ONDEWITZ 
 
WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
W* 
 
 I 
 
 
:»•:.»>••• - 
 
 T8 
 
 J 
 
 t* 
 
 _s 
 
 o 
 
 Is 
 
 <5j 
 
 « 
 
 <s 
 
 ©H 
 
 "** 
 
 Rs 
 
 si 
 
 53 
 
 Ki 
 
 
 
 C5i 
 
 
 ,| 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 te 
 
 '8« 
 
 q 
 
 3 
 
 
 ta 
 
 ~S 
 
 *«i 
 
 nQ 
 
 -Si 
 
 s 
 
 8 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 -o 
 
 8 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 ag 
 
 3 
 
 to 
 
 <b 
 
 V. 
 
 Q 
 
 to 
 ft* 
 
 22 
 
 S*a 
 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 
 QQ 
 
 
 
 ?3 
 
 <u 
 
 C«B 
 
 < 
 
 8 
 
 ■*- 
 
 Q 
 
 
 hi 
 
 «• 
 
 
 
 *• 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 = 
 
 *si 
 
 Q 
 
 " + ~ J 
 
 *&< 
 
 «♦*». 
 
 Q 
 
 Q 
 
 Ik 
 
 
 ^j 
 
 « 
 
 a 
 
 !»2 
 
 ==-_ 
 
 *) 
 
 
 EX 
 
 « 
 
 ft. 
 
 •IS 
 
WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 An Expert Analysis in Plain Language of the 
 
 Weapons and Methods Used in the 
 
 Present Great War 
 
 By 
 BARON HROLF VON DEWITZ 
 
 WITH INTRODUCTORY PREFACE BY 
 HUDSON MAXIM 
 
 ILL US TEA TED 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 
 
 1915 
 

 Copyright, 1915, by 
 DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 
 
PREFACE 
 
 There are two national crimes of equal enor- 
 mity — the one that of military aggression, and 
 the other that of unpreparedness in respect of 
 the necessary safeguards against aggression to 
 protect the property and homes and families of 
 those who depend on us and trust us to safe- 
 guard them. 
 
 One after another of the surrounding nations 
 will likely be drawn into the war before it is 
 over. After the present belligerents have set- 
 tled their scores with the sword, there will be 
 other scores to be settled between the victors 
 and the neutral nations. Differences between 
 the warring and the neutral powers — differ- 
 ences which, in time of peace, might produce 
 very strained relations or precipitate war — may 
 now be lightly passed over as mere discourt- 
 esies. But after the war, some of the acts of 
 the neutrals that at present seem quite insig- 
 nificant may be magnified to advantage as casus 
 belli. It is my opinion that, whichever side 
 wins, the United States will likely have to fight 
 the winner within a short time after the war 
 is over, for neither the Germans nor the Allies, 
 in the heat of passion that now dominates them, 
 will feel in a mood to forgive some of the things 
 which we may feel compelled to do in the main- 
 
 325752 
 
vi : PBEFACE 
 
 tenance of our neutrality. In short, the things 
 which we may be led to do to avoid being em- 
 broiled in the present war may serve to embroil 
 us with the victors, unless the war should end 
 in a draw. 
 
 It is now such an old, old, threadbare story, 
 that it no longer needs repetition that our 
 standing army is a mere corporal's guard; that 
 our militia could stand before a trained army 
 just about as long as a small boy could stand 
 before a John L. Sullivan, while our navy is 
 absolutely inadequate to defend our coast cities 
 or to secure the country against invasion. 
 
 Our army and navy men, who have been 
 educated in these things, and who ought to 
 know, tell us that our position is pathetically 
 defenceless. They tell us that, should our navy 
 be destroyed or evaded, and an army of only a 
 hundred thousand men, equipped with all of 
 the arms and paraphernalia of modern warfare, 
 be landed on our coast, that army could go any- 
 where it should see fit, live off the country, 
 capture our big cities, and hold us up for ransom 
 in spite of all that we could do. 
 
 These good authorities tell us that we have 
 not men enough to man the few guns that we 
 have; that we could not put more than thirty 
 thousand trained men in the field within the 
 first month; while, should the invading nation 
 need more men, it would have some millions in 
 its standing army from which to draw. Any of 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 the great powers could spare a few hundred 
 thousand, or a million men, if need be, for the 
 conquest of the United States. 
 
 Take a map of the United States and a pair 
 of compasses and strike a circle, with a radius 
 of a hundred and sixty miles around Peekskill, 
 New York, as the centre, and in that circle will 
 be found ninety per cent, of the arms and am- 
 munition works, military stores, smokeless pow- 
 der works, torpedo works, torpedo-boat works, 
 arms and armament works, of the entire coun- 
 try, together with the principal coal fields of 
 Pennsylvania. Within this circle will be in- 
 cluded not only New York, but also the city of 
 Boston on the East, and the city of Philadelphia 
 on the West, and all cities between. What an 
 enticement for invasion ! What a prize for the 
 invader ! 
 
 The conquest of this area will not be a work 
 of months, or of years, but only of a few days, 
 and the thing will be done before we shall have 
 time to mobilise the available fighting forces we 
 have, much less to enlist and train and arm a 
 citizen soldiery. 
 
 This vital area is the solar plexus of Uncle 
 Sam, and an army of a hundred thousand 
 trained men landed on our Atlantic seaboard 
 will be able to capture this entire area and sub- 
 due the populace as easily as the police force 
 of New York can subdue a rioting mob. 
 
 The enemy may annex the captured territory, 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 just as Belgium has been annexed by Germany, 
 and then, not only will we all be taxed to sup- 
 port the war, but also we shall be conscripted 
 to fight in the ranks of the enemy against our 
 own people, and we shall all be put to work with 
 an exceeding busy-ness operating our smoke- 
 less powder factories, our gun factories, our 
 ammunition works, to turn out war materials 
 for the enemy. 
 
 This is an age of mechanics, an age wherein 
 man-made mechanism more and more replaces 
 hand work. Everywhere in our industries of 
 peace, we have seen labour-saving machinery re- 
 place the labour of human hands. 
 
 To-day, all the men in the world could not do 
 by hand all of the world's ploughing and sowing 
 and reaping and carrying of the world's food to 
 market; and all the women in the world could 
 not to-day do the world's sewing without the 
 sewing-machine, and all the men in the world 
 and all the women in the world combined could 
 not to-day do a tenth of the world 's writing with- 
 out the typewriter and type-setting and printing 
 machinery. One of the giant dredges that have 
 been ladling out of the Panama Canal the vast 
 landslides can do the pick and shovel and wheel- 
 barrow work of a thousand men. 
 
 Everywhere, in everything we do, and in 
 everything done for us, we find human hands 
 now mainly engaged in guiding the work of 
 labour-saving machinery. 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 The people of the United States of America 
 have been able to develop their enormous re- 
 sources and keep abreast of the world's indus- 
 trial progress mainly by the invention of labour- 
 saving machinery under the protection of our 
 patent law. 
 
 In our competition with other nations for the 
 markets of the world, no one thinks of referring 
 to the prowess of our unskilled citizen soldiers 
 of industry unsupported by machinery, but all 
 reliance is placed upon our multiform labour- 
 saving machinery, and our skilled labour behind 
 that machinery. 
 
 With these pregnant facts before us, it is 
 strange that it should not be very plain to every 
 one that what is true of labour-saving ma- 
 chinery in peace is likewise true in war. It is 
 very strange indeed that there should be intel- 
 ligent men and women among us unable to see 
 and to understand that labour-saving machinery 
 and labour skilled in its use are as applicable 
 and as indispensable to successful warfare as 
 to peaceful industry. Furthermore, labour- 
 saving machinery in war is life-saving ma- 
 chinery. The rapid-fire gun is the greatest life- 
 saving instrument in the world. 
 
 These persons do not seem to appreciate that 
 war is an industry. As a matter of stern fact, 
 war is and has always been the biggest and the 
 most vital industry of mankind, and in no other 
 industry is labour-saving machinery so import- 
 
x PREFACE 
 
 ant and so vital, and in no other industry does so 
 much depend upon the skill of the labour operat- 
 ing the machinery. 
 
 We are the slaves of belief, and we love our 
 chains. Although our faith may be false, we 
 hate the hand that tries to free us. The people 
 of this country have a great false faith in the 
 fighting qualities of their citizen soldiery, im- 
 provised in time of war. They point proudly to 
 the War of the Revolution and the War of the 
 Rebellion to prove how our volunteer soldiers 
 can fight. They overlook the fact that fighting 
 then was mostly done by hand; that now it is 
 mostly done by machinery and that it is 
 just as foolish and absurd to think of taking un- 
 trained men off the farm to operate the guns 
 and machinery of war as it would be to try to 
 operate the factories with them where the guns 
 and machinery are made. 
 
 It takes as long to-day to convert a farmer 
 into a skilled soldier as it does to convert him 
 into a skilled mechanic. 
 
 A citizen soldiery without years of training in 
 the discipline and weapons and mechanism of 
 modern warfare is only a mob, as easily scat- 
 tered by a few real soldiers as chaff by a whirl- 
 wind. 
 
 We, like a lamb rampant believing itself to 
 be a lion, have been bestriding the world with 
 big arrogance, and have flaunted our Monroe 
 Doctrine before the eyes of all the nations, bliss- 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 fully unaware of the fact that we have compara- 
 tively no more fighting potentiality to protect 
 our Monroe Doctrine, should there be a coali- 
 tion of any two nations against us, than a pet 
 pup would have to force obedience in a den of 
 tigers. 
 
 Therefore, I gladly hail the present work of 
 Baron von Dewitz as a book which deals ably 
 with the ever transcending strategic uses of 
 War's New Weapons. 
 
 There are no subjects at the present time 
 more deserving serious attention and examina- 
 tion by all thinking persons than the subjects 
 treated in this volume. 
 
 Baron von Dewitz, a subject of Denmark, 
 very naturally views the present European con- 
 flict with the eyes of a neutral. He has en- 
 deavoured to present facts as he has found them, 
 and witho ut paxtialityy-and his handling of the 
 specfalisecT branches of modern warfare and 
 weapons is that of a military expert. 
 
 He is somewhat of a poet, however, and fills 
 the mind with creepy imaginings about night- 
 hawking air-craft. His considerable actual per- 
 sonal experience with air-craft enables him to 
 speak with a very authoritative fancy, even 
 when he is poetical. 
 
 Baron von Dewitz has a masterful knowledge 
 of military tactics and the philosophy of war- 
 fare. His descriptions in interesting detail of 
 the use of wireless telegraphy on the airship and 
 
 ti* 
 
xii PREFACE 
 
 on the battlefield show an intimate knowledge of 
 this most valuable arm of naval and military 
 service. His talk on the submarine and its op- 
 eration, and his enlightening descriptions of the 
 other weapons of warfare, make one burn the 
 after-midnight oil, finally to lay the book down 
 with reluctance in the wee hours of the morning. 
 Baron von Dewitz is deserving of the deep 
 gratitude of the American people, for by this 
 book he makes a strong appeal to their needed 
 realisation of the significance of modern war 
 machinery, and the imperative necessity of 
 drilling and educating a dependable army for 
 its use, both to fore-fend ourselves against war, 
 and, in the event of war, to save us from hu- 
 miliation and defeat. 
 
 Hudson Maxim. 
 
 New York, March, 1915. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 Pkeface by Hudson Maxim 
 I Aircraft 
 II Automobile Artillery 
 
 III The Submarine . 
 
 IV The Capital Ship 
 V The Turret Fort 
 
 VI The Wireless Signal 
 VII The Fountain Pen . 
 VIII The Super-Commissariat 
 IX Super-Strategy . 
 Epilogue 
 
 v 
 1 
 
 49 
 86 
 127 
 179 
 200 
 222 
 242 
 261 
 290 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Marine Zeppelin of the " Hansa " type; and a 
 Seott-Dewitz bomb-dropping apparatus at- 
 tached to a military aeroplane . . Frontispiece 
 
 PACING 
 PAGE 
 
 French Zouaves repelling a German air raid by 
 means of an anti-aerial field gun ... 18 
 
 The " Eye in the Sky." The latest type of 
 French military " avion " and an automobile 
 aeroplane " hospital " 38 
 
 The Belgian S. A. V. A. turret automobile . 52 
 
 The " Terrible German 42-centimetre cannon " 
 exposed 66 
 
 The Belgian ' ' Minerva ' ' model is a ' ' success- 
 ful type of armoured scout " . . . . * 80 
 
 The latest type of British submarine, class 
 "D " . .102 
 
 " Friedrich der Grosse," a typical example of 
 German super-dreadnaught construction . 134 
 
 The latest model of Krupp 5.9-inch quick-fire 
 naval gun as installed on the German super- 
 dreadnaughts 166 
 
 A Belgian battery of howitzers on the firing-line 
 in Flanders 180 
 
 A French " Battleship on Wheels " . . . 188' 
 
 XV 
 
xvi ILLUSTKATIONS 
 
 PACING 
 
 PAGE 
 
 How a French turret fort looks after facing the 
 fire of German 42-centimetre artillery . .196 
 
 German Kronprinz inspecting a field telephone , 
 outfit 212 
 
 The motor kitchen of the German Kronprinz . 244 
 
 Austrian field kitchens 256 
 
 The Kaiser and His Staff studying War Maps . 278 
 
WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
CHAPTER I 
 AIRCRAFT 
 
 An Aerial Night Attack 
 
 The good city has closed its solid, stony coun- 
 tenance in peaceful sleep. A round, chubby 
 moon, riding behind curtains of cloud, peeks 
 down with the mien of a patriarch upon the 
 empty streets and large, open squares, where 
 no one is afoot, and upon the broad river that 
 flows unrippled and blinking through the city's 
 many arched bridges. 
 
 Here and there a tall, menacing spire conse- 
 crates the crowding roofs with a finger of 
 sombre shadow. Is it chance or heaven that 
 joins two long shadow- fingers in a huge cross 
 over the heart of the city! In the centre 
 thrones a lordly pile gathering under its dome 
 the prayers of holy men and prostrated multi- 
 tudes. 
 
 There are no lights anywhere. There is no 
 motion. The city lies lifeless with the aspect 
 of having been deserted. From the woodlands 
 on its borders comes sigh upon sigh as the rising 
 breeze rustles through the leafage. The sound 
 of it rises and dies away in scarcely audible 
 
2 WAIi'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 cadence like the breathing of some vast, multi- 
 tudinous sleeper stirring uneasily in his dreams. 
 
 A flight of cranes and storks passes over the 
 housetops dragging a iveird, jagged shadow — 
 birds of passage headed wrong and out of sea- 
 son. As they speed over the outer forts a pale 
 shaft of light pierces the fluttering flock — the 
 ever vigilant eye of a garrison ever appre- 
 hensive of the enemy. 
 
 The big clock under the cathedral dome tolls 
 off the second hour past midnight. Stillness 
 broods once more over the rapt city. But for 
 the slow-breathing moorlands there is no sound. 
 
 A large cloud curtain obscures the moon. Out 
 of its folds glides a long, ghostly object. At 
 first it moves with the cloud, but presently it 
 breaks away and ranges forward with uncanny 
 speed. Issuing from the clouds it seems to be 
 of the clouds, so gauzy and ethereal does it look. 
 Nearer and nearer does it move, noiselessly in- 
 creasing its speed in a huge, sweeping curve, its 
 long, sleek sides and tapering points resembling 
 the shape of a monstrous shark! Of a sudden 
 it reels out a dark object trailing on a thread 
 and sails across the city. Something drops 
 hissing and screaming through space. A vi- 
 cious knife-edge of smoke points downward. A 
 lurid flash shoots upward. Then a thunderous 
 roar as of an earthquake blasts the air and sends 
 echoes tumbling in muffled rumblings. Again 
 
AIRCRAFT 3 
 
 a hiss, a flash and a thwiderclap, and again and 
 again before the searchlights on the bastions 
 can concentrate on that most dreaded enemy of 
 modern warfare, the aerial dreadnaught. 
 
 In a twinkle the slumbering city is on its feet. 
 The long pencils of its searching eyes flood the 
 night in a brilliant glare. The rapid-fire artil- 
 lery on the forts crashes away, streaking the 
 night with screaming shells that explode with a 
 wicked, lurid spurt of fire. From a thousand 
 different posts, where sharpshooters have been 
 stationed throughout the city, the rifles of in- 
 fantry squads pop away like bundles of fire- 
 crackers, holing the air with swarms of hum- 
 ming bullets. 
 
 Windows are thrown open everywhere and as 
 quickly slammed. Crowds of people surge out 
 upon the streets, only to be driven back under 
 roof by the infantry pickets. The searchlights 
 do not seem to avail against the blue-goggled 
 crew of the aerial monster that soars above 
 gun-range planting heavy, explosive bombs at 
 will of its daring commander. The shells of 
 the rapid artillery rend the air in vain. The 
 bullets of thirty thousand pickets, firing inces- 
 santly, are also spent m vain, never reaching the 
 aerial cruiser that vanishes as quickly as it 
 came. 
 
 And in a ghostly shower of lead and steel 
 these missiles fall back upon the pickets, crash- 
 
A WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ing through glass and tile, plumping Mo the 
 blinking river, drumming a fiendish tattoo on 
 the solid, stony countenance, heroically scarred, 
 of the good city. 
 
Aircraft Has Eliminated Surprise 
 Tactics 
 
 The great surprise of aircraft in the present 
 war is that it eliminates surprise. The public 
 does not appear to understand the changed con- 
 ditions of warfare that make this possible. 
 Fed on daring exhibition tricks and keyed up 
 to a point of idiotic expectancy by newspaper 
 writers with a taste for prophetic pronuncia- 
 mento rather than for facts, the public has 
 evinced mostly disappointment, whereas mili- 
 tary men have shown enthusiastic approba- 
 tion. 
 
 There have been plenty of epoch-making 
 events on the aerial frontiers of this war, but 
 incompetent correspondents, unable to grasp 
 the nature of their significance, have reported 
 them incompetently. The public has been 
 cheated of its right to be properly informed on 
 aerial tactics in warfare. 
 
 Not only has the air scout reduced the proud- 
 est cavalry to second place in the matter of 
 reconnoissance, but he even prepares the way 
 
 5 
 
6 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 for it. In addition, he precedes and picks the ; 
 terrain for the armoured motor-car squadrons 
 which an invading force deploys in advance of 
 the cavalry. He does this work so efficiently 
 that scouting reports, which formerly required 
 days by the speediest cavalry, are now delivered 
 in a few hours and in a much more thorough 
 and detailed manner. If this were all the air 
 scout had accomplished on the firing-line, any 
 military commander would commend his reten- 
 tion for the mere speeding up of tactical in- 
 telligence. 
 
 But this is by no means all. Air scouting is 
 indispensable in many other directions. For 
 "close-in" reconnoissance over the fighting 
 lines, marking changing positions, intrench- 
 ments and reinforcements, and for extended 
 reconnoissance, especially on the wings of the 
 army to guard against turning movements, the 
 air scout is doing a work of paramount impor- 
 tance to the commander where cavalry could 
 not follow. 
 
 For swift courier service, where galloping 
 hussars were formerly employed, the air scout 
 is now used. For aiding in obtaining the range 
 for the artillery, and continually correcting the 
 
AIRCRAFT 7 
 
 same to insure accuracy of fire, the air scout is 
 invaluable. For spotting the enemy's artillery, 
 which is usually masked, and dropping smoke 
 bombs or tinsel signals indicating the position 
 and simultaneously aiding in establishing the 
 range, only the air scout can get results. For 
 detecting the enemy's line of communication 
 and raiding it by bomb attacks, and even for 
 transporting explosives and detonating rail- 
 roads and bridges, the air scout shows up 
 bravely. In fact, the work he has done, and is 
 doing, in this war, on all these points is of a 
 character so remarkably thorough and efficient 
 that he has influenced measurably the strategy 
 of opposing commanders and compelled tactics 
 that were never tried before. 
 
 The present war has amply shown that the 
 tactical deployment of a modern army is more 
 absolute than relative ; that is, once the forma- 
 tion of the battle-line has been decided upon it 
 is there to stay, and though it is subject to re- 
 arrangement this requires much more time now- 
 adays than formerly. The battle front on the 
 Franco-Belgian borders has ranged from 150 
 to more than 200 miles in length, with little less J 
 than 3,000,000 men strung out in opposing lines. 
 
8 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 It is evident that such tremendously extended 
 formations cannot be quickly changed in the 
 main plan — though changes in detail are effected 
 with much greater dispatch than formerly — 
 and therefore it has become vitally necessary to 
 plan the disposition of the battle-line with hith- 
 erto unknown care and sagacity in advance of 
 actual fighting. 
 
 This necessity has increased the task of the 
 commander-in-chief to a point where the science 
 of conducting warfare on land is beginning to 
 resemble naval warfare. Instead of being more 
 or less in the dark as to the forces opposing 
 him, as in the days when scouting was done by 
 cavalry only, the commanders in this war know 
 exactly what forces they are facing, the same 
 as a naval commander knows by observation 
 the kind and number of vessels he is likely to 
 engage. 
 
 And thus it comes about that on the modern 
 battle fronts where opposing forces know each 
 other's strength and disposition at all times, 
 the same as in a naval battle, it has become 
 practically impossible to execute movements in- 
 tended to ambush or surprise any considerable 
 division of an army. What is the practical 
 
AIRCRAFT 9 
 
 cause of this momentous change in field tac- 
 tics? If it is not due to the "eye in the sky," 
 what is it? 
 
 By the medium of air scouts the commanders 
 in this war have not only been able to accelerate 
 tactical operation in detail, but they have been 
 kept a jour constantly on the strength, position 
 and movements of opposing forces, and by vir- 
 tue of the exact information thus reported they 
 have been enabled to dispose enormous masses 
 of troops over huge areas with greater and 
 closer application of scientific strategy than 
 ever before in the military history of the 
 world. 
 
 Three months' fighting has shown that it is 
 not so much actual superiority of numbers that 
 counts as the ability to oppose the enemy in 
 the decisive encounters with forces superior 
 not only in number but in quality. Owing to 
 scouting facilities being practically equal on 
 either side, concentration of large bodies of 
 troops is immediately detected if undertaken 
 in daytime and as certainly counteracted. 
 Forced marching under cover of night, then, 
 and motor transport of troops to some extent, 
 have become the only means whereby a com- 
 
10 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 mander can move upon the enemy at break of 
 dawn with superior forces. 
 
 The very fact that the Germans appear to 
 possess a higher degree of "nocturnal" mo- 
 bility, and are trained to execute this manoeuvre 
 in large units, is what gave them the initial ad- 
 vantage, more than any other factor, and en- 
 abled them to drive the Allied armies before 
 them almost to the gates of Paris. 
 
 The air scout also affects the method whereby 
 field commanders execute their final orders. 
 The risk assumed by possible misjudgment is 
 so great, owing to the extended firing-line, that 
 no commander would venture to make a deci- 
 sion until all the air scouts assigned to his divi- 
 sion have filed satisfactory reports. If the re- 
 ports do not tally, or if more definite and de- 
 tailed observation is necessary, the modern 
 commander chooses to wait rather than guess 
 his way through, and he can afford to wait, for 
 the air scout makes waiting, in an emergency, 
 only a matter of minutes where cavalry would 
 consume hours. This is particularly so in tacti- 
 cal reconnoitring when the hostile forces are, 
 in most cases, not marching on the roads but 
 are concentrated in trenches or deploying either 
 
AIRCRAFT 11 
 
 to form new lines or to occupy new positions 
 prepared for them during the night. These 
 last-minute changes and eleventh-hour disposi- 
 tions on the enemy's part are what the com- 
 mander is desirous of knowing above any- 
 thing else. It is a matter of minutes. His air 
 scouts bring him the facts and necessarily with 
 considerable personal risk, for in tactical rec- 
 onnoitring the air scout cannot locate and esti- 
 mate the half-hidden troops except by getting 
 down close somewhat within range of rifle-fire. 
 True, a machine or two is often lost in a ven- 
 turesome errand of this sort, but the loss is 
 small compared to what the disaster would be 
 if there were no aeroplanes and squadrons of 
 cavalry were to wade in and try to find an enemy 
 who is waiting for them in trenches with rifles ! 
 One single ' i eye in the sky   f can observe the 
 formation of an entire army corps more ac- 
 curately and with less risk, and in much shorter 
 time, than a whole squadron of cavalry. It 
 must not be assumed, however, that I am in 
 favour of diminishing the cavalry; on the con- 
 trary, I believe, the present war will compel an 
 increase in the cavalry arm generally. There 
 is plenty of evidence that aerial reconnoitring 
 
12 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 is much more effective when supported by 
 cavalry than when independently conducted. 
 The air scout is better fitted to observe than 
 the cavalry, but the latter is better equipped to 
 take quick advantage of his observation than 
 any other arm, and particularly in the impor- 
 tant and difficult screening movements on which 
 the main force of modern armies is forced to 
 rely to a much greater extent than formerly. 
 So far as actual field experience in this war 
 would seem to indicate, the most decisive results 
 have occurred wherever air scouts have oper- 
 ated in conjunction with cavalry assisted by 
 mixed cycle corps of motor and leg-propelled 
 vehicles. In other words, maximum results are 
 best obtainable when the most mobile sections 
 of an army can be made to combine and concen- 
 trate on reconnoissance duty requiring extreme 
 rapidity backed by the instantaneous offerte 
 of sabre and rifle. The "eye in the sky" for 
 discovering and observing a hidden enemy, the 
 "mounted" sabre for outflanking him and 
 pushing home an attack over ground where only 
 horses are efficient, and the "motor-infantry" 
 for deploying a flying wedge over the highways 
 — this seems to be the ideal combination for 
 
AIRCRAFT 13 
 
 reconnoissance requirements in the present war. 
 The Germans appear to have made use of it 
 liberally in their premier advance, when men 
 succumbed to machines and too strenuous push- 
 ing had the effect of a serious reaction, which 
 served to help the Allied resistance. 
 
 When it comes to actual fighting the per- 
 formance of the air scout has disappointed only 
 the laity who have been led to suppose that 
 bomb-dropping aircraft would somehow sup- 
 plant the artillery or at least supplement it. 
 Aerial bomb-dropping is still in the experi- 
 mental stage, despite certain notable advances, 
 and no military man expects much from it ex- 
 cept as a destructive auxiliary against hostile 
 aircraft bases and the like. Here and there a 
 lucky shot has caused not inconsiderable dam- 
 age, but until more accurate means of placing 
 explosive bombs have been adapted to present 
 types of aircraft their offensive strength will 
 remain negligible. This also applies to the 
 Zeppelin dirigibles. Although these craft can 
 carry large stores of heavy, explosive bombs, 
 they do not seem to be able to hit a target 
 properly, even when the target is as large as 
 the vital spots in the cities that have been bom- 
 
\J 
 
 14 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 barded. On the other hand, it must be ad- 
 mitted that the Zeppelin is the only type of 
 craft which is adequately equipped to fight its 
 logical and immediate enemy — the aeroplane, 
 whereas the latter has no effective means of 
 attack against the Zeppelin except the very un- 
 certain factor of surprise, and then only by 
 concerted action. 
 
 But the crowning achievement of aircraft in 
 this war is that while three million trained 
 troops have been locked in a death struggle for 
 months halfway across Western Europe, it is 
 due to the superb reconnoissance of air scouts 
 that not a single instance of ambush or flank- 
 ing turn of consequence has taken place ! 
 
 What the Zeppelins Have Done 
 
 Why have not the Zeppelins done more? is 
 the popular cry. Why don't they sink the 
 Franco-British fleet, why don't they bombard 
 naval and military bases; if they are what is 
 claimed for them, why don't they do something 
 worth while? 
 
 Indeed, the Zeppelins have been active inter- 
 mittently, only the Germans have not thought 
 
AIRCRAFT 15 
 
 it necessary to report their secret operations 
 for the entertainment of newspaper readers. 
 Under cover of night Zeppelins have pre- 
 ceded every important move en masse of the 
 German armies. At early dawn they have ob- 
 served the movements of the Allied armies 
 without themselves being observed. They have 
 sailed around the rear of the Allies and long 
 distances beyond the rear, noting the oncoming 
 of reinforcements, the ever-changing position 
 of the various lines of communication, the prep- 
 arations made for the defence of a line of forts, 
 the manning of intrenched camps, the location 
 of commissariat bases, etc. They have reported 
 what they have seen by their own long-distance 
 wireless, and they have returned to their 
 hangars loaded with fresh detail information 
 accurately mapped out and ready for use. 
 
 Invisible and noiseless, these huge, swift noc- 
 turnal birds of the German forces have placed 
 their commanders in a position to know almost 
 as much about the enemy's doings in the main y^ 
 as the enemy himself under conditions when 
 aeroplanes would have been detected cmd prob- 
 ably destroyed. It must be remembered that a 
 Zeppelin can well afford the time necessary to 
 
16 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ambush itself successfully in the clouds if only 
 for the chance of an occasional peep through 
 the rifts. Similarly, a Zeppelin can hover in 
 fog and mist and wait till it clears, when it 
 rises/ aloft together with the mist, completing 
 observations as it rises, so that its blue-gray 
 contours are not visibly revealed against the 
 overhanging vapours. One notable difference 
 between aeroplane scouting and Zeppelin 
 reconnoissance is that the latter is more thor- 
 ough and remains undetected in most instances 
 while the former invariably betrays its pres- 
 ence. There is a decided advantage in being 
 able to collect information when the enemy does 
 not realise that his plans have been read, and 
 there is little danger of his changing plans in 
 this event. 
 
 We are in the habit of discussing Zeppelins 
 unmindful, or perhaps unaware, that there are 
 at least two classes of this craft with points of 
 divergence which may be cause for surprise to 
 the laity. Whenever Zeppelins have been re- 
 ferred to in print during the past, the designa- 
 tion is applied to the old, and now partly obso- 
 lete, type of aerostat with which the public is 
 generally familiar. A small complement of this 
 
AIRCRAFT 17 
 
 craft were told off for service on the French 
 frontier and in attendance upoii the Baltic and 
 North Sea fleets at the outbreak of the war. 
 Whatever reports have seen print up to this 
 writing have related almost wholly to the ex- 
 ploits of the Pre-Zeppelins. 
 
 As to the latest improved type — the Super- 
 Zeppelins of the German aerial fleet — it must 
 be stated that they are not included in the offi- 
 cial lists nor are they gazetted in even the mili- 
 tary archives of Germany. In common with 
 the motor-driven siege mortars and the field 
 howitzers, both of enormous calibre, and the 
 new naval artillery now being installed on the 
 battleships, they belong to the secret armaments 
 which Germany has succeeded in preparing 
 during times of peace for warlike emergencies 
 of the present calibre. Only a few special offi- 
 cers of the German General Staff know any- 
 thing about the Super-Zeppelins, outside the 
 working crews and the aeronautic architects, and 
 these men are specially sworn in and vigilantly 
 watched to insure complete and permanent 
 secrecy. By dint of diligent spy work, how- 
 ever, certain interesting particulars are now 
 available, but I am not prepared to vouch for 
 
18 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 their accuracy, though they are more than plau- 
 sible and well worth printing. 
 
 The Super-Zeppelins are supposed to be an 
 improvement on the latest known type desig- 
 nated "L III," which displaces no less than 
 32,000 cubic metres and is capable of maintain- 
 ing an average cruising speed of fully 63 miles 
 per hour on extended expeditions of upward of 
 one and a half day's duration. Against this 
 remarkable record the Super-Zeppelins will 
 show an improvement of at least 5 miles in 
 speed and 12 hours additional staying power. 
 What this would mean can be gleaned from the 
 performances of the "L III," officially attested 
 to, which covered 1,300 miles in 36 hours in a 
 circumnavigation of Germany's strategic bor- 
 ders, keeping the while in constant rapport 
 by wireless with its b&se at Friedrichshafen, 
 at distances sometimes approaching 500 miles ! 
 The "L III" can illuminate any target on land 
 or sea with its 40,000 candlepower searchlight 
 from an altitude of 4,600 feet, or just barely be- 
 yond the effective range of aerial cannon. This 
 ~ margin is improved in the Super-Zeppelins, 
 which can place fully a thousand feet of 
 "safety" space between their keel and the ver- 
 

 8 ^ 
 
 
 '- 8 
 
 
 § ^ 
 
 
 « *> 
 
 
 !S § 
 
 
 .48 
 
 
 8 8 
 
 
 s « 
 
 
 Sig 
 
 
 ^ .* 
 
 
 »^> ** 
 
 
 *> Si 
 
 
 ^.s 
 
 
 ^ "8 
 
 
 •S « 
 
 
 £ o 
 
 
 <^ *«■» 
 
 
 ?.s 
 
 
 "-S 
 
 
 8 8 
 
 
 <3 S 
 
 
 8 ^ 
 
 
 « 5»5 
 
 
 S^"* 
 
 
 ° S> 
 
 
 co S 
 
 
 S 12 
 
 
 5 ~e 
 
 
 3 s 
 
 
 § -S 
 
 
 «0 
 
 
 ^ - 
 
 
 rO 8 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 ** 
 
 
 .fc ?: 
 
 
 c ^> . 
 
 
 - ^ ^ 
 
 
 8 8 8 
 
 
 1 i^ 
 
 
 
 £ ^^ 
 
 
 ^ § 1 
 
 
 ^ s ^ 
 
 
 Q 
 
 
 g>*8 8 
 
 
 ^§ -^ •<*» 
 
 
 
 ;*" 
 
 •3 Si^ 
 
 ;*; 
 
 <u e s> 
 
 •a 
 
 o 
 
 s rep 
 
 erati 
 
 is si 
 
 <D 
 
 fc ©H 8 
 
 ■c 
 
 » O s 
 
 u 
 
 3 °* 
 
 *5 
 
 O " In 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 
 £ 
 
 r< ^ 8 
 
 u 
 
 «o v. s 
 
 •a 
 
 8 
 
 ts 
 
 <fc 
 
 o 
 
 *. 
 
 © 
 
 &H 
 
AIRCRAFT 19 
 
 tical range of aerial artillery; and while thus 
 hovering they can reveal any target below with 
 searchlights and discharge bombs. The latter 
 are also a distinct advance upon the known 
 type such as were tried out on the city of 
 Antwerp. Instead of being mere capsules 
 containing explosives the bombs of the Super- 
 Zeppelin will be armoured projectiles capable 
 of penetrating the deck of the strongest bat- 
 tleship or the concrete base of a fortifica- 
 tion. They will be exploded not on con- 
 tact like the present form of bombs but after 
 penetration, on the delayed-action principle. In 
 other words, the explosion will not have the ef- 
 fect of a grenade, which seldom causes real 
 havoc except among massed troops, but it will 
 have the character of a detonating mine. A 
 well-placed shot detonating in the concrete of 
 a fort, after penetrating the same, entirely 
 aside from the personal damage it may do, will 
 wreck the range-finding apparatus and prevent 
 the fort from aiming its cannon correctly. A 
 projectile bomb of this type would have no diffi- 
 culty in piercing the armoured deck of a Super- jl^uJu^ 
 dreadnaught. As little as 50 pounds of dyna- 
 mite — to mention the least destructive of mod- 
 
20 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ern explosives — detonating in the vitals of a 
 battleship, from a vertical aim, will cause a good 
 deal more havoc aboardship than a heavy naval 
 shell piercing the side armour horizontally. 
 Bombs weighing 120 pounds have been dropped 
 by Pre-Zeppelins. The new projectile for 
 Super-Zeppelins will be considerably heavier, 
 and as many as ten will be carried in the maga- 
 zine of each craft, or more than double the 
 ammunition needed to destroy a battleship, as- 
 suming there would be at least one bull's-eye 
 for every miss. The Germans have secretly 
 experimented with aerial range-finders for more 
 than two years. Owing to the war privilege of 
 utilising the patent files ad libitum they have 
 now in their possession at least one method of 
 launching bombs, personally known to the 
 writer, which should enable them to hit a battle- 
 ship at will, and, in fact, a very much smaller 
 target. 
 
 Where the "L III" craft mounts machine 
 guns in the gondola and atop the gas envelope, 
 the Super-Zeppelins will have special rapid 
 artillery of superior range and protected 
 against rifle-fire by shield-barbettes. Even the 
 envelope is tinted a vague blue-gray similar to 
 
AIRCRAFT 21 
 
 the field-uniforms of the German troops, which 
 makes detection an exceedingly difficult task. 
 Moreover, the drums contained in the various • 
 chambers of the envelope are filled with ajre- f/ \ ■- 
 cently perfected kind of gas said not to explode 
 
 even by contact with exploding shells. The 
 fabric used for the drums has improved elastic 
 and adhesive qualities, so that any ordinary rent 
 or tear will partially heal of itself. The gas 
 feed is arranged so that quite a number of 
 drums would have to suffer leakage before the 
 loss of buoyancy would be serious and compel 
 the vessel to rely on her engines entirely for 
 impetus sufficient to steer her out of hostile 
 range. 
 
 It is authoritatively admitted that the secretly 
 made Super-Zeppelins, of which Germany is 
 credited with upward of a dozen, are being 
 especially fitted for an attack not only on 
 British bases but directly against the British 
 navy. It is to be doubted, however, if Germany 
 could produce such a squadron entire in time to 
 deliver a decisive blow despite her far-reaching 
 secret advance preparations. Nevertheless, 
 even if we grant this point it is apparent to 
 any military mind that even a single Super- 
 
 • 
 
22 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Zeppelin skilfully handled stands a first-class 
 chance against a fleet of battleships in blockade 
 formation. And if we go even still further and 
 grant, for argument's sake, that the aerial 
 dreadnaught will not succeed in sinking a naval 
 dreadnaught, even the most prejudiced mind 
 must admit that the offensive activity of such 
 craft in the act of dropping bombs on hostile 
 naval vessels will be a harassing factor of 
 conspicuous aid to simultaneous action of the 
 German torpedo and submarine flotillas. While 
 the experimental factor looms large in these 
 aspects, sound judgment would take into account 
 such practical possibilities as momentarily 
 choking the gunners on naval vessels by drop- 
 ping gaseous bombs to windward of their posi- 
 tion. By such tactics it would not even be neces- 
 sary to hit the ships so long as a series of 
 bombs could be exploded on the windward side, 
 for the fumes of the gases would be prodigious 
 enough to penetrate the turrets and barbettes 
 and nauseate or choke the gunners. Even if 
 the effect would be only that of inducing a vig- 
 orous sneezing on the part of the crew the 
 advantage thus gained might be a decisive 
 factor, for even the most adept of gun captains 
 
AIRCRAFT 23 
 
 could not be expected to adjust his sights to the 
 range given when convulsed by fits of suffoca- 
 tion or nausea ! We must not forget that entire 
 gun crews have been asphyxiated instantly by 
 the explosion of gaseous charges, during several 
 artillery encounters in this war, and if troops 
 can be choked to death by horizontal fire, sail- 
 ors can at least be set sneezing by vertical fire ! 
 
 One reason why the Zeppelins have not as 
 yet taken the offensive against the Allies' armed 
 defence may be found in the fact that the Ger- 
 mans thought it more expedient to acquire some 
 practical experience in the handling of these 
 novel craft over hostile ground before actually 
 engaging hostile positions armed for repelling 
 them. There are quite a few things which the 
 Zeppelin pilots must learn that can only be 
 learned in actual hostile encounter under war 
 conditions. Before the pilots have gathered a 
 certain amount of experience in these respects 
 they might be led to assume greater risks than 
 the vulnerability of their craft would warrant, 
 and the loss of a Super-Zeppelin, entirely aside 
 from its high cost, would be too serious to gam- 
 ble against guesswork tactics. 
 
 A single item should suffice to explain the 
 
24 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 situation : in the matter of target practice, both 
 horizontally with machine guns and vertically 
 with bomb-dropping apparatus, the Zeppelin 
 commanders have little to learn, and in ma- 
 noeuvring against the elements their pilots are 
 quite sufficiently trained. 
 
 It is in the plan of attack and in the plan of 
 retreat that practical experience is most ur- 
 gently wanted. Not that the Zeppelin pilots 
 have no such plans, but it is not known to what 
 extent these plans, which have been worked out 
 to cover every conceivable exigency on the 
 aerial fighting line, are useful or whether actual 
 war experience would disclose means of im- 
 proving them. The pilots of aerial dread- 
 naughts have yet to learn the best method of ap- 
 proaching an enemy ready for them with squads 
 of aeroplanes and aerial cannon, and they must 
 also learn the best way to retreat under fire. In 
 attacking, should the ship rise to its highest 
 altitude and take up a hovering position in the 
 sky while aiming its bombs, or should the ap- 
 proach be made on the lowest altitude dictated 
 by safety and the bomb-dropping conducted 
 while the craft is travelling full speed in an 
 ellipse over its target? 
 
AIRCRAFT 25 
 
 In conducting a retreat from hostile rifle 
 and cannon fire, is it better for the ship to 
 take its chances on rising vertically to its maxi- 
 mum altitude or would it be preferable to go 
 full speed ahead on the horizontal while grad- 
 ually climbing to greater heights? These are 
 questions which only actual fighting can deter- 
 mine with the weight of finality. 
 
 The temptation of the Zeppelin pilot will al- 
 ways be to seek the lowest safe altitude to in- 
 sure accuracy of observation and aim, but this 
 very tendency is what makes the Zeppelin a 
 target for attack, if not by aerial guns, then by 
 hostile aircraft. 
 
 In fighting the latter a flock of aeroplanes 
 would never have to encounter an attack by a 
 Zeppelin, as an attempt of this sort by the latter 
 would cause it to be surrounded by some of the ' 
 aeroplanes even if it could shoot down a few of 
 them before this would happen. The Zeppelin's 
 only recourse would lie in flight under full 
 speed, keeping always a few hundred feet alti- 
 tude power in reserve for a sudden dash sky- 
 ward. While thus flying before its enemies the 
 Zeppelin would have the immense advantage of 
 being able to direct a murderous and continu- 
 
26 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 cms fire from its machine gun batteries — that is, 
 from a solid, steady platform — against its pur- 
 suers before the latter, in most cases, could 
 deliver effective fire, since the platform from 
 which they would shoot is one that is subject to 
 violent vibration and is never quite steady for a 
 moment. 
 
