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 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ITS GROWTH AND DECAY 
 
 V
 
 By THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
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 MAHOMET THE COXOUEROR 
 
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 Constantinople, in 1480, and painted a portrait of him. 
 
 The portrait is in the La\ard Collection.
 
 THE TURKISH 
 EMPIRE 
 
 ITS GROWTH AND DECAY 
 
 BY 
 
 LORD EVERSLEY 
 
 Author of "The Partitions of Poland." " Peel and O'Connell, 
 " Gladstone and Ireland " 
 
 WITH A FRONTISPIECE 
 AND THREE MAPS 
 
 LONDON 
 
 T. FISHER UNWIN LTD. 
 
 ADELPHI TERRACE
 
 
 First published in iqij 
 Second Impression IQ18 
 
 {All rights resert>ed)
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The favour with which, two years ago, my book on The 
 Partitions of Poland was received by the public has induced 
 me to devote the interval to a study of the history of another 
 State which, in modern times, has almost disappeared from 
 the map of Europe — namely Turkey. 
 
 The subject is one in which I have for many years past 
 taken great interest. In the course of a long' life!, I have 
 witnessed the greater part of the events which have resulted 
 in the loss to that State of all its Christian provinces in 
 Europe and all its Moslem provinces in Africa, leaving 
 to it only its capital and a small part of Thrace in Europe, 
 and its still wide possessions in Asia. 
 
 So long ago, also, as in 1855 and 1857, I spent some time 
 at Constantinople and travelled in Bulgaria and Greece, and 
 was able to appreciate the effects of Turkish rule. As a 
 result, I gave a full support, in 1876, to Mr. Gladstone in 
 his efforts to secure the independence of Bulgaria^ and in 
 1879 was an active member of a committee, presided over 
 by Lord Rosebery, which hiad for its object the extension 
 of the kingdom of Greece so as to include the provinces 
 inhabited by Greeks still suffering under Turkish rule. 
 
 In 1887 and 1890 I again visited the East and travelled 
 over the same ground as thirty years earlier, and was able 
 to observe the immense improvements which had been 
 effected in the provinces that had gained independence, 
 and how little change had taken place at Constantinople. 
 
 In view of these experiences and of the further great 
 changes portended in Turkey after the conclusion of the
 
 '6 PREFACE 
 
 present great war, I have thought it may be of use to tell, 
 in a compact and popular form, the story of the growth and 
 decay of the Turkish Empire. 
 
 History may well be told at many different lengths and 
 from different points of view. That of the Ottoman Empire, 
 from the accession of Othman in 1288 to the treaty of 
 Kainardji in 1774, which secured to Russia a virtual 
 protectorate in favour of the Christian subjects of Turkey, 
 has been told at its greatest length by the German professor. 
 Von Hammer, in eighteen volumes. He is the only historian 
 who has explored for this long period both Greek and 
 Turkish annals. 
 
 The British historian, KnoUes, writing in 161 o, told 
 the story of the growth of the Turkish Empire in two 
 bulky folio volumes, much admired by two such different 
 authorities as Dr. Johnson and Lord Byron. The work is 
 based on a few only of the Greek annals. It is very 
 discursive and imperfect, but it contains many most terse 
 and striking passages. Gibbon, the historian of the Roman 
 Empire, and Sir Edwin Pears, in his most interesting book 
 on the Destruction of the Greek Empire, have also relied 
 on Greek authorities up to the capture of Constantinople 
 by the Turks in 1453, before which date there were no 
 Turkish historians. Very recently, in 191 6, Mr. Herbert 
 Gibbons, of the Princeton University, published a very 
 valuable work on the foundations of the Ottoman Empire, 
 dealing with its first four great Sultans. He has again 
 examined with very great care the numerous and con- 
 flicting early Greek authorities, and has thrown much new 
 light on the subject. 
 
 Other historians of Turkey, writing in English and 
 French, such as Creasy, Lane Poole, La Jonquiere, and 
 Halil Ganem (a Young Turk), have drawn their facts 
 mainly from Von Hammer's great work. Their books are 
 all of interest and value. But these writers, and especially 
 Sir Edward Creasy, in his otherwise admirable History of 
 the Ottoman Empire, written at the time of the Crimean
 
 PREFACE ^ 
 
 War, to which I have been much indebted, took what 
 would now be considered too favourable a view of Turkish 
 rule in modem times, and were over sanguine, as events 
 have shown, as to the maintenance and regeneration of the 
 Empire. I have followed their example in basing my 
 narrative mainly on Von Hammer's work, correcting it in 
 some important respects from the other sources I have 
 named, compressing^ it into much smaller compass than 
 they have done, treating it from a somewhat different 
 point of view, and bringing* it down to the commencement 
 of the present great war in 1914. 
 
 It would have been easier to tell the story at double the 
 length, so as to include much other important and interest- 
 ing matter, but, in such case, the lesson to be drawn from 
 it would have been obscured by the maze of detail. My 
 book does not aim at a full history of the long period dealt 
 with. I have proposed only to explain the process by 
 which the Turkish Empire was aggregated by its first ten 
 great Sultans, and has since been, in great part, dis- 
 membered under their twenty -five degenerate successors, 
 and to assign causes for these two great historic move- 
 ments. 
 
 I will only add that I commenced my recent studies 
 under the impressions derived in part from some of the 
 histories to which I have referred and with which I was 
 familiar, and in part from the common tradition in Western 
 Europe — dating probably from the time of the Crusaders 
 — that the Turkish invasions and conquests in Europe were 
 impelled by religious zeal and fervour and by the desire to 
 spread Islam. I have ended them with the conviction that 
 there was no missionary zeal whatever for Islam in the 
 Turkish armies and their leaders who invaded Europe, and 
 that their main incentive was the hope of plunder by the sack 
 of cities, the sale of captives as slaves or for harems, and 
 the confiscation of land and its distribution amon^ soldiers 
 as a reward for bravery. I have also concluded that the 
 4ecay of the military spirit and the shrinkage of Empire
 
 8 PREFACE 
 
 was largely due to the absence of these motives and rewards 
 when the Turks were on the defensive. 
 
 If I have expressed my views freely on this subject, and 
 on the misrule of the Turks in modern times, I have 
 endeavoured to state the facts on which they are based with 
 perfect fairness as between the Crescent and the Cross. 
 
 I have purposely refrained from expressing an opinion 
 as to the future of Turkey, after the conclusion of the exist- 
 ing great war. The problems which will then have to be 
 solved are of a different order to those of the past which 
 have been dealt with in this book. The Turkish Empire, 
 in the sense of the rule of an alien race over subject races, 
 has practically ceased to exist in Europe. It survives in 
 Asia and at its capital, Constantinople, under very different 
 conditions. 
 
 With respect to the numerous works I have consulted 
 for the latter part of my book, I desire specially to acknow- 
 ledge my indebtedness to Mr. Lane Poole's admirable Life 
 of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. 
 
 I have to thank Lord Bryce, Lord Fitzmaurice, and Sir 
 Edwin Pears for their valuable suggestions, and Lady Byles 
 and Mr. Laurence Chubb for their kind help. 
 
 E. 
 June I, 1917.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 
 THE GROWTH OF EMPIRE 
 
 I. OTHMAN (1288-I326) 
 
 II. ORCHAN (1326-59) 
 
 III. MURAD I (1359-89) 
 
 IV. BAYEZID I (1389- 1 403) . 
 V. MAHOMET I (14I3-21) . 
 
 VI. MURAD II (142I-51) 
 
 VII. MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' (145I-81] 
 
 VIII. BAYEZID II (1481-I512) . 
 
 IX. SELIM I (1512-20) 
 
 X. SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT (152O-66) 
 
 XI. GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI (1566-78) 
 
 PAGE 
 13 
 20 
 
 31 
 
 44 
 
 59 
 64 
 
 73 
 98 
 
 103 
 114 
 136 
 
 PART II 
 
 THE DECAY OF EMPIRE 
 
 XII. THE RULE OF SULTANAS (1578-1656) . 
 
 XIII. THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS (1656-17O2) 
 
 XIV. TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH (1702-18) 
 
 XV. TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE (1718-39) 
 
 9 
 
 1 68 
 191 
 203
 
 ,'io 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XVI. TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI (1739-74) . ,211 
 
 XVII. TO THE TREATY OF JASSY (1774-92) . . . 223 
 
 XVIII. TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST (1792-1812) . . 238 
 
 XIX. MAHMOUD II (1808-39) ..... 255 
 
 XX. THE RULE OF ELCHIS (1839-76) . . . 287 
 
 XXI. ABDUL HAMID II (1876-I909) .... 316 
 
 XXII. THE YOUNG TURKS (1909-I4) .... 352 
 
 XXIII. A RETROSPECT ...... 369 
 
 APPENDIX — GENEALOGY OF THE OTTOMAN SULTANS . 382 
 
 INDEX ....... 385 
 
 LIST OF MAPS 
 
 1. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST 
 
 ENTRY OF THE OTTOMANS IN 1353 . Facing page ^I 
 
 2. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE TIME OF ITS GREATEST 
 
 EXTENT ..... Facing page 148 
 
 3. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA MINOR IN I914 
 
 Facing page 369
 
 PART I 
 
 THE GROWTH OF EMPIRE
 
 OTHMAN 
 
 1288-1326 
 
 Towards the middle of the thirteenth century a small 
 band or tribe of nomad Turks migrated from Khorassan, 
 in Central Asia, into Asia Minor. They were part of a 
 much larger body, variously estimated at from two to four 
 thousand horsemen, who, with their families, had fled from 
 their homes in Khorassan under Solyman Shah. They 
 had been driven thence by an invading horde of Mongols 
 from farther east. They hoped to find asylum in Asia 
 Minor. They crossed into Armenia and spent some years 
 in the neighbourhood of Erzeroum, plundering the natives 
 there. When the wave of Mongols had spent its force, 
 they proposed to return to Khorassan. On reaching the 
 Euphrates River Solyman, when trying, on horseback, to 
 find a ford, was carried away by the current and drowned. 
 This was reckoned as a bad omen by many of his followers . 
 Two of his sons, with a majority of them, either returned 
 to Central Asia or dispersed on the way there. 
 
 Two other sons, Ertoghrul and Dundar, with four hundred 
 and twenty families, retraced their course, and after spending 
 siome time again near Erzeroum^, wandered westward into Asia 
 Minor. They came into a country inhabited by a kindred 
 race. Successive waves of Turks from the same district in 
 Central Asia, in the course of the three previous centuries, 
 had made their way into Asia Minor, and had taken forcible 
 possession of the greater part of it. They formed there 
 an Empire, known as that of the Seljukian Turks, with 
 Konia, the ancient Iconium, as its capital. But this Empire, 
 by the middle of the thirteenth century, was in a decadent 
 condition. It was eventually broken up, in part, by assaults 
 of a fresh swarm of invaders from Central Asia ; and in
 
 14 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 part by internal civil strife, fomented by family disputes of 
 succession. 
 
 When Ertoghrul's band appeared on the scene, Sultan 
 Alaeddin ruled at Konia over what remained to him of 
 the Seljukian State. Other remnants of it survived under 
 independent Emirs at Karamania, Sarukhan, Mentsche, and 
 numerous other smaller States. Between them they possessed 
 nearly the whole of Asia Minor, with the exception of a 
 few cities in its north-west, such as Brusa, Nicaea, and 
 Nicomedia and the districts round them, and a belt of 
 territory along the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and 
 the Hellespont, to which the Byzantine Emperors, formerly 
 the owners of nearly the whole of Anatolia, were now 
 reduced. Two small Christian States also still existed there 
 — Trebizond, in the north-east, and Little Armenia, in 
 Cilicia, in the south-east. Though divided among many 
 independent Emirs, the people of Asia IVIinor, with 
 the exception of the Greeks and Armenians, were fairly 
 welded together. The invading Turks had intermixed with 
 the native population, imposing on them the Turkish 
 language, and had themselves adopted the religion of 
 Islam. Ertoghrul and his nomad tribe, before entering 
 this country, were not Moslems, but they were not strangers 
 in language. Whatever their religion, it was held lightly. 
 They were converted to Islam after a short stay in the 
 country and, as is often the case with neophytes, became 
 ardent professors of their new faith. 
 
 The oft -told story of the first exploit of Ertoghrul and 
 his four hundred and twenty horsemen, on coming into the 
 country of the Seljuks, as handed dovm by tradition, though 
 savouring somewhat of a myth, is as follows : They, 
 came unexpectedly upon a battle in which one side was 
 much pressed. They knew nothing of the combatants. 
 Ertoghrul spoke to his followers : " Friends, we come 
 straight on a battle. We carry swords at our side. To 
 flee like women and resume our journey is not manly. 
 We must help one of the two. Shall we aid those who 
 are winning or those who are losing ? " Then they said 
 unto him : " It will be difficult to aid the losers. Our 
 people are weak in number and the victors are strong ! " 
 Ertoghrul replied : " This is not the speech of bold men. 
 The manly part is to aid the vanquished." Thereupon 
 the whole body of them fell upon the Mongols, who were
 
 OTHMAN I 5 
 
 the winning side, and drove them into flight. The side 
 to which they brought aid and victory proved to be that 
 of Sultan Alaeddin of Konia. In return for this provi- 
 dential aid, Sultan Alaeddin made a grant of territory to 
 Ertoghrul to be held as a fief under the Seljuks. It con- 
 sisted of a district at Sugut, about sixty miles south-east of 
 Brusa, and a part of the mountain range to the west of it. 
 
 Ertoghrul and his horsemen were a welcome support to 
 Alaeddin 's waning fortunes. In a later encounter with a 
 small Byzantine force they came ofif victorious, and Alaeddin 
 made a further addition to their territory on the borders 
 of his own, over which he had a very nominal sovereignty. 
 Thenceforth Ertoghrul lived an uneventful pastoral life as 
 the head of his clan or tribe of Turks in the ceded 
 territory, till his death in 1288, nearly fifty years from 
 the date of his leaving Khorassan. His son, Othman, who 
 was born at Sugut in 1258, was chosen by the clan to 
 succeed him, and soon commenced a much more ambitious 
 career than that of his father. When of the age of only 
 sixteen he had fallen in love with the beautiful daughter 
 of Sheik Idebali, a holy man of great repute in Karamania. 
 It is evidence of the small account then held of Ertoghrul 
 and his son that the Sheik did not think the marriage 
 good enough for his daughter. It was only after a long 
 and patient wooing by Othmkn, and as the result of a 
 dream, which foretold a great future of empire for his 
 progeny, that Idebali gave consent to the mlarriage. 
 
 There were no contemporary Turkish histories of the 
 early Ottoman Sultans. It was not till many years after 
 the capture of Constantinople in 1453 that Turkish 
 historians wrote about the birth of their State. They had 
 to rely upon traditions, which must be accepted with much 
 reserve. This, however, is certain, that Othman, in his 
 thirty-eight years of leadership, increased his dominion 
 from its very narrow limits at Sugut and Eski-Sheir to 
 a territory extending thence northward to the Bosphorus 
 and Black Sea, a distance of about a hundred and twenty 
 miles by an average breadth of sixty miles, an area of 
 about seven thousand square miles. There are no means 
 of estimating its population. It was probably sparse, except 
 on the coast of the Marmora and Black Sea. It included 
 only one important city, Brusa, which was surrendered by 
 its garrison and citizens shortly before the death of Othman
 
 1 6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 in 1326, after being hemmed in and cut off from com- 
 munication with Constantinople for many years. Consider- 
 able as these additions were, the nascent State could 
 not even yet be considered as important in size. It was 
 exceeded by several of the larger Turkish Emirates in 
 Asia Minor, such as Karamania, Sarukhan, and others. 
 
 It is notable that Othman, from the outset of his career, 
 devoted his efforts, not against the Turkish Moslem States 
 lying to the south and west of him, but against the territory 
 to the north in possession of the Byzantine Empire, or 
 which had recently been more or less emancipated from 
 it, and inhabited chiefly by Christians. It is to be inferred 
 from this that the motive of Othman was partly a religious 
 one, to extend Islam. This was not effected by any signal 
 victories over the armies of the Greek Empire. There 
 was only one recorded battle against any army of the 
 Emperor, that at Baphoeon, near Nicomedia, where Othman, 
 who by this time reckoned four thousand horsemen among 
 his followers, defeated the inconsiderable body of two 
 thousand Byzantine troops. In the following year, 1302, 
 the Greek Emperor, Michael Palaeologus, alarmed at the 
 progress of Othman, crossed in person into Asia Minor 
 at the head of a small ar'my of mercenary Slavs. But 
 he brought no money with him to pay his soldiers. They 
 would not fight without pay. They dispersed, and Michael 
 was obliged to return to his capital. This was his last 
 attempt to defend his remaining territory in that district. 
 He was hard pressed in other directions by other Turkish 
 Emirs in Asia Minor, and in the first decade of the four- 
 teenth century the Greek Empire lost all its possessions 
 in the islands of the .^gean Sea. 
 
 The extensions of territory by Othman, during his long 
 reign of thirty -eight years, were effected by a slow process 
 of attrition, by capturing from time to time petty fortresses 
 and castles and annexing the districts round them. He 
 acted in this respect, in the earlier stages, as fief of the 
 Seljuk State ; but later, when that Empire came to an 
 end, Othman declared his independence, and thenceforth 
 his accretions of territory were on his own behalf. It 
 would seem that, as these additions were made, their popu- 
 lations, or the greater part of them who were Christians, 
 adopted Islam, not under compulsion — for there is no record 
 of the massacre of captives or of the sale of them as slaves
 
 OTHMAN 17 
 
 — but because they were abandoned by their natural pro- 
 tectors, the Greeks of Constantinople. The important fact, 
 clearly shown by Mr. Gibbons in his recent work, is that 
 the new State thus created by Othman did not consist 
 purely of Turks. It had a very large mixture of Greeks 
 and Slavs, who were welded with Turks by the religion 
 of Islam. They were, from an early period, very distinct 
 from the people of other Turkish States. They called 
 themselves Osmanlis. The term ' Turk ' was used by them 
 rather as a term of contempt for an inferior people, as 
 compared with themselves . It was only in later years, when 
 the other Turkish States of Asia Minor were incorporated 
 in the Empire, that the term ' Turk ' was applied to its 
 people, in the first instance by outsiders, and eventually 
 by themselves. 
 
 To Othman, therefore, is due the credit of this inception 
 of a new State and a new and distinct people. He did 
 not, however, assume the title of Sultan. He was simply 
 an Emir, like so many other rulers of petty States in 
 Asia Minor. He was not a great general. He had no 
 opportunity of conducting a great campaign. He was a 
 brave soldier and a sagacious leader, who inspired confi- 
 dence and trust in his followers and subjects. He pursued 
 with great persistency the policy of enlarging his domain. 
 He was also a wise and capable administrator, and was 
 assisted in this by his father-in-law, Idebali, who acted 
 as his Vizier. He meted out equal justice to all his subjects, 
 irrespective of race and religion. He was simple and 
 unostentatious in his habits. There is no record of his 
 having more than one wife or more than two sons. He did 
 not amass wealth. He divided the loot of war equally 
 among his soldiers, setting' apart a portion for the poor 
 and orphans. 
 
 Othman had a vein of cruelty in his character, as had 
 so many of his descendants, the Ottoman Sultans. When, 
 on one occasion, he propounded to his war council a scheme 
 of further aggression on his neighbours, his uncle, Dundar, 
 a nonogenarian, who had been companion in arms to 
 Ertoghrul, ventured to raise objection to the policy of 
 further extension. Othman, instead of arguing the question 
 with him, took up his cross-bow and shot his imcle dead 
 on the spot, and in this way closured the discussion and 
 put down, at the outset, opposition in the council. 
 
 '2
 
 i8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Von Hammer, in relating this story, says : — 
 
 This murder of the uncle marks with terror the comiiicncemcnt of 
 the Ottoman dominion, as the brother's murder did that of Rome, 
 only the former rests on better historical evidence. Idris (the Turkish 
 historian), who, at the beginning of his work, declares that, passing over 
 in silence all that is reprehensible, he will only hand down to posterity 
 the glorious deeds of the royal race of Othman, relates, among the 
 latter, the murder of Dundar. If then such a murderous slaughter of a 
 relative be reckoned by the panegyrists of the Osmanlis among their 
 praiseworthy acts, what are we to think of those which cannot be praised 
 and of which their history therefore is silent ? ' 
 
 We must judge of Othman, however, not by the standard 
 of the present time, but by that of his contemporaries. By 
 that standard he was reckoned a humane and merciful 
 sovereign. This view is expressed in the prayer which 
 has been used in the religious ceremony, on the accession 
 of every one of his successors to the throne, when he is 
 girt with the double-edged sword of the founder of the 
 Empire, " May he be as good as Othman." 
 
 In his old age, when Othman was incapable of taking 
 the field himself, his son, Orchan, took his place as the 
 leader of the army, and just before the death of Othman 
 Brusa surrendered to him. It was then, as now, one of 
 the most important cities in Asia Minor. 
 
 When Othman was lon his deathbed, after a reign of 
 thirty -eight years, his son Orchan, in terms of affection 
 and lamentation, addressed him : " Oh, Othman ! Thou 
 fountain of Emperors, Lord of the World, Thou conqueror 
 and subduer of Nations." The dying king replied : — 
 
 Lament not, oh my sons ; delight ! for this my last conflict is the lot 
 of all human kind, common to young and old, who equally breathe the 
 air of this malignant world. Whilst I now pass to immortality, live thou 
 glorious, prosperous, and happy. Since I have thee for successor, I have 
 no cause to grieve at my departure. I will give thee my last instructions, 
 to which be attentive. Bury the cares of life in oblivion. I conjure thee, 
 crowned with felicity, lean not to tyranny, nor so much as look towards 
 cruelty. On the contrary, cultivate justice and thereby embellish the earth. 
 Rejoice my departed soul with a beautiful series of victories, and when 
 thou art become conqueror of the world, propagate religion by thy arms. 
 Promote the learned to honour, so the divine law shall be established, and 
 in what place soever thou hearest a learned man, let honour, magnificence. 
 
 ' Von Hammer, i. p. 28 (French translation).
 
 OTHMAN 19 
 
 and clemency attend him. Glory not in thy armies, nor pride thyself in 
 thy riches. Keep near thy person the learned in the law, and, as justice is 
 the support of kingdoms, turn from everything repugnant thereto. The 
 Divine law is our sole arm, and our progress is only in the paths of the 
 Lord. Embark not in vain undertakings or fruitless contentions. For it 
 is not our ambition to enjoy the empire of the world, but the propagation 
 of the faith was my peculiar desire, whicli therefore it becomes thee to 
 accomplish. Study to be impartially gracious to all, and take care to 
 discharge the public duties of thy office, for a king not distinguished by 
 goodness belies the name of a king. Let the protection of thy subjects 
 be thy constant study, so shalt thou find favour and protection from 
 God.' 
 
 It is probable that much of this was the invention of 
 some historian, writing" many years later. It may be taken, 
 however, as a summary, based on tradition, of the prin- 
 ciples which had actuated the dying chief during his long 
 reign. 
 
 Othman died shortly after receiving the welcome news 
 of the surrender of Brusa, and by his last wish was buried 
 there. He was the progenitor of a royal race who, for nine 
 more generations, continued the career of conquest which 
 he inaugurated, till the Empire, in the middle of the six- 
 teenth century, two hundred and seventy -eight years from 
 the accession of Othman, under Solyman the Magnificent, the 
 greatest of his race, reached its zenith. It vvas only after ten 
 generations of great Sultans that the race seemed to be 
 exhausted, and thenceforth, with rare exceptions, produced 
 none but degenerates down to the present time. 
 
 ' Cantemir, p. 20.
 
 II 
 
 ORCHAN 
 
 1326-59 
 
 Othman, on his deathbed, designated as his successor 
 the younger of his two sons, Orchan, aged forty -two, who 
 had been brought up as a soldier under his father's 
 eye, and had shown capacity in many campaigns, and 
 especially in that resulting in the surrender of Brusa. 
 Alaeddin, the elder brother, was not a soldier. He had 
 led a studious life, devoted to religion and law, both 
 founded on the Koran, under the guidance of Idebali. 
 
 The Turkish historians agree in stating that Orchan was 
 most unwilling to act on his father's wishes and take 
 precedence over his elder brother, and that he proposed 
 to divide the heritage of state between them, but that 
 Alaeddin declined the offer. Orchan is then reported to 
 have said : " Since, my brother, thou wilt not take the 
 flocks and herds which I offer thee, be the shepherd of 
 my people. Be .my Vizier." Alaeddin agreed to this, 
 and devoted himself to the administration of the growing 
 State and to the organization of the army, under the rule 
 of his brother.! 
 
 ' Mr. Gibbons refuses credence to this interesting story on the ground 
 mainly of its inherent improbability. His argument does not convince 
 me. The succession of the younger brother to tlie Emirate without a 
 fight for it, on the part of the elder one, was an event so remarkable, and 
 so contrary to all experience in Ottoman history, as to make the explana- 
 tion given a reasonable one. The probabilities seem to me to be all in 
 its favour. Alaeddin died in 1337. It is admitted that for seven years he 
 acted as the first Grand Vizier of the Ottoman State. It may well be, 
 therefore, that he commenced, if he did not complete, the important 
 organization of the army with which he has been credited by Turkish 
 historians. 
 
 20
 
 ORCHAN 2 I 
 
 Orchan followed closely the example of his father. He 
 pursued the same method lOf slow, but sure and persistent, 
 aggrandizement of his State. It will be seen that he suc- 
 ceeded in adding to it a territory nearly three times greater 
 than that which he inherited. Two -thirds of this were in the 
 north-west comer of Asia Minor, along the shore of the 
 Marmora and the Dardanelles, and the remaining third in 
 Europe, where he was the first to make a lodgment for the 
 Ottomans. He made Brusa his capital, and there, after 
 a time, he assumed the title of Sultan. He coined money 
 with the inscription, " May God cause to endure the Empire 
 of Orchan, son of Othman." The phrase must be taken 
 rather as a measure of his ambition than as a descrip- 
 tion of his existing State, for it was then inferior in size 
 to several of the Turkish Emirates in Asia Minor and 
 to most of the Balkan States. Orchan led a most active 
 and simple life. He was always on the move. When 
 not in the field with his troops, he spent his time in 
 visiting his many petty strongholds, seldom remaining more 
 than a month in any one of them. 
 
 The immediate objects of Orchan's ambition, on his 
 accession, were the Greek cities of Nicsea and Nicomedia, 
 with their surrounding districts, the last important posses- 
 sions of the Byzantine Empire in Asia. Nicsea was then a 
 great city. It had attained greater importance during the 
 sixty years when the Latins were in occupation of Constanti- 
 nople and the Greek Emperors were relegated to Asia 
 and made it their capital. It was well fortified. It could 
 only be captured, as Brusa had been, by cutting off its 
 communications with Constantinople, and depriving its 
 people of the means of subsistence. The Greek Emperor, 
 Andronicus III, made an effort to relieve it. He hastily 
 raised an army of mercenaries, in 1326, and led them 
 across the Bosphorus. He fought a battle against Orchan 
 at Pelecanon, on the north shore of the Gulf of Nicomedia. 
 According to the Greek historians, the Ottomans had much 
 the worst of it, losing a great number of men, while the 
 losses of the Greeks were trivial. However that may have 
 been, Andronicus decided on a retreat. But a scrimmage 
 occurred in the night between his bodyguard and the enemy, 
 in v/hich the Emperor himself was slightly wounded. He 
 thereupon fled precipitately, and was conveyed in a litter 
 to the Bosphorus and thence to Constantinople. His army,
 
 2 2 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 dispirited by this abandonment by their Emperor, was 
 defeated and dispersed. As a result, Nicaea surrendered 
 in the following year, 1327, on favourable terms. The 
 majority of its garrison and citizens followed the example 
 of those of Brusa and adopted Islam. Very few availed 
 themselves of the loffer to transfer themselves to Europe, 
 This ill-starred campaign and cowardly flight of Andro- 
 nicus was the last effort of the Byzantine Emperors to save 
 their possessions in Asia. What remained of them, chiefly 
 the city of Nicomedia, were left to their own resources, 
 without further aid from Europe. Nicomedia was well 
 fortified and was apparently a tough job for the Ottomans, 
 for it held out till 1337, or possibly 1338, and eventually 
 surrendered in the same way, and on the same terms, as 
 Brusa and Nicasa. 
 
 In the interval of ten years between the capture of 
 Nicaea and Nicomedia, Orchan was further engaged in ex- 
 tending his State elsewhere in Asia, not towards Angora, 
 in the south, as stated by some historians, but to the north- 
 west, in the ancient Mysia, by the conquest of the Emirate 
 of Karasi, which lay immediately to the north of Sarukhan 
 and with a frontage to the sea opposite to the island of 
 Mytilene. The Emir of this State died in 1333. His 
 two sons disputed the succession. The younger one was 
 favoured by the Ottomans, and when he was put to death 
 by his brother, Orchan sent an army ostensibly to 
 avenge him. The Emir was driven into exile and his 
 State was promptly annexed by Orchan. The same fate 
 befell some other petty Emirates on the southern borders 
 of the Marmora and the Hellespont, rounding off the 
 boundary of the Ottoman State in the north-west corner 
 of Anatolia. The population of Karasi and the smaller 
 States was mainly Turkish, but there must have been many 
 Greeks on the coast who probably adopted Islam, as had 
 the majority of the Greeks of Brusa and Nicsea. After 
 these acquisitions, and that of Nicomedia in 1338, there 
 were no further additions to the Ottoman State in Asia 
 Minor during Orchan's reign. 
 
 There followed, after the capture of Nicomedia, a few 
 years of peace, and it may well be that, during this time, 
 Orchan completed the scheme for the organization of his 
 State and his army. Hitherto, when Othman and Orchan 
 were involved in disputes with their neighbours, and it
 
 ORCHAN 23 
 
 was necessary to use armed force in resistance or attack, 
 an appeal was made for the voluntary service of all the 
 male members of their petty State or clan capable of bearing 
 arms ; and the appeal was responded to without question. 
 When the occasion for their service was at an end, the 
 warriors returned to their homes and to their usual voca- 
 tions. With a rapidly expanding territory and with great 
 ambitions for further conquests, it was evidently thought 
 necessary to constitute a permanent and well -disciplined 
 force, and Orchan, whether adopting, or not, the plans of 
 his brother Alaeddin, determined to effect this. On the 
 one hand, he enrolled a considerable body of infantry for 
 continuous service. They were subject to strict discipline 
 and were well paid, and it will be seen that they could 
 be sent beyond the realm to assist the Greek Emperor 
 or otherwise.' On the other hand, a large body of horse- 
 men was provided, not under continuous service, but under 
 obligatory service, when occasion arose for calUng them out. 
 
 For this purpose the country districts were divided into 
 fiefs, the holders of which were bound to serve in the 
 event of war, and to come provided with horses and equip- 
 ment, or to find substitutes in proportion to the extent of 
 their fiefs. It was, in fact, the adoption of the feudal 
 system, then almost universal in Europe, with this marked 
 difference, that the fiefs were small in extent and were 
 not, as a rule, hereditary. They were given for life as 
 rewards for military service, and on the death of their 
 holders were granted to other soldiers, though in some cases 
 hereditary claims were recognized. When new territories 
 were acquired by conquest from non -Moslems, large parts 
 of them were divided into new fiefs, and were granted to 
 the soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the war. 
 Military service, whether in the new infantry or in the 
 feudal cavalry, was strictly confined to Moslems. Christians, 
 who were thus exempted from military duty, were subjected 
 to a heavy capitation tax from which Moslems were free. 
 
 This new organization of the army, commenced by 
 Orchan and extended and perfected by his son Murad, 
 who also, it will be seen, created the famous corps of 
 Janissaries, converted the nascent Ottoman State into a 
 most powerful engine for war, and gave an immense 
 
 ' This was not the corps of Janissaries, which, as Mr. Gibbons has shown, 
 was created not by Orchan but by his son Murad.
 
 24 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 impetus to the conquest of non-Moslem countries. Most 
 splendid rewards were held out to the Moslem soldiers for 
 victory and bravery. In the event of victory they benefited 
 not only from the ordinary booty in money and chattels, 
 on the sack of cities and the pillage of country districts. 
 They also received as their share four -fifths of the proceeds 
 of the sale .of captives as slaves, the other fifth being 
 reserved as the share of the Sultan. The captives were 
 not only the enemies' soldiers taken in battle, but in many 
 cases the inhabitants of the conquered districts. The strong 
 and the young of both sexes were carried off and were 
 sold, the men as slaves, the fairer women for wives or 
 concubines, or for harems. The soldiers further received, as 
 has been shown above, a large share of the confiscated lands 
 to be held as military fiefs in reward for bravery in battle. 
 As these fiefs were granted for life only, there was a 
 further distribution among the soldiers of the fiefs held 
 by their comrades who were killed in battle, and often, 
 it is said, the same fiefs changed hands many times in 
 the course of a campaign. 
 
 The Moslem inhabitants of a conquered territory were 
 not sold off as slaves, nor were their lands confiscated. 
 These measures were reserved for Christians or non- 
 Moslems. In some cases the Christians were given the 
 option of embracing Islam in order to avoid slavery and 
 the confiscation of their land. But these exceptions were 
 rare in the conquests in Europe, and it is obvious that, to 
 whatever extent they took place, the rewards obtained by 
 the soldiers were reduced. 
 
 It has been shown that hitherto in the Ottoman conquests 
 in Asia Minor at the expense of the Byzantine ^Empire 
 a great proportion of the Christian population embraced 
 Islam ; and it may well have been that the spread of 
 Islam and the conversion of infidels to the true faith were 
 in part the incentives for the expansion of the Ottoman 
 Empire . But henceforth, after the organization of the army 
 by Orchan and Murad and the great rewards held out 
 to the soldiers for the conquest of non -Moslem territories, 
 it does not appear that the Ottoman armies were inspired 
 by any missionary zeal for the spread of Islam. The main, 
 if not the sole motives, were loot and plunder, the sale of 
 captives as slaves, and the confiscation of land and its 
 distribution among the soldiers as fiefs ; and these objects
 
 ORCHAN 25 
 
 were attained to a far gireater extent by the invasion of 
 Christian States in Europe than by the extension of the 
 Empire over Moslem countries in Asia. 
 
 In the year 1354 Orchan, after completing the organiza- 
 tion of his army, turned his attention for the first time to 
 Europe. Thenceforth, till his death in 1359, his restless 
 ambition was directed against the Byzantine Empire. 
 Advancing age prevented his taking the field himself at 
 the head of his army. But his eldest son, Solyman, who 
 had all the great qualities of his race, and who was the 
 idol of the army, took his place in command of the 
 invading forces. 
 
 It may be well to point out here that, at this time, 
 the middle of the fourteenth century, the Byzantine Empire 
 was already reduced to very insignificant proportions, com- 
 pared to its ancient grandeur. The territories subject to it, 
 which for centuries had extended to the Danube in Europe, 
 and in Asia over Anatolia and Syria, had been already 
 greatly diminished when the leaders of the fourth Crusade, 
 in 1204, in one of the most disgraceful episodes in 
 history, turned aside from their avowed object of attack- 
 ing the Moslems in Palestine and, in lieu thereof, attacked 
 and captured Constantinople, and compelled the Byzantine 
 Emperor to transfer the seat of his government to Nicsea, 
 in Asia Minor. There followed the brief period of the 
 Latin Empire. But in 1261 the Byzantine Greeks re- 
 conquered Constantinople, and the ephemeral Latin Empire 
 disappeared from history. The Byzantines were then able 
 to recover a small part only of their old dominions in 
 Europe and Asia. At the time when Orchan, who had 
 driven them from Asia, decided to attack them in Europe, 
 they held there no more than Thrace with Adrianople, a 
 part of Macedonia with Salonika, and the greater part of 
 the Morca in Greece. To the north of them Serbia, under 
 Stephen Dushan, the most eminent of its rulers, had asserted 
 supremacy over the greater half of the Balkan peninsula, 
 was threatening Salonika, and had ambition to possess him- 
 self of Constantinople. Bulgaria, though it had lost territory 
 to Serbia, still possessed the smaller half of the Balkans. 
 The Republics of Venice and Genoa owned many com- 
 mercial ports and islands in the /Egean Sea and Adriatic, 
 and were madly jealous of one another. The position was 
 such as to afford a favourable opportunity to new invaders
 
 26 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 like the Ottomans, for there was no probability of a com- 
 bination among these Christian communities to resist them. 
 
 The story of the first entry of the Ottomans into Europe, 
 as told by the early Turkish historians and adopted by 
 Von Hammer and others, is shortly this. In the year 
 1356 Solyman, the son of Orchan, at the head of a small 
 body of Ottoman troops, variously estimated at from 
 seventy -five to three hundred, under the inspiration of a 
 dream, stealthily crept, it is said, across the Hellespont in 
 boats, and succeeded in surprising and overcoming the 
 Greek garrison of the small fortress of Tzympe, on the 
 European side of the Straits, and having thus gained posses- 
 sion of it, increased the invading force to three thousand. 
 Mr. Gibbons, on the other hand, has unravelled from the 
 Byzantine historians a much fuller and more reliable story 
 of the successive entries !of Ottoman troops into Europe 
 from 1345 downwards. It may be briefly epitomized as 
 follows, in explanation of the great historic event— the first 
 entry of the Ottomans into Europe — a story which is most 
 discreditable to the Byzantine Greeks : — 
 
 On the death, in 1338, of the Greek Emperor Andro- 
 nicus III, the most feeble and incompetent of the long 
 line of Pala?iologi, his Grand Chancellor, Cantacuzene, was 
 appointed, under his will, guardian of his son, John Palaso- 
 logus, and as co -regent with his widow, the Empress Anna. 
 Cantacuzene, not satisfied with this arrangement, and 
 ambitious to secure supreme power in the Empire, had 
 himself proclaimed Emperor at Nicotika in 1343. This 
 was bitterly resented and opposed by the Empress Anna. 
 Civil war broke out. Both Anna and Cantacuzene appealed 
 to Orchan, their new and powerful neighbour across the 
 Straits, for aid against the other. Cantacuzene oftered 
 his young daughter, Theodora, in marriage to Orchan in 
 return for the aid of six thousand Ottoman troops. Orchan 
 apparently thought this a better oft'er than that of the 
 Empress Anna, whatever that may have been. He was 
 perhaps flattered by the prospect of a family connection 
 with a Byzantine Emperor. He closed with the ofTer and 
 sent six thousand soldiers into Europe, in 1345, in support 
 of Cantacuzene, who made use of them by investing Con- 
 stantinople, of which the Empress had obtained possession . 
 After a year's siege, Cantacuzene efl^ected an entry into 
 the city by the aid of his partisans there, who treacherously,
 
 ORCHAN 27 
 
 opened its gates to him. The Em'piress was thereupon 
 compelled to come to terms. She agreed that Cantacuzene 
 and his wife should be crowned as Emperor and Empress, 
 together with herself and her son. This union was further 
 cemented by the marriage of the young Emperor John, 
 at the age of sixteen, with another daughter of Cantacuzene. 
 Orchan, in pursuance of his agreement with the new 
 Emperor, was married in 1346 at the ripe age of sixty-two 
 to the young Theodora, who was to be allowed to remain 
 a Christian. 
 
 It may be assumed that the six thousand soldiers lent 
 to Cantacuzene returned to Asia. But the loan of them 
 soon became a precedent for other transactions of the 
 same kind. In 1349 the Serbians, under Stephen Dushan, 
 were seriously threatening Salonika, and had ultimate 
 designs on Constantinople itself. Orchan was again 
 appealed to for aid by the two Emperors, his father-in- 
 law and brother-in-law, and at their instance he sent twenty 
 thousand soldiers into Europe for the relief of Salonika. 
 With their aid Cantacuzene was able to defeat the Serbians, 
 and to extinguish for ever their hope of replacing the 
 Byzantine Empire at Constantinople. On this occasion, 
 again, it appears that the Ottoman troops, having efifected 
 their purpose, returned to Asia. But four years later 
 another opportunity befell Orchan of sending troops across 
 the Straits, and this time of efifecting a permanent lodg- 
 ment in Europe. Cantacuzene, not satisfied with being 
 only a co -Emperor with his son-in-law and the Empress 
 Anna, attempted, in 1353, to usurp the supreme power in 
 the State. His son-in-law, John Palasologus, now of full 
 age, strongly opposed this. Civil war again broke out. 
 For a third time Cantacuzene appealed to his son-in-law 
 Orchan for aid. In return for the loan of twenty thousand 
 soldiers he offered to hand over to the Ottomans a fortress 
 on the European side of the Hellespont. Orchan agreed 
 to this. The Ottoman soldiers were sent into Europe, 
 under Solyman, and were employed by Cantacuzene in 
 fighting against his other son-in-law, the co-Emperor John. 
 They were successful in this, and occupied Demotika. 
 Meanwhile the insignificant fortress lof Tzympe was handed 
 over to Orchan and was occupied by Ottoman troops with 
 the full consent of Cantacuzene. 
 
 Shortly after this an earthquake occurred in the
 
 28 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Thracian Chersonese — not an unfrequent event there. It 
 did great damage to many cities, among others to Gallipoli, 
 the most important fortress on the European side of the 
 Hellespont, and at no 'great distance from Tzympe. Its 
 walls and ramparts were in great part tumbled down and 
 destroyed, so that entrance to it was made easy. The 
 Ottoman troops at the neighbouring Tzympe, under Soly- 
 man, when this opportunity was afforded to them of 
 getting possession of such an important fortress, deter- 
 mined to avail themselves of it. The Greek garrison of 
 Gallipoli, under the belief that the earthquake and the 
 tumbling down of the walls indicated the Divine will, made 
 no resistance, and the Ottomans established themselves there 
 without opposition. Cantacuzene complained of this to 
 Orchan as a gross breach of their treaty, and demanded 
 that Gallipoli should be restored to him. He offered also 
 to pay a fair price for Tzympe. Orchan, though willing 
 enough to take money for Tzympe, refused point-blank to 
 give up Gallipoli. " God," he said, " having manifested 
 His will in my favour by causing the ramiparts to fall, 
 my troops have taken possession of the city, penetrated 
 with thanks to Allah." It will be seen that Greeks and 
 Turks took the same view of the Divine intervention, the 
 one to excuse their failure to defend the fortress, the other 
 to justify their seizure of it. 
 
 This action of Orchan roused great indignation at Con- 
 stantinople. Cantacuzene now began to see how grave 
 an error he had committed when inviting the Turks into 
 Europe. Public opinion compelled him to declare war 
 against Orchan. He appealed to the Czars of Serbia and 
 Bulgaria to assist him in driving the Ottomans back to 
 Asia. They flatly refused to do so. The Czar of Bulgaria 
 replied : " Three years ago I remonstrated with you for 
 your unholy alliance with the Turks. Now that the storm 
 has burst, let the Byzantines weather it . If the Turks come 
 against me we shall know how to defend ourselves " — a 
 very unfortunate prediction as events ultimately proved ! 
 The whole course of history might have been altered if 
 these two Balkan States had joined with the Byzantines in 
 preventing this lodgment of the Turks in Europe. Want 
 of union of the Christian Powers was then, as on many 
 other later occasions, mainly responsible for the extension 
 of the Ottoman Empire in that continent.
 
 . ORCHAN 29 
 
 Cantacuzene was soon to reap the just reward for his 
 treachery to his country. So far everything had gone 
 well with him. He had ousted the Palaeologi from the 
 throne, of which, it must be admitted, they were .quite 
 imworthy. He had proclaimed his son Matthew as co- 
 Emperor with himself. But when the full effect of his 
 policy of inviting the Turks into Europe was under- 
 stood there was a revulsion of feeling against him at 
 Constantinople. The Greek Patriarch refused to crown 
 Matthew. A revolution took place in the city. Cantacuzene 
 found himself without friends. He was everywhere accused 
 of having betrayed the Empire to the Turks. He was 
 compelled to abdicate. He became a monk and retired 
 to a monastery in Greece. He spent the remaining thirty 
 years of his life in seclusion there, and in writing a history 
 of his times, which, though very unreliable, tells enough 
 of his own misdeeds to justify the conclusion that, by 
 inviting the Ottomans into Europe, he proved to be a 
 traitor to his country. The Empress Irene, his wife, 
 became a nun. 
 
 John Palaeologus was recalled by the people of Con- 
 stantinople, and, after defeating Matthew, not without 
 difficulty, was established there as sole Emperor. His 
 reign lasted for fifty years, a period full of misfortune 
 for the Empire. He was no more able to compel or 
 induce the Turks to evacuate Europe and return to 
 Asia than his father-in-law. The twenty thousand soldiers 
 who had been invited to Europe by Cantacuzene remained 
 there as enemies of the State they had coime to assist. 
 Under the command of Solyman, they advanced into 
 Thrace and captured Tchorlu, within a few miles of Con- 
 stantinople. Though the occupation of this city and of 
 Demotika M^as only temporary, the Ottomans firmly estab- 
 lished themselves in the southern part of Thrace. The 
 Emperor John was eventually compelled to sign a treaty 
 with Orchan, which recognized these Ottoman conquests 
 in Thrace. Thenceforth the Byzantine Empire became sub- 
 servient to, and almost the vassal of, the Ottoman Sultan. 
 Solyman brought over from Asia many colonies of Turks 
 and settled them in the Thracian Chersonese and other parts 
 of Thrace. 
 
 In 1358 Solyman, who had shown great capacity when 
 in command of the Ottoman ar^riv. iri^t \yUh his death
 
 30 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 by a fall from his horse when engaged in his favourite 
 sport of falconry. His father, Orchan, died in the follow- 
 ing year at the age of seventy-two. He had enormously 
 increased the Ottoman dominions. He had achieved the 
 first great object of his ambition, that of driving the 
 Byzantines from their remaining possessions in Asia. He 
 had rounded off his boundaries in the north-west corner 
 of Anatolia by annexing Mysia. He had invaded Europe 
 and had extended Ottoman rule over a part of Thrace. 
 He had reduced the Byzantine Emperor almost to vassalage. 
 These great results had been achieved not so much by 
 force of arms as a general, for he is not credited with 
 any great victory in the field, or by successful assaults 
 on any great fortresses, as by crafty diplomacy and 
 intrigue, backed up by superior force, and by taking 
 advantage of the feebleness and treachery of the Byzan- 
 tines. He also forged the military weapon by which 
 his son, Murad, was able to effect far greater territorial 
 conquests, both in Europe and Asia.
 
 o
 
 Ill 
 
 MURAD I 
 
 1359-89 
 
 MURAD succeeded his father, Orclian, at the age of forty. 
 He soon proved himself to be eminently qualilied to rule 
 by his untiring activity and vigour, his genius for war, 
 and his wise and sane statesmanship. He was illiterate. 
 He could not even sign his name. There is extant in 
 the archives of the city of Ragusa a treaty with its petty 
 republic, which Murad, in 1363, signed by dipping his 
 hand in ink and impressing it with his finger ,marks. 
 The ' tughra ' thus formed became the official signature 
 of subsequent Sultans of Turkey. Osman and Orchan 
 between them created the Ottoman dynasty and State, 
 but Murad must be credited with having founded the 
 Empire in the sense of imposing Ottoman rule on subject 
 races. 
 
 On Murad's accession his territory, though greatly in- 
 creased by Orchan, was less in extent than some other 
 Turkish Emirates in Anatolia. It consisted of an area 
 on both sides of the Sea of Marmora, two hundred miles 
 in length by about one hundred in depth. It included 
 both shores of the Dardanelles, but only one side of the 
 Bosphorus. Constantinople, on the other side, though 
 nearly hemmed in by the Ottomans, was nominally inde- 
 pendent, and its communications with the Greek province 
 of Thrace were still open. Deducting the area of the 
 Sea of Marmora, the territory under Murad's rule was not 
 of greater area than twenty thousand square miles. Its 
 population probably did not amount to a million in 
 number. It is difficult to tmderstand how Murad from 
 this small territory so enormously increased his Empire 
 in Europe. It may be surmised that large numbers of
 
 32 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Turks from other parts of Anatolia flocked to his standard 
 in search of adventure and booty in Europe. 
 
 The ownership of both sides of the Dardanelles did 
 not, in days before the invention of gunpowder, give com- 
 mand of the Straits, and as Murad was without a navy, 
 the passage of his armies between Asia and Europe was 
 at the mercy of any naval Power. The Genoese, who 
 had important commercial settlements on the shores of 
 the Black Sea and on the Bosphorus at Galata, and who 
 maintained a large naval force in the JEgea.n Sea, might 
 easily have barred the way of the Ottomans to Europe, 
 but they hated the Greeks and were greedy of money, 
 and they could be relied on to convey Murad's armies 
 across the Straits for a full consideration. It will be seen 
 that Murad, during his reign of thirty years, increased 
 by more than fivefold the Ottoman possessions, and at 
 one point brought them up to the Danube. He compelled 
 other States also, including the Greek Empire itself, to 
 accept the position of tributaries to his Empire. His fame 
 in Ottoman history must be regarded as on a level vnth 
 that of Mahomet, the Conqueror of Constantinople, and 
 of Solyman the Magnificent, who raised the Empire to 
 its zenith. 
 
 Murad's great extensions of his Empire may more con- 
 veniently, than in a chronological order, be treated under 
 three distinct heads : — 
 
 I . His conquest of the possessions of the Greek Empire 
 in Thrace and Bulgaria and the reduction of that deca- 
 dent Empire to the humiliating position of vassalage. 
 
 2. His great conquests in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia. 
 
 3. His extensions in Anatolia by the absorption of Turkish 
 Emirates or ]>arts of them. 
 
 I. The Conquests in Thrace. 
 
 The Greek Empire, under John Palasologus V, the most 
 unfortunate and incompetent of men, on the accession of 
 Murad, was in a perilous and decadent condition. We 
 have already shown how small were its remaining posses- 
 sions in Europe. It had no friends on whom it could rely 
 to stem the advance of the Moslems. The old spirit of 
 the early Crusaders in Europe was almost extinct. There 
 was bitter feud between the Latin and Greek Churches.
 
 MURAD I 33 
 
 They hated one another more than they feared the Turks. 
 It was a condition of any assistance of the Latin Christians 
 that the Greeks should come into the fold of the Pope 
 of Rome. The Greeks, on their part, flatly refused this, 
 even for the purpose of saving their Empire from extinc- 
 tion by the Moslem Turks. 
 
 It was under these conditions that Murad, in the first 
 year of his reign, determined to follow up the designs of 
 his father by conquests in Europe. Leaving Brusa, the 
 then capital of his State, he crossed the Dardanelles, and 
 at the head of a great army mlarched into Thrace. His 
 generals, Evrenos and Lalashalin, commanded the two wings 
 of it. Evrenos advanced on the left, recaptured the fortress 
 of Tchorlu, five miles from ConstantinoDle, massacred its 
 garrison, and razed its walls. Lalashalin, on the right, 
 captured Kirk Kilisse, and thus protected the army from 
 a possible landing of the enemy from' the Black vSea. 
 Murad then advanced with the centre of his army, formed 
 a junction with the two wings, and fought a great battle 
 at Eski Baba, in 1363, in which he completely defeated 
 the Byzantine army opposed to him, with the result that 
 Adrianople surrendered without a strufrgle and almost the 
 whole of Thrace fell into Murad's hands. Lalashalin then 
 advanced up the Maritza Valley into Bulgaria and captured 
 Philippopolis, a Bvzantine possession south of the Balkans. 
 
 As a result of this successful invasion the Greek Emneror 
 found himself compelled to enter into a treaty with Murad, 
 by which he bound himself to refrain from anv attempt 
 to recover what he had lost in Thrace, to abstain from 
 giving aid to the Serbians and Bulgarians in resisting a 
 further advance of the Ottomans in Europe, and to support 
 Murad against his Anatolian enemies, the Turkish Emirs. 
 Murr>d thereupon returned to Brusa to cop^itate over new 
 enterprises and to organize his forces. He was soon re- 
 called to Europe by most serious events. The Christian 
 Powers had shown no disposition to help the Greeks against 
 the Ottoman invasion, while their possessions in Asia and 
 Europe were being invaded, but the advance into Bulsfaria 
 se^ms to have caused alarm to them. Pope Urban V 
 stirred up T ouis, the King of Hungarv, and the Princes 
 of Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia to resist. Thov combined 
 together :^nd sent an armv of twentv thousand men into 
 Thrace, with' the avowed object of driving the Turks 
 
 ... 3
 
 34 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 out of Europe. Murad hastened to confront them, but 
 before he could arrive on the scene of action his general, 
 Lalashalin, led an army against the allies. The two armies 
 met on the River Maritza, not far from Adrianople, in 
 1363. Ilbeki, in command of the Ottomans, made a sudden 
 night attack, when the Christian troops were heavy with 
 sleep after a festive revel. A stampede took place. The 
 Turkish historian says of the allied army : " They were 
 caught even as wild beasts in their lair. They were driven 
 as flames are driven before the wind, till, plunging into the 
 Maritza, they perished in its waters." 
 
 The Christian army was practically exterminated. The 
 King of Hungary escaped by a miracle. It was the first 
 conflict of the Ottomans with the Hungarians, who were 
 destined to bar the way into Europe for a hundred and 
 fifty years. As a result of this battle all the country south 
 of the Balkan Mountains was incorporated in the Ottoman 
 Empire. Ilbeki, who devised the night attack, and so 
 successfully carried it out, was made away with by poison, 
 at the instance of Lalashalin, who was madly jealous of 
 his great victory. 
 
 The battle of the Maritza was a crushing blow to the 
 Christians. One result of it was that Murad decided in 
 favour of a scheme of conquest in Europe rather than 
 in Asia. In this view he transferred the seat of his govern- 
 ment from Brusa to Thrace, and made Demotika the capital 
 of his Empire. Three years later he transferred it to 
 Adrianople, which for ninety years, till after the capture 
 of Constantinople, held this position, and from thence he 
 organized his great invasion of the Balkan States. Another 
 result was that the Greek Emperor, John Palaeologus V, was 
 forced into a further step towards subjection to the 
 Ottomans. He agreed to become a tribVitary to the Sultan 
 and to send a contingent to the Ottoman army in 
 future wars . 
 
 After a time the Emperor fretted under this position of 
 vassalage, and in 1369 he went on a mission to Rome, in 
 the hope of inducing the Pope to stir up the Christian 
 Powers of Europe to another crusade against the Ottomans. 
 He left his eldest son, Andronicus, in charge of the govern- 
 ment at Constantinople during his absence. Arriving at 
 Rome, he submitted to the most humiliating conditions with 
 the object of gaining the support of the Pope Urban V. He
 
 MURAD I 35 
 
 abjured at St. Peter's, before the High Altar, the prin- 
 ciples of the Greek Church, so far as they differed from 
 those of Rome. He admitted the ecclesiastical supremacy 
 of the Pope. He was then permitted to bend his knee, 
 and to kiss the Pope's feet and hands. He was privileged 
 also to lead the Pope's mule by the bridle. He obtained, 
 however, no return for these abject humiliations. The 
 Pope was unable to induce the Christian Powers again to 
 take up arms against the Ottomans. 
 
 The Emperor's concessions to the Pope were also dis- 
 avowed by the Hierarchs of the Greek Church at Con- 
 stantinople. There never was any prospect of a reunion 
 of the two Churches. The Emperor, John Palaeologus, 
 embarked on his homeward journey having" nothing to show 
 for his pains. On his way back, when passing through 
 Venice, he was arrested, at the instance of his Venetian 
 creditors, who had lent him money to defray the cost of 
 his mission. Not having the means to pay, he could not 
 discharge the legal process. Andronicus had no wish that 
 his father should ever return to Constantinople. He made 
 no efil'ort to raise money for the release of the Em'peror. 
 He pleaded the poverty of the Treasury. A younger son, 
 Manuel, however, with more filial piety, raised the neces- 
 sary sum, by selling all his property, and obtained the 
 release of his father. Shortly after his return to Con- 
 stantinople the Emperor, as was to be expected, deprived 
 Andronicus of all his appointments, and replaced him 
 by Manuel, whom he also made co -Emperor with 
 himself. 
 
 The son of Andronicus, of the same name, furious at 
 this treatment of his father, entered into a mad conspiracy 
 with Saoudji, the youngest son of Sultan Murad, with the 
 object of dethroning both Emperor and Sultan and reigning 
 in their place. Saoudji, being in command of the Sultan's 
 army in Europe, during the absence of Murad in Asia, was 
 able to tamper with the loyalty of the Ottoman troops. 
 He assembled a considerable force in the neighbour- 
 hood of Constantinople, where he was joined by a 
 large number of the sons of Greek nobles and by many 
 soldiers. 
 
 Murad, when he heard, at Brusa, of this mad outbreak, 
 returned with all haste to Europe, and organized resistance 
 to it, in concert with the Greek Emperor. They agreed
 
 36 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 that the two rebels, when captured, should be deprived 
 of their eyesight. Murad thereupon, taking what soldiers 
 he could get together, marched to meet Saoudji's army. 
 When within hearing of it, he called out to the soldiers 
 by night, urging them to return to their duty and promising 
 pardon to them. The soldiers, hearing the voice of the 
 Sultan, who had so often led them to victory, repented 
 of their treachery and deserted the cause which they had 
 so foolishly taken up. Saoudji and Andronicus and the 
 band of Greek nobles, thus deserted by the rank and file 
 of the army, took refuge in the fortress of Demotika. 
 Murad had no difficulty in capturing this place, and Avith 
 it the two rebel princes and the Greek nobles. In 
 pursuance of his agreement with the Emperor, he then 
 deprived his own son of his eyesight and, going beyond 
 his promise, had the young man executed. He caused 
 the Greek nobles to be bound, two and three together, 
 and thrown into the Maritza, while he stood on the bank 
 and revelled in the sight of their drowning struggles. In 
 some .cases he insisted on parents themselves putting 
 their sons to death in his presence. When they refused, 
 the parents were drowned in the river together with their 
 sons. In this instance Murad showed that he had iin him 
 the vein of cruelty which was conspicuous, more or less, 
 in all the descendants of Othman. Andronicus was handed 
 over to the Greek Emperor, who partially, but not com- 
 pletely, carried out his promise of depriving his grandson 
 of eyesight. 
 
 As a result of these events, the Emperor John 
 Palagologus found himself compelled to enter into another 
 treaty with Murad, by which, in order " that he might 
 enjoy up to the end of his life in peace his last posses- 
 sion," he recognized himself as vassal of the vSultan, 
 promised to do military service in the Ottoman army, 
 and gave his son Manuel in charge of Murad as a hostage. 
 
 2. The Conquests in Macedonia, Bulgaria, and 
 
 Serbia. 
 
 The conquest of Thrace by the Ottomans and the defeat 
 of the allied Christians at the Maritza were as great blows 
 to the Bulgarians as to the Greek Empire, though they 
 had given no assistance to the allies. The occupation of
 
 MURAD I ^il, 
 
 Adrianople and Philippopolis opened the way to a further 
 advance into Bulgaria and Macedonia. It was not, how- 
 ever, till 1366 that Murad availed himself of this advantage, 
 and commenced the series of attacks which ultimately made 
 him master of Macedonia and of a great part of Bulgaria 
 and Serbia. The position of affairs in the peninsula at this 
 time was very favourable to him. The Bulgarians, Serbians, 
 Bosnians, and Greeks were madly jealous of one another ; 
 each of them preferred the extension of the Ottoman jule 
 to that of their rivals. Bulgaria alone, if united, might 
 have successfully resisted Murad. But in 1365 its Czar, 
 Alexander, died, and his kingdom was divided between 
 his three sons. Sisman, the elder, got the largest share. 
 The other two gave no assistance to their brother 
 when the Ottomans invaded his country. Between 1366 
 and 1369, Murad advanced into Bulgaria, and took posses- 
 sion of the Maritza Valley, as far as the Rhodope Mountains. 
 In 1 37 1 Lalashalin encountered an army of Bulgarians 
 and Serbians at Samakof, not far from the city of Sofia, 
 and completely defeated it, with the result that Bulgaria, 
 up to the Balkan range, was annexed to the Ottoman 
 Empire. It remained so for over five hundred years, till 
 its release in our own times. 
 
 After this great victory at Samakof, Lalashalin was 
 instructed by Murad not to pursue his conquest of Bulgaria 
 north of the Balkan range, but to proceed westward, and, in 
 concert with Evrenos, to invade Macedonia as far as the 
 River Vardar. This occupied the two generals in the years 
 1 37 I -2. Kavalla, Druma, and Serres fell into their hands. 
 In 1372 they crossed the Vardar River and penetrated 
 into Old Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia. The main part 
 of Serbia, however, remained in the hands of Lazar, 
 its prince. But he was compelled to acknowledge the 
 suzerainty of the Sultan. xA.s regards the part of Bulgaria 
 not annexed, its prince, Sisman, was allowed to retain his 
 independence. His daughter entered the harem of Murad, 
 with the understanding that she was not to be compelled 
 to adopt the Moslem religion. It was not till 1381 that 
 a further advance was made by Murad. He then sent his 
 armies across the Vardar River and captured Monastir. He 
 also took possession of Sofia, and in 13S6 of Nisch, after a 
 fierce struggle with the Serbians.
 
 ^B THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 3. MuRAD's Acquisitions in Asia Minor. 
 
 Between the years 1376 and 1380 Murad found himself 
 able to turn his attention in the direction of Asia Minor. 
 In the tirst of these years he induced the Emir of Kermia, 
 doubtless by threats of war, to give a daughter in marriage 
 to Bayezid, his eldest son. She brought with her as dowry 
 a considerable part of Kermia and the fortress of Kutayia, 
 a position of great strategic importance. In 1377 he 
 followed this up by inducing the Emir of Hamid to sell 
 a great portion of his Emirate lying between Tekke, Kermia, 
 and Karamania, including the district of Ak-Sheir. The 
 effect of this acquisition was to make his frontier conter- 
 minous with that of Karamania. Again, in 1378, he 
 declared war against the Emir of Tekke, and annexed 
 a part of his territory, leaving to him Adalia. 
 
 Murad made no further effort to extend his dominion in 
 Asia tiU 1387, when he led a large army against Alaeddin, 
 the Emir of Karamania. For this purjx)se he called upon 
 the Greek Emperor and the Princes of Serbia and Bulgaria 
 as vassals of the Empire to send their contingents. His 
 two sons, Bayezid and Yacoub, commanded the v^^ings of 
 this army. With a view to conciliate the peasantry of 
 the district he passed through, and to ensure full supplies 
 of food to his army, he gave strict orders that there 
 was to be no pillage, and that the lives and property of 
 the country people were to be respected. Among his troops 
 were two thousand Serbians, whom the Prince of .Serbia 
 was bound by his recent treaty to supply. These men 
 refused to obey Murad's order, and committed atrocious 
 depredations on the route of the army. Murad inflicted 
 severe punishment on them, and directed many of them 
 to be put to death as a warning to the others. The army 
 then marched to meet the Karamanians. A battle again 
 took place on the plain of Angora. Bayezid especially 
 distinguished himself by the fierceness of his cavalry 
 charges and earned for himself the sobriquet of ' the 
 Thunderbolt.' 
 
 There are different versions as to the issue of this battle. 
 Some historians describe it as a great victory for Murad, 
 and claim that he treated the vanquished Emir of Kara- 
 mania vvith great generosity, insisting only on a token of 
 submission. Murad, however, was not in the habit of
 
 MURAD I 39 
 
 neglecting to take full advantage lOf any successes of his 
 armies. It is very certain that, in this case, he did not 
 succeed in extending his Empire. Karamania retained its 
 independence for many years to come, and did not even 
 submit to a nominal vassalage. It seems more probable, 
 therefore, that this battle was indecisive, and that Murad 
 withdrew, without having effected his purpose. 
 
 Murad, who was now near the age of seventy, would 
 have been glad to end his life in repose, but he was 
 recalled to Europe by an outbreak of the Serbians. It 
 appeared that the Serbian soldiers, on their return to their 
 homes, after the campaign against the Karamanians, told 
 the story of the execution of their comrades by order of 
 Murad. It caused universal indignation among the 
 Serbians. They could not understand a war conducted 
 without the levy of booty from the enemy's country. 
 The whole of Serbia rose in rebellion. An alliance iwas 
 formed with Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Albania. Assistance 
 was obtained from Hungary and Wallachia. Murad again 
 took the field in command of an Ottoman army, and, 
 crossing the Balkans, captured Schumla and Tirnova, and 
 then marched towards the Danube. Sisman, the King of 
 Bulgaria, shut himself up in Nicopolis, on the Danube, 
 but was soon compelled to come to term's. He lagreed 
 to give up Silistria to the Turks, and to pay a tribute in 
 the future. 
 
 Lazar, the King of Serbia, in spite of this defection, 
 continued the struggle against the Ottomans, and Sisman 
 himself broke the treaty almost before the ink was dry. 
 He refused to give up Silistria, and sent a contingent in 
 aid of the Serbians. Murad sent part .of his army, under 
 Ali Pasha, against Sisman, who was again shut up in 
 Nicopolis. This fortress was captured. Murad was again 
 generous in sparing Sisman 's life, but this time he de- 
 prived the southern part of Bulgaria of its autonomy, and 
 insisted on its being completely incorporated in the 
 Turkish Empire. 
 
 Lazar, the King of Serbia, continued the war. Murad, 
 in spite of his seventy years, led his army, supported, 
 as in Asia Minor, by his two sons. The decisive battle 
 took place on the plain of Kossova, at the point of junction 
 between Serbia and Bulgaria. It was fiercely contested. 
 At a critical point of it a Serbian noble, Milosch Kobilo-
 
 40 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 witch, who on the previous day had been falsely charged 
 in the Serbian camp with disaffection and treason, gave 
 signal proof of his patriotism by riding boldly into the 
 Turkish lines, as though he was a deserter, and claiming 
 that he had a most important message to deliver to the 
 Sultan. He was allowed to approach Murad, and, while 
 kneeling before him, plunged a dagger into his heart, 
 causing a mortal wound. Milosch then made a desperate 
 rush to escape, but in vain. He was captured and brought 
 to the Sultan's tent. Meanwhile Murad, in spite of his 
 approaching death, was able to give orders for the charge of 
 his reserves, which decided the battle in favour of the 
 Ottomans. The Serbians and their allies were completely 
 defeated and routed. Lazar was taken prisoner and was 
 brought to the Sultan's tent. Murad lived long enough 
 to direct the execution in his presence of Lazar and 
 Milosch. He then expired. 
 
 To complete the tragedy of the day, Bayezid, on hearing 
 of the death of his father, and his own consequent acces- 
 sion to the throne, gave immediate orders for the murder 
 of his brother Yacoub, who had been his valiant com- 
 panion in arms in so many battles. This was effected in 
 the presence of the dead body of the father. The brutal 
 deed was justified by a verse from the Koran, " Rebellion 
 is worse than execution." It was assumed by Bayezid 
 that his brother would claim the throne against him. This 
 was the first recorded case of fratricide in the Othman 
 royal race. Thenceforth it became the settled practice for 
 a Sultan of Turkey, on his accession to the throne, imme- 
 diately to put to death his brothers and other collaterals, lest 
 they should dispute the succession with him. By the law 
 of succession the eldest living male of the reigning family, 
 and not the eldest son of a defunct Sultan, was entitled 
 to the throne. This supplied an additional motive for 
 the practice of fratricide, for the new Sultan, by murdering 
 his brothers and uncles, ensured the succession, after his 
 own death, to his eldest son free from competition. In 
 later times, however, when public opinion would no longer 
 justify fratricide, and when the law of succession of the 
 oldest male in the family was more fuUy recognized, the 
 Sultan, on his accession to the throne, directed the close 
 confinement of his next heir, generally his brother. It 
 followed from this practice that the heir to the throne,
 
 MURAD 1 41; 
 
 instead of being employed on State affairs, or as a general, - 
 and gaining experience, was treated as a prisoner, and was 
 forbidden to take any part in public affairs. It will be 
 seen that this practice of forced seclusion of the heir to the 
 throne during the lifetime of the reigning Sultan was one 
 of the main causes of the degeneracy of the Othman 
 dynasty. 
 
 Reverting to Murad, it has been shown how important 
 an epoch his reign was in the growth of the Ottoman 
 Empire. During the twenty-four years of war, in which 
 he led his armies in the field, he never met with 
 a reverse. He extended the Empire for the first time 
 into vast territories inhabited not by Turks or iby 
 Byzantines, but by sturdy Christian races, such as the Bul- 
 garians, Serbians, and Bosnians. For the first time also 
 the Turks came into conflict with the Hungarians, and 
 defeated them. The influence of the Empire was extended 
 practically to the Danube. Some of the intervening terri- 
 tory was not treated as conquered country and added 
 to the Elmpire, but was allowed to retain the position 
 of tributary or vassal States, as in the case of Serbia. 
 Other parts, such as Thrace, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, 
 were fully incorporated in the dominion of the Sultan. 
 
 Murad, when not engaged in war, devoted himself to 
 perfecting the organization of his army on the lines laid 
 down by his father, Orchan. He also created a new 
 standing corps of soldiers, recruited from the Christian 
 population of the provinces conquered in Europe. This 
 was the renowned corps of Janissaries — the new army. Von 
 Hammer and other historians following him, and more 
 recently Sir Edwin Pears, give very full details as to the 
 constitution of this corps and the motives of its founder. 
 They state that one thousand lads, between the ages of ten 
 and twelve, were in every year conscripted from amongst the 
 children of Christian parents. The most physically strong 
 and intelligent of them were taken. They were forcibly 
 converted to Islam, and were trained with great care for 
 military careers under the immediate direction of the Sultan. 
 After six years of training they were drafted into a special 
 corps, which reached, after a few years, a maximum of 
 twelve thousand men. The discipline of this corps was very 
 severe. It formed the most efficient and reliable body 
 in the Ottoman army. The men looked on their regiment
 
 42 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 as their home. Their lives were devoted to it. They 
 were not allowed to own property. What they acquired 
 belonged to the regiment. They were not, till a later 
 period in the history of the Empire, allowed to marry. 
 They formed the backbone of the Ottoman armies in war ; 
 and in many a hard -fought battle, when disaster and defeat 
 were imminent, they saved the army by their intrepid and 
 persistent stand against the enemy. The object which 
 Murad aimed at is said to have been not merely the 
 strengthening of his army by a standing force of this 
 kind, but that it should, by its personal devotion to the 
 Sultan, act as a check on his other turbulent forces. • 
 
 Sir Edwin Pears says of this force : — 
 
 Take a number of children from the most intelligent portion of the 
 commimity .; choose them for their strength and intelligence ; instruct them 
 carefully in the art of fighting" ; bring them up under strict military 
 disciphnc ; teach them to forget their childhood, their parents, and 
 friends ; saturate them with the knowledge that all their hope in life 
 depends upon their position in the regiment ; make peace irksome and 
 war a dehght, with the hope of promotion and relaxation from the 
 hardship and restraints of the barracks ; the result will be a weapon in 
 the hands of a leader such as the world has rarely seen. Such a weapon 
 was the army of the Janissaries." 
 
 The levy of children was regarded by the Christians as 
 a blood tax of a terrible kind. The corps thus formed 
 was a most valuable instrument in the hands of Sultans who 
 were strong enough to control it. But later, in the times 
 of degenerate Sultans, it became a kind of Praetorian 
 Guard. It dictated the deposition of Sultans and the 
 nomination of their successors. It often insisted on a 
 
 ' Mr. Gibbons in his account of the origin of this corps disputes 
 the figures as reported above from previous writers, and also the alleged 
 motives for its constitution. After careful consideration of the question, 
 I have preferred to adhere to the version given by Sir Edwin Pears, who 
 has investigated the subject with great care in the early Greek and 
 Turkish histories. I have, however, followed Mr. Gibbons in one point, 
 namely, in attributing the constitution of the force to Murad I rather 
 than to Orchan. Mr. Gibbons's account of the corps of Janissaries is to 
 be found on pp. 118-20 of the Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, and 
 that of Sir Edwin Pears in his work on the Destruction of the Greek 
 Empire, pp. 223-30. - Pears, p. 22b.
 
 MURAD I '43 
 
 policy of war. In 1648, under Mahomet IV', the restric- 
 tion of the force to Christian children was removed, and 
 the sons of Janissaries and other Moslems were admitted. 
 Later the levy of Christian children was abandoned, and 
 none but sons of Moslems were admitted to the corps. 
 After the time of Solyman its numbers were greatly in- 
 creased. It became a danger to the State, It will be 
 seen that in 1826 Mahmoud II took vengeance on it for 
 the humiliations he and previous Sultans had undergone, 
 and extinguished it in ruthless scenes of blood. 
 
 There cannot be a doubt, however, that Murad, by 
 creating this corps of Janissaries and recruiting it from' 
 the Christian population in Europe, forged a weapon which' 
 for two hundred years to come played a dominant part 
 in the aggrandizement of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 Knolles^ in his graphic history of the Turkish Empire, 
 sums up the character of Murad in the following sentences, 
 which could not be improved upon : — 
 
 Murad was more zealous than any other of the Turkish kings ; a man of 
 great courage and in all his attempts fortunate; he made greater slaughter 
 of his enemies than both his father and grandfather ; his kingdom in 
 Asia he greatly enlarged by the sword, marriage, and purchase ; and using 
 the discord and cowardice of the Grecian princes to his profit, subdued a 
 great part of Thracia, with the territories adjoining thereto, leaving unto 
 the Emperor of Constantinople little or nothing more in Thracia than the 
 imperial city itself, with the bare name of an emperor almost without an 
 empire ; he won a great part of Bulgaria and entered into Serbia, Bosnia, 
 and Macedonia ; he was liberal and withal severe ; of his subjects both 
 beloved and feared ; a man of very few words, and one that could 
 dissemble deeply.' 
 
 ' Knolles, i. p. 139.
 
 IV 
 
 BAYEZID I 
 
 1389-1403 
 
 Bayezid succeeded his father, Murad, at the age of thirty- 
 four. He reigned as Sultan for only fourteen years, the 
 last of which was spent in captivity. No one of the Othman 
 race passed through such vicissitudes, with such a brilliant 
 career of victory during nearly the whole of his reign, but 
 ending with overwhelming and crushing defeat. He had 
 all the courage and military capacity of his three predeces- 
 sors. He excelled them greatly in cruelty and brutality. 
 In his private life he descended to depths of sensuality, 
 and unmentionable and degrading vice which were unknown 
 to them. 
 
 Early in his reign he adopted a much bolder attitude 
 toward the Christian Powers of Europe than Murad had 
 thought prudent. To a deputation from Italy asking for a 
 renewal of commercial privileges, he replied that when he 
 had conquered Hungary he intended to ride to Rome, and 
 there give feed to his horse with oats on the altar of St. 
 Peter's. His treatment of his Christian subjects was much 
 harsher than that of his predecessors. 
 
 Bayezid followed up his father's great victory at Kossova 
 over the Serbians, and compelled Stephen, the successor 
 of Lazar, to sue for peace. The terms of the treaty then 
 agreed to were very moderate. Instead of being incor- 
 porated in the Ottoman Empire as Bulgaria had been, 
 Serbia was to be an autonomous State, under vassalage 
 to the Ottoman Empire, paying tribute in money, and 
 bound to provide and maintain a contingent of five thousand 
 soldiers at the disposal of the Sultan. Stephen, its prince, 
 also gave his sister, Despina, to the Sultan as an additional 
 wife. He most loyally carried out his promises to Bayezid.
 
 BAYEZID I 45 
 
 In the great battles of Nicopolis against the Hungarians and 
 the crusaders from Western Europe, and of Angora against 
 Timur, the Serbian contingent fought with the utmost 
 bravery, and there were no more loyal soldiers in the 
 Ottoman ranks. 
 
 Having come to terms with Serbia, Bayezid marched 
 southwards with his army, and took up a menacing position 
 near to Constantinople, where the aged and feeble John 
 Palasologus still reigned, supported by his son Manuel as 
 CO -Emperor. By threatening to promote the cause of 
 Andronicus, whose eyesight had not been quite extinguished, 
 after his mad rebelUon against the Emperor, the Sultan 
 compelled the two Emperors to sign a treaty, under which 
 the remnant of the Greek Empire became an abject vassal 
 State to that of the Ottomans. The Emperors promised 
 to pay an annual tribute of thirty thousand pieces of gold 
 and to supply a contingent of twelve thousand men to the 
 Ottoman army to be at the disposal of the Sultan for 
 any purpose he might design. They also undertook to sur- 
 render to the Ottomans the stronghold of Philadelphia, 
 the only remaining possession of the Byzantine Empire in 
 Asia Minor. When the officer in command of that city 
 refused to surrender it, Bayezid insisted on the Greek 
 Emperor employing his contingent in capturing his own city, 
 and on his leading the assault on it, v*dth the aid of his 
 son Manuel, for the purpose of handing it over to himself, 
 their nominal ally, but crafty and designing foe. It would 
 be difficult to imagine a lower depth of humiliation and 
 cowardice than that to which the Emperor and his son 
 thus descended. These public humiliations were aggra- 
 vated by a domestic one. Bayezid, having captured at 
 sea a vessel bringing a foreign princess as a bride for 
 Manuel, took a great fancy for the lady, and insisted on 
 her entering his own harem. 
 
 Bayezid next turned his attention to Asia Minor, where 
 he was mainly ambitious to add to his Empire. His 
 first effort there was directed against Aidin. After defeat- 
 ing its Emir and annexing the State, he dealt in the same 
 way with the Emirs of Sarukhan and Mentsche. He 
 then made an attack on the city of Smyrna, at that time 
 in possession of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. 
 The Knights made a vigorous resistance, and Bayezid, not 
 having command of the sea, was compelled, after six weeks,
 
 ;46 THE TURKISH PZMPIRE 
 
 to withdraw from the siege. He next, in 1391, attacked 
 the Emir of Tekke, and took from him what had been 
 left under his rule by Murad, including the important city 
 of Adalia. The Ottoman frontier was now conterminous 
 with that of Karamania, whose Emir, Alaeddin, was brother- 
 in-law to the Sultan. This family connection was no pro- 
 tection to him. Bayezid invaded and laid siege to Konia. 
 He withdrew on Alaeddin agreeing to give up a slice of 
 his Emirate, including the city of Ak-Sheir. 
 
 Having achieved these annexations, for which there was 
 no justification other than mere greed for the extension of his 
 Empire, Bayezid returned to Adrianople, leaving his general, 
 Timurtash, in command of the conquered provinces. The 
 Greek Emperor John, meanwhile, had been engaged 
 in putting his capital into a state of defence, and for 
 this purpose had demolished three of the most beautiful 
 churches of Constantinople, intending to use their masonry 
 for the erection of new forts. The Sultan, when he heard 
 of this, sent word to the Emperors ordering them to desist 
 from any such work, and threatening to deprive Manuel 
 of his eyesight. The Emperor had no alternative but to 
 obey. But this humiliation was the last he had to endure. 
 He died very shortly afterwards, under the weight of his 
 cares and anxieties, as some historians say, but according 
 to others of gout and debauchery. His son, Manuel, who 
 was detained at the Court of the Sultan, acting as a kind 
 of Groom of the Chamber, on hearing of his father's 
 death, secretly fled and reached Constantinople, where lie 
 was installed as the successor to his father. Bayezid by 
 way of reprisal for this directed a blockade by land of 
 Constantinople. There commenced what was virtually a 
 siege by land of the city, which lasted for seven years, till 
 the invasion of Asia Minor by Timur caused a diversion and 
 brought it to an end. 
 
 Leaving a part of his forces to conduct this blockade, 
 and with instructions to harass the Greek garrison by day 
 and night, Bayezid, with the larger part of his army, 
 marched through Bulgaria, and compelled the Prince of 
 Wallachia to submit as a vassal of the Ottoman TLmpire. 
 A part of his armv then penetrated into Syrmia and engaged 
 in war with the Hungarians. It was defeated and driven 
 back, and Sigismund, the Hungarian King, was able to 
 make a counter-attack, and to capture the important strong-
 
 BAYEZID I 47 
 
 hold of Nicopolis. He, in turn, was forced to abandon 
 the city, mainly by the assistance given to Bayezid by 
 the Wallachians . It was during his retreat through the 
 Duchy of Hunyadi that Sigismund met and became 
 enamoured with Elizabeth Moronay. The offspring of this 
 liaison was the celebrated Hungarian hero Hunyadi the 
 Great, who later took such an active part against the 
 Turks. 
 
 In 1393, Bayezid sent an army, under command of his 
 eldest son, Solyman, to invade the northern part of Bulgaria, 
 which still enjoyed an autonomous existence. Tirnova, 
 its capital, was taken by storm' after a siege of three 
 weeks. Its inhabitants were sent into Asia Minor as slaves. 
 He then decided to incorporate the northern part of 
 Bulgaria in the Ottoman Empire in the same manner as 
 the southern part had already been treated. This com- 
 pleted the servitude of the Bulgarian people. Sisman, their 
 prince, disappeared from the scene, and the ruling family 
 became extinct. The land was confiscated, except in a 
 few cases where the owners were allowed to become 
 Moslems. It was parcelled out to Turks under a feudal 
 system involving military service, while the cultivators of 
 the soil were reduced to serfdom. 
 
 About this time the fortresses of Nicopolis, Widdin, and 
 Silistria fell into the hands of the Ottomans and opened 
 the way into Hungary. Bayezid commenced a system' of 
 raids into that country, not for the purpose, at that time, 
 of acquiring its territory, but for plunder. His Turkish 
 ' akin j is,' or irregulars, spread terror over wide districts, 
 burning and destroying villages and carrying off their 
 inhabitants for sale as slaves. He fitted out ships also 
 with the same object in the newly acquired ports in Asia 
 Minor, and ravaged the islands of Chios and Negropont 
 and districts on the coast of Greece. 
 
 Bayezid was now compelled by an outbreak in his recent 
 acquisitions in Asia Minor, fomented by the Emir of 
 Karamania, to suspend operations on his northern frontier 
 in Europe and to transfer his army to Asia. He received 
 at Brusa an envoy from his brother-in-law, Alaeddin of 
 Karamania, suing for peace . Bayezid replied that the sword 
 alone could determine the issue between them. He sent 
 an army at once, under Timurtash, against the Kara- 
 manians. It encountered Alaeddin on the plain of Ak-Tchai.
 
 '48 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 The Turkish army was com'pletely successful. Alaeddin 
 and his two sons were captured, and without waiting- for 
 authority from Bayezid, Timurtash had them hanged. 
 When Bayezid heard of this treatment of his brother-in- 
 law, he affected to be greatly distressed and incensed, 
 but he soon consoled himself by a text from the Koran, 
 " The death of a prince is less regrettable than the loss 
 of a province," and he gave practical applicaiion of the 
 verse by orders to his army to occupy and annex the 
 whole of Karamania. There was no resistance. Konia 
 and other cities in the eastern part of the State were 
 taken. In spite of this, however, Karamania was not at this 
 time finally incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. After 
 the invasion of Asia Minor bv Timur it recovered its 
 independence, and it was not till seventy years later that 
 it was finally subjected and incorporated. 
 
 About the same time, 1393-4, Bayezid made further 
 important conquests in Asia Minor — namely, Samsun, 
 C^sarea, and Sivas, the last of the most important 
 fortresses on the frontier of Armenia. These g'reat 
 successes both in Europe and Asia, were followed by a 
 period of repose, during which Bavezid gave himself up 
 to a life of gross debauchery. He was recalled from' 
 this by threats of war on the part of Sigismund, King 
 of Hungary, and he soon showed that he had lost none 
 of his vigour and dash. 
 
 Sigismund had fretted under the constant raids on his 
 kingdom, above referred to, and had for some time past 
 been contemplating war against the Ottomans for the 
 recovery of the fortresses on the Danube, which were so 
 great a menace to him. For this ourpose he appealed, 
 in 1395, to the Christian Powers of Eurooe for assistance. 
 He was baeked up by Pope Boniface IX, who preached 
 another crusade against the infidels. Through the efforts 
 of the King of France, Charles VI, a large number of 
 leading nobles of France were induced to band together, 
 "under the Comte de Nevers, son of the Duke of Burgundy, 
 a young man of twentv-two years, without any militarv 
 experience. A thousand horsemen, chevaliers of good birth' 
 and position, and six thousand attendants and mercenaries 
 were enrolled in France for this adventure. Others came 
 frotn England and Scotland, and from Flanders, Lombardy, 
 and Savoy. On their march through Germany to Hungary
 
 BAYEZID I 49 
 
 they were joined by great numbers of German knights, 
 under Count Frederick of Hohenzollern, the Grand Prior 
 of the Teutonic Order, and by a large force of Bavarians, 
 under the Elector Palatine. Later they were reinforced 
 by a number of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, under 
 the command of de Naillac, their Grand Master. When 
 joined by the Himgarian army, under Sigismund, and by 
 the contingents from Wallachia and Bosnia, they made up a 
 total force of about sixty thousand men. The expedition 
 was in the nature of a crusade, but was more secular 
 than religious in its aims and methods, and was regarded, 
 it seems, by most of those engaged in it rather as a kind of 
 picnic than as a serious campaign. The composite force 
 collected together at Buda, in Hungary, in the summer of 
 1396, and thence marched down the Danube to Nico- 
 polis, capturing Widdin and Sistova on the way. When 
 passing through Serbia they ravaged wide districts inhabited 
 by innocent Christians, and emulated, if they did not exceed, 
 the Ottomans in cruel devastation, as though they were in 
 an enemy's country. They established their camp before 
 Nicopolis in September, but for sixteen days they refrained 
 from assaulting the fortress, which was bravely defended 
 by an Ottoman garrison, thus giving time to Bayezid to 
 collect his army and to advance against the allied forces. 
 
 The Christian camp was the scene of riotous living 
 and gambling. Large numbers of courtesans had accom- 
 panied the crusaders. The whole army was in a state of 
 indiscipline and disorder. The French knights were 
 boastful. They spoke with contempt of the Turkish troops, 
 and could not believe that there was any danger from 
 them. Bayezid, whose army was full of confidence in 
 its superiority, was allowed to approach within striking- 
 distance, without any attempt to harass his advance. Even 
 then the Christians did not believe there was danger. 
 The Turks suddenly came into contact with them. The 
 knights were compelled to abandon their gaming tables 
 and their women, and to face the enemy whom they had 
 so much despised. 
 
 The Ottoman army was preceded by large numbers of 
 scouts and irregulars. The leaders of the chevaliers, 
 knowing nothing of the numbers of the Ottomans or of 
 their methods in war, and utterly despising them, most 
 rashly proposed an immediate attack by the whole force 
 
 .4
 
 50 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of their splendid cavalry. The King of Hungary, who 
 had had experience of the Ottomans and who knew their 
 method of masking the main body of their army by 
 irregulars, was more cautious, and advised that the foot 
 soldiers of Hungary and Wallachia should be first employed 
 to meet the attack of the Turkish irregulars, and that 
 the cavalry should be reserved to meet the main body 
 of the Ottomans. The chevaliers were furious at this 
 suggestion. They suspected Sigismund of playing for his 
 own hand, and of wishing to rob them of the glory of a 
 great victory. They insisted on an immediate attack. 
 Sigismund, on hearing of this decision, said, " We shall 
 lose the day through the great pride and folly of these 
 French." And so it turned out. 
 
 The chevaliers advanced in splendid array and had no 
 difficulty in dispersing and slaughtering the mob of 
 Turkish irregulars. But this impetuous charge spent 
 their energy and tired their horses. When they were 
 confronted by the main body of the Ottomans, sixty, 
 thousand in number, they were powerless to resist. They, 
 were surrounded and were compelled to surrender. The 
 main body of Hungarian foot soldiers, when they came in 
 contact with the Ottomans, were not more fortunate. The 
 Wallachians, who formed one of the wings of the army, 
 when they saw how the battle was going, retired frorn the 
 field without a fight. The centre of the Hungarian army, 
 under Sigismund, svipported by the Bavarians, made a most 
 gallant fight, and might have been successful if it had 
 not been that the Serbian army, under Prince Stephen, 
 came at a critical time, in support of the Ottomans, and 
 turned the scale in their favour. After a battle of only 
 three hours the Christian allies were completely defeated 
 with great slaughter on both sides. Ten thousand of the 
 Christians, including most of the surviving chevaliers, were 
 taken prisoners. Those who escaped across the Danube 
 suffered terribly in their retreat through Wallachia. They 
 were beaten and maltreated by the peasantry, for whom 
 they had shown no consideration in their advance. 
 
 Sigismund and the Grand Prior of Rhodes, at a late 
 stage of the battle, abandoned the army to its fate. They, 
 escaped in a small boat down the Danube, and were taken 
 on board by a Venetian vessel, which conveyed them to 
 Germany through the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, and the
 
 BAYEZID I 51 
 
 Adriatic. On passing the Straits the Turks paraded before 
 their eyes the knights made captives at Nicopolis. One 
 of these prisoners thus described what took place : — 
 
 The Osmanlis took us out of tlie towers of Gallipoli and led us to the 
 sea, and one after the other they abused the King of Hungary as he passed, 
 and mocked him and called to him to come out of the boat and deliver 
 his people ; and this they did to make fun of him, and skirmished a long 
 time with each other on the sea. Hut they did not do him any harm, 
 and so he went away.' 
 
 On the morning of the battle of Nicopolis, Bayezid, 
 when told of the heavy losses of his own army, and that 
 in the early part of the battle the chevaliers had massacred 
 a number of Turks who had surrendered on promise lof 
 life, was greatly incensed. He gave orders that all the 
 Christian prisoners to the number of ten thousand were 
 to be put to death in his presence. He made an excep- 
 tion only in favour of twenty -four of the knights, including 
 de Nevers, their leader, for whose release a heavy ranson 
 might be expected. But they were compelled to witness the 
 execution of their comrades in arms. 
 
 On taking leave of them a year later at Brusa, Bayezid 
 addressed de Nevers in these proud and insolent terms : — 
 
 John, I know thee well, and am informed that you are in your own 
 country a great lord. You are young, and in the future I hope you 
 will be able to recover with your courage from the shame of the 
 misfortune which has come to you in your foul knightly enterprise, and 
 that in the desire of getting rid of the reproach and recovering your 
 honour you will assemble your power to come against me and give me 
 battle. If I were afraid of that and wanted to, before your release, I 
 would make you swear upon your oath and religion that you would never 
 hear arms against me, nor those who are in your company here. But 
 no ; neither upon you nor any other of those here will I impose this 
 oath, because I desire, when you have returned to your home, and will 
 have leisure, that you assemble your power and come against me. You 
 will find me always ready to meet you and your people on the field of 
 battle. And what I say to you, you can say in like manner to those 
 to whom you will have the pleasure of speaking about it, because for 
 this purpose was I born, to carry arms and always to conquer what is 
 ahead of me.^ 
 
 Before their final departure, Bayezid treated these knights 
 to a fday's sport on a reg'al scale ; seven thousand falconers 
 ' Gibbons, p. 221. ^ Froissart, xvi. 47.
 
 51 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 were employed on the occasion, and five thousand men led 
 dogs to pick up the game. The historian does not state 
 what was the bag resulting from this great battue. 
 
 Of the twenty -four knights only one, Marshal Boucicaut, 
 took up the parting challenge of Bayezid and returned to 
 the East to make war against him. The others showed no 
 desire to wipe out the disgrace of their defeat.' 
 
 After this great battle at Nicopolis the Ottoman army 
 made irruptions into Wallachia, Styria, and Hungary. The 
 city of Peterwardein was captured and eighteen thousand 
 of its inhabitants were sold into slavery. Another division 
 invaded Syrmia, and devastated the country between the 
 Drave and the Danube. The fortresses on the river 
 taken by the crusaders were recaptured. The raid into 
 Wallachia was a failure. The Turks engaged in it were 
 defeated and driven back. Bayezid himself threatened 
 Buda, in Hungary, but his progress was checked by la 
 long and painful fit of gout. Gibbon moralizes on this 
 in the following sentence : " The disorders of the moral 
 are sometimes corrected by those of the physical world ; 
 and an acrimonious humour falling on a single fibre of 
 one man may prevent or suspend the misery of nations." 2 
 The invasion of Hungary on this occasion was a failure. 
 
 After this campaign Bayezid returned to Adrianople, and 
 there occupied himself by inflicting further humiliations 
 on the Greek Empire. He forced Manuel to resign and 
 imposed John, the son of Andronicus, as its Emperor. 
 He then issued forth again with his army, in 1397, and 
 fell like a thunderbolt on Greece, without any warning or 
 cause of complaint. He marched with his army through 
 Thessaly, capturing on the way Larissa and Pharsalia. He 
 passed through Thermopylas. The mere passage of his 
 army suflficed to subdue Doris and Locris. His two 
 generals, Yacoub and Evrenos, then invaded the Pelopon- 
 nesus. The latter captured and pillaged Argos. Its 
 inhabitants, to the number of thirty thousand, were sold 
 as slaves and deported to Asia. Colonies of Turks were 
 planted in the Morea. Theodore Palaeologus, who acted 
 
 ' Boucicaut in 1399, ^^'ith four ships and two armed galleys and 
 twelve hundred knights and foot soldiers, after defeating an Ottoman 
 fleet in the Dardanelles, arrived at Constantinople and gave assistance 
 to the Emperor in defence of the city. ' Gibbon, viii. p. 114.
 
 BAYEZID I 53 
 
 as despot there on behalf of the Greek Empire, agreed 
 to become tributary of the Sultan. 
 
 Returning to Adrianople, Bayezid determined to obtain 
 immediate possession of Constantinople. The Greek Empire 
 had been already deprived of nearly all territory outside the 
 walls of its capital. The Sultan opened proceedings against 
 it by sending an envoy to the Emperor with this insulting 
 message : — 
 
 When I dethroned your predecessor, Manuel, it was not in your interest 
 but in mine. If, then, you want to remain my friend, you must surrender 
 your crown. I will give you any other government you may wish for. 
 If you do not consent, I swear by God and the Prophet I will not spare a 
 soul in your city ; I will exterminate all of them. 
 
 The citizens of Constantinople, rather than experience 
 the terrible fate which they knew would befall them in 
 the event of a successful assault by the Ottoman army, 
 were willing to come to terms. But the Emperor, who was 
 buoyed up by hope of assistance from the Christian Powers, 
 refused to acquiesce in a pusillanimous surrender. He 
 rephed to the ambassador in dignified terms : " Tell your 
 master that, feeble as we are, we know no other power to 
 whom to address ourselves if it be not God, Who protects 
 the feeble and humbles the powerful. Let the Sultan do 
 what he pleases." 
 
 At this stage, and before he could give effect to his 
 threats, Bayezid was compelled by g'reat events in Asia to 
 raise the siege of Constantinople. Hitherto, in twelve years 
 of incessant war, Bayezid had been uniformly successful. He 
 had annexed the greater part of Asia Minor, Macedonia, 
 Northern Bulgaria, and Thessaly. He had reduced to 
 vassalage the Greek Empire itself and Serbia, Wallachia, 
 Bosnia, and a great part of Greece. He had defeated the 
 feudal chivalry of Europe in the great battle of NicopoUs. 
 He had not met with a single reverse. The next two years, 
 the last of his reign, were to result in disastrous and over- 
 whelming defeat to him, in his capture and death, and 
 in the temporary crumpling up of the Turkish Empire. 
 He came into conflict for the first time with Timur, a 
 general and a conqueror more resolute, crafty, able, and 
 cruel than himself. 
 
 Timur the Tartar, better known to us as Timurlanc
 
 '54 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 — Timur the lame, for he had met in early Hfe with an 
 accident which lamed him — was the greatest, the most ruth- 
 less, and the most devastating of warriors recorded in 
 all history. Born in 1333, a descendant through his 
 mother of the great Gengis Khan, he began life as a 
 petty chief of a Tartar tribe in the neighbourhood of 
 Samarkand. It was not till he had reached the age of 
 thirty -five that he achieved eminence over other neigh- 
 bouring Tartar States. He then conceived the ambition 
 of universal conquest. " As there was only one God in 
 heaven," he said, " so there should be only one ruler on 
 earth " — that one was to be himself. He went a long 
 way towards gaining this object of his ambition, for he 
 embarked on a career which, in rather less than thirty - 
 five years, resulted in an empire extending from the Great 
 Wall of China to the frontier of Asia Minor, and from 
 the Sea of Aral to the River Ganges and the Persian 
 Gulf. He had, by this time, conquered twenty-seven 
 separate States and extinguished nine dynasties. He 
 effected his purpose, not only by force of arms, but by 
 a deliberate policy of terrorism. After victory he was 
 of settled purpose ruthless in cruelties on the greatest 
 scale. 
 
 It was obvious that, sooner or later, he would come into 
 conflict with what was, at that time, the only other growing 
 military Power in the world — the Ottoman Empire. The 
 two potentates had already become neighbours, and causes 
 of dispute and antagonism were often arising between them. 
 Each had sheltered refugee princes, whose territories had 
 been absorbed by the other, and who were engaged in 
 intrigues to stir up war between the two rivals, in the hope 
 of regaining their possessions. Insolent messages passed 
 between the two potentates. 
 
 What is the foundation of thy insolence and folh' ? [wrote Timur to 
 Bayezid]. Thou hast fought some battles in the woods of Anatolia ; con- 
 temptible trophies ! Thou hast obtained some victories over the Christians 
 of Europe ; thy sword was blessed by the Apostle of God ; and thy 
 obedience to the precepts of the Koran in waging war against the infidel 
 is the sole consideration that prevents us from destroying thy country, 
 the frontier and bulwark of the Moslem world. Be wise in time ; reflect ; 
 repent ; and avert the thunder of our vengeance which is yet suspended 
 over thy head. Thou art no more than an ant ; why wilt thou seek to 
 provoke the elephants ? Alas, they will trample thee under their feet.
 
 BAYEZID I • 55 
 
 Bayezid replied in terms of the greatest indignation. 
 He protested that Timur had never triumphed unless by 
 his own perfidy and the vices of his foes. 
 
 Thy armies arc innumerable : be they so ; but what are tlic arrows 
 of the flying Tartars against the scimitars and battle-axes of my firm and 
 invincible Janissaries ? I will guard the princes who have implored 
 my protection ; seek them in my tents. The cities of Arzingan and 
 Erzerum are mine ; and unless the tribute be paid I will demand the 
 arrears under tlie walls of Tauris and Sultania. 
 
 And he added an insult of a yet grosser kind which, by 
 its allusion to the harem, was the worst that could be 
 devised by a Moslem : — 
 
 If I fly from thy arms may my wives be thrice divorced from my 
 bed ; but if thou hast not courage to meet me in the field, mayest thou 
 again receive thy wives after they have thrice endured the embrace of 
 a stranger. 
 
 After this interchange of abuse Timur determined, in 
 1400, to attack and invade Asia Minor from Armenia, 
 at the head of a horde of armed men, estimated by 
 historians at not less than eight hundred thousand. He laid 
 siege to Sivas, in Cappadocia, on the Armenian frontier, 
 which had only been captured by Bayezid about three 
 years previously. It was now defended by a garrison 
 of Turks, under command of Ertoghrul, the eldest son 
 of Bayezid. The fortifications were immensely strong, but 
 Timur was ready to sacrifice any number of men in assault- 
 ing and capturing the city. He employed six thousand 
 miners in undermining its defences with galleries and 
 propping up the walls temporarily with timber smeared 
 with pitch. When the mines were completed, fire was 
 applied to the timber, and the walls gradually sank into 
 the cavities laid open to them, and afi"orded entrance to 
 the assaulting columns. The city was captured. Four 
 thousand of its defenders were buried alive by order of 
 Timur, and Ertoghrul was executed. 
 
