UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE HISTORY OF G R E E C E. VOL. II. S 3 6 8 / c^ /*/ THE HISTORY OF GREECE. By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq. THE SECOND VOLUME. LONDON: Printed by Luke Hansard ^- Sons, ntar Linceln's-Iiin Fields, FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND. 1808. ^ii>?^ •- •• • v.* • • • *-• b? CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME. CHAPTER XIII. Affairs of Greece, from the Thirty-Years Truce to that com- monly called the Peloponnesian War; with a summary view of the history of Macedonia, from the earliest accounts. Sect. I. Administration of Pericles : Science, Arts, and fine Taste ac Athens. Change in the condition of Women in Greece : ^spasia. Popular licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian empire asserted and extended. Project for union of Greece ---------_. p, j_ Skct. II. War between Samos and Miletus: Interference of Athens: Armament under Pericles : Samos taken. Funeral solemnity at Athens in honor of the Slain in their Country's service -----_ p. lo. Sect. III. Affairs of Corcyra : Sedition at Epidamnus : War between Corcyra and Corinth : Defect of the ant lent Ships of War : deficient Naval skill of the Peloponnesians : Sea-fight off Actium : Accession of the Corcyraans to the Athenian Confederacy : Sea-fight off Sybota : Infraction of the Thirty-years Truce - - -- - - - - - - -p. 14, Sect. IV. Summary view of the history of Macedonia. War of Athens with Macedonia : Enmity of Corinth to Athens : Revolt of Athenian dependencies in Thrace : Battle and siege of Potidaa - - - p. 2 s. Sect. V, Assembly of Deputies of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lace- damon : The Thirty-years Truce declared broken. Second Assembly : War with Athens resolved. Embassies from Lacedamon to Athens. Final Rejection of the proposals from Lacedamon by the Athenians p. 33, Sect. YI. Attempt of the Thebans against Plataa - - - - p. 52. Vol. II. b CHAPTER 4QGE0G U CONTExNTS. CHAPTER XIV. Of the Peloponnesian War, from its Commencement to the Death of Pericles, with a summary view of the History of Thrace. Sect. I. State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian Confederacies. Invasion and ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Operations of the Athe- nian Fleet in the fVestern Seas under Carcinus : Gallayit action of the Spartan Brasidas : Ravage of the Peloponnesian coast, and acquisition of Cephallcnia to the Athenian confederacy. Operations of t^e Athenian Fleet in the Eastern seas under Cleopowpus. Measures for the security of Athens : Remarkable Decree : Extermination of the Mginetans. Invasion and ravage of Megaris by the Athenians - - - - - - - p. 58. Sect. II. Summary view of the History of Thrace: Alliance negotiated by Athens with Sitalces King of Thrace and Perdiccas King of Macedonia. Public Funeral at Athens in honor of the Slain in their Country's service. Expedition of the Corinthians against Acarnania and Cephallcnia - p. 70. Sect. III. Second Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Pestilence at Athens. Operations of the Athenian Fleet on the Peloponnesian coast under Pericles ; and on the AJacedonian coast under Agnon. Effects of popular discontent at Athens. First effort of the Peloponnesian Fleet. Attempt of the Peloponnesians to send an Embassy into Persia. Barbarity of the Grecian system of War. Ah Athenian Squadron stationed in the Western sea. Surrender of Potidtea to the Athenians. Death of Pericles - - - ------------ p. 74. CHAPTER XV. Of the Peloponnesian War, from the Death of Pericles, in the third Year, to the Apphcation for Peace from Lace- DJEMON in the seventh. Sect. I. Siege of Plataa by the Peloponnesians - - - - - p. 89. Sect. II. Operations of the Athenians on the Northern coast of the .Mgsan, Affairs of the Western parts of Greece : Assistance sent by Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian Argians and Acarnanians : Battle near Stratus : Sea-fight between the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Corinthian Machcn, and the Athenian Fleet under Phormion : Sea-fight between the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Spartan Cnemus, and the Athenian Fleet under I i Phormion. CONTENTS. iii Pkormion. Attempt to surprize Peiraus. Success of Phormion in Acarnania. Invasion of Macedonia by Sitalces king of 'Thrace - - _ _ p, p^^ Sect. III. Fourth Campain : Third Invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mity^ kn'e. Flight of Part of the Garrison ofPlataa. Siege of Mitylene by Paches. Distress and Exertions of Athens. Transactions under the Lacedemonian Alcidas, and the Athenian Paches on the Ionian Coast - - p. io8. Sect. IV. State of the Athenian Government after the Death of Pericles. Nicias : C/eon. Inhuman decree against the MityleUieans : Death of Paches. Plat£a taken -----------p. 121, Sect. V. Sedition of Corcyra; Operations of the Athenian Fleets under Nico' stratus and Eiirymedon, and of the Peloponnesian under Alcidas - p. 12?. Sect. VI. An Athenian squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. Fnd of the Pestilence at Athens. Sixth Tear of the War : Operations of the Athe- nians, under Nicias on the Eastern side of Greece, and under Demosthenes on the Western: State of Mtolia: Defeat of Demosthenes near Mgitium: A Peloponnesian Army sent into the Western provinces; Ozolian Locris acquired to the Peloponnesian Confederacy : Demosthenes elected General of the Acarnanians \ Battle of 01 pa ; Battle of Idomene : Important suc- cesses of Demosthenes : Peace between the Acarnanians and Ambra- ciots _._-__..._ p, 1^2. Sect. VII. Seventh Campain: Fifth Invasion of Attica. Conquest in Sicily projected by the Athenian administration. Pylus occupied by Demos- thenes: Blockade of Sphacteria: Negotiation of the Lacedemonians at Athens. Cleon appointed General of the Athenian Forces : Sphacteria taken : Application for Peace from Lacedemon to Athens - - - - p. 157. CHAPTER XVI. Of the Peloponnesian War, from the Application for Peace from Laced^mon, in the seventh Year, to the Con- ckision of Peace between Laced^mon and Athens in the tenth Year. Sect. I. Expedition under Nicias to the Corinthian Coast. Conclusion of the Corcyraan Sedition. Embassy from Persia to Lacedamon. Lace- dtcmonian Hand of Cythera., and Mginetan Settlement at Thyrea, taken by the Athenians. Inhumanity of the Athenians - - - - - p. 178. Sect. II. Effects of the superiority gained by' Athens in the War: Se- dition of Megara : Distress of Lacedamon : Movements in Thrace and b 2. Macedonia, iv CONTENTS. Macedonia. Atrocious conduct of the Lacedemonian Government toward the Helots. Brasid.is appointed to lead a Peloponnesian army into Thrace : Lacedemonian interest secured at Alegar a - - - - - p. i86. Sect. III. Sedition in Bxotia and Phocis : Attempts of the Athenians against Bceo/ia : Battle of Delium : Siege of Deliutn - - - p. 194. Sect. IV. March of Brasidas into Thrace. Transactions in Macedonia and Thrace - -------------p. loi. Sect. V. Negotiation for Peace between Athens and Lacedemon. Truce concluded for a Tear. Transactions in Thrace. War renewed. Thespie oppressed by Thebes. War between Mantineia and Tegea. Remarkable instance of Athenian Superstition - - - - - - - - p. 211. Sect. VI. State of Athens: Effect of Theatrical Satire : Qeon fined : Clean appointed General in Thrace: Battle of Amphipolis - - - p. 221. Sect. VII. Passage through Thessaly denied to the Lacedemonian troops. Negotiation for Peace resumed by Lacedxmon and Athens: A partial Peace concluded ♦ ------------p. 229. CHAPTER XVII. Of the Peloponnesian War, during the Peace between Laced^emon and Athens. Sect. I. Difficulties in the execution of the Articles of the Peace. Alliance between Lacedamon and Athens. Intrigues of the Corinthians : New Con- federacy in Peloponnesus : Dispute between Lacedemon and Elis : Dispute between Lacedamon and Mantineia. Tyranny of the Athenian people: Surrender of Scione : Superstition of the Athenian people - - p. 234. Sect. II. Continuation of obstacles to the execution of the articles of the Peace. Change of Administration at Lacedemon : Intrigues of the new Administration ; Treaty zvitk Boeotia ; Remarkable Treaty with Argos j Resentment of Athens toward Lacedamon - ----- p. 243. Sect. III. Alcibiades. A third Peloponnesian Confederacy \ and Athens the leading power - - ---.-_-_._ p. 248. Sect. IV. Lmplication of interests of the principal Grecian Republics. Con- tinuation of dispute between Lacedamon and Elis. Affairs of the La- cedemonian colony of Heracleia. Alcibiades elected General of the Athenian Commonwealth ; Importance of the Office of General of the Athenian Com- monwealth : Influence of Alcibiades in Peloponnesus : War of Argos and Epidaurus. Inimical conduct of Athens toward Lacedamon - p. 257. Sect. CONTENTS. V Sect. V. War of Lacedamon and Argos : Battle near Mantlneia: Sie^e of Epidauriis - - - - -----___. p. 263. Sect. Yl. Change in the Administration of Argos : Peace and AUiance betzveen Argos and Lacedamon : Overthroiv of the Athenian Injiuence, and of the Democratical Interest in Peloponnesus. Inertness of the Lacediemonian Administration : Expulsion of the Oligarchal party from A'gos, and renewal of Alliance bettkjeen Argos and Athens. Siige 0/ Melos bv the Athenians : Fresh Instance of atrocious Inhumanity in the Athenians. . Feeble conduct of the Laredtemonians : Distress of the Oligarchal Argians. Transactions in Thrace. Conclusion of the Sixteenth Tear of the IFar p. 2^4. CHAPTER XVIIL Of the Affairs of Sicily, and of the Athenian Expedition into Sicily. Sect. I. Affairs of Sicily : Hieron King of Syracuse. Expulsion of the Family of Gelon, and Establishment of Independent Democracies in the Sicilian Cities : Agrarian Law. Ducetius King of the Sicels. Syracuse the Soverein City of Sicily. Accession of Syracuse to the Lacedamonian Confederacy : War between the Dorian and Ionian Sicilians : First inter- ference of Athens in the affairs of Sicily : Peace through Sicily procured by Hermocrates of Syracuse - - - ~- - -- - _ p, 281:. Sect. II. New Troubles in Sicily: Nezv interference of Athens; stopped by the Peace betiveen Athens and Lacedismon. Assistance solicited from Athens by Egesta against Selinus. Contention of parties at Athens : Banishment of Hyperbolus. Assistance to Egesta voted by the Athenian Aisembly : Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to command. Mutilation of the Terms of Mercury : Completion of the, preparatiens for the Sicilian expedition, and departure of the Fleet -- - - _ p. 20Q. SaCT. III. Defects of the Syracusan Constitution. Force of the Athenian armament. Measures of the Athenian armament. . Able conduct of Alcibiades, Intrigues, Tumult, popular Panic, and their consequenas at Athens - - - - ~ ---------- p. ■iii. Sect. IV.. Feeble conduct of Nicias: Oppression of the Sicels. First mea- sures against Syracuse. Preparations on both Sides in Winter. Intrigues among the Sicilian Cities. Transactions of the Winter in Greece. Re- ception of Alcibiades at Sparta. Resolution to renew the War with Athens p, 328. Sect, vi CONTENTS. Sect. V. Measures of the Peloponncsians tfi relieve Syracuse. Measures of the Athenian armament in Sicily : Reinforcement to the Athenian armament in Sicily : Siege of Syracuse : Capitulation proposed : Arrival of Gylippus and Pythen to the Relief of Syracuse. Official Letter of Nicias to the Athenian people - - - - - - - - - p.J3il. Sect. VI. Deceleia in Attica occupied by the Lacedamonians. Fresh Reinforcements to the Athenian armament in Sicily. Naval action in the harbour of Syracuse. Distress of Athens. Tax upon the states subject to Athens. Massacre in Bceotia. Naval action in the Co- rinthian gulph --------------p. 355. Sect. VII. Affairs in Sicily. Second naval action in the harbour of Syracuse: Third naval action. Arrival of Re'inforcement under Demos- thenes and Eurymedon : Attack of Epipoltg: Retreat proposed by Demosthenes, opposed by Nicias : Secret Negotiation in Syracuse. Retreat resolved : Consequences of an eclipse of the Moon : Fourth naval action : Distress of the Athenians : Fifth naval action - - - - - - - p. 366. Sect. VIII. Retreat of the Athenians from Syracuse - - - p. 382. CHAPTER XIX. AfFairs of Greece, from the Conclusion of the Sicilian Expedition, till the Return of Alcibiades to Athens, in the Twentv-fourth Year of the Peloponnesian War. Sect. I. Effects at Athens of the nevus of the overthrow in Sicily: Effects through Greece of the overt hrovj of the Athenians in Sicily. Change in the political system of L&cedamon. Measiires of the Peloponnesian coif'deracy for raising a Fleet. Proposals from Eubxa and Lesbos to revolt from the Athenian to the Peloponnesian confederacy - - p. 396, Sect. II. New implication of Grecian and Persian interests. Death of Artaxerxes and Succession of Darius IL to the Persian throne. Effect of the terrors of an Earthquake. Congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy at Corinth. Isthmian Games. Naval success of the Athenians in the Saronic gulph. Influence of A.'cibiades 'in the Spartan councils. A Peloponnesian Fleet sent wider Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, to cooperate with the satrap of Caria and the revolted lonians. Increased distress of Athens. Treaty of alliance between Laced^emon and Persia - - - - p. 404. Sect. III. Progress of revolt against Athens: Exertions of Athens. Siege of Chios. Battle of Miletus. Service of the Peloponnesian arma- ment CONTENTS. vu mettt to the satrap of Carta. Spartan officers, with the title of Harmost, placed in the cities of the Confederacy. Dissatisfaction of the Pelopunnesians with the satrap. Operativiis of the adverse armaments, and intrigues among the Asiatic cities. Change in the administration of Sparta. Com- missioners, sent from Sparta to Ionia, refuse to confirm the treaty with the Satrap. RevoU of Rhodes io the Peloponnesian confederacy - 23.414. S£CT. IV. Alcihiades, persecuted by the new Spartan administration; favored by the satrap of Caria; communicates with the Athenian armament at Samos. Plot for changing the constitution of Athens: Synomosies, or Political Clubs at Athens : Bread betiveen Alcibiades and the managers of I he plot. Netv treaty between Lacedxmon and Persia. Continuation of the siege of Chios, and transactions of the fleets - - - p. 42 c. Sect. V. Progress of the plot for a revolution at Athens: Violences of the Oligarchial party : Proposed nexv form of government : Establishment of the nezv council of administration : Negotiation of the new government for peace with Lacedamon - - - - - - - - - - - p. 439. Sect. VI. Opposition of the fleet and army at Samos to the new government of Athens : Thrasybulus. Dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesian armament with its general. Assistance sent from the Peloponnesian armament to Pkarnabazus satrap of the Hellespont. The restoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian armament: Alcibiades elected general by the armament. Fresh discontent of the Peloponnesian armament : Astyochus succeeded in the command by Mindarus. Commissioners from the nezv government of Athens to the armament at Samos : Able and beneficial conduct of Alcibiades - - - - - - - - - - - - p. 447. Sect. VII. Schism in the nezv government of Athens: Theramenes : A second revolution - - - -- --------- p. ^60. SscT. VIII. Transactions of the Peloponnesian fleet tinder Mindarus, and the Athenian under Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus. Naval action near Abydus. Wily and treacherous policy of Tissaphernes. Naval action near the Trojan shore. Critical arrival of Alcibiades. Naval action 7iear Cyzicus, and capture of the Peloponnesian fleet. Laconic official letter. Liberality of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians. Able conduct and popularity of Hermocrates the Syracusan general - ------ p. 469. Sect. IX. Effects of the naval successes of the Athenians. Reinforce ment under Thrasyllus: His transactions on the Ionian '.cast. Winter (ampain of Alcibiades. Defeat of Pharnabazus. Weakness vf the La- (tdamonian administration - - - -------p. 483. Sect, viU CONTENTS. Sect. X. Importa»t successes of Alcihiaiis. Friendly communication opened with the satrap Pharnabazus. Embassies to the king of Persia. Re- turn of Alcibiades to Athens - --------p. 489. C H A P T E R XX. Affairs ofGREECE, from the Returnof Alcibiades to Athens, till the Conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. Sect. I. State of the Persian empire: Cyms, younger son of Darius II. appointed viceroy of the provinces west of the river Halys. Lysander commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian fleet : Sea-fight of Notium, and its consequences - - - ---------p. 498. Sect. II. Conon commander-in-chief of the Athenian fleet : Callicratidas of the Peloponnesian. Mitylen'e besieged by Callicratidas. Sea fight of Arginusa -.-----_.---__- p. ^08. Sect. III. Impeachment of the generals who commanded at the battle of Arginus<£ -------.-------p. 517. Sect. IV. Sedition at Chios. Lysander reappointed commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian fleet j in favor xvith Cyrus. Unsteddiness of the Athenian government. Measures of the fleets : Battle of Aigospotami p. 530. Sect. V. Consequences of the battle of Aigospotami. Siege of Athens. Conclusion of the Peloponnesian war -------p. ^42. THE THE U HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAPTER XIII. Affairs of GuEECii from the Thirty -Years Truce to that com- monly called the Peloponnesian War; with a summary View of the History of Macedonia from the earliest Accounts. SECTION I. Administration of Pericles : Science, Arts, and Jine Taste at Athens. Change in the Condition of JVomen in Greece : Aspnsia. Popular Licentiousness at Athens. The Athenian Empire asserted and extended. Project for Union of Greece. ATHENS now rested six years, uningagecl in any hostilities; a longer interval of perfect peace than she had before known in above forty years, elapsed since she rose from her ashes after the Persian invasion. It is a wonderful and singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, too little accounted for by anything recorded by anticnt, or imagined by modern writers, that, during this period of tuibulcnce, hi a commonwealth whose M'hole population in free subjects amounted Vql. II. B scarcely 3 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIII. scarcely to thirty thousand families, art, science, fine taste, and polite- ness, should have risen to that perfection which has made Athens the mistress of tli€ world, through all succeeding ages. Some sciences indeed have been carried higher in modern times, and art has put forth new branches, of which some have given new helps to science: but Athens, in that age, reached a perfection of taste that no country hath since surpassed; but on the contrary all have looked up to, as a polar star, by which, after sinking in the deepest barbarism, taste has been guided in its restoration to splendor, and the observation of which will probably ever be the surest preservative against its future corruption and decay. ]\Iuch of these circumstances of glory to Athens, and of improve- ment, since so extensively spred over the world, was owing to Pericles. Peisistratus had nourished the infancy of x\ttic genius j Pericles brought it to maturity. lu the age of Peisistratus books were scarcely known, science Avas vague, and art still rude. But during the turbu- lent period which intervened, things had been so wonderfully prepared, that, in the age of Pericles, science and every polite art waited, as it ■were, only his magic touch to exhibit them to the world in meridian riat. splendor. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomene, whose force of s) US t " understanding and extent of science acquired him the appellation Pint. vit. of the Intellect, had been the tutor of the youth of Pericles, and Pcric remained the friend of his riper years. Among those Avith whom Pericles chiefly conversed was also the Athenian Pheidias, in whom, with a capacity for every science, was united the sublimest genius for the fine arts, which he professed; and Damon, who, professing only music, was esteemed the ablest speculative politician that the world had yet produced. Nor must the celebrated Aspasia be omitted in the enumeration of those to whom Pericles was indebted for the cultivation riat. Meneji. of his mind ; since we have it on the authority of Plato, that Socrates himself acknowleged to have profited from the instruction of that extraordinary woman. It will not be the place here to inlarge upoa the manners any more than upon the arts and knowlege, of the age of Pericles ; } et it may be requisite to advert to one point, in which a great change had taken place Sect. I. CONDITION OF WOMEN. 3 place since the age which Homer has described. The political circum-. stances of Greece, and especially of Athens, had contributed much to exclude women of rank from general society. The turbulence to which every commonwealth was continually liable, from the contentions of faction, made it often unsafe, or at least unpleasant for them to go abroad. But in democracies their situation was peculiarly untoward. That form of government compelled the men to associate all with all. The general assembly necessarily called all together; and the vote of the meanest citizen being there of equal value v/ith that of the highest, the more numerous body of the poor was always formidable to the veal thy few. Hence followed the utmost condescension, or something more than condescension, from the rich to the multitude; and not to the collected multitude only, nor to the best among the multitude, but principally to the most turbulent, ilhnannered, and worthless. Not those alone who sought lionors or commands, but all wlio desired secu- rity for their property, must not only meet these men upon a footing of equality in the general assembly, but associate with them in the gymnasia and porticoes, flatter them, and sometimes cringe to them. The ladies, to avoid a society which their fathers and husbands could not avoid, lived with their female slaves, in a secluded part of the house; associating little with oneanother, and scarcely at all with the men, even their nearest relations; and seldom appearing in public, but at those religious festivals in which antient custom required the women to bear a part, and sacerdotal authority could insure decency of conduct toward them. Hence the education of the Grecian ladies in "-cncral, and particularly the Athenian, was scarcely above that of their slaves ; and, as we fixid them exhibited in lively picture, in the little treatise See also upon domestic economy remaining to ns from Xenophon, they were ^^^i'nst equally of uninstructed minds, and unformed manners. Diogeiiou. To the deficiencies to which women of rank were thus condemned, by custom which the new political circumstances of the country had superinduced upon the better manners of the heroic ages, was owing that comparative superiority, through which some of the Grecian courtezans attained extraordinary renown. Carefully instructed in every elegant accomplishment, and, from early years, accustomed to B 2 converse 4 HISTORY OF GREECE. CnAP.XIir. converse among men, and men of the liighest rank and most improved talents, if they possessed understanding it became cultivated ; and ta their liouses men resorted, not meerly in the low pursuit of sensual pleasure, but to injoy, often in the most polished company, the charms of female conversation, Mhich, with women of rank and character, was plut. vit. totally forbidden. Hence, at the time of the invasion under Xerxes, '^^ more than one Grecian city is said to have been ingagcd in the Persian interest through the influence of Thargelia, a Milesian courtezan, who Avas afterward raised to the throne of Thessaly. Aspasia was also a Milesian, the daughter of Axiochus; for her celebrity has preserved her father's name. With uncommon beauty ■were joined in Aspasia still more uncommon talents; and, with a mind the most cultivated, manners so decent, that, in her more advanced years, not only Socrates professed to have learned eloquence from her, but, as Plutarch relates, the ladies of Athens used to accompany their husbands to her house for the instruction of her conversation. Pericles became her passionate admirer, and she attached hereclf to him during his life : according to Plutarch lie divorced his wife, with whom he had Plat.Menon. lived on ill terms, to marry her. We are informed, on higher autho- & yXlrib.'i. rity? t'l'^t he was not fortunate in his family, his sons being mentioned p. us. t. ?. by Plato as youths of mean understanding. After he was once firmly established at the head of the Athenian administration, he passed his little leisure from public business mostly in company with Aspasia and a few select friends ; avoiding that extensive society in Avhich the Athe- nians in general delighted, and seldom seen by the people, but in the exercise of some public othce, or speaking in the general assembly: a reserve perhaps as advantageous to him, as the contrary conduct was necessary to the ambitious who were yet but aspiring at greatness, or lo the wealthy without power, who desired security to their property. Policy united with natural inclination to induce Pericles to patronize the arts, and call forth their finest productions for the admiration and delight of the Athenian people. The Athenian people were the despotic soverein ; Pericles the favorite and minister, whose business it was to indulge the soverein's caprices that he might direct their measures;- and he had the skill often to direct even their caprices. That fine taste which Sect.I. science, arts AND TASTE. which he possessed eminently, was in some degree general among the Athenians ; and the gratification of that fine taste was one mean by which he retained his influence. Works were undertaken, according to the expression of Plutarch, in whose time they still remained perfect, of stupendous magnitude, and in form and grace inimitable; all calcu- lated for the accommodation, or in some way for the gratification, of the multitude. Plieidias was superintendant of the works: under him many architects and artists were employed, whose merit intitled them to fame Mith posterity, and of whose labors (such is the hardness of the Attic marble, their principal material, and the mildness of the Attic atmosphere) relics which have escaped the violence of men, still after the lapse of more than two thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of design, and even of workmanship, which earned that fame. Meanwhile Pheidias himself was executing works of statuary which Avere, while they lasted, the admiration of succeeding times. Nor docs the testimony to these works, which are now totally, or almost totally lost, rest meerly upon Grecian report; for the Romans, when in pos- session of all the most exfjuisite productions of Grecian art, scanty relics of which have excited the wonder and formed the taste of modern ages, were at a loss to express their admiration of the sublimity of the ■works of Pheidias. When such was the pertcction of the art of sculp- ture, it were a solecism to suppose that the sister art of painting could be mean, since the names of Panasnus, kinsman of Pheidias, a;ul Zeuxis and Parrhas.us, cotemporaries,. remained always among the most cele- brated of the Grecian school. At the same time the chaste sublimity of the great tragic poets iEschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and that extraordinary mixture of the most elegant satire with the grossest buffoonery, the old comedy, as it is called, were alternately exhibited in immense theaters, at the public cxpcncc, and for the amusement of the whole people. Tims captivating the Athenians by their relish for matters of taste and their passion for amusement, Pericles confirmed his authority principally by that great instrument for the management of a people,, his eloquence: but this was supported by unremitted as.siduity ia. public business, and evident superiority of capacity for the conduct of it; HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XII. it; and, above all, by an ostentatious integrity. The whole Athenian .Aptid Pint, commonwealth thus, with all its appurtenances, or, in the vords of Di\'''»rT? cotcmporarv authors, revenues, armies, fleets, ilands, the sea, friend- Alcib. 1. ships and alliances with kings and various potentates, and influence that commanded several Grecian states and many barbarous nations, all were in a m.anncr his possession. Plutarch says that, while thus, during fifteen years, ruling the Athenian empire, so strict and scrupu- lous was his economy in his private affairs, that he neither increased nor diminished his paternal estate by a single drachma: but, according to Isocr. de the more probable assertion, and higher authority of Isocrates, his {"'"'gjj' ~^ ' private estate suffered in maintaining his public importance, so that Auger. i,e left it less to his sons than he had received it from his father. But the political power of Pericles resting on the patronage, Avhich he professed, of democracy, he was obliged to alloM' much, and even to bear much, that a better constitution would have put under more restraint. Such, under his administration, M'as the popular licentious- Pint. vit. ness, that the comic poets did not fear to vent, in the public theaters, the grossest jokes upon his person, the severest invectives against his administration, and even the most abominable calumnies upon his character. His connection with Aspasia was not likely to escape their satire. She was called, on the public stage, the Omphalti of her time, the Deiaueira, and even the Juno. ^Vlan}' circumstances of the admi- nistration of Pericles were malevolently attributed to her influence, and much gross abuse and much improbable calumny was vented against both of them. It would indeed be scarcely possible to distinguish almost any truth amid the licentiousness of wit, and the violence, not to say the atrociousness, of party-spirit at Athens, had we not generally, for this interesting period of history, the guidance of a cotemporary author, Thucydides son of Olorus ; of uncommon abilities and still more uncommon impartiality, and whose ample fortune, great connec- tions, and high situation in the commonwealth, opened to him superior means of information. For what is omitted in the concise review of Grecian affairs, which he has prefixed to his history of the Pelopon- nesian war, we have sometimes some testimony from Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or the orators. To later writers, when not in some 1 1 degree Pexic Sect. I. ATHENIAN EMPIRE EXTENDED. degree siippoited by these, it is seldom safe to trust. Sometimes they have adopted reports carelessly ; and often, as we find Plutarch fre- quently acknowleging, they have been unable to unravel truth amid contradiction and improbability. Indeed Plutarch, tho often extremely negligent, is 5'et often, and especially for the life of Pericles, our best assistant. He frequently quotes his authorities ; and where unbiassed by some evident prejudice, he is generally impartial. We may then trust the united authorities of Thucydides, Isocrates, and Plutareh, notwithstanding the vague accusations reported by Dio- dorus and others, that the clear integrity of Pericles, not less than the wisdom of his public conduct, was his shield against the scurrility of the comic poets, so adapted to make impression on the popular mind, as well as against every effort of the opposing orators '. One great point however of his policy was to keep the people always either amused or employed. During peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme gallics was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was this without a farther use than nieerly ingaging the attention of the people, and maintaining the navy in vigor. Himself occasionally took the command ; and sailing among the distant dependencies of the em- pire, settled disputes between them, and confirmed the power and extended the influence of Athens. The .Sgean and the Propontis did not bound his voj'ages : he penetrated into the Euxine; and finding the distant Grecian settlement of Sinope divided between Timesileos, A^'ho affected the tyranny, and an opposing party, he left there Lamachus with thirteen ships, and a body of landforces, with whose assistance to the popular side the tyrant and those of his faction were expelled. Their houses and property, apportioned into six hundred lots, were offered to so many Athenian citizens; and volunteers were Hot wanting to go upon such conditions to settle at Sinope. To dis- burthen the government at liome, by providing advantageous estab- lishments, in distant parts, for the poor and discontented among the soverein citizens of Athens, was a policy often resorted to by Pericles. ' The expression of Thucydides is of that from ciny other writer: IltfizXSc- Ji/taTC5 forcible kind which is almost peculiar to u> ru n aliJfian xai -rn ytu.y.T,, _v^^/i«Ta» ti him, and to which his character gives an ad- ^laipatw; diupTa-r®' yf»o'fi£»©-. Thucyd. 1. C. ditional weight that it would hardly have c.65,, We 8 HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAr.XIII. Ch.io. S.4. We have already seen him conducting a colony to the Thiacian Cher- of ihisllisi. 5Q„pj^ . a^^j it ^vas during his administration, in the same year, accord* Diod. 1. le. ing to Diodorus, in which the thirty years truce M'as concluded, that Ch^lf'/o*^' the deputation came from the Thessalian adventurers, who had been of this Hist, expelled hy the Crotoniats from their attempted establishment in the deserted territory of Sybaris, in consequence of which the colony was established, under his patronage, with which Herodotus and Lysias settled at Thurium. Plutarch ha^ attributed to Pericles a noble project, unnoticed by any •earlier extant author, but worthy of his capacious mind, and otherwise also bearing some characters of authenticity and truth. It -was no less than to unite all Greece under one great feder.al government, of which Athens shouUl be the capital. But the immediate and direct avowal of such a purpose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous and extensive, as to form insuperable obstacles to the execution. The religion of the nation, tho even in this every town, and almost every family claimed something peculiar to itself, was yet that alone in which the Grecian people universally claimed a clear common interest. In the vehemence of public alarm, during the Persian invasion, vows had been in some places made to the gods, for sacrifices, to an extent beyond what the votaries, mIicu blessed with deliverance beyond hope, were able to perform; and some temples, destroyed by the invaders, pro- bably also from the scantiness of means of those in whose territories they had stood, were not yet restored. Taking these circumstances then for his ground, Pericles proposed that a congress of deputies from every republic of the nation should be assembled at Athens, for the purpose fust, of inquiring concerning vows for the safety of Greece yet unperformed, and temples, injured by the barbarians, not yet restored; and then of proceeding to concert measures for the lasting security of navigation in the Grecian seas, and for the preservation of peace by land also between all the states composing the Greek nation. The naval question, but still more th.e ruin v.hich, in the Persian invasion, had befallen Northern Greece, and especially Attica, while Peloponnesus had felt nothing of its evils, gave pre- tension for Athens to take the lead in the business. On the motion •of Pericles, a decree of llie Athenian people directed the appointment of Sect. I. PROJECT FOR UNION OF GREECE. of ministers, to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has not at all indicated what attention M'as shown, or what participation proposed, for Laceda;mon. His prejudices indeed we find very generally adverse to the Laccdtsmo- iiian government, and favoring the Athenian democracy. But, judging from the friendship which, according to the authentic information of Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archidamus, king of Lace- da;mon, through life, it is- little likely tliat, in putting forward the project for the peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed anything derogatory to the just weight and dignity of Sparta; which would indeed have been, with the pretence of the purpose of peace, only to have put forward a jiroject of contest. Pericles, when he formed his coalition M'ith Cimon, seems to have entered lieartilj' into the inlarged views of that great man, and with the hope that, through their coali- tion, both the oligarchal and the democratical powers in Athens might be held justly balanced, had early in view to establish the peace of Greece on a union between Athens and Laccdamon. It is however evident, from the narrative of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct the measures of the Lacedaemonian government. On a view of all information then it seems most probable that the project of Pericles was concerted with Archidamus; and that the opposition of those in Lacedcemon of an adverse faction, concurred with opposition from those in Athens, who apprehended injury to their interest from a new coalition with the aristocratical party, to compel the great pro- jector to abandon his magnificent and beneficent purpose in a stage so early, that it was no object for the notice of the able and accurate cotemporary historian, in that valuable abridgement of early Grecian history which precedes his narrative of the Peloponnesian war. Vol. II. 10 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. SECTION II. War befzceeti Scnnos and JMiletiis : Interference of Athens : Armament under Pericles: Samos taken. Funeral Solemnity at Athens in honor of the Slain in their Country s Service. Peace between Lacedjemon and Athens was indispensable toward the quiet of the rest of the nation, but, in the vant of such a union as Pericles had projected, was unfortunately far from insuring it; and when war began anywhere, tho among the most distant settle- ments of the Grecian people, how far it might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute between two Asiatic states, of the Athenian confederacy, led Athens into a war, which greatly indangered the B. C. 440. truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely lasted six. Af iletus Thucv/l 1 ^"^^ Samos, claiming each the sovereinty of Priene, itself origi- c. 115. nally a free Grecian commonwealth, asserted their respective pre- tensions by arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering under defeat, apphed to Athens for redress, as of a flagrant injury done them. The usual feuds within every Grecian state furnished assistance to their clamor ; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time in Samos, "the leaders of the democratical party joined the enemies of their country, in accusing the proceedings of its government before the Plat. vit. Athenian people. The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the measures, which followed, to the weak compliance of Pericles with the solicitations of Aspasia, in favor of her native city ; but it appears clearly from Thucydides, that no such motive was necessary- : the Athenian government would of course take connisance of the cause; and such a requisition as might be expected, was accordingly sent to the Samian administration, to answer by deputies at Athens to the charges urged against them. The Samians, unwilling to submit their claim to the arbitration of those who they knew were always systematically adverse to tlie arislocratical interest, refused to send any 1 3 deputies. Peric. Sect. II. WAR BETWEEN SAMOS AND MILETUS. ii deputies. A fleet of forty trireme gallies, however, brought them to immediate submission; their government was changed to a democracy, in which those who had lieaded the opposition of course took the lead ; and to insure permanent acquiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty men and fifty boys, of the first fam.ilies of the iland, were taken as hostages, and placed under an Athenian guard in ilie iland of Lemnos. What Herodotus mentions, as an observation aj)plicable generally, we may readily believe was on this occasion experienced in Samos, * that the lower people were most unpleasant associates to the nobles'.* A number of these, unable to support the oppression to which they found themselves exposed, quitted the iland, and applied to Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, from whom they found a favorable reception. At the same time they maintained a correspondence with tliose of their party remaining in Samos, and they ingaged in their intei-est the city of Byzantium, itself a subject-ally of Atlicns. Collecting then about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, they crossed by night the narrow channel which separates Samos from the continent, and being joined by their friends, they surprized and overpowered the new administra- tion. Without delay they proceeded to Lemnos, and so m'cII con- ducted their enterprize, that they carried off their hostages, together with the Athenian guard set over them. To win more eflfectually the favor of the satrap, the Athenian prisoners were presented to him. Receiving then assurance of assistance from Byzantium, and being not Avithout hopes from Lacedaemon, they prepared to prosecute their suc- cess by immediately undertaking an expedition against Miletus. Information of these transactions arriving quickly at Athens, Pericles, Thucyd. 1. i. with nine others, according to the antient military constitution, joined '^' ^^'^'^^^• with him in command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty trireme galleys. Sixteen of these were detached, some to Chios and Lesbos, to require the assistance of the squadrons of those ilands, Uie rest to the Carian coast, to look out for a Phenician fleet in the Persian service, which was expected to support the Samians. Pevicles with the remain- ing forty-four ships met the Samian fleet of seventy, returning from Miletus, and defeated it. Being soon after joined by forty more Sutcixtifta uxcii'TinuToy. Ilcrod. 1. 7. C. 156. c 2 gallics c. 41. ,e HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. gallies from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he debarked his infantry on the iland of Samos, and laid siege to the city of the same name, by land and sea. Intelligence meanwhile arriving that the fleet from Phenicia was approaching, Pericles went with sixty of his gallies to Caunus in Caria; apparently apprehensive for his small squadron there. The Samians, under the conduct of the able Melissus, (who, as was not unusual in that age, united the charac- . ters of philosopher and military commander) hastened to profit from his absence. Issuing unexpectedly from the harbor with their fleet, they attacked the Athenian naval camp, which was unfortified, destroyed the ships stationed as an advanced guard ', and then defeated the rest of the fleet, hastily formed for action against them. Becoming thus masters of the sea, during fourteen days they had all opportunity for carrying supplies into the town. Thucyd. 1. 1. j\Iean\vhi!e an assembly of deputies from the states of the Pelopon- nesian confederacy w^s held at Sparta, to consider whether the aristo- cratical party in Samos should be protected in what, according to Grecian political tenets extensively held in that age, was rebellion'*. The Corinthians, yet weak from the consequences of their last war Avith Athens, principally decided the assembly to the rejection of the proposal. Indeed, unless an invasion of Attica by land might have been effeatual, tlie confederacy had not means to carry it into exe- cution ; for its naval strength was very unequal to a contention with that of Athens. The Samians, thus disappointed of assistance from Peloponnesus, were weakly supported by the satrap, and the promised succour from Byzantium was delayed. The return of Pericles therefore compelled them to confine themselves within tlieir harbor: and shortly a rein- forcement arrived to him, which might have inabled a less skilful ^ Txi •afo^v^ar.'i^ai; jaD; : for which may an account to the Athenian assembly of be consulted Scheffer's treatise de Wililid what iiad passed at Sparta upon the occasioa Navali, 1.3 c. ■!■. p. IDS. tho he is not very mentioned in the text, affirmed that their satisfactory. 1 would not however uiidtr- deputies had asserted the right of every value his laborious compilation, which may leading city to ruxiSH its allies: ti>l« often guard against the supposition of what cipsri^out iufi.jMa.x'-vi «ito> ti»« ittAa^Eii. Thu- was not, where it fails to inform what was. eyd. J. 1. c,43. * ^linisters from Coiinih, afterward giving' commander Sect.II. funeral solemnity. 13 commander to overbear opposition ; forty gallies from Attica, under Thucydides', Agnon, and Phormion, were followed by twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, while thirty came from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made one vain attempt to cut oif a part of this formidable naval force; and then, in the ninth month from the com- mencement of the siege, they capitulated : their ships of war Avere surrendered, their fortifications were destroyed, they bound themselves to the payment of a sum of money by installment for the expences of the war, and they gave hostages as pledges of their fidelity to the soverein commonwealth of Athens. The Byzantines, not waiting the approach of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be reiidmitted to their former terms of subjection, which was granted. This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the admi- nistration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace of the commonwealth ; and in the event contributed rather to strengthen its command over its dependencies. Pericles took occasion from it ta acquire fresh popularity. On the return of the armament to Athens,. the accustomed solemnities in honor of those who had fallen in the war were performed with new splendor ; and in speaking the funeral oration,, he e>rerted the powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification of the people. As he descended from the bema, even the women pre- .sented him with chaplets; an idea derived from the ceremonies of the public games, where the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something approaching to divine honor, was held among the highest tokens of admiration, esteem, and respect. » The historian not hiiving distinguished gined a third person of the name, nowhere the Thucydides here spoken of, by the men- else mentioned in history. No certainty can tion of his father's name, it remains in doubt be had,^ and the matter is not important; ■who he was. Some have supposed him the but the first supposition appears to me far historian himstlf ; others, the son of Me- the most probable. Aguon and Phormion lesias, once the opponent of Peiiclcs, now become, in the course of the history, farther reconciled to huii ; while others have ima- known to us. U HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. SECTION III. Affairs of Corcyra : Sedition at Epidamnus : IFar beticeen Corcyra and Corinth : Defect of the antient Ships of JTar : d(fcient Naval Skill of the Peloponnesians : Sea-Fight off Actium : Accession of the Corcyrxans to the Athenian Confederacy : Seafght off Sybota : Infraction of the Thirty-Years Truce. The tlireatened renewal of general war in Greece having been obviated, b} the determination of the Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between the Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed during the next three years after the submission of the Samians; or, if hosti- lities occurred anywhere, they were of so little importance that no account of them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a corner of the country, hitherto little within the notice of history, the hlaze rapidly spred over the whole, with inextinguishable fury ; inso- much that the further history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is chiefly a tale of calamities, which the nation, in ceaseless exertions of misdirected valor and genius, brought upon itself. The iland of Corcyra, occupied in an early age by a colony from Corinth, became, in process of time, too powerful to remain a depen- dency, and, becoming independent, was too near a neighbor, and too much inaae-ed in the same course of maritime commerce, not to be the rival and the enemy of its metropolis. It was common for the Grecian colonies, even when they acknowleged no political subjection, to pay a reverential regard to the mother-country ; holding themselves bound Thucyd. 1. 1. by a kind of religious superiority. At all public sacrifices and festivals, the citizens of the mother-country Avere complimented with the pre- C.24. . cedency ; and, if a colony was to be sent out, it was usual to desire a citizen of the mother-country for the leader. Thus, it was supposed, the gods of their forefathers would still be their gods, would favor the enterprize, and extend their lasting protection to the settlement. Corcyra, already populous, had not yet intirely broken its con- nection with Corinth, Avhen the resolution was taken by its gover- ment to settle a colony on the lUyrian coast. An embassy was there- fore Sect.III. sedition AT EPIDAMNUS. 3» fore sent, in due form, to desire a Corinthian for tlie leader. Phalius, of a family boasting its descent from Hercules, Avas accordingly appointed to that honor: some Corinthians, and others of Dorian race, accompanied him ; and Phalius thus became the nominal founder of Epidamnus, M'hich was however considerd as a Corcyraean, not a Corinthian colony. But in process of time, Epidamnus, growing populous and wealthy, followed the example of its mother-country, asserted independency, and maintained the claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, during many years, lorn by sedition ; and a war supervening with the neighboring barbarians, it fell much from its former florishing state. But the spirit of faction remaining, in spite of misfortune, untamed, the commonalty at length expelled all the higher citizens. These, finding refuge among the Illyrians, ingaged with them in a predatory war, which was unremittingly carried on against the city by land and sea. Unable thus to rest, and nearly deprived of means even to subsist, the Epidamnians in possession resolved to request assistance from Corcyra. Conscious however that their state had no claim of merit with the mother-country, those deputed on this business, when they landed on the iland, instead of presenting themselves with the confidence of public ministers, put on the usual habit of suppliants, and betaking themselves to the temple of Juno, thence addressed tlicir petition. The government of Corcyra appears to have been at this time aristocratical ; and hence arose, with the Epidamnian ministers, the greater doubt of a favorable reception. In their petition, therefore, they ventured to desire nothing more than the mediation of their metropolis with their expelled fellov/citizens, and protection against the barbarians ; but even this humble supplication was totally rejected. On the return of their ministers, the Epidamnians, in great distress, Thucd. 1. 1. determined to recur to the antient resource of desponding states, the ^'^ ' Delphian oracle. Sending a solemn deputation to Delphi, they put * the question to the god, ' Whether it Avould be proper for them to ' endevor to obtain protection from Corinth, by acknou'leging that city ' as their metropolis, and submitting themselves accordingly to its 'authority?' le HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIII. ^ authority?' Tlie response directed them, in clear terms, to do so ; and a deputation was in consequence immediately sent to Corintli*. The Corintliians were upon no friendly terms witli Corcyra. The people of that iland, now among the richest and most powerful of Greece, had not only shaken off all political dependence upon them, but denied them all those honors and compliments usually paid by Grecian colonies to their parent states. Animosity therefore stimulat- ing, the oracle incouraging, and the appearance of a fair claim seeming moreover to justify the opportunity for making an acquisition of dominion, the Corinthians accepted tli^e proposal of the Epidamnians. A number of adventurers was collected to strengthen the colony ; and a body of Corinthian troops, with some Ambraciot and Leucadian B.C. 436. auxiHarics, was appointed to convoy them. Fearful however of the ^•- ss-t- naval force of Corcyra, which far exceeded that of Corinth, they passed by land to ApoUonia, and, there imbarking, proceeded by sea to Epidamnus. No sooner was it known at Corcyra that the Corinthians had thus taken possession of a colony in whose affairs the Corcyrasans themselves had refused to interfere, tlian the affair was taken up with warm resent- ment. Twenty-five triremes were immediately dispatched, with a requisition to the Epidamnians to receive their expelled fellowcitizens (for these had now been supplicating protection from Corcyra) and to dismiss the Corinthian colonists and garrison. Tliis being refused, a reinforcement was sent to the squadron, M'hich, in conjunction with the expelled Epidamnians and the neighboring Illy'rians, laid siege to the town. 1. I.e. 27. The Corinthian government was prepared to expect such measures. * E» -aapaSoUii KofiMtif Tr,t «;o'xir, perhaps elsewhere to be found ; but we are is oixirxTc— — 'o S:'avToii assT^i •nra§«Ja»ai, without means of determining the exact xa) hyifioiai; woisiVGai. Thucyd. 1.1. c.25. import of the expressions ■arajjitJSvai ri* «TeAi» In Thucydides's account of the disputes «; imira.i'i, and iyi/xo»af «o«raSai, and we are between Corinth, Corcyra, and Epridamnus, equally uninformed of the proper authority and of that which followed about Potidxa, of those Corinthian magistrates whom we we have more authentic information con- find, in the sequel, aimually sent to the cerning tke proper connection between a colony of Fotidsea in Thrace. Creciaa colony and its metropolis, thjin is As Sect.III. war between CORCYRA AND CORINTH. 17 As soon therefore as intelligence of them was received, a proclamation vas published, offering the privileges of a citizen of Epidamnus to any who would go immediately to settle there, and also to any who, chusing to avoid the dangers of the present circumstances, would pay fifty drachmas toward the expense of the expedition. What the advantages annexed to the citizenship of Epidamnus M'ere we are not informed, but an allotment of land would probably make a part, and the sum to be risked was small. Corinth abounded with rich men and poor; and many were found to ingage personally in the adventure, and many to pay for the chance of profit from the event. But Corinth had at this time only thirty ships of war, whereas Corcyra was able to put to sea near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application was therefore made to the republicsj with which Corinth was most bound in fliendship, for naval assistance. Eight ships were thus obtained from Megara, four from the Palcans of Cephallenia, five from Epidaurus, one from Hermionc, Thucyd. ]. j, two from Treezen, ten from Leucas, eight from Ambracia, and the '^'~'' '^' ' Eleians lent some unmanned. Loans of money were moreover obtained from the Eleians, Phliasians, and Thebans. It had been the settled policy of the Corcyrceans, danders and strong c. 3','. & seq, at sea, to ingage in no alliances. They had avoided both the Pelopon- ncslan and the Athenian confederacy ; and with this policy they had hitherto prospered. But, alarmed now at the combination formed against them, and fearing it might still be extended, they sent ambas- sadors to Lacedffimon and Sicyon ; who prevailed so far that ministers c. 28. from those two states accompanied them to Corinth, as mediators in the existing differences. In presence of these the Corcyrajan ambassadors proposed, to the Corinthian government, to submit the matters in dis-^ pute to the arbitration of any Peloponuesian states, on which tliey could agree ; or to the Delphian oracle, which the Corinthians had supposed already favorable to them. The Corinthians however, now prepared for war, and apparently persuaded that neither Laceda:mon nor Sicyon would take any active part against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, and the Corcyriean ambassadors departed. The Corinthians then hastened to use the force they had collected. j> q 435 Vol. 11. D The oi.78|. 18 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. Tlie troops were already imharked, when they sent a herald to Corcyra formally to tleclare war ; a ceremony required by custom, which, throughout (ireece, was held sacred. But tho they would not omit this, they would delay it, till it might in the least possible degree answer its proper purpose. The armament, consisting of seventy-five- triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed infantry, under the command of Aristeus son of Pellicus, then proceeded for Epidamnus. Off Actium in the Anactorian territory, at the entrance of the Ambracian gulph. where, as the cotemporary historian describes it, the temple of Apollo, stands (a place destined to be in after-times the scene of more im-- portant action) a vessel came to them with a herald from Corcyra, depre- cating hostilities. The Corcyrjeans had manned those of their ships* which were already equipped, and hastily prepared some of those less in' readiness, when their herald returned, bearing no friendly answer. With eighty galleys they then quitted their port, met the enemy, and- g^ainedacompk'tevictory, destroying fifteen ships. Returningto Corcyra,- the}' erected their trophy on the headland of Leucimnc, and they imme- diately put to death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom they. kcpt in bonds. Epidamnus surrendered to their forces on the same day. The ojjportunities now open, for both revenge and profit, were not neglected by the Corcyrteans. They first plunderedthe territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, still connected w ith the mother-countrv.: then going to the coast of Peloponnesus, they burnt Cyllene, the naval arsenal of Elis. Continuing nearly a year unopposed on the sea, there was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprizes; by some of which they gained booty, by others only go-ve alarm, but by all toge- R. C. 434. ther greatly distressed the Corinthians and their allies. It was not Ol 87 i . . ■ ^' till late in the following spring that the Corinthians sent a fleet and some troops to Actium, to observe the motions of the enemy, and give protection to their friends, wherever occasion might require. All the rnsuing summer the rival armaments watched oneanother without coming to action, and on the approach of winter, both retired, within their respective ports. Thucyd. 1.1. But, since their misfortune off Actium, the Corinthians had been un- *"^'' rcmittingly assiduous in repairing their loss, and in preparing to revenge it. Sect. III. ALLIANCE OF CORCYRA WITH ATHENS. 19 it. Triremes were built, all necessaries for a fleet M'ere largely collected, rowers were ingaged ihrougliout Peloponnesus, and where else they could be obtained for hire in any part of Greece. The Corcyreeans, informed of these measures, were uneasy, notwithstanding their past success, with the consideration that their commonwealth stood single, while their enemies were members of an extensive confederacy; of which, tho a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful exertions were nevertheless to be apprehended. In this state of things it appeared necessary to abandon their antient policy, and to seek alliances. Thucydides gives us to understand that tliey would have Thuryd. l.i, preferred the Peloponnesian to the Athenian confederacy ; induced, apparently, both by their kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. But they were precluded from it by the circumstances of the existing war, Corinth being one of its most considerable mem- bers ; and there was no hope that Lacedaemon could be ingaged in measures hostile to so old and useful an ally. It was therefore deter- c. 3u mined to send an embassy to negotiate alliance with Athens. A measure of this kind, among the antient commonwealths, if they had any mixture of democracy, was unavoidably public; and this is one among the circumstances favorable to antient history, which counterbalance the want of some advantages open to the historians of modern ages. Gazettes were then unknown; records and state writings were comparatively few; party-intrigues indeed abounded ; but public measures were publicly decided; and some of the principal historians were statesmen and generals, bred to a knowlege of politics and war, and possessing means, through their rank and situation, of knowing also the facts which they related. Such particularly was Thucy-. dides, son of Olorus, who has transmitted to us the transactions of the times with which we are now ingaged. No sooner then, as we learn from him, was the purpose of the Corey rttans known at Corinth, than ambassadors M'cre sent thence also to Athens, to remonstrate ao-amst it. The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal ora- tion. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A truce D 2 existed ^0 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. existed, bat not a peace, with a confederacy, inferior indeed in naval force, but far superior by land ; and Attica, a continental territory, was Thucyd. 1.1. open to attack by land. That recent circumstance in the Samian * ' war, the assembling of a congress at Sparta, for the purpose of consider- ing whether the Samians, an Ionian people, a colony from Athens, and members of the Athenian alliance, should not be supported in war against their metropoUs, the head of their confederacy, could but weigh in the minds of the Athenian people. The meer summoning of such an assembly, to discuss such a question, strongly indicated the disposition of a powerful party at least in the Lacedcemonian confe- deracy; and the determination of the question, in the negative, demon- strated a present unreadiness, principally among the Corinthians for the renewal of hostilities, from which they had lately suffered, rather than any friendly disposition to Athens. The security of Athens rested prin- cipally on her maritime superiority. But Corcyra was, next to Athens, the most powerful by sea of the Grecian republics ; and to prevent the accession of its maritime strength, through alliance, or through con- quest, to the Pcloponnesian confederacy, was highly important. In the articles of the truce, moreover, it was expressly stipulated, that €,35.(5-40. any Grecian state, not yet a member of either confederacy, might at pleasure be admitted to either. But, notwithstanding this, it was little c. 44. Ifss than certain, that, in the present circumstances, an alliance with Corcyra must lead to a rupture with the Pcloponnesians ; and this con- sideration occasioned much suspence in the minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was held to debate the question. On the first day, the arguments of the Corinthian ambassadors had so far effect that A nothing was decided: on the second, the question was carried for the alliance M'ith Corcyra. Thucydides gives no information what part Pericles took in this important and difficult conjuncture. If it was impoffible, as it seemh to have been, to establish secure peace with Lacedsmon, it would become the leader of the affairs of Athens to provide for maintaining future war; for strengthening the Athenian, and obviating acces- sion of strength to the Lacedfemonian confederacy. But we are enough informed that Pericles would be further pressed by other cir- cumstances. sect.iii. preparations for war. si ciinistauces. The difficulty of keeping civil order in a comnumit}' of lordly beggars, such as the Athenian people were, which had diivcn Cimon, in advanced years, to end his life in distant enterprize, we shall find, in the sequel, a difficulty for which, even in speculation, the v.'isest politicians were unable to propose any remedy, be3-ond finding the fittest objects for restless ambition. It is therefore everyway likely that Plutarch had ground for asserting, that the eloquence of Pericles was employed to promote the decision to M'hich the people came. The character of the measure taken, in pursuance of the decision, may seem to indicate the wisdom of Pericles, guiding the business: with all other states of the confederacy the alliance was offensive and defensive; with Corcyra it was ibr defence only. Meanwhile the Thucyd. earnestness with which the Corinthians persevered in their purpose of ' " prosecuting the war against the Corcyrteans, now to be supported by the power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in support, on their side, from the Lacedeemonian confederacy ; some members of which indeed were evidently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleians, resenting the burning of Cyllene, had exerted themselves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes completely manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia, made their whole fleet a hundred and fifty : the crews would hardly be less than forty thousand men. With this large force they sailed to Cheimerion, a port of Thesprotia, overagainst Corcyra, M'herc, according to the practice of the Greeks, they formed their naval camp. The Athenian government, meanwhile, desirous to confirm their i. ].c.45. new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the command of Laceditmonius son of Cimon; but with orders not to fight, unless a descent should be made on the iland, or any of its towns should be attacked. The Corcyra:ans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, put to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive 1. 1. c.4T. of the Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one of the small ilets called Sybota, the Sowleas or Sowpastuves, between their own iland and the main. Their landforces at the same time, with a thou- «and o» HISTORY or GREECE. Chap. XUI. sand auxilliarics from Zacyntlis, iiicampeJ on the headland of Lucimnc in Core via, to be prepared against invasion ; while the barbarians of the continent, long since friendly to Corinth, assembled in large numbers on the opposite coast. The necessity among the antients for debarking continually t^ iucamp their crews, arose from the make of their ships of war. To obtain that most valuable property for their manner of naval action, swiftness in rowing, burden was excluded : insomuch that not only they Tliucvd 1.4. could not carry any stock of provisions, but the numerous crews could c- -<»• neither sleep nor even eat conveniently aboard. When the Corinthians quitted the port of Cheimerion, with the purpose of bringing the Corcyrfean fleet to action, they took three days provision ; which Thucydides seems to have thought a circumstance for notice, because it appears to have been the practice of the Athenians, when action was expected, hardly to incumber themselves with a meal. ^Moving in the night, the Corinthians, with the daWn, perceived the Corcyrajan fleet approacliing. Both prepared immediately to ingage. So great a number of ships had never before met in any action between Greeks and Greeks. The onset was vigorous; and the battle Mas maintained, c.4<». on either side, with much courage but little skill. Both Corcyraean and Corinthian ships were equipped in the antient manner, very inarti- ficially. The decks were crouded with soldiers, some heavy-armed, some with missile weapons ; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians, trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled a battle of infantry rather than a sea-fight. Once ingaged, the number and throng of the vessels made free motion impossible : nor was there any attempt at the rapid evolution of the diecplus, as it was called, for piercing the enemy's line and dashing away his oars, the great objects of the improved naval tactics ; but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon the heavy- armed soldiers who fought on the decks. Tumult and confusion thus . prevailing everywhere, Lacedamionius, restrained by his orders from fighting, gave yet some assistance to the Carcyreans, by showing himself \vhere\er he saw tliem particularly pressed, and alarming their enemies. The Corcyra-ans were, in the left of their line, successful : twenty of their ships put to flight the ^legariaus and Ambraciots who were 1.7. c. 39,40. 1. 1.C.4S. C.50. Sect. III. S E A-F I G H T S O FF S Y B O T A. 23 were oppoted to them, pursued to the shore, and, debarking, plundered and burnt the naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, had meanwhile been gaining an advantage, Avhich became decisive through the imprudent forwardness of the victorious Corcyrteans. The Atheniiuis now endevored, by more effectual a.«sistance to their allies, to pre\ent a total rout: but disorder was already too prevalent, and advantage of numbers too great against tliem. The Corinthians pressed their success ; the Corcyra'ans fled, the Athenians became mingled among them ; and in the confusion of a running fight, acts of hostility unavoidably passed between the Athenians and Corinthians. Tiie defeated however soon reached their own shore, whither the con- ■ querors did not think proper to follo^^^ In tbe action several gallevs had been sunk: most bv the Corin- Thncyd. l.i, 7 ' . c. 50. thians, but some by the victorious part of the Coreyr^an fleet. Tlie crews had recourse, as usual, to their boats ; and it M'as common for the conquerors, when they could seize any. of these, to take them in tow and make the men prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of the right of their fleet, in the hurry and confusioia of the occasion, not easily distinguishing between Greeks and Greeks, inadvertently de- stroyed many of their unfortunate friends. Wh^n the pursuit ceased, and they had collected whatever they could recover of the wrecks and of their dead, they, carried them to a desert harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, like the neighboring ilets, Sybota ; and depositing them under the care of their barbarian allies, who were there incamped, they . returned, on the afternoon of the same day, •with the purpose of renewing attack upon the Corcyrasan fleet. The Corcyrceans meanwhile had been considering the probable conr sequences of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon their iland, and the ravage of their lands. The return of their victorious squadron gave them new spirits : Lacedjemonius incou- raged them with assurance that, since hostilities had already passed, he would no longer scruple to afford them his utmost support ; and they resolved upon the bold measure of quitting their port, and tho, evening was already approaching, again giving the enemy battle. . Instantly they, 24 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIII. they proceeded to put this in execution. The pR;an, the song of battle, was aheady sung, wlicn the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. Thucyd. Xhe Corcyrasans uere at a loss immediately to account for this ; but presently they discovered a squadron coming round a headland, which had concealed it longer from them than from the enemy. Still uncer- tain V, hether it might be friendly or hostile, they also retreated into their port ; but shortly, to their great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica in the apprehension that the small force under Laceda-monius might be unequal to the occurring exigencies, took their station by them. c. 52. Next day the Corcyraeans did not hesitate, with the tliirty Athenian ships, for none of those under Lacedremonius had suffered materially in the action, to show themselves oif the harbour of Sybota, where the enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians came out of the harbour, formed for action, and so rested. They were not desirous of risking an iugagement against the increased strength of the enemy, but ' they could not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their stock of provisions ; and they were incumbered Mith more than a thousand prisoners ; a Very inconvenient addition to the crowded complements of their galleys. Tlieir object therefore was to return home : but they were apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, would not allow C.63. an unmolested passage. It Avas therefore determined to try their disposition, by sending a small Vessel, with a message to the Athenian commanders, without the formality of a herald. This was a service not without danger; for those of the Corcyrceans, who were near enough to observe what passed, exclaimed, in the vehemence of their animosity, ' that the bearers should be put to death ;' m hich, consider- ing them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of the Greeks. The Athenian commanders, however, thought proper to hold a different conduct. To the message delivered, Avhich accused them of breaking the truce by obstructing the passage to Corcyra, they replied, ' that it was not their purpose to break the truce, but only to * protect their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose to go, they 2 • might Sect. III. END OF THE CORCYRTEAN ^yAR. 25 ' might go without interruption from them; but any attempt against * Corcyra, or any of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians ' to the utmost of their power.' Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians, after erecting a trophy Thucyd. ]. i. at Sybota on the continent, sailed homeward. In their way, they took by stratagem Anactorium, a town at the mouth of the Ambraciau gulph, which had formerly been lield in common by their common- wealth and the Gorcyra?ans ; and leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of their prisoners they found near eight hundred had been slaves, and these they sold. The remainder, about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded, but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. Among them were some of the first men of Corcyra; and through these the Corinthians hoped, at some future opportunity, to recover their antient interest and authority in the iland. The Corcj'rteans, meanwhile, had gratified themselves with the erection of a trophy on the iland Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to the Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian fleet returned home ; and thus ended, without any treaty, that series of action which is distinguished by the name of the CorcyriEan, or, some- times, the Corinthian war. SECTION IV. Summary View of the History of Macedonia. IVar of Athens with Alacedonia : En?nity of Corinth to Athens : Revolt of Athenian Dependencies in Thrace: Battle and Siege of Potidcea, The cotemporary historian has strongly marked the difficulties of those who might have desired to guide the soverein people of Athens in the paths of peace and moderation. The Corcyrajan war M-as far too small an object for their glowing minds : the view toward Sicily and the c. 44. adjacent Italian shores were fondly looked to for new enterprize. Nor pf^t *';i^''' was it intended to stop there. Where spoil allured no difficulty daunted ; Peiid. and the wild vision of conquest was extended from Calabria to Tus- VoL. II. E cany, e6 riut. ibid. & Thucvd. 1. 1. c. 14-1. .^'scliyl. Danaid. Justin. 1. c. 1. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XI 11. cany, and from Sicily to Carthage. Pericles endcvorecl to repress this extravagant and dishonest ambition ; and his view was assisted by circumstances Mliich necessarily ingagcd attention nearer home. The '. jAvns which the Athenians held under their dependency on the northern shores of the iEgean, some highly valuable for their mines of gold and silver, others furnishing the principal supplies of naval timber, and all paying some tribute, gave Athens a near interest in the affairs of IMac£D0NIa. That country, peopled by the same Pclasgian race which principally gave origin to the Greeks, and brought afterward under the dominion cf a Grecian colony, claimed always to be a parf. of Greece. Its history however, as that of most other Grecian states, is almost only known through connection with Athenian history. Thucydides, who must have had superior opportunity, appears to have been able to discover little more than the genealogy of its kings, down- Avard from Perdiccas, mIio was ancestor in the seventh degree to Alex- ander son of Amyntas, the reigning prince at the time of the invasion of Greece under Xerxes. Ilerod.l.s. Thucvdides and Herodotus agree in ascribing the foundation of the c. 137. " . . ... Thucyd. 1.2. I\Iacedonian monarchy to Perdiccas; but later writers have given the * -■ honor to a prince wliom they call Caranus, and whose grandson they reckon Perdiccas. "We cannot but doubt this addition to the pedigree of the IMacedonian kings, when opposed by the united authorit}' of Herodotus and Thucydides, almost within whose memory that pedigree liad been judicially discussed at the Olympian meeting'. Tliree brothers, according to Herodotus, Heracleids of the branch of Temenus> of whom Gavanes was the eldest, and Perdiccas the youngest, passed from Argos into Macedonia, where the latter acquired the sovereinty ; and it seems not improbable that the ingenuity of chronologers, with a little alteration of the name, has converted the elder brother into the grandfather*. The founder of the jMacedonian royal family however was, according to every account, aa Argian, descended from Temcnus ' Thus the learned and geneiallyjudicious began to reign 8l\ years before the '^'hrisliau Henrj Doriwell : Tres illos reges Eusehiams aera, and 36 before the first Olympiad; Per- resciiidiiidosarbitror. Annal. Thucyd. ad. diccus 729 years before the Chris;i;.in ara, Sinn. A. C. 454-. in the fourth year of the 12th Olympiad. * According to the chronologers Caranus the Sect. IV. MACEDONIA. 27 the Heracleid, whence the princes of that family were commonly called Temenids. By a series of adventures, of which romantic reports only Herod. I. 8. remain, he acquired command among the Macedonians; a Pelasglan clan, who held the inland province of iEmathia, otherwise called Macedonia proper, to the north of Thessaly, and then esteemed a part of Thrace. The ]Macedonian name, accordino; to fahle, fahricated however, Schol. ad . : c • V. 226. 1. 14. apparently, in a late age, had its origin from Macedon, son of Jupiter iiiaJ, and iEthria. How the followers of Perdiccas came to assume it, and by what wars or what policy they acquired extensive dominion, we have no precise information; but circumstances are not wanting whence to deduce some probable coi.jecture. The innumerable clans who shared that extensive continent, being in a state of perpetual warfare among oneanother, the situation of the Macedonians, when the Argive adven- turers arrived among them, might be such as to make them glad to associate strangers, whose skill in arms and general knowlege were superior to their own. "While civil and military preeminence were therefore yielded to the new comers, and royalty became established in the family of their chief, the name of the antient inhabitants, as the more numerous, remained. In the course of six or seven reigns the Macedonians extended their dominion over the neighboring provinces of Pieria, Bottiaja, Mygdonia, part of Pteonia, Eordia, Almopia, Anthe- Tlmcjd. 1.2. nious, Grestonia, and Bisaltia ; all, together with ^mathia or IMace- ^'^^^ donia proper, forming what acquired the name of Lower Macedonia, which extended from mount Olympus to the river Strymon. Tiie people of some of thc'se provinces M'ere exterminated, of some extirpated; some were admitted to the condition of subjects, and some probably reduced to slavery. The expelled Pierians established themselves in Thrace, at the foot of mount Pangjeus ; the Bottifcans found a settle- ment nearer their former home, in a tract on the borders of Chalcidice, which Thucydides distinguishes by the name of Bottica. Lyncestis ^ jqi_ and Eleimiotis, with some other inland and mountainous provinces, c. 99- each retaining its own prince, yet acknowleging the sovereinty of the Macedonian kings, became known by the name of Upper Macedonia. While wars almost unceasing with savage neighbors, and frequent E 2 rebellions Herod. 1.5. c. 22. & 1. (). C.45. Thucvd. 1. 2, c. 59."& 1.5. c. SO. Herod. 1. 5. c. 21. & 1. 8. c. 136. •lustiii. 1. 7. c. 3. Herod. 1. 8. c. J 36. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIIL rebellions of conquered subjects, prevented the progress of civilization among the Macedonians, the weakness of the prince and the wants of the people concurred to incorage Grecian establishments on the coast; of which however the principal, those of Chalcidice and the three peninsulas, had been made probably before the ]\Iacedonian kingdom had acquired any considerable extent. Iiut in so little estimation was Macedonia held by the Greeks at the time of the Persian M'ars, that when, in his father's lifetime, Alex liudei son of Amyntas offered himself as a competitoi for tliL prize of the .-,:adion at the Olympian games, it was objected to him that he wis a i.arbarian. The prince however proving himself nof only a Greek, but a Heracleid of the race of Temenus, M'as aduiitted by the HeUanodics, with the approbation of the assenibiy ; and that illustrious origin of the royal family of Mace- donia, fully acknovvleged by both Herodotus and Thucydides, was, among ;ill the invectives of the Grecian orators in aftertimcs, never disputed '. The marriage of Gygeea sister of Alexander with Bubaris, a Persian of high rank, contributed to the security of the Macedonian kingdom, when Xerxes invaded Greece. Alexander was a prince of considerable abilities, improved by communication both with Greeks and Peisians ; but after the retreat of Xerxes, he had so many M'ars to sustain against the neigboring barbarians, that, tho generally success- ful, he had little leisure for attending to the advancement of arts and knowlege among his people. Long before the establishment of the Athenian sovereinty over the ilands and coasts of the ^'Egean, there had been a friendly connection between the commonwealth and the Macedonian kings; in consequence of which, at the time of the Persian invasion, Alexander son of Amyntas was esteemed the hereditary guest of Athens. While he lived, the fi iendly connection seems not to have been interrupted or impaired, by any acquisition of sovereinty to the commonwealth, extending over tovvns which might be esteemed within Macedonia. * Deniosthenes, among other illiberal ventured an attempt to show any: he has language, adapted to excite las audience mcerly thrown oui ihe ugly nickname to the against the great Philip, would call that Athenian populace, for the chance of the prince a barbarian. /Eschines called De- vogue it might obtain, and the eliect it niostbenes a barbarian, and showed his might produce, ground for it; but Demosthenes has not His Sect.IV. war of ATHENS with MACEDONIA. 29 His son and successor Perdiccas was honored with adoption to the citizenship of Athens, forhis merit witlr the Greek nation, in defeating a body th the Persian forces, in their retreat from Greece; and the alliance passed to liim as an inheritance. But diffei'ences afterward arose. One of lac principalities of Upper Macedonia was the appanage Thiuyd. 1. 2. of Philip yuuiig'^r brother of Perdiccas, and another was the inheritance '^- ^'^^' of Dei lias r. prince more distantly related to the royal family. About the time u." the Corcyra^an war, Perdiccas proposing to deprive both his brother ai-n his cousin of their territories, the Athenian administra- tion thougbt proper to take those princes under its protection, and support them against the intended injury. Perdiccas resented this as a breach of the antient alliance, and perhaps he was not without reason jealous of the ambition of the Athenian people. The authority and influence of the two priiiccs, however, were so considerable, that to attack them, while they could be supported by the power of the Athe- nian commonwealth, would have been hazardous : but the circumstances of the times offered a resource suited to the genius of the INlacedonian king, who, M'ithout his father's virtues, was not without abilities. The Athenians hati just taken a decided part in the Corcyrsean war. Tlie hostile disposition of Corinth toward them was in consequence avowed ; that prevailing in Laceda^mon was well known to Perdiccas ; and an opportunity for intrigue, which ivoultl probably involve the Athenian commonwealth in war, with Corinth immediately, and ultimately with Lacedaemon, occurred in his very neighborhood. Thus invited, Per- diccas, ambitious, active, crafty, and unrestrained by any principle of integrity, determined to persevere in his purpose. The town of Potidaa, critically situated on tne isthmus which con- nects the fruitful peninsula of Pallent with the coniines of Thrace and Macedonia, was a Coriiilhian colony; so tar sti'l dependent upon the mother-country as to receive magistrates annually thence, yet ne\er- theless among the tributary allies of Atiiens. Perdiccas sent an offer to Corinth to assist in recovering Potidtea from the Athenian dominion. He sent at the same time to Lacedtemon to propose alliance with that state, or to become a member of the Peloponuesi^n confederacy : and he negotiated not only with the Potidaaus but also with the Chalci- dians 30 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. Xllf. tUans and Bottifcans, subjects of Athens in liis ncighborhuocl, to induce ihcm to revolt. The Athenian government, informed of these transactions, and aware of the hostile disposition of Corinth, judged immediate precaution necessary to the preservation of their command on the northern shores of the .-Egean. A squadron of thirty ships of war was already preparing in the port of Peirceus, to be accompanied by a thousand heavy-armed infantry, for the support of the Macedonian princes Philip and Dcrdas, According to that despotic authority then ^\hich the Athenian people Tluicvd. 1. 2. assumed over the Grecian states of their alliance, peremptory orders c. 50" ^ 57. were sent to the Potidzeans, to demolish their fortifications on the side of Pallene, to give hostages for security of their fidelity, and to send away their Corinthian magistrates and receive no more. The Potidieans c. 58. very averse to obey, yet afraid to dispute these commands, sent ministers to Athens to solicit a recall or a mitigation of them ; but at the same time they communicated privately, in common with the Corinthians, at Sparta, to solicit protection, if the Athenians should persevere in their requisition. The petition to Athens proving ineffectual, and the leading men in the Spartan administration " promising that a Peloponnesian army should invade Attica, if the Athenians attempted to inforce their commands by arms, the Potidceans communicated with the Chalcidian.: and Bottiaeans, a league was formed and ratified in the usual manner by oaths, and all revolted together. We have ample assurance that the command of the Athenian people over their subject states, always arbitrar}', was often very oppressive ; but as scarcely any accounts of the times have been preserved but through Athenian writers, few particulars have been transmitted to us. It is then from an Athenian writer -we have information of the measure next resorted to by the Chalcidians • and, under the foreseen necessity for such a measure, it must apparently have been a galling oppression that could induce a people to revolt. The lands of their rich peninsula would be open to ravage from the superiority of the Athenian fleet, and its produce not only m'ouUI be lost to them, but would assist the enemy to carry on the war against them. To obviate this evil as Sect. IV. REVOLT of CHALCIDICE: WAR avith CORINTH. $i as far as might be, Perdiccas proposed to the Chalcidians, that they should themselves destroy all their sea-port towns, and abandon their lands; tliat Olynthus should be made tlieir one strong place; and that all the ir people, beyond what the defence of that city would require, should remove, with their families, to a territory which he would assign them about the lake of Bolbe in Mygdonia; by the cultivation of vhich they might subsist tdl the war should be over. This proposal, severe as the sacrifice on the part of the Chalcidians must be, Ma* acceptetl, and the measure, at least in great part, executed. These transactions were yet unknown at Athens, when the armament Tlmcyd. 1. ?» intended for Macedonia sailed under the command of Archestratus. His instructions directed him to go first to Potida^a, and see the orders of the Athenian government executed there ; then to take any measures that might appear expedient for preventing revolt in any other towns of the dominion of Athens in that neighborhood; and not till tliesc ■were secured, to prosecute the proposed operations in Macedonia. On his arrival in Chalcidice, finding the revolt already complete, he judged his force insufficient for any effectual measures there, and he therefore turned immediately toward Macedonia, to favor a projected invasion of the inland frontier of that kingdom by Philip. Meanwhile the Corinthians, who had dissuaded war when the com- c.40 i^ (Jo. mon cause of their confederacy only had instigated, became vehement in the call to arms when the particular interest of their own state was infringed. No negotiation was proposed, no desire to have differences c 69. 71. & accommodated according to the stipulations of the existing treaty was '^" inentioned ; but, while their ministers were everywhere assiduously endevoring to excite alarm and indignation among their allies, they prepared themselves inimtdiately to assei t their cause by force. Six- teen hundred heavy-armed and four h.undred light-armed troops, partly volunteers of Corinth, partly ingaged for hire among the otlier states of Peloponnesus, were sent to Potidiua, under Aristeus son of Adei- mantus, who had particidar connections with that colony, and was esteemed there: and so much diligence was used in the equipment, that it was only the fortieth day afttr the revolt v/hen they arrived. The Athenian government, on receiving intciligence of these pro- c. 61. ccedings 32 HISTORY OF GREECE. Ciiap.XIIL cecdings of the Corinthians, sent Callias son of Calliades with forty triremes and two tliousand heavy-armed to join the Httle army under Archestratus. That army, with the assistance of its Macedonian con- federates, had aheady taken Therme and was besieging Pydna, when Callias arrived. The business of the revolted colonies being deemed of more importance than the prosecution of hostilities, however successful, against Perdiccas, proposals were made to that prince. He was not scrupulous, and perhaps reasonably enough had little confidence in any treaty witli any of the republics. A treaty however, not of peace only but alliance with him, was hastily concluded, in which some care apparently was taken of the interests of his brother and the other revolted princes; for so the clear interest of the Athenian people would require; and then the whole Athenian force, with a considerable body of allied infantrv, and six hundred Macedonian horse from Philip, marched for Potida?a. Thucyd. 1. 2, Perdiccas held his inQ;aQ;ement with the Athenians no longer than to c. 62. . serve some present purpose, and then immediately sent two hundred horse to join the army of the Corinthians and their allies. In this confederate army it was necessary to establish, by common consent, some system of command. By election, therefore, Aristeus, general of the Corinthian forces, was appointed commander-in-chief of the in- fantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry. A compliment seems to have been intended to the ^Macedonian monarch, ^\'hether he esteemed the appointment such, ue are not informed ; but he deputed his general lolaiis to execute the office. The Athenian army soon after approach- ing, an action iusued, in which Aristeus, with a chosen body, performing the duty more of a brave soldier than of an able general, broke and pursued a part of the enemy's line, while the rest completely routed his c. 63. remaining army, and drove the survivors for refuge within the Avails of Potidiea. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed ; but Aristeusy returning from pursuit, not without difficulty and loss, by a hazardous effort, joined his defeated troops in the town. The Athenian army sat e. 64. down before it, and being soon after reinforced with sixteen hundred men under Phormion, they blockaded it by land and sea. *=• ^^- Aristeus, who, notwithstanding his error in the battle, appears to 2 have Sect. IV. WAR OF ATHENS WITH CORINTH. 53 have been a man of considerable abilities, as well as of daring courage and indefatigable activity, having regulated things within the place in the best manner for sustaining the siege, found means to slip out of the harbor, unnoticed by the Athenian guardships. Going himself to Olynthus, to take the command of the allied forces there, he hastened dispatches to Peloponnesus with information of what had passed, and pressing for a reinforcement, without which Potidfea, he said, could not be saved : for Phormion was now so superior, that, after having com- pleted a contravallation against the place, he could spare a part of his army to ravage Chalcidice and the Bottisean territory, and he took some smaller towns. S E C T I O N V. Assembly of Deputies of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedcetnon : The Thirty-years Truce declared broken. Second Assembly : JFar with Athens resolved. Embassies from Lacedcemon to Athens. Final Rejection of the Proposals from Lacedcemon by the Athenians. It is from the account, remaining from Thucydides, of that compli- cated and lasting war, to which the affairs just related immediately led, that we derive our best knowlege of the political and military state of Greece, with much collateral information concerning science, arts, and manners, during the period when those circumstances are most interesting; that remarkable period, when the leading Grecian com- monwealths had a political importance, in the affairs of the world, beyond all proportion to their natural strength, and when science and art arose among them to a splendor totally unknown in preceding ages, and never in all points equalled since. If therefore, in following the steps of that able writer, we meet with circumstances which on first view appear little ; if armies ingaged are not numerous ; if the affairs of single towns, and sometimes of small ones, occupy some space in narration ; it must not be concluded that the subject is trifling, since Vol. II. r those 34 IIISTORV OF GREECE. Chap. XIIT. those apparently little matters are connected witli consequences among the most important that occur in the liistory of mankind. Among those Greeks who were not held in suhjection, the Corin- thians appear to have been most aflFected by the rising power of Athens : their commerce was checked, and their colonial dependencies, not absolutely taken from them, were however compelled to acknowlege a degree of sovereinty in the Athenian people, and to pay a tribute ; nominally for the common purposes of Greece, but more reiilly for the particular benefit of Athens. The irritation excited by the check given to their ambition in former wars, and particularl}^ by the loss of friends and relations in the unfortunate action in Miiich ]\Iyronides com- manded against them, was thus kept alive, and the Corinthians Tbucyd, 1. 1. nourished the sharpest animosity against the Athenians. "When there- c. 67. f^^y.Q intellio-ence came from Aristeus of the transactions in Clmlcidice, far from abating of their ardor for war, they applied themselves -with increased sedulity to excite their whole confederacy, and especially Lacedsemon, to take up their cause: 'The truce,' they exclaimed, * was already broken, and Peloponnesus insulted and injured.' At the same time the iEginetans, who bore most impatiently their subjection to Athens, yet feared to make any open demonstration of a disposition to revolt, complained, by secret negotiation among the Peloponnesian states, of the dependency in which they were held, contrary, as they contended, to the treaty ; and they redoubled their instances as they found a growing disposition to hostilit}'. Thus instigated, the Lace- da;monians at length convoked the usual assembly of deputies from the states of their confederacy; and they invited the attendance of ministers from any other Grecian republics which might have any complaint to prefer against Athens. The debates and negotiations whVh followed, afford, in the detail given by Thucydides, so much insight iuti> the politics, the political manners, and the temper of Greece at the time, that, with the risk of some appearance of uncouthness to the modern reader, I shall venture to report the more material parts without abridgement, and with the least deviation that may be from the expression of the original. The 5 deputies Sect.V. PELOPONNESIAN congress. 35 deputies of the confederacy, or a large proportion of them (for it appears Thucyd. ]. i, to have been not a full meeting) being arrived at Sparta, the general ^' '* assembly of the Lacedfemonian people was convened. There happened to be present at the time ministers from Athens, commissioned on some c. 72. other public business; and these were allowed to attend the audience, M'ith the deputies of the confederacy. All being met, proclamation was c, 67, made, according to the custom of the Grecian assemblies, declaring permission for those to speak M'ho had an3'thing to advance. Many came forward exhibiting various complaints against the Athenian government, mostly little important or dubiously founded, excepting those of the Mcgarians and Corinthians. The Megarians urged that, contrary to existing treaty, they were, by a decree of the Athenian people, prohibited all commercial intercourse by land with Attica, anil excluded from all ports within the Athenian dominion. The Corin- thians reserved themselves, till the others should have prepared the " minds of the Lacedemonian people for warmer instigation, and then spoke nearly thus : ' That strict faith, Lacedsemonians, which characterizes your con- c. 6s. ' duct in public and in private affairs, inclines you to disregard accu- ' sations against others ; and hence indeed you obtain the just praise * of moderation and equity, but you remain ignorant of the transactions ' of forcin states. Often we have forewarned you of the wrongs which ' the Athenians were prepaiing for us; but not till we had already ' sufiered, and hostilities were commenced, would you sumnmn this ' assembly of our confederacy; in which we have perhaps more cause ' than others to come forward, injured as we have been by the Athe- ' nians, and neglected by you. Not that we alone are inteiJsted : all ' Greece is concerned; many states being already reduced to subjec- * tiou, and others notoriously threatened ; among which some have, * from treaties of alliance, especial claim to our protection. Corcyra, ' capable of furnishing a fleet superior to that of any republic of our ' confederacy, is already taken from us ; and Potida=a, our most ' important post for holding dominion or carrying on commerce in * Thrace, is at this time besieged. * Nor can we avoid saying that these injuries, which we have thus F 2 'suffered. 56 Thiicvd. 1. 1 c. 69'. c. 70, HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. ' suftered, are in great measure to be imputed to you. After the Persian •' war, you permitted the Athenians to fortify their city; then to build ' their long walls ; and still you have continued to look on, tliO boast- * itig to be vindicators of the freedom of Greece, while they have * deprived of freedom, not only their own, but our confederates. Even ' now the convention of this assembly has been with difficulty obtained ; ' and even now we meet apparently not for the purpose which ought ' to be the object of our consideration. For is this a time to inquire ' whether we have been injured ? Xo, rather how we shall repel injury. ' You have the reputation of being provident and circumspect; but * facts do not justify the opinion. The Persians, we know, came ' against Peloponnesus from the farthest parts of the earth, before you * had made aay ade.quate preparation for defence ; and now you are * equally remiss against the Athenians in your neighborhood. Thus, ' as the barbarian failed principally through his own misconduct, so * their errors, and not your support, have inablcd us hitherto to main- ' tain ourselves against the Athenians. Let it not however be imagined ' that this expostulation is prompted by resentment; we expostulate ' with our friends who err ; we criminate our enemies who injure us. ' But you seem unaware what kind of people the Athenians are, and ' how totally tliey differ from you. They are restless and scheming, * and quick to execute their schemes. You are ever bent upon the * preservation of what you possess ; averse to projects ; and in execu- ' tion, even of necessary measures, deficient. They, again, are daring ' above their strength, adventurous even beyond their own opinion of ' prudence, and full of hope in the midst of misfortune. It is yoiir * disposition always to do less than your power admits, to hesitate even ' when acting on the surest grounds, and to think yourselves never ' free from danger. They are quick, you dilatory ; they fond of roam- * ing, you more than all others attached to your home; they eager to ' make acquisitions in any distant parts, you fearful, in seeking more, * to injure what you already possess. They push victory to the utmost, ' and are least of all men dejected by defeat; exposing their bodies for ' their country, as if they had no interest in them, yet applying their ' minds in the public service, as if that and their private interest were ' one. Sect.V. PELOPONNESIAN congress. 37 one. Disappointment of a proposed acquisition they consider as loss of what already belonged to them ; success in any pursuit they esteem only as a step toward farther advantages ; and, defeated in any attempt, they turn immediately to some new project by which to make themselves amends : insomuch that through their celerity in executing -whatever they propose, they seem to have the peculiar faculty of at the same time hoping and possessing. Thus they con- tinue ever, amid labors and dangers, injoying nothing, through sedu- lity to acquire ; esteeming that only a time of festival, in which thev are prosecuting their projects ; and holding rest as a greater evil than the most laborious business. To sum up their character, it may be truly said, that they were born neither to injoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer others to injoy it. ' When such a commonwealth is adverse to you, Lacedaemonians, you still delay. You will consider those only as your enemies who avow hostility; thinking to preserve peace through your antiquated maxims of policy and equity, defending yourselves but offendino- none, which are no longer fit for these times. It has been by other maxims, by new arts, and by a policy refined through modern expe- rience, that Athens has risen to a greatness which now threatens us all. Let this then be the term of your dilatoriness : give at length that assistance to your allies which, by the stipulations of our con- federacy, you owe them, and relieve the distressed Potidieans. This can no longer be effectually done but by an immediate invasion of Attica; which is the measure necessarily to be taken, unless you would leave a friendly and kindred people a prey to your most deter- mined enemies; and compel us, disposed by every considera! ion of interest, affection, and habit, to maintain our connection with you, through despair, to seek some new alliance. Consult then your own interest, and do not diminish that supremacy in Peloponnesus which your forefathers have transmitted to you.' The Athenian ministers judged it consonant neither to the dignity Tin-cyj l. j. of their commonwealth, nor to the commission under which they acted, c. 72. to answer particularly to the charges thus urged by the deputies of the Pcloponnesian confederacy before the Lacedemonian people ; yet they thought 4C3206 38 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. thought it not proper, on such an occasion, to be intiiely silent. They aj)plied tlieiefoie to the ephors tor leave to address the assembly, whicli Thiic)-d. 1. 1, was allowed them", and they spoke to the following purpose: ' They ■ ' ■ ' considered themselves," they said, ' not at all in presence of those who ' had any right to assume connizance of the conduct of the Athenian ' commonwealth or of its allies ; yet as they had been so publicly ' witnesses to so virulent an invective against those in whose service ' they were commissioned, they thought it proper to admonish the * assembly not to determine lightly and hastily concerning a matter of c.73&:74. ' very great moment.' Having then mentioned the merit of the Athe- nian people with all Greece in the two Persian invasions, and the sense which the Laccdcemonians themselves at the time expressed of it, they c. 75. proceeded to observe, ' That the command of the Athenian people * among the Grecian states had been acquired, not by violence, but by * the dereliction of the Lacedicmonians, and by the consent, and even * at the solicitation of the subordinate republics: that they had a fair * interest in so glorious a possession, so honorably earned, which their ' reputation, not less than the advantages of command, would urge ' them to maintain ; and that even their just apprehensions forbad ' them to relinquish it, since the jealousy of the Lacedjemonians, long ' apparent, and now especially evident in the transaction of the present ' day, amply demonstrated what would be their danger in surrendering c.76&i7~, ' the smallest portion of their present power.' They then endevored to palliate, but they were indeed equally unable to deny as to justify, the general despotism of the Athenian people over their subject states, and the particular measures of severity which had been taken against c. 78. some of them. In conclusion they asserted, that tlrc truce was not broken by them, neither had they yet to complain that the Lacedaemo- nians had broken it. They exhorted therefore perseverance in peaceful measures; they claimed for their commonwealth the justice to which it was iutitled by the stipulations of the existing treaty, which directed a mode of judicial proceeding for the determination of disputes that '° Uf'ffiM>\ii ai ToK AaxiJaiMOMoif, "ip«7a» tiis acccssissent. — This translation is justi- poiM<7^at Koi a.vh\ U to ■E^^i9o; ajlir [tTiut. fifcd by tlie contest, and by other passages Cum igitur ad Lacedaemuniuruni ma"htia- ol' the author. might Sect.V. PELOPONNESIAN congress. S9 might arise ; and tliey declared themselves, in the name of their com- monwealth, readv to abide judgement accordingly. ' Should the ' Lacedjemonians determine to refuse such justice, they submitted ' their cause to the gods, who had been invoked to attest the treaty, * and their commonwealth would defend itself and its just command * to the utmost.' When the Athenians had concluded, the forein ministers were Tlmryd. 1. 1. required to withdraw, and it remained for the Lacedemonians to debate ^' '^' and to decide upon the question. Thucydides, in his exile, as himself informs us, had opportunities, not open to many foreiners, for acquiring !■ 5. c. 26. information concerning the internal transactions of the LacedEemonian state. After the greater number of speakers, he proceeds to relate, had l-i- c.79. declared their opinion that the Athenians had already broken the truce, and that war should be immediately commenced, Archidamus came forward J the prince who, above thirty years before, had deserved so well of his country, by his conduct in the Helot rebellion. In advanced age now, he maintained the reputation of a wise and temperate man '*, and he addressed the assembly thus : ' I, Lacediemonians, have had experi- c. 80. ' ence of many wars, and I see those among you, my equals in age, who ' will not, as happens to many through inexperience, urge war as in ' itself desirable, or in its consequences certain. Within Peloponnesus ' indeed, against bordering states, when hostilities arise, decision *" may be quick; and, the forces on both sides being the same in ' kind, the preponderancy of one or the other may be a subject ' of calculation. But the war now proposed is widely different: ' operations are to be carried far from our frontier, against those whose ' fleets command the seas, who are superior to every Grecian state in * wealth, population, and forces, cavalry as well as infantry, and v/ho * besides have under their dominion many tributary allies. In our * present unprepared situation, to Avhat do we trust for success in ^ attacking such an enemy ? To our fleet ? No ; we are too inferior. * To our riches ? Far less; neither our public treasure nor our private ' wealth can bear any comparison with theirs. We are superior, it is ' said, in the force of infantry of our confederacy, and we will ravage c. si, ' theu* •40 Thucvd. 1. 1. c. S2." c. 83. e. 84, 85. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. their countrj'. But they have large possessions, far beyond the reach of your infantry, and a fleet tliat will come and go Avith the produce, undisturbed by any force that you can oppose to it ; while your irresistible infantry will starve amid the devastation itself has made. Instead therefore of bringing your enemy immediately to terms by such measures, I rather fear you will leave the war as an inheritance to your posterity. ' Let it not however be imagined that I advise to suffer tamely tlie oppression of our allies, or to leave designs against ourselves unnoticed till the moment of execution. Let us, on the contrary, prepare for war; let us endevor to extend our alliances, even among barbarous nations, if either naval or pecuniary assistance can be obtained from them ; let us also contribute liberally from our private properties to form a public fund equal to the probable need. But in the mean time let an embassy be sent to Athens ; and, if our reasonable demands are complied with, our business will thus have its best conclusion. In all events hoM'ever, till we are fully prepared for war, let their country remain unhurt. It is a pledge always ready to our hands, the value of Mhich we should not wantonly diminish. ' Nor let it be supposed that the delay, which I advise, will mark any pusillanimity. AVar is a business less of arms than of expcnce, which alone can make arms efficacious''; especially in the contest of a continental with a maritime people. Money therefore must in the first place be provided. As for that slowness and dilatoriness, with Mhich you have heard yourselves upbraided, they flow from those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us, in public as in private life, to be modest, prudent, and just. Hence it is our cha- racter to be, less than all others, either elated by prosperity or dejected by misfortune : hence we are neither to be allured by the flattery which we have been hearing, nor irritated by the reproach : hence we are at the same time warlike and circumspect ; and hence we shall not be disposed to utter sounding words against our enemies, when we are unable to follow them up by deeds.' * Let us not then wander from those maxims and institutions of 'iff o miMjAti lip^ ojrTMn TUtfiiti, «M» S»iratfii, it'vt T» *vfi» ufiMT, C, 83. 'our Sect.V. congress at LACED.EMON. 41 ' our forefathers, through which our state has long florished great and * free, and beyond all others glorious : nor let us hurry, in one short * portion of a daj', to a decision, vhich must involve with it the lives * of many individuals, the fortunes of many families, the fate of many ' cities, and our own gloiy. Other states may be under necessity of ' taking measures hastily : our strength gives us the option of leisure. ' Since then the Atlienians profess themselves ready to submit the ' subjects of complaint to a legal decision, it appears little consonant * to justice to proceed against those as decidedly criminal, who offer * themselves for trial. Let your determination therefore be to send ' an embassy to Athens, but in the meantime to prepare for war. Thus, * more than by any other measure, you will be formidable to your * adversaries ; and thus you will best consult both j'our advantage and * your honor.' The effect which this sensible and dispassionate discourse should Tlmcyd. 1. 1. have had, was obviated by the following blunt speech of the ephor ^' Sthenelai'das : ' The verbose oratory of the Athenians I do not com- * prebend- They have been large in their own praise, but their inju- * rious conduct toward our allies, and toward Peloponnesus, they have * not denied. If their behavior formerly against the Persians was ' praiseworthy, and is now against us the reverse, they deserve double * punishment ; for ceasing to be meritorious, and for becoming culpable. ' We have not yet changed our conduct; and, if we are wise, we shall * not now overlook the wrong done to our allies, nor delay to revenge * it. Others have money, and ships, and horses : we have good allies, ' who ought not to be abandoned to the Athenians. Nor are such * disputes to be determined by words and legal process. It has not ' been by words that they have been injured. We must therefore avenge ' them quickly, and with our utmost force; nor let any one persuade ' that when we are injured we ought to deliberate. Those rather ' ought to take long time for deliberation who mean to commit injury. ' Let your determination therefore, Lacedemonians, be, as becomes ' the dignity of Sparta, for war; nor isuffer the Athenians to increase ' in power, nor betray your allies, but, with the help of the gods, let us * march against those who wrong us.' Vol. II. G Sthenelaidas, (42 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. Thucyd. 1.1. Sdienelaulas, having thus spoken, proceeded, in the function of his othce, to put the question to the assembly. A clamor being raised on each side (for in the Lacedjemonian assembly votes were given by the voice, and not, as at Athens, by silently holding up hands, or by the perfect secrecy of a ballot) the presiding ephor declared he could not distinguish which had the majority. Thinking therefore, as Thucydides supposes, that the necessity of manifesting more openly his party, would urge every one the rather to vote for Mar, he put the question again thus : ' Whoever is of opinion that the truce is broken, and that the * Athenians have been the aggressors, let him go to that side; whoever ' is of the contrary opinion, to the other side.' Upon the division a large majorit}- appeared for the affirmative. The deputies of the allies being then called, were informed of the determination; and farther told, that it was the -wish of the Lacedaemonians to have another meet- ing of deputies from all the states of the confederacy, who should come authorized and prepared to decide, both concerning peace and war, and how the war, if resolved upon, should be carried on. With this the congress broke up: the deputies of the allies hastened to their several homes: the Athenian ministers waited to finish the business of their mission, and then returned to Athens. e. 88. The Lacedcemonian government was now determined for war; not so much, according to the historian of the times, influenced by the representations of their allies, as by their own ap])rehensions of the growing power of the rival state. The Athenian dominion, within Greece, had indeed been greatly contracted by the conditions of the Thirty-years truce, and by the losses which led to it ; but the remain- ing empire had been gaining consistency, during fourteen years which had since elapsed under the able administration of Pericles ; its force «.122. '^^''is "o^^ such that no single state of Greece could undertake to cope with it; and even the extensive confederacy over which Lacedtemon presided, was, at the instant, far from being in condition to begin hostilities. To acquire a sanction therefore to their undertaking, which c. 118. might spread incouragcment among those ingaged in it, they sent a solemn deputation to Delphi, to inquire of the god if they might hope for success. According to report (so Thucydides expresses himself) 1 the Sect. V. CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON. 43 the god assured them, ' That, if they carried oir the war with becoming ' vio-or, thev would be victorious; and that his favor should attend ' them invoked or uninvoked.' Meanwhile the Corinthians were sedulous in canvassino- the several Tlmcyd. l. i. states of the confederacy separately ; endevoring to alarm their fears and excite their indignation, and to promote by every possible method the resolution for war. Accordingly when the congress met again at Laccdjemon, and the great question M'as proposed, most of the deputies were vehement in accusation of the Athenians, and in requisition of the immediate commencement of hostilities. The Corinthians, in pur- suance of their former policy, reserved themselves to the last, and then spoke thus: * We no longer, confederates, blame the Laceda3monians, Avho, having c. 120, ' now resolved on war, have summoned this assembly to desire itscon- ' currence in the resolution. Presiding over the confederacy, the ' general prosperity requires that they should pay due attention to * their own particular situation and circumstances; and hence arose * their past delay : while the honors we pay tliem, and the command * with -which they are invested, impose on them the duty of constantly ' consulting the welfare of the whole; and hence flows their present * determination. It M'cre needless, we are indeed persuaded, to admo- ' nish any of you, who have had any experience of the Athenians, how ' much it behoves us to be upon our guard against them ; but we Mill ' observe that it imports the people of the inland commonwealths to ' reflect, that, unless they support the maritime states, not only they * Avill be deprived of the many advantages which accrue, even to ' them, from maritime commerce, but if they look on till we are sub- ' dued, their subjection must follow. Ultimately thus we are all * equally interested in the matter on which we are going to decide; ' differing more in regard to the time when we may expect the evil to * fall upon us, than the degree in which it will affect us. ' It is then to repel and to prevent injuries, and not with any ambi- c. 121. ' tious view, that we are earnest for war. Our cause of complaint * against the Athenians is ample: but when we have redressed our ' wrongs, peace will be our object. Nor have we reason to doubt of G 2 ' success. 44 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. success. Our landforce is greater than theirs, and in military skill ■we excel them ; and surely a more unanimous zeal may be expected incur confederacy than in theirs. They are strong at sea : but if we duly employ the means which v,e severally possess, and add the wealth which we may borrow from Delphi " and Olympia, we can equal them even on that clement. The offer of greater pay would intice the people of their alliance from their service: for it is to be remembered, that the power of Athens consists more in a purchased than a native force; whereas ours depends less upon our riches tiian upon ourselves. One naval victory Mould therefore probably com- plete our business. Should that not immediately be obtained, yet their maritime skill will soon cease to give thoni any advantage, because ours will of course improve with increased experience. But even without a superiority at sea, we possess abundant means to dis- tress them ; among ^hich we may reckon, as ver}- important, the easy possibility of gaining their allies. ' It is however not our purpose to persuade you that the dispute before us resembles those, which, for ages, have been common within Greece, of each republic with its neighbor, of nearly equal force, con- cerning the limits of their respective territories. On the contrarv, it deserves your most serious consideration, that the Athenians have attained a degree of power to inable them to contend with us alto- gether : and, what is disgraceful to Peloponnesus even to mention, the question is, whether we shall remain independent, or become their subjects. Our fathers were the vindicators of the freedom of Greece. We fall short indeed of their worth, if we cannot maintain our own freedom ; and while we anxiously oppose the establishment of monarchy in any state, yet sufier an ambitious commonwcallh to be tvrant over all'*. ' To •' It appears from this passage and some Phocian people were gained to tlie Lacedre- folU.wing ones (1. J. c. 143. and 1.2. c. J}.) monian interest; or, wliicli would operate that through some revolution not particu- to the same purpose, were put under oli- larly mentioned by Thuc ydides, but pro- garchal government. bably a consequence of the thirty-years '* Ti'fanoj il («fte» fyxa9ira>ai woAi*. Tliu- Iruce, not only Delphi was again brought cydides afterward puts a similar expression under Lacedxaionian influence, but the iuto lh« mouths botb of Pericles and of Clecu, Sect.V. congress at lac ED iEM on. 45 ' To undei-'vo any labor and risk anv danirer, in avirtuous cause, liath Tluicytl. 1. i. " c X23, ' been transmitted to us as an hereditary rule of conduct. Ill would it ' become us now to deviate from it; and, so much richer and more ' powerful as we are than our forefathers, to lose in the midst of ' abundance what they gained in penury. Let us therefore cheerfully ' ingage in a war which the god himself hath recommended, Mith even ' a promise of his favor in it. All Greece will be with us; and right is ' on our side ; as not only notorious facts prove, but the god has ' testified. Nor let there be delay ; for be it remembered that the * Potidfeans, Dorians, and our kinsmen, are at this time besieged by * an Ionian army. Let us therefore immediately take measures to ' reduce that proud republic, which is aiming at the tyranny of Greece; ' that Vie may ourselves live in peace and independency, and that we * may restore freedom to those Grecian states, which are now so inju- ' riously held in subjection.' This speech concluding the debate, the question was put, and M'ar c 125. was the determination of the majority. Notwithstanding, however, the clamor for hastening hostilities, and notwithstanding even the dansrer of delay after such a resolution so publicly taken, it was presently found, so deficiently prepared yet was the confederacy, that delay was unavoidable. The leading men therefore recurred to negotiation, in which they had three distinct purposes; to induce tlie Athenians to suspend hostilities, while their own preparations should be advancing; to strengthen their own cause among the Grecian states, by making the Athenians the refusers of offered peace; and to sow dissention among the Athenians themselves. With these objects in view, ministers were sent to Athens, commis- c. 126. sioned to make representations concerning a matter wholly forein to everything that had yet been in dispute between the two republics, and of no importance but what Grecian superstition might give. Complete ^ atonement, it was pretended, had never been made for the sacrilege committed, near a century before, when, under the direction of the archon Megacles, the partizans of Cylon were taken from the altars to Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian as- difierent from reproach, b. 3. c. 63. and b. 3, •embly, and having in view someUiing very c. 37. Tf^anioV 'ix^n r^it i^x}iv. be 46 HISTOPwY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. be executed. Many who now injoycd the privileges of Athenian citizens, it was urged, stood affected by that pollution ; which, accord- ing to the prevailing ideas of the age, adhered to all the descendants of the sacrilegious. Lest therefore the contamination should bring down the vengeance of the gods of Greece in some general calamity, the Lacedtemonians, as assertors of the common welfare, required that all such persons should be banished, and the pollution completely expi- ated. This was intended as a blow principally against Pericles, who, Thucvd. 1. 1. by his mother, was descended from Megacles : not however with the *^' ~'' expectation that the requisition would produce his banishment; but with the hope that, through alarm to the popular mind, some embar- rassment might be created for the administration. Pericles was however not at a loss for a measure to oppose to this. Two sacrilegious pollutions were recollected, in which many of the principal families of Lacedtcmon were involved ; the death of Pausa- nias, who had been starved in the temple of Minerva Chalcioeca, and the execution of some Helots Avho had been dragged from the sanctuary of Neptune on mount Ta^narus. The lattep was esteemed a profanation so grossly impious, that popular superstition attributed to it that tre- mendous calamity the great earthquake of Sparta. It was therefore required of the Lacedaemonian government to set tlie example of regard for the welfare of Greece and respect for the gods its protectors, by removing all those who were contaminated through either of those sacrileges. With an answer to this purpose, the Laceda.*monian ministers returned to Sparta. c. 159. A second embassy arrived at Athens soon after, very differently instructed. As preliminaries to a general peace, these ministers urged, that the siege of Potida;a ou"ht to be raised and ^^oina restored to independency ; but chiefly they insisted, that the prohibitory decree against Megara should be revoked ; and, that only being done, they pledged themselves that Lacedremon would not commence hostilities. The two first propositions, little insisted on, were with little ceremony rejected. To the third it was answered, ' That the Megarians had ' made themseh'cs obnoxious to gods and men, by cultivating the ' extralimitary land between the boundaries of Attica and Megaris, * which Sect. V. DEBATES AT ATHENS. 47 * Avliich was consecrated to the Eleusinian goddesses"; and that they ' received and incoiiraged runaway Athenian slaves.' With this answer the second embassy returned to Sparta ; and soon after arrived a third, of three members, Rbamphias, IMelesippus, and Agesander, probably men of more eminence than the former ministers, as Thucydides distinguishes these alone by name. In their representations they noticed none of the requisitions of their predecessors, but they de- manded, as the one condition of peace, that all Grecian states held in subjection by Athens be restored to independency. An assembly of the people was then convened, and it was proposed to consitler of a decisive and final answer. Many spoke, some urging war, some con- tending for peace, and particularly insisting that the offensive decree against Megara ought not to remain an obstacle. At length Pericles ascending the bema, declared himself thus : * IVly opinion, Athenians, has always been, that we ouglit not to Tbucyd. 1. j. * submit to the Peloponuesians, and it remains yet'the same; sensible, ' as I am, that men seldom support a war throughout ^ith the same ' animation with which they ordinarily begin it, but that, in disasters, ' even such as must in the course of things be expected, their s])irits ' droop, and their opinions change. Beforehand therefore I claim, * from those who agree with me in opinion now, to concur with me in ' effort, whenever misfortune may arise; or else, at once to renounce ' all pretension to merit, should success attend our endevors. ' With regard to the grounds of my opinion, the insidious designs ' of the Lacedaemonians against this commonwealth have long been * obvious, and are now more than ever manifest. For notwithstanding ' that the articles of the existing treaty point out the manner in M'hich ' disputes between the two states should be adjusted, and declare that, ' in the mean time, each party should hold what it possesses, yet not * only they have not desired such adjustment, but they refuse to admit ' it. They are, in short, evidently enough determined to support their " E7^^Ka^5»^E5 Itt' Ipyaffiaj to:{ Miyafruo-i ' ture.' Smith. — These inferpretations are *■« yvi tS; lEfS; xal T?5 uofira- Megaiensibus totally unsatisfactory. The scholiast, who crimini dantes quod sacrum, nullisqae linii- has not equally evaded the difficulty, seems tibus finitum solum colcrent. — ' Lund that to warrant the sense ventured in the text ; * was sacred; land not marked out for cul- but the matter is not of consequence. ' allegations' c. 141. 48 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIII. * allegations against us, not by argument, but by arms: they come to ' us,, not accusing, but commanding: they require imperiously, that ' the siege of Potidtca shall be raised ; th;it ^gina shall be indepcn- ' dent; that the decree against Megara shall be annulled ; and, now ' at last, that we shall renounce our command over all Grecian states. ' Let it not however be imagined that even the Megarian decree is too ' light a matter to be supported as a cause of war. That comparatively ' little matter has been thrown out as an ultimate object, meerly to try ' your steddiness. Were you to yield that point, a greater trial m ould ' quickly be imposed ujion you : resisting that, you give them to under- * stand, that they must treat with you as equals, not command you as ' subjects. Thucyd. 1. 1. ' It behoves you therefore at once to resolve, either to submit to a ' state of dependency, v.ithout uselessly incurring the unavoidable evils ' of resistance, or, what appears to me far preferable, to take arms Mith ' a determination to yield to no command, whether concerning a ' matter in itself of great or of little moment, nor, at any rate, to hold " ' what you possess in fear and under controul. For the moment you ' give up your right of judgement, and yield obedience to a command, ' however unimportant the object of that command, your subjection ' is decided. ' If then Me cast our view upon the means of each party, we shall ' find ours not the unfavorable prospect. The funds of the Pelopon- ' nesians must be drawn from the produce of Peloponnesus : for they ' have no forein dependencies capable of affording considerable sup- ' plies; and in Peloj)ounesus neither private nor public wealth abounds'*. ' In protracted war, and in maritime war, they are equally unexperi- ' enced ; for their poverty has always disabled them for both, TJiey ' cannot equip fleets; nor can tliey send armies often, or maintain ' them long from liome. For, in the scantiness of their public revenue, « every man must subsist on service from his private means; and by ' long absence from their domestic affairs, even those means must be '* We find lliis obfervatioii repeated more and had colonies : but their wealtb bore but than once in the sfeeches reported by small proportion either to the resources of Thncydides, without any exception for the Athens, or to the wants of Peloponnesus. Corinthians, who were commercial and rich, * ruined. Sect.V. debates at ATHENS. 49 ruined. A superfluity of wealth alone, and not the strained contri- butions of a people barely above want, can support lengthened and distant hostilities. Such a people are commonly readier to make war with their persons than with their purses: they hope that those will finally escape ; but these may be completely drained and the business yet unfinished. For a single battle indeed, the Peloponnesians, M'ith their allies, might be equal to all the rest of G reece. But for protracted war, beside their want of money, which is their great and insuperable deficiency, wanting one common administration, each state having its equal voice for the decision of measures, and each its separate interest '^ each anxious for its own particular concerns, the general good will be sometimes thwarted, often neglected, and no great design can be steddily pursued. ' Hence you need neither fear that posts will be occupied and for- Thucyd. 1. 