VlAY 15 ^'f ROSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY BY JOHN 1 AVATA BRUNO, Pu D. Suhmittt^a ill partial ftilfllment of the re«|aireinent» for the decree of Doctor of 1*lill«i*ophy In lh« Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University ARCHIVES OF PHIJL080PHY BDITKD BT KPEDKRICK J. E. WOODBHIDGK No. 6, FEBRUAKY, 1916 NEW YOBK THE SCIENCE PRESS lettt fi.'iR5;r::r:: ROSMIXI-S CONTRIBUTION TO ETIIICxVL PniLOSOPTlY BY JOHN FAY ATA BRUNO, PuT). V Submitted In partial fuUilmeut of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia miverslty ARCHIVES OF PHILOSOPHY EDITED Br FPEDERICK J. K. WOODBBIDGK No. 0, February, 191G NEW YORK THE SCIENCE PRESS 1910 ^8B7 Press of THE New Era Printing Cohpany Lancaster, pa. V K^ OUTLINE PAi:hing and everywhere, and to suppress all feelings of patriotism and lib- erty in the whole peninsula. Accordingly, men of elevated mind were thrown into dungeons, or were wrenched out of their beloved country and exiled. And they, guilty only of patriotic love, wan- dered about over those countries, in which liberty was flourishing, and spread the sad news of their national distress. But Metter- nich's policy failed to extingui.sh the fire of rebellion which seemed to be smothered beneath the peaceful aspect of the Italian penin- sula, though it still raged, like the lava under the picturesque sides of its volcanoes. Under the pressure of the persistent and brutal reaction and of the .sad common experience, the vision of the na- tional ideal became more distinct and suggestive than before. The Italian people strained its powers and brought all its possibilities to its richest unfolding. The oi)prossc(l minds seemed to be revived and inspired by the spirit of the Renaissance, which conveyed the sug- gestion that human personality is the source of all activities and achievements. In every province of life there was a momentous awakening. The life of the Italian race reached the moment of ex- pcrimcntum crucis. Now the problem upon which the universal in- 6 SOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL FHIL0S0PE7 terest focused was not merely the emancipation and unity of Italy, but the future of her culture and civilization, in harmony with the spirit of her glorious traditions, which was threatened by her tyran- nical rulers. So \dtal a problem evoked and concentrated all social and intellectual forces. It was a moment of great unrest and of in- tense elaboration of means and schemes. From the powerful fermen- tation of ideas three main currents of thought emerged for the sal- vation of the country. Men of different mental attitudes agreed in the diagnosis of the unbearable conditions of Italy; they were all determined not to sit upon her ruins and weep and lament like Jeremiah. But they were united in the common desire of driving away the hated foreigner, who was recognized as the sole cause of the distress of their beloved country. They were, however, divided in regard to the means to be used and to the method of organizing the new Italy. Some put their hope in the house of Savoy. Others thought to have found the panacea of all evils in a confederation of all the Italian states with the Pope as its chief. Such a plan was the outcome of two main factors. The congress of Vienna and the general tendency of minds in all Europe, permeated by the roman- tic spirit, called out the revival of Catholicism. In Italy, many learned men who did not wish to part asunder their love of the Church and their love of country were fascinated by the memory of the medieval commonwealths which were united ander the pro- tecting power of the Pope. Besides, convinced that the unity of Italy could not be achieved by revolution, they advocated the conciliation of all forces and ele- ments, of papacy and monarchy, of liberty and civil progress, as the most effective method of national regeneration and organization. Mazzini's "Young Italy" stood in opposition to the other par- ties. He urged the Italians to join his association *'in the firm in- tent of consecrating both thought and action to the great aim of re- constructing Italy as one independent sovereign nation of free men and equals." Education and insurrection were the means he sug- gested. But, beyond his own country, he looked to mankind. The idea of nationality was, according to him, the necessary lever for the realization of the cosmopolitan ideal of an international revo- lution and republic. With the ascent of Pius IX. to the throne of St. Peter, the con- ciliatory tendency seemed to prevail over the others. "Wliile through all Europe liberalism and reaction were still in conflict, the election of such a Pope seemed to be a tribute to the national feeling of the Italians. The head of the Church, usually reproached with com- plicity in reviving what was already dead, and in killing what was quite alive, showed that he appreciated indeed patriotism, which niSTOEICAL SITUATION OF EOSMIXI'S ITALY 7 was still resrarcled as a crime and condomned by the Austrian bishops as the work of the devil. Tiie Pope's liberal tendencies could not fail to foster the kindled tlame of patriotic love and to unite all the Italians in the common purpose. Their enthusiasm culminated in a general cry for war ajxainst the oppressing foreigner. During those momentous days, for the firet time in the history of civilized countries, Plato's ideal form of government seemed to be realized in some aspects; the political attitude, under the pressure of circum- stances, became quite philosophical. Rosmini, Gioberti. Mamiani. the most prominent leaders in the movement of thought, forgot their philosophical controversies which had hitherto divided them, and devoted their common efforts to the interest of their country. Gioberti sent our philosopher to Rome as ambassador of Piedmont to induce the Pope, whose constitutional minister was Mamiani, to take part in the war against Austria and to establish the basis of an Italian confederation. But Rosmini's mission failed, because of the reaction which once more prevailed all over Italy. Both the method of revolutionary action and of the impossible idealistic confederation, however, which proved to bo only factors of bitter and general disappointment, were replaced by Cavour's diplomacy. He cleverly broke the dream of a reconcilia- tion which was based upon impossible compromises of principles, tendencies, and attitudes, profoundly diverse, and gave the na- tional party a new direction based upon reciprocal liberty of state and religion. He thus initiated the achievement of the political sjTithesis of the new Italy, free, independent, and united, as she was wished to be by her sons and by the learned abroad. But Ros- mini had not the joy of seeing the final phase of so long and so epic a struggle, to which he had devoted his manifold activity, his health, and reputation. 2. Intellectual Conditions The powerful politit-al action which the Italians displayed for the radical reconstruction of their country was in intimate and or- ganic connection with the unfolding of their mental forces. An action so complex and of such high practical importance could not fail to focus the general attention and provoke reflective thought. It involved, indeed, the necessity of criticizing the old and of developing a new intellectual life. The possi])ility of its succes.s- ful issues depended upon changing hal)its of mind, modes of indi- vidual condur-t. and forms of social life. It had to l)e justified and strengtlicncd with theoretical demonstrations of its justice and of its conformity with the principles of human nature and of modern thought. 