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 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE
 
 NEW EGYPT 
 
 BT 
 
 A. B. DE GUERVILLE 
 
 NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION. PRICE 10*. NET. 
 
 (Some Press Opinions) 
 
 " This delightful book, . . well written, crowded with 
 information and beautiful illustrations . . . should be 
 read by every man who cares for his country and for 
 humanity." Liverpool Pott. 
 
 " A high tribute to the success of Lord Cromer's rule." 
 The Academy. 
 
 " Conveys a more vivid impression of Egypt than any 
 other volume I remember. . . The illustrations are ad- 
 mirably selected and most artistically arranged." 
 Review of Reviews. 
 
 " Anyone going to Egypt for pleasure ought to have 
 with him a copy. It is a perfect example of the sort of 
 volume to be bought abounding in bright glimpses of 
 the land which is the traveller's goal. . . The reader 
 feels that his guide has gone carefully through these 
 sources of knowledge, and that the general statements 
 presented with such lucidity are the result of careful 
 study." Morning Post. 
 
 LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 
 21 BEDFORD STREET, W.C.
 
 THE EGYPT 
 OF THE FUTURE 
 
 BY 
 
 EDWARD DICEY, C.B. 
 
 Author of "Story of the Khcdivate" 
 
 LONDON 
 
 WILLIAM HEINEMANN 
 
 1907
 
 Copyright '. 1907, by William Heinemann
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT .... 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 25 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 64 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE . 93 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 129 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED TO-DAY 156 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE FUTURE OP EGYPT . 186
 
 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 
 
 IN my Story of the Khedivate I endeavoured 
 to narrate the history of Egypt from the day 
 when Mohammed All landed in Egypt as the 
 envoy of the Sultan with a commission from 
 the Porte to restore the authority of Turkey 
 which had been almost reduced to a nullity by 
 the Mamelukes up to the present time when 
 His Highness Abbas II. rules Egypt, nominally 
 as the vassal of his Suzerain, but in reality as 
 the figurehead of a British administration sup- 
 ported by British troops. My object in the 
 sequel to the Story of the Khedivate, which I 
 have ventured to call The Egypt of the Future, is 
 to direct attention to certain defects in British 
 administration under our Protectorate, and to 
 the policy by which these defects could best be 
 
 B
 
 2 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 rectified. Before, however, I can ask my readers 
 to accept my views on the Egypt of the future 
 as worthy of consideration, I deem it well to 
 recall the general character of my relations with 
 Egypt during close upon forty odd years. Let 
 me tell this narrative as briefly and as imparti- 
 ally as is consistent with showing that, for the 
 major portion of my life, I have played a humble 
 part as an interested spectator, though never as 
 an actor, during a very momentous period of 
 history both for my own country and for Egypt. 
 The first occasion of my coming to the Valley 
 of the Nile was the opening of the Suez Canal 
 in 1869. The glamour of that gorgeous pageant 
 comes back to me as I write, but to dwell upon 
 the lavish hospitality displayed by Ismail Pasha 
 towards his invited guests would lead me too far 
 from my subject to justify me in saying anything 
 beyond the bare statement that the reorganisa- 
 tion of Egypt owes more to the first of the 
 Khedives than to any other man, native or 
 foreigner, living or dead. After Ismail had fallen 
 from his high estate it was the fashion of his 
 critics to denounce him as a fraudulent bank- 
 rupt, who had squandered the money of his 
 country in order to gratify his personal vanity
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 3 
 
 and to fill his own pockets. At the time, however, 
 when the Canal was inaugurated, he was popu- 
 larly regarded, not only as the wealthiest, but as 
 the most enlightened of Oriental rulers. Both 
 estimates were untrue, but the latter estimate 
 came nearer the truth than the former. In 
 justice to a Prince, who with many great and 
 grave errors combined lofty ambitions and singu- 
 lar ability, it should be borne in mind that of 
 the ninety odd millions with which he burdened 
 the finances of Egypt, by far the larger portion 
 was spent on the Suez Canal, which could not 
 have been constructed without his lavish aid ; 
 on the Alexandrian breakwater ; on the Soudan 
 railway ; on the immense sugar factories ; on 
 the annexation of the Soudan, by which the 
 dominion of Egypt was extended under the 
 governorship of Sir Samuel Baker to the Equa- 
 torial Lakes ; and on a variety of industrial 
 enterprises which, though they administered to 
 his personal ambition, contributed also to the 
 development of Egypt. 
 
 I need hardly say that 1, in common with 
 every intelligent man in Egypt, whether foreign 
 or native, am absolutely convinced that, under 
 his administration of Egypt, Lord Cromer has 
 
 B2
 
 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 been actuated by no sordid or self-seeking con- 
 siderations. But this conviction is quite consis- 
 tent with a belief on my part, that though, so long 
 as Egypt is under our military occupation, 
 supreme authority must rest with the representa- 
 tive of our virtual Protectorate, it does not 
 logically follow that our interference with the 
 authority of the Government should be based on 
 the system which his Lordship has pursued that 
 of administering Egyptian affairs by British 
 officials. I have always maintained that the 
 right policy for England as well as Egypt was 
 that propounded by Lord Dufferin in his masterly 
 report, and advocated by Nubar Pasha up to the 
 end of his life, namely, that we should administer 
 Egypt as we administer the native States of 
 India, not directly by British officials, but in- 
 directly by native officials under the personal 
 supervision of a British resident. In the follow- 
 ing chapters of this book I shall deal with the 
 present position of Egypt as illustrating the 
 merits and demerits of the two systems of ad- 
 ministration, the one proposed by Lord Dufferin, 
 the other carried into execution by Lord Cromer. 
 All I need point out here is that the latter 
 system, however admirably it has worked in
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 5 
 
 developing the material resources of Egypt, has 
 completely failed in gaining the sympathy or 
 winning the respect of the native population. 
 There is, therefore, no inconsistency on my part, 
 as being one of the oldest advocates of a British 
 Protectorate over Egypt, that I should at the 
 same time argue that our Protectorate would be 
 strengthened, if in the internal administration 
 of the country we gave more scope to native in- 
 fluences and ideas and ruled Egypt in accordance 
 with Oriental convictions, traditions and usages, 
 by native administrators. There are, as I shall 
 explain later on, many difficulties in the way of 
 introducing British ideas of justice, morality and 
 government. But if I succeed in showing that 
 the Anglification of Egypt by British officials is 
 an absolute impossibility, I see myself no incom- 
 patibility in my advocating as our paramount 
 duty the maintenance of our supreme authority 
 as essential to the safety of our highway to 
 India, and in my also contending that our 
 supreme authority would be strengthened instead 
 of weakened if we relinquished a futile attempt 
 to implant British ideas in an Oriental population 
 through the agency of British officials. 
 
 The strongest impression left on my mind
 
 6 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 by my visit to Egypt in 1869 was the vital 
 importance to England of the Suez Canal. At 
 this period French influence was absolutely 
 supreme in Egypt. The Empress Eugenie was 
 the figurehead of the gorgeous pageant to which 
 I have already alluded. She was so, not so 
 much as the consort of Napoleon III., then 
 regarded as the most powerful sovereign in 
 Europe, nor on account of her romantic 
 history, her great beauty and her singular charm 
 of manner, but as the chosen representative 
 of the Second Empire. Everywhere Her Majesty 
 had the place of honour. She was the one 
 centre of attraction. The Entente Cordiale 
 was not even dreamt of in those days, when 
 the offices, the railroads, the steam-boat services 
 in Egypt were all filled with Frenchmen ; French 
 was the language of the cosmopolitan society 
 of Cairo. The Khedive, the Princes, the 
 Ministers and the courtiers of the vice-regal 
 palaces, all, as a rule, spoke French. I think 
 at this time, the Court, taking their tone from 
 Ismail Pasha, were growing a little uneasy at 
 the air of proprietorship assumed by the French 
 officials and politicians after the formal opening 
 of the Canal across the Isthmus. According,
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 7 
 
 therefore, to all the tenets of Oriental diplomacy 
 the Khedive and his Ministers endeavoured to 
 enlist the sympathies of the nation most likely to 
 oppose the establishment of a French Protectorate 
 over Egypt. That nation was clearly England. 
 In consequence, all the English visitors to Cairo 
 at this period received an exceptionally warm 
 welcome at the hands of the Khedive and his 
 Ministers. M. de Lesseps, it is also fair to add, 
 showed special civility to the English visitors 
 who had eome to witness the triumph of his great 
 enterprise. Of all my early recollections of 
 Egypt, the pleasantest were perhaps those of 
 the days I spent at his chalet in Ismailia and 
 of the visits we paid to the different points 
 of interest in the Canal. At the opening 
 I made the journey through the Canal on the 
 Hawk, a vessel belonging to the Telegraph 
 Construction Company, and had the pleasure 
 of making the acquaintance of a large number 
 of financiers, engineers, shipowners and mer- 
 chants, who looked upon the Canal from a 
 business point of view. As to the Canal having 
 been proved capable of construction there was 
 no longer any possibility of doubt. We had 
 sailed ourselves from the Mediterranean to the
 
 8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Red Sea, and as to the feasibility of the transit 
 all we could say was Solvitur ambulando. But 
 even after we had made the passage, grave 
 doubts were entertained, and I think honestly 
 entertained, by the majority of our fellow 
 passengers as to the Suez Canal being kept open 
 permanently, or as to its proving a financial 
 success, or even of the new route being largely 
 utilised by British shipping. The chief opponent 
 of these depreciatory views was the late Sir John 
 Hankshaw, who had always contended in 
 opposition to almost all the leading engineers in 
 England that not only the Suez Canal could 
 and would be made, but that when it was made 
 it had come to stay. It was from a speech 
 delivered by Sir John when the Hawk was 
 stationed in the Bitter Lakes that my attention 
 was first called to the fact that the Canal was 
 destined to be our highway to our Indian 
 Empire. 
 
 At this period, however, there seemed to be 
 no immediate prospect of British interests being 
 gravely affected by the predominance of France 
 in Egypt. His Highness Ismail Pasha was then 
 regarded at home and abroad as the founder of 
 a new Egypt, as a Prince possessing untold
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 9 
 
 wealth and practically unlimited resources, 
 immense energy, high ambitions, firmly seated 
 on his throne and resolved to uphold the inde- 
 pendence of his kingdom against all comers. If 
 this forecast was correct, there was no immediate 
 danger of France assuming a position in Egypt 
 which would enable her to shut out England 
 from the free use of the Suez Canal. On this 
 hypothesis, the question whether our highway 
 to India would be endangered by the creation 
 of a new maritime route between the West and 
 the East was regarded rather as an academic 
 controversy than as a matter of practical politics. 
 In the course of a few months the question of 
 the Suez Canal was driven out of notice by the 
 outbreak of the War between France and 
 Germany, the fall of the Second Empire, the 
 disastrous defeat of the French armies through- 
 out the campaign, which ended in the entry of 
 the German troops into Paris, and the outbreak 
 of the Commune. It was in September 1869 that 
 I had seen the Empress Eugenie for the last 
 time in Egypt at the ball given in her honour 
 at the Ismailia Palace erected for this special 
 purpose on the banks of the Bitter Lakes, when 
 her arrival was saluted by all the ships of war
 
 io THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 moored opposite Ismailia. It was in September 
 1870 that I next saw Her Majesty arriving 
 in a one-horse fly at the Charing Cross Station 
 in London on her way to Chislehurst, and 
 struggling in vain to force her way to the plat- 
 form through a dense crowd of holiday folk, 
 amongst whom she passed unknown and un- 
 noticed. With this dramatic incident my personal 
 connection with Egyptian affairs terminated for 
 the time, and only revived in 1876. 
 
 During this interval the whole position of 
 Egypt had been altered. The fall of the Second 
 Empire and the consequent defeat of France had 
 proved fatal to the influence on which Ismail 
 had based his financial projects. With some 
 reason he had relied upon the support of 
 Napoleon III., and even more perhaps on that 
 of the Empress Eugenie, in assisting him to 
 carry out his grandiose conceptions for the 
 aggrandisement of himself and his country. 
 Had the Napoleonic dynasty remained in power, 
 it is, to say the least, probable that he might 
 have raised money on reasonable terms till such 
 time as his vast projects became remunerative. 
 But from a France crippled by the indemnity 
 of the forty milliards, and governed by a
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT n 
 
 Kepublic hostile to Imperial traditions, no such 
 help could be expected. I suspect myself that 
 even at the inauguration of the Suez Canal 
 Ismail's financial position had become well-nigh 
 desperate. However this may be, His Highness 
 resorted to borrowing enormous sums, first at 
 extravagant, and later on at usurious rates, and 
 by this means he tided off the evil day for some 
 years to come. By 1875, however, his grave 
 embarrassments had become matter of public 
 notoriety. In this year Lord Beaconsfield, then 
 Mr. Benjamin Disraeli, purchased in the name 
 of the British Government the 4,000,000 of 
 the Suez Canal Deferred Shares held by the 
 Khedive, and in 1876, at his instance, the late 
 Mr. Stephen Cave, a highly respected Bristol 
 banker, was sent out to Cairo on a mission whose 
 avowed object was to conduct an examination 
 into the finances of Egypt. He took with him 
 a large staff and was welcomed by Ismail Pasha 
 as if he was the bearer of some important pro- 
 posal. The general belief entertained at the 
 Khedivial Court was that, if Mr. Cave's report 
 should prove favourable as to the intrinsic 
 solvency of Egypt, the British Government was 
 prepared to guarantee the public debt of Egypt
 
 12 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 in consideration of the Khedive consenting to a 
 virtual, if not a nominal, British Protectorate 
 over Egypt. 
 
 At that time I was in close relations with 
 certain financiers who were large holders of 
 Egyptian securities, and at their request I went 
 out to Cairo to learn as much as I could of the 
 true state of affairs. My stay there was sud- 
 denly cut short by the abrupt recall of the Cave 
 mission on the official ground that Mr. Cave 
 found any searching investigation of Egyptian 
 finances to be a task which would require a far 
 longer absence from his own business than he 
 could possibly afford. I have strong reason to 
 believe that the real cause of the recall was that 
 the late Lord Derby, then Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs, offered so violent an antagonism 
 to the idea of any British Protectorate over 
 Egypt that the Premier recognised the impossi- 
 bility of carrying out his Protectorate policy 
 without breaking up his Ministry, and thereupon 
 informed Mr. Cave, to the great disappointment 
 of Ismail Pasha, that a further prolongation of 
 Mr. Cave's mission of enquiry could be of no 
 practical advantage. During my second stay 
 in Cairo I learnt a good deal as to the
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 13 
 
 permanent financial condition of the country, 
 and, what was to me far more important, I formed 
 a friendship with Nubar Pasha which remained 
 uninterrupted till his death. He was the one 
 great statesman, Egyptian or European, I have 
 ever known in Cairo, and it is to him more than 
 any other person I am indebted for such know- 
 ledge as I possess of the land which has been to 
 me of late years almost a second country. 
 
 By Mr. Cave's advice upon his return, my old 
 friend Sir (then Mr.) Rivers Wilson, was sent out 
 to complete the interrupted investigation into the 
 finances of Egypt. In 1877 I was in constant 
 relations with Nubar Pasha, who then, when not 
 actually an exile, was out of favour with the 
 Vice-regal Court and was living in Paris, whence 
 he made frequent visits to London. In that 
 year I published several articles in the Nine- 
 teenth Century which were suggested to me by 
 Nubar, and which attracted considerable attention. 
 The subject matter of those articles dealt mainly 
 with issues which belong to the past rather than 
 the present. The only one to which I would 
 call attention nowadays is one entitled " Our 
 Route to India," as it explains the ideas 
 which for thirty years I have advocated as
 
 i 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 justifying a British Protectorate over Egypt by 
 England. In this article, published in 1877, I 
 stated that 
 
 " Whether we like it or not we are bound to 
 face the contingency that at no distant period 
 Eussia may command the head of the Euphrates 
 valley by land and the Bosphorus by sea. The 
 mere possibility that Russia may obtain the 
 command of the Bosphorus renders it a matter 
 of urgent necessity to us to secure the command 
 of the Isthmus route to India. In order to effect 
 this we must have the power of keeping the 
 Suez Canal open to our ships at all times and 
 under all circumstances ; and to secure this we 
 must acquire a recognised footing in the Delta of 
 Egypt of a far more decided character than any 
 we can claim at present . . . 
 
 " In order therefore to secure our freedom of 
 uninterrupted access to India across the Isthmus 
 it is essential that we should not only have an 
 unrestricted right of employing its waters for 
 war purposes, but that the course from sea to sea 
 as well as its ports of ingress and egress should be 
 under our protection. No strategical knowledge 
 is required to appreciate the importance of the 
 control of the Canal to England. . . The com- 
 mand of the Suez Canal involves of necessity the 
 virtual occupation of Lower Egypt. . . 
 
 " It would be mere hypocrisy to contend that 
 the primary motive with which I, and those who 
 think with me, advocate the occupation of
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 15 
 
 Egypt, is a desire to benefit the condition of 
 its people ; if that were our motive it would 
 be our duty to recommend the annexation of 
 Upper as well as of Lower Egypt. The reason 
 why I advocate the measure is because I regard 
 it as one demanded by our Imperial interests 
 under the changes now impending in the East. 
 Still it is not unimportant to show that in thus 
 protecting our route to India we should at the 
 same time, as I believe, confer a great boon upon 
 the people of Egypt." 
 
 On Mr. Wilson's arrival in Egypt, Ismail 
 Pasha issued a decree appointing a Commission 
 of Enquiry of which Mr. Kivers Wilson and 
 Major Baring (now Lord Cromer), then a 
 member of the Caisse de la Dette, were 
 appointed as the representatives of the British 
 Government. The Commission of Enquiry, after 
 long and tedious negotiations, succeeded in in- 
 ducing Ismail to surrender his private estates to 
 the services of the floating debt, and thereby saved 
 the credit of Egypt. It had been arranged before- 
 hand that the Commission of Enquiry should be 
 succeeded by a Commission of Liquidation. 
 This arrangement was, however, knocked on 
 the head by a sudden announcement on the 
 part of the Khedive that he had resolved upon
 
 16 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 establishing constitutional government in Egypt 
 by appointing an International Ministry of 
 which Nubar Pasha was to be the President, 
 with Mr. Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance 
 and M. de Blignieres as Minister of Public 
 Works. As an intimate friend of Mr. Rivers 
 Wilson and of Nubar Pasha, and as a writer 
 on Egyptian affairs of some small weight in 
 England, I was invited to come out to Egypt 
 with the view of ultimately entering the 
 Egyptian public service. For various reasons, 
 public as well as private, I came to the conclusion 
 that I could be of more service to the interests I 
 had at heart if I remained independent, and, 
 in consideration of the services I had rendered, 
 Rivers Wilson and Nubar Pasha facilitated my 
 obtaining a concession together with the Ottoman 
 Bank for the establishment of an Egyptian 
 Credit Foncier. I was obliged, for private reasons, 
 to leave Cairo suddenly just after the Concession 
 in question had been granted and after Ismail 
 Pasha had given his European Ministers to 
 understand that he did not approve of the 
 limitations which they thought it their duty 
 to impose upon his autocratic power. I was not, 
 therefore, greatly surprised to learn shortly after
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 17 
 
 my return to England that His Highness had 
 dismissed the so-called Anglo-French Ministry 
 and was determined to forbid the prosecution of 
 the Commission of Liquidation, which they had 
 proposed to institute without further delay. 
 
 It would be foreign to my present purpose to 
 discuss how far Ismail Pasha could have held 
 his throne, or whether England and France were 
 well advised in appealing to the authority of 
 the Sultan in order to secure the deposition 
 of Ismail and the nomination of Tewfik as the 
 successor to his father's throne. Suffice it to 
 say that I returned to Egypt in the following 
 year in connection with the Credit Foncier, of 
 which company, in conjunction with M. Raphael 
 Suares, who had taken the place left vacant by 
 the retirement of the Ottoman Bank, I was one 
 of the original promoters and directors and 
 remained on the Board for ten years. In this 
 way I formed a close intimacy with the leading 
 financial authorities in Egypt, an intimacy which 
 I have retained up to the present day. 
 
 My next visit to Egypt was made at the end 
 of 1880, when Tewfik Pasha had succeeded to 
 the Khedivate. I was present at the com- 
 mencement of the Arabi insurrection, when the 
 
 c
 
 1 8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Egyptian troops mutinied in the square of the 
 Palace of Abdin, and when the mutiny was 
 quelled for the time by the Khedive accept- 
 ing the demands of the insurgent leader. The 
 late Sir William Gregory, a very old friend of 
 my own, who, with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, had 
 espoused the cause of the mutiny, and who, I 
 believe, composed the letters to the British 
 Press which Arabi was supposed to have written 
 himself over the signature of "Achmed the 
 Egyptian," introduced me to Arabi and his 
 colleagues. This introduction gave me con- 
 siderable light as to the intrinsic weakness of 
 any Egyptian agitation based on Nationalist 
 principles. A stronger man than the then 
 reigning Khedive might probably have sup- 
 pressed the rising at its outbreak, but it is only 
 fair to remember that Tewfik had been placed 
 on the throne as the nominee of the Porte, and 
 that he was thus placed in a position under 
 which he bore all the responsibility of personal 
 rule without the power to make his authority 
 respected. Egypt was then under the Dual 
 Control, the most illogical of the many illogical 
 systems under which the country has ever been 
 administered. The two controllers were Sir
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 19 
 
 Auckland Colvin and M. de Blignieres, both of 
 them intelligent and fair-minded gentlemen, but 
 both alike paralysed by the divergence of views 
 existing between their respective Governments. 
 As soon as England had advised the suppression 
 of the mutiny by force of arms, France espoused 
 the cause of the mutiny as calculated to dis- 
 parage the credit of her fellow-partner in the 
 Dual Control. The French Government, ani- 
 mated in those days by its traditional hostility 
 towards Great Britain, and led astray by 
 exaggerated reports as to the authority exercised 
 by Arabi over the native population of Egypt, 
 finally went the length of withdrawing its fleet 
 when England announced her intention of 
 bombarding Alexandria and suppressing the 
 insurrection by British troops. The action of 
 France, however, unintentionally, freed the 
 hands of England ; and after the campaign, 
 which ended in Tel-el-Kebir and in the restora- 
 tion of Tewfik to the Khedivial throne by 
 British troops, the supremacy of England in 
 Egypt was established by the logic of facts. 
 The Dual Control was abolished and the 
 military occupation of Egypt by British troops 
 was deemed, and rightly deemed, to be an 
 
 c 2
 
 20 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 absolute necessity till such time as the 
 authority of the Khedivial Government had 
 been definitely restored. Throughout this 
 critical period I was not personally present 
 in Egypt, but I was in constant communication 
 with political, financial, and social notabilities 
 in Egypt, who kept me closely informed of 
 their views and ideas, and I may perhaps 
 claim that my personal absence enabled me to 
 form a clearer and more impartial view of the 
 situation than I could have formed if 1 had 
 been on the spot. 
 
 I returned to Egypt in 1882, after Arabi had 
 been sentenced to death and had had his 
 sentence commuted to exile in deference to a 
 sentimental outcry in his favour on the part 
 of the British public. I had the opportunity 
 of discussing the then position of affairs with 
 Nubar, Cherif, Kiaz, Fakri Pashas, and with 
 Tigrane Bey, all of whom were very desirous 
 of ascertaining how far England's promise of 
 speedily terminating her military occupation 
 was made in good faith or was only intended to 
 throw dust in the eyes, not so much of Egypt, 
 as of France and the other leading Continental 
 Powers. My answer always was that the
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 21 
 
 promise had been made with absolute honesty ; 
 and that there was no statesman in England 
 and no influential party who genuinely desired 
 to convert our military occupation into a per- 
 manent Protectorate. At the same time I 
 expressed my own conviction that when once 
 England had pledged her word to continue her 
 occupation till such time as Egypt had, under 
 British administration, been rendered capable of 
 protecting herself against internal or external 
 dangers, she had committed herself to a course 
 of action incapable of fulfilment. In the course 
 of my conversations on the above subject I 
 remember quoting the opinion expressed to 
 me on my way through Paris on my outward 
 journey by the late Baron de Soubeyran when, 
 to a question of his, as to the intentions of the 
 British Government, I replied that they con- 
 sidered our military occupation as simply pro- 
 visoire. His answer was ' ' *Tadmets bien que 
 c'est provisoire, mais c'est un - provisoire qui 
 durera eternellement." I replied this was 
 exactly my own opinion, but that it was not 
 that of my fellow-countrymen. Thirty years 
 have passed since these conversations took place, 
 but if I was asked my own opinion to-day, I
 
 22 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 should still adhere to Baron de Soubeyran's 
 dictum. 
 
 I spent the winters in Cairo every year up to 
 1885. During this year I was in constant 
 relations with my old friend Sir Henry Drum- 
 mond Wolff, who had been sent out there by 
 the late Lord Salisbury's first Ministry at the 
 instigation of Lord Kandolph Churchill, in order 
 to negotiate with Mukhtar Pasha a convention for 
 the withdrawal of the British Army of occupa- 
 tion and its replacement in case of any dis- 
 turbance by Turkish troops. The statement 
 that the Wolff mission was decided upon owing 
 to a genuine, however impracticable, desire on 
 the part of the then Government to free them- 
 selves from their military obligations towards 
 Egypt, is established beyond the possibility 
 of doubt by the fact that the convention was 
 sanctioned by the British Government, and would 
 have become operative but for the Sultan's 
 refusal, on the advice of France, to ratify the 
 convention. I learnt of the collapse of the con- 
 vention to my great personal satisfaction, and I 
 have seen no reason to change my mind as to 
 the action of France having unintentionally 
 proved a benefit, not only to England, but to
 
 MY RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 23 
 
 Egypt. Shortly before the resignation of the 
 Salisbury Ministry I was appointed a Civil 
 Companion of the Bath " in recognition of 
 services rendered in Egypt." I may add that 
 Lord Randolph saw cause later on during the 
 remainder of his too brief life when I was on 
 terms of exceptional intimacy with him to alter 
 materially his views about Egypt. 
 
 Owing to private circumstances there was, 
 after 1886, a break in my visits to Egypt, and 
 when I returned there again in 1900, Tewfik 
 Pasha whom I had learnt to know and respect for 
 the good sense and loyalty he displayed in the 
 very difficult position of a nominally independent 
 Sovereign under virtual British control had 
 died, and His Highness Abbas II. reigned in his 
 stead. 
 
 In the course of this book I may have to 
 say something more as to the personal characters 
 of the three Khedives whom I have known 
 personally. To form any trustworthy forecast 
 of the future of Egypt, it is necessary to under- 
 stand the latest chapter of Egyptian history, 
 during which England has become a dominant 
 factor in the fortunes of the Khedivial kingdom. 
 Since 1900 I have been a well-nigh regular
 
 24 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 visitor to Egypt and have made many fresh 
 acquaintances and new friends in the land of 
 the Pharaohs. It is with somewhat of a pang 
 that, looking back on the past, I cannot recall a 
 single one of the friends I made or of the people 
 I had known during my first sojourn in Egypt 
 who is still amongst the living, or if still alive 
 has not left Egypt for good. 
 
 I trust, however, I have said enough in these 
 initial pages to show that I am qualified to form 
 opinions as to the future of Egypt from my 
 knowledge of the last seven-and-thirty years, and 
 that whether these opinions of mine be right 
 or wrong, they deserve attention as those of a 
 writer who has seriously studied the conditions 
 of Egypt, and from his life-long study has arrived 
 at certain definite conclusions.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 
 
 IT is close upon five-and-thirty years ago, on 
 the occasion of my first visit to Cairo, that one 
 night driving homewards through the native 
 quarters, which in those days reached almost up 
 to Shepheard's Hotel, I stopped in front of an 
 open-air Cafe', where a dense crowd of natives 
 sat listening eagerly to a Dervish singing or, 
 perhaps I should say, intoning, a sort of metrical 
 romance. I asked my dragoman what the Der- 
 vish was reciting, and was told in reply that he 
 was discoursing of the old days, when Egypt was 
 the greatest nation amidst the peoples of the 
 world. I remember writing at the time rather 
 in jest than in earnest that perhaps before long 
 Europe might be confronted with an Egyptian 
 question. It seems as if this random forecast is 
 likely to be fulfilled at an earlier date than I had
 
 26 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 ever anticipated. For it is, to say the least, 
 upon the cards that the obvious ambition of 
 Turkey to reassert her Suzerainty over the 
 Khedivial Kingdom may lead to an European 
 enquiry into the position of England in 
 Egypt. 
 