 War Beacons That Steer the "Eye in the 
 Air" 
 
 A circumstance which has tended to give Ger- 
 many's dirigible fleets the advantage of unusual 
 mobility and security of base is an excellent 
 system of aeronautic signal lights and beacons. 
 Between its eastern and western frontiers Ger- 
 many has a network of beacon stations that 
 enable her sky pilots to steer a straight course 
 at night and proceed undetected to the point of 
 reconnoissance without exposing themselves to 
 observation. Germany has more than a score 
 of such beacon stations, by means of which she 
 can move her entire aerial corps at all points of 
 the compass, or transfer them from one frontier 
 to another in a few hours. France has entirely 
 neglected this very important branch of military 
 aeronautics. The first German experiments in 
 
AIECEAFT 27 
 
 this field proved that a searchlight throwing a 
 cone of light upward could not be seen at long 
 distances, contrary to expectation. Neither did 
 the plan to identify the beacons by means of 
 coloured slides work out well, as it was found 
 that light projected by them suffered by absorp- 
 tion. For marking the landing-places and the 
 aerodromes or hangars coloured lights were 
 found to be very practical, however. The 
 eventual result of these and similar field ex- 
 periments was that the German flying corps 
 succeeded in evolving a first-class working sys- 
 tem of beacons with landing lights of use for 
 both military and naval aircraft. The search- 
 light plan was discarded and beacons were 
 erected resembling the lighthouses in use for 
 marine navigation. These beacons are of three 
 kinds : to wit, the flash, the fixed and the revolv- 
 ing light, but instead of operating upon the 
 horizon as in lighthouse practice, the aerial 
 beacons operate vertically upon the atmos- 
 phere of the sky. In a class by themselves are 
 what the Germans call the Morse beacons, thus 
 named because they are constructed to trans- 
 late into perpendicular flashes the dots and 
 dashes of the Morse telegraphic code. Thus, 
 
28 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 the Morse beacon known to German mili- 
 tary aeronauts as "Mark 45" reports its 
 position by short and long flashes as follows: 
 xxxx xxxxx o xxxx xxxxx. The type of land- 
 ing lights finally agreed upon as the most de- 
 sirable are embedded in the ground and pro- 
 tected by a huge glass cover, very thick and 
 strong, on which aircraft land directly and are 
 brought to a full stop. The arrangement , of 
 the lights also very cleverly serves in signalling 
 the aviator the direction of the wind while 
 effecting a landing. In the centre of the landing 
 base is a large square white light. Some dis- 
 tance from this centre, about 75 yards, are four 
 red lights designating the points of the com- 
 pass — N. E. W. S. A weather-vane is connected 
 electrically to these lights, so that should the 
 wind blow N.W. the north and west red lights 
 burn in addition to the white base light in the 
 centre. Should the wind turn the vane around 
 to S.W., the lights signalling N.W. are auto- 
 matically doused and only the red lights south 
 and west would show. In case the wind dies 
 down to a dead calm, no red lights are visible, 
 and only the white light in the centre shows. 
 By these very simple and positive means the 
 
AIRCRAFT 29 
 
 German pilot, whenever compelled to fly at 
 night, is at all times able, on picking up a beacon, 
 to tell exactly where he is and how he should 
 steer to make a clean landing in case he wishes 
 to descend. The largest aeronautic light in 
 Germany is the Weimar beacon, which has no 
 less than 27,200,000 candlepower behind its huge 
 revolving flashlight situated atop of the mili- 
 tary aerodrome. The tallest light, that is the 
 light placed at the greatest altitude, is the 
 Grosser Feldberg on the Taunus range, which 
 projects a fixed shaft of light of 800,000 candle- 
 power from a crag situated over 2,800 feet above 
 sea-level. 
 
 Protecting Airship Bases 
 
 In this branch of military aeronautics the 
 Allies have made the mistake of depending en- 
 tirely on the searchlight. Experiments con- 
 ducted in Germany have proved quite conclu- 
 sively that nothing is easier to avoid during 
 nocturnal reconnoissance than the vague pen- 
 cils of a searchlight battery. Their penetrative 
 efficiency is a known factor, and the only pre- 
 caution necessary is to fly above the altitude 
 
30 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 they command. Moreover, they aid hostile air- 
 craft after the manner of beacons whereby to 
 steer, and at the break of dawn, when recon- 
 noissance becomes most effective aboard a 
 dirigible having selected her position to this 
 end under cover of night, the searchlight is, 
 of course, useless. The French army, while 
 based on the barrier forts between Toul and 
 Belfort, was treated to a pretty severe lesson 
 in this regard when a French dirigible, an- 
 nounced in advance by wireless, could not be 
 picked up by the multitudinous shafts from the 
 searchlights on the forts. 
 
 The German plan of protecting aerial bases 
 is thorough and practical. The main defence is 
 stationed on elevated points commanding the 
 base in a wide circle and equipped with special 
 aerial Krupp cannon and machine guns. This 
 artillery is supported by powerful searchlights, 
 which makes it possible to pick out hostile air- 
 craft and simultaneously blind them as soon as 
 they get within bomb-dropping range. In other 
 words, the aerial base is protected by a zone of 
 rapid artillery fire issuing from bastions dis- 
 tributed over a wide area, and at a commensu- 
 rate altitude, so that any hostile object entering 
 
AIRCRAFT 31 
 
 this zone will be subject to cross-fire. In cases 
 where the aerial base contains an aerodrome, 
 the dirigible within leaves its housing at night- 
 fall, and takes up a position at an altitude sup- 
 posedly greater than that which hostile aircraft 
 must steer to make an attack on the aerodrome 
 effective. Between the dirigible hovering noise- 
 lessly and unseen in the clouds beyond range, 
 but capable of picking up any intruder with its 
 searchlights and focusing rapid fire on it, and 
 the terrestrial bastions blazing away from be- 
 low, hostile aircraft would not have much 
 chance to do any real damage before they would 
 suffer annihilation themselves. 
 
 Those who wonder why France, reputed to 
 have the most numerous and efficient air fleet in 
 the world, has not shown any noteworthy dis- 
 position to raid German aerial bases, especially 
 at night, will realise the hazards involved. 
 So much more can be accomplished by skilful 
 reconnoissance, at least during the commence- 
 ment of hostilities, than by destructive tactics 
 that neither the Germans nor the Allies have 
 been quite willing to risk their aerial equipment 
 on sanguinary knight-errantry of this sort. 
 
32 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Aeronautic Auxiliaries 
 
 The very latest development in aeronautic 
 auxiliaries includes motor war transports for 
 aeroplanes, and motor field-repair shops for the 
 same. While France and Germany have made 
 creditable progress in this line, it has remained 
 for Russia to produce these auxiliaries in units 
 comprising motor-trucks pulling aeroplane 
 trailers supported by motor-driven aeronautic 
 field-repair shops. The duty of the motor-truck 
 is threefold. It must pull the trailers contain- 
 ing the aeroplanes, it must carry and quarter 
 the officers attached to the aero squadron, and 
 it must serve as a lazaret for them on the field. 
 Each of these two-ton motor-trucks is com- 
 pletely equipped for this triple duty, which en- 
 ables an entire aero division to proceed, at a 
 good rate of speed, to its base with machines 
 and men and repair facilities in one compact 
 unit. The trailers are so constructed that the 
 aeroplanes can be loaded merely by folding or 
 detaching the planes. The repair-shop is 
 mounted on a three and a half -ton chassis pro- 
 pelled by a thirty-horsepower engine, and its 
 
AIRCRAFT 33 
 
 machinery is intended for manual as well as 
 electrical operation. The equipment is very 
 practical and includes every necessary imple- 
 ment from anvil and smithy to lathe, miller and 
 carpentry tools. For rapidly repairing aero- 
 planes as well as automobiles on the firing-line, 
 such a repair shop on wheels is invaluable. It 
 is one of the very useful auxiliaries which is 
 not " mentioned in dispatches," but it is doing 
 a great work behind the smoke of battle in 
 this war. 
 
 Opposing Aerial Forces Compared 
 Although France had more than a year's start 
 of other nations in the race for aerial armament 
 it remained for Germany to beat her and sur- 
 pass her during the last three years. At the 
 outbreak of this war, Germany had the advan- 
 tage of an aerial fleet superior, not only in con- 
 structive merit and practical equipment but 
 also in organisation and personnel, to that of 
 France, her keenest rival. 
 
 The reader has probably already perused the 
 statistics given out as official and published 
 widely by an unsuspecting press. Let it be 
 said once for all that these statistics, while they 
 
34 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 are official in a popular sense, are more remark- 
 able for what they are intended to hide than 
 for what they are supposed to give. Counting 
 the machines owned by the army, and such as 
 have been commandeered into service, Germany 
 probably went to war with fully 600 aeroplanes 
 of all kinds. But this figure does not represent 
 her actual flying strength. Nowadays the man- 
 ufacture of aircraft has been standardised, 
 which in turn admits of large numbers of ma- 
 chines being made with great rapidity. There 
 are upward of thirty aeroplane factories in 
 Germany that went to work on a night-and-day 
 rush order basis at the call to arms on specifica- 
 tions previously completed by the Imperial Fly- 
 ing Corps. This tremendous effort, supported 
 by the emergency stock of motors and spare 
 parts always carried by the government, has 
 enabled Germany to increase her aeroplane arm, 
 during several months' fighting, until she has 
 now fully one thousand machines in service. 
 
 Most of these additions, it will be found when 
 the smoke of battle clears away, will adhere to 
 a type of craft which may constitute a surprise 
 the same as the secret Krupp and Skoda ar- 
 tillery. The Grand General Staff has an admi- 
 
AIECEAFT 35 
 
 rable system providing for the manufacture, 
 during times of peace, of parts and accessories 
 that demand great time and care, such as 
 motors, chassis, propellers, etc., so that when 
 the bugle sounds it is largely a matter of assem- 
 bling, rather than manufacturing, additional ma- 
 chines. The staff calculates its work on the 
 theory that about sixty per cent, additional 
 craft is required in a war on two fronts, as at 
 present. It is also staff policy to settle in 
 advance, so far as practicable, which of modern 
 improvements ought to be acquired for the gov- 
 ernment with a view to keeping them secret so 
 that a quite considerable proportion of the 
 mobilised aerial forces may have certain special 
 advantages over those of the enemy. As tech- 
 nical improvements in aerodynamics and aero- 
 station are chiefly supplied by military engi- 
 neers, Germany has experienced little difficulty 
 in maintaining technical secrets intended for 
 use only in so far as they remain secrets. 
 
 In Zeppelins, Parsevals and other dirigibles, 
 Germany had twenty-four craft in service at the ^€ufe 
 call to arms, capable of an average speed jrf 48 
 miles per hour. At this writing she has man- 
 aged to complete at least three partly finished 
 
 
36 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Super-Zeppelins with the prospect of finishing 
 an extra squadron of these formidable aerial 
 fighters — probably not less than nine craft — be- 
 fore February. 
 
 Against this dazzling equipment France 
 makes but a poor showing. Although her mili- 
 tary programme calls for seven large swift 
 aerial cruisers of 24,000 cubic metres to be de- 
 livered in January, 1915, none have been com- 
 pleted and only three are in process of construc- 
 tion. The other French dirigibles, of which 
 there are sixteen of all kinds, from the unwieldy 
 Astra craft of 1,000 horsepower to the Zodiac 
 toy- vessels of 110 to 220 horsepower, are so far 
 inferior in speed, cruising range and offensive 
 capacity to the German dirigibles, that it is 
 futile to draw comparisons. 
 
 In the aeroplane arm, France is much better 
 equipped. Although fully 1,000 machines have 
 been acquired by the French Government since 
 1911, it is quite safe to say that only half of this 
 number meet the requirements of modern war 
 efficiency. But France has more aeroplane fac- 
 tories than Germany, and she ought to be 
 able to increase this her only effective aerial 
 arm even more rapidly. One thing is likely to 
 
AIRCRAFT 37 
 
 interfere more than anything else. France 
 lacks the thoroughgoing system and masterly 
 organisation that characterise everything the 
 Germans undertake to do. 
 
 Russia has the ideal "paper" armada of the 
 air. The official statistician credits her with a 
 neat, round 500 machines, and some "official" 
 lists add an extra hundred to this number by 
 way of good measure! Undoubtedly this total 
 has been arrived at by computing the customs 
 receipts including all aeroplanes imported to 
 Russia since 1910 for both private and military 
 use. If Russia can actually muster one-fifth 
 of her boasted aerial strength she will have a 
 good deal more than I would be prepared to 
 vouch for, and the Germans should be able 
 to shoot down their antiquated craft at will. 
 The only item of interest in Russia's aerial de- 
 velopment is the Sirkoski giant machines, of 
 which only four are completed. This native 
 type of monster biplane possesses several not 
 uninteresting and meritorious features, but it is 
 more remarkable as the probable forerunner 
 of what will eventually constitute a troop- 
 carrying aeroplane than for any feature of prac- 
 tical warlike use against existing craft. As 
 
38 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 many as sixteen soldiers have been carried 
 safely by a single Sirkoski machine at low 
 altitudes, however, where they would soon 
 change into corpses if carried on the firing-line. 
 Of dirigibles it is unlikely that Eussia can have 
 more than two fairly modern craft in commis- 
 sion. These vessels are of the French Astra 
 type and of little consequence anyhow. 
 
 England is much better equipped with air- 
 craft than is generally believed. Having bor- 
 rowed most of her constructive ideas from 
 France, England has, nevertheless, succeeded in 
 producing a native type of aircraft which is 
 remarkable for excellence of workmanship, es- 
 pecially the seaplane. She is credited with a 
 total of 300 aeroplanes, but even if comman- 
 deered machines are included in this estimate, it 
 is probably more than twenty per cent, ex- 
 aggerated. Small as this force is compared to 
 those of France and Germany, it has given a 
 good account of itself at the front, chiefly in 
 reconnoissance work and raids on German 
 aerial bases. The care with which the Eoyal 
 Flying Corps has undertaken to train pilots as 
 well as observers has proved an object-lesson to 
 France no less than to Germany. In dirigibles, 
 
) Underwood & Underwood, N. Y. 
 
 n he "Eye in the Shy' 9 that eliminates surprise tactics. Above 
 is the latest type of French military "avion," capable of a 
 speed of 125 miles per hour. Below is an automobile 
 aeroplane hospital, containing every requisite tool and 
 appliance for repairing aeroplanes on the field of battle. 
 
AIRCRAFT 39 
 
 however, Great Britain makes a sorry picture. 
 Seven slow and rather old-fashioned non-rigid 
 airships of various kinds is all she can muster, 
 but these vessels are powerless to manoeuvre in 
 bad weather and will probably not be taken to 
 the front. A half-dozen improved non-rigids 
 are building, capable of negotiating 45 miles 
 an hour, and, if finished according to plans, 
 these ships should be able to join the colours in 
 January. Unless convoyed by a squad of armed 
 aeroplanes it would be fatal to employ such 
 craft for reconnoitring over hostile territory. 
 
 Belgium has a miniature aerial corps chiefly 
 consisting of French aeroplanes manned by 
 French-trained pilots, and it requires no imagi- 
 nation to understand how typically Belgian this 
 is ; but vivid imagination is requisite to see in the 
 ancient and honourable gas-bag labelled "Bel- 
 gique III" the semblance of aerial efficiency. 
 
 Austro-Hungary has two passenger dirigibles 
 of the early Zeppelin type, which are available 
 for military purposes, and three non-rigid 
 dirigibles belonging to the army. Small as this 
 squadron is, the Dual Empire has already bene- 
 fited greatly by it, in a tactical sense, as its bor- 
 der enemies have nothing of consequence to 
 
40 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 oppose against it. In aeroplanes, however, 
 Austro-Hungary is the weakest of the great 
 powers. She can have little more than a score 
 of modern machines at the front, unless Ger- 
 many has been thoughtful enough to loan her a 
 squadron of fliers. 
 
 The activity displayed during the last few 
 months in the way of mobilising the aerial arm 
 is well-nigh stupefying. In dirigibles alone 
 Germany lacks only three of equalling the com- 
 bined strength of France, England, Russia and 
 Japan, according to the latest obtainable official 
 figures; and in aeroplanes the Allies have not 
 been able to exceed by more than eighty ma- 
 chines the total increase of Germany since the 
 first shot was fired. The score is as follows : 
 
 Dibigibles 
 
 Mar. Aug. Jan. 
 
 Allies 43 51 64 
 
 Austria and Germany 39 48 69 
 
 Aeboplanes 
 
 Allies 2700 3380 
 
 Austria and Germany 1400 2000 
 
AIECEAFT 41 
 
 The Austro-German increase in dirigibles is 
 practically concentrated in a tremendous out- 
 put of Zeppelin craft of the marine type, un- 
 doubtedly with a view of torpedoing tlje British 
 blockading fleet from above as it has been tor- 
 pedoed from below hitherto. Another point 
 that has been elucidated since hostilities com- 
 menced is that aero-scouting is not nearly as 
 fatal as it was assumed to be. The casu- 
 alty rosters show that the percentage of 
 killed and wounded in the military and naval 
 aero corps is lower than that of any other 
 arm. 
 
 The Advance in Bomb-Dropping 
 
 The lay impression prevails that the drop- 
 ping of bombs from aircraft has proved rather 
 failure than success. The layman instinctively 
 compares bomb-dropping with artillery fire, un- 
 aware of the fact that the former is not intended 
 to replace or even complement the latter. The 
 greater weight of projectile, and its superior 
 striking velocity on impact, added to the rapid- 
 ity of fire and inexhaustible supply of ammuni- 
 tion, are the advantages of terrestrial artillery 
 
42 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 which no system of aerial artillery can be ex- 
 pected to duplicate. 
 
 In a military sense the aerial bomb is in- 
 tended partly as a demoralising factor and 
 partly as a destructive agent under isolated 
 conditions where no other means of inflicting 
 damage can be brought into play. To be sure, 
 the latest Super-Zeppelins carry a store of 
 heavy explosive projectiles which would cause 
 havoc comparable to that of heavy field artil- 
 lery if dropped with accuracy of aim, but that 
 does not imply that they are supposed to carry 
 the burden of the artillery. A fleet of such craft 
 attacking massed formations of troops in the 
 enemy's rear, beyond the artillery's range, 
 could without doubt at times cause destruction 
 similar to what the artillery is capable of within 
 range. Nevertheless, such a coup-de-main has 
 not been essayed so far in this war, the osten- 
 sible cause being the risk of forfeiting part of 
 the aerial fleet, which is more urgently needed 
 for larger and more ambitious operations. 
 
 There are many different kinds of aerial 
 bombs in use, but they are all similar in that 
 they explode on contact with a terrestrial ob- 
 ject. Hence, the damage caused is in most cases 
 
AIRCRAFT 43 
 
 no more serious than that of a large hand 
 grenade and generally far less than exploding 
 shrapnel. That such would be the case in ac- 
 tual war was foreseen by the writer as early as 
 1910, when he joined in collaboration with Lieu- 
 tenant R. E. Scott of the United States Artil- 
 lery, in evolving a new type of aerial bomb, 
 which would be more destructive than a grenade, 
 equal to shrapnel, and detonating like it by 
 time fuse, and, on demand, quite as effective 
 as a mine exploded in the earth under the 
 enemy's position. The outcome of this col- 
 laboration was an apparatus with means for 
 launching heavily armoured explosive projectiles 
 from aircraft in motion, the launching device 
 actuated by an aerial range-finder to insure ac- 
 curacy of aim. The entire apparatus weighs 
 but 26 pounds and is installable alike in 
 dirigibles as in aeroplanes. The ammuni- 
 tion consists of 15 projectiles weighing 18 
 pounds each and fitted with steering vanes to 
 insure their steady course through space and 
 striking head on without tumbling. The mathe- 
 matical problem involved was that of suiting 
 the range-finding to a quick and accurate de- 
 termination of the parabolic curve which the 
 
44 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 projectile is forced to follow, impelled by the 
 speed of the aircraft; of finding speed of the 
 latter in relation to earth, and means of esti- 
 mating windage on the projectile after launch- 
 ing. Two years' experimenting enabled us 
 finally to produce an apparatus which in 1912 
 fulfilled the above requirements well enough to 
 win the great Michelin Prix Aero Cible of 
 150,000 francs under the auspices of the French 
 Government and the Aero Club de France. Our 
 apparatus, which is the pioneer of all bomb- 
 launching machines, not only defeated all sim- 
 ilar devices entered by other pilots represent- 
 ing the efforts of various nations, but attained 
 the remarkable score of making eleven bull's- 
 eye shots in a target only ten yards in diameter 
 from an altitude of more than 2,500 feet, the 
 aeroplane going at a speed of about sixty-five 
 miles an hour against a stiff breeze. Rendered 
 into the favourite allegory of the newspaper 
 writer, the aeroplane was speeding as fast as the 
 Empire State Express at an altitude more than 
 thrice the height of the Woolworth skyscraper, 
 and buried eleven armoured projectiles in a tar- 
 get about as large as one of the funnels on the 
 Mauretania. Despite this performance — which 
 
AIRCRAFT 45 
 
 France took pains to herald as a French vic- 
 tory! — it was very difficult for us to convince 
 the general staffs of Europe's leading powers 
 that we could sink war vessels as readily as we 
 could explode fortified places and rout encamp- 
 ments ! It was not so much the men as the red 
 tape wound around the men. Before the present 
 war is fought to a finish the powers that hung 
 back in 1912 may desire to adopt the device in 
 1915. 
 
 The points of divergence I wish to emphasise 
 are that the Scott-Dewitz apparatus is the only 
 one produced, to my knowledge, which launches 
 not an ordinary bomb, but a self-steering projec- 
 tile that can be loaded as a shrapnel and det- 
 onated like one, of additional use either as an 
 incendiary missile spreading flame on contact 
 or as a gaseous agent distributing nauseous 
 fumes; and, finally, as an armour-piercing 
 weapon burying itself in the vitals of its target, 
 detonating after penetration, on the delayed- 
 action principle with effect similar to a mine 
 exploded in the ground. 
 
 It is clear that destruction wrought on these 
 lines is formidable in the extreme and much 
 more positive than explosion by contact. 
 
46 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 A system quite different from the above is 
 that invented by Steinmetz for both aerial de- 
 fence and offence. The defence is provided 
 for by a field of aerial mines, shaped like minia- 
 ture captive balloons anchored by wire contact 
 with the earth at altitudes where they will in- 
 terfere with aircraft and explode their charges 
 on contact. This plan of "mining" the air is 
 patterned upon the anchored contact mine of 
 naval warfare, but unlike the latter it is neither 
 invisible nor impervious to currents. The only 
 practical use of air mines would seem to be 
 limited to the nocturnal operations of hostile 
 aircraft, and as they can be set very quickly in 
 rows distributed over various altitudes they 
 should offer fairly good protection even if they 
 tangle and premature explosions are caused by 
 wrecking in a stiff breeze. 
 
 Somewhat more problematical is the Stein- 
 metz offensive plan, which has been adapted 
 from the ancient and honourable method of 
 catching fish by means of a line and hook. Only 
 in this instance the line is a light wire wound on 
 a reel and the hook is a small hand-grenade. 
 The inventor now proposes to go fishing for 
 aircraft in the heavens in a very speedy aero- 
 
AIRCRAFT 47 
 
 plane by overhauling his quarry and " hook- 
 ing" it with the pendent bombs. I do not say 
 that a number of swift aeroplanes fitted with 
 this simple tool could not succeed in pulling a 
 wire over a dirigible and exploding the charge, 
 but in order to capture a 65-knot Zeppelin, for 
 instance, the aeroplane must be not only unar- 
 moured but unarmed in order to insure a su- 
 perior rate of speed and expert handling of the 
 reel bomb. This means that the Zeppelin would 
 have an excellent chance of shooting down its 
 assailants before the latter could hope to over- 
 haul it. A Zeppelin thus attacked would in- 
 variably seek its highest attainable altitude and 
 speed away from the attack. As it can rise at 
 the rate of more than 2,000 feet per minute, and 
 maintain a horizontal speed of 65 knots, the 
 approach of the aeroplane to a fleeing Zeppelin 
 cannot be more menacing than at a rate about 
 30 miles per hour, that is, allowing a speed of 
 96 miles for the aeroplane. At these speeds, 
 the aeroplane must fly a distance of 7y 2 miles 
 in 15 minutes before it could overhaul and 
 snare the Zeppelin. During the first five min- 
 utes, the Zeppelin would have ample time to 
 get the range and adjust its rapid-fire artillery, 
 
48 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to maintain a zone of fire, a continuous stream 
 of bullets focused on the aeroplane. During 
 the ensuing ten minutes, the latter would be 
 compelled to fly 4.7 miles against a zone of 
 murderous machine-gun fire totalling probably 
 not less than 4,000 bullets per minute. If any- 
 body thinks the aeroplane has a chance, let him 
 lead the attack. It is only in exceptional in- 
 stances as when a whole squad of aeroplanes 
 could manage to swoop down out of a protect- 
 ing curtain of cloud upon a Zeppelin at rest, 
 and take it by surprise before it could get under 
 momentum and operate its guns, that the Stein- 
 metz outfit could be considered in the light of a 
 practical aeronautic equipment. But it appears 
 to me it could be employed with more certainty 
 in "hooking" wireless stations, on incendiary 
 raids against hostile hangars, and for harass- 
 ing lines of communication. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 
 
 Firing a "Brummer" 
 
 They who dwell in the pleasant valley of the 
 Sarnbre, where the ornate border-posts of Flan- 
 ders salute the forts of France, are seized by the 
 spell of its autumnal revelry. Last September 
 saw nature on the Sarnbre in the same mood, 
 but the Flemish goodmen and goodwomen failed 
 to respond. 
 
 The harvest moon stood in the sky like a fes- 
 tive, round-faced peasant glowing with anxiety, 
 but there was no harvest anywhere and there 
 was no festive greeting from the earth peasant 
 to the moon peasant. 
 
 Devastation, stubble-fields and devastation. 
 
 The caMseway flanked by double rows of 
 grenadier poplars has lost not a few of its 
 giants by shell fire. Some of the trunks are 
 snapped clean off as one would break a match; 
 others are splintered as by thunderbolts. The 
 poplar column ranges through a village slain to 
 bits with heavy shell fire and consumed by flame. 
 The empty village lane is gutted with debris and 
 broken masonry. Bits of shattered glass gleam 
 
 49 
 
50 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 in the moonlight. Charred timbers and beams 
 grope with rusty spikes against flame-seared 
 walls. A solitary chimney stands aloof, veined 
 with cracks, like a wounded sentinel intent on 
 his duty. What was before a quaint little place 
 notv turns toward heaven a crippled, mangled 
 corpse of charred bone and pallid brow in mute 
 witness of the horror of war. 
 
 Out on the causeway a lonely figure strides 
 up and down — a Prussian picket in gray with 
 spiked helmet. A half-mile further on another 
 sentry and so on at intervals along the fine, old 
 pike toward Charier oi. 
 
 A buzzer sounds. The picket bends down 
 over something by the roadside and picks up a 
 concealed receiver. "Jawohl!" He has his 
 orders. A squad of military engineers ap- 
 proach him presently. They are "pioneers" 
 and carry lanterns doused in buckets. With 
 pick and spade the crew begins to blaze a trail 
 through the field, paving it with heavy wooden 
 planks. Quickly, silently and smoothly work 
 the pioneers, pushing the planked trail ever 
 further until it pierces the forest fringe. And 
 there, in a small glade, also working by lantern 
 light, is a crew of masons and artificers erect- 
 ing bomb-proofs and laying a heavy concrete 
 base in a circle. 
 
 A large, long shaft of light breaks upon the 
 horizon on the east bank of the Sambre. An* 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 51 
 
 other huge shaft cuts in on the west bank. The 
 shafts sweep out slowly searching every inch of 
 ground. Presently they meet and focus on a 
 spot somewhere in the southwest in the direction 
 of Fort Maubeuge, — the prelude to a Prussian 
 night attack. 
 
 Again the buzzer sounds; again the picket 
 snaps "Jawohl!" There is a dull, rumbling 
 sound, barely audible. Shooting it is not. 
 Thunder it cannot be, smiles the moon. 
 
 Closer and closer comes the rumble, and as 
 the picket peers along the murky highway he 
 discovers a huge, unshapely monster ambling 
 forward with the tottering pace of a barbarian 
 idol on wheels. It snorts and blows and growls. 
 It gnashes steel tooth against steel tooth. 
 Sparks of lightning flash from its monstrous 
 eyes. Onward it trundles ponderously like a 
 menace to mankind. 
 
 It comes to a halt before the picket. The 
 canvas is removed and a big 42-centimetre 
 "B rummer" stands revealed gleaming in the 
 moonlight. With its three heavy recoil cylin- 
 ders tucked around the monstrous barrel it 
 looks like a quadruple cannon pointed to shoot 
 down the foolish moon. 
 
 The crew jumps off the motor-tractor, which 
 is detached. The pioneers bring up a team of 
 forty-eight artillery horses, and the heavy piece 
 is skidded and limbered onto the wooden trail. 
 
52 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 The drivers spur on their teams, and the big 
 "Brummer" moves forward tumultuously over 
 creaking planks to its base on the big concrete 
 patch hidden behind the forest fringe. 
 
 The platform base is bolted down, the mount- 
 ings and cylinders are set in place, and the 
 barrel is backed up and cradled in its sleeve of 
 steel. Pistons are snapped into gear, hand- 
 wheels are set spinning, levers are pulled, the 
 ton-heavy side-breech clicks open to the touch 
 of the hand, and the pawl of the turn-table gear 
 begins its metallic chatter as the big gun is being 
 whipped into battery. There is a decade of in- 
 ventive technical skill behind every move com- 
 pleted, behind every part and piece of the huge 
 machine. It responds to its code of mechanical 
 adjustment with the precision of a soldier at 
 drill. A sharp command sends the crew into 
 the bomb-proof. The big piece is loaded and 
 ready for the range. 
 
 With the first gray shimmering of dawn there 
 is a dull, droning sound overhead — the air scout 
 speeding out for final reconnoissance. A bugle 
 calls the gun crew to quarters. Soon the air 
 scout returns, signals and sweeps away to his 
 post of observation several miles beyond the 
 enemy's trenches, where the steel-turreted ram- 
 parts of Fort Maubeuge hide in the morning 
 mists. 
 
 The crew, not employed in firing, lie down on 
 
« • . ?k* 4 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 53 
 
 hands and knees; even the gun-captain crouches 
 apprehensively ! The buzzer sounds three quick 
 taps, then a long "F-e-u-rrr!" 
 
 There is a blast as of an exploding volcano. 
 A hot flash blinds and gags the crew. A dis- 
 integrating crash convulses the earth. And 
 twelve hundred pounds of deadly projectile goes 
 screaming and howling through the air in a 
 vast arc over the Prussian front beyond the 
 Franco-British trenches, beyond their rear, and 
 knocks a monstrous hole through twenty feet of 
 steel and concrete, breaking the crest of the fort 
 impregnable and slaying the crew in one vast 
 explosion. 
 
 The shell has travelled over six miles. The 
 gwn has not moved an inch. 
 
Making the "Impossible" Possible 
 
 Because non-technical writers are freely per- 
 mitted, and even invited, to express opinions 
 on technical subjects there is now, in this conn- 
 try, widespread confusion on many military 
 topics. The belief that the big gun is the big- 
 gest factor in deciding modern battles is a case 
 in point. The success of the secret German 
 heavy artillery of the howitzer and mortar type, 
 which promptly reduced French and Belgian 
 forts considered impregnable, is largely respon- 
 sible for this delusion. To to sure, artillery of 
 the Krupp 42-centimetre type is a tremendous 
 asset to an invading force obliged to cut its way 
 through miles of barrier forts against which or- 
 dinary field cannon is comparatively ineffective. 
 But when these big pieces have done all they can 
 possibly be expected to do in the way of de- 
 stroying a fortified place, it still remains for the 
 infantry to advance and hold the ground thus 
 gained, as otherwise this advantage would soon 
 
 be lost. Also, while the heavy projectiles of the 
 
 54 
 
AUTOMOBILE AETILLERY 55 
 
 Krupp mortars can devastate any modern forti- 
 fication no matter how strong, and at the same 
 time destroy the garrison, heavy firing, no mat- 
 ter how long continued, cannot completely rout 
 the enemy, who would deploy anew on the cessa- 
 tion of firing in case hostile infantry should fail 
 to advance and hold the terrain bombarded. 
 
 The principal difficulty in bringing heavy ar- 
 tillery into action is the slow and laborious man- 
 ner in which it must of necessity be advanced, 
 coupled with the danger of losing it to the 
 enemy in case the advance intended cannot be 
 completed. Hence, the field artillery of a mod- 
 ern army consists mostly of small-calibre can- 
 non of the direct-fire type, and the object of the 
 artillery commander is to make up for the want 
 of extra-heavy ammunition by rapidity of fire 
 and accuracy of aim. 
 
 This is a basic requirement in the armies that 
 are now warring. Those of Germany and 
 Austria are the only ones that have been suc- 
 cessful in introducing a new departure by de- 
 signing mortars for field service that out- 
 class even the heaviest naval artillery, at 
 least in calibre, and of quite astounding 
 mobility despite great weight and unwieldy 
 
56 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ammunition. What was impossible before is 
 not only possible now but a demonstrated 
 success owing to the inventive capacities of 
 the Skoda and Krupp arsenals. Not only- 
 can the Kaiser's armies take heavy artillery to 
 the front, and keep it moving up and down the 
 front at a very creditable pace, but the metal 
 thrown by these giant pieces is of such pre- 
 ponderating calibre that the destructive effect 
 of a 42-centimetre battery practically equals 
 the broadside of a modern battleship. 
 
 All this would have been impossible were it 
 not for the skill with which motor traction has 
 been applied to furnish these modern artillery 
 monsters with the requisite degree of mobility. 
 A decade ago, even had the Germans been 
 ready, their big guns would never have seen the 
 front. Motors were not powerful nor reliable 
 enough then to do the traction work. The guns 
 would have been platformed in steel forts and 
 their excellent offensive capacity lost to the 
 German invading armies. It would take a team 
 of thirty-eight to forty-eight horses to pull a 
 42-centimetre piece over the prevailing terrain, 
 and relays would be required every four hours 
 to keep the big gun moving apace with a march- 
 
AUTOMOBILE AETILLERY 57 
 
 ing army. This would require at least 114 
 horses for each piece, and means slow transpor- 
 tation if everything goes without a hitch, which 
 it doesn't in warfare. 
 
 All kinds of curious estimates are current 
 anent the monstrous Krupp 42-centimetre 
 pieces, which German soldiery has variously 
 nicknamed "Brummers," because of the growl- 
 ing note of their report, "Tanten aus Essen," 
 because of their origin, and "Dicken Luders," 
 because of their squat and stout proportions. 
 
 One military "expert" even goes so far as 
 to state that the piece weighs 124 tons, fires a 
 ll^-ton projectile costing $9,500 apiece, has a 
 barrel length of 69 feet, a maximum range of 
 28 miles, and glibly fixes the total cost of this 
 mechanical monster at the modest figure of 
 $462,000! In the absence of authentic specifi- 
 cations why not draw a bit on the imagination? 
 Another similarly accredited ' i expert ' ' abruptly 
 denies the existence of the gun. He regards it 
 as a myth, arguing that according to the rules 
 of artillery construction, which allows three 
 feet length of barrel for every inch of bore, the 
 gun would be 51 feet long and weigh 34 tons, 
 and, of course, he adds, such a monstrous piece 
 
58 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 is not transportable in the field ! A third critic, 
 and an alleged eye-witness at the front, corri- 
 gates all preceding guesses by announcing, with 
 the air of finality, that the Austrians, not the 
 Prussians, are the chaps who have placed the 
 big guns at the front, "none of which, however, 
 are of more than 30.5-centimetre calibre and no 
 larger than the standard siege cannon in Rus- 
 sia's army." In the absence of facts it is quite 
 remarkable how certain people regale them- 
 selves with conclusions. Once they have shaped 
 for themselves a theory, no matter how weird, 
 they have no difficulty in finding or manufac- 
 turing " facts" to fit the theory. 
 
 It is quite true that the well-known Russian 
 PutilofF arsenals several years ago designed a 
 heavy field-piece, based on drawings and speci- 
 fications obtained from Creusot of France. The 
 gun proper weighs 6 tons, the carriage and 
 mounting about 28 tons, and it is calibred to 
 30.2 centimetres, or about 12 inches. This piece 
 was designed more for siege requirements than 
 for field operations, to which its low degree of 
 mobility is not likely to suit it, and it is for all 
 practical purposes more of a mortar than of a 
 cannon. 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 59 
 
 Some Big Gun Blunders 
 
 Soon after war was declared the Skoda works 
 in Austria, practically the equal to Creusot in 
 artillery technique, sent a battery of 30.2-centi- 
 metre howitzers to be tried out in comparison 
 with the 21-centimetre field and the 28-centi- 
 metre siege howitzers of Krupp make. These 
 are the three types of pieces that finally re- 
 duced the chain of forts defending Liege and 
 Namur to fragments, but as the maximum 
 calibre was held by the Skoda guns some ob- 
 servers got the notion into their heads that 
 Austria furnished the big guns and not Prussia. 
 It was not until the army of General von Kluck 
 crossed the Meuse and the bombarding of Fort 
 Maubeuge began that the "Brummers," the 42- 
 centimetre Krupp automobile mortars, were 
 allowed to decide the issue, hence the confusion 
 in terms and calibre by "veteran" war corre- 
 spondents et al., most of whom are unable to 
 tell a recoil cylinder from a barrel. 
 
 It may also surprise the reading public to 
 know that up to the present time of writing, or 
 about one hundred days of warfare, the alleged 
 
60 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Krupp 42-centimetre cannon that have been so 
 elaborately photographed and vociferously 
 heralded in the newspaper and periodical press 
 are not at all German guns but Austrian 30.2- 
 centimetre howitzers of Skoda make. It must 
 be admitted, however, that only a military ex- 
 pert could tell the latter type apart from the 
 German 28-centimetre siege howitzers, but 
 neither type comes within range of secret arma- 
 ments as they are published as standard equip- 
 ment in the official lists of both countries. 
 
 So far, the writer has not seen a single genu- 
 ine photo of the real German "Brummer" of 
 42-centimetre calibre, and until one of them is 
 captured we are not likely to encounter it in 
 print unless a war correspondent is willing to 
 forfeit his life for the sake of entertaining his 
 readers. 
 
 Nevertheless, it may be asserted with com- 
 parative certainty that the secret 42-centimetre 
 pieces do not differ materially from the stand- 
 ard 28- and 30.2-centimetre pieces except in 
 weight and ponderosity. In general, all three 
 types may be classified as heavy siege auto- 
 mobile artillery, since they have main features 
 in common. The transportation problem is 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 61 
 
 effected in three units. First, there is the auto- 
 mobile tractor, which carries the artillery crew 
 and tools, and furnishes the motive power. 
 Second, a car with the platform and turn-table 
 for the gun including the mounting, the sleeve 
 and the recoil gear. Third, a car specially de- 
 signed to carry the barrel or gun proper. On 
 level roads a single tractor is sufficient to move 
 the three units at a good speed, but where heavy 
 grades interpose a tractor is needed for each 
 car. It is a mistake to assume, as some writers 
 do, that such an outfit of heavy automobile artil- 
 lery can race up and down the firing-line and 
 select bases of operation at will. It can do no 
 such thing. When military men speak of the 
 unusual mobility of these guns they mean that 
 they possess a greater degree of mobility for 
 the enormous weight carried than was possi- 
 ble before. At best they can maintain a pace 
 on average country roads corresponding to the 
 double-quick of an army on the march, which is 
 quite sufficient for modern artillery needs. The 
 initial transportation of the gun from the ar- 
 senal to the army base is undertaken by rail. 
 From this base to its predestined position in the 
 rear of the firing-line, the gun proceeds under 
 
62 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 its own tractive power, that is, it follows the 
 country roads as close up to this position as 
 possible. The most difficult manoeuvre of the 
 whole journey is to move the gun from the high- 
 way across the field terrain to the position 
 plotted for it, or, to use a military term, to get 
 the gun in battery. 
 
 Getting a "Brumrner" in Battery 
 
 If the ground is soft or uneven, the army 
 pioneers are set to work constructing a tem- 
 porary road over which the big gun is then 
 hauled by teams of from thirty-eight to forty- 
 eight horses. When the ground is passably firm 
 the gun proceeds under its own power or 
 assisted by horse, as the exigencies may dictate, 
 but even so there are obstacles in the way of 
 stone fences, ditches and soft spots that must 
 be dealt with by the pioneers before the big gun 
 can be limbered into place. In some cases the 
 heaviest mortars are shipped direct by rail to 
 their emplacements, aided by specially laid 
 side tracks. Once this object is gained a heavy 
 concrete base is laid and the platform with turn- 
 table and mountings emplaced in it solidly. 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 63 
 
 Then the car bearing the barrel is backed up 
 to the platform, and the barrel is fitted to the 
 double recoil cylinders on the mountings and 
 drawn forward into the sleeve. The piston rod 
 of the recoil cylinders is bolted to a lug at- 
 tached to the breech, the barrel is elevated into 
 position, and the big "Brummer" is ready to 
 sling a ton-heavy projectile a distance of seven 
 miles and smash any defence as yet devised by 
 the human brain. 
 
 Some people do not understand the function 
 of a piece of artillery at the moment of being 
 fired. They think the gun jumps back the same 
 as a rifle kicks back. Were this so, neither 
 accuracy nor rapidity of artillery fire would be 
 possible, and a 42-centimetre piece would wreck 
 itself by a single shot. The only thing that 
 changes place at the moment of firing is the 
 piston in the recoil cylinder moving back with 
 the gun proper as it slides in its sleeve or 
 cradle. There are three cylinders running par- 
 allel with the gun barrel. The middle cylinder 
 does the braking actuated by a recoil spring, 
 and the left and right cylinders are merely for 
 air storage. All the cylinders stand fast ; it is 
 only the piston of the recoil cylinder that jumps 
 
64 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 back with the barrel of the gun at the point of 
 firing. The training gears on the mounting 
 give a swift and positive elevation of upward of 
 sixty-five degrees, and also permit of sweeping 
 the gun quickly through a horizontal arc of 
 five degrees on either side of its longitudinal 
 centre. Of course, the entire gun with platform 
 and mounting can be swung completely around 
 by means of the turn-table fixed in the base. 
 