8 SOSMINI'S CONTEIBVTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Besides, the new ideas, the new scientific principles, which had to be the determining and controlling factors of the national think- ing and willing, could not but be clothed with abstract forms, be- cause only such forms could escape political censure. The mag- nificent and promising mental activity of the Renaissance, which had made Italy the cradle of modern thought, was followed by two centuries of intellectual tyranny and slumber. The religious reac- tion and the deadening influence of Spanish bigotry had endeavored to check the new stream of free and independent thought, and to paralyze the germs of a new life. But at the end of the eighteenth century, Italy was again ani- mated by the spirit of Dante and the Renaissance, and emerged from her long intellectual depression and lassitude. She entered then into the general movement of modern thought, to which she had already given the very first vital impetus. It was natural that the Italians should feel impelled, while under the hated foreign j^oke, to concentrate all their mental activities upon the reconstruction of their coimtry, like the prisoners who, groaning under the weight of chains, long for liberty and concen- trate all their efforts upon attaining it. The Italians indeed began to keep thought and action in persistent unity, until their patriotic hopes and struggles were crowned with success. Accordingly, since that very time, they began to display the same eager desire, the same method, to vindicate, to magnify, and to convert all the mem- ories of their glorious past into a living motor force. They endeav- ored, impelled by a feeling of national pride, to restore the value of their culture, and to impress a national mark upon politics, art, literature, and philosophy. They did not fail, however, to throw open their minds and hearts to all the invigorating influence which came to them from foreign countries. They became, under the pressure of their awful experiences, more sensible to the beauty and wealth of thought, ancient as well as modern, which was contained cither in foreign literatures, full already of juvenile vigor, or in their own. The function of literature and art became civil and pa- triotic. Lyric and dramatic poetry assumed an aggressive attitude against the evils which the country had so long endured. Tragedies were more or less disguised battles against any kind of despotism and tyranny ; they aimed to stimulate national feeling by revealing upon the stage past injustices, by exalting deeds of national heroism, and by reviving Roman ideas of liberty, of justice, and of respect for human dignity. Satiric poetry took on a social and civil signifi- cance ; it was an embellished protest against the excessive inequality between the rich and the poor, and a defense of the people trampled and dejected. Painting and sculpture revived and embodied what HISTORICAL SITUATION OF UOSillXI'S ITALY 9 could foster the consciousness of greatness. Music, throufjii its sug- gestive and universal language, displayed the anguish and the hopes of all Italians. They made historical researches, not for the sake of curiosity, but because they were an.xious to indicate the factors of their national misfortune, and to finil in tiie past the flame of enthusiasm and the experiences of their ancestors, which could be translated into working forces. The very dawn of the new intellectual life was, indeed, charac- terized by the critical examination of the ideas they found current and by a great interest in knowledge. Knowledge began to be regarded as a social power and as determining factor in the movement of na- tional regeneration. They nuide scientific investigations to find useful truths, to modify, through experimental methods, mental Imbits, and thus to divert men from the frivolous life of the time and to bring them to serious reflection. Through inner regenera- tion, through a peaceful and normal intellectual evolution, through a national unity of mental life, they wanted to change the distress- ing conditions of the country. Thus the motive, which began to control the evolution of the new intellectual life, was quite practical and determined scientific work. From the beginning, the reflection upon the ideas which permeated social and individual life could afford no satisfaction. The common experience of pu])lic life could not fail to focus the attention of all upon civil laws. These were said to be an emanation from the invisible and eternal will, but proved to be the outcome of the deification of crystallized truths, of hereditary prejudices, and of changeless oppressive political sys- tems, as well as the genuine work of the personal interest of rulers. Such laws were of no public advantage, they did not satisfy any practical need or demand; nay, they were factors in the national oppression and general unhappiness. Accordingly, accommodation I' to them seemed to be cowartUy and shameful. Wavering confidence in the practical value of obedience to them inevitably and fatally implied an attack upon the validity of their ground. The .same po- litical situation was bound to undermine also the })rineiples of moral- ity, which controlled individual conduct and required the subser- vience to tyrannical laws and systems. These laws were based no less upon tradition tliaii authority, and thus they seemed also to perpetuate the unhappy conditions of the country. Many factors happened to subserve the critical and de- structive attitude the Italians assumed while confronting the polit- ical problem, which involved their iiidividual and social happine.s.s. Authority more and more lost respect, because it was regarded as oppressive. Tradition lost the influence it had exerted upon the 10 EOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY national mind, because it suggested always changeless forms of im- possible life. Religious feeling wavered because the Church in Italy was, at that time, identified in the mind of the people with the prevailing political tyranny. And finally the contact with French culture permeated with revolutionary ideas contributed also to foster the feeling of rebellion against the old standards of life and fossilized beliefs. The outcome of such great fermentation of new ideas was moral disintegration, political unrest, and skepticism. The pressure of political activity which imposed profound intellectual revolutions did not make skepticism merry, as in France during the eighteenth century, but anxious to reconstruct knowledge, already regarded as a great dynamic agency in the political regeneration of Italy. The emphasis, however, upon the practical significance of knowledge made u'^cessary critical insight into its origin and nature. Political action r-xiuired a philosophical background. Whence the crucial question rose whether experience or the mind had to be held as the source of knowledge and consequently of ideas, which are its constituent elements; whether ideas had to be consid- ered as innate or as the product of sensations. This problem was regarded, in Italy as well as throughout Europe, at that time, as the most fundamental problem, and was justly placed in the fore- ground of philosophical discussion. For its solution had to furnish the basis of moral and political sciences which were expected to en- lighten and sustain the national movement. In fact, the innate- ness of ideas meant the previous existence of a priori controlling principles. Accordingly, the national thinking and will, knowledge and action, had to be controlled by abstract, eternal, and crystal- lized notions, as during the long years of unchanged slavery. Ideals and laws had to be regarded as eternally given, and consequently there was no hope of reference to the concrete conditions, of po- litical change, freedom, and progress. On the contrary, the belief that ideas were the outcome of ever- changing personal experience involved the conviction that human personality must