 Bayezid, thus challenged, advanced, in 1401, with an 
 army of one hundred and twenty thousand men to avenge 
 the disaster at Sivas. Timur, however, after the capture 
 of that city, refrained from advancing farther into Asia 
 Minor. He passed into Syria and captured Damascus,
 
 ■56 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and thence into Mesopotamia for the capture of Bagdad. 
 It was not till the next year, 1402, that he determined to 
 return to Asia Minor and to humble Bayezid. He retraced 
 his steps to Sivas, and thence, after a further excliange 
 of insolent messages with the Ottoman Sultan, he went in 
 search of him towards Angora, taking the route of 
 Csesarea and Kir Sheir. 
 
 Bayezid had also collected a great army in the east 
 of Asia Minor, and had finally concentrated it in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Angora. He showed none of his previous 
 skill as a general, though all of his insolence and bravado. 
 His army was discontented by his avarice, and by his 
 neglect to pay them out of the well-filled treasury. He 
 refused to follow the advice of his best generals, who 
 warned him aig'ainst meeting Timur's vast hosts on a 
 field where they could deploy their whole strength. The 
 two armies met at last on the plain of Angora, the site 
 of many previous famous battles. It is almost inconceivable 
 that Bayezid, in arrogant contempt of his foe, employed 
 his army, in the face of the enemy, in a great hunt for 
 game, wliich led them into a district devoid of water, 
 where his soldiers suffered terribly, and five thousand are 
 said to have died of thirst. 
 
 Oh return to their camp they found that Timur had 
 diverted the stream which supplied it with water. Bayezid 
 was forced to fight at a disadvantage. The Tartars, who 
 formed a fourth part of the Ottoman army, were not to be 
 relied on in this battle. Their sympathies were with their 
 fellow -Tartars under Timur. Bayezid had committed the 
 fatal error of placing them in the front line, after his usual 
 tactics of meeting the first encounter of the enemy with 
 inferior troops. But in this case the Tartars deserted on 
 the field of battle. The Serbian contingent, under Prince 
 Stephen, and other Christian vassal troops fought with the 
 utmost gallantry and loyalty. But it was in vain. The 
 whole Ottoman army was outnumbered, overwhelmed, and 
 routed with great slaughter. Bayezid with his bodyguard 
 made a last stand. " The Thunderbolt," says the Turkish 
 historian, " continued to wield a heavy battle-axe. As a 
 starving wolf scattering a flock of sheep he scattered the 
 enemy. Each blow of his redoubtable axe struck in such 
 a way that there was no need of a second blow." But in 
 the end he was overpowered and taken prisoner.
 
 BAYEZID I 57 
 
 Bayezid for some time after his capture was treated with 
 unwonted generosity by Timur, who was impressed by 
 his dignified bearing, in spite of his overwhelming defeat 
 and humihation. But after an attempt to escape he was 
 more rigidly guarded, and was put into fetters at night. 
 The treatment of him became more cruel and contemptuous. 
 He was carried by day in the train of Timur, when on 
 the march, in a litter, which was in effect a cage ' with 
 open bars, exposed to the derision and contempt of the 
 Tartars. His wife, Despina, the Serbian princess, was com- 
 pelled to serve Timur with drink at his meals in a state 
 of nudity, and with other women of Bayezid's harem was 
 taken into that of the conqueror. Timur is also said 
 to have made a footstool of his conquered foe. 
 
 Bayezid died of a broken heart after eight months of 
 humiliation, at the age of forty-eight. During that time 
 Timur overran the greater part of Asia Minor, capturing 
 Nica^a and Brusa and many other strongholds from the 
 Ottomans, and Smyrna from the Knights of St. John of 
 Jerusalem. The walls of Smyrna were undermined in the 
 same way as those of Sivas. In two weeks Timur 
 effected a capture which Bayezid had failed to do in three 
 times that length of time. The Knights, when they found 
 that the city was no longer tenable, fought their way 
 down to their galleys against the crowd of despairing 
 inhabitants. Most of them escaped to Rhodes and effected 
 there another settlement. Those who failed to escape were 
 put to death by Timur, who built a pyramid of their heads. 
 Everywhere there was ruthless cruelty. When approach- 
 ing the city of Ephesus, children came out to meet him 
 singing songs to appease his wrath. "What is this 
 noise?" he asked. When told, he ordered his horsemen 
 to ride over the children. They were trampled to death. 
 
 Timur reinstated in their former territories, as tribu- 
 taries to his own Empire, most of the petty princes who 
 had been dispossessed by the Turks, including the Plmir 
 of Karamania. He eventually returned to Samarkand, where 
 he made preparations for the invasion of China, but before 
 
 ' This story of the cage, which forms the subject of a scene in Marlowe's 
 play of Tamerlane, has loeen discredited by some historians of late years. 
 But Mr. Gibbons, after a full and careful examination of all the records 
 of the time, has re-established its veracity.
 
 58 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 this could be realized he died^ at the age of seventy- 
 one, two years after the death of Bayezid. As a result 
 of his raid into Asia Minor the Ottoman Empire there, 
 for the time being, completely collapsed. But the Tartars 
 disappeared without leaving any trace behind them. 
 
 If Bayezid 's physical downfall was overwhelmijig and 
 humiliating, his moral decadence was even worse, and, 
 as it turned out, was more permanently injurious to the 
 people of his Empire by the evil example it set. In 
 the brief periods of peace, spent at Brusa and Adrianople, 
 he gave way to self-indulgence and vice of a deplorable 
 kind. He was the first of his race to break the laws 
 of the Prophet and to drink too freely of wine. In com- 
 pany with his Grand Vizier, Ali, he was addicted to drunken 
 orgies. Still worse, he was tempted by that boon com- 
 panion to give way to vice of unmentionable depravity, 
 condemned by all the world. The Empire was ransacked 
 for good-looking boys, the sons of Christian parents, who 
 were compelled to embrace Islamism and to enter the 
 service of the Court, nominally as pages, but really to pander 
 to the degrading' desire of the Sultan. In adopting such 
 practices, Bayezid set the fashion to others of his entourage. 
 The moral infection then spread widely among the upper 
 classes of society, especially among the judges and ulemas. 
 There can be little doubt that immorality infected the upper 
 society of the Empire and was one of the causes which 
 ultimately led to decadence and ruin. 
 
 It is to be noted of Bayezid that in his short but 
 strenuous career of conquest he did not show any falling 
 off of vigour and courage as a result of his excesses. 
 But in his final campaign against Timur his conduct 
 was so fatuous as to give rise to the belief that his gross 
 debauchery had resulted in softening of the brain. How- 
 ever that may have been, he met in Timur a greater 
 man than himself who, even at the age of seventy, had 
 lost none of his vigour of mind and body, and who, as 
 tnaster also of bigger battalions, was practically invincible.
 
 V 
 
 MAHOMET I 
 1413-21 
 
 On the death of Sultan Bayezid, in captivity, it seemed as 
 though the Ottoman Empire was doomed to extinction. 
 Asia Minor had already passed out of its hands, and was 
 either in possession of the Emirs who had been reinstated 
 in their territories by Timur, and who had sworn alle- 
 giance to him, or was still in the occupation of the invading 
 Tartars. It was not to be expected that the Empire in 
 Europe would survive when it could no longer draw support 
 from Asia. The Christian populations of Bulgaria, Bosnia, 
 and Wallachia would soon reassert their independence, and 
 the Greek Empire might be expected to recover some of 
 its lost provinces. The Turkish Empire, however, showed 
 a most unexpected vitality. It survived not only the 
 invasion of Timur, but civil war, which after the death 
 of Bayezid broke out between four of his sons. An inter- 
 regnum of ten years occurred, during which there was 
 internecine war between these claimants to his throne. The 
 Empire emerged from these stupendous difficulties, under 
 the able rule of the youngest of them, Mahomet I, as 
 strong as ever, and without the loss of a single province. 
 
 Timur's hosts, after ravaging the whole of Asia Minor, 
 departed like a swarm of locusts which has denuded a 
 district of its produce and then seeks fresh ground. They 
 returned to Central Asia. They left nothing behind in 
 Asia Minor of Tartar rule, either of an army or of an 
 administration. The field was left open to the Ottomans 
 to fight among themselves and their former vassals and 
 neighbours for such a settlement as could be achieved by 
 the strongest of them. 
 
 Of the six sons of Bayezid, five fought with him lat 
 
 59
 
 ■6o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Angora m command of divisions of his army. One of 
 them, Mustapha, was supposed to be among the slain ; 
 another, Musa, was taken prisoner and shared the captivity 
 •of his father. The other three escaped. The eldest of 
 them, Solyman, accompanied by the Grand Vizier, Mi, and 
 Hassan, the Agha of the Janissaries, made his way to 
 Adrianople, where, on the death of Bayezid, he had himself 
 proclaimed Sultan, and exercised power as such over the 
 European provinces of the Empire. Issa, a younger son, fled 
 to Brusa, where he also claimed to be successor to his father, 
 and Mahomet, the youngest son, but by far the ablest, retired 
 to Amasia, a small principality iti the north-east of Asia 
 Minor. He there assumed authority over the district. 
 After the death of their father these three claimants for 
 succession to his Empire fought it out between themselves, 
 and, later on, a fourth claimant was added to the list in 
 Musa, who had been set free by Timur, in order that he 
 might convey the dead body of his father for interment at 
 Brusa. 
 
 The earliest conflict was between Mahomet and Issa. 
 Mahomet offered to divide between ithem the Ottoman posses- 
 sions in Asia. Issa refused and claimed the whole of them. 
 He was defeated and fled to Europe, where he sought the 
 assistance of Solyman, who had firmly established himself 
 in the Ottoman dominions there, and who was now able 
 to lead an army into Asia Minor in support of Issa. 
 Mahomet was hard pressed by Solyman. He sent Musa 
 across the Straits to effect a diversion by raising revolt 
 against Solyman in Europe. This had the desired effect, 
 and Solyman was compelled to return to Adrianople. After 
 his departure Mahomet succeeded in defeating Issa again, 
 and the latter disappeared and was heard of no more. 
 
 In Europe, Solyman and Musa were now in deadly con- 
 flict. Solyman was much the same type of man as his 
 father — ^of great vigour and courage in action, but given 
 to orgies of drink and debauchery. The Agha of the 
 Janissaries in vain tried to rouse him from the apathy to 
 which he was often reduced after these bouts. He 
 threatened to shave the Agha's beard with his sword. He 
 was often severe and even cruel to his soldiers, and finally 
 the Janissaries, incensed by his brutal treatment, his dissolute 
 habits, and his inability to rouse himself to action, rebelled 
 against him, at the instance of Hassan, and put him to
 
 MAHOMET I 61 
 
 death. They then took service imder Musa, who became 
 master of the position in Europe and assumed the title of 
 Sultan. 
 
 After an expedition to Serbia for the purpose of 
 avenging what he considered their treachery to him in 
 supporting Mahomet, and where he committed the most 
 revolting cruelties, Musa returned to Adrianople, and opened 
 a campaign against the Emperor Manuel, who, after the 
 death of Bayezid, had superseded Andronicus on the Greek 
 throne and who supported Mahomet. 
 
 The Emperor appealed to Mahomet for assistance. 
 Mahomet, with a Turkish army, supported by the Serbian 
 contingent, crossed the Bosphorus in answer to this appeal, 
 and the strange sight was witnessed of a Turkish army, 
 under command of one of the Othman race, defending 
 Constantinople against another Turkish army. 
 
 Musa eventually retreated from his lines in front of 
 Constantinople, and was pursued by Mahomet. When, 
 later, the two armies came into close touch on the borders 
 of Serbia, a conflict was avoided by a revolt of Musa's 
 troops. The Agha, Hassan, addressed the Janissaries in 
 the very presence of Musa. " Why," he said to them, 
 " do you hesitate to go over to the ranks of the most just 
 and virtuous of the Othman princes ? Why subject your- 
 selves to be outraged by a man who can take care neither 
 of himself nor of others?" 
 
 Musa, on hearing this harangue to his troops, rushed 
 at Hassan and slew him. The companion of Hassan struck 
 at Musa with his sword and wounded him in the hand. 
 The troops, when they saw that their general was seriously 
 wounded, were seized with panic. They deserted and went 
 over to Mahomet. Musa fled with three attendants, and, 
 later, his dead body was found in a marsh. 
 
 Mahomet was now in undisputed command of the Empire 
 as Sultan. He reigned as such for only eight years. He 
 showed, during that time, infinite skill and patience, as 
 a statesman equally as a general, in restoring, consolidating, 
 and maintaining his Empire. He was ardently desirous 
 of peace. To the representatives of Serbia, Wallachia, 
 and Albania he said : " Forget not to tell your masters 
 that I grant peace to all, and that peace I will accept 
 from all. May God be against the breakers of peace." 
 He kept on the best of terms with the Greek Emperor,
 
 62 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 with whom he had made a defensive alliance, and restored 
 to him certain cities on the coast of the Black Sea and in 
 Thessaly. He had frequent causes, however, for the use 
 of his army, and for showing his skill as a general. He 
 compelled the Emirs of Karamania, Kermia, and other 
 principalities in Asia Minor, who had promised allegiance 
 to Timur, to renew their vassalage to the Ottoman Empire. 
 Two or three times the Karamanian prince revolted and 
 endeavoured to assert complete independence. As often 
 Mahomet defeated him, but contented himself with assert- 
 ing supremacy, and did not insist upon the incorporation of 
 his territory with the Empire. He also defeated an attempt 
 of a Turkish upstart to create an independent State at 
 Smyrna and Aidin. He put down a dangerous revolt of 
 Dervishes and extinguished the sect. He came into con- 
 flict at sea with the Republic of Venice, and though he 
 was worsted, and his fleet of galleys was destroyed, lie 
 succeeded in making an honourable peace. 
 
 As a ruler of his Empire he showed many great quali- 
 ties. He gained the appellation which is best translated 
 into English as the " Great Gentleman " — and right well 
 he deserved it. He was magnanimous and just. He 
 strictly observed his promises. He knew that his Empire 
 could not be maintained by force alone, but that justice and 
 clemency were necessary. His Christian subjects were every- 
 where treated with consideration. He would not tolerate 
 cruelty to them. He was a liberal patron of literature, 
 and in his short reign the Ottomans first showed a bent 
 for poetry. It was a blot on his fame that he caused his 
 youngest brother to be deprived of his sight, and that he 
 put to death his nephew, the son of Solyman, lest either of 
 them should dispute the throne with himself or his son after 
 him. His experience of his brothers and the history of 
 his family doubtless convinced him that no member of 
 the Othman race would be content with any position short 
 of the Sultanate. This may not be a moral justification, 
 but it is an explanation which, in view of the ethics of 
 the times, must prevent too severe a judgment. Though 
 Mahomet in his short reign, after attaining full command 
 of the Empire, made no extension of it, he must be re- 
 garded practically as one of its founders and as among 
 its most eminent and successful rulers. He owed his 
 success over his brothers to his moral ascendancy and to
 
 MAHOMET I 63 
 
 the great reputation which he achieved with his troops 
 for his high quahties as a ruler even more than to his 
 prowess as a general. The emergence of the Empire 
 from the extreme difficulties into which it fell from the 
 Mongolian invasion must have been due to the fact that 
 the Ottomans at that time were much superior to the 
 Greeks and the other Christian communities in all the 
 qualities which tend to make a stable government. 
 
 Mahomet died of apoplexy in 1421 at the early age of 
 forty-seven. He was buried at Brusa in a mausoleum near 
 to the splendid building known as the Green Mosque, 
 which he had himself erected.
 
 VI 
 
 MURAD II 
 
 1421-51 
 
 MURAD succeeded his father in the Sultanate as second 
 of the name. He reigned for thirty years, including two 
 short periods when he abdicated and retired into private 
 life. But on each occasion he was compelled by the 
 exigencies of the State, and the youth and inexperience 
 of his son and successor, to resume the throne. He much 
 resembled his father in vigour and capacity as a general 
 and in his desire to act justly. 
 
 At the very commencement of Murad's reign the Greek 
 Emperor Manuel, by an almost incredible act of folly, 
 hoping to take advantage of Murad's youth and inexperi- 
 ence, let loose from confinement a man who claimed, 
 whether rightly or not was never clearly established, to 
 be Mustapha, the son of Sultan Bayezid, who had dis- 
 appeared after the battle of Angora. Manuel entered into 
 a treaty with this claimant to the Ottoman throne, by which, 
 in the event of his succeeding in establishing his succes- 
 sion, the city of Gallipoli and all the cities on the shores 
 of the Black Sea, taken from the Greek Empire by the 
 Turks, were to be restored to it. 
 
 In spite of this scandalous treachery to Islam, the so- 
 called Mustapha succeeded in raising a large army in 
 Eiurope, with which he defeated the troops who adhered 
 to Murad. He then crossed the Dardanelles into Asia 
 with his army in vessels supplied by the Emperor Manuel. 
 Murad showed all the vigour and capacity of his race in 
 dealing with this emergency. He won over the greater 
 part of Mustapha's army, who were disaffected. He defeated 
 what remained. Mustapha was driven across the Straits 
 
 again to Gallipoli, where he was besieged, captured, and 
 
 64
 
 MURAD II 65 
 
 hanged, as the best proof, it was said, that he was an 
 impostor. 
 
 Murad, having defeated this claimant to his throne, 
 determined to avenge the perfidy of the Emperor Manuel 
 and to put an end to the Greek Empire by the capture of 
 Constantinople. For this purpose he collected an army 
 of veterans. He invested the city, making a long line of 
 great earthworks from the Golden Horn to the Sea of 
 Marmora. From this he bombarded the city walls by 
 cannon, then for the first time used by the Ottoman army, 
 but which were not as yet very efifective. He also used 
 movable towers, from which assaults could be made on the 
 walls of the city. He proclaimed that the great wealth of 
 the capital would be the prize of the soldiers if the assault 
 on it were successful. He made a special promise to 
 a band of five hundred Dervishes, who were to lead the 
 assault, that all the nuns in the city would be given to 
 them as concubines. In spite of these great inducements 
 to victory, the assault was unsuccessful. The Greeks de- 
 fended the walls of the city with the utmost heroism, 
 assisted, it was said, by a timely apparition of the Holy 
 Virgin, which stimulated their efforts and depressed the 
 assailants. Murad would probably have been successful 
 with the overwhelming forces at his disposal if he had 
 persisted in the siege, but he was compelled to raise it 
 by a diversion cleverly contrived by the Greek Emperor. 
 
 A rival to the Sultan was set up in Asia in another 
 Mustapha, a younger brother of Murad, who had not been 
 put to death in pursuance of the fratricidal policy of his 
 family. This new claimant was supported by the Kara- 
 manians and Kermians, and with their aid he defeated 
 an Ottoman army in Asia Minor. Murad found it neces- 
 sary to abandon the siege of Constantinople, and' to transfer 
 his main army to Asia Minor for the purpose of dealing 
 with this danger to his throne. He came to close quarters 
 as quickly as possible with Mustapha's army, and defeated 
 it. Mustapha was taken prisoner and was hanged at once 
 by his captors, without giving an opportunity f,0 Murad 
 to exercise his clemency in favour of his brother, had 
 he so willed it. Murad then occupied himself by reducing 
 the Karamanian and other Emirs to complete subjection 
 to his Empire. 
 
 Meanwhile the Emperor Manuel died, and was succeeded 
 
 5
 
 66 THE TURKISH EiMPIRE 
 
 by John Palaeologus. Murad, in lieu of renewing the 
 siege of Constantinople, was content to make another treaty 
 with the new Emperor, imposing on him a heavy tribute and 
 stripping him of almost every possession beyond the walls 
 of his capital. The Empire thus obtained a reprieve for 
 a few brief years. 
 
 In the case of Salonika, which had been recently sold 
 by the Greek Emperor to the Republic of Venice, now 
 desirous of effecting a lodgment in Macedonia, Murad 
 refused to recognize the right of the Emperor to transfer 
 to a foreign Power a city which at one time had been 
 under Ottoman rule. It had three times in the last hundred 
 years been captured by the Ottonaaiis, and had as often 
 been recaptured by the Greeks. Murad led an army, in 
 1430, to attack it, and, after a vigorous resistance by 
 the Venetians, captured it by assault, and finally annexed 
 the city and its district to the Turkish Empire. It 
 was thought that Murad showed great clemency in not 
 allowing his soldiers to indulge in a wholesale massacre. 
 The Greek inhabitants, however, were sold into slavery, 
 and their numbers were so great that a good-looking girl 
 was sold for the price of a pair of boots. 
 
 The suppression of rebellion in Asia Minor, the sub- 
 jection of the Greek Emperor to the position of a humble 
 vassal, and the capture of Salonika had occupied Murad 
 for some years. Later he was involved in long struggles 
 with his neighbours, the Hungarians, on the northern 
 boundaries of his Empire. The Ottomans were engaged 
 in constant raids across the Danube, where vast districts 
 were devastated, and theusands of their population were 
 carried off as captives for sale as slaves. There arose 
 about this time in Hungary a national hero, the celebrated 
 Hunyadi, a natural son of the late King Sigismund. He 
 was a born leader of men, not a great general, but a most 
 valiant fighter. He had gained great distinction in war 
 in other directions. He now became the soul of hostility 
 against the Ottomans. He was known as the White Knight, 
 on account of his silver armour, which always shone in 
 the van of the impetuous charges of his cavalry. He was 
 rightly regarded by his countrymen as a patriot and a 
 national hero. None the less, he was a bloodthirsty ruffian. 
 He made a practice of massacring all the prisoners taken in 
 battle. He found pleasure in having this effected, in his
 
 MURAD II 67 
 
 presence, at banquets, where the guests were entertained 
 by the shrieks of the dying men. 
 
 Hunyadi for twenty years was a terror to the Ottoman 
 armies. His first encounter with them was at Herman- 
 stadt, north of the Danube, which was invested by an 
 army of eighty thousand Ottomans. He led an army of 
 twenty thousand Hungarians against them, in relief of the 
 fortress, and inflicted a severe defeat on them, in despite 
 of great disparity of numbers. Twenty thousand of 
 the Ottomans were killed, including the general. The 
 others were dispersed. Murad sent another army of eighty 
 thousand men against him, under another Pasha. Hunyadi 
 again defeated it with great slaughter at Varsag. 
 
 These notable victories roused great enthusiasm in 
 Europe. It was determined to take the offensive against the 
 Ottomans, and to make another effort to drive them out 
 of Europe. A coalition was formed for the purpose between 
 Hungary and Poland, then united under King Ladislaus, 
 and Wallachia and Bosnia. Serbia, which under its king, 
 Stephen Lazariwitch, had been the firm ally of the 
 Ottomans, and had supported them in many campaigns 
 in Asia and Europe, was now induced to abandon this 
 alliance and, under Stephen's successor, George Branco- 
 witch, to join the confederacy against the Ottomans. 
 The Pope, Eugenius, was most active in support of this 
 combination. His legate, Cardinal Julian Cesarini, led an 
 armed force in support of it. Money was raised for the 
 purpose of the war by a great sale of indulgences to the 
 faithful in every part of Europe. A large contingent of 
 Erencli and German knights joined the allied army. It 
 was, in fact, another crusade, prompted by religious zeal 
 on behalf of Christianity against Islam. The allied army 
 was under the nominal command of Ladislaus, but Hunyadi 
 was its real leader. 
 
 The Republics of Venice and Genoa gave their support, 
 and as, at this time, the Ottomians had no naval force, it 
 was hoped that these Powers, by means of their numerous 
 and powerful galleys, would prevent the transfer to Europe 
 of Murad's miain army, which was again engaged in conflict 
 with the Karamanians in Asia Minor. 
 
 The allied afmy, under these favourable circumstances, 
 crossed the Danube in 1443. It defeated an Ottoman 
 army on the banks of the Masova and again at Nisch.
 
 68 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It then crossed the Balkan range in winter — an operation 
 of extreme difilculty, which has since only twice been 
 effected, by General Diebitsch and General Gourko — and 
 again defeated the Turks in a battle at the foot of 
 these mountains. Strange to say, instead of marching 
 onwards to Adrianople, as Diebitsch did in 1829, Ilunyadi 
 was content with the laurels already achieved, and returned 
 with his army to Buda, where he displayed his trophies 
 and received a triumph. 
 
 Murad, on hearing of the retreat of the Hungarians across 
 the Balkans, determined to come to terms with them, and 
 not to pursue them again across the Danube. With some 
 difficulty, and in spite of the sullen opposition of Cardinal 
 Julian and the French contingent, a treaty was agreed to, 
 at Szegeddin, with Ladislaus, by which Serbia was to be 
 freed from dependence on the Ottoman Empire and 
 Wallachia was to be ceded to Hungary. The treaty was 
 to be in force for ten years. It was solemnly sworn 
 to on the Gospel and the Koran by Ladislaus and 
 Murad. 
 
 While this treaty was being negotiated Murad, weary 
 of war, and desirous of spending the remainder of his life 
 in sensual enjoyments which had so long been denied to 
 him, decided to abdicate his throne. He was still in the 
 full vigour of life at the age of forty -one, though he was 
 said to be growing rather fat. He did not propose, like 
 the Emperor Charles V, to retire to a monastery, but rather, 
 like Diocletian the Roman Emperor, to a luxurious palace, 
 surrounded by beautiful gardens, which he had prepared 
 for his retreat at Magnesia. On the ratification of the 
 treaty of Szegeddin, in 1444, he carried out this purpose, 
 and his son Mahomet, at the age of fourteen, was 
 proclaimed Sultan in his place. 
 
 When this became known to the Hungarians a revulsion of 
 opinion took place against the recent treaty with the Turks. 
 The Hungarian Diet determined, at the instance of Cardinal 
 Julian, backed up by the Pope, to break the treaty. News 
 had arrived of a fresh outbreak of the Karamanians. The 
 fleets of Genoa, Venice, and Burgundy were masters of 
 the Hellespont and would, it was believed, prevent the 
 Ottoman army in Asia Minor from crossing into Europe. 
 The opportunity for crushing the Turks and driving them 
 out of Europe seemed to be most favourable.
 
 MURAD II 69 
 
 Is it now [said Cardinal Julian to the Hungarian Diet] that you will 
 desert expectations and your own fortunes ? Is it to your God and your 
 fellow-Christians that you have pledged your faith ? That prior obligation 
 annihilates a rash and sacrilegious oath to the enemies of Christ. His 
 vicar on earth is the Roman Pontiff, without whose sanction you can 
 neither promise nor perform. In his name I absolve your perjury and 
 sanctify your arms. Follow my footsteps in the path of glory and salva- 
 tion ; and, if you still have scruples, devolve on my head tlie punishment 
 and the sin. 
 
 " This mischievous casuistry," says the historian Gibbon, 
 ** was seconded by his respectable character and the levity 
 of popular assemblies." The Hungarian Diet resolved on 
 war, and King Ladislaus, in spite of his recent oath, deter- 
 mined to break the treaty. Himyadi was, in the tirst 
 instance, strongly opposed to this, but his assent was 
 obtained by the promise of the throne of Bulgaria, in 
 the event of the defeat of the Ottomans and the conquest 
 of that province. The Prince of Serbia, who had regained 
 his independence by the treaty, was persuaded to join 
 with t"he allies by the promise of an addition to his 
 kingdom. 
 
 It was decided to send an army at once against the 
 Ottomans. But it was a much reduced one in comparison 
 with that which had so recently crossed the Balkans. Most 
 of the French and German knights and their attendants 
 had already gone home. Not more than ten thousand 
 remained under Hunyadi. They were joined by five 
 thousand Wallachians . They invaded Bulgaria, and then, 
 instead of crossing the Balkans, descended the Danube 
 to the coast and thence marched to Varna. Meanwhile 
 the Ottomans, in great alarm and fearing the incompetence 
 of the young Mahomet to conduct a great war, induced 
 Murad to emerge again from his retreat. He hastily 
 gathered together an army in Asia Minor. He bribed the 
 Genoese, at the rate of a ducat for each man, to convey 
 it across the Hellespont. He arrived in front of Varna 
 unexpectedly, before the Christian army knew of his inten- 
 tions. His army greatly outnumbered that of King Ladis- 
 laus. In spite of this, the two wings of it were driven 
 back with great slaughter. Murad, in command of the 
 centre of his army^, for the moment and for the only time 
 in his life, lost his presence of mind and was disposed 
 to fly. But the Beglcrbey of Anatolia laid hold of the
 
 70 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 bridle of his horse and urged him to fight it out. The 
 battle was renewed. The Janissaries stood firm and 
 successfully repulsed the main body of the Christians. 
 Ladislaus was unhorsed and asked for quarter. But he 
 was put to death on the field. His head was stuck upon 
 a lance and was held up by the side of another lance 
 which bore on high a copy of the violated treaty. The 
 Christians, when they saw the head of their dead king 
 in its soldier's helmet thus held aloft, were struck with 
 panic and fled precipitately. Hunyadi escaped with diffi- 
 culty. Cardinal Julian expiated by death on the field his 
 sin in advising the breach of the treaty. Two other bishops 
 shared his fate. Never was defeat and disaster more richly 
 deserved. Two-thirds of the Christian army were slain 
 in the battle, and even greater numbers, though a Jess 
 proportion, of the Ottomans shared their fate. 
 
 Murad, having won this great victory, again, a second 
 time, abdicated his throne and returned to his retreat at 
 Magnesia, and again the young Mahomet was invested as 
 Sultan. Though history supplies cases of great kings 
 seeking retirement from the cares of office, and of some of 
 them being induced to resume their thrones, it records no 
 other case of a second abdication and a second resump- 
 tion. Murad was very soon recalled from his abode of 
 pleasure. A serious outbreak of the Janissaries occurred 
 at Adrianople. They ravaged the city and committed great 
 atrocities. The ministers of the young Sultan were greatly 
 alarmed. They felt that only a strong hand could keep 
 a check on the unruly Janissaries. Murad was again sum- 
 moned from his retreat. The young Mahomet was induced 
 to go on a hunting expedition. In his absence Murad 
 again made his appearance at Adrianople and resumed 
 power. Mahomet, on his return from hunting, found that his 
 father was again in the saddle. Murad was received by his 
 troops with a great ovation, and even the unruly Janissaries 
 gave in their submission to him. He did not again seek 
 retirement at Magnesia. He reigned for seven more years 
 — another period of almost incessant war. He first made 
 an invasion of the Morea, which the Greek Emperor's 
 brothers had divided between them and governed as petty 
 princes, or despots, as they were called. Murad had no 
 difficulty in storming and cajDturing the fortification by 
 which the isthmus of Corinth was defended. He com-
 
 IMURAD 11 71 
 
 pelled the two despots to accept the position of vassals 
 under the Empire. 
 
 Murad then again turned his attention to Serbia and 
 Hungary. He defeated the combined forces of Hungary, 
 Serbia, and Bosnia, under Hunyadi, on the field of Kossova, 
 where in 1389 Murad I had first subdued the Serbians. 
 As a result of this great battle Serbia lost its independence 
 and was finally incorporated as an integral part of the 
 Ottoman Empire. Bosnia became a tributary State. 
 
 Murad was less fortunate in his efforts to subdue the 
 Albanians. These people were under the leadership of 
 George Castriota — commonly called Scanderbeg — who had 
 been brought up at Murad's Court as a Mussulman, and had 
 learned the art of war from him, but who had abjured 
 Islam, with a view to leadership of the Albanians. He 
 carried on a guerrilla war against the Ottoman invaders 
 with great success, and Murad was unable to complete 
 the conquest of the State. This was practically the only 
 failure of Murad's adventurous life. His generals met 
 with many defeats at the hand of Hunyadi, but Murad 
 retrieved them in the two battles in which he came in 
 conflict with the great Hungarian hero. He died of 
 apoplexy in 145 1. 
 
 Looking back at his career, it does not appear that he 
 made war with ambitious objects to aggrandize his Empire. 
 War was, in almost every case, forced upon him. Three 
 times the Prince of Karamania declared war against him, 
 and three times Murad defeated him, and was content 
 v^ith insisting on the vassalage of the province and not 
 on its extinction and incorporation with the Empire. It 
 has been shown how perfidious was the conduct of the Greek 
 Emperor, and how fully justified Murad was in reducing 
 his territory to the narrowest limits. Murad's attack on 
 Salonika when in the hands of the Venetian Republic was 
 equally justified, for the Greek Emperor had no right to 
 sell it, and thus invite a foreign Power to make a lodgment 
 there. The wars on the northern frontier were forced 
 upon him by the Hungarians and the Christian Powers 
 in alliance with them. They appealed to arms, and victory 
 decided against them. It will be seen that as a net result 
 of Murad's reign the Ottoman Empire was extended during 
 these thirty years by the acquisition of many petty princi- 
 palities in Asia Minor, by the complete subjection of Serbia
 
 72 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and Bosnia, the conquest of Salonika and its district, and 
 by the conversion of the M,orea into a tributary State. It 
 was, however, reduced by the loss of Wallachia as a vassal 
 State. 
 
 Gibbon, quoting from a Turkish historian, says : — 
 
 Murad was a just and valiant prince, of a great soul ; patient of labour, 
 learned, merciful, religious, charitable ; a lover and encourager of the 
 studious and of all who excelled in any art or science. No man obtained 
 more or greater victories. Belgrade alone withstood his attacks. Under 
 his reign the soldier was ever victorious, the citizen rich and secure. If he 
 subdued any countrj', his first care was to build mosques and caravansaries, 
 hospitals, and colleges. 
 
 Though, more suo, Gibbon suggests doubts whether 
 such praise could be justified in the case of a Sultan 
 " whose virtues are often the vices most useful to himself 
 or most agreeable to his subjects," he admits that 
 
 the justice and moderation of Murad are attested by his conduct and 
 acknowledged by Christians themselves, who consider a prosperous reign 
 and a peaceful death as the reward of his singular merits. In the vigour 
 of his age and military power he seldom engaged in war till he was 
 justified by a previous and adequate provocation. In the observance 
 of treaties his word was inviolate and sacred,' 
 
 ' Gibbon, viii. p. 242.
 
 VII 
 MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' 
 
 1451-81 
 
 If Mahomet, the eldest son of Murad, at the age of fourteen, 
 had been reckoned too feeble to cope with the emergencies 
 of the State, it is very certain that he soon made wond^er- 
 fuUy rapid progress. At the age of twenty -one, when he 
 again mounted the throne on the death of his father, he was 
 amply, and almost precociously, endowed with many of the 
 best, and many also of the worst, qualities of an autocrat, 
 and was quite able alone to take command of the State. 
 He was undoubtedly the ablest man that the house of 
 Othman had as yet produced, not only as a general, but 
 as a statesman. He had also great intellectual capacity 
 and literary attainments. He spoke five languages fluently. 
 He was the most proud and ambitious of his race and the 
 most persistent in pursuing his aims. He combined with 
 these high qualities, however, extreme cruelty and perfidy 
 and sensuality of the grossest and vilest kind. He differed 
 from his predecessors in his craving for absolute power, 
 free from control by his ministers, and in his reckless 
 disregard of human life. Hitherto, from Othman to 
 Murad II, the Sultans had been in intimate association with 
 their viziers and generals, and had shared their meals with 
 them. They were accessible to their subjects, high and low. 
 Mahomet was very different. He was the true despot after 
 the Oriental fashion. He held himself aloof. He took his 
 meals alone. He made no confidants. He treated his 
 viziers and pashas as though they were his slaves. He 
 had no regard for their lives. There were men in his 
 personal service who were adepts at striking off heads by 
 single blows of their scimitars. Two at least of Mahomet's 
 Grand Viziers were put to death in this way in his presence 
 
 73
 
 74 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 without warning or compunction. This levelling process 
 was not apparently objected to by his subjects. 
 
 On hearing at Magnesia of the death of his father, 
 Mahomet, who was eager to resume power, mounted at once 
 an Arab horse, and exclaiming, " Let all who love me 
 follow ! " he rode to the Hellespont, and thence crossed to 
 Gallipoli and made his way to Adrianople. He was there 
 again acclaimed as Sultan, not, however, without having to 
 submit to onerous presents to the Janissaries, a bad prece- 
 dent which was later always followed on the accession of a 
 Sultan. The first act of his reign was to" direct that his 
 brother, an infant son of Murad, by his latest wife, a Serbian 
 princess, should be put to death. He feared that the child, 
 when grown up, might dispute the throne with him, on the 
 ground that its mother was a legitimate wife of royal descent, 
 while he himself (Mahomet) was only the son of a slave. A 
 high officer of the Court was directed to drown the child in 
 a bath. This was effected at the very moment when the 
 mother was engaged in offering her congratulations to the 
 new Sultan on his accession. The foul deed created a very 
 bad impression, and Mahomet found it expedient to disown 
 the act. He did so by directing the execution of the officer 
 who had carried out his order. He compelled the mother, 
 in spite of her royal rank, to marry a slave, an outrageous 
 insult to the Serbian prince and to the memory of his father. 
 
 Erom the earliest moment of his accession it becanie 
 clear that Mahomet intended to signalize his reign by the 
 capture of Constantinople. With this view^, he came to 
 terms for a three years' truce with Hunyadi and the Hun- 
 garians. He chastised and then gave easy terms to the 
 Karamanians, and accepted as a wife the daughter of their 
 prince. He sent an army to the Peloponnesus to prevent 
 the two brothers of the Greek Emperor, who were rulinig 
 there, from lending their aid to the Greeks of Constantinople. 
 He directed the erection of a great fortress on the European 
 side of the Bosphorus, at its narrowest point opposite to 
 another, which had been erected by Bayezid, very near to 
 the capital, so as to command the Straits. When the Greek 
 Emperor sent an envoy to protest against this, Mahomet 
 replied : — 
 
 I make no threats against your city. By assuring the safety of my 
 country I am not infringing any treaty. Have you forgotten the
 
 MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' 75 
 
 extremity to which my father was reduced when your Emperor, in league 
 with the Hungarians, endeavoured to prevent his crossing to Europe by 
 closing the Slrails against iiim ? Murad was compelled to ask for the 
 assistance of the Genoese. I was at Adrianople at the time and was 
 very young. The Mussulmans were in great alarm and you Greeks 
 insulted them. My father took an oath at the battle of Varna to erect a 
 fort on the European side. This oath I v.ili fulfil. Have you the right or 
 the power to prevent my doing what I wish on my own territory ? 'I'he 
 two sides of the Straits are mine — that of Asia Minor because it is peopled 
 by Ottomans, that of Europe because you are unable to defend it. Tell 
 your master that the Sultan who now reigns in no way resembles his 
 predecessors. My power goes beyond their vows. I permit you now to 
 withdraw, but in the future I will have flayed alive those who bring me 
 such messages." 
 
 No more envoys were sent to him after this by the Greeks. 
 Their Emperor, Constantiiie — the last of his line — had suc- 
 ceeded his brother three years before the accession of 
 Mahomet. He was a brave and conscientious prince, who 
 gave lustre to the last days of the Empire. But he was most 
 unwise and provocative in his conduct to the new Sultan, 
 evidently under the belief that he had to deal with the 
 inexperienced youth who had been displaced by Murad 
 six years previously. He threatened to let loose, as a rival 
 claimant to the Ottoman throne, Orkhan, a grandson of 
 Bayezid, who was imder his cliarge, if a larger allowance 
 was not given for his maintenance. Mahomet contemptu- 
 ously rejected the claim. The Grand V^izier, Khalil, who 
 was suspected of being in the pay of the Greeks, warned 
 the Emperor of his extreme folly. " Your madness," he 
 said to the Greek ambassador, " will put Constantinople 
 in the hands of the Sultan. Proclaim Orkhan Sultan in 
 Europe, call in the Hungarians to your aid, retake what 
 provinces you can, and you will speedily see the end of the 
 Greek Empire." 
 
 The new fortress was completed in the autumn of 1452. 
 It was then seen that, in combination with the fortress on 
 the opposite shore, it gave complete command of the Straits 
 to the Ottomans. Venetian vessels which attempted to 
 pass were captured and their crews were sawn in halves. 
 Mahomet then declared his intention to attack Constan- 
 tinople. In an address to his principal pashas, after 
 describing the conquests made by his predecessors in 
 
 ' Von Hammer, ii. p. 379.
 
 76 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Europe and Asia, he pointed out that the great barrier to 
 further progress was this city and the army of the Emperor. 
 
 Tlie opposition [he said] must be ended ; these barriers must be 
 removed. It was for them to complete the work of their fathers. They 
 had now against them a single city, one which could not resist their 
 attacks ; a city whose population was greatly reduced and whose former 
 wealth had been diminished by Turkish sieges, and by the continued 
 incursions made by his ancestors upon its territories ; a city which was 
 now only one in name, for in reality its buildings were useless and its 
 walls abandoned and for the great part in ruins. Even from its weakness, 
 however, they knew that from its favourable position, commanding both 
 land and sea, it had greatly hindered their progress and could still 
 hinder it, opposing their plans and being always ready to attack them. 
 Openly or secretly it had done all it could against them. It was the city 
 which had brought about the attack by Timerlaneand the suffering which 
 followed. It had instigated Hunyadi to cross the Danube, and on every 
 occasion and in every possible manner had been their great enem)'. The 
 time had now come when, in his opinion, it should be captured or wiped 
 off the face of tlie earth. One of two things : he would either have it 
 within his Kmpire or he would lose both. With Constantinople in his 
 possession, the territories already gained could be safely held and more 
 would be obtained ; without it, no territory that they possessed was safe.' 
 
 In the ensuing winter (1452) Mahomet made every pre- 
 paration at Adrianople for a campaign in the next year. 
 Having no means of casting cannons, which at that time 
 were coming into use in European armies, he tempted a 
 Wallachian, who was experienced in such work, and who 
 was in the service of the Greeks, to come over to his side 
 for higher pay, and devised with him a cannon of enormous 
 size, firing stone balls of 2h feet in diameter, and many 
 other smaller, but still large, guns throwing balls of 150 lb. 
 weight, for use against the walls of Constantinople. He 
 also constructed a large fleet of war vessels propelled by 
 oars, biremes and triremes, to be used in the siege of the 
 city. He was most active and eager, working day ,and 
 night in concerting plans with his generals for his great 
 purpose. Early in the following year (1453) he collected in 
 front of the walls of Constantinople an army, estimated at 
 a hundred and fifty thousand men, including twelve thousand 
 Janissaries, and a vast number of irregulars and camp 
 followers eager for the sack of the great city. 
 
 • Sir Edwin Pears, Destruction of the Greek Empire, p. 217.
 
 MAHOxMET If, 'THE CONQUEROR' -j-j 
 
 Constantiiie, on his part, was equally engaged in making 
 preparations for the defence of his capital. He collected 
 supplies of every kind. He did his best to repair and 
 strengthen the walls of the city, which had been neglected 
 and badly repaired by fraudulent Greek contractors. He 
 invited the aid of the Christian princes of Western Europe 
 for the coming struggle. In this view, and in the hope of 
 getting full support from the Pope, he agreed to a scheme 
 of union between the Greek and Latin Churches, in which 
 everything was conceded to the latter. A great service 
 was held at St. Sophia to ratify this union. Cardinal 
 Isidore, the legate of the Pope, a Greek by birth, presided. 
 It was attended by the Emperor and all his Court, clergy, 
 and the officers of State. This gave great offence to the 
 main body of the Greek clergy, and to the great majority 
 of the people of Constantinople. There was implacable 
 hatred between the members of the two Churches, and not 
 even the grave peril of the State could induce them to com- 
 pose their differences. St. Sophia was deserted by its 
 congregation. It was thought to be polluted by the service.' 
 The Grand Duke Notaras, the second person in tTie State 
 after the Emperor, in command of all the forces, was 
 specially offended. He even" went the length of saying 
 in public that he would rather see the turban of the Turks 
 at Constantinople than the hat of a cardinal. It resulted 
 that the Greeks wene divided into two parties. Priests 
 refused to give the sacrament to dying men not of their 
 party. The Churches refused to contribute out of their 
 vast wealth to necessities of the State. Constantine was 
 seriously embarrassed and weakened by the division among 
 his people. Of a total population of the city, reduced 
 as it was, as compared with the past, and estimated at 
 a hundred thousand, not more than six thousand took up 
 arms in support of Constantine against the Turks. 
 
 The appeals to the Western Powers resulted in a certain, 
 but very insufficient, number of volunteers from Southern 
 Europe giving their services to support the Greek cause 
 in its final struggle with the Moslems. Seven hundred 
 Genoe=:e came under the command of Giustiniani, an able 
 
 ' The four pages which Gibbon devotes to a description of this 
 attempted union of the two Churches arc masterpieces of irony and scorn 
 (Gibbon, viii. pp. 287-91).
 
 78 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 soldier of fortune, who proved to be the main support of 
 Constantine. Others had come with Cardinal Isidore, at the 
 instance of the Pope, and with some small amount of money 
 from the same quarter. There were Catalans and ,\ragonese 
 from Spain, but the number of these recruits from Western 
 Europe did not exceed three thousand. The total force 
 under the command of Constantine for the defence of the city 
 amounted to no more than eight thousand. It is strange 
 that there were no volunteers from France and Germany, 
 or from Hungary and Poland, from whence so many 
 crusaders had volunteered in previous years to drive the 
 Turks out of Europe. Nor was there any valid assistance 
 in men and money from the numerous Greeks in the Levant. 
 The unfortunate Constantine was not only very deficient 
 in men, but his resources in money were very lov/. He 
 had, however, in his service twenty powerful galleys well 
 manned, and three galleys had come from Venice. 
 
 It would seem that the cause of Constantine did not much 
 interest Europe, and did not even meet with an effective 
 support among the Greeks themselves. 
 
 The city of Constantinople^ as it then existed, was situate 
 between the Golden Horn, its great harbour, and the sea of 
 Marmora. Its land frontage, distant about nine miles from 
 the entrance to the harbour, was four miles in length. It 
 was protected by a triple line of walls, the two inner of 
 which were very massive, flanked by towers at distances of 
 170 feet. There was a space of 60 feet between these 
 walls. The third and outer wall was a crenelated breastwork 
 on the other side of a fosse, of a width of 60 feet. This 
 powerful line of defence had been devised by the Emperor 
 Theodosius 11 about a thousand years ago and had protected 
 the city in twenty sieges. Before the invention of cannon it 
 was practically impregnable.' There were also fortifica- 
 tions extending for about nine miles on the side of the 
 Golden Horn. The eight thousand men were too few even 
 for effective defence of the four miles of walls, which were 
 to be attacked directly by the Ottoman army, to say nothing 
 of the fortifications along the side of the Golden Horn. 
 The defence, however, with these limited means, was a 
 
 ' The writer, in i8qo, had the ndvantaec of viewinij what remained of 
 these walls in the company of Sir Edwin Pears, who has fully described 
 them in his admirable account of the great siege.
 
 MAHOxMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' 79 
 
 spirited one. It showed that if the Greek Emperor had 
 been adequately supported by the Western Powers ?*Iahomct 
 might not have been able to capture the city. 
 
 The siege was commenced by Mahomet on April 6, 
 1453. Much time had been occupied in conveying the 
 cannon from Adrianople. There were two very interesting 
 incidents in the siege which are worth recording. The one 
 was the breaking of the close blockade of the port by four 
 powerful and well -manned Genoese galleys, bringing pro- 
 visions and stores to the beleaguered city from Chios. They 
 sailed across the Marmora and up the Bosphorus with a 
 strong breeze in their favour. The Sultan sent against 
 them a hundred and forty of his fleet of smaller vessels 
 propelled by oars. They found great difficulty in stemming 
 the heavy sea. The four larger Genoese vessels came down 
 on the smaller craft, crashing against them and shivering 
 their oars. Their crews hurled big stones on the Turkish 
 galleys and emitted against others the inextinguishable fire 
 of which the Greeks had the secret. The Turkish boats 
 could make no headway against the superior weight of the 
 bigger vessels. A large number of them were sunk with 
 serious loss of life. When near to the entrance of the 
 harbour the wind died off and the Genoese vessels were 
 in imminent peril, surrounded as they were by the numerous 
 Turkish craft. But at the last moment an evening breeze 
 sprang up. The Genoese vessels were able to force their 
 way through. The chain which prevented ingress to the 
 harbour was lowered, and the relieving vessels were admitted. 
 
 The Sultan had watched the naval battle from the shore. 
 He spurred his horse some distance into the shallow sea 
 in the hope of animating his sailors to greater efforts. He 
 was bitterly disappointed at this first engagement of his new 
 fleet. The next morning he sent for the admiral, Balta 
 Oghh, a sturdy Bulgarian by birth, and bitterly reproached 
 him for his failure. He directed the admiral to be laid 
 on the ground and held there by four strong men, while he 
 was bastinadoed. Some historians state that the Sultan 
 himself belaboured the unfortunate admiral with his mace. 
 
 The other incident, growdng out of the naval defeat, 
 was that Mahomet, on finding that his small craft, pro- 
 pelled only by oars, were of little effect against the powerful 
 vessels at the disposal of the Greeks, determined to transfer 
 a large number of them from, the Bosphorus to the upper
 
 ■go THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 part of the harbour, where the bigger vessels could 
 not engage them, owing to the shallow depth of water, 
 and where they would be of use against the inner defence 
 of the city. For this purpose Mahomet directed the con- 
 struction of a broad plank road from Tophane, on the 
 Bosphorus, across the hill intervening between it and the 
 head of the Golden Horn. This road was well greased with 
 tallow, and the vessels were dragged up it with wind- 
 lasses and oxen. The descent on the other side of the 
 hill was easy enough. The scheme was not quite a novelty, 
 as an operation of the same kind, though on a smaller scale, 
 had been attempted elsewhere. It was carried out with 
 striking success ; and in one night eighty of the Turkish 
 galleys were transferred in this way to the upper harbour. 
 Mahomet also constructed a pontoon bridge across the 
 harbour, on which batteries were erected. The two schemes 
 together enabled him to attack the Greek defences along 
 the line of the harbour, and compelled Constantine to 
 withdraw many men from the defence of the landward 
 walls, where the main attack was made.' 
 
 The young Sultan took a most active part in the siege 
 work. He traced the lines of fourteen batteries from which 
 the walls were bombarded. The first great cannon was 
 a failure. It burst at the first shot and blew to pieces 
 the Wallachian who had cast it. It was recast, however, 
 and two others of the same size were also cast. About two 
 hundred smaller guns were used. They threw stone balls ' 
 against the walls and towers of the city, and ultimately 
 succeeded in effecting a breach. There can be no doubt 
 that the capture of the city was mainly dkie to the provision 
 of these great guns, which were far above anything pre- 
 viously used against fortresses. The Greeks also used 
 cannons in defence, but the parapets of the walls were 
 not wide enough to allow of the recoil of the guns, and 
 where it was possible to use them the walls suffered from 
 the concussion. Gunpowder was also deficient. 
 
 After seven weeks of siege the bombardment effected 
 breaches in the walls at three points such as to give 
 Mahomet every hope of success in a final assault. The 
 
 • Stone balls of considerable size were used by the Turks to defend the 
 Dardanelles up to a late date. When in 1855 the writer visited the forts 
 there, he observed that they were still provided for some of the'guns.
 
 MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' 8t 
 
 principal breach was at St. Romanus, where the outer of 
 the two main walls was practically levelled for a length of 
 four hundred yards, and four of the flanking towers were 
 destroyed. The broad ditch was filled in part by the 
 debris of the wall and in part by fascines. The Sultan 
 decided that the assault should take place on May 29th. 
 This became known to the Greeks in the city, and both 
 sides made every preparation for a supreme effort. 
 
 On the 28th, Mahomet ordered a proclamation to be 
 made to his troops, to the effect that when the city was 
 captured it would be given up to them to sack at their 
 will for three days. The Sultan, it said, had sworn by 
 the everlasting God, by the four thousand prophets, by 
 Mahomet, and by his own soul that the whole population 
 of the city, men, women, and children, should be given 
 over to them. This was received by the troops with 
 tumultuous expressions of delight. 
 
 On the same day the Sultan reviewed his army in 
 three divisions, each of fifty thousand men, and after- 
 wards received in his tent all the leaders, military and 
 naval. He made a speech to them in which he an- 
 nounced his intention to make a final assault on the 
 city on the next day, explained to them the method 
 of attack, and gave his final orders. He enlarged on 
 his promise to give to the troops the plunder of the city. 
 
 In the city [he said] there was an infinite amount and variety of wealth 
 of all kinds — treasure in the palaces and private houses, churches 
 abounding in furniture of silver, gold, and precious stones. All were 
 to be theirs. There were men of high rank and in great numbers who 
 could be captured and sold as slaves ; there were great numbers of ladies 
 of noble families, young and beautiful, and a host of other women who 
 could either be sold or taken into their harems. There were boys of 
 good family. There were houses and beautiful gardens. " I give you 
 to-day a grand and populous city, the capital of the ancient Romans, the 
 very summit of splendour and of glory, which has become, so to say, 
 the centre of the world. I give it over to you to pillage, to seize its 
 incalculable treasure of men, women, and boys, and everything that 
 adorns it. You will henceforward live in great happiness and leave 
 great wealth to your children. The great gain to all the sons of Othman 
 would be the conquest of a city wliose fame was great throughout the 
 world. The greater its renown, the greater would be the glory of taking 
 it by assault. A great city which had always been their enemy, which 
 hud ahvays looked upon them with :i hostile eye, which in every way had
 
 82 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 sought to destroy tlie Turi;i.sli povvci", would come into their possession. 
 The door would be open to tlieni by its capture to conquer the whole of 
 the Greek Empire." ' 
 
 We have quoted this speech of Mahomet as further proof 
 that plunder and the capture of men, women, and boys for 
 sale or for their harems, and not religious fanaticism, was 
 the main incentive to Moslem conquest. 
 
 The night before the assault was spent by the Turks in 
 rejoicing. Their camp was illuminated. Very different was 
 the action of the Greeks on this last day of their Empire. 
 There was a religious procession through the city, in which 
 every one whose presence was not required in defence of 
 the walls took part and joined in prayer, imploring God 
 not to allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. 
 Eikons and relics were paraded. At the close of the 
 procession the Emperor Constantine addressed a gathering 
 of nobles and military leaders. He called attention to 
 the impending assault. He said : — 
 
 It had always been held the duty of a citizen to be ready to die either 
 for his faith, his coimtry, his sovereign, or his wife and children. All 
 these incentives to heroic sacrifice were now combined. The city was 
 the refuge for all Christians, the pride and joy of every Greek, and of all 
 who lived in Eastern lands. It was the Queen of Cities, the city which, 
 in happy times, had subdued nearlj- all the lands under the sun. The 
 enemy coveted it as his chief prize. He had provoked the war. He 
 had violated all his engagements in order to obtain it. He wished to put 
 the citizens under his yoke, to take them as slaves, to convert the holy 
 churches, where the divine Trinity was adored and the most holy 
 Godhead worshipped, into shrines for his blasphemj', and to put the false 
 prophet in the place of Christ. As brothers and fellov;-soldiers it was 
 their dut)^ to fight bravely in the defence of all that was dear to them, to 
 remember that they were the descendants of the heroes of ancient Greece 
 and Rome, and so conduct themselves that their memory should be as 
 fragrant in the future as that of their ancestors. . . . For himself, he was 
 determined to die in its defence. ... He and they should put their trust 
 in God, and not, as did their enemy, in the multitude of his hordes. 
 
 In the evening a solemn service was held at St. Sophia, 
 memorable as the last Christian service before its con- 
 version into a Turkish mosque. The Emperor and his 
 followers partook of the Sacrament and bade farewell to 
 
 ' Speech of Mahomet recorded by the historian Christobulus, quoted 
 by Sir Edwin Pears, pp. 323-4.
 
 MAHOMET II, ' THE CONQUEROR ' 8 
 
 J 
 
 the Greek Patriarch. It was a memorable scene — a 
 requiem service for the Empire which was about to 
 expire. Later the Emperor paid a last visit to his palace 
 and bade farewell there to its staff. It was a most 
 touching occasion. One who was present there wrote of 
 it : " If a man had been made of wood or stone, he must 
 have wept at the scene." It is very certain that the 
 Emperor had no hope of saving the city from capture by 
 its mortal foes . 
 
 Very early in the morning of the next fateful day, 
 the 29th May, 1453, the final assault was delivered by the 
 Turkish army. The scheme of the Sultan was to attack the 
 walls of the city at many points, from both land and sea, 
 but to make the main assault on the part of the wall which 
 had been so much injured by the cannon in the Lycus 
 Valley, near the gate of St. Romanus, and then, by suc- 
 cessive waves of his vastly greater army, to overwhelm 
 the defenders, using first his inferior troops, and reserving 
 his best for the last attack, when the enemy would be 
 wearied by long fighting. The first assault was made 
 by an immense horde of irregulars, armed with bows and 
 arrows, and with slings throwing stones and iron balls. 
 Gunpowder, though already used for cannon, was not yet 
 applied to muskets. The men adv^anced with scaling- 
 ladders for the assault, and a cloud of arrows darkened 
 the sky. No more than two thousand Greeks could be 
 spared to defend this part of the long line of fortifica- 
 tions. They were collected in the peribolus between the 
 two walls. The gates in the inner wall were closed, so that 
 these men had no opportunity of shirking the defence and 
 retreating into the city. They had to fight for their very 
 fives between the two walls. 
 
 The Sultan directed the great cannon to be brought 
 to the edge of the fosse, and a shot from it broke down 
 the stockade which had been erected in place of the 
 outer wall. Under cover of the dust the Turks made 
 the assault. They were bravely met by the defenders, 
 and were driven back with heavy loss. A second assault 
 was then made by the Anatolian infantry, a very superior 
 force to the irregulars. But they were no more successful. 
 The Sultan, thinking that the Greeks must be exhausted 
 by these two assaults, then personally led a third great 
 body of me,n to a third assault. It consisted of his
 
 §4 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Janissaries. He led them to the edge of the fosse, and 
 thence directed their attack. The cannon was used again 
 against the stockade, and again under cover of the dust 
 caused by it the Janissaries made their assault. Some of 
 them succeeded in getting over the stockade, and a hand- 
 to-hand fight occurred betw^een them and the Greeks. The 
 defenders seemed to have the best of it. But at this crisis 
 a grave misfortune occurred to the Greeks. Giustiniani, 
 who commanded them, was severely wounded. Blood 
 flowed freely from his wounds. He decided to leave the 
 field of battle and return to his ship in the harbour, for 
 medical relief. The Emperor Constantine, who was near 
 by, in vain implored him to remain, pointing out to him 
 the damaging effect his departure would have on the 
 soldiers who remained. Others thought that the wounds 
 were not very serious and that the general was not justified 
 in leaving the field. But he insisted on doing so, and 
 demanded the key of the gate in the inner wall. With 
 him departed some of his Genoese soldiers. This defection 
 caused dismay and depression among the troops. Their 
 resistance to the Turks slackened. 
 
 Some Greek historians accuse Giustiniani of cowardice 
 in deserting the battle at so critical a moment, and Gibbon 
 lends the weight of his great authority to this. The reputa- 
 tion, however, of the famous Italian soldier has been vindi- 
 cated by later historians, such as Mr. Finlay and Sir 
 Edwin Pears. They have shown that Giustiniani died of 
 his wounds within a few days of the capture of Constanti- 
 nople, the best proof of their serious and fatal character. 
 All the same, he may not have sufficiently appreciated the 
 effect of his withdrawal on the soldiers. It might have 
 been better to have died there rather than on board his 
 ship. However that might have been, all are agreed that 
 the departure of the general was the turning-point of the 
 day, and that it had the worst effect on the soldiers engaged 
 in the defence. 
 
 The Emperor did his utmost to retrieve the position. 
 He took upon himself the charge vacated by Giustiniani, 
 and led the defence. Mahomet, on his part, had observed 
 from the other side of the fosse the slackening of the 
 defence. He called out to the Janissaries : " We have 
 the city ! It is ours ! The wall is undefended! " He 
 urged them to a final effort. They rushed the stockade
 
 IVIAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUEROR' 85 
 
 and effected an entry into the peribolus. Soon great swarms 
 of others followed, and overwhelmed the defenders with 
 their vast numbers. The Emperor, despairing of success, 
 threw aside his imperial mantle. He called out, " The 
 city is taken and I am still alive ! " Drawing his sword, 
 he threw himself into the melee. He died lighting 
 gloriously for his city and his Empire. His body was 
 never found, though search was made for it by order of 
 the Sultan. The Greek and Italian soldiers in the peribolus 
 were now completely outnumbered. There was no exit 
 through the inner wall by which they could escape. They 
 were in a trap between the two walls. They were 
 massacred to a man. The Janissaries, having effected this, 
 found no difficulty in making their way through the inner 
 wall, which, as we have explained, was not defended owing 
 to the want of men. 
 
 All attacks on other parts of the city were failures. 
 This one alone succeeded. Victory here was due in part 
 to the good generalship of Mahomet and to his indomitable 
 persistency, and in part to the ill -fortune of the Greeks 
 in the withdrawal of Giustiniani at the critical moment of 
 the defence. The defenders of the city had nobly per- 
 formed their duty. Their numbers were quite insufficient. 
 They had received no adequate support from Western 
 Europe, or even from the neighbouring Christian States. 
 It is quite certain that a few thousand more soldiers would 
 have saved the city. Thirty galleys sent by the Pope 
 with reinforcements were on their way when the city 
 fell. They had been detained at Scio by adverse wind. 
 " Auxilium deus ipse negavit," says the Greek historian. 
 
 When the Turks entered the city they began to massacre 
 all the persons they met in the streets, without distinction 
 of age or sex. But there was practically no resistance. 
 There were no armed men left in the city. The popu- 
 lation was cowed and panic-stricken, as well they might 
 be in face of the overwhelming misfortune which now 
 came upon them. After a short period of massacre the 
 Turks turned their attention to the more practical business 
 of looting and taking captives for sale. They effected 
 this in a deliberate and systematic way. One great band 
 of soldiers devoted themselves to plundering the palaces of 
 the wealthy, another to the churches, and a third to 
 the shops and smaller houses. Everything of value was
 
 86 THE TURKISH EiMPIRE 
 
 gathered together for subsequent division among the 
 soldiers. Of the inmates of the palaces and houses the 
 older people were put to death ; the stronger and younger 
 of both sexes were carried off in bands as prisoners^ bound 
 together with ropes, with a view to ultimate sale as slaves. 
 The Turkish historian, Seaddedin, in words which seem 
 to smack of pleasure at the scene, says : — 
 
 Having received permission to loot, the soldiers thronged into the city 
 with joyous hearts, and there, seizing the possessors and their families, they 
 made the wretched unbelievers weep. They acted in accordance with 
 the precept, " Slaughter their aged and capture their youth." ' 
 
 The gravest misfortunes fell upon the wealthier and 
 more cultured classes in the city. Their daughters and 
 sons were torn from them to be sold to harems in Asia 
 Minor, or for other vile purposes. The parents, if still 
 strong, were sold as slaves. Numbers of them lied from 
 their houses and crowded into St. Sophia and other churches, 
 hoping that their foes would respect places of worship, 
 or expecting that a miracle of some kind would save 
 them. But it was in vain. St. Sophia acted as a kind 
 of drag-net in which all the best in the city were collected, 
 and were carried off thence in gangs. Virgins consecrated 
 to God were dragged from this and other churches by their 
 hair and were ruthlessly stripped of every ornament they 
 possessed . A horde of savage brutes committed unnameable 
 barbarities. 
 
 The city was cleared of everything of value and was all 
 but denuded of its population. By the lowest estimate, 
 fifty thousand persons, mostly the strong and the young 
 of both sexes, were made captives, and later were sold 
 as slaves and deported to Asia Minor. Some few escaped 
 from the city into the country districts. Others found 
 refuge in the Greek and Genoese galleys in the harbour, 
 which were able to get away and escape because the 
 crews of the Turkish vessels blockading the port had 
 deserted in order to take part in the sack. Some were 
 able to hide themselves in the city, and emerged later 
 when the scene of horrors was at an end. Others, we 
 know not how many, were ruthlessly massacred because 
 they were of no value for sale. The proceeds of the sack 
 
 ' Quoted by Pears, p. 303.
 
 MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUERORS 87 
 
 and of the sale of captives brought wealth to every soldier 
 in the Turkish army. No such dire misfortune to a 
 city had occurred since the destruction of Carthage. 
 
 After three days and nights of these orgies the Sultan 
 intervened and proclaimed an end of them. Meanwhile, on 
 the day of the last assault, when his troops were in posses- 
 sion of the city, the Sultan rode into it. He went direct to 
 St. Sophia, and, dismounting, entered the great church. He 
 took pains at once to prevent any destruction of its con- 
 tents, and himself struck down a soldier engaged in this 
 work, telling him that buildings were reserved for him- 
 self. He instructed a mollah to call people to prayer 
 from the pulpit. He thus inaugurated the conversion of 
 the splendid Christian church into a mosque. 
 
 After this he sent for Notaras, who had been in command 
 of the Greek forces under the Emperor, and affected to 
 treat him with generosity. He obtained a list of all the 
 leading men in the city and offered a large reward for 
 their heads. 
 
 On the next day the Sultan made an inspection of the 
 city and paid a visit to the Imperial Palace. On entering 
 it he quoted the lines from a Persian poet : — 
 
 The spider's web hangs before tlie portal of Ccesar's palace, 
 The owl is the sentinel on the watch-tower. 
 
 Later he presided at a great banquet, where he appears 
 to have imbibed too freely of wine. When half -drunk 
 he directed the chief eunuch to go to Notaras and demand 
 of him his youngest son, a handsome lad of fourteen. 
 Notaras refused, preferring death to dishonour for his son. 
 The Sultan thereupon ordered Notaras and all his family 
 to be put to death at once. Their heads were struck off 
 and brought to the banquet and placed before the Sultan 
 as a decoration of his table. 
 
 It was said that the Sultan's ferocity was stimulated 
 by the last favourite of his harem, with whom he was 
 much enamoured, and that she, on her part, was instigated 
 by her father, a Greek renegade. Under this influence 
 the Sultan ordered the execution of all the persons to whom 
 on the previous day he had promised liberty. The Papal 
 legate. Cardinal Isidore, escaped recognition and was sold 
 as a slave by a soldier for a mean price. Pic was later
 
 88 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ransomed. Orkhan, the grandson of Bayezid, who had 
 been brought up as a Christian at the Imperial Court, 
 committed suicide rather than be sold as a slave. 
 
 Although many cruel deeds were committed by the 
 Sultan and his soldiers, and a terrible calamity fell upon 
 the whole community of Greeks, it cannot be said that 
 the capture of Constantinople was the scene of such 
 infamous orgies as took place in 1204, when it was 
 captured by the Crusaders. After the first few hours of 
 entry there was on this occasion no general massacre. 
 There was not much incendiarism. The Sultan did his 
 best, successfully, to save the churches and other buildings. 
 Although the young Sultan was most brutal in some of 
 his actions, he showed in others remarkable foresight and 
 statesmanship. One of his earliest acts, after putting an 
 end to the sack of the city, was to proclaim himself as 
 protector of the Greek Church. A charter was granted 
 to the Orthodox members of that Church securing to 
 the use of it some of the churches in the capital, and 
 authority to celebrate in them religious rites according to 
 their ancient usage. It also gave to them a certain amount 
 of autonomy in civil matters. It recognized their laws of 
 marriage and of succession to property and gave jurisdic- 
 tion to the Patriarch and to Ecclesiastical Courts to enforce 
 them , 
 
 The m.ost eminent survivor of the Greek clergy, 
 Gemiadius, was sought for. He had been sold as a slave 
 after the sack of the city to a pasha at Adrianople. He 
 was brought back to Constantinople and was invested by 
 the Sultan with the office of Patriarch of the Greek Church. 
 Mahomet, in doing so, said : " I appoint you Patriarch. 
 May Heaven protect you. In all cases and all occasions 
 count on my friendship and enjoy in peace all the privi- 
 leges of your predecessors." This was a most vvise and 
 opportune act of policy. The Sultan had been advised 
 by fanatics among the Turks to order a general massacre 
 of Greeks and others who would not embrace Islam. 
 Mahomet's record shows that he would have sanctioned 
 this if he had thought it for the interest of the State, and 
 he would probably have revelled in it. In pursuance of 
 a deliberate policy of enlightened statecraft he rejected 
 this advice. It was necessary to repeople his capital and 
 to attract others than Turks to it. Mahomet was also
 
 MAHOMET 11, ' THE CONQUEROR ' 89 
 
 ambitious of further conquests in Europe. He recognized 
 that the attempt to force a wholesale change of religion 
 on the vanquished would stimulate their resistance, while 
 a wise tolerance might weaken it. When the Prince of 
 Serbia asked Hunyadi, the Hungarian patriot, what he would 
 do with the Orthodox Greek Church if he made himself 
 master of that province, the reply was, " I will establish 
 everywhere Catholic churches." The reply of Mahomet 
 to a similar question was, " By the side of every mosque 
 a church shall be erected in which your people will be 
 able to pray." 
 
 This great act of tolerance of Mahomet was far ahead 
 of the political ethics of the Christian Powers of Europe at 
 that time. His example was not followed by the Spaniards, 
 when they drove from their country the Moslem Moors, 
 who had refused to adopt the religion of their victors. 
 The action of Mahomet is another proof that the Turkish 
 invasion of Europe was not actuated by religious fanaticism 
 or the desire to spread Islam. There seems to have been 
 no attempt to induce or compel the Greeks and others of 
 the conquered city to embrace Islam. 
 
 Mahomet also set to work, at an early date, to repeople 
 Constantinople. For a long time previous to the con- 
 quest its population had been dwindling. In proportion as 
 the Greek Empire was reduced by the loss of its territories, 
 so the importance of the capital was diminished. Mahomet 
 invited all who had fled after the capture to return, 
 promising protection to their property and religion . He 
 directed the transfer of families of Greeks, Jews, and Turks 
 from many parts of his Empire. When he took posses- 
 sion of Trebizond and the Morea, many thousands of 
 Greeks were forcibly removed to Constantinople. The same 
 was the case with many islands in the yEgean Sea. At 
 the end of his reign Constantinople was far more populous 
 and flourishing than it had been under the last Greek 
 Emperor. ■ " 
 
 Although the capture of Constantinople was the principal 
 feat in Mahomet's long reign, and that on which his fame 
 in history chiefly rests, it was, in fact, only the first of a 
 long list of conquests which earned for him from his country- 
 men the title par eminence of 'the Conqueror.' During 
 the thirty years of his reign he was almost always at war 
 in personal command of his armies, and there were very
 
 90 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 few in which he did not add fresh territory to his Empire, 
 either in Europe or Asia. 
 
 Bosnia and the Morea, which had become tributary States 
 under previous Sultans, were now again invaded and were 
 compelled to become integral parts of the Empire. Their 
 princes were dethroned and put to death. Wallachia and 
 the Crimea were forced to become vassal States. In Asia, 
 Karamania, iso long the rival and foe of the Ottomans, and 
 which, after many wars, had agreed to pay tribute, was 
 now forcibly annexed, and its Seljukian line of kings was 
 put an end to by death. The great city of Trcbizond and 
 its adjoining province of Cappadocia, which had been cut 
 off from the parent Empire, after the capture of Constanti- 
 nople by the Crusaders, and formed into a miniature 
 Empire, under the Comneni dynasty, was invaded and 
 annexed by Mahomet, and at his instance its reigning family 
 was put to death. The possessions of the Genoese on the 
 coasts of the Black Sea were seized and appropriated. 
 
 Many islands in the Greek Archipelago, including Lesbos, 
 Lemnos, and Cephalonia, were also attacked and annexed. 
 The same fate befell Eubcea . It belonged to the Republic 
 of Venice, which was also deprived of others of its posses- 
 sions on the coast of the Morea. Besides all these enter- 
 prises, Mahomet in several successive years sent armies to 
 ravage parts of Styria and Transylvania. He even sent an 
 army across the frontier of Italy to ravage the region of 
 Friuli, and other districts almost within sight of Venice, 
 whose Republic was compelled to enter into an ignominious 
 treaty, binding it to assist the Ottomans in other wars with a 
 naval force. The last achievement of the ambitious Sultan 
 was to send a force to the South of Italy, where it captured 
 Otranto. The only captures which Mahomet attempted with- 
 out success were those of Belgrade, in 1456, and the 
 island of Rhodes in 1480. The case of Belgrade yas 
 of the greatest importance, for it long barred the way to 
 the invasion of Hungary and Germany. The Sultan himself 
 took command of the army of attack wdth a hundred 
 and fifty thousand men and three hundred guns . He thought 
 the capture of it would be an easy task after that of 
 Constantinople. But Western Europe, which had rendered 
 so little assistance to the Greek Empire in its extremities, 
 was alarmed at the prospect of the invasion of Germany 
 through the loss of Belgrade. The Pope preached another
 
 MAHOMET II, 'THE CONQUERORS 91 
 
 crusade, and a large body of knights volunteered for the 
 defence of this frontier city. 
 
 Hunyadi led the Hungarians in this his last campaign. 
 The lower town was taken by the Turks after great loss 
 of life ; but the upper town made a protracted resistance. 
 The Christian knights in a notable sortie attacked the 
 batteries of the enemy, captured all the guns, and wounded 
 the Sultan himself. Mahomet was compelled to raise the 
 siege after losing fifty thousand men. It was the last feat 
 of the Hungarian patriot. He died twenty days after this 
 signal success. It was fifty years before Belgrade was 
 again attacked and captured and the road was opened for 
 the invasion of Hungary and Vienna. 
 
 In all these campaigns Mahomet personally led his armies 
 in the field, with the exception of those for the invasion 
 of the Crimea, the attack on Rhodes, and the capture 
 of Otranto, where he delegated the task to able generals, of 
 whom he appears to have had an abundant supply. But there 
 never was a great commander who more completely domi- 
 nated the generals under him and maintained his supremacy 
 in the State. He made no confidences as to his intended 
 military operations, or what were his immediate objects 
 of attack. There were no councils of war. His armies 
 were collected, year after year, on one side or other of 
 the Bosphorus, without any one knowing their destination. 
 When, on one occasion, one of his generals asked him 
 what was his next object, he replied that if a single hair 
 of his beard knew what his intentions were he would 
 pluck it out and cast it into the fire. He held secrecy and 
 rapidity to be the first elements of success in war, and he 
 acted on this principle. With the exception of the single 
 case of the invasion of Wallachia, the provocation for war 
 was in every case on the part of the Sultan. Invasion 
 and attack were preceded by laconic messages calling upon 
 the State or city aimed at to surrender, and the actual 
 attack was made with the shortest possible delay. 
 
 Having determined on war and invasion, his object was 
 pursued with the utmost vigour, and wholly regardless of 
 the loss of life. As a rule, his campaigns were short ; 
 but the war with Venice was an exception. It lasted for 
 many years. It consisted mainly of attacks on strong- 
 holds of the Republic in the islands of the Archipelago 
 and the coasts of Greece and Albania, where the fleets
 
 92 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of the two Powers played a large part. The conquest of 
 Albania also was only effected after a struggle spread 
 over many years, in which the patriot hero, Scanderbcg, 
 defeated successive attacks by Ottoman armies enormously 
 exceeding his native levies. It was not till after the death 
 of this great chief, in 1467, that Mahomet was able to 
 wear down opposition in Albania by sheer force of numbers. 
 
 Early in his reign Mahomet recognized the strategic 
 value of Constantinople. It became the keystone of his 
 Empire. He transferred the seat of his government to it 
 from Adrianople. He fortified the Dardanelles by the 
 erection of two castles on either side of it near to Sestos 
 and Abydos, each with thirty guns, which commanded 
 the Straits. This secured his capital from attack. It 
 prevented the entrance of a hostile fleet into the Sea of 
 Marmora and the Black Sea. He added greatly to his 
 navy, and made it superior to that of any other single 
 Pov/er in the Mediterranean. It gave him absolute supre- 
 macy in the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora. The 
 possessions of the Genoese in the Black Sea were at his 
 mercy. He sent a flotilla of small vessels up the Danube 
 to assist in the siege of Belgrade. 
 
 Throughout all his campaigns Mahomet exhibited perfidy 
 and cruelty on a scale almost without precedent. Princes, 
 generals, and armies, who capitulated on the promises of 
 safety of life and respect of property, were put to death 
 without compunction, in gross breach of faith. The in- 
 habitants of cities were sold into slavery or transferred 
 forcibly to Turkish dominions, in total disregard of solemn 
 pledges. 
 
 A notable case of this kind was that of Bosnia, where 
 the final victory was achieved by the Ottoman Grand Vizier, 
 in command of one of the armies engaged, under the 
 supreme command of the Sultan. The Prince of Bosnia 
 and his army capitulated on the distinct engagement in 
 writing that their lives would be spared. Mahomet was 
 full of wrath at this concession. It was his deliberate 
 policy to extinguish by death the family of any reigning 
 prince whom he vanquished in war. He consulted on 
 the point the Mufti, with doubtless a strong hint as to 
 what the answer should be. The Mufti issued a fetva 
 which declared that no treaty of this kind with an infidel 
 v/as binding on the Sultan . The holy man went so far
 
 MAHOMET II, ' THE CONQUEROR ' 93 
 
 as to offer himself to act as executioner. When the 
 Bosnian king was summoned to the presence of the Sultan, 
 and came before him trembling, with the treaty of capitula- 
 tion in his hand, the Mufti himself struck off his head in 
 the presence of the Sultan, exclaiming that it was a good 
 deed to put an end to an infidel. The fetva in this case 
 formed a precedent for numerous similar cases. The whole 
 of the royal family of Comnenus, the Emperor of Trebi- 
 zond, who, without a fight, surrendered his kingdom to 
 Mahomet, upon the promise of life and private property to 
 himself and his family, were put to death a few weeks 
 later in Constantinople on the most flimsy pretence. 
 
 In a similar way, when the island of Euboea was captured 
 from the Venetians in 1470 by the Sultan, the Venetian 
 garrison, supported by the Greek population, made a most 
 gallant defence and inflicted enormous losses on the Turks. 
 Paul Evizzo, the Venetian general in command of the island, 
 eventually surrendered on the promise of safety of life to 
 himself and his army. Mahomet broke his word. He 
 put to death the whole of the Venetian garrison by the 
 cruel method of impaling. The gallant Evizzo was, by 
 the Sultan's order, sawn in two. His daughter was sum- 
 moned to Mahomet's tent, and w*hen she refused to submit 
 to his lust, was put to death by his order. The island was 
 added to the Ottoman Empire in 1471. 
 
 It must be admitted that in all these conquests the 
 Ottoman armies were very greatly superior in number and 
 in armaments. In many cases they were also assisted 
 by the disunion of their opponents. The subjection of 
 Karamania was due to the death of its last king, Ibrahim, 
 who left seven sons behind him. Six of them were sons 
 of a wife of royal descent, the seventh the son of a slave. 
 The father favoured the youngest, whom he declared his 
 heir. The other six fought for their patrimony against the 
 youngest and besieged him in Konia, the capital. Mahomet 
 thought that this was a good opportunity to intervene 
 and to annex the whole country. Without any cause 
 of quarrel he marched an army of a hundred thousand 
 men into the country and waged war against all the sons. 
 The Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Pasha, was sent on in advance, 
 and defeated Ishak, the youngest son of Ibrahim, in front 
 of Konia. The terms of capitulation were thought by 
 Mahomet to be too humane. He determined to punish
 
 94 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Mahmoud for his leniency. The cords of his tent were 
 cut while the Vizier was asleep. The tent fell on Ithe 
 luckless sleeper. This was a sign of disgrace. Mahmoud, 
 who was a most able and successful general and statesman, 
 was removed from his post and was put to death. The 
 Karamanian dynasty, which for so long had been the 
 rival of that of Othman, was now completely subdued. 
 The country became a province of the Turkish Empire. 
 Its two principal cities were depopulated and lost their 
 splendour. It never again gave trouble to the Ottoman 
 government. 
 
 The country which suffered most from the cruelties of 
 Mahomet was Greece. Here, again, disunion was the main 
 cause of its ruin. Two brothers of Constantine, the last 
 Greek Emperor at Constantinople, Demetrius and Thomas, 
 held sway as tributaries of the Sultan, the one at 
 Argos, the other at Patras. Unmindful of the danger 
 which threatened them, they fought one another for supre- 
 macy, after the death of Constantine, and were assisted 
 in their internecine war by large numbers of turbulent 
 Albanians, who transferred their services, now to one and 
 now to another of these petty despots, and are said to 
 have changed sides three times in the course of a single 
 Sunday. Mahomet, in 1458, thinking that the disputes 
 between the two brothers afforded a good occasion for 
 getting full possession of the Morea, invaded it with a. 
 large force. The two brothers, instead of uniting to defend 
 the country, continued to fight against one another, and 
 attempted, at the same time, singly to fight against the 
 Turks. There followed scenes of massacre and rapine 
 as Mahomet's army passed through the country, besieging 
 and capturing successively its many petty strongholds. In 
 nearly every case, after vigorous resistance, capitulation 
 was offered and agreed to on promise of life to the 
 garrisons. In no case was the promise kept. As a rule, 
 the fighting -men were massacred after surrender, their 
 leaders were sawn in two, and the other inhabitants were sold 
 into slavery, or were in some cases transferred en masse 
 to Constantinople as colonists to fill the empty city. The 
 two brothers were driven from the country. Demetrius 
 appears to have made some kind of terms wdth the Sultan, 
 one of which was that his daughter should enter Mahomet's 
 harem. This promise was not kept ; she was not thought
 
 MAHOMET IF, 'THE CONQUEROR' 95 
 
 worthy of it, and she was insulted by being deprived of 
 the only eunuch who attended her. It is not stated what 
 became of her. Thomas fled from the country, carrying 
 with him, instead of treasure, a valuable relic, the head 
 of St. Andrew, with which he disappeared from history. 
 The Sultan possessed himself of the whole country, with 
 the exception of two or three seaports in the hands of the 
 Venetians. The memory of this cruel invasion of the 
 Turks was deeply impressed on the minds of the people 
 of Greece. But for 471 years, with a short interlude 
 when it was held by the Venetians, it remained a Turkish 
 province. 
 
 On his way back to Constantinople the Sultan passed 
 by Athens, where one Franco reigned as Duke, but 
 tributary to the Turks. He gave orders that Franco was 
 to be strangled. As a special favour this operation was 
 effected, not in the tent of the Turkish general, but in 
 his own domicile, and thus the last spark of Greek 
 independence passed away. 
 
 It is not perhaps fair to judge of Mahomet as regards 
 his cruelties and perfidies by a high standard. His 
 opponents, the chiefs of the countries he invaded and 
 conquered, were, in many cases, not inferior to him 
 in these respects. Scanderbeg, whose patriotic defence 
 of Albania won for him the reputation of a saint in his 
 own country, and a high place in history, was most cruel 
 and vindictive whenever he had the opportunity. He 
 habitually massacred the prisoners taken in his battles. 
 The two despots of the Morea were not behindhand in 
 this respect. The Prince, or Voivode as he was called, 
 of Wallachia, Wlad by name, was one of the most cruel 
 and bloodthirsty ruffians recorded in history. He was 
 known by the name of "the Impaler." He revelled in 
 the dying agonies of the prisoners and other victims whom 
 he subjected to this cruel death. They were reserved 
 for this purpose to enliven his banquets. When some 
 guest expressed surprise that he could bear the odour 
 emanating from the victims of this death, the prince 
 directed the immediate execution of his guest, on a 
 higher pale than the others, so that he might not be 
 incommoded by the odour he complained of. 
 
 Mahomet invaded Wallachia, in 1462, with an army of 
 two hundred thousand. In his pursuit of Wlad he came
 
 96 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 across a field where twenty thousand Turks and Bulgarians 
 had been put to death, one -half of them by impalement and 
 the other half by crucifixion. Mahomet defeated and drove 
 into ^exile this ruffian, and installed in his place a favourite 
 named JRadul, who had been brought up at his Court 
 as a page. On the death of this man Wlad turned up 
 again, but was killed by a slave. Wallachia, which 
 previously liad been compelled to pay tribute by Mahomet, 
 was now made a vassal State. The Sultan appointed its 
 prince. It was not otherwise treated as a Turkish province. 
 
 The failure of the Turkish general to capture the island 
 of Rhodes was said to be due to the fact that, just before 
 the final assault, after long resistance by the Knights who 
 held this island, the Turkish general issued an order to 
 the army that there was to be no pillage of the city, 
 wishing to reserve for the Sultan and himself the wealth 
 which might be captured. This dispirited the Turkish 
 soldiers, and they made no efifort for success in the assault. 
 The Knights again repulsed the -attack and the siege was 
 raised. It was not till 1520 that Rhodes was finally 
 captured , 
 
 Great as Mahomet was as a warrior and general, he 
 was not less conspicuous as an administrator and states- 
 man. The organization and provisioning of his armies 
 in his numerous campaigns were specially worthy of notice. 
 His soldiers were always well fed and were amply equipped 
 with guns and armaments. He was also the sole source of 
 legislation for his Empire. He had supreme power over life 
 and property of all his subjects. More than any of his pre- 
 decessors and successors, he founded mosques, hospitals, 
 colleges, and schools in Constantinople and other cities of 
 his Empire. He fully recognized the importance of science 
 in education. He cultivated the society of learned men 
 and loved to converse with them. He had some reputa- 
 tion ias a poet. With all this, he was notorious for evil and 
 sensual life in a direction which is held to be infamous 
 and (degrading by all peoples. He was not only himself 
 guilty of fratricide, but he prescribed it as a family law for 
 his successors. He died at the age of fifty-one, after thirty 
 years of reign. He had collected a great army for another 
 campaign, but no one knew what his aims and intentions 
 were, whether for another attack on Rhodes, or for the 
 invasion of Candia, or to follow up his success in Calabria.
 
 MAHOMET II, ' THE CONQUEROR ' 97 
 
 His secret died with him. He was the first Sultan to be 
 buried at Constantinople, in the famous mosque which he 
 built there. In spite of his cruelties and perfidies and 
 of his evil life, he has been held in honour by successive 
 generations of his countrymen, and has been rightly 
 designated as 'the Conqueror.'
 
 VIII 
 
 BAYEZID II 
 
 U81-1512 
 
 Mahomet left two sons, of whom the eldest, Bayezid, suc- 
 ceeded him as Sultan at the age of thirty-five. Von Hammer 
 and other historians, who have founded their narratives on 
 his great work, write of Bayezid in terms of disparagement 
 because, unlike other early Sultans of the Othman race, he 
 did not signalize his reign by any great additions to his 
 Empire. If success as a ruler is only to be measured by 
 territorial expansion, Bayezid must take rank in history 
 below the other nine Sultans who created the Ottoman 
 Empire and raised it to its zenith. A great Empire, how- 
 ever, such as that which the Ottomans had already achieved, 
 may be better served by peace than by war for further 
 conquests. It would certainly have been well for the Otto- 
 mans if no attempt had ever been made to extend their 
 Empire northwards beyond the Danube. Bayezid, so far 
 as we can gather his policy from his actual deeds, was not 
 favourable to expansion of his Empire. If he was engaged 
 for some years in war with Hungary, Venice, and Egypt, 
 he was not the aggressor. He came to terms of peace with 
 these Powers when it was possible to do so. He did not 
 support the army which, under his predecessor, had invaded 
 Italy and captured Otranto. He recalled the very able 
 general, Ahmed Keduk, who commanded it. Khaireddin 
 Pasha, who succeeded in command, after a most gallant 
 defence, was compelled to capitulate ; and never again was 
 Italy invaded by a Turkish army. It would seem to have 
 been a wise decision on the part of Bayezid not to pursue 
 further the Italian adventure. 
 
 As it is not our intention to write a complete history of 
 the Ottoman Sultans, but rather to describe the early expan- 
 
 98
 
 BAYEZID 11 99 
 
 sion of their Empire and its later dismemberment, it will not 
 be necessary to devote more than a very few pages to the 
 comparatively uneventful reign of Bayezid. It may be well, 
 however, briefly to note that he was of philosophic tempera- 
 ment, very austere in rehgion, and without his father's vices. 
 Like many of his race he was devoted to literary studies, 
 and he had a reputation as a poet. He was not wanting in 
 energy and valour when occasion required. He was, 
 however, the first of his race who did not habitually lead 
 his armies into the field. 
 
 His younger brother Djcm, who at the death of Mahomet 
 was only twenty -two years of age, was a much more fiery, 
 valorous, and ambitious soldier, and of more attractive 
 personality. He was of a romantic disposition, and had 
 a much greater reputation than Bayezid as a poet. His 
 poems rank high in Turkish literature. His strange 
 adventures and sad fate form one of the romances of Turkish' 
 history, which might well fill many chapters. It must 
 suffice to record of him that, like other brothers of Sultans 
 who were not at once put to death at the commencement 
 of a new reign, he took up arms and claimed the throne 
 against Bayezid. The latter fortunately was the first to 
 arrive at Constantinople after the death of Mahomet. He 
 there obtained the support of the Janissaries, not without 
 large presents to them. With the aid of Ahmed Keduk, 
 Bayezid, after vain efforts to come to terms with his 
 brother, was successful in putting down two rebellions of 
 a formidable character on behalf of Djem. After the 
 second defeat Djem filed to Egypt, and thence, after many 
 adventures, found his way to the island of Rhodes, where 
 he claimed the hospitality of the Knights of Jerusalem. 
 Their Grand Master, D'Aubusson, who had made such a 
 gallant defence of the island against Mahomet, and who 
 was a most brave warrior, was also a crafty and perfidious 
 intriguer. On the one hand, he induced Prince Djem to 
 enter into a treaty, by which very important concessions 
 were promised to the knights in the event of Djem being 
 able to gain the Ottoman throne. On the other hand, 
 D'Aubusson negotiated a treaty with Bayezid under which 
 he was to receive an allowance of 45,000 ducats a year, 
 nominally for the maintenance of Djem, but really as an in- 
 ducement to prevent the escape of that prince from Rhodes. 
 On the strength of this, the unfortunate prince was detained
 
 loo THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 as a virtual prisoner in Rhodes, and later in a castle at 
 Sasesnage, in France, belonging to the order of the Knights, 
 for not less than seven years. At the end of this time the 
 King of France, Charles VIII, intervened in favour of the 
 prince, and got him transferred into the keeping of the 
 Pope at Rome. The Pope Callixtus was also not above 
 making a good profit out of Djem. He came to terms 
 with Sultan Bayezid under which he was to pocket the 
 45,000 ducats a year so long as Djem was kept out of 
 mischief. On the death, some years later, of this Pope, his 
 successor, Pope Alexander Borgia, of infamous memory, 
 renewed the treaty with Sultan Bayezid, with the addition of 
 a clause that he was to receive a lump sum of 300,000 
 ducats if Prince Djem, instead of being detained as 
 prisoner, was put to death. After a short interval the 
 Pope, fearing the intervention of the King of France, on 
 behalf of Djem, and wishing to pocket the lump sum, con- 
 trived the death by poison of the prince. The menace to the 
 Sultan was thus at last removed, and his Empire was 
 spared another civil war, at a cost which by the ethics of 
 the day was no doubt fully justified. 
 
 Of other incidents in Bayezid's reign it is only necessary 
 to state that the most important of his achievements was 
 the complete subjection, in the second year of his reign, of 
 Herzegovina, which had been a tributary State under his 
 predecessors, but was now again invaded. It was finally 
 incorporated as a province of the Empire. There were 
 also many years of desultory war with Hungary, in which 
 frequent raids were made by the two Powers upon one 
 another's territories, and where each vied with the other 
 in atrocious cruelties. Everywhere children were impaled, 
 young women were violated in presence of their parents, 
 wives in presence of their husbands, and thousands of 
 captives were carried off and sold into slavery. But there 
 were no other results, and peace was eventually established 
 between the two Powers. 
 
 In Asia there was war for five years with the Mameluke 
 government of Egypt and Syria. The Mamelukes had sent 
 an army in support of an insurrection in Karamania. The 
 outbreak was put down, and the Karamanians were finally 
 subjected, but the Mamelukes defeated the Turkish armies 
 in three great battles. Peace was eventually made, but 
 only on concession by the Turks of three important fortresses 
 in Asia Minor. ' '^"
 
 BAYEZID n 101 
 
 There was also war with the Republic of Venice, in the 
 course of which the Turks succeeded in capturing the 
 three remaining Venetian fortresses in the Morea — Navarino, 
 Modon, and Coron — an important success which extinguished 
 the influence of Venice on the coasts of Greece. The 
 success was largely due to a great increase of the Turkish 
 navy, which in Mahomet's reign had achieved a supremacy 
 in the Mediterranean over any other single naval Power. 
 It now defeated the Venetian fleet in a desperate battle off 
 Lepanto in 1499, and met on equal terms the combined 
 fleets of Venice, Austria, and the Pope in 1500. It also 
 went farther afield, and at the entreaty of the Moors of 
 Grenada, who were severely pressed by the Christian army 
 in Spain, ravaged the coasts of that country. 
 
 The last two years of Bayezid's fairly prosperous reign 
 were obscured by another civil war, this time at the instance 
 of his son and successor, Selim. Selim was the youngest 
 of three surviving sons of Bayezid. All three had been 
 invested with important posts as governors of provinces 
 in Asia. Ahmed, the second of them, was the favourite of 
 his father, who designated him for succession to the throne. 
 But Selim was by far the ablest and most daring of them. 
 He determined to anticipate the death of his father, who 
 was ageing and in feeble health, by securing the throne for 
 himself. Leaving his seat of government with a large suite, 
 almost amounting to an army, he paid a visit, uninvited, 
 to his father at Constantinople, and there fomented intrigues. 
 He was the idol of the Janissaries, who were dissatisfied with 
 the long inaction of Sultan Bayezid, and hoped for new 
 conquests and loot under Selim. Bayezid, however, w-as 
 supported for the time by a section of his army, and suc- 
 ceeded in defeating his son. Selim then fled to the Crimea, 
 where he raised a new army and, later, again made his way 
 to Constantinople by a forced march round the north of 
 the Black Sea. On arriving there he was supported by the 
 full force of the Turkish army. 
 
 The Janissaries, at the instance of Selim, stormed at 
 the gates of the imperial palace and insisted on the 
 Sultan receiving them in person. Bayezid gave way 
 and admitted a deputation of them to an audience. 
 Seated on his throne, he asked them what they wanted. 
 "Our Padishah," they said, "is old and sickly; we 
 will that Selim shall be Sultan." Bayezid, finding
 
 102 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 that lie could not rely on any section of his army, 
 submitted. " I abdicate," he said, " in favour of my son, 
 Selim. May God grant him a prosperous reign." He 
 only asked as a favour that he might be allowed to retire 
 to the city of Asia Minor where he was born. His son 
 thereupon conducted his father, the ex -Sultan, to the out- 
 skirts of the city with every mark of respect, and Bayezid 
 departed on his journey. He died, however, three days 
 later, not without grave suspicion of foul play. The deposi- 
 tion of Bayezid is interesting and important as showing the 
 increasing power of the Janissaries. Only the strongest 
 Sultan could thenceforth cope with them, and they became 
 eventually one of the main causes of the decay of the 
 Empire which they had done so much to call into existence. 
 
 Bayezid, like others of his race, in spite of his philosophic 
 temperament and his love of ease, had a vein of cruelty. 
 It has been shown that he caused his brother Djem to be 
 poisoned. This was in accord with the family law. A 
 more serious instance was that he put to death his great 
 general, Ahmed Keduk, to whom he was deeply indebted for 
 success in putting down the insurrection of Djem. Ahmed 
 had deeply offended the Sultan by brusquely opposing his 
 peaceful policy, and Bayezid forcibly removed the incautious 
 critic. 
 
 The net result to the Turkish Empire of the thirty-one 
 years of Bayezid 's reign was, on the one hand, the incor- 
 poration of Herzegovina, and the expulsion of the Venetians 
 from the Morea ; on the other, the loss of three fortresses 
 in Asia Minor to the Mamelukes of Egypt and the with- 
 drawal from the South of Italy. 
 
 An incident worth recording was the first appearance of 
 Russia in the field of Turkish diplomacy. An ambassador 
 was sent to Bayezid by Czar Ivan III. He was instructed 
 to refuse to bow his knee to the Sultan or to concede prece- 
 dence to any other ambassadors. Bayezid meekly gave 
 way on these points of etiquette. This was a presage of 
 the attitude of Russia which two centuries later threatened 
 the existence of the Turkish Empire.
 
 IX 
 
 SELIM I 
 
 1512-20 
 
 On the forced abdication of Bayezid, Selim was proclaimed 
 Sultan at Constantinople, with the full support of the 
 Janissaries. He reigned for only eight years, but he 
 succeeded in this short time in more than doubling the 
 extent of the Ottoman Empire. He made no additions 
 to it in Europe, but he conquered and annexed the great 
 provinces of Diarbekir and Khurdistan from Persia, and 
 Egypt, Syria, and a great part of Arabia, including the 
 holy cities, from the Mameluke government of Egypt. He 
 commenced this career of war and conquest at the ripe 
 age of forty-seven. He proved to be a ruler and general 
 of indomitable will and vigour, the exact opposite to his 
 father in his greed for expansion of his Empire. He 
 was a most able administrator. He cared little for his 
 harem or other pleasures of life. Sleeping but little, he 
 spent his nights in literary studies. He delighted in 
 theological discussions and in the society of learned men, 
 and he appointed them to high offices in the State. They 
 had no efifect, however, in softening his evil nature. He 
 had no regard for human life, whether in war or in peace. 
 He was attended by men called mutes, who were ready 
 at any moment to strangle or decapitate on the spot any 
 person designated by him. His most trusted counsellors, 
 his oldest friends and associates, were in constant danger 
 of life. He met argument or protest against his schemes, 
 or criticism of his past actions, by instant death, not un- 
 frequently by his own hand. During' his short reign seven 
 of his Grand Viziers were decapitated by his orders. 
 Numerous other officials and generals shared the same 
 fate. They seldom enjoyed the sweets of office for more
 
 .104 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 than a few months. One of them, in playful reminder of 
 this to Selim, asked to be given a short notice of his 
 doom, so that he might put his private affairs in order. 
 The Sultan replied to him : "I have been thinking for 
 some time of having thee killed, but I have at present 
 no one to fill thy place, otherwise I would willingly oblige 
 thee." Judges convicted of corruption were dealt with 
 in the same way. By a malicious irony they were compelled 
 to pass sentence on themselves, before being handed over 
 to the executioner. Janissaries who dared to ask for 
 increase of pay were also condemned to death. The first 
 recorded act of Selim's reign was to strike dead with 
 his own sword a Janissary who was deputed by the corps 
 to ask for the accustomed presents on his accession. It 
 does not appear that these events cast gloom on Selim's 
 Court. They soon lost the sense of novelty. There were 
 plenty of applicants for the vacant posts, willing and eager 
 to run the risks of office. Selim was agreeable in ,his 
 conversation and life was gay. He did not indulge in 
 refinements of cruelty like his grandfather Mahomet. He 
 acted from a sense of public duty. If be spilled tnuch 
 blood, he restored and maintained discipline in the army 
 and stemmed the course of corruption. He was distinctly 
 popular with his subjects, with whom, as in most Eastern 
 countries, affection was in part inspired by terror. 
 
 As was to be expected, Selim's two elder brothers, 
 Khorkand and Ahmed, whose claims to the Sultanate had 
 been set aside, and who were at the head of important 
 governments in Asia Minor, took up arms against him. 
 Selim, without loss of a moment, led an army to Buessa 
 against them. Khorkand, taken unawares, was quickly de- 
 feated. He was allowed an hour's respite before being 
 bow-strung. During this short interval he wrote a poem 
 deprecating his brother's cruelty. Selim wept over the 
 poem and ordered a State funeral for his brother. At 
 Brusa a horrible scene of slaughter took place. Five 
 nephews of Selim — possible claimants to the throne — were 
 collected there. They were of varying ages, from five 
 to twenty. They were all strangled by order of the Sultan 
 — the eldest of them resisting with terrible struggles, the 
 youngest with plaintive cries for mercy, while Selim from 
 an adjoining room was a witness of the scene, and urged 
 his mutes to hasten their task. Ahmed, the second and
 
 SELIM I 105 
 
 favourite son of Bayezid, made a longer resistance in the 
 field, but a few months later he was defeated and put 
 to death. 
 