1, tified within your country, M'ith which some would alarm you, nor that a formidable navy can be raised against you. Since the Persian war, now above fifty years, you have been assiduously applying to naval affairs, and even your proficiency is yet far below perfection. Naval science, and the skill of experienced seamen are not to be acquired by a people M'hen they please, and in moments of leisure ; on the contrary they require practice, to the exclusion of almost all leisure. Nor, should the Peloponnesians seize. the Olympic or Del- c. U3. phian treasures, will even that avail them, to the degree that some seem to suppose. They cannot, with these, form naval commanders and seamen, such as we possess among our own citizens, more and abler than all Greece besides: nor is it to be supposed that the seamen of our allies, for a temporary increase of pay, v/ill banish themselves from their country, and join the party which has the worse prospect of final success. ' Such then are the deficiencies under which the Peloponnesians labor, Avhile we not only are free from these, but possess advantages peculiar to ourselves. If they are strong enough to invade our country by land, we are equally able to harass them by sea; and should we waste but a small part of Peloponnesus, and they even the whole of Attica, the distress would be far greater to them than to us : for they have no other country whence to obtain supplies ; while we VoL.TI. H ' have 50 Thucyd. 1. 1. K. 144. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIIL liave bur choice among Hands ami continents. The conimaud of the sea is indeed a most important possession. Consider then : were we ilanders, who would be so secure against all hostile attempts? What therefore should be now our aim but to put ourselves as nearly as possible into the situation of ilanders? Our lands and their apperte- nances within Attica should be totally given up : no vain attempt should be made to protect them against the superior landforce of the enemy: our whole attention should be directed to the safely of the city and the command of the sea. Could we gain a battle, fresh and perhaps greater forces would be brought against us. But should we lose one, the revolt of our allies, the sources of our M'ealth and strength, would follow ; for they will no longer rest under their present subjec- tion, than while we have power to compel them. Not the loss of lands and houses therefore, but the loss of valuable lives, M'henever it may happen, is to be deplored ; for lands cannot produce men: but let us keep ourselves strong in men, and we shall not want for lands. If therefore I thought I could persuade you, I would propose that you should yourselves go forth and waste Attica; to show the Pelo- ponnesians how vain their expectation is, that the fear of such an evil may induce you to surrender your independency. ' 1 have indeed many other grounds for clear hope of success, pro- vided our own impaijence and rashness, and the wild desire of conquest, when defence should be our object, injure us not more than the strength or policy of our enemies. On these topics, however, admonition may be better reserved for the circumstances Avhea they arise. The answer now to be returned to Lacedsemon should be this : * Our ports and markets shall be open to the Mcgarians, provided the Laceditmonians will abrogate their pro- hibitions of the residence of strangers M'ithin their territory, as far as regards us and our allies : for the treaty of truce leaves these matters equally open to both parties ''. We will give independency to those " states '* The rough manner in which the Laccdxmonians executed their decrees for the expulsion of strangers is noticed by Aristophanes in his coine.'.y of the Birds. Meton. Ti J' Iri filter; PeisthetErus. "ntririf iv ActKt^atnou, XlKr,ycn av^ta.1 xaT irf. — v. 1114. Where it seems also implied . that Lacedxmon afforded temptation for strangers to go thiUier, SfiCT.V. ■ END OF NEGOTIATION. 51 " states of our alliance, which were independent M'hen the truce was " concluded, whenever the Lacediemonians will allow to the states of " their alliance free agency in whatever concerns their several govcrn- " ments, and will no longer inforce among them a constitution and A " mode of administration, which, under the show of independency, " keep them in effectual subjection to Lacedoemon ". Finally, we arc ^' ready to submit any disputed points to a judicial determination " according to the terms of the treaty; and we will not begin war, but " we will defend ourselves to the utmost." Such an answer will be ' just, will be honorable, will be consonant to the renown and to the ' wisdom of our ancestors, who raised this empire, which we ought not ' to transmit diminished to our posterity.' The assembly assented to the opinion of Pericles, and an answer was Thucyd. 1. 1. accordingly delivered to the Lacedjemonian ambassadors nearly in the terms of his speech ; concluding with the declaration, ' That the Athe- ' nian commonwealth would obey the commands of no power upon * earth, but M-ould readily abide the event of a judicial determination, * conducted upon a footing of equality between the parties, in the mode * directed by the existing treaty ".' With this answer the Laceda;monians returned home, and no more embassies were sent. Hitherto the people of the two states had com- Tnunicated, as in peace, without the intervention of a herald, tho not !.-■ c. J» without caution and suspicion : for, since the affairs of Corcyra and Potidsea, the truce was considered on both sides as broken, and war as impending. But now, tho no hostilities immediately insued, yet communication was ventured on neither side, without the same for- malities as if war had been declared. thitber, probably for gain by sale or exchange of commodities. In the difficulties made for commerce by the Lacedaemonian laws, especially the prohibition of monejfV-the trader would always have advantage over the exchanger, not a professional trader. " 'Otcc» KixiTfot rxTf iai/Lw» aviiuat ^oMri *' We want information from Thucydidcs jj.li o-^ia'i ToTi Actxi^ixi^oi'ioiir twiTuJiiw; afxcvo- what that A^kt; xari raj ^i/tfiixa?, which he fitic^M, X. T. i. To turn this into modern so repeatedly mentions, wa» to have been, language, or perhaps into any language, long circumlocution ie necessary. we 513 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. SECTION VI. Attempt of the Thebans against Platcea. jlerod. 1. 6. While Mant of preparation still withheld the Peloponnesians, the' Tbucvf). 1. 2. Thebans, judging war to be now unavoidable, thought the moment of ^•^- suspcnce advantageous for an attempt toward the more complete esta* blishment of their own sovereinty over Eoeotia : Lacedtemon must favor them ; Athens would fear to attack them. The little town of Platsa, with a territory of scarcely half a dozen miles square, utterly Unable by its OM'n strength to subsist in indepen- dency, had nevertheless, for near a century, been resolutely resisting all Herod, ut controul from Thebes, whence it was less than nine miles distant. n^\'' 1 I o When, before the Persian war, Cleomenes king of Sparta was with an U hucyd. 1.3.' o \ c. 55. army in the neighborhood, the Plata;aus, to obtain the protection, had offered to put themselves under the dominion of Lacedsemon, The answer which, with his usual expressive simplicity, Herodotus attributes to the Lacedaemonians upon the occasion, strongly paints the state of Greece : ' We,' th«y. said, ' live afar off, and ours would be a cold kind * of assistance"; for j-ou might be overpowered and sold for slaves, ' before any intelligence about you could reach us. We recommend to ' you therefoi-e rather to put yourselves under the dominion of Athens *', * a bordering state, and able to protect you.' This advice, adds the historian, they gave, not through any goodwill to the Plata?ans, but with a view to create embarrassment to the Athenians by embroiling llicm with the Boeotians. The Platx\ans however followed the advice. The solemnity of the sacrifice to the twelve gods being chosen for the occasion, ambassadors were sent to Athens, but in the habit and charac- ter of suppUants. Placing themselves at the altar, according to the customary forms of supplication, these ministers thence urged their petition ' That their commonwealth might be taken under the sovereinty *^ '1 he e.Ki ression of Herodotus is very strong, A£>«i i/xe'a; av'ac, to give yoursches. ' and Sect.VL attempt against PLAT7EA. -55 ' and protection of Athens**.' The Athenian people acceded to the humble request. The Thebans, upon the first intelligence of this transaction, marched against Platsa. An Athenian army moved at the same time to pro- tect the new dependency of the commonwealth. The Corinthians however interfering, it was agreed to submit the matter to their arbi- tration. Actuated apparently by the spirit of justice and of liberty, and desirous to give as great extent as tlie nature of things would admit, to that dubious independency which could be injoyed by the smaller Grecian commonwealths, the Corinthians decided, ' That tlie ' Thebans were iutitled to no sovereinty over any towns of Bceotia, '' whose people chose to renounce tlie advantages of that Boeotian ' confederacy of which they had made themselves the chiefs.' The business being thus apparently settled, the Athenian army moved homeward ; but the Tliebans, irritated by a decision so adverse to their views, followed and attacked them on their march. They were de- feated; and then the Athenians took upon themselves to dictate terms: extending the limits which had been prescribed by the Corinthians for Hie Plataean territory, and taking the neighboring little town of Hysias also under their protection, they made the river Asopus the boundary of the Thebaid, both against the Plateean and the Hysian lands. Thenceforward Plata;a, more than ever averse to Thebes, became ■warm in political attachment to Athens. The Avhole force of the little commonwealtli was exerted on tlie glorious day of Marathon, in the honor of which the Plata;ans alone partook with the Athenians. In the not less memorable action of Salamis, they had their share, tho an inland people, aboard the Athenian fleet; and they had distinguished them- selves, under the command of Aristeides, in that great and decisive battle, fouglit near their town, whicli, Ijeyond all other circumstances, halJi given celebrity to its name. Under the patronage of Athens, democracy of course prevailed at Piataea. But as Athens itself was not without an aristocratical party, so there were in Fiatjea persons to whom democratical government, sometimes perhaps partially oppres- sive, and always an obstacle to their ambition, would be dissatisfac- tory. Their cause being hopeless under the dominion of Athens, Thebes J4 HISTORY" OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. Tliebes was the protecting power to which they looked for an altera* tion in their favor. TUucyd. 1. -2. In these circumstances a plot was concerted between Naucleides, the leading man of the arlstocratical Platicans, and Eurymachus, who lield the greatest influence in Thebes. The official directors of thcTheban government were gained to it; an;cd, and convertino: even the calamities of war into an occasion of triumph. The funeral of those who had fallen in their country's service was publicly solemnized ; and the manner of it remains Thucyd. 1. 2. particularly described by Thucydides. Three days before the cere- mony of burial, the bones, collected from the bodies previously burnt, according to the ordinary practice of the Ci recks, were ar- ranged under an ample awning. While thus, according to tlie modern phrase, they lay in state, it was usual for the relations to visit them, and throw on anything that fancy or superstition gave to imagine a grateful offering to the spirits of the deceased, or honor- able to their memory among the living. The day of the bnrial being arrived, the bones were placed in ten chests of cypress-wood, raised on Sect. II. P U B L I C F U N' E R A L 7i ■on carriages, one for each ward of Attica, anil an eleventh carriage bore an empty hier with a pall, in honor of those whose hodies could not be recovered. Procession was then made in solemn march to the Tbucyd. 1.2*- c. 34. •public tomb in the Cerameicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city ; 6c Not. ed. the female relations of the deceased attending, and, according to the ^'^^^ Grecian custom, venting their lamentations aloud. From the institu- Thucyd. 1.3. tion of the ceremony, the tomb in the Cerameicus had been the recep- tacle of all who had been honored with a public funeral, excepting 'those who had fallen at Marathon ; who, for the supereminence of their merit, and the singular glory of the action, had been buried in the field ■of battle, where their peculiar monument was raised over them. Some person of superior dignity and eminent abilities was always appointed by the people to speak the funeral panegyric. On the present occasion «very circumstance directed the public choice to Pericles. When therefore the ceremony of intombing was over, Pericles passed through the croud to a lofty stand raised for the occasion, so that he might be heard by the attending multitude the most extensively possible; and thence delivered that oration, the heads of which at least Thucydides, 1. 1- c.s:. who was probably present, has, it is from his own professions to be pre- 46.' '^' sumed, faithfully collected, preserving in a great degree even the manner in which it was spoken. It remains, in its orio-inal lano-uao-e a finished model of the simple and severe sublime in oratory, which has been the admiration of all succeeding ages; but which must sink in any translation, denies abridgement, and defies either imitation or paraphrase, perhaps beyond any composition that ever was committed to writing. The winter was not for all parts of Greece, as for Athens, a season 1- 2- c,S3. of repose. Evarchus, the expelled tyrant of Astacus in Acarnania, applied to Corinth for assistance to restore him to his little dominion. The anticnts seldom ventured upon maritime expeditions in short days and stormy seasons; the narrowness of tlieir seas, the height and rockiness of their coast, the frequency of sudden squalls, and the want of a guide in cloudy weather, rendering it far more dangerous than where the ocean is at hand, and where in a stout vessel, under guidance Vol. II. L of 74 HISTORY or GREECE. Chap. XIV,. of the compass, distance from land is safely. The zeal of Corinth however was not to be deterred. Forty sl)ips of war and fifteen liundred heavy foot, under Euphaniidas, wilh some auxiliary mercenaries raised by Evarchus, recovered Astacus. Attempts were made upon some other towns of Acarnania, but without success. The Corinthians then moving homeward, debarked in Cephallenia, on tlie Crantpan lands. The Cranfeans, amusing- them witli the pretence of a disposition to capitulate, attacked them unawares, and forced them to reimbark with loss ; upon which, witliout attempting anything further, they returnedi to Corinth. SECTION III. Second Invasion of Attica bi/ the Peloponnesians. Pestilence at Athens. Operations of the Athenian Fleet on the Peloponnesian Coast under Pericles ; and on the Macedonian Coast under Agnon. Effecis of popular Discontent at Athens. First Effort of the Peloponnesian Fleet. Atteinpt of the Peloponnesians to send an Embassy into Persia. Barbarity of the Grecian System of JJ^ar. An Athenian Squadron stationed in the iVestern Sea. Surrender of Potidcea to • the Athenians. Death of Pericles. The events of the first campain justify the Avisdom both of Pericles and of Archidamus, in the counsels they respectively gave before the * commencement of hostilities. The Peloponnesians were evidently, not prepared to wage offensive Mar against Athens with any advantage. A considerable part of Attica had been ravaged ; the harvest had been consumed, carried off, or destroyed. Cut Athens could support that loss ; and the Athenian fleets had meanwhile, with less expence and inconvenience, and probably with more profit, been dealing destruction and gathering spoil in various parts of Peloponnesus and its confederate states. At the same time negotiations had been concluded which pro- mised great access of strength to Athens for the campains to insue; while the Peloponnesians, who had proposed to extend their alliances, hatl brought nothing of the kind to etfect. 4 In Sect. III. SECOND INVxVSION OF ATTICA. 75 In the second year the Pt-!opoi»nesian army was again assembled in sprincf; and toward tlie beginning ofsunnner, still under tlie commaml of" Arthidamus, again entered and ravaged Attica. But a natural calami fy, far more terrible than the swords of their enemies, now attacked the Athenians; a pestilential fever, in many points nearly resembling that scourge which, under the name of the plague, has been, in modern times, continually desolating the fine climates of the east; yet, according to the accurate Thucydides, differing in some essential circumstances. It was then new to the Greeks. Like the modern plague, it was supposed to have originated in Ethiopia; whence, passing into Egypt, it was quickly communicated over the greater part of the Persian empire. Among the Greeks it was first observed in some tov/ns of the Asian coast, and of the neighboring ilands, particularly Lemnos. Its first appearance among the Athenians was in Peirseus; and they were so little aware how it came, or what it was, that a fancy arose, and gained some credit among them, that the wells had been poisoned by the Peloponnesians. Quickly it made its way into the upper town, as Athens was often called, and then the mortality increased rapidly. What was the cause of this malady, says Thucydides, I will leave to others to investrgate; but I will describe its effects, which I can undertake to do exactly; having both experienced them in my own person, and seen numbers of others under the same afiliction. The year, it is universally acknowleged, was remarkably healthy, till Thuoyd. 1. 2. the pestilence appeared; and then every existing sickness seemed to. ^" ^^' change into that one, or lost its symptoms in the violence of the super- A'ening disoririxJ» Tut n£Ae?re»»>)0'ii.i».— Thucyd- 1. 2. c, 69, or S6 Plut. vit. Pericl. Saxe's Me- moirs. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIV. or elsewhere in the neighboring coiuitry. Xeiiophon and his collegues (lid not escape censure from their sovereiii the Athenian people, for granting, without first consulting them, terms, even such terms totliose who were considered as meriting vengeance, and wiio, it was found after the surrender, were incapable of longer resistance. Thus however the Athenians, unable, in their full strength, to defend their own country, yet nevertheless persevering amid affliction and resisting weakness, gained that distant object of contention which had given immediate rise to the war. Pericles lived probably to know the success of the Athenian arms against Potidaja, and it was not long after that he fell a victim to that calamit)-, the endemial disorder, which had already carried off so many of his nearest relations, and most valued friends. He survived however the violence of the fever, and died, in full possession of his senses, of a lingering ilness which it superinduced. No man seems to have been held in such estimation, by most of ""the ablest writers of Greece and Rome, for universal superiority of talents, as Pericles. The accounts remaining of his actions hardly support his renown ; which Mas yet j)erhaps more fairly earned than that of many, the merit of whose atchievements has been in a great degree due to others acting under them, whose very names have perished. The pliilo- sophy of Pericles taught him not to be vainglorious, but to rest his fame upon essentially great and good, rather than upon brilliant actions. It is observed by Plutarch that, often as he commanded the Athenian forces, he never was defeated j yet, tho he won many trophies, he never gained a splendid victory. A battle, according to a great modern authority, is the resource of ignorant generals: when they know not what to do, they fight a battle. It Mas almost universally the resource of the age of Pericles: little conception M'as entertained of military operations, beyond ravage and a battle. His genius led him to a supe- rior system, M'hich the wealth of his country inabled him to carry into practice. His favorite maxim Mas to spare the lives of his soldiers; and scarcely any general ever gained so many important advantages with so little bloodshed. It is said to have been his consolation and his boast, in his dying hours, that he never was the cause tliat a felloM'- citizen Sect. III. C 11 AR A CTE R O F PE R I C LES. f? citizen wore mourning: a glorious and perhaps a singular suljject of exultation for a head of a party in Greece; where, in the struggles of faction, secret assassinations, numerous public executions, and bloody contests in arms, were so ordinary. Pericles might almost equally have made it his boast as general of the commonwealth : for when his soldiers fell, tliey fell victims to the necessity of their country's service, and not to the incapacity, rashness, or vanity of the commander. Had he been less a patriot, less a philosoplier, less humane, his atchievemcnts might have been more brilliant, but he would not equally have earned, from the mouth of Socrates, and the report of Plato, the praise of super- eminence in whatever was wise, great, and becoming ". This splendid character however perhaps may seem to receive some tarnish from the pohtical conduct of Pericles; the concurrence, at last, which is imputed to him in depraving the Athenian constitution, ' to favor that popular power by which he ruled, and the revival and confirmation of that pernicious hostility between the democratical and aristocratical interests, first in Athens, and then by the Peloponnesian war, throughout the nation. But it is remarkable that Thucydides and Xenophon, both suffering banishment, one for twenty years, the other for life, from that democratical power with which both express themselves abundantly dissatisfied, nevertheless always speak with the highest respect of Pericles. The testimony of Isocrates will also deserve consideration. Complaining of the depraved state of the Athenian constitution in his own time, that patriotic statesman says, ' Pericles ' found the constitution less perfect than it had been, but still tolerably * good ; yet he did not use his extraordinary power for his own profit, * but leaving his private fortune less than he had received it from his * father, he carried into the treasury eight thousand talents (near ' two millions sterling) over and above the proceeds of the sacred '■^°'^''- ^^ , > 'ri • r ^1 1 • • Pace. p. 25i. revenue, Ihis concurrence of three such men, in successive ao-es (of whom, Thucydides, probably had personal acquaintance) all ^£flx^£a, urai (nyaXoir^ivu^ OCIW. with Sect. I. SIEGE OF PLAT.EA. 03 with chains. No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or tlieir ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose : yet, after much of the summer consumed, they fouml every efl'ort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring woods of Cithteron, gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with tliem the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advan- tage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on-fire. The conflagrationwas such as M-as never before known, says Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands of men, tho, in mountain-forests, the friction of dry wood, by the agitation of the wind, may sometimes have produced greater. Had the wind favored, it must have had all the effect that the besiegers desired : great part of the town actually became unapproachable. But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brough/t on by a thunder-storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined immediately to Thucyd. 1. ^. reduce the siege to a blockade ; which, tho slow and consequently ^'j\ expensive, would in the end be sure. To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added ; Mith a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufificient body of troops being then appointed to the guard of these works, the Baotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter. Sept. 13. ^1 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. S E C T 1 O N ir. Operatioiis of the Atkenians on the Northern Coast of the JEgean. A fail's of the JVestern Parts of Greece : Assistance sent by Pelo- ponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian Argians and Acarnanians: Battle near Stratus: Sea-fght bctzceen the Pelopon- nesian Fleet under the Corinthian Machon, and the Athenian Fleet under Phormioji: Sea-fght between the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Spartan Cnemus, and the Athenian Fleet under Phormion. Attempt to surprize PeirKus. Success of Phormion in Acarnania. Invasion of Macedonia by Si takes king of Thrace. n. C. 129. While the Peloponnesians Avere thus bending their whole strength, P \v^3* ^"^^ hitherto so vainly, against the little town of Plataja, offensive ope- Thucyd. 1. 2. rations were not neglected by the Athenians. Xenophon son of Euripides, who had commanded the Athenian forces at the taking of Potidsea, was sent again into Chalcidice, with a body of two thousand heavy foot, and two hundred horse. ^ A little before harvest he entered Bottijea, and ravaged the country abodt Spartolus. Often in the wars of the Greeks among oneanother, the intrigues of faction did more than arms. Through such intrigue the Athenian general entertained hope of acquiring Spartolus ; but timely support, which the party in opposition to the Athenian interest obtained from the neighboring city of Olynthus, disappointed him. A battle insuing, the superiority of the enemy in cavalry prevailed against the superior discipline of the Athenian heavy foot : Xenophon, with two general officers his col- legiies, and above four hundred of their heavy-armed, were killed ; and the remainder, who found an immediate refuge in Potidasa, too weak to prosecute offensive operations, returned to Athens. Through this extensive war, upon which the Athenians fixed the name of the Peloponnesian, we become in some degree acquainted with c. 63. the history of some parts of Greece, which would otherwise have remained totally unknoM'n. The Amphilochian Argos, a city on the 4 border Sect.II. operations IN ACARNANTA. 95 border of Acarnania against Epirus, was founded, according to Thu- cydides, by Ampbilochus, son of tbat Amphiaraiis wbo is celebrated aniono- tbe heroes of the war of Thebes. Ampbilochus himself fought at Troy. On his return to the Peloponnesian Argos, his native city, little satisfied with the state of things under the usurpation of jEo-istbeus, he departed with such as chose to follow bis fortune, and settled his colony at tbe bottom of that gulph antiently called the Ampbilocbian, but afterward the Ambracian. To the town which be built there he gave the name of that from which he had migrated; and the same partiality fixed upon the river, near whose mouth it stood, the name of tbe Peloponnesian stream of Inacbus. The epithet Ampbilo- cbian was added to tbe town for tbe convenience of distinction. Situate among barbarians,at the extremity of Greece, the city of Ampbilochus florished; the inferiority, in arts and knowlege, of tbe neighboring clans, to whom the Ampbilocbian name was communicated, but wbo, according to Thucydides, were barbarian, being perhaps a principal cause of its prosperity. Afterward, through various misfortunes, its strength was so reduced that it was scarcely able to support itself as an independent commonwealth; and to obviate other evils, its people recurred to a dangerous expedient for weak states, that of associating a number of families from the neighboring Corinthian colony of Am- bracia. Disputes arose between the two people, and in the end the Ambraciots expelled tbe Argians from their own city. These applied to the neighboring people of Acarnania, and the Acarnanians to the Athenians ; who, a little before tbe beginning of tbe Peloponnesian war, sent Phormion with thirty triremes to their assistance. Through the abilities of that officer, and the superior discipline of tbe very small body of Athenians which he commanded, Argos v/as taken by assault. The city and territory were restored to the Argians, with whom some Acarnanians were associated ; and according to the barbarous practice not unusual with the most polished of the Greeks, tbe Ambracian inha- bitants and garrison were condemned to slavery. Hence followed the alliance of both Acarnania and the Ampbilocbian Argos with Athens, which has been mentioned as subsisting when the Peloponnesian war began. In c. 80. 96 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. In llie second summer of that war, while the pestilence was raging at Athens, the Ambraciots, incensed against the Argians by the treat- ment of their captive fellowcitizens, determined to attemjjt revenge. Associating the Chaonian and some other barbarous clans of their neighborhood, they overran the territory of Argos, but, after some vain Thucyd. 1.:. efforts against the city, returned home. In the following year, that of the siege of Platsea, they proposed not only to take Argos, but to con- quer all Acarnania. With this view they applied to Lacedfemon ; promising that, if they might have such support, naval and military', as they desired, not only they would reduce their particular enemies the Acarnanians, but they would bring over the neighboring ilands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia to the Peloponnesian confederacy, and they hoped also to take Naupactus. Thus the Athenians would be deprived of what principally inabled them to carry expeditions around Pelopon- nesus, and keep a fleet in the western seas. The project was alluring : the Corinthians instantly and zealously ingaged in it; incited by their enmity to Athens, their connection with Ambracia, the desire of revenge against Corcyra, and the hope of recoveiing their power in that iland, to which any success in the proposed measures would be at least a step ; and they induced the Lacedaemonians to concur; The Athenian administration, receiving intelligence of these motions and preparations, and judging Phormion, apparently on account of his experience of the western people and western seas, most proper for the command there, recalled him from Chalcidice, and sent him, as we have seen, with twenty triremes to Naupactus. In the following summer, in pursuance of the measures concerted with the Peioponnesians, the naval force of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciots, was assembled at Leucas ; and the Spartan admiral Cnemus had the good fortune to join them from Cyllenc, with a small squadron and a thousand heavy-armed Pelo])ounesian infantry, undiscovered in his passage by the Athenians. The Corinthians and Sicyonians were preparing their naval force, but could not so readily escape out of their own gulph. Cnemus therefore, without waiting for them, determined to begin ope- rations, by marching directly for Stratus, the largest town of Acarnania, in the hope that he might carry it by assault; by which he expected so Sect. ir. OPERATIONS IN ACARNANIA. 97 so to break the force of the province that it would become an easy conquest. The Acarnanians, meanwhile, informed that beside the formidable Thucyd. 1.2. army already in their country, a fleet was expected, which might chiise its points of attack upon their coast, resolved to remain within their respective towns, and attempt the protection of their fields only so far as, v'ith their strength, and opportunities offering, might be prudent. The Athenian admiral at Naupactus, to whom they sent a request for assist- ance, gave them to understand tiiat he could spare no part of his scanty force from attendance upon the Peloponnesian fleet, in the Corinthian gulph, which was ready to sail. The allied army therefore marched unopposed from Leucas, through the Argian territory, into Acarnania, It was disposed in three columns; the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots forming the left, the Leucadians, Anactorians and some other Greeks the right, and the barbarian Epirots the center. The Greeks kept their columns regularly formed, and chose their camps carefully ; which, according to their usual practice, in an enemy's country, they constantly fortified. But the Epirots, and particularly the Chaonians, vain of their reputation for superior prowess among the clans of that part of the continent, disdained the trouble and delay of nice choice of ground ; and pressed forward, in confidence that the town would yield to their first assault, and the glory m'ouUI be all their own. Intelligence of these circum- stances being carried to the Stratians b}' their scouts, they planted an ambush, into which the imprudent Epirots fell. The forces from the town sallied; the Epirots, partly through surprize, partly through the vigor of the attack, were histantly put to flight, a great number were killed, and the rest were pursued till they reached the Grecian camps. The Stratians would neither make any attempt upon these, nor risk any close ingagement against the superior discipline of the Peloponnesians; but they gave unceasing annoyance from a distance with their slings; in the use of which the Acarnanians universally excelled. Information of the important success obtained by the Stratians, was rapidly forwarded through all the Acarnauian towns, accompanied with exhortation to assemble the force of the country, and drive out a half- conquered enemy, Cnemus meanwhile found his measures so broken Vol. II. O by 58 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. by the defeat of the Epirots, that in the insuiiig night he retreated to the river Anapus, ten miles from Stratus. Thence he sent a herald to des're a truce for the burial of the slain ; and, soon after, falling back to Qineiadee, he dismissed the allies, and imbarked himself for Pelopon- nesus. Acarnania thus was completely freed from .so alarming an invasion. Thucyd. 1. 2. Durina," these transactions by land, the allied fleet, consisting of forty-seven trireme galleys, under the Corinthian admirals IMachon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas, sailed out of the gulph. It was the pvu'pose of Phormion, who, with only twenty, watched them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, on the iEtolian coast, to let them pass the straits, and attack them in the more open sea. The Corinthians, strong in men as well as in ships, but less confident in naval skill, hugged, according to the sea-phrase, the southern shore as far as Patr£E ; and thence, in the night, pushed across for the Acarnanian coast; their object being less to ingage the Athenians, than to join their allies in the prosecution of the preconcerted purposes of the cam- pain. The daring vigilance of Phormion surprized them in the middle of the passage. Tho it Avas night, yet being perfectly clear and calm, they perceived his approach at some distance. Immediately they formed their fleet in a circle, the largest they could, so as not to give opportunity for that evolution of piercing the line, called the diecplus, in which the Athenians excelled, and which their enemies dreaded. The prows of course were on all sides outward; the transports", with a reserve of five of the swiftest triremes, were stationed in the center; and thus in posture of defence, as if to oppose an enemy who outnum- bered them, forty-seven triremes remained to receive the attack of the twenty under Phormion, if, which they could not readily believe, he should be bold enough to attack them. c. H. But the Athenian admiral, confident in his own abilities and expe- rience, and in the practised skill of his people, and observing the order of the enemy to be very readily susceptible of confusion, bore imme- diately upon them with his line of battle formed a-head, and rowed around them; having first directed his captains to threaten as near as possible Sect. II. OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULPH. 9^ possible so as to avoid ingaging, till they should have the signal from him. He well knew that when the breeze from the gulph sprung up, which seldom failed about daybreak, the enemy's circle could not long remain perfect; and his purpose was, by alarming, to hasten and in- hance the confusion. It happened precisely as he foresaw : the first of the breeze drove the windward ships again-st the transports in the center; confusion immediately arose; clamor, with expostulation from ship to ship, insued ; orders were no longer heard ; signals remained imobserved; the attention' of the crews v/as wholly ingaged in obviating the continually threatened shock of one ship against another, or of many against one ; and the swell, that quickly arose, sufficed to prevent any effectual use of oars by rowers so little skilful. Phormion seized the critical moment for giving the signal of attack. In the first onset one of the Corinthian admirals Mas sunk; several other ships were quickly disabled; and such was the confusion that resistance was scarcely attempted, but the first effort of the Peloponnesians was to fly toward the friendly ports of Patrte and Dyme. The Athenians took twelve triremes, the greater part of whose crews they put to the sword. Having pursued as far as was judged convenient, they returned with their prizes to the jEtolian coast; according to the usual practice, which landlocked and stormy seas, the want of the compass, and the deficiency of accommodation in the antient ships of war, made necessary. On the headland of Rhium they raised a trophy, and dedicated to Neptune one of the captive triremes, after which ceremonies they returned to their station at Naupactus. Then the defeated Peloponnesians moved, from the places of their first refuge, to the Eleian port of Cyllene,, where Cnemus, with the forces from Acarnania, soon after joined them. This action of Phormion, tho the forces employed on cither side were too small for the consequences to be very important, yet for the boldness of the attempt, the ability displayed in the execution, and the completeness of the success, has been deservedly reckoned by Plutarch among the most brilliant atchievements of the war'. It appears to Thucvd I 2 ■have disturbed, not a little, the Peloponnesians, and particularly the <=• s^- ^ We find a compliment to Phormion, which seems to mark the popularity of his ■ebstracter, -in the comedy of Aristophanes, called The Knights, v. 551. O 2 Lacedeemonians. 100 HISTORY OF GREECE. CuAr. XV. Lacecltemonians. Those who directed the administration of their government, unversed in naval affairs, could not readily conceive a superiority of science among the Athenian commanders, and of skill among their seamen, that should give the advantage against more than double their numbers, without great misbehavior on the part of their own people; especially as in land-Avar the superiority of the Pelopon- nesians, to all the world besides, was held incontestable. The imwise practice of dividing military command, ordinary with most of the other Greeks, was little usual Avith the LacedEemonians ; but now, in some indignation that the Peloponnesian navy should, by a squadron of only twenty ships, be excluded from the western seas, which were esteemed more peculiarly their own, three Spartan ofiicers, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, were sent to be of council with Cnemus in Thucj-d. 1, 5. his command. The ships damaged in the late action were diligently repaired; a reinforcement was required from the maritime states of Peloponnesus; and a fleet of seventy-seven triremes was thus collected, which proceeded from Cj'Uenc to Panormus on the Achaian coast; where a land-army, in the antient manner of naval war generally capable of advantageous cooperation with a fleet, was also assembled. c. S5. Phormion, informed of these preparations, had sent intelligence of them to Athens, and desired a reinforcement. Twenty triremes were in consequence ordered to join him. It is upon this occasion that we first discover in history the importance of the loss of Pericles, and the want of those superior abilities for the direction of public affairs, which had hitherto, in so great a degree, obviated misfortune and commanded success. Nicias, a Cretan of Gortynium, having in view to advance his own power, proposed to the Athenian government* the reduction of Cydonia in Crete, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. It would be an easy conqifest, he said, for the fleet which was ready to sail for Naupactus, and with the assistance to be readily procured within the iland, could occasion little delay. The Athenian people were ill-advised enough to decree as he desired. The armament went to Crete, and ravaged without opposition the Cydonian lands ; but the town was found so strong, and its people so determined, that there appeared no probability of taking it without the tedious process of a siegej Sect. II. OPERATIONS IN THE CORINTHIAN GULPH. , loi siege, or perhaps a blockade. The commanders would have then hastened their voyage to Naupactus, but contrary winds detained them long in Crete. Meantime Phormion was left to exert his abilities and his vigilance against an enemy who too much outnumbered him. Yet tho they had nearly four times his strength, so confident was he in superior skill, that Thucyd. 1.2. not only he did not refuse, but he appears to have been desirous to meet them wherever he could have sea-room. Moving therefore from Naupactus, he took a station just without the gulph, near the headland of the Molycrian or northern Rhium; and a small army, composed c. po. chiefly of Naupactian Messenians, joined his naval camp on the shore, to assist in case of any attempt from a superior force upon the fleet in its station. This movement was not without danger, as the event proved ; but the apprehension that the squadron expected from Attica might be intercepted and overpowered by the Peloponnesian fleet, appears to have been his motive for quitting the security of his statiou at Naupactus, before that assistance arrived. The Peloponnesians however, with all their advantage of numbers, with all the pride of reputed preeminence in arms, and all the zeal of the Lacedaemonian commandersNto incite them, so felt their inferiority in naval action, from the event of the late ingagement, that they pec- severingly avoided the open, and directed their endevors to draw the Athenians into the narrow sea. From Panormus, which is a little within the gulph, and nearly opposite Naupactus, they moved to the Achaian or southern Rhium, overagainst the station of the Athenians. The two headlands, forming the mouth of the gulph, are less than a mile asunder : the stations of the two fleets would be something more. During six or seven days they watched oneanother without c. s(j. moving. The Peloponnesians then practised a stratagem, apparently well imagined, for forcing the Athenian admiral to action within the gulph. The town of Naupactus, while its youth were in the army attending the Athenian fleet, was left almost Avithout defence. At daybreak the Peloponnesians moved eastward, along the Achaian coast, in a column with four triremes abreast j twenty of the swiftest forming 102 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. an advanced guard. Phormion was immediately in alarm for Nau- pactus. With all haste he got his people aboard from his naval camp, and proceeded eastward by the northern coast of the gulph, with his line of battle formed ahead; the Messenians at the same time pressing their march along the shore toward their town. This was precisely Avhat the Peloponnesiaus wish. ;!. They no sooner saw the Athenian fleet irrecoverably nigaged within the straits, than, trusting to the advanced guard for preventing il5 escape into the harbour of Nau- pactus, they formed for action in line of battle abreast, and pushed across the gulph. The eleven headmost ships of the Athenian line, through superior swiftness, outstretching the right wing of the Pelo- ponnesiaus, escaped attack : the nine others were intercepted, over- powered, and forced ashore. One was taken with its whole crew : all fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians ; but, of their people, many ■escaped by swimming ; the rest were mostly put to the sword. What followed, reported by the authoritative pen of Tliucjdides, proves how important, in the antient system of naval war, the cooperation of an army might be to a fleet. The brave Messenians, zealous in hereditary enmity to Laceda^mon, arri\ing on the beach, dashed completely armed through the surf, boarded the stranded galleys, and driving out the conquerors, recovered all: tho some were already taken in tow. Thuf-yd. 1. 2. Meanwhile the twenty galleys of the Peloponnesian advanced guard ^ * were pursuing the eleven Athenian which had overstretched the main body. Ten of these reached the harbour of Naupactus : and forming •^against the shore, prepared to resist any attack that might be attempted c.gu. against them. A Leucadian trireme, the swiftest of the allied fleet, in which was Timocrates, the first of the Laceda;monian commissioners appointed to be of council with the admiral, pursued the eleventh, an'd gained upon her so fast, that to escape into the liarbour of Naupactus c.yi, seemed impossible. It happened that a large merchant-ship was lying at anchor off the harbour's mouth. The Athenian captain having passed this vessel, turned close round it, and judged his time so well, and managed the evolution with such combined rapidity and exactness, that with his beak he struck the galley of the amazed Leucadians amidship, and with such force that she presently sunk. Timocrates, / 11 in Sect.TI. operations IN THE CORINTHIAN GULPH. 103 in a fit of passionate despair, stabbed himself; and his gored body, floating into the harbour of Naupactus, was afterward taken up there. The rest of the advanced squadron M'as at this time following in a dis- orderly manner, the crews singing the song of triumph, as if already completely conquerors ''•. The catastrophe of their comrades, happen- ing within sight of all, astonished and alarmed them. Some rested on their oars to await the main body of their fleet, but the main body of their fleet was far off, and the enemy near. Some, through ignorance of the coast, struck upon shoals. Their hesitation and distress were as a signal to the Athenians in the harbour. The Athenians, quickly aware of all circumstances, advanced in good order against the enemy yet in confusion. The contest Avas not long: the Peloponnesians fled for their port of Panormus, on the opposite coast of the gul]jh, distant about seven miles, losing six triremes taken by the Athenians. The main body of their fleet, too distant to give any considerable support, and apparently fearful of passing the night on a hostile coast with Avhich they Avere imperfectly acquainted, also sought the security of the port '. The success of the Athenians was altogether extraordinary : they took six of the enemy's triremes; they sunk one: they recovered all their own which had been taken or forced ashore, excepting only that which had fallen into the enemy's hands with its crcAV aboard ; they collected the wreck and their own slain ; they restored the slain of the enemy only through the customary ceremony of a truce solicited for the purpose; and erecting their trophy, which w^as the easiest part of the business, they vindicated to themselves, against a force so supe- rior, every ordinary mark of decided victory. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy at the Achaian Ilhium, on pretence of their success in * The song of battle and the song of vie- ' Thucydides does not, with his usual tory, both hymns to the gods, one a prayer accuracy, account for the inefficiency of the before battle, and at the same time a signal main body of the Peloponnesian fleet in the for ingaging, the other a thanksgiving for latter part of the day. Perhaps there was success, were equally called Psean ; but among them something of that mismanage- Thucydides distinguishes that it was the ment frequently incident to confederate ar- Bong of triumph which was sung upon this maments, of which he was not himself per- occasion ; — 's^xwh^qh re ecft* w^£o^^«5, «{ fectly informed. tlie 10^ HISTORY OF GREECE. Chat. XV. the eariy part of the clay, and placed by it the single captured ship •which had not been retaken, as an offering to the god of the sea. If the event of the former action against Phormion had excited indignation at Lacedcemon, that of the recent battle would give Cnemus, and his two surviving coadjutors, to apprehend no very favor- able reception on their return thither. A project therefore occurring, while the fleet remained yet assembled on the Corinthian coast, for attempting an important stroke against the enemy before they dispersed for the winter, was received, particularly by the enterprizing nmcyd. 1.2. Drasidas, with eager joy. It was known to the Megarians that the Athenian government, secure in naval superiority, left their harbour of PeirjEus without an adequate guard. That most important place there- fore it M as proposed to surprize. A select body of seamen were marched by land to Megara, each carrying his oar, his cushion, and his thong*. Arriving in the evening, they with all haste launched forty triremes which had been laid up in the port of Niscea, and putting immediately to sea, made for the Attic coast. A contrary wind, presently arising, gave them to apprehend that they should not be able to reach Peirteus in time to accomplish a surprize. Doubtful therefore of the possibility of executing their original plan, they determined ui)on a smaller enter- prize, which was clearly within their power. Instead of pushing for ' Tr,» luiirr.t xai to txritptVieF, xxl To» marble fragment, which, before the spolia- rfoTrur7,fx. — Cum singulis remis, Sf singulis tions of the Freuch, was in the \'aticau pulvinis, quos sibt remigantibus subsfcrne- museum at Rome, has been mentioned in a fent, 4" cum singulis scalmis. Tlie thong, former note, (24. s. 4. ch. S.) as the most or loop, to fasten the oar to the rowlock, satisfactory representation known of an is not unknown with us, and I have seen the antient ship of war. In that curious monu- cushion used by Thames wherrymen ; yet ment, the oars project from the side of the that the cushion should have been so indis- vessel through apertures, like the rowports pensable an implement as the account in of our small ships of war; but at the aper- the text would make it appear, v.e do not ture every oar has a bag about it, whose readily conceive. Tho therefore the scholiast purpose apparently has been to prevent the gives the explanation, which the Latin waves from flowing in. 1 leave it for those translator has followed, iruptVior er» to xia? who have leisure for the inquiry to decide a ivixa.^r,>Tai li-ifitra-iilti, Sia ro ^tj tri/irlf iSiJ-9<»i whether the vKrificiHf of Thucviiides may ivtiit Ta{ vivyxf, I cannot help having some h;ive been such a case or bag, rather than suspicion that it meant another thing. A a, cushioQ to sit upou. eirceus, Sect. II. MEASURES IN ACARNANIA. • los PeivEBus, they debarked on Salainis. Notice communicated to Athens by fire-beacons, raised an alarm there, says Thucydides, equal to any- thing experienced in the course of the war. The immediate ajiprehension Avas, that the enemy were already in Peirteus: the inhabitants of that place supposed that the Peloponnesians were at least masters of the town of Salamis, and that the attack would reach them without delay. At daybreak the whole strength of Athens moved down to the port ; antl the galleys were hastily launched and manned, while a strong gar- rison was appointed to Peirteus. The danger however was over almost as soon as known. The Peloponnesians, after collecting some booty, making some defenceless people prisoners, and seizing three triremes from which the crews had fled, hastened back to Nistea, not without apprehension that their leaky vessels might founder before they reached that port. Had the Peloponnesians persevered, says Thucydides, in their first design, supposing no hindrance from the wind, they might easily have succeeded. The event therefore was salutary to Athens, by the admonition it gave. A proper guard was thenceforward kept in Peirffius, the mouth of the harbour was shut with a chain, and all due precaution was observed against surprizes. As soon as the Peloponnesian seamen returned to their fleet, the ships were sent to their several homes, and laid up for the winter. But the active Phormion did not let the severe season pass unemplo3'ed. A party adverse to that which favored the Athenian alliance was strong Thuryd. 1. 2. in some of the Acarnanian towns. As soon as certain intelligence ^' ^^'^' arrived that the Peloponnesian fleet was dispersed, nothing remaining to be feared for Naupactus, he sailed to Astacus. Debarking there four hundred heavy-armed Athenians and as many Messenians, he inarched through Acarnania, and concerting measures with the friendly at Stratus, Coronta, and other principal towns, he banished the obnoxious. OEneiadse, strongly situated among marshes near the mouth of the Acheloiis, alone of all the Acarnanian cities, maintained its alliance with the Peloponnesians. Reimbarking then with his escort, he returned to Naupactus. In spring he proceeded to Athens, taking V'ith him the captured ships, and the prisoners ; of whom the freemen Vol. II. p were loG HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. were shortly exchanged for so many Athenians, prisoners with the Peloponnesians. During these transactions in the western part of Greece, while, in Laceda?mon and Athens, war seemed to sleep for the M'inter, far more Tluicyd. 1. 2. alarming movements occurred on the northern borders. Philip, brother c. f)a. ^ . ' of Perdiccas king of Macedonia, dying, his son Amyntas claimed the succession to the principality which he had held in Upper Macedonia. Ch. 13. S.4. Perdiccas, who had proposed to deprive his brother of that little sub- of this Hist. ,. . • 1 • I'll ,TTi 1 •», 1 • 1 ordinate soveremty, seized it on his death, u hat the Macedonian law on the subject may have been, we have no information, and perhaps it was not very well defined. Amyntas however resorted to the neigh- boring powerful soverein of Thrace, Sitalces. This prince, by his recent alliance with Athens, for what advantages in return, is not said, had ingaged to compel the revolted dependencies of Athens in Chalci- dice to return to their obedience. Ready therefore M'ith his army, he took Amyntas under his patronage; and, Perdiccas refusing to reinstate that prince in the principality which had been held by his father, he resolved to dethrone Perdiccas, and make Amyntas king of ^lace- donia. Xen. Hel. Winter was approaching, but winter warfare, Ave find, was more common with the Thracians than with the Greeks. The forces of Tbiicyd. 1. 2. gijalces unlike the little armies of the Grecian republics, almost e. 9S. .... rivalled In numbers the hosts of Asia: but, far alien from Asiatic effeminacy, Thrace was held by the Greeks themselves to be the favorite residence of Ares and Enyo, or, as the Romans named them^ Mars and Rellona, the deities of war. Sitalces put himself at the head of a hundred thousand foot and fifty thousand horse; and, taking with him the Macedonian prince, marched toward that inland district of the Macedonian kingdom, which had been his father's appanage. Here Amyntas had still friends, and the towns of Gortynia and Ata- lanta readily opened their gates to his protector. Perdiccas, tho of no mean talents, and commanding a considerable dominion, yet weakened by civil war with the princes of his family, was utterly unequal to meet the Thracian army in battle. With his cavalry only he attended upon its motions, while his people sought refuge, some in the fortified towns; -uard to move whithersoever emergency might rcfjuirc, went without the wall of circumvaUalion, directing their march by the clamor. Fire-signals were raised to give notice to Thebes ; but, to render these unintelligible, the garrison formed similar signals in various parts of the town. Meanwhile those Plataeans, who first mounted the wall, had forced the towers on each side,'put the guards to the sword, and proceeding by their ladders on the tops of the towers, from that height discharged missile weapons, with advantage, against those who approached to disturb the passage of their comrades. The parapet between the towers, to make the passing easier, was then thrown down; ladders were placed on the outside, and every one, as soon as over the outer ditch, formed on the counterscarp; whence, with arrows and darts, he cooperated with those on the towers in protecting the rest. To cross the ditch, however, was not easy; for there was much water in it, frozen, but not so as to bear; and before those from the tower-tops, who were the last to descend, could effect it, the enemy's picket-guard approached. But the torches which these carried, of little use to themselves, anabled the Platfeans to direct missile weapons against them, so effica- ciously as to give opportunity for the last of their own people to get ' over the ditch ; which was no sooner done than they hastened off, and, leaving the temple of the hero Androcrates on the right, soThucydides describes their march, struck directly into the Theban road, as that ■which they would least be expected to take. The stratagem was com- pletely successful : they could plainly perceive the Peloponnesians, with their torches, pursuing along the Athenian road, by Dryocephalas toward mount Cithjeron. Having themselves followed the Theban road about three quarters of a mile, they turned short to the right, and passing by Erythr£i3 and Hysite, soon gained the mountains, whence they proceeded securely to Athens. Of those who ingaged in this hazardous but well-planned and ably- executed enterprize, two hundred and twelve thus profited from its success: none were killed; one only was taken on the counterscarp of the circumvallation; five or six returned into tlie town without 1 1 attempting Sect. III. SIEGE OF MITYLENE. 117 attempting to scale the vail. These told the garrison that their comrades, who persevered, were all cut off. Next morning therefore a herald was sent to solicit the dead for burial, and by his return the success of the undertaking was first known in the town. The relief of Mitylene meanwhile was not forgotten at Lacedajmon. Tlmcyd. 1. 3. Requisitions were sent to the several maritime states of the confederacy *^' "^' to furnish their proportion of a fleet of forty ships of war ; and toward spring, Avhile these were preparing, Salsethus M'as forwarded with a r, 25. single trireme to inspect the state of things, and direct what might be necessary. Sala^thus, landing at Pyrrha, found means, through some defect in the contravaliation, where it crossed a deep watercourse, to enter Mitylene. The people, pressed by the able and vigorous con- After 23d duct of Paches in the command of the besieging armament, were already talking of capitulation; but the exhortations of Salasthus, with assurance of speedy succour, encouraged them to persevere in defence. Early in summer the fleet, which tlie zeal of the con- j] r ^27 federacy had increased to forty-two ships of war, sailed for Mitylene P. W. 3. under the command of Alcidas ; and, shortly after, the Feloponnesian j._ 26." army, commanded by Cleomenes, as regent for his minor nephew Pausanias, son of the banished king Pleistoanax, invaded Attica. Not only the produce of the earth was destroyed, wherever cultivation had been attempted in the tract formerly ravaged, but parts of the country before untouched were now laid waste ; so that, excepting that of the second year of the war, this was the most destructive inroad that Attica had experienced. Meanwhile, Alcidas loitering long on the coast of Peloponnesus, and c, 25. then not pressing his voyage across the iEgean, the Mitylenaeans, distressed by scarcity of provisions, began to despair of timely succour, c. 27, Salaethus himself at length grew hopeless of that assistance of which lie had brought the promise ; but he thought he saw a resource in the yet unexerted strength of the garrison. The oligarchal party in Mity- lene, according to a policy common in the Grecian commonwealths, reserved to themselves exclusively the complete armour and efficacious weapons of the heavy-armed, and allowed the lower people the use of the inferior arms, and the practice of the inferior discipline, of the light- armed 118 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. armed only. Saltethus, who, in an oligarchy supported bj' the extra- ordinary institutions of Lycurgus, was accustomed to see all the citizens, ivithout inconvenience, equally intrusted with the completest armour, and trained in the completest discipline, thought nothing was vanting to inabie the Mitylenjeans, instead of starving w ithin their walls, to meet Paches in the field, but to distribute among the lower people the arms lying in their stores. The experiment was niade under his authority', but the event was very wide of his hope. The lower people were no sooner vested with this new military importance, tliau they assumed civil controul: they held their own assemblies; they would no longer obey the magistrates ; but they required thut the lemaining stock of provisions should be open to public inspection, and distributed equally to the people of all ranks; and they threatened, in case of refusal, to make immediately their own terms with the Athe- Thncyd. 1, 3. nians. In this state of things, the leading men thought no time was ^" ^^' to be lost: they proposed at once to the people to treat for a capitula- tion, in which all should be included. This was approved : a herald was sent to the Athenian general, and the following hard terms were accepted : That the JMitylensans should surrender themselves to the pleasure of the Athenian people : That the Athenian army should be immediately admitted into the city : That the Mitylenjeans should send deputies to Athens to plead their cause : That, before the return of these, the Athenian general should neither put to death, reduce to slavery, nor imprison any RIityleua?an. The concluding stipulation was intended particularly for the security of those of the aristocratical party, who had been active in the negotiation with Laceda^mon. Many of them, nevertheless, whether doubtful of Athenian faith, or apprehensive of vengeance from their fellowcitizens, who through their means chiefly had been led to their present diasterous situation, took refuge at the altars. Paches removed them under a guard to the iland of Tenedos, there to await the judgement of the Athenian people, c, 59. Alcidas, with the ileet vvliich should have relieved Mitylene, was no farther advanced than the ilands of Icarus and Myconus, when report of its surrender met him. Desirous of more authentic information, he proceeded to Embatus, a port of the Erythraean territory on the Ionian coast ; Sect. III. OPERATIOKS ON THE IONIAN COx\ST. ng coast; and there receiving assurance tliat the Athenian forces had been seven days in possession of IMitylene, he summoned a council of war to concert measures. In the fleet were some Ionian refu 40. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. every man to death, and reducing the women and children of all ranks to slavery. Such Mas the right vhich the Athenian people claimed_ over Greeks whom they called allies, and who had every pretension so to consider themselves; and such the punishment for renouncing that alliance, to connect themselves with other Greeks. The assembly was no sooner dismissed than a trireme was dispatched, with orders for Paches to carry the decree into immediate execution. But the Athenians were not universally of a temper to sleep upon such a deed without remorse. The very next morning extensive repentance became evident; and many of the principal men joined the IMitylenazan deputies, in pressing the summoning of a second assembly, for the purpose of reconsidering the decree ; and they prevailed. The people were hastily called together, and various opinions Avere delivered. The mild Nicias was a weak opponent to the insolent Cleon, who harangued with vehemence in support of the measure already taken. What folly,' he said, ' to rescind, on one day, what had been, on due deliberation, resolved but on the preceding! Without more stability in measures, there was an end of government, ^\'ith regard to the purport of the decree complained of, example was become absolutely necessary; and a more just example than the Mitylenaeans never could be found. They had always been treated by Athens, not only with justice but with kindness, not only without offence but with cautious respect. And as nothing could be more unprovoked than, the revolt, so nothing could be less defended upon any plea of neces- sity. The Mitylenaeans could not be compelled to the part they had taken: being ilanders, attack could hardly reach them; possessing ships and fortifications, they could have repelled it. Injoying then these advantages, they had before their eyes the example of others^ who, having revolted against Athens, had been punished by depriva-. tion of their marine, demolition of their fortifications, and reduction under a strict subjection. Nevertheless, unsatisfied with possessed felicity, undeterred by obvious example, they not barely renounced their political connection, but they united themselves with those whose professed purpose was the destruction of Athens. Such being the case, it would be weakness to let sentiments of mercy prevail ; , ' and. Sect. III. DECREE AGAKN^ST THE MITYLEN.EANS. 425 * and it would be folly even to delay that decision which wisdon> * required, but which, if tlie present anger of the people cooled, they ' would want resolutioji to make.' These were the principal arguments in support of the inhuman sentence. But Cleon would inforce argu- ment by menaces; and knowing that he could not use a more effectual weapon against the timid Nicias, impudently imputing corrupt motives to any who should dare to oppose him, he threatened criminal prosecu- tion before that wild judicature the assembled people. The assertor of the cause of humanity, upon this occasion, was DiodotAis son of Eucrate.s. He must have deserved to be better known, but upon this occasion only we find him mentioned in history '". In the debate of the preceding day he had been the principal opponent of Cleon; and he now again came forward with firmness, with zeal, and Tbucyd. 1. 3. at the same time with prudence, to plead a cause which, he insisted, was. ^' ' not more that of humanity than of political wisdom. Such was the ferment df men's minds, and so much passion entered into the decisioa of political questions at Athens, that he would not venture to attribute c. 42 — *?. injustice to the decree; he would not venture to affirm that the Athe- nians might not, in strict right, condemn the whole Mitylen^an people to death; but he desired them to consider, 'that the lower Mityle- nffians had no sooner had the power, in consequence of having arms put into their hands,, than they compelled the aristocratical party to treat with the Athenian general. Setting aside however the question of right and justice, he would consider the matter at issue upon the point of expediency only. The terror of capital punishment, it was notorious, did not prevent the commission of crimes: it was the business therefore of a wise policy, by attentive precaution, to pre^ vent revolt, and not to inhance evils, to which necrlisence or misrule might give occasion, by making the situation of those ingaged in revolt completely desperate : it was the business of a wise policy to draw profit from conquest, and not to convert a city, capable of paying large tribute, into a heap of ruins,, and a cultivated country to a desert. . A brother of Nicias was named Eu- the supposition that the father of Diodotus crates, (Lys. or. pro. fil. Eucr.) and the may have been brother of Niceratus, the manner in which family-names were usually father of Nicias, distributed among the Greelis, would favor ' TJie. 126 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. ' The lower people, he observed, even in the subject-states, were in ' general attached to Athens. E%' en were it just, therefore, nothing ' could be more impolitic than, by an act of extreme severity, to alie- * nate, in every subject-state, that party which alone was, or ever ' would be, well-disposed to them.' He concluded with recommend- ing", ' that those who had been selected by Paches as most involved in ' the guilt of revolt, should be, not condemned in haste and in anger, * but judged at leisure with dispassionate deliberation, and that the rest * of the JVIitylensjan people should have a free pardon.' Thucyd. ]. s. The speeches being concluded, the questio-n was put, and Diodotus ^' prevailed; but the influence of Cleon was such that he prevailed but by a very small majority. It was, after all, very much feared that notice of the second decree could not be conveyed to Mitylene in time to prevent the execution of the first ; orders for which had been for- warded near twenty-four hours. A trireme was in all haste dispatched, with no small promises to the crew for arriving in time. They rowed incessantly, refreshing themselves with a preparation of meal, wine, and oil, Avhichthey could take without (juitting their labor, and sleeping by reliefs. Fortunately no adverse wind impeded ; and the trireme with the first decree, going on an odious errand, did not press its way. It arrived however first ; the general had opened the dispatches and was taking measures for executing the horrid order, when the second trireme arrived with the happy countermand. The case of those whom Paches had sent to Athens, as principal actors in the revolt, seems to have been hopeless, since Diodotus him- self had not ventured to offer a word in their favor, farther than to ^^^' claim for them a dispassionate trial. They were more than a thousand, and all were put to death. Nor were those saved from the executioner treated with the generosity which Diodotus recommended. All the ships of war of the Mitylentean commonwealth were confiscated to the use of the Athenian people ; the fortifications of the city Mere demo- lished, and the lands w^ere disposed of in a manner which appears to have been new. According to the genius of democracy, it was calcu- lated rather for private emolument than public advantage, being either required by the soverein people, as an indulgence which they wished 11 and SECT.Iir. DEATH OF PACHES. 127. and could command, or proposed by some leading men as a bribe to obtain popular favor. The whole iland of Lesbos, except the territory of Methynme, was divided into three thousand portions. Three hundred of tlicse were dedicated to the gods; for it was supposed the deity might be thus bribed, not only to pardon, but even to favor the most atrocious inhumanity. The remainder was divided by lot among the Athenian citizens, wiio were however not to have possession of the lands : tjiat was to remain with the Lesbians, who, for each portion, were to pay a yearly rent, in the nature of our quitrents, of two mines, nearly eiglit guineas. A territory belonging to the Lesbians, on the neigboring continent, was disposed of in the same manner. Both the insular and tlie continental territory were reduced under complete and immediate subjection to the sovereinty of the Athenian people. But the gratification of individuals only was provided for, the public trea- sury derived nothing from the arrangement. A very remarkable fact, unnoticed by Thucydides, may, on the authority of Plutarch, require mention here. The conduct of Paches, throughout his command, appears to have been able, and his services were certainly important. On his return to his country he expected honor and respect, suitable to those services; but he found himself called upon to answer a charge of peculation before the assembled people. The orators who conducted the accusation were virulent: their harangues had evident eflect upon the multitude; and the indig- nation of Paches, perhaps less an orator than a soldier, was so raised that, in presence of the assembly, he stabbed himself to the heart. After proceeding thus far in Grecian history, we become so famili- arized with instances of slaughter committed in cold blood, generally not without at least a claim of sanction from lawful authority, and a pretence to the execution of justice, that the horror lessens, and we are prepared for the tragedy which closed the siege of Plattea. We find Thucydides so often giving du-e measure of censure to his fellow- countrymen, that it seems reasonable to suppose they would not have escaped his animadversion for neglecting all endevor to succour the brave little garrison of that place, had there been any prospect of suc- cess from any attempt wit|iin their power. We may conceive, indeed, tUat c. 52. 123 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. , that the pestilence first, and then the revolt of Lesbos, vould greatly weaken their means; not only reducing their ability for exertion, but making all risk doubly dangerous. The besieging army hou'evcr alone Mould scarcely deter them; but the force of Boeotia was at hand, equally to support the besieging army, or to take advantage of the absence of the Athenian forces from Attica, and to intercept their rt.'turn; and the loss of a battle, in the critical circumstances of that time, might have indaugered all the dependencies of Athens, and even Athens itself Thucyd. 1. 3. Such being the inability of the Athenians to relieve Plata:a, in the course of the summer, the third of the sicgt, the garrison began to be severely pressed by famine. The first proposal for a capitulation was nevertheless made by the Lacedaemonian general, ia pursuance of instructions, the result of an illiberal and even treacherous policy, which we should deem more unworthy of Sparta, were there fewer instances of it upon record to her shame. The success of the Pelo- ponnesians in the war, not having been so great and so rapid as they had promised themselves, it was foreseen that, to restore places taken on both sides, might probably become a necessary condition of any peace. But it was an object with the Lacedaemonian government, ia compliment to Thebes, not to restore Plataea. As soon therefore as it was known that the garrison were in extremity of want, the general sent a herald with the proposal, ' that if they would voluntarily submit ' themselves to the Lacedtemonians, and take them for their judges, ' the guilty only should be punished, and none without trial.' The Platisans, utterly unable to struggle for better terms, acceded to these, and surrendered their town and themselves to the Lacedaemonians. Commissioners shortly arrived from Sparta, authorized to pronounce the doom of the unfortunate garrison, which seems to have been already determined; for the mode of trial promised nothing- equitable. No accusation \ras preferred, but the simple question was put to the Pla- laeans, * Whether, in the existing war, they had done any service to ' the Lacede whole would have been destroyed. The conflagration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented that immediate destruction M'hich the aristocra- tical party had apprehended ; but their affairs nevertheless suffered from the defection of their friends. In the night not only the greater part of the Epirot auxiliaries made their escape to the continent, but the commander of the Corinthian trireme consulted his safety by sailing awav. At the beginning of this civil war, the democratical party had sent intelligence to Naupactus, where Nicostratus son of Deitrephes com- c 75. manded the Athenian squadron. On the next day after the departure of the Epirot troops and the Corinthian ship, Nicostratus arrived in the harbour of Corcyra with twelve triremes and five hundrcil heavy- nrmed ?>Iessenians. His purpose of course was to support tlie demo- cratical, which was the Athenian party ; but in the present circum- stances, his arrival perhaps gave greater joy to the defeated nobles, who dreaded nothing so much as the unrestrained revenge of their fellowcitizens. Nor did he deceive their expectation: proposing a 1 1 treaty, Sect.V. sedition of CORCYHA. 1S7 treaty, he succeeded in mediating an agreement, by which rt was determined that ten only, who were named as the most guilty of the nobles, should be brought to trial, and that the rest should retain all their rights as citizens, under a democratical government. He pro- vided then that even the selected ten should have opportunity to escape; and thus a sedition, begun with the most outrageous violence, was composed in a manner little heard of in Grecian annals, totally without bloodshed. The proposal for a league offensive and defensive wnth Athens was carried, as in the present circumstances might be expected, without opposition. Nicostratus would then have returned with his whole squadron to Naupactus; but, the more completely to insure the continuance of quiet so happily restored, the democratical leaders requested that he would leave five of his ships; undertaking to supply him with as many of their OAvn, completely manned. The magistrates, whose office it was to appoint citizens for this service, thought to gain farther security against fresh commotion by selecting many of the aristocratical party. Unfortunately a suspicion arose among these, that the pretence of service was only a feint : that the purpose was to send them to Athens ; where, from the soverein people, they expected no favorable measure. Under this persuasion they betook themselves, as suppliants, to the temple of Castor and Pollux, which no assurances from Nicostratus could persuade them to quit. This extreme, and apparently weak, mistrust excited suspicion among the democratical party. Arming themselves, they broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their arms; and they M'ould have proceeded to bloodshed, if Nicostratus had not prevented. The alarm of the aristocratical party then became universal, and four hundred took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. All the labors of Nicostratus to restore peace and har- mony were thus frustrated ; for mutual jealousy prevented the pos- sibility of accommodation. While the suppliants of .Juno feared assassination should they quit their sanctuary, and starving if they remained, their opponents were apprehensive of some sudden blow meditated by them. To prevent this, therefore, they proposed to remove them to a small iland not far from the shore, near which the temple stood, promising not only safety, but regular supplies of pro- VoL. II. T visions. IM HISTOR\^ OF GREECE. Chap. XV. visions. The utter inability of the suppliants in any way to help themselves, induced them to consent. The same confidence earlier given to the oaths of their adversaries, and to the faith of the generous Nicostratus, might have prevented the miseries that followed. Tliucyd. 1. 3. In this state things had rested four or five days, when a Peloponne- c 76 sian fleet of fifty-three ships of war appeared in sight. It was conl- c. 69. manded by Alcidas, who, on arriving at Cyllene, with the fleet intended for the relief of Lesbos, had found orders to go immediately to Cor- cyra, with thirteen additional ships, taking Brasidas for his collegue in r.77. command. Consternation and tumult immediately spred through the town, the party now triumphant scarcely knowing whether most to dread the Peloponnesian armament or their own felloM'citizens. They however obeyed Nicostratus, who, with his little squadron, quitting the port to meet the Peloponnesian fleet, directed the Corcyrteans to sup- port him as they could get their triremes ready. Sixty were imme- diately launched ; but they were manned with so little selection, that as they advanced, scattered, toward the enemy, two deserted; and, in some others, the crews went to blows among themselves. The Pelo- ponnesians, observing their confusion, detached twenty triremes against them, retaining thirty-five, including the deserters, to oppose the C.78. Athenian squadron. Nicostratus showed himself not less able in military, than prudeait and humane in civil command. Cy superiority in evolution, avoiding the enemy's center, he attacked one wing, and sunk a ship. The Peloponnesians then, as in the ingagement with, Phormion off Rhium, formed in a circle. Nicostratus, as Phormion had done, rowed round them. With twelve triremes he was thus acting with advantage against thirty-five, when the detached squadron, which had obtained more decisive advantage against the Corcyrtean fleet, returned to support their own. Nicostratus then retreated toward the <"• 79- port, in such order as to inable the distractetl Corcyra^ans also to reach it without farther loss ; but thirteen of their ships had been already taken. It was now evening, and nothing could exceed the alarm and con- fusion in Corc^ia. Au immediate attack was expected from the victorious fleet, while it was scarcely possible to be secure against the domestic foe. The suppliants of Juno were however removed from the ilaud to their former situation in the temple, more out of reach of the 11 Peloponnesians, Sect.V. sedition of CORCYRA. i3J» Peloponneslans, and such measures for defence of the town were taken as, in the tumult of the moment, were judged proper. But the inaiuUly of the Spartan commander-in-chief, and apparently his cowardice, uncommon as that defect was in a Spartan, were their hest security. After his naval victory, instead of immediatel}' pushing his success and profiting from the consternation of the enemy, he retired with his prizes to the harbour of Sybota. Even on the next day, the active zeal of Brasidas in vain exhorted attack upon the city; Alcidas would carry his exertion no farther than to debark some troops on the headland of Leucimntj, and ravage the adjacent fields. The democratical Corey- Thucyd. 1. s. rasans nevertheless remained in the most anxious suspence. Tlieir ' domestic opponents were indeed completely in their power, but a supe- rior enemy might severely revenge any severity exercised against them. It was therefore resolved to try, in a conference, to make some arrange- ment for mutual benefit. The body of the aristocratical party still refused all confidence to their opponents: but some, both of those mIio had, and of those who had not, taken refuge in the temples, less fearful, consented to serve in the fleet ; and thirty triremes were manned with mixed crews, those of the aristocratical party being distributed, so as best to obviate danger from their disaffection. Alcidas however attempted no attack : about noon he reimbarked his ravaging troops, and returned to his harbour of Sybota, where, in the evening, he received intelligence, by fire-signals, that a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of war was approaching. Immediately he got under c si. way ; and hastening his course close under shore, as far as Leucadia, would not double the cape of that peninsula, but dragged his gallics across the isthmus, and so passed undiscovered to Peloponnesus. No sooner were the Corcyrtean people assured of the approacli of the Athenian fleet and the flight of the Peloponnesian, than every dark ■ passion mixed itself with the joy which instantly superseded their .fears ; and measures were deliberately taken for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. The IMessenians, , hitherto incamped without, to oppose the forein enemy, were now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then directed to pass from the town port to the Hylla'ic port. In the way, all of the aristocratical T 2 party 140 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. party among the crews were thrown overboard, and in the same instant massacre began in the city. The supphants only in the temple of Juno remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the gods for affronts to themselves, while no apprehension v.as entertained for the grossest violation of every moral duty. The fear of starving never- theless induced about tifty of them, on the persuasion of their oppo- nents, to quit their situation and submit to a trial. They were all summarily condemned and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair : some killed oneanother within the temple ; some hanged themselves on the trees of the adjoining sacred grove ; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their wretchedness. In the city, and through the iland, the scene of murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days the democratical party continued hunting out their opponents, and massacring wherever they could find them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of Bacchus. Super- stitious fear prevented any direct violence there, but a wall was built around the temple, and they were starved to death. Nor was difference of political principles and political connections the only criterion of capital offence. Opportunities for private revenge, or private avarice, were in many instances used. Debtors cancelled their debts by the murder of their creditors; the nearest relations fell by each-other's hands ; audaciousness in crime went so far that some were forced from the temples to be murdered, and some even murdered in them ; and every enormity, says the historian, usual in seditions, was practised, and even more. The Athenian admiral, Eurymedonson of Thucles, lay in the harbour •with his powerful fleet, the quiet and apparently approving spectator of Thucyd. 1.3. these disgraceful transactions; and not till the democratical Corcy- *^" ^^' rffians had carried revenge to the utmost, sailed away. The im- policy of his conduct seems to have been equal to the inhumanity. Nicostratus, interfering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The licence which Eurymedon gave, to massacre all Avho were supposed adverse to the Athenian Sect.v. sedition of CORCYRA. Ul Athenian interest, had a very different effect". About five hundred had escaped; some aboard the triremes which had deserted to the Peloponnesians, some on other occasions. They took possession of some forts and lands, which had belonged to the 'Corcyrtean people, on the continent opposite to their iland ; and thence, wilh all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst of plunder, and the desire of recovering their antient possessions, united could excite, they carried on hostilities against Corcyra; seizing ships, making descents on the coast, living by depredation, and wasting whatever they could not carry off. After this experience of the weakness of their adversaries, they determined to attempt the recovery of the iland; and having in vain solicited assistance from the Lacedtemonians and Corinthians, who ■would no more risk their fleet against the naval force of Athens, they, with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number only six hundred, debarked on Corcyra. The conduct of these undoubtedly brave, but apparently ill-judging men, misled by passion, remarkably supports an observation which Strabo, who lived in an age to see and to advert at leisure to the consequences, has made upon the conduct and character of his fellowcountrymen. The warmth of temper, which perpetually ingaged their whole souls in party disputes and petty quarrels, disabled them for great objects : insomuch that they were continually employing, for mutual destruction, abilities and courage, which, with more political union, might have inabled them to defend their independency for ever, against Rome, and against the world. The aristocratical Corcyrasans, had they directed their views to their establishment on the soil where they had found refuge, might probably have raised a powerful city Thucydides in his manner of marking eneni}', interfered as a generous mediator, the different characters and different merits and so efficaciously as to prevent all out- of the two Athenian commanders, offers an rage. Eurymedon came conmianding a admirable model for writers of cotemporary fleet of sixty ships of war, a force that de- history. Without any offensive remark, terred opposition : he stayed seven days, nieerly stating facts in tlie simplest manner, during which all the enormities were com- he gives the reader fully to discover which mitted, and he went away. This is abso- Reserved the highest praise, and which dis- lutely all that the historian says of Eury- graced himself and his country. Nicostra- medon : but that so short a tale, with so tus, arriving in the very h^ight of the sedi- few circumstances marked, might not escape tion, with only a small force, with which he the reader's notice, with a slight variation had soon to cope with a very superior of words, he repeats it. there. 142 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. there. But passion, to an extraordinary degree, still directed their measures. Immediately on landing in Corcyra, determined to main- tain themselves or die, they burnt those vessels by which they had hitherto been successful and even powerful. They then occupied and fortified mount Istone, which was certainly a prudent step ; and, from that advantageous post, issuing as opportunity offered, they compelled their adversaries to confinement within their walls, and themselves commanded the country. The calamities which followed, being con- nected with Athenian history, will be for notice hereafter. SECTION VI. ^n Athi^nian Squadron sent to Sicily uiider Laches. End of the Pestilence at Athens. Sixth Year of the JVar : Operations of the Athenians, under Nicias on the Eastern Side of Greece, and under Detnosthenes on the H'estern : State of JEtolia: Defeat oj Demos- thenes near AEgitium: A Peloponnesian Army sent into the JFestern Provinces ; Ozolian Locris acquired to the Peloponnesian Confede- racy : Demosthenes eltcted General of the Acarnanians ; Battle of Olpa; ; Battle of Idomen'e : Important Successes of Demosthenes : Peace between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots. The Sicilian Greeks, mostly well-disposed to the Peloponnesians, and ingaged in alliance with them, but distracted by a variety of political T> (-. . „_ interests within their iland, had given no assistance in operation. War Ol. ss. 2. had now broken out among themselves ; and toward the end of summer, 'liucyd! 1 3 ^^^^^ ^^^^ return of Eurymedon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a c. 80. squadron of twenty ships, under Laches sou of Melanopus, to assist the Leontines, an Ionian people, against the Syracusans, who were of Dorian race. The consequences did not become immediately very important ; and it may be most convenient to defer all farther account "of Sicilian affairs till the period when Sicily became the principal scenfe of military operation, c. S". lu the beginning of the insuing winter, the pestilence again broke but Sect. VI. END OF THE PESTILENCE OF ATHENS. 145 out in Athens. It had never yet intirely ceased, tho after the two first years there had been a remission : but in the renewal of its fury it seems to have worn itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole course it carried oft' not less than four thousand four hundred of those Athenians in the prime of life who were inrolled among the heavy- armed, and three hundred men of the higher rank who served in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons who perished by it, no means existed for ascertaining the number. Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive the friend of his youth, whom in old age he was destined to oppose in arms, the illus- trious citizen, Avho M"ith more than regal sway had directed the affairs of the Athenian democracy. Pericles died about the beginning of the third campain of the war. Archidamus commanded the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica in the following spring ; and it is the last occasion upon which tl>e cotemporary historian mentions him. In the fifth year Cleomenes, regent for the minor king of the other reigning family, had the office of general of the confederacy ; and now, in the r, p ^ sixth spring, the command was given to Agis, son of Archidamus. Ol. ss f. The forces were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus for a proposed xhucvd Ls. invasion of Attica, when the terrors of repeated earthquakes, which «• Sy. affected various parts of Greece with uncommon violence, checked the design, and the troops were dismissed. As the war drew out in length, every circumstance tended more and more to justify the counsels which led the Athenians to ingage in it. Notwithstanding that calamity, beyond human prudence to foresee, which had so reduced the strength of the commonwealth ; notwith- standing the loss of those talents which had prepared its resources during peace, and directed them during the two first years of hostility ; Athens Avas advancing toward a superiority which promised, under able conduct in the administration, to be decisive. Indeed the energy of the Athenian government, directed for near a century by a succession of men of uncommon abilitieSj was so put into train, that notwitii- standing the inferiority of the present leaders, it was scarcely perceived to slacken. Democracy, tho a wretched regulator, is a powerful spring. The highest offices in Athens were now open to tlie lowest people* ,44 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. people. Great competition of course arose; and one consequence was, that men of rank and education, however unambitious, vere forced to put themselves forward in public business, that the)' might avoid being trodden upon by their inferiors. Thus Nicias seems to have been rather compelled by circumstances, than induced by his own inclina- tion, to accept the situation in wdiich he was placed. He had succeeded Plut. vit. Pericles in the office of commander-in-chief. Plutarch says, that his "'c- cautious temper led him always to chuse commands where success might be certain, tho the glory would be small ; not from any defect of personal, but of political courage; he was less afraid of the swords of enemies than of the voices of fellowcitizens. After the reduction of Lesbos he had conducted the Athenian forces against a fortified ilet, called Minoa, at the mouth of the harbour of NisEea, the sea-port of Megara. It was without much difficulty taken, and a garrison was left in it. The purpose was to prevent any future surprize, like that lately attempted upon Peira;us, and to curb more effectually the JNIega- rian privateers; which, notwitlistauding the lookout from Salamis, annoyed the Athenian trade. In the present summer it was determined to send out two expedi- tions. Having recovered the principal of those dependencies in Thrace, whose revolt had given rise to the war, having checked defection in Asia by the severe punishment of the Lesbians, having learnt to despise the ravage of Attica, and, safe within their walls, possessing a navy that commanded the seas, the Athenians had leisure Thucyd. 1. 3. and means to prosecute offensive operations. Nicias, with a fleet of *''^^* sixty triremes, \vent to the iland of Melos; whose people, a Lacedas- nioniaa colony, tho through dread of tlie naval force of Athens they had avoided acting with the Peloponnesians, yet rejected the Athenian alliance, and refused to pay tribute. It was expected that, the waste of their lands would have brought them to submission ; but the Melian-i shutting themselves within their walls, with a declared determination not to treat, the tedious business of a siege was postponed for another enterprize, which had been concerted before the fleet left Attica. Passing to Oropus, on the confines of Boeotia, Nicias landed his forces by night, and marched immediately to Tanagra, where he was met by the Sect. VI. MEASURES OF THE ATHENIANS. 14« the whole strength of Athens, under Ilipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, whose conduct at Corcyra, it appears, had not displeased the people his soverein. The day was spent in ravaging the Tanagrsan lands. On the following day, the Tanagrteans, reinforced by a small body of Thebans, ventured an action, but were defeated. Erecting then their trophy, the forces under Hipponicus and Eurymedon marched back for Athens, and the others to their ships. Nicias proceeded with the fleet to the Locrian coast, plundered and wasted what was readily within reach, and then he also returned home. The expedition indeed seems to have had no great object. Apparently, the principal purpose was to acquire a little popularity to the leaders, and obviate clamor against them, by retaliating the evils of invasion on those of their enemies who were most within reach, and by holding out the recompense of pillage to gratify the vulgar mind. The purpose of the other expedition was to support the allies, and Thucyd. 1.3. • c 01 extend the influence of Athens, in the western parts of Greece; a service on which a squadron had been employed every summer from the beginning of the war. Phormion, during his command on that c- 7. station, had so indeared himself to the Acarnanians, that they particu- larly requested his son, or at least some relation, for his successor. A petition so honorable to so deserving an officer was not denied. In the feurth year of the Avar, Asopius son of Phormion \vas appointed to the command of a squadron of thirty ships. With these he successfully ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then, according to his orders, send- ing home the greater part, proceeded with twelve to his station at Naupactus, Anxious, on his arrival there, to show himself worthy of the preference given to a son of Phormion, he seems to have under- taken what his force was unequal to ; and after an unsuccessful attempt against ffiniadie, he lost his life in an attack upon Lencas. In tlie next year we find the command connnitted to Nicostratus, who, with . only twelve triremes had distinguished himself so advantageously in the Corcyrsean sedition, and in action M'ith the Peloponnesian fleet, c. 91. Thirty were now sent to Naupactus, under Demostiiencs son of AI- cisthenes. Demosthenes began operations by the surprize of EUomenus, a port c. 9i- Vol. II. U of U5 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XV. of the Leucadian territory, whose garrison he put to tlie sword; and then, collecting the allies of those parts, Acarnanians, Zacynthians, and Ccphallenians, in addition to the Xaupactian Messenians, who Avere in effect Athenian subjects, and obtaining fifteen triremes from Corcyra, he proceeded against Leucas itself The Leucadians, unable to resist such a force in the field, abandoned their territory to its ravages, and confined themselves within their walls. The Acarnanians were highly desirous to reduce a city perpetually hostile to them, and situate in a manner within their country. But, before the siege could be formed, Demosthenes was allured by a more splendid, tho far more liazardous project, suggested by the Naupactian Mcssenians. yEtolia was a much more formidable foe to Naupactus than Leucas to Acarnania. Always numbered among the members of the Greek nation, yet even in that age, M-hcn science and art were approaching meridian splendor in Attica, scarcely sixty miles from their borders, the iEtolians v.'ere a most rude people. Since the Trojan war, barbarism rather than civilization seems to have gained among them. They lived scattered in unfortified villages : they spoke a dialect scarcely intelligible to the other Greeks; and one clan of Tliuryd. 1.3. them at least, the Eurytanian, was said to feed on raw flesh: they used '^'^^' only light arms; yet their warlike character was high. The Mes- senians urged, that this hostile people might be subdued with the force now collected ; and then nothing would remain, in that part of the continent, able to oppose the confederate arms. Not only these argu- ments ingaged the attention of Demosthenes, but the view which they opened led him to form a more extensive plan. Having reduced ^tolia, he thought he should be able, without other forces than those ■within his command, to penetrate through the Ozolian Locris, and, keeping the impassable summits of Parnassus on the right, traverse the high lands as far as Cv Union in Doris. Hence the descent would be eas)' into Phocis, whose people he hoped, from of old friendly to Athens, -would zealously join him with their forces; for they had been with- held from the Athenian confederacy only by their situation, surrounded by the allies of the Ptloponnesians ; and if a party adverse to the Athenian interest should now prevail among them, he could easily 4 restore Sect. VI. DEMOSTHENES COM.MANDER IN THE WEST. U7 restore the superiority to its friends. Arrived in Phocis, he should be on the borders of Boeotia ; and assisted by the Phocian forces, he could make such a diversion on the northern or western frontier of that powerful hostile province, that, with due cooperation from Athens, and some assistance from a party favoring democracy, which was to be found in every Grecian state, there was no degree of success against the enemies of the commonwealth in the northern parts of Greece, to which it might not lead. In the opinion of Thucydides, if we may judge from the manner of a writer so cautious of declaring an opinion, the enterprize was ably projected ; but obstacles occurred, against the projector's hopes. The Acamanians, disappointed in their own viev/s, and offended at the pre- ference apparently given to the Messenians, refused to join in it. The Corcyrseans, M'hose government, pressed by a domestic enemy, could ill spare any part of its strength, took the opportunity of example for returning home. The Cephallenians, Zacynthians, and Messenians remained ; apparently all together no great force, and the Athenian infantry were only three hundred ; but the Ozolian Locrians of Q^neon, inveterate enemies of the .Etolians, were ready to join in any attempt against them ; and their intimate knowlege of the country, and practice in war with the people, made their assistance particularly valuable. The Messenians moreover, who M'ere best acquainted with the strength of iEtolia, and were likely to be the greatest sufferers from a miscarriage of the undertaking, persevered in recommending it; and Demosthenes was unwilling to give up a favorite project, with oppor- tunities which might not recur. It was accordingly determined that the siege of Leucas should be postponed, and that the forces under the Athenian general should enter .Etolia by the nearest way from QEneon, while the CEueonians took a circuit to meet him in the interior country. The army of Demosthenes was so little numerous, that the whole Timcyd. 1. 3. passed a night in the precinct of the temple of Nemeian Jupiter, on the ^' ^ borders of Locris, where, according to report current in the country, the poet Hesiod died. Nevertheless, no force appearing in the field capable of opposing him, the three towns of Potidanium, Crocylium, V 2 and 148 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. and Ticliium, were taken in as many clays; and plunder was collected tasuch an amount as to influence the decision of future measures. It M'as sent to Eupoliuni in Locris, M'hile the army remained at Tichium. Thucyd. 1.3. As soon as it was safely lodged, pursuing still the advice of the ]\Iesse- c. 57*' iiians, without waiting for the Locrians, who had not yet joined him, Demosthenes proceeded to iEgitium, which Mas abandoned on his . approach, and he took possession of the empty town. c 07. &1.4. He was now in a mountainous and woody country, full of defiles, with his little army consisting almost wholly of heavy -armed infantry. Meanwhile the --Etolians, who had early gathered his intention from his 1.3. C.96. preparations, and who, by the time he passed their frontier, had already collected their forces from the most distant parts, arrived in the neigh- borhood of .Egitium. Well knowing their advantage, they would come to no regular ingagement ; but occupying the heights around, made desultory attacks upon the allied army in various parts, running down the hills, throwing their darts, retiring whenever the enemy advanced^ pursuing M-hen they retired, and, both in pursuit and in retreat, possessing, with their light armour, certain advantage. Demosthenes had nov/ to regret that he had not waited the arrival, of his Locrian allies, armed like tlie ^litolians, and accustomed to contend with them in their desultory mode of action. As long as c. 98. the few bowmen of his army had a supply of arrows, whereever they could give their assistance, their weapons, of longer flight, kept off the enemy, ill armed for defence. But when, at length, all were Morn with long exertion, and their arrows were nearly spent, their com- inander received a mortal wound, and presently they dispersed, each to seek safety as he might. The heavy-armed then, unable to stand the darts of the ^Etolians, whom, with their Aveapons, they could not reach, had no resource but in hasty retreat. Pursued by active men, practised in running among rocks and mountains, many were killed. A ^lessenian, on whom they had principally depended as their guide in this wild and rough country, was among those who early fell. Some then strayed into impassable dells, and, a considerable body entering a pathless wood, the ^tolians set fire to it, and all were destroyed. Order was now totally lost, and every form of ilight and of destruction, says the cotemporary historian, was exjje- ricnced Sect. VI. OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES. 149 rienced by the Athenians and their allies. Procles, the second in command, was killed, with a liundred and twenty of the three hundred heavy-armed Athenians ; and of all the youth of Athens M'ho fell in the Avhole M'ar, continues the historian, those were the prime. Of the allies also a large proportion were slain. The survivors, with difficulty reach- ing the coast, at the distance of about ten miles from the place of action, proceeded to QEneon. The bodies of the dead being obtained for burial, through the usual ceremonies, those of the Athenians were carried to Athens by the returning fleet; but the unfortunate com- mander, fearing to meet the anger of his soverein the Athenian people, remained at Naupactus. A circumstance which, in the eye of dispassionate reason, must tend Thucyd. i. 3. to justify the attempt of Demosthenes, would perhaps inhance, at least ^' ■^"^' in the moment, the indignation of an ill-informed public. The ^Eto- lians had sent three ambassadors, one from each of their principal clans, to Corinth and Lacediemon, to request assistance against the common enemy ; proposing, as their particular object, to take Nau- pactus, which would deprive the Athenians of their best means for keeping a fleet in the western seas. The success obtained against Demosthenes appears to have obviated former scruples, and it was resolved to gratify the iEtolians ; but v/hethcr the jealousy of the kings or of the people was the obstacle, there seems to have been always a difficulty in sending out a Lacedjeraonian force otherwise than under royal command. The business of J^tolia not being thought of im- portance enough to require one of the kings of Sparta, no Lacedaemo- nian troops were sent : a body of three thousand of the allies only, were toward autumn assembled at Delphi ; but these were placed under the orders of three Spartans, Eurylochus, Macarius, and Menedffus. c. i&ii- The Ozolian Locrians, whose country lay between Delphi and iEtolia, were then in alliance with Athens. But the people of Amphissa, one of the principal towns, alarmed at the prospect of attack from the Peloponnesian confederacy, and still more appre- hensive of any interest which their neighbors and inveterate enemies, the Phocians, might acquire with the LacedfEmonian commanders, proposed to Eurylochus to ingage in alliance with Laceda^mon ; and assured him that he might make a readier acquisition of all the Ozolian Locris, ,Vo HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. Locris, so little firm was it in the Athenian interest, by negotiation than by arms. The proposal perfectly suiting the views of the Spartan seneral, he sent ministers through all the Locrian towns. The narrow territory of the Ozolian Locris was at this time divided between no less than thirteen republics. Urged at the same time by the Pelopon- nesian arms, ready to fall upon them, and by both the example and the persuasion of the Amphissians, eight of these acceded to the Pelopon- nesian confederacy. Of the remainder, the Olpsans gave hostages as pledges that they would commit no hostihty against the Pelopon- nesians, but refused to ingage in offensive alliance against the Athe- nians. The Hj^reans refused even to give hostages, till the Peloponnesian forces entered their territory and took one of their villages. The CEneonians and Eupolitans persevering in fidelity to their ingagemeuts with Athens and with their neighbors of Naupactus, their towns were Thucyd. 1. 3, attacked and taken. The hostages being then sent to Cytinion in '-• lO-- Doris, and the iEtolian forces having joined the Peloponnesian, Eury- lochus entered the Naupaclian territory, ravaged the whole, and took the suburbs of Naupactus, which were unfortified. Postponing then the siege of the town, he proceeded to the easier conquest of the neighboring town of jNIolycreium, a Corinthian colony, but long since subject to Athens. Demosthenes, living as a private individual at Naupactus, saw with the utmost anxiety these consequences of his rash enterprize. Uncom- missioned he went into Acarnania ; and, tho at first ill received, he persevered in apology, remonstrance, and solicitation, till he obtained a thousand heavy-armed /Vcarnanians, with whom he passed by sea to Naupactus. The principal hope of taking the place having been founded on the extent of the fortifications, and the disproportionate smallness of the garrison, this seasonable reinforcement gave it security : for blockade by land would he nugatory against a town open to the sea, of which the Athenians were masters. The disappointment on this occasion was lessened to Eurylochus by greater views offering in another quarter. Ministers from Ambracia had solicited his assistance for the conquest of the Amphilochian Argos. Success, they urged, would be attended with the immediate submission Skct. VI. OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES. iji submission of all Amphilochia; Acarnania might then be attacked with advantage; and the consequence, reasonably to be hoped for, would be the acquisition of all that part of the continent to the Lacedemo- nian confederacy. Eurylochus acceded to the proposal, and, with- drawing his forces into iEtolia, waited there, m hile the Amhraciots should prepare for the execution of their part of the undertakino-. Autumn was already advanced, when a body of three thousand Thuryd. !..•?. Ambracian heavy-armed foot entered Argeia (so the territory of the ' ' ^^^' Amphilochian Argos was called) and seized Olpa?, a strong fortress upon a hill close upon the gulph, belonging to the Acarnanians, but little more than three miles from Argos. Intelligence was immediately communicated through Acarnania, and the force of the countr}' was assembled : part marched to the assistance of Argos, part was stationed at Crenffi in Amphilochia, to watch the approach of Eurylochus, which the motions on all sides had given reason to expect. At the same time dispatches were sent to Aristoteles son of Timocrates, then commanding the Athenian squadron in the western seas, requesting succour ; but, such was the opinion which the Acarnanians held of Demosthenes, notwithstanding his defeat in vEtolia, notwithstanding the offence they had taken at him, and while he was yet afraid to meet the judgement of the despotic multitude in his own country, in this critical moment they sent him an invitation to take the office of commander-in-chief of tlie forces of all the Acarnanian republics. This remarkable fact, highly honorable to Demosthenes, proves more than that he was per- sonally respected among the Acarnanians. Their country was nearly equal in extent to Attica, and perhaps proportionally j)opulous in free , subjects, tho not in slaves ; but being divided among a number of village republics, no man could have either the education of Athenians of rank, or that acquaintance with public business upon a great scale, which the Athenians i" office acquired. Hence, in a great measure, the admitted superiority of the Athenians and Lacedfenionians to the other Greeks; and hence the Acarnanians felt the want of a man better educated, and better initiated in public business than any among them- selves, to take, in the present moment of danger, the supreme direction of their affairs, Eurylochus, 156 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XV. Thucvd. 1.3. Eurylochus, upon receiving information of the movement of the Ambraciots, crossed the AcheloLis, and hastened through Acarnania. Avoiding the towns, he passed unnoticed through the country, now deserted, the men being with the army, the women in the fortified places, till he reached Agra'is, a detached district, occupied by an Strab. 1. 8. ^tohan tribe. Thence proceeding over an uncultivated mountainous OOP * ^^ tract, and evading thus the body of Acarnanians appointed to watch his entrance into Amphilochia, he descended by night into Argeia, passed unperceived between the town of Argos and the Acarnanian camp, and joined the Ambraciots in Olpee. Strong with this junction, he moved next morning, and chose a situation not far distant, M'here he incamped. TLucyd. 1.3. Aristoteles m^anM'hile, with his squadron of twenty ships, arrived in the Ambracian gulph, accompanied by Demosthenes, who brought a small reinforcement to the land-force, two hundred heavy-armed Mes- seuians, and sixty Athenian bowmen. The M'hole strength of Acarnania was already collected at Argos, with only a small body of Amphi- lochians, of whom the greater part, friendly to the Athenian interest, were Mithheld by the Ambraciots. Invited by the Acarnanians only, Demosthenes was now elected commander-in-chief of all the allied forces; and the resolution was taken, by common consent, to give the enemy battle. The army in consequence moved toward Olpae, and Demosthenes incamped on ground divided only by a deep valley from the camp of Eurylochus. c. 107, los. Thus situated, both armies rested five days, and on the sixth both prepared for battle. Demosthenes had observed that the enemy out- numbered him, and, to prevent being surrounded, he placed four hundred heavy and as many light-armed x\carnanians in a hollow covered with bushes, whence they would have opportunity to attack, in the rear, that extreme of the enemy's line Mhich would overstretch his flank. The Messenians were placed in the right, with a few Athe- nians, apparently from the fleet, with whom he took post himself. The Amphilochians, who were not regular heavy-armed, but used javelins, were mixed with the Acarnanians in the rest of the line: the Argians arc not mentioned, few of them probably being to be spared from the garrison •Sect. VI. BATTLE OF O L P iE. i^5 garrison of their town. On the other side Eurylochus, with a chosen body, took the left of his line, against Demosthenes and the Messe- nians: the I^Iantineians Mere posted next to him;, the other Pelopon- nesians were mixed with the Ambraciots; who, being a Corinthian colony, preserved the Peloponnesian arms and discipline, and were esteemed the best soldiers of that part of the continent. The armies meeting, the Peloponnesian left outstretching the right of the enemy, was wheeling to attack their flank, when they were them- selves attacked in the rear by the Acaruanians from the ambush. Eurylochus was killed; the Pcloponnesians about him, panic-struck, fled; and this immediate defeat of what was reputed the firmest part of the army, spred dismay as far as the knowlege of it was communi- cated. Demosthenes profited from the opportunity, the Messenians in particular seconding him with a valor worthy of the fame of their antient heroes ; and quickly the left and center of the enemy were completely routed, the Mantineians only retreating into Olpa; in some order. But in the mean time the Ambraciots and others, who held the right of the Peloponnesian army, had defeated the Acarnanians opposed to, them, and pursued as far as Argos. Here however the flying troops found refuge, while the conquerors, returning toward the field of battle, were attacked by superior numbers, and, not without considerable loss, joined their defeated comrades in Olpse. The slaughter of the Pelopon- nesian army altogether was very great, and, of the three Si)artan generals, Meneda^us only survived. By the unforeseen train of circumstances which led to this battle, and much by the activity and able conduct of Demosthenes, both in previous measures and in the action itself, the face of things was now completely changed in the western countries ; the x\thenian affairs were at once restored, as if the disaster in iEtolia had never happened ; and instead of gaining Naupactus, lately considered as the last refuge of the Athenian interest in those parts, the Peloponnesian cause was in a far worse situation than before any force from Peloponnesus was sent into the country. Meneda^us, with whom the command of the defeated Thucyd. is. army remained, was at a loss for measures. He had force indeed '^^ ^^9- sufficient to defend tlie fortress he held, but means Avere v/anting to Vol. II. X subsist U4 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XF. ■subsist there. He bad no stores, and by land a victorious army, by sea the Athenian fleet, excluded supplies. . On the day after the battle therefore, when he applied for leave to bury the dead, he sent proposals for surrendering Olpa;, upon condition of haviug safe passage for his troops to their several homes. Leave to bury the dead was readily granted ; the rest was openly refused ; but assurance was secretly given^ that the Peloponnesians might depart in safety, if they would go quietly and quickly. In this Demosthenes and the Acarnanian chiefs had two objects ; to have the Ambraciots, and the mercenary troops in their service, at mercy ; and to v/eaken the Peloj)onnesian interest in those parts, by rendering the Pelopounesian name, and particularly the Lace- daemonian, odious for self-intcrestedncss and treachery. Menedceus did not scruple to accept the conditions : the dead were hastily buried;, and then the Peloponnesians, of whom the Mantineians were the largest surviving portion, went out in small parties, under pretence of gather- ino; herbs and firewood. The Ambraciots and others, as soon as it was observed that all the Peloponnesians had quitted the place, and were already at a distance, in great alarm followed, in hope to overtake them. The Acarnanians from their camp perceiving this, without waiting for oiders, immediately pursued equally Peloponnesians and Ambraciots; and when their commanders interfered, some went so far as to throw darts at them, sypposiug the public interest betrayed. The matter being however at length explained, the Peloponnesians, where they could be with certainty distinguished, were permitted to pass- unmolested. But much doubt arose, and much contention, which were Peloponnesians; for the Ambraciots i-etaiued so nearly the armour, habit, and speech of their mother- country, that the discrimination was- difficult. About two hundred were killed; the rest reached Agrais, whose prince, Salynthius, gave them a kind reception. Thucyd. 1. 3. The administration of Ambracia, on receiving intelligence that their '* ^^^' troops were possessed of Olpae, had hastened to support them with their whole remaining strength. Ignorant of what had since passed, they had already entered Amphilochia, when information of their march «, U2i ■^vas brought to Demosthenes. Immediately that general sent a strong detachment of Acarnanian troops to preoccupy the defiles of the high- 4 l^vnt'S), Sect. VI. SUCCESSES OF DEMOSTH E N fiS. !5if lands, -vvliich the enemy must cross to enter the plain of Argeia. A fevr miles from Olpse were two loft}^ hills, called Idomene, at the liighest of which the detachment arrived by night, unperceived by the Ambra- ciots, who were incamped on tlie other hill. Demosthenes, after having made the remainder of his army take refreshment, marched in the evening in two divisions ; one of which he led himself by the plain, the other he sent over the Aniphilochian mountains. About daybreak both arrived at the camp of the Ambraciots, who were still at their rest. Demosthenes had formed his advanced guard of Messenians ; who, speaking the Doric dialect, deceived the Ambraciot outguards, while it was yet too dark to see distinctly, so as to pass for their own people from Olps. The surprize was in consequence complete, and the lout immediate. Great slaughter was made on the spot; the fugitives sought the highlands : but the roads were preoccupied by the Acarna- nians of the advanced detachment ; and the light-armed Amphilo- chians, among their own mountains, were terrible in pursuit of the Ambraciots, ignorant of the country, and incumbered with their panoply. Some who had made toward the gulph, seeing the Athenian triremes close in with the shore, swam to them; in the urgency of the moment, says Tliucydides, chusing to receive their death from Grecian foes, rather than from the barbarous, and most inveterately hostile Amphilochians. As if blushing to declare in express terms their catastrophe, the historian adds no more than that a very small portion only of the defeated army escaped to Ambracia. Next day a herald arrived from the Ambraciots, who had escaped Thncyd. 1. 3* with the Peloponnesians from 01pa3 into Agrais, for leave to bin-y those '^' ^^^' who had been killed on that occasion. Ignorant of what had since passed, and astonished at the number of his slaughtered fellowcitizens, whom he saw lying scattered over the country, he was so overwhelmed with grief, on being informed of the extent of the calamity, that he returned without executing his commission. During the whole war, says Thucydides, no Grecian city suffered equally, within so short a time; and could Demosthenes have persuaded the Acarnanians and Amphilochians to march immediately to Ambracia, it must have yielded to the first assault. But a just jealousy in their chiefs prevented. While X cj there ^oCr HISTORY OF GREECE. Chai-. XV. tliere were cities, in tliose parts, connected with the Peloponnesians, the Acarnanians would be necessary alh'es to the Atlienian';, and would- be treated with deference; but when nothing- remained adverse to the Alhenian interest, they would not long avoid the fate of so many other slates, once allies, but now subject to the despotic rule of the Athenian Tliuryd. 1.3. people. Winter was approaching, the season of rest from warfare; so, after dividing tlie spoil, of which a third was allotted to Athens, they dispersed to their several homes. Demosthenes, no longer fearin? to meet his fellowcitizens, carried with him three hundred panoplies, selected from the spoil of the enemj% in pursuance of a vote of the army, as an honorable testimony to the merit of their general, which he dedicated in the temples of Athens. After the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenian fleet, the con- duct of the Acarnanians was directed by a vise and liberal policy, of vhich we cannot but wish that Grecian history afforded more examples. They permitted the refugees in Agrais to pass, under assurance of safety, to (Eneiads, and thence to their several homes; and soon after they concluded a. treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, for a hundred years, with the Ambraciots, including in it the Amphilochians; ivith a condition, judiciously added, that neither the Ambraciots should be bound to act offensively with the Acarnanians against the Pelopon- nesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athe- nians : and the only concessions required were, that whatever towns or lands the Ambraciots had taken from the Amphilochians should be restored, and that the Ambraciots should not assist Anactorium in the •war in a\ hich it was ingagcd with Acarnania. This vise moderation of the Acarnanians was not without its reward. It established for a long time, in their part of the continent, not perfect peace, but more quiet than Avas usual among the Grecian republics; and it tended to fix upon them that character of benevolence and uprightness, by wliich Polyb.1.4. we find they were long honorabl}- distinguished, and for which they P'299- v'ere respected throughout the Greek nation. Sect. Vir. FIFTH INVASION OF ATTICA. 157 SECTION VII. Seventh Campain: Fifth Invasion of Attica, Conquest in Sicilij pro-^ jected by the Athenian Administration. Pi/liis occupied by Demos- thenes : Blockade of Sphacteria : Negotiation of the Laccdcemoniuns at Athens. Clcon appointed General of the Athenian Forces : Sphacteria taken: Application for Peace from Lacedcemon to Athens. The Athenians were now so familiarized to the invasion and waste of Attica, and to the inconvenience of confinement witliin their forti- fications, which experience would teach to alleviate, that the eloquence and authority of Pericles had ceased to be necessary for persuading to bear them. Tlie want of his wisdom, and the want of his authority, were however felt in the general conduct of affairs ; an authority capable of controuling every part of the administration, and of pre- serving concert and consistency throughout. AVhile Attica was, in the seventh year of the war, a fifth time the prey of the Peloponnesian p,_ c. 425. forces, now commanded by Agis king of Lacedscmon, the Athenians, ^''' ?^i- contrary to the admonition of Pericles, were looking after forein con- Thucyd. 1. i. quest. Instead of nieerly inabling their Sicilian allies to support ^' *" themselves, and preventing naval assistance to Peloponnesus from their Sicilian enemies, the experience of their naval power led them to covet acquisition in that rich iland, and to imagine that they might reduce the whole under subjection. In the winter a fleet of forty triremes had Thucyd. 1. 3. r 1 1 > been preparing for that service. Pythodorus was hastened off, with those first ready, to supersede Laches in the command in Sicily; and in spring tlie larger number followed, under Eurymedon son ofThucles 1.4. c.2> and Sophocles son of Sostratidas. Intelligence having been received that the city of Corcyra was reduced to extreme famine by the expelled Corcyrseans, now masters of all the rest of the iland, Eurymedon and Sophocles had orders to relieve it, in their way to Sicily. Those officers, and Pythodorus also, were apparently of the ten generals of the estab- lishment. 158 HISTORY OF GREECE. CuAr. XV, lislimcn!". Dcmostlicnes Avas in no office military or civil; for under the Athenian government no military rank seems to have been held beyond the term for which the people specifically granted it. But he M-as now become a favorite of the people; and irregularities of all kinds seem to liave been growing familiar in the Athenian government. Without any public character, and without any military rank'*, he was authorized to imbark in the fleet with Eurymedon and Sophocles, and, during the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, to employ its force, the those officers were present, as he should think proper '^ No opportunity for any service, within the plan of Demosthenes, had occurred, when, oflf the Laconian shore, under which description Thucydides commonly includes the Messenian, intelligence was met that a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty triremes had sailed from Cyllent*, and Avas already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles, probably never well please: M'as rash and the bratfginpj prom.ise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business Mas not so des])erate as it was in the moment generally imagined ; and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far- exceeded that of the man himself, whose hnpudence seldom carried 'inm beyond the controul of bis cunning. He had received intelligence Tliucyd. I.*, that Demosthenes had already formed the plan, and was preparing for ^' ~^' the attempt, with the forces upon the spot or in the neighborhood.- Hence his apparent moderation in his demand for troops ; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He further showed his judge- ment, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request, which was readily gianted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command. The natural strength of Sphacteria, uneven, rocky, M'oody, together with ignorance of the enemy's force there, had long deterred Demos* thenes from attempting any attack ; and the more, because his misfor^ lune in jEtolia had arisen from incautiously ingaging himself in a rough and wooded country, against unknown numbers. But it had happened that a fire, made by the Lacedramonians for dressing their provisions, had accidentally caught the woods, and, the wind favoring, bad burnt almost the whole. Their best defence being thus destroyed, Demosthenes, now inabled to see his enemy and his ground, no longer hesitated concerning measures. He had sent for such reinforcements as might be obtained from the nearest allies, but before they could join him Cleon arrived. Demosthenes himself had been appointed to an anomalous command, interfering with the authority of the regular generals of the common- wealth ; and it does not appear that he made any difficulty of yieldin"- to tlic M'ayward will of his soverein, and taking the second rank in the command with Cleon. When the new general arrived at Pylus with his reinforcement, it was determined first to try if their business could z 2 .■ not j7« HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. not. be managed by negotiation ; and a message was accordingly sent to the commander-in-chief of the Lacedaemonian army, proposing that the men in Sphactcria should surrender themselves prisoners, w ith the condition, tliat they should be liberally treated in confinement, till the two republics might come to some accommodation. Thucyd. I. •». This being refused, Cleon and Demosthenes prepared to use the force ^'^^' under their command. Giving one intire day of rest to their troops, on the next, at night, they imbarked all their heavy-armed, who M'ere only eight hundred, and, a little before dawn, landed at the same time on both sides of Sphacteria, from the harbour and from the open sea. An advanced post of the Lacedaemonians was surprized, and the guard c. 31—3.2. put to the sword. As soon as day broke, the rest of the forces were landed, consisting of eight hundred bowmen, about as many middle- armed, a few Alessenians and others from the garrison of the fort, and, except the rowers of the lowest bench, distinguished by the name of thalamians, all the seamen of the fleet; who, as the triremes were more than seventy, would be a large body. The force all together was not of the most regular kind, but it was ample against those who held Sphacteria ; of whom the Lacedtemonians, the only regular troops, had been originally but four hundred and twenty, and thirty of those were killed in the outpost. Of the number of attendant slaves, and of those ■who, after landing provisions, may have remained in the iland, we are not informed. Epitadas, the commander, had posted himself, with liis main body, in the central and plainest part, near the only spring the iland afforded. A small reserve he placed in an antient fort, of rude construction, but strong by situation, at the extremity next Pylus. The Lacedaemonians, and indeed all the Peloponnesians, seem to have been absurdly attached, through a point of honor, to the exclusive use of weapons for close fight. Among the early Greeks, the first purpose of arms, after self-defence, was to defend their cattle: the second, when civilization advanced, to protect their harvest and cul- tivated fruits : the third, and not least important, to hold a secure superiority over their numerous slaves. Hence, as well as because of the more determined courage requisite for the use of them, and of their greater efficacy in the hands of brave and able men wherever they can 4 be Sect. Vir. ATTACK OF SPHACTEllIA. 