Development of Tactics World War BY BALCK Lieutenant General, Gennadi Army Translated By Harry Bell With Eighteen Sketches THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1922 All Rights of Translation and Publication for North America Secured by Book Department, General Service Schools, 1921 ^v :;?■. FOREWORD Shortly before the outbreak of the World War, I was engaged in preparing my six-volume "Tactics" (the single volumes of which had already appeared in the 4th Edition) , for a new edition. Extensive preparations had been made therefor and valuable material had been assembled, gath- ered from my essays on Infantry Tactics since 1901 and published in Loebell's Annuals. With the first edition of my "Tactics," I had taken a stand for increased valuation of Tactics and Psychology in troop leading. The World War has confirmed this necessity. My work concerning tactics embraced the viewpoint in tactics of all large military powers prior to the World War, and it is hoped that it will always remain of value in all general questions. The World War brought about enormous changes: It has shown the importance of the penetration, with the million men armies of modern times, as compared to the envelopment. I had very early advocated the unavoidable necessity of the pene- tration, though I fully knew that, without doubt an envelop- ing battle, a "Cannae," would be easier, would have greater success, and would probably also be of more decisive effect. 1 well knev; that my opinion and the opinion of military circles differed greatly; I have never denied the advantages of the enveloping battle, but also have always pointed out the necessity of preparing for the penetration. The World War proved that I was right. I attempted from the first days of the war to make myself familiar with all new writ- ings and events in training, and to utilize the lessons shown. If I now attempt to discuss the development of tactics in the World War, I well know the difficulties thereof, because so far little authentic material is available for a basis. Therefore, in the discussion of actual events in the field, from which I was far removed, I have touched upon briefly and have treated principally the events on the Western front from the standpoint of the troop leader. The portrayal of the development has been selected, because it only makes clear, how we arrived at our present day views, which are FOREWORD SO very different from those at the opening of the World War. It is hoped that this work will have its share in em- phasizing the experiences of the war that have been pur- chased with so much blood, and which experiences may easily run the danger of being lost in the dissolution of our old, tried army. May these pages call back to mind what our troops have performed, the equal of which can- not be found in military history, by heavy work against an enemy so superior in numbers and equipped with all possible auxiliary means. But the heroic achievements of our troops were possible only because all members of the army performed untiring and devoted work in time of peace, in the matter of training the men to faithful per- formance of duty, willingness to assume responsibility and audacity. I have but briefly touched on the end of the army ; my theme ends upon the battlefield ; the awful dissolution process and the failures at home, are beyond the limits of tactics. Therefore, I have purposely avoided touching on the unfortunate struggles in the interior of our country. This book of mine is not for the purpose of accusing, neither is it for the purpose of excusing errors that have been committed. I have merely touched where it was abso- lutely necessary. My only endeavor has been to show how our present day tactics had their being and how they, starting from an excellent peace training, adapted them- selves to the continually more difficult demands of battle. Though the war could not end with victory on the battle- field, that surely was not the fault of the army, nor of its leaders. I shall be very thankful for any corrections and addi- tions. Aurich {East Friesland) the day of the 50th Anniver- sary of the French Declaration of War in the Year 1870. Balck, Lieutenant General, Active Service in the Field, Commanding the 51st Reserve Division. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I — Training in Peace and Reality in War 1 Chapter II — Mobile Warfare 16 Training and Organization 16 Tactics of Mobile Warfare 29 Changes in Organization, Equipment and Armament 37 Training Regulations for Foot Troops 42 Chapter III — Position Warfare in the West, 1914-1917 47 Origin and Nature of Position Warfare 47 The Position Battles Up to the First Attack on Verdun 52 Lessons of the Battle on the Somme and the Battles in Front of Verdun in the Late Fall of 1916 71 Utilizing the Experiences Gained 85 The Battles in 1917 88 Chapter IV — The War in the East and in Italy 108 Russia 108 Battles in Northern Italy 117 Mountain Warfare 122 Chapter V — Technique in War 129 Chapter VI — The Defensive Battle in Position Warfare 151 Chapter VII — German Attacks with Limited Objectives 169 Chapter VIII — Machine Guns 176 Machine Gun Equipment at the Outbreak of the World War__176 Chapter IX — The Infantry Attack in Open Warfare 189 Requirements 189 Procedure of Attack 192 Near Reconnaissance 194 Deployment and Development 197 Artillery of the Attack 199 Working Up to the Enemy 200 The Assault 207 Influence of Fog 213 Fighting in Woods 214 Village Fighting 218 Chapter X— Cavalry Prior to the World War 222 Views on Cavalry Attacks 223 Employment of Cavalry in War 226 Cavalry Divisions 230 Cyclists 231 French Views Concerning Employment of Cavalry 233 Chapter XI— The Artillery 238 Organization and Combat Principles 238 Co-operation of Infantry and Artillery 242 Co-operation Between Artillery and Air Service 246 The Decisive Battle in Position Warfare , 247 The Offensive 251 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter XII— The Year 1918 260 Transition from Position to Mobile Warfare 260 Methods of Hostile Defense and German Offensive 262 The Spring Offensive 270 Resuming the Offensive 281 The Last Defensive Battle 286 Conclusion 294 VI I. Training in Peace and Reality in War "Our long garrison life has spoiled us, and effeminacy and desire for and love of pleasure, have weakened our mili- tary virtues. The entire nation must pass through the School of Misfortune, and we shall either die in the crisis, or a better condition will be created, after we have suffered bitter misery, and after our bones have decayed." Thus wrote the late Field Marshal von Gneisenau under the im- pressions of the experiences of war in the Year 1806. Only the bloody seriousness of war furnishes a final receipt for long peace labors. If the training of the troops is accord- ing to correct principles, so that they can perform anything and everything war demands of them, they will not have to forget on the battlefield anything they have learned in time of peace (I.D.R. 477) ; also they will not have then to learn anything new. Anyone who possesses actual ex- perience in war may more easily attain such education than another who knows war only from books, or whose remem- brances of war have been dimmed during long peace time. The Austrians in 1866 and the British in the Boer War, had materially larger experiences in war than had their opponents, and still neither the one nor the other was inured against disillusions ; it may be because they arrived at erro- neous decisions based on prior experiences, or it may be because the conception of actual war had been lost by col- onial warfare. "La petite guerre gate le militaire." "The Austrians," wrote Marshal Foch when he was Director of the War Academy — "had so far conducted war without un- derstanding war, the Prussians had studied war and there- fore understood it, even without having conducted war." Just as dangerous as effeminacy is the danger of let- ting habitual custom gain the preponderance, as is shown by a senseless repetition in training of a well known exer- cise or a measure that has proven successful in the face of the enemy. The army of 1806 — as von der Goltz calls it "a very industrious, orderly, willing army" — had gone to sleep on the laurels of Frederick the Great. Afraid to break 2 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR away from the creations of Frederick, we had allowed them to become obsolete by adhering to the strong impetus given by unreliable foreigners, and consequently also adhered to the old time line tactics and the sterotyped formations. The first made the army tactically, the latter operatively clumsy, an enormous disadvantage opposed to the French Army that was not bound down to those tactics. Not in line tactics (for in adopting line tactics the British army was victorious in the Peninsula War over the French column tactics) but in the inaptitude of commanders and troops was to be found the cause of defeat on the battlefield. In the "echelon at- tack" practiced in time of peace at every opportunity, later commanders perceived the surest guarantee of victory. In Germany we also trained, up to the publication of the Regu- lations of 1888, by battalion, regiment and brigade. In addi- tion to the free fighting, frequently badly transformed into what we called the "Turkish" method there was a hard and fast formation, which would hardly have been proper in the sixties. The finger marks of this formation was an at- tack, badly prepared by fire, carried out with insufficient means, and the final result of which was retreat, followed by flight in the face of cavalry and forming squares by bat- talions. Even the so-called "Schlichting's Seven Wonders" caused fatal, normal formation tactics, until the new regu- lations swept these misconceptions aside. But no matter how advanced these new regulations were, the habitual cus- tomary training of earlier times (for instance the prepon- derous importance of adhering to regular distance) kept up its domination. Prior to the World War the German army worked faith- fully and it was very far from falling into the errors Gneis- enau had condemned in 1806. But it was not free from a certain formality, which, as early as 1892 Major von Mala- chowski pointed out in an efficient study as "Review" tac- tics. By pointing out the difference between peace engage- ments and actual engagements in war he showed the "Re- view" tactics as fatal for the field training of the troops. In the words of Gneisenau "The endeavor to lead the troops well on large parade and muster days is very damaging," and then continuing, "the tactics which expects everything from regulation uniformity, artificially produced on the PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 3 drill ground, or at the green table, that cannot be used in war is "Review" tactics. In most cases it extends only to a play, or criticism-proof battle exercise. During longer periods of peace it is the most dangerous enemy to field train- ing, by continually attempting to push the field training into the background at all points." And finally he adds wamingly "The mask of 'Review' tactics continually changes, the inherent quality of the matter is always the same." Malachowski then turned against endeavors in the army which had for their object to assure a smooth course of exercises. "No normal tactics can replace the military qualities and tactical perception of the leader," he says, "it is absolutely fatal to field training, by continually leading away from the simplicity and the actuality of things." There is but one auxiliary means to meet such ab- normal growths, and that is reverting to military historical experiences. The "Review" tactics are satisfied with super- ficial (exterior) forms, but forgets entirely that war is con- ducted by men against men and that in war the moral in- fluences are principally of the most decisive importance. It is very probable that the cavalry especially suffered from "Review" tactics, for it rode charges in autumn man- euvers till shortly prior to the World War. These charges gladdened every military eye, but they could never have been executed in that manner under actual fire. On the other hand, we do not desire to bring forth, as an example to be governed by, the British cavalry in the Boer War, which was nothing but mounted infantry. Still less did the artillery count in our exercises, unless it laid weight on appearances, as its firing capacities and results could not be portrayed. Actual experiences in war, which each one can gain only in a limited way, are of inestimable value; but they can produce fruitful effect only if they are thoroughly proven and utilized by the study of military history. And still, how quickly do actual war experiences fade away! We have experienced that fact in our own army. At the opening of the