THE SAflR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION BY F. M. RUSSELL REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, June, 1921 NEW YORK PUBLISHED BY THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1921 THE 8AAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION BY F. M. RUSSELL • • » » • •••^•^ ••, »^ * • J REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, June, 1921 NEW YORK PUBLISHED BY THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1921 'Ijli'ilwll. • • • . • 8UK, INT£Rr^Ar.i;,w.u K.u..n«*IS THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION THE Treaty of Versailles is beginning to bear fruit, and by its fruits it may be judged. At this date its friends can hardly maintain that all the fruit is sweet, neither may its enemies assert that the yield is uniformly bitter. It is now incumbent on those who would foster international under- standing and progress to study the treaty in the light of its actual application rather than from the viewpoint of precon- ceived theory. This paper aims to present a preliminary survey of the initial steps in the application of one section of the treaty, that con- cerning the Saar Basin. Such a survey is possible at this time because the Saar Basin Governing Commission provided for by, the Treaty has been officially functioning since February 21, 1920, and has given an account of its stewardship in frequent detailed reports." To understand the reason for the decision to establish this commission, and to comprehend the peculiarly difficult tasks confronting it, certain facts relative to the Saar Basin and its importance to France and Germany must be stated. The dis- trict over which the commission was given authority includes about 700 square miles of territory contiguous to Alsace- Lorraine, with a population of about 650,000 inhabitants.'* It was formerly part of Germany and the population is over- ^ These reports appear in the League of Nations Official Journal^ the officia record of the activities of the League of Nations, published by Messrs. Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 45 St. Martin's Lane, London, W. C. ' Haskins and Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference^ p. 146. 169 963925 I70 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI whelmingly German in ethnic composition and in sentiment. At least in p^rt, however, the territory had been in French hands at one time or another, and at the conclusion of the war in 191 8 the French were in a position to urge consideration of this fact as a foundation for their claim to the territory.^ Far more significant, in the writer's judgment, in explaining the attitude of the French government regarding the Saar, are the following economic facts. The Saar is principally a coal- producing region. Its output in 191 3 was about 18,000,000 tons, and the production would have been larger but for the fact that the German government preferred to spend a greater amount of energy in developing the mines of the Westphalian district.'' The annual surplus available for export was between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000 tons. On the other hand the coal resources of France are not great enough to supply French industry. As her entire production in 191 3 was but 41,000,000 tons, it was necessary to import 22,000,000 tons in order to satisfy her requirements.^ Indeed, it has been estimated that the total underground coal resources of France are less than those of the Saar.-^ The coal problem of France was aggravated by the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, for these provinces with their thriving industries consumed about three times more coal than they produced. Consequently France would be even more depend- ent on foreign countries in the future than she had been in the past for this basic industrial necessity. There can be no doubt that a desire to avoid such dependence was a strong motive underlying the French demands for the Saar Basin.s During the war the political control of this region seems to have been cherished as one of the secret war aims of France.^ ^ Haskins and Lord, op. cit.^ pp. 132-139, for a brief discussion of historical claims of France. 'Historical Section of the (British) Foreign Office, Handbook No. 31, Lorraine and Saar Mine Fields (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1920), p. 9. * Ibid., p. 25. * Haskins and Lord, op. cit., p. 141. 'L. Barthou, Le Traitk de Paix (Paris, E. Fasquelle, 1919), pp. 108-9. • See TVirw £«ro/^, December 20, 1917, Supplement, for alleged secret corres- pondence between France and Russia, published by the Bolshevist government in November, 191 7. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 171 At the conclusion of the struggle the French made an official demand for the territory, but at first mainly on strategic grounds. Later, at the Peace Conference, the more effective argument was advanced that the Germans, ha^mg^flooded^arxl rendered unproductive the French coal- minqs,, should make reparation in kind by surrendering the Saa^f <:Oc3ilepot5its- and the Saar territory to France.' This proposal not only aroused bitter opposition in Germany but seems to have met with dis- approval in the Peace Conference itself on the ground that it did violence to the principle of self-determination. A compromise, however, was eventually agreed upon by which apparently the partisans of self-determination were satis- fied that their principle had been upheld and at the same time France^ obtained substantially what she wanted. The agree- ment was that Germany should cede to France "■ in full and absolute possession " the coal mines of the Saar Basin.'' If, however, Germany were allowed to retain political control over the district, it would be possible for her, so the French feared, in spite of treaty provisions, to obstruct the exploitation of the mines.3 Ostensibly to avoid this danger it was decided to intrust the League of Nations with the government of the Territory for a period of fifteen years. At the expiration of this time the inhabitants were to be given an opportunity to ** in- dicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed."* The treaty provided that the actual government of the Saar should be vested in a commission of five members, which was to sit in the Territory and act as the representative of the League of Nations. The commission was to be appointed by the Council of the League ; the members were to hold office for one year, although subject to removal at any time by the Council, and they might be reappointed. One of the members of the commission must be a citizen of France and one a native inhabitant of the Saar. The other three members must belong ^Ne-iV York Times^ March 29, 1919. For a more complete discussion of French motives, see Buell, Contemporary French Politics, p. 416 et seq. * Treaty of Versailles, art. 45. ^ Barthou, op. cit., p. no. * Treaty of Versailles, art. 49. 172 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI to three cpuntries other than France or Germany.^ Under this arrangement the two peoples most vitally interested and directly affected-^^the French and the inhabitants of the Saar — were eajch assurpcj pner.ni^mber on the Governing Commission. On the other hand the majority of the commission would, theo- r«^{icd:ly, reflef:t ^a /.more neutral viewpoint and therefore pre- sumably be more truly representative of the League of Nations. Their view, too, would prevail on any matter upon which they were agreed, for the treaty stipulated that the commission was to reach its decisions by majority vote.'' In view of all the circumstances leading to the decision to intrust the government of this territory to the League of Nations, a mixed commission of at least five members was probably the best solution. Experience, it is true, has demon- strated that impartiality is often purchased at the cost of effi- ciency when the members of a mixed commission are drawn from nations which differ more or less widely in language as well as in political, legal and social ideas and institutions. Moreover, such a commission may prove to be dangerously susceptible to the evil forces of suspicion and intrigue. With the appointment of all the members, however, in the control of one body — the Council of the League of Nations — and with the members responsible to that body alone, these difficulties might be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, by a skilful selec- tion of the personnel of the commission. The Governing Commission was given " all the powers of government hitherto belonging to the German Empire, Prussia, or Bavaria . . ."3 Specifically, it could appoint and dismiss public officials, " create such administrative and representative bodies as it may deem necessary", administer and operate the railways and canals and different public services, and even fix the conrditions and hours of labor for men, women and children in the Territory. It also had the sole power of levying taxes and dues. Not only was it empowered to set up a civil and / * Treaty of Versailles, Part III, Sec. 4, Annex, paragraphs 16-17. * Ibid.^ paragraph 19. * /JiV/. , paragraphs 19-33, for an enumeration of the powers of the Governing Commission. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 173 criminal court to hear appeals from the existing territorial courts, and to exercise original jurisdiction in -certain cases for which it should decide the existing courts were incompetent, but the commission itself was made the tribunal to decide by majority vote all questions arising from the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty applying to the Saar. Thus this com- mission of five men had not only extensive executive powers but important legislative and judicial powers as well. On the other hand, certain legal checks and limitations on its authority were imposed, either in the interests of France or on behalf of the inhabitants of the Territory. The Treaty of Versailles guaranteed France economic rights and privileges in the Saar which the commission could not deny, impair or regu- late. As we have seen, the French state was given absolute possession of the coal mines.^ Furthermore, the French cus- toms regime was extended to the Saar, and certain trade regu- lations in the interests of France were specifically stipulated (Part III, Sec. 4, Annex, Paragraph 31). In addition, French money might, at the option of France, freely circulate in the Territory (Paragraph 32). Obviously the possession of the sole important natural re- source of the territory carried with it incalculable power. In order to safeguard the exploitation of this resource, the treaty limited in several ways the freedom of the commission to ad- minister and operate the transportation and communication •systems of the Basin (Paragraphs 7, ^). Power to annul old mining laws or enact new mining legislation was also restricted (Paragraphs 12, 23). The extension of the French customs regime to the Saar Basin meant not only a limitation on the commission's taxing power ; it meant also that France was given power to promote or to hinder the industry and the prosperity of the Territory. The commission's weakness in the economic sphere was in- creased by a similar lack of legal control over the circulating medium. If the French could introduce the franc at will, they had the power not only to inject a disturbing factor into * Treaty of Vereailles, art. 45. 