THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 IM 
 
 ^0 V ^-^^^-^tAjU-^
 
 GERMANY 
 IN THE WAR AND AFTER
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 MSW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limithi> 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA. Ltdu 
 
 TORONTO
 
 GERMANY 
 IN THE WAR AND AFTER 
 
 BY 
 
 VERNON KELLOGG 
 
 Author of "Headquarters Nights" 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1919 
 
 All rights reserved
 
 COPTBIGHT, 1919 
 
 bt the macmillan company 
 
 Set up and eleetrotyped. Published, July, 1919
 
 o 
 
 5'l5 
 
 K 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 With the external manifestations of Germany 
 during the war and since the Armistice the world 
 is familiar. But with what was going on inside 
 that extraordinary country, among those extraor- 
 dinary people, during the war and immediately 
 after it, the world is less familiar. 
 
 It has been my privilege and necessity in 
 the course of my duties since May, 19 15, up to 
 the present time, in connection with the work of 
 the Commission for Relief in Belgium, the United 
 States Food Administration, and the American 
 Relief Administration, all under the directorship 
 of Herbert Hoover, to have some rather close 
 personal acquaintanceship with Germans and Ger- 
 man conditions during all of that time. 
 
 The present opportunity is given me to bring 
 together and expose whatever of my knowledge 
 seems pertinent to the need of us all to under- 
 stand as well as we can the war-time and post- 
 
 868339
 
 Preface 
 
 war experience and situation and the probable 
 future behavior and possibilities of Germany. 
 
 My thanks are given to my friend, Mr. EUery 
 Sedgwick, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, for 
 permission to use In this book whatever I care 
 to from a recent paper published In his magazine. 
 
 V. K. 
 
 New York City, 
 July, 1919.
 
 AUTHOR'S NOTE 
 
 All the chapters In this book except the last one 
 were written after the Armistice but before the 
 signing of the Treaty. The last one was written 
 immediately after the Treaty was signed.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A Post-Mortem: the German Army . . . ii 
 
 German Control of Germans 20 
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food .... 30 
 
 Other Inside Difficulties During the War . 45 
 
 How THE People Were Deceived .... 57 
 
 What the Germans Thought During the 
 
 War and Armistice 66 
 
 Germany Now and To-morrow 79
 
 GERMANY 
 IN THE WAR AND AFTER 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 A POST-MORTEM: THE GERMAN ARMY 
 
 A POST-MORTEM examination of the patient 
 often reveals the cause, or causes, before that 
 only Imperfectly understood, of the fatal Illness. 
 Of course, sometimes it does not. The case of 
 the collapse of militaristic Germanism Is one that 
 urgently calls for examination after the event. 
 We need to find out, for the sake of knowing what 
 not to do or be, as much as we can of what im- 
 perial Germany did or was that brought her to 
 a timely end. 
 
 There may be some who will remonstrate that 
 this end has not come yet, and that a present post- 
 mortem examination of Germany is premature. 
 In all truth. Imperial Germany Is not wholly dead. 
 
 But sometimes, for that matter, neither Is the more 
 
 II
 
 12 Germany in the War and After 
 
 usual subject of a post-mortem wholly dead at the 
 time of the examination. The human body does 
 not all die at one moment; it dies by parts, by 
 organs, by tissues, one after another. For ex- 
 ample, the amoeboid white blood corpuscles, the 
 most independent parts of the body, go on moving 
 and functioning long after the heart has stopped 
 beating. The army was the heart of premortem 
 Germany. It has stopped beating. And it is 
 revealing some curious phenomena in the course 
 of its decomposition. 
 
 Hauptmann Graf W. had been my escort offi- 
 cer at German Great Headquarters in Charleville 
 in 1915 and 1916. It was he who had been the 
 one, as described in an earlier book,^ to brealc in 
 on my attempt to explain one night at dinner, 
 on his invitation, to a group of Headquarters offi- 
 cers just what it is that America understands by 
 democracy. I had proceeded but a little way 
 in my explanation when he interrupted, rather 
 violently, with the exclamation: " Democracy 
 — bah — license, lawlessness, anarchy." On his 
 hurried way from Charleville to Germany after 
 the Armistice he passed through Brussels and 
 
 1 Headquarters Nights, 1918, Atlantic Monthly Press.
 
 A Post-Mortem: The German Army 13 
 
 talked with one of our C.R.B. (Commission for 
 Relief in Belgium) men. 
 
 He was still boasting — entirely characteristic 
 of him — but it was a strange, new boast he ut- 
 tered. Always, at Headquarters, and in our long 
 motor journeys over Occupied France on relief 
 business, in enforced companionship, he had up- 
 held against me the great advantage, nay, the ab- 
 solute necessity, if a people was to be well gov- 
 erned and successful, of a military autocracy. If 
 America wished to be great, or if she had for the 
 moment the seeming of greatness but wished to 
 assure the continuance of this greatness, she should 
 acquire as soon as possible a Kaiser and General 
 Staff. Germany was the greatest nation in the 
 world because it enjoyed just these particular 
 blessings; of course, incidentally its people, its 
 Kultur, etc., etc., were the best, etc., etc., ad 
 nauseam. 
 
 But Hauptmann Graf W. had learned, surpris- 
 ingly quickly, a new boast. Germany was now 
 really going to be the greatest nation because she 
 had got a splendid new government, a real demo- 
 cratic government, not a pseudo-democracy like 
 America's, where the President was more of an
 
 14 Germany in the War and After 
 
 autocrat than any King or Kaiser in Europe, but 
 the most real thing in democracies conceivable. 
 
 My astonished C.R.B. friend stammered out 
 a question. " Do all the officers at Great Head- 
 quarters and all the other officers say this, too? 
 Do they all think as you do? " 
 
 " No, not all; some are fools. But sixty per 
 cent, of them do ; and the other forty per cent. — 
 well, they don't count." 
 
 This seems hard to understand. But I know 
 the Hauptmann Graf W. very well, and many 
 others like him. It was the acceptance of author- 
 ity, the cringing to power. The Kaiser had run 
 away; so had some of the General Staff ; the others 
 were rapidly changing their clothes, doffing uni- 
 forms for mufti. The " real democracy " was 
 in power; hence, knuckle down to it. This is not 
 to say that there are no Germans who believe in 
 democracy and want it. Only the Hauptmann 
 Graf W. is not one of them. He accepts the real 
 democracy — if it can give the orders. 
 
 Some of the leading German officers and offi- 
 cials in Belgium, men of the Governor-General's 
 staff, gave an edifying exhibition in Brussels 
 shortly before scurrying away. The German sol-
 
 A Post-Mortem: The German Army 15 
 
 diers, at the suggestion and with the moral sup- 
 port of a group of soldier-council emissaries from 
 Hamburg and Berlin, took control of the army 
 in most of Belgium on the day before the Armis- 
 tice. The insignia of rank were stripped from 
 the officers' uniforms, or the officers were ordered 
 to strip themselves of their insignia, which they 
 did, and a Soldaten-Rath was established in Brus- 
 sels under the leadership of Private Einstein. 
 This council requested the attendance at one of 
 its meetings of half a dozen of the highest Ger- 
 man officers and officials in the city, men who had 
 been the rulers of Belgium for fours years, whose 
 word had meant life or death to German soldiers 
 and Belgian civilians up to this very moment. 
 They came to the meeting. They came early. 
 They were there before Einstein arrived. When 
 he came in they rose from their chairs and stood 
 respectfully until he was seated. 
 
 Amazing? It was beyond words. I can 
 hardly write this. It is too good to be true. Yet 
 it Is the truth. These were the men who had 
 shot Miss Cavell and scores of the fearless Bel- 
 gians; the men who had brutalized thousands of 
 German soldiers; the men who had insulted, times
 
 1 6 Germany in the War and After 
 
 unnumbered, the Americans of the Relief Com- 
 mission. How many times, for the sake of the 
 work, had we accepted from them, unanswered, 
 with faces burning from anger and shame, a bru- 
 tal or insulting remark! How we had almost 
 come to fear them ! They could do anything. 
 
 Private Einstein had learned the language of 
 command; not by using it, but by hearing it, by 
 having it growled or barked at him. He used it 
 now. The others knew it, too. And they knew 
 the proper response. Each knew how to lift im- 
 passive face to it, hands down on trousers seams. 
 Private Einstein gave each the opportunity to 
 practice a little all that he had so long practiced. 
 
 Then he told them what to do and what not to 
 do. He said that he was informed that the jails 
 in Namur had not yet been opened. Would 
 Governor H., governor of all of Walloon Bel- 
 gium, see to it that the prisoners, British, French, 
 Italian, were all released by night? Gov- 
 ernor H. would see to it. Would Graf R., 
 who had lived in the same house with Governor- 
 General von Bissing, and used this famihar inter- 
 course to rise to great power in Belgium, do this 
 other particular thing that Private Einstein wished
 
 A Post-Mortem: The German Army ij 
 
 done? And would Baron von der L., chief po- 
 litical adviser of the successive Governors-General 
 of Belgium, and a widely known figure in German 
 diplomacy and official intrigue, do that other 
 thing? The humble servants of Private Einstein 
 assured him that they would. 
 
 Is this credible? It happened. 
 
 In the few days after that meeting these men 
 disappeared from Belgium. They slunk away in 
 concealing civilian clothes to Holland or Ger- 
 many. Haughty Rupprecht, crown prince of Ba- 
 varia, escaping the bullets shot into his house, took 
 refuge in the Spanish Legation, whence he was 
 taken under the Spanish flag to the Dutch frontier. 
 
 A few officers not so high in rank and not so 
 easily convinced of the advantage of the new de- 
 mocracy — some of the foolish forty per cent, per- 
 haps — resisted feebly. They continued to wear 
 their uniforms and insignia and tried to give or- 
 ders to their men. Some of them were shot, and 
 others shot at. From the Palace Hotel, former 
 convivial headquarters of German officers back 
 from the front on leave in Brussels, and now taken 
 possession of by the soldiers, a machine gun spat 
 bullets across th? square into the windows of the
 
 1 8 Germany in the War and After 
 
 Cosmopolite, last hold-out of the recalcitrant offi- 
 cers. The soldiers, the soldier-councils, were giv- 
 ing the rulers of Germany their first lesson in the 
 " splendid new democracy." 
 
 It is apparently not necessary to observe — 
 which, nevertheless, I do here parenthetically — 
 that this is not exactly our idea of democracy, for 
 the officers had no representation in it. It was 
 dictatorship, just as the former autocracy was dic- 
 tatorship. The rule of the proletariat alone is 
 no more democratic than is the rule of the nobles 
 alone. Bolshevism is not democracy. It is the 
 exchange of the tyranny of Kings and Nobles and 
 General Staffs for the tyranny of the bottom rung 
 in the political and social ladder. Russia illus- 
 trates this now; Germany will illustrate it to-mor- 
 row if the Spartacists have their way. 
 
 But to return from the parenthesis. One other 
 Brussels happening must be recorded. It is the 
 departure of the German occupying troops. 
 
 On "Liberation Sunday" (November 17th) 
 my wife watched for three hours from a curtained 
 window on the Boulevard du Regent that strange 
 procession of beaten conquerors passing by, the 
 last crazy caravan of mixed German soldiers,
 
 A Post-Mortem: The German Army 19 
 
 seized Belgian cattle and looted Belgian household 
 belongings piled high on gun carriages, munition 
 wagons, passenger hacks and hucksters' carts, 
 moving east. The significant thing to me about 
 this procession — in special connection with the 
 point I am laboring — is that despite the uprising 
 of the soldiers and degradation of the officers dur- 
 ing the last week before the evacuation, when the 
 troops moved away — with their final loot — 
 they were led and kept in line by officers ! It was 
 the effect of long tradition and ingrained habit 
 reasserting itself. In taking up familiar perform- 
 ance again the soldiers needed, or thought they 
 did, or just accepted without need or thought, 
 some kind of control. They wanted somebody 
 over them, somebody to rely on, some one to or- 
 der them; they wanted to be reassured by the 
 familiar bark. Which has its significance to be 
 considered, it seems to me, in any attempts to esti- 
 mate just how rapidly democracy will really come 
 to its own in new Germany.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 GERMAN CONTROL OF GERMANS 
 
 At the time of this writing Noske, minister of 
 national defense, is the strong man of the Major- 
 ity Socialist administration of Germany and the 
 man on whom chiefly depends the hope of a con- 
 tinuing orderly or semi-orderly government. By 
 the time this is published he may not be; before 
 then he may be assassinated; he almost certainly 
 will be if the Spartacists can get to him. But now 
 he is the strength of the Government. Why? 
 Because, although he is a socialist and man risen 
 from the ranks, he uses the control methods of 
 the old regime. He wields the Big Stick; he 
 controls by force. The Germans understand his 
 ways. He orders them, and sends troops to en- 
 force his orders. The Ebert-Scheidemann bloc 
 has a large majority in the National Assembly, 
 and the majority socialists have a larger number 
 of voters than any other German party, but this 
 alone is not sufficient to give them control. They
 
 German Control of Germans 21 
 
 must have a Noske and the Noske method of pre- 
 vailing upon the people to accept their decrees. 
 The splendid new democracy will do very well, 
 and Hauptmann Graf W. and his kind will see its 
 reasonableness and advantage — as long as it can 
 give, and enforce, its orders. 
 