war in 1864 we had lost what had been gained in the Wars of Liberation at so much effort and so much loss of blood. The experiences of Worth and St. Privat should un- doubtedly have been sufficient to teach our army what we 4 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR considered new experiences in the Russo-Japan War. In front of Verdun, in 1916, we had for instance, experiences in plenty concerning how horse batteries could follow the infantry across positions — and shortly prior to the Spring offensive in 19] 8, trials on a large scale were repeated to gain the same old results. It is not at all difficult to cite a military historical ex- ample for every tactical operation. "Especially difficult will be a clear objective judgment, when the question is one of an unfortunate experience in war by our own army. The general adaption of military history to such examples often leads to the most serious errors which, having become ac- cepted rules, spread like an epidemic, which will even take hold of thinking heads, and still will not allow their meaning to be perceived." Thus we can account for the numerous erroneous decisions drawn from events. The Austrians drew from their experiences during the War in Upper Italy in 1859 the necessity of brutal shock tactics; the British, after the Boer War, were not very far from denying the possibility of attack; the desire, to avoid losses, took pre- cedence over the requirement to annihilate the enemy. And finally, the Russians in Eastern Asia had again to gather the same bitter experiences they had gained before at Plevna. Nothing but thorough study of military historical events, omitting the special experiences we obtain ourselves on the respective theaters of war, can prevent commanders from entering a new war with erroneous views of the in- herent qualities of present day fire effect gained during long periods of peace. Up to the present day every war has brought surprises, which the troops could master, not through hard and fast rules and formations, but only through the training they underwent in time of peace ; and this very fact must be reckoned with in peace time training. Only the inflexible will to be victorious, without regard to sacrifices demanded by battle, will overcome all difficulties. Only thus may we prevent the danger of immediately accepting every new thing happening in a strange theater of war as our guide, and adopting it as a cure-all for success. But, on the other hand, there is a caution, that ought to be con- sidered, contained in the words of the British lieutenant general, Sir Ian Hamilton, based on his impressions of the PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 5 battles in Eastern Asia : — "What a blessing ; the larger and the prouder an army is, the more immobile is it in its firmly- rooted power of sticking to fundamentals so that finally, as a unit, it becomes inapt to absorb the experiences of other armies. Military attaches can discover the most important points for training and employment in a foreign army and urgently recommend their adoption. The majority of their comrades pay just as little attention to them as did Napo- leon III pay attention to the reports of Stoffel concerning the Prussian army prior to the Franco-Prussian War." And quite similarly wrote the General of Infantry, von der Goltz, in the second edition of "Rossback and Jena;" — "Even the South- African War has created doubt if we are still on the right road in the execution of our infantry fighting ; will our long and dense skirmish lines, with closely following-up sup- ports, carefully nested in the terrain, in the face of rapid fire, not go to pieces, as did in other times, the massed Prussian lines, under the fire of the French skirmishers?" Herewith were pointed out currents of "review" tactics, which threatened to limit the freedom left by training regu- lations. However, the German infantry could with satis- faction look back on the events of the war in Eastern Asia, for did not the Japanese infantry, trained according to Ger- man methods, victoriously fight under very difficult condi- tions? The Russo-Japanese War had set aside the uncer- tainty caused by the Boer War in the tactical views, and primarily the doubts concerning the possibility of executing the infantry attack. It made short and thorough work in removing the overestimation of adherence to forms, and of overestimation of the value of the fire power of the defense. However, the superior German leadership in 1870-71 and the passiveness of the Turks in 1877 did not show these two maxims as clearly as was the case in the engagements of the British and Japanese. Thus, these wars did not teach anything else than what could be gleaned from the exper- iences of the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish ,wars, namely : "Conduct of War means attack, attack means car- rying forward the fire." Attack and defense are on the same footing; any one who wants to be victorious and who desires to gain an ad- vantage by physically overcoming the enemy, must attack. 6 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR But if we desire to resort to the attack, we must train our troops accordingly. The bayonet training — almost preached by Dragomiroff — would have been the very thing in Eas- tern Asia, if it had been accompanied by thorough training in fire fighting. The form is of importance only, if it mater- ially increases the enemy's losses. The will to be victorious may also offset a discrepancy in numbers ; not the stronger, but the one that is more energetic, has the best chances of success. During a long period of peace, which easily causes overestimation of material factors, we cannot too fre- quently emphasize the fact that the decision to attack is based on the task, not on the relation of strength. This notwithstanding the fact we usually learn the actual strength of the enemy only after a battle, in many cases only after the end of the war, and that all troops are in- clined to overestimate the strength of the enemy with whom engaged, and also that intrepid attack weakens the enemy and makes him dependent on our decision. Finally, no one knows if the enemy is actually able to make use of his forces. These maxims the German army appropriated to its own use. Its location between the two most important mili- tary Powers of Europe, in connection with an army which had delayed the opportunity to demand the utmost power of its people in the expectation of a decisive battle, forced the German army leadership to pay special attention to the attack against hostile superiority in numbers. In the ab- sence of experiences in war by ourselves, our army had to draw on the sources of military history for guides in its training, and this was done with success. Military history offers the possibility to properly learn the decisions that were of decisive importance, which, in exercises on the map, or on the drill ground seldom come into account. For con- duct of war we have to learn from foreign experiences, our own experiences come too dear and almost always too late. "Military history is no manual containing well-formed theories, is no volume to pass the time in reading, but is a careful teacher, who enables us, if we are attentive, to view things and to conceive their value, as w'e would never have seen in life. At any moment we may face in the same, or an entirely changed form, questions demanding responsi- PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 7 ble, decisive and nevertheless immediate action. Of course, military history offers us in outline only the events. But it also offers what the very best theory can never offer, the picture of frictions in war, the picture of the influences of the doubts, of the urgency, of the incalculable chances, of the surprises, of the obstacles; it recounts the road which the commander and practical military knowledge have to take to overcome these difficulties; it prepares the normal counter-poise for the moment of action; it should prepare us also for the unexpected. Military history should take the place of actual experiences in war. Our life is not long enough to gather these experiences up to the moment of action." It does not suffice to merely follow up the regu- lations laid down; these are only the basis of experiences during a definite, and passed, interval of time, which por- tray themselves in a far different manner in the brain of the victor than in the conception of the vanquished. Regu- lations must never descend to the plane of a code laid down for punishments; their details must not be allowed to in- terfere with freedom of action. Regulations are for the purpose of creating independent thought, but they have to be studied in conjunction with military history, and only what the commander inserts into them in the matter of his personal will and skill, makes them the guide for the conduct of battle. The new arms with which the armies were equipped in the beginning of the sixties, favored, in France, the creation of position tactics, caused von Moltke to consider the combination of the operative offensive with the tactical defensive, while the Austrians, having a one- sided, and in addition an entirely false estimation of the French offensive conduct, in vain endeavored to have vic- tory perch on the Imperial standards by means of brutal shock tactics. Of course, those shock tactics were suc- cessful at Custozza over a badly armed and morally in- ferior army. Tactical theories turn into fatal brain illu- sions if they influence the commander in his decision beyond the situation. Mahan, in his "Influence of Naval Power on History," writes as follows: "We will make the observation that changes in tactics will occur not after the introduction of new arms as is necessary, but also that the period of time 8 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR between the two changes is relatively very long; this, un- doubtedly, is caused by the fact that the improvement ot arms has its origin in the skill of one or two individuals, while for the change in tactics the inclination to stick to customs on the part of an entire class has to be overcome, which class endeavors to adhere to what exists now. This is a grave misfortune. It can be overcome only by ac- knowledging each change willingly and voluntarily." The history of tactics in the 19th Century shows this "incli- nation to stick to established customs," from the disputes between field and review tactics, and we could cite more than one case thereof. The reason that, no matter how farseeing any regu- lations are constructed in their inception, they become obsolete after a time, may be found in the very spirit of the training regulations. Emperor Napoleon measured that time to be ten years. In any case, frequent changes are a mistake, if we do not want to interfere with the tranquility of tactical development and if we want to avoid friction in the composition of our mobile army consisting of the reg- ular levies, reservists and landwehr. On the other hand, regulations must follow suit, if the conditions on which they are based have changed. In his military phantasies, the Prince de Linge wrote in 1783: — "A paragraph that ought to be incorporated in all regulations, and that we omit, I do not know for what reason, is that we should occa- sionally act contrary to regulations. We must teach action contrary to regulations just as well as we must teach dis- order among troops, for it will happen in battle." To be out of touch with present day requirements is always dangerous. Troops will have to pay later on with streams of blood for knowledge gained under the fire of the enemy. Of what use was it to the Austrians in 1866 that they charged in utter disregard of death, imbued by the firm will to be victorious, but did so in tactical forma- tions which were then obsolete and in the face of the newest improved arms? The willingness to sacrifice themselves on the part of the troops and strictest discipline, encoun- tered an impassable obstacle in the rapid fire of an unshaken infantry. The experiences in war on the part of our regi- PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 9 merits show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, that bullets make short work of obsolete formations and create new ones. But at what cost ! In the Franco-Prussian War superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay the price. At the outbreak of war the usual custom is to prepare troops, that have been trained under obsolete regulations, for fighting on a strange theater of war by certain "Field Service Regulations." After the battle of Montebello in 1859 Napoleon III made his troops quickly acquainted with the peculiarity of the terrain and the method of fighting on the part of his opponents, and the Austrians neglected