 I shall probably be told that both Europe and 
 Egypt are so satisfied with the results of our 
 Protectorate that there is no cause to apprehend 
 any external or internal interference with its 
 maintenance ; and that the British authorities in 
 Egypt entertain no such apprehensions. I shall 
 doubtless be also informed that it is inconsistent 
 on my part as a lifelong advocate of the annexation 
 of Egypt by England even to suggest that our 
 hold on Egypt is not so secure as it is commonly 
 supposed to be by persons who form their 
 judgment on the optimist reports issued year 
 after year by Lord Cromer and our Anglo- 
 Egyptian officials. It is, I admit, asking too 
 much to suppose that the readers of these pages 
 will bear in mind a series of articles, necessarily 
 of an ephemeral character, which I have written 
 since the opening of the Suez Canal up to the 
 present day. But I assert without hesitation 
 that any impartial perusal of the various articles
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 27 
 
 contributed by me to newspapers and periodicals 
 will show that throughout I have always based 
 my demand for the occupation of Egypt by 
 England on the plain straightforward ground 
 that England cannot afford to let her highway 
 to India pass under the control of any Power 
 or combination of Powers other than herself. 
 
 I have frequently contended that an English 
 Protectorate would secure Egypt orderly govern- 
 ment and material prosperity greater than she 
 could hope to enjoy under native rule, or under 
 the dominion of any continental Power. As 
 an Englishman writing for Englishmen, I regard 
 the interests of England to be the one main 
 object any British statesman, politician, or 
 publicist should have in view. Champions of 
 international altruism may dispute the justice 
 of this contention. But so long as I entertain 
 this opinion, whether right or wrong, there 
 is no inconsistency in my arguing that the 
 policy pursued by our British officials in the 
 administration of Egypt, or by British states- 
 manship at home and abroad, is not the policy 
 best calculated to effect the object I have in 
 view the consolidation of the tenure in virtue 
 of which, and of which alone, we keep in our
 
 28 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 own hands the command of the highway to our 
 Indian Empire. If that tenure is being weakened 
 by recent events, and is likely to be still further 
 weakened, however unintentionally, by certain 
 measures which our British authorities in Egypt 
 are said to have in contemplation, then surely 
 I am justified in warning my fellow-countrymen 
 that our position in Egypt is not quite so strong 
 or quite so unassailable as they are disposed 
 to imagine. 
 
 To understand the true story of England's 
 present position in South Africa one has to recall 
 our action, or rather inaction, after our defeat 
 at Majuba. In like fashion it is impossible to 
 understand our present position in Egypt without 
 recalling the policy, or rather the lack of policy, 
 adopted by England after our victory at Tel-el- 
 Kebir. It is characteristic of our British habit 
 that we engaged in an armed invasion of Egypt 
 in 1882 without any policy as to what was to 
 be done in the event of success, and without 
 coming to any arrangement for joint action with 
 France, a Power having great interests in Egypt. 
 As matters turned out, the stars in their courses 
 fought on our side, and, by a series of unforeseen 
 contingencies, England had it in her power to
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 29 
 
 have there and then assumed a Protectorate 
 over Egypt. 
 
 The opportunity thus offered was deliberately 
 thrown away. Despatches were sent from the 
 Foreign Office under Mr. Gladstone's Premier- 
 ship to every Power interested, however remotely, 
 in Egyptian affairs, to the effect that our military 
 occupation was merely temporary, that our 
 troops would be withdrawn as soon as order 
 was restored, and that we pledged ourselves 
 beforehand to abstain from any annexation of 
 Egyptian territory or from securing any advant- 
 age for ourselves not to be shared with other 
 European Powers. 
 
 After the entry of British troops into Cairo, 
 we again informed the world that we intended 
 to reorganise Egypt, and professed our desire to 
 see Egypt converted into an independent self- 
 governing State in order that we might terminate 
 our occupation at an early period. Thus we 
 tied our own hands and committed ourselves to 
 accomplish a transformation which common-sense 
 should have shown to be impossible, unless we 
 retained possession of the true " free hand " with 
 which our own strong arm had provided us. 
 In so doing we lost the first of the three
 
 30 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 opportunities afforded us by the chapter of 
 accidents for establishing a British Protectorate 
 over Egypt. 
 
 The second opening afforded us was due to 
 the insurrection of the Dervishes under the 
 Mahdi. We compelled the Khedivial Govern- 
 ment to evacuate the Soudan. In the end, the 
 invasion of Egypt by the Dervishes was repulsed 
 by British troops led by British officers. This 
 plain, hard truth was kept as much out of sight 
 as possible at home, but it was fully recognised 
 abroad. After we had thus once again saved 
 Egypt from anarchy, Europe would have raised 
 no protest had we followed up our successful 
 campaign by its logical result the declaration 
 of an avowed Protectorate over the Valley of 
 the Nile. No advantage, however, was taken of 
 the opportunity thus offered. No change was 
 made in our relations with Egypt or with Europe : 
 for the second time, having the winning cards in 
 her hand, England declined to play them and 
 to score the game. 
 
 A third chance was still to be allowed us. 
 The Government of the Dervishes, though not 
 killed, had received a mortal blow. By the 
 withdrawal of the Egyptian administration the
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 31 
 
 Soudan, under the rule of the Khalifa, had en- 
 tered into the category of a " No Man's Land " 
 in Africa, liable in virtue of the treaty of 
 Berlin, to which England was a party to be 
 occupied by the first European Power disposed 
 to claim it as coming within her sphere of in- 
 fluence. By some means or other, which have 
 never been clearly ascertained, secret information 
 reached the British Government that France 
 was preparing to send a force from the French 
 Soudan to the banks of the White Nile, and was 
 conducting negotiations at Adis Adeba in order 
 to induce the Emperor Menelek to send an 
 Abyssinian army to meet the French mission 
 under Captain Marchand at Fashoda and to 
 take possession of the Western Soudan. Happily 
 for England the then British Government dis- 
 played, under Lord Salisbury's premiership, a 
 promptitude of action rare in our political 
 annals. Orders were sent out to Cairo instruct- 
 ing our military commanders to proceed on a 
 campaign, whose avowed object was the over- 
 throw of Dervish rule in the Soudan. The story 
 of the capture of Khartoum and the flight of 
 the Khalifa is too well known to require 
 repeating.
 
 32 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 If the Emperor Menelek had kept his agree- 
 ment with France and had sent an Abyssinian 
 army to join the French military mission on 
 the banks of the White Nile, it might have been 
 difficult for England to assert that the raising of 
 the tricolour at Fashoda, supported by a powerful 
 army, did not come within the meaning of an 
 " effective occupation " laid down by the treaty 
 of Berlin. Owing to the Emperor Menelek's 
 failure to fulfil his share of the Franco- Abyssinian 
 convention, and to the firmness of Lord Kit- 
 chener, England was saved from a catastrophe 
 which might have fatally impaired her position 
 in Egypt. The Soudan was formally declared 
 to be placed under the " condominium " what- 
 ever that may mean of His Majesty the King 
 of England and of His Highness the Khedive. 
 This coup d'etat, for it was nothing less, was 
 accepted with approval in Egypt and in Europe. 
 And it was taken for granted in all continental 
 countries that the declaration would be followed 
 up by the announcement that England was 
 henceforth to take Egypt under her avowed 
 protection. The delusion, however, was soon 
 dispelled. For the third time England was 
 given an opportunity to regularise her position
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 33 
 
 in Egypt, and once more she shrunk from the 
 responsibility of openly admitting that she is the 
 real ruler of Egypt, and thereby obtaining the 
 freedom of action absolutely essential to the 
 success of her present administrative policy. 
 
 Thus, on three several occasions, we could 
 have declared our Protectorate under circum- 
 stances which would have justified its declaration 
 in the eyes of Europe as well as of Egypt. Up 
 to the present day, however, we have kept up 
 the pretence that our military occupation is 
 of a temporary character, and will be terminated, 
 in accordance with the assurances we had given 
 of our own accord, as soon as Egypt has been 
 reorganised under British administration so 
 as to hold her own as an independent State. 
 
 I am most anxious not to discuss the Egyptian 
 question from a party point of view. I adhere 
 now as always to my original contention, that 
 to retain our hold on Egypt, the highway to 
 our Indian possessions, is a matter of vital 
 importance to the British Empire, and I should 
 deeply regret to write a word which might 
 impair the British tenure of supreme authority 
 in the Valley of the Nile. But in my judgment 
 it is the interest of England to look at things 
 
 D
 
 34 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 as they are, not as one might wish them to 
 be, and to admit that during the quarter of 
 a century which has elapsed since our troops 
 first landed in Egypt, we have done nothing 
 whatever to consolidate a defective title or to 
 modify the rights which foreigners acquired in 
 Egypt at dates long preceding our occupation. 
 We have not only done nothing to render Egypt 
 more fit for independence than she was 
 previously to our military occupation, but on 
 the contrary, we have done much to weaken 
 such small capacity for self-government as she 
 possessed at the time when our troops entered 
 Cairo and took possession of the citadel. The 
 two first of these three contentions are matters 
 of fact. The third and last is, I admit, a matter 
 of opinion. 
 
 In as far as I am aware, the negotiations which 
 led up to the Anglo-French Agreement have 
 never been made known, and for obvious and 
 adequate reasons are not likely to become public 
 property for many years to come. But I think 
 all external evidence points to the conclusion 
 that these negotiations originated in Paris and 
 not in London. After the Soudan had been 
 conquered by British troops, and after the terri-
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 35 
 
 tories ruled over by the Mahdi and the Khalifa 
 had been formally taken possession of by the 
 British Government as forming subject to a 
 nominal partnership with Egypt part and 
 parcel of the British Empire, the Government 
 of the French Republic, of which M. Delcasse 
 was the leading member, realised that France 
 could never hope to recover her lost position in 
 Egypt except by force of arms. The only 
 interests France retained in Egypt were mainly 
 of a sentimental character, and sentiment exer- 
 cises far smaller influence in French politics 
 than it does in those of England. At the 
 period to which I allude, the alliance of Russia, 
 the nation amie et alliee, had been shown to be 
 utterly worthless from a military point of view ; 
 and under these circumstances any repetition of 
 the Marchand mission or any action on the part 
 of France calculated to exasperate popular feel- 
 ing in England would have been an act of sheer 
 insanity. 
 
 The maintenance of peace was essential to the 
 existence of the Republic ; but the credit of 
 having averted the danger of war by giving 
 way upon matters in dispute is after all only a 
 negative recommendation with a nation intensely 
 
 D 2
 
 36 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 vain and not without reason of its military 
 repute. Time after time, rising dissatisfaction 
 with the pacific policy of the Third Kepublic 
 had been lulled by some display of military 
 strength, such as the conquest of Cochin-China, 
 the annexation of Tunis and Madagascar, the 
 war with Siam, and the extension of the Algerian 
 hinterland to the south of Timbuctoo, enter- 
 prises which were well within the power of 
 France to accomplish by herself, which were not 
 likely to meet with active opposition from any 
 of the great European Powers, and which grati- 
 fied the vanity of the French nation. To speak 
 plainly, France has been distracted since 1870 
 by an intense desire to prove to the world, and 
 still more to herself, that she is still the France 
 of the First Empire, and by an even more in- 
 tense dread of establishing the truth of this 
 assertion by the arbitrament of war. 
 
 Unfortunately, the gratification created by 
 military achievements of a colonial character is 
 even more short-lived across the Channel than it 
 is with us, and some new achievement was 
 needed to satisfy popular impatience in France. 
 No great intelligence was required to fix upon 
 Morocco as the quarter in which her military
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 37 
 
 strength could best be displayed without incur- 
 ring any serious danger of an armed intervention 
 leading to an European war. Spain, the Power 
 best qualified by proximity and history to inter- 
 vene in Morocco, was too weak and too distracted 
 by dynastic and political dissensions to offer any 
 formidable resistance to the establishment of a 
 French protectorate over the Moorish State. 
 England, it was thought, was the only European 
 Power which could possibly interfere in order to 
 thwart the conversion of Morocco into a French 
 colony, administered in the same way and on the 
 same principles as Tunis. Moreover, in view of 
 the collapse of Russia, it was manifestly in the 
 interest of France to establish more friendly 
 relations between herself and England, which 
 had been interrupted since the commencement 
 of our military occupation of Egypt. The idea 
 of a secret treaty, which was to be kept a pro- 
 found secret till the Convention had been 
 actually concluded, and which would take all 
 other Powers interested in Morocco by surprise, 
 is more in accordance with French diplomacy 
 than with British ; while the omission to com- 
 municate the Anglo-French Convention officially 
 to Germany seems more likely to have originated
 
 38 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 in the brain of a French than of an English 
 statesman. 
 
 Be this as it may, the agreement was one 
 with which both the British Government and the 
 British nation had much reason to be satisfied. 
 Ever since our occupation of Egypt, France had 
 taken the lead in supporting every element, 
 every influence, and every interest in Egypt, 
 whether native or foreign, which, from one cause 
 or the other, was hostile to the policy of 
 England. The Marchand mission was only the 
 crowning act of a long series of endeavours to 
 undermine the authority exercised nominally by 
 the Khedive and his native ministers, but in 
 reality by the representatives of Great Britain 
 and our British officials, who were supposed to 
 act as advisers to their native colleagues, but 
 whose advice was tantamount to a command. 
 Our interest in Egypt was so vastly in excess of 
 our interest in Morocco that, as a matter of bar- 
 gaining, we acted most prudently and wisely in 
 sacrificing the latter in order to secure the former. 
 Apart, too, from its bearing upon Egypt, it was 
 no small gain to England to establish friendly 
 relations between herself and her nearest neigh- 
 bour, and thereby to induce the French Republic
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 39 
 
 to abandon the policy of pin-pricking, which 
 she had pursued persistently not only in Egypt, 
 but in Newfoundland, in the New Hebrides, in 
 West Africa, in Siam, and in every part of 
 the globe where British and French possessions 
 or spheres of influence were contiguous to one 
 another. 
 
 The immediate gain to France under the 
 Anglo-French Agreement was not equally great. 
 It was within the power of France to give 
 England a " free hand " in Egypt in as far as 
 she was concerned. It was not within the power 
 of England to guarantee France a "free hand" 
 in Morocco. All we could possibly do was to 
 pledge ourselves to support France by British 
 diplomacy in any designs she might entertain of 
 establishing a Protectorate over Morocco. In as 
 far as I can form any opinion, there were two 
 considerations which induced France to believe 
 that by " swapping " I know of no fitter term 
 Egypt for Morocco, she was likely to obtain full 
 value for what she surrendered. The first con- 
 sideration was that if she secured the adhesion of 
 England to a French Protectorate over the She- 
 reefian kingdom by a convention kept a pro- 
 found secret till the compact was signed and
 
 40 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 sealed Europe would find itself face to face with 
 an accomplished fact which no Continental Power 
 had any sufficient motive for trying to set aside. 
 The second consideration was a latent hope that 
 England, when once committed to diplomatic 
 support, might become so identified with French 
 interests as to exchange moral influence for an 
 offensive and defensive alliance. 
 
 Both these considerations have proved to be 
 erroneous. It may seem strange that France 
 should ever have imagined that any secret 
 agreement between herself and Great Britain for 
 adding Morocco, in fact if not in name, to the 
 enormous territories she already holds on the 
 North African coast would be accepted with- 
 out protest by the other European Powers. It 
 seems even more strange that France should have 
 believed that under any conceivable circum- 
 stances England would go to war in order to 
 include Morocco within the French sphere of 
 influence in Africa. The only explanation I can 
 offer for the latter delusion is that, the wish 
 being father to the thought, France enormously 
 exaggerated the importance of the anti-German 
 sentiments expressed by a large and influential 
 section of the British Press, and seriously
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 41 
 
 believed that public opinion in England, out of 
 jealousy of the naval and industrial competition 
 of the Fatherland, would welcome any opportu- 
 nity of suppressing this competition before it had 
 obtained formidable proportions. I am bound 
 to add that this delusion was to some extent 
 justified by the exuberant enthusiasm with 
 which the restoration of an entente cordiale 
 between England and France was greeted by the 
 British public. 
 
 I must admit, too, that the unusual demon- 
 strations of friendship for France, officially as 
 well as privately, could hardly fail to create 
 an impression abroad that, in the event of the 
 controversy about Morocco reaching an acute 
 stage, England might not be indisposed to give 
 her armed support to her partner in the Anglo- 
 French Agreement. At home such a delu- 
 sion was confuted by the simple fact that the 
 negotiations which ended in this agreement 
 had been conducted with the personal knowledge 
 and approval of His Majesty the King. His 
 people are two well acquainted with his great 
 common-sense, his intimate acquaintance with 
 foreign politics, his singular tact and knowledge 
 of human nature, and his ardent patriotism, not
 
 42 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 to feel that the interests of England, of which 
 the chief is the maintenance of peace in Europe, 
 were safe in the hands of our reigning sovereign. 
 But abroad the delusion did not and could not 
 appear so manifestly untenable as it did to us. 
 
 To my thinking, Germany was right in her 
 contention that no two Powers can arrange 
 between themselves of their own free will and 
 pleasure as to the partition of a third State, 
 in which other European Powers have political 
 or commercial interests of their own. I am no 
 great believer in International law, but if there 
 is such a thing in Europe, Germany, or for that 
 matter any great European Power, was fully 
 justified in declining to accept the provisions of 
 the Anglo-French Agreement with respect to 
 Morocco until these provisions had been dis- 
 cussed and approved by an International Con- 
 ference. The question whether France or 
 Germany scored more or less diplomatic points 
 in the Algeciras controversy seems to me 
 singularly futile. The one result of the Con- 
 ference which interests England is the principle, 
 formally enunciated by Germany and accepted 
 by France, that the latter Power is not to obtain 
 the free hand in Morocco she would have been
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 43 
 
 entitled to if the Anglo-French Agreement had 
 been recognised as valid. As things stand, 
 France is only allowed to exercise her authority 
 over Morocco under the name of Muley el 
 Hamed, and subject to European supervision. 
 
 So far, England has no cause to complain on 
 her own account. Germany has pursued 
 throughout the same line she adopted when 
 the Anglo-French Agreement was in contra- 
 diction to the course pursued by France 
 communicated to Berlin by England immedi- 
 ately after its formal signature. The answer of 
 the Imperial Chancellor to this communication 
 was in substance that Germany saw no cause to 
 object to the Anglo-French Agreement as far as 
 Egypt was concerned, since under the British 
 occupation England had steadily maintained the 
 principle of the open door, and left intact all 
 rights and interests possessed by German 
 subjects previously to the occupation. And 
 further, upon the understanding that these 
 conditions would remain unchanged, Germany 
 undertook not to oppose British policy in Egypt. 
 The free hand therefore accorded is strengthened 
 by the fact that France has pledged herself to 
 assist England diplomatically in the event of
 
 44 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 any third Power disputing our right to establish 
 an avowed Protectorate or to seriously modify 
 our present anomalous position in Egypt. 
 
 In these circumstances I think most people 
 will agree with me that the present moment is 
 by no means propitious for any attempt to 
 extend and regularise our unsatisfactory position 
 in Egypt. According to the old saying " he 
 who will not when he may, when he wills he 
 shall have nay." We have thrice had our 
 chance and have thrice thrown it away. I am 
 afraid, therefore, that we must wait in patience 
 till, by the extraordinary good luck which has 
 often saved us in Egypt as elsewhere from the 
 errors of our statesmanship, we are offered 
 another chance. This opinion is not shared by 
 the British authorities in Egypt, whose judg- 
 ment most justly carries great weight with the 
 British public. They state with perfect justice 
 that Egypt under British administration has 
 attained a degree of material prosperity never 
 before known in her annals. The extraordinary 
 rise in the price of arable land and of building 
 lots in Cairo and all the leading provincial cities 
 may be due to reckless speculation, but nobody 
 can dispute the statement that the fellaheen
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 45 
 
 earn higher wages, are better fed, better clothed, 
 and better housed than they ever were before ; 
 that the Pashas and the large landowners have, 
 as a body, amassed fortunes beyond the dreams 
 of avarice ; that a very great increase has taken 
 place in the amount of land brought under 
 irrigation ; that railroads and canals and public 
 works of general utility have been introduced 
 under the existing regime ; and that, in spite of 
 all this, the State Revenues show an enormous 
 surplus over expenditure. 
 
 It is hardly a matter for astonishment, if 
 our British authorities in Egypt are convinced 
 that the new order of things established under 
 our rule must command the respect of foreign 
 countries and the confidence of the native 
 population to such an extent as to render any 
 serious opposition either in Europe or Egypt 
 to the consolidation of our rule a practical 
 impossibility. While admitting the substantial 
 accuracy of the above statements, I dissent 
 from the conclusions drawn therefrom. I shall 
 endeavour to explain later on the reasons of 
 my dissenting from the official view of Anglo- 
 Egyptian relations. All I need assert here is 
 that my scepticism is largely shared by the
 
 46 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 persons most competent to appreciate the 
 sentiments of the native and of the non-official 
 foreign residents, English as well as French, 
 Germans, and Italians. The former, with or 
 without reason, object to the general character 
 of our administration ; the latter, while raising 
 no objection to the general character of our 
 administration, hold that our present autocratic 
 system of government conducted by British 
 officials would be even more open to criticism 
 if, as Lord Cromer proposes, the various Inter- 
 national institutions now existing in Egypt were 
 done away with and their functions placed under 
 the direct administration of British officials 
 acting nominally as the servants of the Khedivial 
 Government, but in reality receiving their 
 instructions directly from the British agency. 
 
 It is a commonplace saying that a despotism 
 exercised by a benevolent despot is the best 
 system of government possible in this imperfect 
 world of ours. Egypt under British rule affords 
 to-day a sort of object-lesson both of the merits 
 and demerits of an autocratic administration. 
 Lord Cromer is, I admit most gladly, a high- 
 minded and benevolent autocrat. Ismail, how- 
 ever, in the days of his grandeur, was not a more
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 47 
 
 absolute ruler than the present representative of 
 Great Britain on the banks of the Nile. On the 
 other hand, no principles could be more diametri- 
 cally opposite to one another than those on 
 which Egypt has been administered under an 
 Oriental and a British system of rule. No 
 honest critic can dispute the zeal, the absolute 
 integrity, and the ability with which Lord 
 Cromer rules Egypt. Indeed, the autocracy 
 conferred upon him in virtue of our military 
 occupation is due in no small degree to the 
 general respect entertained by the Egyptians 
 for his personal character. At the same time, 
 the invariable defects of autocratic rule have 
 made themselves manifest. To put the matter 
 shortly, Egypt under autocratic, though 
 genuinely benevolent rule has made enormous 
 material progress, but her moral progress has 
 been of a retrograde description. 
 
 All the work of administration has been 
 entrusted to a number of English officials. The 
 native element has been gradually eliminated 
 from all posts not of a subordinate character. 
 The British officials, men, for the most part, 
 imperfectly acquainted with the language, the 
 laws, the customs, the traditions, and the
 
 48 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 religion of the native population, have been 
 employed to reorganise the country in accord- 
 ance with English ideas unintelligible to, and 
 unappreciated by, the vast majority of the 
 Egyptian people. The Pashas, the wealthy 
 landowners, the Cadis, the Sheiks, and the 
 educated classes, composed in the main of 
 Armenians, Syrians, and Copts, have been 
 practically deprived of the authority they 
 exercised up to the time of our occupation ; and 
 the result of this deprival has been, to say the 
 least, not altogether satisfactory. As things are, 
 the only limitations still left which militate 
 against the absolute supremacy of an autocratic 
 administration are to be found in the Inter- 
 national institutions which were established in 
 Egypt long previously to our occupation, and 
 whose abolition is believed to be contemplated 
 by the British authorities. 
 
 I fully agree that if our British policy is to 
 be carried on in the future as in the past, with 
 the view of what for want of a better word 
 I may call the Anglification of Egypt, the 
 removal of these International institutions is 
 essential to the accomplishment of our object. 
 I hold as strongly as ever that British supremacy
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 49 
 
 in Egypt is a matter of vital importance to 
 England as the mistress of India. But I hold 
 no less strongly that this supremacy can be best 
 secured and maintained by adopting the course 
 we have pursued in many of the Native States 
 of India, and governing Egypt under a British 
 Resident, thus leaving the internal administra- 
 tion in native hands. I am fully alive to the 
 difficulties that beset this solution of the Egypt- 
 ian question, but I think those difficulties would 
 be far less than those of the policy our British 
 authorities have hitherto pursued, that of 
 administering the internal affairs of Egypt by 
 highly paid British officials, and by eliminating 
 the native element. 
 
 Holding this opinion, I doubt whether the 
 removal of the few existing international admin- 
 istrations in Egypt and the consequent extension 
 of our " Anglification " policy would be for the 
 advantage of England. Any such extension 
 would lead inevitably to the further increase of 
 British officialdom and to the more complete 
 exclusion of the natives from part or share in 
 the administration of their own country. This 
 view of mine is also shared by the non-English 
 European community in Egypt, but upon com- 
 
 E
 
 50 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 pletely different grounds. The foreigners, as we 
 English call French, Germans, Austrians, Italians, 
 Greeks, and all other nationalities, who have 
 Consular representatives at the Khedivial Court, 
 are strongly opposed to any abolition of the 
 international administrations, and still more to 
 their absorption by the paramount Power which 
 for the last twenty-five years has occupied 
 Egypt by her troops. They object, not because 
 they have any abstract dislike to our military 
 occupation, which, as they are well aware, 
 guarantees their personal safety. They are 
 utterly indifferent, as a body, to the exclusion 
 of the natives from all posts of any adminis- 
 trative importance. They object to the policy 
 attributed to our British authorities simply and 
 solely because, in their opinion, the remaining 
 international administrations are the sole guaran- 
 tees for the preservation of the exceptional rights 
 and privileges secured to them by treaties and 
 conventions concluded long before the British 
 occupation was ever dreamt of. 
 
 Already the international administrations 
 which under dual control were completely in 
 French hands are now under British control. 
 The Daira Sanieh Administration, which was
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 51 
 
 filled exclusively with French officials, has been 
 suppressed by the liquidation of the loan. The 
 " Caisse de la Dette," which owed its existence 
 to the Goschen-Joubert Convention, concluded 
 with Ismail Pasha in 1857, and was appointed 
 to supervise and control the expenditure of the 
 revenues specially affected to the service of the 
 debt due to the bondholders, lies under sentence 
 of death. 
 
 As soon as the Anglo-French Agreement was 
 signed and sealed two years ago, the British 
 Government, acting, if I am rightly informed, on 
 the advice of the British authorities in Egypt, 
 used the free hand accorded to her by the agree- 
 ment to request the Khedivial Government to 
 issue a decree announcing that the powers of the 
 14 Caisse de la Dette" should in 1912 be trans- 
 ferred to the English financial adviser of the 
 Khedive. Such a request was, under the cir- 
 cumstances, tantamount to an order, and the 
 decree in question was issued with the approval 
 of the Government of the French Republic. 
 In as far as I know, it has never yet been sub- 
 mitted formally to the Powers not parties to the 
 secret treaty ; but as it chiefly concerns the 
 bondholders, whose interests are amply protected 
 
 E 2
 
 52 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 by the improved credit and solvency of Egypt 
 under British administration, it is not likely to 
 be made the subject of protest on the part of 
 any of the European Powers, or of their sub- 
 jects in Egypt, who have no great interest in the 
 market value of Egyptian securities, but who 
 have a very strong interest in the maintenance 
 of the two remaining international institutions 
 which still stand in the way of the complete 
 Anglification of Egypt. These institutions are 
 the Capitulations and the International Tri- 
 bunals, commonly called the Mixed Courts. 
 
 These tribunals owe their existence to the 
 genius of Egypt's one great statesman, whose 
 object was to establish an independent authority 
 in Egypt which would cripple the autocratic 
 power of the then Khedive and would present a 
 barrier against any absolute autocracy which 
 might succeed that of Ismail Pasha. Nubar's 
 origin nl idea was to come to an agreement by 
 which the great Powers of Europe should con- 
 sent to suspend the jurisdiction exercised by the 
 various Consular Courts in Egypt, and to transfer 
 their civil and criminal authority, in any case to 
 which foreigners were parties, to an International 
 Tribunal whose members were to be nominated
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 53 
 
 by the leading foreign Governments and ap- 
 proved by the Khedive. Finally, Nubar had to 
 accept a compromise by which criminal jurisdic- 
 tion, in cases to which foreigners were parties, 
 was left to the old Consular Courts, but trans- 
 ferred in all civil suits to the Mixed Courts. 
 
 These courts were also empowered to give 
 judgment in all suits between foreigners of the 
 same or different nationality, or in suits between 
 foreigners and natives. They were given an 
 authority, unknown, I believe, to any other 
 country, to try actions brought by individuals 
 against the State, to call upon the State to carry 
 out any judgments given by them, and to levy 
 execution upon State property in the event 
 of these judgments not being carried into effect. 
 They are bound to base their judgments in 
 accordance with an Egyptian code identical in 
 almost every respect, other than the one alluded 
 to above, with the Code Napoleon. They were 
 to exercise their jurisdiction for five years, with 
 power of renewal on the part of the Khedivial 
 and the European Governments. It was agreed 
 that, in the event of their jurisdiction being set 
 aside from any cause, the civil jurisdiction of 
 the Consular Courts was to revive automatically.
 