 The way to control Germans and Germany, to 
 make decrees valid, to make promises and agree- 
 ments binding, to make treaties sacred, is by force. 
 At least, this is the way until the New Day really 
 comes in Germany. This the French know very 
 well and this is why France goes panicky to-day 
 when she sees, or thinks she sees, any signs of any 
 releasing of the grip that the world has on Ger- 
 many. The attainment of the present moment 
 has cost her such sacrifice, and so weakened her — 
 despite her great success — that any surrender 
 of control spells danger and horror to her. The 
 Great Menace is removed; it must never, never 
 return. That is the dictating note in all of the 
 international politics of France to-day. 
 
 But Germany is more broken than France seems 
 to realize. Perhaps I can even say, she is more 
 changed. Anyway for a strong nation to be 
 broken is to be changed. When our first food
 
 22 Germany in the War and After 
 
 mission to Poland reached the Swiss-Austrian fron- 
 tier in January, we looked for possible trouble 
 from the Austrian border officials with regard to 
 our passports and papers and the numerous bags 
 and boxes which contained our food and special 
 traveling conveniences. But no Austrian officials 
 appeared to look at our papers or examine our 
 baggage. When, made bolder by this, we de- 
 manded that somebody stamp our passports as 
 seen, so that any later inspection by the police in 
 Vienna or in passing out through the northern 
 Austrian frontier might not lead to trouble for 
 lack of these vises, we were told by representa- 
 tives of a Soldaten-Rath: "We are a republic 
 now; anybody can come and go; any goods can 
 come and go; you don't need any papers; we don't 
 want to look at anything." To be sure this was 
 Austria, not Germany; but it was in a land of Ger- 
 man ways. And it was a great change from other 
 days. 
 
 I cannot put into words the profound impres- 
 sion of brokenness that Vienna and the Viennese 
 make on one. Some reports have come to Amer- 
 ica that the Vienna Opera is still open, that the
 
 German Control of Germans 23 
 
 cafes are full in the afternoons. This is true. 
 People in prolonged times of distress go on with 
 many of their traditional habits if they can. All 
 through the German occupation of Brussels the 
 people, at any rate the little people, crowded the 
 cinemas and cafes. There was not much in the 
 cafes to eat or drink, the coffee was not coffee, 
 the cakes were coarse war bread. But the people 
 came and sat in their accustomed places, and 
 looked over the German-censored newspapers, en- 
 tirely disbelieving what they read, and exchanged 
 in whispers the latest underground news or ru- 
 mors. 
 
 So in Vienna the common people by force of 
 habit and for the lack of better to do, crowd the 
 cafes; and they go to their beloved opera on the 
 few nights that the city can spare coal and light- 
 ing for it. But, in fact, Vienna, " die lustige, 
 schone Stadt Wien," is the most depressed and 
 depressing great city of Europe that I have seen. 
 Its people show a fatal apathy, broken, with no 
 initiative to help themselves, waiting for some 
 one to come to their aid, and apparently hope- 
 less of that. It is really horrible. This, at least,
 
 24 Germany in the War and After 
 
 is my impression of Vienna as I saw it at various 
 times in January, February and March of this 
 year. 
 
 Brussels in the darkest days of her four years' 
 isolation and martyrdom was never like this. 
 Warsaw in November, 19 15, when I saw her soon 
 after the iron hand of von Beseler had closed on 
 her, nor in January of this year when I first saw 
 her again after she had been released and was 
 struggling all unaided to find herself, with her 
 country without food or clothing, without work 
 for her workmen, without stable government, 
 without recognition and trying to fight on three 
 fronts against Bolshevists, Ruthenians and Ger- 
 mans — Warsaw was not like this. 
 
 And, finally, a great difference is apparent in 
 Germany itself. Perhaps we cannot say that 
 Germany is broken as one can certainly say of 
 Austria, but if the French could see more of the 
 interior of Germany, see Berlin, Munich, Leip- 
 zig, Hamburg and Frankfort, see the kind and 
 quantity and quality of the food the Germans have 
 to live on, see the clothing and shoes they have to 
 wear, see the type of men at her head that she has 
 to depend on for guidance and control, see the
 
 German Control of Germans 25 
 
 extraordinary difference between the little almost 
 unrelated groups of voluntary soldiers under offi- 
 cer adventurers that she has chiefly to depend on 
 as army to quell her food and labor riots and pre- 
 serve her from Spartacist uprisings, as compared 
 with that terrible machine of precision and power 
 that swept through Belgium and into France in 
 19 14 and held these ravaged lands through all 
 those long years until the debacle came — if more 
 of the French could see more of all this, they 
 would be less panic-stricken in their fear of a 
 possible swift recuperation of imperial Germany 
 and an overpowering German army. 
 
 From my hotel window in Berlin in February 
 I used to watch almost each day the march past 
 down Wilhelmstrasse of the guard, at noon, on 
 its way to relieve the morning squad at the Chan- 
 cellor's palace. The band played well, but the 
 soldiers marched poorly. People of the street 
 walked along beside them and chatted with them; 
 urchins ran through the column; the leaders and 
 side guides were men from the ranks. Few offi- 
 cers' uniforms were seen on the streets; they were 
 not healthful clothes to wear. We saw a good 
 deal of a Major von S., attached to the Foreign
 
 26 Germany in the War and After 
 
 Office. He arranged most of our food confer- 
 ences with the government officials for us. When 
 we saw him in his own rooms he wore his uni- 
 form with the broad red Staff stripe down the 
 trousers; when we saw him in other offices or on 
 the street he was in mufti. The insolent Prus- 
 sian officer no longer lords it down Unter den 
 Linden; his uniform and saber are tabu; he, him- 
 self, in mufti, is unrecognizable, and glad, for 
 his health's sake, to be so. 
 
 All over Berlin are placards signed by Major 
 X. or Oberst Z. calling on men who wish to be 
 soldiers to enroll themselves with me, to join my 
 crowd. You will be lodged, fed and paid by the 
 Government and commanded by me. There is 
 something in It for all of us. 
 
 These are the freiwillige bands that largely 
 compose the German army of to-day; almost in- 
 dependent groups, loosely disciplined with the 
 German counterparts of the old Italian condot- 
 tiere to lead them; these are the "Regiment 
 Gerstenberg" " Regiment Reinhardt," " Regi- 
 ment Oefen," that one reads of in the newspapers 
 as appearing here and there where trouble rises 
 to machine-gun the illegal food-sellers, the " Wild-
 
 German Control of Germans 27 
 
 Haendler/' of the Moabit, or the Spartacist riot- 
 ers in Hamburg, Halle, or Leipzig. They do not 
 compose an overpowering German army, nor are 
 they likely to. To be sure one of these condot- 
 tiere may turn out to be a man of magnetism and 
 ambition; he might possibly gather round him 
 many of these groups and tie them together; he 
 might, possibly, become a military dictator. It 
 is a contingency to reckon with. But it is a re- 
 mote contingency. 
 
 There has been an impressive and dangerous - 
 break-down of governmental control in Germany 
 since the debacle of the imperial government and 
 army, a break-down to be expected, but to be reck- 
 oned with in all considerations of German possi- 
 bilities. Street crimes, petty robbery, hold-ups, 
 illegal food-selling, disregard of the old Verbotens 
 that so strictly and minutely controlled the per- 
 sonal life of the Germans, all of these go on 
 openly and winked at by military and police offi- 
 cials. 
 
 The break-down in food-control has upset all 
 governmental calculations and attempts to make 
 the food supply last out until the next harvest. 
 Many reports have come to America from our
 
 28 Germany in the War and After 
 
 soldiers and our visitors along the Rhine, of the 
 plentiful supply of food available in Germany. 
 They really mean to speak of the plentiful supply 
 available in the territory occupied by the Allies. 
 Food flows toward occupying armies. The very 
 abundance of food along the Rhine means a more 
 serious shortage elsewhere than would otherwise 
 exist. And that shortage exists all over the rest 
 of Germany. In the best hotels of Berlin, Mu- 
 nich and Leipzig I really suffered from the in- 
 sufficiency, the monotony and the poor quality of 
 the food. I came out of Germany after only a 
 few weeks' stay there hungry and upset in my 
 insides. One simply cannot live in health 'on 
 coarse fish and the products of a laboratory of 
 organic chemistry. That was the chief content 
 of the Berlin menu. 
 
 Without the importation of the foodstuffs now 
 being effected through the permission and by the 
 provision of the Allies, Germany could not possi- 
 bly keep its people alive until autumn. This food 
 is, of course, being paid for by the Germans; it 
 is not being given them. The shipping that brings 
 the food from overseas is German shipping. The 
 food relief of Germany and Austria is a commer-
 
 German Control of Germans 29 
 
 clal transaction, not a dole. The " relief " con- 
 sists in the permission to have food, and a certain 
 assistance in making it available. But it is a most 
 important, an imperatively necessary, relief. It 
 keeps the people from starvation and it aids the 
 Germans to control themselves. Without it there 
 would be anarchy; even with it, anarchy is an 
 ever-present possibility.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 WHAT THE BLOCKADE DID TO FOOD 
 
 Under Secretary of State von Braun once 
 made a notable little speech during the war in 
 which he presented to the Reichstag — and, inci- 
 dentally, to the German people and the world — 
 the irrefutable facts which proved that Germany 
 could not be starved into a break-down, that if 
 the Allies were counting on the blockade and the 
 food and raw materials shortage to win the war 
 they were doomed to bitter disappointment, and, 
 finally, that if the Allies did not make an early 
 peace with Germany something awful would soon 
 happen to them. 
 
 The second official interview that Dr. Taylor 
 and I, representing Mr. Hoover and the United 
 States Food Administration, had in Berlin In 
 February was with Under Secretary of State von 
 Braun. On this occasion he made us a notable 
 little speech In which he presented the Irrefutable 
 facts which proved that Germany's break-down 
 
 . . 30
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 31 
 
 was due practically entirely to her shortage in 
 food and raw materials, and that unless something 
 were done quickly to relieve the terrible situation 
 in which Germany now found herself she would 
 simply explode into revolution and Bolshevist 
 anarchy, and the Allies would have to face the 
 awful something that such a catastrophe in mid- 
 Europe would entail. 
 
 This illustrates one of the difficulties that faced 
 those who attempted to learn anything about Ger- 
 many's condition before the debacle by listening 
 to German declarations about It, and that faces 
 those to-day who would try to know something of 
 Germany's present condition by taking a German 
 official's word for it. Official lying seems to be 
 the great German national sport. Under Secre- 
 tary of State von Braun lied to the German peo- 
 ple and the world when he made his Reichstag 
 speech. But that has little importance for us 
 now. What does have importance Is, how much 
 are he and the others lying now when they pretend 
 to reveal in all candor the German situation that 
 must largely determine the attitude and action that 
 the Allies and America have to take toward Ger- 
 many now and for some time to come.
 
 32 Germany in the War and After 
 
 With regard to this I may say at once that I 
 think Under Secretary von Braun lied less to us 
 III Berhn in February than he lied to the German 
 people and the world during the war. We have 
 certain extrinsic proofs of this. 
 
 There is no doubt that the blockade did effec- 
 tive things to Germany, especially from the early 
 part of 19 1 7 on, that is, since America came into 
 the war. By our action toward the neutral states 
 contiguous to Germany we helped tighten up the 
 blockade to the real pinching point. 
 