have a conscious participation in the creation of truths, ideals, and laws, with absolute independence of every exter- nal authority. Thus the individual, reckoning the changed condi- tion, was able to direct his own conduct and become a decisive factor in the regeneration and reconstruction of Italy. The philosophy of experience which based knowledge and morality solely upon per- ception, proclaimed the right of individualism and of rebellion against intellectual and political oppression as well as against every form of despotism, and thus it best responded to the urgent needs HISTORICAL SITUATION OF ROSMINI'S ITALY H and demands of the second half of the eighteentli eentnry and of the early part of the nineteenth t-entiiry. Of course, the interest in the experimental and positive sciences, the closer contact with the En«;lish and French literatures permeated with the spirit of mod- ern philosophy, the loosened respect for tradition, the declinint? in- fluence of the Church, the decreased feelinf; of tiie supernatural, the conviction, also, that idealism, allied with relifjious and civil authority, was an instrument of reaction, but, above all, the per- sonal presence of Condillac,^ were so many factors which contributed to condition and assure the prevalence of empiricism in Italy. Gerdil,^ indeed, endeavored to oppose to it a foi-m of idealism permeated with the doctrines of Plato, St. Augustine, and Descartes, but his efforts were frustrated by the practical significance and com- promise of idealism, holding fixed, innate controlling principles of individual and social ethics, and by the rapid translation of Con- dillac's works as well as by the teaching of Soave, who followed and exalted Locke as the greatest metaphysician since he had dared "to destroy the chimera of innate ideas. "^ Colleges and universities welcomed the new philosophy, because it seemed to answer the pressing political purpose of that historical moment and to be in harmony with the intellectual temper and with the history of the philosophical thought of the Italians." Art and literature endeavored to assimilate and apply its prin- ciples which, spread in diluted form, could not fail to filter through the strata of national consciousness and conduct." The fact that Condillac and Soave were priests, and that the 3 Condillac lived ten years (1758-1768) in Parma, at that time the " reticles- vous" of the best intelligences, as tutor of the young Due Ferdinand of Bourbon. •• Sigismond Car•'» Kant's philosophy was known in Italy through two books published in French, i. c, "Philosophie do Kant, on principcs fondamcntaux do la i>hilosophie transcendentale, " par Ch. Villers, Metz, 1801, and " Essai d'unc exposition 14 EOSMINI'S CONTEIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY His works are pervaded by both conflicting tendencies, empiri- cistic and rationalistic. He aimed at the reform of philosophy, and accordingly endeavored to correct empiricism and Kantism, but he proved to be unable to extricate himself entirely from both philosophies, in which he found a valuable treasure for his own elaboration. Knowledge and action, according to him, or thought, its elements, functions, and value for truth and good, are the main subject- matter of philosophy. He was aware that the problem of knowl- edge was in his day "the object of meditation in all Europe," and upon this problem he focused his attention. Against sensationalism he held that the mind is not only sensitive, but intelligent and reason- able, and made the distinction between sense and intelligence, sen- sation and thought. Against Condillac he stated that our mind is something more than a mere collection of internal states; that it is a reality, a being, a substance, endowed with the power of analysis and synthesi.s. He rejected innate ideas in the sense of ideas prior to sensations and independent of all experience, but he accepted them in the sense of natural ideas, or ideas for whose acquisition we have a natural disposition, "una virtualita naturale." Galluppi agreed with Kant that knowledge is a combination of subjective and objective elements, but he found Kant's form and matter equally subjective, and hence the failure to solve the problem of knowledge. The crucial point is to determine what is objective and subjective in knowledge. We find objective elements only in the immediate con- tact of the self with reality or in primitive experience; reflective experience which is based upon ideal sj'nthesis is the outcome of the objective elements given by sensations and of the subjective elements produced by the mind itself. This was the solution which Galluppi gave the great problem of critical philosophy. His teaching, char- acterized by simple and attractive eloquence, permeated by the principles of the Kantian and of the Scottish school, and involving the suggestion to descend from theology to psychology, from nature to humanity, from abstractions to facts, provoked a great interest in philosophy amongst the Italians, and seemed to the national party to be a powerful instrument of political action and easy to be assimilated by the people because stripped of the obsolete and dry scholastic form. But during the time of his teaching important new political changes which affected Italy as well as all Europe, brought out succinte de la critique de la raison pure de Kant," par M. Kinker, traduit du hollandais par J. Le Fr., Amsterdam, 1801. The first Italian translation of the Critique of Pure Reason was published by Mantovani, in 1821 and 1822. Galluppi examined Kantian philosophy in detail. HISTORICAL SITUATIOX OF HOSMIM'S ITALY 15 ehaiifjes of intellectual attitudi-. Wlini the rovolutionarv storm was over, a reaction was inevitable. Admiration for the preceding intellectual movement changi:cd to aversion and iiatrcd. Reason was held responsible for the violence done to political ami relipfious ene- mies. "Philosophy" was blamed for the general unrest and dis- order. The French Revolution, welcomed at the beginning as a manifestation of reason and the triumph of man, stripped of re- ligious preoccupations, culminated in excesses of bloody violence. Its issue was a numifest confession of impotence for constructive purposes and social peace. Empiricism transformed into sen- sualism, naturalism changed into materialism, deism degenerated into atheism, enthusiastic morals sunk into egoistic morals, proved to be unable to settle the questions which were .so closely connected with individual and social happiness. The nations of Europe wliose barriers had been overthrown amongst the vicissitudes of the revolu- tionary wars could already freely communicate with one another, fuse together their ideas, and thus participate in a general culture, but they longed for peace and order, for a new source of life, and for a new system of ideas and purpo.ses. So it happened that the general feeling against the violences and destructions of the Revo- lution, the over-excitement and exhaustion produced by sensualistie excesses, the impuissanee of the rationalistic and materialistic "philosophism" to reform society, the universal eager desire of a new center of gravitation, the same programme of the "Holy Al- liance" which heralded the reconstruction of moral order and the regeneration of the political .system of Europe on the basis of Chris- tianity and thus the revival of religion, and finally the triumphant return of the Pope to Rome, evoked a spiritualistic reaction. The romantic movement favored the revival of the Christian religion. For it appealed to spontaneity, sensibility, feeling, emotion, and en- thusiasm which are the main religious factors, and while revelling in the vast world of the unknown as well as in a new n>alm of mar- vels and nw.steries, it evoked the Middle Ages in which Christianity and papacy had predominated. Besides, the satisfaction of estlietic feeling which the dominant religion afforded, the romantic concep- tion of Christianity as perfectly compatible with the highest intel- lectual culture, contribiitcd to present as "ultimatum" to the con- vulsed society the religion against which the revolutionary fury had been directed. Thus, "through a common movement," says Taine, "along the whole line of human thought, causes draw back into an abstract region, where philosophy had not been to search them out for eighteen centuries. Then was manifest the disea.se of the age, the restless- ness of Werther and Faust, very like that which in a similar^jjijc^ .