VlAY 15 ^'f
ROSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION
TO
ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
BY
JOHN 1 AVATA BRUNO, Pu D.
Suhmittt^a ill partial ftilfllment of the re«|aireinent» for the decree of Doctor of
1*lill«i*ophy In lh« Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University
ARCHIVES OF PHIJL080PHY
BDITKD BT
KPEDKRICK J. E. WOODBHIDGK
No. 6, FEBRUAKY, 1916
NEW YOBK
THE SCIENCE PRESS
lettt
fi.'iR5;r::r::
ROSMIXI-S CONTRIBUTION
TO
ETIIICxVL PniLOSOPTlY
BY
JOHN FAY ATA BRUNO, PuT).
V
Submitted In partial fuUilmeut of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy In the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia miverslty
ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY
EDITED Br
FPEDERICK J. K. WOODBBIDGK
No. 0, February, 191G
NEW YORK
THE SCIENCE PRESS
1910
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V
K^
OUTLINE
PA<n
Introduction 1
Part I. The Factors of Kosmini 's Philosophy 3
Chapter I. Historical Situation of Rosmini 's Italy 3
1. Social and Political Conditions 3
2. Intellectual Conditions 7
Chapter II. Eosmini 's Personality 17
1. Rosmini 's Psychological Dispositions 17
2. Rosmini 's Leading Motive, Attitude, and Method 20
3. The Fundamental Principle of Rosmini 's Philosophy 23
Part II. The Essential Features of Rosmini 's Ethical Theory 25
Introductory. The Scope and Method of Ethics 25
Chapter I. The Metaphysical Factor of Morality 28
Chapter II. The Psychological Factor of Morality 36
Conclusion • 45
• • •
111
ROSMINrS
CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
The philosopher's life evolves in space and time, in a certain en-
vironment anil at a certain historical period, the influence of which
he can not fail to undergo. And, indeed, through his education and
his surroundings, his native qiudities are stimidatetl and uioditicd,
his mind is molded to certain habits of thinking, feeling, and acting.
He feels impelled to share the aim and disposition of his time and
race. And thus every phase of his thought and behavior is but a
concrete, effective response to those specific needs, to those human
problems which, being closely connected with social life, focus the
attention of all. We can not, accordingly, consider his doctrine as
an arbitrary, autonomous construction of ideas; we can not imagine
it to be born spontaneously or by chance. The philosopher, anxious
to bring his own contribution to social order, organizes a mode of re-
flective thinking ([uite personal. His philosophy, as every organized
thought, inspired and controlled by a practical motive, is but his
characteristic mode of adjustment to the current state of culture, to
the prevailing Zeitgeist, and to tlKit peculiar situation in which he
happens to be. It embodies his concrete thinking, his lofty aspira-
tions, and his endeavors to be useful to social organization. Thus
we can not doubt that his point of view, his method, his mental atti-
tude, all his psychological situation and activity are determined and
conditioned by his own genius, notions, habits, and motives, as well
as by contemporary social conditions. His philosophical elaborations
may be regarded rather as a human and historical document. For
they mirror the experiences and strivings, the wishes and hopes, the
whole intimate drama of his life. They display the tints which he,
as an artist, imparts to his assumption, combination, and solution of
philosophical problems which always appear anew to each age and
to each individual. And while they happen to be the genuine and
abiding expression of his personality, they manifest the status of
vital questions towards which the general interest converges, and the
social demands that haunt minds at the time in which the philosopher
lives.
"VVe may, accordingly, explain why a philosophical sj'.stem has a
momentous significance, and even a powerful influence on the direc-
1
*2'' ^ :sd^?I-HXI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL P HI LO SOPHY
tion of coutemporary minds; and yet its justification passes away
with its historical conditions. Experience, and consequently philos-
ophy, which is the emotional and intellectual attitude of an individual
towards the urgent problems of life, follows social changes. Thus,
a philosophical doctrine may be a useful instrument of social adjust-
ment at a certain age, owing to social conditions which evoke it, and
it may, however, lose all its value at another age, because of new
social emergencies which call out new purposes and new habitual
modes of confronting problems, and then new reflective thinking.
Thus, if we want to know the meaning, character, and value of
a philosophical system, we must replace it in its historical frame,
in its natural background. We must regard it as the mental atti-
tude which the philosopher assumed towards the problems which
were in the air when he lived. Only thus can we retrace the genesis
of his ideas, his fundamental thought, and the leading motive of
his intellectual efforts. Only then may we have the surest basis
for understanding and appreciating his doctrine. To regard it as
something merely abstract and isolated from human conditions, as
independent of its author 's universe of life and love, aloof from his
reality and experience, or divorced from, and unrelated to the de-
mands and interests of his social milieu, would lead to inevitable
failure.
To valuate Eosmini's contribution to ethical philosophy it is
necessary to trace first the historical tableau of the times in which
he happened to live. A mere outline of the salient features of the
political, social, and intellectual conditions of Italy while Kosmini
was alive will answer our purpose.
In addition, it is of great importance to portray his personality,
namely, his psychological dispositions, the motive which controlled
his mental activity, his philosophical method, and the attitude he
assumed towards the problems Italy confronted at that very time.
After stating the historical and psychological factors of Eosmini's
philosophy, I deem it important to give, as an introductory basis
of his ethical teaching, a short survey of the fundamental principle
of his philosophy, for he was convinced that ethics is dependent upon
metaphysics.
The introductory study of the first part will present Eosmini's
philosophical endeavors in the historical light, and will enable us to
understand and appreciate the essential features of his ethical theory,
which will form the core of the investigation and the subject-matter
of the second part of the present study. Finally, after stating what
the Italian philosopher contributed to the manifold stock of ethical
theories, our interest will center upon the affinity that Eosmini's
ethical principles seem to have with those of precedent philosophers.
PART I
THE FACTORS OF ROSMINI'S PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I
lIiSTOiiicAL Situation of Rosmini's Italy
1. SocicU and Political Conditions
The period of Rosmini's life was characterized by political and
social disturbance.^
Italy was kept in slavery by foreign rulers. Unexpected events,
however, {rradually concurred, from the second half of the eighteenth
century forward, to awake her dormant will. The invigorating
breath of political liberty which came from England, as well as the
French humanitarian ideas which were spread all over Europe,
stimulated some leaders of absolute government to give Italy the first
impulse to a peaceful social and economic evolution. Thus, the
French Revolution, which broke out contemporaneously with this
movement, .seemed there, at its beginning, to be a violent and dis-
turbing phenomenon. The republican armies crossed the Alps, ap-
1 Antonio Rosmini-Scrbati (1797-1855) was horn at Rovereto, in the Italian
Tyrol, of noble and rich parents. He spent his bovhood and youth in an at-
mosphere of religion and study. In 1821 he entered the priesthood. He devoted
most of his life to philosophical investigations and to a religious society which
he foumled, having as purpose the promotion of corporeal, intellectual, and
spiritual works of Christian charity. In 1848 the philosopher Gioberti, at that
time minister of the king Charles Albert, trusted our philosopher with the
mission of inducing the Pope to be the chief of the desired Italian confedera-
tion. Rosmini undertook it as he was convinced that such a confederation could
be the salvation of Italy and of the Church. But the precipitation of political
events and the entourage of Pius IX prevented the accomplishment of Ros-
mini's diplomatic mission.
Indc irac! He began to be suspected of liberalism, which at that time in
Italy meant patriotism, and his philosophy liegan to be the ol)ject of persistent
persecutions. He, however, underwent them, like Socrates, with the grandeur of
mind of a genuine philosopher. Penally, he went, weary and disappointed, to
seek rest and oblivion in the charming solitude of Stresa, near the Lago M^ag-
giore. There the ^'lite of the learned men of Italy and Europe, as Cardinal New-
man, Cardinal Wiseman, Lacordaire, Manzoni, Bonghi, anil some others, met
together to comfort the good and afflicted heart of the great Italian philosopher.
3
4 FiOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPEY
parently induced by the desire to redeem Italy, but the outcome of
their invasion proved to be in open contradiction with the principles
of social and international justice, which were heralded by them with
the bold and steady conviction that they corresponded to the uni-
versal needs and demands of the civilized world. They did not bring,
indeed, any remedy to Italy and only sought material profit ; but
they proclaimed there new social ideas, which aimed at the radical
destruction of the whole edifice of the old regime, as well as at the
organization of a new life.
Their social gospel regarded all men as equal and free and all
nations as mistresses of their own destinies. Accordingly, each na-
tion was suggested to unite its parcelled parties and to form a single
and independent state. Such notions, promising universal revival,
did not fail to make wonderful and rapid strides all over Europe,
while they urged in Italy the development of analogus thoughts and
feelings, which were carefully disguised with literary forms. But
the new principles of uniform, civil organization which Napoleon I.
laid down, gave the Italians the most powerful impulse to their na-
tional solidarity. He abolished pernicious privileges all over the
peninsula. Establishing a strictly laical authority, he inhibited the
influence of clericalism or the religious-factionary control over public
education and intellectual life. He ended municipal jealousies, local
prejudices, and ancient crystallized traditions. Introducing a civil
and penal code, permeated with the spirit of the Roman Law and
of universal equality, he supplanted conflicting customs and juris-
dictions. By the equal and regular administration of justice, he
overthrew the confused and fixed forms of government, of the tenure
of land, and of the whole structure of the Italian society, which
was based upon feudalism. All those changes, as well as the system
of military recruiting, and the construction of new roads and bridges,
greatly contributed to unite the minds and hearts of all Italians.
Besides, the monuments which were erected to perpetuate the mem-
ory of the most glorious events and of the greatest men, and, above
all, the ambition of Napoleon to embody the greatness of the Roman
empire, as the Pope, the German emperor, the men of the Renais-
sance, and the glorious Italian republics had endeavored to do before
him, could not fail to display the beauty of the deliverance and unity
of Italy.2
But, after Napoleon's downfall, the whole peninsula and the
islands which crown it, were thrown again by the congress of Vienna
into the same abject condition in which they were before. They
were once more morcellated in small sovereign states, which were
2 See "Les Resurrections Italiennes," by H. Berenger, E. Pelletan, Ed.,
Paris, 1911.
niSTOEICAL SITUATION OF rOSMIXI'S ITALY 6
enthralled by the despotic control of Austria. Tradition and ab-
solutism were revived by the triumphant reaction.
Napoleon's rule was reg:arded as an illejral attempt ap:ainst order,
and all his activity as propagation of revolution. According^ly,
social order was thought again to be a natural emanation from abso-
lute government. Legislation began to be directed to check pro-
gressive tendencies and every form of revolutioiuiry aspirations.
Divine right began to bo opposed to natural right, legitimacy to popu-
lar sovereignty, the state to the individual, authority to liberty.
The clergy resumed its influence upon education, the censorship of
the press, and .some other offices which gave it control of intellectual
and moral life. But the Italy of 1815 was no more the Italy of the
ante-Napoleonic period. The "geographic expression" was no more
quiescent and inert ; on the contrary, it was permeated with a spirit
of rebellion and progress. The stream of new ideas which had been
brought into the oppressed country from the other nations, whose
barriere had been already overthrown by the French wars, could be
checked no more. The ferment within the stirred minds was power-
ful and pregnant with hopes of bright future.
The emancipation, the unity, and the greatness of Italy was
already the magnificent ideal which focused all the energies and the
heroic efforts of the best Italians; to it everything was devoted and
subordinated.
Austria, meanwhile, in her hatred, stopped at no outrage, at no
absurdity. She began to see conspiracy and revolution in ever>i:hing
and everywhere, and to suppress all feelings of patriotism and lib-
erty in the whole peninsula. Accordingly, men of elevated mind
were thrown into dungeons, or were wrenched out of their beloved
country and exiled. And they, guilty only of patriotic love, wan-
dered about over those countries, in which liberty was flourishing,
and spread the sad news of their national distress. But Metter-
nich's policy failed to extingui.sh the fire of rebellion which seemed
to be smothered beneath the peaceful aspect of the Italian penin-
sula, though it still raged, like the lava under the picturesque sides
of its volcanoes. Under the pressure of the persistent and brutal
reaction and of the .sad common experience, the vision of the na-
tional ideal became more distinct and suggestive than before. The
Italian people strained its powers and brought all its possibilities to
its richest unfolding. The oi)prossc(l minds seemed to be revived and
inspired by the spirit of the Renaissance, which conveyed the sug-
gestion that human personality is the source of all activities and
achievements. In every province of life there was a momentous
awakening. The life of the Italian race reached the moment of ex-
pcrimcntum crucis. Now the problem upon which the universal in-
6 SOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL FHIL0S0PE7
terest focused was not merely the emancipation and unity of Italy,
but the future of her culture and civilization, in harmony with the
spirit of her glorious traditions, which was threatened by her tyran-
nical rulers. So \dtal a problem evoked and concentrated all social
and intellectual forces. It was a moment of great unrest and of in-
tense elaboration of means and schemes. From the powerful fermen-
tation of ideas three main currents of thought emerged for the sal-
vation of the country. Men of different mental attitudes agreed
in the diagnosis of the unbearable conditions of Italy; they were
all determined not to sit upon her ruins and weep and lament like
Jeremiah. But they were united in the common desire of driving
away the hated foreigner, who was recognized as the sole cause of
the distress of their beloved country. They were, however, divided
in regard to the means to be used and to the method of organizing
the new Italy. Some put their hope in the house of Savoy. Others
thought to have found the panacea of all evils in a confederation of
all the Italian states with the Pope as its chief. Such a plan was
the outcome of two main factors. The congress of Vienna and the
general tendency of minds in all Europe, permeated by the roman-
tic spirit, called out the revival of Catholicism. In Italy, many
learned men who did not wish to part asunder their love of the
Church and their love of country were fascinated by the memory
of the medieval commonwealths which were united ander the pro-
tecting power of the Pope.
Besides, convinced that the unity of Italy could not be achieved
by revolution, they advocated the conciliation of all forces and ele-
ments, of papacy and monarchy, of liberty and civil progress, as
the most effective method of national regeneration and organization.
Mazzini's "Young Italy" stood in opposition to the other par-
ties. He urged the Italians to join his association *'in the firm in-
tent of consecrating both thought and action to the great aim of re-
constructing Italy as one independent sovereign nation of free men
and equals." Education and insurrection were the means he sug-
gested. But, beyond his own country, he looked to mankind. The
idea of nationality was, according to him, the necessary lever for
the realization of the cosmopolitan ideal of an international revo-
lution and republic.
With the ascent of Pius IX. to the throne of St. Peter, the con-
ciliatory tendency seemed to prevail over the others. "Wliile through
all Europe liberalism and reaction were still in conflict, the election
of such a Pope seemed to be a tribute to the national feeling of the
Italians. The head of the Church, usually reproached with com-
plicity in reviving what was already dead, and in killing what was
quite alive, showed that he appreciated indeed patriotism, which
niSTOEICAL SITUATION OF EOSMIXI'S ITALY 7
was still resrarcled as a crime and condomned by the Austrian bishops
as the work of the devil. Tiie Pope's liberal tendencies could not
fail to foster the kindled tlame of patriotic love and to unite all
the Italians in the common purpose. Their enthusiasm culminated
in a general cry for war ajxainst the oppressing foreigner. During
those momentous days, for the firet time in the history of civilized
countries, Plato's ideal form of government seemed to be realized in
some aspects; the political attitude, under the pressure of circum-
stances, became quite philosophical.