17? be used, arms for stationary fight in plains were deemed more honor- able than missile weapons. But as, under many circumstances, espe- cially in mountainous countries, like the greatest part of Peloponnesus and of all Greece, it was easy to evade the force of the heavy-armed, and yet to give them annoyance, we fiud the Lacedaemonians often suffering for want of light troops and missile weapons. Epitadas chose, with his little band, to meet an enemy who so outnumbered him, in the levellest part of theiland ; not only because the fountain there was necessary to him, but because there the weapons and the discipline of his people would be most efficacious. But among the Athenians, tho the first honor was given to the panoply, yet the use of the bow was cultivated; and we find the Athenian archers frequently mentioned as superior troops of their kind. Demosthenes had been taught by mis- fortune both how to value light troops, and how to use them ; and Cleon's prudence left him the direction of operations. He placed his light-armed in detached bodies of about two hundred each, on the heights around the Lacedaemonian station, and then, advancing with his heavy-armed within a certain distance of the front of it, lie lialted. Epitadas did not refuse to meet superior numbers; but, as he Thucyd. 1. 4-. advanced to attack Demosthenes, he was assailed on each flank and ^' ^^' in his rear with darts, arrows, and stones. If he turned, those who thus annoyed him instantly fled from his attack, and his heavy-armed would in vain pursue them ; but the moment be resumed his march toward Demosthenes, they renewed their annoyance. Such was the character of the LacedEemonian heavy infantry at this time in Greece, that with all the advantage of numbers on their side, the light-armed of the Athenian army had not approached them without awe, and, as Thucy- dides expresses it, a kind of servile apprehension. But, incouraged by the effect which their first wary exertions derived from the able dispo- sition of Demosthenes, and by the evident inability of the Lacediemo- nians for efficacious pursuit, the light-armed pressed their attacks. This desultory manner of action astonished the Lacedaemonians with its novelty: the ashes and dust, formed by the late conflagration, rising 17 i HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV, risiup: and mingling llicir daakness with that of the constant flight of missile weapons, disabled them from seeing their enemy, •wliom vith tiieir arms tlicy could not reach, if they could see ; while the clamorous iKHse of the irregular assailants drowned tlie voice of command. Utterly at a loss for means of cfl^'ectual opposition, when many v\ ere TlMicvd. 1. 4. already sevevely wounded, they retreated in a compact body toward their reserve in the castle, which wa« not far distant. The light-armed, then pressed their assault wilh increased aidor: the Lacedaemonians gained the fort, -but not without loss. The efficacy of the light troops heing now obviated, Demosthenes led his Ilea vy- armed to the attack; but the Lacedaemonians having great advantage of ground, as well as some defence from the old walls, maintained an equal conflict against superiornumbers. It was already late in the day ; both parties were suffering from heat, thirst and fatigue, and neither had any prospect of decisive advantage, when the e. 35. commander of the Messenian troops coming to Cleon and Demosthenes, told them he had discovered a way by wliich, with a party of light- armed and bowmen, he thought he could scale the fort The party he ^.lesired being accordingly put under bis orders, he led them, so as to avoid being seen by the enemy, to a precipitous part of the rock, A\here, through confidence in the natural strength of the place, no guard was kept. Climbing with great difhcult}-, he made his way .e. 57. good, and appeared suddenly on the summit. Effectual resistance was now no longer possible for the Laceda:nionians, worn with incessant action through a sultry day, and surrounded by superior numbers. Cleon and Demosthenes therefore, deyrous of carrying them prisoners to Athens, checked their troops, who would shortly have put them to the sw ord ; and sent a herald to offer quarter, upon condition that they should surrender themselves to the mercy of the Athenian people. It was doubted whether, even in their hopeless situation, Lacedtemonians would submit to become prisoners; but as soon as they saw the heralds approaching, they grounded their shields and waved their hands, inti- mating that they were dispose^l to hear proposals. Epitadas was no more; iiippa^retes, his second in command, had been so severely wounded S^CT.Vir. SURUENTDER OF SPHACTERIA. 173 wounded that he laj' for lifeless among the slain; Styphon, on whom the command had thus devolved, desired permission to send a herald to the Lacedaemonian army on the continent for orders. Tills was refused, but the Athenian generals sent for a herald from the Lacedce- monian army; and after tlie interchange of two or- three messages, a final answer came to the garrison of the iland in these terms : ' The '' Lacedceraonians permit you to consult your own safety, admitting. ' ' nothing disgraceful*'.' After a short consultation, they then sur- Fendered, according to the Greek expression, their arms and them- selves. On the morrow the commanders of the Lacedaemonian army on the continent sent a herald for their slain, and the Athenians erected their trophy. The killed were a hundred and twenty-eight Laccdeenionians, and the prisoners two hundred and ninety-two. Of the fate of the Helots and- others, who were with the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria, we have no information. The blockade, from the action in the harbour Thucyd. L^.^ to that i« the iland, had continued seventy-two days, including the ^••^^' truce of twenty days, during which the garrison was regularly served with provisions. For the rest of the time they had only had such casual supplies as could be introduced by stealth; yet, such had been the economy of Epitadas, provisions remained when the iland was taken. The Athenian commanders, leaving a siifificient garrison in Fylus, sailed away with the fleet; Eurymedon with his division for Corcyra and Sicily, and Cleon and Demosthenes for Attica: and the Toward the; ingagement of Cleon was completely fulfilled ; for they entered the August. port of PeirtEus with their prisoners within twenty days after he had quitted it. Nothing during the whole war, says Thucydides, happened so con- Thucyd. 1,4. trary to the general opinion and expectation of the Greeks as this event; for it v/as supposed that neither hunger, nor the pressure of any other the severest necessity, would induce Lacedaemonians to surrender tlieir arms; insomuch that among some it was doubted whether the prisoners were of the same race, or at least if they were of equal rank with J7C HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XV. with their comrades who had been killed. Hence an Athenian auxi- liary, with more ill manners than wit, asked one of the prisoners, Tiiucyd. 1.4. ' Whether those who fell in the iland were the men of superior rank ' and merit'*?' To which the Spartan coldly replied, 'An arrow ' would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it could distinguish rank and ' merit.' The prisoners, behig many of them connected with the first families of Sparta, were considered by the Athenians as most valuable pledges. c. 41. It was determined, by a decree of the people, that they should be kept in chains*^ till the two republics should come to some accommodation, unless any invasion of Attica should be attempted by the Peloponne- siaus. In that case the decree declared, in terror to the Lacedaemonian public, that they should be put to death. Such were at that time the maxims of warfare among those who boasted to be the most civilized, and indeed the only civilized people upon earth; and such the motives for preferring death in the field to the condition so mild, in modern Europe, except in France since the revolution, of a prisoner of war. By the event of the business of Pylus the Lacediemonians were in a state of distress totally new to them. From the first establishment of their ancestors in Peloponnesus, it was not known by tradition that such a number of their citizens had fallen into the hands of an enemy; and it was as little remembered that an enemy had ever possessed a post within their country. Pylus was now so fortified that, as long as it was open to supplies by sea, no mode of attack by land, with which the Lacedttmonians were acquainted, would be effectual against it: a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus infested the neighboring country u'ith continual incursions; and the Helots, deserting in num- bers, found .sure protection. In this situation of things, the Lacedae- monian government, anxiously desirous of peace, expected only insult from the haughty temper of their enemy, should they send ministers publicly to propose ternis. They made, however, repeated trials by (^ ** Ka^oi KayaCoi : a plirsse which cannot be ex£ictly tran&laicd. secret Sect. VII. NEGOTIATION BROKEN OFF. 177 fecret negotlatien. The wiser and more m Icate Athenians, and those of higher rank in general, would gladly have profited from present prosperity, to make an advantageous accommodation. But the arro- gance of the people, fed by success, and inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, now the popular favorite, made all endevors for the salutary purpose fruitless. Vol. II. A A [ 173 ] CHAPTER XVI. Of the Peloponnesian War, from the Application for Peace from Laced^mon in the seventh Year, to the Conclusion of Peace between Laced.emon and Athens in the tenth Year. SECTION I. Expedition under Nicias to the Corinthian Coast. Conclusion of the Corcyrcean Sedition. Embassy from Persia to Lacedxmon. Lace- dcemo7iia'n Hand of Cythera, and JEginetan Settlement at Thyrea, taken by the Athenians. Inhiwianity of the Athenians. IF, stopping for a moment at this point of Grecian history, we turn our view back to past transactions, as reported by the impartial pen of the cotemporary historian, we cannot but admire the able policy, the clear foresight, and the bold firmness of him who has by fome writers, antient and modern, been traduced as the wanton author of this, in the end, unfortunate war, the all-accomplished Pericles ; and if we take any interest in the fate of Athens, or of Greece, Ave cannot but regret that he was not yet living to conduct to a conclusion the scene of bloodshed, through the opportunity which now offered, and to exert his capacious mind toward the establishment of a political union, which might have given stability to peace through the country. What might have been done, had Pericles and his virtuous and vene- rable friend the Spartan king Archidamus met in such a crisis, we might amuse ourselves, perhaps not unprofitably, with imagining, were we to take into the consideration all the circumstances of the times, as they remain reported by Thucydides, and illumined with no incon- siderable collateral light, by other cotemporary and nearly cotemporary writers. After the general abolition of kingly power, so fair an oppor- tunity certainly never occurred for carrying into effect the noble 3 project, Sect.I. expedition UNDER NICIAS. 179 project, said to have been conceived, and even attempted by Pericles, Plut.vit. of a federal union of the Greek nation, which might prevent hostility "''^''^* within itself, and afford means of united exertion against forein enemies. But the desire simply of keeping peace at home, perhaps never led to such a union among any people : some pressure of a forein power is wanting ; some overbearing neighbor, or a general superiority of force in surrounding states. No such pressure at this time bore upon Greece. Persia had ceased to give alarm : Macedonia was not yet formidable: Carthage had small inducement to turn her views to a country, where war was so well understood, and riches so little abounded : the name of Rome was scarcely known. The little repub- lics therefore of Laceda^mon and Athens, judging from experience of the past, for they were not always led by the capacious mind of a Pericles, vainly supposed themselves equal to resist any power ever likely to arise upon earth ; an opinion indeed generally entertained, as the writings of Plato and Aristotle prove, even among the ablest poli- ticians of the time; and tho Xenophon was aware of their error, yet he was not aware of any good remedy for the weakness of the antient republics, and the defects of the political system of Greece. Under the controul of Gleon, the Athenian government was not likely to be distinguished for moderation ; and the fortunate event of that adventurer's late presumptuous undertaking, increasing his favor with the people, would not lessen his own arrogance. The conduct of the war moreover, on the part of the Athenians, was so far rendered easy, by the decided superiority which their fleet possessed, and by the pledges in their hands, which secured them from invasion, that they might chuse their measures. Any very consistent plan, as in the present circumstances of their administration it was not very likely to be formed, so it was not absolutely necessary to success. Passion seems to have dictated their next undertaking : they would take revenge on Thucyd 1 4 the Corinthians, the first instigators of the war, and, upon all occasions, '"• *2; the most zealous actors in it. A fleet of eighty triremes was equipped, q'i " '^' and a landforce imbarked, consisting of two thousand Athenian heavy- P. w. 7, armed foot and two hundred horse, with the auxiliary troops of Miletus, ^'^l'^*^™''^''* Andrus, and Caiystus. Nicias commanded. The armament, proceed- A A 2 his: 180 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. ing up the Saronic gulph, made the shore between Chersonesus and Rheiliis, scarcely eight miles from Corinth. The Corinthians, apprized of its destination by intelligence from Argos, had already assembled tlie whole force of their Peloponncsian territory, except five hundred men absent on garrison duty in Anibracia and Leucadia, and tliey marched to oppose the expected debarkation. But Nicias, moving in the night unobserved, landed his troops near Chersonesus. The Corin- Thucyd. 1. 4. thians, quickly informed by signals, hastened thither vvith half their ^' *^' forces, leaving the other half at Cenchreas, for the security of the neighboring coast and country. A very obstinate action insued, in c 44 which, after various efforts, and som.e turns of fortune, the exertions of the Athenian horse decided the event of the day. The Corinthian 2-eneral being killed, with two hundred and twelve heavy-armed, the rest of the army, distressed for want of cavalry to oppose the Athenian, retreated, but in good order, to some strong ground in its rear. The Athenians stripped the enemy's dead, and erected their trophy. The honor of victory thus was clearly theirs, but the advantage gained was otherwise small: they dared not await the junction of the forces from Cenchrcaj with the defeated army; and the less, as all the elders and youths in Corinth were besides hastening to join it, and ere long the neighboring allies would come in. Nicias therefore reimbarked his forces in such haste, that he left behind him two of his dead, who had Thucyd. not been immediately found. Apprehensive then of the clamor and Pl'ut. vit. popular ill-will to which this might give occasion, he sent a herald to ^'c- the Corinthians to request the bodies ; and thus, according to Grecian maxims, surrendered the honor of the trophy, and all claim to the glory of victory. But the decided command of the sea, which the Athenians possessed, gave them means to distress their enemies greatly, with little risk to themselves. The antient ships of war were singularly commodious for operations upon a coast; moving any way in any wind, if not too fresh; and for debarkation and re'imbarkation, wanting no intervention of Tbucyd. 1. 4. boats. While the Corinthians were assembling all their forces iii the *^' *^' ■ neighborhood of Chersonesus, the Athenians moved to the coast beyond Genchreaj, now unguarded ; and debarking near Crommyon, plundered the Sect. I. END OF THE CORCYRiEAN SEDITION-. 181 the adjacent country, incamperl for the night, and reimbarking early in the morning, were thus at once secure from the revenge of tlie Corin- thian arms. They then proceeded to the Epidnurian coast, and seizing Methone, a town on a small peninsula between Epidaurus and Troezen, they raised a fortification across the isthmus. The fleet then returned home ; but a garrison, left in Methone, carried depredation, as oppor- tunity offered, through the Troezenian, Epidaurian, and Halian lands. The close of this summer brought the tragedy of the Corcyrsean sedition to a conclusion. Eurymedon and Sophocles, according to their instructions, making Corcyra in their way from Pylus to Sicily, debarked their forces, and, with the Corcyra;ans of the city, stormed the fort on mount Istone, held by the aristocratical Corcyraans ; most of whom, nevertheless, escaped to a neighboring eminence, so difficult of approach that it was inexpugnable. Being however without means to subsist there, they were soon obliged to surrender; their auxiliaries to the discretion of the besieging army, and themselves to that of the Athenian people. Eurymedon and Sophocles, unwilling to give to others the triumph of leading their prisoners into Athens, and to lose the popular favor which attaches strongly in the moment, but is pre- sently diverted by new objects, placed them in the adjacent little iland of Ptychia, as on their parole; M'ith the condition, that if anyone should attempt escape, the benefit of the capitulation should be for- feited for all. The atrociousness of what followed would be beyond belief, if it came attested by less authority than that of Thucydides '. The chiefs of the democratical Corcyrteans feared that theii fellow- citizens of superior rank, were the Athenian people to decree the doom, tho the Athenian people were not always remarkable for mercy, might yet escape death. They devised therefore a fraud to seduce them to their own destruction. Persons likely to find confidence were employed to infuse apprehension that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them to the Corcyrcean people; offering at the same time to provide a vessel in which they might escape from what • This was written before the transactions has met with information of what passed at in France had beggared all ideas formerly Lyons, after its surrender to the republican • conceived, among the modern European aims, will be struck with the similarity of nations, on such subjects. The reader who some principal circumstances. they 18« HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. Thucyd. 1. 4. they so beyond all things abhorred. The prisoners gave into the ^' *^' snare, and M'ere taken in the ship. The capitulation was undeniably broken, and the Athenian generals surrendered the wretched remains of the Corcyraan nobility, if we may use the term, to the pleasure of their people. These then resolved that their revenge should be com- pleted, and that as far as mrght be consistent with public order, the utmost indulgence for that passion should be allowed to every indivi- dual among the soverein multitude. The prisoners were placed all in one large building. The people, in arms, formed a lane at the door. Twenty of their unfortunate adversaries, bound together, were brought out at a time. ]\Ien with scourges drove on any that hesitated, while the armed citizens selected for revenge those to whom they bore any ill-will, cutting and stabbing as the passion of the moment excited. c. 48. Sixty had been thus killed,, when the rest received intimation of what had been passing. Calling then aloud to the Athenians to put them to death, if such was their pleasure, they declared they would neither go out of the building, nor permit any to come in. The people, not to encounter their despair, got upon the roof, and taking off" the covering, thence in safety discharged missile weapons. The prisoners endevored at first to defend themselves ; but when night came on, no symptom appearing of any relaxation in the animosity of their enemies, they determined to put the finishing stroke to their own misery: some strangled themselves with the cords of some beds which were in the place, some with strips of their own clothes, some used the weapons which had been discharged at them. When day broke, all were found dead. The corpses, heaped upon waggons, were carried out of the city, and disposed of without any of those funeral ceremonies which, among the Greeks, were held of such sacred importance. Eurymedon, after the completion of this abominable scene of treachery and cruelty, prosecuted his voyage for Sicily. €• 49. The taking of Anactorium finished the successes of the Athenian arms, and the operations of the war, for the summer. Being attacked by the Athenian force from Naupactus, in conjunction with the Acar- nanians, it was betrayed into their hands. The inhabitants, a Corinthian colony, underwent no severer fate than expulsion from their settlement, and Sect. I. NEGOTIATION WITH PERSIA. 183 and the loss of all their property. Their houses and lands were occu- pied by a new colony drawn from the several towns of Acarnania. From the beginning of the war, intrigue had been carrying on by the Thucyd. 1. 4. Lacedjemonian government with the court of Persia ; and that court, it appears, was not disposed to disdain negotiation with a little Grecian republic : but the distance, the difficulty and danger of communica- tion, difference of manners, and contrariety in maxims of government, pride on both sides, and some apprehension, on that of Lacedeemon, of the superior weight of the Persian empire, had prevented any treaty from being brought to a conclusion. In the autumn following the After 24 affairs of Pylus and Corcyra, M'hile an Athenian squadron, sent under p 'w. 7. the command of Aristeides son of Archippus to collect tribute, lay at 9}- ^' "*• Eion upon the Strymon, Artaphcrnes, a Persian, was apprehended there; and, his writings being seized and translated, it appeared that he was commissioned by the king of Persia, Artaxerxes, as his minister to Laceda;nion ; that the purpose, or at least the pretence of his mission, was to bring to effect a treaty of alliance with that state ; and the reason was found alledged, that, of several ministers who had passed from Laceda;mon into Persia, no two had carried the same proposals. Apparently, however, the principal object of the Persian court was to examine into the state of things in Greece ; for Artaphcrnes was not to conclude any treaty, but only to conduct into Persia ministers from Lacedaemon, sufficiently authorized to treat for their commonwealth. Aristeides immediately forwarded this important prisoner to Athens. The Athenians had not hitherto solicited any alliance with Persia; yet they were anxious not to embroil themselves with that powerful empire, while they were ingaged in war with Peloponnesus. They would not however permit the minister to proceed to Lacedsemon. He was con- veyed to Ephesus, and ambassadors from the Athenian people were appointed to attend him to the Persian court. But, on their arrival in Ionia, news of the death of Artaxerxes met them, and such troubles followed in the empire, that without proceeding farther, they returned to Athens. Spring J84 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. B. C. 424. Spring advancing, the Lacedasnionians, depressed by their misfor- ^'- TT-f- tunes, remained inactive ; but in Athens, while many were still desirous of peace, the more restless and ardent spirits prevailed, and it was determined to push success, and press the Peloponnesians on all sides. Thuryd. 1.4. The iland of Cythcra was a very important appendage of the Lacedas- *^' " monian dominion ; the possession of it was particularly advantageous for securing the Laconian and ]\Iessenian coast against piratical depre- dation ; and it was commodious for the purpose of such communica- tion with the fertile regions of Africa, as the wants of Sparta might occasionally require, and its institutions would permit. The lands were all possessed by Lacedaemonians ; the government was admini- stered by a magistracy sent annually from Sparta; and a Spartan garrison was constantly kept there. Against this iland an armament of sixty triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed Athenian foot, a small body of horse, and a considerable force of auxiliary troops, sailed e. 34. under the command of Nicias and Autocles. The garrison and inha- bitants were quickly compelled to surrender, without any condition but for their lives only. c, 55. The alarm which this event occasioned in Lacedsemon, and the measures taken in consequence, mark, not so much the want of force in the hands of the Lacedaemonian government, as the w^ant of ability to direct it. Descents upon the Lacedaemonian coast were expected, but where they would be attempted could not be foreseen. Their great legislator seems to have been well aware that a moving force may be more effectual for the protection of a country than any fortifications, since he forbad that Sparta itself should be fortified. In opposition to this maxim, they now divided their strength in forts and strong posts, through the length of their winding coast. The consequence was, that the Athenians could land anywhere without risk ; they wasted the lands at pleasure; and having defeated the only small body of troops that rashly ventured to oppose them, they erected their tropliy, and returned to Cythera. An Ionian trophy in Laconia was a thing unknown before, since the establishment of the Dorians in the country ; and tho the consequence of the defeat was otherwise trifhiig, the fame of the event made a strong impression through Greece, and the Lace- daemonians Sect.I. inhumanity OF THE ATHENIANS. J8S daemonians felt sevefely the injury to their reputation. The Athenians Tlmcyd. 1.4. then sailing again from Cythera, after ravaging a part of the Epidau- rian coast, proceeded to take their last revenge of the unfortunate JEginetans, now estahlished at Thyrea, within the territory and under the immediate protection of Lacedajmon. Thyrea was situated, like most of the older maritime towns of Greece, not upon the shore, hut ahout a mile from it, on rising ground, fitter for defence. But the jEginetans, accustomed to affluence, derived, not from their lands, but from their maritime commerce, still directed their views to the sea; and ■were at this time busied in constructing a fort on the shore, for the protection of their shipping. On discovering the Athenian fleet they hastily retired into Thyrea; which was however itself so deficiently fortified, that a small band of Lacedtemonians of the bordering country, who had been appointed by their government to assist in raising and protecting the works, refused to share in the danger of its defence. The vEginetans, nevertheless, resolved to attempt the protection of the little property remaining to them. But Nicias, landing his whole force, quickly overpowered them; and all, who did not fall in the assault, became prisoners at discretion, together with their Lacedsemo- nian governor, Tantalus, who had been wounded. Thyrea, being stripped of everything valuable, was burnt, and the armament returned, with the booty and prisoners, to Athens. A despotic multitude was then to decide the fate of that miserable remnant of a Grecian people, once declared by an oracle, and confessed by all Greece, the most meritorious of the Greek nation, for their actions in its common defence against the most formidable enemy that ever assailed it. What few individual tyrants could have thought of without horror, the Athenian people directed by a deliberate decree. The law indeed established by the Lacedaemonians, and sealed with the blood of the unfortunate Plata;ans, was but too closely followed, and the Jiginetans were all executed. Tantalus was added to the number of living pledges, obtained at Sphacteria, for the security of Attica. Another decision then waited the pleasure of the Athenian people, the fate of their new conquest of Cythera, and, particularly, that of 8ome of the principal inhabitants, whom the generals had thought it Vol. II. B b unsafe 196 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chaf.XVL unsafe to leave there. These were distributed among the ilands of the Atlienian dominion. The rest of the Cytherians, to whom the capitu- hition only assured their lives, were however left unmolested in their possessions; with a reserve only, from the whole iland, of four talents in yearly tribute to Athens. SECTION II. Effects of the Stiperioriti/ gained by Athens in the JFar : Sedition of' Megara : Distress of Laced(xmon : Jllovements in Thr-ace and jllaccdonia. Ati'ovious Conduct of the Lacedcemonian Government tozcard the Helots. Brasidas appointed to lead a Peloponnesian Army into Thrace : Lacedamonian Interest secured at Megara. B.C. 24. 4. The superiority now acquired by tlie Athenians in the war, began to <^'-tIt- appear decisive. Their fleets commanded the seas and the ilands, without a prospect of successful opposition from any quarter : their landforce was growing daily more formidable ; while the Lacedasmo- jiians, in a manner, imprisoned within Peloponnesus, and unable to defend even their own territory there, were yet more unable to extend protection to their still numerous allies beyond the peninsula. The extravagant views and wild presumption insuing among the Athenian people, which the vying flattery of interested orators contributed not a little to inflame, are marked by their own favorite poet, the admirable Aristoph. satirist of the age. 'A thousand cities,' says one, in his comedy of esp. %. • jije "Wasps, 'pay tribute to Athens. Now were each ordered ta ' furnish subsistence for only twenty Athenians, twenty thousand of ' us might live in all ease and luxury, in a manner worthy of the ' dignity of the republic, and of the trophy of IMarathon.' In another comeciy, The Birds, the extravagance of their petulant and presump- Aristopb.Av. tuous haughtiness is jeered : ' It is intolerable,' says one of them, that V 1 2''5 i • • 1 ■ ' " " we, an imperial people, commanding man}' cities, should be treated V 1 cs— * ^^^*^^^ ^" ^'' ^^ superiority by the gods, who ought to know how to 1,050. ' respect us as their betters.' And iu the same piece, the inordinate craviiig Sect.it. sedition OF MEGARA. 187 craving of their restless ambition is ludicrously noted: report being spred of a new city founded in the air by the birds, the Athenians are represented as immediately earnest to send thither their supcrintend- ants and their decrees \ Indignation, hatred, animated and obstinate enmity became of course mixed wifh the fear which the prevalence of their arms infused through a large portion of the Greek nation, and hence arose a fermentation which principally gave birth to the trans- actions now requiring attention. The circumstances of the little republic of Megara, the nearest Tlmcyd. 1.4. neighbor to Athens, were peculiar. Tho the government was demo- ^' ' cratical, and the chiefs^f the aristocratical party, with a large portion of their adherents, in exile, yet the antient animosity between Megara and Athens did not cease. Fear of the tyranny of the Athenian people kept even the democratical party connected with Lacedtemon. Mean- >vhileadversityinforcingmoderation among the Lacedaemonians, against their usual practice, they allowed the Megarians to chuse their form of government, tho a Peloponnesian garrison, under a Lacedfemonian governor, held their port of Nisasa, a mile only from the citj', with which, as Athens with Peir^us, it had a fortified communication. At the same time the ilet of Minoa, taken, as we have seen, by Nicias, close upon the mouth of the harbour, was occupied by an Athenian garrison ; and twice in every year it had been as a rule for the Athe- nian forces to overrun and ravage the Megarian territory. Yet the aristocratical exiles, having possessed themselves of Pega;, the Mega- rian port on the Corinthian gulph, were enemies to those in the city, exceeding the Athenians in animosity almost as much as they were inferior in power : their watchfulness for every opportunity of plunder, waste, and slaughter, was incessantly harrassing. The distress which this complicated pressure brought upon Megara, rendering the lower people dissatisfied with their leaders, imboldened the remaining friends of aristocracy. Depending upon countenance from Lacedas- mon, they ventured to propose a composition with the exiles, and to urge it as of indispensable necessity, to prevent impending ruin. The * The French, in the paroxysm of their democratiral niiinia, seem to liave borrowed /rom this antique joke their ideii of sending commissioners to fraternue all nations. 13 B 2 leaders 183 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVL leaders of the democratical party, finding this proposal grow popular, and fearing that the fall of their ,.ower, and perhaps the necessity of seeking safety in exile, might follow, negotiated secretly with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. Terms being settled, it was proposed to put the Athe- nians in possession of the walls connecting the city with its port ; and, communication between the Peloponnesian party in the former, and the Peloponnesian troops in the latter, being thus intercluded, both, it was. hoped, must quickly fall, ■niiicyd. 1. 4. ^Matters then being prepared, Hippocrates conducted a squadron by c. t)7. nio-ht to ]\Iinoa, while Demosthenes marched a sufficient landforee, and After 13 ° July. the long v.alls were mastered with little opposition. The IMegariaii conspirators had taken measures for introducing the Athenian army into the city; but suspicion among the Peloponnesian party produced Thucyd. 1.4. precautions that disappointed their purpose. Intelligence of this being C.69. communicated to the Athenian generals, they resolved to direct their whole force immediately against Nisa;a, which, they thought, might thus be taken before any assistance could arrive from Peloponnesus ; and then Megara, a considerable party within its walls fa^•oring them^ ■« oald probably not hold long. The select force which they had first led from Athens was joined by all the troops that could be spared from the guard of the city, together with their usually attending slaves. A conlravallation was immediately begun against Nissa : those houses of the suburbs which lay conveniently for the purpose, formed a part of it; the others furnished materials for the rest; and the work was prosecuted with such diligence, that in two dajs it was nearly comr pleted from the long walls to the sea. The garrison of Nissea, totally without magazines, had received subsistence daily from Megara. Not only they were now deprived of this, but all communication being- precluded, tliey supposed the city already in the power of the opposite party. Despairing therefore of being able to make any effectual resistance, they capitulated. The Athenian generals required all the Lacedaemonians as prisoners at discretion: the others they agreed to ransom at a specified price. Jyacedfemon, from the beginning of the war, far from having any aiau Sect.il distress OF LACED.¥.MON. IS^ man capable of balancing the extraordinary abilities of a Pericles in the supreme direction of affairs, had produced none to equal the science and activity of a Phormion or a Demosthenes in the conduct of a campain. At this time, as Thucydides assures us, a general and very unusual dejection prevailed in Sparta. A series of misfortune and defeat was what the LacedEemonians had not for ages experienced. In the regular course of their singular government they were accus- tomed to overbear opposition ; insomuch that it seemed as if great abilities in a leader were superfluous : wisdom, communicated by edu- cation and practice to every individual of the state, appeared as sufficient, as it was always ready, for public purposes upon all occasions. But a new business was now undertaken, for which their great legis- lator not only had not provided, but which his institutions strongly forbad. They had ingaged in a naval war, a complicated war, and unavoidably a protracted war. To conduct this, other abilities and other management were necessary, than had sufficed for the simple warfare of former ages. But, in seven campains, only one man among them had yet distinguished himself: he M'as still a young man; and the Spartan institutions were singularly unfavorable to eminence in youth. The good fortune however of Brasidas, in his gallant oppo- sition to the first descent of the Athenians on the Messenian coast, did not follow him in his succeeding attempts; he had been foiled in all. But Brasidas could learn from misfortune, witliout being dejected by it. Of a temper as persevering, and a genius as fruitful as his understanding was strong and his courage clear, he alone among the Lacedcemonians was looking around for opportunities of new enter- prize, which might relieve his country from the evils which pressed it,, from the humiliation into which it M'as fallen, and from the greater evils which threatened. Some circumstances appeared favorable to his views, and particularly the alarm arising, on all sides, at the progress of the Athenian power; long since irresistible by sea, and now growing more and more for- midable by land. The terror of it had induced the Sicilian Greeks to Thucyd. 1.4. repress the animosities and accommodate the differences MJiich had ^' ^^' & seq, long prevailed between the several cities of their Hand. Those who had 190 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. Iiad been friends to Athens would no farther promote its power ; those vho had been enemies would no farther irritate its vengeance: the determination was general to maintain peace within the iland, and a neutrality with regard to the differences of the mother-country. But Tlincyd. 1. 4. the revolted cities in Thrace had not equally the means of chusing ^- '^' their party. Expecting that the vengeance which had cut off the people of iEgina from the face of tlie earth, would next fall ujjon them, there was nothing which they were not ready to undertake in oppo- sition to the power which gave them sucli apprehensions. Nor was the king of Macedonia easy in any confidence that he could place in his present alliance with the Athenian commonwealth, with which he had been so often at enmity : and while he was not without appre- hension for the safety of what he already possessed, he was incited by views of ambition to which his connection with Athens was adverse; for he coveted the province of Lyncus, or Lyncestis, which the Athe- nian alliance in some degree guaranteed to its prince Arrhibteus. These circumstances bringing the Macedonian monarch and the chiefs of the Chalcidian towns to a communication of counsels, they had carried on in common a secret negotiation at Laceda3mon. They «. 80. desired a bod}' of Peloponnesian troops, for which they offered to pro- vide all supplies; and, with such assistance, they ingaged, not only to maintain the Peloponnesian interest in the revolted towns, but to extend the revolt. The Lacedjemonian government gladly received a proposal to draw the war from their doors, where it now pressed them, and employ the Athenians in the defence of their distant possessions. But means to send the desired succour were not obvious ; for by sea they could neither oppose, nor easily evade the Athenian fleets ; and by land the march was long and difficult ; through the territory, in part, of uncertain friends, if not of declared enemies. Brasidas was the man to put himself forward for the conduct of an undertaking, which to timidity and inertness appeared impossible, and to injudicious boldness would have been really so. But the Lacedemonian administration was composed of men far different from Brasidas. Tho they anxiously desired to carry the war to a distance, they feared to diminish their force at home; 4 where Sect. II. MASSACRE OF HELOTS. 191 where their own slaves, objects of jealousy now more than ever, since P\ lus was held by Messenians, caused them greater appre- ^ hensions than their forein enemies. A more nefarious measure than that to which they resorted for obviating the danger, is not re- corded in history, nor easily to be imagined. Proclamation M^as made, that any Helots, Avho thought themselves capable of meriting Thucyd. 1. 4» freedom and the dignity of Lacediemonian citizens, by their actions in ^ j^j^j 1 ,«. arms, might present themselves to the magistracy, and a uumber should c. 67. be selected, to be put upon the honorable trial. This was supposed a ready and a safe metliod for discovering which among them would be most forward to revolt : for the same high spirit would incite to seek freedom and the rank of citizens, by deeds of danger, if opportunity offered, equally against Lacedsemon as against the enemies of Lace- dtemon. About two thousand were accordingly chosen; and, being crowned with chaplets, were marched in solemn procession around the temples. Thus, as they were given to expect, they were to receive freedom by being admitted to communicate in religious rites with the free. Soon after they disappeared, and the massacre was managed with such careful secresy, that in what manner any one of them perished was never known. After this shocking and dastardly precaution, the Spartan ministry less scrupled to send a part of their force on a forein expedition. Still however they would allow no more than seven hundred Laceda;mo- aians ' for the hazardous attempt to march by land as far as Thrace. But the reputation of Brasidas for prudent and ingaging conduct among xhucyd. 1.4» the allies of Lacedtemon, as well as for ability and activity in military '^•^'• command, had reached Chalcidice; and the leading men, in the • ocvrS! — which RoUin and some of the Laconia, and established as a colony in commentators Lave understood to mean Lepieum. But in the 67th chapter of the Helots. But Smith, with his usual caution, same book we find the Brasidian soldiers, translating literally and ex] laiuiug nothing, Bfaa-i^iiDi -faTiurai, holding apparently a. must be understood to mean Lacedaemo- post of honor in the line of the Lacedsemo- nians; and I think Thucydides meant to be nian army; and they are there distinguished sp understood. In the 3!th chapter of his from the Nia^afuihif, the newly admitted fifth book we learn that the Helots who citizens. They are mentioned again in the fought under Brasidas were presented with 71s>t, 72d, and 74th cbajiters. their freedom, but they were removed from revolted ^9^ HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVL revolted towns, had solicited his appointment to the command of the armament intended for tlieir support. Their solicitation met the vishes of Bras id as ; and the Laceda3moniaTi miflistry did not refuse him an honor for which there seems to have been no competitor. He n-i J 1 . was to increase the scanty force assisjned him, as he could, bv interest, 1 luicyd. J. 4, ' o ' ' . » c SO. or by hire, among the Peloponnesian states. c 70. It happened that he was preparing in Sicyon and Corinth for his march northward, when he received information of the measures of the Athenians against INIegara. Brasidas thought no business not his, in which he could serve his country. The allies of the immediate neigh- borhood felt as he did for the safety of Megara, and of the Pelopon- nesian garrison in Niscca. In addition therefore to the troops collected for the Thracian expedition, two thousand seven hundred Corinthians, and a thousand Sicyonians and Phliasians, put themselves under his command ; and a requisition was dispatched into Boeotia for the force of that country to meet him at Tripodiscus, a village of Megaris, situate under mount Geraneia. On his march, intelligence met him, that Nisasa was already taken; upon which, leaving his army at Tripodiscus, he hastened, in the night, with three hundred chosen men, to ISIegara, and arrived under its walls, undiscovered by the Athe- «'.7i. nians. Meanwhile a singular kind of concord, between the factions in Megara, had been produced by mutual fear. The democratical chiefs apprehended, that the admission of a LacedcEmonian general would be immediately followed by the restoration of the exiles, and their own banishment ; the aristocratical party not less feared, that the consequence of any alarm to the popular mind would be a prevailing resolution to admit the Athenians, which would produce their own inevitable ruin. A momentary compromise Mas therefore followed by a unanimous resolution not to admit Brasidas. Both parties expected a battle between the Athenian and Peloponnesian armies; and. when the event of that was decided, they might chuse their measures, they thought, more safely. Brasidas therefore, after having in vain attempted to remove the apprehensions of both, withdrew to Tripo- discus. c. 72. Before the arrival of the messenger from Corinth, the Boeotians, in alarm Sect. II. SEDITION OF MEGARA. 19S alarm for their allies of Megara, had been assembling their forces ; and by daybreak Brasidas was joined at Tripodiscus by two thousand two hundred of their heavy-armed foot, with the very important addition of six hundred horse. The whole of his heavy-armed foot amounting thus to six thousand, a force superior to the regular troops of the Athe- nian army before Megara, he marched immediately for that place. The Boeotian horse presently put to flight the Athenian light troops, scattered over the plain. The Athenian cavalry advancing to protect them, a sharp action insued, in which the commander of the Boeotian horse was killed, with little advantage otherwise gained on either side. The measures of Brasidas mark the judicious commander, who knew when to refrain, as well as how to dare. It was notorious, that the Mcgarians watched the event to decide their measures. Brasidas therefore chose for his camp an advantageous situation, very near Megara, and waited xhucyd. 1.4.. there. The Athenian generals, having already carried their purpose in a *^- '*• great degree, deemed it utterly unadvisable, for what remained, to risk the army they commanded, under disadvantageous circumstances, against a superior force. As soon then as the Megarians of the oligar- c. 7-t. chal party were convinced that the Athenians would not venture a battle, they no longer hesitated to introduce Brasidas ; upon which the Athenian generals, leaving a garrison in Nissa, withdrew to Athens. Brasidas, after a very essential service to his country and its allies, thus effected without hazard, except to his own person, returned to Corinth. What followed, in Megara, seems to have been among the instances of depravity in Grecian manners, to which Thucydides has in general Tliucyd. 1,3. terms adverted, imputing it in some degree to the example set in the *^' ^~" Corcyrasan sedition. Those Megarians of the democratical party, who 1. 4, c,74, had been most forward in the Athenian interest, fearing apparently the concurrence of the enmity of Lacedrcmon with that of their fellow- citizens, avoided worse consequences by a voluntary exile. Those %vho had been less violent in party-measures, thought they might then make a composition with the aristocratical party. A conference was accord- ingly held for the purpose. What the democratical leaders most feared was the return of those aristocratical chiefs who were in exile at Fegx. Their restoration however was not to be obviated, but it was aoreed Vol. IL C e that 194, HISTORY OF GUEECE, Chap. XVI. that a complete amnesty for all past transactions should be solemnly sworn to by all. The exiles accepted the condition, and took the oath. They vere presently raised to the principal offices of their little state. Takin"- then the opportunity of a general revieM- of arms, for wliich the people of the Grecian towns were usually from time to time assembled, they apprehended a hundred of those whom they considered as having been most their enemies; preferred an accusation of treason against them before the assembled people ; and, condemnation being pro- nounced, all were executed. The superiority of the olig'archal party being thus rendered decisive, the supreme power in Rlegara, says Thucydidcs, remained long vested in very few hands. SECTION III. Sedition in Bceotia and Phocis : Attempts of the Athenians against Bceotia: Battle of Delium : Siege of Del ium. B. C. 424. The advantage gained by Athens in the war continued to extend its Ol- H T- effects. The partizans of democracy in all the oligarchal republics, but with still more eagerness the numerous democratical exiles, were everywhere watching for opportunities to profit from the turn in the affairs of Greece. In this state of things a plan was concerted for a Thucyd. 1.4. revolution in Boeolia. Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, was at the head of -• 76. ij^Q business ; some banished Orchomenians were among the most zealous and active in it ; and a party in Phocis was prepared to join them on the first favorable occasion. The Orchomenians undertook to ingage mercenary troops in Peloponnesus : for persons either by prin- ciple or by circumstances disposed to favor democracy, or open to the persuasion of bribery, were to be found under all oligarchal govern- ments. Ptoeodorus meauM'hile communicated with the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and a project was formed for betraying Siphae and Chseronaea into their hands; the former a small seaport of the Thespian territory on the Corinthian gulph ; the other, an inland town of the Orchomenian territory, on the borders of Phocis. The Athenians were at the same time to seize and fortify Delium, a temple Sect. III. SEDITION IN BCEOTIA. 195 temple of Apollo in the Tanagiiean district, near the coast overagainst Kuboea ; and the intention being that these attempts on distant points should take place on the same day, it was e?vpected the distraction would prevent effectual opposition anywhere. If then the democratical party in Bccotia should not be imboldened everywhere immediately to rise, yet those posts being securely occupied, and inroads made from them as opportunity offered, with due incouragement given to the revolted and to those disposed to revolt, the whole of Bceotia M'ould quickly be brought under democratical sway, and of course into the alliance and under the protection, which would be, in a great degree, to be under the dominion of Athens. Such was the project: for the execution, while Hippocrates kept the Thucyd. 1.4., force in Attica prepared, Demosthenes conducted a fleet of forty triremes *^" ' around Peloponnesus to Naupactus ; and, to prevent suspicion of the principal design, began operations against the enemies of the Athenian confederacy in the western provinces. On his arrival, he found c>i/nt», ofTHf, xa» Taj These translations are not satisfactory ; and a,Ttixoi/« xai |i»4i» 00-01 crafSa-a* Onaui we find no assistance from notes. The pre- Atheniensiura populo, civibus, incoHs, et cise distinction, however, between fiirowoj peregrinis quotqiiot aderant. Duker. — The and |ijo{, tho we should be glad to know Khole force of /HheiiSy as •.lell ci/izfiis as so- what it was, is not particularly important juurncrs, not excepting eieii the forciners who here. chanced at that time to be there. Smith. Where Sect. III. BATTLE OF DELIUM. 197 Where an intervening hill prevented them from seeing him, while the distance was small, he halted to form his order of battle; and then inarching up the hill, rested upon the top. Hippocrates was yet at Delium, when information was brought of Thucyd. 1. 4. the unexpected approach of the Boeotians. Leaving a body of three hundred horse, who attended him, to watch an opportunity for attack- ing the enemy in the rear, he proceeded himself with all speed to join the main body of his arrny. When he arrived it M'as already formed for action. He rode along the line, making a short speech of incou- ragement; but scarcely had reached the center when the Boeotians moved down the hill, giving the shout of battle. Upon this he ordered immediately to advance, according to the usual practice of the age, it being esteemed disadvantageous to remain stationary and receive the onset. The heavy foot on each side were about six thousand. The Boeotians had, besides, a thousand horse, five hundred targetcers, and above ten thousand light-armed. The Athenian light-armed, whose march, it c. 94. appears, had been stopped in time, were more numerous, but less dis- ciplined and worse appointed, the regular light-troops of the republic being mostly on forein service. The Thebans of the Boeotian army, if we may trust and can understand our copies of Thucydides, were formed no less than twenty-five deep ; the other Boeotians variously, according to the practice of the several towns, or the opinions of the commanders. The Athenian army was disposed in files of eight men. The horse of both armies were placed in the wings. The extremes, however, of neither could come into action, being prevented by the intervention of deep water-gullies. The field was well disputed between the rest ; in action so close, that they joined opposing shields; and where weapons could not avail against the compact arrangement of defensive armour, they endevored to break each other's line by force of pushing. With their right wing the Atlieniaus obtained the advantage, so that the extremity of the enemy's left retreated tov/ard their own right. Next in the Boeotian line to the troops which gave way, were the Thespians, whose left flank being thus exposed, they were surrounded, and sufiered greatly. But in this evolution the conquerors fell into disordei", and, meeting ,98 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVL meeting in action, ingaged one another. Meanwhile Pagondas, with the Thebans, in the right of the Boeotian line, was gaining advantage against the Athenian left. Information reaching him of the distress of his own left, he sent two squadrons' of horse around the hill, who came unawares upon the victorious wing of the Athenians, Mhile they •were yet in the confusion which they had themselves created. Panic seized them, and they fled : the rest of their line, already severely pressed, finding themselves thus deserted, quickly joined in the flight, and the rout became complete : some made toward Dehuni, some to the port of Oropus, some to mount Panics, others variously as hope of safety pointed the way. A reinforcement of Locrian troops joined the Boeotian army in the moment of victory. Being comparatively fresh, they undertook pur- suit, together with the Boeotian cavalry ; and the event would have been very fatal to the Athenians, if approaching night had not favored Plat. Laches, their escape. It was upon this occasion that the philosopher Socrates, £c' 'v* ^'^^^ served among the Athenian infantry, pressed by the pursuing p. 221. t.3. enemy, was in imminent danger of being put to the sword, when his pupil Alcibiades, coming up with a body of cavalry, gave such effectual protection, thac Socrates, with those about him, made good their retreat*. Near a thousand, however, of the Athenian heavy-armed Thucyd, 1,4. ^^^^^ ^^'^^^ Hippocratcs, the commanding general, and a much greater c. 101, number of the light-armed and irregulars. When pursuit had been pushed as far as circumstances would permit, Pagondas raised his trophy, collected the spoil, and, leaving a strong guard over the c. 97. enemy's dead, retired with the main body of his army to Tanagra. Next day a herald was sent by the surviving commanders of the Athenian troops, to request the accustomed leave for burying the slain. On his way he met a Boeotian herald, who assured him that his labor ' itiu T^^>|. Anacharsis, not only tells the story from • Strabo relates that Socrates saved his Strabo, but has beeu so careless as to refer • pupil Xenophon in this battle. Athena-us, to Pluto for authority for it. In the passage as IS observed by Casaubon, in his note on of Plato to which he refers (Conviv. p. 221. the passage, has shown tliat this could not t. 3.) not a syllable is to be found to the be (Atben. 1. 5. c. 15.) and he deduces his purpose. proof from Pluto. Yet Bartlieleiui, iu his Avould Sect. III. S I EG E OF D E LI UM. 199 Mould be vain, and that he would do best to accompany him back to the Athenian camp, whither he was going. The Athenian complied ; and audience being given to the Boeotian herald by the principal officers, he represented, ' that the Athenians had violated the common * law of the Greeks, by which it was established, that, in any invasion * of each other's territories, no temple should be profaned: that in for- ' tifying Delium, they had made the sacred precinct a habitation for ' men, and whatever men usually do in a profane place was done there ; * particularly the water, which the Boeotians had always held it unlaw- * ful for tliemselves to touch but for holy ablution^, was drawn for all ' common uses : that the Boeotians therefore, in their own name and in ' that of the god, invoking the gods of the country and Apollo, warned * tl\em to quit the temple, and clear it of whatever belonged to them.' Amid the most serious political concerns, with the utmost disregard of all moral obligations, we find such matters of meer religious ceremony often deeply ingaging the attention of the Greeks. The Athenians, in Thucyd. i. 4-. return, sent their own herald to the Boeotian camp, who represented, ^- 9*- ' that the Athenians neither had profaned the temple, nor would inten- ' tionally do so: that, by the common law of the Greeks, with the * possession of territory' the possession of temples always passed : that ' the Boeotians themselves, who had acquired their present country by ' conquest, had taken possession of the temples of other people, Avliich * they had ever since held as their own : that if, in the necessity to * which the Athenians were impelled by the unjust violence of the ' Boeotians and their other enemies, to use extraordinary means for * securing their country against invasion, they had disturbed the sacred ' fountain, they depended upon the indulgence of the god for the * transgression, if it was one, where no offence was intended : that, on. ' the contrary, the refusal of the Boeotians to restore the Athenian * slain, was an impiety without excuse : finally, that the Athenians * considered Delium as theirs by conquest, and would not evacuate it ; ' but they nevertheless demanded that their dead should be restored, ' according to the laws and customs of all the Greeks, transmitted from ' their forefathers.' The Boeotians appear to have felt the imputation of 200 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVL Thucyd. 1.4. of impiety and contravention of tlie institutions of tlicir foicfathcrs, '^' ^^' for they endevored to obviate it by an evasion. They said, that, if Oropia, the district in which tlie battle was fought and Delium stood, was a Boeotian territory, the Athenians ought to quit wliat was not theirs, and then their dead shoukl be restored ; but if it was an Athe- nian territory, to ask permission of others for anything to be done there was superfluous. With this the negotiation ended, and the Boeotians prepared immediately to besiege Delium. We learn, from the details of sieges remaining from Thucydides, that the Greeks of his age were not only very deficient in tlie art of attacking fortifications, but that their mechanics were defective, to a degree that we could not readily suppose of those who had carried the arts of masonry and sculpture so high. Fortunate for the people of the age, in theinethcacy of governments to give security to their subjects, that it was so, and that thus, those who could find subsistence within a fortification might generally Avithstand assault. The Boeotians Mere far from thinking the army, with which they had defeated the whole strength of Attica, sufficient for the reduction of a fort of earth and ^. 100. wood, constructed in three days, and hopeless of relief. Two tliousand Corinthians, a body of Megarians, and part of the Peloponnesian gar-, rison which had escaped from Nisasa, joined them after the battle. Still they thought themselves deficient in troops practised in the use of missile weapons, and they sent for some dartmen and slingers from the !Malian bay. After all perhaps they would have been foiled, but for aa engine invented for the occasion. A large tree, in the want of instru- ments for boring, was sa\\ed in two, lengthways; and the parts, being excavated, were rejoined, so as to form a pipe, at one end of which, protected by iron plates, was suspended by chains a large cauldron, into which, from the end of the wooden pipe, a tube of iron projected. On the seventeenth day after the battle, the preparations were com- Novem, plete. The machine, being raised on wheels, was moved to that part of the fort where vine-branches and wood appeared to have been most used in the construction. The cauldron was then filled with sulphur, pitch, and burning charcoal ; large bellows were applied to the opposite end of the cylinder; and a lire was thus raised that rendered itimpos- 4 sible Sect. IV. D E L I U M T A K E N. 20i sible for any living being to remain in the adjoining part of the fort. During the confusion thus created, the besiegers, chusing their moment for assault, canied the place. A considerable part of the garrison nevertheless found opportunity for flight, and saved themselves by getting aboard an Athenian squadron which lay off the neighboring coast : some however were killed, and, what was most important, about two liundred were made prisoners. Presently after, but while the event was yet unknown at Athens, a herald arriving to demand again the bodies of the slain in the late battle, obtained them without difficulty. SECTION IV. 3farch of Brasiclas into Thrace. Transactions in Macedonia and Thrace. These transactions protracted the campain in Greece to a late season, g q 424 Meanwhile Brasidas, having put Megara into a state of security, Ol- ^9. i. returned to Corinth, and while summer was not yet far advanced, had ximcyd! 1.4. set forward on his difficult and hazardous march toward Thrace. He ';• f^* July. had collected a thousand heavy-armed Peloponnesians in addition to his seven hundred Laccdfemonians. As far as the new Laceda;moniau colony of the Trachiuian Ileracleia, he passed through friendly terri- tories ; but there he arrived on the border of a country, not indeed at declared enmity with Sparta, but allied to Athens; and across the Thessalian plains, in defiance of the Thessalian cavalry, -with his small band, -which, including the light-armed and slaves, would scarcely exceed four thousand men, he could not attempt to force his way. The greatest part of Thessaly was nominally under democratical govern- ment, and the democratical party was zealous in the Athenian alliance ; yet, in most of the towns, the interest of a few powerful men princi- pally decided public measures. This facilitated negotiation, and Brasidas M'as not less able in negotiation than in arms. Em])loyino- sometimes the Interest of the king of Macedonia, .sometimes that of ©ihcr allies, and never neglecting the moment of opportunity for Vol. II, D p gaining C.79- 2oa HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. gaining a step, he obtained free passage as far as the river Enipeus. There he found a body in arms, whose leaders declared their resolution to oppose his farther progress, and expressed, in reproaches to his Thessalian guides, their resentment at the permission and assistance so far given to an army of strangeis passing through the country, unau- thorized by the general consent of the Tliessalian people. Fair M-ords, discreetly used, nevertheless softened them ; and, after no long treaty, Thucyi. 1. 4. Brasidas obtained unmolested passage. Through the remainder of Thessaly, dubiously disposed to him, but unprepared for immediate opposition, he made his way by forced marches till he reached Perrhs- bia; among whose people, subjects of the Thessalians, he had provided, by previous negotiation, for a favorable reception. The difficult pas- sage over mount Olympus, which was next to be undertaken, made the friendship of the Perrhcebians particularly important. Under their guidance he arrived with his force intire at Dium, on the northern side of Olympus, where he was within the dominion of his ally the king of Macedonia. Here the difficulties of his march ended, but difficulties of another "kind arose. A common interest in opposing Athens had united the king of Macedonia with Lacedccmon, and with the allies of Lace- dffimon in his neighborhood ; but theirinterests were otherwise diffe- rent, and their views, in some points, opposite. The principal object of Perdiccas was to subdue the province called Lyncus, or Lyncestis, among the mountains on the western frontier of Macedonia, and far from the Grecian colonies. This was a measure by no means calcu- lated to promote the interest of LacediEmon ; which rather required that alliances should be extended on all sides, and that the confederacy should have no enemy but Athens. Eight years before, Perdiccas had been chosen, by the confederate Grecian army, to the secondary com- mand of general of the cavalry, while a citizen of Corinth M'as appointed commander-in-chief. He seems to have been then httle pleased with such a compliment, and apparently it was his purpose now to preclude the means for a repetition of it. Joining his forces with those of Brasidas, he assumed command, and directed the march of the com- bined army toward Lyncestis. 1 1 The Sect. IV. TRANSACTIONS IN MACEDONIA. 203 The prince of Lyncestis, ArrhibjKus, little able to withstand the united forces of Macedonia and Lacedtemon, had sent to Brasidas to request his mediation with Perdiccas. The Spartan general therefore, not immediately refusing to march, stopped however on theLyncestian frontier ; and representing that the apprehcHsion of so great a force, ready to fall upon his country, would probably induce the Lynccstian prince to a reasonable accommodation, he declared that, for the Lace- daemonians, he judged it neither expedient nor just to proceed hostilely, till the trial had been made. Accordingly a negotiation M'as opened, and shortly a treaty was concluded, by which Arrhibfeus became num- bered among the allies of Sparta. Perdiccas, unable to prevent this measure, was however highly dissatisfied ; and he showed his resent- ment by declaring that, instead of furnishing, as heretofore, half the provisions for an army so little disposed to promote his interest, he would in future furnish a third only. The accommodation nevertheless would be upon the whole satisfac-^' tory to Brasidas and his Grecian allies. The dominion of Arrhibajus preserved, might become a valuable weight in the balance against the growing power of so uncertain a friend as Perdiccas; and the arms of the confederacy M'ould now of course be directed to the object which the confederate Greeks desired, the reduction of the power of Athens. Their first attempt was against Acanthus. Some of the principal men Thucyd. 1. i. there had been always disposed to join with the Chalcidians in renounc- '^^^^' ^ ing the Athenian dominion. The democratical party was zealous in August or the Athenian interest, but, being unable to oppose the approaching sept. enemy in the field, they were in alarm for their property, and especially for their vintage, now ready to gather. Upon a knowlege of these circumstances measures were taken. They were summoned, not as enemies, but as those who ought to be friends, to join the confederacy. After some conciliatory negotiation, the Acanthians conceded so far as to agree that Brasidas should be admitted into the town alone; and allowed to declare his proposals before the general assembly. Brasidas, for a Lacedtemonian, says Thucj'dides, was eloquent: he was besides politic; and, tho not strictly scrupulous of truth, he was highly liberal in his pohcy. He began with assuring the Acanthians, Jl'^^fy^- '• i- p p 2 ' that £04 HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAr.XVI. ' that the great object of the Lacedaemonians in the -war was to give * liberty to Greece. It was therefore matter of wonder to him that ' the Acanthians did not at once receive him joyfully ; that they hesi- ' tated to join the confederacy ; that they entertained an idea of * opposing their own deliverance, and that of Greece, from Athenianc ' subjection. Nothing in reason could hold them to such a purpose, ' but apprehension of the power of Athens ; and how vain that appre- ' hension was, he had himself had the good fortune to prove to the ' workl, when, before the walls of Megara, the whole force of Athens ' feared to ingagc that small band of Peloponncsians which he now ' commanded in Thrace.' This politic boast, tho totally false, for he commanded at Megara more than triple the force that he led into Thrace, nevertheless passed with the Acanthians, ill informed of trans- actions in Greece, and liad considerable effect. He proceeded then to Thucyd. 1. 1. tell his audience, ' that he had received assurances from the principal *^' ^^' ' mao-istrates of Lacedsemon, confirmed by the most solemn oaths, that ' whatever cities, through negotiation with him, might accede to the ' Peloponnesian confederacy, should be subject to no claims of autho- * rity from the Lacedemonians, but should be perfectly independent. ' From himself he assured them, that none need fear for person, pro- * perty, or civil rights, on account of any political principles they liad * held, or any political conduct they had followed ; for he was deter- ' mined to support no faction, but, with his best power, to establish, ' wherever he might have influence, that equal liberty for all ranks, ' which formed the boast and the happiness of his own country. If, t. 87. ' then, refusing conditions not only perfectly equitable but highly ' advantageous, they would persist in their connection M'ith Athens, ' and, tho only by the tribute which they paid, promote the subjection •■ of other Grecian states, he should think himself not only justified, * but bound, to consider them as enemies, and to begin immediately * the waste of their lands, lie trusted however they would save hira ' the necessity of a measure so opposite to his inclination, and would ' rather be zealous in setting an example to the other cities of Thrace *• for the recovery of independency.' The cloc^uence of Brasidas, powerfully secojided by his army at tlieir gates, Sect. IV. TRANSACTIONS IN THRACE. 205 gates, had its full effect upon the Acanthians ; and the suffrages of the assembly being taken secretly, tliat none might be afterward individu- ally criminated for tlie vote given, a majority was found for revolting from Athens. The city of Acanthus thus became a member of tlie LacedEemonian confederacy ; and before tlie end of the summer, the example was followed by the neighboring city of Stageirus-. Of the ten generals of the regular establishment of Athens, it should seem that two were usually appointed to the Thracian command. Eucles and Thucydides, the historian, son of Olorus, no.v held that station. Eucles commanded in Amphipolis: Thucydides was at the Tlmcyd. 1.4 iland ofThasus, witb the squadron of the station, consisting of only '^' ^ ' seven triremes. It was to be expected that in spring the Athenians would send powerful reinforcements. It behoved Drasidas, therefore, to make every use of opportunities yet open to him ; and the severe season was rather favorable lor some of the enterprizes which he medi- tated. Amphipolis Mas the most important place held by the Athenians in Thrace. It lay upon a noble river, M'hich it commanded, and whose banks, Mith tlie neighboring hills, bore a growth scarcely exhaustible of ' excellent ship-timber. The country around was a rich plain, and the invironing mountains had mines of silver and gold : the port of Eion, at the mouth of the river, Mas but an appendage, yet a valuable append- age of Amphipolis. This advantageous spot had been colonized, first from Miletus by the unfortunate Aristagoras, and afterward from Athens by Cimon; whose colony, also unfortunate, was destroyed, as Ch. iq. s.s. we have seen, by the Tin-acians. During the administration of "^ '^"^ "'^'' Pericles, and thirteen years only, according to Diotlorus, before the Diod. 1, 12. campain of Brasidas in Thrace, a new colony passed from Atlicns, under '^' ^^' the conduct of Agnon, an Athenian of rank, and of very popular character. The place was already populous and flourishing; but the Thucyd. 1.4. inhabitants were a niixt multitude from various Grecian cities; some '-'■ ^"'^• connected,' by blood, or by habit and intercourse, with the revolted Chalcidians; some, by interest, with the king of Macedonia. On these circumstances Brasidas founded, a project for gaining c. 102, Amphipolis to the Lacedaemonian confederacy. Communication Mas 406 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. was managed M'ith some of the inhabitants, and a plan concerted with them. Collecting then all the force he could obtain from his allies, on, December, a dark Stormy evening, with sleet falling (the weather which he pre- Tliucyd. 1.4. ferred for the attempt) he arrived at Anion and Bromiscus, where the ^' ^^'^' waters of the lake of Bolbe discharge themselves into the sea; and, halting there only while his army took refreshment, he proceeded in the night to Argikis. The people of that little town, always disaffected to Athens, were prepared to receive him. Its teiritory was divided from the Amphipolitau only by the river Strymon, Near Argilus was a bridge, which, as an important pass, was protected by a constant guard ; but no attempt being at present apprehended, the guard was small. Under the guidance of the Argilians, and favored by the storm, Brasidas surprized the guard. Becoming thus master of the bridge, c. lOi. the Amphipolitan territory was open to him. Extreme alarm and con- fusion immediately insued among the Amphipolitans; who, as a hete- rogeneous people, collected from various parts, were almost wholly without confidence each man in his neighbor; and if, instead of plundering the country, Brasidas had led his forces directly against the town, he would have become master of it, probably as soon as he arrived at the gates. This, however, might perhaps be more than his authority could efiect. After gratifying his troops, therefore, Milh the spoil of the country, he waited in expectation that, from so populous a place, with an Athenian general commanding, something would be attempted against him ; and in any action in open field he promised himself success, which would not fail to incourage his friends in the town, and promote his measures. The inactivity of Eucles disappointed Brasidas. No movement was made from the town ; and it was to be apprehended that the arrival of Thucydides, v/ith the squadron from Thasus, would utterly defeat the en- terprize : for beside the force he would bring, having large property and antient family connections in the neiohborhood, Thucvdideshad great influence among both Greeks and Thracians ; and his presence would not only confirm the Amphipolitans in the x\theMian interest, but assist much toward the collection of a powerful landforce for opposing the Peloponnesians. Measures that might be quickly decisive were there- fore Sect. IV. AMPHIPOLIS TAKEN. 207 fore necessary to Brasidas. Thucyflitles imputes expressly no blame to Tluicyd. ].4. his coUegue; but the conduct of Eucles appears evidently to have been '^' ^^^' deficient either in judgement or in vigor, or rather in both. Brasidas found means to send assurance into Amphipolis, ' that it was not his ' purpose to deprive any person in the city, not even the Athenians, of ' either property or civil rights: that all the inhabitants might chuse '. whether they would remain upon the footing of free citizens, or * depart with their effects; only, if the latter was their choice, they c. io5i. ' must go within five days.' This proposal had immediate efficacy: the Athenians, a small proportion only of the inhabitants, little con- fident, evidently, in their general, and highly diffident of their fellow- colonists, had supposed their persons, their properties, and their families, in the most imminent danger of the worst that could befall them : the terms were incomparably more favorable than, from the common prac- tice and policy of Grecian commanders, was to be expected ; and in. their present circumstances, hopeless of timely succour, they could hardly wish for more. Such being the sentiments of the Athenians, the other multitude were still readier to rejoice in the offer, g-enerous as it appeared, of the Spartan general. The promoters-of the revolt, therefore, boldly stepped forward ; the interposition of Eucles was disregarded; the people in assembly decreed that the terms should be accepted ; and Brasidas, with his forces, was immediately admitted into the city. That active officer, then, without a moment's loss of time, proceeded to take measures for possessing himself of Eion, distant about three miles, and so excluding the Athenian fleet from the river. But late in the evening of the same day on which Amphipolis surren- dered, Thucydides, having made unexpected haste from Thasus, entered tlie harbour Avith his squadron. Eion was thus secured, but Amphi- polis was beyond the power of Thucydides to recover. To the loss of that city from the Athenian dominion, \vc seem prin- cipally to owe our best information concerning the history of the limes with which we are ingaged, and almost our only means for any accu- curate acquaintance with the Grecian republics, in that period in which their history is most interesting. The news of the successes of Brasidas c. 10s. in Thrace, but particularly of the surrender of Amphipolis, made great impression i08 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVL hnpression at Athens; and the more, as the pubHc mind was sore with the recent calamity at Dehnm, the greatest experienced from the hands -of the enemy in the course of the war. Those distant dependencies, from whose wealth the republic principally derived its power, had been esteemed hitherto secure under the guard of the Athenian navy, M'ith which no potentate upon earth could contend : but now, through the adventurous and able conduct of Brasidas, they were laid open to the superior landforce of the Peloponnesians ; which, if the Thessalians should not oppose, might be poured in upon them to any amount. Dwelling upon these considerations, and irritated more than instructed by misfortune, the Athenian people vented against their best friends that revenge which they knew not how to vent against their enemies. Thucyd. 1.5. Thucydides, whose peculiar interest and influence in Thrace gave him ^" ' singular means to serve them there, was deprived of his command, and banished from Attica for twenty years. Precluded thus from active life in the service of his country, it was the gratification of his leisure to compose that history which has been the delight and admiration of all posterity. The affairs of Athens continued to be known to him through his numerous friends in high situations there. His banishment, as himself informs us, led to information concerning those of the Pelo- ponnesians, which he could scarcely otherwise have acquired. Brasidas then, thus successful through the inability or remissness of Eucles at Amphipolis, and disappointed through the activity of Thu- cydides at Eion, had however done, with a very small force, very important services for his country. His sedulity to prosecute them was unremitting, and he liad now greatly increased his means. The. ihucyd. 1.4. reputation of his unassuming and conciliating behaviour toward the c. 108. allies whom he had gained, was communicated through the other Grecian cities in Thrace. His character passed for a specimen of tlie character of his fellowcountrymen ; and his constant declaration, that the ijreat purpose oi his commission was to give perfect freedom and independency to all Grecian cities, received such support from the wise liberality of his conduct, that it found general credit. Perdiccas, a prince of much policy and little honor, forgetting his resentment, was t. 123. 214 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. to preserve the Sciona;ans from Athenian vengeance, insisted that the revolt, truly considered, had taken place before the signing of the articles, and he refused to surrender the town. Aristonjmus sent information of this to Athens, where preparation was immediately made to vindicate the claim of the commonwealth by arms. The Lacedaemonian government, disposed to support Brasidas, remon- strated ; but the Athenian people, indignant, as Thucydides says, that not only their continental subjects, but now even those who were in the situation of ilanders, should so presume in the protection of the landforce of Peloponnesus, at the instigation of Cleon, made a decree, declaring that Scione should be taken, and the people put to death. At the very time when this passionate act of democratical despotism was passing, an event occurred, which might have taught the Athe- nians, if a mob could be taught, the superiority of the generous policy Thucyd. 1.4. of Brasidas to their illiberal and inhuman proceedings. Some of the principal menof Mende, an Eretrian colony, also within the peninsula of Palleue, had already gone so far in measures for leading their city to revolt, that they dreaded beyond all things the scrutiny, and the con- sequent punishment, which M'ere to be expected from the jealous tyranny of Athens. Accordingly, finding Brasidas, notwithstanding the truce, ready to receive them into the Lacedaemonian alliance, they thought it their safest way to prosecute the measure begun ; and tho a majority of the lower people was adverse, they succeeded in their design. Brasidas justified himself, partly by urging counter-complaints of infraction of the treaty by the Athenians, partly by maintaining that nothing forbad his receiving any Grecian people into the Lacedaemonian alliance, when the measure on their part was voluntary, and on both sides with- out fraud or treachery. But the Athenians judged otherwise; they would not indeed deem the truce void, but they would proceed to inforce by arms their own sense of the conditions of it.' Brasidas, expecting this, removed the families and efl^ects of the Scionsans and Menda'ans to Olynthus, strengthened the garrisons with five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred middle-armed Chalci- dians, and, having put everything in the best state for defence that time and circumstances would permit, he appointed Polydamidas, 3 apparently Sect.:V. transactions IN THRACE. 2i5 apparently a Lacedaemonian, to the chief command, and returned him- self to his army. In the arduous and complex business in which Brasidas Avas ingaged, in his quality of commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian forces and superintendant of the Peloponnesian affairs in Thrace, while among Grecian towns his negotiations succeeded beyond hope, he found insu- perable difficulty in managing his interests with the ambitious, crafty, haughty, capricious, and faithless king of Macedonia. Whether ArrhibfPus had contravened or deserted his ingagements, or whether Brasidas thought it of so much importance to preserve the friendship of Perdiccas as to be induced himself to break with ArrhibiEus, Thucy- didcs does not inform us ; but the Spartan general and the Macedonian king, with united forces, invaded Lyncestis. Three thousand heavy- Thucyd. 1. 4. armed foot formed the principal strength of the former, and a thousand '^- ^^*' horse that of the latter, who was besides followed by a numerous body of barbarian irregulars. A battle was fought, in which the Lyncestians, who were not without regular heavy-armed foot', were put to flight, but the country being mountainous, they soon reached the heights, where neither the Macedonian horse nor the Peloponnesian foot could, with any hope of advantage, follow them. Perdiccas proposed then to overrun the plain country. Brasidas vi^as anxious for his new allies ; particularly those of Mende, wliere the lower people were so generally disposed to the Athenian interest, that should an Athenian force approach the place in his absence, the citizens of higher rank, who had effected the revolt, could not but be in the utmost peril. Having therefore so far served the king of Macedonia, he thought he might reasonably Avithdraw his forces, to give necessary protection to their common allies. Perdiccas, however was dissatisfied that his wishes ■were disputed ; and, while differences hence arising were yet unsettled, intelligence arrived, that a large body of Illyrian mercenaries, expected c. 125. to remforce the Macedonian army, had betrayed their ingagemcnt, and joined Arrhibieus. This alarming information disposed Perdiccas to retreat with Bra- sidas ; but in consequence of their disagreement, measures were not * The term «7rAiT)); always imports so much. readily 216 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVL readily concerted between them. Night was approaching, and nothing yet determined, when exaggerated reports of the Illyrian numbers excited a panic through the Macedonian army, and the whole multi- tude of barbarian irregulars, w ith many of the Macedonians themselves, took to sudden flight. Already the evil was beyond remedy, before Perdiccas was informed of it; and his camp was so distant from the Peloponnesian, that it became necessary to follow his flying troops, without waiting to communicate with the Spartan general. When day broke, Brasidas found himself in a very perilous situation. The superiority of the enemy's force, and his own want of means for subsistence, left no choice but of hasty retieat. He formed therefore his heavy-armed in a hollow square : the light-armed he placed in the center : he selected a small body of the youngest and most active men, for a reserve, to assist in any point that might be most pressed ; and he took upon himself the immediate command of the rear-guard, consisting Thucyd. 1. 4. of three hundred chosen men. Having; then assured his people that c. 120. . . . . irregular barbarians, however alarming their numbers and their clamor might appear, could ne\er be reiilly formidable to steddy troops, he began his march. c. 127* The lUyrians immediately pursued, with much vociferation and tumult, as if already victois, and slaughter their only business. They attacked : and, to their astonishment, were repulsed with loss: they repeated the attempt with no better success ; and presently deterred by the firm countenance of the retreating army, with its readiness for efficacious resistance in every part, they drew off; but a body of them pressed forward, with intention to occupy the defile of the frontier mountains of Lyncestis, through which the Peloponnesians must necessarily pass to enter Lower Macedonia. Brasidas, aware of this, detached his three hundred, with orders to proceed with all haste to dislodge the enemy from the high ground, at least on one side of the pass. They succeeded in acquiring possession of one of the hills, the enemy evacuated the other, and the army arrived on the same day . at Arnissa, the first town of the dominion of Perdiccas. In the course of tliis well-conducted retreat, the Peloponnesians fell in with much of the baggage and stores of the Macedonians, following, as Sect.V. transactions IN THRACE. 217 as the conductors were able, scattered, and without a guard, the disor- derly flight of their army. Irritated by the base desertion, as they esteemed it, of the Macedonians, the Peloponnesians seized whatever vas most valuable and most portable; and then, loosing from their yokes the oxen employed in drawing the carriages, turned them wan- dering about the country. Tiiis ill-judged revenge, which the general probably could not prevent, completed the alienation of Perdiccas; who, that he might with less danger break with the Peloponnesians, began thenceforth to seek opportunity for renewing his alliance with Athens. On returning into Thrace, Brasidas found reason to regret his unwil- Thutyd. 1. 1. ling absence from the protection of his new allies, and from the care of ^' ' his interests in that country. An armament had arrived in Pallene, under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, consisting of forty. Athenian and ten Chian triremes, with a thousand heavy-armed and six hundred bowmen of their national troops, a considerable body of middle-armed of their allies, and a thousand Thracian mercenaries. Proposing to direct their measures against the revolted cities of Mende and Scione, the Athenian generals began their operations with an attempt to force Polydamidas from a strong situation near the former, in which they narrowly escaped a total defeat. Reimbarking however their troops, they Ment to Scione, and took the suburbs on the lirst assault ; but, unable to make any impression on the town, they proceeded to plunder the surrounding country. A party favoring them within the place, not powerful enough to put it into their hands, was nevertheless powerful enough to deter the ruling party from quitting their walls to protect their fields. Next day therefore the army was divided: half, under Nicias, ravaged the borders of the Sciontean and Mendian territories ; while Nicostratus, with the other half, approached the town of Mende ". Polydamidas, who had retired into that place with his Peloponne- '" The text of Thuc\"dides appears here given, in which Smith's translation has been evidently deficient, and neither the antient followed, is just. A note, however, which scholiast nor tlie modern annotators give we do not find, to explain on what grounds any assistance. It is nevertheless pretty Lis translation rested, would have added to clear, from the context, that the sense heie our satisfaction. Vol. 11. F F sians. 218 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. sians, tliouglit himself strong enough, if he could persuade the Meri- dians to zealous cooperation, to attack the Athenians in the field. He - accordino-ly assembled the people, and proposed the measure; but he '.vas answered by one of the democratical party, ' that the Mendians ' would not march against the Athenians, and that no true interest of ' theirs had led them into their present ingagements with the Pelopon- ' nesians.' Polydamidas, in pursuance of the rules of Spartan disci- pline, and of that authority which Lacedaemonians in command usually everywhere assumed, rather than of the policy which his situation required and the example of his general recommended, seized the man with his own hands, and was proceeding to drag him out of the assembly. This violent and arbitrary act so incensed the democratical party, that they immediately assaulted his adherents. These, imagining that mea- sures had been concerted with the Athenian generals, now at the gates, fled into the citadel, whither Polydamidas and the troops about him also retired. ^Meanwhile the gates were actually thrown open by some of the democratical party ; and the whole Athenian army, the forces of Nicias having now joined those under Nicostratus, entered the town, ignorant of what had passed within, and wondering why they were not opposed. The soldiers accordingly proceeded immediately to pillage, and were with difficulty restrained even from putting the Mendians, their friends, to the sword. The tumult, hoMcver, being soon com- posed, the people Avere summoned to the agora. The Athenian generals then directed the restoration of the democratical form of government ; and, with a politic liberality, declared they would institute no inquiry about the past, but would leave the Mendians to their own measures concerning those, if any such remained among them, who had been active in the revolt. Matters being thus settled in Mende, and a part of the army left to "watch the citadel, the generals proceeded with the larger part against Scione. Polydamidas had occupied a hill, the possession of which Avould have prevented the surrounding of the town with a contraval- lation. They dislodged him, and then immediately began to form their lines. Meanwhile the blockade of the citadel of Mcnde had its effect in reducing the place into the power of the Atlienians; but the 1 1 garrison^ Sect. V. TRANSACTIONS IN THRACE. £19 garrison, by a bold effort, saved themselves. Sallying in the dusk of evening, they overcame the Athenian guard next the sea, and proceed- ing under cover of the night toward Scione, broke through the Athe- nian camp there, and the greater part got safe into the town. During these transactions, the negotiation for renewing the alliance Tliuryd. 1. 4. hetween Athens and Macedonia, concerning which, presently after ^' ^^*' Ills retreat from Lyncestis, Perdiccas had begun to tamper with the Athenian generals, was brought to a conclusion; and the immediate consequence was of great importance. The party in Lacedtemon M'hich favored Brasidas, had so far prevailed, that it was determined to send a body of forces, by the way of Thessaly, to strengthen his army. Intel- ligence of this being conveyed to Nicias and Nicostratus, they applied to their new ally, the king of Macedonia, to prevent the measure. Perdiccas had alwaj's maintained a strong interest in Thessaly, princi- pally through personal communication in hospitality with the leading men. Being desirous to give proof of his sincerity in his revived ingagcments with Athens, and otherwise little willing that his dominion should become a common road of communication for troops between Peloponnesus and Thrace, he prevailed with his Thessalian friends to interfere so effectually, that the Lacedcemonian government desisted from their purpose. Commissioners, however, were sent, of Mhora Ischagoras was chief, to inspect into the stale of things in Thrace; and, contrary apparently to the ingagements of Brasidas, governors with the title of harmost, regulator, were sent A^'ith tlieni from Sparta, to be constant guardians of the Lacedaemonian interests in the several towns. It is remarked by Thucydides, that all of these were under the age required by the Lacedaemonian institutions for forcin command. Brasidas, deprived of the reinforcement which he had long been solicit- ing, and which the Lacedaemonian government too late became disposed to grant him, toward the end of winter, nevertheless, made an attempt j,_ j^j^ to surprize Potidasa ; but, being discovered by the sentries, before he could apply scaling-ladders to the walls, he withdrew without effecting anything. During this year of nominal truce between Lacedsmon and Athens, while the interests of the two states were still prosecuted by arms in F F 2 Thrace, £20 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVI. Thrace, some circumstances for notice occurred in Greece. The Thucvd. 1. 4. Thebans accused the Thespians of the crime of Atticism, as they termed '■ ^'''^' tl^e inclination to an alliance with Athens. The Thesj)ians, however, had been principal sufferers in tlie late battle with the Athenians, near Delium : but this very circumstance, which sliould have proved them not obnoxious to justice, rendered them unfortunately open to oppres- sion ; and the Thebans, under the claim of that arbitrary authority which they asserted over all Boeotia, required that the fortifications of Tiiespife should be demolished, to \\ hich the people of that little city were obliged to submit, r. 134. A dispute between the Arcadian cities, in the want of a superintend- ing authority, led to a petty war, and in the autumn of this year an obstinate battle was fought between the INIantineians and Teaeans. Each claimed the victory; each raised its trophy; and both being disabled for farther exertion immediately in tlie field, both cndevored to gain the favor of the deity, for future occasions, by presenting at c. 133. Delphi the spoil collected in the battle. About the same time, through some negligence of the antient priestess Chrysis, then in the fifty- fifth year of her sacred office, the celebrated temple of the Argian Juno •was destroyed by fire. Chrysis, in dread of the judgement or the wrath of the Argian people, fled to Phlius. Meanwhile the informed Athenians were offering a very remarkable instance of popular superstition. E\er looking up to a superior cause for the direction of the events of this world, they did not attribute the reverse of fortune, which they Mere beginning to experience, to the wretched constitution of their government, now so altered from that which Solon had established, nor to their own insufficiency for deciding on public measures, nor to the folly which, making them dupes to the boisterous eloquence of the ignoble and ignorant Cleon, led them to commit the administration of public affairs principally to his direction. Nor did they conceive themselves obnoxious to divine anger for all their unjust violence to their allies, and all their shocking cruelties to , , those whom they called rebellious subjects; vet they did attribute Thiicyd. 1. 5. . J ^ J c. 11. their misfortunes to the indignation of the deity. The fancy arose c '73 ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ purification of the sacred- Hand of Delus liad been defkiently performed, Sect.VI. circumstances in GREECE. 2^1 performed, and it was proposed to secure the favor of the god by a new act of cruel injustice. Tlie whole Delian people, subjects who had every right to protection from the Athenian government, v. ere expelled from their Hand, without having any other settlement provided for them. Those miserable Greeks, thus inhumanly treated by the most polished of their fellowcountrynien, found, however, charity from those whom they called barbarians: the Persian satrap Pharnaces gave them the territory of Atramytteium, on the iEolian coast, to cultivate for their subsistence. SECTION VI. State of Athens : Effect of Theatrical Satire : Clean fried: Cleon appointed General in Thrace : Battle of AmphipoHs. After the death of Pericles, there seems to have remained no man o? rank in Athens, whose powers of elocution were of that superior kind, which, together with extraordinary talent for popularity, are necessary, in a democracy, for the guidance of public affairs. When all graver men were now tired of ineffectual opposition to the arrogance of the low and petulant Cleon in the general assembly, a poet undertook their cause, and attacked him on the public stage. The practice of the old comedy still subsisted in Athens: public characters were exhibited with the utmost freedom in the theater: masks, representing their countenances, being worn by the actors, M'ho, in thus mimicking their persons, assumed, without any disguise, their names. This licence was of great political consequence; giving opportunity for those who could write, I)ut who could not speak, to declare their sentiments, or to vent their sj)leen, or. political topics : in the want of that art Mhich now fur- nishes such ready means to multiply copies, a composition Avas thus at once communicated to a whole public ; and stage exhibitions supplied the place of the political pamflets of modern times. The interest of a party thus might be promoted on the stage as in the agora; and those opinions might be propagated, and those passions excited, on one day by 228 HISTORY OF GREECE. Cuap.XVI. by tlieatrical exhibitions, which on the morrow might decide the measures of the general assembly. Aiistoph. It M'as after the affair of Pylus, when Cleon was in the height of his ''"' '""' ' popularity, when, in pursuance of a decree of the people, he was honored M'ilh precedence at the public spectacles, and maintenance in the Pry- tancium, that Aristophanes brought upon the stage of Athens that extraordinary comedy, which remains to us with the title of The Knights. Cleon is there represented in the most ludicrous and igno- minious light ; satire being at the same time not spared against the Athenian people, personated in their collective character by a single actor, with the name of Demus ; as Swift, whose Avritings, by their extraordinary mixture of wit, elegance, buffoonery, and political acumen, approach beyond any other modern compositions to those of- Aristophanes, has characterized the people of England under the appel- lation of John Bull. Such was the known influence of Cleon among the Athenian people, and such the dread of the intemperate use he 530, might make of it, that no actor could be found bold enough to repre» sent him on the stage, nor any artist to make a mask in his likeness. But Aristophanes would not be so disappointed : himself a man of rank, personally an enemy to Cleon, certain of support from all the first families of the republic, and trusting in his own powers to ingage the favor of the lower people, he undertook himself to act the part; and, for want of a proper mask, he disguised his face, after the manner of the strolling comedians of Thespis's time, with lees of wine. The immediate effect of this extraordinary exhibition was great. The performance M'as relished and aj)plauded ; Cleon was ridiculed and reviled : in this temper of the pcoi)le an accusation was preferred Aristoph. against him for imbezzeling public money: and, n(^l finding his wonted & Nub.'^ ' support, he was condemned in a fine of five talents, above twelve v-j-ty. hundred pounds sterling. In such a government, however, as that of Athens, nothing was lasting but tiie eapriciousness of the people. The reproach of a con- demnation, against which the greatest and purest characters were scarcely more secure than the vilest, was not likely long to affect Cleon. rericleshimself had been condemned; and, within a few days, the Sect.VL C LEON general in THRACE. 22S tlie people anxiously invited liim to take again the lead in public afiairs. Cleon wanted no such invitation ; he did not, with his repu- tation, lose his impudence. Continuing to cabal in the porticoes and vociferate in the assemblies, he loaded Avith vague accusation all the principal men of the commonwealth. The people gave him credit for abuse of their superiors, as they had given Aristophanes credit for abusing him. In the general assembly the field thus became his OM'n. Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, an able oflficer, and apparently an able statesman, but unknown as a public speaker, seems to have yielded before him ; the mild and timid Nicias feared to exert his abilities in the contest; and Cleon by degrees so reingratiated himself with the people, as to become again the first man of the copiimonwealth, and to have its forces at his disposal. His success at Pylus gave him to delude, not only the people but Thucyd. 1.5^ himself, with the imagination that he possessed military talents : he ^'^' thought he could now command armies without the assistance of Demosthenes ; and another fortunate expedition M'ould drown the memory of what his reputation had suffered from the attack of Aristo- phanes, and inable him to overbear rivalship. He therefore opposed, to his utmost, all proposals of a pacific tendency ; urging continually that the tarnished glory of the commonwealth ought to be restored, and its losses repaired, by at least the recovery of what had been lately ravished from it. His arguments were calculated to make impression on the passions of the multitude: and the truce was no sooner expired than a decree passed for sending a force into Thrace, to the command Thueytl.ibid. of which he was appointed. The armament consisted of one thousand Nub!7.^58i. two hundred foot, and three hundred horse, of the flower of the Athe- nian youth, a considerable body of the allies, also select troops, and thirty trireme gallies. The commission of commander-in-chief in Thrace gave power to increase his force fiom the auxiliaries of that country, and from the Athenian troops already there. Thus vested with an important and extensive command, in the tenth B. C. 422, spring of the war, Cleon took his departure fiom Peiranis M'itii his arma- p'\v''^io' Hjent. Touching first in Pallene, and reinforcing himself with a part of 224 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. of the army which was besieging Scionc, he proceeded to a place called ^'^y- the Colophonian port, not far from Torone, in the neighboring penin- sula of Sithonia. He had been informed that, in pursuance of a plan of Brasidas, for extending the fortifications of Toronij, so as to include the suburbs, a part of the old wall had been taken down, and the new works were not yet completed. Intelligence now came to him by 1"hncyd. 1. 5. deserters, that Brasidas was absent, and the garrison m eak. A sudden '^' ' assault was in consequence attempted, which succeeded, and the governor, Pasitelidas, a Lacedasmonian, was made prisoner, with all those of the garrison and people who survived the first slaughter, c. 6. Elated with this easy success, Cleon determined to proceed against Amphipolis, the most important of all the places of which the valor and ability of Brasidas had deprived the Athenian empire. Sailing therefore round Athos, and entering the Strymon, the armament anchored in the portofEion. This place Cleon chose for his central post. Hence he made a fruitless attempt upon Stageirus, but he succeeded against Galepsus. ISIeanwhile he applied to the king of Macedonia for the auxiliary force, which, according to treaty, he was to furnish, and endevored to obtain some mercenaries by negotiation with Polles, prince of the Odomantian Tliracians. c,3. Brasidas, who depended less upon any force he could M'ith cer- tainty command, than upon his own activity and address and the faults of his enemy, had hastened in vain to the relief of Toronij; the vhen taken, he was already with a body of troops within five miles. \Vhen Cleon moved toward the Strymon, Brasidas directed his attention to Amphipolis. He could muster there, exclusively of the~ Amphipolitans, no more tlian two thousand regular heavy-armed foot, and one thousand middle-armed Thracian Greeks, with the valuable addition, however, of three hundred Grecian horse. The strength of the Am])hipolitans, to be relied upon, was uncertain, on account of the ditference in political sentiments among so mixed a people. The Edonian Thracians, however, voluntarily joined him with the whole force of their clan, horse and middle-armed foot, and he ingaged fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries. With a bodv of fifteen hundred men. Sect. VI. BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS. 225 men, selected from these various troops, he occupied Ccrdyhum, a lofty and strong situation on the western bank of the Strymon, whence he could observe the motions of tlie Athenian army incamped on the opposite bank. The remainder of hi;^ forces he left within the walls'Of Amphipolis, under the command of Cleiiridas. This being the situation of the two armies, Cleon, whose business Thucyd. 1. 5. was offensive operation, rested some time in total inaction, through *^''''*' ^^' meer ignorance, as Thucydides assures us, how to proceed. The num- bers on each side were nearly equal; but the Athenian army was far superior in the kind of troops ; those who were not Athenian citizens being: the flower of the Lemnian and Imbrian forces. Confident in their own ability, and from the first little satisfied Avith the command c. 7. under which they were placed, they grew uneasy in inactivity; while in their leisure they compared the known talents and courage of Bra- sldas with the evident deficiency of their own general. Cleon, informed of the growing discontent, became apprehensive of the consequences. It was his desire to await the reinforcements which he expected : but, in the mean time, to hold out to his troops the appearance at least of employment, and the expectation of something more intended, and thinking, says Thucydides, to infuse an opinion of his military skill by a movement similar to what, tho not his own, had gained him so much credit at Pylus, he quitted his camp and approached Amphipolis. His declared purpose was, not to attack the enemy, who, he trusted, would feel their inferiority too much to venture to attack him: but only to make observations, and when the expected reinforce- ments should arrive, he intended at once to surround and storm the town. He therefore occupied a lofty hill, which overlooked the place, and commanded, on one side, a view of the Strymon expanding into a lake as it approached the sea, on the other, of the varied ground through which its waters flowed from the inland country. Here he formed his camp, confident of holding it in his option equally to remain or retire, unmolested. Meanwhile the gates of the town being kept close, and no troops appearing upon the walls, he began to think he had been deficient in not bringing machines, with the cooperation of Vol. II. G g which, 226 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. •H'hich, in the apparent weakness and timidity of the garrison, a brisk assault might, he imagined, have carried the place. Thucyd. 1. 5, Biasjdas, aware of the inferiority of his own troops in arms and ia ^'^' disciphnc, but the more confident in the resources of his genius, as he knew the inability of the general opposed to him, was anxious to bring on a battle before the reinforcement should arrive. As soon therefore as he saw Cleon in motion, he also moved from his post on Cerdy- hum into Amphipolis. Observing then the disorderly negligence of c. 9, the enemy, and their apparent confidence in security, he formed his plan accordingly. By a sudden attack, without that perfect order of battle to Mhich the Greeks generally attached great importance, he expected to gain two points : first, to throw the enemy into a con- fusion, M'hich might reduce their troops to a level with his own; and then to prevent the incouragement which they would derive from the observation, if he allowed them means for it, of the small proportion which his regular heavy-armed bore to his total numbers. He could not, however, prudently omit those ceremonies which Grecian religion required as indispensable preparatives for a battle ; and the Athenians, from the height which they occupied, could plainly distinguish the sacrifice performing in Amphipolis, before the temple of Minerva, and c. 10, the bustle of preparation throughout the town. Thucydides adds, that the feet of horses and men in great numbers, as preparing to come out, so near might the antient fortifications be approached for the purpose of observation, could be discerned under the town-gates. Cleon, receiving information of these circumstances, and then assuiing himself of the truth of it with his own eyes, would not await attack from a force which he had aifected to despise, but instantly commanded the retreat of his whole army to Eion. This the nature of the ground Avould permit only to be performed by files from the left; •which, in the Greek system of tactics, was highly disadvantageous. To remedy the defect and obviate the consequent danger, Cleon think- ing he should have leisure for it, as soon as the ground permitted, wheeled round his right. If he had been in concert with the enemy to expose his army to certain defeat, he could scarcely have taken measures. Sect. VI. BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLTS. 22; measures more effectual for the purpose. The evolution not only broke, for the time, that compact arrangement whence arose the security and strength of the Grecian phalanx, but exposed the soldier's right side, unprotected by his shield, to the enemy's weapons. This was an advantage beyond what Brasidas had hoped for. Exulting he ex- claimed, ' An army moving in that manner does not mean to stand its ' ground ; the victory is already ours ; open the gates for me ;' and immediately at the head of a chosen band of only one hundred and fifty men, if our copies of Thucydides are right, he ran toward the center of the Athenian army, the part, at that instant, the most disordered. At the same time Cleiiridas, at the head of the rest of the Peloponnesian forces, issuing out of that called the Thracian gate, with a more steddy pace, supported Brasidas, and attacked other parts of the Athenian line. In this situation of things, the Athenian left, already some way advanced, punctually obeyed the orders received, to hasten the march toward Eion, and, breaking away from the center, was soon out of reach of the enemy. This conduct was justified by that of the general, whom nothing could divert from his first purpose, to retreat. Quitting his right, with intention to join his left in its security, he was intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, from whom he received the death he deserved, marked with the ignominy of flight. The disordered center of the Athenian army having been defeated in the first moment of attack, while the left had withdrawn from the contest, Brasidas directed his efforts to the right; which, tho deserted by its general, had preserved its order, and regaining the high ground, resisted firmly. Exerting himself apparently too much as a private .soldier, of which his uncommon strength and activity, perhaps, led him to be over-fond, Brasidas received a wound ; and falling, unper- ceived by the Athenians, was carried off by his friends. The heavy- armed under Clcaridas, coming to support him, were repulsed more than once, and the Athenians maintained the contest till they were surrounded; the enemy's horse and middle-armed foot galling theix rear and flanks, while the whole force of the heavy-armed pressed them in front. Compelled thus at length to give way, they retreated toward G G 2 the c. 11. 22!i HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. the nelgliboving mountains, Avhich the}' gained not without great diffi- culty and much loss; and then dispersing, fled, each as he best could, to Eion. Brasidas lived to be brought into Amphipclis, and to know- that his army was completely victorious, and soon after expired. Scarcely any Spartan known in history, and indeed few men of any nation, have shown themselves so indowed with talents to command armies and to persuade citizens, to make and to maintain conquests, as Brasidas. Tlie estimation in which he was held, was remarkably testified Tinicvd. \.i. by the honors paid toliis memory His funeral was performed with the utmost solemnity at the public expence; all the allies, as well as the Peloponnesian forces, attending in arms. A spot in front of the agora of Amphipolis was chosen to receive his ashes, and, as sacred ground, was inclosed with a fence, to prevent profane intrusion : a monument ■was erected there to perpetuate his memory : every testimony to the foundation of the colony by the Athenian Agnon, whether public building or whatever else, Mas carefully destroyed; and it was ordained by public decree, that, in future, Brasidas, the founder of the liberty of Amphipolis, should be venerated as the true founder of the city; and to conclude all, worship was decreed to him as a hero or demigod, and public games, with sacrifices, were instituted, to be annually performed to his honor'*. '* Diodorus, and, after him, Plutarch, of the times, particularly that of Thucy- relate, tiiat ambassadors from the Thracian dides, Argaleonis, if the story is fairly told, Greeks to Sparta (and such a mission is was more partial lo her country than just mentioned by Thucydides, 1. 5. c. CI.) were to her sun, and tho the sentiment had questioned by the mother of Brasidas, Ar- something noble, the assertion was not galeonis, concerning the death of her son. true ; for Brasidas did not leave his equal In re))ly, speaking largely in his praise, they behind him in Sparta, nor, apparently in all said, that Brasidas had not left his equal Greece. Tke high reputation in which he behind him. ' Strangers,' answered Arga- was held by his enemies, may be gathered leonis, 'you mistake: my son was a man from an expression which Plato has put ' of great merit, but there are many supe- into the mouth of Akibiades, where, speak- ' rior to him in Spaita.' Diod. 1. 12. c. 74-. ing of great characters, and ol Socrates as Plut. Apoph. Lacon. This anecdote is per- the only one without a parallel, he says fectly consonant to the spirit of patrioiism, Brasidas was not so, for he might be com- vhich it was the purpose of the Spartan in- pared to Achilles : Oio« yij A;i|;iXA£u? iy-iili, stitutions to instil into every citizen of uTttixda-inr at m xal Bfaa-iScm. Conviv, either sex, and it may have had its founda- p. -'-'1. t. 3. tion in fact : but according to every account Tiiis expression of Plato seems to mark 11 tbe Sect. VII. MOTIVES TO PEACE. 229 SECTION VII. Passage, through Thessaly denied to the Lacedodmonian Troops. Neo-o- tiation for Peace resumed by Lacedcemon and Athens : A partial Peace concluded. Too late the envy of the leadhig men in the Spartan administration had Thucyd. 1. 5. yielded to the pressing occasions of tlie commonv.-ealth, Mhich wanted ^" '"* abiUties like those of Brasidas, and a body of nine hundred heavy- armed, under the command of Ramphias, Aulocharidas, and Epicydides, had been ordered to his assistance. Toward the end of summer they Mid. Sept. arrived at Ileracleia in Trachinia, and while they were settling the deranged affairs of that colony, the action near Amphipolis happened. They had already entered Thessaly, when intelligence of it reached Thucyd. 1.5. them; and about the same time a declaration Mas communicated to '^' ^^' them from the Thessalians, that their march through Thessaly would be opposed. The difficulty thus presented, the consciousness, as Thu- cydides adds, of their insufficiency for the prosecution of those designs which had originated with Brasidas, the consideration that the necessity for reinforcing the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace was alleviated by the advantages already gained there, and the knowlege that the lead- ing men of their administration were more anxious for peace than willing to risk farther the events of war, all together determined them immediately to lead their little army home. A concurrence of circumstances now contributed to induce the t\ro c. u. leading powers nearly equally to desire peace. The Lacedaemonians the superior strength and activity of Bra- ferences are, that Wolfe commanded the sidas, and his disposition to personal exer- smaller and more disciplined arnjy asainst tion in battle. Perhaps we might do him the more numerous and less regular; tliat an honor not less his due, by comparing his business was attack, tliat of Brasidas him with a soldier of our own country, not defence; and that, instead of a Cleon, the particularly remarkable for those qualuies. general opposed to him was a man of rank, The concluding part of his life, at least, and of distinguished abilities, experu nee and bore a strong resemblance to that of our genera! worth, eonqueror of Canada. The obvious dil- had Si3o HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. had originally ingaged in the war in confidence of decisive superiority, and in full hope that the waste of Attica, with a battle, which they expected would insue, and in which they had no doubt of being victo- rious, would bring the Athenians to their terms. The event had every- way deceived their expectation. The ravage of Attica had produced no important consequence; they found themselves utterly unable to raise that formidable navy which they had projected : on the contrary, their allies harl been exposed to continual danger, and suffered exten- sive injury, from the Athenian fleets; and at length the blow had fallen severely on themselves. Their loss in killed and prisoners at Pylus was such as never within memory had happened to their state : the ' enemy possessed a fortress within their country ; a most galling cir- cumstance, and still more strange to them : an iland was taken from them, which commanded their coast; and from Pylus and from Cythera their lands were infested, and depredation was spred, in a manner before totally unexperienced. Their slaves at the same time deserted in num- bers, and the apprehension was continual, that confidence in fcrein assistance would excite insurrection among the numerous remainder of Thucyd. 1. 5. those oppressed men. Anxiety was unceasing in the principal families, for their friends and relations confined in the public prison of Athens; and, to make the prospect more alarming, a truce, which had been con- .*■. u. eluded for thirty years between Lacedsemon and Argos, was on the point of expiring, and the Argians refused to renew it but on terms to which the Lacediemonians were very unwilling to submit ; while at the same time there appeared reason to apprehend that a breach with Argos Mould make a schism in Peloponnesus, and that some of the principal states of their alliance would side with the Argians against them. So ma«y and so weighty were the causes which still urged Lacedte- mon, notwithstanding the late turn of fortune in her favor, to be soli- citous for peace. At the same time that turn of fortune had consider- ably lowered the haughty tone of Athens. The defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, the revolt of so many of their dependencies, and the fear that others would follow a successful example, had checked the ideii before prevailing, that they could command the fortune of war, and might dictate the terms of peace ; and there followed a very general regret. Sect. VIT. CIRCUMSTANCES PROMOTING PEACE. 231 regret, that the favorable opportunity, procured by the success at Pylus, had been, in wanton haugluiness, thrown away. With the inclination of the people, on both sides, it fortunately hap- Tbucyd. 1. 5. pened that the temper and interests of the leading men concurred. By '^' the death of the turbulent Cleon, the mild Nicias was left undisputedly first minister of the Athenian commonwealth. While the innate temper of Nicias disposed him to peace, the inclination was heightened by the accidental circumstance of possessing a very large patrimony, which, in the insecurity of the sttanty territory of a Grecian republic, peace only could inable to injoy ; and even the desire of glory, to which he was not insensible, led liim to seek the reputation of being the peace- maker for his country, while peace could yet be made with certain advantage. At the same time, among the Lacedaemonians, the interest of Pleistoanax, the reigning prince of the house of Eurysthenes, led him to be urgent for peace. Pleistoanax, as we have heretofore seen, cii 12. s. 5. in early youth, had been condemned to banishment, on suspicion of ° '■'iistiist. taking bribes from Pericles to lead the Peloponnesian army out of Attica. The Lacedaemonian ministry, it appears, whether in the neces- Thucyd. ut sity of complying with popular superstition, or desirous of finding a -"P* cover for their own inability and an excuse for miscarriages, frequently applied for advice to the Delphian oracle; and they were disturbed with the continual jepetition of an exhortation annexed to every response, * That the Lacedaemonians should bring back the demigod, * son of Jupiter.' The friends of Pleistoanax interpreted this as a divine admonition to restore that prince, the descendant and represen- tative of the demigods Hercules and Perseus, acknowleged by Grecian superstition as sons of Jupiter; and Pleistoanax was in consequence restored, after a banishment of nineteen years. But a report was cir- culated, and gained extensive credit, that the admonitory response had been pi-ocured by bribery to the Delphian priests ; and the party in opposition did not fail to make advantage of that report, attributing every adversity that befel the Spartan arms, to the anger of the gods at the restoration of Pleistoanax, at any rate offensive to them, but doubly so, as having been procured by such impious coUuiiiou, Thus it es« HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI. it became particularly an object with that prince to obviate the risk of calamities from war. Tbucyd. 1. 5. Such being the disposition on both sides, conferences were opened, *' and they were continued through the winter. Toward spring the negotiation was so little advanced, that the Lacedemonians circulated notices among their allies, to prepare, not only for a fresh invasion of Attica, but for the establishment of a fortified post in the country. Soon after, liowever, preliminaries were agreed upon ; the fundamental principle of which was, that each party should restore wliat had been taken in the war; except that Nisa;a was reserved to Athens, in con- sideration of the refusal of the Thebans to surrender Plata^a. A conven- tion of deputies from the states of the Lacedtemonian alliance was then assembled, when the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and IMegarians protested against the proposed terms : but the other states, who formed a majority of the assembly, approving them, the Lacedcemonian govern- ment proceeded to ratify the peace in the name of the whole confe- c. i«, deracy. It ran nearly tbus : ' That the common temples, the religious ' rites, and the oracles of the Greek nation, (those of Delphi particu- * larly named) should be equally open to all, to pass to and from at all ' times in safety, by sea or by land; and that the Delphian people * should be independent, yielding obedience and paying tribute to ' none : That the treaty should remain in force for fifty years : That ' if any disputes should arise between the contracting powers, they * should be determined by judicial process, the mode of which should ' be hereafter settled: That the cities to be restored by Laced Ecm on, * namely, Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus, ' together with those in the peninsula of Athos, should be free, paying ' only to Athens the tribute appointed by Aristeides: That those cities * should not, by the operation of this treaty, be bound in confederacy ' with either party; but that it should be perniitted them, by their own ' act, if they should hereafter chuse it, to join the Athenian confede- ' racy: That Amphipolis, being an Athenian colony, should be ' restored unconditionally : and that the Lacedaemonians should pro- ' cure the restoration of the fortress of Panactum in Attica, taken by ' tlie Sect. VII. PARTIAL PEACE CONCLUDED. 233 ' the Boeotians. On the other side, that Coiyphasium (the territory ' in which Pylus was situated) Cythera, Methone, Ptelenm, and Ata- ' lanta should be resjored to Lacediemon. Prisoners were to be equally ' restored on both sides. The Seionteans, now besieged, were left to ' the mercy of the Athenian people; the safe departure of the Pelo- ' ponncsians in garrison with them only being provided for. It was * then stipulated that every state acceding to the treaty should severally ' swear to the observation of it, by that oath which its own religious ' institutions made for itself most sacred and binding; that such oath ' should be repeated annually ; and that columns, with the treaty ' inscribed, should be erected at Olympia, at Pytho (the name by * which Homer calls Delphi, and M'hich seems to have been continued * in use as a more solemn and sacred appellation) at the isthmus, at ' Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedeemon in the AmyclEeum : and, ' finally, that it should be lawful for the Athenians and Laccdaimo- ' nians, by mutual consent, to supply any omission, and, after due ' discussion, to make any alteration in these articles.' The date is then Thucyd. 1.5. . c 19. added thus : 'At the conclusion of the treaty presided the ephor Pleis- ' tolas, on the fourth day before the end of the Lacedemonian month ' Artemisius, and the archon of Athens, AlciEUS, on the sixth day before ' the end of the Athenian month Elaphebolion,' which our chronologers make the tenth of April. Fifteen Lacedtemonians and seventeen Athe- nians, as representatives of the two states, assisted at the sacrifices, and took the oaths. The name of the ephor Pleistolas stands at the head of the Lacedifimonians, thatof Lampon is firstof the Athenians; among whom we find those of Nicias, Laches, Agnon, Lamachus, Demos- thenes, and others who had been in high situations in the government. Vol. II. 11 H [ 2S4 ] CHAPTER XVII. Of the Peloponnesian War, during the Peace between Lac£D5;mon and Athens. S E C T I O N I. Difficulties in the Execution of the Articles of the Peace. Alliance between LacecUemon and Athens. Intrigues of the Corinthians : Nero Confederacy in Peloponnesus : Dispute betueen Lacediemon and Elis : Dispute between Lacedccmon and Mantineia. Tyranny of the Athenian People: Surrender of Scione : Superstition of the Athenian People. TH E treaty of peace thus concluded between the leading powers of the two confederacies, which had been contending, with httle remission, now ten years in arms, was ill calculated to give general and permanent qniet to the nation. A want of able men in the administra- tion of Lacedaemon, which had been manifested in the conduct of the affV.irs of that state tlirough the whole of the war, above all showed itself in this treaty, and in the circumstances which followed, A narrow policy appeared in the treaty itself: the exclusive interest of Laceda;mon was considered: that of the allies, by whom Lacedaemon waspwvcrful, and without whom she scarcely could be safe (such was the alteriti&n since the srmple age of her great legislator) were unpar- Thucyd. 1. 5. donably neglected. The Lacedtemonians themselves were to recover '•^^' all that had been taken from them;, but their old and necessary allies the Corinthians were to remain deprived of their colonies of Soleium in iEtolia, and Anactorium in Acarnania: the Megarians were to put up with the much more distressing loss of Nisaea, their port, not a mile from the city; while the Eleians were suffering, not neglect, but wliat they imputed to Sparta as active injustice and oppression. With all this, the Lacedaemonian administration found tliemsclvcs unable to 4 cany Sect.I. difficulties OF THE PEACE. tzo carry into effect some of the most important articles of their own treaty. It was to be decided by lot, which of the contracting parties Thucyd. 1.5. should first perform its ingagement, for the restoration of prisoners and ^- ^'' places taken, and the lot fell upon Lacedsmon. Accordingly the Athenian prisoners M'cre immediateh'^ released ; and Ischagoras, with two other commissioners, M'as sent into Thrace, to direct the surrender of Amphipolis, and to require compliance with the terms of the treaty, from the towns which had been received into the Laceda;monian alliance. But those towns refused; and Clearidas, who had succeeded Brasidas in the command in chief in Thrace, would not, pretending he could not, in opposition to the Chalcidians, surrender Amphipolis. Both the general, however, and the Chalcidian chiefs, became appre- hensive of the consequences of this disobedience ; and the former went himself, the others sent deputies, to apologize for their conduct, but at the same time with a view to procure an alteration of the articles, or even to disturb the peace. Clearidas was hastily remanded, with orders to bring away all the Peloponnesian forces, if compliance with the terms of the treaty should be any longer delayed. The congress of deputies of the confederacy remained still assembled c. ni. in Lacedtemon, and the Lacedemonian administration had been in vain urging the dissentients to accede to the treaty. They were equally unsuccessful in the endevor to accommodate matters with Argos ; so that, with that state, a v.^ar seemed inevitable, in which, according to all appearance, the greater j)art of Peloponnesus would be against them. Alarmed by these considerations, they proposed a c. c:3. defensive alliance with Athens, which was hastily concluded; and then the Athenians released the prisoners taken in Sphacteria. Meanwhile c. c-u the congress of the Peloj)onncsian confederacy was dismissed, with a disposition, among many of the members, far from friendly to the poli- *^' ~~- -"^ tical quiet of Greece. The complex intrigues that insucd among the Grecian republics, form, in the detail of them remaining to us from Thucydides, not indeed the most splendid, but one of the most curious and instructive portions of Grecian history. Nothing gives to know so intimately the political state of Greece in general, at the time, or the slate of H H 2 I'Uitacs c. ^7. S36 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. parties in the principal republics; and nothing affords equal ground lor a just estimation of the value of that union, scarcely to be called a federal union, but rather a connection founded on opinion, and sup- ported principally by similarity of language, manners, and religious belief; a connection subsisting unequally, uncertainly, and yet sub- sisting, among the numerous and scattered members of the Greek nation. It may indeed be difficult, even with that able and exact historian for our guide, to avoid some tediousness. and perhaps some confusion in the narration ; wliich must however be hazarded, rather than evade an important part of the office of historian. Tlmcyd. 