^^^^ i OK THE ' 16 SOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY ment agitated men eighteen centuries ago: I mean, discontent with the present, the vague desire of a higher beauty, and an ideal hap- piness, the painful aspiration for the infinite."^* But then arose in Italy the question whether or not the whole heritage of the eighteenth century had to be rejected, which age of Italian history had to be copied ; whether the genuine greatness of Italy had to be founded on the revival of the age of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance, when social life and human person- ality were free and independent of supernatural preoccupation, and the Italians enjoyed a spiritual unity of knowledge and will ; or on the revival of the Middle Ages, when the intimate union of Church and monarchy, of religion and authority, of faith and reason, of theology and philosophy, prevailed. Men who were imbued with the spirit of classicism and of the eighteenth-century culture, took the former alternative. Those whose enthusiasm was directed towards romanticism wanted the life of the new Italy to be a continuity of the harmony of all social forces. They displayed, nevertheless, great sympathy for all modern aspirations, and endeavored to subserve their national cause by spreading, under an evangelical disguise, forbidden ideas of liberty, patriotism, and universal equality. The conciliatory tendency was bound to prevail, under the pres- sure of religious and national enthusiasm. Such a tendency, to- gether with the influence of the reactionary and theological, and of the ps.ychologico-spiritualistic movement in France, and the power- ful impulse from Germany to construct gigantic systems in order to have a comprehensive view of spiritual life, could not fail to pro- voke in Italy a philosophy which, by an encyclopedic synthesis should seek to unite all intellectual efforts for the sake of a common na- tional action. The genius of Rosmini provided the needed philo- sophical formula of universal harmony, source of truth, and moral- ity, of reciprocal respect and love, of social justice and individual rights, as symbol of the coming national unity. 14 "History of English Literature," Book lY., €h. I. CHAPTEK U RosMLNi's Person ALiTv 1. h'osmini's Vsychological Dispositions An extraordinary Imnfjcr for learning associatod with a powor- ful inti'llifriMU'c. ii proiiduiiced relipfious tendency. ;iiire to abide in solitude, from fear lest its in- terests shouUl sutler by being mixed up with those of the world at large? Or has heaven bestowed the gift of reason on a few indi- viduals only? And siuill, therefore, the great bulk of numkind for- ever have to be led, like a Hoek of sheep, by the command or the rod of those favored ones? Must incti be for everlasting debarred from judging in a body or pronouncing on matters on which their own dignity and happiness depend?"'' Accordingly, "a good instinct" of his nature irresistibly prompted him to applaud "intentions so humane, and to feel the liveliest gratitiule for those who labor with the intent of placing the very highest truths within the reach of the greatest number. . . . For if this were well and successfully done, the masses would be able to enjoy in some way the lovable aspect of those truths, and would rise to a better condition."" Moreover, he thought that the masses, by bringing their collec- tive judgment to bear on the interminable disputations of the learned, might, perhaps, speak out with such an overwhelming weight of authority as would effectually recall these disputants to more profitable occupations and sountler ways of thiidving, and to work for the true benefit of the indiviilual and society. Rosmini, persuaded of the social and humane mission of philosophy, could not fail to direct his attention to the national problem, which was already the focus of the general intellectual activity. He, in fact, like the elite of his time, did not make a mystery of his love for the common mother, the beloved from whom he had had "life and lan- guage."^ Eye-witnes.s of the violences perpetrated by th(^ French armies as well as of the angry despotism of the restored governments, he grieved over Italy's unhappy state anrl longed for the freedom, in- dependence, and unity, which he openly proclaimed to be "a uni- versal cry" that set throbbing the heart of every Italian.'' * "The Origin of Ideas," toe. cif. 5 "The Origin of Meas," loc. cit. o"The Origin of Ideas," loc. cit. 7 See " Xuovo Saggio HuH'origine delle idee," preface. 8 See "Discorso suH'Unitii .1 'Italia." 20 EOSMINrS COXTHIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHT It seems, however, that Rosmini was distressed rather by the moral disintegration than by the political situation of his country. All his works, in fact, betray a strong moral preoccupation and a persistent endeavor to point out moral reconstruction as a factor of social happiness. But the Church's declining influence, above everything else, attracted his attention. His native religious bias, under the constant influence of his social environment, became a deep and inalterable love for his parents' religion. And to such a love the Italian philosopher subordinated his whole intellectual ac- tivity. Thus, it was inevitable that a life of earnest and close ad- hesion to his religion would have created in his mind habits of in- tellectual submission and criticism not at all independent and im- partial. Besides, his woi'ks bespeak his fondness for abstract, fixed, and eternal principles, his idealistic tendency, his dogmatic affirma- tion, his conviction of the necessity of universals, his determination to organize an absolute system, and consequently, his rationalistic type of mind." 2. Rosmini' s Leading Motive, Attitude, and Method Rosmini seemed to be convinced of the fact that the growing indi- vidualism, the ascending democracy, the progress of national feel- ing, and, finall}^, the intellectual undercurrents of social life had already brought into question the ancient beliefs and moral stan- dards, and that even the position of the Catholic Church had been compromised, being thrown by clericalism into the political turmoil of the times. He, accordingly, felt stimulated to bring his contri- bution to the political, intellectual, and moral reconstruction of his beloved country. Impelled by a motive so eminently practical, he applied his mind to an etiological inquiry into the actual conditions of the Church, of Italy, and of philosophy. Under the pressure of his native dispositions, acquired habits, intellectual temper, and of the dominant current of thought, per- meated with spiritualism and religion, the Italian philosopher found out that the divorce of the Church from social and political aspira- tions, of faith from reason, of theology from philosophy, was the main factor in the restlessness of his social environment. He, therefore, urged the reconciliation of all the intellectual and social forces as the panacea for all the evils of his times. Besides, agree- ing with the prevailing romantic spirit, he pointed to the Middle Ages as the epoch in which