Rosmini, Gioberti. Mamiani. the most prominent leaders in the
movement of thought, forgot their philosophical controversies which
had hitherto divided them, and devoted their common efforts to the
interest of their country. Gioberti sent our philosopher to Rome
as ambassador of Piedmont to induce the Pope, whose constitutional
minister was Mamiani, to take part in the war against Austria and
to establish the basis of an Italian confederation. But Rosmini's
mission failed, because of the reaction which once more prevailed
all over Italy. Both the method of revolutionary action and of the
impossible idealistic confederation, however, which proved to bo only
factors of bitter and general disappointment, were replaced by
Cavour's diplomacy. He cleverly broke the dream of a reconcilia-
tion which was based upon impossible compromises of principles,
tendencies, and attitudes, profoundly diverse, and gave the na-
tional party a new direction based upon reciprocal liberty of state
and religion. He thus initiated the achievement of the political
sjTithesis of the new Italy, free, independent, and united, as she
was wished to be by her sons and by the learned abroad. But Ros-
mini had not the joy of seeing the final phase of so long and so epic
a struggle, to which he had devoted his manifold activity, his
health, and reputation.
2. Intellectual Conditions
The powerful politit-al action which the Italians displayed for
the radical reconstruction of their country was in intimate and or-
ganic connection with the unfolding of their mental forces.
An action so complex and of such high practical importance
could not fail to focus the general attention and provoke reflective
thought. It involved, indeed, the necessity of criticizing the old and
of developing a new intellectual life. The possi])ility of its succes.s-
ful issues depended upon changing hal)its of mind, modes of indi-
vidual condur-t. and forms of social life. It had to l)e justified and
strengtlicncd with theoretical demonstrations of its justice and of its
conformity with the principles of human nature and of modern
thought.
8 SOSMINI'S CONTEIBVTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
Besides, the new ideas, the new scientific principles, which had
to be the determining and controlling factors of the national think-
ing and willing, could not but be clothed with abstract forms, be-
cause only such forms could escape political censure. The mag-
nificent and promising mental activity of the Renaissance, which
had made Italy the cradle of modern thought, was followed by two
centuries of intellectual tyranny and slumber. The religious reac-
tion and the deadening influence of Spanish bigotry had endeavored
to check the new stream of free and independent thought, and to
paralyze the germs of a new life.
But at the end of the eighteenth century, Italy was again ani-
mated by the spirit of Dante and the Renaissance, and emerged
from her long intellectual depression and lassitude. She entered
then into the general movement of modern thought, to which she
had already given the very first vital impetus.
It was natural that the Italians should feel impelled, while under
the hated foreign j^oke, to concentrate all their mental activities
upon the reconstruction of their coimtry, like the prisoners who,
groaning under the weight of chains, long for liberty and concen-
trate all their efforts upon attaining it. The Italians indeed began
to keep thought and action in persistent unity, until their patriotic
hopes and struggles were crowned with success. Accordingly, since
that very time, they began to display the same eager desire, the
same method, to vindicate, to magnify, and to convert all the mem-
ories of their glorious past into a living motor force. They endeav-
ored, impelled by a feeling of national pride, to restore the value
of their culture, and to impress a national mark upon politics, art,
literature, and philosophy. They did not fail, however, to throw
open their minds and hearts to all the invigorating influence which
came to them from foreign countries. They became, under the
pressure of their awful experiences, more sensible to the beauty and
wealth of thought, ancient as well as modern, which was contained
cither in foreign literatures, full already of juvenile vigor, or in
their own. The function of literature and art became civil and pa-
triotic. Lyric and dramatic poetry assumed an aggressive attitude
against the evils which the country had so long endured. Tragedies
were more or less disguised battles against any kind of despotism
and tyranny ; they aimed to stimulate national feeling by revealing
upon the stage past injustices, by exalting deeds of national heroism,
and by reviving Roman ideas of liberty, of justice, and of respect
for human dignity. Satiric poetry took on a social and civil signifi-
cance ; it was an embellished protest against the excessive inequality
between the rich and the poor, and a defense of the people trampled
and dejected. Painting and sculpture revived and embodied what
HISTORICAL SITUATION OF UOSillXI'S ITALY 9
could foster the consciousness of greatness. Music, throufjii its sug-
gestive and universal language, displayed the anguish and the hopes
of all Italians. They made historical researches, not for the sake
of curiosity, but because they were an.xious to indicate the factors
of their national misfortune, and to finil in tiie past the flame of
enthusiasm and the experiences of their ancestors, which could be
translated into working forces.
The very dawn of the new intellectual life was, indeed, charac-
terized by the critical examination of the ideas they found current
and by a great interest in knowledge. Knowledge began to be regarded
as a social power and as determining factor in the movement of na-
tional regeneration. They nuide scientific investigations to find
useful truths, to modify, through experimental methods, mental
Imbits, and thus to divert men from the frivolous life of the time
and to bring them to serious reflection. Through inner regenera-
tion, through a peaceful and normal intellectual evolution, through
a national unity of mental life, they wanted to change the distress-
ing conditions of the country. Thus the motive, which began to
control the evolution of the new intellectual life, was quite practical
and determined scientific work. From the beginning, the reflection
upon the ideas which permeated social and individual life could
afford no satisfaction. The common experience of pu])lic life could
not fail to focus the attention of all upon civil laws. These were
said to be an emanation from the invisible and eternal will, but
proved to be the outcome of the deification of crystallized truths,
of hereditary prejudices, and of changeless oppressive political sys-
tems, as well as the genuine work of the personal interest of rulers.
Such laws were of no public advantage, they did not satisfy any
practical need or demand; nay, they were factors in the national
oppression and general unhappiness. Accordingly, accommodation I'
to them seemed to be cowartUy and shameful. Wavering confidence
in the practical value of obedience to them inevitably and fatally
implied an attack upon the validity of their ground. The .same po-
litical situation was bound to undermine also the })rineiples of moral-
ity, which controlled individual conduct and required the subser-
vience to tyrannical laws and systems.
These laws were based no less upon tradition tliaii authority, and
thus they seemed also to perpetuate the unhappy conditions of the
country. Many factors happened to subserve the critical and de-
structive attitude the Italians assumed while confronting the polit-
ical problem, which involved their iiidividual and social happine.s.s.
Authority more and more lost respect, because it was regarded as
oppressive. Tradition lost the influence it had exerted upon the
10 EOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
national mind, because it suggested always changeless forms of im-
possible life.
Religious feeling wavered because the Church in Italy was, at
that time, identified in the mind of the people with the prevailing
political tyranny. And finally the contact with French culture
permeated with revolutionary ideas contributed also to foster the
feeling of rebellion against the old standards of life and fossilized
beliefs.
The outcome of such great fermentation of new ideas was moral
disintegration, political unrest, and skepticism. The pressure of
political activity which imposed profound intellectual revolutions
did not make skepticism merry, as in France during the eighteenth
century, but anxious to reconstruct knowledge, already regarded as
a great dynamic agency in the political regeneration of Italy. The
emphasis, however, upon the practical significance of knowledge
made u'^cessary critical insight into its origin and nature. Political
action r-xiuired a philosophical background.
Whence the crucial question rose whether experience or the mind
had to be held as the source of knowledge and consequently of ideas,
which are its constituent elements; whether ideas had to be consid-
ered as innate or as the product of sensations. This problem was
regarded, in Italy as well as throughout Europe, at that time, as
the most fundamental problem, and was justly placed in the fore-
ground of philosophical discussion. For its solution had to furnish
the basis of moral and political sciences which were expected to en-
lighten and sustain the national movement. In fact, the innate-
ness of ideas meant the previous existence of a priori controlling
principles. Accordingly, the national thinking and will, knowledge
and action, had to be controlled by abstract, eternal, and crystal-
lized notions, as during the long years of unchanged slavery. Ideals
and laws had to be regarded as eternally given, and consequently
there was no hope of reference to the concrete conditions, of po-
litical change, freedom, and progress.
On the contrary, the belief that ideas were the outcome of ever-
changing personal experience involved the conviction that human
personality must have a conscious participation in the creation of
truths, ideals, and laws, with absolute independence of every exter-
nal authority. Thus the individual, reckoning the changed condi-
tion, was able to direct his own conduct and become a decisive factor
in the regeneration and reconstruction of Italy. The philosophy
of experience which based knowledge and morality solely upon per-
ception, proclaimed the right of individualism and of rebellion
against intellectual and political oppression as well as against every
form of despotism, and thus it best responded to the urgent needs
HISTORICAL SITUATION OF ROSMINI'S ITALY H
and demands of the second half of the eighteentli eentnry and of
the early part of the nineteenth t-entiiry. Of course, the interest in
the experimental and positive sciences, the closer contact with the
En«;lish and French literatures permeated with the spirit of mod-
ern philosophy, the loosened respect for tradition, the declinint? in-
fluence of the Church, the decreased feelinf; of tiie supernatural,
the conviction, also, that idealism, allied with relifjious and civil
authority, was an instrument of reaction, but, above all, the per-
sonal presence of Condillac,^ were so many factors which contributed
to condition and assure the prevalence of empiricism in Italy.
Gerdil,^ indeed, endeavored to oppose to it a foi-m of idealism
permeated with the doctrines of Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes,
but his efforts were frustrated by the practical significance and com-
promise of idealism, holding fixed, innate controlling principles of
individual and social ethics, and by the rapid translation of Con-
dillac's works as well as by the teaching of Soave, who followed and
exalted Locke as the greatest metaphysician since he had dared
"to destroy the chimera of innate ideas. "^
Colleges and universities welcomed the new philosophy, because
it seemed to answer the pressing political purpose of that historical
moment and to be in harmony with the intellectual temper and
with the history of the philosophical thought of the Italians."
Art and literature endeavored to assimilate and apply its prin-
ciples which, spread in diluted form, could not fail to filter through
the strata of national consciousness and conduct."
The fact that Condillac and Soave were priests, and that the
3 Condillac lived ten years (1758-1768) in Parma, at that time the " reticles-
vous" of the best intelligences, as tutor of the young Due Ferdinand of Bourbon.
•• Sigismond Car<l. Gerdil (1718-1802) published a great number of philo-
sophical works in French, Italian, and Latin. See Bouillicr, " Ilistoire de la
philosophic cartesienne," t. 11.. ch. XXVIII.; Ueberweg's "Hist, of Phil.," Vol.
II., page 480.
5 Soave translated into Italian first Dr. Winne's summary of Locke's cele-
brated "Essay," and later published a complete translation in the "Collezione
dei Clasgici Metafisici" in Pavia (1819). His * ' Istituzioni di Logica, Metafisica
e Morale" was useil as a text-book of philosophy in many colleges. He was
professor of philosophy in the Brera college in Milan. Let us notii-e here that
he, like Condillac, was a catholic priest.
« What is the national characteristic of Italian philosophy? According to
Ferri ("Essai sur I'Histoire de la Philosophic en Italic au Di.xXeuviftme Siftcle, "
Vol. II., page 343), the Italian miml, although fonil of experience and life, has
manifested a tendency to idealism; according to P. Ragnisco (Rivista di Filo-
Sofia, Vol. 3, 1911, page 698) the proper characteristic of Italian philosophy
is naturalism.
~ Foscolo, Leopardi, Giordani. Count L. Cicognara ("Del Bello"), Cesarottl
("Saggio sulla filosofia deile liiigue"), Costa (" Del modo <li comporre le idee"),
anil some others wrote under the influence of the new philosophy.
12 EOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
Jesuit order, whose influence was so powerful, strongly favored
the imported philosophy, helped its rapid spread. It was thought
that faith and ethics would not be affected by the principles of em-
piricism. Strange irony of history! The most striking charac-
teristics of the empirical movement in England, where it was born,
as well as in France, where it had been imported by such men as
Montesquieu and Voltaire, were disregard for positive religion and
opposition to the traditional beliefs presented to individuals through
the medium of organized society. The antagonism to innate ideas
meant opposition 'to the blind, undiscussed reception of old ideas,
and eager desire for independent critical examination. Besides,
the theory of transformed sensations assumed the denial of every
authority, either religious or political, leaving conventions and facts
depending upon man's imagination and will. But the new theory
seemed to be in Italy an auxiliary, practical standpoint and a pro-
visional method for political activity rather than a fixed and definite
philosophical position. The evolving of political conditions gradu-
ally modified the strict empiristic attitude. The most prominent
philosophers preceding Rosmini, as Gioja, Romagnosi, and Galluppi,
although contemporary, formed a rhythmic movement of philosoph-
ical thought. They lacked the originality and boldness which had
characterized the Italian philosophy of the Renaissance, and neg-
lected the fresh thought of the great Vico, who was ''the nine-
teenth century in germ,"^ but displayed the same enthusiasm for
the new philosophy of experience. They were permeated with the
spirit of the Enlightenment, and their main interest was accord-
ingly in the problem of knowledge and in the organization of a just
social order. Thus philosophy came to be regarded, as amongst
the ancient Greeks, as a social power, as a determining factor in
political reconstruction, and dependent upon the demands of prac-
tical, and in particular, of political life. It assumed, then, an es-
sentially human direction and its original mission.**
They all betrayed, however, the same aversion for the violent
breaking from religious tradition as well as the same fear of the
moral consequences which could be inferred from the current philos-
ophy: whence the same preoccupation we find in all for reconcilia-
tion, the same endeavor to fuse together the two great streams of
thought which derived from England and France, and to harmon-
ize, even in spite of patent inconsistency, idealism and empiricism
or sensationalism, Descartes and Locke or Condillac.
8 See B. Croce, "La Filisofia di G. Vico," page 248, Bari, G. Laterza, 1911.
English translation by R. G. CoUingwood.
9 Windelband, "History of Philosophy," page 6S; Dewey, "Essays," p. 21.
EISTOTxlCAL SITUATION OF liOSMIM'S ITALY 13
According to Gioja/*' the fune'tioii of philosopliy is to rule the
■whole of human activity for the sake of universal happiness. Ac-
cortliufjly, he thouglit that its business was the defence of human
rights and the promotion of social wealth and the control of social
ethics, which involves hygiene, politeness, and intellectual educa-
tion. He relatetl all inner phenomena to sensations, and sensations
to the senses. But he recognized within us a certain inner aetivity
which he called "the moving force of the soi\l"; this is the source
of all changes, either internal or external.
Romagnosi*' thought that the theory of empiricism and the
theory of innate ideas could be reconciled by recognizing within
our mind, above mere sensation, a peeuliar natural ])()wer, en-
dowed with an activity of its own. whieh he called "senso logico."