 The Austrian 30.2-centimetre Skoda gun 
 throws an explosive projectile weighing close to 
 eight hundred pounds a distance of more than 
 six miles, firing at the maximum range at 42^- 
 degree elevation. The weight of a complete 
 gun outfit is thirty-nine tons. On this basis it 
 is safe to say the 42-centimetre Krupp piece 
 ought to be able to hurl a 16-inch shell, weighing 
 more than a ton, fully seven miles. What this 
 means can perhaps better be appreciated when 
 we say that no super-dreadnaught built, once 
 within range, could withstand the onslaught of 
 such a battery. It is not likely, however, that 
 the Germans may adapt their 42-centimetre 
 mortars to naval requirements, and equip a 
 number of battleships with this formidable 
 arm. 
 
AUTOMOBILE AETILLERY 65 
 
 Every now and then a writer pops up with a 
 lurid tale showing that Germany is approach- 
 ing her finish because her heavy cannon are 
 worn out and the gunners have gone crazy! 
 As usual the guesswork expert straddles the 
 wrong steed and comes a cropper. It is pre- 
 cisely the big guns of the "Brummer" type 
 that suffer least. The explosive strain is much 
 less in a gun of the howitzer and mortar type, 
 such as the German and Austrian "Brummers," 
 than in a direct-fire type of cannon to which 
 naval and field artillery in general belong. 
 When naval men say that the main batteries of 
 a modern battleship can be fired an average 
 of only two hundred rounds — and this applies 
 to 12-inch and 14-inch pieces — they mean not 
 that it is dangerous to fire the guns, though the 
 factor of safety is rapidly reducing after the 
 two-hundredth round, but that the guns are be- 
 coming inaccurate and difficult to serve. Of 
 course, every shot fired by a cannon means a 
 certain microscopic injury to its rifling — erosion 
 is the artillery term — and continued injury of 
 this kind will gradually bring about certain de- 
 fects in the rifling that make good marks- 
 manship impossible. While erosion is more 
 
66 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 prevalent in large guns than in small guns, and, 
 of course, least in the army rifle, this applies 
 only to direct-fire weapons which require in- 
 tense muzzle velocity of projectile to be effec- 
 tive. The indirect-fire artillery, to which Skoda 
 and Krupp howitzers belong, is not menaced by 
 erosion to any considerable extent and can keep 
 up comfortably with the army rifle. As to the 
 crews getting crazy under the strain of serving 
 the batteries, this is all poppycock. To be sure 
 there is a factor of fatigue to be considered, not 
 only in metals but in men. The latter wear 
 down and the former wear out. For this very 
 reason the big gun crews are relieved as much 
 as possible, and the arsenals at Essen are busy 
 day and night to produce new batteries of 
 "Brummers." If gunners are getting crazy, it 
 must be those who are getting the big shells 
 about their ears rather than those who are 
 aiming them. 
 
 When Repairs Might Win Battles 
 
 The really serious side of the artillery prob- 
 lem, on the firing-line, is how to provide for 
 renewals and repairs of the active guns. On 
 
? *• 
 
 ^J ft) 
 
 V ^ 
 
 * s 
 
 8-2 
 
 8.? 
 
 5- © 
 
 J.- 
 
 ■** g 
 
 o 
 
 ••« 
 
 S CO 
 
 Sri** 4 
 to •** 
 
 * -g 
 
 to to 
 «K* ■*- 
 
 8 "8 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 le * 
 
AUTOMOBILE ABTILLERY 67 
 
 the present fighting fronts these pieces have 
 been under high pressure requirements for sev- 
 eral months, and by the time this book may see 
 print they will be pretty well worn ; at least they 
 will be so worn as to be inaccurate. The com- 
 mander who is f arsighted enough to provide for 
 this eventuality, and has means at his disposal 
 to maintain an uninterrupted process of repairs 
 and renewals of active field artillery, will have a 
 tremendous advantage over the commander 
 who waits till he is forced to do it. A factor 
 of this calibre, which most laymen would ignore, 
 might easily become one of particular moment, 
 especially if the war is going to last the winter 
 out. 
 
 But tenderer and more difficult to maintain 
 than rifled field cannon are the motor-tractor, 
 the armoured automobile, and the motor-service 
 cars in attendance upon the artillery corps. 
 The rough handling that these vehicles are of 
 necessity subjected to on the front increases the 
 factor of depreciation to a point where only 
 extraordinary repair facilities backed by ade- 
 quate renewals could possibly maintain the effi- 
 ciency of the motored vehicles. Here is another 
 chance for long-distance generalship. It isn't 
 
68 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 so much who has the most and the best cannon 
 and motor-artillery now as who can keep them 
 best and most numerous till the last great battle 
 of this war is fought to a finish. 
 
 At the outbreak of this war Germany had 
 some four thousand guns in the field artillery, 
 not counting secret armaments, against three 
 thousand owned by France, almost two thou- 
 sand under the Austrian eagle, considerably 
 more than four thousand under the Eussian 
 knout, and little more than a thousand pieces 
 on John Bull's side. Of this artillery it is 
 quite safe to say that Germany and Austria 
 have their full combined quota of six thousand 
 pieces actually in the field. The only one power 
 of the Allies that has all its guns out is France, 
 and deducting the guns that Eussia and Eng- 
 land have saved for other purposes, we find that 
 the Allies are superior to the Austro-German 
 forces by little more than eight hundred pieces. 
 This should be more than offset by the heavy 
 siege howitzers of Skoda and Krupp make, and 
 the capacity of these works for rapidly manu- 
 facturing new artillery in huge quantities. 
 With more than eighty thousand hands working 
 in double shifts night and day the Skoda-Krupp 
 
AUTOMOBILE AETILLERY 69 
 
 combination, added to the twenty thousand men 
 employed by Erhardt and other gun-makers, 
 are most certainly in a position to outdistance 
 the combined efforts of the Russian Putiloff, the 
 French Creusot, and the British Armstrong 
 and Vickars arsenals. 
 
 One of the most potent reasons why German 
 strategy chose the Belgian route for invasion in 
 preference to blundering into the trap so cun- 
 ningly arranged by the French at the "trouee 
 d'Epinal" on the Toul-Belfort barrier, is that 
 the highways in Belgium, and those connecting 
 the Flemish border with Northern France, are 
 more level than elsewhere on the frontier, and 
 thus better suited to the transport of these 
 heavy Krupp and Skoda pieces without which 
 von Moltke could not have ventured to order 
 the storm-drive toward Paris. Reducing mod- 
 ern steel forts by siege methods is a slow 
 operation, but von Moltke was well aware that 
 in the secret Krupp and Skoda heavy artillery 
 the German army had the nucleus for quickly 
 destroying even the stanchest forts of the 
 enemy, and, moreover, artillery mobile enough 
 to keep pace with the forced marching of the 
 German army. 
 
70 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Armoured Automobiles 
 
 The armoured automobile is the " cavalry " of 
 motor-driven artillery. In mobility it is su- 
 perior to horse, but more susceptible to break- 
 down and unable to swerve from the beaten 
 path of the highway. It has offensive power 
 superior to both infantry and mounted troops, 
 but lacks their capacity for concerted and con- 
 tinuous action. Mainly for these and similar 
 reasons the work detailed to the armoured auto- 
 mobile in this war has been limited to reeon- 
 noissance duty involving extraordinary features 
 not hitherto encountered in warfare. For 
 quickly driving a wedge into hostile territory 
 in advance of an invading force, making obser- 
 vations under speed, and, whenever compelled, 
 to attack and disperse with rapid artillery such 
 detachments of hostile troops as it may run 
 across, there is no weapon comparable to the 
 armoured automobile. Fighting on the frontiers 
 has shown that such machines reach their maxi- 
 mum value when operating in conjunction with 
 air scouts, that is, the scouts can usually direct 
 them to the vital spots and warn them of hid- 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 71 
 
 den danger. When the terrain is wooded, how- 
 ever, or in case of misty weather, the air scout 
 can do nothing of importance, but a muffled ar- 
 moured car can sneak through and complete the 
 scouting where mounted men would be detected 
 if not decimated. 
 
 When Germany invaded Belgium the Ameri- 
 can press was forthwith flooded with accounts 
 of how the Germans advanced in endless col- 
 umns of armoured cars ! Marching belongs to a 
 former epoch, the soldiers of modern armies are 
 carried to battle in armour-clad automobiles — 
 that was the sweeping impression conveyed. 
 Of course, nothing of the sort occurred. The 
 German army regulations provide that an in- 
 vading force be invariably preceded by its ac- 
 tive field officers. They must look over the ter- 
 rain and select positions for the advancing army 
 corps. These officers are sped forward in light 
 armoured autos, complete their observations as 
 rapidly as possible, and return to their post. 
 Several such motor-scouting squads shot across 
 the Luxembourg and Belgian borders at the 
 commencement of hostilities, but they consisted 
 of officers, not privates, and only officers are 
 thus transported. Marching is obligatory as 
 
72 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ever, and once the men are in the trenches 
 forced marching orders under cover of night 
 are not infrequent. 
 
 The motor-cars used for high speed scouting 
 purposes are armoured but not armed. There 
 are no guns mounted in the cars. The rifle is 
 the only weapon employed. The plating is very 
 light — seldom of more than four-millimetre 
 thickness — and just sufficient to turn rifle and 
 machine-gun bullets. The German Opel and 
 N. A. G. cars of this type have a vertical steel 
 blade attachment at the front for cutting such 
 wires as the enemy may stretch over the 
 roads. 
 
 In the Minerva military model the Belgians 
 possess another successful type of armoured 
 scout. It is very similar to the light German 
 scout, but is armed with one rapid-fire gun and 
 plated with five-millimetre steel. It has neither 
 hood nor cupola and the crew inside are sup- 
 posed to protect themselves by ducking behind 
 the armoured walls. The Belgians also have a 
 heavier model of S. A. V. A. make, which is 
 equipped with huge headlights to operate at 
 night also. This car has a rapid-fire gun 
 mounted in a cupola-formed revolving turret, 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 73 
 
 and although it is supposed to be an improve- 
 ment on the Minerva type, it has not operated 
 as successfully as the latter. 
 
 When it comes to " armoured forts on wheels/ ' 
 Germany and Italy divide honours. The Mer- 
 cedes and Opel trucks mounting five to seven 
 Krupp rapid-fire artillery, plated with half -inch 
 steel armour, and having solid-tire disk wheels, 
 are virtually miniature mobile forts, but they 
 are not very speedy. An even more formidable 
 fighting machine is the Isotta Fraschini heavy 
 model produced by Italy, which boasts a battery 
 of four rapid-fire guns and has a revolving 
 turret not unlike that of a Gruson fort. Eng- 
 land seems to depend chiefly on commandeered 
 vehicles, and her subsidised, armoured Daimlers 
 are disproportionate in number to the needs of 
 her army. 
 
 France appears to have done comparatively 
 little fighting with her armoured cars, though 
 she possesses in the Schneider and Charron at 
 least two types that are considered models of 
 their kind. The Charron is the only completely 
 inclosed armoured car that affords the crew an 
 unobstructed view on all sides through steel- 
 lattice panels, and even the wind-shield is made 
 
74 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 on this plan. A revolving cupola mounting a 
 single 5-centimetre gun tops the car, and the 
 appliances for training the gun and the cupola 
 are very complete. Despite its weight and 
 heavy equipment this car is quite speedy, hav- 
 ing pneumatic tires, which, strange to say, are 
 left unprotected by shields. 
 
 The Schneider type of armoured car is chiefly 
 noticeable for its "superimposed" turret, that 
 is, the lower part of the turret is stationary and 
 the upper part is rotating. By an ingenious 
 arrangement the gunner can sit on a seat at- 
 tached to the gun and pedal a bicycle crank, 
 which moves the gun with the rotating upper 
 half of the turret cylinder. The gunner has 
 both hands free — and this is an advance over 
 other systems — but as he is actually sitting on 
 top of the gun at the moment of firing he is 
 liable to a good deal of shaking up. 
 
 The experience gained under fire in this war 
 would seem to discourage the further building 
 of excessively armoured and comparatively slow 
 cars in preference to speedy cars clad with 
 plates of medium weight and armoured with one 
 or two machine guns. To appear suddenly, to 
 maintain a withering fire for a while, and to 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 75 
 
 disappear suddenly, these are the capital fight- 
 ing assets of the armoured automobile as far as 
 this war has taught. The extra-heavy, slow- 
 moving, heavy-gun cars do not appear to have 
 done what was expected of them. 
 
 An instance in point is the invasion of the 
 Belgian town, Alost. Instead of sending a fly- 
 ing column through the streets, which were 
 heavily barricaded and filled with snipers in 
 concealment, the Germans wedged in with a 
 small squad of light-armoured automobiles fitted 
 with machine guns. In a short time the streets 
 were cleared, and more than fifteen hundred 
 Belgians were mowed down by the murderous 
 motor artillery. Probably a corresponding 
 number of Prussian troops would have been 
 killed by the barricaded Belgians had the ar- 
 moured cars not been employed before the in- 
 vestment of Alost took place. 
 
 The "Super-Brummer" 
 
 As to the 56- and 60-centimetre German 
 "Brummers," which the American newspapers 
 have so insistently heralded under scareheads 
 like, "Guns to Shoot into England," and "Guns 
 
76 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to Shoot over Twenty-one Miles," I am sorry 
 to say I have no information. If such guns 
 have been at all produced they must of necessity 
 be of the indirect-fire class known as siege mor- 
 tars, and I doubt if they are transportable by 
 motor traction. Their use, if they appear at all, 
 will be confined to siege operations, and for 
 establishing fortified bases on the Franco- 
 Belgian coast for German torpedo and sub- 
 marine craft. Besides, the maximum distance 
 at which the range-finder ceases to operate, 
 owing to the earth's curvature, is eleven miles' 
 range. 
 
 When we consider that it takes fully a year 
 to produce a 30.2-centimetre gun and that six 
 months must be added for one of 42-centimetre 
 calibre, it is quite evident that neither Ger- 
 many nor Austria could at this time have quan- 
 tities of such heavy artillery unless they had 
 started to manufacture in series years ago. As 
 the machinery requisite to the making of these 
 artillery monsters consumes fully a year to 
 produce, and does not maintain its efficiency for 
 long periods, it is clear that the time required 
 and the difficulties encountered are such that no 
 other nation could expect to compete with Ger- 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 77 
 
 many in this arm within the epoch of the present 
 war. So far as I have been able to gather, the 
 first German "Brummer" was laid down in 
 1909. At a subsequent trial at the proving 
 ground the gun was pronounced a "failure" 
 officially. Owing to the huge calibre this was 
 readily believed by the military world, which 
 then and there dismissed the idea of a possible 
 development. This is what the Germans 
 wanted, and forthwith they began to manu- 
 facture "Brummers" by the dozen, keeping the 
 secret so close that only the highest officers of 
 the Grand General Staff knew what was going 
 on underground. 
 
 How the Heavy Shooting Is Done 
 
 Judging by the questions I have been asked 
 since the war began there must be a lot of people 
 in this country who are not aware of even the 
 rudiments of modern artillery practice. They 
 cannot understand how it is possible for the 
 artillery gunner to fire at an object not visible 
 to him and yet hit it. 
 
 What is termed "indirect" firing is a method 
 of reducing artillery practice to mathematics, 
 
78 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 which all modern armies have adopted, chiefly 
 owing to the enormous range of modern can- 
 non. Of course, this applies also to the artil- 
 lery propelled by motor traction. 
 
 The "indirect" system means that a battery 
 of howitzers and field-pieces can stand in a val- 
 ley and shoot over the top of a hillside, drop- 
 ping shells upon an enemy hidden from sight in 
 a forest several miles distant. Artillery officers 
 are required to be expert at geometry and 
 trigonometry, for upon the triangle is based 
 the application of the system. The officers 
 take their post some distance away from 
 the battery and usually on the tallest avail- 
 able eminence. If aeroplanes are operating 
 in connection with the battery, they do the 
 "spotting" not only of the enemy's position, 
 but of the shots as they strike in his direction. 
 One point of the triangle is represented by the 
 officers' post, the second is the battery, the third 
 is the enemy. The distance between the officers' 
 post and the battery is called the base line. 
 This distance is measured. The angles at both 
 ends of the base line are figured. This done, it 
 only requires a trigonometric operation to de- 
 termine the actual distance of the enemy, and 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 79 
 
 this is called " finding" the range. From the 
 officers' post word is given over the field tele- 
 phone to the gunners of the battery informing 
 them of the accurate degree of elevation and 
 the exact point of compass necessary to reach 
 the target. These adjustments having been 
 made, the command "Fire!" is given. From 
 their point of vantage, the officers observe the 
 effect of the shot. If changes in the range are 
 necessary, owing to faulty observation or the 
 movements of the enemy, the field telephone 
 carries the instructions promptly to the gun 
 captains. A battery thus masked in a depres- 
 sion does not betray its position except for in- 
 conspicuous puffs of smokeless powder, and it 
 is only by close-in aero scouting that its exact 
 place on the map can be ascertained. 
 
 Whenever the enemy succeeds in thus spot- 
 ting a battery an effort is generally made to 
 move it during the night unless the battery is 
 holding the post for reinforcements. Here, 
 again, motor traction is an invaluable aid. 
 "While the enemy is preparing to take the battery 
 by assault at dawn, the battery has been motored 
 away to a concealed position, sometimes miles 
 distant, and the first news the enemy gets of this 
 
80 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 nocturnal manoeuvre is usually a sudden shell 
 fire sweeping his trenches from an altered 
 angle. 
 
 Actual War Automobile Strength 
 
 When we analyse the numerical automobile 
 artillery strength of the powers now at war we 
 must not permit ourselves to be misled by the 
 way in which military statistics are compiled, 
 as they vary in different countries. With 250,- 
 000 trucks and cars and more than 200,000 run- 
 abouts and motorcycles at her command, Great 
 Britain would easily seem to predominate, but, 
 as a matter of fact, she has fewer army cars 
 fitted for service than France, and quite a con- 
 siderable proportion will remain in England for 
 home defence. Less than ten per cent, of her 
 motor lorry division — a scant 1,800 cars — have 
 been landed in France, and most of these are for 
 commissariat purposes. Not a single armoured 
 automobile was in the lot. Later on, a few were 
 improvised. Moreover, the British cars have 
 caused much trouble and confusion as they can- 
 not use French parts and accessories and are 
 poorly provided with these from home. These 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 81 
 
 circumstances have not tended to give the Eng- 
 lish army standing at the front in the automo- 
 bile arm. 
 
 With 100,000 passenger cars, 25,000 motor 
 buses, taxi-cabs and motorcycles, and 10,000 
 motor trucks of all kinds available for mili- 
 tary use, France was able to give her trans- 
 portation and commissariat great initiative and 
 well-maintained endurance. She has several 
 squads of automobile aeroplane cannon and 
 armed autos of the Schneider and Charron 
 models. In armoured artillery she has confined 
 herself to batteries of 12-centimetre and 15.5- 
 centimetre Rimailho howitzers. As there are 
 21 batteries of the latter type of gun in the 
 French army, and four pieces in each battery, 
 France would make a very presentable showing 
 in automobile artillery provided all batteries 
 are motor-driven, which is to be doubted. The 
 only advantage secured appears to be increased 
 mobility over the horse-drawn cannon; the 
 French have not understood how to combine 
 greater offensive power with greater mobility 
 like the Germans. 
 
 It is quite curious that the power with the 
 numerically strongest army — to wit: Russia — 
 
82 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 should be least efficient in army automobiles. 
 There are less than 600 trucks in the Empire. 
 Orders for almost double this number have been 
 placed abroad recently, chiefly in this country, 
 but it is a question if delivery can be made in 
 time to make the cars effective. 
 
 The combined Austro-German forces possess 
 the strongest and best equipped automobile war 
 outfit by far. The Dual Empire has 1,400 
 trucks available for army use and about 20,000 
 passenger cars convertible to the same use. 
 A small squad of motor tractors for the heavy 
 Skoda howitzers and light-arm automobiles 
 armed with rifles and machine guns, complete 
 the contingent. Germany has not only fully 
 15,000 convertible passenger cars, but quite as 
 many delivery vans and trucks, besides 1,200 
 subsidised military motor vehicles with trailers. 
 On the offensive end, Germany went to war with 
 some 250 armoured automobiles, 18 searchlight 
 motors, fully 10,000 motorcycles, and at least 
 500 motor-driven field-guns, not counting a 
 squad of extraordinarily powerful motor tract- 
 ors for the transport of the big Krupp 42- 
 centimetre howitzers in the field. In addition, 
 there are several squads of aeroplane repair 
 
AUTOMOBILE AKTILLERY 83 
 
 automobiles and motors with powerful search- 
 lights for use in night attacks. At the call to 
 war the government commandeered no less than 
 60,000 passenger cars. A number of these were 
 told off for the commanding officers, adjutants, 
 orderlies, etc., in order to give the greatest 
 possible mobility to every move affecting the 
 disposition of the army, but the majority of 
 these cars were used to move troops on the 
 firing-line under cover of night. When it is con- 
 sidered that it requires only 510 passenger cars 
 to transport a German regiment on a war foot- 
 ing of 3,000 men, and that an entire army corps 
 can be moved at an average rate of 20 miles per 
 hour at night with a fleet of 7,140 motor cars, it 
 will be understood why the Germans have been 
 able, in most of the decisive encounters, to out- 
 number, or at least equal, a numerically superior 
 enemy. 
 
 French vs. Prussian Cannon 
 
 Many have asked me if it is true that Ger- 
 man guns are inferior to French guns. That 
 such a detail can still stick in American minds 
 shows that ' 'incidents' ' of the Balkan wars, as 
 
84 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 interpreted over British cables, are likely to 
 yield erroneous impressions. 
 
 Stripped of technical phrase, the French field 
 cannon is more of a gun than the Prussian — the 
 same as a Swiss watch is more of a veritable 
 timepiece than an American movement. The 
 latter will keep time just as unfailingly, never- 
 theless, and it will stand careless handling much 
 better. It is easier to repair and cheaper to 
 buy. A Krupp field cannon has parallel char- 
 acteristics. It withstands rough usage better 
 than the French Creusot rifle. The powder 
 employed does not injure the rifling so rapidly 
 under continuous fire; it does not get out of 
 order so easily ;, it has fewer parts and is so 
 thoroughly built that explosions (at least offi- 
 cially attested to) are unheard of. 
 
 The Creusot rifle is a piece of high art gun- 
 making. It represents generations of excellent 
 craftsmanship and the best traditions of artil- 
 lery practice. It is the quintessence of the 
 armourer's art and an object of admiration in 
 all technical detail. Properly handled, it is 
 doubtless a degree superior in efficiency to the 
 Prussian piece — at least on the practice range — 
 but an artillery artist is required to serve it 
 
AUTOMOBILE ARTILLERY 85 
 
 properly. In the heat of battle this does not 
 matter so long as there are enough gun artists 
 to go around. 
 
 In the hands of French gunners, the Creusot 
 is the finest piece of shooting mechanism ever 
 invented, especially the 75-millimetre model, 
 corresponding to a 3-inch gun. Operated by 
 French-trained Bulgar gunners it scored 
 markedly over the Krupp pieces poorly served 
 by incompetent Turkish artillerymen. 
 
 "When the smoke of this world-war clears 
 away I dare say the verdict will show for the 
 Krupp rifle, as handled by Prussian gunners, 
 quite as high percentage of efficiency as the 
 Creusot piece operated by native artillerists. 
 
CHAPTER in 
 THE SUBMARINE 
 
 A Submarine Attack 
 
 The haze of early dawn broods over the bight 
 of Helgoland. A pale and chilly sunrise peeks 
 cautiously over the Friesian dunes outlining 
 the crags of the island fortress crested with can- 
 non. Slowly the pale beams filter through the 
 vaporous curtain lifting a cover in places like 
 a "hausfrau" making up her bed. . 
 
 The sea sleeps calm and frigid like a great, 
 undulating jelly sealed under a blanket of haze. 
 The stillness is oppressive, ominous. 
 
 It is broken at intervals, but not relieved, by 
 gruff, muffled thuds from the inner harbour — 
 from the dim, hidden distance of warlike mys- 
 tery and menace. Were it not for the portly, 
 rubicund buoys that gasp and cough their warn- 
 ing notes, swaying lazily in the tide, one would 
 fancy a school of sea-lions barking a salute to 
 the sun. 
 
 Beyond the cordon of buoys, a row of painted 
 poles sail in the inlet marking the channel that 
 is loaded with anchor mines. The poles are 
 
 86 
 
THE SUBMARINE 87 
 
 bobbing gently up and down like floats in some 
 giant's fishing tackle. 
 
 One of the poles seems to be drifting away 
 from the line. It is of a dark-gray colour. 
 Curiously enough it moves against the tide 
 leaving a thin, keen wake of froth, cmd is lost to 
 view in the haze. Faster and faster the pole 
 travels; sharper and sharper waxes the wake. 
 
 Under the runaway pole, hidden safely beloiv 
 the sleeping surface, stands a man in a conning 
 tower. His eye is glued to a periscope. To the 
 right cmd the left are speaking-tubes, dials, 
 gauges and levers. ' He is the commander of 
 that most dreaded of all naval craft, the sub- 
 marine, the stiletto of the high seas. 
 
 Except for the intense drone of the electric 
 motor there is no sound within the steel skin of 
 the great mechanical fish. There is no splash- 
 ing of water against the sides, no wave motion, 
 only the tremendous pressure of the ocean 
 depths, and the "crusher" gauge shows it. 
 
 The chief gunner stands in the torpedo 
 breech, in the prow, clasping the central hand- 
 wheel. A fling of this wheel and all the tor- 
 pedoes dart away simultaneously. Other men 
 stand by other wheels commanding port and 
 starboard torpedoes for single shots. The 
 quartermaster is posted at the wheel control 
 of the horizontal rudders intent on gauges show- 
 ing the inclination degree and depth level of 
 
88 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 the craft. His movements are curbed to the 
 fraction of an inch; he works as carefully and 
 minutely as a jeweller — cm awkward move of 
 the ivheel means disaster to all hands. Shoulder 
 to shoulder with the commander is the helms- 
 man, his eye on the compass, his hand on the 
 wheel steering the vertical rudder. 
 
 Back in the stern is the chief engineer with 
 his assistants standing by switches and levers, 
 cocks and valves. This is a "split-second" 
 crew, ready on the instant to stop or reverse the 
 motors, to disconnect them altogether or start 
 the gasoline engines in place of them, to bloiv 
 out or force water into the ballast tanks, to 
 draw oxygen and expel carbonic gases, to load 
 storage batteries, to tend compressors, to watch 
 pressures in pistons and chambers, to make 
 quick repairs when necessary — to do more en- 
 gineering and do it efficiently, in the smallest 
 and compactest engine-room ever devised, than 
 was ever done before. 
 
 Conversation is forbidden. Martial disci- 
 pline governs every action. Speech is reduced 
 to words spoken in the performance of duty. 
 The electric lights are so arranged that the 
 tools and appliances needed are distinctly 
 visible. Everything is in its proper place from 
 the potash cartridge chamber that absorbs the 
 foul air to the refuse ejector that blows waste 
 out into the water. At the ear of every man is 
 
THE SUBMAKINE 89 
 
 a speaking tube. From the officer in the turret 
 comes an occasional command — a wheel is 
 turned, a lever is moved, a switch is thrown — 
 and the big mechanical fish continues its daring 
 course, gliding through hostile depths dotted 
 with floating mines and ploughed by the swift 
 forefoot of a hundred cruisers whose smallest 
 gun could send the dauntless diver to the bot- 
 tom with single shot. 
 
 Availing itself of the haze, the submarine 
 ventures to the surface and runs awash at its 
 cruising speed of 16 knots until the British coast 
 heaves in sight, when the course is laid N.E. At 
 six bells in the afternoon* the lookout at the 
 omniscope signals a fleet of fishing smacks on 
 the port bow. The helm is laid down cmd the 
 big mechanical fish bears down upon the dowsed 
 smacks. The haze has cleared. On the fringe 
 of the horizon is a spot, a dark spot getting ever 
 darker and bigger. With his binoculars fixed 
 in the periscope the officer gleans the blurred 
 outline of three large funnels belching black 
 smoke. 
 
 There is a sharp command. The gas engine 
 stops. The speaking tubes commence to rattle 
 with words of command — sharp, precise, stac- 
 cato — answered by the quick (( Aye — aye, sir," 
 of the crew. 
 
 The commander takes an observation, the dis- 
 tance between the enemy is measured mathe- 
 
90 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 matically, the course is laid by compass, the 
 rate of speed is timed to the distance, there is a 
 rapid inspection of all gears — and the final dive 
 is ordered. 
 
 The engine tube speaks. At once the electric 
 motors strike up, sending the craft on its course. 
 The trimming tank tube speaks, and hand- 
 wheels are set spinning as the forward tanks 
 blow their ballast. The quartermaster has al- 
 ready clasped his wheel. The tube talks and 
 he digs in with a gleam in his eye. The dial 
 of the inclinometre shows how smartly he is 
 pointing the craft on its downward dive. The 
 chief gunner is at his post in the torpedo breech. 
 Presently his tube speaks. He spins a small 
 wheel, a piston snaps with a hollow thud, and 
 the war-head of the torpedo chamber clicks into 
 fighting trim, pointing three savage-looking mis- 
 siles at the enemy. 
 
 And thus to the hum of throbbing motors, 
 punctuated by snapping pistons, speaking tubes 
 croaking with commands, the war-head gleam- 
 ing with torpedoes at the ready, the mechanical 
 fish plunges through the foaming brine down- 
 ward to its fighting level of twenty feet below 
 the surface, bearing down upon an enemy it 
 cannot see with uncanny precision, — relentless, 
 irresistible. Availing itself of the fishing fleet 
 as a screen, the submarine is able to take one 
 more peek over the surface without being de- 
 
THE SUBMARINE 91 
 
 tected by the enemy, which develops to he a 
 super-dreadnaught. 
 
 The experienced eye of the commander ob- 
 serves at a glance that he shall miss his target 
 unless — the emergency command rings out: 
 "Starboard helm! Forward trim!" The sub- 
 marine destroyer swerves from its course, rising 
 at the same time to a somewhat higher level. By 
 this manoeuvre her commander hopes to cut the 
 course of the immeasurably swifter dread- 
 naught, and intercept her before she can pass — 
 "Port torpedo — ready!" rings the tube. A 
 great, monstrous shadow comes bearing down 
 upon the little craft. With incredible swiftness 
 it approaches, seeming almost to draw the craft 
 toward it with the suction of its menacing bot- 
 tom. The plunging bilge keels are visible now. 
 A collision means death, not only to the dread- 
 naught, but to the destroyer as well. Just as 
 the great armoured ram of the ponderous hull, 
 ripping through the foam, gaunt and grim with 
 barnacles, seems to aim a deathblow at the 
 little craft, the main tube in the torpedo breech 
 screams: "F-e-u-rrr!" A handwheel spins, pis- 
 tons click in the war-head, there is a hollow pop 
 as of a huge cork being pulled, and a glittering 
 torpedo, charged with superheated energy, darts 
 out, cutting the brine at a mile-a-minute clip. 
 Submarine distance is always deceptive; the 
 dreadnought is fully a cable length away. 
 
92 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 "Starboard torpedo — ready — Fire!" follows 
 the command. But before the second missile 
 can cut the water there is a thunderous explo- 
 sion. The whole forefoot of the huge warship 
 is lifted clean out of the water. Before its 
 yawning freeboard is buried in the swirling 
 foam, the second torpedo knocks a hole amid- 
 ships, exploding her magazines with the roar 
 of an erupting volcano. 
 
 The huge leviathan of armour-plate and giant 
 gun, fleet as a scout, strong as a fort, represent- 
 ing twelve million dollars in the mint of the 
 realm, and nine hundred lives in human flesh 
 and bone, has been scrambled into a horrible, 
 tottering wreck — steam whistles screaming for 
 help, boilers exploding like a field of mines, 
 flames bursting from hatches, masts snapping 
 in two, monster cannon rousing their turrets 
 overboard, the crew jammed like squealing rats 
 in a hundred traps, lashed by jets of scalding 
 steam, the scuppers oozing blood like the nos- 
 trils of a wounded bull. In short, a capital ship, 
 the pride of the proudest navy, has been van- 
 quished by a small marauding craft, looking 
 very like a mechanical fish: a little marine toy, 
 a poor skate of a craft, engineered by a boat's 
 load of dare-devils, the joke of naval mess-rooms 
 and sometimes derisively referred to as the 
 "tin sardine/ 9 
 
The Submarine Is Vindicated 
 
 If you had laid a wager on August 5, 1914, 
 that it should be possible for a single German 
 submarine to send to the bottom three British 
 armoured cruisers of 12,000 tons each, scoring a 
 bulPs-eye with each of its three torpedo tubes, 
 and escape unhurt and intact, you would not 
 have found any takers, least of all among naval 
 officers. The consensus of expert opinion 
 would tend to show that whereas a lucky shot 
 might bag a carelessly manoeuvring cruiser, the 
 accuracy of naval gun-fire is such that the sub- 
 marine would forfeit its existence on the sec- 
 ond, or, at all events, on the third attempt. 
 
 As all the world knows, Lieutenant Otto Wed- 
 digen, commanding the "U 9" of the German 
 submarine flotilla, worked his way through hos- 
 tile mine fields and actually accomplished the 
 "impossible.' i ' The attempt of the British 
 Admiralty to minimise this most brilliant and 
 daring raid by explaining that the cruisers tor- 
 pedoed were "obsolete and of secondary im- 
 
 i 93 
 
94 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 portance" is a bit silly in view of the fact that 
 the same Admiralty took occasion to plume it- 
 self on the " victory" of' the English squadron 
 in the engagement of Helgoland Bight when 
 three German scout cruisers of one-fourth less 
 tonnage and one-half the weight of armament 
 carried by the "obsolete" British cruisers were 
 defeated by an overwhelming force including 
 battle cruisers ! 
 
 Another German submarine slipped through 
 the deadly British mine fields at Deal, daring 
 the naval blockade of the combined Franco- 
 British fleets, and boldly navigated up to within 
 a mile of the English coast, where it torpe- 
 doed and sunk the mine-sweeper Niger. That, 
 also, was "impossible" — before it was made 
 possible ! 
 
 A third German submarine boldly attacked a 
 squadron of three English scout cruisers, the 
 Theseus, Gibraltar and Hawke, which she is 
 reported to have located far away v from its base 
 and in the neighbourhood of the Scottish coast. 
 In this case, the submarine succeeded in sinking 
 the Hawke, an armoured vessel of 7,350 tons, and 
 while her sister-ships escaped, they failed to cap- 
 ture or even damage the little German raider. 
 
THE SUBMARINE 95 
 
 The Pathfinder, a fast scout cruiser of about 
 3,000 tons, was also torpedoed. The super- 
 dreadnaught, the Audacious, of 23,000 tons, lay 
 on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean for more 
 than two weeks before the British Admiralty 
 announced the loss as an accident caused by a 
 drifting mine. Before this book can appear, 
 perhaps the mystery of this " accident" will be 
 unravelled. 
 
 By hook or crook, the British Government 
 has tried to make it appear that the losses in- 
 flicted upon its fleet by submarines are incon- 
 siderable, but the fact remains that German 
 submarines, handled by expert crews and offi- 
 cers, are doing the lion's share of the fighting 
 against overpowering odds not only in war 
 vessels but also in the submarine flotillas of the 
 Franco-British fleets. No amount of censorial 
 "doctoring" and official paraphrasing will les- 
 sen the weight of the fifty-thousand tons' argu- 
 ment in sunken British cruisers on the bottom 
 of the sea; and no further attempts to explain 
 away the successes of German submarines as 
 accidental will avail to blind even the laity to 
 the fact that the submarine has ceased to be a 
 mere harbour defence auxiliary and has become 
 
96 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 a most formidable weapon of attack, compara- 
 ble to that of the capital ship. 
 
 Ignoring "Tin Sardine" 
 
 A decade ago, the submarine was practically 
 ignored by naval men. Its limited range, slow 
 rate of speed, and poor sea-going qualities made 
 the "tin sardine" an object of ridicule in mess- 
 rooms. It was relegated to the rear as being 
 of probable moral, but not much practical, use 
 in assisting the defence of harbours and land 
 fortifications. But the "tin sardine" is grown 
 up now. Germany has at least a dozen 
 fine, husky specimens, averaging over 800 tons 
 with a tactical speed of 10 knots when sub- 
 merged, a strategical speed on the surface of no 
 less than 17 knots, and a cruising radius of 
 upward of 3,300 miles. If the crew could hold 
 out it should be possible to send a shoal of 
 such "tin sardines" across the Atlantic, but 
 whereas a decade ago man was stronger than 
 the machine in a submarine the opposite is now 
 a fact: the machine commands the man. Not 
 only can the modern type of submarine hide 
 on the bottom of the sea down to 200 feet when- 
 
THE SUBMARINE 97 
 
 ever necessary, and successfully withstand the 
 enormous pressure at this depth for twenty- 
 four hours, but it can avail itself of the air in its 
 oxylithe chambers for breathing purposes and 
 continue to stay below for several days and 
 nights. It is no longer a question of how far 
 the submarine can go on a cruise, but how long 
 the crew can stick it out. The capacity of the 
 petrol tank is far greater than the lung capacity 
 of the crew. In surface cruising, when the 
 vessel can speed along without being compelled 
 to dive for protection against gun-fire, trips of 
 upward of fifteen hundred miles have been ac- 
 complished by a number of German submarines 
 seen off the Scottish and Norwegian coasts in 
 this war. This is hard service, however, as the 
 watch on deck is drenched to the skin even in 
 tolerably fair weather, and there are no means 
 of drying clothes. On the other hand, the ac- 
 commodations of the modern submarine in re- 
 gard to cooking, washing, garbage, etc., show 
 great practical improvement. 
 
 The last decade has been a struggle for speed, 
 principally. While the British "A," "B" and 
 "C" types of craft, laid down in 1901-04, had 
 a surface radius of 500 to 1,800 miles, and a 
 
98 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 submerged endurance of 3 to 4.05 hours at full 
 speed, the "D"s and "E"s constructed in 
 1910-13 have 3,000 to 4,000 miles' surface radius 
 and 5 to 7 hours' full speed submerged endu- 
 rance. The latest "E"s have three periscopes 
 for scouting the entire arc of the surface, and 
 are so powerful that they can cruise from Yar- 
 mouth to Gibraltar, fight an action there and 
 return to Yarmouth without drawing on any 
 vessel or base on the way. These boats carry 
 no less than six long-distance Whitehead torpe- 
 does, weighing 1,300 pounds each, with an initial 
 speed of a-mile-a-minute and an explosive 
 charge of 200 pounds of wet gun-cotton. It is 
 quite strange that the British have not been 
 able to deliver a single blow with "E" boats, at 
 this writing, for not only in range and power 
 and number of torpedoes are they superior to 
 the German "U" class, but, technically at least, 
 the English boats are speedier and more formi- 
 dable. The conning tower of the latter is pro- 
 tected by a 4-inch armour plate as a protection 
 against the rapid artillery of destroyers, and 
 disappearing 12-pounder quick-firers are car- 
 ried for attacking seaplanes. 
 
 Of course, the submarine is preeminently the 
 
THE SUBMARINE 99 
 
 weapon of the weaker naval power. With the 
 continued naval pressure of the combined 
 French-British fleets operating against her 
 North Sea coast in overwhelming force, Ger- 
 many had no other alternative but the defensive. 
 To her credit it must be observed, however, 
 that she has managed to turn her defensive into 
 bold offensive coups at times by means of sub- 
 marine attacks. She has used this alternative 
 chiefly because it is the only one available with 
 any degree of success in fighting a heavy block- 
 ade. As the only practical protection for scout 
 ships against submarines is frequent change 
 of course under good speed, backed by eternal 
 vigilance, it was natural and logical that Ger- 
 many should seek to harass the movements of 
 scouts by setting out mines as she did. Having 
 thus availed herself of the menacing danger 
 of the anchored and the floating type of sub- 
 marine mine, Germany lost no time in hurling 
 her submarine boats against the blockading 
 fleet. By these tactics she placed the enemy in 
 the not enviable position of being compelled to 
 move on for fear of getting speared by the tor- 
 pedo of the submarine, and at the same time 
 being required to go slow for fear of colliding 
 
100 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 with a contact mine! No one not personally 
 acquainted with naval routine can appreciate 
 the strain on the vigilance and resource of fleet 
 crews when perplexing conditions such as these 
 are imposed with never-flagging severity week 
 after week, month after month. It speaks 
 volumes for the discipline of the British Navy 
 that its losses were not larger during this period, 
 when the demoralising factors must have been 
 appalling. 
 