the ideal reconciliation he dreamed of, the genuine greatness of Papacy and of Italy, and the lofty task of » See W. .James, "Pragmatism," pages 7, 51; "Some Problems of Phi- losophy," page 35. EOSMIXI'S PEESOXALITY 2i philosophy, were fully realized. His discovery, indeed, could not be otherwise ! But Rosmini thought that such harmonious union had been shattered by tlie movement of modern philosophy. Ac- cording to him, philosophy "from Locke to Kant, in spite of so many efforts, went on wandering farther and fartlier astray, and en- tangling itself in its very ])n)gress, until men grew weary of it, and lost all faith in doctrines tiiat were contimially changing."'"' Thus, he believed that reason was to.ssed about by the waves of skepticism and opinion, and that there was no longer faith in any universally valid truth, or in the possibility of any certain knowl- edge, while respect for authority and tradition sank, religious feel- ings and ideals wavered, ami iinlividuals governed themselves. Sensationalism and subjectivism, indeed, acknowledging no es- sential objectivity of ideas and then no objective measure of truth, and relying only on the relativity of individual ideas, built human knowledge as well as ethical principles upon a relativism of indi- vidual opinions, and, consequently, upon the insecurity of change and caprice. This philosophical attitude and its inevitable conse- quence, the absolute independence of the individual in the theoret- ical and practical sphere, and "the deification of human faculties and affections" plainly proclaimed by Kantian doctrine, hurt Ros- mini 's religious feeling, for they meant a mortal blow to religious tradition and to organized authority. Thus he felt that there was "a yearning for the invaluable boon of a true and .sound philos- ophy," and that the yearning was due to the uncertain utterances and to the imperfect and unsatisfactory .systems which philosophers had already propounded. Rosmini was penetrated with the importance of philosophy be- cause of its all-embracing influence, determining the source of knowledge, and thus making all sciences dependent on itself. Be- sides, philosophy, in his opinion, has an anthropological, a social, and a religious mission, since it is the interpreter of nature as well as of the wishes of the luiman heart, and it unites men amongst themselves and with their Creator. Finally, it aims at the better- ment of men by discovering and transforming truth into reality, and by leading to good and to virtue, as to their natural end.*^ Accordingly, for Rosmini, the restoration of philo.soi)hy was aji urgent need, and it could not be achieved without a firm epistemo- logical ground. Rosmini, agreeing with Locke and Kant, was impres.sed from his early youth, by the practical importance of the problem of ""Theodicy," Ch. XXIX, No. 148. Longmans, Green, and Company, \ew York, 1912. 11 See ''Introduzione alia filosofia. " / 22 BOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPnY knowledge. He justly recognized that the most urgent question to be solved in philosophy was whether, above and beyond individual opinions and purposes, there is anything universally valid, true, and right in itself; whether our ideas have a really objective value and provide a firm basis for knowledge and morality ; wliether at that time of political and moral unrest there could be found a basis for common truth and good which might become a ground of a social agreement and political cooperation. According to our philos- opher, the science of individual and social ethics, law, government, education, which the political situation threw into the front rank of intellectual interests; man's faith in absolute justice; the changeless right of nations to political independence and liberty ; the necessity of suppressing despotism as well as rebellion ; had to rest upon a knowledge, not transient and relative, but stable and unchangeable. Such a knowledge, however, must have for its basis, not the chance ideas furnished by sense-experience, but the ideal order, "the innate idea of the universal which is the truly real;" it must rest "on an object," says Rosmini, "which is always before us, necessary, uni- versal, and independent of us and all created things. "^^ The persistent effort to indicate the idea of the universal as source of objective and absolute truth, as nucleus of the new national mental and moral life, as point of centralization of intellectual and political activity, meant the accumulation of individual energies, the absorption and submission of the individual to organized society as well as to the common supreme ideal of national solidarity and unity, and constitutes the essential characteristic of Rosmini 's phi- losophy. The mental attitude Rosmini assumed towards the philosophical problems which his contemporaries confronted was religious and reactionary, but softened by a spirit of conciliation that was in the air. He seemed to be determined to revive the attitude of the Holy Fathers, who did not hesitate to avail themselves of whatsoever truth the systems of pagan philosophers contained in order to secure rational support for their beliefs. But our philosopher, like them, wanted to subordinate knowl- edge to the lofty ends of faith, reason to revelation, philosophy to theology, science to dogma. Besides, he endeavored to bring Chris- tianity as an efficient factor into philosophical speculation, and thus to harmonize natural and supernatural truths. Convinced that the most striking characteristics of every true and efficient philosoph- ical system are "unity and totality," he built, like his contemporary German philosophers, a gigantic system in which he thought it pos- sible to take in at a glance, almost all truths, arranged in a scheme 12 "The Origin of Ideas," No. 1037, Vol. II. EOSMINI'S PERSONALITY 03 of beautiful uuity, and enhanced with new life by "the evidence of a supreme principle."'^ But in one point Rosniini gladly ajjreed with modern philoso- phers, namely, in the method to be used in philosophy, that is, a method which starts from facts. lie found, howevt-r, that "modern philosophers have contented themselves with analyzin<; the faculties of the soul, and have paid little attention to the analysis of tlieir product, /. e., human cojjnitions. "'^ Acconlinj]: to him, the rijjjht method is to observe what is pjiven by our corporeal senses and at the same time the facts of our inner life and then to accept imj)artially the lc<;itimate eonse(iuenct's of the same.^^ Our philosopher, however, almost exclusively employed the syn- thetic method and thus replaced the concrete by the abstract, the fact by the idea, the internal observation by (i priori reasoning, making the study of man depend on metaphysics. He preferred deduction to induction, the a priori to direct observation, reasoning to experience. He proved, indeed, to be a psychologist, but he often recurred to hypothesis rather than to analysis, to syllogism rather than to experiment. ;i. The Fundamental Principle of Rosniini\s rhilosophij "Unity and totality" is, according to Rosniini. the main charac- teristic of a true and efficient philosophy.'" This characteristic, which we find in the contemporary romantic philosophy, he endeav- ored to .stamp upon his own. Accordingly, he elaborated his ethical and theoretical doctrine in close connection; his ideology and ethics are so interrelated that the one lends light to tlu^ other. Thus, the distinctive marks of the leading principles of his ethical theory can not be given apart from the general principles of his philosophy. A.S we have seen, Rosmini, under the pres.sure of Italy's political and moral problem thought that the main business of philosophy was to build human knowledge upon a fixed basis, and thus to cheek the deplored outcome of skepticism and materialism, and. by placing rea.son in opposition to opinion, to overcome anarchical change which sensationalism and empiricism favored. Rut, according to him. as well as to Kant, the difficulty of the problem of knowledge lies in the po.ssibility of the first judgment. Knowledge is judgment, and then the analysis of the first knowledge or judgment is the first step in every serious philosophical research. Now, the essence of judgment 13 See " Introdiizione alia filosofia. " ""The Origin of Ideas," No. 410. ""Theorlioy," No. 138, Vol. 1. 