 54 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 It was agreed, further, that French, Italian, and 
 Arabic were to be the only languages used 
 in the Courts. 
 
 After the entente cordiale, English was added 
 to the list, but as very few of the judges under- 
 stand English, and still fewer of the advocates 
 who practise in the courts can speak or read 
 English, this concession is of very little practical 
 value. I cordially sympathise with the irritation 
 expressed by my fellow-countrymen when, in a 
 country occupied by British troops and adminis- 
 tered by British officials, they discover that if 
 they go to law they must have their grievances 
 laid before an International Court mainly com- 
 posed of foreign judges, their evidence submitted 
 in a foreign tongue, their claims defended by 
 foreign counsel, and the award of their judges 
 given in a language which, for the most part, 
 they are utterly unable to understand. The 
 only consolation I can offer them is that 
 their sad plight is due to the reluctance dis- 
 played by a long succession of British Govern-* 
 ments to look facts in the face and to avail 
 themselves of opportunities for converting a 
 virtual Protectorate into one openly avowed and 
 distinctly declared. If, however, I happened to
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 55 
 
 be a foreigner residing in Egypt, I should object 
 equally strongly to being judged by an English 
 court whose proceedings were conducted in 
 English, a language which not one foreigner in a 
 hundred can understand, and, as follows logic- 
 ally, in accordance with English common law, a 
 law which has no code, and is based on judge- 
 made decisions, inaccessible to the world at 
 large and unintelligible in many cases even to 
 English lawyers. 
 
 I fully admit that foreigners in Egypt, even 
 if subject to British law administered by British 
 courts, might have absolute confidence in the 
 integrity of our judges and their genuine desire 
 to administer impartial justice. I am not sure, 
 however, how far this confidence is quite as 
 universal as we flatter ourselves, but I am 
 certain that any proposal to abolish the 
 International Tribunals and to replace them by 
 English courts would excite the gravest alarm 
 and encounter the strongest opposition on the 
 part of all the foreign population in Egypt. 
 
 It is even more certain that if the British 
 Government attempted to avail itself of the free 
 hand guaranteed by the Anglo-French agreement 
 in order to abolish the Capitulations, the attempt
 
 56 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 would excite the almost unanimous opposition of 
 the European colony, inclusive of the great 
 number of English residents, who are not 
 connected directly or indirectly with the British 
 administration. In virtue of the Capitulations, 
 foreigners in Egypt enjoy a number of immuni- 
 ties not accorded to the natives. Thus, for 
 example, foreigners are not subject to taxes. 
 They contribute little or nothing directly to the 
 Egyptian revenue. Their only contribution 
 consists in the amount they may have to pay as 
 traders, in the form of customs dues on exports 
 or imports. If they are accused of any serious 
 criminal offence they can only be tried before 
 their own Consular Court, and even if they should 
 be found guilty, the punishment to be inflicted 
 upon them is determined by their Consular 
 judge, and, in most instances, is utterly 
 inadequate to the offence. Finally, their 
 houses are inviolable, and can only be entered 
 by the Egyptian policeman if accompanied by 
 the Consul of the nationality to which the 
 occupant of the house belongs. These rights, 
 secured by the Capitulations, most of which 
 exist in virtue of conventions concluded long 
 ago, extend not only to genuine foreigners, but
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 57 
 
 to aliens who, in return for value received, have 
 been placed under the protection of foreign 
 Powers as naturalised subjects. Thus the large 
 and growing foreign population of Egypt is 
 practically outside the law, and the Capitulations 
 are naturally regarded by the foreign residents 
 as a sort of Magna Charta of their rights, 
 liberties, and privileges. 
 
 It is impossible to dispute the fact that the 
 existence of these exceptions based as they are 
 upon a condition of things which has long since 
 ceased to exist constitutes a scandal and an 
 abuse, and inflicts a grave injustice upon the 
 Egyptian people. It is to the credit of the 
 British Government that, since the days of 
 Mahomet Ali, they have done everything in 
 their power to deter British subjects from 
 availing themselves unduly of the privileges 
 they enjoy under the Capitulations. It was 
 also through British support that Nubar was 
 enabled to obtain the suspension of Consular 
 jurisdiction in Egypt in respect of civil suits. 
 France has for some years past discouraged the 
 abuse of these exemptions by French subjects, 
 though without meeting with much support 
 from the French colony in Cairo and Alexandria.
 
 5 8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 It would be invidious to cite names, but it 
 is well known in Egypt that some of the minor 
 Powers who are represented by Consuls at the 
 Vice-Regal Court have allowed and still allow 
 their Consuls to assist their fellow-countrymen 
 in enforcing the privileges accorded by the 
 Capitulations to their utmost limit, and to do 
 so with the result if not with the object of 
 defrauding the Egyptian revenue. 
 
 I have always held that it would be the first 
 duty of England if ever she assumes a Pro- 
 tectorate over Egypt to obtain the cancelment 
 of the Capitulations. I hold that opinion as 
 strongly as ever. This reform, however, we 
 can never carry out in practice till we take over 
 the public debt of Egypt, and make it known 
 to the world that we regard Egypt as being 
 under the protection of Great Britain, to be 
 defended against internal or external attack 
 with the whole force of the British Empire. 
 I do not see any probability that action of 
 the kind I recommend will be undertaken by 
 our present Government or by any Government 
 we are likely to see in office, till such time as 
 the British public realises the truth that an 
 avowed Protectorate over Egypt is the sole
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 59 
 
 manner by which England can continue, per- 
 manently, to retain the command of our highway 
 to India. The present time, therefore, is not 
 one in which we can pursue the prosecution of 
 reforms in Egypt, which can only be carried into 
 practice with the assent of the foreign Powers 
 of Europe. 
 
 I noticed recently a passage in a speech 
 delivered by Lord St. Aldwyn, better known to us 
 as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in which the late 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer claimed credit for 
 the success which the Unionist Government 
 had obtained in Egypt. The passage was as 
 follows : " They established England as a 
 Trustee for civilisation in Egypt with the assent 
 of other Powers." It would be difficult to 
 express the popular opinion entertained in 
 England as to our present position in Egypt 
 more fully in fewer words. It would be still 
 more difficult to make more inaccurate statements 
 in so few words. England is not a Trustee for 
 Europe. Nobody ever appointed her to this 
 imaginary trust. She occupied Egypt with her 
 troops of her own free will, in defiance of the pro- 
 test raised by France at the time of our bom- 
 bardment of Alexandria. The services she has
 
 60 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 undoubtedly rendered to Egypt have been mainly, 
 if not solely, due to our military occupation of the 
 country, not to any imaginary mandate with 
 which we have been entrusted by Europe. No 
 Continental Power, except France, has ever given 
 its formal assent to our occupation. Germany 
 alone has gone out of her way to express ap- 
 proval of the way in which we have hitherto inter- 
 preted the " free hand " given us by France, and 
 by France alone ; and the assent of Europe has 
 never yet been accorded to our occupation by any 
 International Congress or Conference. 
 
 On many occasions foreign Powers have 
 asked us for information as to the date on which 
 we intend to fulfil our repeated assurances that 
 we would terminate our occupation and withdraw 
 our troops. These demands have been met by 
 the evasive answer that we still adhere to our 
 plighted word, but that the time has not arrived 
 when we could carry out our avowed purpose, 
 because Egypt is not yet qualified for indepen- 
 dent self-government. I repeat, as I have often 
 asserted before now, that I am firmly convinced 
 that, from the date of our occupation after Tel- 
 el-Kebir, and at any rate up to the Soudan Cam- 
 paign, no matter what party may have been in
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 61 
 
 office, England was genuinely desirous of with- 
 drawing her troops from Egypt, and acted with 
 perfect good faith in its assurances to the above 
 effect. But this conviction a point on which I 
 speak with some knowledge is not shared, and 
 cannot well be expected to be shared, by other 
 European nations. Moreover, if my personal 
 conviction were shared by the world at large, 
 the fact would not modify our present position. 
 
 There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt 
 that Germany was in the right in her contention 
 that the secret compact between England and 
 France, as to the form of administration to be 
 introduced into Morocco under the Anglo-French 
 Agreement, could not be held as binding upon 
 other European Powers, which had political or 
 commercial rights or interests in the Shereefian 
 kingdom, unless and until it had been submitted 
 to and approved by an International Conference. 
 Germany insisted upon the submission of this 
 compact to a Conference. France gave way. 
 The Conference was held, and has ultimately 
 decided in favour of the German contention. It 
 is no concern of mine to discuss whether Germany 
 was well advised or otherwise in objecting to 
 the Anglo-French Agreement. I am dealing
 
 62 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 with facts as they are, not, perhaps, as I person- 
 ally could have wished that they had been. All 
 I wish to point out is that the decision of the 
 Algeciras Conference, confirming as it does the 
 non-validity of the free hand accorded to France 
 in Morocco by the Anglo-French Agreement, 
 applies logically to the free hand in Egypt ac- 
 corded to England by France. 
 
 According to the precedent established at 
 Algeciras, any European Power which has poli- 
 tical or commercial interests or rights in Egypt 
 would be entitled to refuse her consent to any 
 substantial changes which England might pro- 
 pose to introduce into the relations between 
 Egypt and other Continental Powers, till these 
 changes have been approved by an International 
 Conference. There can be no reasonable doubt 
 that if such a Conference were to meet, its first 
 step would be to demand an explicit explanation 
 from England as to whether she intends her mili- 
 tary occupation to be permanent or temporary ; 
 and, on the latter hypothesis, when the occupation 
 was to end, or, on the former hypothesis, what 
 guarantees were to be given for the preservation 
 of the rights now possessed in Egypt by the sub- 
 jects of other nations than the two parties to the
 
 OUR PRESENT POSITION IN EGYPT 63 
 
 free hand agreement. If this is so, I think all 
 British statesmen to whatever party they may 
 belong, or whatever their views may be as to the 
 internal administration of Egypt will agree 
 with me in holding that the present moment is 
 singularly infelicitous for proposing the formal 
 recognition of a British Protectorate over Egypt, 
 or for suggesting the expediency of cancelling the 
 Capitulations and abolishing the International 
 Tribunals. 
 
 From remote antiquity it has been recognised 
 as an elementary rule of building that the foun- 
 dations should be laid before the superstructure 
 is commenced. The same rule applies to poli- 
 tical architecture. In the case of Egypt, every 
 successive British Government has ignored this 
 initial principle. They have built the super- 
 structure while the foundations still rest upon 
 desert sand. In the course of a following chapter 
 it will be my endeavour to show how this funda- 
 mental mistake has thwarted the policy of our 
 British administration in Egypt.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 
 
 THE Eastern question is the old question of 
 the struggle between the Cross and the Crescent 
 as personified by the Russian and the Ottoman 
 Empires. This question has influenced the 
 whole course of European statesmanship from 
 the days of Peter the Great ; and though during 
 the half-century which has elapsed since the 
 conclusion of the Crimean War it has assumed a 
 more definite character, we are still far from any 
 final solution. 
 
 The changes in the Near East during the 
 nineteenth century have all tended to the 
 aggrandisement of Russia in the Balkan Penin- 
 sula, and to the impoverishment of Turkey in 
 Europe. Within the memory of men still living, 
 Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, the Moldavian Princi- 
 palities, Crete, Bosnia, and Herzegovina have
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 65 
 
 one after the other been detached from the rule 
 of Islam and have become independent Christian 
 communities all more or less under the protec- 
 tion of the great Sclav Empire of the North. 
 The barriers which half a century ago Europe 
 endeavoured to establish against the advance of 
 Russia towards Constantinople have proved 
 unavailing ; and it may be said without exag- 
 geration that the European provinces, in which 
 Turkish authority is still paramount, are con- 
 fined to Adrianople and Macedonia. The treaty 
 of San Stefano was cancelled by the Congress of 
 Berlin, but the various limitations imposed by 
 this Congress at the instance of England have 
 gradually been declared null and void. Sebas- 
 topol has been rebuilt and refortified. The 
 Black Sea has been converted into a Russian 
 lake ; and the Sultan has been coerced into 
 accepting the position of a Russian Satrap 
 holding his tenure of sovereignty upon suffer- 
 ance. As a matter of fact, the Russian armies 
 could have entered Constantinople, after they 
 had forced their way across the Balkans, had it 
 not been for the hostile attitude of England. 
 It is equally a matter of fact that Russia's fleet 
 could during the last dozen years have entered 
 
 F
 
 66 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 the Bosphorus any day when they had wished 
 to do so, and could have compelled the Sultan 
 either to abdicate or to place himself under the 
 protection of the Russian flag. It has long been 
 a surprise to the Foreign Offices of Western 
 Europe that Russia should have refused so 
 persistently to exercise her power against 
 Turkey. The probable explanation of this 
 delay is that after the defeat of China by 
 Japan, Russia was led to postpone any further 
 aggression upon the moribund Ottoman Empire 
 in view of seizing the opportunity for crushing 
 Japan, and thus making herself the virtual 
 mistress of the Celestial Empire. I do not say 
 I have no authority to say that this is so. 
 All I can say is that the hypothesis I have 
 suggested seems to be the most probable 
 explanation of Russia having failed to avail 
 herself of the Macedonian insurrection, and of 
 the outrages by which it was suppressed, in 
 order to carry into execution the policy which 
 was affirmed by the treaty of San Stefano. 
 Throughout her long and tortuous progress in 
 dealing with the vicissitudes of the Eastern 
 question, Russia has exhibited such remarkable 
 activity and astuteness that the world perhaps at
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 67 
 
 large gave her credit for more foresight than 
 she really possesses. 
 
 Anybody acquainted with the Balkan States 
 is aware that their rulers, their ministers and 
 their leading statesmen are, with very rare 
 exceptions, puppets who shape their policy in 
 accordance with the views which for the time 
 being find favour at St. Petersburg. Every one 
 of them knows that he holds his position on 
 condition of not incurring the displeasure of the 
 great Sclav Empire of the North, and the fate of 
 the few malcontents who have attempted to 
 pursue an independent policy has not been of 
 a kind to encourage any repetition of the 
 experiment. I do not see myself that the con- 
 duct of Russia in this respect can fairly be 
 condemned by the outer world. For the last 
 few years her paramount authority in the Balkan 
 Peninsula has been employed to preserve the 
 peace of Europe by retarding any violent solu- 
 tion of the Eastern question, and by discouraging 
 any open insurrection against the rule of Islam. 
 If, however, circumstances should force Russia 
 to the conclusion that it is for her interests to 
 bring the Eastern question to a crisis, she can do 
 so whenever she chooses by letting loose the 
 
 F 2
 
 68 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 insurrectionary forces which militate against the 
 maintenance of peace in the Near East. Russia 
 has only got to let it be understood in the 
 Balkan Peninsula that she is in favour of a 
 rising, whose object would be the overthrow of 
 Turkish rule west of the Bosphorus, and that in 
 case of need she would support the insurgents, 
 and the whole country-side would respond to 
 the covert appeal. No man is less inclined 
 than I am to join in the sentimental outcry 
 against the " unspeakable Turk." Still, common 
 justice compels me to admit that the Christian 
 provinces have sustained grievous wrongs at the 
 hands of their Moslem masters, and that these 
 wrongs are of a character not easily to be for- 
 gotten, or still less forgiven. I may doubt 
 whether Serbs, Bulgarians or Macedonians would 
 gain by passing from the rule of Turkey under 
 that of Russia. But I cannot honestly blame 
 them if they care more for revenging them- 
 selves upon their hereditary enemy than they 
 do for the preservation of such qualified 
 liberties as they now enjoy. 
 
 In such a contingency as the one I contem- 
 plate, the general course of events may easily be 
 foretold. However far the decay of the Otto-
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 69 
 
 man Empire may have progressed, however 
 hopeless may be the prospects of its regeneration, 
 the Turks have not lost their military vigour ; 
 and, as was shown during the war with Greece, 
 they are more than a match for any forces which 
 could be brought against them by the States of 
 the Balkan Peninsula. Supposing as might 
 easily happen the Turkish armies were to 
 carry all before them, Russia would be bound 
 to interfere for the protection of the Sclav 
 States. She might plead with justice that her 
 position as the head of the Sclav races, and her 
 manifest destiny as the champion of the Cross 
 against the Crescent, compelled her to subor- 
 dinate every other consideration to the duty of 
 opposing the re-establishment of Turkish rule in 
 the Balkan Peninsula. 
 
 Russia at the time when I write these lines is 
 confronted with an internal revolution far graver 
 in its possible consequences than her disastrous 
 and almost ignominious defeat both on sea and 
 land by Japan. No man certainly, not I for 
 one can predict with any confidence whether 
 the Czar or the Duma may carry the day in the 
 end. There is one prediction, however, that I 
 will venture to make, and that is, when the
 
 yo THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 struggle has been ended, the victor in the con- 
 flict whether he be the Czar or the Commune 
 under the name of the Duma will try to stamp 
 out the fires, smouldering under the ashes, by 
 reopening the irrepressible Eastern question. 
 
 There can be no doubt that a successful war 
 with Turkey, ending, as it probably would end, in 
 the occupation of Constantinople and in the 
 substitution of the Cross for the Crescent in the 
 sometime Cathedral of St. Sofia, would create an 
 amount of enthusiasm throughout Russia which 
 could never have been created by the most 
 brilliant successes gained over the army and 
 navy of Japan. A campaign for the expulsion 
 of the Turk from Europe would appeal to the 
 traditions, the superstitions, and the aspira- 
 tions of the Russian people in a far different 
 fashion from that in which a war waged in order 
 to avert an unknown yellow peril in Japan ever 
 did appeal. No doubt the vast majority of the 
 Russian soldiery believed that, in fighting the 
 Japanese, they were carrying out the mission of 
 Russia to exterminate the infidel. But the 
 infidel whom the Mujik has been taught for 
 centuries to hate is not the follower of Buddha, 
 but the follower of Mahomet, the false prophet
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 71 
 
 whose armies would, according to Russian belief, 
 have long ago made Islam the creed of the Sclav 
 races had it not been for the heroic resistance of 
 Holy Russia. In the Western world the 
 crusading spirit has died out. In Russia it 
 is still a living force. If her campaign against 
 Turkey proved successful she might recover 
 at home and to a great extent abroad any 
 prestige she might have lost by her withdrawal 
 from Manchuria. Reculer pour mieux sauter 
 is a principle which Russia has often before now 
 applied in practice, and applied in the main with 
 success. 
 
 All speculations of this kind, based upon what 
 may happen supposing anything should happen 
 which has not yet happened and may never 
 happen, are of the stuff that " dreams are made 
 of." Everything points to the conclusion that 
 the Eastern question is approaching a new, and 
 probably a final, crisis. It is, therefore, not 
 premature to consider how the possibly impend- 
 ing crisis would affect the interests of the chief 
 European Powers, and their relations towards one 
 another. 
 
 It is not difficult to predict that the attitude 
 of England would be, at the outset, one of
 
 72 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 " masterly inaction." Those who, unfortunately 
 for themselves, are old enough to remember the 
 days of the Crimean War, cannot but be struck 
 by the extraordinary change of popular sentiment 
 throughout England in respect of Turkey. 
 
 Our sympathies were then with the Turks ; 
 we all believed in the possible regeneration of 
 the Ottoman Empire ; we all hoped that the 
 result of the war would be to restore the Crimea 
 to Turkey, and thus to hinder the Black Sea from 
 becoming a Russian lake. We all regretted 
 the premature termination of the war, owing to 
 the refusal of France to continue the contest 
 after the capture of Sebastopol. Later on, we, 
 as a nation, saw cause to distrust our previous 
 conviction that Turkey, when removed from 
 the immediate fear of Russian aggression, would 
 set her house in order and reform the abuses 
 common to all Oriental Governments. As this 
 hope died away, we took refuge in the belief that 
 the Balkan States, after they had been liberated 
 from Turkish misrule, would form themselves 
 into independent and enlightened communities, 
 strong enough to hold their own without the 
 protection of Russia. Then came the Bulgarian 
 atrocities ; and from that time the British public,
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 73 
 
 without becoming pro-Russian, became distinctly 
 anti-Turkish. 
 
 I have no wish to defend the Midlothian 
 campaign, but it certainly succeeded in render- 
 ing impossible for the future the friendly relations 
 which had hitherto existed between England 
 and Turkey. Whatever my individual pre- 
 possessions may be, I feel convinced that if 
 Russia were to invade Turkey in the near future, 
 no British Government, whether Conservative 
 or Liberal, would venture to send a British fleet, 
 and still less a British army, to uphold the 
 authority of the Sultan in Macedonia or in 
 Adrianople, or even in Constantinople. Apart 
 from considerations of sentiment, British states- 
 manship no longer attaches the same importance 
 as it used to do to the maintenance of Turkey 
 in Europe, as constituting a barrier against the 
 occupation of Constantinople by Russia. Our 
 military occupation of Egypt has secured our 
 highway to India, and the value of a land 
 route from the Bosphorus to the confines of our 
 Indian Empire, even if carried out by railways, 
 would be of comparatively small advantage to 
 this country. The trade of the Levant, owing 
 to various causes which have little or no connec-
 
 74 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 tion with politics, has passed out of English 
 hands. Common sense shows us that if Russia 
 once instals herself on the Bosphorus, her exclu- 
 sion from Mediterranean waters is a practical 
 impossibility ; common sense also teaches us 
 that any danger arising from the Dardanelles 
 becoming, in fact if not in name, a Russian 
 possession would be far more likely to prove 
 serious to Continental nations than to England. 
 This being so, our interest and our conception of 
 our duty combine to deter us from taking any 
 active part in protecting Turkey in Europe from 
 further Russian aggression. The statement 
 made by the late Lord Salisbury in the House 
 of Lords shortly before his death, that in 
 supporting Turkey " we had backed the wrong 
 horse," expressed somewhat crudely latter-day 
 British sentiment towards the Ottoman Empire ; 
 and this sentiment must inevitably dictate the 
 policy which England would pursue in the event 
 of the Eastern question being suddenly reopened. 
 With regard to France, we may take it for 
 granted that if trouble should arise in the Near 
 East during the next few years, the Government 
 of the Republic would certainly take no action 
 calculated to oppose Russian intervention, while
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 75 
 
 French sentiment would be favourable, or certainly 
 not hostile, to any aggrandisement of Russia at 
 the cost of Turkey in Europe. The enthusiasm 
 excited by the Russian Alliance is not as keen 
 nowadays as at the period of the Czar's visit, 
 and the belief that her " ally and friend " would 
 one day or other assist France in the recovery 
 of her lost province has by this time been 
 greatly shaken. Still, the belief has not altogether 
 vanished amidst the French electorate, and 
 though French politicians have by now realised 
 its groundlessness, they cling, with or without 
 reason, to the idea that the exceptional relations 
 which exist between the Governments of Paris 
 and St. Petersburg] are a tower of strength for 
 France. Moreover, the Near Eastern question 
 is one in which France has less political or 
 national interest than any other of the Great 
 Powers of Europe, while her financial interests 
 must dispose her to look with favour on any 
 policy which might improve the value of Russian 
 securities. 
 
 Italy, again, can hardly be expected to offer 
 any effective opposition in the event of such a 
 contingency as that under consideration. As a 
 naval Power she would certainly view with
 
 76 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 disfavour the command of the Bosphorus and 
 the Dardanelles being transferred to the hands 
 of Russia, involving, as a matter of course, the 
 free entry of the Russian navy into the waters 
 of the Mediterranean. This disfavour would 
 undoubtedly be intensified by the close alliance 
 existing between Russia and France. Supposing 
 any proposal to alter the status quo in the Near 
 East were to be opposed by an European 
 coalition, Italy might, I think, be inclined to 
 take sides with the coalition ; but assuming, as 
 I do, that no such coalition is likely to be forth- 
 coming, I can see no reason why Italy should 
 incur the risk and cost of intervening actively 
 in a controversy in whose solution she is only 
 indirectly interested. It is worth, too, bearing 
 in mind that any antagonism Italy might enter- 
 tain to Russian aggression in the Near East 
 might easily be removed if Italy were led to 
 suppose that in any settlement of the Eastern 
 question in the interest of Russia, she herself 
 could reckon upon the acquisition of Tripoli as 
 her share in the partition of the Ottoman 
 Empire. There is, in as far as I can form an 
 opinion, one first-class Continental Power, and 
 one only, which would be prepared to resist the
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 77 
 
 advance of Eussia in the Near East, if she could 
 see any prospect of her resistance being crowned 
 with success. That Power, I need hardly say, is 
 Austria. A glance at the map of Eastern 
 Europe suffices to show that if Russia could 
 establish herself on the Bosphorus and thereby 
 obtain, indirectly, if not directly, the command 
 of the Black Sea coast from the mouth of the 
 Danube to the Straits of the Dardanelles, 
 Austria would not only lose the chance she has 
 always counted upon of succeeding to the 
 inheritance of the " Sick Man of Europe," but 
 would be in peril of forfeiting her own indepen- 
 dent existence. Up to the period of the Austro- 
 Prussian War in 1866, the Hapsburg Empire 
 would undoubtedly have offered the most 
 determined opposition to any attempt to 
 disturb the status quo in the Near East for the 
 aggrandisement of Russia. But during the four 
 decades which have come and gone since the 
 battle of Sadowa, Austria-Hungary has been 
 subjected to a process of gradual disinte- 
 gration. 
 
 Her three principal races the Germans, the 
 Sclavs, and the Magyars have throughout all 
 this period been engaged in an internecine
 
 78 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 triangular conflict. The jealousies between these 
 rival nationalities are too violent to admit of 
 any serious consideration of their common 
 interests. The one bond of union between the 
 different provinces of the Empire is the existence 
 of a common army, acting under one command. 
 The Magyars are now agitating for the formation 
 of a separate Magyar army, officered exclusively 
 by Magyars and using the Magyar language in 
 giving orders to the Magyar soldiery. The 
 Czechs are clamouring for a Parliament of their 
 own, and in order to accomplish their end have 
 brought parliamentary Government in Austria 
 to a deadlock. The Germans, who, when all 
 is said and done, constitute the backbone of the 
 Hapsburg monarchy, are openly avowing a desire 
 for severance from Hungary, and do not conceal 
 their conviction that the best thing for the 
 German provinces in Austria would be their 
 incorporation in the German Empire. Given 
 this state of things, and it follows that Austria 
 could not safely resist any advance towards 
 the Bosphorus on the part of Russia unless she 
 could count with certainty upon the support of 
 Germany. I tljink this conclusion will not be 
 disputed by any student of European politics
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 79 
 
 who is content to look at facts as they are, not 
 as one might wish them to be. Granted this 
 conclusion, it follows that Germany is master of 
 the situation, and it is desirable, therefore, 
 to understand what her policy in respect of the 
 Near East has been in the past or is likely to be 
 for the future. 
 
 Most English writers on Continental politics 
 seem to me to overlook the fact that Germany's 
 foreign policy is and must be controlled by two 
 distinct and to some extent inconsistent aims. 
 The first of these aims is to give no cause of 
 offence to Russia as the paramount Power in the 
 Dual Alliance. The second is to uphold the 
 strength of the Triple Alliance. The only way 
 in which this complicated policy can be carried 
 into practical effect is by maintaining the status 
 quo in European Turkey as long as such main- 
 tenance may be within the range of possibility. 
 I frequently notice comments in the English 
 Press upon the alleged indifference of Germany 
 to the wrongs of the Macedonians, or upon the 
 lack of cordial co-operation on the part of 
 Germany in the dictatorial demands for drastic 
 reforms addressed to the Sultan by the repre- 
 sentatives of England, France, and Russia.
 
 8o THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 I can easily understand our English point 
 of view. We English are by nature a senti- 
 mental people, and the wrongs of oppressed 
 nationalities and persecuted creeds always appeal 
 strongly to British sympathy, so long especially 
 as the redress of those wrongs has got to be 
 effected, if at all, by our neighbours, not by 
 ourselves. The saying attributed to Prince 
 Bismarck at the time of the Bulgarian atrocities, 
 that the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier 
 were of more importance in his eyes than the 
 liberation of Bulgaria from Turkish rule, was 
 undoubtedly regarded at the time of its utter- 
 ance by Mr. Gladstone and his supporters in the 
 Midlothian campaign as an utterance so cynical 
 as to be almost diabolical in its character. I 
 cannot, however, conceal my opinion that in 
 reality the policy so crudely enunciated by the 
 Chancellor was more humane than that advocated 
 by Mr. Gladstone. Both statesmen were per- 
 fectly well aware that neither they nor their 
 fellow-countrymen had the slightest intention of 
 going to war in order to redress the grievances of 
 Bulgarians, Armenians, Macedonians, or any of 
 the Christian races subject to the dominion 
 of Islam. They must also if we give them
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 81 
 
 credit for ordinary intelligence have been 
 equally aware that these grievances could not 
 be redressed without war. The difference 
 between the two statesmen was that the former 
 gave the Bulgarians clearly to understand they 
 had nothing to hope for from Germany, while 
 the latter encouraged the Bulgarians to protract 
 an unequal struggle by declamatory denuncia- 
 tions of their Turkish oppressors, which, intention- 
 ally or unintentionally, buoyed them up with 
 false hopes of British intervention. If this is so, 
 the policy of Prince Bismarck may fairly be con- 
 sidered the more humane of the two. 
 
