779 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA ri^ REPORT (IN THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION and im. POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO ITS SUPPRESSION. $h*sentril to both Douses of parliament bij (Eomuwitb of |jis Jftajestg. April, 1915. LONDON: PRINTED (7NDEB THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJ KS'l \'S STATIONERY OFFICE By DARLING and SON, Limited, Bacon Street, E. To be purchased, either i ugb any Bookseller, from WYMAN and SONS, Limited, 2 us Buildings, Fetteh Lane, E.C., 28, Ahingdos Street, S.W., . St. Mary Street, Cardiff; or II. M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), &5, I n; or E. PONSONBY, Limited, 116, Grafton Street, Dprlin; or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America and other Foreign Cbuntrie T. FISHEB CNWIN, London, W.C. 1915. "Cd. 7874.1 l'nn M. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. REPORT ON THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION AND THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO ITS SUPPRESSION. Jkesentcb to both Douses of parliament bij Contmanb of fjis (itlajcstg. April, 1915. LONDON: FEINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY UF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE By DARLING and SON, Limited, Bacon Stheet, E. To be purchased, either directly or through anv Bookseller, from WYMAN and SONS, Limited, 29, Breams Buildings. Fetter Lane, E.C., 28, Abingdon Street, S.W., and 54, St. Mary Street, Cardife; or H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, Forth Street Edinburgh; or E. PONSONBY, Limited, 116, Grafton Street, Dublin; or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of T. FISHER UNWIN, London, AV.C. 1915. | fCd. 7874.1 Price 8d, 13H ^ The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRETARY OF STATE. (Received 24th March, 1915.) Governor-General's Office, Sir, Cape Town, 3rd March, 1915.. I have the honour to transmit to you, for your information, twenty copies of a Report, which has been laid before the Union Parliament, on the outbreak of the rebellion, and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression. 2. General Smuts explained in the House of Assembly that this Report had been written by Mr. Leo Fouche, Professor of History in the Transvaal University College, Pretoria, who had been afforded free access to the papers of the Department of Defence. I have, &c, BUXTON, Go vernor- General . The Right Hon. Lewis Harcourt, M.P., &c, &c, &c, Colonial Office, London. PREFACE. This Report consists of two sections, the first dealing with the outbreak of the recent rebellion, the second with the policy pursued by the Government with regard to its suppression. The latter section confines itself exclusively to the efforts of the Government to restore peace without bloodshed, and subsequently to induce the rebels m the field to surrender without further bloodshed. No attempt is made to describe the military measures by means of which the rebellion was ultimately brought to an end. The first section, in which the outbreak of the rebellion is sketched, had to be compiled under difficulties. A mass of material in the hands of the Government could not be used, as it forms important evidence in the cases of individuals on trial or awaiting trial. In the case of certain German agents, investigations are still being pursued, and it would be premature to disclose the information so far collected. On certain points, again, the available evidence had not yet been properly sifted at the time of writing. It is therefore possible that the narrative may require subsequent amplification as to details. It is desired to point out that the narrative of events has been compiled in as objective a manner as possible, and that it contains no statement which is not borne out by evidence in possession of the Government. 322114 (4r,63— 2.) Wt. — G 385. 3000. 4/13. D k S. G 1. A 2 CONTENTS PART I. THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION. I. — South Africa and the European War — Par. 1. — War between England and Germany expected Par. 2. — The Seer Van Rensburg Par. 3. — The Treurfontein Meeting ... II. — Maritz and his Schemes— Par. 1. — Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz ... Par. 2. — His Schemes ... Par. 3. — Proofs of his treasonable Designs... III. — The Conspiracy of the 15th September — Par. 1.— Outlines of the Plot Par. 2. — Ramifications of the Conspiracy ... Par. 3. — Position of General De la Rey Par. 4. — Maritz at Pretoria Par. 5. — Disquieting News from Europe Par. 6. — Union Government prepares to attack German Par. 7.— Nakab Par. 8. — Final Preparations for the 1 5th September Par. 9.— The 15th of September Par. 10. — Potchefstroom Training Camp ... IV.— The Treachery of Maritz— Par. 1. — Preparations for a new Conspiracy Par. 2. — Maritz at Upington ... Par. 3. — Maritz throws off the Mask Par. 4. — Maritz's Ultimatum Par. 5. — Martial Law proclaimed V.— Rebellion in Transvaal and Free State— Par. 1. — The Kopjes Meeting of the 13th October. Par. 2. — A Deputation to the Government ... Par. 3. — The Government prepares to crush Maritz Par. 4. — Veldkornet Claassen mutinies Par. 5. — Beyers takes the Field Par. 6. — The Kopjes Meeting of the 22nd October Par. 7. — Open Rebellion VI. — Aims and Methods of the Rebel Leaders ., South- West Africa Page 6 6 7 12 12 12 13 14 14 15 15 16 18 20 21 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 30 31 31 32 PART II. POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REBELLION. I. — Efforts of Government to Restore Peace — Par. 1. — President Steyn invited to mediate Par. 2. — Terms offered to Rebels in Transvaal II. — Negotiations with General Beyers — Par. 1. — Beyers makes Proposals to Government Par. 2. — Beyers takes hostile Action before his Proposals can be considered Par. 3. — Beyers goes to President Steyn III. — President Steyn's Efforts for Peace — Par. 1. — Attempts to induce De Wet to meet President Steyn ... Par. 2. — De Wet's Evasions Par. 3. — His real Intentions ... Par. 4. — His active Hostilities, while Government Forces stand fast Par. 5. — Attitude of General Beyers Par. 6. — Conclusion IV. — De Wet wants War — Par. 1. — A changed Situation Par. 2. — De Wet refuses a Conference Par. 3. — Who is to blame ? 34 36 38 41 42 43 44 46 46 47 47 47 48 IS Page V. — The Government Takes Action— Par. 1. — Beyers wishes to confer with De Wet ... ... ... ... ... ... 49 Par. 2. — His Request Refused 49 Par. 3. — Policy of Government explained ... ... ... ... ... .. ... 49 p ar . 4. — After Mushroom Valley, De Wet wishes to negotiate 51 Par. 5. — Government refuses a Conference... ... ... ... ... ... ... 51 VI. — Efforts to induce Rebels in the Field to Surrender — Par. 1. — Instructions with regard to Rebels surrendering voluntarily 52 Par. 2.— Effect of the Notification of the 12th November 53 Par. 3. — Period within which to surrender extended for Rank and File of Rebels ... 54 Par. 4. — Live Stock oi all Rebel Leaders still in the Field to be confiscated ... ... 54 VII. — Other Efforts for Peace in the Orange Free State 55 VIII. — Poltcy of the Government during the last stage of the Rebellion ... 57 APPENDIX. A. — Resignation of General Beyers — Correspondence between General Beyers and the Minister of Defence B. — Documents dealing with the Treachery of Maritz — (1) Extracts from Report of Captain Muller (2) Affidavit by Captain Malan (3) Affidavit by Captain Louw (4) Affidavit by J. A. L. van der Merwe ... (5) Agreement between Maritz and the Governor of Ger (6) Proclamation by the Governor-General of the Union (7) Proclamation by Maritz O. — Correspondence between General Botha, President Steyn, and General Smuts, dealing with the Efforts to obviate Bloodshed man South West Africa 61 63 63 65 66 66 67 67 69 Part I. The Outbreak of the Rebellion. I.—SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN WAR. ' 1. War between England and Germany expected. — The growing hostility between England and Germany, which had been so marked a feature of inter- national relations during the last decade, did not pass unobserved in South Africa. With many in this country (as elsewhere throughout the world) it had become an accepted belief that war between the two countries was inevitable, and that at no distant date they would be engaged in a deadly struggle for supremacy. The outbreak of the great war in Europe at the beginning of August, involving England and Germany and bringing them to grips at last, affected South Africa immediately and profoundly./ Although the great majority of Dutch South Africans had no sympathy whatever with German aims or Prussian ambition, they were, on the other hand, not very passionately anti-German either. They could not be expected to feel towards Germany as the average Englishman did. Only a handful of them, whether from ties of blood and kinship, or for other reasons, were pro-German in their sympathies. In the two late Republics, however, there were many who quite naturally regretted their lost independence. The regret might be merely sentimental, but sentiment has to be reckoned with, particularly in times of great excitement, when it easily leads to deeds. It is not surprising, then, that in the ferment aroused by the gigantic struggle in Europe, which seemed to be shaking the world to its foundations, young men began to see visions and old men to dream dreams of what the outcome might be for South Africa. The times were not without their signs. There was a seer in Lichtenburg who had visions of strange import. Years ago and long before anyone in this country had dreamt of war, he had beheld a great fight of bulls, six or seven of them, engaged in bloody combat ; a grey bull had emerged victorious from the contest. The bulls signi- fied the great nations of Europe and the grey bull was Germany. Thousands had discussed this strange vision, and had remembered its prophetic character when later war actually broke out. The vision seemed ominous. Germany was predestined to triumph.. 2.' — The Seer Van Rensburg. — The seer was Nicolaas van Rensburg, of Lichten- burg, a simple and illiterate farmer. He was a prophet not without honour in his own country. On many occasions he had given proof positive of the possession of extraordinary powers of prevision, so men said and believed. It would be out of place here to give examples of the many telepathic forecasts (or happy guesses) with which he was credited. It is certain that he had a great hold on the imagination of thousands of his people. During the Anglo-Boer War some commandos, when Van Rensburg was in their laager, neglected all precautions. If " Oom Niklaas " declared that the English were not in the neighbourhood, it was a waste of energy to post sentries and keep a look-out. An extraordinary (and apparently quite authentic) vision, correctly foretelling certain events leading to the conclusion of peace, had established his reputation. His fame spread throughout the land, and everywhere strange tales were told of his wonderful gift. His reputation had, strangely enough, not diminished since the war. This was, perhaps, due to several causes. He had never attempted to exploit his " gift " and impressed most of those who came in contact with him with his apparent sincerity. If he duped others, it seemed he also duped himself. Moreover — and this was perhaps the secret of his continued success — his " visions " were invariably symbolic and mysterious ; they possessed an adaptability of character that was truly Delphic. Indeed, his hearers were compelled to put their own interpretation upon his visions. The seer seldom pretended to understand or explain them himself. General De la Rey took a great interest in the seer, who had belonged to his commandos during the Anglo-Boer War. Van Rensburg, again, had the greatest admiration for General De la Rey, and had frequently hinted to his circle that great things were in store for the General. One of his visions had been well known to General De la Rey and his friends for some years. The seer had beheld the number 15 on a dark cloud, from which blood issued, and then General De la Rey returning home without his hat. Immediately afterwards came a carriage covered with flowers. What these things portended, Van Rensburg could not say. He believed that they signified some high honour for the General. 3. The Treurfontein Meeting. — In the Western Transvaal — in the Lichtenburg- Wolmaransstad area — owing, perhaps, to the presence there of the seer Van Rens- burg, the feeling aroused by the war was most intense. There is evidence that many in this area had been for long living in the belief that a war between Germany and England was bound to come and that when the day came an effort w r ould be made to restore the independence of the Transvaal. The mere prospect of war between Germany and England was sufficient to pro- duce a rebellious movement. It will be remembered that war was declared between these two countries on the 4th of August. Already, on the 3rd August, Commandant F. G. A. Wolmarans (of Ward Onder Hartsrivier) was warning his friends that " in a short while they would get orders to go to Treurfontein to attend a meeting. The people would assemble and the ' Vierkleur ' would be hoisted." When asked : "What then?" Wolmarans replied: 'From there we shall go to the German Border for ammunition." Asked further as to the attitude of the Government, Wolmarans said : " The Government is all right." It is impossible to overlook the significance of the remark about the German Border. It shows that Wolmarans (who was. in the confidence of Major Kemp and others) knew something of the schemes and the position of Maritz. When the war at last broke out the effect in Lichtenburg was instantaneous. The prophecies of Van Rensburg were eagerly recalled, and it was remembered that he had foretold a day on which the independence of the Transvaal would be restored. One officer actually called up his men to be in readiness on Sunday, 9th August, as that would be the day on which the prophecy would be fulfilled. After this, too, certain individuals could be seen daily cleaning their rifles and cartridges in order to be ready for the day. Several men in this district claimed to be in regular communi- cation with German South-West Africa before August, 1914. Within a week of the declaration of war between England and Germany the district was further pro- foudly stirred by the news (now become generally known) that a great meeting of local burghers was to be held at Treurfontein on the loth of August, and that certain local officers were commandeering their burghers to come to this meeting armed and fully equipped for active service. Careful inquiries by other local officers brought to light the following facts : — Veld Kornet I. E. Claassen and Commandant F. G. A. Wolmarans, of Ward Onder Hartsrivier, had been commandeering their own burghers, as well as their political friends, since the first week of August to come to the meeting which was to be held at Treurfontein on the 15th. The instructions given to these men were that they were to come with rifle, horse, saddle, and bridle, and as much ammunition and provisions as they could manage to bring. Commandant Wolmarans personally instructed his veldcornets to commandeer their men in this way. The commandeering was carried out by means of " com- mandeerbriefjes," signed by Claassen and Wolmarans, and also personallv bv word of mouth. The meeting was to be addressed by General De la Rey, and it was generally believed that the assembled burghers would march on Potchefstroom immediately after the meeting. The prophecies of Van Rensburg had a great deal to do with the excitement which had been produced locally. The strange vision of the number 15, which had long been common knowledge, was now discussed with intense interest. The 15, it was said, signified the 15th of August, the day of the meeting. That would be the day, which had been so long expected — the day of liberation. ' Van Rensburg was now the oracle. His prophecies with regard" to the great war had been signally 8 fulfilled. Germany was at grips with England and her triumph was looked upon as inevitable. The day had arrived to strike a blow for their lost independence. Van Rensburg assured his following that the Union Government was " finished." Not a shot would be fired. The revolution would be complete and bloodless. Between the 10th and the 15th the plotters in Lichtenburg were actively pre- paring for the day. There is evidence that German secret agents were working in concert with them. The 15th would mark the beginning of a new era. When doubters asked how they could be so certain that the 15 signified a day of the month — and of the month of August in particular — they were scornfully if illogically told that " in God's time a month sooner or later made no difference." The Government had been informed by its local supporters of these alarming preparations. It was quite clear that an attempt was to be made on the 15th to start a rebellion. Everything would depend on the meeting which was to be addressed by General De la Rey. General De la Rey's position in the Western Transvaal was unique. He possessed an unrivalled influence and was looked up to as the uncrowned King of the West. His attitude at the meeting would sway the mass of his adherents and decide the question of peace or war. General Botha summoned General De la Rey to Pretoria some days before the meeting, and was able to persuade him to use his best endeavours to calm the excited feeling Avhich had been aroused and to use his influence to see that no untoward incidents should occur. On Saturday, the 15th, the great meeting was held. About 800 burghers were present. General De la Rey addressed them and explained the. situation m Europe. He exhorted his audience to remain cool and calm and to await events. After the address " a strange and unusual silence " was observed. A resolution was passed unanimously expressing complete confidence in the Government to act in the best interests of South Africa in the present world crisis. The address seemed to have had a very good effect. The burghers appeared to have taken their leader's advice to heart, as they dispersed quietly to their homes. All danger of a rebellious movement had apparently been averted. II.— MARITZ AND HIS SCHEMES. 1. Lieut. -Colonel Maritz.— At the outbreak of the War, the defences of the north-western districts of the Cape Province, where the Union territory marches with that of German South- West Africa, were in charge of Lieut. -Colonel Solomon G. Maritz. Maritz had distinguished himself in the Anglo-Boer War, and, although quite without education, had given many proofs of a natural aptitude for military opera- tions. He had fought for a long time in the north-western districts of the Cape Colony, and had come to know the country and its people thoroughly. At the conclusion of peace in 1902 he left South Africa,* and tried his fortune, first in Madagascar and afterwards in German South- West Africa. Here he was of considerable service to the Germans during the campaign against the Hereros, when he organized a transport service, composed mostly of Dutch South Africans, which did very good work under very trying conditions. During his residence in German South- West Africa he had made many friends among the Germans, as well as among the Boers settled in German territory. He subsequently moved to the Orange Free State and entered the Union Police. On the organization of the Union Defence Forces he had been offered a commis- sion on the staff of the Active Citizen Force. He passed through the Military Training School at Bloemfontein, and at the beginning of 1913 he was appointed to command Military District No. 12, comprising the north-western districts of the Cape Province. At the beginning of August, 1914, he was appointed Lieutenant- Colonel in command of the Union border in the direction of Kakamas and Upington. This appointment was made on the recommendation of General Beyers, and had been sanctioned by the Minister of Defence only very reluctantly, on the repeated and urgent demands of the Commandant- General. * He was apprehensive of the possible consequences of certain actions of his during the war. It appears that Maritz did not confine himself to his military duties, but also took a keen interest in politics. Some considerable time before the European War broke out it was stated in the Transvaal that Maritz " was working for the Hertzog party in the north-western districts." This statement was made by a duly accredited official of the Nationalist Party, who subsequently became a fellow conspirator with Maritz and a prominent rebel leader. It is certain that since the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War Maritz had brooded over schemes for re-establishing a republic in South Africa. He hoped to do so with German help, and had apparently prepared for the day when Germany and England should be at war with each other, in order to put his project into execution. . From the moment war was declared between England and Germany Maritz was in close and constant touch with the German authorities across the border. Later, when he was in open rebellion against the Union Government, he showed his corre- spondence with the Germans to certain Union officers. From this it was evident that he had been in communication with the Germans since the first week in August. 2. His Schemes. — The aims and aspirations of Maritz are best explained in his own words. On the 9th of October, 1914, the day on which he had begun his rebellion, he declared to a Union Intelligence Officer that ' he first conceived the idea of liberating South Africa when he was at the Military School at Bloemfontein." He was at the Military School from the 1st of July to the 9th of November, 1912. Tt is known that treasonable schemes were discussed between Maritz and others at this time, and that he opened communications at this period with the Governor- General of German South-West Africa. The name of his intermediary is also known. ■ If we are to believe Maritz further, he was the leading spirit in this conspiracy. The Intelligence Officer above mentioned, in his report of the interview, states that Maritz " seemed to resent the insinuation that Beyers was the heart and soul of the movement. He stated that Beyers had been ' put on by him.' He seemed very anxious to have any and all the credit that might be attached to the enterprise." To the officers under his own command, whom he had wholly or partially cor- rupted, Maritz made similar statements. Several of these officers have since made sworn declarations, from some of which the following extracts are taken. At Keimoes he addressed his men on the 12th October, " assuring us officers that com- munications with the Germans had been carried on for the last two and a half years, at the same time assuring us that persons of high standing in the Transvaal and Free State were at the head of affairs."* He gave no names on this occasion, in order not to get these persons of standing into trouble. With others he was less reticent. An officer who had helped him actively with the disarmament of his own maxim section at Van Rooisvlei, and whom he trusted, has made the following statement : " Maritz always gave me to understand that he was in constant touch (onderhandelingen) with Generals De Wet, Beyers, Hertzog, and Kemp, in order to become free, since England was now involved in war. I understood from Maritz that these communications had been taking place during the last two or three years. The leaders concerned were Generals De Wet, Hertzog, Beyers, and Kemp. These names were mentioned in his address to his troops at Van Rooisvlei. He stated that these persons were in the movement."! It is obvious that these statements of Maritz cannot be accepted without careful examination. He was embarking upon a most dangerous and disgraceful career of treason, and required potent arguments to overcome the natural reluctance of those whom he wished to drag with him upon his criminal course. Nothing was better calculated to remove the scruples of his followers than the assurance that respected leaders of the people, men with great reputations, were in the movement with him. It is therefore not surprising that Maritz made free with the names of prominent South Africans who were known or supposed to be in opposi- tion to the' Government, and that, by a diligent use of assertions like these, he succeeded in seducing a large number' of men from their allegiance to the Union. 3. Proofs of his treasonable Designs. — Quite apart from Maritz's own asser- tions however, there is ''evidence which proves that he had been in communication with the German authorities for some years v Two independent witnesses assert that Maritz had made arrangements with the Germans before he was appointed to the command of the north-western districts (i.e., before January, 1913). • Affidavit by Lieut. Karel Rood. f Affidavit by Capt. A. S, Louw, Appendix, p. 65. 