to do this. In 18^6 Benedek was forced to change the tac- tics that he had recommended in his field service regula- tions, before his excellent views could be of any general benefit to the army. The tactical instructions of Kuro- patkin were without any effect whatever in the Russo- Japanese War and individual experiences were disregarded. It is very desirable that the first experiences in battle be- come the general property of all concerned as rapidly as possible. In 1870 we did not do this, and all units had to gather their own experiences. As late as August 18, 1870, the 85th Fusilier Battalion advanced in columns toward the center, though the campaign in Bohemia had shown that that formation was completely obsolete. In the World War, the experiences gained at some one point were printed and thus quickly became the general property of all. The im- pulse to gain and spread experiences worked especially well on tranquil fronts. Extraordinarily much was accomplished by establishing schools in order to make officers of all ranks, under officers of the special arms, familiar with the latest experiences. But this method sufficed only when the troops, by the method of their training in peace, had gained the necessary ability to adapt themselves thereto. Training regulations should not emphasize the matter of formation, they should induce every one to practical co-operation. Troops that are thus trained and trained theoretically, and who are not afraid of losses, will soon evolve new tac- tics. What a difference there was between the method of 10 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR attack of the Guard at St. Privat and at Le Bourget, and the charge of the Royal Grenadiers on Chateau Geisberg and of the Baden Body Grenadiers on the railroad embankment at Nuits! The Russian experiences at Plevna were similar to ours in August, 1870, except that with the Russians the fear of losses gained the upper hand; they considered the fire effect of the Turks as a certain unchangeable factor, de- clined the freedom of operations, and sought only means to lessen their losses. In no instance must the troops at the first sudden impression of the hostile fire effect accept that fire effect as a stated factor and passively submit to it with the thought that it cannot be helped, and that the main consideration is to lessen the losses. In that case we forget that the impressions are the same with the enemy. The effect of these impressions is naturally larger if we have, be- fore the war, underestimated our opponent. The Russians sought to draw lessons for mechanical conduct in battle, as they also did subsequently in Eastern Asia ; but entirely dif- ferent factors co-operated decisively. The application of the best lessons as to utilization of our own fire power, as to formations and conduct against the influence of moral fac- tors, is impossible. We must never lay down the law, or accept as a maxim for our action, that procedure which proved itself in war, or in battles, as immediately the best, or which brought about the victory. Conditions, under which that procedure was correct, play too large a role, and among these numerous and different conditions the moral status of the troops and of the commander play the leading role. What one may permit himself to do and what, be- cause he permits himself to do it, leads to success, is for another who adopts it, the very cause of defeat. Studying wars and battles does not furnish recipes for victory. It increases the knowledge of the commander of troops only when it causes him to perceive the connection between cause and effect. It is not difficult to perceive the effect, that lies open to the view, but to correctly cull the causes, requires not only a clear view and study, but thought and knowledge of the characteristics of war. It is important also to know that chance plays a great role in all military actions, and that chance favors permanently him only, who PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 11 deserves it. It is therefore wrong to condemn any action because without "luck" success could not have been possible. Such an event teaches merely that we must have the mental conception that luck easily passes one by, and that we must have manhood enough to grasp it in passing. Superior in rifles and guns, trained in fighting the mountain inhabitants of the Indian frontier, and in defense against numerous swarms of the false Mahdi, the British entered the campaign against the Boers with full confidence. No one doubted a glorious victory ; but, in the dark December days of 1899 ill-success succeeded ill-success, not only in the matter of defeated attacks, but — what the heart of a soldier had to feel most poignantly — even capitulations in the open field. Up to then it had been unheard of in British military history, that in the first six months 182 officers and 4984 men capitulated, while only 168 officers and 2124 men were killed or wounded. It is said that the tactics pursued by the British had their origin on German ground. But, German troops defeated, with German tactics, in South-Africa, an enemy equally as good as the Boers ; our troops there in any case understood how to quickly adapt themselves to new con- ditions. Colonial wars and inapt training in the home coun- try had led the education of British commanders into wrong channels. Absence of the firm will to insert even the very last man for victory, dearth of willingness to assume re- sponsibility on the part of the higher commanders, absence of independence on the part of the subordinate commanders and the inability to execute attacks by combined units sup- ported by artillery, are the real causes of the British dis- asters. As the British had, at the start, underestimated the Boers, the weight of the impressions gained was the heavier. Underestimation is followed as a matter of course by overestimation. In England, they went even so far as to question the possibility of any attack, and only gradually the spirits rose again. We must bear witness to the fact that the British in the World War attacked especially well. Through the misconception of inherent things in the Boer War, we attempted in Germany to follow the forms of the Boer attacks for a time (as a matter of fact, the Boers never attacked), until we again thought of our own experiences 12 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR and employed only the most valuable of the experiences gained in the South African War. A similar thing happened in the Russo-Japanese War. The tactical causes of defeat were the same as in the Boer War, and thereto were added faults to be found in the char- acter of the Russian peoples. Bitterly did they pay for their underestimation of the enemy. And this very fault is hard to avoid, as leaders and troops take their own achieve- ments as a model. Only sharp criticism of our own action can save us from underestimating the enemy. On the Japanese side also, the first successes had been bought with relatively small losses and just as in the Franco- Prussian War, a change of the procedure of attack took place, as we can see from following up the battles of the First Army. As with us in the year 1870 the endeavor was to arrange a looser formation. "But the course of war, with- out definite rules, caused all tactical formations prescribed by regulations to be forgotten. As was the case with the Germans in 1870, the Japanese battle action gradually lost its uniform character and adapted itself again and again to the changing situation. In larger as well as in smaller units, down to the battle unit, the same applied. Thus, the Japan- ese tactics became more and more clearly acting according to circumstances, without regulation formations, and without oflficial basis, all depending on the peculiarity of the leaders." Knowledge of the inherent peculiarities of a people, of their military establishment and tactical views is therefore absolutely required of every leader. Thus, the tactics of the French 1st Corps at Worth ought not to have contained anything surprising to us, as those tactics had been min- utely discussed in German military literature prior to the war, and the fire effect of the chassepot rifle, which we be- littled (probably for reasons of training), ought not to have been unknown to the troops. The annihilating effect of hos- tile arms must not be allowed to offer something new to our troops. Proper target practice must make known the effect of arms to the troops and get them accustomed to have the artillery and other arms fire over their heads. As far as possible, the primary battle impressions must not be for- eign to the troops. Dragomiroff's method of training, to PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 13 strengthen the will and the heart, was correct, though it had been completely misunderstood in Russia. The leader must be able to see his troops bleeding, but he must also know how to save them from unexpected high losses. The more individual the training has been in time of peace, the more the will to gain victory has been fostered, the more the readiness to assume responsibility has been developed, the better will the troops behave under the first impressions in battle. The individual will perform more, the more he is trained in the use of his arm, and the more he is imbued with the feeling that he is superior to the enemy in its use. In prior wars the British, the French, and the Russian boasted of their superiority to all other armies, in the use of the bayonet. This conviction in a way hurt them, as it merely fostered the desire to seek the decision in hand to hand fighting. Similarly, in the World War the conviction of the superiority of the German infantry in close range fighting which was proven in the very first battles, and there- after spread throughout the army, played a great role in the stubbornness of defense and in the relentless attack. Under the surprising impression of the effect of hostile fire we quickly discount the effect of our own fire, when it becomes the "safety valve of our own nervousness," as when the skir- misher fires only to deaden his hearing, or to be doing some- thing. Here the influence of the subordinate commanders and of quieter and better educated men must make itself felt, to attain a slow, well-aimed fire. The moral value of the individual is the decisive factor. We must not forget the importance of drill. It may be possible that other peoples do not feel its beneficial influ- ence. But we require drill by all means. We should never forget that it was nothing but the drill which helped the Guard at St. Privat gain the victory with the employment of obsolete formations and in spite of enormous losses. When imminent danger of death overpoweringly awakens the striving for salvation, when the frightful impressions of the battle cloud the clear understanding, then the often-heard word of command must electrify the soldier and make him capable to perform his duty. Therefore we cannot go too far in demanding the utmost endeavors in time of peace ; but 14 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR not in the forms of a senseless marching around the parade or drill ground, but in the forms used in battle. We foster the drill, not for inspections, but for war. However, the army has no community life for itself alone. Prior to the World War, the army was the school through which a very material portion of the people went. Army and people are, and must be, one. Education of the entire people for efficiency in war and willingness to sacri- fice is a political and national necessity, and at the same time the main basis for the successful training of an army equal to all conditions. We were not saved from surprises in the World War, as will be shown later on. But we did not treat them merely passively, we became master of them and utilized them. That was possible only through the manner of our peace training, through rapid dissemination of all experiences, and through never slacking up in our work during the rest pauses between the battles. "It has always been moral factors which have decided a war, even before it began, and it will always be moral factors that will do so. In compari- son with them everything else, organization, numbers, arma- ment, and even leadership, are but secondary considera- tions. And that is even true of leadership, as has just been said, because in an army in which every individual is trained to perform his highest duty, the leadership cannot be bad. And even if leadership sometimes commits an error, which is but human, what are those errors as compared with the efficiency that overtops everything, and the moral strength ? "But let us not believe that at any time any technical inventions, even if they are ever so enormous, will be able to change even the very least