The function of the logical sense which is prior to the affirma-
tion and negation of our judgments, is to perceive in sensation,
in the world of phenomena, the supersensible element, the ele-
ment of intelligibility whieh is the being and the activity of
things "Vessere ed il fare delle cose." Thus, according to him,
being and causality only are intelligible or objects of our under-
standing. The object of the rational sen.se is the idea, the intel-
ligible, the being, not sensations, which only furnish our mind with
occa.sions to exercise its logical sense. So his teaching marked an
almo.st complete divorce from Locke and Condillac and a definite
step in a transition from empiricism to idealism.
Galluppi^- assumed a different philosophical attitude towards the
problems which the pressure of political conditions and the general
intelleetual movement of Europe brought to the foreground of philo-
sophical interest. His teaching marked, indeed, a very important
stage in the movement of philosophical thought in Italy. For he
was the first to understand and welcome the revolution brought
into philosophy by Kant, and to awaken the minds of his own coun-
trymen from their dogmatic slumber and from their fond attach-
ment to sen.sualism or rationalism by pointing out to tliem the
necessity of critical investigation.^^
1'^ Molchiorre-Gioja (1707-1829). See Ucberweg, "History of Philosophy,"
Vol. ir.. pages 483—484; Ferri, Histoire do la Philosoi)hic en Italic au XIX""
si^de, ' ' Vol. I.
11 G. Domenico Roniagnosi (17G 1-1 8.3.5). See Ueberweg, op. cit., pages
484-85. Vol. II.; Ferri, op. cit.. Vol. I.
n Baron Pasquale Galliippi (1770-184fi). See Forri an<l Ueberweg, op.
cit.; R. Mariano, "La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie," 1868; Palhori&s,
"La Th^orie Id^logique de Galluppi," Paris, Mean, 1908.
>•'» Kant's philosophy was known in Italy through two books published in
French, i. c, "Philosophie do Kant, on principcs fondamcntaux do la i>hilosophie
transcendentale, " par Ch. Villers, Metz, 1801, and " Essai d'unc exposition
14 EOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
His works are pervaded by both conflicting tendencies, empiri-
cistic and rationalistic. He aimed at the reform of philosophy, and
accordingly endeavored to correct empiricism and Kantism, but
he proved to be unable to extricate himself entirely from both
philosophies, in which he found a valuable treasure for his own
elaboration.
Knowledge and action, according to him, or thought, its elements,
functions, and value for truth and good, are the main subject-
matter of philosophy. He was aware that the problem of knowl-
edge was in his day "the object of meditation in all Europe," and
upon this problem he focused his attention. Against sensationalism
he held that the mind is not only sensitive, but intelligent and reason-
able, and made the distinction between sense and intelligence, sen-
sation and thought. Against Condillac he stated that our mind is
something more than a mere collection of internal states; that it is
a reality, a being, a substance, endowed with the power of analysis
and synthesi.s. He rejected innate ideas in the sense of ideas prior
to sensations and independent of all experience, but he accepted
them in the sense of natural ideas, or ideas for whose acquisition we
have a natural disposition, "una virtualita naturale." Galluppi
agreed with Kant that knowledge is a combination of subjective and
objective elements, but he found Kant's form and matter equally
subjective, and hence the failure to solve the problem of knowledge.
The crucial point is to determine what is objective and subjective in
knowledge. We find objective elements only in the immediate con-
tact of the self with reality or in primitive experience; reflective
experience which is based upon ideal sj'nthesis is the outcome of the
objective elements given by sensations and of the subjective elements
produced by the mind itself. This was the solution which Galluppi
gave the great problem of critical philosophy. His teaching, char-
acterized by simple and attractive eloquence, permeated by the
principles of the Kantian and of the Scottish school, and involving
the suggestion to descend from theology to psychology, from nature
to humanity, from abstractions to facts, provoked a great interest
in philosophy amongst the Italians, and seemed to the national
party to be a powerful instrument of political action and easy to be
assimilated by the people because stripped of the obsolete and dry
scholastic form.
But during the time of his teaching important new political
changes which affected Italy as well as all Europe, brought out
succinte de la critique de la raison pure de Kant," par M. Kinker, traduit du
hollandais par J. Le Fr., Amsterdam, 1801. The first Italian translation of the
Critique of Pure Reason was published by Mantovani, in 1821 and 1822. Galluppi
examined Kantian philosophy in detail.
HISTORICAL SITUATIOX OF HOSMIM'S ITALY 15
ehaiifjes of intellectual attitudi-. Wlini the rovolutionarv storm
was over, a reaction was inevitable. Admiration for the preceding
intellectual movement changi:cd to aversion and iiatrcd. Reason was
held responsible for the violence done to political ami relipfious ene-
mies. "Philosophy" was blamed for the general unrest and dis-
order. The French Revolution, welcomed at the beginning as a
manifestation of reason and the triumph of man, stripped of re-
ligious preoccupations, culminated in excesses of bloody violence.
Its issue was a numifest confession of impotence for constructive
purposes and social peace. Empiricism transformed into sen-
sualism, naturalism changed into materialism, deism degenerated
into atheism, enthusiastic morals sunk into egoistic morals, proved
to be unable to settle the questions which were .so closely connected
with individual and social happiness. The nations of Europe wliose
barriers had been overthrown amongst the vicissitudes of the revolu-
tionary wars could already freely communicate with one another,
fuse together their ideas, and thus participate in a general culture,
but they longed for peace and order, for a new source of life, and
for a new system of ideas and purpo.ses. So it happened that the
general feeling against the violences and destructions of the Revo-
lution, the over-excitement and exhaustion produced by sensualistie
excesses, the impuissanee of the rationalistic and materialistic
"philosophism" to reform society, the universal eager desire of a
new center of gravitation, the same programme of the "Holy Al-
liance" which heralded the reconstruction of moral order and the
regeneration of the political .system of Europe on the basis of Chris-
tianity and thus the revival of religion, and finally the triumphant
return of the Pope to Rome, evoked a spiritualistic reaction. The
romantic movement favored the revival of the Christian religion.
For it appealed to spontaneity, sensibility, feeling, emotion, and en-
thusiasm which are the main religious factors, and while revelling
in the vast world of the unknown as well as in a new n>alm of mar-
vels and nw.steries, it evoked the Middle Ages in which Christianity
and papacy had predominated. Besides, the satisfaction of estlietic
feeling which the dominant religion afforded, the romantic concep-
tion of Christianity as perfectly compatible with the highest intel-
lectual culture, contribiitcd to present as "ultimatum" to the con-
vulsed society the religion against which the revolutionary fury had
been directed.
Thus, "through a common movement," says Taine, "along the
whole line of human thought, causes draw back into an abstract
region, where philosophy had not been to search them out for eighteen
centuries. Then was manifest the disea.se of the age, the restless-
ness of Werther and Faust, very like that which in a similar^jjijc^ .^^^^
i
OK THE '
16 SOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
ment agitated men eighteen centuries ago: I mean, discontent with
the present, the vague desire of a higher beauty, and an ideal hap-
piness, the painful aspiration for the infinite."^*
But then arose in Italy the question whether or not the whole
heritage of the eighteenth century had to be rejected, which age of
Italian history had to be copied ; whether the genuine greatness of
Italy had to be founded on the revival of the age of the Roman
Empire and the Renaissance, when social life and human person-
ality were free and independent of supernatural preoccupation,
and the Italians enjoyed a spiritual unity of knowledge and will ;
or on the revival of the Middle Ages, when the intimate union of
Church and monarchy, of religion and authority, of faith and reason,
of theology and philosophy, prevailed.
Men who were imbued with the spirit of classicism and of the
eighteenth-century culture, took the former alternative. Those
whose enthusiasm was directed towards romanticism wanted the
life of the new Italy to be a continuity of the harmony of all social
forces. They displayed, nevertheless, great sympathy for all modern
aspirations, and endeavored to subserve their national cause by
spreading, under an evangelical disguise, forbidden ideas of liberty,
patriotism, and universal equality.
The conciliatory tendency was bound to prevail, under the pres-
sure of religious and national enthusiasm. Such a tendency, to-
gether with the influence of the reactionary and theological, and of
the ps.ychologico-spiritualistic movement in France, and the power-
ful impulse from Germany to construct gigantic systems in order
to have a comprehensive view of spiritual life, could not fail to pro-
voke in Italy a philosophy which, by an encyclopedic synthesis should
seek to unite all intellectual efforts for the sake of a common na-
tional action. The genius of Rosmini provided the needed philo-
sophical formula of universal harmony, source of truth, and moral-
ity, of reciprocal respect and love, of social justice and individual
rights, as symbol of the coming national unity.
14 "History of English Literature," Book lY., €h. I.
CHAPTEK U
RosMLNi's Person ALiTv
1. h'osmini's Vsychological Dispositions
An extraordinary Imnfjcr for learning associatod with a powor-
ful inti'llifriMU'c. ii proiiduiiced relipfious tendency. ;iii<l a deep feel-
ing of sympathy for men were the important features of Rosmini's
psyeholoprjeal inlieritanee. These native dispositions were devel-
oped hy the social environment in which he was reared, and exerted
a constant influence on his mental activity. His early tuition as
well as his acadiMuic course was permeated with rt'li<rious ideals.
The atmosphere which he and the learned men with whom he was
in continuous intercourse breathed was pervaded hy I'cligious reac-
tion against the movement of modern thought, regarded as the main
factor of social disturbance. Accordingly, his mind did not escape
hal)its of analogous thinking, feeling, and acting, and partaking
of the prevailing reactionary aim and disposition of his times and
cla.ss.
The silent, beautiful scenes of immensity and mystery which the
snowy Alps display provoked the eager mind of the young Ros-
mini to wonder and philosophy. We are told, indeed, that he began
very early to incline to the investigation of truth, and to display a
striking tendency to moralize. While he was a boy. playing the
game of "policeman." or "catch thief," he preferred the part of
judge to every other, for he liked to pose as a "wise man," and to
give good advice to his little friends.
We are told also that the young thinker surpri.sed his tutor with
his advanced philosophiciil knowledge. Just when the good teacher
judged his pupil al)le to be initiated in the philosophy of empiricism,
he discovered that he did not need to be taught philosophy, for he
knew enough and mastered Afpiinas's "Summa. " The precocious
philosopher showed at an early age that he felt the great importance
of "the queen and mother of all sciences"; philosophy was always
the subject of his con vereat ions and letters. lie was so enamored
of the .study of philosophy, that lie spent much of his youth and of
the rest of his stormy life in devotion to it.
"Philosophy and the contemplation of nature," he said, "far
17
18 KOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PEILOSOPHY
from wearjnng us, form such an agreeable recreation that I sliould
not be disposed to sacrifice it for any other. "^
"Day and night," he said, "I roamed through flowery paths, as
it were, in the vast demesne of philosophical lore, feelihg all that
joy which the first aspect of truth infuses into the soul, feeling that
security which borders on hardihood, feeling those indefinite hopes
peculiar to youth when for the first time turning, with elevated
and conscious reflections, to the universe and its Creator, thinking
to absorb the one and the other as easily as we breathe."^
We are told that no difficulty daunted him; nay, difficulties in-
flamed his ardor, because in every difficulty he saw a secret calcu-
lated to arouse his curiosity, a treasure to discover. Such intellec-
tual enthusiasm actuated him to read all the ancient, medieval, and
modern philosophers, and to collect together the many scattered
fragments of truth he found in their works. It is said of him that
like an industrious bee, he went everj'where in quest of honey, and
wherever he found any, he drew it forth. Thus here and there, the
shadow of some antecedent philosophy can be retraced in his works,
but he was a disciple of nobody. His immense philosophical elab-
oration had as its source only his intellectual and moral temper, his
native genius as well as his mental habits, molded as they were by
his social environment.
The bent and disposition of Eosmini's mind converged not only
towards contemplation, but toward action as well. He was ani-
mated by altruistic feelings; he felt impelled to communicate his
ideas to his fellow-men.
For he was convinced that high intellectual culture is refining
and ennobling, and to discover truth means to discover the means
of moral progress. It filled him with pain ' ' to think that truths ex-
cellent in themselves and congenial to the human intelligence should
be monopolized by a small circle of individuals, as though none but
themselves had a right to possess them. "^
And referring to the Scholastic attitude he says, "Is there not
something odious and hurtful to human feeling in a science which,
under the pretence of being scholastic, envelops itself in mystery;
which seems to hate the light of day; which wears all the appear-
ance of a sect, with a language, or rather jargon, of its own, and
forbidden to the rest of men, and which assumes an ambitious, or
1 Impelled by the desire of spreading philosophical knowledge, he formed
an academy of young philosophers in his house. The members of the new aca-
demy, eager to imitate the Peripatetics, indulged in philosophical discussions,
wandering about the charming surroundings of Eovereto.
2 "Introduzione alia filosofia. "
» "The Origin of Ideas," Vol. I., Ch. III., §36.
EOS MINI'S PERSONALITY 19
at least a strange and exclusive tone, as if it liad some great secret
to conceal, or some dark ends to accomplish?"*
Thus, Rosmini could not conceive philosophy divorced from
human affairs and interests. "Why," he asks, "should this science,
which boasts of being the motiier of all the arts, keep itself aloof
from, and sullenly refuse to hold friendly intercourse with, the
human family? Has it, then, like some beasts of a new species, im-
penetrable lairs, wh(>re to abide in solitude, from fear lest its in-
terests shouUl sutler by being mixed up with those of the world at
large? Or has heaven bestowed the gift of reason on a few indi-
viduals only? And siuill, therefore, the great bulk of numkind for-
ever have to be led, like a Hoek of sheep, by the command or the
rod of those favored ones? Must incti be for everlasting debarred
from judging in a body or pronouncing on matters on which their
own dignity and happiness depend?"''
Accordingly, "a good instinct" of his nature irresistibly
prompted him to applaud "intentions so humane, and to feel the
liveliest gratitiule for those who labor with the intent of placing the
very highest truths within the reach of the greatest number. . . .
For if this were well and successfully done, the masses would be
able to enjoy in some way the lovable aspect of those truths, and
would rise to a better condition.""
Moreover, he thought that the masses, by bringing their collec-
tive judgment to bear on the interminable disputations of the
learned, might, perhaps, speak out with such an overwhelming
weight of authority as would effectually recall these disputants to
more profitable occupations and sountler ways of thiidving, and to
work for the true benefit of the indiviilual and society. Rosmini,
persuaded of the social and humane mission of philosophy, could
not fail to direct his attention to the national problem, which was
already the focus of the general intellectual activity. He, in fact,
like the elite of his time, did not make a mystery of his love for the
common mother, the beloved from whom he had had "life and lan-
guage."^
Eye-witnes.s of the violences perpetrated by th(^ French armies
as well as of the angry despotism of the restored governments, he
grieved over Italy's unhappy state anrl longed for the freedom, in-
dependence, and unity, which he openly proclaimed to be "a uni-
versal cry" that set throbbing the heart of every Italian.''
* "The Origin of Ideas," toe. cif.
5 "The Origin of Meas," loc. cit.
o"The Origin of Ideas," loc. cit.
7 See " Xuovo Saggio HuH'origine delle idee," preface.
8 See "Discorso suH'Unitii .1 'Italia."
20 EOSMINrS COXTHIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHT
It seems, however, that Rosmini was distressed rather by the
moral disintegration than by the political situation of his country.