 Some of these effective things have been re- 
 vealed since Armistice Day. They can be ex- 
 pressed In figures; to begin with, certain German 
 official figures. This, of course, puts the pre- 
 sumption strongly against them. But, strangely, 
 they are confirmed by certain German figures 
 which we have been able to get unofficially. In 
 addition, the American War Trade Board, the 
 American military and naval Intelligence services 
 and our diplomatic representatives in those neu- 
 tral countries nearest to Germany and most ac- 
 tively In commercial relations with her during the 
 war were able to obtain information which was 
 not only of Important use during the war but is
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 33 
 
 now very serviceable In checking up the figures 
 that the German Government is presenting to 
 make out its case of present need and its plea for 
 practical pity. With these figures In our hands, 
 Dr. Taylor and I were able to ask pertinent ques- 
 tions of the Berlin ofiicials and to correct these 
 officials whenever they seemed inclined to dash off 
 into the national official sport that I have referred 
 to by the ugly word. 
 
 Also certain testimony for the figures is appar- 
 ent to the eye in Germany to-day. These things 
 seen on the streets are less amenable to expres- 
 sion in figures but they have a real value in con- 
 nection with any statistical considerations. They 
 reveal something of the likelihood or unlikelihood 
 of that which the figures purport to prove. 
 
 For example, one sees fewer strongly convex 
 Germans now than in the old days. This is an ob- 
 vious fact that helps to give reality to the other- 
 wise bald and unillustrated statistical statements 
 concerning shortages in meat and fats and bread 
 and beer. Wooden collars and cuffs, paper shirts 
 and skirts and shoes with wooden soles and cloth 
 or paper uppers are not articles that one chooses 
 to wear when textiles and leather are plentiful.
 
 34 Germany in the War and After 
 
 But Germans wear them. Nor do the principal 
 hotels of Berlin, Munich and Leipzig use paper 
 tablecloths and napkins and laboratory-made 
 food by predilection or for economy's sake alone. 
 The other kinds are simply too scarce. 
 
 But after all we must have recourse to figures 
 to make the war-time situation really apparent. 
 Let us begin with meat and fats which the block- 
 ade, according to von Braun's Reichstag speech, 
 was not hitting very hard, and anyway, if it was, 
 was not doing much harm to because of the suffi- 
 ciency of home production. What is the story 
 to-day of the facts of yesterday? 
 
 The Germans are willing, nay, anxious, to ad- 
 mit that while before the war not less than 900,000 
 tons a year of meats and animal fats were im- 
 ported directly or produced by imported concen- 
 trated foodstuffs, the 19 17 importations of animal 
 fats were only 5,000 tons and the 19 18 (first ten 
 months) only 2,000 tons, while the importation 
 of concentrated feeding stuffs for the animals was 
 cut to one-one-hundredth of the pre-war figures. 
 And as a consequence of this effect of the blockade 
 and of other meat-limiting conditions the German 
 meat ration during the months just preceding the
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 35 
 
 Armistice was on the average only 135 grams 
 (4^ oz.) per head per week for the city popu- 
 lations, which is just about one-eighth of the aver- 
 age pre-war consumption. Also this meat was 
 much inferior to the pre-war meat, and the substi- 
 tute protein-supplying eggs and fish were not avail- 
 able to take its place. The meat-hungry people 
 raided the game preserves of the Kaiser, and even 
 captured and ate those familiar and famous Berlin 
 swans that used to paddle so pridefully and 
 Prussianly on the Spree and Havel. 
 
 While the pre-war average annual German con- 
 sumption of eggs amounted to 425,000 tons, of 
 which 40 per cent, were imported, the war-time 
 use of eggs was reduced to an amazing degree. 
 In 19 17 the imports of eggs amounted to but 
 40,000 tons (instead of the pre-war annual aver- 
 age of 170,000 tons) and in 19 18 (first ten 
 months) to but 17,250 tons. Also because many 
 hens were killed on account of the shortage of 
 meat, and there was little grain available to feed 
 the ones left alive, the native production of eggs 
 was much reduced. In Berlin for several months 
 before the Armistice there was but one egg a 
 month available per head of the population.
 
 36 Germany in the War and After 
 
 As to fish, the figures tell a similarly sad story. 
 While of the pre-war average annual fish consump- 
 tion of 577,000 tons, Importations were relied on 
 to the extent of about 361,000 tons, these imports 
 were cut in 19 17 to 161,000 tons and 19 18 (first 
 ten months) to 97,830 tons. Also the native fish 
 catch was greatly lessened. 
 
 Coupled with this shortage in meat, eggs and 
 fish was the shortage in butter. During the last 
 months before the Armistice the quantity of but- 
 ter available in Berlin per week was not more 
 than that which had been available per day before 
 the war. And there was but little vegetable oil 
 and fat to make up for the lack in animal fats. 
 There was practically a total stoppage of the im- 
 portations which before the war had provided over 
 82 per cent, of the 188,500 tons of vegetable oils 
 and fats annually used. Of the 1,600,000 tons 
 of oleaginous fruits and seeds annually imported 
 in pre-war time, but little more than one-one-hun- 
 dredth could be imported in 19 17. 
 
 Finally, in this group of protein-carrying and 
 fatty foods, milk demands a special paragraph. 
 Germany was in the unfortunate position of de- 
 pending for the production of nearly one-half its
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 37 
 
 milk on imported concentrated foodstuffs. As al- 
 ready stated, the blockade played havoc with these 
 importations. The annual average of 5,180,000 
 tons for the years 19 12 and 19 13 was reduced to 
 59,000 tons in 19 17 and to 41,000 tons for the 
 first ten months of 19 18. The absolute minimum 
 milk requirements for Germany are estimated at 
 one and three-fourths million liters; in the last 
 year of the war there were not more than one and 
 one-fourth million liters available. 
 
 All this frightful shortage in meats and animal 
 fats made Germany in war time, perforce, a land 
 of vegetarians. But rice, after the stocks existing 
 at the beginning of the war were used up, was 
 practically totally lacking. The importation of 
 dried legumes was cut from an annual pre-war 
 average of 310,800 tons to 1,708 tons in 19 17. 
 So on bread and potatoes fell the burden of keep- 
 ing the German people alive through the war. 
 And they had a thankless task of it. 
 
 In the first place there was not enough of them; 
 in the second place, sometimes the potatoes and 
 always the bread were of poor quality. The ne- 
 cessity of " stretching " the grain by milling it at 
 a high percentage — going from the usual 70 per
 
 38 Germany in the War and After 
 
 cent, first to 72 per cent., then 75 per cent., then 
 80 per cent., then 82 per cent., and in the last 
 year of the war to 94 per cent. ! — and by mix- 
 ing with this high extraction wheat and rye flour 
 other meals such as potato, bean, pea, barley, oat, 
 and turnip meal, together with finely ground bran, 
 resulted in a bread almost unedible for many. 
 Even starving people can balk at turnip bread. 
 It was indeed the terrible '' Kohl-Ruben Zeit " 
 (Epoch of Turnips) of late 1916 and early 1917 
 that did more to unsettle the German confidence 
 in such speeches as von Braun's than anything else. 
 It is from that time, when, in the face of a failure 
 in the potato crop of 19 16, it was necessary to 
 have recourse to the abundant supply of turnips 
 to replace lacking potatoes and when these turnips 
 were also used as substitutes for many other foods, 
 even to the extent of making turnip marmalade 
 and turnip coffee, that the increase in mortality 
 and morbidity among the German civil population 
 appears. Which introduces us to a new set of 
 figures, German official figures, it must be con- 
 fessed, which we are not in a position at present to 
 check up as effectively as we can the figures of 
 reduced importations. Indeed we must wish, for
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 39 
 
 humanity's sake, that they are, as they probably 
 really are, exaggerated. 
 
 In the first place, the malnutrition of the people 
 had as consequence a marked reduction in weight. 
 Statistics collected from all towns of over 5,000 
 population reveal an average loss per person of 
 20 per cent, in weight. Losses of even 50 per 
 cent, were not rare. The consequences of this 
 " emaciation, caused especially through shortage 
 of albuminous foods, were," according to an offi- 
 cial report, (i) " reduction of physical and men- 
 tal capacity of the individual; his will power and 
 mental balance were gravely affected; (2) the re- 
 appearance of suppressed or controlled diseases; 
 (3) rapid increase of other diseases; (4) irregu- 
 larities in female functions and a general tendency 
 towards infertility; (5) retarded recovery in all 
 cases of illness; (6) marked increase in mortality 
 and morbidity, especially among the aged and the 
 youth of school age." 
 
 This German official confession of a break- 
 down in the mental capacity, will power, and men- 
 tal balance — by which it is intended to say also 
 moral balance — of the people is probably made 
 as an excuse for many wrong things not explicitly
 
 40 Germany in the War and After 
 
 but Implicitly admitted to have been committed 
 during the war. It can hardly apply, however, to 
 the soldiers themselves, who up to the last mo- 
 ment were at least fairly well fed, and for the 
 most part of their service very well fed. It must, 
 therefore, be offered as an excuse for the tolerance 
 and often open approval of the people at home, 
 that is, the nation as a whole, of the brutalities and 
 crimes committed by the army In Belgium and 
 France, and of the unmoral methods of the Ger- 
 man rulers and statesmen. 
 
 But there were other peoples who, during the 
 war, were hving on a minimum life-sustaining ra- 
 tion, and who lost weight under it, and were ex- 
 posed to all the consequences of malnutrition. 
 With all the efforts of the Commission for Relief 
 in Belgium, most of the ten million people in Oc- 
 cupied Belgium and France — especially France 
 — were underfed through all the period of the 
 war. Their food shortage began within a few 
 months after the war began; Germany's food 
 shortage did not begin to be serious until a year 
 after theirs. Yet no one would have been less In- 
 clined to ascribe to the imprisoned and half- 
 starved Belgian people a serious falllng-off In
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 41 
 
 will power and mental capacity and moral balance, 
 in one word, morale, than Governors-General von 
 Bissing and von Falkenhausen and their staffs, 
 to whom control of the Belgian people was in- 
 trusted. The underfed Belgians maintained a 
 spirit through all their martyrdom, under all the 
 discouragement of continuous bad news — care- 
 fully provided whether the real news was bad or 
 good — and all the humiliation and privation of 
 soup-lines and all the possible hopelessness of re- 
 sistance that is beyond words fully to make known. 
 On the other hand the underfed Germans had all 
 the encouragement of the long period of German 
 military successes, and of the continuously ex- 
 ploited assurances of ultimate success and an en- 
 suing grand orgy of eating, drinking, and being 
 merry at the expense of the Allies. 
 
 Yet, after all, it is probably true that the under- 
 nutrition of the Germans is in some measure re- 
 sponsible for some of their lack of mental and 
 moral balance. Especially is It probable that the 
 food shortage In the spring and summer of 19 18, 
 coupled with their sudden and profound disillu- 
 sionment in the autumn, are responsible for much 
 of their present hideous surrender of personal con-
 
 42 Germany in the War and After 
 
 trol. For the disorderly German of to-day is an 
 amazing revelation to any one who knew the or- 
 derly German of yesterday. 
 
 As to the actual mortality in the civil population 
 during the war, and ascribed by the authorities to 
 the food shortage, it is declared that while the 
 year 19 14 showed no increase over 1913, there 
 was in 19 15 an increase of 9% per cent, over 
 1913, in 1916, 14 per cent., in 1917, 32 per cent., 
 and in 19 18, 37 per cent. The great increase be- 
 gan in December, 19 16, in the Kohl-Ruben Zeit. 
 These percentages indicate a total number of 
 deaths in 19 15-19 18 of nearly 800,000 more 
 civilians — the deaths of two million soldiers are 
 entirely excluded — than would have died if the 
 death rate of 19 13 had remained the annual aver- 
 age for the four war years. The increase was 
 greatest proportionately in the age group 5 to 
 15 years (55 per cent, over the 19 13 rate) and 
 next in the i to 5 years group (49H per cent, over 
 1 9 13). Tabulated by disease causes, the most 
 notable increase was from tuberculosis which, 
 from a rate of 16 per 10,000 deaths in 19 12 and 
 15 per 10,000 deaths In 19 13, jumped to 18 per
 
 What the Blockade Did to Food 43 
 
 10,000 in 1916, 25 in 1917, and 27% in 1918, 
 or in this last year of the war almost exactly dou- 
 ble that of 19 13. 
 