4568 B 10 As for his relations with Transvaal and Free State leaders, there is no doubt that he was in communication with certain people in the Free State and the Trans- vaal since August, 1914. Further, an officer who was taken prisoner by Maritz at the time of the latter's rebellion overheard a discussion between two of Maritz's most trusted confederates (Major Ben Coetzee and Commandant P. de Villiers), in which the name of the man used as intermediary between Maritz and Genera] Beyers and others was mentioned. One of Maritz's most trusted confederates, Andries Kampher (" Koper "), who had fought with him as a rebel in the Anglo-Boer War, and who is now a member of Maritz's " Provisional Government," stated on Friday, the 7th August, at the farm Onap, in Bushmanland, that " Maritz would not fight against the Germans. This he knew well, because Maritz had an agreement of long standing with the Germans." Kampher had been in close touch with Maritz for a long time past. On the 7th August, he met Maritz by special arrangement at Brandvlei, and the two passed a whole night together, walking about in earnest conversation. That same day (7th August), Maritz, in the course of a remarkable speech to the inhabitants of Brandvlei, stated that " we in South Africa have no enemy unless we make one ourselves." He further declared that he would not invade German South- West Africa, giving as his reason that the Active Citizen Force was too badly equipped and incapable of dealing with such well armed and disciplined forces as the Germans possessed. Further light is thrown on the schemes of Maritz by an examination of his rela- tions with P. J. Joubert, who is an intimate personal friend, and fought with him in the Anglo-Boer War and in German South- West Africa. Joubert had been living for years in German South-West Africa, where he owns a farm near Keet- manshoop. During July, 1914, Joubert was in the Orange Free State on some mysterious business. He returned to German South-West Africa at the beginning of August. On the 4th of August he was at Kakamas, where he informed one Van der Merwe that he expected war would be declared between Germany and England. He was going to his farm near Keetmanshoop to collect his movables, in order to return to the Cape Province. Joubert then left for German South-West Africa, and was again seen at Kakamas on the 13th August. He then told the same Van der Merwe that he had had to flee for his life from the Germans, that he had to swim through the Orange River. (This story was entirely untrue.) Joubert now stayed at Kakamas with Albert Stadler, subsequently the rebel commandant under Maritz. On the 5th August Stadler sent the following telegram to Maritz at Calvinia : " Joubert arrived safely yesterday evening. Everything quiet and peaceful. Tele- graph particulars." Maritz was at this time returning from Pretoria, where he had been in consul- tation with General Beyers. He arrived at Calvinia on the 17th, and the same day dispatched the following telegram to Stadler: "11/83. Very urgent. August 17. If little Joubert* is still there, tell him to wait until I come to Kakamas. I leave here to-morrow morning early.. If he has left, telegraph me immediately where he is. You may send any telegrams to me O.H.M.S. Show this telegram to Post Office as your authority. Reply immediately." Stadler and Joubert were not at Kakamas at this time. On the 19th Maritz sent a telegram to the Postmaster at Kakamas : " Urgent. Find Joubert imme- diately and ask him to reply whether he will wait at Kakamas. I must meet him. Stadler can perhaps give you information." The same day Stadler telegraphed to Maritz from Keimoes : " Urgent. Joubert still here. Waiting for you." Joubert was at this time " generally considered a German spy "t by local people. Maritz, however, appointed him his Staff Captain, and by means of urgent repre- sentations at headquarters managed to get this appointment confirmed. Maritz, as we have seen, had announced that he was leaving Calvinia for Kakamas early on the morning of the 18th, in order to find Joubert. He did not leave Calvinia until the 21st. On that day he sent the following telegram to General Beyers at Pretoria : " Urgent. Following telegram received from Commandant Stadler, Kakamas, begins : ' Official news received from German West that all cattle * " Joubertje " in original, t Intelligence report, 11 must be removed from south to north. Africanders refuse to do this. According to report they will employ firearms if necessary.' I leave to-day by motor to prevent difficulties.* Could not leave sooner." In the meantime the affair at Schuitdrift took place. Some Africanders (the Liebenbergs) living in German South-West Africa had fled to Union territory with their cattle. This was in consequence of the German order to move all cattle north- wards, as mentioned in Stadler's telegram. A German police patrol had attempted to arrest them, whereupon the Liebenbergs had fired on the police. Maritz tele- graphed to General Beyers from Kakamas on the 23rd : " Arrived here this a.m. Saw report at S.A.M.R. camp re fight between refugees and Germans on Orange River islands. Going down there and from there direct to Calvinia. Reach there Tuesday morning. Take no steps till I report to you." The anxiety of Maritz over the Schuitdrift affair was very natural. All his schemes were based upon the cultivation of the most cordial relations between Ger- mans and Dutch. He had already made it clear to his friends that he would never attack German South- West Africa. The action of the Liebenbergs in firing on a German police patrol threatened to upset all his plans. It would cause bad blood between Germans and Dutch, and embroil the races whom he hoped to unite in his cause. Maritz went to investigate the occurrences at Schuitdrift. He crossed the river and proceeded into German territory and conversed by telephone with the Officer Commanding the German forces at Warmbad. He returned to Calvinia on the 25th, and there publicly spoke with the greatest indignation of the conduct of the Liebenbergs in firing on the Germans. They ought, he declared, to be hanged or shot. He also stated privately that he would hand over the Liebenbergs to the Germans, as they had committed nothing short of murder. As a matter of fact, German patrols were during the latter part of August seeking for the Liebenbergs on Union Territory, near Pofadder (not far from Pella Mission Station). It is unthinkable that the Germans would have ventured upon such a course unless they were satisfied as to the attitude of Maritz, the supreme military authority in those parts. Their action in thus violating Union territory at this point was most pro- bably the direct outcome of Maritz's communications with Warmbad, above described. On the day of his return to Calvinia (25th August), Maritz telegraphed to General Beyers : " Am back from Kakamas. Everything is quiet and peaceful and no danger on border. I think it would be good if you could come down to Upington personally after the 7th September, to see burghers, t Reply when you can come. I send my report to-day by post re occurrences and shooting of German soldiers by Africanders. There is no truth whatever in all rumours re advance (overkomen) of enemy." Two things strike us in this telegram. In the first place, Maritz's statements that " there is no danger on border," and that " there is no truth whatever in all rumours re advance of enemy." In the second place, his desire that Beyers should come to Upington to see the burghers. Both these points are explained by the schemes he was then maturing. Two other telegrams dispatched by Maritz the same day are also significant. They refer to his friend Joubert. One was addressed to the Magistrate at Spring- bok : " Just arrived from German Border and Pella. Rumours false. All quiet. Joubert with me at present. Appointed adjutant my staff." The other telegram was to Colonel Skinner, Defence Headquarters, Pretoria : " August 25. Captain Joubert just arrived from German South- West can give you full and reliable infor- mation re German South- West. If such is required he may go to Pretoria." Authority was given for Joubert to proceed to Pretoria. He came about the beginning of September, and had an interview with Generals Botha and Smuts. He professed to be very anxious to serve the Government with his intimate knowledge of the country, and managed in this way to gain some knowledge of the general plan of the projected attack on the German Colony. According to Joubert's own statement, however, his real object in coming to Pretoria was " to see Generals Beyers and De la Rey."| He certainly saw General Beyers on this occasion. Joubert's later movements are referred to in a subsequent * This refers to Maritz himself, t It had been decided to call out the local Active Citizen Force for training; at Upington during September. \ Statement made by Joubert, after his capture, to a police officer. 4563 15 .' \y Is chapter. It may, however, be stated here that an officer who inquired iocally into the origin of the " Maritz rebellion " reports that " Captain P. J. Joubert appears to have played the greatest part in engineering the rebellion." III.— THE CONSPIRACY OF THE 15th SEPTEMBER. It was not only in the Western Transvaal that the European War had produced a profound effect. Its course was being carefully watched in the Eree State and at Pretoria. It is an established fact that'during the month of August a conspiracy was organized which was to lead to a general rising on the 15th of September. This was a much more serious affair than the abortive attempt to engineer a rising at Treurfontein on the 15th of August. The leader in this conspiracy was General C. F. Beyers, Commandant- General of the Active Citizen Force of the Union. With him in the plot were Lieut. -Colonel Maritz and a number of prominent men who are now in prison awaiting trial. 1. Outlines of the Plot. — The following extract, taken from a voluntary state- ment made in prison by one of the most prominent of the conspirators, gives the groundwork of the plot : — " The general impression I gained from Beyers was that, if pressure was brought to bear, the Government would resign rather than fire on its own people; and that arrangements had been made with the German authorities, in the event of their winning the European struggle, to guarantee the Free State and Transvaal their freedom; and I was under the impression that Maritz was the one that had made the arrangements with the German authori- ties. I had questioned Beyers on these points at my previous interviews and he had informed me that Maritz had made arrangements with the Germans." 2. Ramifications of the Conspiracy.-^In and around Pretoria there were many who were prepared to join General Beyers in an attempt to overthrow the Govern- ment. In the Free State there was General De Wet, whose energy and iron deter- mination were well known. He could be trusted to organize the rebellion in his Province. Maritz was already far advanced with his plans and could be counted upon not only to carry on his propaganda of sedition among his own people, but also to keep an open door for his German friends, with whom he was known to be in treasonable communication. In the Western Transvaal there were already cheering signs of discontent, which by careful fanning could be blown into a blaze of revolt. Major J. Kemp, District Staff Officer for Military District No. 7 (which embraces the Western Transvaal), was a leader in the movement and would be able to do a great deal with the help of his friends among the Defence Force officers of his area. In conjunction with General Beyers he had organized the Rifle Associa- tions in the west, and there are signs that a policy of careful discrimination in the selection of officers had been consistently carried out. It was known that the Active Citizen regiments of the west would concentrate on the 2nd of September at Potchef- stroom for their annual training. With good management they could perhaps be won over and induced to mutiny. These regiments would form a most useful nucleus for a striking force. All the members of the Government, as well as most of the heads of Government departments, would be at Capetown for the Session of Parliament. It would thus be possible to strike a paralyzing blow from Potchefstroom before anything could be done to avert it. 3. Position of General De la Rey. — A very important factor in the situation in the Western Transvaal was General De la Rey. If he could be induced to join in the conspiracy, it would be an immense gain to the cause, as his personal influence was very great. Should he oppose the movement, it would be a serious blow to the plotters, as neither Beyers nor Kemp could hope to do anything against General De la Rey in the west. There is evidence to prove that General Beyers set himself systematically to work on General De la Rey's mind in order to induce him to join the conspiracy. General De la Rey was known to hold strong religious views, which coloured hio is whole outlook. The seer Van Rensburg, who was always full of religious talk, had in this way acquired a considerable amount of influence over General De la Rey. There is the best of evidence (General Beyers' own statement) for the belief that he himself did not scruple to work on General De la Rey's mind through his religious feelings. The following letter and telegrams form part of the correspondence which passed between Beyers and General De la Rey at this time. On the 11th of August General Beyers wrote the following letter to General De la Rey : — Translation.] " 76/41. • 11th August, 1914. " General De la Rey, " Lichtenburg. " Dear General, — Matters are serious, and I should like to discuss things with you. I do not mean that you must come to Pretoria specially for the purpose, but should you be coming to Pretoria, please be so kind as to let me know and to come and see me at my office. " With kind regards, " Sincerely yours, 6 C. F. Beyers. " The commandants of the Transvaal have been called up to meet me here next Friday morning: in connection with the European War. " C. F. B." The same day (11th) General Beyers received a cipher telegram* from Major J. Kemp, District Staff Officer at Potchefstroom. It proved to be undecipherable, and Kemp was asked to repeat the telegram in clear. t Thereupon the following telegram was received from Kemp : — Translation.] " I have to report that I have been to Lichtenburg and that I was informed that a public meeting is to be held at Treurfontein on Saturday, loth inst. Public feeling appears to be excited, and I consider it advisable that you attend the meeting in order to enlighten public." On the 12th General Beyers sent the following telegram to General De la Rey : — Translation.] " I learn you will address meeting Treurfontein Saturday. Is it not possible to postpone meeting, so that you can meet me here Friday to discuss urgent and important points ?"1 The meeting, as we have seen, was not postponed, but took place on the 15th inst. 4. Maritz at Pretoria. — Maritz had arrived at Pretoria on the flth of August, the same day on which General Beyers expresses a desire to see General De la Rey. Hearing the same day from Kemp of the proposed meeting at Treurfontein, he next telegraphs to General De la Rey, asking him to postpone the meeting and to meet him at Pretoria on Friday, the 14th, '' to discuss urgent and important points." Maritz was to leave Pretoria on the 14th, § and it is not difficult to guess that General Beyers would have liked to confront General De la Rey with Maritz and with the proofs of German support which Maritz had most certainly brought with him. Maritz's account of his own preparations on the Orange River and his German treaty would have been striking evidence of the progress of the conspiracy and potent arguments against hesitation. The visit of Maritz to Pretoria (11th to 14th August) was a most important stage in the development of the conspiracy. It settled the question of German guarantees and German assistance in the most satisfactory way, and, synchronizing as it did with the meeting of the Transvaal commandants, it enabled the chief conspirators to ascertain personally the state of feeling among the leading fighting * No. 264. t No. 2314. J No. 2347. 5 He did "leave" on 'the 14th. 14 ineii of the Transvaal. It also gave them the opportunity of sounding their supporters and of gaining new adherents. Thus, a few days after the meeting on the 14th an ex-officer, who had shortly before resigned his commission in the Defence Force, received a message from Maritz and Kemp through General Muller, saying " I was a fool to resign as I might have been useful. ... I asked him, Muller, what they meant ; he replied : They have some work for you to do." The ex-officer in question thereupon went to see General Beyers, who asked him to come to his (Beyers') house.* At this interview, he states, Beyers " informed me that he had no intention of going to German South- West, and he had made up his mind to resign, and that he was waiting for the resolution of Parliament on that point before tendering his resignation. He stated his reason for not going to German South-West was (that) he would not fight the Germans as they were friendly to us, and that he would rather be shot than fight against them." 5.' Disquieting News from Europe. — Meantime disquieting news was being received from Europe. The German advance on Paris seemed irresistible. French and English had been flung back, apparently hopelessly beaten. The strategic retreat of the Allies appeared a hopeless rout, and rumour increased its significance enor- mously. It seemed as if Germany would soon have the Allies completely at her mercy. The v Prophet " Van Rensburg, indeed, saw visions in which 40,000 German soldiers were marching up and down London.,, These absurd imaginings of a dis- ordered brain were freely circulated by the conspirators and some of them really believed (or at least pretended to believe) them. 6. The Union Government proposes to attack German South-West Africa. — It was at this unpropitious moment that rumours began to spread that the Union Government was contemplating an attack on German South- West Africa. The news created some alarm even among supporters of the Government, who realized the arduous character of the undertaking as well as the political difficulties it would raise. Among a section of the political opponents of the Government it was received with loud outcries of indignation. This was genuine in the case of those who looked upon the proposed campaign as " fighting for England " against old friends, who had sheltered and befriended some of those who were now perhaps to be called upon to attack their German bene- factors. The leaders of the conspiracy made the most of this feeling and actively fanned the hostile elements into a determined opposition to any action against German South-West Africa. When the Germans began overt hostilities against the Union by occupying Union territory opposite Nakab (on or about the 19th August), many political oppo- nents of the Government rallied to its support, realizing that the " neutrality " doctrine was exploded. Not so the extremists. At the " Nationalist " Congress held at Pretoria on the 26th of August, a few days after the violation of Union territory above referred to, the strongest language was used against the proposed " robbers' campaign " against German South-West Africa. Among those present were Senator -A. D. W. Wolmarans (in the chair), the Rev. H. van Broekhuizen, P. G. W. Grobler, M.L.A., and the Rev. H. Fourie. General De la Rey was specially invited to address the congress. He did so. and, in a speech which made a deep impression, strongly urged union in the present time of crisis. His attitude at this time shows that as yet the conspirators had not ventured to give him any hint of their schemes. On the 22nd of August certain units of the Defence Force were called up for their annual training. On the 24th came the news of the affair at Schuitdrift. As we have seen, this led to another violation of Union territory by the Germans. Owing, however, to the machinations of Maritz, no news of the German patrols south of the Orange River leaked through, and the Government remained in ignorance of the occurrence. On the 9th of September General Botha announced in Parliament the policy of the Government with regard to German South-West Africa. In the debate which ensued the " Nationalist " Party bitterly opposed the proposed advance on that country. Some members went so far as to accuse the Government of a piece of gross chicanery in connection with the violation of Union territory at Nakab. * The date was probably Sunday, 16th Angus!. 15 7 Nakab.— Nakab, or Nakob, is a waterhole about eighteen miles north of the Orange River on German territory, quite close to the Union border. A German police post is established here. On the other side of the border, and also quite close to it there is a Union police post. Both posts take their name from the waterhole. The waterhole itself is so near the border that a kopje on Union territory commands it. What had happened was that the Germans had occupied this kopje, apparently to safeguard their access to the water. „ '' ■,-., The few maps which marked the position of Nakab at all naturally showed the waterhole, which was in German territory. ; . When the news arrived of the German advance at this point the Railway Department happened to.be issuing as part of its ordinary routine a map of the North-West Cape Province in connection with a proposed extension of the railway line from Prieska to Upington, which was to be laid before Parliament. On this map the waterhole at Nakab had been marked, as usual, on the German side of the border. After the arrival of the news of the violation of Union territory, the officials concerned were apparently seized by doubt as to the accuracy of their map in this respect, since they were unaware of the existence of two (really three) places going by the same name (the waterhole and the two police posts). Accordingly, they altered the position assigned to Nakab, shifting it further east and just over the border. This was done in the most open manner, an arrow being inserted to indicate the direction in which the position of Nakab had been shifted. There was no inten- tion to deceive, for the alteration was so obviously an afterthought and was carried out so openly (as a glance at the map in question will show) that it could not have deceived an infant in arms. This circumstance was, however, eagerly seized upon as a proof of how per- fidiously the Government was misrepresenting the facts to the public. What had really happened, it was declared, was that the Union forces had seized German territory, for on the map there is only one Nakab, and that is in German territory. To hide its delinquency the Government tries to falsify the map ! This example of political pettiness would not have been worth mentioning if it had not done a great deal of harm. The lie was repeated through the length and breadth of the land and helped to inflame hostile passions against a Machiavellian Government which apparently stuck at nothing to gain its ends. 8. Final Preparations for the 15th September. — Meanwhile General Beyers was completing his arrangements for the rising on the 15th September. Events in Europe were helping his plans to perfection. The German armies were still advancing on Paris with terrible, and seemingly irresistible, swiftness. The French Government had abandoned the capital. Paris seemed doomed to fall within the next week or two. On the 5th of September (when the Allies in France were still in full retreat) General Beyers sent the following telegram, marked ' Private," to General De la Rey at Lichtenburg : " Very anxious to see you, important business. Can you meet me here Saturday, 12th inst. ? " To this a reply came from Mr. B. Krige, General De la Rey's son-in-law, informing General Beyers that General De la Rey had left for Capetown to attend the Special Session of Parliament. General Beyers thereupon telegraphed to General De la Rey at Capetown as follows (8th September) : — " Would like to see you here Monday, 14th, or Tuesday, 15th inst. If inconvenient, telegraph earliest date. Important." At the same time he also telegraphed to General De Wet at Memel : " Do not come to Pretoria now. Our friend will not be here." General De la Rey replied on the 10th September : ' Will come to see you when Parliament adjourns." General Beyers, it is clear, was still hoping to persuade General De la Rey at the last moment to join the conspiracy or, failing that, to place him before a fait accompli at Potchefstroom. At the worst, even if General De la Rey should refuse to join the movement, his mere presence at the critical moment, when the first step had to be taken, would be invaluable. The conspirators would certainly not have scrupled to mislead their followers with regard to General De la Rev's position, since we know that they did not scruple, in many cases, to assure their deluded followers that the whole Government was behind the movement* About this time General Beyers was being strongly urged by certain ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church to make some public declaration against the proposed * See belov, Chap. VI, p. :)2, 16 expedition to German South-West Africa. A few days before his resignation he was visited by a number of ministers, who, among other things, urged upon him that the time had come to make known his views to his people. Friday, the 11th September, was a critical day in the history of the conspiracy. An expeditionary force was going to sail from Capetown to seize Luderitzbucht.