 Bearing these facts in mind, I view with regret 
 the criticisms which have appeared in the Press, 
 and especially in the Liberal Press, of Great 
 Britain insinuating that Germany has been 
 guilty of selfishness in not exerting her in- 
 fluence at Constantinople more warmly on 
 behalf of the reforms which other European 
 Powers have urged upon the acceptance of the 
 Porte. In as far as Germany possesses any in- 
 fluence at Yildiz Kiosk, she owes it to the fact 
 that she has throughout recognised the extreme 
 difficulties of the Sultan's position, has admitted 
 that the Turks equally with the Macedonians 
 
 G
 
 82 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 have grave cause of complaint, and has treated 
 " Abdul the damned " with a consideration fairly 
 due to a sovereign who, however his authority 
 may have declined in Europe, is still the com- 
 mander of the Faithful, the recognised head of 
 Islam throughout Asia and Africa. From 
 all that I can learn, Germany has never yet 
 failed to support any demand for reforms in 
 European Turkey addressed to the Porte by the 
 so-called Concert of Europe. All that can be 
 said is that this support has not been as violent 
 and intemperate in tone as that of other 
 European Powers. 
 
 Germany, I admit, does not conceal her wish 
 to postpone for the present any drastic solution 
 of the Eastern question. In so wishing she is, I 
 venture to assert, in the right. As things are, 
 the Gordian knot must be cut, if cut at all, by 
 Russia. Russian intervention must necessitate 
 an Austro-Russian war, in which Germany could 
 hardly avoid taking sides either with Russia or 
 with Austria. Happily, the policy of Russia has 
 hitherto coincided with that of Austria in avoid- 
 ing any rupture with Turkey. So long as the 
 conflict between the Czar and the Duma remains 
 undecided, Russia is bound over to keep the
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 83 
 
 peace in the Near East. Whatever may be the 
 case with other Powers, England's chief interest 
 is the maintenance of peace ; and therefore she 
 has every cause to be satisfied with the policy of 
 Germany, which is directed to the preservation 
 of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. In 
 Bosnia and in Herzegovina, Austria has shown 
 extraordinary capacity for enlisting the support 
 of a Mussulman population in the establishment 
 of law and order under her protectorate. The 
 extension of her authority along the southern 
 sea-board of the Balkan Peninsula would be the 
 best solution of the Eastern question. But in 
 order that this, or any other similar experiment, 
 should have a chance of success, it is all- 
 important to postpone any sudden overthrow of 
 Turkish rule in Europe. This end the Near 
 Eastern policy of Germany has constantly in 
 view, and an acknowledgment of this bottom fact 
 explains many of the apparent inconsistencies of 
 German statecraft. 
 
 If ever there was a place marked out by 
 nature as the capital of a great Empire it is the 
 city of Constantinople. Standing as it does at 
 the mouth of the Golden Horn, it commands, 
 or ought to command, the narrow straits of the 
 
 G 2
 
 84 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Bosphorus which lead from the Black Sea into 
 the Sea of Marmora, and by so doing com- 
 mands also the narrower straits through which 
 the waters of the two above-named seas emerge 
 into the Mediterranean. 
 
 In the bygone time, before the discovery 
 of steamships and gunpowder, the capital 
 founded by Constantine was far more impreg- 
 nable than it is to-day. For commercial 
 purposes the position is, or, more correctly 
 speaking, was, of even greater importance. 
 Constantinople, under the Byzantine and the 
 Ottoman Empires alike, formed the point of 
 junction between the trade of Europe and Asia, 
 the centre of the caravan routes connecting the 
 two continents. The discovery of the Cape 
 route and the construction of the Suez Canal 
 have successively deflected the course of 
 commerce between the East and the West from 
 the old land routes to the comparatively new 
 maritime routes. Still, in the near future, when 
 direct railway communication has been estab- 
 lished between the manufacturing centres of 
 Europe and the markets of the East, it is certain 
 the trunk line must pass through Constanti- 
 nople, the more so as there would, I understand,
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 85 
 
 be no serious difficulty in constructing a sub- 
 marine railway under the Bosphorus and thus 
 enabling passengers and goods to be carried 
 without change of cars from Calais to Persia, if 
 not to India. I only allude to these facts to 
 show that so long as Constantinople is held by 
 an Imperial Power, as the capital, or one of the 
 capitals, of its Empire, the command of the 
 Bosphorus and the Dardanelles becomes an 
 imperative necessity, while the temptation to 
 treat the Euxine and the Sea of Marmora as 
 both coming under the category of a mare 
 clausum must become well-nigh irresistible. 
 
 History confirms this view. When the 
 capital of the Koman Empire was transferred 
 from the Tiber to the Bosphorus, the glamour 
 of ancient Rome survived long after her real 
 strength had departed. Moreover, when the 
 Emperor Constantine shifted the seat of his 
 Government, there was no adjacent European or 
 Asiatic Power which could contest the supremacy 
 of his reorganised dominion. In as far as I can 
 learn, the possession of Constantinople con- 
 ferred, as a matter of course, the undisputed 
 command of the two seas, whose approaches 
 could only be entered through the Bosphorus
 
 86 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 on the north and the Dardanelles on the 
 south. 
 
 When, however, the Turks captured Constan- 
 tinople in the middle of the fifteenth century, 
 their tenure was for a long time precarious. 
 Turkey, surrounded on her European frontiers 
 by Christian States, which, after the decline of 
 the Roman Empire, had acquired an independent 
 position, and were more or less united by their 
 common enmity to Islam, felt the necessity of 
 closing the entrance to the Sea of Marmora 
 against the galleys of the Venetian Republic and 
 of the Knights of St. John. For a century after 
 Constantinople had been renamed Stamboul, 
 and after the Cathedral of St. Sofia had been 
 converted into a Mohammedan mosque, no foreign 
 ships were allowed to pass the Dardanelles even 
 for purposes of trade. In the period to which I 
 allude, the whole shores of the Black Sea 
 belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Russia was 
 hardly known as a State, and the only enemies 
 Turkey had to take account of were the Mediter- 
 ranean countries, whose sole sea access to 
 Stamboul lay through the Dardanelles. 
 
 It was only after the first repulse sustained 
 by the Turks before the walls of Vienna that
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 87 
 
 the Sultan Suleyman I. entered into treaties 
 with France and Venice by which French 
 and Venetian trading vessels were allowed 
 to enter the Sea of Marmora and unload their 
 cargoes in the Golden Horn. Similar rights 
 were conceded to England before the close of 
 the sixteenth century. It was not till the follow- 
 ing century that Russia dealt her first blow to 
 the Suzerainty of Turkey over the Euxine. By 
 the treaty of Kulchuk Kainardj the Crimea was 
 declared an independent State. Large terri- 
 tories bordering the Black Sea were ceded to 
 Russia, and, what was more important, the Czar 
 obtained the right of erecting fortresses on its 
 shores, and of placing Russian men-of-war upon 
 its waters, the only stipulation then made being 
 that the commerce between Russia and Turkey 
 should be conducted solely by Turkish vessels. 
 This stipulation was cancelled after a few years' 
 time, and in 1774 the Muscovite mercantile navy 
 was allowed free right of navigation in the 
 Euxine. Similar privileges were accorded sub- 
 sequently to England, France, and Italy, but 
 the rule by which no foreign ship of war could 
 enter the Sea of Marmora through the Hellespont 
 was still upheld in its integrity. Indeed, this
 
 88 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 rule was formally confirmed in 1840, at the close 
 of the war between Turkey and Egypt ; when a 
 convention was concluded between England, 
 Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, with the 
 view, as far as I can ascertain, of preventing 
 France from using her naval power to assist 
 Mehemet Ali in his insurrection against the 
 Sultan. The Crimean war led to the first open 
 infraction of the rule by which no man-of-war 
 other than those of Turkey was allowed to enter 
 the Sea of Marmora. The navies of England 
 and France passed through the Dardanelles and 
 the Bosphorus, and entered the Black Sea with 
 the consent, and indeed at the request, of the 
 Turkish Government. The Crimean war resulted 
 practically in a drawn battle, and the treaty of 
 Paris, by which peace was concluded, partook of 
 the nature of a compromise. The Euxine was 
 neutralised by common consent. All trading 
 vessels, no matter what their nationality, were 
 given right of free navigation within its waters. 
 The entrance of men-of-war into its waters was, 
 however, absolutely prohibited, except in the 
 case of cruisers of small tonnage sailing under 
 the Russian or Turkish flags, which were em- 
 ployed, or said to be employed, on police
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 89 
 
 duties. Russia had long resented the limitations 
 placed upon her naval forces in the Black Sea, 
 and after the Franco-German war she induced 
 the Powers represented at the conference of Paris 
 to modify the treaty of 1856, and to allow both 
 Turkey and Russia to keep any naval force in 
 the Black Sea which they might respectively 
 deem necessary. Both Powers still stood theo- 
 retically upon a footing of absolute equality. In 
 practice, however, Russia became absolute mis- 
 tress of the Black Sea. In the course of a few 
 years, she constructed a powerful fleet in the 
 Euxine ; she rebuilt the naval arsenal of Sebas- 
 topol ; she fortified Batoum, and converted it 
 into a military stronghold. During these same 
 years, Turkey owing to her financial difficulties, 
 to the war with Servia, to the Bulgarian insur- 
 rection, and to the general disorganisation of 
 her Government allowed her fleet to fall into 
 ruin ; and beyond an effort to erect fortifications 
 at the northern end of the Bosphorus, an effort 
 which proved futile in consequence of Russia's 
 objection to the forts in question being manned 
 with guns, Turkey did nothing whatever to 
 strengthen her hold on the straits which consti- 
 tute her sole defence against any naval attack
 
 90 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 on the part of her Muscovite neighbour. If the 
 treaty of San Stefano which Russia imposed upon 
 Turkey after the passage of the Balkans had 
 not been cancelled by the opposition of England, 
 all regulations restricting the passage of Russian 
 warships between the Mediterranean and the 
 Black Sea would probably have been swept away 
 before many years had passed. It was the policy 
 of Russia to lay much stress upon the immediate 
 removal of these restrictions, as, in the event 
 of Russian men-of-war being allowed to pass to 
 and fro from one sea to the other, a similar 
 privilege could not have been denied to other 
 maritime nations. For obvious reasons it was, 
 therefore, more conducive to Russian interests to 
 keep in force the international regulations by 
 which men-of-war belonging to other nations are 
 precluded from passing the Dardanelles. If these 
 regulations had not been in existence at the time 
 of the Russo-Turkish war, the course of campaign 
 would probably have been modified to the dis- 
 advantage of the former Power. If they should 
 cease to exist while the Sultan still rules over 
 European Turkey, the supremacy of Russia in 
 the Black Sea might conceivably be exposed to 
 serious damage. The present policy, therefore,
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 91 
 
 of Russia is to close the Dardanelles to ships of 
 war belonging to other nations, and at the same 
 time to reserve for herself the practical right of 
 exit and ingress for her cruisers. 
 
 It is obvious to any intelligent observer that 
 the Eastern question is working out its own 
 solution. The process may seem slow to those 
 who suffer under Turkish misrule, and still more 
 to those who are longing for the death of the 
 Sick Man of Europe in order to divide his 
 inheritance. But the diseases under which 
 Turkey suffers have reached a stage when no 
 hope of any permanent recovery can reasonably 
 be entertained. The real question in the Near 
 East is not when Turkey will have to surrender 
 her last possessions on the mainland of Europe, 
 but who is to succeed her as Mistress of Con- 
 stantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. 
 The slower the process of disintegration the 
 better for the interests of England as the friend 
 of peace. There is no need to say that, if it 
 were not for the fear of Russian aggrandisement, 
 the Turks would long ere this have been ejected 
 from Europe. 
 
 Whatever may be the outcome of the Russian 
 revolution, whether the Czar is deposed in fact,
 
 92 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 if not in name, or whether the insurrection is 
 crushed, the winning party in either case will 
 probably engage in a war for the final overthrow 
 of Turkish rule in Europe. It is, therefore, to say 
 the least, on the cards that we may hear at no 
 distant day of the Eastern question being on the 
 eve of settlement. If so, the relations between 
 England and Egypt must come up for discussion, 
 and England surely against her will must be 
 forced to choose at last between declaring her 
 Protectorate over Egypt, or fixing a time for 
 the evacuation of Egypt by her troops.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 
 
 THE only European Power which has any 
 distinct and definite opinion of its own about 
 Egypt is, I need hardly say, Great Britain. 
 Even this statement should be accompanied 
 with considerable qualifications. England as a 
 nation cannot as yet be fairly said to have any 
 decided views, one way or another, beyond a 
 general instinct that British supremacy in the 
 Valley of the Nile is an advantage to her inter- 
 ests as the mistress of India, so long as that 
 supremacy can be upheld without grave sacrifices 
 on her part. This is not so much the fault of 
 the British public as of the successive Govern- 
 ments, no matter whether Liberal or Conserva- 
 tive, which have held office since England first 
 intervened in Egypt by force of arms. From 
 the date of the bombardment of Alexandria up
 
 94 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 to the day on which I write, no British Ministry 
 has had the courage to let it be known at home 
 and abroad that they consider the command of 
 the country traversed by the Suez Canal to be a 
 matter of permanent vital interest to the British 
 Empire. Nor has any Ministry publicly acknow- 
 ledged the patent fact that this command can 
 only be secured by England taking, openly and 
 avowedly, upon herself the administration of 
 Egypt, or, in other words, declaring a British 
 Protectorate over the land of the Pharaohs. It 
 is indeed only within the last few years that 
 any British Premier with the possible exception 
 of Lord Beaconsfield has ever seemed to realize 
 even in his own mind, that when England had 
 once established the military occupation of 
 Egypt, she had " come to stay." 
 
 I am convinced myself that the repeated 
 declarations volunteered by English statesmen, 
 from Mr. Gladstone downwards, of our intention 
 to withdraw the army of occupation at an early 
 period were made in absolute good faith. This 
 is a point on which I can speak with some 
 authority, as for many years I was almost 
 the only known publicist who advocated the 
 expediency of England's assuming an avowed
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 95 
 
 and permanent Protectorate over Egypt, and, 
 in this capacity, I was brought into frequent 
 communication with almost all the leading states- 
 men and Ministers who took any serious interest 
 in the "Egyptian Question," and they were 
 comparatively few in number. 
 
 As soon as our troops had entered Cairo and 
 had replaced Tewfik Pasha on the Vice-regal 
 throne, Mr. Gladstone went out of his way to 
 bar British occupation being converted into 
 British Annexation. In as far as a country can 
 ever be bound by Ministerial declarations, Mr. 
 Gladstone left England bound hand and foot so 
 as to preclude her from even contemplating 
 the annexation of Egypt. With his usual ignor- 
 ance of all foreign, and especially of all Eastern 
 countries, he was firmly convinced that after a 
 brief period of British tutelage Egypt might 
 become fitted for popular self-government, and 
 have learnt to appreciate the advantages of a 
 system of administration based upon British 
 ideas of law and order. Time after time he 
 made honest efforts to carry out his policy, and 
 I have reason to believe that, when the then 
 Marquis of Hartington declared in the House 
 of Commons that the evacuation of Egypt was
 
 96 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 a question not of months but of weeks, he spoke 
 on the authority of the Premier. Mr. Goschen and 
 Lord Northbrook, who at that period were leading 
 members of the Gladstone Ministry, were equally 
 opposed to any idea of annexation, though I 
 should doubt their having been equally confident 
 of the political regeneration of Egypt under 
 British tutelage. As years, however, went by, 
 and as it became more and more manifest that 
 the Egyptians, far from becoming better qualified 
 for self-government under an autocratic British 
 administration, were growing less and less quali- 
 fied to administer their own affairs for them- 
 selves, public opinion in England became more 
 and more reconciled to the indefinite prolonga- 
 tion of our sojourn in the Valley of the Nile, 
 not as tenants at will, but as permanent free- 
 holders. It became manifest years ago, that 
 England's withdrawal of her army of occupation 
 would be the signal for internal disturbances, 
 which must necessitate the renewed occupation 
 of Egypt by some other European Power, France 
 for choice. This truth, however, was very slow 
 of acceptance on the part, not only of the British 
 public, but of the British Parliament. It was 
 only after the Boer War, and the consequent
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 97 
 
 growth of Imperialism, that England became 
 reconciled to the idea of an avowed Protectorate. 
 Up to this period the Conservatives were as 
 reluctant as the Liberals to take up " the white 
 man's burden " in the Valley of the Nile. The 
 then Sir Stafford Northcote, Lord Cross, Sir 
 Michael Hicks-Beach, Lord Eandolph Churchill, 
 Lord Wolseley, and the late Lord Derby were 
 consistently hostile to any idea of annexation. 
 Their conversion was only effected by the 
 tardy discovery that our supremacy in Egypt 
 was essential to the welfare of Great Britain as 
 the ruler of India, and by their realising that, 
 supposing we lost this supremacy, as we should 
 infallibly do if we had to withdraw the army of 
 occupation, we should lose Egypt without any 
 chance of recovery. Moreover, the enforced 
 evacuation of the Soudan by Mr. Gladstone's 
 orders, the ill-starred mission of General Gordon, 
 and his subsequent abandonment, instead of 
 facilitating as the author of the evacuation 
 policy had fondly imagined had converted the 
 insurrection of the Dervishes into a formidable 
 movement which seriously threatened the inde- 
 pendence, if not the existence, of Egypt. It 
 was impossible for England to withdraw her 
 
 H
 
 98 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 troops and leave Egypt open to the invasion of 
 the Mahdi, without national disgrace. As the 
 year went on, it became more and more mani- 
 fest that Egypt under British administration 
 had made no appreciable advance towards self- 
 government. Indeed, after the defeat of the 
 Khalifa, the capture of Khartoum, the Marchand 
 mission, and the formal annexation of the Soudan 
 under the so-called con-dominium of King 
 Edward VII and the Khedive, it became obvious 
 to any statesman of ordinary intelligence that 
 England, whether she liked or not, and what- 
 ever promises she might have made, had prac- 
 tically no choice except to remain encamped in 
 Egypt. 
 
 I am convinced that this is the view enter- 
 tained by the great majority of British states- 
 men and ministers, irrespective of their party 
 politics. I am not equally certain that a similar 
 conviction as to the necessity for England of 
 retaining Egypt, as an outpost of the British 
 Empire, is entertained by the British electorate. 
 Public interest in England on questions of 
 foreign policy is mainly confined to questions 
 which in one way or another appeal to senti- 
 mental considerations. The extraordinary ma-
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 99 
 
 terial progress made by Egypt under British 
 rule has gratified our national pride. But when 
 it was proved to demonstration that the im- 
 mense benefits we had bestowed on Egypt had 
 failed in procuring for us the gratitude or the 
 respect of the Egyptian population, the gilt to 
 use vulgar parlance was washed off the ginger- 
 bread. If we ever have a strong Prime Minister, 
 such as Mr. Gladstone, with a powerful Radical 
 and Nonconformist following, it might not be 
 impossible to patch up some compromise under 
 which our army of occupation might be with- 
 drawn in exchange for paper guarantees acknow- 
 ledging our supremacy in Egypt ; and such a 
 compromise might conceivably be carried through 
 Parliament without exciting any outburst of 
 popular indignation. I do not say that such an 
 eventuality is probable, but I do say that it is 
 not impossible, and that, rightly or wrongly, the 
 British public, as a body, has hardly yet realised 
 the supreme importance to the British Empire 
 of retaining Egypt under our military domin- 
 ation. In other words, the British nation ac- 
 quiesces in, and sanctions our Protectorate, but 
 is not enthusiastic about its continuance, and 
 cannot, as I think, be expected to display any 
 
 H 2
 
 ioo THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 keen enthusiasm about the retention of Egypt 
 until such time as diplomatic fictions are dis- 
 carded and Egypt is recognised at home and 
 abroad as forming part and parcel of the British 
 Empire. 
 
 The state of mind which I have endeavoured 
 to depict as representing British opinion in 
 respect of Egypt is one which foreign countries 
 find it hard to understand. They believed from 
 the outset, and they doubtless believe still, that 
 England has succeeded in establishing herself 
 as the dominant Power in Egypt by tortuous 
 intrigues and wilful misrepresentations, and 
 that by her success in obtaining the object of 
 her ambition she has justified her title of 
 " perfidious Albion." 
 
 This general distrust of England was and 
 I fear is deep-rooted throughout Europe. It 
 was, however, in France alone, up to the time of 
 the Boer War, that this latent hostility assumed 
 an acute form. It is only fair to admit that 
 France had considerable ground for provocation. 
 From the days of the Restoration, France had 
 invariably supported Mahomet Ali in his in- 
 surrection against Turkish rule. England, on 
 the other hand, had throughout espoused the
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 101 
 
 cause of the Sultan, and, with the aid of Russia, 
 had stopped the advance of the Egyptian armies 
 on Constantinople, and had intervened by force 
 of arms to modify, in favour of Turkey, the final 
 compromise by which in 1840 peace was estab- 
 lished between the Suzerain and the Vassal 
 Power. It was not without reason that France 
 claimed to be the author of Egyptian independ- 
 ence, and this claim was fully recognised by 
 Mahomet Ali and his successors up to the 
 accession of Ismail Pasha. Napoleon III 
 carried on the traditional policy of France in 
 respect of Egypt, and it was mainly owing to 
 his personal support that the Suez Canal was 
 carried to completion in defiance of the per- 
 sistent opposition of Great Britain. Later on, 
 when Ismail Pasha's lavish expenditure could 
 only be continued by constant loans, France 
 financed Egypt on much the same principle 
 as, on a larger scale, she has recently financed 
 Russia. Indeed, up to 1870, English financiers 
 and English bond holders had little or nothing 
 to do with Egyptian securities. Thus, at the 
 period of which I speak, French influence was 
 supreme at the Khedivial Court. The vast 
 majority of the foreign officials employed in the
 
 102 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Egyptian public service were of French origin. 
 French was the only European language with 
 which the ministers, the officials, the Khedive, 
 the Princes and the Court were familiar, and, so 
 long as the Second Empire lasted, the influence 
 of France in all political and financial affairs 
 affecting Egypt was almost uncontested. Even 
 after the deposition of Ismail, France continued 
 under the Dual Control to exercise an authority 
 in Egyptian affairs almost, if not quite, equal 
 to that of England, and this authority she might 
 have maintained to the present day if the 
 Freycinet Ministry had not been misled by the 
 advice of Ferdinand de Lesseps, and in con- 
 sequence recalled her fleet when England 
 requested the co-operation of France in the 
 bombardment of Alexandria. Never was so 
 disastrous a blunder committed on such untrust- 
 worthy advice. France, with her usual ignorance 
 of foreign countries, seriously believed M. de 
 Lesseps' assurances that the British fleet and 
 the British army would be defeated by Arabi 
 and his followers, or perhaps, to speak more 
 accurately, would encounter such formidable 
 resistance on the part of the insurgents as to 
 justify French intervention in Egypt and enable
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 103 
 
 her to dictate her own terms alike to the Khedive, 
 the mutineers, and the British Government. 
 France has nobody except herself to blame 
 for the fact that after Tel-el-Kebir England 
 abolished the Dual Control and declared her 
 intention of administering the affairs of Egypt 
 herself, subject to the proviso that she pledged 
 her word to withdraw her military occupation, as 
 soon as Egypt had been so reformed under 
 British rule as to render her competent to 
 administer her own affairs a condition which 
 never has been realised, and, after the lapse of a 
 quarter of a century, seems well nigh incapable 
 of realisation. 
 
 If our foreign critics, who are always 
 denouncing the perfidy of British policy in 
 respect of Egypt, would endeavour to look at 
 hard facts, they would have to acknowledge that 
 after England had occupied Egypt for four years, 
 she made a bona fide, though unsuccessful, 
 attempt to carry out her plighted word. In 
 1885 Lord Salisbury's Government, at the 
 instigation of Lord Randolph Churchill, made 
 overtures to the Porte for the conclusion of an 
 arrangement by which England might consider 
 herself justified in withdrawing her troops from
 
 io 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Egypt. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was our 
 representative appointed by the British 
 Government, Mukhtar Pasha Ghazi by the 
 Turkish. The two plenipotentiaries met by 
 common consent in Cairo to discuss the terms of 
 the proposed convention, and after a protracted 
 discussion they agreed that, on the withdrawal 
 of our army of occupation, the duty of main- 
 taining order in Egypt should be entrusted to 
 Turkish troops, subject to a written engagement 
 that if order should not be maintained, Turkey, 
 in as far as she was concerned, should offer no 
 opposition to the return of a British army of 
 occupation. How far this engagement would 
 have been binding is open to question. 
 Whatever may have been the theoretical merits 
 or demerits of the Wolff-Mukhtar convention, 
 there can be no question as to the plain fact 
 that, if we had withdrawn from Egypt, our 
 chance of ever returning there, as masters, 
 would have been more than problematical. It 
 was only by accident we escaped from a disas- 
 trous position. The draft convention had been 
 signed and sealed by the plenipotentiary envoys 
 of England and Turkey, it had been approved 
 by the former Power and only required the
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 105 
 
 sanction of the latter to become law. At the 
 eleventh hour, however, France exerted her 
 diplomatic influence at Constantinople to induce 
 the Sultan to refuse his signature to the 
 convention framed by his chosen Commissioner. 
 Whether this intervention on the part of France 
 was due to a rigid regard for her traditional 
 policy as the protectress of Egypt against 
 Turkey, or whether it was due to French 
 petulance and to French distrust and jealousy 
 of England in all matters affecting Egypt, I do 
 not undertake to decide. All I venture to 
 state is that France saved us from the conse- 
 quences of our own folly : and that for the 
 second, and not the last, time in our dealings 
 with Egypt. 
 
 It is only in human nature that France should 
 bitterly resent her discomfiture, all the more 
 because it was mainly due to her own action. 
 From the defeat of Arabi up to the close of the 
 Boer War, the annals of Egypt are one long 
 record of French attempts to weaken the suprem- 
 acy of England by underground intrigues with 
 every party and every interest in the Khedivial 
 Court and the Soudan, which was hostile, 
 from whatever motive, to the British occupation.
 
 io6 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 It was only after the capture of Khartoum and 
 the collapse of the Marchand Mission that France 
 gave up as hopeless the idea of recovering her 
 lost ascendancy in Egypt and accepted our mili- 
 tary occupation as an accomplished fact. So 
 long as England seemed likely to succumb to the 
 Boers, all the Continental nations, with scarcely 
 an exception, sympathised with the efforts of 
 France to upset British supremacy in Egypt ; 
 and if it had not been for the refusal of Germany 
 to assist in the Convocation of an International 
 Conference to regulate the relations between 
 England and Egypt, France would probably have 
 succeeded in the efforts she made to force 
 England to terminate her unavowed Protectorate. 
 As soon, however, as the course of the war in the 
 Far East, and the unexpected defeat of Russia 
 by Japan, had deprived the Dual Alliance of its 
 former value, as regarded France, the latter 
 Power recognised the importance of coming to an 
 understanding with England. The result of this 
 recognition was the Anglo-French agreement, by 
 which France agreed to give England a free 
 hand in Egypt in return for England agreeing to 
 give France a free hand in Morocco. This 
 agreement has subsequently developed into the
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 107 
 
 Entente Cordiale. For the present it is enough 
 to say that it has removed any immediate 
 possibility of a Continental coalition against 
 our continued occupation of Egypt. France was 
 the leading member of this abortive coalition, and 
 now that she has retired from the coalition there 
 is no other European State at once able and 
 willing to undertake its leadership. The plain 
 truth is that when once the exaggerated, though, 
 to some extent genuine, sympathy for the Boer 
 cause was dispelled by the logic of facts, there 
 was no Continental nation except France which 
 had any strong personal interest in the Egyptian 
 Question. Under our Protectorate and our 
 policy of the " open door," Egypt is as free to 
 traders and investors of every civilised nation as 
 it is to our own people. Foreigners of all races 
 have the same legal rights and privileges as are 
 accorded to English subjects : while, so long as 
 the Capitulations are held in respect, they enjoy 
 special advantages not possessed by them outside 
 the Ottoman Empire. This being so, it is idle 
 to imagine that any Continental nation has 
 sufficient commercial or political interest in 
 Egypt to induce her to resent our military 
 occupation of the Nile Valley on the ground of
 
 io8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 its being an unauthorised aggrandisement of 
 the British Empire. 
 