 Selim, now safe on his throne, turned his attention to 
 war with Persia. The principal cause of conflict arose 
 out of a dispute on religion. From an early time (the 
 Mahommedan world had been divided into two hostile 
 sects— the Sunnites and the Schiis. The point of differ- 
 ence was whether authority should be attributed to the 
 writings of the four immediate descendants of the Prophet, 
 as the Schiis contended, or whether the words of the 
 Prophet alone should be conclusive on matters of dogma. 
 It would seem that the smaller the difference in dogma 
 between two sects of a religious body, the worse they 
 hate one another ; and just as the Christians of the Greek 
 and Latin Churches hated one another more than they 
 hated the followers of Mahomet, so the Sunnites and the 
 Schiis hated one another to the point that they were each 
 bent on exterminating the other — though the difference 
 between them might seem to outsiders to be no greater 
 than that between Tweedledum and Tweedledee. 
 
 Persia was the headquarters of the Schiis. In the 
 Ottoman Empire the Sunnites greatly prevailed. But of 
 late years the Schiis had gained ground in Asia Minor. 
 Selim, who was a bigoted follower of Mahomet, deter- 
 mined to extirpate this heresy throughout his Empire. 
 With devilish zeal he employed an army of spies to ferret 
 out the heretics, and on a given day seventy thousand ,of 
 them were arrested. Forty thousand of them were put to 
 death, and the remainder were condemned to terms of 
 imprisonment. This violent action does not seem to have 
 aroused any popular indignation against Selim. It earned 
 for him in Turkey the title of * the Just,' and diplomats 
 of the day and historians wrote of it in laudatory terms. 
 It was a proof of the possibility of extirpating a heresy 
 if the means adopted were ruthlessly carried out. The 
 Schii heresy was extinguished, once for all, in the Ottoman 
 Empire. This exploit, however, added to the animosity 
 already existing between the Persians and the Ottomans, 
 and made war between them inevitable. The immediate 
 clash was hastened by the Persians giving asylum to Murad, 
 a son of Ahmed, who had not been included in the slaughter 
 of his cousins at Buessa.
 
 io6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Persia, at this time, was under the rule of Shah Ismail, 
 a most capable and successful ruler, who had renovated 
 the kingdom, and added largely to it by the conquest 
 and subjection of many minor adjoining States. The two 
 potentates were well matched in vigour and ability. When 
 war with Persia was propounded by Selim in his council, 
 there was ominous silence. There was evidently fear of 
 the undertaking. The Janissary guarding the entrance to 
 the chamber broke down the suspense by throwing him- 
 self on his knees before Selim and expressing ardent 
 support to the war. This precipitated a decision by the 
 council, and the Janissary was at once promoted to high 
 office. 
 
 Early in March, 1 5 1 4, a hundred and forty thousand 
 men and three hundred guns were collected on the Asian 
 side of the Bosphorus, under command of the Sultan. 
 Sixty thousand camels were provided to carry its baggage 
 and munitions. The army commenced its march on 
 April 20th. Its aim was Tabriz, then the capital of Persia, 
 distant from Scutari, as the crow flies, by over one thousand 
 miles of a mountainous country, in which there were no 
 roads. The main difficulty was the supply of the army 
 with food for men, horses, and camels. This was partly 
 effected from Trebizond, to which the command of the Black 
 Sea enabled Selim to send supplies from Constantinople. 
 
 Selim preluded his campaign by an insolent letter to 
 Shah Ismail. In the course of it he said : — 
 
 It is only by the practice of the true religion that a man will prosper 
 in this world and deserve eternal life in the world to come. As for thee, 
 Emir Ismail, such a reward will never be thy lot ; for thou hast deserted 
 the path of salvation and of the holy commandment ; thou hast defiled the 
 purity of the doctrine of Islam ; thou hast dishonoured and cast down the 
 altars of God ; thou hast by base stratagem alone raised thyself and 
 sprung from the dust— to a seat of splendour and glory ; thou hast 
 opened to Mussulmans the gate of tyranny and oppression ; thou hast 
 forced iniquity, perjury, and blasphemy to impiety, heresy, and schism ; 
 thou hast, under the cloak of hypocrisy, sown in all parts the seeds of 
 trouble and sedition ; thou hast raised the standard of ungodliness ; thou 
 hast given way to thy shameful passions and abandoned thyself without 
 restraint to the most disgraceful excesses. . . . Therefore, as the first 
 duty of a Mussulman, and above all of a pious prince, is to obey the 
 commandment, " Oh ye faithful who believe, perform ye the decrees of 
 the Lord " — the ulemas and our teachers of the law have pronounced
 
 SELIM I 107 
 
 deatli against thee, perjurer and blasphemer as thou art, and have laid 
 upon every good Mussulman the sacred duty of taking arms for the 
 defence of religion and for the destruction of heresy and impiety, in thy 
 person and the persons of those who follow thee. 
 
 On the approach of Selim and his army to the frontier 
 of Persia, Shah Ismail, instead of going out to meet his 
 foe, laid waste the whole country and retreated towards 
 his capital . This greatly increased the difficulty Selim 
 had of supplying his army. The soldiers were exhausted 
 by the long march. The Janissaries began to murmur. 
 One of the generals, Hemdar Pasha, who had been brought 
 up Kvith Selim from his earliest childhood, and might be 
 expected to have great influence with him, was persuaded 
 by his brother officers to remonstrate with the Sultan 
 against further prosecution of the invasion of Persia, through 
 a country where every vestige of food was destroyed. 
 The Sultan met the suggestion by ordering the instant 
 decapitation of the pasha. 
 
 Selim endeavoured to provoke Ismail to meet him in battle 
 by another insolent letter, written mainly in verse, taunting 
 him with cowardice. " One who, by perjury," he wrote, 
 " seizes sceptres, ought not to skulk from danger. . . . 
 Dominion is a bride to be wooed and won by him only 
 whose lip blanches not at the biting kiss of the sabre's 
 edge." Ismail replied in a dignified letter denying the 
 existence of any reason for war, and expressing willing- 
 ness to resume peaceful relations . He suggested that 
 Selim's letter, written in a style so unfitting the dignity 
 of the Sultan, must have been the hasty production of a 
 secretary, who had taken an overdose of opium. The 
 taunt was a bitter one, for it was well known that Selim 
 was addicted to opium. The letter was accompanied by 
 the present of a box of opium to the supposed secretary. 
 
 Meanwhile Selim and his army marched on with 
 ever-increasing difficulties of supplies. The soldiers at last 
 broke out in open revolt and demanded to be led back 
 to their homes. Selim took the bold course of riding into 
 the midst of them and addressing them personally. 
 
 Is this [he said] your service to your Sultan ? Does j'our loyally consist 
 of mere boast and lip worship ? Let those among you who wish to go 
 stand out from the ranks and depart. As for me, I have not advanced
 
 ;io8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 thus far merely to double back on uiy track. Let the cowards instantly 
 stand aloof from the brave who have devoted themselves with sword and 
 quiver, soul and hand to our enterprise. 
 
 He gave word of command to form columns and march, 
 and not a single man dared to leave the ranks. 
 
 On the approach of the Ottoman army to Tabriz, Ismail 
 was lat last drawn from his reserve. He determined to 
 give battle. The two armies met at Calderan, not far 
 from the capital, on August 1 4th, i 1 6 days from the 
 commencement of the march, which must have covered 
 nearly twelve hundred miles. This was a great perform- 
 ance on the part of the Turkish army. It was by this time 
 reduced to one hundred and twenty thousand men, of whom 
 eighty thousand were cavalry. The Persian army con- 
 sisted of eighty thousand cavalry, splendidly mounted and 
 equipped, jand well trained. But there were no infantry 
 and no guns. The Turkish soldiers were fatigued by their 
 long march. They were ill -fed and the horses were stale 
 and out of condition. The issue turned upon the success 
 of the charges of the Persian cavalry. They attacked 
 the Turks with great impetuosity in two bodies on either 
 flank. That under command of Ismail himself was suc- 
 cessful and broke and dispersed the opposing wring of 
 the Turks. The other column was unsuccessful. The 
 Ottomans fell back behind their guns. The Janissaries 
 formed a solid front. The cannons opened a destructive 
 fire, which was supported by the fire of the Janissaries, who 
 were now armed with muskets. The Persians were shattered 
 and destroyed. The defeat of the other wing of the Turkish 
 army was retrieved. Twenty-five thousand Persian horse- 
 men lay dead on the field. Ismail himself was badly 
 wounded and escaped with difiiculty. 
 
 After this victory Selim entered Tabriz, and remained 
 there eight days. It was his wish to winter in Persia 
 and to renew his campaign in the following spring, but 
 his soldiers objected and insisted on being led home. This 
 time Selim found himself unable to refuse. He turned 
 homeward with his army. No terms of peace were con- 
 cluded with Ismail, and the two countries continued 
 nominally at war during the remainder of Selim's life. 
 But the great provinces of Diarbekir and Khurdistan 
 remained in the hands of the Turks. Selim left them in
 
 SELIM I 109 
 
 charge of the well-known Turkish historian, Idris, who 
 spent the next year in organizing these two departments 
 and in putting down any attempt at resistance. He was 
 eminently successful in this, and the two provinces were 
 permanently annexed to the Ottoman Empire. The whole 
 campaign of Selim must be considered as a most striking 
 success. To hav^e marched a hundred and forty thousand 
 men, with eighty thousand horses and three hundred guns, 
 over twelve hundred miles, and to have defeated a power- 
 ful army, backed by all the resources of a great country, 
 was an achievement which earned for Selim a place in 
 the first rank of great generals. Selim does not appear 
 to have been anxious to include Persia in his Empire. His 
 hatred of the Schii heresy was such that he aimed rather 
 at isolation than annexation. He issued a firman forbidding" 
 any trade with Persia, and when a number of merchants 
 were reported to him for having broken the law by enter- 
 ing into illicit trade with the Persians, he ordered them 
 to be executed. He was only with difficulty induced to 
 revoke the order by the Mufti Djemali. 
 
 On his return to Constantinople Selim, inflamed by his 
 siTccess in putting down the heresy of the Schiis and 
 his victory over heretical Persia, determined to extirpate 
 Christianity from his dominion. Again with the greatest 
 difficulty he was dissuaded from this course by the 
 courageous Mufti . But he insisted on depriving the 
 Christians in Constantinople of all their churches, which 
 he turned into mosques. 
 
 In the spring of 15 16 Selim determined to extend his 
 Empire by the conquest of Syria and Egypt. These 
 countries had been for many years past under the rule of the 
 Mamelukes, a bodv of soldiers recruited from Circassian 
 slaves, and from whose ranks Sultans were elected for their 
 lives. The existing Sultan, Kansar Ghowri, was eighty years 
 of age, but was still able to take command in the field of 
 his Mamelukes. The immediate pretext for war, as in 
 the case of Persia, was a religious one. A claim was 
 preferred by wSelim for the protection of the holy cities of 
 Mecca and Medina . i I ' • ' 
 
 On June 26th Selim arrived at Konia, and thence sent 
 an insolent missive of defiance to Ghowri, who was at 
 Aleppo. In return, a mission was sent to the Turkish 
 headquarters. It consisted of an envoy and a suite of
 
 no THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ten Mamelukes in splendid military array and glittering 
 with armour. Selim was indignant at this warlike demon- 
 stration. He directed the immediate execution of the ten 
 members of the suite, and with difficulty was persuaded 
 not to deal in the same way with the envoy. As an 
 alternative the envoy was shorn of his beard and hair, his 
 head was covered by a nightcap, and he was mounted 
 on a broken-down donkey, and was returned in this 
 ignominious way to Ghowri. 
 
 The two armies met in battle not far from Aleppo. 
 The issue was not in doubt. The Egyptians had no guns. 
 They also sufii'ered from the defection of the Djellans, a 
 section of Mamelukes of the second and inferior rank. 
 An hour sufficed to ensure complete victory to the Turks. 
 Ghowri fled and died, trampled to death, it was said, by 
 the mass of fugitives. The victory caused the loss not 
 only of Aleppo but of the whole of Syria. Selim, after 
 a few days at Aleppo, went to Damascus, and there 
 organized the invasion of Egypt. This involved the pro- 
 vision of many thousands of camels to carry water for 
 the troops when crossing the desert. He sent five thousand 
 men to Gaza, under Sinan Pasha, the brave general who 
 had led the victorious wing of his army against the Persians . 
 They met there an Egyptian army of about the same 
 number, and a fierce battle ensued, which resulted in the 
 defeat of the Mamelukes, mainly owing to the Ottoman 
 artillery. 
 
 Selim left Damascus with his main army on Decem- 
 ber 1 6th. On arrival at Gaza he ordered the immediate 
 slaughter of all its inhabitants. He also directed the 
 execution of one of his own generals who ventured to 
 point out to him the danger of an invasion of Egypt. 
 On January loth the arrangements for this expedition were 
 complete. Ten days were occupied in crossing the desert 
 between Syria and Egypt. The army was harassed by 
 Arabs, but there was no attempt to resist on the part 
 of the main Egyptian army. When, at one time, the 
 Grand Vizier, thinking that the cloud of Arabs meant a 
 more serious resistance, persuaded Selim to mount his 
 war-horse, the Sultan, on finding it was a false alarm and 
 that it was only an afTair with Arabs, directed the execution 
 of the Vizier. 
 
 On the last day of the year 1 5 1 6 Selim arrived with'
 
 SELIM I III 
 
 his army within a few miles of Cairo. Meanwhile the 
 Mamelukes had elected Tourman Bey as Sultan to succeed 
 Ghowri. But there was much opposition to this on the 
 part of those who favoured the claim of the son of Ghowri. 
 As a result, there was dissension in the Egyptian army. 
 Two of their leaders, Ghazali Bey and Khair Bey, entered 
 into treasonable relations with Selim. Ghazali persuaded 
 Tourman to send the guns, with which the Egyptian army 
 was now provided, by the ordinary route, and then secretly 
 sent ' information of this to Selimi, who was able to 
 avoid the guns by taking another route. 
 
 The two armies met near Ridania. The battle resulted 
 in the complete defeat of the Egyptians, with a loss of 
 twenty -five thousand men, owing to their want of guns. 
 Selim then advanced on Cairo. There was no resistance 
 at first, but later the Mamelukes reoccupied it and made 
 a desperate resistance to the Turkish army. The streets 
 were barricaded and every house was turned into a fortress. 
 Selim spent three days in getting possession of the city. 
 Eight hundred Mamelukes who surrendered on promise 
 of their lives were put to death. A general massacre of 
 the inhabitants then took place, and fifty thousand of them 
 perished by the sword, or were thrown into the flames of 
 the burning houses. As a result of this, and further 
 military operations in the Delta, Egypt was completely 
 subdued. The brave and generous Tourman was taken 
 prisoner and, after denouncing the two traitors in the 
 presence of Selim, was put to death. 
 
 Some months were then occupied by Selim in organizing 
 the conquered country. It was not annexed as an integral 
 part of Turkey. The Mamelukes, or rather the section 
 of them who had been unfaithful to their Sultan, and who 
 had survived the general slaughter, were entrusted with 
 the administration of Egypt, subject to the superior con- 
 trol of a pasha appointed by the Turkish government. 
 Ghazali and Khair Bey received the reward of their treason 
 — Ghazali was appointed Governor of Syria and Khair Bey 
 of Egypt. A garrison of five thousand Ottoman soldiers 
 was left at Cairo. The Turkish army insisted on an 
 early return to Constantinople. A war against Moslems, 
 where there was no opportunity of making captives for 
 sale as slaves or for harems, had no charm for them. Selim 
 had once more to give way.
 
 '112 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It was not till September 17th that he was able to com- 
 mence his homeward march. Having safely passed the 
 desert, he said to his Grand Vizier, Younis Pasha, who was 
 riding beside him, " Well, our backs are now turned on 
 Egypt and we shall soon be at Gaza." Younis, who had 
 originally been opposed to the expedition, could not resist 
 the reply : " And what has been the result of all our 
 trouble and fatigue, if it is not that half our army has 
 perished in battle, or in the sands of the desert, and that 
 Egypt is now governed by a gang of traitors ? " This 
 imprudent speech cost the Grand Vizier his life. His 
 head was struck off as he rode by his master's side. 
 
 The conquest of Egypt entailed the acquisition of the 
 interests of that country in a great part of Arabia, including 
 the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Selim was also able 
 to induce the titular Caliph, who through many generations 
 had inherited from the early successors of Mahomet a 
 certain undefined authority in the religious world, and who 
 held a shadowy Court at Cairo, to make over to him and 
 his successors, as Sultans of Turkey, the barren office, 
 together with its symbols, the standard and cloak of the 
 Prophet. These symbols were removed to Constantinople, 
 and thenceforth the Sultans assumed the title of Caliphs 
 and Protectors of the Holy Places — and this may have 
 added to their prestige in the Moslem world, though 
 it may be doubted whether it contributed much to the 
 strength of the Turkish Empire. Of more material 
 advantage was the fact that an annual tribute was paid 
 by the Egyptian government, which a few years later, 
 under Solyman, was fixed at 80,000 ducats. It also con- 
 tributed men and ships to wars undertaken by the Sultan. 
 In the siege of Rhodes, in 1524, Egypt sent three thousand 
 Mamelukes and twenty vessels of war. 
 
 Selim spent some time at Damascus and Aleppo on his 
 way back in organizing his new acquisitions. Syria was 
 incorporated in the Turkish Empire, and has remained 
 so to the present time. 
 
 The campaign which ended in the conquest of Egypt 
 and Syria was not less conspicuous in its result than 
 that against Persia, more on account of the difficulties 
 of organization, than for success on the field of battle. 
 Treason and the want of artillery were more responsible 
 for the defeat of the Mamelukes than the valour of the
 
 SELIM I 113 
 
 Ottoman troops. It is not easy for us to understand why- 
 Egypt was not incorporated in the Empire in the same 
 way as Syria. The Mamehikes were as much strangers to 
 the country as the Turks themselves. The minority of 
 them, who survived the M^ar and the bloody executions 
 by Selim, had no claim to recognition as the ruling class 
 in Egypt, other than their treachery to their fellow -Mame- 
 lukes and their Sultan and the aid which they had given 
 to the invaders. It will be seen that these surviving Mame- 
 lukes soon regained full power in Egypt, and reduced the 
 pashas appointed from Constantinople to puppets. 
 
 Selim returned to his capital in i 5 1 8 . In the remaining 
 two years of his life there were no further military exploits. 
 He made great preparations for another campaign. He 
 added greatly to the strength of his navy. He built a 
 hundred and fifty ships of war, many of them of g'reat 
 size for those days. It was generally believed that he 
 intended an attack on Rhodes to avenge the defeat of his 
 grandfather, the acquisition of which, lying' as it did across 
 the route to Egypt, was of great importance. Before, 
 however, any decision was arrived at, Selim died on his 
 way to Adrianople, very near to the spot where his father 
 had been poisoned by his orders. He left the reputation 
 of being one of the ablest organizers of victory, but also 
 the most cruel despot of the Othman line. It was for long a 
 common expression with the Turks, by way of a curse, 
 " Mav'st thou be a vizier to Sultan Selim."
 
 X 
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 
 
 1520-66 
 
 Selim was succeeded by his only son, Solyman, at the 
 
 age of twenty -six, who reigned for forty -six years, a period 
 
 of unexampled splendour in the history of the Ottoman 
 
 Empire — its culminating era. This was mainly due to 
 
 the personal qualities of the new Sultan. He surpassed 
 
 all his predecessors, and still more his degenerate successors, 
 
 in dignity and graciousness. He was not behind the best 
 
 of them in military capacity, vigour of action, and personal 
 
 courage. He combined with these quahties statesmanship 
 
 of high order. With rare exceptions he stood by his 
 
 engagements and did not follow the precept of the Koran 
 
 that faith need not be kept with infidels. He was great 
 
 as an administrator and legislator. Before he mounted 
 
 the throne he had been employed by his father as governor 
 
 of three very important provinces, and had gained a 
 
 high reputation for his determination to secure justice to 
 
 his subjects, whatever their race or creed. His private life 
 
 was free from scandal. He was noted for his clemency 
 
 and kindness of heart. If massacres took place after 
 
 victories or after capture of fortresses when he v/as in 
 
 command, it was because he could not restrain his turbulent 
 
 and bloodthirsty Janissaries ; but the occasions of such scenes 
 
 were comparatively rare. He had, however, a blend of 
 
 cruelty in his character, as had most of his predecessors. 
 
 Being an only son, he had no occasion, on mounting the 
 
 throne, to carry out the fratricidal law of Mahomet II. But 
 
 he was determined that there should be no possible rival in 
 
 his family, however remote. After the surrender of Rhodes, 
 
 two years later, on the promise of life and property to its 
 
 defenders, he singled out, in breach of his promise, a son 
 
 114
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 115 
 
 of Prince Djem, who was one of those included in the 
 amnesty, and directed the immediate execution of him and 
 his four sons. Worse also than fratricide was the murder 
 by Solyman of two of his own sons. The eldest of them, 
 Mustapha, was a most promising prince. He had already 
 shown his capacity as governor of a province. He was 
 endowed with all his father's best qualities. He was the 
 idol of the army and the hope of his country. 
 
 Solyman was persuaded by his latest favourite concubine, 
 a Russian lady, Ghowrem by name, who had unbounded 
 influence over him and retained it till late in life, that Prince 
 Mustapha was intriguing against him, and aimed at de- 
 throning him, as Selim had done in the case of Bayezid. 
 She hoped to secure the succession for her own son. With- 
 out a word of warning or any opportunity of defending 
 himself, Mustapha, in the course of the second Persian 
 campaign in 1553, on entering his father's tent, was seized 
 by the mutes and was strangled while Solyman looked on 
 at the foul deed. There was more excuse for putting to 
 death another son, Bayezid, who had been goaded by an 
 intrigue in the Sultan's harem into taking up arms, in 1561, 
 against his brother Selim. He was defeated and fled to 
 Persia, where he was at first received with great honour 
 by Shah Talmasp, the successor to Ismail, with the distinct 
 promise t"hat he would not be given up. But Solyman 
 obtained his extradition by threat of war and the promise 
 of 400,000 pieces of gold. The unfortunate prince was 
 treated with the greatest indignity. His hair and beard 
 were sliorn. He was handed over, together with his four 
 sons, to an emissary of his brother Selim, who at once 
 put to death the whole party. 
 
 As a result of the murders of these two sons of Solyman, 
 a third one, the son of Ghowrem, was the only heir to the 
 throne. He succeeded Solyman and was known as " Selim 
 the Sot." It will be seen that this prince had none of the 
 qualities of his race. He was the first of a long line of 
 degenerates who eventually lost the greater part of the 
 Empire which had been built up by Solyman and his 
 predecessors. 
 
 Though the office of Grand Vizier was not so dangerous 
 to its holders as under Selim I, it proved to be fatal to 
 two of the nine men who held it during Solyman's reign. 
 One of the most remarkable incidents of Solyman's life
 
 116 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 was his infatuation for Ibrahim, the second of his Grand 
 Viziers. Ibrahim, a renegade Greek by birth, had 
 been captured as a boy b|y corsairs and sold as a slave to 
 a widow in Magnesia, who brought him up as a Mussulman. 
 Recognizing his talents, this lady gave him an excellent 
 education. Solyman, on a visit to that province, came 
 across Ibrahim, and, attracted by his musical talent, took 
 him into service, where he rose to be master of the pages 
 and grand falconer. He soon acquired immense influence 
 over his master, whose sister was given to him in marriage. 
 He was rapidly promoted, and in 1523 was appointed Grand 
 Vizier. The Sultan and his favourite became inseparable. 
 They had their meals alone together. They concerted 
 between them all the afTairs of State. Ibrahim justified this 
 preference, for he proved to be of great capacity, not 
 inferior in any respect to his master, and his superior in 
 education and knowledge of languages and history. He 
 was appointed Seraskier, or Commander-in-Chief, when the 
 Sultan was unable personally to command. In the earlier 
 campaigns in Hungary and Persia, and in the siege of 
 Vienna, he took a most active part, and was the main 
 adviser to his master, 
 
 Afier thirteen years of implicit confidence in Ibrahim, sus- 
 picion arose in the mind of the Sultan and was fanned by 
 the Sultana Ghowrem, who coveted the post of Grand Vizier 
 for her son-in-law, Roostem Pasha. There does not appear 
 to have been any ground for these suspicions, save that 
 Ibrahim, intoxicated by his elevation, assumed the airs 
 almost of an equal with the Sultan. A vizier suspected 
 was very near to his doom. Entering the palace one 
 day in 1536 to dine with the Sultan as usual, he was 
 never seen alive again. The next morning his body was 
 found in the palace. His immense wealth was confiscated to 
 the State. It was said that Solyman in an adjoining room 
 to that where this murder was perpetrated was smothered 
 with kisses by Ghowrem so as to drown the cries of the 
 dying Vizier. 
 
 In another case, the Grand Vizier Achmet was decapitated 
 in the council chamber by order of Solyman, solely because 
 he gave advice which displeased his master. Von Hammer 
 gives a long list of other high officials who shared the 
 same fate. 
 
 During the forty-six years of his reign Solyman added
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 117 
 
 enormously to the Empire. Belgrade, Rhodes, nearly the 
 whole of Hungary, the Crimea, the great provinces of Mossul, 
 Bagdad, and Bassorah, and a part of Armenia taken from 
 Persia, Yemen and Aden in Arabia, Algiers, Oran, and 
 Tripoli, and an undefined extent of hinterland inhabited bv 
 Arabs in North Africa, and a \\dde extension of Egypt in the 
 direction of Nubia, were the contributions which he trans- 
 mitted to his successors. There were few years of his long 
 reign in which he was not under arms. War with Hungary 
 and Austria in the north alternated with war with Persia in 
 the east and with Spain in the west. Solyman was often in 
 command of his armies. He conducted personally thirteen 
 campaigns, some of them, such as those against Persia, 
 extending over two years. For the most part these wars 
 were embarked on without any just or even plausible 
 cause. They were stimulated by lust of conquest on the 
 Sultan's part, and by craving for active service and for 
 loot on the part of the Janissaries. Religious fanaticism 
 seems to have had little concern with the motives or results 
 of them. 
 
 Solyman's first campaign, in 1521, w^s directed against 
 Belgrade, the city which had successfully defied Mahomet IT. 
 He marched against it at the head of an army of a hundred 
 thousand men with three hundred guns. It was bravely 
 defended by the Hungarians. But they had no guns. After 
 seven days of bombardment the city was assaulted and 
 captured. There was no massacre of the garrison or the 
 inhabitants. Solyman converted the principal church into 
 a mosque. The city was thenceforth garrisoned by a 
 Turkish force. It constituted the principal stronghold of 
 the Empire on the Danube, and was the gateway for many 
 invasions of Hungary. 
 
 In the next year, 1523, Solyman followed up this success 
 by an attack on the island of Rhodes, where Mahomet had 
 also failed, and the capture of which had become more 
 important since the conquest of Egypt, lying as it did on 
 the direct route by sea from Constantinople. For this 
 purpose Solyman sent a fleet of three hundred vessels with 
 eight thousand Janissaries and a hundred siege guns. 
 He marched at the head of a hundred thousand men 
 through Asia Minor to the bay of Marmerice, opposite to 
 Rhodes, whence they were conveyed to the island. The 
 knights, six hundred in number, with only five thousand
 
 ii8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 trained soldiers and a levee of peasants on the island, 
 made a heroic defence under their Grand Master, de 
 Lisle Adam. It was only after a siege of nine months 
 that they were at last compelled to capitulate. It was 
 the first occasion on which a gfreat fortress was approached 
 by sap and spade work, so as to avoid gun fire, and in which 
 bombs were used by the attacking army. Solyman's army 
 is said to have lost fifty tholisand men in casualties pud 
 as many more by disease. Under the terms of capitulation, 
 the survivors of the garrison with all their personal property 
 wfeTe to be conveyed to Crete, after twelve days, in their own 
 galleys. After an interview with the Grand Master the Sultan 
 is reported to have said, with great generosity, "It is not 
 without regret that I force this brave man from his home 
 in his old age." The arms of the knights are still to be 
 seen carved on the houses they occupied in Rhodes. The 
 Turks have always respected them in memory of the gallant 
 defence. The terms of surrender were faithfully observed by 
 Solyman with the exception already referred to. The knights 
 eventually settled at Malta, at that time a nearly desert 
 island. They made it the seat of their order and fortified 
 it. Its central position in the Mediterranean made it ^ 
 stronghold of the utmost importance. Solyman, in the 
 last year but one of his long reign, thought it necessary 
 for the expansion of his Empire, in the North of Africa, to 
 oust the knights from their new' nest. He sent an army and 
 a fleet under command of Piale Reis to besiege it. There 
 commenced another celebrated siege in which the knights, 
 under command of their Grand Master, Lavallette, covered 
 themselves with glory. The Turks were defeated in many 
 assaults on the fortress, and were ultimately compelled to 
 withdraw with heavy losses. 
 
 The two years after the conquest of Rhodes were spent 
 by Solyman in organizing his kingdom. His inaction was 
 greatly resented by the Janissaries, who hated their dull 
 life in barracks and longed for war and for loot. They 
 broke out in revolt and pillaged the houses of Ibrahim 
 and other great functionaries. The outbreak was quelled, 
 Solyman killing with his own hand three of the rebels. 
 Their Agha and other leaders were put to death. But 
 Solyman found it expedient to appease the mercenaries 
 by generous presents, and in the next year — mainly at 
 their instigation — embarked on another war. He was urged
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 119 
 
 to invade Hungary by Francis I, King of France, who 
 hoped to create a diversion from the ambitious projects of 
 the Emperor Charles V. This may be considered as the 
 first entry of the Turks into the maze of European politics. 
 Hungary and Bohemia were at that time united under the 
 rule of Louis 11, a very young and inexperienced man. 
 
 In April, 1526, Solyman and his Grand Vizier, Ibrahim, 
 with a hundred thousand men and three hundred guns, 
 marched to Belgrade, and thence invaded Hungary. On 
 August 27th, five months after their departure from Con- 
 stantinople, they met the Hungarian army at Mohacz, not far 
 from the Danube, and about halfway from Belgrade to Buda, 
 then, as now, the capital of Hungary. The battle was 
 quickly decided. The Ottoman army had the advantage of 
 an overwhelming superiority both of men and guns. The 
 Hungarians were defeated. Their King, eight bishops, a 
 great majority of the Hungarian nobles, and twenty -four 
 thousand men were killed. This decided the fate of 
 Hungary. Before marching onwards, Solyman ordered 
 all the prisoners he had taken — four thousand in number 
 — to be put to death. He reached Buda on Sep- 
 tember loth. The city surrendered. Solyman received 
 there the submission of a number of Hungarian nobles 
 who had survived the disaster of Mohacz. At his instance, 
 Count Zapolya, one of the magnates of Hungary and 
 Voivode of Transylvania, was elected by them as King 
 of Hungary in succession to Louis IT, who had left no 
 heir. Solyman shortly after this — influenced in part by 
 news of civil disturbance in Asia Minor — left Buda and 
 retreated to the Danube, and thence returned to his capital. 
 The temporary occupation of part of Hungary had been 
 attended with fearful devastation and with great loss of 
 life to its population. It was estimated that two hundred 
 thousand men were massacred. The retreating army 
 carried off an immense booty and drove before them 
 about a hundred thousand captives of both sexes, who 
 were eventually sold as slaves at Constantinople. Garrisons 
 were left by the Turks in some of the frontier fortresses of 
 Hungary. 
 
 The election of Count Zapolya as King of Hr.ngary 
 under the dictation of the Turks led to civil war in that 
 country. Archduke Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, 
 to whom the Emperor had transferred his Archduchy of
 
 I20 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Austria, claimed the throne of Hungary, by virtue of a treaty 
 between the Emperor and the late King Louis. On the 
 other hand, it was claimed by Zapolya and his adherents 
 that, under an ancient law of Hungary, no one but a native 
 could be elected as King. In spite of this, the nobles of 
 Western Hungary met in Diet at Presburg and elected 
 Ferdinand. Ferdinand appealed to arms, and was supported 
 by the Austrians. He defeated his rival. Zapolya was driven 
 from the country. He fled to Poland, and thence he appealed 
 to the Sultan for aid in support of his claims in Hungary. 
 Ferdinand, hearing of this, sent an envoy to the Sultan. 
 Most unwisely, he not only claimed assistance in support 
 of his claims to the throne of Hungary, but he demanded 
 that Belgrade and other towns in Hungary in possession 
 of the Sultan should be given up. Ibrahim, the Grand 
 Vizier, who conducted the negotiations with the two rivals, 
 was most arrogant. He claimed that every place where the 
 hoofs of the Sultan's horses had once trod became at once 
 and for ever part of the Ottoman Empire. " We have 
 slain," he said, " King Louis of Hungary. His kingdom 
 is now ours to hold or to give to whom we list. It is not 
 the crown that makes the King, it is the sword. It is the 
 sword that brings men into subjection ; and what the 
 sword has won the sword will keep." 
 
 The Sultan decided against Ferdinand and said to 
 Zapolya's envoy, " I will be a true friend to thy master. 
 I will march in person to aid him. I swear it by our 
 Prophet Mahomet, the beloved of God, and by my sabre." 
 To the rival's agent he said that he would speedily visit 
 Ferdinand and drive him from the kingdom he had stolen. 
 " Tell him that I will look for him on the field of Mohacz 
 or even in Buda, and if he fail to meet me there, I 
 will offer him battle beneath the walls of Vienna." 
 
 In pursuance of these threats, Solyman, in 1529, at 
 the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men and with 
 three hundred guns, again invaded Hungary and laid siege 
 to Buda. The city surrendered at the instance of traitors 
 among its defenders. Under the terms of capitulation 
 life and property were to be preserved to the garrison and 
 the citizens. The Janissaries, furious at the loss of loot, 
 refused to recognize the terms. They massacred all the 
 garrison as they issued from the fortress, and they carried 
 ofi" for sale most of the young women of the towri. Zapolya
 
 SOLYMAN THE iMAGNIFICENT 121 
 
 was reinstated as a vassal King of that part of Hungary. 
 Solyman then marched on to Vienna. He arrived there 
 on September 27, 1529, with over two hundred thousand 
 men. There ensued the first of the two memorable sieges 
 of Vienna by the Ottomans. 
 
 Charles V, Emperor of Germany, was at this time the 
 greatest and most powerful sovereign in Europe. He had 
 inherited the kingdoms of Spain, the Netherlands, Naples 
 and Sicily, as well as his possessions in Germany. Born 
 six years later than Solyman, he was elected Emperor of 
 Germany a year before the accession of Solyman as Sultan. 
 He abdicated his throne and retired to a monastery ten 
 years before the death of Solyman. For thirty-six years, 
 therefore, their reigns v,ere synchronous. It would be hard 
 to say which of the two sovereigns was the more valiant 
 in arms, or the more astute statesman. Judged by the 
 extent of conquests, Solyman far surpassed his rival. 
 Charles did little more than maintain the integrity of his 
 immense inherited possessions in Europe. But he acquired 
 by conquest Tunis in Africa, and Mexico and Peru in 
 America. 
 
 When Solyman, instigated by Francis I of France, was 
 invading Austria, Charles was deeply engaged in war against 
 France in Italy, and could not send an army to meet the 
 Ottomans in the field. Vienna was left to stand the brunt 
 of invasion without a protecting army. Its garrison con- 
 sisted of only sixteen thousand soldiers under Count de 
 Salms. Its fortifications were only a continuous wall 5 feet 
 in thickness and without bastions. Its guns were only 
 seventy -two in number. Such weak defences seemed to offer 
 little hope against the overwhelming numbers of the Otto- 
 mans. The tents of the Sultan and his army whitened the 
 whole plain round the city. Irregular cavalry, called 
 Scorchers, depending on loot for their food and pay, ravaged 
 the country for miles round the city with incredible cruelty 
 and rapacity. A Turkish flotilla of four hundred small 
 vessels found its way up the Danube, after destroying all 
 bridges, and lent assistance to the siege. It was all in vain. 
 The Austrian and Spanish troops under the Count de Salms 
 defended the weak lines with the utmost courage and 
 tenacity. The Viennese citizens constructed lines of earth- 
 works within the walls, against which the lighter guns of 
 the Turks had little effect. The powerful siege guns of
 
 122 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the Ottomans had been left behind en route, owing to heavy 
 rains and the badness of roads. Numerous assaults were 
 made by the Turks. The soldiers were at last dispirited by 
 failure. In vain their officers drove them on by sticks and 
 sabres. The men said they preferred death from their 
 officers to death from the long arquebuses of the Spaniards. 
 Twenty ducats a head were given or promised to them. 
 It "was to no purpose. Solyman_, after three weeks of 
 fruitless assaults, found himself compelled to raise the 
 siege and to retreat with his great army. His irregulars 
 had so ravaged the country that he had the utmost difficulty 
 in feeding his men. 
 
 Before striking the camp all the immense booty taken in 
 the campaign was burnt. The prisoners, most of them the 
 peasantry of the district round Vienna, were massacred. 
 Only the fairest of the young women were carried off 
 captives to be sold as slaves. The Sultan returned to Con- 
 stantinople. There was no pursuit of his army. It came 
 back intact. It was a slur on the fame of Solyman that 
 he endeavoured to conceal his failure to capture Vienna by 
 lying accounts of success, and by a popular celebration of 
 triumph, on return to his capital. There was this much 
 to be said for him, that he had flouted the Austrians, by 
 invading their country and devastating it up to the walls 
 of Vienna, without any attempt, on their part, to meet him 
 in the field or to follow him up on his retreat. 
 
 Three years later, in 1532, Solyman, with another 
 immense army, again invaded Hungary, with the avowed 
 object of marching to Vienna and attacking the army of 
 the Emperor. Charles V, on this occasion, took com- 
 mand of the Austrian army. It was expected that a trial 
 of strength would take place between the two potentates, 
 and would decide which of them was the stronger. But 
 Solyman's progress was delayed by the heroic defence for 
 three weeks of the small fortress of Guns. After its capture 
 Solyman made no further advance towards Vienna, but 
 turned aside and devastated Styria, and then led his army 
 homeward. The Emperor, on his part, made no effort 
 to meet his foe and join conclusions with him. It was 
 evident that both of them were anxious to avoid the issue 
 of a great battle. 
 
 Though the Sultan had retreated and had returned to 
 Constantinople, peace was not concluded, and a desultory
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 123 
 
 war was continued for some years between Ferdinand and 
 Zapolya. Peace was concluded in 1538, under which 
 Zapolya was to retain the title of King of Eastern Hungary 
 and Transylvania and Ferdinand was acknowledged ruler 
 of the western half. In 1566 Solyman again invaded Hun- 
 gary, on his thirteenth and last campaign, to which we will 
 revert later. 
 
 We have thus described briefly the course of events 
 between the Turks and the Hungarians, supported by 
 Austria. Though the conquests of Solyman in this direc- 
 tion had been arrested by his failure to capture Vienna, he 
 succeeded in securing virtual possession of the greater part 
 of Hungary. 
 
 It is necessary to revert to Solyman's feats in other 
 directions. In 1534 he entered upon his sixth campaign, 
 this time against Persia. Shah Ismail was no longer alive, 
 and had been succeeded by Shah Talmasp, a very weak 
 personage. Solyman, as a prelude to his attack, gave 
 orders for the execution of all the Persian prisoners at 
 Gallipoli. Ibrahim was sent on, in advance, by some 
 months, with a large army. Instead of marching by 
 Aleppo to Bagdad, he took the route direct to Tabriz, 
 which he occupied without resistance on the part of the 
 Persians. He wintered there, and the next spring he was 
 joined by Solyman with another army, and together they 
 marched to AIossul and Bagdad, through a most difficult 
 • country, where the climate entailed great losses on the 
 army. Bagdad was ultimately reached. It was treacher- 
 "Dusly surrendered by its commander. In fact, the Shah 
 
 > made no attempt to repel the invasion of the Ottoman 
 ' army, and the two great provinces of Mossul and Bagdad 
 
 ^ ^>were added to the Ottoman Empire, without any pitched 
 -battle on the part of Persia. 
 
 ^ ' There were other campaigns in Persia in 1548, 1553, 
 
 \% and 1554, in which the Turks often suffered more from 
 » the climate and From the difficulty of obtaining supplies 
 than from the guerrilla attacks of the Persians. But there 
 was no pitched battle between the armies of the two Powers. 
 The Turks maintained their conquests, and have done so 
 to the present year (19 17). 
 
 Not less remarkable during the long reign of Solyman 
 than his conquests by his army were the exploits of his 
 navy. It achieved victory in many hard-fought battles 
 
 i
 
 124 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 with Spain and Venice. Tlicrc was no great disparity in 
 naval force between the Turks and the Spaniards, but when 
 the fleets of Venire and the Pope were combined with 
 those of Spain, there was great superiority on their part 
 in the number and size of vessels. In spite of this, in the 
 two great battles where this combination was against them, 
 the Turks were victorious, and generally, throughout 
 Solyman's reign, his fleets m.aintained a supremacy in the 
 Mediterranean. This enabled him to add to his Empire 
 the provinces of Algiers, Oran, and Tripoli, and numerous 
 islands in the /Egean Sea, taken from Venice. 
 
 The Mussulman States of North Africa, at the com- 
 mencement of Solyman's reign, were in the hands of 
 degenerate and incompetent Mahommedan rulers, who 
 exercised little control over the Arabs of the hinterland. 
 The cities on the coast were the haunts of pirates, who 
 sometimes sailed under the flags of these States, but more 
 often under no flag but their own. They preyed on the 
 commerce of the Mediterranean, bringing their prizes into 
 their ports and selling the captives as slaves, with the 
 result that in Tunis alone there were twenty thousand 
 Christian captives. These corsairs formed squadrons of ten 
 or twenty galleys, under the command of admirals, chosen 
 from the most daring and adventurous of them. They 
 were called corsairs, but, in fact, they were mere pirates, 
 knowing no law but their own, and that founded on robbery 
 and murder. The sea-dogs in command of these pirates ■ 
 gained great experience in handling their ships and 
 squadrons. They ravaged the coasts of Spain, Italy, and 
 France, and even occasionally of England and Ireland, 
 devastating the cities and villages and carrying away booty 
 and captives. 
 
 It has been shown that Selim paid great attention to 
 h's navy, and increased his ships in number and size. 
 Solyman followed the same course. But his admirals and 
 captains did not com}>are in skill and daring with those 
 of the pirate squadrons. When Solyman became aware 
 of this, he most astutely invited the ablest and most 
 experienced of these pirates to take service under the 
 Ottoman flag, and to bring with them' their ships and 
 men. He gave high appointments to them, raised them 
 to the rank of admirals and commanders-in-chief of his 
 navy, over the heads of the officer's of his regular service.
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 125 
 
 The first and most distinguished of these corsairs to 
 take naval service under Solyman was Kheireddin, better 
 known in history as Barbarossa. He was one of four 
 brothers, of Greek descent, born in Mytilene, three of 
 whom in early life took to piracy as a profession, under 
 the pretence of legitimate commerce at sea. Two of them 
 eventually lost their lives in the venture, but the third 
 survived, prospered, and made money. He collected a 
 squadron under his command and became the terror of 
 the whole Mediterranean, capturing merchant vessels and 
 devastating the coasts in all directions. Gathering strength 
 in number of ships and men, he made war on his own 
 account. He attacked Algiers and made himself master 
 of that city and its surrounding district. But finding him- 
 self unequal to the task of maintaining an independent 
 rule there, he recognized the supremacy of the Sultan 
 of Turkey. He carried on his ships seventy thousand 
 fugitive Moors from Andalusia, in Spain, and settled them 
 at Algiers. Later, he was employed by Solyman in an 
 attack on Tunis, which was then under the rule of Muley- 
 Hasan, the twenty -second representative of the dynasty of 
 Boni Hafss — a degenerate reprobate, who had murdered 
 all but one of his forty -four brothers on his accession 
 to the throne, and who spent his energies in recruiting 
 a harem of four hundred good-looking lads. On the 
 pretext of putting an end to this infamy, Barbarossa 
 attacked the city of Tunis, and had no difficulty in getting 
 possession of it and expelling the contemptible Sultan. He 
 did not, however, remain many months in possession of 
 it. Muley -Hasan appealed to the Emperor Charles for aid. 
 
 The Emperor, in personal command of a fleet of five 
 hundred vessels and an army of thirty thousand men, 
 attacked and defeated Barbarossa in a battle before the 
 walls of Tunis, captured his vessels lying" there, and drove 
 him into the interior of the country. Although he had 
 come there at the invitation of the Sultan of Tunis, and 
 the inhabitants of the city had given no assistance to 
 Barbarossa in defending it against the Spanish attack, the 
 Emperor allowed his soldiers to sack it after the capture. 
 A scene of almost incredible cruelty and destruction took 
 place. Thirty thousand of the innocent inhabitants were 
 massacred, and ten thousand were sold into captivity. The 
 mosques and all the principal buildings were burnt and
 
 126 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 destroyed. No worse deed was ever perpetrated by any 
 victorious Moslem army in that age. It resulted that 
 Tunis, for a time, was rescued from Barbarossa and 
 from Ottoman rule. Muley-Hasan was reinstated there on 
 terms of close dependence on Spain. It was not till 1574 
 that Tunis finally fell into the hands of the Turks. 
 
 Barbarossa had made a splendid defence of the city. 
 His force was quite inadequate for the purpose. Solyman 
 was at the time engaged in war with Persia and could 
 not give adequate support. Shortly after this, when war 
 broke out between the Ottomans and Spain, the Sultan 
 invited Barbarossa to Constantinople, and made him (}rand 
 Admiral of the Turkish fleet. In this capacity he fought 
 in 1538 a great naval battle off Prevesa against the com- 
 bined fleets of Spain, Venice, and the Pope, under Admiral 
 Andrea Doria, in which he achieved victory, in spite of 
 great inferiority of numbers and size of vessels. He 
 appears to have been the first to adopt the manceuvre of 
 breaking the line of the enemy's fleet, for which three 
 centuries later Nelson was so famous. The Turkish fleet 
 numbered a hundred and thirty vessels, and that of the 
 combined Christian Powers a hundred and sixty -seven. 
 Six of the latter were captured and destroyed. The main 
 body of the combined fleet drew off, under cover of the 
 night. Later, Barbarossa accompanied Solyman in the 
 attack on Corfu, which was heroically defended by the 
 Venetians., The Sultan was compelled to withdraw from 
 the island. 
 
 This failure at Corfu, and that before Vienna, were the 
 only reverses which Solyman personally encountered in his 
 numerous cam'paigns. Barbarossa, however, in the course 
 of the war with the Venetians, succeeded in capturing 
 from them all the many islands which they possessed in 
 the yEgean Sea, with the exception of Crete and the few 
 fortified places they held in the Morea. These were his 
 last exploits. He died at Constantinople in 1546. 
 
 Others, however, of the same brood of corsairs or pirates 
 succeeded Barbarossa in the Turkish navy, and maintained 
 its reputation for successful daring. The most distinguished 
 of them were Dragut (or Torghut) and Piale, both of 
 them renegade subjects of Turkey who had taken to piracy 
 as a profession. Dragut, a Croatian by birth, closely re- 
 sembled Barbarossa in his career, in his prowess at sea,
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 127 
 
 and in the terror which he created on the coasts of Italy 
 and Spain. He had little respect for the allies of the 
 Sultan, and captured their vessels as readily as those of 
 his enemies. When called to account by the Porte for 
 the destruction of some Venetian merchant ships, and sum- 
 moned to Constantinople, he declined to go there, well 
 knowing the fate in store for him. He betook himself, with 
 his pirate squadron, to Morocco, which he made the base 
 for piracy for some years. Later, Solym^n, finding the 
 need of such a daring spirit, invited him again to take 
 service under the Ottoman flag, and promised to imake 
 him Governor of Tripoli, lif he coU|ld capture it. Tripoli 
 then belonged to the Knights of St. John at Malta. Dragut 
 attacked and captured it, and annexed it to the Turkish 
 Empire. Eventually Dragut was appointed Governor of 
 Tripoli and, in this capacity, led a fleet in aid of the attack 
 on Malta in 1565. He lost his life in an assault on the city. 
 
 Another such corsair was Piale, who, in his turn, after 
 a long spell of piracy, was taken into the Ottoman naval 
 service by Solyman, and rose to be comlmander -in -chief . 
 He defeated the combined fleet of Spain, Venice, and the 
 Pope, under command of Andrea Doria, sent to recapture 
 Tripoli. He attacked and annexed for the Turks the 
 province of Oran, on the African coast, westward of 
 Algiers. He commanded the Turkish fleet in the attack 
 on Malta in 1565, the last naval enterprise in Solyman's 
 reign. 
 
 It was not only in the Mediterranean that Solyman's 
 navy was active. A fleet was fitted out at Suez, lunder 
 command of Piri Pasha. It secured to Turkey the com- 
 mand of the Red Sea and enabled the capture of Aden 
 and Yemen. It extended its operations thence to the 
 Persian Gulf and the coast of India, where it came into 
 conflict with the Portuguese, who beat off the Ottoman 
 ships. 
 
 The failure of the expedition to Malta, though he was 
 not in personal command, appears to have weighed heavily 
 on the mind of Solyman. It was his ambition to finish 
 his career by a success as signal and important as that 
 against Belgrade, in the first year of his reign. He deter- 
 mined to take command himself of the army which was 
 to make another invasion of Hungary in 1566, in spite 
 of his seventy-two years and the feeble state of his health.
 
 12S THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 He was not able to mount his horse. He was carried in 
 a litter at the head of his army.. It was his special wish 
 to capture Szigeth and Erlau, which had successfully re- 
 sisted Ottoman attack on the last invasion. He appears 
 to have directed the march of his army in the minutest 
 detail. One of his pashas accomplished a march in one 
 day which he was instructed to effect in two days. Solyman 
 was incensed and directed the execution of the over- 
 zealous pasha, and with difficulty w^s dissuaded from this 
 by his Grand Vizier. i ; ; 
 
 The great Sultan died unexpectedly in his tent from 
 apoplexy during the siege of Szigeth, before the capture 
 of this city and while the guns of his army were thunder- 
 ing against its citadel, most bravely defended by Nicholas 
 Zriny — a fitting end to the old warrior. His death was 
 for long concealed from the army. The Grand Vizier 
 directed the execution of the Sultan's physician, lest ^lie 
 should divulge the secret. Solyman's body was embalmed 
 and was carried in the royal litter during the remainder 
 of the short campaign in Hungary, and orders were still 
 given to the army in the nanie of the defunct Sultan. It 
 was not till news came that Selim had arrived at Belgrade 
 from his government in Asia , Minor that the army, on 
 its homeward march, was informed of the death of the 
 great Sultan. 
 
 This was the last of Solyman's thirteen campaigns in 
 which he led his armies personally on the field. There 
 were others in which his generals commanded. It is to 
 be observed of all of them that there was only one 
 case in which a pitched battle of any great importance 
 was fought on land. The single case was that of Mohacz, 
 already referred to, where the Ottoman army greatly ex- 
 ceeded in number that of the Hungarians opposed to it, 
 and was provided with a park of artillery, in which the 
 enemy was wholly deficient. The result, therefore, was 
 never in doubt. With that exception, there was no great 
 battle either with the Hungarians, the Austrians, or the 
 Persians. The campaigns consisted of invasions by great 
 armies of the Ottomans, with heavy parks of artillery, 
 and with large forces of irregular cavalry, who ravaged 
 and devastated the invaded country. The generals opposed 
 to them, not being able to meet the Turks in the field, 
 spread their forces in numerous fortresses, more or less
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 129 
 
 strong, and the campaigns consisted in besieging these 
 fortresses. With rare exceptions, these sieges were suc- 
 cessful. The Turks brought overwhelming forces to bear 
 on them. Their siege guns completely overmatched the 
 guns of the defence. It was a question of a few days or 
 a few weeks how long these fortresses could resist. The 
 wonder is that many of them resisted so long. The usual 
 course of such campaigns was that the Turks, having cap- 
 tured the fortresses in the invaded districts, either annexed 
 them to their Empire, as in the case of Eastern Hungary and 
 Mesopotamia, or compelled the vanquished State to acknow- 
 ledge the suzerainty of the Sultan and to pay tribute, as 
 in the case of Western Hungary, or retired, leaving the 
 ravaged country so destitute of supplies that the enemy 
 could not follow up the retreating army. 
 
 Solyman was almost always successful in his cam- 
 paigns — but they do not entitle him to a pJace in the first 
 rank of great generals who have earned their laurels by 
 defeating opponents not unequal in number in the open 
 field. Practically, there was only one sovereign in Europe 
 — namely the Emperor Charles V — and no one in Asia, 
 who could hope to meet Solyman on equal terms on the 
 battlefield, and the Emperor evidently did not care to 
 measure swords with him in the open. 
 
 If these considerations detract from the military fame 
 of Solyman, they do not lessen his reputation as an 
 empire -builder and as an organizer of campaigns of 
 invasion. Seldom has an Empire been extended to such 
 an extent as that of the Ottomans under his efi"orts, with so 
 little expenditure of life or of the resources of the State. 
 Solyman evidently made it his task to run no risk of 
 failure, but to use such overwhelming force as made 
 resistance all but impossible. 
 
 To put in the field these enormous armies, supported by 
 large masses of cavalry and great parks of artillery, to 
 transport them from Constantinople to the centre of 
 Hungary, or from Scutari to the frontiers of Persia, re- 
 quiring many weeks or months, was to perform a work of 
 organization of the first order. In the long course of his 
 reign and the many expeditions led by himself and liis 
 generals, the only failure to supply his armies in the field 
 with food and munitions of war was in the attack on Vienna. 
 Solyman had also unerring judgment and success in select- 
 
 9
 
 130 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ing his generals and other agents in his many campaigns. 
 The same may be said of his naval campaigns, in which 
 he took no personal part, and where success turned upon 
 the selection of competent admirals to command his fleets. 
 What a stroke of genius it was to go outside the profes- 
 sional men of his naval service, and to put at the head 
 of his fleets and of his naval administration, such men 
 as Barbarossa, Dragut, Piale, and others, who had gained 
 experience and had made their reputation as freebooters 
 and pirates ! It was due mainly to this that the Ottomans 
 acquired a virtual supremacy in the Mediterranean, that 
 Algiers, Oran, and Tripoli were brought under the Empire, 
 and that a fleet fitted out at Suez enabled the conquest of 
 Aden and Yemen. 
 
 It was not, however, only in military and naval 
 successes and in the additions to his Empire that Solyman 
 showed his greatness. His firm and resolute, yet sym- 
 pathetic, policy made its mark in every department of 
 the State. He insisted on impartial justice to every class 
 throughout his Empire. Governors of provinces, or other 
 high officials, who erred in this respect, and who were 
 guilty of injustice and cruelty, or who were corrupt and 
 incompetent, were at once dismissed, and not unfrequently 
 paid the penalty of death for their crimes. His very first 
 act on becoming Sultan was to order the dismissal of a 
 batch of unjust and corrupt officials. Von Hammer's pages 
 are full of other instances of the same kind throughout 
 Solyman's reign. He made no exception for favoured 
 persons, however near to the throne. Ferard Pasha, who 
 was married to one of the Sultan's two daughters, was 
 dismissed from the governorship of a province for gross 
 acts of injustice, cruelty, and corruption. By the urgent 
 entreaties of his wife, and of the Sultan's mother, Ferard 
 obtained another appointment. But on the renewal of his 
 misdeeds he was again dismissed, and, this time, was put 
 to death by order of the Sultan. 
 
 The finance of the Empire under Solyman was most 
 carefully husbanded. He fully recognized the strength 
 given to his country by a well -filled treasury. In spite of 
 his many wars, there were only two years in which he 
 found it necessary to levy exceptional taxes. In other 
 years the ordinary revenue sufficed. Taxation was com- 
 paratively light. His wars in part paid for themselves by
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 131 
 
 levies and exactions on the invaded countries, and by the 
 sale of captives. Janissaries and Spahis, numbering 
 together about fifty thousand, formed the standing army, 
 and were well paid. The holders of fiefs throughout the 
 Empire were bound to military service in time of war, and 
 to bring horses and arms. They numbered about eighty 
 thousand, and received no pay. Neither did the horde of 
 irregular cavalry, Tartars, and others who accompanied his 
 armies, receive pay. They provided for themselves by 
 ravaging the countries they passed through. Under these 
 conditions, the wars of Solyman were not burdensome to 
 the State. 
 
 Like so many of his predecessors, Solyman had a strong 
 bent to literary studies and poetry. His poems have a 
 reputation among his countrymen for dignity. He com- 
 piled a daily journal of his campaigns which is of historical 
 value. He was a liberal patron of science and art. His 
 reign was the Augustan age of Turkey. He v/as generous 
 in his expenditure on mosques, colleges, hospitals, aqueducts, 
 and bridges, not only in Constantinople, biit in all the 
 principal cities of his Empire. 
 
 It is to be noted that the sobriquet ' Magnificent ' was 
 given to Solyman by contemporaries in Europe. In Turkey 
 he was knowTi as ' the Legislator.' His reign was con- 
 spicuous for great reforms in every branch of the law — 
 all aimed at justice. The land laws were overhauled. The 
 feudal system of fiefs, which had been partially adopted on 
 the model of other countries in Europe, was simplified and 
 \mproved. The position of the ' rayas,' was ameliorated. 
 Something like fixity of tenure was secured to them. The 
 condition of the peasantry in Turkey was distinctly better 
 than that of the serfs in Hungary and Russia. The 
 Greek population of the Morea preferred Turkish rule 
 to that of the Venetians. A certain number of Hungarian 
 peasants voluntarily left their country and settled under 
 the more humane government of Turkey in Roumelia. 
 A further proof of the general contentment of the 
 people through the great expanse of the Turkish Empire 
 was that during the forty-six years of Solyman's reign 
 there was no outbreak among any one of the twenty different 
 races which inhabited it — ^and this in spite of the fact that 
 the country districts were denuded of troops for the many 
 campaigns in Hungary and Persia.
 
 132 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 While giving Solyman full credit for all these great 
 achievements of his reign, it is necessary to point out that 
 impartial historians have detected defects in his system 
 of government, which grew apace under his incompetent 
 successors, and led inevitably to the decadence of the 
 Ottoman Empire. 
 
 A Turkish historian, Kotchi Bey, who wrote on the 
 decline of the Ottoman Empire in 1623, about sixty years 
 after the death of Solyman, and who has been described 
 by Von Hammer as the Turkish Montesquieu, attributed 
 the decline in great part to the following causes : — 
 
 1 . The cessation in Solyman's time of the regular 
 attendance of the Sultan at the meetings of the Divan, or 
 great Council of State. Solyman had a window constructed 
 in an adjoining room opening into the council chamber, 
 where, hidden behind a veil, he could listen to the dis- 
 cussions of the Divan without taking a part in them. His 
 successors ceased even to listen from behind the veil. This 
 absence of the Sultan from his Council added to his arbi- 
 trary power and belittled the influence of his ministers. 
 So long as a very competent man like Solyman was on 
 the throne, this new practice may not have produced the 
 worst results, but in the case of his incompetent successors 
 it led to immense evils. The Sultan was finally swayed in 
 his decisions not by his responsible ministers or his Grand 
 Council, but by the inmates of his harem or by other 
 irresponsible and corrupt outsiders. 
 
 2. The habit introduced by Solyman of appointing men 
 to high ofhce who had not passed through the grades of 
 lower offices. The first and most conspicuous case of 
 this kind was the promotion of Ibrahim, the favourite com- 
 panion of Solyman, from the post of Master of the Pages 
 in the Sultan's household to that of Grand Vizier. 
 Numerous other cases could be quoted of a less conspicuous 
 character. Solyman, in fact, appointed outsiders to every 
 kind of office, however important. Eunuchs and renegades 
 of all kinds were elevated to the highest posts. Solyman 
 himself appears to Tiave been a very gbod judge of men, 
 and rarely made mistakes in his appointments, but his 
 successors had no such discernment, and appointments were 
 conferred at the caprice^ or under the influence of the 
 harem or otherwise, on the most unfit persons. 
 
 3. The venality and corruption first practised by Roostem
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 133 
 
 Pasha, who was Grand Vizier for fifteen years, and who 
 was married to Solyman's daughter. The principal merit 
 of Roostem in the eyes of his master was his skill in 
 replenishing the treasury. Among the means he adopted 
 of raising money was the exaction of large payments from 
 persons on their appointment to civil offices in the State. 
 These payments in Solyman's time were fixed in a definite 
 proportion to the salaries. They were not adopted in the 
 military and naval services. Under later Sultans they 
 became arbitrary and exorbitant, and were extended to the 
 army and navy. Practically appointments of all kinds were 
 put up to auction and given to the highest bidder. In 
 order to meet these payments on appointment, governors 
 of provinces and all officials, down to the lowest, were 
 induced to adopt corrupt practices of all kinds and the 
 sense of public duty was destroyed. 
 
 4. The evil practice introduced by Solyman of heaping 
 favours on his favourite viziers, or of allowing them to 
 amass wealth by selling their favours to those below them 
 in the official hierarchy. Ibrahim, who was Grand Vizier 
 for thirteen years, and Roostem for fifteen years, amassed 
 enormous fortunes. They set up a standard of extravagant 
 life, which was followed by other viziers and high officials. 
 Roostem on his death was possessed of 8 1 5 farms in Anatolia 
 and Roumelia, 476 watermills, 1,700 slaves, 2,900 coats 
 of mail, 8,000 turbans, 760 sabres, 600 copies of the 
 Koran, 5,000 books, and two millions of ducats. His 
 example in gaining wealth was followed by others in a 
 minor degree according to their opportunities. High 
 office came to be regarded as a means and opportunity 
 of acquiring great wealth, and this evil rapidly spread 
 throughout the Empire and led to corruption and extortion. 
 
 There was a corrective, or perhaps it should be called 
 a nemesis to this, in the fact that when an official was 
 put to death, by order of the Sultan, his property was con- 
 fiscated to the State. Ibrahim's immense wealth was thus 
 dealt with, and even in Solyman's time, and much more 
 so in those of his successors, the confiscated fortunes of 
 viziers, governors, and other officials sentenced to death 
 formed an important item in the annual income of the 
 State. There can be little doubt that not a few pashas 
 were put to death by the successors of Solyman in order 
 that the State might benefit from the confiscation of their
 
 134 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 fortunes. It was perhaps thought that the mere fact of 
 accumulation of wealth by an official was sufficient proof 
 that it had been improperly acquired, and that the holder 
 deserved to lose his lite and fortune. 
 
 There may be added to these causes of ultimate deca- 
 dence pointed out by the Turkish historian another which 
 must occur to those who closely study the reign of Solyman 
 — namely the growing influence in State affairs of the Sultan's 
 harem. The fall and death of Ibrahim, the murder of Prince 
 Mustapha, and the rebellion and consequent death of Prince 
 Bayezid were mainly due to intrigues of the harem. Great 
 as Solyman was, he fell under the evil influence of his 
 favourite Sultana, the Russian Ghowrem, better known in 
 history as Roxelana. Ghowrem was not only a most seduc- 
 tive concubine ; she was a very clever and witty woman, 
 with a great gift of conversation. She retained her influ- 
 ence over Solyman when age had reduced her personal 
 charms. By the entreaties of the Sultan's mother, who 
 perceived the malign influence of this woman over her 
 son, she was for a time got rid of from the Seraglio, 
 But Solyman could not forget her, and insisted on her 
 recall. Ghowrem celebrated her triumph by getting the 
 consent of the Sultan to many executions. Thenceforth 
 till her death her influence was unboimded. " I live with 
 the Sultan," she said, "and make him do what I wish." 
 Appointments to the highest offices were made at her 
 instance and abuses of all kinds arose. But worst of all 
 was the precedent that u-as set for the interference of 
 the harem in matters of State. 
 
 With Solyman's successors the influence of the harem 
 was continually a growing one, and v/as generally, though 
 not always, as will be seen, a danger to the State. It 
 became increasingly necessary for a minister who hoped 
 to retain his post to secure personal support in the Sultan's 
 harem. The harem itself became the centre of intrigue 
 and corruption, with fatal efl'ect on the interests of the 
 State. But worst of all dangers to the Empire was the 
 possibility — nay, the probability — that the succession of the 
 great man at the helm of State able to restrain the law- 
 lessness of the Janissaries, the fanaticism of the mullahs, 
 and the corruption of pashas might not be maintained. 
 Solym.an never did a worse deed for the future of the 
 Empire than when he put to death his eldest son, who
 
 SOLYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT 135 
 
 had proved himself to be in every way fit to succeed him 
 as Sultan, and when later, at the instance of Ghowrem, 
 he secured the succession of his son Selim. He knew 
 that Selim was a worthless and dissolute drunkard. He 
 is said to have remonstrated with his son and endeavoured 
 to induce him to reform his conduct. It will be seen that 
 it was in vain. The succession of Selim was a nemesis 
 for the murder of Mustapha. He was the first of a long 
 line of degenerates, who ruined the great work of Solym.an 
 and his predecessors. 
 
 In spite of this crime and of the base murder of 
 his most intimate friend and servant, Ibrahim, in spite 
 of the inception of the grave abuses we have lef erred to, 
 it must be admitted, on an impartial review of Solyman's 
 reign, that Solyman was the greatest of the Othman race 
 who created the Empire, and that in a generation of famous 
 rulers in Europe, including Charles V, Francis I, Leo X, 
 our own Henry VIII, Sigismund of Poland, and others, 
 he excelled them all in the deeds and qualities which con- 
 stitute the greatness and fame of a ruler. There is a 
 Turkish proverb to the effect that " Happy is the man 
 whose faults can be numbered, for then his merits cannot 
 be counted."
 
 XI 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI 
 
 1566-78 
 
 SOLYMAN was the last and greatest of the first ten Ottoman 
 Sultans who, succeeding one another from father to son, 
 in rather less than three hundred years, raised their PZmpire 
 from nothing to one of the most extended in the world. 
 They must have been a very virile race, for their reignr 
 averaged about twenty -eight years, far above the ordinary 
 expectations of life. With one exception they were all able 
 generals and habitually led their armies in the field. They 
 were all statesmen, persistent in pursuing their ambitious 
 aims. Many of them were addicted to literary pursuits, were 
 students of history, and even had reputation as poets. In 
 spite of these softening influences, there was in nearly all 
 of them a fund of cruelty. It may be doubted whether, in 
 the world's history, any other dynasty has produced so 
 long a succession of men with such eminent and persistent 
 qualities. 
 
 Solyman was succeeded by his third son, .Selim, com- 
 monly called ' the Sot,' a sobriquet which sufficiently 
 describes him. He was the only son spared from the bow- 
 string. Selim was followed by twenty -four other Sultans 
 of the Othman dynasty down to the present time. With 
 the rarest exception, they were men wholly wanting in 
 capacity to rule a great Empire. Only one of them was 
 capable of leading his army in the field. The others had 
 neither the will nor the capacity, nor even the personal 
 courage to do so. They fell under the influence either of 
 their viziers, or of the women or even of the eunuchs of 
 their harems. 
 
 136
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI 137 
 
 If the persistency of type and of the high quahties 
 of the first ten Sultans was remarkable, no less so was the 
 break which occurred after Solyman, and the almost total 
 absence of these qualities in their successors down to the 
 present time. One is tempted to question whether the 
 true blood of the Othman race flowed in the veins of these 
 twenty -five degenerates. Von Hammer refers to a common 
 rumour at Constantinople, though he does not afhrm his 
 own belief in it, that Selim was not really the son of Soly- 
 man but of a Jew, and that this accounted for his infatuation 
 for a favourite Jew adventurer, who obtained a potent 
 influence over his weak mind. Such a break in true descent 
 might well have been possible in the vicious atmosphere 
 of the harem, in spite of the precaution that no men 
 but those deprived of virility were to be allowed to 
 enter it. 
 
 Whatever may be the explanation, there can be no doubt 
 that the degeneracy of the Othman dynasty dates from the 
 accession of Sehm the Sot. But this did not necessarily 
 involve the immediate decadence of the Empire. The 
 Ottoman Empire could not have been built up by the 
 energy and ability of a single autocrat in each generation. 
 There must have been many capable men, statesmen, 
 generals, and administrators, of all ranks, who contributed 
 in each 'generation to the achievements ,of their' rulers. Many 
 such men survived for some years the death of Solyman, and 
 preserved the Empire from the ruin which threatened it. 
 The Empire, in fact, did not begin to shrink in extent till 
 some years later, and for about twelve years, as if from the 
 momentum given to it by the powerful Sultans of the past, it 
 actually continued to expand. Selim was the first of the new 
 type of Sultans. He took no interest or part in the affairs 
 of State. He w'as a debauchee ,aind a drunkard. He gkve an 
 evil example to all others, high and low. Judges, cadis, and 
 ulemas took to drink. Poets wrote in raptures about wine. 
 Hafiz, the most in esteem of them, wrote that wine was 
 sweeter than the kisses of young girls. The attention of 
 the Mufti was called to this, and he was asked to censor the 
 poem as contrary to the injunctions of the Koran. But the 
 Mufti replied that " when a Sultan took to drink it was 
 permissible for all to do the same and for poets to 
 celebrate it." 
 
 Selim fell completely under the influence of his Grand
 
 138 THE TURKISH EIClPiRE 
 
 Vizier, who had held the post for two years under Solyman. 
 Sokolli, who was a most capable man, was the virtual ruler 
 of the Empire. He was a man of large views. He had 
 two important and interesting schemes in his mind. The 
 one to cut a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, so that the 
 Turkish fleet might find its way into the Red Sea and 
 Indian Ocean, the other to make a junction by a canal 
 between the rivers Don and Volga. These tv/o great rivers, 
 which have their sources in Russia, run a parallel course 
 for a long distance, and at one point approach one another 
 within thirty miles. They then diverge again, the one 
 flowing into the Sea of Azoff, the other into the CaspLan 
 Sea. By joining these two rivers by a canal at the point 
 where the distance between them is the least, it would be 
 possible for a Turldsh flotilla to ascend the Don, and then, 
 after passing through the canal, descend the Volga into the 
 Caspian Sea, whence it would be able to attack the Persian 
 province of Tabriz with great advantage. The commercial 
 possibilities of this junction of the two great water highways 
 were also obvious. The scheme, hov/ever, necessitated 
 taking Astrakan and other territory from Russia — a country 
 which had of late years largely extended its possessions 
 and power. 
 
 In this view, SokoUi, in 1568, sent an army of twenty- 
 five thousand Janissaries and Spahis by sea to Azoff. 
 They were there joined by thirty thousand Tartars from the 
 Crimea, and the combined force marched thence to 
 Astrakan, at the mouth of the Volga. For the first time, 
 therefore, the Ottomans came into direct conflict with the 
 Russians. The expedition was a total failure. The Turks 
 were unable to capture Astrakan, and a Russian army 
 completely destroyed that of the Tartars. The main 
 Turkish army was compelled to retreat to Azoff. Later, the 
 greater part of it was lost in a great tempest in the Black 
 Sea, and only seven thousand of its men returned to Con- 
 stantinople. The project of a Don and Volga canal was 
 consequently abandoned. That for a canal across the 
 Isthmus of Suez was aho indefinitely adjourned, owing to 
 an outbreak of the Arabs in the province of Yemen, which 
 necessitated sending an army there under Sinan Pasha. 
 This was thoroughly successful, and Yemen and other parts 
 of Arabia were completely .and finally brought under the 
 subjection of the Ottoman Empire.
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI' 139 
 
 After the reconquest of Yemen, Sokolli determined to 
 attack Tunis, which since its capture by the Emperor 
 Charles V had been in the occupation of the Spaniards. 
 The fleet employed for this purpose was under the 
 command of Ouloudj Pasha, a renegade Italian, who 
 ^fter a successful career as corsair and pirate was 
 induced to take service under the Sultan. In 1568 
 he was appointed governor of Algiers, and in that 
 capacity led the expedition against Tunis in the following 
 year. He defeated the Spaniards and occupied the town. 
 But the garrison retreated into the citadel, which they held 
 till 1574. 
 
 In 1570 another expedition was decided on, this time for 
 the purpose of capturing the island of Cyprus, which was 
 then in possession of the Republic of Venice, with which the 
 Porte was at peace. Sokolli, on this account, was at first 
 opposed to the scheme. But on this occasion, for the first 
 and, apparently, the only time, Sultan Selim overruled his 
 minister. He loved the wine of Cyprus and wished to secure 
 a certain supply of it. He had also, in a drunken orgy, pro- 
 mised to elevate his boon companion, the Jew, to the position 
 of King of Cyprus. The Mufti, who had always hitherto 
 given a full support to Sokolli, was consulted as to whether 
 the treaty with Venice was binding on the Sultan so as to 
 make an attack on Cyprus unlawful. He issued a fetva to 
 the effect that, as Cyprus at some distant time had been 
 under Moslem rule, as a dependency of Egypt, it was the 
 duty of a Mussulman prince to avail himself of any favour- 
 able opportunity to restore to Islam territory which had 
 been taken possession of by an infidel Power, and that, 
 consequently, the treaty with Venice was not binding on 
 the Sultan. 
 
 In accordance with this ruling of the Mufti, an expedition 
 was fitted out in 1570 by the Ottoman government, consist- 
 ing of a hundred thousand men, including irregulars, under 
 command of Kara Mustapha, who was the rival of vSokolli, 
 and a fleet under Piale. This force laid siege to Nicosia, the 
 capital of Cyprus, a flourishing Christian city, where there 
 were said to be as many churches as fliere are days in the 
 year. After a siege of seven weeks the city was captured 
 by assault, and was given up to sack by the Turkish' soldiers. 
 Thirty thousand of the inhabitants were massacred. Many 
 women killed themselves and their children rather than give
 
 140 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 themselves up to the maddened soldiers. Two thousand 
 of the better-looking children of both sexes were sold as 
 slaves. i ! 
 
 Mustapha Pasha then proceeded to invest Famagosta, 
 the principal fortress in the island. It was heroically, 
 defended by a mixed force of Italians and Greeks, under 
 command of Bragadino, a brave Venetian general. It 
 successfully resisted attack throughout the winter of 1570. 
 It was not till August in the following year (1571) that 
 the garrison, reduced to less than four thousand men, 
 was compelled by failure of food and munitions of war to 
 surrender. Very favourable terms were promised to them 
 by Mustapha. The lives of the garrison were to be 
 respected, and the property and religion of the citizens 
 were to be secured to them. The garrison were to be 
 conveyed in Turkish galleys to Crete and there released. 
 In pursuance of these terms the captiv^es were embarked on 
 board galleys ready to sail to Crete. At this stage an inter- 
 view took place between Kara Mustapha and Bragadino and 
 his suite of twenty officers, at which very hot words passed 
 between them. The Turkish general complained that some 
 of his men, taken prisoners during the siege, had been put 
 to death. Bragadino denied this. His language was con- 
 sidered to be insolent by Kara Mustapha, who at once gave 
 orders that all Bragadino's suite were to be strangled in 
 his presence. Their leader was reserved for a more cruel 
 fate. The men embarked on the galleys were landed again 
 and were massacred. A week later, Bragadino, who had 
 been treated in the interval with the greatest cruelty and 
 the most barbarous indignities, was flayed aUve. His skin, 
 stuffed with hay, was exhibited to the scorn of the Turkish 
 soldiers. The capture of Famagosta completed the conquest 
 of Cyprus. It remained in the possession of the Ottomans 
 till, as will be seen, it was handed over to the British 
 Government, in 1878, in pursuance of a policy devised 
 by Lord Beaconsfield. The Turks are said to have lost 
 fifty thousand men in its capture. It was in revenge for 
 this that Kara Mustapha resorted to the terrible deeds 
 above described. 
 
 Meanwhile the Christian Powers had been greatly alarmed 
 by the loss of Cyprus and the atrocities above described. 
 At the instance mainly of the Pope, an alliance was formed 
 in 1570 with Spain and Venice, with the object of opposing
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLL'l 141 
 
 the growing strength of the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. 
 A great fleet was fitted out by these Powers, and was placed 
 under the command of Don John of Austria, the natural 
 son of the late Emperor, Charles V, a young man of 
 only twenty-four years, who had shown his capacity in 
 the measures for the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, 
 and was already reckoned one of the best generals of the 
 time. The fleet consisted of two hundred galleys and six 
 powerful galleasses with heavy armaments. It was manned 
 by eighty thousand soldiers and rowers, one-half of whom 
 were provided by Spain and one -third by Venice, the 
 remainder, one-sixth, by the Pope. Don John was in 
 supreme command. The Spanish division was commanded 
 by the Prince of Parma, soon to become notorious in the 
 Netherlands under Philip II, and who was later in com- 
 mand of the Armada fitted out in Spain for the invasion of 
 England. 1 
 
 The fleet assembled at Messina on September 21, 
 I 57 I, too late for the relief of Cyprus. The Turks collected 
 in the Gulf of Lepanto a much greater fleet of two hundred 
 and ninety galleys manned by a hundred and twenty 
 thousand soldiers and rowers. But they had no large 
 galleasses with powerful armaments to compare with those 
 of the Spaniards. The fleet was commanded by the Capitan 
 Pasha Ali, a young man without experience in naval war. 
 The second in command was Ouloudj. Perted Pasha 
 was in command of the troops. He and Ouloudj were 
 opposed to an immediate battle with the allied fleet on the 
 ground that their men were not as yet sufficiently trained. 
 At a council of war heated discussion took place. The 
 Capitan Pasha insisted on immediate attack. Ouloudj 
 broke off the discussion, saying, " Silence. I am ready, 
 because it is written that the youth of a Capitan 
 Pasha has more weight than my forty -three years 
 of fighting. But the Berbers have made sport of 
 yiou, Pasha ! Remember this when the peril draws 
 near. " 
 
 The rowers of both fleets were galley slaves chained to 
 the oars. On the Turkish fleet they were Christians who 
 had been made captives in war. On the Christian fleet 
 they were the sweepings of the jails. In both cases the 
 admirals promised liberty to them if they performed their 
 dutv in the coming battle.
 
 142 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 The two fleets met near the entrance to the Gulf of 
 Lepanto on October 7, 1571- The Christian fleet was ranged 
 in a crescent with the Venetians on the left flank. The s'n 
 powerful galleasses were posted like redoubts at intervals 
 in front of the lines of galleys. Don John was at the centre 
 of the crescent. The two fleets approached one another. 
 The engagement soon became general. The Turkish galleys 
 as their enemy neared them, were somewhat broken in line 
 by the Spanish galleasses, which raked the Turkish galleys 
 with their more powerful armaments. The Turkish admiral, 
 in the Sultana, made a direct attack on Don .John's ship, 
 the Real, which was later supported by a second galley. 
 The three were locked together, and the Spanish soldiers 
 boarded the Turkish vessel. A desperate hand-to-hand 
 combat took place, in which the Turkish admiral was killed. 
 His head was cut off and, against the will of Don John, was 
 stuck on the masthead of the Spanish vessel. This caused 
 general discouragement in the Turkish fleet. All along the 
 line the Turkish vessels were v/orsted in the combats with 
 their opponents. There resulted a complete defeat of their 
 centre and left wing. Ouloudj, in command of the Turkish 
 right wing, was more fortunate. He succeeded in out- 
 manoeuvring the Venetian vessels opposed to him. He 
 made a violent attack on fifteen galleys which were 
 detached from the main fleet of the allies and suc- 
 ceeded in sinking them. When he became aware that 
 the main Ottoman fleet was completely defeated by the 
 Spaniards, he made a dash with forty of his own 
 galleys through the enemy's line and succeeded in 
 escaping. With this exception, the whole of the Turkish 
 vessels, two hundred and sixty-six in number, were 
 captured or sunk. Fifty thousand Turks lost their lives 
 in this great battle, and fifteen thousand Christian slaves 
 were liberated. 
 
 It was an overwhelming defeat for the Ottomans. No 
 such naval victory had occurred in the Mediterranean 
 since that of Actium, very near to the same spot, w'here 
 (B.C. 3O Marc Antony's fleet was destroyed by that 
 of Octavdus. Nor was there another such decisive 
 naval encounter in those seas till that known as the 
 Battle of the Nile, v>rhen Nelson captured or sank 
 nearly the whole of the French fleet oft' ^he coast of 
 Egypt.
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI 143 
 
 It was to be expected that the allied Christian fleet 
 would follow up its great victory by attack on some Turkish 
 territory. No such project was entertained by its admirals 
 and generals. The fleet dispersed after its victory. 
 Each detachment of it returned to its own ports, there 
 to receive ovations of triumph. Sculptors and painters 
 celebrated the event by works of art in churches at 
 Rome, Venice, Messina, and other cities. Never was 
 so decisive a victory productive of so little further 
 result. ; i 
 
 The contrast between the action of the defeated Turks 
 and that of the victors was most striking. Ouloudj, picking 
 up forty stray galleys in the JEgea-U Sea, returned to Con- 
 stantinople with eighty vessels. Piale joined him there 
 with a few more. Sokolli and his colleagues in the Turkish 
 Government made the most determined efforts to restore 
 their fleet. Even Selim showed some spirit on this occa- 
 sion. He contributed largely from his privy purse. He 
 gave up part of the garden of his palace at Seraglio Point 
 as a site for the construction of new vessels. One hundred 
 and sixty galleys were at once commenced, together with 
 eight galleasses of the largest size. By the spring of the next 
 year they were completed. The losses at Lepanto were 
 made good and the Ottoman fleet was as powerful as 
 before the disaster. In the summer of 1572 the 
 allied Christian fleet was again assembled on the eastern 
 Mediterranean. It was still inferior in numbers of vessels 
 to that of the Ottomans. The two fleets came in sight of 
 one another twice in that season in the neighbourhood of 
 the island of Cerigo and, later, off Cape Matapan, but 
 no engagement took place. It may be concluded that 
 Ouloudj, who was now Capitan Pasha of the Turkish navy 
 with the honorary name of Killidj Ali, thought it the better 
 policy not to risk his new fleet before the crews were 
 thoroughly trained. He withdrew, and the sequel showed 
 the wisdom of his action. The allied fleet was unable to 
 do anything. 
 
 Later, in 1573, the Venetians found it expedient to 
 negotiate terms for a separate peace with the Porte. 
 Their envoy, who appears to have remained at Con- 
 stantinople during the late war, interviewed Sokolli for 
 this purpose. When he alluded to the losses which 
 the two Powers had rerentlv inrurred, the one of the
 
 144 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 island of Cyprus, the other of its fleet, Sokolli proudly 
 replied : — 
 
 You have doubtless observed our courage after tlie accident which 
 happened to our fleet. There is this great difference between our loss and 
 yours. In capturing a kingdom we have cut off one of your arms, while 
 you, in destroying oar fleet, have merely shorn our beard. A limb cut 
 off cannot be replaced, but a beard when shorn will grow again in greater 
 vigour than ever. 
 
 Terms of peace were concluded. Not only was the 
 capture of Cyprus confirmed by a formal cession of the 
 island, but the Republic agreed to pay to the Porte the cost 
 incurred by its capture, estimated at 300,000 ducats. The 
 tribute paid by Venice for the island of Zante lof 500 
 ducats was increased to 1,500 ducats. The Republic was 
 relieved of the annual tribute of 8,000 ducats in respect 
 of Cyprus. The limits of the possessions of the two Powers 
 in Dalmatia and Albania were restored to what they had 
 been before the war. The terms were humiliating to 
 Venice ; they could not have been worse if the battle of 
 Lepanto had never been fought. 
 
 The rapid restoration of its fleet by the Porte gave fresh 
 evidence of its vital power and its unsurpassed resources. 
 For a long time to come the Ottoman navy, supported by the 
 piratical conting'ents from its Barbary dependents, held a 
 virtual supremacy in the Mediterranean. 
 
 After the conclusion of peace between Venice and the 
 Porte, Don John, in October 1573, commanded a Spanish 
 fleet in an expedition against Tunis, which, as above stated, 
 had been captured by Ouloudj on behalf of the Turks. 
 The task of Don John was the more easy as the Turks 
 had not succeeded in capturing the citadel, which was still 
 in the possession of its Spanish garrison. He had no 
 difficulty in defeating the few Turks who were in posses- 
 sion of the city of Tunis. He showed no disposition to 
 restore to his throne the Sultan Hamid. This miserable 
 creature appeared at Tunis and claimed to be reinstated 
 there. But the Spaniards would have nothing to do with 
 him. He was deported to Naples. 
 
 Don John, having effected his object, departed to Spain, 
 leaving at Tunis a mixed garrison of eig'ht thousand Italians 
 and Spaniards. When news of this capture reached Con-
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLT 145 
 
 stantinople, SokoUi and Ouloudj were greatly incensed. 
 In 1574 a fleet of two hundred and sixty galleys and 
 galleasses with forty thousand men was sent out, under 
 command of Ouloudj, who made short work of the Spanish 
 and Italian garrison at Tunis, and recaptured the province, 
 and finally annexed it to the Turkish Empire. This prob- 
 ably could not have been efifected if Venice had remained 
 in alliance with Spain, but alone the latter was not able 
 to meet the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean. 
 
 In 1574 Selim died under the influence of drink, and 
 was succeeded by his son, Murad III, as much a nullity 
 as regards public affairs as his father. Sokolli remained 
 as Grand Vizier till his death, four years later, by the 
 hands of an assassin, but with diminishing power, owing 
 to the intrigues of the Sultan's harem, which eventually 
 contrived his end. 
 
 In 1578, the last year of Sokolli's vizierate, war again 
 broke out with Persia, and a great army was sent to Asia, 
 under command of Mustapha, the conqueror of Cyprus. 
 It began by invading Georgia, then under a native Christian 
 prince in close alliance with, if not under the subjection 
 of, Persia. Mustapha had no diflficulty in conquering 
 Georgia,' and in occupying the adjacent Persian provinces 
 of Azerbijan, Loristan, and Scherhezol. He penetrated to 
 Dhagestan, on the Caspian. The war was continued under 
 Sokolli's successors for some years with varying fortune. 
 It was not till 1590 that a treaty of peace was concluded 
 with Persia, under which these provinces were ceded to 
 the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 It will be seen from this brief narrative that the acquisi- 
 tions of the Ottoman Empire during the twelve years when 
 the Grand Vizier Sokolli was virtually its ruler were very 
 great and important. They included the island of Cyprus, 
 the province of Tunis, the kingdom of Georgia, the 
 provinces taken from Persia, and the Yemen, in Arabia. 
 These, with one exception, were the last acquisitions of 
 the Ottoman P2mpire. The exception was that of the island 
 of Crete, which was not attacked by the Turks till sixty - 
 seA^en years later, in 1645, and was not finally conquered 
 till 1668. But by this time the Ottoman Empire had 
 begun to shrink at the hands of its enemies in other 
 directions. It maybe concluded, therefore, that the last 
 year of the vizierate of Sokolli^ 1578, and not the last 
 
 .10
 
 146 THE TURKISH EAHTRE 
 
 year of Solyman's reign, was the zenith of the Ottoman 
 Empire. 
 
 The Emi)ire was by this time extended from the centre 
 of Hungary in the north to the Persian Gulf and the 
 Soudan in the south, from the Caspian Sea and the borders 
 of Persia in the east to the province of Oran in Africa 
 in the west. It included nearly the whole of the southern 
 shores of the Mediterranean, except that of Morocco, and 
 all the shores of the Black Sea and the Red Sea. All 
 the islands of the ^Egean Sea except Crete belonged to it. 
 These territories were inhabited by twenty different races. 
 Their population has been variously estimated at thirty 
 millions and upwards. Many of the Greek cities at that 
 time existing in Asia Minor were still very populous, in 
 spite of the massacres which had taken place when they 
 were captured by the Turks. It is probable that the popu- 
 lation of Asia Minor, of Syria, and of Mesopotamia was 
 much larger than it is at the present time. That of 
 Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia was also greater than it 
 was in modern times before their emancipation from Turkish 
 rule. After the death of Sokolli there ensued an era when 
 misgovernment and corruption played havoc with the Empire, 
 and a process of shrinkage began which extended over 
 three centuries, the exact opposite to its growth in the pre- 
 vious three centuries. 
 
 It should here be noted that although the Sultans were 
 autocrats in the full sense of the term, there existed in 
 practice some ultimate check on their misdeeds. The Mufti, 
 as the chief interpreter of the sacred law of Islam, had 
 the right and power to declare whether any act of the 
 Sultan, or any proposed act by any other person, was in 
 accord with or opposed to such law. As the Mufti could 
 be deposed by the Sultan and then be put to death, this 
 power could be very rarely used by him. But when out- 
 breaks occurred on the part of the Janissaries and reached 
 a point when the deposition of the Sultan was demanded, 
 the Mufti, as a rule, was asked for his opinion. It will 
 be seen that of the twenty-five Sultans after Solyman eleven 
 were deposed, and in almost every case the Mufti gave 
 his legal sanction. The Janissaries may have been very 
 lawless, but they were not the less a salutary check on 
 the Sultans. With one possible exception the depositions 
 were well deserved. It should be noted that there was
 
 GRAND VIZIER SOKOLLI I47 
 
 also a check on the Sultans in the Divan, which was com- 
 posed of the four viziers and many other functionaries, 
 mihtary, civil, legal, and religious. It met once or twice 
 a week and discussed matters of State. Till the time of 
 Solyman the Sultan presided, but he gave up this practice. 
 In the absence of the Sultan the Grand Vizier presided. 
 In the reign of the degenerate Sultans the Divan often played 
 an important part.
 
 40 
 
 Stanf\)Pd!s Geogl£sU3Jbt,IondoTi.
 
 G
 
 PART II 
 
 THE DECAY OF EMPIRE
 
 XII 
 
 THE EULE OF SULTANAS 
 
 1578-1656 
 
 After the death of Sokolli many years elapsed before 
 another Grand Vizier was able to wield the power of the 
 State, in place of the weak and incompetent Sultans ;who 
 succeeded to the throne. The supreme power fell into the 
 hands of women of the Sultan's harem. For a time the 
 chief influence lay wdth the Sultana Bafifo, a Venetian lady 
 of the noble family of that name, who had been captured 
 when young by a corsair and sold as a slave to the harem 
 of Sultan jNIurad III. She was a very clever and 
 ambitious, as well as a beautiful woman, and for a time 
 Murad was devoted to her charms to the exclusion of 
 other inmates of his harem. But his mother, the Sultana 
 Valid6, jealous of Baffo's exclusive influence in politics, 
 contrived to draw Murad's affection from her by tempting 
 him with two other very beautiful slaves. Later, the lady 
 who presided over the harem and her assistant improved 
 on this method by procuring for the Sultan a succession 
 of beautiful slaves, in such numbers that the price of this 
 ware rose enormously in the slave market. 
 
 Murad, imder the influence of these attractions, devoted 
 himself wholly to voluptuous life in his harem. He became 
 the father of one hundred and three children, of whom 
 forty-seven survived him. The Sultana Baffo, the mother 
 of his eldest son, though she had lost her charm for him 
 as a mistress, continued to influence him in public affairs 
 by her wit and cleverness, sharing it, however, with the 
 other ladies referred to. After the death of the Sultana 
 Valid(5, the Sultana Baffo succeeded in regaining much 
 of her earlier and exclusive influence. She retained the same 
 authority over her son Mahomet ITI, who succeeded his 
 
 151
 
 152 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 father in 1595. It resulted, therefore, that this lady, for 
 twenty-eight years, exercised the greatest power in the State. 
 Mahomet was as much a nullity in public afifairs as his 
 father. He signalized his accession to the throne by putting 
 to death his nineteen brothers. He thought apparently 
 that this holocaust shed some lustre on these unfortunate 
 princes, for he accorded to them a State funeral. They 
 were followed to their graves by all the high dignitaries 
 of the State, and were buried beside their father. Six 
 favourite slaves of the eldest of these princes, who might 
 be expected to give birth to future claimants to the throne, 
 were sewn up in sacks and were flung into the Bosphorus. 
 
 Mahomet was the last Sultan who was allowed before 
 his accession to have some experience in public affairs as 
 governor of a province. Thenceforward it was the practice 
 for reigning Sultans to immure their heirs in a building 
 in the Seraglio, at Constantinople, known as the Cage, where 
 they were allowed to have no intercourse with the outer 
 world, and could have no experience, or even knowledge, 
 of public affairs, and which they only left either to reign 
 as Sultans or to be put to death. It has been suggested 
 by some writers that this treatment of the heirs to the 
 Ottoman throne was the main cause of the lamentable 
 degeneracy of the Othman dynasty. It must undoubtedly 
 have contributed to this, but it should be noticed that the 
 three Sultans, Selim II, Murad III, and Mahomet HI, who 
 had not been subjected to this debasing treatment, and had 
 been governors of provinces before their accession, were 
 quite as worthless and incompetent as any of their successors. 
 
 Mahomet, after eight years of a vacuous reign, was 
 succeeded by his son Achmet, who reigned for fourteen 
 years. He was as incompetent to rule as his two 
 predecessors. He fell under the influence of other 
 ladies of his harem. The Sultana Baffo was ignored and 
 lost her power. On the death of Achmet, in 161 7, he 
 was succeeded not by his eldest son but by his brother 
 Mustapha, a lunatic. Achmet had spared his brother's life 
 on account of his lunacy. Mustapha, therefore, by virtue of 
 the law of succession, succeeded, but he was deposed after 
 a few months, and was followed on the throne by Othman II, 
 the son of Achmet, who showed some greater capacity. 
 In his short reign, however, of four years he incurred the 
 disfavour of the Janissaries, who insisted on his deposition
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 153 
 
 and 'death. The lunatic Mustapha was then reinstated on 
 the throne, and was again deposed, after a few months. 
 He was succeeded by Murad IV, a lad under twelve years. 
 Till he came to years of discretion his mother, the Sultana 
 Valide, (who was a. clever woman, virtually ruled. It will 
 be shown later that Murad was of very different type to 
 his six predecessors. On coming of age he emlancipated 
 himself from the influence of the harem, and was the 
 last of his dynasty who was a warrior and who personally 
 led his army in the field. His rule lasted for only eight 
 years. On his death, in 1640, he was succeeded by his 
 iDrother Ibrahim II, a worthless voluptuary, during whose 
 reign of another eight years the harem recovered its influ- 
 ence. He was followed by Mahomet IV, and for eight more 
 years the rule of the harem was maintained. From this 
 brief narrative it will appear that from the death of Sokolli 
 in 1578 till 1656, a period of seventy-eight years, during 
 which seven Sultans occupied the throne, the supreme power 
 in the State iwas exercised by women of the harem, with 
 the exception of the eight years of the reign of Sultan 
 Murad IV. For twenty-eight of these years the Sultana 
 Baffo, and later other ladies less known to fame, were 
 virtually the rulers of the Empire. Grand Viziers were 
 made and unmade at the will of these ladies, with occa- 
 sional intervention of the Janissaries. They seldom held 
 the office for more than a year, l^he Sultana Baffo was 
 a grasping and avaricious woman. Under her evil influ- 
 ence, and later that of other ladies of the harem, the 
 system of the sale of offices was greatly extended and 
 became universal throughout the Empire for all appoint- 
 ments, high and low. 
 
 It has been shown that the Grand Vizier Roostem, in 
 Solyman's reign, first introduced the system of requiring 
 payments from persons appointed as governors of provinces 
 and to other high civil posts ; but the sums were fixed 
 and definite, and were paid into the treasury of the State, 
 and the system was not extended to the army. The pay- 
 ments now became arbitrary and universal, and were ex- 
 tended to appointments in the army. The Sultan himself 
 was not above taking a part in this plunder, and the ladies 
 of the harem had also their full share. Grand Viziers 
 only succeeded in retaining their posts by large payments 
 to the Sultan and his entourage, male and female.
 
 :i54 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Von Hammer, on the authority of the historian Ali, 
 tells the story that a favourite of the Sultan, one Schemsi 
 Pasha, who was descended from a family formerly reign- 
 ing over a province of Asia Minor, on the borders of 
 the Black Sea, which had been dispossessed by an early 
 Ottoman Sultan, on coming from an interview with the 
 Sultan, Murad III, exclaimed with a joyous air : " At last I 
 have revenged myself on the House of Othman, for I have 
 now persuaded it to prepare for its own downfall ! " When 
 asked how he had done that, he replied : "By persuading 
 the Sultan to share in the sale of his own favours. It 
 is true that I placed a tempting bait before him. Forty 
 thousand ducats make no trifling sum. From this time 
 forth the Sultan sets the example of corruption, and 
 corruption will destroy the Empire." ' 
 
 As a result of this evil practice of the sale of offices, 
 the whole system of government throughout the Empire, 
 from top to bottom, was infected with bribery and corrup- 
 tion. The judges, equally with other officers, were corrupt, 
 and gave their judgments to the highest bidder. Criminals 
 of the vilest kind who could bribe the judges were allowed 
 to go free. All confidence in the administration of the 
 law was destroyed. All officers in the State, from the 
 highest to the lowest, held their posts at the will of those 
 who appointed them, and were liable to be superseded at 
 any moment. Having paid large sums for these posts, it 
 was necessary for them to make hay while the sun shone, 
 and to recoup themselves for their outlay by exactions 
 on those below them, and by plundering the people in 
 their districts. 
 
 The army being no longer exempt from this pernicious 
 system, officers were appointed or promoted, not because 
 they were efficient, but because they had the longest purses. 
 The discipline of the army was therefore relaxed. There 
 was also great dissatisfaction throughout the service 
 because the soldiers were paid in debased coins. The 
 garrisons of such frontier fortresses as Buda and Tabriz 
 broke out in revolt. The Janissaries got out of hand. 
 There were conflicts between them and the Spahis. The 
 Janissaries frequently insisted on the dismissal, and even 
 on the execution, of viziers and other ministers of State, and 
 the craven Sultans and the ladies of their harems had to 
 ■ Von clammer, vii. p, 4.
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 155 
 
 consent. There was rebellion in Transylvania, Moldavia, 
 and Wallachia. The Christians of the Lebanon rose against 
 their oppressors, the Turks. Brigandage increased to a 
 lamentable extent in other parts of the Empire. 
 
 The ladies of the liarem, it would seem, were not favour- 
 able to war. The Sultana Baffo, being a Venetian by 
 birth, averted war with that Republic for many years. 
 Peace was also made with Austria and was maintained for 
 some years. But in 1593, when Transylvania and Wallachia 
 were in rebellion, Austria and Hungary were induced by 
 sympathy for their people to declare war against the Porte. 
 Their army, under command of the Emperor Maximilian 
 and Count Pfalfi, the Hungarian general, marched to the 
 Danube, capturing on their way Gran, Pesth, Bucharest, 
 and other strongholds of the Turks. They then crossed 
 the Danube and marched to Varna. 
 
 There was the greatest consternation at Constantinople 
 at the loss of so many strongholds and the defeat of the 
 Turkish armies. There was a general demand that 
 the Sultan himself, the incompetent Mahomet, should 
 endeavour to restore confidence to the Turkish soldiers, 
 by putting himself at the head of them, as his predecessors 
 had done in past times. He was urged to unfurl the 
 standard of the Prophet, and to appeal to the religious 
 fervour and fanaticism of the army. Mahomet was most 
 unwilling to adopt this course. He preferred to remain 
 in the Seraglio at Constantinople. The Sultana Baffo, 
 fearing that her influence might be lost if her son was 
 out of her sight, backed his refusal to march. On the 
 other hand, his preceptor, the historian Seadeddin, who 
 had great influence over him, made every effort in the 
 opposite direction. At last the Janissaries refused to go 
 to the front unless their Padishah led them, and Mahomet, 
 much against his will, was compielled to put himself at 
 the head of his army. The sacred standard of the Prophet 
 and his mantle, a most prized relic, were brought out 
 for the occasion. With much pomp the Ottomans marched 
 northwards to meet the invaders. The Austrians and 
 Hungarians fell back at the approach of this great army 
 of Turks. They abandoned all the fortresses they had 
 captured in Bulgaria. They recrossed the Danube. The 
 two armies at last came into conflict on the plain of 
 Cerestes, in Hungary, on the 24th of October, 1596,
 
 156 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 where a memorable battle took place, extending over three 
 days. 
 