* General Beyers knew that General Lukin and Maritz were to co-operate with this force, and that hence the crisis must come within the next few days. On the 11th he sent a " Clear the line " telegram to Maritz at Upington as follows : — " 2441. Commandant- General would like to see you here Tuesday. If impossible for you, then send Joubert."t Learning of this telegram, Major Burgess, General Beyers' Chief Staff Officer, pointed out to him that as this order might cause Maritz to quit his post, notice of it should be given to the General Staff at Headquarters. General Beyers had not done so, and replied that, as it was uncertain as yet whether Maritz himself or his staff officer was coming, he would not report the matter to Headquarters until a definite answer had come from Maritz. No such report was made, and on Tuesday, the 15th of September, Joubert was at Pretoria in close confabulation with General Beyers, but without the knowledge of the authorities at headquarters. The same day (11th) General Beyers wished to telegraph to. Major Kemp at Potchefstroom to come to Pretoria the next day (Saturday) to see him. But as a telegram might be delayed, General Beyers gave orders to telephone to Kemp. This was done and the next day Kemp and Lieutenant-Colonel Bezuidenhout (afterwards one of Kemp's " Generals ") arrived by motor-car and interviewed General Beyers. One of the leading conspirators was present at this interview. The following is taken from his statement, before mentioned : — " During my stay in the office a discussion took place about Kemp's camp at Potchefstroom, and it was decided to keep the camp on till the following Wednesday to enable De la Rey to address the men. The camp was to have broken up on the Monday. I heard Kemp tell Beyers that Manie Maritz had made all arrangements down there, and it was understood that Maritz was to start the trouble, and as soon as he started De la Rey and Kemp were to start in the Transvaal.:}: Kemp, I understood, was to act under De la Rey, and T gathered that the organization in the Western Transvaal was of old standing and all arrangements seemed to have been made; and I think the idea was to use the camps § as a nucleus to get the men together." Kemp and Bezuidenhout returned to Potchefstroom that same afternoon. Kemp wrote out his resignation as soon as he got back to the camp. It is dated Sunday, 13th September. Another telegram dispatched by General Beyers on the 11th, the day on which he was arranging to interview Maritz and Kemp, may be quoted here. It was addressed to General Sir Duncan Mackenzie, who was in command of the force then about to sail from Capetown to occupy Luderitzbucht. It read as follows : — " As one soldier to another, I wish you and the force under your command every success in the operations which you are about to undertake." On Monday morning (14th) a telegram arrived from Captain Joubert (Staff Officer to Maritz). It was dispatched from Bloemfontein Station, and stated that Joubert would arrive at Pretoria that same evening. After receiving this telegram General Beyers took Captain Van Manen, one of his staff officers, with him to the house of a relative. There, from notes in his posses- sion, General Beyers dictated his resignation manifesto to Van Manen. General Beyers had in the meantime ordered his chauffeur to overhaul his motor- car carefully and to equip it with new tubes and covers in readiness for " a long journey." 9. The \5th of September. — Joubert arrived at Pretoria on the Monday even- ing. On Tuesday morning, the 15th, he saw General Beyers. He brought a message from Maritz, " informing him (Beyers) that all arrangements had been made and all was ready. "|| * This was the date of sailing originally fixed. The departure had, however, been postponed, but Beyers was not aware of this. t This was Maritz's Staff Captain. % This is, of course, not the whole truth with regard to the plans for the Transvaal. The deponent could n«t say more without betraying his own share in the conspiracy. § I.e., those of Kemp and Maritz. | Statement of one of the leading conspirators before mentioned, At the conclusion of the interview, General Beyers sent Joubert directly to Johannesburg in his own motor-car to see General De la Rey. Joubert was too dangerous a personage to be seen about Pretoria. The motor-car was to bring General De la Rey from Johannesburg to Pretoria. The resignation of Major Kemp was received in the course of the morning. The moment for action had arrived. Everything was ready. At Upington Maritz was waiting for the signal to begin. The Germans were at hand to support him. Kemp and his confederates were completely prepared at Potchefstroom. The members of the Government were far away at Capetown, making plans to attack German South- West Africa, in happy ignorance of the blow about to fall upon them. The arrival of the two Generals in Potchefstroom Camp on Wednesday morning would be the signal of revolt. General Beyers himself was ready. His resignation manifesto, as we have seen, had been prepared as soon as he heard that Joubert was coming from Maritz. Immediately after his interview with Joubert, when the latter had left for Johannesburg, General Beyers summoned his staff officers to his office. It was about 12.30 o'clock. When the officers appeared, he formally announced his resignation to Major Burgess, Captain Blaney, and Captain Van Manen. He explained that Captain Van Manen would hand his resignation to the Acting Secretary for Defence. The Minister of Defence, then at Capetown, had, of course, to be informed immediately. General Beyers agreed to a suggestion that, owing to the critical situation, the telegram announcing his resignation to the Minister should be put into cipher. He did not inform his staff that his letter of resignation had already been handed to the Press. The further events of that remarkable day are well known. General De la Rey had been expected at Potchefstroom on the 15th on his return from Capetown, via Fourteen Streams. He had, however, returned through the Free State and was at that moment at Johannesburg. General Beyers now sent Joubert with his motor-car to Johannesburg. The car was to bring General De la Rey to Pretoria. This was done. In his evidence before the Court of Inquiry* into the shooting of General De la Rey, General Beyers stated that when General De la Rey arrived in Pretoria, the latter asked him (General Beyers) to go with him to Potchefstroom and Lichtenburg. Both of them were opposed to the German South-West African expedition, and hence General De la Rey invited him to go to these places " with the idea of having meetings at both places " to tell the people what was going on. He (General Beyers) then pointed out to General De la Rey that the burgher training camp at Potchefstroom was breaking up the next day, and that " before the men left for their homes they could inform them as to what took place in Parlia- and of the reason of his (Beyers') resignation." That was the story told by General Beyers on the 28th September. It will, however, be remembered that on the 12th Beyers and Kemp had arranged to extend the duration of the Potchefstroom Camp specially to the 16th " to enable De la Rey to address the men." When we bear this in mind, and also Beyers' evident anxiety to get into touch with General De la Rey (as proved by his telegramst and his action in sending his motor-car to fetch him), it seems (to say the least of it) extraordinary that, when the two at last met, it should be General De la Rey and not Beyers who proposes " to hold meetings at Potchefstroom and Lichtenburg." We may safely assume that the original suggestion came from Beyers. His one object now was to get General De la Rey to the Potchefstroom Camp by four o'clock the next morning, when the revolt would begin. General De la Rev's presence in the camp was needed to persuade those who still wavered. His presence would be easily secured by the pretext of a meeting. In this way also Beyers could make sure of getting General De la Rey to Potchefstroom without as yet taking him into his confidence and explaining the whole plot. This would have been wholly in keeping with Beyers' conduct throughout the conspiracy. His first principle was to trust nobody entirely. None of his fellow-conspirators appear to have been completely in his confidence. The two Generals left Pretoria about seven that evening. When they came to Johannesburg a police cordon had been thrown round the town to capture three , , . , i * 28th September. t In addition to these telegrams, Beyers sent numerous verbal messages to General De la Rey asking to see him. *363 C 18 desperadoes, known as the " Foster gang," who were trying to escape in a motor-car. The police had orders to stop all motor-cars and to examine in particular any car containing three men. The car of General Beyers was repeatedly challenged by the police, who ordered the driver to stop. The Commissioner who inquired into the case finds that " it was very reprehensible on the part of the chauffeur and the owner of the car not to have obeyed the signals to stop."* It was this continued defiance of the police which led to the accidental shooting of General De la Rey. General Beyers was, of course, quite unaware of the real object of the police cordon. It is, however, not strange that he refused to stop when challenged and tried to burst through the cordon. He believed that the police were after him, that his plot had been discovered ! When, after General De la Rey had been shot, the car at last stopped, General Beyers was " quite speechless." He believed he was trapped. 10. Potchefstroom Training Camp. — The real object of the journey to Potchef- stroom, which was arrested so unexpectedly at Langlaagte, is best explained by referring to what had been happening in the training camp at Potchefstroom. A most extraordinary feeling was noticed among the officers of the western regiments concentrating for training at Potchefstroom at the beginning of September. On the train before their arrival Lichtenburg officers were openly asserting that they would not go to German South-West Africa, that the Government was forcing its own will on the people, &c. In the camp seditious language was constantly heard. A regular campaign was begun for the ' conversion " of those who still stood by the Govern- ment., It was freely stated that the Active Citizen Force regiments were not intended for German South-West Africa at all, but as soon as they were embarked they would be sent to Furope to fight England's battles there. This was a strong card to play against those who were ready to go to German South-West Africa. The other topic of general interest was the seer Van Rensburg and his visions. He had predicted a revolution in connection with the figure 15. The Government of Botha and Smuts was " finished." The new State would have at its head " a man who feared God." Other wonderful visions of the seer were recounted. He had seen the English leaving the Transvaal and moving down towards Natal. When they had gone far away, a vulture flew away from among them and returned to the Boers and settled down to remain with them. That was Botha. As for Smuts, he would flee to England. There was no hope that he would see South Africa again. More sinister methods were employed to sap the loyalty of those who hesitated. One young officer, whom his own colonel was trying to corrupt, pointed out that he was poor and embarrassed ; his farm was heavily mortgaged and he might be forced to sell it at the conclusion of peace. " That is precisely my own position," replied the senior, " but when this thing (i.e., the proposed rebellion) is over, we shall all be out of trouble. There will be plenty of money." Others were approached in the same way. Those who did not join in denouncing the Government for the proposed cam- paign against German South-West Africa, or who declared themselves ready to go, were gradually cold-shouldered and isolated. They were " not Africanders." They were made to feel themselves pariahs and forced to seek the company of the few English officers in camp. From the statements of some of the conspirators to their friends it is possible to gather the outlines of their scheme. The Active Citizen Force concentrated at Potchefstroom (about 1,600 men) was to be induced to mutiny and begin a rising. The movement would be actively seconded by certain district commandants and other leading men in the Western Transvaal and elsewhere. It should be observed in this connection that certain district commandants of the Western Transvaal were constantly coming to the camp and in close confabulation with Kemp. Plans of rebellion were openly discussed between these and Defence Force officers in the plot and definite arrangements were made. The intention was to march from Potchefstroom on Pretoria, commandeering men and horses on the way. The Vierkleur would then be hoisted. The German prisoners of war (then interned at Roberts Heights) would be released, and a force sent to German South- West Africa for arms and ammunition. In the meantime the insurrectionary movement would be actively organized throughout the country. * Report, p. 9. 19 The day on which the rising was to begin was to be the lath_o^September. The seer had so often spoken of the mysterious number 15 and the wonderful things that were going to happen in connection with it that no more suitable date could have been selected. On the night of the 14th the " Prophet " himself was specially sent for by motor-car to be personally present on the loth to witness the consummation of his prophecy.. The consph'ators hoped to profit by the impression he would undoubtedly make on those who still hesitated. Unfortunately for them, however, the seer refused to leave his home, saying that " It was not yet clear to him that that was his path." Apparently he did not realize that by refusing to come he was imperilling not only the success of the plot, but also that of the prophecy. It may be that he was content to risk his reputation rather than his neck. In any case his refusal was a real disappointment to his friends. The signal for revolt was to be the arrival in the camp of Generals Beyers and De la Rey. They would immediately seize Potchefstroom and the railway line, and then proceed east and west respectively to organize the revolution. General De la Rey was returning from Capetown, where he had attended the Special Session of Parliament. He was expected to travel via Kimberley and would be due to arrive at Potchefstroom on the 15th. As a matter of fact, he returned through the Free State and was still at Johannesburg on the 15th. This was another and a serious disappointment to the plotters. They now determined to begin the rising early on the morning of the 16th. For three or four days before the 15th the regiments in camp had been carefully exercised in ceremonial parade drills in preparation for the reception of the two Generals. A special guard of honour had also been formed, horses of a uniform colour being selected for this purpose. On the Tuesday morning the troops were paraded by squadrons and addressed by some of the senior officers, notably Lieutenant-Colonel Bezuidenhout and Lieu- tenant-Colonel Kock. The following is the substance of what Kock said to the men of " A " Squadron of his regiment : " Burghers, I wish to address a few words to you before the camp breaks up. As you are all aware, the Government has decided to attack German South- West Africa. I just wish to tell you that you may do as you like, but, as for me, I shall not cross the border unless I am absolutely forced to. If there are any of you here who wish to volunteer, you may hand in your names to your captain. We shall then appoint officers from among the volunteers and send them off this very night if possible." One of his officers, Lieutenant , stood out and asked whether this was being done by order of the Government. Kock did not reply directly. In this way Kock went through his whole regiment. When he had finished, one of his senior officers demanded from him whether he was acting on orders, and, if not, why he had taken such an extraordinary course. Kock replied that they were all doing it. They wished to ascertain the feelings of their men. All through that day (Tuesday) the men were kept ready to march at five minutes' notice, with kit and blankets ready packed and strapped. Some of the senior officers who were in the plot had their heavy baggage sent away and their field-kit prepared in readiness to proceed on a long trek. It was obvious that something extraordinary was going to take place. Wild rumours began to fly about, but the conspirators kept their secret well and had taken care to let no one into their confidence whom they did not trust absolutely. The Mayoress of Potchefstroom had invited the officers in camp to an " At Home that afternoon, but the tension in camp had become so great that none of them went.* The officer who shared a tent with Kock spoke very strongly to him and demanded an explanation. After some hesitation Kock decided to take his comrade into his confidence at least partially. Late on the night of the 15th September, he informed him that Beyers and Kemp had resigned their commissions. Beyers and General De la Rev would be in the camp at 4 o'clock the next morning. They would then move to Lichtenburg with the regiments assembled at Potchefstroom. Nothing was said about the object of this move. Some loyal officers actually fled from the camp that night. 4563 C -i 20 That evening Kemp was observed to be extremely anxious and unsettled. He explained that his nervousness was due to his fear that General De la Rey would be prevented from coming to the camp. About 3 o'clock that night the officer sharing Lieutenant-Colonel Kock's tent was awakened by the entrance of a man, who proved to be Kemp. Kemp leant over Kock's bed and whispered something in his ear. Kock, in a profoundly startled voice, exclaimed, " 0, God ! " Kemp left immediately, and Kock then whispered to his friend, " Generaal De la Rey is dood geskiet."* IV.— THE TREACHERY OF MARITZ. 1. Preparations for a new Cons-piracy. — The accidental death of General De la Rey on the evening of the 15th September was a staggering blow to the con- spirators. They could not for the moment believe it to have been accidental. One of the plotters, borrowing an historic phrase, declared that ' it upset their whole apple cart." Major Kemp at Potchefstroom lost his head completely when the news reached him. After giving the news to some friends, as already described, he dashed off in a motor-car to the town and made desperate efforts to withdraw his resignation, which had reached Pretoria the day before. These efforts were, however, not successful. When it was found that General Beyers was still at liberty, and that the shoot- ing of General De la Rey had indeed been purely fortuitous, the plotters again took heart. Some days afterwards Kemp remarked to a friend : " Thank God, Ave've still got Manie Maritz on the Orange River." The camp at Potchefstroom broke up quietly that Wednesday (16th) and the various units proceeded home. A splendid opportunity had been lost. The golden moment had passed, but it was still possible to try again. New factors were now made use of to fan the flame of rebellion. The tragic death of General De la Rey had caused a profound sensation through- out the country and especially in the Western Transvaal. The superstitious recalled the vision of the fateful number 15. The General had indeed " returned home without his hat, followed by a carriage full of flowers." t The shooting of the beloved General by a policeman was at once attributed by the conspirators to some dark design of the Government. They shamelessly spread the story that the bullet had penetrated General De la Rey's body and the motor-car from in front, and that hence the General had been shot at sight — deliberately assassinated — by order of the Government. The authority of a medical man who had examined the dead body was quoted for the statement, which was circulated in the most extraordinary manner over the length and breadth of the land. Even a responsible man like Senator Wolmarans appears to have believed this story, for in an interview in " Het Volk " he used language which gave that impres- sion. \ Needless to say, this falsehood so sedulously spread helped materially to inflame public opinion against the Government. General Beyers, who knew that he was standing on a volcano, said nothing in public, but, by displaying the motor-car as often and as publicly as possible, contributed not a little to the popular excitement on the question. Some inkling of the true state of affairs had by this time reached the public. Rumours of rebellion were in the air. At the memorial service to General De la Rey. held at Pretoria on the 18th September, the Rev. Mr. Bosman referred to the talk of rebellion which was going about and earnestly exhorted his hearers to put such thoughts from them. At the funeral of General De la Rey at Lichtenburg, on Sunday, the 20th inst.. General Beyers, with a Bible in his hand, passionately repudiated the suggestion that he had any disloyal intentions, and invoked the dead General's spirit as his witness. * " General De la Rey has been shot dead." j It was remarked that his room in the hotel at which he was staying at Johannesburg on the 15th was No. 15. X See his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry into the shooting of General De la Rey. 21 That same evening after the funeral he, with Generals Ue Wet and Kemp, convened a secret meeting of men whom he thought he could trust, and advised them to join the Defence Force and then to await the signal for action. The next day, Monday, the 21st September, General Beyers and General De Wet held a public meeting at Lichtenburg. Ex-Major Kemp was chairman and between 700 and 800 were present. The old Orange Free State flag was unfurled by one of the audience, but General Beyers remarked " We don't want any of this nonsense here." General De Wet declared that they wanted to act constitutionally and spoke chiefly against the proposed attack on German South-West Africa. General Beyers expressed himself as opposed to a proposal which had been made that all Defence Force officers should follow his example and resign. He hoped they would not do so. He was anxious to see Major Kemp reinstated and hoped the meeting would request the Government to sanction this.* He further emphasized that " rebellion was the thing furthest from his mind." At this meeting a resolution was passed, calling upon the Government to with- draw the Active Citizen Force from the borders of German South -West Africa before the 30th of the month (September).. A committee consisting of Generals Beyers, De Wet, Liebenberg, and Kemp was appointed to organize public meetings and prepare a great national demonstration against the attack on German South- West Africa. General De Wet gave notice that another big meeting would be held at Kopjes the following Thursday (the 24th). On the 26th came the unfortunate affair at Zandfontein, north of the Orange Biver, where a Union Force under Co lonel Grant was badly cut up by the Germans. The responsibility for this must probably be laid at the door of Maritz. General Botha, who was not unaware of the subterranean movements in progress, addressed a great meeting at Bank on the 29th. He emphasized the fact that the Government did not intend to commandeer burghers for service in German South - West Africa. He also warned his hearers against German designs within the Union itself. On the 2nd of October General De Wet, who had been extremely active in the Northern Free State, addressed a meeting at Potchefstroom, at which ex-Major Kemp and ex-Major Pienaar, and N. Serfontein, M.L.A. for Frankfort, were also present. General De Wet denounced the Government in the strongest language, but could not proceed very far as the meeting was broken up by supporters of the Government. At one stage of the proceedings General De Wet threatened to report the police for not giving him adequate protection. On October 6th J. J. Smit (Smith), an ex-lieutenant of the Orange Free State Artillery, resident in German South-West Africa since the war, was arrested at Kroonstad for seditious language. He had told Mr. H. G. de Wet that " Maritz had promised him to join the Germans when the proper time came and that he had arranged with the Germans for the last three years."