bit of the nature of war. It is true that they may change the forms, but they will never touch war's inner core. The capability to be victorious is not naturally inherent to any people. It cannot be bor- rowed from nature for eternity. No, the capability for victory must be educated into the people and into the army and must be maintained by strict performance of duty. Maintenance is frequently more difficult than acquisition. Two races, two nations, may be physically equal and have PEACE TRAINING AND REALITY OF WAR 15 the same intelligence, but if in case of one of them the capa- bility of greater sacrifices by the individual, and thus by the entire people, is less than is the case with the other, it is as certain as the sun rises in the morning and sets at night, that war will pass its hard judgment on the lesser sacri- fice." II. Mobile Warfare TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION The German leadership sought the annihilating battle as quickly as possible ; and in order to be able to conduct it at the decisive point, satisfied itself with defensive proce- dure on minor fronts, or with giving ground, prior to the decisive battle. The training of the infantry in time of peace was in full conformity with those intentions. Train- ing in peace was based on the excellent drill regulations of May 5, 1906, which of course had their origin in 1888, but which had been revised several times. Special preference to training in mobile warfare sought to foster the spirit of attack on the part of the infantry in every possible manner. The leaders saw the basis of all military success in indepen- dence, properly checked by tactical training and education, in increased firing ability and marching capacities, as well as in drill intelligently carried out. We cannot blame the troops for their inclination to a so-called "attack-agitation" in carrying out the attack. This however prevented the co-operation between infantry and artillery which would have produced the fullest effect. Insufficient time was given to battle reconnaissance, to the establishment of means of communication, and it cannot be denied that there was a great preference for dense skirmish lines. But this peace training had such a permanent effect that the regular soldier and the reservist could not be distinguished in their capa- bilities within a few days. The officers of the furlough class were prominent by their knowledge and faithfulness to duty. The effect of the training course, held before the war on the drill grounds, could be plainly felt. Only the aims should have been set higher. It must be attributed to the youth and incomplete training of many officers who had been promoted on the battlefield, that they not always found the proper "tone" in their relation with the older soldiers whom they had been with but shortly before in ranks, and to whom they were now superiors. The difficulty in pre- serving the status as superiors, placed the new officers in 16 MOBILE WARFARE 17 a difficult position often erroneously considered as super- cilious ; it probably might have been better to transfer these officers, on commission, to other units. It was far from those officers to be cold to their subordinates, though they were blamed for that. Many of the newly appointed officers failed. Instead of setting an example to their men, they thought more of their ease and pleasure, which could be procured behind the front by any one with sufficient means. The subordinate had sharper eyes than the superior. The danger to consider single instances as the general rule, lay near. It cannot be denied that in selecting the provisional applicants for commissions we did not always exercise suffi- cient care, and on the other hand, we were frequently too slow in promoting acting officers. How frequently, however, have we seen that in battle the men preferred to follow the youngest lieutenant than the older well-tried noncommis- sioned officer. The necessity to carefully husband our material for commissioned officers which compelled us to cut out a "leader reserve" before battle, encountered small compre- hension ; the great loss in officers show that very plainly. In the course of the World War the conditions of re- plenishment became worse. Younger levies at home had grown up uninfluenced by the older men in the field. The irresponsibility of youth in Germany increased and the short time for training at home by officers that were not of the best grade offered no counterweight. To this were added difficulties in the matter of subsistence. Increases in wages made the relations more acute between employers and em- ployees and between superiors and subordinates. Through this new levy, and through the influence of men of the field army, home on furlough, mistrust was sowed between the recruits and the officers, which was not fully perceived in the first two years of the war. It was strange, but in the officers, people saw only "Prolongers of the War," who were believed to expect higher rank from the longer duration of the war, while as a matter of fact, a major general, for in- stance, remained a full year longer in that grade than he would have in time of peace, before being promoted to lieu- tenant general. The talk that officers procured at the cost 18 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR of the men, advantages which were denied the men, was easily believed. We do not want to deny, by any means, that irregularities happened, that through the method of appointing officers much was made easier for them. But in general the officers can be proud of the fact that they took good care of their men. Mistrust existed, factory workers believed that preference in the matter of granting furloughs was given to agricultural workers, while the latter objected to the numerous claims of well paid factory workers for ex- emption from service. All this ill feeUng was increased by the advanced cost of all necessities at home ; and many men returned to the field army disgusted with conditions at home. As was the case during the Franco-Prussian War, the losses in officers were extremely high in the first battles, so that young officers quickly became company and even battal- ion commanders. It was soon perceived, that it would have been wise to train every officer in time of peace for the du- ties of the next higher grade. Intense desire to attack on the part of the troops and bravery of the officers, never fear- ing bodily harm, helped the troops to overcome many diffi- cult situations. "All hail to that army where untimely bravery is frequently shown ; it may be a rank growth, but it is a sure indication of fruitful ground." The German defense held to a single line, fortified in depth as much as possible — and generally strongly occu- pied — sought the decision by the attack of its main reserve. Advanced positions, which had been occupied under the ex- periences of the fortress warfare (Regulations for fortress warfare, August 13, 1910, p. 123) assumed a doubtful im- portance and the question arose, due to increasing develop- ment of aerial reconnaissance, of advanced positions being replaced by false v/orks. Under the conviction that infan- try that can attack well, can also defend itself well, we had not paid as much attention to the technique of the defensive battle as should have been done. Leaders and troops paid little attention to the defense. The soldier does not love the spade. Troops that had participated in fortress maneuvers however were better trained for the close range battle in the use of hand grenades and minenwerfers. MOBILE WARFARE 19 The infantry was armed with the rifle model '98 (mag- azine under the barrel and pointed bullet) . The complement of machine guns was not sufficient. There were onlj^ 6 guns to the regiment. The fire effect was excellent, but the sled mount was too heavy; protective shields intended to offer protection to the men in the fire fight and during fire pauses, betrayed their location by their size. The intrenching equipment had been augmented shortly before the war by the addition of an intrenching tool wagon for each regiment (field train) containing 230 long handled spades. With the small intrenching equipment, suitable only for digging trenches of little depth, 1 company could construct a trench of 150 meters. The supply of wire cut- ters and wood working tools was inadequate. Hand grenades, introduced by the Russian infantry, were used only by pioneers. The "protective coloring" of the field equipment was not correctly done. The various arms betrayed themselves by different colored insignia. Officers fell because of their equipment, order clasps, belts, sashes, and especially the officers' long side-arms. To each infantry regiment were attached 6 telephone squads with 18 kilometers of light wire (not field wire as in case of telephone battalions), and there were an addi- tional 12 kilometers of light wire on the infantry ammu- nition wagon. Of special importance for mobile warfare was the equipment of mobile field kitchens. The Russians had these rolling kitchens but not the French nor British. The Jager battalions, composed of picked men, and intended for the support of the army cavalry, had been reinforced by 1 cyclist and 1 machine gun company each. They performed excellent services due to their increased fire, their training and the excellent material of which they were composed. The German cavalry had excellent well trained animals, though a little sensitive against extremes of temperature. The troopers, trained by 3 years' service, were armed with the carbine and tubular steel lance as principal weapons; the "thrusting" saber, fastened to the saddle was little suited to the German cavalry for their "strike and cutting 20 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR method." Our cavalry could meet the French and British cavalry with full confidence. France believed that the Ger- man cavalry had a great love for fighting dismounted. The regulations of March 4, 1909, rightly warned against fight- ing on foot in only a half-hearted manner. These drill regulations also mentioned the possibility of carrying on at- tacks on a larger scale dismounted (C.D.R. 456) but laid par- ticular emphasis on the general rule, that the cavalry fight should in general be mounted (C.D.R. 389) ; also that cavalry must always try to solve its task mounted. "Only where the lance is out of place, the cavalry resorts to the carbine. In an engagement of all arms, small cavalry units may achieve local success by vigorous action at the right moment. Decisive participation in the course of a battle, either in the beating off of a hostile attack or in the support of our attack, is possible only by insertion of large masses of cavalry. The enemy is very vulnerable to a cavalry at- tack on his flank or rear. Merely threatening an attack in such a direction has a serious effect on the hostile troops. But the cavalry must not be satisfied with mere threaten- ing. Operations against the lines of communications of the enemy to the rear can have valuable results ; but these opera- tions should never divert the cavalry from its battle task. If a battle ensues, then the watchword for each large and small cavalry unit must be "participation in the victory." (C.D.R. 393-395.) Success against unshaken infantry is con- sidered possible "if the cavalry has come up close and can attack by surprise" (C.D.R. 441). An attack against shaken infantry will always be successful. Attack direction and attack formation are of less importance in this case. (C.D.R. 443.) Where possible, charges against infantry from sev- eral sides may be executed with depth formation, in which the leading waves are deployed. In attacks against artil- lery the advice was given to attack the flanks rather than the rear. Artillery under cover can be charged in front also, under certain conditions, without material loss (C.D.R. 444), and heavy artillery was pointed out as an especially vulner- able target (C.D.R. 448). In the service of reconnaissance the attack was especially emphasized, the impression created on an enemy by the offensive action of patrols and recon- MOBILE WARFARE 21 noitering detachments was valued especially high. It was believed that no valuable information could be gained by making detours. The enemy undoubtedly would endeavor to hide important measures from our view, which could only be overcome by force of arms. To foster the offensive spirit, stress was laid on the fact that our mounted messengers could find their way back only after the hostile reconnoi- tering detachments had been driven from the field. The composition of the larger units (army cavalry) was consistent with the demands of reconnaissance and battle ; higher cavalry commanders were instructed to cause the consolidation of several cavalry divisions