 It does not appear that Mahomet took any part in the 
 direction of his army. The Grand Vizier was virtually 
 in command. The second in command was Cicala, an 
 Italian by birth who had embraced Islam, a most brave 
 and resolute soldier, greatly favoured by the ladies of 
 the harem. The Sultan, however, was present in the field, 
 surrounded by his bodyguard. The sacred banner of the 
 Prophet was unfurled and roused, it was said, the fervour 
 of the Turkish soldiers. On the first day the Turks met 
 with a reverse, and a division of their army was defeated. 
 A council of war was held, at which Mahomet expressed 
 his wish to retreat and to avoid further battle. Seadeddin 
 stoutly opposed this. " It has never been seen or heard 
 of," he said, " that a Padishah of the Ottomans turned 
 his back upon the enemy without the direst necessity." 
 Mahomet then suggested that he himself should with- 
 draw from the battle, and that the Grand Vizier, Hassan 
 Pasha, should take command of the army. " This is 
 no affair for pashas," said Seadeddin, " the presence 
 of the Padishah is indispensably necessary." It was 
 decided to continue the battle in the presence of the 
 Sultan. 
 
 The second day was no better for the Ottomans than 
 the first. On the third day, October 26th, the two main 
 armies came into closer quarters. The Hungarians, under 
 Count Pfalfi, attacked the Ottoman artillery in flank and 
 captured all the guns. The battle seemed to be irretrievably 
 lost. The Sultan, seated on a tall camel, surrounded by 
 his bodyguard, watched the rout of his army. He wished 
 to fly while there was time. He was dissuaded again by 
 Seadeddin, who quoted a verse from the Koran : " It is 
 patience which wins victory, and joy succeeds to sorrow." 
 The Sultan, wrapping the Prophet's mantle round him, 
 consented to remain on the field. 
 
 The Austrians now charged the Ottoman camp. The 
 Imperial soldiers, breaking their ranks, devoted themselves 
 to plunder. At this point Cicala, at the head of a large 
 body of irregular cavalry, which had taken no part so 
 far in the battle, charged with irresistible force the scattered 
 host of the Christians. They carried everything before 
 them . The Austrians, in their turn, were driven from the
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 157 
 
 field. Maximilian and Sigismund were compelled to fly 
 for their lives. 
 
 The Ottomans, as a result of this gallant charge, regained 
 all that they had lost. Thirty thousand Austrians and 
 Hungarians perished. Ninety -five of their guns were 
 captured. The camp and the treasure of the Archduke 
 were taken. Never was a more complete and unexpected 
 victory. No thanks, however, were due to the Sultan. 
 There can be no doubt that if he had acted on his own 
 impulse and had fled, the battle would have been lost. 
 He was a timid spectator of the conflict, .and of much 
 the same use as the sacred standard and the cloak of 
 the Prophet. The victory was undoubtedly due to the 
 courage of Cicala and the splendid charge of his cavalry, 
 and to the determination of Seadeddin in compelling his 
 master the Sultan, against his will, to remain on the field 
 of battle . 
 
 No more important battle had taken place beyond the 
 Danube since that of Mohacz in the time of Mahomet II. 
 If the victory had resulted to the Christians, the whole 
 of the Ottoman possessions north of the Danube would have 
 been lost. The Christian army, under Maximilian, would 
 again have crossed that river and have advanced into 
 Bulgaria and Macedonia, and the dismemberment of the 
 Ottoman Empire might have been precipitated by two or 
 three centuries. 
 
 The craven Sultan returned to Constantinople imme- 
 diately after the battle. He received there a great ovation 
 for the victory due to Cicala. Never again did he lead 
 an army on the field. He devoted himself thenceforth 
 to a voluptuous life in his harem. The government of the 
 Empire remained in the hands of the Sultana Valide. 
 
 Cicala, as a reward for his successful charge, was imme- 
 diately promoted to be Grand Vizier. It was a most un- 
 fortunate selection. He treated with great severity the 
 Ottoman troops who had misbehaved at the battle of 
 Ceresties. He accused them of cowardice. He inflicted 
 summary punishment on their leaders. Thirty thousand 
 of the soldiers, mostly belonging to Asia Minor, dispersed 
 and returned to their homes, spreading disaffection and 
 rebellion in their several districts. 
 
 After this signal victory war of a desultory character was 
 continued with Austria for some vears, now one and now the
 
 158 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 other getting the better of it in the capture and recapture of 
 fortresses. In 1606 peace was arrived at. A treaty was con- 
 cluded between the two Powers at Silvatorok, which was, on 
 the whole, unfavourable to the Ottomans. Transylvania was 
 practically freed from their rule. They were confirmed 
 in the possession of one -half of Hungary, but the other 
 half was freed from tribute. The fortresses of Gran, Erlau, 
 and Gradiscka were secured to Ottoman possession, Raab 
 and Komorn to Austria. The annual payment of 30,000 
 ducats by Austria, which the Turks regarded as a tribute, 
 was also to cease, but a lump sum of 200,000 ducats was 
 to be paid to the Porte. 
 
 By the surrender of its claims on Transylvania the 
 Ottoman Empire in Europe entered upon a course of 
 shrinkage, which thenceforth, up to the present time, has 
 been the normal course of events. 
 
 This decadence was soon to be illustrated in another 
 direction. War had again broken out with Persia, and 
 the Turks sustained a series of defeats. In 161 8 peace 
 was patched up for a time, by the terms of which all the 
 provinces which had been captured under Murad III and 
 Mahomet III were ceded again to Persia, and the boundaries 
 between the two Empires were restored to what they had 
 been under Selim II. Meanwhile, as a result of mis- 
 government, the Turkish Empire was going headlong to 
 ruin. We have a very authoritative account of the 
 deplorable condition into which it had fallen at this period 
 in the reports of Sir Thomas Roe, who was sent as the 
 first British Ambassador to the Porte by James I. 
 Queen Elizabeth had already, a few years previously, 
 entered into correspondence with the Porte, and had urged 
 the Sultan to join in a naval alliance in the Mediterranean 
 against Philip II, who was then threatening to invade 
 England. The reply of the Porte was friendly, but 
 nothing more. 
 
 In 1622 Sir Thomas Roe was sent on a mission, mainly 
 for the purpose of protesting against the piratical destruc- 
 tion of British commerce by corsairs from Algiers and 
 Tunis. He remained at Constantinople for five years, and 
 succeeded in obtaining promises of redress from the Porte. 
 The Pasha of Algiers was recalled and a successor was 
 appointed. But apparently this had very little effect in 
 abating piracy. The reports of Sir Thomas Roe are
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 159 
 
 full of descriptions of the misery of the inhabitants of 
 Turkey, of symptoms of decay, and of the falling grandeur 
 of the Empire. 
 
 All the territory of the Grand Seignior [he says] is dispeopled tor want 
 of pasture and by reason of violent oppression — so much so that, in the 
 best parts of Greece and Anatolia, a man may ride three or four, or 
 sometimes six, days and not find a village to feed him or his horse, 
 whereby the revenue is so lessened that there is not wherewithal to pay 
 tlie soldiers and to maintain the Court. It ma}' be patched up for a while 
 out of the Treasur}', and by exactions which are now onerous upon the 
 merchants and labouring men to satisfy the harpies.' 
 
 I can say no more than that the disease works internally that must ruin 
 this Empire ; we daily expect more changes and effusion of blood. The 
 wisest men refuse to sit at the helm, and fools will soon run themselves 
 and others upon the rocks. 
 
 This State for sixteen months since the death of Othman hatli been a 
 stage of variety ; the soldiers usurping all government, placing and 
 displacing more vulg. as the wynd of humour or dissatisfaction 
 moved them. In this kind I have seen three Emperors, seven Grand 
 Viziers, two Capitan Pashas, five Agas of the Janissaries, and, in propor- 
 tion, as many changes of governors in all the provinces, every new Vizier 
 making use of his tune displacing those in possession and selling their 
 favours to others.^ 
 
 In another passage he points out that the hope of booty 
 was the main motive for war and invasion by the Turks :— 
 
 The Turkish soldier is not only apt but desirous to make invasion 
 because all things are prey and all kinds of licence allowed to them ; and 
 his hope is more upon booty and prisoners than upon conquest. Every 
 boy or girl is to them magazine and lirings them the best of merchandise 
 and worth 100 dollars, so that every village is to them a magazine and 
 they return rich. . . . But I am persuaded versa vice if they were invaded 
 and the war were brought to their doors they would be found the 
 weakest, unprovided and undisciplined enemy in the world.3 
 
 The pirates of Algiers have cast off all obedience to the Empire, not 
 only upon the sea where they are masters, but presuming to do many 
 insolences even upon the land and in the best parts of the Grand 
 Seignior.* 
 
 There can be no doubt that at the beginning of the 
 seventeenth century, when Sir Thomas Roe wrote these 
 dispatches, the Ottoman Empire was in a condition of un- 
 
 ' Sir T. Roe's Embassy, pp. 66-7. = Ibid. p. 178. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 206. ■* Ibid. p. 243.
 
 i6o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 paralleled disorganization, and its various races were in 
 a state of untold misery, owing in part to the want of strong 
 men at its head, and in greater part to the system of 
 corruption which had infected every branch of its adminis- 
 tration. If at this time any neighbouring Power had been 
 in a position to attack it, the Empire would not have been 
 able to offer resistance. But Spain, after the reign of 
 Philip II, was almost as decadent as Turkey. Germany 
 was distracted by internal religious wars and was unable 
 to concentrate on external foes, while Russia had not as 
 yet developed a position which made her formidable to the 
 Turks. 
 
 It has already been stated that there was a break in the 
 disastrous rule of the harem when Murad IV came of age 
 and was able to take the reins of government from the hands 
 of his mother. The Sultana Valide was a very clever 
 woman, with excellent intentions, and practically ruled the 
 State during his minority. But she was not equal to the 
 task of coping with the grave difficulties of the time. The 
 Empire was going to the bad in all directions. The Per- 
 sians, taking advantage of the confusion in Turkey, declared 
 war and successfully invaded the provinces of Erivan and 
 Bagdad. The two Barbary provinces of Algiers and Tunis 
 were asserting independence. They engaged in piratical 
 attacks on the commerce of the allies of the Porte, and 
 were negotiating separate treaties with them. The internal 
 condition of the Empire became worse than ever. There 
 were frequent outbreaks of Janissaries, who imposed their 
 will on the Sultana. 
 
 In 1632, Murad, on reaching the age of twenty -one, 
 took command of the State, and soon showed that he was 
 of very different fibre from his six incapable predecessors. 
 His first experience was an outbreak of the Janissaries, 
 who demanded that the Grand Vizier and sixteen other 
 prominent officials should be executed. Murad was com- 
 pelled to yield. But he felt deeply the humiliation of his 
 surrender and was determined to aveng'e it. He gathered 
 round, him a faithful band of Spahis, and suddenly, when 
 it was least expected, dealt with the leaders of the Janissaries 
 by putting them to death. This had the effect of cowing 
 that mutinous body. He then devoted himself to the task 
 of purging the State of corrupt and unjust officials of all 
 ranks. He pursued this task with most ruthless energy.
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS i6i 
 
 On the slightest suspicion officials in the highest positions 
 were secretly put to death by his orders, and their bodies 
 were flung into the Bosphorus. He became a terror 
 to evildoers of all ranks. But he also became blood- 
 thirsty and callous of life in the process. Brutal as were 
 his deeds, they had the effect of restoring order in the 
 State and discipline in the army. Throughout the length 
 and breadth of the Empire his dominant will made itself 
 felt, and his authority as Sultan was soon completely 
 re-established. 
 
 Murad showed himself equally vigorous and competent 
 as a general. His effective reign, after taking over the 
 government from his mother, did not extend over more than 
 eight years. During this time he personally led two ex- 
 peditions against the Shah of Persia, each of them occupying 
 two years. In the first of them he conquered Erivan. 
 In the second he recaptured the city of Bagdad, after a 
 most desperate resistance by the Persians. Of the gar- 
 rison of twenty thousand men only six hundred survived. 
 The Ottoman army was then allowed to sack the city, and 
 thirty thousand of the inhabitants were massacred. The 
 whole province was restored to the Ottoman rule. More 
 than eighty years passed before another war took place with 
 Persia. ' ' | , 
 
 In these campaigns Murad showed immense vigour. He 
 marched at the head of his army and shared with the soldiers 
 their hardships. His saddle was his pillow at night. There 
 was no pitched battle with the Persians. The campaigns 
 consisted of sieges and captures of fortresses. On his return 
 to the capital after the second campaign, in 1639, Murad 
 received a great popular ovation. He died soon after, in 
 I 640, from fever, aggravated by intemperance, to which he 
 was addicted. When he was on the point of death he gave 
 orders for the execution of his brother, Ibrahim, the only 
 surviving male of the descendants of Othman. Ibrahim 
 had been immured in ' the Cage ' during the lifetime of 
 his brother. He was quite unfit to rule the Empire, and 
 Murad must have well known this. It was surmised that 
 Murad preferred to go down in history as the last Sultaji 
 of the Othman race rather than hand over the throne to 
 such an incapable successor. Others thought that he in- 
 tended his last and favourite Grand Vizier to be his suc- 
 cessor. His mother, the Sultana Valide, with the object 
 
 1 1
 
 1 62 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of saving the life of her second son, Ibrahim, feigned to 
 carry out Murad's order. She sent a message to the dying 
 Sultan that Ibrahim had been put to death in accordance 
 with his instructions. Murad, it is said, when he heard of this 
 "grinned a horrible and ghastly smile and then expired." 
 
 It may well have been that those who wished for the 
 destruction of the Ottoman Empire regarded with com- 
 plaisance the failure of Murad's intention of putting an end 
 to the Othman dynasty. It was obviously impossible that 
 Sultans of the type of those who had succeeded the great 
 Solyman could for long hold the Empire intact. A new 
 dynasty, founded by an ambitious vizier, or some other bold 
 adventurer, might have invigorated the Empire and have 
 long delayed its dismemberment. But Dis aliter visum 
 est. 
 
 If Murad's intention to put his brother to death was 
 prompted by the conviction that Ibrahim was unfit to rule 
 the Empire, he was fully justified by subsequent events. 
 In his short reigli of eight years Ibrahim succeeded in 
 undoing all the good which Murad had effected by his 
 ruthless vigour. He proved to be a degenerate, whose 
 original evil nature had been worsened by many years of 
 immurement and constant dread of death at the hands of 
 his brother. He was as bloodthirsty as Murad, without 
 the same motive of restoring' discipline in the army 'and order 
 and justice throughout the Empire. He was also cowardly 
 and mean. He wasted the resources of the State, which 
 had been wisely accumulated by Murad, in self-indulgence 
 and in gratifying the caprices of his harem. He was the 
 most confirmed debauchee of the long line of the Ottoman 
 Sultans. The Sultana Valide pandered to his passions 
 by presenting to him every Friday a new female slave. 
 By this means she obtained full influence over him and 
 used it in every case to the great detriment of the State. 
 Every abuse and evil which Murad had checked grew 
 apace, and the Turkish Empire, so far as internal affairs 
 were concerned, entered on a new course of decadence. The 
 rule of the harem again prevailed, without any motive but 
 that of gratifying the caprices of its inmates. Disaffection 
 and rebellion spread among the Janissaries and Spahis, 
 and also among the ulemas and all classes of people at 
 Constantinople. A conspiracy was formed to get rid of 
 Ibrahim. It was supported by the main body of ulemas.
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 163 
 
 At a meeting of the conspirators the charge against Ibrahim 
 was formulated as follows : — 
 
 The Padishah has ruined tlie Ottoman world by piUage and tyranny. 
 Women wield tlic sovereignty. The treasury cannot satiate their expense. 
 The subjects are ruined. The armies of the infidels are besieging towns 
 on the frontiers. Their fleets blockade the Dardanelles. 
 
 It was determined to dethrone Ibrahim and to replace 
 him by his son Mahomet, a lad of seven years of age. The 
 Sultana V'alide did her best to shield her son from the 
 threatened blow, but she was ultimately induced to give 
 her consent to his deposition. A large body of Janissaries 
 then invaded the palace and insisted on Ibrahim appearing 
 before them. They announced to him the decision to 
 depose him. He was compelled to submit and was con- 
 ducted to prison. The question was then submitted to 
 the Mufti, "Is it lawful to dethrone and put to death a 
 Padishah who confers all the posts of dignity in the Empire, 
 not on those who are worthy of them, but on those who 
 have bought them for money?" The Mufti repHed by a 
 fetva in the laconic word "Yes." There was a threat of 
 an emeiite among the Spahis in favour of Ibrahim. He 
 was promptly put to death and his son Mahomet IV was 
 installed as Sultan. 
 
 The eight years of Ibrahim's reign, however, were not 
 without some importance as regards the external affairs of 
 the Empire. They showed that there were still some capable 
 men in the service of the Sultan. In 1641 an expedition 
 was fitted out for the recapture of the important city of 
 Azoff, which of late years had fallen into the hands of the 
 Cossacks. It was a failure and met with a reverse. In 
 the next year a much larger force was sent out, and was 
 supported by a hundred thousand Tartars from the Crimea. 
 It succeeded in its object. The Cossacks, before sur- 
 rendering the city, destroyed all its fortifications and burnt 
 the town. The Turks rebuilt it and left a garrison of 
 twenty -six thousand in this important frontier fortress. 
 
 In 1 644 another expedition was fitted out against the 
 island of Crete, which then belonged to the RepubHc of 
 Venice. It had been bought many years previously from 
 the Marquis of Montserrat, to whom it had been allotted as 
 his share in the spoil of the Greek Empire, after the 
 capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204.
 
 '1 64 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It appears that a fleet of merchant vessels, on their way 
 from Constantinople to Egypt, was captured by corsairs 
 from Malta, who sought shelter for a time for themselves 
 and their prizes in one of the ports of Crete. The Sultan 
 was greatly incensed at this, the more so as some of the 
 captured vessels belonged to one of the eunuchs of his 
 harem. His first design was to send a fleet to attack I\'Ialta, 
 but he was dissuaded from this course. He decided, as an 
 alternative, to attack Crete, although the Porte was at peace 
 with Venice, and the Republic was willing to make amends 
 for the violation of its neutrality by the IVIaltese corsairs. 
 
 A fleet was thereupon fitted out, in 1645, ostensibly to 
 attack Malta, but with sealed orders to divert its course 
 when at sea to Crete. It consisted of a hundred and four 
 vessels carrying upwards of fifty thousand men. The fleet, 
 under the above orders, steered for Crete, and made a 
 sudden attack on Canea, one of the chief ports of the island. 
 Having captured this city and also P.etino, the army was 
 landed. It overran the whole island and invested Candia, 
 its chief fortress and capital. A memorable siege then 
 commenced. It lasted for nearly twenty -five years. The 
 Republic of Ven.ice made desperate efforts to save the city. 
 It was not supported bv the native Greek population of 
 the island, who hated their Venetian rulers, and were not 
 unwilling to exchange them for Ottomans. 
 
 While the Porte was thus engaged in the endeavour to 
 add to its domain at the expense of the Republic of Venice, 
 it was incurring a very serious shrinkage of Empire in the 
 Mediterranean, along the northern coast of Africa. His- 
 torians agree in assigning to the middle of the seventeenth 
 century the virtual severance from Ottoman rule of the two 
 Barbary States of Algiers and Tunis. It is not possible to 
 fix a precise date in either case, for the process of amputation 
 was slow a,nd was spread over some years, and long after the 
 Sultan had practicallv ceased to exercise any real power over 
 these dependencies the semblance and form of suzerainty 
 was maintained. The main cause for the loss of these 
 provinces was the practif^e which had grown up. under the 
 corrupt administration of the Porte, of selling the posts of 
 governors of them to the hip-hest bidders in money. In 
 place of men of energy and of capacity, able to control the 
 unrulv elements of mutinous soldiers and disaffected Moors 
 and Arabs, governors were appointed under a system of pur-
 
 THE RULE OF. SULTANAS 165 
 
 cliase who were quite incapable of performing the duties of 
 their office, and who merely thought of filling their pockets 
 and recouping themselves for their outlay. The practice then 
 arose for the Janissaries and other Ottoman soldiers form- 
 ing the garrisons of Algiers and Tunis to elect their own 
 chiefs. The appointments of these men, Deys, as they were 
 called, were for a time submitted to the Sultan for approval 
 or veto, but later this form was discontinued, and the Deys 
 elected by the soldiery became the real dominant authorities 
 in these States, and eventually superseded in form, as well 
 as in substance, the feeble pashas sent nominally as 
 governors from Constantinople. Virtual independence was 
 thus achieved. Both States provided themselves with fleets 
 of powerful war vessels, which roamed over the Mediter- 
 ranean and the Atlantic as far as the coasts of Ireland and 
 Madeira, preying upon the commerce of ail countries, irre- 
 spective of whether they were at war with the Porte or 
 not. They were, in fact, pirates. The captured crews were 
 employed as slaves in the bagnios of Algiers and Tunis. 
 The best evidence of the actual, though not yet of the 
 formal, independence of these Barbary States was that other 
 Powers sent their fleets to attack and bombard them, and 
 to destroy, if possible, their pirate craft, without declaring 
 war against the suzerain power, the Porte. Thus, as early 
 as 1 61 7 a French fleet, under Admiral Beaulieu, made 
 an attack on the Algerian fleet of forty vessels of from two 
 hundred to four hundred tons, and destroyed many of 
 them. In 1620 a British fleet, under Sir Richard Mansel, 
 in retaliation for the capture of no less than four hundred 
 British merchant ships in the previous five years, made 
 a similar attack on Algiers, without, however, much result. 
 In 1655, another British fleet, commanded by Admiral 
 Blake, under orders from Protector Cromwell, bombarded 
 Tunis, and destroyed a great part of its fleet, and having 
 effected this proceeded to Algiers. There was much con- 
 sternation there, and the captives of British birth were given 
 up without a struggle. In both these cases there was no 
 declaration of war against the Porte, and no offence was 
 taken by the Sultan at the action of England. 
 
 In 1663 the British Government made a treaty with 
 the Sultan empowering it to attack and punish the 
 Algerines without being charged with a breach of amity 
 with the Porte. It frequently availed itself of this,
 
 :i66 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and many naval attacks were made on these nests of 
 pirates, without, however, very effectual results. In some 
 of its naval operations in the yEgean Sea the Porte received 
 assistance from the fleets of these two Barbary States. 
 But this was entirely at the discretion of their virtual rulers 
 and was not considered obligatory on them. For our 
 present purpose, it is sufficient to point out that the States 
 became virtually independent of the Ottoman Empire about 
 the year 1650. In the case of Algiers this independence 
 continued till the State was conquered and annexed by 
 France in 1830. In Tunis the same process took place, 
 with the difference that an hereditary Deyship was eventually 
 formed undqr a Greek adventurer whose descendants retained 
 power there till 1881, when the French invaded the 
 province and eventually annexed it to France. 
 
 Ibrahim was succeeded by his son, Mahomet IV. He 
 reigned for thirty-nine years. During the first eight of 
 these there was chaos in the Empire. The government 
 remained in the hands of the harem. The position was 
 aggravated by fierce dissension in that institution. There 
 were two rival parties, the one led by the ex -Sultana 
 Valide, the mother of the late Sultan, who was loath to part 
 with the power she had acquired during her son's reign, 
 the other by the mother of the new Sultan, Torchan by 
 name. Both of them had their supporters among the 
 Janissaries and Spahis, with the result that there were fre- 
 quent disorders and encounters in the streets of the capital. 
 Grand Viziers were made and deposed with startling rapidity, 
 as one or other of these parties prevailed. Outbreaks 
 occurred in many parts of the Empire and there was no one 
 with sufficient authority to cope with them. The dispute 
 between tlie two ladies was eventually settled by the murder 
 of the elder one. Meanwhile it was fortunate for the Empire 
 that Austria was so exhausted by thirty years of war in 
 Germany that she was not able to avail herself of the 
 opportunity afforded to invade the Ottoman Empire and 
 recover Hungary and other provinces. But the war with 
 Venice resulting from the unprovoked attack by Ibrahim 
 on Crete was continued without intermission. A Venetian 
 fleet under command of Admiral Macenigo defeated and 
 destroyed an Ottoman fleet oft" the Dardanelles and took 
 possession of the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos. It 
 blockaded the Dardanelles. Strange to say, this did not
 
 THE RULE OF SULTANAS 167 
 
 put a stop to the siege of Candia by the Ottomans. This 
 was maintained with pertinacity, but for a long time without 
 success. Meanwliile anarchy prevailed in the Empire. 
 Relief most unexpectedly came from the appointment of 
 a Grand Vizier by Sultana Torchan, by which she made 
 some amends for her previous misdeeds.
 
 XIII 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 
 
 1656-1702 
 
 At this stage, when the ruin of the Empire seemed to 
 be imminent, owing to the faikire of vigour and authority 
 of so many Sukans, the general corruption of officials, 
 and the lawlessness and mutinous conduct of the army, 
 there rose to the front a man, or rather a succession of 
 men of the same family, who were able to stem the evil 
 tide and to restore, for a time, the credit and prestige 
 of the Empire. In the following forty -six years four 
 members of the Kiuprili family filled the post of Grand 
 Vizier — not, however, without more than one unfortunate 
 interregnum. They ruled the Empire in the name of 
 the incompetent Mahomet and his successor. This advent 
 of a family was the more notable as in Turkey there 
 never was any trace of hereditary rank. While the throne 
 had been filled without a break by members of the 
 Othman family, who, in the first three hundred years, 
 deservedly acquired prestige so great that it has survived 
 a yet longer succession of degenerates, it has never 
 been supported by an hereditary class of any kind. 
 The structure of the political and social system of 
 the Ottoman Turks has always been democratic. The 
 highest posts in the State, equally with the lowest, were 
 accessible to all, irrespective of merit, often by mere per- 
 sonal favour, or even, it would seem, by chance, without 
 consideration of birth or wealth. The unique exception to 
 this, where members of the same family rose to the highest 
 position of the State under the Sultan, was that of the 
 Kiuprili family. 
 
 Mohammed Kiuprili, the first of this remarkable stock, 
 was of Albanian descent. His grandfather had migrated 
 
 1(8
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS, 169 
 
 to Kiupril, a small tOHii in Amasia, in Asia Minor, whence 
 the family took their name. Their position must have 
 been a very humble one, for Mohammed commenced Jiis 
 career as kitchen-boy in the palace of the Sultan. He 
 rose to be chief cook and, later, steward and grand falconer, 
 and thence by favour of the harem was appointed as 
 governor successively of Damascus, Tripoli, and Jerusalem, 
 acquiring in all of them the reputation of a just, firm, 
 and humane ruler. At the full age of seventy, on the 
 advice of the Sultana Valide, he was finally appointed 
 Grand Vizier, in spite of the protests of all the pashas, 
 ulemas, and other officials, who alleged that Kiuprili was 
 in his dotage, that he could neither read nor write, land 
 that he was quite incompetent for the post. Never were 
 experts more mistaken. Kiuprili only consented to take 
 the post upon the conditions, solemnly swore to by the 
 Sultana Valid^ on behalf of her son, who was then only 
 fifteen years of age, that all his acts as Grand Vizier 
 would be ratified by the Sultan without examination or 
 discussion, and that he would have a free hand in the 
 distribution of other offices and in the award of honours. 
 He further fortified his position by getting from the Mufti 
 a fetva sanctioning by anticipation all his measures. 
 
 Armed with this authority, Kiuprili entered upon the 
 work of his high office, and at once proceeded to use his 
 powers with inflexible firmness and with the utmost severity. 
 He emulated Sultan Murad IV in his relentless war against 
 wrongdoers of every class, high and low, throughout the 
 Empire. There was not the same spirit of cruelty or 
 bloodthirstiness as in Murad's case, but there was the 
 deliberate policy to extirpate abuses by the forcible 
 removal of those concerned in them. Corrupt officials, 
 unjust judges, incompetent officers in the army, and 
 mutinous soldiers were promptly put to death. The same 
 fate befell those who were suspected of intriguing against 
 the new Vizier. It was said that during his five years of 
 office thirty -five thousand persons were executed by his 
 orders. The number included a great many mutinous 
 soldiers. The principal executioner at Constantinople 
 admitted that he had strangled four thousand persons of 
 some position during this period. Terrible as was this 
 retribution on wrongdoers of all kinds, there cannot be a 
 doubt that in the main it was salutary. The eft'ect of
 
 I70 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Kiuprili's inHexible will and determination was speedily 
 apparent throughout the Empire. Corruption and injustice 
 were stayed. Disorders of all kinds were repressed. 
 Discipline and subordination were restored in the army. 
 
 Kiuprili, by his vigorous action, was able to extinguish 
 the revolts in Asia Minor and elsewhere. He reconstructed 
 the Ottoman navy, with the result that naval supremacy 
 was again asserted in the yEgean Sea and the war with 
 V^enice took a favourable turn. The islands of Lemnos 
 and Tenedos were recovered by the Porte. The siege 
 of Candia was again prosecuted with the utmost vigour. 
 
 Kiuprili practically ruled the Empire with unquestioned 
 authority for five years, till his death in 1661. In prospect 
 of that event he obtained from the Sultana Valide and 
 the Sultan the reversion of the Grand Vizierate for his 
 son, Ahmed Kiuprili. On his deathbed he is said to have 
 given to the young Sultan the following heads of advice : — 
 
 Never to listen to the advice of women. 
 
 Never to allow a subject to become too rich. 
 
 To keep the treasury of the State well filled. 
 
 To be always on horseback and to keep the army on the move. 
 
 Ahmed Kiuprili, when he succeeded his father as Grand 
 Vizier in 1661, was only twenty-six years of age. He 
 has rightly been considered by Turkish historians as the 
 most eminent in the long list of statesmen of the Ottoman 
 Empire, with the exception only of SokoUi. He had been 
 given the best of education by his father, and had early 
 experience in public affairs as governor of a province. 
 He had all his father's inflexible will and firmness, with- 
 out carrying them to excess by wholesale executions. For 
 a year after his accession to power he continued his father's 
 regime of severity, but when he felt assured of his position 
 he relaxed it, and thenceforward his administration was 
 humane and just. He had most engaging manners, digni- 
 fied and modest. He spoke with reserve and without 
 verbiage. He ruled the Empire for fifteen years, until 
 his death in 1676. During this time he enjoyed the full 
 confidence of Sultan Mahomet, who, though he had reached 
 the age of twenty when Ahmed Kiuprili was appointed 
 Grand Vizier, and might in due course have taken part in 
 public affairs, devoted himself wholly to the pleasures of
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 171 
 
 the chase and never interfered with the conduct of affairs 
 by his great minister. 
 
 Ahmed was a most strict observer of the religious 
 precepts of Islam. In spite of this, he was noted for 
 his enlightened tolerance of other religions. He abolished 
 the restrictions against the building of churches by the 
 Christian subjects of the Porte. He did his best to improve 
 the condition and lighten the burthen of the rayas. His 
 administration was free from abuses. " He gave an example 
 to all below him by refusing to take money for appoint- 
 ments to offices or for any administrative acts. He kept 
 the treasury well filled, in spite of the many wars he 
 was engaged in. It was, in fact, in the civil administration 
 of the Empire that his ability and wisdom were chiefly 
 conspicuous. His military career was chequered, for 
 though he succeeded in adding to the Empire not a few 
 important territories, he encountered for the first time in 
 its history a great and historic defeat at the hands of the 
 Austrians and a second serious defeat by the Poles. 
 
 In 1663 war broke out with Austria, and the Grand 
 Vizier, in command of an army of a hundred and twenty 
 thousand men with a hundred and twenty -three guns, 
 crossed the Danube at Belgrade and marched northwards 
 to Neuhausel, one of the three most important strongholds 
 in the hands of the Austrians, which, after a siege of 
 five weeks, was compelled to surrender. Meanwhile the 
 Khan of the Crimea, at the head of a horde of irregular 
 horsemen, overran Moravia, committing the most frightful 
 devastation and carrying off eighty thousand Christians as 
 captives for sale as slaves. 
 
 After the capture of Neuhausel, Ahmed Kiuprili took 
 other minor strongholds in the neighbourhood, and then 
 returned to Belgrade for winter quarters. In the following 
 year he again issued from Belgrade with his army and 
 marched to Neuhausel. He then crossed the River Mur 
 and captured Serivar, and on July 26 he reached 
 Komorn, on the River Raab, on the frontier of Hungary 
 and Styria. The Austro -Hungarian army, under the com- 
 mand of the Comte Montecuculi, a general of great 
 reputation — an Italian by birth and the rival of Tureune 
 — held a position on the River Raab not far from Komorn. 
 It was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Ottomans. 
 But since the last great battle between the two Powers
 
 t72 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 at Cerestes the Austria ns liad greatly improved in the 
 quality of their generals and officers and in their arma- 
 ments. The discipline of the Ottoman troops was no 
 longer what it had been, and they had not kept pace in 
 the improvement in guns. 
 
 On August I, 1664, the two armies met near to the 
 Convent of St. Gotthard, which gave its name to a memor- 
 able battle. In spite of their great numerical superiority, 
 the Ottomans met with a severe defeat, largely clue to 
 the charge of heavy cavalry of the Austrians, under the 
 command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, soon to become 
 famous as a general. The Turks lost ten thousand men, 
 many of whom were driven into the River Raab and were 
 drowned. Thirty thousand of their cavalry, who were 
 spectators of the battle from the other side of the River 
 Raab, took to flight when they saw the issue of the battle 
 and abandoned fifteen guns. The Grand \^izier was able 
 to draw ofif the main body of his army without further 
 loss. The Austrian losses were heavy, and they made 
 no efifort to follow up their victory. The battle, how- 
 ever, was of supreme importance, for it was the first great 
 defeat of the Ottomans in the field by the Austrians. It 
 broke the prestige of the former, which had been unques- 
 tioned since the battle of Mohacz in 1526. 
 
 In spite of their victory, the Austrians were willing to 
 negotiate with the Grand V^izier for terms of peace, and 
 ten days after the battle a treaty was signed at Vascar, 
 where the Turks were encamped. It was, in the main, 
 a renewal of the treaty of Silvatorok. So far as it differed, 
 it was favourable to the Ottomans. It provided that 
 Transylvania was to be evacuated by both Austrians and 
 Turks. It recognized Apafy, whose claims had been main- 
 tained by the latter, as prince of that province, subject 
 to payment of tribute to the Sultan. Serivar and 
 Neuhausel were to remain in the hands of the Sultan. Of 
 seven palatinates occupied by the Ottomans, four were to 
 remain in their hands and three were to be restored to the 
 Emperor. Ahmed Kiuprili had every reason to be satis- 
 fied with this treaty. Though defeated in a pitched battle, 
 he had added to the Empire of the Sultan. He led his 
 armies into winter quarters again at Belgrade at the end 
 of October, and on his return to Constantinople received 
 a popular ovation.
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 173 
 
 In 1667 Ahmed entered upon another campaign. He 
 was determined to bring to a successful issue the siege 
 of Candia, which for so many years had baffled aU the 
 efforts of his predecessors. He landed in the island of 
 Crete with large reinforcements. The city of Candia was 
 defended with the utmost tenacity and courage by the 
 Venetians, under the command of JMorosini, later famous 
 for the conquest of the Morea. Ahmed spent nearly three 
 years before the city. He urged on the siege with great 
 engineering skill. The Venetians made every effort to 
 retain possession of the city and of the island by offers 
 of large sums of money. Ahmed Kiuprili proudly replied 
 to these overtures : " We are not money-dealers. We 
 make war to win Candia, and at no price will we 
 abandon it." 
 
 In the course of 1669 the prospect of a successful 
 defence of the city was increased by the arrival of a 
 French fleet, commanded by the Due de Noailles, and 
 having on boird the flower of the French nobility and six 
 thousand soldiers. They were joined later by auxiliary 
 squadrons of the Pope and the Knights of Malta. The 
 combined fleet, consisting of seventy vessels, bombarded 
 the Ottomans from the sea, while the besieged opened fire 
 on their front. The allies hoped to place the Turks between 
 two fires and to draw them from the trenches which invested 
 the city by land. The attack, however, failed owing to 
 the accidental blowing up of some of the attacking vessels. 
 This brought confusion into the whole line. A sortie of 
 the garrison was also unsuccessful. Later, a serious mis- 
 understanding arose between Morosini and the Due de 
 Noailles, which led to the departure of the allied fleet 
 and the abandonment of the city to its own resources. 
 The garrison was now reduced to four thousand men 
 capable of bearing arms. Defence against the overwhelm- 
 ing forces of the Turks was impossible. Terms of 
 surrender vi'^ere agreed to. The siege, which had lasted 
 for nearly twenty -five years, was brought to an end. Favour- 
 able terms were accorded to Morosini and the garrison. 
 The whole island fell into the hands of the Ottomans, and 
 shortlv after this a treaty of peace was effected with the 
 Republic of Venice, which recognized the transfer of Crete, 
 with the exception of three small ports on its coast, which 
 were retained for commercial purposes.
 
 174 THE TURKISH EiMPIRE 
 
 A third war was undertaken in 1672 by Ahmed Kiuprili 
 against Poland in support of the Cossacks of the Ukraine, 
 who had risen against their oppressors, the Poles, and had 
 appealed to the Porte for protection against the invasion 
 of their country by Sobieski. It was decided by Ahmed 
 to support these insurgents. An army of six thousand 
 was sent there, in concert with a much larger force of 
 Tartars from the Crimea. The Czar of Russia joined 
 with the King of Poland in protesting against this inter- 
 vention of the Porte. The proud answer of the Porte 
 was : — ■ 
 
 God be praised, such is the strength of Islam that the union of Russians 
 and Poles matters not to us. Our Empire has increased in might since 
 its origin ; nor have all the Christian kings that have leagued against us 
 been able to pluck a hair from our beard. With God's grace it shall ever 
 be so, and our Empire shall endure to the Day of Judgment. 
 
 Ahmed Kiuprili himself, in a letter written in his own 
 hand to the Polish envoy, defended his action in terms 
 which might well have been quoted later when the Christian 
 subjects of Turkey rose in arms against their oppressors 
 and claimed the assistance of Russia. 
 
 The Cossacks [he said], a free people, placed themselves under the 
 Poles, but being unable to endure Polish oppression any longer, they have 
 sought protection elsewhere, and they are now under the Turkish banner. 
 If the inhabitants of an oppressed country, in order to obtain dehverancc, 
 implore the aid of a mighty emperor, is it prudent to pursue them in such 
 an asylum ? When the most mighty and most glorious of all emperors is 
 seen to deliver and succour from their enemies those who are oppressed, 
 and who ask him for protection, a wise man will know on which side the 
 blame of breaking peace ought to rest. If, in order to quench the fire 
 of discord, negotiation is wished for, so let it be. But if the solution of 
 differences is referred to that keen and decisive judge called ' the Sword,' 
 the issue of the strife must be pronounced by God, by whose aid Islam 
 has for a thousand years triumphed over its foes.' 
 
 In the campaign of 1672, the important city of 
 Kaminiec, the capital of Podoha, was captured. The King 
 of Poland then sued for peace, and the treaty of Bucsacs 
 was agreed to, under which the province of Podolia was 
 ceded to the Sultan. The treaty, however, was disavowed 
 
 ' Von Hammer, xi. p. 378.
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 175 
 
 by Sobieski and the principal nobles of Poland. They 
 renewed the war against the Turks. It lasted for four 
 years. In 1673 the Turkish army, under Ahmed Kiuprili, 
 met with a crushing defeat from the Poles, under Sobieski, 
 near Choczim. His camp was surprised. The Wallachians 
 and Moldavians deserted him on the field and went over 
 to the enemy. There was great slaughter of the 
 Turks. In the following year the Turks returned to the 
 charge, but were again worsted. In 1675 Sobieski, aided 
 by the Russians, gained another great victory over the 
 Turks at Lemberg. But in the following year the Turks, 
 under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, turned the tables 
 on tlie Poles. The superior resources of the Turks, under 
 the able administration of Kiuprili, told at last in their 
 favour. Sobieski, who had become King of Poland, was 
 defeated. The whole of Podolia fell into the hands of 
 the Ottomans. Sobieski was now willing to come to terms. 
 Under the treaty of Zurawna (October 27, 1676) terms 
 rather more favourable than those under the repudiated 
 treaty of Bucsacs were conceded to the Ottomans. Podolia 
 was ceded to them. 
 
 Ahmed Kiuprili died a few days after the signature of 
 this treaty from the effect of drink. Though Ine had 
 incurred severe defeats at the hands of the Austrians and 
 Poles, he had retrieved them by his persistence and by 
 the effective use of the resources of the Empire, which 
 he enlarged by the province of Podolia, the island of 
 Crete, and the district of Neuhausel and Serinvar, in 
 Hungary. These entitle him to be ranked among the 
 makers of the Empire so far as Europe was concerned. 
 His enlightened administration, his humane and just bear- 
 ing, his insistence on equal justice for all, irrespective 
 of religious creeds, his strict observance of his plighted 
 faith in public and private affairs, in matters great and 
 small, his patronage of science and literature, earned for 
 him a place in the first rank of Turkish statesmen. 
 
 It was hoped in many quarters that the Sultan would 
 appoint as successor to Ahmed Kiuprili his brother, Zade 
 Mustapha Kiuprili, who had shown as governor of provinces 
 that he had manv of Ahmed's high qualities. In an evil 
 moment Mahomet conferred the post of Grand Vizier on 
 his son-in-law, a favourite companion in the chase, Kara 
 Mustapha— the black Mustapha — who was notorious for his
 
 *I76 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 bloodthirsty disposition and his avidity and corruption. This 
 seems to have been one of the few acts of the Sultan 
 Mahomet IV where he exercised his royal prerogative, for 
 as a rule he left everything to his Vizier, when appointed, 
 and cared for nothing but the pleasures of the chase. A 
 more unfortunate appointment could not have been made. 
 Thirteen years elapsed before Zade Kiuprili was at last in- 
 vested with the office. They were years fraught with 
 disaster to the Empire. 
 
 The first military effort of the new Grand Vizier was to 
 lead an army in 1678 across the Danube into the UkVaine. 
 He came into conflict there with the Russians as well as 
 the Poles, and met with a severe defeat. The war, 
 however, simmered on with varying results till 1681. Peace 
 was then concluded v;ith Russia, and the Turks gave up 
 the disputed country. 
 
 In 1682 the population in that part of Hungary which 
 was under the rule of the Emperor Leopold revolted against 
 his bigoted tyranny. Kara Mustapha thought that this 
 afforded an opportunity for attacking Austria. He seems 
 also to have been inflated with ambition to create a king- 
 dom for himself. He collected an enormous army at 
 Adrianople, and in the spring of the following year, T683, 
 he crossed the Danube at the head of two hundred and 
 seventy-five thousand men, without counting a horde of 
 irregular Tartars and camp followers. He met with little 
 resistance in his march northwards till he reached the 
 walls of Vienna at the head of two hundr'ed thousand men. 
 The Emperor, on his part, was very ill -provided with troops 
 to meet this enormous host of invaders. He had no more 
 than thirty-five thousand men under arms. Of these, eleven 
 thousand were left to garrison Vienna, and the main body 
 was quite insufiicient to meet the Turks in the field. In 
 his peril the Emperor appealed for aid to Sobieski, the 
 King of Poland. The Poles had very recently concluded 
 peace with the Turks. But this made no difficulty. Sobieski 
 undertook by treaty to send an army of fifty thousand 
 men in support of the Emperor. There was a clause in 
 the treaty of a significant character. It was not to be 
 annulled by any future dispensation of the Pope. The 
 Polish army, however, was at some distance and could 
 not reach Vienna in less than eight weeks. There can be 
 little doubt that if Kara Mustapha had pressed the siege
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 177 
 
 with vigour Vienna must have fallen before the arrival 
 of the Polish army. 
 
 This second great siege of V^ienna began on July 1 5, 
 1683. The Emperor and his family fled to Bavaria. The 
 fortifications of V^ienna had been much neglected and 
 offered no serious obstacle. But the city was heroically 
 and obstinately defended by its commander, Count von 
 Stahremberg, who emulated Count Salms of the first siege. 
 Twenty thousand of its citizens enrolled in its defence. 
 The Turkish batteries shattered the walls. There were 
 frequent sorties without avail. It was said that the Ottoman 
 army, with its enormous superiority in numbers, might 
 easily have carried the city by storm, bat that Kara 
 Mustapha hoped to gain it by capitulation, in which case 
 the wealth of the city would be at his own disposal as 
 representative of the Sultan, whereas, if it were taken by 
 assault, the great booty would fall mainly to the soldiers. 
 He delayed, therefore, the final attack. Meanwhile Sobieski 
 had time to bring up his army from Poland and to join 
 Prince Charles of Lorraine, who was in command of the 
 Imperial troops, making a total force of eighty thousand. 
 They crossed the Danube at Tulm by a bridge of boats, 
 and then made a detour through a most difficult country 
 behind the Kalemberg, so as to attack the Tiu-kish army 
 before the city from the rear. Kara Mustapha was guilty 
 of incredible neglect in not offering resistance to the cross- 
 ing of the Danube by the Christian force, or to their 
 passage through the difficult country behind the Kalem- 
 berg. On September 6th rockets from the Kalemberg 
 announced to the garrison of the city that the relieving 
 army had occupied these heights behind the Turkish camp. 
 
 V/hen Sobieski saw the great array of the Turkish camp 
 exposed to attack, he felt very confident of success. He 
 contemptuously said of the Grand Vizier : " This man 
 is badly encamped. He knows nothing of war. We shall 
 certainly beat him." In an address to his troops he 
 said : — ^■ 
 
 \V;irriors and friends, yonder on the plains are our enemies, in numbers 
 greater indeed than at Choczim, where we trod them underfoot. We have 
 to fight Iheni on a foreign soil, but we fight for our own countr)', and 
 under the walls of Vienna we are defending those of Warsaw and Cracow. 
 We have to save to-day not a single city but the whole of Christendom, 
 of which the citv of Vienna is the bulwark. The war is a holy one. 
 
 12
 
 I7S THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 There is a blcssin<^ on our arms and a crown of glory for liiin who falls. 
 . . . The infidels see you now above their heads, and with hopes blasted 
 and courage depressed are escaping among the valleys destined to be 
 their graves. I have but one command to give — Follow me ! The time 
 is come for the young to win their spurs." 
 
 Kara Alustapha, when he saw the Christian army on 
 the heights above him, made immediate preparations for 
 battle. He gave orders for the massacre of thirty thousand 
 Christian captives, mostly women and children, taken 
 prisoners on the route to Vienna and destined to be sold 
 as slaves. Leaving the best of his men, the Janissaries, 
 in the trenches before the city, he concentrated the main 
 part of his army to meet the attack of the Poles from 
 the rear. Sobieski ranged his army in a great semicircle 
 and made a general advance against the Turks. The 
 Tartar irregulars fled and carried confusion to the rest of 
 the army. Sobieski then led his best troops direct against 
 the centre of the Turks. The mass of the Ottoman army 
 was broken and routed. Terrible slaughter followed, and 
 the whole of the Turkish camp, with immense booty, fell 
 into the hands of the Christians. The Janissaries in the 
 trenches before the city were then attacked on two sides, 
 by the victorious Poles from the rear and by the Viennese 
 garrison on the front. They were cut to pieces and 
 annihilated. The victory of Sobieski was complete and 
 final. Three hundred guns, nine thousand ammunition 
 wagons, and twenty-five thousand tents were captured. 
 
 The Turkish army was driven froin the field and, panic- 
 stricken, took to flight. Untold thousands of them were 
 killed, together with great numbers of pashas and generals. 
 Kara JMustapha escaped with the mob of fugitives, carry- 
 ing with him the sacred banner of the Prophet. The 
 d6bris of the army, found its way to Raab, and thence to 
 Buda, where the Grand Vizier ordered the execution of 
 some of the best officers of the army, whom he falsely 
 accused of being responsible for the disaster. He himself 
 then made his way to Belgrade, where, in his turn, he 
 was put to death, with much more justification, by order of 
 the Sultan. His immense and ill-gotten wealth was con- 
 fiscated by the State. He had lived in unprecedented 
 splendour. In his harem were fifteen hundred concubines, 
 
 ' Schimmer, Txt'o Siege<^ of Vienna, p. 137.
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 179 
 
 attended each by a servant, and seven huindred eunuchs 
 to guard them. His own personal servants and horses 
 were counted by thousands . 
 
 The second siege of Vienna, thus brought to so glorious 
 an end by its brave garrison and by Sobieski, differed 
 essentially from that undertaken by Sultan Solyman in 
 1529. Solyman was compelled to raise the siege and 
 to retreat by the failure of food and munitions. He met 
 with no reverse in the field, and he was able to withdraw 
 his army intact. Mustapha fought a pitched battle against 
 a very inferior army coming in relief of the city, and was 
 defeated, and his army was routed and broken up. There 
 never was a greater disaster to an army or to a general. 
 It brought most serious results to the Ottoman Empire. 
 It broke once for all the prestige of the Turks as a 
 conquering nation. It removed the fear of an Ottoman 
 invasion which for two centuries had been a nightmare to 
 the Central States of Europe. 
 
 The attack on Vienna was practically the last effort 
 of the Ottomans to extend their Empire into an enemy's 
 country. Henceforth they were almost always on the de- 
 fensive. It will be seen that the defeat of the huge army 
 by Sobieski resulted in the loss to the Turks of the greater 
 part of their conquests in Hungary, and that, in a few years, 
 it led to their being driven across the Danube. 
 
 Sobieski and Lorraine, after their great victory in front 
 of Vienna, followed it up with vigour. At Paskenay 
 they fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by the 
 retreating Turks and lost two thousand men, but two days 
 later they attacked the enemy and defeated them with 
 great slaughter. The bridge of boats across the Danube 
 by which the Turks retreated was broken by the rush 
 of fugitives and seven thousand v/ere killed or drowned. 
 The Christian army then pressed on to Gran and invested 
 and captured that important fortress. It had been in posses- 
 sion of the Turks for many years. Henceforth it was a 
 rampart of Austria and Hungary against them. This con- 
 cluded the year's campaign. The Austrians and Poles 
 went into winter quarters. 
 
 Meanwhile the effect of the great victory at Vienna was 
 to stimulate other Powers to join the combination against 
 the Turks. The Pope preached another crusade against 
 them -the fourteenth. The Republic of \'enice fitted out
 
 I So THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 a fleet, which was joined by galleys of the Pope, 
 the Knights of Ivlalta, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. 
 In the following year this fleet attacked and captured the 
 island of Santa Maura and the city of Prevesa, at the 
 entrance to the Gulf of Arta. A Venetian army also 
 invaded Bosnia and Albania. 
 
 In this year also (1684) the Austrians, under Lorraine, 
 issuing from Gran, crossed the Danube and attacked and 
 defeated the Turks at Warzen, and again in another battle 
 before Buda, and then besieged that fortress. But after 
 some weeks they were compelled by the rainy season and 
 disease in the army to raise the siege and retreat. Mean- 
 while another Austrian army advanced into Croatia and 
 fought and defeated the Turks. As a result of this the 
 province of Croatia, which had been for one hundred and 
 fifty-one years under Turkish rule, was freed from it, and 
 was thenceforward an Austro -Hungarian possession. 
 
 In the following year, 16S5, the Austrians made further 
 progress. The important stronghold of Neuhausel, which 
 twenty -two years previously had been captured by the Turks, 
 was now recaptured after a desperate resistance. Of its 
 garrison of three thousand men only two hundred survived. 
 The women and children of the Turks were sold to land- 
 owners in the Austrian Empire. The capture of this city 
 was the cause of great rejoicing throughout Europe. In 
 1686 the siege of Buda was renewed. The Imperial army 
 consisted of ninety thousand men — Germans, Hungarians, 
 and Croats . It was under the command of the Prince 
 of Lorraine. The siege was commenced on June i8th. 
 Three attempts to relieve it under Grand Vizier Solyman 
 failed. After six weeks of siege the Austrians assaulted 
 and captured the city. Its brave defender, Abdi Pasha, 
 and its garrison perished, and the city was given up to 
 ruthless sack. The city had been in possession of the 
 Turks for a hundred and forty-five years, and during this 
 time had resisted successfully six sieges. It now passed 
 finally into the hands of the Hungarians. 
 
 The campaign of the following year, 1687, was opened 
 on the Drave. The Grand Vizier led an army of fifty 
 thousand men and sixty-six guns. It met the Austrians 
 at Mohacz on the very field where, a hundred and 
 sixty years previously, the Hungarians had been defeated 
 in the battle which gave one -half of their country to the
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS i8i 
 
 Turks. The Ottomans were now in their turn defeated 
 and routed. Twenty thousand of them were killed, while 
 the loss of the successful army was only a thousand. 
 Slavonia was in the same year cleared of all Turkish 
 forces, and was permanently restored to Austria, while in 
 Transylvania the Voivode Apafy, who owed his position 
 to the Turks, now turned against them. 
 
 Meanwhile the Venetians had been equally successful 
 during the past three years. Their army, under Morosini, 
 invaded the Morea in 1686, captured all its strongholds, 
 and drove the Turks from the country. They also success- 
 fully invaded Dalmatia. In 1687 they attacked and 
 captured the Pirc'eus and Athens. It was on this occasion 
 that the Parthenon, which, in spite of many centuries of 
 war and dangers of all kinds, still existed in all its 
 original grandeur and beauty, was irreparably ruined. The 
 Turks had made use of it as a powder magazine, thinking 
 probably that it was safe from attack. A bomb from 
 the Venetian batteries exploded there, whether purposely 
 or not, and converted the temple into a ruin as we now 
 see it. The whole of Greece was now practically in the 
 hands of the Venetians. The Greek population had given 
 no aid to the Turks in resisting the new invaders. They 
 had soon to learn that there was little to choose between 
 their old and their new masters. If anything, the Venetians 
 proved to be the more tyrannical and rapacious. 
 
 On the conclusion of the campaign of 1687 in Hungary 
 the Turkish army, as a result of its long series of defeats, 
 was seething with discontent, and was almost in a state 
 of mutiny. Its leading officers met and petitioned the 
 Sultan, demanding the dismissal and execution of its 
 general, the Grand Vizier Solyman. They elected Siawousch 
 Pasha as their general. The army then retreated across 
 the Danube to Philippopolis, and thence to Adrianople, from 
 whence it sent a deputation to the Sultan to enforce its 
 views. The Sultan summoned a great Council of State, 
 at which it was decided to accede to the demands of the 
 army. Siawousch Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier in 
 place of Solyman, who was soon after put to death by 
 order of the Sultan. It was hoped by this concession 
 to appease the army, and to prevent its march to 
 Constantinople. The arm}'^, however, persisted in its 
 threatening attitude and renewed its march to the capital.
 
 1 8 2 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It now increased its demands. It insisted on the deposition 
 of the Sultan. There was general concurrence in [this 
 among officials at Constantinople. Mustapha Xiuprili, the 
 brother of the late Ahmed Kiuprili, who was Kaimachan, 
 and performed the duties of Grand Vizier in his absence 
 from the capital, called an assembly of ulemas at St. 
 Sophia. He addressed them in these words : — 
 
 Since the Padishah thinks only of diverting himself in the chase, and 
 at the time when the Empire is assaulted from all quarters we have seen 
 him dismiss all men capable of repairing our misfortunes, can you doubt 
 any longer that the dethronement of a Padishah who thus conducts the 
 affairs of the State is legally permitted ? 
 
 The ulemas unanimously concurred. They decided on 
 the dethronement of Sultan Mahomet and his replacement 
 on the throne, not by his son, but by his legal heir, his 
 next brother, Solyman. They then betook themselves to 
 the abode in the Seraglio where that prince was secluded, 
 called him forth, and announced to him their decision, 
 citing in favour of it a verse from the Koran : " We 
 have named you to be Khaliff of the country." 
 
 There was no opposition to this. Solyman, who had 
 spent his life in seclusion, in constant fear of being 
 murdered by his brother, and who was only saved by 
 the brave efforts of the Sultana Valide, his mother, came 
 out of what was virtually a prison to be invested with the 
 insignia of Sultan. Mahomet, who had reigned as Sultan 
 for thirty -nine years, which he had devoted wholly 'to 
 the chase, to the neglect of every duty of his great office, 
 retired to the secluded building which his brother 'had 
 occupied so long. He died there a few years later, 
 regretted by no one. 
 
 Von Hammer gives a detailed account of one of Sultan 
 Mahomet's organized expeditions in pursuit of game, which 
 may be worth quoting as an illustration of his pursuits 
 and cliaracter. The scene of it was between Adrianople 
 and Tirnova, and it occurred in 1683, the year in which 
 his army was engaged in the invasion of Austria and on the 
 siege of Vienna. Thirty thousand peasants were brought from 
 all parts for the purpose of beating the woods and putting 
 up the game. For their subsistence a levy was made on 
 the district of 150,000 marks. This battue cost the lives
 
 THE KIUPRILi VIZIERS 183 
 
 of a great number of beaters, who succumbed to the fatigue 
 of the operations. Many rayas were brought from as 
 far as Belgrade for the occasion. The Sultan, on seeing 
 the bodies of those who had perished, said to his followers : 
 *' These men would doubtless have rebelled against me. 
 They have received their punishment in anticipation of 
 this." 
 
 Mahomet, it would seem, owed his deposition not so 
 much to his own callous neglect of his duties as Sultan 
 as to the arrogant incapacity of Kara Mustapha in his 
 campaign against Vienna and the imbecility of the two 
 succeeding Grand Viziers, Ibrahim and Solyman. 
 
 Solyman, who thus mounted the throne in 1687, at the 
 age of forty -one, showed greater capacity than was to be 
 expected after his long seclusion in ' the Cage,* but 
 he was quite unequal to the task of controlling the 
 mutinous Janissaries. They fiUed Constantinople with 
 riot and slaughter. They pillaged the palaces of the viziers 
 and others. They attacked the harem of the Grand Vizier 
 Siawousch, whom they had so recently elevated to the 
 post. He was killed in bravely defending his harem. His 
 favourite wife and sister were dragged naked through the 
 streets after being cruelly mutilated. The disorder of the 
 capital became so unendurable that the population rose 
 in arms and assisted the authorities in resisting the 
 Janissaries. Their Agha and principal officers were put 
 to death, and order was at last restored. 
 
 In the spring of the next year, 1688, a well equipped 
 army was sent to the Hungarian frontier, in the hope of 
 retrieving the defeats of the past five years. The Austrians, 
 however, had made good use of the interval . They had 
 now three armies in the field, under the command of 
 Prince Charles of Lorraine, Prince Louis of Baden, and 
 Prince Eugene of Savoy — all three generals of exceptional 
 ability. They invested the fortress of Erlau and captured 
 it. The road to Belgrade now lay open to them. This 
 supremely important city, the bulwark to the Balkans and 
 the gateway to Hungary, was treacherously surrendered 
 by its garrison in August 1688' after a bombardment of 
 only twenty-one days. Prince Louis of Baden about the 
 same time invaded Bosnia and occupied a great part of 
 it. Dalmatia revolted and threw over Turkish rule. Nisch 
 was later occupied by the Austrians, and Widdin, on the
 
 l84 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Danube, fell into their hands. By 1689 the only fortresses 
 in Hungary remaining to the Turks were Temesvar and 
 Warardin. 
 
 Farther eastward the Turks had been more fortunate. 
 An army of Tartars from the Crimea overran Poland in 
 1 688 and defeated a Polish army on the Sereth. In 
 the following year, when Russia joined in the combination 
 against the Ottomans and sent an army into the Crimea, 
 it met with a severe defeat. These were the only rays of 
 light to the Turks. Elsewhere *they met with a succession of 
 disasters. The Balkan provinces, for the first time since the 
 days of Hunyadi, were threatened by the Austrians. Parts 
 of Bosnia and Serbia were in their hands. The whole of 
 Greece and Albania had been conquered by the Venetians, 
 under Morosini, and the Turkish fleets had been swept 
 off the Mediterranean by the combined fleets of Venice, 
 the Pope, the Knights of Malta, and the Duke of Tuscany. 
 On the Ottoman side no single general of any capacity 
 had appeared. 
 
 It was under these conditions that a general council of 
 the Empire was summoned at Adrianople at the end of 
 1689. After a long discussion, it advised the Sultan to 
 appoint as Grand Vizier Zad6 Kiuprili, who had been 
 passed over by Sultan Mahomet IV in favour of the corrupt 
 and incompetent Kara Mustapha after the death of Ahmed 
 Kiuprili. After thirteen years of misgovernment and 
 calamity this third member of the Kiuprili family was 
 called to power. He showed at once great vigotir and 
 capacity. Addressing the chief dignitaries of the Empire, 
 he described the perilous condition of affairs : "If we 
 go on as we have been in the past, another campaign will 
 see the enemy encamped before Constantinople." He took 
 immediate steps to restore the financial position. 
 
 Zade Kiuprili repleted the treasury by heavy contributions 
 on the ofScials, who had enriched themselves at the 
 expense of the public. Pie filled the ranks of the army 
 by calling out veterans. He revived the Ottoman navy. 
 He fitted out a flotilla of vessels for ser\'ice on the Danube. 
 He replaced a number of incompetent and corrupt governors 
 by honest men on whom he could rely. He endeavoured 
 to win the support of the Christian rayas throughout the 
 Empire. He issued imperative orders to all governors 
 and pashas that no one should be allowed to oppress the
 
 THE KIUPRILI' VIZIERS 185 
 
 rayas. No taxes were to be levied on them except the 
 capitation tax. He allowed the Christians everywhere to 
 build churches, though he himself v/as a most strict Mussul- 
 man. He freed trade from many unwise and unnecessary 
 restrictions . He was personally austere and simple in his 
 habits, very reserved in his utterances. It was said of him 
 that he never committed a crime and never used a super- 
 fluous word . He was commonly called ' Kiuprili the 
 Virtuous.* Unfortunately for his country, he held the post 
 of Grand Vizier for less than two years, for it will be 
 seen that he was killed in battle in 1 69 1 . 
 
 At the time when he assumed the Grand Vizierate the 
 Austrians had crossed the Danube and had advanced far 
 into Macedonia. Kiuprili sent an army against them and 
 defeated them in two engagements. As a result, nearly 
 all the important posts south of the Danube were recovered 
 and the pressure on the Empire in this quarter was removed. 
 Zade Kiuprili now took command of the army in person, 
 and in August, 1690, advanced through Bulgaria, drove 
 the Austrians from their position between Sofia and 
 Nisch, and besieged and captured the latter place. He then 
 attacked and captured in succession Semendria, Widdin, 
 and Belgrade. Another Ottoman army under Tekeli Pasha 
 invaded Transylvania and drove the Austrians from it. 
 PCiuprili returned to Constantinople covered with glory. 
 
 About this tim.e vSultan Solyman died and was succeeded 
 by his brother, Achmet IT, v/ho, like himself, had been 
 brought up in the seclusion of the Seraglio, and was quite 
 incompetent to rule the Empire or to lead its armies. 
 Fortunately he left matters in the hands of his Grand Vizier. 
 Kiuprili again led the army in the field and, advancing from 
 Belgrade in May, 1 696, marched northwards on the right 
 bank of the Danube to meet the Austrians under Prince Louis 
 of Baden, who were advancing from Peterwardein. The 
 two armies met at Salankemcn. Their flotillas engaged 
 on the Danube and the Turks were there the victors. But 
 on land the battle ended in great disaster to them. .Vgainst 
 the advice of the most experienced of his generals, Zade 
 Kiuprili insisted on fightino", without waiting' for rein- 
 forcements that were on their wav. A most desperate 
 battle took place in v^hicli the Turks were completely 
 defeated. The Grand Vizier, in the hope of restoring the 
 fortunes of the dav, rushed into the melee, sword in hand.
 
 1 86 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and was killed while hewing his way through the Austrian 
 ranks. The Turkish troops were dispirited by the death 
 of their general and gave way. Panic and rout followed. 
 The Turkish camp and a hundred and twenty guns fell 
 into the hands of the Austrians. About the same time 
 Tekeli Pasha was also defeated by the Austrians and was 
 driven out of Transylvania. The Ottoman Empire was 
 again at a very low ebb after these disasters. Sultan 
 Achmet died heartbroken by the burden of shame and grief, 
 and was succeeded by his nephew, Mustapha 11, the son of 
 Mahomet IV. 
 
 The new Sultan was not wanting in the will to relieve the 
 plight of his country, but it will be seen that he had not 
 the capacity or the persistency required in such an emer- 
 gency. He fully recognized that the main causes of disaster 
 were the dissolute habits and incapacity of his predecessors. 
 Immediately after his accession to the throne he issued a 
 Hatti-Scheriff in which he announced his intention of restor- 
 ing ancient usages and leading his armies in person. In 
 the course of this notable document he said : — 
 
 Under monarchs who are the slaves of pleasure or who resign them- 
 selves to indolent slumber, never do the servants of God enjoy peace 
 or repose. Henceforth voluptuousness, idle pastime, and sloth are 
 banished from this Court. While the Padishahs who have ruled since 
 the death of our sublime father Mahomet have heeded naught but their 
 fondness for pleasure and for ease, the unbelievers, the unclean beings, 
 have invaded with their armies the four frontiers of Islam. They have 
 subdued our provinces. They have pillaged the goods of the people of 
 Mahomet. They have dragged away into slavery the faithful with their 
 wives and little ones. This is known to all, as it is known to me. I therefore 
 have resolved, with the help of the Lord, to take a signal revenge upon 
 the unbelievers, that brood of hell ; and I will myself begin the holy war 
 against them. . . . Do thou, my Grand Vizier, and ye others, my viziers, 
 my ulemas, my lieutenants and agas of my armies, do ye all of you assemble 
 round my person and meditate well on this my imperial Hatti-Scheriff. 
 Take counsel and inform me if I ought to open hostilities in person against 
 the Emperor or remain at Adrianople. Of the^c two measures choose 
 that which will be most profitable to the Faith to the Empire and to the 
 servants of God.' 
 
 In response to this, the Divan met and discussed for 
 three days whether the new Sultan should command in 
 
 ' Von Hammer, xti. p. 372.
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 187 
 
 person the army about to be sent against the Austrians. 
 They came to an adverse decision. They thought that it 
 would not only expose the sacred person of the Sultan to too 
 much risk, but would also involve excessive expense. They 
 probably thought also, but scarcely dared to express it, 
 that the Sultan, being quite inexperienced in military matters, 
 would be an encumbrance to the army. They advised the 
 Sultan that he ought not to commit his imperial person 
 to the chances of a campaign, but would do better to leave 
 the conduct of the war to the Grand Vizier. The Sulta^i 
 replied in the laconic words, " I persist in marching." In 
 accordance with this decision, Mustapha in person, in spite 
 of his inexperience, led a well appointed army in the summer 
 of 1696 from Belgrade to Temesvar, capturing on the 
 way various minor fortified places. His first encounter 
 with the enemy near Temesvar was successful. The 
 Austrians were defeated with heavy loss and Temesvar was 
 relieved. Mustapha, however, did not pursue his success 
 further. He returned to Constantinople and there received 
 an ovation. 
 
 In the following year, 1697, iNIustapha again marched 
 with his army from Belgrade into Hungary, without any 
 definite plans as to what he proposed to do. After many 
 councils of war and much irresolution, it was decided to 
 advance northwards to the River Theiss. The Austrian 
 army was now under command of Prince Eugene of Savoy, 
 who, we have seen, made his debut at the siege of Vienna. 
 He was the ablest general of his time. The two armies 
 met at Zenta on the River Theiss, about sixty miles above 
 its junction with the Danube. The Turks had erected a 
 bridge over the river at this point. The Sultan and his 
 cavalry, and a great part of the artillery, had already 
 crossed thie bridge. The infantry were still on the other 
 side. Prince Eugene with his army, coming suddenly upon 
 them, caught the Turkish army in flagrante delicto, divided 
 by the river. Advancing in a wide crescent, he attacked 
 the whole line of the Ottoman infantry who had not crossed 
 the river. There was great confusion in the ranks of the 
 Ottomans and discord among the leading officers and a 
 want of direction. A large body of Janissaries mutinied 
 on the field of battle and began to massacre their officers. 
 There ensued an overwhelming defeat of the Ottomans. 
 Twenty-six thousand Turks were slain on the battlefield
 
 l88 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and ten thousand were drowned in their attempt to cross 
 the river. 
 
 The Grand Vizier, four other viziers, and a great number 
 of pashas and thirty aghas of Janissaries were killed ; four 
 hundred and twenty standards were captured. The Sultan, 
 who had witnessed the battle from the other side of 
 the river in comparative safety, was able to escape with 
 some of his cavalry to Temesvar, and thence he returned 
 to Belgrade and Constantinople. This experience satisfied 
 his military ardour, and he never again appeared at the 
 head of his army. An immense booty fell into the hands 
 of the Austrians. All the Turkish guns were captured. 
 What remained of the army defeated at Zenta found its 
 way to Belgrade, and thence returned to Adrianople, while 
 Prince Eugene crossed the Danube into Bosnia and made 
 himself master of the greater part of that province. 
 This great victory of the Austrians, after fourteen years of 
 almost uninterrupted success, decided not only the campaign 
 but the war in their favour, and marked irrevocably the 
 decadence of the military power of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 Six days after the battle the Sultan, in his peril, turned 
 once more to the Kiuprili family for help. In place of the 
 Grand Vizier, who had been killed at Zenta, he appointed 
 Hussein Kiuprili, a son of the elder brother of Mohammed 
 Kiuprili, and therefore a cousin of Ahmed. Until the 
 siege of Vienna he had given himself up to a life of pleasure, 
 but after that grave defefat of the Turks he filled with 
 great distinction many high posts in the government. He 
 was the fourth member of his family to hold the position of 
 Grand Vizier, and showed himself fully capable of bearing 
 the burden. 
 
 In the course of the following winter of 1697-8, many 
 efforts wer.e made to bring about peace. Lord Paget, the 
 British Ambassador, offered the mediation of Great Britain 
 and Holland on the principle of Uti possidetis — that each 
 of the Powers concerned, Austria, \''enice, and Poland, were 
 to retain what they had wrested from Turkey. Hussein 
 Kiuprili summoned a great Council of State to consider this. 
 He had personally fought at St. Gotthard and other battles, 
 and fully recognized the superiority of the Austrian army. 
 The Ottomans, since the siege of Vienna, had been defeated 
 by them in nine great battles, and had lost by siege 
 nine fortresses of the first rank. He felt that if the \yar
 
 THE KIUPRILI VIZIERS 189 
 
 were prolonged there would be further reverses of the same 
 kind. At his instance, it was decided by the Council to 
 accept the mediation of Great Britain and Holland. The 
 other Powers, with the exception of Russia, were equally 
 willing. The Czar, Peter the Great, alone objected, and 
 warned the other Powers not to trust in Great Britain and 
 HoUand, who, he said, were only thinking of their own 
 commercial interests. In spite of his efforts, it was decided 
 to hold a Peace Congress, at which all these Powers, includ- 
 ing Russia, eventually were represented. It was held at 
 Carlowitz, not far from Peterwarden, on the Danube, and 
 after seventy -two days' discussion and negotiation it resulted 
 in peace on the basis suggested by Lord Paget. Austria, 
 it was finally agreed, was to retain possession of Tran- 
 sylvania and Sclavonia and of all Plungary north of the 
 River Marosch and west of the River Theiss. This left to 
 the Ottomans only about one -third of their previous 
 dominions in Hungary. The Emperor also was relieved 
 from payment of tribute in respect of Hungary and Tran- 
 sylvania. The Republic of Venice was to retain the ]\Iorea 
 and Albania, but was to give up its conquests north of the 
 Isthmus of Corinth — the only departure from the principle 
 of Uti possidetis. The Republic was also relieved from 
 payment of tribute to the Porte in respect of the island of 
 Zante. Poland was to retain Podolia. Russia was to have 
 Azoff and the districts north of the Sea of Azoff which were 
 actually in her occupation. The Czar Peter was dissatisfied 
 with this and refused to enter into a treaty upon these terms. 
 He would only agree to an armistice for two years on 
 this basis. The other three Powers concerned entered into 
 treaties of peace for twenty -five years. 
 
 This treaty of Carlowitz was of supreme importance in 
 the international relations of Europe. It recognized for 
 first time that the status of the Ottoman Empire was a matter 
 for the concern of all the Powers of Europe, and not 
 only of those at war with it. It established the principle 
 01 equality of the Powers concerned, and rejected finally 
 the pretensions of the Ottoman Empire, founded on its long 
 career of conquest. Thenceforth there was no longer any 
 fear of the invasion of Central Europe by the Turks. 
 The settlement was not so ignominious to them as the later 
 treaties of Passarowitch, Kainardji, Adrianople, and Berlin, 
 but not the less it was a great triumph for the Christian
 
 190 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Powers of Europe. In view of the long series of defeats 
 of the Ottoman army and the exhausted state of the Empire, 
 Hussein Kiuprih acted the part of a wise statesman in assent- 
 ing to the treaty. If his advice and that of other members 
 of his family had been followed, and the Christian subjects 
 of the Empire had been treated with justice, later humilia- 
 tions might have been avoided, and the Empire might 
 have survived intact to a much later date. 
 
 Hussein Kiuprili retained the post of Grand Vizier for 
 three years after the treaty of Carlowitz. During this 
 time he showed that he had most of the qualities of his more 
 distinguished relative, Ahmed Kiuprili. He was a man 
 of high culture and public spirit. He did his best by 
 wise and salutary reforms to stem the growing evils of 
 the State. He aimed at curbing the mutinous power of the 
 Janissaries. He endeavoured in many ways to improve 
 the deplorable condition of the rayas. His reforms met 
 with violent opposition from reactionaries. His health broke 
 down under the stress and he was compelled to resign his 
 post. He died within a few weeks, in 1702. His reforms 
 did not survive him. His successor, Daltaban Pasha, was 
 a man of a totally different type, a savage Serbian, -who 
 could neither read nor write, and who had acquired a 
 reputation for gross cruelty which he fully justified in 
 his more exalted position. 
 
 Once again, in 17 10, another member of the Kiuprili 
 family, Nououman Kiuprili, was appointed Grand Vizier, 
 but though he had many of the virtues of his race he did 
 not prove to be equal to the post. He insisted on attempt- 
 ing to do too much. He interfered with every detail of 
 the State and accumulated the hostility of all his 
 subordinates. The affairs of the government fell into 
 confusion and he was in consequence deposed after a very 
 few months. The names of five other members of the 
 same family appear in the history of the next few years 
 as generals and governors of provinces. 
 
 It may be doubted whether in the annals of any country 
 a single family has produced so many distinguished men, 
 owing their position, not to personal favour, but to their 
 own merits and to the exigencies of the State. The case 
 is unique in the history of Turkey, where it would be 
 difificult to find another instance where two members of 
 any family rose to distinction.
 
 XIV 
 TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH 
 
 1702-18 
 
 MuSTAPHA did not long survive as Sultan the death of his 
 great Vizier, Hussein, the fourth of the Kiuprilis. He had 
 not fulfilled the early expectation of his reign, when, against 
 the advice of the Divan, he took command of his army, 
 in the field. Disappointed and discouraged by his failure, 
 he fell back on a life of indolence and debauchery. After 
 the death of Hussein Kiuprili there was widespread dis- 
 content throughout the Empire, and in most parts imminent 
 danger of rebellion. Mustapha had not the courage to 
 cope with it. He abdicated the throne and retired volun- 
 tarily to the Cage. He was succeeded by his brother, 
 Achmet III, at the age of thirty, who reigned for twenty- 
 seven years till he was deposed at the instigation of the 
 Janissaries. 
 
 Achmet had not been subjected by his uncle to the 
 customary seclusion. He came to the throne, therefore, 
 with greater knowledge of the world. He was not a 
 warrior. He did not attempt to lead his armies in the 
 field. But he did not allow the affairs of State to fall into 
 the hands of women of his harem. Neither did he permit 
 ambitious Viziers to monopolize power. He changed them 
 so often that this was impossible. During the first fifteen 
 years of his reign there were twelve Grand Viziers. Jt 
 was imputed to him that these frequent changes were due 
 to his want of money and the extravagances of his harem. 
 It was the custom for Grand Viziers, on their appointment, 
 to make very large presents in money to the Sultan, and 
 Achmet looked on this as a source of income. But during 
 their short tenures of office he interfered very little with 
 them. He was, however, personally in favour of a policy
 
 192 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of peace, and supported his Viziers in its maintenance. The 
 first six years and the last twelve years of his reign were 
 periods of almost unbroken peace to the Empire. In the 
 other nine years there were many important events bearing 
 on the extension or reduction of his Empire. Territory 
 formerly in the possession of the Ottomans was reconquered, 
 and provinces long held by them were lost. The city of 
 Azoft and its adjoining territory — ^important for the pro- 
 tection of the Crimea — were recovered from Russia. The 
 Morea and Albania were reconquered from the Republic 
 of Venice. By agreement with Russia a partition was made 
 of important provinces belonging to Persia, some of which 
 had formerly been in the possession of the Porte. On 
 the other hand, as the result of war with Austria, the remain- 
 ing part of Hungary, not included in the cession made 
 by the treaty of Carlowitz, and considerable parts of 
 Serbia and Wallachia were lost to the Empire. The gains 
 in territory exceeded in area the losses. But there caii be 
 little doubt that the loss of prestige by the Ottomans from 
 the defeats of their armies by the Austrians under Prince 
 Eugene was not compensated for by victories over the 
 \'enetians and Persians, or over the very inferior army of 
 Peter the Great. 
 
 The first of the wars thus referred to was that with 
 Russia, then under the rule of Peter the Great. He \vas 
 ambitious of extending his Empire by the acquisition of 
 the Crimea, and of thus getting access to the Black Sea. 
 It was only after the defeat of Charles XII, the King of 
 Sweden, at the battle of Pultowa in 1709, and the conse- 
 quent conquest of Livonia, that his hands were free for 
 aggression elsewhere. Russia was already in possession of 
 the important fortress of Azoff, on the north-east shore of 
 the sea of that name. The Czar had also fortified Taganrog 
 and other places threatening the Crimea. The Porte was 
 alarmed by these manifest preparations for war. The 
 relations of the two Governments were also embittered by 
 the fact that the Swedish King, Charles XII, after his 
 defeat at Pultowa, sought refuge in Turkey, and that the 
 Sultan accorded a generous hospitality to him, and with great 
 magnanimity refused the demand of Peter for his extradi- 
 tion. It followed that, in 171 i, the Porte anticipated the 
 undoubted hostile intention of the Czar, and declared war 
 against Russia. An army was. sent by the Sultan across
 
 TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH 193 
 
 the River Pruth into Moldavia, under command of Grand 
 Vizier Baltadji. This pasha had risen to his post from 
 the humble position of woodcutter at the palace, through 
 the intrigues of his wife, who had been a slave in the 
 Sultan's harem. The Czar, on his part, had collected his 
 forces in the south of Poland and marched into Moldavia. 
 The two armies met on the River Pruth. The Russian 
 army, already greatly reduced in number by want of food 
 and disease, numbered no more than twenty -four thousand 
 men. The Ottomans, who had been reinforced by a large 
 body of Tartars, under the Khan of the Crimea, were at 
 least five times more numerous. The Czar Peter, unaware 
 that the Ottomans had crossed the Danube, advanced 
 rashly on the right bank of the Pruth, and was posted 
 between that river and an extensive marsh not far 
 from Zurowna. The position was dominated by hills, which 
 the Grand Vizier occupied in force, and his numerous and 
 powerful guns swept the position of the Russians, cut off 
 their access to the river, and completely hemmed them in. 
 Their plight is best described in a letter which the Czar 
 wrote to the Russian Senate at Moscow from his camp at 
 this point : — 
 
 I announce to you that, deceived by false intelligence and without 
 blame on my part, I find myself shut up in my camp by a Turkish army. 
 Our supplies are cut off, and we momentarily expect to be destroyed or 
 taken prisoners, unless Heaven should come to our aid in some unexpected 
 manner. Should it happen to me to be taken prisoner by the Turks 
 you will no longer consider me as your Czar and Sovereign, nor will you 
 pay any attention to any orders that maj' be brought to you from me, not 
 even if you recognize my handwriting ; but you will wait for my coming 
 in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well confirmed 
 intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose as my successor 
 him who is most worthy among you. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the Russian army was com- 
 pletely at the mercy of the Ottomans, and might have been 
 entirely destroyed or captured. It was saved from either 
 fate by the Czar's wife, Catherine. She was the daughter 
 of a peasant, married in the first instance to a dragoon in 
 the Russian army, and later the mistress of Prince 
 MenschikofT. Peter, smitten by her beauty and wit, had 
 recently married her, and she was with him on this cam- 
 paign. This lady, with great presence of mind, collected 
 
 13
 
 194 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ■what money she could, to the value of a few thousand 
 roubles, and sent it and her jev/ellery with a letter to the 
 Kiaya of the Grand Vizier, suggesting a suspension of hos- 
 tilities with a view to terms of agreement. In this way 
 relations were established between the two generals, and 
 a treaty of peace v/as agreed to. Its terms were very 
 humiliating to Russia. Azoff and its surrounding district 
 were to be surrendered to the Porte. Taganrog and some 
 other fortresses were to be dismantled. The Russian army 
 was to withdraw from Poland. The King of Sweden was 
 to be allowed safe conduct through Russia to his own 
 country. There was to be no Russian ambassador in the 
 future at Constantinople. In return for these great con- 
 cessions the Russian army was to be permitted to retreat 
 without molestation. 
 
 The preamble to the treaty contained the following 
 remarkable admission of the predicament in which the Czar 
 and his army were placed : — 
 
 By the grace of God, the victorious Miissuhnan arm}^ has closely 
 hemmed the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood 
 of the River Pruth, and the Czar has asked for peace, and it is at his 
 request that the follo\ving~articles are drawn up and granted. 
 
 It was also declared in the treaty by the Grand Vizier 
 " that he made the peace by virtue of full powers vested 
 in him, and that he entreated the Sultan to ratify the 
 treaty, and overlook the previous evil conduct of the 
 Czar." 
 
 The signing of the treaty of the Pruth was vehemently 
 opposed by the King of Sweden, who was in the Ottoman 
 camp, and by the Khan of the Crimea. They doubtless had 
 good reasons of their own for wishing the war with Russia 
 to be prolonged. It was due to their intrigues at Con- 
 stantinople that violent opposition was roused to the 
 ratification of the treaty. Baltadji found on his return that, 
 instead of being received with acclamation for having re- 
 covered Azoff and other territory, of which the Porte had 
 been deprived a few years previously, he was dismissed 
 from his office with disgrace. The Kiaya Osman and the 
 Reis Effendi Omer, who were believed to be largely 
 responsible for the treaty, were put to death by order of 
 the Sultan.
 
 TO THE TREATY OE PASSAROWITCH 195 
 
 The Porte refused to ratiTy the treaty, and preparations 
 were made for a renewal of the war with Russia. But 
 wiser counsels ultimately prevailed, largely through the 
 advice of the British Ambassador, Sir R. Sutton ; and two 
 years later, after long negotiation, another treaty was 
 concluded with the Czar, which embodied all the terms 
 of that effected by Baltadji which had been so much 
 objected to. 
 
 Many historians have found fault with Baltadji for having 
 neglected the opportunitv of destroying or capturing the 
 Russian army and the Czar Peter himself, and for having 
 allowed them to escape by concluding the treaty. It has 
 been suggested that he was bribed by the Empress 
 Catherine. It is, however, inconceivable that one in the 
 high position of Grand Vizier, where there were such 
 immense opportunities for enrichment, could have sold him- 
 self and his country for so small a price. It is more 
 probable that the presents of the Empress were made to 
 the subordinate of the Grand Vizier for the purpose of 
 opening negotiations with him. It is also more reasonable 
 to conclude that Baltadji was convinced that no better 
 terms could be obtained by a "prolongation of the war. 
 The destruction of the Russian armv or its capture, together 
 with the Czar, would have roused the Russian people to 
 a great effort to avenge such a disaster. It is significant 
 that the Sultan, while putting to death the Kiaya and Reis 
 Effcndi, spared the life of Baltadji, who was mainly respon- 
 sible, and simply dismissed him from the office of Grand 
 Vizier. This seems to indicate that the Sultan had given 
 authority in advance to Baltadji, as stated in the treaty, to 
 agree to terms such as were actually obtained. It seems to 
 be unlikely that Sultan Achmet desired to extend his Empire 
 bevond the territory of Azoff into the heart of Russia. 
 What better terms, then, could have been obtained by 
 prolonging the war? 
 
 It has also been contended by some historians that it 
 was unwise policy to impose such a humiliation on the 
 Czar as that embodied in the treatv ; that it was certain 
 to lead to a renewal of the war for the purpose of avenging 
 it. But the Czar himself did not apparently take this 
 view of the case. After the escape of his army from 
 disaster he showed no inclination to renew the war. He 
 was willing, two years lat*"!-, to re-enact the treaty, in
 
 196 Till: TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 spite of its humiliating terms. He did not break peace 
 with the Turks in the remaining ten years of his reign. 
 He did not bear a grudge against them and after a few years 
 he entered into an arrangement with the Sultan for the 
 partition of a large part of Persia. 
 
 On a review of the whole transaction, we must conclude 
 that the Grand Vizier Baltadji was fully justified in effect- 
 ing the treaty of the Pruth, and that it was no small 
 achievement, by the skilful manceuvring of his army and 
 without the loss of a single life, to impose terms on 
 the Czar, under which the Ottoman Empire recovered 
 Azoff and its district, the key to the Crimea, and 
 obtained the other valuable concessions embodied in the 
 treaty. 
 
 In 1 7 1 5 the Porte embarked on another war, this time 
 against the Republic of Venice, with the object of recover- 
 ing the Morea, which sixteen years previously had been 
 conquered by the Republic, when in alliance with Austria, 
 and the possession of which had been confirmed to the 
 Republic by the treaty of Carlowitz. Morosini, the Venetian 
 general by whom this conquest had been achieved, was now 
 dead. It was thought that Austria would not intervene. A 
 pretext for the war was found in the assistance which the 
 Republic rendered to the Montenegrins in an insurrection 
 against the Porte. The army, which had been equipped for 
 war with Russia, was now available for other purposes. 
 The Grand Vizier Damad, who was also otherwise known 
 as Coumourgi, son-in-law of the Sultan, took command of 
 an army of a hundred thousand men. A fleet of one 
 hundred sail co-operated by sea. The Sultan himself 
 accompanied the army as far as Larissa, in Thessaly, but 
 no farther. He left the direction of it wholly in the 
 hands of Damad, who showed great ability in the conduct 
 of the war. It commenced with the siege of Corinth, 
 which, after a brave defence of three weeks, capitu- 
 lated on July 7, 17 1 5, on favourable terms. But a 
 powder magazine blew up during the evacuation of the 
 fortress, killing six or seven hundred of the Turkish soldiers. 
 This afforded an excuse for breaking the agreement, 
 and for a general massacre of Venetians and Greeks, 
 whether of the garrison or inhabitants — much to the 
 disapproval of Damad. This siege of Corinth formed 
 the subject of Lord Byron's well-known poem, in
 
 TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH 197 
 
 which Damad is referred to under the name of 
 Coumourgi : — 
 
 Coumourgi — can his glory cease, 
 That latest conqueror of Greece, 
 Till Christian hands to Greece restore 
 The freedom Venice gave of yore ? 
 A hundred years have rolled away 
 Since he rcfixcd the Moslem sway. 
 
 With poetic licence Byron attributes to the Venetian 
 governor of Corinth tlie setting fire to the powder magazine 
 and the fearful destruction of life which it caused : — 
 
 When old Minotti's hand 
 
 Touched with the torch the train — 
 
 'Tis fired. 
 
 There seems to have been no more justification in fact for 
 this than for the statement that the Venetians gave liberty 
 to the Greeks. Nothing is more certain than that the 
 Greeks hated the rule of Venice as more oppressive than 
 that of the Turks. 
 
 After the capture of Corinth the Ottoman army, in two 
 divisions, invaded the Morea, and had no difficulty in 
 capturing all the Venetian fortresses there, such as Modon, 
 Coron, and Navarino. The Greek inhabitants gave no 
 assistance to their Venetian masters. They welcomed the 
 Turks as their deliverers from an odious tyranny. 
 
 The reconquest of the Morea occupied Damad and his 
 army for only a hundred and one days. There was no 
 pitched battle with the Venetians. The campaign con- 
 sisted of a succession of sieges of fortresses. It was 
 the intention of the Ottomans to complete the expulsion 
 of the Venetians by the capture of Corfu and the other 
 Ionian islands, but at this stage the Emperor of Austria, 
 Cliarlcs VI, intervened, and entered into a defensive alliance 
 with the Republic of Venice. It was too late, however, to 
 save the Morea. There was much difference of opinion 
 at the Court of the Sultan whether the action of Austria 
 should be treated as a casus belli . The Grand Vizier Damad 
 vehemently contended that it was a breach of the treaty 
 of Carlowitz. He was a man of great force of character
 
 198 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and very eloquent. But there was strong opposition to 
 him. The debates in the Divan, in presence of the Sultan, 
 have been recorded and are interesting reading. The 
 Mufti, when consulted on the subject, gave his judgment 
 in favour of Damad. This decided the Council. War 
 was declared against Austria, and in 1 7 1 6 an army of 
 a hundred and fifty thousand vv'as sent, under command 
 of Damad, to attack the Austrians. It reached Belgrade 
 in September. A council of war was then held to decide 
 whether to advance towards Temesvar or Peterwardein. 
 There was again difference on the subject. Damad 
 ultimately gave his decision in favour of the latter project. 
 
 The Turks crossed the River Saave by a bridge of boats, 
 and then marched along the bank of the Danube towards 
 Peterwardein. Their van came in contact with that of the 
 Austrians at the village of Carlowitz, where, sixteen years 
 before, the last treaty had been signed. From Carlowitz 
 to Peterwardein the distance is only two leagues. The 
 Austrian army, greatly inferior ,in numbers to that of the 
 Turks, was posted in front of the great fortress, behind 
 entrenchments which had been made by Siawousch Pasha 
 in the last war. It was again commanded by Prince 
 Eugene of Savoy, who, in the interval, had gathered fresh 
 laurels in many hard -fought battles for Austria, and who 
 was second to no living general, save only the Duke of 
 Marlborough, by whose side he fought so many battles. 
 The two armies came to issue on August 10, 17 16. At 
 first the battle went in favour of the Ottomans. Their 
 redoubtable Janissaries broke the line of the Austrian 
 infantry opposed to them. Prince Eugene then brought 
 up his reserve of cavalry. They charged the Janissaries 
 with irresistible force, and retrieved the fortunes of the 
 day. Damad Pasha, when he saw that the tide of battle 
 was turning against him, put himself at the head of a band 
 of officers and galloped into the thick of the battle, in 
 the hope of infusing fresh courage in his army. He was 
 struck down and was carried from the field to Carlowitz, 
 where he died. 
 
 As so often happened to the Turks, the loss of their 
 leader caused a panic in their ranks and completed their 
 discomfiture. Their left wing retreated in the direction of 
 Belgrade, and was followed by the debris of the rest of the 
 army. One hundred and forty of their guns were captured.
 
 TO. THE TREATY. OF. PASSAROWITCH 199 
 
 Their camp and an immense booty fell into the hands of 
 the enemy. The battle, however, was not very costly in 
 men to either side. The Austrians lost three thousand 
 men and the Turks about double the number. Eugene 
 followed up his success by the siege of Temesvar, the 
 last great stronghold of the Ottomans in Hungary. He 
 appeared before it twenty days after the battle of Peter- 
 wardein. Its garrison of eighteen thousand men capitulated, 
 after a siege of five weeks, on November 25th. This 
 completed the campaign of 17 16. The Turks had not 
 been more successful in other directions. They were com- 
 pelled to raise the siege of Corfu. Their fleet often met 
 that of the Venetians and had rather the worst of it, 
 though there was no decisive battle. 
 
 In the year following, 1 7 1 7, another large army was 
 sent from Constantinople to the Danube, under Grand 
 Vizier Khalil, who had succeeded Damad after the battle 
 of Peterwardein. It consisted of a hundred and fifty 
 thousand men, of whom eighty thousand were Janissaries 
 and Spahis. It was no more fortunate than that under 
 Damad in the previous year. Prince Eugene, still in com- 
 mand of the Austrians, had opened the campaign by 
 marching to Belgrade with a force of not more than 
 seventy thousand men. He besieged the city and fortress, 
 which was garrisoned by thirty thousand Ottomans. When, 
 after three weeks of siege, the Ottoman army came in 
 sight, so vastly superior in numbers, the position of Eugene 
 was most critical. The garrison of Belgrade was in front 
 of him and Khalil's army, double in number of his own, 
 threatened his rear. 
 
 It is highly probable that if the Ottoman general had 
 attacked the Austrians without delay he would have been 
 successful. He hesitated and delayed. He ended by an 
 effort to besiege the besiegers. He entrenched his army 
 in the rear of that of Eugene. The two armies then 
 fired their heavy guns on one another without much result. 
 The Turks were greatly superior in this respect. They 
 were provided with a hundred and forty guns and thirty - 
 five mortars. Failure of food would have compelled the 
 Turks to an issue. But Prince Eugene anticipated this 
 by making an attack himself on the Ottoman lines. Never 
 was a bolder course attempted by a general, and never 
 was there a more brilliant success. With greatly inferior
 
 200 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 force, the Austrians stormed the Turkish lines on 
 August 1 6, 1 7 1 7, little more than a year from the 
 day on which the battle of Peterwardein had been 
 fought. The Ottomans gave way along their whole line. 
 Twenty thousand of them were killed or wounded, while 
 the loss of the Austrians in killed was no more than two 
 thousand. Prince Eugene himself was wounded for the 
 thirteenth time in his great career. The Turks retreated 
 in disorder. They lost a hundred and thirty-one guns 
 and thirty-five mortars and a vast supply of munitions. 
 On the following day Belgrade and its garrison of tliirty 
 thousand men surrendered. 
 
 After the battle before Belgrade and the capture of 
 that fortress, the Austrians advanced and occupied a great 
 part of Serbia and Western Wallachia. They appealed 
 to the Serbian people to rise against their Ottoman masters, 
 but not more than twelve hundred answered the appeal 
 and joined the Austrian army. There was no desire on 
 the part of the Serbians to exchange Turkish for Austrian 
 rule. The occupation by the Austrians of territory south 
 of the Danube proved to be temporary. Twenty -two years 
 later the Ottomans recaptured Belgrade and drove the 
 Austrians from Serbia. 
 
 Meanwhile the Grand Vizier Khalil was dismissed from 
 office by the Sultan for the incapacity which he had shown 
 in the campaign and in the battle of Belgrade. After 
 a time he was succeeded by Damad Ibrahim, a son-in-law 
 and lifelong favourite of the Sultan, who held the post 
 for twelve years, till the deposition of Achmet in 1730. 
 He proved himself in every way worthy of his high office. 
 There was a desire in many quarters to embark on another 
 campaign for the recovery of Hungary. But in the winter 
 of 1717-18 the British Ambassador again proposed media- 
 tion, on behalf of England and Holland, on the principle 
 of Uti possidetis. This was accepted by both Austria and 
 the Porte. The Emperor was willing to content himself 
 with what he had already achieved, the more so as there 
 was danger of war in other directions. There was more 
 difficulty on the part of the Ottomans. But the Sultan 
 and the Grand Vizier ultimately gave their decision in 
 favour of peace. 
 
 The precedent of the Congress of Carlowitz was closely 
 followed. A congress was held at Passaro witch, a small
 
 TO THE TREATY OF PASS ARO WITCH '201 
 
 town in Serbia. England and Holland again acted as 
 mediators. After long discussion, agreement was arrived 
 at, and was embodied in a treaty known as that of 
 Passarowitch, on July 21, 17 18. By its terms the whole 
 of what remained of Hungary to the Ottoman Empire 
 after the treaty of Carlowitz, a large part of Wallachia, 
 bounded by the River Aluta, and the greater part of Serbia, 
 and a portion of Bosnia bounded by the Rivers Morava, 
 Dwina, and Unna, together with the fortresses of Belgrade 
 and Semendria, were ceded to the Emperor. 
 
 The Republic of Venice, on whose behalf Austria had 
 embarked on the war, fared badly by the treaty. It had 
 to give up to Ottoman rule the whole of the Morea which 
 had been reconquered by Damad, but received some con- 
 cessions in Dalmatia. It was, however, arranged by the 
 Congress that the Porte should have an access to the 
 Adriatic, so as to protect the Republic of Ragusa from 
 Venice. There remained to Venice of its possessions in 
 this quarter only the island of Corfu, the other Ionian 
 islands, and a few ports on the Albanian and Dalmatian 
 coasts. The Porte engaged by the treaty to put a stop 
 to the piracy of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Ragusa, and 
 to prohibit the residence of the Hungarian rebels in the 
 vicinity of the new Austrian frontier. 
 
 The treaty of Passarowitch, following on the great defeats 
 of the Ottomans at the battles of Peterwardein and Bel- 
 grade, was almost as important as that of Carlowitz. It 
 determined finally the release of the whole of Hungary 
 from the Ottomans. Their rule there had never been more 
 than a military occupation. There was no real incorpora- 
 tion of the country in the Ottoman Empire. There had 
 been no attempt to settle Turks there, or to impose the 
 Moslem religion on its population. After the expulsion 
 of the garrisons from the various fortresses, all vestiges 
 of the Ottomans disappeared, and no trace of them 
 remained as evidence that they had ever been masters 
 there. • It was a great achievement of the Aastrians, for 
 which Prince Eugene was mainly responsible. It should 
 be added, however, that there does not appear to have 
 been any popular rising of the people of Hungary, whether 
 Magyars or Sclavs, either in these last two years of war 
 or in the previous war of 1698-9, against their Ottoman 
 
 ' See the Mcmoircs cie Morosini, in. pp. 112, 113.
 
 202 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 rulers. It has been shown that the earlier war had its 
 commencement in an insurrection against the Austrians 
 in that part of Hungary subject to their rule. The Turks 
 hoped to take advantage of this. They appear to have 
 been in close relation with these insurgents throughout these 
 two wars. The Austrians defeated the Turks and drove 
 them out of the country, but their bigoted tyranny was 
 not more acceptable to the inhabitants than that of the 
 Turks. Many years were to elapse before the Magyars of 
 Hungary secured for themselves the benefits of self- 
 government . 
 
 The war with Austria, which resulted in the treaty of 
 Passarowitch, did something more than free Hungary from 
 Ottoman rule. It completed the destruction of the prestige 
 of the Turkish armies which had so long weighed on the 
 mind of Europe. The great battles of Peterwardein and 
 Belgrade, in which the Turks were defeated by Austrian 
 armies of very inferior numbers, following as they did 
 a long succession of similar defeats from the battle of 
 St. Gotthard dow^n wards, showed conclusively that the 
 Ottoman armies were no match for the well -disciplined 
 forces of Austria when led by competent generals. The 
 Ottomans seem to have been completely cowed by the 
 succession of defeats. Thenceforth they were always on 
 the defensive in Europe, and never willingly acted the 
 part of aggressors. It became the settled conviction of 
 Europe not only that there was no longer any reason to 
 fear invasion from the Turks, but that it was only a question 
 of time when they would be driven back into Asia.
 