! He also stated that he had come " out of German South- West Africa to meet Maritz." Maritz had " arrested " Smit and sent him to Pretoria to interview Generals Botha and Smuts, apparently hoping by this to lull their suspicions. Smit himself declared to De Wet that he had told the Generals '' a lot of lies " to put them off the track. On the 10th General Beyers and the Rev. Mr. Van Broekhuizen addressed a meeting at Pretoria, nominally on the life of President Kruger. The audience, however, would not listen to them and the meeting broke up in confusion. These public meetings were an important part of the plans of the conspirators. It was hoped by means of these to inflame public opinion and so to prepare for the final outburst. The first step was to be taken by Maritz. 2. Maritz at Upington. — Maritz at Upington had been very careful not to show his hand. Although he and his confederates had been secretly sowing sedition and preparing the way for a mutiny among his troops, there was as yet no evidence to show that he contemplated treachery. The Active Citizen Force regiments of his district had been called up for training and were concentrated at Upington and Kakamas. It will be remembered that he had invited General Beyers to visit his camps.} * His reason for wishing to get Kemp reinstated is plain enough. t De Wet's affidavit. J Telegram, 25th August. 22 On the 10th September Maritz again invited General Beyers to visit his camps in the following telegram : " I consider it very desirable that you should come to address the burghers personally in the two camps, namely, Upington and Kakamas. If you are coming, telegraph me when you will be here. Everything still quiet and in good order."* To grasp the full significance of this telegram we must recollect that Maritz was by this time in close and constant communication with the Germans. The Government was proceeding with the invasion of German South- West ; Africa and a force under General Lukin was about to cross the Orange River and i march on Warmbad. On the 23rd September the following telegram was sent to Maritz from Defence Headquarters : li Minister wants to know if you can move strong force to Schuit Drift from Kakamas and advance Upington force towards border in direction of Ukamas. He thinks it might then be possible for you to co-operate with Lukin in march to Warmbad." To this Maritz replied as follows on the 25th September: "11/43. Sep- tember 25th. Re telegram G 60/31 from Defence (Staff). It seems to me ridiculous to say that I must move to Schuit Drift with a strong force, as you know that I have not even got all requirements to equip burghers in camp. It is impossible to divide the burghers I have here. Most of them have, owing to postponement of camps 1913, not gone through course of musketry or fired a single shot. It is, therefore, in the first place, quite out of the question to think of advancing against the Germans with these children, as it is reported that there are at Ukamas alone over 3,000 Germans well mounted and armed with artillery and I have not a single cannon. Have only three machine guns under two little English lieutenants, who seem to me to be scarcely able to fasten their breeches, with the few children under them. As already pointed out to you when I was last in Pretoria, I warned you that public would refuse to cross border and advance into German South-West Africa, or if Germans advance into the Union owing to action of Government they would also refuse, and all my officers of the Active Citizen Force, as well as of the Defence Rifle Associations, have unanimously resolved to resign as soon as I order them to cross. I was told by General Botha and you that this would be done by volunteers, which must also be understood from your circular telegram No. 11/83, Sept. 21. This assurance I can also give you, that if Germans advance owing to action of the Government and the volunteers cannot repel them the public will unanimously refuse to fire a shot. The best advice I can give our Government under the circumstances is to consider well these matters of taking German South-West Africa. I will do my best to support you on this side of the border, but I cannot divide my force, but will immediately move forward as many as are properly equipped in the direction of Ukamas for "protective purposes. I must again point out to you that officers and public were always under the impression that this is only a peace training camp. I have further to say that my position is very difficult. If there are further plans that I must attack German South-West Africa under these conditions I shall be glad if my resignation is accepted." This telegram showed that Maritz was following in the footsteps of General Beyers. Such action on his part, when actually face to face with the enemy, might have the most disastrous consequences. The Minister decided to send Major B. Enslin to Upington, nominally as Chief of Staff to Maritz, in reality to investigate and report upon the position. Enslin arrived at Upington on Sunday the 27th. He found a very serious state of affairs. Maritz and the majority of his officers were openly saying they would not go to German South-West Africa. Seditious talk was rife in the camp. It was clear, also, that there was something behind all this talk. The day after his arrival Enslin reported as follows to the Minister : " From discussions I have had with Maritz have gathered he and his officers are prepared to defend Union against invasion, but under no circumstances will they cross border, and if ordered to do so they will resign. Their reasons are those given Hertzog, Beyers, and thence in Maritz's telegram to you.. Maritz most emphatic and will not be persuaded. Things are very critical. Half inhabitants here are clearly doubtful if Government still intend invasion this end. Commando 2,000 experienced men required in lieu of Maritz's commando. On arrival proposed force Maritz men should be asked volunteer. It would have good effect with farmers if Colonel Brits * C. 7/14/2. 23 be placed command here if possible. Maritz's resignation should not be accepted until proposed force due here as there is danger Germans hearing it and attacking Kakamas, &c, where stores held. Maritz says there are 3,000 Germans on border well equipped cannon. Maritz thinks invasion likely result civil war, but I have no grounds think he intends taking arms favour Germans. Wire me direct what action you propose taking Maritz. Wire enable me know how to act. Code wire to Enslin will be delivered personally." General Smuts on receiving this report at once telegraphed to Maritz :— ; " September 28.. I wish to see you immediately here in Pretoria. Hand over your command in meantime to Major Enslin and come here with all speed."* Through the Magistrate of Upington the Minister the same day sent the follow- ing instructions to Major Enslin : " I have instructed Colonel Maritz by telegram to hand over command temporarily to you and to come and see me at Pretoria as quickly as possible. You will assume command Maritz's force until other arrangements are made. If Kakamas is attacked, you will fall back on Upington. If Upington is attacked you must defend it as well as possible and not let stores fall into hands of enemy. The Durban Light Infantry from Durban and the Imperial Light Horse from Capetown are being sent to you as quickly as possible. Your commando is being recruited up to 300. Pienaar with 75 leaves here as soon as possible together with Cronje and 25 Scouts of Pretoria Intelligence Unit. Cronje and his men to be under Captain Erasmus." ' Enslin's position was extremely difficult. Maritz suspected him and on various pretexts refused to show him his papers. Nor would he impart any information as to the movements of the Germans or the dispositions of his own forces. Maritz watched him carefully and sent officers to talk to him in order to find out what he really thought. Enslin could not find out what was going on, nor could he ask too openly, as he did not know whom he could trust. In private conversation with him Maritz affirmed that he would not go to German South- West Africa. He considered Botha and Smuts traitors to their country. The only real leader of the people was General Hertzog. By means of a ruse Enslin was at last able to discover Maritz's real intentions. Maritz was induced to talk to an emissary whom he took for a sympathiser, and to him he confided that he (Maritz) was in communication with the Germans.. It was, he said, entirely due to his personal influence with them that no attack had as yet been made on the Union forces on the border. In confirmation of his statements, he showed his correspondence with the German authorities. As soon as Enslin had obtained this information he telegraphed to the Minister (on the evening of the 28th) asking him to arrange for his own recall or for that of Captain Erasmus, in order to report personally at Pretoria, as it was too dangerous to transmit all the particulars by wire. A He had received information which made him fear that " A " Force was in danger of being crushed by a strong German column. Although it was now clear that Maritz was acting in concert with the Germans, it was impossible as yet to relieve him of his command, as that would cause him to begin hostilities against the Union. The force under his command had been corrupted and could not be trusted. Moreover, if Maritz were removed, his German allies, knowing the position, would probably attack immediately. A strong loyal force had first to be moved to Upington before Maritz could be dealt with. " If Maritz's resignation is accepted now," said Major Enslin, " I expect disaster." The Minister promptly recalled Erasmus and the next day telegraphed to Major Enslin : " Your cipher telegram last night asking me to instruct Maritz send you back or recall Captain Erasmus. Minister presumes you had then not yet received my message through Magistrate. Does it alter your opinion and do you still think it necessary to leave Maritz little longer in command? Reply sharp." Enslin replied : " Maritz has not handed over nor mentioned anything about your instructions. He told Erasmus he is in communication Germans thereby pre- venting invasion Kakamas. Appears he is playing a double game. Will do my best most difficult position. I am afraid trust any one camp." On the night of the 30th September the tension in the camp was very great.. The officers generally believed that Maritz was playing a double game. The few loyalists • D/0176. 24 were afraid of being captured. An officer of the maxim gun section actually trained his guns on the camp, so as not to be caught unawares. In the meantime the Minister was doing his utmost to move to Upington whatever loyalist forces were available. Maritz replied on the 29th to the Minister's telegram ordering him to come to Pretoria at once : " It is impossible for me to come over under circumstances and hand over command to Major Enslin, as matters would certainly go wrong. Please give definite reply to my telegram 11/14 September 25."'* The Minister replied : " D/0189. Your 11/14. With reference to your tele- gram of 25th September, it is necessary for me to see you in order to discuss whole position. In meantime I consider it quite safe for you to hand your command over to Major Enslin. I am taking the necessary steps to send reinforcements imme- diately in your direction. Please acknowledge my telegram and state when you leave for Prieska." The reinforcements referred to by the Minister were the troops under Colonel Wylie. On the 2nd October the Minister telegraphed to Maritz : " Colonel Wylie. in command of a force consisting of a regiment mounted troops and a battalion infantry, is proceeding with all haste to co-operate with you for defence of Upington- Kakamas area. His command is independent of you, but you and he must take best combined action for defence of Upington and Kakamas and for safeguarding our stores there. I hope to be able in two days to reply to your telegram of 25th September." Maritz had not yet replied to the Minister's telegram of the 30th September, ordering him a second time to come to Pretoria. He now replied (2nd October) : "Your D/1089, September 30. I do not believe it necessary to discuss position further with you, as I have already explained position to you and what consequences will be.. With regard to safety of handing over my command to Major Enslin, my view is that you know as little about that as about position of own affairs, t In order to defend position here I need no reinforcements. Again refer you to my telegram of 25th September, and request you to consider same carefully." 3. Maritz throivs off the Mask. — Maritz was evidently alarmed at the near approach of these loyalist forces, of which he was informed through his spies before he had received the telegram of the 2nd October from the Minister. On the afternoon of the 2nd October he broke up his camp at Upington and marched away with prac- tically his whole force and all available ammunition. When Major Enslin, who was his Chief of Staff, inquired as to this movement, Maritz told him that he was moving to the border " to carry out his instructions." He asked Enslin to accompany him, but the latter excused himself on the ground that he had to see to the forwarding of equipment and stores. When this sudden move was reported to the Minister, he inquired of Major Enslin (3rd October) : " Have you any fear of treachery in connection with Maritz's movement, or do you think its object defensive ?" Enslin replied as follows : — " Maritz's movement all of a sudden not understood and suspicious. It may be he thinks he is clearing himself from disobedience by moving to border. He expressed no intention proceed further, but have just ascertained he has taken all ammunition with him. I warned Lieutenant Freer charge machine guns keep sharp lookoat. Owing injudicious wires from Supplies and Transport, Pretoria, to Supplies and Transport here, Maritz knows that thousand men coming, as he asked me what wagons wanted for. I have heard no news re enemy necessitate his sudden move- ment. Colonel Wylie has not yet arrived owing breakdown motor car. No horses here suitable for Colonel Brits and staff officers." The reference to Colonel Brits in the last sentence requires explanation. The Minister had some days previously appointed him to the command of all the forces concentrating on Upington. Colonel Brits had received instructions to proceed with all speed to that place, and to take the most vigorous and effective measures for the defence of the various posts held along the border. Further, as soon as he reached Upington he was to send for Maritz and hand to him a letter from the Minister^ in which the latter accepted Maritz's resignation (tendered in his telegram of the 25th September). Should Maritz object, he was immediately to be arrested and sent to Pretoria under escort. The Minister stated that he would prefer to have no arrest made if Maritz was ready to come to Pretoria voluntarily. This was the telegram in -which he tendered his resignation. t The meaning is not clear. 25 Colonel Brits was next to hand over Maritz's own command to Colonel Bouwer. Maritz's officers and men were then to be separately called together and dealt with according to their attitude. When Maritz moved his force from Upington on the 2nd October, he had really begun the rebellion. He marched in the direction of the German border and arrived on the 4th at Van Rooisvlei, about twenty-five miles west of Upington. A portion of his force was in camp at Kakamas. He sent orders for this detachment to join him at Van Rooisvlei. It arrived on the 7th October. On the 6th, Maritz went to the German border with Joubert, nominally to look for water, in reality to make final arrangements with the Germans. One of his most trusted officers was informed the next day (7th) that " Maritz had been to the Germans and returned with instructions from the Germans not to fight against them, but against the British flag."* On the 9th came the final step. Maritz assembled his whole force (between 500 and 600 men), and so arranged them that the doubtful units (such as the maxim section, which was commanded by English officers) were completely surrounded by others which he could trust. When this was done, Maritz disarmed the maxim section, which could, under the circumstances, offer no resistance. Maritz thereupon mounted a box, and addressed his men. He explained that the Government expected him to cross the border into German South-West Africa, and that he had refused to do so. He read out some of the telegrams which had passed between Headquarters and himself, ending with the telegram from the Minister in which he was ordered to report immediately to Colonel Brits at Uping- ton. He declared that he would not obey this order. He proceeded to abuse Generals Botha and Smuts in very coarse language, and then revealed the schemes with which he had for long been occupied. He told of the contract between the Government of German South-West Africa and himself, and stated that the Transvaal and Free State were ready to rise as soon as he moved. Everything had been arranged with Beyers and other leaders. He concluded with a stirring peroration : — ' ' I can assure you that I did not put on this uniform to serve England — far from it. I did it solely for the goodwill of my country, and now I am on the point to act. When General Botha insisted on my taking command, I told him that it was a fruitless attempt to try such a thing, but he would not listen, and once more I took command and promotion for the benefit of my country, and now, in the sight of God and you, I lay down my distinction marks as an English Lieutenant- Colonel, for I want to be nothing more than a common burgher to fight for the freedom of my country, and I shall not cease, though my blood may flow, and Heaven knows I shall shed my blood with honour. ' You all know I have a wife and two children, and I love them dearly : Heaven knows I do. But my country comes before them.' With this his tears overwhelmed him, and he got off the box."t Hereupon Sergeant-Major Engelbrecht (recently promoted to Captain by Maritz) proposed that the mutineers appoint Maritz as their Commanding Officer, to lead them at his own discretion. This was agreed to. Those who refused to join him (about sixty officers and men) were sent under an armed guard towards the border, where they were handed over to a German force which was waiting there in readiness to take them in charge. 4. Maritz's Ultimatum. — When Colonel Brits arrived at Upington on the 7th October, he found Maritz gone with his whole force, which he had concentrated at Van Rooisvlei. He had, however, as yet given no proof of any intention to mutiny. Colonel Brits now had to " bell the cat." He suggested to the Minister that the latter should telegraph to Maritz informing him that Brits had been appointed to com- mand on the border, and ordering Maritz to report immediately to Brits. Brits would forward this telegram to Maritz, who would thus be forced at once to show his hand. The Minister accordingly sent the following message to Maritz : " October 7th. I have appointed Colonel Coenraad J. Brits to command the units under your com- mand, and those under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wylie. Please proceed immediately to Upington and report to Colonel Brits." This was the telegram Maritz read out to his men at Van Rooisvlei on the 9th. • Affidavit by Capt. A. S. Louw. Appendix, p. 65. f Affidavit by S. J. Heynes. 4563 D 26 What had passed between himself and Colonel Brits with regard to this tele- gram is related by Colonel Brits in his telegram of the 8th to the Minister : " I sent your wire to Maritz re my appointment to him, and at same time ordered him to be here at 2 p.m. Friday enable me to discuss position with him and Wylie. Following is his reply : ' I have no objection at all to hand over my commando to you, and don't like to be pestered by any one in the world with minutes, and I report also to nobody. All I want is my discharge. You may take over the commando as it is. I shall try to be in town on Sunday morning, but I pledge myself to nothing. You can bring my discharge and take over my commando here.' Leipoldt, who brought reply, reports Maritz admits co-operation Germans, and exhibited documents from them. Maritz also stated he would only go to Pretoria with Rustenburg, Lichtenburg, and his own commandos, and if his arrest attempted he would fight. He is strongly supported in his attitude by his officers, who all seem anxious for rupture. It appears Maritz wishes put me in position attack him with English troops make political capital and set civil war going. He is thirty miles from here, and has 500 men with provisions up to 10th. All supplies now being stopped. Sending Bouwer with couple men take over his command and deliver your letter." As here indicated, Colonel Brits intended to send Lieutenant-Colonel Bouwer to Maritz, to take over the command of the units under him. When Bouwer arrived at Van Rooisvlei, Maritz had already hoisted the Vierkleur and sent those of his men who had refused to join him to German South- West Africa as prisoners. On the 10th the Minister received the following telegram from Upington : "Bouwer taken prisoner by Maritz. Allowed return here in order communicate to Government Maritz ultimatum to effect that unless Government guarantees to him before 10 to-morrow morning to allow Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller meet him at his headquarters in order get their instructions he will attack Upington, Kakamas, and other places. Bouwer reports Maritz in possession howitzers, pom- poms. ' Holds rank General Commanding German troops. Sixty officers and men unwilling to co-operate with him taken prisoners and handed Germans. Vierkleur hoisted by Maritz and Germans. Further details follow. We are ready to defend Upington. Bouwer further reports that he was shown agreement between Maritz and German Governor guaranteeing independence Union, &c. Maritz will be Kakamas to-morrow." In another telegram sent later that day Colonel Brits was able to give further particulars : Maritz had informed Bouwer that, unless he was otherwise advised by Hertzog, Beyers, and the others named by him, he (Maritz) was determined to fight to the bitter end. He boasted his ability to overrun the whole of South Africa, and stated that the Germans had placed at his disposal a hundred guns and unlimited quantities of small arms, ammunition, and money. He also showed Bouwer numerous telegrams, heliograph messages from the Germans, showing that he had been in communication with them at least since the 10th September. Maritz boasted that General Lukin would be surrounded at Steinkopf that night, and that he was facili- tating the concentration of German troops against other Union forces. 5. Martial Law Proclaimed. — On Monday, the 12th October, the following communication from the Government was published in the Press : — " Ever since the resignation of General C. F. Beyers as Commandant- General, Citizen Force, there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces in the north-west of the Cape Province which were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel S. G.. Maritz. The Govern- ment at once arranged to send Colonel Coenraad Brits to take over the com- mand from Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz. On the 8th instant Colonel Brits sent a message to Maritz to come in and report to him. To this message Maritz replied in a most insolent manner that he was not going to report to anybody. All he wanted was his discharge, and Colonel Brits must come himself and take over his command. Colonel Brits then sent Major Ben Bouwer to take over the command. On arrival at Maritz's camp, Major Bouwer was taken prisoner with his companions, but he personally was subse- quently released and sent back with an ultimatum from Maritz to the Union Government to the effect that, unless the Government guaranteed to him before 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 11th October, that they should allow Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller to meet him where he was, in order that he might receive instructions from them, he would forth- with make an attack upon Colonel Brits' forces, and proceed- further to invade the Union. 27 " Major Ben Bouwer reported that Maritz was in possession of some guns belonging to the Germans, and that he'held the rank of General Commanding the German troops. He had a force of Germans under him, in addition to his own rebel commando. . He had arrested all those of his officers and men who were unwilling to join the Germans, and had them sent forward as prisoners to German South- West Africa. Major Bouwer saw an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South-West Africa guarantee- ing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfish Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz. Major Bouwer was shown numerous telegrams and helio messages dating back to the beginning of September. Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money from the Germans, and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa. " In view of this state of affairs, the Government is taking the most vigorous steps to stamp out the rebellion, and inflict condign punishment on all rebels and traitors. " ' A proclamation declaring martial law throughout the Union will appear in a Gazette Extraordinary to-day, Monday, the 12th October, 1914." As here indicated, martial law was proclaimed the same day.* V.— REBELLION IN TRANSVAAL AND FREE STATE. 1. 'The Kopjes Meeting of the 13th October. — The effect of the mutiny of Maritz on the conspirators in the Transvaal and Free State was to spur them to greater activity. They realised that the time had come for deeds. A meeting of the leading seditionaries was convened for the 13th of October at Kopjes, in the Northern Free State. . General P. Liebenberg, of Witpoort, Klerksdorp, who had been appointed as one of the committee of four which was to organize meetings against the German South- West Africa campaign, was summoned with much secrecy by Kemp to attend this meeting. Completely unaware of the true intentions of the leaders, he duly went to Potchefstroom, where he saw Kemp on the morning of the 12th. While he was with Kemp ex-Colonel Bezuidenhoutt arrived with the news that Maritz had mutinied. This produced demonstrations of joy on the part of Kemp and his friends, which Liebenburg failed to understand. The party left immediately for Kopjes, with elaborate precautions against being seen together. About 1 o'clock that day, while resting under a tree near Vredefort, Liebenberg asked ex-Major J. J. Pienaar (who was driving him in his car) what the object was of the meeting at Kopjes. Pienaar was surprised to find that Liebenberg knew nothing and then proceeded to explain the position. "We are in difficulties," he said, "Maritz is our ally. We must help him." " How ? " asked Liebenberg. Pienaar then explained that Maritz had been sent to the German border with the object of raising a revolt on the 15th Sep- tember. Kemp was to do the same at Potchefstroom, where he would then be in charge of the training camp.. A provisional Government had been arranged; General Beyers would be Presi- dent and General De la Rey Commandant-General over all the commandos. The scheme had been that, after seizing Potchefstroom and raising the Republican flag there, Beyers and he (Pienaar) would march with the Defence Force on Krugersdorp, while Kemp and General De la Rey would move to Lichtenburg with a small force in order to call up the district and mobilize commandos there. They would then also march on Krugersdorp, and, joining forces with Beyers and Pienaar, would proceed to Pretoria to overthrow the Government, to hoist the Vierkleur and release the German prisoners of war. In the meantime General De Wet would organize the revolution in the Free State. * For Text of Proclamation see Appendix, p. 67. t He had resigned on the 18th September. 4563 n 2 28 The plan had failed because General De la Rey, who was expected at Potchef- stroom on the 14th, did not come at the expected time, and had been shot before he could reach the camp. After these interesting revelations had been made, the journey to Kopjes was continued. On the 13th the meeting took place, in the dining-room of the parsonage of the Rev. Mr. Ferreira. Among those present were : General C. R. de Wet, the Rev. Mr. Ferreira, H. Serfontein (M.L.A.), N. W.. Serfontein (M.L.A.), J. Brand Wessels (M.L.A.), Rocco de Villiers, Commandant Meyer, of Kopjes, P. T. Fiirstenberg ' (M.P.C.) — these were Free State men. From the Transvaal there were : Kemp, Pienaar, Bezuidenhout, Jan Botha, Bodenstein, Piet Grobler (M.L.A.), the Rev. Mr. Vorster, the Rev. Mr. Van Broekhuizen, and General Liebenberg. General De Wet was elected to the chair. He asked the Rev. Mr. Ferreira to open the proceedings with prayer. After this De Wet spoke.. He said they had not a moment to lose. Matters had already been delayed by the death of General De la Rey. They could not lose another day, as Martial Law had been proclaimed. Maritz was already fighting. They themselves had neither money nor arms, but with Maritz there was plenty of both. Ihey had to go to Maritz for these. They had to start here, in order to help Maritz. General Liebenberg was both astonished and alarmed at such language and was the first to speak after De Wet had finished. Liebenberg asked him : " Where are Generals Beyers and Hertzog 1 " De Wet replied that he had come from General Hertzog the day before. Hertzog had told him that he would not come to the meeting as he was already the scapegoat. He (Hertzog) wished them to proceed, however, and if he was wanted then De Wet knew where to find him. De Wet added that they all knew that Hertzog was not a soldier but rather a man of the law. Pienaar next explained the absence of General Beyers, relating how after the meeting at Pretoria on the 10th October, the hostile crowd had cut to pieces the tyres of his motor car. General Liebenberg found this no excuse for Beyers' absence and said so. He asked General De Wet whether he meant what he had said as to helping Maritz. De Wet replied " Yes." Liebenberg then made it clear that he had no intention of joining in any rebel- lious movement and warned the others as to the consequences of such steps. He proposed that a deputation should be sent to the Government to lay their grievances before it, informing the meeting that if they refused to consent to this, he would have nothing further to do with the movement. This proposal was strongly opposed by De Wet, Kemp, and others. Wessels and Grobler, however, supported it and it was ultimately adopted.. (Obviously no other course was open to the conspirators, unless they could make away with Liebenberg.) A deputation was accordingly appointed, which left the same afternoon for Pretoria. The meeting was adjourned for a week, until the 22nd. When the meeting was over, De Wet announced that he was going to hold a krijgsraad with the officers alone. This was done. A ferment of excitement had been by this time produced among De Wet's followers at Kopjes and elsewhere in the northern Free State. At the news of the meeting to be held at Kopjes on the 13th a crowd of over 200 had assembled there — many of them armed. After the meeting was over, De Wet addressed the crowd waiting outside. He explained that the meeting had been private. A dark cloud, he went on to say, was hanging over their land, but it would break and the sun would shine through again. " You shall know shortly if happiness or misery is coming over the land. There are only a few here, but thousands are ready and waiting for the word. You must go home and wait patiently." 2. Deputation to the Government. — The members of the deputation left that afternoon by train for Pretoria. De Wet accompanied them, although he had refused to be a member of the deputation. At Pretoria Station Mr. Van Broek- huizen's motor car was waiting. General De Wet accompanied him in the car. It had been arranged that the members of the deputation were to meet at an hotel the next morning, and Mr. Van Broekhuizen, who was a member of the depu- tation, had promised to bring General Beyers with him without fail to meet the members before they went to interview General Botha. Mr. Van Broekhuizen appeared at the appointed hour, but without General Beyers. As excuse he gave that " they had to hide General Beyers." As for himself he was not going to accom- pany the deputation to General Botha. This caused considerable dissatisfaction among the members, one of whom bluntly remarked it was a bad look out if Beyers took to hiding already. 29 The deputation was received by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Mines being also present. The members talked from a quarter to twelve in the morning to four o'clock in the afternoon without intermission. When they were leaving General Botha asked one of them in despair : " What do these people really want? " The deputation had, of course, no real object. As we have seen, it had been forced upon the leaders of the conspiracy to avoid a premature disclosure of their plans. The real business of that day was being done outside. Generals De Wet and Beyers, brought together by the Rev. Mr. Van Broekhuizen, could discuss their plans and make their final arrangements in peace, while General Botha was listening to imaginary grievances in his office. General De Wet was brought to the station that same afternoon by the Rev. Mr. Van Broekhuizen's car. He proceeded by the Natal line to his farm at Memel, Orange Free State.. On the journey he dispatched two telegrams, the one addressed to Commandant Meyer, Kroonstad, the other to his brother, Commandant Meyer, Kopjes, both saying : " Bedank dadelik " (" Resign immediately ").* At the interview between De Wet and Beyers at Pretoria on the 14th, the two leaders appear to have made their final dispositions. They knew that the Govern- ment was calling out commandos to deal with Maritz and that these would con- centrate within the next few days. They were also aware that Kemp, Bezuidenhout, Wolmarans, and Claassen were actively preparing for a rising in the west. Pienaar and others were sowing sedition in the valley west of Pretoria, while General Muller and his confederates were busy east of Pretoria. The crisis would come within the next few days. That De Wet and Beyers had come to some definite decision is clear from De Wet's telegrams to the two Meyers. Five days later Beyers himself was to be in the field in active rebellion. 3. The Government prepares to crush 'Maritz. — The Government was pre- paring to deal vigorously with Maritz and to crush the rebellion he was fomenting on the Orange River. On the 11th October, General Botha had dispatched the following circular telegram to all the District Commandants of the Transvaal : — - [Translation.'] " Colonel Maritz has treacherously gone over to the enemy with a con- siderable portion of his commando, and is now marching with the enemy against General Brits and threatens to invade the north-western districts of the Cape Province. General Brits is asking urgently for help. In these circumstances the Government has decided to declare Martial Law imme- diately throughout the whole of the Union and to commandeer sufficient burghers to defend the Union. You are hereby ordered to commandeer 100 men, with horse, saddle, and bridle, to be prepared on Thursday, the 15th inst., at , to be moved further. If it is quite impossible for you to be ready by Thursday give me notice of earliest date, but you must understand that the matter is most urgent. When commandeering you must in the first instance take those who have offered themselves voluntarily for service in German West Africa, and then thereafter commandeer as much as possible from among the unmarried men and from the best and most willing fighting men. You need not necessarily confine yourself to members of the Rifle Associations. Should some burghers wish to take a second horse with a native orderly (achterrijder) with them, the Government will have no objection. Do your best to obtain good horses. Other equipment will be provided according to previous circulars. Wagons and mules need, however, no longer be purchased. In this serious crisis the Government expects of each officer and man that he will put all other feelings aside and that he will protect his country and people against treachery. Reply to Staff Officer, Commando Recruiting. 11/10/14." 4. Velolkomet Claassen mutinies. — Under this scheme the district of Lichten- burg had to provide 300 men, the three local commandants, A. P. Visser, J. Lombard, and F. G.. A. Wolmarans being each responsible for raising 100 men. Commandants Visser and Lombard had no difficulty in obtaining the required number. In fact more than half their men joined voluntarily. Commandant Wolmarans assured his brother commandants that he was busily engaged in raising * Dispatched from Ingogo Station. 30 his own force. I. E. Claassen was to be his veldkornet, his other officers were already appointed, and he would soon have his 100 men ready. As a matter of fact, how- ever, Wolmarans was in constant communication with Bezuidenhout, Kemp, and others, and was secretly preparing to revolt. At Lichtenburg the men were equipped for the field. Their horses were valued, taken over by the Government and paid for in cash. The actions of Wolmarans were by this time becoming so suspicious that the Minister of Defence was advised to remove him from the Lichtenburg Commando. On the 18th October, further representations were made to General Smuts with regard to Wolmarans' attitude, and in consequence the Minister summoned him by telegram to Pretoria. Wolmarans received the summons and assured his fellow commandants (who had been instructed to keep an eye on him) that he was going to Pretoria. He did not do so, however. On the 19th, Commandant A. P. Visser, becoming alarmed at the seditious spirit which was by this time noticeable among a section of the public, and fearing that the infection might spread to the local commando, decided to move his forces out of the district. He accordingly gave orders to entrain for Potchefstroom. All the men obeyed cheerfully, and although Commandant Wolmarans was absent his officers and men were all present. On arriving at the station Commandant Visser took his men inside the wire fence enclosure. It was noticed that Veldkornet Claassen kept his men outside the enclosure. Trucking was at once commenced. After five or six trucks had been loaded with horses, Commandant Visser noticed that Claassen appeared to be holding a meeting with his men. He went to investi- gate and Claassen asked him : " Where are we going ?" Visser replied that he did not know. They might be required to fight against the Maritz rebels or against Kaffirs. He was simply carrying out orders. B. J. van den Berg thereupon said he was going no further. He was not going to shoot his own people. Claassen then begged Visser, as commandant, to turn back with all his men. Commandant Visser refused indignantly and appealed strongly to the men not to disgrace themselves by refusing to proceed. He warned them that if they refused to proceed they were to surrender their horses, arms, and equipment (which were Government property). Claassen then suddenly mounted his horse and shouting " All who love me, follow me," dashed off. About 150 burghers immediately followed him. Claassen appears to have taken the mutineers to Cyferpan (in the neighbourhood of Treur- fontein), where they disbanded and dispersed to their homes. They all retained their horses and rifles and the other Government property with which they had been equipped. The mutineers had been instructed to be ready to reassemble at a moment's notice. Kemp and Wolmarans were going to the meeting of rebel leaders at Kopjes on the 22nd, at which the final measures were to be decided upon. On their return from the meeting, these two would give the signal for revolt. This arrangement was duly carried out, and on the 24th Wolmarans and Claassen began hostilities by stopping trains at Treurfontein and commandeering men and war material " by order of Commandant-General C. Beyers." The following is the text of commandeerbrief jes issued by Claassen on the 24th October : — [Translation.'] " Commandeering Order under Martial Law, " October 24th, 1914. " All burghers of the Union of South Africa from 16 to 60 years of age are commandeered with horse, saddle, and rifle and ammunition complete (with) rations for eight days to appear on Tuesday morning, 27th October, 1914, at 8 o'clock a.m., at Hakboschlaagte. " By order of " Commandant-General C. Beyers. "I.E. Claassen, V.K." ■ This mutiny of the 19th October led by Claassen was the first overt act of rebellion in the Transvaal. It was soon to be followed by others. 5. Beyers takes the Field. — General Beyers had been keeping very quiet since the end of September. On the 10th October he had arranged, as we have seen, to address a meeting presided over by Mr. Van Broekhuizen at the Opera House. 31 Pretoria, nominally on the life of President Kruger. The audience was, however, so uproarious that the police had to intervene and the meeting had to be broken up. That same day the news had arrived of Maritz's " ultimatum " to the Govern- ment, demanding to meet Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Muller, and Kemp, " in order to get their instructions." With regard to Maritz's demand for an interview with the Generals, the Government put the facts before the public in its communication to the Press on the 12th. General Beyers was repeatedly invited to take action. As late as the 17th October he was asked to go to Maritz. General Beyers appeared to hesitate and asked for time to consider the position and consult his friends. When next heard of he had left Pretoria and was organizing a rebel commando near Damhoek. He appears to have left Pretoria accompanied by Mr. Van Broekhuizen on the 19th October, the day on which Claassen had mutinied at Lichtenburg. 6. The Kopjes Meeting of the 22nd October.— In the Orange Free State General De Wet had in the meantime been incessantly active. On the 17th he left his farm at Memel for Kopjes. On the 20th he went to Heilbron, where he stayed with Rocco de Villiers. The next day (21st) he returned with Rocco de Villiers to Kopjes. On his journeys during these last days, De Wet was constantly holding meet- ings at farms along his route. On his journeys to Kopjes on the 21st, armed burghers were met at various points and several farms, including that of Command- ant Meyer, of Kroonstad, were visited. At Meyer's a meeting was held with about seventy farmers, some of whom had come armed, on horseback and in motor-cars. Various other bodies of armed men were met on the way to Kopjes. On the 22nd the meeting which had been adjourned from the 13th was continued. A number of Transvaal leaders, including Kemp, Pienaar, and Wolmarans, were again present. There were in reality to be two meetings. With the men who had been present on the 13th the position was discussed. From Damhoek, where he was then lying with a rebel commando, Beyers sent a special messenger to attend the meeting, with the double object of conveying a message from him and of bringing back any resolution which the meeting might arrive at. Beyers' message to the meeting was that " here (in the Transvaal) every- thing was in order, and that the burghers were practically under arms." The reso- lution taken at the meeting, as brought back to General Beyers by his messenger, was : " Whereas the Dutch South African people in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal are oppressed, the meeting resolves to confide all further measures to General Beyers in the Transvaal and to General De Wet in the Orange Free State." When the meeting was over, De Wet announced that he was going to meet the " krijgsomcieren " in private. What transpired at this meeting is known only to those who were present. It is easy to guess that military measures were discussed. After the meeting, De Wet, at 4 p.m., addressed a crowd of about 300 burghers who had assembled outside to await the result of the conference. Half of this crowd was armed. He advised them to wait a little longer. In a short time they would know all. They were to resist the police if their horses and rifles were commandeered. If Fiirstenberg called them out, they were to obey. De Wet, who by this time travelled with an armed escort of about sixty mounted burghers, then left for Heilbron, where another meeting was held at the house of Rocco de Villiers. He left the same evening for the Frankfort district. 7. Open Rebellion.— On. the 23rd a force of armed rebels prevented the holding of a meeting which had been arranged by Commandant Van Coller at Rhenoster- draai, for the purpose of obtaining volunteers to fight against Maritz. That same night (23rd October) a rebel force occupied Heilbron. The next day another rebel commando, under N. W. Serfontein, M.L.A., made a demonstration at Reitz. and seized a train by which some volunteer recruits were proceeding to Kroonstad Camp. The volunteers were deprived of their rifles and ammunition. * * * * • # # # The rebellion had broken out in the Orange Free State. 32 VI.— AIMS AND METHODS OF THE REBEL LEADERS. 1. The aims of the rebel leaders have been briefly indicated in the foregoing chapters. They are very clearly expressed in a letter written by General De Wet on the 5th of November : " Our purpose is to get to Maritz. After arriving there to return immediately with Maritz to Pretoria. There, in the capital of South Africa, we shall, if God (in whom all our trust is) so wills it, haul down the flag and proclaim our independence."* General C. Muller put it still more plainly. Addressing a band of rebels at Kleinfontein (District Pretoria) on the 26th October, he said : — " Now is the time for us Africanders to get our independence back. All the farmers (Boers) must rise simultaneously. They need not be afraid, as there will be no bloodshed. Our independence is guaranteed by the German Kaiser. General Beyers has the treaty in his pocket. What more do vou want?" ' That such aims should find some support in the late Republics is perhaps not surprising. What may, however, have caused surprise is the readiness with which thousands of Dutch South Africans, living under a constitution of their own devis- ing, were prepared to take up arms against a Government composed almost exclu- sively of men of their own blood, the leaders of their own party, placed in power by their own people. 2. The explanation is to be found in the methods adopted by the rebel leaders to gain their ends. Misrepresentation was the most formidable weapon in their arsenal. Knowing the character of their people, and the implicit trust they repose in their leaders, these men did not hesitate to mislead their followers with the grossest falsehoods. Taking advantage of the strong feeling which existed against the expedition to German South- West Africa, Beyers and De Wet during the initial stages of the movement asserted that they were merely going to lead a movement of " passive resistance " against the policy of the Government. The example of Ulster was frequently quoted, to prove that such action would be quite " constitutional." Nothing was said at this stage about Maritz or the Germans. There was no mention as yet of the " South African Republic " or " President " Beyers. General Beyers, as we have seen, pretended to believe that !i if pressure was brought to bear, the Government would resign rather than fire on its own people."t He appears to have based all his calculations on the sedulous encouragement of this belief among his followers. He constantly assured them that " there would be no fighting." Hundreds in this way joined his commando under the impression that they were simply joining a movement of protest against being commandeered to fight in German South-West Africa. ' In the seer Van Rensburg the leaders possessed a most useful instrument for the work of deluding the simple-minded farmers and leading them almost uncon- sciously into rebellion. Van Rensburg had always foretold that General Botha would not resist the movement. The revolution would be bloodless. This statement was repeated by the seer to a great concourse of people in Lichtenburg on the very day of the action at Commissie Drift, and two days before that of Treurfontem. The leaders also made use of the strong racial patriotism of the farmers to lead them astray. ' During the critical days when the rebellion was beginning, and while the Government was attempting to restore peace without bloodshed, the rebel leaders everywhere were asserting that the Government would not take action against them, as the Ministers secretly desired to see the rebellion succeed. Hence, it was said, the duty of all true Africanders was to join the rebels and help their friends in the Government, who were only waiting for some show of force to have an excuse for surrendering. t The same policy of misrepresentation was pursued in the Free State. I he pre- text of a " passive resistance " movement was speedily abandoned, and it was openly said that the object of the leaders was the establishment of a republic The Dutch in the Transvaal, it was stated, had risen as one man. General Botha himself was secretly directing the movement. The people of the northern Free State were assured over and over again that " Botha was going to start the revolution in the Transvaal. The provincial patriotism of the Free Staters was artfully inflamed by appeals like * This letter is referred to below, p. 46. t See above, p. 12. 