on the battle- field into 1 cavalry corps (C.D.R. 523), in so far as this had not been done during the course of the operations (C.D.R. 229). The cavalry division consisted of 3 cavalry brigades, each of 2 regiments, 1 machine gun battalion, 1 pioneer de- tachment, and 1 information detachment. Some cyclist troops and a Jager battalion were attached. During the year prior to the war, the German artil- lery had been increased so that each infantry division had the disposition of 2 regiments, of 6 batteries and 2 light ammunition columns each; 1 battalion thereof being equip- ped with light field howitzers. Corps had the disposition of a heavy howitzer battalion of 4 batteries. We could count on the attachment of mortars (21-cm.) and heavy guns in battle. At the beginning of the World War the field bat- teries had 6 guns and caissons ; horse batteries, 4 guns and caissons, heavy field howitzer batteries, 4 howitzers with 8 caissons, and mortar batteries, 4 mortars and caissons. During the course of the war all field batteries were limited to 4 guns, without any disadvantages accruing thereby, as far as military literature shows. In the 6-gun battery there were 136 rounds per piece available, in the French 4-gun battery 312 rounds for each piece. The field gun, model '96, with its very effective shrapnel, was considered the main fighting weapon, and less importance was attached to the shell, as shown by the supply thereof carried by the battery. The light field howitzer with high explosive shell was to be employed principally against artillery targets be- hind cover, villages, and troops in dense forests. "It is able 22 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR to pierce most of the cover found in the field, and to fire on captive balloons and airplanes at high altitude." (F.A.D.R., 356.) The heavy field howitzers, drawn by heavy draft horses, broken to fire, was considered an especially effective gun to fire on artillery under cover and on strongly fortified positions. Only when the crisis of battle demanded it were the heavy field howitzers advanced at the trot. The princi- pal projectile was the percussion shell (instantaneous and delayed fuse). The employment of the mortar battery was made more difficult by the parts of the gun being carried separately on the march — barrel, cradle and trail. It re- quired about five minutes to assemble the piece. Equipped with a mobile and efficient heavy artillery the German Army was presumed to have a material superiority over its oppo- nents. It could, "delay by its long range pieces the advance of the enemy ; could force him to make detours ; could block or keep open defiles." "It also can take up the battle against heavy hostile artillery and thereby facilitate going into posi- tion of light batteries at effective range." (F.A.D.R. 388.) As the battery that is in the open can be rapidly destroyed, the development of the telephone and the indirect laying method, caused the field artillery to generally be found fir- ing from covered positions. Causing the officers of the fur- lough class to attend courses of instruction in field artillery schools of fire, had disseminated knowledge of indirect lay- ing and the new firing procedure to a very great extent. Regulations demanded that the field artillery should at times disregard the advantages of covered positions, and should fire from the open to bring about the decision in the infantry battle. (F.A.D.R., 367.) In such emergency even the hottest infantry fire was not to be feared. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the battle activity of infantry and artillery must be of the closest and that the main task of the latter is to support the infantry (I.D.R. 44, 446, F.A.D.R. 366). Co-operation of these two arms was demanded, but it was left to the training in peace time to find the suitable means therefor. (I.D.R. 447, F.A.D.R. 368.) That require- ment left much to be desired. We intended to force the de- fender to leave his position and show his troops by having our infantry advance and attack (F.A.D.R. 494, H.A.D.R. MOBILE WARFARE 23 454) . Then the task was left to the artillery to annihilate the enemy with its sheaf of projectiles. Contrary to this method, the French Regulations contemplated but a portion of the artillery firing on the attacking infantry, while the mass of the guns were to engage the hostile artillery. Conduct of the artillery battle was left to the commander of the artil- lery. Employment by regiment and by battalion was the rule, without however prohibiting the employment of sin- gle batteries and platoons. It was recommended that in- stead of dispersion, employment by groups be resorted to, for the better utilization of the terrain for facilitating fire control (F.A.D.R. 366). Hostile artillery was to be engaged by field fire and heavy artillery combined, though we did not deceive ourselves in thinking that locating batteries under cover would be easy. If we did not succeed in locating the hostile batteries, firing on observation posts that were visi- ble might promise success. (F.A.D.R. 438.) In any case the infantry had to become used to the belief that the attack must be made even when the artillery did not succeed in gaining fire superiority. The infantry division formed the battle unit; 2 to 6 infantry divisions were formed into an army corps or group, which could be reinforced in artillery according to the sit- uation. All fighting arms were combined in the infantry division, while corps headquarters reserved to itself the dis- position of the heavy artillery, information detachments, columns and trains. Dividing the infantry division into 2 infantry brigades of 2 regiments and 1 artillery brigade, also of 2 regiments (a corresponding number of infantry and artillery regiments) undoubtedly assisted in the proper co-ordination of these arms. This co-ordination was inter- fered with by the assignment of a light field howitzer bat- talion. The organization of the infantry into 2 brigades was disadvantageous in so far as the brigade unit became disrupted in deploying for battle from the march column. One brigade commander became superfluous. A better so- lution, and one corresponding to the battle object, was at- tained by decreasing the units into 3 infantry regiments and 3 artillery battalions (1 of the latter a light field how- itzer battalion) . Experience soon showed this organization 24 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR corresponded best with the demands of battle, even if the overhead, in comparison with numbers of troops, became larger. Many instances happened where field guns and light field howitzers were found in the same battalions. It was a grave error to send the 22d and 27th Reserve Corps in October, 1914, to Flanders and Poland, after a short period of training, without attaching strong artillery to them. Only a few commanders, with war experience, could be assigned to them by transfer, at the last hour and the number of seasoned soldiers in those corps was very small. Intense enthusiasm could not offset training and equipment. These corps went to pieces in Flanders under heavy losses. This was the more serious, as in these corps the men were from the well educated classes and we lost considerable ma- terial that could have been used later on for commissioned officers. We thus gained the same experiences as we did in the Wars of Liberation, in forming volunteer corps. Events of war proved that new organizations of young troops, Land- wehr and Landstrum, require a more liberal supply of ar- tillery, to give them the same fighting power, as active and reserve organizations. No one can foretell in arranging war organizations when units will be compelled to fight at a de- cisive point. The divisional cavalry originally organized into 3 squad- rons, still possessed a certain fighting strength. This strength proved itself unnecessary the more the cavalry confined itself to message service and near reconnaissance. In the matter of technical troops, only 1 pioneer com- pany with division bridge train was attached; this sufficed for mobile warfare, but was not sufllicient as the change was made into position warfare. There were no division in- formation detachments, and only 1 sanitary company. Ersatz units, at mobilization received an insufficient instructor personnel. When the loss in officers became so great these units very soon lost their active officers by transfer. This loss was very bad for the training of the Ersatz troops. The retired officers detailed as instructors, did not comprehend the requirements of modern war. This increased the difficulties in training at home, so that units in the field were satisfied to have only primary drill and MOBILE WARFARE 25 training take place at home, while the actual training for work in the field was undertaken by divisions independently, in field recruit depots gradually established. In any case these replacements could be furnished quicker from divi- sion depots than to be brought from home. For this the army authorities should have made arrangements in time of peace. All experiences gained in war proved that field recruit depots were necessary in the theater of war. The training in the field recruit depots was enhanced by the military atmosphere; by the immediate use of cam- paign experiences and lessons ; and by life within the midst of hostile peoples. According to the progress of their train- ing the men were formed into companies. Strict orders had to be issued that the men subsequently were sent to join their former organizations or in case or recruits, to whose home district they belonged. This was especially important in consideration of furthering esprit de corps. In the battles on the Hochberg near Rheims in 1917 one battalion of my division was almost annihilated. Within three days it had been filled up again from our field recruit depot, and by transfer of officers, and was again ready for employment. We generally allowed eight weeks for training in the Er- satz battalion, four of which was for company training. In that short a time nothing thorough could, of course, be ac- complished. The greatest difficulties encountered were to make good the losses in officers. The Ersatz battalions com- menced very early to train younger acting officers and of- ficer aspirants. As compared with the old noncommis- sioned officers, who in most cases were far more advanced in years, they lacked experience in military service and in the field. It might probably have been better to promote efficient first sergeants and sergeants major to commis- sioned rank, as rapid promotion of young men causes bad blood very quickly. In the field mental education alone is without value. If the young officers were assigned to a unit of well trained troops, their value in the field grew gradually. It was no illusion whatever that such a short time of training could not suffice to create a unit of war- trained troops. A superficial training, deceiving the lay- man, can be attained, but we can never create the cohesion 26 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR and the morale, which assures the primary battle value of troops. Campaigns clearly showed the importance of a well trained peace army. Even the training of Kitchener's armies does not justify a militia system. Training was had under the pressure of military events. There was a nucleus of units that had been trained in peace, furthered by the sporting sense of the entire nation. The primary training was not for the difficult mobile war, but for mere position warfare, in which the troops were supported by superior artillery. The war situation permitted the high command to designate the time for recruits to be sent to the front according to the status of their training. Complaints that the army, with its young officers, was not able to cope with the difficult situations, were frequently heard. Sporting rifle clubs and military training in the schools and colleges of the nation are absolutely necessary for an army that has but short period of service in peace time. Athletic and similar training are not only for bodily training, they are, for the mind also, of great value. They not only further the will power but demand within a stated time the great- est exertion of all mental and physical powers. Thus they directly increase the value of our youth for service in the field. Labor Battalions modeled after those of Japan, were organized by us early in the war. These units relieved the fighting troops from detaching large numbers of men and preserved their fighting strength. The Russians learned this lesson to their sorrow through the difficulties they en- countered in bringing up recruits in Eastern Asia. Men, who were unsuited for active service in the field under arms, were enrolled in the labor battalions, and