 XV 
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE 
 
 1718-39 
 
 The remainder of Sultan Achmet's reign, till his deposition 
 in 1730, was a period of uninterrupted peace, so far as 
 Europe was concerned. Damad Ibrahim retained his post as 
 Grand Vizier for twelve years, during which he had the 
 absolute confidence of the Sultan and practically ruled the 
 Empire. His policy was distinctly favourable to peace. The 
 only disturbance to it was on the frontier of Persia. That 
 kingdom was in a state of commotion. Its feeble and 
 incompetent ruler. Shah Hussein, was subverted by an 
 Afghan adventurer, Mahmoud. Hussein's son, Tahmasp, 
 appealed to the Czar of Russia and to the Sultan of Turkey 
 for aid to recover his kingdom. Peter the Great offered 
 his support in return for the cession of provinces in the 
 Caspian and Black Sea, and sent an army to take posses- 
 sion of them. This greatly alarmed the Porte, and it 
 threatened war with Russia. Eventually, however, war was 
 avoided. An agreement was arrived at, in 1723, between 
 the two Powers for the partition between ihem of the 
 greater part of North Persia. The Porte was ito have 
 as its share the provinces of Georgia, Erivan, Tabriz, and 
 Baku. Russia was to have Schirvan and the other provinces 
 already promised to it by Tahmasp. Russia was prac- 
 tically already in possession of its share. The Porte had 
 to send an army to conquer the provinces which were to 
 be its portion. It met with some opposition, but the cities 
 of Erivan and Tabriz were captured. This brought the 
 Porte into conflict with Tahmasp, but eventually an agree- 
 ment was arrived at. Tahmasp was thrown over, and 
 Mahmoud recognized the sovereignty of the Porte over 
 the provinces referred to. It is not worth while enter-
 
 204 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ing further into details of these transactions, for it will 
 be seen that in a few years Persia, under Nadir Khan, 
 acting on behalf of Tahmasp, recovered these provinces. 
 
 After a reign of twenty-seven years a mutiny broke out 
 against Achmet among the turbulent Janissaries, headed 
 by Patrona, an Albanian soldier in their ranks. It 
 speedily spread among the whole body of soldiers, and 
 was supported by the dregs of the population of the city 
 and by a band of criminals whom they had released from 
 prison. It was probably promoted by enemies of the Grand 
 Vizier. There was much want of vigour in dealing with 
 the outbreak at its early stage. Subsequent events under 
 Achmet 's successor showed that it was not really of a 
 formidable character and that it might easily have been 
 put down at its inception by strong measures against its 
 ringleaders. It was allowed, however, to gather head and 
 to spread. It was said that the mutiny was due to the 
 unpopularity of the Sultan, his profuse expenditure, and 
 the great pomp he maintained. This scarcely seems to 
 afford a sufifieient explanation. It has also been suggested 
 that among other causes was the discontent of the soldiers 
 on account of the long peace and the lack of opportunity 
 for loot, and perhaps also the expectation of the customary 
 large presents on the accession of a new Sultan. When 
 the rebels got the upper hand they made no substantial 
 proposals for a new policy. 
 
 The Sultan, at an early stage, consulted his sister, the 
 Sultana Khadidje, who advised him to keep his ministers 
 close at hand, so that he might save his own life at their 
 expense, if the rebels would be satisfied by a concession 
 of this kind. He appears to have followed this advice. 
 He lost his head in the crisis, and quailed before the 
 mutineers. He entered into parleys with them. They 
 demanded the surrender to them of three of the principal 
 ministers. Achmet asked whether they wished these 
 ministers to be handed to them alive or dead. They unani- 
 mously agreed that they wished to have the dead bodies. 
 The Sultan thereupon had the base and incredible meanness 
 to order that his Grand Vizier — his lifelong friend, married 
 to his daughter — the Capitan Pasha, and the Kiaya were to 
 be strangled and their bodies given up to the mutineers. 
 This did not content the Janissaries. They demanded the 
 deposition of the Sultan. Achmet then offered to abdicate
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE 205 
 
 the throne on condition that his life and those of his 
 children should be spared. They agreed to this. Achmet 
 thereupon summoned before him his nephew, Mahmoud, 
 whom he acclaimed as Padishah in place of himself and 
 made obeisance. He then retired to the Cage from which 
 Mahmoud had emerged, and there spent the remainder of 
 his life in seclusion. 
 
 Mahmoud, the son of Mustapha II, succeeded at the 
 age of thirty -four. Achmet had not treated him with the 
 same generosity that he had himself experienced from 
 Mustapha II, but had insisted on his seclusion in the Cage. 
 After spending so many of his best years in this way, 
 Mahmoud was unfitted for active duties as head of the State. 
 He had a turn for literature, and was a generous patron of 
 public libraries and schools ; but as regards the direc- 
 tion of affairs of the Empire he was wholly incompetent. 
 He fell completely under the influence of the Kislaraga, 
 the chief eunuch of his harem, Bashir by name, who acted 
 as his secretary. Bashir had been an Abyssinian slave, 
 and was bought for the Sultan's harem for 30 piastres. 
 Little is known of the personality of this man, save that, 
 from behind the curtain of the harem, he practically exer- 
 cised supreme power for nearly thirty years, and died at 
 a very advanced age, leaving a fortune of more than thirty 
 millions of piastres and immense quantities of valuables. 
 These included more than eight hundred watches, set with 
 precious stones, which, it must be presumed, were the gifts 
 of applicants for appointments. Bashir made and unmade 
 Grand Viziers at his will, and if any one of them complained 
 of Bashir's Interference with his duties, that was the more 
 reason for his instant dismissal. In Mahmoud's reign of 
 twenty -four years there were sixteen Grand Viziers. In 
 any case, it must be admitted that the success of Mahmoud's 
 reign, such as it was, and the continuity of policy, were 
 mainly due to this aged eunuch. 
 
 In the first few weeks of the new Sultan's reign the 
 supreme power of the State was practically in the hands 
 of the rebel Janissaries, under the leadership of Patrona 
 and Massuli, who were soldiers in their ranks. These men 
 soon made themselves intolerable by their insolence and 
 bravado. Patrona installed his concubine in one of the 
 Sultan's palaces, and when she gave birth to a child there, 
 insisted on the Sultana Valide treating her with all the
 
 2o6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 courtesies due to royalty. He insisted also on the appoint- 
 ment as Hospodar of Moldavia of his personal friend, a 
 Greek butcher named Yanaki, who had lent him money. 
 The bolder men about the Sultan determined to get rid 
 of these men. The Janissaries and other soldiers who had 
 joined in the deposition of Achmet were brought to a 
 better frame of mind by large distributions of money. 
 They promised to obey their officers, on condition that no 
 punishment should be awarded to them for their part in 
 the rebellion. Patrona and Massuli and twenty -one of 
 their leading adherents were then summoned to a meeting 
 of ministers at the palace, and were massacred there in 
 presence of the Sultan himself. Within three days seven 
 thousand of the rebellious Janissaries were put to death. 
 
 Pacification having thus been effected at the capital, 
 attention was turned to Persia, where, as has been pointed 
 out, a partition treaty with Russia had assigned a large part 
 of that kingdom to the Porte, but the possession of which 
 had not yet been obtained. In the meantime a brigand 
 chief, Nadir, later to become world-famous as the invader 
 of India, had taken service under Tahmasp, the son of 
 the dethroned Hussein. Nadir succeeded in driving tiie 
 Afghans out of Persia and reinstating Tahmasp as Shah. 
 He proceeded, however, to usurp the power of that feeble 
 monarch, and eventually got himself accepted as Shah in 
 place of Tahmasp. He declared war against the Turks in 
 1 7 33 "5 and, after defeating them in several engagements, 
 compelled them to sue for terms of peace. The Porte was 
 the more ready to accede to terms as war with Russia was 
 imminent. A treaty of peace was therefore agreed to with 
 Nadir in 1735, under which all the provinces which were 
 the subject of the partition treaty with Russia were restored 
 to Persia. Russia also, in prospect of war with Turkey, 
 came to terms with Nadir, and surrendered nearly all the 
 territory which had been acquired under the partition treaty 
 with Turkey. 
 
 Peter the Great had died in 1727, and in 1730 was 
 succeeded by the Empress Anne, a clever and ambitious 
 woman. She was incited to war with Turkey by Marshal 
 Munnich, the ablest general whom Russia so far had pro- 
 duced. He promised to drive the Turks out of Europe. At 
 Constantinople the eunuch Bashir was in favour of a policy 
 of peace. He was over seventy years of age and wished
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE 207 
 
 to end his days in repose. He resisted as far as he could 
 every attempt to draw the Sultan into war. The French 
 Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, was 
 most anxious to embroil Turkey with Austria. The two 
 maritime Powers, however — Great Britain and Holland — 
 pulled in the opposite direction, and peace was maintained 
 as long as possible. But when, in 1735, the Russians, 
 though nominally at peace with Turkey, captured two 
 fortresses in the neighbourhood of Azoff and threatened 
 that most important outpost of the Empire, the Porte 
 declared war. A Russian army of fifty-four thousand men, 
 under command of Marshal ]\Iunnich, then invaded the 
 Crimea. They stormed and broke through the fortified 
 lines of Perekop at the isthmus of that name, joining the 
 Crimea to the mainland, hitherto thought to be impreg- 
 nable. They captured the city of Perekop, and then over- 
 ran the whole of the Crimea, devastating it and massacring 
 its inhabitants by thousands. The Russian army, however, 
 suffered g'reatly from exhaustion and disease in the cam- 
 paign, and it eventually withdrew from the Crimea before 
 the winter. Another Russian force, under General Leontiew, 
 captured Kilburn, and a third, under General Lascy, an 
 Irishman by birth, attacked and captured the city of Azoff. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian diplomatists discovered that the 
 Emperor of Austria, Charles VI, was quite as anxious as 
 the Czarina Anne to possess himself of Turkish provinces, 
 and was ready to enter into a coalition for the purpose. 
 In the winter of 1736-7 a secret treaty for this purpose 
 was entered into between the two potentates. But as it 
 was not thought expedient by the .\ustrians to commence 
 their attack until all their preparations for it were com- 
 pleted, a pretence was made of negotiations with the Porte, 
 who had made overtures of peace to the Russians. For 
 this purpose a Congress Avas held at Nimirof early in I737- 
 Later it became known that the negotiations on the part 
 of the two allied Empires were illusory, and that there 
 never was any intention to' come to terms. The Porte, 
 on its part, was extremely anxious for peace, and was 
 ready to make large concessions, but the terms suggested 
 on behalf of Russia were so extortionate that it was quite 
 impossible for the Sultan and his ministers to entertain 
 them. The Russians demanded the cession of the 
 Crimea, the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia
 
 2o8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 under a native prince, subject to the supremacy of 
 Russia, the opening of the Black Sea and access to 
 it through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russian 
 vessels of war, and the payment of fourteen millions 
 of roubles. Austria, on its part, demanded the cession 
 of the whole of Bosnia and Serbia. Such terms could only 
 be assented to by the Porte after complete and disastrous 
 defeat. They were indignantly rejected, and, much 
 against the wish of the Porte, the Congress came to an 
 end, and the Sultan was forced to take up arms in defence 
 of his Empire. 
 
 A Russian army of seventy thousand men, under Marshal 
 Munnich, opened the campaign of 1737 by an attack on 
 Oczakofif, the most important of the Ottoman fortresses 
 on the northern shores of the Black Sea, and General 
 Lascy, with forty thousand men, again invaded the Crimea. 
 Oczakofif was vigorously defended by twenty thousand 
 Turks. After some days of siege the principal powder 
 magazine in the fortress blew up, causing enormous destruc- 
 tion and loss of life. The Turkish general, dismayed by 
 this, capitulated on favourable terms. But this did not 
 prevent the massacre of the greater part of the garrison, 
 and only three thousand of them survived. The losses of 
 the Russians, chiefly by disease, were also very great, and 
 nothing more was done by Munnich in this year's cam- 
 paign. Meanwhile Lascy in the Crimea had repeated the 
 operation of Munnich of the previous year, and eventually 
 retreated from it. 
 
 The Austrians, on their part, invaded Bosnia and Serbia 
 with two armies. The principal one, under General 
 Seckendorf, attacked and captured Nisch and, later, Widdin. 
 But this exhausted their efforts for the year, and most of 
 their army perished from disease in the marshes of the 
 Danube . 
 
 The campaign of 1738 was little more decisive. The 
 Ottomans, with revived courage, took the offensive, and, 
 advancing into Hungary, under Grand Vizier Yegen 
 Mohammed, captured Semendria and Orsova. The 
 Austrians fell back on Belgrade. General Lascy again, 
 for a third time, invaded the Crimea, but the country had 
 been so devastated by the two previous invasions that he 
 could find no means there of feeding his army, and he 
 was soon compelled to vyithdraw, In the winter great
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE 209 
 
 efforts were made by the Porte to arrive at terms of 
 peace, and it wa^ willing to make great sacrifices. But 
 Marshal Munnich vehemently opposed all peace proposals 
 at the Russian Court. He was still inflamed with the 
 desire to invade Turkey and to capture Constantinople. 
 At his instance emissaries were sent into the European 
 provinces of the Ottoman Empire to incite the Christian 
 rayas to rise in arms against their masters and oppressors 
 — the first instance of the kind. 
 
 On the opening of the campaign of 1739 Munnich led 
 his army through Podolia, a province then belonging to 
 Poland, whose neutrality he violated. He spread desola- 
 tion along his march, as though he were passing through 
 an enemy's country. He crossed the frontier of Moldavia 
 and defeated a Turkish army at Khoczim, and then advanced 
 to Jassy, the capital of thcprovince, and captured it. 
 
 Meanwhile the Austrians renewed their attack on Serbia 
 and Bosnia under two new generals, Wallis and Niepperg. 
 An army of fifty-six thousand Austrians issued from Peter- 
 wardein and marched southwards, apparently in total 
 ignorance of the strength of the Turkish army which was 
 advancing to meet them. By great efforts the Porte had 
 raised and equipped an army of two hundred thousand 
 men, under the Grand Vizier Elhadji Mohammed. It 
 met the Austrian army at Krotzka, half-way between 
 Semendria and Peterwardein . The Austrians were de- 
 feated, as was to be expected, in view of the enormous 
 disparity of the two armies. They fell back again on 
 Belgrade. The Ottomans followed up their victory and 
 commenced a bombardment of Belgrade. 
 
 Nothing could exceed the imbecility and infatuation of 
 the Austrian generals, Wallis and Niepperg. They were 
 now as anxious to make peace as they had been boastful 
 and bellicose at the commencement of the campaign. The 
 French Ambassador, Villeneuve, was with the Turkish 
 army. His mediation was accepted by the Austrians, and 
 terms of peace were agreed to, without consultation with 
 the Russian generals. Belgrade and all the parts of Serbia 
 and Bosnia which had been ceded to Austria by the treaty 
 of Passarowitch and a great part of Wallachia were restored 
 to the Ottoman Empire. The victory of the Ottomans 
 at Krotzka and, still more, the treaty of Belgrade 'which 
 followed, caused dismay and indignation to the victorious 
 
 14
 
 210 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Russians in Moldavia. It was obviously impossible for 
 their army at Jassy to make any further advance into 
 Turkey, or even to hold its own in Moldavia, when an 
 Ottoman army of two hundred thousand, fresh from victory 
 over the Austrians, was on their flank on the Danube. 
 Munnich's grandiose scheme for the capture of Constan- 
 tinople was extinguished. It became necessary for the 
 Czarina to follow the example of the Austrians and to 
 make peace with the Turks. Terms were ultimately 
 agreed to, under which the Russian conquests in Moldavia 
 and the Crimea and the city of Oczakoff were given up. 
 Russia retained only a narrow strip of land on the shores 
 of the Black Sea. The city of Azoff was to be demolished 
 and its territory was to form a belt of borderland, unculti- 
 vated and desert, between the two Empires. The Russians 
 were prohibited from maintaining a fleet either in the Black 
 Sea or the Sea of Azoff. 
 
 The two treaties, as a result of the campaign of 1739, 
 were a triumph for Turkey. They were more due to the 
 imbecility and incapacity of the Austrian generals than to 
 the valour of the Ottomans, for it was no great feat of 
 arms for two hundred thousand Turks to defeat fifty-seven 
 thousand Austrians at the battle of Krotzka. But the 
 strategy of the Porte in concentrating their main force 
 against the Austrians on the Danube, while making little 
 resistance to the Russians in Moldavia, was fully justified.
 
 XVI 
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINxVRDJI 
 
 1739-74 
 
 The campaign, and the resulting treaty of Belgrade, saved 
 the Ottoman Empire from further shrinkage for many years. 
 There followed a long period of peace. This was due not 
 merely to the fact that the Po-rte pursued a policy of 
 peace, but because the two great Powers in Europe, Russia 
 and Austria, who were bent on the dismemberment of 
 Turkey, were not in a condition to prosecute their aims, 
 and were not able to enter into any combination for tliie 
 purpose. In 1740 the Emperor Charles VI died. This 
 event led to a scramble among the neighbouring Powers 
 for his inheritance, and to the war known as that of the 
 Austrian Succession, which was brought to an end by the 
 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. This was followed 
 later again by another war, known as the Seven Years 
 War, which was concluded in 1763. In neither of these 
 great wars did the Porte take any part, and it is to its credit 
 that it did not take advantage of them to attempt the 
 recovery from Austria of any of its lost dominions in 
 Hungary. Till war broke out with Russia in 1768 there 
 was profound peace. 
 
 Sultan Mahmoud died in 1754 and was succeeded by his 
 brother, Othman II, who reigned for three years only. He 
 was deformed — a. hunchback. He does not appear to have 
 made any change in the foreign policy of his government. 
 In his three years of reign there were six Grand Viziers, and 
 it seems probable that the real power of the State was exer- 
 cised by the successor to the Kislaraga Bashir, from behind 
 the curtain of the harem. 
 
 Mustapha III succeeded his brother at the age of fifty. 
 He had spent his life up to this time in seclusion, in the
 
 112 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Cage of the Seraglio, cut off from all contact with, or evert 
 knowledge of, public affairs. For the first six years of 
 his reign he left matters very much in the hands of his 
 Grand Vizier, Raghab Pasha, the last of the many who had 
 filled this post under Mahmoud. Raghab proved to be 
 a most wise and competent statesman, not far behind Sokolli 
 and the Kiuprilis, and, hke them, devoted to a policy of 
 peace. 
 
 After the death of Raghab in 1763 Mustapha gradually 
 took into his own hands the reins of government. Though 
 well-intentioned and with a sense of public duty, he was 
 feeble, hasty, and impatient, and was wanting in the most 
 essential faculty of a ruler, that of selecting competent 
 men as generals and administrators. He abandoned thq 
 policy of peace and allowed himself to be drawn into war, 
 with the most unfortunate results to his Empire. It was 
 his misfortune that his reign coincided with those of two 
 .such able and unscrupulous neighbouring potentates as 
 Catherine 11 of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia. 
 
 The Empress Catherine was invested with supreme power 
 in Russia in the year 1762, in place of her worthless 
 husband, after a military revolt. At her instance, Russia 
 embarked on a policy of aggrandizement against both 
 Poland and Turkey. Frederick the Great also, who had 
 very recently favoured an alliance with the Porte with the 
 object of checking the advance of Russia, now reversed his 
 policy. In 1764 he made a treaty with the Russian Empress 
 reciprocally guaranteeing their possessions, and promising 
 assistance to one another, if the territories of either of 
 them were invaded. But if France were to attack Prussia, 
 or Turkey to attack Russia, assistance was to be given in 
 money. Very soon after this an agreement was arrived 
 at between these two Powers for the dismemberment of 
 Poland and the partition between them of part of its terri- 
 tory. The Empress of Austria, Maria Theresa, also, though 
 most unwillingly, became a partner in this scheme. The 
 Porte was much opposed to this Polish policy of the three 
 conspirators. It protested strongly but in vain against the 
 occupation of Poland by Russian and Prussian troops and 
 against all the infamous proceedings which led to the first 
 partition of Poland. The Russian Government made no 
 effort to avert war. On the contrary, it showed by many 
 actions a deliberate intention to drive the Turks into war.
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 213 
 
 It fomented and encouraged rebellion against the Sultan 
 in the Crimea, the Morea, Montenegro, and Georgia. It 
 violated the neutrality of Turkey by pursuing PoHsh refugees 
 across the frontier of Bessarabia into territory belonging 
 to the Khan of the Crimea, a vassal of the Sultan, and 
 destroying there the town of Balta. 
 
 At a Divan held at Constantinople in October 1768 it 
 was decided that Russia, by its proceedings against Poland, 
 had broken the treaty of Belgrade, and that war against 
 her would be just and necessary. The only opposition to 
 this came from the Grand Vizier, Mouhsinzade Pasha. He 
 did not, indeed, object in principle, but he maintained that 
 it was most unwise to declare war until full preparations 
 had been made for it. He pointed out that the frontier 
 fortresses were in a most unprepared state, and that as 
 military operations could only be commenced by the Turks 
 in the next spring, Russia would be placed in an advan- 
 tageous position by an immediate declaration of war. For 
 this advice, which the sequel fully justified, the Grand 
 Vizier was dismissed from his office. In his place Emen 
 Mahommed was appointed — a most incompetent man, know- 
 ing nothing about military matters, by his own admission. 
 As a result of this premature declaration of war, Russia 
 had full notice, and entered on the campaign of 1769 in 
 Moldavia before the Porte was ready to send an army to 
 defend that province. The Empress put into the field three 
 armies. The principal one, under command of Prince 
 Galitzin, invaded Moldavia and laid siege to Khoczim. It 
 was not till May 1769 that the Grand Vizier was in a 
 position to issue from his camp at Babatagli and march to 
 Isakdji, near Ismail. He there summoned his generals to 
 a council of war and opened the proceedings by an astound- 
 ing admission of incompetence. Asking for their opinion 
 as to what direction his army should be led, he said, " I 
 have no experience of war. It is for you to determine what 
 operation shall be undertaken and what are the most favour- 
 able chances for the army and the Sublime Porte. Speak 
 without hesitation and enlighten me by your counsel." 
 
 The generals were struck dumb with astonishment at 
 this confession of ignorance and impotence. Eventually a 
 discussion arose. There was great difference of opinion. 
 As a result, the only decision arrived at was to cross the 
 Danube into Moldavia, and then proceed as circumstances
 
 2 14 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 might suggest. In fact, there was no definite plan of 
 campaign. The army, in accordance with this, crossed the 
 Danube. It was then decided to march to the River Pruth. 
 It reached a point about halfway between Khoczim and 
 Jassy. But already it suffered greatly from want of food, 
 for which no preparations had been made. The soldiers 
 also were harassed by swarms of mosquitoes in the marshes 
 of the Danube and the Pruth. It was unable to prevent 
 the capture of Khoczim by the Russians. It was ultimately 
 forced to retreat before coming into serious contact with 
 the enemy, and it found its way back to the Danube ; and 
 thus concluded the campaign of 1769. 
 
 The Russians did little in the early part of 1770. Prince 
 GaUtzin was almost as imbecile and incompetent as the 
 Grand Vizier. The Empress recalled him and appointed 
 in his place General Romanzoff, a most able and determined 
 soldier. The Sultan, on his part, recalled Emen Pasha and 
 gave orders for his execution. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Empress Catherine was engaged in 
 carrying out another part of her ' Oriental project,' as 
 it was called. She had sent numerous emissaries disguised 
 as priests to various parts of Greece with the object of 
 stirring up rebellion against the Sultan. Under the belief 
 that a general rising would take place, she sent a great 
 fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean for the purpose 
 of giving support to the insurgents. It consisted of twelve 
 ships of the line, twelve frigates, and numerous transports 
 conveying a military force. The expedition was under 
 the supreme command of Alexis Orloff, the brother of her 
 then lover, who had led the military revolt which placed 
 her on the throne. He had expectations that a throne 
 would be found for himself at the expense of the Turks. 
 The fleet was under virtual, though not nominal, command 
 of an Englishman, Admiral Elphinstone, who was supported 
 by numerous other British officers. It was said that every 
 vessel in the fleet had one of these officers on board. This 
 must have been with the cognizance and approval of the 
 British Government, which at that time favoured the ag- 
 grandizement of Russia. This fleet left Cronstadt at the 
 end of 1769, and arrived off the coast of the Morea in 
 February 1770. It was welcomed by a large body of 
 insurgent Greeks (Mairotes) and a Russian force was landed. 
 The insurgents perpetrated the most atrocious acts of
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 215 
 
 cruelty on the comparatively few Turks resident in the 
 district. , 
 
 The ex -Grand Vizier, Mouhsinzade Pasha, now Governor 
 of the Alorea, showed great vigour. Collecting a force 
 of Albanians, he succeeded in defeating the insurgent 
 Greeks, fifteen thousand in number, and their Russian allies. 
 The Russians were compelled to re -embark in their fleet. 
 The Greeks who remained on shore were subjected to 
 ruthless slaughter, as were also the inhabitants of tlic 
 district. The whole countryside was devastated by the 
 Albanians. The Russian fleet, after ineffectual attempts 
 to capture Modon and Coron, sailed away. It came in 
 contact, off the island of Scios, with the Ottoman fleet, not 
 very unequal in number and size of vessels. A naval 
 battle took place on July 7, 1770, in which the Turks were 
 worsted. The defeat would have been the more serious 
 if it had not been for the extraordinary bravery of one of 
 their captains, Hassan of Algiers, who had gained ex- 
 perience as a corsair. Laying his vessel alongside of that 
 of the Russian admiral, he fought with the utmost despera- 
 tion till both vessels were blown up. 
 
 The defeated fleet sought refuge in the small harbour of 
 Tchesme, where it was blockaded by Admiral Elphinstone. 
 The British ofificers devised a scheme for destroying the 
 Turkish fleet. Lieutenant Dugdale volunteered to pilot a 
 fire-ship against them. Before coming to close quarters 
 the Russian sailors deserted the vessel, and Dugdale alone 
 remained on board. He steered the vessel against a 
 Turkish ship and set fire to it. The fire spread to the 
 other vessels, closely packed in tlie harbour, and the whole 
 of the Ottoman fleet was burnt and destroyed with the 
 exception of a single frigate. A more gallant and successful 
 attack has never been recorded in the annals of naval 
 warfare. 
 
 Elphinstone, who had fortunately escaped death — as did 
 also Hassan the Algerian, when their warships were blown 
 up in the recent naval battle — then advised that the Russian 
 fleet should sail without delay to the Dardanelles and force 
 its way through the Straits to the Sea of Marmora and 
 Constantinople. But Orloff hesitated and delayed, with 
 the result that the Turks, getting wind of the intention, 
 hastily erected four batteries at the Dardanelles, two on 
 either side of it, crossing their fire. These were sufficient
 
 21 6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to make it impossible for the Russian fleet to force its 
 way through the Straits. 
 
 Orlofi" and the Russian fleet then proceeded to the island 
 of Lemnos, where it landed troops and besieged the chief 
 fortress. It was evidently hoped to secure a base for 
 the fleet in the yEgean Sea. After sixty days of siege the 
 garrison gave in, and terms of capitulation were agreed upon 
 with Orloff. In the meantime, however, Hassan had per- 
 suaded the Porte to allow him to make a desperate effort 
 to save Lemnos. He enlisted four thousand ruffians at 
 Constantinople for this purpose. When it was pointed out 
 what a hazardous enterprise it was, the reply was that it 
 mattered little whether it was successful or not. If success- 
 ful, Lemnos would be saved ; if unsuccessful, Constantinople 
 would be rid for ever of four thousand of its greatest 
 blackguards. Hassan landed unexpectedly in Lemnos, and, 
 declining to recognize the capitulation, attacked the Russians 
 and defeated them, and compelled them to take to their 
 ships again. 
 
 Hassan, after this successful exploit, was made Capitan 
 Pasha of the Ottoman navy. He managed to collect together 
 another fleet, and engaged the Russian fleet again off 
 Mondreso. Both fleets claimed victory, but it would seem 
 that the Russians had the worst of it, for they sheered off 
 and left these waters. When next heard of, the Russian 
 fleet was engaged in giving support to Ali Bey, the head of 
 the Mamelukes of Egypt, who had risen in rebellion against 
 the Turkish pasha there, and who was now invading Syria. 
 Orloff landed four hundred soldiers in Syria in support of 
 this rebel. But Ali Bey soon found himself in difficulties. 
 An outbreak took place in his own army against him, 
 fomented by his brother-in-law. Ali Bey was defeated and 
 put to death, and the four hundred Russians were slain in 
 battle. The Porte for a time recovered its hold on 
 Egypt. 
 
 The story of Orloff's expedition has been told as it is 
 a good illustration of the use of a naval force which can 
 command the sea in a war of this kind, and of its inabili^ty 
 to undertake operations on land, or to force its way against 
 land batteries, unless supported by an adequate army. 
 Orloff's fleet remained in the east of the Mediterranean till 
 the close of the war in 1773, but it did not effect anything 
 of importance.
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 217 
 
 Reverting to the military operations on the Danube, 
 the autumn campaign of 1770 was very unfavourable to 
 the Ottoman cause. Khalil Pasha, who was now in com- 
 mand, proved himself to be no more competent than his 
 predecessor. Romanzoff, in command of the Russian army, 
 overran the whole of Moldavia. Khalil led thirty thousand 
 efficient soldiers and a host of Tartar irregulars against 
 him. The two armies came in contact at Karkal, where 
 Khalil entrenched himself in front of the Russians, while bis 
 Tartars ravaged the country behind them and threatened 
 their communications. Romanzofif then stormed the Turkish 
 line. The Turks fled in panic. Their camp and guns and 
 immense stores fell into the hands of the Russians. The 
 surviving Turks recrossed the Danube. At the close of 
 the campaign of 1770 all the Turkish fortresses north of 
 the Danube were in the hands of the Russians. The Grand 
 Vizier's army was practically destroyed. Only two thousand 
 men were left to him under arms. 
 
 In the following year, 1771, still greater disasters 
 attended the Turks. Prince Dolgorouki, at the head of 
 eighty thousand Russians and sixty thousand irregular Tar- 
 tars, invaded the Crimea after storming successfully the lines 
 of Perekop. The whole province was overrun. Kertch 
 and Yenikale were captured. Wallachia and Moldavia 
 successively fell into the hands of the Russians. Khoczim 
 and Jassy were captured. The only gleams of success to the 
 Turks in this campaign were the recovery of Giurgevo 
 on the Danube and the successful defence of Oczakoff and 
 Kilburn on the shores of the Black Sea. In the Caucasus 
 the Russians were also successful and drove the Turks from 
 Georgia and Mingrelia. 
 
 These repeated successes of the Russians began to cause 
 alarm to Austria and Prussia, who by no means wished 
 for the undue aggrandizement of their neighbour. They 
 therefore attempted negotiations with Russia for mediation 
 on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. But the Empress 
 Catherine obstinately resisted anything in the way of 
 interference by other Powers, and made it known to the 
 Sultan that terms of peace must be settled with herself 
 alone. In his desperation the Sultan proposed to Austria 
 a joint partition of Poland as a bribe for assistance against 
 Russia, oblivious of the fact that he had entered upon war 
 with Russia on behalf of Poland. The offer was declined
 
 21 8 THE TURKISH P:MPIRE 
 
 by the Emperor, not because he had any objection to a 
 scheme of plunder, but because he did not consider tlie 
 Porte to be in a position to become an effective partner in 
 such a scheme. As a matter of fact, Austria, Russia, and 
 Prussia were continually negotiating schemes for the dis- 
 memberment either of Poland or Turkey, as might be most 
 convenient to them. 
 
 At the end of the campaign of 1771 an armistice was 
 agreed to between Russia and the Porte, and the greater part 
 of the following year was occupied in discussing terms of 
 peace at a conference or congress at Bucharest. An ultima- 
 tum was eventually presented by Russia, embodying terms of 
 what might seem to be a very moderate character, in view 
 of the great success of her armies and the extent of territories 
 which they had practically conquered. The Sultan himself 
 and his Grand Vizier and principal ministers and generals 
 were in favour of accepting the terms as offered, but the 
 Mufti and the whole body of the ulemas were vehemently 
 opposed to them. The Divan therefore rejected them 
 and war was renewed. As these terms did not sub- 
 stantially differ from those which were accepted two 
 years later, it is not worth while at this stage to explain 
 them. 
 
 Meanwhile there had been for more than a year a sus- 
 pension of hostilities, and a breathing time had been afforded 
 to the Porte, during which strenuous efforts were made for 
 another campaign. At the end of 1772, Mouhsinzade 
 Pasha, who had so distinguished himself in the defence 
 of the Morea, was again appointed Grand Vizier. He 
 infused new vigour into the army. In the spring of 1773, 
 when the negotiations at Bucharest were brought to a con- 
 clusion, hostilities were recommenced. The campaign in 
 Europe, in this year, was confined within the quadrilateral 
 formed by the fortresses in Silistria and Rustchuk on the 
 Danube, the city of Varna on the Black Sea, and the great 
 fortress of Schumla to the north of the Balkan range. 
 There were several engagements between divisions of the 
 two armies in this district, in which the Turks were generally 
 worsted, but these victories were not of much avail to the 
 Russians so long as the three great fortresses of Silistria, 
 Varna, and Schumla remained in the hands of the 
 Turks. 
 
 The two main features of the campaign were the success-
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 219 
 
 ful defences by the Turks of Silistria and Varna against 
 overwhelming forces of Russians. General Romanzoff 
 crossed the Danube early in the year near Silistria. He 
 defeated a Turkish division and compelled it to retreat to 
 that fortress, vi^here it added to its garrison. Romanzofif then 
 laid siege to it. His army stormed the outer defences 
 with the utmost vigour and succeeded in forcing them. 
 But their difficulties only then commenced. The Turks, 
 under command of Osman Pasha, maintained an heroic 
 resistance. The whole male population turned out in aid 
 of the army. They fought the advance of the Russians 
 street by street. In the end the Russians were compelled 
 to retreat, after the loss of eight thousand men. Later, 
 Romanzoff inflicted a severe defeat on the Turks at Korason. 
 This opened the way to Varna. But here again a success- 
 ful defence was offered by the Turkish garrison, supported 
 by the seamen of the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea. 
 This was the closing scene of the campaign of 1773. Sultan 
 Mustapha died towards the close of this year, and was 
 succeeded by his brother, Abdul Hamid, who had been 
 secluded in the Cage for forty -eight years. As was to 
 be expected, he showed no capacity for the position to 
 which he was now at last called. He was, however, favour- 
 able to peace, as was also Mouhsinzade, who was maintained 
 as Grand Vizier. 
 
 At the commencement of the campaign of 1774 the 
 Grand Vizier issued from his camp at Schumla with twenty - 
 live thousand men, with the intention of taking the offensive 
 and attacking the Russians at Hirsova, on the Danube. 
 The Russian forces in that district were under command of 
 Suwarrow, who now and later was to show himself the 
 greatest general Russia had as yet produced. He did not 
 wait to be attacked by the Turks. He advanced from 
 Hirsova and met the Grand Vizier's army at Kostlidji, 
 where he gained an overwhelming victory. The Turkish 
 camp and all its guns and stores were captured. The 
 defeated army dispersed, and the Grand Vizier found himself 
 with only eight thousand men to defend Schumla. The 
 Russians manoeuvred so as to cut off the communications of 
 Schumla with the capital. Mouhsinzade thereupon asked 
 for an armistice. This was refused by the Russians, but 
 they were willing to discuss terms of peace. The assent 
 of the Porte was obtained by the Grand Vizier, and on
 
 2 20 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 July I 6, 1774, after seven hours only of discussion between 
 plenipotentiaries at the village of Kainardji, a treaty of 
 peace was agreed to. 
 
 The terms were almost identical with those which had 
 been rejected by the Porte two years before, after the con- 
 ference at Bucharest. In view of the fact that the Ottoman 
 armies had been everywhere defeated during the war, and 
 that the Russians had obtained actual possession of the 
 Crimea, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia in Europe, 
 and of Georgia and Mingrelia in the Caucasus, the terms 
 were distinctly moderate. The Empress must have been 
 very desirous of peace. There was a serious rebellion of 
 her southern provinces. Affairs in Poland were causing 
 her great anxiety. Her losses in the war with Turkey 
 had been very great, though her victories were many. It 
 was all -important to her that her hands should be free. 
 These were doubtless adequate reasons for moderation in 
 her terms to Turkey. 
 
 Under this treaty Russia gave up nearly all the Turkish 
 territory occupied by her armies. The Crimea was not, 
 indeed, restored to the Turks. The independence of the 
 Tartars there and in Bessarabia up to the frontier of Poland 
 was recognized under a native prince, in whose election 
 Russia and Turkey were forbidden to interfere. Neither 
 Power was thenceforth to " intervene in the domestic, 
 political, civil, and internal affairs of this new State." There 
 was, however, a grave reservation pregnant of future 
 aggrandizement to Russia. She was to retain the fortresses 
 of Kertch, Yenikale, and the cities of Azoff and Kilburn. 
 These would necessarily give access to and virtual com- 
 mand over the Crimea to Russia at any future time. For 
 the present, however, the Crimea, though lost to the Turks, 
 was not acquired by Russia. It is probable that the ulemas 
 would not have assented to the transfer of a Moslem 
 province to a Christian Power, and that the war would 
 have been continued if Russia had insisted on this. 
 Oczakoff, on the opposite side of the Dnieper to Kilburn, 
 was retained by the Po^te. But the two Karbartas on the 
 shores of the Euxine, though inhabited by Moslems, were 
 retained by Russia. With these exceptions, all the Ottoman 
 territories in the hands of Russia as a result of the war— 
 Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Georgia, and Mingrelia — 
 were restored to the Sultan. In the case of Wallachia
 
 TO THE TREATY OF KAINARDJI 221 
 
 and Moldavia, this retrocession was subject to the con- 
 dition that free exercise of the Christian rehgion was to 
 be secured to their population, and that there was to be 
 humane and generous government there for the future. 
 The right of remonstrance in these respects was secured 
 to the ministers of Russia at Constantinople on behalf of 
 these provinces. 
 
 Another most important clause, full of danger for the 
 future to the Ottoman Empire, related to its Christian sub- 
 jects. " The Sublime Porte," it ran, " promises to protect 
 constantly the Christian religion and churches and allow 
 the ministers of Russia at Constantinople to make represen- 
 tation on their behalf." 
 
 This most important provision gave to Russia a preferen- 
 tial right of protection of the Christian rayas not conceded 
 to any other Christian Power. Provision also was made 
 for the full access of Russian subjects to the holy city of 
 Jerusalem. Free navigation was provided for Russian ships 
 on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, but nothing was 
 said as to a right of access through the Dardanelles and 
 Bosphorus. There was no mention of Poland in the treaty, 
 though it had been the original cause of the war. Two 
 secret clauses provided for the payment by the Porte of 
 four millions of roubles within three years and for the with- 
 drawal of the Russian fleet from the Archipelago. 
 
 The importance of this treaty, moderate though it was 
 in many of its terms, has always been recognized by his- 
 torians as the starting-point for further and greater dis- 
 memberments of the Turkish Empire. The treaty of Car- 
 lowitz had secured the deliverance of the Christian popu- 
 lation of Hungary from Ottoman rule. But this treaty now, 
 for the first time, tore from the Empire a Moslem province 
 and gave to Russia a right of intervention on behalf of 
 all the Christian population — an immense innov^ation, 
 humiliating to the Turks, and fraught with the gravest 
 peril to their Empire in the future. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the Grand Vizier was fully 
 authorized by the Porte to agree to the terms of this treaty. 
 He was, however, recalled and deposed immediately after 
 its signature, and he died from the effects of poison on his 
 way to Constantinople. It was probably thought by the 
 ministers of the Sultan that Mouhsinzade, if called to account 
 for concluding so humiliating a treaty, would be able to
 
 222 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 show their full responsibility for it. It remains only to 
 state that the Russian plenipotentiaries at Kainardji delayed 
 the signature of the treaty for four days in order that it 
 might synchronize with the anniversary of the treaty of the 
 Pruth, which had been the cause of so much humiliation to 
 Russia.
 
 XVII 
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY 
 1774-92 
 
 Eighteen years elapsed between the peace of Kainardji, 
 1774, and the treaty of Jassy, 1792, the next conspicuous 
 event in the downward course of the Ottoman Empire. 
 The first thirteen of these years were a period of external 
 peace to the Empire under the rule of Abdul Hamid I. 
 The country had been completely exhausted by the late 
 war with Russia, and the Sultan — or, rather, his ministers, 
 for he appears to have been little competent himself to 
 carry on the government — were strongly in favour of main- 
 taining peace, and did so in spite of great provocation 
 from the Empress Catherine. That able and unscrupulous 
 woman pursued her designs for the complete subjection of 
 the Crimea with relentless resolution and activity. It was an 
 essential condition of the peace of Kainardji that the Crimea 
 was to be an independent State under the rule of a native 
 Tartar prince. The breach of it, by the assumption of 
 sovereignty, direct or indirect, on the part of Russia, would 
 undoubtedly b^e a just cause of war to the Turks. The 
 Porte, however, was not in a position to take up a 
 challenge of the Empress. The knowledge of this was 
 doubtless the main motive for her proceedings during the 
 next few years. 
 
 The steps by which Catherine attained her object bore 
 a striking resemblance to those by which other annexa- 
 tions were carried into effect by Russia, and might well 
 have been predicted. A member of the princely Tartar 
 family of Gherai, Dewlet, was elected by the Tartars of 
 the Crimea as their Khan. The agents of Russia thereupon 
 supported the claims of a rival Gherai, Schahin. They 
 fomented disaffection and revolt against Dewlet. While
 
 12 \ THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 sedulously disclaiming any project of annexation, Catherine 
 then sent an army into the peninsula with the ostensible 
 purpose of restoring order. It compelled the abdication 
 of Dewlet and the election of her nominee, Schahin. This 
 prince, raised to the throne by Russian arms, found it 
 necessary to follow the advice of the Russian agent, and 
 soon made himself most unpopular with his subjects. A 
 revolt took place against him. He appealed to the Empress 
 for assistance. A Russian army again appeared in the 
 guise of pacificator. The Tartars who opposed were 
 slaughtered or driven from the country. Schahin was com- 
 pelled to resign his throne, and the Empress thereupon 
 proclaimed the annexation of the Crimea, with professions 
 of acting only for the benefit of its people and to save them 
 from misgovernment. The wretched tool Schahin was im- 
 prisoned for a time in Russia, and later was expelled the 
 country into Turkey, where he was speedily put to death. 
 The Porte was unable to undertake a war on behalf of the 
 independence of the Tartars, and in 1784 a new treaty was 
 made between the two Powers, recognizing the sovereignty 
 of Russia over the Crimea and a district along the north 
 of the Euxine inhabited by Tartars. 
 
 Later, there were many indications of the intention of 
 Catherine to exploit her wider project of driving the Turks 
 from Europe. In 1779, when a second grandson was born 
 to her, the name of Constantine was given to him. Greek 
 women were provided for him as nurses, and he was taught 
 the Greek language. Everything was done to stimulate 
 the hope that there would be a revival of a Greek Empire 
 at Constantinople, in substitution for that of the Ottomans. 
 
 Meanwhile there was a succession of grave internal 
 troubles in Turkey, fomented in part by emissaries from 
 Russia. The brave old Hassan of Algiers, now Capitan 
 Pasha, who had the complete confidence of the Sultan, 
 was continually being called upon to put down revolts. 
 Thtis in 1776 he defeated the Sheik Jahir, who had revolted 
 in Syria. In 1778 he was engaged in expelhng from 
 the Morea the rebellious Albanians, who had been employed 
 against Orloff in his invasion of that province, and who, 
 after his defeat, had remained in the Morea, establishing 
 themselves in a lawless ascendancy there, oppressing, 
 plundering, and slaughtering Turks and Greeks alike with- 
 out discrimination. Hassan succeeded in defeating and
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY 225 
 
 expelling these wild ruffians. Later, Hassan was employed 
 in putting down a rebellion of the Mamelukes in Egypt. 
 He led an army there, and succeeded in restoring the 
 authority of the Sultan. In 1787 he was again recalled 
 to Constantinople, on the imminence of war with Russia, 
 and at the age of seventy -five was employed for la time 
 in command of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea and 
 later as commander-in-chief of the army. It will be seen 
 that for the first time in his life his good fortune deserted 
 him and that he met with seriou,s defeats. 
 
 It has already been shown that the Empress Catherine 
 was very provocative in her policy and action to Turkey. 
 In 1787 an agreement was arrived at between Catherine 
 and Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, for common action 
 against the Turks, and with the deliberate intention of 
 driving them from Europe. A partition was to be made of 
 their European provinces between the two Powers and a 
 Greek Empire was to be set mp at Constantinople. 
 
 The Empress ma,de a triu,mphal progress through the 
 Crimea, under the auspices of her favourite and paramour, 
 Prince Potemkin, to whose efforts its annexation had been 
 mainly due. The Emperor Joseph met her on the way 
 there at Kherson, and hatched with her a scheme of war 
 with Turkey. A triumphal arch was erected, with the 
 inscription, " This is the way to Byzantium." Emissaries 
 were sent to stir up rebellion in Wallachia and Moldavia. 
 Claims were raised officially against Turkey for the 
 province of Bessarabia and the fortress of Oczakoff, on 
 the ground that they had formerly been part of the domains 
 of the Khans of the Crimea. These claims greatly irritated 
 the Turks. The few years of peace had renovated them. 
 They were now ambitious of recovering the city of Kilburn, 
 and even had hopes of regaining the Crimea. Popular 
 feeling was aroused, and at the instance of the Divan, 
 and without waiting to make preparations for the defence 
 of the frontier fortresses, the Sultan declared war against 
 Russia on August 15, 1787. 
 
 A large force was then sent by the Porte to Oczakoff, the 
 fortress on the embouchure of the Dniester, with the inten- 
 tion of attacking Kilburn on the opposite side. A fleet 
 was sent, under Hassan, to co-operate with it, and to 
 convey the army across the river to Kilburn. Unfortu- 
 nately for the Turks, the Russian force at Kilburn was 
 
 IS
 
 226 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 under the command of Suvvarrow, a military genius of the 
 first rank. He allowed the larger half of the Turkish 
 army to be conveyed across the river and then attacked it 
 by land, while a flotilla of gunboats from Nicholaif engaged 
 the Turkish fleet. This strategy was completely success- 
 ful. The Ottoman force of eight thousand men landed 
 on the Kilbum side was overwhelmed and slaughtered. 
 Nearly the whole of Hassan's fleet was destroyed. The 
 attack on Kilbum was completely defeated. 
 
 Nothing more was effected by either of the two com- 
 batants in 1787. At the beginning of the next ,year, 
 1788, the Emperor of Austria, on February loth, declared 
 war against Turkey without any provocation. He had been 
 delayed fulfilling his agreement with Catherine by dis- 
 turbances in his own dominions. He was now free to 
 carry out his undertaking. The Turks, therefore, found 
 themselves confronted by two formidable enemies. Fortu- 
 nately for them, Russia was prevented putting forth its 
 full strength in the south, in consequence of war having 
 broken out with Sweden. The Empress was unable on 
 this account to carry out her engagement with the Emperor 
 to send an army into Moldavia in support of that of the 
 Austrians. Nor was she able to send a fleet into the JEgean 
 Sea, as had been promised. But Joseph took command 
 himself of an army of two hundred thousand men with 
 which to attack the Turks. He soon proved himself to 
 be the most incompetent of generals. The only defeat he 
 was able to inflict was upon his own soldiers, under circum- 
 stances unprecedented in war. 
 
 The Turks, when they found that there was no danger 
 of any advance on the part of the Russians, sent a great 
 army across the Danube, which encountered and defeated 
 an Austrian army, under Wartersleben, at Mendia. Joseph 
 then marched to relieve this defeated force and to protect 
 Hungary. He took up a position with eighty thousand men 
 at Slatina, within easy reach of the Grand Vizier's army. 
 At the last moment, when all the preparations had been 
 made to attack the Ottomans, the Emperor took alarm. 
 He abandoned his project of attack, and retreated in the 
 direction of Temesvar. The retreat was begun at mid- 
 night. Great confusion took place. An alarm was spread 
 that the Turks were close at hand and were about to 
 attack. The wildest panic occurred. The Austrian artillery
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY 227, 
 
 was driven at full speed in retreat. The infantry mistook 
 them for the enemy. They formed themselves into 
 small squares for defence, and began to fire wildly in all 
 directions. In the early morning, when the sun rose, it 
 was discovered that these squares had been firing into one 
 another, with the result that ten thousand men were liors 
 cle combat. The Turks now came up and made a real 
 attack. They defeated the Austrians and captured a great 
 part of their artillery and baggage. No other engagement 
 took place in this direction in the course of this year. 
 The Emperor lost thirty thousand men in his attempted 
 manoeuvre and forty thousand by disease. He never again 
 ventured to command an army. 
 
 Little was attempted in 1788 by the Russians till August, 
 when Potemkin found himself in a position to invest 
 Oczakoff. The siege was protracted till December, when 
 Suwarrow was called in to assist. Under his spirited advice, 
 an assault was made on the fortress, and, in spite of 
 enormous losses, the Russians overcame all opposition and 
 entered the city. A frightful scene of carnage then 
 occurred. The city was given over to the Russian soldiers. 
 Of a population of forty thousand only a few hundreds 
 escaped death, and twenty thousand of the garrison were 
 slaughtered. In spite of this great loss, the campaign of 
 1788 had not been altogether to the detriment of the 
 Turks. Though they lost Oczakofi", and all hopes of re- 
 covering Kilburn and the Crimea had vanished, they had 
 successfully resisted Austria. Joseph's attack had ignomini- 
 ously failed. 
 
 The campaign of the following year was far more 
 disastrous to the Turks. Early in 1789 Sultan Abdul 
 Hamid died, and was succeeded by his nephew, Selim III, 
 a young man of twenty-seven, of vigour and public spirit. 
 He had not been subjected by his uncle, Abdul Hamid, to 
 the debasing seclusion which had for so long been the 
 fate of heirs to the throne. He had been allowed much 
 freedom. His father, Mustaplia, had left him a memoir, 
 pointing out the dangers of the State, and advising ex- 
 tensive reforms, and the young man had deeply studied 
 this. He was fully conscious of the necessity for 
 radical changes, and though he very wisely did not attempt 
 to lead his troope in the field, he spared no effort to 
 improve the condition of the army and to sthnulata ithe
 
 228 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 warlike zeal of his subjects. He sent the immense accumu- 
 lation of plate in his palace to the Mint, and he persuaded 
 the ladies of the harem to give up their jewellery in aid 
 of the treasury. He was ardently in favour of reforms in 
 all directions. He deserved a better fate than was in 
 store for him. It will be seen that his reign was one of 
 most bitter reverses . 
 
 Unfortunately for the Turks, ill -health prevented the 
 Emperor Joseph from again taking the field in command 
 of the Austrian army. He was replaced by Marshal 
 Loudon — ^a veteran of the Seven Years War, a Scotsman 
 by race, who had risen from the ranks and had deservedly 
 won great reputation. It was said of him that he " made 
 war like a gentleman." He was noted for his quick 
 decision on the field of battle, and though over seventy-five 
 was still in full vigour. A new spirit was infused into 
 the Austrian army. A part of it under Marshal Loudon 
 invaded Bosnia and Serbia, where it met with brilliant 
 success. In Bosnia it was stoutly resisted by the Moslem 
 population. In Serbia it met with cordial co-operation 
 of the rayas, who detested their Moslem oppressors. The 
 greater part of these two provinces was occupied. Another 
 Austrian army, under the Prince of Coburg, was directed 
 to Moldavia to act in concert with the Russian army, 
 under Suvvarrow. The Sultan, on his part, appointed 
 Hassan as Grand Vizier and commander-in-chief of the 
 army. Hassan was not equal to the task of confronting such 
 a general as Suwarrow. He advanced with a large army 
 against Coburg, who was stationed at Fokshani, on the 
 frontier of Moldavia. Coburg would have been over- 
 whelmed by the superior force of the Turks had it not 
 been for the wonderful activity of Suwarrow, who marched 
 sixty miles through a difficult and mountainous country in 
 thirty -six hours to relieve the Austrians. Suwarrow, imme- 
 diately on arrival, late in the afternoon, made preparations 
 for attacking the Ottoman army. Two hours before day- 
 light the next day he assaulted the fortified camp of the 
 Turks. Never was a bold course more completely justified. 
 The camp was carried by the Russians with the bayonet. 
 The Turks lost all their artillery and immense stores. 
 Another great army was sent by Selim and was also utterly 
 defeated by Suwarrow on the River Rimnik in September 
 of the same year. '
 
 TO THE TREATY OF. JASSY '229 
 
 These two serious defeats caused panic at Constantinople. 
 To allay this the Sultan, to his infinite discredit, gave 
 orders for the execution of the brave old Hassan — ^the 
 victor in so many battles, whose advice for the better 
 training of the Janissaries had been cruelly neglected. But 
 it was the habit of the Turks to attribute every defeat 
 to the treason of the general and to put him to death, 
 just as the Convention at Paris, during the revolutionary 
 wars, sent to the guillotine the generals who failed — not, 
 it must be admitted, without some result in stimulating 
 others to better efforts. 
 
 Farther to the west, Belgrade and Semendria were 
 captured by the Austrians in this campaign of 1789. In 
 the following year the tide of victory on the part of the 
 Russians and Austrians was stayed by two events. The 
 one was that the Emperor Joseph found it necessary, in 
 consequence of outbreaks in almost every part of his own 
 dominions, caused by his hasty and ill-considered measures 
 of centralization, in defiance of all local customs, to hold 
 his hand against the Turks, and withdraw his conquering 
 armies in order to employ them in putting down revolution 
 at home. His death occurred early in 1790. Leopold, 
 who succeeded, a wise and sagacious ruler, the very opposite 
 to Joseph, reversed the policy of his brother. He did 
 not favour a Russian alliance against Turkey. 
 
 Another cause of Austria withdrawing from the war was 
 the entry into the field of politics in the east of Europe 
 of England, Prussia, and Holland. These Powers had 
 formed a close defensive alliance, and had already exer- 
 cised great influence by joint action. They had extinguished 
 French influence in Holland. They had intervened with 
 good effect between Russia and Sweden and had brought 
 about peace between them. They now proposed media- 
 tion between Austria and Turkey, not without threats of 
 stronger action. An armistice was agreed to between these 
 Powers. The death of Joseph greatly facilitated an 
 arrangement. Terms were agreed upon with the Turks, 
 and were ultimately embodied in the treaty of Sistova, 
 on the principle of the status quo before the war^ 
 under which all the territory which Austria had occupied 
 in Bosnia, Serbia, and Wallachia, including the fortresses 
 of Belgrade and Semendria, were given back to Turkey, 
 with the exception pf a smajl strip of land in Croatia ancl
 
 230 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the town of Old Orsova. The acquisitions by Austria 
 were of very small importance and made but a poor 
 return for the great effort put forth in the war. But the 
 new Emperor, Leopold, did not think that Austria had any- 
 thing to gain by the dismemberment of either Turkey or 
 Poland. Had he lived, subsequent events might have turned 
 out differently, and Poland, in all probability, would not 
 have been victimized. 
 
 The defection of Austria from the alliance with Russia 
 against the Turks was a very serious matter for the 
 Empress Catherine. It was balanced, however, in part, 
 by peace with Sweden, which enabled her to use her whole 
 force on land and sea against her remaining enemy. She 
 still adhered to the project of driving the Turks from 
 Europe, and reconstituting a Greek Empire at Constan- 
 tinople. She sent numerous emissaries to Greece to 
 persuade its people " to take up arms and co-operate with 
 her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the 
 countries they had usurped, and in regaining for the 
 Greeks their ancient liberty and independence." 
 
 Early in 1790 she received a deputation at St. Peters- 
 burg from some leading Greeks. They presented a 
 petition to her. 
 
 Wc have never [it said] asked for your treasure ; we do not ask for it 
 now ; we only ask for powder and shot, which we cannot purchase, and to 
 be led to battle. ... It is under j^our auspices that we hope to deliver 
 from the hands of barbaric Moslems an Empire which they have usurped, 
 to free the descendants of Athens and Lacedsnion from the tyrannous 
 yoke of ignorant savages — a nation whose genius is not extinguished, 
 which glows with the love of liberty, which the iron yoke of barbarism 
 has not destroyed. 
 
 The Empress, in reply, promised to give the assistance 
 they asked for. They were then presented to the young 
 Prince Constantine, who replied to them in the Greek 
 language : " Go, and let everything be done according 
 to your wishes." 
 
 The wealthier Greeks in the Levant had already fitted 
 out a squadron of thirteen frigates in support of their 
 cause. These were now, by order of the Empress, sup- 
 plied with guns at Trieste and were put under command 
 of a brave Greek admiral, Lambro Caviziani. This 
 squadron, when fitted out, made its way to the /Egean Sea,
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY '231 
 
 where it made its base in the Isle of Scios. The Turkish 
 fleet in those waters was at a low ebb. The best of the 
 Turkish vessels were being employed in the Black Sea. 
 But seven Algerine corsairs came to the assistance of the 
 Porte, and, in concert with some Turkish ships, fought a 
 naval battle with the Greek squadron and sank the whole 
 of its vessels. 
 
 The Russian army on land was more fortunate. Their 
 chief operation in 1790 was the capture of Ismail, a most 
 important fortress on the northern affluent of the Danube, 
 about forty miles from the Black Sea. So long as this 
 city was in the hands of the Turks an advance of an 
 invading army from Bessarabia into Bulgaria was hardly 
 possible. The fortress was defended by a very large 
 garrison. Suwarrow was again put at the head of a corps 
 d'armee by Potemkin, the commander-in-chief, with the 
 laconic order, " You will capture Ismail, whatever may 
 be the cost." Six days after his arrival before the 
 fortress, Suwarrow ordered his troops to assault it. Speak- 
 ing to them in his usual jocular manner, he said : " My 
 brothers, no quarter ; provisions are scarce." At a terrible 
 cost of life the city was taken by storm. A scene of 
 savage carnage ensued, unprecedented even in the experi- 
 ence of Suwarrow. Thirty-four thousand Turks perished. 
 Suwarrow admitted to a friend that he was moved to tears 
 when the scene was over. But he was accustomed to shed 
 these crocodile tears after horrors of this kind, when he 
 had made no effort to mitigate them. When news of the 
 achievement arrived at St. Petersburg, the Empress, at 
 her lev^e, addressing the British Ambassador, Sir C. Whit- 
 worth, said, with an ironic smile : "I hope that those who 
 wish to drive me out of St. Petersburg will allow me to 
 retire to Constantinople." 
 
 Meanwhile the allied maritime Powers — England, Prussia, 
 and Holland — having succeeded in their mediation between 
 Austria and Turkey, and in restoring peace between them, 
 on the basis of the status quo, were now engaged in 
 efforts of the same kind as between Russia and Turkey. 
 They offered mediation to the Empress Catherine in the 
 course of 1790. In a reply to the Prussian King, she 
 indignantly rejected intervention. " The Empress," she 
 said, " makes war and makes peace when she pleases. 
 She will not permit any interference whatever in th?
 
 '232' THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 management or government of her affairs." It was under- 
 stood, however, that she was not disinclined to peace upon 
 the terms that Oczakoff and the district between the Rivers 
 Dniester and Bug, which were in her full possession, were 
 to be retained by her, and that all other of her conquests 
 were to be restored to Turkey. The allied Powers were 
 unwilling to assent to this, and made preparations for an 
 armed mediation to compel Russia to restore Oczakoff to 
 Turkey . 
 
 In the case of Great Britain, the proposed intervention 
 on behalf of the Turks in support of their Empire was 
 a new departure in policy. Its Government had been 
 closely allied with that of Russia during the greater part 
 of the eighteenth century. Its policy had been mainly 
 determined by jealousy of France. It looked upon Russia 
 as a counterpoise to that State. It had never raised any 
 objection to the ambitious projects of Russia against 
 Turkey. Lord Chatham, whose foreign policy had pre- 
 vailed till now, had always held that it was not the 
 interest of England to enter into a connection with the 
 Turks. England had looked on with indifference in 1784, 
 when the Empress Catherine had taken possession of the 
 Crimea. Charles Fox was at that time Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs in England, and he showed himself as much in 
 favour of Russia as Chatham had been. " My system 
 of foreign politics," he wrote, " is deeply rooted. Alliance 
 with the northern Powers (including Russia) ever has 
 been and ever will be the system of every enlightened 
 Englishman." It was an entirely new departure when the 
 younger Pitt, in 1790, entered the lists in alliance with 
 Prussia against Russia in order to restore and maintain 
 the balance of power in the south-east of Europe in favour 
 of Turkey. 
 
 The British Government renewed its offer of mediation. 
 Its Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to inform 
 the Empress that if she would accept a peace on the basis 
 of the status quo, England would use her influence to 
 obtain from the Turks a formal renunciation of their claims 
 to the Crimea under the guarantee of the allies. The 
 Empress, in her reply through her minister, expressed her 
 indignation at the unparalleled conduct of the allies in 
 attempting to dictate in so arbitrary a manner to a sovereign 
 perfectly independent, and in want of no assistance to
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY '233 
 
 procure the conditions which seemed to her best suited 
 to satisfy her honour. Rather than diminish the glory of 
 a long and illustrious reign, the Empress was ready to 
 encounter any risk, and she would only accept the good 
 offices of the King of England " inasmuch as they may 
 lead to preserve for her the indemnification she requires 
 of Oczakoff and its district." ' 
 
 The reply was important, for it showed that Russia was, 
 at all events, willing to bring the war to an end and to 
 forgo its intention of driving the Turks out of Europe, 
 The fact was that, in spite of repeated victories, the Russian 
 losses in killed and wounded, and still more by disease, 
 were very serious. The Empress also had other troubles 
 on her hands. The Polish question, in Avhich she was 
 more interested than in that of Turkey, was imminent. 
 The Second Partition was decided on. It was necessary for 
 her to have a free hand. In spite of this, she was 
 determined not to yield possession of Oczakoff. 
 
 Meanwhile the British and Prussian Governments were 
 in consultation. They were agreed that they were bound 
 to insist upon the surrender of Oczakoff and its district, 
 and upon a peace based on the status quo before the 
 war. It was contended that, as Austria and Sweden had 
 both made peace on such terms, the allies could not with 
 honour demand less for the Turks, and that Turkey Avould 
 consider itself betrayed if the allies were willing to give 
 up those districts. 
 
 It was decided, therefore, by the allies to enforce by 
 arms their mediation on the basis of the status quo. The 
 British Government engaged to send a fleet of thirty -five 
 vessels of the line into the Baltic, and Prussia to march 
 an army into Livonia. It was agreed that neither Power 
 would look for any territorial acquisition, but would 
 only insist on greater security for the Porte in the 
 Black Sea. 
 
 In this view Mr. Pitt, on March 28, 1791, presented to 
 the House of Commons a message from the King asking 
 for the supply of means to augment the forces of the 
 Crown, He based his justification, says Mr. Lecky, who 
 has given a summary of Pitt's speech, mainly on the 
 interests of Prussia and the obligation of Great Britain 
 to defend her. 
 
 ' Whitvvorth to Leeds, January 10, 1781 ; Record Oflicc=
 
 '234 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Prussia [Pitt said], of all European Powers, is the one who would be 
 the most useful ally of England, and the events that were taking place 
 were very dangerous to her. The Turkish Empire is of great weight in 
 the general scale of European Powers, and if that Empire is diminished or 
 destroyed, or even rendered unstableor precarious, the situation of Prussia 
 would be seriously affected. . . . Could any one imagine that the 
 aggrandizement of Russia would not materially affect the disposition of 
 other Powers — that it might not produce an alteration in Poland highly 
 dangerous to Prussia ? ... If a powerful and ambitious neighbour 
 were suffered to establish herself upon the very frontier of Prussia, what 
 safety was there for Denmark, or what for Sweden when Prussia shall no 
 longer be in a position to help them ? The safety of all Europe might 
 afterwards be endangered. Whatever might be the result of the war in 
 which the Turks were now unhappily engaged, if its results were to 
 increase the power of Russia the effect would not be confined to the 
 two Powers alone ; it would be felt by the rest of Europe. 
 
 He asked for the means to equip a great fleet to be 
 sent to the Baltic and a smaller one for the Black Sea. 
 
 The proposal of Pitt for giving effect to this policy was 
 violently opposed by Charles Fox in a speech which pro- 
 duced a very great effect in the House of Commons and 
 on the coimtry. 
 
 The insistence [he said] on the surrender by Russia of Oczakoff and its 
 district was in the highest degree unjust and impolitic. It was unjust 
 because Russia had not been the aggressor in the war and because, in 
 spite of her great successes, she had consented to concessions which 
 displayed her signal moderation. It was impolitic, for the only result of 
 an expensive and dangerous war would be to alienate, perhaps for ever, 
 a most valuable ally, without obtaining any object in which England had 
 a real interest. . . . Russia was the natural ally of England. What had 
 England to gain by this policy ? In what way could English interests or 
 English power be affected by the acquisition by Russia of a fortress on 
 the Dniester and a strip of barren land along the northern shore of the 
 Black Sea ? . . . The assertion that England was bound by the spirit of 
 its defensive alliance with Prussia was in the highest degree dangerous 
 and absurd. If defensive alliances were construed in such a way they 
 would have all the evils of offensive alliances, and they would involve us in 
 every quarrel in Europe. W^e hound ourselves only to furnish assistance 
 to Prussia if she were attacked. She had not been attacked. She was at 
 perfect peace. She was absolutely unmenaced. It was doubtful whether 
 the new acquisition of Russia would under any circumstances be injurious 
 to Prussia, and it was preposterous to maintain that it was the duty of 
 England to prevent any other nations from acquiring any territory which 
 plight possibly in some future war be made use of against Prussij^.
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY 235 
 
 Fox was supported by Burke in a powerful speech, in 
 spite of their growing differences on the subject of the 
 Revolution in France. 
 
 Considering the Turkish Empire [he said] as any part of the balance of 
 power in Europe was new. The Turks were essentially Asiatic people, 
 who completely isolated themselves from European affairs. The minister 
 and the policy which should give them any weight in Europe would 
 deserve all the ban and curses of posterity. For his part, he confessed 
 that he had seen with horror the beautiful countries that bordered on the 
 Danube given back by the Emperor of Austria to devastation. Are we 
 now going to vote the blood and treasure of our countrj'men to enforce 
 similar cruel and inhuman policy ? ... That so wise a man as Pitt 
 should endeavour, on such slight and fi'ivolous grounds, to commit this 
 country to a policy of unlimited adventure, sacrificing the friendship of 
 one of our oldest allies and casting to the winds the foreign policy of his 
 own father, was the most extraordinary event that had taken place in 
 Parliament since he had sat within its walls. 
 
 Pitt's motion was carried, but by many votes short lof 
 his usual party majority. Two other debates took place on 
 the subject. Though Pitt maintained his majority, it was 
 evident that the opinion of the House of Commons, and still 
 more of the country, was opposed to going to war with 
 Russia on behalf of Turkey. Pitt very wisely decided to 
 abandon his policy of war. He withdrew his proposal in 
 the House of Commons. The Foreign Minister, the Duke 
 of Leeds, who was personally committed to it, resigned his 
 office. Another messenger was sent to the British Ambas- 
 sador at St. Petersburg with instructions not to present the 
 menacing despatch to the Czar, and, fortunately, arrived in 
 time to prevent it. 
 
 Sir E. Creasy describes the action of Charles Fox in 
 thus defeating the policy of Pitt as due to violent and un- 
 scrupulous party motives, and Mr. Lecky, while agreeing 
 in substance with the arguments of Fox, and condemning 
 Pitt's policy, does not acquit the former of political partisan- 
 ship. He never loses an opportunity of impeaching the 
 conduct of Charles Fox, on account of his action in the 
 war with the American colonies and in the revolutionary 
 war with France. It may be permitted to us to say, in 
 spite of these high authorities, that seldom has a greater 
 service been done to the country than in the defeat of Pitt's 
 proposal to go to war with Russia on this occasion. I^
 
 236 THE TURKISH ExMPIRE 
 
 was a unique case in our constitutional history when the 
 House of Commons by its debates, and not by its votes, 
 defeate'd a proposal for war made to it by a Prime Minister, 
 with all the authority of the Crown and the Government. 
 The merit of this was mainly due to Fox. 
 
 In the meantime the Turks were incurring further defeats 
 on the Danube. They made desperate efforts to replenish 
 their armies, but the men were ill -trained and were unable 
 to meet the veteran troops of Russia. Kutusoff, at the head 
 of a Russian army, routed a great Ottoman army at 
 Babatagh in January 1791, and in July of the same year 
 Prince Repnin, with forty thousand Russians, defeated and 
 dispersed seventy thousand Turks at Maksyu, on the southern 
 bank of the Danube. The Turks were equally unfortunate 
 on the east of the Black Sea. A Russian army invaded 
 the province of Kuban and defeated a Turkish army there, 
 and occupied the whole of the province. 
 
 As a result of all these reverses the Divan was dispirited. 
 There was no prospect of assistance to Turkey from any 
 quarter. They were willing to come to terms. The 
 Empress, on her part, was equally willing. She wanted 
 her army to march into Poland to put down an outbreak 
 of the Poles, under Kosciuszko. In spite of her recent 
 victories, which had secured to her the occupation of 
 Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Kuban, she was 
 ready to give up all with the exception of the fortress of 
 Oczakoff and the country between the Rivers Dniester and 
 Bug. Terms on this basis, and without any mediation 
 or interference of other Powers, were agreed on between 
 Russia and Turkey in August, 1791, and were embodied 
 in the treaty of Jassy in January of the following year. 
 Under this treaty the River Dniester was the new boundary 
 of the Russian Empire, and all conquests west of it were 
 restored to the Turks. Russia also gave back the province 
 of Kuban, but the treaty recognized the Empress as the pro- 
 tector of the petty independent principalities in that region. 
 
 The project of carving for Potemkin a kingdom out of 
 the Danubian principalities was abandoned, and that of a 
 Greek Empire at Constantinople was indefinitely adjourned. 
 Potemkin, who was a Pole by birth and had been raised 
 from the position of a sergeant in the Russian army to 
 princely rank with a fortune estimated at seven millions of 
 our money, died a few days after the treaty.
 
 TO THE TREATY OF JASSY 237 
 
 In the next four years the Empress achieved the final 
 partition of Poland, and obtained for Russia the lion's 
 share. Had she lived, she would probably have used her 
 acquisitions there as a vantage-ground for new aggressions 
 on the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile Greece was abandoned 
 to the tender mercies of its oppressors.
 
 XVIII 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 
 
 1792-1812 
 
 Twenty years after the treaty of Jassy, another slice of 
 the Ottoman territory was ceded to Russia in 1812 by the 
 treaty of Bucharest. The history of Turkey during the 
 interval is full of interest in its relation to the Napoleonic 
 wars, but much of it has little bearing on the shrinkage of 
 the Empire. 
 
 After the conclusion of the war with Russia in 1792, 
 Sultan Selim was most anxious to maintain peace and to 
 keep out of the complications arising from the French 
 Revolution. He was fully conscious of the necessity for 
 reforms in every branch of the administration of his country, 
 and especially in the constitution and training of the army. 
 He regarded the Janissaries as a grave danger to the 
 State. He initiated many great schemes of reform. But 
 in 1798 these were nipped in the bud by a fresh outbreak 
 of hostilities. War was forced upon him most unexpectedly, 
 and without just cause or even pretext, by the Revolutionary 
 Government of France, a country whose traditional policy 
 had been to support the Ottoman Empire against that of 
 Austria. France had recently become a near neighbour 
 to Turkey. Under the treaty of Campo-Formio in 1797, 
 after the great victories of General Bonaparte in Italy, 
 the Republic of Venice ceased to exist. Venice itself, 
 and much of its Italian territories, were subjected to the 
 rule of Austria, and its possessions in the Adriatic, the 
 Ionian Islands, and the cities on the mainland, such as 
 Prevesa and Parga, were ceded to France. This change 
 of masters was welcomed by the inhabitants of the islands, 
 who were weary of the tyranny of the Venetians. 
 
 The Directory, which then ruled in France, was filled 
 
 238
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 239 
 
 with ambition for further extensions in the East. It was 
 under the impression that the Ottoman Empire was on 
 the point of complete dissolution. There was much, at 
 the time, to justify this view. The central power of the 
 State was almost paralysed. The pashas of many provinces, 
 such as All of Janina, Passhwan Oglou of Widdin, and 
 Djezzar of Acre, had made themselves all but independent 
 of the Sultan. Egypt was virtually ruled by the Mamelukes. 
 Its pasha, appointed by the Porte, was without any authority. 
 Serbia and Greece were seething with rebellion. Bonaparte, 
 while commanding the army in Italy, sent emissaries to 
 several of these provinces, and especially to Greece, holding 
 out hopes of support in the event of open rebellion. It 
 seemed at first as though his ambition was for extension of 
 French dominion in Greece and other European provinces 
 of the Porte. An army of forty thousand men, including 
 the best of the veterans who had fought in Italy, was 
 mobilized at Toulon. Two hundred transports were pre- 
 pared to convey them to some unknown destination, and 
 a powerful fleet of fifteen battleships and fifteen frigates 
 was ordered to act as convoy. At the last moment the 
 Directory, at the instance of Bonaparte, decided on the 
 invasion of Egypt. A blow was to be struck there, not 
 against the Porte, but against England, with whom France 
 was at war. There were vague intentions or dreams, after 
 the conquest of Egypt, of invading India and founding 
 a great Eastern Empire for France on the ruins of the 
 British Empire. It was pretended that the attack on Egypt 
 was not an act of hostility to the Porte. Egypt, it was 
 said, was to be delivered from the cruel and corrupt govern- 
 ment of the Mamelukes. There was no declaration of 
 war against the Sultan. It was expected that he would 
 acquiesce in the suppression of the Mamelukes. 
 
 The utmost secrecy was maintained as to the destination 
 of the expedition. It left Toulon on May 19, 1798, under 
 the command of Bonaparte. He took with him many of 
 the ablest generals who had served under him in Italy and 
 a large party of ' savants,' who were to explore the monu- 
 ments of Egypt. The orders from the Directory to 
 Bonaparte, drawn up doubtless by himself, were 
 
 to clear the En<Tlisli from all their Oriental possessions which he will be 
 able to reach, and notably to destroy all their stations in the Red Sea ;
 
 240 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to cut through the Isthmus of Suez and to take the nccessarj' measures to 
 assure the free and exclusive possession of that sea to the French 
 RepubHc. 
 
 The destination of this great fleet and army was unknown 
 to the British Government. But there was a strong British 
 fleet at the entrance of the Mediterranean, under Lord St. 
 Vincent, who detached a large part of it, under command 
 of Nelson, to watch the issue of the French fleet from 
 Toulon. It was composed of an equal number of battle- 
 ships to that of the French fleet, but of inferior size, and 
 with fewer guns. It was very deficient in frigates. 
 
 On June i oth, three weeks after escaping from Toulon, the 
 French fleet arrived at Malta. The Knights of St. John, who 
 had made so valiant and successful a defence of the island 
 against the Ottomans in 1565, now offered a very feeble 
 resistance to the French. The knightly monks had become 
 licentious and corrupt. They very soon capitulated. 
 Bonaparte annexed the island to France, and the ancient 
 Order came to an ignominious end. 
 
 Leaving four thousand men at Malta, the fleet sailed for 
 the island of Crete, and hearing there that Nelson was 
 in pursuit, Bonaparte at once decided to sail to Alexandria. 
 He then for the first time annoimced to the army its 
 destination . 
 
 Soldiers [he said in a proclamation], you go to undertake a conquest 
 of which the effects upon the civihzation and the commerce of the world 
 will be incalculable. You will strike at England the most certain and the 
 most acute blow, while waiting to give her the death-blow. . . . The 
 Mamelukes, who favour exclusively English commerce, some days after 
 your arrival will exist no more. 
 
 Nelson meanwhile, when he discovered the departure of 
 the French fleet from Toulon, shrewdly guessed that it 
 was bound to Egypt, and bent his course there, hoping to 
 find the enemy's ships at Alexandria. He arrived there on 
 June 28th, before the French fleet, and, hearing nothing' of 
 it, he doubled back to Sicily. The two fleets crossed one 
 another not far from Crete, and within sight of one another 
 if the weather had been bright ; but a dense haze and 
 the want of frigates to act as scouts prevented Nelson 
 discovering the proximity of his enemy. But for this it 
 is certain that the French fleet, encumbered as it was
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 241 
 
 with two hundred transports, would have been totally- 
 destroyed and the whole armada would have met with 
 unparalleled disaster. It is interesting matter for specula- 
 tion what effect this would have had on the career of the 
 Corsican general and on the history of Europe. As it 
 was, the French fleet and army, favoured by their extra- 
 ordinary good luck, arrived safely at Alexandria on July i st . 
 The army disembarked there. The battleships, not being 
 able to get into the harbour, were anchored in Aboukir 
 Bay. Alexandria was captured, after a slight resistance 
 by its small garrison — though Bonaparte himself was slightly 
 wounded in the attack. A week later the army commenced 
 its march to Cairo. 
 
 Bonaparte issued one of his bombastic and mendacious 
 proclamations to the Egyptian people, explaining that he 
 was making war against the Mamelukes, and not against 
 them or the Sultan. 
 
 For a long time [it said] the crowd of slaves bought in Georgia and the 
 Caucasus have tyrannized the most beautiful place in the world; but God, 
 on whom all depends, has ordained tliat their empire is finished. People 
 of Egypt, they have told you that I have come to destroy your religion. 
 Do not believe them. Answer that I am come to restore your rights, to 
 punish the usurpers, and that I respect more than the Mamelukes, God, 
 his Prophet, and the Koran. . . . Thrice happy are those who will be on 
 our side. They will prosper in their fortune and their rank. . . . But 
 woe threefold to those who arm themselves for the Mamelukes and fight 
 against us. . . . Each man will thank God for the destruction of the 
 Mamelukes and will cry "Glory to the Sultan! Glory to the French 
 army, his friend ! Malediction to the Mamelukes and good luck to the 
 people of Egypt." 
 
 The army suffered greatly on its march to Cairo from 
 the heat and the sand. The soldiers murmured and asked 
 for what purpose they were brought to such a country, 
 where they saw no evidence of wealth, and where there was 
 nothing to loot. But they fought two battles on the way 
 against the Mamelukes and easily defeated them. The armies 
 against them on both occasions consisted of no more than 
 twelve thousand men, of whom only five thousand were 
 Mamelukes and the others ill -trained fellaheen. These were 
 of no avail against thirty thousand veterans of the French. 
 The city of Cairo, on the approach of Bonaparte, was sacked 
 
 16
 
 '242 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 by the retreating Egyptians. He presented himself rather 
 as the saviour of life and property. He had no difificulty 
 in restoring order there. 
 
 Meanwhile Nelson, on the arrival of his fleet at Naples, 
 heard definite accounts of the destination of the French 
 armada. He retraced his course to Egypt. On the 
 memorable ist of August, 1798, he came in sight of the 
 enemy's fleet, anchored in Aboukir Bay. The oft -told story 
 of the decisive and glorious battle need not be repeated. 
 The French fleet, under Admiral Brueys, was annihilated 
 by the British fleet, much inferior in number of men and 
 guns. The admiral was killed. His flagship was blown 
 up. Only two of his ships escaped for a time, and later 
 were captured before reaching France. As a result, the 
 communications of the P'rench army with France were 
 thenceforth completely severed. It was hopelessly stranded 
 in Egypt. Bonaparte did not hear of the disaster till 
 August 19th, on his return from an expedition, in which 
 he defeated and chased from the country a force of Mame- 
 lukes, under Ibrahim Pasha. His sole remark was : " Eh 
 bien ! It will be necessary to remain in these countries 
 or to make a grand exit like the ancients. The English 
 will compel us to do greater things than we intended." 
 
 The signal victory of the British fleet had far-reaching 
 results. The Sultan of Turkey, who had hitherto been 
 undecided as to his policy, now felt that he might safely 
 take up arms against the French and reassert his sovereignty 
 in Egypt. He well knew that Bonaparte could receive 
 no reinforcements from France and that the invading army 
 must gradually melt away . He declared war against France, 
 and entered into alliances, offensive and defensive, with 
 Russia and England. His alliance with the former led to 
 strange results. A combined fleet of Russia and Turkey, 
 hitherto the most deadly foes to one another, issued from 
 the Dardanelles, and attacked and drove the French from 
 the Ionian Islands, so recently acquired by them, and 
 from their fortresses on the mainland. 
 
 The Porte also collected two armies for the reconquest 
 of Egypt, the one in Syria, the other in the island of 
 Rhodes. Bonaparte decided to anticipate attack by the 
 invasion of Syria. He spent at Cairo the winter of 1798-9, 
 the least reputable period of his amazing career. His 
 private life there was most scandalous, far more so than
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 243 
 
 that, bad enough, of his wife, Josephine, whom he had 
 left at Paris. His public life was little better. In the 
 hopes of conciliating the Egyptian people and facilitating 
 the further conquests in the East, of which he dreamt, he 
 professed unbounded admiration for the Moslem religion. 
 He feigned to be a convert to that faith. His vaunting 
 proclamations were headed : "In the name of Allah. There 
 is no God but God. He has no son and reigns without 
 a partner." He did his best to induce his soldiers to 
 become Moslems, but in vain. No one was taken in by 
 these fooleries. He gained no respect from Egyptians of 
 any creed. There were many outbreaks in different parts 
 of the country, and a most serious one in Cairo. They 
 were put down with ruthless severity. He followed the 
 Turkish practice of decapitating the prisoners and great 
 numbers of suspects, and exhibiting their bleeding heads 
 in public places as a warning to others. 
 
 Bonaparte left Egypt in January, 1799, with an army 
 of twenty -five thousand, made up in part by sailors of 
 his sunken fleet, and in part by recruits from the Mame- 
 lukes. He crossed the Isthmus of Suez, and reached Gaza 
 on February 25th and Jaffa on March 7th. This last 
 city was held by five thousand Turks. After a brave 
 defence they capitulated on terms that they should be 
 treated as prisoners of war. In disregard of this they 
 were marched down to the beach and, by order of 
 Bonaparte, were slaughitered in cold blood because it was 
 inconvenient to encumber his army with prisoners. No 
 worse deed of Turkish atrocity has been recorded in these 
 pages. Leaving Jaffa, his army arrived before Acre in 
 a few days. " When I have captured Acre," he said to 
 his generals, " I shall arm the tribes. I shall be in a 
 position to threaten Constantinople. I shall turn the British 
 Empire upside down." 
 
 But he reached at Acre the end of his tether in the 
 East. He had sent his heavy guns by sea to meet him 
 there. They were captured on the way by the British 
 fleet, and were now mounted on the mud ramparts 
 of the fortress and used against him. A British fleet, 
 under command of Sir Sidney Smith, was lying in the 
 roadstead and kept the communications open with Con- 
 stantinople. The admiral and his sailors assisted in the 
 defence of the city, the garrison of which consisted of
 
 '244 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 only three thousand men. Its weak fortifications had been 
 strengthened by Colonel Philippeaux, a distinguished French 
 royalist. Against these defences Bonaparte hurled his army 
 in vain. In the sixty days of siege there were forty 
 assaults and twenty sorties of the garrison. " In that 
 miserable fort," said Bonaparte, " lay the fate of the East." 
 
 On May 7th large reinforcements arrived from the 
 Turkish army at Rhodes. A last and desperate assault, 
 led by General Kleber, was unsuccessful. I3onaparte was 
 compelled to admit his failure. His dream of an Eastern 
 Empire was dissipated for ever. On May 20th he com- 
 menced a retreat, after a loss by death of four thousand 
 men and eight generals. The army suffered most severely 
 in passing through the desert. 
 
 Shortly after the return of the French troops to Egypt 
 on July 14th, an army of fifteen thousand Turks, con- 
 voyed by the British fleet, was landed at Aboukir. 
 Bonaparte attacked on the 25th and utterly defeated it. 
 Thousands of the Turks were driven into the sea and 
 drowned. This victory of the veterans of the French army 
 over the ill -trained Turkish levies, without guns or cavalry, 
 Wa;s a godsend to Bonaparte. It shed a gleam of glory over 
 the terrible failure of the whole expedition. His dispatches 
 made the most of it. At this stage news from France 
 showed the necessity for his return there. He decided to 
 abandon the army to its fate. With the utmost secrecy 
 arrangements were made for the embarkation of the 
 general and his staff on board two frigates . They rode 
 down to the shore and got into boats, leaving their horses 
 behind them. The return of the riderless horses was the 
 first intimation to those left behind that they were aban- 
 doned by their general. The two frigates left Egypt on 
 August 22nd and, by hugging the African coast, they 
 escaped the British cruisers, and after a most hazardous 
 voyage of six weeks they landed their passengers in France, 
 where Bonaparte posed as a conqueror. Nor did his failure 
 in Egypt interfere with his subsequent triumphant career. 
 
 Early in March 1801 a British army of fifteen thousand 
 men, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, landed in Egypt, and 
 later another contingent, under General Baird, coming from 
 India, also arrived there. The French army of occupa- 
 tion was badly handled. It was divided between Cairo 
 and Alexandria. It was defeated in detail and ultimately
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 245 
 
 surrendered. It was then said to number twenty-four 
 thousand men and three hundred and twelve guns. On 
 hearing of this disaster Bonaparte is said to have felt 
 great anguish. " We have lost Egypt," he said. " My 
 projects have been destroyed by the British." Egypt was 
 restored to the Sultan, freed not only from the French but 
 also from the Mamelukes, and for a time Turkish pashas, 
 appointed by the Porte, ruled the country. There can be 
 no doubt that the Sultan owed this wholly and solely to 
 the British Government. It will be seen that he showed 
 little gratitude, for in a very few years' time he took the part 
 of the French in the great war. 
 
 Meanwhile, in 1802, a peace was patched up for a time 
 between England and France at Amiens. Concurrently 
 with this terms of peace were agreed upon between France 
 and the Porte, under which the sovereignty of the Sultan 
 over Egypt was recognized. When, two years later, war 
 again broke out between France and England and other 
 Powers, Bonaparte, then First Consul, reversed his action 
 as regards the Ottoman Empire, and made an alliance 
 with it a cardinal point of his new policy. 
 
 After the conclusion of peace with France in 1802, 
 Sultan Selim had a respite for a very few years before 
 he was again involved in war. He directed his attention 
 to serious internal reforms of his Empire. He fully recog- 
 nized that the first and foremost of these must be the 
 reorganization, if not the suppression, oif the corps of 
 Janissaries. Not only had the experience of late wars 
 shown that they had become a most incompetent military 
 force, quite unable to meet on equal terms the well-trained 
 soldiers of Russia and France, but in every part of his 
 Empire they were a danger to the State, endeavouring to 
 monopolize power and to oust that of the pashas appointed 
 by himself. They were also the main oppressors of the 
 rayas. The task of suppressing them and of creating 
 an army on the model of those of European Powers was 
 a most difficult and dangerous one, for the Janissaries 
 were, or pretended to be, the most devout of Moslems, 
 and were supported by the fanatical part of the popula- 
 tion. They had strong supporters in the Divan. The 
 ulemas were almost unanimously in their favour. The 
 Divan was divided into two parties, those who favoured 
 reform and who gave support to the Sultan, and the
 
 ■^^6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 reactionary party, who were opposed to all reform and 
 championed the Janissaries. There was another serious 
 division of the Divan — namely those who espoused the cause 
 of Russia, not unfrequently in the pay of that Power, and 
 those who favoured France. After the conclusion of peace, 
 France was represented at the Court of the Sultan by very 
 able ministers, who soon regained the influence for that 
 country which it had formerly enjoyed. 
 
 Nowhere throughout the Empire were the Janissaries 
 more turbulent and dangerous or more oppressive to the 
 rayas than in Serbia. They aimed at governing the 
 province in the same way as the Mamelukes in Egypt 
 and the military Deys in Algiers and Tunis, and if they 
 had been allowed to have their way, Serbia would have 
 achieved a virtual independence of the Porte, under a 
 military and fanatical Moslem despotism. The Janissaries 
 there were almost as hostile to the Spahis inhabiting the 
 provinces as to the rayas. They aimed at ousting the 
 Spahis from their feudal rights in the country districts 
 and at an assumption of ownership of land, more oppres- 
 sive to the peasant Christian cultivators of the soil than 
 that of the Spahis. Both Spahis and rayas appealed 
 to the Porte for protection against these ruffians. The 
 rayas in their petition to the Sujtan said that — 
 
 not only were they reduced to abject poverty by the Dahis (the leaders 
 of the Janissaries), but they were attacked in their religion, their morality, 
 and their honour. No husband was secure as to his wife, no father as 
 to his daughter, no brother as to his sister. The Church, the cloister, the 
 monks, the priests, all were violated. Art thou still our Czar ? then come 
 and free us from these evildoers, and if thou wilt not save us, at least tell 
 us that we may decide whether to flee to the mountains and forests, or to 
 seek in the rivers a termination of our miserable existence.' 
 
 The Sultan was willing to listen to these grave com- 
 plaints, and to put down the turbulent Dahis and their 
 attendant Janissaries, not so much out of sympathy for 
 the rayas as in order to restore his own authority in 
 the province and as a first step towards the reformation or 
 suppression of the Janissaries elsewhere throughout his 
 Empire. He began by threatening the Dahis. If they 
 did not mend their ways, he would send an army against 
 
 • Ranke's History of Serbia, p. 115
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 247 
 
 them. These ruffians, knowing that the Suhan could not 
 venture to employ a Moslem force against them, came to 
 the conclusion that he meant to arm the rayas of the 
 province. They determined to anticipate this by a general 
 massacre. If no resistance had been offered to this, the 
 whole Christian population of Serbia would have been 
 exterminated. The rayas, however, were no longer the 
 submissive and patient people they had been reduced to 
 by servitude for two hundred and fifty years under the 
 Turks, during which no one of them had been allowed 
 to carry about him a weapon of defence. As has been 
 already stated, they had been invited to rebel by the 
 Austrians in their last war with the Turks, had been armed 
 by them, and had given valuable assistance. Great 
 numbers of them had been trained as soldiers, and retained 
 their arms when the Austrians retired from the country, 
 after the peace of Sistova, which provided no adequate 
 security for these unfortunate people. 
 
 They now, in 1807, rose in arms against their 
 oppressors, who were bent on exterminating them. They 
 elected as their leader George Petrowitsch (Kara George, 
 as he is known in history), a peasant like themselves, a 
 most brave man, who had served in the Austrian army, 
 and who soon showed great qualities as a general. Under 
 his leadership the rayas succeeded in driving the Dahis 
 and Janissaries out of the country districts. 
 
 The Sultan at the commencement of this servile war 
 lent his assistance to the rayas. The Pasha of Bosnia 
 was instructed to support them with an armed force. The 
 local Spahis also, who were still in the country and had 
 not been driven away by the Dahis, lent assistance. On 
 the other hand, the Dahis received assistance from the 
 fanatical part of the Moslems in the towns. They had 
 also the sympathy and aid of Passhwan Oglou, the mutinous 
 Pasha of Widdin. It was, however, almost wholly due to 
 the efforts of the Serbian rayas that the Dahis were com- 
 pletely defeated. Most of them were slaughtered, and the 
 world was well rid of them. When this was achieved, 
 the whole of Serbia was practically in the hands of the 
 Christian rayas, with the exception of Belgrade and a few 
 fortresses, which were garrisoned by the Sultan's troops. 
 
 At this stage the Sultan, when all that he really aimed 
 at was achieved — namely the suppression of the local Janis'
 
 '24S THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 sari€S— summoned the insurgent rayas to lay down their 
 arms and to resume their position as subjects of the Porte 
 and as rayas under the yoke of the local Spahis as of 
 yore. The war, however, had evoked a national spirit 
 among the Christian population, which would not be con- 
 tent with the old condition of servitude. They sent a 
 petition to the Russian Government claiming assistance on 
 the ground that they were members of the Greek Church. 
 The Czar, in reply, advised them to present their claims 
 at Constantinople, and promised to give his support to 
 them at the Porte. They then sent a deputation to the 
 Sultan, and boldly claimed that Belgrade and the other 
 fortresses should be given up to them, and asked that 
 arrears of taxes and tribute should be remitted. The first 
 of these was the most important, for it virtually meant 
 a claim for autonomy under the suzerainty only of the 
 Sultan. 
 
 These demands caused the greatest indignation among 
 the Moslems of the capital, and the Sultan forthwith re- 
 jected them. He ordered the members of the deputation 
 to be imprisoned. He directed the Pasha of Nisch to 
 invade Serbia and reduce the contumacious rayas to their 
 former condition. He threatened them with death or 
 slavery. Kara George met this force on the frontier lof 
 Serbia and defeated it. He also defeated two other armies 
 which the Sultan sent against him, and he was able, un- 
 aided by any external force, to capture Belgrade and the 
 other fortresses and expel the Turkish garrisons. Thus it 
 happened that the native Christians of Serbia, by their 
 own heroic efforts, without any foreign assistance, achieved 
 a virtual independence of Ottoman rule, an event of supreme 
 importance in its effect on other Christian communities 
 under servitude to the Turks. 
 
 Meanwhile important events were developing at Con- 
 stantinople. It was the scene of a violent diplomatic 
 struggle between Russia and England on the one hand, 
 and France on the other, for the support of the Porte in 
 the war then raging in Europe. The Emperor Napoleon 
 sent as ambassador there General Sebastiani, formerly a 
 priest, now a soldier and able diplomat. His demands 
 were supported by the great victory of the French ov^er 
 the Austrians at Ulm. The recent acquisition by France 
 of Dalmatia and a part of Croatia brought that Power
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 249 
 
 into close relation with Turkey. Sebastiani pressed for 
 the support of Turkey with great insistence. 
 
 On the other hand, Russia was equally cogent in its 
 demands, and even more threatening. It insisted on an 
 alliance, offensive and defensive. It demanded that the 
 Sultan should recognize the Czar as the protector of all 
 the Christians in Turkey professing the Greek religion, 
 and that the Russian Ambassador should have the right 
 of intervention on their behalf. The Sultan, conscious of 
 the inferiority of his military force, could only temporize. 
 
 Moslem pride and fanaticism was greatly excited by 
 the demands of Russia. Sebastiani, working on this, 
 persuaded the Sultan, by way of retort to Russia, to depose 
 the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, on the ground 
 that they were suspected of being pensioners of Russia. 
 The Czar treated this as a gross breach of the engage- 
 ment entered into by the Porte, in 1802, under which the 
 Hospodars of the two principalities were only to be removed 
 from their posts with the consent of Russia. He there- 
 upon ordered an army of thirty-five thousand men, under 
 General Michelsen, to invade Moldavia. The army entered 
 Jassy and, a little later, Bucharest before the Porte was 
 able to make any resistance. 
 
 The British Government at the same time gave full 
 support to Russia. Its Ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, in- 
 sisted on the Porte joining the alliance of England and 
 Russia against France. The Sultan refused to do so. Mr. 
 Arbuthnot thereupon sailed away in a frigate and joined 
 the British fleet lying off the island of Tenedos, under the 
 command of Admiral Duckworth, which consisted of seven 
 battleships and two frigates. This fleet, favoured by a 
 fair wind, then forced the Dardanelles against the Turkish 
 batteries on February 19, 1807, with little damage, and 
 made its appearance in the Sea of Marmora. It there 
 destroyed a Turkish battleship and four corvettes. 
 
 The fleet anchored off the Prince's Islands, within a few 
 miles of Constantinople, which was exposed to bombard- 
 ment from the sea. The admiral presented a demand to 
 the Porte for the surrender of the Ottoman fleet lying at 
 Constantinople and for compliance with the demands of Mr. 
 Arbuthnot. He threatened to bombard the city if his 
 ultimatum was rejected. If any serious effect could have 
 been given to this menace, immediate action should have
 
 2 50 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 been taken. The Ambassador and the admiral allowed 
 themselves to be drawn into a negotiation spread over ten 
 days, during which the Sultan and the whole male popu- 
 lation of his capital were engaged, with feverish haste, in 
 strengthening the defences of the city. A thousand guns 
 and a hundred mortars were mounted on its batteries. 
 The Turkish fleet, consisting of tv/elve battleships, was 
 removed to a point in the harbour beyond the reach of 
 the guns of a bombarding fleet. The defences of the 
 Dardanelles were also greatly strengthened. Admiral Duck- 
 worth was compelled at last to the conclusion that a 
 bombardment would be attended with very serious risk 
 to his own fleet. If it were damaged, the Turkish fleet; 
 coming out of the Bosphorus, might assail it with advantage. 
 It might also be impossible for it to repass the Dardanelles. 
 He decided to withdraw. On March ist he weighed anchor, 
 and on the 3rd he repassed the Dardanelles, this time with 
 considerable damage to his ships and loss of life. Some 
 of the ships were struck by the enormous stone balls fired 
 from the Turkish batteries. Two corvettes were sunk and 
 six hundred men were killed. The fleet narrowly escaped 
 destruction. The whole adventure redounded little to the 
 credit either of the diplomacy or strategy of the British 
 Government . 
 
 Not content with this futile demonstration against Con- 
 stantinople, the British Government attempted another 
 expedition, even more futile and senseless, this time against 
 Egypt, in the hope, it may be supposed, of bringing 
 pressure to bear on the Sultan. A force of five thousand 
 soldiers was sent from Sicily, then in British occupation, 
 and was landed on the Egyptian coast near Alexandria 
 on March i8th. It marched on that city, which, garrisoned 
 by only four hundred and fifty Turks, surrendered. This 
 was its first and last success. A few days later fifteen; 
 hundred men were sent to attack Rosetta, at the mouth of 
 the Nile, and were repulsed. Another expedition was even 
 more unsuccessful. Of two thousand men sent out, one 
 thousand were killed and wounded. There seems to have 
 been expectation that the Mamelukes would assist the British 
 against the Turkish troops. This was not realized. The 
 remains of the small army under General Eraser were 
 cooped up in Alexandria until September, when, owing 
 to the serious disaffection of the inhabitants of the city
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 251 
 
 and the approach of a large body of Turks from CairOj 
 it was recognized that its position was untenable. A flag 
 of truce was sent to the advancing Turks with the offer 
 to evacuate Egypt if the British prisoners in their hands 
 were given up to them. This was accepted, and on 
 September 25th the little army embarked again on its 
 transports and returned to Sicily. 
 
 These two senseless expeditions had an effect the very 
 reverse of which was intended. They exasperated Turkish 
 opinion and drove the Porte into closer alliance with the 
 French. In the meantime, and since the failure of the 
 demonstration by Duckworth's fleet, momentous events 
 occurred in Constantinople. The Sultan took advantage 
 of the departure of the main body of Janissaries with the 
 army sent to the Danube to extend his scheme for raising 
 a military force, clothed and drilled and paid on the 
 European system. He issued an edict that the youngest 
 and best of the Janissaries were to be enrolled in this new 
 corps. This caused the gravest discontent among the 
 Janissaries still in garrison at Constantinople, to the re- 
 actionary party in the Divan, and to the ulemas. The 
 Janissaries broke out in mutiny at the end of May 1807. 
 They put this question to the Mufti : " What punishment 
 is deserved by one who has established the new military; 
 force? " The Mufti replied : " Death, and that according to 
 the Koran, since the Divan had introduced among" Mussul- 
 mans the manners of infidels and manifested an intention 
 to suppress the Janissaries, who were the true defenders 
 of the law and the prophets." 
 