 It would appear as if since France has with- 
 drawn her antagonism England's Protectorate 
 over Egypt was likely to be free from opposition 
 of any kind on the part of Europe. There is, 
 however, one aspect of the Algeciras Conference 
 which cannot be left out of sight in any calcula- 
 tion of the outlook for Egypt in the near 
 future. 
 
 France had learnt nothing from the loss of her 
 colonial possessions in India and in North America. 
 Then, as now, the colonial policy of France was to 
 exploit her colonies for the exclusive benefit of her 
 own people and her own trade. This is the policy 
 she has since pursued in Tunis, in Madagascar, in 
 Cochin China, and there can be no reasonable 
 doubt that this was the policy she intended to 
 pursue in Morocco. I suppose that some day or 
 other we shall know more than we do at present 
 of the negotiations which must have preceded 
 the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement. 
 Meanwhile, there is a strong antecedent proba- 
 bility that the first overtures came from France. 
 The idea of a deal by which France was to 
 pledge herself to give England a free hand
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 109 
 
 in Egypt in consideration of our allowing France 
 to do what she liked in Morocco was, to my 
 thinking, too subtle a one to have been conceived 
 by a British brain. The advantage, however, 
 accruing to England from the formal recognition 
 by France of our supremacy in Egypt was well 
 worth an undertaking on our part that we would 
 offer no opposition to any policy France might 
 think fit to adopt in Morocco. The settlement 
 of our Newfoundland controversy with France 
 was an even more solid advantage than the 
 surrender of any hypothetical claims on the 
 part of France to a voice in the administration 
 of Egypt. 
 
 The conception, moreover, that the conclusion 
 of a secret treaty by which France and England 
 agreed to support a common policy in respect 
 of Egypt, where the latter exercised a virtual 
 Protectorate, and in which the former contem- 
 plated establishing a similar Protectorate 
 would, on its disclosure, command the approval 
 of all European Powers, seems to me more in 
 accordance with French than with British 
 diplomacy. The ignorance of foreign policy, 
 which is so characteristic of French statesman- 
 ship, and which was so signally illustrated by
 
 no THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 M. Delcasse"s persistent belief in the Dual Alli- 
 ance, may excuse his delusion that the assent of 
 England would suffice to remove any objection 
 on the part of third parties to the virtual, if 
 not the nominal, annexation of Morocco by 
 France. The treaty in question was supposed 
 tp guarantee the maintenance of the " Open 
 Door " principle for a limited number of years, 
 but experience has taught Continental nations 
 that the " Open Door" can easily be closed, as 
 was the case in Tunis, by a series of restrictions 
 under which no one, except a Frenchman, can 
 carry on business successfully in a French 
 colony. " Tunisification " is a barbarous word, 
 but it expresses clearly enough the process by 
 which France would inevitably have endeavoured 
 to keep Morocco a private preserve for French 
 traders, colonists and officials, supposing the 
 Anglo-French Agreement had been carried out 
 in the way that France anticipated at the time 
 of its signature. I cannot but think that if a 
 similar treaty had been drawn up between let 
 us say France and Spain, England would have 
 been the first to protest against the treaty being 
 accepted as valid, unless there was some more 
 potent protection for British interests in Morocco
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 1 1 1 
 
 than that provided by a declaration on the part 
 of France that she intended for the present to 
 administer Morocco under a French Protectorate 
 on the principle of the " Open Door." 
 
 Under these circumstances it seems to me 
 obvious that the failure of the French Govern- 
 ment to communicate the Anglo-French Agree- 
 ment officially to Germany must have been 
 intentional and not accidental. The only 
 explanation I can find for the otherwise unin- 
 telligible omission to acquaint Germany officially 
 with the terms of the agreement is that, in the 
 opinion of M. Delcasse* and his colleagues, 
 Germany, on learning that the Anglo-French 
 understanding on the subject of Morocco was 
 an accomplished fact, would not think it worth 
 her while to dispute its validity, and that, there- 
 fore, France would weaken her own case by 
 admitting the assumption that Germany had 
 any right to be consulted or to express any 
 opinion on the matter. Our own Government 
 acted in accordance with British diplomatic 
 usage in communicating the terms of our 
 understanding with France in respect of Egypt 
 directly to Berlin ; and France would have 
 occupied a far stronger position if she had
 
 ii2 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 followed our example, and had not given 
 Germany a plausible excuse for not communi- 
 cating her intended dissent from the Anglo- 
 French understanding in respect of Morocco till 
 it suited the exigencies of German policy. I 
 am not concerned in endeavouring to show that 
 the intervention of Germany in the Morocco 
 controversy was wise or unwise. All I contend 
 is that Germany in common for that matter 
 with every great European Power had an 
 indisputable right to object to the Anglo- 
 French Agreement as calculated to affect 
 German interests in Morocco. In respect of 
 Egypt she felt confident that German interests 
 would not suffer under British administration, 
 and she forthwith expressed her approval. In 
 respect of Morocco she felt confident that German 
 interests would suffer under French adminis- 
 tration, and refused to give her approval to the 
 Anglo-French understanding until it had been 
 submitted to an International Conference. 
 
 If it had not been for accidental circumstances, 
 I cannot but think the justice of the German 
 contention would have commended itself to the 
 common sense of the British public. There is 
 no country in Europe which has so strong a
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 113 
 
 personal interest as England in maintaining the 
 general principle that no two Powers can come 
 to a valid agreement as to the annexation or 
 partition or occupation of a hitherto independent 
 State without the approval of other Powers 
 whose interests are likely to be affected by the 
 proposed change of administration. Unfor- 
 tunately, popular opinion in England, and still 
 more in France, attached an importance to the 
 Anglo-French Agreement to which it had no 
 intrinsic claim. In itself the Anglo-French 
 Agreement was welcome to Great Britain. The 
 recognition of our supremacy in Egypt and the 
 settlement of the Newfoundland difficulty by 
 the withdrawal on the part of France of 
 claims dating from the Treaty of Utrecht were 
 substantial advantages to the British Empire ; 
 and the restoration of friendly relations with 
 France, as our nearest neighbour and for many 
 long years our most formidable enemy, was 
 genuinely felt by the British public as matter 
 for personal satisfaction. 
 
 What happened to Morocco was to us a 
 matter of comparative indifference ; and at the 
 outset the protest raised by Germany against 
 the arrangements contemplated under a secret 
 
 i
 
 1 1 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 treaty was popularly regarded in England as 
 being dictated by German ill-will towards 
 England and by German jealousy of our entente 
 cordiale with the French nation. To put the 
 matter plainly, the opposition to the Anglo- 
 French Treaty, first made public on the occasion 
 of the German Emperor's visit to Tangiers, was 
 regarded by the British public as an unjusti- 
 fiable attempt on the part of Germany to put a 
 spoke in the wheel of an arrangement which 
 gave general satisfaction to England as well as 
 to France, and which ought to give satisfaction 
 to Morocco if she understood her true interests. 
 There was, too, a genuine, though irrational, 
 British sentiment that we did not like to see 
 France bullied, and that we were honourably 
 bound to support our ally by the moral force of 
 British public opinion. The result of this state of 
 popular feeling, almost unintelligible to anyone 
 not born and bred in England, was to give rise 
 to an outburst of enthusiastic sympathy for 
 France, which could hardly fail to be interpreted 
 in Germany as an expression of ill-will towards 
 the German nation, and as an intimation that, 
 in the event of her persisting in her protest 
 against the Anglo-French Agreement, England
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 115 
 
 would in the end side with France as against 
 Germany. 
 
 As soon, however, as it became manifest that 
 on the one hand Germany was in earnest, and 
 on the other that England had no intention of 
 going to war in order to uphold the Anglo- 
 French Convention as binding upon Europe, 
 France had no option save to accept the 
 German demand for an International Confer- 
 ence, and thereby to abandon the fundamental 
 principle on which the Anglo-French Agreement 
 was based, that is, the right of France and 
 England to settle between themselves what was 
 to be the future status of Morocco under a 
 French Protectorate. 
 
 Naturally enough, the organs of the French 
 Kepublic and their partisans in the English 
 Press have not lost a single opportunity of 
 affirming that France never proposed to admin- 
 ister Morocco on the same principles on which 
 she has administered Algeria, Tunis, Mada- 
 gascar, and every other French colony on the 
 face of the globe. I do not dispute the sincerity 
 with which eminent French statesmen have 
 repudiated the idea that France seriously con- 
 templated the Tunisification of Morocco. They 
 
 I 2
 
 n6 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 would still doubtless affirm that in Tunis they 
 had respected all foreign rights, had safeguarded 
 all foreign interests and had, subject to the 
 exigencies of the French fiscal system, maintained 
 the principle of the " Open Door." On the 
 other hand, I fail to see how, even with the best 
 will in the world, France could have practically 
 carried out the policy of the " Open Door " in 
 Morocco, while she maintained the policy of the 
 closed door in Algeria, as the two States are not 
 separated by any natural frontiers, but divided 
 by a geographical line running for the most part 
 through a sparsely inhabited desert. 
 
 Thus, when France had once accepted the 
 German proposal to submit the Morocco question 
 to a conference, she had virtually given up her 
 contention that, given the approval of England, 
 she was entitled to establish a protectorate over 
 Morocco without the sanction of Europe as ex- 
 pressed by a congress. Thus, Germany practi- 
 cally established the point she had contended 
 for, namely, that France was not at liberty on 
 the strength of the Anglo-French Agreement 
 to add Morocco to her colonial possessions. 
 
 It seems to me incredible that the French 
 Government should not have realised that to
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 117 
 
 submit the settlement of the Morocco controversy 
 to an International Congress was tantamount to 
 the abandonment of her intention to constitute 
 herself the paramount power in Morocco. It is, 
 however, intelligible enough that the French 
 Government should have been unwilling to 
 acknowledge this fact openly. 
 
 All countries are apt to magnify their own im- 
 portance, and France is no exception to this rule. 
 Our own estimate of England's greatness, strength, 
 and loyalty is probably as high as that of France : 
 but we do not labour under the delusion, so 
 universal with our neighbours, that all nations 
 in the civilised world entertain a respect and 
 admiration for France, only second, if at all, 
 to that they entertain for their own country. 
 This delusion is intensified by the utter indiffer- 
 ence of Frenchmen to foreign politics, and their 
 extreme ignorance of foreign countries. Paris is 
 in French opinion the ville lumiere not only of 
 France, but of the globe ; and it is to her, as 
 the personification of France, that all other 
 nations, consciously or unconsciously, look for 
 " light and leading." 
 
 Acting on the belief that the sympathies of 
 Europe and America were on their side, and
 
 n8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 that all the great Powers would be anxious to 
 uphold the prestige of la grande nation, they 
 took it for granted that an International Congress 
 would decide in favour of the French as opposed 
 to the German solution of the Morocco question. 
 Moreover, it may have been genuinely imagined 
 at the Quai d'Orsay that the action of France in 
 accepting the reference of the matter in dispute 
 to a Congress would be recognised by the neutral 
 powers as entitling her to their own gratitude, and 
 that, therefore, she might count on their support- 
 ing her claim at Algeciras by such a majority as 
 would render it impossible for Germany to resist 
 the decision of an International Congress. The 
 plain truth is that the French Government 
 overlooked the fact that the only serious interest 
 the neutral Powers had, or have, in Morocco was 
 to avoid the possibility of peace being endangered 
 in Europe by the controversy between France 
 and Germany, and that this result could only be 
 achieved by satisfying the demand of Germany 
 that France should not be given " the free hand " 
 in Morocco which would have been secured to 
 her by the Anglo-French Convention. Thus, as 
 the dominant desire of every neutral Power 
 is the preservation of the peace of Europe,
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 119 
 
 and as every Power bases her policy on con- 
 siderations of her own personal interests, the 
 idea that Europe would support the preten- 
 sions of France on account of their equity, 
 whether real or imaginary, was manifestly 
 chimerical. 
 
 The only concession made to France has been 
 the acknowledgment of her right as a European 
 Power, whose territory is contiguous to that of 
 Morocco, to take any military measures required 
 to protect her own territory against raids on the 
 part of Morocco. I can quite understand the 
 contention that the annexation of Morocco by 
 France would be the best arrangement, if not 
 for Morocco itself, for the interests of the Euro- 
 pean residents and traders in the Moorish king- 
 dom. But, even if this is so, Germany had a 
 perfect right to contend, on her side, that the 
 annexation of Morocco, which would of necessity 
 involve the extension of French territory from 
 Tripoli to the Atlantic, was not consistent with 
 the political and industrial interests of Germany 
 or of Europe. The policies, therefore, of France 
 and Germany in respect of Morocco were abso- 
 lutely incompatible with, and even antagonistic 
 to, one another.
 
 120 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 I have no wish to deny that moral force has 
 a certain weight of ifcs own in all international 
 controversies, but it is and always will be while 
 human nature remains what it is of very 
 limited weight unless it has physical force at 
 its back. At the risk of repeating a definition 
 of the difference between physical and moral 
 force which I have used more than once, I should 
 say that, in the former, the bayonets are in the 
 front, but that in the latter they are in the 
 rear. Without bayonets behind or before moral 
 force cannot be said to exist. If this definition 
 is correct it is obvious that the only real force 
 of the Algeciras Conference resided in two of its 
 members, that is in Germany or France. England 
 under the wise guidance of our late Foreign 
 Minister, if not at the instance of His Majesty 
 who has shown remarkable tact and common 
 sense in carrying through an understanding which 
 has been welcomed alike on both sides of the 
 Channel took the utmost care to define before- 
 hand our obligations under the agreement in 
 question. We bound ourselves to give France a 
 free hand in Morocco in as far as we were con- 
 cerned, and to give our diplomatic support to any 
 measures France might propose to take for its
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 121 
 
 re-organisation. But I am convinced that no 
 one of the late Ministry, or no statesman of the 
 slightest political authority, ever contemplated 
 seriously the possibility of our going to war for 
 the sake of assisting France in adding Morocco 
 to the dominions of the Kepublic. 
 
 We had no interest in the fortunes of Morocco 
 which could conceivably justify our military 
 intervention in that unfortunate and inaccessible 
 country. Whether the Sultan or the Pretender 
 reigned at Fez was to us a matter of indiffer- 
 ence. Moreover, it was obvious to the meanest 
 comprehension that for England to assist France 
 by armed force might easily bring about com- 
 plications between England and Germany. The 
 very possibility of such a conflict was viewed 
 with hostility by the British public, not only 
 from the absence of any justification for such a 
 policy, but because it might eventuate in a 
 breach of friendly relations with the one country 
 which, in virtue of its race, its institutions, 
 religion, its national character and its history, 
 is more akin to us than to any other Continental 
 nation. If this was true in the days when our 
 effusive demonstrations of goodwill towards 
 France were at their height, it is still more true
 
 122 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 to-day, when political power has passed into the 
 hands of a party pledged to domestic reforms 
 which could only be carried out under a pacific 
 foreign policy incompatible not only with wars 
 but with rumours of war. England therefore 
 could not be counted upon by France for any- 
 thing beyond diplomatic support. 
 
 The Conference met in the middle of February, 
 and spent the first month of its existence in 
 non-official conversation between its members, 
 and in dealing with collateral subjects which 
 had no bearing upon the main points at issue, 
 namely, the formation of a State bank and the 
 organisation of a police force to maintain order 
 in Morocco, and to enforce the reforms which 
 the Conference should determine to introduce. 
 These two points owed their importance to their 
 involving the issue whether France was or was 
 not to have a free hand in Morocco, as contem- 
 plated by the Anglo-French Convention. The 
 earlier work of the Congress has been aptly 
 described as " marking time," that is, discussing 
 subsidiary subjects which carried their task no 
 forwarder, but furnished a decent excuse for 
 prolonging their deliberations. It should, how- 
 ever, be owned that this " marking time " policy
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 123 
 
 brought to light five important conclusions. 
 The first was that England had no intention of 
 going beyond the terms of her compact with 
 France by interpreting diplomatic support as a 
 preliminary step towards an active intervention 
 which might affect her friendly relations with 
 Germany. The second was that no one of the 
 neutral Powers would take action calculated to 
 endanger, however remotely, the maintenance of 
 European peace. The third was that, in the 
 event of any question being brought before the 
 Conference affecting the issue whether Morocco 
 should be placed under exclusively French con- 
 trol, as proposed by France, or under some form 
 of international control, as proposed by Ger- 
 many, there was no likelihood of France com- 
 manding any substantial majority of the neutral 
 Powers. The fourth was that France had defin- 
 itely abandoned any idea of running the risk of 
 a war with Germany single-handed in order to 
 carry out her ambition of securing a supremacy 
 in Morocco similar to that secured by England 
 in Egypt. The fifth and last was that Germany 
 would sooner withdraw from the Conference than 
 accept any compromise under which Morocco 
 would become a French dependency.
 
 i2 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Given these conclusions, there could be no 
 possible doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the 
 Conference. It remained with Germany to 
 determine whether the Conference should end in 
 smoke, or whether its members should accept 
 some arrangement by which the administration 
 of Morocco should be conducted under inter- 
 national control. It is not my object to discuss 
 in this article whether the attitude of Germany 
 in this affair is likely to prove more conducive 
 to her own interests or to those of Europe and 
 Morocco than the adoption of the " free hand " 
 for France, proposed under the Anglo-French 
 Agreement. 
 
 At the first sight it may seem as if the 
 decision of the Conference of Algeciras had 
 no special bearing upon Egypt and her relations 
 with England. But the fact remains that the 
 Conference, at the instance of Germany, accepted 
 the principle that no private understanding 
 between two European Powers in respect of a 
 State in which other Powers had commercial 
 or political interests could be regarded as binding 
 upon third parties, until it had been previously 
 submitted to, and approved by, an International 
 Conference. What is sauce for the goose is
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 125 
 
 sauce for the gander, and it follows logically 
 that if an arrangement about Morocco con- 
 cluded between France and England is null 
 and void without the approval of an Inter- 
 national Conference, an arrangement between 
 the same Powers as to Egypt cannot be accepted 
 as valid except under similar conditions. Now 
 the British Government had the good sense to 
 communicate the Anglo-French agreement as 
 soon as it was concluded, and thereupon was 
 informed officially from Berlin that the German 
 Government saw no objection to the free hand 
 accorded thereby to England in Egypt in as 
 far as Germany was concerned. After the 
 Conference was concluded, Germany declared to 
 England that she saw no cause to object to 
 our having the free hand in Egypt accorded 
 to us, however irregularly, by the Anglo- 
 French Agreement, as German subjects and 
 German interests had every cause to be satisfied 
 with the treatment they had received in Egypt 
 under British administration. This second 
 declaration was coupled with an intimation 
 that if any fundamental change were effected 
 in the relations between Egypt and Germany, 
 the latter Power did not intend to commit
 
 126 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 herself beforehand to similar acquiescence under 
 altered conditions. Before the Conference was 
 ended, it was an open secret that the British 
 authorities in Egypt under their interpretation 
 of the Anglo-French Agreement proposed to 
 abolish the capitulations : to cancel the juris- 
 diction of the International Courts : to appoint 
 a consultative legislature, which, in practice if not 
 in theory, could only legislate in obedience to 
 British instructions, or in accordance with British 
 ideas ; and to insist upon all communications 
 between the Khedivial Government and Foreign 
 Powers being conducted through the British 
 Agency, instead of being conducted as at 
 present through the Consuls-General accredited 
 to the Viceregal Court. Any such changes, 
 whether beneficial or hurtful in themselves, 
 would modify most seriously the status of 
 foreigners residing in Egypt : and if ever any 
 changes of such a character should be proposed, 
 not as a pious aspiration but as a practical 
 policy, England may have to face the active 
 opposition of Germany. This contingency is 
 one whose occurrence is a possibility if not a 
 probability.
 
 EGYPT AND EUROPE 127 
 
 To sum up, the attitude of the leading Con- 
 tinental Powers in regard to the British occupa- 
 tion of Egypt may be best described as one 
 of unbenevolent neutrality. They dispute the 
 British title to establish a Protectorate over 
 Egypt : they disapprove on grounds of equity 
 and good faith of the manner in which we have 
 established our title : but they have no wish to 
 oust us at their own cost and risk from the 
 virtual Protectorate we have acquired, and under 
 which we have raised Egypt to a state of 
 marvellous material prosperity, and have, to 
 say the least, inflicted as yet no injury on 
 the subjects of any Continental Power which 
 has commercial interests in the land watered 
 by the Nile. So long as Germany's relations 
 with England remain such as they are at present, 
 we can do pretty well what we please in Egypt. 
 But if the entente cordiale should ever give 
 serious umbrage to Germany, she has it in her 
 power to assert that, in virtue of the unanimous 
 decision of the Algeciras Conference, the free 
 hand given to England in respect of Egypt is 
 null and void in common with that given to 
 France in respect of Morocco. But, so far,
 
 128 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 I hope that England will let sleeping dogs 
 lie : and if so, she need fear no serious external 
 attack upon her Egyptian Protectorate, though 
 her position would be far less assailable if it were 
 once openly declared.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 
 
 THERE is a well known saying attributed to 
 many men of note, but I believe myself that it 
 was probably first uttered by Dr. Abernethy. 
 On some occasion he was asked by a lady sit- 
 ting next him, " Doctor, what is your religion ? " 
 " Madam," he replied, " that of all sensible men." 
 Upon the lady pressing him for further informa- 
 tion as to " what that religion really was," the 
 doctor retorted " that, my dear Madam, is a ques- 
 tion no sensible man ever answers." The reason 
 I quote this not very novel anecdote is that 
 Egypt is one of the few countries in which the 
 half-truth implied by the doctor's words would 
 not appeal to any large class of the community. 
 
 I am most anxious to avoid wounding 
 anyone's religious susceptibilities, but I feel that 
 religious belief in Allah and his prophet 
 
 K
 
 1 30 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Mahomet holds so important and so exceptional 
 a place in the life of the Egyptian people that 
 to omit all reference to it would be to ignore one 
 of the dominant factors of the Egyptian 
 question. Here, the gulf which separates the 
 educated from the unlettered classes is far wider 
 than in most European countries. The former 
 have been from their earliest years in touch with 
 Europeans, and have assimilated many of their 
 ideas, while the bulk of the population has 
 been but little influenced by Western civilisation, 
 and it is by the bulk of the nation, not by the 
 cultured few, that the character of Egypt's 
 faith and its tendencies must be fairly 
 estimated. 
 
 In calling attention as I have done to the 
 recrudescence of fanaticism, I am aware that I 
 am touching on controversial ground, and that 
 many educated Egyptians who have kindly 
 communicated their ideas all assure me fanat- 
 icism is not a characteristic of their fellow- 
 countrymen and their co-religionists. I have 
 also received assurances in this respect from 
 European residents here to whose opinion I 
 attach high value. 
 
 I am sure that my friends, native as well as
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 131 
 
 foreign, had no intention of misleading, but I 
 doubt whether they understand the word 
 fanatic in quite the same sense as we use it in 
 England. I am speaking of the Egyptians as a 
 whole and not of the small cultured class which 
 is frequently taken, I think erroneously, as 
 representative of the native. 
 
 Superstitions of the grossest kind are well 
 nigh universal amidst the Egyptian masses, as 
 evinced by the wearing of charms and amulets, 
 and their blind faith in quacks and soothsayers. 
 It is but a short step from superstition to 
 fanaticism. The one strong sentiment of the 
 fellaheen is their belief in Islam, and if any 
 impression should, with or without just cause, 
 get hold of the native mind that Islam is in 
 danger, superstition is always liable, in a 
 Mahometan country, to develop into fanaticism. 
 
 The population of Egypt is commonly esti- 
 mated at some twelve millions, of whom ninety 
 per cent, are followers of Islam, the remaining 
 one-tenth consisting of Copts belonging to 
 the Greek Church, Armenian Christians, Jews, 
 Italians, who as a rule adhere to the Roman 
 Catholic Church, Greeks, whose creed is that of 
 the orthodox Eastern rite, and Levantines, who 
 
 K 2
 
 132 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 belong in fairly equal proportions to the various 
 creeds of Christendom. This being so, Egypt is, 
 to all intents and purposes, a Mussulman coun- 
 try, whose people are worshippers of Allah, 
 followers of the Prophet, and believers in the 
 Koran. 
 
 Is there any real prospect of Islam ever 
 becoming again a militant religion ? This is the 
 question which is perplexing the minds of all 
 Europeans residing in Oriental countries, and 
 more especially in Northern Africa. I should 
 like, if possible, to throw some little light upon 
 this vexed question. I am keenly alive to the 
 truth of a favourite saying of my old friend 
 Nubar Pasha, that the longer one studied the 
 East, the more one realised how little one under- 
 stood the Eastern point of view as seen through 
 European spectacles. It has been my fortune 
 to have been in intimate acquaintance with five 
 well-known men who had lived their lives chiefly 
 in Eastern countries, who were familiar with 
 Eastern languages, and especially with Arabic, 
 and who were singularly free from any bias, one 
 way or the other, in the never-ending contro- 
 versy between the Crescent and the Cross. 
 Their names were Sir Richard Burton, Sir
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 133 
 
 Samuel Baker, Giffard Palgrave, Lawrence 
 Oliphant, and Lionel Moore, all of whom have 
 long since joined the majority. Differing widely 
 in character and disposition, they had this in 
 common, that they were learned in the language 
 of the Koran, and that they had a genuine 
 sympathy for the followers of the Prophet. 
 Yet from one and all, I could never get any 
 satisfactory explanation of the fundamental 
 difference between Islam and Christendom, ex- 
 cept that the East was the East and the West 
 was the West. 
 
 My personal knowledge of countries in which 
 Islam is the dominant creed is for the most part 
 confined to Egypt, a country whose position is 
 entirely different in many important respects 
 from that of any other Mahometan States in 
 Asia and Africa ; still it seems to me that Egypt 
 affords a curious illustration of both the strength 
 and the weakness of Islam as a militant religion. 
 Theological controversies of any kind are matters 
 with which I am incompetent to deal, though I 
 own candidly that I am unable to understand 
 why any man born and bred in Christendom 
 should elect to change his creed for one, to say 
 the least, expounding a less lofty ideal.
 
 i 3 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 At the same time, a man must be very 
 prejudiced who fails to understand why Ma- 
 hometanism has so strong a hold upon its 
 followers. It has in reality but two articles of 
 faith. The first is that there is one God and 
 one God only, and the second is that Mahomet 
 was the chosen prophet of Allah, the all-wise, 
 all-just, and all-powerful Deity by whom all 
 things were made. The Koran is rather a 
 system of laws regulating the conduct of true 
 believers than a confession of faith. In many 
 respects Islam is almost identical with Judaism, 
 except that it is founded on a broader basis than 
 that of race or caste or colour. Every man of 
 any nationality or language is free to become a 
 follower of Islam if he renounces idolatry and 
 acknowledges that there is one God, whose 
 prophet was the inspired author of God's word. 
 Indeed, the bottom fact of Islam is the duty 
 incumbent on all Mahometans to convert the 
 world to the worship of one God and to exter- 
 minate the idolaters who refuse to be converted, 
 though, to quote a passage of the Koran, an 
 exception was to be made " in favour of the 
 Jews and of all who believe in a day of 
 judgment."
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 135 
 
 Happily for humanity there has never yet 
 been any creed which has carried out its tenets 
 to their extreme logical result, and Islam soon 
 saw cause to modify the rigid execution of its 
 sacred mission. During the early years when 
 the followers of the Prophet spread over the 
 Eastern world, conquering and to conquer, they 
 carried out their mandate to the letter. 
 Gradually, however, as their first ardour died 
 away, they realised that the wholesale exter- 
 mination of idolaters was a task beyond their 
 power, and contented themselves with accepting 
 tribute from unbelievers as an adequate proof 
 of their subjection to the authority of Islam. 
 But though they failed to carry out the policy 
 of exterminating the infidel to the letter, they 
 always adhered to the principle that this policy 
 was one imposed upon them by the sacred law, 
 even if its full execution might not be possible 
 for the present. Contact with Christendom has 
 abated, to some extent, the animosity between 
 the Cross and the Crescent. Yet, through all 
 the centuries that have come and gone since the 
 death of Mahomet, his followers have never 
 wavered in their conviction that some day a 
 Messiah or Mahdi would make his appearance
 
 136 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 upon earth who would lead the followers of the 
 Prophet to victory and enable them to fulfil 
 their appointed task, the forcible conversion of 
 the heathen world to the worship of Allah, the 
 one supreme ruler of the universe. 
 