under efficient officers, performed excellent services. The infantry, as a matter of course, had to bear the heaviest burden. In active officers of infantry, the 7th Army Corps lost 70%, 60% of officers of the furlough class, and 40 9( of the men. The corresponding numbers in field artillery were 45%,, 35% and 7%. The tactical views of the Austrian Infantry, after they had been purged of false ideas of the lessons of the Boer War, were in general in accordance with the tactical views MOBILE WARFARE 27 of the German leadership. The Austrians did not fully un- derstand the method of German training, in which prime im- portance was laid on good training in firing and marching. However a portion of the Austrian Infantry was well trained for mountain warfare. In time of peace each regiment had 2, in war 3 machine guns with tripod and collapsible shields carried on pack animals. It was believed machine guns could replace artillery at short range and their employment in defense as a fire reserve in widely separated positions was recommended. Regulations of 1911 laid emphasis on the value of training in close formation in order to increase discipline. This however without limiting the front to be covered in the various exercises. The Regulations desig- nated "the inflexible will" as the power that would mainly decide the battle: — "In case the attacker does not succeed in gaining fire superiority, even after inserting all his rifles, the commander must always remember that even in apparently hopeless situations success will come to the side which is the more stubborn. Tenaciously persisting is far better, and causes less losses, than retreat When dur- ing a costly, stubborn infantry engagement the enervating influences of the battlefield have caused the utmost exhaus- tion on both sides, that side will gain the victory whose iron discipline and stronger will power enables him to better withstand that exhaustion, and who continues the fight with unshakeable persistence, until he has forced the enemy to desist Upon the sure, firm will of the comman- der reflects all actions of the troops. If he vacillates in his decision, his uncertainty is transmitted to his subordinates. He must let his will permeate to his subordinates, and must always take care that his will turns into action." The im- portance of independence was especially emphasized. In the excellent words of our field regulations, par. 38, "Inac- tivity is criminal." It was pointed out that the decision being made and knowing its objective, the energetic exe- cution of the decision makes high demands on character. That often after success these demands must be increased. "After every battle the vital point is for the comman- der, and for the troops as well, to force themselves to over- come the mental, physical and moral tension, which, after 28 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR fatigue and danger, may easily lead to being satisfied with a half-success. Only a forceful, inflexible will can overcome this weakness. In most cases the commander must demand, after the success, a further extreme effort by all forces to complete the victory and annihilate the enemy. Only thus can he avoid renewed heavy sacrifices in subsequent bat- tles." The regulations of 1903, written under the fresh im- pressions of the Boer War, placed too high a value on fire effect, and credited fire as the only decisive element. The regulations of 1911 took into account the fact that the oppo- nent would display tenacity and persistence, which all lead- ers demand. "Infantry, imbued with the will to attack, physically and morally well trained and well led, can fight successfully under the most difficult conditions. The infan- try batters down the enemy with its fire, then with the bay- onet breaks down his last resistance." Good infantry must always look to the bayonet fight as the last resort, it is fre- quently indispensable to gain the decision. The final appeal to the bayonet, omitted in prior regulations, is found again in the new regulations. In its preparation for war the army suffered much from the small appropriations. A portion of the infantry (Landwehr) consisted mainly only of skeleton organizations so that the excellent plans for training of the drill regulations were of little use, the more so as the re- plenishment of officers had not been sufficiently prepared. The number of guns and machine guns of units did not cor- respond to the requirements of modern times. Still less than in Germany was the population, fit to carry arms, made available for service in the army. The Austrian Cavalry was excellently trained as such. Its regulations corresponded to those of the German cav- alry. The artillery had been for years the elite arm. Theo- retically well trained, it suffered from having a small num- ber of guns. In an army corps there were only 8 gun bat- teries, 2 light and 2 heavy field howitzer batteries, a total of 84 guns against 160 in the German army. Austria's ar- tillery had not been sufficiently trained for the tasks of fire control in large scale battles. MOBILE WARFARE 29 At the opening of the war the Imperial Austrian army was not a valuable instrument for war. The value of the army was decreased by the composition of the States from which men, with different racial qualities, and different poli- tical aims were drawn. German and Hungarian troops were decidedly superior to Slavic troops. High losses in the first battles, for the replenishment of which little preparations had been made, the absence of an old, well-tried corps of noncommissioned officers, the mixture of non-German with German troops, with no common language, the unreliability of the Slavic troops, an indisputable effeminacy on the part of the officers, decreased the value of the army still fur- ther. "In the instruction of officers training in will power was neglected, knowledge and education were rated higher. More dutiful subordinates, than independent, forceful sup- eriors were trained; we systematically accustomed the offi- cer to be dependent and to await leadership. In the general staff, knowledge was the prime requisite; the general staff dominated the forms of troop leading and the issue of or- ders, but was insufficiently acquainted with the instrument with whose help it intended to utilize its knowledge." In 1916 an exchange was tried with German officers ; it was hoped to give the Austrian army a greater degree of power of resistance through the increased influence of German offi- cers in its training, and through the insertion of German troop units into the Imperial Austrian units of the army. But it was too late for that. The army lacked strict disci- pline, lacked the enormous driving power, and lacked the sense of duty, of the German troop units which never failed in the first four years. TACTICS OF MOBILE WARFARE The rapid advance of the German Armies in the West made a material change in the method of fighting impossi- ble; the troops attacked as they had been taught in peace; after the first experiences the skirmish lines were kept thin- ner. Troop leadership sought to give plenty of time for the absolutely necessary battle reconnaissance, and for a better co-operation with the artillery. Proper utilization of the terrain progressed under the stimulus of the hostile fire. 30 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR On the eastern front the training of the German infantry, was so superior to its opponent that here also a change in the method of fighting was not considered necessary. It must be said that the Russians had many excellent quali- ties. Its infantry especially showed the benefit of the ex- periences gained in the Russo-Japanese War in its use of the hand grenade and field fortifications. While demanding the strictest discipline, our regulations had educated the troops in initative and the will to attack. It had given them the means to adapt themselves to the changing forms of battle. Where high losses occurred, the reason could in- variably be traced to non-observance of the maxims laid down in regulations. A material difference in the conception of the infantry attack in Germany and in France existed prior to the World War in the value laid on utilizing infantry fire. Regula- tions for the training of the French infantry published im- mediately prior to the World War did not mention the neces- sity of gaining the infantry fire superiority, the artillery rather was to hold down the hostile guns, and then to facili- tate the advance of the infantry by heavy fire on the de- fender's infantry. "Infantry is the main arm; it fights through fire and on the move. Only the forward movement, leading to hand-to-hand fighting, is decisively irresistible, and usually an effective and strong fire has to open the road to pierce the enemy Artillery fire, which has only a very slight effect on an enemy under cover, can never by itself drive the defender out of his position. The advance of the infantry must compel the opponent to show himself and to offer targets. The artillery supports the advance of the infantry, by annihilating everything that might hold up that advance." Infantry must resort to its protecting arm if the hostile fire prevents a continuation of the forward movement, which, as soon as possible, should be resumed. Our German regulations considered "the most excellent means for working up, (prerequisite to going forward) to be gaining fire superiority" (170), "which will be perceived by the decreasing hostile fire, or by the enemy firing too high" (336). In this, errors were possible, as fire pauses, ordered by hostile commanders, due to firing with incorrect MOBILE WARFARE 31 sight elevations, might only too easily be mistaken as due to the results of our fire. The demands of the Infantry Drill Regulations (374), to not make the execution of the infan- try attack mainly dependent on first gaining artillery fire superiority, seldom furnished a basis in field exercises to execute an attack with our own infantry weapons. We waited until our attacking artillery had gained fire super- iority. During the Russo-Japanese War it was reported of Japanese attacks that they had been executed without the Japanese artillery having gained fire superiority. Reports from the Balkan war made us study the statements accord- ing to which Bulgarian and Serbian infantry had worked their way up to within 200 to 300 meters of the enemy with- out firing a shot. By deploying into small detachments and under efficient support by the attacking artillery, a well trained unit might get close to the enemy and take up the fire fight only at close range. This was successfully achieved by the 43d Infantry Brigade (General v. Hiilsen) on Sep- tember 9, 1914, at Gerdauen. French reports available at this time praise the rapid advance of our infantry and their excellent utilization of the terrain, without waiting for the artillery preparation. They state that the fire effect of the infantry was annihil- ating and that the machine guns were used effectively at every opportunity and with surprising skill. The effects of the field artillery were considered less favorable. The reports further say that the superiority of the German tactics was especially noticeable in the open terrain during the battle of Saarburg. The hostile divisions were anni- hilated in a frightful frontal attack, though the French in- fantry utilized the terrain most excellently and could barely be distinguished. The Alpine Chasseurs and the colonial troops fought very well. The skill of the French in defend- ing a village was especially noticeable, while at the start the fire of the French infantry and machine guns did not come up to our expectations. That may have been because we valued the artillery effect too highly and believed that it could overcome every halt that was forced on us. Though the fire was good by itself, the French sought every oppor- tunity to attempt a flanking movement, and was seen to be 32 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR especially adept in finding good firing positions, unperceived by the enemy, in houses, bams, sheds, etc. The French positions also had a great depth, the lead- ing line consisting of single rifle trenches, connected by false works, and the foreground excellently arranged. Farm- ing implements that had been left in the fields, scarecrows, and trees were utilized to designate the range. In the British Infantry were found many excellent marksmen, who acted independently. Much attention was given to flanking fire; loopholes and embrasures in the trenches, arranged so as to allow firing obliquely to the line of retreat had the preference ; trenches were generally well hidden, were constructed in sawtooth shape or wave-like, so that the attacker could be taken under oblique fire, while the enemy's fire, straight from the