 Fortified by this fetva, the Janissaries then passed a 
 resolution tliat Selim must be deposed. They sent a deputa- 
 tion to the Sultan to insist on his abdication. Selim, 
 however, had already heard of their intention. He had 
 no force at hand sufficient to overcome the mutinous 
 Janissaries. He anticipated their demands by himself going 
 to the Cage, where his cousin Mustapha, the next heir 
 to the throne, was immured, making obeisance to him as 
 Sultan, advising him not to listen to those who desired 
 great changes, and wishing him a happier reign than his 
 own. He then attempted to commit suicide by taking 
 poison, but Mustapha dashed the cup containing it from 
 his hands and swore that his life should be saved. On 
 the arrival of the deputation of Janissaries at the palace
 
 ^5^ THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 they found that a new Sultan was already installed there. 
 Selim retired with dignity to the apartments in the Cage 
 vacated by Mustapha. 
 
 The new Sultan, Mustapha III, was a very weak and 
 incompetent man. He was aged thirty, of imperfect educa- 
 tion and poor intellect. He filled the throne for a few 
 months only, during which there was practically no govern- 
 ment. Though Selim himself was reconciled to the loss 
 of his throne, he had powerful friends who resented his 
 fall. Bairactar, the Pasha of Rustchuck, who owed his 
 post to Selim, marched upon Constantinople \vith forty 
 thousand Bosnians and Albanians. They overawed the 
 Janissaries and invaded the palace. They knocked at its 
 gates and demanded that Selim should be brought out to 
 them. Mustapha, however, on their approach, had already 
 given orders that Selim and Mahmoud, the only survivors 
 of the Othman race besides himself, were to be put to 
 death, in the hope that this might save his own life. The 
 mutes were able to strangle Selim, not without a desperate 
 struggle, which, if prolonged for a few minutes, would 
 have saved him, for Bairactar was already storming at 
 the gate of the palace. Mahmoud could not be found. 
 Selim's body was then cast out to Bairactar and his men. 
 " Here is he you seek ! " it was called out. On entering 
 the palace Bairactar found Mustapha seated on his throne. 
 He was dragged from it and was sent to prison. Mahmoud, 
 who had been hidden in the furnace of a bath, was found 
 and was installed as Sultan. 
 
 Bairactar, having succeeded in deposing Mustapha and 
 installing Mahmoud, most unwisely allowed the Bosnian 
 and Albanian troops to return to their homes. There 
 remained only four thousand men as a bodyguard on whom 
 the new Sultan could rely. They were not sufficient to with- 
 stand the Janissaries. These turbulent men broke out in 
 another rebellion. They attacked Bairactar in his palace. 
 He took refuge in a tower used as a powder magazine. 
 He was there blown up, whether by accident or wilfully 
 is not known. There ensued a few days of civil war. 
 The artillery on whom the Sultan relied went over to the 
 Janissaries. A counter-revolution was effected. Mustapha 
 would have been restored to the throne if he had not 
 been put to death in the interval . Mahmoud owed his 
 life to the fact that he was the last surviving male of
 
 TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 253 
 
 the Othman race. He was compelled to yield to the 
 menaces of the Janissaries, who were now masters of the 
 city. An edict was issued in his name which repealed all 
 the reforms effected by Selim. The old system was 
 restored, with all its abuses. In the next three or four 
 years the Janissaries were virtually the rulers of the Empire. 
 Grand Viziers were appointed and dismissed at their dicta- 
 tion. Mahmoud was greatly humiliated. But he bided 
 his time, and it will be seen that before long he inflicted 
 a most bloody revenge on the Janissaries and extinguished 
 their corps for ever. 
 
 Meanwhile affairs on the Danube fared badly with the 
 Turks, as might be expected. The Russians gained com- 
 plete possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Their armies 
 crossed the Danube and laid siege to fortresses on the 
 right bank. In 1807 Russia and France came to terms. 
 The treaty of Tilsit provided that hostilities were to cease 
 between Russia and Turkey, and that the Russian troops 
 were to be withdrawn from Moldavia and Wallachia, till 
 a definitive agreement had been come to between these two 
 Powers. But a secret article, which was not made public 
 till some tirne later, provided that all the European provinces 
 of Turkey, except Roumelia and Constantinople, were to 
 be taken from the Sultan. We now know that there were 
 long discussions between Napoleon and the Czar, on the 
 River Niemen, as to the future disposal of these and 
 other provinces. Napoleon was ready to concede to Russia 
 the Danubian principalities and Bulgaria. He claimed for 
 France Egypt, Syria, Greece, all the islands of the Archi- 
 pelago, and Crete. Austria was to be propitiated by the 
 cession of Bosnia and Serbia. The question remained what 
 was to be done with Constantinople. Napoleon would not 
 concede it to Russia. The Czar insisted upon this. The 
 agreement broke down on this point. But it is certain 
 that Napoleon was willing enough to throw over his recent 
 allies, the Turks, and to join with their hereditary foe in 
 dismembering their Empire. A more perfidious transaction 
 is not to be found in history . • 
 
 In compliance with the treaty of Tilsit, Russia suspended 
 hostilities with the Porte. But the Russian army remained 
 in occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia, and showed no 
 intention to evacuate them. War was renewed in 1809. 
 Prince Bagration, at the head of a Russian army, crossed
 
 '2 54 TH£ TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the Danube and captured several Turkish fortresses on its 
 right bank. In the following year, 1810, the Russians 
 captured the important stronghold Silistria, but failed with 
 very heavy loss in an assault on Rustchuck. Later in the 
 year they inflicted a severe defeat on the army of the 
 Grand Vizier at Baltin. They then succeeded in a second 
 attack on Rustchuck, and captured Sistova. But they failed 
 to take the fortified camp at Schumla, and were unable 
 therefore to cross the Balkan range. 
 
 In 1 8 1 1 war was again imminent between Russia and 
 France, and the Russian generals on the Danube received 
 orders to stand on the defensive. The Turks took 
 advantage of this, and sent a large army across the Danube. 
 It was eventually defeated and compelled to surrender. 
 In spite of their successes, the Russians were willing to 
 come to terms. They had hitherto insisted on the retention 
 of Wallachia and Moldavia. They were now ready to 
 make concessions. The invasion of Russia by Napoleon 
 was imminent. It was necessary for the Czar to con- 
 centrate all his forces in defence of his own Empire. 
 Negotiations were commenced in 181 1, and they resulted 
 in the treaty of Bucharest of May 28, 18 12. It was 
 agreed that the River Pruth was to be the new ]x)undary 
 between the two Empires. The whole of Wallachia and 
 a great part of Moldavia were restored to Turkey. Bess- 
 arabia and a part of Moldavia were ceded to Russia. 
 
 The treatment of Serbia in the treaty was ungenerous 
 on the part of Russia. An amnesty was to be granted to 
 its people. They were to be secured in future the regulation 
 of their internal affairs. But the supremacy of the Sultan 
 was to be maintained, and Belgrade and other fortresses 
 which had been captured by the Serbians were again to 
 be garrisoned by Turkish troops. This last was the cause 
 of great troubles in the future. But for the impending 
 invasion of Russia by Napoleon the terms would .undoubtedly 
 have been far less favourable to the Porte,
 
 XIX 
 
 MAHMOUD II 
 
 1808-39 
 
 The first four years of Mahmoud's long reign of thirty- 
 one years were fraught with bitter humiliation to him at 
 the hands of the Janissaries. There was no indication of 
 his subsequent career, when he proved himself to be the 
 most able and resolute of Sultans since Solyman the Magni- 
 ficent. But he was also the most unfortunate, for he was 
 unable to prevent a greater reduction of the Turkish Empire 
 than had been incurred by any one of the long line of 
 degenerate Sultans. It may well be, however, that but for 
 his action still greater losses w^ould have resulted, for on his 
 advent to the throne the Empire seemed to be on the brink 
 of ruin, hi every part of it turbulent and rebellious pashas 
 were asserting independence. In Epirus the celebrated All 
 Pasha of Janina had cast off allegiance, and was threatening 
 to extend his rule over Greece, Thessaly, and the Ionian 
 Islands. At Widdin on the Danube, at Bagdad on the 
 Tigris, at Acre in Syria, the same process was being pur- 
 sued by other pashas. In Egypt, Mehemet Ali had assumed 
 the position of Governor and was creating an army and a 
 navy independent of the Porte. In Arabia, the sect of 
 Wahabees had attained a virtual independence, and had 
 obtained possession of the holy cities. Other provinces, 
 such as Serbia, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, were 
 seething with disaffection caused by long and intolerable 
 misgovernment. The difffculty of holding together the 
 distracted Empire was greatly increased by the want of an 
 effective army under the fuU control of the central Govern- 
 ment, so as to enable it to cope with the centrifugal forces 
 which threatened disruption. The Janissaries, who had 
 contributed so largely to the growth of the Empire, were 
 
 255
 
 256 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 now a standing danger to it. They were able to overawe 
 the Suhan, and to dictate to him the appointment and dis- 
 missal of Viziers. But successive campaigns on the Danube, 
 and conflicts with rebellious pashas, had given abundant 
 proof of their inefficiency as a military force. Compared 
 with the armies of European Powers they were an ill- 
 disciplined and badly armed mob. They arrogantly refused 
 to be armed, clothed, and drilled after the fashion of 
 European armies. While useless for war, they were formid- 
 able for other purposes. They were under no control. 
 They terrorized the capital, and in the provinces they were 
 at the disposal of any adventurous pasha who suborned 
 them to support his ambitious and rebellious projects. 
 Mahmoud from the earliest years of his reign fully recog- 
 nized, as many of his predecessors had done, how urgent 
 the necessity was to put an end to this turbulent force, 
 and to create a new army which would obey and support 
 him as Sultan, and be of value against external enemies. 
 It is his principal claim in the history of Turkey that he 
 was able to effect this. Eighteen years, howiever, elapsed 
 before he felt strong enough to grapple with these foes of 
 his dynasty and State. 
 
 Apart from this great achievement, he showed inflexible 
 firmness and courage in the great difficulties which con- 
 fronted him, and almost alone he bore the burden of the 
 State for thirty -one years of unparalleled peril, and often 
 of most serious disaster. It will be seen that, in spite of 
 these high qualities, and in spite of the reform of his army, 
 the losses of territory to his Empire were very serious. In 
 Greece, the Morea, and the provinces north of the Gulf of 
 Corinth up to the frontier of Thessaly, acquired complete 
 independence under the guarantee of the three Great Powers 
 of Europe. Egypt, Moldavia and Wallachia, and Serbia 
 attained almost similar independence, subject only to 
 the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey and the 
 payment of fixed tributes. They no longer added to the real 
 strength of the P^mpire. On the other hand, he completely 
 destroyed the power of the rebelhous Pashas of Janina, 
 Widdin, Bagdad, and Acre, and through Mehemet Ah, the 
 Pasha of Egypt, he subdued the Wahabees and recovered 
 the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 
 
 It should be added that Mahmoud, unlike so many of 
 his predecessors, devoted his life to affairs of liis State
 
 MAHMOUD II 257 
 
 rather than to his harem. He committed at times acts of 
 great cruelty. He put to death his brother Mustapha and 
 Mustapha's only son, and caused to be drowned in the 
 Bosphorus four ladies of Mustapha's harem who were 
 enceinte. He had no scruple in directing the secret 
 assassination of any persons whom he suspected of har- 
 bouring schemes in opposition to his own. He authorized 
 the perpetration of ruthless massacres of Greeks in all parts 
 of his Empire at the inception of the revolution in Greece. 
 But t"hese were acts of policy in accord with the traditions 
 of his family, approved by public opinion of the Turks, by 
 whom terrorism and massacre were recognized as justifiable 
 methods of government. The murder of his relatives left 
 him the sole survivor of the Othman race, a position which 
 secured him from intrigues against his throne by the 
 Janissaries. 
 
 The most serious of the losses to the Empire in 
 Mahmoud's reign was that of Egypt, for it was a Moslem 
 country, and though for many years previously the hold 
 on it by the Ottoman Porte had been slender, and the 
 Mamelukes had been able, as a rule, to impose their will 
 and to govern the province, yet the Porte could in the main 
 rely on it for support to the Empire in times of emerg*ency. 
 It will be well, therefore, to explain the changes effected 
 in Egypt, for it will be seen that they had a great bearing 
 on events in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, who effected the virtual independence of 
 Egypt, subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan, 
 was the most remarkable man that the Mahommedan world 
 had produced in modern times. The son of an Albanian 
 Moslem fisherman and small landowner at Kavala, on the 
 borders of Thrace and Macedonia, he was left a penniless 
 orphan, and was brought up as a dependent in the house- 
 hold of the chief magistrate of the district, who was a 
 distant relative. He never learnt to read or write. He 
 said of himself in later years that the only books he ever 
 read were men's faces, and that he seldom made a mistake 
 in them. When the French invaded Egypt under General 
 Bonaparte, Mehemet Ali was sent in defence of it with a 
 band of three hundred Albanians, as one of their junior 
 officers, and before long, on the return home of the com- 
 manding officer, contrived to step into his place. When 
 the Turkish army was driven into the sea at Aboukir in 
 
 17,
 
 258 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 1794 by Napoleon, lie was saved from drowning by a 
 boat from the British admiral's ship. Later he was put 
 in command of all the Albanians employed in Egypt, and 
 was attached for a time to the British army. 
 
 After the departure of the British from Egypt, conflict 
 arose between the Turks and the Mamelukes for the control 
 of the government. Mehemet at first sided with the .Mame- 
 lukes, but later he threw them over in favour of the 
 Albanians in the service of the Turks. When the British 
 Government sent its futile expedition to Egypt in 1808, 
 Mehemet was chiefly concerned in opposing it. He was 
 in command at Rosetta when a great number of British 
 soldiers were slain, and a few days later he entered Cairo in 
 triumph through an avenue of British heads stuck on pikes. 
 Thenceforth he rapidly rose in influence and position, and 
 at the age of thirty-five was the most powierful man in 
 Egypt, and was able to instal himself as Pasha. He was 
 harassed and opposed by the Mamelukes. He determined 
 to get rid of them. He invited about five hundred of their 
 leading men to a friendly conference at the citadel of Cairo. 
 After entertaining them at a sumptuous repast, he ordered 
 the gates to be shut, and had them all shot down in 
 the narrow street of the citadel. A single man only of 
 them survived by leaping his horse from the wall of the 
 citadel, a height of 30 feet. This was followed by a 
 slaughter of nearly all the Mamelukes in the country. 
 Mehemet in this set the exam.ple which was followed a 
 few years later by Sultan Mahmoud in suppressing the 
 Janissaries. 
 
 Thenceforward Mehemet was undisputed ruler of Egypt. 
 He had a genius for organization and government. 
 Though cruel and vindictive, and even bloodthirsty, as 
 regards his enemies and against evildoers of all kinds, 
 he had a keen sense of justice, and a determination to 
 mete it out equally, and v/ithout favour, to the people of 
 all sects and races. He brought about peace and order 
 and prosperity such as Egypt had never of late years 
 enjoyed. He was ambitious to extend his rule. He 
 organized for this purpose, and for asserting himself against 
 the Porte, an army of a hundred thousand men raised by 
 conscription and armed and drilled on the model of 
 European armies, v/ith the aid of French and Italian ofiicers 
 who had served under Napoleon. He also built a power-
 
 MAHMOUD II 259 
 
 fill fleet with the help of French naval constructors. He 
 soon proved the value of his new army by putting down 
 a revolt in Arabia of the Wahabees. He did this, on 
 behalf of, and in the name of the Sultan. He alsQ con- 
 quered the oasis of Senaar and extended the rule of 
 Egypt into the Sudan. It will be seen that later, in 
 1825 and 1826, he sent his army and navy in support of 
 the Sultan to the Morea for the purpose of putting art 
 end to the revolution in Greece, which the Sultan had been 
 unable to cope with. Before dealing with this, however, it 
 will be well to revert to Mahmoud and explain the course 
 of events which compelled him to call in aid Mehemet 
 All's army. 
 
 One of the earliest matters which Mahmoud had to deal 
 with was that of Serbia. The treaty of Bucharest had left 
 that province in a very unsettled and ambiguous position. 
 The Turks, under its terms, were permitted to garrison 
 Belgrade and other fortresses, and were to concede to 
 the Serbians self-government, but there was no adequate 
 guarantee for this. The Serbians, who were in possession 
 of the fortresses, refused to give them up to the Turks 
 until a sclieme of self-government was arranged. The 
 Porte insisted on immediate surrender. Subsequent pro- 
 ceedings showed that there was no intention to give effective 
 self-government to the Serbians. The Sultan in 18 13 sent 
 an army to enforce his claims. Kara George, in most 
 strange contrast to his previous heroic action, lost courage 
 on this occasion. After burying the treasure which he had 
 amassed as virtual ruler of Serbia, he fled the country and 
 sought refuge with the Austrians. In so doing he passed 
 out of the history of his country, save that when, some years 
 later, he thought he might safely return to Serbia, he was 
 arrested and shot as a traitor. 
 
 After this defection Serbia seemed to be at the mercy 
 of the Turks, and the greater part of it was occupied 
 by them. But at the moment of its great peril another 
 national patriot and hero rose to the front in the person of 
 Milosch Obrenowitch, who, much as Kara George had done 
 a few years previously, took the lead in rousing the Christian 
 population to resistance, and in leading them to victory. He 
 succeeded in driving the Turks from all the country districts 
 and shutting them up in the fortresses. Mahmoud then 
 sent another army with the objort of relieving the Turks in
 
 2 6o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the Serbian fortresses and subduiHg the rebels. The army, 
 however, halted on the frontier, and negotiations ensued 
 which lasted for some years without any result. The 
 Sultan, it seems, was unwilling, in view of the numerous 
 other difficulties pending in his Empire, to risk the 
 loss of an army in a guerrilla war in the mountains of 
 Serbia. 
 
 The most serious of Mahmoud's other difficulties at this 
 period was the insurrection of the Greeks in 1821. Never 
 was rebellion of a subject race more justifiable. Nowhere 
 throughout the Ottoman Empire were the results of its 
 rule more degrading and intolerable than in Greece. It 
 served none of the purposes for which governments exist. 
 Life and property and honour were without security, and 
 justice had degenerated into the practice of selling injustice 
 to the highest bidder. 
 
 The condition of the Greek population was infinitely 
 worse than that of their compatriots in most other parts of 
 the Empire. In Constantinople the Greeks were a wealthy 
 community. They had a large share in the administration 
 of the Empire. The Porte, in fact, could not do without 
 them. Their religion was under the special protection 
 accorded to it by Mahomet the Conqueror. The trade of 
 the Empire was largely in their hands. At Smyrna, 
 Salonika, and many other cities, there were large numbers 
 of Greeks who had enjoyed facilities of trade and had 
 accumulated wealth. Mahmoud, like many of his pre- 
 decessors, recognized that, by largely contributing to taxes, 
 these people were a source of wealth to his Government, 
 and was not disposed to adopt any measure proposed by 
 the more fanatical of Moslems to extirpate them or to drive 
 them into rebellion. Not a few of the islands of the 
 archipelago, such as Scios and Psara, were practically 
 allowed to govern themselves, and life there was as well- 
 ordered as in any part of Europe. 
 
 It was very different with Greece on the mainland. It 
 seems to have been the policy of the Porte to prevent its 
 becoming a populous and wealthy country, with a view to 
 keeping it under close subjection. Much of its land was 
 in the ownership of Moslems, a majority of whom were 
 Greeks by race, who had adopted Islam in order to save 
 their property. They were a fanatical class who were quite 
 as oppressive to the rayas, the cultivators of the soil, as
 
 MAHMOUD II 261 
 
 were those of pure Turkish descent. The Ottoman Govern- 
 ment presented itself to the Greeks only as an engine 
 to extract taxes, and the pashas who were sent to 
 govern them thought only how best and most quickly to 
 fill their pockets, knowing that their tenure of office would 
 be very short. The people there compared their condition 
 with that of the self-governing communities pi Scio and 
 other islands. Education had spread to some extent in 
 spite of the neglect of the Government. Wealthy Greeks 
 from other districts had endowed some schools and colleges. 
 With education came the study of the past history of Greece 
 and the ambition to renew its nationality and greatness. 
 For some time past secret societies such as the Hetairia, 
 promoted in the first instance by the Greeks of Odessa, 
 had been spreading their influence in Greece, and had laid 
 the seeds of revolution. 
 
 The insurrection in Greece was not only based on 
 political and racial ideals, it was also an agrarian war, the 
 revolt of cultivators of the soil against their feudal 
 oppressors. This gave to the outbreak in rural districts 
 its intensely persistent, passionate, and cruel attributes. 
 
 The revolution broke out in the Morea at the beginning 
 of April 1 82 1, and soon spread over the whole of its 
 country districts. It was estimated that at that time there 
 were twenty thousand Moslems thinly spread in the country 
 districts, most of them of Greek race, feudal lords of the 
 soil and oppressors of the rayas. Nearly the whole of these 
 Moslems were now brutally murdered, without distinction of 
 age or sex. The survivors fled into the fortresses, which 
 were garrisoned by Turks. These fortresses were speedily 
 invested by the Greeks, and within three months nearly all 
 of them were compelled to surrender. In most cases capitu- 
 lations were agreed to on the terms that lives would be 
 respected, but in no case were these terms adhered to. The 
 garrisons and the Turkish inhabitants and the refugees 
 from the country districts who had gathered there were 
 brutally murdered. 
 
 The first encounter between the Turkish soldiers and the 
 Greeks that could be called a battle was at Valtetsi, in the 
 neighbourhood of Tripolitza, the capital of the Morea. 
 Three thousand Greek peasants there defeated five thousand 
 Turks, with a loss of four hundred Turks and a hundred 
 and fifty Greeks. The battle destroyed the prestige of
 
 '262 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the Turks. It showed that they were no match for the 
 insurgent Greek peasants. 
 
 As a result of this victory, Navarino and Tripolitza fell 
 into the hands of the Greek insurgents after short sieves. 
 In both cases the garrisons capitulated on favourable terms 
 for themselves and the inhabitants of the towns. In neither 
 case were the terms observed. All the Moslem troops 
 and inhabitants were ruthlessly massacred. At Tripolitza 
 these numbered eight thousand, including women and 
 children. " Greek historians," says Finlay in his History 
 of Greece, " have recoiled from telling of these barbarities, 
 while they have been loud in denouncing those of the 
 Turks." 
 
 When news of the massacres in the Morea arrived at 
 Constantinople the greatest alarm and indignation arose. 
 Bloody and ruthless reprisals ensued against the Greeks 
 residing there. The Sultan set the example. He directed 
 that many of the leading Greeks were to be imme- 
 diately executed. The Greek Patriarch was hanged by 
 his order at the gate of the episcopal residence. The fetx'a 
 authorizing this was pinned to his body. There was no 
 reason to believe that the Patriarch was implicated in the 
 outbreak in Greece. Four other bishops met the same 
 fate. Thousands of Greeks of inferior position fell victims 
 to the fury of the people at the capital and at many other 
 cities, such as Smyrna and Salonika, and in Cyprus. The 
 Sultan took no Steps to restrain these horrors. Women 
 and children equally with men were murdered. Their houses 
 were burnt, their property was pillaged. It was estimated 
 that the number of Greeks thus massacred was not short of 
 the number of Moslems slaughtered in Greece at the out- 
 break of the revolution. Thenceforth Greeks and Turks 
 emulated one another in their acts of barbarity. The Turks 
 had always been bloodthirsty when their passions and fears 
 were roused, and they now had terrible wrongs to avenge. 
 The Greeks had been degraded by long oppression, and 
 were little better than Turks. Both people evidently thought 
 that the results of their cruelties were proof of the wisdom 
 of inflicting them. The Greeks, by extirpating the Moslems 
 in the Morea, cleared the country, once for all, of their 
 oppressors and effected that separation of the two races 
 which, it will be seen later, the Great Powers of Europe 
 thought desirable, though they hoped to attain it by peace-
 
 MAHMOUD II 263 
 
 ful expropriation and indemnity. The Turks claimed that 
 their severities checked the spread of the revolution, and 
 compelled one half of the Greek people living within their 
 midst to submit to Ottoman rule. 
 
 It has been shown that the revolution broke out in the 
 Morea. Within a few months the whole of that country 
 was cleared of Ottoman troops and of Moslem inhabitants. 
 The outbreak extended to most of the islands of the archi- 
 pelago, where the Greeks predominated, where there was 
 less admixture of Slav blood than on the mainland, and 
 where the traditions of a long-past national existence and 
 of high civihzation survived in a stronger form. In 
 spite of their greater prosperity, due to milder treatment 
 at the hands of the^ Turks, they were ardently in favour of 
 independence. It was in the islands that the majority 
 of Greek merchant vessels w^ere owned. They numbered 
 between four and five hundred, and were manned by twelve 
 thousand Greek sailors. An active war fleet was formed out 
 of these vessels and sailors. They frequently met and 
 defeated the Turkish fleet. They made special use of fire 
 ships, and blew up or burnt many of the Turkish vessels 
 and caused the greatest alarm to the Turkish sailors. 
 
 In the course of the four years 182 1-4, the Turks were 
 generally worsted by the Greek insurgents on land and 
 sea. Not only the Morea, but the parts of Greece north of 
 the Gulf of Corinth up to the frontier of Thessaly, includ- 
 ing Athens — then reduced to a squalid, third-rate town^ 
 and the islands of the archipelago, achieved a practical 
 independence. A national government and a representative 
 assembly were constituted. The outbreak in Greece roused 
 the sympathies of great numbers of persons in Western 
 Europe, especially in England and France. In spite of this, 
 the Governments of these countries for long held aloof and 
 discouraged the rebellion, not wishing to see Turkey 
 weakened as against Russia. Lord Byron v/as an enthusiast 
 for the Greeks, and in 1824 landed at Missolonghi and 
 joined their army. But it cannot be said that he effected 
 much during the short time he survived there. He was 
 evidently disillusioned, like so many other Philhcllenes who 
 joined the Greeks, by the discords, intrigues, and cor- 
 ruption of their leaders. But he never lost faith in their 
 future. He confidently predicted that the Greek nation 
 would prove itself worthy of freedom. He gave his life
 
 -^264 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to the cause. He died of malarial fever within a few 
 weeks of landing at this unhealthy spot. This did much 
 to arouse the interest of Europe and to promote its inter- 
 vention on behalf of the Greeks. 
 
 After four years of futile efforts to stamp out the Greek 
 revolution, it became clear to Sultan Mahmoud that his 
 army, as then constituted, was unequal to the task. He 
 was much impressed by the success of Mehemet Ali in 
 Egypt in creating an army armed and drilled in the manner 
 of European armies. In 1824, he called on this great 
 vassal to aid in the reconquest of Greece by sending his 
 new army and fleet there. Mehemet consented to do so, 
 but only on the promise of the Sultan that Syria, Damascus, 
 and Crete, would be added to his Pashalic. He sent his 
 fleet to co-operate with that of the Sultan on the coast of 
 the Morea. It sailed from Alexandria on July 25, 1824, 
 with an army of ten thousand infantry and a thousand 
 cavalry, under command of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of 
 Mehemet Ali. They were landed at Modon and marched 
 thence to Navarino. That fortress was garrisoned by six- 
 teen hundred Greeks. The flower of the Greek army of 
 seven thousand men advanced to relieve the fortress. 
 Ibrahim with three thousand men attacked and utterly 
 defeated them. The Greeks fled in wild confusion. This 
 battle was proof that the best Greek troops were unable 
 to encounter the well-disciplined Egyptians in a pitched 
 battle. 
 
 After the capture of Navarino, Ibrahim continued his 
 reconquest of Greece with uniform success. The Greeks 
 were exhausted by their long' struggle against the Turks. 
 They could offer but a very feeble resistance to this new 
 and far more effective enemy. In April, 1826, the Egyptian 
 army captured Missolonghi, causing a loss to the Greeks 
 of four thousand men. Thence he gradually subdued the 
 whole of the Morea. Later the cities of Corinth and 
 Athens fell into the hands of the Turks, and on M,ay 6, 1827, 
 at a battle at Phalerum, in the neighbourhood of this last 
 city, Reschid Pasha, in command of an Albanian army, 
 defeated and dispersed the last army of the Greeks then 
 in the field. The Greek Government was forced to remove 
 from the mainland to the island of Poros. The whole of 
 Greece then fell into anarchy. Though the Greek fleet con- 
 tinued to make a gallant stand against the combined
 
 MAHMOUD II '265 
 
 Turkish and Egyptian fleets, it was not strong enough to 
 maintain a mastery at sea and to cut off the communication 
 between Ibrahim's army and its base in Egypt. It is 
 certain that if the Great Powers of Europe had not inter- 
 vened, Greece would have been completely subdued, and 
 Turkish rule would have been reinstated there. Ibrahim 
 threatened to remove the whole Greek population and sell 
 them into slavery, and to replace them by Egyptians ^nd 
 Arabs. 
 
 Meanwhile the success of Ibrahim's army, armed and 
 disciplined on the model of European armies, as compared 
 with the failure in previous campaigns in Greece of the 
 ill -disciplined and badly armed troops of Turkey, produced 
 a great impression at Constantinople. Mahmoud now found 
 that his long -cherished project for the reform of the army 
 was supported almost unanimously by the Divan and by 
 the whole of the ulemas. He determined, therefore, to 
 carry it into effect, and to suppress his mortal foes, the 
 Janissaries. He had been long engaged in making pre- 
 parations for a decisive issue with these turbulent troops. 
 He had formed a body of fourteen thousand artillerymen, 
 drilled and armed on the new model, and on whom he could 
 thoroughly rely for support. His predecessor, Selim, had 
 enlisted a small body of infantry on the same model. The 
 Agha of the Janissaries, Hussein Pasha, was devoted to 
 him, as was also the Mufti. The Sultan thereupon, in May 
 1826, gave orders to the Janissaries that one -fourth of them 
 were to be incorporated in the new corps of infantry. The 
 Janissaries refused. They marched in a body, on June 14th, 
 to the palace, intent on overawing the Sultan, as they had 
 so often done in the past. They met their master on this 
 occasion. The Sultan summoned the artillery to his support. 
 He unfolded the sacred banner and directed their action. 
 They pounded the Janissaries with cannon shot in the 
 streets leading to the palace and drove them back to their 
 barracks with heavy loss. The guns were then concentrated 
 on the barracks and set fire to them. No quarter was 
 given. The Janissaries perished either by gim fire or in 
 the burning barracks. Four thousand of them were dis- 
 posed of in this holocaust. The Sultan ruthlessly followed 
 up his victory. Many more thousands of the Janis- 
 saries were put to death in Constantinople and in other 
 cities of the Empire. The force was entirely destroyed. Its
 
 '266 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 very name was erased from official records. Mahmoud had 
 obtained an overwhelming victory. His new army was 
 at once increased to forty-five thousand men, exclusive of 
 his artillery, with the intention of gradually raising it to 
 two hundred thousand. It was recruited, however, wholly 
 from the Moslem population. The Christians were ex- 
 cluded from its rank;^ as rigidly as under the old regime. 
 There can be no doubt that if time had been allowted to 
 Mahmoud to complete the number and efficiency of this 
 new army, the Ottoman Empire would again have become 
 a most formidable military Power. The Sultan did much 
 more to centralize power in himself. He abolished the 
 military feudal system, which had become a gross abuse. 
 The beys were everywhere suppressed, or were allowed to 
 draw their incomes only for the term of their lives. The 
 rents hitherto paid to these persons were in the future to be 
 paid directly to the State. 
 
 Mahmoud also effected many other important reforms. 
 He abolished the Court of Confiscations, which had provided 
 a revenue to the State out of property of persons con- 
 demned to death or exile, and which had become a great 
 abuse. He deprived pashas of their power to put people 
 to death at their will without trial. He enacted that no 
 one should in future be so dealt with without formal trial 
 and the right of appeal. He put the vast Vacouf property 
 (dedicated to Islam) under State management. He 
 prohibited the wearing of turbans and made the use of the 
 fez universal in his Empire. He set the example of cloth- 
 ing himself after the European fashion. He entertained 
 ambassadors and their wives and others at his palace as 
 other sovereigns did. He contemplated great reforms in 
 favour of his Christian subjects, but it will be seen that the 
 task was left incomplete for his successors. 
 
 At this point of his career Mahmoud had attained un- 
 qualified success. He had succeeded in putting down 
 all the rebellious pashas, such as AH of Janina and others 
 Mehemet Ali of Egypt had recognized the supremacy of 
 the Sultan by sending his army and navy to suppress the 
 Greek rebellion. Greece had been practically reconquered 
 The Greeks in other parts of the Empire had been terrorized 
 into submission. Insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia 
 had been suppressed. The Serbian fortresses were in his 
 hands. Above all, the Janissaries, who had proved to
 
 MAHxMOUD II 267 
 
 be so useless as a military force and who had murdered two 
 of his predecessors and deposed many others, were sup- 
 pressed. He had carried out great reforms in his Empire. 
 Mahmoud had effected all this by his own inflexible firm- 
 ness and by statesmanship of a high order, not unmixed 
 with cruelty and cunning. 
 
 Two events now occurred which materially affected the 
 position of Turkey, and deprived Mahmoud of the fruits 
 of his ably devised policy. The one was the death of 
 Alexander, the Emperor of Russia, the other the decision 
 of the British Government to intervene on behalf of Greece'. 
 Alexander for some years past had been on the horns of a 
 dilemma. He had a deep sympathy for the subjects of 
 the Ottoman Empire who were members of the Greek 
 Church, and a great aversion to Turkish rule. But he also 
 hated and feared revolution. He believed in the divine 
 right of rulers, however bad, and would take no step to 
 support the revolt of their subjects, however oppressive 
 their government. He feared that a dangerous precedent 
 might be extended to his own Empire. This conflict of 
 views paralysed his action. He gave no assistance to 
 the Greek insurgents. So long as he lived there was 
 little hope that Greece would recover its independence. 
 He died late in 1825, and was succeeded by his brother, 
 Nicholas, a much younger and more vigorous man, and a 
 truer exponent of Russian ideals. The new Czar had no 
 objection to insurrection if it was not directed against his 
 own government. He hated the Turks and wished to drive 
 them out of Europe much more than he sympathized with 
 the Greeks. He had many other grounds of complaint 
 against the Porte. It has also been suggested that he 
 wished to come to conclusions with it before time had 
 been given for perfecting' his new army. 
 
 As regards Great Britain, its Government had not 
 originally sympathized with the Greek revolution, but the 
 reverse. But public opinion, outraged by the barbarities 
 which had been committed, had produced an influence on 
 it, and Mr. Canning, the Foreign Secretary, was personally 
 very favourable to the cause of Greece. The Government 
 as a whole held the view that the continuance of disorder 
 in Greece was a menace to the peace of Europe. They 
 had no wish for the extension of Russia at the expense of 
 Turkey. They thought that if Greece were not pacified
 
 268 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Russia would intervene, and would not confine its claim to 
 the settlement of the Greek claims, but would aim at other 
 conquests. They decided, therefore, to make an effort to 
 settle the Greek question on the basis of autonomy, subject to 
 the suzerainty of the Sultan. In this view the Cabinet sent 
 the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg in 1826 to 
 negotiate with the Czar. He effected an arrangement which 
 was later embodied in the treaty of London of July 6, 1827, 
 between the three Powers, Great Britain, Russia, and 
 France, for the pacification of Greece. Under the terms 
 of this treaty it was agreed, with a view to bringing about 
 a reconciliation between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks, 
 to offer mediation, and to demand an immediate armistice 
 as a preliminary to the opening of a negotiation. 
 
 Under the arrangement to be proposed to the Ottoman 
 Porte, Greece was to be granted complete autonomy, under 
 the suzerainty of the Sultan, and was to pay a fixed annual 
 tribute. It was to be governed by authorities whom its 
 people were to nominate. In order to bring about a 
 complete separation between the individuals of the two 
 nations and to prevent the collisions resulting from a long 
 struggle, the Greeks were to enter upon possession of all 
 Turkish property, either on the continent or in the isles of 
 Greece, on condition of indemnifying the former proprietors 
 by the payment of an annual sum to be added to the tribute. 
 By an additional secret article it was provided that "if, within 
 one month, the Ottoman Porte did not agree to accept the 
 mediation of the three Powers and consent to an armistice, 
 the signatories of the treaty would find the necessity for 
 an approximation with the Greeks by entering into relations 
 with them, and would employ all their means for the 
 accomplishment of the objects of the treaty without, how- 
 ever, taking any part in the hostilities between the two 
 contending parties." 
 
 In accordance with this treaty, a demand was made on 
 the Porte, by the ambassadors of the three Powers, for an 
 armistice, and for a pacification of Greece on the basis 
 above described. The Porte indignantly refused to enter- 
 tain the proposed mediation. It denied the right of the 
 Powers to intervene as regards its Greek subjects. In a 
 manifesto to its own people, the Porte justified its refusal 
 to mediate on the proposed basis. It denied that the 
 Greeks had any cause for complaint against the Ottoman
 
 MAHMOUD II 269 
 
 rule. "It is notorious," it said, " that these Greeks have 
 been treated like Mussulmans in every respect and as to 
 everything which regards their property, their personal 
 security, and the defence of their homes, and that they have 
 been loaded with benefits by the present Sultan." 
 
 The negotiations between the Porte and the ambassadors 
 were protracted by the former, in order that an Egyptian 
 fleet, bringing large reinforcements to Ibrahim in Greece, 
 might arrive at Navarino before the conclusion of them. 
 After the final rejection of the proposals of the ambassadors, 
 instructions were given to the combined fleet of the three 
 Powers to efifect a blockade of the Greek ports, and to 
 prevent the entrance or departure of any Turkish or 
 Egyptian vessels of war. 
 
 The combined fleet, under command of the British 
 admiral. Sir Edward Codrington, thereupon took up a 
 position outside the bay of Navarino. The admiral then 
 entered into negotiations with the Turkish admiral and 
 concluded an armistice on behalf of the Greeks. In spite 
 of this, the Egyptian troops, under Ibrahim Pasha, con- 
 tinued to ravage the Morea in the most cruel manner, 
 devastating property, murdering the men, and carrying ofif 
 the young women for sale as slaves in Egypt. As the 
 winter was approaching, the British admiral thought it 
 would be difficult to maintain his position outside the bay. 
 He determined, therefore, to enter the bay with his fleet. 
 The combined fleet consisted of ten vessels of the line, ten 
 frigates and smaller vessels, with about twelve hundred 
 guns. The Turko -Egyptian fleet consisted of five ships 
 of the line, fifteen frigates, and sixty -two smaller vessels, 
 armed with two thousand guns. It was anchored in ,a 
 crescent facing the entrance of the bay. There were also 
 batteries on shore commanding the entrance of the bay. 
 The allied fleet entered the bay without opposition from 
 these batteries and anchored in a line alongside of the 
 Turkish and Egyptian vessels. 
 
 It was obvious that the position was a most critical one, 
 almost certain to lead to an armed conflict. The Turks 
 fired the first gun and broke the armistice, whether inten- 
 tionally, or not, is not quite clear. The challenge was 
 taken up. There followed a fierce battle between the two 
 fleets. In a few hours of this 20th' of October, 1827, the 
 Turko -Egyptian fleet was completely destroyed. With the
 
 270 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 exception of some of the smaller craft, all the vessels were 
 sunk or burnt. Their crews had fought valiantly, but they 
 were no match for those of the allied fleet. But their 
 guns caused much loss of life and did much damage, and 
 the British battleships, after the battle, were compelled to 
 return to England for repairs. The batteries on shore 
 did not begin to fire until the allied fleet had taken position. 
 They might have effected much more damage if they had 
 fired on the fleet when entering the bay. A more complete 
 destruction of a fleet had never occurred. 
 
 This great victory gave no satisfaction to the British 
 Government. The spirit of Canning no longer inspired 
 it. He had died since the initiation of the policy which 
 inevitably led to this naval battle. On the meeting of the 
 British Parliament, early in 1828, the Speech from the 
 Throne referred to the battle in the following terms : " His 
 Majesty deeply laments that this conflict should have oc- 
 curred with the naval force of our ancient ally. Pie still 
 entertains a confident hope that this untoward event will 
 not be followed by further hostilities." The Duke of 
 Wellington, who was now Prime Minister, when challenged 
 in the House of Lords as to the expression * untoward 
 event,* said : — 
 
 The Ottoman Empire was an essential part of the balance of power 
 in Europe. Its preservation had been for many years an object to the 
 whole of Europe. While he acquitted the British admiral of all blame, 
 he pointed out that, under the treaty of London, one of the stipulations 
 was that the operation was not to lead to hostilities. When, therefore, the 
 operation under the treaty did lead to hostilities, it certainly was an 
 untoward event. 
 
 It is difficult, however, to conceive how the Duke, who had 
 negotiated the treaty with the Czar of Russia, could have 
 supposed that, in the event of the Sultan not agreeing to 
 the terms of mediation, the use of force against him could 
 be avoided. ' ,' 
 
 However that might have been, the destruction of the 
 Ottoman fleet at Navarino was of momentous importance. 
 It cut ofif the communication between Ibrahim Pasha and 
 Egypt. It restored to Greece command of the sea in the 
 archipelago. It assured the supremacy of the Russian fleet 
 in the Black Sea. This last was of enormous value to the 
 Russians in the war which soon broke out with Turkey. It
 
 MAHMOUD II 271 
 
 facilitated the capture of Varna, and enabled the Russian 
 army to advance across the Balkans and to threaten 
 Constantinople. 
 
 Ibrahim Pasha, finding his position in the Morea un- 
 tenable, entered into a convention with the British admiral 
 under which he was permitted to withdraw the Egyptian 
 army from Greece and embark it for Alexandria without 
 molestation from the allied fleet. There remained in the 
 Morea only the Turkish troops. They held most of the 
 fortresses there. Later, a French army, under General 
 Maison, was, by agreement with the allies, sent to the Morea. 
 It soon cleared the whole country of the Turkish troops. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Sultan at Constantinople, in spite of the 
 destruction of his fleet at Navarino, still maintained an 
 obstinate refusal to accede to the terms of the treaty of 
 London. The ambassadors of England and France there- 
 upon left the city. Differences then began to arise between 
 the three allied Powers. The Emperor of Russia pro- 
 posed to employ coercive measures against Turkey, and 
 for this purpose to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. 
 England and France rejected the proposal. They wished 
 to preserve the Ottoman Empire as well as to secure the 
 independence of Greece. But the Greek question was only 
 one of the complaints of Russia against Turkey. It had 
 also grave reasons to complain that the treaty of Bucharest 
 and the later treaty of Akermann of 1826, confirming and 
 extending it_, were disregarded by the Porte, which 3till 
 occupied Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia by its armies. 
 The Sultan, in a manifesto to his own people, had publicly 
 announced that he had entered into the treaty of Akermann 
 with the full intention of not being bound by its terms, and 
 that he regarded Russia as his hereditary foe. 
 
 On April 26, 1828, Russia declared war against Turkey. 
 England and France found themselves in a position when 
 they could not object, for the Porte still refused their 
 demands as regards Greece. They had joined with Russia 
 in destroying the Turkish fleet. They were now compelled 
 to stand by while the Russians invaded Turkey. The 
 position, and still more the results of the war, showed 
 v.'hat a grave error Mahmoud committed when he refused 
 to agree to the scheme of the allied Powers for granting 
 autonomy to Greece under the suzerainty of Turkey. If 
 he had accepted, his fleet would have been intact. England
 
 272 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and France would have been in a position to object to 
 Russia's schemes. As it was, Greece secured an absolute 
 independence, and Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia were 
 soon, by the victories of Russia, to secure the status of 
 complete autonomy which the Sultan had refused to 
 Greece. 
 
 The Emperor Nicholas, in nominal command of his army, 
 crossed the Pruth on May 7, 1828. His force consisted of 
 not more than sixty -five thousand men, a surprisingly small 
 number for the greatest military Power in Europe to put 
 into the field. It was necessary, however, to keep a large 
 army in Poland, where an outbreak was expected. Another 
 army was stationed in the Ukraine to watch Austria, who 
 regarded the Russian attack on Turkey with suspicion and 
 malevolence ; and a fourth army of thirty thousand men, 
 under General Paskiewich, invaded Asia Minor from the 
 Caucasus. With the main army it was hoped to cross 
 the Balkans and to menace Constantinople. The Turks 
 offered no resistance in Moldavia and Wallachia. But it 
 was not till June 8th that the Russians were able to effect 
 a crossing over the Danube. The Sultan, on his part, 
 commenced the campaign under great disadvantages. His 
 old army of Janissaries had recently been destroyed. The 
 new army, equipped and drilled in the fashion of European 
 armies, was very raw and ill-trained. It consisted of very 
 young men, who were recruited with difhculty, often by 
 compulsion, for the new service was very unpopular, and 
 the older men could not be induced to join. It did not 
 count more than forty -five thousand men, exclusive of the 
 artillery. It was supplemented by irregulars from Asia, 
 and the total force under arms was estimated at one hundred 
 and eighty thousand men, of whom, after providing for 
 the defence of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, for a 
 reserve at Adrianople and for other demands on the Empire 
 in Europe and Asia, there remained only fifty thousand 
 men to oppose the Russians in Bulgaria, and to provide 
 garrisons for the fortresses on the Danube and for Schumla 
 and Varna. These garrisons, however, were supported by 
 the armed Turkish inhabitants of the towns, who could 
 be relied on for a vigorous resistance. The Turks /were 
 under the further disadvantage that the greater part of 
 their fleet had been destroyed at Navarino. The Russians 
 were, in consequence, completely masters in the Black Sea.
 
 MAHMOUD II '273 
 
 They were able to send to the JEgenn archipelago another 
 fleet, which Hockaded the Dardanelles. 
 
 In spite of these difficulties, the Turks made an .un- 
 expectedly vigorous defence against the Russian invasion in 
 Europe. The campaign of 1828 was mainly one of sieges, 
 where the Turkish soldiers, supported by Moslems of the 
 fortified towns, fought to the best advantage behind walls 
 and earthworks. They could make but a poor stand in the 
 open against their better trained enemy. 
 
 The Russians, after crossing the Danube, laid siege to 
 Ibrail, the most important fortress on the lower stretch 
 of the river, and which it was essentially necessary to 
 capture before making an advance to Schumla. The 
 garrison and inhabitants made a gallant resistance, and 
 it was only after five weeks that it was compelled to sur- 
 render, on June 17th. The Russian army was then divided 
 into three parts — the one to attack Silistria, the capture of 
 which was almost as necessary as that of Ibrail ; the second 
 to besiege Varna ; the third and most important, under the 
 Emperor, to march to Schumla. The attack on Silistria 
 failed, and after some weeks the force employed against 
 it marched in the direction of Schumla to support the 
 Czar's army. Even with this addition it was found 
 impossible to invest the fortified camp of the Turks behind 
 Schumla, and, after a demonstration, it was compelled 
 to hold a defensive position, in front of Schumla, while 
 the Czar and a part of the army marched in support of 
 the division before Varna. 
 
 On August I 8th the Czar arrived there with a reinforce- 
 ment of nine thousand men, and the siege then commenced, 
 while the Russian Black Sea fleet of eight ships of the 
 line and three frigates, under command of Admiral Greig, 
 joined in the attack from the sea. The Turks again made 
 a desperate and prolonged defence, which might have been 
 successful if it had not been that Jussuf Pasha, in 
 command of the garrison, with five thousand of his men, 
 traitorously deserted the city, on October 14th, and threw 
 themselves on the mercy of the Czar. The remainder 
 of the garrison, under the Capitan Pasha, refused to be 
 a party to the surrender. It was said that the cause of 
 this extraordinary act of treachery was that the Sultan, 
 in pursuance of his policy of concentrating all power and 
 authority in himself, had been persuaded by an intrigue 
 
 [18
 
 '274 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to confiscate the property of Jussuf, who was one of the few 
 large landowners in Turkey, while the owner was gallantly 
 fighting the enemy at Varna. However that may be, the 
 remaining garrison was soon compelled to capitulate, and 
 this most important stronghold fell into the hands of the 
 Russians. Without it no advance could possibly have been 
 made across the Balkans. 
 
 The campaign of 1828 came to an end with the surrender 
 of Varna. Though the Russians had been able to capture 
 two of the four fortresses which barred their way to the 
 Balkans, the campaign had not been without success to 
 the Turks. They had shown unexpected powers of re- 
 sistance, and had prevented for a year the achievement 
 of the main object of the Russians— their advance to Con- 
 stantinople. The losses of the Russians had been very 
 great, not only in the sieges, but by disease, which dogged 
 their armies as usual. 
 
 Baron von Moltke, the German general, who, at the 
 invitation of the Sultan, was with the Turkish headquarters 
 during this war, writes of the Russian and Turkish troops 
 in his remarkable history of it : — 
 
 The faults of the Russian Staff were atoned for by the innate excellence 
 of the Russian troops. The self-sacrificing obedience of the commanders, 
 the steadiness of the common soldiers, their power of endurance and 
 unshaken bravery in times of danger, were the qualities that enabled 
 them to avert the dangers of their position before Schumla and to hold 
 the Turks in check, and to make up for all deficiencies and overcome all 
 resistance at Varna.' 
 
 Of the Turks he adds : — 
 
 We cannot say much for the skill of the Turkish commanders, but the 
 conduct of the Turks, from the highest officers to the last soldier at 
 the storming of Ibrail, their courage and steadiness in the mines and 
 trenches) before Varna, were far above all praise. 
 
 In Asia the Turks had not done so well. General 
 Paskiewich was able to defeat the army in front of him 
 and to capture the important stronghold of Kars and its 
 adjoining district. 
 
 The campaign of 1829 began late. It was not till the 
 middle of May that the Russian army again took the field, 
 
 ' Moltke, p. 257.
 
 MAHMOUD II 275 
 
 not on this occasion under the Czar, but under General 
 Diebitsch, who proved to be a most able general and 
 diplomatist. The army was again most inadequate for 
 the campaign which was in contemplation — namely, the 
 crossing of the Balkans and an advance to Constantinople. 
 It consisted of no more than sixty-eight thousand men, a 
 force which, in these days, eighty -eight years later, would 
 count for little or nothing. It was thought necessary, as a 
 condition precedent to any advance, to capture Silistria. The 
 siege was commenced on May 17, 1829. The Russian 
 force detailed for this was not more than fourteen thousand 
 men. The Turks who defended it were twenty-one thousand 
 in number, including eight thousand armed inhabitants. 
 In spite of this disparity of numbers, the town was captured 
 after a siege of forty-four days, on July 26th, at a loss 
 to the Russians of two thousand five hundred men. 
 
 In the meantime Diebitsch had advanced with the main 
 army in the direction of Schumla. Reschid Pasha, who 
 had replaced Hussein Pasha as Grand Vizier and Seraskier, 
 issued from Schumla with forty thousand men, and on 
 June 1 8th a great battle took place at Kulewtska. The 
 Turks were utterly defeated by a very inferior force of 
 Russians. They had begun the battle with an impetuous 
 charge, but they could not sustain it against the serried 
 ranks of the Russian veterans. Some ammunition wagons 
 exploded and, as often happened with the Turks, a wild 
 panic ensued. They fled from the field of battle land 
 dispersed in all directions. All their artillery fell into the 
 hands of the Russians. Reschid escaped at the head of 
 six hundred men and found his way to Schumla, Where 
 there were ten thousand Turks, and where a large 
 number of fugitives from the battle eventually found 
 refuge. This victory at Kulewtska had far-reaching effects. 
 It was the first great battle in which the new troops of 
 Mahmoud were tested. It showed that the Russian soldiers 
 had an overwhelming superiority. 
 
 Silistria fell on July 13th. The Russians who had been 
 engaged in the siege then joined Diebitsch before Schumla. 
 The general thereupon decided on the bold and even 
 perilous course of crossing the Balkans, without previously 
 capturing Schumla and its army. Leaving ten thousand 
 men to mask that fortress, where a much greater force 
 of Turks was now assembled, consisting largely of men
 
 '276 THE TURKISH ExMPIRE 
 
 demoralized by the recent defeat, Diebitsch commenced 
 his march with such secrecy that for some days the Turks 
 were not aware of it. Reschid Pasha, expecting an attack 
 on Schumla, and thinking his force insufficient for its 
 defence, had called in the various corps who were posted 
 for the defence of the mountain passes. Diebitsch there- 
 fore met with no opposition. He crossed the mountains 
 in nine days of forced marches fraught with great hard- 
 ship to his troops. When south of the mountain range, 
 he deflected his route to the Black Sea and got into com- 
 munication with the Russian fleet, under Admiral Greig, 
 which assisted in the capture of Bourgas and other ports 
 along the coast, and afforded supplies to Diebitsch's army. 
 
 Three battles were fought south of the mountains, at 
 Aidos, Karnabad and Slivno, where small divisions of Turks 
 were defeated and dispersed. After three weeks from 
 crossing the Balkans, Diebitsch arrived in front of 
 Adrianople, a city of eighty thousand inhabitants, with a 
 garrison of ten thousand men. His army was by this time 
 reduced to less than twenty thousand men. Its appearance 
 before Adrianople caused wild panic. Never before had 
 a hostile army crossed the southern range of the Balkans. 
 It was thought to be impossible. It was confidently believed 
 that the Russian army numbered over one hundred thousand 
 men. The city and its garrison surrendered without making 
 a show of fight. Everywhere on its route through Bulgaria 
 the Christian raya population had received the invaders 
 with acclamation and the Turks had thrown away their 
 arms and fled. The campaign of 1829 in Asia had been 
 almost equally disastrous to the Turks. Paskiewich had 
 defeated them in a pitched battle and had captured Erze- 
 roum. He was now approaching Trebizond^ after dispersing 
 an army on the way. 
 
 When news reached Constantinople of the crossing of 
 the Balkans and the capture of Adrianople, there was con- 
 sternation and dismay among Turks of all classes. The 
 Sultan almost alone maintained his presence of mind. He 
 issued a proclamation calling on all the Turks in the city 
 to join in its defence. He announced his intention to 
 take command in person . The sacred banner of the Prophet 
 was unfurled. But when, at the first review of the forces, 
 the Sultan appeared in a carriage and not on horseback, 
 this " unheard of and indecorous innovation " chilled the
 
 MAHMOUD II 277 
 
 enthusiasm of the volunteers, and undid the good which 
 was expected from his action. 
 
 There was no great zeal for the defence of the capital. 
 The chief ministers of the Porte were unanimous in 
 advising the Sultan to sue for terms of peace. They were 
 quite ignorant of the weakness of the Russian army. They 
 beheved the stories that more than a hundred thousand men 
 were advancing on the capital. There were no troops 
 at Constantinople, they said, able to meet this army. The 
 ambassadors of England and France, who had recently, 
 returned to Constantinople, at the invitation of the Sultan, 
 backed up the ministers, and urgently advised him to come 
 to terms with the enemy. We now know that all this 
 advice and these alarms were founded on false informa- 
 tion and that there was no real justification for them. 
 In fact, the real position of the Russian army was one 
 of extreme danger. It had suffered great losses on the 
 battlefields and from the hardships of the forced marches, 
 and was also being decimated by disease. There was 
 no possibility of its being reinforced. Retreat across the 
 Balkans was almost impossible. The Turkish army at 
 Schumla was now reinforced. On its flank there was an 
 army of twenty thousand Albanians, under the rebellious 
 Pasha of Scotra, who had refused aid to the Porte in the 
 earlier part of the campaign, but who, now that the existence 
 of the Empire was threatened, might confidently be expected 
 to come to its aid. Advance to Constantinople might also 
 be dangerous, if not impossible. It (was distant one 
 hundred and forty miles. Its garrison of thirty thousand 
 men, supplemented by fresh volunteers, might be relied on 
 to meet the Russians, now reduced to much less than twenty 
 thousand. These difficulties of the Russian army, however, 
 were not known to the Porte. 
 
 In view of the strong pressure brought to bear tipon 
 him, the Sultan, for once in his life, gave way, and agreed 
 to send plenipotentaries to Adrianople to discuss terms of 
 peace. Diebitsch well knew the danger of his position, 
 and was anxious to make peace, but he maintained lan 
 attitude of firmness and confidence. He was ready, he 
 said, to discuss terms, but he was equally willing to advance 
 with his army against the capital. Already a part of his 
 army was pressed forward. It occupied a line from the 
 Black Sea at Kilia to Enos in the archipelago — a distance
 
 ■278 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of over one hundred miles, much too long for his weak 
 force. It is recognized by Moltke and all military authori- 
 ties that if the Porte had stood firm and had refused to 
 agree to terms, Diebitsch could not have made good his 
 threatened attack on the capital. In the history of war 
 there has never been a more successful case of ' bluff.' 
 The Porte gave in to unreasoning and ill-informed fear, 
 and on September 19th peace was concluded between the 
 two Powers and the treaty of Adrianople was signed. 
 
 It is certain [said Moltke] that this treaty released Diebitsch from a 
 position as perilous as could well be conceived, and which, if prolonged 
 for a few more days, might have caused him to be hurled down from 
 the summit of victory to the lowest depth of ruin and destruction." 
 
 The terms of peace agreed to were moderate, so far as 
 Russia itself was concerned, though very serious in their 
 effect on the Ottoman Empire. The Czar had proclaimed 
 at the outset of the war that he had no desire for territorial 
 aggrandizement. He fully adhered to this promise. With 
 two comparatively small exceptions, Russia gave up all 
 the territory which it had conquered in the war, both in 
 Europe and Asia. It retained only a small part of 
 Moldavia which gave access to the Sulina mouth of 
 the Danube, a position of great importance to it in the 
 future. In Asia, Kars and Erzeroum were given back to 
 Turkey. In Europe, the Pruth continued to be the 
 boundary of the two States. But Moldavia and Wallachia, 
 though nominally restored to the Ottoman Empire, were 
 practically freed from it. They were to enjoy complete 
 autonomy. The Hospodars, in future, were to be appointed 
 for life. The two States were to be allowed to raise 
 armies independent of the Porte. The tribute payable in 
 future was to be fixed, and could not be increased. 
 Religious and commercial freedom were to be secured to 
 them. The Sultan was to be their suzerain and nothing 
 more. This meant practical independence. The same 
 privileges were secured for Serbia, with the exception that 
 the Porte was to be permitted to garrison the fortresses of 
 Belgrade and Orsova. The Turks were required to depart 
 from all other parts of the country.. Silistria was to be 
 returned to Turkey, but other fortresses on the Danube were 
 
 ' Moltke, p. 443.
 
 MAHMOUD II 279 
 
 to be razed. That river, therefore, ceased to be the first 
 defence of the Turkish Empire to the north. An indemnity 
 of eleven and a half million ducats, equal to five millions 
 sterling, was to be paid by Turkey for the expenses of 
 Russia in the war. The payment was to be spread over 
 ten years, and the territory occupied by Russia was not to 
 be wholly surrendered till this was eft'ected. 
 
 As regards Greece, the treaty embodied and made obli- 
 gatory on the Sultan the provisions of the treaty of London 
 of July, 1827, between the three Powers, and the further 
 protocol between them of March 1829, which defined 
 the future limits of Greece. Under the protocol, the 
 boundary line was to run from the Gulf of Volo to the 
 Gulf of Arta, so as to include the greater part of Thessaly. 
 The country south of this was to be subject to a monarchical 
 government, hereditary in a Christian prince to be chosen 
 by the three Powers, with the consent of the Porte and 
 under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and with an administra- 
 tion best calculated to ensure its religious and commercial 
 liberty. This proposal had been submitted to the Sultan by 
 the ambassadors of England and France on March 22, 1829. 
 He had then obstinately refused to have anything to say to 
 it. When the Russians had crossed the Balkans, the Sultan, 
 in the hope of propitiating England and France, offered to 
 the ambassadors to agree to an autonomous Greece (under 
 a Hospodar, limited, however, to the Morea. This the 
 ambassadors refused. The Porte, under the treaty with 
 Russia, now agreed to their full demand. 
 
 The Governments of England and France appear to have 
 taken umbrage at the action of Russia in dealing with the 
 subject of Greece in a separate treaty with the Porte. It 
 was thought that the Czar wished to get all the credit of 
 liberating Greece from Turkish rule. They therefore in- 
 formed the Russian Government that the execution of the 
 treaty of London of 1827 did not belong to the Czar alone, 
 but was to be the work of the three Governments. In 
 consequence of this a further conference took place in 
 London, at which it was decided that the suzerainty of the 
 Sultan over Greece was to be abolished, and complete inde- 
 pendence was to be secured to the Greeks . They also came 
 to the unfortunate decision that the line of boundary of the 
 new kingdom was to be greatly restricted, and instead of 
 running from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta, was
 
 28o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to be drawn from the mouth of the Archilous to the 
 mouth of the Sperkius_, thus excluding from the new king- 
 dom the whole of Acarnania and the greater part of 
 Thessaly, where the population was almost wholly Greek. 
 They also decided that Crete was not to be included, but 
 was to be restored to Turkish rule. Mr. Finlay says of 
 this : " Diplomatic ignorance could not have traced a more 
 unsuitable boundary." ' 
 
 The Sultan agreed to this new project. He probably 
 preferred a smaller Greece with complete independence to 
 a larger one with full autonomy, subject to his suzerainty. 
 Greece was accordingly recalled into national existence with 
 a greatly reduced area, leaving outside large districts with 
 completely homogeneous Greek populations. This was 
 fraught with grave difficulties in the future. One effect 
 of it was that Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who, later, 
 as King of the Belgians, proved to be one of the most 
 able rulers of his day, refused to accept the throne of 
 Greece on the ground that its area was too restricted, 
 and Otho, a son of the King of Bavaria, was selected by 
 the Powers for the post, and proved to be a most incom- 
 petent and reactionary ruler. It would seem that Lord 
 Aberdeen, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in England 
 at the time, and who was mainly responsible for these 
 changes, was anxious to restrict the kingdom of Greece to 
 the smallest possible area. 
 
 Reverting to the treaty of Adrianople, it is to be observed 
 that while Russia acquired a very insignificant extension 
 of territory, and was content with the prestige of having 
 dictated its terms, and with having acquired a position such 
 that it might insist on its behests to the Porte, as regards 
 its Christian subjects,* being obeyed in the future, Turkey 
 lost very greatly. It was said that the Sultan, after signing 
 the treaty, shut himself up in his palace at Therapia for 
 weeks in gloomy despair. There was much cause for 
 this. The treaty was a complete surrender of all that he 
 had been contending for since his accession to the throne. 
 It was humiliating to himself and his Turkish subjects. It 
 was the inevitable precursor of much that was to occur to 
 other parts of his Empire. His grief and indignation must 
 have been greatly aggravated when he came to know the 
 real condition of the Russian army at Adrianople and to 
 
 ' Finlay, vii. 59.
 
 MAHMOUD II 281 
 
 appreciate that, if he had stood firm in resisting the advice 
 of his ministers and of the ambassadors, the Russian army 
 would have been quite unable to make an advance against 
 Constantinople. This, however, should not lead us to 
 forget the supreme error which Mahmoud committed 
 in refusing to come to terms with the three Powers as 
 regards Greece after the treaty of London. If in 1827, 
 the Sultan had been willing to make concessions in the 
 direction of autonomy to Greece, it is nearly certain that 
 there would have been no declaration of war on the part 
 of Russia, and in the event of war he would not have 
 been wanting in allies. His fleet would not have -been 
 destroyed at Navarino, and time would have been afforded 
 to him to reorganize his army and to make it effective 
 against those of the Christian Powers. As it was, not only 
 did he lose all real hold over Moldavia, Wallachia, and 
 Serbia, not only did Greece gain its independence, but he 
 was soon to lose all real authority in Egypt, a Moslem 
 country, except the barren right of suzerainty of the Sultan 
 and a fixed tribute in money. 
 
 It has already been stated that when, in 1824, the Sultan 
 invited the aid of the Pasha of Egypt to crush rebellion in 
 Greece, Mehemet Ali only consented to lend his army and 
 fleet on the express promise that the Pashalics of Syria, 
 Damascus, Tripoli (in Asia), and Crete would be given 
 to him, in addition to that of Egypt. But when in 1827, 
 after the destruction of the Turko -Egyptian fleet at 
 Navarino and the expulsion of the Egyptian army from 
 the Morea, Mehemet Ali pressed for the performance of 
 this promise, he met with a blank refusal, except as regards 
 the island of Crete, the Pashalic of which alone was con- 
 ferred on him. Mehemet was very indignant at this breach 
 of promise, and determined to seize by force the provinces 
 which he coveted. He set to work with great resolution 
 to build another fleet, in place of that which had been 
 burnt or sunk, and to improve and strengthen his army. 
 
 By 1832 he completed these preparations for war. He 
 then picked a quarrel with the Pasha of Syria and, pre- 
 tending to make war against him and not against the 
 Sultan, sent an army, under Ibrahim, across the desert 
 into Syria. It captured Gaza and Jerusalem without diffi- 
 culty, and then marched to Acre, where the Egyptian fleet 
 met it and co-operated in a successful attack on that
 
 ■2 82 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 fortress. After this success Ibrahim marched with his army 
 to Aleppo and Damascus, defeating two Turkish armies. 
 He then crossed the mountains into Asia Minor, and fought 
 another great battle at Konia on October 27, 1832, and 
 defeated a large Turkish army. He then marched to Brusa. 
 
 These disasters caused the greatest alarm at Constan- 
 tinople. There was no other Turkish army in the field 
 capable of resisting the march of Ibrahim's army to the 
 Bosphorus. In his peril the Sultan appealed to the British 
 Government for aid against the Egyptians, offering a close 
 alliance for the future. He met with a refusal, at the 
 instance of Lord Palmerston, who did not then appear to 
 value a Turkish alliance, though the British Ambassador 
 at Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, strongly advised 
 it. Mahmoud then appealed for aid to the Emperor of 
 Russia, who gladly availed himself of the opportunity of 
 increasing his influence in Turkey and of effecting a 
 virtual protectorate over it. For a second time, within 
 recent years, a close alliance v/as formed between the Czar 
 and the Sultan, and in February, 1833, a Russian fleet 
 issuing from Sebastopol conveyed an army to the Bosphorus 
 for the defence of Constantinople. 
 
 For a time the influence of Russia became predominant. 
 None but Russians had access to the Sultan. Russian 
 troops and sailors were seen everywhere, and Russian 
 officers were employed to drill and command the Turkish 
 battalions. This state of things caused great alarm to the 
 British and French Governments. They were both con- 
 cerned in preventing Russia obtaining possession or control 
 of Constantinople. They felt it was necessary to stay 
 the advance of Ibrahim's victorious army, which w^as the 
 excuse for the presence of the Russians at Constantinople. 
 They offered, therefore, to the Sultan that if he would 
 insist on the withdrawal of the Russian army from his capital, 
 they would guarantee him against the further invasion of 
 Mehemet Ali's army. France, though always very friendly 
 to Mehemet Ali, and in favour of his independence as 
 against the Sultan, had no wish to see Constantinople in 
 the hands of Russia. 
 
 By dint of great diplomatic pressure, in which Lord 
 Palmerston took the leading part with the greatest ability, 
 a double arrangement was effected. On the one hand, 
 Mehemet Ali, perceiving that he would be powerless to attack
 
 MAHMOUD il -283 
 
 Constantinople against the opposition of Russia, England, 
 and France, was induced to come to terms with the Sultan. 
 A convention was signed between them in 1833, and a 
 firman was issued by the Porte under which Mehemet was 
 confirmed as the Pasha, not only of Egypt, but of Syria, 
 Damascus, Adana, Tripoli, and Crete, an immense acces- 
 sion of dignity and power to him. The Sultan was to 
 be suzerain and the Pashalics were conferred on Mehemet 
 Ali only for his life, and there was no promise that they 
 would be continued to his son Ibrahim or other descendants. 
 The concession, however, as it stood, was most humiliating 
 to the Sultan. On the other hand, Russia agreed \vith 
 the Porte to withdraw its troops from Constantinople and 
 the Bosphorus, but only on the promise, embodied in the 
 treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, that Russian ships of war should 
 have the privilege of passing through the Bosphorus and 
 Dardanelles, at any time, without obtaining the consent of 
 the Porte, a privilege which was to be denied to the ships 
 of other Powers, unless with the previous consent of Russia. 
 It also secured to Russia the right to send an army to 
 the Bosphorus and land it there whenever the exigencies 
 of the Turkish Empire made it expedient to do so. The 
 firman to Mehemet Ali was dated May 5, 1833, and the 
 treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was agreed to with Russia on 
 July 8th of the same year. By these two measures, the 
 result of a great diplomatic struggle, the menace of 
 Mehemet Ali against Constantinople, which at one time 
 seemed likely to involve all the Powers in Europe in war, 
 was brought to an end. The Egyptian army was with- 
 drawn into the provinces added to the Pashalic of Mehemet 
 Ali, and the Russian troops were recalled by the Czar from 
 Constantinople. 
 
 After this settlement, very favourable both to Russia 
 and Egypt, but humiliating to Turkey, a period of a few 
 years' repose was accorded to the Sultan, so far as his 
 relations with the Emperor Nicholas and Mehemet Ali were 
 concerned. But there were frequent internal troubles and 
 outbreaks, which were put down by Mahmoud, not without 
 some difficulty. Both Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali spent 
 the interval in making preparations for another encounter. 
 Mahmoud could not acquiesce in the virtual independence 
 of so large a part of his Empire under Mehemet Ali. The 
 latter was determined to convert his Pashalic into an here-
 
 284 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ditary one and to attain virtual independence of the Porte. 
 He had ambitions also to supplant Mahmoud as the head 
 of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan, during this time, 
 employed a large number of Prussian officers, under Colonel 
 von Moltke — later to become so famous in the Franco- 
 German War of 1870 in command of the German army — 
 to train his army, while Mehemet Ali again employed 
 French officers for the same purpose. Five years elapsed 
 before war again broke out between them. 
 
 In 1838 Mehemet Ali, having completed all his arrange- 
 ments for war with his suzerain, announced his intention 
 to pay no more tribute in the future to the Porte. This 
 amounted to a declaration of independence and a renuncia- 
 tion of allegiance. Mahmoud, on his part, was determined 
 to crush his rebellious vassal, and collected an army 
 on the Euphrates for the invasion of Syria. The oppor- 
 tunity seemed to be a favourable one, as the population 
 of Syria was in revolt against Mehemet Ali, whose govern- 
 ment had proved to be almost as oppressive and tyrannical 
 as that of the Sultan. Early in 1839 Mahmoud declared 
 war and gave directions to his army to invade Syria.. 
 He also fitted out a fleet, consisting of nine ships of the 
 line and twenty -four smaller vessels, and directed it to pro- 
 ceed to Syria and to co-operate with his army advancing 
 from the Euphrates. 
 
 Both these expeditions of the Porte came to grief. The 
 army which invaded Syria met the Egyptians, again under 
 command of Ibrahim, at Nazeb on June 25, 1839. The two 
 armies were about equal in number, each of them about 
 forty thousand. The Turks were completely defeated. 
 Many of their battalions deserted on the field of battle and 
 went over to the enemy ; the remainder were routed and 
 dispersed. Six thousand of them were killed and wounded ; 
 ten thousand were taken prisoners. One hundred guns and 
 great masses of stores fell into the hands of the Egyptians. 
 The Turkish army in these parts ceased to exist. 
 
 The great Turkish fleet had sailed from the Bosphorus 
 on July 6th amid many popular demonstrations. It was 
 under the command of the Capitan Pasha, Achmet, who 
 proved to be a traitor. After passing through the 
 Dardanelles, instead of following his instructions by making 
 his course to the coast of Syria, Achmet sailed direct to 
 Egypt, and there entered the port of Alexandria with flying
 
 MAHMOUD II 285 
 
 colours and handed over the fleet to the enemy of the 
 Sultan, the rebellious Pasha Mehemet All, a proceeding 
 without precedent in history. It was only accomplished, 
 we may presume, by profuse bribery on the part of the 
 crafty Pasha. 
 
 Mahmoud was spared the knowledge of these two signal 
 disasters to his Empire. He died on July i, 1839, some 
 writers allege from the effect of alcohol, though this is 
 doubtful. Creasy and many other historians are unstinting 
 in praise of Mahmoud. They assign to him a very high 
 position in the list of Sultans. They bear testimony to his 
 high civic courage, and to the firm resolution with which 
 he confronted the many crises of his reign. We must 
 fully admit these qualities. Few sovereigns in history have 
 had to deal with such a succession of grave difficulties. 
 Almost alone he bore the weight of Empire. We must 
 not, however, lose sight of the fact that his administration 
 and diplomacy were fraught with failure, that his Empire 
 incurred greater losses than under any previous Sultan, that 
 his armies met with invariable defeat, not only on the 
 part of numerically weaker armies of Russia, but also from 
 insurgent Greeks and Serbians, and even from Egyptians, 
 whose fighting qualities were much inferior to those of the 
 Turks. His firmness and resolution were very great, but 
 they failed him at the supreme crisis of his career, when 
 the Russian army, with quite inadequate numbers, after 
 serious losses in battle and by disease, threatened Constan- 
 tinople from Adrianople, and when it is now quite certain 
 that, if Mahmoud had stood firm and had refused to come 
 to terms, overwhelming disaster must have befallen the 
 Russians. At another crisis also his firmness amounted 
 to most unwise obstinacy when he refused, in 1827, to 
 concede autonomy to Greece at the instance of the Great 
 Powers — a supreme error from which all his subsequent 
 misfortunes logically followed. Mahmoud seems also to 
 have been wanting in magnetism to inspire his generals and 
 soldiers with his own courage and resolution. He does 
 not compare in this respect with his contemporary and 
 rival, Mehemet Ali. He had little of the martial vigour 
 and of the craft of that great vassal. If the Great Powers 
 had not intervened, it was highly probable, if not certain, 
 that Ibrahim's army would, either in 1833 or in 1839, 
 have marched to Constantinople, have effected a revolution
 
 '286 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 there, and have put an end to the Othman dynasty. It 
 might have given new life to the decadent Turkish Empire. 
 In any case, there w^as no reason why Mahmoud, if he 
 had been endowed with Mehemet Ali's genius and adminis- 
 trative capacity, should not have created an army superior 
 in force and discipline to that of the Egyptian Pasha, and 
 equal to the task of preventing the Russians from crossing 
 the Balkans.
 
 XX 
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 
 
 1839-76 
 
 Mahmoud was succeeded by his son, Abdul Mehzid, a 
 youth of sixteen years, who proved to be of very different 
 stamp from his father. He was of mild and gentle nature, 
 without physical or mental vigour, and wanting in force 
 of character. He was enfeebled early in his reign by 
 excessive indulgence in his harem. Later he was addicted 
 to alcohol, like many of his predecessors. His father had 
 monopolized power, and had frequently changed his 
 ministers, with the result that he left no statesman behind 
 him who could impose his will on the young Sultan and 
 govern in his name. Nor was any lady of the harem 
 ambitious and competent to guide or misguide the ship 
 of State, as had not infrequently been the case in the 
 past, when the reigning Sultan was unequal to the task. 
 The main power during this reign as regards foreign 
 affairs, and to some extent even as regards internal affairs, 
 seems to have been vested in the ambassadors of the Great 
 Powers. This power was exercised collectively by them 
 on the rare occasions when they were unanimously agreed, 
 but at other times by one or other of them, and 
 chiefly, as will be seen, by the British Ambassador, Sir 
 Stratford Canning, later Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who, 
 by his force of character and commanding presence, 
 obtained immense personal influence over the feeble mind 
 of Abdul Mehzid, and exercised an almost undisputed 
 sway from 1842 to 1858, with the exception of brief 
 intervals when he was in England on leave, and when the 
 Russian Ambassador succeeded in obtaining exclusive 
 influence. 
 
 The new Sultan was fortunate, as compared with his 
 
 287
 
 '288 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 father, that in the thirty -one years of his reign his 
 Empire experienced no serious loss of territory. It 
 is necessary, however, to advert to the two main events 
 of it — the one, the suppression of Mehemet Ali's ambitious 
 projects and the restriction of his hereditary Pashalic to 
 Egypt ; the other, the Crimean War, as it is known in 
 history — the war with Russia, the effect of which was to 
 stave off for nearly twenty years the dismemberment of 
 the Turkish Empire in Europe. 
 
 As regards the first of these events, it has been shown 
 that, in the last year of Mahmoud's reign, Mehemet Ali 
 was in a position of great strength, which might liave 
 enabled him to overthrow the Othman dynasty. He had 
 destroyed the main Turkish army in Asia, at Nazeb, on 
 the frontier of Syria, and by the infamous treachery of 
 Achmet Pasha he had obtained possession of the Turkish 
 fleet. He comported himself, however, with moderation 
 at this stage. He informed the Porte that he was willing 
 to come to terms if they would recognize the Pashalics of 
 Egypt, Syria, Tripoli (in Asia Minor), Adana, and Crete 
 as hereditary in his family. He had no intention, he 
 said, to use the Turkish fleet against his suzerain, the 
 Sultan. He would give it back to the Porte, if his terms 
 were agreed to. If Sultan Mahmoud had been alive, it may 
 be confidently assumed that he would have rejected these 
 terms with contumely, and would have fought it out with 
 his rebellious vassal. But Abdul Mehzid was wanting in 
 courage to meet the crisis. The two disasters caused the 
 greatest alarm at Constantinople. The majority of the 
 Divan were ready to concede the demands of Mehemet 
 Ali. They were prevented from doing so by an unprece- 
 dented occurrence. The ambassadors of the five Great 
 Powers — England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia — 
 met in conclave and came to the conclusion that it was 
 contrary to the interests of their respective Governments 
 that Mehemet Ali's demands should be acceded to. They 
 informed the Porte that their Governments desired to 
 discuss the questions raised by Mehemet Ali, and invited 
 the Sultan to suspend a definitive arrangement with him. 
 This was agreed to by the Divan. The settlement of the 
 relation of the rebellious pasha to the Sultan fell into the 
 hands of the ambassadors, and a kind of tutelage was 
 established over the Turkish Empire.
 
 THE RULE OF. ELCHIS 289 
 
 The conduct of the Emperor Nicholas on this occasion 
 was most conciliatory to the other Powers. He intimated 
 to them that, if they were united on a scheme to settle the 
 Egyptian question, he would not insist on the special 
 right which he had acquired under the treaties of Bucharest 
 and of Akermann to exclude the ships of war of other 
 Powers from the Dardanelles, and that he would withdraw his 
 few remaining troops from Constantinople and the Bosphorus. 
 Lord Palmerston, on behalf of Great Britain, expressed 
 his admiration of this attitude of the Russian Emperor. 
 As a result, a conference took place in London between 
 the representatives of the Great Powers, at which Lord 
 Palmerston, on behalf of England, and Baron Brunnow, 
 on behalf of Russia, took the leading part. Grave differ- 
 ence soon arose at the conference on the part of France. 
 Its Government, though strongly opposed to Russia obtain- 
 ing possession of Constantinople, had always been favour- 
 able to the claim of Mehemet Ali to an hereditary Pashalic 
 in Egypt and Syria, and had secretly encouraged him 
 to make himself independent of the Porte. It now 
 supported him against the veto of the other Powers. 
 Eventually England, Russia, and Austria, finding that they 
 could not come to agreement with France, decided to act 
 without its concurrence, and to compel Mehemet Ali to 
 evacuate Syria and to restore to the Porte the Turkish 
 fleet. After long discussion between these three Powers, 
 a convention was agreed to on July 15, 1840. They 
 presented an ultimatum to Mehemet Ali, calling upon him 
 to submit himself to the Porte. They promised that if, 
 within ten days of the receipt of the ultimatum, he would 
 give orders for the withdrawal of his army from Syria, 
 and would give up the Turkish fleet to the Porte, he 
 would be recognized as hereditary Pasha of Egypt and 
 as Pasha of Syria for his own life ; but, if not, the 
 offer of the life Pashalic of Syria and the hereditary 
 Pashalic of Egypt would be withdrawn, and he would 
 have to content himself with the Pashalic for life of Egypt. 
 It was also intimated to him that if there was refusal or 
 delay the fleets of the three Powers would at once institute 
 a blockade of Egypt and Syria. This ultimatum of the 
 three Powers, when it became known in France, caused 
 the most profound indignation ; the more so wlien, on 
 the refusal of Mehemet AM to accede to the ultimatum, the 
 
 19
 
 290 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 British fleet, supported by war vessels of the two othei" 
 Powers, made its appearance on the coast of Syria. This 
 was thought to be an insult to France. War between that 
 country and England was imminent. There were violent 
 scenes in the French Chambers, and most bitterly hostile 
 articles in the French papers. There were threats of war 
 on the part of the Government of France. But prudent 
 counsels ultimately prevailed, when it was discovered that 
 France was not prepared for a naval war, and that its 
 fleet could not hope to contend with the British fleet in 
 the Mediterranean or to land an army in Syria. 
 
 The three Powers, on their part, mainly at the instance 
 of Lord Palmerston, declined to submit their policy to 
 the threats of France, and persisted in their demonstration 
 of force against Mehemet Ali. War was averted between 
 England and France, and Louis Philippe (then King of 
 the French) contented himself with the cynical observation 
 that there was all the difference in the world between 
 threatening war and actually going to war. 
 
 Meanwhile the British fleet, under Admirals Stopford 
 and Napier, appeared before Beyrout and bombarded and 
 destroyed its forts. Two thousand men were landed, under 
 Napier, and defeated the Egyptian forces. The same 
 operation was repeated a few days later at Acre. The 
 powerful defences of this fortress were demolished by the 
 guns of the British fleet, and six thousand men were landed, 
 under Napier, and defeated Ibrahim's army. It was in 
 these attacks on Beyrout and Acre that steamships made 
 their first appearance in maritime war. The allies were 
 greatly assisted by the revolt of the people of Syria against 
 Mehemet All's oppressive government. Desertion also was 
 very rife in the Egyptian force, and Ibrahim's army, which 
 had originally consisted of seventy -five thousand men, had 
 dwindled down to twenty-five thousand. 
 
 After these operations on the coast of Syria, Napier and 
 his squadron appeared before Alexandria and threatened 
 bombardment. But Mehemet Ali, by this time, had realized 
 that he could not hope to make war successfully against 
 the three Great Powers as well as the Sultan. He entered 
 into negotiations with Admiral Napier. He agreed to 
 evacuate Syria and to give up the Turkish fleet to the 
 Porte, provided that the Sultan would recognize him as 
 hereditary Pasha of Egypt. In the meantime the Sultan
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 291 
 
 of Turkey had issued a firman deposing Mehemet Ali from 
 all his Pashalics. This did not necessarily mean much, 
 for the Porte on four previous occasions had publicly 
 deposed the rebellious pasha, but without any result. 
 Eventually, on September 20, 1841, agreement was arrived 
 at between Mehemet Ali and the three Powers. In spite 
 of his deposition by the Sultan, Mehemet Ali was confirmed 
 in the position of hereditary Pasha of Egypt, but was 
 deprived of all his other governments. He was to pay 
 tribute to the Porte equal to one -fourth of the revenue of 
 Egypt — later fixed at an annual sum of £400,000. He 
 was to withdraw his army from Syria and to maintain no 
 larger force in Egypt than eighteen thousand men. 
 
 The intervention of the three Great Powers, taking the 
 matter out of the hands of the Sultan, brought about an 
 arrangement much more favourable to him than the Divan 
 were willing to agree to. Syria was relieved of the govern- 
 ment of MehemiCt Ali and was placed again jUnder the control 
 of the Porte. Egypt, on the other hand, was made prac- 
 tically independent, subject only to a fixed tribute in 
 recognition of the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. This 
 result was achieved not by the force of arms of the Sultan, 
 but by the action of the three Great Pow'ers, directed chiefly 
 by the able diplomacy of Lord Palmerston, who steered 
 this concert through all its difficulties and against the 
 violent opposition of France. The final settlement thus 
 imposed on Mehemet Ali, which extinguished his ambitious 
 projects and reduced his rule to Egypt alone, is said to 
 have broken the heart of the old man. He lived on for 
 eight more years, but they were spent in gloom and 
 depression, aggravated by the death of his able and 
 distinguished son Ibrahim. It should be added here that 
 in 1 84 1, as a sequel to the arrangement about Egypt, a 
 convention was agreed to between the Great Powers, in- 
 cluding Russia, and Turkey by which the vessels of war 
 of all countries except Turkey were forbidden to pass 
 through the Straits to and from the Black .Sea. 
 
 The settlement of these grave questions, in 1841, was 
 followed by twelve years of comparative repose in Turkey, 
 broken only by occasional revohs of pashas, or of subject 
 races driven to desperation by chronic misgovernment. 
 These were put down by the Seraskier, Omar Pasha, who 
 proved to be a very competent general for tliis purpose.
 
 292 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It was during this period that Sir Stratford Canning, as 
 British Ambassador to the Porte, attained a personal influ- 
 ence over the Sultan, Abdul Mehzid, of an unprecedented 
 character, such that he may be said to have virtually ruled 
 the State. 
 
 Canning on three previous occasions had represented 
 the British Government at Constantinople during the reign 
 of Mahmoud. In 1812 as Minister Plenipotentiary, when 
 quite a young man, he had gained immense credit by 
 inducing the Sultan to come to terms with Russia, by the 
 treaty of Bucharest. The effect of this was to free the 
 hands of the Czar and to enable him to withdraw his army 
 from the Danube and to use it on the flank of Napoleon's 
 army in the celebrated Moscow campaign. This largely 
 contributed to the defeat of the invasion of Russia. 
 
 Later he had been engaged in the delimitation of Greece, 
 after the recognition of its independence, and had shown 
 himself a Philhellene. In 1842 Lord Aberdeen, then 
 Foreign Minister of England, sent him again as ambas- 
 sador to the Porte at the age of fifty-seven. He remained 
 there, with two short intervals, till 1858. He acquired, 
 during these sixteen years, the title of * The Great Elchi," 
 the ambassador par eminence. By the Christian rayas 
 of the Ottoman Empire he was known as the Padishah of 
 the Padishahs. He was the most distinguished envoy ever 
 employed in the British Diplomatic Service. He belonged 
 to an old school of diplomats, when communications with 
 the Home Government were long in reaching their destina- 
 tion, and when ambassadors necessarily took much respon- 
 sibility upon themselves, and dictated rather than followed 
 the policy of their Governments. He held himself to repre- 
 sent his sovereign rather than the transient ministers of the 
 day. His mien was such as greatly to impress the Turks. 
 It was stately and dignified. His countenance was noble 
 and spirituelle. His eyes seemed to penetrate the minds of 
 those with whom he transacted business, and made it diffi- 
 cult for them to conceal their intentions. His own methods 
 were always honourable and straightforward. Though he 
 was well versed in the arts of diplomacy and could meet 
 mine by countermine, he never resorted to trickery. The 
 Turks learned that his word was implicitly to be trusted, 
 and that he wished well to their country. He treated 
 the Turkish ministers with the utmost hauteur. With some
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 293 
 
 of them, whose hands were known to be stained with 
 blood, he refused to have any communication. If his 
 demands were refused at the Porte, he went direct to the 
 Sultan and fairly bullied that weak, gentle, and well- 
 intentioned sovereign into acquiescence. He entered on 
 his work in this embassy with two main convictions, one 
 might almost say obsessions — the one that it was the interest 
 of England, and therefore his own duty, to oppose the 
 schemes of Russia at every turn ; the other that it was 
 his duty to urge, and even to compel, the Porte to carry out 
 internal reforms, and to come into line with other civilized 
 countries in Europe, in default of which he fully recognized 
 that the Ottoman Empire could not be maintained. He 
 liad a firm belief that this was possible, and that he was 
 himself the appointed man to effect it. For this purpose he 
 freely made use of threats of force from England if his 
 behests were refused, and of promises of protection against 
 Russia if they were agreed to. An envoy of this character, 
 great as were his qualities and personal merits, was a 
 cause of embarrassment to British policy, for the Govern- 
 ment could not control him. One might say of him, in 
 the words of Shakespeare : — 
 
 If great men could thunder as Jove himself docs, 
 • Jove would ne'er be quiet. 
 
 Canning used the thunder of his country freely in 
 pursuance of his own policy. He was undoubtedly the 
 main cause of the war which soon ensued between Great 
 Britain and Russia. 
 
 Meanwhile the reform of its administration and its laws 
 had long been recognized by the very few honest and 
 capable statesmen of Turkey as indispensable to the 
 maintenance of its Empire. Mahmoud himself, in the latter 
 part of his life, had appreciated this necessity, land had 
 given his sanction to a scheme of reform. But death came 
 to him before it was issued. He must have instructed his 
 son as to this policy, for one of the first acts of Abdul 
 Mehzid, by the advice of his Grand Vizier, Reschid Pasha, 
 was to issue the important declaration of reform which 
 had been prepared by Mahmoud, and was known as the 
 Hatti-Scheriff of Ghulkanc. It promised equally to all 
 his subjects, without distinction of creed or race^ security
 
 '294 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 of life, of honour, and of property, the equitable distribu- 
 tion of taxes, the public trial of all prisoners, ,the right of 
 all to hold and devise property, and the systematic 're- 
 cruiting of the army. It appointed a council to elaborate 
 the details of administrative reform to give efifect to these 
 principles. But this great charter of reform lacked the 
 will of a Mahmoud to enforce it. There ensued a dangerous 
 reaction. Reschid Pasha was compelled to resign. Riza 
 Pasha, who succeeded him, and his colleagues, were 
 reactionary, fanatical, and an ti -Christian. The Hatti- 
 Scherifif, like almost every other promise of reform 
 in Turkey, became a dead letter. Riza was also corrupt 
 and venal, and robbed the treasury of untold sums. It 
 became the principal object of Canning to obtain the dis- 
 missal of this man and of the gang of peculators who 
 worked with him, and the reinstatement of Reschid. 
 Proposals for reform in favour of the rayas were impossible 
 with ministers who carried their hatred of Christianity to 
 the length of excluding from the public service every Turk 
 who could speak a Christian language. 
 
 By dint of long and patient efforts Canning obtained 
 such a mastery over Abdul Mehzid that he was able to 
 bring about a change of ministers, and to reinstate Reschid 
 Pasha as the only statesman in Turkey who was capable 
 of carrying out reforms, and who was willing to be guided 
 by himself as to their main principles. 
 
 In 1852 a serious diplomatic dispute broke out at Con- 
 stantinople, between the representatives of France and 
 Russia, as to the guardianship of the Holy Sepulchre at 
 Jerusalem and many trumpery details connected with it. 
 Early in 1853 there were strong indications that the 
 Emperor Nicholas intended to take the opportunity of this 
 dispute to raise a much more serious question against the 
 Porte. He evidently desired to disarm the opposition of 
 England to his schemes. In a private conversation at St. 
 Petersburg with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambas- 
 sador at his Court, he opened his mind : — 
 
 The affairs of Turkey arc in a very disorganized condition. Tlie 
 country itself seems to be falling to pieces. The fall will be a great 
 misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should 
 come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that 
 neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised.
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 295 
 
 . . . We have on our hands a sick man — a very sick man. It will, I tell 
 you frankly, be a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip 
 away from us before all necessary arrangements were made. 
 
 With this intimation the conversation appears to have 
 dropped. A few^ days later it was renewed at a private 
 entertainment . 
 
 You know [the Emperor said] the dreams and plans in which the 
 Empress Catherine was in the habit of indulging ; these were handed 
 down to our time ; but while I inherited immense territorial possessions, 
 I did not inherit these visions — those intentions, if you like to call them 
 so. On the contrarj', my country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in 
 everything, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire more territory 
 or more power than I possess ; on the contrary, I am the first to tell you 
 that our great, perhaps our only, danger is that which arises from an 
 extension given to an Empire already too large. 
 
 Close to us lies Turkey, and in our present condition nothing better for 
 our interests can be desired. The time has gone by when we had any- 
 thing to fear from the fanatical spirit or the military enterprise of the 
 Turks, and yet the country is strong enough, or has hitherto been strong 
 enough, to preserve its independence, and to insure respectful treatment 
 from other countries. 
 
 In that Empire there are several millions of Christians whose interests 
 I am called to watch over, while the right of doing so is secured to me by 
 treaty. I may truly say that I make a moderate and sparing use of my 
 right, and I will freely confess that it is one which is attended with 
 obligations occasionally very inconvenient ; but I cannot recede from the 
 discharge of a distinct duty. . . . 
 
 Now, Turkey has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude 
 that, eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of his life, he may 
 suddenly die on our hands ; we cannot resuscitate what is dead. If the 
 Turkish Empire falls it falls to rise no more, and I put it to you, 
 therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a 
 contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a 
 European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe, if it should 
 occur unexpectedly and before some ulterior system has been sketched. 
 That is the part to which I am desiring you should call the attention of 
 your Government. 
 
 Now, I desire to speak to you as a friend, and as a gentleman. If 
 England and I arrive at an understanding in this matter, as regards the 
 rest it little matters to me. It is indifferent to me what others do or 
 think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly that, if England thinks of 
 establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow 
 it. For my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to 
 establish myself there— as proprietor, that is to say— for as occupier I dp
 
 '296 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 not say ; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provisions 
 were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the 
 position of occupying Constantinople. 
 
 On the 20th February, in a further conversation, the 
 Emperor said : — 
 
 If your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any 
 element of existence, your Government must have received incorrect 
 information. I repeat to you, the sick man is dying, and we can never 
 allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some 
 understanding. 
 
 The next day he added : — 
 
 The principalities are, in fact, an independent Slate under my 
 protection. This might so continue. Serbia might receive the same 
 form of government. So again with Bulgaria ; there seems to be no 
 reason why these provinces should not form one independent State. As 
 to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. 
 I can thus only say that if, in the event of a destruction of the Ottoman 
 succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of 
 Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I could say the same thing of 
 Candia. That island might suit you, and I do not see why it should not 
 become an English possession. 
 
 Sir Hamilton Seymour, in reply to the Emperor, said 
 to his Government : — 
 
 I simply observed that I had always understood that the English views 
 upon Egypt did not go beyond the part of securing a safe and ready 
 communication between British India and the Mother Country. 
 
 " Well," said the Emperor, " induce your Government to write again 
 upon this subject — to write more fully and do so without hesitation. I 
 have confidence in the British Government. It is not an engagement or 
 convention which I ask of them ; it is a free interchange of ideas in case 
 of need — the word of a gentleman — that is enough between us." 
 
 In reporting these conversations to the Foreign Secre- 
 tary, Sir Hamilton Seymour expressed his own opinion as 
 follows : — 
 
 It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign who insists with 
 such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring State must 
 have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of the dissolution, at 
 all events for the dissolution, must be at hand.
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS '297 
 
 In answer to these overtures the British Government, 
 through Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, dis- 
 claimed all intention of aiming at the acquisition either of 
 Constantinople or any other of the Sultan's possessions, and 
 accepted the assurances of the like effect which were given 
 by the Czar. It combated the opinion that the extinction 
 of the Ottoman Empire was near at hand and deprecated 
 a discussion based on this supposition as leading directly 
 to produce the very result against which it was hoped 
 to provide. Finally, the British Government, with abun- 
 dance of courtesy, but in terms very stringent and clear, 
 peremptorily refused to enter into any kind of secret 
 engagement with Russia for the settlement of the Eastern 
 question . 
 
 Lord Clarendon, who succeeded Lord John Russell as 
 Foreign Minister in the course of these proceedings, in a 
 final despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour (March 23, 1853), 
 expressed the following opinion : — 
 
 Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies, and a 
 determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the 
 dignity and independence of the Sultan — that friendly support, in short, 
 which among States as well as individuals the weak arc entitled to 
 expect from the strong — in order not only to prolong its existence but 
 to remove all cause for alarm respecting its dissolution. 
 
 It will be seen that the British Government took much 
 too sanguine a view of the prospects of reformed Govern- 
 ment in Turkey, and that the Emperor of Russia was much 
 nearer the mark. 
 
 We have quoted these conversations at length because 
 of their extreme importance when read by the light of 
 subsequent events. They produced a bad impression at 
 the time on the British Government, and still more so on 
 public opinion in England, when later they were made 
 public It was thought that they indicated a deliberate 
 intention on the part of the Emperor of Russia to force 
 the Eastern question to the front, and to dismember the 
 Ottoman Empire by a partition of the same kind as that 
 to which Poland had been treated, a few years back, and 
 in which Russia would have the lion's share. 
 
 • The above conversations arc reported in Parliamentary Papers, 1854, 
 Eastern Question, House of Commons, 84.
 
 •298 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 A more reasonable view may now be taken of the 
 policy of the Emperor Nicholas. Subsequent events have 
 conclusively shown that he was fully justified in describing 
 the Turkish Empire as sick, almost to death, for since then 
 it has lost almost the whole of its dominions in Europe. 
 Russia also has acquired but a very small share of the vast 
 territories that have been taken from it. It is also subject 
 to the reflection that, although the British Government in 
 1852 disclaimed any wish or intention to join in a scheme 
 of partition of the Ottoman Empire, it has since acquired 
 a considerable part of it, approximating to the ofifer of 
 the Czar — namely Egypt, the Sudan, and the island of 
 Cyprus. 
 
 Early in 1853 the Czar sent as a special envoy to the 
 Porte Prince Menschikof, a rude and bluff soldier. He 
 was instructed to insist on Russia's claim to the guardian- 
 ship of the Holy Sepulchre, in opposition to that of France, 
 and with a further demand, -of a more serious kind, for a 
 protectorate in matters of religion over members of the 
 Greek Church throughout the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 It was no doubt in consequence of the conversations of 
 the Czar with Sir Hamilton Seymour and of this special 
 mission of Prince Menschikof that Canning, who had, in 
 1852, resigned the embassy at Constantinople, and had 
 been created a peer, with the title of Lord Stratford de 
 Redclifife, was again sent as ambassador to the Porte by 
 Lord Clarendon, who was now Foreign Minister in England. 
 Lord Stratford himself appears to have drawn up the 
 instructions of the Foreign Office. He was directed to 
 neutralize, by England's moral influence, the alarming 
 position opened up by the demands, as regards the Holy 
 Places and other matters, of Russia and France, and the 
 dictatorial, if not hostile, attitude they had assumed. He 
 was left unfettered for the settlement of the Holy Places. 
 His own judgment and discretion might be trusted to guide 
 him. The Porte was to be told that it had to thank 
 its own maladministration and the accumulated grievances 
 of foreign nations for the menacing tone now adopted 
 towards it by certain Powers ; that a general revolt of 
 its Christian subjects might ensue ; that the crisis was 
 one which required the utmost prudence on the part of 
 the Porte, and confidence in the sincerity and sound- 
 ness of the advice it would receive from him, to
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 299 
 
 resolve it favourably for its future peace and independence. 
 He was to counsel reform in the administration of Turkey, 
 by which alone the sympathy of the British nation could 
 be preserved. 
 
 In the event of imminent danger to the existence of 
 the Turkish Government, the ambassador was authorized 
 to request the admiral in command of the British fleet 
 at Malta to hold himself in readiness, but he was not to 
 direct the approach of the fleet to the Dardanelles without 
 positive instructions from her Majesty's Government. 
 
 Lord Stratford, on arrival at Constantinople, found that 
 his protege, Reschid Pasha, had been dismissed from the 
 post of Grand Vizier, at the instance of the new envoy of 
 Russia, and replaced by a pasha favourable to that Power. 
 Prince Menschikof, by the use of menaces, and probably 
 with the aid of bribes, had obtained a commanding influ- 
 ence over the Sultan's Government. He insisted that his 
 demands on the Porte should be kept secret, and threatened 
 to leave Constantinople if they were divulged to the British 
 Ambassador. Lord Stratford, however, found no difficulty 
 in obtaining full information as to the Russian demands. 
 He showed very great diplomatic skill in separating the 
 question of the Holy Places from the more serious one of the 
 protectorate over the Greek Church. He contrived to settle 
 between Russia, France, and the Porte the dispute as to 
 the Holy Sepulchre. There remained, however, the more 
 serious one of the protectorate. This was aggravated by 
 personal rivalry and hate between the Czar Nicholas and 
 Lord Stratford. The real question in dispute became largely 
 whether Russian or British influence was to predominate 
 in Turkey, and whether reforms, so essential for the security 
 and well-being of its Christian population, were to be carried 
 out under a protectorate by Russia or by England. It is 
 impossible to read the able biography of Lord Stratford 
 by Mr. Lane Poole, or Mr. Kinglake's well-known chapters 
 on the causes which led to the Crimean War, without con- 
 cluding that the policy of England at this crisis was virtually 
 directed, not by the British Cabinet in London, but by 
 Lord Stratford at the Embassy at Constantinople. Prince 
 Menschikof, in the struggle which ensued at the Porte, 
 was little competent to contend against so practised and 
 wary a diplomat as Stratford, and was completely worsted 
 in the attempt.
 
