Public Men of To -Day An International Series JOSEPH AMBERLAIN GIFT or Miss Frances M. Molera THE BIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN PUBLIC MEN OF TO-DAY An International Series Forthcoming Volumes Sefior Castelar. By DAVID HANNAY. Pope Leo XIII. By justin McCarthy. President Cleveland. By JAMES LOWRY WHITTLE. The Right Hon. Cecil Rhodes. By Lord Cromer. Signor Crispi. EDWARD DICEY, C.B. By H. D. TRAILL. By W. J. STILLMAN. Previous Volumes The Ameer Abdur Rahman. By STEPHEN WHEELER. Li Hungchang. By Prof. ROBERT K. DOUGLAS. M. Stambuloff. By A HULME BEAMAN. The German Emperor, William II. By CHARLES LOWE. THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Copyright by Elliott &• Fry, Photographers, 55, Baker Street. II'. THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN By S. H. JEYES With a Frontispiece LONDON BLISS, SANDS AND FOSTER CRAVEN STREET, STRAND c^ :ib> C L "3 CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. MUNICIPAL CAREER. Mr. Chamberlain's parentage and early training — His learning years spent in business — His commercial enterprise — Entrance into local politics — The Nonconformist bias — Revolt of the Political Dissenters against official Liberalism — "Clericalism is the enemy " — The Old Birmingham and the New — An Adventurous Mayor and Corporation — Republicanism in the 'Seventies — The Mayor and the Prince — Mr. Chamberlain elected to the House of Commons — His views on the limits of Municipal Socialism. Pages 1-27 CHAPTER II. PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. First impressions of the new member for Birmingham — the enfant terrible of Radicalism — A streak of Socialism — The doctrine of Ransom — The Natural Rights of Man — Building up a practical reputation in the House — The foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury — Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington — The policy of that revolt — Mr. Chamberlain and the Caucus — The rise of the organization and its later developments. 28-48 CHAPTER III. RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. Causes of the Liberal victory in 1880 — Imperialist expenditure — The Irish vote — Mr. Chamberlain's support of Gladstonian foreign policy — Admitted to the Cabinet — Defence of the Convention of Pretoria — The imbroglio in Egypt — Mr. Bright's resignation — Replaced in Cabinet by Sir Charles Dilke — Radical influence strengthened 49 - 76 M503732 vi CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. The Fenian and Agrarian movements in Ireland — The Irish and the Irish-Americans — The Compensation for Disturbance Bill — Mr. Chamberlain and the Peers — Dissension in the Cabinet — Renewal of Coercion — Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain — The Land Bill not satisfactory to the Parnellites— Mr. Chamberlain on the right of eviction — His defence of the general policy of the Govern- ment — The limits of concession to Ireland — The " Treaty of Kilmainham " and the suppressed Clause — Mr. Foster's resig- nation — His successor murdered in Phcenix Park — Mr. Trevelyan becomes Chief Secretary — Mr. Chamberlain's disappointment — Ireland still unreconciled — A test of Liberal faith Pages 77-124 CHAPTER V. AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. Mr. Chamberlain's first legislative work at the Board of Trade — Mr. Gladstone's New Rules of Procedure — Mr. Chamberlain's zeal for the efficiency of Parliament — The Grand Committees on Law and Trade — The shifting standpoint of politicians with regard to the Closure — Mr. Chamberlain's views on the American system — The bore and the obstructionist — The Bankruptcy Act — The Patent Act — Mr. Plimsoll's agitation against the Shipowners — Mr. Chamberlain's Merchant Shipping Bill — Its failure and his offer to resign — Subsequent legislation under Lord Salisbury's Second Administration ...... 125-145 CHAPTER VI. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-1886. Conservatives and the Irish vote — Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Parnell — The abandonment of Coercion — Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamber- lain enter into the competition — Mr. Parnell raises his terms — Mr. Chamberlain's reply at Warrington — Balance of Parties after the General Election — Mr. Gladstone converted — The unauthorised announcement and the ambiguous denial — Mr. Chamberlain at Birmingham — Mr. Gladstone's overtures to CONTENTS. vii Lord Salisbury for a joint scheme of Home Rule — Meeting of Parliament and Defeat of Lord Salisbury's Administration — Mr. Gladstone and his Colleagues — The Liberal Unionist secession — Mr. Chamberlain's provisional adherence — Mr. John Morley has his way with the Home Rule Bill — Resignation of Mr. Chamber- lain — The Land Purchase Bill abandoned, and the Home Rule Bill reduced to an abstract Resolution — Mr. Chamberlain wavers — Gladstonians capture the Caucus, and refuse to meet his views — He agrees to act with Lord Hartington unreservedly — The Home Rule Bill thrown out — Mr. Gladstone appeals to the country Pages 146-181 CHAPTER VII. THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. Home Rule, the abstract theory and the actual Bill — Mr. Chamber- lain's Address — The General Election — Lord Salisbury and the Liberal Unionist Leaders — Mr. Chamberlain's attitude still distinct from Lord Hartington's — Effects of Lord Randolph Churchill's resignation — The Round Table Conference — The article in the Baptist — Failure of the negotiations — The Revision of Judicial Rents — Concession to the Radical Unionists — Hopes of a Liberal Reunion abandoned — The North American Fisheries — Mr. Chamberlain's successful negotiations — His marriage to Miss Endicott — The Parnell Commission. 182-205 CHAPTER VIII. THE UNIONIST COALITION. Conservatives and Mr. Chamberlain's Social Programme — Allot- ments and Small Holdings — Local Government Reform — Land Purchase in Ireland — Free Education — The futile session of 1892 — Mr. Gladstone's return to office — Mr. Chamberlain in Opposi- tion — His future position as member of a Coalition — Points of possible disagreement — Church Disestablishment — Voluntary Schools — Relative importance of Social Reforms and Political Innovations — Conservatives the pioneers of social legislation — Rivalry between the two Unionist Parties . . 206-226 viii CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. Mr. Chamberlain's coolness in argument — His range of illustration — The Reform agitation — "They toil not, neither do they spin" — Duels between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain — Attack on the Peers — Criticism of the Whigs — The Egyptian Skeleton and Rip Van Winkle — "A vile conspiracy" — The defeat of the Home Rulers — The later and milder style . Pages 227-237 CHAPTER X. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. Appointed to the Colonial Office — The Imperialist influences on Mr. Chamberlain's career — Free Trade and New Markets — Trade and the Flag — The development of backward Colonies — Qualifications for a Colonial Secretary — The Irish danger — The November Circular — Imperial Federation — The Transpacific Cable and the All Red Route — Mr. Rhodes and the Bechuana chiefs — The fate of the Swazis — British Indians in South Africa — The Imperial Government and the Transvaal Boers — Dr. Jameson's Expedition and the Battle of Krugersdorp — Mr. Chamberlain's promptitude and straightforwardness — The Venezuela Boundary dispute — Connection between the Colonial and the Foreign Office — Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain — The dead-set against England .... 238-258 THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN CHAPTER I. MUNICIPAL CAREER Mr. Chamberlain's parentage and early training — His learning-years spent in business — His commercial enterprise — Entrance into local politics — The Nonconformist bias — Revolt of the Political Dissenters against official Liberalism — ' ' Clericalism is the enemy" — The Old Birmingham and the New — An adventurous Mayor and Corporation — Republicanism in the 'Seventies — The Mayor and the Prince — Mr. Chamberlain elected to the House of Commons — His views on the limits of Municipal Socialism. a T HE best abused man in England ! " — such is the account Mr. Chamberlain has recently given of his own position in public life. The accuracy of that self-description cannot be disputed either by his supporters and friends, or by his adversaries and enemies. For his supporters are friends, and — in a still greater degree — his adversaries are enemies. Like Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Gladstone, but like no other figure in current English politics, he possesses the quality — call it as you please, the vice or the virtue — of exciting the personal animosity of those who know nothing about him except his public acts B 2 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. and the opinions he has expressed. He is probably as heartily detested by Home Rule Radicals who have never exchanged two sentences with him, perhaps never set eyes upon him, as Lord Beaconsfield was by the Noncon- formists when he made light of Turkish misdoings in Bulgaria, or Mr. Gladstone by the Unionists when he first announced his conversion by Mr. Parnell. Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour, Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, are liked, admired, and even respected by many, perhaps by most, of those with whose political views they are at open issue. Of course they are accused of all kinds of public faults — ambition, intrigue, cynicism, time-serving, everything except corruption. But not one of those names, when mentioned on a public platform, would be greeted with a storm of hisses such as used to follow the mention of Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Glad- stone, and may now be counted upon as a certainty at any Liberal meeting when a reference is made to Mr. Chamberlain. This does not mean that the present Secretary for the Colonies in a Unionist Administration has lost all the private friendships which he used to enjoy on the other side of the House of Commons. In the abundant charity of public life in this country* — and because of the social connections which unite the great families that still guide, if they do not dominate, the inner working of the two great Parties in the State — it would be reckoned absurd to give the cold shoulder to a politician who happened to be on the wrong * Since these words were written (October, 1S95) the confidence which Mr. Chamberlain has inspired by his brief tenure of the Colonial Office has considerably modified the previous feeling of most of his political adversaries. MUNICIPAL CAREER. 3 side. For two or three years after the " great split" of 1 886, there did, it is true, prevail, during that un- exampled excitement, a personal prejudice which almost led to the social ostracism of Liberals who stood by Mr. Gladstone, or went over with him. But the feeling passed away as soon as it became clear that all present danger of the threatened constitutional innovation had disappeared — that Home Rule was but a pious opinion. It is only the Mr. Pickwicks of politics who feel in- dignant when their own Serjeant Snubbin exchanges a friendly nod with the other people's Serjeant Buzfuz. The benefit of this mutual toleration, arising as it does partly from the political indifference of London life, and partly from honest good humour, is shared by Mr. Chamberlain, though, perhaps, not so fully as by some of his colleagues. The reason is that the great majority of the Home Rulers in Parliament may fairly be described — without any invidious suggestion being implied — as provincial politicians, while the bulk of the Unionists are either men about town or, if they have their roots in the country, are, nevertheless, men of the world, who have been born and bred in the opinions they support, and regard the views of those who differ from them with the same allowance as good Churchmen extend to the errors of the Roman faith. They lack the hot gospellers' enthusiasm, the earnestness often passing into rancour, which is the distinctive and not dishonour- able mark of provincial politics. The offence which Mr. Chamberlain has given to those who now denounce him is that, having been looked on as one of themselves, he has turned against them the 4 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN very force on which they reckoned as their exclusive property. They abuse him, not because he has changed his opinions — that imputation has never been pressed against Mr, Bright, the Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Goschen, or Lord James of Hereford — but because, when he joined the Unionists, he took with him an organised following drawn from the very class which, but for him, might have remained faithful to Mr. Gladstone. If he had simply changed his own allegiance he might have been forgiven. But they cannot pardon his having transferred to the enemy a solid block of constituencies in the very heart of England. The other Liberal Unionists are called faint-hearts, deserters at worst. But Mr. Chamber- lain is reckoned a traitor. His cutting speeches and tart retorts help to exasperate the feeling, but language far more violent than he has ever employed, and satire quite as keen, have been accepted without enduring re- sentment from other leaders of the Unionist Party. In the following pages,* no attempt will be made to frame either a eulogy or a denunciation, but simply to trace, with as much fairness as may be possible, the out- line of Mr. Chamberlain's public career, and supply some of the materials for an intelligent criticism. The diffi- culty of that task will be appreciated by all who have tried, whether from outside or inside, to reach the truths of current history, and to avoid error where every sentence in the record that does not deal with overt acts and published speeches is matter of controversy. Nor does the writer undertake to present a popular picture of the man as distinct from the politician. Though there is * Written, it should be said, from a Conservative point of view. MUNICIPAL CAREER. 5 nothing to conceal or extenuate in Mr. Chamberlain's private life, there is nothing in it which concerns the public. The taste for such personal details as are so lavishly supplied in some quarters is, on the whole, a harmless curiosity ; nor is it to be denied that this kind of gossip — when it happens to be true — may reflect a genuine light on character, and assist the formation of a serious judgment. In a biography published at a due interval from a man's death, when such material has been sifted with care and may be used without offence, it has a proper and necessary place, but in the estimate of a living politician it would be at once deceptive and vulgar. Some, it is true, of the worthies of our own time court and enjoy the glare of publicity, while a few successful charlatans live for "paragraphs" — in fact, themselves supply the puffs which are the very breath of their ex- istence, and then " wonder how it is these things get into the newspapers." But with regard to Mr. Chamberlain, it will be admitted, by those who praise him least, that he has never mixed up his individual life with his public career, and that any infringements which have been made on his privacy have been made against his will. Those personal facts, therefore, will alone be mentioned which may be required for connecting and explaining his political action. Readers who delight in the 'eye-glass- and-orchid ' style of criticism are referred to the personal columns of the London and country press, and to the art- less humours of Mr. F. C. Gould's popular caricatures. Joseph Chamberlain was born at 3, Grove Hill Terrace, Camberwell, on July 8th, 1836, and comes of a stock in which he boasts that Nonconformist traditions have been 6 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. hereditary. About the middle of last century, the son of Daniel Chamberlain, a maltster at Laycock, in Wilt- shire, had moved to London, and set up as a boot-and- shoe manufacturer in the City. The business had already been carried on for two generations at the same address when it passed to Mr. Joseph Chamber- lain, senior. His wife was the daughter of Mr. Henry Harben, a wholesale provision merchant. There were nine children of the marriage, six sons (one deceased) and three daughters, the eldest of the family being the subject of this sketch. At the age of eight, Joseph Chamberlain was sent to a preparatory establishment conducted by Miss Pace, at 122, Camberwell Grove. But in the following year the Chamberlains removed to 25, Highbury Place, Islington. The lad then attended as a day-boarder the excellent private school in Canonbury Square, kept by the Rev. Arthur Johnson, a very good scholar and capable teacher, whose widow Mr. Chamberlain visited a short time ago, and found in full enjoyment of all her faculties. At the age of fourteen he was admitted to University College School, which offered, without reli- gious teaching, something answering to a Public School training — so far as that can be obtained by boys who live in their parents' homes. He studied Greek, Latin, and mathematics, but it was in " modern subjects," as they are called, that the boy distinguished himself, gaining, in the two Upper Forms, first prizes for Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and French. At that time it was not considered necessary for a young man who was intended for commerce to learn much that would not help him to "get on in life." MUNICIPAL CAREER. 7 Mr. Chamberlain, we see, was started on his career without more than a tincture of that literary and philo- sophical training which has helped so many public men to justify the advancement they have, perhaps, obtained by other arts — without that close intercourse of youthful natures which does so much to soften the prejudices and rub away the angularities of a strong character. The love of ideas and the habit of toleration which a clever young man brings away from his residence at a University, or from extended travelling, Mr. Chamberlain had to acquire at an age when most minds have ceased to grow. He was put into an office, and kept hard at work during those formative years when most men afterwards destined to rise to a high place in the State have been, perhaps unconsciously, preparing themselves for the broader life of Imperial politics. He read all the time, he argued, and he thought. In fact, he acquired, through his natural love of knowledge, at least as good an acquaintance with English and French literature as many of those whose education is prolonged into manhood. Then, as now, he was a " great reader." It is to this we must attribute the fact that his intellectual development was checked, but not stopped. If we find in his earlier views, and in his manner of expressing them, a certain narrowness and rigidity, we must also allow that, once admitted to a larger sphere, he showed a surprising aptitude for ac- quiring new ideas and modifying old preconceptions. At the time of life when Mr. Chamberlain entered Parlia- ment, most men have not only moulded the opinions they profess, but have lost the capacity for acquiring fresh ones ; and that is why it is said that few members of the 8 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. House of Commons do much good there unless they have gone into it young. Mr. Chamberlain did go into it young — in mind, in the power of self-adaptation. At the age of sixteen, then, he was put into his father's business, and worked at it for two years. But in 1854 a change occurred in his prospects. His father was brother- in-law of Mr. Nettlefold, member of the well-known firm of wood-screw makers, of Birmingham. Having acquired the English rights in a remarkable American patent for improved machinery, the Messrs. Nettlefold determined to build new works, bring in more capital, and infuse fresh blood into the business. The co-operation of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, senior, was therefore invited, and at the age of eighteen Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, junior, was sent to Birmingham as the active representative of his father's interest in the new partnership. The young man threw himself into commerce with all the energy which he has since displayed in politics, and it was largely through his exertions and ability that the great success of the firm was obtained. After a time of some difficulty they found themselves in a position to turn out a better article at a lower price than any of their rivals, and secured, if not quite a monopoly, at least the lion's share, of the English trade. The fact is that for the first five or six years the business had been carried on at a loss, owing to the " cutting rates " arising from the double competition of foreign rivals and small firms at home. In order to make the trade remunerative, Mr. Chamberlain bought out the two chief rivals in the neighbourhood, and as many of the smaller men as were willing to agree to a reasonable arrangement. Meantime, Nettlefold and MUNICIPAL CAREER. 9 Chamberlain were enlarging their field of operations, built wire-mills and iron-mills, and engaged in working collieries. There is no need to inquire into the allegations made as to their treatment of local competitors, since, as Mr. Stead admits in a by-no-means-friendly summary of Mr. Chamberlain's career, in The Review of Reviews, his conduct "as a manufacturer and an employer of labour cannot have been open to much reproach, otherwise there would be much more local and personal opposition to him in the Midlands than anyone can pretend to discover to-day." Politics apart, he is most admired in the very district where his business was carried on. Of course he has enemies in his own neighbourhood, but he has incurred their ill-will or distrust either through the un- compromising nature of the opinions he has expressed, or by his skill and energy in carrying his views into effect. The unscrupulousness which his adversaries attribute to him as a politician they no longer — whatever they once did — profess to discover in his private life. The enterprise and prosperity of the firm* enabled Mr. Chamberlain to retire at the comparatively early age of thirty-eight, and to devote the whole of his energy to what had hitherto been his chief relaxation — 'the study and the practice of politics. It may encourage those who despair of impromptu speaking to learn that the readiest and most coherent of debaters was at first compelled to prepare his speeches with the utmost care, and to commit large portions to memory, before he * For some of the personal statements in this volume the author is indebted to Mr. B. C. Skottowe's Life of foseph Chamberlain, published by Messrs. Cooper and Co., of Birmingham, about ten years ago, as well as to various magazine articles. io JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. dared get on his legs. But his powers of self-expres- sion and self-possession had been trained by constant exercise at the Birmingham and Edgbaston Debating Society,* and he was already known as an incisive controversialist, when in his thirty- third year (1868) he was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Education League, that vigorously polemical association which played so active a part in the struggle between the claims of secular and religious training under the School Boards about to be established by Mr. Forster's Act of 1870. That the League were beaten in their crusade, and forced by a Liberal Govern- ment to accept a compromise still in force, was a bitter disappointment to the militant Nonconformists. They nearly broke with Mr. Gladstone, and never forgave Mr. Forster. For the fifteen seats on the Birmingham School Board constituted under the new Act, the League had ventured to nominate as many candidates, but only seven were elected. Amongst them was Mr. Chamberlain, and those who most sincerely reprobated his aims acknowledged the strenuous skill he displayed in stretching, so far as possible, the terms of the Statute, so as to meet the views of the extreme Party with which he was associated. He made, of course, many enemies, but he also gathered a large and compact following. On the Town Council (to which he had been elected in 1869) he had in the same way identified himself with what were then regarded as Progressive and almost revolutionary movements. As a * Where he occasionally gave expression to views which would now be called Imperialist. MUNICIPAL CAREER. n member of the Watch and the Free Grammar School Committees, he worked for the opening of the Art Gallery and Reference Library on Sundays, and for the admission of poor children to the Grammar School. When he came up for re-election in 1872, the opponents whom he had offended by these proposals made a resolute effort to get rid of him, and came so near success that he only saved his seat by sixty-two votes. His victory was won by fighting the election on strictly political lines — a dangerous innovation, said the defeated Party. But the Radicals retorted that the Conservatives had started it. Neither at the time, nor since, did Mr. Chamberlain repent of his attitude. It is absurd, on the face of it, to mix up Municipal with Imperial issues. No logical excuse can be put forward. And in London, when the first County Council was elected, an honest attempt was made to keep politics out of the arena. But almost all the Moderates who adopted that line were, as a matter of fact, known to be Conservatives, while the Progressives were equally identified with Liberalism. Though the former chose to ignore what they regarded as a coincidence, the latter seized on the favourable conjunction, and made their profit out of it. In a small Municipality, or one where Party feeling does not run high, the experiment which failed in London, and has since been abandoned by both sides, may, no doubt, be worked with success. But in the majority of the great Municipalities it is wiser frankly to face the fact that ordinary electors are puzzled by cross divisions, and that the one motive which is likely to bring them to the poll is the hope of turning 12 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. their political adversaries out of office and putting their own champions in power. The doctrine was formulated by Mr. Chamberlain in a speech he delivered at Birmingham in 1880. "It is of the essence of our Representative Institutions," he said, "that we should have Party Government; and the lines of Party, if they are not defined by politics, will be fixed by something less honourable and less definite. They must be fixed by local prejudice or personal preference, and if you have lesser issues in place of the greater, I believe you will find that there will be less extended interest in the work which has been done. There will be inferior character in the representatives. You are likely, in such a case, to have a more apathetic constituency, and less efficient representation." In the discontent, almost a revolt, caused among the Political Dissenters by the provisions in the Elementary Education Act in favour of some sort of religious teaching, Mr. Chamberlain made himself prominent in denouncing Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Forster. At a Conference of Nonconformist delegates, held in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester (January, 1872), he said that for years the Nonconformists had served the Liberal Party; they had been hewers of wood and drawers of water; they had been patient under somewhat con- temptuous toleration very hard to bear; they had accepted, meanwhile, every act of justice as a favour, and every instalment of rights as a singular and almost unmerited grace ! They had waited for the convenience and the pleasure of the Liberal Party. " But now, when we might fairly expect an accelerated speed, when we might justly demand a larger share of MUNICIPAL CAREER. 13 attention and relief, suddenly the great Liberal Party falters and the Liberal Leaders hesitate; and, under the guidance of a man who boasts his Puritan ancestors while he is indifferent to their principles and to their cause, we see ourselves drifting back into the darkness, when we thought we were emerging into the light of perfect day. Concessions which are made to threats of Irish dis- affection, which are wrung from the Government by the terrors of a priesthood which takes its inspiration from a foreign source, are curtly refused to Nonconformist loyalty. While Conservative support is angled for, and clerical opposition is bribed into silence with a great price, we are told to take our support elsewhere by the Leader of a Ministry that we contributed mainly to bring into power." The final reference was to the memorable scene, two years before, when the Education Bill was under debate in the House of Commons. Mr. Miall had plucked up his courage, as Nonconformist spokesman, to threaten to withdraw his support from the Liberal Party. In those days Mr. Gladstone did not sit quiet under such a menace. His dignity was undisturbed, in spite of the rising passion. " I hope," he said, " that my hon. friend will not extend his support to the Government one hour longer than he deems it consistent with his sense of duty and right. For God's sake let him withdraw it the moment he thinks it better for the cause he has at heart that he should do so ! " Poor Mr. Miall sank into his boots, but the Non- conformists outside the House were not intimidated. How the wound rankled in the Birmingham League may be seen from Mr. Chamberlain's further remarks. "I suppose," he said, "that it is not consistent with the pacific habits of Nonconformists to make a demonstration upon Mr. Forster's windows, or to pull down any park 14 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. railings, although we have been told that both these exhibitions have been very marvellous stimulants to modern statesmanship. But we are met here to advocate no intemperance of word or action ; on the contrary, the policy of this, as of another great alliance which has its centre in this town, is one of total abstinence. The Nonconformists must withdraw their support at elections from Liberals until they have learned the Liberal alphabet, and can spell out the first words of the Liberal creed. Our opponents have set us an example of union and organisation. The parson and the publican have joined hands at Plymouth, and again in the West Riding. Everywhere the Roman Catholics and Churchmen em- brace ; the lion lies down with the lamb in order to secure from School Boards support to denominational education." On the following day, January 24th, Mr. Chamberlain's declarations were even more vigorous. Then, as always, Mr. Chamberlain knew exactly what he wanted. He summed up his demands as follows : Absolute control, by representatives of the ratepayers, of all national funds applied to secular education. Withdrawal of all grants made to Denominations for this purpose. Relegation of religious teaching to religious bodies, each at times specially set apart and in its own buildings. If Board Schools were employed for such a purpose, all Denominations to be treated alike. Similar concessions with regard to the Training Colleges. ' Until these concessions had been obtained, the Nonconformists were to go on with the fight. They were to make no peace and hear of no compromise till MUNICIPAL CAREER. 15 religious equality was an accomplished fact, and religious " toleration " an antiquated history. The vigour and vehemence with which Mr. Chamber- lain led the Birmingham agitation against "clericalism" in the Board Schools called all his powers into action, and he soon became the most influential man, almost a dictator, in his own town. He was elected Mayor in 1873, and re-elected in 1874 and 1875. Two things are equally clear about the Chamberlain regime which was now established in the local government of Birmingham. The first is that the Party who had got into power made no pretence of foregoing their advantages by making any compromise with their opponents. The second is that, while they used their majority for all it was worth, they ad- ministered the affairs of the Municipality for objects they believed to be for the common good. They embarked on what may be called a policy of State Socialism on a small scale. In a review of his own work, tinged with pardonable self-complacency, Mr. Chamberlain, four or five years ago, described the condition of his adopted town : " Fifty years ago," he said, " the population of the town was 180,000, or about 40 per cent, of what it is at present. The rateable value was rather less than one- third of what it is at present. In those days there were, with the exception of the Town Hall and of the Market Hall, no public edifices of any magnitude or importance. There were no Parks, there were no Free Libraries, there were no Baths, there was no Art Gallery or Art Museum, there were no Board Schools ; there was no School of Art, no Midland Institute, no Mason College; there was no Corporation Street. The great area which is covered by that thoroughfare, and the streets depending upon it, 16 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. was one of the worst districts in the town, both socially and considered from a sanitary point of view. In fact, at the period of which I am speaking, the era of street improvements had not begun. The streets themselves were badly paved ; they were imperfectly ' lighted, they were only partially drained. The foot-walks were worse than the streets. You had to proceed either in several inches of mud, or in favoured localities you might go upon cobble-stones, on which it was a penance to walk. The gas and the water belonged to private monopolies. Gas was supplied at an average rate of about 5s. per 1000 cubic feet. The water was supplied by the Company on three days in the week ; on other days you must either go without, or you must take advantage of the perambu- lating carts which went round the town, and which supplied water from polluted wells at 10s. the thousand gallons. You will not be surprised, under these circum- stances, to know that, in 1848, the annual mortality of Birmingham was thirty in the thousand ; now it is twenty in the thousand. The only wonder is that it was not much greater ; because we read of whole streets from which typhus and scarlet fever, and diphtheria and diarrhoea in its worst forms, were never absent. We read of thousands of courts which were not paved, which were not drained, which were covered with pools of stagnant filth, and in which the ash-pits and the middens were in a state of indescribable nastiness. The sewerage of the town was very partial ; and, in fact, to sum up this description, it may truly be said that, when this Society was born, Birmingham, although it was no worse than any of the other great cities of the United Kingdom, was a town in which scarcely anything had been done, either for the instruction, or for the health, or for the recreation, or for the comfort, or for the convenience, of the artisan population." The reforms carried out under the new system are worth describing. In January, 1874, Mr. Chamberlain brought forward his scheme for the purchase, by the Corporation, of the gasworks belonging to the two private MUNICIPAL CAREER. 17 Companies which had hitherto lighted the town, and he carried it by fifty-four votes against two. It was necessary, however, to confirm this almost unanimous decision by a sort of plebiscite, and a town meeting was held at which the proposal was adopted by a majority of nearly three to one. The undertakings then bought up now represent a capital value of more than two millions sterling, the price of gas has been reduced to a level which excites the admiring envy of Londoners, while the profits are put between ^30,000 and ^40,000 a year. This enterprise was followed by a similar purchase of the waterworks, which were then yielding the shareholders a revenue of more than ^5 0,000 per annum. Nor has the result been less successful; the cost of the supply has been reduced for the consumers, its quality has been improved, while the Municipality has become possessed of a property esti- mated at more than two millions, and bringing in an income almost equal to that derived from the gas. Further, the sewage farm of 1200 acres was purchased and laid out at the cost of ^400,000; but against the ^55,000 a year spent in working it must be set some ^25,000 derived from the sale of produce. An adventure in Municipal Socialism of a yet bolder character was made when the Corporation undertook to clear the slum district, lying in the centre of the town, and construct the handsome street to which it gave its own name. For this undertaking, commenced in 1875, it eventually became necessary to raise a sum of ;£i, 600,000 ; but no public funds were available to purchase property that came into the market before the necessary Act was obtained. To meet this difficulty c 1 8 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chamberlain offered to advance ;£i 0,000, and his example induced other public -spirited citizens to con- siderably increase the amount available. When the Corporation were in a position to exercise the powers conferred on them by Cross's Act, the insanitary area was gradually laid out and rebuilt on leases of 75 years. As soon as they fall in, at the middle of next century, it may be assumed that few Corporations in the world will be so rich as the Birmingham one. It may be said that all these ambitious schemes were expensive, and loaded the Municipality with a heavy debt. But the assets at their present value would almost strike a balance, while the prospective increment — on a reason- able, not a speculative, basis — shows that the twenty-two years which Mr. Chamberlain had spent in private business had taught him to make a good bargain for his fellow-townsmen, and enabled him to repay many times over the fortune he drew from Birmingham and its neigh- bourhood. If the present rates are high, between six and seven shillings in the pound, they were not any lower before these improvements were put in hand, and the day is likely to come, though not just yet, when they will be largely reduced. These public benefits, whether realised, prospective, or dubious, were not accepted without misgiving as to their financial outcome ; and to politicians on the other side they had the disadvantage of steadily increasing Mr. Chamberlain's influence, and hardening it into something like despotic authority. On his election, in 1875, for the third time to the civic chair, it was complained by one of his leading opponents that he was "not only MUNICIPAL CAREER. 19 Mayor, but Town Council too." Nor did he trouble to conciliate adverse opinion by any moderateness in expres- sion. It required some courage — perhaps it did not show much judgment — to arrogate in 1874, even though it was by a half-humorous exaggeration, the name of Com- munist. The word had, he admitted, an ugly sound for those who remembered the outrages which disgraced Paris three years before ; but the leaders of that Com- mune, he affirmed at a civic banquet, had fought for the same principles of local self-government as themselves. At this time, in fact, it would be fair to describe Mr. Chamberlain as — in theory, at least — "a bit of a Red." His belief seems to have been that a Republic was " bound to come" in England. If we smile at a prophecy no nearer to fulfilment than when it was first uttered, we must remember that a quarter of a century ago similar views were openly expressed by most advanced Radicals, and gloomily acquiesced in by reluctant Whigs and desponding Tories. The coming Revolution might be gradual or it might be sudden, but the Church of England, the House of Lords, and the Crown — with a few other antiquated survivals of feudalism, such as private property in land — were spoken of as institutions doomed to be swept away, probably in the order named, by the waves of advancing Democracy. As an illustration of the extreme Radical opinions which Mr. Chamberlain entertained in the " salad days " of his public career (though mature in years, he was still young in politics), it may be interesting to mention that some misgivings had been felt with regard to his election to the civic chair for 1874. It was to be part of the 20 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Mayor's duty, that year, to extend an official welcome to the Prince of Wales on his visit to Birmingham, for the purpose of opening the new municipal buildings. But, advanced Democrat as he was, Mr. Chamberlain has never lacked urbanity, and his enemies even charge him with taking delight in ceremonial and social functions. The truth is that with the most uncompromising abstract views he has always combined the best aspect of Oppor- tunism — the power of waiting patiently for anticipated changes until the time is ripe for them. He was quite devoid of that prickly enthusiasm, that demonstrative ardour, which induced a French politician to insult the Czar of Russia, on his visit to Paris, by crying Vive la Pologne! It was found that Mr. Chamberlain, without in any way doing violence to his Radical theories, yet knew how to give a cordial and respectful welcome to the Heir to the Throne. The task was the less difficult because, in the destruc- tive opinions held by most Radicals at this time, there was no element of personal rancour against her Majesty and the Royal Family; and, popular as was Mr. Bradlaugh in the Midlands and some parts of the North of England, his more sensible supporters were scandalised — or, at the worst, amused — by such productions as his Impeach- ment of the House of Brunswick. They were hardly treated as serious politics ; and if ever the cardinal points of the British Constitution were to be unhinged, it was believed by thinkers who had been brought up on Bentham and Mill that the reforms they looked forward to would be consummated by orderly agitation and legislative enactment, not by popular uprising and social catastrophe. MUNICIPAL CAREER. 21 What precisely were the methods they had in view they did not explain. But they carried on their intellectual trade by catchwords picked up from popular science, and were fond of saying that their ideal would be brought about by evolution, not by revolution. In the eventful history of the last twenty years in England, a period in which so many new doctrines have been canonised and so many old ones exploded, nothing is more curious than the nearly complete disappearance of that school of political thought — sturdy in its origin, and the instrument of much good work for the State — which was represented at one end by the Philosophic Radicals and at the other by Mr. Bradlaugh. Between these intellectual extremes, one all theory and the other all practice, stood politicians — chiefly leaders of pro- vincial opinion — who, like Mr. Chamberlain at this time, equally impressionable and influential, found them- selves possessed by the tendency of their generation, but not so completely possessed as to lose their mental balance. They exercised a propagating yet moderating power on the political energy of the time — these pro- vincial men of affairs, trained in a narrow but lively cosmopolis, standing in line both with the philosophers and the agitators, yet identified with neither. It was not likely, however, that a man rich, young, ambitious of power, who believed equally in his principles and in his abilities, would long be content with a purely civic career. In 1874 Mr. Chamberlain had stood for Sheffield, in the hope of unseating Mr. Roebuck, a veteran Liberal who had not kept up with his Party. The candidate from Birmingham was, however, rejected "}"> JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. by a great majority, and it was not till 1876 that he received from his own town an opportunity of entering the House of Commons. On the retirement of Mr. George Dixon he was elected without opposition. Mr. Chamberlain's entrance into Parliament did not coincide with the end of his municipal activity; though for a man who does strenuously whatever he takes in hand, it was obviously impossible to combine both vocations. Even when, four years later (1880), he definitely severed his connection with the Town Council, he still cherished with satisfaction the memory of his civic accomplishments. He was not hurt by the contemptuous Irish taunt that his was a " Mayoral mind," and in October of that year he made a declaration of proud humility : "I will confess to you," he said, "that I am so parochially minded, that I look with greater satisfaction to our annexation of the gas and of the water, to our scientific frontier in the improvement area, than I do to the results of that Imperial policy which has given us Cyprus and the Transvaal ; and I am prouder of having been engaged with you in warring against ignorance and disease and crime in Birmingham, than if I had been the author of the Zulu war, or had instigated the invasion of Afghanistan." In parting company with Mr. Chamberlain as the Birmingham administrator, it may be well to anticipate the course of events by giving a summary of the opinions which he expressed, about two years ago, on the theory and art of Municipal Government. The article in The New Review was, no doubt, written with a view to combat the excessive pretensions of the London Progressives, and to show that the so-called County of London is an area too amorphous and heterogeneous MUNICIPAL CAREER. 2 -j to be regarded or treated as a civic unit, and that the success of Birmingham is no augury of similarly pros- perous results from the self-government of London. The life of Mr. Chamberlain may be said to coincide with the growth and completion of municipal institutions. It was in 1835, tne vear before he was born, that the Commissioners appointed in 1833 to enquire into the state of the existing Corporations in England and Wales issued their Report. But the authors of the Municipal Reform Act (1835) had no idea, as Mr. Chamberlain says, how extensive would be the development of the system they had thus inaugurated. Their object was only to place the internal government of corporate cities and towns on a solid foundation as to their finance, judicature, and police. The powers of the Corporations were not greatly extended by the new Statute, which was confined to "establishing a true popular constituency, and an administration strictly responsible to it." The wide and multifarious functions now entrusted to civic authorities have been added, one by one, as new needs and new demands have been brought forward, and as an overworked Imperial Parliament has re- lieved itself from ever-increasing responsibility, by delega- ting local concerns more and more to local administration. The duties of a modern Corporation include control of the police and the maintenance of public order ; drainage, sewage, and lighting ; precautions against fire ; sanitary inspection, and certain powers of legislation ; public im- provements, extending to the construction of bridges, docks, and wharves. It may provide hospitals for infec- tious diseases, lunatic asylums, cemeteries, baths and 24 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. wash-houses, parks and recreation grounds, free libraries, art galleries, museums, technical and industrial schools. It has to superintend the local administration of many general Acts of Parliament, to assist in the management of many charitable and educational foundations. Finally — this is, perhaps, the most important, as it was originally considered the most doubtful, sphere for its energy — it may acquire such " public monopolies " as the supply of gas and water, electric lighting, and tramways. In England, we have no right to complain that any of these powers have been seriously abused : all the under- takings are not successful, and the management is not, in every case, economical. But there is no suggestion of corruption such as openly prevails in some of the American cities ; and it is Mr. Chamberlain's opinion, after going carefully into the comparative costs, that the average expenditure per head of the population is four or five times as great in the United States as in Great Britain. One cause of the difference is the bribery practised by American candidates, and the necessity, when they have obtained office, for recouping themselves by organised extortion. Nor is this mischief corrected — probably it is increased — by the custom of treating municipal appointments as the rewards of political fidelity. Since both Parties are about equally corrupt, it is very rare for one to expose the other. The morals which Mr. Chamberlain draws are — first, that the officials, once appointed, should enjoy a reason- ably safe tenure and receive adequate salaries ; the second is that the elected members of the Corporation should stand in close relations with their constituents. MUNICIPAL CAREER. 25 To fulfil the second condition, it is necessary that the area of jurisdiction should not be too large. Aristotle, with whom Mr. Chamberlain is in independent — perhaps unconscious — agreement, thought that for efficient govern- ment it was advisable that the candidates for office should be thoroughly known by the electors. This made the ancient philosopher fix for the perfect city a lower limit than the modern statesman. " It is true," Mr. Chamberlain writes, " that these duties [those enumerated above] cannot be satisfactorily per- formed if the area of responsibility is indefinitely enlarged. Already, the work of a conscientious member of a Council in a large town exacts from him the devotion of one or two days in the week to his public duties. The Mayor who enters thoroughly into his work is as fully occupied as a Prime Minister, and can attend to no other occupa- tion during his term of office. It may well be doubted whether the enlargement of municipal boundaries, which is constantly going on, has not proceeded far enough. A population of half-a-million is practically the largest number that can be governed from one centre with the individual attention and constant assiduity that have contributed so much to the usefulness and popularity of corporate work. Many observers friendly to the work, and careful of the reputation of the London County Council, regret that the establishment of a central authority did not follow, rather than precede, the creation of Local Councils dealing with more moderate areas, and fear that the possible outcome may be, when the first flush of public interest has passed away, the permanent institu- tion of a great centralised bureaucratic administration, jealous of its authority, wedded to its own methods, and gradually losing touch with the people for whose benefit it exists. Decentralisation is one of the secrets of success- ful Local Government, and it is an empty name in connec- tion with a local authority which professes to look after the health, the comfort, and the domestic arrangements of nearly five millions of people." 26 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. On the question of the Unification of the City with the County of London — the proposed absorption, that is, of the Corporation by the County Council — Mr. Chamber- lain here pronounces no opinion, but it will be seen that he is strongly in favour of the plan brought forward — by the same Royal Commission which recommended Unification — for the creation of a number of independent Municipalities, each with a Mayor and Council, within the Metropolitan area. On most of the other vexed questions of municipal politics, Mr. Chamberlain has, guided by his own experi- ence as an administrator with a marked leaning to Socialistic experiments, declared himself on the side of the Moderate Party. The general good of the whole community is what he would aim at — not to elevate one class artificially at the expense of any other; not to penalise those who pay the greater part of the rates for the sake of those who receive the greater part of the benefit. He gives no countenance to those agitators who would use the power of local taxation with the object of diminishing accumulated wealth and equalising fortunes. The establishment of municipal workshops, for instance — in order to find or make employment for all applicants, and to pay the Trade Union rate of wages — would, Mr. Chamberlain thinks, throw local finance into confusion, interfere with private enterprise, and demoralise a large part of the population. "The true sphere of municipal activity is limited to those things which the community can do better than the private individual. To take a single illustration : it is evident that the main drainage and sewering of a town can only be undertaken by the representatives of the MUNICIPAL CAREER. 27 town as a whole, and cannot safely be left to, or, indeed, be possibly carried out by, each individual citizen for himself. But besides works which, from their magnitude, or from the necessity of concerted action in regard to them, must necessarily be placed in the hands of a central authority, all undertakings which are in the nature of monopolies may also rightly be claimed as fit subjects for municipal control." When a public authority goes beyond this limit — when it becomes its own builder, engineer, manufacturer, or shopkeeper; when, in fact, it undertakes work that private persons are equally able to perform, it incurs various risks. The strain of personal superintendence will become too severe for the elected members of the Council, and the control will gradually fall into the hands of the permanent officials. Under the name of self-government, the area will be administered by a bureaucracy. Secondly, the expenditure will be in- creased out of all proportion to the results, since both the local authorities and their agents will lack that stimulus of self-interest which keeps a private indi- vidual, or firm, on the alert for every new invention, and for every opportunity of reducing expense and pre- venting waste of labour and material. A further danger lies in the multiplication of employes. The temptation for a public body is to bid for popularity by giving special advantages to those it employs — higher wages and shorter hours of work. That is the beginning of jobbery. A Corporation must act as generously as, but not more generously than, the most liberal of private employers. "If it goes one inch beyond this, it is entering on the downward path which has conducted so many American municipalities to their ruin." CHAPTER II. PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. First impressions of the new member for Birmingham — The enfant terrible of Radicalism — A streak of Socialism — The doctrine of Ransom — The Natural Rights of Man— Building up a practical reputation in the House — The foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury — Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington — The policy of that revolt — Mr. Chamberlain and the Caucus — The rise of the organization and its later developments. IT would be unfair to describe the Liberal Party, at the time w T hen Mr. Chamberlain entered the House of Commons, as disunited in Parliament. The various groups — Whig, Radical, and quasi-Republican — who were co-operating for the overthrow of the Disraeli Administra- tion had a common basis in principle. The only question was how far the less-advanced members would be willing, or might be induced, to accompany their more logical associates. The retirement of Mr. Gladstone from the Leadership, in 1875, had been followed by the election of Lord Hartington to succeed him. But the choice did not mark any real ascendency of the Moderate section over the Extremists. Though he was naturally attached to the Whig traditions of his house, he was a young and ambitious man, and it was believed that he would, when the call came, move with the spirit of the time. Nor had his promotion over Mr. Forster's head been due 23 PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. ' 29 to any preference for that political caution which he was already considered to embody. The reason why he was accepted by the Radicals was that they wished to punish the author of the Elementary Education Act for successfully insisting on the maintenance of Religious Teaching. The election of Lord Hartington, while welcomed by the more timid members of the Party, was, in fact, a triumph for the Nonconformists generally, and especially for those who had associated themselves with the Birmingham League. It was, therefore, as a conspicuously able organizer of a powerful and energetic body that Mr. Chamberlain made his first appearance at Westminster. He was, to some extent, a known man when he took his seat, but he made little effort during his first Session to bring himself prominently before the House of Commons. His maiden speech was delivered on Lord Sandon's Elementary Education Bill, August 4th, 1876, and, as he knew his subject thoroughly, it produced a favourable impression. The second occasion on which he addressed the House was in the following February; and the subject, a Prisons Bill — brought in by the Home Secretary (Mr. Cross) — was one on which his administra- tive experience entitled him to a respectful hearing. But his reputation for advanced — even dangerous — opinions and his habitual association with Radicals of Sir Charles Dilke's colour would have won him the interest that proceeds from curiosity. With playful exaggeration, Mr. H. W. Lucy has described the feelings with which he was regarded by old-fashioned Conservative members. 