1.5. The Corinthians, irritated now against Lacedtemon, were not less warm than at the beginning of the war in enmity to Athens. When the convention of the confederacy was dismissed, their deputies, instead of returning immediately home, went to Argos, where means of con- fidential communication with some of the leading men ' were open to them. To these they urged, that ' since the Lacedemonians, resign- ' ing their antient character, or rather tlieir pretension to the character, ' of protectors of the liberty of Greece, had made not only peace, but ' a close alliance, with the Athenians, its most determined and dangerous ' enemies, it became the Argians to interfere, toward the preservation, ' at least, of Peloponnesus. The opportunity which present circum- ' stances offered,' thev said, 'was invitinsj : for such was the disoust ' taken at the conduct of Lacedismon, it would be only to declare, by ' a public decree, the readiness of the Argian people to enter into ' alliance with any independent Grecian cities, and they would quickly ' find themselves at the head of a powerful confederacy.' The Argian chiefs were very well disposed to the measure thus recommended ; but a difficultv occurred in tlie democratical form of their srovernmenl. In regular course, all negotiation with forcin states must be transacted with the assembly of the people. This would unavoidably make the business more public than suited the views of the Corinthian deputies, or could consist with the safety of the leading men in some of the republics with which they meant to negotiate. The Corinthian mini- sters therefore advised to propose, in general terms only, to the Argian ' Till a Ti?iti. people, Sect. I. ALLIANCE OF LACED^MON AND ATHENS. 23? people, ' That alliances should be made with friendly Grecian states;' and when this proposition had received the sanction of a decree, it might be ventured farther to recommend, 'Thattb.e necessary nego- ' tiations should be intrusted to select commissioners.' A concurrence of circumstances at this time favored the purpose of the Corinthians. While the reputation of Lacedaemon had been con- siderably lowered in Greece by the events of the late war, Argos, keeping upon good terms with all the contending powers, had thriven in peace. Ambition grew with increasing wealth and strength, and the decay of Lacedaemon seemed to offer an opening for Argos, to recover its antient preeminence and command in Peloponnesus ; which, far from an empty honor, Mould be a very important advantage, when, as at present, a war with that still powerful neighbor was impending. Thus the Thucyd. 1. 5. Corinthian deputies succeeded with the Argian chiefs, and these with '^" " the people; and a committee of twelve men was appointed, with full power to conclude treaties of alliance, defensive and offensive, with any Grecian states, except Athens and Lacedffimon : if either of these should offer, it was required that the proposal should be laid before the Argian people. Not any liberal view to an improvement of the federal union of c. cp. Greece, but the separate interest of particular republics, brouglit the first accession to the proposed new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. While the war with Athens had kept Lacedajinon fully jngaged, the Mantineians had compelled a part of Arcadia, before inde- pendent, to submit to their dominion ; and they justly apprehended that, in the leisure of peace, however any generous regard for the com- mon welfare might be wanting, the consideration of their own interest would urge the Lacedemonians to interfere, and prevent such exercise of sovereinty over any people within Peloponnesus. The universal liberty of Greece had been held out as the tirst principle of tiie new confederacy ; but to make a beginning toward collecting allies, was esteemed by the Argians of more importance than a strict adherence to any such principle. The government of Mantinria, like their own, ■was democratical : which was a reason both for their union in oppo- sition to Lacedsemon, and for the allowance of some indulgence to Mantineia ^38 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. Mantineia in the exercise of a tyrannical authority over other Grecian states. Tl)is narrow and corrupt policy vas, in the moment, not nnattended with the proposed advantage. Great and general offence and alarm had been taken at that article in the treaty between Laceda^mon and Athens, M-hich declared that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, with- out mention of any other states of Greece, might in concurrence, at any time, make whatever alteration in the conditions to them should seem fit; which was little less than a declaration of authority, in those two states united, to give law to Greece. The accession of Mantineia to the new confederacy increased the ferment : for, while intelligence of the fact was circulated, the motives were not universally obvious ; and it was very generally supposed, that the Mantineians, near neigh- bors to both Lacedsemon and Argos, knew more than was generally known, and that reasons which impelled them ought probably to weigh with all. Tluicyfi. 1. 5. Tlie Lacedcemonian administration, early informed of all these poli- tical movements, were greatly alarmed. Ministers were dispatched to Corinth, which was understood to be the fountain-head of the intrigue, to inquire and remonstrate. By the terms of that confederacy of which Lacedasmon was the head, it was stipulated that the voice of a majority of the states should bind the whole; with an exception, how- ever, required perhaps by Grecian superstition, but singularlj' ada])ted to political evasion, expressed in these terms, ' provided no hindrance ' occurred from the gods or heroes.' ^A'hatever might be the views of some leading men among the Corinthians in desiring the continuance of the war, the cause of the general dissatisfaction of the Corinthian people M'ith the terms of the peace, was well known, and was reasonable. The Lacedtemonians, in stipulating for the restoration of all places taken from themselves by the Atlienians, had ceded the towns of Soleium and Anactorium, taken from the Corinthians. But this, however a real grievance and a just cause of dissatisfaction, could not projjcrly be urged by the Corinthians as a cause for refusing accession to the treaty with Athens, which was a regular act of the confederacy. They resorted therefore to the gods for their pretence ; allcdging that they c. 30. Sect. I. I NTRIGUES OF THE CORINTHIANS. 239 they had bound themselves by oath to protect the Potidteans and their other allies in Thrace; whence arose a hindrance from the gods, such that they could not accede to the terms of the treaty. To the com- plaints of the Lacedaemonians about the Argian confederacy, they replied, ' that they would consult their allies, and do nothing but what ' should be deemed proper and jnst.' With these answers the Laceds- nionran ministers, unable to obtain any farther satisfaction, returned home. In the disputes, difficult by any means to settle, to which the division Thucyd. ]. 5.^ of Peloponnesus into so many independent village states gave perpetual *^* '^ ' occasion, circumstances had arisen to set the Eleians, still more than the Corinthians, at variance with Lacedeemon. Before the war, the people of the little town of Lepreum, oppressed by the united enmity of some neighboring Arcadian villages^ had applied to Elis for protection, offering half their lands to obtain it. The Eleians, accepting the con- dition, compelled the Arcadians to make peace, and then allowed the Lepreans still to occupy the ceded territory, paying only an acknow- legement of a talent yearly to Olympian Jupiter. For anything that appears, the bargain was advantageous for a people so unable to defend •their property, and maintain themselves in unconnected independency, as the Lepreans. But when the war with Athens broke out, the Lepreans, as well as the Eleians, being members of the Laceda'munian confederacy, urged the cxpence of expeditions into Attica, and other burthens of the war, as pretences for discontinuing the payment. This however, the Eleians would not admit; upon which the Lepreans appealed to Lacedsemon : but tlw; Eleians, apprehending that they •should not have fair measure of justice there,, waved the arbitration, jxad asserted their right by arms. The Lacedgemonians nevertheless proceeded to give sentence in tlie cause, declaring the Eleians aggres- .sors, and the Lepreans free ; and upon the refusal of the Eleians to .accept this decision, they had put a body of forces into Lepreum for its protection. Irritated by this arbitrary, and, as they esteemed it, unjust pro- ceeding, the Eleians were prepared for tlie opportunity which now offered for; ingaging in, a confederacy of Peloponnesian states, in oppo- sition c. 33. £40 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII, sition to Lacedscmon. They sent ministers t» Ccrintlf, who concluded - a separate treaty of alliance with that state; and, proceeding to Argos, pledged their coinmon wealth to the new confederacy. Then the Corintlaans also acceded to that confederacy, and their influence decided th.e Chalcidians of Thrace to the same measure. The Boeotians and IVIegariuns vere enough dissatisfied with Laceda?mon to declare ap])robation of it, and an intention to concur. But the consideration that the presidency of a democratical government could scarcely fail to jar with the interests of their oligarchal administrations, made them hesitate to conclude. Tbucyd. 1. 5. "While these intrigues M'ere going forward, for the purpose of sub- verting the power of Lacedaemon, the administration of that state were carrying into effect against the iMantineians, after their usual method, by force of arms, that undefined and arbitrary kind of jurisdiction, Mhich the Peloponnesians seem, in some measure, by common consent to have committed to them, and which, tho not often successfully, had nevertheless been opposed almost as often as exercised. A party at Parrhasii in Arcadia, one of the toM'nships which the ^lantineians had subjected, applied to Lacedtemon for relief. The Mantineians were not only obnoxious at Lacedaemon, for their new connection with Argos, but still more particularly for having put a garrison into Cypsela, a fortress in the Parrhasian territory, close upon the borders of Laconia. At the same time therefore to take Cypsela, and to relieve the Parrhasians from their subjection to Mantineia, which would be in effect to bring them under subjection to Lacedcemon, the whole force of the commonwealth marched under the king Pleistoauax. The resource of the IMantiueians, not one of the smallest republics of Greece, is among the strongest proofs of the miserably uncertain state of government, law, property, and freedom, through the greatest part of that country. That they might exert their whole force in defence of the Parrhasian territory, they committed their own city, with their families, and indeed their all, except themselves and their arms, to a garrison of Argians. They were nevertheless unable to give any effectual opposition to the Lacedaemonian army : Cypsela was destroyed, and Parrhasii, as far as under Lacedcemonian protection might Sect. I. AFFAIRS OF LACED^MON. ^41 ■night be, became again an independent state. The fidelity of the Argians to their trust, however, cemented the new connection between their state and Mantineia. In the course of the summer, Clearidas returned to Lacedtemon, with the troops which had fought under Brasidas in Thrace; and the Thuryd. 1,5. government rewarded the valor and zeal of the Helots of that army with the present of their liberty, giving them leave to settle themselves wherever they could find a livelihood. The present seems thus to have been of small value ; for the Helots were little able to provide a settle- ment for themselves. But in Lacedfemon Mere some other Helots, who, to strengthen the state in its decliuing circumstances, had been admitted to the rights of citizens ; and Spartan pride and Spartan jealousy, now peace was restored with Athens, would willingly see all those persons members of any state rather than of their own. The infranchised Helots therefore were all established in Lepreum, as an increase of force to that town against the enmity of Elis. A measure of arbitrary severity, not indicating a good and firm con- stitution, was about the same time taken, on the plea of necessity for the security of the commonwealth, against the unfortunate men who had been just restored to their country, after so long languishing in Athenian prisons. Not only many of them were of high rank, but some were actually in high offices. They found themselves neverthe- less exposed to frequent invective, for having done, what was esteemed, among the Lacedaemonians, so disgraceful and so illegal, and hitherto so unknown, as surrendering their arms to an enemy, tho, for the oc- casion, it had been specially warranted by the executive power. Some disturbance was apprehended in consequence; to prevent which, a decree of degradation was passed by the people against them, rendering them incapable of office, and, what appears extraordinary, whether as precaution or punishment, incapable of buying or selling. Some time after, however, tho what occasioned the change we are not informed, they were restored to their former rights and honors. Peloponnesus thus, long esteemed the best-governed and the happiest Isocr. Ai = portion of the Greek nation, might seem now to have sheathed the ad philipp.* sword, drawn against external enemies, only to give the freer oppor- VoL. II. I I tunity Ui HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIL tunity for internal convulsion. Athens meanwhile, and her confede- racy., were not better prepared for political quiet and civil order. In that state indeed of the Athenian constitution, which gave means for C'leon to become first minister and general in chief, thefate of the sub- ordinate republics, subjected to the arbitrary will of such a soverein as the Athenian people, under the guidance of such a minister as Cleon^ could not but be wretched, or in tJie highest degree precarious. That tyranny over them, described and remonstrated against, especially by Xenophon and Isocrates, appears to have been then at rts greatest height; nor could the mild benevolence of a Nicias go far toward its. restraint Not satisfied with the simple possession and e.vercise of abso- lute poMcr, tho it sent those who offended to execution or slavery by Isocr. de thousands, the Athenian people would indulge in the pride and vanity L 1!. ed, "" and ostentation of tyranny. ' So diligent,' says Isocrates,. ' were they Auger. < ^Q discover how they might most earn the detestation of mankind, ' that, by a decree, they directed the tribute money to be exhibited, ' at the Dionysian festival, on the stage of the theater, divided into ' talents; thus making parade before their allies, numbers of whont ' would be present,^ of the property wrested from them to pay that * very mercenary force, by which they were held in so degrading a sub- * jection; and setting the other Greeks, of whom also many would at- ' tend, upon reckoning what orphans had been made, what calamities ' brought upon Grecian s^tates, to collect that object of pride for the ' Athenian people.' Such was the character of the Athenian government, when the unfor- tunate Sctonaeans, all assistance being withdrawn from them, were «. it ^ reduced to the dreadful necessity of surrendering themselves at dis- cretion to the Athenian forces; and the Athenian people added,- upon the occasion, a shockin"- instance to the manv that occur in history, of the revengeful and unrelenting temper of democratical despotism, Tho Cleon was no longer living to urge the execution of the decree, of which he had been the proposer, it was nevertheless executed in full strictness: every male of the Sciona;ans, arrived at manhood, was put to death, and the women and children Mere all reduced to slavery : the town and lands were given to the Plataans. Amid such acts of extreme inhumanity, we have difficulty to discover any c. CJ2. Sect. II. OBSTACLES TO THE PEACE. 2i% any value in that fear of the gods, and that care about the concerns of what they called religion, which we find ever lively in the minds of the Greeks. The late change in the fortune of war, and the losses sustained by the commonwealth, gave the Athenians to imagine that the gods iuul taken offence at something in their conduct; but they never looked beyond some vain ceremony ; whether, in its concomitant and consequent circumstances, moral or most grossly i:'nmoral. The Tlmcyd. 1. s. cruel removal of the Delians from their iland had been undertaken as a work of piety, necessary toward obtaining the favor of tlie deity. The contrary imagination now gained, that the god's pleasure had been. mistaken; and the Delians Mere restored to their possessions. Possibly some leading men found their ends in amusing the minds of the people with both these mockeries. SECTION IL Continuation of Obstacles to the Execution of the Articles of the Peace. Change of Administi'ation at Lacedcemon : Intrigues of the neio Administration; Treaty with Ba'otia; Remarkable Treaty with Argos ; Resentment of Athens toward Lacedcemon. The peace restored free intercourse between Athens and those Pelo- c_ 35^ ponnesian states which acceded to it; tho inability, on one side, com- p q ^^j^ pletely to perform the conditions, produced immediately, on the other, Ol. 8y|, complaint, with jealousy and suspicion, trhich soon became mutual. The Peloponnesian troops were withdrawn from the protection of Amphipolis; but the place was left to the inhabitants, with arms in their hands. The other Thracian towns, which had joined the Pelo- ponnesian alliance, refused to acknowlege the authority of the treaty: for the conditions, tho favorable to the democratical, would have been ruinous to the oligarchal, which, tlwough the connection with Lace- dcemon, was become the ruling j)arty. In consequence of repeated remonstrances, a day was at length named, within which, if all those included in the treaty, as members of the Peloponnesian confede- xacy, did not comply with the terms, Lacedasmon should hold them I j 2 as 144 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. as enemies, and join Athens in her measures. The time passed, and the Lacedaemonians still made excuses. They had manifested their desire, they said, to fulfil their ingagements, by doing everything in their power: they had restored the Athenian prisoners, they had withdrawn their troops from Thrace ; they still hoped, without so rigo- rous a measure, against antient allies, as compulsion by arms, to succeed to their desire with the Corinthians and Boeotians ; and with regard to the prisoners in the hands of the latter, about whom the Athenians were particularly anxious, they had no doubt of obtaining their release. It therefore became the Athenians to show an equally good disposition by surrendering Pylus ; or, if they would still detain that place as a pledge, they should however remove the Messenians and Helots, implacable and restless enemies of Lacedtemon, and garrison it with Athenians only, who would not contravene the terms of the peace. With the latter requisition the Athenians, after much altercation, com- plied ; and the Messenians and Helots, removed from Pylus, were established in Cephallenia. Thucyd. 1. 5. The change in the annual magistracies, in autumn, brought a change ^' ^"* in the politics of Lacedamon, which of course aftected all Greece. Lacedasmon like other Grecian states, had its factions; and there was now an opposition, if we may use a modern term perfectly apposite, not only adverse to the peace, but holding constant correspondence with the Corinthians, Boeotians, and other seceders from the confede- racy. The political power of the kings, which should have given stability to the measures of executive government, was nearly annihi- lated ; while the ephors, in the name of the people, had been gradually acquiring, to their own office, a despotic controul over the whole administration ; and, that office being annual, the Lacedemonian councils became of course liable to much fluctuation. At the late change, two of the opposition, Cleobulus and Xenares, had been elected ephors. In the following winter a congress of deputies, from all the principal states of Greece, was assembled at Sparta, for the pro- fessed purpose of accommodating the numerous existing diffisrences; but, after much altercation, they parted without settling anything. Cleobulus and Xenares then put forward an intrigue, apparently well conceived, Sect. II. POLITICAL INTRIGUES. 245. conceived, for the purpose, at the same time, of serving their party, of relieving their country from evils actual or threatened, and of confirm- ing and even extending its antient preeminence among the Grecian republics. In Argos itself, the state most inimical to Lacedzemon, they held correspondence with a friendly party ; and they were upon good terms Avith the leading men of Corinth and 13ocotia, which their predecessors had not been. These circumstances formed the basis of their project. Instead of opposing the new confederacy, they proposed, through the Corinthian and Boeotian deputies, who were friendly to their purpose, first, to promote the projected alliance of Boeotia with Argos, and then to endevor to ingage Argos itself in alliance with Lacediemon. That being eflfected, it would not be dif- ficult to renew the connection with Boeotia, Corinth, Mantineia, and Elis; and thus Lacedtemon would find itself at the head of its whole antient confederacy, M'ith the powerful and long inimical common- wealth of Argos added. The plan, so laid, was communicated to the friendly party in Argos. Thucyd.l. 5. and the Boeotian and Corinthian deputies returned home. The ^' ^^° Boeotarcs, being then sounded, were found perfectly disposed to the measure. But the publicity required for all transactions of govern- ment, even in the aristocratical Grecian commonwealths, thwarted a project for which secrecy was indispensable. It was necessary for the c. 38. Boeotarcs to obtain the assent of the four supreme councils. They y began with proposing alliance with Corinth ; to which a majority in the councils would have had no repugnancy, could they have been assured of the concurrence of the Spartan administration; but beinsr uninformed of what had passed between their deputies at Sparta and the ephors, they were alarmed at the proposal of a measure which would be apparently a declaration of enmity to the Lacedaemonians, with ■whom they chose to maintain their connection. Ministers from Argos were already arrived at Thebes; but the leading proposal of an alliance with Corinth being rejected, the Boeotarcs did not venture any mention q.37. of an alliance with Argos, and, for the present, the whole business dropped. While this intrigue was going forward, another business from c 39. Lacedasmon 246 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. Lacednjmon was negotiated at Thebes. Nothing now pressed the LacedfEinonians so much as the retention of Pylus by the Athenians ; and tlicy knew that nothing pressed the Athenians so much as the retention of the Athenian prisoners, and the fortress of Panactum iij Attica, by the Boeotians. The olyect of Lacedsomon therefore was to procure from tlie Baotians the restoration of Panactum and tlie pri- soners, so tliat they might obtain in return tlic surrender of Pylus from the Athenians. The difficult}' was to find means of remuneration to JBoeotia. Tlie Boeotians would accept nothing but an alliance with I.acedffimon, upon precisely tlie same conditions with that lately con- cluded with the Athenians; but this was directly contrary to an article of the treaty between Laccdsmon and Athens, Mhich positively declared that neither party sliould form anj' new alliance but in concurrence with the other. Through the interest nevertheless of the party in X,aceda:mon, which desired a rupture with Athens, the treaty was con- cluded ; and, after all, the Boeotians deceived the Lacedajnionians: for, to prevent the inconvenience, which might arise to themselves, from a fortress critically situated upon their borders, instead of surrendering Panactum they destroyed it. Thiicyd. 1. 5, Report of the public circumstances of these transactions being quickl}"^ conveyed to Argos, without any information of the secret intrigue, occasioned great anxiety and alarm there. Not imagining the Laced a;n\onian government would so immediately contravene their ingagements with Athens, after a treaty solemnly made, the terms of whicli were known, the Argian administration concluded that the alliance witli Boeotia had been concerted with the Athenian govern- ment ; that Athens of course was to be a party to the confederacy ; that thus Argos would be precluded from any advantageous connec- tion with Athens, which had always been looked to as a certain resource whenever necessity might press ; and, instead of being the presiding power of a confederacy of the principal republics of the Greek nation, they should stand single to oppose Lacedsmon at the head of such a confederacy. Urged by tliis apprehension, they determined imme- diately to attempt an accommodation Avith Laceda'mon, and for nego- tiators they chose Euslrophus and JEson, the two men among them I who, c. 40. Sect. ir. REMARKABLE CONVENTION. 247 Avho, on account of their party-connections (for these, in every Grecian citv, extended among neigliboring states) were most likely to find confidence from the Lacedi-emonians now in power. Tlie negotiation is remarkable for a ciiciimstance, which proves how far the ideas of the rude ages were still retained in those Grecian commonwealths, which had not taken a leading part in the affairs of the nation. The object in dispute between Lacedasmon and Argos was the territory of Cynuria. Thucyd. 1.5. The Argians demanded that the question of riglit to this territory, *■*'• formerly theirs, but long since possessed by the Lacedaemonians, should be referred to the arbitration, either of some state, or of some indivi- duals, who might be agreed upon by the two parties. This was posi- tively refused. The Argians tlien, anxious for peace, but anxious also to maintain their claim, ofllcred to make a truce for fifty years, without any other condition than a provision for the future discussion of the question, according to a mode of which the history of the two states furnished an example : they proposed that eitlier party should be at liberty to call upon the other, when not ingaged in war nor afflicted with endemial sickness, to meet them in battle on the disputed lands, and the victory should finally decide the right of property ; but, to prevent unnecessary slaughter, neither should pursue into the other's territory. The Lacedaemonian government, practised in extensive poli- tical negotiation for near a century, while their state had presided over the affairs of a great confederacy, received this proposal, however coun- tenanced by the practice of former ages, as something ridiculous. But the Argian administration, probably not wholly unaware of the futility of such a provision, but expecting credit for it with the multitude their soverein, persevered in the recjuisition ; and the Lacedaemonians, not thinking the matter important enough to warrant the rejection of a proposal otherwise meeting their anxious wishes, at length assented ; declaring however that tl;ey could not trust the ambassadors of a democracy, so far as to consider the peace as concluded, until it should be ratified by a public act of the Argian people. This was obtained, and the peace thus completely made. Meanwhile commissioners had been sent from Lacediemon into c. 42. Bceolia, to receive the Athenian prisoners in the hands of the Boeotians,; together S48 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. together with the fort of Panactum. ^Mien they arrived, the fort was already destroyed; and, in excuse for this, it was pretended that, according to an antient compact between the Boeotians and Athenians, the territory of Panactum was to be the exclusive property of neither people, and cultivated by neither, but to remain a pasture for the common use of both. The prisoners were however delivered to the Lacedaemonians, who repaired with them to Athens; and, in restoring them, declared also the rasing of the fortifications of Panactum, and the retreat of the garrison, which they affected to consider as equi- valent to a restitution of the place. But the Athenians, already informed of the treaty concluded by Laceda;mon with Boeotia, so repugnant to repeated professions made to Athens, were disposed to see the matter differently. Reproaches for these, and for many less important breaches or neglects of the treaty, were freely vented ; the restoration of Pylus was refused; and the Lacedsemonian com- missioners were obliged to return, without effecting any of the purposes of their raissioc SECTION III. Alcibiades. A third Peloponnesian Confederacy ; and Athens the leading Power. While such was the mutual dissatisfaction between Lacedsemon and Thncyd. 1. 5. Athens, there was in the latter, as well as in the former state, a party desirous of renewing the war; and at the head of that party a new character was coming forward, singularly formed to set the world in a flame. Alcibiades son of Cleinias was yet a youth, or at least in any other city, says Thucydides, would have been esteemed too young to be admitted to a leading public situation'; but high birth, great con- nections, and extraordinary talents gave him premature consequence. His family boasted their descent, as wc learn from the words which * Thus, I think with our translator SmiiL, the passage ii to be understood; butDuker's cote may be consulted. Plato Sect. III. A L C I B I A D E S. S49 Plato puts into the mouth of Alcibiades himself, from Eurysaces son Pkt, Akib. of the Telamonian Ajax, and through him from Jupiter. His great- li ^ ^ ^''' erandfather, named also Alcibiades, had been among the associates of , .• 1 -r. - • • • Isocrat. rfe Cleisthenes in expelhng the Peisistratids, and restoring the common- bigis, p. 152. wealth. His grandfather Cleinias liad gained the honorable reward of cif's^^^^* the Aristeia, for his conduct in the first action with the fleet of Xerxes, of this Hist. off Artcmisium, in a trireme which he had fitted at his own expence ; and his father, called also Cleinias, fell in the service of his country, in Plat.Alcib.i. the unfortunate battle of Coroneia, against the Boeotians. His mother, ^' ' " * Deinomache, M'as daughter of Megacles, head of the Alcmceonids, the first fainily of Athens; and by her he was nearly related to Pericles, wlio, on the death of his father, became his guardian. Unfortunately his connection with that great man did not bring those advantages of ? * j!^ ' education, which might have been expected from a guardian, who so united the philosopher with the statesman, and, amid all the cares of his high situation, gave so much attention to science. Left therefore to himself, a very large patrimonial estate afforded Alcibiades means for that dissipation in pleasure, to which passions, constitutionally v Strong, impelled, and various circumstances contributed in an unusual degree to invite. The graces of his person are mentioned, by cotem- Plat.Conviv» porary writers, as very extraordinary. In the seclusion, in which the ^^"' j^^"^' yVthenian ladies lived, they could be little liable to the seduction of c.2. s.24. wit and ingaging behavior ; but they were thence perhaps only the Alcib. more alive to the impression of personal beauty, when sacrifices and processions afforded the scanty opportunity of mixing with the world, 60 far as to see, tho not to converse with, men. Alcibiades, as we are assured by Xenophon, was the object of passion and intrigue for many of the principal ladies of Athens'. The splendor of his fortune, and the power of those with whom he was connected, at the same time drew about him a croud of flatterers of the otlier sex : Athenian citizens, allies, subjects, and strangers, vied in paying court to him; ' Ala ftJf jtaWiO! vttI lat^Wm xui irtpLtSi has been owing to the want of intercourse yvmziKU) &rijiijf.'inii. Xen. Mem. Socr. 1. 1. c. 2. between the sexes, wliicli alone can give «. 24. Tiie coarseness of this expression, of manners their best polish, an elegant writer among a refined people, Vol. II. ' Kk aud 459 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIT. and there was danger that the intoxicating powers of adulation might have destroyed, in the bud, all hope of any valuable fruit from the singular talents of his mind. Ill this period of his life occurred the extraordinary addition to the rest of his extraordinary fortune, to become acquainted with the philo- sopher Socrates. That wonderful man, who had then for some time made it his business, as it was his pleasure, gratuitously to instruct the youth of Athens in those two points, which preceding professors of science had most neglected, the duty of men to men, and, as far as uninlightencd reason could discover, the duty of men to God, justly considered Alcibiades as one who deserved his peculiar care; since ha was certainly one whose virtues or vices might go very far to decide the future fortune of his country, Alcibiades was not of a temper to rest satisfied with ignorance. Ambition, but still more the love of distinction than the love of power, was the ruling passion of his mind. Plat. Alcib. To obtain instruction tlierefore, which might promote the gratification *;ConMv. pf |-])a|; ruling passion, lie submitted his other passions to the controul of the philosopher. Consciousness of superior abilities, and ambition inflamed by flattery, had inspired Alcibiades with the purpose of putting himself forward as a public speaker, before he had attained his twentieth year: but, tho he spurned at the remonstrances of his other friends, the authority and advice of Socrates diverted him from that extravagance. A singular friendship grew between them. They were companions in Plat.Conviv. peace and in war. Socrates, who was indowed by nature ^^ith a lsocrat"^de' constitution of body scarcely less remarkable for its firmness than bigis, p. 154. that of his mind for its powers, served a campain in Thrace with t. 3. . . Alcibiades, then in earliest manhood. The soldier-sage, yielding to none in courage in the day of battle, was the admiration of all for his patience, in want, fatigue, and the cold of that severe climate. Alci- biades was hismost zealous emulator ; but in action it was particularly Ch. 15. s. 3. his aim to outdo him. In a battle near Potidasa, apparently that in of Ibis Uist. ^vhich the generals, Xenophon son of Euripides and his two coUegiies, Plut. vit. were killed, he was severely wounded, and would have lost his life, PlHtX'onviv. ^"'' ^"^" ^^^^ protection given him by Socrates, who fought by his side. f. 220. t. 3. The daring exertion of Alcibiades, which had led him into the danger. was Sect. III. A L C I B I A D E S. fi51 was deemed by the principal officers of the army, perliaps a little partial, says Plutarch, to his high rank and high connections, to deserve the Aristeia. The generous youth, just to the superior merit of his master, declared they were much rather due to Socrates : but the philosopher, adding the authority of his voice to that of the officers, the reward was given as it was first decreed. Alcibiades returned the benefit, in the unfortunate battle of Delium, where he saved Socrates, Ch.16. s.j». as we have already seen, from the swords of the pursuing Boeotians. "'' But the passions of Alcibiades were too strong for constant perse- verance in submission to the advice of his incomparable friend. His predominant passion, the desire of preeminence in everything, was not to be subdued. No sooner had he acquired possession of his estate, than the splendor of his style of living became such, as in Athens had been utterly unknown. Much as things differed from those in our time and country, we may form some idea, of his extravagant magni- ficence from one circumstance, related by the authentic pen of Thucy- dides. It had before been esteemed a splendid exertion, for the greatest individual citizen, to send one chariot to contend in the races at the Olympian festival; it was reckoned creditable for a commonwealth to send one at the public expence. Alcibiades sent no less than seven Thucyd. 1.6. to one meeting ; where he won the first, second, and fourth honors, jjogrkt de No commonwealth nor any prince had before done so much. In the bigis, p. 153. same manner in all those public offices, which in his rank and circum- piut. vit. stances were not to be avoided, presidencies of theatrical entertainments and athletic games, and the equipment and command of ships of war, his sumptuousness far exceeded what had been common. This osten- tation, and the general splendor of his manner of living, while they attracted some friends and numerous followers, excited also much censure and many murmurs. They were considered, and with much indignation considered, by many, as repugnant to that moderation and equality, which ought to be maintained among the citizens of a demo- cracy; while by others they were looked on Mith more complacency, as the most innocent way of evaporating that boiling spirit, and reducing those large means, which might otherwise have been more dangerously employed. Alcib. 252 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVII. lu the midst of a career of dissipation and extravagance, that excited at the same time wonder, alarm, indignation, and admiration, tlie circumstances of the times, and even the Avislies of many grave men, seem to have invited Alcibiades to put himself forward in public busi- Aristoph. ness. Nicias, who, since the death of Pericles, had stood at the head eqo'iri'^ ' of the most respectable party in the commonwealth, was sinking under 131.9. the turbulence of Hyperbolus, the friend of Cleon when Cleon was i3(X),i3l3. living, of similar birth, similar talents, similar character, and the suc- fc*^V^"^'' cessor to liis influence among the lowest of the people. In this situation Ti)ucyd. 1.8. of things, the nephew of Pericles seemed the person to whom to look Plut.'vit. for 3" associate to the successor of Pericles; and the gravity and mild Kic&AJcib. dignity of Nicias, it was hoped, might temper the too vivacious spirit of Alcibiades. But Alcibiades had not yet learnt the necessity of moderation in anything. Young as he was, he M'ould hold no second place. With his influence, derived from inheritance and connection, and assisted by talents, Avealth, and profusion, popularity was much in his power; and he had no sooner determined upon being a public man, than he would in the very outset be at the head of things. It was generally important, for those who sought eminence in any Grecian commonwealth, to have political connections among the other states of Greece. The family Thucyd. ]. 5. of Alcibiades were, from antient times, hereditarv public guests of Lacedsmon, and they had been connected by private hospitality with 1.8. C.6. some of the first Lacedaemonian families. Alcibiades was a Laconic name; first given, among the Athenians to the great-grandfather of the pupil of Socrates, in compliment to a Spartan family, with which the Athenian was connected in close friendship. But the interference Ch.5. s. 5. of the Lacedamionians in favor of the Peisistratids, which we have oc c. 7 s "^ of this iiiJt. heretofore had occasion to notice, would be likely to excite theindig- Thiicjd. 1.5. nation of an associate of Cieisthenes ; and accordingly the elder Alci- r. 4-3 blades, with those ceremonies which custom prescribed, as creditable among men and neccssaiy to obviate the wrath of the gods, renounced the heieditary hospitality of his family with Sparla. Hh great grand- son resolved to seek a renewal of that antient connection; and, as a preparatory step, was assiduous iu kind atteutiou to the Lacedosmonian li prisoners Sect. m. POLICY OF ALCIBIADES. 25.1 prisoners in Attica. But the Lacedemonian governmeut, systemati- cally indisposed to youth in political eminence, 'and not less syste- matically indisposed to the wild and luxurious extravagance of Alcibiades, slighted his advances ; and when business occurred with the Athenian commonwealth, as it was necfssary to communicate with some leading men, they chose rather to address themselves to Nicias or Laches. This aversion, on the part of Laceda3mon, decided Alcibiades to a line Thucyd. 1. 5. of political conduct, adverse at the same time to Laceda-mon and to *''^^* Nicias. He was about his twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh year, when he first tried the powers of his eloquence in the general assembly*. The affair of Panactum was his topic : he inveycd against the faith- lessness of Sparta, as if the demolition of that fortress had been con- certed by the Boeotians with the Lacedaemonian government. He was heard with ready attention by the Athenian people. All the opponents of the aristocratical cause were not admirers of Hyperbolus. Alci- biades, to carry his point against Nicias, professed zeal for the demo- cratical interest ; and the experience of his abilities as a speaker, added to the weight he derived from birth, property, and connection, made him presently the head of a considerable party. He continued his invective against Lacedsemon ; and the league hastily made by that state with Argos, afforded fresh matter. Nothing, he said, but inimical intentions against Athens, could have induced the LacedEemonians to form such a connection with such inveterate enemies as the Argians ; tlieir purpose could be only to deprive Athens of a valuable ally, that so they might, with better hope, renew the war. The peojrle continued to listen with a favorable ear, and Alcibiades gained influence and authority daily. Meanwhile he had been communicating among neighboring states; he had confidential intercourse with the leading men at Argos, of the party adverse to Laceda3mon; and, finding cir-, cumstances on all sides favorable, he formed an extensive and extra- ordinary plan, which he began immediately to carry into execution. ♦ .So we are tok-1 by Diodorus and Nepos ; who will take the pains to consult the note but Acacius has calrulaied, from several in the 343d page of Duker's Thucydidcs, circumstances mentioned by Plaicr. that he will judge for liuiiself Low I'ar to give credit must have been at least thirty. The reader to that calculation. The 254 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. B. C. 470. The Argian people were no sooner undeceived concerning the Ol. t!9. 4. circumstances of the alliance between Lacedsnion and Boeotia, and Thucvd.'i. 5. the supposed participation of Athens in that measure, than they became *• '*^' careless about peace with LacedsEmon, and inclined much rather to renew and improve their connection with Athens; an antient all}-, and, what was an important consideration, of congenial government. Upon this disposition of the Argians, Alcibiades principally founded his project. He proposed to his friends in Argos, leaders of the demo- cratical party there, to procure that ministers should be sent to Athens from their state, from Elis, and from Mantineia ; and he M'ould then inaaae to make the Athenian commonwealth a member of the Aro:ian confederacy. His Argian friends undertook the business ; the Argian people were readily persuaded to concur in it : the influence of Argos prevailed with Elis and Mantineia ; and shortly ministers from all those commonwealths met in Athens. This unexpected stroke of the young Athenian politician alarmed the Lacedtrmonian government. Not only the negotiation of Cleo- bulus and Xenares, from which such important advantages had been expected, was likely to be thwarted, but there was apparent danger that Athens might become the leading power of the very confederacy, at the head of which it was the direct purpose of that negotiation to establish Lacedirmou. Anxious to obviate this, they sent an embassy to Athens, carefully composed of persons the most likely to be well received there: of whom Endius was a hereditary friend and q;uest of the family of Alcibiades. The ambassadors were instructed to apolo- gize for the treaty with Boeotia, as a measure neither in intention or etfcct injurious to Athens; to demand the surrender of Pylus in return fur the evacuation of Panactum ; and bj' all means to obviate any league of Athens with Argos. c. 45. On their arrival at Athens, having audience from the council of Aldb. &" Five hundred, whose office, in time of war nearly superseded by that Kic. of general of the commonwealth, had now resumed its importance, they found reason to promise themselves a favorable issue to their negotiation. This would not only ruin the immediate project St Alcibiades, but would go fur to establish the poM'cr of the opposite parly Sect.III. policy of ALCIBIADES. 255 party in Athens ; and no common policy, nor perhaps any honorable policy, could prevent such consequences. Alcibiades was ing-enious, and not scrupulous. He ingaged the Lacedtemonian ambassadors in a private conference, in which he persuaded them by no means to acknowlege, before the Athenian people, the fulness of the powers M'ith which they were vested : they would find, he said, the arrogance of the multitude insupportable; and the only way to check the most unreasonable demands would be to deny their plenipotentiary com- mission. If they would only take his advice in this matter, his oppo- sition should cease, and he would even become the advocate of their cause. The reasoning, in itself plausible, was urged in a manner so plausible, and with such professions and protestations, that the Lace- daemonians implicitly assented to it. Next day they had their audience of the assembled Athenian people. After they had declared the purpose of their mission, Alcibiades put the question to them, ' Whether they came with full powers or with * Umited?' and they answered, 'that they were Innited by instruc- * lions,' The members of the council, whom they liad assured that their commission was plenipotentiary, were astonished at this reply : Nicias, with whom they had not had the precaution to communicate, was astonished ; but presently the ambassadors themselves were still more astopi.shed, \vhen Alcibiades reproached them as guilty of gross and shameful prevarication, and coni^luded a harangue, the most virulent against Laceda^mon, and the most .soothing and alluring to the Athe- nian people, w ith proposing the question for ingaging the Athenian commonwealth in the Argian alliauce. His daring and well-conducted treachery would, in the opinion nf Thucydides, have had full success in the instant, but for an accident, which alarmed the superstition, at the same time that it excited the natural fears, of the Athenian people. The city was, in the moment, shaken by an earthquake ; no mischief followed ; but the assembly was immediately adjourned. The delay of a day thus gained, giving time for passion to cool and reflection to take place, was advantageous to the views of Nicias. la the assembly held on the morrow, urging tliat the people ought not to Thucyd. 1.5, decide hastily, and in the midst of uncertainty, concerning a matter '^'- '^''• of fcjy HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. Xm. of very great importance, he prevailed so far against Alcibiades, that, instead of immediately conckiding the alliance with Argos, it was determined first to send an embassy to Lacedajmon, of which Nicias himself was appointed chief. But the measure which Alcibiades could not prevent, he contrived to render ineffectual ; or, rather, to convert to the promotion of his own purposes. The embassy to Laceda?mon being voted, instructions for the ambassadors were to be considered ; and it was resolved, that the restoration of the fort of Panactum, the immediate delivery of Amphipolis into the power of the Athenian people, and a renunciation, on the part of Lacedcemon, of the alliance with BcEotia, or, instead of it, the accession of Boeotia to the terms of the late peace, should be preliminar\'^ conditions, without assent to which, in their fullest e.xtent, nothing should be concluded. Tiie year ^ of magistracy of the ephor Xcnares was yet unexpired, and the party of Xenares still prevailed, Tlie Boeotian alliance had been the measure of that party: the requisition of a renuntiation of it was of course ill received ; and Nicias and his collegues were obliged to return to Athens without obtaining, either for their commonwealth or for themselves, any one object of their mission. Indignation would not unnaturally arise upon such an occasion among the Athenian people ; and art was not wanting, and pains were not spared, to intlame it. The party of Alcibiades thus gained an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority in the assem* bly. The Argian and Eleian ministers were still at Alliens, and a league offensive and defensive, for a hundred years, with their republics, the dependent allies of each contracting power (such nearly is the expression of Thucydides') being included, was proposed and carried: it was agreed that pillars of marble, Avith the treaty ingraved, should be erected, at the separate expence of each republic, at Athens in the Thucyc!. 1.5. citadel, at Argos in the temple of Apollo in the agora, and at Mantineia *^' ^^' in the temple of Jupiter; and that a brazen pillar, with the treaty also ingraved, should be placed, at the common expence of the confederacy, at Olympia. By this extraordinary stroke in politics, Athens, and no longer Lacedtemon, was the leading power even of the Dorian states, nnd head of the principal confederacy in Peloponnesus itself. Sect.IV. -complicated POLITICS. ^57 SECTION IV. ImpUcafioti of In teres fs of the principal Greciaii Republics. Conti' nuation of Dispute between Lacedcemon and Elis. Affairs of the Lacedceynonian Colony of Heracleia. Alcibiades elected General ; Importance of the Office of General of the Athenian Commonwealth : Influence of Alcibiades iii Pelopo?inesus : JFar of Argos and Epi- daitrus. Inimical Conduct of Athens toward Lacedcemon. Bt the several treaties now lately made, the interests of the principal Thucyd. 1. 5, c, 48. Grecian republics were strangely implicated. Inimical to Sparta as the late transaction of the Athenian commonwealth certainly was, and not less in direct contravention of subsisting ingagements with Athens as the treaty a little before concluded hy Lacedtemon with Boeotia appears, the alliance between Lacediemon and Athens nevertheless subsisted. At the same time Corinth, ingaged in confederacy with Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, refused to concur with those states in the Athenian alliance; inclining rather to renew its old connection with c. 49. Lacedsmon, then at open hostility with Elis, and scarcely upon better terms with the other states of the confederacy. Meanwhile the Eleians, conceiving themselves grossly injured by the Lacedaemonians in the affair of Lepreum, and unable to vindicate their claim by arms, had recourse to the authority derived from their sacred character and their presidency over the Olympian festival. Before the Olympian tribunal, composed of their own principal citizens, they accused the Lacedffiraonians of prosecuting hostilities after the commencement of the Olympian armistice; and sentence was pronounced, according to the Olympian law, condemning the Lacedie- nionian commonwealth in a fine of two thousand mines, between seven and eight tliousand pounds sterling ; being tu'O mines for every soldier employed. The Lacedaemonian government, more anxious, on account of the late turn in Grecian politics, to clear themselves of offence against the common laws and common religion of Greece, declared Vol. II. L L that •58 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVII. that they would submit to the penalty, had they or their officers been guilty of the crime; but they insisted that, when the hostilities com- plained of were committed, the armistice had not been made known to them by the customary proclamation. In the irregularity and uncertainty of the Grecian year, proclamation only could ascertain to eacli republic when the armistice was to begin. The Eleians main- tained that, according to antient constant custom, it was proclaimed first within their own territory : that then they held themselves imme- diately bound to abstain from hostilities against others ; and reason, not less than the Olympian law, required that they should then be exempt from injury by hostility from any member of the Greek nation. The Lacedccmonians still insisted that they ought not to be fined for an involuntary crime. The Eleians maintained that the sentence was just, and could not be reversed or altered ; but, if the Lacedismonians would restore Lepreum, which had been so injuriously and impiously seized, they would not only remit the portion of the fine due to them- selves, but also pay for the Lacedsemonians that due to the god. The Thucyd. 1.5. LacedfEmonian government positively refusing both to restore Lepreum, and to pay the fine, the Eleians declared the whole Lacedcemonian people excluded, both from contending in the games at the approach- ing festival, and from partaking in the sacrifices ; not however forbid- ding their attendance as spectators. It was apprehended that the high spirit of the Lacedcemonian people, long accustomed to give law to Peloponnesus and to Greece, might not acquiesce under this decision, excluding them from the common religious solemnities of the Greek nation. To obviate violence, there- 01.9ft. fore, the whole youth of Elis attended during the festival in arms; and " ^ ■ a thousand heavy-armed Argians, as many Mantineians, and a body of Athenian horse, came to assist in keeping the peace. Such a measure might alone indicate how hardly the peace of Greece was to be kept. But, M'ith all this precaution, an occurrence at the games excited general apprehension. Leichas, a Lacedtemonian, had a chariot pre- pared for the race: and not to be disappointed, excluded as he was from entering it in his own name, he obtained permission to enter it in the name of the Boeotian people. As a public chariot of Bceotia, it 3 won. Sect. IV, AFFAIRS OF LACED.EMON. tS9 won. But the vanity of Leichas was not to be so satisfied : to make it known to >wlioni the victorious chariot really belonged, he stepped forward before the assembly, and placed a chaplet on the head of his charioteer. The rod-bearers, whose office it was to inforce order, as iu the roughness of Grecian manners, amid republican equality, it seems they were authorized to do, without any consideration for the dignity of the man or of his city, struck Leichas in presence of the assembly*. Such an affront, however, to a Laceda;monian citizen, it Avas feared might bring a LacediEmonian army to Olympia; but the Lacedcemo- nian government, not subject to passionate counsels, overlooked the offence to an individual, and the affair had no immediate consequence. After the conclusion of the festival, Corinth became the seat of poli- tical negotiation. The Argians sent ministers thither to press the accession of the Corinthian state to the new confederacy. The Lace- da;monian government, judging it necessary to counterwork the various intrigues carrying on to their disadvantage, sent also ministers to Corinth. After much negotiation through the summer, to little or no effect, the terrors of an earthquake, of which however no mischief is reported, occasioned the dissolution of the congress. The affairs of the Lacedaemonian colony of Heracleia continue to ingage notice, as they contribute to characterize the state of Greece. The people of Trachinia and its neighborhood had never forgiven the Thucyd. 1. 5. gross trespass committed upon the rights and property of a Grecian '^' ' people, by those who assumed the title of protectors of Grecian liberty, and they disturbed Heracleia with continual hostilities. Success had been various ; but in this autumn the Heracleians were defeated in After 30 battle, v/ith such loss, that the survivors scarcely sufficed for the "^P^' defence of their walls and of the property necessary to their subsist- ence. In the next spring therefore the Boeotians, fearing that, while Thucyd. 1.5. the Lacedsemonians were intent upon their nearer interests in Pelopon- „ 7\ _ nesus, the Athenians might seize Heracleia, took upon themselves to 01. 90. f. P.W. 13. * It is sometimes difficult to estimate the this story would rather give to suppose that exact value of words and phrases in a dead Leichas was formally condenmed to receive language, when it depends on laws and a public whipping, which was inflicted ac- customs of which we are not exactly in- cordingly ; and the plirase of Tliucydides formed. The manner in which Lysias tells will bear that meaning. L h i direct 4C0 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. tlirect its affairs, and to send away the Lacedjemonian governor Hege- sippidas, as unfit for his command. The Lacedasmonian government, not a little dissatisfied with this species of kindness, had however too much upon their hands to take immediately any active measures for vindicating their dominion over their colony. B.C. 419. While these transactions ingagcd some of the principal states, 01. 5)0. i. Alcibiades had been prosecuting intrigue, ably and successfully, within and without Attica, His measures at home procured his election to the hi^-h office of general in chief of the commonwealth; an occasional office, created only in times of supposed emergency ; but which, beside the ilnportance of the military command, carried with it, not nominally indeed but effectually, greater civil power than anj' of the permanent magistracies, or than all of them : for the general, having the right to assemble tlie people at all times, had no occasion to consult any other council ; so that, as long as he could command a majority in the assem- bly, he was supreme and sole director of the executive government. Nearly absolute soverein thus in Athens, he was hardly less so in Argos, and his influence extended widely among other states in Peloponnesus. In the beginning of summer, having previously con- certed matters M'ith the leading men of the Argian administra- tion, he Mcnt, with a small escort of heav^'-armed and bowmen, to Argos, whence, with an addition of Peloponnesian troops, he made a progress through the cities of the confederacy within the peninsula; and, with plenitude of assumed power, arranged matters evcrj'where so as to give a decided superiority to the party m hich favored his views. To confirm the democratical interest in the little city of Patrte in Achala, he persuaded the people to connect their town with their port by fortifications, which would bring tlicm more immediately within the protection of the Athenian fleet. A similar measure, proposed a\ the Achaian Rhium, was prevented b}' the Sicyonians and Corinthians. Among these turns in Grecian politicsj the little republic of Epi- daurus, a dismembered branch of the anticnt Argolic state, was firm in the Lacedaemonian alliance. Epidaurus, always obnoxious, would, in the event of the expected war with Laccda;mon, be particularly annoy- ing to Argos; being so situated that it would very much interrupt communication Sect. IV. WAR OF ARGOS AND EPIDAURUS. 26i communication with Athens : for if the Corinthians, who were now dubious, should become adverse, the passage could be made only by- sea, round the Scylltean promontory ; and this, in case of a serious attack from Lacedfemon, would make assistance from Athens to Argos slow and precarious. A pretext, of whimsical appearance in modern times, was found for making war upon Epidaurus : it was the neglect to send a victim to a temple of the Pythian Apollo, in the Argian terri- tory, due as a quit-rent for some pastures held of Argos by the Epidau- rians. On this ground it was proposed to subdue Epidaurus ; and mea- sures M'ere concerted with Alcibiadcs for the purpose. Meanwhile preparation was made by the LacediEmonian government, Thucyd. 1. 5. as for some very important enterprize, the object of which was kept a '^' ^^' profound secret. Troops were required of the allies, M'ithout any inti- mation of the purpose. Such requisitions are more than once men- tioned by Thucydides ; and they strongly indicate the importance of that supremacy which subordinate states acknowleged in the head of their confederacy. The M'hole force of Laconia marched, under the command of king Agis, to Leuctra, on the borders; where, according to the constant practice of the Greeks, before they would move in amis beyond their own territory, the diabaterial or border-passing sacrifice was performed. The symptoms of the victims being, on this occasion, declared by the priests unfavorable, after all the pomp and all the labor and expence of preparation, Agis immediately dismissed the allies and led the Lacedasmanian forces home. The allies were however directed to hold themselves in readiness to march again, immediately after the conclusion of the approaching festival of Carneia. The Argians, before restrained by the alarm of the great preparations made by LacedanPiOn, determined to use the opportunity, now so unex- pectedly allowed them, for prosecuting their purpose against Epidaurus, for whicli the Carneian festival was particularly commodious. The Carncian was a festival common to all the Dorians, and one of the prin- cipal of their calendar. Its ceremonies were mostly military, and, for the celebration, M'hich lasted many days, a camp was always formed. The Argians, tho they chose their time we-11, seem to have concerted their measures ill; but the measures of their opponents -were still more defective. tea HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. defective, and tend, among numberless circumstances occurring ia Grecian history, to show both the inconvenience of the Grecian reli- gious festivals, and the inefficiency of league among the Grecian republics for preserving internal security and domestic quiet. Four i4 All-:. days before the holidays, the Argians entered the Epidauiian lands in , arms, and immediately commenced plunder. The Epidaurians sent to their allies for succour. Some excused themselves on account of the festival ; which, as tliey affirmed, they were religiously bound to cele- brate : some came as far as the Epidaurian borders and halted : none Thu'cyd. 1. 5. gave any effectual assistance. At this very time a convention of ^' ^^' deputies of the several states of the Argian alliance was sitting at !Mantineia, assembled at the requisition of the Athenian government, for the professed purpose of negotiating a general peace. Intelligence of the attack upon Epidaurus was quickly communicated there, and the Corinthian deputy (for Epidaurus was among the allies of Corinth) remonstrated Avarmly against it. The Argians in consequence with- drew their troops, but the convention separated soon after without concluding anything; and the Argians recommenced hostilities, ■which were continued, but with little effect, through the remainder of the summer. ^' •'"• A rcniforcement of three hundred men, Mhich passed by sea from Laconia to Epidaurus in the following winter, produced a very remark- able remonstrance from the Argian to the Athenian government. In the treaty of alliance between the two states, it was stipulated that neither should permit the enemies of the other to pass through its dominion. The Argian administration accused the Athenian of con- travening this article, by permitting the Lacedtemonians to pass by sea to Epidaurus. This may seem to have been dictated by Alcibiades, and to mark the extraordinary extent of his influence in Argos ; for, under the semblance of a remonstiance, it was really an acknowlegement that the Grecian seas, even to the very shores of Peloponnesus, were the dominion of Atheiis. The reparation which they required for this injury would appear, in modern times, scarcely less extraordinary than the accusation : it was, that the Athenians should withdraw the Athe- nian garrison from Pylus, and replace there the ]\Iessenians and Helots who Sect. V. WAR OF LACED.EMON AND ARGOS. 263 who had been removed to Cephallenia. Apparently this requisition vas concerted with Alcibiades, or perhaps suggested by him; for he ■was tlie mov'er of the measures which followed in Athens. A decree of the people directed, that, on the column on which was ingraved the late treaty with Lacedeemon, a clause should be added, declaring that the Lacedaemonians had broken the treaty. This being taken as the ground, it was then commanded, by the same decree, that the Messe- nians and Helots, lately removed to Crane in Cephallenia, should be reestablished in Pylus. In the course of the winter many skirmishes passed between the Argians and the Epidaurians, but no important action ; and an attempt, toward spring, to take Epidaurus by escalade, failed. SECTION V. JVar of Lacedmnon and Argos: Battle near Mantinda : Siege of Epidawus. The Lacedcemonians could not, 'without extreme uneasiness, consider Thucyd. 1.5. the present state of things in Peloponnesus, not only as their own com- *^' ^^' mand and influence were diminished, but as what they had lost liad accrued to their rivals of Athens and Argos. By midsummer of this year, the continued pressure of the Argian arms, however defectively g C. 418. conducted, had reduced the Epidaurians, old and still faithful allies of 01.90. 4. . , P. W. 1*. Lacedsemon, to great distress. Some effort must be made, or all com- mand and influence in Peloponnes\is, beyond their own territory, would be gone. It was only to sound the trumpet, and the whole Lacedee- monian people M'cre at any time assembled, ready for service. The allies yet remaining to the state were summoned ; and the Lacedtemo- nian array, strengthened with the greatest force of Helots that could be trusted, marched under the command of king Agis. They were pre- sently joined by the Tegeans, and all those other Arcadians who had not, with the Mantineians, renounced the Lacedaemonian alliance :. Phlius w^as the appointed place of junction for the allies, equally those within «. 58. 204 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVII. within and those without Peloponnesus. No less than five thousand lieavy-armcd, as many light, and five hundred horse, with a foot- soklier attending every horseman, marched from Boeotia'; Corinth sent two thousand heavy-armed; Sicyon, Pallenc, Epidaurus, and Megara, all they could spare, and the Phliasians Avere prepared to join with their wlK)le-strength. Tliucyd. l.o. The Argians, quickly informed of these movements, dispatched to their allies urgent requisitions of assistance. Accordingly the ^lanti- neians joined them with their whole force, the amount of which Thu- cvdides does not specify : the Eleians sent three thousand heavy-armed. TIhis in consequence of the successful treachery of Alcibiades, Pelo-. ponnesus was divided at arms within itself; Avhile Athens, preparing indeed assistance for her ally, but risking little, looked on, and injoyed the storm. The Aroians, being joined by the ^lantineians and Elclans, proposed to prevent the junction of the Laceda'monians \vith their northern allies; afld with that \iew took a position near ^Nlethydrium in Arcadia. It was evening when Agis hicamped on a hill overagainst them, as if intending to ingage next morning ; but moving silently in the night, he passed on unperceived so as to secure his way to Phlius. The Argians had then to expect the invasion of their country by the whole combined force of the enemy. To prevent this, they moved to a posi- tion on the road of Nemea; the only way by which a numerous army could conveniently pass the mountains, M'hich divide Argolis from Phliasia and Corinthia. Agis, by apparently a very able disposition, rendered this measure fruitless. Leading the Lacedaemonians by a rough and dithcult mountain-road, he entered the Argian plain unop- posed, and placed himself between the Argian army and Argos. The Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pallenians, by another road, also difficult and little practised, entered another part of the plain, equally unresisted. Tlie Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians only were sent by the Nemean road, with orders to avoid ingaging, unless the enemy should move against either of the divisions in the plain. In that case the * What those attc-rKliiig foot-soldiers were, whom Thucydides distinguishes by the name ■ef i^iira-ef, we are informed ohK by late writers, whose authority seems very doubtful. - Boeotian Sect. V. WAR OF LACEDiEMON AND ARGOS. 265 Boeotian liorse, more numerous than that of tlie enemy, if indeed the enemy had any, might find opportunity to attack with advantage. These well-judged movements being all successfully executed, the Argian army was surrounded by a force so superior, that its destruction seemed inevitable. Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of Argos, saw the peril of his situation: he communicated upon it with Alciphron, an Argian of rank, connected by hospitality with Laceda3mon, and they determined together upon a measure which would appear very extraor- dinary in itself, and scarcely credible in its success, if we were not already somcM'hat familiarized with Grecian politics. They went pri- Thucyd. 1.5. vately to Agis, and, pledging themselves to lead their state to alliance ^' ^°' with LacedtEmon, upon terms that should be satisfactory, they prevailed with him to grant upon the spot, of his sole authority, a truce for four months; and, to the astonishment of the Lactda;monian army, orders were immediately issued for retreat. By this negotiation, fortunate as it was bold, Thrasyllus and Alci- phron hoped to acquire such favor among the Argian people as might inable them to promote at the same time their two objects, the oli- garchal interest and the Lacedaemonian alliance. They were, how- ever, utterly disappointed. The Argian people, and even their com- manders, totally unpractised in war upon any extensive scale, were so unaware of the danger from which they had been rescued, that they imagined they had been deprived of a most favorable oppor- tunity for crushing the Lacediemonians ; inclosed, they imagined in- advertently, between the allied army and the garrison of Argos. The public indignation, stimulated apparently by the democratical leaders, rose so high, that Thrasyllus saved his life only through the protection of an altar to which he fled, and a decree of the people declared all his property confiscated. Presently after the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, the auxiliary force c. 6i. from iVthens arrived at Argos ; a thousand Athenian heavy-armed and three hundred horse, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The After iitli oligarclial party in Argos, tho unable to protect Thrasyllus against the momentary rage of the people, were nevertheless strong ; and they would immediately have dismissed the Athenian forces, as no longer Vol. n. M m wanted fiG6 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. Wanted in Peloponnesus for any purpose of the confederacy. But Alcibiades was too watchful a politician to suffer his purposes to be so batikd, and the important alliance of Argos to pass from him. Quickly informed of all circumstances, he went to Argos in quality of ambas- - , sador, and, in conjunction with the two generals, demanded an audience of the Argian people. The oligarchal Argians very unwillingly con- sented, and not Avithout a degree of compulsion from their INIantiueian and Eleian allies, who were still present. The eloquence of Alcibiades then prevailed. The Argian people felt his reproaches for breach of faith with Athens, gave credit to his representations of the strength of the confederacy, and of the circumstances now pecuharly favorable for prosecuting the war ; and, a proposal being suggested for striking an important stroke with little risk, it was summarily resolved upon. Ilostaoes had been taken by the Laceda;monians from some Arcadian towns of their alliance, whose fidelity they doubted, and had been placed in custody of the Orchomenians, whom they thought firm. The allied army instantly marched to Orchomenus. The fortifications of that little city were m eak ; the people were alarmed by the greatness of the force preparing to attack them, and, apprehensive that they might be overpowered before succour could arrive, they insured present safety by an early capitulation. Surrendering the hostages committed to their charge, and giving liostages of their own people, they were admitted members of the Argian alliance. Thucyd. 1. 5. This stroke being thus rajjidly struck, the question was agitated, to «• 03. what object the allied army should next be directed. The Eleian» Avere urgent for Leprcum ; but the recovery of Lepreuni, however desirable for the Eleians, little interested the other allies. The Manti- ueians therefore proposing the far more important acquisition of Tegea; and giving assurance that they had intelligence with a party in that city, which would favor the enterprize, the Argians and Athenians con- curred with them. The Eleians were so dissatisfied with this preference of the great concerns of the confederacy to the particular interest of their state, that they marched home. The rest of the allied army pre- pared to go against Tegea. *• ^3. The Lacedccmonians, more reasonably displeased with their prince than Sect. V. WAR OF LACED/EMON AND ARGOS. aG7 than the Argians with their general, had been however more temperate ill their ariger. While peace was the apparent consequence of his measure, the pubHc discontent vested itself only in expressions of dis- approbation. But when, instead of breaking the force of Argns by one blow, or even taking the city, to which some thought the opportunity might have extended, they found, on the contrary, great advantage given to the enemy, an allied city of some importance lost, and their pledges for the fitlelity of the rest of Arcadia taken from them, Agis was called to account, with a degree of passion not usual, says Thucy- dides, with the LacedEcmonians. IJe was upon the point of being judicially condemned in a line amounting to more than four thousand pounds sterling ^ and moreover to suft'cr the indignity of, what was othervvise probably no very important loss, having his house levelled with the ground. But consideration for his former assiduity in service, with his unblameable deportment on all occasions, and respect for the blood of Hercules and the dignity of the Spartan government, at length prevailed. His intreaty to be allowed an opportunity of proving, by future conduct, that he had not deserved such severe censure, was oranted, and he resumed the command of tlie armv, but not with- out a limitation never before put upon Spartan kings : ten persons were appointed to be his military council, without whose concurrence he was not to lead the forces beyond the Lacedemonian dominion. For the detail of military operati'ju, however, he seems to have been intrusted with the usual authority. Meanwhile intelligence arrived at Lacedaemon, from the party yet Thucyd.l. 5. ruling in Tegea, that, if assistance was not quickly given, their oppo- ^' nents of the democratical interest would prevail, and that important city would be annexed to the Argian confederacy. The whole force of Laconia was in consequence assembled, with unexampled celerity, and marched immediately. The Arcadian allies were required to hasten to Tegea, and expresses were dispatched to Corinth, Boeotia, and as far as Phocis and Locris, for the forces of .those provinces to nieet the Lacedjemonian army before ]\Iantineia. Tegea was quickly put into a state of security ; and then the Lacedaemonians, with their Arcadian " A hundred thousand drachina\ M ji 2 allies, S68 H I S T O R Y O F G 11 E E C E. Chap. X VIL allies, entered the Mantineian lands, and the usual ravage of Greciart armies followed. Thucyd. 1.5. fiie views of the confederates upon Tegea being thus checked; nothing remained for *hem but to retreat and leave their own country open to extensive waste, or to risk a battle. They determined upon the latter, and, approacliing the Lacedaemonian army, occupied some strong ground, where they formed, Agis, eager to do away the dis- grace he had incurred, took the earliest moment for leading his forces to action. He was already within arrow's flight of the enemy, when one of the elder officers ' called aloud to him, in the terms of a Greek proverb, ' that he was going to mend evil with evil '°:' meaning that, to atone for his former ill-judged retreat, he was now rushing to an inconsiderate and ruinous attack. Seeing presently the justness of the admonition, and incouraged by it to the measure which prudence required, tho rashness or acrimony might blame, Agis instantly gave orders to halt, and then drew off without ingaging. Whatever, on the other hand, might have been the abilities of the Thucyd. 1. 5. Argian generals, and it appears they M'ere considerable, the democra- tical weight in the Argian government would have rendered them of little avail. The geuerals w ished to hold their present advantageous ground : but the troops, little practised in military subordination, and impatient of rest and delay, grew tumultuous, and accused them of traitorously permitting a flying enc.ny to escape. Unable otherwise to compose the disorder, they marched after the Spartan king. This was precisely what Agis desired; and to provoke it, he had been employing his troops in diverting the course of a mountain-stream, so as to damage the jMantineian lands. Being informed that the confe- derates nevertheless persevered in holding their strong post, he was returning, without due precaution, toward the hills, when he suddenly met them advancing in order of battle along the plain. Never, saj's Thucydides, was such consternation known in a Lacedtemonian arm3\ The excellence of the Lacedaemonian discipline, however, inabkd the ' Tut t;fic€v\i^u» TK, wbich might mean one of the council appoiated to adsise him, or possibly only one of the elder officers of bis army. king Sect.V. battle near MANTIKEIA. 269 king to form bis order of battle in a sbortertime tban would bave been possible M'itb any otber troops tlien in tbe known world ; and, before tbe attack could be made, tlicy were prepared to receive it. Tbe Argians and tbeir allies, after a sbort exhortation from tbe Tlmcyfl. 1. 5. several commanders, rusbed forward with fury. Tbe Lacedtemonians, '^' ^'' ' continues tbe cotemporary bistorian, use speecbes of exhortation less tban any otber Greeks; well knowing that discipline, long andcare- fuUy practised, gives more confidence to troops tban any harangue, however fine and however ingeniously adapted to tbe occasion. To tbe astonishment of the confederates, who had observed with joy the tumult occasioned by the first alarm, they were seen presently in perfect order, silent and without hurry, stepping in exact time to the sound of numerous flutes, and thus preserving their front compact and even, Avitbout any breaking or floating, tbe seldom failing defects of extensive lines". Tbe numbers, on either side, Thucydides professes that he could not learn with certainty ; thus teaching us what credit is due to ■writers incomparably farther removed from means of information, who pretend to state with precision the force of contending armies. Tbe extent, however, of the Lacedtemonian front evinced their superiority ; and the two armies were the most numerous that ever, within the bounds of tradition, had met in Peloponnesus. On the Argian side tbe Athenian, of the other army the LacediEmonian, was the only cavalry. Indeed the Lacedaemonians seem to bave been tbe only Peloponnesian people who, at this time, had any cavalry. In all actions among the antients, the right, on both sides, commonly c. 71.. " It is Thucydides' description of the march of the Lacedaemonian phalanx, upon this occasion, that IMilton has imitated in the first book of the Paradise Lost : Rose A forest huge of spears ; and thronging behtis Appear'd, and serried shields, in thick array. Of depth immeasurable. Anon tbey move, In perfect phalanx, to tlie Dorian mood Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised To hightb of noblest temper heroes old, Arming to battel, and, instead of rage. Deliberate valor breathed, firm, and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat.. overstretclied 270 IIISTOar OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. overstretched the left of the opposing- army. For, ingaghig hand to hand, the shield, the principal defence, being borne on the lefl arm, was less a protection for the right side ; and the soldier in the extreme of the right wing, to avoid exposing the undefended part of his body, would always rather incline to the right. The man then next on the left, and so every man in the line, would also press rather toward the right, to profit from the protection of his neighbor's shield. Thus, on the present occasion, it happened that before the armies met, the Man- tineians, on the right of the Argian line, had considerably overstretched the Lacedcemonian left; and, on the other side, theTegeans, on the ri"ht of the Laced.cnionian line (the Lacedcemonian front being of greater extent) had still more overstretched the Argian left. Agis, observing this, when the armies were only not ingaged, inconsiderately ordered a movement, with a view to remedy the inconvenience which he apprehended. The Skirite and Brasidian bands (by the latter name those soldiers were honorably distinguished who had fought under Brasidas in Thrace) forming the left of the Lacedsmonian line, were directed to break aMay from the main body, so far as to prevent the IMantineians from taking the army in flank; and two lochi of Lacedce- monians, under the polemarcs Hipponoidas and Aristocles, were com- manded, from another part, to till the interval. The Skirites and Tbucyd. 1. 5. Brasidians instantly obeyed : but Hipponoidas and Aristocles, whether the enemy were so near that it was impossible, or they thought tlie danger of the movement to the whole army would justify their disobe- dience, kept their former post. The Skirites and Brasidians therefoie, being presently attacked by the M'hole force of the JNIantineians, toge- ther with a thousand chosen Argians, were cut off from tlieir main body, overpowered, compelled to retreat, and pursued to the baggage of their army. Meanwhile the rest of the line of the Laceda-monians had every- Avhere the ail vantage, and particularly in the center, where Agis himself took post. The Argian center scarcely came to action with him, but c 73. fled the onset. The Athenians thus, who formed the left of the con- federate line, were completely deserted; the center having fled, while the right Mas pursuing. Their total destruction must have followed, 5 but Sect. V. BATTLE NEAR MANTINETA. 271 but for the protection given to their retreat by their own cavahy, V'hose services on that day were eminent. Even thus, however, they would scarcely have been inabled to save themselves, had not the defeat of the Skirites and Brasidians called the attention of the Lacedtemo- nian king. The victorious Mantineians, when they found the rest of their army defeated, avoided his attack by hasty retreat. Agis, true to the institutions of Lycurgus, pursued no farther than to make victory sure. The killed therefore were not numerous in pro- portion to the numbers Ingaged and the completeness of the success : seven hundred Argians, two hundred Mantineians, and two hundred Athenians, among Avhom both the generals fell, are the numbers of the confederates reported by Thucydidcs. Of the Laceda'monians about three hundred were killed, principally Brasidrans and Skirites; and of the allies of Lacedaemon a very small number, as they were little ingaged. After collecting the spoil of the field and erecting their trophy, the Lacedajmonians carried their dead to Tegea, and intombed them ceremoniously. The enemy's dead were restored, on the usual application from the vanquished. The other Spartan king, Pleistoanax, had advanced as far as Tegea, Thucyd. 1.5. with an army composed of Lacedemonians above and under the age for forein service, to be ready, in case of misfortune, to support Agis. Immediately upon receiving information of the victory, he returned ; and at the same time messengers were dispatched to Corinth, and the more distant allies, to countermand the march of their troops. The victorious army, after paying honorable attendance upon the obsequies of the slain, returned home, and the great Doric festival of the Carneia, whose period was at hand, ingrossed the public attention. The event of this battle restored the Lacedaemonian character in Greece. The advantage of numbers, indeed, had been on the side of the Lacediemouians ; but the circumstances of the action proved their superiority in discipline, and in that valor which discipline infuses, by giving individuals to confide in the combined exertions of numbers M'ith whom they act. This discipline in the soldier, we find, was, in the late battle, of efficacy even to counterbalance defective pre- caution and defective judgement in the general; while the want of it in 272 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVII. in the confederate army rendered superior abilities in the commanders of no effect". The misfortunes, the misconduct, and the apparent slackness of the Lacedasmonians, in the course of the war with Athens, were in consequence no longer attributed to any degeneracy in the people, but to the mismanagement of leaders, and the chance of war: a contempt, whicli had been gaining, for the Spartan institutions and discipline, as if hitherto respected above their worth, was done away ; and the Spartan character resumed its wonted superiority. But the Carneian festival occupied the Lacedaemonians at a very inconvenient season for a military people. Regulated, as all the Grecian Dodw. Anu. festivals, by the revolutions of the moon, it began this year about the seventh of August. Its principal ceremonies lasted nine days : but the whole month, named among the Dorian Greeks the Carneian, was, in a tlesrree, dedicated to religious festivitv. In the rude ages of the Hera- cleids and of L3'curgus, this check to military enterprize might be salutary: but in days of more refined and extensive policy, when wars, not of choice, but of political necessity, might be' to be maintained against states capable of supporting lasting hostilities, such avocations should no longer have been allowed to interrupt public business. The Lacedaemonians Avere, however, so attached to their antient Thucvd. 1.4. «. 76." institutions, that, till the period of the Carneia was completed, no " Thus much may be gathered from cipline of the Lacedaemonuiiis, which, in the Thucydides' account of the battle. But preface to his account of this very battle, he his opinion is farther delivered in a remark has taken occasion to describe, admirable upon it, in a manner sufficiently intelligi- in theory, and well supported by practice ; ble, tho in cautious and rather obscure and which, in his account of the battle terms: 'AXXa paX>r» W xari -a t5 itself, he shows to have been not less adnii- i/iTTsifia Aaxtoocifionoi iXaa-^uiiifTcq toti, tS rablc in effect. Kara oraiTa must have been aiijs'ia EOEilai ivK i<7i7ot •aefiyenijittcii. Thu- intended to relate to the circumstances of cyd. 1. 5. c. 72. ' But on this occasion, the battle, and not to an}- circumstances of ' more remarkably than ever, the Laceda;- the military art ; and by ijiirufix has been ' monians, tho in all respects outdone in meant the experience and science of the ' the military art, gave signal proofs of general, and not the skill of the soldier. A ' their superiority in true manly valor.' strong sense of delicacy, not less a charac- Thus Smith has translated, aiming to follow terisiic of Thucydides than his scrupulous the letter, and certainly missing the sense, impartiality, has apparently prevented him Thucydides could not mean here to speak from expressing his opinion on this occasiou disrespectfullv of that military art and dis- more openly. military Sect.V. siege of EPIDAITRUS. " ara military operations were prosecuted for profiting from tne victory of Mantineia. Soon after that event, the arrival of a thousand Athenian and three thousand Eleian heavy-armed to join the Argian army, inhanced the regret and indignation of all thinking men in the Argian con- federacy, at that petulant impatience and unadvised rashness, inherent in democratical government, which had superinduced their defeat. So powerful a reinforcement, seconding superior abilities in the generals, could those abilities have been effectually exerted, might have given the advantage over the ill-directed discipline of the Lacedsemonians. Offensive operations were immediately resumed ; not indeed directly against Lacedasmon, but against their allies on the other side of the peninsula. The Epidaurians, objects hitherto of unjust ambition and oppressive policy, had now made themselves objects of revenge; enter- ing the Argian territory, while its principal force was absent, wasted the country, and slaughtered the inferior troops appointed to its pro- tection. The siege of Epidaurus was regularly formed, and while the Lacedcemonians were supinely intent upon their festival, a contraval- lation was completed. Winter then approaching, a sufficient force was appointed to guard the lines, and the rest of the troops dispersed to tlieir several homes. Vol. 11. N n S74 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII, SECTION VI. Change in the Administration of Argos : Peace and Alliance between ArgDs and Lacedoimon : Overthrow of the Athejiian Influence, and of the Democratical Interest in Peloponnesus. Inertness of the Lacedaemonian Administration : E.vpulsiau of the Oligarclial Party from Argos, and renexcal of Alliance betueeii Argos and Athens. Siege of Melos by the Athenians : Fresh Instance of atrocious Inhu- manity in the Athenians. Feeble Conduct of the Lacediemonians : Distress of the Oligarchal Argians. Transactions in Thrace. Con- clusion of the Sixteenth Year of the Ha r. Scarcely any disaster could befal a Grecian commonwealth that- would not bring advantage to some considerable portion of its citi- zens. The unfortunate battle of INIantineia strengthened the oligar- chal cause in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and of the usually, dreadful consequences of unsuccessful war among the Greeks, brought the Argian people to a temper to bear advice about an accommodation with Lacedaemon ; while the inconvenience of democratical sway, unbalanced, which had been so severely experienced in the circum- stances of the battle, disposed them to hear, with less impatience, of the necessity of trusting executive government to a few. On this turn, in the public mind, the oligarchal leaders founded a project to overset the present politics, not only of their own state, but of all Greece. They would first propose to the Argian people simply to make peace with Laceda2mon: that being effected, and the Athenian alliance in conse- quence no longer necessary, the people might probably be persuaded, for the sake of confirming the peace, to make alliance a\ ith Laceda:mon. Having thus far used the power of the people as the instrument of their measures, they would tr^en turn those very measures against the power of the people : with assistance from Laceda:mon they Avould abolish the authority of the general assembly, aud establish oligarchal govern- ment. Such •Sect.VI. peace &.ALLIANCE of ARGOS & LACED.EMOxX. ^70 Sucli was the scheme, and it appears to have been ably conducted. The Carneia gave opportunity -for communication with Luceda;mon ; and tho the watchfid acuteness of Alcibiades led him to suspect the intrigue, insomuch that he passed to Argos purposely to counterwork it, yet the measures of the oligarchal party M'ere so well taken, and the depression of the popular mind gave them in the moment such oppor- tunity, that the vote for peace vas carried. This leading step being gained, the oligarchal party proceeded to push their advantage. Mat- ters had been prepared by secret negotiation, and articles were soon settled ; according to Avhich it was agreed, ' That all Peloponnesian Thucyd. 1. 5. * cities, small equally and great, should be independent, as in the times '^' ' ' and according to the customs of their forefathers " : That the hostages * in the hands of the Argians should be restored to theii" friends : That ' the siege of Epidaurus should be raised : That, if the Athenians per- ' severed in prosecuting it, the Lacedcemonians and Argians should ' unitedly oppose them ; and that they should equally oppose the ' interference of any forein armed force, upon any occasion, within the * peninsula.' This blow to the politics of Alcibiades and the interest of Athens, c. 78. was quickly followed b}- an alliance, defensive and offensive, between Lacedaemon and Argos, accompanied with a renunciation, on the part of Argos, of the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantineia. Among the articles which Thucydides has reported, in the Doric dialect in which they were written, and apparently at large, the following parti- cularly deserve notice : ' All cities of the confederacy, those of the ' Lacedaemonian equally and of the Argian aUiance, shall have the * clear and independent injoyment of their own laws and their own ' polity, according to antient usage '^ If city has difference with city, ' it shall be decided by judges to ■be duly appointed by both" ; or it * shall be lawful to refer the decision to any third city equally friendly '^ KxTa ra. varpici. pute between Athens and Lacedseiiion before \ '* Kari Ta narcia. the war, we want information by what rule '' I know not how more satisfactorily to of law, by what process, and under v.'liiit paraphrase the single word of the original, sanction, such litigation between state and iiaxpbni/.'.f : translators and commentators state was to be managed. give no assistance ; and here, as for the dis- N^ N 2 'to o. so. 476 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. * to both. i\lilitary coniinaiul shall rest with the Lacedfcmonians and ' Argians ; who shall, by joint councils, direct, equitably and impar- * tially, the military affairs of the whole confederacy.' TtiucyH. 1.5. As soon as this second treaty was concluded, a requisition was sent to Athens, in the name of the united republics, for the immediate eva- cuation of the Epidaurian territory, M'ith a declaration that neither embassy nor herald from Athens would be received, while Athenian troops remained in Peloponnesus. The Athenian administration pru- dently yielded to the necessity of the moment, and Demosthenes was sent to brins: awav the Athenian forces. That officer showed his usual ability in the execution of this ungrateful commission : he saved the dignity of his republic by giving the afiair the appearance of a favor granted by Athens to both Epidaurus and Argos ; and he more essen- tially served his republic by restoring, in some degree, a good corres- pondence with both those cities. Success animated the administrations of the newly-allied states, and they pushed it with a degree of vehemence. Ambassadors were sent to invite Perdiccas king of ^Macedonia to join their confederacy, with orders at the same time to ratify by oath, in the name of the two states, to the Chalcidian towns, the alliance, and ingagement for protection, formerly made by Lacedsmon. Contrary then to that spirit of equity, moderation, and peace, Mhich the terms of their confederacy appeared to hold forth, commissioners, escorted by a thousand heavy-armed from each state, went to Sicyon, and, by their assumed authority, subverting the established democratical government there, committed the supreme power to an oligarchy of their own selection. This, liowever, they would vindicate by asserting that the antient constitution of Sicyon •was oligarchal, and the democracy a usurpation. Measures, which had been for sbme time preparing, toward a revo- lution of the same kind at Argos, were now thought mature. Accord- ingly those leading men. Mho had conducted the negotiations with Lacediemon, and had since directed the administration of Argos, under the nominal authority of the popular assembly, assumed to themselves the supreme power of the state, and the authority of the popular assembly was expressly abolished. Meanwhile the Mantineians, seeing Sect. VI. COMPLICATED POLITICS. 27? seeing that, instead of any longer receiving protection from Argos, they were to expect oppression from the union of that powerful state with Laceda'mon, yielded, very reluctantly, their command over the Arcadian towns which they had suhjected, and made their peace with Lacedarmon upon such terms as they could obtain. The La.ced?emonians then took upon themselves to regulate the little Thucyd. 1.5. republics of Achaia, so as to restore the LacedaMiionian influence, ^' ^^' where it had been overpowered by a democratical party, and to confirm it, where it was tottering; and they found universal acquiescence. Thus, before the end of winter, all the effect of the treacherous policy of Alcibiades, which had been at first so threatening to Lacedajmon, was done away, and Peloponnesus Avas more completely than ever united, not immediately in war, but in politics, against Athens. This important change seems to have been produced by springs, not within the power of human wisdom in the Athenian administration to controul. Its advantages were lost to Laceda;mon through the want of energj', which had so long been conspicuous in the administration of that state. Tho the democratical form of government was abolished in Argos, the democratical interest remained powerful ; and, early in spring, a conspiracy was formed to overturn the oligarchy. The time j]_ (^ 4^-.^ chosen, for carrying it into effect, was the season of the Gymnopaidela, O'- 9o- 1. the Naked Games, at Sparta. But a democratical party could not After 2d" easily keep a secret. Intelligence of tlie design was acquired by the 'M"^''' Argian administration, and communicated to Sparta, with a request of precautionary assistance; yet, such was the infatuated attachment of the Laccdivmonians to those stated festivals, they would not stir. The discovery of the plot, and the knowlege that it was discovered, led the two parties in Argos to arms ; and, intelligence of this being forwarded to Sparta, then at last it was thought proper to adjourn the celebration of the festival, and send an army to save so important an ally. But it Avas too late: the two parties had come to action in Argos, the oligar- chal party Avas defeated, many had been killed, and most of the rest forced into exile, Some of the fugitives met the Laced;emonian army at Tegea, and were the first to give information of their own misfor- tune. They expressed at the same time confident hope that their affairs might yet be restored : in the confusion unavoidable immediately on such ^iis HISTORY OF GREECE. Chat-: XVTI. such a revolution, it would be easj'', they said, for so powerful an army to become masters of the city ; and to their remonstrances they added the most urgent intreaty. But the chiefs of the Lacedaemonian army were not to be so persuaded ; they led their forces immediately home, to conclude the celebration of their festival. Had we not these circum- stances from the authentic pen of Thucydides, we should scarcely conceive them possible of a people, who could sometimes conduct themselves with so much united dignity and policy as the Lacedie- monians. The conscious weakness of the prevailing party in Argos, marked Ly one of their first measures, makes the conduct of the Lacedsemoniains appear the more extraordinary and more inexcusable. Confident neither in their own strength, nor in the expectation of assistance from Athens, the Argians sent a deputation to make their peace with Lacedromon. The exiles did not fail to send deputies to oppose them. The Lacede- monians, with ostentatious moderation, referred the matter to the ■general convention of deputies from the states of their confederacy, ijoth parties were heard ; but judgement was given, as might be expected, against the democratical party ; and it was decreed that an army should be sent to carry it into effect. The weak remissness of tlie Lacedaemonian government again showed itself, in delaying the executiou of this decree ; and the Argian administration, thus at the same time threatened and incouiaged, recurred to Athens, where their application was gladly received, and the former connection of Athens and Argos was restored. Those measures which the existing circumstances rendered advisable, were then taken by the Argians, for resisting the vengeance of Laced as - mon ; which, instigated continually by their banished fellowcitizens, would scarcely fail at length to fall upon them. The landforce of Lacedasmon would be decidedly superior to any they could expect to assemble : upon their walls therefore ihey must depend for protection, and upon the sea, if matters were pushed to extremity, for subsistence. Accordingly they applied, with the utmost sedulity, to secure the com- munication of their city with the sea, by long walls ; such as connected x^thens with its ports, and such as the policy of the Athenian govern- 4 . ment S-ECT.yi. RENEWED ALLIANCE of ARGOS and ATHENS. 279 raent had recommended to many oLhev Grecian towns, standing, according to the usual choice of situation among the early Greeks, near, but not on, the shore. The Athenian government, under the influence of Alcibiades, gave large assistance, particularly furnishing builders, and artificers ; and all the Argian citizens, all the slaves, and eA'cn the women, assisted in the work. Those indeed were not likely to want zeal for such business, mIio had to apprehend the miseries which the Grecian practice of war usually brought upon a town taken. It was not till the following autumu that the Lacediemonians Thucyd. 1. 5, exerted themselves, SO far as to undertake any military operation, in ' " favor of those miserable families, the principal of Argos, who, confiding in the Lacedaemonian alliance, had ingaged in the measures througli which, with the loss of all their property and many friends and rela- tions, they now languished in exile. Then at length the confederacy was called upon for the due proportions of troops, and the Lacedaemo- nian forces marched under Agis. Some friends to the oligarchal interest yet remained in Argos: these had communicated with the exiles and with Lacedjemon; and it was hoped that the approach of the Lacedaj- monian army would inable them to stir with effect. The precaution however of the democratical leaders prevented this ; and the Lacedae- monians were neither prepared nor disposed to undertake the siege of Argos. They however destroyed the yet unfinished works of the long walls; they took Hysiaj, a small town of Argolis, and put all the free- men to the sword; and then returning home, dismissed their forces. The Argians used the opportunity thus left open for revenge. Their ; fugitive nobles found favor and protection principally in Phlius, where most of them resided. _ The Phliasians suffered for their charity, through • tlie ravage of their lands by the Argian forces. The restoration of Argos, in its present state, to the Athenian con- federacy, was but a small step toward the recovery of that influence in Peloponnesus, which Athens had lately held, and a very deficient gra- tification for the ambition of Alcibiades. That restless politician ibid, therefore looked around for other opportunities to promote his own y^i"[{^^^' power and consequence, through an extension of the empire of his Mc. commonwealth; p. ^v. 10. 089 ' HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. commonwealth ; and particularly carried his views forward to a war, in which he would certainly command, and hoped to shine. An expe- dition had been prepared, under Nicias, for the reduction of the revulted cities of Thrace; but it became necessary to abandon the measure, in consequence of the neglect of Perdiccas king of Macedonia to send tlie troops which, according to treaty, he should have furnished. His alliance with Argos and Lacedienion becoming also known, he was, for the two offences, declared an enemy to Athens, and the Athenian fleets stopped the maritime commerce of his dominions. Thucyd. 1. j. Intrigues of the oligarchal party being still carried on, or suspected, ]?''(' 41 r ^" Argos, .Mcibiades went thither in spring with twenty ships of war, Ol. I?, t. and, with the support of the democratical party, seized no less than three hundred of those supposed most connected with tlie oligarchal interest, whom he placed in several Hands of the iEgean, under 'he Athenian dominion. This, among the usual violences of Grecian politics, may be esteemed a lenient measure. The next step of the Athenian democracy, said by Plutarch to have been also dictated by Alcibiades, was a much grosser and more shocking trespass upon the common rights of mankind, and much less defensible upon any plea of political necessity. Alcibiades would not recommend any direct hos- tility against Lacedaemon ; policy forbad; but he recommended every- thing that might most provoke Lacedsemon to begin hostilities. The ])eople of Melos, both irritated and incouraged by the failure of the attempt against them, in the sixth year of the war, under Nicias, became presently active in hostility against Athens. They were, how- ever, of course included in the peace between Athens and Lacedaemon, and we are not informed of any offence they afterward gave ; yet it was now determined by the Athenian people to subdue the iland. An armament was accordingly prepared, consisting of thirty Athenian, six Chian, and two Lesbian ships of war, twelve hundred heavy-armed, three hundred bowmen, and twenty horse-bowmen, all Athenians, and fifteen hundred heavy-armed of the allies. This force, under the command of Cleomedes and Tisias, debarked in Melos without opposition. Before any ravage, a deputation was jsent into tlie city to persuade the people to submit to the Athenian dominion. Sect. VI. SURRENDER OF MELOS. 28i dominion, without making violence necessary to their reduction ; and it was supposed that, could the deputies have addressed their eloquence to the people at large, they might have succeeded; but this the chiefs would not permit. With the chiefs thei'efore only a conference was held, of which Thucydides has left an account in detail; meaning however, apparently, not to repeat exactly what passed, but only to give a metliodized account of the general arguments, and perhaps to express his own opinion on some points, particularly the ungenerous inertness of the Lacedaemonian administration, in a less invidious way than if he had spoken in his own person. The claim of the strong- to command the weak, with absolute authority, Avas so familiar among the Greeks, that it seems not to have shocked even Thucydides; who, on this occasfon, makes the Athenian deputy assert it in the most unqualified manner; professing even his confidence in a continuance of that favor of the gods, which had already Inabled the -Athenian people to exercise so many cruelties, and reduce so many Grecian states to subjection. The Melians however, in hope of assistance from Lacedigmon, Thucyd. 1. 5. refusing to submit, the blockade of their city was formed by sea and ^•^^~- ^^*- land. Their resistance was for some time vigorous. In the course of c. uj. the summer they made a successful sally, upon that part of the contra- vallation where the Athenian magazine was, and carried a considerable supply of provisions into the town. In the winter- they made another c. iiS, sally, attended with some success : but this occasioned a reinforcement from Athens to the besieging army. The town being then closely pressed, discontent arose among the lower people. The chiefs appre- hending sedition, with a design to betray them to the enemy, and doubting their means of prevention, took the desperate rcso,urce of surrendering the place, with all in it, to the pleasure of the Athenian people. After all we have gone through of Grecian history, we cannot but shudder at what followed. The Athenians had no pretence for any command over the Melians but that they were stronger. Connected by blood, by habit, and by their form of government, with Lacedaj- mon, those ilanders had nevertlieless been cautiously inoffensive to Vol. II. Co Athens, «82 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. Athens, till forced to become enemies. The punishment for this invo- hintary crime, even to the lower people, supposed all along in some degree friendly, when all were surrendered together to the mercy of the Athenians, was no less than what the unfortunate Scionceans h^.d undergone, for that termed their rebellion. All the adult males were put to death, and the women and children, of all ranks, Mere sold for slaves. The iland was divided among five hundred Athenian families. With the most unquestionable testimony to facts, which strike with horror when perpetrated by a tribe of savages, we are at a loss to con- ceive how they could take place in the peculiar country and age of philosophy and the fine arts; where Pericles had spoken and ruled, where Thucydides was then writing, where Socrates was then teaching, where Xenophon and Plato and Isocrates were receiving their educa- tion, and where the paintings of Parrhasius and Zeuxis, the sculpture of Pheidias and Praxiteles, the architecture of Callicrates and Ictinus, and the sublime and chaste dramas of Sophocles and Euripides formed the delight of the people. Tho the late battle near ^lantineia had restored the tarnished glory of the Lacedaemonian arnjs and the sullied character of the people, yet the conduct of their administration continued to earn for them those imputations of ill faith, illiberal policy, and inertness, which, in report- ing the conference at Melos, Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian commissioner, and which, for their conduct toAvard Argos, they had deserved. Their total abandonment of the faithful and unfor- tunate IMelians was deeply disgraceful. Their Argian friends, wandering up and down Peloponnesus, were, wherever they showed themselves or were heard of, striking testimonies to their discredit. In the existing tumult of Grecian politics, some exertion was unavoidable ; but it was generally feeble, irregular, and confined to little objects. No less than thrice, since the beginning of hostilities with Argos, the Lace- dtcmonian army, after advancing to the frontier, was stopped by unfavorable appearances in the border-passing sacrifice, and re- turned home ; a circumstance little known when able and active men directed public affairs. Once indeed we have this religious trick politically accounted for. Incouragement from the friends of oli- garchy Sect. VI. FEEBLE CONDUCT of the LACEDAEMONIANS. 28» garchy in Argos induced the Laceda?monian army to march, and intel- ligence that the plot was discovered occasioned the stop, M'hich was im- puted to forbidding tokens in the sacrifice. At times, however, party ran high in Lacedtemon itself; which might contribute to the visible feeble- ness and irregularity in the conduct of the administration at this period. Before the end of the winter in which Melos fell, an effort was made Thucyd. 1. o". . c. 7. to relieve the Argian fugitives, and distress the Argians in possession ; but, tho the preparations promised something great, what followed was little and inefficacious. The forces of all the Peloponnesian allies, except Corinth, were assembled, and the strength of Laconia joined them. But, from the first, the objects seem to have been no more than to carry off the plunder of the villages of Argolis, for which waggons attended the march of the army, and to establish the Argian fugitives in Ornese, an Argolic town on the borders of Phliasia. Both were very incompletely executed. A small part of Argolis only was plundered; and the Lacedaemonian army was no sooner withdrawn, and, according to the practice of the Greeks, dispersed for the winter, than the Argians, with a small auxiliary force from Athens, marched against Ornea?, which was so ill provided for defence, that those who held it consulted their safety by immediate flight. During these military transactions, the Lacedtemonian administra- tion so far exerted themselves in negotiation, as to endevor to excite the Chalcidians of Thrace, whose present independency was a benefit derived from the arms of Laceda;mon, to join the king of Macedonia in hostilities against Athens. But the Chalcidians, no longer won and animated by the abilities, the activity, the popular manners, and the generous faith of a Brasidas, and probably both apprehensive of tlie power and distrustful of the character of Perdiccas, refused. While indeed they injoyed independency in peace, the small tribute assessed by Aristeides was apparently not an object for which to provoke the naval power of Athens ; and it was rather their interest to see Perdiccas, after all his wiles, unquiet within his own government, as well as harrassed by a forein war. The troubles within Macedonia disabled bira for any considerable exertion without ; while ^lethone, an Athe- O o 2 niaa ^64 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVII. nian garrison on the borders, became an asylum for Macedonian refugees and malcontents ; who, together with a body of Athenian horse stationed there, employed themselves in inroads wherever they could find most plunder and least resistance. Such were the transac- tions of the sixteenth winter of the wan [ 2S.5 ] CHAPTER XVIII. Of the AflPairs of Sicily, and of the Athenian Expedition into Sicily. SECTION I. Affairs of Sicily : Hieron King of Syracuse. Expulsion of the Family of Gelon, and Establishment of Independent Democracies in the Sicilian Cities : Agrarian Law. Diicetius King of the Sicels. Syra- cuse the Soverein City of Sicily. Accessioft of Syracuse to the Lacedcejnonian Confederacy : War between the Dorian and Ionian Sicilians: First Interference of Athens in the Affairs of Sicily : Peace through Sicily procured by Her^mocrates of Syracuse. ^ I ^ H E Athenian people, whose numbers Avere far below the name of -^ a nation, being indeed a very small portion of the Greek nation, but whose men were all soldiers and seamen ; possessing a fleet that no one state then on earth could resist, high discipline, military as well as naval, officers of extensive experience, a civil and political system upon the whole admirably arranged, with large revenue from mines and from tributary states; there is no foreseeing how far their tyrannous domi- nion might not have been extended over Greeks and among forein nations, but that the folly of democracy unrestrained would of course Avork its own ruin. The evident weakness in the political conduct of the only rival power, Laceda:mon, operated to the incouragement of chiefs and people; and in the same winter in which the inhabitants Thucyd. 1.6, of the little iland of Melos were cut off from the face of the earth, the S;, \" . rliit. vit. wild ambition of the people of Athens became eager in project for the Nic, conquest of another iland, many times larger, not only than Melos, but than Attica; ignorant at the same time, almost all of them, of its magnitude, its population, its value if conquered, and its means to resist conquest. In t%8 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIII. Ch. 10. of In the succinct history of Sicily formerly given, we have seen Gelon, this Hist. from a private citizen of Gela, become king of that city and of Syra- cuse, and head of the Grecian interest in the iland. His dominion comprehended all the Grecian settlements on the eastern coast, the greatest part of those on the southern, with some on the northern, and Arist. de extensive command over the inland barbarians. After an illustrious Rep^l. 5. reign of only seven years, dying at no very advanced age, in the next c. 12. 'to' Diod. 1. 11. year, if we can understand and may trust Diodorus, after the glorious T> r^ .^r battle of Himera, he Mas succeeded by his brother Hieron. The only D. C 479. ... . considerable power besides in Sicily, was that of Theron prince of Agri- gentum ; who, like Gelon, had raised himself from a private station, and had also merited his advancement. He outlived Gelon, according B. C. 472. to Diodorus, seven years, dying in the first of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, after a reign of only ten. His son Thrasydajus, who suc- ceeded him, was of a different character : arrogant abroad, as tyrannical at home, he ingaged in war with Hieron. Being defeated, he lost the respect of his own people ; and flying, for refuge from their animosity, lo the Misffian jNIegarians, was by them put to death. His opponents made peace with the Syracusan prince, and a republican form of government was restored. Gelon's reign was too short for completing a work of such complex difficulty as that of molding into one regular government, and well fixing in their several places, the many parts, little disposed to coalesce, of which his dominion consisted. His policy had made Syracuse a very large city. Probably before his accession its population was become too great to be contained within the limits of Ortygia, the original site. The narrow channel, separating that iland from the northern shore of the bay, was in part filled, and the town was extended upon the mainland. The increase of inhabitants under Gelon, how- ever, required a very great addition of buildings. Among the advan- tages of the situation was an inexhaustible store of free-stone under the soil, of a kind easily wrought, yet, after exposure to the weathe^,^ sufficiently hard. On the northern side of the harbour, a hill composed lutirely of such stone, was, in extent and form, commodious for the site of the new town Rising precipitous from the sea and from the plain, Sect. I. HIERON KING OF SYRACUSE. 287 plain, so that slight fortifications would be strong defences, its hight was moderate, and its summit level ; the western end only rising into lofty craggs. The level part, ten or twelve miles in circuit, became intirely covered by the new town ; which was divided l^y fortifications into two parts, with the names of Achradina and Tyche ; the former eastward against the sea, the other reaching westward toward the craggy higlit ; so that Syracuse consisted now of three towns, Achradina, Tyche, and Ortygia, capable of separate defence against a common enemy, or against each other. Whether the fourth, with the name of NeapoHs, Newtown, stretching along the shore of the great port, below Tyche, toward the river Anapus, had its beginning under Hieron, seems uncertain. The extraordinary extent and population how- ever, which Syracuse finally acquired, will be matter for future notice. Hieron, as well as Gelon, was a man of superior character, but of a Demetr. de character less exactly fitted for the dhlicult situation to which, on his '^^°^' ^'^^^' brother's death, he succeeded. Learned and a munificent incourager Xenoph. of learning; splendid and of elegant taste; humane and of fine feel- H'^""""- ings; he was rather qualified to preside beneficially and with dignity over an established government, than to direct the affairs of a state so compounded as that of which Syracuse was the capital. He had talents for war, which he had displayed under his brother's reign. After he came himself to the throne, no dispute with forein powers required his Diori. i. u. personal exertion in military command ; but his fleet relieved the «• 5i. Cumteans of Italy by a victory over the Tuscan fleet. In peace there- fore his wealth iuabled him, as his taste disposed him, to shine in the costly race of chariots on the Olympian course, and liberally to reward those who had talents for mixing his fame with the achievements of his coursers there. Accordingly the poetical abilities of Pindar have been peculiarl}- dedicated to promote the renown of Hieron. At the same time men of genius from various parts of Greece were entertained in his court; among whom the poets iEschylus, Simonides, and Bac- chilides, are principally mentioned. Yet, if we may trust that elegant dialogue remaining from Xenophon, in which Hieron and Simonides are the supposed speakers, he was utterly unable to accomplish his anxious wish for changing the nature of his government, aud convert- ing «3S HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIII. in"- his tyranny into a constitutional monarchy. He there pathetically laments that, while his sahjects couUl pass, as husiness or amusement kd them, wherever they pleased, without fear, he could be free from apprehension nowhere; but must go, as tyrants it seems usually did, himself constantly armed, as well as surrounded by armed attendants ; and he particularly regrets that his subjects (not all, nor, in any pro- bability, a majority, but a party) were more to be dreaded by him than any forein enemy. Apjjarently Hieron had not the art, like Gelon, to mediate between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, and compose their jarring pretensions. His disposition led him to be more attentive to the splendor of his court, the conversation of men of genius and science, and perhaps the great business of fleets, armies, and forein connections, than to the detail of interior government, and the secret workings of political fermentation. It is not unlikely that, disgusted M-ith petulance and illiberality, he might show himself indisposed to the democratical interest, more than political prudence woukl allow. For the lower people of the Greeks, unlike those of the freciot and most high-si)irited nations of modern Europe, who are generally the most orderly as well as the most industrious, were, on the contrary, disdain- ful of labor, as the office of slaves, and, unless in military employment, Xen. Hier. jj^sy only in faction. Of particulars we are not informed, but we learn Aiistot. de ,,,,-,• i • i i i i i • Rep. 1.5. that to hold his high station, and support those who supported liim, S;.^j' , ,, Hieron was reduced, against his nature, to use severities. He died Diod. I. II. ' o ' C.66. nevertheless in peace, in the eleventh year of his reign, and was suc- B C 467 ^"^^'^^' J" '^'s authority by his younger brother Thrasybulus. The circumstances of the revolution, which quickly followed, are very deficiently reported. Thrasybulus is accused of cruel severity, and a conduct generally despotic. The democratical party were cer- tainly strong throughout the cities of his dominion : they ingaged in DioJ. 1. 11. their cause those who held the principal sway in Agrigentum, Himera, Selinus, and some other towns, and then openly revolted. The people of higher rank, however, generally adhered to Thrasybulus; and the two parties divided the city itself of Syracuse between them ; Thrasy- bulus maintaining himself in Ortygia and Achradina, while the rest Mas occupied by the insurgents. War was thus caiTied on for some S time : c. 67, 68. Sect. T. INDEPENDENT DEMOCRACIES IN SICILY. 289 time: but at length Thrasybukis, finding his force insufficient for any hope of final success, retired to Locri in Italy, M'liere he passed the remainder of his days in private life. Diodorus is, unfortunately, the only author from whom we have any account, with any attempt at connection, of these and the insuing events ; which could not but abound in political matter, at the same time curious and instructive. His concise narrative of the demolition of Gelon's fabric of empire, is little consistent with what we learn, from the more authentic pen of Herodotus, concerning its establishment, and as little consistent with the account given, even by himself, of Gelon's uncommon popularity 'n hile he lived, and of the high respect in which his memory continued for ages to be held. It is a confused mass, injudiciously compounded of the contradictoiy reports, evidently, of contending factions. Nevertheless, comparing that narrative, such as it is, with the purer tho more scanty sources of Herodotus and Thucydides, we may acquire no unsatisfactory general idea of the train and of the character of political events in Sicily. On the expulsion of Thrasybulus, the democratical party everywhere Diod. 1. 1 1. predominating, and the democracy of Syracuse not being yet strong o/-q " or settled enough to assert command, every town of the dominion of B. C. 4G3. the tyrants assumed its separate independency. But as the acquisition had been effected through communication among all, it was proposed still to secure it by friendly political intercourse ; and for this purpose a congress was held, of deputies from the several towns. The principal measures of this meeting, reported by Diodorus, strongly mark the democratical principle by M'hich it was animated. A festival was esta- blished, to be called the Eleutheria or Feast of Freedom, common for all the Sicilian cities, at whose common expencea colossal statue of the Eleutherian Jupiter was to be erected; and, on every return of the festival, four hundred and fifty oxen M'cre to be sacrificed, whose carcases should regale the citizens intitlcd to partake in the rites. At the same time ' it was resolved that no less than seven thousand citizens (if we may trust our copies of Diodorus,) including most of the principal families, should no longer be competent for the honors of magistracy in the 'commonwealth. The historian, M'ith much apparent reason, ascribes Dwd. 3.1 1. to this source the long troubles that followed. Those injured men, '^' '■ Vol. II. P p refusing ^S «90 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIIL refusing to acquiesce under the t}Tannous decree, possessed themselves of two divisions of the city, Achradina and Ortygia, and carried on 01.79.4. ■\var by land and sea against their opponents. From similar causes troubles nearly similar arose, about the same time, in Agrigentuni, Gcla, IFimera, ]\Ics.scna, and Catana. Everywhere the parties were nearly balanced ; cultivation was interrupted ; produce was destroyed ; and the acquibilion of freedom, as it was called, involved one of the most productive countries upon earth, after much ineffectual bloodslied, in universal v. ant. This at length produced a general compositioii ; and a retreat being provided for those who could not accommodate matters witli the prevailing party in their respective towns, by allotting a portion of the IMessinian territory for their possession, it was hoped tranquility might have been restored to the iland. But thus, in every little state, lands were left to become public pro- pertv, or to be assigned to new individual owners. Everywhere then that favorite measure of democracy, the equal division of all the lands of the state, was resolved upon ; a measure impossible to be per- fectly executed ; impossible to be maintained as executed ; and of very doubtful advantage if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained. The attempt produced neither the proposed quiet, nor any other public benefit, in Sicily. Private interest and party interest Diod. 1. 11. were everywhere busy aud everyv/here powerful. In the inscription ^' ' of citizens, mauy, through favor of leading men, were admitted hastily and with little examination; others wcve arbitrarily rejected: many, even of those benefitted by acquisition of land, envied others with portions more fruitful or better situated; while many others, deprived of both property and municipal rights, w hich they had before p«ssessed, were reduced to the condition of vagabonds and beggars. New and violent dissentions followed. In many towns the govern- ment, with the favorite name of democracy, was so unstcddy, that through the discontent of the lower people, sometimes arising from c. 86. caprice, sometimes from oppression, temptation arose for the powerful and wealthy to aspire to tyranny. In Syracuse especially this oc- 01. 81. 3. curred ; but, of many adventurers none succeeded : Tyndarion lost his ' ' life in the attempt. It was however among the Greeks, so common to impute the purpose of tyranny, and even to give the title of tyrant, to Sect. I. DUCETIUS KING OF THE SICELS. 2&» to the leader of an adverse party, that the value of tlie terms, as we find tliem used by antient authors, is often very uncertain. After the death of Tyndarion, Syracuse seems to have injoyed a short season of rest under democratical government; and in this period an exertion was made against a forein foe, which proved that, amid all the troubles, forein conmicrce had not ceased, and the marine of Syra- cuse was not totally decayed. The Tuscans, long powerful pirates in the western parts of the Mediterranean, but repressed by the able and vigorous exertions of Gelon and Hieron, took advantage of the dis- sentions among the Sicilian commonwealths, to renew their depredations on the Grecian commerce and coasts. The Syracusans fitted out a B_ Q^ 453 fleet ao-ainst them, of sixty triremes, which, under the command of O'- **'•*• Apelles, spreil terror through the Tuscan seas; and a debarkation being c. 67. made in Corsica, then chiefly under the Tuscan dominion, the coast was plundered, the town of ^Ethalia taken, and the fleet returned to Sicily laden with booty, particularly prisoners, who were made valuable as slaves. Meanvvhile the antient possessors of Sicily, called by the Greeks bar- c. 78, barians, who still held the inland parts, derived, from the long distraction of the Grecian interest, a respite from oppression. This was so ably used by a Sicel prince, Ducetius, that he became the principal potentate of the iland. Long confined to strong holds among the hills, carrying thither from the vales M'hatever of their harvests they could save from t!ie rapacity of the Greeks, and cultivating the vales only as they could snatch opportunity, at the risk of being carried off for slaves, the Sicels had maintained little connection among themselves, every village having its separate and independent polity. Ducetius united all, c S7. except the Hybljeans, under one dominion; and then he ventured to move his residence and the seat of his government from Nese, among the mountains, to a new town which he founded, with the name of Palice, in the vale beneath, by M'hich he would of course acquire more complete command of that vale, and more efi^ectually vindicate its produce. Whether ambition or political necessity produced the measures which followed, we are without means toDiod. 1. 2. know. Ducetius, becoming ingaged in war with the Agrigentines, 01, gV.. j. took Motya, then held by an Agrigentine garrison ; and, the Syracu- B. C. 452. p p 2 sans 29a HISTORY OF GREECE. CuAr. XVIII. sans sending assistance to tlie Agrigentines, he defeated their united forces. Popular rage, at Syracuse, wreaked its iUibcral vengeance against the unfortunate general who had commanded ; lie was con- demned to suffer death as a traitor, and executed. But when pas- .ssion subsiding gave room for reflection, wiser measures were adopted. The power, the proved aljiUties, and the various successes of Ducetius excited general apprehension among the Sicilian Greeks, unaccus- tomed to such a potentate within their iland. The Syracusans and Agrigentines taking together the lead, a large force was in the next summer collected ; a battle was fought, and, after a very obstinate re- sistance, the Sicels were routed. The Agrigentines quickly retook Motya, and then rejoining the Syracusans, their united forces followed the motions of the Sicel prince. Ducetius bad not the resources of a settled government, or of the command of a civilized nation. Deserted by some of the troops M'ho had attended his first flight, and upon the point of being betrayed by some of those who still accompanied him, he took a measure which the Diod. 1. 