174 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI industry, but also to jeopardize the financial policies of the commission at any time. On the other hand, most of the powers given the commission were limited and qualified in order that the interests and local customs of the inhabitants might be properly safeguarded. In fixing conditions and hours of labor the commission was enjoined to have regard for the wishes of the local labor organi- zations and to take into consideration the principles adopted by the League of Nations (Paragraph 23). Not only might the commission not impose a new internal tax " without previously consulting the elected representatives of the inhabitants", but it must apply the proceeds of taxation exclusively to the needs of the Territory (Paragraph 26). The inhabitants were to retain their religious liberties, their schools, their language and their local assemblies, under the control of the Governing Commission (Paragraph 28). The power of the commission to annul existing laws that had not been enacted as temporary war measures was limited by the requirement that the commis- sion must first consult with the elected representatives of the inhabitants (Paragraph 23). Furthermore, the commission was positively enjoined to provide internal protection for the per- sons and property of the inhabitants and to take measures for the protection of their interests abroad (Paragraphs 30, 21). No military service, however, anight be required or allowed, and no fortifications might be constructed in the Territory (Para- graph 30). The inhabitants werej:hua freed from this burden as long as they remained under the government of the League. On February 13, 1 920, the Council of the League of Nations met and appointed the Governing Commission. Acting under the authorization of the treaty (Paragraph 18), the Council named the French member, M. Rault, as chairman and execu- tive of the commission. The other members were Alfred von Boch, landrath of Sarrelouis (Sarrois), Major Lambert (Belgian), and Count von Moltke Hvitfeldt (Dane).' At this * The fifth member of the Commission, whose name was not announced at the time, the CtJmmission not having received word ofVhis acceptance of the appoint- ment, was Mr. R. D. Waugh, of Winnipeg, Canada, who did not arrive in the Ter- ritory until ApW. — League of N'a lions Official Journal ^ No. 4, p. 192. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 175 meeting, also, directions were adopted for the guidance of the Governing Commission.^ These directions not only restated general guiding principles but also regulated certain matters of detail which, though implied if not expressed in the treaty of peace, the League as trustee of the Territory could scarcely leave to the discretion of the commission. Perhaps no international commission has had to undertake a more delicate task or play a more difficult r6le than the Saar Basin Governing Commission. At the outset the German pop- ulation, informed of the secret correspondence of France with Russia concerning the Saar during the war, aware of the French attitude at the Peace Conference, and convinced that the French were intriguing to detach the Rhine provinces from Germany, were prepared to consider the League government nothing less than a " disguised annexation " of the territory by France. At best it was not of their choosing, but a government imposed from the outside, and therefore to be sullenly endured and covertly sabotaged rather than loyally supported. Feeling assured of the moral support of Germany, the inhabitants could scarcely be expected to acquiesce readily in measures the com- mission might feel called upon to take in reorganizing the gov- ernment of the Territory. The commission's responsibility was indeed a heavy one, its task disheartening. It must carry out the rigorous terms of the Treaty of Versailles, cooperate with the French in their exploitation of the coal mines, support France in other measures of economic penetration allowed her by the treaty, and yet convince the inhabitants that it was gov- erning in their interest. Theoretically, the members of the commission, both individ- ually and collectively, would have powerful incentives to govern well. ' If the French member were inclined to forget that he represented the League of Nations rather than France, still it would not^ require a great deal of astuteness for him to realize that both present and future interests of France would be best served by a commission animated by moderation and liber- ality. For the most effective exploitation of the coal mines * Z. N. O. y.j no. 2, pp. 50^52. 176 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI the willing cooperation of the inhabitants was imperative. If the Territory was to be prevented from voting to return to Germany at the end of the fifteen-year period the feat could only be accomplished by making the lot of the inhabitants pleasant and profitable under the new regime.' The three members at large could not be presumed to have any special interests to serve that would conflict with the desire to make the work of the commission a success. It is true that the member from the Saar, though he could scarcely obstruct the work of the commission directly, even if so minded, could contrive to make it unpopular with the people. The Council of the League, however, by careful selection could avoid such a contingency^ or remedy an error of choice at will.