3 o JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. " It would be interesting to know exactly what opinion Sir Walter Barttelot formed of Mr. Chamberlain's prob- able appearance, before he had the pleasure of meeting him face to face in the House of Commons. He had evi- dently evolved some fancy picture, for his surprise at seeing the junior member for Birmingham in a coat, and even a waistcoat, and in hearing him speak very good English in a quiet and undemonstrative manner, was undisguised. . . . When, therefore, there arose, from a bench below the gangway opposite, a slightly-made, youthful, almost boyish- looking person, with a black coat fearlessly unbuttoned to display the waistcoat and disclose the shirt-collar and necktie, Sir Walter began to stare, and cast side-glances at that other great legislator, Colonel Corbett, in the startled endeavour to know what he thought of this. Moreover, the Radical wore, not spectacles with tin or brass rims, as Felix Holt would undoubtedly have done if his sight had been impaired, but — an eye-glass. Positively an eye-glass, framed in precisely the same style as that which Colonel Corbett himself wears, when his good-humoured face is turned towards a distant object. Surprise deepened when the Radical, in a low, clear, and admirably-pitched voice, and with a manner self-possessed without being self-assertive, proceeded to discuss the Prisons Bill, opposing it on the very lines which Sir Walter had made his Torres-Vedras when he besieged the Bill last Session. This was very remarkable; but there was only one thing for an English gentleman to do, and that Sir Walter promptly did." He rose when Mr. Chamberlain sat down, and shook hands with him. Conspicuous ability, from whichever quarter it is displayed, is always welcomed throughout the House of Commons, which, if one of the most critical, is also one of the most generous assemblies in the world. And the truth is that Mr. Chamberlain, apart from the assistance which he was evidently capable of rendering to important PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 31 discussions, was at this time a persona non ingrata to the Conservatives. They fixed upon him at once as a candid and complete exponent of the ultimate tendency of Radicalism — as the enfant terrible of a school which they dreaded, whose declarations and admissions could be used against it, whenever they wished to warn and frighten timid or half-hearted electors. Though the difference had not yet found overt expression, there existed a latent contrast between the aims and principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain. The faith of the Tribune of the people, the great orator of the Corn Law agitation, was bounded by the covers of any treatise which expounded the orthodox doctrines of the Manchester or Cobdenite Political Economy. Freedom of trade, freedom of con- tract, the right of every individual to all liberty which did not interfere with the equal liberty of some other individual, the duty of the State to interfere as little as possible in the private affairs of its citizens, and only to preserve public order, and keep the field open for unrestricted competition — these were the axioms, clear and rigid, by which the Old Radicals stood, and which in their time did much to improve the condition and elevate the character of the English people. The coldness and the hardness of the creed, that devil- take-the-hindmost spirit which animated the whole body of doctrine, were for a time disguised by the emotional character of some of the men who professed it. John Mill, for instance, while pressing these views to their utmost extreme in his Political Economy, inserted in that famous work many passages — quite inconsistent with its main thesis — which breathed the warmest sympathy with 32 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. those who, by no fault of their own, came off second-bes in the struggle for existence. Bright, again, though he could argue logically when he chose, appealed less to the reason than to the heart, and the underlying harshness, not of his own nature, but of the principles he had adopted, only came out when he opposed tooth-and-nail the humane Factory Legislation proposed by the Con- servatives. It was a violation, he believed, and rightly believed, of his cardinal doctrine, that the State should not interfere with the liberty and discretion of private individuals. And the manufacturing class to which he belonged regarded such paternal innovations as inspired, not by any sympathy with the working-classes, but by a desire on the part of the country gentlemen to revenge themselves on the mercantile philanthropists, who had abolished the Protective Duties which made farming profitable enough to support high rents. But even at this date the full meaning and real consequences of the old-fashioned Economy had not yet impressed them- selves on the mind even of thoughtful politicians. Mr. Chamberlain never seems to have pinned his faith to theories on which, unconsciously, he had made so extensive an inroad by the example of State, or, more correctly, of Municipal Socialism, which he had set by his administrative work in Birmingham. On the other hand, there was little or nothing to indicate that, while always holding by Free Trade, he would come to advocate measures that would be in open conflict with the teachings of the Manchester orthodoxy. It was, indeed, something of a paradox that a politician whose persuasive force seemed to lie in the neat and PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING, 33 lucid marshalling of facts, and in the orderly sequence of his inferences, should be the first man in the English Liberal Party — in a degree even more marked than Sir Charles Dilke — to fall under the influence, not indeed of predatory and tyrannical Communism, but of the more rational side of Socialist aspiration. If we look at Mr. Chamberlain's whole public career, if, for the time, we put aside criticism of the particular measures which he has advocated or opposed, and if we disregard the personal motives which justly or unjustly have been attributed to him, we are forced to conclude that the one dominating object — the key to internal unity amid external diversities — is his desire to improve the daily lot of the poor, and to use legislation for the pur- pose of helping and protecting those who cannot help or protect themselves. We may believe, if we like, that some of his schemes would, in the end, do more harm than good ; we may show, if we please, that opinions he has put forward at one time are logically inconsistent with those he is at present maintaining ; we may say — if the charge is one to which any politician is more amenable than any other — that he has played for popular applause. All this being, for the sake of argument, ad- mitted, it is nevertheless true that the one man in English politics who seems to be the incarnation of logic has based his career on sentiment. The point cannot be more clearly illustrated than by quoting his most famous utterance. The fact that it was not 'delivered till the beginning of 1885 does not consti- tute any real departure from the order of events, since from 1876 to 1886 there was no sensible modification of D U 34 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. the principles by which he was guided. The speech about "ransom" was but the most pointed and most assailable expression of views which he had never concealed, even when he was the colleague of a statesman so averse from Socialism as Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Chamberlain was defending the programme he wished at this time to force on the Liberal Party. " What," he asked, " is to be the nature of the domestic legislation of the future? I cannot help thinking it will be more directed to what are called social subjects than has hitherto been the case. How to promote the greater happiness of the masses of the people, how to increase their enjoyment of life, is the problem of the future ; and just as there are politicians who would occupy all the world and leave nothing for the consolation of anybody else, so we have their counterpart at home in the men who, having already annexed everything that is worth having, expect everybody else to be content with the crumbs that fall from their table. If you will go back to the early history of our social system you will find that, when our social arrangements first began to shape them- selves, every man was born into the world with natural rights, with a right to share in the great inheritance of the community, with a right to a part of the land of his birth. But all these rights have passed away. Some of them have been sold ; some of them have been given away by people who had no right to dispose of them ; some of them have been lost through apathy and ignorance ; some have been destroyed by fraud ; and some have been ac- quired by violence. Private ownership has taken the place of communal rights, and this system has become so interwoven with our habits and usages, it has been so sanctioned by law and protected by custom, that it might 'be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to reverse it. v But then, I ask, what ransom will property pay for the security which it enjoys? What substitute will it find for the natural rights which have ceased to be recognised? PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 35 Society is banded together in order to protect itself against the instincts of those of its members who would make very short work of private ownership if they were left alone. That is all very well, but I maintain that Society owes to these men something more than mere toleration in return for the restrictions which it places upon their liberty of action." The excitement caused by this uncompromising declar- ation from the mouth of a Cabinet Minister was not allayed by the comparatively moderate application which he proposed. Taken as it stood, it might be made the apology for any action short of a forcible insur- rection. Nor did Mr. Chamberlain seriously qualify it in the speech he made a few days later (January 14th) at Birmingham. "I asked the other day," he said, "what ransom will property pay for the natural rights which have ceased to be recognised ? I will put the question now in a different form. What insurance will wealth find it its advantage to pay against the risks to which it is undoubtedly subject?" He had been lectured, meantime, for his doctrine of Natural Rights, and told that no rights existed outside the law. That, he retorted, was a dangerous and revolu- tionary doctrine. If it was correct, then, as the majority made the law, might would make right ; and the majority would be entitled, without regard to natural equity and justice, to secure its own interests at the expense of the minority. " I repudiate that contention," he went on, " but it must not be invoked in favour of the rich alone. If the rich want their rights to be respected, as they ought to be, they are 36 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. bound in return to respect the rights of their less fortunate brethren. It is said that these vie\Vs lead straight to Communism, and that Communism is a very terrible thing. Let us understand each other. I, for one, have never thought it possible or expedient to bring everything down to a dead level. I have never supposed you could equalise the capacities and conditions of men. The idler, the drunkard, the criminal, and the fool must bear the brunt of their defects. The strong man and the able man will always be first in the race. But what I say is, that the community as a whole, co-operating for the benefit of all, may do something to add to the sum of human happiness, may do something to make the life of all its citizens, and, above all, of the poorest of them, somewhat better, somewhat nobler, somewhat happier." These passages, and others to the same effect which might be quoted from Mr. Chamberlain's speeches in the first decade of his Parliamentary life, are interesting, not only because they establish the theory for which they have been cited, but also because they throw a light on the school of political thought by which the speaker was at this time guided. Like his friend, Mr. John Morley — who still lives under the dual control of austere Cob- denite doctrine and the sympathetic aspirations of French Revolution theories — Mr. Chamberlain had accepted without hesitation most of the inferences so logically drawn from an absolutely unwarranted hypothesis. There is, as the latter knew, no kind of evidence for that original state of society which was postulated alike by Hobbes and Rousseau, for the justification of exactly opposite systems. Hobbes to apologise for Absolutism, Rousseau to find a basis for the unlimited doctrine of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, had imagined and described a pre-historic epoch of universal anarchy terminated by a PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 37 Social Contract which became the basis of the now existent conditions of human existence. As they differed about the terms of the bargain, they were naturally able to put different constrictions on the Natural Rights that were the supposed subject of the alleged negotiation. The whole notion, was, of course, a pure fiction that could only be tolerated in the days before men began to realize that the same laws of evidence must be applied to the study of human institutions as of natural phenomena. It cannot be said that the anthropologists have yet thrown — it must not be assumed that they ever will throw — any useful light on the habits and customs of primeval man, still less on the social instincts of that half-human creature from which he may have been developed. But this much we have learnt from the research of those who busy themselves with the remotely knowable — from the limitations which scientific rigour imposes on the use of speculation — that we cease to be philosophers if we try to pass off our conjectures, whether plausible or absurd, as anything but what they really are. There is nothing to suggest either that man existed before law, or that law existed before man, or that both came into being together. And any argument resting on such a sup- posed sequence of one to the other, or of the imaginary coincidence of both, is founded on imagination. It is but inventing an ancient world to square with our theory of what modern society ought to be. While it lasted it was a pretty amusement for the philosophers, but it could not long survive into a scientific age. Still, though the foundations have been undermined, the superstructure has not yet been thrown down, and 38 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. men are still found who talk glibly about Natural Rights. They forget — if they ever knew — the origin of that convenient phrase. They are not aware that it is but the linguistic survival of an exploded theory. Nor is it any reproach to Mr. Chamberlain that he fell in with the popular misconception. When called to account for his expression, he was able to quote the philosophical theory from which it arose — which showed that he had read more and thought more than most practical politicians, if he had not read and thought enough. It is, after all, but an amiable form of Optimism to describe as natural what we believe to be proper. But it was not by the boldness of his general opinions, the odium which they might draw upon him from some quarters, or the popularity they might win in others, that Mr. Chamberlain set himself to achieve a Parliamentary reputation. Almost on his first appearance at West- minster he seems to have picked up the art, never acquired by many acute thinkers and eloquent speakers, of getting the ear of the House. One of the best ways, though not infallible, is to understand the subject on which you ask to be heard ; the other, and less com- municable quality, is always to speak to the point. And that was the most distinctive mark of Mr. Chamberlain's earlier essays in debate. He seldom interfered in a discussion to which he could not contribute some in- formation not possessed by most of his audience, and he always stated it in language they could follow. He instructed the House without lecturing it. His chief excursion into abstract politics was, as we have already seen, an attempt to persuade the PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 39 House of Commons, as he had previously persuaded the Birmingham Town Council, that something like, though not identical with, the Gothenburg system should be tried in this country. He suggested that Corporations should be empowered to acquire, by purchasing the rights of existing licence-holders, the sole right of retailing strong liquor. It cannot, however, be said that the scheme pro- duced much impression on the House of Commons, which never pays much attention to questions not likely to become the subjects of immediate legislation. Mr. Chamberlain was more effective in his treatment of less ambitious topics. Reference has already been made to his speech on Mr. Cross's Prisons Bill. This preliminary success he followed up by dealing, always in a competent and businesslike strain, with questions arising out of Local Government, the state of Endowed Schools in Ireland (one of the matters taken up by Lord Randolph Churchill at this time), the prevention of cattle disease and the importation of foreign beasts, and legal reform with regard to Patents, Bankruptcy, and Merchant Shipping. Before the Dissolution of Parlia- ment in 1880, he had identified his name with a number of important questions which could only be understood by a politician who did not mind the trouble of getting up a host of complicated facts. Though there are plenty of ambitious men in Parliament, and plenty of industrious ones, there is never an excess of those who combine both qualities, and if Mr. Chamberlain had, between 1876 and 1880, deliberately prepared himself for the office which he was to receive at Mr. Gladstone's hands, he would not have acted in a very different way from that which he 40 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. adopted. But if he had confined himself to matters of detail he might perhaps have got himself labelled as fit for them — and nothing better. From a limited reputa- tion it is very hard to escape. Now the man of facts and figures is extremely useful to a Government : he can detect weak points in a specious indictment, and often convict an opponent of ignorance and make him seem to be in the wrong, though his main contention is perfectly correct. Such a man is always sure of a place when his Party come into office, but it is generally a subordinate place ; and if, after half a lifetime of in- glorious usefulness, the time comes when he thinks he may ask for something better, he is generally told that he can have a peerage if he likes, and if he does not — well, there is somebody else who will take the office he is not contented with. Now, Mr. Chamberlain had no intention of being reckoned among the minor place-men of a Ministry — the unpromotable Under-Secretaries. He considered himself a man of Cabinet rank, and, while working up those administrative questions which chiefly fall under the Board of Trade, he also proved his ability to take part in a full-dress Debate. During these years of his novitiate, Parliament was thinking chiefly of the Eastern Question and of South Africa. On both these contro- versial topics he went strongly against the Conservative Government. Though he never descended to mere clap-trap, spoke without enthusiasm of Russia, and kept within limits his invectives against Turkey, he may fairly be described as accepting and assisting the policy which Mr. Gladstone was advocating with so much fervour, and PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. \\ — as most of us now think — so misdirected an eloquence. The most noticeable points taken by Mr. Chamberlain in his frequent speeches on this subject were the advisability of strengthening the Greek Kingdom as a defence against Russian aggression, and the possibility of coming to a friendly understanding with the Czar. He did not believe that Russia had evil designs on India — no nation could covet so onerous a responsibility. In that obiter dictum of 1878 we find a strange contrast with the Colonial Secretary of 1895. He was, at the outset of his Parliamentary career, though never one of the Little Englanders, strongly opposed to what he called the noisy Imperialism of the Music-halls. And, like most other politicians at this time, he was not alive to the importance of our South African possessions, and the necessity for extending them. But it must be confessed by the most staunch Conservative that he had a strong, though not a convincing, case when he attacked Sir Bartle Frere's policy in Zululand. Those who believe that the conduct of that energetic High Commissioner was justified by the attitude of Cetywayo, that it was necessary to crush the Zulu power if we meant to protect Natal from a barbarian inroad, and that the conflict was bound to come about soon, if not at once, must also admit that Frere precipitated the collision, and did so with his eyes open, and with the intention of forcing the hand of the Home Government. If he did not act in defiance, he certainly acted in excess, of his instructions. And this was clearly proved by the sharp reprimand he received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. But it was argued that by refusing to recall him the 42 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Government gave a practical sanction to the policy they had formally condemned, and, if they really did not approve the annexationist policy of their subordinate, they were bound to replace him, as soon as might be, with an officer less self-willed. While Frere was kept in office, there was no probability that his action would be reversed. This contention was driven home by Mr. Chamberlain, nor can its force be denied. The fact, however, was that such a reversal was now impossible without disgrace, and without inflicting, on the natives who had stood by us, greater hardships than those threatened to the tribe which opposed us. Frere had, indeed, succeeded in committing us to the Zulu War, and, since it had to be fought out, he was the best, indeed the only, man to go through with it. Almost without exception, the Colonists believed in him, swore by him : to recall him, when they were fighting for the defence, as they believed, of their lives and homes, would have been a severe strain to the loyalty of Natal. Unanimous as was the opinion of South Africa in favour of the Zulu war, it was decidedly unpopular in England, especially after the disasters with which it opened. And the more combative debaters on the Opposition side knew they were doing effective service to their Party when, like Mr. Chamberlain, they fixed Ministers with the fullest responsibility for the action of Sir Bartle Frere. Those who disagree most profoundly with the line taken up by Mr. Chamberlain on this question, if they will refer to the speeches he delivered, will be struck by the care which he had taken to get up the whole history of British hostilities in South Africa, and the strength PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 43 of the case he made out for a general inquiry into the manner in which we had from time to time found our- selves involved in these embarrassing, expensive, and frequently sterile operations. Similarly, when speaking on the Eastern Question, and maintaining views which certainly appear tinged with partisan bitterness, Mr. Chamberlain was always definite when he complained of Ministerial policy, or belittled the diplomatic achievements of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury in Berlin. And he had a knack — as with regard to the actual cost of bringing the Indian troops to Malta — of asking inconvenient questions that were not invented haphazard, but inspired by special information which he had been at the pains to acquire. The art of administering interrogatories in the House of Commons is a favourite one with young members who wish to call at- tention to themselves. But it must be used with moder- ation, or the questioner is soon reckoned as one of those bores who may safely be snubbed when a candid reply is inconvenient or impossible. Mr. Chamberlain's questions were not numerous, but they were frequent enough to keep him constantly in evidence ; and whenever there was an organised attack on Ministers, whether on a regular Vote of Want of Confidence, or in a straggling discussion like that on Flogging in the Army, he always took care to get his share of the sport. It was on the last of these subjects that he fell into one of those "indiscretions" which either make or mar a career. Lord Hartington had separated himself from the Radical agitation,* whereupon Mr. * Ministers had practically conceded their claim, but a Con- servative revolt, led by Sir Walter Barttelot, induced them to 44 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Chamberlain got up and renounced allegiance to the " late Leader of the Liberal Party." Open rebellion like this could only be forgiven in a man whose position was assured. It had, indeed, been his deliberate policy that no sooner did he feel his feet in the House of Commons than the official Party chiefs should know he was there ! That his support, and that of the confident little group of Radicals who sat with him, could not be had for asking, was becoming painfully clear. If the Whigs liked to fall in line with the Radicals, their company would be tolerated, if not effusively welcomed, and they would be permitted to get their share in the good things going. But the Radicals had no idea of selling themselves into official bondage for the sake of carrying out a Whig programme. The taunt directed against Lord Hartington was the more cruel, because during Mr. Gladstone's retire- ment his successor had shown equal tact and courage in keeping together a disappointed, and not altogether harmonious, following — an undertaking which no other Liberal of that period could have accomplished with equal success. Mr. Chamberlain, however, quite understood that if the Liberals carried the country with them the new Cabinet would not be constructed by Lord Hartington \ and he also knew that Mr. Gladstone is not the man to resent a display of independence. The safest way to be withdraw from the compromise. Coming into the House late, and imperfectly informed of what had occurred, Lord Hartington depre- cated a continuance of the discussion, and provoked the strongest irritation among the Radicals. PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 45 admitted to a Ministry is to show that you can make yourself unpleasant if you are left outside. With respect to Mr. Chamberlain, there never was the slightest doubt that he possessed that important qualification. But even if there had been no reason to fear his Parliamentary attack on the flank he had the strongest claim on the gratitude of the Party. He was the first President and admitted controller of the American institution popularly known as the Caucus, more politely referred to as the Birmingham system of political organization, and officially described as the National Federation of Liberal Associations. The ideal form of that organization was described by Mr. Chamberlain a few years later (1885), when so many constituencies had just been reconstructed, through the extension of the franchise and the redistribution of seats. In every electoral division there should be a Repre- sentative Council (the Liberal Three Hundred, or Four Hundred, or whatever might be the convenient number), which should select the Parliamentary candidate, manage the registration, and bring voters to the poll. In a large place, such as Birmingham, these District Councils would together constitute the United Liberal Association of the city or town ; and in constituencies where the three- cornered representation existed (as, in 1880, at Birming- ham), its duty was to see that no votes were wasted, and so to distribute them, by arrangement with the electors, that the minority candidate did not get elected. But the ordinary function of the (say) United Liberal Association of Birmingham was to collect and express the political opinion of the whole town, while the National Federation would " define and formulate " the policy and 46 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. programme of " the Liberal Party as a whole." In defence of this system, the object of which was to impose the will of the people — i.e. the will of a majority of the Liberals — on the Leaders of that Party, Mr. Chamberlain has made many public speeches. "I know," he said in 1883, "that there are some who express alarm at the recent development of our Liberal organizations. They denounce it as the Caucus ; they describe it as a machine. I am not surprised that the Tories should dislike it. I do not wonder that they feel so painfully what they unsuccessfully try to imitate. These great, open, popular representative associations are not at all in their line. They are alien to the spirit of Toryism. The ' Primrose League ' is more in their way, with its silly sentimental title. I confess I am surprised when I find these organizations objected to and criticised by many who profess themselves in sympathy with the democratic movement. Why, the democratic movement would lose all its force without organization. The difficulty of Radi- calism in times past has always been that there was no cohesion among the people. Napoleon III. told Mr. Cobden, in conversation, that private interests were like a disciplined regiment, while the public good was defended by a disorganized mob. The force of democracy, to be strong, must be concentrated. It must not be frittered away into numberless units, each of them so preciously independent that no one of them can unite with another even for a single day." Two years later, Mr. Chamberlain described the Caucus as the servant of the people, not its master; the engine by which popular opinion could be concentrated and its effectual expression secured. In fact it was, in his conception, to be the medium by which the Leaders could be kept in touch with, and if necessary under the control of, the majority of their supporters. And this PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING. 47 view, it is but justice to him to admit, he maintained even when he had himself become one of those front- bench figures whom, in his unrestrained democratism, he wished to reduce to the function of mere instruments and mouthpieces of the popular will. The system has its merits as well as its drawbacks : and the practical advantages were so conspicuous that the Party who first derided and denounced it had, finally, to imitate it. The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations differs in no essential respect from the National Liberal Federation as originally con- ceived, and as it was worked for some little time. But on the great Party split in 1886, the headquarters of the Federation were removed from Birmingham to London. Though not officered by the same persons, it is housed under the same roof as the Central Liberal Association, and it has fallen more or less under the control of the Party Whips. The extent to which this influence extends is, at the present time, a subject of hot debate within the Liberal Party; but it is certain that, if the Leaders have got rid of a rather tiresome taskmaster (as the Federation promised soon to become), they have also deprived them- selves of a most effective medium for ascertaining the views of their followers. But in 1880 the Federation was young, vigorous, and almost on its trial. Mr. Chamberlain, whatever might be his personal rivalries and political disagreements with the Whigs, was too wise — perhaps he was not quite strong enough — to fight them out in the face of the enemy. As soon as the General Election came within measurable distance, he insisted on the virtues of organization and 4 8 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. unity. The differences between Liberals and Conserva- tives were far greater than any which could exist between different sections of Liberals. It was " sheer nonsense " to say that Radicals and Nonconformists could not take their stand by the side of Whigs. When the General Election was over, Mr. Chamberlain lost no time in pointing out how successfully the Caucus had answered the test which had been applied to it. It had been established in sixty-seven constituencies, and in sixty of them the Liberal candidates had gained or retained the seat. It was obvious that the master of so potent an organization, one that was certain of being universally adopted and yet further developed, must be conciliated by a statesman who looked forward to any continued hold of office. Both by his Parliamentary aptitude and his electioneering influence Mr. Chamberlain had made himself indispensable to his Party, and the only question was, if the General Election resulted in the return of the Liberals to power, whether the junior member for Birmingham would be contented to begin with an office outside the Cabinet. CHAPTER III. RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. Causes of the Liberal victory in 1880 — Imperialist expenditure — The Irish vote — Mr. Chamberlain's support of Gladstonian foreign policy — Admitted to the Cabinet — Defence of the Convention of Pretoria — The imbroglio in Egypt — Mr. Bright's resignation — Replaced in Cabinet by Sir Charles Dilke — Radical influence strengthened. THE downfall of the Conservative Administration, at the General Election of 1880, is not difficult to account for. Most reasonable students of current history, even those who are most disgusted with the subsequent excesses of Turkish misrule, are ready to admit — now that we are removed, by half a generation's lifetime, from the Party controversies of the hour — that the foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield was substantially just and prudent ; that it raised the honour and influence of England in Europe ; and that any mistakes or over- sights on this or that point of detail were more than compensated by the assurance given to the world that this country intended to regain some of her old inter- national authority, and to fight, if need were, in defence of her Empire. The revival of the old national pride and self-reliance would, by itself, be a sufficient justification for the Administration of 1 874-1880, even if it were proved E 49 50 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. that in each particular instance the Conservatives had been mistaken. It was, indeed, easy for acute critics — and none were more acute than Mr. Chamberlain — to pick holes in the Berlin Treaty, and to make a mock of the grandiloquent phrases in which Lord Beaconsfield celebrated his very solid achievements. It was not difficult to show that, in return for an island which did not pay its way, we had accepted serious and almost indefinite responsibilities in Asia Minor ; that Russia had been exasperated while Turkey cherished a secret grudge against us ; that Bulgaria had been divided and Greece disappointed ; that the settlement could not be enduring; and that Great Britain had little to show for the dangers she had incurred. In South Africa, again, neither the pretext on which the Zulu War was conducted, nor the manner in which it was waged, was likely to reassure public opinion. And among the few dozen people in England who pretended to understand the North-west Boundary question, on which the Afghan policy of Lord Lytton had hinged, there was by no means complete agreement as to the merits of the ex- tensive military undertaking on which he entered. On the credit side of the account, Lord Beaconsfield could only enter the acquisition of the Suez Canal shares, the occupation of Cyprus, the annexation of the Transvaal. They were all good assets, but could not be realised immediately. The most important items were negative ones. We had stood between Russia and Turkey, and thus prevented the Czar from making him- self master of Eastern Europe ; we had driven back an aggressive enemy from the gate of India; and we RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 51 had saved the colony of Natal from being overrun by a horde of savages. In addition to these undoubtedly important, if unappreciable results, we had made an immense advance in the good opinion, if not in the good-will, of Europe. But glory is one of those good things which cannot be cheaply bought, and the burden which was laid upon the shoulders of the taxpayers was imposed at a time when depressed agriculture and declining trade made it difficult for them to provide for the outgoings of their business and households. It is possible that a heaven-born financier might have found some way of alleviating or seeming to lighten the load that was to be borne ; but Sir Stafford Northcote, a sound and somewhat humdrum economist, was compelled to present a Budget equally honest and unpopular. The result was that the ordinary struggling middle-class man was alienated for the time from the Conservatives, lest by renewing their lease of power he might find himself involved in liabilities beyond his patience, perhaps beyond his powers. It must be remembered that at this time, though the doctrine had been proved and preached, it had not yet come home to the ordinary mercantile mind, that the best remedy for dwindling trade is to open up new markets abroad. What we now regard as a truism was, only fifteen or twenty years ago, treated as an abstract proposition which had no particular relevance to the domestic affairs of the average Englishman. The too general impression about our Colonies was that they involved us in a naval and military expenditure far beyond the necessities of national defence; that it would not be a bad thing if we could 52 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. honourably retire from India, and if the Australasian communities were to notify us that they would prefer to dispense with the Imperial connection. As for South Africa, its possibilities of development were almost un- known ; and as to most other parts of that Continent, there was a blank in most people's minds as complete as in the maps of an ordinary school atlas. It was not, then, on their successful work abroad that Ministers could expect the average uninstructed elector to give them a vote of confidence. Nor could more sanguine expectations be founded on a comparison between the two protagonists of Conservatism and Liberalism. Lord Beaconsfield was an old and weary man, and if he occasionally flashed out a spark of the still unextinguished genius it did but show that the fire was smouldering. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, though advanced in years, was young in vigour. Nominally, of course, he had retired from the Leadership ; but the rest which he had given himself from the routine work of Parliament and Party-management had brought fresh strength ; and the series of harangues he delivered in Midlothian — some of them masterpieces of popular oratory, but all of them animated with vivid passion — proved that he was perfectly able and willing to stand the strain of office. The manifesto which Lord Beaconsfield addressed to the country, in the shape of a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, was, from the tactical point of view, almost a failure. It was at once alleged that, by drawing attention to imaginary dangers in Ireland, the Conservative Leader was trying to divert it from the legislative sterility of his Ministry. When he RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 53 spoke of those politicians who, " having failed to enfeeble the Colonies by their policy of decomposition," might soon take up measures for "the disintegration of the United Kingdom," most people laughed at the veiled suggestion that Mr. Gladstone would go in for Home Rule, while the personal followers of the Liberal statesman resented it as an odious imputation. Mr. Gladstone himself was more pained than indignant, but he gave a sufficiently explicit contradiction. That Lord Beaconsfield was afterwards proved to be right about Ireland : that the country was honeycombed with Secret Societies, and almost ripe for rebellion; that it needed strong, steady, and passionless government; that the Liberals, whose hold on the English middle-class had been shaken, and who were by no means predominant with the working-men, would one day have to patch up a majority by admitting the Home Rulers to alliance — all this shows that whether by information or instinct, by calculation or conjecture, or by an almost inspired cynicism, Lord Beaconsfield was a prophet of truth. But, like other prophets, he was before his time, and was laughed at by the solid and serious people. That, probably, he did not much care about. What touched him more, and injured his Party, was that in revenge for his outburst the leaders of the Irish Nationalist Party issued a Manifesto to their supporters in England, exhorting them to vote against " Benjamin Disraeli," as "the enemy of their country and their race." It is difficult to say in how many of the English Constituencies which were now lost by narrow majorities the scale had been turned by the solid Irish vote. But it was gener- 54 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. ally agreed that Mr. Gladstone was greatly strengthened by the active alliance of politicians who had hitherto main- tained a contemptuous neutrality between the two English Parties, though always ready to make a bargain with either. It would be idle to ignore, or seek to explain away, the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, the convinced Imperialist and enterprising Secretary for the Colonies of 1895, was, in 1880, in external, as in internal affairs, an eager and effective advocate of Gladstonian policy. It would be easy, if the amusement were worth the trouble, to select passages from his speeches then and his speeches now, which might establish an apparently complete contrast of opinions. It must be further admitted that in the inglorious period about to commence — a period embracing the Convention of Pretoria, the evacuation of Candahar, the abandonment of Gordon — Mr. Chamberlain was not merely saddled with a share of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, but he was himself largely accountable for the policy of that body. The truth is, that, although in domestic policy he had never quite accepted the rigid doctrines of the Manchester School, and combined a vein of State Socialism with the tenets of the orthodox Political Economy, he had not yet publicly cut himself away from the peace -at -any -price accretions which had grown up round the body of Cobdenite teaching. Cobden himself, we know, advocated a strong Navy, and was prepared to make almost any concession for the sake of keeping up our maritime supremacy ; but it so happened that the most eloquent expositor of his financial gospel, Mr. Bright, was convinced, as manufacturer and as RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 55 Quaker, that war was bad for trade and evil in the sight of God. The influence of that great orator and single-minded politician was strong throughout the Liberal Party : in the Birmingham district it was predominant. And it would have been strange indeed if a young man like Mr. Chamberlain — determined though he always was to think for himself — had altogether escaped the contagious enthusiasm of a noble delusion. Mr. John Morley is the one conspicuous politician who still cherishes the old anti- Imperial traditions. He is animated— if one may venture to form a guess about his motives — by a humane horror of bloodshed, by a hatred of the hardships and cruelties suffered by the aborigines who come into contact with a Colonising Power, and by a belief that the process of Imperial expansion withdraws the energy of the nation from that democratic development which lie has most at heart. The subsequent conversion of Mr. Chamberlain from the doctrines he professed in 1876-1880, and practised in 1 880- 1 885, was not quite so sudden as it seemed. The necessity, so strongly impressed on him in 1886, of maintaining a real and effective union between Great Britain and Ireland, no doubt, strengthened his belief in the equal importance of preserving the integrity, and consolidating the strength, of the whole Empire. But it was not the sole influence, if it was the determining motive, which turned the Gladstonian President of the Board of Trade into the Imperialist Secretary for the Colonies. This is shown by the fact that as soon as he entered Parliament he became an intimate associate of Sir Charles Dilke, who, though then, as now, one of the 56 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. most advanced members of the Radical Party, has always insisted on the paramount duty of maintaining a powerful Navy, and of working up an efficient Army. He has no generous illusions as to the pacific feeling of other Powers towards England, and is well aware that we shall be stripped of our possessions abroad as soon as we are unable to defend them — or, at least, inflict condign punishment on those who assail them. If Sir Charles believes that we ought to retire from Egypt, it is not because he wishes to reduce our powers of Imperial defence, but because he thinks that our occupation of that country, besides being a standing cause of offence to France, weakens our general position. If that view is, on the whole, unsound, because it neglects yet greater considerations, it is, at least, founded on reasons abso- lutely different from those which lead Mr. John Morley and Mr. Labouchere to the same conclusion. It is, at least, probable that daily contact with a politician whose information on the naval and military armaments of the world goes beyond that of most professional experts, confirmed in Mr. Chamberlain a sense of our Imperial responsibilities. The seed was at work all the time ; and if for the next five years it seemed, for all the outside world knew,* to be lying dormant, we need not be surprised that, in 1880, Mr. Chamberlain was regarded only as a thorough -going partisan, who could be trusted to find fault with everything done or attempted by the politicians who had to be turned out of office. * Mr. Bright, however, used to say of Mr. Chamberlain that he was " the only Jingo in Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet." RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 57 From the beginning of the General Election it was clear how the scale would turn. But the impulse towards domestic reform, or the reaction against Imperialism, was even stronger than had been anticipated. When the returns were completed, it was found that Mr. Gladstone was supported by 354 Liberals, that the Conservative strength was reduced to 236, and the Home Rulers mustered 62. The relative position of Parties had been almost reversed since 1874, but the one encouraging fact for Englishmen who were but slightly interested in the ordinary vicissitudes of politics was that the Liberals were practically independent of the Nationalist vote. So decisive was the verdict of the country that Lord Beaconsfield saw no use in awaiting the meeting of Parliament. On April 18th he tendered his resignation to her Majesty, and three days later Ministers went down to Windsor and gave up the seals of office. It was re- quired by Parliamentary etiquette that the nominal Leader of the Opposition should be invited to construct an Administration, and for that purpose Lord Hartington was sent for by the Queen, and, on his declining the re- sponsibility, it was offered to Lord Granville. There is no need to inquire into the inner history of a brief and unimportant crisis from which there was but one issue — the appointment of Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister. So completely was this recognised by the two statesmen who had done all the hard work of the Opposition, that not only did they stand aside for the Chief whom they had relieved, but also consented to take office under him, Lord Hartington going to the India Office, and Lord Granville to the Foreign Office. Most of the 58 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. other appointments were more or less matters-of-course. The Chancellorship of the Exchequer was assumed by the Prime Minister ; the Lord Chancellorship went, as of right, to the late Lord Selborne ; Lord Northbrook took the War Office, and Mr. Childers the Admiralty ; while Mr. Forster was admitted to the Cabinet as Chief Secretary for Ireland, his work in connection with the Elementary Education Act of ten years before marking him out for the constructive policy contemplated for that country. Sir William Harcourt was contented with the Home Office, while Lord Kimberley, the Duke of Argyll, and Mr. Adam (late Whip of the Party), were provided for by the Colonial Office, the Privy Seal, and the First Commissionership of Works. Of a more experi- mental nature were the appointments of Professor Fawcett, a novice in administration, to the Post Office, and of Mr. Mundella, who was supposed to have ideas about educa- tion, to the Vice-Presidency of the Council. All but the two last Ministers were taken from the approved ranks of official Liberalism, and even these exceptions could hardly be reckoned as belonging to the advanced wing of the Party. What was to be done for the Radicals ? As a preliminary conciliation, the sinecure post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had been given to Mr. Bright. But it was well-known that Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain both considered themselves entitled to seats in the Cabinet, while the Old Liberals felt the strongest objection to having more than one other Radical within that supreme Council. There was no personal rivalry between the two candidates, each; it was understood, being equally anxious to press RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 59 his own and the other's claim.* A way out of the diffi- culty was discovered by inducing Sir Charles, whose knowledge of Continental politics was unsurpassed in the Party, to accept the Under Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, a post which becomes specially dignified and influential when the Chief happens to be a member of the House of Lords. Way was thus made for Mr. Chamberlain, who was appointed to the Board of Trade and admitted to the charmed circle — a rapidity of promotion almost unexampled in political history, since, four years before, his name had been almost un- known outside his own district. His influence was at once felt in the Cabinet, and it is no secret that it was exercised, if not in direct antagonism, at least in open competition, with that of the Old Liberals. How potent a force it was, whether for good or evil, will be fully realised only by those who understand where the real strength of Mr. Chamberlain's character lies. His constructive statesmanship was soon to be displayed in legislation specially connected with his own Department. His skill as a Parliamentary debater and a platform orator was already recognised. His method of attack was, however, too vehement, his analysis too merciless, to attain the supreme gift of rhetoric — that of convincing opponents, or at least shaking their preconceived opinions, and making them feel uncomfortable about the course to which for the time they are committed. But that quality, which is lacking to Mr. Chamberlain in open argument, is owned * Indeed, they had agreed that neither would accept office unless one or other was taken into the Cabinet. 60 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. by him in a supreme degree when he is arguing in private conference. He is, in fact, the most persuasive of counsellors, and it is to his advice in the Cabinet that we may unhesitatingly trace some of those vari- ations in policy — those " sharp curves " that excited Lord Salisbury's bitter derision — which the Administration of 1 880-1 885 were destined to execute. If Mr. Cham- berlain could not dictate the original line of action, he could deflect it afterwards, and when we speak of the inconsistencies and vacillations of Mr. Gladstone's Government, we must account for them by the fact that there was all the time going on a struggle of wills be- tween the minority of Radicals, led by Mr. Chamberlain, and the Whigs under Lord Hartington — the other mem- bers of the Cabinet, most of them Opportunists like their Chief, being swayed by whichever force was for the moment the stronger. There are two ways in which a Minister with views or convictions may seek to impose them on his colleagues. One is that which Lord Randolph Churchill adopted with such brief success in 1886 — by carrying his resigna- tion in his pocket and producing it, on every disappoint- ment, as a loaded pistol to be held to their heads. It may be effective once, twice, or thrice ; but before long the malcontent is sure to be taken at his word and told to do his worst. The other plan was followed by Mr. Chamberlain — he kept on pegging away at his pur- pose, and leaving other people, if they liked, to do the resigning. It was expounded, with as much explicitness as the etiquette of Ministerial reserve permits, in a speech he delivered to his constituents in June, 1881. He had RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 61 accepted office, he told them, not without hesitation. In the first place he distrusted his own qualifications after so short an experience of Parliamentary life : in the second place, he could not surrender, without regret, his full independence as a private member. A Liberal Government which professed to represent the Liberal Party must, of necessity, consist of men of different shades of opinion. They would all be animated by the same principle, all would be going in the same direction, but the order of progress, the rate of progress, even the means and instruments of progress, would be capable of infinite variety. No man had any right, under such circumstances, to expect that he would always be able to have his own way. Everyone must be prepared to make concessions, and all must be ready — so much the speaker had learned from his experience in Birmingham — to accept, and endeavour to carry out, the wish of the majority when it had been expressed after full discussion. The questions of foreign policy which the new Cabinet was called upon to decide were — in the Transvaal, the conclusion of the War and settlement of the terms of peace ; on the North-West frontier of India, to determine our relations with Afghanistan ; and in Europe, to insist on the execution by the Sultan of those terms in the Berlin Treaty which were in favour of Greece and Monte- negro. On all these points, Ministers were pledged by the speeches which they had made in Opposition, and only in one respect did they depart from them afterwards. Mr. Gladstone had, no doubt, given the Boer leaders the greatest encouragement by the sympathy he had expressed with their struggle, and by his denunciations 62 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. of the Annexation carried out by the Conservatives ; but he had never pledged himself to reverse that policy, and at the opening of Parliament he put into the mouth of her Majesty an explicit declaration that her supremacy would be maintained in the Transvaal, and that the " large and liberal " institutions of self-government with which the " European settlers " would ultimately be in- vested were to be accompanied by provisions for the security of the indigenous races. In other words, the Transvaal w r as to be retained as a British Colony or Protectorate, the Boers were to regulate their domestic affairs, and the natives were to remain under the direct authority of the Crown. It was impossible, Lord Kim- berley declared in the Upper House, to say what calamities our receding might not cause to the native population. It would be lamentable if, after the ex- penditure of so much blood and treasure, there should be a revival of internecine struggle. The Boer leaders were furious at what they regarded as a betrayal of their just hopes. They had no time to lose if they were to make a success of their rebellion, since the admiration with which Mr. Gladstone regarded a nation struggling to be free had not prevented the despatch of reinforcements to the British troops in Natal, in order to stamp out the insurrection. The Boer Republic was proclaimed for the second time on December 30th, 1880, by Messrs. Kriiger, Joubert, and Pretorius, and orders were given for the prompt occupa- tion of Laing's Nek and an advance into British territory. Sir George Colley then decided that he must not wait for reinforcements, and on January 28th he delivered his RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 63 gallant but ineffectual attack on Laing's Nek. The re- pulse experienced by our men showed what a formidable foe we had to deal with ; but it was hardly expected, when Sir George occupied Majuba Hill, a position com- manding the one held by the Boers, that they would think of turning him out. This, however, they not only attempted, but executed. There was no disguising the fact that we had been fairly beaten, both in generalship and in fighting qualities. As soon as the news of these two defeats came to London the Liberal Government, like the English people, seem to have felt that before anything else could be settled the ignominy must be wiped out. If the Boers, who were for the time masters of the situation, did not make an unconditional submission, they must be visited with prompt chastisement. Nor was there any doubt that, with the forces by this time available, Sir Evelyn Wood could very soon have accomplished what public opinion demanded. In the Queen's Speech of January, 1881, the Government had expressed the inten- tion of taking " military measures " with a view to the "prompt vindication of her Majesty's authority" — so they had no abstract scruples with regard to making war or shedding blood. But where they had looked forward to performing a military promenade, they found to their disgust that real fighting would be required, and that a Ministry pledged to Retrenchment would be involved in one of those expensive undertakings which they had condemned when begun by their predecessors. On February 8th, their warlike fit had already passed away ; that is to say, Lord Kimberley telegraphed that, if the Boers would desist from armed opposition, they 64 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. should receive guarantees for a friendly settlement ; and on the 2 1 st the Government accepted the offer of Mr. Brand, President of the Orange Free State, to act as intermediary. Inflated by success, and by the certainty that we should not push the campaign any further, the Boer leaders declined to give up their forcible resistance on the terms suggested by the Colonial Secretary, but proposed an armistice for the arrangement of peace. This insulting offer — from subjects to their Sovereign — was accepted by the Government, and on March 6th a Conference was agreed to. It was held on March 21st; and the terms were promptly settled. It is not too much to say that when they were explained in the House of Commons, next day, they were received in this country with amazement, in South Africa with disgust. The only points obtained in our favour were the recognition of the British Crown as Suzerain, involving the right to control the foreign relations of the Transvaal. The Boers, on the other hand, gained complete rights of self-government ; and it was quite understood that the Commission which was to be appointed to " consider and safeguard the interests of the natives " was but a pretext for concealing our abandonment of allies who had trusted to our word. Sir Owen Lanyon has testified that an Englishman openly thanked God that his children were Afrikanders — they would have no reason to be ashamed of their country. The one excuse to be made for the Convention of Pretoria — it was a surrender, and nothing less — was that if we were going to give way at all it was better to give way altogether. The Boers had got everything they RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 65 wanted, more than they expected, and anything withheld for the present could, they knew, be gained by further pressure and encroachment. In this calculation they were only too well justified when they negotiated the Convention of London (1884).