11. conipletest despair only could dictate. Mounting his horse by night, he rode alone into Syracuse, and placed himself at an altar in the agora. Early in the morning the circumstance became known, and the magistrates assembled the people, to receive their orders for mea- sures to be taken with a suppliant of such importance. Diodorus, the warm advocate of the Sicilian Greeks, acknowleges that there were some among the Syracusans, who thought only of re\enge against the unhappy prince, for what they had suffered from his able conduct in war against them ; but the majority was decided by more generous senti- ments, and probably a better policy. To permit him to remain in Sicily being judged inexpedient, lie w as conducted to Corinth, where he was liberally maintained at the public expence of the Syracusan common- wealth. The government of Syracuse, after a long course of troubles, appears at this time to have been settled into some consistency ; and the city, large, populous, and wealthy, began to feel its weight in the scale of Sicilian politics. The people of the sniallcr towns were become sen- sible that they had been making themselves miserable for an inde- pendency which they could not maintain, that they were equally un- 2 able «. 91. Sect. I. SYRACUSE SOVEREIN CITY OF SICILY. 293 able to coalesce in federal union, and that they must unavoidably lean upon a superior. The only competitor, M'ith Syracuse, for superiority among the Sicilian towns, was Agrigentum; and while the competi- tion remained, lasting peace could not easily subsist between them. The Syracusan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, appa- Dioci. 1. 12. rent!}' to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the ou'sa 3 power of their comraonweallh. They permitted, or rather incouraged B. C. 446. him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at Cale Actti, on the northern coast of the Hand. This was considered by the Agrigeiitines as a measure inimical to them : a war followed ; and the Agrigcntines, being defeated, were compelled to receive terms of peace from Syracuse. Thus the S^^racusan democi'acy became decidedly the leading power among the Greeks of Sicily. One Sicel town, Trinacia, among all the troubles of the Hand, had Diod. 1. 12. always preserved independency ; and its people, now alone within ^* tI' Sicily, except the Carthaginian garrisons and perhaps the Elymian towns, refused to acknowlege the sovereinty of the people of Syracuse. This was deemed a sufficient cause for war ; and the wretched barba- Ol. Si. 4. rians, after a most gallant resistance, v.'ere compelled to yield. All the ^' ■*'^'' principal men, of vigorous age, had first fallen in action; the elder, to avoid the ignominy and misery of servitude, or of massacre, from the hands of their implacable enemies, put themselves to death ; the sur- viving inhabitants were made slaves, and the town was destroyed. The Syracusans, having thus overborne opposition, proceeded to take Diod. 1. 12. measures for securing the dominion they had acquired. They exacted • tribute, and from time to time augmented the exaction, from all the cities of the Hand. With the revenue thus arising they increased their navy and their establishment of cavalry ; and when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Sj^racuse, by its extent of dominion, and its naval force, Thucyd. was among the most powerful of the Grecian republics. Its allijince Avas therefore a great object for both the contending powers in Greece. As a Dorian people, the Syracusans were disposed to favor the Pelo- ponnesians, and actually ingaged in tlseir confederacy ; but as demo- cratical, they were not zealous in a cause which was in so great a - degree the cause of oligarchy. Circumstances moreover quickly arose, within 294 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. vithin their iland, to prevent them from giving that assistance which the Peloponncsians hoped, and which, strong as Syracuse was in marine, had its force heen exerted while Athens was weak from pestilence and revolt, might have given a very different turn to the war. Thucyd. 1. 3. But the empire of democracy heing of course oppressive, opportunity niod 1 V2 °"b' ^^^s wanting for revolt against that of Syracuse. The Leontines, c. 53. -whether sufferinc; more than others, or incouraged by better hope of ni' 8T I ' forein assistance, were the first to resist. They were of Ionian origin, from Chalcis in Euboea, and their revolt was a signal for all the Ionian states in Sicily to take arms against Syracuse. The powerful city of Rheo-ium in Italy, whose people were also partly of Chalcidian race, joined them. Camarina moreover, originally a Dorian city (how re- peopled, after the removal of its inhabitants to Syracuse under Gelon, \v£ are not informed), having hoM'ever particular quarrel with Syra- cuse, joined the Ionian confederacy. But all the other Dorian cities, more numerous and powerful than the Ionian, adhered to the Sy- racusans ; and the Epizephyrian Locriaus of Ilaly concurred in their alliance. B. C. 427. In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, during the revolt of Lesbos and the sedition of Corcyra, the Syracusans, already undisputed masters of the field, blockaded Leontiui by land and sea. The Ionian towns then all trembled for their fate: a subjection still more severe than that which had excited the revolt, would be the certain conse- quence of the fall of Leontini, which they were unable to relieve. In these circumstances, and under these apprehensions, they turned their thoughts to Athens, as the mother-state of the Ionian blood ; and a deputation was sent thither to request assistance, urging the claim, not only of consanguinity, but of antient treaties of alliance. The factions of Sicily, and the general prevalence of democracy, had promoted the cultivation of oratory. Gorgias of Leontini is reported to have been the first rhetorician who reduced his profession to an art, which he taught for paj', and he was at this time in high reputation. Gorgias, according to Diodorus, was placed at the head of the cm- » Tliis date is gathered from the circumstances. Thucydides has not specified the time when the war began, and Diodorus is inaccurate. bassy Sect.I. first interference of ATHENS. 295 bassy to Athens; and tlie novelty of his artificial and flowery elo- quence, tho afterward justly reprobated by maturer Attic taste, is said to have tlien wonderfully captivated the Athenian people. The season was, however, favorable for the effect of his talents: the rebel- lious Mitylenreans had recently yielded to the arms of Paches ; and the Athenian interest triumphed in Corcyra, under the auspices of the Athenian admiral Eurymedon, through the horrid massacre of the oli- • garchal party there. Nor were inducements wanting for the inter- ference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Sicily. The Peloponnesians derived thence supplies of corn, which, by a squadron Thucyd. 1. 3, in the Sicilian seas, or rather, according to the manner of cruizing among the antients, on the Sicilian coast, it was proposed to stop. Hopes moreover were entertained that, under the name of alliance, the Athenian dominion might be extended in Sicily ; which would bring, at the same time, increase of income to the state, increase of office and emolument for powerful men, and increase of importance, with op- portunities for profit, regular and irregular, to every Athenian citizen. Thus incited, in opposition to the salutary advice left them as a legacy by their great minister Pericles, the Athenians ingaged in the affairs of B. C. 427, Sicily. A squadron of twenty ships of war, under Laches son of Me- p'',^'^".^' lanopus, and Charoeades son of Euphiletus, being in the autumn sent to assist the Leontines, took its station in the friendly port of Rhegium. The immediate effect of this reinforcement, as appears from the Thucyd. 1. 3. tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, was, that the blockade of Leontini [".^^ ^' oj, by sea M'as given up or became ineffectual, and supplies could be intro- duced. In the winter an expedition was undertaken by the Athenian commanders, against the Liparsean, called also the ^olian ilands, in- habited by a colony of Greeks from Cnidos. The Lipara3ans held al- Tluuyd. l.o. hauce with the Syracusans, and probably M'ere troublesome to the Rhe- gians and their allies by maritime depredation. The measures of the B. C. 42G. Athenians aoainst them however failed. In the followin"- summer ^"".i?'^;.^" the relief of Leontini from the land blockade being attempted, Tliui-yd. 1. s. Charreades fell in action. Laches nevertheless, conducting the allied ' forces against Alcssena, took that city by capitulation, and then sailinir eye HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. sailing to the Epizcphyrian Lociian coast, ravaged the country, de- Thurvd. 1. 3. featetl the Locrians, who came out to protect it, and took the small '^' ^^' town of Peripoliiim. c 103. In the next winter an attempt was made against the citadel of Nessa in Sicily, held by a Syracusan garrison; but the allies were compelled to retire with loss. The Syracusans then, decidedly superior bv laud, but excluded by a stjuadron of only twenty triremes from their own seas, where they liad long been accustomed to command, resolved to restore their marine, of late neglected, and give battle to the enemy's fleet. Intelligence of this .was forwarded to Athens, with a recjuest for reinforcement; and, the success already obtained incouraging the Athenian government, it Mas determined to send such a fleet as should at once give superiority beyond competition at sea, and, it was hoped, command speedy success in the final object of the ■war. Pvthodorus son of Isolochus was forwarded immediately with a small squadron to supersede Laches in the command in chief, while triremes were preparing in the port of Peira^us, to follow in spring, under Eurymedon son of Thcocles, and Sophocles son of Sostratidas, >\hich should make the number of the relieving fleet sixty. This change in the command seems not to have been advantageous. The conduct of Laches in Italy and Sicily had been apparently judi- cious and vigorous, and, for the force he commanded, successful ; and the situations in which we afterward find him, prove that his estimation was not mean in Athens or in Greece. He was the person to whom, together with Nicias, the Laceda'monian government always applied, when business was to be transacted with the government of Athens. When the truce for fifty years was made with Laceda;mon, he Mas the person appointed to the dignified office of pronouncing the prayer, that the event might be fortunate for the commonwealth : M'hen the war broke out between Argosand Laecdivmon, he commanded the Athenian auxiliar}^ forces in the army of the Argian confederacy ; and he lost his life, as mc have seen, in conducting the gallant, and, for the cir- cumstances, successful retreat of those troops, from the unfortunate field of Alautineia. His successor in the Sicilian command began his operations Sect. I. INTERFERENCE OF ATHENS IN SICILY. 297 operations inauspiciously : debarking his forces on the Locrian coast, Thucyd. 1. 3. near the town of PeripoHnm, which Laches had taken, lie was attacked '^' ^^^" by the Locrians, and compelled to retire with loss. The following spring was rendered remarkable by an eruption of c 106. mount .Etna, the third remembered among the Greeks, from their first establishment in Sicily. The boiling matter overflowed a part of the Catanian territory, but did not affect the town. In the beginning of summer, faction disabling the Rhegian government, and the Athenian p q ^oq •general being either weak or remiss in his command, the Sy-racusans, P- ^v. 6. through intelligence in Messena, recovered that important place. It c.'i'.'^^ was about this time that Demosthenes ingaged in his extraordinary attempt at Pylus, which ended so advantageously for Athens. Intel- ligence arrived at Syracuse, that the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles, destined to reinforce Pythodorus, instead of advancing from ■Corcyra, was returned to the Peloponnesian coast, and likely to be detained there. The opportunity seemed favorable for the Syracusans to try a naval action ; but they could assemble, in the harbour of Mes- sena, no more than thirty triremes. Pythodorus however had only Thucyd. 1. 5. ■sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian. Coming to action, nevertheless, '^' '^''' •in that strait so celebrated for the poetical terrors of Charybdis and Scylla, he gained the advantage, but it was not decisive. The circumstances of Camarina then, sedition raging, and the Syra- cusan party nearly prevailing, induced him to lead his whole fleet thither. He saved Camarina, but the opportunity of his absence Avas .taken by the enemy, for marching against Naxus, a Chalcidian city, of the Ionian confederacy, not far from Messena. The Naxians how- ever were fortunate in alliance with the Sicel barbarians, of their neigh- borhood ; who no sooner heard of the distress of their friends, than they came, in large force, to their relief. The Sicels attacked the besieging army : the Naxians sallied opportunely : of the Messe- oiians and others, of the Dorian army, to the amount of more than a thousand were killed upon the spot, and, af the rest, only a small proportion escaped the hands of the pursuing barbarians. The Syra- cusan fleet, deprived of a land-force on which it could depend for pro- Vox. IL Q a tection, «98 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIIT. teclion, such was the antient marine, dared no longer await the return of the Athenian fleet to Messena. The Leontines, the blockade of their town by land having been already abandoned, then marched to cooperate m ith tiie Athenian fleet, in an attack upon Messena. The attempt however failed ; and, the Athenian armament remaining in- active during the rest of the summer and all the following Minter, tho hostilities were continued among the Sicilian Greeks, nothing important resulted. Tlmcvd. 1. 5. Meanwhile the fame of the various successes of Athens, and of the «. iS, seq. gp,^p,.^j ^^,,.,^ j^^ j-]^g fortune of the war, contrary to the expectation of all Greece, infavor of that ambitious and restless republic, raised alarm among thinking men ; and this was increased by the arrival of the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles in the Sicilian seas. During the winter, Camarina and Gela, neighbor-cities of Sicily, not actuated by any extensive view, but meerly considering the separate convenience of their own communities, concluded a peace between themselves, for themselves only; each city holding itself bound to the conditions of its former confederacy, for all purposes of war against other states. But the su)x;rior political importance of Syracuse gave larger views to its leaders; among wliora Hermocrates son of Hermon was rising to eminence, for abilities, courage, activity, and, above all, for a dispo- sition truly patriotic. The small beginning of peaceful measures made by the Camarina;ans and Geloans, appeared to Hermocrates a favorable opening for proposals for a general peace. He first prevailed with his own city, and then procured a congress of ministers, at Gela, from all the cities of the iland. A variety of clashing interests, among so many little states, made accommodation difficult ; but the eloquence of Hermocrates displayed so forcibly the danger of forein interference, and particularly of Athenian interference, and urged so plausibly the evident disinterestedness of Syracuse, decidedly superior in the war, and no way pressed to promote peace but by the desire of benefits and the apprehension of evils which would involve all Sicily, that he finally prevailed. A general peace, was concluded, by the condi- tions of which every city retained what it held at the time, except I that, Sect. II. PEACE IN SICILY. vj'J that, for a stipulated sum, the Syracusans restored jNlorgantina to the Caniarinceans. The success of Hermocrates in this negotiation effectually checked the ambitious views of the Athenians upon Sicily. The commanders of the fleet, seeing no opportunity of farther service to their country', sailed home. Indignation however met them from their soverein the people, for permitting their allies to make peace: Pytliodorus and Sophocles were punished with banishment. Tlie services of Eury- medon, at Corcyra and at Pylus, apparently saved him from so severe a sentence, but he was condemned in a fine. SECTION 11. New Troubles in Sicily: New Interference of Athens ; stopped by the Peace betzveen Athens and Lacedcemon. Assistance solicited from Athens by Egesta against Selinus. Contention of Parties at Athens : Banishment of Hyperbolas. Assistance to Egesta voted by the Athenian Assembly : Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to command. Mutilation of the Terms of Mercury >• Completion of the Preparations for the Sicilian Expedition, and Departure of the Fleet. Hermocrates, it appears, had no idea, and, indeed, Thucydides seems Tliucyd. 1. 5. to have had no ideii, of the possibility of molding all the Sicilian '^' ' Greek municipal governments into one commonwealth, or even of establishing among them an effective federal union. The Sicilian patriot is represented, bj^ the statesman-historian, admonishing the congress only to exclude forein interference, and such wars as might arise among themselves M'ould have no very important ill consequences. Through such extreme deficiency in Grecian politics, new troubles quickly arose in Sicily. Time and various circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands, which had been Q Q 2 made, 300 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIIL made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini they were warm in project for a fresh and equal partition ; and, to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for asso- ciating a number of new citizens. The landowners, thus, not only upon the point of being deprived of their patrimonies, but exposed to every kind and degree of oppression from democratical despotism, applied to Syracuse for protection ; and, with assistance thence, expelled all the lower people. Whether it might have been possible, by any milder expedient, to have obtained tiny reasonable security for themselves, considering all we learn of the common temper of faction among the Greeks, must appear at least doubtful. It was however hardly possible that the violent measure adopted could place them at ease. Having only their slaves to divide offices with them, the busi- ijess and the burden of arms must be exclusively their own, in circum- stances requiring the most watchful attention of a garrison. For not only the worst evils that man can inflict on man were constantly to be apprehended from the vengeance of the expelled, but the produce of their fields could not be vindicated, and their subsistence insured, with- out, if not constant exertion, yet constant readiness for exertion, against plunderers. The Syracusans therefore carrying their liberal kindness so far as to offer all the Leontine landowners admission into the number of Syracusan citizens, all migrated to Syracuse, and Leon- ■" tini was totally deserted. What, in their new situation, offended or alarmed these men, appa- rently so generously relieved, we are not infornied ; but there seems o-round for conjecture that it was some vialence, committed or threat- ened, by the democratical party in Syracuse. A number of them quitted that city in disgust, and seizing a part of the town of Leontini, called PhoceiE, and a fort in the Leontine territory named Rricinnias, they invited their own expelled lower people to join them. JMany of these, who had been wandering about Sicily, mostly in sufficient dis- tress, accepted the invitation ; and predatory war upon the Leontine and Syracusan territories became the resource of all for subsistence. Intelligence S>!CT.n. RENEWED INTERFERENCE OF ATHENS. soi Intelligence of tlie expulsion of all the commonalty from the prin- cipal Ionic city of Sicily would not be received with satisfaction at Athens. It was quickly followed by information of the partial revival of the democracy of Leontini, through the establishments made in Phoceee and Bricinnite. The resolution was then taken to send ministers to Sicily, to discover the strength of the Athenian interest throughout the iland, and to promote a league hostile to Syracuse. Pha;ax son of B. C. 422. Erasistratus was sent, with two others, to manage this business; and p''^,^"^'- he seems to have conducted it ably. Urging, both in public harangue and in colloquial communication, the notorious oppression of the ' Leontine people, and the evident disposition of Syracuse to assume tyrannical sovereinty over all Sicily, he succeeded with the powerful states of Agrigentum and Camarina. At Gela he failed; and finding no promising prospect in any other city, he passed through the country of the Sicels to Bricinnia;. The garrison there hoMCver was greatly incouraged by his information of the alliances he had procured for them in Sicily, and by his assurances of assistance from Athens. Returning then homeward by sea in the usual course, by the Italian coast, in his way he added to the Athenian interest in those parts by an advan- tageous treaty which he concluded with the Epizephyrian Locrians. This prosperous beginning toward a restoration of Athenian influence in Sicily, through a revival of troubles among the Grecian colonies there, was early checked by the event of the battle of Amphipolis, •which happened in the summer of the same year. The negotiations for peace between Athens and Lacedsmon, begun in the succeeding autumn, were brought to a conclusion in the following spring. The party of Nicias then predominated : the maxims of Pericles again swayed the Athenian councils; views of farther ac(iuisition to the dominion of the commonwealth were rejected, and all interference ia the affairs of Sicily dropped. The interest of the principal states of Greece in Sicilian affairs thus ceasing, for near six years M'e have little information concerning them. But, in that interval, two small republics, toward the western end of the iland, Selinusand Egesta, became ingaged in that kind of domestic war, which; according to the political doctrine maintained by Hermo- c rates, 308 HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAP.XVail. Thucyd. 1. 6. crates, in his speeches to the Sicilian congress, could have no important ^' ''■ ill consequences, were forein interference only excluded. The Seli- nuntines obtained assistance from S3Macuse ; which was within the proposal of Hermocrates for insuring general safety and happiness to Sicily. But the Egestans found themselves thus effectually deprived of their portion of safety and happiness among the Sicilian people ; for the)' were presently blockaded by sea and land. It behooved them to find, if possible, assistance e(]ually powerful with that of Syracuse ; but within Sicily it was impossible. Pressed therefore by the apprehension of what usually befel a captured town from a Grecian enemy, they determined to seek forein aid; and none appeared so likely to be B. C. 4l6. obtained and to be effectual as that of Athens. [Ministers were accord- P \V^i6 '"S'y ^^'''^' '^^'^^" urged arguments which might not unreasonably have weight with the Athenian people. ' The Syracusans," they observed, ' had already exterminated the Leontines, a people connected Arith the ' Athenians, not only bv antient alliance, but by blood. If this passed ' with impunity, and not this only, but that domineering people were ' permitted to go on oppressing all the allies of Athens in Sicily, let ' it be considered what a force might accrue to the Peloponnesian con- ' federacy, in a future, nay, a now impending Mar.' To these argu- ments assurances were added, that the Egestans wanted only troops, their wealth being ample. Athens was at this time more than usually agitated by faction. Alcibiades, checked in his ambitious views by the event of the sedi- tion of Argos, which had nearly annihilated liis extraordinary influence in Peloponnesus, was looking around for new opportunity of enterprize, and his purpose to ingage the commonwealth in war again was notorious. The party of Nicias dreaded war on its own account, but still more on account of the increase of influence and authority which would insue to Alcibiades; and they vigilantly opposed all his measures. This contest was favorable to Ilyp.erbolus, who had slill great weight, through the support of that body of the citizens which had raised Cleon to greatness. Ilyperbolus had nearly overborne Nicias by vehemence of railing and by threatening pro- secutions; but he could not so overbear Alcibiades. Against him therefore Sect. II. BANISHMENT OF HYPER BOLUS. 303 tlierefore he directed another kind of policy. The vast ambition of Alcibiades, his splendid manner of living, and the superiority he Pint. vit. affected in everything, gave occasion for the suggestion, which was "" ^^ '"' ' sedulously circulated among the people, that his power and influence were greater than could be safe in a democrac}', and that the ostracism was necessary to bring men to a just level. Alcibiades and his friends were alarmed at this ideli, and at the readiness with which the people ap|)eared to receive it. They endevored at first to counterwork it by urging, that not Alcibiades, whose power rested intirely on the favor of the people, but Nicias and the aristocratical party, were the pei'sons really to be feared ; and the banishment of the head of that party would best restore a just equilibrium in the commonwealth. Hyperbolas used all his art to inflame the dispute, and at the same time to set the people equally against both the leaders. His influence was such, that it M'as evidently in his power to decide which of the two should be banished. But he had a politician to incounter, such as Cleon never met with. Alcibiades communicated M'ith Nicias : an assembly of the people was held ; both collected their strength ; and Hyperbolus Avas named as a person, by his weight, influence, and sedi- tious designs, dangerous to the commonwealth. The people were surprized ; for no man of his mean condition was ever before proposed as a subject for the ostracism. But the Athenian people loved a joke ; and this appeared a good one: they would iionor him by ranking him Avith Miltiadcs, Aristeides, Themistocles, and Cimon. To the whim of a thoughtless multitude was added all the weight of interest of Alcibiades ami Nicias, and the banishment of Hyperbolus was de- cided. The coiilition of parties, however, lasted no longer than to strike this blow ao-ainst a man whom both feared. One was still as earnest for war as the other anxious to maintain peace. The embassy from Egesta afforded an opportunity such as Alcibiades wished. As general of the commonwealth, for he still held that office, he received the ministers in the most favorable manner, and warmly recommended their cause to the people. None of his measures seem to have been opposed with more effort by the party of Nicias. For a time they prevented any decisioa 304 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chaf. XVIIL decision in favor of the Egestans, But at length the various argu- ments and repeated supplications, which the authority and influence of the general gave opportunity to urge, in some degree prevailed Avith the people. In the autumn of the sixteenth year of the war, while the Melians M'ere still resisting the Athenian forces, and about the time that the Lacediemonians were so inefficiently employed in estaljlishing their Argian friends in Ornese, commissioners were sent into Sicily to gain information of the state of things, and particularly to inquire whether the Egestans reiilly possessed those fundi, -for sup- porting a large armament, Mhich their ministers pretended. B.C. 415. In the following spring, the commissioners returned, accompanied p'w^" '■ t)y new ministers from Egesta ; who brought with them sixty talents Thucyd.T.6. in silver, about fifteen thousand pounds sterling, as a montli's pay in advance for sixty triremes, which they were directed to request. With this specious voucher in their hands, they were introduced into the Athenian assembly. The commissioners, devoted to the party of Alcibiudes, concurred with them in every representation, true or false, that might induce the people to vote the assistance desired ; not scrupling to add their testimony to the assertion, that the sum produced bore but a small proportion to the resources of the treasury of Egesta and the wealth of its temples. This was found afterward to be a gross imposition ; but the assembly was persuaded, and the decree passed for sending the sixty triremes. The policy of Alcibiades upon this occasion, unnoticed by Plutarch and all the later writers, is ho-wever not very defectively unfolded in the simple and concise statement of facts by Thucydidcs. Tho Nicias so vehemently opposed the favorite measure of Alcibiades, yet Alcibiades would not appear the opponent of Nicias : on the contrary, he would use the weight and influence of Nicias against Nicias himself The decree for sending a force to Sicily being carried, the commanders were to be named. The partizans of Alcibiades were still the proposers of all measures, yet Nicias was named first in command ; Alcibiades Aristoph. second : and, for a third, Lamachus was chosen ; a man of birth, who, V. 597,601, tho yet in the prime of life, had seen much service, but a soldier of T 604!^'^^' fortune, of a dissipated turn, and of no great weight, either by abilities or Sect. II. DEBATES ON THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. sos or property. Instructions were then voted; that the generals should use the force conimitted to them, first, to give security to Egesta against the Selinuntines ; then to restore the commonwealth of Leon- tini ; and afterward to take any measures they might judge proper for promoting the Athenian interest in Sicily. Fur carrying into effect these purposes, it mus decreed that they should have (liscretionary powers. Such rapid decision could not but be hazardous, where the measures of executive government were directed by a whole people. I3ut it was the oliject of Alcibiades and his party not to let popular passion cool. Four days only were allowed before a second assembly was held, to decide upon the detail of the armament, and to grant any requisition of the generals, for which a vote of the people might be necessary. Nicias, unprepared before to oppose a decree which had appointed him to a great command unsought, but disapproving the purpose, which he knew to be reiilly the conquest of Sicily, now stepped for- ward to admonish the multitude his sovercin. ' To urge to Athenian tempers," he said, ' that in reason they should ' rather take measures to secure what they already possess, than ingage ' in wild projects for farther acquisition, I fear will be vain ; yet I ' think it my duty to endevor to show you how rash and unadvised your ' present purpose is. Within Greece you seem to imagine yourselves * at peace: yet some of the most powerful states, of the confederacy ' with which you have been at war, have not yet acceded to the treaty, * and some of the articles are still controverted by all. In short, it is * not a peace, but meerly a dubious suspension of hostilities, prolonged * by ten-day truces, which will hold only till some misfortune befall ' us, or till Laced^emon give the word for war. At the same time ' your antient subjects, the Chalcidians of Thrace, have been years in. ' a rebellion which they are still maintaining ; and some others, whom ' you esteem dependent states, pay you but a precarious obedience. * Is it not then extreme impolicy to incur needlessly new and great ' dangers, M'ith the view to increase a dominion already so insecure? ' As to the dominion which Syracuse may acquire in Sicily, which * some desire to represent as highly alarming, far from an object of Vox,. II. R It * apprehension, SOG HISTORY OF GREECE. Ciiap. XVIII. appreliension, it would rather give us security. For while Sicily is divided, each state M'ill court the favor of the Lacedivmonians, who profess themselves the protectors of independency ; but when once the Syracusans are masters of all, they will be less forward ia connection with Lacedtemon, and more cautious of opposing the Athenians; whose cause is similar to theirs, and whose interest congenial. * For myself,' continued Nicias, ' at my years, and after the long course of services in Avhich my fellowcitizens have been witnesses of my conduct, I may venture to say that no man is less anxious for his personal safety. I have large property, through which my welfare is intimately connected with that of the commonwealth. But m'c owe both life and fortune to our country ; and I hold that man to be a o-ood citizen who is duly careful of both. If then there is among you a young man, born to great wealth and splendid situation, whose passion for distinction has nevertheless led him far to exceed, in magnificence, both what suited his means and what became his situation ; if he is now appointed to a command above his years, but with which, at his years especially, a man is likely to be delighted ; above all, if repairs are wanting to a wasted fortune, which may make such a command desirable to him, tho ruinous to his countr}-, it behooves you to beware how you accede to the advice of such a coun- sellor. I dread indeed the warm passions of that crowd of youths, the followers and supporters of the person of whom 1 speak: and notwithstanding the decree of the last assembly, all men of sober judgement ought yet to interfere, and prevent rash undertakings, of a magnitude that may involve, with their failure, the downfall of the commonwealth. If therefore, honored as I am, by the voice of my country, with appointment to the chief command of the intended expedition, I may presume to advise, it shall be, that the expedition be not undertaken ; that the Sicilians be left still divided by their seas from Athens; that the Egestans, as without communication with Athens they ingaged in war with the Selinuntines, so, without our interference they accommodate their differences; and that, in future, the Athenians ingage in no alliances with states which, in their own I ' distress. Sect. II. DEBATES ON THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. 307 • distress, will claim assistance, but, in the distress of Athens, could ' aflford none.' Alcibiades, thus particularly called upon, mounted the bema to reply. He began with insisting upon his just pretension to the high command to which he was raised, and with glorying in the extravagances of which he was accused. ' ]My ancestors before me," he said, ' have been honored for that very conduct which is now imputed to me as criminal. I own, and it is my boast, that I have exceeded them all in magnificence, and I claim merit M'ith my country for it. The supposition had gained, throughout Greece, that Athens was ruined by the M'ar. I have shoM'u that an individual of Athens could yet outdo what any prince or state had ever done. I sent seven chariots to the Olympian festival, and gained the first, the second, and the fourth prizes: and the figure I maintained throughout, at that meeting of the whole Greek nation, did not disparage the splendor of my victory. Is this a crime ? On the contrary, it is held honorable by the customs of Greece, and reflects honor and renown, even on the country of those who exhibit such magnificence. With regard then to my extravagance, as it has been called, at home, whether in public entertainments or in whatever else, perhaps I may have drawn on me the envy of some of our own citizens: but strangers are more just; and in my liberality and hospitality they admire the greatness of the commonwealth. ' If then even in these things, comparatively meer private concerns, I have deserved well of my country, let it be inquired what my public conduct has been. Glory, I will own, I ardently desire; but how have I sought to acquire it, and what has been my success? Have I promoted rash enterprizc ? Have I been forward, as it is said youth is apt to be, to ingage the commonwealth, wildly and witlxout fore- sight, in hazardous war? or was it I who, by negotiation, without either danger or expence to yourselves, brought all Peloponnesus to fight your battles for you against Laceda;mon, and reduced that long-dreaded rival state to risk its existence at Mantineia, in arms against its own antient alUes? If such have been my services, on R R 2 ' first S0« HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. first entering upon public business, you need not, I hope, fear but my oreater experience will now be advantageous to you. ' With regard then to Nicias, who has long anil honorably served you in the high situation of general of the commonwealth, tho he has been expressing himself acrimoniously against me, I readily acknowlege his merit, aud have no objection to serve with him : on the contrary, I think it would become your Misdom to employ us together. Nicias has the reputation of cautious prudence, and singular good fortune; I am said to be more than prudently enter- prizing. For want of enterprize his wisdom, and the good fortune with which the gods have been accustomed to bless it, will be una- vailing to the commonwealth : checked by his prudence, my dispo- sition to enterprize cannot be dangerous. * To come then to the question more immediately before the assembly, the opportunity now offered to the commonwealth, for acquisition in Sicily, ought not to be neglected. The power of the Sicilians, M'hich some would teach you to fear, has been much exaggerated. They are a mixed people, little attached to one another, little attached to a country which they consider as scarcely theirs, and little disposed to risk either person or fortune for it ; but always ready for any change, whether of political connection, or of local establishment, that may offer any advantage, or relieve from any distress. Nor is their mili- tary force such as some have pretended ; several Grecian states and all the barbarians of the iland, will be immediately in your interest. Distracted then by faction, as it is well known the rest are, negotia- tion, well managed, may soon bring more to jour party. * But it is endevored to alarm you with apprehensions of invasion from Peloponnesus. With regard to this, late experience has demon- strated what may suffice us to know. The Peloponnesians are always able to overrun the open country of Attica, even when none of our force is absent on forein service ; and, should the expedition now proposed take place, they can rlo no more. Ought we then to abandon allies, whom treaties ratified by oath bind us to protect? Is it a just reason for so failing in our ingagements, that those allies are unable ' to Sect. II. DEBATES ON THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. 30» ' to afford us mutual protection? It was surely not to obtain Egestan ' forces for the defence of Attica that the treaty was made ; but to ' prevent our enemies in Sicily from injuring Attica, by finding them ' employment within their own iland. It has been by readiness to ' ASSIST ALL, whether Greeks or barbarians, that our empire, and all ' empire, has been acquired. Nor, let me add, is it now in our choice ' how far we will stretch our command; for, possessing empire, we ' must maintain it, and rather extend than permit any diminution of ' it ; or we shall, more even than weaker states, risk our own subjection ' to a forein dominion. I will then detain you no longer than to * observe, that the command which we possess of the sea, and the ' party of which we are assured in Sicily, v/ill sufficiently inable us to ' keep what ^ve ma}' acquire, and sufficiently insure means of retreat if * we should fail of our purpose; so that, Avith much to hope, we have, ' from any event of the proposed expedition, little to fear. I am ' therefore firmly of opinion that your decree for it ought not to be ' rescinded.' This speech of Alcibiades was received with loud and extensive Thucyd. 1. 6. applause. It was followed by speeches of the Egestan and Leontine ^' ministers, imploring pity and urging the faith of treaties, which also ^' had their effect ; and at length the disposition of a large majority of the people to favor the purpose of Alcibiades became so evident, that Nicias would not any longer directly oppose it. But, as first of the generals elect, it was his privilege to name the force that he judged requisite for the enterprize ; and he thought to damp the present ardor, and excite a little reflection, by naming what, he expected, for the Athenian commonwealth to send on distant service, would be deemed extravagantly great. While therefore he appeared to accede to the general wish, he cndevored to divert it from its object by reciting the diflfitulties that would oppose its accomplishment. ' We have, at c. 20. * present,' he said, ' for allies in Sicily, the Egestans, semibarbarians, ' and the Leontines, who scarcely exist as a people. It is to be hoped ' that Naxus and Catana, on account of their connection by blood ' with the Leontines and with Athens, may be induced to join us: but ' there are, beside these, seven independent Grecian cities in Sicily, on * whose 310 ThucTtl. 1. 6. c. 22.' HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAr.XVlII. whose op])osition we may rely'; all of them possessing regular forces of land and sea, with funds to maintain them; and especially Selinus and Syracuse, the first objects of the war. The Syracusans, in addi- tion to considerable wealth of their own, command tribute from the barbarians of the iland. But the two points in which they, will principally have advantage over us, are the possession of a numerous cavalrv, and of the stores which a plentiful country affords ; while we must depend upon precarious supplies by sea. In addition there- fore to a powerful tlect, an army, such as we have been accustomed to send on forein service, will be very unequal to the object. Unless we obtain other allies than the Egcstans, such a force could not stir, in Sicily, for the cavalry alone of the enemy. It must then be con- sidered that we shall not only be far fiom home, but far also from any territory under our command. Supplies will therefore reach us, not without risk and difficulty at all times; but during the four winter months, scarcely an advice-boat can pass to us. These things considered, it appears that, beside a large force of regular heavy- armed of our allies and subjects, in addition to what it may be advisable to send of our own, if we can obtain any for hire in Peloponnesus, it should be done. Since moreover to transport so far a body of cavalry capable of opposing the cavalry of the country is impossible, we must add a large force of bowmen and slingers, who may at least relieve our heavy-armed against the annoyance of the enemy's horse. Our fleet must be superior beyond competition ; otherwise we can have no certainty even of subsistence; and it will be proper to provide abundantly beforehand for so numerous an armament, to prevent the distress that might otherwise arise from accidents of winds and seas. Beyond all things, however, we must be amply supplied with money; because what the Egestans talk of, I am confident they only talk of. In a word, to begin our business with any prospect of success, we must, from the moment we land, be in every point superior to the enemy. This is what the welfare of the commonwealth, I am fully persuaded, requires. If any man can ' Syracuse, Seliqus, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Iliraera, Messena. convince Sect.il debates on the SICILIAN expedition. sii ' convince you that my opinion is unfounded, I am ready to resign my ' command to him.' The simple prudence of the experienced Nicias was no match for Thucyd. 1. 6. the versatile sagacity of the young politician M'ith whom he had to ^' '^'^' contend. Tlie friends of Alcibiades received this speech with the highest approbation; affecting to consider it not at alias dissuading or discouraging the undertaking, but, on the contrary, wisely and pro- vidently recommending what would insure success. The whole people were infatuated with the spirit of enterprize. Love of novelty and change, M'ith certainty of present pay, and hope of they knew not what future acquisition, influenced the more thoughtless of all ranks; while the past successes of Athens, and the evident weakness and inefficiency of the Lacedsemonian administration, incouraged even the more expe- rienced and prudent ; insomuch that if any deeper thinkers disapproved, a declaration of their sentiments might have subjected them to the danger of being deemed disaffected to the commonwealth, and fined, banished, or even capitally condemned, according to the momentary caprice of the despotic soverein. Such being the disposition of the people, Nicias was called upon to c. 25. declare what precisely was the force that he thought necessary. He would have declined in the moment, urging that he wished to consult his coUegues; but popular impatience would admit no delay, and, over- come with importunity, he at length said, that less than a hundred triremes and five thousand heavy-armed, with a due proportion of bowmen and slingers (making, in the whole, at least thirty thousand men, those in the sea-service included) would be insuflicient ; and that stores and all necessaries should be plentifully provided to accompany the fleet ; which ought not to be left dependent upon precarious sup- plies. Popidar zeal did not confine itself to the meer grant of what was thus demanded ; but a vote was immediately passed, impowering the generals to command, for the expedition, whatever they should judge expedient for the prosperity and glory of the commonwealth. The ravage made by the pestilence, at the beginning of the war, was now in a great degree repaired: the loss in battle had never been great; and the revenue, far exceeding the ordinary expences of the common- AV'calth, 3ia HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIIL M-ealth, vhlch in peace vere trifling:, incouraged ambition. Preparation therefore, thus amply supplied, was made with a celerity proportioned to the zeal of the people. During the equipment, and while the popular mind was bent with a singular degree of passion upon the proposed conquest, injoyino- already in ideii large acquisition of sovereinty, whence tribute would accrue, such as might give ever\- Athenian citizen to be forever exempt from labor and from po\erty, without occupation or profession but that of arms, everything was suddenly disturbed by a strange circumstance, to which Grecian superstition alone gave any importance. It was a custom among the Athenians, derived from very early times, when art ■was rude, to place an imperfect statue of Mercury, the head completely carved, the rest generally a block meerly squared, in front of every residence, whether of gods or men : this custom was still held sacred, and neither temple nor house at Athens was without one of those formless guardians. In one night the greatest part of them had the face mutilated by persons unknoMu. Alarm and indignation imme- diately filled the city : the matter M-as taken up most seriously by magistrates and people: however the act of ill-designing men, it was very generally considered as an omen foreboding ill to the proposed Thucyd. expedition ; and great rewards were publicly offered to any, free or slave, who would discover the perpetrators. "With regard to the offence in question, inquiry and temptation were equally ineffectual ; not the Andoc.de least discovery was made; but indication was obtained concerning the Tiiucyd.lt). mutilation of some statues, some time before, by young men heated c. 2S. ^\'lt[\ wine, and also of a profanation of the sacred mysteries, by a mock celebration of them in private houses ; and in this accusation Alcibiades was involved. Thucyd. Of the party in opposition to Alcibiades were all who leaned to ATc'ib! vd'^de oligarchy, and most of the most powerful men of the commonwealth; bigis,p. 13S. nyiio indignantly bore the superiority assumed by that young man, by whose abilities, assisted by the splendor of his birth, and the greatness of his fortune, and supported by the favor of the people, they found themselves so overwhelmed, that they had for some time past submitted in silence. But the present was an opportunity not to be neglected : they Sect.II. prosecution OF ALCIBIADES. sis they set themselves instantly to take advantage from it to ruin him in the favor of the people, that foundation of sand on wliich all power in Athens must rest, and then the reins of the commonwealth would of course pass into their own hands. The report was sedulousl}' propa- gated, that Alcibiadcs was the principal author of all the late outrages. Facts known, it was said, afforded sufficient presumption of what could not be directly proved ; and the meer style of living of Aicibiades, so unbecoming the citizen of a commonwealth, and notorious to all, for it was displayed ostentatiously, demonstrated that he had no moderate purposes, and th.at nothing less than the tyranny of Athens was the ultimate object of his ambition. Comparing the cautious account of Thucydides with the known circumstances of the tim.es, the temper of party at Athens, and events preceding and following, we find strong reason to suspect, tho we cannot be certain, that, not Aicibiades, but tlie enemies of Aicibiades, Avere the authors of the profanation whence tke disturbance arose. Alcibiadcs was known, in his revels, to have committed irregularities, Mhich would give color to suspicion against him. But the mutilation of the Mercuries was no affair of a revel ; it was evidently a concerted business, conducted with the most cautious sccresy. Nothing could be more injurious, nothing more necessarily ruinous in its consequences to all the warmest wishes of Aicibiades, than such an event at such a time, and nothing could equally favor the purposes of his opponents : nothing therefore more Avithout temptation for him, Avhilethe strongest motives might urge them to commit the deed in secret, Avith the hope of fixing upon him the suspicion. Accordingly, in no one circum- stance of his public life does Aicibiades seem to have conducted himself more unexceptionably than under this accusation. He neither avoided inquiry, nor attempted to overbear it; but coming forAvard, Avith the decent confidence of innocence, he earnestly desired immediate trial, and deprecated only accusation in his absence. ' If guilty,' he said, ' he Avas ready to submit to the death Avhich he should deserve : if * innocent, he ought to be cleared of the shocking imputation; and as •' it Avould be unjust, so Avould it be in the highest degree imprudent to ' keep such a charge hanging over a man vested with so great a Vox-. II. S s '"command. 314 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIIL ' command.' But, as usual with all factions, what prudence would dictate for the benefit of the commonwealth was, with his opponents, but an inferior consideration ; what would advance the power of their party was the first. Dreading, therefore, his popularity with the army, fearing particularly the alienation of the Argian and Wantineian auxi- liaries, whom his influence principally had obtained for the expedition, and apprehensive that blame thus might fall upon themselves, they determined neither immediately to accuse, nor wholly to give up accusation ; and they prevailed with the people to decree simply, that Alcibiades should hold his command, and proceed on the expedition \ Thncvd. 1.6. This being determined, popular zeal returned to its former object, '^' ^^' and by midsummer the preparations were completed. So great and so splendid an armament was never before sent by any Grecian state on c. 31. forein service. The importance of the armament itself, the importance and distance of its object, and the popular predilection with which it uas favored, occasioned extraordinary allowance for the equipment. Private zeal contended with public; the commanders of triremes not sparing their own purses, every one to have both his crew and his vessel completest, equally for show and for service. The daily pay of a drachma, tenpencc sterling, was given by the public to every private sailor; and the captains added extraordinary pay to able seamen, and to all the roAvers of the upper bench, distinguished by the name of Thranitcs, whose situation Avas more exposed, and whose office both required more skill and was more laborious than that of the rowers of the lower benches. The heavy infantry, all chosen men, who, as usual in the Greek service, provided their own arms and appointments, vied with each other in the excellence and good appearance of both, c- 30- On the day named for imbarkation, the Athenian citizens inrolled K C ■ Ol Qi i ^°^ *^^^ expedition appeared on the parade at daybreak, together with P. w. 17. those of the allied forces which were then at Athens. The whole city After S June. • i i - i -r. • i • i accompanied their march to Pena^us ; the natives, says the cotemporary * This is Thiicydides's account. Accord- Eion, from a later transaction, to assert so ing to an oration remaining from Isocrates, much thus generally, leaving t© his hearers die accusers of Alcibiades were punished, to refer it to the time to which it belonged, which would inifly an acquittal of himself. Isocrat. de bigis, p. 133, 13i. v. 3. But apparently the orator has taken occa- historian. Sect. III. EXPEDITION TO SICILY. sis historian, divided between hope and fear, on seeing so great a propor- tion of the strength of tlie commonwealth, with some relations or friends of every family in it, committed to the rage of elements and the chance of war, at a distance which, for antient navigation, was so great'; while the nnmerous foreiners more calmly gratified their curiosity M'ith so splendid and interesting a spectacle. As soon as the embarkation was completed, and everything prepared for getting under way, trumpets sounded for signal of silence, and prayers for success were put up to the gods with more than usual formality, heralds direct- ing, and the M'hole armament uniting their voices. Goblets of wine were then produced in every ship, and officers and privates toge- ther, out of gold and silver cups, poured libations and drank to the prosperity of the armament and of the commonwealth, the citizens and strangers on the beach joining in the ejaculation. This ceremony being performed, the pjEan was sung, and the whole fleet moved for ^T^gina, thence to take its departure for Corey ra. SECTION III. Defects of the Syracusan Constitutmt. Force of the Athenian Arma- ment. Measures of the Athenian Armament. Able Conduct of Alcibiades, Intrigues, Tumult, popular Panic, and their Conse- quences at Athens. Intelligence of the extraordinary magnitude of the Athenian pre- Thucyd. 1.6. parations passed from various quarters to Syracuse ; and the destination, in a democratical government, could not remain a secret. Nevertheless it was long before the news gained such credit, among the Syracusan people, as to produce any measure for obviating the threatened evil. It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of ' Thucydides calls it the most distant as gation of the antients therefore made Sicily, well as the greatest expedition ever made in his opinion, more distant than Egypt. by any Grecian slate. The coasting navi- s s 2 Syracuse, 316 HISTORY OF GREECE. Cuap. XVIIL Syracuse, or at least a great change in the administration, since the oligarchal Lcontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens. The democratica! party now bore tlie sway ; and some jealousy toward tlie nobles, lest preparation for war should throw an increase of pover into tb.eir hands, appears to have influenced the leaders of the day. At the same time the circumstances of Syracuse, considerably altered since the former interference of Athens in the affairs of Sicily, were such as would intlame the usual presumption of a democratical gavern- ment. The Ionian interest, formerly, with the assistance of Camarina, nearly balancing the Dorian, was now suppressed ; Syracuse was the acknowleged head of the Grecian name in Sicily; and the Syracusan people trusted that, excepting the semibarbarian Egestans and the Leontine freebooters, the Athenians v.'oukl not find a friend in the iland, who would dare to own himself " At length, however, accumulated accounts arriving, each more alarming than the former, it M'as thought proper to convene the general assembly. The patriotic and able Hermocrates, the peacemaker of Sicily when harassed by internal M'ar, was among the foremost to pro- Thucyd. 1. 6. pose vigorous measures against forein attack. Representing the Athenian armament as really great and formidable, but dangerous to Syracuse only in proportion to its deficiency of exertion, he proposed to strengthen the Syracusan confederacy by conciliat- ing the barbarians of the iland, and by extending alliance among the Italian Greeks: he would even make overtures to Carthage, the lichcst commonwealth upon earth, and therefore ablest to give that kind of assistance which was most desirable, as being most efticacious with least danger ; and it was reasonable to suppose, lie said, that appre- hension of the growing power and extravagant ambition of Athens would dispose the Carthaginians to the connection. Application ought also to be made to Corinth and Laceda^mon, whose favorable disposition could not be doubted. Such in general was the nego- tiation which, in his opinion, their circumstances required. "With regard then to military operation, he was clear that they ought to meet invasion before it reached them : and, high as the reputation of the Athenian navy was, yet local circumstances gave them such advan- 5 tagcs, C.33. Sect. III. MEASURES OF THE SYRACUSANS. si7 tages, that a proper exertion of the naval force whicli the Sicilian states were able to raise, might make it impossible for the Athenians ever even to reach the Sicilian coast. This idea was founded on the deficiencies of the antient marine; ofvvhich the words put into the mouth of Hermocrates, by the able cotemporary historian, give the clearest as M'ellas the most authentic information. ' The Tarentines,' said Hermocrates, ' are our allies ; and the Athenian fleet, to go from ' Corcyra, their known place of assembling, to Sicily, must first make ' the lapygian coast, and cannot avoid passing Tarentum. The harbor ' of Tarentum therefore should be the station for the greatest naval ' force that can be collected. So numerous a fleet, as that of the enemy, ' cannot keep exact order in the long passage (for so, in Thticydidcs's ' narrative, Hermocrates terms it) across the Ionian gulph. From the * harbour of Tarentum, therefore, we may chuse our moment of attack, ' with certain advantage. We shall go into action with our crews ' refreshed in a friendly port, and our galleys light; the Athenians * fatigued with rowing and incumbered with stores : or, should they, ' at the expence of these, prepare for action, we may, if prudence ' require it, retire into our port, and M'ait for fresh advantages. Nor * can these fail to offer: for the enemy must then again incumber ' his gallics with stores, or risk to sufler from M'ant, in tlie passage ' along a hostile coast. Such being the inconvcniencies and the ' hazards which he must have to incounter, I think, if the measure I ' propose were taken, he would scarcely venture at all to cra>;s the ' gulph.' This able advice, to a whole people in assembly directing executive Thucyd. 1. 6. government, did not find the attention it merited. Many would not ^''^^' yet believe that the Athenians meant to invade Sicily with views of conquest: some even ridiculed the idea: various contradictory opi- nions were warmly maintained; and Athenagoras, chief of the demo- cratical party, endevored to use the opportunity for carrying a point against the nobles. ' It was rather to be wislied than feared,' he said, * that the Athenians would be so mad as to invade Sicily. For himself, ' he thought them wiser. Peloponnesus itself was not better able to ' resist them; and the force of Syracuse alone was su])erior to double ' the 318 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chat. XVIII. * the armament whose approach was represented as so alarming-. No ' cavahy, he well knew, was imbarked : within Sicily the Athenians ' could obtain none, except an inconsiderable force from Egestaj and ' even their heavy-armed were inferior in number to the Syracusan. ' Such being their deficiency, if, instead of commencing operations, * as they must, from their naval camp, with scarcely a friend within the ' iland, they possessed a neighboring city equal to Syracuse, even so ' their army, instead of making conquest, would hardly escape destruc- Thucyfl.l. 6. < tion.' Having declared his sentiments against the measures proposed '^' ^' ' by Hermocrates, he proceeded to invey against him and the whole body of the nobles. ' The ambition of young men,' he said, ' panted ' for military command; but the city would not so impose a yoke upon * itself. On the contrary, prosecution should prevent the seditious ' purposes of those who would spred alarm ; and punishment should e. 41. * not fail for such offences against the common welfare.' He was pro- ceeding thus in the endevor to excite popular passion, when one of the generals (for the Syracusan constitution at this time divided the chief military command between a board of fifteen) interfered with the authority of office. He strongly reprobated the attempt to check the freedom of debate, and deter individuals from declaring their opinion on public affairs : * When hostilities were threatened,' he said, ' the ' welfare of the commonwealth unquestionably required preparation in ' due proportion to the danger. It should therefore be the care of the ' generals to acquire more certain intelligence, than seemed yet to liave ' been obtained, and in the mean time to communicate with the allies ' of the commonwealth, and take all other proper precaution.' AVithout putting any question to the vote, he tlien dismissed the assembly. £^2. While such, through the defects in the constitution of the govern- ment, was the unprepared state of Syracuse, the whole of the Athenian c. 43. forces was already assembled at ('orcyra. The fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian penteconters. Of the triremes, a hundred were Athenian; and of these, sixty were light for action, forty carried soldiers. The other thirty-four triremes were of the allied state?, principally Chian. The heavy-armed were, in all, five thousand one hundred ; of whom two thousand two hundred were Athenian Sect. Ill, FORCE OF THE ATHENIAN AR]\IAMENT. si9 Athenian citizens; and of these only seven luinchecl, appointed to tlie inferior service of marines''', Mere of tlie Thetes, the other fifteen hundred being of the higher orders. 'J'he Argian auxiliary heavy-r armed were five hundred ; the iNIantineian, including a few Pelopon- ncsian mercenaries, two hundred and fifty; the remainder of the heavy-armed were fiom the subject states. The regular light-armed were four hundred Athenian and eighty Cretan bowmen, seven Jmndred " Rhodiau slingers, and a hundred and twenty Megarian refugees. A single horse-transport carried thirty horse. The storeships provided by the Athenian government, which carried also botli sutlers and artificers, were thirty of large burden, of tlie kind called holcads, and a hundred smaller'; i)ut many other vessels, belonging to individuals, followed, for the sake of profit from tlie market of so large an armament. Through the rash precipitancy of one party in the administration, and the opposition by which the other was perplexed, so deficient had been the preparatory measures, that it was yet unknown to the generals what Italian or Sicilian cities Avould receive them. Three triremes Tlmcyd. I. &, \vere therefore dispatched to inquire and to negotiate, with orders to *^' meet the fleet as soon as possible with information. The whole then moved from Corcyra, in three divisions ; each of which separately might more readily find, in the Italian ports, those supplies which the antient ships of war could so scantily carry, and that shelter which they were so extremely liable to want. All however together crossed the gulph, and made the lapygian promontory, without misfortune. Then they dispersed to seek supplies around the bay of Tarentum ; but not a single town would admit them M'ithin its walls, or even make a market for them. Tarentum and Locri denied them water and the shelter of their ports. At length the whole fleet reassembled, without disaster, at Rhegium, the first allied city in their course. But even the Rhegians cautiously refused to admit them within their walls ; al- lotting them however commodious ground for incampment, and pro- viding for them a plentiful market. The S3'racusans, at length, satisfied of the necessity of giving up private ease for public service, and no longer hesitating between party interest Siio HISTORY OF GREECE. Chat. XVIII. interest and general welfare, jiermitted their leaders to make serious preparation for meeting the comins: evil. Ministers were sent to con- xiliate some of the Sicel tribes; garrisons were placed in situations to controul othei-s ; arms and horses were examined ; and troops marched to occupy some of the most critical posts for defending the Syracusau territory. JMeanwhile the three Athenian ships, dispatched from Corcyra, Ind been as far as the Ej;estan territory, and did not rejoin the fleet till it was arrived in the harbour of Rhegium. They brought information, that the representations made by the Egestan ministers at Athens, of the wealth of their state, had been utterly false, and that the commis- sioners, sent by the Athenian government to inquire concerning it, had been grossly deceived. The richest temple of the Egestan terri- tory was that of Venus at Eryx ; where indeed the collection of cups, flagons, censers, and other vessels of silver, was considerable. After being conducted to a display of these sacred riches, the commissioners liad been variously invited and entertained by the principal Egestans; and, wherever they went, not only all the gold and silver plate of the place was studiously collected, but whatever besides could be borrowed from neighboring' towns, Phenician as well as Greek. These commis- sioners had been appointed by the influence of Alcibiades and his part}'-; Whether they were chosen for their ability or their folly may be diffi- cult to guess ; but they had either believed, or affected to believe, and reported to the Athenian people accordingly, that thf}- could not suf- ficiently admire the wealth of Egesta. The commissioners sent from Corcyra were, on the contrary, such as Nicias, the first in command, would approve ; and their purpose being, not to procure partial evi- dence to promote a decree for the expedition, but to find means (for what would now be a principal object of Alcibiades himself) to prose- cute its purpose, they made strict scrutiny. On their return they reported, that the Egestans coijld only show thirty talents, between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling, in their treasury, and that, for anything more, their wealth was quite problematical. Probably none of the generals had relied much upon the wealth of Egesta ; yet as it had been seriously proposed as the fund which was to afford means Sect, in, ATHENIAN INVASION OF SICILY. 321 means for the first conquests, they were distressed by its deficiency; for tlie Athenian people were not likely to receive very favorably an immediate application for a supply. The disappointment however did not come single. The llhegians had been upon the point of yielding to the solicitations and remonstrances of the Athenian generals, who urged them to join their arms to those of their antient allies, for the purpose of restoring their common kinsmen the oppressed Leontines ; but they now gave for their decisive answer, ' That they would do ' every office of friendship to the Athenians, within the limits of ail ' exact neutrality; but they would ingage in no hostilities, unless in ■* concurrence with the Italian states of their alliance.' This determination of the Rhegians Avas a disappointment, less on account of the force of land and sea, tho not inconsiderable, which they could have furnished, than for the check it would give to nego- tiation among the Sicilian towns, where the example of Rhcgium would be of weight. The Athenian generals found themselves in con- sequence much at a loss. In many places a disposition adverse to the Syracusan supremacy aflforded advantageous opportunities : but, through the divisions among the leading men of Athens, and the haste Thucyd. 1. ^, of those who promoted the Sicilian expedition to profit from popular "^^ *^" favor, it had been so neglected that the semibarbarian Egestans upon the verge of ruin through their war with Selinus, and the miserable Leontines, ejected from their city and territory, Avere the only confederates of Athens beyond the Ionian sea. When therefore it came to be debated what should be tlie first measures of the arma- ment, the three generals differed, nearly as might be expected from their difference of character; and each had plausible ground for his opinion, Nicias experienced, prudent, from the first little satisfied with his command, and now in ill health, proposed to relieve Egesta, c. -if. which was the primary object of their instructions ; and, unless the Egestans could fulfil their ingagement to furnish pay for the whole armament, or readier means should occur, than yet appeared, for re- storing the Leontines, not farther to risk the forces or waste the treasures of the commonwealth. The disposition to assist its allies would be shown in the relief of Egesta ; its power would be mani- . Vol. IL T ar fcstcd 322 HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAr.XVIII. f'eslcd by the nieer circumstance of sending so great an armament to siicli a distance, and, satisfied with this, he would return im- mediately home. Aleibiadcs, whose temper was impetuous, but his mind capacious, and his abilities universal, clated^with the extraordinary eil[^"t'cts wliich his first essay in political intrigue had produced in Peloponnesus, and not deiccted by disappointments for which he was more prepared than his collegiies, had formed his oAvn plan for laying the foundation of extensive conquest, and persevered in it. ' Such a force,' he said, 'as ' they commanded, ought not to return home without achievement, ' and without honor. Yet he would not disapprove prudent, or even * cautious measures. He would therefore propose that negotiation ' should be tried with all the Grecian cities, except Syracuse and Se- ' linus, and with every barbarian tribe of the iland. In some places, * perhaps, zeal in the Syracusan interest might be mecrly slackened; ' in others, defection from it might be procured : in some, supplies of ' provisions only might be obtained ; in others, auxiliary troops. The * beginning should be made with ]\l'essena, the most commodious city ' and port of the iland for their principal station, whence to carry on * the war. When trial had been duly made what might be done by ' negotiation, when they were fully assured who were determined ene- ' mies, and who were, or might probably be made, friends, then tliey ' should have a clearer view of the business before them, and Selinus * and Syracuse must, nndoubtedly, be the first objects of their arms.' Lamachus, much a soldier and little a politician, but cxjierienced in the captious and greedy temper of the peTiple his soverein, differed Thucyd. 1. 6. from both his collegues : 'Their whole force,' he said, ' ought iinmc- ' diately to be directed against Syracuse, while yet in a state of un- • ' readiness, and surprize. If the city could not be taken by a brisk ' effort, which he thought not impossible, the other towns, of the ter- ' ritory would however fall into their hands, before the effects in them ' could be removed ; and the produce of the country would of course * be theirs. Thus they should acquire means to prosecute the war, ' without the invidious measure of applying to Athens for money. ' But possibly, what of all things was most desirable^ the Syracusans 1 1 ' might 1 Sect. III. ATHENIAN INVASION OF SICILY. 32S ' might tlius be provoked to risk a battle ; and a victory would in- ' stantly do more toward procuring alliance among the Sicilian cities, ' than negotiation for twenty years. Should the enemy, on the cou- ' trary, yield their country without an eftbrt, beside the profit from ' plunder, so decisive an acknoxrlegcment of the superiority of the ' Athenian forces would be highly favorable to any negotiation that ' might be deemed expedient. With regard to Messena, he thought * it not of so much consequence. The deserted port of JMegara, com- * modiously near to Syracuse, and their own whenever they would ' take possession of it, would be far preferable for their naval station.' It appears, from vhat follows in Thucydides, that the opinion of Lamachus, if conquest was to be sought and the displeasure of the Athenian people avoided, was not the least judicious ; but, being over- ruled, that general chose to concur with the opinion of Alcibiadcs, to Thucyd. I. 6. which Nicias was thus compelled to yield. Alcibiades then undertook '^- ^^• himself the business of negotiation with Messena. He could not how- ever prevail so far as to bring the IMessenians to join in the war against Syracuse; but he obtained, what was of some importance, permis- sion for the Athenian armament to contract for provisions through- out their territory. He then went with sixty triremes, Lamachus accompanying, to Naxus; and he found the people of that city, who were purely Ionian, and from of old adverse to Syracuse, so much more favorable to his views, that he ingaged them to join in league, defensive and offensive, M"ilh Athens. Thence he proceeded to Catana; but the prevalence of the Syracusan party there procured a refusal even to treat. Still therefore coasting southward, he sent for- ward ten triremes to Syracuse. Approaching the mouth of the port, a, herald from the deck of one of them proclaimed the intention of the, Athenian commonwealth, ' to restore the oppressed Leontines to their ' just rights, a measure to which it was bound both by ties of blood ' and terms of alliance ;' adding, * that any Leontines would be re- ' ceived as friends by the Athenian armament.' This ceremony being performed, and such observation made, as circumstances permitted, on tlie ports, the city, and the circumjacent ground, the detached isquadron rejoined the fleet, and all together went once more to Catana. T T 2 Meanwhile 3U HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. ]\Iean\vhile apprehension, either of the Athenian armament, or of a party among their own people, had so far wrought a change in the Tliiuyd. 1.6. minds of the Catanian leaders, that they consented to admit the Athe- nian generals to declare their proposals to the assembled people. The forces, being landed, were stationed without the walls, while the gene- rals went into the town; and Alcibiades undertook to address the Catanian people. While he was speaking, and the Catanians, collected in the agora, were universally intent upon the harangue, some of the Athenian soldiers observed a small ill-constructed gateway unguarded, through which, in meer wantonness, they made their way into the town; and, finding no opposition, quietly joined the assembly. The sight struck instant alarm into the Syracusan party, who imagined the city betrayed by their opponents. Some of them liastily, but silently, withdrew; and the rest, awed by apprehension of the dread- ful calamities usually brought, on the weaker party, by sedition ia Grecian cities, concurred in a decree, which was presently proposed, for an alliance defensive and offensive with Athens. Shortly after, the whole fleet moved from Rhegium to Catana, which it was resolved to make the principal naval station. It soon appeared that the project of Alcibiades to strengthen the Athenian interest by negotiation, and proportionally, of course, to «• 53. weaken the Syracusan, had been extensively founded. A party in Camarina, incouraged by what had passed at Naxus and Catana, as well as by the reported strength of the Athenian armament, sent to request support in attempting a revolution. The fleet moved thither; but it was found that the innovators had been overhasty in their measures, and the project could not be carried immediately into exe- cution ; 3'et an Athenian party still subsisted in Camarina. In returning, the Athenian connnanders debarked a body of forces near Syracuse, and collected considerable booty ; but the Syracusan cavalry quickly checked this mode of warfare, cut off some stragglers, and compelled the rest of the maroding troops to seek their ships. The fleet pro- ceeding then to Catana, found there the Salaminian, the ship appro- priated to purposes of sacred and solemn office, bearing an otder from the Athenian people for the immediate return of Alcibiades and some X)ther Sect. III. EXTRAORD^ARY ALARM AT ATHENS. 32,5 other officers to Athens, to answer accusations preferred against them for mutilating the statues and jirofaning the mysteries. Since the armament sailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing the worst evils of democratical frenzy. The oligarchal party, unequal to open contention with the democratical, had resolved upon the bold project of making democracy itself their instrument for exciting po- pular passion, M'ith the hope of directing it to the promotion of their own interest. Instantly after the departure of the fleet, they became Isocrat. • 1-/Y- • II • 1 -1 ■ pro Alcib. sedulous in diftusmg rumours and observations, that might excite p. ]3s. t. 3. suspicion and alarm. The power and influence of Alcibiades, his Tbucyd. 1. 6. magnificence, his ambition, his unprincipled conduct, and his various extravagancies. Mere made constant subjects of public conversation. His abilities, at the same time, and even his virtues, Avere compared to those by which the Peisistratids had acquired the tyrann)'. The severities which had occasioned the expulsion of those celebrated tyrants were then magnified tenfold ; the execration to which their memory had been condemned, by the party which had overborne them, ■was alledged in proof of their enormities; and the circumstance that the Athenians, unable to effect their own deliverance, had owed it to the Lacedaemonians, was pressed upon public recollection. Shortly every occurrence was made, by some construction, to import a plot for establishing tyranny. Fear, suspicion, and their certain concomitant, a disposition to severity, thus gained complete possession of the public Thucyd. mind. Every one -was bent to discover, by any means, the plot and its ^„^Qg' ^^ authors. Officers were appointed, intitled Examiners *, with full autho- myst. rity for every search and inquiry ; and great rewards were offiered for any who would indicate anything. The most suspicious and incoherent evidence only was obtained, from slaves and men of the vilest charac- ters. But public alarm, once so excited, was not to be readily quieted. It was deemed bettei-, says Thucydides, that just men should suflcr, than that the constitution should be indangered. Many of principal rank and most respectable character were in consequence imprisoned. It appears indeed difhcult to discover for whose benefit the Athenian constitution, as it now stood, was calculated. The lower people at least should 32G HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. should have had some confidence in protection for innocence, from that government for which they were so anxious, and in vhich they •were, nominally at least, supreme. But, on the contrary, when Pei- saiider and Chariclcs, two of the examiners, appointed to that office by Andoc. de popular favor, declared their opinion that a plot for overthrowing the m}st. p. 19. (i^i^^ocracy was in agitation, and farther inquiry therefore necessary, upon the usual signal for assembling the council, all the people fled from the agora, cverj- one fearful of accusation and imprisonment. Tliucjd, ut Nor was this indiscriminating jealousy a humor that had its hour and *"P* passed: it held, and grew daily more severe. Suspicion extended; more persons were imprisoned ; and there was no foreseeing where popular rage Avould stop. Thucyd. 1. 6. It happened that while suspicion was most rife, yet v/hat or whom to suspect was most uncertain, some movements in Bceotip. occasioned the march of a small body of Lacedsmonians to the Corinthian isthmus. This circumstance increased suspicion into imagined certainty, and re- doubled every former fear : the business of Boeotia was thought a feint ; intrigue with the obnoxious party in Athens, it was supposed, must be the real cause of the movement ; and, for one night, the whole people watched in arms. The panic spred to Argos: designs against the de- mocracy were suspected there ; and, tho Alcibiades himself had con- ducted the removal of the principal Argians who favored oligarchy, and placed them in secure custody, divided among the ilands under the Athenian dominion, yet now the Athenian people gave up those unfortunate men to be put to death by the democratical party in Argos, as if connected in plot with the friends of ^Vlcibiades. n.Co. Alarm and the severities of au alarmed despot were still continuing Andoc.de ^^ extend, when one of tlie most ol)noxious of the imprisoned (Thu- Plut. vit. cvdides has avoided to name him, but we loarn from his own extant A' I " oration, as well as from Plutarch's account, that it was Andocides) in conversation with one of his fellow-prisoners on their present suffer- ings and farther danger, yielded to the argument that, guilty or not guilty, it were better to confess something: 'The jwpiilar mind,' it was urged to Audocides, ' would evidently not otherwise be appeased ; ' and a confession would not only be more likely, than perseverance in ' asserting Sect.III. recall of ALCIBIADES. 327 * asserting innocence, to procure bis own safety, but would restore ' quiet to tlie city; and tbo some must be sacrificed, yet numbers ' liiiglit so be saved from that mad vengeance, excited by fear, which ' now tlireaic'iied so indiscriminately and unboundedly,' Information, thus extorted by tlie pains of a prison and the fear of death, against several persons as concerned in the mutilation of the Mercuries, was received among the peojile \vi:h a childish joy. The dark plot was supposed comidetely discovered ; the informers were set at liberty, witli all whom they did imt accuse; of those whom they did accuse, tho proof of the facts alledged was utterly defective, yet none escaped capital condemnation : all who were in prison, or could be taken, suf- fered death immediately, and public rewards were offered for killing those who fled from this democratical justice. To carr}' the business thus far, little or no deliberation was thought Thucyd. I'. (J, necessary. The ditHculty was to bring within reach of the democra- tical dagger those of the accused who were with the army in Sicily ; and especially Alcibiades himself, now become supremely the object of terror, as he hud before been of favor with the people. His death, as Thucydides assures, was determined ; but it was feared to apprehend, in the army, the favorite still of the army. It was farther feared les-t the whole armament might be indangered by any tumult which should come to the knowlege of the enemy and incourage attack ; and the defection of the Argian and Mantineian auxiliaries, whom the influence of Alcibiades had obtained for the service, was looked upon as a cer- tain consequence of any severity against him. It was therefore re- solved to send heralds in the sacred trireme called the Salaminian, not to arrest him or any other accused persons in the army, but si-mply, in the name of the people, to command their return to Athens. Imme- diate obedience was pai houses, trees, and a pool of water; on the other by precipices: felled trees, arranged from the camp to the sea and to the village of Dascon, ga-ve security to the naval station; works were hastily thrown up ^hcre the ground Avas less strong by nature or accident, and the bridge over the Anapus was broken. The first intelligence of this movement filled the Syracusans with surprize and alarm. They hastily returned to Syracuse, looked at the Athenian camp, and finding it too strong to he attacked, incamped themselves tor the night. Ne.\t morning, the generals little experi- enced, and the people little practised in military discipline, all ima- gined that to assault, not to be assaulted, would be theirs, and many M'ent into the town, which was near. Meanwhile the Athenian gene- rals, having ground now before-thcm on which the enemy's horsie would 12 not Sect.IV. measures AGAINST SYRACUSE. ssi not be formidable, drew out of their camp in order of battle. The Sy- racusans then also hastily formed; and, however deficient in dis- cipline and skill, Thiicydides bears them testimony that they Mere not deficient in courage or in patriotic zeal. A sharp action insued : but a thunderstorm, with heavy rain, alarmed and disturbed the more inex- perienced soldiers, and the Syracusan infantry at length everywhere gave way. Their horse, however, tho unable to take any considerable part in the battle, protected their fliglit, so that little execution was done in pursuit, and tlwy retired within the city-walls. This expedition appears to have been in itself very ably conducted by tlie Athenian generals ; but it was little connected with any exten- sive plan of operation. On the morrow after the battle, having, in Tlmcyd. 1. 6. consequence of the usual application from the vanquished, restored the *^ enemy's dead, to the number of only two hundred and sixty, they reimbarked the whole of their forces, and returned to Catana. This flash of victory, however, had its advantageous consequences. It re- stored the sullied reputation of the Athenian arms, confirmed the al- lies, and opened means for farther negotiation within Sicily : it as- sisted moreover to save, if not to gain credit at home, and tended to prepare the Athenian people for receiving more favorably any applica- tion for supplies and reinforcement. The want of cavalry had been experienced as the great deficiency of the armament. It was therefore determined to collect, during the winter, the greatest force of horse that could by any means be obtained within the iland, and also to ap- ply for a body from home. A large supj)ly of money \y'as moreover indispensable ; and it behooved the generals to exert themselves, in soli- citation among allies, in rapine against enemies, that they might spare the Athenian treasury ; upon which, nevertheless, some demand was unavoidable. The siege of Syracuse was resolved upon for the first object of the insuing campain. For the interval, the fleet was laid up, and the army disposed in quarters, at Naxus and Catana. Meanwhile among the Syracusans, tho much uneasiness arose from the late ev^ent, which so disappointed the opinion fondly entertained of their superiority to the Athenians, yet the misfortune was not without salutary consequences. The depression of the public mind imposed u u 2 silence 332 HISTOR\^ OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. silence upon faction, repressed forward ignoiance, and gave scope for abilities and patriotism to come forward. The general assembly met, and the people listened with anxious attention, while Ilermocrates son of Hermon spoke. ' Their late defeat,' he said, ' was no cause for de- ' jection such as he saw prevailing. Meer people, as they compara- ' lively were, and not formed soldiers, it was much for them to have * shown themselves so nearly equal to select troops, of the first reputa- ' tion in Greece. Besides, the very circumstances of the action ' pointed out the means of future success. It was not in strength, but ' in order and discipline ; not in bravery, but in system of command ' and subordination, that they were inferior. The alteration necessary * was obvious; the chief commanders should be few, but they should ' be experienced ; they should be trustworthy, and they should be ' trusted. The winter should then be diligently employed in improv- ' ing discipline : the force of heavy-armed should be increased, by * giving arms at the public expence to the poor but able-bodied ' citizens. Courage and confidence,' he continued, ' will of course ' revive, with improved system, improved skill, and increased force; ' and in spring, I doubt not but we may meet the enemy upon equal ' terms.' It were indeed difficult to imagine anything more inconvenient, or more adverse to effectual exertion, than the system of military com- mand which democratical jealousy, inforced by frequent sedition, had established at Syracuse. The supreme military authority was divided among no less than fifteen officers ; and even this numerous board, if the term may be allowed, was, upon all momentous occasions, to take its orders from the people. But the present alarm, and the pressure of evident necessity, gave force to the advice of Ilermocrates. The command in chief Avas committed to Ilermocrates himself, with only two collegues, and they were vested with discretionary powers. Pleasures equally vigorous and judicious immediately followed. The great object, for a town expecting a siege, Mas to obviate contraval- Thucyd. 1. 6. lation. On the side thercfure of the quarters called Temenites, and ^' '''' Epipoke, the new generals extended the fortifications of the city ; and they occupied with garrisons two critical posts in the neighbourhood, the Sect. IV. MEASURES OF THE SYRACUSANS. S33 the precinct of the temple of Olympieium, to tlie southward of the city on the farther bank of the river Anapus, and a fort named Me- gara. Having thus provided for immediate security, they extended their views. A M'atchful eye was kept upon the negotiations of the Athenians among the Sicilian states ; and, information being received tliat the whole Atlienian armament was asseml)led, for tlie remainder of the winter, at Naxus, an expedition was made, apparently more witli a view to revive the drooping spirits of the people, than with the expectation of any other important advantage, to destroy the huts, whicli the Athenians had left standing, on the ground they had quitted near Catana. Among the cities in alliance with Syracuse, the fidelity of Camarina, notthe least powerful among them, was the mostdoubted. Tho accounted a Dorian people, the Camarinieans had been from of old adverse: they ITiucyd. 1.6. were the only Sicilian Dorians who had constantly refused to put ^■'^' themselves under the degrading and oppressive protection of the Syra- cusan commonwealth. To strengthen themselves in independency, while Laches commanded the Athenian forces in Sicily, they had ingaged in alliance with Athens ; but by the general peace among the Sicilian cities, which Hermocrates had procured, without re- nouncing the Athenian alliance, they became allies also of Syracuse. When the armament under Nicias arrived in Sicily, the Syracusan government required assistance from Camarina; and, the dilatory con- duct of the Athenian oenerals brinoi no" their force into contempt, the Caniaringeans, fearful of the resentnient of a powerful neighbor, sent a bcdy of auxiliary horse. The late demonstration of the superiority of the Athenian arms, would be likely to make a change in sentiment at Camarina, not favorable to the Syracusan interest; and it was known that the Athenian generals were carrying on negotiation there. To counterwork this, and win the Camarinteans to the Syracusan cause, Hermocrates thought important enough to require that he should go himself at the head of an embassy to Camarina. As far as the connection with Athens only was to be dissuaded, the business undertaken by Hermocrates was easy. The notorious con- duct, and even the avowed principles of the Athenian government, were 334 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIII. were such as could not but give alarm, wherever the Athenian power could be extended. Being admitted to audience by the Camarimtan Tliucyd. 1. 6. people, Hermocratcs justly urged, 'that the restoration of the Le- c. /{). &seq. , ontiiies, which the Atlienians held out as tiieir object in the invasion ' of Sicilv, -was a shalloM' pretence. The Leontines indeed Mere ' lonians, kinsmen of the Athenians; bat what were the Euboic Chal- ' cidians, tlie verv people from whom the Leontines deri\ ed their im- ' mediate origin? Equally kinsmen of the Athenians, they were held ' in strict subjection, and denied the use of arms *. Protection to the * semibarbarian Egestans could, still less tlian the restoration of the ' Leontines, be the real motive for sending so expensive an armament ' so far. It was in short not dubious that the subjugation equally of ' all the Sicilians was the object of Athenian ambition.' So far the arguments of Hermocrates were unanswerable. But when he was to justify the past conduct of Syracuse, and persuade thd Camariufeans to assist the Syracusan cause, whatever fear the power of Athens might excite, the consideration of the nearer and more obvious danger pre- ponderated, of servitude to a }>eople of their own iland, their fellow- colonists ; a servitude likely to be more severe, and certainly more grating. All therefore that could l>e obtained, by solicitation or re- inqnstrancc, urged with all the ability, and supported by the respect- able character, of Hermocrates, was a declaration, ' that, being ingaged ' in alliance with both Athens and Syracuse, the Camarina^ans could * take no part, consistently with their oaths, but that of an exact * neutrality.' While the Syracusan leaders were thus sedulous, tho not always suc- cessful, in negotiation Mithin Sicily, they directed their attention also to those states in Greece itself, in which they might reasonably expect a disposition friendly to themselves, and were sure of a disposition hos- tile to Athens. An embassy was sent first to Corinth, the parent state of Syracuse. There a disposition was tbund, if not of the purest kind- ness to Syracuse, jet of the utmost readiness to oppose Athens. IVJi- nisters Avere appointed to accompany the Syracusan ministers to Lace- dsemon, and assist in rousing the usu-all}' sluggish counsels of that ' So Smith translates 'Atrec^iffKivm, and I believe properly. State. Sect. IV. A L C I B I A D E S A T S P A R T A. 335 state. The ephors, and others of prevailing power tliere, were free to incoiirage bywords, and wiUing even to assist by negotiation, but backward to give that more efficacious assistance whicli the necessi- ties of Syracuse were Hkely to require. But an Athenian was now become the most formidable fee to Athens. Timcyd. Alcibiades had passed in a merchant-ship, from the Thurian territory isocrl'pro to the Eleian port of Cyllene, whance he proceeded to Argos, wliere ''^'"L>- his interest, as v.e have seen, had been powerful. The establishment Ch. 17. s. 3. of his credit now M'ith the democratical party there, would afibrd the ° ^ "* '^'^' fairest ground for its restoration with the democratical party in Athens ; but the diligence of his opponents disappointed him. They procured a decree of the Athenian people for his banishment from Greece, and the mission of ministers to Argos to deniand his person. He had hi- therto hesitated to accept an invitation from Lacedtemon. A party there favored him : his connection by the claim of hereditary hospi- tality with the republic, and his services to many individuals, when Thucyd. 1.5. prisoners in Athens, would recommend him. But he feared the body of the people, who might be apt to recollect, with no friendly mind, the evils which had been suffered, and the greater evils apprehended and risked, from the war excited in Peloponnesus by his ambition, his talents, and his influence; and he feared not less the prejudice, which could scarcely fail to be entertained against him, on account of his constant connection with the democratical, and opposition to the oli- garchal interest, in his own country. The leading men, however, in general, even those otherwise less well disposed to him, aware that he was capable of being no less a useful friend than a pernicious enemy,, were in the moment willing to forget every objection to him. He judged it unsafe to remain longer in Argos ; he was therefore ready to go wherever circumstances might afford any prospect of advantage ; and, a safe-conduct being sent to him, he went to Sparta. On his arrival he found a general disposition in his favor, rather such as he might have wished, than such as could reasonably be ex- pected. The senate assembled, and, the people being summoned to give him audience, all listened with anxious attention, while he com- Diunicated 336 Thucyd. 1. 6. c. 90. Thucvd. 1. 6. e. 91.' HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. muiiicated information and advice. ' The views of con([uest enter- tained at Athens,' he said ' were extensive. It was proposed first to reduce all Sicily ; then the Grecian possessioiis in Italy. With the inexhaustible supply of ship-timber which Italy afforded, it was in- tended so to increase the fleet, that the conquest of Carthage might be undertaken. Spain and all the western shores of the Mediter- ranean would then be open ; whence mercenary troops might be ob- tained, in any numbers, and the best of their kind. These would be employed against Peloponnesus by land, while the fleet should blockade it by sea; and thus it was proposed to complete the subju- gation of Greece. The conquered countries, it was expected, each as it was reduced, would furnish supplies for farther conquest, with- out burthening Athens. ' And however wild and visionaiy,' continued Alcibiades, ' these vast projects may on first view appear, I, who have long meditated upon them, who know the resources of Athens, who have seen the deficiencies of the ill-constituted and unconnected commonwealths against which its arms are now directed, am confident that success is not impossible. The Sicilian Greeks have little military discipline or skill. Syracuse, having already suffered a defeat by land, will presently be blockaded by land and sea; and, unassisted, must un- avoidably fall. Sicily may then be considered as conquered, and Italy will not hold long. Thus not Sicily only, but Peloponnesus itself, is deeply interested in the event.' Having by this representation sufliciently alarmed the Lacedjemo- nians, he proceeded to inform them how the threatened danger might be averted. ' A fleet,' he said, ' you have not, equal to oppose the ' Athenian ; but troops may be sent to Sicily, making them work their ' own passage, in sufficient number to form, with the Sicilians, a com- ' petent force of regular heavy-armed. But, what I hold of more im- ' portance than any troops you can send, let a Spartan general go to ' Sicily ; who may establish discipline among the Sicilians already ' firm in the cause, and whose authority may bring over, and hold ' united under one command, those not disposed to obey the S3Tacu- * sans. 5scT.IV. ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA. 3.37 ' sans. Tims, more than by any other measure, your decided friends ' will be incouraged, and those dubiously affected y> ill be confirmed in ' your interest. ' But it will be neceffary, for the incouragemcnt of the Syracusans * and the distraction of the Athenians, without reserve to beo-in hosti- ' lities in Greece. Nothing can be so efficacious, and nothino- the * Athenians so much dread, as your occupying and fortifying a post ' within Attica; and for this purpose the town of Deceleia is to be ' preferred. Thus their country will no longer be theirs but yours ; * no revenue will accrue to them from it; even that from the silver- ' " ' mines of Laureium may be stopped : but, what is still more im- * portant, nothing will equally superinduce the revolt of those distant ' possessions, whence their principal revenue is derived, as the know- * lege that they are pressed at home.' After having thus indicated and advised whatever v/ould most con- tribute to his country's downfall, Alcibiades thought, for his cha- racter's sake, however persecuted by that country, some apology ne- cessary for such conduct. ' I hold that,' he said, 'no longer my Thucyd. 1,6". ' country, which is governed by a set of men who have so injuriously *^" ^-• ' driven me from it. Nor ought I to be considered as persuading war ' against my country ; but rather as endevoring to restore myself to * the country which was once mine, and to restore that country to its ' due government within itself, and its just situation among the Gre- ' cian republics. I account him a true patriot, not who, being un- * justly expelled, rests in banishment, but who, still animated by love ' of his country, does his utmost to restore himself. Upon you, Lace- ' dcemonians, I depend for the greatest benefits, to my country not less ' than to myself. You may trust me therefore that there is no danger, ' no hardship, which I am not ready to undergo in your service, and ' that I shall have every satisfaction in cooperating with you, to pull ' down the tyrannical power, now usurped by Athens, and restoring ' Greece to that happy situation, in which you, by common consentj * and not by violence, presided over it.' The eloquence of Alcibiades, his advice, but still more the expects- Thucyl. l.S, tion of advantage from the important information which he was un- '^'^'" .Vol. II. X questionably S38 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. questionably able to give concerning every circumstance of Athenian affairs, decided the Lacedfemonians, and it was resolved to assist Syrsc cuse, and to renew the war with Athens. S E C T I O N V. Measures of the Peloponnesians to relieve Sp'acuse. Pleasures of the Athenian Armament in Sicily: Re'inforcetnent to the Atheniati Armajuent in Sicily: Siege of Syracuse: Capitulation propofed : Arrival of Gylippus and Py then to the Relief of Syracuse, Official Letter of Nicias to the Athenian People. The resolution for war being taken at Lacedaemon, the business of Sicily required the first attention. To command the force to be em- Thucyd. 1. 6. ployed there, Gylippus Avas appointed, son of Cleiindridas, who bad *J,',^^" , been banished, when tutor to the rounaj king Pleistoanax, for miscon- Ch. 13. s. 5. ' . . „ . «f ihisHift. duct in a former war with Athens, and on suspicion of taking bribes from Pericles. Gylippus was directed to consult, with the leading men of Corinth and Syracuse, about the readiest and best means for trans- porting troops to Sicily ; but those troops were to be collected as they might among the allied states, Lacedaemon furnishing none. A man, however, more qualified than Gylippus, for the business committed to liim, could hardly have been selected; and, sparing as Lacedasmon was of troops and treasure, the authority and influence with which he was largely vested, were, as we find by their effects, of extraordinary power. Ordering two Corinthian triremes to attend him immediately atAsine, he urged the diligent preparation of the rest of the force to be em- ployed under his command. B. C. 414. The resolution taken, for renewing war with Athens, might give to P w'is^ expect some restored vigor in the Lacedtemonian councils; but the Thucyd. 1.6. first operations of the LacediEmonian arms indicated none. In spring the force of Laconia was assembled, and marched against the Argian territory. On its arrival at Cleonas, an earthquake, a common cir- cumstance in most parts of Greece, and especially in Laconia, with- 11 out Sect. V. MEASURES IN GREECE AND IN SICILY. 33» out doing any considerable mischief, threw ail into consternation : superstition saw in it the anger of the gods declared; the army imme- diately retreated, and the expedition Avas given up. Such conduct in- couragcd and invited the Argians to revenge. Entering the Lacede- monian territory of Thyreati's, they collected plunder that sold for twenty-five talents, about six thousand pounds sterling ; which was esteemed a large booty, well rewarding the enterprize. A conspiracy, which about the same time broke out in the little nmcyd. l.d, city of ThespitE in Boeotia, requires mention, as it tends to illustrate the state of Greece. The deinocratical party rose against their oli- garchal magistrates ; the Athenians marched a body of troops to sup- port them. The insurgents were nevertheless overpowered ; some Avere apprehended (what they suffered we are not informed) and the rest fled to Athens. During winter, the Athenian generals in Sicily had not neglected such measures for promoting their business, as the season would per- mit. Soon after disposing their troops in quarters they marched with c. 7-i. their whole force to Messena, in hope of gaining that city, through intelligence long maintained with a party there : but Alcibiades, who, before his flight, had been privy to the negotiation, gave warning of the danger. The Athenian armament therefore, after suffering in a winter camp for thirteen days, was obliged to return, without effecting anything but the destruction of some of the principal Messenians of their own party, who were seized by their opponents, condemned as traitors, and executed. Some negotiations among the Sicel tribes had a more fortunate ilTue. c 88, Those of the plains, indeed, habituated to subjection under the Syra- cusan government, and ready objects of Syracusan resentment, could few of them be persuaded to revolt : but the midland mountaineers, who had always preserved independency, and considered the Syra- cusans as their natural enemies, were predisposed to the Athenian cause. Most of them readily furnished provisions, and some even paid contributions in money. A small force brought to terms a few who were found adverse, and relieved some others, more favorably iu- X X a clined, S40 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. X\III. dined, from the restraint iii which they had been held by Syracusan garrisons. Thucj'cL 1. 6. Toward tlie ap[)roach of spring the whole Athenian armament moved from Naxus to Catana, to be nearer its principal object ; and nego- tiation was extended as far as Tuscany and Carthage. Overtures had been received from Tuscany, yet tlie result seems to have been littl« important, and it does not appear that the negotiation with Carthage produced anything. Tlie generals however succeeded in collecting, within Sicily, horses for a body of cavahy. Iron, bricks, and other materials, neceffary for the proposed contravallation, were prepared, and every disposition was made for undertaking the siege of Syracuse. B C 414 Early in spring the army marched. The lands of jNIegara,^ whicli, P. W. 18. since the depopulation of the city by Gelon, had been Syracusan pra- t.s"!,^ ' '' P^rty, were ravaged. An attempt upon a fort held by a Syracusan garrison failed ; but the vale of the river Tereas was plundered un- opposed, the standing corn burnt, and, a small body of Syracusans in- terfering to cl>eck the ravage, some were killed, the rest fled. For this little success a trophy was erected, and the army returned to Catana. After a short time for refreshment, the generals moved again, gained the Sicel town of Centoripa by capitulation, and burnt the corn of the adverse Sicel tribes of Inessa and Hybla. Returning then to Catana, they found the supplies and reinforcements from Athens arrived. For the passion of the Athenian people for conquest in Sicily had not r. S3. abated : the application of the generals had met M'ith favor far beyond their expectation ; and all their requests were granted without demur. y No addition of infantry liad been desired : there were sent two hun- dred and fifty horse-soldiers, with complete accoutrements, but without horses ; three hundred talents in silver, amounting to about seventy- five thousand pounds sterling ; and stores of all necessary kinds in abundance. e_ j5_ The generals resolved then immediately to lay siege to Syracuse. Nature, art, and a numerous population concurred to make Syracuse strong ; and to reduce a place, of but moderate strength, we have seen, ia the art of attack of that age, a contravallation always was necessary. Here Sect.V. operations IN SICILY. 341 Here two difficulties opposed ; the extent of the town, and the form of a hill, over the skirt of which a suburb extended. The hill, slopino- ' toward the town, was precipitous toward the country ; and the suburb, from its situation, overlooking the town, was called Epipolce '. The Syracusan generals M'ere apprized of the intention of the encmv ; they Avere not uninformed of the usual mode of conducting- sieges; and they were aware how important it would be tO' occupy the hill of Epipola?, But they were new in command ,• discipline remained yet to be esla- bhshed among their troops ; and, till danger became pressing, notM'ith- standing the vote conferring on them discretionary power, the attempt would be hazardous to inforce discipline among those who, by a simple vote, might take away the power they had given. Not therefore till it was known that the Athenians had collected a considerable body of cavalry, and were already prepared to march for Syracuse, Hermocratcs and his collegues ventured to take measures for appointing guards and distributing duty. At daybreak they led all the Syracusan citizens, within the age for service, into a meadow on the bank of the Anapus. After a review of arms, they appointed a select body of seven hundred men to be stationed in Epipola;, as a kind of picket-guard to give as- sistance wherever danger might press, but to be particularly a protec- tion for that very important post. An Andrian refugee, named Dio- milus, versed, as a subject of Athens, in the Athenian discipline, was appointed to the command of the body selected' for so critical aservice; a circumstance strongly indicating how conscious the Syracusan gene- rals were of the inferior skill and experience of their own officers. On the very night preceding these measures of the Syracusans, the Thucvd. 1.5. Athenian generals, imbarking their whole army, had passed, undisco- ^' 5^' vered, to a place near Syracuse, called Leon, where a body of infantry was hastily debarked, which proceeded immediately to Epipoli3e, less than a mile distant, and by a pass called Euryelus, moi>nted the hill unopposed. Information of this surprize being next morning car- ried to the Syracusans, occupied in the meadow of the Anapus at the distance of three miles, excited great consternation. Courage however did not fail them. With much zeal, but much disorder, all hastened to ' Jtearly synonymous with the English name Oveutoh. repel 542 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. repel the invaders. A fierce conflict insued : but tumultuous valor was little efiicacious against steddy discipline. The Syracusans were com- pelled to retreat, with the loss of three hundred heavy-armed, among whom fell Diomilus, the newly appointed commander of the select band. The near refuge of their walls prevented greater slaughter. Next morning the Athenians drew out into the plain to offer battle : but the temper of the Syracusan people, chastised by the event of the preceding day, no longer disposed them to put violence upon the pru- dence of their generals, and they did not stir. The Athenians, return- ing to Epipolse, applied themselves to construct a fort at Labdalum, among the highest precipices, as a citidel, in which to deposit their Thucvd. 1. 6. military chest and other valuables". While thus employed they were <:■ 9!s. joined by three hundred Egestans, and one hundred Naxian and Sicel cavalry ; and, the Athenian troopers being mounted, the cavalry of the army all together, exclusive of the horse-bowmen, were now six hundred and fifty. The fort being quickly completed, the army de- scended into the plain, and the work of contravallation was imme- diately begun. Syracuse was built between two inlets of the sea, called the great port, and the Trogilian port ; and it nearly inclosed a third, called the little, or the Ortygian port, which was separated from the great port only by the little iland of Ortygia, the site of the original city. On the inland side of the town rose the hill of Epipolte ". It was the business '° To^j T£ (Txivourt x«i Tof; xt^l*'-" *"'''" ' The circuit, according to Strabo, amounted tixrt. ' to a hundred and eighty Stadia, twenty-two " The site of Syracuse is thus described • English miles and a half; an account I by a modem traveller : ' The antienl city ' once suspected of exaggeration ; but, after * of Syracuse was of a triangular form, and ' spending two days in tracing the ruins, * consisted of five parts or towns; Ortygia, ' and making reasonable allowances for in- * or the iland ; Achradina, that faced the • croachments of the sea, I was convinced * sea; Tyche, joined to Achradina on the ' of the exactness of the measurement.' * east; Neapolis, wliich lay along the side Swinburne's Travels in the Two Sicilies, *^ of the great port; and, at the western p. 3C7, ▼. "• ' extremity, Epipolas. Some lofty rocks. It will be observed that this writer speak* ' crowned with ramparts, formed a strong of Syracuse when it had acquired its greatest ' defence all around, except in Neapolis, extent, some time after the age of the Pelo- * where the walls crossed the low-grounds, ponnesian war. His account of the exten- Sect. V. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. 343 business of the Athenians to carry their works of contravallatioii from Epipolas to the sea on each side; to the Trogilian port on the north, to the great port on the south. Tliey began on the northern side, and through their superior practice and skill, every possible preparation having been made during winter, tlic business advanced so rapidly as to astonish not less than it alarmed the Syracusans. At a loss for mea- sures to oppose to it, their generals resolved to venture a battle, rather than quietly permit the prosecution of works, which threatened, in their completion, the inevitable capture of the cit3^ They accordingly led out their forces ; but, in approaching the enemy, their order became deranged, and deficient discipline among the troops baffled their endevors to restore it. They had the prudence immediately to command hasty retreat, and were fortunate enough, under the protection of their horse, to get Avithin their walls again with little loss. This check was salutary to the Syracusans, as it tended to repress that intemperate ardor, which very inconveniently interfered with the authority of the generals ; and the genius of Hermocrates soon led him to the measures most proper in the existing circumstances. The Athe- nian works would be effectual only if the contravallation Avere com- pleted. They were yet confined to the northern side of the town : on the southern side therefore, between Epipola; and the great port, Her- Tliucyd. 1. C. mocrates carried out a work from the town-wall, cutting the proposed '^' ^^* line of the enemy's contravallation. He expected that his work would be interrupted, and perhaps destroyed ; but even thus he foresaw con- siderable advantage from it. If the enemy assailed it with the whole sive circle of prospect from tbe summit of ' thousand inhabitants, seems to float on Euryelus may deserve notice here : ' the bosom of the waters, guarding the en- ' Toward the north,' he says, ' tlie eye • trance of its noble harbour. The Plem- ' wanders over vast plains along a line of ' myrian peninsula locks it on the opposite • coast, to the fool of Etna, whose mighty ' shore, beyond which an expanse of sea i» ' cone shuts up the horizon with unspeak- ' seen, stretching away to Cape Passaro. • able majesty. The mountains of Italy rise ' 'ITie hills of Nolo bound the view to the • like clouds, on each side of It. Southward ' southward, and the foreground is every • the city of Syracuse, now reduced to its ' where an expanse of rich level plains, ' original spot, Ortygia, once an iland, but ' thickly planted, and watered by the wind- ' now a peiiiftsula, still containing eighteen ' iag stream/ of the Anapus,' p. 330". 3-u HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap, XVIIL of tlicir forces, he would retire, and he had his end in the interruption of thc'ir works ; if Avith a part, he would oppose with his wh»le force,, and so Mould probably be superior. The Athenian generals hoM'ever Tluiryd. 1.6. knew tlieir business: they permitted him to complete his work without ^•^^^ disturbance: a guard was placed in it, and the rest of the forces with-, drew into the city. Tho circumstances had occurred powerfully to' , r-eprcss forward rashness among the Syracusans, yet Hermocrates had not yet been aljle to establish due subordination among those who, having chosen him their commander, retained nevertheless, by the constitution of Syracuse, legal power still to command him. The Athenians, from the heights of Epipola:, observed the disorderly neo--. ligence of the Syracusan guard ; and, in the heat of mid-day, when part were strayed into the city, and the rest mostly reposing in their huts, a chosen detachment, supported by a strong body, assaulted the: fort, while the rest of the army distracted the enemy's attention by a. fiilse attack in another quarter. The guard of the fort immediately fled. The Athenians and Argians pursuing, entered that quarter of Syracuse called Tcmenites. They were however quickly overpowered, and compelled to retire out of the city with some loss; but they demolished the counterwork, carried off many of the piles, and, in claim of victory, erected their trophy. e. 101- On the next morning they began the contravallation on the southern side, from Epipolie toward the great port. The Syracusans, urged by their evidently growing danger, notwithstanding their late ill success, began a fresh counterwork, across a marsh lying between " the town and the river Anapus, and nearer the sea than their former work. The Athenian generals, upon this, ordered their fleet from Thapsus, where it had hitherto lain, into the great harbour. Nicias Mas at tliis time confined by ilness. Under the command of Lama- cluis, therefore, the Athenian forces issued at daybreak from Epipolte,' and making their way across the soft ground of the marsh upon planks, stormed the new work of the Syracusans, and routed the forces Mhich- came out of the town for its protection. The right of those forces' tasily reached the town again; but the left. made for a bridge over the Anapus. The Athenians cndevored to intercept them; but the ''i Syracusan SxcT. r. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. sio Sy racusan horse, of which the greater part was in that wing, facing about -unexpectedly, charged tlie more advanced of the Athenian troops, re-- pulsetl them, and spred confusion through tlieir right winp-. Lamachus, vho was in the left, hasteaing with a small body of bowmen, to - restore order in the right, and imprudently passing a deep ditcli, by which ready assistance was prevented, he was overpowered and killed, wilh fi\e or six of tl^ose about him. The Athenian left, however, advancing, the Syracusans retreated again hastily, but carried off with them the body of the Athenian general, and crossing the ri\er, were there secure. The momentary success of tlieir comrades, meanwliile, Thucyd. ]. 6, incouraging the Syracusans who had fled into the city, their leaders *^' ^^^* conceived the bold ideii of assaulting Epipolte, which they rightly judged would, upon the present occasion, be left with a small guard. Accordingly they took and demolished an outwork, and might have taken the whole, so weak was it left, but for the orders, judiciously given by Nicias, to the numerous slaves attending the army, to set fire to the wood, not sparing the machines, which lay before the wall. A flame was thus quickly raised, wliich checked the assailants; and, the Athenian army hastening to the relief of their principal post, while their fleet was seen entering the great liarbour, the Syracusans retreated within their walls. All hope of intercepting the contravallation, or by any means pre- c. 103. venting its completion, was now given up by the besieged ; and despon- dency, and its consequence, discord, began to gain among tliem. This became quickly knou'u among the neighboring states; and a general disposition to abandon the Syracusans, and to fear and flatter the Athenians, followed. This temper spred as far as the Italian cities : apprehensions arose that their refusal to furnish a market might draw, on them the vengeance of the conquering commonwealth ; and sup- plies flowed to tlie Athenian armament from all quarters. Those of the Sicel tribes also, who had before su])ereiliously rejected invitation from the Athenians, now solicited their alliance ; and from Tuscanv three, penteconters joined tlie fleet. . . •, Meanwhile the Syracusan multitude, impotent against their enemies,, vented their discontent against their generals, and Hermocrates and , Vox.. II. Y Y , his S46 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII; his collegues were removed from their office. One of them, however, Heracleides (unless it u'as anotlicr person of the same name) was re- stored, and Eucles and Tellias were associated with liim in the com- mand. At the same time suspicion of treachery between party and party, the universal bane of the Grecian commonwealths, especially iu adverse circumstances, gained ground. The lower people Avere far from being equally apprehensive with their superiors, of the conse- quences of yielding to the Athenians ; capitulation became the subject of frequent debate in the general assembly, and even messages passed to Nicias on the subject: but the terms proposed were not such as that cautious servant of the Athenian people could suppose would satisfy his greedy masters. Thus nearly however was a great point, and per- , haps the most important, carried toward realizing the magnificent vi- sions of the ambition of Alcibiades ; and so near was Nicias to gaining, almost against his will, the glory of conqueror of Syracuse and of Sicily, and adding to the dominion of Athens the greatest acquisition ever yet made by Grecian arms. Gylippus was arrived at Leucas with only two Lacedaemonian and two Corinthian ships, the rest of the squadron to be furnished by Co- rinth being not yet ready, when intelligence reached him of the ill situation of Syracuse; so exaggerated, that he gave up Sicily for lost, and thought he should do much if he could save the Italian states to the Peloponnesian confederacy. To this object therefore he deter-^ mined to direct his efforts. Taking Pythen, the Corinthian admiral, with him in his small squadron, he went first to Tarentum ; where, as a Thucyd.ibid. Lacedasmonian colonv, he was well received. He had -some hope of Di xl. 1. 13. . . . C.93. ' ' gaining Thurium, through family interest there; his father, Clean- p'" &'v *^'<^^S having passed his exile at that place, where he Avas admitted to the rights of citizenship. Means were thus open for attempting ne- gotiation ; but the Athenian interest, supported by the present reputa-i tion of the Athenian arms, was not to be overborne, and he could ob- tain nothing. In proceeding along the coast, to try negotiation with other towns, a violent storm interrupted his course, and, narrowly escaping shipwreck, he returned to Tarentum. Thiicyd. 1.7. Some days were necessary for refitting his shattered galleys, and then 4 he S ECT. V. S I E G E OF S Y ll A C U S E. S47 he proceeded with Pythen to Locri, from whose people, through local interest always adverse -to the Athenians, they found a favorable recep- tion. There thej' gained the first authentic intelligence of the reiil state of thing's at Syracuse. They learnt that, tho the circumvallation was really extended from Epipoiic to the sea on each side, and so far completed that any attempt upon it, without a very superior force, wou]d be rash, yet over the crags themselves of Epipolaj it might be possible to introduce troops into the cit3\ Learning farther that the strait of Messena was unguarded, they proceeded by sea^ along the northern coast of Sicily, to Ilimera; and v.ith the people of that place they succeeded. Gylippus then immediately determined to lay up his triremes in the port of Ilimera, and march across the country to Syra- cuse, with such force as he could collect. He ingaged the HimersEans to send with him a thousand foot, heavy and light, and a hundred horse ; and obtaining from them regular armour for those of his crews who were unprovided, he thus made his Peloponnesian heavy-armed seven hundred. He depended upon zealous assistance from the Seli- imntines, in whose cause the Syracusans had drawn on themselves the arms of Athens ; he had promises from Gela; and an opening oftered for negotiation with some of the Sicels, through the recent death of a chief named Archonidas, whose influence principally had decided them -to the Athenian interest. In all these negotiations the very name of Lacedeemon, as Thucydides assures us, powerfully seconded the ac- tivity and abilities of Gylippus. The Selinuntines indeed, avIio beyond others owed zeal to the cause, deceived his just expectation, sending only a small body of light-armed : the Geloans also sent only a small body, but it was cavalry ; the Sicels joined him with a thousand men. His force all together, with attending slaves, might be about five thousand. During these transactions in Sicily, the squadron, assembled at Loii- Thucyd. 1. 7, cas, sailed for the Italian coast, leaving behind Gongylus, one of the ^" Corinthian commanders, who happened not to be ready. This acci- dental circumstance had most important consequences. Gongylus, as soon as himself and his trireme were prepared, pushing across the gulf, without making the usual circuit of the Italian shore, arrived on the Sicilian coast before the squadron, and entered the harbour of Syracuse Y Y 2 unopposed. 348 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIH'. unopposed. For Nicias, thinking success now assured, and lidding in contempt the force which he heard was approaching, kept little watch; and tho he had not disdained to send four triremes to prevent the pas- sage of Gylippus through the strait of IMessena, yet he sent them too late. The arrival of Gongylus was most critical. Summons had heen issued for a general assembly to meet for the declared purpose of debating concerning terms of capitulation. Uncertain hope, raised by the ar- rival of the Corinthian admiral; gave strength to the party adverse to the surrender : the question of capitulation was postponed : Gongylus was aHowed to address the people; and the warm assurances he gave of. speedy and effectual succour, not from Corinth only, but from Lace- ditmon (for the authority of the Lacediemonian name, says again Thu- cydides, was of principal M'eight) wrought such a tiu'n in the popular mind, that the chiefs ventured to propose to march out and meet Gy- lippus, who, from communication M'hich had passed, was known to be approachirrg. It could not be without' gross neglect in Nicias, that, with a force of . scarcely two thousand heavy-armed, and those for the most part but inferior troops, Gylippus shortly after ascended Epipola^ unopposed; by the same way of Euryelus, by Mhich the Athenians had first obtained possession of that important post. The Syracusan forces actually went Tilucyd. 1. 7. out to meet him ; and to the- astonishment of the Athenian general' and *■ ^' armj'-, busied in the works on tlie south of the city, tile combined forces made their appearance as if oflFering battle. Gylippus however- had the precaution to halt while retreat was still at Iris option, and he sent, forward a herald with the pmposal, 'That' if the Athenians would quit ' Sicily in five days with their arms and baggage, he was willing to ' make a truce for the purpose.' The messagcwas of course received wltli di.^chiin, amid their astonishment, by those who thought them- selves on the point of becoming conquerors of Syracuse and of Sicily. Kicias, however, continued motionless, while the herald Mas simply ordered to withdraw. INIeantime the able Gylippus had had sufficient opportunity to observe, that the Syracusan forces were deficient in dis- cipline, to a degree beyond what he had imagined ; tlyat they M-ere ut- terly' unable to form on unevtn and confined ground ; and that the first thing Sect.V. siege of SYRACUSE. 34!) thing necessary for him was to retreat for more space. Nicias made no attempt to profit from any of these circumstances, hut remained behind his -works. Gylippus, thus allowed to retire at leisure, chose his camp for the night on the liigh ground of Temenites. Next morning the combined forces appeared again in order of battle, in front of the Athenian works, and by their position intercluded the communication of the Athenian general with his fort of Labdalum, and ■with his northern lines. Nicias continued still unaccountably mo- tionless, while Gylippus sent a strong detachment which stormed the fort, and put the garrison to the sword. A smaller occurrence on the same day contributed to raise the spirits of the Syracusans ; an Athe-^ nian trireme was taken at the harbour's mouth. Gyhppus having, by this succession of daring but well concerted Tlu)ryd. 1. r. measures, in his outset, Mholly changed the face of affairs, insonuieh that not only the city was very effectually relieved, but the Athenian army was now rather in a situation of some danger, prudently checked the spirit of enterprize, that he might give stability to the advantage obtained. Master of EpipoliB through his success against Labdalum, he began immediately to carry out works to intersect the Athenian works, using the materials which the Athenians themselves had col- lected. Meanwhile Nicias, aware that the moment of opportunity; for that great success with which he had lately had reason to flatter him- self, M^as gone by, and that, however he might still be superior in the field, to take Syracuse was beyond his present strength, continued nevertheless to prosecute his southern work toward the sea. In a country where all was inimical, to keep his communication open with his fleet, woulil be necessary to the subsistence of his army, and might become necessary even to its safety. Occupying therefore the head- land of Plemmyiium, on the southern side of the entrance of the great harbour, he rcu.ed there three redoubts, in which he placed the greater part of the baggage and stores of his army, and near them he stationed his ships ot' burden and small craft. This measure, \ve\\ conceived in regard to : • objects particularly in view, was, however, attended with great iii enienccs. The soil w^as swampy and unwholesome; the water b -n; the Syracusan fort of Olympieium Avas near, and a body. S.'O TIISTO^IY OF GREECE. Chap. X VIII. body of horse, stationed there by Gylippus, gave unceasing annoyauce; .watching- the wood and water-parties, cutting- off stragglers, and ma- kiiig- it dangerous to stir tVom the camp, but in powerful bodies. Thiicvd. 1.7. It ^^as not long before Gylippus again -clrew out his forces and of- '^-' ^' fered battle; and Kicias now, at length, did not refuse to meet him. The field was very narrowj. confined between the contravallation and the city- wall. The Syracusan horse had net space for action, and the infantry, pressd by the superior discipline of the Athenians, soon re- treated within their fortifications. It seems to have been the purpose of Gylippus to give practice to the Syracusans, with the least possible risk, and make them experience the necessity- of submitting to the seve- rity of Spartan discipline, if they would hope for the success for which the Spartan arms were renowned. Addi-essing them in assembly, he •took all the blame of the late failure to himself; condemned his mis- application of their cavalry ; praised the valor shown by theif infantry ; and flattered them with remarking- that, being of the same Dorian ori- gin with the Lacedjemoniaus, they ought to hold themselves superior to lonians and ilanders of the >Egean ; and he doubted not but they would quickly show it, by driving those intruding adventurers out of their country. He scon gave them opportunity of trial. Kicias would rather have Thucvd 1 " avoided action, but that the Syracusan counterwork from Epipolae c. ()• alarmed him. Already it barely did not intejsect tlie line of the Athe- nian contravallation ; and if completed would, according to Thucy- dides, not only prevent the completion of the contravallation, but give to the Syracusans both the choice when they would iugage, and cer- tain advantage in action. Gylippus so chose his ground that his cavalry could attack the Athenian left in tlank. The wing was thus thrown into a confusion, which spred in some degree through the line, and Nicias hastily withdrew behind liis works. Having thus esta- blished, in his own army, the opinion that they were superior in the field, Gylippus prosecuted assiduously his projecting work, and it was quickly carried beyond the Atlienian line. This being effected, says Thucydides, if the Syracusans should now have the misfortune to be defeated in battle, and reduced to confine themselves with.n their w^alls, Sect. V. S I E G E O F S Y R A CU S E. 35! ■walls, it would nevertheless be scarcely possible for the Athenians to complete their centra vallation. But adversity began to pour- upon the Athetiians. Nicias had sent twenty triremes to the Italian coast to intercept the squadron from Thucyd. 