 The causes which have maintained Islam un- 
 changed and unchangeable cannot be discussed 
 here with advantage. All I desire to point out 
 is that the duty of making war upon the infidel 
 is still the cardinal tenet of Islam. It may be 
 no more than a pious aspiration, but it is one 
 which has influenced the daily life of every 
 generation of Mahometans, and which influences 
 the generation of to-day. Every few years or 
 so a Mahdi makes his appearance in some part 
 of the Mahometan world. He is always a 
 holy man, a doctor learned in the law, an 
 erudite scholar according to the Mahometan 
 standard of scholarship, an evangelist who has 
 acquired the veneration of his fellow-believers 
 by the sanctity and self-abnegation of his 
 private life, and who has vindicated his claim 
 to holiness by the fervour and frequency of 
 his prayers, by his self-imposed penances, and 
 by his sacrifice of all creature comforts and 
 carnal pleasures. When he has won the con-
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 137 
 
 fidenee of his neighbours his evangel is always 
 the same. 
 
 He announces that he has been deputed from 
 on high to warn his hearers that the decline of 
 the Crescent as compared with the Cross is due 
 to the followers of the Prophet not adhering to 
 the laws of Islam. He invariably exhorts his 
 hearers to renounce smoking, intoxicating 
 liquors, and association with infidels. As his 
 influence grows, he denounces the evil lives led 
 by their rulers and protests against the wicked- 
 ness of paying taxes to a government in which 
 the leading posts are held by Christians or men 
 of no religion, and bids them remember that the 
 only guidance they should follow is that of men 
 inspired, such as himself, whose one desire is to 
 see the true faith of Islam practised by high and 
 low. Sooner or later words lead to actions. 
 The tax-collectors or the officials of the govern- 
 ment are assaulted in the village where a Mahdi 
 reigns supreme. The government is obliged to 
 interfere. The Mahdi is either banished, im- 
 prisoned, or murdered ; a number of his adher- 
 ents are shot down by the soldiery, and order is 
 once more re-established. When a certain 
 interval has elapsed, another Mahdi comes
 
 138 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 forward, preaches the same doctrine, suffers the 
 same fate, and so on da capo. 
 
 This fanatical fermentation is always going on 
 throughout Islam, but does not assume serious 
 proportions unless it is stimulated by a holy 
 man of exceptional ability and believed with 
 or without reason to be of genuine piety. 
 Such a man was Sheik Mahomed Ahmed of 
 Dongola, the Mahdi of the Soudan. The 
 memories of European residents and officials in 
 Egypt are so short that I suspect few of them 
 are aware how near the Mahdi came to being 
 placed in a position enabling him to carry out 
 his policy of marching upon Cairo and driving 
 all Christians out of Egypt. He failed owing to 
 the military occupation of the country by British 
 troops. The Egyptian regiments, if not accom- 
 panied by British troops, would have refused to 
 fight against the Dervishes, or more probably 
 would have deserted to the enemy, while the 
 Mahdi himself would have been welcomed as a 
 deliverer by the Mahometan population of the 
 Khedivial kingdom. 
 
 This assertion may be disputed, but not, I 
 think, by any one who knew Egypt during the 
 time when the Anglo-Egyptian armies were
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 139 
 
 defeated by Osman Digma. Only the other day, 
 when the Turks were reported to be massing 
 troops in the Sinai Peninsula with the view of 
 endangering the Suez Canal, popular sentiment 
 in Egypt was enlisted on the side of the Sultan. 
 In the face of our past experience, I feel con- 
 siderable hesitation in accepting the official view 
 entertained, or at any rate professed in Cairo, 
 that the native Mussulman population are so 
 gratified by the immense material improvements 
 introduced into Egypt under British administra- 
 tion, that they would rally to our support in 
 case of that administration being attacked either 
 from within or from without. 
 
 Within the last two years a feeling of unrest 
 has manifested itself in every part of the 
 Mahometan world, and especially in Africa. 
 Why this should be so is very difficult to 
 explain. My own explanation is after all a 
 mere conjecture, which I give for what it is 
 worth. Amongst Mahometans there is, by 
 virtue of their faith, a tendency to fatalism. 
 The word Kismet explains the Oriental point 
 of view with regard to all the incidents of 
 human existence. Up till a very recent period, 
 in all conflicts between natives and Europeans,
 
 i 4 o THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 experience had shown that the former were 
 certain to be defeated in the end. The only 
 cause that could account for this invariable 
 series of defeats was that for some inscrutable 
 reason it was the will of Allah that unbelievers 
 should gain the upper hand for the time being. 
 To the Moslem mind this explanation is amply 
 sufficient. If Allah did not intend that the 
 faithful should triumph over the faithless, there 
 was no more to be said, no motive for embark- 
 ing in any conflict where defeat was a practical 
 certainty. This reluctance on the part of the 
 Moslem to engage in futile attempts to over- 
 throw the military supremacy of the European 
 administrations in Africa told strongly in favour 
 of order throughout the Dark Continent. 
 
 Suddenly and unexpectedly, the conviction 
 that native forces, however brave, were bound 
 to be worsted by Europeans was shaken to its 
 base by the discovery that Russia, which was 
 regarded in the East as the greatest military 
 Power in Europe, had been driven from pillar to 
 post by the victorious Japanese, that her armies 
 had been put to flight, her navy destroyed, her 
 fortresses captured by a comparatively diminutive 
 and feeble Power, whose people, whatever else
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 141 
 
 they might be, were certainly not Caucasians or 
 Christians. It may be said with truth, that 
 the native Africans, whether they were Maho- 
 metans or Christians or heathens, knew nothing, 
 and, if possible, cared less, about Japan. But 
 yet I should doubt whether there was a town or 
 village in the whole of Africa where the inhabi- 
 tants did not learn directly or indirectly that 
 the Russian invaders of the Far East had been 
 scattered like sheep by an unknown non-Euro- 
 pean race. In the Mussulman communities 
 there was sure to be some Mahdi or student of 
 the Koran ready to point the moral of this 
 reversal of all previous experience, and to instil 
 the belief that what the Japanese had accom- 
 plished against Russia might be achieved against 
 the English in Egypt, against the Spaniards in 
 Morocco, or against the French in Tunis or 
 Algeria, by native forces trained and disciplined, 
 as in Japan, by native officers. 
 
 In all human probability the magnitude of 
 the Japanese victories was grossly exaggerated 
 by popular rumours, while the causes which 
 differentiate Japan from all other Oriental 
 countries were kept deliberately in the back- 
 ground. But, granted all this, it still remains
 
 1 42 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 certain that the tidings of the wholesale rout 
 sustained by Eussia inspired a conviction 
 throughout the length and breadth of Maho- 
 metan Africa that the tide had turned at last, 
 and that the time was at hand when Islam might 
 resume her career of conquest and might fulfil 
 her mission of exterminating all unbelievers, no 
 matter what creed they may profess. The 
 strength of this hypothesis is, I think, confirmed 
 by the known facts of the recent fermentation of 
 Africa. It is significant that almost every one 
 of the recent uprisings against European rule 
 in Africa has occurred since the news of the 
 Russian debdcle had, or could have, reached 
 Africa. Disturbances have arisen in Egypt, in 
 the Soudan, in Somaliland, in German East 
 Africa, in Uganda, in Natal, in the Congo Free 
 State, in the French Congo, in the Gold Coast, 
 in Northern Nigeria, in Zululand, in German 
 West Africa, in Ashanti, and in Timbuctoo. 
 But the chief risings have taken place in the 
 territories occupied by Moslem populations, and 
 especially in those under European Protectorates 
 or under European spheres of influence. 
 
 Strange as it may seem to us, the great and 
 manifest benefits conferred upon the natives
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 143 
 
 by European administrators are least appre- 
 ciated in the Moslem communities which 
 approach most closely to Western civilisation 
 and which are under British rule. The reason 
 of this is obvious enough to any one acquainted 
 with the East. There, the sense of patriotism 
 or even of nationality is wanting. The fact 
 of being born and bred in one and the same 
 country constitutes no bond of union between 
 the inhabitants of an Eastern land. The one 
 binding link in the East between races, as well 
 as between individuals, is that of belonging to 
 a common faith and observing the same religious 
 rites and practices. No Mussulman in Egypt 
 regards Kopts, or Armenians, or Greeks, as 
 fellow-countrymen because they happen to be 
 born in Egypt. In like fashion, in as far as 
 I could ever learn, our tenure of India is mainly 
 due to the fact that neither Hindoos nor 
 Mussulmans, with the exception of a few Baboos, 
 believe in an Indian nationality. But though 
 the Oriental, whether in India, Asia, or Africa, 
 is unable to realise even the idea of an inter- 
 national brotherhood between men of different 
 creeds, he realises, far more fully than a citizen 
 of Europe, the brotherhood appertaining to a
 
 i 4 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 common creed. Nowhere is this latter brother- 
 hood so firmly realised or observed so loyally 
 as between Mahometans. A Moor or a Malay, a 
 Soudanese, a Tunisian, or an Algerian, are to 
 all intents and purposes more fully brethren than 
 a couple of fellaheen who live and work side by 
 side in the same village, supposing one to be 
 a Moslem and the other a Copt. 
 
 You may say this state of mind is unnatural 
 and illogical until you can realise the fact that 
 patriotism is a word without meaning in the 
 East, while community in faith is a bond whose 
 force no European, except possibly in Slav 
 communities, can really understand. Even in 
 the present year of grace, an era which we are 
 assured day by day is one of the highest 
 culture and greatest enlightenment, any 
 ignorant Mahdi who preaches a Jehad, that is a 
 holy war for the extermination of infidels, is 
 certain to secure the sympathy, if not the active 
 support, of his fellow Mussulmans. This fact 
 may be unpleasant, but it is a fact on which our 
 future policy in the East must be based. 
 
 I might take credit to myself for having 
 called attention for many long months to the 
 general unrest amidst the Mussulman population
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 145 
 
 of Egypt. All the credit, however, I can 
 honestly claim is that of having looked at facts 
 as I saw them with my own eyes and not 
 through official glasses. I have always done full 
 justice to the great material improvements 
 which have been introduced into the conditions 
 of native life in Egypt under our British adminis- 
 tration. I have, indeed, expressed an opinion 
 that if our system of administration had been 
 indirect instead of direct, we should have 
 rendered our reforms less distasteful to native 
 sentiment. Whether I am right or wrong can 
 only be proved whenever if ever the experi- 
 ment should be tried of substituting the policy 
 recommended by the late Lord Dufferm for that 
 which has hitherto found favour with the 
 British Agency in Cairo. 
 
 Up to the other day it was an article of faith 
 with the British authorities that the natives of 
 Egypt, irrespective of their religious creed, were 
 so satisfied with the reign of law and order we 
 have introduced into Egypt, and with the aboli- 
 tion of the abuses prevailing previous to our 
 military occupation, that they would resist any 
 attempt to subvert our Protectorate. My 
 assertion that, as a matter of fact, this con- 
 
 L
 
 146 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 tention was unsound, and that the Moslem 
 cared more about Islam than he did about 
 crops and irrigation works, was denounced as 
 inconsistent with the information forwarded by 
 British officials from every part of Egypt, as to 
 the general contentment of the natives under 
 our enlightened rule. When I ventured to re- 
 peat the truth I have so often expressed, that 
 Egypt owes its present prosperity to the presence 
 of the British army on Egyptian soil, I was told 
 that I overlooked the extraordinary effect pro- 
 duced on native opinion by the justice of our 
 sway and by the success of our administrative 
 policy. I ventured to foretell that the mere 
 rumour of Turkish intervention would unite the 
 whole Egyptian nation into partisans of the 
 Sultan. I need not say that the views I then 
 expressed have been shown to be substantially 
 correct, while those of my critics have been 
 proved to be utterly erroneous. I am convinced 
 that our British officials honestly believed in the 
 loyalty and gratitude of the fellaheen, but I 
 utterly fail to understand how their delusions 
 on the subject in question are compatible with 
 any real study and understanding of the 
 native mind or of the extraordinary influ-
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 147 
 
 ence of Islam as a political factor in Moslem 
 countries. 
 
 Time after time during the last few months 
 events have occurred which ought to have 
 opened the eyes of our officials to the true 
 state of things. The riot of Alexandria, the 
 attempt to blow up the arsenal of Khartoum, 
 the raid by Soudanese who had served under 
 the Khalifa upon a village occupied by Anglo- 
 Egyptian soldiers, a raid which was only pos- 
 sible on the hypothesis that the sympathies of 
 the Soudanese villagers were with the insurgents, 
 not with the Anglo-Egyptian soldiery ; the 
 sudden occupation of Akaba by Turkish troops, 
 the revival of the Sultan's shadowy Suzerainty 
 over Egypt, were all signs pointing to a general 
 discontent amidst the Mussulman population, a 
 discontent which was partly due to dissatisfaction 
 with unwelcome and unpopular reforms, but, still 
 more so to the sympathy of creed which causes 
 all Egyptian followers of the Prophet to regard 
 Abdul Hamid with veneration as being the head 
 of Islam. When it was made manifest that in 
 the event of a collision between Turkish and 
 Egyptian troops the latter would refuse to fight 
 against the former, and that their refusal would 
 
 L 2
 
 i 4 8 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 enlist the sympathies of the whole Moslem com- 
 munity, the British authorities in Egypt awoke 
 to the fact that they had been living in a fool's 
 paradise. 
 
 This much I am bound to say in the interest 
 alike of England in the first place, and of Egypt 
 in the second. If anyone will search through 
 Lord Cromer's voluminous and interesting report 
 for 1905, published at the end of April, 1906, 
 he will fail to find any allusion to the state of 
 unrest which had already manifested itself in the 
 valley of the Nile. The only allusion to the dis- 
 content, which had first made itself manifest in 
 1904, is contained in the concluding sentence of 
 this report : " During the past year the whole 
 machine of Government worked very smoothly. 
 It will be seen from the report which I now 
 submit, that improvements in various directions 
 have been effected. There is every reason to 
 believe that this steady and uniform rate of 
 progress will be maintained in future years, but 
 nowhere must there be undue haste." In order 
 to show his belief in a steady and uniform rate 
 of progress, his Lordship had recommended, 
 in the previous pages of this report, the abolition 
 of the Capitulations, the impending dissolution
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 149 
 
 of the Mixed Tribunals, the termination of the 
 Caisse de la Dette, and the creation of a con- 
 sultative parliament for Egypt, whose members 
 were to be partly nominated and partly elected, 
 who were to consist exclusively of local notabili- 
 ties under conditions necessarily rendering the 
 members completely subservient to the Egyptian 
 Government, which in its turn is equally sub- 
 servient, as long as the army of occupation 
 remains in Egypt, to the representative of Great 
 Britain at the Khedivial Court. Opinions may 
 differ as to the merits or demerits of these 
 proposals, but there can be no doubt as to 
 the fact that if they should be carried into effect 
 they would render the authority of their origin- 
 ator more absolutely autocratic than it is at 
 present. 
 
 Up to the date of the Denshawai outrage our 
 British officials still cherished the delusion that 
 there was no serious unrest in Egypt, and that 
 the reinforcement of the Army of Occupation was 
 solely due to the hostile attitude of Turkey on 
 the frontiers of the Sinai Peninsula. It was still 
 taken for granted that the resolution of England 
 to uphold the independence of Egypt by force 
 of arms against any aggression on the part of the
 
 1 50 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Sultan must be welcome to the people of Egypt, 
 who were supposed to dread any reassertion of 
 Turkish authority, and to resent the revival 
 of the pretension that Egypt, in fact as well 
 as in name, is a vassal province of the Ottoman 
 Empire. These delusions were dispelled when it 
 became evident that the Moslems, who form 
 upwards of nine-tenths of the Egyptian popula- 
 tion, still acknowledged the supreme authority 
 of the Sultan, as the Commander of the Faithful, 
 and cared far more for the interests of their 
 faith than for the material advantages they had 
 obtained, and could only hope to preserve, 
 under our military occupation. 
 
 It is common justice to acknowledge that, 
 as soon as Lord Cromer's eyes were opened 
 to the fact that the optimistic views he had 
 maintained so long and so persistently were no 
 longer tenable, he acted with a promptitude, a 
 courage, and firmness of purpose, for which he 
 deserves the gratitude of all who have at heart 
 the interests of England, and the well-being of 
 Egypt. The severity displayed under British 
 authority in stamping out the riot, of which 
 Denshawai was the scene, was one whose neces- 
 sity we may regret, but of which we have no
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 151 
 
 cause to be ashamed. I can appreciate the 
 argument, however much I may dissent from it 
 individually, that under existing conditions 
 Egypt is not worth keeping by England. What 
 I cannot understand is the logical position of 
 men who profess to believe that the maintenance 
 of our Protectorate over Egypt is a matter of 
 vital interest to the British Empire, and who 
 yet object to the employment of the only means 
 by which our supremacy can be upheld. 
 
 To speak the plain truth, any outrage upon 
 British soldiers wearing the British uniform is 
 an offence which must be punished sternly and 
 promptly, whatever excuses may be suggested 
 to mitigate the gravity of the crime. If a 
 British soldier can be shown to have committed 
 an unprovoked attack upon a native, he should 
 be tried before a military court, and if the 
 charge brought against him should be established 
 to the satisfaction of this tribunal, he should be 
 punished severely by the British military author- 
 ities. There is no probability, so long as the 
 administration of Egypt remains in its present 
 hands, of such sentence erring on the side of 
 undue severity. It was owing to a well-founded 
 conviction that an exceptional Court was re-
 
 152 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 quired to judge charges brought against soldiers 
 by natives, or against natives by soldiers, that 
 the tribunal which tried and sentenced the 
 Denshawai prisoners was established in 1895, 
 when there were symptoms of serious excite- 
 ment amidst the native population, and of grave 
 hostility to British troops. It would have been 
 far better if the Court had been composed 
 solely of British officers, whose sentence should 
 have been approved by the British Consul- 
 General previous to its execution. But with 
 our usual preference for phrases to facts it was 
 decided that native judges, as well as British, 
 should form part of the Court, under an errone- 
 ous belief that their presence in the tribunal 
 would satisfy the natives that the trial would be 
 fair and impartial. As, however, the natives 
 entertain a not altogether baseless conviction 
 that in the courts of law as well as in the public 
 service, native officials will always be under the 
 control of the British Agency, the presence of 
 native judges was not regarded as any guarantee 
 for their own protection. On the whole, how- 
 ever, this exceptional Court has fulfilled its 
 exceptional purpose, and the idea that the 
 natives or their families and friends objected to
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 153 
 
 any alleged legal irregularity in the constitution 
 or the procedure or the code of the Court will 
 not commend itself to any one who realises the 
 fundamental differences between Eastern and 
 Western conceptions of justice. The ringleaders 
 in the Denshawai outrages were perfectly aware 
 that if they were brought to trial their punish- 
 ment, according to Eastern ethics, must be 
 death, without hope of reprieve or respite. 
 Justice must be short, sharp, and summary to 
 impress the Oriental mind ; and any delay in 
 the infliction of the punishment or any mitiga- 
 tion of its severity would have been fatal to the 
 purpose for which the penalty was inflicted. 
 The fellaheen now understand that henceforth 
 British soldiers belonging to the army of occu- 
 pation cannot be attacked with impunity. 
 
 In comparison with Pan-Slavism, any peril to 
 European civilisation arising from Pan-Islamism 
 is utterly insignificant. Under a powerful rule, 
 whether that of an autocratic Czar or even 
 more of a democratic Socialist Republic, Russia 
 might conceivably combine all the Slav States 
 lying outside her frontiers into one great con- 
 federacy. No such combination of Mahometan 
 States is possible under the leadership of a
 
 154 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 disorganised and moribund empire such as 
 that of Turkey in Europe. The utmost the 
 Commander of the Faithful could effect by 
 advocating a Pan-Islamic agitation directed 
 against Christendom in Mahometan provinces 
 would be to stir up isolated demonstrations 
 against the powers that be, which in Egypt, at 
 any rate, would be easily suppressed, so long as 
 we have an adequate army in Egypt, and so 
 long as any disturbance in any part of the Nile 
 valley or of the Soudan is stamped out as 
 promptly and as sternly as we suppressed the 
 incipient riot at Denshawai. The warning 
 conveyed by Sir Edward Grey as to the potential 
 danger of allowing the fermentation of Islam in 
 the East to continue unchecked was, there is 
 reason to believe, impressed upon the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs by our Consul- 
 General in Egypt. The warning thus given is 
 all the more impressive, owing to the fact that 
 his Lordship has been for the last few years a 
 firm partisan of a conciliatory policy towards 
 the natives, and of studying their susceptibilities 
 by keeping our troops almost out of sight and 
 out of mind. 
 
 If I am right, therefore, in my views, our
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 155 
 
 present position can only become critical in 
 Egypt if the Imperial Government, yielding to 
 the pressure of the more advanced of their 
 supporters, should undo the effect produced by 
 the condign punishment of the Denshawai 
 rioters, and thereby lead the fellaheen to 
 imagine that England is only half-hearted 
 in her determination to suppress any hostile 
 demonstration against the British Protectorate. 
 Anglo-officialdom in Egypt might, possibly with 
 advantage, be kept more in the background ; 
 but the British Army must be kept henceforth 
 in the front. Nemo me impune lacessit must 
 be the password of our administration in Egypt, 
 civil as well as military. 
 
 It could never be forgotten that unrest in 
 Egypt might at any moment be resuscitated by 
 popular agitation in any of the other States of 
 Africa in which Islam is the dominant creed, 
 but whose government is European and Christian. 
 If, to cite a hypothetical case, a native rising 
 against French rule were to take place in 
 Algeria, and a French army were to sustain such a 
 defeat at the hands of native troops as our army 
 suffered at Isandula, the news would be passed 
 from mouth to mouth by native messengers, and
 
 156 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 would be known throughout Africa long before 
 it reached the ears of our officials. In the pres- 
 ent state of unrest, such an occurrence would be 
 regarded by the whole Mahometan population 
 of North Africa as a sign that the followers of 
 the Prophet were to take up arms and expel, if 
 they could not exterminate, all infidels who, to 
 their thinking, worship more gods than one, and 
 who do not obey the commands of Allah as laid 
 down in the Koran. It is, therefore, of vital 
 importance to all Christian Powers who have 
 possessions, spheres of influence, or Protectorates 
 in the Dark Continent, that they should act 
 together against any Jehad in any part of Africa, 
 however far they may be distant from the 
 immediate scene of a conflict between the Cross 
 and the Crescent. There are only four great 
 European Powers which directly or indirectly 
 control the administration of native States where 
 Islam is the religion of the bulk of the popula- 
 tion. Those countries are England, France, 
 Italy, and Germany. 
 
 It would be extremely difficult to form any 
 sort of Pan-European League for the protection 
 of Christian communities settled in Mahometan 
 countries. It would, however, come to much the
 
 MILITANT ISLAM 157 
 
 same thing if all the European Powers who have 
 personal interests in Africa could be brought to 
 realise that a Mahometan rising in any one 
 State is a danger, not to the individual State, 
 but to all other States under similar conditions. 
 It is therefore most desirable that there should 
 be no cause of dissension between the various 
 European nations who have interests of their 
 own in Africa. England and France may, for 
 the present, be relied upon to pursue a common 
 policy. Whether Germany or Italy will follow 
 their lead must depend mainly upon the attitude 
 adopted towards them by England and France. 
 The suspicion of Germany entertained by France 
 is too ingrained to afford much hope that France 
 will, of her own accord, approve of any policy 
 calculated to remove the antagonism between 
 Great Britain and the Fatherland, or to support 
 the fulfilment of Italy's ambition to establish a 
 Protectorate over Tripoli. England, however, is 
 in a position to command the support of the 
 French Eepublic in respect of Egypt and the 
 Soudan. There can be no reasonable doubt that 
 England has a strong personal interest in secur- 
 ing the cordial co-operation of Germany in her 
 endeavour to hinder the recent revival of
 
 158 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Moslem fanaticism from assuming formidable 
 proportions. 
 
 To the best of my belief, our own Govern- 
 ment is fully aware how much we owe to the 
 refusal of Germany to give any encouragement 
 to the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula by 
 Turkish troops. It is certain that if Germany 
 had kept silence at Constantinople, the Sultan, 
 relying on the supposed good-will of Germany 
 and on the temporary effacement of Eussia as a 
 military power, would have pursued his aggres- 
 sive policy towards Egypt, and would have 
 compelled England to engage in a war with 
 Turkey, and, by so doing, expose herself to the 
 bitter hostility of Islam throughout Asia and 
 Africa generally, and especially in Egypt.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED TO-DAY 
 
 ENGLAND and Egypt have few things in 
 common beyond the two facts that they have 
 both the same initial letter and that they both 
 are governed under an unwritten constitution. 
 Happily for any Egyptian Hallam, whose self- 
 imposed task should be to record the birth and 
 growth of constitutional government in the 
 valley of the Nile, his researches will not neces- 
 sitate his going back to any very remote period. 
 During the earlier years of Ismail Pasha's reign 
 the government of Egypt was, in fact as well as 
 in theory, an absolute personal despotism. His 
 will was law. His ministers were appointed at 
 his pleasure, dismissed at his pleasure, and were 
 regarded by him and by -his people as clerks 
 whose sole function and duty was to carry out 
 their master's orders to his own satisfaction.
 
 160 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 He was in the main an amiable, good-natured 
 man, who liked people to like him, and who was 
 devoid of the lust of cruelty not infrequent 
 amidst despotic rulers in all parts of the world. 
 Still, if anybody, high or low, great or small, 
 famous or infamous, crossed Ismail's path or 
 stood in Ismail's way he crushed the offender 
 with merciless severity. Egypt was only an 
 alias for Ismail. The Viceroy held the purse- 
 strings of the State. He borrowed without the 
 knowledge or consent of his people, he con- 
 tracted loans without their sanction, he paid 
 the proceeds into his own coffers, he allowed no 
 inspection or supervision of his revenue, which 
 was practically identical with the revenue exacted 
 by taxation ; he allowed no distinction to be 
 made between his personal receipts and out- 
 goings, and these he handled as supreme ruler 
 of Egypt. 
 
 No doubt there were certain limitations to 
 Ismail's uncontrolled omnipotence. His Suzerain 
 the Sultan was nominally his overlord, and 
 claimed an ill-defined authority over the vassal 
 State. But the vassal was perfectly well aware 
 that the Suzerain would never put his theories 
 into practice so long as the former was able to
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 161 
 
 pay hush money to the latter. He had far too 
 shrewd a knowledge of human nature, and above 
 all of Oriental human nature, not to be aware 
 of the latent fanaticism of the Orient, which the 
 nations of Christendom seem unable to realise, 
 not to recognise the peril of incurring the hostil- 
 ity of Islam : and though in private life he might 
 denounce teachers of Islam as vulgar mischief- 
 makers, who were always meddling in matters 
 which did not concern them, he never committed 
 any offence, beyond the comparatively minor 
 sins of associating with infidels and drinking 
 champagne, which would justify his being repre- 
 sented as not a believer in the Koran or a 
 genuine follower of the Prophet. Thus his fear 
 of arousing the dormant fanaticism of Egypt 
 and directing it against himself did to some 
 slight extent curb his autocracy. He never 
 openly disputed the authority of the Moslem 
 Courts. The Wakfs, which own considerable 
 property devoted to religious charities or to 
 instruction in the Koran, were almost the only 
 owners of land in Egypt whose revenue he left 
 comparatively untouched by increased taxation. 
 A more important limitation to his unrestrained 
 power was the growth of the European community 
 
 M
 
 1 62 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 in Alexandria, which under the capitulations had 
 achieved almost complete independence. It was 
 a favourite saying of Nubar Pasha that the 
 greatest boon for an Oriental population was to 
 have a European community planted in their 
 midst, because such a community in their own 
 interests propagated ideas of European law and 
 justice until the ideas so propagated filtered 
 gradually into the Oriental mind. I believe 
 this assertion was true generally. I am con- 
 vinced it was true in the case of Alexandria and 
 to a lesser extent of Port Said. These two sea- 
 ports were in close communication with what I 
 may call their respective mother countries, and 
 Ismail was intelligent enough to understand that 
 if he committed any gross outrage against the 
 principles which regulate the code of European 
 civilisation, these outrages would be reported to 
 Europe and would damage the credit on which he 
 depended for the further loans necessary to meet 
 the payments of interest on his previous loans till 
 such time as the vast undertakings on which he had 
 embarked recklessly had become remunerative. 
 