 •300 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Early in May, after the arrival of Stratford, a recon- 
 struction of .the Turkish ministry was effected at his 
 instance. The nominee of Russia was dismissed. Ref'at 
 Pasha took his place as Grand Vizier, and Reschid, Lord 
 Stratford's main ally, was reinstated in office as Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 By Stratford's advice the Porte determined to resist the 
 Russian demands. The claim to protect the members of 
 the Greek Church was pronounced to be inadmissible. 
 Prince Menschikof was informed to this effect, and on 
 May 2 1st he broke off diplomatic relations with the Porte, 
 and left Constantinople in high dudgeon. This was 
 followed, on May 31st, by an arrogant despatch to the 
 Porte from the Russian Government, insisting on the 
 acceptance of the Menschikof demands. At the instance 
 of Stratford, the Porte again refused, and thereupon a 
 Russian army crossed the Pruth, on July 3rd, and occupied 
 Moldavia and Wallachia. In a manifesto, issued a few 
 days later, the Czar disclaimed any intention of conquest, 
 and justified his occupation of the provinces as a material 
 guarantee for the fulfilment of his demands on behalf of 
 the Christian population of Turkey. 
 
 That there was ample cause for the complaints of the 
 Russian Government of the maltreatment of the Christian 
 population in Turkey cannot be disputed. On July 22, 
 1853, Lord Stratford himself, in a formal communication 
 to the Porte, forwarded reports from the British Consuls 
 at Scutari, Monastir, and Prevesa, which detailed " acts 
 of disorder, injustice, and corruption of a very atrocious 
 kind, which he had frequently brought to the notice of 
 the Ottoman Porte." He complained that the assurances 
 given by the late Grand Vizier of remedies for such evils 
 had not been carried out, and he observed, with extreme 
 disappointment and pain, the continuance of evils which 
 affected so deeply the welfare of the Empire. 
 
 Again, on July 4th of the same year, in a further 
 communication to the Porte, Lord Stratford wrote : — 
 
 The. character of disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with truth 
 to be in general that of Mussulman fanaticism, excited by cupidity and 
 hatred against the Sultan's Christian vassals. 
 
 Unless some powerful means be applied without further delay, it is 
 to be feared that the autliority of the central Government will be com-
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 30 1 
 
 pletely overpowered and that the people, despairing of protection, will 
 augment the disorder b_v resorting to lawless means of self-preservation. 
 
 Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Minister, also, in a com- 
 munication to the British Ambassador, showed that he was 
 fully alive to the serious character of the disorders in the 
 Turkish Empire. He wrote : — 
 
 It is impossible to suppose that any true sympathy for their rulers will 
 be felt by the Christian subjects of the Porte, so long as they are made 
 to experience in all their daily transactions the inferioritj' of their position 
 as compared with that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects ; so long as 
 they are aware that they will seek in vain for justice for wrongs done 
 either to their persons or their properties, because they are deemed a 
 degraded race, unworthy to be put into comparison witli the followers 
 of Mahomet. Your Excellency will plainly and authoritatively state to 
 the Porte that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian 
 Powers. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous 
 principle and the loss of sympath}' and support of its allies. 
 
 In spite, however, of the experience of the futility of 
 all past promises to carry out the most elementary reforms 
 in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte, both 
 Lord Stratford and Lord Clarendon appear to have based 
 their policy largely on the belief that the Porte would be 
 more amenable in the future. 
 
 The occupation of the Danubian principalities by a 
 Russian army did not of itself necessarily involve war 
 with Turkey. Though the Sultan was suzerain of these 
 provinces, they enjoyed complete autonomy under the pro- 
 tection of Russia. Under certain conditions that Power 
 was entitled to send its army there. But the continued 
 occupation of them was clearly antagonistic to the sovereign 
 rights of the Sultan and would ultimately lead to war. 
 
 With a view to avoid war, a conference was held by the 
 representatives of all the Powers except Russia at Vienna, 
 and an agreement was arrived at for the settlement of the 
 question between Russia and Turkey by England, France, 
 Austria, and Prussia. This was agreed to by Russia. It 
 was commended to the Porte by the Powers, and Lord 
 Stratford was instructed by Lord Clarendon to use all 
 his efforts to obtain its consent. 
 
 Officially, Lord Stratford performed his task in due 
 accord with the instructions of Lord Clarendon. But his
 
 302 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 biographer and, still more, Mr. Kinglake admit that the 
 rejection of the Vienna demand was mainly due to the 
 British Ambassador. After quoting the words of Lord 
 Stratford, in which he described his efforts to induce the 
 Porte to accede to it, Kinglake writes : — 
 
 These were dutiful words. But it is not to be believed that, even 
 if he strove to do so, Lord Stratford could hide his real thoughts from the 
 Turkish ministers. There was that in his very presence which disclosed 
 his volition ; for if the thin, disciplined lips moved in obedience to con- 
 stituted authorities, men who knew how to read the meaning of his brow, 
 and the light which kindled beneath, could gather that the ambassador's 
 thoughts concerning the Home Governments of the four Great Powers of 
 Europe were little else than an angry quosego ; the sagacious Turks would 
 look more to the great signs than to the terms of formal advice sent out 
 from London, and if they saw that Lord Stratford was, in his heart, 
 against the opinion of Europe, they could easily resolve to follow his 
 known desire and to disobey his mere words. The result was that 
 without any sign of painful doubt the Turkish Government determined 
 to stand fnm. 
 
 This is the view of a panegyrist of Lord Stratford. 
 We have quoted it for the purpose of showing that it was 
 practically Lord Stratford who guided the Turkish Govern- 
 ment in this matter. 
 
 After the failure of the settlement prepared at the Vienna 
 Conference, the Porte, on October ist, by the advice of 
 Lord Stratford, made a formal demand on Russia for the 
 evacuation of the Danubian principalities, and in default of 
 this, a fortnight later it declared war. The Turks then 
 boldly took the initiative. Their army, under Omar Pasha, 
 crossed the Danube in November, 1853, and fought two 
 battles successfully against the Russians at Oltenitza and 
 Citale in Wallachia. 
 
 Meanwhile, on October 22nd, when Russia and Turkey 
 were already at war, the fleets of England and France 
 entered the Dardanelles. Though this was not an infraction 
 of the treaty of 1841, it was a distinctly hostile act on the 
 part of these Powers against Russia. But negotiations still 
 continued. W^hatever hopes, however, there were of a 
 favourable issue were destroyed when, on November 30th, 
 a Russian fleet of six battleships, issuing from Sebastopol, 
 attacked and completely destroyed a Turkish squadron of 
 eleven cruisers and smaller vessels lying at anchor in the
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 303 
 
 port of Sinope, on the coast of Asia Minor. P'our thousand 
 Turkish sailors perished in this engagement. This was 
 an act of war, as legitimate as the attack by the Ottoman 
 army on the Russian force north of the Danube, the more 
 so as the Turkish vessels were believed to be carrying 
 munitions of war to arm the Circassians against Russia. 
 It caused, however, an immense sensation in England and 
 France. It was denounced as an act of treachery and as 
 a massacre rather than a legitimate naval action. The 
 fleets of the two Powers then lying in the Bosphorus were 
 at once instructed to enter the Black Sea and to invite any 
 Russian ships of war they might meet there to return to 
 their ports. They were to prevent any further attack on 
 Turkey. This made war inevitable. But negotiations were 
 still for a time continued, and it was not till March 28, 
 1854, that war was actually declared against Russia by 
 England and France. Armies were then sent by these 
 Powers to Constantinople, and thence to Varna, in the Black 
 Sea, with the object of protecting Turkey against the attack 
 of a Russian army and of assisting the former in com- 
 pelling the evacuation by the Russians of the two Danubian 
 provinces. 
 
 Meanwhile, early in the spring of this year (1854), a 
 Russian army had crossed the Danube and had invested 
 Silistria, the great fortress which barred the way to the 
 Balkans and Constantinople. It was defended with the 
 utmost bravery and tenacity by a Turkish army under 
 Moussa Pasha, assisted by two British engineer officers, 
 Butler and Nasmyth. On June 25th the Russians recog- 
 nized that they could not capture the fortress. They 
 raised the siege and retreated across the Danube, after 
 incurring immense loss of life and material. 
 
 All danger of an advance by the Russians across the 
 Danube and the Balkans was now at an end. The Turks 
 unaided had effectually prevented any such project. The 
 Russian army thereupon retreated from the Danubian prin- 
 cipalities. Their place there was taken by an Austrian 
 army, with the consent of both Russia and the two Western 
 Powers. No reason existed, therefore, why the war 
 should be continued, so far as England and France were 
 concerned. There was no longer any necessity for their 
 armies to defend the frontiers of Turkey. But a war spirit 
 had been roused in the two countries and was not to be
 
 304 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 allayed without much shedding of blood. The two Powers 
 decided to use their armies which had been collected at 
 Varna for the invasion of the Crimea and the destruction of 
 the naval arsenal at Sebastopol, which was regarded as a 
 permanent menace to Turkey. 
 
 Thenceforth, the part of the Turks in the war became 
 subordinate and even insignificant. The war was fought 
 a oiitrance between the two allied Powers and Russia. 
 The successful landing of the two armies at Eupatoria, in 
 the Crimea, their splendid victory over the Russian army 
 at the Alma, their flank march to the south of Sebastopol, 
 the commencement of the long siege of that fortress, the 
 famous battles of Balaklava and Inkerman and the terrible 
 sufferings of the British army in the winter of 1854-5, the 
 memorable defence of Sebastopol under General Todieben, 
 the capture of the Alalakoff by the French on September 8th, 
 1855, and the consequent evacuation of the city and forts of 
 Sebastopol, on the southern side of its great harbour, are 
 events of the deepest interest in the histories of the allied 
 Powers and Russia, but have comparatively little bearing 
 on our present theme. Very little use was, in fact, made 
 of the Turkish army by the Allies in the course of the war 
 A division of seven thousand men was sent to the Crimea 
 in the autumn of 1854, and was employed for the defence 
 of Balaklava. It was led by most incompetent officers, and 
 when attacked by the Russians on the morning of the Battle 
 of Balaklava, the men precipitately fled. This exposed the 
 flank of the allied army to great danger. Later, another 
 Turkish force under Omar Pasha was sent to Eupatoria. It 
 was attacked there by a much superior Russian army, early 
 in 1855, and fighting behind earthworks it made a very 
 effective resistance and completely repulsed the Russians. 
 It was said that the humiliation of this defeat of his troops 
 by the despised Turks was the immediate cause of the 
 death of the Emperor Nicholas. 
 
 In Asia Minor another Russian army invaded Turkish 
 territory and laid siege to the fortress of Kars. There 
 followed the memorable defence of this stronghold by the 
 Turks, assisted, if not commanded, by General Williams, 
 later Sir Fenwick Williams, and Colonel Teesdale. It was 
 ultimately, after a four months' siege, compelled by want 
 of food and munitions to capitulate. The failure to relieve 
 it was due to the grossest and most culpable negligence
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 305 
 
 of the Turkish Government, hi this siege and in that of 
 SiHstria and the defence of Eupatoria, the Turkish soldiers 
 gave ample proof that when well led they had lost none of 
 their pristine valour in defence of earthworks. The allied 
 Powers, however, seem to have been quite ignorant or 
 unmindful of the military value of the Turkish soldiers and 
 made little or no practical use of them. An army of 
 fifty thousand Turks led by English or French officers 
 would have been of the utmost value in the earlier part 
 of the war. It was only towards the close of it that twenty 
 thousand Turks were enrolled under British officers. But 
 this action was too late, and they took no part in the war. 
 
 The writer, as a young man, spent a month in the Crimea 
 in 1855, and was present as a spectator on Cathcart's 
 Hill on the eventful day when the Malakoff was captured 
 by the French, and the British were repulsed in their attack 
 on the Redan. He well recollects the prevalent opinion 
 among British officers, whom he met, that the Turkish army 
 was a negligible force and of no military value in the 
 field. This opinion was abundantly shown in the attitude 
 of British and French soldiers to the Turkish soldiers when- 
 ever they met, and must have been very galling to the 
 pride and self-respect of the latter. 
 
 The capture of the Malakoff, a great feat of arms on the 
 part of the French army, was the last important event in 
 the campaign of 1855. Early in 1856 there were strong 
 indications that the Emperor of the French was weary of 
 the war. Public opinion in France declared itself unmis- 
 takably against its continuance. France had nothing to 
 gain by its prolongation. Its military pride had been 
 satisfied by success in the capture of Sebastopol and the 
 destruction of the Russian fleet. Its army in the Crimea 
 was suffering severely from disease. With the British it 
 was otherwise. Their army before the enemy was in greater 
 force than at any previous period of the war. It was eager 
 to retrieve its prestige, which had been somewhat impaired 
 by the failure at the Redan. The British Government was 
 as anxious for another campaign as w'as the army. But 
 without their French ally they could obviously do nothing. 
 The French Emperor entered into secret negotiations with 
 the Emperor Alexander, who had succeeded Nicholas. The 
 success of the Russian army in the capture of Kars and 
 the valour it had shown in defence of Sebastopol made it 
 
 '30
 
 3o6 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 easy to negotiate peace without slur on its military fame. 
 It is impossible for us, who now look back on these times, 
 to perceive what possible object could have been gained 
 by England in prolonging the war. The projects of com- 
 pleting the conquest of the Crimea, and of sending an army 
 to the Caucasus in aid of the Circassians, and another army 
 to the Baltic to free Finland from Russia, were fantastic 
 and perilous. PZngland was saved from these adventures 
 by the wiser policy of the French. The British Govern- 
 ment against its will was compelled to enter into a negotia- 
 tion for peace. This was effected through the mediation 
 of Austria. Terms were jDrovisionally agreed to, and a 
 Congress of the Great Powers was held in Paris in 1S56, 
 at which a treaty of peace was finally concluded. 
 
 Under the terms of this treaty all the territories con- 
 quered by Russia in Asia or by the allied Powers in 
 Europe were restored to their former owners. The small 
 part of Bessarabia conceded to Russia by the treaty of 
 Bucharest and giving access to the Danube was reannexed 
 to Moldavia. The exclusive protectorate of Russia over 
 the two Danubian principalities was abolished, and they 
 were placed under the joint protection of all the Great 
 Powers. The suzerainty of the Sultan over them was 
 recognized. But the Porte engaged to preserve for them 
 an independent and national administration, with full liberty 
 of worship, of legislation, and of commerce. They were 
 to be permitted to organize national armed forces. Serbia 
 was accorded the same treatment, except as regards a 
 national army, but the armed intervention of the Porte was 
 to be permitted only with the consent of the Powers who 
 were signatories to the treaty. The Black Sea was 
 neutralized. It was thrown open to the mercantile marine 
 of all nations, but was interdicted to the war vessels of 
 either Russia or Turkey, and these two Powers engaged 
 not to establish or maintain any military maritime arsenals 
 on its coasts. 
 
 As regards the internal administration of Turkey and 
 the treatment of its Christian population, the treaty con- 
 tained the following clause : — 
 
 The Sultan, having by his constant solicitude for the welfare of his 
 subjects issued a firman (the Hatti-Humayun), which, while ameliorating 
 their condition without distinction of religion or race, records his generous
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 307 
 
 intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing 
 to give a further proof of his sentiments in that direction, has resolved 
 to communicate to the contracting Powers the said firman emanating 
 spontaneous!}' from his sovereign will. The contracting Powers recognize 
 the high value of this communication. It is clearlv understood that it 
 cannot give to the said Powers the right to interfere cither collectively 
 or individually in the relations of H.M. the Sultan with his subjects or in 
 the internal administration of his Empire. 
 
 The latter part of the clause, it will be seen, completely 
 nullified and destroyed the effect of the earlier part ":of 
 it, and practically gave full licence to the Sultan to con- 
 tinue his misgovernment of his Empire and to refuse the 
 just demands of his Christian subjects — a very lame and 
 impotent conclusion to the war. 
 
 In explanation of this clause, it should be stated that 
 Lord Stratford, shortly before the meeting of the Con- 
 gress, had succeeded, after long efforts, in extracting from 
 the Porte another charter of reform in favour of its Christian 
 subjects, known as the Hatti-Humayun. This was referred 
 to in the treaty, not as an act binding on the Porte, but 
 merely as an indication of the Sultan's good intentions, 
 and with the express condition that neither the Great Powers 
 signatories to the treaty nor any one of them were to be 
 entitled to call him to account in the event of his pious 
 intentions not being carried into effect. Lord Stratford, 
 •when he heard at Constantinople of the intentions of the 
 Congress, but before a final conclusion was arrived at, 
 wrote to Lord Clarendon the following strong protest : — 
 
 There are manv able and experienced men in this conntrv who 
 view with alarm the supposed intention of the Conference at Paris to 
 record the Sultan's late Firman of Privileges (the Hatti-Humayun) in the 
 treaty of peace, and at the same time to declare that the Powers of Pairope 
 disclaim all right of interference between the Sultan and his subjects. 
 They argue thus : The Imperial firman places the Christians and the Mus- 
 sulmans on an equal footing as to civil rights. It is believed that the Porte 
 will never of its own accord carry the provisions of the firman seriously 
 into effect. The treatv, in its supposed form, would therefore confirm 
 the right and extinguish Ihe hope of the Christians. Despair on their 
 side and fear on that of the Turks would, in that case, engender the 
 bitterest animosity between them, and not improbably bring on a deadly 
 struggle before long.' 
 
 • Life of Lord Stratford, ii. p. 442.
 
 3o8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 This protest, which doubtless represented Lord Strat- 
 ford's own convictions, was of no avail. Lord Clarendon 
 was powerless at the Congress. He met with no support 
 from the French representatives. They cared nothing for 
 reforms in Turkey. The Russians, in view of the origin 
 of the war and the refusal of the other Powers to recognize 
 their claim to intervention on behalf of the Christians in 
 Turkey, were naturally indisposed to concede it to others, 
 either individually or collectively. The nullifying provision 
 was inserted in the treaty. It abrogated v^hatever effect the 
 recognition of the firman might have had. The Hatti- 
 Humayun became, ipso facto, a dead letter. Lord Strat- 
 ford was bitterly disappointed. " He felt very keenly," 
 says his biographer, " the pusillanimity of his own Govern- 
 ment, who had made him a victim to their deference to 
 France." In a letter to his brother after the conclusion of 
 the treaty. Lord Stratford wrote : " To be the victim of so 
 much trickery and dupery and charlatanism is no small 
 trial. But I have faith in principles as working out their 
 own justification, and fix my thoughts steadily on that 
 coming day when the peace of Paris will be felt and its 
 miserable consequences." 
 
 Lord Clarendon, in a letter to the ambassador, thus 
 described his own views of the treaty : — 
 
 I think as you do about the terms of peace, but I am not the least sorry 
 that peace is made, because, notwithstanding our means of carrying on 
 the war, I believe we should have run risks by so doing for which no 
 possible success would have compensated. We should have been alone. 
 ... If you could have seen all that was passing when I got to Paris — 
 the bitterness of feeling against us, the kindly (I might almost say the 
 enthusiastic) feeling towards Russia, and the determination, if necessary, 
 to throw over the Vienna conditions in order to prevent the resumption 
 of hostilities (money matters and Bourse speculations being the main 
 cause), you would have felt as I did, that our position was not agreeable, 
 and that Brunnow was justified in saying that they did not come to 
 make or negotiate peace, but to accept the peace which was to be crammed 
 down their throats. . . . Unluckily, too, just as negotiations began the 
 French army fell ill, and the Emperor himself admitted to me that, with 
 twenty-two thousand men in hospital and likely to be more, peace had 
 almost become a military as well as a financial and political necessity 
 for him." 
 
 ' Life of Lord Stratford, ii. p. 436.
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 309 
 
 Lord Stratford's words on hearing that the treaty was 
 signed were, " I would rather have cut off my right hand 
 than have signed that treaty." 
 
 The writer paid a second visit to Constantinople in 1857. 
 He rode there from Belgrade, passing through Bulgaria 
 on -the way, and was witness of the miserable condition to 
 which this province had been reduced by Ottoman rule. 
 He spent a few weeks at Therapia, where the Amba^ssadoir 
 was residing, and was favoured by many conversations with 
 him. Lord Stratford was always most kind and communica- 
 tive to young men. He made no secret of his bitter dis- 
 appointment. The treaty of Paris, he alleged, was a death- 
 blow to the cause of reform in Turkey. If the Christian 
 population were not protected from misgovernment, the 
 Empire was doomed. He was under no illusion as to the 
 misgovernment of the country. He knew that if left to 
 themselves the Turks would do nothing, and that all the 
 reforms promised by the Hatti-Humayun which he had 
 obtained with so much labour and difficulty before the con- 
 clusion of the Crimean War would remain unexecuted and 
 would be a dead letter. He considered that England had 
 been betrayed at the Congress of Paris, that the clause in 
 the treaty which embodied the Hatti-Humayun was nullified 
 by the provision that its recognition did not entitle the 
 Great Powers either collectively or separately to interfere 
 in the internal affairs of Turkey. He held that this was 
 fatal to the enforcement of the new reforms. He main- 
 tained that the only way to induce the Turks to act in 
 accordance with them was through threats and fear, and 
 that some external Power should bring such pressure to 
 bear on them. This might be done by England alone, or 
 by England in alliance with France, or by the Great Powers 
 collectively. He preferred the first of these ; he had 
 little hope of the last ; but the treaty had extinguished all 
 methods equally.' It was the last year of the Great Elchi's 
 reign at Constantinople. He retired from his post and 
 from the public service in the following year at the age 
 of seventy -one. 
 
 He was succeeded by Sir Henry Bulwer, later Lord 
 Dalling, an ambassador of a very different type. Though 
 an able diplomat, he cared nothing for reform in Turkey. 
 He allowed himself to be placed under personal obliga- 
 
 ' The above is from notes of conversations with Lord Stratford made 
 at the time.
 
 3!d THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 tion to the Sultan, which destroyed his influence. He 
 made no effort to induce, stdl less to compel, the Porte 
 to give effect to the Hatti-Humayun which his predecessor 
 had obtained with so much labour. 
 
 The cause of reform in Turkey [says Mr. Lane Poole], for which Lord 
 Stratford had striven for so many years, began its downward course when 
 the Turks understood the altered character of the British Embassy under 
 Sir Henry Bulwer. Lord Stratford's farewell to Constantinople was the 
 occasion for a stately ceremony, in which the Sultan and all his ministers 
 and the whole population joined in paying a last tribute to the departing 
 Elchi. ... He knew, however, that he was assisting in the obsequies of 
 his hopes. His long struggle for reform of the Ottoman Empire was 
 at an end, and in the character of his successor he could trace the 
 antithesis of all he had striven for, the abandonment of all he had won.' 
 
 Lord Stratford lived on in retirement to the age of 
 ninety-three, long enough to see the verification of all 
 his fears as to the effect of the unfortunate clause in the 
 treaty of Paris in nullifying the promises of reforms in 
 Turkey and of aU his predictions as to the result of this in 
 the revolt in 1874 of the Christian populations of Bosnia, 
 Herzegovina, and Bulgaria under the stress of appalling 
 misgovernment and tyranny, and in their final liberation 
 from Turkish rule by the armies of Russia. On this occa- 
 sion the revolt of these subjects of the Porte had his full 
 sympathy, and he admitted that Russia was fully justified in 
 its intervention. 2 
 
 Mr. Gladstone in 1876 dedicated to Lord Stratford his 
 pamphlet on Bulgarian atrocities, which had such powerful 
 effect in preventing England from taking up arms again 
 in support of Turkey. 3 
 
 ' Life of Lord Stratford, ii. p. 449. 
 
 ' Lord Morley's Life of Gladstone, ii. p. 555. 
 
 3 It may be well to add, wliat has not been mentioned by his able 
 biographer, doubtless because Lord Stratford's daughters were alive when 
 the book was published in 18S8, that the Great Elchi gave testimony of 
 his belief in the permanence of the Turkish Empire by investing the 
 greater part of his personal property and savings in Turkish Bonds. 
 In 1874, when the Porte became bankrupt and repudiated payment of 
 interest on the debt, some friend at Constantinople wrote to Lord Stratford 
 giving timely information of what was coming and advising him to sell 
 his bonds while there was yet time. Lord Stratford, however, thought 
 it was inconsistent with his sense of honour to act on this advice. His
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 311 
 
 Looking back at the Crimean War, it is now possible 
 for us to perceive and admit that its main, if not its only, 
 result was to postpone for a few years the break up of the 
 Turkish Empire in Europe. It negatived for a time the 
 claim of Russia to an exclusive protectorate over the 
 Christian populations of the Balkans which would secure 
 to them the benefit of good government. Lord Stratford's 
 hopes of a reformed Turkish Empire, more or less under 
 the aegis of England, were frustrated by the treaty of 
 Paris. As a result, no reforms were effected in Turkey. 
 Its downward course was retarded, but not averted. When, 
 in 1876, the accumulated grievances of the Christian popu- 
 lation compelled an outbreak, it will be seen that the 
 intervention of Russia on their behalf was practically 
 admitted by England and the other Great Powers. 
 
 Abdul Mehzid died in 1861. He had not realized even 
 the small promise of his youth. He had many instincts that 
 were sound and good. He was the most humane of the 
 long list of Sultans. He fully recognized the urgent neces- 
 sity for reforms in his State, in order to bring it into line 
 with other civilized States in Europe. But he had tiot 
 the energy or the will to carry them into effect, and the pro- 
 gramme of reform conceded to Lord Stratford remained a 
 dead letter. He was prematurely aged by debauchery. He 
 was the first Sultan to fall into the hands of moneylenders of 
 Western Europe. Great sums were borrowed ostensibly 
 for the war with Russia. But the larger part of them 
 was expended by Abdul Mehzid in wild extravagance, 
 in gratifying the caprices of the multitude of women in 
 his harem, in building palaces, and in satisfying the 
 demands of corrupt ministers. On the occasion of the 
 marriage of one of his daughters with the son of a Grand 
 V^izier he spent forty millions of francs on her trousseau 
 and in fetes. Meanwhile the services of the State were 
 neglected, nothing was done to relieve Kars, and corruption 
 spread in all directions. 
 
 means were greatly reduccrl by tlie bankruptcy of the Porte. After 
 his death and the cessation of his pension, his daughters would have been 
 in very reduced circumstances if it had not been for the generosity of a 
 personal friend of their father, the late Lady Ossington, who made up to 
 these ladies, for their lives, the amount of the pension from the State 
 which had lapsed by the death of Lord Stratford.
 
 3T2 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Abdul Aziz, who succeeded his brother and reigned for 
 fifteen years, was physically one of the finest of his race. 
 He was majestic in appearance. His mien was gracious. 
 He was every inch a Sultan. But this was about all that 
 could be said for him. His mind was vacuous. His 
 education had been neglected. He had spent many years 
 in forced seclusion, but had secretly intrigued with the 
 more fanatical party in the State against his brother, and 
 had raised hopes that on coming to the throne he would 
 reverse the measures of reform, such as they were, which 
 his two predecessors had initiated. But he belied these 
 expectations for a time. On his accession he issued ,a 
 proclamation announcing his intention to follow his two 
 predecessors in the path of reform. He promised to 
 economize the resources of the State and to reduce the 
 vast expenditure of the palace. He pensioned ofif the 
 multitudes of concubines of his brother, and gave out 
 that he meant to content himself with the most modest 
 harem. But these proved to be no more than good inten- 
 tions, which only paved the way to very opposite measures. 
 Before long his own retinue of women was increased to 
 nine hundred, and the number of eunuchs in his palace 
 to three thousand. His extravagance soon emulated that 
 of his brother. His reign was one of external peace, 
 which afforded full opportunity for giving effect to the 
 reforms promised by his brother and registered by the 
 treaty of Paris. Nothing was ever done. The firman 
 proved to be a dead letter. His ministers cared no moire 
 than himself for reforms. Successive British Ambassadors 
 made no serious efforts in this direction. Indeed, they 
 were precluded by the treaty of Paris from any exclusive 
 pressure on the Porte, without the support of all the other 
 Powers . 
 
 The reign was chiefly conspicuous for the enormous 
 borrowings of money in London and Paris by the Porte, 
 following on the bad example set by Abdul Mehzid. The 
 debt was rapidly increased by Abdul Aziz till it reached 
 a total of nearly two hundred millions sterling. It does 
 not appear that the accruing interest on this great debt 
 was ever paid out of the revenues of the Empire. Fresh 
 loans were continually raised, out of which the accumulated 
 interest on previous loans was provided. Huge commissions 
 to financiers who brought out the loans, and bribes to
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 313 
 
 pashas for consenting to their issue, accounted for another 
 large part of the borrowed money. What remained was 
 mainly devoted by the Sultan to new palaces and to 
 extravagances of his harem. This merry game went on 
 as long as credulous people in Western Europe could be 
 induced to continue lending. But the credit of the Turkish 
 Empire was exhausted in 1874. A repudiation of half 
 of the interest was then announced, and in the following 
 year the remaining half was repudiated. This did much 
 to weaken the interest of Western Europe in the Turkish 
 cause. Eventually a composition was arrived at with the 
 creditors of the State. An International Commission was 
 appointed, in whom certain revenues of the State were 
 vested, out of which the interest of a greatly reduced total 
 of the original debt was to be paid. The principle of foreign 
 control over the finance of the Empire was thus 
 introduced. 
 
 The Russian Government during this reign, by its skilful 
 diplomacy, backed by threats of force, recovered much of 
 its old influence at the Porte, and its ambassador. General 
 Ignatief, began to dominate its councils and to nominate 
 its Grand Viziers. Three events during the period showed 
 the gradual downward course of the Empire. In 1867 the 
 two Danubian principalities succeeded in accomplishing 
 their long-desired object of uniting together in a single 
 State, thenceforth known as Roumania ; and in 1868 Prince 
 Charles of Hohenzollern was elected, and was invested by 
 the Sultan as the hereditary ruler of this new State. The 
 union of the two provinces into a single State practically, 
 secured independence to it, while the connection of its 
 ruler with the reigning family of Prussia marked the advent 
 of that Power into the political system of the Christian 
 States founded on the debris of the Turkish Empire in 
 Europe, and was the first of many important alliances of 
 which we now see the intent and result. Serbia also made 
 an important advance to independence. In 1867 the Turkish 
 garrison in Belgrade, the occupation of which had been 
 confirmed by the treaty of Paris, was withdrawn by the 
 Porte. These two events were the result of pressure of 
 the ambassadors of the Great Powers, who were anxious 
 to minimize the causes of friction to the Porte, which did 
 not add to its real strength. 
 
 Another important event was the repudiation by Russia
 
 314 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 on October 31, 1870, during the Franco-German War, of 
 the clause in the treaty of Paris of 1856 which interdicted 
 the Black Sea to Russian and Turkish vessels of war, 
 and forbade to both Powers the creation or maintenance of 
 naval arsenals on the coasts of that sea. We now know that 
 Prince Bismarck, on behalf of Prussia, secured the neutrality 
 of Russia in the war with France, in 1870, by promising" 
 to support this repudiation by the Czar of his treaty 
 obligation. Complaint has not unfrequently been made of 
 the refusal or neglect of the British Government, of which 
 Mr. Gladstone was then the head, to insist on the mainte- 
 nance of this treaty by Russia, even at the risk of war. 
 But the Porte, in whose interest the provision had been 
 framed by the Congress of Paris, and which was primarily 
 concerned in its maintenance, showed no desire or inten- 
 tion to make its breach by Russia a casus belli, and it 
 would have been sheer madness for England, either with 
 or without Turkey, to have taken up the challenge of 
 the Czar. A humiliating restriction such as this on the 
 sovereign rights of a great country was obviously of a tem- 
 porary character, and could not, in the nature of things, be 
 a permanent arrangement. It had served its purpose by 
 giving to the Porte a respite of fourteen years from naval 
 attack by Russia. Lord Palmerston, who was Prime 
 Minister in England when the treaty 3vas made, had him- 
 self put on record the opinion that the enforced neutrality 
 of the Black Sea might be expected to last for fifteen 
 years. It is to be noted that some years would necessarily, 
 elapse after the repudiation of the treaty before a Russian 
 fleet could be created in the Black Sea and before Sebas- 
 topol could be restored as a naval base. In point of fact, 
 in the war, which was soon to break out between Russia 
 and Turkey, in 1877, the latter Power had virtual com- 
 mand of the Black Sea, and the Russian army which crossed 
 the Balkans and advanced to the vicinity of Constanti- 
 nople did so without the support of a naval force in the 
 Black Sea, as had been the case in 1829. 
 
 Another event also occurred in 1870, the significance of 
 which was not fully appreciated at the time. Previous to 
 that year the Christian Slav populations of the Balkans, 
 such as the Bulgarians, Bosnians, and others, were under 
 the spiritual jurisdiction of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch 
 and were regarded as Greeks. The ancient history of
 
 THE RULE OF ELCHIS 315 
 
 Bulgaria and its claims to a distinct nationality appear to 
 have been forgotten or ignored by politicians interested in 
 the Eastern question. On March 10, 1870, Abdul Aziz, 
 under pressure from Russia, backed by its able ambas- 
 sador, General Ignatief, issued a firman recognizing the 
 separate existence of Bulgaria, and creating for it a national 
 Church independent of the Greek Church, though differing 
 in no important respect in point of doctrine or ritual. 
 This laid the foundation for a new nationality in the 
 Balkans. Bulgaria, long forgotten, emerged from obscurity 
 and came to the front as a competitor of the Greeks, 
 The importance of this will be appreciated later, when we 
 come to the rivalry of these races for the debris of the 
 Ottoman Empire in Europe. 
 
 In 1876 a bloodless revolution took place in Constan- 
 tinople. A new ministry was forced upon Abdul Aziz, of 
 which Midhat Tasha — one of the few genuine and con- 
 vinced reformers among the leading Turks — was a member. 
 They decided to depose the Sultan. They obtained a 
 fetva from the Mufti justifying this on the ground of his 
 incapacity and extravagance. No single hand was raised 
 in his favour. After a vain protest, he submitted to his 
 fate, and was removed from his palace to another building 
 destined to be his prison. Four days later he was found 
 dead there, and nineteen physicians of the city, including 
 men of all nationalities, testified that Abdul Aziz died by 
 his own hand.
 
 XXI 
 
 ABDUL HAMID II 
 
 1876-1909 
 
 On the deposition of Abdul Aziz, his nephew, the eldest 
 son of Abdul Mehzid, much against his will, was pro- 
 claimed as Sultan, under the title of Murad V. His feeble 
 mind, reduced to a nullity by long seclusion in the Cage, 
 and by the habit of intemperance, was completely unhinged 
 by this unexpected elevation, and after a few weeks — on 
 August 31, 1876 — it became necessary for the committee 
 of ministers who had set him on the throne to depose him 
 in favour of the next heir. His brother, Abdul Hamid H, 
 held the Sultanate for thirty-three years, and is still aJive, 
 in the custody of another brother, the present Sultan, after 
 being deposed, in his turn, in 1909. 
 
 Abdul Hamid proved to be the most mean, cunning, un- 
 trustworthy, and cruel intriguer of the long dynasty of 
 Othman. His mother was an Armenian. He was destitute 
 of physical courage. He lived in constant fear of plots 
 and assassination, and in suspicion of every one about 
 him. He trusted no one, least of all his ministers. He 
 allowed no consultations between them. If he heard that* 
 two of them had met in private, his suspicions were aroused 
 and they were called to account. He employed a huge 
 army of spies, who reported to him directly and daily as 
 to the doings of his ministers, of the ambassadors, and of 
 any one else of importance. They fed him with reports, 
 often false, on which he founded his actions. Plots were 
 invented in order to induce him to consent to measures 
 which otherwise he would not have sanctioned. He 
 claimed and exercised the right of secret assassination of 
 his foes or suspected foes. No natives of Turkey were 
 safe. They might disappear at anv moment, as so many 
 
 316
 
 ABDUL HAxMID 317 
 
 thousands had done by the order of the Sultan, through 
 some secret agent, either to death or exile. This was not so 
 much from pure wickedness of heart as from fear of being 
 assassinated himself, and the belief that his safety lay in 
 exterminating his enemies before they had the chance of 
 maturing their plans against himself. The ambassadors of 
 foreign Powers had little influence with him, except so 
 far as they were able to threaten the use of armed force, 
 when, sooner than risk war, he gave way . He showed great 
 cunning in playing off one ambassador against another, 
 and was an adept in all the meanest intrigues of diplomacy. 
 
 Abdul Hamid's life was one of incessant labour. He 
 devoted himself most assiduously to the work of his great 
 office. Whatever his demerits, he was absolute master of 
 his ministers and of his State. There never was a more 
 centralized and meticulous despotism. As he trusted no 
 one, he was overwhelmed by most trivial details and graver 
 questions were neglected. He could not, indeed, administer 
 the vast affairs of his Empire without information or advice 
 from others, but no one knew from day to day who was 
 the person on whose advice the Sultan overruled his osten- 
 sible ministers, whether a favourite lady of his harem, or a 
 eunuch, or some fanatical dervish, or an astrologer, or a 
 spy. There was constant confusion in the State, arising 
 from antagonism between the officials of the Porte and 
 the minions of the palace. 
 
 Outwardly, Abdul Hamid had the manners of a gentle- 
 man, but inwardly he was as mean a villain as could be 
 found in the purlieus of his capital. He was avaricious to 
 an extreme, and though his expenditure wlas most lavish and 
 his charities wide, he amassed immense wealth, which he 
 invested secretly through German bankers against the rainy 
 day which he expected . When it came and he was deposed, 
 amid universal execration and loathing, his life was spared 
 in the hope mainly of extracting from him these secr'et 
 investments. He was not above receiving bribes himself, 
 on a igreat scale, from financiers in search of concessions. 
 He did nothing to check the chief evil of Turkish rule— 
 the sale of offices and the necessity for officials to recoup 
 themselves for their outlay by local exactions. Though 
 he was not without some instincts for good government, 
 and was free from any fanaticism, his system was such 
 that everything went to the bad in his reign, and that
 
 3i8 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 many years of peace, after the treaty of Berlin, were 
 attended by no improvement in the condition of his people, 
 but the reverse. The result of his policy was that his 
 Empire suffered a greater dismemberment than had been 
 the bad fortune of any of his predecessors, and as he 
 monopolized power, he must be held mainly responsible 
 for its evil results. 
 
 At the very outset of his reign Abdul Hamid was con- 
 fronted with most serious questions affecting the integrity 
 of his Empire. In 1875 an outbreak had occurred in Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, the result not merely of misgovernment 
 by the Turkish pashas and officials, their rapacity and 
 exactions, and of the system of farming the taxes, iDUt 
 of a vicious agrarian system. The great majority of 
 landowners, though of the same Slav race as the rayas, 
 the cultivators of the soil, were.' Moslems by religion. Their 
 forbears had become so when the Ottomans conquered 
 their State in order to save their property. They wer« 
 as rapacious and fanatical as any landowners of Turkish 
 race in any part of the Empire. No Christians were 
 employed in the administration of these provinces. The 
 evidence of the Christian rayas was not admitted in the 
 courts of law. Justice or injustice could only be obtained 
 by bribes. The police and other officials lived by 
 extorting money from those whom it was their duty to 
 defend. 
 
 The bad harvest of 1874 was the immediate cause of 
 the outbreak, for the farmers of the taxes refused to make 
 any concessions. It was, in the first instance, directed 
 rather against the Moslem landowners and the local Turkish 
 officials than against the Sultan, but it rapidly developed 
 into a general insurrection against the Sultan's government. 
 Every effort was made by Austria and Russia to localize 
 it and to induce the Porte to make concessions. Count 
 Andrassy, the Austro -Hungarian Foreign Minister, drew up 
 a scheme for the pacification of the two provinces. It 
 proposed that the system of farming the taxes should be 
 abolished, that the taxes raised in the provinces should 
 be expended locally for their benefit, that complete religious 
 equality should be established, and that a mixed commis- 
 sion should be appointed to supervise the carrying out of 
 these reforms. The scheme was agreed to by Russia, Great 
 Britain, and the other Powers, and was presented to the
 
 ABDUL HAMID 319 
 
 Sultan, who acquiesced in it. But it proved, like other 
 promises of reform in Turkey, to be a dead letter. Not a 
 single step was taken to give efifect to any part of it. The 
 rebellion in the two provinces continued. The insurgents 
 increased their demands. They insisted that one -third of the 
 land should be given up to the rayas. The movement soon 
 extended to Bulgaria, which was seething with dis- 
 affection. 
 
 On April 21, 1876, an outbreak of Bulgarians occurred 
 on the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, of which" 
 Batak was the centre. It was put down without difficulty 
 by a small Turkish force sent from Constantinople, under 
 Achmet Agha, with little loss of life to the troops engaged, 
 but with relentless cruelty, not only to the actual insurgents 
 who surrendered on promise of life, but to the whole popu- 
 lation of the district. Bands of Bashi-Bazouks, consisting* 
 of Tartars from the Crimea who had been planted in 
 Bulgaria, were let loose on them. Indiscriminate murders, 
 rapes, and rapine took place. Sixty villages were buirnt. 
 Twelve hundred persons, mostly women and children, took 
 refuge in a church at Batak and were there burnt alive. 
 In all about twelve thousand persons perished in these 
 brutal reprisals. Achmet Agha received a high decora- 
 tion from the Sultan for this performance. There was 
 nothing new in this method of dealing with an outbreak 
 by the Porte. It was in accord with its traditional system 
 and policy to wreak vengeance on those revolting by orgies 
 of cruelty, which would strike terror among subject races 
 and act as a warning to them in the future. 
 
 What was new in the case of the Bulgarians in 1876, 
 and was fraught with misfortune to the Turkish cause, 
 was that full and graphic accounts of the horrors com- 
 mitted at Batak, written by Mr. Edwin Pears (now Sir 
 Edwin), the correspondent at Constantinople of the Daily 
 News, appeared in the columns of that paper. They pro- 
 duced a profound impression on public opinion in England. 
 Discredit was thrown on the story in the House of Commons 
 by Mr. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, but it was fully con- 
 firmed by Mr. MacGahan, another correspondent of the 
 same paper, who visited the district, and later by Mr. 
 Walter Baring, a member of the British Embassy at Con- 
 stantinople, who, bv the direction of the Government, made 
 full personal inquiries on the spot. He described what
 
 320 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 had taken place as " perhaps the most heinous crime that 
 has stained the history of the present century." 
 
 It was also unfortunate for the Turks that Mr. Gladstone, 
 the only survivor in the House of Commons of the British 
 statesmen responsible for the Crimean War, who had 
 recently retired from the leadership of the Liberal party, was 
 fired by the description of these horrors in Bulgaria to 
 emerge from his retirement and to take up the cause of 
 the Christian population of European Turkey, for which 
 he held that the treaty of Paris had made his country 
 responsible. 
 
 Meanwhile the horrors at Batak had also aroused the 
 indignation of Russia and the fears of Austria. A 
 fanatical outbreak of Moslems at Salonika resulted in the 
 murder of the Consuls of France and Germany. Serbia 
 and Montenegro, impelled by sympathy for their fellow 
 Slavs in Bosnia, declared war against Turkey. A Turkish 
 force defeated the Serbians, who appealed to Russia 
 for assistance. At this stage another effort was made 
 by Russia and Austria, supported by Germany, to avert 
 a general conflagration, and a scheme was embodied 
 in what was known as the Berlin Memorandum for com- 
 pelling the Porte to carry out the reforms which it had 
 admitted to be necessary. The British Government, how- 
 ever, very curtly refused to be a party to the scheme, on 
 the ground that they had not been consulted in framing 
 it and did not believe in its success. About this time 
 also the British fleet in the Mediterranean was ordered to 
 Besika Bay, a step taken avowedly for the purpose of 
 protecting British subjects in the turmoil which had arisen, 
 but which seemed to the Porte to indicate an intention to 
 support them against the demands of the other Powers. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, fearing that these actions indicated the 
 intention of the British Government to withdraw from the 
 concert of Europe and to renew the separate policy which 
 had led to the Crimean War, made a vehement attack on 
 it in the House of Commons for refusing to agree to the 
 Berlin Memorandum. Later, in September 1S76, he pub- 
 lished his well-known pamphlet on " the Bulgarian 
 Horrors," in which, with passionate language, he dwelt 
 at length on the massacres at Batak and denounced the 
 Turkish Government. lie protested that he could no longer 
 bear his share of responsibility for the Crimean War.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 321 
 
 Otherwise he might be accused of " moral complicity in 
 the basest and blackest outrages upon record in that 
 century." 
 
 Those [he wrote] who opposed the Crimean War are especially 
 bound to remember that the treaty of Paris made Europe as a whole, 
 and not Russia alone, responsible for the integrity and independence 
 of the Oltoman Empire, which had given this licence to Turkish officers 
 to rob, murder, and ravish in Bulgaria. ... As an old servant of the 
 Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more 
 than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and 
 insist that our Government, which has been working in one direction, 
 shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour, in common with the 
 other States of Europe, in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive 
 power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the 
 only possible manner, namely, by carrying oft themselves. Their zapties 
 and their mudirs, their bimbashis and their yuzbashis, their kaimakans 
 and their pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out 
 from the province they have desolated and profaned.' 
 
 The pamphlet produced an immediate and profound 
 effect on public opinion in Great Britain. It was followed 
 up by speeches of the same force and eloquence on the 
 part of the veteran statesman. Meetings took place in 
 every part of the country, at which sympathy was expressed 
 for the Christian populations of Turkey. The Turks were 
 denounced for their cruelties and bad government. Resolu- 
 tions were unanimously passed in accord with the policy 
 recommended by Mr. Gladstone. Lord Stratford himself 
 expressed sympathy with the movement, differing only in 
 this from Mr. Gladstone, that England, in his view, should 
 exert its influence not only for the Bulgarians, but for all 
 the oppressed subject races in Turkey. Many of the most 
 cultivated men in England joined in the movement quite 
 irrespective of party politics. 
 
 Mr. Disraeli, who was created Earl of Beaconsfield in 
 the course of these events, on his retirement from the 
 House of Commons, showed great courage and persistence 
 in resisting the movement. His sympathies lay wholly in 
 the opposite direction. His Eastern policy was in accord 
 with that of the previous generation of statesmen, such 
 as Palmerston, and, indeed, Gladstone himself in his earlier 
 stage of opinion, who believed that the maintenance of the 
 
 ' The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question in Hie Easl, 1876. 
 21
 
 322 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Turkish Empire was essential to the integrity of the }3ritish 
 P^mpire. He saw no reason for change. He dreaded the 
 further advance of Russia. He did not believe in the 
 honesty of the professions of its Emperor. He enforced 
 his views at a public meeting at Aylesbury on Septem- 
 ber 20th, and endeavoured to stem the movement. He 
 scoffed at the Bulgarian horrors. He declared the perpe- 
 trators of them were not so bad as those who made them 
 the subject of agitation for their political purposes. He 
 was evidently prepared to support the Turks against any 
 invasion of their country by Russia, and to renew the policy 
 of the Crimean War. But it was in vain. 
 
 Though the agitation promoted by Mr. Gladstone did 
 not result in inducing the Government to join the other 
 Powers in compelling the Turkish Government to concede 
 autonomy to its Christian provinces, or to carry out reforms, 
 it had two effects of great historical importance, which 
 must be our justification for referring to the subject. It 
 made impossible the renewal of the policy of the Crimean 
 War — ^the armed support by Great Britain to the Turks 
 against an invasion by Russia on behalf of the Christian 
 population of the Balkans. It paralysed the hands of those, 
 like Lord Beaconsfield, who desired to support the Turks 
 and the status quo. On the other hand, it doubtless stimu- 
 lated Russia to armed intervention, by making it clear that 
 there would be no resistance on the part of Great Britain. 
 Lord Beaconsfield's yCabinet was divided on the subject. 
 A majority lof its members evidently concurred with Lord 
 Derby, the Foreign Secretary, in opposition to war with 
 Russia on behalf of Turkey. 
 
 On September ;2ist, the day after Lord Beaconsfield 
 had delivered his fiery pro-Turkish speech at Aylesbury, 
 Lord Derby, (On behalf of the Government, in a despatch 
 to the Ambassador at Constantinople, directed him to 
 inform the Porte that the atrocious crimes of the Turkish 
 authorities and troops in Bulgaria had aroused the righteous 
 indignation of the British people, and that Great Britain, 
 as signatory to the treaty of Paris, could not be indifferent 
 to them. He demanded that examples should be made 
 of the perpetrators of these crimes. 
 
 On October 30th Lord Derby further informed the Russian 
 Government, through the ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 that, however strong the feeling in England against the
 
 ABDUL HAMID 323 
 
 Turkish cruelties, it would be superseded by a very, different 
 sentiment if it were believed that Constantinople was 
 threatened, or that British interests in the Suez Canal were 
 in any danger. This message to the Emperor could only 
 be interpreted as meaning that the British Government 
 would not interfere with any action that Russia might take 
 against Turkey, provided it did not involve the conquest 
 of Constantinople or endanger British interests in Egypt. 
 It was evidently so understood by the Emperor, for imme- 
 diately on receipt of the above despatch, on November 2nd, 
 he gave his word of honour to the British Ambassador 
 that he had no designs on Constantinople and no intentions 
 whatever to annex Bulgaria. 
 
 In spite of this explicit announcement on the part of 
 the Emperor, in response to the despatch from the British 
 Foreign Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, a few days later, on 
 November 9th, at the annual civic banquet at the Guildhall 
 of London, delivered himself of a most bellicose ispeech 
 on behalf of Turkey, practically threatening war with 
 Russia, without any reference to the pacific assurance of 
 the Czar, which, as we now know, was in his hands at the 
 time when he made this speech. There could not well 
 be a clearer intimation on the part of the British Premier 
 that he had no belief in the good faith of the Emperor. 
 
 This menacing speech of the British Prime Minister 
 was telegraphed to Russia, with the result that the Czar 
 was greatly incensed, and on the next day, November loth, 
 he made a public pronouncement at Moscow to his people 
 of the gravest importance, to the effect that, if he could 
 not obtain adequate guarantees from the Porte for the 
 protection of its Christian subjects, he would act inde- 
 pendently of other Powers, relying on the loyalty of his 
 people to support him. 
 
 In the meantime, through Lord Derby's efforts, it had 
 been arranged with Russia and the other Great Powers 
 that a Conference should be held at Constantinople of repre- 
 sentatives of all the Powers, for the purpose of deciding 
 what administrative changes should be proposed to the 
 Sultan, with a view to the common purpose — namely the 
 better protection of his Christian subjects in Europe. 
 
 Lord Salisbury, as a member of the British Cabinet and 
 Secretary of State for India, represented England at this 
 Conference. It met at Constantinople on December 23,
 
 324 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 1876. On the day before the meeting of the Conference 
 at Constantinople a firman was published by the Sultan, at 
 the instance of Midhat Pasha, promulgating a scheme of 
 constitutional reform, which had been agreed to by the 
 ministers of the Porte in the short reign of Murad, but 
 which Abdul Hamid on his accession had refused to 
 sanction. A National Assembly was convoked, to be elected 
 by universal suffrage, without distinction of race or 
 religion, throughout the Empire. It was hoped to antici- 
 pate the demands of the Conference by a scheme of reform 
 wider than they were likely to advise. This was effected 
 with perfect good faith by Midhat, who was earnestly in 
 favour of reform. But subsequent events showed that the 
 Sultan adopted this course for the purpose only of throw- 
 ing dust in the eyes of the Conference, and with the full 
 intention of setting aside the Constitution as soon as the 
 Conference had broken up. The Conference might perhaps 
 have acted more wisely in treating this act of the Sultan 
 as an honest proposal, and in making it the basis of a wide 
 reform of the Ottoman Empire. They held it to be a 
 sham. They proceeded with their discussions as if it had 
 not been issued. They preferred an alternative scheme 
 of providing autonomous institutions for the Christian 
 provinces of Turkey, and for the appointment of governors 
 subject to the approval of the Great Powers. There was 
 practically no difference of opinion at the Conference 
 between the British and Russian delegates. Lord Salisbury 
 and General Ignatief. The Conference, at their instance, 
 reduced its demands on the Porte to the most moderate 
 minimum. 
 
 The Sultan refused point-blank to entertain the pro- 
 posals of the Conference, on the ground that they inter- 
 fered with his sovereign powers. He pleaded the new 
 Constitution which he had just accorded to the Empire. 
 There never was any intention on his part to make any 
 concessions. He was under the belief that if war resulted 
 with Russia from his refusal to agree to reforms his country 
 would not stand alone. He took the policy of England 
 from the speech of Lord Beaconsfield at the Guildhall; 
 and not from Lord Derby or Lord Salisbury. Lord 
 Beaconsfield had, in fact, thrown over his colleague, Lord 
 Salisbury, in that unfortunate utterance and had insured 
 the failure of the Conference at Constantinople,
 
 ABDUL" HAMID 325 
 
 A few days after the break-up of the Conference, Midhat 
 Pasha was ignominiously dismissed from office. The new 
 Constitution did not long survive its author. In May, 
 1877, Abdul Hamid suspended it and dismissed the National 
 Assembly which had been convoked. During the two months 
 of its existence its members had shown a determination to 
 expose the scandalous abuses of the Hamidian system. Later 
 Abdul Hamid trumped up a charge against Midhat of having 
 been responsible for the murder of Sultan Aziz. Two men 
 employed by that Sultan, a wrestler and a gardener, were 
 suborned to confess that they strangled Aziz at the instance 
 of Midhat. Midliat was tried by corrupt judges and was not 
 allowed to cross-examine these men. He was found guilty 
 and condemned to death. At the instance mainly of the 
 British Government the sentence was commuted to banish- 
 ment to Arabia. Midhat was there strangled by order of 
 Abdul Hamid in 1882, and his embahned head was sent to 
 Constantinople, in order that the Sukan might be assured of 
 his death. The two men who had confessed to the murder 
 of Aziz were released and were pensioned by the Sultan. Sir 
 Henry Elliot, who was British Ambassador at Constantinople 
 at the time of the death of Sultan Aziz, put on record his 
 conviction that it was a case of suicide, that the charge 
 against Midhat was trumped up, and that the whole pro- 
 ceedings are an indelible stain on Abdul Hamid. 
 
 Meanwhile, in 1877, another attempt was made by the 
 Great Powers to effect a settlement of the Eastern question. 
 Count Schouvaloff was sent to London by the Emperor of 
 Russia on a special mission for the purpose. .Agreement 
 was arrived at between the Powers. It was embodied in a 
 protocol, and was presented to the Porte. It was promptly 
 rejected on April loth by the Sultan as inconsistent with 
 the treaty of Paris by interfering with the independence 
 of the Ottoman Empire. Russia thereupon declared war 
 against Turkey, justifying it in a dignified manifesto, on 
 the ground that the Sultan, by rejecting the protocol, had 
 defied Europe. Russia, therefore, held the strong position 
 of acting on behalf of Europe. England was the only 
 Power to take exception to this. Lord Derby, in a 
 despatch to the Russian Government, said that he and his 
 colleagues regarded the action of Russia as an obstacle to 
 reform in Turkey, and held that the plight of the Christian 
 population could not be improved by war — a most unfor-
 
 326 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 tunate prediction, as the result proved. More fortunate 
 was the prediction of Mr. Gladstone at the close of a 
 speech which he made in the House of Commons, on April 
 24, 1877, immediately after the declaration of war by 
 Russia, when moving a resolution intended to prevent the 
 Government from taking up a hostile attitude to Russia 
 in the coming war, 
 
 I believe, for one [he said], that the knell of Turkish tyranny in these 
 provinces (the Balkan provinces) has sounded. So far as human cyes 
 can jud^c, it is about to be destroyed. The destruction may not come 
 in the way or by the means that we should choose ; but come from what 
 hands it may, I am persuaded tliat it will be accepted as a boon by 
 Christendom and the world.' 
 
 The answer of the Government to Mr. Gladstone was 
 given in the debate by the Home Secretary, Sir Richard 
 Cross, later Lord Cross. It showed that the policy of 
 Lord Derby, and not that of Lord Beaconsfield, had pre- 
 vailed in the Cabinet. The Government, he said, regretted 
 the war which had been declared by Russia, and did not 
 believe that it would do any good, but it would not give 
 support to either side, unless the Suez Canal or Egypt or 
 Constantinople were threatened. 
 
 It followed from this decision of the British Cabinet 
 that the hopes which the Sultan had formed from the 
 speeches of Lord Beaconsfield were not realized. He was 
 left alone to fight against Russia in another attack on his 
 Empire. Immediately after the declaration of war, on April 
 24, 1877, two Russian armies invaded Turkey — the one in 
 Europe, of two hundred and fifty thousand men, under the 
 nominal command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the other in 
 Asia, of a hundred and fifty thousand men from the Caucasus, 
 under that of the Grand Duke Michael. The former crossed 
 the Pruth into Roumania, which was still nominally a part 
 of the Ottoman Empire. But on April i 5th the Roumanian 
 Chamber had given its assent to a convention with Russia 
 providing for the passage of the Russian troops through 
 the principality and otherwise giving promise of friendly 
 support. The Porte, as was to be expected, treated this 
 as a hostile act, and directed the bombardment of Calafat, 
 a Roumanian fortress on the Danube. The Roumanians 
 
 ' House of Commons, April 24, 1877.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 327 
 
 thereupon, on May 21st, declared war against Turkey. They 
 gave most effective support to the Russians throughout the 
 campaign. Indeed, it may be fairly said from the course 
 of the campaign that the invasion of Bulgaria would not 
 have been successful without the help of the Roumanians. 
 
 The Emperor of Russia had further prepared the way 
 for the invasion of Turkey by securing the neutrality of 
 Austria -Hungary. At a personal meeting in the previous 
 year at Reichstadt, he had assured the Emperor of Austria 
 that he had no intention of taking possession of Con- 
 stantinople. He further promised that Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina would be handed over for occupation by Austria- 
 Hungary as a reward for neutrality in the event of success 
 in his war against the Turks. 
 
 Owing to unprecedented inundations in the valley of 
 the Danube, it was not till two months after the commence- 
 ment of the campaign that the Russian army was able to 
 cross that river. It did so at two points, the one in the 
 Dobrudscha, the other at Hirsova. In neither case did it 
 meet with serious opposition. The Turkish army of defence 
 was little inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, but 
 its general, Abdul Kerim, proved to be quite incompetent. 
 He spread his forces in detachments over a front of five 
 hundred miles, and was too late in concentrating them. 
 The Russians, after capturing Nicopolis, the Turkish strong- 
 hold on the Danube, advanced into Bulgaria and captured 
 Tirnovo, its ancient capital. Everywhere they were received 
 by the Bulgarians with rapturous demonstrations of delight 
 at the prospect of deliverance from Ottoman rule. 
 
 General Gourko, with a flying corps, then made a very 
 hazardous but successful march across the Balkans by the 
 Hainkoi Pass, and advanced into Bulgaria along the Trudja 
 Valley as far as Eski Zagra. Thence, turning back, he 
 attacked the more important Shipka Pass from the south, 
 and defeated a Turkish force in occupation of it. Mean- 
 while, early in July, the main Russian army from Tirnovo 
 came in contact at Plevna, twenty miles south of the Danube, 
 with a Turkish army of fifty thousand men under Osman 
 Pasha, who had been sent in relief of Nicopolis, but was 
 too late for the purpose. 
 
 Plevna was not a fortress. It was a strong natural 
 position, where the Turks entrenched their army behind 
 earthworks and redoubts with great engineering skill, and
 
 328 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 where they maintained an obstinate and memorable defence 
 for nearly five months, the most striking incident of the 
 campaign of 1877. Three unsuccessful assaults were made 
 by the Russians, assisted by a Roumanian army, in which 
 great losses were incurred. Thereupon, by the advice of 
 General Todleben, the hero of the defence of Sebastopol 
 in the Crimean War, the attempt to take these works at 
 Plevna by assault was given up, and it was subjected to a 
 close investment. The occupation of the Shipka Pass by 
 Gourko prevented the advance of a Turkish army in relief 
 of Plevna, in spite of successive attacks by the Turkish army 
 under Suleiman Pasha. As a result, after five months of 
 heroic resistance, Osman Pasha found himself in great straits 
 for want of food for his army. He determined to make a 
 great effort to break through the lines of the investing 
 army. The sortie failed, and Osman and his whole remain- 
 ing army of thirty -two thousand men were compelled to 
 surrender on January 9, 1878. This had the effect of 
 releasing the Russian army in front of Plevna. General 
 Gourko and the main part of the Russian army thereupon 
 marched to Sofia. General Skobeleff, in command of 
 another army, determined to force his way across the Balkan 
 range. An army of ninety thousand Turks under another 
 Pasha was stationed at the southern end of the Shipka 
 Pass and barred his way. Directing a part of his army to 
 made a feint attack along the Shipka Pass, Skobeleff led 
 the remainder by two sheep tracks distant about six miles 
 from the pass, and crossing the mountains, was able to attack 
 the enemy on the flank at Shenova. The Turks were 
 defeated and their whole army was compelled to surrender. 
 By this brilliant manoeuvre of Skobeleff, the Grand Duke 
 Nicholas, in nominal command of the whole Russian army, 
 was able to advance v/ithout further opposition to Adria- 
 nople. He took possession of it on January 28th. Mean- 
 while the Turks met with further defeats from the Serbians 
 and Montenegrins. The former captured the important 
 town of Nisch. The latter captured Spizza, in the bay of 
 Antivari, and Dulcigno, in the Adriatic. 
 
 In Asia the Turks were no more fortunate than in Europe. 
 Their army under Muktar Pasha was little inferior in 
 numbers to that of the Russians, but it was divided between 
 Kars, Ardahan, and Erzeroum. The Russians in the course 
 of the campaign of 1877 succeeded in successively cap-
 
 ABDUL HAMID 329 
 
 turing these important fortresses and in getting possession 
 of nearly the whole of the districts inhabited by Armenians. 
 
 By the middle of January 1878 the resistance of the 
 Turks was practically at an end in both continents. They 
 were compelled to sue for peace and to appeal for the 
 mediation of the other Powers of Europe. On January 31st 
 an armistice was agreed on. 
 
 The capture of Adrianople and the fact that there was 
 no Turkish army capable of resisting the further advance 
 of the Russians to Constantinople caused great alarm to 
 the British Government. Opinion in England, which had 
 not supported Lord Beaconsfield in his desire to renew the 
 policy of the Crimean War, and to assist the Turks against 
 the invasion of Bulgaria by the Russians, now veered round, 
 at least among the wealthier and a large section of the 
 middle class, and declared itself vehemently opposed to 
 the occupation of Constantinople, which appeared to be 
 imminent, even if it should be only of a temporary 
 character. 
 
 The British fleet at Besika Bay was ordered to enter the 
 Dardanelles. The House of Commons was asked to vote 
 six millions for war purposes. Every preparation was 
 made for war. Russia replied to these demonstrations by 
 advancing its army nearer to Constantinople. The head- 
 quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas were established at 
 San Stefano, a village on the shore of the Marmora, within 
 sight of Constantinople. A portion of the British fleet then 
 took up a position near to Prince's Island, also within sight 
 of the capital. The position between the two countries, 
 England and Russia, was therefore most critical. 
 
 Meanwhile negotiations took place directly between Russia 
 and the Porte. Terms of peace were offered and agreed to, 
 and on March 3, 1878, a treaty was signed between the 
 two Powers at San Stefano. It was in accord with the 
 promises which had been made to the British Government 
 by the Czar. Constantinople, the province of Thrace, and 
 Adrianople were left in possession of the Turks, and the 
 capital was not even to be temporarily occupied by the 
 Russian army. Bulgaria was not to become a Russian 
 province or even an independent State. But a great Bul- 
 garia from the Danube southward, with frontiers on the 
 Black Sea and the .^gean Sea, and including the greater 
 part of Thrace, was constituted as an autonomous State,
 
 330 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan, under a 
 prince to be elected by its people and approved by Russia. 
 As thus constituted, it would cut off the Porte from direct 
 junction and communication by land with its remaining 
 possessions in the Balkan peninsula, such as Macedonia, 
 Epirus, and Albania. Serbia and Montenegro were to be 
 greatly enlarged and both were to be independent States. 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be endowed with autono- 
 mous institutions while remaining subject to the Porte. 
 Reformed administration was to be secured for the reniaining 
 Balkan provinces. No extension was conceded to Greece, 
 but Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete were included in the pro- 
 vision of reformed administration. The Roumanians were 
 very shabbily treated after the valuable assistance they had 
 rendered to the Russian army. The part of Bessarabia, in- 
 habited largely by Roumanians, which had been taken from 
 Russia by the treaty of Paris and added to Moldavia, was to 
 be restored to the Czar, together with a small strip which 
 brought Russia up to the Danube as a riverain State. In 
 exchange, Roumania was to be content with the barren 
 Dobrudscha, sparsely inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. 
 Roumania was to- be an independent State. In Asia, Kars, 
 Ardahan, Bayezid, and Batoum, and their districts were to 
 be ceded to Russia. Erzeroum was to be restored to 
 Turkey. An indemnity for the war of twelve millions 
 sterling was to be paid by Turkey. 
 
 The publication of these terms did not allay the appre- 
 hensions of the British Government. They were regarded, 
 in the first instance, as meaning the complete dismember- 
 ment of Turkey in Europe. Lord Beaconsfield and the 
 Turkophil members of the Government believed that a 
 great Bulgaria would be completely under the influence of 
 Russia, and would be used as a stepping-stone for the 
 ultimate acquisition of Constantinople by that Power. They 
 could not understand, what was often insisted upon by Mr. 
 Gladstone in his speeches, that the best barrier against 
 the advance of Russia, in the Balkan peninsula, would be 
 a self-governing, contented, and prosperous State, and that 
 the larger it was the better it would serve that purpose. The 
 Government, under these misapprehensions, determined to 
 resist the creation of a big Bulgaria, even at the risk of 
 war with Russia. They maintained that the treaty of San 
 Stefano was completely at variance with the treaty of
 
 ABDUL HAMID 331 
 
 Paris of 1856, and must be revised by a new Congress of 
 the great Powers of Europe. 
 
 The Russian Government would not agree to submit 
 the whole treaty to a Congress, but only some parts of it. 
 A collision between Russia and England seemed to be 
 imminent. War preparations were continued by the latter, 
 and hidian troops were sent to Malta. Lord Derby, the 
 P'oreign Minister, and Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secre- 
 tary, who were opposed to war, resigned, and the war party 
 in the Cabinet prevailed. But the Czar was very averse to 
 war, whatever might be the wishes of his generals at the 
 front before Constantinople. At the last moment terms 
 of reference to a Congress were agreed upon between the 
 two Governments, and war was averted. By an agreement 
 which was intended to be secret, but which was divulged 
 to the Press in England by an unscrupulous employe at the 
 Foreign Office, the British Government promised to support, 
 at the Congress, the main clauses of the treaty of San 
 Stefano, subject to a concession, on the part of Russia, as 
 to Bulgaria. Under this agreement, the intended big Bul- 
 garia was divided into three pai^ts. That between the 
 Danube and the Balkan range was to be dealt with as 
 proposed in the San Stefano treaty. It was to be an 
 autonomous State under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with 
 a prince elected by its people. A second part of it, imme- 
 diately south of the Balkan range, to be called Eastern 
 Roumelia, was to be an autonomous province more directly 
 under the control of the Porte . A third, the part bordering 
 on the yEgean Sea and containing a mixed population of 
 Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and (in parts) Moslems, was to 
 be restored to the Porte subject to conditions for better ad- 
 ministration equally with other Turkish provinces in Europe. 
 This part has since been generally spoken of as Macedonia. 
 
 The Congress of the Powers met at Berlin on June 1 3, 
 1878, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. It was 
 the most important gathering of the kind since the Congress 
 of Vienna in 18 15. The Great Powers were represented 
 by their leading statesmen. England, by Lord Beacons - 
 field and Lord Salisbury ; Russia, by Prince Gortchakoif 
 and Count Schouvalofit' ; France, by its Prime Minister, 
 Waddington ; Italy, by Count Corti, its Foreign Minister ; 
 Austria, by Count Andrassy. The Porte, apparently, was 
 unable to find a competent Turk for the purpose.
 
 332 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 It was represented by Karatheodori, a Greek, and by 
 Mehemet Ali, a renegade German. Germany, it need not 
 be said, was represented by Bismarck, who acted as the 
 'honest "broker." Although apparently invested with un- 
 limited authority to deal with all questions arising out of 
 the treaty of San Stefano, the Congress found that its hands 
 were practically tied behind its back by the agreement 
 between England and Russia. It had no other option than 
 to cut down the big Bulgaria under the tripartite scheme 
 already described, which was the essence of the Anglo - 
 Russian agreement. As regards the artificially created 
 province of Eastern Roumelia, Lord Beaconsfield, who 
 throughout the proceedings of the Congress championed 
 the Turkish cause, insisted that the Porte was to have the 
 right to maintain garrisons in its frontier fortresses. He 
 threatened to break up the Congress if this was not con- 
 ceded. Russia, though strongly opposed to this, ultimately 
 gave way. This was a triumph for Beaconsfield, the value 
 of which we can now appreciate, with the knowledge that 
 no advantage was ever taken by the Porte of this permission 
 to garrison Eastern Roumelia. 
 
 The most important point on which the Congress effected 
 a change in the treaty of San Stefano was in respect of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the instance of Bismarck, 
 these two provinces, instead of being endowed with 
 autonomous government, were handed over to Austria for 
 occupation and administration, while remaining nominally 
 a part of the Turkish Empire. Montenegro was to lose 
 half of the territory conceded to it at San Stefano.' The 
 claims of Greece for a definite extension of its territory 
 were championed by the representative of France, but were 
 opposed by Lord Beaconsfield. The Congress contented 
 itself with a recommendation to the Sultan that the 
 boundaries of Greece should be extended so as to include 
 Thessaly and a part of Epirus. Organic reforms of adminis- 
 tration and law were to be carried out by the Porte in the 
 European provinces of the Empire on the recommendation 
 of a Commission to be appointed by the Great Powers. 
 
 The Congress confirmed to Russia the acquisition of 
 the provinces in Asia above referred to, and the restora- 
 tion of Erzeroum and Bayezid to the Porte. The Armenians 
 
 ^' ' Bismarck induced Lord Beaconsfield to propose this to the Congress.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 333 
 
 were guaranteed good government and protection from the 
 raids of Kurds and Circassians. Some other amendments 
 of the San Stefano treaty of no great importance were 
 decided upon, and on July 13, 1878, the treaty of Berlin 
 was signed by the representatives of all the Powers, after 
 exactly a month of discussion. 
 
 After his success at the Congress in respect of the 
 Roumelian garrisons, obtained by the threat of war, 
 Beaconsfield was able to return to England with a flourish 
 of trumpets, boasting that he had succeeded in obtaining 
 ' peace with honour.' Though the treaty of Berlin nullified 
 that of San Stefano as regards the big Bulgaria, it did, 
 in fact, ratify the virtual dismemberment of the Ottoman 
 Empire in respect of four-fifths of its territory in Europe 
 and freed about eight millions of people from its rule. This 
 great achievement was due to Russia alone, and the gains 
 to that Power in Bessarabia and Armenia were in com- 
 parison small and unimportant. The splitting up of 
 Bulgaria, which constituted the main dift'erence between 
 the two treaties, was due to British diplomacy, backed by 
 threats of war. But the result obtained did not stand the 
 test of even a short experience. Two of the Bulgariati 
 provinces thus torn asunder were reunited seven years later. 
 More recently, the parts of Macedonia and Thrace restored 
 to full Turkish rule by the treaty of Berlin have, within 
 the present century, again been freed from it, and have 
 been annexed to Serbia and Greece in about equal portion. 
 
 It will be seen from this brief statement that by the treaty 
 of Berlin Great Britain obtained nothing for itself, unless 
 it were that the division of Bulgaria was of permanent 
 value to it in strengthening' the hold of the Turks on 
 Constantinople, a contention which has not been confirmed 
 by subsequent events. It did, however, succeed in getting 
 something out of the general scramble for territory. By, 
 another secret treaty which, to the amazement of the 
 members of the Congress at Berlin, was made public during 
 their sittings, the Porte agreed to hand over to the occupa- 
 tion of England the island of Cyprus, on terms very 
 similar to those under which Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
 placed under the charge of Austria. The occupation of 
 the island was limited to the time during which Kars and 
 Ardahan should be in possession of Russia. As ft con- 
 dition of this occupation. Great Britain guaranteed to the
 
 334 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Porte its Asiatic possessions. But this guarantee was con- 
 ditional on good government being secured to the Armenian 
 population in the east of Asia Minor, a condition which 
 has never, in fact, been fulfilled. The treaty was justified 
 in the British Parliament on the ground that Cyprus would 
 be of great value as a place d'armes for the British 
 army in the event of attack by Russia on the Asiatic 
 provinces of Turkey or of an attack from any quarter 
 on Egypt. The Porte was guaranteed by the British 
 Government an annual tribute so long as the occupation 
 should last, based on the average revenue which it had 
 received from the island. The proceeds were assigned 
 for payment of the interest on the loan raised by Turkey, 
 during the Crimean War, guaranteed by England and 
 France. The arrangement was made hastily and without 
 due inquiry, with the result that the island has been, 
 burthened with a charge far in excess of its past pay- 
 ments to the Porte, and the British taxpayers have been 
 compelled to bear a part of the burthen. An occupation 
 such as that of Cyprus was almost certain to become per- 
 manent, and in 19 14, during the existing war, the island 
 was permanently annexed by the British Government. 
 
 Looking back at the events which led to the liberation 
 of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule and to all the other changes 
 sanctioned by the treaty of Berlin, it must now be fully 
 admitted that the agitation which Mr. Gladstone promoted 
 against the Turkish Government had a great ultimate eft'ect. 
 It averted the use of armed force by Great Britain for 
 the purpose of preventing the intervention of Russia on 
 behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans. In a 
 great speech in the House of Commons in review of the 
 treaty of Berlin, Mr. Gladstone delivered himself of this 
 verdict on it : — 
 
 Taking the whole provisions of the treaty of Berlin together, I must 
 thankfully and joyfully acknowledge that great results have been achieved 
 in the diminution of human misery and towards the establishment of 
 human happiness and prosperity in the East. 
 
 As regards the conduct of England at the Congress he 
 added these weighty words : — 
 
 I say, Sir, that in this Congress of the Great Powers the voice of 
 England has not been heard in unison with the constitution, the history,
 
 ABDUL HAMID 335 
 
 and the character of England. On cvciy question that arose, and that 
 became a subject of serious contest in the Congress, or that could lead to 
 any practical results, a voice has been heard from Lord Beaconsfield and 
 Lord Salisbury which sounded in the tones of Metternich, and not in the 
 tones of Mr. Canning, or of Lord Palmerston, or of Lord Russell. . . . 
 I do affirm that it was their part to take the side of liberty, and I do also 
 affirm that, as a matter of fact, they took the side of servitude.' 
 
 Lord Salisbury himself lived to make the admission that 
 England in its Eastern policy " put its money on the 
 wrong horse." 
 
 The three years which followed the treaty of .Berlin 
 were spent by the Great Powers in the endeavour to give 
 effect to its provisions, by settling the boundaries betw^een 
 Turkey and its disjecta membra, and other important details. 
 Two of these questions led to great difficulty. The Porte, 
 as was to be expected, put every obstruction in the way 
 and resorted to its accustomed dilatory methods. By the 
 treaty Montenegro had been guaranteed a port in the 
 Adriatic. It was not till 1880, after the return of Mr. 
 Gladstone to power in England, that effective pressure was 
 put on the Porte. He induced the other Powers to join 
 in sending a combined fleet to the Adriatic to blockade 
 its coast as a demonstration against the Porte. This, how- 
 ever, was not effective for the purpose. It mattered little 
 to the Porte that its coast in the Adriatic was blockaded. 
 It was not till the British Government threatened to send 
 its fleet to Asia Minor, and by seizing some custom houses 
 there to cut off supplies of money, that the Sultan was 
 brought to book. Eventually the port of Dulcigno and 
 the district round it were ceded to Montenegro and its 
 claim for access to the Adriatic was conceded. 
 
 The case of Greece caused even greater difficulty. The 
 treaty of Berlin, it has been showD, contained no specific 
 promise or guarantee of a cession of territory to Greece. It 
 merely made a recommendation to that effect, leaving it to 
 the discretion of the Porte whether to accede to it or not. 
 As Greece had taken no part in the war of liberation of 
 the Balkans, it had no special claim, except such as 
 arose from a wish of the Powers to avoid complications in 
 the future. It was admitted, however, by the Porte that 
 something should be done in the way of rectifying its 
 
 ' Parliamtntary Report, House of Commons, July 30, 1878.
 
 336 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 frontier in this direction. Another conference of the Powers 
 at Berlin [reported in favour of drawing the frontier line 
 so as to include in the kingdom of Greece the whole of 
 both Thessaly and Epirus. This was gladly assented to by 
 Greece, but was rejected by the Sultan. The Powers, 
 however, were not willing to back up their proposals by 
 armed force. The French Government, which had sup- 
 ported the claim of Greece at the Congress, now drew 
 back. Eventually, after two years of diplomatic labour, 
 a compromise was arrived at, mainly at the instance of 
 the British Ambassador to the Porte, Mr. Goschen, who 
 showed infinite skill and patience in dealing with the Sultan. 
 A line of frontier was agreed to, which conceded to Greece 
 the whole of Thessaly and about a third part of Epirus. 
 This line excluded Janina and other districts inhabited 
 by Moslem Albanians, and also other districts where Greeks 
 predominated, but under the circumstances it was the most 
 which could be effected v/ithout a resort to arms. Greece 
 had to wait some years before a more complete settlement 
 could be secured to her. 
 
 As regards the organic local reforms in administration 
 and law which, under the treaty of Berlin, were to be carried 
 out in the European provinces of the Empire, a Commission 
 was appointed by the Great Powers in 1880. The British 
 representative was Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, later Lord 
 Fitzmaurice. He took the leading part in drawing up a large 
 and complete scheme of reform, which was agreed to by 
 the Commission and was presented to the Sultan for his 
 approval in accordance with the treaty. 
 
 There followed, after these proceedings, a period of 
 twenty -eight years, up to 1908, during which Turkey, under 
 the rule of Abdul Hamid, was free from external war, and 
 opportunity was therefore afforded for giving effect to the 
 promises by the Porte, guaranteed by the treaty of Berlin, 
 of reforms and improved administration in Macedonia and 
 other Balkan provinces left in its possession, and also 
 in Crete and Armenia. Except as regards Crete, not 
 a single step, however, was ever taken by the Porte to 
 give effect to these promises. The scheme of organic 
 reform was never approved by the Sultan. It was treated 
 as waste-paper, like every other promise of reform in 
 Turkey. Disorder and misgovernment continued unabated. 
 Several events soon took place which showed that the
 
 ABDUL HAMID 337 
 
 disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was still slowly but 
 surely proceeding. The most important of these was in 
 relation to Bulgaria. The reduced and mutilated province 
 under that name, as settled by the treaty pf Berlin, chose 
 as its ruler, with the consent of the Powers, Prince 
 Alexander of Battenberg, a young man of great merit 
 and promise. Eastern Roumelia, cut off from Bulgaria, 
 was also constituted as a separate province, more imme- 
 diately dependent on the Porte, but with autonomous 
 government, under a Christian governor nominated by the 
 Sultan. But this ingenious scheme of Lord Beaconsfield 
 did not work in practice. Economic difficulties, arising 
 from separate tariff's, equally with national aspirations, 
 necessitated union. The representative chambers of both 
 provinces were incessant in their demands for this. 
 
 The union of the two States was now opposed by Russia. 
 But, strange to say, it was supported by Great Britain, 
 at the instance of Lord Salisbury, who had been associated 
 with Lord Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin in in- 
 sisting on the severance of the two provinces. He had 
 since been persuaded by the British Ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, Sir William White, a far-seeing statesman who 
 had intimate knowledge of the Balkans, that a united 
 and strong Bulgaria would, in the future, be a bar 
 to the ambitions of Russia against what remained of 
 Turkey. 
 
 Fortunately for the Bulgarians, the Sultan arrived 
 at the same conclusion. When, therefore, in 1885, the 
 two provinces insisted on union, and a Bulgarian army 
 occupied Eastern Roumelia, with the full assent of its popu- 
 lation, who deported the Turkish governor to Constanti- 
 nople, the Sultan made no real opposition. He was 
 persuaded to accept the union as a fait accompli. The 
 diplomatic difficulty arising out of the treaty of Berlin 
 was evaded by the Sultan in 1886 nominating the Prince of 
 Bulgaria as governor of Roumelia. Thenceforth the repre- 
 sentative chambers of the two States met as one body at 
 Sofia, and the union was practically effected. This caused 
 great discontent in Serbia, which was jealous of the 
 aggrandizement of its neighbour and demanded territorial 
 compensation. War consequently broke out between Serbia 
 and Bulgaria. After a three days' battle at Slivnitza, the 
 Bulgarians, contrary to all expectations, were completely 
 
 '7.2
 
 338 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 successful, under the able generalship of Prince Alexander. 
 Belgrade lay open to the victorious army. But the Great 
 Powers then again intervened and insisted on terms of 
 peace between the belligerents, based upon the status quo 
 before the war. The Emperor of Russia deeply resented 
 the action of his relative, Prince Alexander. The Prince 
 was kidnapped and was forcibly conveyed out of the 
 country and compelled to abdicate. There ensued a strong 
 movement in his favour in Bulgaria. He was recalled 
 from exile. But at this critical moment of his career the 
 Prince appears to have lost his nerve, and instead of stand- 
 ing firm and relying on the support of the people, for 
 whom he had done so much, he gave way to the demands 
 of the Czar, and retired into obscurity as a cavalry officer 
 in the Austrian army. In his place Prince Ferdinand of 
 Saxe-Coburg was elected as ruler of the united province, 
 subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. 
 
 Another cause of frequent international difficulty during 
 the reign of Abdul Hamid was that of the island of Crete. 
 The Powers at Berlin had refused to include it in the 
 kingdom of Greece or even to recommend this course to 
 the Porte. They contented themselves with a provision in 
 the treaty guaranteeing to the island a reformed administra- 
 tion under a Christian governor. In compliance with this, 
 Photiades Pasha, a Greek subject of the Porte of adminis- 
 trative capacity, was appointed governor, and a representa- 
 tive chamber was constituted. For a few years the island 
 enjoyed peace and prosperity. But later, on the retirement 
 of Photiades, the Sultan endeavoured to restore his authority 
 in the island by appointing' a Moslem governor and sus- 
 pending the national assembly. Insurrection followed in 
 1896. The Greeks of the island, who formed by far the 
 greater number of its inhabitants, were supported by the 
 Government and people of Greece. War broke out in 
 1897 between the Porte and Greece. It was the first 
 occasion on which the Turkish army, which had been 
 trained by German officers, under command of General 
 von der Goltz, was able to show its quality. In thirty 
 days it completely defeated the Greek army and occupied 
 Thessaly and Epirus. The Powers thereupon intervened 
 and prevented the Porte from taking advantage of its 
 success. Peace was again insisted upon between the 
 belligerents. Greece was compelled to submit to a small
 
 ABDUL HAMID 339 
 
 rectification of its frontier and to pay the cost of the war, 
 estimated at four millions sterling. 
 
 The Turks thereupon evacuated Thessaly, and with them 
 departed the last of the Moslem beys or landowners. 
 Though Greece had at the time a navy superior in strength 
 to that of the Porte, it effected nothing in the war by sea. 
 Turkish troops had been able to invade Crete, and were in 
 practical occupation of it. The four Powers, not including 
 Germany, whose Kaiser was already coquetting with the 
 Sultan, with a view to a future military alliance, tlien 
 blockaded the island, occupied ports on its coast, and ulti- 
 mately compelled the Turkish troops to evacuate it. In 
 1898 PVince George of Greece, a son of the King of 
 Greece, was appomted governor of the island at the 
 suggestion of the Powers, and the native assembly was 
 recalled into existence. This arrangement was obviously of 
 a temporary nature. It lasted with growing friction till the 
 revolution in Turkey in 1908. When Austria annexed 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Cretan Assembly proclaimed 
 annexation to Greece, and thenceforth the union of the 
 island to the present kingdom was complete and was fully 
 recognized by the Powers. 
 
 The Great Powers were less successful in securing 
 performance of the promises of the Sultan under the treaty 
 of Berlin in the case of the Armenians. The Porte had 
 undertaken by the treaty to carry out, without delay, " the 
 amelioration and reforms demanded for provinces inhabited 
 by Armenians and to guarantee their security against Kurds 
 and Circassians." Periodic reports showing what reforms 
 were effected were to be laid before the Powers, who 
 were also to superintend their application. These pro- 
 visions were the more important as they were practically 
 the conditions on which the provinces of Erzeroum and 
 Bayezid, which had been occupied by the Russians in their 
 invasion of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey in 1877, were 
 restored to the Porte. It may be taken that, if the Powers 
 had conceived it possible that these promises would not 
 be carried out, they would not have been so cruel as to 
 restore these two provinces, inhabited so largely by 
 Armenians, to Turkish rule. Lord Salisbury in 1888 did, 
 in fact, use strong language to the Porte on the subject 
 of Armenia, and threatened armed force if reforms were 
 not carried out. In spite of this threat, no reforms were
 
 340 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 effected. Mr. Gladstone, when he came into power again 
 in 1892, endeavoured to bring pressure on the Porte in 
 favour of the Armenians, but he met with no support from 
 other Powers. Bismarck at last intimated to him that the 
 subject had better be allowed to drop. Russia, it seems, 
 was at that time engaged in the effort to induce the 
 Armenians inhabiting the districts round Kars, which had 
 been ceded to it under the treaty of Berlin, to give up their 
 national Church and to join the Greek Church. It was 
 little disposed to give support to the Armenians who 
 remained subjects of the Porte. 
 
 As a result, the Armenians obtained no valid protection, 
 and the Kurds and Circassians continued their raids against 
 these peaceful people. Later, suspicion of Armenian in- 
 surrection arose in the mind of Sultan Abdul Hamid. There 
 were a few isolated cases in which insignificant numbers 
 of Armenians, prompted by their compatriots across the 
 frontier in Russia, formed conspiracies against the Turkish 
 Government. But these feeble sparks were extinguished 
 by the Turkish ©fhcials on the spot without difficulty. They 
 were made the excuse, however, by the Sultan for a new 
 policy of massacre directed against these unfortunate 
 people. Massacres on a small scale began in 1889. 
 
 In 1 890, when the writer was at Constantinople, he was 
 favoured with an interview by the Sultan, who spoke on 
 the subject of the Armenians, and sent a message to Mr. 
 Gladstone, conveying his most positive assurances that he 
 was animated by none but the most friendly feelings towards 
 these people, and that he was determined to secure to 
 them good government. Such assurances from this quarter 
 were but proofs of malevolent intentions. Certain it is that 
 the tale of ofificial massacres was thenceforth for some 
 years a continuous one. Abdul Hamid appears to have 
 deliberately made up his mind, if not to settle the Armenian 
 question by extermination of the Armenians, once for all, 
 at least to inflict such a lesson on them as would never be 
 forgotten. This policy culminated in 1894. Commissioners 
 were then sent into the country inhabited by Armenians with 
 directions to summon the Moslems of the district to the 
 mosques and to inform them of the Sultan's wishes and 
 plans. They were to be told that liberty was given to 
 them to take by force the goods of their Armenian neigh- 
 bours, and if there was any resistance to kill them. It
 
 ABDUL HAMID 341 
 
 was not an appeal to the fanaticism of the Moslems, but 
 rather to their greed for loot and to their jealousy of their 
 more prosperous neighbours. 
 
 At the same time every precaution was taken to prevent 
 the news of these wholesale acts of rapine land massacre 
 from being known to the outside world. No strangers or 
 visitors were allowed to enter the country where these scenes 
 were taking place, and the most rigorous censorship was 
 applied to all letters coming from them. Save in a few 
 rare cases where the mollahs refused to obey, in the belief 
 that the Koran did not justify such acts, the instructions 
 were acted on and the policy of murder and robbery was 
 preached in the mosques. In the province of Bitlis twenty - 
 four Armenian villages were destroyed by Zeki Pasha. 
 Their inhabitants were butchered. Zeki was decorated by 
 the Sultan for this infamy. In 1895, ^^^ again in 1896, 
 wholesale massacres of Armenians took place, organized 
 by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and effected through the agency of 
 Shakir Pasha and other officials, civil and military. It 
 was estimated that a hundred thousand Armenians were 
 victims of these massacres, either directly or indirectly by 
 starvation and disease which followed them. Constanti- 
 nople itself, on August 22 and 28, 1896, was the scene of 
 an organized attack on the Armenian quarter. It was 
 invaded by gangs of men armed with clubs, who bludgeoned 
 every Armenian to be found there. In vain did the ambas- 
 sadors protest and appeal to the treaty of Berlin. In 
 vain did Mr. Gladstone issue, for the last time, from his 
 retirement and appeal to public opinion on behalf of these 
 people, designating the Sultan as Abdul the Great Assassin. 
 No Power was willing to use force or even to threaten 
 force on behalf of the Armenians. Even Russia was dis- 
 inclined to do so. These people had no wish to be 
 absorbed by Russia. An Armenian of good position and 
 wide acquaintance with his countrymen in Asia Minor, when 
 questioned by the writer on this point in 1890, said that 
 the Armenians had no desire to become subjects of Russia. 
 They would prefer to remain under the Turks, if England 
 would hold a big stick over the Sultan ; but if England 
 would not do this, they would prefer Russia, or the devil 
 himself, to the Turk. 
 
 It need not be said that these massacres of 1890-5 
 have been completely put into the shade by the far more
 
 342 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 extensive and bloody massacres of 1915, and that the policy 
 of deporting the whole population of Armenians has been 
 carried to a terrible conclusion. 
 
 There remains the case of the Macedonians and other 
 people of the Balkans who were replaced by the treaty of 
 Berlin under Ottoman rule. The difficulty of dealing with 
 them was aggravated by the fact that the population of 
 these districts was not homogeneous. Bulgarians, Greeks, 
 and Serbians were in many districts mixed up, each with 
 separate villages or communities, so that no definite 
 geographical lines could be drawn between them. The 
 neighbouring States of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece were 
 furiously jealous of one another, each claiming these inter- 
 vening districts. This, however, was no excuse to the 
 Porte for the continued misgovernment of these provinces. 
 Their unfortunate populations, while enduring the evils of 
 misrule, were able to compare their position under Turkish 
 rule with that of their more fortunate neighbours who 
 had been liberated from it by the treaty of Berlin, and 
 were enjoying all the benefits of self-government in 
 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. 
 
 The writer had the opportunity of personally forming an 
 opinion on this subject. In 1887 and 1890 he paid visits 
 to Greece, and in 1890 he visited Bulgaria on his way 
 to Constantinople, staying a few days at Sofia and Philip- 
 popolis. In both cases he was able to compare the new 
 condition of things with what he recollected of his previous 
 visits to these districts in 1857. Nothing could be more 
 striking and more satisfactory to those who had felt con- 
 dence in the principle of self-government and of democratic 
 institutions. The change in Bulgaria was the more remark- 
 able as it had been effected in the twelve years which had 
 elapsed since the treaty of Berlin. In these few years the 
 Bulgarians had equipped themselves with the machinery 
 of a progressive democratic community, with schools and 
 colleges, and with compulsory education. Roads, harbours, 
 and improvements of all kinds were in course of construction. 
 The Tartars and Circassians who had been planted in 
 Bulgaria by the Porte after the conquests by Russia of 
 the Crimea and the Caucasus, and who were the main 
 instruments of the horrors of Batak, had again been trans- 
 planted by the Porte in Asia Minor. But the indigenous 
 Moslems, whether of Slav or Turkish race, in spite of
 
 ABDUL HAMID 343 
 
 vehement exhortations of their mollahs, remained and were 
 well treated by the Christian population now in posses- 
 sion of power. They had no cause for complaint. They 
 were represented in the National Assembly of Bulgaria by 
 not a few men of their own religion. 
 
 The Bulgarian peasants, who, under Turkish rule, had in 
 many parts been driven from the fertile plains into the 
 Rhodope Mountains and had there formed congested districts, 
 had migrated again into the plains and were extending cul- 
 tivation. A member of the Bulgarian Chamber of Deputies, 
 when asked by the writer what his constituency of peasants 
 thought of the change since old Turkish times, replied 
 that they all admitted that though taxation had not been 
 reduced there was this great difterence : Under the Turkish 
 regime the taxes went into the pockets of the Turkish 
 officials and of the Sultan's gang of robbers at Constan- 
 tinople, and the peasants who paid got no return for them. 
 But under the new regime they had full return for their 
 money in schools and roads, with other improvements, and 
 in the protection of life and property. Brigandage, which 
 used to be rampant, had wholly ceased, and justice could 
 be obtained from the magistrates without bribes. 
 
 In Greece there was everywhere the same story, the 
 same comparison of the present with the past, to the 
 immense advantage of the existing state of things. 
 Brigandage had entirely ceased. Athens had become a 
 capital worthy of the nation — remarkable for the number 
 and character of its public buildings and institutions, for its 
 museums, colleges, and schools, founded for the most part 
 by wealthy Greeks in all parts of the world. 
 
 There remains to consider what had been the relative 
 and contemporaneous changes in the Balkan provinces still 
 remaining under Turkish rule and in the (mainly Moslem) 
 countries of Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia. To 
 inquiries of the writer in all quarters, m 1890, there was 
 but one answer, that since the treaty of Berlin the con- 
 dition both of Christians and Moslems throughout the 
 Turkish Empire had gone from bad to worse. In the 
 Christian Balkan provinces still under Turkish rule mis- 
 government was more rampant. Brigandage had increased. 
 The rapacity and exactions of the Turkish officials were 
 worse than ever. Discontent was seething in all directions 
 — the more so when the populations compared their fate
 
 344 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 with that of their more fortunate neighbours across the 
 frontiers who had been liberated by the armies of Russia 
 and by the treaty of Berlin. Nor were the reports as to 
 the condition of the Moslem subjects of the Porte in any 
 way better. The exactions of Turkish officials had 
 increased on people of all races and religion. The con- 
 current testimony from all quarters was that the condition 
 of the Moslem peasants had greatly deteriorated. 
 
 The writer, on his return from the East in 1890, in 
 the following paragraph described the danger to Turkey 
 resulting from this state of things : — 
 
 The danger to Turkey in its Eastern provinces of Asia Minor and in its 
 European provinces in Macedonia and Epirus is the comparison between 
 the condition of those who were freed in 1878 from the Sultan's rule, and 
 who have become self-governing, as in the case of the Bulgarians, or have 
 gone under the rule of Austria, Russia, or Greece, with those who remain 
 the subjects of Turkish rule. When, on one side of mere geographical 
 lines, without any physical difference, the populations arc flourishing and 
 improvements of all kinds in roads, railways, harbours, schools, etc., are 
 being effected ; when brigandage is at an end, and the cultivation of land 
 is extending ; when justice is equally administered, and security to life and 
 property is afforded by the authorities ; and when all these improvements 
 date from the time when they ceased to be under Turkish rule ; and when, 
 on the other side of these lines, the conditions are the same as formerly, 
 or even worse, and no improvement of any kind has taken place, the 
 contrast must inevitably lead to fresh aspirations of the peasantry, to 
 renewed political difficulties, to threats of intervention, and to further 
 schemes for disintegrating the Empire at no distant date. The real 
 defects of the Turkish Government appear to be the same as ever, not so 
 much in the laws themselves as the administration of them, or the want 
 of administration, the excessive centralization, the want of honest and 
 capable governors, the corruption which infects all official classes, the 
 want of money to supply the needs of the central Government and the 
 extravagance of the Sultan, the consequent excessive taxation, the com- 
 plete absence of security for life and property.' 
 
 ' Ninctccnih Century Review, December 1890. This article, which 
 contained other severe criticisms on the rule of Abdul Hamid, was 
 translated into the Turkish language, for his perusal, by the late Professor 
 Arminius Vamberi, who was the guest of the Sultan at the time of my 
 visit to Constantinople in 1890, and who had suggested to him that he 
 should favour me with an audience. The Professor backed up my state- 
 ments bv remonstrances on his own behalf, with the result that the 
 Sultan took grave offence. He withdrew the pension which he had 
 annually paid to the Professor and put an end to their long friendship.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 345 
 
 For seventeen more years these evils continued unabated 
 in the Ottoman Empire under Abdul Hamid, while the 
 condition of the liberated provinces was continually im- 
 proving and the contrast was becoming every year more 
 striking. Discontent and disaffection to the Turkish 
 Government, and contempt and hatred of the Sultan, the 
 head of it, increased not only among his Christian subjects, 
 but equally among the Moslems throughout the length and 
 breadth of the Empire. 
 
 The provinces of the Empire which had attained virtual 
 independence under Moslem rulers, such as Egypt and 
 Tunis, were little more fortunate in their experience. They 
 were infected with the same radical defects and misgovern - 
 ment as the suzerain Power. In Egypt the enlightened 
 despotism of Mehemet Ali had degenerated into the corrupt 
 administration of his grandson, Ismail Pasha. Egypt fell 
 into the hands of French and English moneylenders, and 
 millions of borrowed money were squandered by the Pasha 
 with little or no benefit to his country. Bankruptcy ensued 
 to the State, and the bondholders persuaded the French and 
 English Governments to interfere on their behalf and to 
 insist on a financial control through their Consuls. Later, 
 in 1 88 1, a popular movement arose in Egypt against this 
 foreign control, and the army, under Arabi Bey, revolted. 
 France refused to join with England in putting down the 
 revolt and in maintaining the dual control. England alone 
 undertook the task. It sent an army to Egypt, defeated 
 Arabi and his native army, and restored the nominal rule of 
 the Khedive. The dual financial control of Great Britain 
 and France was maintained. But a virtual protectorate by 
 the former was established, with the result that it became 
 eventually the master of Egypt. 
 
 In no case was the action of Abdul Hamid more fatuous 
 and more opposed to the real interests of his Empire than 
 in dealing with this Egyptian question. It was the policy 
 of Great Britain, at the time we are referring to, pursued 
 by both political parties in the State, to maintain as far 
 as possible the authority of the Sultan in Egypt and the 
 integrity of the Turkish Empire. When, in 1881, Mr. 
 Gladstone's Government proposed to send an army for 
 the temporary occupation of Egypt in order to put down 
 the rebellion of the Egyptian army, it was most anxious 
 to do so with the consent and support of the Porte. It
 
 346 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 invited Abdul Hamid to send troops there to act in concert 
 with the British army and in support of his own sovereign 
 rights. The Sultan refused to do so. He could not be 
 brought to believe that, in the event of his refusal, the 
 British Government would act without him. But this was 
 precisely what it did. A British army was landed in 
 Egypt and put down the rebellion without any support 
 from the Sultan. When it was too late, Abdul Hamid 
 discovered the supreme error of his policy. 
 