^ Indeed the Council had this important power over the entire membership of the com- mission. On February 25th, the day before the Governing Commission officially entered Saarbriicken, which it chose as the seat of gov- ernment, it issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Saar, intended, doubtless, to anticipate and discourage any inclination to oppose its authority as well as to announce the principles by which it would be guided in its government of the Territory.^ The proclamation announced the determination of the commis- sion to carry out the terms of the treaty *' both in letter and in spirit ". No disorder or resistance, passive or otherwise, would be tolerated. On the other hand, the Governing Commission would provide protection for the persons and property of the inhabitants and would allow them to retain their local assemblies, religious liberties, associations, schools and language. Finally, the Commission would be constantly guided in the exercise of *The plebiscite was to be open only to persons over 20 years of age who had been residents in the Territory at the date of the signature of the treaty, and therefore the French, if so disposed, could not resort to *' colonization ** to insure a favorable vote (Part III, Sec. 4, Annex, paragraph 34). 2 In the report by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the First Assembly of the League, on the work of the Council, the statement is made with- out comment that M. von Boch (the Saar member of the Commission) resigned (no date) and that M. Hector had been appointed in his place. — Doc. de P Assemblies no- 37, p. 23- 'Z. N. 0, y.i no. 3, pp. 107-108, contains the text of the proclamation. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 177 its authority by the principles of international cooperation which actuated the League of Nations. It assured the people that it would not allow them to be exploited or to be underpaid for their labor and that it would '' concern itself specially with the development of industry and the condition of the workers'/. The first task of the Governing Commission, after the distri- bution of departments among the different members,^ was to modify and replace as rapidly as possible the military regime, which was still as onerous as ever in spite of the fact that the Treaty of Versailles was nearly a year old. Realizing how heavily the military control bore on the inhabitants and how productive it was of discontent, the Governing Commission immediately took measures calculated to restore in large part the political and civil liberties of the inhabitants. It restored complete freedom of movement in the Territory. It abolished the military police courts, asserting in its report to the Council of the League of Nations that '' no inhabitant of the Saar will henceforth be summoned before a court-martial ", and promul- gated an amnesty ordinance covering sentences which had been pronounced by the military police courts.^ The electoral law drawn up by the commission after consultation with the political parties of the Territory was decidedly liberal. For the archaic Prussian " three-class system " of voting, a democratic electoral regime was substituted, providing for universal adult suffrage, the secret ballot and proportional representation.^ ^ L,N. O. y., no. 3, p. lor; no. 4, p. 192. A provisional distribution of 'duties among the members was made in the absence of the fifth member. As revised after bis appearance the assignments were as follov^rs : The President, M.,Rault (French Member)— Interior, Foreign Affairs, Commer(^, Industry and Labor. M. Lambert (Belgian) — Public Works, Railways and Postal and Telegraphic Service. Von Boch (Saar) — Agriculture, Public Health and Social Insurance. Von Moltke Hvitfeldt (Dane) — Public Education, Ecclesiastical Affairs and Justice. R. D. Waugh (Canadian) — Finance, Food Control. 'First Report of the Saar Basin Governing Commission, League of Nations Official Journal^ no. 3, p. 104. ' Second Report of S. B. G. C, op. cit.^ no. 4, pp. 2CX3-203. 178 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI The economic situation also demanded attention, but unfortu- nately in economic matters the Territory was at the mercy of France and Germany, and the Governing Commission could do little in the way of safeguarding local interests. For example, the factories in the Saar district were seriously handicapped by their inability to obtain from the French, who were now in pos- session of the mines, an adequate supply of coal.^ Under the terms of the treaty, however, the Governing Commission had no power to give domestic needs precedence over foreign de- mands ; it could only insist on the maintenance of the " pro- portion existing in 191 3 between the amount consumed locally and the total output of the Saar Basin." ^ A similar impotence on the part of the Governing Commis- sion was exhibited when the French State Mines decided to pay their employees and conduct their financial transactions in francs instead of marks. Even the mere probability that such a step would be taken had aroused the keenest apprehension and alarm in the Saar Basin. It would certainly entail an increase in the cost of living, and it would almost inevitably cause hardship to certain classes among the inhabitants. Yet the hands of the Governing Commission were tied by the treaty, which specific- ally permitted the introduction of French currency, at the option of France. The commission could and did issue a futile warn- ing that the change of currency would not only '' compromise legitimate interests, such as small unearned incomes and pen- sions of all kinds ", but also arouse political opposition.