16 See " Introtluzione alia filosofia." 24 BOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY consists in the union of a subject individual and of a predicate, of a particular idea and of a universal idea. Thus every judgment supposes a universal idea. Experience gives us particular ideas or the matter of knowledge. The universal idea, however, or the form can derive neither from sense-experience, for this happens w'ithin the sphere of contigent facts and reaches nothing beyond the indi- vidual, nor from reflection, which is an operation of the mind, and every intellectual operation is a judgment. The exclusion of these two possibilities, the former as insufficient, and the latter as form- ing a vicious circle, leaves one last hypothesis, namely, that the uni- versal idea is prior, that is, innate. Thus within human reason there is at least a notion wiiich is primitive, indispensable to the formation of the first judgment, and which is the first condition and link of human knowledge. This primitive idea is the light and life of reason, and the form of forms; since it is universal, it is also the most elementary and simple and it is to be found, accordingly, in every judgment, in every operation of our mind as its most essen- tial factor. It contains necessarily as in germ all human knowl- edge ; it is the ruling thought, and successively becomes cause, sub- stance, finality. According to Rosmini, such an idea can not but be the ''idea of being" or the "ideal being." In fact, our internal analysis shows us that our cognitions have the idea of being as a common element. This idea is at the bottom of every thought. "The idea of being," he says, "is the most universal of all ideas. It is w^hat remains after the last abstraction possible ; and its removal puts an end to all thought and makes every other idea impossible. "^^ ' ' Man has by nature an intuition of that ideal and indeterminate being which contains all entity in an indistinct state, in a way ana- logous to that in which a large block of marble contains all the statues which the sculptor proposes to make out of it, or a given superficies all the figures that can be designed thereon. "^^ This "corner-stone" of the edifice of human knowledge, virtue, and happiness, which Rosmini sought from his early youth, this nucleus, source, and rule of every art and science, this very efficient means of philosophical and social restoration, is not a production of reason itself; it does not derive from the thinking self, like the Kan- tian forms; but it is communicated from without, and it is, there- fore, not subjective, but objective.^" 17 "The Origin of Ideas," A'ol. II., No. 411, page 17. 18 " Theodicy, " Vol. II., No. 668, page 159. 19 See "Filosofia del Diritto, " Introdiizione. Pagani reports in his "Life of Rosmini ' ' that the Italian philosopher proposed to himself the great problem of the origin of ideas when he was seventeen years old (1814), and that in the fol- lowing year he discovered the fundamental principle of his philosophy. PART II THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF KOSMINI'S ETHICAL THEORY INTRODUCTORY The Scope and ^Ietuod of Ethics The science of ethics is, according to Rosmini, the director of human life, since its purpose is to direct man's rational activity. Man's goodness, however, depends upon the goodness of his will, for the will is the supreme and active rational power, which controls and synthesizes all his intellectual and moral actions. Nay, the will is precisely the same radical and immanent activity which con- stitutes human personality. Whence our philosopher concludes that man is moral, because his will is susceptible of good and bad activity, of moral or immoral acts and habits, or, in one word, of morality.^ Thus the crux of every theory is to discover the factors which make good man's will, or, in other words, what is "moral good" or "virtue." Man is endowed with the faculty of sensation as well as with that of intelligence. By the faculty of .sensation, he perceives things as they are; by the faculty of intelligence, he perceives things as possible. This different mode of perceiving is, according to our philosopher, the cause of distinction between subjective and objec- tive good. The sense is the source of subjective good ; the intellect is the source of objective good. Every sensible good stimulates and satis- fies man; and he is naturally impelled to unite himself to such a good, and to enjoy it. Man, however, does not regard the objective or "intelligible" good as .sometliing which belongs to himself, as something which may be felt by him. He merely eonsidei's it as an object of his intelligence, of his intellectual intuition everywhere and in wliatsoever mode it may be found. "The objective good is merely contemplated by the intelligence." Now, the burning ques- tion is whether the moral good is subjective or objective. Rosmini believes this distinction to be of the highest importance, 1 See "Antropologia," I., IV.. €hs. VL, VIII.; "Prefazione alle opere di filosofia morale"; "Compendio di etica." Introduzione, §§I., 11.; "Thcoivcs in the idea the true being, iiulepentlent of every change. Rosmini, like Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato, wanted to place rea.son in opposition to opinion; he thought that sensationalism and empiricism, whii'h were the prevalent currents of piiilosophical thought in Italy at that time of national becoming, compromised or nullified the fundamental principles of epistemology and ethics. Accordingly, identifying being with good, in a Euclidean manner, presupposed a changeless supreme idea in man, as the rational measure, rule, and end of human actions, as it is also the funda- mental source of epistemological and ethical law. lie intciulcd thereby to furnish the new national life with a basis eternally im- mune to change ; he intended to respond to the need of new ideals, of new intellectual beauty, which the revival of Christian ideals and the influence of romanticism brought into every province of life. Rosmini, as well as Scotus Erigina. making the individual de- pendent upon the universal, meant to subordinate all the particular forces to the almighty authority of the Supreme Being, and of the Cluirch. He intended, indeed, to focus the minds of the oppressed Italians as well of the oppressors of that time and of all time, upon an inexhaustible .source of truth and justice, (juite independent of all circumstances and motives. That is the reason why he does not account for the dynamic, progressive character of morality, and thinks the moral life to be a changeless structure. He, moreover, intended to say that duties and rights undergo no change, as the moral order does not depend upon the will and the caprices of men, but upon the Absolute, Eternal, Supreme Being. The unchangeable moral principle consists in the practical recog- nition of the entity or the good, partaken of by im-n. oi-. in other words, in the love for all who enjoy the divine within themselves. Such an idea, while it suggested reciprocal love and union to the groaning hearts of the Italians, kindled also their ardent desire for political cmatn'ipation. The fundamental moral law. divine in its -See " rhacilo, " ami "Republic,'' especially