All his works, in fact, betray a strong moral preoccupation and a
persistent endeavor to point out moral reconstruction as a factor of
social happiness. But the Church's declining influence, above
everything else, attracted his attention. His native religious bias,
under the constant influence of his social environment, became a
deep and inalterable love for his parents' religion. And to such a
love the Italian philosopher subordinated his whole intellectual ac-
tivity. Thus, it was inevitable that a life of earnest and close ad-
hesion to his religion would have created in his mind habits of in-
tellectual submission and criticism not at all independent and im-
partial. Besides, his woi'ks bespeak his fondness for abstract, fixed,
and eternal principles, his idealistic tendency, his dogmatic affirma-
tion, his conviction of the necessity of universals, his determination
to organize an absolute system, and consequently, his rationalistic
type of mind."
2. Rosmini' s Leading Motive, Attitude, and Method
Rosmini seemed to be convinced of the fact that the growing indi-
vidualism, the ascending democracy, the progress of national feel-
ing, and, finall}^, the intellectual undercurrents of social life had
already brought into question the ancient beliefs and moral stan-
dards, and that even the position of the Catholic Church had been
compromised, being thrown by clericalism into the political turmoil
of the times. He, accordingly, felt stimulated to bring his contri-
bution to the political, intellectual, and moral reconstruction of his
beloved country. Impelled by a motive so eminently practical, he
applied his mind to an etiological inquiry into the actual conditions
of the Church, of Italy, and of philosophy.
Under the pressure of his native dispositions, acquired habits,
intellectual temper, and of the dominant current of thought, per-
meated with spiritualism and religion, the Italian philosopher found
out that the divorce of the Church from social and political aspira-
tions, of faith from reason, of theology from philosophy, was the
main factor in the restlessness of his social environment. He,
therefore, urged the reconciliation of all the intellectual and social
forces as the panacea for all the evils of his times. Besides, agree-
ing with the prevailing romantic spirit, he pointed to the Middle
Ages as the epoch in which the ideal reconciliation he dreamed of,
the genuine greatness of Papacy and of Italy, and the lofty task of
» See W. .James, "Pragmatism," pages 7, 51; "Some Problems of Phi-
losophy," page 35.
EOSMIXI'S PEESOXALITY 2i
philosophy, were fully realized. His discovery, indeed, could not
be otherwise ! But Rosmini thought that such harmonious union
had been shattered by tlie movement of modern philosophy. Ac-
cording to him, philosophy "from Locke to Kant, in spite of so many
efforts, went on wandering farther and fartlier astray, and en-
tangling itself in its very ])n)gress, until men grew weary of it, and
lost all faith in doctrines tiiat were contimially changing."'"'
Thus, he believed that reason was to.ssed about by the waves of
skepticism and opinion, and that there was no longer faith in any
universally valid truth, or in the possibility of any certain knowl-
edge, while respect for authority and tradition sank, religious feel-
ings and ideals wavered, ami iinlividuals governed themselves.
Sensationalism and subjectivism, indeed, acknowledging no es-
sential objectivity of ideas and then no objective measure of truth,
and relying only on the relativity of individual ideas, built human
knowledge as well as ethical principles upon a relativism of indi-
vidual opinions, and, consequently, upon the insecurity of change
and caprice. This philosophical attitude and its inevitable conse-
quence, the absolute independence of the individual in the theoret-
ical and practical sphere, and "the deification of human faculties
and affections" plainly proclaimed by Kantian doctrine, hurt Ros-
mini 's religious feeling, for they meant a mortal blow to religious
tradition and to organized authority. Thus he felt that there was
"a yearning for the invaluable boon of a true and .sound philos-
ophy," and that the yearning was due to the uncertain utterances
and to the imperfect and unsatisfactory .systems which philosophers
had already propounded.
Rosmini was penetrated with the importance of philosophy be-
cause of its all-embracing influence, determining the source of
knowledge, and thus making all sciences dependent on itself. Be-
sides, philosophy, in his opinion, has an anthropological, a social,
and a religious mission, since it is the interpreter of nature as well
as of the wishes of the luiman heart, and it unites men amongst
themselves and with their Creator. Finally, it aims at the better-
ment of men by discovering and transforming truth into reality,
and by leading to good and to virtue, as to their natural end.*^
Accordingly, for Rosmini, the restoration of philo.soi)hy was aji
urgent need, and it could not be achieved without a firm epistemo-
logical ground.
Rosmini, agreeing with Locke and Kant, was impres.sed from
his early youth, by the practical importance of the problem of
""Theodicy," Ch. XXIX, No. 148. Longmans, Green, and Company, \ew
York, 1912.
11 See ''Introduzione alia filosofia. "
/
22 BOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPnY
knowledge. He justly recognized that the most urgent question to
be solved in philosophy was whether, above and beyond individual
opinions and purposes, there is anything universally valid, true,
and right in itself; whether our ideas have a really objective value
and provide a firm basis for knowledge and morality ; wliether at
that time of political and moral unrest there could be found a basis
for common truth and good which might become a ground of a
social agreement and political cooperation. According to our philos-
opher, the science of individual and social ethics, law, government,
education, which the political situation threw into the front rank of
intellectual interests; man's faith in absolute justice; the changeless
right of nations to political independence and liberty ; the necessity
of suppressing despotism as well as rebellion ; had to rest upon a
knowledge, not transient and relative, but stable and unchangeable.
Such a knowledge, however, must have for its basis, not the chance
ideas furnished by sense-experience, but the ideal order, "the innate
idea of the universal which is the truly real;" it must rest "on an
object," says Rosmini, "which is always before us, necessary, uni-
versal, and independent of us and all created things. "^^
The persistent effort to indicate the idea of the universal as
source of objective and absolute truth, as nucleus of the new national
mental and moral life, as point of centralization of intellectual and
political activity, meant the accumulation of individual energies,
the absorption and submission of the individual to organized society
as well as to the common supreme ideal of national solidarity and
unity, and constitutes the essential characteristic of Rosmini 's phi-
losophy.
The mental attitude Rosmini assumed towards the philosophical
problems which his contemporaries confronted was religious and
reactionary, but softened by a spirit of conciliation that was in the
air. He seemed to be determined to revive the attitude of the Holy
Fathers, who did not hesitate to avail themselves of whatsoever
truth the systems of pagan philosophers contained in order to secure
rational support for their beliefs.
But our philosopher, like them, wanted to subordinate knowl-
edge to the lofty ends of faith, reason to revelation, philosophy to
theology, science to dogma. Besides, he endeavored to bring Chris-
tianity as an efficient factor into philosophical speculation, and thus
to harmonize natural and supernatural truths. Convinced that the
most striking characteristics of every true and efficient philosoph-
ical system are "unity and totality," he built, like his contemporary
German philosophers, a gigantic system in which he thought it pos-
sible to take in at a glance, almost all truths, arranged in a scheme
12 "The Origin of Ideas," No. 1037, Vol. II.
EOSMINI'S PERSONALITY 03
of beautiful uuity, and enhanced with new life by "the evidence of
a supreme principle."'^
But in one point Rosniini gladly ajjreed with modern philoso-
phers, namely, in the method to be used in philosophy, that is, a
method which starts from facts. lie found, howevt-r, that "modern
philosophers have contented themselves with analyzin<; the faculties
of the soul, and have paid little attention to the analysis of tlieir
product, /. e., human cojjnitions. "'^
Acconlinj]: to him, the rijjjht method is to observe what is pjiven
by our corporeal senses and at the same time the facts of our inner
life and then to accept imj)artially the lc<;itimate eonse(iuenct's of
the same.^^
Our philosopher, however, almost exclusively employed the syn-
thetic method and thus replaced the concrete by the abstract, the
fact by the idea, the internal observation by (i priori reasoning,
making the study of man depend on metaphysics. He preferred
deduction to induction, the a priori to direct observation, reasoning
to experience. He proved, indeed, to be a psychologist, but he often
recurred to hypothesis rather than to analysis, to syllogism rather
than to experiment.
;i. The Fundamental Principle of Rosniini\s rhilosophij
"Unity and totality" is, according to Rosniini. the main charac-
teristic of a true and efficient philosophy.'" This characteristic,
which we find in the contemporary romantic philosophy, he endeav-
ored to .stamp upon his own. Accordingly, he elaborated his ethical
and theoretical doctrine in close connection; his ideology and ethics
are so interrelated that the one lends light to tlu^ other. Thus, the
distinctive marks of the leading principles of his ethical theory
can not be given apart from the general principles of his philosophy.
A.S we have seen, Rosmini, under the pres.sure of Italy's political
and moral problem thought that the main business of philosophy
was to build human knowledge upon a fixed basis, and thus to cheek
the deplored outcome of skepticism and materialism, and. by placing
rea.son in opposition to opinion, to overcome anarchical change which
sensationalism and empiricism favored. Rut, according to him. as
well as to Kant, the difficulty of the problem of knowledge lies in the
po.ssibility of the first judgment. Knowledge is judgment, and then
the analysis of the first knowledge or judgment is the first step in
every serious philosophical research. Now, the essence of judgment
13 See " Introdiizione alia filosofia. "
""The Origin of Ideas," No. 410.
""Theorlioy," No. 138, Vol. 1.
16 See " Introtluzione alia filosofia."
24 BOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
consists in the union of a subject individual and of a predicate, of
a particular idea and of a universal idea. Thus every judgment
supposes a universal idea. Experience gives us particular ideas or
the matter of knowledge. The universal idea, however, or the form
can derive neither from sense-experience, for this happens w'ithin
the sphere of contigent facts and reaches nothing beyond the indi-
vidual, nor from reflection, which is an operation of the mind, and
every intellectual operation is a judgment. The exclusion of these
two possibilities, the former as insufficient, and the latter as form-
ing a vicious circle, leaves one last hypothesis, namely, that the uni-
versal idea is prior, that is, innate. Thus within human reason
there is at least a notion wiiich is primitive, indispensable to the
formation of the first judgment, and which is the first condition and
link of human knowledge. This primitive idea is the light and life
of reason, and the form of forms; since it is universal, it is also the
most elementary and simple and it is to be found, accordingly, in
every judgment, in every operation of our mind as its most essen-
tial factor. It contains necessarily as in germ all human knowl-
edge ; it is the ruling thought, and successively becomes cause, sub-
stance, finality. According to Rosmini, such an idea can not but be
the ''idea of being" or the "ideal being." In fact, our internal
analysis shows us that our cognitions have the idea of being as a
common element. This idea is at the bottom of every thought.
"The idea of being," he says, "is the most universal of all
ideas. It is w^hat remains after the last abstraction possible ; and
its removal puts an end to all thought and makes every other idea
impossible. "^^
' ' Man has by nature an intuition of that ideal and indeterminate
being which contains all entity in an indistinct state, in a way ana-
logous to that in which a large block of marble contains all the
statues which the sculptor proposes to make out of it, or a given
superficies all the figures that can be designed thereon. "^^
This "corner-stone" of the edifice of human knowledge, virtue,
and happiness, which Rosmini sought from his early youth, this
nucleus, source, and rule of every art and science, this very efficient
means of philosophical and social restoration, is not a production of
reason itself; it does not derive from the thinking self, like the Kan-
tian forms; but it is communicated from without, and it is, there-
fore, not subjective, but objective.^"
17 "The Origin of Ideas," A'ol. II., No. 411, page 17.
18 " Theodicy, " Vol. II., No. 668, page 159.
19 See "Filosofia del Diritto, " Introdiizione. Pagani reports in his "Life
of Rosmini ' ' that the Italian philosopher proposed to himself the great problem
of the origin of ideas when he was seventeen years old (1814), and that in the fol-
lowing year he discovered the fundamental principle of his philosophy.
PART II
THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF KOSMINI'S ETHICAL THEORY
INTRODUCTORY
The Scope and ^Ietuod of Ethics
The science of ethics is, according to Rosmini, the director of
human life, since its purpose is to direct man's rational activity.
Man's goodness, however, depends upon the goodness of his will, for
the will is the supreme and active rational power, which controls
and synthesizes all his intellectual and moral actions. Nay, the
will is precisely the same radical and immanent activity which con-
stitutes human personality. Whence our philosopher concludes
that man is moral, because his will is susceptible of good and bad
activity, of moral or immoral acts and habits, or, in one word, of
morality.^
Thus the crux of every theory is to discover the factors which
make good man's will, or, in other words, what is "moral good" or
"virtue." Man is endowed with the faculty of sensation as well as
with that of intelligence. By the faculty of .sensation, he perceives
things as they are; by the faculty of intelligence, he perceives things
as possible. This different mode of perceiving is, according to our
philosopher, the cause of distinction between subjective and objec-
tive good.
The sense is the source of subjective good ; the intellect is the
source of objective good. Every sensible good stimulates and satis-
fies man; and he is naturally impelled to unite himself to such a
good, and to enjoy it. Man, however, does not regard the objective
or "intelligible" good as .sometliing which belongs to himself, as
something which may be felt by him. He merely eonsidei's it as an
object of his intelligence, of his intellectual intuition everywhere
and in wliatsoever mode it may be found. "The objective good is
merely contemplated by the intelligence." Now, the burning ques-
tion is whether the moral good is subjective or objective.
Rosmini believes this distinction to be of the highest importance,
1 See "Antropologia," I., IV.. €hs. VL, VIII.; "Prefazione alle opere di
filosofia morale"; "Compendio di etica." Introduzione, §§I., 11.; "Thco<licy,"
Xo9. 398, 410.
25
26 BOSMINI'S CONTSIBVTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
since the confusion of tlie two kinds of good has brought ruin to
philosophy and morals.- He praises the German school because of
its contribution to the important distinction, whereby ethics has
been delivered from the motivation of happiness.^
To say that moral good is subjective, is, according to Rosmini,
to base it upon the relativity of human ideas and purposes, and,
consequently, upon individual opinions, preferences, and caprices;
thus it can be found together with a bad will. This is the fatal
consequence of the philosophy of sense. But our philosopher, im-
pelled by the bias of his mind and character, is determined to oppose
such philosophical premises and ethical consequences. He seems
thoroughly convinced that the ethical conduct of life needs sure
principles, that the norm and standard for the valuation of worth
must be unique, fixed, and absolute, and, finally, that it may be
found above and beyond individual experience, in a Platonic meta-
physical atmosphere,
Rosmini, following the German philosophers, eliminates happi-
ness, that is to say, just what the Greek thought to be its essential
element, from the science of ethics. He holds that ethics is only
concerned with moral good. Eudemonology is the science which
deals with happiness.
Thus, the great problem the moral philosopher is called upon
to solve is the problem of the nature of moral good. It is indeed a
problem of the highest practical importance, since human happiness
depends upon its right solution. The nature of moral good, how-
ever, may be traced only by the analysis of its fundamental factors.