* But at the time they went through the pretence of being dissatisfied, and even talked of rejecting the Convention of Pretoria at the meeting of the Volksvrad. A telegram was despatched to London by the Triumvirate, asking for further con- cessions, but at this point Ministers stiffened their backs, and eventually (Oct. 25th, 1881) the terms were ratified. Mr. Chamberlain's defence was as good as any other : that the Transvaal was a difficult country, and inhabited by a warlike race ; that if we were to occupy it by force, we should require a number of troops equal to that of our possible opponents — a number which he put at 15,000 to 20,000. The calculation was, no doubt, far too high ; but under the profound impression created by Boer prowess, it was neither in appearance nor in- tention an exaggerated one. Mr. Chamberlain, however, was too good an advocate to dwell long on a weak case. He carried the war into the enemy's country, and argued that the whole trouble had been brought about by the fault of the Conservatives. " We were in possession," he said, "of information to the effect that the great majority of the people of the Transvaal were reconciled to the Annexation." As late as December, 1880, Ministers had been advised by their agents on the spot not to pay * Under this instrument we are, however, entitled to set aside any Treaty concluded between the South African Republic and any Foreign Power, except the Orange Free State. F 66 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. any regard to the action of a few agitators. On the 5 th of that month, Sir Owen Lanyon had assured them there was no reason for anxiety; and on the 16th, the Boers were in open insurrection. " They established a Provisional Government, and they hoisted the old flag of the Republic at Heidelburg. Well, there was then, at all events, no longer the possibility of a doubt as to the state of affairs. It was perfectly evident under those altered conditions that we should have to make new arrangements ; but at the same time it was necessary that we should be in a position to take guarantees, in the first place, for the safety of loyal settlers, if there were any such, in the Transvaal ; in the second place, for the good treatment of the native popu- lation who had accepted our rule ; and in the third place, against the recurrence of quarrels with native tribes across the borders, which might lead to difficulties in South Africa. And therefore we hurried forward reinforcements with such speed that, when later on the conditions of peace were arranged by Sir Evelyn Wood, he had under his command something like 12,000 troops — more than the total adult male population of the whole of the Boers in the Transvaal. * * * * * * " While, then, the Government were preparing for every event, we did not think that we were justified — and it is for you to say how far you agree with us — we did not think we were justified in closing the door to a peaceful settlement. The overtures for this settlement came in the first instance from President Brand, a man who is deserving of the hearty recognition of every friend of peace. He is the President of the Orange Free State. He has done his best to prevent his fellow-countrymen from going into the war, and to put a stop to the un- necessary effusion of blood. And in the second place, overtures came from the Boer leaders. Mr. Kriiger, their Vice-President, wrote to Sir George Colley to say that he was confident of the justice of his cause ; and RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 67 he was so certain that the English people, if they only knew the true facts, would do him right, that he was willing to submit the case to a Royal Commission, to be appointed by the Queen. Well, sir, we thought that those were terms which ought to be accepted ; and we instructed Sir George Colley, if certain conditions could be obtained, to arrange for a settlement upon that basis. "Among the conditions, the first and most important was that the Boers should desist from armed opposition. But while the correspondence was going on, in the midst of the negotiations, unfortunately, on three several occa- sions, the British troops, inarching in inferior numbers to attack the strong position of the Boers, met with a repulse. Those events were deplored by us, as they must be by everyone ; but they did not seem to us to constitute a reason why we should withdraw the offer which we had previously made. In those attacks we were the aggressors — not the Boers — and our losses, greatly as we grieve for them, did not make the original cause of war more just ; they did not make the prolonga- tion of this miserable and inglorious struggle more desirable and expedient. And therefore, when Sir Evelyn Wood, acting on his own responsibility, arranged for an armistice, we approved his proceedings. And when the terms of peace were arranged, when the Boers accepted our offer, as we had originally made it, we rejoiced in the prospect of a settlement without further effusion of blood, whether of Englishmen or Dutchmen ; and we did not think the English people would feel themselves to be humiliated, because their Government had refused knowingly to persist in a course of oppression and wrong- doing, and we had accepted, without a victory, terms which were the best we could reasonably expect that even the greatest victory would give to us. We are a great and powerful nation. What is the use of being great and powerful, if we are afraid to admit an error when we are conscious of it? Shame is not in the confession of a mistake. Shame lies only in persistency in wilful wrong-doing." 68 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. England as a great Power could, Mr. Chamberlain thought, afford to be generous to a petty State like the Transvaal, and to practise a forbearance not permissible in regard to another strong nation which had put an insult upon us. It must be added that, though agreeing to the Conventions of 1881 and 1884, Mr. Chamberlain was strong in urging the necessity for Sir Charles Warren's expedition, which prevented the Boers from occupying Bechuanaland, and thus preserved an im- portant territory for the British Crown. There is no need to recall in detail the course of the Afghan War — the disaster of Maiwand, and the celebrated march of General (now Lord) Roberts from Cabul to Candahar. From the point of view of the Opposition, Mr. Chamberlain described it as an " entering on a course of wanton aggression, in order to obtain a ' scientific frontier ' " ; and so strongly had Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues committed themselves to this judg- ment, that, on their coming into power, the only course open to Lord Lytton, Governor-General of India, was to retire from a position which is not generally considered to be affected by the course of politics at home. It was equally clear that, whatever other concessions might be extorted by our astute ally, the Ameer Abdur Rahman, the new Government were bound to act up to their professions by retiring from Candahar. The spirited protest against that course delivered by Lord Beacons- field, in his last speech in the House of Lords, was not expected, any more than the political and strategical arguments of Lord Salisbury, to divert the Government from their purpose ; and in defence or extenuation of RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 69 their resolve it may be pleaded that they had on their side a considerable amou.it of expert authority. They did make out a case, if it was not a convincing one. But the radical fault of their decision in this, as in other instances, was that they set themselves to reverse so abruptly the foreign policy of their predecessors. It was the misfortune of the country — of the Empire — that the General Election of 1880 had so largely been contested on matters which ought to lie outside the ordinary con- troversies of politics. Here again the sole responsibility does not rest with the Liberals. If, under Mr. Gladstone's guidance, the assault had been chiefly directed against the Foreign Office, the defence had also been conducted from that basis. It was but human nature that the Conservatives should seek to obtain credit for the diplomatic successes of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, and that " Peace with Honour " should be as much the watchword of one Party as " Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform " of the other. Since the disastrous period of 1 880-1 885, a better sense of public duty has inspired our politicians; each side has, in Opposition, practised more reserve in criticising the action of those in office, and has therefore been enabled, when its turn of power came, to consider each question as it arises without prejudice and without preconception. The paramount obligation of the Foreign Office is now seen to be, if not to maintain an absolute continuity in English policy, to substitute for the " sharp curves " which gave us a reputation for bad faith abroad, the more gradual deflections that may be required by new circumstances or altered views. This example was set by Lord Salisbury in 1885 ; it was followed by Lord 70 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Rosebery; nor has either of them since departed from the patriotic rule. It was, indeed, under such a pretext — but it was a pretext which deceived nobody — that the Gladstone Ministry, in coming into office in 1880, set themselves to the congenial task of humiliating Turkey. Their object, they professed, was to obtain a complete and imme- diate execution of the Berlin Treaty — that instrument which they had themselves depreciated and denounced. Nothing, of course, could have been said against their policy if it had been thorough-going ; but they insisted only on those clauses which were adverse to the Turkish interests, and ignored others that would be offensive to Russia or inconvenient to Bulgaria. The story of the delimitation of the Greek and the Montenegrin frontiers, the temporary Concert of Europe, and the Dulcigno Demonstration, falls outside the scope of the present volume. It is enough to say that the partial success which was achieved had to be dearly paid for. We had affronted and injured the Sultan in Europe, so he deter- mined to have his revenge in Africa. There is no reasonable doubt that the troubles which arose in the Valley of the Nile, and subsequently extended to Khartoum, were exasperated, if they were not origin- ated, by the machinations of the Porte. It is true that they might have been suppressed in the beginning had there been in Egypt a more effective instrument of European control than the Condominium exercised by England and France. It is also true that the native soldiers whom Arabi induced to join him had real grievances to bring forward. But as a Nationalist RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 71 movement the rising was simply an imposture. The timidity which Tewfik Pasha displayed at the beginning — a lack of judgment for which his subsequent loyalty made ample amends — was due to his suspicion, his well- founded belief, that the intrigues of Arabi and his con- federates were not frowned upon at Constantinople, and that, if he showed too much alacrity in restoring order, he would lose the favour of his Suzerain, and possibly endanger his own position as Khedive. The game in which Mr. Gladstone's Government were now called to take a hand would have taxed the skill and nerve of the most ruse diplomatist, acting with complete knowledge and full authority. But the Ministry, as we know, were distracted by diversity of views, hampered by pacific pledges and non-intervention theories ; and, though for knowledge of facts and shrewd- ness of inference they could not have been better advised than by Lord Granville, he lacked that confidence and authority which would command assent and bring about a firm and consistent policy. The Sultan hostile ; the Khedive hesitating ; the native regiments insubordinate ; the civil population in- different ; France watching her chance to edge us out of the country ; Parliament opposed to any action that would cost money; Prince Bismarck, though he denied the imputation, delighted at the growth of complications which would bring us into acute misunderstanding with the Quai d'Orsay — these were the main factors of the situation. It is absolutely certain that nothing would have startled Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues more than to be told that within two years of obtaining power 72 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. they would make themselves, by right of conquest, masters of Egypt. That result might never have come about had not the resignation of M. Gambetta, the one great statesman produced by the Third Republic, placed the direction of French policy in the less con- fident grasp of M. de Freycinet. He was ready to join in despatching ships by way of naval demonstration, but he did not intend the French ironclads to go into action. The procrastination of the Powers, their evident division, the success of his revolt, the apparent collapse of Tewfik, encouraged Arabi, intoxicated him. The demand of Sir Beauchamp Seymour (Lord Alcester), that he should forthwith desist from the fortifications which he was constructing with some military skill, was one which he thought need not be obeyed ; and when he saw that the British Admiral was in earnest he actually had the audacity to fire the first shot. So began the bombardment of Alexandria, an operation not quite so safe and simple as it is sometimes repre- sented. The officer of the United States Navy who was appointed by his Government to report on the operations has shown that if the Egyptians, who displayed consider- able skill and courage, had realised how little damage had been done to their forts by the British fire, and how easily it might have been repaired, and above all, if they had known that Admiral Seymour's ammunition was running out, they might have given us a good deal of trouble. The easy victory we won, and the very creditable seamanship employed to gain it, do not make the page a glorious one in the annals of the British Navy ; but the blame for the subsequent outbreak of rioting, RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 73 pillage, and murder in Alexandria cannot fairly be laid to the Admiral's door. Already he might be afraid that the Government would not thank him for com- mitting them to open war, and he naturally shrank from any action on land. It was only after the mob had been for two days in possession of the town, had killed about 2000 Europeans (mostly Greeks and Levantines), destroyed an enormous amount of property, and started fires at several points, that Sir Beau champ Seymour sent out a small landing-party, and in a few hours brought the cowardly rabble under control. Having gone so far, the Government were bound to advance yet further. The bombardment of Alexandria had commenced on the morning of July nth, 1882, and was renewed on the 12 th, but on the afternoon of the latter day it was discovered that Arabi had abandoned the whole line of fortifications. His retreat might, perhaps, have been cut off had the Fleet been accom- panied by a sufficient number of men equipped for land service ; but the absence of such a necessary provision, as well as the short supply of shot and shell, showed how far it had been from the intentions of the Government to have their ironclads used except by way of demonstration. The small saving which they effected by sending the Admiral without proper support and supplies proved, however, an expensive economy. On July 24th, Mr. Gladstone had to move a Vote of Credit for ^2,300,000 for the military expedition, ordered four days before, for the restoration of order and the Khedive's authority — with or without the co-operation of other countries. 74 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. The brilliant little campaign brought by Sir Garnet (now Lord) Wolseley, with the assistance of Sir Edward Hamley, to a successful issue by the hazardous night- march and the storming of Tel-el-Kebir, enabled Ministers to close, with something like credit, the first chapter of their adventures in Egypt ; and we may safely infer, from what we know of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke, that, once committed to war- like operations, they interposed no obstacle to their being pressed forward with all possible despatch and efficiency. But there was another, and at this time more important, representative of the Radicals for whom it was no longer possible to remain in the Ministry. Mr. Bright, as we have seen, was not only a political economist who hated all war as waste of the wealth of nations, but a Quaker — though not of the strictest sect of the Society of Friends — who thought that self-defence was the only possible excuse for shedding man's blood. He had delayed his resignation, out of personal regard for Mr. Gladstone, as long as possible — as long as the true character of our action in Egypt could be disguised by the amiable sophistries of his Chief, who represented that we were only protecting the peaceful inhabitants of Egypt from military tyranny. But the bombardment of Alexandria and the intended operations on land left Mr. Bright no alternative but reluctantly to sever a life-long association in politics. Some surprise had, indeed, been expressed that the decision was so long postponed; and it was rather unfairly hinted that Mr. Bright's tenacity of office had made him falter in his religious principles. It is more charitable, and more RADICALISM IN THE CABINET. 75 probable, to assume that his hesitancy arose from the natural unwillingness of a staunch and sincere partizan to injure the political Cause and embarrass the Leader he believed to be great instruments of national good. The secession of Mr. Bright marks the first public divergence, on point of principle, between himself and his colleague in the representation of Birmingham, both in the House of Commons and the Cabinet. To war in the abstract, we may take it, Mr. Chamberlain was quite as much opposed as Mr. Bright ; but from these particular hostilities which had so suddenly arisen the former saw no honourable means of escape, and he concurred in the measures taken for bringing them to a victorious termination. The loss of Mr. Bright was unimportant in Parliament, since there was no fear that his great eloquence would be actively exerted against the Government of which he had been a member. The sinecure office he had held was filled by the appointment of Mr. Dodson (Lord Monk Bretton), whose promotion from the Local Government Board gave Mr. Gladstone an opportunity of admitting Sir Charles Dilke to the Cabinet, and investing him with duties for which he was, by his capacity for assimilating masses of dry facts, even more suited than for the office of Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It had been understood, when Sir Charles Dilke stood aside in 1880, that he should be put in the Cabinet on an early oppor- tunity; and the arrangement had this special advantage, that one Radical was replaced by another. But it would be idle to pretend that the new member, if a shrewder adviser and a far more capable administrator, possessed 76 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in the country at large the influence and moral force wielded by his predecessor. Within the Cabinet, however, the Radical element was greatly strengthened by the change of persons. Between Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke there was a greater sympathy in political objects, more probability of coherent action, than between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Bright. You very soon came to the bottom of Mr. Bright's Radicalism ; it might be summed up in the two precepts Laissez-faire and "Force is no remedy"; and in all essentials it was less opposed to Toryism -minus- Pro- tection than to the State Socialism of politicians who believed that Imperial or Municipal authority should be employed where individual effort would be ineffectual or less efficient. Between the State Socialism at this time associated in England with advanced Liberalism (though, abroad, it was patronised by so autocratic a statesman as Bismarck), and the more adventurous doctrines of modern Conservatism — Free Education, Old Age Pen- sions, Assisted Purchase of Dwelling-houses, and the like — there exists, if not identity, a common element of Paternalism, which, no doubt, helped to bridge the gulf that Mr. Chamberlain was one day to be asked to cross. CHAPTER IV. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. The Fenian and Agrarian movements in Ireland — The Irish and the Irish- Americans — The Compensation for Disturbance Bill — Mr. Chamberlain and the Peers — Dissension in the Cabinet — Renewal of Coercion — Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain — The Land Bill not satisfactory to the Parnellites — Mr. Chamberlain on the right of eviction — His defence of the general policy of the Govern- ment — The limits of concession to Ireland — The " Treaty of Kilmainham " and the suppressed Clause — Mr. Foster's resig- nation — His successor murdered in Phcenix Park — Mr. Trevelyan becomes Chief Secretary — Mr. Chamberlain's disappointment — Ireland still unreconciled — A test of Liberal faith. THE retirement of Mr. Bright was not a single instance of Cabinet disagreement. But to under- stand the resignation, first of the Duke of Argyll and afterwards of Mr. Forster and Lord Cowper — re- placed respectively by Lord Carlingford as Lord Privy Seal, and Mr. (Sir) G. Trevelyan and Lord Spencer, as Chief Secretary and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland — it is necessary to give a brief summary of events in Ireland, and of the Ministerial policy with regard to that country. And at this point we shall have to touch one of the most debated episodes in Mr. Chamberlain's career. To attain brevity and, so far as possible, avoid con- trovertible assertions, it will be assumed that the two Irish demands which became urgent at the end of the 77 78 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. "seventies" — the one for Home Rule, and the other for reform in Land Tenure — were equally genuine, and that it was the stubborn refusal of these concessions to the national desire which forced the former movement into Fenianism and the latter into Agrarianism. It will be simpler to put aside the two contradictory suggestions, first, that Mr. Parnell bribed the peasant cultivators into supporting Home Rule by promising them something- like the freehold of their farms, and, secondly, that he manufactured the agrarian agitation in order to get up more steam for his political propaganda. The safer, and probably the sounder, theory is that two movements which have shown so much vigour and had existed long before "that genius Parnell" — as Lord Salisbury has called him — illumined them with a flash of romance, did proceed from a real national feeling. If we have weakened the agrarian cry by granting nearly all it asked for, we have not yet made any impression on the Home Rule cause. We may have proved that every conceiv- able scheme is unworkable, we may have convinced its advocates that nothing but force will extort it from the Imperial Parliament, but we cannot congratulate our- selves on having killed, or even crippled, the agitation until the Unionists have made some inroad into those solid electoral districts where none but a Nationalist can- didate stands a chance of being returned to Westminster. It was a simple conception which Mr. Parnell hit upon — to work Home Rule and Agrarianism side by side, to use Mr. Davitt and his Land League for the Parlia- mentary campaign. He was favoured by a season of distress which could easily be magnified into a Famine ; THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 79 and on June 7th, 1879, he stood, at Westport, on the same platform as Mr. Davitt — released on ticket-of-leave from the fifteen years' penal servitude to which he had been sentenced in 1870, on the charge of conspiracy to depose the Queen and levy war against her. On this occasion Mr. Parnell advised the tenants that their only hope was to get rid of the landlord system. Mr. Glad- stone's Act of 1870 had been a complete failure, since it did not deprive a landlord of the right to evict tenants who did not pay their rents. The proprietors of the soil must be bought out. But that was for the future. The thing to do at present was for the tenants to insist on paying no more than a "fair rent," and they must "hold a firm grip of their homesteads and lands" if they wanted to make the landlords "see the position." The farmers must not let themselves be dispossessed. It would not do to rely on their Parlia- mentary representatives. Let them remember that God helps those who help themselves. On the last day of the following October, the Land League was formally inaugurated in Dublin. The objects were defined as the reduction of rack-rents and to assist the occupiers to become the owners of the soil. The methods were to promote organization among the tenants, to defend those who might be threatened with eviction for refusing to pay unjust rents, to help in working the Bright Clauses of the Land Act, and so to reform the law that a tenant should acquire the freehold of his farm by paying a fair rent for a limited number of years. Other Resolutions were that Mr. Parnell (the President) should be re- quested to go to America to beat up subscriptions, and 8o JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. that none of the League funds should be employed for Parliamentary expenses. So far, then, the League would appear to be an ex- clusively agrarian association : what connection had it with the political movement ? The key lies in Mr. Parnell's projected journey to the United States. In England it was given out that his purpose was to collect money for the starving peasantry ; in Ireland, that he was collecting subscriptions for the Land League ; in America, that he was working up a political organization to smash the Union. The project did not greatly prosper at first, and it became necessary, if the dollars were to come in freely, for the Land League to explain, by the mouth of Mr. Davitt, that it did not conflict with " any higher national aspiration for the complete redemption of Ireland." Mr. Parnell was personally almost unknown by the Irish Americans, but Mr. Davitt's introduction was sufficient. The latter it was who had organized the New Departure — i.e. the agreement for mutual toleration and co-operation between the Physical Force advocates in America and the more or less constitutional agitators in the United Kingdom. Between the Americans, who cared nothing for the Land League or the Constitu- tional Movement, and Mr. Parnell, who disliked the idea of armed insurrection, stood Mr. Davitt, whose Fenianism and Agrarianism were equally irreproachable. A comfortable understanding was soon arrived at. On January 2, 1880, Mr. Parnell, in New York, admitted that a social revolution could not be effected by "dealing with it in kid gloves." A true revolutionary movement, he went on, should have an open and a THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 81 secret side. The Land League, for instance, was open — indeed, he would not himself belong to an illegal organization. But he did not condemn the Clan-na-Gael, and would not disdain to take assistance from it. On February 20th he made his most famous and, from the Clan-na-Gael point of view, most satisfactory utterance. The ultimate goal, he said at Cincinnati, was, when English misgovernment had been undermined, to pave the way for Ireland to take her place among the nations of the earth. " None of us," he declared, " will be satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England." Even more explicit were the views of Mr. Biggar, who, at a banquet held in the Leader's honour on his return, avowed that if constitutional means failed to get Ireland her rights, he thought " Ireland would produce another Hartmann, and probably with a much better result." Hartmann, it may be explained, was the man who had just been arrested in Paris on the charge of having tried to blow up the Czar in his Winter Palace. Up to this point, then, we see that Mr. Parnell, assisted by Mr. Davitt, had been working with a double purpose : to bring the Physical Force enthusiasts in America, who had the dollars, into line with the Constitutionalists in Ireland, and to combine the demand for Home Rule with the cry for Land Reform, so that all Irishmen who cared for either object should be welded into one organi- zation. It was his success in both these undertakings which gave him the authority he wielded in Ireland till within a few months of his death. The means by which he extended his influence to Parliament, the relentless obstruction of all Imperial business until Irish wishes G 82 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. were considered and partially satisfied, excited the admiration and disgust of the two English Parties, for whom he felt and expressed equal contempt. It had been quite understood that the Session of 1881 would be an Irish one. But that did not content the Nationalists. The request was made, when the new Ministry met Parliament in 1880, that time should be found for a measure to suspend evictions. The Chief Secretary replied that this meant a Bill for the Suspension of Payment of Rent, and he declined to see any distinction between the two proposals. On June 12th, however, he had to announce — so firm had been the pressure applied by the Nationalists, and so strong the support it had received from the Radicals in the Cabinet— that the Government had in effect accepted the principle asserted by the Nationalists, and incorporated it in their Bill for the Relief of Distress in Ireland. Such was the origin of the notorious Compensation for Disturbance Bill. The best excuse for the scheme was that its proposed duration was limited to the end of 1881, until the contemplated Land Act should come into force. The conditions under which a defaulting tenant could claim compensation for having been evicted were that he must really have been unable to pay his rent, an inability caused by bad seasons, not by idleness or thriftlessness ; that he should be willing to continue his occupation on reasonable terms ; and, finally, that the landlord should have refused such terms. Mr. Chamberlain was one of the warmest supporters of a measure which the Government thought themselves compelled to adopt. It was rejected in the House of Lords by 252 votes against 51, and a loud outcry was THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 8 j raised by the Radical Party against that body. Mr. Chamberlain did not mince his words : — "You will recollect the solemn warning which Mr. Gladstone, in urging the acceptance of that Bill upon the House of Commons, addressed to us in reference to the state of affairs. He said, ' Ireland stands within measurable distance of civil war,' and he urged that this Bill should be accepted as, in the opinion of the Govern- ment, necessary to strengthen their hands, and to enable them to secure obedience to law and order. The warning- was neglected — the House of Lords rejected the Bill, and I say, never in the history of that House has it committed a more unwise and a more unpatriotic act. If that Bill had been passed, we have the assurance of the leaders of the Irish Land League themselves that they could not have successfully continued their agitation. The Bill was rejected, and civil war has begun. Class is arrayed against class in social strife, and now 30,000 soldiers and 12,000 policemen are barely sufficient to enable the Government to protect the lives and the property of the Queen's subjects in Ireland." As a matter of fact, Mr. Chamberlain, with the rest of his Party, was wrong as to the sequence of events. The agitation which followed the rejection of the Bill had also preceded it. The movement against Rent had been started, and the Land League organized, a year before ; Boycotting and intimidation were already in full swing ; and the Fenian organization was re-established, and had showed its activity in almost every part of the country. And if the Bill which, according to those who supported it, would have averted the troubles that were in store ; if it would have met the chief demands of the farmers, and brought about a temporary settlement, how is it that Mr. Parnell and his immediate following declined to vote 84 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. for the Third Reading? They would not have walked out of the House if the measure had been one to satisfy their constituents. If, in the shape and with the limita- tions devised by Mr. Gladstone's Administration, it was not passed with the acceptance of the Parnellite members of Parliament, it certainly would not have induced them to check, to refrain from increasing, the agitation which had been going on for nearly two years. That agitation, with the more serious dangers that might follow, was the excuse precedent for bringing in the Bill ; it cannot also have been the result of throwing it out. The truth is that — once the measure was lost — it be- came, in the eyes of its friends, invested with an efficacy not previously apparent. It must be remembered, too, that the division into Unionists and Home Rulers had not yet been introduced into English politics, the Moderate Liberals were still strong in the House of Lords, and the Bill was lost because it was condemned by their judgment. It is likely, probable indeed, that the discon- tent in Ireland, partly genuine and partly manufactured, was exasperated by a sense of disappointment ; but it was chiefly in England, where there was less appreciation of the forces really at work, that the Peers were found guilty of causing all the crimes and suffering engendered by the Land League. There is, however, no reason to suggest that English Radicals were insincere in these charges. Honestly they believed in their Bill, and they were at their wits' end to find an excuse for the Coercion which they were about to enforce — so they put it all down to the Peers. The reason for this mistake and misrepresentation was THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 85 not the wilful blindness of mere partizanship. The Radicals at this time — Mr. Chamberlain with them — believed and said that the real Irish difficulty was agrarian discontent ; and, if the causes of it were re- moved or modified, they expected that the cry for Separation, or Home Rule, would gradually die away. They did not recognise, or did not fully recognise, that there was quite as much vitality in the political as in the social programme. To pretend that the disturbances of 1880 were due simply to agrarian unrest is to ignore so very significant an incident as the raid on the Juno, when forty cases of firearms were carried off by the Fenians. The local branch of the Land League, at Cork, took it on itself to condemn that enterprise. The question was at once referred to headquarters. Mr. Brennan was of opinion that, in future, it would be as well if the Cork people were to mind their own business, and Mr. Dillon ex- pressed himself to the same effect. As a result, the Resolution was expunged by the Cork branch. It was at Ennis, on September 19th, that Mr. Parnell formulated the course of action which was advisable in cases of " land-grabbing." "What," he asked, "are you to do with a tenant who bids for a farm from which his neighbour has been evicted ? (' Kill him ! ' ' Shoot him ! ') Now, I think I heard somebody say, ' Shoot him ! ' (' Shoot him ! ') I wish to point out a very much better way — a more Christian and charitable way — which will give the lost sinner an opportunity of repenting. (' Hear, hear ! ') When a man takes a farm from which another has been evicted, you must show him on the roadside when you meet him, you must show him in the streets of the town, 86 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. you must show him in the shop-counter, you must show him in the fair and in the market-place, and even in the place of worship — by leaving him severely alone, by putting him into a moral Coventry, by isolating him from his kind as a leper of old — you must show him your detestation of the crime he has committed ; and you may depend upon it, if the population of a county in Ireland carry out this doctrine, that there will be no man so full of avarice, so lost to sense of shame, as to dare the public opinion of all right-thinking men within the county, and to transgress your unwritten code of laws." So thoroughly were these counsels taken to heart by the ignorant peasants to whom they were addressed, so established was the reign of terror in the country districts, that Mr. Forster once again got his head given him, and resolved on prosecuting the leaders of the movement. On October 23rd, criminal informations were filed against Mr. Parnell, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Biggar, and about a dozen others. At the Lord Mayor's banquet, on November 9th, Mr. Gladstone, while referring to the remedial measures about to be introduced for the benefit of the Irish tenants, declared that prior to this must be the duty of enforcing the law. This statement he accompanied with a clear intimation that if the existing Statutes were not sufficient Ministers would ask for further powers. All the time, however, it was known that Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain were strongly opposed to the renewal of Coercion ; and in a speech delivered in the same month as Mr. Gladstone's, Lord Salisbury sar- castically alluded to the " Birmingham members of the Cabinet " as being unconsciously enlisted on the side of outrage and disorder. This, of course, was an opponent's way of putting the case. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 87 • "Crime and outrage," he said, "though very disagreeable to those who live in the midst of them, have a Parlia- mentary value. A Land Bill, especially if it contained confiscatory clauses, would fall very flat if there were no disturbances in Ireland. The longer the disturbance continues the fiercer it becomes, and the more cause there would seem to be for exceptional legislation next Session ; and if there are members of the Government — as I suspect there are — who have some pet project, some darling theory, to promote, they will wish for that state of things which will furnish the argument that will best establish their theories. On the other hand, if the land- lords are delivered over for the winter to the tender mercies of the Land League, it may be hoped they will be more pliable next spring, and will offer their fleeces more readily to the shearer who may desire to shear them. In other words, the present state of Ireland, all the anarchy, and all the crime committed in that country, are so many arguments for future legislation. Every person who is shot, or wounded, or carded, or tarred and feathered, contributes to bring revolutionary principles, with regard to the land of Ireland, within the range of practical politics. He would act on Mr. Gladstone's mind with the same effect as the Clerkenwell outrage." There were, Lord Salisbury said on another occasion, two Governments in Ireland : the ostensible Executive, which discussed and hesitated, but did not act ; and a secret system, which acted with a definite purpose, betray- ing no sign of distraction and division, operating in extreme cases by assassination, but more generally by torment and torture, cruelty, and destruction of property. Then Lord Salisbury turned upon Mr. Bright, and his maxim that force is no remedy. That, he retorted, was not the opinion of the Land League. Every day it was bringing, by these methods, new districts under its control. Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Salisbury said, had inquired why 88 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. • it was that during the Conservative regime order had been maintained, but anarchy broke out as soon as the Liberals came into office ? The theory advanced by Lord Salisbury was, that the Irish were demoralised by the " electioneering habits of the Liberal Party." Another was that the Con- servatives would have crushed the disorder before it became dangerous. Mr. Gladstone's Ministry had already waited for six months before taking action, and if they waited another six months there might be no remedy save that of extreme measures. If this "philanthropic dawdling" went on much longer, we should have to face the alter- natives of subjugating Ireland, or separating from her. The hesitation in the Cabinet was, however, not due to any individual lack of purpose. The collective decision was delayed because the two opposing wills were still evenly balanced. Neither Mr. Forster nor Mr. Chamber- lain had yet succeeded in getting his own way ; each was working his hardest to win over Mr. Gladstone, whose only firm resolve at this moment was to let neither of his advisers break away, or be driven, from the Ministry. We may fairly assume that no abstract argument, no consideration of probable, but still unrealised, conse- quences, would have induced either Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Bright to sanction the exceptional or coercive legislation which was in direct opposition to the most cherished principles of Radicalism. They were only converted — so far as they ever were converted — by accomplished facts, and by the proved impotence of the existing law. It was not so much the murder of Lord Mountmorres, on September 25th — to take the most notorious instance — as the inability of the police to get THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 89 any clue to the crime, the open sympathy of the peasantry with the perpetrators of such acts, and their organized refusal to assist in detecting them, which overpowered for a time the objections to Mr. Forster's proposals. A series of Cabinet Councils was held in November, and though this is not an unusual time for settling the business of the ensuing Session, the meetings were so frequent and prolonged that a general belief sprang up that a Ministerial crisis was about to declare itself. The scale was, perhaps, now turned in favour of Mr. Forster by the organised persecution of Captain Boycott, and the necessity of protecting him with a military force. His labourers and stablemen left him in a body, tradesmen were warned not to deal with him, his crops were left ungathered, and the bearer of a telegram was stopped and " cautioned." On December 8th, Mr. Forster issued a circular to the Irish magistrates, reminding them of their powers for dealing with disturbances of the peace, and recommending them, where necessary, to apply for extra force. What kind of military precautions would have been required throughout Ireland may be inferred from the fact that 7,000 men had been employed in county Mayo to keep the peace while a party of Orangemen, from Ulster, were engaged in gathering Captain Boycott's crops. At this rate the whole strength of the British Army would be required for police work in Ireland.. It was pretty certain, therefore, that, when Parliament re- assembled, Mr. Forster would be invested with the powers for which he asked. An incentive in this direc- tion was supplied by the action of the Irish Party on the 27th. At the meeting presided over by Mr. Parnell, the 90 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Sessional Chairman and now recognised Leader, it was resolved that the members should sit on the Opposition benches, whether the Conservatives or the Liberals hap- pened to be in office. By this decision they once again marked their absolute independence of both English Parties. They had, at the General Election, thrown the whole weight of their influence on Mr. Gladstone's side, but the impending prosecution of Mr. Parnell and some of his Parliamentary colleagues had made them, if possible, more hostile to the Liberals than to the Conservatives. The only other result of the prosecutions in Dublin was that Mr. Justice Fitzgerald pronounced the Land League an illegal Association ; but the disagreement of the Jury showed that it was useless to look to the ordinary process of law for the punishment of "political offenders." On January 7th, 1881, the Queen's Speech was read, and explained the whole Irish programme of the Government. The first place was occupied by a demand for coercive powers, which were necessitated by the "alarming char- acter" of the "social condition of the country." Agrarian crimes had multiplied, the administration of justice was frustrated, evidence was impossible to obtain, and an " extended system of terror " had paralyzed the exercise of private rights and the performance of public duties. Following the measures for arming the Executive with repressive powers would be a Bill for further regulating the relations between landlord and tenant, and for assisting the establishment of a peasant proprietary. Another Bill would be submitted for the establishment of County Government in Ireland on representative principles. But Ministers were very much deluded if THE EIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 91 they supposed that these remedial proposals would re- concile the Nationalist Party to the stringent Coercion about to be enforced. An Amendment to the Address was moved by Mr. Parnell, and, after seven nights' Debate, was rejected by 435 votes against 57. The overwhelming bulk of the Liberals, English, Welsh, and Scotch, with the Conservatives, supported the Ministry, but it is worth mention that in the minority were eight members of the Radical Party, politicians who were known to be on most points in sympathy with Mr. Bright, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir Charles Dilke. The Protection of Life and Property Bill, introduced by Mr. Forster, amongst other provisions of a most coercive character, invested the Lord- Lieutenant with the power of ordering the arrest of any person whom he might reasonably suspect of any treasonable or agrarian offence. The prisoner was to be treated as an uncon- victed person, but could be kept in confinement to the end of September, 1882. There was no need to put him on trial. This is, perhaps, the most arbitrary power ever demanded by a modern Government in this country, and no Ministry except a Liberal-Radical one would have ventured to ask for it. The object was, as Mr. Forster said, to lay hold of " village tyrants," who practised intimidation because they knew that nobody dare give evidence against them. But he admitted that he would never have accepted office if he had thought it would devolve on him to make such a proposal ; and if he could have foreseen that this would be the result of twenty years of Parliamentary life he would rather have left Parliament than undertake it. The object of the 9 2 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Peace Preservation Bill, which followed the more im- portant measure, was to render the possession of arms illegal within a "proclaimed district." The Protection of Life and Property Bill was opposed at every stage by the Nationalists. On Mr. Gladstone's moving that it would have precedence over all other business, the discussion was protracted for twenty hours. When it was resumed next day, Mr. Bright marked the adhesion of the Radical members of the Cabinet to Mr. Forster's policy by an impassioned attack on the Land League, which, he said, had demoralised the people. He had voted against coercive proposals in the past because he did not at the time believe them necessary, and because they were not accompanied, as in this instance, by remedial measures. He supported them now because he knew Mr. Forster and felt con- fidence in him, and because the Land League had superseded the law of Parliament. Mr. Chamberlain does not appear to have taken part in the Debates on this measure, but it was assumed that his views were fairly represented by Mr. Bright's remarkable utterance, and that, while he retained all his objections to Coercion as a principle, he was ready, if not to admit that they were inapplicable to the present circumstances, at least to waive them for the present. Any scruples he might have enter- tained on this point must have been weakened by the defiantly obstructive tactics employed by the Nationalists. Such a scandal as the Forty-one Hours' Sitting, only terminated by the coup diktat of the Speaker (Brand), must have been specially offensive to a politician who has gone even to extreme lengths in his desire to improve THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 93 the legislative efficiency of Parliament. The abstract sympathy which he felt with the political objects of the Home Rule Party must have been considerably reduced by his disgust, as a Radical believing in the almost divine right of a majority, at the methods by which the Irish members sought to defeat or delay the progress of business. It was, indeed, only by use of the Closure that the two measures on which Mr. Forster relied for the restoration of order were carried through the House. It was hardly to be expected from political human nature that Con- servatives, though assisting the Government with their votes, should forbear from twitting Mr. Gladstone with having brought in five Coercion Bills, while Lord Beaconsfield had only proposed one. More bitter were the taunts levelled against the Cabinet by the Radicals. Mr. Cowen, in particular, fell foul of Mr. Bright's dictum that the law of repression might be an instrument of tyranny in the hands of a tyrant, but in the hands of men who had spent their lives in the promotion of freedom it would be a measure of protection. Mr. T. P. O' Connor pleasantly remarked that the deadliest foe to freedom was a Liberal Minister. Though no delay was encountered either by the Coercion or the Arms Bill (as they were popularly called) in the House of Lords, it was March 2 1 st before the second had received the Royal Assent and the Government were able to begin work with the Land Bill which they regarded as their Message of Peace to Ireland. The relief experienced by Mr. Chamberlain at the prospect of escaping for a time from the Coercion he 94 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. detested to the constructive legislation he believed in, is evidenced by his remarks on the situation in Ireland : "What is to be done now? Well, the Tories have no doubt whatever as to the course which we ought to pursue. By the mouths of their leaders, by their organs in the press, they urge upon the Government to put aside at once the Land Bill, to give up any attempt at remedial legislation, and to go to Parliament for more and more Coercion, for the abolition of trial by jury, for the suppression of the Land League, and for other stringent and arbitrary measures. Well now, for my part, I hate Coercion. I hate the name and I hate the thing. I am bound to say that I believe there is not one of my colleagues who does not hate it as I do. But then we hate disorder more. It seems to me that the issue is now with the Irish people and those who lead them. They can have no doubt any longer. It might have been possible before ; they can have no doubt any longer as to the intentions of the Government. We have brought in a Land Bill. We have offered our message of peace to the Irish people. * * ■* -3f * * I do not say that it may not be susceptible of amend- ment, but I say that, as it stands, and, speaking generally of its main provisions, it has been welcomed by the majority of the Irish press. It has been frankly accepted as satisfactory by the whole of Ulster. It has been approved — I am always speaking of its main proposals — it has been approved by the Roman Catholic clergy." The Land Bill of which Mr. Chamberlain spoke so hopefully was based, to some extent, on the Reports of the Duke of Richmond's and Lord Bessborough's Com- missions. The majority of the former body had declined to recommend in its entirety the scheme known as the Three F's — Fair Rents, Fixity of Tenure, and Free Sale — an arrangement which reduced the landlord to little THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 95 better than the position of an incumbrancer on his own estate. Among other remedies suggested were State assistance to voluntary emigration and the reclamation of waste lands. The Bessborough Commission, however, preferred to the latter proposals the advance of money by the State (four-fifths of the price) to tenants wishing to purchase their holdings, but by a five-to-one majority it supported a measure on the basis of the Three F's. This is not the place to inquire into the allegations made in the House of Lords as to the proceedings of the Bessborough Commission, and to the one-sided manner in which the evidence had been collected. The measure produced by the Government was described by Lord Carlingford, who piloted it through the House of Lords, as virtually consisting of the Three F's. The Irish tenant would now receive by law — what was accorded to him by custom in the most prosperous parts of the country — the right to dispose of his interest in his holding ; and this interest consisted of two elements, the value of his unexhausted improvements and the "good-will of his farm." How he acquired the latter, and whether it did not properly remain in the landlord, was a point that caused much discussion, but the abstract arguments of mere lawyers in the interests of landlords were not allowed to prevail against the determination of Ministers to appease the agrarian discontent prevailing throughout Ireland. By this enlarged conception of the Ulster custom of Tenant Right, the Government now set up what answered the demand for Free Sale. The establishment of a special tribunal, the Land Commission, to settle rents was defended on the ground 96 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. that in Ireland there was no real freedom of contract as between landlord and tenant, the latter being prepared to concede any terms rather than submit to being deprived of his holding. And, as a corollary to Fair Rents, it was necessary to give Fixity of Tenure — it would be no good for the Court to fix a rent if the landlord could terminate the tenancy at any moment he .pleased. By the Bill, therefore, which subsequently became law, a statutory term of fifteen years was created, during which period the rent might not be raised except with regard to capital laid out by the landlord under an agreement with the tenant. The only ground on which eviction could be sustained would be non-payment of rent, or the breach of certain covenants, such as those against sub-letting, or bankruptcy, or waste, or persistent obstruction of the landlord's right to mine, cut timber, etc. Besides these —the main — provisions of the Bill, were others relating to compensation for disturbance, reclamation of waste lands, voluntary emigration, and land purchase. Without going into any of the tech- nicalities raised in Committee in both Houses, or discussing the merits of the Amendments proposed by the Peers, it will be seen that in its original shape — nor was it afterwards substantially reduced to the detri- ment of the tenants — the measure was a large and generous reform ; or, as its opponents would prefer to say, it took a great deal of the landlord's property away and vested it in the tenant. The disgust of the Ministry may therefore be imagined when, on the last night of the Second Reading Debate, Mr. Parnell described the Bill as a miserable dole. It THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 97 would require such radical alterations before it could be accepted by his Party that he declined to compromise himself by voting for the principle of the measure. No- body was more indignant than Mr. Chamberlain, and he openly charged the Irish Party with seeking to obstruct the removal of grievances. "There is no secret about what I am going to say. There is no dispute about it. Mr. Parnell and those who follow him have never concealed the fact that their chief object is not the removal of grievances in Ireland, but the separation of Ireland from England. Why, only a few months ago Mr. Parnell, speaking in Ireland, said that he would never have joined the Land League, he would have taken no part in this great agitation which has been called into existence to redeem the Irish people from the conse- quences of centuries of wrong — he would have taken no part in that agitation if he had not thought it would have helped him in the Nationalist and Separatist movement, in which he chiefly takes an interest. How can we satisfy these men? Our object is not the same as theirs; we want to remove every just cause of grievance. They want to magnify grievances and to intensify differences. We want to unite the Irish people and the English and the Scotch in bonds of amity. We want, I say, to bind the Irish people to this country in bonds of amity and cordial union, just as much as Scotland is united to England, although the time was when Scotchmen felt as bitter a hostility to the union as Irishmen now profess to feel. Well, under these circumstances, I find that the gentlemen to whom I have referred do not openly oppose the Land Bill, because, I believe, they are well aware that their constituents would not justify them in such a course. But they are not unwilling to put obstacles in its way. They are not unwilling to raise Motions for Adjournment or to put questions which lead to Debate, and which take up the precious time of the House, which ought to be ex- pended solely in the promotion of this measure; and, above all, they try by agitation to force upon the Government H 98 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. impossible concessions, the effect of which, if only we were to accept them, they know would be that the Bill would very likely be rejected by the House of Commons, and would certainly be rejected by the House of Peers." Nor would Mr. Chamberlain lend any countenance — anti-coercionist as he still was, in conviction — to Mr. Parnell's suggestion that the Executive should not allow the police or soldiery to be employed in protecting the men who were carrying out evictions. He has never sup- ported open defiance of the law, and even in these his most Radical days we find him speaking of the power of a mighty Empire as the one guarantee of liberty. An eviction might be, and sometimes was, a harsh and oppressive act, but it might also be the only way in which a landlord could secure a fair and moderate rent. " I say that in such a case as I have described," he went on, " the landlord's rent is as much his property as your coat or your money is yours." As for Mr. Parnell's advice to the tenants not to pay " unjust rents," were they to make themselves judges in their own case ? And some of the Land Leaguers went even further, and advised the tenants to pay no rent at all. " The problem before the Government was how to protect honest tenants from a harsh and unjust landlord, without protecting the dis- honest tenant in his dishonesty, and helping him to take advantage of the prevailing agitation so as to rob his creditors, refusing, with money in his pockets, to pay his landlord who, perhaps, was poorer than himself." The history of the Land Bill in the House of Lords, and of the conflict which at one period seemed menacing between the two Chambers, does not fall within the scope THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 99 of this volume. Lord Salisbury recommended that the measure should be read a second time, though he declared that the Irish landlord seemed henceforth to be " like a man living in a country ravaged by earthquakes — he could never know when some part of his property might not be destroyed." Of the modifications introduced by the Peers, and finally accepted by the Commons, the most important was the excision of the Parnell Clause, empowering the Land Court to stay proceedings against a tenant in arrear until his application for a Judicial Rent had been decided. On Mr. Gladstone's announcing that this would be included amongst other concessions to the Peers, Mr. Parnell declared that — if the term was Parliamentary — he would describe the conduct of the Government as contemptible ! Never was Ireland more disturbed than immediately after it had received the Message of Peace. Mr. Dillon advised the people not to break the law, but sail as close to the wind as they could. The cry for No Rent was raised throughout the South and West of Ireland. Mr. Gladstone was so embittered by the action of the Nation- alists that at Leeds, on October 7th, he made a vehement personal attack on their Leader. Mr. Parnell desired, the Prime Minister said, to stand, as Aaron stood, between the living and the dead; but to stand, not as Aaron stood, to arrest, but to spread the plague ! Mr. Parnell retorted, at Wexford, that Mr. Gladstone's remarks were un- scrupulous and dishonest. A few days afterwards he was removed from current controversy, and put under lock- and-key in Kilmainham. His arrest was followed by that of his most prominent colleagues, except Mr. Biggar and ioo JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Healy, who, at Mr. ParnelPs request, kept out of the range of Mr. Forster's Act. The situation at this moment has been summed up by Mr. T. P. O'Connor. " The two nations," he writes, "stoop opposite each other — both unanimous. Not a voice in England was raised in favour of Mr. Parnell ; not a voice in Ireland was raised in favour of Mr. Gladstone. Ireland and England confronted one another in universal and undisguised hatred." The League did not long delay its reply to the arrest of Mr. Parnell and his associates. On October 18th it issued the No Rent Manifesto from Kilmainham Prison, enjoining the tenants to pay nothing to the landlords until the prisoners were set at liberty. Two days later the League was proclaimed an illegal body, and nominally " suppressed," but most of its financial transactions were carried on under cover of the Ladies' Land League. That for the time Mr. Chamberlain was convinced of the necessity for strong measures, detest them as he did, we may infer from the speech he made at Liverpool on October 25th. From the utterances of a Minister in the House of Commons it is never safe to conclude that he is personally in favour of the course or the measure he is supporting. It may be that he has fought in the Cabinet against what he is advocating in Parliament. Having done his best to carry his own views, and having been over-ruled, he must either resign or assume his share of the collective responsibility. What he says in Parliament he says not for himself, but for the Cabinet. And some Prime Ministers are supposed to have enforced the cynical etiquette that the colleague who is most doubtful THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 101 of a measure shall be told off to defend it. It ensures his loyalty, and seals his convictions. But when a Minister makes a platform speech he is doing a voluntary act, and he certainly need not go out of his way to insist on opinions which are not really his own. Mr. Chamberlain took this occasion to enter on a general defence of the Ministerial policy In Ireland. He made allowance for the unreasonableness of the people of that country. It would be too much to expect that the bitter memories still lingering in thousands of Irish cabins should be entirely effaced by the " tardy and incomplete reparation of these later years." Once again he blamed the Peers for rejecting the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, and said that if the Nationalist leaders had discountenanced violence and intimidation their agitation would have deserved sympathy in England. But if they did not countenance, certainly they permitted, a system of terrorism which no civilised Government could endure. The reform of unjust laws, the ostensible object of the League, was approved by the Government, but they could not tolerate cruelty to animals, arson, and outrage. They had been compelled to suppress that association, because, instead of trying to remove a grievance, it was seeking to inflame it. The League, it must be admitted, was not only de- nouncing the Land Act as insufficient, but doing its best to make it a failure. And the object of the agrarian agitation was to assist the movement for national indepen- dence. Unless the Government were prepared to face the separation of England and Ireland, they were bound, Mr. Chamberlain said, to assert their authority. He could 102 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. not himself contemplate the establishment of a hostile Power within striking distance of our shores. If Ireland were given independence, the most probable result would be civil war, but, even if that were avoided, she would always be jealous and afraid of England. The two countries would be a standing menace to each other, and the naval and military expenditure would become intoler- able on both sides. And the end would be that Ireland would have to be reconquered, or England would be ruined. " I am not prepared," Mr. Chamberlain said, " to face these contingencies, and, therefore, I say — Liberal and Radical as I profess myself to be — to Ireland what the Liberals, or Republicans, of the North said to the Southern States of America, ' The Union must be preserved.' " It will be observed, from this passage, that Mr. Cham- berlain was not thinking of Home Rule, but of avowed Separation ; and this declaration must not be interpreted as proving that he was, in 1881, unalterably opposed to any of the widely different schemes put forward under the latter name, but all far more moderate than the one adopted five years later. Indeed, he goes on to Use language of a somewhat elastic character. " With these limits" — preservation of the Union — "there is nothing which you may not ask and hope to obtain : equal laws, equal justice, equal prosperity, these shall be freely accorded to you. Your wishes shall be our guide, your prejudices shall by us be respected, your interests shall be our interests ; but Nature and your position have forged indissoluble links which cannot be sundered with- out being fraught with consequences of misery and ruin to both our countries, and which, therefore, we will use THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 103 all the resources of the Empire to keep intact." But the Coercion he now endorsed still rankled in his mind. He referred to it once again as an odious and temporary expedient. Neither then nor since has he supported it except when accompanied by remedial measures. It was not Nationalist invective that hurt Mr. Chamber- lain, it was the taunts of English Radicals, like Mr. Cowen, against the men "who had so often stood before Europe as the friends of every slave shivering in his chains, but were themselves putting in force a despotism as remorse- less as was operating in Moscow." Still, the Government held, through the winter, to the firm, if severe policy demanded by Mr. Forster. The time was inopportune for relaxation when Ministers were, above all things, anxious that the Land Act should have a fair trial ; nor did the conduct of the Land Leaguers incline them to reconsider their position. The relations between the constitutional agitators in the United Kingdom and the advocates of Physical Force in America were becoming more apparent, and the indolent, unbelieving British public were now aware that the boasts about the Skirmishing Fund and Dynamite Conspiracies had some more solid basis than the imagina- tion of contributors to papers like the Irish World. On the meeting of Parliament, February, 1882, Ministers professed in the Queen's Speech to discern some "signs of improvement" in the condition of Ireland, but before the Easter Recess they almost admitted — the course of events showed — that their policy had, so far, failed. Moonlighting was carried on with something like impunity ; Boycotting and intimidation were systematically practised ; the importation of arms 164 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. was going on, it was found, on an extensive scale ; two of Lord Ardilaun's bailiffs were murdered in Connemara, an informer was shot in Dublin ; the suppression of the Land League had only transferred its activity to the Ladies' Land League ; the proposal to confer the Freedom of the City of Dublin on Mr. Parnell and Mr. Dillon was carried by the Corporation, and the example of the capital was followed by other centres of disaffection. From these facts, which are selected as indications of the general condition of affairs, it was open, at least, for those who disliked Coercion to argue that it had been ineffectual. The arguments of Mr. Chamber- lain and his Radical colleagues in the Cabinet were renewed, and pressed with increased vigour on the wavering mind of the Prime Minister. They triumphed at last ; and it was decided, since the leaders of the Land League could not be crushed, to try what might be done in the way of conciliation. Indeed, it was difficult at the time to see what further steps could be taken in the way of repression. About seven hundred persons were in prison as "suspects," and it would be impossible, even though the law by which they were detained would not expire in September, to deprive them of their liberty much longer without putting them on trial. On April ioth, the news was received that Mr. Parnell had been released from Kilmainham, and the news that he had only been allowed out of prison on parole (in order to attend the funeral of a relative in Paris), though it allayed the excitement, did not remove the impression that a new policy was to be started. On the 24th, how- ever, he returned to Kilmainham, and for a few days, THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 105 though many conjectures were circulated, nothing definite was ascertained. But on May 2nd it was known that Lord Cowper (Lord-Lieutenant) and Mr. Forster (Chief Secretary) had resigned ; that Mr. Parnell, Mr. Dillon, Mr. O'Kelly, and Mr. Davitt were to be set at liberty ; and that the Government would bring in an Arrears Bill on lines laid down by Mr. Parnell. Such, in effect, were the terms of the famous " Kilmain- ham Treaty " — the arrangement carried out by the Radical members of the Cabinet, who had now won Mr. Gladstone over to their own way of thinking. It was made in dis- regard, in defiance, of Mr. Forster's opinions ; it was, most impartial judges now agree, a mistaken and even a mischievous agreement. But there is no reason to accuse those who are responsible for it — and the chief responsibility rests with Mr. Chamberlain — of having played false to Mr. Forster. The negotiations were carried on without the Chief Secretary's concurrence, but he knew that they were going on, and he so far recognised them that he was willing for the prisoners to be released if they would give a trustworthy assurance that they and their friends " would not attempt, in any manner, to intimidate men into obedience to their un- written law." In a confidential letter to Mr. Gladstone he declared that, without such an undertaking, their liberation would only make matters worse, unless the country became so quiet that "Parnell and Co." could do little harm, or unless a strong Act was passed which w r ould make it possible to govern the country in defiance of them. This point is brought out by Sir T. Wemyss Reid, in his very interesting Life of the Right Hon. W. E. 106 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Forster, but it should be added that the author takes a very strong view of the treatment received by his hero. It is clear that, Mr. Forster — like Mr. Gladstone — was kept posted in every stage of the negotiations conducted by Captain O'Shea, as intermediary between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Parnell, and had a complete knowledge of everything done. The truth was that, at this time, the difference between the Coercionist and Anti-Coercionist members of the Cabinet had passed beyond a mere conflict of opinion or competition in advice. It was evident that there was no longer room for both groups in the same Ministry. Either the Radi- cals must be defied, or Mr. Forster must be driven out. To standing by Mr. Forster there was the objection that he would insist on still stronger powers of repression than those with which the Liberals had somewhat reluc- tantly provided him. It was not only a question of maintaining Coercion, but of increasing it. If the Prime Minister acceded to this demand, it was certain that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Bright would leave him. It would be carried, no doubt, because Ministers could rely on a sufficient number of Conservatives to support them ; but it would only be carried at the cost of a split with the Radicals, and no Minister has a more rooted dislike than Mr. Gladstone for turning to his adversaries for help against those who should be of his own following. On a calculation, then, of the advantages on both sides, and, perhaps, from weariness of severities that were not even successful, Mr. Gladstone decided that THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 107 the Radical policy should have a trial. The first over- tures came from Mr. Parnell. On April 13th, three days after his release on parole, Captain O'Shea, on his behalf, wrote both to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, urging the Government to take up the Arrears Question. Mr. Gladstone replied on the 15th : "April 15/72, 1882. "Dear Sir, — I have received your letter of the 13th, and I will communicate with Mr. Forster on the im- portant and varied matter which it contains. I will not now enter upon any portion of that matter, but will simply say that no apology can be required either for the length or the freedom of your letter. On the con- trary, both demand my acknowledgments. I am very sensible of the spirit in which you write, but I think you assume the existence of a spirit on my part with which you can sympathise. Whether there be any agreement as to the means, the end in view is of vast moment, and assuredly no resentment, personal prejudice, or false shame, or other impediment extraneous to the matter itself, will prevent the Government from treading in that path which may most safely lead to the pacification of Ireland." • Mr. Chamberlain's answer was dated the 17th : "April ipk, 1882. "My dear Sir, — I am really very much obliged to you for your letter, and especially for the copy of your very important and interesting communication to Mr. Gladstone. I am not in a position, as you will under- stand, to write you fully on the subject, but I think I may say that there appears to me nothing in your proposal which does not deserve consideration. I entirely agree in your view that it is the duty of the Government to lose no opportunity of acquainting them- selves with representative opinion in Ireland, and for that purpose that we ought to welcome suggestion and 108 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. criticism from every quarter and from all sections and classes of Irishmen, provided that they are animated by a desire for good government, and not by a blind hatred of all government whatever. There is one thing must be borne in mind — that if the Government and the Liberal party generally are bound to show greater con- sideration than they have hitherto done for Irish opinion, on the other hand the leaders of the Irish Party must pay some attention to public opinion in England and in Scotland. Since the present Government have been in office they have not had the slightest assistance in this direction. On the contrary, some of the Irish members have acted as if their object were to embitter and prejudice the English nation. The result is, that nothing would be easier than at the present moment to get up in every large town an anti-Irish agitation, almost as formidable as the anti-Jewish agitation in Russia. I fail to see how Irishmen or Ireland can profit by such policy, and I shall rejoice whenever the time comes that a more hopeful spirit is manifested on both sides." As Mr. Gladstone, at the time when the "Treaty" was discussed in Parliament, objected to the production of documentary evidence, the gaps have to be filled from the statements made by Captain O'Shea, Mr. Forster, Mr. Parnell, and from other matters subsequently brought to light. Mr. Parnell's promise to abstain from political agitation during his fortnight's release from Kilmainham — the condition on which that indulgence had been granted — did not preclude him from the negotiations now opened up by Captain O'Shea. When the latter, however, expressed his hope that the release might be permanent, the former replied, " Never mind about the ' suspects.' " The important thing, he said, was to settle the Arrears Question for the tenants then in danger of being evicted. Captain O'Shea's account is THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 109 that he expressed a doubt whether Ministers would bring in such a Bill as Mr. Parnell required, and exhorted him to use his personal influence towards preserving order in Ireland. It was, however, just after this interview that Captain O'Shea addressed himself to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, and obtained the replies given above. He was so far encouraged that, although after " numerous conversations " he failed to shake Mr. Forster in his opinions, he persevered with his mission, and, with the Chief Secretary's leave, had many interviews with the suspects in Kilmainham. At the same time as these negotiations were going on through Captain O'Shea, other overtures — as may be inferred from a question asked by Sir Walter Barttelot on June 13th, which Mr. Gladstone declined to answer — were made through Mr. Justin McCarthy, who was in communication between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Parnell. The result of the latter was embodied in a letter from Mr. Parnell, which Mr. Gladstone declined to produce, and which was dated two days later (April 30th) than the one (April 28th) which was read out in the House of Commons. As to the agrarian stipulations there was no substantial differ- ence between the documents, but it is curious that the one which has been kept from public knowledge did not contain the sentence, or any reference to the promise, which caused so much excitement in Parliament. When the time comes for the publication of the second and subsidiary correspondence, the wonder will be that so inoffensive an arrangement — inoffensive if we accept the Ministerial policy as to Arrears — was not placed before the public judgment. no JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Let us return now to the letter (April 28th) which has hitherto been the only material on which outsiders can, estimate the Treaty of Kilmainham ; and since it con- tains more, not less, than the letter of April 30th, we may safely assume that it was on this basis that the bargain was struck. Mr. Parnell wrote as follows : — " I was very sorry that you had left Albert Mansions before I reached London from Eltham, as I had wished to tell you that, after our conversation, I had made up my mind that it would be proper for me to put Mr. M'Carthy in possession of the views which I had pre- viously communicated to you. I desire to impress upon you the absolute necessity of a settlement of the Arrears Question which will leave no recurring sore connected with it behind, and which will enable us to show the smaller tenantry that they have been treated with justice and some generosity. The proposal you have described to me, as suggested in some quarters, of making a loan, over however many years the payment might be spread, should be absolutely rejected, for reasons which I have already fully explained to you. If the Arrears Question be settled upon the lines indicated by us, I have every confidence — a confidence shared by my colleagues — that the exertions which we should be able to make strenuously and unremittingly would be effective in stopping outrages and intimidation of all kinds. As regards permanent legislation of an ameliorative character, I may say that the views which you always shared with me, as to the admission of leaseholders to the Fair- Rent Clauses of the Act, are more confirmed than ever. So long as the flower of the Irish peasantry are kept outside the Act, there cannot be any permanent settlement of the Land Ques- tion, which we all so much desire. I should also strongly hope that some compromise might be arrived at, this Session, with regard to the amendment of the tenure clauses. It is unnecessary for me to dwell upon the enormous advantage to be derived from the full extension of the Purchase Clauses, which now seem practically to THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. in have been adopted by all parties. The accomplishment of the programme I have sketched out to you would, in my judgment, be regarded by the country as a practical settlement of the Land Question, and would, I feel sure, enable us to co-operate cordially for the future with the Liberal Party in forwarding Liberal principles and measures of general reform; and I believe that the Government at the end of this Session would, from the state of the country, feel themselves thoroughly justified in dispensing with further coercive measures. "Yours very truly, « c s . p ARNELL „ How was this proposal regarded by Mr. Forster ? We know what his views were — that the prisoners must not be released until they had given an unequivocal pledge to abstain from agitation, or until Ministers had been armed with new powers of repression. The letter from Mr. Parnell contained no definite promise, and Mr. Forster knew that his colleagues at the time were resolved against bringing in a new and stronger Coercion Bill. His own account of his feelings was given in the House of Commons, from a memorandum of his conversation with Captain O'Shea, on April 30th. "After telling me that he had been from eleven to five yesterday with Parnell, O'Shea gave me his letter to him, saying that he hoped it would be a satisfactory expression of union with the Liberal Party. After care- fully reading it, I said to him, ' Is that all, do you think, that Parnell would be inclined to say ? ' He said, ' What more do you want? Doubtless, I could supplement.' I said, ' It comes to this — that upon our doing certain things, he will help us to prevent outrages,' or words to that effect. He again said, ' How can I supplement it ? ' referring, I imagine, to different measures. I did not feel justified in giving him my own opinion, which might be interpreted to be that of the Cabinet, so I said I H2 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. had better show the letter to Mr. Gladstone, and one or two others. He said, ' Well, there may be faults in expression, but the thing is done ; if these words will not do, I must get others ; but what is obtained is ' (and here he used most remarkable words) ' that the conspiracy, which has been used to get up boycotting and outrages, will now be used to put them down, and that there will be a union in the Liberal Party.' And as an illustration of how the first of these results was to be obtained, he said that Parnell hoped to make use of a certain person,* and get him back from abroad, as he would be able to help him to put down conspiracy or agitation — I am not sure which word was used — as he knew all its details in the West. He was a released suspect, against whom we have for some time had a fresh warrant, and who, under disguises, had hitherto eluded the police, coming backwards and forwards from Egan to the outrage-mongers in the West. I did not feel myself sufficiently master of the situation to let him see what I thought of this confidence, but I again told him that I could not do more at present than tell others what he had told me." "A disgraceful compromise !" Such was Mr. Forster's expression. What, then, was Mr. Gladstone's view of the transaction? Writing to Mr. Forster, he referred to the words italicised in Mr. Parnell's letter as " a hors cFazuvre which we had no right to expect." We see, then, that Mr. Gladstone had taken note, and realised the value, of Mr. Parnell's promise to "co-operate cordially with the Liberal Party." But how is this fact to be reconciled with his public and explicit assertion that "there was not the slightest understanding of any kind, that Mr. Parnell had asked nothing of the Government, and the Government sought nothing from him " ? The truth came out on May 15th, when Mr. Parnell * The notorious Sheridan. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 113 rose in the House of Commons to tell the whole story, and read out what purported to be a copy of his own letter of the 28th. The recital was accurate, except in one respect — he omitted the italicised words. The device was the more ridiculous because Mr. Forster was present in his place — Mr. Forster, who had read and considered the whole text, and was not in the least likely to forget so salient a passage. He at once asked, in the most pointed manner, whether the whole document had been read. A lively description of the scene that ensued is given by Mr. H. W. Lucy in his recent biography of Mr. Gladstone : " Mr. Parnell said he had read the whole of the copy as supplied to him by Captain O'Shea. Captain O'Shea, who, though at this time on terms of personal intimacy with Mr. Parnell, and later disclosed as the emissary between Mr. Chamberlain and the captive Irish Leader in the preliminaries of the Kilmainham Treaty, usually sat with the Ministerialists. He was thus within reach of Mr. Forster, who, amid a scene of growing excitement, handed to him a document and asked him to read the last paragraph. Captain O'Shea showed some unwilling- ness, and there was a bandying of the paper to and fro between the front bench below the gangway and the shaggy statesman in the corner seat. Eventually Captain O'Shea read the paper handed to him by Mr. Forster. It proved to be a copy of Mr. ParnelPs letter, dated from Kilmainham, 28th April, 1882, addressed to Captain O'Shea. In it appeared a clause affirming that the settle- ment of the Land Question alluded to ' would, I feel sure, enable us to co-operate cordially for the future with the Liberal Party in forwarding Liberal principles.' "By whose authority, or at whose instigation, this im- portant passage in the letter had been omitted from the copy prepared for Mr. ParnelPs reading, is partly explained by Mr. Chamberlain. In the course of recurrent conver- sation on the subject, Mr. Chamberlain said that Captain ii4 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. O'Shea, in privately communicating Mr. Parnell's letter to him, had asked leave to withdraw the sentence omitted from the letter read by Mr. Parnell. The incident had, he assured the scoffing Conservatives, made so little impression on his mind, that when the letter was read by Mr. Parnell he had not noticed the omission was made.* That the letter in its complete form came before the Cabinet, and was discussed by them with the subsequently omitted sentence forming part of the text, appears from the fact that the document handed by Mr. Forster to Captain O'Shea was the identical one circulated among members of the Cabinet for their information. It was one of the bitter reproaches of the controversy that Mr. Forster, in handing about the scrap of paper, had be- trayed the confidence of the Cabinet. However it came about, by whomsoever inspired, the omission of the sentence was a petty machination that invested the whole proceeding with an underground air of mystery distasteful to the House of Commons, and most harmful to the Ministry." Why, then, was this attempt made to burke what could not long be concealed? We may take it, though Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain would have been very glad to keep their own counsel about the promise of Mr. Parnell's support, that they must have known that Mr. Forster, smarting under a sense of defeat and ill-treatment, would not let them off. They were too experienced in English public life to expect success in so feeble a manoeuvre. The truth was, as Mr. Chamberlain suggested, that they had yielded to the importunities of Mr. Parnell, who, with all his steadfastness of purpose, was afflicted with a constitutional incapacity for straight- * The letter of April 30th {vide page 117 supra) contained no such clause. Indeed, the Liberal Leaders treated the offer as purely voluntary on Mr. Parnell's part, and no part of their bargain, while the Conservatives regarded it as the chief consideration. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 115 forward action. He preferred to play a trick, even when he knew that it must be exposed. What, then, was his reason for making a secret of his pledge to the Liberal Ministry? Not, we may be sure, gratitude for past favours, not any desire to save their good name. To understand his reason we must look at the events, far more striking, which had intervened between the con- clusion and the publication of the Kilmainham Treaty. On May 2nd, Mr. Forster and Lord Cowper resigned their office, and their places were at once filled, as Chief Secretary and Lord Lieutenant, by Lord Frederick Cavendish and Lord Spencer. It is no secret that Mr. Chamberlain had expected — or feared— that he would be invited to succeed Mr. Forster. He was not anxious for the office, and expressed his hope that it would not be offered him. But it would not have been unnatural if he had been possessed — as Mr. Balfour was afterwards — with the ambition to distinguish himself in a post where so many able men had failed; and, apart from his theories of administration and legislation, he had one special advantage. He enjoyed the friendship of Mr. Parnell, and was on almost intimate terms with some of the Nationalist members. Though he had never pledged himself to Home Rule, he had declared himself in sympathy with a policy which would do justice to Ire- land; and he had won, Mr. Justin McCarthy testifies in a recent issue of the New York Forum, the confidence of the Irish Party — " We consulted him on all occasions. A vacancy took place in the office of Chief Secretary, consequent upon the sudden resignation of the late Mr. W. E. Forster, n6 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. and Mr. Chamberlain thought he had every reason to believe that the position would be offered to him. He did what I think was a prudent and a straightforward thing, under the conditions. He sent for a number of the most advanced Irish Nationalist members, and he told us that he desired our advice as to the course he should take in the event * * * * of his being invited to assume the position of Chief Secretary for Ireland. I mention the fact only to show what confidence we then had in him, and what confidence he then professed to have in us — in us whom, since that time, he has so unsparingly denounced. He knew then, as well as we did ourselves, that our support of him must depend upon his fidelity to the prin- ciples which he and we had together proclaimed with regard to Irish nationality and the claim for Home Rule." It was at seven o'clock on the evening of May 6th, 1882, that Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke were hacked to death by agents of the Irish National Invincibles. Though Ministers were grieved by the loss of a popular colleague, and the tragical end of a promising career, there was no lack of aspirants for the post of danger. The plucky and generous offer of Mr. Forster to carry on the duties of Chief Secretary until other arrangements could be made was not accepted, since both Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke* were available for the post. " Nothing had happened," Mr. Chamberlain said, "which would deter him from under- taking the task if it were offered him." But it was not offered. Nor is the explanation very difficult. It was not likely, after so audacious a crime had been success- * The post was offered to Sir Charles, but without a seat in the Cabinet. He declined it because under such conditions he did not believe he could do any good. But Mr. Chamberlain, as being already in the Cabinet, would — according to his understanding with Sir Charles — have accepted the office. THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 117 fully carried out in a public park in the Irish capital, and in broad daylight when many people were passing back- wards and forwards, that Mr. Gladstone would persevere in the new policy of conciliation. Certainly he would not further commit himself to that course by giving the Chief Secretaryship to a colleague who, for the last two years (except for a brief interval), and even within the last few days, had been fighting against Coercion, and who might, not improbably, be called upon to enforce the system he detested. Other personal reasons may have influenced Mr. Gladstone, such as his unwillingness to inflict too open a slight upon an old and valuable colleague like Mr. Forster, by putting in his place the politician who had so recently triumphed over him. Though we know that no kind of personal enmity existed at this time between Mr. Forster and Mr. Chamberlain, there had been so direct and incessant a conflict of opinion, so stubborn a struggle of masterful wills and high tempers, that it would have seemed bad taste in their common Chief to mark the defeat of one by giving his place to the other. He escaped from the difficulty by appointing Mr. (now Sir) George Trevelyan to the most difficult and most thankless post in the Ministry. In fairness to a politician who has incurred many harsh criticisms for his changes of opinion, it is due to him to say that, in the vigorous regime now about to be initiated, he won an equal share with Lord Spencer in the esteem of Englishmen, and was visited by Irishmen with a similar portion of furious — and, occasionally, disgusting — abuse. To those who like to reconstruct history on an imaginary basis, it may be an interesting pastime to n8 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. sketch in their minds what would have been the effect upon Ireland, and what upon Mr. Chamberlain's career, if, at this critical juncture, he had been called upon to succeed Lord Frederick Cavendish, and allowed to put his theories into practice. His knowledge of Irish questions, at this time, had not been drawn from direct acquaintance with the country or the people, but he had obtained a good second-hand substitute by his association with the Nationalist representatives. It is certain that many Chief Secretaries have gone to their duties with equipments inferior to those which Mr. Chamberlain would have brought. If he had once been convinced of the necessity for repressive methods, we know that, even in what may be called the more sentimental period of his Radicalism, he would have enforced them with a thoroughness not less than that displayed by Mr. Trevelyan. But the probability was that he would be too slow to realise the need for vigour, too tenacious of his faith in con- ciliation, too cool in the face of perils which might menace the very foundations of society. Anyhow, English opinion was not inclined, on the morrow of the Phoenix Park murders, to favour any further experi- ments in the government of Ireland. When Parliament met on May 8th, the first business was to pay a tribute of honour to the two brave and faithful men — the rising politician and the experienced public servant — who had been killed at the post of duty. Another task of a sterner kind was for the Government to announce that they would proceed, next day, with a stringent measure of Coercion. It would have been vain for Mr. Parnell to protest then against a THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 119 course on which the House of Commons was so clearly resolved. " I wish," he said, " to express on the part of my hon. friends, and on my own part, and, I believe, on the part of every Irishman, in whatever part of the world he may live, my most unqualified detestation of the horrible crime which has been committed in Ireland. I cannot advert to the steps which the Government propose to take. I do not deny that it may be impossible for the Government to resist the situation, and that they feel themselves compelled to take some step or other in the direction indicated by the Prime Minister ; but I wish to state my conviction that the crime has been committed by men who absolutely detest the cause with which I have been associated, and who have devised that crime and carried it out as the deadliest blow which they had in their power to deal against our hopes in connec- tion with the new career on which the Government had just entered." We may accept, without reserve, Mr. Parnell's dis- claimer of sympathy — his complicity was never imagined by those who were at all behind the scenes of the Irish movement — with the crime of the Invincibles. Indeed, it was committed, we are practically sure, with the express object of thwarting his policy. He had just brought the Constitutional Movement to the highest point— the nearest to success — which it had ever reached. He had made a bargain with the Government under which his agrarian supporters would get nearly all they had asked for — more than ever they expected; and so cynical was his contempt for English politicians, so profound his belief in the market value of the Irish vote, that already he seemed in his own mind within reach of that political concession which, in less than four years, he was to wring from the 120 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Parliamentary necessities of a diminished Liberal Party. But it would be Home Rule only he would get — a statutory, and perhaps subsidiary, Assembly — not Repeal of the Union, not the proclamation of an Irish Republic. Such comparatively moderate ends, such peaceful and prosaic methods, would not satisfy the hatred for England which had been the dominating and animating force of the American Clan-na-Gael and the Irish National Invin- cibles. Mr. Parnell, however, had never meant or wished to be an instrument of their insensate fury. His reading of the New Departure, under which the open and the secret organizations agreed to work in mutual toleration and with occasional co-operation, was that he should get the use of some of their money and reap the Parlia- mentary benefit of outrages carried out by their agents. They were to find the cash and run the risks, and he was to pocket the profits. For a time he carried on this double game with signal success. He won a renewal of their somewhat doubtful confidence when he denounced Mr. Gladstone, and when he was put into prison. But their suspicion broke out again as soon as he was released on parole. It was intensified when the rumour got about that he was in treaty with Ministers ; and when he was finally discharged from Kilmainham the Invincibles believed, and rightly believed, that he had thrown over and sold the cause — the cause of armed insurrection — in return for such peddling concessions as could be gained from the Imperial Parliament. To spoil his game, to show that Irishmen were not moderate, that the hatred of generations had not died out, they plotted a dramatic crime. Twice THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 12 1 they were frustraled by accident in attempts to kill Mr. Forster ; they were more successful in their attack on Mr. Burke and his companion — of whose identity it has been alleged that their agents were unaware — Lord Frederick Cavendish. Now that the relations which obtained at this moment between the Constitutional Leader and the Extremists in America and Ireland are known, it is not difficult to see why Mr. Parnell was so anxious to disguise the terms of alliance which he had just concluded with the Liberal Government. It is not necessary to suggest that he was influenced by regard for his personal safety, though he knew that his life had been threatened, and never ex- pected to die in his bed. But the time had not yet come when he could openly discard the believers in Physical Force. If he had said there must be no dynamite, they would have retorted that there would be no more dollars. It was to avoid a misunderstanding with the Extremists, which would more than counterbalance his success with the Liberal Ministry, that he omitted from the copy of his own letter, which he read aloud at Westminster, the passage which would most clearly reveal the intimacy of his proposed relations with Mr. Gladstone. He was so far justified in his fears that, if the Extremists had been doubtful of him before, they openly denounced him now. So far as he ever reinstated himself in their good opinion, it was by the persistent fight he made against the new Coercion Bill. From that point of view it was, perhaps, fortunate for him that Lord Spencer and Mr. Trevelyan demanded such a measure. But to Mr. Chamberlain and his Radical colleagues it was a profound disappointment 122 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. that, just at the very moment when their long struggle against "exceptional legislation" had seemed on the point of triumph — when they had got rid of the colleague who staked his fortunes on that policy — the tide was suddenly turned by the murder of the man who had been chosen to succeed him. It is, perhaps, the most mortifying rebuff which Mr. Chamberlain has experienced in his political career. " Assassination," said Mr. Bright, on the murder of President Lincoln, "has never turned the history of mankind." Perhaps not. But it has changed the policy of a Gladstone Cabinet. In an interesting speech delivered at Swansea on February ist, 1883, Mr. Chamberlain admitted that, after " eighty years of stormy Union," Ireland was still hostile and unreconciled. " Coercion has failed to extort submission. Concession has been powerless to soften her animosity. I do not wonder sometimes that disappointment and even despair should fill the minds of men when they see the efforts, the unexampled and unremitting efforts, which were made in the last two Sessions by the English Parliament to do justice to Ireland, met by words of menace and insult, and followed by worse than words, by deeds — by disorder, by crimes of violence, and by cowardly assassinations. Every nerve should be strained to detect and to punish the authors of those crimes. But we should blind our- selves to the teachings of our history, and to the experience of every other country, if we did not recognise in the existence of these crimes, and in the unfortunate fact that a large proportion of the population sympathise with those who commit them, an indication of a social condition altogether rotten, which it is the bounden duty of statesmen to investigate and to reform. There are only two other courses open to you. You may, as some truculent writers have urged, abandon altogether the idea of the Constitu- THE FIGHT AGAINST COERCION. 123 tional Government of Ireland, and rule the country as a conquered Dependency. How long do you suppose such a state of things would last ? How long do you suppose that Englishmen with their free institutions would tolerate the existence of an Irish Poland so near to our own shores ? It is too late to speak of such a scheme. "The other alternative is Separation, which I believe would jeopardize the security of this country, and which I am sure would be fatal to the prosperity and the happi- ness of Ireland. Well, I reject both alternatives. I contend that both are equally impossible and equally intolerable; but it is to these conclusions that you are inevitably driven if you accept the arguments of those public writers and speakers who have been urging you to abandon hereafter all further conciliation, and have been protesting against, as they say, truckling any more to Irish discontent. I say that as long as there is any just cause for discontent in Ireland, there is still scope for our remedies. Not until we have removed every just cause for discontent, until we have abolished every grievance, are we entitled to say that if Irishmen are still dissatisfied, we have at least done our part — the resources of statesmanship are ex- hausted. Gentlemen, the present crisis is a test of our faith in Liberal principles. Do not let us be too soon cast down. Centuries of wrong and of oppression have made Ireland what she is. We have no right to expect that a few months, or even a few years, of beneficent legislation will undo the mischief. We cannot take our hands from the plough. Let us go on steadfastly in the path which our great Leader has marked out for us, un- moved by clamour and unshaken by panic. Let us keep on in the even tenor of our way, dictated to us as it is by Liberal principles, and commended to our acceptance by every consideration of justice and of expediency." To prevent any suspicion that the Radicals were seeking to thwart Lord Spencer and Mr. Trevelyan in their resolute administration of the law, Mr. Chamberlain had at the outset paid a marked compliment to the Lord- t24 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary, and declared that "all their colleagues" had the greatest confidence in their firmness, their discretion, and their impartiality. The system had so far been successful that in less than two months Mr. Chamberlain felt himself entitled to say that a "qualified peace had been established in Ireland." " Peace and order have been restored ; crime and outrage have almost ceased. In the meantime, the black conspiracies of murder and violence, which had gathered round the outskirts of the agitation, have been exposed and unmasked, and their authors are being brought to punishment. I say we have the right to claim credit for this success. We have the right to ask that fair-minded opponents shall acknowledge it. But I say that success is due to the fact that, while we have firmly administered the law, we have also recognised the substantial grievances of the Irish people — on which their discontent was founded ; and we have made extraordinary efforts to remove those grievances. Without the Land Act, which is the mark of Lord Salisbury's scorn, you would have had no peace, even the qualified peace we have at present in Ireland. Lord Salisbury's moral, which he wished you to draw, is that force is the only remedy. Force is no remedy for discontent — and force alone has never removed the causes of discontent, of which the crime and outrage that we deplore are the extreme and unjustifiable expression." If the above defence of Ministerial policy was not complete or convincing, that was no fault of the apologist. He had, it must be confessed, made out the best case possible. CHAPTER V. AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. Mr. Chamberlain's first legislative work at the Board of Trade — Mr. Gladstone's New Rules of Procedure — Mr. Chamberlain's zeal for the efficiency of Parliament — The Grand Committees on Law and Trade — The shifting stand-point of politicians with regard to the Closure — Mr. Chamberlain's views on the American system — The bore and the obstructionist — The Bankruptcy Act — The Patent Act — Mr. Plimsoll's agitation against the Shipowners — Mr. Chamberlain's Merchant Shipping Bill — Its failure and his offer to resign — Subsequent legislation under Lord Salisbury's Second Administration. THE time of the House of Commons in the Session of 1 88 1 having been pre-occupied with the Pre- vention of Crimes Bill (passed to satisfy English opinion) and the Arrears Bill (forced through Parliament in execution of the " Treaty of Kilmainham "), little leisure was left for practical attention to other parts of the United Kingdom. Amongst the reforms promised in the Queen's Speech, but finally dropped, were two for which Mr. Chamberlain was responsible as President of the Board of Trade — amendments of the law relating to Bankruptcy and Patents. But in spite of the incessant discussions of Irish matters, of the Government's policy in Egypt, Mr. Bradlaugh's successive and conflicting claims as to making an Affirmation and taking the 125 126 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Oath, Mr. Chamberlain managed to find space for his Electric Lighting Act. The main object of this measure was to save Municipalities which wished to adopt the new illuminant from the trouble and cost of promoting in each case a special Act of Parliament. Henceforth they would only be required to obtain the consent of the Board of Trade. It should also be mentioned that, in the Session of 1880, Mr. Chamberlain had succeeded in passing two measures relating to the Merchant Navy — one dealing with Grain Cargoes, and the other with the payment of Seamen's Wages. The comparative sterility of the 1881 Session and the necessity of considering the New Rules of Procedure, which Mr. Gladstone had introduced with the object of checking systematic Obstruction, induced the Govern- ment to call Parliament together in the autumn. The official Conservatives were not disinclined to support the principle underlying the Ministerial proposals, though they did not relish the applications suggested. Lord Randolph Churchill, on the other hand, as Leader of the now established Fourth Party, protested against any inter- ference with the liberty of Debate without an express appeal to the country on that issue. He prophesied — and the result has justified his prediction — that the powers thus placed in the hands of the majority would be abused for Party purposes. And he was corroborated by the cynical candour of Radicals like Mr. Labouchere, who thought that when the country had made up its mind discussion was only waste of time. Half an hour would, he said, be long enough to give the Opposition for stating their views. AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 127 Not only were the New Rules carefully considered in the Cabinet, but they were also subjected to prolonged discussion, and underwent certain modification, in the House of Commons. It would be an idle exercise of ingenuity to inquire which of these proposals, or what part of each, was adopted in accordance with or defiance of Mr. Chamberlain's opinions; but we know that he was always in favour of making Parliament an efficient machine for carrying out the views of the majority — an object which, however self-evident its propriety may appear, can hardly be carried out without introducing the risk of stifling useful and legitimate discussion. Stringent as they seemed to be, the New Rules were soon found to be ineffective against the scientific ob- struction of the Irish members. They had to be largely remodelled by the next Administration. A less controversial experiment, for the purpose of accelerating legislation, was the institution of two Grand Committees — one on Trade, the other on Law. The object was to relieve Committee of the whole House from the labour of considering the details of compli- cated legal and commercial measures. Each of these Committees was to consist of not less than 60, or more than 80, members ; 20 made a quorum ; the proceedings were public, like those of the House, and when a Bill had been " reported " by one of these Committees, it was to be in the same position as if it had been " reported " by a Committee of the whole House. The importance of this arrangement, which was warmly supported by Mr. Chamberlain, was seen in the following year, when the new machinery enabled him to carry through Parliament 128 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. two valuable Bills which might otherwise have been crowded out by the pressure of more contentious business. In all these constantly recurrent discussions about Closure and Obstruction, there is a noticeable tendency in politicians on both sides of the House to adapt their opinions to their circumstances. The Ministerialist is always apt to think that arguments against his own proposals are mere frivolity which should promptly be suppressed in the public interest ; while the Opposition orator is shocked at the idea of tampering with free and full discussion. In 1890 — by which time the amended and still more stringent Rules then in force had been, for the time, broken down — Mr. Chamberlain, though not a member of Lord Salisbury's Second Ad- ministration, was one of its most influential advisers and supporters. He was disgusted at the slow pro- gress which the Government were making against the organised resistance of English and Irish Home Rulers. Writing in the Nineteenth Century (December), he asked the question whether we should "Americanise our Institutions." Should we adopt the drastic procedure of the House of Representatives ? And he explained the means by which the M 'Kinley Tariff Act, and other im- portant measures, had been forced through. The Senate had introduced 500 amendments into the Tariff Bill, and the discussion in the House of Representatives threatened to be interminable. To prevent this Mr. M 'Kinley, on behalf of the Committee of Rules, pre- sented a Resolution which provided that, after it was passed, the Committee of the whole House should be discharged from further consideration of the Bill and AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 129 the Senate's Amendments; that it should be considered in the House ; that, after " two hours' general debate," a Motion might be made to non-concur in the Amend- ments "in gross," and to arrange a Conference as asked for by the Senate; and that the House should at once proceed to vote on the said Motion. This Resolution was carried by means of the 11 Previous Question " device, and the majority had its way. " The House," Mr. Chamberlain remarks, " has ceased, for the time, to be in any true sense of the word a deliberative Assembly. ' It is like a woman,' said Senator Evarts ; ' if it deliberates, it is lost.' It remains only to confirm the edicts of the Committee on Rules, and to register the laws prepared in caucus by the majorities on the Select Committees. The Democrats have struggled vainly in the grasp of this iron system. They have been driven from the artistic Obstruction of public business with which Englishmen are familiar, and which consists in the gradual invasion of Govern- ment time by endless discussion on every possible question, concentrated at last on the measure which is the chief object of attack, but employed also against even the most innocent and unobjectionable proposals with the sole object of occupying the minutes which might otherwise be devoted to the contested legislation. In their despair they have resorted to the coarser methods of wasting time by frequent Divisions on frivolous Amendments and points of Order, and by refusing to help in making the quorum re- quired by the terms of the Constitution. Every hole has been stopped, however, as soon as opened. New rules, prepared by the Speaker, and carried under the operation of the 'Previous Question,' have limited the power of taking Divisions, and have altered the long-standing practice of the House with regard to counting a quorum. The minority have been baffled and beaten at every point. The most drastic Resolution, and the most complicated K i 3 o JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Bill, can be carried through the House in about seven hours if it is the pleasure of the majority to exercise its full powers, and it has been made evident that, on the least sign of Obstruction, their powers will be used to the uttermost, and without mercy. It may well be asked, ' What, under such a system, becomes of the rights of the minority ? ' Some such question is said to have been addressed to Speaker Reed, who replied : ' The right of the minority is to draw its salaries, and its function is to make a quorum.' This reductio ad absurdum of Parlia- mentary Government in a free country must appear a phenomenon of baleful import to Englishmen nurtured in the traditions of the British House of Commons, and looking back to centuries of full and almost unrestricted discussion. " At Westminster, on the other hand, legislation was " only possible by the sufferance of the minority, and very often of a small minority, made up of the least respectable and least intelligent members of the Opposi- tion." Which was the better, the American or the English system ? " If there be no choice but between the paralysis of all government caused by the factious conduct of the minority, and the suppression of debate which is the result of the American system, many good citizens and friends of progress will not hesitate to choose the latter as the less of two evils." Mr. Chamberlain argued that the powers in the hands of the Leader of the House of Commons were already sufficient if he had the will and the nerve to use them. There was nothing to prevent the majority passing, by the Closure, Resolutions similar to those adopted in Congress. Nor did Mr. Chamberlain, at this time, believe that such action would be unpopular outside the House of Commons. It would be wiser, however, not to " wait for the advent of AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 131 this deliverer," but to deal at once with the two great causes of Obstruction — Votes in Supply, and the Com- mittee Stages of Bills. " Nothing is easier than to start a hare in Committee of Supply. A member drops in from dinner or from the smoking-room, and inquires of his neighbour what is the subject under discussion. It may be the wages of a housemaid in a Royal Palace, or the salary of an Am- bassador to a foreign Court, the cost of a racing-plate, or the charges for the Army and Navy. It may raise the whole foreign policy of the country, or it may concern some infinitesimal detail of a complicated administration. Whatever it is, and whether he knows anything of the subject or is profoundly ignorant of it, the course of the obstructionist is clear. He rises to put a few questions to the Minister. When he has primed himself sufficiently, he becomes sceptical and critical. His thirst for informa- tion has grown with what it feeds on. Some other members join in the sport, an Adjournment is moved, and then a reduction of the Vote; and so the game goes merrily on, and the originator of the discussion must be singularly unskilful if he is not enabled to go home to bed, when the hour for Adjournment arrives, with the pleasing consciousness of having earned his rest by wasting several hours of Government time, and lessening to this extent the chances of all other legislation. This kind of Obstruction is not always deliberate. The worst offender in the present House of Commons — the member who speaks oftenest during the Session, who constantly 'surveys mankind from China to Peru/ without adding one single idea or suggestion to the sum of human know- ledge — does not belong to the fraternity of obstructionists, but is simply a bore of unusual dimensions. In former times the bore was extinguished by the universal reproba- tion of the House. Now, however, when he serves the purpose of the obstructionists, he is protected and shielded by them, and is a useful, though unconscious, instrument in their tactics." 