 In the preceding discussion of the food dif- 
 ficulties, no reference was made to the situation 
 as regards the stimulating drinks, coffee, beer and 
 wine, so abundantly used by tbe Germans in nor- 
 mal times, nor to tobacco which is the German's 
 sine qua nan. All these suffered a sea-change 
 early in the war, which became more and more 
 accented as the months passed. The coffee was 
 not coffee; the tobacco not tobacco; and the beer 
 became scarce and thin; German wines were still 
 available, at great price, but French wines, certain 
 kinds of which are much affected by the Germans 
 for their alleged excellent effects on digestion, 
 were altogether wanting after the stocks seized 
 and stolen in the first months of the war had been 
 used up. 
 
 Germany had annually imported about 181,000 
 tons of coffee before the war, or about three kilo- 
 grams per person. When no more coffee came 
 in, recourse was had to many kinds of substitutes. 
 Browned grains were first used and were the most 
 acceptable, but the grain shortage soon limited
 
 44 Germany in the War and After 
 
 their use. Other substitutes were made from 
 dried and browned figs, sugar beet chips, turnips, 
 " and other vegetable garbage," as a German 
 official suggestively put it. All these substitutes 
 lacked precisely that element, caffeine, that gives 
 coffee its stimulating effect, which was an effect 
 especially sought for by the underfed people. 
 
 The beer was gradually lessened in amount and 
 alcoholic strength. As the demand on all the 
 cereals fit for human consumption for use as food, 
 chiefly in the form of bread, was so imperative, 
 only very small quantities of them could be as- 
 signed to the brewers for beer-making. This 
 quantity got to be as low as 5 per cent, of the pre- 
 war quantity so used. 
 
 As for tobacco, all sorts of unsatisfactory sub- 
 stitutes were resorted to. Among them were hop 
 flowers, the foliage of various trees, pine needles, 
 and the leaves of a curiously large variety of other 
 plants. I remember trying a certain one of these 
 tobacco substitutes called Kriegs-Mischung with 
 most uncomfortable results. As a matter of fact, 
 not a little illness was caused by smoking certain 
 of these substitutes, especially beech-leaves.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 OTHER INSIDE DIFFICULTIES DURING THE WAR 
 
 If the blockade and general war situation made 
 the difficulties of food supply so serious that their 
 steady cumulation, as time passed, tended plainly 
 to inevitable disaster, no less can be said of the 
 difficulties in the supply of raw materials for cloth- 
 ing and footwear and for the necessary industries, 
 and the difficulties In coal supply and railway 
 transportation. It was all very well to tell the 
 world that paper shirts and skirts were quite as 
 comfortable as woolen and cotton ones, and that 
 wooden soles and near-leather uppers made shoes 
 good enough for anybody, that copper was easily 
 replaceable by mysterious new alloys abundantly 
 available, and that the German coal supply was 
 undiminished, and the railways functioning under 
 the all-efficient military control with unusual per- 
 fection, but It was quite another thing to face 
 actually living these lies Indefinitely. 
 
 " American bluff " never dared such dizzy 
 
 45
 
 46 Germany in the War and After 
 
 heights as the Germans easily rose to in the latter 
 years of the war. But bluff cannot too long sub- 
 stitute for reality, and this particular German 
 bluff was simply another disappointing Ersatz. 
 
 When I first arrived in Belgium, in June, 19 15, 
 and was soon after assigned to the relief work 
 in occupied France, I used to travel between 
 Brussels and my post at Great Headquarters in 
 Charleville on the German military trains of 
 which several a day regularly made the five hours' 
 journey. In the summer and autumn of 19 15 
 these trains left Brussels (or Charleville) always 
 promptly on the minute and arrived at destination 
 equally promptly on the minute. They were 
 composed of first-class corridor cars in excellent 
 condition, clean, well-lighted and, when winter 
 came, well-heated. There was a dining car and 
 buffet car for the single meal or mid-meals drink- 
 ing that the German officers enjoyed on the jour- 
 ney. Everything was efficient and comfortable. 
 
 But this did not last. As the months passed, 
 the trains lessened in number, the coaches became 
 jumpy as to wheels and ragged as to upholstering, 
 the lights faded to sputtering and then into gloomy 
 darkness, the dining car and the food and drink
 
 Other Inside Difficulties 47 
 
 disappeared, and instead of starting and arriving 
 on schedule time there was delay in getting away, 
 interruptions along the journey, and utter uncer- 
 tainty as to time of arrival except that it would 
 be hours after the scheduled moment. Yet these 
 were military trains with preferential treatment 
 as to equipment and personnel. What must have 
 been the joys or comforts or reliability of civilian 
 trains inside Germany? 
 
 But more convincing than personal impressions 
 are the statistics now available. During the 
 month of January, 19 14, the railways of Prussia 
 handled promptly and efficiently 219,000 loaded 
 freight cars a day; in January, 19 18, they han- 
 dled neither promptly nor efficiently 146,700 
 freight cars, and in January of this year (1919) 
 only 105,200, or slightly less than 50 per cent, 
 of the pre-war number. As to passenger cars, no 
 figures are available, but they would show far 
 greater differences. To keep a nation alive and 
 of the character of a going concern, it is much 
 more important to move freight than passengers. 
 In January, 19 19, at which time the situation can- 
 not have been much worse than in the last months 
 before the Armistice, the passenger express trains
 
 48 Germany in the War and After 
 
 of Germany were but three per cent, of the pre- 
 war normal; the total passenger trains but 35 
 per cent, of the normal, and the total freight trains 
 but 42 per cent, of the normal. 
 
 The chief reason for the break-down in trans- 
 portation was the scarcity of copper, tin, nickel, 
 asbestos, cotton and rubber. The German loco- 
 motive has a copper fire-box. When copper was 
 no longer available for this purpose, iron fire-boxes 
 were put in when replacement was necessary. 
 These could not stand the heat and went to pieces 
 quickly. The lack of tin added to the lack of 
 copper left available only lead, zinc, and aluminum 
 with which to make friction metals. The best 
 combinations which the Germans were able to per- 
 fect would stand neither the friction itself nor the 
 generated heat well, nor did they lubricate prop- 
 erly. In addition, the only available lubricating 
 oils themselves were of poor quality. The result 
 was that bearings had to be often replaced in the 
 journals and hot boxes were of daily occurrence 
 on almost every moving train. The absence of 
 cotton, asbestos, rubber and copper made itself 
 keenly felt when it came to trying to make con- 
 nections water- and steam-tight. None of the
 
 Other Inside Difficulties 49 
 
 substitutes for brass and asbestos stood up, and 
 engines had to be frequently sent In for repair 
 simply for leaks alone. The number of engines 
 in the shops for these repairs In pre-war times 
 was never beyond 13 per cent, of those being used; 
 by the end of 1 9 1 7 It had reached 33 per cent., and 
 In January, 19 19, it was 43 per cent. 
 
 Altogether, the deterioration of rolling stock 
 and the difficulties of repair because of deficiency 
 In materials and man-power must have been a tre- 
 mendous handicap on the German effort to main- 
 tain even their minimum necessity of transporta- 
 tion in the latter period of the war. 
 
 The coal shortage further added to the general 
 transportation difficulties. In addition it mili- 
 tated against the effectiveness of all war-time in- 
 dustry except actual government-controlled war 
 industries themselves, for It was to these industries 
 and to strictly military transportation that the 
 available coal was first allocated. The lack of 
 coal for other than the war industries had, too, 
 a depressing and even seriously injurious effect 
 on the people as a whole in their unheated 
 homes, shops, offices, and public gathering places. 
 The cold was especially felt in connection with the
 
 50 Germany in the War and After 
 
 lowered food ration and insufficient supply of 
 warm clothing. 
 
 These discomforts of the people for lack of 
 sufficient coal were real, but an examination of the 
 available statistics of coal production in Germany 
 during the four years of war reveals the interest- 
 ing fact that there was practically no falling off in 
 the number of tons of coal annually mined. For 
 example, while the production in 19 13 was 
 278,000,000 tons, the imports 18,000,000 tons, 
 and the exports 44,000,000 tons, the correspond- 
 ing figures for 19 18 are, 275,000,000, 100,600, 
 and 16,000,000. This last item of 16,000,000 
 tons exported in 19 18 despite the urgent home 
 need requires explanation. But there is a simple 
 and sufficient one. Germany had to take that 
 much coal out of the amount it could possibly have 
 devoted to keeping its people more comfortable, in 
 order to send it to contiguous neutrals in exchange 
 for certain absolutely necessary supplies of neu- 
 tral origin, an exchange which the Allied blockade 
 could not wholly prevent. 
 
 Immediately after Armistice Day, however, 
 when governmental internal control fell down and 
 strikes were the order of the day, the coal pro-
 
 Other Inside Difficulties 51 
 
 duction went off rapidly. In January and Febru- 
 ary of this year the output of the great Ruhr dis- 
 trict had fallen from the normal of 300,000 to 
 310,000 tons a day to quantities fluctuating be- 
 tween 150,000 to 260,000 tons a day. And the 
 Silesian normal output of from 120,000 to 130,- 
 000 tons a day had fallen to from 32,000 to 60,000 
 tons a day. The official estimates for the whole 
 of Germany put the production of bituminous coal 
 in January and February, 19 19, at from 50 per 
 cent, to 60 per cent, of normal. And since that 
 time the output percentage has fallen still lower. 
 It is interesting to note, as showing the close 
 commercial and economic inter-relation among the 
 adjacent countries of Europe that the people in 
 Switzerland, Holland and Denmark were but lit- 
 tle less cold and uncomfortable in the war winters, 
 because of the coal situation in Germany, than the 
 Germans themselves. For while Germany was 
 able, or, better, really had to keep up a certain 
 export of coal to these countries this export was 
 much less than normal. The 16,000,000 tons 
 sent out in 19 18, and the 19,000,000 tons sent 
 out in 19 1 7 were much less than the pre-war nor- 
 mal as indicated by the figure of 44,000,000 tons
 
 ^2 Germany in the War and After 
 
 in 1 9 13. Not all of the pre-war export went to 
 those countries which in the war were known as 
 the contiguous neutrals, but a large part did. 
 Switzerland and Holland and Denmark, gave up 
 hot water baths and heated theaters and warm 
 houses to about the same degree as Germany did. 
 There is a pertinent significance in this fact to be 
 taken into account in connection with all attempts 
 to picture European conditions as they will be 
 effected by a broken or continually restless and 
 upheaving Germany. 
 
 The blockade and the large withdrawal of man- 
 power from those native sources of raw materials 
 which were not actually necessary for munitions 
 and other strictly war supplies, combined to effect 
 to an impressive degree a curtailment of the raw 
 materials needed for German industry and of the 
 substances commonly used by the people as every- 
 day necessities. 
 
 The blockade almost entirely cut off the needed 
 importations of cotton, wool, jute, rubber, silk, 
 and the metals already referred to. This was 
 especially true for the period 1917-1918; the 
 blockade was not so effective before that time. It 
 is reliably estimated that Germany managed to
 
 Other Inside Difficulties 53 
 
 get in, in the three years 19 16-19 18, not more 
 than 2 per cent, of her normal importations of 
 cotton. What an aching want of cotton this re- 
 veals. 
 
 Even as early as the fall of 19 15 the cotton 
 substitutes were making their appearance. My 
 Headquarters escort officer and I stopped one day 
 in that autumn at Montmedy, at that time the 
 headquarters of the Crown Prince's army. In a 
 hospital there I was shown a fluffy white substance 
 which was being used as bandage and sponge ma- 
 terial instead of cotton. It was made from the 
 bark of pine trees. It was soft and absorbent 
 and not a bad substitute for cotton in the particu- 
 lar use to which it was being put. But it was not 
 something that, as my officer proudly put it, " had 
 solved the cotton problem." It was only making 
 it very clear that there was already, after one year 
 of war, a serious cotton problem in Germany. 
 
 Germany obtained all through the war a certain 
 amount of iron ore from Sweden. And her early 
 seizure of the French Lorraine iron basin gave her 
 an important source of steel supply. But little of 
 this steel was available for any but strictly war 
 purposes. In peace time the steel outturn of the
 
 54 Germany in the War and After 
 
 great Krupp factories for civil purposes is about 
 90 per cent.; during the war 90 per cent, of its 
 outturn went for strictly war materials. 
 