 The naval strategy plotted by the German 
 Admiralty has worked out remarkably well. To 
 attack by submarine chiefly and prevent the 
 enemy from using his submarines in reprisal — 
 this seems to have been the plan, at least, 
 the preliminary phase. Hence, the German 
 fleet was ordered to its naval bases on the 
 North Sea there to remain under the additional 
 protection of the coastal forts. Screens of 
 heavy steel-wire mesh were anchored across the 
 egress to every base, and immediately behind 
 the scouting line mine fields of the contact type 
 were planted. Mine-laying craft were deployed 
 to load the waters beyond the scouting lines 
 with floating mines. In other words, a British 
 submarine advancing to attack the German fleet 
 
THE SUBMARINE 101 
 
 would encounter — first a danger zone of drift- 
 ing mines, any one of which would send her to 
 kingdom-come by contact, and secondly she 
 would face gun-fire by destroyers and scout 
 cruisers. Granting that she might, perchance, 
 discover an opening and slip through the scout 
 lines, she would certainly run into the anchored 
 mine field or the steel- wire screen studded with 
 mines, which shield the German ships of the 
 line in the roadsteads against sanguinary ex- 
 ploits of this kind. When a fleet has thus pro- 
 tected itself against submarine as well as tor- 
 pedo-boat attack it is next to impossible for a 
 blockading fleet, no matter how; superior, to 
 force it into action, to dig it out. Against the 
 chief advantage of the blockader, which is keep- 
 ing the hostile fleet bottled up, the defender has 
 the not undesirable privilege of choosing his 
 time and place for action. The German admiral 
 can order a submarine attack on certain British 
 vessels, and he has done so — but the British 
 admiral cannot order a similar attack, and he 
 has not done so. The North Sea has been open 
 to German submarines because there was always 
 a chance of their finding a quarry some time. 
 The English submarines have had nothing to 
 
102 WAR'S tfEW WEAPONS 
 
 hunt except mines, which they are supposed to 
 dodge, and destroyers, which are usually too 
 speedy to lend themselves as likely targets. 
 
 Even under favourable circumstances it is by 
 no means an easy matter to drive a torpedo into 
 the bowels of a moving war vessel. A ruse is 
 sometimes needed. It appears that Lieutenant 
 Weddigen, in attacking the Aboukir, laid a 
 trap for that ship by getting behind some fishing 
 smacks that were apparently laying mines. As 
 the Aboukir bore down on the smacks, fol- 
 lowed by her two sisters, the "U 9" dove and 
 launched a 21-inch calibre torpedo into her, re- 
 peating the manoeuvre until all three ships were 
 on their beam-ends and sinking. 
 
 How It Works 
 
 So long as newspapers persist in describing 
 Zeppelins and submarines alike as "cigar- 
 shaped," I am really at a loss to know how a 
 real submarine looms in the mind of the layman. 
 At the outmost it could resemble only a very 
 bad cigar. The main changes in the outward 
 contours are a tendency toward longer lines and 
 increased sea-going features. More than ever 
 
THE SUBMARINE 103 
 
 before is care observed in the riveting of the 
 various seams, and the latest boats show notable 
 improvements in speed, size and cruising 
 qualities. 
 
 The manner in which a submarine is operated 
 is very interesting, but the work of describing 
 the operation in plain language is a cruel test 
 of human patience. Briefly, then, the sub- 
 marine has a sort of dual existence. When the 
 boat is awash and under cruising speed it is 
 operated by its gasoline engine quite like a 
 motor boat. While thus cruising about the boat 
 is under what is called its "strategical" speed 
 because it is moving from its base to a place 
 selected for an attack. When the boat arrives 
 at this place and dives, it is operated during the 
 period of submergence by electric motors, and 
 the steering, pumping, handling and loading and 
 firing torpedoes is done pneumatically and elec- 
 trically. A motor boat on the surface, an elec- 
 tric diving-boat under the surface — I wonder if 
 this explains anything? While running sub- 
 merged the boat is considered as being under 
 its "tactical" speed because, having arrived at 
 the point determined by its strategic voyage, it 
 moves on its target and completes the assault. 
 
104 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 The gasoline as well as the electrical engines 
 are marvels of compactness and efficiency. The 
 gas engine may drive propellers directly — 
 and it always does when the boat is awash and 
 cruising — or it may be disconnected and drive 
 a motor as a dynamo, which in turn generates 
 electricity for charging the storage battery. 
 With batteries thus charged the boat can dive 
 and the electric motor, drawing upon the power 
 thus stored up in the batteries, will drive the 
 propellers and do all necessary work while the 
 boat is running submerged. 
 
 The gas engine may also be used for driving 
 an air compressor, and the power thus stored 
 is made available for bailing out the ballast 
 tanks, for driving the bilge pumps, or for eject- 
 ing torpedoes while submerged. On the tail 
 shafts running to the propellers are several 
 clutches for effecting these changes. 
 
 When the ballast tanks are empty a sub- 
 marine boat usually weighs about twenty per 
 cent, less than an equal volume of water. The 
 boat may be made to float high or low by adjust- 
 ing the amount of water in the ballast tanks. 
 This is called "trimming." There are so-called 
 "trimming tanks" both in the bow and in the 
 
THE SUBMAEINE 105 
 
 stern. Unless the boat is properly trimmed it 
 is likely to turn turtle when advancing under 
 speed. Sometimes it is expedient that the boat 
 should be brought to a full stop when submerged 
 and float motionless at any predetermined 
 depth. An "adjustment" tank is available for 
 this manoeuvre. 
 
 The steering below the surface is done by 
 horizontal and vertical rudders. The surface 
 navigation is by compass, chart and sextant. 
 The latest boats have two periscopes, one for 
 the helmsman looking straight ahead, and one 
 for the commander, giving a zonal view all 
 around with binocular enlargement when de- 
 sired. 
 
 The angle of diving and rising is automatic- 
 ally controlled. A so-called "crusher" gauge 
 prevents the submergence of the vessel to depths 
 where the pressure of the water would endanger 
 its structural safety. A "depth" gauge shows 
 distance below surface while submerged. Other 
 gauges and dials indicate the vessel's speed, the 
 amount of fuel oil carried, the stored electricity 
 on hand for submergence runs, the reserve com- 
 pressed air for breathing and for launching tor- 
 pedoes, the temperature, water on hand in bal- 
 
106 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 last tanks, etc. Everything is "dialled," every- 
 thing is gauged. Turn a handwheel, pull a 
 switch, throw a lever : these are the operating 
 motions. There are none other. 
 
 In a boat carrying three torpedo tubes a crew 
 of only five men working in unison can operate 
 the craft during submergence. First man is at 
 a handwheel controlling horizontal or diving 
 rudder. His eyes are glued to a gauge show- 
 ing degree of submersion and an inclinometre 
 for maintaining an even keel. Second man 
 operates the vertical helm from the conning 
 tower, steering by compass. Third man is an 
 engineer in control of the electric motors in the 
 stern of boat. Fourth man stands by the cen- 
 tral handwheel at the torpedo breeches in the 
 bow of the boat. Fifth man is the commander 
 in the conning tower. He signals the men with 
 speaking tubes. The fourth man's job is to spin 
 the central handwheel till the bow-cap at the end 
 of the revolving axis is slid forward a bit, when 
 it is revolved until the two holes in the bow-cap 
 disclose a torpedo behind each. When closed 
 the bow-cap is in reality the bow of the boat, 
 but the cap is necessary to prevent the egress 
 of water into the torpedo tubes. Each torpedo 
 
THE SUBMARINE 107 
 
 has a breech with a handwheel. The fourth man 
 fires them on signal by spinning the handwheel, 
 which releases the pressure in the pneumatic 
 compressor, and out flies the torpedo at a mile- 
 a-minute clip. 
 
 Most boats can dive within the three-minute 
 limit. Only a man with quartermaster's experi- 
 ence should be intrusted with the horizontal 
 rudders, as too much helm when the vessel is 
 plunging may capsise it. Running at 10 knots 
 submerged, the maximum speed, only 5 degrees 
 of horizontal helm is required to complete a 
 plunge to the 20-foot war level at an inclina- 
 tion of Sy 2 degrees. 
 
 There is no vibration in a boat running sub- 
 merged. And there is no noise except for the 
 hum of the motors relieved by the speaking-tube 
 commands. The ventilation is not much worse 
 than that of the New York subway, but better 
 care is exercised in renewing it. Steel flasks 
 with compressed air or oxylithe supply new 
 air while the carbonic acid gas of the respired 
 air is chemically absorbed. Food is cooked for 
 the crew on a handy little electric stove. Drink- 
 ing water is on tap in large steel flasks. There 
 are pneumatic pressure exhausts for garbage, 
 
108 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 refuse, etc. Meals are served on trestle tables 
 amidships. Hammocks are slung under the 
 deck for the crew and only the officer has a 
 berth — collapsible. And, to complete the tech- 
 nical roster, no white mice are carried any 
 longer to detect gasoline leaks aboardship! 
 
 Attack and Defence 
 
 Submarine does not fight submarine for 
 obvious reasons, and as the only effective 
 weapon against it is the naval gun, the methods 
 of protection devised naturally assume the char- 
 acter of a tactical defensive. The attack is al- 
 ways launched by the submarine. There is no 
 single instance in this war of a naval vessel 
 having ferreted out a submarine, giving chase 
 and sinking it. Destroyers and light scouts 
 have happened upon submarine craft in thick 
 weather, but such encounters have been mostly 
 accidental and not the result of a plotted chase. 
 The tactical defensive of naval vessels, then, 
 consists in a combination of preventive meas- 
 ures. The best protection for vessels on block- 
 ade patrol seems to be a good rate of cruising 
 speed with frequent alteration of the course. 
 
THE SUBMAEINE 109 
 
 Vessels thus deployed under steam should al- 
 ways be convoyed on either board by flotillas of 
 destroyers. The great mobility of the mosquito 
 craft enables them to attack quickly under full 
 speed and focus their rapid artillery on any 
 rising submarine and also, if the distance is not 
 too great, to ram the same. A fleet at anchor, 
 however, must rely on carefully set mine fields^ 
 steel-net obstacles, and, in the last instance, on 
 liberal subdivision of the hulls in watertight 
 compartments. Some of the latest dread- 
 naughts are furnished with extra internal ar- 
 mour as a protection to its vital parts against 
 torpedo attack, especially the projectile maga- 
 zines. The belief has been expressed by some 
 naval writers that thorough subdivision of the 
 hull would have saved the three ships of the 
 Aboukir class from foundering, but the fate of 
 the Audacious, which was minutely divided by 
 more than five hundred compartments below the 
 armour belt, does not provide a good argument 
 for the subdivision plan, irrespective as to 
 whether a mine or a torpedo sent her to the bot- 
 tom. Personally, I am inclined to think that 
 a combination of destroyer with seaplane scout- 
 ing will be found to be extraordinarily effective 
 
110 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 before the signal " cease firing" flaunts over the 
 North Sea. For detecting submarines there is 
 no agent that can compare in efficiency with the 
 seaplane, and the destroyer is the best weapon 
 of attack against them. The records of naval 
 aviators show that submarines running sub- 
 merged can be spotted by air scouts from altitudes 
 ranging upward to 1,800 feet, that is, when the 
 atmosphere is calm and clear. In rough weather 
 the scouting must be done close-in to a couple 
 of hundred feet over the surface, but even under 
 this handicap the scouting of the seaplane will 
 be more exact and thorough than that of any 
 other known agent, and the destroyer is more 
 readily available to take prompt advantage of 
 the successful spotting by the seaplane. 
 
 Operations in the North Sea have shown that 
 the chances of a destroyer getting close enough 
 to drive home its ram in a submarine are better 
 than naval critics expected. In fact, owing to 
 its thin skin of soft iron the submarine is the 
 most vulnerable of all naval craft; the slightest 
 touch of a speeding destroyer is quite certain to 
 open a seam or rip a hole in the hull. The 
 multi-periscope craft ought also to provide a 
 fairly good target for the rapid artillery of 
 
THE SUBMARINE 111 
 
 the destroyers even when running submerged 
 with the eye-pieces awash. Two or three peri- 
 scopes cutting across the surface over a single 
 submarine could easily be put under zonal fire 
 by the destroyers when a loss of one or all of 
 the periscopes would be a practical certainty. 
 Bereft of its tactical "eye" the submarine 
 would not be able to manoeuvre for an attack. 
 
 The Automobile Torpedo 
 
 Hand in hand with the development of the 
 submarine boat has gone the improvement of 
 the automobile torpedo — its only weapon of 
 attack. It is not generally realised that the 
 kind of torpedo used in the Eusso-Japanese 
 engagements of 1904 is little more than a toy 
 compared to the torpedo of 1914. What was 
 gun range then for battleships is torpedo range 
 now. A decade of constructive experimenting 
 has evolved a marine weapon that will rip 
 through six miles of water at a 40-knot pace 
 and knock down a super-dreadnaught ! To be 
 sure this is the extreme performance, but it has 
 been done dozens of times in practice tests and 
 it will doubtless be done in actual battle if this 
 
112 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 war demands it. At any rate, the "safety" 
 battle distance of modern naval tactics has been 
 raised to five miles, and it is the automobile 
 torpedo that has raised it rather than the naval 
 gun. Five miles' battle distance means that 
 vessels engaging in combat are warned not to 
 venture inside the five-mile zone, as by so doing 
 they expose themselves to the long-distance tor- 
 pedoes carried by cruisers and battleships. 
 This in turn means that the naval artillery 
 must do its main effective work before the ves- 
 sels approach the five-mile limit. Between the 
 ten-mile and the five-mile ranges the naval gun 
 has the decision. As long-distance torpedoes 
 are not generally carried by submarines, the lat- 
 ter will probably not be employed in a running 
 battle action between ships of the line except 
 under extraordinary conditions. 
 
 The much-abused term "cigar-shaped" may 
 be applied with perfect propriety to the con- 
 tours of the automobile torpedo. The internal 
 mechanism, which was kept a close secret for 
 so many years, presents one of the most in- 
 genious methods of adapting a self-regulating 
 steering gear to a self-propelled, high-speed 
 submarine weapon as yet invented by the mind 
 
THE SUBMARINE 113 
 
 of man. Plainly speaking, then, the bow sec- 
 tion of the torpedo — usually called the war- 
 head — is charged with upward of 250 pounds 
 of gun-cotton and fulminate of mercury. 
 Through the longitudinal centre of this charge 
 runs a tube loaded with the detonating ex- 
 plosive. This tube has a plunger point at the 
 extreme front end, which protrudes beyond the 
 war-head and strikes the target first. The 
 plunger acting on the detonating charge in the 
 tube explodes the war-head. The section fol- 
 lowing is a steel chamber loaded with com- 
 pressed air, which is used as motive power for 
 the machinery in the adjacent " secret' ' cham- 
 ber. This machinery not only drives the pro- 
 pellers by means of a turbine engine, but regu- 
 lates the horizontal and vertical rudders with 
 quite an amazing degree of automatic precision. 
 The controlling mechanism in the secret cham- 
 ber is so exact that as soon as the torpedo is 
 launched the horizontal rudders operate so as 
 to maintain the missile at the prescribed depth 
 of 15 feet below water, while the vertical rud- 
 der keeps it pointed toward the target. Simul- 
 taneously a small hydrostatic chamber opens 
 and absorbs enough water through its perfora- 
 
 y 
 
114 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tions to maintain a steady course and, even keel 
 for the flying missile. The twin propellers are 
 mounted on the same axis and are made to 
 counter-rotate in order to prevent swerving 
 from the course. 
 
 By Gyroscope and Superheat 
 
 The most interesting and valuable improve- 
 ments in torpedo construction, however, centre 
 around the introduction of the gyroscopic gear 
 and the ignition superheating of the compressed 
 air. The gyroscope was adapted to torpedo re- 
 quirements because it was found that occasion- 
 ally a torpedo would balk and act " mysteri- 
 ously" for no ascertainable reason; in some 
 cases it would suddenly fly from its course in 
 a wide circle and dart back at the vessel firing 
 it. The latest type of gyroscope gear is elec- 
 trically driven and is connected up with the 
 rudders to such an accurate degree of mechani- 
 cal nicety that it is feasible now to launch a 
 torpedo from the starboard tube against an 
 enemy approaching on the port bow, or, as a 
 newspaper man would say, to " shoot around 
 corners/ ' A gyroscopieally controlled torpedo 
 
THE SUBMAKINE 115 
 
 when fired broadside from starboard can be 
 made to sweep through an angle of 45 degrees 
 around the prow of the launching vessel, con- 
 tinue the arc for an equal number of degrees on 
 the port side of the prow, and speed straight 
 ahead for a target several miles distant. To 
 recapitulate, a cruiser with a main battery of 
 6-inch rifles could venture to attack one having 
 8-inch rifles by speeding in beyond the five-mile 
 limit and launching its torpedoes under gun- 
 fire. While firing salvos of 6-inch projectiles 
 over the port side, the cruiser fitted with 
 gyroscope torpedoes could launch these over the 
 starboard side, and a single hit of such a missile 
 w r ould be more disastrous, in most cases, to the 
 heavier cruiser than the effect of its heavier 
 gun-fire on the light cruiser. 
 
 The superheating of the compressed air 
 causes it to expand and increase in propulsive 
 capacity. Before this discovery was made and 
 applied, the temperature of the compressed air, 
 owing to gradual escape in feeding the motor, 
 would frequently fall below zero, when the re- 
 maining air charge would fail to expel itself 
 with force sufficient to be effective. The low 
 temperature would cause the lubricants and the 
 
116 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 exhaust to clog, and put an insuperable limit to 
 the effective range of the weapon. Of the two 
 hundred pounds of compressed air stored in 
 the chamber, little more than 150 pounds could 
 be made available for use; the rest was dead 
 weight. There are several methods of super- 
 heating, but the ignition plan appears to be the 
 simplest and most effective. It consists of a 
 mechanism which ignites an alcohol flame in the 
 air chamber at a point when something like half 
 the distance has been negotiated by the torpedo. 
 The air remaining expands. The high speed 
 attained up to this point is thus maintained to 
 the end. The range is considerably increased. 
 It is largely through the successful application 
 of superheating that torpedo speeds have been 
 increased from 30 to 50 per cent, during the last 
 few years. Whereas formerly the extreme 
 speed attainable at 1,000 yards was 35 knots 
 with a 21-inch torpedo, the same weapon will 
 travel at a rate of 44 knots with ignition super- 
 heater. 
 
 The Submarine Mine 
 
 The submarine mine caused great damage in 
 the Russo-Japanese engagements, and is keep- 
 
THE SUBMARINE 117 
 
 ing up its record of destructiveness in the pres- 
 ent war. It is difficult to say which of the two 
 kinds — the anchored or the floating mine — is the 
 more dangerous, but the trouble seems to be 
 that they are not dangerous to the enemy only. 
 The loss of the Speedy and the Amphion to the 
 British, and the loss of the Yorck to the Ger- 
 mans, are significant instances of the almost 
 prohibitive danger involved in the planting and 
 maintaining of mine areas. 
 
 The floating mine is provided with a trigger- 
 handle. As soon as this handle jostles against 
 the hull of a ship the detonating charge acts on 
 the explosive loaded in the mine and the blast 
 follows. To make this operation more certain, 
 mines are frequently anchored in pairs, that is, 
 two mines are connected by a light steel cable, 
 supported by floats, each mine being anchored 
 besides, of course. As the ship touches the 
 cable and advances with it on its prow, the 
 mines attached to the extremities of the cable 
 are forced against the vessel, one on either side, 
 and a double explosion is the result. The usual 
 depth at which the anchor mine is planted is 
 fifteen feet below the surface. Heavily mined 
 areas have series of anchor mines for depths 
 
 j 
 
118 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 scaling down to twenty-five and even thirty feet, 
 one tier of mines above the other. 
 
 The naval operation known as mine sweeping 
 is not a popular one aboard the mosquito flotilla. 
 Two destroyers advance to the field dragging 
 a length of light chain cable between them. 
 They keep well abreast of each other and are 
 separated by one or two cable lengths. The 
 bight of the cable is dragged across the bottom 
 of the sea and the mines thus caught in the 
 cable soon jostle together and explode — but not 
 always without damage to the destroyers. Of 
 course, mine sweeping of this sort would be im- 
 possible under shore batteries or close to a hos- 
 tile squadron, but it is the only efficacious means 
 known for clearing the high seas of the deadly 
 menace of drifting mines. 
 
 The fouling of a German submarine in a fish- 
 net off the Dutch coast may suggest the use of 
 special nets as a defensive measure against sub- 
 marine boats as well as submarine mines in this 
 war. The heavy nets used for deep-sea fishing, 
 if properly weighted and boomed out, should 
 be able to tangle almost any submarine, and it 
 should be possible to take advantage of the cur- 
 rent and dispatch net sections on booms to foul 
 
THE SUBMARINE 119 
 
 the mines in the mouths of harbours and thus 
 cause them to explode. A rope around the pro- 
 peller of a submarine is apparently sufficient to 
 put the little assassin of the briny depths out 
 of action. 
 
 Seaplane Torpedoes 
 
 The fact that seaplanes have been success- 
 fully launched from improvised platforms over 
 the decks of war vessels has induced Admiral 
 Fiske of the United States Navy to point out 
 a rather interesting method of launching naval 
 torpedoes from seaplanes instead of from sub- 
 marines. He contends that while the submarine 
 is powerless to operate at night, the seaplane is 
 ideally fitted to transport a torpedo under cover 
 of darkness and launch it within one-fifth of its 
 striking range against hostile vessels. It is 
 quite true that a seaplane can manoeuvre prac- 
 tically invisible at night at an altitude of little 
 less than a mile, but where is the seaplane that 
 can carry two men and the 1,300-pound naval 
 torpedo to a height of nearly a mile? Even if 
 a machine could be perfected to accomplish such 
 a feat the method of manoeuvring would be 
 
120 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 slow and laborious, which might entail detection, 
 and it would be compelled to volplane to within 
 something less than ten yards to the surface 
 of the water, before it could launch the torpedo, 
 and again there would be the danger of detec- 
 tion, at least by the searchlights of auxiliaries. 
 The idea is fundamentally sound, but a light- 
 weight torpedo of medium range and a heavy- 
 weight seaplane, both specially made for the 
 combined service, are necessary requirements 
 before this ingenious plan could be realised in 
 battle action. It is obvious that a dirigible of 
 the Zeppelin type would have no difficulty in 
 carrying several standard naval torpedoes, but 
 its commander could not afford to risk his ship 
 to gun-fire by approaching the surface to launch 
 a torpedo. The plan is suited only to specially 
 constructed seaplanes. Their vast range of 
 vision, far greater speed, their superior habi- 
 tability and manoeuvring capacity, are the very 
 features which entitle them to tactical prefer- 
 ence over submarines for bringing up torpedoes 
 to the point of attack. Submarines for day 
 action and the seaplane-torpedo for night action 
 may be a future phase of war — deux faces d'un 
 meme probleme! 
 
THE SUBMARINE 121 
 
 Is There a Super -submarine? 
 
 Is there such a thing as a super-submarine? 
 There is. However, only a few of these craft 
 are in active commission, and what is expected 
 to be the ultimate super-ship of the depths is 
 only in the "blue print" stage at this writing. 
 
 Of course, one may be permitted to regard the 
 very latest German "U" boats as being in the 
 super class. They displace no less than 850 
 tons. They are armour-plated over every square 
 inch of visible surface when cruising awash. 
 The turret is of 4-inch Krupp plate and armed 
 with a brace of rapid 3-inch rifles. No less than 
 5,000 horsepower is stowed away in the Diesel 
 oil-engines that propel this type of craft at a 
 pace of 17 knots awash and 11 knots submerged. 
 In other words, these boats do not have to duck 
 for protection against destroyers. They are suf- 
 ficiently well armoured to withstand destroyer 
 gun-fire at 2,000 yards and present a much 
 smaller target than the latter. With their 
 heavy shooting 3-inch rifles they are able to 
 open up any destroyer within 3,500 yards' dis- 
 tance, or about two miles. These boats carry 
 
122 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 no less than eight 21-inch torpedoes capable of 
 long-range work, and are designed especially 
 for attacking battleships. 
 
 The French navy is producing two boats of 
 the same type approximately, though not quite 
 so formidable in armour and armament, but to 
 make up for this they have anti-aerial guns on 
 the turrets, and are supposed to be a trifle 
 speedier than the German craft, at least on 
 paper. 
 
 Out of the "D" class the British navy has 
 tried to evolve a super-craft somewhat on the 
 lines of the German and French boats, but 
 there is no official information available as to 
 what has actually been accomplished. England 
 is jealously guarding her progress in this arm. 
 The opinion of naval men is that she will be 
 able to put boats in the water of the super- 
 type before the battle standard is hauled 
 down. 
 
 It may be a matter of surprise for most 
 Americans to know that the first submarines for 
 the British navy were built in 1901, from de- 
 signs furnished by John P. Holland, the Ameri- 
 can inventor. Italy was quick to follow, France 
 and Eussia subsequently adopted the idea. Not 
 
THE SUBMARINE 123 
 
 until 1904 did Germany actively begin to pro- 
 duce a flotilla of submarines. 
 
 In the meanwhile, the United States navy has 
 been outdistanced by its European rivals, 
 though it remains the pioneer in adopting the 
 first practical boat. A parallel to this curious 
 condition was the pioneer work of the Wright 
 brothers in evolving the first practical aero- 
 plane, and the failure of America to keep 
 abreast with Europe in the further evolution of 
 aircraft. 
 
 However, the period of "submarine" apathy 
 has come to an end. The present war has prod- 
 ded Uncle Sam to activity once more, and the 
 old pioneer has voted himself a lordly check 
 to show the world what he can do in the line of 
 the super-submarine! 
 
 Congress has sealed its approval with a grant 
 of $1,300,000, and when the war is over, and 
 all the fighting of a whole generation is done, 
 w T e shall be able to contemplate this marvellous 
 engine of destruction with the feeling that it 
 "could have licked them all," to anticipate 
 the gentleman of the goatee and the bettle- 
 brow. 
 
 There is no suggestion of "tin sardine" 
 
124 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 about the new Yankee craft. The foc'sle wits 
 may possibly christen it the "electric whale"! 
 At any rate, it will be larger than any cetacea 
 ever created by Nature or heralded by skipper's 
 tales! It will displace 1,000 tons on a total 
 water-line length of 265 feet, or almost double 
 the capacity of the average submarine boat. 
 The strategic or cruising speed will approach 
 20 knots and effort will be made to insure a 
 tactical or submerged speed of 12 knots. It will 
 be a sea-going submarine in the completest sense 
 of the term, inasmuch as it will have a cruising 
 radius of 6,300 miles and a submerged radius 
 of 3,200 miles. She can trail a modern fleet of 
 dreadnaughts and cruisers, which seldom aver- 
 ages more than 14 knots in times of peace and 
 18 knots on a war footing, and go where they go 
 jwithout being outdistanced, except when the 
 wireless signals forced draught and cleared 
 decks. She is armoured over all her visible hull 
 heavily enough to stand an engagement with 
 light scouts and destroyers, and her armament 
 of three 4-inch rifles should enable her to rout 
 such craft, as she herself presents but a poor 
 target. Her torpedo equipment is tremendous. 
 There are ten tubes, each capable of launching 
 
THE SUBMARINE 125 
 
 a 21-inch long-distance torpedo with a war-head 
 of 390 pounds of gun-cotton, over a range of 
 3y 2 miles. An ingenious departure in the tor- 
 pedo armament is effected by placing the six 
 tubes in the hull as fixtures and putting the 
 four remaining tubes on pivotal disappearing 
 carriages on the deck. By virtue of this equip- 
 ment the new super-submarine can sweep the 
 horizon at any angle with four torpedo tubes 
 w T hile awash and cruising, which in turn means 
 that any cruiser venturing within gun-range is 
 within reach of the four torpedoes on her deck 
 that are easily concentrated on a target. If the 
 enemy is too formidable the boat can house its 
 deck torpedoes in the twinkle of an eye, and 
 dive to its submerged level where it will have 
 the use of four tubes in the bow and two tubes 
 in the stern. 
 
 If the new submarine monster proves a suc- 
 cess — and there are no technical obstacles — the 
 time will be approaching, as prophesied by Ad- 
 miral Sir Percy Scott, when submarines work- 
 ing in conjunction with seaplanes will decide 
 naval battles, and not the super-dreadnaught. 
 At any rate, no battleship as yet devised could 
 attack a super-submarine of the type proposed 
 
126 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 and escape its torpedoes unless it were to be 
 most efficiently protected by a veritable cordon 
 of destroyers and scouts, but even the British 
 navy cannot guarantee protection on this scale 
 at all times. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE CAPITAL SHIP 
 
 Super-dreadnaught vs. Battle Cruiser 
 
 The North Sea is seldom calm where it rolls 
 into the Skagerak, that stormy strait, whence 
 Norse sea kings were wont to sally forth under 
 bellying sail with crews of vikings in mail and 
 plate, bending to the ponderous oars. No sail 
 in sight, only a fane of inky smoke on the hori- 
 zon. By-and-by two funnels can be seen under 
 the threatening' curtain and a low rakish vessel 
 heaves into sight, cutting the water with in- 
 credible speed. It glides through the heavy 
 sea, tapering smartly from bow to stem, as 
 though its long, sleek sides were not armoured 
 as stoutly as a fortress. The deck is dotted with 
 steel turrets spiked with monster cannon, each 
 turret a citadel itself. The whole vessel is con- 
 trived like a floating fortification, but it moves 
 and steers with nimble ease as though it were 
 the merest cockle-shell and the giant guns but 
 tubes of paper. This, then, is the modern sea- 
 king, the battle cruiser of the high seas, an 
 armoured, turbined, heavily -gunned brother- 
 
 127 
 
128 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 in-arms to that adventuresome craft of yield- 
 ing hemp and canvas, the viking bark of 
 old. 
 
 Suddenly the course is changed. Bugles call, 
 buzzers snarl, dials oscillate, levers click, hand- 
 wheels spin, and at every battle post electric 
 signals register the commands from the bridge. 
 The decks are cleared for action. The monster 
 turrets swing into position over the port side. 
 The menacing muzzles of a dozen huge cannon 
 rise as by magic to an acute angle, remaining in 
 focus there. 
 
 Another fane of smoke has broken on the port 
 bow; another vessel less tapered but more pon- 
 derous has appeared under three stout funnels. 
 A thick wave of foam curls under the massive 
 prow. The decks are dotted with turrets even 
 more ponderous, spiked with giant guns even 
 more overawing. 
 
 Not a mem is in sight on deck even though 
 there are almost a thousand souls aboard either 
 one of the marine monsters intent on mutual 
 destruction. 
 
 At ten miles 9 range the super-dreadnaught 
 opens fire with a shot from one of its mighty 
 14-inch rifles. The sound of the ton-heavy 
 projectile as it hurtles screaming through the 
 air is like a death-gasp from the underworld. 
 The missile remains in the air something like a 
 half -minute, but it seems hours before it strikes, 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 129 
 
 tossing a crater of water as it explodes. An- 
 other shot follows and a third as the big sea- 
 fighter improves his aim; but before the accurate 
 range can be learned the battle cruiser has 
 changed her course and bears down upon him 
 under a full head of steam. 
 
 Range shots explode on all sides of the battle 
 cruiser as she continues her grim advance at 
 desperate risk, until the distance falls under the 
 effective range of her 11-inch ordnance. Once 
 more the battle cruiser lays down her helm, and 
 as her freeboard swings into play under full 
 speed the whole ship seems to jump out of the 
 water under the shock of a tremendous explo- 
 sion. A broadside of 11-inch pieces has been 
 fired. The air moans and howls under the on- 
 slaught of the storm of projectiles. Half the 
 guns have been aimed short, the other half long, 
 of the plotted range. The long shots take their 
 toll. The super-dreadnaught is discovered with- 
 out her aft funnel and a jagged hole yawns 
 under her superstructure, emitting smoke and 
 flame and hissing steam. 
 
 Something knocks in the port plates of the 
 battle cruiser and explodes on her berth-deck, 
 killing two gun crews, choking the hull with 
 fumes, and wrecking three 6-inch guns — the first 
 bulVs-eye of a 14-inch shell. The battle cruiser, 
 being quicker at the range-finding, manages to 
 land two salvos of her big guns before she has 
 
130 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to take the full punishment of her adversary's 
 14-inch ordnance. 
 
 Those two salvos save the battle cruiser. Of 
 the twenty projectiles fired at the super-dread- 
 naught, thirteen have taken their toll, some of 
 them hitting in the same spot. Her gunners 
 have understood how to concentrate their fire 
 with admirable skill. A water-line hit, breached 
 by the first salvo, was knocked into a yawning 
 chasm by the second, a lucky shot sailing clean 
 through and exploding in the boiler-room, rip- 
 ping a ghastly hole in the very vitals of the big 
 fighter. 
 
 The latter has fired but a single broadside, 
 four shots taking effect, but such is the smash- 
 ing power of her giant 14-inch rifles that the 
 stern turret of the battle cruiser is breached 
 and the guns wrecked. Other shots have clipped 
 her freeboard and dismasted the foretop. 
 
 But that double water-line hit proves fatal to 
 the super-dreadnaught. Before he can launch 
 a second broadside the boilers explode, rolling 
 him over with an ugly starboard list and foul- 
 ing his aim. 
 
 Up to this phase of the action both vessels 
 were steaming freely, the cruiser under forced 
 draught bent on cutting the range to the 
 maximum of her offensive capacity. But the 
 heavy list impairs the manoeuvring of the 
 dreadnaught and he is unable to prevent his 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 131 
 
 fleet adversary from getting within torpedo 
 range. The first missile roams wide, but the 
 second explodes under the dreadnaught's fore- 
 foot, twisting the heavy ram and at the same 
 time detonating his forward torpedoes. The 
 double explosion has the effect of splintering 
 and amputating the entire bow of the big ship. 
 
 The havoc aboardship is appalling. On the 
 lower decks are lacerated and bleeding men, 
 seared by flame and smoke, running about in 
 swirling fumes among corpses still warm with 
 the blood oozing from gaping wounds and sev- 
 ered members. The inrush of the sea floods the 
 madly struggling crew before it can force a 
 passage through the wrecked hatchways already 
 littered with dead and dying. A heavy steam- 
 pipe bursts under the deck, scalding many sur- 
 vivors to death with a tremendous roar that 
 drowns their piteous screams. The heavy list 
 puts the big turret guns beyond the power of 
 man to handle; the crews tumble out on the 
 blood-spattered deck. The ammunition hoists 
 jam; the fire-control station dangles helplessly 
 against the mast; the command tubes and signal 
 wires are tangled and twisted out of order; the 
 captain and the officers are powerless to fight 
 the ship any longer. Suddenly there is a wild 
 scramble — panic has seized the crew of the now 
 defenceless wreck — and with one tumultuous 
 yell those who cam, leave their posts, and jump 
 
132 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 overboard. The officers draw their revolvers, 
 but it is too late for discipline. With one awful 
 blast of escaping steam, punctuated by the dull 
 thud of bursting bulkheads, and the savage crash 
 of plunging wreckage, the super-ship turns up 
 her blood-trickling deck and flame-swept sta- 
 tions and keels over, turning turtle in the heav- 
 ing sea. 
 
The Strategic Situation 
 
 The naval situation in the present world war 
 provokes comparison with David's dauntless 
 stand against Goliath and Gulliver's pugnacious 
 handling of the fabled giant. As yet there is no 
 indication that the little fellow may whip his 
 ponderous adversary, despite the fact that the 
 former has outstripped the latter as a fighter 
 in almost every action at this writing. 
 
 The naval odds against Germany are greater 
 than even the military odds. Not only is Ger- 
 many compelled to fight the British navy, more 
 than twice as strong in tonnage and armament, 
 but the French navy prevents Austria from 
 aiding her ally and the Eussian Baltic squadron 
 hinders the German grossadmiral from focusing 
 his entire fleet strength against the British 
 blockade. Add to this the ever-present possi- 
 bility of Japan dispatching a battle squadron to 
 European waters, not only to convoy an armada 
 of troop ships with military .reinforcements, 
 but also to act as a naval reserve for the Allies, 
 and it will be apparent that no matter how 
 
 133 
 
134 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 bravely and efficiently the Germans may fight 
 their vessels, they cannot hope to win the naval 
 war. Even if they could manage to defeat a su- 
 perior unit of British capital ships in a decisive 
 fleet action, the reinforcements available against 
 her by the allied French, Japanese and Eussian 
 fleets would enable the defeated British navy 
 to rally and insure a final victory to itself 
 against such units as Germany would have left 
 in this contingency. The German navy may 
 score intermittent victories, ship for ship, and 
 possibly squadron for squadron, and its per- 
 sonnel may demonstrate a superior degree of 
 fighting ability, still when it comes to the great, 
 final line-up and the super-dreadnaughts on 
 either side clear decks for a pitched battle, sum- 
 moning every class and type of naval craft in 
 auxiliary support of their main offensive, the 
 Germans are hopelessly outclassed. 
 
 There are some possible exceptions to be 
 quoted against this estimate of naval exigencies 
 based on the known and certified strength of the 
 opponents. The unknown power of secret 
 armaments must also be considered. It is not 
 logical to reason that because Germany was able 
 to produce secretly made siege artillery that 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 135 
 
 ground " impregnable" fortresses to dust, she 
 should also be able to produce naval armaments 
 of like superiority, but it is not unreasonable 
 to assume that the German admiralty has 
 availed itself of the same opportunity for un- 
 detected warlike enterprise provided by the 
 German general staff. If the naval Zeppelins 
 now being completed are equipped with ap- 
 paratus of adequate power to destroy armoured 
 ships rather than for the bombardment of bases 
 and cities, and if by skilful handling of this 
 novel unit the Germans might succeed in sink- 
 ing a considerable number of the British capital 
 ships on blockade patrol with but little disaster 
 to their Zeppelin fleet, the chances for an equal 
 final combat would be much improved. But 
 unless the new naval Zeppelins can launch 
 armour-piercing torpedoes and detonate heavy 
 charges of explosives in the vitals of capital 
 vessels — unless they can torpedo from above al- 
 most as effectively as the submarines torpedo 
 from below — this new and untried combination 
 of aerial and naval offensive is not likely to be a 
 decisive factor in the naval campaign as a whole, 
 though it might aid in destroying quite a num- 
 ber of valuable vessels. 
 
136 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Another possibility is that Germany may 
 have utilised the respite occasioned by the block- 
 ade to install in the turrets of her battleships 
 a larger calibred weapon than the 30.5-centi- 
 metre Krupp piece, which is the regular equip- 
 ment. Efficient as these rifles are, and almost 
 equal in offensive power to the British 12-inch 
 naval gun, they are no match for the 13- and 
 14-inch rifles, not to mention the 15-inch pieces, 
 which are carried by the latest British super- 
 dreadnaughts. I do not mean to suggest that 
 inasmuch as Germany could produce 42-centi- 
 metre guns for her army she should also be 
 able to produce 42-centimetre guns for her navy. 
 The technical requirements involved are of an 
 entirely different nature. The military 42- 
 centimetre piece is in reality a transportable 
 mortar in which the gaseous pressure is low com- 
 pared to the colossal pressure in the breech of 
 a naval gun. The latter belongs in the so-called 
 " direct-fire" category of cannon, which neces- 
 sitates the flattest possible trajectory, which 
 in turn compels the highest attainable velocity 
 of projectile. In case the Krupps have ac- 
 tually developed a type of 42-centimetre naval 
 gun — and necessarily such manufacture must 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 137 
 
 have been initiated years ago to be available in 
 proper quantities now — and the capital vessels 
 of the German navy could sally forth armed 
 with 42-centimetre pieces in every turret that 
 held only 30.2-centimetre weapons before, the 
 superiority of the British fleet would be seri- 
 ously interfered with, to say the least. There 
 may be inherent structural difficulties in the way 
 of laying a 42-centimetre gun in barbettes de- 
 signed to hold only 30.2-centimetre pieces, but 
 who knows but what this contingency was 
 provided for in advance? Besides, while the 
 power and range of modern cannon have been 
 increased marvellously during the past decade, 
 their space requirements have been noticeably * 
 decreased. If only the latest type of German 
 super-dreadnaught could make effective use of 
 a possible 42-centimetre armament, and even if 
 the added weight would make it imperative to 
 limit installation to the centre line turrets, a 
 squadron equipped with such formidable 
 weapons ought to be able to engage two squad- 
 rons of British super-dreadnaughts equipped 
 with 13- and even 14-inch primary armament. 
 
 I will admit that the deductions entering into 
 this forecast are largely speculative, but I will 
 
138 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 not admit that conclusions are futile merely be- 
 cause they have been arrived at by agencies 
 other than those licensed by reason and knowl- 
 edge. At any rate, the latter qualities made a 
 pitifully poor showing when a wondering world 
 began to draw on them for an explanation of the 
 Krupp secret military armaments. In this con- 
 nection perhaps it would not be amiss to recol- 
 lect that the British navy actually boasted 16.5- 
 inch rifles in the early eighties. These ponder- 
 ous pieces were of Armstrong manufacture and 
 weighed 110 tons each, or fully as much as the 
 heaviest coast defence guns. These giant guns, 
 which were regular primary equipment in battle- 
 ships of the ill-starred Victoria class, required 
 seven minutes to fire one round, weighing 1,800 
 pounds. While superior in "smashing" power 
 to anything afloat these guns were inferior in 
 penetration to the present 9.2-inch naval rifle. 
 Mainly owing to their tremendous tonnage and 
 slow delivery of projectile the Armstrong mon- 
 sters were finally discarded. The Krupps be- 
 came leaders of the modern tendency to make 
 cannon more effective and less ponderous, and 
 it is not impossible that this enterprising, 
 aggressive firm may have evolved a 42-centi- 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 139 
 
 metre naval rifle only slightly heavier and 
 proportionally less ponderous than the present 
 British 14-inch naval piece. Moreover, the in- 
 stallation of 15-inch rifles in the very latest 
 English super-dreadnaughts goes a long way 
 to show that the improvements made in limiting 
 bulk while increasing power in modern arma- 
 ments is such that the extraordinary calibres, 
 which were dismissed in the eighties as imprac- 
 ticable, are once more forging to the front, 
 backed by substantial guarantees of superior 
 effectiveness. 
 
 Only by perpetrating a combination of su- 
 perior naval armaments with strong aerial ar- 
 tillery does it appear that Germany could take 
 her several adversaries by surprise and match 
 their superiority with a novel tactical offensive, 
 backed by super-armaments, naval as well 
 as aerial. The Germans have demonstrated 
 their ability to concoct surprise on land; it 
 remains to be seen if they can do it at sea 
 also. 
 