1 32 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. This abuse might be disposed of in one of two ways. The Votes might be sent to one or more Committees, whose considerations should be substituted for that of Committee of the whole House. But if the Commons insist on their ancient constitutional right to deal with Supply in Committee of the whole House, the remaining alternative is to fix, before starting on Supply, the number of days which shall be devoted to each class of Estimates, and to order the Committee to report each class at the expiration of the time named. With regard to the Committee stage of a Bill, it is recognised that a small minority in Parliament can occupy a whole Session in the discussion of Amendments to a single Bill. No ordinary Closure, no limitation of the length of speeches, no rules against repetition or disorder, will be a sufficient safeguard against this danger. The one remedy is that adopted by the House of Representa- tives — to fix by Resolution a time at which the discussion in Committee shall be brought to a close. To carry out this proposal, it would be advisable to appoint a Com- mittee of Rules, similar in composition to the existing Committee of Selection, " whose fairness and impartiality has never yet been questioned." To this Committee of Rules any Minister in charge of a Bill should, at any stage, be permitted to refer it, "with instructions to report, recommending a fixed limit of time for its pending and subsequent stages." This Motion, and the Motion for adopting the Report, should be put to the vote without Debate. The Committee would be under standing general instructions to take into account the character of the Bill, the nature of the opposition, and the time of the Session, AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 133 and would also be at liberty to report that it was un- desirable to fix a limit. Under this arrangement, Mr. Chamberlain believed that full time would always be allowed for fair discussion. Otherwise, he saw no end to the obstruction which was being practised at Westminster. " Are we content," he asks, " to leave every majority in turn at the mercy of an unscrupulous minority, who can clog the wheels, and bring the machinery to a standstill, if their demands are not complied with ? Have we not been long-suffering and patient enough? How long are we to wait, passive and inert, before we use our strength to throw off this incubus, that threatens to strangle the great and noble institution of Parliamentary Government, and to destroy, in its unclean embrace, the mighty power that has withstood successfully the arbitrary violence of Kings, and has survived to give expression to the well- considered decisions of a free people ? " The fervour of Mr. Chamberlain's language and the unwonted — perhaps inappropriate — flowers of speech adorning the peroration show how much he took to heart the obstacles placed in the way of legislative proposals which he considered were urgently demanded and likely to produce useful results. It must be remem- bered that Mr. Chamberlain is a convinced, even a passionate, believer in the possible beneficence of Parliament. There is no man in public life who has less of the political cynic about him. The Optimist — the State Socialist — in Mr. Chamberlain revolts from any form of anarchy. He believes in Man, in Majorities, in Parliaments. If a hardship exists, if an institution is faulty, what is wrong must be made right by authority — the authority of the People. Is a difficulty in the way? 134 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. then it must be cleared out. Does an opponent stand in front? then he must be swept aside. He has often been reproached with the views thus expressed in 1890, because, when the Home Rule Bill of 1893 was under discussion, he protested against that " Closure by Compartment " which was adopted by the majority somewhat on the model of his own proposals. But the reply is obvious. The limits then enforced were fixed, not by such an impartial authority as he had sug- gested, but by a slight preponderance of excited partizans. Other objections may be brought against his scheme, the chief of which is that no Prime Minister could adopt it for his own advantage without providing his next successor on the other side with similar facilities. Without accusing English statesmen of any exaggerated political scepticism, it is fair to say that, with most of them, their belief in the value of their own legislative proposals is much less fervid than their detestation of the aims and policy of their opponents. But this is a frame of mind not shared, and scarcely understood, by Mr. Chamberlain. That is why, of all the purely political reforms which he has at heart, none is more warmly cherished than to improve the undoubtedly defective and dilatory machinery of the House of Commons. Excited Radicals may declare that the Peers are the standing obstacle to progress ; the real drag on the legislative wheel is applied by the popular Chamber. That may be regarded as a disadvantage or a benefit, accord- ing to the measure of our faith in advancing Democracy. Though Mr. Chamberlain's more ambitious projects of reform at Westminster have not yet been, and are not very likely hereafter to be, realised, he had to thank AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 135 the institution of Grand Committees for the success he at last attained with regard to his Bankruptcy and Patent Bills. The former measure had first been introduced in 1 88 1, just before the Easter Recess. The object of that scheme was to substitute commercial for legal supervision, and to revive official control exercised under the Board of Trade. The liquidations by arrangement and the com- positions of the Act of 1869 were no longer to be recognised, insolvent estates being dealt with only in bankruptcy. If the debtor was himself the petitioner, he would still by that act deprive himself of all control of his own affairs, which would pass into that of the Court. A meeting of creditors must be held within seven days after the petition, and meantime the Official Receiver would take charge of the estate. The acceptance of compositions was placed under strict limitations, and the debtor could get no discharge except at the hands of the Court. The trustees were to have a fixed remuneration, and the accounts must be audited by an independent public department. Though approved by so good a lawyer as the late Sir John Holker, the Bill had to be dropped ; but the same principles in substance were embodied in the measure which Mr. Chamberlain pressed to a Second Reading on March 19th, 1883. It was then referred to the Grand Committee on Trade, and, though it consisted of 150 Clauses and numerous Schedules (some of the former containing much that was novel and con- tentious), it was reported to the House on June 25th. The main principles — that the conduct of the insolvent should be subjected to a searching inquiry, and that the action and accounts of the trustees should be controlled 136 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. and audited by an independent authority — were generally admitted to be necessary. But there was a sharp opposition to the proposal that all money received by the trustees should be paid into the Bank of England. In order to conciliate the champions of decentralisation, Mr. Chamberlain agreed that the Board of Trade should be empowered, on being applied to, to employ a local Bank. His object in standing by the main part of this much - discussed 68th clause was a characteristic one. The large balances that would be temporarily placed at the disposal of the Government, by paying them into its account at the Bank of England, would be equivalent, Mr. Chamberlain calculated, to an income of ^30,000, enough to make the new official machinery self-supporting. In this, as in most of his other essays in constructive legis- lation, Mr. Chamberlain proved the value of those years which he devoted, in the learning-time of a man's life, to making a private fortune. That he has lost something by being cut off from the strict intellectual training and the wider range of interests which are now open to most young men who intend to follow a commercial career, he would probably be the first to admit ; but the business community has no reason to regret that, for once in a way, the Board of Trade received the compliment of being put under an expert — not an amateur waiting for promotion, and helpless, meantime, in the hands of his official subordinates. The new President knew how to make use of the knowledge and energy of his trained staff, and yet be a good deal more than their Parlia- mentary mouthpiece. The Bankruptcy Act of 1883 was acknowledged by AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 1 37 all lawyers and men of business to be a vast improve- ment on the previous state of the law. But it was not a final settlement, and that its objects have been in some cases frustrated is no more than what was to be expected. There is a large class of habitually insolvent persons whose purpose in life appears to be to give their names to leading-cases in the law of bankruptcy, and to discover, perhaps for a time to profit by, undetected flaws in any Statute that may come in force. Against such systematic evasion — frequently passing into fraud — it is impossible for any Act of Parliament to provide a complete set of precautions. The only thing is to stop up each hole as it is discovered. But it will always be necessary to make periodical changes in the law of bankruptcy, because as soon as the creditors have begun to understand their remedies, the debtors have hit on a new way for defrauding them. It is also complained that the ad- ministration of small estates was left disproportionately expensive. That is true enough ; but, in the first place, a small estate may give as much trouble as a large one ; and, secondly, it is not to the interest of lawyers — or they think it is not — to cheapen procedure. But nobody has ever refused Mr. Chamberlain the highest credit for the Act of 1883, or denied that it checked a great deal of the waste and some of the fraud which had gone on before it became law. Nor must we forget to acknow- ledge that quality in Mr. Chamberlain which his adversaries describe as his "way of working things." Not only did he draft a good Bill — plenty of Ministers do as much as that — but he made his colleagues share his opinion of it. He talked them into finding time to 138 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. get it considered, in preference to several competing measures ; and he talked the Grand Committee on Trade into accepting it pretty much in the shape he proposed. There was less occasion for the exercise of these qualities in the Patent Bill, which was read a second time on April 12th, 1883, and then referred to the Grand Committee. The object was to encourage poor inventors by making it possible for them to secure, on easier terms than before, the profits arising from their own ingenuity. The " provisional " fee was reduced from £5 t0 £i, and the first payment from ^20 to £3. In this way the needy man with a valuable idea would not any longer, through inability to pay the Government fees, be compelled to sell it for "an old song" to the first person who took advantage of his position. For the sum of £4 the inventor would be protected in his rights for as many years. By that time he would be able to see whether his scheme was worth any further outlay, and for ^154 he would be able to get a Patent lasting for fourteen years. The Bill went quickly through Com- mittee, and in due course received the Royal Assent. These departmental measures of a politician who was regarded by the Conservatives with especial dread, both for his advanced views and increasing public influence, led to a rather unfair attack upon him in the Session of 1884. It was asserted that of the 67 Official Receivers appointed under the Bankruptcy Act, no less than 51 were Liberals, and 19 had been Liberal agents. Mr. Chamberlain's defence — generally accepted in the House — was that he was personally acquainted with only five of those 67 gentlemen : two he knew to be Liberals, and AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 139 one a Conservative, while he was ignorant of the political views of the other two. The appointments had been made by a Departmental Committee, and it was sug- gested that there had been a desire to fall in with the political views of the President of the Board of Trade. On the question of "Spoils to the Victors," a good deal of cant is indulged in by whichever Party happens to be out of office ; but it never carries much weight with practical politicians, and in this case the Motion for a Committee of Inquiry was only supported by 53 votes, while it was opposed by 101. There are but two ways in which a Minister can exercise the patronage entrusted to him : he must be guided either by the merit of individuals or Party services. The former is at once ideal, trouble- some, and inefficient. It is impossible to select candidates in the order of suitability. All the public need care about is that conspicuous ability shall not be ignored, and that evidently-incapable persons shall not be jobbed into per- manent offices. Ministers will cease to reward partisans as soon as members of Parliament are elected — without regard to politics — simply for their moral worth and intellectual gifts. But the prejudice against Mr. Chamberlain, the distrust of his methods, and the dislike of his ultimate aims, broke out more strongly when it was seen how vigorous were the measures he intended to take for the protection of life at sea. As long before as 1875, Lord Norton (then Sir Charles Adderley) had introduced a Merchant Shipping Bill with the object of controlling the abuses practised by the owners of " coffin-ships " — sent to sea for the purpose of being lost, so that the owners Ho JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. might obtain the insurance money, which probably was largely in excess of the value of the vessels and their cargoes. When this Bill was sacrificed in the customary " Massacre of Innocents," a painful scene was raised by Mr. Samuel Plimsoll. He referred to some shipowning members of the House as villains, whom he was deter- mined to unmask. The apology he was afterwards induced to make did not end the matter. Though many of the allegations made against shipowners as a class were grossly exaggerated, Mr. Plimsoll had established a clear case for legislative interference, and, before the Session closed, a measure was hurried through which invested the Board of Trade with certain powers for the next twelve months. Other Acts were subsequently passed in 1876, 1880, 1882, and 1883; but it was not pretended, or supposed, that the question had been settled. On June 15th, 1884, Mr. Chamberlain explained, at Newcastle, the necessity for the Bill which the Board of Trade had in preparation, in order to check the preventible losses of life at sea. These losses, he said, had, the year before, reached the appalling figure of one death for every sixty men who went to sea. Altogether, 3,500 British seamen had come to an untimely end. A furious agita- tion was commenced by the shipowners, and Mr. Chamberlain complained that even those whose conduct was above reproach declined to assist him in the crusade against unworthy members of their own calling. The main causes of loss of life at sea, Mr. Chamberlain explained, on May 19th, on the Second Reading, were under-manning, over-loading, and over-insuring. Hence- forth, a marine insurance was to imply a contract of AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 141 indemnity for the loss actually experienced ; while nothing would be recoverable if the ship had been un seaworthy through the owner's fault. The contract of service with the officers and seamen was to imply an undertaking by the owner that the ship was seaworthy at starting, and that all reasonable means would be taken to keep her so. The owner was brought within the Employers' Liability Act, except where errors of navigation could be proved. He would be unable to contract himself out of his liabilities to his employees, or the owners of property on board. The Board of Trade was empowered to constitute districts with local marine courts, each consisting of the detain- ing officer, a shipowner's representative, and an officers' representative. The Government officer could not detain a ship except with the concurrence of the shipowner's representative, or by an order of the Admiralty Court \ but he could warn owner, master, and crew that the ship was unseaworthy, and this would terminate their obligation to serve on board. Such were some of the more important proposals in a Bill so stringent that it could only be accepted if the necessity were not merely existent, but had clearly been proved, and if it had behind it a strong body of public opinion. Whatever might be the truth as between the almost contradictory statements made by the President of the Board of Trade and the shipowners on matters of fact, it was at once clear that the Bill did not stand any chance of success. How w T as the ordinary member of Parliament to decide between the allegation that over-insurance was the chief cause of preventible loss of life at sea, and the assertion of the United Kingdom Steamship Assurance H2 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Association, doing a business of fifteen millions a year, which declared that it could not trace a single case of a vessel being sacrificed for the sake of insurance money? What the Government, for the present, had to consider — it was forced on them — was the fact that a compact body of voters would be alienated if Ministers stood by the proposals of the President of the Board of Trade. He did, indeed, receive some support from individual members of the Conservative Party. But it was hardly likely that they would refrain, if the chance came, from helping to throw out an Administration which, as they believed, had done so much injury to British interests in every part of the world, and brought, especially in the Soudan, so much dishonour on the name of England. Divided in policy and allegiance as the Conservatives were in 1884, Ministers were in daily fear of defeat. They were by no means prepared to defy a resolute interest like that of the shipowners. It is only fair to add, in defence of those more candid politicians on both sides who hesitated to give Mr. Chamberlain the assistance he asked for, that he had somewhat prejudiced his own cause by his too close association with the generous, but not absolutely accurate, philanthropist who had started the movement. When Mr. Plimsoll had made his indecorous, if excusable, display at Westminster, in 1875, Mr. Chamberlain, as Mayor of Birmingham, had presided at a meeting held to protest against the action of the Government, and express sympathy with the member for Derby. Though he had, when he became President of the Board of Trade, taken all pains to get at the truth, had made free use of all official AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 143 sources of information, and had taken counsel with those shipowners who were willing to meet him in anything like an amicable spirit, he still kept up a close association with the man who had levelled the most damning charges against the whole body. Even in 1885, when he went down to Hull to speak on the subject, Mr. Plimsoll sat by his side on the platform. It was not likely, therefore, that the shipowners would look cordially on the conciliatory offers made by Mr. Chamberlain. It is to the zeal and the vehemence which he threw into this movement that its failure was partially due in 1884, as well as to the selfish energy of those whose interests would be effected. Moreover, they had some reason to complain that the restrictions proposed were in excess of what was required, and that they were equally irksome to men who needed control and to those whose business was conducted on generous and humane principles. Mr. Chamberlain felt the disappointment so keenly — it was so sharp a contrast to his previous successes — that he went to the Prime Minister and offered his resignation. From Mr. Chamberlain's own account of the interview, Mr. Gladstone seems to have been most kind — almost fatherly. The immediate business of the House, he reminded the too enthusiastic President of the Board of Trade, was the agitation for giving the Franchise to the agricultural labourers. Would it not be better, just at present, to see about getting a thoroughly Liberal House of Commons ? When that great result had been accom- plished, it would be quite easy to do justice to the seamen. " Therefore," Mr. Chamberlain explains, " in deference to Mr. Gladstone's judgment, and with the anxious desire 144 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. to promote in every way the reformed representation to which I attach so much importance, I consented to remain ; but I did not abandon — and will never abandon — the purpose I have had in view. Mr. Gladstone did the best he could under the circumstances. When the Bill was withdrawn, it was decided to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole subject. I en- deavoured to make that Commission as representative and impartial as possible : the shipowners were again dis- satisfied. They claimed — what was absolutely unusual and unprecedented in the formation of such a Commission — that the special interest concerned should be represented by five delegate representatives in addition to those I had already appointed. I say that the demand was absolutely unusual. At the same time, I did not offer opposition to it, and I did not object to it, except so far as I feared the delay which the extension of the numbers of the Com- mission would cause in its proceedings. It was to me a matter of no consequence at all whether there were five shipowners, or fifty, on the Commission. I have always believed that when the Report is published, the public will look to the opinion of the impartial members of the Commission, and not to those who sit as the delegates of the interest chiefly concerned. The Commission was appointed ; it has sat and taken a great deal of evidence ; and now it has decided that although its labours are not nearly completed, the evidence, so far as it has gone, shall be made public." The Royal Commission to inquire into Merchant Shipping, with which for the time Mr. Chamberlain had to be satisfied, had held its last sitting a week before he delivered this speech, and the Report was issued in the following November. But on March 4th, 1886, another Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea — which, for practical purposes, was the old one re-appointed — was gazetted (Mr. Gladstone being then Prime Minister, and Mr. Chamberlain not yet having left the Cabinet). The AT THE BOARD OF TRADE. 145 Report was issued at the end of August, 1887 (in Lord Salisbury's Second Administration), and recommended, amongst other changes, such an alteration of the law of Marine Insurance as would prevent owners from making a profit out of the loss of their ships. In the following year an Act was passed requiring the owners and masters of every British merchant ship to see that it is provided, according to certain rules laid down, with such boats, belts, and other life-saving appliances as — having regard to the nature of the service, and the necessity of not en- cumbering the deck — may best be adapted for securing the safety of the passengers and crew. In 1892 another Act was passed, which had been backed by Mr. Chamber- ain, declaring that every ship with a submerged load-line is to be deemed " unsafe " within the meaning of the Act of 1876, and that such submersion shall be considered reasonable and probable cause for detaining the vessel. Other clauses relate to the proper inspection of the stores and water provided for the crews of vessels trading from any port in the United Kingdom, either through the Suez Canal, or round the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn. And in 1894, an Act was passed which consolidated previous legislation, consisting of 748 Sections (with Schedules), and covering 360 pages. If Mr. Chamberlain has not carried out the whole of the programme he originally laid down, it must be acknowledged that his persistent interest in the subject has resulted in great benefits for the men belonging to our Merchant Navy; and that his legislative record, as estimated by the length of his Parliamentary career, is not inferior to that of any living politician. CHAPTER VI. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. Conservatives and the Irish vote — Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Parnell — The abandonment of Coercion — Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamber- lain enter into the competition — Mr. Parnell raises his terms. — Mr. Chamberlain's reply at Warrington — Balance of Parties after the General Election — Mr. Gladstone converted — The unauthorised announcement and the ambiguous denial — Mr. Chamberlain at Birmingham — Mr. Gladstone's overtures to Lord Salisbury for a joint scheme of Home Rule — Meeting of Parliament and Defeat of Lord Salisbury's Administration — Mr. Gladstone and his Colleagues — The Liberal Unionist secession — Mr. Chamberlain's provisional adherence — Mr. John Morley has his way with the Home Rule Bill — Resignation of Mr. Chamber- lain — The Land Purchase Bill abandoned, and the Home Rule Bill reduced to an abstract Resolution — Mr. Chamberlain wavers — Gladstonians capture the Caucus, and refuse to meet his views — He agrees to act with Lord Hartington unreservedly — The Home Rule Bill thrown out — Mr. Gladstone appeals to the country. IF we are properly to understand the events of 1886 — the great turning-point in the history of the Liberal Party — we must bear in mind that the Conservative Leaders, both before they came into office in June, 1885, and for some little time afterwards, were suspected of having arrived at a secret understanding with Mr. Parnell. Lord Randolph Churchill, the most influential member of the Cabinet in the House of Commons, had not disguised 146 THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 147 the intimate terms on which he stood with the Home Rulers. The absurdly mysterious interview which — no doubt, at his instigation — was held in London in July, 1885, between Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Parnell, had been whispered abroad long before it was proclaimed by the latter. It had come to the ears of Mr. Gladstone, and had persuaded him that the other side were making a bid for the Irish vote. According to Lord Carnarvon's subsequent explanations, we are asked to believe that his conversation with the Home Rule leader was entered on with a mere desire to learn the opinions of the Irishman best entitled to speak for the majority of his countrymen ; that he had expressly guarded himself against being supposed even to entertain the idea of a Statutory Parliament in Dublin, whether with or without the power of protecting Irish industries against British competition;* and that Mr. Parnell indulged in deliberate fabrication when he gave a contrary impression. The Liberal Leaders meantime — Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, in par- ticular — were kept an courant with the various versions which it suited Mr. Parnell to give out. They did not believe that Lord Carnarvon had been acting only for himself, or only for himself and Lord Randolph; the Churchill legend was then in full strength, and anything which that brilliant genius took up for the moment was * Lord Carnarvon did, no doubt, make these formal stipulations, protesting, with a sort of simple cunning, that he spoke, as it were, "without prejudice." But it is known now that he and Lord Randolph Churchill led Mr. Parnell to believe that they would support a moderate form of Home Rule, and press it on their colleagues. Lord Carnarvon did indeed take up the task of persuasion, but Lord Salisbury declined to entertain the suggestion. 148 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. supposed to represent the future policy of a docile Party ; in short, it seemed that if Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues did not make up their minds at once, they would find the Irish vote irretrievably lost. They were confirmed in this impression by the first acts of the new Government. In bold contrast with Lord Spencer and Mr. Trevelyan, who had demanded the renewal of repressive powers* if they were to remain responsible for order in Ireland, the heads of the new Executive — Lord Carnarvon and Sir William Hart-Dyke — believed and declared that they might dispense with exceptional legislation. Indeed, no other course was open to them, unless Lord Salisbury was prepared to get rid of Lord Randolph Churchill and his immediate followers. Various excuses were put forward for this policy. It was but an experiment, Lord Carnarvon explained, and if it proved a failure it would be replaced by a permanent measure of repression. Nor could it be urged on the other side that Coercion, though ad- ministered with unflinching courage and unswerving firmness by Lord Spencer and Mr. Trevelyan, had succeeded in its objects. Another argument — adapted for platform use — was that, having just "trusted the people of Ireland " in admitting them to the privileges of an extended franchise, it would be absurd for Parliament * Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet had decided — according to the account given by the Prime Minister, " with the Queen's permission " — to abandon the Coercive Clauses of the Act, but to invest the Viceroy, by Statute, with powers to enforce, whenever and wherever necessary, the "Procedure Clauses" which "related to changes of venue, Special Juries, and Boycotting." Ministers proposed, in fact, to dispense with the name, and maintain the reality of Coercion. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 149 to impose new restrictions on their personal liberties. But the most substantial, the only valid, apology was urged by Lord Salisbury, who pointed out that at so advanced a period of the Session as that at which the Conservatives had succeeded to office, and without a majority in the House of Commons, it was by no means certain — it was, indeed, improbable — that they would succeed in carrying an adequate scheme. It may be replied, of course, that they ought not to have assumed responsibility without power, or have undertaken the government of the United Kingdom when they could not do their duty by Ireland. But the retort — from a Party point of view irresistible — is that everything else might justly be sacrificed to the object of getting rid of an Administration which had concluded with the victorious Boers of the Transvaal the humiliating Convention of Pretoria ; had thrown away, by the evacu- ation of Candahar, what was thought the most solid result of the Afghan war; had involved us in vague and increasing liabilities in Egypt, without any compensating opportunity of making it an integral part of the Empire ; had wasted English treasure in the Soudan, sent Gordon on a hopeless mission, and left him to his fate until rescue was impossible ; had affronted Austria, estranged Germany, established with France a standing occasion of animosity, and brought us — through the Penjdeh bungle — to the brink of a war with Russia over a quarrel in which it was doubtful whether we were even in the right. The picture does not pretend to be absolutely im- partial in all its details ; but these were the features which presented themselves to the eyes of the Conservative 150 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Party, and they would have been slow to forgive their Leaders if (for the sake of a comparatively unimportant question of Irish administration) they had neglected the long-awaited moment when Mr. Gladstone should be driven from power. A distinct pledge had, moreover, been given by Lord Salisbury, at the commencement of the Session, that, in the event of the Government being defeated, he and his friends would be prepared to take office. The growing suspicions of the Liberal leaders — Party politics had not for many years run so high as in 1885 — were increased by a speech which Lord Salisbury delivered at Newport on October 7th. There was not, in fact, a word or a phrase which could fairly be held to imply that the speaker favoured, or would even consider, any scheme of Home Rule. But it contained an elaborate apology for the abandonment of Coercion, and the tone throughout was more conciliatory than he had recently used with regard to Irish questions. Nor is there any reason why his supporters should refuse to admit that he was anxious, at the now imminent General Election, not to have the Nationalist vote in the English constituencies given solid to the other side. That his speech was not unlikely to avert that result was clear to the exasperated managers of the Liberal Party. They were righteously shocked at such "trafficking with disorder and disloyalty." This, of course. But the more practical question was, how should they outbid the Tory offer? It was thought that in Mr. Chamberlain a middle term might be found between official Liberalism and THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 151 Irish Nationalism. He was known to be friendly towards Mr. Parnell, to have worked hard for his liberation from Kilmainham, and not to be averse from "the principle of Home Rule." * Indeed, the year before, he had brought forward in the Cabinet a scheme which was very much more comprehensive than anything generally understood by the name of Local Government. It was, in fact, a proposal to sweep away Dublin Castle, and to vest all the powers exercised by its various Departments, with others retained by Departments in London, in a National Elective Council — a body which would be regulated by Irish opinion, and would possess every power short of independent legislation. Subsidiary to this influential and representative Council was to be a network of local elective bodies, charged with the administration of their several districts. Mr. Chamberlain has declared that he had reason to believe, at the time, that these proposals would have found acceptance with the leaders of the Nationalist Party, and with the chief representa- tives of Irish opinion. On this point, however, he has been, subsequently, contradicted by the persons to whom he referred. But they have made it an obligation of patriotism to discredit every assertion which he has made. * But by that " principle " he understood nothing more than a rather extended scheme of Local Self-Government. Neither then nor since has he abandoned that definition. To prevent confusion it should be stated that at this time " Home Rule" had not become a definite and almost technical term. A Home Ruler now is a politician who will support the gift of a separate Parliament and a separate Cabinet for Ireland. Before the meaning was thus crystallised by Mr. Gladstone's two Bills, it included any proposal to develop the representative system in that country. 152 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. "No doubt," he admitted, "there would have remained the national sentiment in favour of the establishment of a separate Legislature, but if such Councils as I had suggested had been established and put in full working order, if the perpetual interference of foreign authorities had been abolished, I believe that the old sense of grievance would have gradually died out, and that a new generation would have arisen that would have been glad and willing to accept the obligation as well as the ad- vantage which the union of the Three Kingdoms for Imperial interests is calculated to secure." The scheme did not commend itself to the Moderate Liberals, and it disappeared. We may also infer — without doing violence to the probabilities — that no sooner did Mr. Parnell gather that something might be conceded than he raised his terms. At a complimentary banquet, held in Dublin on August 24th, he had declared that the question of the legislative independence of Ireland was on the point of solution. Speaking of the Dublin Parliament as established, he denned the powers it would claim. They included a free hand with regard to the land, the right of building up Irish industries (which meant Protection as against England), and control of public education (which mi^ht involve a sort of endowment of the Roman Catholic religion). The Legislature would, Mr. Parnell hoped, consist of a single Chamber; he did not want a House of Lords. To this extended and apparently unexpected demand, Mr. Chamberlain had replied in a speech at Warrington on September 8th: "Speaking for myself, I say that if these, and these alone, are the terms on which Mr. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 153 Parnell's support is to be obtained, I will not enter into competition for it. This new programme of Mr. Parnell's involves a great extension of anything that we have hitherto understood by ' Home Rule.' The powers he claims for his separate Parliament are altogether beyond anything which exists in the case of the State Legislatures of the American Union, which has hitherto been the type and model of the Irish demands ; and if this claim were conceded, we might as well for ever abandon all hope of maintaining a United Kingdom. We should establish within less than thirty miles of our shores a new foreign country, animated from the outset with unfriendly intentions towards ourselves. A policy like that, I firmly believe, would be disastrous and ruinous to Ireland herself. It would be dangerous to the security of this country, and under these circumstances I hold that we are bound to take every step in our power to avert so great a calamity." Yet the Warrington speech was not, and was not meant to be, a definite rejection of the whole Nationalist pro- gramme' — still less, to lead to an open quarrel with the Irish Leader. Mr. Chamberlain congratulated him on having dwelt on "the folly, as well as the wickedness," of the cowardly crimes which had so greatly discredited the Irish cause. That fact the speaker regarded as one of "good augury," and he re-affirmed his readiness to give Ireland — as he would give England and Scotland — the "greatest possible measure of Local Government" — a phrase almost identical with that previously used by Mr. Gladstone, and approvingly quoted by Mr. Chamber- lain (June 3) at Birmingham — "the widest possible self- 154 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. government " consistent with maintaining the " integrity of the Empire." The difference between what Mr. Parnell would accept and what Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Chamberlain would grant was so sharp and clear that there seemed no chance of an understanding being arrived at. On the eve of the General Election, the Liberal Leader asked, at Edinburgh, for such a majority as would maintain the independence of the House of Commons, as a whole, in dealing with the Irish question. He expressed his fervent hope that "from one end of Great Britain to the other" not a single representative would be returned who, " for one moment, would listen to any proposition tending to impair the visible and sensible Empire." Mr. Parnell's reply (Liverpool, November 10) was that English legislation should not be advanced until the Irish question had been disposed of. He invited Mr. Gladstone to formu- late his offer of limited self-government, by drawing up a Constitution for Ireland — subject to the conditions and limitations for which he had stipulated to safeguard the supremacy of the Crown and the integrity of the Empire. Mr. Gladstone (November 17) noticed, but hardly answered, the challenge. Till Ireland had chosen her representatives there could not, he said, be any authori- tative statement of her wishes, and without that knowledge any proposal would be made in the dark. Besides, he was not himself in an official position, and could not assume a function that properly belonged to Ministers. The meaning of all this was that Mr. Gladstone refused to be drawn — anyhow, till he saw what the Parnellite vote, THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 155 then standing at about 60, would be worth after the Election. Seeing that no definite offer could be got from Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Parnell issued his manifesto urging his countrymen in Great Britain to vote against the " man who coerced Ireland, deluged Egypt with blood, menaces religious liberty in the school, the freedom of speech in Parliament, and promises to the country generally a repetition of the crimes and follies of the last Liberal Administration." The result of the General Election was just that which Mr. Gladstone had deprecated. The Conservatives (249) and the Home Rulers (86) amounted to 335 — the exact strength of the Liberals. It would, no doubt, be easy enough to defeat the Conservative Ministry, but Mr. Gladstone could not himself retain office while the Parnellites were hostile. The Irish were practically masters of Imperial Parliament. On December 12th, a feeler had been thrown out by the Daily News, in a suggestion that a small committee should be formed of the leaders of both Parties, including Mr. Parnell and some of his friends, which should consider what sort of legislature it would be wise and safe to set up in Dublin. It was at once evident that the Conservatives would not take part in such a Conference, and on December 17th the whole situation was suddenly changed. It was announced in the Standard that Mr. Gladstone was prepared to deal with the Home Rule question on the following lines : The unity of the Empire, the authority of the Crown, and the supremacy of Imperial Parliament, were to be maintained. 156 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. An Irish Parliament was to be created, and entrusted with administrative and legislative powers. There was to be security for the representation of minorities and the partition of Imperial charges. A certain number of Irish members were to be nomin- ated by the Crown. A prompt, though ambiguous, denial was telegraphed by Mr. Gladstone. The statement was not, he said, an accurate representation of his views, but was, he presumed, a speculation upon them. It had not been published with his knowledge or authority; nor was any other, beyond his own public declarations. This very qualified repudiation made it clear that the statement was substantially correct, and everybody took it for granted that Mr. Gladstone had at last been converted to Home Rule. That impression was confirmed by the statement made, the same evening, by Mr. Chamberlain, at the Birming- ham Reform Club : " I have hoped — I have expressed publicly the desire — that the two democracies, the English and the Irish, moved by common aspiration and sympathetic appre- ciation, should march shoulder to shoulder along the paths of political freedom and progress. Mr. Parnell, indeed, has alienated and embittered all sections of the Liberty Party ; but national questions of grave importance must not be prejudiced by personal considerations. We are face to face with a very remarkable demonstration of the Irish people. They have shown that, so far as regards the great majority of them, they are earnestly in favour of a change in the administration of their Govern- ment, and of some system which would give them a larger control of their domestic affairs. Well, we our- selves, by our public declarations and by our Liberal THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 157 principles, are pledged to acknowledge the substantial justice of the claim. I see in the papers some account of negotiations which are reported to have been pro- ceeding between the leaders of the Liberal Party in England and Mr. Parnell. I have had no part in any negotiations. I have expressed no approval of any scheme, and I think it very likely that the rumours which affect other prominent members of the Liberal Party may be equally groundless. " As to Mr. Gladstone," he continued, " we know what his opinion is from his public utterances. He has again and again said that the first duty of Liberal statesmen is to maintain the integrity of the Empire and the supremacy of the Crown ; but that, subject to that, he was prepared to give the largest possible measure of Local Government that could be conceived or proposed. Well, I entirely agree with those principles, and I have so much faith in the experience and patriotism of Mr. Gladstone, that I cannot doubt that, if he should ever see his way to propose any scheme of arrangement, I shall be able conscientiously to give it my humble support. But it is right, it is due to the Irish people, to say that all sections of the Liberal Party, Radicals as much as Whigs, are determined that the integrity of the Empire shall be a reality, and not an empty phrase." Mr. Chamberlain once again referred to the American example, when the Northern States poured out their blood and treasure like water to preserve the Union, and "fought and won the grandest contest of our time." If Englishmen retained the courage and stubborn deter- mination of their race, they would allow nothing to impair the effective union of the Three Kingdoms that owed allegiance to the Sovereign. But the gist of the speech came at the end. Personally, he did not think the time had arrived when the Liberals could usefully interpose. " Mr. Parnell has appealed to the Tories. 158 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Let him settle accounts with his new friends. Let him test their sincerity and good-will ; and if he finds he has been deceived, he will approach the Liberal Party in a spirit of reason and conciliation." The policy of Mr. Chamberlain, the chief and best tactical adviser to Mr. Gladstone, was to throw, if possible, on the Tories the odium of considering, if not conceding, Home Rule. It would draw their fangs if it could be shown that between their proposals and those of Mr. Gladstone there was not distinction of principle, but only a difference in degree. It was in pursuance of this idea that Mr. Gladstone subsequently bethought him of certain informal discussions on the Irish question which he had held with Mr. Balfour when they were both on a visit to the Duke of Westminster, at Eaton Hall. The result was the amusingly diplomatic corre- spondence* in which the astute Leader of the Opposition tried to entice the equally wary Prime Minister into an arrangement for settling the Home Rule question without reference to Party politics. It is not impossible that Mr. Gladstone was surprised when Lord Salisbury politely declined, through Mr. Balfour, to fall in with his proposals. But, once the Conservatives had been com- mitted to any scheme of Home Rule, whether accepted or rejected by the Nationalist Party, they saw it would not be easy for them to resist any further extensions which might hereafter be pressed on by Mr. Gladstone. It is not, however, unlikely that the offer was actuated by higher motives than merely the desire to shirk the political danger which would be incurred, as even Mr. John * See Mr. P. W. CJayden's England under the Coalition. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 159 Morley* foresaw, by the Party which first proposed to concede Home Rule to Ireland. Mr. Gladstone was genuinely anxious to clear the Irish question out of the way, so that he might, when next he obtained a majority, proceed with the legislation demanded by his English supporters. This, too, was the view adopted, with even less reserve, by Mr. Chamberlain, who was at this time regarded, though not without grave searchings of heart among the Whigs, as the future Leader — at least, in the House of Commons — of the Liberal Party. The Con- servatives, on the other hand, were equally alive to the advantage they held for resisting what they considered the dangerous tendencies of Radicalism, so long as Mr. Parnell " blocked the way." On tactical grounds, then, as well as from their conviction of the mischief that would ensue from destroying, or even weakening, the Union, they were amply justified in refusing even to look at Mr. Gladstone's offer. Before the meeting of Parliament in 1886, it was realised that the experiment of dispensing with Coercion had resulted in disastrous failure. The resignation of Lord Carnarvon and Sir William Hart Dyke, who had, for the time, identified themselves as Lord-Lieutenant and Chief Secretary with that policy, was accepted. Though the former office was, for the time, left in commission, Mr. W. H. Smith was at once appointed to the latter, and, after a flying visit to Ireland, reported that the Executive must be armed with further powers. An intimation to that effect was inserted in the Queen's " It will stir deep passions," he told his Newcastle constituents on December 21st ; "it will, perhaps, destroy a great Party." 