 Scarcity of such a simple homely article as soap 
 can work great discomfort and hardship; indeed 
 it can be a serious menace to good health and to 
 personal morale. In time of peace about 400,000 
 tons of the fats and oils available in Germany 
 were used annually for technical purposes, above 
 all for the manufacture of soap. Because of the 
 blockade not only the greater part of the fat im- 
 ports ceased, but it became necessary to use for 
 human alimentation all kinds of domestic fats, in 
 so far as they could be adapted by processes of 
 refining, for that purpose. In November, 19 15, 
 it was forbidden to use for technical purposes any 
 fats suitable for human consumption. 
 
 By the spring of 19 16 the fats available for 
 soap making were so scarce as to make controlled 
 restriction and the use of soap substitutes neces- 
 sary. While in pre-war times about ten kilograms 
 of laundry and toilet soap had been used annually 
 per person, a ration of only 250 grams a month 
 of wash-powder, containing only 4 per cent, of 
 fat, could be allowed for laundry use, and of one
 
 Other Inside Difficulties 55 
 
 cake of toilet soap of 50 grams consisting to the 
 extent of about three-quarters of clay. In Janu- 
 ary, 19 1 8, the wash-powder ration was reduced to 
 125 grams a month. " Many attempts to replace 
 soap by fatless washing substances were made, but 
 these preparations proved quite unsuitable for 
 bodily use, and of a limited utility only for laun- 
 dry purposes." The quotation is German official. 
 
 This last quoted sentence invites a few further 
 remarks on the subject of Ersdtze (substitutes), 
 a word which all through the war was a word of 
 boasting and now has become a special word of 
 confession and whining. The truth is that the 
 substitutes didn't substitute. The vaunted Ger- 
 man science and ingenuity simply could not make 
 the needed bricks without straw. Speaking of 
 the shortage of leather and textiles for clothing, 
 the German authorities admit to-day that, despite 
 all attempts, " we have not succeeded up to the 
 present day (January, 1919) in supplying the civil 
 population with a single really useful substitute 
 [for leather or textiles]. The paper textures 
 that appeared on the market were, without count- 
 ing their high prices, a disappointment." 
 
 And the testimony, both official and unofficial
 
 56 Germany in the War and After 
 
 expert, is the same with regard to substitutes for 
 the usual foods and metals, as well as for leather 
 and the textiles. Some of these were useless when 
 made; others more usable cost so much in time, 
 materials, and labor as to be unpracticable. The 
 leading scientific men of Germany with whom we 
 talked admitted this; the people in the street ad- 
 mitted it with less hesitation and in terms of no 
 dubiety. The number of these substitutes ran 
 into the thousands ; they turn out to have been prac- 
 tically that many disappointments.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 ' HOW THE PEOPLE WERE DECEIVED 
 
 These revelations of the actual internal difficul- 
 ties of Germany during the war help explain why 
 imperial Germany broke. That the actual col- 
 lapse was immediately the result of the decisive 
 military victories of the Allies in the late summer 
 and autumn of 191 8, should not prevent us from 
 recognizing that the break-down behind the lines, 
 the internal collapse which would itself have ended 
 the war even in the face of a purely military stale- 
 mate, was certain to come in the spring of 19 19. 
 Despite Under Secretary of State von Braun's 
 declaration to us in February that the collapse of 
 Germany was caused solely, or chiefly, by the " il- 
 legal, inhuman, monstrous blockade " — how mon- 
 strous, incredible, illegal and inhuman things are 
 when the other fellow is doing them ! — he knows 
 that this is not true. Germany could have stag- 
 gered on until her 19 18 harvest was used up, and, 
 with her armies holding in the west, she would 
 
 57
 
 58 Germany in the War and After 
 
 have done It; although in fact It would have been 
 only a hopeless staggering, and her few Informed 
 people knew It. But the end really came by a 
 white flag from the General Staff, not the general 
 public. The people were still holding out, amaz- 
 ing. In the light of what we now know, as It is. 
 
 Indeed it is no less than a wonder that Germany 
 was able to go on for as long as she did. And 
 Germany herself now wonders how she was able 
 to do it. The explanation Is chiefly one of psy- 
 chology, of the official and the self-deception of 
 nearly a whole people, and of an almost super- 
 human endurance of an almost Impossible situ- 
 ation on the basis of the promise, and a blind faith 
 in this promise, of an early cessation of the situ- 
 ation and a complete compensation for the suffer- 
 ings endured. A few Germans saw some time 
 before the break, the reality of things and the 
 certain disaster that Impended from this reality. 
 The principal organic chemist, the principal statis- 
 tician and the principal agricultural expert of Ger- 
 many told Dr. Taylor and me that they knew, a 
 year before the end, that Germany was doomed. 
 But these wise Germans were few and they had to 
 keep silent. The two or three who did try to
 
 How the People Were Deceived 59 
 
 speak up either got quickly out of the country, or 
 into prison. If there was freedom of anything in 
 Germany during the war, it was not freedom of 
 speech. 
 
 One of the most revealing books concerning the 
 internal situation in Germany during the war time 
 is Kurt Muehsam's " W'le W'lr Belogen Wurden," 
 a fully documented account of " the official decep- 
 tion of the German people " by means of the press 
 control. The book was published in Munich as 
 soon after the Armistice as it could be put through 
 the press. It is a book of damning revelation of 
 German official lying, German official stupidity and 
 German official culpable ignorance of facts, and, 
 more important, of the significance of facts known. 
 It helps reveal the singularly artificial character 
 of the control of the German nation by the rulers 
 of Germany, a control to which, nevertheless, the 
 mass of the people from ignorant peasants to most 
 erudite of professors submitted tamely for amaz- 
 ingly long. 
 
 Muehsam lays bare by actual citation and quo- 
 tation the whole censor system, absurd In Its at- 
 tempt to controvert all truth, criminal in its suc- 
 cess of hiding sufficient truth to wreck the nation.
 
 6o Germany in the War and After 
 
 It was a system that went far beyond saying what 
 truth might not be printed, for it included saying 
 what untruth should be told. 
 
 For example, to show its attitude towards a sin- 
 gle critically important matter, on May 17, 19 18, 
 the official news agency gave out for publication 
 in all the newspapers a statement that " the num- 
 ber of American fighting troops in France is, ac- 
 cording to reliable official information, to be esti- 
 mated at about ten divisions — only four of these 
 are at the front. The total of all those back of 
 the lines as well as in them is at the most from 
 150,000 to 200,000 men. Press notices concern- 
 ing these facts should state, therefore, that Amer- 
 ica has not been able to meet its expectations in the 
 way of sending troops, and the earlier estimates 
 of the German General Staff as to what America 
 could do have proved to be true. However, 
 in order not to let the enemy know how well 
 informed we are, the actual figures given 
 above should under no circumstances be men- 
 tioned! " 
 
 Now as a matter of fact there were at the time 
 this was given out to the German press nearly one 
 million American troops in France. Was the
 
 How the People Were Deceived 6i 
 
 General Staff just lying or was It just ignorant of 
 the facts? The latter supposition Is almost incon- 
 ceivable. In any event the giving out of this 
 false information to the German people was both 
 stupid and criminal. 
 
 In a remarkable " Censor Book " Issued in 
 March, 19 17, general instructions including ex- 
 plicit prohibitions and recommendations were 
 given concerning the press treatment of a long 
 series of subjects arranged alphabetically and run- 
 ning all the way from " Aalandfrage " to " Zen- 
 surmassnahmen." These presumably permanent 
 instructions were added to a thousandfold by the 
 special instructions Issued constantly by a so- 
 called " Press Conferenz," which, beginning in 
 19 14 with weekly sittings, soon became an almost 
 continuously sitting Institution, and In addition by 
 other confidential detailed Instructions with re- 
 gard to particular matters of the minute which 
 were constantly issued by no less than a score of 
 separate official bureaus and war offices. 
 
 The Censor Book, under the head " Lebens- 
 m'tttel," forbade the publication of any declara- 
 tions or suppositions that " our economic hold- 
 ing out may not be possible." It also forbade the
 
 62 Germany in the War and After 
 
 comic papers from making the food shortage the 
 subject of jests. 
 
 Under " Zensurmassnahmen " it was forbidden 
 to print any news concerning any measures taken 
 to enforce the censorship ! In a word, in the face 
 of, and by means of what was notoriously the 
 most radical and criminal censorship ever insti- 
 tuted it was attempted to cover up the fact of any 
 censorship at all. 
 
 On September 22, 19 14, just after the first bat- 
 tle of the Marne, the '' Press Conferenz " gave 
 out to the newspapers and the people of Germany 
 the following announcement: 
 
 " The general military situation in the West is 
 good. No retreat or backward push has taken 
 place as a result of any tactical advantage of the 
 enemy. Our movements were entirely of stra- 
 tegic nature for the preparation of new successes 
 and were not forced by the enemy." 
 
 On the next day this general thesis was repeated 
 with certain interesting additions — amazingly 
 absurd additions, as a matter of fact — one of 
 them being a prohibition to the press to say any- 
 thing about the backward movement of the Ger- 
 man troops " in order that the enemy may be left
 
 How the People Were Deceived 63 
 
 in his present embarrassing great uncertainty " 
 about these movements ! 
 
 When the Luxburg '^ Fersenkt ohne Spur" af- 
 fair was a few days old, the worried Berhn For- 
 eign Office issued a rather petulant special instruc- 
 tion to the press to the effect that although the 
 Entente was continuing to publish new telegrams 
 the Foreign Office wished all references to the 
 Luxburg affair to " disappear from the German 
 press once and for all." On March 16, 19 17, 
 the press was giv^en the statement that the in- 
 juries to the German ships in American harbors 
 had been successfully accomplished. " For exam- 
 ple, the giant steamer Vaterland had been made 
 completely unusable for America." On July 27, 
 19 17, the press was notified that it should refer 
 to Russia as still a brave antagonist. " The suc- 
 cesses of our troops are much depreciated if our 
 press continues to speak of the Russian Army as 
 without strength or power of resistance " ; which 
 was exactly its condition at this time. 
 
 On August 29, 191 8, a long instruction to the 
 press was issued announcing the retirement from 
 the Marne for ten to twelve kilometers of Boehn's 
 Army, but forbidding any immediate publication
 
 64 Germany in the War and After 
 
 of the fact. The news was told the press so that 
 preparation could be made " if the Entente should 
 announce this retreat as a great success, as was 
 probable," to meet " the urgent necessity through 
 the press of creating a proper understanding and 
 of quieting the public." It was further stated 
 to the press that the Marne operations had re- 
 sulted in a failure both on the German and En- 
 tente sides to carry out the planned movements 
 but " in any discussion of the situation the failure 
 on the German side is not to be mentioned while 
 that of the Entente is to be strongly brought out 
 and emphasized." 
 
 But we cannot dig farther into this mine of 
 decaying " blood and iron." The odor is too re- 
 pellent. This is not simply censorship; it is pre- 
 meditated official deception of a whole people. 
 The German authorities cannot have understood 
 the great risk in it. They seemed to have be- 
 lieved that if they could carry on for the day, the 
 morrow could be met when it came. 
 
 We know censorship, and do not like it; and 
 so do the English and the French people know it 
 and dislike it. One country may make use of it 
 more than another. But there is more than a
 
 How the People Were Deceived 65 
 
 quantitative difference between the censorships we 
 know and this German one; there is a qualitative 
 difference. One country may not allow its news- 
 papers to print the enemy communiques. The 
 German newspapers had to print them with ad- 
 ditions or subtractions that made them tell, as of 
 enemy origin, the lies that the German authorities 
 wished to tell their people. The official deception 
 of the German people by the German rulers 
 through all the long war agony was not the least 
 of the crimes of imperial Germany, nor was it the 
 least of the means whereby the German nation 
 was led to ruin.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 WHAT THE GERMANS THOUGHT DURING THE 
 WAR AND ARMISTICE 
 
 The press Is reputed to be the voice of the 
 people, and many of us read the German news- 
 papers assiduously through the war and armistice 
 period in the hope of learning just what the Ger- 
 man people were thinking and saying. But 
 Muehsam has shown us that during the war pe- 
 riod, at least, it was their masters' voice, not their 
 own, that came from the printing presses. It was 
 in truth a gramaphone we were hearing reading 
 out from the prepared records the dictations of 
 General Staff, Foreign Office, Press Conferenz, 
 and all the rest. So despite an occasional revela- 
 tion in Die Zukunft, Berliner Tageblatt, Leipziger 
 Volkstimme, Miinchner Post, and similar socialist 
 or liberal journals, which preferred to accept an 
 occasional suppression rather than be completely 
 tongue-tied as regards truth-speaking, we learned 
 little from the German press of what the German 
 
 66
 
 What the Germans Thought 67 
 
 people were thinking or were saying among them- 
 selves In whispers. 
 