1. 7 Leucas. His army had scarcely recovered 'from the consternation of their late defeat, when they saw the enemy's squadron, consisting of c. 7. twelve triremes, enter the little harbour of Syracuse. The strength, thus added, gave the city, for the present, complete security. It was therefore resolved to act upon the offensive against the Athenians; and with this view it was proposed to collect a still greater strength, for which tlie credit of prosperous circumstances and recent success •would best give means. Ministers were sent to Laceda'mon and Co- rinth ; and the active Gylippus went himself around the Sicilian cities, to excite the lukewarm, and win the adverse, to exert themselves in the cause of Laceda^mon and of Syracuse, which, he contended, was tJie cause of liberty, of justice, and of the general interest of Sicily. - AVbat opinion the Athenian general no^w held of his own situation, we learn from his own account, transmitted by Thucydidcs. Writing Avas but beginning to come into common use for ordinary purposes. The dispatches of generals were mostl}', or, it rather appears, univer- sally, committed to trusty messengers, who delivered them verbally. Thucyditles speaks of Nicias as the first general who made it his prac- c. s, tlce to transmit his reports home constantly in writing. He had ob- served, says the historian, that messengers, in delivering verbally to the soverein people in assembly the reports committed to them, some- times through inability to express themselves clearly, sometimes through' fear of relating the whole of unpleasant truths, sometimes through hope of conciHating favor by exaggerating agreeable circum- stances, generally gave an impression wide of- the re'aHty. From his first' appointment therefore to a command with which hie had always been little satisfied, and-ia which complex operations were to be con- ducted at- a greater distance from home than had been usual for the Athenian arms,- he had used the precaution of frequently sending dispatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction ; ■and these were always formally red to the assembled people, by the secretary Sii HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. swretarv of the commonwealth ". He had now clelermuiecl, in conse- fjiicnce 01 his ill success in the late battle, to remain upon the defen- sive for the rest of the summer. For this lie thought it necessary to apologize very particularly in his dispatches to Athens. He therefore committed thera to officers whom he selected as most competent to answer any questions that- might be put to tbem, yet he scrupulously protested that his Mritten dispatches onlj- should be considered as having his authority. Tliiicyd. 1.7. In these he represented, that, 'After having nearly attained the ' object of the expedition, when Syracuse was already reduced to ex- ' tremity, the arrival of Gylippus, with a considerable reinforcement, ' partly Peloponnesian and partly collected in Sicily, had changed the ' face of affairs : that he had nevertheless been victorious in the first ' action, but the superiority of the enemy in cavalry and troops of ' missile weapons, was, under able conduct, too much for him to re- ' sist ; and, in a second action, he had been constrained to retreat : * that it was in consequence noAV become necessary to confine himself ' within his lines, to forego offensive operations, and to consult prin- ' cipally how he might best insure the safety of his army against supe- ' rior numbers; for, instead of besieging, it was ratlier reduced to the ' condition of a camp besieged : that the superiority of the Syracusaii * cavalry rendered any communication with the country highly dan-^ ' gerous : that, for increase of evil, he not only apprehended -a strong «• 12. ' alliance within Sicily against the Athenian interest, but was assured ' that additional forces Mould arrive from Peloponnesus; and that,, * finally, he was threatened with attack, not by land only, but by sea. ' The fleet,' he proceeded to observe, 'had unavoidably gone fast to ' decay; the ships were become leaky; the crews diminished; the ' enemy had not only had more ships, but, secure against attack, they ' could chuse when they would attack him : it was therefore necessary c. 13. ' for his fleet to be unremittingly watchful : the guard of the naval ' camp, and convoys for the introduction of provisions and stores, ' kept the whole on constant duty : the crews, forced to go far fon. ' wood and water, were continually suffering from the SyracusaU; '* O yf.an^tuTtvi T?{ ira>ii«5. c. 10. • ' horse. Sect. V. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. SoS horse. Meanwhile not only the slaves deserted in numbers to the enemy, but the auxiliaries and mercenaries, who had hoped that plunder more than fighting Avould be their business in Sicily, now they saw the Athenian armament declining, and the enemy gTowing- in vigor, went home without leave. Sicily,' continued the unfortu- nate general, ' is wide; and, wholly to prevent these desertions, is im- possible; even to check them is difficult; and of" all losses to an Tluicyd. 1.7. armament, that of able seamen is least easily repaired. Nor are ^' ''*'' these the only evils that press us : what is to me most distressing, both to feel and to complain of, remains yet to be mentioned. Your temper, Athenians, is adverse to subordination. The army is a part of you ; a part of that soverein peo])lc on whom my power whollv depends ; and I find my authority insufficient to coutroul the per- verse disposition, and restrain the pernicious conduct, of some under my command. Meanwhile the enemy abound in resources, and we are destitute ; for Naxus and Catana, our only allies in this part of the world, arc little able to assist us. If then, in addition to existing evils, the Italian cities, whence our supplies of jirovisions have been principally drawn, should be induced, by the ill state of our affairs and your neglect of us, to refuse farther assistance, we should be at once undone, and the enemy would have a complete triumph with- out the risk of a blow. ' I could have sent a more pleasing account, but I could not send intelligence M'hich it more imports you to receive. I know your dis- position to be gratified by favorable reports of your affairs; but then I know too the change that follows in your temper, when the event disappoints expectation ; and I have tlierefore thought it best to ex- plain to you, without reserve, the reiil state of things. ' Since, then, I can atfirm that neither your generals, nor your army, c. 15. have deserved blame for their conduct in your service here, since Sicily is now united against us, and reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, I will venture to declare that it is become absolutely necessary for you to determine on one of two measures : either your forces noM' here must be immediately recalled ; or an additional ar- mament, not inferior in either land or naval force to the former, must Vol. II. Z z be Sbi HISTORY OF GREECE. Chat. XVIII. * be sent hither: it must be here early in spring, and a large sum of '■* money for its use will be indispensable. For myself, I request that I ' may be superseded in the command, for which ill health disqualifies * me ; and I hope I may be allowed to claim this as an honourable in- ^ dulgence due for my past services.' The Athenians were not yet practised eno-igh in misfortune to listen to wise advice thwarting a favorite purpose. Ambition was a popular passion, not resting on incitement from Alcibiades. The pertinacity indeed and the vehemence with which its objects were pursued, con- sidered together with the near prospect of success, even under the dis- advantage of his removal from the execution of the vast projects which he had conceived, may indeed afford no small amount of ajwlogy for his conduct in directing the effervescence, wliich apparently none could still. The Athenian people M-ould not, on the remonstrances of Thncyd. 1.7. Nicias, give up their views of conquest in Sicily : they M'ould not even allow their infirm and deserving general to retire. An additional force ■was immediately voted ; Nicias was required to remain with the com- mand in chief; Menander and Euthydemus, officers now in Sicily, were appointed his present assistants in the duty : Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, who had already so much distinguished himself by im- portant services, and Eurymedon son of Theocles, who had commanded at Corcyra, at Pylus, and in Sicily, Mere named to lead the reinforce- ment. As an earnest of the resolution of the Athenian people to give the utmost support to their friends in Sicily, Eurymedon was sent for- ward about midwinter, with ten triremes and twenty talents of silver, while Demosthenes remained to superintend the equipment of the rest of the armament. Sect. VI. WAR RENEWED BY LACED.EMOX. 355 SECTION VI. Deceleia in Attica occupied by the Lacedivmonians. Fresh Rc'ui force- merits for the Athenian Armament in Sicily^ Naval Action in the Harbour of Syracuse. Distress of Athens. Tax upon the States subject to Athens. Massacre in Bceotia. Naval Action in the Corinthian Gulph. While the Athenians were thus madly intent upon distant conquest, a more serious attack than they had yet experienced, was preparing against their own country. The success of Gylippus, the prospect of assistance from the whole force of Sicily, the evident embarrassment of Athens, the exhortations of Corinth, the advice of Alcibiades, and the important information and assistance which he was capable of givino-, now all together determined the Lacedfemonians to recommence hosti- Thucvd 1 -. lities immediately against Athens. They weie farther incouraged, says ^' ^^' the historian, bj' the consideration that justice (not simple justice, or a due consideration of the rights of men, which Grecian religion little taught to regard, but justice ratified by a solemn appeal to the gods) Avas now on their side. Their misfortunes, in the latter years of hostility, -had led them to reflect that the beginning of the war had, on their part, teemetl with injustice, and breach of solemnly plighted faith. Such were the refusal to submit their disputes with Athens to a judi- ,cial determination ; the support of the violence committed by the Thebans against Platasa; and the first invasion of Attica. On the contrary, since the truce, the Athenians had always refused to submit matters in dispute to judicial inquiry, which the Lacedtemonians had frequently demanded. The same transgression, therefore, which they thought had already bronght the vengeance of the gods on themselves, they concluded M'ould now bring it on the Athenians. The war thus became popular, and to prosecute hostilities with vigor was determined with alacrity. It was resolved to carry into execution the long nie- e thought himself not strong enough to attack, unless he could divide their strength. Sect. VI. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. 357 strength. He proposed therefore another measure, which, to some, might appear still bolder: he would man the ships and attack the enemy's fleet. The reputation of the Athenians for naval superiority was so established by their various successes against the Peloponnesians in the beginning of the war, that the Syracusans were startled with the first idea of ingaging them on water. But the influence of Hermocrates powerfully seconded the authority of Gylippus. Together they in- couraged the Syracusans, by representing to them, that nothing so daunted an enterprizing people as daring and unexpected enterprize against them. ' The Athenians themselves,' they added, ' had not ' always been a seafaring people : the invading Persians had first forced * them to become such ; nor was there any reason why tlie Syracusans, * more prepared for it now than the Athenians then, should not quickly ' even excel them.' Recent good fortune had prepared the Syracusans for incouragemcnt. Having already, under the conduct of Gylippus, succeeded so much beyond their liopes, they were disposed now to carry the'w hopes Ingli. Accordingly they submitted themselves to his Thucyd. I.", command: thirty-five triremes fit for service lay in tlie great port, '^'^'" and forty-five in the little port : all were manned by night, while Gy- lippus led the whole force of infantry toward the Athenian forts at, Plemmyrium. At daybreak the stir in the Syracusan fleet became visible to the Athenians, who hastily manned sixty triremes; of whic:h twenty-five were ojvposed to the thirt\'-five of the enemy already within the great port, and thirtj'-five to the forty-five which were advancing to enter it. On the land-side, the watch was so negligent, that the approach of an enemy was neither observed nor looked for, but the whole army made toward the shore to assist the fleet. Gylippus meanwhile, hastening his march, carried the largest of the three forts at the first assault; upon which the other two were immediately abandoned by their gar- risons. By this time the fleets were ingaged. Within the great port, the Syracusans had at first the advantage; but their larger division breaking their order in advancing to the attack, were defeated; and then the conquering Athenians, hastening to the relief of their pressed ships, SS9 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. ships, quickly compelled the other division of the Syracusan fleet to fly. Eleven Syracusan ships A\ere sunk ; the crews of three were made -prisoners; those of the others, mostly periihed. Three Athenian ships were destroj'ed. Th.e Athenians erected a trophj- for their naval victory : the Syracusans erected three trophies for the three forts taken. Thucyd. 1. 7, More important tokens of success, however, than any trophies, re- mained to the Syracusans. The killed and prisoners in the forts, not- withstanding the numbers that fled, were many : the military chest, all the most valuable effects of the principal officers, large magazines of provisions, most of the stores of both army and fleet, masts for forty triremes, and three complete tiiremes laid up ashore, were taken. One of the forts was immediately demolished : garrisons were placed in the other two, and a squadron of triremes was stationed un- der their protection, to intercept supplies by sea to the Athenian camp ; vhither, thenceforward, no vessel could arrive, but by stealth, or by fighting its way. Notwithstanding therefore their naval victory, the consequences of the late complex action was very seriously disadvan- tageous to the Athenians; and while their general, never remarkable for activity, was oppressed with sickness, alarm and despondency began to peryade the armament. Meanwhile the conduct of the Syracusans, under the able direction c. 25. of Gylippus and Hermocrates, was all energy. Twelve triremes, under Agatharchus, a Syracusan, pushing to sea, one went to Peloponnesus with dispatches. Agatharchus, with the remaining eleven, made the Italian coast, to intercept a fleet of Athenian transports and storeships, of which intelligence had been received, and most of them fell into his hands. He proceeded then to Caulonia on the Bruttian shore, where he burnt a quantity of navy timber which had been collected for the Athenians. In his return, meeting at Locri the Thespian auxiliaries destined for Syracuse, he took them aboard his squadron, and made homeward. One of his triremes was taken by an Athenian squa- dron stationed at Megara; the rest arrived safe in the harbour of Syracuse. Notwithstanding their late naval defeat, Gylippus and Hermocrates 1 resolved Sect. VI. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE: INVASION OF ATTICA. S59 resolved not to give up their purpose of disputing with the Athenians the command of llie sea. Accordingly, to secure their station in the great port, whence tliey might best annoy the Athenian fleet, they formed before it a kind of rampart of piles. To prevent the completion of this, and to destroy what was already done, became an important object for the Athenians. The merchantships of the antients, capa- cious, deep, and firm in the M'ater, like modern vessels for ocean navi- gation, were much fitter for some purposes of stationary fight than their galleys of war. A merchantship therefore, of the largest size ", being fitted with turrets and parapets, was conducted close to the Syracusan rampart; a body of troops aboard annoyed the Syracusan workmen, and drew the attention of the troops appointed to protect them : meanwhile a party in boats fastened ropes about the piles, divers went down and sawed them at the bottom, and thus most of them were hauled up or broken. To fortify and defend their naval station on one side, and to destroy it on the other, Avas then for some time the principal object of the two adverse parties ; in which, on the side of the Athenians, the skill, activity, and boldness of the people were more observable than the science or vigor of the general. The Syracusans continued to drive piles, and some in such a manner that, not appearinof above water, they were very dangerous to the Athenian boats ; yet divers were found, for large rewards, to saw and fasten ropes even to these, so that the labor of the enemy was continually to be renewed ; and as the present view of the Athenian general was defence, and to gain time for the arrival of the reinforcement which he expected, his purpose was in a great degree accomplished. While the Athenian afi^airs were thus waning in Sicily, Athens itself Tlmcyd. 1. 7, began to feel severely the consequence of having a Peloponnesian gar- rison estabhshed in the heart of its territory. In the former invasions a considerable part of the harvest had been consumed or carried off, and the vineyards, orchards, and olive plantations had been destroyed or greatly damaged. The injury however had not extended over the whole country. The Lacedcemonian army, for want of magazines^ could 360 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIIL could not stay long; and when it was gone, no appreliension remained, during the rest of tlu; year, for wliat had escaped its ravages : the herds and ilocks returned to their pastures, and tlie owners of the lands might make any use of them that the interval till the next summer would admit. But the garrison of Deceleia kept the whole rountry, and the city itself, in constant alarm. Its very wants compelled it to exertion: for the troops, little supplied by their cities, were to subsist chicflj' by plunder; and the assistance, which they received occasionally from home, was less in money or stores, than in reinforcements to assist in rapine. The Spartan king Agis, M-ho had led the expedition, and super- intended the construction of the works, remained, after the departure of the rest of the army", as governor of the garrison, and assiduously and ably directed its measures. Not only all produce and revenue from the lands of Attica, with all the herds and flocks which they had maintained, were lost to the Athenians, but more than twenty thou- sand slaves deserted, the greater part mechanics and manufacturers. The Athenian cavalry were to little purpose employed in the endevor to check the ravage and desertion. Many of the horses, the art of shooing that animal being yet unknown, were lamed by unremitted service on rough and rocky ground, some were disabled by wounds, and the rest soon worn down. Thucyd. ]. 7. Among the inconveniencics insuing from the establishment of the ^'^^' enemy in Deceleia, one is mentioned by Thucydides, which marks to a surprising degree the imperfection of antient navigation. The large and fruitful iland of Euboea was at all times the principal resource to the Athenians for supplying the deficiencies of the scanty and arid soil of Attica. The produce was mostly brought to the port of Oropus, Cliaiidler's and thence conveyed by land, along a hilly road of about forty-four jnumev in j^iip. to Athens. Tlie nearest, the least hillv, and almost the only Cirep.~o, and ' ' . Antonin. practicable road for heavy burdens, passed through Deceleia. The oc- cupying of that post by the enemy therefore made it necessary to carry every thing by sea. With the advantages of modern navigation, this would be incomparably the preferable method ; but the cotemporary author assures us that, in that age, the expeuce of the transport all the way Sseqv.VI. PRESSURE ON ATHENS. g6l way by sea far exceeded that of the old practice '*. For the rest, wc may readily conceive the force and the truth of the concise phrase >vhich Thucydides has used to express the distress of a great city : In- stead of a commonwealth, he says, Athens was reduced to the condition of a garrison. Without a territory, it depended upon su])plies by sea for subsistence. The whole people were harrassed with military duty, ^o incessant as to admit little other employment. By day they mounted guard by reliefs ; but for the night, excepting the higher orders who composed the cavalry, none were at any time excused ; those, not immediately wanted for the duty of the ramparts, being required to be in constant readiness with their arms": and this continued through all seasons, during the remainder of the war. Pressed thus by every inconvenience of a siege at home, such con- tinued to be the zeal of the Athenian people for foreiu conquest, such the ardor with which they insisted on the prosecution of the siege of Syracuse, a city scarcely inferior to Athens in size or population, that unless it was seen, says the historian, nobody would believe it. Thus indeed, he continues, the expectation of all Greece Avas strangely dis- appointed, and the opinion generally entertained, both of the power and of the perseverance of Athens, proved mistaken. The pressure of new evils served but to bring forward new resources. All revenue from Attica, public and private, ceasing, it was necessary to look abroad for augmentation of supplies. A total change Avas made in the '♦ Those less acquainted with the advan- benefit of tides in our narrow seas, which, tages which the arts of modern navigation in the Mediterranean, is little known, give to transport by sea, may form some " '0> fAii Jip' ottAoi? iroimy.ittit, oi ^ iin tgD estimate of them from the following circum- ru'/av^- The exact value of the phrase ip' stances. !Much of the trade between Lon- ow^oi; woiot/iwoi, apparently a military phrase don and Canterbury is carried on by water ; of the day, is scarcely now to be ascer- and Vt'hitstable, six miles from Canterbury, taiiied. The explanations attempted by the is the port of that city for its communica- commentatorE and translators are very un- tion with the Thames. The passage from satibfactory. For discovering the meaning London to Whitstable is perhaps eighty of Thucydides upon this occasion, the cu- miles: but the general charge of carriage is rious reader may however consult another the same for the six miles by land, between passage of Thucydides, nearly to tlie same Whitstable and Canterbury, as for the eighty purpose, in the 69th chapter of his eighth iy water, between Whitstable and London, book ; and some similar phrases occurring Allowance must however be made for the in Xenophon may assist him. Vol. II. 3 A collection sea HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. collection of revenue from the subject-states ; the antient tribute was abolished, and, instead of it, a tax was imposed, re?;einbling the mo- dern customs ; being a t\venticth of the value of all imports and ex- ports'*. Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon our- selves, wns the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from liistory, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependant commonwealths; the arbitrary power by M-hich it was imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, tho the burden itself was comparativel}- a nothing. While the Athenians were suffering from the Peloponnesians established in Deceleia, a cruel stroke fell upon their neighbor enemies of Boeotia. The circumstances, little materially connected with the great events Thuc d ^^ ^^^^ ^^^'^' '^^^'^^ however considerably toward a portraiture of the 1. 7. c. 29. times. Thirteen hundred middle-armed Thrncians, hired for the Sici- lian expedition, did not arrive till after the fleet under Demosthenes was gone. Means to forward them were not ready, and their pay was burdensome, being an Attic drachma, nearly tenpence sterling ahead, daily. It was resolved therefore to send tliem home and dis- charge them; but, by the way, to make any use of them against the enemies of the commonwealth, for which opportunity might offer. The command was committed to Diitrephes, an Athenian, who, passing through the Euripus, debarked his barbarians on the first hostile shore in his course, that of the Tanagrtean territory. Having collected some booty, he hastened to deposit it in the neighboring friendly town of Chalcis in Euboea, and in the evening again crossed the Euripus '• Thucydides, not in the moment aware it, farther than to inform of some different of the explanation necessary to make this readings, which are evidently and grossly interesting passage clearly intelligible to bad. The Latin translation runs thus : Per posterity, for whom professedly he wrote, id tempus tributi loco vicessimam mercium, has expressed himself in his usual close man- quje mari vehebantur, populis imperio sue ner, with no oiher words than these: Ti» subjectis imperarunt, sperantes se majorem iixos-i» iffo t5t»» Tar x?°"" '"' **■'■* ^a\ii^'ni witii whom it is by no means a common jofii^omj «» i ailtTr^ufotc f»aA>,o» And another English and a Swiss traveller, atlas S «« m^mXcv rai? J^foAarj ;^g?s-9«t. both habituated to accurate observation, 'I'hucyd. 1.7. c.36. being separately asked, told me they reckon- seventy- 363 HISTORY OF GREECE. Cuap.XVIIL seventy-five triremes and met them. The contest was long: two Athenian triremes were sunk; but the fleets parted without any great advantao-e c-ained on either side. 'niuc5d. 1. 7. Next day the Syracusans did not move. But no incouragement ^' ^*' arose hence to tlie Athenians. They felt that they had lost the supe- riority by sea, as well as by land; and they concluded that the enemy would not long rest satisfied with the progress already made. Nicias therefore directed his principal attention to the security of his fleet. He had already formed a stockade in the water, for the defence of his naval station. In front of this, at convenient distances, he now moored large merchant ships, of the kind called holcades, much loftier as well as deeper than the galleys of war. In these were placed machines bear- ing instruments of vast weight, called dolphins; so suspended, over the sea, that they might be dropped on any vessel passing near, and with such violence as to sink it. Behind these floating fortresses, any of his ships, pressed in action, might find shelter, with means to return with advantage against an enemy, bold enough to pursue them so far. e. 39, 40,41. The Syracusans did not disappoint the expectation of the Athenian general. The very next morning their land and sea-forces nmved at once toward his camp and naval station ; but the serious attack, as l)efore, was on the fleet. As before, also, much of the day was con- sumed in fruitless contest. At length Ariston, a Corinthian, esteemed the best seaman" in the Syracusan fleet, conferring with his coUcgucs in command, advised a measure, judicious in their circumstances, tho, in the authentic description of Thucydides, it marks great deficiency, both in the ships of war of the Greeks, and in their militar}^ and naval Ck. 13. s. 3. economy. We have heretofore observed a Corinthian fleet, when going to seek an enemy, taking three days provision aboard. But it appears that when immediate action was expected, as on the present occasion, the general practice was to leave everything but their arms in their naval camp ; not incumberiag themselves ashipboard with a single meal. Toward midday, in pursuance of the advice of Ariston, the Syracusans retreated, but in perfect order, toward their naval station Sect.VIT. third naval ACTION. 369 station. The Athenians, fatigued with unavailing contest, did not pursue. The Syiacusans, on reaching the shore, found a market of eatables provided. The magistrates, in consequence of notice from the naval commanders, had compelled all persons in the city to send whatever provisions they had ready, and the crews debarking, took hasty refreshment. Meanwhile the Athenians, retreating to their naval camp, had dis- persed, expecting no interruption of leisure for their meal ; when sud- denly they perceived the Syracusan fleet approaching again in order of battle. With much timndt, and mostly without refreshment, they hastened'aboard, and the action was renewed. But it was no longer equally maintained, as before. The strengthened bows of the Syra- cusan galleys, through management improved by experience, d;!niaged several of the Athenian : the numerous dartmen on tiie Syracusau decks plied their weapons efficaciously; and practice in that manner of naval ingagement, which the confinement of the port re(iuired, had given the Syracusan leaders to imagine a new mode of annoying an enemy, who, like the Athenians, depended chiefly on the skill of their rowers and the shock of the beak. Dartmen in boats, venturing under the quarters, and even under tlie lateral galleries of the Athenian gal- Tbucyd. 1. 7. leys, gave more annoyance to their seamen than even the dartmen on ^' '^' the decks ^'. Seven Athenian ships being sunk, several others much damaged, *' Vloy.l y sVi f.£ij(a 01 t> To~; ?,£ffToi; ■jrXofoi; only gratings; tlieir purpose having been, as w;fi7r^£o»l£5 Tut Jlvfcixmriuv, xai £? T£ ths Tafiraq I imagine, only to give projection and pur- V7rc.7ri7i-1i)i''i£; tuit TroAsi^iut viwsi y.a,\ i% t« chase to the upper oars. A parapet, raised ■K>.a.yiix. 'ica.fom'hioHic, y.ai l| i.v]m U tk? vat;T«; on them, protected the towt^rs in a great axoiTi^ovTE!. This is a passage lor which little degree against missile weapons from the assistance is to be expected from translators decks of the enemy's galleys, but the open anil commentators. An attentive cxamina- or grated bottom gave passage for weapons tion of an antique piece of sculpture in the from boats underneath. Vatican museum at Rome, mentioned in a 1 am sorry to have to say that Win- former note, assisting the idea furnished by kelman's description of the piece of sculp- general Melvill, first gave me to imagine I ture in question, and the ingraving he understood it. I doubt however if the ver- has given of it, are both very erroneous, sion given in the text may carry with it suf- Equally the antiquarian and the artist have ficiently its own explanation. I suppose the been evidently ignorant of what a ship or a lateral g tileries of the galleys to Ijave been boat ?hoidd be or could be. Vet \Vink»l- opcn at bottom, or at most to have had man flattered himself with the imagi'.iatiou Vol II. 3 U i'"t 370 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. (lamagcd, and tlie trews of all weakened with fasting, fatigue, and Avomids, the whole licet souglit the shelter of their floating fortresses. So far the Syraciisans pursued, and three of their ships, elate with suc- cess, pushed within them ; hut two were sunk, and the other was taken with her whole crew. The rest retired, satisfied with the success of the (hiy, and confirmed in opinion that they were now superior, by sea as Avell as by land, to that enemy from whom they had so lately appre- hended subjugation. It was therefore unanimously resolved, at the earliest opportunity, to renew the attack on botli elements. Tlmcvd I - ^" ^'^^ short and critical interval, between the resolution taken <=; ■*2. and the proposed execution, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived, ■ " with a fleet of seventy-three triremes, five thousand regular heavy- armed infantry, and a greater number of bowmen, dartmen, and slingers; so that, including the attending slaves, the landforce alone would approach twenty thousand men. Alarm and astonishment now returned witli double force upon the Syracusans. They were assured that Attica itself was in the possession of an enemy ; and it appeared an unaccountable paradox, that, so pressed at home, the Athenians should send out such a force to make forein conquest ; a force in all points equal to that which Nicias had first led to Sicily. The power of Athens, says the historian, thus appeared stupendous, its resources beyond calculation, and their own danger consequently endless. Demosthenes, having landed his forces, viewed his ground, and received the information that Nicias and his officers could give, formed his opinion of the business before him, and decided on the measures proper to be taken, with that cool and just judgement, which might be expected from an officer who, to considerable talents, joined his extensive experience. Powerful as the junction with Nicias made the armament under their command, and much as it struck sudden terror into the enemy, Demosthenes did not flatter himself with certain success. In his younger days he had been entcrprizing, even to rash- lliat he had discovered, in this monument, or their accounts, have left for us, how their perhaps iu the incorrect drawing of it, which ships of war were rowed. A man wlio never \\e. contemplated in his closet, a solution of himself pulled an oar, will in such an that difficulty, which the antients, in all attempt hardly avoid absurdity, ness. Sect. VII. REINFORCEMENT FROM ATHENS. 371 ness. Now, in mature age, undazzled by the near view of glorious conquest, unawed by the apprehension of popular rage, neither the hope of profit, nor the prospect of fame, nor the fear of a tyrannical multi- tude could move him from what he thouglit the welfare of his country required. The safety of the Sicilian army was not to be staked against any hope of conquest : the gain would be a precarious advantage to the commonwealth, the loss almost certain ruin. His first resolution there- fore was to avoid the error of Nicias, losing opportunity by delav : his ■next, to fix upon some one undertaking, in which success might be in some degree decisive, and failure not fatal : and finally he determined, that should such a first attempt be defeated, it would be improper to risk farther so large a portion of the strength of the commonwealth, and, whatever indignation he might incur from the Athenian people, he would lead the armament home. Upon this occasion Thucydides sufficiently declares his opinion, that, with able and spirited conduct in the outset, the conquest of Syracuse might have been eflfected by the Athenian arms. Had Nicias, he says, instead of wasting almost a year in little enterprize, gone at once against that city, he might have completed his contravallation. The Syra- cusans, at first, confident in their own numbers, did not even think of desiring assistance from Peloponnesus; and they might have been put beyond means of relief, before any eflfectual assistance could arrive. Circumstances were now very dift'erent ; but to accomplish the purpose of the expedition seemed not yet beyond hope. The Athenian force was clearly superior in the field. The principal obstacles to the progress of the siege were the enemy's counterwork intersecting the line of the contravallation, and their possession of Epipolas. Demosthenes ob- served that the counterwork was only a single wall, without defence behind ; so that possession of Epipolas would give him possession of the counterwork. He therefore judged that the assault of Epipolte would be the best criterion ; its success or its failure would best de- termine, whether the siege of Syracuse should be vigorously prosecuted, or abandoned without delay. The account of Thucydides may give to suppose, tho it does not directly express, that the ideas of Demosthenes did not exactly meet 3 B i those c. 43. 378 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chav.XVIIL those of Nicias. The consideration that the reinforcement had re- stored superiority in the field, seems to have led to the first measure taken, which was to ravage the country beyond the Anapus. In this, apparently, a double object was proposed. Possibly the enemy might be provoked to risk a battle; of all things, perhaps, for the Athenians, the most desirable. Should they avoid it, the Athenian army, beside being gratified with booty, would derive incouragement from the experienced acknowlegement of their superiority. Nothing opposed them : the cavalry and light troops from Ol3mpieium only attempted some desultory annoyance, with little effect. The next attempt, which Thucyd. 1. 7. was against the counterwork, was unfortunate. The machines were burned by the enemy, and every attack repelled. Demosthenes then insisted that his proposed assault of Epipolse should be no longer de- layed ; and Nicias and the other principal ofllcers acceded to the measure. Apparently Nicias was at this time too infirm to take any active part in a business which migh't require great exertion. Under the command therefore of Demosthenes, Eurymedon and ]\Ienander, the w hole army, except a small guard for the works, was ordered for the dutv : provisions for five days were carried, and the engineers and arti- ficers attended, to form defences in the instant of getting possession of the ground. To attack, howcvei', otherwise than by surprize, so great a force, in a post so strong by nature and by art, was deemed un- advisable. Night was therefore chosen for the purpose : the array moved, as Thucydides describes the hour, about the first sleep. Ascending by the way of Euryelus, they passed the first Syracusan post unperceived. Surprizing then a small outwork, they put part of the guard to the sword : but the greater part, escaping, alarmed the camps in Epipolfe. These were three : the Sicilian allies formed one; the allies from Greece another ; and a third was composed of Syracu- sans : Gylippus himself commanded. All was quickly in motion to oppose the assailants : but the Athenian van, led by Demosthenes, re^ pulsed the first troops they met, and continued mounting the liill, while those who followed demolished the fort taken. Attacks were renewed by Gylippus, but still unsuccessfully : the Athenians pushed forward, but. Sect. VII. ASSAULT OF EPIPOL^. 373 but, in confidence now of success, hastening to complete the acquisi- tion of the enemy's works, tliey grew more careless of their order. In this state the Boeotians, who were among the allies of Syracuse, met, and checked them. Among a large body of men, confined within nar- row space, on rough ground, and by night, confusion once arising, spred rapidly. To communicate commands was diiificult; and, tho the moon shone bright, yet when established arrangements were once disturbed, it was no longer easy to distinguish friends from foes. The repulsed Athenians, meeting those yet advancing, were received m ith pointed spears. This occasioned frequent and clamorous passing of the word ; which thus became known to the enemy, and of course useless or even prejudicial to themselves. Rut beyond all things the peeanism, the song or shout of battle, which the Greeks always used in the moment previous to attack, increased the confusion: for that of the allies of Athens of Doric race, Argians, Corcyrasans, and others, being the same with the Syracusan, alarmed the /Uhcnians wherever they heard it ; and as disorder extended, the troops of the Athenian army, in several parts, fought oneanothcr. At length all took to flight. The only road for retreat was narrow; the fugitives were nu- merous ; and hastening to avoid the pursuers swords, many perished by falling down precipices. Of the more fortunate, who gained the plain, those who had served under Nicias, acquainted with the country, easily reached their camp or lines; but some of the newly arrived, missing their way, were next day cut off by the Syracusan horse. The morrow was a day of mourning to the Athenians, as of triumph to the Syracusans. The dead were restored to the defeated, through the usual ceremonies. Thucydides does not specify the number"; he says it was considerable, but not so great as the number of shields taken would have given to suppose ; because those who fled over the precipices disincumbered themselves of their armour; and, tho many perished, some escaped. The Syracusans erected two trophies ; one at " Plutarch states it at the round sum of dred. Later writers however are not likely two thousand. Diodorus, al\va3s struggling to have had iiiforniatiou which Thucydides to "ive celebrity to the deeds of his fellow- could not obtain, countrymen, calls it two thousand five hun- the 374 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. the beginning of the ascent of Epipolee; the other, on the spot where the Boeotians made the first effectual resistance. Thucyd. 1.7. Every circumstance appeared now to require that the Athenian generals should quickly enter upon some new plan. The armament was sickly, partly from the season, partly from the marshy and un- wholesome ground on Avhich it was incamped ; and the hope of soon reducing Syracuse, or indeed of at all reducing it, seemed frustrated. Demosthenes therefore warmly urged his opinion, before given, that due experiment having been made and having failed, all purpose of conquest in Sicily should be at once abandoned, and the armament conducted home. Not the necessities of their own situation, he said, more than the wants and distresses of the conmionwealth required the measure; insomuch that it would be inexcusable farther to risk so great a portion of the public strength, and continue such waste of the public revenue, on what Avas comparatively an unimportant object, Thucydides very seldom declares, in direct terms, an opinion by M'hich the character of his cotemporary might be affected. It is however easy to perceive that he approved, upon the whole, both the advice and the conduct of Demosthenes, as, for his country's Avelfare judi- cious, for himself disinterested and manly. It is not equally easy to discover his opinion of the conduct of Nicias : perhaps he was unable c, 48. to determine his own judgement of it. Nicias positively refused to lead the armament home. ' The temper of the Athenian people,' he said, ' is well known to me : warm in expectation, and jealous of their * authority, they will highly resent a measure so disappointing to their ' hopes, unauthorized by their decree. Our conduct, then, let it be * recollected, must be submitted to the judgement, and our fate must ' be decided by the vote, not of those who have seen and who know ' vhat we know, but of those ^\ho will be persuaded of anything by * any eloquent accuser. Even of those now under our command, of ' those now loudest in complaint of the evils they are suffering, some, ' nay many, will unsay their assertions, blame the abandoning of the ' expedition, impute corruption to their generals, and perhaps become ' our accusers, or at least join in the vote for our condemnation. I ' therefore, if I am brought to the alternative, will not risk a shameful 1 ' death Sect. VII. RETREAT PROPOSED: SECRET NEGOTIATION. ^is ' death from the injustice of my fellowcitizens, to avoid an honorable ' death from the valor of the enemy. But I think we are not yet so * straitened. Ill as the face of our aifairs appears, I Avell know the ' condition of the Syracusans is worse. In some points, they are un- ' der great difficulties ; in others, reduced to absolute inability. They * are ruined by their expences. Two thousand talents, already con- * sumed upon their auxiliary forces and their fleet, have not sufficed : ' they have besides incurred a large debt. Their fleet therefore they * cannot long maintain ; and on the least failure of payment, their ' auxiliaries will abandon them. We are under no ecjual difficulty; ' and on these considerations I hold it utterly improper to give up ' the enterprize.' Such were the sentiments of Nicias, delivered in the council of war. But, beside his extreme horror of the prospect of living under the Athenian democracy, with credit so impaired as it must have been by relinquishing the enterprize, he had reasons for his perseverance which he did not communicate. There were among the Sjracusans some who, as their fellowcitizens of the opposite party were to them the most odious and most dreadful of enemies, wished well to the Athenian arms. These communicated secretly with Nicias; they informed him Thucyd. 1.7. accurately of the state of things in the city ; they urged him to perse- '^' *^' ^ *^* vere in the siege ; and they incouraged him to hope, that the very distress of the enemy and the zeal of his secret friends, with little exer- tion on his part, M'ould give him still to return home conqueror of Syracuse. Demosthenes, uninformed of this negotiation, was unable to com- c. 49. prehend the conduct of Nicias; and he strenuously insisted that, if they must wait for a decree of the people to authorize their return home, yet the army ought immediately to move from ground so un- healthy, and still more the fleet from that confined situation, in which it could not come to action but under the grossest disadvantage. Eurymedon concurred with him; but Nicias still opposing, deference to his rank, together with the supposition, and perhaps intimation, that he might have intelligence unknown to them, occasioned a suspension of measures, and the armament remained in its station. Unexpected 37G HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. Unexpected success had now prc]jave(l the Syracusans for any ex- ertion. But Gylippus and Ilermocrates would not omit to profit from Thucy.l. 1. 7. that credit which grows witli prosperity. Information arrived that factions were violent in Agrigentum; and it was hoped that assistance, critically given, might put the party friendly to Syracuse in possession of the government. Accordingly Sicanus was sent thither, with fifteen c 50. triremes; but, on his arrival, lie found matters accommodated between the contending parties, and t!ie moment of opportunity lost. Gylippus himself was in the mean time more successful in a journey, which he undertook into the Sicel country. Besides collecting a considerable force among the barbarians, he was joined by a body of Peloponnesians, A\ho, to avoid the Athenian fleet, had made the coast of .Africa, and , thence crossed to Selinus; and he led the whole, without opposition, into Syracuse. ^Meanwhile the Athenian armament, dispirited by disappointment,, was also weakening daily by sickness. Intelligence, that Gylippus had introduced a powerful reinforcement within theSyracusan lines, excited new apprehension, and Demosthenes and Eurymedon regretted their concession to their elder coUegue. Nicias at length was persuaded, yet scarcely persuaded, to give the sanction of his coustnt to the retreat of the armament. He deprecated any public decision of such a measure by that open manner of voting, vhich, in pursuance of the democratical principle, was the general practice of the Athenian military^'; and orders were given, with cautious privacy, for the fleet and army to prepare for quitting their station. All was accordingly 07 Ana readv, when the full moon was suddenlv darkened. None had tb.cn science to foresee the regular return of that phenomenon; few could be persuaded that the cause was in the order of nature. It struck the armament with terror, as a portent boding ill to their purpose: appli- cation was made to the generals, deprecating tiie intended march : the augurs and sootlisayers declared that, to bring the heavenly powers *■■' Ml) ^anfui; yi a|ia» ir,^'t(i7$ai. We the tomiiion foiT.is of proceeding on such want ex|ilaiiaULin ol lliis ibiubc, which the occasions in his age, without thinking of commentators and transl^itors do nrt tive. the explanation that posterity might need. Thucydides has written for lliose who knew again Sect. Vir. ECLIPSE OF THE MOON. , 577 again to a friendly aspect, required a delay of thrice nine days; ami Nicias, more superstitious than the rest, affirmed that, till that period was completed, he would not even consult about removal. There seems to have been nothing in this omen to persuade the Athenians, more than the Syracusans, that the illboding regarded them. On the contrary, Plutarch gravely imputes to the augurs ignorance in their profession; they ought, he says, to have known Plut. vit. that an eclipse portended rather the favor of tlie gods to those Avhose purpose was retreat. Plutarch apparently must have had a low opinion of the power or of the goodness of the gods, whicli did not make a signal of favor intelligible, or did not dispose the favored to a just confidence in such a signal. But omens of undecided import, such is the nature of superstitious fear, commonly were taken as un- favorable by those in adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the knowlege that the Athenians held themselves to be the objects of the divine displeasure portended, sufficed for the Syracusans to derive incouragementfrom the portent. They were confident of superiority Thucyd. 1. 7. by land; they considered the intention of secret retreat as proof of fear '^' ^^' to stand a battle. They resolved therefore not to allow the enemy to establish themselves anywhere in Sicily, by which the war might be drawn into length, but to attack them by sea and land in their present situation, and by their total destruction to deter future invasion. Such being the purpose, the able leaders directed their attention, for some da3's, to exercise, their people in whatever they judged most necessary to success in naval action. Giving then the seamen a day of rest, they led out the infantry, and they gained some small advantage over a body of Athenians, horse and foot, who advanced against them'*. On the next day they proposed their great attack. Accordingly c. 52. ^ Dodvvell has been, I think, not sue- clear. With regard to the delay required cossful in the calculation of dajs from the by the augurs, whether there has or has not eclipse forward, and the endevor to assign been tlie corruption of the text of Tliucydi- to each its circumstances. He has given des supposed by Dodwell, is little important, either not due attention, or not due credit, but Plutarch's account agrees with the com- to the narrative of Thucydides, which, with- nion reading, out such minute accuracy, is consistent and Vol. II. 3 C seventy- 378 HISTORY OF GREECE. Ciiav. XVIII. spventy-six triremes moved from the naval station, and the whole land- force advanced toward the Athenian lines. Tiie Athenians, superior by ten triremes, met their fleet. Eurymedon, who commanded the right, to nse that advantage which superiority of numbers gave, stretched away with a view to surround the left of the enemy. The center spread- ing, to obviate the danger of too great an interval between the di- visions, weakened itself by making the intervals too great between ship and ship. In this state it was attacked by the enemy in close order, and presently defeated. The Syracusans then directing their principal effort against the division of Eurymedon, now cut off from the rest of the fleet, took, destroyed, or drove aground every ship, and Eurymedon himself was killed. The left wing, thus AvhoUy without support, fled, pursued, to the shore. Such is the brief account which Thucydides gives of this important action ; as if feeling too much to relate in detail a defeat, for its consequences, so deplorable, and the first, of any importance, which his country ever suffered at sea from an inferior force. With his usual tenderness for characters, he names neither Nicias nor Demosthenes ; and expresses no opinion, nor imputes any blame, otherwise than by omission. Thucyd. 1. 7. Gylippus, while no part of the landforces were yet ingaged, observed C.52. from the shore the distress of the Athenian fleet, and many of the ships forced aground beyond the protection of their stockade and their camp. Immediately he detached a body of infantry to intercept any of the crews that might fly, and to overpower those who might attempt to defend their stranded vessels against the victorious Syracusans. The Tuscan allies were the nearest troops of the Athenian line. The Syracusan detachment, elate with the success of their fleet, approached in disorderly haste. The Tuscans, bj- a vigorous assault, conducted with regularity, put them to flight. Gylippus sent reinforcement; but assistance coming also from the Athenian camp, the Athenians finally prevailed, Mith some slaughter of the enemy's heavy-armed, and they saved most of the stranded ships. The Syracusans however took eighteen, and of these the whole crews perished. An attempt was made to destrov the Athenian fleet, within its stockade, by a fireship. 1 " The Sect. VII. FOURTH NAVAL ACTION. S79 The wind favored the design, but the practised skill of the Athenian Thucyd. 1. 7. seamen rendered it ineftectual. The Syracusan fleet then retired, and each party erected its trophy : the Syracusans for their naval victory, the Athenians for their success by land. But the event of the naval action, so contrary to all hope founded on former experience, was a disaster so momentous, and so little balanced by the better fortune of the landforces, that the deepest dejection pervaded the Athenian armament. On the other hand, the Syracusans began to consider themselves no longer as an oppressed people, strug- gling in the almost hopeless defence of everything dear to them; they looked forward to success that might intitle them vanquishers of Athens, c. 56. k 59. and vindicators of the liberties of Greece. Accordingly they applied themselves immediately to blockade the port; desirous now to prevent tlie departure of that force, from which they had expected the worst evils of subjugation ; and proposing no less than to destroy, or reduce to the dreadful condition of prisoners at discretion, the whole of that formidable fleet and army. • Meanwhile not dejection only, from a sense of disgrace, and appre- c. 60. hension of the swords of their enemies, but the most urgent of wants pressed the Athenians. In consequence of the resolution taken to raise the siege (no suspicion being entertained that the enemy could prevent their departure by sea) they had forbidden farther supplies of provi- sions from Catana. Naval superiority lost, the means of intercourse with Catana were gone; and thus the desire to depart was inforced, as the means were rendered precarious. A council of war was called to consider of these untoward circumstances; and the taxiarcs, officers nearly of the rank of colonels in our service, were summoned to assist the generals with their advice. The result of the deliberation was a resolution to withdraw the whole armament by sea. This being de- termined, the subordinate resolutions followed, to use all possible means for strengthening the fleet; and, with this view, to abandon immediately their extensive line of contravallation, and reduce their works to a single fort near the naval station, large enough only to contain the baggage and sick, with a competent garrison. But naval action now, far different from that in open sea, where they had been long ac- 3 c 2 customed S80 HISTORY OF GREECE, Chat. XVIII. customed to a decisive superiority, must be unavoidably similar to that in which they had already yielded to inferior numbers. Thus late Thucyd. 1. 7. therefore, taught by severe experience, they proposed to prepare accord- ingly. Upon this subject the advice of the masters^' of the triremes was required. The lightness of the vessel, a quality necessary to swift- rowing, and, in open sea, of inestimable advantage within the harbour of Syracuse would little avail. On the contrary, to be able to maintain a stationary fight, as between infantry ashore, was of principal impor- tance. It was therefore resolved that every man capable of bearing^ arms, beyond the necessary garrison of the fort, should be taken aboard; that numerous bowmen, with the ablest dartmen, particularly the Acarnanian, should be stationed on tlie decks; and that, on the prows, grappling-irons should be fixed, which might at once obviate the shock of the enemy's stronger bows, and, preventing their retreat, give op- portunity for their own numerous heavy-armed to act. Pui-suant to these resolutions, about a hundred and ten triremes M'cre equipped and c. 65. manned. The bustle of preparation in the Athenian naval camp Avas observed by theSyracusans, and intelligence reached them of the grappling-irons with which the Athenian prows were armed. Gylippus and Hermocrates, tho they could not equip eighty triremes, nevertheless determined to pur- sue the contest, so far successful, for naval sujx^riority. Against the new mode of action proposed by the Athenians, they thought it neces- sary to prepare; but for this it was held sufficient to cover the forecastles of their triremes with bull-hides, on which the grappling-irons would c. 69. not readily take any firm hold. While the animation of theSyracusans and their confederates seconded the spirit of their leaders, among the Athenians, notwithstanding the great superiority of their naval force, a general dejection prevailed. The discouragement, arising from the late naval defeats, was proportioned to the former confidence in the opinion, sujiported by long experience, of their decided superiority. But as the spirits of those under his com- mand sunk, the animation, and indeed the whole character of Nicias seemed Sect. VII. FIFTH NAVAL ACTION. 381 seemed to rise: His behavior on tlie occasion was truly great. Little ambitious, under favoring fortune rather deficient in exertion, and sometimes culpably remiss in his command, his activity and animation increased as evils pressed and dangers threatened. None was now so warm in exhortation, that might restore the drooping courage of the soldiers and seamen. The state of his health did not permit him to take the command ashiphoard : but he was sedulous in attending the necessary preparation, and directing every arrangement. Wiien all was ready for the proposed attempt, thinking, says the historian, he had not yet said so much for the incouragement of his officers and people as the singular importance of the occasion demanded, he went around the whole armament; and speaking to each trierarc separately, after mentioning their superiority in numbers, and the measures taken for resisting the enemy's novel mode of attack, he exhorted every one, by his own glory, and by that inherited from his ancestors, to exert liim- self in the battle to insue. Leading then the whole to the shore, he there committed them to Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, under whose orders they embarked, and moved immediately to the harbour's mouth to force the egress. The enemy, who carefully watched their motions, Kljuickly made ti,uc\cI. 1.7. towardthenijUnderthe Corinthian Pythen,andSicanusandAgatharchus, '• ^^• Syracusans; the Corinthian commanding the center, the Syracusans the wings. With the first shock the Athenians made themselves masters of the vessels that blockaded the mouth of the port, and M'ere hasten- ing to unmoor them and clear the passage, when the Syracusans ap- proached, and a most obstinate battle insued. Meanwhile the Athenian army stood on the shore, observing with the most anxious attention what passed, within such a distance that they could see and hear almost everything. When therefore after a long contest, with various fortune at times in various parts, the ad- vantage of the Syracusans become decisive, and the whole Athenian fleet fled pursued, then grief, indignation and dismay (says the eloquent historian, at a loss for words equal to the description) rose to the utmost pitch that any circumstances could produce in the human mind, since none could be more hopeless. Entering 382 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIIL Thucyd. 1. 7. Entering little into detail, and not at all accounting for the event of '^■'^" this disasterous battle, Tlmcydides proceeds to describe the conse- quences. The dejection that pervaded the defeated armament was so extreme, and the danger impending so urgent, that the sacred dues of the dead, objects commonly of such anxious attention, were totally neolected ; no herald was sent to request the restitution of the bodies, no care was taken about their burial, but every thought was absorbed in the evils that pressed, and the perils that threatened, the hving. Amid the o-eneral despair, however, Demosthenes did not lose his usual enero-y of mind. Going to Nicias, he proposed what might still have saved the greater part of the forces. Sixty triremes remained to the Athenians: those of the enemy, tho victorious, were reduced to fifty. He thought it therefore very possible still to force the passage out to sea, if, imbarking that very night, they made the attempt at daybreak. Nicias approved, but the crews absolutely refused. ' To retreat,' they peevishly remonstrated, ' was all the generals wanted ; they would go ' anywhere by land, and fight their way, if necessary ; but by sea the ' experience of the past sufficiently proved that they could expect ' nothing but destruction.' The execution of the salutary measure was thus preventett by excess of discouragement. SECTION VIII. Retreat of the Athenians from Syracuse. C.73. Gyltppus and the Syracusan chiefs, on considering the advantages whichtheir last success gave them, became more than ever desirous to prevent the departure of the enemy : the Syracusans, by the complete destruction of the invading armament, would deter future invasion ; and Gylippus hoped, in effect, to conquer Athens itself in Sicily. The opinion was general in Syracuse, and it justifiecf the proposal of Demosthenes, that the Athenians would now think only of retreat by land, and it was supposed they M'ould move that very night. But the Sect. VIII. RETREAT OF THE ATHENIA N S. 383 the SyraCLisan people, wearied with the labor of the day and exhilarated with its success, were more eager to injoy the leisure, which they had so M-ell earned, than solicitous about any future events. It happened too that the morrow was the festival of Hercules. Anions such an assem- blage of people of Dorian race, and on such an occasion, the desire of duly celebrating the day of a hero-god, with whom they esteemed themselves so connected, became irresistible; and nothing could pre- suade thera to quit the religious revel for nocturnal military enterprize. Hermocrates, who had been at first most urgent for marching imme- diately to intercept the Athenians, knew his fellowcitizens and mankind too well to attempt, in such circumstances, to force inclination: but his fruitful genius provided still a resource for the attainment of his purpose. In the evening, some persons under his direction went on horseback to the Athenian camp; and approaching enough to be heard, when they could be little distinctly seen, pretended they were of the party which had been accustomed to communicate with Nicias. Finding credit so far, they charged those whom they had ingaged in conver- sation, to go and tell the general, ' tliat tlie passes were already * occupied by the Syracusans, and that he would therefore do well not ' to move that night, but wait and concert his measures.' The fatal Thucyd. 1. 7. bait v/as taken, and the next day Mas spent by the Athenians in '•' "*• various preparation for the march. But Gylippus and Hermocrates, having yielded in the moment to the M'ishes of their people, found means, before the morrow ended, to ingage them in their own views. Their victorious fleet went to the Athenian naval station, and no opposition being attempted, they car- ried off, or burnt on the spot, every ship there. The army at the same time marched out, under the conduct of Gylippus, and occupied all the principal passes around the Athenian camp, and in that line of country which the Athenians would probably propose to traverse. On the next day'*, every thing being prepared, as far as circum- stances would permit, orders were issued by the Athenian generals for ** The third from the naval action, ac- who counted the day itself of an action first, cording to the phrase of Thucydides, and the next day as second, and so forth, the usual mannerof reckoning of the Greeks; marching. C.75. 381 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. marching. The pen of Thiicydides and the language of Athens are wanting, to describe adequately tlie scene presenting itself upon that occasion ; when, in the bitterness of autient warfare, every horror offered itself to expectation, that the human body can suffer or the human mind conceive. No light distress arose from the rejection, that, instead of fulfdling the lofty hopes of their enterprize, the whole uf so powerful a fleet was destroyed ; that, through their failure, ruin threatened their countr\' ; and that, instead of returning, as they had so latel)' with reason expected, conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only, and that almost a hopeless resource, for avoiding slaver}' or death. But, in the circumstances of that flight, many dreadful considerations, many lamentable objects, presented them- selves, striking home to the feelings of every individual. The dead lay yet «nburied; and the recollection, or, in many instances, the sight, of a relation or a friend so neglected, struck not only with grief but with horror. Yet the voices and the actions of the many living, whom Abounds or sickness disabled for the march, their complaints, their ex- postulations, their prayers, their embraces, and the painful, yet fruitless endevors of some to follow tlicir friends, were still more distressing than the compunction which arose from the neglect, impious as it M'as deemed, but so far excusable as it was unavoidable, of the still and silent dead. INIutual reproach then, and self-reproach, for that share which any had had in superinducing or inhancingthe public calamity, Avhether by promoting the enterprize, or by obstructing the retreat, occasionally aggravated the bitterness of Avoe. Such, in short, saj's the historian, was the accumulated weight of present misery, that it thiew the whole multitude into tears ; and, absorbing the apprehension of farther danger, took away almost the desire, and even the power to move. At length the march commencing, resembled that of a whole city flying from a besieging army. This is the remark of the cotemporary historian, drawing a-comparison from among those circumstances Avhich distinguish autient from modern times. For the numbers, he continues, including attendants, were not less than forty thousand. Attendants however were of little importance : mostly slaves, they deserted Sect. VIII. RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS. 38,5 deserted openly; and in the instant of the army's moving, the greater part disappeared. Thus even the cavahy and the heavy-armed were reduced to carry their own provisions and necessaries ; some beino- ■without attendants, some mistrusting those who remained to them : and the small portion of provisions they possessed demanded every care, since it was far from being equal to their probable wants. Amid the extreme dejection and anguish, not Avithout reason per- Thucyd. 1.7. vading the armament, Nicias Avonderfully sujjported the dignity of *^" '^^' his character and situation. Individually the distress of the existing circumstances appeared not to affect him ; his only anxiety seemed to be to relieve that of others, and to diffuse incouragement among all. The historian's authority for the remarkable words he attributes to him on the occasion, tho not stated, certainly might be good : but whether we consider them as conveying the sentiments of Nicias or of Thucydides, they are highly interesting, as they mark the opinion entertained of the divine providence, by a man of exalted rank, of ex- tensive information and experience, just and religiously disposed, but never taught to consider this life as a state of probation, and to expect, in futurity, the reward of good or the punishment of evil deeds. From the head of the line, according to Thucydides, exerting his voice to the utmost, that he might be heard as extensively as possible, Nicias, with an unruffled countenance, desired the troops to advert to his c. 77. own case: 'I,' he said, * am in body (you may see indeed the state ' to which sickness has reduced me) verv far from beinor the strongest * among you. In the blessings of high fortune I M^as once inferior to * none : but now I must bear every present evil, I have to apprehend ' every threatened danger, in common with the lowest under my com- ' mand. Such is my lot; who have always been regular and zealous ' in every duty to the gods; and not only, as far as depended simply * on myself, scrupulously just, but liberally charitable among men. * Hence I have hope and confidence that our fortune will change for * the better. The affliction we xiow suffer is suiely beyon,d our de§ert; * the enemy have already been sufficiently fortunate ; and if our enter- * prize against this country has offended any of the gods, it cannot be ' but our present evils are adequate punishment. For wc are not the Vol. II, 3D ' fust 386 Thucyd. 1. ~. c. 78. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIIL first M ho have draMii our swords in the attempt, unjustifiable be it confessed, to subjugate and reduce to slavery our felloM-creatures, and seize to ourselves their possessions. In doing thus, doing only what is ordinary among men, others have suffered for it only what men may bear. "We therefore have surely reason to hope, that the gods will at length moderate their apparent excess of vengeance against us ; objects, as we are already become, of pity rather than- of indignation. ' Confiding thus far then in the divine mercy, let us look to what, meer human things considered, our circumstances are, and surely we ought not to despond. Such a force as we possess, with so large a proportion of regular troops, wherever we establish our abode, we are not only a formidable army, we are a commonwealth. Certainly no Sicilian state, Syracuse excepted, Avill easily drive us from any situ- ation we may occupy ; or even prevent us from occupying any we may desire. To be safe, indeed, we have only to reach the Sicel ter- ritory ; for their fear of the Syracusans insures to us the friendship of the barbarians. Firm minds and orderly conduct then are principally necessary to your welfare ; and not to yours only, but that of the Athenian commonwealth ; which, however lamentably fallen through our misfortune, it may not be beyond our ability to restore; since the strength of a state consists, not in towns, not in territory, not in ships, but in men." ) i^ ■''■ '^' --- ' ' Having thus spoken, Nicias led the march, the army being disposed in two divisions, with the baggage between them ; himself commanding the van, Demosthenes the rear. The i-oad chosen was not toward their Grecian friends of Naxus and Catana, but that by which they hoped most readily to reach the Sicel country ; where soonest they might find food and safety, Mith leisure to concert farther measures. At the ford of the Anapus, very little distant from their camp, they found a body of Syracusans posted to oppose the passage. These they soon forced to retire; but the enemy's horse and light infantry, hanging on their flanks and rear, gave such continued annoyance, that, after a march of only five miles, finding a rising ground commodious for the purpose, tJiey iucamped foi the night. On the next day they made still less progress. Sect. VIII. RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS. 387 progress. Want of provisions induced them to lialt, after a march of only two miles and a half, in a plain where, beside collecting cattle among the farms and villages, they could supply themselves with water, for their progress over the liilly and dry country, which lay next in their way. But, on the third day, the Syracusan liorse and light- -armed, in larger force than before, gave so much greater annoyance, that, after many hours wasted in unavailing attempts to repress them, tlie distressed Athenians returned to the camp they had last occupied, Nor could they profit, as on the preceding day, from their situation : even to obtain water, such was the enemy's superiority in cavalry, was •difficult and hazardous. Errors in conduct, evidently in the opinion of Thucydides, had oc- curred ; though he has avoided, as usual, the express declaration of any opinion. Either change of plan, or some greater effort than had yet been made, was clearly indispensable. On the next morning, there- Tbucyd. 1. 7. fore, they nioved earlier than usual, and pressed their march, with the view to occupy the Acrason-lepas, the first narrow at the entrance of the highlands. But the opportunity lost was not so easily recover- able : their slowness had given the enemy time, both to discover their ■intended course, and to profit from the knowlege; and on their arrival at the Acrtcon-lepas, they found not only an armed foroe to oppose them, but the natural difficulties of the pass increased by a fortifica- tion. An assault was immediately attempted, which v/as not in the moment successfid. IMeauwhile astonii came on; such, says the 4 Sept. ace. , . . . , , . ■ I • 1 to Chron. historian, as in the autumnal season is common ; but, in the present Tim. but la- Avane of the Athenian affairs, and the despondency its consequence, ''^'^'^l'""' everything was construed as an ill omen, and the generals could not Sep. persuade their troops to renew the attack. As constant exertion tqnds to maintain the animation which success has raided, so new and, un- expected opposition commonly inhances the depression of the unfor- tunate. Gylippus, attentive to every opportunity, and observing the ■ hesitation of the Athenians after their repulse, sent a body of men to raise a fort in their rear, so as to intercept their retreat. The Athenian •generals, liowever, found no difficulty in checking this purpose. Their force was indeed yet such as to deter the enemy- from giving thepi 3 D 2 battle ; S8'8 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. battle ; and accoidingly they again chose their camp for the nigiit within the plain. But on the morrow, when they moved again, still with the view to force the passage of the mountains, they had no sooner quitted their camp, than the Syracusan horse and light-armed were upon their flank^^ and rear. If they halted to repel the annoyance, the enemy instantly retreated ; but the moment they resumed their march, the attack was renewed ; and this so repeatedly and efficaciously, that after advancinp* only one mile through the plain they incamped again. Then the Sy- racusans also retired to their camp. Thucyd. 1. 7. The distress of the Athenians was now become very jrreat : while c 80 numbers were suffering from wounds received in the many skirmishes, all were in almost total want of provisions and of all necessaries. The generals therefore came to a sudden resolution to break up their camp by night, and take the road toward the sea, the direct contrary to that which they had been hitherto following, and on which the enemy waited to intercept them. For, pursuing along the coast the way to Camarina and Gela, they might still reach the Sicel territory, by a more circuitous course indeed, but through a more level and open country. The usual fires were lighted, to obviate suspicion in the 'enemy, and then the army was silently assembled and the march begun. Nicias led, with a hasty pace, yet preserving due regularity. Through some unknown fatality, alarm and tumult arose in the division com- manded by Demosthenes. Order was after some time restored ; but the two divisions were completely separated. c. 81. The Syracusans, as soon as day broke, perceiving the Athenian camp deserted, in the usual temper of democratical jealousy, began to cri- minate Gylippus, as if he had traiterously permitted the enemy to escape. To discover which way so large a body had directed its march, ■was however not difficult, and shortly all joined in zealous pursuit. Demosthenes, notwithstanding the misfortune which had retarded him, had before daybreak reached the road leatling from Syracuse to Elorus. A little farther he found a body of Syracusans raising M'orks to obstruct his passage across the gully, through which flows the brook Cacyparis. Ihcse he soon dispersed, According to the plan con- S certed Sect. VIII. RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS. 389 certed with Nicias, he should then have turned up tlie course of the Cacyparis, to gain the interior country ; but, by the advice of his guides, he proceeded, still near the coast, to the brook Erineus; and there the cavalry of the Syracusan army overtook him. From the first there seems to have been some difference of opinion between the Athenian generals, concerning the manner of conductino- the retreat. Nicias thought tlie safety of the army depended, beyond all things, upon the rapidity of its march : the insult of assault should therefore be borne, and halts made, to repel attacks, only when they threatened very important injury. This evidently was what Thucy- dides approved. But Demosthenes was more disposed, on every occa- sion, to revenge with the view to deter annoyance. No sooner there- fore were the Syracusan horse now pressing upon his rear, than he changed that line of march by which he could best gain ground, to form his troops so as to act most efficaciously against the enemy. The "Syracusans saw their opportunity, and pushed by him while he halted. Their infantry quickly came up, and Demosthenes was surrounded. Too late discovering his error, he took the best measure that circum- stances would then admit, occupying a walled inclosure near at hand, where tlie enemy's horse could not reach him, and where he could defy even their heavy-armed infantry. Sut repeated sufferings, in the course of this long war, and especially the affair of Pylus, had taught the Lacedsmonians the value of light troops and missile weapons. Gylippus, employing the heavy-armed only in false or in desultory at- tacks, made principal use of his bowmen, darters, and slingers ; and from these, through the remainder of the day, the Athenians had no xhucyd. Ur. rest. In the evening, v/hen many were thus wounded^ and all worn. <=• ^'-• with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, he sent a herald with a proclamation, promising liberty to any of the danders who would come to the Syra- cusan camp and surrender their arms. Not many, even in so hopeless a situation, when all the evils, that the barbarity of antient warfare could inflict, were impending, would forsake their general and their comrades ; an instance of fidelity deserving notice the more, as the common conduct of the Athenians would not seem to merit such, attachment from tlieir subjects ; and while it does honor to them- sdves 'S<)0 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XVIII. selves and to Demosthenes, it certainly reflects some credit on the, go- vernment of Athens. So desperate indeed M'ere the circumstances, that, in the same evening, Demosthenes capitulated for the rest of his troops, surrendering himself and them prisoners of war, with no other stipulation than that none should suffer death, either through violence or for want of sustenance. . With tlieir arms they gave up all their money, throwing it into the hollow of shields held to receive it, and four shields were thus filled M'ith sjiver. The prisoners, in number about six thousand, were immediately conducted to Syracuse. Meanwhile Nicias, having ascen.ded some way by the course of tlie -Cacyparis, crossed to the Erineus % passed that stream, considerably above the scene of Demosthenes's fate, and incamped on some high Thucyd. 1.7. ground near the faither bank. Early next morning the Syracusaii 7 Sep. -army hastened in pursuit, and the horse quickl}- overtaking him, gave Chron. Thu. jijfoimation of tlie capitulation made by Demosthenes, and summoned but rather a 1 1 • 1 ^ 1 1 r- ^•eekJater. him to surrender lumselt and. the torces under his command. Re- fusing credit to such intelligence so transmitted, he asked a safe- conduct for a horseman of his own to make the inquiry, \\hich was .granted. The return of his inessenger assuring him of the fact, he then sent to propose, in the name of the Athenian commonwealth, reimbursement to Syracuse of all the expences of the war, upon con- dition only that the troops under his command might depart in safety; and for security he would leave Athenian citizens as hostages, one for every talent that would thus become due. The proposal was rejected, and the Athenian army was quickly surrounded by the multitude of the enemy ; who M'oukl hoM'ever neither make nor sustain any regular attack, but continued, till evening, unceasing annoyance with missile weapons. Among the disti'csses of the Athenians, not the least was the want; of -provisions. Could they have supported the enemy's assaults on their . present ground, they could not have subsisted there. Kicias there- fore, about midnight, called to arms as silently as possible, w'ith inten- tion to pursue his march : but the watchful enemy perceived his mo- tions, and immcdiatelj' sang the pa-an. Upon this he gave up thp '' Tliis appears from a comparison of the 80th chapter of TLucydides wjth.the S3d. • • design. Sect. VIII. SURRENDER OF THE AT H E NIA N S. sgi design, and remained in liis camp ; but a body of about three hundred, witliout his orders, made a successful push at the enemy's Hnc, broke through, and, under favor of the obscurity, quickly got beyond im- mediate pursuit. Nicias waited for the dawn, and then continued his march. Even then the enemy, under the able conduct of Gylippus and Thucyd. ].7. c 8 V Hermocrates, wonld come to no regular action, but only infested, as Sept. 8. or before, with missile M'eapons and desultory charges of cavalry. Sicily, raiher about through the greatest part of its extent, is high land, intersected with numerous valleys, whose sides are commonly steep, and the banks of the streams, flowing through them, often craggy. At no great distance from the camp, Avhich the Athenians had quitted, the river Assinarus has a deep and rocky channel. While extreme thirst urged their steps to its stream, they hoped that, if they could once reach its further bank, they should gain some respite from the annoyance of the ene- my's cavalry; and the light-armed would be less formidable, when unsupported by the heavy-armed and horse. But, notwithstanding all the exertion which such motives inforced, when they reached the bank the enemy's heavy- armed were close upon them. Discipline then yielded to the pressure of evil felt and danger threatening. Without any order tiiey hurried down the steep, pushing and tramp- ling on oneanother; and, in the tumult, some were destroyed by the spears of their Comrades. The first object of most was to assuage intolerable thirst. Meanwhile the enemy's light-armed, acquainted ■with all the M'ays, reached the opposite bank before them, and the whole Athenian army, inclosed in the hollow, was exposed, helpless, to missile weapons on both sides. The Peloponnesians at length led the way for the Syracusans, down into the bottom, to complete the slaughter ; while the Athenians, still resisting to the utmost, were so pressed by extreme thirst, that, in the midst of action, many of them would drink the turbid and bloody Avater, and even fight for it. Already they were lying dead in heaps in the river, M'hile the horse Tliucyd. i.; pursued and cut off any who could escape up the banks, when Nicias, whom nothing could induce to submit to the Syracusans, found oppor- tunity to surrender himself to Gylippus.. That general then com- manded to give quarter, and was obeyed. Among the rocks, and in the^ c. So. 398 HISTORV OF GREECE. Chap. XVIII. the windings of the stream, a large number of the Athenians found opportunity for either concealment or flight : the rest were made pri- soners. No capitulation was made, as for the division under De- mosthenes : and, prisoners being valuable as slaves, the Syracusan soldiers were diligent in embeziling them as their private property. In this they were so successful, that the prisoners of the Syracusan state remained comparatively few. A detachment M'as sent after the three hundred who broke through the Syracusan line in the niglit, and took Thucyd, 1. 7. them all. Tiie pubhc prisoners, with what spoil could be collected, were conducted to Syracuse. It would have been a glorious and a singular triumph, for Gylippus, to have carried the Athenian generals, the two most illustrious men of their time, prisoners to Sparta ; one distinguished for his friendly dispo- sition toward the Lacedaemonian people, the other for his successes against them. But the jealous, cruel, and faithless temper of democratical despotism disappointed his just expectation. A de- cree of the Syracusan people condemned both to tleath, and they were executed. In the antient democracies, the most worthless individual, touching at any time a chord in consonance with popular passion, could procure the sanction of soverein authority for any vil- lainy. For where neither one person nor a select body was responsi- ble, but the whole people, truly despotic, were the common authors of every public act, the shame of flagitious measures was so divided that it was disregarded. For any one to own himself author of the black de- cree against Nicias and Demosthenes, the one intitled to the protec- tion of the Spartan general, the other under that of a capitulation solemnly granted in the name of the Syracusan people, appears, for a time at least, to have been avoided. Thucydides says the circum- stances immediately leading to the measure were not, in his time, with any certainty knoM'n at Athens. It seems likely to have been in the desire of those concerned, to shift the black imputation upon others, Diod. 1. 13. that it was by some thrown on Gylippus. The party politics of after- Plut.'vit. times led the Sicilian historian Timaeus to calumniate Hermocrates. ^^' But Diodorus, who, may have had sources of information not open to Thucydides, and Mho, the a zealot for democracy and of little judge- men 1i Sect.VIIL catastrophe of Tllli ATHENIANS. sas. ment, was of much candor, attributes the motion for tlie flao-itious decree positively to Diodes, then a leader of the democratical party, afterward, as we shall see, nder of the republic, anxl always the opponent of Hermocrates, And this well agrees with those circumstances con- nected with the measure, which Thucydides proceeds to relate, as all he could obtain toward elucidation of it. The fears, he says, of those who had carried on treasonable correspondence with Nicias, induced them, if not to promote, yet to concur in the vote for putting- him to death; and the Corinthians had particular enmity to him, apprehen- sive, for some cause not explained to us, that his restoration to power in Athens would be injurious to their interest. All authorities how- ever agree that it was a public and solemn decree of the Syracusaii people which consigned the Athenian generals to execution "'. MeanM'hile the miserable remnant of their once flourishing arm}-, the greatest ever sent out by any one Grecian state, was reserved for a still severer lot. A vast quarry in the hill of EpipoliB, whence the stone had been principally taken for building the city, was judged the most secure and commodious place for the confinement of such a mid- titude of men, so versed in the use of arms. Into this the freemen were conducted, to the number of about seven thousand : the slaves were sold by public auction. But the faith of the Syracusan people, so shamefully broken with the generals, was not very religiously kept with those of inferior rank. On the contrary, their whole conduct was marked with a spirit of deliberate cruelty, the general vice, it must be confessed, of the fairest days of Greece ; which yet ought not to be attributed to the disposition of the people, since it was the unavoidable result of the political state of the country. The Syracusans saw, in the Athenian prisoners, not generous enemies, but oppressors, who would have reduced them to the deepest misery. Tho food therefore was not denied, yet it was given in quantity barely sutficient to support life j ^nd cruelty was still more shown in the scanty allowance of water. • *• Plutarch, in Lis life of Nicias, pro- cuse ; but his account is satisfactory chiefly fesscs to have taken particular pains to col- as it tends to confirm that of 'Ihucydides, lect and collate whatever remained to his without adding scarcely anything of any time concerning the expedition against Syra- impartance. Vol. II. 3 E Nv- 594 HISTORY OF GREECE, Chap. XVIII. No sliclter wns affoided from the inclemency of the slcy ; and '.vhtle the rertectecl heat of the midday sun, in the open and capacious dungeon, was -scarcely tolerahle, the chill of autumnal night made an alternacy very injurious to health. No means M'ere given to avoid their Qwn filth; no care was taken of those who sickened ; and, whea anj' died, as many did, some of unattended wounds, some of disorder caused by various hardship, tlic bodies remained to putrefy among their living companions ; and the eloquent historian, here as on a former occasion, failing of words to his mind to describe the extreme misery^ sums up all with saying, that no suffering could possibly result fron> so wretched a situation, which was net experienced by the Athenian prisoners. Toward the end of november, after a confinement of about seventy days, the ilandcrs, and others who were not citizens of Athens, or of some Grecian town of Sicily or Italy, were taken out for the milder lot of being sold to slavery. The Athenians, with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, remained ; and we are not informed that tliey were ever released. Thucjd. ]. 7. Meanwhile those, of the army under Nicias, who, instead of public prisoners of the Syracusan state, had been made the private property of individuals, suffered variously, according to the condition or temper of the masters, under Mdiom they fell ; and, of those who had escaped by flight, few fared better ; for, unable to find subsistence, they were mostly reduced to the hard resource of offering themselves, in any town they could reach, to voluntary slavery. Thus, says the historian, all the towns of Sicily abounded with Grecian slaves. A few only had the good fortune to make their way, immediately from the field of action, to the friendly city of Catana, whence they got their passage to Athens ; but afterward others found means to fly from bondage to the same asylum. Pint. vit. In the miserable state of servile dependency, to which such numbers of Athenians were reduced, the science, literature, fine taste, and polite manners of Athens are said to have been beneficial to many. Some, who were fortunate enough to meet with masters of liberal disposi- tion, were treated with the respect due to superior accomplishments; some were even presented with their freedom. Since the days of Hieron, the literature of Greece or Ionia had little made its way ta Sicily ; c, 85. c. 86. Nic. Sect. VIII. CATASTROPHE OF THE ATHENIANS. 3u& Sicily ; and, through defect of materials, copies of books were not yet readily multiplied. But many of the Athenians retained, by memory, much of the works of Euripides ; whose moral and pathetic strains, "which they used to sing as the solace of their bondage, singularly touched the Sicilians. Euripides lived to receive the grateful acknow- legements of some who returned to Athens, and related what kindnessr they had received in servitude, or what relief in beggary, for the plea- sure they gave by speaking, singing, or teaching, his verses. ,'j »; « [ 306 ] CHAPTER XIX. Affairs of Geeece, from the Conclusion of the Sicilian Expedition till the Return of Alcibiades to Athens, in the Twenty-fourth Year of the Peloponnesian War. SECTION I. Effects at Athens of the Ncxcs of the Gverthroxo in Sicily: Effects through Greece of the Overthrozc of the Athenians in Sici/i/. Change in thepolitical System of Lacedfemon. Measure^! oj the Peloponnesian Confederacy for raising a Fleet. Proposals f-om Eubcea and Lesbos to revolt from the Athenian to the Peloponnesian Confederacy. Thucyd. 1. 8. 'T^HE news of the total destruction of the most powerful armament '^•^' -■- ever sent out by any Grecian state, supposed so far from the danger of such a catastrophe that it was capable of accomplishing almost any conquest, being first brought to Athens by no official messenger, but communicated accidentally in the uncertain way of reports, did Tlut. vit, not immediately find credit. Plutarch relates that a foreiner, landing **"^' at Peirasus, went into a barber's shop, which, like the modern coffee- house, was the usual resort of idle newsmongers in the Grecian cities (as, we find, afterAV'ard in Rome) and spoke of the event as what he supposed would of course be weU known there. The barber, with more zeal than discretion, went immediately into the city, and communicated the intelligence to the archons ; who, with the natural anxiety of magistrates under the tyranny of a despotic multitude, summoned an assembly of the people, and produced the barber to declare his news. The people, in extreme agitation, demanded his authority. The in- cautious man could produce none: he had no previous accjuaintance vith the person from whom he received the information, aud knew not Avherc Sect. I. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT IN SICILY. Sf)7 ■where to find him. The indignant multitude immediately ordered the barber to the torture of the wheel, (a mode of punishment nowhere exactly described to us, but Mhich it seems might he borne long',) and he \va* not released till some of the more fortunate few, who had escaped'from the scene of woe, arriving, confirmed the uncertain intelligence. Even Tluiryd. 1. s. these, however, M'ere not at first credited for the full extent of the ^' ^' ■ misfortune. Multiplied concurring testimonies at length removing every doubt of the magnitude of the calamity, then public anguish 13. C. ii.-? became extreme. Popular rage began with venting contumely against p'\v '",*■ the orators who had advised the expedition; as if, says the historian, October, the people themselves had not directed it ; and, in fact, the people in assembly holding the executive as well as the legislative government, every one being free to propose, and sometimes a majorit}' with tumul- tuous clamor commanding measures, there could be no duly respon- sible minister. From the orators then the public anger extended to the soothsayers, augurs, interpreters, any who had contributed to establish the belief thai the gods wouJd favor the project of conquest in Sicily. But in this excessive irritation of the public mind, fear soon became the prevailing passion. Private losses of friends or relations, which stimulated the first movements, gave way to the consideration, that the commonwealth had not such another body of citizens, in the prime of life, as that which had been so rashly committed to destruction, nor such a fleet, nor naval stores to fit such another, nor funds to supply the accumulated wants which the conjuncture created : and then it ■ followed, that nothing less was to be expected then the appearance of the enemy's victorious navy before Peirajus, and the blockade of Athens by land and sea. In this general consternation, however, there were not wanting either able heads or magnanimous minds among the Athenians, and the crisis itself gave them the power to take the lead. Wise measures and the most vigorous that circumstances admitted, were accordingly resolved on; to restore the navy, to collect stores, to raise money, and to save it, by abridging, not private luxury, which was yet moderate, _' 'E; Te» Tpp^of xaTaJfSiijj irgtsAJi'Tg 7to>iiD yj^kmi, », t. i.— Plat. vit. N;c, but SOS HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XI-X, but public luxury, which was already immoderate in Athens', and, above all things, to obviate the defection of the allied and subject states, particularly of Eubcca, the most valuable dependency of the commonwealth, and without M'hich the population of Athens could not easily subsist. But the depth of misfortune, into which their own folly had precipitated them, induced, among the Athenian people, a con- ■sciousness that a multitude is unfit to direct executive government. To obviate therefore the extravagancies of unbalanced democracy, a new council of elders was created, whose office was to deliberate on all public measures, previously to their being proposed to the general assembly. This indeed was providing for the prudence of executive government, but not for vigor, not for secresy, not for dispatch; qua- lities which could meet in the Athenian administration only when a Themistocles or a Pericles, general at the same time and demagogue, controuled by no council, could first resolve on measures, and then command the approbation of the general assembly. Never however were the Athenian people so disposed to moderation, order, and at- tention to wise advice as in the present crisis. ' It was so resolved ' therefore,' says the cotemporary historian emphatically, ' and it Avas ' done; and the summer ended.' Tliueyd. 1.6. IMeanwhile the attention of all Greece was excited, and the politics of every republic put in motion by the blow Mhich Athens had received in Sicily. Apprehension of the consequence of so great an addition to the power of that ambitious and rcstles republic, as the conquest of Sicily might have given, had been very general and very serious. No evil that could befall the aristocracies, which composed the Lacedaemo- nian confederacy, was so dreadful and so odious as subjugation under the tyrannous rule of the Athenian multitude. Nor was Laccda;mon itself without alarm ; for tho tiie conquest of Sparta was not likely soon to be accomplished by the Athenian arms, yet there was no inferior evil which might not be expected, and quickly. Already the Lacedamo- r.ians beheld, not only many of their dependencies wrested from them, » Tinker has a judicious note i;;i(:n the to explain what, for want of better inquiry •lassa^e of TliiKydiclus, which I have thus into the state of Athens at the ti.Tie, he evi- par'phra«rd. The fiholiusi has uiyJcrtakeu dently di'.: not understand. ■ . but c.Z Sect. I. CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SPARTA. 399 but two garrisons established M'itbin tbeir own country, infesting a large part of it Avith devastation, to uhicli they could neither prescribe bounds nor foresee an end. At the. same time the Athenian fleets so decidedly commanded the seas, that no prospect appeared of m.eans for competition with them on that element ; insomuch that not only the Lacedaemonians were unable to extend protection to any allies beyond the ready reach of their landforce, but the extensive line of the Laconiau coast must be continually open to insult. In all these things tlie catastrophe at Syracuse made a change, that nothing but the mad am- bition, or madder jealousy, of a despotic multitude could have produced; and that change was immediate and almost total. The navy of Athens was no longer formidable; the Peloponnesian fleets now commanded tlie seas. The allies of Lacedasmon, therefore, no longer fearing any- thing from the enemy, became only anxious for exertion, that they might speed il}', as tliey trusted they could easily, complete the purpose of the war, and relieve themselves from burdens under which they had been long uneasy. The neutral republics, at the same time, thouglit the moment come for deciding their party, before it was yet too late to claim merit for the decision. But the principal effect was seen among the subject states of Athens; who, with anadvised eagerness, pressed forward in revolt, taking it for certain that the Athenians would be unable to maintain the war through the insuing summer. JMeanwhile the LacedaMnonians, with the characteristical coolness of their government, injoyed the view of this various fermentation, and prepared to profit from it to the establishment of their own permanent superiority over all Greece, to which they now looked as an acquisition completely within their power. Among the circumstances of these times, a change in the Lacedoemo- nian system, which considerably affected the general politics of Greece, . will require notice. The LacedEemonian kings, who in Lacediemon, «xcept when presiding at some religious ceremony, were scarcely distinguished from the mass of citizens, being obliged, in all political business, to yield to the tyrannical authority of the ephors, injoyed, in the command of armies abroad, a more truly royal state as well as a more efficacious royal authority. The interest which tliey thus had -*oo HISTORY OF GREECE. Cha?. XIX. had in lead ins; tlieir country into long and distant wars, had been restrained by the law of Lycurgus, forbidding such wars; and that law, inforced sometimes by the opposite interest of the ephors, had been much more effectually and constantly inforced by the poverty of the Laccdicmonian commonwealth. Nevertheless, before the Persian war, Cleomenes, by ing-aging- the state in frequent hostilities, appears to have acquired extraordinary power ; and afterward, in the new and vast scene of action M-hieh the Persian war opened, Pausanias, tho not king but mecrly regent and general of the republic, was able to prosecute ambitious views to a great length. His own imprudence indeed, more than any other obstacle, seems to have ruined his purpose: and the insuing downfall of the powerof Sparta checked, for a time, the ambition of its generals and kings. When the Peloponnesian war broke out, Archidamus, a prince advanced in years, and of a character singularly amiable, prudent at the same time and philanthropic, seems to have had no object, in command, but the good of his country and of all Greece. His son Agis, a man of moderate talents, would prehaps not liave attempted innovation, if circumstances had not led to it. He succeeded to the throne in an early stage of a most complicated and lasting war. Error in conduct, apparently the consequence of error in judgement, produced, as we ha\e seen, very severe censure upon liim from those M'ho, in Lacedannon, had legal authority to censure and even to punish kings. Afterward, by his success at Mantinela, he acquired some reputation. He was still in the vigor of his age, but of large experience, when the establishment of a standing force in Dcceleia gave him, what none of his predecessors ever injoyed, a perennial mili- tary command. Here he found himself reiiily king: here he M'as free flmcyd, 1. 8. froH! the vcxatious and degrading controul of the ephors: here he might not only use at discretion the troops immediately under his orders, but he had authority to levy forces, raise contributions, exercise command among the allies of the commonwealth, and treat with forfin states. Thus vested wth independent power, he was of course respected, and could niaU- h ini sell feared ; so that much more deference was paid by the states of the confederacy to Agit;, in his garrison at Decelcia, than to any Spartan king at home, or even to the Spartan goverjdnjent itself, i I The •S. 5 Sect.I. measures of LACED7EM0N. 401 The residence of his garrison therefore was not unhkely to be preferred ~ to that of his capital. These were consequences apparently not in the 'view of the LacedEemonian administration, when the advice of the Athenian refugee was taken for the permanent occupying of a post in Attica; yet the circumstances of the Lacedemonian government prevented any effectual eft'ort to check them. The establishment of a public revenue at Lacedsmon seems to have been a depaiture from the spirit, at least, of Lycurgus's system. When such an establishment was first made, we are not informed ; but we find Archidamus, in the debates preceding the Peloponnesian war, speaking of it not as a new thing. The length of that war, and the extent of the scene of action, would make attention to the revenue more than ever necessary; and thus again a new interest was created, intimately connected with that which led the kings to desire war alwaj's rather than peace, and any residence rather than that of Sparta. Throuiih the business of tlie revenue, the leadino- men at home mia-ht have an interest in.yielding to the king's wish for forein command; and hence the influence of the king, tho at a distance, might keep together Tluicvd. 1. 8. a party in, Lacedajmon. Agis in his command at Deceleia did not ''••^' neglect this policy. ' The LacediBmonian government now, with serious earnestness, applied c. 3. themselves to what had been their professed purpose at the beginning of the war, the acquisition of a fleet to rival that of Athens. The project, then wild, was become at length practicable. Instead of five hundred triremes, originally proposed, one hundred were now required of the confederacy. The Lacedsmonians themselves under- took for twenty-five. An equal number was appointed toBoeotia, fifteen only to Corinth, fifteen to Locris and Phocis, ten to Arcadia Mith Pallene and Sicyon, and ten to Megara, Troezen, Epidaurus, and Henpione. Agis was directed to collect the contributions for the pur- pose from the northern states. • Accordingly, with such an escort as he judged sufficient, he marched from Deceleia about the beginning of November; and after receiving what had been assessed upon the friendly, he proceeded to increase the sum by taking from the hostile. Turning Vol. II. 3 F toward 40t mSTOUY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. toward the Malian bay, he carried off considerable booty from the (Etsan vallies; and then, advancing still northward, he compelled the Plithiot Acliaians, with some other tribes subject to theThessalians, in Thucyd. I. 8. defiance of the resentment of that people, to deliver hostages and pay c. 4. 1 • contributions. Meanwhile the Athenians, recovered in some degree from the first emotions of grief and alarm, and submitting themselves to able gui- dance, were taking measures, suited to their reduced circumstances, for resisting the impending storm. Their first diligence Mas directed to the collection of naval stores, and the building of ships; for on the possession of a poweiful fleet everything depended. Their next care was to increase the security of vessels passing betwcn Euboea and Athens; for without free communication with Euboea, the city could not easily be subsisted. With this view therefore a fort was erected on the pro- montory of Sunium. Thus, but especially in the renovation of the fleet, a large but indispensable expence would be incurred, which would inforce the necessity of parsimony in matters of inferior moment. The garrison was therefore withdrawn from that post in Laconia which had been occupied by Demosthenes in his way to Sicily, and measures vrere taken to reduce unnecessary expences, and establish exact economy ^^^ in public affairs. Thus, says the cotemporary historian, in the close of the nineteenth year of the war, preparations were making on both sides, as if war was just then beginning. But it was not possible for any prudence, among the Athenians, to prevent that consequence of their late misfortune, which they most apprehended and their enemies most hoped, the defection of their allies and the revolt of their subjects. The Eubocans, whose country was so important to Athens, that a better government would never have left it in the situation of a subject-state, but would have given its people one interest with themselves, were foremost to take measures for break- ing their dependency. The residence of the Lacedaemonian king in their neighborhood offered new opportunity for the intrigues of the discontented : the consideration of the force that he could command from the surrounding states, in addition to that constantly under his 1 orders, Sect. I. DEFECTION of SUBJECT STATES from ATHENS. 403 orders, gave large incouragement; and, soon after the arrival of the news of the Sicilian defeat, a proposal was communicated to Agis from a strong party in Eubcea, to bring over tiie whole island to the Lacedaemonian confederacy. Agis gave assurances that tlie force under his command should be employed in their favor, and in com- municating the project to the Lacedaemonian administration, he used his interest to promote their cause. But the cautious government of Lacedajmon, tho unwilling to reject so advantageous a proposal, was nevertheless little disposed to any spirited exertion for assisting it. Three hundred only of those called neodamodes, newly-admitted citizens, were granted for the service; Mho, under the command of Alcamenes, marched into Attica. Agis was taking measures for transporting this body into Eubcea, when a deputation from Lesbos, also proposing revolt, reduced him to difficulty. His desire coincided with the wishes both of the Eubocans and the Lesbians; but neither people could effect their purpose without assistance, and he was unable to give it at tlie same time to both. He was already ingaged to the Eubo:ans ; and their extensive country, almost adjoining to the coast of Bceotia, whether as loss to Athens, or gain to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was far more important than the smaller iland of Lesbos, on the other side of the iEgean. But the Baotians, the most powerful of the allies of Lacedsmon, had a strong partiality for the Lesbians, whom, as of iEolian race, they considered as kinsmen ; while the Lesbians, tho connected by no political interest, revered the Boeotians as the chiefs of their blood. Agis, whether considering the interest of Lacedtemon or his own interest, desirous of gratifying the Boeotians, resolved to postpone the business of Eubcea to that of Lesbos. Accordingly, without any communication Avith Lacedicmon, he ordered Alcamenes to conduct to Lesbos that very force, which had been sent by the Lacedaemonian government for the express purpose of assisting the revolt in Eubcea. S F 2 404 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. S E C T I O X II. Keic Implication of Grecian and Persian Interests. Death of Artax- erxes and Succession of Darius II. to the Persian Throne. Effect of the terrors of an Earthquake. Congress of the Pcloponnesian Confederacif at Corinth. Isthmian Gaines. Naval success of the Athenians in the Saronic Gu/ph. Infuence of Alcibiades in the Spartan Councils. A Peloponnesian Fleet sent under Chalcideus, ac- companied by Alcibiades, to cooperate with the Satrap ofCaria and the revolted lonians. Increased Distress of Athens. Treaty of Alliance betxceen Lacedx^mon and Persia. Not all tlie sounding vauntsand ingenious panegyrics, of later writers^ mark so strongly theascendancy whichtbelittle commonwealth of Athens had acquired in the politics of the civilized world, and the degree to Avhich it had repressed the force, or at least the spirit, of the vast empire of the east, or display so clearly the superiority, which a few consenting thousands, ably directed, may acquire over ill-governed millions, as the cotemporary historian's simple narrative of the consequences of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. That event in the west presently set the east in motion, and the affairs of Greece became in a new way impli- cated with those of Persia. Darius had succeeded his father Artaxerxes in the throne. Artaxerxes, tho an able prince, and interrupted by no considerable forein wars, had exerted himselt^ through a long reign, M ith very incomplete success, to restore vigor to the unwieldy mas.s of the empire. While his cares were employed in composing the dis- orders, which troubles, preceding h.is accession, had produced in the central parts, the connection with the distant provinces remained loose and imperfect; insomuch that, independently of any effortof the satraps for the purpose, a more independent power accrued to them, than could consist with the good government of the whole. Thus, upon the appointment of Tissaphernes to the satrapy of Caria, Amorges, natural son of the late satrap Pissuthues, was incouraged to revolt; not pcihapsi Sect.il affairs of PERSIA. 405 perhaps in professed opposition to the soverein of the empire, but to the new satrap only. Regardless, however, of the mandates of the prince, and in defiance of the arms of his officers, he maintained him- self in the Carian mountains. But the M'ants of the Persian government pressed npon those to ■whom its powers were delegated, in proportion as its weakness incou- raged opposition to them. The satraps were required to remit from their provinces, not only the accruing tributes, but the arrears. From the time of the victories of Cimon, most of the Grecian towns in Asia had been tributary to Athens, and many of them since those of Xanthippus and Leotychidas. The jealousy of the Athenian govern- ment allowed few to remain fortified ; yet the terror of the Atlienian name kept them secure, as far as history informs us, against any Ch.ip. 15. , . . . , sect. 3. of attempts rroni tlie Persians, except ni one mstance, Avhen sedition at this ilisu Colophon afforded an opportunity, the advantage of whicli, liowever, Avas of short duration. Nevertheless the Persian court affected to con- sider all those towns as still appendages of the empire, and a tribute assessed upon them was required from the satraps'. The wretched policy of Athens, in the government of its dependencies, so far pro- moted the views of the Persians, that there was in every Asiatic city a party, composed mostly of the higher ranks, who were ready to prefer the more liberal supremacy of a Persian satrap to the oppressive and insulting tyranny of the Athenian people. Under these circumstances it appears difficult to say which was most wonderful, the strength of the little commonwealth of Athens, which could hold such a command, or the weakness of the vast empire of Persia, which could not recover its dominion. The plea of inability from the satraps had at length been allowed at the Persian court, so far that the arrears of tribute due from Thncyd. I. S- (J. b. Tissaphernes, for the Grecian towns within his satrapy, were no longer 3 VVl)at we find from Thucytlides upon upon ihe Grecian towns in Asia, and in- tbis subject, in the fifth and sixth chapters gaged that no Persian troops should come of his eighth book, implies the strongest within three days march of tlie western contranion among the Greeks, as well as the superior estimation in Mhich those of Dorian race had been long accustomed to hold themselves ; for on each fide the Ionian troops were victorious over the Dorian. The Athenians elate with their success, proceeded then immediately to take measures for an assault upon Miletus; but, in the evening of the c.^G. same day on which the battle was fought, intelligence arrived of the ap- proach of a fleet from Peloponnesus, of fifty-five triremes. Onomacles and Scironidas, anxious to restore the naval reputation of Athens, and perhaps too fearful of the temper of the people, their sovereiu, to nse their judgement with due calmness, proposed to await tlie enemy's at- tack. But Phrynichus declared that he would neither be allured by a false opinion of glory, nor yield to unmanly shame : whatever Ifis country's welfare most required, was in his opinion most honorable; and in the present state of the commonwealth, it would ill become them to risk unnecessarily its naval force. Either his arguments or his au- thority prevailed, and the fleet returned to Samos. The Argians, fretted, Thucydides says, with the disgrace of their own fliare in the late battle, sailed home. V'oL. II. 3 H - Peloponnesus 418 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. Peloponnesus had not alone sent out the fomidable fleet which thus relieved Miletus. At the instigation principally of Hermocrates son of Hermon, the Dorian Sicilians had generally agreed to take an active part in the war ; and Syracuse sent twenty triremes under his com- mand, which had however yet been joined by only two more, furnished by Selinus The Lacedemonian Theramenes commanded the fleet in chief. On its reaching the coast of Asia, the Athenian armament being gone, it was to be considered what should be undertaken ; and Ihucyd. 1. s. ii^Q commanders resolved to gratify their new ally the satrap, by directing their first measures against lasus, the residence of the rebel Persian chief Amorges. The fleet, in its approach to that place, was mistaken for an Attic fleet: the first assault in consequence succeeded; and Amorges being made prisoner, was a grateful present to Tissaphernes, who was thus inablcd to obey his soverein's commands, which required him to send the rebel, or at least his head, to Susa. Some Greek troops which Amorges had entertained in his service, being mostly Peloponnesian, were taken as a reinforcement to the army. The other prisoners formed a valuable part of the booty, being made over to Tissaphernes, equally free and slaves, at a certain price a head ', and the ca])ture all together was among the richest made in the war. Possession of lasus being made over to the satrap's officers, the Grecian armament returned to Miletus for winter quarters. In confederacies composed of so many little republics, claiming independency, as those under the lead of Athens and Lacedtemon, to insure any just regularit}" in business, either military or political, Avould be hardly possible, without powers to be exercised by tlie superior, hazardous for the liberties of the inferior people. But the internal divisions of every little state, fur more than any consideration for the confederacy at large, induced the subordinate governments not only to admit readily, but often to desire the controuling inter- ference of the imperial people. The Lacedtemonian government accordingly sent superintending officers of their own, with the title of harmost, regulator, to reside in all the cities of their confederacy, ' The price menlionrd by tlie historian is time of the Peloponnesian war, is very un« a Doiic stater, the value of which, at the certainly known. beyond Sect. III. L ACED^. M ONIAN HARMOSTS. 419 ■beyond proper Greece. The autliority of these officers would depend much upon tlie power of the superintending state at tlie time, and the weakness of the subordinate, whether the weakness of scanty numbers and property, or weakness superinduced Iiy internal divisions. The har- most, however, g-enerally seems to have been but another name for a governor. Philippus, a Lacedtemonian, Mas aj)poinled haimost of Miletus. Ptedaritus, sent from Sparta to hold the same office at Chios, could not so readily and safely read) his destination. Landing, however, at Miletus, he was escorted by land to Erythra', and thence found opportunity to make the short passage to Chios, without interruption from the Athenian cruizers. Early in the winter Tissaphcrncs visited the Peloponnesian fleet, Thucyd. r. 3. and, according to agreement with the Lacedfemonians, distributed '^p- ^ ... After 2d OcU a montli s pay to it, at tb.e rate ot an Attic drachma, ahout ten- pence sterling, daily, for each man. He then apologized for pro- posing to give in future only half a drachma, till he had consulted the king's pleasure; declaring himself desirous, if he could obtain authority for it, to continue the full pay before given. Theramenes, having only a temporary command, for the purposeof conducting the fleet to Astyochus, under mIiosc orders it was to remain, was little disposed to exerthimself about its pecuniary interests; but theSyracusan Ilermocrates remonstrated warmly ; and Tissaphernes thought it so far of importance to keep his new allies in good-humour, that he at length made an addition to the half drachma, but would not allow the whole. In the course of the winter an additional force of thirty-five triremes Thucyd. l.s. under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, joined the Athenian '^'^^' fleet at Samos, which thus acquired again a clear superiority in the Asiatic seas. It was in consequence resolved to push the siege of Chios, and at the same time to blockade the port of Miletus. For the former purpose the greatest part of the landforce was assigned, with a squadron of thirty triremes ; for the other, the rest of the fleet, consisting of seventy-four. The commanders drew lots for the services. It fell to Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty triremes and a part of the heavy-armed, to act against Chios: the others, 2 II 2 with 420 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. with seventy-four, commanded the seas about Samos, and prepared for an expedition against Miletus. Thucyd. 1, s. j\Iean\vhile Astyochus, -who liad gone to Chios to obviate expected revolt, hearing of the reinforcement brought by Theramenes from Peloponnesus, but uninformed of the great addition arrived to the enemy's fleet, thought the Peloponnesian interest in the iland suffici- ently secure, and crossed to the opposite continent, where opportunity of farther acquisition appeared to invite him. Having however in vain attempted Pteleuin and Clazomena;, he was compelled by tem- pestuous weather to take refuge in the port of Cuma. But in all the Grecian towns, through the opposition of interests, and the almost universal attachment of the democratical party to the Athenian cause, and the aristocratical to the Lacedtemonian, intrigues c. 32. were endless. "While Astyochus lay with his fleet at Cuma, the aris- tocratical party in Lesbos sent proposals for bringing that iland again to the Lacedaemonian alliance. Astyochus favored the measure, but the Corinthians were disinclined to it; and the Chians, more appre- hensive of their fellowcitizens of the Athenian party than of any other enemy, M'ere extremely averse to any diminution of the friendly force within their own iland. Piedaritus, the Lacedemonian governor, concurring with them, refused to let any Chian vessels go on the c. 33. service. Astyochus, highly displeased with this opposition to his purpose, declared that the Chians should in vain solicit from him that assistance wliich they might soon want; and with this threat he de- parted, to assume his naval command at Miletus. c. 35, The Peloponnesian cause had continued to gain among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, and a fresh reinforcement of ten Thurian triremes, with one Syracusan, had passed to Peloponnesus. The Lacedfenionlans, adding one of their own, appointed Hippocrates, a Lacedaemonian, to command the squadron, which they sent to join the fleet at Miletus. Cnidus having lately revolted from Tissaphernes, Hippocrates M'as sent tliither, with orders to watch the town with six of his ships, while the other six took their station atTrlopium, a promontory of the iland, for the purpose of intercepting the enemy's merchant-ships from Egypt. In- formation of this disposition being co'ninnmicated to the Athenian fleet, Sect.IIL dissatisfaction V/ITII the PERSIANS. 421 fleet, a squadron was detached, which took the six ships at Triopium^ vhose crews however escaped ashore. The loss of six ships ta the Peloponnesian confederacy, supported only by its own means, might have been of some consequence, but with the advantage of the Persian alliance, it was little re^^-arded. Astyochus, on his arrival at IMiletus, found the Milesians zealous in tlie Thucyd. l.g cause, and the armament in high spirits, notwithstandiiv the reduc- '''•^'^' tion of pay, which had occasioned so many murmurs. The pa}' still given by Tissaphernes was more than the Peloponnesian governments ever had given, or were able to give, and the booty acquired at lasus was a great gratification. Nevertheless the principal officers could not rest satisfied with the terms of a treaty, which they could so little justify to their people at home, as that made by Chalcideus ; and, at length, Tissaphernes was persuaded to allow the objectionable articles to be reconsidered. Theramenes had now the conduct of the business on the part of Lacedtemon, and a new treaty was concluded ; in which the sovereinty of the Persian king over the Grecian cities in Asia v/as rather less explicitly acknowleged, but yet was acknowleged. The use at this time, made by the Peloponnesians, of the advantages of Persian pay and Asiatic plunder, seems to have been to indulge themselves in the large and wealthy city of IMiletus, under the fine sky of Ionia, while their new allies, the Chians, Avere pressed with danger of the united evils, which faction within, and an enemy without, might bring. Before the winter ended, the Athenians occupied the port and c, 3S. town of Delphinium, not far from the city. The democratical party among the Chians, in itself strong, seeing the Athenian fleets again superior in the Asiatic seas, showed its disposition to the Athenian cause so openly, that Pasdaritus and the oligarchal party were in great alarm. They applied to Astyochus at Miletus for succour; but, in conformity to his threat, he refused to give any.. P«daritus sent com- plaints against him to Lacedcemon ; but distress and danger meanwhile continued to press the Chians. AV'hen, among the various applications for the Lacedasmonian alli- ance, the preference had been given to Tissaphernes and the lonians, it had not been intended, even by Endius and Alcibiades, to slight the overtures 422 HISTORY or GREECE. Chap. XIX. Tliucyd. 1. 8. overtures of Pharnabaziis. IVenty-scven sliips were therefore pre- ^' -'■ , pared expressly for the serviee, in which that satrap debired assistance. Tut, in the beginning of M'inter, the year of magistracy of Endius had expired, and with it expired, in a great degree, tlie influence of Alci- biades in the Lacedrcmonian administration. A considerable change of counsels insued. The men in command, and the measures pursuing, on the Asiatic coast, were looked upon with a jealous eye. The iicwly-juepared squadron, placed under the command of Antisthencs, uas ordered, not to the Hellespont or any port of the satrapy of Phar- iiabazus, but to Miletus, to join the fleet already there; and eleven commissioners were imbarked in it, to inquire concerning men and thino's, and, as a council, to assume in a great degree the direction of aftairs on the Asiatic station. They were particularly authorized to appoint, if they should see proper, Antisthenes to supersede Astyochus in the command in chief; and also, at their discretion, to send any number of ships, with Clearchus for the commander, or not to send any, to cooperate with Pharnabazus. Antisthenes, with the eleven commissioners, making j\Jelos, in their way to the Ionian coast, fell in with ten Athenian triremes. They took three, but the crews escaped, and the other seven got clear away. This adventure gave them more alarm than satisfaction. They feared infor- mation to the Athenians at Samos, of their approach, and consequent attack from a superior force. Instead therefore of making farther their direct course for Ionia, they bore away southward for Crete, and so on to Caunus in Caria, whence they sent to ]\Iiletus inteUigence of their arrival. ^ ^j Meanwhile Astyochus, notwithstanding his anger against the Chians, -was preparing to attempt their relief, before it should !)e too J., 40. l^te to save allies so valuable to the confederacy. They were already severely pressed : a contravallation was nearly completed against the city: their lands were totally at the enemy's mercy; and their nu- merous slaves M^ere deserting fast. Astyochus however, upon receiv- ing the advice from Antisthenes, thought it his first duty to give con- voy to the council, and his first interest to take care of the reinforce- ment ; and he accordingly moved with his whole fleet to Caunus. The a Athenian Sect.TII. ratification of treaty av I th PERSIA REFUSED. 423 Athenian admiral meanwhile had actually sent a squadron under Char- minus, but of twenty ships only, to Avatch the squadron coming from Peloponnesus. Missing this, Charminus fell in with the grand fleet under AstyocHus, dispersed in a fog, and took three ships; but, when Thuc^d. 1. 8. the fog cleared, the fleet collecting, he found it necessary to fly for ^' ^'' Halicarnassus, and reached that place, not without losing six ships. Intelligence of this being carried to the Athenian admirals, they went c. 43. with their whole force to offer battle to the Peloponnesians, who had put into the port of Cnidus ; hut these showing no disposition to stir, the Athenians returned to Samos. As soon as the Athenian fleet was gone, the eleven commissioners- from Sparta began the more peculiar business of their mission, the con- sideration of the Persian treaty ; and Tissaphernes thought the occa- sion important enough to require his presence at Cnidus. The com- missioners, of whom Lichas was the chief, appear to have been friends of Agis ; but, whatever party views they may have had, tlicy con- ducted themselves in this business with a stern dignity, and with the appearance at least of an inflexible integrity, becoming the anticnt repu- tation of Sparta. The treaties were certainly verj' exceptionable. The words of tlie first, yielding to the king of Persia the sovereinty of all the countries his predecessors had ever commanded ; those of the other, forbiddino- the Lacedajmonians and their allies from carrvino- arms against any of those countries ; were an acknowlegement, on the part of Lacedtemon, of the claim of Persia, not on!}' to all the Asiatic and Thracian cities, and all the ilands of the iEgean, but to ^Macedonia, Thessaly, Locris, and almost the whole north of Greece, including Attica: so that the Lacedemonians, instead of supporting their pre- tensions to be vindicators of Grecian liberty, thus admitted the sub- jection of near half the nation to the Persian dominion. The Lacedae- monians did not indeed bind themselves to put Persia in possession of the countries so in general terms ceded ; and, had their leaders been wily politicians, they might perhaps, after profiting from Pt isian assist- ance to serve their own purposes against Athens, have easily prevented Persia from making any advantage of those articles, which seemed so to militate with the comm.on cause of Greece. But Lichas and his col- leg ucs 424 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. leo-ues would not, for any tciDporaiy interest of their country, surrender its honor. They condemned the treaties, both that concluded by Chalcidcus, and that by Theramenes, in the strongest manner; they declared that they would on no account ratify them; and they insisted that the troops should receive no more pay from the satrap, unless he Mould enter into a new treaty upon other terms. Tissaphernes, dis- gusted with their authoritative tone and unbending manner, went away without concluding anything. How far the conduct of the connnissioners would be approved by the troops, to whom Persian pay had been no small gratification, may- be doubted ; but a circumstance occurred of a nature to obviate Thurvd 1 s P'csent dissatisfaction. Overtures came to the Peloponnesiau com- c. 4i. nianders from some leading men of the wealthy iland of Rhodes. The fleet, consisting of ninety-four triremes, went thither; Cameirus, one of the principal towns, but unfortified, was taken without resistance : the chief men of the iland were summoned to an assembly, and all the towns were peaceably brought over to the Peloponnesian interest. Intelligence of the motion of the Peloponnesiau fleet being conveyed to thp Athenian commanders at Samos, they sailed in all haste for VC 411 l^liotles, but arrived too late for any effectualinterposition. The Pelo- Jiiiiuurj. ponncsians obtained thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, toward the expences of the war, and, the winter being already advanced, tliey laiU up their fleet in the harbours of the iland. CT.IV. PARTY AT SPARTA adverse to ALCIBIADES. 