33 the following : " Who is to have the honour of being the first to hoist the republican flag % It is for you to decide. Botha and the Transvaalers are ready. Are you going to let them forestall you V Those who know the Free State can imagine the effect of such appeals coming, as they did, from responsible and trusted leaders. If the rebellion was started on lies, it was also largely maintained on lies. The most preposterous falsehoods were circulated to induce waverers to join the rebels. " General Beyers was bombarding Pretoria with German artillery." " The Free Staters, after clearing their Province of all Government forces, were now besieging Maritzburg " ; and " Maritz was on the Vaal with 30,000 men and 100 guns," &c. The effect of such reports can be imagined. On the 28th October, forty armed Free Staters were captured at Engelbrechts- drift, on the Vaal River. Questioned as to their reasons for coming into the Trans- vaal, they explained that they had been informed that Johannesburg and Pretoria were in the hands of General Beyers, and they were going to join him. When they heard the true state of affairs, they all went back to their homes. This is a single incident out of hundreds.* It is impossible to give an adequate idea of the amount of harm done by the deliberate dissemination of falsehoods during the early stages of the rebellion. In the later stages, when the Government was taking vigorous action against the rebel commandos, the most shameless distortions of fact were again resorted to by the rebel leaders to keep their following from melting away. The rank and file were continually warned not to trust the terms offered by the Government to those who surrendered., These terms were a mere blind. All who surrendered would be deported and have all their property confiscated, and so forth. 3. Where such misrepresentations were not enough to induce burghers to join the rebel commandos, methods of violence were -methodically employed. Com- mandeering was resorted to from the very first day. As we have seen, Wolmarans and Claassen had begun to commandeer for the Treurfontein meeting in August. The same tactics were pursued at the end of October, wherever rebel leaders were trying to raise a commando. As the commandeering was in the majority of cases carried out by the official local commandant or the veld kornet, or other duly appointed officer of the local rifle association, it was not always easy to distinguish between the commandeering orders on behalf of the Government (which was mobilizing its own commandos at the. time) and those on behalf of the rebel leaders. News travels slowly in the country districts, and hence in some instances farmers on receiving a commandeering order from their own local commandant, signed " By order of General C. F. Beyers, Commandant-General," obeyed this order readily enough, under the impression that they were being called up by the Government. There are authenticated cases where men became aware of the fact that they were rebels only after they had been captured by a Government force. These are, of course, exceptions. The commandeering order issued by Veldkornet Claassen in the name of General Beyers is an example of the type of '"orders" circulated everywhere by the rebel leaders. These commandeering orders were sent round with parties of armed rebels. The farmer so " commandeered " was invariably faced by the prospect of having all his serviceable horses and a good deal of his live stock confiscated by the rebels unless he joined them. Many joined the rebels in this way, in order to save their property. For those who refused to join under any circumstances the position became extremely dangerous. They had to be constantly on the alert to escape falling into the hands of vengeful bands of rebels. Many dared not sleep in their houses, for fear of an attack under cover of the night, but had to seek safety in the veld and sleep there with their families. Others received written orders to remain on their farms, under penalty of instant dea+h if it were discovered that they had so much as set foot outside their boundary. By such methods of misrepresentation, by commandeering, by threats of imme- diate confiscation of all their movables, and of ultimate punishment (after the * It appears that Oost, who was Secretary to General De Wet, made it a regular practice to visit the camp fires of the commando every night in order to spread " the latest news " from Europe. This news generally referred to what the Germans were doing in Paris and London, which had long since fallen into their hands. 456S 34 revolution) for having refused to join, it was possible for the leaders to get together a considerable following. 'A study of these methods helps us to understand not only the sudden outbreak of the rebellion, but also its sudden collapse,. When the Government, after having exhausted in vain all the means of restoring peace without bloodshed, at last grasped the sword, the deluded followers of the rebel leaders for the first time had their eyes opened to the true position of affairs. And with their disillusionment came the end of the rebellion. Part II. Policy of the Government with regard to the Suppression of the Rebellion. I.— EFFORTS OF GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE. In its anxiety to avoid the calamity of civil war, the Government tried every means of inducing the rebellious leaders to refrain from extreme steps._ The Rev. A. P. Kriel, of Langlaagte, who was known to have much influence with General Beyers, was asked by General Botha to go and see him. On the 24th October Mr. Kriel proceeded to Damhoek and there interviewed General Beyers. General Beyers explained his presence there by saying that he had no longer felt safe at Pretoria. When asked why there were so many people with him, he said they had come of their own accord, as the Government wanted to commandeer them for the war against German South-West Africa. Beyers further stated that he had as yet said or done nothing whatever. (As a matter of fact, however, he had assumed command of the local rebel commando since the previous day.) He also said that it was not his intention to shoot, but that if the Government forces fired on his men then blood would flow. Asked if he had any message for General Botha, Beyers replied that General Botha could come with his commando to some place to be indicated by him and that he (Beyers) would then come with his commando. They could then discuss the situation with each other. Owing to the proclamation of Martial Law, General Beyers said, no meetings could be held, hence his people had to meet under arms. When Mr. Kriel pointed out the danger of such a proceeding, General Beyers promised that not a shot would be fired by his men. This message was delivered by Mr. Kriel to General Botha on the evening of the 24th October. 1. President Steyn invited to mediate.— President Steyn, owing to his unique position and the great influence he possessed with all sections of Dutch South Africans, was peculiarly well fitted for the role of mediator. To President Steyn General Botha on the 22nd addressed a letter, inviting him to use his influence with Generals De Wet and Beyers in order to avoid bloodshed. President Steyn at once complied, and on the 24th October his son, Dr. Colin Steyn, arrived at Pretoria with three letters, addressed to General de Wet, General Beyers, and ex-Major Kemp respectively. These letters were to be personally delivered by Dr. Steyn. The letters stated that President Steyn was sending his son with a letter from General Botha to himself, which letter Dr. Steyn would read to them. President Steyn then expressed a strong desire to see the recipients and invited them to come to Onze Rust for that purpose. It was decided at Pretoria that as Kemp was a subordinate, it was not necessary to consult him. That same afternoon (24th) Dr. Steyn was sent to Damhoek, where General Beyers was then in laager with a rebel commando. Should General Beyers 35 decide to accept the invitation to Onze Rust, Dr. Steyn was to inform him that a special train would be provided to convey him from the nearest station (Magalies- berg) to the Free State.* Dr. Steyn returned to Pretoria that night and reported that General Beyers had refused to bind himself to go and see President Steyn before he knew that General De Wet had also bound himself to go to President Steyn. In the meantime, while Dr. Steyn was on his way to General Beyers, a telegram from him had been sent to General De Wet at Memel, explaining that he had a letter from his father, which he had to deliver personally, and asking General De Wet to leave word with a mutual acquaintance at Vrede where he could be found. To this telegram no reply had been received. It was feared that De Wet would be suspicious of any emissary coming to him straight from Pretoria. It was felt also, in view of the undecided character of General Beyers' reply to President Steyn's invitation, that it would, under the circumstances, be more advisable for Dr. Steyn to return to Bloemfontein for further consultation with President Steyn. He accordingly left for Bloemfontein on the 26th. President Steyn after obtaining his son's report, sent him with General Hertzog to endeavour to get into touch with General De Wet. On the 28th they arrived at Heilbron. where they hoped to find De Wet. He was not there however. Dr. Steyn thereupon came north to Pretoria, while General Hertzog remained to search for De Wet. Alarming as the situation had become in the meantime, the Government still hoped to be able to deal with it without having recourse to violence, which would certainly precipitate civil war. An attempt had been made on the night of the 22nd to arrest Kemp, Pienaar, and Wolmarans on their return from the meeting at Kopjes, but they had succeeded in evading the police. On the 23rd October the Minister of Defence informed the Commissioner of Police that " he wishes bloodshed to be avoided by us at this stage." If arrests could only be effected by bloodshed, they were not to be attempted, unless specially authorized by the Minister, t A source of much evil was the commandeering of burghers by the rebels, above referred to. Hundreds of burghers joined the ranks of the rebels through fear. On the 24th October General Smuts telegraphed to the Resident Magistrate at Lichtenburg, stating that " our object must be to keep the Lichtenburg burghers quiet and not let them join the rebels from fear." The Magistrate was instructed to get as many reliable emissaries among them as possible, and to exhort them to sit still and refrain from joining the rebels. The Government, the Minister continued, will do them no harm if they return Government property in their possession. The well disposed burghers should come together under their officers for their own pro- tection, as the rebels will compel them to join their forces. The Magistrate was to instruct all officers to this effect. On the 26th October an official statement appeared in the Press in which the Government announced the facts to the public, and stated that, although it was pre- pared to deal firmly with the situation, it had " spared no efforts to preserve the peace without bloodshed." " Citizens," the statement concluded, "who have been, for some reason or other, guilty of disobedience under the Defence Act,i need not fear any action against them on that ground on the part of the Government, so long as they remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the authoritv of the Government of the Union." Rebellious manifestations, however, continued after this and became more violent from day to day. Rebel commandos were mobilizing in both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the Transvaal the activities of the rebels had become so threatening that it was impossible for the Government to allow them to proceed. East, north, and west of Pretoria bands of rebels swarmed, commandeering men, horses, and arms, looting * See Appendix, C 8a, p. 71. t Secretary of Defence to Commissioner of Police, SlSrd October. t This was so phrased as to convey clearly to rebel or disaffected persons that if they had refused to come out when "commandeered "—really not under the Defence Act but under martial law— their offence would be overlooked. It must be clearly understood that only Transvaal burghers were commandeered to suppress the Maritz rebellion. Government expressly did not commandeer anv Free State burghers, but went on collecting volunteer commandos for German South-West Africa according to the original scheme before the Maritz rebellion broke out. 4563 36 'stores and breaking up the railway and telegraph lines. Pretoria itself was threatened with an attack, or in any case with complete isolation. General Botha, therefore, took the field against the rebels, and on the 27th October dispersed a rebel commando led by General Beyers.at Commissie Drift, south of Rustenburg. After the dispersal of his commando General Beyers himself had hidden so effectively that the Government was utterly in the dark as to his movements. No information whatever could be obtained. The reports which came in were most contradictory. The Minister of Defence believed that General Beyers had Tetreated to the fastnesses of the Pilansberg, north of Rustenburg. This was the position when Dr. Steyn arrived at Pretoria on the 29th. It was quite impossible to give him any assurance that General Beyers could be found within the next few days.* The Government was. however, making the most strenuous efforts to discover the whereabouts of Beyers, and undertook to inform him, immediately he was found, of the position with regard to General De "Wet, and to give him a safe conduct to proceed to Onze Rust should he desire to do so. This information was conveyed to President Steyn, and he was asked to keep De Wet at Onze Rust (should he arrive in the meantime) until Beyers, who was being searched for in every direction, could arrive. The object of Dr. Steyn's second visit to Pretoria was to ascertain, in case the rebels should offer to surrender, what terms, if proposed on their behalf, the Govern- ment would be prepared to entertain. The attitude of the Government at this time is shown in the following memo- randum drawn up for the guidance of President Steyn in the negotiations he hoped to begin with the rebel leaders : — [Translation.'] Very Confidential. " (1) Government is not prepared to make any proposal or to take any step in regard to which it is not assured that it will be acted upon. " (2) If any proposal is to be made, as suggested by C(olin) S(teyn) (i.e., exemption from criminal prosecution for all disaffected who surrender to their local magistrate within a prescribed period and hand over all rifles obtained from the Government in their possession and after that go home without delay), then this must come from the other side as a proposal which the dissatisfied burghers are prepared to accept. " (3) In that case the Government will be disposed to give such proposal its most serious consideration, as it desires ardently to avoid bloodshed. " (4) It is not clear why burghers think they will be commandeered for German South- West Africa as Prime Minister has already officially declared that this will not take place and that only volunteers will be used (for the expedition)." Dr.. Steyn was very anxious to make sure of General De Wet, and as events were marching rapidly, he returned to the Free State, in order to induce him to come to Onze Rust. He took with him the above memorandum, which he was to convey to President Steyn. 2. Terms offered to Rebels in Transvaal. — The affair at Commissie Drift on the 27th October had not frightened the rebels in other districts of the Transvaal. Rebel concentrations continued east of Pretoria, and on a much bigger scale in the Western Transvaal. A great concourse of armed burghers was reported at the house of the " Prophet " Van Rensburg (on the border between the districts of Lichtenburg and "Wolmaransstad) on the 27th, while other rebel forces were gathering in the vicinity of Wolmaransstad. On the 28th October the Magistrate of Wolmaransstad reported that he might be able to get to the rebel commando, then near Leeuwdoorns, and asked for instructions. The Minister of Defence replied, on the 29th, instructing the magistrate to pro- ceed to the rebels and to tell them to disperse quietly and go home. If they did so, * See Appendix C 11, p. 72. •J T S3 nothing would be done to them. If they remained on commando, they would be treated as rebels and would run the risk of having all their property confiscated. On the 29th October Colonel Alberts scattered the rebel forces which had been collected in this area at Treurfontein. These rebel commandos were under the command of Beyers and Kemp. On the same day Commandant P. Vorster, who had been operating near Hek- poort, reported that he had captured some rebels and had surrounded a large number in the Magaliesberg. He stated that many of these were said to be anxious to return, but feared for their lives. He inquired whether the Minister would issue a proclamation guaranteeing their lives, which could be sent to these rebels. The Minister in reply (29th October) ordered Commandant Vorster to send messages to the misguided and misled people in and near the Magaliesberg, to let them know, in the name of the Government, that if they returned home without delay and laid down their arms and remained quiet, the Government would take no steps against them. Should they give no heed, they would be looked upon and punished as rebels.. On the 30th October the Minister of Defence telegraphed important instruc- tions, embodying the policy of the Government with regard to the terms of surrender of rebels, to all commanders of Government forces in the disaffected area. The message was as follows : — [Translation.'] " Send messages and dispatch riders among the disaffected and call upon them to lay down their arms and go home without further delay. Government will take no further steps against them if they do this. If not, they will be prosecuted and punished as rebels." (Addressed to six commanders.) At the same time, the five magistrates in the disaffected area received the follow- ing instructions from the Minister (30th October) : "Please do your best with assistance of local officers to send reports round your district calling upon all disaffected burghers to hand in their arms and to go home quietly. If they do this Government will do them no harm. If, however, they continue in the field, they will be considered as rebels and severely dealt with. Ask officers everywhere to arrest ringleaders and real mischief makers, but to let rank and file go home." (Addressed to Magistrates, Lichtenburg, Wolmaransstad, Klerksdorp, Bloemhof, and Rustenburg.) Identical instructions were conveyed on the 1st November to the Magistrates of Marico, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, and Waterberg, and also to the commanders of Government forces east of Pretoria. On the 31st Colonel Alberts reported from Treurfontein that there was a very strong feeling among the officers under his command against the policy of allowing rebels who were openly organizing to return freely to their homes on simply sur- rendering their arms and ammunition. The Minister replied (31st) : — [Translation.] " It is in the interests of the Government to put an end to the rising in the western Transvaal as speedily as possible. Therefore we promise pardon (vrijstelling) to those who surrender immediately. If not, they will be punished as rebels." The same day the Magistrate of Klerksdorp suggested to the Minister that a time limit should be laid down within which the rebels must return home. To this the Minister replied (31st) : — " Yes. Rebels in order to be left alone must surrender at once. Offer is not permanently open." All magistrates in the disaffected areas were instructed, on the 1st of November, to keep a most careful record of every rebel burgher who should voluntarily sur- render, with or without arms. A rebel thus surrendering, but without arms and ammunition, was to be warned that his surrender would be cancelled if it was found that he had possessed such at the time of his surrender, but had kept or made away with the same. On the 2nd November inquiries were addressed to the Minister with reference to the circular instructions to magistrates and commanders in the field issued on the 30th October and the 1st of November (as reported above). 38 Colonels Mentz and Jordaan, who were operating east of Pretoria, telegraphed from Bronkhorstspruit : " Are contents applicable to areas under us, and does it (the amnesty offered to rebels) apply to leaders as well ? " To this the Minister replied (2nd November) that the terms applied to all, whether leaders or not, who forthwith laid down arms. In the same connection, Colonel-Commandant Lemmer telegraphed from Lich- tenburg to General Smuts on the 2nd November to inform him that he gathered from the wives of men with the rebel commandos and also from prisoners that if steps could be taken to acquaint the rebels with the terms of the proclamation* a large number of them would lay down their arms. He stated that the wives were ready to follow the rebel commandos in order to do so. Colonel Lemmer wished to know, in case the suggestion was acted upon, what guarantee could be given to subaltern leaders like veldkornets, &c. He asked for an interview per telephone in order to be quite clear. Verbal instructions were given accordingly. II.— NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL BEYERS. 