 But there were a few Americans In such situ- 
 ations as enabled them to hear the actual voices 
 of some of the German people. Mr. Gerard In 
 Berlin and Mr. Whitlock In occupied Brussels 
 heard something of what the government officials 
 had to say In moments when they were not too 
 consciously speaking to the public, and I had 
 some unusual opportunities at Great Headquar- 
 ters In 19 1 5 and 19 16 to hear an occasional 
 straight word from the staff officers with whom I 
 necessarily came Into contact. Also I heard oc- 
 casionally some even stralghter words from the 
 orderlies of these officers and from petty officers 
 and soldiers at the Headquarters. One thing was 
 noticeable; the speech of the orderlies and soldiers 
 while In the earlier months of the war as vain- 
 glorious as that of the officers, grew to be differ- 
 ent, even very different. 
 
 Their letters from home made impressions on 
 them that their simple minds could not but reflect. 
 And these impressions did not make for happiness 
 or boasting. They learned that things were go- 
 ing badly at home ; that their wives and children
 
 68 Germany in the War and After 
 
 were suffering even though no foreign foe was 
 burning their houses, looting their shops, pos- 
 sessing their fields or outraging their women. 
 And these orderlies and soldiers, many of them 
 at least, were not too long in understanding that 
 while the army was winning victories, Germany 
 was not winning the war, certainly not, at least, 
 with the rapidity that had been assured them. 
 
 I remember one old Landsturmer who, in his 
 capacity of guard at a little bridge, stopped my 
 motor to examine my pass. He had just heard 
 of the break in diplomatic relations between Ger- 
 many and America, and misunderstood it to be 
 the American declaration of war. 
 
 " So," he grunted, " you are going to fight us. 
 Well, I'm glad. You will win, and that will end 
 it. We want it to end." 
 
 During 19 1 5 every one at Headquarters — ex- 
 cept the unfortunate French villagers of the town 
 and the neutral Americans of the Relief Commis- 
 sion — was radiant and boastful. It was taking 
 a little more time and exertion to make the win- 
 ning than had been counted on, but victory was 
 certain; it was almost in sight. And this feeling 
 lasted until the first of July, 19 16. The officers
 
 What the Germans Thought 69 
 
 I had to be with were almost unendurable in their 
 high spirits, their strutting and boasting, their 
 insolent references to America's hold-off policy — 
 easily explained by our cowardice and selfishness. 
 But one day in the first week of July, 19 16, on a 
 trip of inspection of the relief work, on which an- 
 other American of the Relief Commission and 
 myself were escorted by three German officers of 
 the Headquarters Staff, we pushed as far west as 
 Coucy le Chateau where we opened our luncheon 
 baskets at the foot of the noble tower of the old 
 chateau ruins. They were not the utter ruins, 
 it may be remarked in parentheses, that they are 
 now. 
 
 As we munched our war-bread and Leherwurst 
 we heard the constant rumble of a heavy cannon- 
 ading along the front to our west. It even inter- 
 rupted our conversation. That is, the officers oc- 
 casionally and rather nervously checked them- 
 selves in mid-sentence to glance at each other and 
 mutter, "Heavy, unusually heavy; the damned 
 English are getting more wasteful." Talk about 
 the history of the chateau and the German vic- 
 tories in the east faded away. They were too 
 much interested in the significant rumble.
 
 70 Germany in the War and After 
 
 So after luncheon we climbed the long spiral 
 stair in the tower wall to the summit to see what 
 we could of what was going on. We had a most 
 extended panorama of the West Front all the way 
 from Noyon to Soissons. All along this line there 
 was the smoke of bursting heavy shells; it was 
 really a bombardment on a grand scale; an enor- 
 mous quantity of shell was being hurled into the 
 German lines by hundreds of heavy cannon. If 
 it were not the prelude of an extensive serious of- 
 fensive, It was at any rate a proof that the Allies 
 had finally succeeded in so developing their mu- 
 nitions output that they could play with equal ex- 
 travagance the German game of artillery prepara- 
 tion and offensive. 
 
 Our officers did not like the looks of it. They 
 became gloomy, grouchy. We made the long 
 journey back to Headquarters mostly in silence. 
 And that evening at dinner and after when the 
 news of what was really going on at the front had 
 come in by radio and telegraph and telephone, 
 for there was much of it, they began whining. 
 " How can we expect to win with America fur- 
 nishing the Allies enormous quantities of muni- 
 tions? What can we do with all the world against
 
 What the Germans Thought Jl 
 
 us? Why is this universal hate of Germany? " 
 It was an amazing change from the boasting of 
 the day and days before. And it all came from 
 the first day's artillery preparation for the first 
 Somme offensive — from that and from the yel- 
 low streak that the buttoned-up field-gray blouses 
 had up to now concealed from view. 
 
 After July, 191 6, the tide of war ebbed and 
 flowed, and as it changed the German officers 
 boasted or whined. When the fateful day in 
 1 9 17 came on which America broke off diplo- 
 matic relations with Germany, the German Gen- 
 eral Staff had a shock. It was very angry; angry 
 with America and angry with " the stupid pigs " 
 of statesmen and diplomats in Berlin who had al- 
 lowed matters to come to such a pass. But they 
 had certain hopes. Baron von der Lancken, po- 
 litical head of von Bissing's government of Bel- 
 gium, said to me on the afternoon of my last day 
 in Brussels — it was in the middle of March three 
 weeks before we were at war with Germany: 
 "This is a sad state of affairs; we should never 
 have allowed it to come about. Of course, it 
 means war. But I cannot believe that there will 
 ever be such feeling or such war between America
 
 72 Germany in the War and After 
 
 and Germany as exists between England and Ger- 
 many. We may, indeed, may we not, hope for a 
 more platonic war? " 
 
 There is no doubt that the Germans believed 
 we should never really enter the war against them. 
 We had waited so long; they had already done 
 so many things to us that Germany would never 
 have tolerated having us do to them that 
 they had put us down as too cowardly and selfish 
 to spend lives and money in war against them. 
 We were safe over there across the ocean. And 
 we were making money in provisioning the Allies 
 with food and material. The German General 
 Staff and Berlin were sure we would never come 
 in, and the German people were sure of it because 
 they were told so over and over again by the men 
 who knew. 
 
 And then after we were in they were told over 
 and over again that we would not count. The in- 
 structions to the German press about our troop 
 landings, quoted in the last chapter, are examples 
 of this. At first the General Staff really believed 
 that we would not count seriously; they relied on 
 our unpreparedness, our lack of a trained army, 
 and the enormous difficulty, even with free use of
 
 What the Germans Thought 73 
 
 the ocean, of carrying overseas a sufficiently large 
 force with continuing necessities in the way of 
 food and munitions in great quantity; and then 
 there was the increased difficulty of doing this in 
 face of submarine attack to count on; and finally 
 they were sure that even if we were able to get 
 over at all we could not do It in time to save the 
 situation. 
 
 But first the General Staff, and then, gradually 
 and despite all attempts to prevent it, the people, 
 learned the disturbing news of the American 
 coming to France. From the German soldiers on 
 the West Front who began to meet American sol- 
 diers all up and down the line and to learn by 
 sad experience their eagerness and unmistakable 
 capacity for fighting, the news got back to the 
 people. And the realization of what this Ameri- 
 can coming really meant, and the bitterness at the 
 deception that had covered it up were not con- 
 ducive to strengthening the hold on the people, 
 in these increasingly difficult days, of the German 
 court and military rulers. 
 
 As I have said, we were told in Berlin In Febru- 
 ary of this year by three of the best known scien- 
 tific men of Germany that they knew long before
 
 74 Germany in the War and After 
 
 the break-down came that it was Inevitable. 
 When we asked these men why they had not cried 
 this aloud to the people, so as to save further 
 bloodshed and national exhaustion, they said sim- 
 ply: "We should not have been heard. At first 
 the people would not have believed us, and before 
 we could make them believe we should have dis- 
 appeared, either In prison or as refugees forced 
 to escape from the country. Remember NIcolal 
 and Forster and Muehlon." 
 
 It Is true that Germany was no place In 19 17 
 and 19 1 8 for truth-telling. Muehlon, the ex-dl- 
 rector of Krupp's, had fled to Switzerland for 
 speaking out some unpalatable truths. We saw 
 him In Berne a few weeks after the Armistice. 
 He was Interesting himself In the possibility of 
 obtaining food relief for Germany, and had a 
 moving tale to tell of the serious situation. He 
 saw the food control disappearing and at the same 
 time the food stocks also going. Spring would 
 bring the people face to face with starvation. But 
 even as he revealed the desperate brokenness of 
 Germany, and asked for help, he flashed out now 
 and then with characteristic German insolence, a 
 boast or a challenge.
 
 What the Germans Thought 75 
 
 " You must be careful," he declared; " you 
 must not treat Germany too hard; you cannot 
 push us too far. The world must reckon with 
 Germany's intrinsic greatness; it must not over- 
 look the importance of her Kultur, her science 
 and her art; the world will always need Ger- 
 many." 
 
 And then with equally characteristic naivete and 
 utter lack of comprehension of the realities ex- 
 ternal to himself and Germany he asked — and 
 this only a month after the bloody fighting in the 
 Argonne — if we did not think it an auspicious 
 time to institute a propaganda among the chil- 
 dren of America to collect funds for the feeding 
 of the children of Germany, as we of the C.R.B. 
 had done so successfully in earlier days for Bel- 
 gium ! 
 
 That is one of the difficult things in understand- 
 ing the thoughts and talk of the people and of the 
 rulers of Germany since the end of the fighting 
 period. They themselves do not understand the 
 thoughts of other peoples about Germany and 
 German ways. And hence German thinking and 
 expression since Armistice Day are based on ac- 
 cepted premises concerning their own position and
 
 76 Germany in the War and After 
 
 concerning our position that we cannot understand 
 as acceptable. 
 
 We believe that Germany was beaten in a mili- 
 tary way and that her military leaders so fully 
 recognized this as to lead them to know that the 
 only means of saving their armies from complete 
 slaughter or complete surrender as prisoners was 
 to ask for an armistice; which was, in effect, an ac- 
 knowledgment of defeatbut an escape from the full 
 consequences of defeat. But the German people 
 as a whole do not by any means share this belief. 
 
 Returning from Berlin to Paris in February I 
 found myself alone in a compartment on the train 
 from Cologne to Spa with a German locomotive 
 engineer on his way to help advise the German 
 armistice commission about the delivery of rail- 
 way engines and cars to the Allies. He was an 
 unusually Intelligent man, or seemed so, and was 
 very frank in his talk. 
 
 We were discussing the German revolution. 
 He agreed that It was a good thing for Germany; 
 it had to come; the old regime had to go; the time 
 had certainly come for It to go. 
 
 " But," he added, " what a pity they didn't put 
 off the revolution a little longer."
 
 What the Germans Thought 77 
 
 "Why?" I asked. 
 
 " Why, because we should have won the war 
 soon, and then we should have been in so much 
 better shape. You know, we were not beaten in 
 a mihtary way. It was just our break-down be- 
 hind the lines." 
 
 And he then, unintentionally, gave some proof 
 of the conditions " behind the lines," when he 
 paid ten marks to a passing Scots soldier for a 
 cake of Sunlight soap. The occupying troops 
 along the Rhine can pay many bills with a few 
 bars of soap. That is one thing the blockade did. 
 
 But the idea that Germany was not beaten by 
 arms is not limited to the man in the street. In 
 a speech before the National Assembly at Wei- 
 mar, a Minister of the Majority Socialist govern- 
 ment was interrupted by clamorous approval when 
 he declared : " We were not beaten ; we gave up." 
 
 For the sake of stopping further bloodshed in 
 Europe, and to end the privation and suffering of 
 the civil population of Germany, the unbeaten 
 army of Germany " gave up " ! 
 