160 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Speech, along with an unequivocal declaration against Home Rule. On June 26th the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that, on the 28th, Mr. Smith would introduce first, a Coercion Bill, for which pre- cedence would be demanded, and then a Bill for extending the Ashbourne (or Land Purchase) Act of the previous Session. This meant, of course, that Lord Salisbury's Government would be thrown out by the joint vote of the Nationalists and Liberals as soon as a Motion could be invented which would give the two Parties an excuse for combination. It was provided in an Amendment to the Address proposed by Mr. Jesse Collings, one of Mr. Chamberlain's immediate followers, which embodied what was described, in the political slang of the time, as the Three-Acres-and-a-Cow policy. Ministers did their best to postpone a Division which they knew would go against them, until they had ex- pounded their Irish policy, and had some opportunity of drawing their opponents into an explanation of their own programme. But they failed to carry their point, and an animated Debate ensued, in the course of which Mr. Chamberlain supported Mr. Jesse Collings. " We support," he said, "a hostile Amendment, in the first place, because the condition and claims of the agricul- tural labourers constitute one of the great questions raised at the last Election, and because it is our bounden duty to uphold those claims in Parliament ; and in the second place, because we have no confidence that the Government will either do justice to the agricultural labourers or to any other question they may have to deal with." THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 161 Mr. Balfour had, indeed, announced that the Govern- ment were prepared to invest the Local Authorities, constituted under their proposed Local Government Act, with the power of acquiring land for Allotments, but he expressed his doubt of the value of Small Holdings. Nor, again, did he make any suggestion — indeed, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach expressly disclaimed the idea — that their proposals would satisfy the demands of the extreme Land Reformers ; the Radicals, therefore, felt that they might with a good conscience vote for Mr. Collings's Amend- ment to the Address, expressing the regret of the House that no measures had been announced for affording facilities to agricultural labourers and others in the rural districts to obtain Allotments and Small Holdings "on equitable terms as to rent and security of tenure." This was carried by 331 votes against 252, and the Govern- ment were defeated on a question of Confidence. In the adverse majority were included 74 Nationalists, while in the minority were 18 Liberals— men like Lord Hartington, Mr. Goschen, Sir Henry James, Mr. Courtney, and Sir John Lubbock, apart from any objection they might feel to the particular question before the House, declining to assist Mr. Gladstone in returning to power, now that he was pledged to one or other form of Home Rule. They repudiated the very principle, and felt no curiosity about the details. More uncertain was the attitude of 76 other Liberals, of all shades of opinion, who had absented themselves from the Division. The one thing clear was that the Conservative Govern- ment, which had taken office the year before, must resign, and that its defeat had been brought about M 1 62 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. by the action of the Radicals who were under the more direct influence of Mr. Chamberlain. On him, then, rests the responsibility — nor has he ever sought to repudiate it — of bringing the first Home Rule Administration into power. On January 28th, Lord Salisbury's resignation was accepted by the Queen, and on the following evening Mr. Gladstone received the expected summons to London. Amongst his old colleagues who declined, or were not invited, to associate themselves with a Home Rule policy, were Lord Hartington, Mr. Forster, Mr. Goschen, Sir Henry James, Mr. Courtney, Lord Selborne, Lord Derby, and Lord Northbrook. The new Cabinet was constituted as follows : Mr. Gladstone, First Lord of the Treasury and Lord Privy Seal ; Lord Herschell, Lord Chancellor ; Lord Spencer, Lord President ; Sir William Harcourt, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Mr. Childers, Home Secretary ; Lord Rosebery, Foreign Secretary ; Lord Granville, Secretary for the Colonies ; Mr. Camp- bell- Bannerman, Secretary for War; Lord Kimberley, Secretary for India ; Mr. George Trevelyan, Secretary for Scotland ; Lord Ripon, First Lord of the Admiralty ; Mr. John Morley, Chief Secretary for Ireland ; Mr. Mundella, President of the Board of Trade ; and Mr. Chamberlain, President of the Local Government Board. Ministers outside the Cabinet were Lord Aberdeen, Viceroy of Ireland; Lord Wolverton, Postmaster-General; Sir Lyon Playfair, Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education ; Mr. Heneage, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Mr. John Mellor became Judge Advocate General ; Sir Charles Russell, Attorney THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 163 General ; and Sir Horace Davey, Solicitor General. The Under Secretaries were Mr. Broadhurst, Home Office ; Mr. Bryce, Foreign Office ; Mr. Osborne Morgan, Colonial Office ; Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, India Office ; Lord Sandhurst, War Office; Mr. C. T. Acland, Board of Trade; and Mr. Jesse Collings, Local Government Board. In this list it will be seen that no less than four names are included of Liberals who subsequently declared themselves Unionists — Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Trevelyan in the Cabinet, and Mr. Jesse Collings and Mr. Heneage outside. The letter in which Mr. Chamberlain accepted office was subsequently read out in the House of Commons, but this is, perhaps, the best place to reproduce it : "40, Princes Gardens, S.W., "January 30//&, 1886. "My dear Mr. Gladstone, — I have availed myself of the opportunity you have kindly afforded me to consider further your offer of a seat in your Government. I recognize the justice of your view that the question of Ireland is paramount to all others, and must first engage your attention. The statement of your intention to examine whether it is practicable to comply with the wishes of the majority of the Irish people, as testi- fied by the return of eighty-five representatives of the Nationalist Party, does not go beyond your previous public declarations, while the conditions which you attach to the possibility of such compliance seem to me adequate, and are also in accordance with your repeated public utterances. But I have already thought it due to you to say that, according to my present judgment, it will not be found possible to reconcile these conditions with the establishment of a National Legislative Body sitting in Dublin, and I have explained my own preference for an attempt to come to terms 1 64 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. with the Irish members on a basis of a more limited scheme of Local Government, coupled with proposals for a settlement of the Land, and, perhaps, also of the Education question. You have been kind enough, after hearing these opinions, to repeat your request that I should join your Government, and you have explained that, in this case, I shall retain 'unlimited liberty of judgment and rejection ' on any scheme that may ultimately be proposed, and that the full consideration of such minor proposals as I have referred to as an alternative to any larger arrangement will not be excluded by you. On the other hand, I have no difficulty in assuring you of my readiness to give an unprejudiced examination to any more extensive proposals that may be made, with an anxious desire that the results may be more favourable than I am at present able to anticipate. In the circumstances, and with the most earnest hope that I may be able in any way to assist you in your difficult work, I beg to accept the offer you have made to submit my name to her Majesty for a post in the new Government. I am, my dear Mr. Gladstone, " Yours sincerely, " J. Chamberlain." This letter was, it must be admitted by those who take the least favourable view of Mr. Chamberlain's subse- quent actions, a clear intimation that his acceptance of office in a Home Rule Administration was merely pro- visional. The charge that he had only joined the Government with a view of wrecking it, that he went on board to scuttle the ship, hardly required the indignant denial which he gave it when he explained his subsequent resignation ; and Mr. Gladstone, who on a personal question is never wanting in magnanimity towards his opponents,* cheered the repudiation. There was, indeed, * Witness the graceful compliment which he paid to Mr. Cham- berlain on his son's successful speech in the House of Commons on the second Home Rule Bill. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 165 little hope, if Mr. Chamberlain really meant to stand by the safeguards he had postulated, that he would be able to concur in the scheme which Mr. Gladstone, with the assistance of Mr. John Morley and Sir Robert Hamilton, was now preparing. It was known, in the first place, that the new Chief Secretary was chiefly bent on satisfying the aspirations of the Nationalist members, and desired, above everything else, to make the concession, not a grudging instalment, but a settlement in full. The letter of provisional adherence was written on January 30th, 1886, and it was not till March 16th that the first reasonably circumstantial rumour was circu- lated that Mr. Chamberlain could not accept the now matured scheme. The time has not come when the inner history of the intervening six weeks may be written. But the broad facts are that the majority of the Cabinet were not consulted by the Prime Minister, except when they were invited, from time to time, to approve the plans drawn up between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Morley (with the assistance of Sir Robert Hamilton's local and tech- nical knowledge) ; that individual members were now and then asked their opinion on this or that point, but there was no attempt, hardly a pretence, to thresh out the scheme in full Council;* that, from the beginning, so marked an incompatibility had shown itself between the objects of Mr. Morley and Mr. Chamberlain, close personal friends as they still were, that Mr. Gladstone abandoned the hope of bringing them into accordance ; that he gave a deliberate preference to the adviser whose * Vide Sir George Trevelyan's explanation in Parliament of his reasons for resigning office. 1 66 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. opinions more closely approached his own, and, after a time, paid little more than a polite attention to the arguments of the other. Mr. Gladstone was, it must be confessed, in a difficult position. The faith of the Irish members was, at this time, pinned to Mr. Morley ; and if he were to leave the Government it was certain they would repudiate the Bill. And he certainly would retire, rather than make himself responsible for an incomplete measure. Home Rule was the only excuse for his being called within the Cabinet, the one explanation of his suddenly-acquired importance. Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was identified with several causes, all of which he was equally keen about. There was, therefore, a chance — so it seemed to Mr. Gladstone — that at the last moment he might be induced, by some slight concessions, to sink his objections to this particular measure, rather than break with the Party to which he looked for the future accomplishment of his whole programme. It must also be borne in mind that Mr. Gladstone was honestly convinced that the Bill was the best that could be framed — as, perhaps, it was — and that, on further consideration, so acute and reasonable a statesman as Mr. Chamberlain would be compelled to acknowledge its merits. It is not easy to say — perhaps Mr. Chamberlain himself would not assert with absolute confidence — whether there ever was any ground for such expectations ; whether any further safeguards, such as Mr. Gladstone might have been persuaded to incorporate in the Bill, or any limita- tions devised for controlling the proposed Irish legislature, THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 167 would have constituted the basis of a working compromise. We should say No, if we judged simply by the speech Mr. Chamberlain made at the First Reading Debate, so essential seem the points of difference between what he would accept and what Ministers proposed. But it must be remembered that he stated, on this occasion, that he resigned, not only on the Home Rule Bill, but also on the Land Purchase Bill ; and, though Mr. Gladstone interposed when he touched on a measure not yet presented to Parliament, he subsequently found an op- portunity of stating his objections to the double scheme. The letter in which Mr. Chamberlain's decision to leave the Government was given — a decision he had been invited to reconsider but would not change — was dated March 15th: " My dear Mr. Gladstone, — I have carefully con- sidered the results of the discussion on Saturday, and I have come, with the deepest reluctance, to the conclusion that I shall not be justified in attending the meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday, and that I must ask you to lay my resignation before the Queen. You will remember that, in accepting office, I expressed grave doubts as to the probability of my being able to support your Irish policy. Up to that time, however, no definite proposals had been formulated by you, and it was only on Saturday last that you were able to make a communication to the Cabinet on the subject. Without entering on unnecessary details, I may say that you proposed a scheme of Irish land -purchase which involved an enormous and unprece- dented use of British credit, ' in order,' in your own words, ' to afford to the Irish landlord refuge and defence from a possible mode of government in Ireland which he regards as fatal to him.' This scheme, which contem- plates only a trifling reduction of the judicial rents fixed before the recent fall in prices, would commit the British i68 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. taxpayer to tremendous obligations, accompanied, in my opinion, with serious risk of ultimate loss. The greater part of the land of Ireland would be handed over to a new Irish elective authority, who would thus be at once the landlords and the delegates of the Irish tenants. I fear that these capacities would be found inconsistent ; and that the tenants, unable or unwilling to pay the rents demanded, would speedily elect an authority pledged to give them relief, and to seek to recoup itself by an early repudiation of what would be described as the English tribute. With these anticipations, I was naturally anxious to know what was the object for which this risk was to be incurred, and for what form of Irish government it was intended to pave the way. I gathered from your statements that, although your plans are not finally matured, yet you have come to the conclusion that any extension of Local Government on exclusive lines, including even the creation of a National Council or Councils, for purely Irish business, would now be entirely inadequate, and that you are convinced of the necessity for conceding a separate Legislative Assembly for Ireland, with full powers to deal with all Irish affairs. I understood that you would exclude from their competence the control of the Army and Navy, and the direction of Foreign and Colonial policy; but that you would allow them to arrange their own Customs tariff, to have entire control of the Civil Forces of the country, and even, if they thought fit, to establish a Volunteer Army. It appears to me that a proposal of this kind must be regarded as tantamount to a proposal for Separation. I think it is even worse, because it would set up an unstable and temporary form of government, which would be a source of perpetual irritation and agitation until the full demands of the Nationalist Party were conceded. The Irish Parliament would be called upon to pay three or four millions a year as its contribution to the National Debt and the Army and Navy, and it would be required in addition to pay nearly five millions a year for interest and sinking fund on the cost of Irish land. These charges would be felt to be so heavy a burden on a poor country that persistent THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 169 controversy would arise thereupon, and the due fulfilment of their obligations by the new Irish authority could only be enforced by a military intervention, which would be undertaken with every disadvantage, and after all the resources of the country and the civil executive power had been surrendered to the Irish national Government. I conclude, therefore, that the policy which you propose to recommend to Parliament and the country practically amounts to a proposal that Great Britain should burden itself with an enormous addition to the National Debt, and probably also to an immediate increase of taxation, not in order to secure the closer and more effective union of the Three Kingdoms, but, on the contrary, to purchase the repeal of the Union and the practical Separation of Ireland from England and Scotland. My public utter- ances and my conscientious convictions are absolutely opposed to such a policy, and I feel that the differences which have now been disclosed are so vital that I can no longer entertain the hope of being of service in the Government. I must, therefore, respectfully request you to take the necessary steps for relieving me of the office I have the honour to hold. " I am, yours very truly, "J. Chamberlain." The date originally fixed for the introduction of the Home Rule Bill was March 22nd; then it was shifted to April 1 st; and, finally, to April 8th. Up to the last moment negotiations had been kept open, and it was stated that Mr. Chamberlain had submitted a counter- scheme for the establishment of a National Assembly in Dublin, free to make bye-laws, but always subject to the Imperial Parliament, allowed to levy Rates but not Taxes, with power to manage Irish affairs, only limited by control from Westminster. But Mr. Gladstone had gone too far to recede to such lengths as were required, and, after the letter given above, no serious hope remained of 170 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. changing the position either of the Prime Minister or his seceding colleague. But at this time Mr. Chamberlain had no thought of entering on active opposition to the Government. He was not one of the Liberals who attended the famous meeting, on April 14th, at the Opera House, organised by the Loyal and Patriotic Union. Lord Hartington was there, and Mr. Goschen, and they made common cause with Lord Salisbury and Mr. Smith. When the Land Bill was introduced, two days later, and Mr. Chamberlain led the attack on that measure, he admitted that since he had been a member of the Government great changes had been introduced into the Home Rule Bill. " In these changes," he said, "and in the prospect of still greater changes yet to come, I rejoice to see an approxi- mation between the views of my right hon. friend and myself, which I did not dare to hope for at the time I left the Cabinet." His objections to the Land Bill (which had also been modified in the interval) still remained in force, because, though many objectionable features had been removed, the whole policy of the Bill seemed of doubtful expediency. It was unwise to grant to Irish peasants what would not be conceded to Scotch crofters or English labourers. But, hostile as Mr. Chamberlain's speech was to the actual proposal before Parliament, the general tone was one of conciliation. The con- clusion was greeted with delighted cheering from the Gladstonians. " For my own part," he said, " I recognise the spirit of conciliation with which the Government has tried to meet some of the objections which have already been taken to THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 171 their scheme. I know I need not assure my right honour- able friend, or my friends around me, that the differences which, unfortunately, for a time — I hope it may be only a short time — have separated me from my right honourable friend have not impaired my respect or regard for his character and abilities. I am not an irreconcilable opponent. My right honourable friend has made very considerable modifications in his Bill. All I can say is, if that movement continues, as I hope it will, I shall be delighted to be relieved from an attitude which I only assumed with the greatest reluctance, and which I can only maintain with the deepest pain and regret." That he was not using an empty form of words, Mr. Chamberlain proved by his subsequent action. He went down to his constituents in the Easter Recess, and delivered a searching, but not a violent, criticism of the two Bills now awaiting their fate in the House of Commons. His main purpose was, of course, to justify his action in the eyes of those who had so recently elected him as a supporter of Mr. Gladstone. The speech he made on this occasion is recognised as one of his finest platform performances, but it was the con- clusion which was most significant. To the Land Bill he could not assent. It was, he thought, a bad Bill. "I would sooner," he said, "go out of politics altogether than give my vote to pledge the capital of the country, and the future earnings of every man and woman in the United Kingdom, in order to modify the opposition of a small class of Irish proprietors to a scheme which, if it remains in its present form, will, I believe, infallibly lead to the separation of Ireland from England. I object, in this case, to the risk which we are asked to incur. I object, also, to the object for which we are asked to incur that risk. But, as regards the Home Rule Bill — the Bill for the Better Government of Ireland — my opposition 172 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. is only conditional. I regret very much that this great measure, involving so vast a change, such enormous risks ■ — so vitally affecting the welfare of the Kingdom — should have been brought before Parliament without more con- sultation with the other leaders of the Liberal Party, and with the members of the Liberal Party generally. I think the Bill would have benefited a good deal by fuller con- sideration, both in the Cabinet and in the country. But at the same time I admit that, having been introduced by so eminent a man as the Prime Minister, the question cannot be allowed to fall, the problem cannot be disre- garded. The only question is as to the form which the Bill shall assume, and I think I can show you, in a few words, that, if certain alterations were made, all the anomalies which I have described to you, most of the objections which I have taken, would disappear. If, to begin with, the representation of Ireland at Westminster were maintained on its present footing — if Irishmen were allowed to vote and to speak on all subjects which were not specially referred to them at Dublin, then they would remain an integral part of this Im- perial realm ; they would have their share in its privileges, and their responsibility for its burdens. In that case the Imperial Parliament would be able to maintain its control over Imperial taxation in Ireland, and, for all Imperial purposes, the Parliament at Westminster would speak for a United Kingdom. I should like to see the case of Ulster met in some form or other. I would be glad if it were found possible to concede to Ulster, having regard to the great distinctions which I have pointed out of race, and religion, and politics — I would be glad if there could be conceded to Ulster a separate Assembly." Mr. Chamberlain was, in fact, looking forward, as he had said, when the present time of trial was over, to a future Liberal reunion, without embittered memories or unkind reflections, so that the great work, in which the Party had been unanimous, might be carried forward. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 173 The spirit he displayed, not less than the arguments he brought forward, obtained from his constituents a vote of unabated confidence, which was opposed by only two dissentients. Lord Harrington, it should be noticed, had been less successful. He was invited by the Liberal Council of the Rossendale Division of Lancashire to explain his conduct in voting against Mr. Jesse Collings's Amendment, as well as his attendance at the meeting held at Her Majesty's Theatre. After hearing his very able and temperate arguments, his constituents declined either to censure him or express approval of his course. They contented themselves with thanking him for his speech, and hoping that " such measures would be passed as would tend to the peace and prosperity of Great Britain and Ireland." The difference between the two cases was that Lord Hartington had identified himself with the Opposition, while Mr. Chamberlain had only separated himself from the Government. There was still a belief that the latter, and those who were guided or influenced by his action, might be induced to vote for the Second Reading of the Home Rule Bill, the Debate on which had been fixed to begin at so distant a date as May 10th, in order to give time for the Liberal Associations throughout the country to bring pressure to bear on hesitating representatives. A manifesto was issued by Mr. Gladstone, on May 3rd, in which he practically intimated that the Land Bill was no longer to be an essential article of the Liberal faith, and that in the Home Rule Bill all questions of detail were subsidiary. The only important thing was to support the principle of establishing a Legislative Body 174 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in Dublin, " empowered to make laws for Irish, as dis- tinguished from Imperial, affairs." The effect of this declaration was instantaneous. The obvious inference was that, to avert the threatened split in the Party, and obtain a nominal concurrence in his proposals, the Prime Minister was prepared to abandon his measure for the Session, on condition that its principle was accepted, and to bring forward some- thing different on another occasion. At this moment Mr. Chamberlain was nearly converted, not indeed to Home Rule as defined in the Bill, but to allowing that measure to be peacefully withdrawn after the Second Reading. He believed that its successor, if any were brought forward, would be of a comparatively innocuous and conciliatory character. At this moment, however, an attack was made on his own stronghold, the National Federation of Liberal Associations. That powerful instru- ment of influencing opinion and organising action had hitherto been almost in his hands. No little part of his reputation among the Liberals, and the alarm with which he was regarded by the Conservatives, rested on his being the almost omnipotent " boss " of what was called the " Birmingham Caucus." Two days after the Prime Minister's astute manifesto, his influence in that body was successfully attacked by the official Gladstonians at a special meeting (held in London), when Mr. J. E. Ellis moved, and carried by an overwhelming majority, a series of Resolutions promising unconditional support to the Government. He was menaced at the same moment with a raid on Birmingham, but there at least he was sure of his footing. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 175 To assault him on his own ground — as has been dis- covered by those who have tried to undermine his authority in the Midlands — is not the way to bring him round. Still, he was so anxious to avert a definite rupture in the Liberal Party* that he wrote a letter to Mr. T. H. Bolton, on May 6th, in which he said that " the key of the position" was to maintain the representation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament, and her full responsibility for all Imperial affairs. This was not a detail that could be left to "the hazards of Committee." It was a point of " supreme importance," which must be " decided on the threshold of discussion." But if this concession were made, Mr. Chamberlain expressed a hope that the " present imminent danger of a fatal breach in the ranks of the Liberal Party might be happily averted." Though it is certain that this, the nearest approach that Mr. Cham- berlain ever made to giving way, was not brought about by what had happened in the Caucus, it is equally certain that the deceptive success had stiffened the backs of Mr. Gladstone's advisers, who induced him to refuse a demand not more exigent than several others which he was quite ready to agree to. They got the idea that they might * At this time, and for many months to come, his object was to keep close touch with the Liberals and Radicals throughout the country, and to educate them to see the danger of the scheme which had been so suddenly sprung upon them. If a sudden disruption of Party ties had taken place, it seemed probable that Home Rule would have become an entirely Party question, the vast bulk of the Liberals going one way, and the Conservatives the other; and in this case, sooner or later, the Home Rulers would have had a majority whereas, so long as a considerable section of the Liberal Party could be prevented from acceptance of the scheme in its now crystallised form, there was no chance that it would pass into law. 176 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. safely despise Mr. Chamberlain's influence in the country and in Parliament. They had previously reckoned his following in the House of Commons at more than fifty ; now, they reduced their estimate to half-a-dozen. The last overture made by Mr. Chamberlain having been ignored, on May 12th he held a meeting of Liberals favourable to the " Home Rule principle," but opposed to anything like the present Bill. It was attended by fifty- two members of the House of Commons ; and on the 14th an independent meeting was convened by Lord Hartington. Of the sixty-four who assembled at Devonshire House, thirty-two, amongst whom was Mr. Chamberlain himself, had been present at the previous gathering. To the eighty-four members thus accounted for nine others had to be added, who had sent letters of sympathy ; and the probability was that, eventually, the total of " Dissentient Liberals" would mount into three figures. But the important thing was, that Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington agreed, for the time, to act together, and vote against the Second Reading. This result had been finally brought about by the long-delayed response to the demand for the retention of the Irish members at West- minster. The night before, Mr. Campbell -Bannerman had been put up to say that the Government would give their most friendly consideration to any suggestion for " enabling the Irish members to take part in our dis- cussions." But this foreshadowing of the famous " in-and- out " proposal did not meet Mr. Chamberlain's objections, and when Mr. Campbell -Bannerman had finished, he "put up his notes in his pocket," Mr. Clayden records, "with an air of disappointment and disgust, THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 177 and, glancing at Mr. Caine, shook his head and went away." It has been spitefully suggested that at this time Mr. Chamberlain was playing to drive Mr. Gladstone into re- tirement, by defeating the measure to which he had pledged himself, and to rally the bulk of the Liberals — who were by no means enamoured of Home Rule for its own sake — to the support of a Coalition Ministry, of which Lord Hartington and himself would be the leading members. There is this much ground for the imputation, that the possibility of a Liberal- Unionist Ministry was openly discussed in the newspapers ; and as members of that imaginary Cabinet were mentioned, in addition to Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain,* Mr. Goschen, Sir Henry James, Mr. Trevelyan, Mr. Courtney, with Lord Selborne, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Northbrook, Lord Carlingford, and Lord Derby. Undeniably it would have been, so far as ability goes, a strong Administration ; but the project, so far as it had assumed definite shape, had to be abandoned after Lord Salisbury's speech on May 15th. He distinctly reminded the Conservatives that it would be they who would furnish the greater part of the votes to which the victory in the coming Division would be due, and plainly intimated that the responsibility of assuming office would belong to them- selves, not to the allies whose assistance they received with a hearty welcome, and whom, in turn, they were willing to assist so far as agreement was possible. But, even without this unmistakable hint, both Lord * A rumour was published that even at this date Mr. Chamberlain had fixed his affection on the Colonial Office. N 178 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Harrington and Mr. Chamberlain must have realised that it would hardly be pleasant for them, just at present, to work together in the same Administration. The memory of their previous differences in the Cabinet, of their open controversies on the platform, was still too fresh. It did not prevent them from co-operating against a common danger. No, doubt they could have struck out a Modus Vivendi; but there must have remained a certain sense of insecurity in an alliance between the typical representative of Whig principles and the exponent of the Unauthorised Programme. Besides, Lord Harrington was a declared Unionist ; Mr. Chamberlain was still, in a sense, a Home Ruler, and even on the last day of May stated the case, at a Liberal-Unionist Conference, in favour of abstaining from the Division. But he accepted and endorsed, without reserve, the general opinion of the meeting, and next day pledged himself to vote against the Bill. From the speech he delivered that evening, in pursuance of this decision, it may be interesting to extract the passage in which he defended his own action : — " I have been assailed with extraordinary bitterness because I have exercised an independent judgment in a matter which I believe to be vital to the interests of the country. I have been told that I am animated by personal spite and private spleen. Yes ; I do not com- plain of hon. members from Ireland taking that view and expressing it — it is their habit of controversy. No one has ever been opposed to them in politics but he has been covered with virulent abuse and misrepresenta- tion, and none more conspicuously than Lord Spencer and the Prime Minister, whom they are now loading with fulsome adulation. But I address myself to my hon. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 179 friends round me, from whom I have the misfortune to differ. I ask them to consider whether it is really neces- sary to impute the basest motives to public men at a time when there are, on the surface, reasons perfectly honour- able which may sufficiently account for their conduct. Do you say — do you dare to say — that my right hon. friend and colleague in the representation of Birmingham is animated by personal spleen and spite ? He takes the same course as I do ; he is going into the lobby against this Bill and against the friend, the associate, and the Leader, whom he has followed with loyal devotion for many years of his life. My right hon. friend has done as great services, he has lived almost as long in public life, as the Prime Minister himself, and no one has doubted his honour. But you say that I am in a different position. And why do you say that ? What I am saying now I expressed in public — it is in print — before the General Election, before I was a member of the Govern- ment, before I had the slightest conception that any idea of this kind was fermenting then — if it were fermenting — in the mind of the Prime Minister. I spoke at War- rington in September, 1885, and, referring to the demands of the hon. member for Cork, I said then that if there were any party or any man who was willing to yield to those demands in order to purchase his support, I would have no part in the competition. And then many of my friends whom I see around me thanked me in public for what they thought that frank, plain, and courageous declaration. And now, forsooth ! for having made the same declaration some three months later, when the occasion has arisen, they accuse me of personal and unworthy motives. Sir, the charge is unjust ; the charge is ridiculous. For there is not a man here who does not know that every personal and political interest would lead me to cast in my lot with the Prime Minister. Why, sir, not a day passes in which I do not receive dozens or scores of letters urging me, for my own sake, to vote for the Bill, and dish the Whigs ! Well, sir, the temptation is no doubt a great one, but, after all, I am not base enough to serve my personal ambition by betraying my country ; 180 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN and I am convinced, when the heat of this discussion is passed, Liberals will not judge harshly those who have pursued what they honestly believe to be the path of duty, even though it may lead to the disruption of Party ties, and to the loss of the influence and power which it is the ambition of every man to seek among his political friends and associates." This personal vindication was the more dignified and effective because it made no high-falutin' claim. There was no pretence that the speaker was free from the personal ambitions of political humanity. But, as a matter of fact, none of the Liberals who now formally separated themselves from Mr. Gladstone stood to lose so much by that step as Mr. Chamberlain : not Mr. Bright, whose resignation in 1882 had practically put him outside the pale of candidates for office ; not Lord Hartington, or Lord Selborne, or Mr. Goschen, whose distrust of the new elements in Liberalism had been growing every year more pronounced, quite apart from Home Rule ; not even Sir Henry James, who refused the highest prize of his profession, and showed that, even to a distinguished lawyer, there are higher objects than the Woolsack. But Mr. Chamberlain gave up — when a little paltering with his conscience, a slight stretching of his convictions, would have enabled him to retain — not only his position as a member of the Cabinet, but the reasonably -assured reversion of the Liberal Leadership ; and he gave them up at a time when he was at equally open discord with Conservatives and Moderate Liberals, when there was little proba- bility of his being admitted into partnership with the adversaries of his late allies. THE HOME RULE CRISIS, 1885-86. 181 The long-deferred Division, after a Debate spread out over a month, was taken on June 7th, and Mr. Glad- stone was defeated by 30 votes — 343 against 313, 94 Liberals having gone into the Opposition Lobby. The Prime Minister at once realised that he must either abandon Home Rule for the remaining Parliamentary term, or appeal to the country. There is no doubt that he entered on the General Election of 1886 in a hopeful spirit ; by this time he had taught himself to believe without reserve in the cause he had taken up, and he was advised by Mr. Schnadhorst (the Caucus secretary), who was admitted to a special meeting of the Cabinet, that the Irish vote in the English constituencies would be enough to outweigh Liberal-Unionist influence. If it had not been for the ill-starred confidence with which Mr. Gladstone was inspired by Mr. Morley's enthusiasm and Mr. Schnadhorst's calculations, he might, perhaps, have patched up a sort of peace in his Party, squared the Irish for a time by promising them another slice out of the landlords' remaining interest in the soil, and deferred the renewal of Home Rule proposals till he could recommend them to the voters of Great Britain as one ingredient in some captivating mixture like the Newcastle Programme. Had the Prime Minister followed that prudent, though ignoble policy, he might, at least, have postponed for a few years the commence- ment of Lord Salisbury's Second Administration, and Mr. Chamberlain would not have suddenly become — what he still remains — the most interesting figure in the politics of the day. CHAPTER VII. THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. Home Rule, the abstract theory and the actual Bill — Mr. Chamber- lain's Address — The General Election — Lord Salisbury and the Unionist Leaders — Mr. Chamberlain's attitude still distinct from Lord Hartington's — Effects of Lord Randolph Churchill's resignation — The Round Table Conference — The article in The Baptist — Failure of the negotiations — The Revision of Judicial Rents — Concession to the Radical Unionists — Hopes of a Liberal Reunion abandoned — The North American Fisheries — Mr. Chamberlain's successful negotiations — His marriage to Miss Endicott — The Parnell Commission. FROM the Election Address which Mr. Chamberlain issued to his supporters in Birmingham, it will be seen that, even after having so largely contributed to Mr. Gladstone's defeat, he still conceived himself to be a Home Ruler, though opposed to a separate Irish Parliament. His co-operation with Whigs and Con- servatives was, in his own mind, limited to resisting a particular scheme which they all disliked. " Liberal Unionists," he said, " while determined in their op- position to a separate Parliament for Ireland, are, nevertheless, anxious to meet, as far as possible, the legitimate aspirations of the Irish people, shared, as they believe them to be, by Scotland and by Wales, for 182 THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 183 greater independence in the management of their local affairs." There were four points to be observed. First, the relief of the Imperial Parliament by the devolution of Irish local business ; second, the full representation of Irish opinion on matters of local Irish concern ; third, to give Irishmen a fair field for legitimate local ambition and patriotism ; fourth, by removing all unnecessary interference with Irish government on the part of Great Britain, to diminish the causes of irritation and the opportunity of collision. It would be necessary to establish a complete system of Local Government for the Three Kingdoms ; but beyond and above a purely municipal arrangement of this kind, a larger arrangement would be found safe and desirable, under which, subject to the concurrent and supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament, the various portions of the United Kingdom should be enabled to exercise greater influence over local administration, and over legislation for their special needs and requirements. The Address concluded with a spirited protest against the attempts made to excommunicate all who were unable to repudiate in a few months the opinions and convictions of a lifetime. Mr. Chamberlain believed, not only that such a scheme might be acceptable in Great Britain, but also that, though not accepted by the Nationalist politicians, a full settlement on the above lines would put an end to the general agitation in Ireland. He declined, there- fore, to join either in a common propaganda, or in a temporary fighting organization, with the Whig and Con- servative Unionists. The improvised National Radical 1 84 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Union supplied all the machinery required by Mr. Chamberlain and his immediate followers; and in the Birmingham district, from which his most active col- leagues were drawn, the question hardly arose whether the Conservative vote should be solicited or accepted. Mr. Chamberlain himself, Mr. Bright, Mr. George Dixon, Mr. Powell Williams, and Mr. W. Kenrick were returned unopposed; and in Bordesley, where Mr. Jesse Collings had to fight for his seat, the majority was in the pro- portion of four to one. But the Liberals whose views were more nearly represented by Lord Hartington or Mr. Goschen assisted, and were assisted by, the Con- servatives all over the country. There was practically no conflict, hardly any competition, between the two Parties of the Unionist combination. The result of the General Election was that the English Gladstonians (194) with the Nationalists (85) were in a minority of 37 as compared with the Conservatives (316), without counting on either side the 75 Dissentient Liberals who followed Lord Hartington or Mr. Chamberlain. The latter, there- fore, if they acted all together, were in a position either to give the Conservatives a commanding majority, or to turn them out of office at a moment's notice. On receiving the Queen's commands to form a Ministry, Lord Salisbury's first care was to bind the Liberal Unionists to a firm alliance with the Conserva- tives. He carried this policy so far that, with her Majesty's permission, he offered to stand aside for Lord Hartington, and even to serve in the same Ministry. There were several reasons why Lord Hartington could not accept the offer : one was that the Conservatives, THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 185 who would constitute so large a portion of the proposed Coalition, evidently would not relish the command being given to a Liberal Unionist ; another was that if the Whig Unionists were represented in the Cabinet the Radical Unionists would not like to be left out. Differing as they did on many points, Lord Hartington and Mr. Cham- berlain were agreed in the wish to use a Conservative majority to promote Liberal measures, and agreed also that they would for the present exercise more influence outside the Ministry than if they gave a sort of security for their allegiance by taking office either with or under Lord Salisbury. Their own divergences of opinion did not matter, so long as they each occupied the position of an independent adviser to the Ministry; but the Progressive influence of both might be neutralized if the opinions of one were felt to be in conflict with those of the other. It was right that the offer should be made by Lord Salisbury, and equally right that it should be declined. It was but a few months since Lord Salisbury and Lord Hartington, Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain, had been engaged in holding each other up to the scorn or ridicule of excited Party meetings. The betrayal of Gordon, the doctrine of Ransom, the Unauthorized Programme — these are ancient matters now; but in 1886 they were fresh in the minds of men who had been exchanging charge and counter -charge, sneers and epigrams. With the best wish in the world to let bygones be bygones, some of the barbs were still rankling, and the old rivalries must soon have broken out again. The wiser thing was for 1 86 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. each Party to make trial of the other, and afterwards — when they should have settled down to harness together — to convert their Alliance into a Coalition. The different attitudes assumed by Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain were defined at a meeting held at Devonshire House on the day (August 5th) of the meeting of the new Parliament. A formal hope was expressed by the former that the Liberal Party would again be united, but that could only be done if Home Rule were thrown over — a course, he seemed to think, within the range of probability. Meantime, Liberal Unionists must support Lord Salisbury's Government, otherwise they would defeat the very object for which they had fought at the General Election. Mr. Chamber- lain concurred with Lord Hartington as to the immediate duty of Liberal Unionists, but dwelt with considerable emphasis on the prospects of a Liberal reconciliation. He thought a basis of agreement might be found with regard to the Irish question. As a sign that the Liberal Unionists did not consider that they had ceased to be Liberals, they should sit on the Opposition benches, alongside the Gladstonians. There was not precisely a contrast between the two speeches, but a certain difference in tone showed that one of the Dissentients was beyond negotiation, while the other was still anxious for compromise. But in the Debate on the Address, whatever might be his feelings towards Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Chamberlain now found himself at open issue with Mr. Parnell — who had moved an Amendment which was practically a vote of Censure, on Ministers — and was assailed by Mr. THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 187 Sexton for having proved more Tory than the Tories. The abuse with which, from this time, Mr. Chamberlain has been assailed by the Nationalist politicians never counted for much in English opinion. He has himself always sought to appeal over their heads to the Irish nation, and — rightly or wrongly — refused to treat them as really representative of the popular demands. Just at this time they were very much at discount in this country. Invented by Mr. Harrington, the Plan of Cam- paign had been taken up by Mr. Dillon and Mr. O'Brien — much to the disgust of Mr. Parnell and some of his more statesmanlike Irish supporters. The undisguised dishonesty of the object, and the cruel methods by which it was pursued, had shocked many of those Gladstonians who had been able to extenuate or ignore the frauds and outrages by which the Land League and the National League had maintained their illicit authority. It is believed that not a few of the English Home -Rulers in Parliament might have been found in a coming -on mood if they had been approached at this time by the Liberal Unionists. But the bulk of that Party were not disposed to make or sanction any overtures. A meeting was held in Willis's Rooms, at which Lord Hartington insisted that the alliance with the Conservatives must still be kept up ; and a somewhat chilly reception was given to the advice, telegraphed by Mr. Chamberlain from abroad, that a Conference should be proposed between the two sections of the Liberal Party with regard to concessions to Ireland. Almost at the end of the year, the question of a formal Unionist Coalition was once again raised in an acute 1 88 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. shape. Lord Randolph Churchill had at last been taken at his word by Lord Salisbury, and his resignation was accepted. For us, who are wise after the event, it is easy to see that the Ministry were well rid of that dis- turbing genius, that brilliant incubus. Lord Randolph believed — what half the Conservatives in the House of Commons believed — that Lord Salisbury's Ministry was now on the point of breaking up, and that if they did not take him back on his own terms they would not survive their second Session. Those who had worked in council with the prophet of Tory Democracy had begun to find him out, but the general public, who judged him only by his public performances, knew him only as the most effective platform speaker in England and a singularly promising Leader of the House of Commons. For us, who are wise after the event, it is easy to see that Randolphianism never had any more bowels in it than Boulangism. The one was a man without a cause — the other a cause without a man. But at the time a great scare set in ; and to restore the confidence of his demoralised followers, Lord Salisbury once again invited the co-operation of the Liberal Unionists, once again offered to serve under Lord Hartington, and once again was met with a refusal, though it was accompanied with something like a pledge of general support. The decision of Lord Hartington was warmly approved by Mr. Chamberlain, whose confidence in Lord Salisbury's Administration had been severely shaken by the retire- ment of a politician for whom he had a warm admiration ; with whom, in spite of occasional quarrels, he kept up a THE I NIONIST ALLIANCE. 