 The battle which naval critics have been 
 looking for has not happened at this writing. 
 The battle cruiser has not fought it out with 
 the super-dreadnaught. The experts' attention 
 
140 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 is focused on this long-expected encounter, 
 which is supposed to decide whether a few knots 
 of additional mobility and greater steaming 
 radius is an advantage in a running fight, when 
 armaments are practically equal. To sacrifice 
 a little in "smashing" power and range, but 
 nothing in tonnage for the sake of out-manoeu- 
 vring an adversary that is taking no chances 
 in armour or armament, these are the basic 
 qualities of the battle cruiser which are yet to 
 be tried out in a death grapple with the super- 
 dreadnaught before we know which of these 
 types shall remain the "capital" ship of the 
 future. i 
 
 The dominant tendency of naval architects 
 appears to favour a high rate of speed backed 
 by a tremendous steaming radius, provided the 
 sacrifice in armour and armament does not dis- 
 qualify the vessel from combat with the heaviest 
 battle unit — and these main essentials are in- 
 corporated with acute insistence in that most 
 modern of modern sea-fighters, the battle 
 cruiser. 
 
 The only vessels that have been engaged at 
 this time at all fitted to decide the momentous 
 argument of B. C. vs. B. were the Audacious 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 141 
 
 and the Goeben. A duel between these two ves- 
 sels — the latter a fine specimen of the German 
 idea of a battle cruiser, the former a typical 
 example of the British idea in super-dread- 
 naughts — should have been tremendously in- 
 structive if not of decisive moment. 
 
 There are naval critics like Admiral Sir Percy 
 Scott who incline toward the belief that the 
 submarine may eventually replace the capital 
 ship. The successful development of the one- 
 thousand- ton super- submarine with huge cruis- 
 ing radius and tremendous torpedo armament, 
 most admittedly points to the day when naval 
 engagements may be fought out under the sea 
 rather than on it, and our gallant fleet admirals 
 may shrink to the proportion of mere submarine 
 savants I 
 
 The "Goeben-Breslau" Escape 
 
 In a tactical sense the most brilliant exploit 
 of the German navy at this writing was one in 
 which not a solitary shot was fired nor a drop 
 of blood wasted. A powerful British-French 
 fleet chased the battle cruiser Goeben and the 
 protected cruiser Breslau into Messina harbour, 
 
142 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 giving the German commander the choice of 
 suffering the internment of his vessels or fac- 
 ing destruction if he attempted escape. Not 
 only did the German commander prefer the lat- 
 ter alternative, but he managed to hoodwink 
 and elude the overpowering enemy. He handled 
 his vessels so efficiently that he was able to save 
 them from what seemed certain annihilation, and 
 dropped his anchor under the guns of the Dar- 
 danelles before the British commander realised 
 that he had been the butt of some clever ruse. 
 The German commander not only succeeded in 
 eliminating loss or even damage, but he added 
 his vessels to the navy of a friendly power, 
 which was destined to make use of them sub- 
 sequently, and offset a loss suffered by that 
 power in two capital vessels seized by England 
 shortly before their completion. 
 
 A naval lesson is pointed by this action. An 
 inferior unit having maximum speed and large 
 cruising radius has not only inherent possibili- 
 ties for outmanoeuvring a vastly superior 
 enemy, but accidental possibilities for outwit- 
 ting him or confounding his judgment at the 
 executive moment. The speed of a squadron is 
 that of its slowest unit, but the speed of two 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 143 
 
 fast cruisers is the maximum of their capacity. 
 This will generally account for an advantage of 
 a few knots in favour of the smaller unit. Be- 
 sides, there are other agencies, such as " jam- 
 ming" the wireless or tampering with the code 
 of the enemy, which may, in this instance, have 
 aided the escape of the German vessels, entirely 
 aside from their tactical mobility. The court- 
 martialing of the British admiral soon after 
 this episode indicates that contributory causes, 
 more potent than mere mobility, aided in his 
 deception, causes that are likely to remain 
 admiralty secrets. 
 
 The Helgoland Action 
 
 In the engagement of the bight of Helgoland 
 the British commander appears to have been the 
 abler tactician. 
 
 A searching rake of destroyers was deployed 
 as a bait to the German patrol scouts. A light 
 cruiser squadron supported this movement 
 with a powerful squadron of battle cruisers in 
 reserve. The fog enabled the British to screen 
 this manoeuvre from the enemy. The Germans 
 nibbled the bait and engaged the destroyers and 
 
144 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 the scouts with similar units. Eliminating the 
 destroyer flotilla the main fighting units at this 
 phase of the action included two British scouts, 
 the Fearless and Arethusa, against three Ger- 
 man scouts, the Koln, Mainz and Ariadne. 
 While numerically superior to the British unit, 
 the Germans suffered the disadvantage of a 
 slightly weaker armament, that is, their total 
 primary power of thirty-four 4.1-inch rifles did 
 not appear to be quite as effective as the two 
 6-inch and eighteen 4-inch rifles mounted by 
 the enemy. That the Arethusa should have 
 been able to inflict most of the damage with its 
 6-inch pieces, up to this point, is additional 
 proof that the slightly heavier gun possesses 
 marked advantages in an action between un- 
 armoured vessels. As it was, the Germans were 
 not able to inflict much damage before the 
 British battle cruiser squadron hove in sight 
 and took its toll in death shots of 12-inch calibre, 
 placing the German scouts on the loss roster. 
 This engagement contains no lesson of conse- 
 quence. That it should be possible to bait a 
 blockaded enemy with a rake of scouts, only to 
 insure the destruction of his patrols by driving 
 in a wedge of battle cruisers at the opportune 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 145 
 
 moment, is a well-enough established tactical 
 contingency.* 
 
 The Coronel Battle 
 
 The action off Coronel was also decided by 
 superior artillery, although the British virtually 
 commanded the heaviest guns. Admiral von 
 Spee not only outmanoeuvred Admiral Crad- 
 dock, but greatly outpointed him in gunnery. 
 The main fight developed between the armoured 
 cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, mounting 
 a total of sixteen 8.2-inch and twelve 5.9-inch 
 rifles in primary batteries, against the Good 
 Hope and Monmouth, armoured cruisers, total- 
 ling two 9.2-inch and thirty 6-inch rifles. The 
 Germans were superior in the weight of metal 
 thrown by sixteen 8.2-inch pieces as against two 
 9.2-inch pieces of the British, but the latter had 
 the advantage of greater range and "smash- 
 ing" power in their weapons. As the action 
 was fought in "line ahead" formation the arm- 
 aments that could be brought to play were 
 limited to two 9.2-inch and seventeen 6-inch 
 
 * For an account of the torpedoing of the British cruiser 
 squadron " Hogue," " Aboukir " and u Cressy " see the chapter 
 on " The Submarine." 
 
146 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 rifles on the British side against twelve 8.2- 
 inch and twelve 5.9-inch rifles on the German 
 side. 
 
 Tactically, the British should have opened 
 fire and made their two superior rifles effective 
 before the Germans could land a broadside. 
 The reports indicate that they either failed to do 
 so or that the shots fell short. At 7,000 yards' 
 range, had the English maintained this distance, 
 they would have been able to penetrate the 
 armour of the German cruisers with their 9.2- 
 inch pieces, while the latter would have been 
 at a loss to hull the British cruisers with the 
 8.2-inch batteries. Admiral von Spee very 
 cleverly manoeuvred his vessels until the range 
 had been cut to about 6,000 yards, when he sud- 
 denly opened fire with broadsides of 8.2-inch 
 rifles. It was these well-aimed salvos, concen- 
 trated first on the Good Hope and then on the 
 Monmouth, which sent these fine vessels to the 
 bottom. It is probable that the minimum range 
 during this action did not drop much under 5,000 
 yards, owing to the sundown, and it is possible 
 that the secondary batteries of 5.9- and 6-inch 
 guns had no decisive voice in the argument. 
 The British 9.2-inch naval gun discharges a 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 147 
 
 980-pound armour-piercing projectile at the 
 rate of 6.5 rounds per minute with a muzzle 
 velocity of 2,800 foot-seconds and a muzzle 
 energy of 20,685 foot-tons. At 6,500 yards' 
 range a single shot of this calibre could have 
 pierced any part of the German cruisers, not 
 excepting the armoured belt. 
 
 The explanation offered by the British ad- 
 miralty that a heavy rolling sea precluded ac- 
 curate marksmanship is laughable, for certainly 
 the Germans were wallowing in the same rolling 
 sea and their marksmanship was excellent. 
 
 Of scout cruisers Germany had three in this 
 battle — the Numb erg, Leipzig and Bremen — 
 opposed to a single British scout, the Glasgow, 
 and an armed transport. Despite their vast 
 superiority, in tonnage as well as in armament, 
 the Germans did not succeed in destroying the 
 Glasgow, which showed a fine burst of speed, 
 and escaped in a ragged condition. The 
 English cruiser had an advantage of a couple 
 of knots over the German vessels, but the latter 
 matched no less than thirty 4.1-inch rifles 
 against two 6-inch and ten 4-inch rifles of the 
 former. Perhaps the German scouts were 
 slower than their tactical rating, owing to foul 
 
148 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 bottoms — a handicap characteristic of hunted 
 fighters— but this does not minimise the tactical 
 efficiency of the Glasgow's commander in out- 
 manoeuvring his greatly superior opponent. 
 
 The "Audacious" and "Bulwark" Disasters * 
 
 The loss of the super-dreadnaught Audacious 
 in Lough Swilly on the north coast of Ireland 
 shows that a submarine is equal to the sangui- 
 nary exploit of cruising hundreds of miles away 
 from its base and destroying the most formi- 
 dable of fighting vessels. The sinking of the pre- 
 dreadnaught Bulwark almost in the very mouth 
 of the Thames proves that a cleverly handled 
 submarine can steal through the most ingeni- 
 ously planted mine fields and elude hostile 
 scouting screens with a good chance of striking 
 down the enemy on his own base. These two 
 losses, totalling almost fifteen million dollars, 
 constitute a more serious disaster than all the 
 British losses gone before. The naval archi- 
 tects who advocate multiform bulkheads are 
 not likely to refer their arguments to these two 
 
 * According to the original British admiralty reports both 
 of these vessels were sunk by contact with mines, but subsequent 
 investigation indicates that they were torpedoed. 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 149 
 
 vessels, one of which sank like a plummet, the 
 other slowly enough to encourage the belief that 
 it " could" have been saved. The charges car- 
 ried in the torpedoes of modern submarines are 
 so tremendously effective that the theoretically 
 plausible plan of the "subdivisionist" is not 
 likely to find practical proof in this war. It is 
 all very well to design a ship supporting water- 
 tight decks on watertight bulkheads, and it is 
 not difficult to convince naval boards, by a show 
 of mathematical fireworks, that so-and-so many 
 bulkheads may be blown without seriously im- 
 periling the flotation, but wet gun-cotton has 
 a way of opening up a vessel that is anything 
 but mathematically correct. It is fatal to rely 
 on a multiplicity of compartments to prevent a 
 ship from sinking. A torpedo may bend in a 
 score of bulkheads and still the ship may float 
 while another torpedo may blow only a single 
 bulkhead and sink the ship. The pressures 
 developed by submarine explosion are so enor- 
 mous that not only are the bulkheads blown but 
 the longitudinal seams between the decks are 
 opened, and the leakage thus caused is bound, 
 in most cases, to waterlog and finally wreck the 
 vessel. It is not improbable that some such 
 
150 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 erratic starting of seams is what sent the 
 Audacious to the bottom. 
 
 The Dashing Sea-Hussars 
 In a tactical sense, the sea-raiding done by 
 the light German scouts the Emden, Leipzig 
 and Karlsruhe is the smartest exhibition of 
 seamanship in the present war. These three 
 " musketeers " of the high seas have defied cap- 
 ture for several months by a powerful enemy 
 looking for them with wireless and cruiser 
 squadrons in all the oceans. They have been 
 able, not only to destroy scores of hostile mer- 
 chantmen, but they have provisioned and coaled 
 from their prizes before sinking them, and in 
 some instances they have managed to establish 
 bases on obscure islands. The Emden, single- 
 handed, almost swept British shipping off the 
 Indian Ocean and stopped the mail. The daunt- 
 less deeds of her brothers-in-arms are too 
 numerous to mention here. Whatever one may 
 choose to think, the fact remains that never 
 before were naval vessels handled with better 
 tactical efficiency and keener resource and dar- 
 ing in the face of desperate odds, than these 
 three daring "Flying Dutchmen" of the seven 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 151 
 
 seas. The Germans refer to their exploits as 
 "Hussarenstuchsen," and quite so, for cavalry 
 has seldom attempted adventure of a character 
 more sanguinary and romantically warlike. 
 Even the somewhat less brilliant performances 
 of the Nurnberg and Konigsberg would be quite 
 sufficient in themselves to establish for the per- 
 sonnel of the German navy a reputation second 
 to none and equalled by few. 
 
 These five German sea-hussars have managed 
 to almost paralyse British shipping in the 
 Pacific, the South Atlantic and the Indian 
 Ocean for several months, and have captured 
 and destroyed more than one hundred hos- 
 tile merchant vessels. British and French 
 cruisers have raked the oceans in vain, and 
 at one time there was actually a total of 
 some eighty odd vessels commissioned with 
 their destruction. And still they remained 
 afloat, challenging capture with the utmost per- 
 tinacity and dauntless daring. The fate of the 
 Emden was not accomplished until that little 
 vessel was handicapped by a foul bottom and 
 empty ammunition chambers, and even then it 
 did not surrender, but chose self-destruction. 
 
 From a naval viewpoint the exploits of the 
 
152 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 German sea-hussars provide a very opportune 
 lesson, indicating that a small raiding unit, 
 efficiently handled, can keep the high seas in 
 good cruising shape for a long time, and do a 
 great amount of damage to shipping under the 
 very nose of a vigilant and far superior enemy 
 equipped with every means for the destruction 
 of the raiders. 
 
 Naval Losses Compared 
 
 It being the custom of newspaper writers to 
 compare naval losses by the number of vessels 
 vanquished, there is now a widespread delusion 
 that Germany has suffered the severest blow in 
 the loss of 25 vessels as against 20 British ves- 
 sels, at this writing. Comparisons of this cali- 
 bre maybe instrumental to " headline" artistry, 
 but governments take cognisance of the tonnage 
 and armament involved and the class of vessel. 
 The affixed tables are compiled with a view 
 of determining the relative naval status of the 
 losses incurred on both sides. It will be noticed 
 that the greater numerical German disaster con- 
 cerns chiefly minor craft of the ' 'mosquito" 
 fleet, while the lower numerical British disaster 
 includes a large proportion of valuable fighting 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 153 
 
 ships. Stripped of diplomatic phrase, the fig- 
 ures plainly show that the weaker German fleet, 
 bottled up and isolated from its ally, managed 
 to cause the allied enemy a loss of 139,070 tons 
 in the same space of time — approximately fif- 
 teen weeks — that she suffered a loss of only 
 41,559 tons herself! Dealing a blow fully three 
 times as hard as that imposed by its adversary 
 speaks volumes for the superior enterprise and 
 superb training of the German navy. 
 
 BRITISH LOSS: 
 
 TONNAGE PRIMARY ARMAMENT 
 
 Super-Dreadnaught 
 
 " Audacious " 23,400 10—13.5 in., 16 — 4 in. 
 
 Pre-Dreadnaught 
 
 "Bulwark" 15,250 4— 12 in., 12— 6 in. 
 
 Armoured Cruiser 
 
 " Warrior " 13,550 6— 9 in., 4—7.5 in. 
 
 " Good Hope " 14,300 2— 9 in., 16—6 in. 
 
 " Aboukir " 12,200 2— 9 in., 12—6 in. 
 
 " Cressy " 12,200 2— 9 in., 12—6 in. 
 
 " Hogue " 12,200 2— 9 in., 12—6 in. 
 
 "Monmouth" 9,950 14— 6 in. 
 
 Protected Cruiser 
 
 " Hawke " 7,500 2— 9 in., 10—6 in. 
 
 "Hermes" 5,700 11— 6 in. 
 
 "Amphion" 3,500 10 — 4 in. 
 
 "Pathfinder" 3,000 9— 4 in. 
 
 " Pegasus " 2,200 8 — 4 in. 
 
 Mine Sweeper 
 
 "Niger" 820 
 
 Gunboat 
 
 "Speedy" 800 
 
 Destroyer 
 
 " Bullfinch " 400 Total Primary Armament : 
 
 Submarines 10—13.5"; 4—12"; 16—9" 
 
 AE-1, E-3, and D-5 . . 2,100 4— 7.5"; 99— 6"; 43—4" 
 
 Total tons displacement: 139,070 
 
154 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 GERMAN LOSS: 
 
 TONNAGE PBIMARY ABMAMENT 
 
 Armoured Cruiser 
 
 " Yorck " 9,500 4—8.2 in. ; 10—5.9 in. 
 
 Protected Cruiser 
 
 " Magdeburg " 4,500 12 — 4.1 in. 
 
 " Koln " 4,280 12—4.1 in. 
 
 " Mainz " 4,232 12 — 4.1 in. 
 
 Scout Cruiser 
 
 " Emden » 3,544 10—4.1 in. 
 
 " Ariadne * 2,618 10 — 4.1 in. 
 
 " Hela " 2,040 10—4.1 in. 
 
 " Cormoran " 1,600 8—4.1 in. 
 
 Gunboat 
 
 " Jaguar n 900 
 
 "litis" 900 
 
 " Luchs " 900 
 
 " Tiger " 900 
 
 Surveying Ship 
 
 " Planet " 495 Total Primary Armament : 
 
 " Mowe " 495 4—8.2" ; 10— 5.9" ; 74—4.1" 
 
 Destroyers 
 
 S115,S117,andS119 1,600 
 
 S124 and S126 .... 1,050 
 
 S90 and " Taku " . . 825 
 
 V187 680 
 
 Submarine 
 
 U15 500 
 
 Total tons displacement: 41,559 
 
 In explanation of the above estimate, fairness 
 compels me to say that the heaviest German 
 loss was not caused in hostile action, for the 
 Yorck was sunk by contact with a German mine. 
 Also, although primary armament is sup- 
 posed to include no weapon lighter than the 
 6-inch rifle, I have taken the liberty of extend- 
 ing this classification to the 4-inch rifle, which 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 155 
 
 is in reality a quick-fire piece. It will be seen 
 that while the British loss in tonnage is more 
 than three times greater than the German, ther 
 British armament loss is even much more severe 
 and out of all proportion to that suffered by 
 the German ships. Even were we to include the 
 3-inch rifles on the gunboats, the proportion in 
 favour of Germany would not be unbalanced. 
 When we consider the complements it appears 
 that something like nine thousand English 
 sailors and officers suffered death or capture 
 against only one-third this number in German 
 crews. 
 
 Since the above was written the defeat of 
 Admiral von Spee's squadron off the Falkland 
 Islands by a vastly superior British force in- 
 creases the German loss in the following pro- 
 portions: A total tonnage of 32,250 as rep- 
 resented by the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leip- 
 zig, Numb erg and Dresden, and a total arma- 
 ment of twenty 8.2-inch, twelve 6-inch and 
 thirty-two 4.1-inch rifles. In this, as in other 
 naval engagements, the Germans appear to have 
 fought to the last man and the last gun with an 
 esprit de corps something akin to the berserker 
 fury of the ancient vikings. They refused to 
 
156 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 surrender even on honourable terms, preferring 
 to meet death like warriors, singing their na- 
 tional songs defiantly with their faces turned 
 toward the flag until the waves closed over them. 
 The English admiral deserves credit for tactical 
 efficiency in rounding up and destroying the 
 elusive enemy without much damage to his own 
 squadron, which was so vastly superior, both in 
 armour and armament, as to enable him to crip- 
 ple the Germans at the maximum range before 
 they could return his fire effectively. The fight 
 was so unequal as to be a foregone conclusion : 
 12-inch ordnance scoring over 8-inch ordnance 
 in perfect conformity with the artillery manuals. 
 The advantage was with the British but the 
 Germans reaped the glory. I do not mean 
 to intimate by this that valour is a historical 
 rather than an active quality in the British 
 navy. The dash of an English submarine below 
 several rows of anchor-mines guarding the Dar- 
 danelles, resulting in the sinking of an obsolete 
 Turkish battleship, proves that the British are 
 not content with sporting the laurels of gallant 
 traditions, but quite capable of emulating the 
 Germans in adventuresome exploit. 
 Technically speaking, the German naval raid 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 157 
 
 on the Scarborough, Hartlepool, Whitby bases 
 was a most efficiently conducted operation, 
 and apparently without a flaw. The main 
 object — to elude a superior and vigilant enemy 
 and shell his coast effectively before he could 
 gather for pursuit — was accomplished without 
 a hitch. The Germans made their way despite 
 fog and mine fields, and took their vessels in- 
 shore where no British pilot has ever taken 
 ships of that size. Their maps were accurate, 
 and in thirty minutes their artillery had found 
 the vital spots in the coastal targets selected. 
 In effecting their escape the Germans appear 
 to have destroyed some of the enemy's torpedo 
 craft, and every phase of their action seems to 
 have been most accurately timed and skilfully 
 carried out. To be sure, the raid accomplished 
 no purpose of material consequence beyond the 
 punishment inflicted on the coast towns under 
 fire, but it demonstrated the fact that England 
 can be invaded from the sea, and that the 
 British navy cannot be relied upon absolutely 
 to prevent attack — and the moral effect of this 
 experience is an asset of no mean calibre. 
 
 To compare this raid to the cross-ravaging 
 methods of the ancient freebooter, and to cen- 
 
158 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 sure Germany for bombarding the English coast 
 while British vessels bombard German bases on 
 the Belgian coast, is little less than ridiculous 
 in a military sense, whatever it may be con- 
 strued to mean ethically. 
 
 British vs. German Naval Status 
 
 While it is quite apparent to an unprejudiced 
 eye that the British navy has not been able to 
 prevent its weaker adversary from inflicting 
 vastly more damage than it could deal in turn, 
 it should be said in justice that the British navy 
 on the whole has accomplished the mission in- 
 trusted to its care, nevertheless. The British 
 blockade still remains intact. Under its pres- 
 sure German raids have been confined to the 
 submarine arm, with one exception. The navy 
 made it possible, by adequate convoy lines, to 
 transport the entire available expeditionary 
 army to French soil, a feat that had something 
 to do with staying the German flanking offen- 
 sive. The navy swept German commerce from 
 the seas and policed the ocean lanes sufficiently 
 to insure the safe passage of troop transports 
 bearing reinforcements from Canada and India, 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 159 
 
 not a small task, taken in the aggregate, even 
 for a big navy. 
 
 Despite the heavy punishment suffered, the 
 British navy is measurably stronger at this 
 writing than at the outbreak of war, owing to 
 the addition of such vessels as were acquired 
 or have been finished in the meantime. As to 
 the immediate future, the status of the German 
 naval programme is such that Germany will 
 gain proportionally more in new additions to 
 her fighting units before February, 1915, than 
 will England. Assuming that the building 
 operations will not fall short of schedule, Ger- 
 many should have 3 super-dreadnaughts ready 
 in this interim against 2 British ships of the 
 same class. The Konig, Markgraf and Grosser 
 Kurfurst, each displacing 26,575 tons, are a 
 more necessary and valuable addition to the 
 German naval needs than the War spite and 
 Queen Elizabeth, each of 27,500 tons, are to the 
 already greatly superior English fleet. Ger- 
 many also has 3 battle cruisers building, all 
 measuring up to the 30,000 tons mark — the 
 Victoria Luise, Hertha and Lutzow — all of 
 them superior to the Moltke and Goeben class, 
 which would strengthen this arm of her fleet so 
 
160 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 that she could venture to match it against Eng- 
 land's squadron of 10 battle cruisers. Besides, 
 no vessels of this class are now building in 
 British yards. In armoured cruiser construction 
 there is no activity on either side, but in the 
 Graudenz and Regensburg Germany has two 
 fine 5,000-ton cruisers of 271^-knot speed that 
 should leave the ways before England could 
 launch any of her newly-planned 30-knotters 
 of the 3,800-ton class. 
 
 As far as building activities may influence 
 the naval strategy of the opponents it is evi- 
 dent that while it may be a matter of compara- 
 tive indifference to England as to the time most 
 favourable for a pitched battle, there is every 
 incentive on Germany's part to assume the of- 
 fensive as soon as her new battle units are ready 
 for action, as she will then have reached her 
 greatest attainable strength. 
 
 In the destroyer and submarine arm there is 
 considerable building activity on both sides. 
 Exactly what the proportional developments 
 are, it is not possible to estimate, but it is highly 
 probable that Germany will try to increase her 
 submarine arm to the very utmost; at least, she 
 has a dominant incentive to increase the arm 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 161 
 
 whereby she has scored her main successes even 
 to the point of actually commissioning craft of 
 the super-submarine class. England, on the 
 other hand, being tactically on the defensive, 
 is probably striving to strengthen her destroyer 
 flotillas as the most readily available defence 
 against submarine attacks. 
 
 The operations of the German right wing 
 along the Ypres channel have puzzled many ob- 
 servers. Why such tremendous military sacri- 
 fices should be deemed expedient to occupy an 
 additional strip of coast line, does not appear, 
 at first glance, to be an essential military re- 
 quirement. Only when the strategical objective 
 of the German admiralty is admitted to consid- 
 eration does the military necessity for this des- 
 perately contended offensive coincide with the 
 naval plan. 
 
 It is not possible to adequately mine the strait 
 of Dover. The depth of the current-swept chan- 
 nel at this point precludes the planting of mine 
 fields to effectually repel submarine operations, 
 whereas the distance — some twenty-two miles — 
 is eminently favourable to concerted action by 
 submarine flotillas. 
 
 Moreover, should the Germans take Calais 
 
162 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 and convert it into an advanced naval base they 
 would be well placed for preventing further 
 reinforcements to the British expeditionary 
 army. Also, should the Germans reassume the 
 offensive against Paris, based on this point, 
 the German right wing, protected by the Channel 
 from molestation, would be in a stronger posi- 
 tion than during the drive of the von Kluck 
 army. Besides, such a movement, or even a 
 stand made here, would prevent a concerted 
 operation of the British expeditionary army 
 and the British navy against the German naval 
 bases at Wilhelmshaven, Emden and Cuxhaven. 
 The capture of Antwerp was the first link in 
 this chain of preventive measures against just 
 such a move. The fighting along the Ypres 
 channel was the final anvil blow, and if the chain 
 has been forged by the time this book can ap- 
 pear the importance of Calais as a determining 
 factor will hardly need further explanation. Had 
 the Germans incautiously pushed on to Paris 
 — a movement of more political than strategic 
 importance — they would have exposed them- 
 selves to a flanking attack, not only on land but 
 on their blockaded coast, and jeopardised their 
 naval force at a very disadvantageous moment. 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 163 
 
 Chaos in Naval Nomenclature 
 
 Thanks to omniscient newspaper strategists 
 the public mind in this country is now in such 
 a deplorably chaotic state in regard to naval 
 matters that a little elucidation on certain basic, 
 elementary points may find readers. 
 
 In these days when boatswains do no 
 "swaining," and ship's carpenters do no car- 
 pentering, and seamen are largely incapable of 
 seamanship, naval employments are not what 
 they used to be, that is, the terms remain but the 
 functions have been altered, or, as an American 
 would say, the job has changed. The flag com- 
 mand and the post commission are the chief 
 emblems of the highest naval executive rank. 
 A fleet admiral may have under his command no 
 less than two divisions of eight battleships each, 
 ten armoured cruisers, six protected scouts, and 
 twenty-four destroyers. This fleet is divided 
 into various individual correlative flag com- 
 mands held by vice or rear admirals. Ordi- 
 narily, a full admiral would be assigned six 
 battleships of such a unit while vice or rear 
 admirals would get four, so that each unit of 
 
164 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 battleships with its auxiliary cruisers and de- 
 stroyers would be under flag command by an 
 admiral, and all the units of the entire fleet 
 under the supreme command of the fleet ad- 
 miral. A squadron is usually a unit or division 
 of a fleet, but sometimes the term is applied to 
 what is in reality a fleet intact, such as the first 
 cruiser squadron of the Channel fleet. 
 
 Neither the fleet admiral nor the flag admirals 
 attached to his command have anything to do 
 with the vessel that flies their ensign, which is 
 termed the flagship. An admiral merely uses 
 the latter as a sort of naval headquarters from 
 whence he directs the executive command as 
 regards his particular division. The flagship 
 proper is commanded by a post captain. He is 
 responsible for the ship as the admiral is re- 
 sponsible for the squadron. On a modern sea- 
 fighter the captain is very little in evidence, 
 however. He does not stand on the bridge with 
 a dapper little spyglass as pictured in the Sun- 
 day supplements. The chief navigation officer 
 is the man responsible for the handling of the 
 vessel under way. The chief engineer is su- 
 preme in the engine-room. The torpedo and 
 gun crews are under separate commands. The 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 165 
 
 detail operations of these various commands are 
 discharged by numerous petty officers. In the 
 British navy there are no less than sixty-nine 
 different ratings of such warrant officers, 
 divided into chief and petty grades. The "sec- 
 ond-in-command," usually a post commander, 
 is the man on whom devolves the lion's share 
 of what used to be the captain's duties. He is 
 the chief superintending agent of the vessel, 
 and a sort of focus of responsibility. The cap- 
 tain's office nowadays is more like that of chief 
 inspector and final authority in all matters. 
 Of course, when the decks are cleared for action 
 he is in supreme executive command and fights 
 the ship the same as the admiral, using the flag- 
 ship as his base, fights the squadron under his 
 ensign. 
 
 Homogeneity of Units 
 
 To some it is a mystery why warships are 
 being built in classes. The Congressional agi- 
 tation in Washington is limited to idle argu- 
 ments for or against a two-ship or a three-ship 
 naval building programme, a secondary matter 
 compared with the far greater advantage of es- 
 
166 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tablishing and maintaining a homogeneous fleet. 
 It is of no use to build battleships unless they 
 are at the same time supplemented by the neces- 
 sary number of cruisers and scouts and de- 
 stroyers to insure their maximum efficiency in 
 line of battle. A homogeneous fleet is one con- 
 sisting of squadrons of capital ships built on 
 the class principle supplemented by squadrons 
 of cruisers and auxiliaries built on the same 
 principle. A heterogeneous fleet is one con- 
 sisting of good " ideas" and political poppy- 
 cock. To illustrate, a modern homogeneous 
 squadron would include, say four capital vessels 
 of super-dreadnaught calibre capable of 25 
 knots, complemented by eight armoured cruisers 
 of 28 knots, twelve protected scouts of 30 knots, 
 and a flotilla of 35-knot destroyers. In such a 
 squadron the vessels that must of necessity be 
 possessed of extreme speed in order to do the 
 work assigned to them efficiently — the destroy- 
 ers and the scouts — are able to move as a unit 
 at their highest maximum speed. One ship is 
 as good and as fast and as well armed as any 
 other ship of that unit. Likewise, the armoured 
 cruisers are able to manoeuvre and fight as a 
 unit, and the battleship division can be sent 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 167 
 
 into action, when the cruisers have prepared 
 the way, with the certainty that no one vessel 
 will outspeed any other and that all the vessels 
 are equal in combative power. Homogeneity in 
 speed, in steaming radius, in offensive and de- 
 fensive armament, and in class of the units 
 composing a squadron, or in. the squadrons com- 
 posing a fleet, is what makes a naval force ef- 
 fective and efficient. The addition of fighting 
 vessels not belonging in any class or unit of 
 such a force, no matter how powerful, is not an 
 advantage but rather a detriment unless enough 
 such vessels are added to constitute a unit by 
 themselves. If the above outlined fleet were 
 added to by two super-dreadnaughts of 28 knots, 
 the speed of the battle unit would still remain 
 at 25 knots, and as the 3 extra knots were in- 
 tended to give the 28-knot vessel a chance to 
 select her range and position in an action, this 
 advantage is lost. They would be fought and 
 handled under fire as if they were what they 
 are not, 25-knot vessels, because the action 
 would be based on the class and capacity of the 
 main unit of 25-knot battleships. 
 
 If the agricultural gentlemen on whom this 
 country bravely relies to build up its naval de- 
 
168 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 fence were to have their way, the United States 
 navy should every year have a brace of mon- 
 ster vessels that would be able to run away 
 from any vessels previously built and so on 
 indefinitely until it would be impossible to 
 gather a squadron of fighting vessels that could 
 be manoeuvred together and properly comple- 
 mented, and this, then, would be a hetero- 
 geneous fleet. The French navy is a good ex- 
 ample of baneful heterogeneous building plans. 
 It is a collection of good " ideas," not a fleet. 
 
 Contrary to the popular idea the lookout in 
 the "crow's nest" is not the man who finds the 
 range and tells the gunners where to shoot. 
 What was once the fighting top of a battleship, 
 bristling with rapid artillery, is now the fire- 
 control station, fitted with apparatus for range 
 finding and observation. An electrical switch- 
 board connects this station with every primary 
 battery. 
 
 The heavy guns are inclosed in turrets, pro- 
 tected by barbettes, which are in reality little 
 citadels of armour-plate surmounted by cupolas. 
 The barbettes turn with the guns on cylinders. 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 169 
 
 Naval vs. Military Strategy 
 
 The strategical speed of a vessel is its steam- 
 ing distance, the factor of mobility that deter- 
 mines its radius of action. The tactical speed 
 is the maximum pace at which the vessel can be 
 manoeuvred when going into action. The rated 
 speed is determined by a series of trial trips 
 when the vessel is taken over a measured course 
 under forced draught, aided by supplementary 
 personnel and such added contingencies as can- 
 not be secured under service conditions, hence, 
 the rated speed is always somewhat in advance 
 of practical service performance. 
 
 The principles of naval strategy are radically 
 different from military strategy. On land the 
 offensive is the weapon of the stronger, the 
 defensive is the lot of the weaker. At sea the 
 opposite is the case. The more powerful naval 
 force will always attempt preventive measures 
 against the less powerful force, which will al- 
 ways seek to checkmate such measures by inter- 
 mittent attacks. The British navy is at present 
 on the defensive, trying to prevent the German 
 fleet from breaking through the blockade by 
 
170 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 virtue of which Germany's sea power is im- 
 mobilised. But in order to do more than this — 
 to win an action or a fleet battle — the British 
 fleet must move on the German and risk its ves- 
 sels against coastal forts supporting hostile 
 vessels. History shows that naval victories are 
 won not on the home base but in hostile waters. 
 Even the German submarine raids were not won 
 near the German coast. 
 
 The Under -Munitioned American Navy 
 
 The factor of preparedness is a far more im- 
 portant character in naval warfare to-day than 
 ever before in the history of the world. An 
 army taken unawares can be mobilised in a com- 
 paratively short time; raw recruits can be 
 drilled for trench duty in ten weeks. But a 
 navy taken unawares cannot be mobilised. 
 Ships cannot be improvised like recruits. There 
 is no such thing as mobilising new units to a 
 naval force. The navy must take such vessels 
 as it has and fight them with such crews as it 
 has. The only kind of mobilisation possible is 
 in bringing the various crews up to their full 
 war complements, but that concerns at best only 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 171 
 
 a few thousand men. Increased activity in the 
 manufacture of ammunition is also possible, but 
 that benefits chiefly the rapid artillery because 
 heavy ordnance ammunition requires an ex- 
 tremely long time to produce. The only addi- 
 tional vessels a navy can count on in the face of 
 war are such as are building, and may be com- 
 pleted quickly, and such as it may acquire by 
 purchase or capture. 
 
 The British and the German navies are 
 models of homogeneous construction and su- 
 perior preparedness in every department. Of 
 the remaining great navies that of the United 
 States is without a doubt least fitted for actual 
 combat. The vessels are as good as similar 
 vessels of the leading navies, but the tendency 
 to heterogeneous construction cuts down the 
 vessels suitable for duty in first-line-of-battle 
 to a surprisingly small number. And of the 
 vessels suitable for this duty only a few homo- 
 geneous battle units can be built. The actual 
 effective naval force which an American fleet 
 admiral could oppose against an enemy would 
 represent something like half of the American 
 naval strength on paper, for not only would it 
 be lacking in the number of vessels fit, but it 
 
172 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 would be short of personnel, short of auxiliaries, 
 and, most dangerous of all, it would be short 
 of ammunition. 
 
 While it takes five years to develop an expert 
 gun-captain, and four years to complete a 
 super-dreadnaught, it requires no less than four 
 years to manufacture a full complement of 
 heavy naval ordnance ammunition. At this rate 
 it is obviously futile to dispatch "rush" orders 
 to the arsenals once war is declared, and should 
 this happen at the present time, and for some 
 time to come, the under-munitioned American 
 navy could not hope to fight a successful battle 
 with the navy of a first-class power. 
 
 The maximum capacity of the United States 
 government arsenals is only 500 14-inch shells 
 in one year — just barely enough to supply one- 
 fifth of the dreadnaught line of battle with its 
 full quota of projectiles. And this was a record 
 performance, requiring a force of more than 
 2,000 men working double time. 
 
 What about the other four-fifths of the big 
 sea-fighters? Aided by the steel works at Beth- 
 lehem, Midvale and Watervliet, and such private 
 machine shops as are or could be equipped to 
 make projectiles, it is possible that the govern- 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 173 
 
 ment arsenals might achieve a complete com- 
 plement of heavy ammunition for the entire 
 navy somewhat within the four-year limit. We 
 must not forget that in the meanwhile the 
 American fleet would be at the mercy of an at- 
 tacking fleet inferior in tonnage but complete 
 as to ammunition requirements. 
 
 It is not so much a question as to whether a 
 three-ship or a six-ship standard of naval pro- 
 gramme is adopted in future. Three super- 
 dreadnaughts completely equipped with am- 
 munition and skilled crews, and adequately sup- 
 ported with the auxiliaries necessary to warrant 
 their maximum efficiency in line of battle — such 
 as scouts, cruisers, colliers, repair ships, etc.— 
 would constitute a far more formidable weapon 
 on the high seas than six such vessels with in- 
 sufficient ammunition, incomplete auxiliaries 
 and green crews. It is the time required, not 
 the cost involved, that the American Congress 
 should consider in planning an adequate navy. 
 
 Strategically, the greatest handicap to battle 
 efficiency in the American navy is the lack of 
 an admiralty or a trained general staff of offi- 
 cers. The substitution of a so-called "board 
 of strategy'' in the emergency of war is a poor 
 
174 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 makeshift. What the general staff is to the 
 army the admiralty is to the navy. An army 
 without the coordinate leadership of a general 
 staff is merely a horde of armed men and quite 
 helpless on the modern battlefield. With no 
 thought of injuring national pride I do not hesi- 
 tate to say that a single army corps of first-line 
 German troops would be sufficient to deal with 
 the entire American army of regulars. Against 
 a completely equipped and superbly led force of 
 45,000 troops, the American army could only 
 muster about 55,000 fully equipped regulars, 
 commanded by officers with no divisional or 
 corps training nor versed in tactics on the gen- 
 eral scale. 
 
 A navy without an admiralty is only a collec- 
 tion of ships. Even if the ships are quite as 
 good as similar ships in other navies they can- 
 not be used against an enemy, to the complete 
 extent of their maximum efficiency, without the 
 preparatory plans and strategic leadership of a 
 general sea staff or admiralty. Not until a 
 coherent plan of organisation is perfected, pro- 
 viding for thoroughgoing military method and 
 cooperation between fleet divisions and an 
 admiralty staff in close accord with the navy 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 175 
 
 department, may the American navy hope to be- 
 come something more than a string of ships. 
 Individually, ship for ship, the Americans show 
 up pretty well, and they would approach the 
 standard of the German and British navies were 
 they not under-manned as well as under-muni- 
 tioned. The suggestions now being made for 
 improving the navy would only raise the in- 
 dividual vessel to the foreign standard, and the 
 navy would still remain third-class as a whole, 
 even if Congress kept on adding vessels until 
 England would be equalled in tonnage. Navies 
 do not enter into duels with single ships, but 
 sail into battle action with fleets composed of 
 many ships. Hence, it is not so much a question 
 of what a certain vessel can do as how many 
 vessels of the same class can be fought as a 
 squadron, and how many such squadrons can 
 be ranged into fleet formation in uniformly 
 equipped and homogeneous battle units. As mat- 
 ters stand now the American navy is not only 
 incapable of defending the country from event- 
 ual attack by a smaller but better organised 
 navy, but it constitutes a menace to the national 
 security in that its very presence lulls to sleep 
 the fears of the average American citizen as 
 
176 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 certainly as it invites hostile aggression. 
 Sooner or later the so-called Monroe doctrine 
 will compel the United States to fight for it 
 or drop it. It is altogether too sweeping in its 
 contentions to remain unchallenged indefinitely. 
 With Japan in control of Germany's island 
 bases in the Pacific, forming as they do an iron 
 girdle around the Philippines, the blow may 
 come first from the Japanese. Should this hap- 
 pen now the American navy would be compelled 
 to go into action without any general plan of 
 attack, without any plan of battle approach, 
 and without subordinate plans for the torpedo 
 and submarine arms. It would be obliged to 
 improvise these cardinal essentials on which 
 foreign navies, including the Japanese, have 
 spent years of preparation, and its fine vessels 
 and competent personnel would be dispatched 
 into action in a haphazard, discreditable, unmili- 
 tary manner, nothing short of criminal negli- 
 gence. The navy would not be to blame for de- 
 feat under these conditions. Only miracles 
 could prevent it. 
 
 According to official estimates, prepared since 
 the outbreak of the present war, a fleet of some 
 two hundred colliers and merchantmen would be 
 
THE CAPITAL SHIP 177 
 
 necessary to supply fuel and provisions to the 
 American navy when operating five thousand 
 miles from its home bases under war service 
 conditions. Such a fleet of merchantmen is not 
 available. As a substitute the naval auxiliaries 
 might be used, to the serious detriment of the 
 entire campaign, of course. The first-line of 
 battle vessels would have no fast cruiser 
 squadron to fall back on for scouting. There 
 are three such vessels averaging 20 knots, 
 against 28 to 30 knots in foreign navies, and 
 there is not a single 30- to 35-knot destroyer in 
 the American navy that cannot be overhauled 
 by any foreign battle cruiser of 28 knots in 
 rough weather. 
 