 It would be absurd to attribute any credit to 
 Ismail for having involved Egypt, whose public 
 debt was only three millions at the time of his
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 163 
 
 accession to the Vice-regal throne, and had 
 increased, after he had reigned ten years, to 
 close upon a hundred millions. Yet as a matter 
 of fact Egypt owes its present prosperity to the 
 Franco-English bondholders who brought about 
 European intervention in Egypt, not from any 
 regard for the welfare of the Egyptians, but in 
 order to secure the repayment of their advances 
 which had been made to Ismail, and guaranteed 
 by him through the hypothecation of the 
 revenues of Egypt. Still if Ismail had not 
 borrowed right and left in order to carry out his 
 various schemes for the development and ag- 
 grandisement of Egypt, there would have been 
 no commissions of enquiry, no law of liquidation, 
 no escape except bankruptcy from the crushing 
 burden of a gigantic debt. Moreover, if it had 
 not been for the necessity of conciliating public 
 opinion in Europe. Ismail would never have 
 consented to the reforms which are still the 
 main bulwarks of such qualified independence as 
 Egypt enjoys to-day. My own impression is 
 that Ismail never realised the full effects of the 
 reforms he was persuaded to sanction on the 
 advice of the one great statesman whom Egypt 
 has produced since the days of Joseph. From 
 
 M 2
 
 164 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Ismail's personal point of view, the sole object 
 of abolishing the jurisdiction of the Consular 
 Courts in civil matters, and of placing in the 
 International Courts the trial of all civil suits 
 between foreigners of different nationalities, 
 or between foreigners and natives, was to 
 throw dust in the eyes of Europe and to lead 
 the Powers to suppose that the International 
 Courts would administer justice on European, 
 not on Oriental principles. He found out his 
 mistake when he discovered that the code of 
 the International Courts, which he understood 
 was, subject to certain local alterations, the 
 counterpart of the Code Napole'on, and which he 
 had signed, as he alleged, without perusing, 
 contained a clause authorising the new Inter- 
 national Courts to give judgment to any suit 
 brought against the Government, and in the case 
 of this judgment not being carried out to levy 
 execution by the officials of the Courts on any 
 land or property belonging to the State. His 
 Highness assured my old friend, the late Horatio 
 Lloyd, who came out to Egypt in 1876 to 
 present a claim by the constructors of the 
 Alexandria breakwater, that if he had understood 
 the clause in question he would have cut off his
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 165 
 
 right hand sooner than sign the code, which 
 may fairly be described as the Magna Charta of 
 the Egypt of to-day. I am certain this state- 
 ment was made to Mr. Lloyd, but I am by no 
 means equally certain of its truth. In the 
 course of his dealings with the Suez Canal 
 Company, with the cosmopolitan capitalists who 
 supplied him with the funds he required, and 
 with the Levantine merchants who piled up his 
 huge floating debt, he had long come to the 
 conviction that he could always wriggle out of 
 any financial difficulty either by coercion or 
 corruption. Thus he may have easily imagined 
 that the new judges of the International Courts 
 would prove equally accessible to similar in- 
 ducements. It was only when Messrs. Goschen 
 and Joubert came out to Egypt as the repre- 
 sentatives of bondholders and received the 
 active support of their respective Consuls- 
 General, that Ismail realised that both England 
 and France, the only two Powers seriously in- 
 terested in Egyptian affairs, were determined to 
 insist upon some equitable agreement being 
 made with the bondholders. It was then that, 
 in his natural desire to avoid any explanation of 
 the way in which he had appropriated the vast
 
 1 66 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 sums he had borrowed from Europe, he hit upon 
 an original conception of his own, that of 
 converting the Government of Egypt from an 
 Autocratic into a Constitutional Government. 
 The Commission of Enquiry, which had been 
 instituted in order to discover how far Egypt 
 and Ismail were severally or jointly responsible 
 to the bondholders for the loans floated on the 
 markets of Paris and London, had hardly begun 
 to examine how far the proceeds of these loans 
 had been appropriated to State purposes, or 
 employed by the Khedive for his personal 
 expenditure, when the Commission of Enquiry 
 was sent about its business on the plea that his 
 Highness had determined to rule Egypt in 
 future as a Constitutional Sovereign, acting in 
 obedience to the advice of an International 
 Ministry. 
 
 In accordance with this change of front, Nubar 
 Pasha, an Armenian, and the only Egyptian 
 statesman known by repute or even by name 
 out of Egypt, was appointed Prime Minister. 
 Mr. (now Sir) Charles Rivers Wilson, then Con- 
 troller of the British National Debt, was made 
 Minister of Finance, and M. de Blignieres, a 
 well-known French official, was created Minister
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 167 
 
 of Public Works. The International Ministry 
 lasted for about three months. At its outset 
 Ismail went about assuring everybody he met 
 that " Nous sommes plus en Afrique ; nous 
 sommes en Europe," and declaring that he was 
 now a Constitutional Sovereign with no will 
 of his own, whose sole duty it was to give his 
 Ministers the benefit of his advice and ex- 
 perience, and to carry out any policy they might 
 dictate. The one measure carried out by the 
 Anglo-Franco-Egyptian Administration was to 
 nominate a sort of Parliament which was, if my 
 memory serves me right, to be elected later 
 on by manhood suffrage, and to whose approval 
 all laws and decrees were to be submitted before 
 they came legally into force. As soon as Ismail 
 discovered that the Constitutional Ministry, in- 
 stead of dropping the prosecution of the enquiry, 
 as he had anticipated, was bent on pursuing its 
 investigations to the bitter end, he announced 
 that the farce of a sham constitution had been 
 played too long, dismissed his Ministers and 
 declared openly that he intended to re-establish 
 absolute autocracy in obedience to the wishes of 
 his people. 
 
 I think Ismail was not altogether wrong in
 
 1 68 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 asserting that the International Ministry were 
 unpopular with the mass of his subjects. They 
 laboured under the fatal defects of being 
 Christians and foreigners. As long as they 
 were supposed to command the confidence of 
 the Viceroy their authority was complete, but 
 the moment an impression gained ground that 
 the Khedive was dissatisfied with their services, 
 their doom was sealed. When it became 
 manifest that neither France nor England was 
 prepared to take any active steps to uphold 
 the International Ministry, Ismail came to the 
 conclusion that his absolute autocracy was 
 definitely recognised both at home and abroad. 
 Acting on this belief, he refused to execute 
 the judgments of the International Courts. 
 
 It is very difficult to speculate on what the 
 course of events might have been if something 
 had not happened which did happen. England 
 and France, the two countries which had the 
 strongest interests in Egypt, political as well as 
 financial, were extremely averse to any joint 
 intervention, and were equally determined not to 
 allow any solitary intervention on the part of 
 either of them. Matters were at a deadlock, 
 when Germany suddenly appeared on the scene.
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 169 
 
 A despatch, whose authorship is commonly 
 assigned to Prince Bismarck, was sent to Cairo 
 from Berlin, informing the Khedivial Govern- 
 ment that Germany, as one of the Powers which 
 had acquiesced in the substitution of the Inter- 
 national Courts for the Consular Courts, felt it 
 her duty to insist upon the judgments of the 
 latter tribunals being carried into execution. 
 The despatch concluded with an intimation, 
 couched in diplomatic phraseology, to the effect 
 that if the judgments of the International Courts 
 were not carried into immediate effect Germany 
 would take such steps as might be sufficient to 
 enforce compliance with her just demands. I 
 have never been able to understand exactly what 
 steps Germany intended to employ for this 
 purpose. It is, however, giving the Great 
 Chancellor credit for no exceptional sagacity if 
 he realised that the threat would suffice to effect 
 his purpose without any display of armed force. 
 As soon as the German ultimatum was known, 
 the Government of the French Republic came to 
 the conclusion that any German intervention in 
 Egyptian affairs must be averted at all costs and 
 all hazards. The idea that the Sultan, as 
 Suzerain of Egypt, should be induced to depose
 
 170 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 the Viceroy on the ground of his culpable 
 misrule of the vassal kingdom, an idea which 
 had been originally proposed by England and 
 rejected by France, was adopted in hot haste, 
 and orders were sent from Constantinople to 
 Cairo instructing Ismail Pasha to abdicate and 
 to resign his title of Khedive. In accordance 
 with a firman issued by the Sultan on Ismail's 
 own request, the succession devolved upon 
 Ismail's eldest son, not as heretofore on his 
 eldest male relative. Thus, by the will of the 
 Sultan, and with the consent of England and 
 France, Ismail Pasha was deposed and exiled 
 from Egypt, and his son Tewfik Pasha reigned 
 in his stead. The deposition of Ismail was 
 solicited as a favour, and therefore neither 
 England nor France was in a position even 
 if they were so inclined to insist upon any 
 curtailment of the absolute authority conceded 
 to the descendants of Mahomet Ali by their 
 Suzerain. Thus, subject to the limitations to 
 which I have already referred, Tewfik remained 
 as absolute an autocrat as his father. The 
 only difference lay in their personal characters. 
 Ismail was a man of strong will, high ambitions, 
 great native ability and utterly devoid of
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 171 
 
 scruples. Tewfik was a kindly, well-meaning 
 man, a devout follower of the Prophet, and 
 desirous above all things of a quiet life. If 
 ever there was a world out of joint it was Egypt 
 in 1878 to 1881, and by " cursed spite " the duty 
 of " setting that world aright " fell on Tewfik's 
 shoulders. Never was a sovereign placed by 
 cruel fate in a more parlous plight. The Com- 
 mission of Liquidation undertook to reorganise 
 the finances of his country, to the advantage 
 doubtless of Egypt, but still more obviously to 
 that of the foreign bondholders. The two 
 controllers, M. de Blignieres and Mr. Morgan 
 Auckland Colvin, were always pressing the 
 Khedive to grant reforms which could only be 
 carried out in times of tranquillity and pros- 
 perity. At this period, moreover, the Treasury 
 was empty ; the creditors were pressing for 
 payment ; and the army was on the eve of 
 mutiny. In recalling the history of these days 
 it is only fair to bear in mind that, whatever 
 opinions may be held as to the merits or demerits 
 of Arabi's ideas, it was " Achmed the Egyptian," 
 and he alone, to whom the military occupa- 
 tion of Egypt by British troops whether for 
 good or evil is due. I can say with absolute
 
 172 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 confidence that the massacres at Alexandria and 
 the insurrection raised against the authority of 
 the reigning Viceroy by Arabi and his fellow con- 
 spirators left England absolutely no choice except 
 to suppress the mutiny and replace Tewfik on the 
 throne. The obligation incumbent upon the 
 British Government was recognised, however 
 reluctantly and however half-heartedly, by Mr. 
 Gladstone and his colleagues. The British Fleet 
 was despatched to Alexandria under the impres- 
 sion that France would co-operate with England 
 in the restoration of order. At the eleventh 
 hour, when instructions had been sent out to the 
 British Admiral to bombard Alexandria, the 
 French Fleet acting under orders from Paris 
 quitted the harbour and sailed out to sea. There 
 is a strong reason to suppose that it was 
 M. Ferdinand de Lesseps who was the primary 
 cause of France thus forfeiting her hold on 
 Egypt. He had formed a most exaggerated 
 estimate of Arabi and his influences in Egypt, 
 and had in virtue of this estimate assured M. de 
 Freycinet, then all powerful in France, that the 
 bombardment would be of no avail, and that if 
 England were [to land an army in Egypt her 
 troops would be held in check, if not defeated,
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 173 
 
 by the insurgents, and that in such a case France 
 might step in and dictate terms of peace to the 
 belligerents to her own profit and advantage. Be 
 this as it may, England, after Tel-el-Kebir, the 
 ignominious flight of " Achmed the Egyptian," 
 and the unopposed entry of our troops into 
 Cairo, was absolute mistress of the situation, and 
 of her own authority replaced Tewfik Pasha upon 
 the Vice-regal throne. What I wish to point 
 out is that Tewfik's restoration was not accom- 
 panied by any attempt to modify his relations 
 with the Sultan or to restrict the absolute auto- 
 cracy which had attached to the hereditary 
 Pashalik since the days of Mahomet Ali, the 
 Lion of the Levant. Subject to our military 
 occupation, Tewfik's will remained supreme 
 throughout Egypt ; and if he had been allowed 
 to exercise his legal authority and punish the 
 soldiers and officials who mutinied against his 
 Government and conspired against his life, by 
 the rough and ready punishment which is in- 
 flicted on such criminals in every Oriental country, 
 he probably would have become powerful enough 
 to dispense after a brief period with the presence 
 of our troops. 
 
 Fortunately for the interests of the British
 
 174 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Empire, a misplaced sentimentalism on the part 
 of the British public insisted upon Arabi and 
 his associates being treated as patriots whose 
 offences would be adequately met by exile in 
 lieu of death. Tewfik Pasha was thereby con- 
 demned, sorely against his will, to look to the 
 prolongation of our occupation as essential to 
 the continuance of his reign, if not to that of 
 his life. I was told during his lifetime by one 
 of his Ministers that in the early days of our 
 occupation some remark was made in the course 
 of conversation about a recent review of the 
 British garrison at which his Highness had 
 been present. Thereupon the Viceroy suddenly 
 turned to his interlocutor saying " Do you 
 suppose I like all this ? I tell you I never see 
 an English sentinel in my streets without 
 longing to jump out of my carriage and strangle 
 him with my own hands." If this was the 
 sentiment of so peaceable and kindly a man as 
 Tewfik Pasha, it is easy to understand what was 
 and probably still is the sentiment of the 
 other descendants of Mahomet Ali, Princes of 
 far stronger character and higher pride of race 
 and creed. If once our Protectorate were 
 openly avowed, the Khedive and the members of
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 175 
 
 the Khedivial family in common with all 
 Orientals would accept an accomplished fact 
 with its necessary consequences. But so long 
 as there exists a possibility or even a probability 
 of our troops being withdrawn, they cling to the 
 hope of recovering their old rank and place and 
 power. Nor can I for one as an Englishman 
 consider their lack of appreciation of British 
 rule as a conclusive sign of moral depravity. 
 
 It was during Tewfik's reign that Major 
 Baring, then Sir Evelyn Baring, returned to 
 Egypt after the occupation. Throughout his 
 previous residence in Cairo as British Commis- 
 sioner of the Caisse de la Dette he had played a 
 comparatively unimportant part in Egyptian 
 affairs, as he then did not possess the 
 high financial reputation which pertained to 
 his colleague, Rivers Wilson, as the British 
 Minister of Finance in the short-lived Anglo- 
 Franco-Egyptian Constitutional Ministry, and 
 as the Controller of the National Debt of 
 England. On his return, however, from India, 
 where Major Baring had filled the office of 
 Financial Minister with remarkable success, 
 he was appointed British Consul-General in 
 Egypt. From that date up to to-day he has held
 
 1 76 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 a position in Egypt which no British Consul- 
 General had ever held before or is ever likely to 
 hold again. Even those who in common with 
 myself entertain the opinion that the system of 
 direct autocratic personal administration intro- 
 duced into Egypt by Lord Cromer is not in 
 harmony with the true interests 01 either 
 England or Egypt, must at the same time admit 
 that his policy of rendering Egypt solvent, no 
 matter at what cost or at what retardment of 
 reforms most urgently needed, has been in ac- 
 cordance with sound judgment and high states- 
 manship His Lordship never wavered in his 
 convictions that all internal reforms must be 
 postponed till Egypt was placed in a position 
 to pay the interest on her public debt out of her 
 own resources. Great courage and perseverance 
 were required to carry out an unpopular policy 
 in the face of constant opposition ; and Lord 
 Cromer may fairly claim that the restoration of 
 Egyptian credit is the basis of all the material 
 amelioration he has introduced into Egypt. In 
 order, however, to carry out his policy of re- 
 trenchment, our Consul-General had of necessity 
 to enforce the collection of revenue and the 
 diminution of expenditure in every department
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 177 
 
 of administration by English officials appointed 
 nominally by the Khedive, but practically by 
 himself, and dependent upon his good pleasures 
 for their continuance in office. Thus he has 
 gradually secured an absolute autocratic authority 
 as great as that exercised by Mahomet Ali or by 
 any Viceroy of Egypt down to the fall of 
 Ismail Pasha, though exercised, as I must 
 frankly admit, with higher motives and with a 
 far greater sense of personal responsibility. 
 
 The sudden and unexpected death of Tewfik 
 Pasha and the accession to the Vice-regal 
 throne of Abbas then almost a boy tended 
 incidentally to render Lord Cromer's predomin- 
 ance more powerful and more manifest than it 
 had ever been before. Whatever Tewfik Pasha's 
 private sentiments may have been towards the 
 British occupation, he never placed himself in 
 direct opposition to the policy of England as 
 enunciated by her proconsul. Great excuse 
 must reasonably be made for the reigning Vice- 
 roy if, having been raised to the throne while 
 very young, having been chiefly educated abroad 
 under influences not over friendly, to say the 
 least, to the British occupation of Egypt, and 
 being surrounded at his accession by French as 
 
 N
 
 178 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 well as native advisers, who were constantly 
 urging him to assert himself, he should have 
 yielded to a not unnatural desire to show that 
 he considered himself the master of his own 
 army, whose officers, notwithstanding their 
 British nationality, held office under his own 
 commission, liable theoretically to be dismissed 
 at his own pleasure. Possibly if Lord Kitchener 
 had not been the General in Command of the 
 Anglo-Egyptian Army, the criticism addressed 
 by the Khedive to the manner in which active 
 manoeuvres had been executed by his own troops 
 in his own presence, the criticism might not have 
 been called for so complete an apology as the 
 future conqueror of the Khalifa insisted upon as 
 indispensable. The then Prime Minister, Riaz 
 Pasha, represented to the youthful Viceroy 
 that unless he withdrew the order of the day 
 at which Kitchener had taken umbrage, his 
 continuance on the throne might be rendered 
 doubtful. The Khedive thereupon capitulated, 
 but though the lesson may have been needed, 
 it is only in human nature that it should have 
 been bitterly resented by a young Prince who 
 had never fully realised till then that he was 
 not even master of his own army.
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 179 
 
 The above incident, if I am not mistaken, 
 had much to do with Lord Cromer's deter- 
 mination to govern Egypt by English officials, 
 who were appointed by him and who held 
 office, in fact if not in name, in accordance with 
 his own ideas and his own instructions. By 
 this time his Lordship had, I think, come 
 to two conclusions to which he had never 
 committed himself previously. The first con- 
 clusion was that our military occupation was 
 certain to be permanent. The second con- 
 clusion was that within the lifetime of his 
 generation Egypt was never likely to adapt 
 herself to any form of constitutional self-govern- 
 ment. On the strength of these conclusions 
 he formed the opinion that the best mode of 
 establishing law and order in Egypt was to 
 inpregnate the country, in as far as possible, 
 with English ideas of justice and administration, 
 and that this was most likely to be effected 
 by British officials acting under his own 
 instructions and his own control. 
 
 The position occupied by our Consul -General 
 up to 1888 was one of extreme difficulty. In 
 the first place he had to recommend, or, more 
 correctly speaking, to enforce upon the Khedive 
 
 N 2
 
 180 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 and his Ministers a policy of rigid economy, a 
 policy always unpopular in every country and 
 above all in every Oriental country. To the 
 native mind it seemed irrational to spend money 
 in reducing the capital of the debts due to foreign 
 bondholders, when the same money employed 
 in irrigation would have materially increased 
 the revenue of Egypt. The Home Government 
 cared very little about what was done, or left un- 
 done in Egypt, so long as no action was taken by 
 our representative at the Khedivial Court which 
 might discredit their repeated assertions that our 
 occupation was not intended to be permanent, 
 and was to come to a termination as soon as 
 Egypt had become fit to govern herself in 
 accordance with British ideas of sound adminis- 
 tration. The strangest of the many strange 
 phases of Anglo-Egyptian history is that, while 
 on the Continent and in Egypt these assertions 
 were regarded as silly attempts to throw dust 
 into the eyes of other nations, they were made 
 in perfect good faith and honesty by the 
 Government of Great Britain whether the 
 Liberals or Conservatives were in power. Lord 
 Beaconsfield may have contemplated the estab- 
 lishment of a British Protectorate over Egypt at
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 181 
 
 the period of the Cave mission, but if so, the 
 opposition of his colleagues and of all the 
 leading members of the Conservative party 
 compelled him to abandon the idea. I can say 
 from my own knowledge that Mr. Gladstone's 
 hostility to any proposal for the permanent 
 occupation of the Nile Valley was shared by 
 Mr. Bright, Lord Hartington, Mr. Chamberlain, 
 Mr. Goschen, Lord Wolselev, and Lord Granville. 
 
 / * 
 
 Lord Cromer may, and probably did, perceive 
 far sooner than our Ministers at home that 
 England having once got into Egypt would find 
 insuperable difficulties in getting out of Egypt, 
 but in accordance with the instructions he 
 received he was precluded from even intimating 
 in Cairo that England was in favour of a 
 prolonged occupation. It was not till after 
 Egypt had been coerced into evacuating the 
 Soudan, and the Dervishes threatened the 
 invasion of the Nile Valley that England 
 reluctantly came to the conclusion that the task 
 we had undertaken of rendering Egypt capable 
 of defending itself against external or internal 
 attacks was an utter impossibility, and that, there- 
 fore, in order to protect our highway to India, we 
 must render our occupation of Egypt permanent.
 
 1 82 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 It is only justice to Lord Cromer to acknow- 
 ledge that while British policy towards Egypt 
 was based on a delusion, he would have found it 
 extremely difficult to administer the country in 
 co-operation with native officials. The only con- 
 tingency under which, at the period I speak of, it 
 would have been possible was the conclusion of a 
 political association between Lord Cromer and the 
 one statesman of Egypt, Nubar Pasha. From the 
 commencement of the era when Egypt was on 
 the verge of bankruptcy and when my intimate 
 friendship with Nubar first commenced, he never 
 disguised his conviction that Egypt must fall 
 under the Protectorate of some European Power, 
 and that the Power best qualified to exercise such 
 a Protectorate with the least injury to Egyptian 
 interests was England. Socially he preferred 
 France to England ; he spoke French to perfec- 
 tion, he had been educated in France, and his 
 chief personal friends were Frenchmen. But 
 though an Armenian by race and creed, he looked 
 upon Egypt, where his family had resided since 
 the days of Mahomet Ali, as his native land, and 
 always studied what, rightly or wrongly, he 
 believed to be her interests. Of all the many 
 men of eminence, who either as statesmen,
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 183 
 
 diplomatists, travellers, or visitors came into 
 personal relations with Nubar, I have never 
 known one who was not impressed by his ex- 
 ceptional faculty of understanding the different 
 points of view from which all questions political, 
 personal, or religious present themselves to 
 the Oriental and the Western mind. I think 
 I could safely state that Lord Cromer 
 would not dispute my estimate of Nubar 
 Pasha's exceptional ability. I think, too, he 
 would admit that they might have worked 
 together to the joint advantage of England and 
 Egypt if their respective characters and the 
 positions in which they were severally placed 
 by the force of circumstance could have admitted 
 of any common action. If either Lord Lyons, 
 Lord Dufferin, or Sir William White had 
 occupied the post of Lord Cromer, I am inclined 
 to believe they would have availed themselves 
 gladly of Nubar Pasha's intimate knowledge 
 of Oriental nature and of European foreign 
 affairs, but between Lord Cromer and Nubar 
 there was an incompatibility of character which 
 was in itself fatal to any full appreciation of each 
 other's sterling merits. There were faults, I have 
 no doubt, on both sides. Both men cared more
 
 1 84 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 for having their own way than for the show of 
 power. I can recall an incident narrated to me 
 at one of the earliest meetings of the Commission 
 of Enquiry. At this meeting, Nubar delivered 
 a very eloquent and detailed account of the 
 reasons which had induced him to establish the 
 so-called International Tribunals, to the effect 
 that these Courts were absolutely independent of 
 the Government and therefore could be relied 
 upon to administer justice. He added that 
 justice was the basis of all genuine reform and 
 of all true civilisation. When Nubar had 
 finished his speech, M. de Blignieres, then 
 Minister of Public Works, rose and said he 
 could not allow this speech to pass in silence 
 without shaking the hand of its author and 
 thanking him for the services he had rendered 
 not only to Egypt but to humanity by the noble 
 sentiments he had expounded so ably. Upon 
 M. de Blignieres sitting down, Major Baring, 
 as he was then, remarked " if talking was over 
 they had better begin business." This anecdote, 
 whether true or false, illustrates clearly the lack 
 of mutual sympathy which, subsequent to our 
 military occupation, characterised the relations 
 between Lord Cromer and Nubar. The power-
 
 HOW EGYPT IS GOVERNED 185 
 
 ful imagination of the latter, his marvellous 
 command of language, his love for great ideas 
 and greater conceptions, his dislike of adminis- 
 trative details, his large views of expenditure 
 and his sympathy with Oriental customs, usages 
 and prejudices were all distasteful to his British 
 colleague, whose strict regard for rigid economy, 
 whose preference for British laws and British 
 jurisprudence exercised by British Consuls and 
 Judges, and whose stiffness of manner presented 
 a barrier against any cordial co-operation 
 between Nubar and our Consul-General. If 
 such co-operation was impossible between men 
 who, in their own way, were possessed of ex- 
 ceptional ability, it became still more impossible 
 between our Consul-General and such native 
 Ministers as Cherif, Riaz, and Fahn, who were 
 all, notwithstanding their several merits, utterly 
 incapable of grasping the fundamental principles 
 of British rule in Egypt as propounded by Lord 
 Cromer. 
 
 If I have made my meaning clear it is not 
 difficult to comprehend how Lord Cromer came 
 to the conclusion that it was impossible to 
 administer Egypt in any other way than by 
 British officials imbued with British principles.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT. 
 
 I HAVE, I hope, succeeded in showing that the 
 Egypt of to-day is governed by an autocratic 
 system whose fundamental principle is the same 
 as that under which Egypt has been ruled for 
 ages, namely, that the will of the Monarch 
 is law. I fully admit that the application is 
 very different. The Sovereign de facto is a 
 high-minded British nobleman, who, so long as he 
 retains the confidence of his own Government, can 
 administer the affairs of Egypt in any way he 
 deems most conducive to British interests. The 
 Sovereign de jure is, in theory, an independent 
 Prince, whose real function is to issue willingly or 
 unwillingly the decrees he is instructed to sign 
 by his Mayor of the Palace. I have endeavoured 
 to show that this anomalous arrangement has 
 been mainly brought about by a variety of causes
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 187 
 
 for which Lord Cromer is not responsible and 
 which might very possibly have led any other 
 Consul-General who had held the same post to 
 pursue the same policy under the same con- 
 ditions. 
 
 It is with great reluctance I say anything in 
 depreciation of Lord Cromer's great merits as an 
 administrator. But the interests of truth com- 
 pel me to state that his remarkable individuality 
 has biassed him almost unconsciously in favour 
 of a system of autocratic rule administered by 
 British officials appointed by himself and holding 
 their offices subject, in fact though not in name, 
 to his approval. A knowledge of Arabic is not 
 considered an essential qualification for a repre- 
 sentative of Great Britain in Egypt ; and it must 
 be owned that there is far less risk of orders being 
 misunderstood or disregarded or performed with 
 negligence, if these orders are given directly in 
 English to English officials. All Orientals are 
 fond of talking, and, as a matter of courtesy and 
 custom, use long-winded phrases and are slow in 
 coming to the point. The day's work is quicker 
 done if conducted in English ; and this condition is 
 better fulfilled if a native official has no opportunity 
 of expressing his own views in his own language.
 
 1 88 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Moreover, the Latin saying, Crescit indulgens 
 sibi dims hydrops, seems to me applicable to 
 almost all moral as well as physical diseases ; 
 and especially to that mental malady, the 
 inordinate love of power. To this malady his 
 Lordship seems to me a victim. The force of 
 circumstances, as I have already said, far more 
 than his own volition, has placed him in a 
 position of exceptional authority ; and his 
 personal characteristics have led him to make 
 the consolidation and extension of that authority 
 the dominant principle of his policy. The 
 extent to which this policy is now carried on, 
 and has been carried on for years, can hardly 
 be appreciated by any one not intimately 
 acquainted with Egypt. It is no exaggeration 
 to assert that under this policy the administra- 
 tion of Egypt is conducted by British officials, 
 and that these officials are under the absolute 
 control of the British Agency. From the 
 highest posts in the public service to the lowest, 
 every appointment is made under the super- 
 vision of Lord Cromer, and his disapproval is 
 fatal. This is not all ; I have no doubt his 
 Lordship would, in good faith, deny the state- 
 ment that no British official can express doubt
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 189 
 
 as to the expediency of any measure emanating 
 from the Agency, or criticise it unfavourably, 
 without losing all chance of promotion and 
 risking the tenure of his position. All old 
 public servants, whether British or native, who 
 have resided long in the country and who have 
 thus acquired experience, are viewed with a 
 certain disfavour from the fact that they are 
 competent to express opinions which may not 
 be in accord with the ideas in favour at 
 headquarters. What his Lordship prefers are 
 young officials utterly unacquainted with the 
 country, and who, therefore, even if they had 
 the wish, have not the power to question 
 the wisdom of his opinions. Very shortly 
 before his leaving Egypt for South Africa, 
 Lord Kitchener, while still Governor of the 
 Soudan, came down to Cairo on a visit, and on 
 being asked by an acquaintance what he had 
 come for, replied, as the story goes : "I have 
 come to take a course of lessons in Lord Cromer's 
 Kindergarten." I cannot vouch myself for the 
 truth of this story, but I can vouch for it as 
 representing the current opinion of the day. 
 Under the existing regime, the policy of the 
 Agency has always been to discourage any intimacy
 
 190 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 between our officials and their native colleagues, 
 and to give as little encouragement as possible 
 to any British official who endeavours to ascer- 
 tain for himself the views and opinions of the 
 Egyptian population. No doubt, for his own 
 convenience, and for the purpose of carrying out 
 his duties, a British official may pick up sufficient 
 Arabic to understand and speak it colloquially. 
 But any attempt to study Arabic literature and 
 hold converse with the teachers of Islam would 
 not be a mark in his favour with the powers that 
 be. The inevitable result of this state of things 
 is that the Agency for many years past has only 
 been visited by persons who shared, or professed 
 to share, Lord Cromer's views as to the expedi- 
 ency of administering Egypt by British officials, 
 and that the few persons, whether British, foreign, 
 or native, who were competent to form an inde- 
 pendent opinion differing from that of our Consul- 
 General, have gradually ceased to have any rela- 
 tions with the Agency other than those of a 
 personal or social character. 
 