Now, from all Rosmini 's ethical works it may be concluded that he
thinks the moral good to be the outcome of two main factors, one
of which we may call ''metaphysical" and the other "psycholog-
ical.'' According to him, all ethical judging, the will and its whole
activity, must conform to a supreme and fundamental law of action,
which is categorically imperative, universally true and valid as well
as universally uniform. This is, for him as for Kant, the most sig-
nificant feature of morality. Such a law, however, which he sup-
poses to be prior to all particular laws, grounding their existence
and obligatory force, is objective, absolute, and independent of all
empirical motives.
This primal and fundamental law is the metaphysical and chief
factor of morality ; it constitutes its essence. Bufr the law presup-
poses an agent, and an agent capable of adjusting himself; it presup-
2 See "Prefazione alle opere di filosofia morale"; "Priucipii della scienza
morale," Ch. III.; "Storia comparativa e critica intorno al principio della
morale," etc.
3 See "Prineipii della scienza morale," op. cit., Ch. III.^ a. I.
THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF ETHICS 27
poses a free will. Neither the law nor the will alone constitutes
morality.
The moral situation, according to Rosmini, involves also the
psychological factor, and both ethical factors, not asumler, but in
reciprocal relation. The science of ethics is then confronted by
another problem of no less importance : the problem of the nature
of the agent and of the relation between law and the will in order
to have human actions clothed with morality, and therefore good.
It is the business of ethics to answer these central problems,
which form the core of every ethical theory. Let us notice here that
Rosmini does not regard an ethical theory as a working hypothesis,
since ethics is not for him hypothetical, conditional, and relative,
lie considers ethical tlicoiy as helpful to morals because of its
formulation of fixed precepts for action, rather than for the scien-
tific insight it affords into trutli. Tie does not define ethical theory
from the standpoint of principles which can provide a method of
action, but from that of rules which are prescriptions for it. Ethics,
however, is a science for him, not an art, as for Joim Stuart Mill.*
It is, indeed, a science because it formulates laws, but it is a
practical science, as its laws are formulated for the sake of action.
It may, accordingly, be called "the theory of practise" or "the
theory of action."^
Ethics, says Rosmini, is "the science which gives systematic order
to the norms to which human actions must adjust themselves, and
determines the relation between actions and norms.""*
*" Logic," Book 6, Ch. 12.
5 See "Prefazione alio opore di filosofia morale."
6 See "Sistcnia lilosofiio, " No. 21G.
CHAPTER I
The ]\Ietaphysical Factor of Morality
EosMiNi, being determined to set up the ideal of reason against
the relativism of sense, seems to regard as basic the conviction that
the concept is the goal of science, since conception alone gives us
the permanent essence of things, while the objective content of con-
ceptual knowledge is the idea. According to him. the idea is merely
the immediate and direct cognition of things in their proper essence,
which is eternal.^
Since an idea is an essence, and since our judgment is always
right when an idea is its rule, Rosmini thinks that an idea, a notion,
is also the rule or standard according to which we must judge of
the morality of our actions, and behave : that is to say that the
moral law is nothing else than an idea.- The notion of "perni-
ciousness, ' ' for instance, is the notion through which w^e know what
actions are pernicious or not. We compare and conform our ac-
tions with such a notion, as if it were a type. The moral law is
then a notion. Besides, Rosmini seems to accept the law exalted by
Socrates to the principle of scientific method, namely, the law of
logical dependence of the particulars upon the universal. He
thinks, accordingly, that every notion supposes and depends upon
another, anterior to itself, and that a series of notions supposes a
primordial one that is the ground upon which all the others are
based. Thus, since moral norms are nothing else but notions, ac-
cording to our philosopher, they also suppose a notion which is the
first of the whole possible series. And he finds that every moral
law is indeed permeated with a common form or idea, as every one
indicates and prescribes something common, or what is "moral
good" in human action. From that he concludes that all laws are
derived from a fundamental one, or, in other words, they are noth-
ing else but applications and consequences of a primordial and basic
one. That is the fundamental idea through which we form our
moral judgments. Now, the question arises: Wliat is this funda-
mental idea or notion? What is this primal and basal law? Ros-
mini thinks that such notion and law are the outcome neither of
1 See "Psychology," No. 1339; "Prineipii della scienza morale," Ch. I.,
a. I., and Ch. II., a. II. " L'essenza," says Eosmiui, "non c se non do che si
comprende nella idea della medesima."
2 "Prineipii," op. cit., Ch. I., a. I.
28
THE METAPnYSICAL FACTOFi OF MOJ^ALITY 2i)
experience, nor of reflection, as they iiave nothiiipr to do witli man's
sensuous nature, nor with the whole workl of phenomena. Man as
sensuous being can aft'ord no foundation for a law which is supposed
to be supreme, and independent of all emi)irical motives. Its seat is
indeed man as noumenon. to use Kant's language, or his rea.son,
that is to say, his essential ami characteristic part. The funda-
mental law, however, is not a product of rea.son, as Kant holds it to
be. Rosmini thinks that the notion which is the root of all laws
and moral noi-ms. which is valid and uniform universally for ra-
tional beings, can not be created by reason. According to him. it
is an original possession of the mind. Our mind is passive, as the
law is given to it prior to all perception or individual cognition.
Such a notion, moreover, according to Rosmini, is endowed with
immutability, eternity, universality, and necessity.^
Now, the idea, endowed with such divine characteristics, can not
fail to be the idea of being, not of this or that being, but of uni-
versal being. The idea of being is anterior to all .sensations and
association, and then to all ideas; it is found at the bottom of every
thought ; it is used by our mind as the rule of all our judgments.*
Since the first Idea is the factor and source of all judgments, it
follows that it is also the factor and source of all ethical judgments,
and thus that it is the fundamental law, the generator and the
raison d'etre of all laws and moral standards. Besides, since it is
the light of reason and since our mind, when it reasons and judges,
does nothing but apply it, we ought to follow it wlion we perform
our actions. By so doing, we follow a fixed and absolute rule and
ideal of rightness, or truth itself.
But how may the ideal being, or the essence of being, be the su-
preme moral rule, or the rule of moral good ? IIow may it ho the
means whereby we judge of the good and evil of our actions? IIow
may it be the supreme criterion or standard of morality?
Rosmini thinks that the moral good of liuman conduct is a kind
of good ; accordingly, we can not judge of it. unless we have first
the notion of good in general. By defining the moral good, we do
nothing else than determine and limit the universal notion of
good, and adapt it to moral science, which does not deal with the
general good, but with a special good, namely, with the moral.
What is then good in general ?
Our philosopher makes an original analysis of th<^ nature of
pood. Men, he says, usually claim as "good" the object which
pleasantly stimulates and answers to our faculty of desiring, namely,
the faculty which impels us to enjoy the good. Of course, an ob-
« See "Principii, op. cit., Cli. T.
<See "New Essay on the Origin of Idea?," Nos. 558-574.
30 BOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
ject which is provocative of abhorrence rather than of longing to
possess and enjoy it, is never said to be "good." Thus the real
and concrete good involves some interdependence, some connection,
some relation between things and our appetitive power; it implies,
from one side, the adaptability, the fitness of things to satisfy our
needs, our craving, our personal convenience, and, from the other,
the existence of our conative impulse towards them.
Such interrelation supposes, indeed, a being capable of feeling,
of desiring, and of seeking the objects which are endowed with pro-
vocative characteristics. Now, may such a being fail to desire itself?
No, indeed. Its tendencies fatally converge towards the preserva-
tion and development of its own nature. It would be an obvious
inconsistency to say that a being might long for its own annihilation,
as annihilation is nothing, and nothingness can not be the object of an
appetite. Every existing being then has a tendency to unfold itself, to
better itself, and to preserve itself. Development, perfection, and
preservation are its good.
The same power of desiring is nothing else but the power of aim-
ing at its own perfection, and at everything that has the possibility
of helping to reach the natural goal of every being, that is to say, its
expansion of life, its totality and completion, or, in a word, its good.
Good and Being, therefore, are identical terms, and the ancients
were right to define good as the end of all things and the object of
universal desire. The identity of Good and Being is also confirmed
by the analysis of the satisfaction of our appetitive faculty. Ros-
mini finds in every satisfaction two elements, namely, a general
condition of well-being or an enjoyment, and a perfection, a value,
or some worth which is enjoyed. The question naturally arises
whether these two elements of the subjective good are necessary to
constitute the concept of good, or whether one alone is sufficient.
When we indicate the perfections or values of a certain nature, do
we not indicate so many goods? Do we not give an account
of them before considering any appetitive power? Are we not
wont to attribute degrees of perfection and good even to inanimate
and insensible natures? Do we not usually say that every thing is
good, when it is considered in its own nature? Do we not take as
synonymous terms "perfection and good"? Do we not conceive
the perfections of the various natures as so many beings inde-
pendently of the subject which might be stimulated by them, and
might long for them ? Rosmini thinks that man 's idea of perfection
or value is the outcome of experience. For a sensible being can
not perceive any perfection if it does not feel it; and our mind
can not think of a certain good, unless it is presented to it by feeling.^
5 See ' ' Principii, ' ' op. cit., Ch. II., a. I. ; his " Ideologia. ' '
TEE METAPHYSICAL FACTOli OF MOEALITT 31
Accordingly, the former (luestion may be expressed as follows:
Since we can not perceive and hence can not know the worth of
the various natures, unless we have some feeling and appetite, does
it follow that the feeling and appetite are also necessary to their
existence? In other words, may a perfection, a ^'ood, exist without
being sensible ?
Rosmini hokls that it is of the highest iiiipoi'tiuiee to iiotiee that
a thing to be evaluated, to be a perfection, must afford some sensible
satisfaction, that is to say, its qualities must be felt by some agent.
It thus implies some relation to some sense, and then to some being,
for whom alone it has value. A perfection which does not give any
enjoyment, does not perfect, can not be conceived as such. A per-
fection, therefore, involves "sensibility," that is to say, adaptation,
aptitude to be felt and desired; it involves some relation to a being
endowed with the power of feeling. Even the perfections of inani-
mate things are said to be perfections because of their relation to
some being furnished with senses.
Thus, we may conclude that neither enjoyment, nor perfection,
alone, is the essential constituent of the idea of good. Both are
required to constitute it, as both are so closely interdependent that
they can not be conceived a.sunder. A desirable object always pre-
supposes a feeling subject; and an object which is enjoyed always
involves a relation to some agent ; the goodness of both objects im-
plies the exi.stence of some being. The analysis of the subjective
and empirical good proves, according to Rosmini, that Being and
Good are identical terms. Our philosopher proves their identity
by considering the good, not only in its relation to sen.se and appe-
tites, and then to some being, but even by the analysis of the concept
of good, namely, by investigating what our understanding recog-
nizes and distinguishes within the concept of good. According to
him. our undei'standing considering good as its own object, or as
concept, sees it stripped of its relation to feeling. For it is its law
to forget, or, at lea.st, not to notice what is mingled at the very be-
giiHiing of the process of formation of concepts. These being
formed, are kept under a synthetic condition, inuler a fornnda of
what our understanding saw in the first and immediate cognition,
and to it we refer, without paying any more attention to what is
present in .sen.sation. In like manner, if we examine the origin of
our idea of good and perfection, we find that at the very beginning
we have aasociated an agreeable .sensation with it. .so that we did
not recognize any good, uidess it was followed by .some plea.sant
impression. After having acquired the habit of attributing the
concept of perfection to things we have known by experience to be
pleasant, we think of them, without paying any more attention to
32 BOSMINI'S CONTFIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
their power of modifying us pleasantly. Thus the term "perfec-
tion" is gradually freed in our mind from its relation to the senses;
it acquires a general value; it becomes a universal concept, and
thus independent of its connection with sensuous nature, Rosmini
notices that our understanding goes further in this process of ideal-
ization, as it also observes the pleasant or painful condition of the
human body to correspond to a certain disposition of its parts, to a
certain order in the measure, in the form, in the number, in the re-
ciprocal connection and action of its parts. Thus, such intrinsic
order, to which a pleasant sensation corresponds, is considered as
perfection of the human body. In that case, however, we still call
perfection the condition of the body coexistent with the agreeable
feeling. But we afterwards generalize our own experience, and, ob-
serving the other beings, animate and sensible like us, regard them
as perfect, because we are aware that they realize their ideal type,
they arc what they ought to be, they "are," namely, they conform
to their essence, and, accordingly, they seem to enjoy the most
pleasant existence.
In the same manner, we see inanimate beings to be more or less
fit to subserve our own needs, or those of other beings, because they
have a certain condition, configuration, and composition, or, in other
words, they are what they ought to be, namely, useful and agree-
able. In all these cases the term "perfection" has the meaning of
the intrinsic order, of the most complete condition of development
and realization of every being.
Such essential order, however, such completeness or perfection
exists only within our understanding, because of its own process, as
concept or, what is just the same for Rosmini, as essence. Thus,
the essence of a being is its ideal type, or the rule or criterion, ac-
cording to which we judge of the degrees of its goodness. We
think its good to be what is required by its essence, what unfolds
and realizes it, or, in other words, what is appropriate to its nature,
and harmonizes with its existence.
The energies of every being naturally seek that end, as its most
perfect and typical condition. Thus the analysis of the idea of
good shows that Being and Good are two terms involving each other ;
that they are two aspects of the same truth. The Scholastic saying
^'ens et honum convertuntur" is justified. Now, it is important to
notice that the value, perfection, or the good of beings is contem-
plated, indeed, by our intelligence, but it is contemplated, accord-
ing to Rosmini, as something real, objective, and then independently
of the pleasant sensuous effect, as it is seen under the light of the
primordial object of our mind, or, of ideal being. Whence it fol-
lows that all essences are nothing else, for our philosopher, but de-
THE METAPHYSICAL FACTOIl OF MORALITY 33
terminations and limitations of the universal and ideal Being itself.
Besides, it follows that the idea of good, like the idea of being, is
more general than sensation, it is prior to it.
Rosmini notices, moreover, tliat, since the vahie or good of a
being is found in the realization of its essence, it follows tiiat every-
thing which opposes and thwarts the process of its development is
evil. Thus evil is. not absolute negation of good, but lack of some
perfection. Accordingly, a series of values, of good, may be found
in every beinir. starting inmi its first and imperfect existence and end-
ing with its last stage of development and realization. The more ade-
(|uately, then, a being realizes its ideal, the more entity it has, the
greater is its good. Now, since Being and (iood are one and the same
thing, it is obvious that we know the value or the degree of perfection
of a being, when we possess its idea ; when we know its essence, its de-
gree of existence, as well as its intrinsic order and how far it is real-
ized. Besides, from the identity of Being and Good it may be con-
cluded that the notion whereby both are known by us is the same.
Since, according to Rosmini, the idea of being is the origin of all be-
ings, it follows that it is also the origin of all goods; and as it is the
means whereby we know all beings, it is evident that it is also the
means whereby we know and valuate every kind of good, namely, the
good which satisfies .some agent, or subjective good, as well as the
good which is independent of all personal and empirical motives, and
which is good in itself, or objective good.