 So all through the armistice period while the 
 German people knew that they were badly broken, 
 that their industries were almost at a standstill,
 
 yS Germany in the War and After 
 
 that they had not enough food to eat, with a 
 prospect of having less before their 19 19 harvest 
 came in, that their rail transportation was so mis- 
 erably insufficient that a simple journey from Ber- 
 lin to Munich was to be looked on as an under- 
 taking of such difficulty and discomfort as to be 
 avoided unless absolutely necessary, that their coal 
 supply was so reduced that they must get on with 
 little heat and light, that they must wear paper 
 clothing and wooden shoes, and that for all of 
 this there could be no relief except by the benevo- 
 lence of their enemies or by the fear of these 
 enemies that a too-miserable Germany might be 
 a danger to the stabihty of their own governments 
 — despite all this, the German people would not 
 accept the knowledge that their armies had been 
 beaten by the armies of the Entente. Their sol- 
 diers had stopped fighting for reasons of discretion 
 but they had come home unconquered. It re- 
 quired the hard terms of armistice and peace that 
 followed and annihilated these armies within the 
 very heart of their untouched country to shake the 
 confidence of the Germans in their delusion.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMANY NOW AND TO-MORROW 
 
 The peace has come ! Seven months have 
 passed since Armistice Day. The material condi- 
 tions of Germany have not changed much in this 
 time; certainly they have not changed much for the 
 better. Some food has gone into the country — 
 and has been eaten as rapidly as it arrived. Some 
 commercial agents of various countries, enemy 
 as well as neutral, have arrived, but the arrange- 
 ments with them are, at best, tentative. The out- 
 come of these arrangements depends on various 
 variables, the final influence of any one of which 
 can only be guessed at now. The commercial 
 blockade has been maintained; the slight relaxa- 
 tion of it has only been for the sake of keeping 
 the people alive, not for the sake of beginning 
 Germany's industrial rehabilitation. The out- 
 standing interest and activity of the seven months 
 since last November have been political; struggle 
 for and against the government set up by the 
 
 79
 
 So Germany in the War and After 
 
 Revolution; intriguing and fighting by Independ- 
 ent Socialists and Spartacists; watchful waiting 
 and subterranean mining by Royalists and reac- 
 tionaries ; thoughtful weighing of advantages and 
 chances by Separatists in Bavaria and the Rhine- 
 land and elsewhere. There has been little ac- 
 complished along lines other than political. In- 
 deed, under the circumstances, with the peace set- 
 tlement always hanging fire, there could be little. 
 Only politics can be played to much advantage 
 in such a situation. So politics — and finding 
 something to eat — have been the German pre- 
 occupations of the last half year. 
 
 But it is of importance to us, and even more 
 to that part of the world nearer Germany, to know 
 all that can be known of Germany's actual ma- 
 terial condition to-day. We need to know this to 
 know what Germany can do and to guess at what 
 she is really going to do to-morrow. For despite 
 all the drastic conditions of the Versailles peace 
 Germany is not dismembered, not extinguished. 
 She is a living nation of sixty million people with 
 a tradition and habit of hard work, of inter- 
 national commercial relations, of highly developed 
 industry based on scientific method, attention to
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 8i 
 
 detail and disregard of morals; In a word, bent on 
 success as an Industrial and commercial competi- 
 tor of other nations. 
 
 German business men and commercial experts, 
 between expressions of horror, Indignation and 
 profanity concerning the peace requirements, have 
 taken pen in hand to write reassuring articles in 
 Berlin and Frankfort newspapers about Ger- 
 many's business opportunities in the future. Al- 
 though Germany has not won political domina- 
 tion of Eastern Europe she can still count on com- 
 mercial domination of it, say these German busi- 
 ness men. Her goods and her trade are as es- 
 sential to Poland and Russia and the Balkans as 
 they ever were, or as they could ever be even 
 with political control over these countries. These 
 peoples have to have Germany; let us get the 
 peace and let them get their boundaries fixed and 
 their governments going, and then we can go 
 after their business. We may have lost the war 
 for the ownership of the East, but we have not lost 
 our opportunity for commercial domination of 
 It. The countries and the backward peoples are 
 still there, these pastoral and agricultural folk 
 who have to get their manufactured things and
 
 82 Germany in the War and After 
 
 fertilizers and dyes and medicines and all the rest 
 from outside their boundaries. They have to 
 have Germany just as much as, and perhaps more 
 than, ever. That is the kind of comfort In these 
 sore hours of surprise, dismay. Indignation and 
 vituperation, that not a few German traders have 
 been able to find. 
 
 Well, it is encouraging comfort for us, too. 
 For we prefer to see Germany planning commer- 
 cial conquest rather than military conquest. We 
 do not like fighting so much, despite our taste of 
 success in it, that we want to go at It again soon. 
 And Germany planning to trade with the Balkans 
 is not disquieting to us; and ought not to be for 
 anybody else. Only let Germany stick to trade 
 this time — and forget Berlin to Bagdad. 
 
 In the meantime what Is Germany's situation 
 at this time of making a new beginning with her 
 industry and commerce? Where does she stand 
 after five years of blockade and commercial isola- 
 tion? 
 
 At the time of the outbreak of the war Ger- 
 many had, as all the world knows, a great and 
 rapidly growing International commerce. She 
 was, it seemed, well on the way to outstrip all
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 83 
 
 competitors. Why did she attempt a world con- 
 quest by war when she had a world conquest by 
 commerce apparently certain? I used to ask this 
 question at Great Headquarters. The answer 
 I got was the shallow clever one: "Exactly; 
 that proves, doesn't it, that it was not we who 
 started the war or wanted war. We were al- 
 ready winning over France and England in the 
 race for world-power. Why should we risk the 
 chance of war? " 
 
 Echo murmurs, " Why? " 
 
 Perhaps no one, not even those Germans who 
 did want war and compelled war, can answer sat- 
 isfactorily. Perhaps the very taste of success- 
 ful conquest by commerce was like the rank savor 
 of warm blood to the carnivore, exciting the ap- 
 petite. Perhaps conquest by commerce, swiftly 
 as it was really moving, seemed irritatingly slow 
 compared to the possibilities of possession by 
 war. Perhaps it is all to be referred for answer 
 to that convenient escape from answer, the 
 extraordinary, the unfathomable German psy- 
 chology. 
 
 At any rate, whether we, or Germany, can an- 
 swer this conundrum, or not, our other queries
 
 84 Germany in the War and After 
 
 touching the actual situation which faces Ger- 
 many about to begin again the long climb uphill, 
 and the probabilities of her manner and rate of 
 ascent, are capable of more promising considera- 
 tion. We may be able to find answers to these 
 queries that will have some degree of correct- 
 ness, because there are certain ascertainable facts 
 to start from. 
 
 In the first place Germany's food outlook for 
 the coming harvest year must be considered, as 
 daily bread is requisite for daily toil, whether in 
 factory or counting house. In shop or govern- 
 ment bureau; or. Indeed, on the very farm Itself 
 where the food is produced. 
 
 The outlook for this year's grain crop Is not bad. 
 It Is perhaps not as good as It was earlier In the 
 summer, for there was bad weather In May, but if 
 there is 85 per cent, of a normal crop — and the 
 German authorities insist that nothing better than 
 that can be hoped for because of the lessened 
 acreage planted, the lessened man-power avail- 
 able and the lack of fertilizers — it would not re- 
 quire an impossibly large importation of grain 
 and fats, to maintain a fairly sufficient working 
 ration for all the people through all the coming
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 85 
 
 year. The German food controller, Schmidt, 
 thinks that, with any sort of effective government 
 in the saddle, he can lay his hands on at least 
 two-thirds of the crop, for official rationing to 
 the people; the other third will partly be fed to 
 animals by the farmers, and partly escape into the 
 hands of the illegal food-trade, the Schleich- 
 handel. But even thus out of control it will, 
 at least, find its way into the mouths of men and 
 stock. 
 
 If a million, or better one and a half million tons 
 of bread grains (wheat and rye) can be im- 
 ported — and with America's enormous wheat crop 
 to draw on, plus what Is available from Argen- 
 tina and Australia that ought to be easily possible 
 — a sufficient, if not extravagant, bread ration can 
 be assured. 
 
 It Is not so promising as to potatoes. Posen 
 has been the greatest potato-producing part of 
 Germany, but Posen has a new name now — or 
 rather an old one restored. It Is Posnania again; 
 Polish Posnania. This means a distinct lessening 
 of the German potato supply, although It may 
 well be that Poland can sell some of Its Posnanlan 
 potatoes to the German government — at a price.
 
 86 Germany in the War and After 
 
 This matter of price, not only of potatoes, but 
 of bread and meat, of all food, Indeed, is going 
 to be one of the looming subjects of difficulty and 
 discussion among all the German people all 
 through the coming year, as where is it not a 
 looming subject. The fixed price for wheat to be 
 paid the German producer has been, during the 
 past year, but little over a dollar a bushel. But 
 with a fixed, or, rather, minimum price for Ameri- 
 can wheat of more than two dollars a bushel on 
 the farm, and with an as yet Indeterminate, but 
 certainly pretty serious cost of transportation from 
 Iowa to Hamburg, how is the German govern- 
 ment going to hold the German farmer down to 
 receiving but a dollar for his wheat and rye, 
 when it is paying two or three times as much for 
 the necessary importations. If they do not pay 
 the German farmers more these farmers will not 
 be very enthusiastic about planting next spring; if 
 they do pay them more the price of bread to the 
 factory workman is going to be a simple, but ef- 
 fective, argument for Bolshevism. 
 
 The meat supply is bound to be low; Germany 
 has had no concentrated feeds to fatten her ani- 
 mals, although there is forage enough from this
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 87 
 
 year's crop to carry the animals alive through the 
 winter. The German herds have not been greatly 
 reduced, the reduction being nothing like, for ex- 
 ample, that of the French herds, but the milch cat- 
 tle are giving only about one-half the normal 
 milk yield; this because of lack of concentrates. 
 However, the opening of the North and Baltic 
 Seas again to the German fishermen will help 
 out in the meat difficulty, and the ability to trade 
 freely with Denmark and Holland will help out 
 in the line of dairy products. Germany will have 
 vegetables and fruits enough to get along with, 
 and her native sugar production will be sufficient to 
 provide a reasonable ration, even though it will 
 take more than next year to get back to the old 
 exporting basis. 
 
 Altogether, Germany, with its ports open to 
 importations and with a financial arrangement 
 sufficiently generous on the part of foreign export- 
 ers, ought to be on a sufficiently sound food basis 
 to begin its uphill climb without facing the starva- 
 tion specter whose presence would mean no climb- 
 ing at all. 
 
 But food is only the beginning. One cannot 
 work without food, but neither can one without
 
 88 Germany in the War and After 
 
 raw materials to work with, equipped factories 
 to work in, men to do the work, and markets for 
 the output. What is the present situation in Ger- 
 many as regards these conditions? 
 
 Germany's war chest at the beginning of the 
 war contained more than money. There was in 
 it a good supply of the raw materials of war, such 
 as copper, nickel, tin, asbestos, rubber, and cotton, 
 and the other things needful for munitions and 
 transportation which were not native to the coun- 
 try. And in the first years of the war, before the 
 blockade was really effective, more of these ma- 
 terials were imported. In 19 15 Germany was 
 able to get in nearly one-half of her usual pre- 
 war annual importation of cotton. There were 
 also certain reserve stocks of native raw materials, 
 so that any lessening of production because of a 
 heavy diversion of man-power to the army would 
 not handicap the needs of the war-lords. 
 