425 SECTION IV. Alcibiades, persecuted bij the new Spa7'tan administration ; favored by the satrap of Caria ; communicates zvith the Athenian armament at Samos. Plot for changing the constitution of Athens : Syno- mosies, or Political Clubs at Athens : Breach between Alcibiades and the managers of the plot. Neiv Treaty between Lacedxmon and Persia. Contitmation of the siege of Chios, and transactions of the fleets. While an important acquisition was thus made to the Peloponnesiati confederacy, intrigue had been prosecuting, M'ith no inconsiderable effect, in opposition to it. Since the expiration of the magistracy of Endius, the party of Agis had been gaining strength in Lacedjemon; and not only Alcibiades could no longer lead measures, as before, on Thucyd. 1. 8. the coast of Asia, but his designs became more and more suspected in '^''^^' Peloponnesus. In thwarting Alcibiades, however, the Lacedaemonian administration feared him. What precisely to expect they knew not ; but they apprehended some great stroke in politics to their disadvan- tage ; and, according to the concurrent testimony of historians, too unquestionable M'hcn Thucydides is in the list, private instructions Avere sent to Astyochus, to have Alcibiades assassinated. This measure has been attributed by some to the vengeance of Agis : whose bed it is said, Alcibiades had dishonored, and whose queen is reported to have been so shameless, as to boast of her connection with the greatest and handsomest man of the age. Others have ascribed it to the re- venge of the queen herself, for a silly declaration of Alcibiades, if he really made it, that no inclination for her person, but meerly the vanity of giving a king to Sparta and an heir to the race of Hercules, induced him to pay her any attention. The cotemporary historian mentions upon the occasion neither Agis nor the queen ; his expression rather goes to fix the crime upon the Spartan administration ; and, tho the other stories possibly may have originated in that age, they Vol. II. 3 I bear 4«6 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIX.* bear much more the character of the taste of following times. Alci- biades however, whether infonvied of the design, or only suspicious of the Lacedaemonians, from acquaintance ^uth their principles and con- sciousness of deserving their enmity, withdrew from their armament and took his residence with Tissaphernes. He was not unprepared for the change. Uneasy, notwithstanding the favor he found and the attention paid him, in the dependent cha- racter of a stranger and a fugitive, it was his object to restore himself to his country, before that country was reduced sa low as to be not "worth returning to. With this view he had courted the satrap assi- duously and successfully. Neither the interest of the Persian empire, nor the satrap's interest, were, any more than his ov/n, the same with that of Lacedajmon or the Peloponnesian confederacy. An opening therefore was not wanting, first for insinuations, and then for advice, that might set the satrap at variance M'ith the Peloponnesians, and render Alcibiades not only agreeable but necessary to him. Tissa- phernes, pressed for money, both by his court and by the expences of his government, and at the same time desirous of amassing for him- self, listened with ready attention to any suggestion of means to spare his treasury. Alcibiades told him, 'that the allowance of pay to the ' Peloponnesian forces was extravagant. The Athenians,' he said, * long versed in naval affairs, and highly attentiv^e to them, gave no * more than half a drachma for daily pay to their seamen; not,' as he pretended, ' from economical motives, or from any inability to afford ' more, but because they esteemed a larger pay disadvantageous to ' their service.' Tissaphernes approved the proposal for a reduction, but dreaded the discontent that would insue. Alcibiades assured him, ' that he need not apprehend it: a sum of money, judiciousl}- distri- * buted among the commanders, would quiet all outcry ; or, if there * was a man among them not to be bought, it was only the Syracusan ' Hermocratcs. Representations and remonstrances would probably ' be made : but they might easily be refuted ; nor need the satrap ' give himself any trouble about them : he would undertake to answer ' every argument and silence every clamor. The pretensions indeed- * of most of the Grecian states were extravagant ; that of the Chians, ' he Sect.IV. policy of ALCIBIADES. 427 ' he would not scruple to tell them, was even impudent. The richest ' people of Greece, they were not contented with gaining iiidepen- ' dency at the expence of the blood and treasure of others, but ex- ' pected to be paid for defending it. Nor were the less wealthy states, ' which had been tributary to Athens, more reasonable. Delivered * from the burden of tribute, they now grudged an unbought service, ' to preserve the independency and immunity which had been freely ' given them.' Having thus persuaded the satrap that he could ob- viate clamor, Alcibiades undertook to conciliate favor to him, and excite zeal in his service : ' He would assert,' he said, 'that the pay ' hitherto given was from the private income of the satrapy; that ' Tissaphernes was laboring to obtain an allowance from t!ie royal ' revenue; and should it be granted, v/hatever it might be, the whole ' should be distributed to the forces without reserve.' Tissaphernes approved the proposal, and that reduction of pay, M'hich has been al- ch. 19. s. 3. ready noticed, with the insuing discontent, and at length, through o*' this Hist, the dexterity of Alcibiades, the compromise, followed. Having thus gained the satrap's ear, and recommended himself to his confidence, Alcibiades proceeded to promote his own views at tlie expence of the most important interests of the Peloponnesian confe- deracy. ' He urged, that both the public interest of the Persian em- Thucyd. 1.8. * pire, and the private interest of the satrap, required, not speedy nor ^' *"* ' complete success to the Peloponnesian cause, but a protraction of ' the war : that the Phenician squadron, which had been promised, * ought not to be allowed to join the Peloponnesian fleet : that, for ' the same reason, to incourage reinforcement from Greece, by hold- ' ing out the lure of Persian pay, was impolitic: that the king's in- ' terest clearly required a partition of power among the Greeks : the * same state should not preponderate by land at the same time and ' by sea; but rather the Athenians should be supported in their * wonted superiority on one element, and the Laced a;monians on the ' other. Thus it would always be in the king's power to hold the ' balance between them, or to employ one against the other, as he * pleased. These being the principles that should regulate the politics ' of Persia toAvard Greece, it followed that the Athenians were the 3 I 2 * niore 428 HISTORY OF GREECE. Ciiap.XIX. * more commodious allies for the king : they had no land-force capable ' of coping M'ith his land-force: they were powerful and rich only by ' holding other states in subjection; and, through their fear of revolts ' and of forein interference," they might be kept alwaj's in some degree ' dependent. At any rate, they -would always be glad to share Mith the ' king and his satraps the tributary cities of Asia. But, on the con- ' trarv, it was the professed purpose, and the known policy, of the ' Lacedasmonians, to emancipate all Grecian states from subjection ' toother Greeks; and tliey would certainly not rest long, while any ' remained under a forein dominion. It was therefore the obvious * interest of Tissaphernes, after having taken from the Athenians what- ' ever he could readily acquire, to break with the Lacedosmonians and ' drive them out of Asia.' The conduct of the Lacedaemonian commissioners, in the congress of Cnidus, contributed not a little to give force to these plausible suggestions; for it went far toward verifying the predictionof Alcibiades, that, M'hen once the Lacedaemonians had obtained a superiority at sea, they would not be contented to leave any Grecian cities subject to Persia. Theirdisposition having been thus manifested, what followed, on the part of the satrap, Mas to be expected ; the pay to the armament was, not indeed immediately stopped, but irregularly issued; and when the Peloponnesian commanders proposed any exertion with the fleet, Tissaphernes always objected, ' that the Phenician squadron,' which he never intended should arrive, ' ought in prudence to be waited ' for.' Astyochus, whether through weakness or corruption, appears to have deferred to him upon all occasions ; and thus, as the historian remarks, the most powerful fleet ever sent from Peloponnesus, wasted in inaction. Thucyd. 1. 8. Alcibiades, having thus far wrought upon the satrap, saAV the crisis approaching that might probably inable him, not only to return to his country, but to acquire tlie glory of restoring his country to safety, and perhaps even to splendor. The Athenians, in their distress, had been making great and even wonderful exertions; but those very ex-' ertions had nearly exhausted them ; and it was evident to all the more 2 informed c 47. Sect. IV. PROJECT OF ALCIBIADES. 429 informed among them, that, tho they might still maintain themselves, and perhaps even prosper, against the meer force of the Pcloponnesian confederacy, wliich tliey knew could not with its own means support its late exertions at sea, yet against that confederacy, snpplied by the wealth of Persia, it M'ould be impossible for them long to hold. Alcibiades, well aware both of the weakness of the commonwealth, and of the opinions and dispositions of the people, knew that nothino- would give him so much importance as the notoriety of his favor ■with Tissaphernes. But tho he had risen by the populace, yet as he had also been condemned to death by the populace, he was unwillino- again to trust himself under its unlimited authority; and he thought things so much in his power, that he resolved to require a change of government and the establishment of oligarchy, as the condition upon ■which he would restore his own services to his country, and at the same time bring to it the advantage, in its present circumstances the inestimable advantage, of the alliance of Tissaphernes. The idea appears bold, even to extravagance ; but it was in cha- racter for Alcibiades, and the times were singularly favorable. Most of the better sort of people, worn with the capricious tyranny of the multitude, and dreading such other dictators as Cleon and Hyperbolus, desired the change. There v/ere few trierarcs in the fleet who did not desire it, and with these Alcibiades found ready means to communicate. Thucyd. 1. 8. His overtures excited attention: Thcramenes, Eratosthenes, Ari.stocrates, Lys.''or. con. names which Avill recur to notice, are mentioned among those who i^'aLosth. ■\vent from Samos to confer with him; and the assurances he gave that he would ingage Tissaphernes in the Athenian interest, and through him lead the king himself to an alliance with Athens, were very gladly received by the more powerful and richer men, who suffered most from the war, who were most pressed in consequence ofthe late public misfor- tunes, and whose property was principally called- upon to supply the increased exigencies of an exhausted treasury. The proposal held out to them the prospect, at the same time, of an advantageous conclusion of the waj-, and of a change of go\-ernment, favorable both to the power of those who were ambitious of power, and to the ease of those who only desired ease. Immediately therefore on their return to Samos, 430 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. Samos, communicating with their friends, and finding those disposed to the cause numerous and zealous, they settled the form of an oath for all who should be admitted to their councils (a precaution common among the factions of the antient republics) by which they bound themselves to mutual support and protection. Body and system being thus given to the party, the leaders ventured to declare openly their knowlcge, that the king would become the ally of Athens, and furnish money for the expences of the war, provided Alcibiades M'ere restored, and the government changed to an oligarchy. Some alarm and indignation at first arose ; but the hope of profiting from Persian pay softened the murmur, and the multitude acquiesced under the ideii of loss of power, when the recompence was to be increase of both security and profit. Phrynichus however, the commander-in- chief, known to be vehemently adverse to Alcibiades, was supposed also zealous in the democratical interest, and the innovators had there- fore avoided communication with him. But their measures could not be intirely concealed from him, and, Avith such power as he possessed, he warmly opposed them. Calling together the Athenian citizens of the armament, he urged the falsehood or futility of the arguments which had been used to promote the projected change. ' Alcibiades,' he said, (and Thucydides affirms that he said truly,) ' cared no more ' for oligarchy then democracy, or for anything but for means of his ' own restoration to his country and to power. Nor was it to be ' believed that the Persian king would prefer the Athenian alhance to ' the Peloponnesian ; since the Athenians claimed command over so * many cities within bis country, Avhile the Peloponnesians, whose ' naval strengtli now balanced that of Athens, formed no such ' invidious pretension. It was equally vain to suppose the promise of ' oligarchal government would allure either the subject-cities which had ' revolted, or those which still remained in obedience. The purpose of ' those cities was, not to be inslavcd with an oligarchal rather than a * democratical constitution, but, under whatsoever government, to be * independent of forein dominion. Neither was the supposition less * unfounded, that person and property would be more secure under the * rule of those called the better people ; for those better people, in the ' exercise Thiicyd. 1. 8, Sect.IV. opposition of PHRYNICHUS. 4S1 * exercise of power, commonly sought their own in preference to the ' puhlic benefit. Nowhere indeed were men in public service so liable ' to oppression of every kind, even to capital punishment without trial, * as where the power of the people, the refuge of the innocent, and the ' moderator of the excesses of the great, was done away. That such ' M'as the opinion, the well-founded o])inion, prevailing in most of the * allied states, he well knew; and, for himself, he could not be satisfied ' with any for the measures now proposed, whether for the return of ' Alci blades, or whatever besides.' But in a business of this kind, a political and not a military affair, the authority of the commander-in-chief availed little. The associated party, having a decided majority in the army, resolved immediately c.i'j. to send a deputation to Athens, to push their purpose there. Peisander was appointed first of the deputation, and, notwithstanding any op- position from the commander-in-chief, they sailed for Attica. Tho all thus far had been conducted peaceably, yet Phrynichus c. 50. stood in the situation of a man who, in a rebellion or civil war, has taken his party. However he might be inclined to sheath the sword^ he apprehended his opponents would not; he expected they would pre- vail at Athens ; he feared the consequences to himself, and, to obviate them, he had recourse to a measure extremely hazardous, but still more unjustifiable. Thucydides, on occasion of the retreat from Miletus, gives Phrynichus the character of an able and prudent man. We can hardly give him credit for prudence upon this occasion. He informed the Lacedtemonian commander, Astyochus, of the divisions in the armament under his command. Astyochus, who seems to have been a weak man, went to Magnesia, and communicated both to the satrap and to Alcibiades the intelligence he had received. Alcibiades immediately sent information, to the principal Athenians in Samos, of the treachery of their general; insisting that the punishment which ought to be inflicted for such a crime was death. Phrynichus, in high alarm, and indeed in great peril, wrote again to Astyochus, complain- ing, ' that due secresy had not been observed about what he had before ' communicated : that the danger insuing to himself was most pressing ; * the danger of what he most abhorred and deprecated, perishing by 'the C. D 432 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. ' the bands of his detested domestic foes : that to avoid this there was * nothing- he was not ready to undertake, even to the betraying of the ' whole armament under his command to destruction.' Nor was this a difficult undertaking, for Samos was without fortifications; and t6 give means of executing it, he added every necessary description and direction. Astyochus communicated this also to Alcibiades. Thucyd. I. s. From the dangerous situation in which Plirynichus -was thus in- volved, he extricated himself with singular boldness and dexterity. Having taken his measures so as to know that Astyochus was still betraying him, and that fresh communication Mas upon the point of arriving from Alcibiades, he called together the army, and told them he had learnt, by private intelligence, the intention of the enemy to attack them. The consideration that Samos M-as unfortified, and the observation that part of the fleet was stationed without the port, he said, induced them to the measure; and he therefore issued immediate orders for works to be, in all haste, throw^n up around the city, and for every other precaution to be used against the expected attack. It had before been intended to fortify Samos; preparations had been made in consequence ; and the business, so as to serve the present need, was quickly accomplished. ^Meanwhile the expected letters arrived from Alcibiades, indicating that the armament was betrayed by its general, and that the enemy were preparing to attack it. The intelligence now only appeared to confirm that communicated by Phrynichus, and to justify his measures; so that the accusation accompanying it was Avholly ineffectual, being considered meerly as the scheme of a man, enough kno\vn to be little scrupulous, to ruin a political enemy. It was a bold undertaking in which meanwhile Peisander and his collegues were ingaged at Athens ; to propose to a soverein people to surrender their power, and submit to be governed by the men of supe- rior birth and wealth, over jvhom they had so long been accustomed to tyrannize. But apprehension of the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, sapported by the riches of Persia, and of the dreadful vengeance commonly to be expected in that age from a conquering enemy, lowered their haughtiness, and, instead of power and •wealth, made them anxiously look for means of secure existence iu humbler freedom. Peisander Sect.IV. measures AT ATHENS. 433 Pei Sander therefore, incouraged by the visible effect of popular fear, Tlmcyd. l."*. declared his purpose without reserve: he told the assembled people, ^' ^^' ' that they might have the assistance of the king, and thus be not ' only delivered from their apprehensions, but assured of regainino- a * decisive superiority over their enemies, upon two conditions; the ' restoration of Alcibiades, and a change in the form of government.' Indignant clamor from some, sullen murmurs from others, were excited by this proposal. The particular enemies of Alcibiades were vociferous : and they were supported by the sacred families of the Eumolpids and Ceryces, who urged religion and divine wrath as obstacles to his return. Those who feared no personal ill from the restoration of Alcibiades were less violent. Peisander bore patiently the reproaches of all ; and when opportunity was at length given for him to resume his speech, addressing himself to the most angry, he observed, ' that the Pelo- ' ponnesians, always more powerful by land, now equal at sea, and * superior in the number and strength of their allies, were supported * in the expences of the war by the wealth of Persia ;' and he then put the question, ' What were the means of the commonwealth to resist * such a combination, or what the hope to escape impending destruc- * tion?' To this question no answer, or none in any degree satisfactory to the assembly, was or could be given, ' In such circumstances * then,' continued Peisander, ' the object for consideration must be, * not what form of government you would prefer, but under what * form the commonwealth can exist. And here no choice remains: it ' must be agovernment placed in such hands, armed with such authority, * that the king may confide in it, so as to be induced to become your * ally.' To soften the zealous partizans of democracy, he then added, ' Some among you, I know, think this a great evil. But can you * hesitate to chuse between certain ruin, and what will at worst be a ' passing evil? since, when peace and safety are restored, nothing ' can prevent the people from restoring, M'henever they please, the * anticnt form of government.' Thus exciting at the same time fear and hope, and indeed proving c. 54. to tlic people that they had scarcely another chance for safety, notwith- standing the aversion -which had so long obtained among them, almost Vol. II, 3 K to 434 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. to an abhorrence, of oligarchy, Peisander prevailed. By a decree of the general assembly, eleven commissioners were appointed, himself the first, to treat with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; with full power to conclude whatever they should judge expedient for the common- wealth. Orders were then issued for the recall of Phrynichus and his collegue Scironides; in Avhose room Diomedon and Leon were appointed to command the armament. There were at Athens societies called Synomosies, which bore con- siderable resemblance to our political clubs ; with this difference principally, that as property, liberty, and life itself were incomparably less secure there than under the mild firmness of our mixed govern- ment, the interests of individuals, which bound them to those societies, Avere much more pressing than what commonly lead to any similar establishments among us. The sanction of a solemn oath to their ingagements was therefore always required af the members ; whence the societies obtained their name, signifying sworn brotherhoods*. The objects proposed were principally two ; private security, and poli- tical power; and for the sake of one or both of these, most men of rank or substance in Athens were members of some Synomosy. Against the oppression of democratical despotism, wdiich was often, as we shall see more particularly hereafter, very severely exercised against the rich, the collected influence of a body of noble and wealthy citizens might give protection, when the most respectable individual, standing- single on his merits^ would be overwhelmed: and the same union of Syytiftoeriaj imt^ irvyxatt) vfortpon J» tn I itnow not that this interesting passage, in B-oAii aerai Im ^xaij xal af}(aTi. Societates which 'Iliucytiides Speaks ot what was funii- & collegia, quas prius in urbe erant, & qua; liar in his lime, without sufficiently explain- judiciis & magistraiibus prreerant. Vers, inghimself for posterity,, has been aaywhere Dnktr.— Juntos of the accojnplicet already duly discussed. The explanation which I- formedin the city, uilh the view to thrust them~ have ventured to give, is founded on -.k 4elxes into the seats of judicature and the great comparison of that passage with whatever offices (f state. Smith's TrausL If the word has occurred to my notice, anyway bearing accomplices, for which there is no sufficient a relation to the subject, in the various authority in the original, were omitted, I authors whom I have had occasion to cou- should prefer the English translation to the suit, and in whose authority i have con~ Latin, which is indeed clearly bad. The tidence. ether, licwever, is far from salisf^iclory, and. influence Sect. IV. POLITICAL CLUBS AT ATHENS. 434 influence wliicli could provide security against oppression, with a little increase of force, would dispose of the principal offices of the state. Peisander addressed himself severally to all these societies, and he seems to liave had considerable success in persuading them to concur iu his measures. Everything being thus prepared, as mcII as time and circumstances would permit (for very important interests required his presence on the other side of the J^gean) he hastened his departure with his ten collegues. Arriving at Samos, they found their cause so prospeiing that any Tliucyd. 1. 8. stay there aj)peared needless. They proceeded therefore to the Asiatic main, to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes ; and they were admitted to a conference, at which the satrap attended in person, but which was managed for him by Alcibiades. The conduct of that wily politician, upon this occasion, is not completely accounted for by the cotemporary historian, but the ground of it may be gathered. It could never be his intention to estabhsh at Athens an unbalanced oligarchy ; the most adverse of all constitutions, to that supremacy of one person, which he had, like many others before him, injoyed under the democracy, and M'hich it was certainly his purpose to regain. Neither he, nor probably any other, had supposed that the democracy could have been overthrown, and such a government established on its ruin, by so sudden and so quiet a revolution as that managed by Peisander. As he then would be disappointed, so Peisander and his principal associates would be elated ; and those terms M'hich he expected to have commanded from the oligarchal and democratical parties balanced, M^ould not be conceded to him by the established oligarchy. Hence apparently it became his purpose now to render the conference abortive, by making demands for the satrap, to which tlie Athenian commissioners could not consent. Finding them however disposed to yield much, he required the cession of all Ionia, with the adjacent ilands, to the Persian monarch : and, fearing the urgency of their situation would induce them to admit this, he raised new diffi- culties; a second and third conference were held, and at length he added the requisition, that, along all the coasts of the Athenian domi- nion, navigation should be free for the king's ships, at all times and in 3 K 2 any «. 0, , 456 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX.- any number. Such a demand convincing tlie commissioners tliat Alcibiades meant nothing friendly to them or their party, they broke up the conference in some anger, and returned to Samo". Thncyd. 1.8. Peisander and his coUegues were no sooner gone, than Tissaphernes went to Caunus, in Caria, a situation commodious for communicating with the Peloponnesian commanders, with whom he renewed negoti- ation. He was now in alarm for the conse{juence& of his refusal of pay to their fleet, which, of three disagreeable things, he foresaw Avould probably produce one : either the Pelopannesians must fight; the Athenians, and would be defeated; or their crews would desert, and thus the Athenians, without obligation to him and without risk to themselves, would become decisively superior; or, what he dreaded more than either of these, to supply their pressing necessities they would plunder the territories under his command, and thus weakea the sources of his revenue. In pursuance therefore of his original purpose, to keep the Greeks balanced against oneanother, he invited the Peloponnesian chiefs to a conference at Miletus, which was not refused ; aixd having then directed the issue of pay as formerly, a new- treaty was quickly concluded^ which ran thus i ' In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephoralty ' of Alexippidas in Lacedaemon, a treaty was concluded in the plain ' of the Mieander, between the Lacedaemonians and their allies on one * part, an^ Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces ' on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king and those of tlie * Lacedaemonians and their allies. * Whatever the king possesses in Asia shall be the king's, and the * king shall direct the affairs of his OAvn country according to his will* ' and pleasure. Tlie Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not injure ' any place within the king's dominion; and if any among the * Lacedaemonians or their allies shall attempt such injury, the Lace- ' dsemonians and their allies in common shall prevent it. So also if * sHiy of the king's subjects shall attempt any injury to the Lacedtemo- ' nians or their allies, the king shall prevent it. • Tissaphernes shall continue to pay the fleet in the manner here- ' tofcre agreed, until the king's fleet shall airive. After that it shall 4 ' be Sect. IV. TRANSACTIONS OF THE FLEETS. 437 ' be at tlie option of the Laccdtemonians and their allies to pav their ' own fleet, or to receive the pay still from Tissaphernes, upon con- * dition of repaying hiin when the war shall be concluded. The fleets, ' when combhied, shall carry on operations under the joint direction * of Tissaphernes, and of the Lacedasmonians and their allies. ' No treaty sl>all be entered into with the Athenians but by mutual * consent of the contracting parties.' Thus the alliance of Lacedsemon M'ith Persia^ or at least with the Satrap, m as apparently confirmed. During these negotiations, Leon and Diomedon, having taken the B G 4ir command of the Athenian armament from Phrynichus and Scironidas, Kndofjan. had moved to Rhodes with hiteutlon to offer battle ; but on their c. 55."^ ' arrival they found the Pcloponnesian fleet laid up for the winter. After gratifying their crews therefore, with some revenge against the Rhodians and some profit to themselves, by ravage of a part of the rland, they took their station at the neighboring iland of Cos, to watch the enemy's motions. While the Peloponnesians were thus inactive, their allies of Chios c.6i, were reduced nearly to extremity. In an unsuccessful sally, Pfedaritus, the Lacediiemonian harmost of Chios, had been killed; the blockade was completed, and famine began to press the inhabitants and garrison. In this situation of things opportunity was found to send an officer to Rhodes, who urged to the Pcloponnesian commanders there, that, as the city was effectually blockaded, its distress was become pressing, and nothing less than strong effort with the whole fleet could save it. Twelve triremes had been left as guardshipsat Miletus, four of which were Syracusan, five Thurian, and only one Lacedaemonian; but the Lacedaemonian commander, Leon, was a man of enterprize. While Astyochus hesitated, Leon, taking advantage of the absence of the Athenian fleet from the neighborhood, conducted his squadron to Chios. The Chians, informed of his approach, manned twenty-four triremes and went out to meet him, while their infantry made a diver- sion by an attack upon the Athenian works. Thirty-two Athenian ships had been left as a guard upon Chios. With these an obstinate action insued, in which the Chians were so far successful as to conduct the 4.13 HISTORY or GREECE. Chap. XIX. tlie twelve Peloponnesian ships into tlieir harbour, ami Leon was received as the person charged with the care of the interests, and with tlie administration of the authority, of the Lacedjemouian state, in the room of Predaritus. The rehiforcement thus acquired was important: it inabled the Chians to obtain some supplies by sea ; and occurrences soon after aftbrded farther opportunity. The renewal of connection with the satrap of Caria did not prevent the Peloponnesians from prose- cuting their purpose of extending their alliance to Pharnabazus satrap B. C. 411. of t^i^c Hellespont. Early in spring, the twenty-tirst of the war, Ol. 9--f. Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent to him. He went by land, with only Mar. 28. a small escort : yet, on his arrival before Abydus, the efficacy of the ^ Spartan name sufficed to induce that city immediately to revolt from End of April. the Athenians ; and, two days after, Lampsacus followed the example, Strombichides, who commanded the Athenian squadron at Chios, being Thucvd 1 8 informed of these circumstances, hastened to the Hellespont with <:• 63. twenty-four triremes. The sea thus was left open for the Chians to leceive any relief. The cautious Astyochus, receiving intelligence that a strong squadron of the enemy was thus called far from the Ionian coast, thought the opportunity favorable for seeking an action with their principal fleet. Upon his moving from Rhodes, Leon and Diomedon quitted Cos, and resumed their station at Samos. Ast^'ochus led his fleet first to Chios, and strengthening himself with the whole naval force there, went to Samos, and offered battle. The Athenians, however, would not stir ; and indeed their affairs were in a state, both at Samos and at home, that might have afforded to a more able and active commander than Astyochus, other advantage than that from which he had proposed to profit. Sect. V. PROGRESS OF PLOT FOR REVOLUTION, 43§ SECTION V. progress of the plot for a revolution at Athens : Violences of the oligar- chal party : Proposed new form of government : Establishment of the new council of administration : Negotiation of the nexv govern- ment for peace with Lacedcemon. Peisander and his collegues, returning to Samos from their unsuc- B.C. 411. cessful negotiation with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, had the gra- February. ./,. ^, 111- Thucyd. 1.8. tincation to find, not only that their cause had been gaining in tlie c. 63. army, but that the ohgarchal party among the Samians themselves were both disposed and able to effect a change in the government of their iland. Thus incouraged they determined to pay no more atten- tion to Alcibiades, but, in prosecuting their original purpose of a change in the Athenian constitution, to rely upon their own strength for the conduct, both of the domestic affairs of the commonwealth, and of the business of the war. A large subscription was raised by the party, for supporting measures upon which now depended, not only their interest, but their personal safety. Having established this groundwork for future proceedings, it M'as c.6*. then determined that Peisander, with five of the other commissioners, should return to Athens to manage the concerns of the party there, and that the other five should go througli the allied and subject-states, and endevor to bring all under an oligarchal form of government. Diotrephes was appointed to thesuperintendancy of the affairs ofThiace. In his way thither he stopped at Thasus, and succeeded in at once abolishing the sovereinty of the people there. The consequence, how- ever, was not what Peisander and his collegues intended. Some prin- cipal Thasians of the oligarchal party, who had been banished by the Athenians, had takeu refuge with the Peloponnesian armament on the Asiatic coast. They maintained a correspondence with their friends remaining in the iland, and had been importunately urging revolt. Diotrephes did for them the most dilKcult part of their business, much better 440 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. belter than they could have done it for themselves. Oligarchy being established, the Thasians in possession made no longer any difficulty of preferring the Lacedaemonian to the Athenian connection ; the exiles were restored, and Thasus became a member of the Peloponnesian Thucyd. 1. 8. confederacy. Meanwhile Peisander and the five who fccompanied '^' '^^* him, wherever they touched in their way to Athens, seem to have found as little difficulty in effecting the change of government they desired, as Diotrcphes at Thasus : but the consequence in most of the c 64. towns (so Thucydides says, without naming them) was the same; they revolted to Lacedaemon. By this very circumstance, what otherwise might appear a pheno- menon, is explained ; how a few citizens of Athens, with self-assumed authority, could almost instantaneously overturn the constitutions of so many Grecian republics. Democracy having long principally depended? throughout Greece, upon the patronage of Athens, when the Athenian democracy was overthroM'n and oligarchy substituted, immediately the prevalence of the oligarchal or aristocratical party was prepared. But the means by which the oligarchal party at Athens had advanced far in its purpose, do no honor either to the Athenian government or the Athenian character. Assassination was largely used ; and it seems to have been chiefly managed by youths of the best families. Androcles, a man of mean origin, whose influence among the lower people had contributed much to the condemnation of Alcibiades, and who had ever since been the most forward champion of democracy, was among the first taken oflf. Others, of the most obnoxious to the friends of Alcibiades and of oligarchy, shared the same fate; for, at Athens, the causes of Alcibiades and of oligarchy were not yet distinguished. Inquiry concerning these murders was smothered or deterred, and the C.66. friends of democracy became afraid to show themselves. 5_ gj The oligarchal party thus finding themselves strong, ventured to declare openly the kind of change which they proposed to make in the constitution ; in which some consideration was had for established prejudices, as well as for an appearance of public virtue. There was to be still an assembly of the people, but in some degree select: it y as to be confined to a body of five thousand, to be chosen among those Sect. V. VIOLENCE OF THE OLIGARCIIAL PARTY. 441 those most (inaliiied by property and personal ability to serve the com- monwealth : and public pay was to be allowed to none but those actually serving in the fleet or army. This, says the cotemporary his- Tlnicyd. 1. ,s. torian, was something specious and alluring ; being not only cono-enial '^'^^^'' to the spirit of the antient constitution, but even to modern practice; since so large a number as five thousand citizens scarcely ever met In one assembly; and at the same time it held out to everyone the hope that, if he would concur in the measures proposed, he mio-ht be a member of the soverein body. Meanwhile the general assemblies were regularly held according to antient form, and the council of Five-hundred retained its functions. But assassination was continued; and Vvith so little reserve, and such impossibility of obtaining justice against the perpetrators, that poli- tical opposition was deterred. None spoke, either in the assembly or council, but those of the party, and they not without previous com- munication with the chiefs. The friends of democracy', without equal union among themselves, ignorant of the numbers of the oligarchal party, and supposing them much greater than they really were, scarcely- dared complain of enormities practised; every one thinking himself fortunate if, with the utmost caution to avoid offending, he avoided suffering. To this depression of the democratical party nothing so much contributed as the treachery among its reputed friends ; for, some of those farthest from previous suspicion having joined the oligarchal party, no one kncAV any longer in whom he might confide. Thus assassinations continued to pass without inquiry ; and, even where proof could be obtained against the perpetrator, nobody ventured to prosecute. Already things were in this situation, when Peisander returned to c. 67. Athens. Before his departure, a decree had been made, declaring, in general terms, that the government should be changed : it remained yet to be decided bow. An assembly of the people was convened to determine that important question. The oligarchal party had such a superiority, that they might propose, with a certainty of carrying, in the moment, almost anything : but it was not what might be in the moment carried in the assembly at Athens, that would decide the future constitution of the commonwealth, or their own future fate. Vol. II. 3 L Not 442 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. Not only turns in the popular mind must be provitled against, but great consideration must be had for that large portion of tlie common- vealth, serving in the armament, on the other side of the .^gcan. It was therefore moved, that the consideration of the business should be referred to a committee of ten men, -who should make their report on an appointed day ; and a decree passed to that effect. The day being come, the people were summoned to assemble on the hill of Colonus, a little more than a mile from the city. The ten then came forM'ard Mith the simple proposal of a law, whose aim was nothing more than to obviate illegality in the future measures of the party. It stated, that every Athenian should be free to declare any opinion, in the assembly, upon political topics; and it inflicted heav}- penalties upon those who should endevor to abridge this liberty, Mhether by legal prosecution, according to theantient law, or in any other manner. This being carried, and what before Avould have been treason thus made legal, some of the party declared their opinion, that the form of the administration of the commonwealth ought to be changed, and that pay and remuneration should no more be issued from the treasury, for any but those employed for the commonwealth on forein service. This also being patiently heard, Peisander then ventured to propose tlie form of government to be established : ' That five presidents ' should be chosen by the people : that these should elect a hundred, * and that each of the hundred should elect three : that the council ' of Four-hundred thus formed, should be vested with full power to ' direct the executive government': that the supreme authority in * last resort should reside in a body of fi\e thousand citizens, to be ' assembled at the discretion of the council ^' Thucyd. 1. 8. In this manner it was endevored, by the ablest politician, in the judgement of Thucydides, at that time in Greece, to remedy the evils of the Athenian democracy; for Peisander, tho himself able, Avas but an instrument in the hands of Antiphon; a man, says the historian, * ''Ap;^£i» oV» «» apira yiyiuffxuffit iuT«x^a- implied, but is not expressed by the his- refctf. — Thucyd. 7- 67- torian; nor indeed does it seem to have * Tlie distinction of the legislative and been fully and clearly conceived by any of executive powers appears in some degree tbe antient politicians. in c 68." Sect.V. establishment of the new GOVERNiMENT. 443 in virtue inferior to no Athenian of his age, and in abilities, whether for tlie closet or the assembly, superior to all. This very superiority exciting jealousy among the people, had prevented the exertion of his talents for the public benefit; a circumstance not uncommon among the antient democracies, and which probably contributed to inliance the aversion of Antiphon to that form of government: but in any private cause, whether in the inferior i.ourts of judicature, or before the assembled people, no man was equally capable of serving his friends, either by his advice or by his eloquence. The second place ariiong the opponents of democracy seems to have been held by Theramenes son of Agnon ; a man also of superior powers, botii of thought and elocution, and moreover of considerable military experience. But, beside those originally of the oligarchal party, there v.ere some eminent men who had passed over to it from the democratical ; and, of these, Phrynichus, the late commander on the Asiatic coast, was the chief. Of a fearless temper, but an unprincipled mind, Phrynichus dreaded, beyond any personal danger, the restoration of Alcibiades to the com- monwealth and to power. As soon therefore as the oligarchal party broke with Alcibiades, Phrynichus joined the oligarchal party; and, after the common manner of renegades, exceeded in zeal the most zealous of the original members. A number of superior men, says the cotem- porary historian, being thus united in the conduct of the business, it is no great wonder that it succeeded; tho to deprive the Athenian people of liberty, for that is his expression, a hundred years after the recovery of it by the expulsion of the tyrants, during above fifty of which they had been accustomed, not only to obey none, but to com- mand many, was indeed an arduous undertaking. The decree, directing the new constitution, having passed the Thucyd. 1. 3. assembly of the people, the party managed among themselves the appointment of the new council. But the council of Five-hundred, in whom the old constitution vested the excutive power, had not been consulted concerning any of the measures taken or proposed : they were still in possession of the prytaneium or state-house, in Mhich a part of them, the prytanes, usually resided ; and it was apprehended they might not peaceably resign it. When therefore the new council 3 L 2 Avas 444 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. was to be introduced, measures were taken, with much forethought, to obviate opposition, which might produce tumult. Since the establishment of a hostile garrison in Deceleia, constant readiness for military duty had been required of the whole people. Daily all appeared in the morning in arms; and the magistrates and officers distributed the duty of the day among them ; some to the guard of the works, others to hold themselves in readiness for the field. All who conld be spared were then tlismissed, with directions only to repair to the general parade at a certain signal. On the day fixed for ejecting the old council, it was provided that the citizens of the dcmocratical interest should be dismissed, and those only retained in arms for the duty of the day, in whom the party could best confide. Among these were a number of Andrian, Tenian and Carystian auxiliaries, with some colonists from iEgina, all brought to Athens for the purpose. ]\Iatters being thus prepared, the Four-hundred went to the pryta- neium, armed each with a concealed dagger, and attended by a hun- dred and twenty youths, who had been accustomed to perform for them the business equally of guards and assassins '. They carried with them the arrear of salary due to the counsellors of the bean, as the Five-hundred were called, and making a tender of it, required all to withdraw. The old council, quietly taking their pay, obeyed the requisition, and no stir was made in the city on the occasion. The ■ Four-hundred then proceeded to elect prytanes from their own body by lot; and, with the same ceremonies of prayer and sacrifice, which were prescribed by custom for the antient council, they commenced the execution of their office. Thus was apparently completed this extraordinary revolution. Athens, and whatever of Attica was not held by the enemy, yielded obedience to the new council, become the supreme power of the com- monwealth, through a law made, with all due form, by the assembly of the people, which before held that power. In the general conduct • This seems to l)e the import of the his- from the ordinary armed attendants of the ' torian's phrase, "or; l;^pS>To £iTi woo ^iat ■xiifovf- Athenian magistracy, who were always bar- 7«iv. Thucydidcs calls them"E^^)ivf5 teana-ttdi, barians, generally Scythians, thus marking that they were different people of Sect. V. MEASURES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. 445 of the business, we see something very different from the tumul- tuous revolutions so numerous among- the inferior Grecian republics. Nowhere else, in the accounts remaining to us, can we rliscover such a regard for all the forms of an established constitution : yet, even in this revolution at Athens, we find strong relics of barbarism, I must risk the expression, and very defective notions of policy. None of those public massacres took place, which were so usual in Grecian ^ revolutions: public executions, with the pretence of law or popular judgement, were also avoided: some persons were imprisoned, some banished ; and, were this all, the duty of the ruling powers to preserve jiublic tranquility perhaps might have justified it: but many, in the apprehension of being obnoxious, sought their safety by fliglit ; for the horrid and base practice of secret assassination was continued, against those whom the prevailing party supposed most adverse and most formidable. • Of the many actually living in banishment, under condemnatioiv from the assembled peo]de, or the popular tribunals, some the leaders of the revolution would gladly have restored; and probably they would have refused the favor to few, so that, among the number, the historian Thucydides might have returned to his country. But the restoration of Alcibiades, tho he had been the first mover of the revolution, was looked to by most of the party with no friendly eye. Some, as Piiry- nichus, were essentially interested in his exclusion; and all would be jealous of the talents, the fame, the popularity, of one who had so long- been the active and successful opponent of the oligarchal interest. Confident that they no longer needed his assistance, they were no longer willing to admit that superiority, which must have been yielded to him J and therefore, to obviate opportunity for any measures in his favor, making a merit of supporting the decrees and judgements of the people, they resolved that none should be restored who had been banished by the people. In other points they did not preserve the same respect for the decrees of the people, or the forms of the antient constitution, or even for their own declarations concerning the new one. The appointment of a Tlmcyd. I. s. supreme assembly of five thousand had been held out only as a lure, <"■• 9'^- to 446 HISTORY OFGREECE. Chap. XIX. to ingage readier acquiescence under the other changes ; for such a body would have been perhaps even more difficult to manage, by the Few, who proposed to hold all power in their own hands, than the assembly open to every citizen. But they declared, and they found no small advantage in so doing, not only that the supreme power in last resort was to be vested in such a select, yet numerous body of citizens, but that the selection, though not published, was already made; for thus they kept every man in hopes for himself, and in fear of his neighbor. The party, being thus completely masters within the city, turned their attention to things without. It was a most important object for After27Fek them to make peace with Lacedfiemon, and they had warm hope of success. Accordingly they sent to Agis, then in Deceleia, representing to him, that he would no longer have a fickle, faithless and arrogant multitude to deal with, but a government more resembling that of Sparta, and which might deserve his confidence. But Agis, considering the probable ferment of men's minds immediately after such a revolution, thought he might possibly find means to command terms instead of treating for them. Declining therefore any negotiation, he sent for a large force from Peloponnesus, m ith which, added to his troops in Deceleia, he marched to the walls of Athens. The Athenian people, he concluded, would not yet be disposed to pay regular and quiet obedience to their new leaders : the sudden appearance of a Thucvd. 1. 7. hostile army would excite alarm; difl^"erence of opinion would pro- '^•^^' bably arise; contention would follow, and perhaps mutiny; and, in the confusion, possibly a well-timed assault might carry the city. The event justifies the character of ability, which Thucydides gives to the leaders of the oligarchal party in Athens. Nothing happened of what Agis expected. The whole of the Athenian cavalry went out of the city, in good order, accompaniedby some light-armed and bowmen, with a body of heavy-armed following to support them. The Peloponnesian army had not a force of cavalry equal to oppose the Athenian. A detach- ment, advancing very near the walls, was attacked and overpowered, and the Athenians carried off the dead. Agis finding himself thus disappointed, prudently withdrew to Deceleia, and sent back the troops .1 lately Sect. VI. TRANSACTIONS ON THE ASIAN COAST. 447 lately arrived from Peloponnesus. The Athenian ministry were thus encouraged to try again a negotiation, and, fresh overtures to Agis being now favorably received, they made no delay in sending ministers End of . T J March. to Laceda3mon. SECTION VI. Opposition of the fleet and army at Samos to the new government of Athens: Thrasyhulus. Dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesian ar?na- ment with its general. Assistance sent from the Peloponnesian armament to Pharnabaziis satrap of the Hellespont. The restoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian armament : Alcibiades elected general by the armament. Fresh discontent of the Peloponnesian armament: Astyochiis succeeded in the command by Mindarus. Cotn- missioners from the neto government of Athens to the armament at Samos : Able and beneficial conduct of Alcibiades. Thus successful in their administration at home, and in train to put \^ q ^jj an end to war, within Greece, difficulties were arisinc: for the oli- P- W. 21. AT - .Vi garchal leaders, Avhich no wisdom on their part probably could have prevented. Peisander, before he left Samos, had e.xerted himself Thucyd. J, s. among the people of that iland, so far as to persuade many of the ^- ^'^■ democratical party to join the oligarchal; and a society was formed of three hundred friends of oligarchy, who, according to usual practice, bound themselves to oneanother by solemn oaths to support their common measures. Peisander thought the olio'archal interest thus secure among the Samian people, as he hoped it M'as in the armament. But, after his departure, tumults arose among the Samians : the Athenians of course interfered ; and, Charminus, one of the generals, was, with some others, unfortunately killed. lu these contests the oligarchal party had the advantage; they depended upon support from the Athenians, among M'hom they supposed the oligarchal to be now the prevailing interest; and they were proceeding to take farther mea- sures against the supporters of democracy. But 448 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XI!?. But there had always been, among the patrons of democracy, at Athens, some of the first families of the commonwealth: for of these there were always some who could more readily rise to power through the democratical than the oligarchal interest ; and indeed some were con- sidered in a manner hereditary chiefs of the democratical cause. The present generals, Leon and Diomedon, connected as they were m ith the leaders of the oligarchal party, yet having themselves great interest among the people, were averse to the proposed change of government ; and, the democratical Samians soliciting their protection against the oppression of the oligarchal, they readily gave it. Leon and Diomedon, however, appear to have hecen moderate in party, and not men of commanding characters. There were two younger officers, of inferior rank, Thrasybulus sou of L) cus, captain of a trireme, and Thrasyllus, an officer of the heavy-armed, who by th.eir reputation for ability, courage, activity and integrit}', were of principal consideration. These were zealous in tl;e democratical cause: they instigated the generals, by Avliom they were well leceived; they were sedulous in argument and persuasion among the soldiers and seamen, by whom they were beloved and respected ; and thus, w hile the revolution took place at Athens in favor of oligarchy, the prepon- derance of. the democratical cause Mas restored in tlie armament at Samos. The democratical Samians then, obtaining support from the Athenians, prevailed against their opponents. Tliirty of the society of three hundred were ])ut to death . three -were banished ; and the r^st, M'ith a humanity not common in Greek sedition, on submitting to demo- cracy, received a free |.iardon '°. Tiiucyd. 1. 8. The revolution at Aihcns being unknown yet at Samos, Chtereas ^•'*- son of Archestratus, a man of eminence in the Athenian armament, was dispatched in the herald-ship Paralus to report these trans- actions ; not without expectation that he would be the messenger of grateful news to the ruling powers. Information of the extraor- dinary change that had taken place meeting him on his arival, he '" 'I'he phrase of Thucydides, singularly to be translated : To^ yii>i?Ai; oi;/*>ti(rixaxo:/>l£{, concise and singularly expressive, is scarcely Sr.niK^mnifnt'A re^curs) ^vnTrotiiTtvor. instantly Sect. VI. COMMOTION IN THE ATHENIAN FLEET. 449 instantly secreted himself; and the event justified the suspicion which directed that conduct. Two or three of his officers were thrown into prison : his crew were moved into an ordinary trireme on the Eubcean station ; and the sacred ship Avas committed to persons more devoted to the ruling party. Choreas, waiting only to acquire information, in his concealment, of the circumstances of the revolution, returned in haste to Samos, and reported there, with the usual, or even more than usual exaggeration of party-spirit, the violences of those who held the powers of government at home. Regardless of truth, he dwelt upon whatever would be likely most to irritate the passions of those serving in the armament. A few assassinations, if we may judge from the omission of all mention of them upon this occasion by the historian, seem not to have been considered as what would make much impression : the sufferers \vere probably little connected with the armament, or little esteemed in it : but 'that the Four-hundred inflicted stripes without re- ' serve; that despotic restriction was put upon discourse; that complaint ' was held criminal, and that it was dangerous to open the lip against ' the ruling powers ; that even the wives and children of those on foreiu ' service were not secure from insult ; that it Avas proposed to confine, ' as hostages, the nearest friends of all those in the armament at Samos, ' who were supposed friends of democracy:' these were the topics on which Chtereas principally insisted. Such information, from a man of rank, just arrived from Athens, when the armament was already in a ferment, raised an instant flame. In the first moment of alarm and passion, the zealots for democracy were going to turn their swords against those of their comrades who had shown a disposition to favor oligarchy; and nothing prevented so rash a measure, but the consideration, warmly urged by some of the more prudent among them, that the Peloponnesian armament was near enough to take advantage of such a circumstance, for the destruc- tion of both parties. Bloodshed being thus prevented, and the commanders-in-chief, as far as appears, passive, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus took the lead : for it was not now a military business, but the civil interest of the com- VoL. II. S M monwealth, c. 70. 450 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. monwealth, vhicli it behooved the armament, a large and ahnost a preponderant portion of the commonwealth, to take into consideration. The first measure M'as to require an oath from all, with particular attention to those supposed to favor oligarchy, binding them, in the most solemn manner, to support democracy, to persevere in the war against the Peloponnesians, to maintain concord among themselves, to hold the Four-hundred for enemies, and to admit no treaty with them: This oath, having been universally taken by the Athenians, was tendered to the Samians, who also took it universally. Hence- forward the Samians were admitted to all councils, as men ingaged in the same cause Avith the Athenians, and bound by the same interest, whose assistance \vas necessary to their welfare, and whose welfare depended upon their success. Thiicyd. 1. 8, JMatters being thus far settled, the armament would no longer con- sider the commonwealth as existing at Athens, but took upon them- selves to be the commonwealth. The generals Leon and Diomedon, notwithstanding the degree of concurrence they had thus far given, were esteemed not sufficient!}' zealous in the cause. As the general assembly of Athenian citizens, therefore, the armament assumed autho- rity to depose them, together with every commander of a trireme whom they thought adverse to democracy; and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were, by the same authority, raised to the command-in-chief» These measures, in fact declaring a civil war, put equally the arma- ment and the city, both watched by a forcin enemy already too powerful, in a most perilous situation. The armament, however, says the his- torian, comforted themselves with the considerations, that they were the strength of the commonwealth ; that the oligarchal party, tho in possession of the city, were comparatively weak: that, the whole fleet being theirs, the subject-states must also be theirs, together with the revenue thence arising; the collection of which they possessed means to inforce, v/hich the oligarchal party were totally without : that, even for subsistence, those who held Athens were more dependent upon them than they upon those who were masters of Athens ; for not only they could more command the sea, but they could even more command 2 the Sect. VI. DISCONTENT in the PELOPONNESIAN FLEET. -iSi the entrance of the harbour of Peirs2iis. With regard to a home, Sanios, a fine iland with a considerable city, was no contemptible home. Such then being their means, not only of subsistence and security, but even of wealth and power, it was little to be doubted but Alcibiades, ill- treated as he had been by the oligarchal party, would gladly join his interest with theirs; and thus, the king of Persia becoming their ally, there M'as no kind or degree of success which they might not reason- ably hope. But should they finally be deceived, in any or in all their views against their domestic enemies, still, M'hile such a fleet was theirs, retreats would not be wanting, where they might find, not only lands of which to possess themselves, but also cities in which to settle. The oligarchal party at Athens had always been apprehensive that Thucyd. !. 8. c 7 '^ the nautic multitude, as Thucydides calls them, would not readily acquiesce under the change of government. Immediately therefore B.C. 411. after the appointment of the council of Four-hundred, ten commissi- Soon alter oners had been dispatched for Samos, with instructions, in giving infor- mation of the change, to apologize, soothe and persuade. The com- Thucyd. 1.8. missioners, however, meeting intelligence at Delos of the violent '^' ' measures of the democratical party in the armament, the deposition of the generals, and the appointment of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus to the command, feared to proceed. Fortunately for Athens at this time, there was neither able conduct c 7S. at the head of the Peloponnesian armament, nor union among the members. Discontent grew so as to threaten mutiny or defection ; Bpgin[)i,,„ of and in this the Syracusans took the lead. ' It was evident,' they said, ^^^ich. •' Aiin.rhiicvd. ' that the satrap meant no good to their cause. Not only the pay but rather ' which he had ingaged to furnish was reduced, but the reduced l^eg.oiApnl. ' pay was irregularly and deficiently issued. Under pretence of ' waiting for the Phenician fleet, which he did not intend should ever ' join them, he had prevented action with the enemy when weak in ' numbers. He now continued to prevent it, when they were perhaps ' yet weaker through sedition; and their own commander-in-chief, * either overreached or bought, yielded to him in everything.' Urged by fear of sedition among his own people, while he was invited Tbucyd. 1. 8. by intelligence of sedition among the Athenians, Astyochus deter- 3 M 2 mined 452 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. mined to lead the fleet against the enemy. But, when he arrived off » Samos, things were aheady composed in the Athenian armament under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, M'ho were equal to their new command. All was order and vigilance within the harbour : an express was sent to the Hellespont to require the return of Strombichides, who arrived quickly ; and then the Athenian fleet, consisting of a hundred and eight triremes, moved toward the Peloponnesians, who declined the oftered battle, and retired into the port of Miletus. Such, after all the great loss in Sicily, and with faction so raging as to render it doubtful where the government existed, was still the naval Tliucyd. 1. 8. power of Athens ; while the Peloponnesians were so far from being able, '^' ' with their own strength, to support the contest in naval war, that a diminution only of pecuniary assistance from Persia, reduced them immediately to distress. Eut while Persian policy was successfully em- ployed in fomenting the divisions of Greece, the weakness of the Persian government, and the militating interests of its officers commanding- provinces, afforded the Greeks reciprocal advantages. Pharnabazus pro- posed to profit from the growing dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians with Tissaphernes. He sent to inform them, ' that if they would bring ' their fleet to the Hellespont, and connect their interests with liis, ' he would furnish faithfully and regularly that pay and those supplies, ' which Tissaphernes was evidently no longer disposed to give.' At the same time there arrived from the Byzantines a proposal to revolt, if support could be obtained from the Peloponnesian fleet. These overtures were deemed by the Peloponnesian commanders to require immediate attention. But to make their way to the Hellespont, they must probably fight the Athenian fleet, which the commander-in- Aniil chief desired to avoid. Forty ships therefore were sent under Cle- archus son of Rhamphias, with direction to take a circuitous course through the open sea, that he might escape observation from the Athenian scouts. His passage was interrupted by a storm. Ten of his triremes only, under Helixus the Megarian commander, made their "way good to the Hellespont; the rest, being dispersed, sought again the port of Miletus, which they were fortunate enough to reach. Clearchus prosecuted his journey by land to take the Hellespontine command, Sect. VI. ALCIBIADES ADOPTED BY THE ARMAMENT. 453 command, and on his arrival he found Byzantium, through the exer- tions of Helixus, in concert with thePeloponnesian party there, ah-eady a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. With this disposition among the dependencies of Athens to revolt^ Thrasybukis and ThrasyUus were aware that they had undertaken what, with their own strength, they should scarcely be able to bring to a good conclusion. Whether they had previously held any intelli- gence with Alcibiades, is not said by the historian, but appears pro- bable. An assembly of the Athenian citizens of the armament was summoned, as if the legal general assembly of the commonwealth. Thrasybulus undertook to explain the advantages to be expected from the restoration of Alcibiades: the assembly assented; and a resolu- tion, in the form of a decree of the Athenian people, declared him restored to the privileges of an Athenian citizen, and no longer liable, for any passed transaction, to either punishment or trial. This being carried, Thrasybulus, whose measure principally it was, ■went himself to communicate mformation of it to Alcibiades, then residing M'ith Tissaphernes. They returned together to Samos : the assembly was again convened, and Alcibiades spoke. After shortly lamenting the calamity of his exile, the injury that had insued to his country, and the misery to himself, he adverted to present circum- stances, and dwelt largely on the fair prospect that appeared of future prosperity to Athens, through the benefits which his restoration would bring. ' Nothing,' he said, ' was wanting to induce the satrap to ' take an active part in their favor, but sufficient assurance of steddi- ' ness in the government, and due adherence to ingagements made. * Nor was it any secret what he would require; for he had repeatedly ' declared, that he would freely treat with Alcibiades, Avcre the affairs ' of the commonwealth again committed to him. In that case, not ' only his revenue should supply the wants of Athens, but the Pheni- * cian fleet, now at Aspendus, instead of reinforcing the Peloponnesian, ' should join the Athenian against the Peloponncsians.' The assembly ■were ready to believe what they wished to be true, and the speech of Thucvd. I. g. Alcibiades made such impression, that he was upon the spot elected "■'• ^^'• general: tliose before appointed were continued as his collegues; but tlic 4J-1 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. the chief direction of affairs, with the approbation apparently of Thrasybuliis and Tlirasjllus, passed immediately into his hands. Things being so far settled, immoderate joy and thoughtless con- fidence pervaded the armament. Already they held the Peloponnesians in contempt. Revenge against the Four-hundred was their favorite object ; they considered the means as in their hands, and they would sail directly to Peira;us. Alcibiades however had influence, and he did not want prudence, to check the rash design. ' The nearer enemy,' he said, ' must not be so left, to act unopposed against the most va- ' luable possessions of the commonwealth. AVith regard to himself, * moreover, it would be utterly improper to run to distant enterprize, ' without going first to communicate personally with the satrap. Their ' interest required that he should show himself in the rank in M'hicli ' they had placed him ; and, armed with the importance which that rank ' gave, consult concerning the arrangements to be made.' They yielded to these arguments; the assembly was dismissed, and he set off imme- diately : anxious, says the historian, to show Tissaphernes his power among the Athenians, as to impress the Athenians with an opinion of his influence with Tissaphernes ; and, as he could now be, to both, either a valuable friend or a formidable foe, he aM-ed the Athenians with the name of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with that of tlie Athenians. Tlmcyd. 1. S. Intelligence of these transactions in Samos, being conveyed to the Peloponnesian armament at Miletus, occasioned a violent ferment there. The irregularity and deficiency of the issues of pay, before complained of, had increased since the appearance of the Athenian fleet on the coast, and the refusal of battle by the Lacedaemonian commander. Alcibiades, lately their counsellor, and still the man of most influence with the satrap, was now become commander-in-chief of the enemy. Not only the soldiers and sailors, but the principal officers, openly accused Astyochus of compliance adverse to their interests and that of their countr}'. Weak and mean, they declared, they had always thought it, but they now pronounced it treacherous ; and unless a successful battle was fought, or new measures were taken to procure supplies, the crews, they said, would, and indeed must dtsert, to fiud subsistence. The c. 83. Skct. VI. WEAK CONDUCT of the SPARTAN COMMANDER. 4:5 The Sicilian force was now no ionger guided by the wisdom, the energy, and the influence of Hermocrates, who, in consequence of a change in the Syracusan administration, had been superseded in his com- mand. While then the rest of the armament canvassed matters amono- Thucyd. 1. s. themselves, the Syracusan and Thurian seamen, with the licentiousness '^' ^^' and arrogance nourished under a democratical government, and either allowed, or not duly controlled, by a democratical commander, went in a body to Astyochus, and, in a tumultuous manner, demanded the pay due to them. Astyochus, who appears to have had no talent for holding authority, reproved them with Spartan haughtiness; and not only threatened Dorieus the Thurian commander" (who, improperly enough, accompanied his people, and even spoke for them) but lifted his stick as if to strike him. It is from Thucydides that we have this testimony to the rough manners of a Spartan general; to which the democratical Thurians made the rough return that might be expected. With a nautic shout, they rushed forward to protect and revenge their commanding officer. Fortunately for Astyochus, an altar was near, and he fled to it: the rioters respected the sanctuary, and presently dispersed. This was not the only wound which the Lacedaemonian commandsuf- fered. Tissaphernes had taken a strong measure to secure his authority in Miletus ; he had built a fort within tlie walls of the city, and placed a garrison there. In the necessity of the Milesians, on first revolting from Athens, to procure protection, on any terms, against Athenian vengeance, it does not appear that this had occasioned any opposition " The sclioliast, hastily and carelessly, lowing sentences he mentions Hermocrates considering Dorieus as a gentilitious name, as already superseded by an order from Syra- iuterprets it to mean Hermocrates. In cuse, and adds circumstances hardly allowing recollecting that the Syracusaus were a Dori- the supposition that he had at all incouragcd an people, beseems to have forgotten that the ofiensive conduct of the Sicilians. It the Lacedajmonians were so. A Spartan may be observed farther that Dorieus son general would scarcely distinguish a Syracu- of Diagoras, apparently the same man spoken san as the Dorian, by way of eminence. In of by Thucydides, is mentioned by Xeno- a preceding passage (c. 35. 1. 8.) Thucydides phon, (Hellen. 1, 1. c.l. s.2.) Noristhisthe particularizes Dorieus son of Diagoras as only instance,in which we find Dorieus, like the commander of the Thurian squadron in other gentilitious names among the Greeks, the Peloponnesian fleet. Within a few fol- taken as the proper name of an individual. or 45^5 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIX. or complaint. Bui, when they thought themselves established mem- bers of the Peloponnesian confederacy, they began to consider such a badge of foreiu servitude with uneasiness; and at length, the spreading discontent against Tissaphernes incouraging, they entered the fort by surprize, with a superior armed force, and compelled the garrison to withdraw. The Lacedsemonian commissioner, Lichas, condemned this violence. Apparently he and his collegues had learned to be more complaisant to the satrap than when they arrived from Sparta. * Miletus,' he said, ' being situated in Asia, was within the king of ' Persia's proper dominion. It became its people therefore to submit * to Tissaphernes as his officer ; and the interest of the confederacy ' required that it should be so.' A majority, however, of the allies in the armament, and, above the rest, the Syracusans, declared openly and vehemently their dissent to the doctrine of Lichas, and their approba- tion of the conduct of the JNIilesians. Accordingly the Milesians persisted in excluding the Persian garrison, and asserting their independency, and they manifested, upon all occasions, without scruple or reserve, a Avarm animosity against the Lacedsemonian com- missioner. Thucyd. 1. 8. Things were in this state at Miletus, when INIindarus arrived from ^- ^^' Lacedirmon to supersede Astyochus in the command-in-chief. Mean- while the wary Tissaphernes held to the former advice, and would not change his policy for the present persuasion of Alcibiades. He would hold the balance between the contending parties in Greece; and he could no more be induced now to break with the Lacedcemonians, than he had desired before to give them a decisive superiorit}'. On the contrary Astyochus remained in favor : for the same conduct which had rendered that general obnoxious to many of those under his com- mand, had been gratifying to the satrap. When therefore Astyochus returned home, Tissaphernes sent with him Gauleites, a Carian, who spoke both the Greek and Persian languages, in quality of his minister to Sparta. Gauleites was instructed to apologize for any apparent slackness in Tissaphernes toward the interest of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and to prefer complaints against the Milesians; particu- larly insisting upon their affronting and injurious conduct in expelling the Sect.VL critical SITUATION OP ATHENS. 4-^7 the Persian garrison. The Milesians, informed of this, sent ministers B C 4-11 to vindicate themselves; and Ilermocrates, reduced to the situation of an individual without office, accompanied them to Sparta. Such, fortunately for Athens, was the distraction of interests amono- its enemies, while there was an Athenian commonwealth in Attica and another in Samos, more virulently inimical to, each other than to any lerein foe. Meanwhile the Four-hundred, through a stranoe incautiousness, met with a check in their proposed negotiation for peace with LacedEemon. Their ambassadors imbarked in a trireme, Tliucyd. 1. 8, manned with those who had been removed from the herald-ship '^' ^°' Paralus, for their devotion to the democratical party at Samos. In passing the Argolic coast, the crew mutinied, carried the vessel into Nauplia, and delivered the ambassadors prisoners to the Argian admini- stration. No independent Grecian state was so interested in the schism of the Athenian commonwealth as Argos. The revolution had excited great alarm. It was apprehended that the abolition of democracy, at Athens, would be followed by the downfall of the democratical interest throughout Greece. Intelligence of the turn which things had taken, at Samos, was proportionally gratifying: the opportunity to serve the democratical party, by checking the negotiation of their adversaries, was seized with zeal; and, as it Avas the purpose of the Athenian crew to join the fleet at Samos, the Argians sent with them ministers, com- missioned to assure the democratical party there of their friendship and support The commissioners, appointed by the Four-hundred to negotiate c. S(>. with the fleet and army, meanwhile had ventured to proceed from Delos, and arrived at Samos about the same time with the ministers from Argos. Alcibiades was already returned ; an assembly of the Athenian citizens in the armament was summoned, and the commissioners from Athens, and the Argian ministers, were together admitted, to audience. Tumult immediately began among the soldiers. ' Those who had ' subverted the democracy,' it was exclaimed, ' should receive capital * punishment.' The generals used their endevor3 to restore order, and with some ditficulty succeeded. The commissioners then addressed the assembly. Their first solicitude was to discredit the charges, reiilly Vol. II. 3 N replete 458 HISTORY OP GREECE. Chap. XIX. replete with falsehood, which had been alledgcd against the Four- hundred by Chxreas. They assured the soldiers and seamen ' that ' their friends and relations at Athens had never received the least * injury or molestation from the present government.' Thus far they were heard with patience; but when they proceeded to vindicate the change made in the constitution, calling it ' still a democracy, modi- ' fied only in such a manner as the present circumstances rendered neces- * sary,' they were interrupted with fresh tumult. Wlien quiet was again restored, still the commissioners could not gain attention : others would speak; various opinions were given, various proposals offered; and at length it appeared the prevailing disposition, and even the decided resolution, to sail immediately for PeiriEus, and at once restore the former constitution, and punish those who had overthrown it. Then, says Thucydides, for the first time, Alcibiades did his country a real service, and such a service that perhaps no man ever did a greater. The assembly was on the point of passing the rash decree, and, in the zeal of the moment, it would have been carried into instant execution. Athens thus would have been plunged into the horrors of civil war, and every remaining dependency of the commonwealth in Ionia and on the Hellespont would have passed almost instantaneously into the hands of the enemy. No man certainly, continues the historian, but Alcibiades was able to prevent this ; and he did prevent it. He reproved the passion that had been shown in the proceedings, and the people, the armed people, bore his reproof: he demonstrated the destructive ten- dency of what was proposed, and they were alarmed with their own measure : he procured acknowlegement that what had been advised by others was wrong; and, taking upon himself to dictate the answer which should be returned to Athens, they yielded to his authority. * He did * not object,' he said, ' to limiting the votes in the general assembly to * five thousand: but he would require the immediate abolition of the ' council of Four-hundred, and the restoration of the antient council * of Five-hundred. If the new government had retrenched any super- ' fluous expence, so that the forces serving abroad might be more ' certainly and plentifully subsisted, they should have his applause for ' it. He trusted they would not separately make any treaty with the * enemy. Sf.ct.VI. beneficial CONDUCT OF ALCIBIADES. . 4..y * enemy. With the present strength of the commonwealth intire, there * was good hope that the enemy might be brought to a reasonable * accommodation: but, were so large a portion as, either the party now ' prevailing in Samos, or the party now prevailing in Athens, to be * cut off, there would soon be no commonwealth left for an enemy to * treat with.' Alcibiades, having thus answered the commissioners, then addressed the Argian ministers; thanking them in the name of tlie assembly for the zeal their commonwealth had manifested, and desiring they \vould only hold themselves in readiness to give that assistance, which might become important, tho in the moment it was not wanted. This hazardous business being thus fortunately accommodated, it p r- 4,, became necessary for Alcibiades to attend to the motions of Tissaphcrnes, P \\ • 21. who wasgone to Aspendusto visitthePhenicianfleet there, and had taken xhuUfl 1 8. Avith him the Lacedasmonian commissioner Lichas, with two Pclopon- ^ ^''- nesian triremes, under the command of Philippus, the harmost of Miletus. No less than a hundred and forty-seven ships of war were actually assembled; a force ample to give the superiority to which- soever of the belligerent powers the satrap might chuse to favor. Alcibiades followed him; probably too well acquainted with both his c. 88. character and his designs, either to fear that he would afford any very effectual support to the Peloponnesians, or to expect that he would be diverted from a policy, so congenial to his nature, as that of wearing out both parties, M'hile he gave hopes to both. Alcibiades knew also that it was much an object, with the satrap, to gratify his court, by doing its business with the least possible expence. But he had nevertheless his end in his journey. He gained the credit, with the Athenians, of preventing the junction of the Phenician fleet Avith the Peloponnesians, and he disturbed the councils and measures of the Peloponnesians, by giving new force to the jealousy and mistrust they had for some time entertained of Tissaphcrnes. *J y 2 460 HISTORYOFGREECE. Chap. XIX. SECTION VII. Schism in the weti" government of Athens: Theramenes : a second revolution. B.C. 411. WHiLii, at Samos, the democraiical party were held together, and Ol. yc. \. concert Avas maintained in their proceedings, throus;h the decided April. superiority of one man at their head, division was growing among the &q' ' ' ' many men of great abilities, but of various tempers, vicMS and interests, who directed the aftliirs of the oligarchal party at Athens. Aristocrates son of Sicelius, Theramenes one of the generals of the establibhnient, and some others in high offices, had been for some time dissatisfied with the prospect of their affairs ; insomuch that they wanted only v. 90. opportunity to disingage themselves from their party. On the con- trary Antiphon and Peisander, M'hose strong measures left no means of retreating, Phrynichus, who dreaded nothing equally with the return of Alcibiades, and Aristarchus, upon principle the most inveterate and vehement of all the enemies of the democracy, together with many other men of considerable weight, remained firm in their purpose of main- taining the oligarchy. The answer from Alcibiades, and the account, brought by their commissioners, of the state of things in Samos, together with their knowlege of the inclination to secession within their own party, gave much uneasiness, but produced no disposition to yield. Their proposed resource was to make peace witli Lacedo?mon ; and upon any terms, rather than not make peace. With an oligarchal government they trusted they might easily obtain, not peace only, but alliance and certain protection : and indeed they considered the means of connection ■with Lacedffimonias their only ground of hope, even for personal safety. Their former embassy having been stopped, by the mutiny of the crew of the vessel in which it sailed, Antiphon and Phrynichus now undertook the negotiation. Those who directed the government at home, were in the mean time to take measures for obviating domestic opposition. With this Sect.VII. contention AT ATHENS. 461 this view it was judged of much importance to forward the completion of a fort, some time since begun, on a spot called Eetioneia, commanding the entrance of the harbour of Peirteus. It was already so far advanced that they established the public magazine of corn there; and they not only caused all corn imported to be there deposited, but compelled all indi- viduals in the city, who possessed any quantity, to send it thither. Meanwhile the same answer from Samos, which urged the determined Thucvd. 1. g. supporters of oligarchy to these strong measures, incouraged the dissen- '^' ^^' tients in their proposed secession. That answer offered them a clear overture for an accommodation. Even in Athens the body of the people was still inclined to democracy ; and, to restore superiority to the democratical party, leaders only were wanting, in whom the body of the people might confide. To obtain their confidence therefore became the object of Theramenes and Aristocrates. This would give them importance with the chiefs of the armament at Samos, and ground on which to open a treaty. Other circumstances followed, still to incourage and incite them. Antiphon and Phrvnicluis returned from Lacedtcmon, without effectinir in any degree the purpose of their mission, or however without effecting any purpose that they dared declare. Presently after, intelligence End of April. arrived of a fleet assembling in the Laconian ports, to favor the revolt of Euboca. Appearances gave to suspect that, instead of Euboea, the fleet was intended for tlie Attic coast; and that the fort of Eetioneia was intended to insure the reception of a Peloponnesian fleet, as much as to prevent the entrance of the Athenian into the harbour of Pcirreus, Nor was this suspicion, in the opinion of Thucydides, unfounded. The first wish of the oligarchal party, says the historian, was undoubtedly to have the command of the Athenian empire intire: but, if this could not be, they would have been glad to hold the independent dominion of Attica, deprived of the subject-states, yet preserving the fleet and the. walls of the city: rather however than submit to the restoration of democracy, which would involve their certain ruin, they M'ould have consented to the demolition of the fortifications of Athens and the surrender of the whole fleet, that their persons and estates only might J^^^^^.^^ j j^ be secure, under Lacedasmonian protection. The construction of c. os," the 46« HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX, the foil was therefore prosecuted with the utmost dihgence; and, as it arose, the disposition of the gates and sally-ports, says the historian, sufficiently indicated its purpose. Ao-ainst these measures, vhich Thucydides, no friend in general to democracy, reprobates, and which ought to have united, in opposition, every honest hand and heart in Athens, the first signal blow was by assassination; an act in its nature too opposite to all justice, and too subversive of all order, to produce any lasting good, in whatever cause it may be practised. A few days after the return of the ambassadors from Laccdaemon, toward midda}^ in the full agora, and not far from the state-house, Phrynichus was stabbed by one of the city-guard, and died soon after of the wound. The murderer escaped; but an accom- plice, an Argian, was taken, and being put to the torture by the Four- hundred, indicated no name, nor declared anything, but that there had been frequent and numerous meetings in different houses, particu- larly in that of the commander of the city-guard. No information I.ys. con. was obtained, on which any prosecution could be founded : inquiry con- p.Tst. vel. cerning the murder dropped, the deed being evidently popular; and 491. Lycurg. Thcrameues and Aristocrates, whether conscious of the crime or not, con. Leocrat. . . <7 1 • p. 217. t. i. wereincouraged by the event to proceed in their design '\ Those of their ]{dske P^'^ty* "''^o ^^'^f^ o^ the Four-hundred, meanwhile kept their seats in that council, and Theramenes his office as a general of the establishment. Things were in this situation when the alarming intelligence arrived, that the Peloponnesian armament, instead of going to Euboea, had overrun the iland of /Egina, and was now at anchor in the harbour of Epidaurus, as if threatening Athens itself. Theramenes had foretold that this would happen. From the event, thus confirming his prediction, he took occasion farther to animate his party against the party of Antiphon. ' If preventive measures,' h6 said, * were not quickly ' taken, the Peloponnesian troops would be admitted into the fort of " The orator Lycurgus, in his accusation firms, what is more important in the account of Leocrates, relates the murder of Phryni- of Thucydides, the popularity of the deed, thus differently, iu regard to some facts of and the popularity of the principle, that as- little consequence ; as that it was committed sassination, in the cause of the people, was by night wiihout the city, at a fountain near meritorious, some willowbeds: but he remarkably con- 1 1 ' Eetioncia, Sect. VII. CONTENTION AT ATHENS. ' Ectoineia, and a Lacedemonian would command in Peiisus.' It was accordingly resolved to strike the decisive stroke: a laro-e propor- tion of the heavy- armed were already gained, the taxis commanded by Aristocrates, a body nearly correspondent to our battalion, was on duty at the works of Eetioneia, and Hermon, an officer warm in their interest, commanded in Munychia. Under these favorino- circum- stances, when measures m ere not yet completely concerted, the soldiers, in their zeal for the cause, arrested Alexicles, the general commandino- in Pciia:us, a man zealous in the oligarchal interest, put liim in close confinement, and then set themselves to demolish the fort of Eetioneia. Intelligence of this violence passed to Athens while the council was sitting, and Tiitramenes present. The members of the opposite party, alarmed and indignant, accused Theramenes and his immediate friends, as instigators of sedition. Theramenes, with ready coolness, replied to the charge, and proposed to go himself and release his collegne. This being incautiously approved, he went instantly, taking with him one of his coUegues present, whose political sentiments he knew to agree with his own. Meanwhile alarm spred rapidly, from the state- house through the city; it was generally supposed that Alexicles was put to death, and that the democratical party liad taken possession of Peirajus, with intention to maintain themselves there, in opposition to the existing government. While therefore Aristarchus, with a small body of the ecjuestrian order, whom he could collect in the instant, hastened after Theramenes, all the younger and more zenlousofthe oligarchal party ran to arms. The elder interfered to check the indis- cretion of zeal on both sides; and Thucydides of Pharsalus in Thessalv, a public guest of the commonwealth, particidarly distinguished himself in appeasing the commotion Quiet thus was so far restored that, excepting the few who accompanied Aristarchus, none marched in arms to Pciraeus. Aristarchus and Theramenes arrived nearly together. The latter immediately addressed the soldiers with the authority of general, and reproved their conduct. It was however known, by many, that his words did not perfectly express his sentiments; and, while soine attended to his speech, others continued the demolition of the fort. Aristarchus, with 4G3 4G1 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIX. with those of the oligarchal party about him, with much indignation interfered in vain. The soldiers, addressing Theramcnes, asked, ' If ' he reiilly thought it for the pubhc good that the fort should be ' completed, or if the interest of the commonwealth did not rather ' require that it should be destroyed ?' Having had time then to look about him, and seeing that he should have sufficient support, he answered, ' If they were of opinion that it ought to be demolished, ' he could not dissent.' This sufficed for the soldiers : the whole body set immediately to work; and the word was passed, or rather a kind of short proclamation was made through Peirseus, evidently not a momentary thought of the soldiers themselves, but either preconcerted among them, or communicated by the leaders of the party ; ' Whoever * is for the government of the Five-thousand, instead of the tyranny • of the Four-hundred, let him assist in demolishing the fort.' To have named democracy, or the government of the people at large, as treason against the existing government, would have rendered the delinquents obnoxious to capital punishment; but an appeal to the Five-thousand was legal, by the constitution of the Four-hundred themselves. Numbers of the inhabitants of Peirajus obeyed the call, and the demolition of the fort proceeded rapidU'. Thuryd. 1.8. Ncxt day, the fort being completely destroyed, the soldiers released ^' ^'^' their general Alexicles; and then going to the theater of Bacchus, adjoining to Munychia, there held a regular assembly. The result of the debate was a resolution to march into Athens, and take possession of the Anaceium, the precinct of a temple of Castor and Pollux, as a place of arms. The regularity of their proceedings, the appeal to the Five-thousand, and the care taken to do nothing that a majority among any five thousand of the citizens might not perhaps approve, alarmed and distressed the oligarchal leaders, more than if greater violences had been committed. The Four-hundred, however, assembling at their usual hour, sent a committee to confer with the troops. Addressing themselves more to individuals, and to small parties, than to the assem- bled body, the committee endevored to conciliate the more moderate, and to persuade them to use their endevors to pacify the more violent: ~ * The Five-thousand,' they said, ' should be immediately declared ; ' the Sect. VII. CONTENTION S AT ATHENS. 46i * the Four-hundred now in office should lay down their authority in ' due time; and it should be for the Five-thousand to decide the kind ' of rotation, ^nd the mode of election, by which their successors should ' be appointed. Meanwhile every dearest interest ought to warn the ' soldiers not, by any violences, to afford those opportunities to an ' enemy at their gates, which might superinduce the destruction of ' the commonwealth.' These arguments, urged in a conciliating manner, had their effect: and it was at length agreed that, on a day named, a general assembly should be held, in the precinct of the temple of Bacchus, to consider of means for effecting a permanent reconciliation of parlies. The day appointed being come, the people were already moving Thucyd. 1.8. toward the temple of Bacchus, when intelligence was communicated, *^' ^*' that the Peloponnesian fleet under Hegesandridas, consisting of forty- two triremes, having crossed the gulph from Epidaurus, and touched at Megara, was actually off Salamis. Immediately the whole force of Athens, of both parties, united for the moment by the fear of a common enemy, ran down to Peirzeus as by consent ; and, without waiting, or, most of them, caring, for orders from the existing government, eacli did what the exigency of the moment appeared to him to require: some went aboard the triremes afloat; others launched those ashore; c. 95, some took post upon the walb, and some at the mouth of the harbour. The Peloponnesians however made no attempt upon the Attic coast, but, doubling the headland of Sunium, proceeded to Oropus. New alarm then seized the Athenians. The disposition in Euboea to revolt wa's known. Already deprived of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Deceleia, the added loss of Euboea would nearly deprive them of means to subsist. Corn, meat, every article of food came principally from Euboea. Hastily therefore, and under no regular direction, as in a dissolution of government, they manned some triremes with such crews as in the moment offered, and, under the command of Thymochares, the squadron moved immediately for Eretria : some triremes stationed there made their number thirty-six. Among the numerous proofs, in history, of the great defects in the antient system of naval war, what followed is not in the least remarkable. Thymochares Vol. II. 3 O landed 466 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. landed his crews to get refreshment. The Eretrians, prepared for revolt, had concerted measures with Hegesandridas. No provisions were to be found in the pubhc market; the Athenians could supply themselves only from private houses far from the port, and the crews in consequence dispensed over the town, A signal was given by the Eretrians ; the Spartan admiral made across the channel ; and the Athenian fleet was attacked, while the crews M'ere in confusion, and before all could be got aboard. After some resistance, therefore, it was compelled to fly. Some of the ships escaped into the harbour of Chalcis ; the rest mostly ran upon the Eretrian coast, and the crews fled by land. Those -who reached a fort occupied by an Athenian garrison, adjoining to Eretria, ■were safe; but others, who, confiding in the friendship of the Eretrians, entered the city, were all put to death. Two and twenty triremes fell into the hands of the Peloponncsians ; and presently all Euboea, except Oreus, revolted to them. Thucyd. 1. 8. The consternation at Athens, on receiving the news of the event, was greater than even from the defeat in Sicily. Attica itself was less valuable to Athens than Euboea; not only as the soil was less fertile, but as the appropriation of the produce was less certain, to a power, hitherto the first upon earth by sea, but inferior to its enemies by land. Nor was this the only distressing consideration ; for, had the enemy pushed with their victorious fleet immediately for Peirauis, tiiey might have possessed themselves of the harbour. What precisely might have been the consequence was beyond human foresight ; but this, says the cotemporar}^ historian, may be esteemed certain, that nothing less than the return of the fleet from Samos, which would have superinduced the loss of Ionia, the Hellespont, and in short the whole forein dominion, could have saved Athens. It was not however upon this occasion only, he continues, that the Lacedtemonians showed themselves most accommodating enemies to the Athenians ; and thus the misfortune, which threatened the ruin of the commonwealth, prx)ved the prelude to its restoration. ^ , „ Twenty triremes remained still in the port of Peirasus, and they June. Avere immediately manned. But, in the present state of fermentation, who should undertake the direction of public measures, or who 1 1 could Sect. VII. CONTENTIONS AT ATHENS. 4G7 could undertake it with effect, was not easy to determine. Probably notliing could prevent the people from assembling wherever public affairs were to be debated. A proposal hazarded for summoning them to the Pnyx, M'here, under the democracy, the general assemblies had been most commonly held, met with general £\pprobation and no avowed opposition. In the Pnyx accordingly the people met ; the democra- tical chiefs found the power in their hands ; and a decree proposed was passed, with all the antient forms, declaring, ' That the council of ' Four-hundred should be dissolved ; that the supreme authority .should ' be immediately vested in Five-thousand ; that all, at the time in * Athens, npon the roll of the heavy-armed should be of the Five- ' thousand ; that no man in any office under the commonwealth ' should receive any pay.' This change was no sooner decided, and the party of Theramenes in Thucvd. I. s. consequence possessed of a clear superiority, than Peisander, Alexi- '^- ^^' cles, Aristarchus, and many others of the principal supporters of oli- garchy, quitted Athens, and most of them went to Decelcia. Aristar- chus used the means which his office of general afforded, in aban- doning his country, to strike a blow against it. CEnoe, that town on the Attic border against Boeotia, the ineffectual siege of which, by the army under Archidamus, had, twenty-one years before, been the first object of the Peloponnesian arms in the war, was still lield by an Athe- nian garrison. The troops passing between Deceleia and Peloponnesus • were frequently annoyed from it, and a party of Corinthians had been lately cut off. The Corinthian government, thus instigated, had in- vited the Boeotians to join them in reducing the place ; and the siege was formed. When Aristarchus determined to fly, he commanded the attendance of some of the barbarian bowmen in the Athenian service ; and selecting for the purpose, according to the historian's phrase, the most barbarian, he went to CEnoe. Having quickly concerted matters with the besiegers, he told the garrison, that a treaty M'as made with Lacedeemon, according to which CEnoe must be immediately sur- rendered to the Boeotians. The garrison, excluded from other infor- mation, gave credit to a man known to be in the office of general of the 3 O 2 commonwealth ; 465 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. commonwealth; and, obtaining from the besieging army asafeconduct, evacuated the place. Antiphon, with a few ohgarchal leaders of less note, ventured to remain in Athens ; Antiphon apparently trusting in his policy, his eloquence, his personal influence, and the quiet conduct he had ob- served ; directing the secret councils of the party, but leaving others to be the ostensible conductors of every measure. Upon the flight however of the more active leaders, opposition to Theramenes and his associates had ceased. ]\fany assemblies of the people were succes- sively held, according to the antient forms of the commonwealth, in the Pnyx : the restoration of Alcibiades, and of all who, for the same cause, had absented themselves from their country, was decreed ; and the constitution was settled, says the cotemporary historian, upon a better footing than at any time within my memory''; a mixed government being established, with the supreme authority judiciously divided between the Few and the jNIany. In this concise eulogy is contained the whole of the account, given by Tluicydides, of the form of government established by Theramenes; and upon no occasion does he leave us so much to regret the want of explanation and detail. Upon no occasion, however, do we see the historian more strongly marked as the true patriot. Frequently we find him reprobating the extravagancies of an unbalanced demo- cracy so strongly, that we might suspect him of some partiality for oligarchy. But here, as indeed throughout his account of the oli- garchy established by Peisander, he shows himself a decided enemy to tyranny in every shape, and the warm partizan only of whatever government might best secure universal freedom through equal and well supported law. " 'Etti yt l/iov. In my opinion, Smitli.— quidan mcmorid. I have no doubt in pre- Meo judicio, Duker. But Duker adds, in a ferring the version of Acacius. note, Acacius W) yi lnoS non male vertit mcd \ Sect. VIII. TRANSACTIONS IN LESSER ASIA. 499 SECTION VIII. Trathsaciions of the Peloponnesian feet under Mindarus, and the Athenian under Thrasyllus and Thra^ybulus. Naval action near Abydus. Jl'ily atid treacherous policy of Tissaphernes. Naval action near the Trojan shore. Critical arrival of Jlcibiades. Naval action near Cyzicus, and capture of the Peloponnesian feet. Laconic official letter. Liberality of Pharnabazus to the Pelopomiesians. Able conduct and popularity of Hennocrates, the Syracusan general. During these transactions at Athens, the Peloponnesian armament, B.C. 411. on the Asiatic coast, had been wholly occupied with the distresses, to 1^; ^^•^^•, J I ' Thucyd. 1.8. ■which the want of an adequate revenue of their own, and the failure of c. 99. the satrap Tissaphernes in his ingagemcnts, had reduced them. One of the Lacedsemonian commissioners, Philippus, had attended the satrap toAspendus: another, Hippocrates, was stationed at Phaselis. All in- telligence, from both, confirmed the opinion, long entertained, of the satrap's faithlessness, and of his determined purpose to deceive them. Meanwhile fresh overtures arrived from the satrap of Bithynia, Pharna- bazus ; who, having observed the advantage which Tissaphernes derived from his Grecian connection, the recovery of dominion over the Grecian towns within his satrapy, and of the tribute from them, Avhich for a long time had passed to Athens, showed himself disposed to treat upon terms which, with his more honorable character, might be inviting. Ihese united motives induced Mindarus, the new com- mander-in-chief, to resolve upon movingwiththe fleet to the Hcflespont, for the sake of readier and surer communication with the Bithynian satrap. But the Athenian fleet at Samos was in the most favor- able situation to intercept his passage ; and tho his numbers were superior, he desired to avoid a general action. Secrecy and caution, however, lie hoped might prevent interruption; but a storm, coming upon him in the passage, compelled him to take shelter in the harboui of Icarus, and remain there five or six days. During 470 Tliucyd. 1. c. 100. Be- ginning of July. HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. During this interval, intelligence passed to Samos, that the Pelopon- ncsian fleet had quitted the port of Miletus for the northward. Thra- syllus, with whom, in the absence of Alcibiadcs and Thrasybulus, the chief command rested, in all haste moved M'ith fifty-five triremes for the Hellespont, anxious to arrive before the Pelopounesians ; but, in his passage, learning that ^Mindarus, from Icarus, had gone with his fleet to Chios, and remained there, he put into IMethymne in Lesbos. Beside that IMethymne was a commodious .station for watching the Peloponnesian fleet, the affairs of that valuable iland required his at- tention. Some men of the first families of ISIethymne, exiles on ac- count of their aversion to democracy and the Athenian interest, had proposed to profit from present circumstances for restoring themselves to their country ; the Peloponnesian armament being at hand, the two satraps friendly, and Athens distracted by sedition. Having accordingly collected a small force on the continent, in pursuance of the common prejudice in favor of a leader from the mother-countr}', they put them- selves under the conduct of Anaxarchus, a Theban ; tlie Bceotians being esteemed the parent people of the ^Eolian race, and particularly of the Lesbians'*. Their first attempt was a surprize upon Methymnc itself: "* Aicc^ccfp^ov ©Jioaiou, xara to irvyyi>U, r.-y^vfiin^v. Hoc Tliucydides, 3. 86. 6. SS. & alibi de populis ejusdem originis & consan- guineis dicit. Qunenam autera sit Thebano- rum, & Methymnceoium, vel Cyaiajorum, si quis hoc ad eos perlmere putabit, e-jyyttua, Dunc non scio, nee vacat quaerere. Duker. — I own I am better pleased v.ithsuch direct confession, than when thofe who undertake to be commentators, pass bj' difficult pas- sages, often of much more historical impor- tance, as if there were no difficulty in them. One cannot, however, but wonder at Duker's difficulty here, because the consanguinity of the Lesbians and Boeotians not only is mentioned byThucydides in his .account of the Alitylenjean revolt, (b. 3. c. 2.) but the scho- liast, commenting upon the passage, explains it well and clearly thus: — Kai a-a^ arxtta^oTai (t» Af'^ioj) fcTE civt)fr,vxti £vWauQafG>i:^r uvToT^ Axx£caifjt,otix'f v.ai Bo»&JTa;>. To ol SYrrENHN ONT12N Itt* jjLotovi T9vq BoiuTov; hucTH/t' oJI&( ya^ KXTct TO Aio?Ay.ci' ruyyeviT^ rxr Afiff'ttiui'. The reader, who niav desire higher authority than the scholiast, will find Strabo large on the suljject. I have been induced to say thus much on this little matter, principally for the testimony which wo here find from Tliu- cydides, in confirmation of Strabo's account of the origin of (he Jiolian Greeks of Asia ; which has been followed in the account given of the.'Eolic migration, in the second section of the fifth chapter of this History. It is indeed, not without attention to such little detached scraps of information, wherever they nan be found among the works of the most authoritative antient writers, that we are iuabled to collect the scattered members of Sect. VIII. TRANSACTIONS IN LESSER ASIA. 471 itself: buttlie vigilance of the Athenian commander in Mitylene dis- appointing them, they hastened across the lieights which divide the iland, and by a sudden assault took Eresus. Intelligence of these circumstances had called Thrasybulus with five triremes to Lesbos; he found there two Athenian triremes and Ifve ]\Iethymna3an, and Thrasyllus now joined him with fifty-five. The heavy-armed were debarked^ and preparation was made to attack Eresus by sea and land. INIeanwhile Mindarus, still desirous to avoid action M'ith the Athenian Thucvd. l.s. fleet, and considering the business of Eresus as a small concern, left '^' ^^'" his Methymna^an friends to their fate, and made his course along the Asiatic shore for the Hellespont. Thucydides has thought important enough for notice, what would now appear utterly trifling, except as it marks, more strongly than anything that has yet occurred, the imperfection of the marine of that age. Speed was the object of Mindarus, both for avoiding the Athenians in the passage, and for being before them in the Hellespont : but, as oars were his instruments of motion, intervals of rest were necessary for his crews; and, as Ave have already had occasion to observe, the construction of a trireme was such, and the crews so numerous for the space, that refreshment could not con- veniently be taken aboard. Mindarus therefore landed his crews to dine, at a port of the Phoca^an territory, and to sup, at Arginuste in the Cumtean territory, overagainst Lesbos, where lay the Athenian fleet, which he was so anxious to avoid. Moving again, however, in the night, he dined next day at Harmatous, and, proceeding in the afternoon with the utmost haste, part of his fleet arrived before midnight at Rhostcium, within the Hellespont, and the rest in the harbour of Sigeium at its mouth. Eighteen Athenian triremes were lying at Sestos. Fire- c. 102. signals from the Asiatic shore announced to them their danger, and they hastened to get out of the narrow sea. Of four intercepted,"' one, forced of early Grecian history; to detect the sup- so broken and dispersed, something of a har- posititious and doubtful among what is re- monizing whole. lated by inferior or later autliors ; to ascer- '' Smith gives to suppose, by his trans- tain and arrange the genuine; and, without lation, that eight were tai. Xenophon seems afterward to reckon the " Thus I suppose the l/n* ts xaJ JSpa of fTza-xipU among the taSf. I do not recollect Xenophou may be interpreted, the former that Thucydides ever gives the title of ,ctSt word relating to Grecian customs, the latter to any but ships of war, except once to a to Persian. merchant-ship of very large size, mii, *° Yvt iritlt rftifici »a» esraxlfifi. Cum /nvpopo^o;, iu the harbour of Syracuse, 1. 7. quiiique triremibus et una navi actuaria. c. 24. !Mindarus Sect. VIII. PRESSURE OX THE ATHENIANS. 477 Mindaiiis having received reinforcements which made his fleet sixty triremes, proposed to attack the forty which lay at Sestos ; but timely intelligence of his intention coming to the commanders they Mithdrew by night to Cardia, at the bottom of the gidph on the other side of the Chersonese. Alcibiades joined them th.ere ; but he joined them with other hopes than he had given, both the armament and the peoi)le at home, to entertain. All the expecta- tions, which he had raised so high, of assistance from the sreat kino- through the satrap, the cooperation of the Phenician fleet, and, m l)at Avas still more important to the commonwealth, and what would be incomparably more felt by the armament, the pay which would never fail, were at an end. Deprived of Ionia, of the Hellespontine cities, of the Thracian colonies, of Attica itself, and retaining but a precarious dominion over a part of Euboca, the sources of that revenue, by Mhich the commonwealth had hitherto been powerful, were gone; and the pay of Persia, promised by Alcibiades, was what both the armament abroad and the people at home had de- pended upon, for means to recover their losses, and to support even a defensive war. In these circumstances Alcibiades saw that daring measures, and quick decision, were necessary, both for himself and for tlie common- wealth. Mindarus, disappointed of his purpose against the -fleet at Xen. Ile.t 1 1 C 1 Sestos, by its retreat to Cardia, had moved to Cyzicus ; and, Pharna- ^ g"_ bazus meeting him with his land-forces, that defenceless town was compelled again to receive its law from the enemies of Athens. Alcibiades resolved, tho with a force considerably inferior, to seek them there. From Cardia he moved to Sestos ; and every preparation being made that circumstances admitted, orders were already issued for pro- ceeding up the Propontis, when Theramenes arrived from Macedonia, s. s. and Thrasybulus from Thasus, each with twenty triremes. This for- tunate reinforcement made new consideration necessary : it was im- portant to conceal from the enemy the increased numbers of the fleet, s. lo^ On arriving therefore at the iland of Prceconnesus, a proclamation was issued, denouncing capital punishment against any who should be taken in the attempt to cross to the Asiatic shore. The soldiers and seamen 478 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. seamen M'ere then summoned, as to a popular assembly; and Alci- biades, addressing them, ventured to declare, without reserve, the necessities of their situation. ' Supplies,' he said, ' to the amount ' that the prosecution of the v/ar would require, were not within their ' present power to obtain, or within the means of the comraonwealtli ' to afford : the eneni}-, on the contrary, sup])orted by the wealth of * Persia, knew no want. Vigorous exertion and quick decision were ' therefore indispensable : they must prepare for action both by sea and ' land ; and by land both in the field, and in the attack of fortifica- ' tions.' Past success, superiority of present strength, and an opinion of their general's abilitv, oave confidence, and the speech of Alcibiades Xen. 1!pI. '^•''is received with applause; the assembly was dismissed, all were 1.1. c.i. ordered aboard, and the fleet, consisting of eighty-six ships, got under May. A heavy rain presently came on, which favored the purjjose of sur- prizing the enemy. As the fleet approached Cyzicus, the veather cleared, and the enemy's fleet, of sixty triremes, was seen exercising, at such a distance from the port that its return was already intercepted. The Peloponnesians, discovering the Athenian fleet so much stronger thiin they had expected, were in great consternation. They had no hope of success in naval action, and the enemy was between them and their port. The resource, which the nature of the antient marine afforded, was to make for the nearest shore, and depend upon tlie assistance of ». 12. their land -force for the protection of their stranded ships. A'.cibiades, aware of their intention, passing with twenty ships beyond their line, debarked his people. Slindarus, seeing this, also debarked, met Alcibiades, was defeated, and himself slain. The crews of the whole Pe- loponnesian fleet then fled ; and, except the Syracusan squadron, burnt s. 13. by its own people, every ship was carried oft"by the Athenians. Cyzicus was abandoned, both by the Peloponnesians and by the satrap ; arfd next day, the Athenian fleet approaching, the inhabitants immcdiaiely surrendered. This important success, which left the enemy in a moment without a fleet, would of course go far to restore the animation of the armament, and the popularity of the commander. But the situation of Alcibiades • was Sect. Vlir. VICTORY OF ALCIBIADES. 47y ^vas still of extreme difficult3\ The government at home could not yet the more for his victory supply his armament. Instead therefore of prosecuting- operations against the enemy, his first attention was ne- cessarily still to be given to providing subsistence for his own people. Remaining twenty days at Cyzicus, he raised large contributions there, llie liistorian remarks that the Cyzicenes experienced no other xen llel severity ; as if he thought another general might not have been so '• '• ^'i- s 13 indulgent: thoin the defenceless state of their town, to h:r\-e avoided " - contending with the united force of the Peloponnesians and the satrap, it should seem, could not very reasonably be imputed to them as a crime. The fleet then went to Perinthus and Selymbria, where contri- s. n. bution's were also raised. Proceeding thence to Chrysopolis in the Chalcedonian territory, fiear the entrance of the Euxine, Alcibiades caused that place to be fortified, and established there a custom- house for levying a duty of a tenth in value of all cargoes passing the strait. This mode of collecting a revenue requiring force, he left, beside a garrison, thirty ships there, with Theramenes and Eubulus to command. With the rest of the fleet he returned to the Hellespont. While Alcibiades was thus profiting from victory, the Peloponnesians s. ij. were suffering distress, of which a very remarkable picture remains, in the letter M'ritten to the Spartan government by Hippocrates, to wliom the command-in-chief devolved on the death of Mindarus. It was in- tercepted by the Athenians, and, being reported in the original dialect by Xenopiion, is among the most curious and authentic specimens of Laconic M'riting. In any change of language it must sufler, but it ran nearly thus : ' Success hath turned against us : Mindarus is slain : the * men hunger: ^hat to do we know not.' These four short sentences made the whole of the dispatch. The Peloponnesians, however, found an able and generous friend in $. iff. the satrap Pharnabazus, M'ho not only relieved their wants but soothed their feelings : ' Their loss in men,' he said, ' had not been great, and ' the meer loss of ships ought not to dispirit them : the king's domi- * nions abounded with materials ; and they should soon have another ' fleet.' MiO II I ST O R Y O F G R E E C E. Chat. XIX ' fleet.' Distributing then to every ir.an of the armament a garment, Xen. Hol. ami subiistence for two months, he sent the generals" and commanders h '^'^' of trircn.es to Antandrus, at the southern foot of Mount Ida, where tind3er abounded, to superintend the construction of a fleet ; directing, that as many vessels should be built, for every state of the confederacy, as had been lost by each in the late action. That the seamen mi<>ht' not in the m.can time be totally idle or useless, furnishing them vith licavy armour, which was a gratification, inasmuch as an idea of supe- riorhonor was attached to the service of the heavy-armed, he appointed them to the guard of the maritime territory. While the Pelcponnesians were employed in building a fleet at An- tandrus, the Antandrians themselves were busied in raising walls for the defence of their toMn. But among the numbers of the Peloponnesian armament, in this unavoidable intermission of military enterprize, some v/ould have times of total leisure ; and some, notwithstanding the en- devors of Pharnabazus to obviate the evil, Mould be likely to abuse th.at leisure. In these circumstances none, among the various people who composed the armament, behaved so unexceptionably toward the inhabitants as the Syracusans: and this was the more remarkable, as discipline was much less inforced by law among them than among any of the Peloponnesian forces, or even the Athenian; the Syracusan de- mocracy being a constitution firr less well regulated than the Athenian, s. 21. But llcrniocratcs had been restored to the command of the Syracusan B.C. 410. squadron; and he not only himself possessed the confidence of all under him, but he taught the superior officers to acquire the confidence of the inferior, and these that of the multitude. Thus a grada- tion of influence supplied the place of subordination inforced by penalty, and a strict discipline was founded upon reverence and afiec- tion. To effect this requires the most capacious mind united with the most refined temper, and is indeed among the most e.xaltcd efforts of "Military and naval command were tinct titles ; and tieiice we are without a constantly, among the antients, united in word to express the office which united the tlie same person, whence they had but one two, as the anticnt languages are without title for the commanders-in-chief in the two terms to express the distinction. The term services. The complete separation of the General here is not accurate, but we have two commands, with us, has produced dis- none more so. human Sect. VIII. INFLUENCE OF II E R M O C RATES. 481 human genius. The benevolence of Hermocrates led tbe way for those under his command to be benevolent, and the leisure of the Syracusans ■was employed in assisting the Antandrians in the construction of their fortifications. In gratitude for this kindness, a decree of the Antan- drian people gave the freedom of their city to all the people of Syracuse. Meanwhile Syracuse, led by faction, was preparing a most ungrate- Xv.n. llcl. ful return for its meritorious officers. Hermocrates and his collegues, 'J'^'^' for he had not been intrusted alone Avith the chief conmiand, were not only superseded, but, without a trial, M'ithout an opportunity to speak for themselves, and while they were ignorant even that they were accused, banishment was decreed against all. The news of their being deprived of the rights of citizens, in their own country, reached them just as their good deeds had procured an extension of the rights of citizenship to every one of their fellowcountrymen ; a privilege indeed little likely to be very advantageous to many individuals, but lionorable to the commonwealth, as well as to the generals and army for whose sake it was given. The troops and seamen were called together, and Hermocrates fpoke, for himself and his collegues. * Irregular as the proceedings against them,' he said, ' had been, ' and unjust as the condemnation, they should nevertheless submit to ' the voiceof their country ; and, as their legal authority was abrogated, ' and their appointed successors not arrived, it would be proper for the ' armament to elect their own commanders for the interval.' His speech was answered with shouts from the soldiers and seamen, o. 19. declaring their approbation of the conduct of their present generals, and their indignation at the illegal sentence against them. The principal officers not only declined to offer themselves for the command, but, in the name of the whole armament, desired that Hermocrates and his collegues would hold it till the new generals should arrive. These, in reply, admonished to avoid whatever might bear any appearance of sedition. ' The time will come,' they said, ' when, in a constitutional * manner, we shall desire your honest support to us against a malicious ' prosecution. You will then declare how many battles you have ' fought, how many ships you have taken, what general success has ' attended you under our command; and you will relate the testimony Vol. II. 3 Q ' of 482 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIK, ' of the whole confVcleratc armament to your merit and ours, manifested ' in the post of honor which has been constantly assigned to ns, upon Xcn.Hel. < all occasions, bv sea and land." The ad-.nouition had the full eflect 1. 1. ,.1. . " . . s. cu. proposed from it. .Nothing disorderl}- insuecL A unanimous declara- tion onl}- was made, that the generals were without blame, and the request was persisted in, that thfy would hold the command till their appointed successors arrived. Soon afterward Demarchus, l^.Iyscon, and Potames came from Syracuse, and the command passed into their hands Avithout any commotion. The armament however showed that they would not liave suffered any violence to the persons of their former generals ; and most of the trierarcs entered into an agreement, upon oath, to exert themselves, on returning to .Syracuse, for procuring their restoration to their countxy. History affords few examples of so warm an attachment, in aa armament, to the persons of their generals, united with so just a con- sideration of the welfare of the country, and of the constitutional authority of those to whose party principles they were ad\erse, and with whose measures they were highly and justly dissatisfied. Hermo- crates, dismissed from his command, was still capable of serving the common cause, and of promoting those measures for ruining the power *■ ~~- of Athens, for which he had long been zealous. He went to Lacedsmon, where he M'as honorably received, and he explained to the government there the state of things in Asia; particularly the conduct, the character, and the designs of tl'.e Persian satraps, the frank generosity of Pharnabazus, and the crafty interestedness of Tissaphernes". Having thus confirmed the resolution to carry on the war, and opened views to the means, and at the same time strengthened his awn interest among the principal men of Laceda;mon, which might be important toward the promotion of his views at Syracuse, he returned to Asia, where Pharnabazus received him with distinguished friendship. Not waiting for solicitation, the generous Persian was forward to relieve '* In consequence of the defective con- clear whether a second journey of Hernio- nection, alreadv noticed, of the beginning of crates to Laceda;mon is here intended, or the narrative of Xenophou with the end of the account rtlates only to that before no- tbat of 1 hucydides, it seems not perfectly liced from Thucydides. his Sect. IX. SUCCESSES OF THE ATHENIANS. 4S3 liis wants and promote his wishes ; especially giving- money unasked. Hermoeratcs, thus furnished with means, prepared triremes and hired seamen, to assist the common cause in which already he had shown so much zeal and ability; and to assist afterward, if occasion should be, the party with which he was connected in his own country, and promote his restoration.- SECTION IX. m F.ffects of the tiaval successes of the Athenians. Reinforcement under Thrasi/llus : His transactions on the Ionian coast. Winter campain of yilcibiades. Defeat of Pharuabazus. JFeakness of the Lacedae- monian administration. The affairs of Laceda^mon were at this time ill administered; n r ♦, xvhile Athens, so lately supposed ruined in Sicily, and since upon <>!• J/i- 2. Ihe point of bringing destruction upon herself, was again raised toward a superiority over the Peloponnesian confederacy, tho the Peloponnesian confederacy was supported by the wealth of Persia. The effects of Xen.Hel. returning prosperity spred : a party in Thasus, in the Athenian interest, 'g" ^^J^'"' rose upon the Lacedtemonian harmost, and expelled him, together with those citizens who principally favored the Peloponnesian cause. Pasippidas, who had been sent from Lacedasmon totake the command- in-chief on the Asiatic station, and had collected a small squadron at Chios, was accused of being privy to the revolt, induced by bribes from Tissaphernes. What interest of Tissaphernes this measure was to promote, does not appear; but the accusation so far had credit at Sparta, that Pasippidas was recalled and banished, and Cratesippidas was sent to succeed him in the command. About the same time an occurrence within Attica itself, otherwise little s. 2-t. important, contributed to raise the spirits of the Athenian people, and to confirm the hope, which had begun to revive among them, that they should be finally superior in the war. Agis, marching out of Deceleia for plunder, approached Athens. Thrasyllus, taking the conmiand as a general of the establishment, led out the whole force of the city, and S Q 2 formed 484 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. formed for battle near the gymnasium of the Lyceium. Agis had apparently not expected such a measure, only because in the M'liole course of the war the Athenians had hitherto avoided it. Being pro- bably now not strong enough prudently to meet their numbers, he withdrew hastily; and the Athenian light-armed, follouing his retreat, made some slaughter of his rear. Great credit was given to Thrasylliis. for his conduct on this occasion. The reinforcement for the armament in the Hellespont, wliich it v.as his principal business in Athens to request, was voted with alacrity ; a thousand libavy-armcd, a hundred horse, and fifty triremes ; and he was authorized to select the heavy- armed from among the citizens inroUed for that service. To give more security then to the communication by sea from Athens eastward, particularly with Eubaa, and perhaps to afford some protection to the silvefmines of Laureium, Thoiicum, near the Suniad promontory, was fortified, and a garrison established, there. Agis, not a prince of shining abilities, had hovicver tlie merit of diligence in his command. On his first appointment, he seems to have been highly satisfied with it; but the late turn in the fortune of war,, in favor of Athens, Mas likely to render it less agreeable. Hitherto he had had a decided superiority : all Attica was cither under his orders, or liable to the terror of his arms; and even the glory of con- queror of Athens seemed within his hope. But should the Athenians acquire a decided superiority in the Hellespont and on the Asiatic coast; should Alcibiades then return with his powerful fleet and troops flushed with conquest; and should the Persian satrap not furnisli money to inable the Lacedemonians to maintain, together with a powerful fleet, such a force through the year in Deceleia, as the supplies, to be obtained from their own confederacy certainly would not inable them to maintain ; he might be reduced to act on the defensive, and Xen. llel. risk even to be without means to defend himself Urged by these s! 25.^^ ' considerations, he sent a remonstrance to the government at home. It was to little purpose, he observed, that he and the army vith him, had been so long using their diligence, by land, to deprive Athens, of the produce of Attica, if the sea could furnish the city with that plenty, which, before his eyes, was. cont.inii«lly passing into the 4 harbour Sect. IX. TRA'NSACTIONS ON THE ASIATIC COAST. 485 harbour of PoiriEus. He therefore proposed that a scpiach-on sliould be stationed at Byzantium and Chalcedoii, to intercept the vessels i'roni the Euxine (for it was from the fertile shores of tiiat sea that Greece had long been accustomed to sup'ply the deficiency of its Ilerod. 