Books IV. and V. 48 BOSMINI'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY origin and nature, imposed on the oppressor's recognition of, and veneration for, human dignity. Human rights are sacred as duty is sacred. Since justice is grounded in God's will, Rosmini meant that Italy's political de- liverance and unity were God's will as well. Thus the Italian philos- opher indirectly intended to foster the national aspirations of his compatriots and to help modify their political and social situation. But the principle upon which Rosmini endeavored to build his system of ethics, although clothed with rational form, is religious and theological, and, therefore, more adapted to moral theology than to scientfic ethics. A scientific theory of ethics can not be grounded upon an abstract and mystical presupposition, since what is outside phenomena is, by the same fact, outside the control of reason and experience, and can not be verified. The belief in an a priori, tran- scendental principle of morality involves denial of continuity in moral experience, not rational subordination, and hence the im- possibility of scientific inquiry. For ethics, then, would only ex- plain how to execute, how to carry out absolute and fixed ideals of conduct, while its function, as science, is to organize experimental results, and to show how man, free from every preoccupation, con- tributes in the creation of moral ideals. And man is enabled to say what is really good, or worth while in conduct, only by means of personal or racial experience. An ethics, truly human and scien- tific, since it exists precisely for the sake of man who lives and works in the world of phenomena and experience, can not have a basis lying outside all experience, unless it renounces a scientific stand- point, and is satisfied to be mere casuistry or dialectics. Moreover, Rosmini holds as supreme ethical formula the practical recognition of being in its order. If such practical recognition were the out- come of man, regarded in his totality, that is to say in his heart and intelligence, we could use it as a leading measure of the worth and good of beings, as well as for a rule of actions. But Rosmini, following Kant, thought that there is an antithesis between the intelligible and the phenomenal world. He, as well as Kant, attempted to discover for ethics a rational foundation, inde- pendent of the world of phenomena. Both thought that experience is conditioned, while the moral law must be unconditioned, and its origin then must be independent of all experience. Both thought that all feeling is empirical, sensuous, egoistic, and can afford no foundation for the moral law. Thus, both disregarded the life of feeling and emotion, which claims to build moral ideals in the process of human experience. Both have the same conception of the fundamental problem of ethics, CONCLUSION 49 and beg:in, not with an original unity, but with a duality. Kant begins with the spontaneity and receptivity of the mind, while Ros- mini begins with the idea of being and sensation. Such being, of which man has an immediate and intuitive vision, has, according to Rosmini, an objective value. But Rosmini does not prove the ob- jective validity of the internal intuitive knowledge. We may, accordingly, say that his "being" is nothing else than the subjective thought itself in its extreme abstraction. Tims, he does not begin witli God. but. as Kant, with the human mind it.self.3 Besides, since Rosmini denies to iuiman mind the complete com- prehension of the pure Being, and since he thus implicitly denies the possibility of deducing from it all the determinations of being, it follows that the pure being intuited by the mind is not the true, pure being, namely, God, but merely the being abstracted from re- flection.* Rosmini, however, does not agree with Kant in some other points. According to Kant, for instance, man is at once law-giver and subject. According to Rosmini, man can not impose laws on him.self. as .such an action presupposes authority, and hence he can not be legislator to him.self. Moral conceptions, according to Kant, are gained from pure reason itself. Rosmini thinks that the funda- mental law can not be derived from our own reason, but that it is given, and man is passive, Kant holds that duty springs neither from authority, nor from experience. Rosmini is thoroughly convinced that the .source of duty is transcendental, that is to say, it is God. For Kant the characteristic feature of the ethical is autonomy : for Rosmini heteronomy. The dignity of liuman personality, accord- ing to Kant, depends on man's capacity for autonomy, or on his capacity for following the universal law, derived from his own rea- son ; according to Rosmini, the dignity of human personality lies in the immediate intuition of being, in the participation of divine es- sence by means of the light of reason, and, finally, in man's natural capacity to incline to. and to merge him.self in, God, source of moral good and happiness. If we examine more particularly the moral edifice wliich Ros- mini intended to build in those moments of intense national move- ment, we find that liberty, according to him. is an act merely intel- lective; that is, not an act of mere contemplation, but an act of assenting contemplation. But is not this a metaphysical hypothesis 3 Sec Spaventa, "La filosofia di Kant e Rosmini," pages 47-t8; Fiorentino, "La filosofia contemporanoa in Italia," page 23. ♦See A. Franchi, "Ultima Critica," page 116; R. Benzoni, "Dottrina dell- Essere nel sistema rosminiano. " 50 BOSMINI'S CONTBIBUTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY without any true ground? If the assent to contemplated being is a mere business of the intelligence, under the pressure of the idea of being (which is, according to Rosmini, leading, ruling, informing our rational life), does it not follow that the will is thoroughly de- termined a priori? Rosmini is mistaken in considering exclusively in man the intellective factor, making it the unique factor of all our inner events, and subordinating all our psychic activity to it. Conscious, however, of the necessity of accounting in the process of moral action for the active power of feeling, and anxious to explain the passage from idea to act, he discovered the practical love which he supposes to precede the realization of the will. It is an impelling force, but the intellect is, according to our philosopher, the acting force. But is there any volitional act which is not ac- companied by feeling? Is there any act of the human will which is not at the same time conscious, and that, as object of conscious- ness, does not involve a condition, either agreeable or disagreeable? Consciousness of an object implies not only some mental presenta- tion of the object, but also some subject to whom it is presented. The object may or may not appeal to the "whole" subject, not only to his intelligence, but to his impulsive and emotive life as well. If it appeals, it can not fail to arouse interest and desire and agree- able emotion. If it does not appeal, it stimulates aversion, and its consequent emotions. Rosmini fails to recognize that our psychic life is unique, coexistent with its factors, intimately inter-connected. The life of intelligence and the life of feeling can not be viewed apart without renouncing the great discoveries of modern psychol- ogy. We can not, accordingly, conceive, as Rosmini does, the prac- tical judgment as determined by mere ideas and abstract relations; for it is the anticipated representation of an act and hence has re- lation alike to sensibility, intelligence, and impulse. Such a repre- sentation can not fail to be accompanied by some emotion, with some active and motor reaction. Has not even the most ideal speculation an active side? Have not