189 cordial friendship, and who was, of ail his colleagues, the one most accessible to Progressive influences. By obtaining the assistance of Mr. Goschen, who accepted the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, Lord Salisbury recruited a statesman who was but nominally a Liberal Unionist — who was, in fact, more cautious in his policy than some who called themselves Tories. It was for his personal qualities, his political sincerity, and his financial genius, that Mr. Goschen — the man Lord Randolph con- fessed he had forgotten — was so important an accession to the strength of Lord Salisbury's Government. But his acceptance of office, though it made a sort of personal tie between Conservative Ministers and reflective Liberals like Sir Henry James, did nothing to increase the confidence of the advanced Reformers who followed Mr. Chamberlain, or even of those equally positive, though less impatient, Liberals who looked for guidance to Lord Hartington. At the outset of Lord Salisbury's Second Administra- tion, it is not unfair to say that the Radical and the Liberal Unionist leaders made it their chief business to keep an eye on the Conservatives. There was no sign of personal disagreement or distrust. But they expected — and reasonably expected — that, in return for the vote of their respective contingents in the House of Commons, they should be taken into consultation, and to have as much voice in the settlement of policy as if they had been actually admitted into the Cabinet. After a time, both sides grew accustomed to a somewhat anomalous arrangement, and it worked with unexpected smoothness. But in passing judgment, whether favourable or depreci- igo JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. atory, on the conduct of the 1 886-1 892 Ministry, it is not right to say, "The Conservatives did this," or " The Conservatives refused to do that." Sometimes there was a concession by the minority, e.g. when Lord Salisbury had his way about Tithes ; sometimes the yielding was done by the majority, as in the instance of Free Education. But, in a general way, the common policy was determined, not by surrender on either side, but by fair give-and-take. Meantime — i.e., before this understanding had been tested in practice — Mr. Chamberlain confessed, at Bir- mingham, that Lord Randolph's resignation had weakened his faith. That politician, he considered, had risen superior to the old Tory traditions, and, now that he was gone, Mr. Chamberlain feared a recourse to re- actionary policy. This feeling it was which, in part, at least, made him throw out the strong hint that resulted in the Round Table Conference. The Liberals, he said, were agreed on ninety-nine parts of their programme ; they disagreed only on one. Even on the Land Question they were not far apart. "There is the real grievance of Ireland, there is the real problem we have to solve, and, believe me, gentle- men," said Mr. Chamberlain, "without solving this Land Question, Home Rule is impossible; and I believe that, if you solve it, Home Rule will be unnecessary. Are we," he asked, " far apart upon the principles which ought to guide a settlement of the Land Question ? I think not. . . . I am convinced that, sitting round a table, and coming together in a spirit of compromise and con- ciliation, almost any three men — leaders of the Liberal Party — although they may hold opposite views upon another branch of the question, would yet be able to arrange some scheme." THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 191 Mr. (now Sir) H. H. Fowler declared that this offer provided the basis of a reasonable compromise ; and on January 3rd, 1887, a letter from Mr. Gladstone to Sir William Harcourt was published in the Daily Nezus, in which it was practically accepted. Ten days later the Conference met at Sir William Harcourt's house — Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Morley for the Gladstonians, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Tre- velyan for the Radical Unionists, and Lord Herschell to represent the Open Mind. There is no need to go into the history of those abortive negotiations. While they were in progress — and they went quite comfortably at first — Mr. Chamberlain was as unreasonably eulogised by expectant Gladstonians as he was denounced without cause by perfervid Unionists. He had never pledged himself unconditionally to either side, and he was logically and morally quite at liberty to express — as he did — his eager hope that a reunion might be effected. That he made a great error is quite clear. He had over-rated the importance of Lord Randolph's secession from the Ministry, and under-estimated the points of difference between the Home Rule and Unionist faiths, even when each had been rationalised down to the lowest working minimum. Already, some rash Gladstonians had begun to rejoice over his impending recantation, and he had to reply with some candid remarks about "political mischief-makers " who were trying to intimidate Liberal Unionists with " threats of political extinction." " Let there be no mistake," he said ; " we are anxious, we are eager, for reunion. We are willing to go a long way to meet our former friends. We have laid ourselves open to much misconception by making the first advance, 192 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. but there are limits to the concessions which can be made, which can be demanded of us, and unless there is an equal reasonableness on the part of our former friends, upon their shoulders must rest the responsibility of the further disaster and confusion which will fall upon the Liberal Party." Lord Hartington and Sir Henry James were not de- ceived, as Mr. Chamberlain was — as he never would have been but for his sudden alarm for that Social Programme which has never ranked second in his mind to any other cause, even to maintaining the Union. This was, in fact, Mr. Chamberlain's last definite effort to rejoin the Party which he had hitherto considered the one better adapted, and more disposed, to carry Progressive legislation. It is admitted on all hands now that the project of this Conference was, from the beginning, an amiable mistake. The time has not yet come — we are too near to the events — to examine the reasons, or to sift the conflicting state- ments* made about them, for the failure of negotiations * Between the accounts, given by Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Chamberlain, of the understanding on which the Conference met there is, not inconsistency, but flat disagreement. Sir William's view is that the establishment of a Dublin Parliament with an Executive dependent on it was taken as common ground, while Mr. Chamberlain contends that " not one word was said " about such a scheme. The plans discussed were very different ; e.g. a proposal to establish some system of provincial authorities (on the model of the provincial Constitution of Canada) subordinate to Imperial Parlia- ment, and dealing only with subjects specially referred to them, the Imperial Parliament retaining a concurrent power of making laws and levying taxes. Sir William said that the negotiations broke down because Mr. Chamberlain was opposed, not to Home Rule, but to Mr. Gladstone ; Mr. Chamberlain accounted for the collapse by saying that behind the Liberal Leaders was ' ' a power they dared not face." THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 193 which seem to have been commenced on both sides with an honest expectation of eventual harmony. The truth, no doubt, is that each side thought the other could be induced to give way on the essential points at issue. The only matters of agreement were that the Home Rule Bill and the Land Bill of 1886 were both to be treated as if they had never existed, and that it would be a good thing for both parties if the Gladstonian Liberals and Liberal Unionists could patch up their quarrel. But neither that diplomatic fiction nor the sense of ex- pediency availed to bring about a compromise — how was compromise possible ? — on such questions as whether Imperial Parliament should be invested with an effective Veto on the legislation of an Irish Assembly. This power Mr. Chamberlain was bound, by all his past ex- pressions and present convictions, to insist upon ; and Mr. Morley was equally compelled, by his own genuine conversion to Home Rule, and by the demands of his Nationalist allies, to refuse. On some other points which gave difficulty — such as the separate treatment of Ulster and the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary — a working arrangement might conceivably have been arrived at. But when a funda- mental principle is involved, when both sides are sincere, and neither can be imposed upon by verbal shams, this kind of palaver is but waste of time and temper. Of the former, not much was expended — a great deal of the latter. After two or three friendly meetings in January, an adjournment was made till the middle of February, at which date Sir George Trevelyan — whose trust in the power of argument has survived an acquaintance o 194 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. with practical politics — still believed that reunion was attainable. The fact was that Sir George had been talked over, and Mr. Chamberlain had not. A few days later, the Baptist published an article by Mr. Chamberlain, in which he showed that Home Rule was leading to the indefinite adjournment of "all Liberal reform," including the Welsh Nonconformists' demand for Disestablishment, a measure with which he expressed the strongest sympathy. If the Welsh people, by returning 23 out of their 30 members to support Mr. Gladstone, meant to express approval of his Irish policy, they had "no right whatever to complain of the delay of their hopes, and they must wait patiently until the country has changed its mind, and is prepared to hand over the minority in Ireland to the tender mercies of Mr. Parnell and the Irish League. Nor would they be the only disappointed persons. The crofters of Scotland and the agricultural labourers of England will keep them company. Thirty-two millions of people must go without much-needed legislation because three millions are disloyal, while nearly six hundred members of the Imperial Parliament will be reduced to forced inactivity because some eighty delegates, representing the policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago Con- vention, are determined to obstruct all business until their demands have been conceded." If any hope still remained of inducing Mr. Chamber- lain to rejoin the official Liberals by offering him terms he could conscientiously accept, it would have been dissipated by this utterance, which gave them, at least, a pretext for saying that he was impracticable. The fact 7 HE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 195 is that, though the bulk of Mr. Gladstone's followers would have been glad to make a considerable sacrifice for the sake of regaining Mr. Chamberlain and the Midland capital, some of his chief colleagues were by no means sorry to have got out of their own way the masterful and managing statesman who would, undoubtedly, claim— and obtain — the leadership as soon as Mr. Gladstone should leave it vacant. He was, they thought, less inconvenient as an adversary than as a rival. Though friendly expressions were still used on both sides, and though there really was a temporary abatement of hostilities between Home Rule and Unionist Liberals, it was by Mr. Gladstone's directions that Sir William Harcourt wrote to Mr. Chamberlain and suggested that the Conference should be suspended for a time. The reason assigned was that the Baptist article had raised a storm, which should be allowed to blow over. The facts were that the points of difference revealed were so radical that nothing could be accomplished by further discussion ; and that Mr. Gladstone, knowing how sincere was Mr. Chamberlain's Radicalism, hoped that he would soon be tired of co-operating with the Conservatives. Mr. Chamberlain, naturally, accepted Sir William's letter as an informal discharge of the Conference, and told Sir George Trevelyan that he should not go on with it. There was no longer any hesitation about his attitude on Irish questions. He voted against Mr. Parnell's hostile Amendment to the Address at the opening of the 1887 Session, and against the Tenants' Relief Bill, and he supported Mr. Balfour's demand for "urgency" for the Crimes Bill. Though never converted to Coercion " as a 196 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. policy," and always regarding it as a " hateful incident," he realised that there could be no order or liberty in Ireland so long as the Plan of Campaign was allowed to continue ; and he was particularly disgusted by the covert menaces which Mr. Parnell had ventured to throw out. Never, in recent times, has Party spirit in England worked more hotly, more savagely, than about Eastertide of 1887. The Nationalists realised that they would be beaten, unless they could intimidate the Government into dropping the repressive measure being pressed forward by the Chief Secretary — which Mr. Gladstone, throwing himself heart and soul into the agitation, described as " the worst, the most insulting, the most causeless Coercion Bill ever submitted to Parliament." The sting of it was that it was not limited in duration, and that, being once armed with the powers they demanded, Ministers would not again be put to the trouble and odium of forcing a similar Bill through the House of Commons. On the other hand, the Coercion could be suspended — on the discretion of the Executive — in any district where it seemed no longer necessary ; and before Mr. Balfour had ceased to be Chief Secretary he was to have the pleasure of announcing that it was dormant throughout Ireland, except in a few neighbourhoods still liable to agrarian disturbance. Granted that the need for exceptional measures had been established, it must be admitted that no more considerate, or more effective, scheme could have been proposed. Let us assume that its enforcement was uncomfortable in districts where it had to be applied. The prospect of its relaxation gave the inhabitants the best of reasons for mending their THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 197 behaviour, and for using their influence to the same effect on those about them. Almost at the same time as Mr. Balfour brought in his Crimes Act, Lord Cadogan introduced an Irish Land Bill, based on the Report of a recent Royal Commission, but not adopting the recommendation that the Judicial Rents fixed (under the Act of 1881) for a term of fifteen years, should be revisable every fifth year, and that the amount should be settled with reference to the price of agricul- tural produce. The measure was only of a temporary character, meant to supplement the now admitted deficiencies of Mr. Glad- stone's Act. But no permanent remedy for agrarian discontent could be looked for until the policy of the Ash- bourne Act, of the previous Conservative Administration, could be yet further developed, and until the evils arising from the dual ownership of the soil could be removed by an extensive scheme of Land Purchase. For the present, it was proposed to give relief to certain leaseholders (numbering some 150,000 persons) by per- mitting them to apply for a judicial revision of their rents, and, in cases of sub -letting, to throw up their leases ; and to check evictions by allowing a landlord, who had obtained judgment, to turn the tenant into a "care-taker" instead of executing the legal process. Equitable jurisdiction was given to the County Court judges with regard to tenants who believed they had ground for complaint : time might be allowed for pay- ment, relief might be given, as in bankruptcy, to really insolvent tenants, and reinstatement, at a fair rent, was rendered permissible in deserving cases. As some 198 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. set-off to concessions made largely at the expense of the landlord class, those who could not get their rents were excused payment of rates. The Bill was generally approved by the Liberal - Unionist Party, though, at a meeting held at Devonshire House, Mr. Chamberlain, while agreeing to support the Ministerial proposals for Coercion, insisted somewhat significantly on the necessity of making the concurrent remedial measures fully adequate to the emergency. What he meant by those remarks appeared when, having passed the Lords, the Land Bill came up for Second Reading in the Commons. Among the further con- cessions he demanded, the most important was that the Judicial Rents should be made subject to revision. This, no doubt, was a proposal which had been condemned, in anticipation, by Lord" Salisbury and Mr. Goschen ; one which it would be difficult to defend if any regard was to be paid to the promise, implied in the Act of 1 88 1, that the landlords should not have their incomes reduced by Parliament for the statutory term of fifteen years. But Mr. Chamberlain pressed the case, and was backed up not only by the Radical Unionists, but by the Ulster Loyalists. It cannot be denied that the change of policy was unacceptable to the Conservative Leaders ; but, at a meeting of the Party, called by Lord Salisbury, it was decided that the concession must be made, in view of the necessity for doing nothing to weaken the Unionist majority. The success of Mr. Chamberlain was, it must be admitted, resented by many Conservatives, though they were ready to allow that he was entitled to some return for his Parliamentary support. THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 199 In spite of Mr. Chamberlain's efforts — at the eost of irritating his Conservative allies — on behalf of the Irish demands, he was at this time more disliked and reviled by the Nationalists than any other Unionist in Parlia- ment. Nor was he sparing of taunts in reply. Peculiar exasperation was caused by his account, given at Inver- ness, of a " scene " in the House of Commons, in the course of which Colonel Saunderson accused the Irish members of being friendly with murderers — and, Mr. Chamberlain said, accused them truly. The point of that remark lay in the fact that the first " Parnell Letter" (about the Phoenix Park murders) had recently been published, and at this time both Parties seem to have lost their heads. Many Unionists, reasonable men in ordinary times, said and believed that most of the Irish members were little better than assassins, while they were themselves regarded as circulating what they knew to be malignant inventions. The violence of feeling thus generated and stimulated made it difficult, if any desire had still existed in Mr. Chamberlain's mind, to return to his old associates. The final breach, so he regarded it, was caused by a speech of his old friend, Mr. Morley : " How can we, in the midst of the heat of protest against this disastrous and shameful policy of Coercion," Mr. Morley asked, " hurry forward to reconcile ourselves with our Dissentient friends, who are in the main responsible for fastening this policy on Ireland? How can we hurry forward to unite with statesmen who not only support the general policy of Coercion, but doggedly, defiantly, and steadfastly go into the Division Lobby against any modifications of it, and in favour of making the Bill as drastic as they can?" 200 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. This, Mr. Chamberlain replied, was "the turning point." The cleavage, he said on June ist, had become irreparable, and he was driven to the conclusion that on the Gladstonian side there was no longer any desire for reunion. It was in this speech that he used an expression which has been so often thrown in his teeth — as if it showed that his Unionist policy had been influenced by social ambition. But the context shows that the offending phrase, " English gentlemen," was only used by way of antithesis : " We shall be taunted, I suppose, with an alliance with the Tories. At least, our allies will be English gentlemen, and not the sub- sidized agents of a foreign conspiracy. I look beyond mere Party considerations. The Government may be Tory, but, if its measures are Liberal, I am prepared to discuss them on their merits, and without regard to past controversies." Thoroughly able as Mr. Chamberlain is to take good care of himself in any war of words, he found his political position, at this time, far from comfortable. He was at open enmity with the Gladstonians, he was out of harmony with the Conservatives, and he was not quite at one with the Hartingtonian Unionists. Nor could he always reconcile himself to the various applications of the Crimes Act demanded by the Irish Executive. It had been decided to proclaim the National League ; and Mr. Chamberlain, believing there was " no emergency in Ireland," not only abstained, when the question was brought up by Mr. Gladstone, from supporting Ministers, but, with a few other Unionists, voted with the Opposition. It was in every way desirable, if the opportunity offered THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE 201 itself, that he should withdraw, for a time, from the personal controversies in which he had been so warmly engaged on one side, without having finally attached himself to the other. It was at this juncture that a tiresome, old-standing dispute between Great Britain and the United States, with regard to the North American Fisheries, seemed to Lord Salisbury — whose one animating motive at the Foreign Office is to settle, by peaceful bargain and mutual concession, any possible cause of quarrel with foreign countries — that the assistance of a statesman who was also a man of business would be especially welcome. The Washington Government had agreed to the appointment of a new Commission, and Mr. Chamberlain was asked, and agreed, to represent Great Britain. Invested with this modern equivalent for the old Libera Legatio, it was hoped that he would be removed, for a time, from the embarrassments of a somewhat ambiguous position, and that, when he returned, it would be easier for him to drop into what now seemed his natural place as one of the Liberal Unionist Leaders, but in definite alliance with the Conservative Ministry. Before starting on his important mission, he naturally paid a visit to his constituents in Birmingham, where he delivered a capital fighting speech in defence of the Government policy. This, unfortunately, he followed up with a political tour in Ulster. He had a most cordial, even enthusiastic, reception from the Loyalists, who were well aware that no other Englishman had done more to save them from that Dublin Parliament against which, if necessary, they were prepared to go out 202 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in open rebellion. But the animosity of the Nationalists was roused to fury by his openly fraternising with their sworn foes;, and the word went forth that the American Irishmen should see to it that his diplomatic mission was a failure. Unwisely, perhaps — Mr. Chamberlain does, occasionally, let his temper betray him into telling truths that were better unspoken — he referred to this vindictive plot. The publicity thus attracted to the threat compelled the Irishry to make their word good. It is unnecessary here to go into the history of the North American Fisheries question. In 1887 it was already more than a century old ; and if the United States Government had pressed to an extreme the rights which they possessed under various Treaties, and some- times pressed them beyond any rational interpretation of the terms, it cannot be pretended that the Dominion Parliament had proved accommodating. There was, in fact, some risk of dangerous misunderstanding when the Canadians exercised their right of seizing American vessels which had, or were charged with having, infringed the latesj: regulations. After a careful inquiry into all the facts, and a study of the whole situation, extended over some three months, Mr. Chamberlain arranged with the American and Canadian representatives a fairly equitable compromise. Nor was it without difficulty that Mr. Chamberlain induced the Dominion Government to make the concessions necessary to give the Americans a motive for coming to an agreement. The proposals were, briefly, to reckon the Three-mile Limit in bays and creeks not from headland to headland, but by an imaginary line drawn across the entrance at the THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 203 first point when the width did not exceed ten miles. American fishermen were allowed to enter Canadian ports and harbours for the purpose of loading, reloading, and obtaining supplies — rights which had been very severely restricted in the 1818 Treaty. They were even permitted to buy bait in Canada, but only on condition that the taxes on Canadian fish products were abandoned by the United States. The draft Treaty was signed at Wash- ington, but the Republican majority in the Senate, partly to keep the Irish-American vote, and partly to harass Mr. Cleveland's Administration, refused to ratify it.* The rebuff to Mr. Chamberlain was, no doubt, a subject of exultation to his adversaries. But the personal importance of this prolonged American visit was not limited to the objects for which it had been undertaken. Mr. Chamberlain, who had been a widower since 1875, now became engaged to Miss Mary Endicott, daughter of Hon. W. Endicott, Secretary of War in Mr. Cleveland's Administration, to whom he was married on November 15th, 1888. With regard to the Special Commission appointed in 1888 to report on the authenticity of the charges brought by the Times against Mr. Parnell and the Nationalist Party in general, Mr. Chamberlain, though he attached special importance to the letters attributed to the Irish Leader, was strongly of opinion that the inquiry should not be limited to that topic, but should cover the whole * No practical harm was done by this demonstration. The Pleni- potentiaries had arranged a Modus Vivendi to remain in force till the Treaty should be ratified. It has been continued up to the present time, and its existence has answered all the purposes for which the Treaty was concluded and signed by the Plenipotentiaries. 204 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. ground of the indictment. Although Sir William Harcourt, and other Gladstonians, went far beyond the mark when they declared that he was the main instigator of the action taken by the majority of the House of Commons, there is no doubt that he sincerely believed in at least the bulk of the accusations. That the documents relating to Mr. Parnell in particular had been published in good faith was as clear as it was difficult to understand, if he were a maligned man, why he was so obstinately reluctant to take measures for his own vindication. Though he was to be exonerated by the subsequent exposure of Richard Pigott and his confession of the forgeries, no blame can be attached to Unionists — and many English Home Rulers — who had previously believed that Mr. Parnell was indeed the author of the incriminating letters. The momentary and strictly personal triumph which he achieved before the Judges did not, however, relieve him from his full share of the collective guilt proved against his Party. Nor had Mr. Chamberlain any difficulty in showing, when the Report of the three Judges was under discussion in the House of Commons in 1890, that the Nationalists were unable to claim an acquittal. There could be no "picking and choosing " among the findings of the Tribunal ; and he dwelt on the intimate connection which had been established between some members of the Irish Parlia- mentary Party and the Physical Force conspirators in America, whose object was to assassinate public men in this country, and lay our chief cities in ruins. Hitherto such charges had been brought against the Nationalists only by their opponents, and might on that account THE UNIONIST ALLIANCE. 205 carry less general authority. The case was now altered when those allegations had been proved before a Judicial Tribunal, and put on record by the Judges. After an utterance like this, it was clear that there could no longer be any peace or truce between Mr. Chamberlain and the Pamellites. They regard him with a personal vindictiveness which they do not extend to other Unionists, nor has he been slow to retort upon them. No phrase, perhaps, has given deeper offence than the one in which he described them as a " Kept Party." But, in spite of the bitter recriminations exchanged in Parliament and on the platform, it is to Mr. Chamberlain's credit that, during the hottest period of controversy, he had always sought to modify the rigours of imprisonment in the case of adversaries who had brought themselves within the grasp of the law. It had been largely due to his influence that Mr. Balfour — whether logically or illogically — had agreed, in 1889, to sanction certain re- laxations of gaol discipline in favour of political prisoners as distinguished from ordinary offenders. Those who know Mr. Chamberlain best, including those who have quarrelled with him, admit that, however sharply he may use his tongue, he does not hug his resentments, and at the present time bears no personal ill-will even against those who have assailed him with every epithet to be drawn from a copious vocabulary of malediction. CHAPTER VIII. THE UNIONIST COALITION. Conservatives and Mr. Chamberlain's Social Programme — Allot- ments and Small Holdings — Local Government Reform — Land Purchase in Ireland — Free Education — The futile Session of 1892 — Mr. Gladstone's return to office — Mr. Chamberlain in Opposi- tion — His future position as member of a Coalition — Points of possible disagreement — Church Disestablishment — Voluntary Schools — Relative importance of Social Reforms and Political Innovations — Conservatives the pioneers of Social Legislation — Rivalry between the two Unionist Parties. IT may not be held quite fanciful to suggest that the close view which Mr. Chamberlain obtained, during his American Mission, of some of the great advantages, and equally great liabilities, involved in our Colonial possessions, helped still further to modify the Gladstonian element in his Radicalism. Even while he was a member of the 1 880-1 885 Administration, while he shared and claimed responsibility for all the results of its foreign policy, he had always, as we have seen, been credited with a sense of Imperial duty. How strongly that inclination, now for the first time showing itself in a public and prominent way, was afterwards to be de- veloped will be matter for a later chapter. But it must have become increasingly clear to his mind that if he 206 THE UNIONIST COALITION. 207 agreed almost entirely with the Conservatives about Ireland, and if he sympathized with their Imperial views, the approximation predicted by scornful opponents was no longer so improbable as it had seemed two years, even twelve months, before. The only question was whether a working compromise could be arranged, so that the Party to whom he gave a general support should accept some portion of his Social Programme. He was gratified, perhaps a little surprised, to find that the Conservatives, whom he had so often suspected and accused of reactionary intentions, were ready to meet him halfway ; that he could co-operate, without doing violence to his own convictions, in all the social proposals that originated with Ministers, though he might not think they went far enough in the direction he desired; that even the " ecclesiastical " legislation, in which Lord Salisbury persevered with the object of removing the friction that arose from an antiquated and inconvenient method of collecting tithes, was absolutely inoffensive to the most sincere Nonconformist, though it was resisted by political Dissenters who wished to keep an ancient grievance alive, so as to use it for their attack on the Establishment; and finally, that the Prime Minister and his colleagues were willing to graft on to their own programme schemes unconnected with, if not adverse to, their past professions and existing principles ; that the Liberal Unionists, in fact, were loyally admitted to a share in directing the policy of the two Parties, which would be at least proportionate to their numerical importance. Even with regard to the "Three Acres and a 2o8 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Cow " policy, so closely associated with some of Mr. Chamberlain's immediate adherents, he found that the Conservatives were ready to concede as much as it was reasonable to expect. To the extension of the Allotment and Cottage Garden system they had always been favour- able, for the excellent reason that anything which made the agricultural labourer more prosperous or contented would be to the advantage of the whole landed interest. The Act of 1887, which enabled Sanitary Authorities to acquire land for such purposes, was at the time deemed sufficient for its purpose ; but, on its being proved that the process of acquisition was encumbered by too many dilatory formalities, Ministers amended it, three years later, by a Statute which simplified and cheapened the procedure. To the establishment of Small Holdings, as distinguished from plots of garden ground, Conser- vatives were not absolutely hostile, though they believed that it would be an expensive and a futile experiment. They had resisted the proposal for some time, chiefly on these grounds, and because they knew that the value of large farms would be destroyed, both for letting and for working, if the choicest and most accessible fields were sliced off for the benefit of small proprietors. When Lord Salisbury yielded, as he did yield in 1891, to the pressure of his Radical supporters, he expressed his scepticism as to the possibility of reviving the yeoman class in England, though for political reasons he would be glad to see it re-established and widely extended. There cannot, indeed, be a greater element of constitutional stability, as France has shown, than the existence of a great number of families owning THE UNIONIST COALITION. 209 the land which they cultivate with their own labour. The Act of 1892 was professedly an experiment, and was surrounded with limitations and safeguards which prevented it being made into a standing menace to the landlords and their larger tenants. It cannot be said that it has either broken down or proved a conspicuous success ; but since it came into operation the state of agriculture throughout Great Britain has been so lan- guishing that village labourers and tradesmen, who have saved money enough to pay purchase instalments or to stock a holding have generally been too prudent to risk their thrift on so unpromising an undertaking. With regard to the reform of Local Self-Government, it was the Conservatives, Mr. Chamberlain found, who were prepared, rather than their opponents, to construct a popular and representative system. In Mr. Ritchie, who piloted the Bill of 1888 through the Commons with considerable skill, he found a Conservative hardly less Radical than himself. The reform of Metropolitan Administration, by the creation of a Council with powers extended over the whole " County of London," went, indeed, far beyond the principles laid down by Mr. Chamberlain. If, in other respects, the Act of 1888 was not so complete as thorough - going believers in the virtues of Local Self-Government might desire, the blame for dropping the scheme for District Councils lay with the Gladstonian Opposition, as it did for the abandonment of those Licensing Clauses under which the Councils would have been empowered gradually to reduce the number of public drinking-places. Nor, in face of the confessed failure of the Land p 210 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Act of 1 88 1, in which Mr. Chamberlain had so warmly co-operated with Mr. Gladstone, could he feel anything but satisfaction with the various schemes of Land Purchase, culminating in the great Act of 1891, by which Mr. Balfour struck at the root of agrarian dis- content. For the essentially vicious system of a dual ownership, which reduced the landowner to the position of a rent-charger invested with certain rights of sporting and mining, and which made the tenant regard him as a mere encumbrancer, was now substituted an arrange- ment under which the cultivator was enabled, on easy terms, to buy out any landlord who was willing to sell his property. Nor could any serious financial objection be raised, such as Mr. Chamberlain had himself raised against Mr. Gladstone's proposals in 1886, to the manner in which the Imperial credit was pledged. The ingenious system of checks and securities, said to have been devised by Mr. Goschen in friendly counsel with Mr. Balfour, made the risk of default so small, and the chance of resort to the Exchequer so remote, that they might safely be dismissed — as the event has shown — from practical consideration. The measures sanctioned for the supply of Seed Potatoes in distressed parts of the country, for the gradual improvement of Congested Districts, and for the construction of Light Railways in Ireland, while they stood outside the range of Party controversies, showed that, whatever divergencies might display themselves in the future, there was a point at which the Progressive Conservatism of Mr. Balfour began to run on parallel lines with the State Socialism of Mr. Chamberlain. THE UNIONIST COALITION. 211 The most signal instance of Mr. Chamberlain's influence on Lord Salisbury's Administration was that he induced the Conservatives — and some Liberal Unionists who had been equally opposed to the measure — to take up the cause of Free Education in 1891. Lord Salisbury had preferred to call it Assisted Education. But once he realized that the plunge must be made, he gave up all hesitation, and agreed to the total abolition of com- pulsory School Fees. It would be incorrect to suggest that the whole credit — or discredit — for this scheme lies with Mr. Chamberlain. It was warmly supported by many of those Conservatives, not quite extinguished in the eclipse of Lord Randolph Churchill, who are never quite sure on which side of the House they want to sit, and by some others, whose personal convictions were quite unshaken, but who thought that it would be bad electioneering to go to the country without a gift in their hands. The conspicuous failure of that attempt to debauch the British voter with State largesse was not, however, due to any virtuous indignation on the part of the electorate. It was because they had what seemed a better offer from the other side. It would be unfair to blame Mr. Cham- berlain for this degrading competition with the Newcastle Programme, since the establishment of Free Education had long been one of his proposals, and it flowed naturally from the principles he had so often professed. But with the Conservatives it was a mere concession to what they believed was expediency. Even with such credentials, the Unionists did not think that the time had yet come to dissolve Parliament. They were bound, they 212 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. considered, at least to bring forward a scheme of Local Government for Ireland. Many of the Conservatives, and all the Liberal Unionists, had, indeed, pledged themselves to propose a generous scheme of reform. Meritorious as was the Bill produced by Mr. Balfour, and reason- able as were the safeguards by which it was accompanied, he found that there was on the Home Rule side not even a pretence of giving it a fair consideration. The only purpose it served was, for a time, to combine in hearty opposition the divided and demoralised frag- ments of the Irish Party. The chief result of the superfluous Session of 1892 was to enable the Nationalists partially to recover from the discredit into which they had been brought : — with the English Nonconformists, through their loyalty to their Leader in his disgrace ; with other Englishmen, through the cynical treachery of their subsequent abandonment ; and, universally, through the acrimonious wranglings, after his death, which had shown Great Britain how unfit they were to be released from the control of an impartial and Imperial Parliament. The delay in appealing to the country till the end of June, 1892, was, perhaps, the capital error of Lord Salisbury's Second Administration ; and, so far as it was caused by the supposed necessity for proposing a Local Government Bill for Ireland, it must be admitted that Mr. Chamberlain shares, with other Unionist leaders, the blame for bad advice. The responsibility is not, perhaps, a heavy one, since it is quite a conjectural, though a highly probable, suggestion that the Unionists would have done better if they had risked their fortunes the year before. THE UNIONIST COALITION. 213 The results of the General Election were particularly unfavourable to the Liberal Unionists. Before the General Election of 1886 they had mustered 90; after it they came back — if the followers of Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain be reckoned together — 77 strong; and, in the course of the bye-elections, they had only been reduced to 65. But after the appeal to the electorate they numbered only 46. The Conserva- tives suffered heavy losses, but, proportionately, not so severe. They went to the country 304 strong, and came back 268, while the Nationalists (both sections) were reduced from 86 to 81. The nett result, after the returns were completed, was a combined Gladstonian and Nationalist majority of 42 over the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. It is unnecessary, so near to the events, to retrace the history of the Gladstone-Rosebery Administration of 1 892-1 895. It is enough to say, with reference to Mr. Chamberlain, that his loyalty, in Opposition, to the Unionist cause showed none of that hesitancy which had been caused in 1886 and in 1887 by his desire for bringing about a reunion of the Liberal Party, and for discovering — if that were possible — a liberal scheme of Local Self-government not incompatible with the maintenance of Imperial Authority. If Mr. Gladstone's first Government of Ireland Bill had shaken his hopes of such a consummation, they were finally shattered by the second and revised edition. Though some of the objections which he had urged against the scheme of 1886 were inapplicable to that of 1893, others arose of equal, if not greater, importance. It would, probably, 214 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. be difficult to quote a speech in which Mr. Chamberlain has finally and formally repudiated the abstract principle of Home Rule as he once understood it. But it may be taken for granted that, for practical purposes, he is as convinced a Unionist as Mr. Balfour himself, and that, even in the direction of Local Self-government for Ireland, he is not prepared to go much further than the bulk of the Conservatives, or to dispense with any material safeguards which they would desire to impose. Dangerous as it would be to predict the future of a statesman so progressive in ideas, so sensitive to fresh influences, so receptive of current forces, it may be said with reasonable confidence that Home Rule is a closed chapter in the book of his life. But the question is often asked, Suppose Home Rule were finally abandoned by the Liberal Party, or (as is more conceivable) suppose it were relegated to the limbo of pious faiths — would Mr. Chamberlain then be invited, and would he then consent, to walk across the House of Commons? The answer may, perhaps, be left to those who feel themselves able to predict what, ten years hence, will be the respective principles of the two great Parties in the State. Those who follow the more pedestrian method of studying things knowable will say, first, that the statesmen who may then occupy the chief positions in the Liberal Party will not be consumed with anxiety to invite the aid of one who would not be content with a second place. But the strongest guaranty for Mr. Chamberlain's adherence to the Coali- tion of which he has become so prominent a member is that he is no longer, as he was in 1886-1892, an in- THE UNIONIST COALITION. 215 dependent outsider. For every act done, and every promise made, kept, or broken by the Unionists, he will share as much responsibility as any other member of the Cabinet. He is not, as we have seen, a Minister who lightly throws up office. There was much done in Mr. Gladstone's Second Government which was un- palatable to the President of the Board of Trade ; much was left undone which he considered urgent. But he had already realised that retirement is a confession of failure. It was because, on the other hand, he was so alive to the possibilities that still remain to a resolute Minister, as long as he has access to the Cabinet, that he hung on to the last moment in 1886, hoping against hope that Mr. Gladstone could be persuaded into real concession. It is, then, only on a vital point of difference that Mr. Chamberlain is likely to part company with his present colleagues. Is such a disagreement within the political probabilities ? That there is, on some questions, a funda- mental discord between himself and the Conservatives must be admitted. He is a Nonconformist pur sang, and he desires to see the Disestablishment and Dis- endowment of the Church of England — not only in Wales. If, by any means, that question could be raised in a practical shape, he would probably find a difficulty in opposing it. In the last Parliament, he gave considerable umbrage to many Conservative Churchmen by voting for the Second Reading of Mr. Asquith's Bill for Welsh Disestablishment. Yet he was acting only in accordance with a well-understood arrangement, and one of his reasons, it may be remembered, for abandoning 216 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Home Rule, was that the agitation for it blocked the approach of Parliament towards that Liberationist policy which he has all his life advocated. If in supporting the principle of Mr. Asquith's measure, last year, he did not violate the terms of his then-existing alliance with the Conservative Party, he had unfortunately exposed himself to reasonable complaint in a letter written on January 31st, and published in the Aberystivith Observer. " Disestablishment in Wales must come," he observed, "and the only question is whether it shall be accompanied by a just treatment of the Church in regard to its funds. This can be secured now by the Unionist Party, and Churchmen would be wise if they were to urge their leaders to devote themselves to this part of the subject. If, on the contrary, they meet the present agitation with an absolute non possumus, they may probably find that when it is next brought forward, the opportunity of a compromise will have been lost. The Welsh Church is entitled to liberal, and even generous, terms ; and if, under these circumstances, it is freed from the connection with the State, it will, in Mr. Chamberlain's belief, rise to a position of influence and usefulness that it has never yet enjoyed." If Mr. Chamberlain still hopes to talk the Conservative Party into Disestablishment by Consent (even Welsh Dis- establishment), he imagines a vain thing. Not for the sake even of maintaining the Union between Great Britain and Ireland would Lord Salisbury, or any Conservative likely to succeed him, consent to such a sacrifice of essential principle. If such a betrayal were contemplated by any Opportunist Leader, he would probably be defeated in Parliament, and certainly at the next appeal to the country. THE UNIONIST COALITION. 217 This is one of the points on which Parliamentary Con- servatism dare make no concession to Liberal Unionism. Nor is it likely that Mr. Chamberlain will repeat the invitation. At the time he put it forward he was still in the position of an independent ally of the Conservative Opposition. He is now a member of a Coalition Govern- ment. Nor is it probable that Mr. Chamberlain will be found at serious issue with the Conservatives in regard to the contemplated measure for the relief of Voluntary Schools from some of the embarrassments caused by the abolition of fees in 1891. The declarations which he made, as one of the guiding spirits of the Birmingham League, about twenty years ago, pledged him, no doubt, to work for the universal establishment of School Boards, and against any form of national or local assistance being given to Denominational institutions. Some of his critics have busied themselves in the collation of parallel passages from his speeches at that period and from his recent utterances. Mr. Chamberlain, certainly, has no right to complain of this method of warfare, since no one has employed it more effectively against his own opponents. It is believed that he has a perfect dossier of the public views of every politician who is, or has been, or is likely to be on the other side, and that he "notes it up" with as much care as a lawyer does his case-books. The inconsistency has been admitted and explained by himself. Speaking at Birmingham on April 24th, 1 89 1, he pointed out that — like most of the militant Nonconformists of the period — he had believed that, 218 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in spite of the very different intention professed by its author, Mr. Forster, the Education Act of 1870 would be fatal to the Voluntary Schools. So far from that expectation being realised, they had doubled their accommodation, more than doubled their subscription- lists, and were providing for the education of two-thirds of the children in England and Wales. To destroy them, and put Board Schools in their places, would mean a capital outlay of fifty millions, and a yearly expenditure of five millions. He recognised, in fact, that he had been mistaken in his forecast, and in the altered light in which he now saw the facts he naturally revised what he saw to be an impracticable policy. Again, he is under an honourable obligation to assist the Conservative Leaders in this matter. They adopted Free Education, as has already been shown, in order to make some return for Mr. Chamberlain's valuable support ; but it was on the understanding that neither directly nor indirectly should the proposed boon to the working- classes be allowed to damage the cause of Religious Education. Unfortunately, the Act has not proved quite so harmless as was expected. The extra grant of ten shillings a head in lieu of the fees which used to be levied from the parents has, in the majority of cases, failed to cover the loss caused by their remission. This is of no consequence to the School Boards, which can make good the deficiency by raising the local Rate, but the managers of a Voluntary School can only turn to the generosity of their private supporters. The result is that the two systems, though enjoying equal support from the Imperial Exchequer, do not compete on fair THE UNIONIST COALITION. 219 terms, especially as the prolonged and apparently in- definite depression of agriculture makes it almost im- possible for the landlords, clergymen, or farmers to increase their annual subscriptions. We know that all the members of the Unionist Administration are agreed that the hardship must be alleviated, that something must be done to redress the balance. Probably we shall soon learn which of the many expedients proposed has been adopted by the Cabinet. On such a point as this it is admitted that a resolute Nonconformist like Mr. Chamberlain, and an obdurate Whig like the Duke of Devonshire, do not see eye to eye with so strong a Churchman as Lord Salisbury. But the chances of an amicable arrange- ment are advanced rather than impeded by the in- tellectual disagreement. Neither party will try to convince the other — a project not worth attempting. They will both sit down to arrange an equitable com- promise. It is dangerous to put forward a conjecture so near to the event, but the strong probability is that when the arrangement is announced, it will displease the extremists on both sides, and be accepted by the great body of public opinion. Mr. Chamberlain has declared, and been ridiculed for declaring, that he has never changed his principles. Yet the boast was more truthful, in his case, than with most politicians. If he no longer adheres, or attaches less importance than he did, to some of the leading articles in the "Radical Programme,"* he has not publicly * It may be interesting at this point to recapitulate the leading points urged in The Radical Programme, a publication to which Mr. 22o JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. recanted the main doctrines of the political school from which he made his entry into public life. His faith was never bounded by Cobdenism, and upon that basis there has been gradually built, brick by brick, storey by Chamberlain contributed a Preface in July, 1885. He has disavowed authorship of the nine anonymous articles of which it consists, but " without pledging himself to all the proposals they contained," he "welcomed their appearance," and commended them to the "careful and impartial judgment of his fellow-Radicals." The Unauthorized Programme, though sometimes confused with it, was a distinct affair. It comprised Local Government in Counties, Free Education, Allotments and Small Holdings, and Graduated Taxation. The Radical Programme contained, among other less sweeping destruc- tive and constructive reforms : Manhood Suffrage. Equal Electoral Districts. Payment of Members of Parliament. Disestablishment and Disendowment of the Church of England (on less indulgent terms than those conceded to the Irish Church). Reconstruction of Local Government, by means of County Boards. National Councils, but not separate Parliaments, for Scotland, Ire- land, and Wales (limited to the management of internal affairs). Universal Taxation, coupled with a Progressive Taxation both of Income and Realised Property. Sweeping reforms in Land Tenure. Restoration of illegally-enclosed land to the community. Improvement of Labourers' dwellings, Reconstruction of Insanitary areas at the expense of the property-owners, and Purchase of sites for Cottages at the rate in the open market, without compensation for the compulsory sale. Free Education. Reform of the House of Lords was not included in the Radical Programme. Its defects were inseparable from its existence. So long as it only protested against the decisions of the House of Commons, but finally consented to register them, it might be a cause of vexation and delay, but it was not a permanent obstacle. Nor need its abolition be demanded, unless it were to insist upon asserting itself. In that case it would, "of its own accord and by its own act, be reformed out of existence." THE UNIONIST COALITION. 221 storey, a superstructure of State Socialism. Essentially we know that the laissez-faire of the one creed and the paternalism of the other are in logical disagreement. It is almost impossible to conceive Mr. Bright, who may be taken as the most sentimental exponent of the old Philosophical Radicalism — Mr. Bright, whose sympathy with the poor and suffering was as conscientious as his belief that a humane Poor Law fulfilled all the duties which the State owed to those who could not, or would not, work for a living — it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive Mr. Bright supporting a proposal to provide Pensions for the Aged Poor* ; to mitigate the Sweating System by barring the competition of foreign cheap labour; to advance money for working-men to buy the houses they live in, or the holdings they wish to cultivate : to establish a system of compulsory insurance between employers and employed, so that the latter should receive full compensation for any injuries suffered, while the former would be relieved from further liability. These are the main items in the list of reforms for which Mr. Chamberlain is at present working. There is not one of them which is not in actual or potential conflict with the gospel of Individualism. Yet there is not one of them which he would not consider more important than any of the political proposals of the Newcastle Programme — the Disestablishment of Churches, * Mr. Chamberlain has quite recently expressed a hope that the Government may be able to consider the Minority Report (signed by himself, Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Booth, and others) of the Royal Com- mission on the Aged Poor, and that another Commission may be appointed '"with a view to legislation," 222 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. the Extension of the Suffrage, the ending or mending of the House of Lords. With undisguised contempt Mr. Chamberlain has referred to those pretending reformers who would defer all practical steps towards making the life of the poor a little happier and nobler than it is at present until they have got through their political agenda. It is his idea that all these constitutional changes, and others which in due time he would, no doubt, support, may be postponed until something solid has been accomplished to improve the Condition of the People. The State Socialism in him has not swallowed the Radicalism, but it has got in front of it, and does not show any sign of yielding its priority. If his old associates ever desire to draw him over to their own side, they must first convince him that their political propaganda is more worthy of im- mediate attention than the practical schemes — and the ideal visions — presented by that theory of the State's duty to the Individual which is, at once, the contrast and complement to the ancient view of the Citizen's obligation to the Community. For the present, Mr. Chamberlain believes that he can get more assistance towards his social goal from Con- servatives than from Liberals. He has admitted — and this was before he was in active alliance with the former — that they had done more remedial and constructive work than their competitors for popular favour. A crucial instance was provided in the history of the Employers' Liability Bill, brought forward by the late Administration. It was, in most respects, a measure of which he approved. It abolished, for instance, the vexatious doctrine of Common THE UNIONIST COALITION. 223 Employment, which, as interpreted by the Judges, has so often prevented an injured, or the relatives of a deceased, workman, from obtaining compensation for his disablement or death. But it also proposed to forbid em- ployers and working-men to contract themselves out of its operation, although, by a mutual insurance fund, they had already provided a fuller compensation, and one which could be got without the expense and trouble of litigation. But these insurance funds are disliked by the Trade Union officials because, where they exist, the work- men are less inclined to support another organization. Mr. Chamberlain cared nothing for the Trade Union officials ; he cared a great deal for the interests of the working-classes as a body, of whom about nine-tenths are non-Unionists. Many Conservatives on the other hand, were hesitating, in fear of the influence that might be thrown against them by the Trades Unions at the im- pending General Election. They thought that a mistake had been made when the Peers adopted Lord Dudley's Amendment, which allowed contracting-out in cases where a voluntary arrangement offered terms as good as, if not better than, the proposed Act would legalise. Mr. Chamberlain boldly supported the House of Lords, because to maintain such associations was specially important, since they afforded an example, and offered a nucleus, for the more extended system of in- surance which he wishes to see established. In this respect, then, as in Factory Legislation and in the improvement of the Dwellings of the Poor, he is con- vinced, by comparing the past performances and pro- fessed intentions of the two Parties, that he is more 224 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in harmony with modern Conservatism than existing Liberalism. Before all things Mr. Chamberlain is, not indeed, an Opportunist, but a Possibilist. At the opening of the last Session of the Rosebery Government he moved an Amendment to the Address which censured Ministers for taking up the time of Parliament with the discussion of measures which, according to their own statements, there was no prospect of passing into law. In the Election Address which he issued after the Dissolution of Parliament last year, he declared that the Unionist Leaders were absolutely agreed to lay aside the "wild schemes of constitutional change and destructive legis- lation " which had formed the staple of Liberal proposals, and to devote their principal attention to " the policy of constructive social reform." The Conservatives, he declared a few weeks later in Birmingham, had been the "pioneers and promoters of social legislation." (He had admitted as much in 1885, when he was trying to force the Liberals to follow the same path.) For the Acts of Parliament relating to the Regulation of Mines and Factories, to the improvement of Artizans' Dwellings, to the establishment of Allotments and Small Holdings, for Free Education, the country had to thank the Conservatives. Let the Liberals have all the credit and glory belonging to the removal of constitutional abuses, but their rivals had been the first to take an interest in questions affecting the material happiness and domestic life of the people. Such, then, are the reasons which, in addition to one still more powerful that will be developed in the last THE UNIONIST COALITION. 