1.7. produce in coin) and he recommended Cleiirchus son of I'hamphias, ^•'*''- a public guest of the Byzantines, for the command. Tlie jMoposal was approved ; fifteen ships were collected from the allied states, niosllv from Megara, for there were none in the ports of Laconia ; and, under the Spartan Clearchus, they sailed for their destination. In passino- the Hellespont, three were taken by the nine Athenian guardshijis always stationed there: with the remaining twelve, Clearchus v.as fortunate enough to reach Byzantium. In spring the armam.ent under Thrasyllus sailed from Peirajus. It Xen. Tld. •was resolved that, before it joined the fleet under Alcibiades, somelhino- '• '• '■,•-• should be undertaken in Ionia. Possibly, while Alcibiades occupied H. C. 400. the attention of Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesiaa commanders, p'v?'ot"" some part of that rich country might be recovered to the Athenian dominion. But if no lasting acquisition could be made, contributions might be levied ; and, by hostile incursions those supplies might lie taken from the territories acknowleging the authority of Tissaphernes, which were no longer to be expected from that satrap's friendship. Thrasyllus, to give more efficacy to the force he commanded, armed five thousand of his seamen as targeteers. Usually they carried only light armor; but he proposed to make them act with his regular middle-armed. Having touched at Samos, he proceeded to the Milesian " This date is Dodwell's. Xeiiophon is tlie 3-ear of the ninety-third Olympiad. Cut, far from being equally accurate with Thu- doing so, I am unabie to divide the years of t-ytUdes in marking times and seasons ; but the Peloponnesian war, from the time -.vlieii. he has specified the yeai', here intended, as the narrative of Thucydidcs ends, so that an Olympic year, and, unless interpolation Xenoplion and Thucydides may agree. Dod- is to be suspected, as that of the ninety- well's boast may perhups suflice for my apo- third Olympiad; which, according to the logy: Intelliget autem operis a nobis sus- chronologers was the year 408 before the cepti difficultatem, qui expenderic quid viri Christian a;ra. I am utterly unsatislied with maximi tentariut in primis Xenophontis Dod'.vt'H's correction, in which he has fol- armis, Petavius et Petitus, nee tanion operam lowed Diodorus : I much rather give credit nostram supervacuam Iccerinl. Dodw. Ann. tt, and, (l(.baiking near Pyg:da, ravaged ihe country. A body of Miicsians coming to assist tlse Pygelians in the protection of tlicir pro- perly, fell upon tlie Athenian light-armed, scattered in quest of booty, and put them to flight. But the numerous targelecrs of the Athenian armament were at hand; and supported by only two lochi of heavy- armed, tlcy attacked the pursuing Milesians, and routed them with considerable slaughter. Two hundred shields were taken, and the success was thought important euough to warrant the erection of a trophy '■^. Thrasyllus, however, did not follow the blow ; whether he found the strength of Aliletus too great, or any intelligence induced him to Xeii. He). turn his arms another way. On the day following the action, reim- s 3 '^" barking his forces, he proceeded to Notium an Athenian colony ; and marching thence to the neighboring city of Colophon, where a strong party favored the Athenian interest, he gained admission, and Colophon vas restored to the Athenian alliance. On the next night he entered Lydia, burnt many villages, and collected much booty, chiefly money and slaves. Stages, a Persian who commanded in the neighborhood, interfered with a body of horse, but with little effect. s. 4. Thus far successful, Thrasyllus resolved next upon a more important enterprize ; but he seems to have been too long and too open in pre- paration. It became evident that he had a design upon Ephesus; and against Grecian arms Tissaphernes invoked etiicaciously the aid of Grecian superstition; to which, as we have seen, he had been paying compliments, that, from a Persian of his high rank, appear extraordinary. He sent through the towns of his satrapy, urging that Diana was threatened, and it behooved all Greeks to exert themselves in her July. defence. It was not till the seventeenth day after the invasion of Lydia that Thrasyllus arrived off Ephesus. He debarked his forces in two divisions ; the heavy-armed near mount Coressus ; the horse, Mho would be but few, with the targeteers and light-armed, on the other side of the city, near the marsh. '♦ The SHIELD, icrir)f, always implies a ot'equalconsequence, and two hundred light- heavy-armed soldier. Two hundred targets, armed slain would scarcely have been wiXiaitj taken, would by no means have been thouglit worth mention. Tissaphernes Sect. IX. TRANSACTIONS ON THE ASIATIC COAST. 4S7 Tissanhcrnes had already collected n kir";e nniiv at Epliesus. The ^'en- Hel. ' o ^ » 1 1. 1 c '^ Asian Greeks were numerous. The Syracusans, from the twenty ships s\ x destroyed near Cyzicus, and from five lately arrived from Syracuse, with the Sclinuntines from two ships, were together perhaps five thou- sand men. The satrap himself headed a body of horse; and to all this were added the numerous population of the city. Sucli a force would not wait to be besieged by the small army of Thra.sy!lus. Taking advantage of hisapparently faulty arrangement, in dividing his strength, they quickly overpowered his heavy-armed, pursued to the ships, and killed about a luindred. They proceeded then against the other division, ^ j^ less likely to make effectual resistance, and killed tluee lunuhcd. For this double success they erected two trophies, and they decreed the aristeia to the Syracusans and Selinuntines. The sum gi\cn ujjon the occasion was considerable, and presents were besides made to indi- viduals who had distino'uibhed themselves. The spirit of Hermocrates seemed still to animate the Sicilian forces. Their conduct altogether was so acceptable to the Ephesians, that a perpetual immunity from taxes (probably those assessed upon strangers) was granted to all Syracusans of the armament, who might at any time reside in Ephesus: and the Selinuntines, having lately lost their home (for Selinus had been taken by the Carthaginians) were presented universally with the freedom of the city. Thrasyllus, after his defeat, proceeded toward tlie Hellespont, s. s. While he stopped at Methymne in Lesbos, the Syracusan squadron of twenty-five triremes (the munificence of Pharnabazus, seconded by the diligence of the Syracusan officers, having already repaired the loss at Cyzicus) was seen passing from Ephesus. Thrasyllus took four with their crews: the rest escaped back to the port whence they came. Among the prisoners one was remarkable: he Mas the first- cousin of the general Alcibiades, and of the same name. He had accompanied his kinsman in his flight, when persecuted for the business of the Mercuries; but, instead of tlie Lacedaemonian, had ingaged in the Syracusan service; and, apparently satisfied with it, under the admirable regularity which Hermocrates had established, he continued to fight against his country. Thrasj-Jlus nevertheless gave him his liberty. The other prisoners, being sent to Athens, were put into ASS HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIX. Xeii.IUl. into the stOTie-quairics of PeirsEus, in retaliation for the confinement s !) '^^ * ^^ t^^^ Atiienian prisoners in the quarries of Syracuse. They were, however, less carefully guarded, or the prison was less secure; for, in the following -winter, digging a passage through the rock, and flying hy night, all escaped, some finding their way to Deceleia, and the rest to Megara. The successes of Thrasyll us seem to have heen very inferior to the expectation formed of his expedition ; anil the delay in the junction ■with Alcibiades, appears to have prevented that active general from undertaking anything of consequence against the enemj'. Thirty triremes being stationed at the entrance of the Euxine, on the indis- ])ensable duty of collecting revenue, his force i-emaining in the Helles- ])ont was unequal to great enterprize ; and the occupation to which he Avas himself obliged principally to direct his attention, was the main- tenance of his forces. Tire summer was far advanced when he was joined by Thrasyllus at Scstos. He appears however to have had, then ready, a plan for winter operations. He conducted the whole fleet ^10. to Lampsacus on the Asiatic shore. There the ships were as usual laid up. Lnd of Sept. 'pjjg town being without defence, he employed the troops in raising for- tifications. But a point of honor occasioned some disturbance: those who had been serving under Alcibiades refused to rank with those newly arrived under Thrasyllus : they had been always conijuerors ; those under ThrasvUus were tainted with the disgrace of defeat. Alcibiades seems not to have opposed a prejudice, dangerous only under weak command, and from which, on the contrary, abilities might derive advantage. He quartered them separately, and employed them sepa- rately on the fortifications. From. Lampsacus an extent of territory, subject to Persia, was open to inroad ; but, in the neighboring city of Abydus, Pharnabazus had his winter residence, attended by a large force of cavalry. Alcibiades led his* army toward Abydus, purposely to invite a battle. The satrap unadvisedly met him ; was defeated, and, being pursued by the small body of Athenian cavalry, led by Alcibiades, was savcil only by the swiftness of his horse and the darkness of supervening night. After this action, in which the soldiers under Thrasyllus had their equal share, the rest of tlie army saluted them as cleared from dishonor, and no longer Sect.X; affairs of LACED^MON. 489 longer refused to join them in arms in the field, or associate with them in quarters. The' victory deterring opposition from the enemy, several incursions were made into the country during the winter, vvith some profit to the Athenians, and extensive injury to those whom the power of the Persian empire ought to have protected. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian e;overnment was distracted by do- Xen. Hel. 1. 1. C.2. mestic disturbance. A rebellion had taken place among the Helots ; g. 12. a large body of whom, getting possession of some strong posts among the mountains, toward the Malean promontory, defended themselves with such successful obstinacy, that a capitulation was at length granted, allowing them to go and settle themselves anywhere out of the Lacedaemonian territory. While such was the derangement at home, able attention to distant concerns could hardly be. The pride of com- mand, however, and the jealousy of their prerogative over the re- publics of their confederacy, did not cease among the Lacedaimonians. Little as they were able to support their colony of the Trachinian Heracleia, they were dissatisfied with that interference of the Thebans, which had probably saved it from utter ruin. They sent thither a new governor, who, in conjunction with the Thessalian Achaians, led the whole force of the colony against the CEtsans, its perpe- . tual enemies. The Achaians betrayed their allies, the governor was killed with seven hundred of his people, and the colony was thus reduced to a weaker state than Avhen the Thebans interfered for its preservation. SECTION X. Imp07'tant successes of Alcibiades, Friendly comnnmication opened with the satrap Pharnabazus. Ambassies to the king of Persia. Return of Alcibiades to Athens. The successes of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades having restored superi- ority to the Athenian arms, the next, and a most important object, was to restore to the commonwealth a revenue equal to the expences of a Vol. II. 3 R war, 490 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap.XIX. war, M'hicli, long as it had lasted, was not yet likely to be soon con- cluded. Through the measures already taken, something accrued from the trade of the Euxine : but, to secure this, a large force must be constantly employed at great expence, and yet the enemy, from Byzantium and Chalcedon, could interrupt the collectors and share the profit. Alcibiades therefore resolved to direct his next measures against those two towns. They being recovered, the whole revenue from the trade of the Euxine would accrue to Athens, and her dominion, on the shores of the Propontis and Hellespont, would be restored to nearly its former extent. A decisive superiority on the Hellespontine coasts might induce Pharnazabus to treat ; Tissaphernes would become alarmed for his Ionian towns, naturally the next objects for the Athenian arms ; and thug an opening might be gained for counterworking the negotiations of Lacedaemon, and stopping those supplies from Persia, which alone inabled the Peloponnesian confede- racy to maintain its fleet. With these views, in the twenty-fourth spring of the war **, Alcibi- ni' 9z A, ' ades led his whole force to the iland of Proeconnesus. The Chalce- P. \v. 24. donians had suspected that attack would soon approach them, and this After 25th ^ . ,. , , . ' , . March. movement confirmed the suspicion. Immediately they stripped their j^^j^'^gl" country of every moveable of value; which, however, they would not »• 1- trust within their city, but committed all to the care of their neigh- bors the Bithynians, a Thracian hord. Intelligence of this being carried to Alcibiades, he put himself immediately at the head of his cavalry, directed a select body of heavy-armed infantry to follow, and the fleet at the same time to attend his motions ; and, going to the Bithynian frontier, he threatened fire and sword to the country, if all the Chalcedonian property was not surrendered to him, together with hostages and pledges to insure peaceful conduct from the Bithynians themselves. His demands were complied wnth, and he then directly formed the siege of Chalcedon. ** Or the twenty-fifth ; as observed in a on the matter noticed in the twenty-third marginal reading of Leunclavius, in the uoie of this chapter. Paris edition of l625, which seems founded Hippocrates, SectX. successes of ALCIBI ad ES. 491 Hippocrates, a Lacedaemonian, commanded in that city. He had Xen.Hel. sent information of his danger to Pharnabazus, Avho hastened to his relief ,' J^' ^q ' with an army strong in cavahy ; but the Athenians were so rapid with their works that they completed a contravallation, from sea to sea, except where a river interfered. Nevertheless Hippocrates, aware of the satrap's approach, sallied witli the whole garrison, while the Persians endevored to force a passage through the works, by the bed of the river. Thrasyllus opposed Hippocrates, and a fierce conflict was long equally maintained between them. Alcibiades in the meantime compelled Pharnazabus to retire, and then led his cavalry, with a small body of heavy-armed, to the assistance of Thrasyllus. Hippocrates was thus overpowered, him- self killed, and his surviving troops fled into the tov/n. After this successful action, Alcibiades committed the conduct ofsf. the siege to the generals under him, and passed himself to the Helles- pont, to prepare for other enterprize, and at the same time to promote that business which was unceasingly requiring his attention, often to the interruption of enterprize, the collection of supplies. Meanwhile Pharnabazus, finding himself unable to relieve Chalcedon, sent proposals to the generals commanding the siege. His connection with the Pe- loponnesians had not answered his expectation : they had been defeated in every action they had attempted ; several of the Grecian tOM'ns which acknowleged his dominion and their alliance, were already taken ; the fate of Chalcedon was sure, if not prevented by a treaty ; if the maritime towns of iEolis should next be attacked, he was unable to protect them ; and to judge of the future by the past, the Lacedtemo- nians were equally unable. His overtures were accepted by the Athenian generals, and an accommodation was shortly concluded on the following terms ; ' that Pharnabzus should pay twenty talents, • about four thousand pounds, as ransom for Chalcedon : that the ♦ Chalcedonians should in future pay tribute to Athens as formerly, and ' should also pay all the arrears of tribute : that Pharnabazus should * conduct ambassadors from Athens to the king : that till the return of ' the ambassadors, the Athenians should commit no hostilities against ' the Chalcedonians.' Apparently Chalcedon was to be considered still 3 ji S- within 482 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. within the satrapy and under the protection of Pharnabazus ; as formerly ■ ve liave seen Potidcea tributary to Athens, M'hile under the sovereinty of Corinth. Xen. Hel. Meanwhile Alcibiades, having assembled the M'hole Grecian military g". 8. * force of the Chersonese, and a body of Thracian foot, with between three and four hundred horse, (for he had property in the Chersonese, and great personal interest among both Greeks and Thracians there) he made himself master of Selymbria, on the northern coast of the Propontis, and was taking measures to form the siege of B^'zan- tium. Pharnabazus, informed of his approach, sent to require his ratification of the agreement concerning Chalcedon. That agreement seems to have corresponded with the views of Alcibiades ; but he nevertheless refused to confirm it by his oath, unless the satrap would enter into reciprocal obligation with the same ceremony ; meaning, apparently, to assert his claim to equal rank. Pharna- bazus hoAvever consenting, he crossed to Chrysopolis; where two Persians, Metrobates and Arnapes, attended to receive the oath from him, while Euryptolemus and Diotimus waited upon the satrap for the same purpose in Chalcedon. This public ceremony being concluded, private compliments and mutual assurances passed, that might form the foundation of an intercourse of friendship, t. 9. The next business to be arranged was that of the embassy to the Persian court. Euryptolemus and four other Athenians were appointed, together with two Argians. Intelligence of this being communicated to the Lacedsemonian generals at the Hellespont, excited considerable jealousy there. An embassy from Sparta was already at Susa ; but ap- plication was nevertheless made to Pharnabazus, that other ministers might go at the same time with the Athenian and Argian, which he readily granted. Of no great abilities, but of an open generous dispo- sition, averse to wily policy, the satrap seems to have meant equal friendship to both parties, and to have proposed no advantage to him- self but what might arise from general esteem. Pasippidas, the com- mander-in-chief, put himself at the head of the LacedEemonian em- bassy; Hermocrates the Syracusan, and liis brother, Proxenus, still 1 1 exUe« Sect. X. AMBASSIES TO THE PERSIAN COURT. 45^ exiles from their country, accompanied him. Cyzicus was the ap- pointed place of meeting for all, and Pharnabazus in person undertook to be their common conductor. Matters being thus settled for the country on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, so that his satrapy was in peace, Pharnabazus appears not to have concerned himself about Byzantium. The Lacedcemonian Clearchus, commanded there. In addition to the inhabitants, he had i.T'cs.' some troops from old Greece, a small body of LacedEemonians of those ^" '°' ^*' ^^• called Perioscians and Neodamodcs, some Megarians under Helixus, and some Boeotians under Cyratadas. The Athenians attempted ail the modes of assault, known in that age, without success ; but they completed a contravallatiou, and the place was soon pressed by famine. Thus reduced to distress, while the Peloponnesian commanders, who should have endevored to relieve him, were passive, Clearchus formed the bold project of going himself to infuse vigor into their counsels, and collect a fleet with which to make a diversion, such as might compel the Athenians to raise the siege. He depended upon money from Pharnabazus. There were some triremes Tn the Hellespont, which Pasippidas had stationed for the protection of the maritime towns; some were just completed at Antandrus ; Hegesippidas commanded a squadron on the Thracian coast. All these he proposed to assemble, and to promote the building of more. But Clearchus, tho an able man, wanted the policy of Brasidas. Thucydides informs us, that the fame of the conciliating and liberal conduct of Brasidas was exten- sively serviceable to the Lacedsmon; in cause, long after his death : Brasidas was considered as an example of the Lacedemonian character; generally to the grievous disappointment of the people who allied them- selves with Laced cem on ; for the governors or superintendants, placed in every city with the modest title of Ilarmostes, Regulator, assumed almost universally a despotic authority. Clearchus was not less des- potic than the rest. When provisions began to fail in Byzantium, his soldiers from old Greece were still supplied; the Byzantine people were disregarded. General discontent insued : an Athenian party had s. rs. always existed in the city ; it now gained strength, and the absence of Clearchus 494 HISTORY OF GREECE. Ghap.XIX. Clearchus added incouragement. While famine grew more and more pressing, communication M'as managed with Alcibiades; a gate was opened for him by night ; the Athenian troops entered ; and HeHxus and Cyratadas, to whom the command had been committed by Cle- archus, after some resistance, were compelled to surrender themselves prisoners. The services which, by the reduction of Byzantium, Alcibiades had completed for his country, less brilliant than some, were yet perhaps, in importance, equal, and, by the union of ability and vigor displayed in an extensive and complicated command, even superior to what any Athenian or any Greek had ever before performed. When the forces first placed him at their head, Athens scarcely commanded more terri- tory than its walls inclosed; revenue was gone, and the commonwealth depended for existence upon its fleet, which was at the same time dis- pirited and mutinous. He had restored loyalty to the fleet ; he had restored dominion to the commonwealth ; he had destroyed the enemy's fleet ; and, under his conduct, the navy of Athens again commanded the seas: and, what was not least among the services, his successes and his reputation, without solicitation or intrigue, had conciliated the adverse satrap Pharnabazus, and opened probable means for checking those sources of supply to the enemy, the failure of which would restore 1 ?' c. 4. *" Athens certain superiority in the war. In this state cf things he s- *. thought he might with advantage revisit his country, whence he had been absent six years ; and he proposed at the same time, as winter was approaching, to gratify the greater part of his forces with means of seeing their friends, and attending to their domestic concerns. These being his purposes, after he had settled the affairs of Byzan- tium, and the other dependencies of the commonwealth on thePropon- i'is and the Hellespont, he led the armament to Samos. Thence he sent ,^ Thrasybidus with thirty ships to the Thracian coast ; and, the restored reputation of the Athenianarmsseconding the measures of that active and able officer and statesman, all the cities which had lately revolted were quickly recovered. Alcibiades went himself with twenty ships to the Carian coast; and, in tributeor contribution, collected a hundred talents, s. 5. about twenty thousand pounds, for the public treasiwy. On his return to Samos, Sect. X. RETURN OF ALCIBIADES TO ATHENS. 495 Sanios, reserving twenty ships, he sent the rest, under the conduct of ThrasyUiis, to Attica. There was yet a strong party in Athens so in- veterately inimical to him, tho since the last revolutionit hadlessdared to show itself, that he would not venture thither till the temper of the people should be more completely manifested, in the reception of the returning fleet. Meanwhile he went with his squadron to the coast of Laconia, under pretence of gaining intelligence of the enemy's designs, and of observing what was going forward in the port of Gythium. Information from his confidential friends reached him at sea, that he Xen. HeJ. had been elected general of the commonwealth, and that Thrasybulus, g'^^ ^' who was also absent, and Conon alone of officers present, were appointed his collegues. Upon this he made immediately for Attica. It happened that he entered the harbour of Peirteus on the day of the «• 5. Plynteria, a kind of mourning religious ceremony, when the statue ^^ ^^P'* of Minerva was veiled ; and, tho to any other Greek, such was Grecian superstition, not esteemed unlucky, on that day no Athenian dared transact any important business. Many people, as the cotemporary historian tells us, considered this as an ill omen, both to Alcibiades and to the commonwealth. Nevertheless, the approach of Alcibiades being announced, a vast Xen. Hel. croud attracted by curiosity, both from Peirceus and from the city, g' g_ assembled about the port. The general language was, ' that Alcibiades ' was the most meritorious of citizens : that his condemnation had * been the wicked measure of a conspiracy of men, who scrupled nothing ' to promote their own interest: that his abilities were transcendent; ' his liberality unbounded : his opposition to his country had been ' forced; his eagerness to return to its service proved his patriotic * inclination. As for danger to the democracy, men like him had no ' temptation to innovate ; the favor of the people gave him all the ' power and preeminence he could wish for. Accordingly he had ' never oppressed any : whereas his opponents had destroyed by assas- * sination the most deserving citizens; and, if ever they appeared to ' possess any popular confidence, it was only when the death or exile of * all better men left them without competitors for the leading situa- * tions 496 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIX. ' tions in the commonwealth '^' While these were the sentiments sounded by the general voice, a few were heard to say less loudly, ' that Alcibiades had alone been the cause of all the past'misfortunes, ' and it was to be feared he would still be the promoter of measures * dano-erous to the commonwealth.' He was not yet so assured of the prevalence of sentiments in his favor, but that he approached the shore with apprehension. He even hesitated to quit his galley, till from the deck he saw his cousin-german Eur^-ptolemus son of Peisianax, with others of his relations and confidential friends. Nor did even they trust intirely in the protection which the etablished government, hardly indeed yet established, could or would afford. They came prepared to resist any attempt that might be made against his person ; and, surrounded by them, he proceeded to the city. Xen. Hel. His first business, in regular course, was to attend the council of 6. 8. * Five-hundred ; his next to address the general assembly. Before both he took occasion to assert his innocence of the sacrilegious profana- tions, of which he had been accused, to apologize for his conduct during his banishment, and to criminate his prosecutors. Many after him spoke strongly to the same purposes ; and the current of popular favor became so evident, that not a word was heard in opposition to him; for the people, says Xenophon, would not have borne it. He was chosen, with a title apparently new, governor-general, or com- mander-in-chief with supreme authority **, as the only person capable of restoring the former power and splendor of the commonwealth. So nearly allied we commonly find democracy with absolute monarchy; and not in effect only, but often in form also. s. s. Soon after he was vested with this high dignity, opportunity occurred for Alcibiades to gratify the people who conferred it, and to acquire '' 'Avrcli 01 liinix; >.iiif 9/»Ia5, S,' uvio Tci-To ranks, yet existing in public opinion, among ? taking the command of a squadron which lay there, he proceeded *• ^- to Cos and Miletus, and thence to Ephesus; where, Mith the ships he had collected by the way, he found himself at the head of a fleet of seventy triremes. B. C. 407. As soon as he heard that Cyrus was arrived at Sardis, he hastened, in company with the ambassadors newly returned from Susa, to pay his Xen. Hel. court there ; and he found a most favorable reception. The prince 1 1 c 5 s_ 2. ' ' told him, ' that it was equally his fathers command and his own ' inclination, to join the Lacedcemoniacs in zealous prosecution of the * war against Athens; that he had brought with him five hundred ' talents, about a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling, ' for the particular purpose; and he would not spare his own revenue ' in the same cause;' adding, in the warmth of youthful zeal, and in the hyperbolical manner of the east, ' that he would cut up the throne • on which he sat,' (which was of solid silver and gold,) ' rather than s. 3 &•*. ' means for prosecuting the M-ar should fail.' In the treaty concluded ' Our copies of Xenophon say tliree years; but archbishop Usher has supposed years to have been put for months by the carelessness of transcribers. 4 with ■Sect. I. LYSANDER LACED.T.I\IONrAN COMMANDER. 501 with the Persian court, it was stipulated, tliat the king should allow thirty Attic mines for the monthly pay of every trireme; which made three oboli, not quite fourpence sterling, for each man daily \ Incou- raged by the prince's free promise, and not yet accustomed to the extravagance of oriental diction, Lysander proposed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay toevcr}- seaman. ' The increase of expence,' he saici, ' tho it might on a hasty view appear jjrofuse, would in the end be ' found economical; inasmuch as the desertion that would insue among- ' the enemy's seamen would, beyond all things, accelerate a happy con- ' cldsion of the war.' Cyrus, M'ho had not expected that such advantao-e would be taken of his warmth of expression, answered nevertheless, Avith much politeness, ' that he doubted not the proposal was founded ' on a just view of things, but he could not exceed the king's command.' Lysander, with the complacency of a courtier already formed, impli- citly assented; and the prince, satisfied altogether with his behavior^ invited him to sui)per. Wine usually circulated freely at a Persian XeiuAnab^ entertainment, and Cyrus did not always stint himself to moderation. Lysander's manner and conversation were insinuating; the prince's spirits were eleva-ted ; and, drinking to Lysander after the Persian manner, Xen. Ilel.. he asked ' what he could do for him that would give him mosit satis- ' faction ?' Lysander answered, ' that nothing would gratify him equally ' with the addition of a single obolus to the seamen's daily wages.' Pleased w ith the apparent disinterestedness and generosity of the Spartan general, the prince consented, and the pay M'as augmented accordingly. The armament was of course highly gratified; and, whether his influence "with the prince was considered, or his generous preference of the com- mon welfare to his private emolument, for which such an opportunity seemed offered, very great credit accrued to Lysander. The people of Athens were not apprized of the acquisition of the Xcn. Ilel. alliance of Persia by the Peloponnesian confederacy, when Alcibiades, ^^ ' '" in the third month after his return, sailed again from Peirjeus. His * This, if all were paid alike, would give ciai) service, the pay of inferior officers and two hundred and sixty-six men to every privates the same, ar.d that of superior trireme. Commonly we find, in the Gre- oDicers only double. armament 1. 1. c. 4. e, 10. i. O. S. 9. boi HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. anv.ament consisted of fifteen hundred lieaw-armed foot, a handled and fift}' horse, and a hundred triremes. Aristocrates and Adeimantus were appointed generals of the landforccs under him. He directed his Xen. llil. course first to Andros, which had revolted. The ilandfrs, assisted by a small body of Lacedaemonians, were rash enough to meet him in the field. They were defeated with some loss ; but Alcibiades, finding their walls too strong to be readily forced, satisfied himself, for the present, with erecting a trophy for the. little success obtained, and pro- ceeded with his armament to Samos. The intelligence, which greeted Iran on his arrival, of the treaty concluded by Lacedscmon with Persia, the treatment of the Atheeiau ministers, and the favor of the young prince toward theLaceda;monians, was highly unwelcome, and threw a damp on the spirits of^the whole armament. It was not the military force, but the wealth of Peisia» that M'as dreaded, as it would give elficacy to the military force of the lPeloi)onnesian confederacy' ; and a greater portion than before of that ■wealth was now likely to be ready, for purposes of hostility to Athens. The active mind of Alcibiades was immediately turned to counter- work the effect of the Lacediemonian negotiation, and circumstances affording hope occurred. According to the antient policy of the Per- sian empire, the satraps, within the extensive country which was put iinder the command of the prince, retained still a share of independent authority in their respective satrapies. Nevertheless Tissaphernes, in a manner eclipsed by the prince's superior rank and power, and the greater splendor of his court, fell comparatively into neglect and con- tempt, particularly with the LacediBmonians. Hence, notwithstanding his late injurious treatment of Alcibiades, it was thought interest might jiow possibly reunite him with the Athenians, and through him means might be obtained for negotiation, from which some advantage might be drawn. Tissaphernes was actually gained ; but he was in no favor with Cyrus, and all his endevors to procure a reception for Athenian ministers were ineffectual. This turn of things greatly injured Alcibiades both with the arma- ment at Samos and ^^th the people at home. His promises of Persian assistance, which he, and he only, could procure, had first and princi- pally Sect.I. SEAFIGHT of NOTIUM. 509 pally led to his restoration. That assistance alone, he had said, and his confidential friends had always maintained, could save the common- wealth. Not only these promises had totally failed, but that important assistance had accrued to the enemy ; and in a greater degree than he could ever promise it to Athens. He felt these circumstances, and was liurtby the temper of the armament which followed. His naval force ■was yet superior to that of the enemy ; but quick decision alone pro- bably could either secure his own situation in command, or avert im- pending ruin from the commonwealth. He led his fleet therefore to Xen.llei. Notium, on the Asiatic shore, within view of Ephesus, -where i' g -* ^' Lysander lay. Information came to him that Thrasybulus, who had wintered wilh his squadron in the Hellespont, was employed in for- tifying Phocasa on the iE'olian coast. Possibly Alcibiades thought it might be advantageous to withdraw himself, till the moment offered for important action. He left his fleet, however, to go and concert measures with Thrasybulus, intrusting the command to Antiochus, but with strict orders to avoid a general ingagement. During his absence, Antiochus, whether actuated by honest but in- judicious zeal, or coveting a glory to which he could not honestly aspire, went with a few triremes to the harbour of Ephesus, as if to ex- plore ; but passed by the very prows of some of the enemy's fleet, as if to provoice pursuit. L3^sander, who had now ninety triremes, was yet employed in improving the strength and condition of his fleet, without meaning to seek an action. The conduct of Antiochus in- duced h'm to order a few galleys to be hastily launched and manned, and to pursue. Notium was so near that this movement could be seen there, and a superior force presently advanced to relieve Antiochus. Lysander being prepared, led out his whole fleet. The Athenians, not equally prepared, hastily, and as they could, in the exigency of the mo- ment, put all their ships in motion. Lysander began the action with his fleet regularly formed. The Athenians, one after another eudevoring to get into the line, maintained the fight for some time, in a confused and ficattered manner, but at length fled for Samos. Fifteen of their ships were taken, but most of the men escaped : a few were made prisoners; Antiochus 1. I. C. 0. S.9. 504 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. Antiochus was among the killed. Lysander erected his trophy upon the headland of Notium, and carried his prizes to Ephesus. X"n.. Hcl. This was a most mortifying event for Alcibiades. He hastened back to his fleet, and, highly anxious to repair its disgrace, he went to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and offered battle. Lysander liow- ever, being considerably inferipr in force, would not 'move, and Alci- biades returned to Samos. Hut. vit. The policy of the Lacedjemonian government seems to have met the '^' ■ vanity of Lysander, in the endevor to give more than its due splendor Pausan. to the victory of Notium. Nine statues M'ere dedicated at Delphi on 1. 10. c, 9. ^jig occasion, the effigies of Lvsander himself, of IJermon the master of his ship, and of Abas his soothsayer, with those of Castor, Pollux, Juno, Apollo, Diana, and Neptune. That victory, little in itself, be- came important, as Plutarch justly observes, by its political con- -sequences. The credit of Alcibiades had already received injury among tlie ill-judging multitude of Athens. They held that he ought not ta^ have left the revolted iland of Andros unsubdued: yet there can be 110 doubt but he would have been inexcusable in wasting the time of his powerful armament upon that little object, when concerns of im- portance so beyond comparison greater to the commonwealth, called him to the Asiatic coast. His commission excused him from that constant communication with the people, usually required of Athenian generals : but it might nevertheless be not difficult to persuade the people, that the neglect of such communication was disrespectful, and marked an unbecoming arrogance : nor is it indeed improbable that Alcibiades may sometimes have used the ample powers committed to him, in a more lordly style than prudence would justify. But, as Plutarch continues to observe, his very glory injured him : the people expected that nothing should resist the man to whom, whether serving 'or opposing his country, all had seemed hitherto to yield. When in- formation came that he had quitted Andros without subduing it, they Xen. Ilel. bore the immediate disappointment ; but it was with the daily expcc- -s.io.' ' tation of intelligence that Chios and all Ionia were conquered. When therefore the news arrived that the fleet had tied before an inferior force Sect.I. accusation OF ALCIBIADES. 505 force, with tlie loss of fifteen ships, Athens was in uproar. Intelli- gence of a much more threatening misfortune, the alliance of Persia with Lacedcemon, communicated at the same time, made no comparable ' impression. The enemies of Alcibiades took immediate advantage of the popular temper; and those in the city were assisted by some who came from the fleet for the purpose. Of these Thrasybulus son of Plut. vit. Thrason, mentioned on this occasion only in history, principally tli is- Alcib/ tinguished himself An assembly of the people being convened, and curiosity eager for the detail of an unexpected and alarming event, Thrasybulus mounted the bema, and exclaimed vehemently ao-ainst the commander-in-chief: ' His pride,' he said, ' was intolerable, and * his negligence of the public service shameful. His abilities indeed ' were great, but he was continually quitting the fleet: and while he ' pretended to be employed in raising contributions for public service, ' his time was spent among Ionian courtezans, in the indulgence of ' the most extravagant luxury. In a station in view of the enemy's 'fleet, he had intrusted a command, involving the being of the ' commonwealth, to men who had no merit, biJt that of flattering his * pride and ministering to his desires. The, late ignominious disaster ' had had no other source. As for any regard for Athens or the Athe- ' nian people, it was evident he had none; and if, in consequence of * a better knowlege of him, their partiality toward him should cease, ' he was prepared to do without them. While vested with so great ' a command, his attention had been more given to his estate in the '' Thracian Chersonese than to their service. A castle, which he had ' built there, was already prepared to receive him, in that second banish- * ment which he so well deserved, and which he evidently expected.' Some mixture of known truths, with the falsehood and malignity of this accusation, probably assisted to give it etHcacy. There seems to have been no ground for the imputation of negligence. Indeed some of those points, in the character of Alcibiades, which were most excep- tionable in his youth, appear to have been improved with increasing years and increasing experience; and, as passion cooled, and reason strengthened, and adversity instructed, the lessons of Socrates were remembered and had their eftect. In his conduct since liis restoration, Vol. II. 3 T whether 506 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. whether in military or political business, neither rashness shows itself, nor dishonesty. On the contrary, all his projects appear to have been formed M'ith singular prudence, as they Mere executed with singular vigor. However he may have failed in regard to the person to whom he intrusted the command of the fleet, during that short absence ■which proved so unfortunate, in every other instance his choice of assistants and deputies in command was judicious, liberal, and happy. The confidence which he continued always to give to Thra- sybulus son of Lycus, and to Thrasyllus, at the same time conferred and reflected honor. But these considerations escaped the Athenian people; called upon, in a moment of indignation and anxiety, to decide upon a matter of the utmost consequence, and plied by the eloquence of interested men, M'hile the information necessary for due discussion of the question M'as not before them. Without waiting to know how their general might apologize for his conduct, or what necessity, or what view of public service might have directed it, the multitude, whose momentary will decided, without controul, the most important measures of executive government, passed the fatal decree. Thrasybulus was involved with Alcibiades; and thus the two men who were by experience, added to singular gifts of nature, beyond all others perhaps then in the world, qualified to relieve the common- wealth, in its almost desperate circumstances, were dismissed from their employmenis. Ten generals were appointed in their room, and the long list requires notice: they were Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thra- .syllus, Aristogenes. How that balance in the powers of government at Athens, which Thucydides mentions to have been so judiciously established, when the council of Four-hundred was abolished, had already been com- pletely deranged, Xcnophon gives no direct information ; but, in the circumstances related by both writers, it ren^ains suggested, Alcibiades, disappointed in his first great political purpose, of leading the aristocratical interest in Athens, and, through his antient family connection with Lacedasmon, extending his influence over Greece, threw himself at once on the demgcratical interest; with the extraor- l dinary Sect. I. FACTION AT ATHENS. 507 dinary success, followed by the rapid reverse, which we have seen. When his country, through the evils which he principally broucrht on it, was prepared to make terms with him, he preferred an aristo- cratical or oligarchal party for his future support. But, finding himself presently deceived by the persons actually leading those in- terests in Athens, so that democracy was his only resource, it was an unbalanced democracy only that could answer his purpose; be- cause an unbalanced democracy only would give hhii that plenitude of authority, which could inable him to overbear the aristocratical and oligarchal parties, so warmly disposed to oppose him. Having reestablished himself then on the ground of the democratical interest, yet, in the necessity of absenting himself on command abroad, his power failed for controlling the movements of faction at home. How parties there Mere at the time divided, and how little, notwith- standing the rash vote for the deposition of AlcibiadcsandThrasybulus, any held a clear superiority, is indicated in the composition of the new board of generals. Pericles was a near kinsman of Alcibiades; Aristocrates had been his general of infantry in his last command ; Thrasyllus one of his most active partizans, and among those whom, as an ofiScer, he had most favored and trusted. But Conon, the first of the ten, a man of superior qualifications, appears to have been not his friend. Meanwhile Epigenes, Diophanes and Cleisthenes, men of Lys. a?/« high birth, but in no office, led the mob, and led it to the most de- apoIcV spotic measures : on the vague accusation of being unfriendly to the P/fi '• multitude', some, who had taken part with the Four-hundred, were condemned without trial, by a single vote of the general assembly, and executed ; many suffered confiscation of their property, some were banished, some incapacitated for honors and public employments; some were compelled to purchase their safety. In this state of things, Xcn. Hel. Alcibiades, not indeed being actually summoned, but of course to give s. I'o. ' an account of his conduct, if he appeared, and probably to defend him- self against impeachment, not unreasonably avoided, to trust his fate to such a judicature as the assembled Athenian people. Thrasybulus, 3 T 2 less 508 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. less obnoxious to the jealousy of party, seems to have remained M-ith the fleet, retaining the command of his trireme, Alcibiades retired to his estate in the Thracian Chersonese. SECTION II. Cotion commander-in-chief of the Atheuian feet : CaUicratidas of the Pcloponnesian. Mitylene besieged by CaUicratidas. Seafght of ArginuscE. B. C. 407. CoxoN, at the time of his appointment to be one of the new gencrals- Xen llei in-chief, was absent, being employed in the siege of Andros, M'here he 1. 1. c. 5. commanded. A decree of the people directed him to go immediately, with the squadron of twenty ships under his orders, and take the com- mand of the fleet at Samos. It was already late in the year, and, on his arrival at Samos, he found a dejection in the armament, not inviting to great undertakings. Fortunately the enemy's fleet was not yet so strong as to incourage them to enterprize. His first measure then, and apparently a measure of absolute necessity, was precisely that which had been so objected to Alcibiades, as to be made a ground of his impeachment. Selecting seventy triremes, and strengthening the crews by drafts from above thirty moie, Conon divided them into squadrons, which were sent various ways ; and they were successful in executing his orders to collect contributions and plunder, in severat parts of the coast of Asia ftnd the neighboring ilands, which acknow- le"ed the dominion of Persia or the alliance of LacecUcmon. o r.6. i. I. In the insuing winter, CaUicratidas was sent from Sparta, to take the command-in-chief of the Pcloponnesian fleet. CaUicratidas, widely different from Lysander, was one of the purest models of the old Spartan character; a zealous and sincere disciple of the school of Lycurgus*; On ♦ Barthelemi has not scrupled (e. 4i!. clearest terms, to afiirni that CaUicratidas, p. 103, vol.4, ed. 8vo.) on ilie authority of Lysander, and Gylipims, were all bcrn iu so late a writer as iElian, given also in not the that class of freemen of Laceda;nion, which was Sect. II. CALLICRATIDAS LACEDAEMONIAN COMMANDER. 509 On his arrival at Epliesiis, Lysander told him, that he resigned to him a victorious fleet which commanded the seas. Callicratidas replied, ' Pass * then with your fleet to the westward of Samos, and deliver up the ' command to me in the harbour of Miletus.' The Athenian fleet lay at Samos, and passing to the westward of that iland would put a general action in the choice of the Athenian admiral. Lysander excused him- self by alledging, that in so doing he should go beyond his duty, since the officer appointed to supersede him was arrived. Callicratidas, gratified with the implied acknowlegement that the fleet was not strong enough to meet the enemy, made it his first business to increase its force. He sent to Chios, Rhodes, and other states of the confederacy; and, having thus collected fifty triremes, which made his number all together a hundred and forty, he then proposed without delay to seek a battle. The condescending politeness of Lysander, so different from what was usually experienced in Spartan commanders, his apparent disin- terestedness, and his attention to the welfare of those under him, together with the ability he had shown in every kind of business, had rendered him highly acceptable to the armament and to the allied cities. Callicratidas had not been long in his command, before he discovered that some of the principal officers, devoted to his prede- cessor, were forming a party against him. They not only obeyed neg- hgently and reluctantly, but endevored to excite discontent in the armament and among the allies. ' The Lacedaemonian system,' they said, ' was most impolitic. Such continual change of the person at ' the Jiead of things must produce immoderate inconvenience. A was of acknowltged servile origin; and lie we may trust Plutarch, wliose authority is at adds, ' that they obtained the full rights of least as good as .Elian's, and whose asstrtipa ' citizens only as the reward of signal ex- incomparably more probable, Lysander was ' ploits,' for which he seems to have had no of the Heracleid family, esteemed the first in warrant whatever. He appears to have for- Greece. But Herodotus, Thutydides and gotten that Gylippus was son of Cleandridas, Xenophon, all make it sufficiently evident who held the high station of regent during that, in their time, no men of servile, or the minority of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, any other neodamode families, as they were and that it was the clear dignity of a Spartan, called, could reach those liigh siuiations, wliich, according to Thucydides, made him under the Spartan government, which Gylip- a fit person for the Sicilian command. If pus, Lysander and Callicratidas held. ' niosi 510 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. * most important naval command thus fell into the hands of men ' unversed in naval affairs; and those, who had had no communication ' among the allies, were to preside over the interests of the allies. * The consequences would be ruinous, both to the allies and to the ' fleet.' The measure taken by Callicratidas to obviate this dangerous cabal, as it stands reported by the cotemporary historian, strongly marks bis Xen. Hel. character. Calling together the Lacedaemonians of the armament, he s.5.^ ' spoke to them in the following style of Laconic eloquence: ' I could * be very well contented to stay at home ; and if cither Lysander, or ' any other, pretends to more skill in naval command, I shall notgainsaj' * it. Being however, by the appointment of the Lacedsemonian govern- ' ment, admiral of the fleet, it is my business to act in that situation to * the best of my ability. I therefore now require your advice. You * know, as well as I, what the purpose of the government is, which I am ' anxious to have duly performed. Will it then be better for me to * remain here ; in which case you Mill give me your zealous coopera- ' tion ; or shall I go home and relate the state of things ?' This speech s. 6. had in a great degree the desired eflect. All were anxious to obviate accusation at Sparta ; and all were in consequence forward to demon- strate, both by word and deed, that they meant no resistance to the legal commands of the Lacedaemonian admiral, and no backwardness in the service of the confederacy. The ditKculties of Callicratidas, however, did not end here. . His rough manners, ill accommodated to relieve, on the contrary irritated the regret of his predecessor in resigning a very high situation ; and his simple and unsuspicious honesty did not conceive any political neces- sity for condescending communication with the man whom he came to supersede, not for any pleasure of his own, but for the service of his country. Lysander had a large sum of money remaining, of what had been committed to him by Cyrus for the pay of the fleet. Noway de- sirous of gratifying Callicratidas, he would not make it over to him, but, to earn credit with the prince by a display of his economy, returned the whole into the Persian treasury. Callicratidas immediately found liimself in want. He made, however, no difficulty of going to the court of Sect.II. CALLICRATIDAS LACEDiEMONIAN COMMANDER. 5u of Saidis, to ask for a supply, which he supposed was to be issued of course: but to provide for a favorable reception by any previous in- trigue or any ceremonious compliment, or to obviate any ill impression that Lysander or the friends of Lysander might have made, did not come within liis imagination. On arriving at Sardis, he applied for an audience. He was answered, that he must M'ait two days. Patience was a Spartan virtue, and he did not immediately feel the affront. But, on going according to the appointment, he met still with procrastination ; and as he repeated his fruitless at- tendance in the antichambers, everything he saw, the pomp, the insolence, the servility, which struck his first notice, and the faith- lessness and venality which soon became evident, all excited his indignation. At length, in complete disgust, he departed without having seen the prince, and with his business in no part done; ex- claiming ' that the Greeks were indeed wretched who would so truckle * to barbarians for money! He saw,' he said, ' what would be the con- ' sequence of their quarrels among oneanother ; an;l, if he lived to ' return home, he would do his utmost to reconcile Lacedtemon with ' Athens.' On arriving at Ephesus, his first care was to move his fleet from a place so near Sardis, and so immediately under the controul of Persia. He conducted it to Miletus, whose people preserved more independency. Thence he sent a small squadron home for a supply of money. For inter- Xen. Hel. mediate need he obtained a loan from the Milesians and Chians, and 'l'^' ' S. { ,0, he then proceeded to employ the force he had collected, his fleet consisting of a hundred and seventy triremes. Methymne in Lesbos was his first object, and he took that city by assault. All the s. 9- effects were given up for plunder, and the flaves were collected in the market-place, to be sold for the benefit of the armament. The allies proposed the sale of the Methymna;an citizens; but Cal- licratidas, with a spirit of liberal patriotism, of which instances are rare in Grecian history, declared that, ' where he commanded, no * Greek should be made a slave.' While Callicratidas had been so increasing his fleet, Couon ad- hered to the different system which, on first taking the command, he had £12 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. had adopted, reducing the number of his triremes, to have more select crews. If we may guess at tlie purpose, of which we are not posi- tively informed, he was urged by the same deficiency of supplies from' home, which had not a little interrupted the operations even of Alci- biades, and, beside a strict parsimony, made every attention to the collection of contributions necessary. With select ships, and select crews, he could be quicker in his motions, make sudden attacks upon defenceless places, pursue merchant-ships or small squadrons, Xen. Ilel. and avoid an enemy too strong to be opposed : and hence appa- s' Vo'^ renlly the expression which Xenophon reports of Callicratidas, 'that ' he would stop Conon"s adultery with the sea ';' impl} ing, that it was not by a fair superiority, but through a furtive kind of success, that Cononhad appeared in some degree to command that element. The Peloponnesian fleet was lying at Methymne, when Conon was seen passing with seventy triremes. Callicratidas pursuing, endevored s. 11. to intercept the retreat of the Athenians to Samos. Conon fled for IMitylene; but the Peloponnesian rowers exerted themselves with s- 12. such vigor, that Callicratidas entered the harbour with him. Com- pelled thus to fight against numbers so superior, the Athenians lost thirty triremes, the men however escaping. The other forty triremes they secured by hauling them under the town-wall, so as to be pro- tected from the battlements. Callicratidas, stationing his fleet in the hafbour, and sending for infantry from ^lethymne and Chios, formed the siege of Mitylene by sea and land. After these successes, unasked supplies came to him from Cyrus. The situation of Conon meanwhile was highly distressing. The city was populous and unprovided ; and not only he was without means to procure supplies, but he was at a loss for means even to send information of his distress. To attempt this however was necessary. For tlie defence of his triremes, lying on the beach, a guard from his landforces was ]daced in each. From two of them of known swiftness,he moved the soldiers' before day, and put, in their stead, crews of his best rowers, who gave place again to the soldiers after dark. This was ' Kotun Je s~s-£», Jti irail«r£i u.v\o> fnoi^utTa * Tow; iWiSara;. Xen. Ilel. 1. 1. C. 0. S. 14. Til SaXatrcai'. repeated S. 13. Sect. II. EXTRAORDINAllY EXERTION of the ATHENIANS. 5 13 repeated four days. On the fifth, at noon, the apparent inattention of Xen. Hel. the enemy, while their crews were ashore at their dinner, seemed to s. 13. afford the wished-for opportunity : the two triremes pushed out of the port; and, according to orders, one directed its course westward, im- mediately for Athens, the other northward toward the Hellespont. This however could not be; done unseen by the enemy. In some confusion, cutting the cables' of some of their ships, they were quickly in pursuit; *• 15. and one of the Athenian triremes was taken about sunset the same »• lo- day : the other reached Athens. The exertion which the Athenian commonwealth was still able to make, after all its Jesses and all its internal troubles, shows extraordinary vigor in the system, which owed its origin to the daring genius of Themis- tocles, and its improvement and permanence to the wisdom of Pericles 5 yet which perhaps could never have existed, or could not havelasted, but for the well-constructed foundation, which the wisdom of Solon had pre- pared. The circumstances required every effort. A hundred and ten tri- s. 17. rcmes were equipped and manned : but, for this, not only every Athenian citizen, within age for forein service, of the two lower orders, but many of the order of knights, who on all common occasions were exempt from naval service, imbarked; and, all being insufficient, numerous slaves Avere added, to complete the crews. The whole number wanted would not be so few as twenty thousand. In thirty days, however, this nu- merous fleet was ready for sea : the generals, before appointed, were directed, as admirals, to take the command (for, in speaking of the Greek naval service, we have continual difficulty to chuse between these titles), and under the orders of those who were at the time in Athens, it proceeded to Samos. Ten Samian triremes reinforced it s. is, there ; and, requisition being sent to the other allied and subject states, for the utmost naval force that they could furnish, allowing no able- bodied citizens to avoid the service *, an addition was thus collected which made the whole upward of a hundred and fifty : its course was then directed toward Lesbos. At the time of Conon's defeat, Diomedon, another of the ten ge- s. 16. nerals, was cruizing with a separate squadron of twelve ships. Receiving Vol. II. 3 U informalioii 1.1. C.6 s. 19 5M HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. information of his coUegue's distress, he made an effort, apparently with more zeal than judgement, to relieve it. Callicratidas took ten of his ships: Diomedon himself escaped with the other two. Xen Hel. The Spartan admiral was yet with his whole force at jNIitylene, when intelligence reached him, that a powerful fleet from Attica was arrived at Samos. Leaving then fifty triremes, under Eteonicus, to continue the hlockade, he went with a hundred and twenty to meet the enemy. The same evening putting his people ashore, according to the usual prac- i. 20. lice, upon the headland of Malea in Lesbos, for their supper, as night came on he discovered the fires of a naval camp on the little ilands of Arginusa;, between Lesbos and the main : and, soon after, informa- tion was brought him that the Athenian fleet was there. About mid- night he weighed, proposing a surprize ; but, a thunder-storm coming on, compelled lum to wait for day. 5'*1« Early in the morning the approach of the enemy became known ta the Athenian commanders, who immediately imbarked their crews, steered southward for the open sea, and formed their order of battle.. Eight of the ten generals of the commonwealth were aboard the fleet. $.22. Xenophon informs us, but without accounting for it, that the Pelopon- nesian ships were at this time generally swifter than the Athenian ; sa that, since the first )ears of the war, the circumstances of naval action were inverted, the Lacedaemonians proposing to profit from rapid evo- lution, while the Athenians directed their principal care to guard against it. The Laceda'^monian fleet therefore was formed in a single line. The Athenian order of battle was remarkable : each of the eight generals com-« manded a squadron of fifteen ships ; and the eight squadrons, in two lines,, formed the wings of the fleet. The allies held the center, in a single line ; -*.25. and with them were posted thirteen Athenian captains; Thrasybulus, Theramenes, and aiwther, not named, who had all formerly commanded as admirals, and ten who held the rank of taxiarc in the land service, which seems to have been superior to that of tricrarc in the navy. The attention to rank, here marked by Xenophon, deserves notice, as it was less to be expectad in a democracy, and as it accounts for the regularity with which the Athenian military service was conducted, while, in some of the Grecian democracies, subordination was very defective. ■•23' Xenophon seems to have thoaght the disposition of the Athenian fleet Sect.II. SEAFIGHT OF ARGINUS^. 5i5 fleet judicious, and the master of the Spartan admiral's ship, Ilcrnon, a Megarian, apparently saw that it was. More experienced probably, in naval affairs, than his commander, he augured ill of the approaching battle, and advised retreat from superior numbers. Callicratidas an- swered, with the spirit of a disciple of Lycurgus, but not with the judgement which the great command intrusted to him required, ' that ' his death would be a small loss to Sparta, but flight would be dis- * graceful.' The fleets met, and the action was long disputed in line. Various xen. Mel. exertions then broke the reoularity of order, and still the fiaht was ' '■ '^'^- maintained for some time with much equality. At length Callicratidas, who commanded in the right wing of his fleet, in the shock of his galley striking an enemy m ith the beak, fell overboard and perished. About the same time the Athenian right, commanded by Protomachus, jnade an impression upon the Peloponnesian left : confusion spred to the right, no longer directed by the orders, or animated by the exertion, of the commander-in-chief; and shortly the whole fled. Above seventy triremes were either destroyed or taken : of the Lacedcemonian squad- ron, consisting of ten, only one escaped. Twenty-five' Athenian ships were sunk or disabled. When pursuit ended, the Athenian admirals held a council of war 8.25. &c. 7, to consider of measures next to be taken. To collect the wreck and the dead, but more especially to relieve the living, who might be floating on the ruins of galleys, or endevoring to save themselves by swimming, was commonly an important business after naval action. Diomedon proposed that this should be the first concern of the whole fleet. Erasinides, on the contrary, was for proceeding im- mediately with the whole fleet to the relief of Conon, the primary object of their instructions. The enemy's fleet under Eteonicus, he said, were due diligence used, might be taken intirej the destruction * In Xenophon's account of the battle, context proves that in the latter passage twenty-five is the number of ships nienti- there has been no eriur in transcription, oned as lost, together with their crews. In Unable more sutiFfactorily to reconcile the a following passage (c. 7. s. 10.) twelve contradiction, I have stated the tweiity-five wMt. 4,iipi«rft«. If there is any- it has escaped me. I think it is not noticed where any fartheraccuuiitof this remarkable by either Petit or Potter, law, than what we have here from Xenophou, 3 X « ' The 52; HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. * The crimes held most atrocious, among men, are sacrilege, and ' high-treason. Tlie generals before you are accused of none such. * But if the decree of Canonus is, in your opinion, too mild for them, ' let the law against sacrilege and treason be your guide. Even so, ' each will have his separate trial; a day for each Mill be divided into * three parts : in the first you will inquire and determine whether tliere ' is cause for putting the accused upon trial ; the second will be allotted ' to the accusation ; the third to the defence. Let it be recollected * how lately Aristarchus, the most obnoxious of those who overthrew ' the democracy, and who afterward, in his flight from Athens, per- * formed the signal treachery of betraying CEnoe to the Thebans, even ' Aristarchus was allowed his day, and even to chuse hib day, for his * defence. Will you then, Athenians, who were so scrupulously just ' to one whose treason was so notorious, and whose conduct so grossly ' injurious, will you deny the common benefit of the laws to those who * have so signally served their country? Will you break down the bar- ' riers of that constitution by which, hitherto, individuals have been * safe, and by which the commonwealth has become great, to deliver ' to the executioner your meritorious generals, covered with the recent * glory of the most important victory that has been gained in a war of * twenty-six years ? If you would consult the justice, the honor, or * the safety of the commonwealth, you will rather reward them with * crowns, their due as conquerors, than, yielding to the malicious ' arguments of wicked men, condemn them to an ignominious death. ' To what therefore I have at present to propose, I trust you cannot Xen. Hel. * hut assent: it is, ' That each of the generals be separately tried, 1. ]. c. 7. ' accordine: to the provisions of the decree of Canonus.' According to the forms of the Athenian assembly, the question was at the same time put upon the motion of Euryptolemus and that of Callixenus. The majority was declared for the motion of Euryptolemus; but, at the requisition of Menecles, the holding up of hands being repeated '*, it was declared for that of Callixenus. The resolution of the council being thus confirmed, in conformity to that resolution the people proceeded to ballot. The fatal vase pronounced sentence of Sect. III. GRECIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITY. 525 of death against the eight generals, and the six present were exe- cuted ". Plutarch relates of Alcibiades, that when, on his recall from Sicily, he avoided returning to Athens, being asked, ' If he could not trust his country? ' he replied, ' Yes; for everything else: but in a trial ' for life, not my mother ; lest by mistake she should put a black ball ' for a white one.' Whatever authority there may have been for this anecdote, it contains a very just reproof of the Athenian mode, of giving judgement on life and death, by a secret ballot ; which, without preventing corruption, admits mistake, excludes responsibility, and covers shame. But while, under the security of opr own admirable constitution, we wonder at the defective .polity of a people whom we find so many causes to admire, it is not a little advantageous, for the writer of Grecian history, that circumstances have been occurring, in a nation calling itself the most polished of the most polished age of the world, which not only render all the atrocious, and before scarcely credible, violences of faction among the Greeks, probable, but almost make them appear moderate. Al the same time it may not be digressing improperly to remark, that, as \» hat has been passing in France may tend to dluhtrate Cirecian hij^lory, and to exculpate the Grecian cha- racter from any innate atrocity, beyond what is common among other na'tions, there occurs also, in Grecian history, what may inable to form a juster estiniate of the French character, than a view of the late enormities, compared only \\ilh what has at any time passed in our own countiy, might lead us to conceive: and, if the inability of wise and worthy men, such as undoubtedly must have existed in France, to hold their jusr influence among the people, and prevent those dis- graceful proceedings, aj)])ears itself a disgrace both to themselves and to the nation, Grecian history, and the extant writings of the ablest Gncian politicians, will pi rhaps furnish their fairest apology. For, so many men of the brightest talents and highest acquirements, . as in Greece turneil their tbougiits, vvith the closest attention, to a »' Lvsias mentions this transaction in his oration against Eratostheiies, (p. 123. vel4C(J.) and lub account, as far as it goes, confirms Ibut of Xenophon, _ • subject 5-G HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. subject so universally and deeply interesting, not one seems to have been able even to imagine a form of government which might, in a o-veat nation, reconcile the jarring pretensions arising from that variety of rank among men, without which even small societies cannot subsist. Our own writers, through meer familiarity with the object, as foreiners from unacquaintance with it, have very much overlooked what, in importance, is perhaps not inferior to any one circumstance in the sinscular constitution of our oovernment. It was not till after the troubles in France began, that a refugee, who had been in situations inabling him to see and compelling him to observe, discovered, what, but for those troubles, would perhaps never have occurred to his notice ; that Lettrc aa ' nowhcre else, in the world, such harmony subsists, between the several Roi par M. . • t> , i , cle Ciiionne. ranks or citizens, as in hngland. This harmony is indeed the foundation, the firm foundation, on which the proud superstructure of the British constitution rests. Ranks vary, as much, or perhaps more than elsewhere. But no one rank has that gigantic preeminence, whicli can inable it to trample upon its next inferior. In the scale of subordination, the distance from top to bottom is great ; but the gradation is scarcely perceptible, and the con- nection intimate. Each rank, moreover, is interested in the support of its next superior : none are excluded from the hope of rising ; and, of all the various ranks, the highest is most interested in the support of all. We cannot consider without wonder, that an order of things, apparently the most natural, as well as the most beneficial, never subsisted in any country but our own. It has not always perhaps been duly recollected, by speculative politicians, that, among the antient republics, no such order of citizens existed as that which, in Paris, after, the first revolution, assumed, or, for nefarious purposes, was complimented with, despotic power; and, while the representatives of the nation were deliberating on the rights of man, trampled under foot all rights. The functions of tliat order of citizens were, in Athens, performed by slaves; and, without keeping this circumstance constantly in mind, we cannot but be liable to the grossest error, in applying the rules of antient policy to modern times. Those writers, who would infer that formerly the lower people in England were not free, because the lowest rank were actually Sect. III. REFERENCE TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 5^7 actually slaves, attempt a fallacy upon their readers. In treatino- of Athens, Laceda-mon, or Rome, they would have distinguished, as they ought, slaves from citizens. It is unquestionahle that, from the Anglosaxon conquest downward, the constitution of this country has been al\va}S free: and tho, in unsettled times, and especially under the first Norman kings, law might be overborne by the violence of accidental power, yet both the l.iv.-, and the established mode of administering the law, never were otherwise than highly, and even singularly, favorable to the freedom and property of even the lowest citizens '*. Montesquieu has undertaken to foretel the fall of the English Con- stitution; and a credit has been given him, proportioned rather to tloe merit of the prophet than of the propliecy. Montesquieu, evidently, had not duly adverted to that peculiar amalgamation of ranks in England, through which all coiilesce; or, if it may be so expressed, to that concatenation, by which the lowest end of a long chain is. as firmly connected with the highest, as the intermediate links with oneanother. Through this advantageous constitution, England has always avoided, and it may well be hoped will continue to avoid, that violence of internal fermentation, which continually disordered, and at length' destroyed the governments of Athens anxl Rome; and hence she has^ been inabled to resist the contagion of French politics, so alluring in. distant prospect, so hideous in near approach, which perhaps no other '* It seems to deserve more notice, tban King's ilnrss, in 1788, brought forward re- I think it has yet met with, that the mo- cords of Parhament, not only proving narchs to whom otir constitution is most that the constitution was as well under- indebted, Alfred, Henry II. and Edward I. stood, in the reigns of Henry the fourth and were conquerors. It is certainly a most Heniy the sixih, as at any time since, to unworthy slander upon those uncommon tliis day, but uHording precedents tur most great men, as well as upon the parliaments, dillicult and delicate ci.cumstaiices, such from Edward tiie first, till the time when as the wisest, ol any age, might rejoice Fortescue wrote under Henry the sixth, to to find established by the wisdom of their assert, as often has been done, that England forefalherb. These 'ocords, and most of had no valuable constitution, and no true the important historical matter tiny re- freedom, till the opposition to the Stuarts, late to, had escaped the notice of all our or the expulsion of the Stuarts, procu ed historians, thera. The debates on occasion of the European 5£S HISTORY or GREECE. Chap. XX. European government, whose mildness would allow it equal admission, could, without foreln assistance, have withstood. Nor is it, I apprehend, as some political writers have asserted, of Tio importance to trace the freedom of the constitution of this country beyond the civil war in the reign of Charles the first. For the purpose indeed of establishing the right of the British people to freedom, it is utterly unnecessary. But, toward a clear comprehension of the con- stitution itself; toward a certain knowlege of the broad and deep foun- dation on which it rests; toward a ready and just perception of the manner in which it may be affected, through the various changes to which all human things are liable, and through some which we have already seen ; extension of dominion, influx of riches, increase of population, increase of revenue, immoderate debt, and the possible reduction of that debt; toward a just judgement how far any of these changes are beneficial, and how far injurious, and when alteration or remedy may be wanting, and ^vhat, in any given circumstances, wail be the probable effect of any alteration or remedy proposed; toward all these an acquaintance with the history of our constitution, from earliest times, is of great importance. If then it is to ourselves important to know the historj- of our con- stitution from earliest times, it will also be not a little important to other nations, if any such there are, who would form a constitution on the model of ours, or who would improve the constitution they possess, after our example. Nor will it be less important to those Avho, without any good foundation to build on, and without any valuable experience within their own country, would raise, with the airy materials of theory, a constitution more perfect than the most perfect that has yet existed upon earth. For Maut of attention to the breadth and antique firmness of the basis on which our envied and truly enviable government rests, the singular manner in which the materials of the superstructure are adapted to each other, and how they are held together by their natural fitness to coalesce, the complexion of Europe stems to threaten many new and memorable lessons in politics; lessons for every order that can exist in a state separately, and lessons for nations united. Happy then those, who, gathering wisdom from the 1 1 sufferings Sect. III. REFERENCE TO FRANCE AND ENGLAND. sufferings and clangers of others, can avoid the miseries which many will probably feel. Such were the sentiments occurring on what appeared the readiest probable consequences of the state of things, in Europe, when this part of the history M'as first offered to the public. The extraordinary revolution, which has insued, was, rather for the M^onderful rapidity of its progress, than for its character, then less within reasonable expectation. And, in digressing thus far, I trust I ha\e not over- stepped the limits within which the writer of Grecian history may claim, not an exclusive, but a common right. A Grecian history, and indeed any history perfectly written (these volumes pretend to no such merit) but especially a Grecian history perfectly written, should be a political institute for all nations "'. '• As M. de Calonne's letter, referred to et qui lous sont titri-s (re sont les seals qui in the text, tho printed, was, I believe, never le soient en Angleterre) partagent dans unc publislied, it may not be superfluous to give meme association, sans pri-judice nuanmoins here, in its original language, the passage k leurs qualifications distinctivea, I'honneur where the observation noticed occurs. de la Pairie; et c'est, sans contredit, le pre- J'ignorois, lorsque j'ai commence cette niier corps de I'Etat. Leur prerogative n'est lettre, a quel point la division eclatoit deja jamais contestue ni envies par les Com- entre la Noblesse et le tiers Etat, dans les munes, qui ont parmi leurs Membres les fils, diflerentes provinces de votre roj'aume: de- les freres, les parens, de ces mumes Lords, puis qae je I'ai appris, j'en fremis. Vu la et des plus grandes maisons du royaume. situation oil les" choses ont etc amenees, il C'est ce melange, cette transfusion, si je le n'y a pas lieu d'esperer que la concorde pu- puis dire, de la p'us haute Noblesse dans le isse se retablir d'elle-meme, et sans qu'on corps represeutatif du peuple, qui entretient ait extirpe les germes de dissention qu'on I'harmonie entre I'un et I'autre, et qui res- n'a que trop fomentes. 11 faut -done y pour- serre le ncEud de leur union; c'esl ce qui voir par quelque moyen nouveau, puissant, fait que les deux Chambres fraternisent sans et efficace. Celui que je propose est eprouve. se confondre, qu'elles se contrebalancent C'est par lui qu'il existe en Angleterre, en- sans se rivaliser, que I'une empeche I'autre tre les Grands et le Peuple, plus d'accord d'empieter, et que toutes deux concourent qu'il n'y en a, je pense, dans aucune autre egalement au maintien de la prerogative nation ; nulle part ailleurs I'esprit public royale et h la conservation des droits na- n'est aussi marque; nulle part I'interet n'a tionaux. Lettre addressee au Roi, par M. plus d'enipire pour r&unir tous les Etats. de Calonne, le 9 Fevrier, 1/89) P-67, 68. Or il est constant que rien n'y contribue The very great advantage, to a free con- davantage que I'institution d'une Charabre stitution, of having a hereditary first magi- Haute et d'une Chambre Basse dans le Par- strate, the depositary of the supreme execu- lement; ainsi que leur composition respec- tive power, so distinguished by superior tive, les distinctions qui les separent, et ks rank as to exclude all idea of competi- rapports qui les unissent. Plus on etudie tion, has been very well explained by De cet ensemble, plus on trouve i I'admirer: Lolme; but the benefit of that singular Les Lords qui ferment la Chambre lluute, amalgamation of various rank among the Vol. II. 3 Y P«°P'<^' 529 530 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. SECTION IV. Sedii'ion at Chios. Lysander reappointed commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian feet ; in favor xcith Cyrus. Unsfeddiness of the Athenian government. Measures of the fleets : Battle of Aigos- potami. B.C. 407. P. W. 25. While Athens, by a violent exertion of power in thesovercin assembly, overthrowing the barriers of the constitution, and trampling on law and justice, was preparing her own downfall, there occurred, on the Pelopoiv- nesian side, what will deserve notice, as it affords additional proof how little all Greece Mas prepared to reeeive a constitution, that could esta- blish peace throughout her confines, and give security to all, or to any. people, which prevails in England, has, I think, nowhere been duly noticed. In no court of Europe, I believe, is rank so ex- actly regulated, among the highest orders, as in England ; and yet there is no rank per- fectly insulated; all are in some way impli- cated with ' those about them. To begin even with the heir apparent; as a subject, he communicates in rank with all other subjects. The king's younger sons rank next to the elder, but their rank is liable to reduction : their elder brother's younger sons, if he succeeds lo the crown, will rank before them. The Archbishops and the Chancellor, and the great officers of state, rank above Dukes not of royal blood ; but their rank is that of office only : tlie Dukes, in family rank, are xommonly much above the Archbishops and Chancellor. Thus far our rule, I believe, differs little from that of other European courts. What follows is peculiar to oirrselves. The peers, all equal in legal, difierin ceremonial rank. The sons of peers, of the liigher orders, rank above the peers themselves of the lower or- ders; but, superior thus in ceremonial rank, they are in legal rank inferior. For the sons I of all peers, even of the royal blood, being commoners, while in ceremonial rank they may be above man}' of the peers, in legal rank they are only peers with the commoners. 1'his implication of the peerage with the body of the people is the advantageous cir- cumstance, which lias particularly struck Mr. de Calonne. But there is another thing which perhaps not less strongly marks the wise moderation of our ancestors, to whom, we owe. the present order of things. No dis- tinction, between subjects, can be really more essential than the being or not being members of the legislative body ; yet the rank of a member of parliament is known neither to the law, nor to the ceremonial of the country. Among untitled commoners there is no distinction of rank, that can be very exactly defined ; and yet a distinc- tion always subsists, in public opinion ; de- cided partly, and perhaps sometimes too mucli, by wealth, partly by consideration given to birth, connections or character -^ which, ujjon the whole, perhaps more tSian under any other government, preserves the subordination necessary to thu well-being of large societies. of 1.2. c.l. s. 1. Sect. IV. SEDITION AT CHIOS. ,531 of her people. After the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, in the battle of Arginusffi, the Peloponnesian cause seems to haVe been neglected by Cyrus. The squadron, which had escaped from Mitylcne, remained at Xen. Hel. Chios ; where its commander Eteonicus-joined it from r>fethymne, but Avithout money to pay it. Accu-stomed as the Greeks were to subsist on military service by their own means, this gave at first no great uneasiness. In so rich an iland, the industrious found opportunity to earn something, by working for hire; and w ild fruits, or those- cheaply- bouglit, were resources for the less handy or more idle; so that, in the joy of recent escape, and with the hope of speedy relief, the wants that occurred, during summer,, were patiently borne. But when, in advancing autumn, clothes became ragged, shoos worn out, wants of all kinds increased, while means of earning lessened, and, as the stormy season approached, the hope 'of relief grew fainter, reflection began then to excite the most serious apprehensions. In this state of things the comparison of their own circumstances, with those of tlie wealthy Chians, was obvious to remark; and the transition M-as ready to the observation, that, having arms in their hands, it depended only upon themselves to change situations. A conspiracy was in consequence formed, for making themselves masters of the iland; and it was agreed that, for distinction, every associate should cany a reed. Intelligence of this plot did not reach Etconicus, till the number of s. 2. associates was so great, that to oppose it by open force would have been highly hazardous. If we may judge from the expression of Xenophon, upon the occp.sion, compared with so many of Thucydides, Plato, and other writers, whicii show how widely it was held, among the Greeks, that might made right, and that the useful was the measure of the honest, Eteonicus would not much have regarded tlie robbery of his allies, even with the massacre that must probably have attended, if disadvantageous consequences had not been to be apprehended to his commonwealth, and blaine on that account to himself. The fear of a general alienation from the Lacedaemonian cause, according to Xeno- phon, determined his opposition to the conspiracy ; and rather an arbitrary power, conceded on the necessity of the case to military commanders, than any defined and constitutional authority, inablod him to oppose it with effect. Selecting fifteen confidential persons, s.3. 3 Y CJ and 532 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. and arming them Avith daggers, he v/ent through the streets of Chios. The first person observed, bearing a reed, was a man with disordered eves, coming out of a surgeon's shop, and he was instantly put to death. A crowd presently assembled about the bod}' : and, inquiry being anxiously made, answer was, in pursuance of direction from Eteonicus, freely given, ' that the man was killed for carrying a reed.' Information of these circumstances was communicated quickly througli the city. The conspirators, themselves unprepared, were ignorant vliat preparation might have been made against them; and every one, as the report reached him, hastened to put away his reed. Eteonicus, Xen. Hel. ^^.j^^ \\ atclied the event, M-ithout oiving time for recovery from sur- ). 2. c. 1. ... s. 4, pri^e, ordered all aboard. The mark of distinction was gone; none of the conspirators any longer knew M'hom to trust; all became anxious to avoid crimination; ready obedience would be the first proof of inno- cence : and presently not a man, of cither land or sea forces, remained ashore. Eteonicus then assembled the Chian magistrates, informed them v.hat a danger they had escaped, and represented the necessity of providing for the present wants of the armament. A supply M'as instantly given him, with which he repaired to the fleet, and distributed a month's pay for each man. In doing this he passed through every sliip, and spoke to all the soldiers and seamen of their several duties, and particularly of the probable business of the insuing campain, as if he had known nothing of the conspiracy. All M'ere happy to receive this tacit assurance that they were free from danger; all became anxious to show themselves zealous in the public cause : and thus, with only the death of one man, not the most guilty perhaps, but certainly con- nected Mith the guilty, a mutiny was completely smothered, which, under a hesitating commander, might not have been quelled without shedding many times more blood, and not being quelled, would have spred havoc over the richest and most populous iland of the .Egean. '• It was about the time when this dangerous business was so fortunately settled, that a congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Ephesus. The Chians, and probalily all the Asian Greeks of the con- federacy, sent their deputies particularly commissioned for the purpose. For the European states, the principal ofricers of their respective forces mostly Sect. IV. LYSANDER AGAIN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 533 mostly acted as representatives. What had been passing in Athens vas unknown, or imperfectly known ; and the same wisdom and spirit in council at home, the same ability and energy in operation abroad, which had so wonderfully restored the Athenian commonwealth from agony to vigor and victory, were expected still to continue. It was therefore a question of most serious concern, not only how the war should be conducted, but who should direct operations. Much would depend on the good-will and ready assistance of the Persian prince, and with him it was therefore deemed proper to communicate. The result of the deliberations was a resolution to send ministers to Lace- dsmon, in the joint names of the prince, the armament, and the allies, Avith information of the state of things, and a request that Lysandcr might be reappointed to the command-in-chief. No Spartan, Brasidas alone excepted, had ever so conciliated the allied cities as Lysander; no Spartan knew equally how to render himself agreeable to a Persian prince : his military as well as his poli- tical conduct had been able, and his success against the Athenian fleet at Notium had gained him fame. At another season, nevertheless, the Lacedasmonian government might perhaps not have been persuaded to contravene a rule, esteemed important, never to commit the command- in-chief of the fleet twice to the same person. But the consideration of the great defeat they had received, and of their utter inability to support their Asiatic allies, or to dispute the command of the seas with the Athenians, without the aid of Persian money, disposed them to relax a little. Nominally however they still adhered to their principle, while, by a subterfuge, they gratified the Persian prince and their Grecian confederates : Aracus was appointed navarc, admiral of the fleet, for the year : but Lysander was sent to command in Asia, Mith the title of epistoleus '*, vice-admiral. Lysander, arriving atEphesus when winter was not yet far advanced, C Q. 407. made it his first concern to provide that, in spring, he might have a fleet ^- ^^' 25. '* The word seems to have meant origi- command in the Lacedasmonian service, nally a.n officei sent by a superior officer to See Xen. Hel. 1.1. c.l. s.l5. It is pretty command for him ; but it appears to have exactly rendered by the Roman title Le- become the usual title for the second in gatus. able .534 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. Xen. Hel. able to meet that of Athens. . The squadron under Eteonicus at Chios, J O Q 1 S.J Si 9. ' ^"'' ^^^ other detached ships, M-ere sent for to Epliesiis, examined, and the necessary repairs directed. IMeasures were at the same time taken to hasten the completion of the triremes building at Antandrus; and ■when this business was duly put forward, Lysandcr hastened to pay his compliments personally to the Persian prince at Sardis. He had the satisfaction \o find that absence had ilot diminished his interest there: he was received with distinguished attention, aiul treated as a confi- dential friend. Cyrus showed him a particular account of the sums issued for the pay of the fleet ; remarked that they much exceeded what the king had given him for the purpose; but added, ' that as the ' countr}^, which the king had put under his command, afforded a great ' revenue, and his good inclination to Lysander and the Lacedicmo- * nians remained perfect, money should not be wanting for the prose- «• s. ' cution of the war.' Ljsander, returning to Ephesus \\'ith an ample supply, paid the armament all the arrears due, according to the rate before establislied ; and, with goodwill thus conciliated toward himself, B. C. 405. and zeal for the service apparent among all ranks, l>e was proceeding to * ' " ' make arrangements for opening the campain, when a message arrived from Cyrus, desiring his presence again at Sardis. Condescendingly as the Persian prince" conducted himself toward the Greeks, his haughtiness among his own people was extravagant. Assuming the tone of soverein, he required those marks of servile respect, which custom had appropriated to the monarch of the empire. The Xen. Ilel. court-dress of Persia had sletvesso Ion's: that, when unfolded, they 1. 2. c. 1. . . , 'J s. 0'. ' covered the hand ; and the ceremonial required, of those who approached the royal presence, to inwrap the hands, so as to render them helpless''. Two youths, nearly related to the royal family, refusing this mark of extreme subordination to Cyrus, were, in pursuance of an arbitrary command from that piince, put to death. Complaint was made at " In the East fasliions -change little, and * the Manialiikes. It covers very completely the strange one here iirentionecl, it seems, is ' the whole body, even the fingers' ends, retained to this day. ' The bcneesh,' says ' which it is held very indecent to bhow be- one of the most intelligent and exact of mo- ' fore the great.' V^olney's Travels in Egypt, dcrn travellers, ' is Uie cercmoi;i;i^ dress of Susa, Sect. IV. MEASURES OF LYSANDER. 535 Susa, by their unhappy parents, and indignation was loud and general against the cruel and dangerous pride of Cyrus. Darius, an indulgent father, desirous of repressing the evil, but tender about the means, sent a message, mentioning only, that he was laboring under a severe ilness, and therefore wished to see his son. Cyrus did not refuse obedience to the paternal summons; but, before he would leave Sardis, he sent for Lysander. The Spartan general, hastening to the call, was -"^pn- Hel. received with distinction, even more flattering than before. Cyrus s.9. expressed the warmest interest in the Lacedeemonian cause ; anxiously dissuaded risking a general action at sea, without a decided supe- riority ; remarked that, with the wealth of Persia, . such a superiority might certainly be acquired; showed an account of the revenue, arising from the countries under his own command ; and, directing a very large sum to be put into the hands of the Spartan general, for the cxpences of the war, parted with this kind exhortation, ' be mindful ' of my friendship for Lacedtemon and for yourself.' Lysander, returning to Ephesus_ thus abundantly supplied, gave a new flow to the already high spirits of his forces by another issue of pay. In the mean time, such had been the effect of his Mcll-directed atten- tion, seconded by an unfailing treasury, that the fleet was already equal in strength to the' Athenian. He proposed therefore to proceed upon offensive operation ; but not to risk the uncertain event of a general ingagement, which no necessity of his circumstances required. His view was directed less immediately against the fleet, than against the suliject dependencies of Athens, the sources of the revenue by ■which the fleet was supported.. Accordingly he led his armament first to the C'arian coast, where he took the town of Cedreia by assault. His troops shared the plunder; among which ere reckoned the inhabitants, a mixed race, Greek and barbarian, Avho were sold for slaves. In every one of the towns on the Hellespont and Propontis, which the successes of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus had restored to the domi- nion of Alliens, a Lacedaemonian party remained. In giving efficacy to the efforts, which sucli a party might be able to make, two very important objects might be at once accomplished, the checking of the revenue which supported the Athenian fleet, and the recovery of the trade .536 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. trade with the Euxnie, which furnished the best supplies of corn. The Hellespont was therefore the point, to which Lysander proposed . to direct his principal attention; having apparently no immediate view beyond the objects abovementioned. Desirous to avoid the Xen. Hel. Athenian fleet in the passage, he made his way close along the friendly 1. 11, 12. shore of Asia, and, without interruption, reached Abydus. Of all the towns on the shores of the Hellespont and Propontis, which the d^efeat in Sicilj^ had given to the Lacedcemonian confederacy, Abydus alone had not been retaken. The harbour of Abydus therefore was made the station of the fleet. The city was populous ; its force of infiintry was added to the infantry of the armament, and all put under the command of Thorax, a Lacedaemonian. The neigh- boring city of Lampsacus, being then attacked by land and sea, was taken by assault. The plunder, which M'as considerable (for Lampsacus was rich, and large store of provisions had been collected there) was given to the troops and seamen, but the free inhabitants M'ere not molested in their persons. The government of Athens, after that violent struggle of faction which produced the condemnation of the generals, appears not to have reco- Xen. Hel. vered its former consistency. It was not long after (so Xenophon says, s. 12.*^ '' without mentioning how long) that the Athenian people, repenting, directed their anger against those who had misled them to the atrocious deed; and Callixcnus, and four others, were compelled to find sureties for their appearance before the same tremendous tribunal, which had consio-ned the victorious a;enerals to the executioner. At the same time Lvs. Aw. opportunity was taken to procure the recall of the banished, and the restoration of the dishonored ; while the people, brought to their senses, (such is the expression even of the democratical Lysias, confirming the account of Xenophon,) more gladly directed their A-engeance against thofe who had promoted prosecutions, for interest or malice, under the democracy, than against those who had ruled in the oligarch}'. Xenophon proceeds, with evident satisfaction, to relate, that Callixenus, who found opportunity to fly, and afterward found means to make his peace and return, lived nevertheless universally hated and avoided, and, among those public distresses which will hereafter occur to notice, was starved to death. It KiciccX. uttq'K, StCT. IV'. MEASURES OF THE FLEETS. '53:7 It was however vainly attemj)ted, by an oath of concord, taken by Xen. & Lvs the whole people, to put an end to the ferment of party. Administra- "'' '^''" tion was weak, and democratical jealousy interfered in every measure. The connnand-in-chief of the fleet was already divided between three oflicers, Conon, Adeimantus, and Philocles. Three more M'ere now added, with equal powers, Menandcr, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. For Xen. Ilel. subsistence, the armament depended upon itself. It was indeed able = Vi to collect the tribute, assessed upon the subject-states of Asia and Thrace, and it could sometimes raise contributions from the enemy's country : but tliis business unavoidably ingaged the attention of the generals, to the hindrance of that enterprize, which was necessarv toward final success in the war; while the Peloponnesian commanders, having all their pecuniary wants supplied by the wealth of Persia, could chuse their measures. The fleet, M'hich the Peloponnesians were thus inabled to raise and maintain in energy, far greater than had ever formerly been seen in wars between the Greeks, made it necessary for the Athenians to assemble their whole naval force in one point; and that decisive action, v»'hich it was the obvious policy of the Peloponnesians to avoid, was possibly to the Athenians necessary. In ability for com- mand, perhaps, Conon did- not yield to Lysander; and his fleet, at s. 15, least equal in number, for it consisted of a hundred and eighty triremes, and probably superior in the proportion of practised seamen among the crews, was inferior only by the division of the supreme authority. Confident therefore in strength, and elate with recent victory, the Athenians passed from Samos to the Asiatic coast, and s. 11. plundered tlie country acknowleging the sovereinty of Persia. They jnoved then for Ephesus, to ofter battle to the enemy ; but, in tlieir way, they received intelligence that Lysander had already passed northward. In alarm for the dependencies of the commonwealth on ?• i-'- the Hellespont, they hastened after him. Arriving at Eleus, they were informed that Lampsacus was aheady taken, and the enemy's fleet there. Stopping therefore only while they took refreshment, they proceeded to Sestos, where they procured provisions for the night, and arrived the same evening at Aigospotami, directly overagainst Vol. II. 3 Z , Lampsacus. 538 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. Lampsaciis. The historian, describing their progress, particularizes, •what deserves notice as it marks the manner of antient naval opera- tions, that they dined at Eleiis and supped at Aigospotami, Avhere they formed their naval camp. The strait between Lampsacus and Aigospotami being scarce!}' two miles wide, the arrival of the Athenian fleet was instantly known to Lysander, and his plan almost as instantly formed. On the same night his orders were issued. By daybreak next morning his crews had tal:en their meal, and went immediately aboard. All was com- pletely prepared for action, but no movement made. Cy sunrise the Athenian fleet was ofi^" the harbour of Lampsacus in order of battle. Tlie Peloponnesiaus remained motionless : the Athenians waited till evening, and then returned to Aigospotami. As the Atlienian fleet Xen. Hel. withdrew, Lysander ordered some of his swiftest galleys to follow ^. c.c. 1. tijem, with instruction to the commanders to approach the opposite shore enough to see the enemy debark, and form some judgment of their immediate intentions, and then hasten back with the information. This was punctually executed. Lysander meanwhile kept his fleet in readiness for action; and, not till he was assured that the enemy's motions indicated no enterprize, he dismissed his crews for their refreshment. On the morrow these movements were exactly repeated, and so for the two following days. Xen. Hel. Since the battle of Notium, Alcibiades had resided in his castle in 1.1, c. 5. iijg Thracian Chersonese. The two fleets in his neiohbourhood of s. 10. =" 1.2. c. 1. course attracted his attention, and he was at least so far sensible to the welfare of his country as to be uneasy at what he saw. Aigospo- tami had neither town nor defensible harbour, but only a beach on which the galleys might be hauled, or near which, in the shelter of the strait, they might safely ride at anchor. The ground was com- modious for incamping; but, in the defective military system of that age, the seamen and soldiers vent to Sestos, two miles off, for a market. The enemy meanwhile, at Lampsacus, had the security of a barbour for their fleet, with a town for their people, where, always in Plut. vit. '' readiness for every duty, they could procure necessaries. Alcibiades Lysandf >^ ent to tlie Athenian camp, and communicated with tlie generals on these Xen. ut sup. c. I Sect. IV. BATTLE OF A I G O S P O T A M I. y^^f these circumstances; observing that, if they moved only to Sestos, tliey, equally v/itb the enemy, would have the benefit of a town with a harbour, and equally, as from their present situation, might light M'hen they pleased ; with the advantage, which in their present situation they could not command, of fighting only when they pleased. This admonition, slighted by the other generals, was treated by Tydeus and Menander with unmannerly disdain, and Alcibiades withdrew. Lysander, meanwhile, had observed that every day's experience of Xm. H-l. bis inaction increased the confidence and ne{>li2;ence of the Athenians. ' i'-,'^ '^ ^ '3. 17. Not confining themselves to the market of Sestos, they wandered Avide about the country, to seek provisions, or on pretence of seeking them. Still they continued in the morning to offer battle, returning in the afternoon to their camp. On the fifth day, he directed the commanders of his exploring ships, if the Athenians debarked and dispersed as usual, to hasten their return, and communicate notice to him, by the way, by elevating a shield. The whole armament Mas kept in readiness, the landforces under Thora.x were aboard, the expected signal was made, and the fleet moved across the strait. Conon alone, of the Athenian generals, M'as in any state of prcpa- s. is. ration. As soon as he saw the enemy in motion, he ordered the call to arms, and the signal for all to go aboard : but soldiers and seamen were equally dispersed; some of the triremes were Mholly without hands ; and the distance was so small, that the Peloponneslans were upon them long before any effectual measures for defence could be taken. Conou's trireme, Avith seven others of his division and the sacred ship Paralus, had their complete crews aboard ; and these pushed off from the shore. All the rest M'ere seized by the enemy, at anchor or upon the beach. No effort, within the power of nine ships, could have any other effect than adding the loss of those nine to that of the s. iQ. rest of the fleet. While therefore tlie enemy were intent upon their great capture, made Avithout a blow, but still to be secured against the Athenian landforce, Conon fled unpursued; not unmindful, how- ever, of such service as his strength might accomplish. Sails were an incumbrance to the antient galleys in action. Within so narrow a strait therefore, and with his port at hand, Lysander had left those of 3 z 2 his 540 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. his fleet ashore. Conon had intelligence that the store Mas not v.-ithin the walls of Lampsacus, but at the point of Abarmis. Accordins^ly landing- there, he carried off all the mainsails", and then hastening to the month of the Hellespont, escaped to sea. ileanwhile L3'sauder, having secured possession of the Athenian ships, to the number of a hundred and seventy, directed his attention to the scattered crews and troops. Some of these found refuge in tiif neighboring towns and fortresses '': but the greater part, together with all the generals ", were made prisoners. In the evening of the same day on which the fleet was taken, Lysander sent away an account of Xen. Hel. his extraordinary success. A Milesian privateer *' was chosen to convey vo*^^ it; and the captain, Theopompus, . used such dihgence, that on the third day he reached Laceda3mon. s. 21. The prisoners in the mean time being conveyed to Lampsacus, jt became matter of very serious consideration how to dispose of numbers, so beyond all common example of battles among the Greeks. The allies were assembled for consultation ; and that animosity appeared among them, which the antient manner of warfare was likely to excite. !Many accusations were urged against the Athenians, of what they had done, and what they had proposed to do. Of two triremes, a Corinthian and an Andrian, lately taken, the crews by order of the Athenian general Philocles, had been put to death by being thrown down a precipice. It was averred, and Xenophon seems to acknowlege it as a truth, that the Athenians, in a council of war, had determined to cut off the right hand of every prisoner to be made in the action whicli they were seeking. Adeimantus alone, of the generals, is said to have opposed this inhuman resolution. -Many other enormities were alledged ; and the council resolved, that all the prisoners who were Athenian citizens, except Adeimantus, should be put to death. Lysander, after reproach- ing Pbilocles with setting the first example, among the Greeks, of a most cruel violation of the law of war (which however, as in the " Ta niya}.u. iri». his life of Lysander, tho rather loose, tends '" Ta Tiix"'^?'* al- x«'^f"'' to confirm the interpretation. " So I think Xenophon must be under- ** Ml^i^lB» Anrif. stood; and the expression of-Plutarch, in course .s. 22. Sect. IV. B A TT LE O F A I G O S P OT A :\I I. 541 course of this History we have had too much occasion to observe, was neither tlie first nor peculiar to the Athenians) began the execution, lor so much the expression of Xcnophon seems to assert, by killing that general with liis own hand. The Athenian citizens, who fell victims to the vengeance of the allies, and perliaps in some measure to the convenience of the Spartan general, M'ere, according to Pkitarcl), I''"'- vit. three thousand. ^^' Adeimantus, alone saved from this bloody execution, did not escape Xen. Ilel, with his character clear: it was asserted that, being corrupted by "*' '*"''' Lysander with Persian gold, he had betrayed the fleet. The charge, however, was never proved ; nor does it appear how Adeimantus could have commanded the circumstances which put the fleet into the enemy's hands"; and the execution of the other generals, who indeed seem never to have been accused, appears proof of their innocence. Not that the narrative of Xenophon gives all the information we might desire. The conduct, however, of the Athenian commanders altogether seems to have been totally inexcusable; tho in what degree any one was separately blameworthy does not appear. While the command of gold, which Lysander possessed, excites one kind of suspicion, the haste and the extent of the execution, together with the little scru- pulousness usual among the Greeks, may excite another. At the same time it is possible that the misconduct, in the Athenian armament, may have arisen from division of command and violence of party. To carry any steddy authority may have been impossible; ami, while none could confide in the government at home, all would fear it; not for their misdeeds, but for the prevalence of a faction, adverse to the faction with which they were connected. Athens, the trap and grave of her victorious generals, would not be the place where, in the present disasterous circumstances, Conon would expect refuge for himself, or where nine ships could probably be of " We fiixl, in the Grr.cian services, where coinnmnd, or that, till the attack made by a command was committed to manyy it was Lyiander (except in the negligence of the common for each to take his day in turn Athenians, which had increased gradually) (Herod. 1. 6. c. 1 10. ct Thucyd. 1. 6. c. 91.) ; the circumstances of that day differed from but the historian does not say that the day those of the four preceding, of the action was the day of Adeimantus's any 542 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. Xen. Hel. anv impoitaiit service to the public. As soon therefore as lie was 1 '^I'g'^ ^' l)e3'ontl danger af pursuit, he dispatched the sacred ship Paralus alone Diod.]. la, to bear the news of a defeat, whicli could be scarctiy less than the stroke of death to the commonwealth. For himself, fortunately having friendship with Evagoras, who ruled the Grecian city of .Salamis in Cyprus, he directed his course thither, with his remaining squadron, and was kindly received. SECTION V. Cpnsequences of the battle of A'igospotami. Siege of Athens. Con- elusion of the Pcloponncsian war. The ruin of the Athenian marine, effected at Aigospotami, put all the dependencies of the commonwealth at once into the power of the enemy : Lysander had only to direct the course of his victorious fleet, and take possession. The command of the strait, communicating with Xen. Hel. ^\^q Euxine sea, was his first object. As soon as he appeared between 6. 1. Byzantium and Chalcedon, both those important places desired to capitulate. The Athenian garrisons were allowed to depart in safety ; but policy prompted this apparent lenity. Lysander already looked forward to the conquest of Athens ; and, against the uncommon strength of the forlilications of that city, famine would be the only weapon of certain erlicacy. As therefore any augmentation of the numbers within would promote his purpose, he permitted all Athenian citizens to go to Athens, but to Athens only. Those Byzantines who had taken a leading part in delivering their city to Alcibiades, apprehensive per- haps more of their fellowcitizensthan of Lysander, retired into Pontus. s. "• Meanwhile the Paralus, arriving by night at PeiriEus, communicated p' VV "? ^ intelligence, such as no crew perhaps of the unfortunate licet, not protected by the sacred character of the ship, would have dared to carrj*. Alarm and lamention, beginning immediately about the harbor, , were rapidly communicated through the town of Peirajus, and then passing from mouth to mouth, by the long Mails, up to the city, the consterna- 12 tiou Sect. V. M E A S U R E S A T A T H E N S. 540 tion became universal ; and that night, says the cotemporary historian, no person slept in Athens. Grief for the numerous slain, the best part of the Athenian youth, among whom everyone had some relation or friend to mourn, was not the prevailing passion ; it v,as overborne by the dread, which pervaded all, of that fate to themselves, whicli, how- ever individuals might be innocent, the Athenian people as a body Mere conscious of deserving, for the many bloody massacres perpetrated at their command. Tiie treatment of the Histijeans, Scionsans, Toro- n^ans, iEginetans, and many other Grecian people (it is still the cotemporary Attic historian who speaks) but, above all, of the Melians, a LacediEmonian colony, recurred to every memory, and haunted every imagination. Athens was not even now without able men, capable of directing public affairs in any ordinary storm. But, beside that the remaining strength of the commonwealth was utterly unequal to the force that Avould be brought against it, the lasting strife of faction, and the violence of intestine tumult, had nearly destroyed all coherence in the constituent parts of the government. Nothing remained of that public confidence, which, after the Sicilian overthrow, had inablcd those who took the lead to surprize all Greece with new exertion, and even to recover superiority in the war. The leader of the soverein many jsocr. do Avas Cleophon, by trade a musical-instrument-maker, who, treading pa^e, p. vits. in the steps of Cieon and liyperbolus, had acquired power even superior de Ugat. to what they had formerly held. Such was his confidence in his l'-"-^' • ascendancy, that he did not scruple, in scorn of democratical equality, to assume the distinctions and pomp of command. To have a residence suited to his new dignity, he used opportunity offered by the banish- ment of Andocides, chief of one of the most antient and eminent Andoc. de families, to occupy his house. But public agony and fear inforced, '»>^'- for the moment, sober conduct, and a disposition to listen to those fittest to advise. Oi> the morrow after tiie arrival of the fatal news, a general assembly being held, such measures were resolved on as the exigency of the moment most required. Immediate siege by land and sea was expected. To raise a fleet able to oppose that of the enemy was no longer possible. It was therefore determined to block up all the s. 3. 8. 4 ^44 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. the ports except one, to repair the walls, to appoint guards, and pre- pare every way to sustain a siege. -, ,, , Meanwhile Lvsander, after receiving- the submission of the Hellcs- Xen. iiei. .' ^ pontine cities, sailed to Lesbos, where ISIityleuK immediately surren- dered to him. He sent Eteonicus, with only ten ships, to the Thracian coast, and all the Athenian dependencies there acceded to the Lace- dasmonian terms. All the ilands hastened to follow the example, Samos alone excepted. The Samians, in the savage fury of democracy, answered the summons by a massacre of the men of rank'' among their citizens, and prepared for defence. Means to punish this insulting barbarity were not likely to be ■wanting : at present a greater object called Lysander. He sent infor- mation, at the same time to Laceda:?mon and Deceleia, that he was ready to sail for Peira?us with two hundred triremes. The Lacedemo- nian government determined upon a strong exertion, to put a speedy end to a war which had lasted, with scarcely any perfect intermission, twenty-six years. The Peloponnesian allies Mere summoned to arms, consisting now of all the states of the peninsula except Argos. The V hole force of Laconia was at the same time ordered to march : the king, Pausanias, son of the regent who Mon the battle of Plata^a, commanded in chief. With the powerful army thus assembled, Pausanias entered Attica : Agis joined him with his troops from Deceleia ; and they fixed their head-quarters together in the celebrated gymnasium of Academia, close to Athens. The interval of leisure for the fleet, during the preparation for the march of the army, was employed by Lysander in an act of justice and charity, likely to bring great credit to himself, and popularity to the Lacedimonian name. There were, wandering about Greece, some, s. 5. ]\Ielians and ^Eginetans, who, by accidental absence, or some other lucky chance, had escaped the general massacre of their people by the Athenians, These Lysander collected and reinstated in tlieir ilands. l-'rom iEgina he proceeded to Salamis, which he plundered ; and then, ■v\ith a hundred and fifty triremes, took liis station at tlie mouth of the harbour of Peiracus, to prevent supplies to Athens, by sea. AVithout Sect. V. S I E G E O F A T H E N S. 545 Without an ally, without a fleet, without stores, and blockaded by Xen. Hel. sea and land, the Athenians made no proposal to their victorious g §" *^"^* enemies : in sullen despondency they prepared, to the best of their ability, for. defence, without a reasonable view but to procrastinate their final doom, and certain to suffer in the interval. But the consider- ation, for the cotemporary historian dwells upon that point, that without even revenge for a pretence, in meer wantonness of power'*, they had doomed to massacre and extirpation so many Grecian states, whose only crime was alliance with those who had now obtained such a superiority in arms, incited to stubborn resistance and deterred intreaty. Not that there was unanimity on this subject within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the party which had established the Lys. odv. government of the Fourhundred, of which a relic was still considerable, j/f^tosth. far from viewing the approach of the Lacedaemonians with the same apprehensions as the democratical chiefs, looked to it rather as M'hat might afford them relief, and even be turned to their advantage. But hence the democratical party had only the more jealousy, not wholly an unreasonable jealousy, of any treaty to be managed under their direction ; and, between the two, the moderate and worthy had difficulty to interfere at all in public affairs. Meanwhile the operations of the besiegers tended meerly to blockade : no assault was attempted : the purpose was to make the effect of famine sure; and before long it was severely felt by the Athenians. Not however till many had died of hunger did they even talk of capitulation. Xen. Hel. At length a deputation was sent to king Agis, for he appears to have g" j," '^'~' remained alone to command the blockade, offering alliance offensive and defensive with Lacedsmon, which, in the language of Grecian politics, implied political subjection, but stipulating for the preservation of their fortifications and their harbor. Agis gave for answer, ' that ' he had no power to treat; proposals must be addressed to the admi- ' nistratiou at Lacedsmon.' Ministers were then sent into Pelopon- s. s. iiesus : but at Sellasia, on the border of Laconia, a haughty message from the ephors commanded their immediate return ; informing them, Vol. II. 4 A * that 5i6 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. * that the terms they brought were known at Lacedosmon ; and, if they ' desired peace, they must come better instructed.' This answer, communicated at Athens, filled the city with despair. Condemnation of the Athenian people to slavery was the least evil now expected from the revenge of a conquering enemy ; and, before even another deputation could bring an answer from Lacedicmon, many must perish of hunger. In this nearly-threatening M'reck of Lys. adv. ^.j^^ commonwealth, the council of Areiopagus, still holding a dignified. Eratostli. _ . . p. i28. existence, tho with curtailed authorit}', endevored to mediate between the contending factions, and proposed to undertake that negotiation, for preserving the ruins of the falling state, which the enemy refused to enter into with one party, and the people pertinaciously refused to commit to the other. But popular jealousy prevented the salutary measure. The Many were taught to fear that the Areiopagus M'ould 1.2. c. 2. join the oligarchal party, and make terms for their exclusive advan- T ■ , taoe. It was understood that the Lacedsemonians, among other thinars, Eiatostb, required the demolition of the long walls for the space of ten furlongs. A:adv.Acor. Archcstratus, a member of the council, only declaring his opinion, in p.4ji,453. ]^jg pi;^ce, that such a requisition ous;ht not to prevent a treaty, M'hich Xeu. ut sup. ' ^ '^ ' . . might save the wretched remains of the commonwealth, was imprisoned; and a decree of the people passed, forbidding even to consult about such an article. But, in holding out the requisition to demolish the walls, no assur- ance having been given that slavery should not be the common doom, the dread of this made the people so untractable, that the leading men seem to have been at a loss to know what safely they might even propose, in so pressing an exigency. Cleophon himself could no longer either command or appease the popular mind. His opponents used the oppor- tunity for preferring a capital accusation against iiim. Examples of what might be done, by ably using critical emergencies, abounded in the annals of the Athenian government. Cleon, when nearly the despotic tyrant of Athens, had been fined ; Hyperbolus banished by ostracism: Cleophon was condemned to death and executed. If Lys. in.Ni- Lygjag, speakins; as a pleader, should be trusted, a fraud, of most com. p. 84-9. J ' r o I ' ' ' cd. Reiske. dangerous tendency, M'as used by his opponents : the real law not war- ranting: I Sect. V. SIEGE OF ATHENS. 5 17 ranting- a capital sentence, they made an interpolation in the code of Solon, in pursuance of which condemnation was pronounced. That some of the party adverse to Cleophon were not very scrupulous, we have sufficient assurance ; but what credit may be due to the story told by Lysias, no information on the subject remaining from the cotem- porar}' historian, seems not easy now to judiie. The execution of Cleon however was evidently the removal of a principal obstacle to accommodation. Therameues, becoming more Xen ibid & a leading man, ventured to undertake that, if he might be commis- Lys. adv. sioned to go to Lysandcr, as well as to Lacedasmon, lie would bring '° ''^' ' certain information whether there was a serious intention to reduce the Athenian people to slavery, or whether the demolition of the walls was required only to insure political subjection. The people in assembly gave their approbation, and Theramenes went; but it seems implied, by Xenophon, that he did not execute his commission with perfect good faith. He remained with Lysander more than three months. What his difficulties reiilly vveVe, is nowhere clearly indicated ; but the appearance rather is, that he waited for the time when the total failure of provisions, among the Athenian people, should inforce patient atten- tion to any advice, by which their immediate destruction might be obviated. How the Athenians were inabled to support themselves so long, after mortality from famine was begun among them, the historian has omitted to mention : but some incidental information, remaining from Isocrates, considered together with Xenophon's account of the cir- cumstances of the siege, in some degree explains it. The Pcloponne- sians, masters of Attica, and commanding the seas, trusted that they could starve the city into submission, without the great labor and expence of a contravallation, such as the circuit of Athens and Peirasus, and the walls connecting them, would require; and, more completely to deter the introduction of provisions, tliey denounced, by procla- mation, immediate death against any "wlio should ije taken in the attempt. But the pressure of want, and the dread of captivity, coin- ciding with the passion for distinction, strong in Athenian breasts, excited to daring action; and the Peloponnesian army could not 4 A 2 completely 1.2. c. 2 3. 11 548 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. completely guard the extensive circuit of the walls, nor the fleet, ia Isocrat adv. all weathers, perfectly block the harbours. In these circumstances p. 264. t. 3. the captain of the Paralus (the same who had been sent by Conon with the news of the defeat at Aigospotami) distinguished himself by successful adventure. His name is unknown to us; but, through the incident that Isocrates afterward pleaded a cause for him, we learn that he. together with his brother, found means, not only to intro- duce provisions into the harbour of Peira^us, but sometimes even to intercept vessels bringing provisions for the Peloponnesian fleet; and that they were rewarded with crowns, and with the public thanks of the Athenian people, solemnly pronounced before the statues of the heroes, styled the eponymian, standing near the prytaneium, from whom the M-ards of Attica were named. Xen. Hel. But notwithstanding these occasional supplies, want, and the appre- hension of want, grew more and more pressing in Athens. Theramenes therefore, in the fourth month after his departure, trusting that the ferocity of the democratical spirit might be sufficiently tamed, ven- tured to return, without having performed what he had undertaken. To the anxious multitude, assembled in haste to learn the result of his tedious negotiation, he excused himself, by imputing his detention to Lysander; who dismissed him, he said, at last, with a declaration, ' that he had no authority, either to grant terms, or to say what the ' Lacedasmonian government would require; and that application to ' any purpose could only be made to the ephors.' It was no longer time for hesitation. Au embassy, consisting of ten persons, with Theramenes at the head, was immediately appointed to go to Lace- dEemon, with the fullest authority to treat concerning the fate of Athens, and save the miserable remains of the commonwealth, if they could. 5 jj. The sacred character of ambassadors procured free passage for Theramenes and his coUegues, as far as Sellasia. There, as the former embassy, they were met by an officer from the ephors, who would not permit them to proceed, until they had given satisfactory assurance of the fulness of their powers. On their arrival at Laccdcemon, an assembly of the deputies of the Lacedcemonian confederacy was held, in Sect. V. S I E G E O F A T H E N S. <49 in which the fate of Athens was to be decided Tlie Corinthian and Theban deputies contended vehemently ' that no terms should be Xen. ibk). ' granted: the Athenian commonwealth, the enemy of the common pTce." p'! 2-20. * liberties of Greece, so nearly successful in the horrid attempt to '•S&i'iataic. ' inslave or exterminate the Avhole nation, ought to be annihilated : ' the people should be sold for slaves, and the site of the city should ' be made a sheepwalk, like the Crissean plain.' Many of the other deputies supported these opinions: but the Lacedaemonians, whose administration was little subject to passionate counsels or hasty deci- sion, seem to have predetermined otherwise. Deprived of its navy and of the revenue and power derived from transmarine dependencies, Athens, under oligarchal government, they thought might be 3. valuable dependency of Lacedsemon ; and perhaps the recollection of what had happened but a \'e\v years before, when almost all Peloponnesus had been united in war against them, might give to apprehend that, at some future period, they might want a balancing power against Corinth, Thebes, or Argos. They declared therefore, with ostentation of regard for the common welfare and glory of Greece, that it would not become the Peloponnesian confederacy, and least of all the Lace- daemonians, to reduce to slavery a Grecian people, to whom the nation was beholden for the most important services, in the greatest danger that ever threatened it. Accordingly, they proposed, and it was re- solved, that the conditions, upon which the Athenians should be per- mitted to exist in civil freedom, should be these: ' That all ships of ' war should be surrendered, except twelve; that the long walls, and * the fortifications of Peirasus, should be destroyed ; that all exiles and ' fugitives should be restored to the rights of the city ; that the * Athenians should hold for friends and enemies all other people, as ' they were friends or enemies to Lacedtemon; that the Athenian * forces should go wherever Lacedsmon might command, by land * and sea.' With these terms Theramcnes and his collegues hastened back to xen. Hel. Athens. Already snch numbers had perished for want, that to hold 5 ^^3*^' ~* many days longer was impossible. The arrival of the ambassadors therefore was no sooner announced, than the people from all parts of the 550 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XX. tlie city crowded about them, in the most painful anxiety, lest an irresistible enemy should still have refused to treat, and no choice should remain but to die of hunger, or surrender to the mercy of those from whom they had scarcely a pretence to ask mercy. Information, that a treaty was concluded, gave, for the night, general relief. On the morrow an assembly of the people v.as held. Theramenes declared the terms, which, he said, were the best that himself and his coUegues had been able to obtain, and such as, in his opinion, the people, in the present most unfortunate state of things, would do well to accept. A considerable body, nevertheless, even now, affirmed pertinaciously, that thev would not consent to the demolition of the walls. A larae majority however, yielding to the pressure of extreme want, carried a decree, ratifying the treaty concluded by their ambassadors. Xcn. llel. The acceptance of the offered terms being notified to the besieging s.ii. ' armament, Agis took possession of the walls, and Lj'sander entered the harbour of Peirajus vrith his fleet. The demolition of the walls 5 INIay. ^ -^vas a principal circumstance of triumph for the Peloponnesians. It 01.03 4 ' ^^^s begun by the army, with much parade, to the sound of military Ami. Tim. iTiusic, and with an alacrity, says the cotemporary Athenian historian, natural to ih.ose who considered that day as the era of restored freedom to Greece. Notices were then sent to the exiles and fugitives, mostly men of the best families of Athens, to whom this sad reverse in the fortune of their country would alone give the means of returning to it, and recovering their property. Their presence was necessary toward the probable permanence of the next measure, the change of the Xen. Ilel. government to an oligarchj-. The popular assembly Mas abolished, 1. 2. c. 3. rji^d the supreme authority was committed, for the present, to a council of thirty, among whom Theramenes found a place. They were directed to consider of a new form of political administration, such as Lace-, (liumon should approve, preserving the antient laws and civil govern- ment of the commonMcalth, as far as might consist with oligarch}-. , Things being so far settled in Athens, Agis led away the Peloponne- sian aimy, including the garrison of Deceleia; and all Attica, but Attica only, became once more the quiet possession of the Athenians. Lysander conducted j^tlic fiCct to Samos. The people of that ilaiul, 1 after J, 2 Sect. V. END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 551 after sustaining a siege for some time, capitulated; and the terms granted were milder than their conduct had intitled them to expect: they were permitted to depart in safety, whither they pleased; carrying, however, only the clothes they wore. The lands, houses, slaves, cattle, the whole iland in short, with all it contained, were given to their fellowcitizens of the aristocratical party. After having settled this business, Lysander dismissed the ships of the allies, and with the Lacedemonian squadron sailed for Laconia. So ended the Peloponnesian war, in its twenty-seventh year ; and so Lacedeemon, now in alliance with Persia, became again decidedly the leading power of Greece; and the aristocratical, or rather the oligarchal, triumphed over the democratical interest, in almost every commonwealth of the nation. EN'D OF THE SECOND VOLUMi Primed by Luke Hansard & Sons, near LiucoluVlim fields. S30 6 SOUTHPRw Dc%'?i?' °' California THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY idate stamped below AT LOS ANGKLES 214 Mitford - M69h History of v72 Greece