^ Never- theless, the measure went into effect, and the most the commis- sion could do was to mitigate the evil consequences in some measure by regulating prices.'^ This, indeed, was done, but only after forty thousand metal-workers had evinced their dis- satisfaction by going out on strike.^ Trouble arose with Germany as well as with France. The * Third Report of S. B. G. C, op. cit.^ no. 5, p. 277. 2 Treaty of Versailles, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, paragraph 15. 'Third Report of S. B. G. C, L. N. Official Journal, no. 5, p. 278. * Fourth Report of S. B. G. C., op. cit.^ no. 6, p. 370. ^ Ibid., p. 369. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 179 Saar had long been accustomed to importing the bulk of its foodstuffs and merchandise from Germany. The depreciation of the mark in consequence of the war only increased the de- pendence of the Saar district on Germany, because the pur- chasing power of the mark was greater in Germany than in France and other countries. It was therefore a severe blow to the inhabitants of the Saar Basin when, on April 10, 1920, the German government announced that the frontier would be closed to both exports and imports. In this emergency, the commis- sion sought concessions from the German government, and pro- visionally admitted into the Saarbrlicken Chamber of Commerce a representative of the Imperial German Commissioner for Exports and Imports, with authority to ** make the necessary adjustments" with a view to facilitating commercial transactions between Germany and the Saar.^ The steel works of the Basin were compelled to reduce their output because the requisite supply of coke could no longer be obtained from Germany.^ The partial shutting-down of the steel works, coming at a time when the workers were demanding higher wages to meet the increased cost of living, still further aggravated the burden of economic privation and social discontent. In another direction the Governing Commission was more successful. A French decree of April 23 had prohibited the importation of certain articles into France. As the Saar had been drawn into the French customs regime, these articles pre- sumably were also barred from the Saar Basin. It so happened that the list included food and other articles of daily use which the Territory had to purchase from Germany. Learning of the decree, the inhabitants became alarmed and representations were made to the Governing Commission. M. Rault, acting for the commission, then went to Paris and succeeded in securing the assurance that the decree would not apply to the Saar Basin.3 On the whole, the commission seems to have lost few oppor- tunities to demonstrate its good will toward the inhabitants of * Second Report of S. B. G. C, op. cit.^ no. 4, p. 192. 'Third Report of S. B. G. C, op. cit., no. 5, p. 277. *IHd., p. 283. l8o POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI the Territory. Although its financial condition was anything but flourishing, it voted credits for private philanthropies and considered plans to encourage, by means of loans without in- terest, sorely needed housing construction in Saarbriicken.^ From the very first, however, the Governing Commission seems to have met with considerable opposition and suspicion. If its acts happened to be above criticism, its motives were im- pugned. It seems to have faced hostility from the German officials, the teaching profession, the clergy and the " higher industrial and commercial classes." It encountered open and bitter opposition from most of the newspapers of the Territory. This opposition, the Governing Commission has intimated, was greatly aggravated, if indeed it was not primarily instigated, by certain organizations financed by Germany. ^^ Under these circumstances the Governing Commission soon receded at several points from its original liberal stand. Al- though it had announced that steps were being taken for the complete restoration of the liberty of the press and had decreed the final abolition of courts-martial, it was soon constrained to withdraw from the position it had taken on these matters. The occasion was a bitter attack on the French Army in the Socialist paper Volksstimme. The commander of the French troops in the Territory asked the commission for its approval of the in- stitution of court-martial proceedings against the offending editor and the commission offered no objection.3 Subsequently, in a report to the Council, the commission justified its action on the ground that it was still dependent on the French troops, not having been able to organize a police force up to that time, and that it could not safely allow aspersions to be cast on the French military forces. Moreover, since the new civil and criminal courts which the commission was authorized to establish had not yet come into being, and inasmuch as there was a strong proba- bility that, regardless of the merits of the case, the offending editor would have been ** ostentatiously acquitted " if tried be- 1 Third Report of S. B. G. C, op. Hi., no. 5, p. 284. ^ Jbid.f pp. 284-285. ■Second Report of S. B. G. C, op. aV., no. 4, pp. 196-197. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION igj fore a local tribunal, the commission had " allowed military justice to take its course ". By an order of the tenth of June, admission to the Territory was made more difficult, freedom of movement within the Basin was circumscribed, and the commission began the preparation of a plan for controlling the movements of foreigners. These measures no doubt were dictated largely by a desire to discourage German propaganda against the French and against the Gov- erning Commission.' Quite as drastic was the action taken by the commission in April, 1920, when a railway strike appeared to be imminent. On April 28, the commission issued a decree warning the popu- lace that in the event of such a strike a state of siege would be proclaimed, and the personnel necessary to operate the railways would be obtained by requisitioning civilians. In this case, the commission may well have been motivated by solicitude for French military requirements as well as by a determination not to permit any interruption of the transportation services upon which the food supply of the Basin's dense population depended. Moreover, the commission considered it to be a duty to provide the railway facilities demanded by French exploitation of the mines.' A measure of quite different character, but one that could hardly be popular, was the decree of July 7, whereby the Governing Commission " intrusted to the Government of the French Republic " the duty of protecting the foreign interests of the inhabitants of the Saar Basin — a duty which the Treaty of Versailles had imposed upon the Governing Commission itself.3 The contention of the Governing Commission that the slender financial resources of the Territory could not bear the strain of a separate diplomatic establishment is less open to question than the choice of France as representative of the Territory. To have intrusted this important function to some neutral power rather than to an interested party would have * Fourth Report of S. B. G. C, op. cii.y no. 6, p. 372. ^ L. N. O. J y no. 4, p. 194. * Fourth Report of S. B. G. C, op, cit.^ no. 6, p. 374. 1 82 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXVI been not only more consonant with the spirit of the League of Nations, but also better calculated to inspire confidence in the high motives of the Governing Commission. It is obviously too early as yet to speculate with any assurance on the future of this first experiment in international adminis- tration under the League of Nations. The period covered in this paper, a transitional period characterized by tentative de- cisions and provisional measures, marks but the first stage of the experiment. The second stage, ushered in by the election of the first legislative assemblies in July, 1920, cannot now be described. Yet it is in this latter stage, which provides formal opportunities for closer cooperation and at the same time multi- plies the chances for friction between the Governing Commis- sion and the representatives of the inhabitants, that the test will come.' Certain observations, however, may be ventured at this time. While it is true that the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles upon the authority of the Governing Commission make it theoretically impossible for the commission to oppress the native population, it is no less true that the terms of the treaty seriously circumscribe the commission's power to pro- mote or even to protect the material interests of the inhabi- tants. Influential Germans dwelling in the Territory could not be unaware of this, and they were sure to govern themselves accordingly. Anticipating their hostility, the commission as- sumed an attitude of firmness tempered by gestures of concili- ation. It was careful to keep the weapon of physical force in the background as much as possible, but unfortunately the moral weapon, upon which it must depend for any permanent victory over the forces opposed to its authority, could not be used with freedom. Indeed, to kill opposition with kindness was a Herculean task. French ambition, German hostility, and — one might add — the rigorous terms of the treaty, were powerful and apparently permanent factors militating against ^According to the terms of the Treaty (Part III, Sec. 4, Annex, paragraphs 23, 26), the Governing Commission was under obligations, as soon as the Territorial as- semblies should be convened, to consult them before modifications and changes in the laws might be made. No. 2] THE SAAR BASIN GOVERNING COMMISSION 183 the success of a conciliatory policy. Tliat the commission tried the methods of conference and discussion, reserving the weapon of force for emergencies, is to its credit. That it did not always succeed by the first method, and that it too frequently had to resort to the second, is not necessarily to be attributed either to lack of sincerity or to failure of judgment, but rather usually to a set of circumstances over which it did not have the necessary control. If despite these difficulties the commission's regime should ultimately prove conducive to material prosperity as well as to civil liberty, even the most skeptical among us will be compelled to admit that the principle of international admin- istration has been vindicated by an exceptionally severe test. F. M. Russell. Stanford University.