From the fact that Being and CTOod are identical Rosmini finally
infei-s the concept of Absolute Good. As Absolute Being is the
being which has the whole of es.sence within itself, so also Absolute
Good is the good which includes the whole of good. The Complete
Being is the Complete Good, which lacks nothing, and for this
rea.son it is ab.solute. The Complete Being, however, is the supreme
good, not only in and for itself, but it is also the supreme good rela-
tively to particular beings. Rosmini calls the complete and abso-
lute Being, which is by the same fact the snpreme and absolute
Good, "God." God, therefore, is the end of human activity. To
become one with ITim is the high destiny of man as rational being."
Now. to understand Rosmini 's point of view, it is of the highest
importance to notice what is fundamental in his ethical theory. He
holds that everj' real individual, realizing his own es.sence, does
iiothing but realize the essence of being. Since this partakes of
the universal, infinite, necessary, and divine essence, it partakes of
the Absolute Being, of God Himself. Bv the same fact, everv real
individual by realizing good partakes of the Absolute Good. Thns
cSee "Principii," op. cit., Ch. III., a. VII F.
34 BOSMINI'S CONTSIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
the Absolute Good is the goal of rational activity, and ought to be
recognized and loved wherever found.
Every man, therefore, according to Rosmini, as rational being,
and thus partaking of God Himself, makes a moral demand, that
is to say, he demands to be recognized and loved, because of his
participation in the Absolute Being and Good. The essence of
morality, then, or, the ultimate ground of every moral law, of every
moral obligation, lies in the respect due to Infinite Essence. Ac-
cordinglj'-, the principle of morality may be formulated in the fol-
lowing law: ''Recognize the essence of being J' But to recognize
the essence of being is the same as to recognize its goodness ; we can
say then that the principle of morality consists in the practical
recognition of every being, according to the good it is found to
possess, that is to say, according to its value and worth.
Now, since the essence of morality is identical with the essence
of being, it must be endowed with the same characteristics. Since
the essence of being is objective (because it is independent of every
subject), so also is moral good or the essence of morality. We do
not create it; we only verify it. The essential law of pure reason,
according to Rosmini, consists in grasping being in itself, so also the
law of practical reason is the good appreciated in itself, or, in its
intrinsic and objective value, not according to the merely personal
and subjective profit which may derive to the agent from his faith-
fulness to duty. Besides, good partakes of the immutability of
Being; its stability is then eternal. The good which is object of
human actions is, finally, as the essence of being, divine and infinite.
God, therefore, ought to be, according to our philosopher, the focus
of thought and love, the satisfaction of man 's intelligence and heart.
Moreover, since the principle of morality and obligation consists
in the practical recognition of every being, according to its essence
and goodness, it follows that we must distribute our love among
things in proportion to their respective grades of being, and prefer
the greater to the lesser grade. ''I must prefer my country," says
Rosmini, ''to my life." The moral law says absolutely: "Sacrifice
thyself for thy country."^
But here it may be asked: How can man, a finite being, ascend
to the knowledge and practical recognition of the essence of beings,
which is infinite? How can he measure the degrees of entity?
Wliat is the first and supreme rule whereby we know when and how
the principle of obligation must be applied? Rosmini answers that
man is endowed by nature with the intuition of the essence of being.
By means of this intuition, he is fitted to know and measure every
essence and then every goodness. Since the idea of being is the
7 "Theodicy," No. 725.
THE METAPHYSICAL FACTOR OF MORALITY 35
supreme rule whereby we conceive and measure the entity of beings,
and con.se(iuently the objective good, or, moral good, end of human
actions, the ethical formula "Follow the litjht of reason," may be
translated into this other: "Follow the idea of good, as it shoivs
you the measure of the entity of every being/' To know its entity
is to know its value, its worth, its dignity, and its right to be recog-
nized for what it is and to be loved accordingly.**
Thus, according to Rosmini, the idea of being is the ground of
ethical judgments; it is the source of morality and obligation; it is
the metaphysical basis of the law of knowledge and action. Epis-
temolog}' and ethics have the same foundation, independent of man's
experience. This is the kernel of Rosmini 's ethical theory!
8 "Theodicy," No. 725.
CHAPTER II
The Psychological Factor of Morality
The whole value, the whole good, of beings lies, according to
Rosmini, in the fact that beings, realizing their own essence, partake
of the infinite, immutable, and absolute essence of the Supreme Be-
ing. Their good, however, if it is known and enjoyed only by in-
telligence, is "objective good."
Intelligence considers them in themselves, independently of every
personal interest, of every empirical motive, and, by so doing, it
attributes to them that which really belongs to them, and thus it does
them justice. The moral good, then, can not be anything else than
the objective good. And the supreme moral law, the whole moral
legislation is rooted and grounded in the objective good, or, in
other words, in the Absolute and Eternal. But the possibility of
man's subordination to a certain law depends upon its promulga-
tion. Man must have knowledge of the law in question ; it must be
present in his mind as an idea; for when man obeys a normative
rule, he adjusts his rational activity, his will, to it. The root of
human activity lies in knowledge itself; action is always directed
by idea; and will terminates through action in an object known and
set before it by intelligence.^
The supreme moral law, therefore, or the objective good, must
be, indeed, present to the intelligence, not as a mere object of con-
templation. If the will does not intervene to will it, after having
knowm it, objective good does not acquire the characteristic of moral
good. A merely speculative, formal, sterile knowledge of the good
can not constitute the notion of moral good. When the agent wills
the good known already by his intelligence, the good is moral. Thus
the moral good is, according to Rosmini, the objective good, known
by the intelligence and willed by the will.^
The quality of morality is simply the relation of the objective
good to the intelligent nature willing it. Now, Rosmini thinks that
the supreme and fundamental law of morality has been promul-
gated to man from the early dawn of his life. Since the idea of
being is the light of reason itself, or ''a spark of the divine fire"
which enables man to know the entity of beings, it performs the
1 " Theodicy, " Nos. 398, 631, 637, 644.
2"Prmeipii," op. cit., Ch. IV., a. VI.
36
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR OF MORALITY 37
function of the supreme moral law ; since it is innate, it follows
that we carry within ourselves the germ of morals, the source of
the whole moral legislation ; we bear within ourselves the reason or
will of God Himself, unceasingly proclaiming what is right. ^
Thus, for Rosmini. the fundamental law or notion of morality is
not the outcome of the course of experience, but something imposed,
originating from a transcentlental, invisible authority. The mind
is merely passive when it receives the principle of morality, as it
can not be legislator to itself; it can impo.se no norms, no standards
of action on itself. Accordingly, the basis and justifying principle
of the ethical judgment lie outside of the mind itself in transcen-
dental conceptions, or considerations that do not result from human
experience. Our philosopher is thoroughly convinced that the prin-
ciple of morality can not be empirically acquired, but that it must
be implanted, because it is universal and categoric ; it is truth itself,
whereas experience, however repeated and multiplied, never gives
anytiiing more than particular facts.*
Rca.sons and laws can not be received by the senses; essentially
unknown to sense, they are manifest only to rational natures.^ The
principle of morality is, therefore, infused into our reason. Thus,
it is abstract and .static !
But Being has, for Rosmini, always this essential characteristic,
that it is good, and hence it can not be known except as good. Now,
the knowledge of it as good implies an affection, an inclination
toward it. Just as Being, in its character of "light," creates the
intellect, a formal cause of the human soul, so the same being, in its
essential character of "good," creates the "primitive will," as the
final cause which actuates the first affection, the first volition, di-
rected to universal being. And as the intellect is the receptive
power, so the will is the active power which corresponds to it. Now,
according to our philosopher, the intellect has, as its essential object,
ideal being. Being is immutable, the intellect, then, has the nature
of an "immanent" act rather than of a power. In the same way
it may be said that the primitive and universal will has not the
nature of a power, but of an immanent act. which is the principle
and basis of power. Hence Rosmini prefers to call it "primitive
volition," in.stead of primitive will."
3 " Compcndio di etica." Nos. 5.3, .54; "Theodicy," Nos. 5, 2.59. 262.
*"Thcodirj-." Nos. 13,8. IM, 1.51. 2.5!).
5 "Principii," op. dt., Ch. T., a. III. Rosmini think.s that his conception
conforni5< to Marcus Aurelius's conception of fundamental law. "Hanc video
sapicnti.s.'timorum fuissp scntcntiam, legem neque hominuvi intjeniis rnpHafam,
nee scitum nliquod ease populorum, sed (uternum quiddam, quod univcrsum mun-
dum regeret, imperandi, prohibendiquc sapicntia." (*'De Leg.," IT.)
• "Psychology," Nos. 1008-1011. "The immanent act is that which en-
38 HOSMINI'S CONTSIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHT
Man, accordingly, by the intuition of the essence of the uni-
versal being, is enabled to know the essence of real and individual
beings, that is to say, their value, their worth, and their "claim" to
be recognized and loved. For the same reason he has a natural and
spontaneous predisposition toward the universal being or universal
good. And since the moral principle imposes adhesion to the known
entity of beings, man is by nature predisposed to act in accordance
with the fundamental moral law. Such a force which tends to the
whole of being, to universal good, may be called "moral," because
it comes from being and goes to beiug.^
Thus the human will carries within itself a relation of con-
formity to the first and eternal law, or notion of being. Man, as a
real being, is finite, but by the intuition of Being, he is also intel-
lective and moral, and partakes of the infinite. His tendency, how-
ever, to act morally, that which Rosmini calls "moral liberty," in so
far as it is natural and spontaneous, is not meritorious. Man is neces-
sitated to act with moral liberty, that is to say, he is determined to
his action, not by external cause, but by his inner impelling bent to
adhere to good in general. This natural inclination of the subject
to universal good is what constitutes the will itself.'^
The will, regarded as such, is not the source of merit ; it deserves
neither praise nor blame.'' But if the will acts in accordance with
this first activity, it preserves in its operation an order altogether
analogous and corresponding to the order of being itself, and by
this order it is determined to act with moral perfection. This
point of view evidently involves a deterministic and intellectualistic
conception of the will, and makes the decision of the will exclusively
dependent on inner insight.
Does it mean that Rosmini does not believe in the freedom of
the human will? Rosmini believes in it, and gives an original and
interesting analysis of it. Liberty, according to him, springs up
at a certain stage of the psychic process of action. Doubtless it
does not intervene in the intuition of the essence of being, since this
is absolute and necessary. This essential and divine power is given
to man and he does not contribute anything to it. Nor does liberty
intervene in the spontaneous and immanent tendency which the
dures with a being so long as no substantial change supervenes in it. ' ' Ibid.,
1205.
7 See "Psychology," No. 896; "Etiea," Nos. 514-525; "Teosofia," No.
1037. Such moral force is called by Eosniini " Preponderanza morale." It is
nothing else but what is called by St. Thomas "Bonum naturae, scilicet naturalis
inclinatio ad virtutem," la, Ilae, q. LXIII. and LXXXV., a. I.
8 See "Teosofia," No. 1037; "Etica," No. 29.
9 Dante expresses the identical idea^ when he says, ' ' Qiiesta prima voglia
Merto di lode o di iiasimo non cape. ' ' Purg. XIXVIII., 59, 60.
THE PSTCnOLOGICAL FACTOR OF MOEALITT 39
idea of being or the liglit of reason produces in the will, impellinf*
it to adhere to, and love, all entity and good. It may be said that
the divine craves for the divine which is found in every intelligent
being. Liberty, finally, does not intervene in the external action,
as that depends on the will, subordiiuited. already, to a certain nor-
mative rule, and determined thereby. The role of free will, there-
fore, the merit or demerit of actions, and the responsibility of the
agent, are to be sought elsewhere.
Rosmini thinks that man is endowcil ns ith a twofold activity; as
an intelligent being he is endowed with rational activity; as a real
being he is endowed with sensuous activity. Now, if he were merely
intelligent, if he could shuffle off his mortal coil of animal ([ualities,
he would be in a state of pure intelligence ; he would comnnuiicate
with beings by means of his reason ; he would perceive their whole
entity by the same means, and, bj' perceiving their entity, he would
perceive also their value, their good. Such transcendental knowl-
edge would, of course, induce a universal rational love for all beings ;
such universal love would afford intellectual delight to man, rid of
his animality. This whole process would be spontaneous, neces-
sary, voluntary, as the will of the rational luiture would then follow
its own natural inclination. Man, therefore, as an intelligent being,
would always act morally, namely, according to his natural rational
predisposition toward universal being and good, as well as in ac-
cordance with the moral demand of beings to be recognized and
loved, in proportion to their entity. As a real being, however, man
is endowed with feeling, with physical qualities and needs; in other
words, he feels impelled by an inner physical force to act for his
own satisfaction, pleasure, or happiness.
If this activity which, aims, not at the good in itself, but at the
good of the agent, could be naturally conformed with the rational
and immanent activity, the freedom of the will would be useless.
But it happens that both activities come into collision and seek to
determine the will in opposite directions; either of which alone would
suffice to make it act. At this crucial stage, the objects of opposite
order, radically different, produce two kinds of volition. Both
volitions are possible; as the one may determine the will towards
the intellective and objective good, aiul the other towards the sensi-
tive and subjective good. The choice between the two possible voli-
tions is free. There is no coercion. Man has. according to Rosmini.
the power of making one volition prevail over another, and thus of
determining himself to action. This power which the will pos.sesses,
is called by Rosmini "liberty of indifference," "bilateral-liberty,"
or "meritorious libcrtv."
40 EOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
But how does the will display such a power? How does one
volition prevail over another? How is the choice between two con-
trary volitions brought about? Rosmini holds that the will is a
power which acts in accordance with the reasons that man has in
his mind and proposes to himself. Whence we may conclude that
the will can not operate unless man has reasons or knowledge, ac-
cording to which he might deliberate, choose, and will. The reason
or motive, however, does not determine the will.
The determining force, the power of free choice, or "liberty,"
lies within the agent himself. Liberty affords the agent, in the
presence of several motives, the power of making one motive prevail
over all others so that the predominating motive determines the will
to act."
Rosmini, however, does not mean that a motive might have the
force of directing choice. According to him, there are two kinds
of cognition. The first cognition of things is direct, immediate, in-
stinctive, necessary, and so not voluntary. Through it we are fur-
nished with ideas of thicgs. The understanding forms perceptions,
and such ideas as are consequent on these, in an instinctive and
natural manner, and, for tliat reason it is not liable to error, for
nature does not err. Through this first intellective apprehension
we perceive the thing in its entirety, by a simple act, as if it were a
simple object. Thus, the direct cognition is purely synthetic; it is
the primitive, spontaneous synthesis of being and sensation. Let
us notice that in perceiving the things as a whole, we have no in-
terest to perceive them in one manner rather than in another. We
are then merely passive.^^
Besides, we must notice that in perceiving the entity of beings,
we have a conception of their value. Accordingly, direct cognition
enables our theoretical reason to make speculative judgments and
acquire speculative knowledge. The first ideas, however, by which
we know things are for Rosmini equally indifferent ; they have, in
other words, not purposive, but representative character only. Thus
Rosmini fails to notice that all our consciousness is dynamogenic,
and that an idea is a nascent act. Our philosopher, however, thinks
that the need of action impels the will to reflection, that is to say,
to turn back upon what we before perceived directly and involun-
tarily; it urges the rational, active power to analyze, decompose,
and consider previous and direct cognitions.