1. General Beyers makes proposals to Government. — The Magistrate of Wol- maransstad informed the Minister on the 5th of November that Mr. Cecil Meintjes, of Lichtenburg, had been to General Beyers' commando at Katbosfontein (north-west of Wolmaransstad) and had brought a message from Beyers and his officers for the Government. The following extracts from a statement drawn up by Mr. Meintjes immediately after the interview will show what passed between him and General Beyers : — " I left Lichtenburg on Tuesday, 3rd November, at 1 p.m., on Government instructions, to find the Lichtenburg burghers who had joined the forces opposed to the Government and to explain and make known to them as much as possible the proclamation with regard to the laying down of their arms and to assure them that if they and even their field cornets returned to their homes peacefully, no steps would be taken against them by the Government." . . . (After meeting " General " Wolmarans and General Beyers), " The two Generals and myself retired to a bedroom, where an interview lasting about an hour took place. I explained to General Beyers the object of my mission, and they informed me that they had already acquainted their men with the contents of the proclamation. General Beyers then handed me the notice to the burghers . . . (given below). " General Beyers then informed me that the men refused to surrender under the proclamation, as they stated that after surrender the Government had arrested men contrary to the undertaking in the proclamation. That, I said, was an infamous untruth ; and I could assure them that such was not the case, and that the men who surrendered under the proclamation would not in any way be inter- fered with by the Government. ... I took his assurance that the proclamation had been made known." (From other parts of Mr. Meintjes' narrative it is clear that the men did not know of the notification, and that the leaders jealously kept the knowledge of it from them. Mr. Meintjes himself was not permitted to converse with the rebels while in their laager.) " Thereupon the conversation turned on the resolution by Parliament with regard to the campaign against German South-West Africa and the reason for General Beyers and others taking up the position in which they stood. Beyers stated that he was taking up a position of passive resistance, as they were against the campaign (vide Annexure " A "), and as it was impossible to address the burghers in the ordinary way, on account of the regulations under Martial Law being so strict, they were bound to come together in the manner they had done, to silently protest. Such restrictions, he said, were only to be expected in Russia. Upon this I pointed out that it did not appear to me to be correct to offer passive resistance with rifle in hand, and that the actions of General De Wet in the Orange Free State convinced me that he was in open and active rebellion against the Government. General Beyers replied that he was not responsible for the actions of General De * The circular instructions of 30th October are here referred to. 39 Wet. I suggested that it would, in my opinion, have been better if the people who thought they had a grievance had remained at their homes quietly and refused to be commandeered to proceed to German South- West Africa. That was my impres- sion of passive resistance. ' Turning to the question of the resolution by Parliament, I explained that the Government by consulting Parliament had consulted the people within the meaning of the Constitution, to which he replied that that was only technical; but I said, even allowing it to be technical, it was correct. I contended further that, even if the people had been consulted as he suggests, and the matter had been made clear and explained to them in the proper light, and taking the views in the Cape Colony and Natal and the slight difference of opinion in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the majority would have been in favour of the German South-West Africa campaign, and especially if the campaign were to be undertaken with volunteers. With this view he disagreed, and gave me the impression that the South African Party, by whom the Government ruled, should be the only party to be consulted. Further argument followed, and I explained that other parties, such as the Labour and Unionist party, have had many grievances agajnst the Government, but they all had to submit to Parliament and did not take up the attitude adopted by Generals Beyers, De Wet, and their men. In fairness, I must add that General Beyers also contended that the Constitution only made provision for Parliament being consulted in internal affairs, and that on the question of attacking German South-West Africa the people had to be consulted in the manner he suggested. General Beyers denied that the Germans first crossed the Union border and ridicules the idea of being at war with the common enemy. At my suggestion we agreed to disagree and the conversation turned on the reason why the Government had commandeered the people. I said to General Beyers that he must know that'after the Government had made it public that the campaign -against German South-West Africa would be carried on with volunteers, and after General Botha's speech at Bank Station, and before any commandeering was done, Maritz turned traitor and threatened to invade the Union and that that was the cause of the commandeering. The original trouble, he replied, was occasioned by the Government in undertaking the campaign against German South-West Africa and that the Government knew who they had in Maritz, as the Government had been informed by Maritz and by General Beyers that they would not cross the Union border into German South-West Africa. " General Beyers denies any complot or any understanding whatsoever as between himself and Maritz. (This information was volunteered.) Why he did not renounce Maritz when the latter mentioned his name, I cannot say nor did I ask him. " I then asked General Beyers whether he did not agree with me that most of the people with him were there in the belief that they were going to regain their inde- pendence, and that many of them had been misled by the prophet Van Rensburg. His reply was that some of them may think of independence, and that only some of the Lichtenburg people were following old Van Rensburg. " General Beyers certainly gave me the impression that he was not there to fight for independence, but only for the purpose as stated, and that he had no intention of taking the offensive, but would only fight in self-defence. He also stated that the people had flocked to him in silent protest against the Government. I assured him that hundreds of people in the Lichtenburg District had been commandeered in his name, and after inquiring from General Wolmarans whether he had given instructions to commandeer, and receiving answer in the negative, General Beyers replied that if people were commandeered in his name it was without his instruc- tions. I referred to the men of Claasen, who, after being fully equipped bv the Government, and having received payment for their horses from the Government, turned against the Government. This, I said, I regretted to see done bv Africanders and considered it a disgrace, but General Beyers states that he is not to blame. I also referred to the conduct of Wolmarans during the latter's few minutes of absence. . . . In conclusion. I pointed out the deplorable state of affairs and asked General Beyers to climb down and choose the lesser of two evils, the greater of which was the rebellion facing us, and also to endeavour to bring the country back to a normal state. He said he was prepared to do so, but stated that the Government would not climb down at all and would not admit the mistakes made bv them Reference was made to General Smuts bragging at the Pretoria Club about beino- able to obtain 30,000 volunteers, and where were they now? Of course, here ao-ain 4U General Beyers loses sight of the fact that 'commandeering was forced upon the Government by Maritz and the rebellion. " I plainly informed General Beyers'that I did not think that as far as he was concerned the cause justified his action or, in other words, that even presuming that his contention was correct, which is in no way admitted, his provocation was sufficient to have brought about the present state of affairs. " I asked General Beyers what, in his opinion, would be the outcome or result of the whole matter, and he replied that he knew the Government would apprehend him, other leaders, and many of the men, but his experience in the late war had taught him that it would take the Government a very long time before they caught every one. ■' I may add that although I got the assurance that the proclamation had been made known to the men, I was not allowed into the laager, the reason for which may be either to prevent me from conversing with the people or not to enable me to gauge their strength. In this connection, I must state, however, that later in the afternoon and after the interview with General Beyers I spoke to some of his body- guard, but a few minutes after his departure for the laager one of his men, a certain Jooste who is well known to me, returned and informed me that General Beyers did not wish me to speak to the men too much. " Lastly, and in order to endeavour to bring about an amicable settlement, I asked General Beyers whether there was anything reasonable he wished me to submit to the Government, and if so I would willingly submit it on my return. He then submitted verbally more or less what is contained in Annexure ' B,' which I pre- ferred to take down in writing at his dictation after he had convened a war council suggested by him, and which was taken down by me after the war council had met. On the verbal suggestion I asked General Beyers about General De Wet and others, and he stated that he would be able to influence them to agree with him. " We thereupon adjourned ; he returned to the laager to convene the war council. " In the evening General Beyers returned and submitted what is contained in the Annexure ' B ' and which was taken down by me at his dictation. With regard to dictation of this document, I may mention that General Beyers stopped after dictat- ing paragraphs 1 and 2, and I informed him that the suggestion was too general, and I should like to have something more definite, whereupon he dictated para- graph 3. I then asked him what about the leaders, and he dictated paragraph 4, but said that as far as he was concerned he would be prepared to stand his trial as his conscience was clear. " It was then arranged that if the Government thought a solution possible on the lines suggested, an emissary had to be sent under a white flag to General Beyers, either from Wolmaransstad or Schweizer Reneke. I informed General Beyers that I doubted very much whether the Government would allow the leaders to go unpunished as that would show too much weakness on the Government side, although I would like to see the Government find a way out of the difficulty without further bloodshed and with the object in view to also choose the lesser of two evils if possible. ' Before my departure the next morning I wrote General Beyers the letter copy of which is annexed marked " C," so that there may be no misunderstanding.* " I informed General Beyers also that on my return I would fully report. He would, of course, not allow me to return the afternoon after the interview, stating that I was travelling by motor and they were only on horseback, and besides he had to convene the war council, the result of which had to be intimated to me that evening." The documents referred to by Mr. Meintjes follow here : — Annexure "A." [Translation^ Steenbokfontein, 29th October, 1914. Notice. Notice is hereby given to all burghers of the Union that, whereas the Government of the Union has decided to conquer German South-West Africa and the members of Parliament belonging to the South African Party, on incorrect reports and statements, have confirmed the decision of the Govern- ment; [and as Parliament has taken this step without consulting the nation, * This letter is not reproduced. 41 whereby the rights of the people (volksrecht) have been outraged]; and whereas protests have been raised against the godless attack on German South-West, against a nation that has never done us any harm, but has always been well disposed; and whereas the Government has deprived the public of its right to protest peaceably by proclaiming Martial Law and regulations, now therefore we continue to protest, arms in hand, against that so dangerous principle, which the Government desires to carry out against the wish and the will of the nation, being convinced that our nation will be plunged into the greatest misery and disaster, and that God's curse will fall on us, if this resolution of the Government is carried out. As our attitude of protest is not to shed fraternal blood, but on the con- trary, as already proved, to avoid this where possible and under no circum- stances to assume the offensive (aanvallenderwi j ze op te treden), we in con- clusion call upon all burghers to use all their powers and influence against the conquest of German South- West Africa, and at the same time to refuse to be used by the Government to fight against us with weapons, as our only object is the honour of God and the welfare of people and country. (Signed) C. R. De Wet, C. F. Beyers, Generals of the Protesting Burghers. N.B.— In another copy of the above, dated the 28th of October, handed by General Beyers to Captain Brink at Bloemfontein on the occasion of his (Beyers') visit to President Steyn, the paragraph given in brackets is omitted. Annexure " B." ^Translation.'] Council of war of General Beyers shares his view as hereunder : — (1.) Unhappily blood has been shed because Government people (men- schen) charged the opposing party. According to evidence of this side, it appears that the first shots came from the Government force. This is in execution of orders of General Beyers, that no shooting may take place except in self-defence. (2.) View of General Beyers : If Government continue the war against German West with original undertaking, i.e., with volunteers, then there will be, so far as we are concerned, no objection to a friendly solution of the present position. (3.) If the Government continues the war against German West with volunteers alone and under no obligation then we are disposed to disband and go home quietly. (4.) It is also a condition of the council of war that all* officers and leaders will not be prosecuted. 2. General Beyers takes hostile Action before his Proposals can be considered. — Immediately on the arrival of Mr. Meintjes at Wolmaransstad, the local Magis- trate telegraphed an account of his interview with General Beyers to General Smuts, giving the conditions on which General Beyers and his officers were prepared to disband their forces and go home, and also mentioning that General Beyers had stated that he could influence De Wet and Kemp to agree with his views. General Smuts instructed the Magistrate the same day (5th November) : " To proceed under white flag to General Beyers and to explain to him that the circular notice sent out to the commandos t applies to the leaders, and that the Government will not prosecute them for rebellion, provided they surrender without further delay. It is to be clearly understood that amnesty applies only to those who forthwith lay down arms, surrender all Government property in their possession, and quietly return to their homes. " Regarding other point raised in the messaget the Government have already, through formal statements by the Prime Minister and otherwise, made it clear that they intend to prosecute the war in German South- West Africa by means of voluntary recruiting and not by commandeering, and they see no reason for departing from this policy. Such commandeering of burghers as took place recently was with a view to suppressing rebellion raised by Maritz and others in the Cape Province, and not * Sic. t Rebel commandos. J From Beyers. 4563 v 42 for the purpose of operations in German South- West Africa. Please impress on General Beyers that any action to be taken under the notice or this statement must be taken without any delay." The Minister's message given above was dispatched from Pretoria at 1.45 p.m.* on the 5th November. At this very moment General Beyers was crossing the railway line near Kings- wood and attacking the Government forces guarding it. He had thus marched twenty-five miles from Katbosfontein, where Mr. Meintjes had interviewed him the previous evening. He had also detained Mr. Meintjes until his commando was on the march, giving as his reason that Meintjes was travelling by motor and his own men on horseback. Now, Mr. Meintjes was charged with a message from Beyers and his officers, giving the conditions on which they were prepared to disband and go peacefully to their homes. If this was seriously meant, the proper course for General Beyers would have been to send Mr. Meintjes off to deliver his message to the Government as soon as possible, while he himself kept his commando quietly at Katbosfontein, pending the arrival of a reply. There were no Government forces in the neighbour- hood, as General Beyers (owing to his excellent system of patrols) well knew, and thus no hostilities were to be feared if he remained at Katbosfontein. On the other hand, any advance south towards the railway line on his part was bound to produce bloodshed, as Government forces occupied all important positions on the line and had been guarding it for days. Furthermore, any move on his part would necessarily delay the arrival of the reply of the Government to his message which, he had arranged, should be sent from Wolmaransstad or Schweizer Reneke. In acting as he did, therefore, General Beyers clearly showed that his professed anxiety for peace was not sincere, and that, so far from seeking a peaceful solution, he was deliberately courting a collision. The Magistrate of "Wolmaransstad reported on the evening of the 5th that he had started for Kingswood (on the track of Beyers), but had not been able to get into touch with him. He proposed to follow him again the next day and inquired : " If I find that there has been actual military operations, will that qualify the Government's offer ? " This telegram arrived at Pretoria at 11 p.m. on the 5th. The next morning (6th), early (9.25), the Minister replied : " In view of yesterday's events,! it is not necessary for you to proceed with your mission as instructed my D/0061 of yesterday." 3. General Beyers goes to President Steyn. — The Magistrate had, however, left early that morning to locate General Beyersf and so the Minister's message did not reach him in time. Late that night (6th) the Magistrate telegraphed that he had followed General Beyers into the Orange Free State, and had interviewed him at 12.45 that day. " Beyers' reply is," he continued, " that he must see De Wet before replying, but can answer for Kemp. Will Government give him a clear passage to see De Wet ? Beyers will wait where I have seen him to receive your reply unless molested. Will you facilitate his seeing De Wet? In the meantime, so far as the commando is concerned, leave it alone unmolested. Please wire your reply to Beyers by hand of Commandant Swartz, who will send it out and endeavour to find Beyers if he has moved. I took precaution to point out clearly that I considered that your offer was given on the understanding that it might be delivered at or about Katbosfontein, and I did not know what position now would be since he had crossed into the Orange Free State. On my arrival here§ I find troops have moved out and others are following. ... I declined to guarantee that operations would be suspended against him, and explained I was purely the bearer of your reply to his communica- tions through Meintjes." The Minister had in the meantime received information from the Orange Free State which made him hope that De Wet had at last agreed to a conference with President Steyn.|| He therefore telegraphed to Commandant Swartz at Kingswood (November 6th) : " Please send through express to General Beyers to tell him that » The Magistrate's telegram, reporting Meintjes' interview with Beyers, reached Pretoria at 10.o9 that morning. t The engagement between Beyers and Commandant Swartz near Kingnwoo In the Transvaal rebels were also surrendering daily in small parties in the west, while in the Waterberg District the local commandant, Viljoen, wished to surrender with his whole commando. He accordingly opened communications on the 16th with the local magistrate, in order to arrange the time and place of surrender. On the 16th De Wet broke across the railway line westwards, and the next day Commandant Celliers scattered the commando under Beyers, Wolmarans, and Conroy, capturing in all 299 prisoners. Both De Wet and Beyers were relentlessly pursued by various Government forces, with the result that their men soon began to surrender in large numbers. On the 18th, e.g., over a hundred of De Wet's men came in to surrender at Ventersburg, and the local commandant expressed the opinion that if the notification of the Government could be brought to the knowledge of the rebels generally, there would also be a general surrender. The Dewetsdorp commando, 72 strong, also sur- rendered. On the same day other small bodies of rebels laid down their arms at Wmburg, \rede, &c. In the Transvaal the number of rebels still in the held was by this time very small, but from this number considerable batches were deserting daily m order to surrender. 'On the 19th General De Wet was forced to abandon the greater part of his commando, owing to the great dis- satisfaction which existed among its members. In an address to his men on the Vet Kiver. he advised all those who were unwilling to follow him further «. hide their rifles and go home. More than half his commando took him at j ' T/ rff 1 1( ? K' epare for surrender.. On that day fiftv-three rebels surrendered to Colonel Manie Botha near Odendaalsrust, while in the Trans- vaal over one hundred rebels surrendered in the north and west. The expected surrender en masse of the Nylstroom commando was prevented at the last wholn^L ^ aCtl ° n of s likely to be for our people. Perhaps in a few days we shall be face to face with a civil war in which the Government will be obliged- to do their duty, in which the English population is unanimous as one man, and in which our Boer population will be sharply divided. Our people in the Cape Province are almost unanimously opposed to this treasonable movement, and in the old Republics as well it is certain that there is a large proportion of the people, to say the least, which feels that there is no advantage to be gained for ourselves or our posterity along the path of treason and disloyalty. The outcome, therefore, of such an insurrection, headed by men who in the past have been our honoured leaders, can only mean the total ruin of our people. For my part I am prepared to take any honourable steps to obviate such a disaster, but I would appeal to you, too, President, and I feel assured that in this our dark hour I shall not do so in vain. Our people still continue to look up to you as their greatest figure, and they will listen to you as they would to no one else amongst them. The situation imposes upon you the responsibility of no linger remaining quiet, but using all your influence to avert this calamity. I consider it imperative that you should without delay, through your son Colin and other reliable men, dispatch a letter to De Wet, Beyers, and Kemp, and either summon them to meet you or in some other way turn them from the path of destruction where they now stand. If they come to jou the Government will take no steps to arrest them, and will provide every facility for your messengers. Do your best, President, to save our people from this reproach, this indelible dishonour. The position is more serious than words can describe. What jou do must be done at once ; an outbreak may now be expected any day. Believe me, Yours faithful lv and sincerely, ' (Sgd.) LOUIS BOTHA. His Honour President M. T. Steyn, Onze Rust, Orange Free State. 71 [5] Onze Rust, 23rd October, 1914. Dear General Botha, General Burger has handed me your letter. And so the thing against which my prayers and labours and warnings have for the past ten years been directed, viz., civil war, has come at last. According to the information supplied me by General Burger I can no longer doubt that this is the case. I am sending Colin with a view to averting, if possible, at the last moment the danger feared. I shall therefore request Generals De Wet, Beyers, and Kemp to meet me here at Onze Rust. How far your information is correct as to the two last I cannot judge. I accordingly assume that it is so. I question its accuracy as regards General De Wet. The success of my efforts will largely depend upon the manner in which this affair is handled by the Government. If Generals Beyers and Kemp have already committed an act of rebellion you can understand that they will not be inclined to leave their burghers and run the risk of being arrested. The most distinct assurance must, therefore, be given upon this point; also that if they abandon their resistance you will not have themselves and their followers arrested and brought to justice. It will also be well to extend the above to include Maritz and his followers, for you will under- stand that if the allegation is correct that Generals Beyers and Kemp were in the plot with Maritz, they will not be inclined to leave him in the lurch in order to save themselves. In a matter of this kind, General, statesmanship is frequently of more effect than force of arms. I cannot too strongly recommend this policy of forbearance and that not only in the interests of our people, but also in your own. Once blood has been spilt the time for forbearance is past, and then, rightly or wrongly, you and your colleagues will have to bear the reproach that it was under your Government that civil war, if not fraternal war, broke out. Do therefore what you can, General, to prevent it. I am doing everything in my power as far as my feeble strength allows. I am ae yet not apprehensive as regards the Free State, but if the fire is once kindled in the Transvaal I am afraid that the Free State too will be ablaze in a moment. May God in his mercy avert it ! Colin is at your service to proceed further immediately upon arrival in Pretoria. I do not know where General De Wet is. Please find out, for it will be necessary for Colin to see him, too, personally and deliver my letter. Unfortunately the telephone service is stopped this morning, and so it is difficult to discover where he is. Please give instructions if you can for the telephone to be kept open for me. Hoping that these efforts may meet with such blessing that our country may yet be saved from the danger apprehended, and with kindest greetings and deepest respect, I remain, Yours sincerely, (Sgd.) M. T. STKYN P.S. — Keep this out of the papers. Publicity may possibly defeat our plans. I shall also acquaint Hertzog with the position. [6] Colin Steyn to General De Wet, Memel. Clear the Line. D/0557. 24th October. — Have letter for you from my father which I must deliver personally. Leave information with Jan Wessols at Vrede where and when I can see you. [7] General Smuts, Pretoria, to Special Justice Peace, Memel. D/0558. 24th October. — Is General De Wet at Memel ? Reply sharp and also wire when he leaves. [8] The bearer is Dr. Colin Steyn, son of President Steyn. He is upon a special mission from his father of which I am cognizant. All officers and burghers are instructed to facilitate his journey. (Sgd.) Louis Botha, Prime Minister. [8a] 24th October, 1914. Dear Dr. Steyn, If General Beyers decides to go to see your father arrangements will be made to convey him by special train from Magalies Station to Kaalspruit Station. Please find out from him when he can take the train at Magalies so that the necessary arrangements can be made on the line. Yours faithfully, (Sgd.) J. C. Smuts. 