 Eecord scores of individual gun crews are 
 desirable, but it is well-nigh fatal to depend 
 upon them and neglect the main requirements of 
 the navy as a whole. In the naval engagement 
 off the coast of Santiago, when a far superior 
 squadron of American battleships attacked four 
 Spanish cruisers, there were forty-one actual 
 hits out of a total of nearly two thousand shells 
 fired by the Americans. There are several crack 
 gun crews in the United States navy that meas- 
 ure up to European standards of efficiency, but 
 
178 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 here again we encounter an improvement that 
 only affects certain vessels for a certain time 
 and does not establish the navy as a whole on a 
 standard basis of efficiency. It is the well-worn 
 " star " idea of the variety circus applied to 
 naval needs, and while these are not bettered by 
 it there is an element of " hurrah M patriotism 
 in it, which is very valuable material, indeed, to 
 the bold and fearless gentlemen who are en- 
 gaged in the pursuit of politics and journalism. 
 In the opinion of the writer extreme speed, 
 great cruising range, heavy armament and but 
 little armour are destined to be the dominant 
 features in the capital ship of the future. A 
 vessel armed with 15-inch rifles in centre-line 
 turrets, capable of 30-knot speed and endowed 
 with a steaming radius of some 6,000 miles, 
 would not need the protection of armour except 
 in the water-line and in the turrets. Such a 
 vessel would assume the proportions of a super- 
 battle cruiser and could outfight the heaviest 
 super-dreadnaught afloat. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE TURRET FORT 
 
 A Bull's-Eye 
 
 The Belgian gunners in Fort Pontisse, on the 
 right bank of the Meuse, fought like fiends and 
 endured like heroes. Shell after shell smashed 
 itself into shivers of steel splinters against the 
 armoured dome of the big turret. Shrapnel ex- 
 ploded on the glacis, ploughing ugly scars in the 
 greensward, and on the very parapets they 
 would burst, with a blinding crash, hurling hot 
 slugs and splinters through the embrasures, 
 killing the men behind the guns. But that mat- 
 tered little. New men jumped to the vacant 
 post, men stripped to the waist swarthy with 
 smoke, men gleaming from sweat and decorated 
 with bloody wounds. 
 
 The lieutenant, his blackened head wrapped 
 in white bandages, stood by the gunlayers di- 
 recting the firing with reeling brain. Half of his 
 men were in the lazaret below, in the concrete 
 bowels of the fort. His captain was killed, his 
 brother officers were maimed, but still he kept 
 on doing his duty heroically. 
 
 The ammunition hoist jams and he goes below 
 
 179 
 
180 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to give directions. The crew in the overheated 
 vault is more dead than alive. Some of them 
 have turned raving mad and attack their com- 
 rades with sword bayonets'; others appear to 
 have lost their hearing. With drawn revolver 
 the officer establishes authority in the pandemo- 
 nium raging among the blackened, crazed crew 
 in the inferno below. 
 
 "To-night we shall have r enforcements and 
 provisions!" he cries, and the men rally with 
 hoarse cheers and a "Vive Belgique!" But 
 "to-night" never comes. As the officer mounts 
 the winding stair to the cupola where the cannon 
 belch forth their crashing salvos, something 
 strikes the big dome with the force of an earth- 
 quake and rends it in half. There is a thunder- 
 ous explosion with a blinding flash of smoke 
 and fumes. As the smoke rolls away there is 
 revealed to view a ghastly crater of jagged 
 armour-plate and broken concrete littered with 
 shattered cannon and torn shreds of bleeding 
 bodies while from below comes a horror-stricken 
 swarm of yelling imbeciles — black, panting, 
 sweating and with bloodshot eyes — struggling 
 through the debris like a horde from hell on 
 doomsday! 
 
 The official report states that Fort Pontisse, 
 "after gallantly withstanding the fire of the 
 enemy's field batteries, was finally reduced by 
 a 42-centimetre shell." 
 
Gruson Forts Not Obsolete 
 
 Is the modern type of permanent fortress 
 obsolete ? Is the alleged impregnability of steel- 
 turreted Gruson forts a myth? Why, since the 
 heavy German siege artillery was able to re- 
 duce the strongest fortifications in Belgium and 
 northern France, are the barrier forts opposite 
 the German line between Verdun and Toul, and 
 Epinal and Belfort, still intact? 
 
 Most of the Gruson forts referred to were 
 designed to withstand the onslaught of 4-inch 
 and 6-inch field guns and 7-inch and 9-inch siege 
 artillery. The bombardment of Liege, Antwerp, 
 Maubeuge, La Fere, Laon, and similar perma- 
 nent works, shows plainly enough that they per- 
 formed their duty and were able to stand up 
 under the fire of batteries superior, not only in 
 number of guns, but in calibre as well. It was 
 not until the 30.2- and 42-centimetre artillery 
 w^as emplaced against them that the forts crum- 
 bled up and failed to take a strain for which 
 they were never designed. Every German ar- 
 
 181 
 
182 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tillery officer knew that this would happen, but 
 the French officers did not know it until the 
 first shot found its mark. This feat does not 
 prove that Gruson forts are obsolete, contrary 
 to the general opinion; it merely shows that 
 forts, like other products of engineering skill, 
 cannot be expected to perform service out of all 
 proportion to their original capacity. There 
 are Gruson batteries in the German coastal 
 forts, dotting the line between Wilhelmshaven 
 and Brunsbiittel, which are designed to with- 
 stand 12-inch and 13-inch naval artillery and 
 capable of returning the compliment with 15- 
 and 17-inch pieces. Had the French and the 
 Belgian forts had the advantage of such pon- 
 derous installations, and had the 42-centimetre 
 artillery nevertheless succeeded in reducing 
 them ultimately, it would be logical to conclude 
 that the attack had once more beaten the de- 
 fence in artillery practice. As the matter 
 stands now, nothing has been settled beyond the 
 fact that 6- and 8-inch Gruson turrets are no 
 match for heavy Krupp siege guns. There is 
 but one possibility of arriving at a conclusive 
 determination of the issue in case those of the 
 vessels in the British channel squadron, which 
 
THE TUREET FORT 183 
 
 mount 15-inch rifles, would try these weapons 
 on the armoured domes of the German coastal 
 forts, but there is not much likelihood that such 
 costly ships would be permitted to risk their 
 armoured skin in a sanguinary attack of this 
 order. We have the declaration of a seasoned 
 and fearless critic — the former British sea-lord, 
 Admiral Beresford — that only madness could 
 move a naval commander to oppose coastal 
 works of this type and calibre. 
 
 Infantry Protecting Artillery 
 
 The forts on the barrier line Verdun-Belfort 
 have not been engaged, not because the Germans 
 have not a sufficient quota of heavy siege artil- 
 lery, but because the German lines lack the 
 necessary reinforcements to venture out of 
 their present strong intrenchments and force 
 the emplacement of their 30.2- and 42-centimetre 
 guns within range of the forts. On this historic 
 barrier line the world is being treated to the 
 spectacle of infantry protecting forts from ar- 
 tillery attacks, whereas it is usually the forts and 
 the artillery that are supposed to cover the in- 
 fantry. Obviously it is futile for the Germans 
 
184 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to try to force emplacement when they have not 
 the required force of reserves to hold the ad- 
 vanced position, which would be instantly sub- 
 jected to a combined attack en masse by the 
 French. Not being able to provide emplace- 
 ment within range of hostile forts, it is, of 
 course, out of the question to employ the 42- 
 centimetre ordnance at all, which again proves 
 the fact, already elaborated in a previous chap- 
 ter, that it is the infantry which prepares the 
 way for the artillery, the latter being subject 
 to capture or destruction without the support 
 of the former. 
 
 The MaJang of a Turret Fort 
 
 The barbette battery, or as it is popularly 
 termed the turret fort, which is named after 
 its inventor, Hermann Gruson, a South-German 
 engineer, is the property of the great gun- 
 making firm, Krupp Aktiengesellschaft. Spe- 
 cial machinery had to be invented before it 
 was possible to produce the armour required 
 for the barbettes. Several years of indefat- 
 igable experimenting and large expenditure of 
 capital followed before the requisite quality 
 
THE TURRET FORT 185 
 
 of chilled cast iron could be produced in the 
 proper quantities. New cranes, moulds, vats, 
 furnaces, machines, tools, etc., had to be con- 
 trived and constructed before the systematic 
 production of barbetted fortress batteries could 
 be undertaken. 
 
 To the scout who happens to get a glimpse of 
 a Gruson battery undetected, it looks very much 
 like the top of a huge tortoise rising but a few 
 feet above ground. The heavy steel dome is 
 curved to prevent the impact of shell-fire at an 
 acute angle, and it can be rotated around its 
 axis by electric power. The rifles within the 
 barbette are mounted very much like naval 
 guns, and the entire operation of serving and 
 loading the piece reminds of naval gun prac- 
 tice rather than of land artillery. The sighting 
 and loading mechanism of the guns, and the ro- 
 tating machinery of the barbette, complete the 
 contents of the dome. Below it are concrete 
 vaults, stationary of course, containing the am- 
 munition magazine and hoist, the special en- 
 gines for supplying power, pumps, tools, etc. 
 The method of pointing such a battery is very 
 interesting. The guns are not turned as in a 
 field battery. The barbette is rotated until the 
 
186 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 guns are in line with the target, when the guns 
 are elevated or lowered in the vertical plane 
 according to the range given. Ordinarily this 
 would require quite spacious apertures in the 
 cupola to admit of the upward and downward 
 pointing of the guns, and such apertures would 
 be easy targets for hostile shrapnel fire. Gru- 
 son foresaw this exigency and mounted his 
 guns in close-fitting embrasures with the trun- 
 ions in movable bearings controlled by hy- 
 draulic pressure. Instead of pointing the guns 
 up or down as in other battery systems, Gruson 
 made a departure in gun-laying by fixing the 
 guns in embrasures and moving their breeches 
 up and down. The rotation of the turret in- 
 volves not only the armoured dome but the com- 
 bined weight of the guns, the gun-mountings, 
 and the superstructures. In some of the heavy 
 coastal installations the total weight thus ma- 
 nipulated amounts to 2,300 tons, or a greater 
 bulk than has ever been moved before with 
 mathematical precision for any use whatsoever. 
 
THE TUEEET FOET 187 
 
 Steel Forts of Antwerp Are German 
 
 Because the Belgian General Brialmont was 
 instrumental in having Gruson turrets installed 
 in his plan for the defence of Antwerp — and 
 even the plan proper was adapted from the 
 Prussian system — the press has not hesitated 
 to proclaim him as the inventor. The moderni- 
 sation of the Antwerp fortifications dates from 
 1909 and includes nine intrenched sections com- 
 pletely encircling the inner belt of forts, built 
 upon the German plan with German guns in 
 German Gruson turrets. The only element in 
 those forts that was not German was the officers 
 and crew, but as none of the forts mounted ar- 
 tillery heavier than the 6-inch calibre it is easy 
 to see that they were no match for the Krupp 
 and Skoda siege pieces. 
 
 Firing a Gruson Battery 
 
 The Gruson batteries employed in coastal 
 forts are for the most part of the heavy mortar 
 type designed for " high-angle' ' fire, whereas 
 those in land fortifications use the direct system 
 
188 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 of fire control. The gunlayer in a coastal bat- 
 tery cannot see the target he is required to hit. 
 The range is plotted for him by an observer 
 stationed, sometimes a mile away, at a point 
 where he can figure the angle undetected. The 
 lowest elevation of the gun is at 45 degrees and 
 the highest practical range is marked by 65 
 degrees, giving a zonal arc of fire of 20 degrees. 
 The target is a war vessel and usually it will 
 be manoeuvred at a lively pace when within 
 range, which further increases the difficulty of 
 making hits. Fired at the ultimate range of 
 65 degrees the projectile will remain in the air 
 somewhat more than a minute, during which 
 time a swiftly moving vessel will have covered 
 a distance several times its own length. This, 
 then, is allowed for by estimating the speed of 
 the vessel, but a vessel thus manoeuvring 
 against a fort will take care to change its speed 
 as often as desirable to disrupt such estimates. 
 The projectile, when it lands, will not harass 
 the heavily armoured sides of the vessel. Ow- 
 ing to its high-angle path through the air it will 
 either penetrate the light steel decks or smash 
 the cupola of a turret or the poorest protected 
 parts of a warship. But a vessel thus attacked 
 
JS 
 
 Q 
 
 ^H 
 
 X 
 
 *v 
 
 © 
 
 55 
 
 ^3 
 
 so 
 
 [5 
 
 
 5j 
 
 c 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 « 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 80 
 
 ^u 
 
 *« 
 
 •«• 
 
 _n> 
 
 93 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 p 5S ' 
 
 s 
 
 *»a 
 
 © 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 © 
 
 p»a 
 
 "XS 
 
 Cj 
 
 
 
 
 k. 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^> ( 
 
 g 
 
 »j 
 
 ^ 
 
 lo 
 
 <M 
 
 
 Q 
 
 
 "-+-. 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 ■s 8 
 
 SO 
 
 8 
 
 © 
 
 '<*» 
 
 -2 
 
 ^5 
 
 • 2 
 
 © . 
 
 s2 
 
 Si 
 
 V. «c 
 
 N» 
 
 g 
 
 <fc 
 
 1* 
 
 © 
 
 8 v. 
 
 ftj 
 
 ^3 
 
 •** o 
 
 00 
 
 
 
 rO 
 
 a, 
 
 «0 «0 
 
 
 
 09 
 
 a 1? 
 
 8 
 
 
 *>§ 
 
 Q 
 
 
 42 
 
 CO 
 
 b 
 
 e-5 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 SI 
 
 si 
 
 
 
 ft 
 
 C5 
 
 .g, 
 
 § 2 s 
 
 <f> 
 
 •a 
 
 o -S 
 
 ^J" 
 
 fc 
 
 s-g 
 
 oe 
 
 >-. 
 
 ., © 
 
 5 
 
 Q 
 
 •9 g^ 
 
 nq 
 
 ? 8 
 
 p ss 
 
 * 
 
 O Q 
 
 e "*S 
 
THE TURRET FORT 189 
 
 cannot answer with high-angle fire. There are 
 no mortars aboardship for obvious reasons. 
 Naval vessels are wedded to cannon only, and 
 utilise what is known as the direct-fire system, 
 which has the advantage of much greater veloc- 
 ity and penetration than the mortar shell, but 
 also a much harder task in that the projectile is 
 supposed to hole the armour of ships and steel 
 forts. Mainly because war vessels are practi- 
 cally helpless against the high-angle fire of 
 modern steel forts, which in themselves are very 
 poor targets for a gunner on a floating plat- 
 form, it has become an axiom among naval com- 
 manders not to enter into combat with land 
 forts, at least not forts of the Gruson type. 
 
 Bigger than the 42-Centimetre €t Brummers ** 
 
 Germany has about two hundred miles of 
 coast line on the North Sea defended by the 
 most complete system of fortification in exist- 
 ence. Jahde Bay alone is guarded by no less 
 than thirteen detached forts and batteries of 
 the very heaviest class. Some of the Gruson 
 turrets installed there, and at other points, con- 
 tain the most formidable coast artillery ever 
 
190 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 built, the calibres running from 13.9-inch and 
 14.3-inch to 15.7-inch and 17.7-inch ordnance, 
 more ponderous than even the famous 42-centi- 
 metre siege guns. Of course, these giant cali- 
 bres are installed in the turrets proper while 
 the cupolas mount the lighter 8.2-inch and 9.4- 
 inch pieces. The average main armament is 
 represented by 10.2-inch, 11-inch and 13.9-inch 
 batteries. From the extreme southwestern 
 island of Borkum, guarding the approach to the 
 Ems river, running eastward and northward 
 to the island of Sylt in the North Frisian lit- 
 toral, the German coast is defended by forti- 
 fications of this type. The fact that no attack 
 has been ventured against them by the greatest 
 and most powerful navy in the world, and that 
 their mere presence has discouraged the enemy 
 from enforcing his time-honoured strategy to 
 establish the first line of naval defence on the 
 hostile coast, is certainly a practical argument 
 upholding the defensive efficacy of Gruson bar- 
 betted fortifications. Moreover, the presence of 
 the latter has compelled the British navy to con- 
 tent itself with an offshore blockade in greatly 
 extended formation, no squadron venturing 
 more than two hundred miles from its assigned 
 
THE TUREET FORT 191 
 
 base on regular patrol duty. This offshore dis- 
 position of blockading units has given the Ger- 
 man torpedo and submarine flotillas plenty of 
 sea room for assaults on the British lines and 
 bases, an opportunity of which they have 
 availed themselves freely. In the celebrated 
 Spezzia tests when the heaviest cannon pro- 
 duced by England — a 100-ton Armstrong piece 
 — hurled its 2,200-pound projectile against the 
 heaviest Gruson plate produced by Germany 
 without breaching it, though three shots were 
 fired at close range at the same plate, there 
 is not the ghost of a chance that British battle- 
 ships mounting guns of inferior smashing 
 power, being compelled to fire at long range, 
 could seriously damage the Gruson barbettes 
 of the German coast defence. 
 
 Helgoland — The Fort Impregnable 
 
 If the pressure of the British blockade could 
 be brought to bear on the Kiel canal, the British, 
 and not the German, navy would be in control 
 of Helgoland Bight. The control would extend 
 in a line running across the bight from the 
 mouth of the river Eider to Wangeroog in the 
 
192 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 East Frisian littoral, and a close-in blockade 
 would then be possible, checkmating the slight- 
 est attempt at a German offensive. But the 
 island fortress of Helgoland stands in the way 
 spiked to the crags with enough heavy ordnance 
 to fight the entire British fleet, and whatever 
 ships might break through would court certain 
 destruction by the German Hochseeflotte. 
 
 In the centre of the island fortress is a mortar 
 battery, mounting 11-inch and 16-inch pieces, 
 capable of smashing through the decks of battle- 
 ships at from five to eight miles' range. The 
 direct-fire batteries are placed in tiers one over 
 the other to a height of 176 feet above sea-level. 
 The heavy pieces are placed below and range in 
 calibre from 13.9-inch to 17.7-inch; the lighter 
 ordnance is emplaced in the upper tiers and 
 consists of 8.2-inch, 9.4-inch, 10.2-inch and 11- 
 inch rifles. Here is an argument for the defence 
 offered by Gruson barbetted forts that is not 
 even partially answered by the fate of the 
 inland forts in France and Belgium. 
 
THE TURRET FORT 193 
 
 Shooting Across the Channel — in Print 
 
 Be it said right here that the reiterated news- 
 paper rumours anent the emplacement of 51- and 
 65-centimetre guns in German coast batteries, 
 ostensibly on a line approaching Calais from 
 Ostend, with a view of bombarding the English 
 coast and knocking the British fleet off its base, 
 are nothing short of balderdash and poppy- 
 cock. Even though Calais were captured for a 
 base it would be a physical impossibility to aim 
 cannon across the Channel, even if cannon ac- 
 tually existed that could cover the distance of 
 22 miles. Such scaremongers usually forget 
 something, in this instance that the earth is not 
 flat but round, and that the resultant curvature 
 beyond a radius of eleven miles does not lend 
 itself to calculation by the range-finding ap- 
 paratus nor to observation. Batteries em- 
 placed on coastal points along the Channel are 
 intended only as a defence against a close-in 
 blockade of the British fleet, but certainly not 
 as a means of attacking the British coast, and 
 for such a defence it is not necessary to con- 
 jure forth artillery of fabled capacity when 
 
194 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 42-centimetre mortars are more than formidable 
 enough to keep the enemy beyond the offshore 
 radius of sea pressure. At 10,000 yards or 
 about six miles these giant mortars can be de- 
 pended on to achieve the very remarkable score 
 of 3 hits out of every 4 shots fired, which 
 corresponds to their average hitting percent- 
 age of 75 in target practice. Much larger 
 ranges have been covered, and record targets of 
 90 per cent, have been achieved, but the above 
 represents the average effectively offensive 
 power of such batteries, which is more than 
 sufficient for any emergency. 
 
 t 
 
 Rifle Against Turret Fort 
 
 Strange as it may appear to the laity, the only 
 available weapon against a Gruson battery is 
 the infantry rifle! If the Germans should be 
 able to oppose the French with much superior 
 numbers of infantry on the present intrenched 
 lines, the attack against the barrier forts — rifle 
 against turret cannon — would probably be con- 
 ducted as follows : A night raid en masse would 
 be made with a view of carrying the French 
 trenches. During this manoeuvre the German 
 
THE TURRET FORT 195 
 
 infantry would have the support of machine 
 guns and light field batteries besides a number 
 of searchlight stations to expose the enemy to 
 view and blind him at the moment of his counter- 
 offensive. The Germans might have recourse 
 to illuminating bombs, that is, a new type of 
 shell which causes no physical harm, but ex- 
 plodes a zone of luminous balls that descend 
 very slowly, casting a vivid, steady light over 
 a large area. As the gun does not betray its 
 location it is possible by this means to subject 
 the enemy's movements to almost constant ob- 
 servation, for what the beams of the searchlight 
 would not disclose could assuredly be ascer- 
 tained by the explosion of luminous bombs. We 
 will assume that the Germans have prepared 
 a long time for the attack and have succeeded 
 in pushing the sap-head of their approach 
 trenches to a point within storming distance of 
 the besieged intrenchments. These approaches 
 issue in a zigzag line from the main trenches. 
 They are dug by sappers at night, and the zig- 
 zag shape protects such approaches from cross- 
 fire. In order to hoodwink the enemy and make 
 it difficult for him to determine from which di- 
 rection the main attack will be launched, some 
 
196 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 of the approaches dug serve merely as blinds 
 or they may be used in flanking operations. 
 
 Although the attack is aimed ultimately at 
 the fortress the initial phase of it concerns only 
 the intrenchments of the infantry, which are 
 sufficiently far advanced to prevent the Ger- 
 mans from emplacing siege artillery and getting 
 the range on the fortress. These intrench- 
 ments are protected by a maze of wire-entangle- 
 ments. Even where every man has been pro- 
 vided with nippers the toll of death has been 
 so heavy in removing such obstacles that re- 
 liance is now chiefly placed in explosive means 
 of destroying entanglements. The present war 
 has declared as obsolete the various ingenious 
 schemes for pulling down wire fields with giant 
 rakes or for bridging them with boards or 
 planking. The toll of life is too enormous. The 
 pole or tube system is much more efficient and 
 less bloody. The pole used looks very much 
 like a colossal rocket: it is hollow and loaded 
 with sections of some high explosive based on 
 picrid acid. The mast-head is capped with steel 
 and fitted with rollers so that it can be flung 
 under the wires and steered properly into the 
 trap. A fuse is attached to the near end of the 
 
THE TUHEET FOET 197 
 
 pole. Well-placed such a pole will explode a 
 breach in a barbed wire trap large enough for 
 a squad of men to walk through abreast. An at- 
 tempt would be made to explode the trap in as 
 manyplaces as possible at the same time in order 
 to force a general advance of troops through the 
 breeches made. Assuming, then, that the enemy 
 would be routed from his first-line intrench- 
 ments by a combination of explosive wire poles, 
 searchlights, shell illuminants, and rapid artil- 
 lery, all subservient to an advance en masse 
 of the infantry, the figKt is by no means won. 
 If the distance gained is sufficient to emplace 
 siege artillery, and leave the reduction of the 
 fortress to the care of the big "Brummers," 
 the next general advance of the infantry would 
 be timed to coincide with the breaching of the 
 armoured turrets. Before this point could be 
 gained the enemy's infantry, unable any longer 
 to prevent the emplacement of superior hostile 
 artillery, would have abandoned its positions in 
 most instances, and its sear guard would be 
 busy with sappers and engineers in securing 
 new intrenchments for the retreating divisions. 
 
198 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Mining and Counter-Mining 
 
 In case the Germans had no siege artillery 
 heavier and more efficient than that in hostile 
 forts, the attack would be pushed home by re- 
 peated infantry assaults in connection with 
 sapping and mining galleries. The latter are 
 virtually tunnels that are dug and timbered the 
 same as in mine practice, leading up under the 
 base of the fort. A heavy explosive charge is 
 placed in the tunnel head and is detonated by 
 electricity when the storming of the fortress 
 is ordered. Simultaneously with this explosion, 
 which may be counted on to open up the fort, 
 the infantry would advance to the attack with 
 bayonet fixed under the support of shrapnel fire 
 while luminous shell and searchlight turn night 
 into day. The danger of mining is so apparent 
 that all the great French frontier forts have 
 sought to protect themselves against it by a 
 system of counter-mining. A shaft is sunk 
 under the fort and galleries or tunnels radiate 
 from it in various directions. Some of the gal- 
 leries have transverse tunnels, the idea being 
 to cover as much of the underground terrain as 
 
THE TURRET FORT 199 
 
 possible, to prevent the enemy from driving 
 home his mine galleries. Men are posted in the 
 counter tunnels with sound detectors, and as 
 soon as the position and direction of the hostile 
 gallery have been decided, explosives are placed 
 in the counter gallery and detonated. And thus 
 the attack would be advanced by degrees until 
 the storming party would be successful in 
 carrying the fortress by assault or the garrison 
 is saved by reinforcements. In either event the 
 final decisive operations would be intrusted to 
 the infantry arm, no matter how heavy the ar- 
 tillery might be on both sides. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 
 
 Nietschevo! 
 
 It is night on the Polish frontier. Toward 
 the southeast there is a line dotted by the camp- 
 fires of the Russians, bivouacking under the can- 
 non of Novogeorgievsk. The night breeze 
 wafts the fumes of the kindly fires across the 
 deserted harvest fields where the peace of utter 
 desolation reigns. t Mounted patrols are posted 
 in the distance. Beyond them, scattered over 
 the terrain in a wide arc, are the pickets — lonely 
 soldiers in long tunics peering into the night 
 with bayonet fixed, alert to the slightest sound 
 or movement behind the curtain of impenetrable 
 darkness whence the Prussians are expected. 
 
 The night passes without disturbance. The 
 bugles of the fortress call to reveille. Patrols 
 are relieved. Pickets are changed. As the 
 morning haze begins to lift it discloses a 
 double screen of scouts deployed behind cover 
 in the distance, but as far as the eye can reach 
 there is no sign of an approaching enemy. To- 
 ward the north the curtain of mist rises some- 
 what more tardily, lingering around a few 
 
 200 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 201 
 
 scattered haystacks. The quartermaster is 
 short of forage, and the commander details a 
 squad of men to requisition the fodder. The 
 men advance with teams of wagons. Suddenly 
 the officer reins in his horse. He gives a com- 
 mand. The men unsling their rifles and fix 
 bayonets. The officer dismounts and leads 
 them forward in skirmish line, his eye intently 
 fixed on one of the haystacks which has grown a 
 top-piece overnight in the shape of a tall pole 
 with a cross-tree. A second command in rasp- 
 ing Russian brings the men up on the double- 
 quick. Wires are now visible, glinting through 
 the haze and stretching from the cross-tree to 
 the earth. The last fifty yards is covered with 
 a rush. The stack is surrounded by a cordon 
 of bayonets with panting soldiers at the ready. 
 The officer draws his revolver and shoots into 
 the stack. There is no response. He steps 
 back and deploys his men into a firing-squad. 
 A volley is ordered and fired. Still no response, 
 except for a scurrying rustle of mice. The squad 
 pulls up and begins to inspect the stack at close 
 quarters. A hole is discovered on the north 
 side. The officer crawls into it revolver in 
 hand. He finds himself in a small hollow den 
 and stumbles over a wire. Something clicks 
 and falls heavily to the ground at the same time. 
 The officer withdraws, wire in hand, following 
 the direction pointed by it. With the frail 
 
202 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 metal thread in his hand the officer is led afield 
 for several hundred yards to a point where the 
 little wire has been spliced into a larger wire 
 running straight to the Russian headquarters. 
 
 The officer straightens with a jerk. At last 
 the extent of the damage is clear. The head- 
 quarters' field wire has been tapped, and the 
 orders affecting a whole army corps have been 
 flashed by portable wireless to the German field 
 headquarters. 
 
 The officer returns to the haystack on the run. 
 The Siberians have pitched the straw with their 
 long bayonets and stand in open-mouthed won- 
 der around some strange-looking instruments 
 which they have uncovered. None of them 
 knoiv what wireless means; none of them can 
 read. But the officer knows and he can read. 
 He pounces upon a tag tied to the manipulating 
 key of the transmitter. It contains a one-word 
 message, written in Russian but in German 
 characters: Nietschevo ! * 
 
 * " Nietschevo " is Russian for "Never mind." 
 
Intentional Interference Is Practicable 
 
 When the minutiae of this war are chronicled 
 the world will be astonished to learn of the 
 utility of the wireless signal in decisive mo- 
 ments. Although it is not generally realised 
 that Hertzian waves compare with the waves 
 of light in speed, the popular faith in wireless 
 transmission is much better established than the 
 public's knowledge of the manner in which it 
 is made use of on the field of battle. 
 
 In the savagely contested struggle for su- 
 premacy on the Ypres terrain the success of 
 the initial phase of the German action depended, 
 in a large measure, on a wireless message, 
 which was intercepted by the Allies. It re- 
 vealed the fact that the Germans had been 
 strongly reenforced at the very point selected 
 by the enemy for a counter-offensive. The 
 tapped signal prevented a large Allied force 
 from marching into a carefully baited death- 
 trap. 
 
 This method of aerial interference is called 
 
 203 
 
204 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 "jamming," and though military men have 
 shown little credence in its practical applica- 
 tion it appears that there have been several in- 
 stances where jamming succeeded, especially 
 when the atmosphere was heavily loaded with 
 continued communication. Technically, it 
 should be well-nigh impracticable to disrupt 
 wireless conversation even when greatly su- 
 perior wave motion and a variable scale of wave 
 distance are employed as a means of intentional 
 interference. Against such an onslaught there 
 is little elemental protection, but in most cases 
 skill in transmission and cooperative apprecia- 
 tion between the operators of method and usage 
 are the technical qualifications that best insure 
 a wireless code message against hostile inter- 
 ference. Sometimes atmospheric conditions 
 cause periods of unintentional interference 
 when all wireless conversation must cease for a 
 time. The experienced commander is prepared 
 for such an emergency with a subsidiary equip- 
 ment of field telegraph outfits for long-distance, 
 and couriers drawn from the cavalry and the 
 motorcycle arm, for the shorter distances. 
 When the barometric disturbance is not too 
 violent aeroplanes are, of course, always avail- 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 205 
 
 able for transmitting messages, and at night 
 searchlight signals are sometimes resorted to. 
 The main utility of wireless service in the 
 present war is divided between long-distance in- 
 telligence work and short-range reconnoissance 
 duty. The operation of the intelligence func- 
 tion is well-known and does not differ essen- 
 tially from the established routine of commer- 
 cial wireless telegraphy. The general staff 
 keeps in touch with the general field head- 
 quarters by the same methods, and under prac- 
 tically the same conditions, as govern communi- 
 cation between commercial stations. The only 
 noteworthy divergences are that while the lat- 
 ter are chiefly occupied with volume of business, 
 the military stations are more vitally concerned 
 with the accurate and unmistakable dispatching 
 of relatively few messages under code conditions 
 of comparative secrecy. 
 
 Secrecy Depends on Skill 
 
 Observers at the front agree that the essential 
 requirement for secret communication, as far 
 as the station equipment is concerned, lies in the 
 skill with which the wave-length can be sub- 
 
206 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 jected to rapidity of change without entailing 
 the risk of confusion. This is the weak point 
 in wireless service. Even temporary confusion 
 has been known to result quite as disastrously 
 as intentional interference by a hostile station. 
 Only by the closest cooperation between opera- 
 tors, and their intimate understanding of mu- 
 tual methods, is it possible to counteract the 
 inevitable tendency toward confusion under the 
 present system of transmission. Military men 
 who have watched wireless operations on the 
 Franco-German battle lines are of the opinion 
 that while it is a mistake to have the transmitter 
 sharply tuned it is desirable to have the receiver 
 capable of being very acutely tuned; also, in 
 altering the wave-length, either in transmitter 
 or receiver, it is advantageous that the ap- 
 paratus should be equipped so that these altera- 
 tions can be made rapidly by operating a single 
 handle controlling all circuits. 
 
 In war practice the various stations are syn- 
 tonised to slightly different wave-lengths, mak- 
 ing it a troublesome matter to attract attention. 
 The operators on the firing-lines use as few 
 waves as possible since all variations are not 
 independent, and also because a flat-tuned hos- 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 207 
 
 tile station will almost invariably cover an 
 appreciable range of these wave-lengths neces- 
 sitating the employment of a wave-length dif- 
 fering from that of the hostile station by about 
 ten per cent. 
 
 Field Wireless Equipment 
 
 The French army regulations provide for 
 wireless service between general staff head- 
 quarters and army corps, connecting these with 
 cavalry divisions and lines of communication. 
 Unlike the German organisation there is no 
 provision for wireless service within the lines 
 of army corps nor within the lines of in- 
 fantry divisions. Apparently the chief de- 
 pendence for intelligence service in the battle 
 zone remains with the aeronautical corps. This 
 explains, in a measure, the paucity of hostile 
 aerial attacks upon German bases as undoubt- 
 edly the French aero corps have been engaged 
 almost exclusively on reconnoissance and com- 
 munication duty within the army lines. 
 
 The war strength of wireless companies in 
 the French army amounts to 10 officers and 293 
 N. C. O.'s and recruits; English companies com- 
 
208 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 prise 12 officers and 293 N. C. O.'s and men; 
 German companies are a trifle heavier. The 
 French organisation, which is the parent model 
 on which other armies have planned their regu- 
 lations, provides for one general headquarters, 
 6 sections, each consisting of 2 detachments, or 
 a total of 12 detachments together with a park. 
 The English organisation is by 2 headquarters, 
 7y 2 detachments, consisting of two divisions 
 each, or a total of 15 detachments exclusive of 
 the park. A French wireless company carries 
 302 miles of wire and cable, or fully double the 
 material of an English company, which is de- 
 pendent for its quota of 600 miles of wire on 
 the army transport. A French company carries 
 96 sets of instruments against only 45 carried 
 by an English company. The pace of construc- 
 tion in both armies is 3 kilometres per hour; 
 the rate of operation is about 400 words per 
 minute. 
 
 The material is transported by four classes of 
 wagons, usually horse-drawn. The office wagon 
 is the executive base. The pole wagon carries 
 the sections and fittings out of which the tele- 
 graph pole is improvised. The other wagons 
 supply tools, repair material, cable and wire, 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 209 
 
 etc. In field operation the responsibility is 
 divided between an officer who plots the route, 
 a sergeant who overlooks the work, N. C. 0. 
 distributers who issue material and check the 
 amount used, operators for working the ap- 
 paratuses and bicyclists serving as orderlies for 
 breaks in the line. Besides, there is a corps of 
 pole-men and cable crew who pay out the cable, 
 guide it over the terrain, make joints, dig holes 
 for the poles, and raise the same in position. 
 The construction corps work in squads. The 
 first squad builds the line, working 100 yards in 
 the rear of the wagon; the second squad 
 strengthens the line, working a quarter of a 
 mile in the rear. The mast sections used for 
 the pole are the result of much vigorous experi- 
 menting. Those in use at the front can with- 
 stand the strain of a wagon being driven over 
 them. The sections consist of hollow, wooden 
 pieces, hexagonal in shape, having a cylindrical 
 hollow space inside into which are inserted con- 
 necting sleeves of drawn steel tubing. Such a 
 pole is very handily erected, even in rough 
 weather, by a force of 4 men in about 15 min- 
 utes. The pole entire is carried in sections on 
 a specially made limber wagon. The largest 
 
210 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 portable military wireless station in regular use 
 is of lJ/2~kw. capacity, with a maximum range 
 of 200 miles. The total weight, including cart 
 and crew, is about 750 pounds. It requires only 
 20 minutes to pitch such a station and get it 
 into working order. 
 
 Rather than beguile the reader with a disser- 
 tation on the respective functions of syntonisa- 
 tion tests, tuning inductance, jigger primaries 
 and potentiometres, I dare say an outline of 
 the various types of wireless outfits now being 
 used in battle action would be more useful to 
 an understanding of how wireless service is 
 being rendered by the different arms. 
 
 The Knapsack Wireless 
 
 What is known as the "knapsack" station 
 is the most easily manipulated of portable 
 wireless outfits. The whole station is packed 
 into 4 haversacks averaging 20 pounds for each 
 load, or a total pack of 80 pounds. Thus dis- 
 posed four soldiers can easily carry a whole 
 station on the march, but, of course, the ap- 
 paratuses are not used except for scouting par- 
 ties in widely deployed formation. When such 
 
THE WIEELESS SIGNAL 211 
 
 parties are accompanied by mounted patrols 
 the station is carried in two packs on horseback. 
 Every component part of the station is compact, 
 weatherproof and easily accessible. Only short 
 wave-lengths are employed, hence elaborate 
 tuning is obviated and simplicity insured in 
 operation. The knapsack outfit has demon- 
 strated a remarkable degree of utility in the 
 present war. For replacing mounted orderlies, 
 and such visual signals as are ordinarily used 
 for patrol duty, there is nothing like it. Small 
 as the station is it has a range of from 5 to 7 
 miles, and can dispatch more information in 
 ten minutes within this radius than a whole 
 squadron of orderlies riding at the gallop. 
 Fitted with this device a scouting patrol can 
 creep up pretty close to a hostile position and 
 report its observations instantly without fear 
 of detection, which would be unavoidable if 
 visual signalling were resorted to or the slow 
 methods of mounted orderlies were attempted. 
 The " marine landing' ' station is thus termed 
 because it is designed for the use of such land- 
 ing parties as naval vessels may dispatch for 
 shore duty, either independently or in coopera- 
 tion with a military force. The apparatus is 
 
212 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 considerably more powerful than that of the 
 knapsack calibre and admits of conversations 
 up to 50 miles. The entire outfit is transported 
 on two special carts and the motive power is 
 furnished by marine soldiery. 
 
 The Aeroplane Wireless 
 
 The most modern type of scouting aeroplanes 
 in the present war carry specially fitted aerial 
 wireless stations that enable them to keep in 
 touch with aerodrome bases and report observa- 
 tions to the field headquarters. Most of the 
 parts of this outfit are distributed in the hull 
 of the aeroplane; only the manipulating key 
 and the control switch are visible. The receiv- 
 ing station is very compact and has a small 
 pole connected with a trailing wire having a 
 safety plug. For extended reconnoissance, 
 especially in cases where the aviator could not 
 hope to return for added information and get 
 away alive, and when all the scouting must be 
 done at high pressure, the aerial outfit appears 
 to have scored many notable successes at the 
 front, especially in the German lines. Actual 
 war conditions show that no aviator is safe 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 213 
 
 from high-angle rifle fire below the 1,200-yard 
 limit, and double this altitude is essential to 
 avoid the fire of anti-aerial artillery. This 
 makes accurate observation of an enemy intent 
 on hiding his slightest movement a matter of 
 extreme difficulty, and most of the aviators who 
 have lost their lives in scouting flights are those 
 who have ventured below the safety zone to 
 improve their observation. 
 
 The Army's "Wireless Whiskers" 
 
 The cavalry wireless, or as the troopers say 
 the "wireless whiskers" of the army, has shown 
 a surprising degree of efficiency at the front. 
 The mounted wireless squad has been able to 
 keep pace with the regular cavalry under the 
 most strenuous conditions. It can follow any- 
 where cavalry can go — and that is practically 
 everywhere — and in less than 10 minutes es- 
 tablish communication upward of two days' 
 marching distance. 
 
 In the allied armies the second regiment of 
 every cavalry brigade has a wireless detach- 
 ment consisting of 4 troopers, 1 cyclist and 3 
 
214 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 horses, besides a horse-drawn wagon for each 
 brigade. Each cavalry division has a squad of 
 6 cyclists fitted with tools and material for 
 destroying or repairing lines of communication. 
 The wireless detachments of the German uhlan 
 and dragoon divisions that preceded the ad- 
 vance into Belgium and France were consider- 
 ably heavier in equipment as well as in men. 
 
 The regulation cavalry wireless outfit is car- 
 ried on 4 horses at an average load per saddle 
 of 160 pounds, or a total weight of 640 pounds. 
 The radius of communication is about 30 miles ; 
 the time required to unpack and erect the sta- 
 tion is only 10 minutes. The method of loading 
 the pack is very ingenious. The generating set 
 is in position on the pack saddle frame, the rigid 
 saddle frame being removed from the horse and 
 placed on the ground for working. One horse 
 carries the engine strapped on one side of the 
 saddle and the electric generator on the other 
 side. Distributed on either side is a supply of 
 2 gallons petrol and l/ 2 gallon lubricating oil. 
 Another horse transports the transformer on 
 the left and the receiver with all accessories on 
 the right. A third horse is loaded with pole-sec- 
 tions, spreaders and ground nets. A fourth 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 215 
 
 horse packs on the left pole-stays, halyards, 
 anchor pegs and on the right side the aerial 
 wires and primary oscillating circuit of the 
 transmitter. 
 
 The Automobile Wireless 
 
 The French army has developed what is per- 
 haps the most extraordinary example of a prac- 
 tical automobile wireless station for field service. 
 This outfit is entirely self-sustaining, transports 
 its own crew of a dozen men together with pro- 
 visions and material, and has a travelling radius 
 of upward to 250 miles before extra fuel and 
 provisions are necessary. The .radius of com- 
 munication is about 200 miles, and the endu- 
 rance is 5 hours on a single charge. Not only is 
 the car containing the station completely in- 
 closed, but the walls are double and lined with 
 wadding in order that the noise made by the 
 apparatus in action may not betray the location 
 of the station to the enemy. There are demount- 
 able sleeping quarters within the car for the ac- 
 commodation of the crew. The motive power is 
 supplied by a 4-cylinder, 16-horsepower motor, 
 having four speeds forward and one rear- 
 
216 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ward. The brake gear is unusually efficient, and 
 solid tires on wooden wheels are used. The pole 
 sections are loaded on the roof of the car. To 
 the pole-head is attached the antenna, consisting 
 of 6 wires whose opposite ends are anchored 
 in the ground. The ground connection is made 
 by means of steel netting, and a special wire 
 connects the pole-head with the station car. 
 A 500-cycle alternating current is used for dis- 
 patching messages. By means of a micrometer 
 screw it is possible to gauge the sparking inter- 
 vals very handily, which is of advantage in mod- 
 ifying the intensity of the current exciting the 
 antenna; neither is it necessary to retune the 
 latter to alter the wave-length. In fact, the 
 apparatus is so flexible that signals varying 
 in wave-length from 200 to 2,500 yards are re- 
 ceived without difficulty, thus greatly enhanc- 
 ing the adaptability of this ingeniously con- 
 trived station for field work. 
 