 Later again, between 1885 and 1887, when Lord Salisbury 
 was Prime Minister, he was most anxious to come to an 
 arrangement with the Porte for the ultimate withdrawal of 
 the British army in occupation of Egypt. He sent a special 
 envoy (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) to Constantinople, with 
 the olYer of a treaty to the Sultan, under which the British 
 army was to be wholly withdrawn from Egypt within seven 
 years, but with the condition that if, later, armed inter- 
 vention should again become necessary, British troops should 
 be employed for the purpose in preference to those of any 
 other Power. This most friendly and advantageous pro- 
 posal was agreed to by all the ministers of the Porte and 
 was favoured at first by the Sultan, but, after long negotia- 
 tion, he refused to sign the treaty. Later, when he per- 
 ceived the mistake which he had made, he offered to 
 reopen the negotiations, but met with a rebuff" from Lord 
 Salisbury. The two incidents are important as showing that 
 Egypt became a dependency of Great Britain mainly through 
 the perversity, folly, and stupidity of Abdul Hamid. 
 
 In Tunis analogous agencies had been at work in favour 
 of France. The occupation of this province had been the 
 subject of conversations between the Powers at the Congress 
 of Berlin. Prince Bismarck himself suggested it to the 
 representative of France, hoping perhaps that it would be 
 the cause of ill-feeling between that country and Italy, 
 and would widen the breach between them to the advantage 
 of Germany. The British delegates expressed themselves 
 as not unfavourable to this project. It followed that, 
 between 1881 and 1883, the Government of France forcibly 
 assumed a protectorate over Tunis and a control <of its 
 finance and administration, with the acquiescence, if not 
 the full approval, of the British Government. In the case of 
 Tunis, however, its connection with the Turkish Empire 
 had been virtually severed three centuries earlier.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 347. 
 
 Both in Egypt and Tunis, European control effected great 
 improvements in the condition of the native populations, 
 especially the peasantry, and afforded illustration to the 
 people of Turkey of the grave defects of their own Govern- 
 ment and its corrupt administration. A party was gradually 
 formed in the first decade of the present century among 
 Moslems in Turkey in favour of constitutional reform. It was 
 known as the Party of Union and Progress. Its members 
 were called the Young Turks. It had its origin with Turks 
 exiled abroad and chiefly living in Paris, and thence it 
 began to permeate Turkey and find influential support in 
 Constantinople. It obtained adherents in great numbers in 
 the Turkish army. It established a Committee at Salonika, 
 where it was in close touch with the officers of the Turkish 
 army, which had its headquarters there. By the year 1908 
 this m.ovement had enormously increased. Among its ablest 
 members were many Jews and cryptic Jews of Salonika. 
 
 There was universal discontent. The system of espionage 
 which the Sultan had set up, and which was his main 
 engine of government, was odious to people of every rank, 
 high and low. The army shared in the discontent. It 
 was not till they were certain of the support of the army 
 that the Committee of Union and Progress attempted any 
 overt act. But when assured of this they boldly proceeded 
 with their plans. On July 2^, 1908, at Salonika, Enver 
 Bey, on behalf of the Committee, proclaimed a revolution, 
 and on the same day the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps, stationed 
 there, declared their intention of marching to Constantinople 
 and compelling the Sultan to reform the Constitution. It 
 was decided by the Committee that Abdul Hamid should 
 not be deposed, but that he should be allowed to remain 
 on the throne, provided he accepted the Constitution in good 
 faith. The Committee had further made certain of the 
 support of the Albanian soldiers who formed the body- 
 guard of the Sultan, and who had been looked upon by him 
 as his most reliable supporters. Abdul Hamid, when he 
 found that the army was against him and that he had no 
 friends on whom he could rely, even among his bodyguard, 
 announced his willingness to concede the demands of the 
 revolutionary party. Never was a revolution effected with 
 so little bloodshed and with more complete success. The 
 Sultan dismissed his corrupt and hated ministers and 
 appointed others, dictated to him by the Committee. He
 
 34^ THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 agreed to summon again the Parliament which he had 
 dismissed in 1877. He issued a firman abolishing ,the 
 system of espionage. He publicly swore fidelity to the 
 new Constitution. For a time the people of Constanti- 
 nople were willing to believe in his sincerity. The Sheik ul 
 Islam pronounced that there was nothing in the demands 
 of the people which was opposed to the laws of Islam. 
 A general election took place of members for a National 
 Assembly under a process of double election. Men of all 
 races and religions were equally admitted to the franchise. 
 
 There were everywhere great rejoicings over the new 
 Constitution, though very few people beyond Constanti- 
 nople and Salonika had any conception of what it meant. 
 There was for a time great enthusiasm for England, and 
 the new ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, on arriving at 
 Constantinople to take up the post received a great ovation . 
 On December loth the new Parliament met, and was opened 
 by the Sultan with a speech, in which he promised to safe- 
 guard the Constitution and to protect the sacred rights of 
 the nation. The various Christian and other subject races 
 were well represented in the Chamber of Deputies. Its 
 members showed an unexpected ability in the conduct of 
 its proceedings and in their speeches. 
 
 It was not long, however, before difficulties began to 
 arise, and reaction reared its head again at the secret 
 instigation of the Sultan. There was an outbreak in 
 Albania against the Committee of Union and Progress. 
 The bodyguard of Albanians was won back to the support 
 of Abdul Hamid by profuse bribery. Disorder broke out 
 in many parts of the Empire. It was at Constantinople, 
 however, that the gravest dangers to the new order of 
 things arose. The first act of the new Government was to 
 dismiss the host of spies, who had been maintained at a 
 cost of £1,200,000 a year. It was said at the lime that 
 if three persons were seen talking together in the streets 
 one of them was certain to be a spy in the employment of 
 the Sultan. These people found their occupation gone. 
 The new ministers also cleared the public departments of a 
 vast body of superfluous and useless employes, most of them 
 hangers-on of the palace. These two classes of people 
 made a formidable body of malcontents, who conceived 
 that their fortunes depended on the restoration to the Sultan 
 of his old powers of corruption. They were supported by
 
 ABDUL HAMID 349 
 
 a small body of fanatical tnoUahs, who believed, or pre- 
 tended to believe, that the new Constitution was in opposi- 
 tion to the sacred law. But more important than these 
 agencies of reaction were the personal efforts made by 
 Abdul Hamid to tamper with the fidelity to the new Govern- 
 ment of the troops at Constantinople by the profuse dis- 
 tribution of money from his private stores. The new 
 ministers had also made the mistake of releasing from 
 prison, not merely great numbers of persons imprisoned 
 at the will of the Sultan for political reasons, but also all 
 the prisoners convicted of serious crimes. These formed 
 an element of disorder in the city and caused alarm and 
 distrust among the well-disposed citizens. 
 
 On April 13, 1909, nine months after promulgation of 
 the new Constitution, a revolt broke out among the troops 
 at Constantinople, and a counter-revolution was proclaimed. 
 It had no ostensible leader of any repute or influence. 
 Abdul Hamid avoided committing himself openly to the 
 movement. But for the moment, backed by elements of dis- 
 content, it was successful. The new ministers, the members 
 of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the members 
 of the new Assembly were compelled to seek safety by 
 flight. If Abdul Hamid had boldly come forward as the 
 champion of the reactionaries and fanatics, he might have 
 crushed his enemies and have restored the old regime. 
 But he lacked the courage for a desperate game. He 
 contented himself with the secret supply of money in 
 support of the movement. 
 
 Meanwhile the Committee of Young Turks met at 
 Salonika, and determined to put down the counter-revolution 
 by force. They called on Mahmoud Shefket Pasha, in com- 
 mand of the 3rd Army Corps, to support them. He said 
 that he had sworn to maintain the Constitution, and agreed 
 to march his army to Constantinople. At San Stefano he 
 met the members of the Assembly and the ministers who 
 had fled from the city. By the 24th of April the army 
 had overcome the feeble opposition of the rebellious troops 
 and were in occupation of the most important parts of 
 the capital. The counter-revolution was suppressed at a 
 very small cost of lives. The National Assembly met again, 
 and the first question for their decision was what should 
 be done with Abdul Flamid. They put the following ques- 
 tion to the Sheik ul Islam : —
 
 350 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 " What should be done with a Commander of the 
 Faithful who has suppressed books and important disposi- 
 tions of the Shenel law ; who forbids the reading of, and 
 burns, such books ; who wastes public money for improper 
 purposes ; who, without legal authority, kills, imprisons, and 
 tortures his subjects and commits tyrannical acts ; who, 
 after he has bound himself by oath to amend, violates 
 such oath and persists in sowing discord so as to disturb 
 the public peace, thus occasioning bloodshed ? 
 
 " From various provinces the news comes that the popu- 
 lation has deposed him ; and it is known that to maintain 
 him is manifestly dangerous and his deposition is advan- 
 tageous . 
 
 " Under these conditions, is it permissible for the actual 
 governing body to decide as seems best upon his abdication 
 or deposition? " 
 
 The answer was the simple word ' Yes.' 
 
 Never was a sovereign condemned by a more emphatic 
 and laconic word. Upon this the National Assembly 
 unanimously decided on the deposition of Abdul Hamid. 
 They sent a deputation to the palace to inform him to this 
 effect. He appears to have taken the sentence of deporta- 
 tion very quietly. " It is Kismet," he said. " But will 
 my life be spared?" He who had been so merciless to 
 others was chiefly concerned now in claiming mercy for 
 himself. He pleaded that he had not put to death his 
 two brothers, ]\Iurad and Rechad. The question was 
 reserved for the National Assembly. 
 
 Abdul Hamid found himself deserted and friendless. He 
 was execrated by his subjects and despised and distrusted 
 by all his fellow sovereigns in Europe, unless it were the 
 German Emperor, who, of late years, had given a support 
 to him in all his misdeeds at home and abroad. In his 
 hour of peril the Emperor gave him no support, but the 
 reverse. When he found how the wind was blowing, 
 William II commenced an intrigue with the Committee 
 of Union and Progress through Enver Bey, who had 
 received a military training in Germany and was personally 
 known to him. It is said that the Emperor insisted as 
 a condition of recognition of the new order that the life 
 of Abdul Hamid should be spared. There was another 
 reason for doing so — namely the hope of the Young Turks 
 to squeeze his hidden wealth from the deposed Sultan.
 
 ABDUL HAMID 351 
 
 However that may be, Abdul Hamid's life was spared. He 
 was deported with a few of the more favoured members 
 of his harem to Salonika, where he was detained as a 
 virtual prisoner, but not otherwise maltreated. After his 
 departure money and diamonds to the value of over a 
 million pounds sterling were found in his palace, a small 
 part only of his ill-gotten wealth. Two millions sterling 
 were deposited with German banks and very large sums 
 were in the hands of the Emperor William. Thus ended 
 a reign of thirty -three years, more disastrous in its imme- 
 diate losses of territory and in the certainty of others to 
 follow, and more conspicuous for the deterioration of the 
 condition of his subjects, than that of any other of his 
 twenty -three degenerate predecessors since the death of 
 Solyman the Magnificent.
 
 XXII 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 
 
 1909-U 
 
 Mehmet Rechad was proclaimed Sultan in place of his 
 brother, under the title of Mahomet V, at the age of 
 sixty -four. He had spent the whole period of his man- 
 hood as a virtual prisoner, the last thirty-four years lof 
 it under the close surveillance of his brother. He was 
 never allowed to have friends or even to read newspapers. 
 His servants were in the pay of Abdul Hamid and acted 
 as spies on him. He devoted his life to his harem. It 
 was not surprising that he lost what little intellect he was 
 originally endowed with. A diplomatist who had many 
 opportunities of seeing him since his elevation to the throne 
 thus describes him : — 
 
 The very appearance of Mahomet V suggests nonentity. Small and 
 bent, with sunken eyes and deeply lined face, an obesity savouring of 
 disease, and a yellow, oily complexion, it certainly is not prepossessing. 
 There is little or no intelligence in his countenance, and he never lost a 
 haunted, frightened look, as if dreading to find an assassin lurking in some 
 dark corner ready to strike and kill him. . . . Abdul Hamid hated and 
 despised him, but was afraid to have him killed — perhaps through fear 
 that a stronger man might take his place.' 
 
 The new Sultan had not been a party to the conspiracy 
 which dethroned his brother. No one in his senses would 
 have entrusted him with so important a secret. It was 
 said of him that he simulated the mannerisms of an idiot 
 in order to allay suspicion in the mind of Abdul Hamid 
 that he took any interest in politics. He lived in constant 
 fear of being put to death. A portrait of this degenerate 
 would explain better than words, if it were not too cruel, 
 ' The Near East from Within, p. 38. 
 
 352
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 353 
 
 the depth to which the once proud race of Othman has 
 fallen. It was probable, however, that the cunning men who 
 engineered the revolution thought it would better serve 
 their purpose to have a cipher as the figure-head of the 
 Empire than a man with a will of his own. 
 
 After the defeat of the reactionaries and the deposition 
 of Abdul Hamid, in 1909, the Young Turks had another 
 spell of power, during which they had the opportunity of 
 effecting reforms in the administration of the Empire. They 
 made a bad use of it. It soon became evident that there 
 were two sections in the Committee in violent antagonism 
 to one another. That which succeeded in getting the 
 upper hand was chauvinistic, vehemently national in its 
 objects and methods, aiming at the enforcement of unity 
 throughout the Empire by Turkifying everything, with- 
 out regard to local customs or to difference of race. They 
 endeavoured to impose the Turkish language on the many 
 subject races who spoke only their own language. They 
 forbade the teaching in schools of the Albanian language 
 in Albania, and of Arabic, the sacred language of Islam, 
 in Arabia. They introduced compulsory service for the 
 army, and forced the Christians of the Balkan provinces 
 to serve in its ranks, with the result that thousands of 
 young Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians, inhabitants of 
 Macedonia, fled the country and sought refuge in the neigh- 
 bouring States. The Young Turks availed themselves of 
 the opportunity which this afforded them of strengthening 
 the Moslem population of Macedonia by inviting thousands 
 of the lowest class of Moslem Bosnians to migrate there. 
 These men were the cause of grave disturbance and dis- 
 order. No provision was made for their employment. 
 Committees of Young Turks were formed there, who incited 
 the Turkish local authorities to deeds of arbitrary tyranny 
 rivalling, if not excelling, the infamies of Abdul Hamid's 
 rule. The autocracy of that tyrant was broken at Con- 
 stantinople and his system of espionage, which had caused 
 such indignation, was suppressed, but hundreds of local 
 Abdul Hamids came into existence in the provinces. 
 
 The central Government at the capital followed the method 
 of the late Sultan in minute interference with every detail 
 of administration. There can be no doubt that the con- 
 dition of the Christian provinces of the Empire became 
 worse than ever. Meanwhile the enthusiasm for England 
 
 23
 
 354 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and for the principles of the British Constitution cooled 
 down at Constantinople. Whatever may have been the 
 cause, the fact was certain that British influence at the 
 Porte fell to a vanishing point, while that of Germany 
 rapidly rose. The military alliance which has been so 
 valuable to Germany in the existing great war was then 
 formed. The period was also marked by repeated changes 
 of the Grand Vizier, according as one or other section 
 of the Young Turks got the upper hand. 
 
 It was not long before the process of dismemberment 
 of the Empire was renewed and the wolves were gathered 
 round it to share in the spoil . The Young Turks were 
 less successful in resisting them than Abdul Hamid, who, 
 at least, had kept them at bay by 'his cunning and shifty 
 diplomacy during the many years which had elapsed since 
 the Congress of Berlin, though it may well be said of 
 him that the pent-up evils of his long misgovernment were 
 in great part responsible for the dismemberments which 
 followed in the regime of the Young Turks. 
 
 Very soon after the revolution of 1908, on October 7th, 
 before there v/as experience of the new Constitution, the 
 Austro -Hungarian Government took advantage of the crisis 
 and proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
 in defiance of the treaty obligations imposed by the Great 
 Powers at Berlin. There was no attempt to justify this. The 
 annexations made little or no difference to the people of 
 the two provinces. They were already, for all practical 
 purposes, under the rule of Austria -Hungary. The main 
 difference was that the Bosnian soldiers discarded the fez 
 which they wore as the symbol of Ottoman suzerainty. 
 The annexation, however, caused great indignation among 
 the Turks, who regarded it as an insult to their Empire. 
 It was also the cause of ill-feeling in Russia, and did 
 something to bring about the great war of 19 14. The 
 Austrian Government gave up its occupation of the Sandjak 
 of No vi -Bazar and agreed to take over a share of the 
 Ottoman debt, to the amount of about four millions sterling. 
 As these concessions v/ere accepted, the Porte must be 
 held to have condoned the offence. Prince Ferdinand of 
 Bulgaria very soon followed the example of the Austro - 
 Hungarian Government. He proclaimed himself an inde- 
 pendent sovereign. This also made very little practical 
 difference to his subjects. On October 12th the Cretan
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 355 
 
 Assembly proclaimed the union of the island with 
 Greece. 
 
 The next blow to the Ottoman Empire came from a 
 very unexpected quarter, from Italy, which made a sudden 
 and unprovoked attack on Tripoli. This province in Africa 
 had never been autonomous. It was an integral part of 
 the Ottoman Empire, governed directly from Constanti- 
 nople. Its population was purely Moslem — Turks and Moors 
 in the city of Tripoli and other places on the coast, and 
 with semi -independent Arabs in the hinterland. There was 
 no demand on the part ,of these natives for a change of 
 government. Italy had no valid cause of complaint on 
 behalf of its few subjects who resided in the province, 
 though it trumped up something of the kind. It was a 
 case of pure aggression, prompted by jealousy of France 
 in respect of Tunis, to which, geographically and economic- 
 ally, Italy had a stronger claim. It may be confidently 
 assumed that the French Republic gave its consent to the 
 seizure of Tripoli by Italy, and that Great Britain acquiesced 
 in it, if it did not formally approve. 
 
 Up to the end of 19 10, the Italian Government had con- 
 stantly professed the desire to maintain the integrity of the 
 Turkish Empire. When rumours arose of an intention 
 to grab Tripoli, its Foreign Minister, so late as Decem- 
 ber 2, 1 9 10, emphatically denied them in the Italian 
 Chamber. "We desire," he said, "the integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire and we wish Tripoli always to remain 
 Turkish." Nothing had since occurred to disturb the rela- 
 tions between the two countries . But in September 1 9 1 I 
 the Italian Government sprang a mine on the Porte by 
 declaring its intention to occupy Tripoli. On October 26th 
 it notified to the Powers of Europe its intention to annex 
 that province. It sent an army of fifty thousand men for 
 the purpose. Its fleet bombarded the Turkish town of 
 Prevesa, in the Adriatic, and drove the Turkish fleet to 
 seek refuge within the Dardanelles. It took possession 
 of several of the islands in the vEgean Sea. 
 
 The Porte was caught at a disadvantage. Abdul Hamid 
 had for many years completely neglected his navy. He 
 owed it a grudge for having taken part in the deposition 
 of his predecessor. He feared that its guns might be 
 trained on his palace. He had allowed the Minister of 
 Marine, the most corrupt and greedy of all his Pashas,
 
 356 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 to appropriate to his own use the money allotted by the 
 budget for the repair of warships. For many years the 
 battleships never left the Golden Horn. But for this the 
 Ottoman navy, which in the time of Abdul Aziz had 
 been the third most powerful in Europe, might have made 
 the landing of an Italian army in Africa impossible. The 
 garrison in Tripoli, which Abdul Hamid had always main- 
 tained in strength, had been greatly reduced by the Young 
 Turks. The reinforcelnent of it after the declaration .of 
 war, when Italy had command of the sea, was a very 
 difilicult task, the more so as the British Government pro- 
 claimed the neutrality of Egypt, though it was still tributary 
 to the Porte, and forbade the passage of Turkish troops 
 into Tripoli. 
 
 In spite of these obstacles, the Porte made a gallant 
 fight for its African province, with the aid of the Arabs 
 of the hinterland. Both Turkish and Italian armies com- 
 mitted the most horrible atrocities in this war, and there 
 was little to choose between them in this respect. The war 
 lasted till October, 1912, and was only brought to an end 
 when the Porte found itself confronted by danger from a 
 quarter much nearer home. 
 
 There can be little doubt that the war with Italy, the 
 consequent engagement of a large Turkish army in defence 
 of Tripoli, and the blockade of Turkish ports by the Italian 
 navy, making it difficult for the Porte to transfer its troops 
 from Asia direct to the Balkan States, precipitated the 
 intervention of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia on behalf of 
 the Christian inhabitants of the remaining provinces of 
 the Porte in Europe, which were now on the eve of revolt. 
 
 The condition of these Christian provinces had in no 
 way improved under the regime of the Young Turks, but 
 very much the reverse. The governors and other Ottoman 
 officials were as corrupt, rapacious, and arbitrary as they 
 had ever been. There \vas no security for life or property. 
 The Turkish soldiers plundered the villages of Christians 
 which they were sent to protect. Bands of brigands, some- 
 times wearing the uniforms of Greek, sometimes of 
 Bulgarian soldiers, devastated the country. No attempt 
 was made by the Young Turks to put in force any part 
 of the reforms which had been proposed by the Commis- 
 sion appointed by the Great Powers after the Congress of 
 Berlin.
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 357 
 
 Lord Fitzniaurice's scheme remained as much a dead letter 
 as it had been for over thirty years under Abdul Hamid. 
 The Young Turks had added new difficulties and more 
 causes of complaint by their attempts to Turkify every- 
 thing, and by their extension of conscription to the Christian 
 population. The physical situation of Macedonia made it 
 impossible that its people would willingly submit to this 
 continued misgovernment and tyranny. Their immediate 
 neighbours were Bulgarians, Serbians, and Greeks, of 
 kindred race, all of whom, with the assistance of Russia 
 and other European Powers, had obtained freedom from 
 Turkish rule. The peoples of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia 
 sympathized with their compatriots who were still under 
 the detested yoke. 
 
 If ever intervention by neighbouring States was justified 
 for the purpose of restoring order and securing good 
 government in accordance with treaty obligations, this was 
 a case for it. The crisis was precipitated by massacres 
 of Bulgarians at Kotchana, in Macedonia, and of Serbians 
 on the borders of Montenegro. 
 
 Early in 1912 negotiations for armed intervention in 
 Macedonia took place between the Governments of Greece, 
 Bulgaria, and Serbia, at the instance mainly of the able 
 and patriotic Premier of Greece, M. Venezelos. For the 
 first and only time in their history a combination was 
 effected between these three States against the Turkish 
 Empire. It will be seen that, though it was most effective 
 for its immediate purpose of defeating the Turks and ex- 
 pelling them from nearly the whole of their European 
 possessions, it broke down, with most unfortunate results, 
 almost immediately after this great success. 
 
 On March 18, 1 9 1 2, a treaty was signed between 
 Bulgaria and Serbia for mutual military aid to one another 
 in war with Turkey. A secret clause provided that in 
 tlie event of any portion of Macedonia being conquered the 
 parts respectively nearest to the two States should be 
 annexed to them, and that the intervening territory should 
 be divided between them by the arbitration of Russia. 
 This clearly showed that the intervention aimed at territorial 
 conquest. Two months later another treaty was signed 
 between Greece and Bulgaria, binding the two States to 
 aid one another if attacked by Turkey, or in the event 
 of systematic violation of rights by that Power. Nothing
 
 358 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 was said in this as to the division of spoil after the war. 
 Montenegro later came into the chain of alliances, and, in 
 fact, was always eager for war with Turkey. 
 
 When it became known to the Great Powers that these 
 alliances were formed, and that war was imminent, they 
 made every effort to allay the storm and to maintain peace. 
 A strong protest was addressed, on September 25th, by 
 Russia and Austria on behalf of all the Powers. They 
 endeavoured to resuscitate the treaty of Berlin, which had 
 so signally failed, to secure order and good government in 
 the remaining Christian provinces of Turkey. They under- 
 took, by virtue of the twenty-third article of that treaty, 
 to insist on the realization of the promised reforms in the 
 administration of these provinces, but with the reservation, 
 which made the promise futile in the eyes of all concerned, 
 that the reforms should not in any way diminish the 
 sovereignty of the Sultan or impair the integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire . 
 
 The allied Balkan States, in a very dignified despatch 
 of October 1 5th, declined to act on the advice of the 
 Powers . 
 
 The Governments of the Balkan States [they said] consider that after so 
 many promises of reform have been so often and so solemnly given by 
 Turkey, it would be cruel not to endeavour to obtain in favour of the 
 Christian population of the Ottoman Empire reforms of a more radical 
 and definite nature which would really ameliorate their miserable con- 
 dition if appUed sincereh' and in their integrity. 
 
 They enclosed a copy of an ultimatum which, on the 
 same day, they addressed to the Porte, insisting on the 
 carrying out of a series of reforms specially detailed. 
 
 If [they said] the Porte desires to accept these proposals, order and 
 tranquillity will be reinstated in the provinces of the Empire, and a 
 desirable peace will be assured between Turkey and the Balkan States, 
 which have hitherto suffered from tlie arbitrary and provocative measures 
 adopted by the Porte to them. 
 
 Among the list of reforms insisted on was the ceding 
 and confirmation of the ethnical autonomy of provinces of 
 the Empire, with all its consequences. The ultimatum was 
 presented to the Porte, which treated it as a declaration of 
 war. Its first and most important act was to come to
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 359 
 
 terms with Italy in order to free its hands for the more 
 important war at its very portals. A treaty of peace was 
 signed on October 1 5th, by which the Porte agreed to 
 withdraw its troops from Tripoli, and thus virtually recog- 
 nized the acquisition of that province by Italy. Italy, on 
 the other hand, agreed to withdraw from the islands of 
 the ^gean Sea which it had occupied — a promise which, in 
 fact, it did not perform. 
 
 Meanwhile hostilities had already commenced in the 
 Balkans. Montenegro declared war on October 8th. The 
 three other States followed suit on October i8th, and each 
 of them sent its army on the same day, or nearly so, across 
 its frontiers to invade Turkey. Beyond the desire for the 
 better government of the Christian provinces of Turkey, 
 there were doubtless arricres pensees on the part of all 
 the allied States. Greece coveted Crete and other islands 
 in the ^gean Sea, and hoped to extend its frontiers on 
 the mainland. Bulgaria yearned for the big Bulgaria as 
 defined by the treaty of San Stefano. Serbia had ambitions 
 for a revival of its wide boundaries under Stephen Dushan, 
 and aimed at access both to the yEgean Sea and the Adriatic. 
 Montenegro wished for a part of Albania and for exten- 
 sions in the Adriatic. Each State had large populations 
 of a kindred race beyond its frontier sufifering from cruel 
 misgovernment and tyranny and crying for help. But it 
 seems improbable that they could have expected to realize 
 their full hopes, or to achieve such a denoument as actually 
 occurred. 
 
 The allies between them had seven hundred thousand men 
 under arms. Turkey had no more than four hundred 
 thousand in Europe. It had, however, great reserves in 
 Asia, and its aggregate force largely exceeded that of 
 the allies. It was to be expected that the Turkish armies 
 in Europe would make a good fight, and would at least 
 afford time for these reserves to come up. 
 
 The Greek army, under the command of the Crown 
 Prince Constantine (the present King of Greece), who had 
 received a military education in Germany, crossed the 
 northern frontier and, in four days, on October 22nd, 
 encountered a Turkish army, under Hassan Pasha, at 
 Sarandoporus. The Turks held a very strong position and 
 were little inferior in numbers. In spite of this, they 
 were worsted, and were compelled to retreat in the follow-
 
 36o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 ing night. The next day the Greeks renewed their attack. 
 The unfortunate Turks, disheartened by their defeat at 
 Sarandoporus and wearied by the long night march, were 
 caught unawares in a ravine which offered no possibility of 
 defence. Terror-stricken and demoralized, they fled before 
 their foe. They left behind them the whole of their artillery 
 and transport. 
 
 The retreating Turks, despite their panic, found time to 
 wreak their vengeance on the unfortunate Christian in- 
 habitants on their route and mercilessly butchered them. 
 What remained of their army retired on Veria, where it was 
 reinforced by fourteen fresh battalions. On the 28th the 
 Greek army resumed its march. In front of Veria it again 
 came in contact with the Turks, who were posted in a 
 very strong position. The issue was not long in doubt. 
 The unhappy Turks were mown down by the Greek guns. 
 Officers and men again fled like a beaten rabble. After 
 these signal defeats the remainder of the Ottoman army 
 crossed the River Vardar on November 3rd, within a few 
 miles of Salonika. On the 8th that city capitulated to the 
 Greeks, not without suspicion of treachery. Hassan Pasha 
 and twenty -five thousand men, the- remains of his army, 
 were made prisoners. On the next day a division of the 
 Bulgarians, detached from their main army in Thrace, 
 appeared on the scene at Salonika, after a forced march, 
 in the hope of being able to claim a share in the capture 
 of that important city. At the request of its general, 
 the Greeks gave permission to two regiments of Bulgarians 
 to enter the city. In spite of this limitation, ten regiments 
 were sent there, and were the cause of much subsequent 
 trouble , 
 
 While these great and unexpected successes were being 
 achieved by the Greeks, the Serbians were advancing from 
 the north. A Turkish army of a hundred thousand men, 
 under Zeki Pasha, had marched up the valley of the 
 Vardar River to meet them. The two armies, about equal 
 in numbers, met at Koumanovo on October 23rd, the day 
 after the victory of the Greeks at Sarandoporus. The 
 Turks were well supported with all modern implements of 
 war, with machine guns, aeroplanes, and wireless telephone 
 apparatus, but they had not a staff competent to make use of 
 them. Their artillery was the best which Krupps' celebrated 
 German works could turn out, and was superior in number
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 361' 
 
 to that of the Serbians. The French Creiisot guns, however, 
 of the latter proved to be the better in action. But, worst of 
 all, the commissariat arrangements of the Turks were of 
 a most primitive character. They relied mainly on their 
 men feeding themselves at the expense of the peasantry, 
 on their route, with the result that they were underfed. 
 The weather was most inclement and the troops were only 
 provided with light summer clothing. The best of soldiers 
 cannot fight with empty stomachs and scanty clothing. As 
 a result, in spite of a vigorous resistance in the great 
 battle, the Turkish lines were broken by the splendid 
 infantry of the Serbians. There resulted a rout and the 
 precipitate retreat of the Turkish army. It lost the whole 
 of its artillery— a hundred and twenty guns. Of the 
 hundred thousand men, only forty thousand survived as 
 a military force. Uskub, the ancient capital of Serbia, 
 was captured. Another Serbian army advanced towards 
 the Adriatic and captured Durazzo. 
 
 After the fierce and decisive battle at Koumanovo, what 
 remained of the Turkish army retreated down the Vardar 
 Valley to Veles, and thence, instead of marching to Salonika, 
 where it might have been in time to save that city from the 
 Greeks, it marched westward to Prilip, on the route to 
 Monastir. The Serbians, after a brief delay, followed it 
 up and came in contact again at Prilip, where the Turks 
 held an immensely strong position. It was taken at the 
 point of the bayonet, a striking proof of the superb quality 
 of the Serbian infantry. 
 
 The Turks retreated thence to Monastir, where they found 
 reinforcements. On November 17th and i8th, another great 
 battle was fought in front of Monastir, in which the Turks 
 were again defeated, with the loss of ten thousand prisoners. 
 The remains of the army retreated into Albania, where it 
 was too late in the season for the Serbians to follow them. 
 They were ultimately, in the following spring, brought back 
 to Constantinople by sea from the Adriatic. There could 
 not have been a more completely victorious campaign for 
 the Serbians. Zeki's army was virtually extinguished. 
 
 While these critical events were pending in Macedonia 
 the Bulgarians were equally successful in the east. They 
 invaded Thrace on October i8th in great force, and on 
 the 22nd encountered a Turkish army at Kirk Kilisse and, 
 after a two days' battle, defeated it. On the 28th they.
 
 362 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 fought the main Turkish army, under Nazim Pasha, which 
 was drawn up in a line from Lulu Burgas to Visa. The 
 Turks made an obstinate resistance, but after forty-eight 
 hours of fierce assaults by the Bulgarians they gave way 
 and retreated in terrible disorder, till they found themselves 
 behind the lines of Tchatalja, the celebrated fortifications 
 which protect Constantinople at a distance of nineteen miles 
 on a line from the Black Sea to the Marmora. On their 
 advance through Thrace the Bulgarian soldiers, assisted by 
 irregulars of Bulgar race, committed atrocities and cruelties 
 on the Turkish population which rivalled all that the Turks 
 in the past had perpetrated. 
 
 On November 17th the Bulgarians attacked these lines 
 of Tchatalja with great vigour. But the Turks had brought 
 up fresh troops from Asia. The lines were well defended 
 with Krupp guns, and several successive assaults were 
 repelled . 
 
 On December 3rd, at the instance of the Great Powers, 
 an armistice was agreed upon between Turkey and Bulgaria 
 and Serbia. War, however, was continued with Greece 
 and Montenegro. As a result of the campaign the Turks 
 had been defeated in every engagement by Greeks, Serbs, 
 Bulgars, and Montenegrins. They were driven from 
 Macedonia and from nearly the whole of Thrace and Epirus. 
 They still, however, retained Adrianople, Janina, and 
 Scutari. It was only when in defence of such cities, or 
 behind such lines as those of Tchatalja that the Turkish 
 soldiers showed the tenacity and courage for which they 
 had been famous. Whenever they met the enemy in the 
 open field they were always defeated. 
 
 It is almost incomprehensible [wrote Mr. Crawford Price, who was 
 a witness of this debacle of the Turkish army] that this warhke nation, 
 the stories of whose valour fill the most thrilling pages of the military 
 history of the world, could have degenerated into a beaten rabble flying 
 before the onslaught of despised Serbians and Greeks, people who, till 
 yesterday, scarce dared to lift their voices when questions affecting their 
 interests were discussed and settled. The Greeks most effectually wiped 
 out the stain of 1897. They showed themselves the superior of tlie Turk 
 in organization, strategy, and tven in personal courage. ... I do not 
 wish to dwell too strongly on the lack of courage exhibited by the 
 Ottoman soldiers. Words fail me to describe the utter demoralization 
 I found in the ranks of the Turkish troops after their defeat.' 
 
 ' The Balkan Cockpit, G, M. Crawford Price, p. 102.
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 363 
 
 Among the chief causes of this demoralization of the 
 Ottoman armies was the complete absence of preparation 
 for feeding them. It was the rule, rather than the excep- 
 tion, for the troops to be left three or four days without 
 food. Another cause was that the Ottoman armies in this 
 campaign in Europe had in their ranks a large proportion 
 of Christian natives of the district who had been conscripted 
 for the first time. Their sympathies were all in favour 
 of the enemy, and they undoubtedly assisted in promoting 
 the stampedes when the Turkish lines were broken. The 
 survivors fled to their homes. 
 
 The winter of 19 12-13, after the conclusion of the 
 armistice, was spent in futile negotiations for peace at a 
 Conference in London. The main cause of failure was 
 Adrianople. The Bulgarians insisted on its cession to them 
 as a condition of permanent peace. The Porte, in the 
 first instance, was not unwilling to give way on this. But 
 a military etneute occurred at Constantinople. A deputa- 
 tion from the army, headed by Enver Bey, insisted on 
 entering the chamber where the Council of Ministers were 
 deliberating on the question, with the object of protesting 
 against the surrender of the stronghold. Nazim Pasha, the 
 Minister of War, and his aide-de-camp were killed in the 
 endeavour to resist this inroad. The Grand Vizier was 
 thereupon terrorized into resignation . In his place Mahmoud 
 Shefket, who had proved to be so loyal to the Young 
 Turks at the early stage of their movement, was appointed. 
 He refused to surrender Adrianople. The negotiations in 
 London were broken off. 
 
 Early in 1 9 1 3, on January 4th, the Bulgarians gave 
 notice of the termination of the armistice. War was 
 renewed. On February 4th the Bulgarian army commenced 
 an attack on Adrianople, supported on this occasion by 
 fifty thousand Serbians. On the same day they fought a 
 battle near Bulair, defeated the Turks, and captured that 
 important fortress, threatening the command of the Darda- 
 nelles. The Greeks also renewed the war. They sent an 
 army into Epirus and, on March 6th, captured Janina, 
 making prisoners thirty-three thousand Turks and seizing 
 immense stores of guns and ammunition. On the loth of 
 the same month their fleet captured the island of Samos. 
 
 On March 28th the Bulgarians captured Adrianople and 
 its garrison of twenty thousand Ottomans, and on April 21st
 
 364 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 the Montenegrins succeeded in getting possession of Scutari, 
 which they claimed as the capital of their State. After 
 these serious reverses the Porte was desirous of coming 
 to terms, and was willing even to cede Adrianople and 
 almost the v/hole of Thrace. It invited the mediation of 
 the Great Powers. The allied States agreed to this. A 
 second Conference was held in London on the basis that 
 the Porte was to give up all its possessions in Europe, save 
 the small part of Thrace south of a line drawn from Enos, 
 in the .^gean Sea, to Media, in the Black Sea, a few miles 
 north of the Tchatalja lines. Crete was to be ceded to 
 Greece, and the destination of the islands in the yEgean Sea 
 lately in the possession of Turkey, and some of which were 
 necessary for its defence, was to be left to the decision of the 
 Powers. A treaty was effected between the Porte and the 
 Powers to this effect. But there was far greater difficulty 
 in determining how the ceded districts were to be divided 
 between the victorious Balkan States. The position was 
 aggravated by Roumania coming into the field and claim- 
 ing compensation in territory, in consideration of the 
 important changes impending in the balance of power in 
 the Balkans . 
 
 The four States so lately in alliance against the 
 common enemy, Turkey, were now madly jealous of one 
 another in the division of the spoils. Serbia, which had 
 contributed so largely to the result by the splendid valour 
 of its army against the main body of Turks imder Zeki 
 Pasha, was not content with the small slice of Macedonia 
 which it had agreed to in the treaty with Bulgaria in 
 191 2, before the war. The decision of the Powers that 
 Albania was to be an independent State deprived Serbia of 
 the much -hoped -for access to the Adriatic. The acquisition 
 by Bulgaria of Thrace, including Adrianople, would greatly 
 alter the balance of power in the Balkans to the disadvantage 
 of Serbia and justified its claim to a larger share of 
 Macedonia. It was already in occupation of nearly half 
 of that province. Bulgaria was equally ambitious to revive 
 the big Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty, and could also 
 appeal to long past history in favour of it. It was deter- 
 mined to get possession of Salonika, and was madly jealous 
 of Greece. The Greeks, on their part, were in possession 
 of that city and of the southern half of Macedonia. They 
 had got hold of these districts by force of arms and
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 365 
 
 were determined not to give them up. No agreement could 
 be come to in London. Russia in vain did its utmost to 
 compose these differences. It offered to act as arbitrator 
 and invited the Balkan States to send representatives to 
 Petrograd to settle the questions. 
 
 We now know that the Bulgarian Government had no 
 intention whatever to make concessions to the other Balkan 
 States. The pacific section of its ministers were over- 
 borne by the more bellicose members. M. Gueshoff, the 
 able Premier, who had been responsible for the policy 
 which preceded the war, and who was now in favour of a 
 peaceful settlement, was compelled to resign. King 
 Ferdinand, a most unscrupulous and ambitious intriguer, 
 backed up the war party, and was mainly responsible for 
 the treacherous policy pursued, which was fraught with so 
 much misfortune to his State. In spite of the warnings 
 from Russia that, if force were resorted to, Bulgaria would 
 find itself confronted by a Roumanian army, and that the 
 Porte would also join in the war against it, King 
 Ferdinand and his Government decided on war v/ith their 
 late allies. They had unbounded and arrogant confidence 
 in their army, and despised those of Greece and Serbia. 
 
 On June 29, 191 3, at midnight, the Bulgarian army in 
 Macedonia made a sudden and unprovoked attack on the 
 Greek and Serbian outposts, without any warning or declara- 
 tion of war. This treacherous action was followed up 
 the next day by an advance of the Bulgarian army of 
 a hundred thousand men on the right flank against the 
 Serbian army, which was nearest to them. For the moment 
 this seemed to promise success, and the Serbians were 
 compelled to fall back. But on July ist the Serbians, 
 whose forces, supported by the Montenegrins, were almost 
 equal in number to the Bulgarians opposed to them, rallied 
 and decided on a counter offensive. On July 2nd they 
 attacked the Bulgarians on the Bragalbabza River, defeated 
 them, and captured many of their guns. On July 4th 
 another battle took place with much the same result. Istib 
 was captured on the 8th, and the Bulgarians were then com- 
 pelled to retreat towards their own frontier. 
 
 Meanwhile the main army of the Greeks, which was 
 concentrated at Salonika, a day's march from the Bulgarians 
 on the left flank, advanced to attack them. The two 
 armies were equal in numbers, caih of about seventy
 
 366 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 thousand men. They met at Kiltich, about half-way 
 between the Rivers Vardar and Struma, and a day's march 
 from Salonika. The Greeks inflicted a very severe defeat 
 on their foes. This was followed up a few days later by 
 victories at Doiran and Strumnitza. In the fortnight which 
 followed the Bulgarians were defeated in a series of engage- 
 ments as they retreated to their own frontier. 
 
 The prediction and warnings of the Russian Government 
 were now verified. The Roumanians, when they found that 
 the Bulgarians were involved in war with the other Balkan 
 States, announced that they were dissatisfied with the small 
 concession of territory made to them at the Conference in 
 London — namely the fortress lof Silistria and a belt of land 
 on the Danube. They insisted on a further cession of 
 territory to them in the Dobrudscha. They sent an army 
 across the Danube, on July loth, to support this demand. 
 It advanced without opposition to within a few miles of 
 Sofia. The Turks also saw the opportunity of retrieving 
 out of the scramble something of their recent great losses 
 of territory. They determined to tear up the treaty of 
 London, signed only a few weeks ago. They sent an army, 
 under Enver Pasha, into Thrace, on July 1 5th, to attack 
 Adrianople. It had no difficulty in recapturing that most 
 important city, from which the Bulgarians had withdrawn 
 nearly the whole of its garrison in order to strengthen their 
 armies against Greece and Serbia. It also reoccupied 
 Demotika and Kirk Kilisse. 
 
 The Bulgarians found themselves in a most perilous 
 position. Their armies had everywhere been defeated and 
 driven back. They were surrounded by invading armies. 
 They were compelled to sue for terms. On July 31st an 
 armistice was agreed to, and a Conference was decided 
 on, to be held at Bucharest, between the representatives 
 of the Balkan States, without the presence of those of the 
 Great Powers. At the Conference the Bulgarians found 
 themselves in the position of being hoist with their own 
 petard. They were compelled by force majeure not only 
 to give up all their ambitious projects, but also to make 
 serious concessions to all their rivals. Had they been willing 
 to come to terms at the Conference at London or, later, 
 to submit to the arbitration of Russia, they would un- 
 doubtedly have secured for themselves a large slice of 
 Macedonia. They would have retained possession of a
 
 THE YOUNG TURKS 367 
 
 great part of Thrace, with Adrianople and Demotika, and 
 the only concessions they would have made were Silistria 
 and the small belt of land on the Danube. They were 
 now compelled to agree to the division of the whole of 
 Macedonia between Greece and Serbia. They had to sur- 
 render a part of the Dobrudscha to Roumania, and the 
 larger part of their conquests in Thrace, including 
 Adrianople, to the Turks. All that remained to them in 
 return for their stupendous efforts in the recent wars wa,s 
 a smaU portion of Thrace with a narrow frontage to the 
 ^gean Sea, but without a port of any value or importance. 
 Never was there a case in which base treachery and over- 
 weening arrogance were followed by more fatal retribution. 
 
 Greece got the larger share of the spoil of Turkey in 
 the two years of war. It obtained rather more than half 
 of Macedonia — namely 17,000 square miles, with a popu- 
 lation of 1,697,000. It also secured the final cession 
 to it of the important island of Crete, and of Samos, and 
 other islands in the ^gean Sea. Its territory and popula- 
 tion were increased by more than one -half. Serbia obtained 
 15,000 square miles, with 1,656,000 inhabitants, Bulgaria 
 only 9,600 miles and 125,000 inhabitants. Roumania 
 secured 2,600 square miles, with 286,000 inhabitants, and 
 Montenegro 2,100 square miles and 251,000 population; 
 while the Turks lost 54,000 square miles, inhabited by a 
 population of 4,239,000. But the recovery of Adrianople, 
 Demotika, and Kirk Kilisse was a great coup for them. 
 It redounded to the prestige of the Young Turks and their 
 leader, Enver Pasha, who soon became Minister of War. 
 
 The German Emperor telegraphed his congratulations 
 to the Sultan on the recovery of Adrianople, and to the 
 King of Roumania on the success of his intervention. He 
 also conferred on the King of Greece, his brother-in-law, 
 the baton of a Field Marshal in the German army. The 
 King received this honour in person at Berlin in the presence 
 of a great gathering of German generals. In a speech 
 on the occasion, he attributed his success in the recent 
 war, in the first place, to the bravery of his army, and in 
 the second to the training which he and many of his 
 officers had received in the military schools of Berlin. 
 Thenceforth, till the outbreak of the great war in Europe 
 in 19 14, the influence of Germany in the Near East, iand 
 especially in Turkey, was continiially on the increase. Enver
 
 368 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Pasha, who now predominated in the councils of the Porte, 
 was devoted to the interests of Germany, and was prob- 
 ably in its pay. At his instance the Turkish army, which 
 had so conspicuously failed in the recent wars, was put 
 under the control of the German General Von der Goltz, 
 and large numbers of ofilicers were lent by Germany for 
 its better training. Secret drillings of troops took place 
 in many remote parts of the Empire. These measures 
 were well timed to coincide with the outbreak in 1 9 1 4 of the 
 great war, which, it is now very certain, had been already 
 determined on by the General War Staff at Berlin. 
 
 It only remains to add that when, soon after the com- 
 mencement of the war, the Porte, at the instance of Enver 
 Pasha, declared itself against the Allied Powers, the British 
 Government at once proclaimed the independence of Egypt, 
 under its protectorate, and the annexation of Cyprus. These 
 were the last territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire which 
 can be counted as fails accomplis. It has been shown 
 that, in the past, there were due to the regime of the 
 Young Turks, during the six years of its predominance, 
 from 1908 to 1 9 14, the loss in Europe of Macedonia, 
 Epirus, and Albania, and of a large part of Thrace ; of 
 Crete, Cyprus, and many other islands in the .^^^^gean Sea ; 
 and the suzerainty of Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina ; 
 and in Africa of the province of Tripoli and the suzerainty 
 of Egypt. These great losses rivalled in extent of ter- 
 ritory and population those incurred either by Mahmoud II 
 or by Abdul Hamid II. It needs no prophet to predict a 
 further shrinkage of territory, or loss of independence, after 
 the conclusion of the existing war in Europe, whatever may 
 be its other results.
 
 XXIII 
 
 A RETROSPECT 
 
 It has been shown in preceding chapters that the two 
 great historic movements of the growth and decay of the 
 Turkish Empire extended over periods not differing much 
 in length. Reckoning its birth from the accession, in 
 1288, of Othman, as chief of a small tribe of Turks in 
 Asia Minor, nearly three hundred years elapsed before the 
 Empire reached its zenith. During these years ten eminent 
 Sultans and one Grand Vizier (Sokolli) of a degenerate 
 Sultan were concerned in its extension. It was a period 
 of almost continuous victory and conquest. The Ottoman 
 armies, during these years, met with only a single serious 
 disaster, that at Angora in 1402 at the hands of Timur 
 and a host of Mongolian invaders, which seemed at first 
 to have struck a fatal blow to the Empire. But it soon 
 rallied, and the process of aggrandizement was renewed. 
 With this exception the Ottomans were almost uniformly 
 successful. The number, however, of pitched battles in 
 the field, which decided the fate of States successively 
 invaded, was not great. Thrace was won by the defeat 
 of the Byzantines by Murad I at Eski Baba in 1361. 
 The Bulgarians were conquered at Samakof in 1371, and 
 the Serbians at Kossova in 1389, by the same Sultan. The 
 Hungarians were overthrown at Mohacz in 1529. The 
 Persians were defeated at Calderan, 1 5 1 4, near Tabriz, 
 and the Egyptians at Aleppo, 1 5 1 6, and Ridania, near 
 Cairo, under Selim, 15 16. The crusaders from Europe 
 were defeated in three great battles — at the Maritza, 1363, 
 Nicopolis, 1396, and Varna, 1444. At most of these 
 battles the Ottomans had great superiority of numbers, and 
 as against the Persians and Egy^otians they were provided 
 with a powerful artillery, of which their opponents were 
 
 24 369
 
 370 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 wholly deficient. The other very numerous campaigns con- 
 sisted mainly of successions of sieges by invading armies 
 of Ottomans, where the invaded, with inferior forces, 
 protracted the defence, often over long terms of years. 
 
 The Ottomans were almost equally successful at sea, 
 with one notable exception, at Lepanto, at the very end of 
 the period we are referring to, when they met with a 
 terrible disaster from the combined navies of Europe, 
 much inferior in numbers of ships and men. But before 
 this their naval supremacy had enabled them to extend 
 the Empire over Algiers and Tunis. Nothing resulted 
 from the great battle of Lepanto except los.s of prestige 
 to the Ottomans. The combination against them was dis- 
 solved, and for many years they maintained supremacy 
 in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
 At the close of this period of growth the Ottoman 
 Empire reached its zenith and extended over the vast 
 countries described in the chapter on the Grand Vizier 
 Sokolli. The whole of its immense area, however, was not 
 in full ownership of the Ottomans. Parts of it, such as 
 North Hungary, were autonomous States with native rulers 
 paying tribute to the Porte. Other parts, such as the Crimea, 
 Wallachia, and Moldavia, were vassal States, whose princes 
 were appointed by the Sultan, and which were bound to 
 send contingents in support of the Ottoman armies when 
 at war. The really integral parts of the Empire in Europe 
 were Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, 
 and Albania ; in Asia, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and 
 a great part of Arabia ; and in Africa, Tripoli. Egypt, 
 Tunis, and Algiers very early acquired a practical autonomy 
 under the suzerainty of the Porte, though they were still 
 nominally integral parts of the Empire. The Empire thus 
 constituted was one of the greatest in the then world. 
 It may be w^orth while briefly to review the causes which 
 led to its aggregation. 
 
 It was the common belief in Europe, confirmed by many 
 historians, up to recent times, that the Ottoman arinies 
 which invaded Europe from Asia Minor were composed of 
 pure Turks, and that the motive which impelled them in 
 their conquest was the fanatical desire to extend Islam. 
 But these views have been modified of late years. It has 
 been shown that the armies which Sultans Orchan and' 
 Murad led across the Straits into Europe were not pure
 
 A RETROSPECT 37 f 
 
 Turks, but were very largely composed of subjects of the 
 East Roman Empire from the northern parts of Asia Minor, 
 who, after the defeat there of the Byzantine armies, had 
 embraced Islam. They were welded with the Turks by, 
 religion into something approaching to a nation. They called 
 themselves Osmanlis, or Ottomans, from the founder of the 
 Othman dynasty. It may be doubted whether the Turks 
 alone were capable of effecting the conquests in Europe. 
 It is certain that they could not have maintained the Empire 
 when formed. 
 
 The Turks of Anatolia had many valuable qualities as 
 soldiers. They were, and are to this day, brave, hardy, 
 sober, frugal, and cleanly in their habits, as inculcated by 
 their religion, a strong point in their favour in days when 
 sanitary arrangements were completely ignored by armies. 
 They bore the hardships of long campaigns without 
 complaint. But they were deficient in intelHgcnce and 
 education, which count for much in war as in civil life. 
 In this respect they were very inferior to subjects of the 
 East Roman Empire and to many of the Christians with 
 whom they came in conflict. But the Ottomans who first 
 invaded Europe were not simply Turks. Later, the most 
 effective corps in the Ottoman army was formed exclu- 
 sively of the sons of Christian parents in the Balkans, 
 conscripted at an early age and forcibly converted to Islam. 
 It was with forces thus constituted that the Ottomans ex- 
 tended their Empire up to and beyond the Danube. The 
 conquests of the larger part of Asia Minor, of Mesopo- 
 tamia, Syria, and Egypt, were also effected, by composite 
 forces, to which Serbia and Wallachia sent contingents 
 by virtue of treaties with the Porte. The greater number 
 of Ottoman generals who distinguished themselves in these 
 early days of conquest were not of Turkish race, but were 
 Greeks, Albanians, Slavs, and Italians, who had embraced 
 Islam or whose forbears had done so. It was the same with 
 almost all the naival commanders. They were of foreign 
 origin, who had gained experience as pirates and had 
 embraced Islam. The crews who manned the Ottoman 
 navy were mainly Greeks from the islands in the 
 JEgean Sea. 
 
 With respect to the objects and motives of the Ottoman 
 conquests, a careful review of the history of the early 
 Sultans has shown that there was very little, if any, of
 
 372 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 missionary enterprise on behalf of Islam. It will be 
 admitted that there is no pretence for concluding that the 
 vast conquests in Asia and Africa had any such motive. 
 The populations there were already Moslems. The motives 
 for conquest were the ambition to extend the Empire at 
 the expense of neighbouring States and the hope of plunder 
 on the part of the soldiers. Religious zeal had nothing to 
 do with it. What reason is there to suppose that conquests 
 in Europe had any different object than those in Asia? 
 As a matter of fact, there was no very large extension of 
 Islam in Europe as a result of Ottoman conquest. When 
 cities were captured and their inhabitants were massacred, 
 or when districts were conquered and the people were 
 carried away as captives to be sold as slaves, they do not 
 appear to have had the alternative offered to them of 
 embracing Islam. 
 
 In some few districts, as in Bosnia and parts of Albania 
 and the Morea, the landowners, or some of them, were 
 allowed to avoid the confiscation of their property by 
 becoming Mussulmans. But these were exceptions. The 
 general rule was that the land of the conquered districts 
 was confiscated without the option to the owners of changing 
 their religion and saving their property. As regards the 
 labouring people, the rayas, there does not appear to 
 have been any desire that they should adopt the religion 
 of their conquerors. They were wanted for the cultiva- 
 tion of the land as serfs or slaves. It seems to have been 
 a matter of indifiference what their religion was. 
 
 There is also nothing to show that the Ottoman soldiers 
 were animated by any religious zeal in their campaigns in 
 Europe. The main cause of their military efficiency was the 
 organization of the army effected by Orchan and perfected 
 by Murad I. It offered imtnense rewards to the soldiers 
 for victories in battle and for personal valour, in the share 
 of booty and plunder levied in the conquered districts, 
 of captives to be sold as slaves, of wom.en for wives or 
 concubines or to be sold for harems, and of lands to be 
 distributed as fiefs. These rewards appealed to the pre- 
 datory instincts of the Moslem soldiers, whether Turks 
 or others of alien origin. In the rare intervals of 
 peace the soldiers soon wearied of life in barracks, and 
 yearned for active campaigns. At such times the Janissaries 
 and other soldiers were a danger to the State from their
 
 A RETROSPECT 
 
 m 
 
 turbulence and disorder. It was necessary to find employ- 
 ment for them at a distance. This acted as a constant 
 incitement to war and to fresh conquests. It was one of 
 the causes of the continuous growth of the Empire. 
 
 A second main cause of success to the Ottoman armies 
 in Europe was the want of union for resistance on the part 
 of the people of the Balkan States. There can be little 
 doubt that if the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians ;had 
 combined to resist the invading Moslems their efforts 
 would have been successful. But Greeks and Bulgarians, 
 Greeks and Serbians hated one another more than they 
 feared and hated the Ottomans. In the six centuries dealt 
 with in this volume there was only a single occasion when 
 Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians formed a combination 
 against the Ottomans. This was not till 191 2. The com- 
 bination was successful and drove the Turks out of 
 Macedonia, Epirus, Albania, and the greater part of Thrace. 
 But we have shown that it broke down on the division 
 of the spoil, with the result that the Turks recovered a small 
 part of their lost territory. The case illustrates our con- 
 tention that want of union of the Christian States was 
 a main cause of the servitude of all of them for nearly 
 five hundred years under Turkish rule. 
 
 Lastly, in appreciating the causes of the wonderful 
 growth of the Ottoman Empire, we must not lose sight 
 of the personal element, of the fact that, for ten genera- 
 tions, the Othman family produced men capable of leading 
 their armies in the field to victory, and almost equally, 
 remarkable as administrators and statesmen. This succes- 
 sion of a single family, father and son, for ten generations 
 without a break, culminating in the greatest of them, 
 Solyman the Magnificent, is quite without precedent or 
 example in history. The Othman family were pure Turks 
 in their origin. But the Turkish blood was very soon 
 diluted. The mothers of future Sultans were either captives 
 taken by corsairs or slaves bought on account of their 
 beauty. They were of every race — Greeks, Slavs, Italians, 
 or Russians. But in spite of this mixed blood the type of 
 Sultans remained much the same for ten generations. The 
 prestige acquired by the family in these three hundred 
 years, as founders and maintainers of the Empire and as 
 generals who led their armies to victory, was such that it 
 has impressed itself on the imagination of all Ottomans,
 
 374 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 and has survived to this day, in spite of the long subse- 
 quent degeneration of the family. Unquestionably, the 
 foundation and growth of the Empire were largely due to 
 the personal qualities of the Othman dynasty. 
 
 After the death in 1578 of Grand Vizier Sokolli, who 
 carried on the traditions of the first ten Sultans for a 
 few years under the worthless Selim II, the pendulum of 
 Empire swung in the opposite direction. Thenceforth, down 
 to the present time, there were successions of defeats and 
 disasters to the Turkish Empire, with but few intermis- 
 sions. Provinces were torn from it periodically, like leaves 
 from an artichoke, till all but a small fraction of it in 
 Europe, the whole of its possessions in Africa, and a large 
 part in Asia have been lost to the Empire. What remains 
 to it is the core of Turkish and Arabic provinces in Asia, 
 and in Europe only its capital, Constantinople, and a small 
 portion of Thrace to the north of it. 
 
 Five of the Great Powers of Europe have had their 
 share of the spoils, and six independent States have been 
 resuscitated out of the remaining debris of it. It is hard 
 to say which of the Great Powers gained most. Austria 
 recovered by force of arms Hungary, Transylvania, 
 Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, and by artful policy 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia obtained by conquest 
 the Crimea, Bessarabia, Podolia, and a part of the Ukraine 
 in Europe, and the Caucasus, and a great part of Armenia, 
 in Asia. France has possessed itself of Algiers and Tunis. 
 England has secured the suzerainty and practical possession 
 of Egypt and complete possession of Cyprus and Aden. 
 Italy has seized Tripoli. Of the six smaller independent 
 States, Bulgaria and Roumania ov/e their revival solely to 
 Russia, Greece mainly to Great Britain and France, 
 Albania to the concert of the Balkan States in 1 9 1 2, and 
 Serbia and Montenegro alone owe their freedom mainly 
 to their own valour. It need not be said that gratitude 
 forms no part of the ethics of modern statecraft, and a few 
 only of the above States have recognized that they owe any- 
 thing to the Powers who rescued them from Turkish rule. 
 
 During the last three hundred years, when these vast 
 changes were being effected, the Ottoman army lost all the 
 prestige it had acquired during the previous three hundred 
 years. With the single exception of the battle of Cerestes, 
 fought against the Hungarians in 1646, when a debdcle
 
 A RETROSPECT 375 
 
 of the Turkish army was averted by the splendid cavalry 
 charge of Cicala Pasha, which saved to the Ottoman 
 Empire the larger part of Hungary for another term of 
 seventy -two years, its armies were defeated in almost every 
 battle of any importance. In nearly all of them the Otto- 
 mans had the advantage of very superior numbers, but this 
 did not save them from disaster. The armies opposed to 
 them were led by a succession of generals who were masters 
 of the art of war, such as Sobieski, King of Poland, Prince 
 Eugene of Savoy, Prince Charles of Lorraine, Generals 
 Munnich, Loudon, Kutusoff, Suwarrow, Diebitsch, Paskie- 
 vitch, Skobelelif, and Gourko. Compared with these, the 
 Turks had not a single general of eminence and only a 
 few valiant leaders in battle. 
 
 To what causes, then, are we to attribute the decay and 
 dismemberment of the vast Empire, and the complete 
 failure of its armies to maintain prestige for victory and 
 valour ? It is more easy perhaps to suggest causes for 
 downfall than for the birth and growth of the Empire. 
 First and foremost of the causes has unquestionably been 
 the degeneracy of the Othman dynasty. It could not have 
 been by a mere chance coincidence that the growth of 
 Empire was synchronous with the reign of the first ten 
 Sultans, and that its decay and dismemberment were ex- 
 tended through the reign of twenty-five successors, of whom 
 all but two, or possibly three, were degenerates and wholly 
 incompetent to rule. The Ottoman State was an autocracy 
 in which all military, civil, and religious faculties were 
 tentred in its head. It needed autocrats competent for 
 the task, and in the absence of such it was certain that 
 the State would take the road to ruin. Whether the 
 degeneracy of the dynasty was due, as has been hinted, 
 to a break in the true succession, and the introduction of 
 alien blood after Solyman the Magnificent, or not, the 
 fact remains that we can discern no trace of the eminent 
 qualities of the family in those who succeeded him. 
 
 The deterioration of the race, which began with Selim 
 ' the Sot,' was confirmed and accentuated by what occurred 
 after three more Sultans had succeeded father to son — 
 all of them equally unfit to fill the throne. The original 
 law of succession, which had been set aside by the cruel 
 practice of fratricide, was then reverted to, and the 
 eldest male of the familv, and not the eldest son of a
 
 376 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 defunct Sultan, was recognized as his successor. Thence- 
 forth, by way of precaution against conspiracy and rebellion, 
 the reigning Sultans, in lieu of putting their brothers to 
 death, immured them as virtual prisoners in the building 
 of the Seraglio known as the Cage, where they were allowed 
 little or no communication with the world. They were per- 
 mitted to maintain their harems, but by some abominable 
 process the women were sterilized so as to prevent their 
 giving birth to possible claimants to the throne. Of twenty 
 successors to Mahomet IV, seventeen were subjected to this 
 degrading treatment, and only left prison on succeeding to 
 the throne. Three Sultans escaped this treatment, two of 
 them by succeeding their fathers, in default of other male 
 heirs of an older age. Only one of these three was better 
 equipped to fill the throne than the average of the other 
 seventeen. It is evident, therefore, that the dynasty was 
 worn out. It would have been well for the Empire if the 
 Othman race had long ago come to an end, and had been 
 replaced by some more virile and competent stock. 
 
 It followed, from the degeneracy of this long succession 
 of Sultans, that the supreme power of the State fell into 
 other hands, either of viziers who were able to dominate 
 the reigning Sultans and to secure themselves against 
 intrigues of all kinds, or more often of the harem. It 
 would be difficult to exaggerate the evils which resulted 
 from the intervention of the Sultan's harem in affairs of 
 State. The harem consisted of a vast concourse of women 
 and slaves, of concubines and eunuchs, maintained at a 
 huge expense — a nest of extravagance and corruption. It 
 was always in antagonism to the official administration of 
 the Porte, which ostensibly carried on the administration 
 of the State under the direction of the Sultan. The 
 favourite concubine for the time being, or the ambitious 
 mother of a Sultan, or not infrequently the principal eunuch, 
 gained the ear of the Sultan and overruled the more ex- 
 perienced advisers of the Porte. The harem was the centre 
 from which corruption spread throughout the Turkish 
 Empire, as officials of every degree, from the highest to the 
 lowest, found it expedient to secure their interest with 
 its inmates by heavy bribes. It has been shown in previous 
 pages that the sale of offices, civil and military, became 
 universal. This was largely responsible for the decay and 
 dismemberment of the State. An illustration of this was
 
 A RETROSPECT '>,']'] 
 
 to be found in the cases of Egypt, Algiers, and Tunis. 
 The incompetent pashas, who had obtained by purchase the 
 governorships of these important provinces, were unable 
 to control the local Mamelukes in Egypt, or the local 
 Janissaries in Algiers and Tunis, with the result that these 
 provinces became practically independent and later were 
 lost to the Empire. 
 
 A second main cause of the decadence of the Empire 
 was undoubtedly the deterioration of its armies. We miss 
 altogether in the many great battles of the last three 
 hundred years the elan and the daring spirit by which the 
 Ottomans won their many victories in the period of accre- 
 tion of the Empire. Two main explanations may be offered 
 for this. The one that the armies in the later period 
 were formed more exclusively from the Turkish and Arabic 
 subjects of the Empire, and that the proportion of men 
 of Greek or Slav descent was far less, if it was not wholly 
 absent. When the Empire was extended over the whole of 
 Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Syria, the Moslem population 
 was enormously increased. In 1648 the corps of Janis- 
 saries ceased to be levied from Christian youths and was 
 recruited from Moslems. There was wanting, therefore, 
 to the army the spirit given to it in the past by the Greeks 
 and other Christian races. This difference was probably 
 more serious in the case of the ofBcers than with the rank 
 and file. The Turks supplied very poor material for 
 officers . 
 
 The other explanation is to be found in the absence of 
 incentive to military ardour in the later period. If we 
 have been justified in the conclusion that there was little 
 or no motive for the Turkish army in the shape of religious 
 fanaticism and the desire to spread Islam, but that plunder 
 and the hope of acquiring lands for distribution among 
 the soldiers was its main inducement, it followed that this 
 incentive to victory and valour was almost entirely absent 
 in the later period when the Empire was on the defensive, 
 when it was no longer a que'stion of making fresh conquests, 
 but of retaining what had already been won. The army 
 could not expect to get loot and plunder or captives for 
 sale as slaves, or land to be confiscated for fiefs, 
 when engaged in war for the defence of some tributary or 
 vassal State or of some more integral part of the Empire. 
 Nor could there be the feeling of fighting for their own
 
 378 THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 homcsyand property when defending a subject Christian 
 province. Yet another partial explanation is to be found 
 in the fact that the general corruption had infected the 
 army, as well as the civil administration of the State. 
 JVomotions through all the ranks went not to merit, but 
 to the highest bidders. The civil branches of the army 
 also, such as the commissariat and those for the supply of 
 munitions, which in the earlier period were well provided 
 for, fell into disorder and confusion owing to the universal 
 spread of corruption. 
 
 In view of these many serious changes, it is not diflficult to 
 appreciate the causes for the falling oh of the moral of 
 the Ottoman army and for its failure to maintain the reputa- 
 tion it had achieved in the three centuries of conquest and 
 extension of the Empire. The war which is now raging 
 in the Near East has shown that the Ottoman soldiers, 
 when organized, and in part led, by competent foreign 
 officers, when lighting pro aris et focis, and especially 
 when in defence of well fortified lines, have a great military 
 value. 
 
 A third cause, however, for the failure of the Ottomans 
 to maintain their Empire in Europe is undoubtedly to be 
 found in the continually worsening conditions of the 
 Christian populations subject to it. In the earlier period 
 there is good reason to conclude that the average con- 
 dition of the rayas in the Christian provinces subjected 
 to Ottoman rule and law was somewhat better than that 
 of the peasants in some neighbouring States, such as 
 Hungary, Austria, and Russia. There was something in 
 the way of fixity of (tenure accorded to the rayas which 
 was absent from the feudal serfs. 
 
 It was alleged that peasants from Hungary not infre- 
 quently migrated into the Balkan States in order to enjoy this 
 better treatment, and it is certain tliat the Greeks of the 
 Morea and Crete preferred the rule of the Ottomans, bad 
 as it was, to that of the Venetians, who were even more cruel 
 and rapacious. However that may have been, it is certain 
 that everywhere under Turkish rule, during the last three 
 hundred years, the conditions of the Christian populations 
 became more wretched and intolerable, and relatively far 
 worse than in neighbouring States. This was greatly due 
 to the degeneracy and corruption of the central Govern- 
 ment at Constantinople, and to its evil example and influ-
 
 A RETROSPECT zi^ 
 
 ence throughout the Empire. Governors of provinces and 
 all local officials became more corrupt and rapacious. There 
 was no security for life or property. Justice was not obtain- 
 able in the local tribunals. Arbitrary exactions were levied 
 on the peasantry. Brigandage everywhere increased. 
 Money levied in the provinces was never expended for the 
 benefit of their populations. Turkish rule acted as a 
 blight on the districts subject to it. Provinces liberated 
 from it improved in condition beyond recognition. The 
 comparison with them was an ever present object-lesson 
 to those who remained under Turkish rule. The elYorts 
 of the combined Powers of Europe to induce or compel 
 the Porte to effect improvements in the government of 
 its subjects proved to be futile and impotent. Treaty 
 obligations with this object were habitually disregarded 
 by the Porte and were treated as waste -paper. Provinces 
 thus conditioned were always on the brink of rebellion. 
 They were kept in subjection, not by the maintenance of 
 any large armed forces there, but by periodic massacres 
 of a ruthless character. These were not the product of 
 religious fanaticism, as iias often been suggested, but of 
 deliberate policy, and were instigated by orders direct from 
 the Porte, with the hope of inspiring terror in the minds of 
 the subject races. 
 
 Foreign intervention, incited not so much by territorial 
 ambition as by popular sympathy for the oppressed, was 
 resorted to for the purpose of redressing grievous wrongs 
 and for preserving the peace of Europe. As a result of 
 these causes, extending over more than three hundred years, 
 the Turkish Empire, so far as Europe is concerned, and 
 in the sense of a dominant Power over subject races, has 
 ceased to exist. In countries which it held in subjection 
 for over five hundred years it has left no trace that it 
 ever existed. The very few Turks and the Tartars and 
 Circassians who had been planted there by the Porte when 
 the Crimea and the Caucasus were subjected by Russia 
 have departed bag and baggage from Europe. They have 
 migrated to Asia Minor at the instigation of their mollahs. 
 The few Moslems who remain beliind in these districts are 
 not of Ottoman or Turkish descent ; they are of the same 
 races as their neighbours. Their ancestors adopted Islam 
 to save their property. 
 
 The Young Turks, who of late years have controlled the
 
 38o THE TURKISH EMPIRE 
 
 Empire, have signally failed to arrest the great movement 
 which we have above described. They have further 
 developed their policy of Turkifying what remains to them 
 of the Empire during the existing war. Their massacres 
 and deportations of Armenians in Asia Minor have been on 
 a scale and with a cruelty without precedent in history. 
 Whether responsibihty for this indelible crime will be en- 
 forced on them, and whether, as it richly deserves, the 
 Turkish Empire will suffer further reductions, will depend 
 on the issue of the colossal struggle in which the nations 
 of Europe are now engaged. Whatever the future may 
 have in store in these respects, there is one certain moral 
 to be drawn from the story which has been told in these 
 pages, namely that an Empire originally founded on the 
 predatory instincts of an alien military caste, and whose 
 rulers during the last four hundred years have never recog- 
 nized that they had any responsibility for the good govern- 
 ment and well-being of the races subject to them, could not, 
 if there be any law of human progress in the world, be 
 permanent, and was destined ultimately to perish by the 
 sword.
 
 APPENDIX
 
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 -2
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abdul Aziz, 312-16 
 
 Abdul Hamid I, 223-7 
 
 Abdul Hamid II, 316-52 
 
 Abdul Mehjid, 287-312 
 
 Abercromby, General, 244 
 
 Aboukir Bay, 242, 244 
 
 Acarnania, 280 
 
 Achmet I, 152 
 
 Achmet II, 185-6 
 
 Achmet III, 191-203 
 
 Acre, 239, 243, 255-6, 281, 290 
 
 Adalia, 38, 46 
 
 Aden, 117, 130, 374 
 
 Adrianople, 33-4, 46, 52-3, 58, 60- 
 I, 68, 74-6, 79, 88, 92, 113, 176, 
 1 8 1-2, 184, 186, 188-9, 276, 280, 
 
 285, 329. 362-3, 367 
 
 Ahmed Keduk, 98, 102 
 
 Aidin, 45, 62 
 
 Aidos, 276 
 
 Akinjis (irregulars), 47 
 
 Ak-Shai, 46-7 
 
 Ak-Sheir, 38 
 
 Albania, Albanians, 37, 39, 61, 71, 
 90-5, 144, 168, 180, 184, 189, 192, 
 211, 215, 224, 252, 257-8, 264, 
 
 330, 348, 353. 359, 364. 368, 374 
 Aleppo, 109-10, 123, 282 
 Alexander of Battenberg, Prince 
 
 of Bulgaria, 337-8 
 Alexandria, 240-1, 244, 250, 264, 
 
 271, 284 
 Algiers, 117, 124-5, 130, 158, 160, 
 
 164-5, 201, 224, 370 
 Andrassy, 318, 331 
 Andria Dorea, 126-7 
 Andronicus III, 21, 26,61 
 
 Angora, 45, 369 
 
 Apafy, 172, i8i 
 
 Arabi, 345 
 
 Arabia, 117, 145,259, 265 
 
 Arabs, no, 124, 138, 164, 255 
 
 Ardahan, 328, 330, 333 
 
 Argos, 52 
 
 Armenia, 48, 55, 1 17, 329, 332, 336 
 
 339. 340-1, 380 
 Astrakan, 138 
 Athens, 95, 181, 264, 343 
 Austria, 117, 120-3, 128, 155, 157- 
 
 8, 166, 171-2, 175, 186, 198-200, 
 
 202, 225-6, 247, 327, 339 
 Azof, 138, 163, 189, 192, 194-6, 
 
 207, 210, 220 
 
 Babatagh, 236 
 Baffo, Sultana, 151-5 
 Bagdad, 56, 117, 123, 160-1, 255-6 
 Bairactar, 252 
 Baku, 203 
 
 Balaklava, Battle of, 304 
 Balkans, 25, 28, 33-4, 37, 68-9, 
 184, 218, 271-3, 276, 326, 330, 
 
 335, 342-3- 358, 365 
 Balta Oghli, 79 
 Baltadji, 194-6 
 Baphaeon, Battle of, 16 
 Barbarossa, 125-6, 130 
 Barbary States, 160, 164-6 
 Bashi-bazouks, 319 
 Bashir, the eunuch, 205. 211 
 Bassorah, 117 
 Batak, 319, 320, 342 
 Batoum, 330 
 Bayezid I, 38, 40, 44-59 
 25 ^'^^
 
 386 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Bayezid II, 98-103 
 
 Bayezid, Fortress of, 330, 332 
 
 Beaconsfield, Lord, 321-4, 330, 
 
 332-3, 337 
 Beglerbey of Anatolia, 69 
 Belgrade, 72, 90, 92, 117, 119, 127, 
 
 171-2, 178, 183, 185, 187-8, 198, 
 
 200, 229, 254, 259, 278 
 Berbers, 141 
 
 Berlin, 189, 342, 354, 356 
 Berlin Congress, 331-9 
 Besika Bay, 329 
 Bessarabia, 213, 220, 225, 231, 236, 
 
 306, 330, 374 
 Beyrout, 290 
 
 Bismarck, 331-2, 340, 346 
 Blake, Admiral, 165 
 Bonaparte, General, 238-44, 248, 
 
 253-4. 257. 292 
 Bosnia, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43, 53, 67, 
 71-2, 90-3, 180, 184, 188, 201, 
 208-9, 228, 252, 310, 318, 320, 
 
 332-3, 339, 353, 368 
 Boucicaut, 52 
 Bourgas, 276 
 Bragadino, 140 
 Brusa, 14-15, 18-19, 21-2, 33-5, 
 
 51, 58, 60, 63, 104, 282 
 Bucharest, 218, 220, 238-54, 259, 
 
 271, 366 
 Bucsacs, Treaty of, 174-5 
 Buda, 49, 52, 68, 119, 120, 180 
 Bulair, 363 
 Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 25, 28, 32, 
 
 36-9, 41-4, 47, 53, 69, 155, 157, 
 
 185, 231, 253, 272, 276, 296, 310, 
 
 315, 319, 327, 329, 330, 333-4, 
 
 337-8, 342-3, 357, 363, 368 
 Bulgarian Atrocities, 320-3 
 Burke, Edmund, 235 
 Byron, Lord, 263 
 Byzantium, Byzantines, 21, 22, 24, 
 
 28-9, 30, 32-3, 36, 41, 43, 45, 52, 
 
 82, 89, 94, 225, 369 
 
 Caesarea, 56 
 
 Cage, the, see Seraglio 
 
 Cairo 111-12,241-4,251,258 
 
 Calabria, 96, 140 
 
 Calafat, 326 
 
 Calderan, Battle of, 108 
 
 Caliph, 112, 182 
 
 Candia, 96, 167, 170, 173, 296 ; see 
 also Crete 
 
 Canea, 164 
 
 Canning, Mr., 267, 270 
 
 Canning, Sir Stratford, see Strat- 
 ford de Redcliffe 
 
 Cantacuzene, 26-9 
 
 Carlowitz, Treaty of, 189, 190, 192, 
 196-7, 221 
 
 Castriota, 71 
 
 Caucasus, 220, 241, 272, 306, 342 
 
 Cephalonia, 90 
 
 Cerestes, Battle of,i55, 157, 172,374 
 
 Chamber of Turkish Deputies, 348 
 
 Chatham, Lord, 232 
 
 Chios, 47, 79 
 
 Choczim, 175 
 
 Cicala Pasha, 155-7, 375 
 
 Circassia, 109, 303, 306, 333, 339, 
 340, 342, 379 
 
 Citale, 302 
 
 Coburg, 228 
 
 Codrington, Admiral, 269 
 
 Committee of Union and Pro- 
 gress, 347, 349 
 Comnenus, 90 
 Constantine, Emperor, 75, 77-8, 
 
 80, 82, 84, 94 
 Constantine, King of Greece, 359 
 Constantinople (attacked), 25, 46, 
 52-3, 61, 65 ; capture of, 78-89 
 Corfu, 126, 197-8, 201 
 Corinth, 70, 189, 196-7, 264 
 Corsairs, 124-6, 139, 159, 164-5, 
 
 231, 373 
 
 Cossacks, 163, 174 
 
 Court of Confiscations, 266 
 
 Cracow, 177 
 
 Crete, 118, 140, 145, 163-4, 166, 
 173, 175, 240, 264, 280-1, 283, 
 330, 336, 338, 354, 359. 368, 378 
 
 Crimea, 90-1, 1 17, 138, 163, 171, 174, 
 184, 192-6, 207-8, 210, 212, 217, 
 223, 225, 227, 232, 304-5, 342, 374
 
 INDEX 
 
 38r 
 
 Crimean War, 288-3 :.o 
 Croatia, 180, 229, 248, 374 
 Crusades, 25, 32, 34, 45, 48-9, 
 
 90-1, 163 
 Cyprus, 139-41, 144-5, 262, 298, 
 
 333-4. 368, 374 
 
 Dahis, of Bosnia, 246-7 
 Dalmatia, 144, 181, 201, 248, 374 
 Damad Pasha, 196-8, 201 
 Damascus, 55, 169, 264, 281-3 
 Danube, 32, 39, 41, 49, 52, 66-9, 
 76,80,92,98, 117, 119, 121, 155, 
 157, 171, 176-7, 179, 181, 184-5, 
 
 193, 235-6 
 Dardanelles, 33-50, 52, 64, 92, 163, 
 
 166, 208, 215, 242, 249-50, 273, 
 
 283, 289, 304, 329, 354 
 Demetrius, Despot of Greece, 94 
 Demotika, 29, 34, 36 
 Derby, Lord, 322-6 
 Dervishes, 62, 65 
 Deys, 165-6 
 Diarbekir, 103, 108 
 Diebitsch, Marshal, 275-8, 375 
 Divan, the, 147, 186, 191, 198, 
 
 213, 218, 225, 236, 245-6, 251, 
 
 265, 288 
 Djem, Prince, 99, 100, 115 
 Dobrudscha, 327, 330, 366-7 
 Don, River, 138 
 Doris, 52 
 
 Dragut, 126-7, ^30 
 Druma, River, 37 
 Duckworth, Admiral, 249-51 
 Dulcigno, 335 
 Dundar, 13, 17, 18 
 Durazzo, 361 
 
 Earthquake at Gallipoli, 28 
 Egypt, 98, 100, 102-3, 109-13. 139. 
 164, 216, 239, 244-5, 256-8, 265, 
 269, 281, 283-4, 288-9, 291, 296, 
 
 345. 347. 368, 374 
 Elphinstone, 214-15 
 England, 158, 229, 231, 248, 279 ; 
 
 see also Great Britain 
 Enos, 277 
 
 Enver Bey, 363, 366-7 
 
 Ephesus, 57 
 
 Epirus, 255, 330, 332, 336, 338 
 
 344. 363, 368 
 Erivan, 160-1, 203 
 Erlau, 183 
 
 Ertoghrul, 13, 14, 15, 17, 55 
 Erzeroum, 13, 276, 278, 328, 333, 
 
 339 
 Eski Baba, 33, 369 
 
 Eski-Sheir, 15 
 
 Eugene, Prince, 183, 187-8, 192, 
 
 198, 201, 375 
 European conquests, 25-6, 28- 
 
 30. 32 
 Evizzo, Paul, 93 
 Evrenos, 33, 37, 52 
 
 Ferdinand, Archduke, 119, 120 
 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 338, 
 
 354 
 Fox, Charles James, 232-5 
 France, 238, 248-9, 257, 268, 271 
 
 279, 282, 284, 290, 294, 345 
 
 Galata, 32 
 
 Gallipoli, 28, sr, 64, 74, 123 
 
 Gaza, 110, 112, 243, 281 
 
 Genoa, 25, 32, 67-8, 75, 77, 79, 84, 
 
 86, 90, 92 
 George Brancowitch, 67 
 George, Prince, of Greece, 339 
 Georgia, 145, 203, 213, 217, 220, 241 
 Germany, 90, 12 r, 166, 284, 320, 
 
 339. 346, 350. 354. 367 
 Ghazali, iii 
 Ghengis Khan, 54 
 Ghowrem, Sultana, 1 15-16, 134 
 Ghowri, 109-11 
 Gladstone, 310, 314, 320-2, 326, 
 
 330. 334-5. 340. 345 
 Goltz, von der, General, 338, 368 
 Gran, 179, 180 
 Great Britain, 232-3, 267, 333, 345 
 
 368 
 Great Powers, the, 288-9, 290, 301, 
 
 307. 313. 323. 325. 334. 358. 362. 
 
 366, 374
 
 388 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Greece, Greek affairs, 230, 237, 
 
 239. 255. 257, 259, 260, 262-4, 
 
 266, 268, 271-2, 279, 292, 
 
 333. 335. 338, 342. 356, 360, 
 
 364 
 Greek Church, 35, 89, 248-9, 267, 
 
 299, 314-15 
 
 Hafiz, 137 
 
 Hamid Emirate, 38, 144 
 
 Hassan, 156 
 
 Hatti-Humayun, 306-7, 310 
 
 Hatti-Scheriff of Ghulkane, 293 
 
 Herzegovina, 100, 102, 310, 318, 
 
 327. 332-3. 339. 354 ' 
 
 Hetairia, 261 
 
 Hirsova, 219, 327 
 
 HohenzoUern, 49, 313 
 
 Holland, 201, 229, 231 
 
 Hungary, Hungarian affairs, 33-4, 
 39, 41, 44-6, 48-9, 50-2, 66-9, 
 71. 74-5. 78, 90-1, 98. 100, 116- 
 17, 119, 120-2, 128-9, 155. 176, 
 180-1, 187, 189, 192, 201, 211, 
 
 375. 378 
 Hunyadi, 47, 66-71, 74, 76, 91 
 
 Ibrahim, King of Karamania, 93 
 Ibrahim, Grand Vizier, 116, 119, 
 
 120, 123, 132, 134-5 
 Ibrahim, Sultan, 153, 162-3, ^66 
 Ibrahim Pasha, 264-5, 269. 270-1, 
 
 281, 284-5, 291 
 Ibrail, 273 
 Iconium, 13 
 Idebali, 15, 17 
 Idris, 109 
 Ilbeki, 34 
 Indian troops, 321 
 Inkerman, Battle of, 304 
 Ionian Islands, 197, 238 
 Irene, Empress, 29 
 Islamism, 14, 16, 17, 22, 24, 64, 67, 
 
 89, 146, 171, 243, 266, 340, 348, 
 
 353. 372. 377 
 Ismail, 107-8, 123, 231 
 Jaffa, 243 
 Janina, 239, 255-6, 336, 362-3 
 
 Janissaries, 23, 41-3, 55, 60-1, 70, 
 74,76,84-5,98, 101-4, 108, 114, 
 1 17-18, 131, 146, 152, 154, 159, 
 165, 178, 183, 187-8, 191, 204, 229, 
 238, 245-6, 251-2, 256, 265, 377 
 Jassy, 209, 217, 249 
 Jassy, Treaty, 223-37 
 Jerusalem, 221, 281, 294, 298 
 John Palaeologus, 26-7, 29, 32, 34- 
 6, 45, 66 
 
 Kainardji, Treaty of, 189, 211 
 
 Kaminiec, 174 
 
 Karamania, 14-16, 38-9, 46-8, 58, 
 
 62, 65, 67-8, 71, 90, 93-4 
 Kara George, 247-8, 259 
 Karasi, 22 
 Karnabet, 276 
 
 Kars, 274, 278, 304, 310, 326, 333 
 Kavalla, 37 
 Kermia, 38, 62, 65 
 Khadidje, Sultana, 204 
 Khair Bey, 11 1 
 Khalil Pasha, 200, 217 
 Kherson, 225 
 
 Khocsim, 209, 213-14, 217 
 Khorassan, 13, 15 
 Khorkand, 104 
 Khurdistan, 103, 108 
 Kilburn, 217, 220, 225-7 
 Kilia, 277 
 
 Kirk Kilisse, 33, 361, 366-7 
 Kir Sheir, 56 
 Knights of St. John, 45, 49, 50-2, 
 
 57,99, 1 17-18, 127, 240 
 Komorn, 171 
 
 Konia, 13-15, 48, 93, 109, 282 
 Kosciuszko, 236 
 Kossova, 39, 44, 71, 369 
 Kostlidji, 219 
 Kotchana, 357 
 Kotchi Bey, 132 
 Koumanovo, Battle of, 361 
 Krotzka, 209 
 Kuban, 236 
 
 Kulewtska, Battle of, 275 
 Kurds, 333, 339, 340 
 Kutayia, 38
 
 INDEX 
 
 389 
 
 Lalashalin, 33-4, 37 
 
 Larissa, 52, 196 
 
 Latin Church, 32-3, 35, 67, 69, 77 
 
 Latin Empire, 25 
 
 Lazar, King of Serbia, 37, 39, 40 
 
 Lemberg, 175 
 
 Lemnos, 90, 166, 170, 216 
 
 Leopold, Prince, 280 
 
 Lepanto, Battle of, loi, 142, 370 
 
 Lesbos, 90 
 
 Little Armenia, 14 
 
 Locris, 52 
 
 Lorraine, Prince Charles of, 172, 
 
 179, 180, 183, 375 
 Louis (of Baden) Prince, 183, 185 
 
 Macedonia, 43, 53, 157, 185, 330, 
 
 333. 336, 342, 344. 353. 357. 361, 
 
 367. 368, 377 
 Magnesia, 68, 70, 74 
 Magyars, 201-2 
 Mahmoud I, 203-11 
 Mahmoud II, 252-287 
 Mahomet I, 59-64 
 Mahomet II, 73-98 
 Mahomet III, 151-2 
 Mahomet IV, 166-83 
 Mahomet V, 352 
 Maksyu, 236 
 Malta, 118, 127, 164, 173, 180, 184, 
 
 240. 331 
 Mamelukes, 100, 102-3, ^09. ^^^> 
 
 113, 216, 225, 239, 241, 243, 245, 
 
 250, 258 
 Mansel, Admiral, 165 
 Manuel, 35-6, 45-6, 52-3, 61, 64, 
 
 65 
 Maritza, Battle of, 369 
 Matthew, Emperor, 29 
 Mecca, 109, 112, 256 
 Medina, 109, 112, 256 
 Mehemet Ali, 257, 259, 264, 266, 
 
 281-91, 331, 345 
 Mendia, 226 
 Mentshe, 14, 45 
 Mesopotamia, 56, 125, 343 
 Michael Palaeologus, 16 
 Midbat Pasha, 324-5 
 
 Military service, 23-4, 41, 47 
 
 Milosch Kabilowitch, 39, 40 
 
 Milosch Obrenowitch, 259 
 
 Mingrelia, 217, 220 
 
 Missolonghi, 264 
 
 Mohacz, 119, 157, 172, 180, 369 
 
 Moldavia, 155, 175, 193, 206-9, 
 210, 213, 217, 220-1, 226, 228, 
 236, 249, 253, 255, 266, 271-2, 
 278, 281, 300, 306 
 
 Moltke, 274, 278, 284 
 
 Monastir, 37, 300, 361 
 
 Mongols, 13, 369 
 
 Montenegro, 196, 212, 320, 328, 
 
 330. 332, 335, 359, 362, 365, 367 
 Moors, loi, 125, 164 
 Moravia, 171 
 Morea, 181, 189, 192, 196-7, 201, 
 
 212, 214, 218, 256, 259, 261-3, 
 
 269, 271, 279, 378 
 Morocco, 127 
 
 Morosini, 173, 181, 184, 196 
 Mosques, 97, 109, 340 
 Mossul, 117, 123 
 
 Mouhsinzade, 213-15, 218-19, 221 
 Muley-Hasan, 125, 140 
 Murad I, 31-44 
 Murad II, 64-73 
 Murad III, 145-51 
 Murad IV, 153 
 Murad V, 316 
 Musa, 60, 61 
 Mustapha, 65 
 Mustapha I, 152 
 Mustapha II, 186-91 
 Mustapha III, 211-23 
 Mustapha IV, 251-2 
 
 Napier, Admiral, 290 
 
 Naples, 242 
 
 National Assembly, 349, 350 
 
 Navarino, loi, 197, 262, 264, 269, 
 
 270-2, 281 
 Nazib, Battle of, 284, 288 
 Negropont, 47 
 Nelson, Admiral, 240, 242 
 Neuhauscl, 171-2, 175, 180 
 Nevers, Count de, 48, 51
 
 390 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nicea, 14, 21, 22, 25 
 
 Nicomedia, 14, 21, 22 
 
 Nicopolis, 39, 45, 47, 49, 51-3, 327, 
 
 369 
 Nicosia, 139 
 
 Nicotika, 26 
 
 Nisch, 37, 67, 185, 248, 328 
 Novi- Bazar, 354 
 Nubia, 117 
 
 Oczakoff, 220, 225, 227, 232-4, 
 
 236 
 Odessa, 261 
 Oltenitza, 302 
 Omar Pasha, 291, 302, 304 
 Oran, 117, 124, 127, 130, 146 
 Orchan, 18, 20-31 
 Orlof, Prince, 214, 216, 224 
 Orsova, 230, 278 
 Osmanlis, 17, 51 
 Othman I, 13-20 
 Othman II, 152 
 Othman III, 211 
 Otho, King, 280 
 Otranto, 90-1, 98 
 Ouloudj, 139, 141-2, 144-5 
 
 Padishah, loi, 155-6, 163, 182, 
 
 205 
 Paget, Lord, 188-9 
 Palmerston, Lord, 282, 289, 290-1, 
 
 314 
 Passarowitch, Treaty of, 189-202 
 Patriarch, Greek, 29, 83, 88, 262, 
 
 314 
 Pears, Sir E., 319 
 
 Pelecanon, Battle of, 21 
 
 Persia, 103, 105-9, 1 15-17, 123, 
 
 126, 129, 145, 158, 160-1, 192, 
 
 196, 203 
 Peterwardein, 52, 185, 201, 209 
 Pfalfi, 155-6 
 
 Phalerum, Battle of, 264 
 Pharsalia, Battle of, 52 
 Philippopolis, 37, 181, 342 
 Piale Pasha, 130, 139 
 Pitt, William, 232-5 
 Plevna, 327-8 
 
 Podolia, 174-5, 189, 374 
 
 Poland, 67, 78, 120, 171, 174-6, 
 
 184, 189, 194, 212, 217-18, 220, 
 
 230, 233, 272 
 Poros, 264 
 Portugal, 127 
 
 Potemkin, Prince, 231, 236 
 Presburg, 120 
 Prussia, 212, 217, 229, 231-4, 284, 
 
 288, 313 
 
 Raab, 172-3, 178 
 
 Raghab Pasha, 212 
 
 Ragusa, 31, 201 
 
 Retino, 164 
 
 Rhodes, 57, 90-1, 96, 98, 112-13, 
 
 117, 242, 244 
 Ridania, 111 
 Roe, Sir Thomas, 158 
 Roostem, Grand Vizier, 132-3, 153 
 Roumania, 313, 326, 328, 364-7, 
 
 374 
 Roumelia, 131, 133, 331 
 Roumelia, East, 331-2, 337 
 Roxelana, see Ghowrem 
 Russia, 102, 131, 138, 174-6, 184, 
 
 188-9, 192-31 203, 206, 212, 214, 
 
 220, 226, 231, 248, 253, 268, 271- 
 
 7, 294, 313, 326, 366 
 Rustchuk, 218, 252, 254 
 
 Salankemen, Battle of, 185 
 Salonika, 66, 71-2, 260, 262, 320, 
 
 347. 349. 352. 3^0. 365 
 Samakof, Battle of, 37, 369 
 Samarcand, 54, 58 
 San Stefano, 329, 330-3 
 Saoudji, 35-6 
 
 Sarandoporus, Battle of, 360 
 Sarukhan, 14, 16, 22, 45 
 Scanderbeg, 71, 92, 95 
 Schiis, 105, 109 
 Schumla, 39, 218-19, 254, 272-3, 
 
 275-6 
 Scios, 231, 260 
 Seaddedin, 86, 156-7 
 Sebastopol, 282, 304-5 
 Selim I, 103-14
 
 INDEX 
 
 391 
 
 Selim II, i3b-45 
 Selim III, 227-51 
 Seljukian Turks, 13, 14, 16 
 Semendria, 185, 201, 208, 229 
 Seraglio, 152, 155, i6x, 182, 185, 
 191, 205, 212, 219, 251, 316, 376 
 Serbia, 25-8, 32-3, 37-9, 41, 43-5, 
 49> 50, 53> 57> 61, 67-9, 71, 74, 
 90, 184, 192, 200, 208, 228, 239, 
 246-8, 255, 259, 260, 266, 271-2, 
 278, 281, 296, 313, 320, 330, 333, 
 
 337. 342, 364-5 
 Serinvar, 172, 175 
 Serres, 37 
 
 Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 294-7 
 Sheik ul Islam, 348-9 
 Shipka Pass, 327-8 
 Siawousch, Pasha, 181, 183 
 " Sick man of Europe,' 295-6 
 Sigismund, King, 46-9, 50, 66 
 Silistria, 39, 47, 218-19, 254, 273, 
 
 275. 303. 305. 367 
 Silvatorok, Treaty of, 158, 172 
 Sinope, Battle of, 303 
 Sistova, 49, 247, 254 
 Sivas, 48, 55, 57 
 Slatino, 226 
 Slavery, 24, 47, 66, 100, 109, 139 
 
 241, 265, 373 
 Slavonia, 181, 189 
 Slavs, 16, 17, 201, 263, 314, 320, 
 
 342 
 Slivno, 276 
 
 Smith, Admiral Sir Sidney, 243 
 Smyrna, 45, 57, 62 
 Sobieski, 174-9, 375 
 Sofia, 37, 185, 328, 337, 342 
 Solyman I, 114-36 
 Solyman II, 183-5 
 Solyman, Shah, 13 
 Solyman, Prince, 25-7, 29 
 Sophia, St., 77, 82, 86-7, 182 
 Soudan, 146, 259, 298 
 Spahis, 131, 138, 154, 162-3, 166, 
 
 246, 248 
 Spain, 117, 124, 126-7, 140-1 
 Stephen Dushan, King of Serbia, 
 
 25. 27 
 
 Stephen (of Serbia), 44, 50, 56, 67 
 Stopford, Admiral, 290 
 Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 282, 
 287, 292-3, 298, 300, 307-9, 310 
 Strumnitza, 366 
 Styria, 52, 122, 171 
 Suez, 127, 138, 240, 243, 323 
 Sugut, 15 
 Sultan (title), 21,31 
 
 Sultan (accession murders), 40, 65, 
 96, 104, 152 
 
 Sultana Valide, 151, 153, 157, 160-3, 
 166, 169, 182, 205 
 
 Sunnites, 105 
 
 Suwarrow, 219, 226-8, 231, 375 
 
 Sweden, 192, 194, 230, 234 
 
 Syria, 100, 103, 109, 111-13, 242, 
 264, 281, 283-4, 288-9, 343; 377 
 
 Syrmia, 46, 52, 260, 262 
 
 Szegeddin, 68 
 
 Szigeth, 128 
 
 Tabriz, 106, 108, 123, 138, 203 
 Tahmasp, Shah, 115, 123, 204, 206 
 Tartars, 54-9, 138, 163, 174, 176, 
 178, 184, 217, 220, 223, 342, 379 
 Tchatalja, lines of, 362, 364 
 Tchorlu, 29, 33 
 Tekke, Emirate of, 38, 46 
 Temesvar, 184, 187-8, 194, 226 
 Teutonic Knights, 49, 67 
 Theodora, 26-7 
 Theodore Palasologus, 52 
 Theodosius, 78 
 Thermopylae, 52 
 Thessaly, 278, 280, 330, 332, 336, 
 
 338-9 
 Thomas, Despot in Greece, 94 
 Thrace, 369, 370 
 Timurlane, 53-9, 62, 76 
 Tirnova, 39, 47, 182, 327 
 Torchan, Sultana, 167, 169 
 Tourman Bey, in 
 Transylvania, 119, 155, 158, 172, 
 
 i8r, 185-6, 189 
 Trebizond, 14, 89, 90, 106, 276 
 Tripoli, 117, 124, 127, 130, 169, 
 
 201. 281, 283, 354, 356, 359
 
 392 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Tripolitza, 261-2 
 Tughra, 31 
 
 Tunis, 121, 124, 126, 144-5, 158, 
 160, 164-5, 201, 347, 354, 370, 
 
 374 
 Turk (the name), 17 
 Tzympe, 26-8 
 
 Ukraine, 174, 176, 272, 374 
 
 Ulemas, 162, 182, 265 
 
 Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 283 
 
 Vacouf lands, 266 
 
 Valtetsi, 261 
 
 Varna, 69, 218-10, 271-3, 304, 369 
 
 Vascar, 172 
 
 Venezelos, M., 357 
 
 Venice, Venetians, 25, 35, 50, 62, 
 66-8, 71, 75, 78, 90-1, 93, 95, 98, 
 loi, 124, 126-7, i4i~2, 164, 170, 
 173, I80-I, 184, 189, 192, 196-7, 
 
 201, 238, 378 
 
 Vienna, 91, 116, 120-3, ^^6, 176-9, 
 
 182 
 Viziers, 17, 20, 58, 60, 73, 75, 92, 
 
 103, 1 15-16, 119, 133, 136, 147, 
 
 166, 168-91, 205, 253 
 
 Voivode, 95, 119, 181 
 Volga, 138 
 
 Wallachia, 33, 39, 46-7, 49, 50 
 52-3. 59> 61, 67, 69, 72, 76, 90-1, 
 95-6- 155. i75> 192, 200-1, 207, 
 209, 217, 220-1, 236, 249, 253, 
 255, 266, 271-2, 278, 281, 300 
 
 Warardin, 184 
 
 Warsaw, 177 
 
 Wartersleben, General, 226 
 
 Warzen, 180 
 
 White, Sir W., 337 
 
 Widdin, 47, 49, 183, 185, 208, 239, 
 247, 255-6 
 
 Wlad, 95-6 
 
 Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, 346 
 
 Yemen, 117, 127, 130, 138, 145 
 Young Turks, 349, 352-69, 379 
 
 Zante, 189 
 
 Zapolya, Count, 119, 120, 123 
 
 Zenta, Battle of, 187-8 
 
 Zriny, 128 
 
 Zurawna, Treaty of, 175, 193 
 
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