72 [ 9 ] 27th October, 1914. General C. R de Wet is on his way to President Steyn at his farm Onze Rust near Bloemfontein. I have guaranteed his immunity from arrest upon this journey. All officers and burghers are instructed to respect this safe-conduct under my hand, and to facilitate this journey as well as General De Wet's return journey to Heilbron, Reitz, or Vrede. (Sgd.) Louis Botha, Prime Minister. [10] Very Confidential. " (1) Government is not prepared to make any proposal or to take any step in regard to which it is not assured that it will be acted upon. •' (2) If any proposal is to be made, as suggested by C(olin) S(teyn) (i.e. exemption from criminal prosecution for all disaffected who surrender to their local magistrate within a prescribed period and hand over all rihes obtained from the Government in their possession and after that go home without delay), then this must come from the other side as a proposal which the dissatisfied burghers are prepared to accept. " (3) In that case the Government will be disposed to give such proposal its most serious con- sideration, as it desires ardently to avoid bloodshed. " (4) It is not clear why burghers think they will be commandeered for German South-WeSt Africa as Prime Minister has already officially declared that this will not take place and that only volunteers will be used (for the expedition)." [11 ] Colin to M. T. Steyn, Kaalspruit Station. D/0825. 29th October. — Leave to-morrow for Heilbron. Hoping for the best. Beyers not yet discovered. It will be desirable for General De Wet to remain with you as he is being sought for in all directions. [12] »«».«,., a«,,m a » j Colonel Botha, GENERAL SMUTS to J Colonbl Brand ; Kroonstad Bloemfontein D/0887. 31st October. — If De Wet wishes to go through to Onze Rust to see President Steyn do not hinder him. [13] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/554. 31st October. — Do you know where Colin and Hertzog are? Have not heard since his telegram from Pretoria. [14] General Smuts, Pretoria, to President Steyn, Onze Rust, Bloemfontein. D/0914. 31st October. — Your B/554. Colin left for Heilbron Thursday night to get in touch with Rocco. Have heard nothing further of him or his movements. [15] General Smuts to Colonel Brand, Bloemfontein. D/0931. 1st November.— Please inform President Steyn Colin has again arrived at Pretoria jm\ now. I have not seen him yet. I shall let the President know when he leaves. [16] General Smuts to Colonel Brand. Bloemfontein. D/093G. 1st November.— Tell President Steyn that Colin arrived here safely and proposes return again Free State to-morrow. Hopes to be at Bloemfontein Wednesday or Thursday. 73 [17] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/565. 1st November. — Hertzog just arrived here. Report very hopeful. Please give instruc- tions that no military steps be taken as long as negotiations continue. Hertzog already asked General De Wet to do the same. Am sending letter to General De Wet to-day with the same request. A hasty step now may have fatal consequences. [18] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0945. 2nd November. — Your B/565. Instructions issued everywhere in Free State to adopt waiting attitude and not assume offensive. Colin will be at Helibron about 1 o'clock. [19] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/579. 2nd November. — Have learned with regret my letter will not reach General De Wet until to-day. Hope it will have desired effect that he too adopts waiting attitude. Be patient just a little longer. [20] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/590. 3rd November. — As I entertain the hope that if further hostilities are avoided it will be possible to bring parties to an understanding shortly after arrival of General De Wet I think it desirable that General Botha or you should be in the vicinity in order so to expedite the negotiations and to end the suspense that now prevails. What do you think ? [21] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0982. 3rd November. — Senekal burghers wish conference at Bloemfontein on Saturday of two representatives from each Free State district. Have answered that you are working in direction of peace and that their proposal must stand over for the present. I trust affair will reach satisfactory conclusion Thursday. [22] Steyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/991. 3rd November. — Thanks for your telegram re conference, also for your answer. Hope you have received my telegram of this morning and that you will give my suggestion earnest consideration. In my opinion it may contribute greatly to speedy solution. [23] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0022. 4th November. — •Your B 590 of yesterday. Have consulted General Botha as to your suggestion. Regret it is impossible for him or me to leave Pretoria now. Moreover journey to Bloemfontein in present circumstances will occupy nearly two days and thus lead to more loss of time. Trust your work will be successful. [24] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/599. 4th November. — Telegram received. Fear your absence at distance may easily be cause of failure. No news from Colin yet. Shall inform you at once of his arrival. [25] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0051. 5th November. — Shall be glad if you will tell me where General De Wet is, whether he is going to Bloemfontein, and when he is arriving ? I have heard nothing further of Colin. 4563 K 74 [26] Magistrate, Lindley, to General Smuts, Pretoria. 5th November, 1914.— Colin Steyn still here. He informs me that he will meet General De Wet somewhere on the Ventersburg road about 10 a.m. to-morrow. In hopes that General De Wet will then proceed to Bloemfontein to interview ex-President Steyn. [27] Magistrate, Lindley, to Defence, Pretoria. 6th November, 1914. — All quiet here this morning. Colin Steyn has just left by motor via Steynsrust for Ventersburg Road to meet General De Wet. Commandant Naude still in laager. Rebels are all along Lovat, Steynsrust, and to the north of Steynsrust. [28] DlSSO, Eroonstad, to GENERAL Smuts, Pretoria. M. 386. 6th November. — Colin Steyn left Lindley this morning to meet General De Wet at Ventersburg. [29] STEYN, Bloemfontein, to GENERAL Smuts, Pretoria. B/606. 5th November. — Colin and De Wet not yet arrived. Information is that they intended to be in the neighbourhood of Lindley Tuesday or Wednesday on their way here. Have heard nothing since. Think thev are being held up by wet roads. We expect them any moment. Where are Kemp and Beyers ? [ W ] Steyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/608. 6th November. — Regret De Wet and Colin not yet arrived. I think they have been held up by rain. I do not know, however, whether they are coming on horseback or by motor. Have not yet heard anything from Colin direct, but from a certificate of Commandant Prinsloo to Brand Wessels it appears De Wet was still quite resolved to come, so I am still expecting him any moment. [31] Steyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/611. 6th November.— General De Wet and Colin not yet arrived. Have just sent General Hattingh, Brand Wessels, and Dr. Loubser to look for them. Meantime General Hertzog remains with me so that we need lose no time when De Wet arrives. [32] General Smuts, Pretoria, -to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0123. 7th November. — Beyers located yesterday on Vaal River between Bloemhof and Wolmaransstad. Have sent him safe-conduct to you. I do not know if he will use it. Delay of De Wet and activity of his commandos are making affair almost hopeless. Fighting already begun at Kroonstad in order to oppose destruction of line and blowing up of bridges. [33] Magistrate, Winburg, to General Smuts, Pretoria. 7th November. — Dr. Colin Steyn left here this morning for Bloemfontein. He wishes you to send any further instructions to him there. (Begins)*— I have just returned from General De Wet. He insists on Beyers and Kemp being present at Onze Rust as a condition to his going on Tuesday. I understood he was going to Onze Rust at the unanimous request of his officers, but at a meeting on Wednesday he insisted on above condition and eventually he decided to write a letter to President Steyn. He informed me of that on Friday. He however wanted me to wait till Monday, but I deemed it advisable to proceed direct to Bloemfontein. He then asked me to return on Monday, in which case he might accompany me, but I do not know whether he will. If De Wet can be induced to stop his advance and there is any chance of finding Beyers and Kemp there is still chance of peace. De Wet's officers are still in same frame of mind as mentioned in my last report. * What follows is a telegram from Dr. Steyn. [34] General Smuts, Pretoria, to President Steyn. Bloemfontein. D/0125. 7th November. — Colin left Winburg for Bloemfontein this morning. His conduct has been extremely fine and patriotic. I learn that De Wet intends not to go to Bloemfontein until next week. Meanwhile he is hurrying on forward movement. My fear is that his attitude makes position hopeless. [35] Steyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/612. 7th November.— Thanks for both telegrams. Movements of opposing sides make affair complicated, but I trust not yet hopeless. I shall await Colin's arrival and then see what can be done. I have heard nothing as yet from De Wet. I shall be glad if Beyers comes. Perhaps a door will be opened for this. I 36] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/613. — Colin arrived. After having heard his report I have decided to send Charles Fichardt and Colin to De Wet at once to bring him here. I am asking him to arrange for his commandos to move in such a way as not to come in collision with Government troops. Please issue similar instructions and please take measures above all that no attack is made upon his men so long as he is away. I should go in person but am too unwell. The suspense of the last days has been too much for me. Colin will try to get hold of Bevers to-day. [37] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0130. 7th November. — Your telegrams of even date received. From intercepted dispatches of De Wet's it appears that he is going on with his plans in spite of your efforts. Report also received that Colonel Lemmer engaged General Beyers near Hoopstad to-day and 'captured 350 of Beyers' commando. We deeply regret to hear of the state of your health. [38] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0150. 8th November. — Consider it my duty to bring the following to your notice before you meet De Wet and Beyers. When Colin was here in connection with the treatment of rebel leaders in case of unconditional surrender no open hostilities had as yet taken place. De Wet and Beyers have however very much delayed their visit to you and meanwhile war has openly broken out, considerable engagements have been fought, much public and private property has been destroyed and numerous lives have been lost. Only to-day the Winburg Commando under Cronje has been destroyed. In these circumstances the situation has so changed that I fear public opinion, which has been much embittered, will not tolerate a complete amnesty in the case of the most prominent leaders. [39] Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/616. 9th November. — Fichardt and Colin just back. They report that General De Wet now refuses to come. They found him yesterday during the fight at Sand River. De Wet alleges that as usual he was intending to keep the Sunday quiet when he saw men on a kopje at a distance. Thinking that thsy belonged to his commando he rode towards them and when he reached the kopje he was fired at, with the result thac eight of his men, including his own son Danie, were killed and a number wounded. An engagement then developed and Cronje's commando was defeated. Colin thereupon broke off his journey to Beyers and so now the meeting will not take place. I regret that my efforts have failed. I must now wait patiently to see if another opportunity may not offer later. Had blood not been shed in the Free State and Transvaal I still had hope that a way out would be found, hence my constant anxiety that no violent measures should be taken. I am informed that the ambulance arrangements amongst the burghers in the field leave much to be desired. Is it not possible for steps to be taken to make good this deficiency so as to alleviate the sufferings of our poor people ? Can the Government not provide the necessary material ? 4563 K 2 76 [40] General Smuts to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0179. 9th November. — Your B/616. Contents of your telegram noted with regret. After all the delay perhaps there was nothing else to expect. I am doing my best to improve ambulance arrangements so that both sides may have attention. [41] President Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. 10th November. — General Beyers just arrived. Hav£ had a long conversation with him. I think it would be well if you can give him and his secretary* a safe-conduct to General De Wet. I fear, however, that if the Government maintain the position indicated in your telegram of yesterday it will be- difficult to arrange matters. I would most strongly advise that the Government abandon that position and follow a broadminded generous policy otherwise I foresee a state of affairs that may continue perhaps for years and occasion much bloodshed and suffering, to say nothing of material loss. General Hattingh arrived to-day and reports conditions are worse than one imagines. Please wire me as quickly as possible if you can send General Beyers a safe-conduct. His safe-conduct here he only received yesterday. [42] General Smuts, Pretoria, to President Steyn. Bloemfontein. D/0228. 11th November. — I have sent on contents of your telegram to General Botha, who is absent from Pretoria, and shall answer as soon as possible. [43] . Steyn, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. 11th November. — When do you think you will be able to send reply ? [44] Captain Brink, Bloemfontein, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/629. 11th November. — President Steyn has been asked to send you following telegram : — (Begins) The two men who came here with General Beyers went off to Bloemfontein this morning with a pass in order to get their motor-car attended to. They are now being detained there against their will. Please issue instructions for them to be sent back at once. (Ends) Two individuals referred to were furnished by Commandant V. d. Berg, District Boshof, and belong to Government forces. I have asked them to remain here pending instructions from you. [45] General Smuts, Pretoria, to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0252. 11th November. — I have asked Staff Officer at Bloemfontein to send two men with motor back to General Beyers. I regret that I cannot give General Beyers a pass to General De Wet, but attitude of General De Wet is such that I expect no useful result from meeting and must there- fore request General Beyers to return to his commando. [46] General Smuts, Pretoria, to Captain Brink, Bloemfontein. D/0253. 11th November. — Your B/629. Please send two men back to President Steyn to take Beyers back to his commando. 1 have refused to let him go on to De Wet. [47] General Smuts, Pretoria, to Decompol, Bloemfontein. D/0257. 11th November. — Instruct your various branches to notify public that Government have •delayed taking action in Orange Free State because they wanted President Steyn to use his influence with De Wet with object of preventing bloodshed. De Wet has, however, finally declined to listen to President Steyn and Government have therefore taken the field in Orange Free State with very strong forces from Vereeniging to Bloemfontein and hope to be able with forces at their command to restore law and order as they have already done in Transvaal. * Rev. H. van Broekbui/.en. 77 [48] Stbyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. B/631. 12th November. — Your telegram to hand. Beyers just left. I have found him quite amenable and therefore regret extremely that you cannot give him a safe-conduct to General De Wet, because I have been expecting that this interview would help greatly towards a peaceful solution. Also I had meant to have a motor fitted up for me in such a way that I might follow slowly as far as my strength would allow in order to get nearer De Wet and be able to be present also if required. May God have pity upon our poor people. [49] General Smuts, Pretoria, to President Steyn, Bloemfontein. D/0271. 12th November. — Had I expected any good result from interview I should certainly have given Beyers a pass. He is discouraged and depressed and De Wet is firmly resolved and determined to proceed and only result of a meeting between them in your absence would be that De Wet would talk Beyers round. We delayed active operations in Free State in expectation of conference until at last De Wet had 5000 men in the field, until he was openly saying in his speeches to his commandos that he thought it strange that the Government should be so anxious to negotiate with rebels, and until after temporizing for a long time he finally refused to attend conference. We could wait no longer and unless De Wet is convinced by force I do not believe he is more likely to listen to argument. It is therefore in the highest interests of country and people that we discharge our duty as a Government. [50] Steyn, Tempe, to General Smuts, Pretoria. 16th November. — Brand Wessels just returned. Reports that General De Wet is willing, if he can obtain safe-conduct and if safe-conduct can also be sent to General Beyers, to visit me along with Beyers and open negotiations in order to see if a way cannot be found by which peace can be restored. He appears to be less concerned about anything else than the redress of certain grievances felt by the burghers which he will discuss with me. I trust that the Government will take advantage of this favourable opportunity as I feel convinced we are on the way to a peaceable solution. The interview will take place in my presence thus removing your objection. According to my information the situation grows worse daily. As I said before if we do not take advantage of this opportunity now I foresee bloodshed and misery that will continue for years. Do not refuse consent, therefore. You know General De Wet and it is only by means of the utmost exertions and by bringing all my influence to bear that he has been prevailed upon to come to me. If you agree please wire separate safe-conducts here for both Generals also a safe-conduct for Brand Wessels to take the safe-conduct to De Wet and accompany him here. [51] General Smuts, Pretoria, to His Honour President Steyn. 17th November. — The Government has seriously considered your telegram of yesterday's date. We feel that the position has entirely changed since General Botha first appealed to you to use your influence with De Wet and Beyers to avert bloodshed. Then no hostilities had yet occurred and De Wet and Beyers were merely busy forming commandos. Beyers would not go to you without De Wet, and De Wet put off from day to day, with the obvious intention of gaining time in order to mobilize a great force. Meanwhile hostilities broke out in the Transvaal and later in the Orange Free State, whereupon De Wet point blank refused to go to you. Since then bloody encounters occurred in Transvaal and Free State and many have been killed and wounded. Even yesterday a battle took place at Virginia with considerable losses on both sides. We feel that, however much we desire peace on an honourable basis and to avoid further bloodshed, the military position has become too serious to sanction the proposed conference ; even now we do not know whether this is not again an attempt to gain time. To his commando he openly scoffs at these negotiations, and asks his burghers why the Government is so desirous of negotiating with rebels, and he assures the poor misguided people that both yourself and General Hertzog are with him ; and as no word from you to your people has publicly gone forth advising them and pointing out their duty, your silence, however well meant, is taken by many as approval of De Wet's attitude and allegations. The Government has made its position clear by the issue of a notice containing the terms on which rebels who voluntarily surrender will be treated. To such an extent is public feeling embittered that great dissatisfaction exists among the loyal burghers on account of the leniency of these terms, and the Government feels that the position is likely to become still worse and more fatal than it is to-day if the rebsls are to be allowed to extort peace terms from the Government. Unconditional surrender on the basis of the Prime Minister's conditions is necessary, on the understanding that there is at present no intention to apply capital punishment in the case of the leaders. While we cannot, therefore, consent to grant a safe-conduct, there is yet every probability that General De Wet has met or will meet General Beyers to-day, and that they will therefore be able to exchange views and, if they so wish, to approach the Government, We extremely regret having to send this reply to your telegram, but looking to the present position, the manner in which it arose, and the security for the future peace of South Africa, there seems no other way open to us. 78 [52] Steyn to General Smuts. 18th November. — Your telegram to hand. The contents thereof are very disappointing, but as the responsibility rests with the Government, it is not for me to judge its attitude. More especially is the matter disappointing to me, because, on a former occasion, after bloodshed had already taken place, the Government was yet able to find a peaceful solution. Allow me to remark that the facts as set forth by you do not clearly show the course of events. General Beyers told me that he would come if General De Wet came, but before General Hertzog and Colin could reach De Wet an attack was made on General Beyers by the Government, although I had requested that nothing should be done to render the negotiations more difficult. This action against General Beyers has undoubtedly influenced De Wet in his attitude. As it was on General Botha's request that I intervened, his attack on General Beyers was a disappointment to me. I am convinced that this attempt to restore peace was really meant, and was not merely intended to gain time. Your information re what General De Wet told his burghers about Hertzog and myself cannot be correct, because General De Wet would not tell an untruth. I am also suprrised that you make remark about my silence, since directly after the treachery of Maritz I communicated my attitude to General Botha, and more especially as you let me know twice through Colin that you did not think it desirable that I should say anything at first. Nobody could impart to my silence the meaning yon indicate, as my efforts to bring about peace were generally known. To say anything now after matters have taken such a course would be more easily misconstrued than my silence. I tried honestly and sincerely' to ward off disaster from our country. I have no power to act. I can only give advice, and this is not always accepted. For the present, I shall remain quiet, but if I could be of any service to my people at a later date, my services are at your disposal. I am sending Brand Wessels to Generals De Wet and Beyers with a copy of your telegram, so that they may know contents and if they wish to do so may open negotiations direcc with the Government Please issue instructions at once so that Wessels may be allowed to do this. [53] General Smuts to His Honour President Steyn. 19th Novemb< r. — I extremely regret that you should have viewed my reply in the way you did. It was by no means my intention to make recriminations which, under present circumstances, would be out of place, but to make clear the reasons why your request for safe-conduct could not be acceded to. I did not understand either from the course of events or from Colin that General De Wet was influenced by the fighting which took place in Rustenburg and Lichtenburg. Your request that we should not take the offensive in the Free State was given effect to until it was virtually too late and the massing of large rebel commandos in Free State had made civil war practically unavoidable. The collision between Cronje and General De Wet near Doornberg was, of course, on both sides a mere accident, but proves the impossibility of avoiding conflict when commandos are opposed to each other in the field. If you compare the date of General Botha's letter to you with that of General De Wet's final refusal to attend conferance at Onze Rust, you will see with what patience we on our side have acted. And it will always be a matter for sharp criticism of the action of the Government that, whilst they were in a position to prevent it, they allowed General De Wet to take undisturbed possession of the whole of Northern Free State under the pretext of carrying on private negotiations. Our action was due simply and solely to our earnest desire to save the honour of our people and to avoid the calamity of a civil war. Where our efforts have 6o fatally miscarried it would be criminal indeed to incur the same risk, especially as we know nothing first hand as to General De Wet's attitude but are asked to act only on hearsay, which does not tally with his own authentic public speeches at Vrede and else- where. I am grieved to learn from your telegram that you seem to be under