 Portable vs. Permanent Stations 
 
 Although the practical application of efficient 
 portable wireless outfits to military needs is 
 less than three years old, the advance made can 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 217 
 
 best be appreciated by comparison with per- 
 manent stations. First-line battleships in the 
 United States navy carry stations of 5 kw. ca- 
 pacity and 425 miles wave-length. The New 
 York [code letter: N M I] is an example 
 of this class. Second-line fighters like the 
 Kearsarge [code letter : N I P] cover the same 
 wave-length on 2-kw. capacity. The Siasconsett, 
 Mass., station [S C] covers 350 miles on 2 kw., 
 while the Mare Island Navy Yard, Cal., 
 [N P H] has a wave-length of 900 miles on 
 2y 2 kw. Contrast with these permanently 
 equipped stations the 200 miles' capacity of the 
 ll^-kw. portable military outfit, made ready for 
 use within twenty minutes, and the achievement 
 made in adapting and perfecting transportable 
 units is evident. 
 
 ''Sealed Orders" by Naval Wireless 
 
 In general, wireless service has benefited mili- 
 tary operations in the manner of an improve- 
 ment over the field telegraph and telephone, 
 which in turn dispense with mounted couriers 
 to a great extent. It is when we consider the 
 intelligence needs of the navy that wireless serv- 
 
218 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 ice appears not only as an improvement but as 
 a revolutionary agent. Formerly a squadron 
 on the high seas had no communication with its 
 base except by means of swift cruisers, and even 
 this slow and uncertain connection was subject 
 to interruption and delay by rough weather 
 and sea fog. Nowadays a sea-going squadron 
 is in daily touch with its base, or connecting 
 relays, irrespective of distance and regardless 
 of the elements. Sealed orders have been made 
 obsolete. The strategy board of the admiralty 
 issues its orders to the fleet commander by 
 wireless command, whether he is at anchor in 
 the roadstead or cruising on the high seas. 
 
 In the matter of secrecy and speedy delivery, 
 however, the wireless still lags behind the tele- 
 graph and the submarine cable. Many experi- 
 enced commanders are frankly opposed to it 
 on this account, and prefer to rely on cruisers 
 and cable connections whenever possible. The 
 Goeben escape off Messina has proven what 
 such authorities feared that intentional inter- 
 ference, if not purloined codal secrets, might 
 become an objectionable factor. Adroitness in 
 manipulation, however, will prevent interfer- 
 ence in most instances, or, at least, it will pre- 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 219 
 
 elude the possibility of the enemy using his 
 wireless while engaged in the noble work of 
 "jamming" one's own, but there is no known 
 cure for credulous and gullible commanders. 
 Wireless service is now so closely wedded to 
 modern naval needs that a commander who 
 should venture to completely dispense with it in 
 preference to cruiser and cable connections 
 would soon find himself outmanoeuvred on the 
 high seas by an opponent equipped with wireless. 
 When the aerial signal is finally developed to a 
 point where it may compare with the telegraph 
 in speed and secrecy of delivery, there will be 
 no need for any other messenger, at least not 
 in the navy. If the wireless telephone, mean- 
 while, is brought to a point when persons 
 other than unmannerly expert operators may 
 attempt to use it with some degree of satisfac- 
 tion, perhaps the future will reveal intercom- 
 munication between the vessels of a fleet on the 
 high seas by wireless telephone, and long-dis- 
 tance shore communication of the flagships by 
 wireless telegraph to the exclusion of any other 
 connection. There have been several instances 
 when naval operators have conversed by wire- 
 less telephone over distances upward of one 
 
220 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 hundred miles, but less than half of this radius 
 would be adequate for fleet manoeuvre were the 
 service in a state when one might depend on it 
 under any conditions, which it is not. , 
 
 The Naval Time Signal 
 
 There is one man aboardship who was never 
 known to say an unkind word about the wire- 
 less, and he is the navigating officer. That man 
 knows exactly how it feels to be responsible for 
 a ten-million-dollar ship and not know exactly 
 his position on the chart. The wireless time 
 signals, which the principal shore stations are 
 dispatching nowadays as a matter of routine, 
 are of conspicuous aid to navigators, both mer- 
 chant and naval. By a system of pre-arranged 
 rules, simplified to code, the big shore stations 
 issue time signals at fixed intervals that enable 
 navigators on the high seas to check the ac- 
 curacy of their chronometers. Thus the great 
 German station at Norddeich [K N D] in the 
 East Frisian littoral, having a radius of no 
 less than 2,600 miles, gives the 12 o'clock mid- 
 day signal by a 3-minute warning to get ready, 
 then four series of 5 dots, rhythmically ren- 
 
THE WIRELESS SIGNAL 221 
 
 dered, the final dot of which is the noon hour to 
 a dot ! Similarly the Eiffel tower at Paris, with 
 a radius of 2,000 miles, volunteers the midnight 
 hour. The Poldhu station in Wales is effective 
 upward to 2,200 miles and the Clifden station in 
 Ireland 3,000 miles. The largest radius is cov- 
 ered by the famous Eilverse station in Hanover 
 with 4,000 miles. The three most powerful wire- 
 less stations commanding the Mediterranean are 
 Cadiz 1,500 miles, Madrid 2,000 miles, and 
 Catano 2,500 miles. While the German station 
 at Tuckerton, N. J., is equipped to carry mes- 
 sages across the Atlantic Ocean, most of the 
 British stations are designed with a view of 
 supporting fleet manoeuvres in the North Sea. 
 Between Dover and Lerwick there are upward 
 to a score of short-range wireless bases in con- 
 stant operative touch with the British navy and 
 the admiralty offices in London. 
 
 '*<■ 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE FOUNTAIN PEN 
 
 The Newspaperman's Confessional 
 
 First Chronicle. — Our left wing suffered all 
 day from a murderous onslaught of protesting 
 German- American citizens intent on "both" 
 sides and the "real" news [as if we knew!], 
 but toward evening we fell back on intrench- 
 ments prepared by our indefatigable corps of 
 foreign correspondents. Our "big guns" es- 
 tablished the fact that the Crown Prince Ru- 
 precht of Bavaria was discovered in a smart 
 hotel at Munich in the act of showing his newly 
 sharpened sabre to his wife, who seized the 
 sabre and kissed the blade, exclaiming — "Bring 
 it back covered with blood that I may kiss it 
 once more!" Splendid lead for editorial on 
 German barbarity and cruelty. Luckily our 
 strategic position is such that no one stopped 
 to question whether royal personages are really 
 in the habit of making "smart" hotels the scene 
 of their rendezvous. It developed later that 
 since the Crown Princess died two years ago it 
 was a tactical error to use the story as news, but 
 we were able to cover our exposed position by 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 223 
 
 subsequent screening operations with a force of 
 war poets and window-cleaners. 
 
 Second Chronicle. — We saved our centre from 
 "being pierced to-day by a furious advance in the 
 price of beans, and only the dare-devil courage 
 of our composing-room patrol saved a two- 
 column advertisement from utter annihilation. 
 The masterly retreat conducted by our editorial 
 department amounts to a victory in itself since 
 it extricated us from an untenable position and 
 furnished our forces with a new point d'appui 
 resting firmly on a non-inflammable waste basket 
 and the office cuspidor. Thus intrenched we 
 were able to shell the enemy at leisure, and our 
 cavalry patrols in Whitehall Street [England] 
 unearthed a strong story showing how the 
 fumes of the French shrapnel sometimes 
 asphyxiate the enemy. 
 
 In a drawing-room of a French chateau a 
 company of German jagers were discovered 
 in a state of absolute petrifaction. Some stood 
 at the window in the act of taking aim, others 
 sat around a table joined in a game of cards, 
 still others retained cigarettes between their 
 lips, and the lieutenant had his mouth open as 
 if about to issue an order. The life-like ex- 
 pression of the corpses was astonishing. We 
 scored quite a beat with this interesting story, 
 and I enjoyed it myself until a military man 
 spoiled my taste for it by telling me confiden- 
 
224 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tially that soldiers are not allowed to smoke 
 or play cards in the presence of an officer, 
 nor would they be likely to indulge in that 
 pastime if the enemy was so close that they 
 could actually shoot at him from the windows! 
 As this information was confidential I did not 
 impart it to our readers, of course, but I made 
 up for it the next day by reducing a German 
 defeat from 132-point full-page spread to a 
 modest 3-column head! Our vanguard is re- 
 treating masterfully despite the morale of the 
 office, and our rear-guard is advancing inch by 
 inch beyond our skirmish line, supported by 
 double columns of worn type and scare-heads. 
 
 Third Chronicle. — A wounded "constant 
 reader" was brought in on a stretcher during 
 the lunch hour. We revived him with a drink 
 of absinthe, but when the poor fellow saw the 
 bottle he keeled over and met his death patriot- 
 ically, being a German. Sauerkraut would 
 probably have saved him. All of which re- 
 minds me that our nation is in a "state of 
 public peril 9 ' [phrase copyrighted'] and that it 
 behooves us to maintain "complete neutrality." 
 Strong stuff, this neutrality gag. The circula- 
 tion manager tells me it sells the paper beauti- 
 fully! Our offensive-defensive is now so solid 
 with the readers that we can afford to use 
 blank cartridges for a while. When the interest 
 begins to flag we shall move on the earthworks 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 225 
 
 of public opinion with poster type and scare- 
 heads, supported by flying wedges of facts in 
 massed bodies, and electrify our readers by 
 showing that all the while we were proclaiming 
 ourselves officially neutral we maintained a rol- 
 licking trade in war munitions to the allied bel- 
 ligerents. This expose ought to qualify me for 
 the presidency or something, and if our columns 
 will stand the strain the paragraphs will take 
 care of themselves. 
 
 Our army continues victoriously despite ice 
 in the Baltic and broken type in the composing- 
 room. We remain adamant toward the in- 
 truder who was discharged for spelling 
 "Przymyzl" correctly, but as he cannot pro- 
 nounce it nothing would be gained by taking 
 the insolent fellow back on the force. We are 
 crippled by erudition in all departments. What 
 we want is oratory, especially in the composing- 
 room, but we are also willing to engage a few 
 military experts who can show honourable dis- 
 charge papers from prominent shoemakers and 
 fashionable greengrocers. 
 
 Fourth Chronicle. — An almost inhuman attack 
 was launched at the ghostly hour of night 
 against our exposed right wing, charging us 
 with attempting to turn the flanks of veracity. 
 In this emergency we have armed our office boys 
 to the teeth with squirrel guns and horse-pistols, 
 and expect soon to hear of developments in the 
 
226 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Bukhovina. Our outposts debouch magnifi- 
 cently [not in the literal sense, however]. 
 Last week we buried the old Field Marshal von 
 Moltke — got kind of tired seeing his phiz on the 
 front anyhow — and this week we have scheduled 
 old man Emmich to commit suicide for the sec- 
 ond time [and this time we will see that it 
 "takes" even if our commissariat runs out of 
 red ink and scare type] . Besides, we have listed 
 that goose-stepping brother von Kluck for cap- 
 ture; we have repeatedly defeated this fellow 
 with "special extras" while he was advancing 
 through France, and we are a bit tired of his 
 antics. Those "dead" ones, von Billow, von 
 Heeringen and von Haussen, have no business 
 to be mentioned any longer, but I am going to 
 keep on declaring the Crown Prince as dead as 
 a door-nail until he actually dies — in order to 
 be the first man on deck with the news! 
 
 Our strategy continues to receive the plaudits 
 even of our enemies. The deployment of our 
 scissors-squad right in the nick of time to save 
 our 42-centimetre paste-pot ordnance from sum- 
 mary invasion and capture was so accurately 
 timed that not a single subscriber was lost in 
 the carnage, though at one time it seemed as 
 though nothing could prevent the enemy's 
 trumpeters from sweeping our counterscarps 
 with listerated gum and peanut-shell. Led by 
 the janitor our cavalry screen made a historic 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 227 
 
 attach on Lille, turning off the gas in that city 
 and plunging the enemy into utter darkness. 
 Next to the exploit of our blind compositor, who 
 defeated a whole regiment of German jdgers 
 with a French prize bull that had been unneces- 
 sarily goaded by sticks of Limburger cheese, 
 we can recollect no front page victory that can 
 compare with it. 
 
 Fifth Chronicle. — We have indorsed the stand 
 taken by our Secretary of State that United 
 States does not need a large army because the 
 efficacy of chewing gum and grape juice is such 
 that a million armed men can be stamped out 
 of the ground in twenty-four hours. We do not 
 see how this is possible but we take the Secre- 
 tary's word for it, as he was once a colonel and 
 ought to know. We are also boosting the plan to 
 turn the United States Navy into a sort of toy- 
 land for tin marines and wooden sailormen, as 
 this would enable us to save the huge expense of 
 building modern vessels and permit the gradual 
 adoption of old wooden hulls. If the Swiss re- 
 public can get along without a navy, the vastly 
 more powerful American republic certainly 
 ought to be able to defend itself with fishing 
 smacks and garbage scows. We are not posted 
 on the technical questions involved, but are quite 
 content to take the word of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, as he was once a farmer and ought to 
 know. 
 
Blundering Correspondents 
 
 The theatre of war on both fronts is so im- 
 mense, and the theatre of operations is so com- 
 plex and multiform, that it is not feasible to 
 furnish even a meagre outline of the events. 
 Some day a whole library will be written in 
 detailed analysis of the latter. In the brief 
 space allotted I shall limit myself to the cor- 
 rective task of pointing out some of the blunders 
 that have been made by correspondents in re- 
 porting military operations and events, espe- 
 cially such as appear to have made an impres- 
 sion on the American public. 
 
 While I was writing editorial analyses on the 
 war for some New York newspapers I was 
 repeatedly asked to define words like " counter- 
 scarp," " point d'appui," etc., and one daunt- 
 less correspondent dispatched a bundle of clip- 
 pings in which he had marked the word ' ' strat- 
 egy," which appeared frequently and in the 
 most surprising connections, requesting a defi- 
 nition to "fit all cases"! In a land gasping 
 under the weight of ponderous dictionaries, and 
 
 228 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 229 
 
 at the same time harrowed by weird and un- 
 familiar pronunciation, one becomes inured to 
 surprise. Indeed, the word strategy has been 
 used to denote the movements of patrols, of 
 aeroplanes, of signalmen, of individual com- 
 mands, anything, apparently, from pistols to 
 carrier pigeons. 
 
 Newspaper Tactics 
 
 It has been said that there are no surprises 
 in this war, but it seems to me there has been 
 nothing but surprises. How otherwise is one 
 to account for the Allies winning all the " vic- 
 tories" while the Germans were chasing them 
 through Belgium and France to the very bor- 
 ders of the Marne! The censored reports 
 showed very plainly that the German advance 
 was of no strategic importance, and that the 
 "masterful retreats" of the Allies would event- 
 ually solve the situation. The American news- 
 papers allowed themselves to become hypno- 
 tised by the censored accounts from London to 
 such an extent that the most brilliantly con- 
 ducted offensive campaign in modern warfare 
 was distorted into a series of German defeats. 
 
230 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 In their eagerness to follow the hint from Lon- 
 don, whence they are accustomed to go in quest 
 for every scrap of foreign news, they even out- 
 Englished the censor and "forgot" to report 
 the actual dates of the German occupation of 
 strategic points. There is one New York paper 
 in undeservedly good standing, which has not 
 even at this date admitted the fall of Liege, 
 while there is not one who has not reported, on 
 several occasions, the capture or death of men 
 like von Moltke, von Kluck, von Emmich and 
 even the Kronprinz! 
 
 In fact, the American press, in utter igno- 
 rance of the magnitude of the task involved, and 
 as nonplused as a boy on beholding his first 
 elephant, did the very thing it should not have 
 done, and dispatched a gang of men to the 
 front, thinly disguised as "war" correspond- 
 ents, who were about as fit to record the 
 operations of modern armies as an American 
 cowboy would be to report a sitting of the 
 naval board. With one or two exceptions these 
 men must be classed as incompetents. Some 
 of them had served in previous campaigns by 
 disclosing their utter lack of military training 
 and knowledge — which did not matter so much 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 231 
 
 with a non-military audience and editors intent 
 on "stories" rather than fact — and most of 
 them could not tell the difference between a 
 sword and a sabre. To this corps of "rocking- 
 chair" civilians, trained in the gentle art of 
 turning molehills into mountains, the Ameri- 
 can people is indebted for the harebrained and 
 amateurish manner in which this war has been 
 reported. The logical thing to do, it seems to 
 me, since press censorships were established 
 abroad with the obvious intent of passing only 
 favourable news, would have been to establish a 
 board of analysts on this side, composed of 
 authorities skilled in military and naval war- 
 fare, and let this board sift the censored re- 
 ports before the press would turn their staffs 
 loose on the material. A military censorship is 
 only the strategy of the intelligence service in 
 condensed and emendated form for popular con- 
 sumption. It cannot be gotten around by de- 
 tachments of newspapermen — even if they are 
 competent — because first-class powers do not 
 allow them at the front, as I pointed out at the 
 outbreak of this war. But this is not the first 
 war which has been misreported. Any one 
 who is anxious to convince himself on this point 
 
232 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 should compare the war correspondence of the 
 British-Boer conflict and the Russo-Japanese 
 campaign with the military reports of the con- 
 testants on both sides. The former is largely 
 fiction, the latter are based on fact. The space 
 allotted here is too brief to admit of even par- 
 tial exposition of the woeful mistakes made by 
 correspondents in this war. I shall limit my- 
 self to a few examples that must be fresh in the 
 mind of the readers, and which plainly show 
 that the correspondents are ignorant of even 
 elementary knowledge of warfare. 
 
 Newspaper Cavalry 
 
 German cavalry has been referred to as "uh- 
 lans," as if it consisted exclusively of this arm. 
 It is true that les uhlans of Frederick the Great 
 impressed themselves so indelibly upon the Gal- 
 lic mind that the term became synonymous, in a 
 popular sense, with Prussian cavalry, but no 
 military man would employ such a misleading 
 phrase. There are no less than four classes 
 of cavalry — hussars, uhlans, dragoons, and 
 cuirassiers — and all of them were engaged, the 
 hussars and uhlans forming the light arm of 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 233 
 
 the cavalry. Some correspondents have per- 
 sisted in using the phrase "lancers," evidently 
 taking their cue from the British field scribes, 
 but as all four classes of German cavalry are 
 armed with the lance, this term is even less de- 
 scriptive, as well say " horsemen" and frankly 
 own up to ignorance. 
 
 Fake "Field" Reporting 
 
 A deployment of skirmishers is glibly re- 
 ported as an "invasion." An encounter be- 
 tween advance guards becomes a "battle." 
 The masking of a fortress is exaggerated into 
 a "siege." The operations of a corps are mag- 
 nified into that of an army. If it advances it is 
 "victory," if it retreats it is "defeat." Be- 
 tween these extremes there can be no distinc- 
 tions, at least not in a mind innocent of the 
 tactical operations whereby an army disposes 
 its forces for concerted action. When the 
 heavy German and Austrian siege artillery ap- 
 peared at the front it was described in the hys- 
 terical phrase of a fugitive vainly trying to 
 picture a bombardment. A train of denials and 
 counter-denials followed, but the big guns, 
 
234 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 which constitute a surprise and a good " story" 
 in themselves, were not adequately described. 
 The judgment passed on prowess and discipline 
 is unintentionally amusing. Again and again 
 German soldiers have been berated for their 
 "cowardly" action in "running away" when 
 their officers were shot by aspirants for "best- 
 sellers" fame who do not know that a standing 
 order [vorschrift] in the German army is that 
 troops finding themselves without commanders 
 under action must fall back and place them- 
 selves under orders immediately. In the same 
 breath the correspondents would refute them- 
 selves by stating that the German infantry 
 charges were so fierce that the men chopped 
 their way through barbed wire traps and con- 
 tinued to charge against the glacis of the forts, 
 in the face of a withering fire, until they were 
 stretched low on the very parapets ! 
 
 Fake "War" Photographs 
 
 The inscriptive skill displayed on "war" 
 photographs shows that though modern guns 
 will carry far, bluff will carry still farther. 
 For about three months this country was flooded 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 235 
 
 by printed reproductions of photographs taken 
 at least one year ago at French, German and 
 British field manoeuvres. The old inscriptions 
 were crossed out, and new ones were concocted 
 to fit present needs. In his famous hurry the 
 " head-line' ' artist would sometimes confuse 
 the nations a bit, as when he would label French 
 infantry in skirmish line as "Austrians Mov- 
 ing to the Attack!" and French troops have 
 frequently been ticketed Belgian. However, 
 these are mild offences when compared to 
 photos of the Karlsruhe, described as a German 
 "battle cruiser," squadrons of Belgian lancers 
 masquerading as "German uhlans," and those 
 memorable prints of French cuirassiers digni- 
 fied to posterity under this delicious inscription 
 — "Armour Plated Suits for Kaiser's Men!" 
 
 Under the caption, ' ' Terrible French Cannon 
 Aims and Destroys Itself," a newspaper syndi- 
 cate scattered broadcast a narrative so entirely 
 improbable as to be unintentionally amusing. 
 The illustration embellishing this chef d'ceuvre 
 of anticipatory reporting was nothing more or 
 less than the standard 155-millimetre field gun 
 of the French army. Suffice it to say that its 
 inventor, Colonel Bimailho, would be the last 
 
236 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 person to approve the startling claims of this 
 intrepid" story.' ' 
 
 Some Typical Yarns 
 
 Another "find" was the noble series of "saw- 
 bayonet" lore, with which a tremendously fa- 
 mous ' i double-star * ' war correspondent burdened 
 the cable at great cost to his unsuspecting paper. 
 This happened at the time when the world had 
 practically decided, aided ominously by the 
 British press censor, to single out the Germans 
 for barbarous methods of warfare. There was 
 not the ghost of a doubt but what Prussian sol- 
 diers had been caught in the act of severing the 
 heads of perfectly well-behaved French soldiers 
 with "saw-bayonets," a fiendish weapon spe- 
 cially made for this purpose. The mere fact 
 that the correspondent succeeded in finding two 
 specimens of this weapon in trenches formerly 
 held by the Germans was considered ample 
 proof of unpardonable barbarity ! No one even 
 inquired why it should be considered advan- 
 tageous for a soldier to engage in the slow and 
 tedious process of sawing his enemy in two 
 when a well-placed jab would finish him, entirely 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 237 
 
 aside from the fact that he who would attempt 
 to do the sawing would certainly be jabbed to 
 death before he could finish the job! If that 
 double-starred manipulator of mistakes had but 
 known that the corporals of a German company- 
 carry so-called "saw bayonets," for engaging 
 wire entanglements and cutting away the under- 
 brush, and that the saw blade is affixed to the 
 rifle to gain added leverage, but certainly not 
 for decapitating human members, it is possible 
 his readers would have lost a "beat" and cap- 
 tured a fact. 
 
 The dum-dum bullet thrillers owe their origin 
 to similar misconceptions. None of the nations 
 engaged are in the manufacture of dum-dum 
 bullets. Personally, I do not believe that a 
 single bullet of this description has been issued 
 to a single soldier in this war. What the sol- 
 diers themselves may have done in the way of 
 denting or filing their bullets is quite another 
 matter, but if this has actually been done, to 
 any noticeable extent, even a layman must admit 
 that the soft-nosed French bullet lends itself to 
 being tampered with a good deal easier than the 
 steel-jacketed German bullet! Besides, the 
 standard type of bullet cannot in all cases be 
 
238 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 depended upon to make only cleanly-perforated 
 wounds. When fired at long range the bullet 
 may deviate slightly before it strikes the body, 
 or the soldier's clothing and accoutrements may 
 cause it to swerve and "keyhole" after striking; 
 in either case the wound caused will resemble the 
 mushroom exit of a dum-dum missile. But, per- 
 haps, data of this sort would not constitute a 
 " story." 
 
 When Ought Counts Naught 
 
 If all the errors and mistakes were collected 
 and collated with such material as would be 
 afforded by the misrepresentation, wilful as 
 well as unintentional, as appertaining to the 
 issues of this war, we should have a volume that 
 no man who has ever borne arms could resist* 
 
 Especially is this so if the volume would in- 
 clude a comparative statistical survey of the 
 estimates of casualties and losses furnished by 
 correspondents. Imagination is a tame term to 
 describe the activity exhibited in this field by 
 knights of the scissors and paste pot, capable of 
 creating six-cipher earthquakes and four-cipher 
 conflagrations on the hint of a night wire. A 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 239 
 
 statistician who kept count from August 4th to 
 September 4th, 1914, states that the Germans 
 alone lost about 1,500,000 in wounded, missing, 
 and killed troops in this interim, according to 
 the dispatches printed! That there are any 
 Germans left at all at this writing encourages 
 me to say that the suggested demise of that 
 nation is somewhat precocious, but I shudder 
 when I think what the grand total fatalities of 
 all the armies must be by this time. 
 
 The Fountain Pen Duel 
 
 As a matter of fact the reportorial fountain 
 pen is a weapon of modern warfare capable of 
 inflicting a good deal of damage. It does not 
 slay, neither does the wireless signal, but its 
 potency is nevertheless so considerable that 
 governments at war protect themselves against 
 it by the iron-rule of censorship. A skilfully 
 manipulated corps of fountain pens can turn a 
 foe into a friend, remove or engender a preju- 
 diced opinion, and generally mould and coach 
 the opinions and sympathies of non-combatant 
 nations in a war of this kind. The German 
 scribes are bidding for American sympathy, 
 
240 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 not because Germany cares a hoot what 
 America thinks, but because it is the only great 
 power left that has not declared war against 
 Germany, and it has the only navy that could 
 insure German supremacy on the sea. The 
 Allied scribes are bidding for American sym- 
 pathy also, to prevent it from being diverted 
 to Germany, and with their control of the cables 
 they have been able to defeat the German 
 scribes in every decisive encounter of the 
 "fountain pen" duel. The United States is 
 nine-tenths prejudiced against the German 
 cause to-day — thanks to the superior equip- 
 ment of the Allied scribes — and there is not the 
 slightest prospect of an improved sentiment. 
 And this is the crux of the matter: Had the 
 cables remained open, and had it been possible 
 for the German scribes to enter the fight 
 against the Allied scribes with equal means of 
 propaganda, it is quite conceivable that Ameri- 
 can feeling would be favourable to Germany or 
 at least divided equally between the contest- 
 ants. From this to actual aid in a financial 
 and commissary way is not such a long step 
 in a nation that recognises no government ex- 
 cept that which may, and may not, lie in public 
 
THE FOUNTAIN PEN 241 
 
 opinion, and once America had committed her- 
 self as a covert ally it would not be difficult to 
 embroil her as a belligerent. 
 
 The Kusso-Japanese war was likewise 
 "handled" by the British cable and corre- 
 spondence monopoly. So adroitly was the 
 fountain pen manipulated that the American 
 people became enamoured of the Japanese 
 [England's allies], and entirely ignored Eus- 
 sia's claim to some return for her very val- 
 uable friendship to the United States in times 
 past. This perverted sentiment found practical 
 expression at the peace of Portsmouth, N. H., 
 when an American president, acting, perhaps 
 unconsciously, as England's tool, compelled 
 Eussia to terms that would not have been quite 
 so humiliating to her, and perhaps not disas- 
 trous, had the popular sentiment in America 
 been favourable to her at the time. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 
 
 It happened during the storm-march of the 
 German right wing under General von Kluck 
 against the armoured forts of La Fere. The 
 most advanced position was held by a detach- 
 ment of Prussian fusileers, who withstood the 
 onslaught during a whole day of incessant en- 
 gagement without food. The men had dug them- 
 selves into flat trenches hastily prepared with 
 hand-spades. They were practically isolated. 
 Two companies had been hurled forward to 
 reenforce them, but the distance was too great 
 and the French and English machine guns 
 mowed the men down as a scythe cuts grass. 
 The German rapid-fire artillery kept up a con- 
 tinual stream of bursting shrapnel against the 
 British left, which threatened any moment to 
 take the isolated German position by storm. 
 Of the two regiments gambling their lives away 
 in that position there was not one man who did 
 not have a dead comrade beside him. Most of 
 the men had been shot in the head. The shal- 
 low trenches afforded but little shelter against 
 the galling fire of the British, which clipped 
 
 242 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 243 
 
 the crest of the earth-screen with the precision 
 of scissors wherever a spike helmet peeped 
 forth. Not only were the Germans exhausted 
 for want of food, but their ammunition belts 
 were getting to be as empty as their stomachs, 
 and they were using the belts of slain comrades. 
 Of the six thousand fusileers in that fire-swept 
 position only two thousand remained, and they 
 were facing what seemed like utter annihilation. 
 Then something happened that no one will 
 forget who saw it. A big, fat Prussian army 
 cook bobbed up behind a boulder a few hundred 
 yards behind the German position and fired a 
 rocket with a line attached. A stray bullet 
 bowled the big felloiv over like a rabbit at pre- 
 cisely the same moment. That bullet deflected 
 the aim of the ambitious chef and caused the 
 rocket to land exactly in the German trench. 
 Quickly the line was pulled in and an enor- 
 mous projectile followed. A hail of bullets 
 greeted the advance of the gliding missile, but 
 its armoured sides turned every shot very 
 smartly and it was finally hauled into the trench. 
 A tap on the shell, which was of the Skoda 30.2- 
 centimetre calibre, showed that it was not 
 loaded. A wooden cover had been inserted in 
 the blunt end where the priming charge is sup- 
 posed to be. The cover was dug out, and be- 
 hold! there was the most appropriate form of 
 ammunition for that exigency, in the shape of 
 
244 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 sausages — sausages packed like sardines — the 
 famous u erbswurst" of the Prussian army 
 that makes dying men stand up and goose-step! 
 With a sausage in his left and a rifle in his right 
 it is no wonder that the German fusileers were 
 not routed. Toward night heavy reinforce- 
 ments reached the position they had so valor- 
 ously defended. 
 
 The fat cook was discovered in the lazaret, 
 where the commander went and saluted him. 
 An Iron Cross now dangles on his proud bosom, 
 but he is not the only cook in the German army 
 who has received and earned it. 
 
"Fighting on the Belly and Marching on the 
 
 Stomach" 
 
   
 
 The commissariat of the German army is 
 the most complete and efficient organisation of 
 its kind in the world. It towers head and shoul- 
 ders above the French^ Japanese, English and 
 Russian organisations despite the fact that 
 these bodies have achieved a very notable and 
 genuine progress, especially during the last 
 decade. While her opponents seem to have 
 realised that an "army travels on its stomach,' ' 
 Germany has applied the twofold lesson that 
 a modern army fights on its belly and marches 
 on its stomach. In the German commissariat 
 honours are equally divided between transpor- 
 tation, rapid and adequate, to deploy an army 
 to its destination ; provisions, ample and acces- 
 sible, to feed the fighters ; defence by means of 
 pick and shovel, and offence by ammunition and 
 rifle. Not the slightest detail in any one of 
 these departments has been overlooked or 
 scanted at the expense of the service as a whole. 
 
 245 
 
246 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 A volume could be written on tlie operation of 
 each department. Suffice to say that the watch- 
 word for each of them has been : service, more 
 service, better service. Every possible, and ap- 
 parently impossible, exigency has been pro- 
 vided for to secure and maintain maximum 
 efficiency in feeding the imperial troops on the 
 battlefield under every conceivable and incon- 
 ceivable condition of warfare. 
 
 The " heavy artillery" of this branch of the 
 service is represented by formidable field 
 kitchens and bake ovens mounted on four- 
 wheeled trucks and drawn by horses or motor- 
 propelled. In fact, the work of baking and 
 cooking is not disturbed or retarded by the 
 march of the troops, but goes on uninterrupt- 
 edly as the kitchens and ovens follow in the 
 rear of the marching columns. It was largely 
 due to the perfection of the provisioning 
 branch of the commissariat that the German 
 storm-drive through Belgium and Northern 
 France was made possible. 
 
 The commanding officers' mess is supplied 
 by specially contrived automobile field kitchens, 
 complete to the smallest implement. It is part 
 of German field strategy to maintain the great- 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 247 
 
 est possible degree of mobility in the officers' 
 corps. The commanding officers proceed by 
 automobile and are required ,to precede the 
 troops and select the battle-ground; hence, 
 motor-kitchens are necessary to follow and 
 feed them. The first Prussian soldiers to break 
 into Belgium were not troops on the march, but 
 a flying detachment of superior officers in high- 
 power motor cars. Then followed squads of 
 armoured motor cars, paving the way for the 
 advance guard, consisting chiefly of cavalry, be- 
 fore the infantry marched across the border. 
 
 The most completely equipped of officers' 
 motor-kitchens are those in personal attend- 
 ance on the Kaiser, the Kronprinz and the 
 Kronprinzen of Bavaria and Wurttemburg, 
 commonly styled grand dukes. The motor- 
 kitchen of the Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm is 
 typical of the field service de luxe. It is almost 
 the size of a London bus and contains a com- 
 plete kitchen, with cook range, bake-oven, pan- 
 try, water cistern, ice-box, china closet, buffet 
 service and what not. Sometimes the Kron- 
 prinz motors from the firing-line to the kitchen 
 for his meals in his private field automobile, 
 which is operated by a chauffeur who has the 
 
248 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 coolness and skill of a professional racer. At 
 other times the kitchen motors after him and 
 his staff as far as the terrain and the range 
 of hostile artillery permit. Besides the chauf- 
 feur there is a cook and a butler stationed in 
 the motor-kitchen, to which one or two orderlies 
 are attached in addition. 
 
 "Fleisch, Brot und Wasser!" 
 
 The three big items in feeding an army on 
 the march are meat, bread and water. A com- 
 missariat which can supply these main essen- 
 tials in uniform and adequate quantities, and 
 warrant the quality pure, even though many 
 other " necessaries" may be lacking, can keep 
 an army in good physical fighting condition on 
 the firing-line. If the rigours of a winter cam- 
 paign must be encountered, as in the present 
 war, special equipment in the shape of helmet 
 hoods, mufflers, mittens and socks, all of the 
 very best quality, are issued to the troops in ad- 
 dition to their regular winter equipment as 
 otherwise they would not live to eat the pro- 
 visions. The general staff of the commissariat 
 has carefully gathered data, based on practical 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 249 
 
 experience, demonstrating that the most effi- 
 ciently equipped soldiers, whether for summer 
 or winter campaigning, will invariably prove 
 superior to soldiers inefficiently equipped 
 though inured to the climate. On this theory 
 the German commissariat is fitting out the im- 
 perial armies on the Russian frontier for 
 winter-campaigning in such a thoroughgoing 
 manner that the troops may be expected to 
 withstand the severe climate there at least 
 as well if not better than the native Russian 
 troops. 
 
 In a campaign like that waged by Germany 
 in its storm-drive into France, every part of the 
 commissariat was sacrificed to mobility and 
 speed. This requirement had a peculiar bear- 
 ing on the chief anxiety of the provision branch, 
 that of meat. Ordinarily a strong effort is made 
 to supply the troops with beef on the hoof, at 
 least the advanced divisions that are engaged 
 on the firing-line. Fresh beef broth does keep 
 up the strength and courage of soldiers fighting 
 in the trenches when nothing else will. Two 
 hours of uncomfortable sleep out of sixteen spent 
 on heavy duty in all kinds of weather, under 
 withering rifle- and shrapnel-fire, with sudden, 
 
250 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 forced marching in the dead of night, only to 
 face worse hardships at the break of dawn, is 
 a combination of evil times that goads the ani- 
 mal instincts of fighting men to a point when 
 their ravenous appetite resembles that of the 
 wild beasts of the jungle. Nutritive capsules and 
 tablets will no more cure hunger of this sort 
 than any of the so-called "health" foods, nor 
 "physical culture" alternatives, nor any of the 
 ingeniously contrived and scientifically con- 
 cocted dietaries that do so much on paper and 
 perform so beautifully in private tests. A pill 
 can be produced that will contain as much nutri- 
 tive value as four ounces of meat, but the meat 
 will put more strength in the soldier than the 
 pill. Laboratory experts are in the regrettable 
 habit of forgetting that man is endowed with a 
 stomach that must be filled as well as fed. 
 Mere nutritive value is not enough; volume is 
 quite as necessary. It is the alimentary value 
 and volume of the food that still hunger and 
 make proper digestion possible. Pill schemes 
 and capsule tricks may be all right for anaemic 
 people, but when it comes to feeding a super- 
 army of well-nigh four million men, disposed on 
 two hostile fronts, in which every man is under a 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 251 
 
 harrowing, crushing strain, physically and men- 
 tally, the stomach of man demands the food that 
 Nature has provided for it since the beginning 
 of time. The German commissariat has acted 
 on this basis. It is the soup meat and roast 
 meat made from freshly slaughtered cattle, and 
 served from properly attended field kitchens, 
 that have filled the stomach, quenched the hun- 
 ger and revived the strength of the exhausted 
 German soldiers, enabling them to do a great 
 deal more fighting in the aggregate, man for 
 man, than the equally brave but less skilfully 
 provisioned hostile troops. 
 
 '^Kriegskonserven" 
 
 To obtain fresh food in adequate quantities 
 means that the commissariat must do a great 
 deal of foraging and for greatly advanced posi- 
 tions maintain a herd of cattle on the heels of 
 the rear guard. In the initial German dash into 
 France, which is unparalleled for speed in the 
 annals of military history, there was no time to 
 forage or stop for anything beyond supplies by 
 rail. No attempt w^as made to establish a cattle 
 corral. The main supply of meat came in car- 
 
252 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 loads, freshly slaughtered, and was loaded, on 
 arriving at the various railheads, into motor- 
 vans, transporting the supplies further to the 
 field encampments. Only when an army corps 
 would make a halt to reduce a fortification or 
 invest a town was there an attempt made to 
 forage and supply beef on the hoof. 
 
 To meet the exigency occasioned by the Ger- 
 man storm advance, the commissariat fell back 
 on its carefully conditioned, immense store of 
 hermetically sealed beef, soup and vegetables. 
 This branch of the service has been built up by 
 food experts and physiologists attached to the 
 government service. The "Kriegskonserven," 
 as the Germans call them, are prepared in fac- 
 tories controlled by commissary officials. The 
 strictest inspection of the products used is oblig- 
 atory, and the finished products include every- 
 thing imaginable from goulash to potted fowl, 
 all kinds of roasts, stews, soups and even des- 
 serts. This food is not ordinary tinned stuff, 
 but the very best products the market affords 
 scientifically inspected and prepared with a view 
 of not only stilling hunger and giving strength, 
 but also appealing to the palate. It has been 
 found that an appetising fare, capable of con- 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 253 
 
 siderable variation, will keep troops in much 
 better shape and spirits than the same alimen- 
 tary value and volume without the palatable ele- 
 ment. Every can and box is sealed and labelled 
 with the nature of contents and date of making. 
 After a certain time the conserves are confis- 
 cated and new supplies take their place, the idea 
 being to keep the stock on hand in a perpetual 
 state of absolute freshness. Sample rations of 
 Kriegskonserven have been dispatched to the 
 German colonies in China and Africa and sub- 
 jected while there to the extreme conditions of 
 tropical climate for long periods of years with- 
 out the slightest deterioration. During the ad- 
 vance of the seven big armies into France, of 
 which General von Kluck commanded the right 
 wing, enormous quantities of Kriegskonserven 
 were forwarded by rail to the farthest safe point 
 in the rear of these armies. A temporary base 
 would then and there be established at each 
 point, which would accumulate a large stock of 
 provisions. The various army divisions would 
 draw on the nearest available base for supplies, 
 and these were forwarded by motor truck until 
 the steadily advancing army made the distances 
 to be covered by motor transport large enough 
 
254 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 to warrant the establishment of new depots and 
 bases. 
 
 The water supply of a modern army is no 
 longer by way of the old-fashioned barrel wagon 
 or the well-bucket. Large motor vans loaded 
 with steel cisterns do the work of allaying the 
 soldiers' thirst. One such truck holds enough 
 drinking water to insure a liberal swig for every 
 man in an army corps, or a force approximating 
 45,000 men. This means a daily continuous 
 service of twelve big cistern trucks to allay the 
 parched throats of a half -million men. As there 
 are at least four million German troops in the 
 field it would require about one thousand motor- 
 cistern trucks to supply them with water were it 
 not for the system of sterilising and purifying 
 river water by a radio-active process, of com- 
 paratively recent invention, which has obviated 
 the use of the " water-wagon' ' trains to a very 
 considerable extent. 
 
 The baking arrangements in the French and 
 English armies differ a good deal from those 
 adopted by Germany, not only in the kind of 
 bread made, but also in the manner of baking. 
 The British commissariat sticks to the earth- 
 oven method, which is perhaps better suited to 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 255 
 
 the kind of loaves favoured by Tommy Atkins, 
 whereas the German commissariat provides 
 very capacious field bakeries on four-wheeled 
 trucks, drawn by teams of horses. Despite 
 various economies that have been introduced 
 from time to time the expense of the rations 
 necessary to maintain a modern army in the 
 field is well-nigh staggering. A military statis- 
 tician has computed the total commissary cost 
 of supplies and rations to all the troops of all 
 the armies opposing one another in the field at 
 this writing at more than twenty million dollars 
 per day ! 
 