 But as the war ran on, longer, much longer, 
 than the General Staff had ever counted on, these 
 accumulations were exhausted. Then came the 
 days of strenuous attempts to smuggle in every 
 least bit of needed metal, cotton, wool and rub- 
 ber, of wholesale systematized stripping of the oc-
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 89 
 
 cupied territories even to name-plates from the 
 doors and wool from the mattresses, of substitute 
 alloys and pine bark " cotton." All industrial 
 production for export stopped, of course, at the 
 very beginning of the war, and production for 
 home use was made over into production for war 
 use. Before the war Krupp's steel output was 
 over 90 per cent, for civilian purposes; in 19 17 it 
 was over 90 per cent, for war purposes. The 
 great dye factories became instantly, and with 
 almost no interruption of work, factories for high 
 explosives. German industry was gradually all 
 concentrated on meeting the one crying need: war 
 supplies. German raw materials were all used, 
 and used up, to produce things of destruction, 
 which were themselves destroyed in destroying. 
 The result of all this was to leave Germany, 
 when the end of the war came, with a certain 
 amount of manufactured war supplies on hand, 
 a small amount of native raw materials waiting to 
 be converted into more war supplies, and almost 
 no stocks of supplies for civilian use. As to 
 stocks of manufactured articles for export — which 
 is a matter the business men of other countries are 
 much interested in and concerning which many
 
 90 Germany in the War and After 
 
 guesses have been made — It is not easy, perhaps 
 it Is impossible, to speak with certainty. But one 
 may be pretty confident that all talk of Germany's 
 being prepared, the minute the blockade is re- 
 leased, to dump large quantities of her special 
 products such as dye-stuffs, chemicals, scientific in- 
 struments, potash, and the rest, on to the markets 
 of the world is idle talk. There were probably 
 considerable stocks of some of these things on 
 hand when the war began but many of them were 
 materials which could be made use of for war pur- 
 poses by Germany herself; and these were cer- 
 tainly used. And the labor, coal and raw ma- 
 terial difficulties certainly permitted no extensive 
 manufacture during the Armistice period. 
 
 However, with the demand for war supplies at 
 an end, and with importation of raw materials 
 again possible Germany can turn her attention — 
 all of It not required to be concentrated on internal 
 political, financial and social problems — to be- 
 ginning to build up her industries for the produc- 
 tion of civilian articles for home need and for 
 export. This attention must first be directed to 
 the re-conversion of her converted factories. The 
 factories for high explosives can easily become
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 91 
 
 factories for dye-stuffs and chemicals again; 
 Krupp's can reverse the percentage of its steel out- 
 put from 90 per cent, war to 90 per cent, civilian 
 purposes. Some other factories cannot be so 
 quickly put back into peace-time work. 
 
 But the re-conversion of factories is perhaps 
 the least of the difficulties to be met. Two others 
 especially are of great importance. 
 
 There is a scarcity of coal — although there need 
 not be a scarcity for any particular industry if the 
 government decides to cut somewhere else. Some 
 coal must be exported in exchange for certain in- 
 dispensable imports, as, for example, to Switzer- 
 land, Holland and Denmark for food. Also 
 what coal there is has become very expensive. 
 The cost of coal per ton has risen about 300 per 
 cent., imposing a great increase in the cost of man- 
 ufacture. 
 
 There is a scarcity of skilled labor. The Gen- 
 eral Staff kept skilled labor out of the army as 
 long as it could but before the end came much 
 of it had to be enrolled, and many of the men 
 were killed or mutilated. In addition the recon- 
 struction work in Belgium and France, demanded 
 by the treaty, will keep much German labor busy
 
 92 Germany in the War and After 
 
 for a long time. What there is left for the Ger- 
 man factories will have to be paid for at two to 
 three times the pre-war rate; and it will return 
 a much lessened output than In the good old days 
 of nine and ten hours — they are eight-hour days 
 now — and of a high industrial morale. That 
 morale is, certainly for the moment, gone. 
 
 Finally there are the great political and eco- 
 nomic changes to talce into account; the changes al- 
 ready made, the changes that are still to come. 
 These changes affect both labor and capital. 
 They give labor a control it has not had before 
 which will be exercised in directions opposed to 
 the old exploitation of man-power in manufac- 
 turing. And they make capital afraid. Initia- 
 tive under these risks will be lessened; there will be 
 a reduction of working capital to the lowest 
 amount possible; fears of sequestration will keep 
 capital out of sight; capital will have a dispropor- 
 tionate share of the war-debt to pay; there will be 
 " socialization " of certain industries, with its 
 doubtful effect on efficiency. 
 
 But Germany will undoubtedly return to work; 
 she must, or literally fall to pieces. Business will 
 undoubtedly try to resume Its old methods of gain-
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 93 
 
 ing and dominating foreign markets, but to do 
 this will it have that powerful government sup- 
 port that the old regime gave it, and will it not 
 need exactly this kind of support more than ever 
 before? 
 
 Altogether, to my thinking, fears of a quick re- 
 sumption of German industrial and commercial 
 dominance in world trade seem to me only 
 fears of the thoughtless mind, the mind that 
 does not take new circumstances into account but 
 works in a groove creased by experience of days 
 and conditions that are gone and kept open by 
 memories of a time that is past. On the other 
 hand hopes of a less dangerous but a reasonable 
 and needed resuming of German industry will have 
 every chance of rcahzation if the world outside 
 Germany is fairly generous as to credit, and the 
 world inside Germany finds soon some political 
 stability. 
 
 In all discussions of the future of Germany, 
 which attempt to point out probabilities based on 
 premises of actual material conditions, one con- 
 stantly meets a certain kind of argument in rebut- 
 tal which is triumphantly summed up in the expres- 
 sion: "You can't tell me; I know Germans."
 
 94 Germany in the War and After 
 
 The idea is that the future of Germany will be 
 determined by Germans and not by material facts, 
 not by conditions imposed by the rest of the world 
 or by the presence or absence of raw materials 
 and coal, and labor, and money, or by any other 
 hard and fast material circumstances. And the 
 idea is, further, that Germans will always behave 
 as we have seen them behave. It is on the basis 
 of this behavior that we claim that we know them. 
 But does, indeed, anybody really " know Ger- 
 mans." Because Germans are human beings like 
 ourselves and because they read the same history, 
 study the same mathematics and science and 
 philosophy, speak a language that we can acquire, 
 enjoy the same music and pictures, live, in a word, 
 as we hve, can we, from the experience of knowing 
 ourselves, know Germans? We have, most of us, 
 certainly decided that the Germans, from the ex- 
 perience of knowing themselves, certainly do not 
 know other people. Their behavior during the 
 war has shown that they did not know English, 
 Belgians or Americans. But whether this be- 
 havior, as we have seen it with horror and dis- 
 may, is the only thing we are to take into account
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 95 
 
 in our attempt to prophesy as to German future 
 doing and becoming seems to me very doubtful. 
 
 The world needs a better knowledge of human 
 biology; a more developed science of the human 
 species. We need to Icnow much more of the pos- 
 sible influence of environment and education in de- 
 termining the psychology and behavior of a given 
 human group. Because we are all of the same 
 species must all those of us with relatively equal 
 endowment of brain and nervous system feel and 
 think essentially alike? And if we do not — as 
 of course we really do not — must that prove a 
 fundamental distinction among us as to stock and 
 biological inheritance? Or can a varying inten- 
 sive type of environment and education produce so 
 radical a differentiation among us, among groups 
 of men of similar basic make-up, that we can 
 come to react very differently to the same stimulus, 
 and hence be, for the practical purposes of living 
 and associating with each other, very different 
 kinds of creatures? 
 
 My own experience in the last four years has 
 done much to make me over from a convinced be- 
 liever in the dominating influence of heredity over
 
 96 Germany in the War and After 
 
 environment and education In determining human 
 behavior and moral makeup Into a believer in the 
 great possibilities of the modifying effect of en- 
 vironmental conditions. Germans are not so dif- 
 ferent from Englishmen and Americans by stock, 
 that is, by inheritance; but they have been made 
 different by education, using the word in Its larger 
 biological sense. And If this is true there is hope 
 that they may be changed again if their educa- 
 tion Is sufficiently changed; that if their environ- 
 ment becomes strongly democratic and democra- 
 tizing they may In time become of the democratic 
 faith. 
 
 This Is not to say that the adoption of a form 
 of democratic government necessarily means the 
 acquirement of the democratic faith. Democracy 
 is more a matter of education, of the acquirement 
 of an attitude, of a state of mind and heart, 
 the possession of a feeling of good will and gen- 
 erosity, a willingness to give every man and every 
 group of men a fair chance In both Internal and 
 external relations, and a gladness to see all man- 
 kind move forward and upward. It means less 
 class feeling and more human feeling; It is al- 
 truism, not egoism. It Involves internationalism.
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 97 
 
 but not simply the internationalism of the 
 proletariat. 
 
 Can Germans come to this? Not if human 
 nature is immutable. But it is not. The pres- 
 ent human nature of the Germans is not neces- 
 sarily a human nature they have always had. 
 Indeed it is certain that it is not. It was much 
 worse once, in times very far back, than it is 
 now; and in times not so far back it was better 
 than it is now. The study of the pre-history of 
 the Germans and of the rest of the Europeans — 
 of all the human race, for that matter, — shows 
 that we were at one time, in the course of human 
 evolution, in a stage literally but little removed 
 from a truly brute condition. We were simply 
 " animal among animals." But by the nature of 
 our physical evolution, which gave us speech and 
 the possibility of recording our traditions, and 
 gave us a special development of mind rather than 
 better claws and teeth with which to carry on 
 our struggle for existence, our general course of 
 evolution diverged importantly from that of the 
 other great animals in that it moved toward de- 
 velopment on a basis of the mutual aid principle 
 rather than the mutual struggle principle. We
 
 98 Germany in the War and After 
 
 found a genuine biologic advantage in altruism, 
 just as the social insects, the ants and bees, most 
 successful of insect types, found it. 
 
 Our nature changed; it became more and more 
 what we now recognize by the phrase human na- 
 ture as contrasted with brute nature. And it 
 changed rapidly; rapidly, that is, from the biologi- 
 cal point of view. 
 
 But the important element which has made 
 possible the immense hastening of this change of 
 nature, of mental and moral makeup, has been the 
 element of environment and education, rather than 
 that of pure natural selection. In our social evo- 
 lution we have been able to hold fast, by virtue 
 of speech and writing, to steps which are not 
 actually a part of our natural evolution. We 
 have a social or traditional inheritance as well as 
 a physical inheritance. And it is by conscious mod- 
 ification of our environment and education that we 
 can determine the character of this all-important 
 influence on our lives. 
 
 The Germans have been made what most of 
 them are to-day by a perverted and brutalizing 
 education. They were taught that human evolu- 
 tion is chiefly determined by crass and cruel nat-
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow 99 
 
 ural selection; that the struggle for existence 
 among human groups is the complete analogue of 
 this struggle among the brute groups. The 
 strongest in fighting are the fittest to live. 
 
 Well, if that is so — and it is not; but if it is — 
 what do the Germans think to-day about the fit- 
 ness and value of their type of cultural develop- 
 ment? Is it not, on the very basis of their own 
 perverted reading of the factors of evolution, 
 proved to be an unfit type? I remember how 
 often my old friend, the university professor of 
 biology on the German General Staff at Charle- 
 vllle used to say: " We must Inevitably win this 
 war for we are biologically right; we are the fit- 
 test to live, and hence nature is with us. That 
 group which can dominate other groups is the 
 chosen of evolution. It should struggle with 
 other groups and it should win over them and 
 dominate them for the sake of the evolutionary ad- 
 vance of the human race." 
 
 Well, does he hold fast to that now? If so 
 let him, and the others who believe with him, 
 tell the German people that the American, Eng- 
 lish, French type of civilization, of social organ- 
 ization, of democracy, of human nature, is the
 
 100 Germany in the War and After 
 
 right one, the one proven best by biological law. 
 For it happens to have won in the struggle. 
 
 But whether these men accept the war's verdict, 
 or not, as the verdict of natural law, there will 
 be plenty of less scientifically-informed, less sophis- 
 ticated but more common-sensible Germans who 
 will see in the debacle of Germany's autocracy and 
 militarism the need and the opportunity of chang- 
 ing the type of German education, of changing the 
 environment of Germany's new generation to one 
 more in keeping with the world's present stage of 
 social evolution. It is the stage of democracy; 
 German human nature can be changed to fit in 
 with it. We may not " know Germans," but we 
 do know something about human beings in gen- 
 eral, and Germans are, after all, of that biological 
 category. And human beings can change, and 
 change fairly rapidly, their consciously controlled 
 environment, and hence the character of their so- 
 cial evolution. 
 
 There are still sixty million Germans in Ger- 
 many: a human group of great potentiality. All 
 they need is the proper education; the kind of en- 
 vironment that the world has come to under- 
 stand as the best for right influence on human
 
 Germany Now and To-Morrow loi 
 
 evolution. Instead of carrying their old type 
 of social organization and political attitude to all 
 the rest of the world and imposing it on the rest 
 of the world by force, they have now for their 
 own sake and the sake of human progress to ac- 
 cept another type. I believe that, with time, they 
 will see this and do it. But it will not be done 
 in a day. 
 
 THE END 
 
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