225 chapter, have induced Mr. Chamberlain to come into active partnership with the Conservatives, and to share the credit and responsibility of a joint-policy. There is, however, one consideration which must not be ignored if we are to deal frankly with the prospects of the recently- established Coalition. Is there such a rivalry between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists as to make it likely that personal or political jealousies may gradually lead to disintegration? It cannot be denied that sharp con- troversies have from time to time arisen between the two sections of the Unionist Party, that even now it is considered advisable in some localities to maintain separate organizations, and that no name has been invented — except that of Unionist — which covers both wings of the combined force. There was, at one time, talk of a " National Party," but the term did not catch the popular fancy, and it has been quietly dropped. It would be impossible to discuss, without going into tedious detail, the misunderstanding which arose between the two Unionist Parties in Birmingham, when the death of Mr. Bright, March 27th, 1889, created a vacancy in the Central Division. It soon became a controversy between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Randolph Churchill, and, warm as it was while it lasted, it left no bad blood behind — at least between the chief combatants. The history of the Leamington dispute is equally unedifying, and it cannot be said that the Leaders on either side showed all the tact and judgment required from men in their position. Fortunately, this kind of misunderstanding is less likely to arise in the future, since the Liberal Unionists Q 226 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. in the House of Commons are no longer in that pre- carious position which accounts for, and partly justifies, a sensitive state of feeling. They are nearly as strong as they were in 1886,* while their representation in the Government is considerably beyond the proportion to which they would be entitled on a mere calculation of their numerical strength in the Parliament. The generous allotment of offices which they received at Lord Salis- bury's hands has been attributed to Mr. Chamberlain's talent for pushing his own friends. Whatever truth there may be in a theory which may be taken as complimentary or the reverse, according to the spirit in which it is propounded, it must be admitted that the Liberal Unionist Party comprises an abnormally large number of capable politicians; that from 1886 to 1895 they persisted in an honourable renunciation of all their personal ambitions ; and that to no member of that group do the Conservatives owe a deeper debt of grati- tude than to Mr. Chamberlain. * They were 77 in 1886 ; they are now 72, since the last Con- servative member for Dublin University has been replaced by Mr. W. E. H. Lecky. CHAPTER IX. MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. Mr. Chamberlain's coolness in argument — His range of illustration — The Reform agitation — "They toil not, neither do they spin" — Duels between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain — Attack on the Peers — Criticism of the Whigs — The Egyptian Skeleton and Rip Van Winkle — "A vile conspiracy" — The defeat of the Home Rulers — The later and milder style. IT is impossible to form a complete estimate of Mr. Chamberlain without emphasizing the combative side of his nature. In private conference or conversation he is willing and anxious to hear everything that can be urged, from any point of view — to listen as well as to speak — even to admit that there is some justification for opinions opposed to his own. But as soon as he gets upon his legs on a platform, or in Parliament, he seems to be deserted by that sweet reasonableness. His con- clusions are so clear, so lucidly expressed, so coherently argued out, that any lack of confidence in stating them would, probably, seem to him weak, if not hypocritical. In feeling, he is not more arrogant than many men who affect a graceful academic dubiety, but he certainly fails to give that impression of toleration — almost of mental hesitation — which is one of the most effective 227 228 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. compliments that can be paid to an assembly of equals. The story is told — probably it is untrue— that, on more than one occasion in the late Parliament, some hesitating Liberals had been on the point of voting against their Party. They had been influenced by the candid tone, the air of moderation, which Mr. Balfour can assume when he is not fighting with his back against a wall; but, after Mr. Chamberlain had risen to drive the arguments home, and complete the logical rout of the enemy, the doubters resolved that they would not do anything to gratify so exultant a victor. Yet it would be difficult, in politics, to enjoy a greater intellectual treat than to hear Mr. Chamberlain deliver one of his more elaborate speeches in Parliament — the one, for instance, he made after the General Election of 1892. The voice is clear, penetrating, and musical, if it lacks some of the deeper notes of the very greatest orators and actors. The sentences are always neatly constructed, generally short, and they are hardly ever thrown out of order by the loudest or most unmannerly interruption. No speaker is less disconcerted by a sudden question or interjection. Mr. Chamberlain stops, replies, and then goes on as if nothing had happened. Nothing, indeed, has happened except that a neat rejoinder has been put in, or, as Mr. Healy found on a memorable occasion, a stinging retort driven home. The episode does not break the line of argument which Mr. Chamber- lain has laid down in his mind. He is, probably, one of the very few impromptu speakers who sit down without having forgotten some of the very points they had been anxious to urge. Although his range of reading is tolerably MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. 229 wide, his public references and quotations are drawn from easily-accessible sources. The Bible, Shakespeare, Dickens, Rejected Addresses, The Biglow Papers — these do not exhaust, but they fairly represent, the books which he lays under contribution. On the other hand, his speeches have a merit very rare in these slipshod days. They can be printed almost as they are spoken, and they are, in form, at least as " literary " as those of any of our public speakers, except, perhaps, Mr. John Morley and Lord Rathmore (Mr. David Plunket). Indeed, there is more finish, more style, in Mr. Chamberlain's speeches than in the magazine articles which he composes at his leisure; but, in the latter case, he leaves himself little room for indulging his undoubted sense of form, because most of them have been published for some definite, and almost technical, object, such as explaining his scheme of Old Age Pensions, his views on the Labour Question, the working of Municipal Institutions, or the dangers and defects in a Home Rule Bill. At the end of 1883, Mr. Chamberlain was busy in getting up the steam for the coming measure of electoral reform, by which the agricultural labourers were to be admitted to the franchise. The vigour and vehemence of the President of the Board of Trade had alarmed some moderate members of the Liberal Party. "A few days ago," he replied, "I was addressing a vast and enthusiastic audience in the city of Bristol upon this subject. Since then I have had the advantage of seeing many criticisms on the speech which I delivered, and I hope, in all humility, that I may profit by them. But, gentlemen, there is one observation, frequently re- peated, which has puzzled me not a little. I find that I 230 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. have given offence by being too confident in my declara- tion of principles — too cocksure, as one of my reviewers somewhat inelegantly expressed it, And it appears that it would have been more becoming, and more statesman- like, if I had hesitated a little about the application of Liberal principles, if I had doubted as to the expediency of applying them at the present time ; and if I had dwelt less upon such elementary considerations as natural rights and natural justice, and had thought more of the difficulties which, undoubtedly, attend every effort to change the existing order of things. In fact, the criticism is a varia- tion upon a passage in the Biglow Papers, where we are told that the first thing for sound politicians — " ' To larn is That truth, to draw kindly in all sorts of harness, Must be kept in the abstract, for come to apply it You are apt to hurt somebody's interests by it." With nobody has he crossed swords more frequently in the past than with the Chief of the Administration of which he is himself a member. And it was evident that both the combatants keenly enjoyed their series of duels. It was in March of the same year that Mr. Chamberlain had made his striking and quite inappropriate charge against a statesman who had already proved his ability to earn a good position in the open market for talent. " Lord Salisbury," Mr. Chamberlain said, "cares nothing for the bulk of the Irish nation. He has no sympathy for the poor tenants who for years, under the threat of eviction and the fear of starvation, have paid unjust rents levied on their improvements and extorted from their desperate toil and hopeless poverty. I say that on this matter, as on many others, Lord Salisbury constitutes himself the spokesman of a class — of the class to which he himself belongs — who ' toil not, neither do they spin,' whose fortunes, as in his case, have originated in grants made in times long gone by for the services which courtiers rendered kings, and have since grown and in- MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. 231 creased, while they have slept, by levying an unearned share on all that other men have done, by toil and labour, to add to the general wealth and prosperity of the country of which they form a part." In a less unfriendly controversy which followed, with regard to proposals for improving the dwellings of the poor, the Radical Leader could not deny that the Con- servative statesman had long shown his practical interest in the question. " I agree with Lord Salisbury — that the improvement of the dwellings of the working-classes is an urgent social question. It is as urgent and necessary in the country as in the town. But it is an obligation which is incumbent upon politicians and statesmen everywhere. Well, I have ventured in the Fortnightly Review to criticise the pro- posals which Lord Salisbury has made. I have stated my opinion of them, that they are inadequate and totally insufficient. I think they may be described in a sentence from Lord Beaconsfield's novel, in which he makes one of his characters — a Radical, by the way — say, ' For the poor you have sympathy, for the rich you have compensa- tion.' Gentlemen, you are in a position in Wolverhampton to judge how far that description is just. Your corpora- tion has been enterprising enough to carry out a scheme of improvement. Your rates will be burdened by a loss which was estimated at ^"50,000, and which will probably amount to even more than that, and that loss is due to the fact that you have had to pay an excessive price to the owners of the property which you have taken. Well, I don't think that the owners of such property ought to be able to make a profit out of the necessities of the com- munity — and when they have abused their rights to the injury of public health and public morals, then I say that I think they ought to be punished, and not rewarded at the expense of those whom they have injured." When the Franchise Bill was rejected by the House of Lords because Mr. Gladstone refused to couple it with 232 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. a scheme for Redistribution, Mr. Chamberlain was one of the most bitter, most vigorous, assailants of the Peers. He had "prayed" beforehand that they might be en- dowed with "grace, wisdom, and understanding," and, like most other Radicals of the time, he believed that they would be frightened by the rising agitation. Continuing the campaign against the Peers, Mr. Chamberlain said at Denbigh in the autumn : " Their cup was nearly full. I have no spite against the House of Lords ; but, as a Dissenter, I have an account to settle with them, and I promise you I will not forget the reckoning. I boast a descent of which I am as proud as any baron may be of the title which he owes to the smiles of a king, or to the favour of a king's mistress, for I can claim descent from one of the 2,000 ejected Ministers, who, in the time of the Stuarts, left home and work and profit, rather than accept the State-made creed which it was sought to force upon them, and for that reason, if for no other, I share your hopes and your aspirations, and I resent the insults, the injuries, and the injustice from which you have suffered so long at the hands of a privileged assembly. But the cup is nearly full. The career of high-handed wrong is coming to an end. The House of Lords have alienated Ireland, they have oppressed the Dissenters, and they now oppose the enfranchisement of the people. We have been too long a peer-ridden nation, and I hope you will say to them that if they will not bow to the mandate of the people, they shall lose for ever the authority they have so long abused." But his gibes against Peers who " toil not, neither do they spin," lacked the lively tone with which he attempted to stimulate Moderate Liberals such as Lord Hartington and Mr. Goschen. The truth was that Mr. Chamberlain was now (1884- 1885) engaged, not MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. 233 without Mr. Gladstone's approval, though much to the disgust of the Whigs, in "making the pace" for the Liberal Party. He was working-up that Unauthorized Programme which was to replace the effete policy of the Whigs. Mr. Goschen had described Mr. Chamberlain and his associates as the " Salvation Army of Politics," and lamented that Political Economy was being abandoned for State Socialism. One of Mr. Chamberlain's retorts is famous : — " Mr. Goschen is very great at finding difficulties, but he would be greater still if he would only remember that it is the business of a statesman to overcome them. To scent out difficulties in the way of every reform — that is the congenial task of a man of the world, who coldly recognises the evils from which he does not suffer himself, and reserves his chief enthusiasm for the critical examination of every proposal for their redress, and for a scathing denunciation of the poor enthusiast who will not let well alone, and who cannot preserve the serene equanimity of superior persons. " ' Well ! well, it 's a mercy we have men to tell us, The rights and the wrongs of these things anyhow, And that Providence sends us oracular fellows, To sit on the fence* and slang those at the plough.' " Mr. Goschen says that he has been told to stand aside. I do not know by whom — not by me. We cannot spare him. He performs in the Liberal Party the useful part of the skeleton at Egyptian feasts. He is there to repress our enthusiasm and to moderate our joy. But when he adopts another metaphor, and says he will swim against the stream, I admire his courage, but I have no confidence in his success ; and I say he may as well attempt to swim up the Falls of Niagara as to stay the progress of the democratic movement which he has already vainly resisted. * It may be interesting to politicians who use this phrase in so different a sense to note its origin and proper meaning. 234 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Not less notorious was the reference to Lord Harring- ton's attack on the " Radical Programme " : — " I know something of the Midland Counties in my own district. There is not a single Liberal candidate who has not accepted some one or more points of the Radical programme. It is, therefore, perfectly futile and ridiculous for any political Rip Van Winkle to come down from the mountain on which he has been slum- bering, and to tell us that these things are to be excluded from the Liberal programme. The world has moved on while these dreamers have been sleeping, and it would be absurd to ignore the growth of public opinion and the change in the situation which the Reform Acts have produced. ^f» TP» Tff */f T?S I shall be told to-morrow that this is Socialism. I have learnt not to be afraid of words that are flung in my face instead of argument. Of course it is Socialism. The Poor Law is Socialism ; the Education Act is Socialism ; the greater part of municipal work is Social- ism ; and every kindly act of legislation, by which the community has sought to discharge its responsibilities and its obligations to the poor, is Socialism ; but it is none the worse for that. Our object is the elevation of the poor, of the masses of the people — a levelling up of them by which we shall do something to remove the excessive inequality in social life, which is now one of the greatest dangers, as well as a great injury to the State. I do not pretend that for every grievance a remedy will be found ; we must try experiments, as we are bound to do. Let us continue to pursue our work with this object, and if we fail, let us try again and again until we succeed." On July 2nd, 1886, Mr. Chamberlain was helping his friend, Mr. Jesse Collings, to retain his seat for the Bordesley Division. It was in these provocative, MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. 235 though perfectly accurate, terms that he referred to the Irish movement in the form it had then assumed : — " It is one thing," he said, " to grant wishes and to meet the requirements of the Irish people ; it is another thing to drop upon your knees to the conspirators in America. You have a momentous decision to take. This is an unexampled crisis in our national history, it is an unparalleled chapter in our annals. You have a Prime Minister, in the very height of his popularity, turning round upon himself, upon all that he has said, upon all that he has been understood to say, for I know not how many years, and making an abject sur- render to the vile conspiracy which has endeavoured, I fear not altogether without success, to shake the con- stancy of English statesmen by threats of outrage and assassination. Gentlemen, will you share in this humilia- tion? Will you be a party to this surrender? The British democracy is upon its trial. On your shoulders have descended all the traditions of the past. To you is entrusted the defence of your country. Your action is being watched with the keenest interest by every de- pendency in every quarter of the vast dominion that your ancestors have established. In all our Colonies — above all in India, where hundreds of millions of men acknowledge the sway of England, not merely for the display of force which we are able to make, but because they believe us to be brave, and bold, and enduring — in every country over which the rule of the Queen extends, these proposals have excited an alarm amongst the friends, and a sinister interest amongst the foes, of England." One more instance may be given — this in gentler mood — of Mr. Chamberlain's controversial style. It is taken from a speech delivered last August, when — quantum mutatus — he was the guest of the Birmingham Con- servative Club. He is referring to the explanation 236 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. suggested by the Home Rule Radicals for their crushing defeat : — " I do not wonder they are devoting that leisure in endeavouring to discover some explanation of our victory and their defeat. But even upon this they cannot agree. Dissensions continue, although they have ceased to be a party. I find one of their great organs claims that it is all due to ' chance.' That is a most ingenious suggestion. It appears that, by a skilful manipulation of figures, they are able to show, to their own satisfaction, that if there had been a slight change in a few con- stituencies, the whole position would have been reversed. I never was able myself to perform feats of legerdemain, and I doubt very much whether this feat will be in any way a consolation to the 120 gentlemen, more or less, who have had to make way for 120 Unionists. But this, at all events, is curious, that this same organ of public opinion found, in a majority of 28, the indisput- table exponent of the national will, to go behind which was treason to the representative system ; and it found, in a majority of 152, only an accident that has no moral significance. Then there is another great organ of Home Rule opinion which admits the importance of the majority, but takes it out of the electors, and abuses them. It describes them as wallowing in the mire and floating in beer. Really, it is very ungrateful. In the same newspaper, before the election, you read day after day an appeal to these same electors, whose intelligence was praised up to the skies, to give their votes in favour of the Separatist candidate. It is exactly what we know happens in the case of savage tribes, who crawl on their stomachs to their idols and pray to them for success in their undertakings ; and if they do not get the success, then they abuse their idols and load them with oppro- brious revilings. These are the general explanations and excuses for the defeat which our opponents have sustained, but each man has his own account of it. One declares it is due to the weakness and vacillation of Lord Rosebery in connection with his attack upon the House of Lords. Another attributes it to the obstinacy of Sir William MR. CHAMBERLAIN IN CONTROVERSY. 237 Harcourt in pressing for the Local Veto. A third lays all the fault on Mr. Asquith, who truckled to the New Unionists. Many assume that it is entirely owing to the unpopularity of Home Rule, and there are some who trace its cause in the ungenerous treatment which was meted out to the Welsh Church, and which was of such a character that it even provoked the public disapproval of Mr. Gladstone himself. Each section of the Party knows exactly how the rout came about ; each member knows whose fault it was, and he knows perfectly well it was not his. Well, I confess that I take rather a different view to these gentlemen. I accept all their explanations and put them together, and I say they are all in fault, and that condemnation applies to the whole of them. I believe that this great popular verdict is a condemnation, not of one point in the Gladstonian policy, but of the whole course of that policy, and, above all, of the discreditable tactics by which it was sought to promote it. It is too soon to say of a statesman who may be hoped to have many years of public activity before him, and especially of one in whom the combative qualities are so highly developed, that he has ceased to be a contro- versialist. From 1883 to 1892, nobody gave or received harder knocks than Mr. Chamberlain, and in the three General Elections covered by that period he was almost the central figure of every fray. But during the Gladstone- Rosebery Administration of 1 892-1 895, though one of the keenest critics of Ministers, he observed a milder and mellower tone towards his opponents, and, as has already been pointed out, he has, since he took office as Secretary for the Colonies, received a more tolerant consideration than they had previously accorded to the man whom they regard as primarily responsible for the defeat of Home Rule. CHAPTER X. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. Appointed to the Colonial Office — The Imperialist influences on Mr. Chamberlain's career — Free Trade and New Markets — Trade and the flag — The development of backward Colonies — Qualifications for a Colonial Secretary — The Irish danger — The November Circular — Imperial Federation — The Transpacific Cable and the All Red Route — Mr. Rhodes and the Bechuana chiefs — The fate of the Swazis — The Imperial Government and the Transvaal Boers — Dr. Jameson's Expedition and the Battle of Knigersdorp — Mr. Chamberlain's promptitude and straightforwardness — The Venezuela Boundary dispute — Con- nection between the Colonial and the Foreign Office — Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain — The dead-set against England. IN the allocation of Cabinet offices, which was Lord Salisbury's first duty, on being commanded, last summer, to construct an Administration, two consider- ations were self-evident. The first was that Mr. Cham- berlain must have a prominent position, and the second that Mr. Balfour must be Leader of the House of Commons. It was difficult to assign to Mr. Chamber- lain the Chancellorship of the Exchequer because the seniority and past services of Mr. Goschen might seem to entitle him to the preference. Nor, on the other hand, was it desirable that he should, as it were, be 238 MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 239 placed in a superior position to Mr. Chamberlain. Though there was indeed no personal rivalry between the two men, the public insisted on treating them as competitors. The difficulty was solved by giving the Chancellorship to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, and by sending Mr. Goschen to the Admiralty, and making Mr. Chamberlain Secretary for the Colonies — the office which he chose in preference to any other that was open. The appointment of a manufacturer from the Mid- lands — an ex-member of Mr. Gladstone's anti-Imperialist Ministry — a politician chiefly identified with schemes of domestic reform — to a post which is so closely con- nected with foreign policy, took the outside public by surprise. But those who had followed Mr. Chamber- lain's career attentively were aware that his view of the position and duty of England had been gradually — almost insensibly — modified during his experience of Parliamentary life. Never associated with the Little Englanders, though none had more bitterly attacked Lord Beaconsfield's foreign policy, or more keenly analysed his grandiose explanations of it, the President of the Board of Trade had come to see what mischief had been done to our commercial and manufacturing interests by the alternately timid and rash conduct of the Foreign and Colonial Offices in 1 880-1 885. South Africa disturbed, and almost mutinous ; the military and official class in India estranged ; Australia murmuring ; in Egypt vast liabilities, without corresponding power or profit; the word of England disregarded in the councils of Europe; a war with Russia averted more by luck 240 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. than management — these were some of the most striking results of that disastrous regime. Even in the brief period of Lord Salisbury's " stop-gap Government " in 1885 -1886, Mr. Chamberlain, at first doubting and even decrying, came to recognise that some- thing had been done to restore the country to her proper position. During the time when, as an adviser from outside, he was associated with Lord Salisbury's Second Administration, he saw that by firmness without aggression, by a series of diplomatic bargains which as a man of business he could understand and value, we had not only obtained the best part of the most promising regions in the African Continent, but had removed any near prospect of quarrel with all but one of our European rivals ; that even with France we stood on better terms than during Mr. Gladstone's professedly more pacific period ; that we had reached a good understanding with Russia; that an acrimonious quarrel with the United States about the Behring Sea Fisheries had been settled by a reference to Arbitration; that the Colonial Govern- ments were no longer in more or less open mutiny against Downing Street; and that when Lord Salisbury laid down office we enjoyed the friendship of the Triple, and the respect of the Dual, Alliance. It was also obvious that if Lord Rosebery had not left affairs in quite such order as he found them, or as when he handed the Foreign Office over to Lord Kimberley, the Liberals had made up their minds not to reverse the policy of their predecessors ; that there was no con- siderable backing in the country for those who, like Mr. John Morley, wanted us to retire from Egypt, or, like MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 241 Sir William Harcourt, to withdraw from Uganda. The revival of a patriotic, if not an Imperial, spirit in the Liberal Party was no doubt due, in some degree, to a contrast of the results of 1 880-1 885 with those of 1 886-1892 ; in some degree to the disappearance of Mr. Bright, Lord Granville, and Lord Derby, and to the fading influence of Mr. Gladstone. A yet more efficient cause was that a period of military peace had been one of unrelenting commercial war. The most striking example was, no doubt, the M'Kinley Tariff Act, by which the United States attempted to destroy the American trade of Europe, and chiefly that of the United Kingdom. But the Commercial Treaties con- cluded between the different Continental Powers, though not expressly or chiefly directed against ourselves, were all so many blows struck at our own dwindling supremacy in trade, while the fiscal policy of France was almost defiantly hostile. The inevitable tendency, if not the conscious purpose, of all these movements would be to drive us out of the markets where we used to enjoy ascendency, if not monopoly. Debarred by the accepted rules of Free Trade from seeking to modify hostile tariffs by the threat of retalia- tion, we were finding every year less customers for our exports, and, while the village districts in the United Kingdom were being impoverished and depopulated by a series of calamitous seasons, the congested population of the great towns had every year less employment for their energies. It was emphatically borne in on the mind of all who, like Mr. Chamberlain, take any trouble to watch the pulse of national prosperity, that the time R 242 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. might come at no distant date when, dissatisfied with the results of Free Trade, the people might demand a return to Protection. In Free Trade, the most essential part of the Cobdenite faith, Mr. Chamberlain is a devout believer.* Nothing short of absolute and urgent necessity would induce him even to consider Protection, no matter how seductive were the alias it assumed. But there is only one way in which the doctrine can be saved from its increasing disfavour among those professedly practical persons who judge — or think they judge — by results. If the foreign trade of the United Kingdom goes on declining, whether absolutely or only in proportion to that of our rivals, the blame will, un- doubtedly, be laid on Free Trade. It is all very well for the philosophers to denounce, and statisticians to de- monstrate, the fallacies of Protectionism : they will make no impression on those who cannot, or will not, under- stand a complicated chain of reasoning. The maxims of Political Economy, free lectures, leading articles, and leaflets by the hundred thousand, will not shake the opinion of that mentally impregnable person who says, when you have finished your neat and con- clusive demonstration, " Yes, that is all very well in the abstract, but it doesn't work in practice." How far Mr. Chamberlain and other staunch believers in the accepted English interpretation of Free Trade — which * That he is not one of the doctrinaire purists, even on this subject, is shown by the support he gave, last February, to Sir C. Howard Vincent's Motion in favour of restricting the importation of goods made in foreign prisons — a question which indeed has nothing to do with the real principle of Free Trade, but has been confused with it. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 243 debars us from Retaliation in order to get Reciprocity- have realized the danger in which the central doctrine of Cobdenism is now placed, it is difficult to say. But, for the last five years and more, he has been preaching the necessity of developing old and opening new markets in those regions of the world which are still free from the tariffs of European and American rivalry. It has always been true, in a sense, that "trade follows the flag" — indeed, the day seems not very distant when British trade will be excluded wherever the British flag is not flying. No sooner did Mr. Chamberlain succeed Lord Ripon at the Colonial Office, than he began to give effect to this conviction. His views were expressed in his first month of departmental experience, in reply to a deputation of commercial magnates, who called his attention to the defective means of communication in backward Colonies, such as those in West Africa. "As to the general principle," he said, "I go certainly as far as the farthest of you go ; and I am very anxious that my fellow-countrymen should understand that under the policy of the Government we hope to develop the resources of such Colonies as those of which you have been speaking to the fullest extent. It is only in such developments that I see any solution of those social problems by which we are surrounded. Plenty of em- ployment and a contented people go together, and there is no way of securing plenty of employment except by creating new markets and developing the old ones. The only dominion which in any way compared with the British dominion was that of the Romans, and it was to the credit of the Romans that they left behind them, wherever they went, traces of their passage and their civilization in the form of admirable public works. I am sorry to say that Great Britain has largely neglected its 244 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. duty in that respect in the countries under her care. I admit to you, as I did to the House of Commons last night, that it is in a certain sense a new policy. It is a great policy. It is one, no doubt, open to criticism and to the fullest consideration. You cannot undertake a policy of this kind without a certain amount of risk ; but if the people of this country, out of their superfluous wealth, are not willing to invest some of it in the development of what I have called their great estate, then I see no future for these countries, and I think it would probably have been better if they had never come under our rule. I hope that you, who have more than a mere general interest in these countries, will do what you can to popularise the subject. If that is the general policy the Government have in view, undoubtedly there is no more favourable instance on which to try it than the West African Colonies. There was a time when there was a feeling adverse to these Colonies, and when we should have been very well pleased to be rid of them for the benefit of any other Power ; but that feeling has now, I believe, quite disappeared. There is no doubt that hardly any part of her Majesty's dominions presents such opportunities for a rapidly increasing trade as these Gold Coast Colonies. You may rest assured that every assist- ance that we can give will be given to promote and assist better communication with the interior. A great deal has been done, as you are aware. The Lagos Railway may be said to have almost commenced — that is, we have authorized the building of the bridges, and we shall authorize the building of the railways as soon as the surveys are completed, and push them on as rapidly as possible. The Gold Coast Railway has been surveyed, and will be begun as soon as the point of commencement has been arranged. In Sierra Leone the survey has been completed for 150 miles. We have, however, a sugges- tion from Colonel Cardew for some modification of the line of route, and these are details which will require some little consideration ; but we will not waste time." MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 245 In the same spirit, and even more strongly expressed, were the remarks he made at the "send-off" banquet given to the new Governor of Western Australia : " It is to me an encouragement and a great delight to find that in the Colonies and in the Mother Country there is some confidence, at all events, in my desire to bring them closer together. I will venture to claim two qualifications for the great office which I hold, and which, to my mind, without making invidious distinctions, is one of the most important that can be held by any English- man. These qualifications are that, in the first place, I believe in the British Empire; and, in the second place, I believe in the British race. I believe that the British race is the greatest of governing races that the world has ever seen. I say that not merely as an empty boast, but as proved and evidenced by the success which we have had in administering the vast dominions which are con- nected with these small Islands, and I believe, therefore, that there are no limits to its future. I think a man who holds my office is bound to be sanguine, bound to be confident, and I have both those qualifications. I wish sometimes that the English people were not so apt to indulge in self-criticism, which, although it does no harm at home, is sometimes misinterpreted abroad. We are all prepared to admire the great Englishmen of the past. We speak of the men who made our Empire, and we speak of them as. heroes as great as any that have ever lived in the pages of history ; but when we come to our own time we doubt — we seem to lose the confidence which, I think, becomes a great nation such as ours. And yet if we look even to such comparatively small matters as the expeditions in which Englishmen have recently been engaged, the Administrations which Englishmen have controlled, I see no reason to doubt that the British spirit still lives in Englishmen. When I think of the incidents of such a campaign as that of Chitral, the other day ; when I think of the way in which, in numerous provinces in India — and I might speak, from my own experience, of the Administration in Egypt- 246 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. — of the way in which a number of young Englishmen, picked, as it were, haphazard from our population, having beforehand no special claims on our confidence and gratitude, have, nevertheless, controlled great affairs, and with the responsibility placed upon their shoulders, have shown a power, a courage, a resolution, and an intelligence which have carried them through extraordinary diffi- culties, I say that he, indeed, is a craven and a poor- spirited creature who despairs of the future of the British race." Mr. Chamberlain's policy is to choose for Governors men who have the capacity and desire to assist in developing the industrial resources of the Colonies, whether endowed with Responsible Government or directed by the Crown. There is no fear that a statesman so deeply impressed with the virtue of Local Self-Government will attempt to over-ride, or even unduly to guide, the wishes and aims of independent Legislatures. There is, no doubt, a danger — but one which may easily be exaggerated — that the Irish spite which followed him across the Atlantic may be directed to thwarting him in those Colonies where emigrants of that race have acquired their wonted influence in politics. The experiment has not long been at work ; but hitherto his reputation as a Social Reformer, his evident interest in and acquaintance with the commercial circumstances of the different Colonies, and his absolute freedom from the red-tape methods and doctrinaire traditions of Downing Street, have prevailed against any prejudice that might arise from his opposition to Nationalist claims at home. Nor does he pretend that his only object is to benefit the outlying portions of the British Empire. Such MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 247 benevolence would not be understood, or believed in, by the very practical men who guide the affairs of our most progressive Colonies. His purpose is to extend and to consolidate the commercial intercourse between the Mother-country and her Colonies, as well as amongst the Colonies themselves. The business-like Circular he issued last November leaves nothing to be desired in point of lucidity or candour : — " I am impressed with the extreme importance of securing as large a share as possible of the mutual trade of the United Kingdom and the Colonies for British producers and manufacturers, whether located in the Colonies or in the United Kingdom. " 2. In the first place, therefore, I wish to investigate thoroughly the extent to which, in each of the Colonies, foreign imports of any kind have displaced, or are dis- placing, similar British goods, and the causes of such displacement. " 3. With this object, I take this opportunity of in- viting the assistance of your Government in obtaining a return which will show for the years 1884, 1889, and 1894— " (a) The value (if any) of all articles, specified in the classification annexed, imported into the Colony under your Government from any foreign country, or countries, whenever (and only when) the value of any article so imported from any foreign country, or countries, was 5 per cent, or upwards of the total value of that article imported into the Colony from all sources, whether within or without the British Empire, and when the total value of that article imported was not less than ^500. " (b) The reasons which may have in each case induced the Colonial importer to prefer a foreign article to similar goods of foreign manufacture. "4. These reasons (which should take the shape of a Report on each article separately, of which the foreign import exceeded 5 per cent, of the whole import, and 248 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. of which the total value imported was not less than ^500, as denned above) should be classified and dis- cussed under one or other of the following heads : — " (a) Price (delivered in the Colony) of the foreign article as compared with the British. " The term ' price ' is not intended to include the duty (if any) levied in a Colony ; it is the ordinary price in bond, and this should be clearly understood in making the Report. " But where it is found impossible to give any except the wholesale price (duty paid), this should be stated, and the exact amount of duty entering into the price should be given. " In treating of price, regard should be had to cost of transport, facility of communication with any given country, subsidies to shipping, special railway rates, bounties on export, terms of credit or payment given by British or foreign exporters, rates of discount, &c. "(b) Quality and finish, as to which full particulars should be given. " (c) Suitability of the goods for the market, their style or pattern. " In connection with this, and in illustration of the reasons for the displacement of British goods of any class, it is important that patterns or specimens of the goods preferred should be sent home, unless the bulk is very great. This will be necessary chiefly in those cases where the difference cannot be fairly described in writing. " (d) Difference of making-up or packing, as to which full particulars should be given. " (e) False marking, such as piracy of trade marks, false indications of origin, or false indications of weight, measure, size, or number. " (/) Any other cause which may exist should, of course, be stated. " It sometimes happens that imports which actually came from foreign countries, pass through Great Britain, and are included in Colonial statistics as British. Where this is a matter of common knowledge, I shall be obliged to you if you will treat of these imports under the headings MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 249 embraced in this paragraph, notwithstanding the fact that they are not distinguished in the returns. " 5. With a view to facilitating the return, I annex to this despatch a draft of the form under which the particulars above requested may be returned; a list of commodities which is intended, as far as possible, to secure uniformity in making the return ; and a schedule of instructions as to filling up the return, which I would beg you to commend to the attention of those on whom the preparation of the return may fall. " 6. To select the best classification to guide your advisers in their investigations has been a task of some difficulty. Most Colonies have classifications of their own, usually admirable of their kind ; but as they have been mainly compiled for the special tariff purposes of each Colony, they differ considerably from one another, and do not afford a basis of classification generally applicable to all Colonies. I have, therefore, on the whole, thought it best to adopt the condensed classifi- cation used by the Board of Trade in the annual statistical abstract for the exports of the United Kingdom. At the same time, I suggest that those responsible in each Colony for furnishing the returns for which I am asking should expand their return under each chief heading by such detailed sub-heads as may be suggested either by the ordinary Colonial returns, or by the course of trade in the particular Colony ; and in this connection I append a schedule of sub-divisions suggested by various Cham- bers of Commerce in this country. "7. I am further desirous of receiving from you a return of any products of the Colony under your Govern- ment which might advantageously be exported to the United Kingdom, or other parts of the British Empire, but do not at present find a sufficient market there, with any information in regard to quality, price, or freight which may be useful to British importers. I mention the matter here that you may be prepared with information ; but I am contemplating the preparation of a further and fuller despatch on this branch of the subject. " 8. I am well aware how much has been, and is being, 250 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. done in this direction by the self-governing Colonies through the High Commissioner for Canada, and through the Agents General, and also by the Imperial Institute, the Royal Colonial Institute, and other public bodies. " I am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my admiration for the excellence of this work ; but on a matter of such importance, no additional efforts or oppor- tunities of acquiring information can be superfluous. " 9. I shall be glad to have these returns as soon as possible, and shall greatly appreciate your expedition in the matter. " I have the honour to be, your most obedient, humble servant, J. Chamberlain." It would be premature to suggest that the ultimate aim of the Secretary for the Colonies is to promote an Imperial Zollverein — a system of Free Trade within the British Empire, combined with Protection against countries lying outside it. Undoubtedly, such a system would secure for the Queen's subjects most of the advantages of universal Free Trade, since we should have unrestricted access to the products of every climate in the habitable world. But such an arrangement could not be carried out except with the hearty assent, perhaps only on the initiation, of the Colonial Governments, and there are many reasons — inter-Colonial rivalries and the difficulty of harmonising the interests of cheap labour in India with those obtaining in the other parts of the Empire — which, for the present at least, would retard such a general agreement. Yet Mr. Chamberlain refuses to regard Imperial Federation, to which such a Zollverein is as essential a preliminary as the Kriegsverein for common defence, as an unsubstantial vision. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 251 " It is," he said, at a dinner held to celebrate the completion of the railway between Natal and the South African Republic, " a dream which has vividly impressed itself on the mind of the English-speaking race, and who does not admit that dreams of that kind, which have so powerful an influence upon the imagination of men, have, somehow or another, an unaccountable way of being realised in their own time? If it be a dream, it is a dream that appeals to the highest sentiments of patriotism, and even of our material interests. It is a dream which is calculated to stimulate and to inspire every one who cares for the future of the Anglo-Saxon people. I think, myself, that the spirit of the time is, at all events, in the direction of such a movement. How far it will carry us, no man can tell; but, believe me, upon the temper and the tone in which we approach the solution of the problems which are now coming upon us, depends the security and the maintenance of that world-wide dominion, that edifice of Imperial rule, which has been solely built up for us by those who have gone before." None of the projects now in the air, or brought within range of possible execution, interest Mr. Chamberlain — who seems to regard his office of Colonial Secretary as including that of President of an Imperial Board of Trade — more than those for connecting the Australian Colonies and Canada by a trans-Pacific cable. At a private con- ference, the other day, with the Agents-General for the former, and the High Commissioner for the latter, he suggested that a Commission should be formed, consisting of two representatives of Great Britain, two of Australasia, and two of Canada. After some discussion it was agreed that the Colonial representatives should be named by the Colonial Governments, and appointed by the Imperial Government, and the Commission should consider and report upon the whole subject in all its aspects. It was 252 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. also arranged that the Agents-General and the High Commissioner of Canada would move their Governments to appoint representatives on this understanding. It is further understood that he will not be backward in urging on the Chancellor of the Exchequer first, and the House of Commons afterwards, that a substantial subsidy should be granted until the scheme is able to pay its own way. Even if that desirable result were never attained, the slight annual deficit which might arise would be well worth defraying, for the sake of the impetus it would give to Imperial trade. Not less evident is Mr. Chamberlain's sympathy with the proposal to establish an "All Red Route," by rail and sea, between England and Australia, via Canada. * The weak link in the chain is that of the steamer service across, the Atlantic. What is required is a merchant fleet which may compete with such vessels as the Majestic and Teutonic. Lord Rosebery smiled graciously enough upon the proposal for the United Kingdom to co-operate with that of the Dominion, but his sympathy did not run to proposing a joint subsidy. Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, has promised to go thoroughly into the whole scheme, and while anxious that Imperial Parliament should assume a proper, even a generous, share of the liabilities, was hopeful of reducing the total amount that might be required. In Canada, we have Mr. Hall Caine's recent testimony, no English statesman is at present so popular as Mr. Chamberlain. Nor has he shown less tact in dealing with the various outstanding disputes which, by no fault of their * The difficulty is not one of finance, but of keeping the route open in time of war. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 253 own, the late Administration bequeathed him. The relations between the British South Africa Company and the Bechuana Chiefs had reached a point so serious that an armed conflict was not impossible, and good allies like Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen might have been sacrificed to the commercial ambition of Mr. Cecil Rhodes. On the one hand, it was impossible to allow them to delay the extension of the railway system northwards ; on the other, that advantage would be dearly purchased if the good faith of England towards her native friends underwent any further shocks in South Africa. In one respect Mr. Chamberlain resembles Lord Salisbury : he believes that a bargain is always possible if the two parties can only be brought to a reasonable frame of mind. More by intercession than by dictating, he hit upon an arrangement which has been cheerfully accepted both by Mr. Rhodes and the Chiefs. The former has got all the land he requires for his railway extension, while the territories of the latter have been so delimited that the Rulers suffer no substantial hardship, while their subjects are protected from that interference with native law and custom which they so strongly resent, and especially from the trade in strong drink, which has already ruined before their time so many races of African aborigines. The fate of the Swazis had been determined before Mr. Chamberlain came into office, and with regard to the real, though exaggerated, hardship with which they have been treated, it is, unfortunately, true that neither Party can throw stones at the other. The neglect of their just claims to British protection against the Boers 254 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. began with the Gladstonian Government of 1 880-1 885, but no redress was given during either of Lord Salisbury's Administrations. The fact is that British statesmen had begun to hope — now that the memories, on one side, of the Annexation, and, on the other, of Majuba Hill, seemed to be somewhat mellowed by time, and that English immigrants were swarming into the Transvaal, and acquiring an influence which the decadent Boer oligarchy could not much longer defy — that at some not remote date the territory we took in 1877, and gave up in 1 88 1, would once again pass under the British flag, not by conquest, but by voluntary agreement. Mean- time, it had been considered unadvisable to exasperate the powerful Kriiger Party by any avoidable clashing with their traditions of independence. Mr. Chamberlain was naturally anxious to remain on friendly terms with President Kriiger, and to establish, if possible, a relation of real cordiality between British and Boers — an achievement in statesmanship which would have been especially becoming in one who has to bear his share of responsibility for the Conventions of Pretoria (1881) and of London (1884). Nor is there much doubt, if things had been allowed to run a quiet course, that he would have induced the Boers to im- prove the position of those Uitlanders in the Transvaal — whether English, German, or American — who were willing to become naturalised subjects of the South African Republic. It is impossible at the present moment (January 18th, 1896) to write with absolute certainty on the motives which led Dr. Jameson to make his ill-advised and disastrous raid in Boer territory. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 255 Whatever excuse or explanation may hereafter be forth- coming, we must not allow our admiration for the dashing soldier of fortune, who had already done good service for the Empire, or our sorrow for the death of the brave Englishmen who joined his foray, that the result must, in any event, have been deeply injurious to British interests. Certainly it would not have been justified by success, since it would have placed the Imperial Govern- ment in the painful dilemma of either repudiating the action of Englishmen, or of taking advantage of their wrong. Now that the attempt has ended in conspicuous failure, we can all see that it was a mistake. Mr. Chamberlain arrived at that conclusion while the issue was still un- certain — while it was generally believed that Dr. Jameson was almost sure of success. Without an hour's hesitation, he disavowed and denounced the project, did all that could be done to prevent its being carried out, and did it knowing that he would be reviled by every Chauvinist in the Empire if Dr. Jameson had but ridden into Johannesburg at the head of a victorious troop. Any statesman who was merely possessed of a cool head would eventually have reached the same judgment, but Mr. Chamberlain reached it at a moment's notice, and acted upon it without waiting to see 'how things would turn out.' By this action he did something more than prove his own fitness for the office he had selected, he also vindicated the good faith of the Imperial Government. He has supplied the best possible answer to the hasty sneers and malicious insinuations of some of our Con- tinental critics. If the worst comes to the worst England 256 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. can, no doubt, rely on her own right hand ; but it is also well to have a good case. Any pretext for a quarrel which might have been set up has been removed beforehand by the perfectly correct and absolutely straightforward conduct of the Colonial Secretary. Nor was there wanting a quiet dignity to the terms (January 4th) in which Mr. Chamberlain referred to the telegram of congratulations by the German Emperor so rashly and so rudely addressed to President Kriiger. " The Government," Mr. Chamber- lain said, "adhere to the Convention of 1884, and they uphold that Convention in all its provisions." That is to say, we will not encroach on the rights of the South African Republic, but we shall maintain — against any attempt at European dictation or interference — our own equally established right to control the foreign relations of the Transvaal, those with the Orange Free State being alone excepted. What may be the outcome of this unhappy disturbance in South Africa is yet unknown. It could not have been raised on a less opportune occasion. We had not yet seen our way to the end of the misunderstanding which so suddenly arose with the United States in consequence of President Cleveland's interference in the ancient Boundary dispute between the Venezuelan Republic and the Colony of British Guiana — an interference which may have been influenced by the fear of American concessionaires under the Caracas Government, that Mr. Chamberlain's declared intention of developing our more backward Dependencies would clash with some of their schemes for acquiring exclusive commercial interests within our dominions. MR. CHAMBERLAIN, THE IMPERIALIST. 257 Such are some of the problems, great and small, which Mr. Chamberlain has already had to deal with — not to mention his responsibility for dismissing the pretended envoys from King Prempeh, and for the second Ashanti Expedition. It is too soon to pass judgment on the work at the Colonial Office, to which Mr. Chamberlain has directed himself with a fulness of knowledge and an ordered enthusiasm that stand in marked contrast with the languor which, in the case of some previous incumbents, has allowed the practical control of affairs to pass into the hands of the permanent chiefs of the Department. Their knowledge and good-will have never been called into question, even by fretful and disappointed Colonists ; but it does not lie within their duties to originate a new or vigorous policy. Mr. Chamberlain, it is admitted, no sooner took command in Downing Street, than he began to "make things hum" — a result which has, throughout his life, ensued in every sphere of activity that he has entered. He makes mistakes, he does injustice, like other men ; but they are the mistakes or the injustice of an alert brain and a driving energy which cannot rest while anything remains unaccomplished. Not within the memory of many living persons has the direction of Imperial affairs been a more anxious task than it is at the present time. At every turn the work of the Colonial hinges on that of the Foreign Office. It should be a matter for national content- ment that the quick judgment and bold initiative of Mr. Chamberlain are both strengthened and controlled by the mature experience and unillusioned wisdom of s 258 JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. Lord Salisbury, who exercises, even in Chancelleries not friendly to British policy, the personal authority accorded to the one still active survivor of the great school of statesmen who may be called the Makers of Modern Europe. Just now, it is true, there seems to be a dead set against England. We are isolated, it is said. We have been isolated before. But we have in our hands, to use when we please, the power of making such a bargain as no Power or combination of Powers could decline. THE END. William Brcndon and Son, Printers, Plymouth. 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