This process of reflection, of analysis, which is thoroughly volun-
tary and practical involves a ''practical evaluation" or "judgment"
10 ' ' Antropologia, ' ' Ch. VII.
11 See "New Essay on the Origin of Ideas," Vol. III.. Nos. 1258, 1259,
1261; "Principii," op. cit., Ch. V., a. III.
THE PSYCnOLOGICAL FACTOR OF MORALITY 41
of the things, known already throu^rh previous, immediate cogni-
tion. At tliis stage the will displays its power of liberty. For it is
free to appreciate and recognize things as they are in cognition and
to adhere to their entity as known, as it is free to alter their value
by arbitrarily increasing or diminishing for itself the degrees of
being or entity, thus substituting another entity, feigned and created
by the energy of its own caprice. The volitional activity then mani-
fests itself by "recognition," either simple or fictitious. It implies,
indeed, a previous cognition as well as no alteration of its object.
This voluntary recognition is an assent to immediate cognition; it
is true, just, moral, if the will, in i-ecognizing the previously known
entity, does not alter its value, but is content with that measure of
value which direct cognitinn prescribes. On the contrary, it is
unjust and immoral, if the will assumes that the entity of things is
different from the one contained in the direct cognition, and thus
estimates it at more or at less than its true worth, recognizing it as
what it is not. not as what it is.
This practical force of arbitrary evaluation is simjily the reason
which prevails and determines the choice. Without the practical
force there is no determination, but a mere inclination which does
not end in choice. Thus, given the case in which each of two voli-
tions has in its favor a reason of equal weight, the free will can. by
increasing the force of the reason which is favorable to it, choose one
rather than the other. Whence Rosmini concludes that the will may
conform its activity to its moral liberty or to the moral claim of
beings, and thus to the good, or to the opposite, and thus be unjust
and evil.'-
He notices, besides, that practical esteem produces a "practical
love." We act because we are impelled by a practical love which
prevails over other loves. We are free to will or not to will actions,
because we are free to love or not to love them, to increase or di-
minish our love or our hatred of this or that action. This power
of ours which is called liberty is practised first on the affections of
our heart, and through it on tlie actions themselves.
But when we love a thing, we love it because we consider it good ;
we may, indeed, love something evil, but when we do so, we love it
"suh specie honi." Thus, the intrinsic nature of love involves
esteem of the object loved; our personal valuation is a factor in our
own loving."
To sum up; the process of the moral act, according to Rosmini,
i»See "Psychology." No. llO.'i; " Antropolopia," Nos. (536-64.^; "The-
odicy," No. 621; "Etica," Ch. III., a. I., II., III.; "Principii," op. cit.,
Ch. V.
13 See "Principii," op. cit.. Hi. V., a. TIT.
I
I
42 EOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
is as follows: we first have ideas and memories of things; we have
direct and necessary cognitions: we see things as they are. After
the will provokes the reflection upon these things known, this volun-
tary reflection is just or unjust, according as it tends to recognize
faithfully the direct cognition, or to alter it. The agent, during
voluntary reflection, concentrates his attention, or meditates, upon
the immediate cognition. Out of this voluntary meditation springs
a keen and active apprehension, which is true or false, according as
the act of the will, directing reflection, was right or perverse. The
apprehension ends in a practical judgment or esteem. The prac-
tical valuation produces an intellectual delight or sorrow. Such a
delight is the beginning of the love that immediately follows it as
its completion and end, as such a sorrow is the beginning of the
hatred that immediately follows it as its mark and fulfilment.
The external action is the last stage of the complex psychic
process which the will instigates, under the pressure of action, carry-
ing out its power of liberty. Liberty, then, according to Rosmini,
consists in self-determination; the will uses its power of free choice
between volitions, categorically different, only when there is con-
flict between subjective and objective good, that is to say, between
duty, virtue, moral law, and pleasure, satisfaction, happiness, or,
in other words, between the ideal and the real, the infinite and finite.
Accordingly, it must be the law of the rational principle to consider
the value of being in itself, independently of the accidental and real
action which it exercises on the rational subject. That value must,
therefore, be measured by ideal being, and not by considerations of
subjective advantage and disadvantage, and must be estimated by
comparison with ideal being. Our practical reason must not esti-
mate its object at a different value from that which it has in itself
considered with respect to ideal being. It must act in view of the
true measure of that object discovered by comparison with the es-
sence of being intuited by the mind in universal-ideal being. To
act according to this measure is to act rationally and, hence, mor-
ally; to act from the mere impulse of the real action which an object
exercises on us, is to abandon the law of reason, to follow that of
blind, or merely sensible, real being. To act morally, in other words,
we must direct our actions to being, as it is their natural end ; thus
we must forget ourselves and objectify ourselves in being, or in
the object of our activity, as intelligent beings. And as the object
of our rational and moral actions is the Infinite, we must merge our-
selves in the Infinite, Supreme Being, the Absolute Good. AVlien
we love a thing, when we think of it, we do nothing but bring our-
selves into the same thing as term of our love and thought, and forget
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR OF MOLALITY 43
and, in a sense, annihilate ourselves. That is what Rosmini wants
us to do before the objective, infinite, moral good, the goal of onr
rational aetivity.^^ By so doing, we perform a voluntary recogni-
tion of what we first necessarily know; we welcome the good of the
things we have perceived; we recognize what is true. nay. truth it-
self; and thus we subordinate ourselves to the fundamental prin-
ciple of moralit}'; we ai"e inoi-ally ^'ood and acfoinplish our supreme
duty.
Now, since the principle of cognition which constitutes the su-
preme law, according to which tiie theoretic reason operates, sup-
plies, likewise, the law, according to whidi the practical reason ouglit
to operate, it follows that if the law of tin' theoretic reason says:
"Being is the object of knowing,'' the law of the practical reason
says: "Being ought to be object of practical knowing.""^
Let us notice here that Rosmini 's endeavors to distinguish reason
into theoretical and practical have proved to be vain. He does not,
indeed, regard, like Kant, the theoretical reason and the practical
reason as two faculties radically different.'" lie thinks that there
is but one rational principle, which in so far as it knows is called
"theoretic," and in so far as it acts is called "practical." But he
identifies them dc facto. And, indeed, since speculative reason is
constituted by the intuition of being in general, since the practical
reason is the same recognition of the essence of beings, and since
good, the term of the practical reason, and being, the terra of pure
reason, are one and the same thing, inasmuch as they are con-
vertible terms, it follows that both pure and practical reason have
the same object and term ; there is no conflict between them ; they
are not distinct, but are one reason, one instrument of activity; and
thus the rational principle which is found in man is for practise,
action, life.
jNIoreover, let us notice that Rosmini. making morality dependent
only upon knowledge, fails to consider man in his totality, as he neg-
lects to pay attention to the life of feeling which, as well as the life
of reason, claims to be a basis of ethical judging.
Finally, it is of the highest importance to notice that Rosmini
derives the conception of human dignity from the fact that man is
endowed with the intuition of Being, whereby he is enabled to ])er-
eeive, recognize, and love the entity of beings, and, since their entity
is nothing but participation in the Absolute, it follows that man is
i« " PsTchology, " No. 1429; "Theodicy." Nos. 384-415; "Teosofia." II.;
"PrJncipii," op. dt., Ch. V.
i5'<PsycholoKi'," No. 1399.
16 See "Theodicy," No. 161.
44 BOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
enabled to know, recognize, and love the Infinite, the Absolute, or
God Himself.
Besides, the light of reason, with which man is by nature en-
dowed, is participation in God's light. It is, for Rosmini as for
Flavins Justin, the natural revelation of the divine and "germinant
Logos." Thus, man partakes of God's dignity. Accordingly, he
can not be regarded as a means, but only as an end."
"See "Principii," op. cit., Ch. III., a. IX.; Ch. IV., a. VIII. and IX.;
"Storia comparativa," Ch. I., a. III.; "Teosofia," No. 831; "Etica," Nos.
98, 99, 102-104.
CONCLUSION
The theory of ideal being is the basis of Rosmiiii's vast philo-
sophical edifiee; it is the unifying faetor in his whole system of
thought; it is the starting point of every philosophical problem lie
confronts and discusses, as well as of his theory of ethics. His
entire philosophy, then, stands and falls with the doctrine of being.
The fundamental error in Rosmini's system of philosophy and of
ethics lies in his method. He begins with the universal or idea, and
attempts to descend to the particular or the phenomenal. Thus he
begins with an a priori element, with a theory of what is prior to
every experien ?, with the highest abstraction, since the idea of
being is one of the last terms of our intellectual elaboration that
supposes, indeed, a series of previous operations. Now, to assume
an abstraction, as the starting point of knowledge, is to assume a
psychological and epistemological impossibility. Positive facts con-
stitute the beginning of human knowledge. Something abstract,
extra-empirical, can not be the object of experience, of idealization,
of desire, of interest, as it has no value, no meaning for life, and
consequently it can be neither stimulus nor response to any need or
demand. The function of thinking is aroused by the presence of
some object, which involves reaction or adjustment.
It can not be denied, indeed, that every judgment iinplit's the
notion of being, but we can not from this fact conclude that the
idea of being exists within our mind, prior to all experience, and
that it may be the main factor of all our intellectual development.
The substitution of idea for fact, of intuition for perception, is an
arbitrary and unscientific substitution. In fact, how can we pass
from the mere notion of being to real being, from a mere abstract
form of our mind to life? What bridges the gulf between the ideal
and the real? According to Hegel it is "becoming"; according to
Gioberti it is "creation"; according to Rosmini it is an uncontrolled
synthesis between perception aiul ideal being.
Ro.smini endeavors, indeed, to solve the diflieulty by holding that
the idea of possil)le being, indeterminate in itself, is determined by
the act of perception, and thus it becomes the idea of a real being.
But such a postulate is not at all justified, and contains contra-
dictory affirmations. Tlie idea of a possible being, as it is sim|)le
and indeterminate, can not uiulergo the slightest change or modifi-
cation, without being no longer what it was, without annihilating
45
46 EOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
itself, for the sake of being replaced by a new idea. Thus the latter
would not be a transformation, but a suppression of the first.
The phenomenon of perception proves to be impossible in Ros-
mini's psychological theory. Perception is an act of adjustment of
the organism to the environment, and we do not need any abstrac-
tion as means of performing such a biological function.
Besides, let us remark against Rosmini's theory of knowledge
what Aristotle noticed against that of Plato, that is to say that our
knowledge does not begin with universal, since our knowledge of
the individual precedes our knowledge of the universal.^
Moreover, Rosmini, following Plato, hypostatizes the universal,
attributing to it a separate existence, characterized by immutability
and eternity. But we may object to Plato as well as to Rosmini that
the universal can not exist apart from the individual, since, if it did
so, the transition from a knowledge of the one to a knowledge of
the other would be impossible. Finally, Rosmini holds the uni-
versal to be ready-made, apart from phenomena, while we may say
that the formal aspect of universality is a production of the mind,
and, therefore, the universal, as such, does not exist in individual
things, but in the mind alone. It seems to be arbitrary to derive
the universal from a transcendental entity as Rosmini does. I can
not help regarding as a mere chimera the belief in anj'- abstract idea,
containing intelligible essence, and conditioning and determining,
as an eternal archetype, reality, the data of experience which is
concrete, particular, and determined in space and time.
To believe in such a thing is to believe that human science may
be severed into two orders of objects, absolutely distinct, and having
no other relation than a kind of parallelism in their development.
The abstract and the concrete are characterized by profound dif-
ferences, but, in spite of those differences, both are products of ex-
perience.
But Rosmini's final motive was that of Plato, and he felt it
necessary to assume the same rationalistic attitude, and to base his
ethics upon metaphysical, or rather mythical epistemology. He, as
well as Plato, thought that the knowledge in which virtue is to con-
sist must be the cognition of what is truly real, as opposed to opin-
ions which may be only relative, and dependent on phenomena, on
empirical and subjective motives, thus compromising true knowledge
and morals. The leading motive of both philosophers proved to b*»
ethico-social, since both wanted to check the moral disintegration of
their countries and to lift up the moral standard of national life
by indicating moral conduct as factor of true happiness, individual
as well as social. Thus the common ideal of their philosophical en-
1 "Eth. Nic," VI., II., 11-13, b5.
CONCLUSION 47
deavors was to win true virtuo by true kiiowlod<]:o. So I think that
Kosinini assumed as thesis of his epistemologfieal and metaphysical
doctrine of ethics, the thesis discussed, in a special way, in IMato's
Meno.-
Phito was convinced that the fundamental principle of morals
was exposed to the danger of contiiuious change by the Protagorean
doctrhie of relativity. He thou^dit, accordingly, that as Socrates
had fii-st taught, virtue is knowleilge, and knowledge of the good.
But he thought, moreover, that the absolute truth of conceptual
knowledge consists in the fact that it conc(>ivcs in the idea the true
being, iiulepentlent of every change.
Rosmini, like Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato, wanted to place
rea.son in opposition to opinion; he thought that sensationalism and
empiricism, whii'h were the prevalent currents of piiilosophical
thought in Italy at that time of national becoming, compromised or
nullified the fundamental principles of epistemology and ethics.
Accordingly, identifying being with good, in a Euclidean manner,
presupposed a changeless supreme idea in man, as the rational
measure, rule, and end of human actions, as it is also the funda-
mental source of epistemological and ethical law. lie intciulcd
thereby to furnish the new national life with a basis eternally im-
mune to change ; he intended to respond to the need of new ideals,
of new intellectual beauty, which the revival of Christian ideals
and the influence of romanticism brought into every province of life.
Rosmini, as well as Scotus Erigina. making the individual de-
pendent upon the universal, meant to subordinate all the particular
forces to the almighty authority of the Supreme Being, and of the
Cluirch. He intended, indeed, to focus the minds of the oppressed
Italians as well of the oppressors of that time and of all time, upon
an inexhaustible .source of truth and justice, (juite independent of
all circumstances and motives. That is the reason why he does not
account for the dynamic, progressive character of morality, and
thinks the moral life to be a changeless structure. He, moreover,
intended to say that duties and rights undergo no change, as the
moral order does not depend upon the will and the caprices of men,
but upon the Absolute, Eternal, Supreme Being.
The unchangeable moral principle consists in the practical recog-
nition of the entity or the good, partaken of by im-n. oi-. in other
words, in the love for all who enjoy the divine within themselves.
Such an idea, while it suggested reciprocal love and union to the
groaning hearts of the Italians, kindled also their ardent desire for
political cmatn'ipation. The fundamental moral law. divine in its
-See " rhacilo, " ami "Republic,'' especially Books IV. and V.
48 BOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
origin and nature, imposed on the oppressor's recognition of, and
veneration for, human dignity.
Human rights are sacred as duty is sacred. Since justice is
grounded in God's will, Rosmini meant that Italy's political de-
liverance and unity were God's will as well. Thus the Italian philos-
opher indirectly intended to foster the national aspirations of his
compatriots and to help modify their political and social situation.