front against the loop- holes had no effect. The trenches usually lay 300 to 500 meters below the crest or behind hedges. The troops made much use of night firing. Subsequent to the first battles much was heard in Ger- many of the insidious conduct of the French and Belgians ; it was said that each soldier (?) had a suit of civilian cloth- ing in his knapsack, to evade difficult situations or to carry on the war as a bushwhacker. Long range ricochets caused the suspicion that inhabitants had fired from houses, and it was also assumed that the entire population took part in the information service. Cases of that kind certainly did happen, but should not be taken as the general rule. There is no doubt that the Germans were much inferior to their opponents in the employment of permitted and forbidden war ruses and tricks, and our men did not consider it fair that the enemy should resort to placing sharpshooters in trees, and neither did they consider the conduct of the British sharpshooters posted in cabbage fields as permissible. At the start our men were not suspicious enough and they trusted the inhabitants too much. Subsequently they saw in each inhabitant a traitor. The German rifle fire had an enormous effect, probably being the result of carefully firing each round in the manner taught in peace in connection with the training in the con- tinuous rifle fire, increasing and decreasing according to MOBILE WARFARE 33 the situation. The main fire fight was carried on at about 800 meters range, then the lines advanced in long, broad rushes, to close with the enemy quickly without awaiting for our artillery to gain fire superiority in each instance. Under the impression created by this advance, hostile fire effect soon diminished, and in most cases the French did not await the contact but retreated when the attacker came to within 500 meters, thus offering excellent targets to the artillery. Our troops felt superior to the enemy in short range fighting. The example set by the officers and by a few courageous men, who in time of peace had not been numbered amongst the best subordinates, was of de- cisive influence. In battle everyone went straight ahead and everyone fired straight to the front. In the very first bat- tles the importance of independence could be seen. Fire control, developed in peace time to perfection with its precise words of command, was practiced only in the most favorable instances at the opening of fire. The noise of battle is generally such that we cannot hear our own com- mands. Targets — almost exclusively a strip of the terrain from where the noise of firing seems to come — and eleva- tion, will be designated by the platoon commander as long as practicable, but very soon the fire control will slip out of his hands, and his place is taken by the squad leader and finally by the individual skirmisher. This is of no very great importance, provided the individual correctly observes the effect, husbands his ammunition, increases the fire rapidity when the target becomes more favorable, and decreases it when the target fades, and ceases fire at once when the target disappears. The command "fire slower, fire quicker" merely indicates inattention or insufficient training. In carrying the fire forward to the enemy, in gaining the fire superiority by infantry, supported by the fire of the artillery, the Infantry Drill Regulations saw the surest means of success, and demanded that infantry open fire only at mid range even in a terrain devoid of cover. In bat- tle the conviction gained ground more and more, that to bring the defender into a condition where he could be charged, was the principal task of the artillery and that, considering that the infantry could rapidly entrench, fire M DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR preparation by infantry was a minor matter. Besides the terrain, the possibility of our own and of the enemy's fire effect controlled the manner in which infantry worked it- self up to charging distance. But even under the most favorable conditions artillery will not be able to open a road for the infantry to victory, even if reliable connection is maintained during the entire attack between the two arms. Insufficient support of artillery forced the infantry to resort to the spade to hold the ground it had gained. The infantry soon perceived that incautious conduct on the part of the staffs and troops soon drew the hostile artillery fire, and that fire was then directed also on points where in the opinion of the enemy commanders, German troops were moving and where they might be halting. The fire was then in the shape of a sweeping fire up to the longest ranges. This occasionally caused material losses to an incautious unit, but a cautious unit could avoid it, as the method of fire was distinguished by regular uniformity. The French artillery designated buildings, woods, and rows of trees as "artillery traps." Frequently the fire commenced with a well prepared fire-surprise and the effect then might be very great. The artillery took pleasure — being covered in front against the German artillery — in firing into neighbor- ing sectors. Reconnaissance and scouting that attracted no atten- tion was now of importance, in order to cross the long and mid-ranges by smaller units vdth irregularly formed skir- mish lines, to gain a firing position at about 400 to 500 paces from the enemy. The skirmish lines were made denser by supports rushing forward from cover to cover. It was also found to be well to bring the reserves up in skirmish waves. Massing the reserves at points that could be seen from afar, proved to be an error. The success of the attack was based on the efficiency of the lowest commanders; battalion and regimental commanders had their hands full in inserting the troops and keeping up connection with the artillery, as well as with efficiently bringing up the reserves, and could not therefore supervise all the minor details of troop lead- ing. MOBILE WARFARE 35 Night engagements very soon assumed increased im- portance; their success frequently became questionable by reason of insufficient preparation and by the fact that no attention was being paid to the lessons of war that had been compiled during peace. Dense skirmish lines, with scouts far to the front, were found to be of advantage, or any for- mation in close order with narrow front extension. It was found best to execute the advance with pieces unloaded. All distances were shortened. The decision was sought in the charge with cold steel and without shouting. If the enemy was encountered, an immediate charge was always of advantage. As the enemy undoubtedly was prepared to fire, it was well to draw his fire by false movements and to conduct the charge in another direction, but in any case to clear the roads. Charges that were to pierce deep into the enemy, required formation in depth. Conduct in case of artificial illumination (agreed-on signals or signs for our own illumination or our own information) and co-operation with searchlights (light signals, flank protection) required special training. In the defense, fire must be opened only if the enemy is recognized beyond doubt. The practice, re- commended by Regulations, of laying guns and rifles during daylight for firing at night, was hardly ever resorted to; night fire was as a rule executed by machine guns, not by riflemen. Frequently it was found better not to occupy the skirmish trenches, because the defender, standing lower was of a disadvantage against the attacker standing higher; it was found to be best during the night to have the unoccu- pied trenches as an obstacle in front of the line. The newly organized reserve corps employed in Flan- ders in October, 1914, did of course utilize the experiences of the Western front, but suffered from the difficulties in- herent to all new organizations, when they have been insuffi- ciently trained and fcicompletely equipped. The first battles caused heavy losses among the young, inexperienced troops, but by early summer of 1915 they had been trained in the following attack method. Approach to within about 800 meters of the enemy with patrols, which reconnoiter and find out everything necessary for the battle activity. Ad- vance by the company on a narrow front in skirmish waves, 36 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR companies 200 meters in rear of each other. Intrenching in the first firing position, reinforcing with machine guns, and men making the firing line denser to an interval of two paces between skirmishers. Working forward by squads up to the next firing position, which again will be entrenched. From the firing position close to the enemy the charge starts under all available fire protection, the captured position be- ing immediately arranged for defense against a counter- attack that is sure to come. The French First Army (Dubail, November 27, 1914) demanded that troops, as the result of the first lessons gained in the war, abandon, the march column 10 to 12 kilo- meters from the enemy and continue the further advance deployed; that the infantry, in open terrain, should not show any unit in close order at 10 kilometers range from the hostile infantry, but work up to 500 meters in the smallest units and these intrench when they could no longer advance. In covered, close terrain and in hazy weather, each battalion in the first line was to send ahead 1 company, followed by 2 companies echeloned to the flanks, and followed in turn in their center by the reserve company. For fighting in woods it was laid down that the companies in the second line should at once turn against the enemy. It was recommended that in night fighting an advance be made by half platoons in column of fours. A German report concerning the French method of at- tack supplements these Regulations. "Frequently individ- uals rushed forward, assembling again in squads at the nearest cover. Stretches of open terrain were crossed in this manner in very thin lines, echeloned, and offering a very poor target. The supports and even the reserves fol- lowing the skirmishers separated into small groups, never more than a platoon, with large intervals. The endeavor seemed to be to reach the mid ranges without material losses and there to form skirmish lines that could take up the bat- tle in force. The fire of these skirmish lines usually was very strong, but was of little effect as soon as it met our in- fantry fire." The French infantry was excellently supported by its artillery, which utilized its long range guns to the utmost. MOBILE WARFARE 37 Its skill was very great in finding and taking up covered positions, in frequently changing positions and in observa- tion. Batteries, platoons and single guns took position with very irregular, different intervals and in echelon. It appears that the French entirely abandoned the normal position with regular intervals. Detaching of platoons or pieces for the direct support of the infantry or for the purpose of flanking the leading lines was frequently observed. The French laid the greatest value on flanking fire. The en- deavor was very plain on the part of the French artillery, to cover itself frontally against German artillery firing straight to the front by this method of taking position, either using the terrain (ridges, villages, buildings) or by the use of masks (strips of wood, rows of trees, hedges). Each French gun carried a saw in its limber, by the use of which it procured for itself a line of sight through these masks and, covered frontally, fired obliquely, and mostly into the firing sector of its neighbor, and thus effectively flanked the neighbor's attack target. Therefore the French bat- teries were hard to locate by the German batteries, and could but seldom be perceived by our infantry in the front line, causing it frequently to assume that it was being fired on by its own artillery. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENT Based on the experiences of the war, changes in or- ganization and armament had been made in the summer of 1916, which were to make their influence felt on the method of fighting. The divisions were organized into 3 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of artillery of 9 batteries (3 of them light field howitzers) and 2 pioneer companies; the strength of the divisional cavalry had been reduced to 1 squadron, but the information troops had been permanently increased. Heavy artillery was assigned to the division from time to time according to need, so that in tranquil posi- tion warfare each division generally had 3 heavy field how- itzer batteries, 1 mortar battery and 2 heavy gun batteries. The number of machine guns had been materially increased, each battalion receiving 1 machine gun company of 6 guns. 38 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR By changing the construction of the gun carriage (wagon) the guns per company could subsequently be doubled. The introduction of automatic rifles whose importance the Ger- man infantry had found during the fighting on the Somme, took place in the Summer of 1917 ; the introduction of "fir- ing cups" for throwing grenades from the rifle, took place in the Spring of 1918, after specially constructed grenades had proved to be too heavy for mobile warfare. Each man was protected by a steel helmet, in addition received a gas mask and in many cases a long-handled spade, which was valued also as a means of hand-to-hand fighting. Every man was equipped with hand-grenades ; the originally adopted ball or disc grenades were not good, and they were replaced by grenades more easily handled, and the lighter egg grenades, which were carried in the attack in sandbags slung across the shoulder. There is no doubt that both sides overestimated the effect of the hand grenade and attached more value to it than to the rifle. An automatic pistol — "long pistol" — (16 per company) was supplied for trench warfare. For connection with the artillery colored light rockets served, and for connection with airplanes colored lights and large cloths (panels) were used. Shocktroops, minenwerfers and flame throwers taken from the position war, could also be employed in the mobile war. The artil- lery had made great progress in flash and sound ranging methods. Much more use was made of the shell, than had been expected before the war. In gas shells artillery pos- sessed a fighting means, independent of the direction of the wind, to neutralize hostile batteries and to gas stretches of the terrain. Airplanes increased in importance through armament, equipment with cameras and wireless apparatus. The means of communication were materially improved. In addition to the telephone there came into use intermittent lights, ground and wireless telegraph, light and sound sig- nals, information projectiles, carrier dogs and pigeons. In February, 1918, the divisions received wireless battalions (also for ground telegraphy), and the personnel with the troops was organized into troop message detachments as follows : each infantry regiment, had 1 regimental informa- tion platoon, consisting of 1 officer, and 13 men; each in- MOBILE WARFARE 39 fantry battalion had 1 battalion information platoon, consist- ing of 1 officer and 21 men ; each independent battalion (cav- alry rifle regiment) 1 battalion information platoon of 1 officer and 30 men. Employment, traffic and co-operation was in charge of the information officer under the direction of the regimental (battalion) commander. As early as 1915 the French commenced to organize their battalions into 3 infantry and 1 machine gun com- pany of 8 guns, and to attach automatic rifles — up to 16 — to the companies. By the law of September 27, 1916, the company organization was fixed. Each company, not count- ing officers, had a subsistence strength of 194, the fighting company proper having a strength of 168 men. This num- ber did not include 4 older noncommissioned officers and 22 men, used for runners, signal men and infantry pioneers. The men throwing hand and rifle grenades were designated "grenadiers," the gunners of the automatic machine guns were designated "fusiliers," and the rest as "voltigeurs." The fighting company was divided into 4 platoons of 2 half-platoons (sections) each. Of the half-platoons, the first always contained rifle grenadiers, hand grenade throw- ers and fusiliers, the second contained the voltigeurs, 4 rifle grenadiers and 2 cartridge carriers (pourvoyers) . All men were trained as hand grenade throwers. The fighting company numbered 32 hand grenade throwers, 16 rifle gren- adiers and 8 (12-16) gunners for automatic machine guns. The rifle grenade {Vivien Bessieres) fired from a firing cup, was very effective. With 16 rifles arranged with the appliance a barrage could be thrown with 150 rounds per minute at from 80 to 150 meters. In village fighting they replaced absent artillery, cut off the retreat of the enemy, prevented supports coming up, and defeated counter-at- tacks. Fire unity was sought. The possibility of fire by the automatic rifle on the move forced the enemy under cover in the final phases of the charge. Of course, the machine gun could not be entirely replaced, but the automatic rifle was especially useful in accompanying the infantry, to se- cure terrain that had been taken, to stop counter-shocks, and enable the bringing up of machine guns without undue haste. 40 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR The 37-mm. gun attached to the battalion was so mobile that it could follow the infantry in all battle situations ; its fire was exact, easy to regulate, had a range up to 1500 me- ters, and could be fired from a covered position. The pro- jectile had the effect of a shell, as solid shot pierced three sandbags, or steel plates. It was especially suited for anni- hilating invisible machine guns. In the attack waves the gun was not to be used, as there it would be easily seen and destroyed. In order to gain the highest efficiency of the company after its first organization, all war implements must act in co-operation, the supply of ammunition must be assured and the complement well trained. In the training the ma- chine guns and the 37-cm. gun directed their fire on targets above ground, the hand and rifle grenades against skirmish- ers or targets under cover. In the deployed line the interval between files was 4 to 5 paces. The platoon had an extension of 60 to 75 me- ters. In depth it was formed in two waves following each other at 10 to 15 meters distance, the grenadiers and fusil- iers in the first wave, the grenade carriers and voltigeurs in the second. They were followed by the nettoyeurs (trench moppers-up) at 10 to 20 meters distance, and the latter, at a distance of 40 to 50 meters, by the company reserves. The fighting front of one compan|y was 300 meters. By the law of September 10, 1917, the peculiar organi- zation of the platoon was even extended to the half -platoon "as after the filling up of the first line the battle is con- ducted by half -platoons ; therefore these should not only in case of need, but at the very start, combine all infantry auxiliary and fighting means and have the auxiliary weap- ons within themselves be able to take formation in depth." Each half-platoon had 1 sergeant and 14 to 18 men, with one automatic rifle attached. After the automatic rifles had been distributed to the half-platoons, the 8 guns re- maining comprised the materiel reserve — 4 to the company, 4 at the disposition of the division. There was no differ- ence made in half-platoons between grenadier (hand gren- ade throwers) and voltigeurs. The half-platoon consisted MOBILE WARFARE 41 French Battalion in Attack Formation Extension — 400 to 500 meters iBt Wav< 2d Wav( 1st Company 2d Company 2d Platoon ' 1st Platoon 2d Platoon ' ist Platoon > I I Section I S^tion S^tion | Section /rrst /f(Si J((S) 3d Wave S S, k -.- 4th Platoon I A 3d ipiatoon I GO* . I . J J-| ^ $ G^M G S^H S G \ Jf G d 4th Hatoon , 3d Platoon M S C^ Jf G S \Ji S G'Jf G S H M ^* J/ Jt \ // M /f Jf T Jt Jt 4th Ware J{ // \ /f Jf ' M /f 5th Wave^^^^ |^/ J-; /T/i/ 1 ^''J'; W&/ tflSl^S* /ffS) \jf(St ATU \ X{S) ^Jftt/ JK/St 6th Wave ^«>•> >¥^ /Trrr I r Lexjend : ^ 3-4 Hand Grenade • Throwers S 1 Cpl & 3 pvts ■to ( automatic rifles) /f 3-4 Rifle Grenade ^" throwers rLu/'F\ajae thrower ^ Company Comdr ™ with telephone operators & lighl signal equip- ment 4 Platoon Comdr with tel. operator 4 Sergeant & Section comdr -^ , , L/itter bearers ^ „ , Minenwerfers Cleaners-up Bn. Comdr with Tel & It. Signal Equipment .h/faJCp J M. G. Co. nil 2iPIatoon 200m p Ist.PlatooiL 3d Platoon^ 4tk PlatoM Section Section. 1^1^ 1^1^ i^i^ i^i^ J M, ^^05^any|/ |y f |j iiil 3d Company lJ7»r/»»37-mm. gun ) 42 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR of a complement (1 corporal, 3 men, fusiliers), of auto- matic rifles, of grenadiers V. B. (grenade gun) with 2 to 3 firing cups divided between the two squads. It was directed that an elite company be formed in each regiment. In the attack the half -platoon was formed into 2 waves with 10 to 15 meters distance, in the first wave the riflemen and the automatic machine gun squad, in the second wave the rifle grenade throwers and skirmishers. In the attack the platoon inserted its half-platoon either alongside or behind each other; in the latter case the first half -platoon was the vague d' assault (attacking wave), the second the vague de r^enfort (support), distance 60 to 100 meters, ex- tension (half-platoons in rear of each other) 40 to 45 meters. The nettoyeurs (trench moppers-up) were fur- nished by other than the attacking unit, which after the completion of their task formed the security detachment of the trenches. In England the same mixing of men took place. Each tactically independent platoon (28 to 44 men) consisted of 4 squads; riflemen, hand grenade throwers, light machine gun (Lewis gun) and rifle grenade throwers. Half of the men, were trained in the use of the machine gun, the other half in the use of the rifle grenade. TRAINING REGULATIONS FOR FOOT TROOPS At the close of the battles of the Somme in the Au- tumn of 1916 the lessons of the mobile and position war- fare that had been gathered were thoroughly examined. These were published to the troops in January, 1917, in the shape of an outline of "Training Regulations for Troops in the Field." The mobile war has proven the correctness of the general rules of our previous training and field exercises, and thus it was only a question of minor changes of our Field Service Regulations. The few directions how- ever contained in our F. S. R. concerning position warfare, required material revision and extension. The impor- tance of drill, as means to an end, to teach the individual the absolute necessity of the strictest obedience to his superior, had come to the front everywhere, especially in difficult battle situations. Troops, trained and educated MOBILE WARFARE 43 in a strict school, fought well. This fact had to be ad- hered to in the new Regulations, but on the other hand, the fact was not to be lost sight of that thoughtless drill, carried to excess on the drill ground, had a damaging effect. The increase in auxiliary arms and the necessity of making the "shock-troop procedure" the very life of the troops, led to the publication of a second outline edition in January, 1918. The Regulations treated of training, not leadership. Rigid adherence was held to careful, strict individual train- ing as a basis for the schooling of the unit, and all was left out which was not absolutely required in war. The train- ing of the individual was to be furthered at every oppor- tunity, either while at rest, or in the trenches. Special attention was paid to rigidity, exactness and order, in all close order drill. Double time in cadence, present arms, the manual of arms for the charge, and the use of signal flags was omitted. In extended order the formation in platoon columns was omitted, the line was the principal formation for the company. Drill ground formations were no more to be expected of the company, than skirmish fire in close order. Volley fire and the charge, gaining direction on guides sent to the front, the transition from line into column of squads while on the move, as well as different kinds of deployment for firing were done away with. A new designation was given to the single column (column of files) and also col- umn of twos, as column and double column. The most important formation in close order was the company column, in which the platoons are in column of squads, in double column, or single file with 1^ pace inter- val, which can be increased according to need (see plate). The company must be able to take up, in addition to the regulation formations, a formation adapted to the ter- rain and the available space. The formation of the pla- toons need not be the same in that case. The main point is that the company must be ready for employment in any direction according to existing conditions. By attaching the automatic rifles, the company received a materially changed appearance. Training Regulations (first edition) 44 DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS— WORLD WAR COMPANY COLUMN 20' ^ SOcmr ^^ BEZZIZI * ^!< /W^A rrrr-i tcnx) ■HT TTI W I.I I I I'm I I I rrrn ti I I I I s ■ strength of the Company 5 officers 22 NCO 160 men 9' 6eo(t)e6 ©OOQ ■ I I I! SdOO© axD ^32123 1 machine grun wagon l-CH i Company Commander 3 Lieutenant !— ' 1st Sergeant S File-closer •3 Squad leader • Machine gun commander ^ (ako right guide) B Left guide BB Sanitary NCO ^ Armorer Front rank file DRear rank file D Runner, telephone operator + Litter bearers •■ Musician ^ Machine gunner