 The Wonderful Field Kitchens 
 
 About ten years ago the German commissariat 
 came to the conclusion that it was a mistake 
 to issue rations in a raw and unprepared state 
 to troops in the field. It was argued that sol- 
 diers that have been subjected to heavy march- 
 ing or trench duty during the day are quite 
 naturally tired out toward evening, and tired 
 men make bad cooks. At best the rations issued 
 to the soldiers are cooked by them over im- 
 provised camp-fires in a hasty and slovenly 
 
256 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 manner, resulting in meals causing intestinal 
 disorders, which put many of them on the sick- 
 list. A large proportion of the soldiers are too 
 tired to even attempt cooking and eat their 
 rations raw, thus adding still further to the 
 surgeon's roster. If the soldier could be cer- 
 tain of three substantial meals, at dawn, at noon 
 and at night, properly prepared by skilled 
 cooks, not only would his resistive strength be 
 greatly improved, but also his morale and fight- 
 ing spirit. 
 
 This very logical view led to the introduction 
 of a new type of military field kitchen, the final 
 evolution of which remains to-day the pride and 
 boast of the German commissariat. No army 
 has anything like it. No kitchen anywhere is 
 better equipped to perform the service expected 
 of it. To show how thoroughgoing the Ger- 
 mans are once they make up their minds to 
 do something, I will attempt a description of 
 how they evolved the best portable military 
 kitchen for feeding an army on the march: 
 
 Out of forty different models submitted to 
 the German general-staff, which opened the 
 initial public competition in 1905, only two 
 specimen kitchens approached the official re- 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 257 
 
 quirements. A second competition was started 
 containing no less than fourteen separate speci- 
 fications with a multitude of subdivisions, cov- 
 ering every conceivable requirement from ca- 
 pacity and safety appliances to noiselessness, 
 freedom from explosion, and even "invisible" 
 appearance ! The final choice fell upon an out- 
 fit of the following description. A four-wheeled 
 vehicle for two horses, the front carriage being 
 detachable from the rear when necessary, and 
 both parts capable of being drawn by the same 
 team. On this truck the kitchen proper is 
 mounted, containing an explosion-proof copper 
 holding 200 quarts in a boiling vat, an explo- 
 sion-proof 70-quart coffee tank, both receptacles 
 having separate fireboxes and ash-pits. The 
 front carriage contains 200 extra-rations for 
 the men, the daily quota of provisions, 3 extra 
 rations for the horses, folding canvas water 
 pails, driver's and cook's baggage, and besides 
 a saw, pick-axe, hatchet, carriage tools and 
 fittings, stores and stable material. The rear 
 carriage holds the fuel box and the cooking 
 contrivances, such as meat-chopper, coffee mill, 
 strainers, knives and other utensils. The boil- 
 ing vat surrounds the copper and prevents the 
 
258 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 food from being burned and facilitates self- 
 cooking; also, it serves as a hot-water heater. 
 Because of this hot-water immersion method 
 the food in the copper continues to cook as in 
 a steam-kitchen, and is ready for serving at end 
 of normal cooking time. Even after twelve 
 hours the food is found to have a temperature 
 of 148° Fahr., and should the necessity arise 
 for keeping the food untouched even longer, a 
 new fire is made every twelve hours and in this 
 way the contents can be kept fresK and pala- 
 table up to within 72 hours or three days and 
 nights. The copper is aluminum-lined and easy 
 to keep clean. The preliminary cooking is done 
 at night and early dawn. After the cooking is 
 completed the men can draw on the kitchen for 
 hot water, and have their canteens replenished 
 with steaming hot coffee. An ingenious ar- 
 rangement of multiform spigot makes it pos- 
 sible to fill six flasks simultaneously, and as 
 these flasks are fitted on the thermo plan the men 
 detailed for sentry duty are able to carry with 
 them the satisfying hot beverage to their post. 
 The total weight of such a "feldkiiche" is 
 about 3,000 pounds, and it can follow even cav- 
 alry on the march almost anywhere. It does not 
 
THE SUPER-COMMISSARIAT 259 
 
 smoke, it is noiseless in cooking and operation, 
 and the fire-box has a marvellous capacity for all 
 kinds of fuels, from coal and wood to peat and 
 briquettes. Owing to the constant heat main- 
 tained by the boiling vat the consumption of fuel 
 is very small. The coffee tank and the copper 
 are fitted with strong covers capable of being 
 hermetically locked, and all the drawers and 
 compartments in the front and rear parts of 
 the vehicle have locks and are entirely weather- 
 proof. In an emergency sucli a kitchen can be 
 taken across rough country, and in rough 
 weather, at a gallop without spilling a drop or 
 wasting a particle of food. As the rear section 
 can be driven independently it is possible even 
 at night to venture forward to the firing-line 
 and feed the exhausted troops in the trenches 
 direct from the kitchen. In the daytime such a 
 manoeuvre is usually limited to the second and 
 third line trenches for obvious causes. While 
 the men are being fed from the kitchen the 
 front section of the vehicle is sent back to the 
 rear for fresh provisions. 
 
 These horse-drawn field-kitchens, then, to- 
 gether with the motor-propelled mess-kitchens 
 for the commanding officers, and the automobile 
 
260 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 kitchen cars for army and corps commanders, 
 constitute the piece de resistance of mobile 
 culinary science on the firing-line. It is by per- 
 fected and complete arrangements of this cali- 
 bre that the German commissariat has suc- 
 ceeded in making one soldier do the work of two 
 at times, whenever the trenches in the Western 
 theatre of war were depleted of men wanted 
 to stem the tide of the Russian invasion. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 SUPEE-STEATEGY 
 
 General "Vorwartz"! 
 
 A big, square-set man is sitting at a table 
 lighted by ornate silver candlesticks. A detail 
 map of the East Prussian boundary is in his 
 lap. Other maps are spread on the table to- 
 gether with calipers, ferrules and other instru*- 
 ments. 
 
 In the room adjoining are a number of adju- 
 tants and staff -officers. Some of them are 
 gathered about a large dining-table entirely cov- 
 ered by a scale map, showing the minutest vari- 
 ation in the terrain under study. The posi- 
 tions of the armies are marked on the map by 
 tape fastened with stickers. Reenf or cements 
 under way are identified by arrows. There is 
 a portfolio in which every move made by any 
 and all of the armies is written down with 
 scrupulous exactitude. An ordonnanz is in 
 charge of the big chart and marks with tape 
 any change made in the positions. 
 
 At a small table is the telephone exchange, 
 operated by a N. C. 0. The wire connects di- 
 rectly with all the army field headquarters. If 
 
 261 
 
262 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 a general commanding an army has anything to 
 report it must go over this wire, but generals 
 in command of army corps and divisions must 
 first telephone the army commander, and if he 
 thinks the report is of importance also to the 
 commander-in-chief he orders it relayed over 
 the direct wire. 
 
 In a corner is a portable wireless station. 
 Through the window the mast and the antennce 
 can be seen. The operators are in constant at- 
 tendance. Messages received are instantly 
 typewritten in triplicate and brought to the 
 commander-in-chief before any one else is per- 
 mitted to see them. 
 
 The other rooms of the little chateau are used 
 as living and sleeping quarters for the staff 
 members. The garden lawn has been con- 
 verted into a military garage, where several 
 high-power automobiles, some of them ar- 
 moured, are kept ready for instant use. Sen- 
 tries are posted at all exits and approaches. A 
 mounted patrol is stabled in the barn. 
 
 For several days messages have been pour- 
 ing into the headquarters exciting the buzzers 
 on the telephone and the wireless outfits, send- 
 ing ordonnanzen scurrying from room to room, 
 dispatching couriers by automobile, and add- 
 ing tape and stickers on the big war map until 
 it resembles a crazy-quilt. Gradually corps 
 after corps have swung into line, and army after 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 263 
 
 army has debouched, under incessant fighting, 
 until they occupy the strategic positions selected 
 for them in advance by the big, square-set man 
 sitting alone in the little room. 
 
 An anxious moment is approaching. The 
 right wing, which was badly mauled by an over- 
 whelming force of Cossacks, has suffered a set- 
 back from which it must recover before the 
 entire field army can operate as a unit. The 
 map shows that reenf or cements have reached 
 the right wing in the nick of time, but it has not 
 been able to advance as yet and is merely hold- 
 ing its own. The whole campaign, involving 
 more than a million troops, hinges on the fate 
 of the hard-fighting right. Every time the re- 
 ceiver clicks and buzzes the officers look up 
 from the map and cease talking, but the expected 
 message does not arrive. The big, square-set 
 man is pacing the room with his hands on his 
 back. A frown has settled over his strong, mar- 
 tial face, but he controls himself well and gives 
 no vent to his emotions. For two days he has 
 spoken only in monosyllables, and only in an- 
 swer to the deferential inquiries of his staff! 
 A lesser man would have been elated at the 
 general advance made by the troops, but this 
 man is aiming for a decisive victory to crush 
 the enemy. Every hour lost by the right wing 
 in re-forming and joining his plan of attack may 
 cost him the battle. 
 
264 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 Once more the wireless buzzer raps. The 
 operator does not wait to type the message but 
 dashes it off on a blank, and the ordonnanz 
 takes it to the commander-in-chief. The big 
 man scowls, for the right is not advancing. 
 Suddenly his face brightens with a daring idea. 
 He pens an order commanding the right wing 
 to feign retreat until it appuys on the centre, 
 then to advance en masse! 
 
 The ordonnanz opens the door and steps 
 aside. The commander-in-chief enters. The 
 officers in the staff-room stand at attention. 
 
 "Gentlemen," he says, " I leave for the front. 
 The battle will be at Tannenberg." 
 
 Soon after a high-power motor-car sweeps 
 out from the terrace of the chateau carrying an 
 ordonnanz beside the chauffeur and an adjutant 
 sitting beside a big, square-set man in a blue- 
 gray mantle. The sentries present arms with 
 a snap, and the big man begins to plan the psy- 
 chological moment of the battle action. At 
 the very juncture when the feigned retreat shall 
 have led the enemy into a trap, and the grand 
 advance of his armies will commence, he, the 
 commander-in-chief, shall be there to lend spirit 
 and dash by his presence, ready to correct a 
 possible error in strategy, and insure the fullest 
 measure of efficient generalship in every divi- 
 sion, in every corps, in every army, and as be- 
 tween army and army. 
 
German Strategy Vindicated 
 
 No matter what one's sympathies may be, 
 any fair-minded person with some comprehen- 
 sion of military matters must admit that in 
 point of strategy and tactical efficiency the 
 German army has proven itself distinctly su- 
 perior to the allied armies. After a study of 
 the various campaigns on the Russian and the 
 Franco-Belgian borders I dare venture the 
 assertion that had the operations been reversed 
 and the allied commanders been forced to step 
 into the shoes of the German commanders, to 
 fight against numerically stronger enemies on 
 two fronts simultaneously, they would have suf- 
 fered defeat by this time. I do not mean to sug- 
 gest by this that the allied commanders are de- 
 ficient in strategy; on the contrary, they are 
 very competent. The French, especially, have 
 demonstrated a high degree of skill in tactical 
 manoeuvres ; the Russians are much better offi- 
 cered and led than in former campaigns; the 
 British closely rival the French in tactics and 
 
 265 
 
266 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 outrival them in technical qualifications ; at least 
 the expeditionary regulars do, whatever the 
 mobilised mercenaries may amount to. Even 
 if Germany were to be defeated before this 
 book can appear the strategy displayed by her 
 Grosser Generalstab [Grand General Staff], 
 and the tactical results obtained by army, corps, 
 and division commanders, as directed by this 
 staff, constitute a measure of preeminence in 
 warfare so decidedly superior to the achieve- 
 ments of allied commanders that the latter 
 would have more to learn from the defeat of 
 the enemy than he could possibly learn from 
 their victory. To bring home the essence of 
 this situation to the commercially trained 
 American mind suffice it to liken the German 
 plan to a highly trained and completely 
 equipped organisation pitted against an enter- 
 prise in which several decisive elements have 
 been left to the initiative of circumstance. It 
 is the difference between the department store 
 method of conducting business and the shop- 
 keeper's plan of resistance. The only arm of 
 the allied forces that was up to the standard 
 of maximum efficiency at the outbreak of war 
 was the British navy, but there is no arm in 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 267 
 
 the German service that is not up to the re- 
 quirements of the standard. 
 
 The Steel Ring Around Germany 
 
 The factors that have induced Germany dur- 
 ing more than four decades to maintain a state 
 of military readiness were of the downright 
 compelling nature dictated by her geographical 
 and industrial position, whereas the circum- 
 stances that induced her enemies to ally them- 
 selves against her were promoted by a com- 
 bination of political and diplomatic aspirations. 
 Germany is the only great power in the world 
 that is surrounded by enemies. Russia has no 
 frontiers in the sense that she does not fear an 
 invasion threatening her existence. France has 
 only one frontier to defend. England remains 
 in a state of "splendid" isolation, leaving her 
 frontier to the care of her navy. 
 
 On the other hand, consider Germany's ex- 
 tremely perplexing position. Toward the East 
 she is confronted with the greatest land power 
 on earth, whose main present ambition is to 
 become mistress of the Baltic, a power that can 
 put upward of ten million troops in the field 
 
268 WAB'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 out of a total population of 170,000,000 inhabi- 
 tants. Toward the West the German eagle is 
 threatened by a power once dominant on the 
 Continent, and while dominant always as 
 brutally aggressive toward Germany as she be- 
 came secretly jealous and vindictive after fall- 
 ing from her high estate. The campaigns of 
 conquest waged on Germany by Napoleon and 
 Louis XIV inflicted a much heavier blow at 
 Prussia than the capture of Alsace-Lorraine at 
 France. Toward the North, threatening her 
 entire coast and her shipping, is the greatest 
 maritime power in the world, with a record of 
 always having opposed, for something like 
 three centuries, whichever power, friend or foe 
 alike, might happen to achieve dominance on 
 the Continent. No single fact in the politi- 
 cal history of Europe has been more thoroughly 
 amplified than that, but it is not to be found 
 in English text-books and readers. The na- 
 tional history of France, the Netherlands, 
 Spain, Denmark, etc., are in evidence, however. 
 The manner of waging war by England follows 
 the precedent of utilising her vast political in- 
 fluence, based chiefly on her weight as a mari- 
 time power, to obtain an ally on the Continent 
 
SUPER-STKATEGY 269 
 
 and incite the same against the dominant nation 
 at the time. There has never been a time when 
 England failed to procure a 1 cat's-paw on the 
 Continent, but of the nations who allowed them- 
 selves to be inveigled it is quite singular that 
 not one has commemorated the event! Unless 
 Belgium erects a monument in gratitude for 
 that handful of British marines that conducted 
 such a "masterful retreat" before Antwerp, 
 the precedent of history will remain intact, 
 and the Belgians have bought their status as 
 cat's-paw with the loss of their country. On 
 the South, Germany has one measurably de- 
 pendable neutral "buffer" in the Swiss re- 
 public, which is fairly coining money in its 
 role as middleman in munitions of war, and may 
 be depended on to remain serenely neutral un- 
 der these conditions. Historically, the status 
 of Italy as an ally has earned the simile of a 
 "man on the fence," and present events show 
 that she means to pursue the glory attaching 
 thereto. 
 
 A Pertinent Parallel 
 
 Such are the main outlines with which the 
 strategy of German diplomacy has had to deal, 
 
270 WAE'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 and which have induced and made necessary 
 the unusually high degree of military prepared- 
 ness on the part of the German Grand General 
 Staff. I am well aware of the fact that the 
 average American reader is not impressed by 
 these conditions because he stands apart in a 
 country separated from the human sources and 
 basis of its being by an ocean of some three 
 thousand miles. A parallel may, therefore, be 
 quite opportune. The single state of Texas is 
 big enough to accommodate Germany and 
 France within its borders. Imagine, then, ap- 
 proximately half of this area peopled by sixty- 
 five million people, adding to their number by 
 one million babies annually. This was the 
 population of the United States at the time of 
 the war with Spain, and it is the population of 
 Germany to-day. With this in mind let us 
 transfer the United States population of anno 
 1900 to Europe and confine it to an area only 
 half as large as Texas, within the constitutional 
 boundaries of Germany, and let us surround 
 it on all sides, shoulder to shoulder with power- 
 ful enemies, the same that Germany now is 
 dealing with, does any sane person believe that 
 the sixty-five million Americans thus confined 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 271 
 
 within Germany's borders would remain there 
 under a negative, submissive national policy, 
 permitting Eussia and France to conspire 
 against their safety, unchecked, standing idly 
 by while England bullied their shipping off the 
 high seas, counteracting their every move for 
 colonial expansion? Would the affirmative be 
 plausible if at the same time these expatriated 
 American millions succeeded by dint of thor- 
 oughgoing application, aided by an orderly and 
 efficient government, in becoming the leading 
 progressive nation on the Continent not only 
 in commerce and industry, but in science and 
 invention, rivalling France in art, music and 
 literature, and defeating England in foreign 
 trade, even at her very doorstep in the 
 colonies? Would it be wrong for an American 
 population thus disposed behind German fron- 
 tiers to contest for a share of the world's trade 
 just because England has amassed to her- 
 self a world monopoly in foreign trade and 
 shipping — because 46,000,000 Britons rule over 
 one-fifth of the habitable globe? Would it 
 be criminal to arm against the possible on- 
 slaught of a state like Russia, still modelling her 
 foreign policy on the prescript of Tsar Peter 
 
272 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 the Great, and already glutted with land to the 
 extent of owning one-sixth of the habitable 
 globe? Would it be "barbarous" to be simi- 
 larly prepared against the French constantly 
 nursing their historic case of injured vanity, 
 conspiring secretly with Eussia for revenge, 
 though their decreasing birth-rate does not call 
 for added territory, which they have acquired, 
 nevertheless, in a very presentable colonial 
 empire, considerably larger than the area of the 
 United States? Add to these comparisons the 
 fact that the American millions thus placed 
 under the Prussian eagle would be required to 
 suffer the additional mortification of standing 
 by while the surrounding enemies would annex 
 or capture valuable colonial possessions in all 
 parts of the world, while preventing the Ameri- 
 cans from getting even a decent foothold, and 
 keep up this policy of estranging and isolating 
 American interests for more than forty years ! 
 It is all very well to criticise Germany for at- 
 tacking before she was herself attacked, for 
 anticipating the ambuscade, so to speak. But 
 it is dangerous to base a personal conviction on 
 the data supplied by official press censors in 
 the hire of the British Government whose con- 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 273 
 
 trol of the cables and the correspondents drawn 
 on by the American press has gradually led, 
 during the last four decades, to the dominance 
 of American public opinion on political subjects 
 abroad. 
 
 How Strategy Operates 
 
 The commander-in-chief conceives a general 
 plan of action either for a defensive or an of- 
 fensive campaign. He elaborates this plan with 
 a view of disposing the various armies under 
 his baton, in positions where it will be possible 
 for them to operate against the enemy on the 
 most favourable terms. He conceives the plan 
 of campaign in its entirety, ignoring detail. 
 He gives definite instructions to the command- 
 ers of the various armies, only. He imposes 
 upon each commander a definite task, the ob- 
 jective, which is correlated to the tasks saddled 
 on the commanders as a whole so as to insure 
 uniformity of operation. He is in constant 
 rapport with the army commanders. As their 
 reports begin to come in over the wires he is 
 in a position to determine the value of a cer- 
 tain progress made or gauge the setback caused 
 
274 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 by a retreat. In the latter case, if the retreat 
 is serious and continued, the commander-in- 
 chief draws on his reserves to prevent a rout. 
 Strange as it may seem, the reserves are the 
 only soldiers who are under the personal com- 
 mand of the commander-in-chief. He follows 
 the movements of the various armies on the 
 map and does not accompany them in the field. 
 As the campaign progresses he is able to fore- 
 see where and when a decisive action is going 
 to be fought; at least, this is possible so long as 
 his armies are on the offensive. A first-rate 
 C. I. C. does not suffer a chance like that to 
 go by without inspiring his army chiefs by his 
 presence. A high-powered automobile, pre- 
 ceded sometimes by a pilot car, takes him to the 
 scene of action at racing speed. He takes no 
 hand in the action, however, merely observes 
 that his instructions, as given by wire, are 
 properly carried out by the army commanders. 
 If a reverse overtakes the embattled troops that 
 could not be foreseen at the time of his issuing 
 the instructions, on which the battle plan is 
 based, the C. I. C. is right there on the spot to 
 grasp the situation and issue remedial orders. 
 The army commander, even if he has a quarter 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 275 
 
 of a million men under his baton, is powerless 
 to issue strategical commands affecting the 
 army as a body, even if he knows what to do 
 and realises that not to do it may mean defeat. 
 Such orders must come only from the C. I. C, 
 and he alone is ultimately responsible. This, 
 then, is the function of strategy as affecting 
 military operations. 
 
 How Tactics Operate 
 
 Strategy is very frequently confounded with 
 tactics, especially by the horde of novelists, 
 humourists, star-reporters and funny men, 
 which a resourceful press forthwith dispatched 
 to the front and generously labelled " war-cor- 
 respondents.' ' Tactics may be said to begin 
 where strategy leaves off. Sometimes they 
 overlap. The strategic work of the C. I. C. is 
 translated into tactical orders by the army com- 
 mander, who is concerned with the movements 
 of his particular army only. These orders are 
 further specialised by the corps commanders, 
 responsible for army corps only, and detailed 
 to the division commanders in charge of divi- 
 sions only, until they reach their ultimate 
 
276 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 crystallised shape as regimental orders de- 
 tailed on colonels in charge of regiments. 
 Tactics, therefore, prescribe the operations of 
 an army on the battlefield together with every 
 unit of which the army is composed. The zone 
 of tactics is confined, therefore, to the move- 
 ment of troops upon the field of battle. The 
 zone of strategy extends from the military base 
 to the battle-lines governing the disposition and 
 placing of troops in the hands of the tactical 
 commanders at points selected for them. Thus, 
 the work involved in placing seven armies in 
 the field on the western frontier and coordinat- 
 ing their operations was strategy performed 
 by Field-Marshal von Moltke, while the task of 
 operating the right wing, for example, and 
 fighting it against the allied left, was the tacti- 
 cal problem intrusted to General von Kluck. 
 The field of strategic execution is the war map ; 
 the field of tactical operation is the battle-line. 
 A presentable volume could be written on the 
 changes in tactics alone. In the present war 
 the fatal zone of infantry and artillery fire is 
 more than three times as large as it was in 1870, 
 and the flattening of trajectories has made the 
 fire so tremendously effective as to compel the 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 277 
 
 modern soldier to fight on his belly and advance 
 like a mole digging its way in the earth. Add 
 to this the fact that the rate of fire has been 
 quadrupled — and in some arms even quintupled 
 — which means that every man and every gun 
 can fire at least four shots for every one that 
 could be fired in the war of 1870, and it is no 
 longer difficult to understand why shock action 
 is not attempted to any extent. The only time 
 soldiers expose their bodies in this war is at 
 the moment when storming a trench, but even 
 this is never attempted until the trench has been 
 "singed" with shrapnel and made untenable. 
 Hundreds of trenches have been taken by both 
 sides in this manner only to be given up and 
 evacuated owing to the enfilading fire of the 
 flanking or supporting trenches. 
 
 During the first four months of the war the 
 Germans were repeatedly criticised for "at- 
 tacking in massed formation" — at least, this is 
 how it looked to war correspondents posted 
 some twenty miles to the rear! Undoubtedly 
 these reports originated from the fact that 
 whenever the Germans ordered an advance 
 en masse it was made from behind cover, usually 
 a shallow trench, during the storm-march into 
 
278 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 France, and the men would attack, on the run, 
 in open line of skirmishers, until close enough 
 for shock action, when they would concentrate 
 and lunge forward for the final assault. This 
 plan of attack appears to have been quite suc- 
 cessful in storming forts and intrenched camps, 
 necessarily at an extraordinary loss of life, and 
 while less suited to breaching permanent 
 trenches it has proven to be about the only 
 effective action for an army constantly march- 
 ing forward and constantly urged to attack to 
 keep up the pace. During the later phases of 
 the campaign, when the Allies took the offen- 
 sive, they were compelled to risk the same 
 method, and only when they get so strong in 
 men and material that they "can afford to risk 
 three lives in storming to one in the German 
 trenches will they be able to assume a general 
 offensive with a view of routing the enemy from 
 his present solid line of intrenchments. 
 
 In this trench warfare it has been reported 
 that both sides have availed themselves of old- 
 fashioned weapons, like catapults, arrows, and 
 old-style mortars. It is possible that individual 
 detachments may have improvised something of 
 this sort in the field, but there is no regular 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 279 
 
 equipment of this description. The German 
 army has a special machine for heavy trench 
 work, called Minenwerfer, which is in reality 
 a small mortar capable of tossing quite a heavy 
 explosive shell into the opposing trenches. 
 These mortars have given a good account of 
 themselves, but the favourite weapon of close-in 
 trench fighting is the 'hand grenade, which is 
 sometimes launched with a sling; perhaps here 
 we have the mystery of i ' catapults. ' ' 
 
 Why Paris Was Not Taken 
 
 The intrenchment tactics of the Germans 
 have been described as a "rout" since they fell 
 back from the Marne on previously selected 
 positions beyond the Aisne. Subsequent events 
 have shown that von Moltke's strategy was jus- 
 tified, for even if the Germans had pushed on to 
 the very walls of Paris — and the French army 
 was not, at the time, able to prevent it — they 
 could have gained no permanent advantage by 
 that, and they would then have committed 
 themselves to a lengthy campaign of pursuit, 
 which would have made it impossible for them 
 to speedily reenforce their menaced Russian 
 
280 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 frontier. By retreating to the Aisne and set- 
 tling down to siege tactics in admirably con- 
 structed trenches the Germans were able to 
 strip their forces of first-line troops and rush 
 them to the Eastern frontier, making it pos- 
 sible for General von Hindenburg to achieve 
 two clean-cut decisive victories, resulting in the 
 capture and loss of nearly a quarter of million 
 Russian troops. The check thus administered 
 sufficed at least to delay the active resumption 
 of the Russian advance by something like two 
 months, and it is doubtful if a result of this 
 magnitude could have been accomplished in 
 France. On the other hand, had von Hinden- 
 burg failed — and he certainly would have failed 
 without adequate reenforcement — the Russians 
 might have been before Berlin at this writing, 
 and at such heavy cost a decisive victory over 
 the French could not be bought. Meanwhile, it 
 must not be forgotten that Germany had vir- 
 tually conquered Belgium together with the 
 only part of Northern France of which she 
 could hope to retain a piece eventually. Even 
 if the German army had succeeded in investing 
 Paris and driven the French army beyond the 
 Loire and the Garonne, France would have 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 281 
 
 refused to capitulate so long as England and 
 Russia remained her allies, depending quite 
 naturally upon them to relieve the military 
 pressure upon her, as they did. In other words, 
 to have permitted the continued advance of the 
 Imperial army would have been a great error 
 of strategy and tantamount to sending it on a 
 fool's errand. By stretching a solid line of 
 trenches across her conquered territory in 
 France and Belgium, based in the southeast on 
 the Swiss Alps and in the northeast on the 
 Channel coast, the German C. I. C. accomplished 
 a master-stroke for by this plan of strategy he 
 enabled his armies in the West to hold the main 
 advantage gained by them, while he empowered 
 his armies in the East to deliver a telling blow 
 and preserve the frontier intact. 
 
 It is quite true that the Germans have made 
 no advance of importance since this plan was 
 carried into effect, that is, when we dispose of the 
 capture of Antwerp and the march along the sea- 
 board toward the Ypres terrain as relatively 
 unimportant. But this much may be prophesied 
 with certainty that should the Allies, who have 
 entirely failed to pierce the German intrenched 
 lines during several months of incessant field 
 
282 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 operations, succeed in rolling the Germans back 
 from the Ypres canal and retake Antwerp, this 
 event would be heralded as something in the 
 nature of a colossal and decisive victory. The 
 Germans have no strategic motive in changing 
 their plan of action on the French frontier 
 until they can administer another blow at 
 Russia that shall relieve their rear once more. 
 The struggle for a base at Calais is purely 
 tactical and of value principally to naval 
 operations. 
 
 If the Germans can hold what they have 
 gained on both frontiers they are quite safe 
 from defeat, but they cannot hold it by simply 
 holding on indefinitely. They have less to gain 
 by purely defensive operations than their 
 enemies. That the German C. I. C. fully real- 
 ises this point is evident by the fact that since 
 the German armies went into intrenchments 
 along the Aisne they have assumed an offensive- 
 defensive rather than a flat defence. That they 
 are outnumbered has not prevented them from 
 forcing such fighting as there has been; they 
 have given the enemy no rest; tactically they 
 are on the defensive, but their operations par- 
 take of the offensive. 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 283 
 
 Grand Scale Super-Strategy 
 
 With about four million troops disposed on 
 a battle-line of two fronts covering about five 
 hundred miles, and opposed by certainly not 
 less than five million allied troops, the military 
 problem confronting the German C. I. C. is so 
 much vaster in extent and so much more difficult 
 of solution as compared to even the mightiest 
 wars of history that it has called into play a 
 kind of super-strategy hitherto unapproached 
 in warfare. When the war is over and the 
 truth is ferreted out to the last button and 
 bayonet, the well-nigh superhuman achievement 
 of the Grand General Staff in expeditiously 
 manipulating vast masses of troops on in- 
 terior lines, flinging them from the Western 
 frontier across Germany to the Eastern frontier 
 to deliver a blow and back again to hold the 
 Western intrenchments by the skin of their 
 teeth, while all the time new troops are being 
 fitted out at the barracks by the army corps and 
 green recruits are drilled to a point of efficiency 
 in a few weeks, is an exhibition of strategy on 
 the grand scale that makes Napoleon's opera- 
 
284 WAK'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tions look like a pastime with toy soldiers. To 
 frustrate the objects of the Prussian super- 
 strategy the Allies have seized upon a plan of 
 counter-operation, which has caused more dam- 
 aging effect to the German arms than any tacti- 
 cal offensive by the Allies. Every time the 
 Germans strip a line of intrenchments to reen- 
 force their offensive on the Eussian border the 
 Allies answer by a counter-offensive on the 
 French border, and vice versa a German ad- 
 vance on the Western frontier is retarded by 
 a Eussian advance on the Eastern frontier. 
 No better plan of counter-strategy could be 
 conceived. It put a stop to the German storm- 
 march through France, and if it could be in- 
 definitely continued on present terms the Allies 
 would not have to win a decisive victory on the 
 grand scale for the utter exhaustion and gradual 
 decimation of the German forces would make it 
 unnecessary. After almost six months of the 
 most savagely contested battle action the Ger- 
 man C. I. C. still holds the upper hand. He 
 retains the advantages and territory gained in 
 the initial advance. What he lost he has made 
 up, meanwhile, in fresh acquisitions. His posi- 
 tion is sound to the core and his armies are not 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 285 
 
 shaken. In the main he has had to take a good 
 deal more punishment than he has inflicted, as a 
 premium for assuming and maintaining the of- 
 fensive for so long. He is still operating on 
 interior lines — a huge advantage — and he has 
 prevented the concerted efforts of allied ene- 
 mies from invading his military borders. Even 
 if he were driven by superior weight of num- 
 bers to take a defensive stand behind the Vis- 
 tula on the East and the Rhine on the West, 
 even if he lost all that had been gained in 
 France and Belgium, the position of Germany 
 would not be desperate, not even as serious as 
 the status of France when the Prussian "pickel- 
 hauben" spiked the borders of the Marne. 
 
 In many ways the strategy pursued by the 
 French C. I. C. is reminiscent of the Fabian 
 policy of the Romans in dealing with the vic- 
 torious armies of Hannibal, the Carthaginian 
 conqueror. Every time the Roman senate dis- 
 patched an army against the invader it was de- 
 feated by Hannibal in open combat. The forces 
 of Hannibal were as distinctly superior in mili- 
 tary efficiency over the Roman legions as the 
 German soldier to-day is superior to his allied 
 opponents. For years Hannibal remained vie- 
 
286 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 torioub. He was by far the greatest military 
 genius since Alexander the Great. Step by step 
 he laid the possessions of Eome under his 
 sceptre. Nothing, apparently, could save the 
 city of Rome from conquest and sack. It was 
 not until the Romans, after trying several make- 
 shifts, adopted a consistent defensive and ceased 
 to openly fight the army of Hannibal that they 
 could devote themselves to the task of harassing 
 its flanks and cutting off its lines of communica- 
 tions, which finally sapped the strength of the 
 Carthaginians. The Romans skilfully avoided 
 open battle during this campaign when they 
 were steadily accumulating strength, and Han- 
 nibal was slowly petering out. Instead of mov- 
 ing upon Hannibal even at this auspicious junc- 
 ture they dispatched Scipio with an army to 
 Spain to fight Hasdrubal, the brother of Han- 
 nibal, on whom the latter depended for reinforce- 
 ments. Scipio won. Then, and not until then, 
 when Hannibal had forfeited his reserves, did the 
 Roman legions move upon the isolated Cartha- 
 ginian army, scoring a victory upon which the 
 course of civilisation hinges as upon a pivot. 
 
 For six months the allied armies have emu- 
 lated the Romans in defensive tactics as cer- 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 287 
 
 tainly as the German forces have followed the 
 offensive of Hannibal. By attacking alternately 
 on the eastern and western borders, though 
 nominally remaining on the defensive, and leav- 
 ing the task of forcing the fighting to the enemy, 
 the Allies have gained in strength perceptibly 
 more than they have suffered in punishment. 
 Had they moved upon the Germans in a general 
 offensive action the chances are that they would 
 have suffered a decisive defeat. Should the 
 Austrian army cease to be of practical aid to 
 Germany, however, and become a burden, the 
 strategic moment would have arrived when the 
 Allies by simultaneously assuming a grand of- 
 fensive action on both borders might place Ger- 
 many in a position where she will have to fight 
 a good deal harder than did Hannibal at Zama, 
 to escape defeat. 
 
 The Strategic Status Quo 
 
 As matters stand at this writing the German C. 
 I. C. has failed to complete the offensive planned 
 on Calais, but he has managed to score two most 
 decisive victories over the Russians in East 
 Prussia and Poland, both of which were her- 
 alded as Muscovite triumphs by the romancing 
 
288 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 censor of Petrograd. Despite these successes, 
 which abundantly demonstrated the superiority 
 of the Germans over the Russians on the battle- 
 field, notwithstanding a noticeable improvement 
 in the latter as compared with their showing in 
 previous campaigns, ever so much more is re- 
 quired of the German soldier to win out in the 
 long run because the Russian soldier, fighting 
 on one. front only, will be able to outnumber 
 him in the proportion of three to one. It has 
 been said and repeated that German statecraft 
 has set a task for German strategy in a war on 
 two fronts entirely beyond the capacity of the 
 German army. Relatively speaking, this is 
 true, but it still remains to be proven conclu- 
 sively true. It must not be forgotten that a 
 German C. I. C. once upset the calculated strat- 
 egy of almost entire Europe in an attempt to 
 crush Prussia, when she was not so well pre- 
 pared as at present, and came out a victor 
 under the historical title of Frederick the Great. 
 The splendid resistance offered by the Servian 
 and the Belgian armies in the face of over- 
 powering odds remains as a present-day ex- 
 ample of the latent and recuperative power of 
 an army pushed to the extreme of its fighting 
 
SUPER-STRATEGY 289 
 
 capacity when actuated by the undying courage 
 of invincible valour and love of country. Never 
 before in history has the German vaterland 
 been so solidly united as at present. Never be- 
 fore have German troops gone into battle with 
 a more formidable spirit of valour and self- 
 sacrifice in order that the vaterland may be 
 saved and its enemies may be vanquished. Ir- 
 respective of whether one likes or dislikes the 
 Germans this much we must concede to them in 
 all fairness. Should the German armies go 
 down to defeat ultimately, snowed under by 
 overpowering numbers, they may be depended 
 on to battle heroically to the last, like the Ger- 
 man cruisers scattered upon the high seas, 
 every one of which knew that she was facing 
 ultimate destruction and none of which surren- 
 dered to the enemy. 
 
 In general, the science of strategy has been 
 less influenced by modern weapons and equip- 
 ments than the tactical branches. If the elder 
 Field-Marshal von Moltke were alive to-day he 
 would probably be the first to reverse his tacti- 
 cal dictum, made famous in the Franco-Prus- 
 sian war of 70-71, to wit, " March divided, 
 fight united.'' 
 
 i* 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
 A Weapon Against War 
 
 To try to stop war by peaceful means is 
 about as futile as to lecture a cat for stealing 
 milk. Peace is the cause of war. No matter 
 how well and how long the human family may 
 manage to live together peacefully, history 
 shows with painful clearness that the longer a 
 condition of peace endures the more certain it 
 is to develop causes for war and to finally pre- 
 cipitate a condition of war. Mankind is en- 
 gaged in perpetual warfare. Sometimes it 
 pauses to catch its breath, and that is peace. 
 There is no real and final peace. What we 
 dignify by the term peace is only a sort of 
 truce. History proves it, every page of it. 
 Mankind ignores the lesson. Every genera- 
 tion thinks it is somehow better than the pre- 
 ceding. Imaginary betterment of this kind is 
 supposed to bring about the disarmament of the 
 nations if not the millennium. One only has 
 to wait patiently and be good and the miracle 
 
 290 
 
EPILOGUE 291 
 
 will happen of itself. But history never fails 
 to apply its stringent lesson, and Europe is now 
 smarting under it, showing that we are as far 
 from the millennium as we ever were. 
 
 Mankind has never learnt anything of itself. 
 It has been forced at every turn to learn, it has 
 been kicked forward on the road to knowledge, 
 it has been frightened into progress. War is 
 a condition of mankind that cannot be abated 
 by arguments. War will not cease until a 
 weapon is found against it. Peace propaganda 
 is about as effective as rotten oranges against 
 a battleship. The pacifists make the mistake 
 of assuming that public opinion is sufficient in 
 itself as a compelling force. Public opinion is 
 stronger in the United States than in any other 
 country — in fact, it is the basic force for all 
 governmental power — but if American public 
 opinion decided in favour of disarmament to- 
 day and determined upon a career of national 
 peace, war would be forced upon the American 
 nation, nevertheless. 
 
 There is nothing the matter with the peace 
 proposition in itself, but it needs the backing of 
 armed force. If we could bring the leading 
 powers of the world together in a mutually pro- 
 
292 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 tective association of interests aiming at peace 
 everlasting, backed by their armed strength, 
 we should be advancing on the proper path to 
 a solution. Entirely aside from the present war 
 if the Entente Cordiale and the Triple Alliance 
 could be persuaded to reduce their armaments 
 on a scale commensurate with native popula- 
 tion and colonial interests, and if this reduc- 
 tion were to be radical, a heavy burden would 
 be lifted from the shoulders of Europe. But 
 comparative disarmament would offer no prac- 
 tical guarantee of peace. It is the first step, but 
 much more remains to be done. If the nations 
 involved could agree to abolish the means of 
 mobilisation, secret armaments, strategic bases 
 and railways, concentration centres, etc., and 
 would content themselves with lining their 
 mutual borders with a policing force of soldiery, 
 subject to the call of the mutually protective 
 association to enforce a state of peace in any 
 serious emergency arising, it would be difficult 
 to make war, and if war ensued, neverthe- 
 less, it would involve only the policing sol- 
 diery. In time, one might proceed further 
 and provide that the soldiery lining the Franco- 
 German borders, instead of guarding oppos- 
 
EPILOGUE 293 
 
 ing sides of the same line, should be fused 
 into a Franco-German soldiery guarding the 
 same border together. If all other borders 
 in Europe were to be similarly protected 
 against aggression, and the concentration and 
 mobilisation of troops other than those actually 
 stationed on the borders were made impossible, 
 war could still be declared, but the chance of 
 gaining anything by it would be so remote that 
 no nation would care to declare war. On the 
 other hand, the incentive to maintain a state of 
 peace would be so strong as to constitute the 
 first and foremost consideration of the powers 
 involved. In such a scheme the demands of 
 peace would have the backing of an armed force 
 supported by the leading nations of the world, 
 and the nation that would dare to break such a 
 covenant would soon be subjugated by the other 
 nations. 
 
 The meanest nation on earth will always in- 
 sist on its right to defend itself by armed force, 
 hence, absolute and unconditional disarmament 
 is impracticable. Neither is it desirable, for a 
 nation undefended is like a city unpoliced and 
 soon becomes a burden or a prey to its neigh- 
 bours. A border constabulary, however, even if 
 
294 WAR'S NEW WEAPONS 
 
 it amounts to an army in itself, is not danger- 
 ous to the world at large so long as it is deprived 
 of means to mobilise and concentrate, and if 
 the same agreement is entered into by the lead- 
 ing powers there should be no loss of dignity 
 on the part of any one power. 
 
 The only serious obstacle to a practical real- 
 isation of this plan is the semi-feudal manner 
 in which diplomacy is conducted, which makes 
 the foreign policy of a nation a thing entirely 
 foreign to the real desires and interests of the 
 nation. This present war did not grow out of 
 hatred between the citizens of the powers en- 
 gaged; in fact, the citizens were most peace- 
 fully engaged in mutual, international rela- 
 tions requiring no resort to arms. Had the 
 people been left to themselves there would have 
 been no war. There was no serious clash of 
 interests between them, only competitive rival- 
 ries in tradal and industrial fields. The clash 
 came between the foreign and diplomatic poli- 
 cies of the governments ruling the peoples. 
 These policies are the trouble-making tools of 
 governments. The house of Romanoff has one 
 originated by Tsar Peter the Great, the Haps- 
 burgs have another, the Hohenzollerns have a 
 
EPILOGUE 295 
 
 third, and the policies pursued by the British 
 Parliament, the French Conseil and the Ameri- 
 can Congress, are just as prolific in trouble- 
 making potency as any subscribed to under the 
 imperial sceptre. They may cause war at any 
 time, even though the peoples committed to 
 them by birth and habitat are not in any sense 
 inclined to war. Consequently, there can be no 
 real and abiding progress toward lasting peace 
 until the elements entering into the foreign poli- 
 cies of the nations have been substituted by 
 elements in harmony with the natural life of the 
 peoples. That such a time may arrive is con- 
 ceivable, but it is so far off in the reckoning of 
 space as to leave no immediate hope of a 
 solution. 
 

 W 
 
 *roi£ 
 
 
 BORROWED 
 
 ^SSSaS*- 
 
 

 VB 4797 
 
 o 
 
 •^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
 '• i ..»*.*