But the principle upon which Rosmini endeavored to build his
system of ethics, although clothed with rational form, is religious
and theological, and, therefore, more adapted to moral theology than
to scientfic ethics. A scientific theory of ethics can not be grounded
upon an abstract and mystical presupposition, since what is outside
phenomena is, by the same fact, outside the control of reason and
experience, and can not be verified. The belief in an a priori, tran-
scendental principle of morality involves denial of continuity in
moral experience, not rational subordination, and hence the im-
possibility of scientific inquiry. For ethics, then, would only ex-
plain how to execute, how to carry out absolute and fixed ideals of
conduct, while its function, as science, is to organize experimental
results, and to show how man, free from every preoccupation, con-
tributes in the creation of moral ideals. And man is enabled to
say what is really good, or worth while in conduct, only by means of
personal or racial experience. An ethics, truly human and scien-
tific, since it exists precisely for the sake of man who lives and works
in the world of phenomena and experience, can not have a basis
lying outside all experience, unless it renounces a scientific stand-
point, and is satisfied to be mere casuistry or dialectics. Moreover,
Rosmini holds as supreme ethical formula the practical recognition
of being in its order. If such practical recognition were the out-
come of man, regarded in his totality, that is to say in his heart and
intelligence, we could use it as a leading measure of the worth and
good of beings, as well as for a rule of actions.
But Rosmini, following Kant, thought that there is an antithesis
between the intelligible and the phenomenal world. He, as well as
Kant, attempted to discover for ethics a rational foundation, inde-
pendent of the world of phenomena. Both thought that experience
is conditioned, while the moral law must be unconditioned, and its
origin then must be independent of all experience. Both thought
that all feeling is empirical, sensuous, egoistic, and can afford no
foundation for the moral law.
Thus, both disregarded the life of feeling and emotion, which
claims to build moral ideals in the process of human experience.
Both have the same conception of the fundamental problem of ethics,
CONCLUSION 49
and beg:in, not with an original unity, but with a duality. Kant
begins with the spontaneity and receptivity of the mind, while Ros-
mini begins with the idea of being and sensation. Such being, of
which man has an immediate and intuitive vision, has, according
to Rosmini, an objective value. But Rosmini does not prove the ob-
jective validity of the internal intuitive knowledge.
We may, accordingly, say that his "being" is nothing else
than the subjective thought itself in its extreme abstraction. Tims,
he does not begin witli God. but. as Kant, with the human mind
it.self.3
Besides, since Rosmini denies to iuiman mind the complete com-
prehension of the pure Being, and since he thus implicitly denies
the possibility of deducing from it all the determinations of being,
it follows that the pure being intuited by the mind is not the true,
pure being, namely, God, but merely the being abstracted from re-
flection.*
Rosmini, however, does not agree with Kant in some other
points. According to Kant, for instance, man is at once law-giver
and subject. According to Rosmini, man can not impose laws on
him.self. as .such an action presupposes authority, and hence he can
not be legislator to him.self. Moral conceptions, according to Kant,
are gained from pure reason itself. Rosmini thinks that the funda-
mental law can not be derived from our own reason, but that it is given,
and man is passive, Kant holds that duty springs neither from
authority, nor from experience. Rosmini is thoroughly convinced
that the .source of duty is transcendental, that is to say, it is God.
For Kant the characteristic feature of the ethical is autonomy : for
Rosmini heteronomy. The dignity of liuman personality, accord-
ing to Kant, depends on man's capacity for autonomy, or on his
capacity for following the universal law, derived from his own rea-
son ; according to Rosmini, the dignity of human personality lies in
the immediate intuition of being, in the participation of divine es-
sence by means of the light of reason, and, finally, in man's natural
capacity to incline to. and to merge him.self in, God, source of moral
good and happiness.
If we examine more particularly the moral edifice wliich Ros-
mini intended to build in those moments of intense national move-
ment, we find that liberty, according to him. is an act merely intel-
lective; that is, not an act of mere contemplation, but an act of
assenting contemplation. But is not this a metaphysical hypothesis
3 Sec Spaventa, "La filosofia di Kant e Rosmini," pages 47-t8; Fiorentino,
"La filosofia contemporanoa in Italia," page 23.
♦See A. Franchi, "Ultima Critica," page 116; R. Benzoni, "Dottrina dell-
Essere nel sistema rosminiano. "
50 BOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
without any true ground? If the assent to contemplated being is
a mere business of the intelligence, under the pressure of the idea
of being (which is, according to Rosmini, leading, ruling, informing
our rational life), does it not follow that the will is thoroughly de-
termined a priori? Rosmini is mistaken in considering exclusively
in man the intellective factor, making it the unique factor of all
our inner events, and subordinating all our psychic activity to it.
Conscious, however, of the necessity of accounting in the process
of moral action for the active power of feeling, and anxious to
explain the passage from idea to act, he discovered the practical
love which he supposes to precede the realization of the will. It is
an impelling force, but the intellect is, according to our philosopher,
the acting force. But is there any volitional act which is not ac-
companied by feeling? Is there any act of the human will which
is not at the same time conscious, and that, as object of conscious-
ness, does not involve a condition, either agreeable or disagreeable?
Consciousness of an object implies not only some mental presenta-
tion of the object, but also some subject to whom it is presented.
The object may or may not appeal to the "whole" subject, not
only to his intelligence, but to his impulsive and emotive life as well.
If it appeals, it can not fail to arouse interest and desire and agree-
able emotion. If it does not appeal, it stimulates aversion, and its
consequent emotions. Rosmini fails to recognize that our psychic
life is unique, coexistent with its factors, intimately inter-connected.
The life of intelligence and the life of feeling can not be viewed
apart without renouncing the great discoveries of modern psychol-
ogy. We can not, accordingly, conceive, as Rosmini does, the prac-
tical judgment as determined by mere ideas and abstract relations;
for it is the anticipated representation of an act and hence has re-
lation alike to sensibility, intelligence, and impulse. Such a repre-
sentation can not fail to be accompanied by some emotion, with some
active and motor reaction. Has not even the most ideal speculation
an active side? Have not material representations as well as the
most lofty speculations some relation to our emotive life? Have
they not all some value for our personality? And since they have
some value, some relation to our entire life why must moral judg-
ments, which are quite practical, and in which mind and heart are
interested, be regarded as isolated from our daily life ?
Finally, moral good, according to Rosmini, corresponds to Being,
made possible, indeed, by its relation to feeling, but subsistent in
itself, independent of the feeling subject which apprehends it. If
good, for man, is possible only in relation to feeling, how can
Rosmini hold such good to be objective and subsistent in itself,
CONCLUSIOX 51
takin<2r away every relation? Tliat would be a catharsis, psycho-
logically impossibli', since a thing has no value and is no longer a
good as soon as it has no relation to anything else. Since, accord-
ing to Rosmini, an idea is constituted by matter ami form, how does
he imagine idea to be mere form, without any relation to matter?
If subject and object, matter and form, ideal possibility and reality,
are correlative terms, it is impossible to conceive one without the
other. The belief in an ideal order apart from the real, and exist-
ing in itself, stripped from every previous relation to the real, is the
belief in metaphysical dreams.
An ethics which claims to be scientific must present a conception
or moral good that nuiy be human, immanent, dynamic, developing
tlirough, and sinndtanc^usly with, i)syehological factors of indi-
vidual and social order as well. — To sum up what has been said, the
chief error in Rosmini 's etiiical theory is that it has for basis ide-
ology, and not a psychology of human nature. His native qualities,
however, his bias, his environment, the prevalence of ronumticism
over classicism, the great spiritual influence of Christian ideas,
could not fail to determine Rosmini 's mind to seek a system of
morals in the region of metaphysics and of a rationalism which he
thought immune to change, while everything was changing. Such a
system of ethics as he considered to be the most urgently needed, the
great Italian philosopher offered to his country, which he hoped to
see morally renewed and become politically united and independent.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
1. On Bos7nini's Life, see Paoli, "Memorie della vita A. Rosmini-Serbati, "
Turin, 1880-84; "Antonio Rosmini e la sua prosapia," Rovereto, 1880;
"Epistolario completo di A. Rosmini-Serbati," Turin, Casale: 1887-94;
W. Lockart, "Life of A. Rosmini-Serbati," London: Kegan, Trench, and
Co., 1886; Anon., "La Vita di A. Rosmini," Turin, 1897; Anon., "Pie-
cola Vita di A. Rosmini," Casale, 1897; "The Life of A. Rosmini-Ser-
bati," tr. from the Italian of Pagani, London, 1907.
2. Literature on the political situation of Rosmini's Italy is abundant. See,
however, Rey R., "Histoire de la renaissance politique de 1' Italie, "
Paris, 1864; Stillman, W. J., "The Union of Italy" (1815-189.5), Cam-
bridge: At the University Press, 1899; Martinengo-Cesaresco Evelyn. L.
Ilazeldine (Carrington), "The Liberation of Italy," London: Seeley
and Co., 1895; Pietro Orsi, "L 'Italia Moderna," English Ed., London:
Fisher; New York: Putnam, 1900; German Ed., Leipzig: Teubner, 1902;
Italian Ed., Milano: Hoepli, 1910; Tyffe C. A., "A History of Modern
Europe," New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1896; W. Alison Phillips,
"Modern Europe," 2 vols. London: Rivingstons, 1905; "The Cambridge
Modern History," planned by Lord Acton, edited by A. W. Ward and G.
W. Prothero, vol. X and vol. XI, New York: The Macmillan Co.; Quinet,
"Revolutions d 'Italic," Paris; B^renger, H., "Les Resurrections Ital-
iennes, " Paris: E. Pelletan, 1911; Tivaroni, "Storia critica del Risorgi-
mento Italiano, " etc.
3. For the intellectual condition of Bosmini's Italy, besides those referred to
above, see Tivaroni C, "Lo svolgimento del pensiero nazionale," 3 vols.,
Turin, 1894; De Sanctis, F., "Storia della Letteratura Italiana," 2 vols.,
Napoli: A. Morano, 1909; "La Letteratura Italiana nel secolo XIX,"
Napoli: A. Morano, 1902; G. Cardueci, "Dello svolgimento della letter-
atura nazionale in Italia;" G. Guerzoni, "II terzo rinaseimento, " Milan:
Hoepli. G. Barzellotti, "La letteratura e la rivoluzione in Italia avanti e
dopo il 1848 e -49;" G. Barzellotti, "Dal Rinaseimento al Risorgimento,"
Palermo: R. Sandron, 1909; G. Barzellotti, "La nostra letteratura e
I'anima nazionale," Nuova Antologia, p. 193, ser. 4, vol. 93, Roma, 1901;
Mazzoni, "L'Ottocento," Milano: Vallardi; Marasea A., "Le Origini
del roniantismo italiano," Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1910; Luehaire, ,T.,
"L'Evolution Tntellectuelle de I'ltalie de 1815 a 1830," Paris: Hachette
et Cie, 1906; Seignobos, C, "History of Contemporary Civilization,"
New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1909; Draper, "History of the Intellectual
Development in Europe," 2 vol.. New York: Harper, 1876; Flint, R.,
"History of the Philosophy of History," New York: C. Scribner's Sons,
1894.
4. On Bosmini's Philosophy, See Bartholmeso, "Histoire critique des doctrines
religieuses de la philosophic moderne, " Paris, 1855; M. Debrit, "Histoire
des doctrines philosophiques dan I'ltalie contemporaine, " Paris: Meyrueis,
1859; A. Conti, "Storia della filosofia." 2 vols., Firenze: Barbera, 1864;
and La filosofia contemporanea in Italia, 1865; Mariano, R., "La philos-
52
BIBLIOGRAPHY ■.,•'': .:;'53'
ophie contemporaino en Italie, " Paris: Gcrmer Bailli^re, 1868; Ferri, L.,
" P]ssai sur I'histoire de la philosophio en Italie au XIX* sidcle, " 2 vols.,
Paris: Didier, IS69; G. Barzellotti, "Philosophy in Italy," in Mind,
1878, vol. JII, pp. 505-538 (a rapid but careful survey of the Italian
philosophical movement during the nineteenth century) ; Fiorentino, "La
filosofia contemporauea in Italia."
Barth^iemy Saint-llilaire, "Victor Cousin, sa vie, sa correspondence," Paris,
1895, vol. Ill, p. 379, the influence of sensationalism on Italy at that
epoch; K, Werner, "Die italienische Philosophic dea XlXten Jahrhun-
derts," 5 vols., Wien: Faesy, 1884-87. See vol. I, " Roscniini and seine
Schule," by the same; "A. liosmini Stelluug in der Geschichte dor neuren
Philosophie, " 1884, vol. XXXV, Denkschrift der philosophistorich. Claase
der Koniglichen Academie der Wissenschaf ten, Wien. Ueberweg, * ' History
of Philosophy, vol. II, Italian contemporary pliilosophy, pp. 482 fit; Win-
delband, "History of i'hilosophy," pp. G24, 031; H. lliiffding, " Phiios-
ophes contemporains, " Paris : F. Alcan, 1908, p. 37, "La philosophie
italienne apr^ la Renaissance."
A bibliography, tolerably complete, of Rosmini 's own writings and of the
works dealing with his life and philosophy may be found in the philo-
sophical system of A. Rosmini-Serbati, trans, by Thomas Davidson, pp.
lii-lxxxviii, in Baldwin's Dictionary of Phil, and Psych., p. 444, vol. Ill,
Part I, and in Palhorifes's, "La philosophie de Rosmini," Paris: F.
Alcan, 1908, pp. 389-394. The treatises in which Roi-niini sets forth his
ethical teaching and which are connected with it are " Teodicea " (1828),
English trans., vol. 3, Longmans, Green & Co., 1912; " Nuovo Saggio
8ul rOrigine delle Idee," 1830, English trans., London: Kegan. 1883-
1884; "Psicologia" (1846-1850); English trans., London: Kegan, 3
vols. 1884, 1885, 1888; "Principii della scieuza morale" (1831); "Storia
comparativa e critica de' sistemi intorno al Principio della morale"
(1837) ; " Antropologia in servivio della scienza morale" (1838) ; "Trat-
tato della coscienza morale" (1839); "Filosofia del Diritto" (1841-
45); "Compendio di Etica, " published at Turin (1847) under a false
name, and republished (Roma: Desclee, 1907) under Rosmini 's name.
VITA
John Favata Bnino was born the 10th February, 1877, at Santa
Caterina Villarmosa (Italj-). He had his preliminary education, and
pursued literary, scientific, and philosophic studies in his native
country. After receiving his Licenza Liceale (1897), he achieved a
course of high religious studies in the Great French Seminary St.
Louis which lies upon the ruins of the old Carthage.
In Columbia University, he studied (1910-13) philosophy under
Professors John Dewey, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Wendell T.
Bush, George Stuart Fullerton, Felix Adler, William Pepperrell
Montague, and Walter B. Pitkin; and psychology under Professors
James McKeen Cattell, Robert Sessions Woodworth, S. S. Colvin,
and the Kaiser Wilhelm Exchange Professor. Felix Krueger.
54
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