 I do not wish to insinuate for one moment 
 that Lord Cromer's isolation is due to any 
 deliberate plan or set purpose of his own. On 
 the contrary, I have no doubt he is honestly
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 191 
 
 convinced that every one of the steps through 
 which he has augmented his supremacy, by 
 removing any obstacles standing in his way, has 
 been taken in the interest of England, in the 
 first place, and of Egypt in the second. The 
 results, however, of his policy, whether adopted 
 consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or un- 
 wittingly, have been equally injurious. No 
 small share of the responsibility attached to the 
 policy which Lord Cromer has pursued must 
 justly be assigned to successive British Govern- 
 ments. Both parties, Conservative and Liberal, 
 have been equally guilty in refusing to look 
 facts in the face. They have both adhered to 
 the fiction that our military occupation of Egypt 
 was only temporary and was to be brought to a 
 close whenever Egypt should be rendered com- 
 petent to govern herself. As the years passed 
 on, the date at which this contingency could even 
 be expected to occur was postponed further and 
 further. But up to to-day, no British Govern- 
 ment has had the courage to speak the truth and 
 to say that it is our intention to prolong our 
 occupation to the Greek Calends. This feeble- 
 ness of purpose has imposed upon our repre- 
 sentatives in Egypt the necessity of keeping up
 
 1 92 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 the hollow pretence that Egypt is still an in- 
 dependent State, whose lawful sovereign is 
 H. H. the Khedive. I may be doing Lord 
 Cromer an injustice, but, as far as I am aware, 
 he has steadily discountenanced the idea of an 
 avowed and open Protectorate. I know that 
 many years ago he, in conversation with a friend 
 of mine from whom I heard the story and who 
 was in favour of a Protectorate, answered : 
 " There is no need for any formal declaration, 
 we have got to go on as we are doing now, and 
 some fine day the world will discover that we 
 have established a Protectorate without anybody 
 knowing that we have done so." I hold myself 
 that a Protectorate has got to come and perhaps 
 at no very distant period. My contention is 
 that when the time arises we shall experience 
 far greater difficulties in carrying out our in- 
 tention than we should have done at an earlier 
 period. 
 
 I am not alluding so much to difficulties 
 which might arise from the jealousy or the ill 
 will of other European Powers. Now that 
 France has engaged to give us a free hand in 
 Egypt, and so long as the entente cordiale 
 remains in force, any proposal on our part to
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 193 
 
 assume direct responsibility for the government 
 of Egypt, and to guarantee the payment of the 
 interest of the Egyptian public debt, would 
 probably encounter no serious objection on the 
 part of any Continental Power with the possible 
 exception of Turkey. The opposition I antici- 
 pate would come from Egypt. 
 
 Up to a few years ago, Egypt would perhaps 
 have acquiesced in a British Protectorate as 
 readily as she always has acquiesced in her 
 endless list of conquerors and in her equally 
 numerous changes of dynasties. Nor can there 
 be any question that, so long as we are given a 
 free hand in dealing with any overt resistance, 
 our present force in Egypt would prove sufficient 
 to enable us to establish a Protectorate if we 
 were so minded. The difficulty would be that 
 of passive resistance on the part of the Egyptian 
 public. A number of causes have contributed 
 to bring about this development of popular 
 sentiment. Let me enumerate only a few of 
 the principal ones. Under British rule we have 
 introduced freedom of the Press and applied it 
 to the native papers, printed for the most part 
 in Arabic, and we have done this in accordance 
 with the traditions of political life in our own 
 
 o
 
 194 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 country. His Lordship has always maintained 
 that the best way to suppress popular agitation 
 is to allow the agitation to blow off steam by 
 means of a free Press. I think this argument 
 holds good when the rulers are of the same 
 race and use the same language as the ruled, 
 and when the great majority of the population 
 can both read and write. Neither of those 
 conditions exists in Egypt. From the days of 
 Mahomet Ali to those of Ismail, to speak evil 
 of the ruler was a very grave offence, punished 
 with death or mutilation. It was the duty of 
 the native ministers to call the attention of the 
 Sovereign to any charge against the Government 
 which appeared in such few papers as then 
 existed. Now, there are a score of native papers, 
 some of which, such as El Lewa have a very 
 considerable circulation, and are forwarded daily 
 by rail to all parts of the Delta and the Nile 
 Valley. In almost every village, however small, 
 there is somebody who can read or write, and 
 when the day's work is over this man of letters 
 reads the newspaper out to his fellow villagers. 
 The reader being relatively a man of education 
 is able to expound the Koran and is therefore 
 likely to be biassed against infidels. He therefore
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 195 
 
 naturally selects for reading such passages as 
 attribute grave offences against morality and 
 justice, however unjustly, to British officers and 
 officials. The truth of anything which appears 
 in print is taken for granted by the fellaheen, 
 and especially if the charge made is one that 
 appeals to their instinctive dislike and distrust 
 of foreign rulers. I am assured by English 
 merchants and traders, whose occupation causes 
 them to visit the villages, especially in the Delta, 
 that they have noticed the great effect produced 
 by the native papers, and, with or without 
 reason, they attribute to this cause a marked 
 change in the manner of their native customers 
 and acquaintances. According to them, this 
 change does not go so far as hostile utterance, 
 but seems to indicate that the old confidence in 
 our good faith and honest dealing has been 
 impaired from some cause or other. Of course 
 this assertion will be denied by almost every 
 British official, from Lord Cromer downwards, 
 who still clings to the delusion that, whatever 
 may be said in the native papers, the fellaheen 
 are too keenly alive to the vast improvement 
 we have brought about in their material con- 
 dition to have the slightest wish that our 
 
 o 2
 
 196 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 military occupation should be brought to a 
 close. 
 
 Another cause of discontent is due to the 
 vague idea that some change is impending. So 
 late as in 1904 Lord Cromer, in his annual 
 report, expressed a conviction that the 
 recovery of her autonomy by Egypt was a 
 mere question of time, and these words were 
 doubtless repeated in all the native papers, and 
 not unreasonably led an ignorant and illiterate 
 people to think there must be some hidden 
 reason for such a statement being made by the 
 great British Lord, who is supposed to speak in 
 the name of England, the real ruler of Egypt. 
 On the face of the globe there is not a country 
 more prone to desert the losing side than Egypt ; 
 and if the natives should get a notion into 
 their heads that England was contemplating the 
 withdrawal, or even the diminution, of her 
 army in Egypt, they would begin to speculate 
 as to whether they had better incline towards 
 the Court or towards the Nationalist Party, 
 represented by Mustapha Pasha Kamel. I 
 confess I find it hard to take the new Arabi 
 seriously. He seems to me an educated Achmed 
 the Egyptian, with the difference that he is an
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 197 
 
 Effendi and not a fellah, and that he is a type 
 of the Frenchified Egyptians who surrounded 
 Ismail in the days of his prosperity, who knew 
 no literature and spoke no language other than 
 that of France, and whose highest pride was to 
 be taken for a born son of Gaul. I have lived 
 too much in Egypt not to be aware that in this 
 world-old country the smallest causes may pro- 
 duce the most unexpected results. Still, as 
 far as I can judge, the issue of a new Anglo- 
 French edition by the Editor of the Lewa, the 
 organ of the Egyptian Nationalists, is not likely 
 to produce much effect in Egypt; even if, as 
 The Times alleges, the Khedive himself had sup- 
 plied the capital necessary for its publication. I 
 attach far more importance to the facts that the 
 fellaheen, that is, the vast majority of the 
 Egyptian population, have acquired what to 
 them is comparative wealth, that with this 
 wealth they have developed certain habits of 
 expenditure ; and that, amidst these habits, one 
 of the most common is the desire to obtain a 
 higher education for their sons. In the days 
 when I was young I was always told that know- 
 ledge was power. My later experience has 
 shown me that the knowledge of reading,
 
 198 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 writing, and arithmetic, though a most valuable 
 acquisition when it is confined to a few, is abso- 
 lutely worthless when it is well-nigh universal. 
 What the fellaheen desire for their children is 
 not mental improvement, but such elementary 
 education as may qualify them for entering the 
 public service as clerks or accountants, and thus 
 rising in the social scale. I am afraid the prac- 
 tical result of this craving for posts and places 
 may convert a large number of efficient labourers 
 into very inefficient public servants. Still, the 
 mere circumstance of this craving for education, 
 the influence of the native Press, and the 
 encouragement given by the Government to 
 the public schools, have materially contributed 
 to the sentiment of unrest to which I have 
 already alluded. The possibility of a free native 
 Press, and the spread of education leading to 
 unrest, should, I think, have been foreseen by 
 the British Agency. 
 
 I entertain no doubt that Lord Cromer and 
 his British subordinates were honestly convinced 
 that if they secured the material prosperity of 
 Egypt they might rely on the self-interest, if not 
 on the gratitude, of the Egyptians, to render 
 them staunch supporters of the British occupation,
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 199 
 
 under which their prosperity had been achieved 
 and under which alone it can be maintained. 
 Their mistake lay in ignoring the tenacity with 
 which all followers of the Prophet cling to their 
 creed. Islam is so intimately associated with all 
 the habits, manners, customs and usages of 
 everyday life in Mahommedan countries that it 
 is very difficult to make any changes in 
 existing laws and customs without raising a 
 suspicion amidst the native population that these 
 changes are dictated by hostility to Islam. The 
 country has been inundated with British officials, 
 who, even when they are nominally subject 
 to the authority of their native co-adjutors 
 appointed by the Khedivial Government, are 
 given to understand that their native colleagues 
 are to carry out the instructions they receive 
 from the British Agency. Thus the native 
 officials, learning that they were mere dummies 
 in the adminstration of their own country, 
 have either retired from the public service 
 or have contented themselves with drawing 
 their salaries and acquiescing in whatever in- 
 structions they may receive from their British 
 colleagues. 
 
 The situation is aggravated by the personal
 
 200 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 characteristics of its authors. From causes I 
 have already alluded to, his Lordship prefers to 
 do as much as possible by himself, dislikes criti- 
 cism, and prefers to act through officials who, 
 whether native or European, are content to carry 
 out his instructions even though privately they 
 may dissent from his views. One by one, every 
 influence which impaired his autocracy has been 
 removed or fettered. The Khedive has been 
 taught that it is more consonant with his comfort 
 and self-respect not to tender advice about the 
 internal affairs of his kingdom. The native 
 ministers in common with all Orientals dislike 
 trouble, and, having found out that their position 
 is much pleasanter if they accept the proposals 
 of their British advisers without discussing their 
 merits or demerits, avoid any futile discussion. 
 The British officials, with few and decreasing 
 exceptions, are ready to carry out the policy 
 dictated from the British Agency without raising 
 objections or suggesting difficulties which might 
 delay its prompt execution. The only institution 
 which tends to limit his autocracy are the capitu- 
 lations, the mixed tribunals, the mercantile 
 community, and the Consuls-General accredited 
 to the Khedivial Court, whose authority has
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 201 
 
 already been seriously diminished under the 
 Anglo-French agreement. 
 
 In his report of the year 1905, published last 
 April, Lord Cromer has put forward with great 
 frankness and ability the reforms which he 
 would desire to introduce in the near future. 
 The following to quote his Lordship's own 
 words is "A brief summary of the proposals" 
 which are set forth in his report. 
 
 1. No change is proposed in the composition 
 or function of the existing Legislative Councils 
 or Assembly. 
 
 2. A separate Council is to be created, composed 
 wholly of subjects or protected subjects of the 
 Powers which were parties to the institution of 
 the mixed tribunals. Decrees passed by a majority 
 of this Council, and promulgated by the Egyptian 
 Government, with the consent of His Britannic 
 Majesty's Government, would be binding on all 
 foreigners resident in Egypt. 
 
 3. An engagement will be taken by both the 
 British and Egyptian Governments that every 
 reservation in favour of British subjects should 
 endure for the benefit of the subjects of other 
 Powers. 
 
 4. It is proposed that the Council should
 
 202 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 consist of about twenty-five to thirty ministers. 
 Of these a minority proportion would be named 
 by the Egyptian Government. A limit to the 
 number of officials in the service of the Egyptian 
 Government who may be named members of the 
 Council is to be fixed. The majority of the 
 Council is to be elected in such a manner as 
 shall be hereafter decided. 
 
 5. Local interests, and not nationality, shall 
 form the basis of representation, but the maxi- 
 mum number of elected members, who may be 
 of any single nationality, is to be fixed by treaty. 
 
 6. The Suez Canal Convention and the Khedi- 
 vial Decree of the 28th November 1904 are to 
 be excluded from the purview of the Council. 
 
 7. The Egyptian Government will be precluded 
 from derogating from provisions as to freedom 
 of trade or as to the rates at which customs 
 duties are levied in virtue of any existing or 
 future commercial concessions with any foreign 
 Government. 
 
 8. Quarantine regulations connected with safe- 
 guarding foreign countries from the introduction 
 of disease by ships passing through the canal 
 will continue as at present to form the subject of 
 diplomatic arrangements. The preservation of
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 203 
 
 Egypt against the introduction of disease from 
 abroad will be within the functions of the 
 Egyptian Government and Legislatures. 
 
 9. The existing Consular Courts are to be 
 abolished when other Courts have been erected 
 by fresh Legislation. 
 
 10. Certain reservations are to be made as 
 regards the freedom of action of the new Legis- 
 lature in the matter of criminal legislation. 
 
 11. The system of quinquennial periods for 
 the Mixed Tribunals is to be abolished. The 
 existing regime of those Tribunals is to remain 
 in force until modified by fresh legislation passed 
 by the Council and approved by the British and 
 Egyptian Governments. 
 
 12. The existing judges of the Mixed Tribunals 
 are to be entitled to retain their posts, and their 
 services are to be available in any Courts which 
 may in the future be established. 
 
 13. The British and Egyptian Governments 
 are to make a formal declaration to the effect 
 that they have no intention of changing the 
 fundamental principles of the existing civil and 
 criminal legislation. 
 
 14. The principle of the irremovability of 
 judges is to be maintained.
 
 204 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 15. The official languages of the new Council 
 will be English, French and Italian, but written 
 opinions may be recorded in any other language. 
 
 16. English, French, and Italian are to be 
 legally placed on a footing of perfect equality. 
 
 17. The Hague Arbitration Tribunal is to 
 decide any differences of opinion as regards the 
 interpretation of the treaty which it will be 
 necessary for the Powers to sign. 
 
 The programme thus summarised is a very 
 able and lucid document. I have no reason to 
 suppose that Lord Cromer has changed his views 
 since it was issued last April. On the contrary, 
 I have every reason to believe that his Lordship 
 has been actively engaged since its issue in 
 recommending its adoption to all the parties 
 who might be likely to raise objection to its 
 acceptance. The Legislative Councils are to 
 discharge their nominal duties and yet to retain 
 their present rank and draw their present 
 salaries. The foreign residents, a very powerful 
 body, are to be conciliated by the suggestion 
 that a separate Council should be formed exclu- 
 sively from their ranks, partly nominated and 
 partly elected, whose qualification is to be local 
 interest and not nationality, and whose decrees
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 205 
 
 are, subject to the approval of the Egyptian 
 Government, to be binding on all foreigners 
 resident in Egypt. Foreign countries which 
 have commercial interests in Egypt are assured 
 that, under the proposed reforms, their subjects 
 shall be placed on exactly the same footing as 
 British subjects. The Suez Canal Company and 
 the Anglo-French Agreement are expressly ex- 
 cluded from any criticism or interference on the 
 part of the new Legislature, and the Egyptian 
 Government is precluded from adopting any 
 recommendation of the Council affecting custom 
 duties or absolute freedom of trade. The Powers 
 who are asked to abolish the capitulations are 
 assured the abolition will not take place till 
 other Courts shall have been established with 
 their approval. The Mixed Tribunals are not to 
 be renewed when their next quinquennial juris- 
 diction expires, but the judges, who would natur- 
 ally resent losing their appointments, are in- 
 formed that the existing judges will be allowed 
 to retain their posts and their salaries during 
 their lifetime, and their irremovability is to be 
 guaranteed. As a sop to British susceptibilities, 
 English, French, and Italian are to be hence- 
 forth the three official languages used in the
 
 2o6 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 Courts which are to supersede the existing 
 Mixed Tribunals ; but to satisfy the irritation 
 this provision might cause to suitors of other 
 nationalities, written pleadings may be recorded 
 in any other language, I presume, including 
 even Arabic. Finally, in order to commend the 
 new Egyptian constitution to public opinion on 
 the Continent and in America, any controversy 
 as to the proper interpretation of the meaning 
 of the proposed agreement, which must be 
 signed by the Powers who were parties to the 
 institution of the Mixed Courts, has to be sub- 
 mitted to the arbitration of the Hague Inter- 
 national Tribunal. 
 
 I fully admit that no better or abler plan 
 could be devised with the object of reconciling 
 all the various conflicting interests which militate 
 against the new constitution Lord Cromer is 
 desirous of introducing into Egypt. I fully 
 agree that the abolition of the capitulations 
 would be, in itself, a great boon to the Egyptian 
 Revenue. 
 
 There are many objections I should raise as to 
 the particular proposals of this draft constitution 
 for Egypt. But as I object to the scheme in 
 toto, to discuss details is a sheer waste of time.
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 207 
 
 To speak plain English, the way to understand 
 the project in question is to strike out the name 
 of Egyptian Government wherever it appears, 
 and to substitute for it that of the British 
 Agency. The capitulations, the Mixed Tri- 
 bunals, the Consuls-General accredited to the 
 Khedive, and last but not least the European 
 companies and capitalists, are the only influences 
 left in Egypt which interfere with the absolute 
 autocracy Lord Cromer's policy would confer, 
 not only upon himself, but upon his successors 
 in the post he now occupies as the representative 
 of our unavowed Protectorate. I find it difficult 
 to comprehend how autonomy is compatible with 
 absolute personal autocracy. I learn from Lord 
 Cromer's two last reports that the aim of his 
 policy is to prepare Egypt for autonomy. I do 
 not doubt for one moment the sincerity of this 
 avowal. My intelligence, however, is too 
 limited to enable me to understand how the 
 absolute autocracy of the ruler can be the 
 way to prepare the ruled for autonomy. The 
 process seems to me analogous to that of the 
 schoolmaster who undertook to teach his pupils 
 the art of swimming, but would never allow them 
 to go into the water till they had learnt to swim.
 
 208 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 The only explanation I can offer is that Lord 
 Milner was in the right when he described 
 Egypt as " the land of paradox." 
 
 If it could be proved to me that the continu- 
 ance of a system under which Egypt is to be 
 subject to the absolute will of a single individual 
 is essential to the maintenance of our Protectorate, 
 there is no more to be said as far as I am 
 concerned. I have never wavered in the views 
 I have expressed for years that the command 
 of our highway to India is essential to the wel- 
 fare of the British Empire, and that this being 
 so, England is justified in occupying Egypt till 
 such time as our Protectorate ceases to be essen- 
 tial to the vital interest of England. As far as 
 the present is concerned, I can see no reasonable 
 prospect of Egypt becoming an independent, 
 self-governed State. If, from any cause, our 
 occupation was to be brought to a close, some 
 other Power would step into our shoes. Egypt 
 is too wealthy and too open to attack to stand 
 alone, and if she must be placed under foreign 
 protection, I think her interests would be far 
 better protected by England than by any other 
 Great Power. To my mind, the idea of autonomy 
 being conferred on Egypt is, for the present, a
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 209 
 
 pious aspiration and nothing more. It would 
 be folly for any man who has seen so many 
 changes in the world as I have witnessed in the 
 course of a longish life, to say positively that 
 Egypt may never become capable of self-govern- 
 ment. It is futile in discussing mundane affairs 
 to look very far ahead. A score or so of years 
 is as much as our mental outlook can cover, and 
 I decline to express any opinion as to whether 
 Egypt will ever be governed by her own inhabi- 
 tants, or, if so, at what date her emancipation 
 from absolute autocratic rule, such as she has 
 endured for countless centuries and endures 
 to-day, may be approximately expected to occur. 
 Under these circumstances, to talk of Egyptian 
 autonomy as coming within the range of practical 
 politics seems to me an absurdity. As things 
 stand, there are various limitations which still 
 furnish certain guarantees against the autocratic 
 power possessed by our representative being 
 carried to any great extent. At the risk of 
 repeating myself, I gladly own that Lord 
 Cromer is as good an absolute ruler as Egypt 
 has ever possessed ; and if he should carry out 
 his programme to abolish the capitulations, 
 suppress the mixed courts, establish an advisory 
 
 p
 
 210 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 legislature nominated indirectly, if not directly, 
 by himself, deprive the Khedive of the right of 
 communicating with foreign Powers except 
 through the British Agency, and thereby 
 convert the Consuls-General accredited to his 
 Highness into commercial consuls, the machine 
 of autocracy would work without a hitch or 
 break. I doubt, however, autocracy, absolute 
 and uncontrolled, proving beneficial even to so 
 high-minded and upright an autocrat as our 
 present Consul-General. I remember two or 
 three years ago when I was calling at the 
 Agency I happened to speak to him on the 
 subject of the Caisse de la Dette, and he 
 remarked : " I have often thought when I was 
 in India that if we had had there such an 
 institution as the Caisse de la Dette to check our 
 Indian expenditure, we might have been saved 
 from many extravagances and errors we have 
 committed there." Apparently, since then, his 
 Lordship has altered his mind and has come to 
 the conclusion that the disadvantages of any 
 independent institution whatever exceed its 
 advantages for Egypt. I am myself of opinion 
 that, in the interest of Egypt, the gain she 
 might derive from the abolition of the capitu-
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 211 
 
 lations would be dearly purchased by the 
 removal of the international institutions which, 
 to some extent, hamper the absolute autocracy 
 Lord Cromer now desires for himself, and which 
 must, of necessity, devolve upon his successors, 
 who may easily be men of far less common sense 
 and sound judgment. 
 
 I feel strongly the duty we contracted to- 
 wards Egypt when we occupied the country and 
 undertook its administration. It may satisfy 
 English sentiment to maintain the fiction that 
 we came here and remain here for the good 
 of Egypt. A fiction, however, which imposes 
 upon nobody is, to my thinking, at once foolish 
 and dishonest. All the same, I hold we owe it to 
 ourselves, as far as is consistent with the mainten- 
 ance of our occupation, to render that supremacy 
 as little onerous to Egypt as possible. For the 
 time, at any rate, the belief professed at the 
 British Agency and propagated by British 
 officialdom that the natives are so grateful for 
 the material improvement we have effected in 
 their condition as to regard the possibility of our 
 retiring from Egypt with absolute dismay has 
 been discredited by the course of events. Still 
 I see symptoms of its revival, and I notice that
 
 212 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 it is the cue, if I may use the word, of British 
 officialdom to say that there is not and never has 
 been any unrest in Egypt, and that the natives, 
 though their affection for us may not be ardent, 
 know their own interests a great deal too well to 
 desire our departure. If people like to believe 
 that everything is for the best in the best possible 
 of worlds I should be sorry to shake their 
 optimism. All I can assert is that, in this 
 country, religion plays a part it does not play in 
 Europe, and that therefore fanaticism is always a 
 latent element which wise statesmanship should 
 never fail to take into account. As things are, I 
 see no cause to anticipate any outburst of hos- 
 tility between the followers of the Cross and the 
 Crescent, especially in Egypt, where the native 
 population is, as a rule, of a pacific character ; 
 and it is manifest that under such a contingency 
 the odds would be in favour of the British troops 
 as against any possible assailants. Still, if it was 
 my lot to live in or near a powder magazine I 
 should strongly object to anyone throwing 
 matches carelessly about. On like grounds I 
 should always deprecate in Egypt, and still more 
 in the Soudan, any needless cause of dissatisfac- 
 tion being given to a population with whom any
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 213 
 
 grievance, however unreasonable, is well nigh 
 certain to excite suspicion that the grievance is 
 intended to give offence to the creed of Islam. 
 
 My contention is that, putting aside our im- 
 provements in irrigation, whose utility the fella- 
 heen can appreciate, the reforms we endeavour to 
 introduce, and our interference with native 
 customs, usages, laws, and habits, give umbrage 
 to the inhabitants of Egypt, and are also cal- 
 culated to create an impression that they are 
 directed against the authority of the Koran. 
 If these reforms were carried out by native 
 administrators speaking their own language, 
 belonging to their own creed, and understanding 
 their own prejudices, they would, I feel con- 
 vinced, create far less discontent than they do at 
 present. All change is distasteful to a conserva- 
 tive nation warmly attached to a non-progressive 
 creed : and the unpopularity is all the stronger 
 when the reforms are introduced by British offi- 
 cials often very imperfectly acquainted with their 
 language, and so convinced of the superiority 
 of British ideas as to deem their advantages too 
 self-evident to require explanation. I cannot 
 but think that by this time whatever may be 
 the case with the British Agency the great
 
 2i 4 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 majority of our British officials must have come 
 to the conclusion that any attempts to persuade 
 the natives to accept British ideas respecting 
 sanitation, law, justice, and administration are 
 doomed to failure. This being so, the question 
 is whether it is worth while to continue an 
 experiment which has been proved impracticable. 
 If I am asked what I should propose as an 
 alternative, I should recommend the system 
 which has been adopted in the native States of 
 India by England, in Tunis and Algeria by 
 France, and in Bosnia and the Herzegovina by 
 Austria, and adopted with success. The funda- 
 mental principles of this system may be stated 
 briefly as follows. Supreme authority should be 
 vested in the hands of the representative of the 
 Protecting Power, whether he may be called 
 Resident, Governor, or Consul-General. Subject 
 to this supreme authority, as little change as 
 possible should be made in the internal adminis- 
 tration of the protected State. The old laws, 
 customs and usages should remain as they were 
 before the Protectorate existed, and the old 
 native administrators should as a rule be retained 
 in the public service. These administrators 
 should be clearly given to understand that they
 
 THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 215 
 
 would be allowed a considerable latitude in the 
 discharge of their functions, and that they 
 would not be called to account if their adminis- 
 tration should be considered somewhat differently 
 from the view entertained by the Protecting 
 Power, but that if any gross scandal or abuse 
 should occur during their administration they 
 would be forthwith dismissed or, if necessary, 
 severely punished by the representative of the 
 Protectorate. To work out the details of such a 
 system must be the work of the Kesident, and 
 this can only be done by the men on the spot. 
 All I am concerned with is its broad principle. 
 
 In the provinces, all appointments up to the 
 rank of Governor should be held by Egyptian 
 subjects, who would be responsible for order and 
 decent administration and would be liable to 
 dismissal by the Consul-General in case any 
 gross outrage or corruption were brought to the 
 latter's knowlege. This, as I have already 
 stated, is, in substance, the scheme suggested by 
 Lord Dufferin, and it is the one best fitted to 
 render our Protectorate more congenial or 
 perhaps I should say less uncongenial to the 
 Egyptian public than that which has hitherto 
 been adopted by the British Agency.
 
 2i6 THE EGYPT OF THE FUTURE 
 
 At the moment when I write two contingencies 
 seem not unlikely to occur, either of which might 
 bring about a crisis in Egyptian affairs. The first 
 contingency is the possibility that the Great 
 Powers may assent to Lord Cromer's demands 
 for having a free hand in Egypt accorded to 
 England not only by France but by the other 
 Great Powers in Europe. The second, and, to 
 my mind, the far more probable contingency, 
 is that the Powers may decline to accede to the 
 demands I have recapitulated until the relations 
 between England, as the Protecting Power, and 
 Egypt, as the Protected State, have been dis- 
 cussed by an International Conference. In view 
 of either of these contingencies, it is all important 
 to call the attention of England to the un- 
 satisfactory character of our present unavowed 
 Protectorate and to the failure of our existing 
 policy of ruling Egypt by British officials in 
 preference to administering Egyptian affairs 
 with the cordial co-operation of the native 
 element. This must be my excuse for the 
 publication of The Egypt of the Future. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 R. CLAY AND SONS, LTD., I'-READ ST. HILL, B.C., AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
 
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