material representations as well as the most lofty speculations some relation to our emotive life? Have they not all some value for our personality? And since they have some value, some relation to our entire life why must moral judg- ments, which are quite practical, and in which mind and heart are interested, be regarded as isolated from our daily life ? Finally, moral good, according to Rosmini, corresponds to Being, made possible, indeed, by its relation to feeling, but subsistent in itself, independent of the feeling subject which apprehends it. If good, for man, is possible only in relation to feeling, how can Rosmini hold such good to be objective and subsistent in itself, CONCLUSIOX 51 takin<2r away every relation? Tliat would be a catharsis, psycho- logically impossibli', since a thing has no value and is no longer a good as soon as it has no relation to anything else. Since, accord- ing to Rosmini, an idea is constituted by matter ami form, how does he imagine idea to be mere form, without any relation to matter? If subject and object, matter and form, ideal possibility and reality, are correlative terms, it is impossible to conceive one without the other. The belief in an ideal order apart from the real, and exist- ing in itself, stripped from every previous relation to the real, is the belief in metaphysical dreams. An ethics which claims to be scientific must present a conception or moral good that nuiy be human, immanent, dynamic, developing tlirough, and sinndtanc^usly with, i)syehological factors of indi- vidual and social order as well. — To sum up what has been said, the chief error in Rosmini 's etiiical theory is that it has for basis ide- ology, and not a psychology of human nature. His native qualities, however, his bias, his environment, the prevalence of ronumticism over classicism, the great spiritual influence of Christian ideas, could not fail to determine Rosmini 's mind to seek a system of morals in the region of metaphysics and of a rationalism which he thought immune to change, while everything was changing. Such a system of ethics as he considered to be the most urgently needed, the great Italian philosopher offered to his country, which he hoped to see morally renewed and become politically united and independent. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1. On Bos7nini's Life, see Paoli, "Memorie della vita A. Rosmini-Serbati, " Turin, 1880-84; "Antonio Rosmini e la sua prosapia," Rovereto, 1880; "Epistolario completo di A. Rosmini-Serbati," Turin, Casale: 1887-94; W. Lockart, "Life of A. Rosmini-Serbati," London: Kegan, Trench, and Co., 1886; Anon., "La Vita di A. Rosmini," Turin, 1897; Anon., "Pie- cola Vita di A. Rosmini," Casale, 1897; "The Life of A. Rosmini-Ser- bati," tr. from the Italian of Pagani, London, 1907. 2. Literature on the political situation of Rosmini's Italy is abundant. See, however, Rey R., "Histoire de la renaissance politique de 1' Italie, " Paris, 1864; Stillman, W. J., "The Union of Italy" (1815-189.5), Cam- bridge: At the University Press, 1899; Martinengo-Cesaresco Evelyn. L. Ilazeldine (Carrington), "The Liberation of Italy," London: Seeley and Co., 1895; Pietro Orsi, "L 'Italia Moderna," English Ed., London: Fisher; New York: Putnam, 1900; German Ed., Leipzig: Teubner, 1902; Italian Ed., Milano: Hoepli, 1910; Tyffe C. A., "A History of Modern Europe," New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1896; W. Alison Phillips, "Modern Europe," 2 vols. London: Rivingstons, 1905; "The Cambridge Modern History," planned by Lord Acton, edited by A. W. Ward and G. W. Prothero, vol. X and vol. XI, New York: The Macmillan Co.; Quinet, "Revolutions d 'Italic," Paris; B^renger, H., "Les Resurrections Ital- iennes, " Paris: E. Pelletan, 1911; Tivaroni, "Storia critica del Risorgi- mento Italiano, " etc. 3. For the intellectual condition of Bosmini's Italy, besides those referred to above, see Tivaroni C, "Lo svolgimento del pensiero nazionale," 3 vols., Turin, 1894; De Sanctis, F., "Storia della Letteratura Italiana," 2 vols., Napoli: A. Morano, 1909; "La Letteratura Italiana nel secolo XIX," Napoli: A. Morano, 1902; G. Cardueci, "Dello svolgimento della letter- atura nazionale in Italia;" G. Guerzoni, "II terzo rinaseimento, " Milan: Hoepli. G. Barzellotti, "La letteratura e la rivoluzione in Italia avanti e dopo il 1848 e -49;" G. Barzellotti, "Dal Rinaseimento al Risorgimento," Palermo: R. Sandron, 1909; G. Barzellotti, "La nostra letteratura e I'anima nazionale," Nuova Antologia, p. 193, ser. 4, vol. 93, Roma, 1901; Mazzoni, "L'Ottocento," Milano: Vallardi; Marasea A., "Le Origini del roniantismo italiano," Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1910; Luehaire, ,T., "L'Evolution Tntellectuelle de I'ltalie de 1815 a 1830," Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1906; Seignobos, C, "History of Contemporary Civilization," New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1909; Draper, "History of the Intellectual Development in Europe," 2 vol.. New York: Harper, 1876; Flint, R., "History of the Philosophy of History," New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1894. 4. On Bosmini's Philosophy, See Bartholmeso, "Histoire critique des doctrines religieuses de la philosophic moderne, " Paris, 1855; M. Debrit, "Histoire des doctrines philosophiques dan I'ltalie contemporaine, " Paris: Meyrueis, 1859; A. Conti, "Storia della filosofia." 2 vols., Firenze: Barbera, 1864; and La filosofia contemporanea in Italia, 1865; Mariano, R., "La philos- 52 BIBLIOGRAPHY ■.,•'': .:;'53' ophie contemporaino en Italie, " Paris: Gcrmer Bailli^re, 1868; Ferri, L., " P]ssai sur I'histoire de la philosophio en Italie au XIX* sidcle, " 2 vols., Paris: Didier, IS69; G. Barzellotti, "Philosophy in Italy," in Mind, 1878, vol. JII, pp. 505-538 (a rapid but careful survey of the Italian philosophical movement during the nineteenth century) ; Fiorentino, "La filosofia contemporauea in Italia." Barth^iemy Saint-llilaire, "Victor Cousin, sa vie, sa correspondence," Paris, 1895, vol. Ill, p. 379, the influence of sensationalism on Italy at that epoch; K, Werner, "Die italienische Philosophic dea XlXten Jahrhun- derts," 5 vols., Wien: Faesy, 1884-87. See vol. I, " Roscniini and seine Schule," by the same; "A. liosmini Stelluug in der Geschichte dor neuren Philosophie, " 1884, vol. XXXV, Denkschrift der philosophistorich. Claase der Koniglichen Academie der Wissenschaf ten, Wien. Ueberweg, * ' History of Philosophy, vol. II, Italian contemporary pliilosophy, pp. 482 fit; Win- delband, "History of i'hilosophy," pp. G24, 031; H. lliiffding, " Phiios- ophes contemporains, " Paris : F. Alcan, 1908, p. 37, "La philosophie italienne apr^ la Renaissance." A bibliography, tolerably complete, of Rosmini 's own writings and of the works dealing with his life and philosophy may be found in the philo- sophical system of A. Rosmini-Serbati, trans, by Thomas Davidson, pp. lii-lxxxviii, in Baldwin's Dictionary of Phil, and Psych., p. 444, vol. Ill, Part I, and in Palhorifes's, "La philosophie de Rosmini," Paris: F. Alcan, 1908, pp. 389-394. The treatises in which Roi-niini sets forth his ethical teaching and which are connected with it are " Teodicea " (1828), English trans., vol. 3, Longmans, Green & Co., 1912; " Nuovo Saggio 8ul rOrigine delle Idee," 1830, English trans., London: Kegan. 1883- 1884; "Psicologia" (1846-1850); English trans., London: Kegan, 3 vols. 1884, 1885, 1888; "Principii della scieuza morale" (1831); "Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi intorno al Principio della morale" (1837) ; " Antropologia in servivio della scienza morale" (1838) ; "Trat- tato della coscienza morale" (1839); "Filosofia del Diritto" (1841- 45); "Compendio di Etica, " published at Turin (1847) under a false name, and republished (Roma: Desclee, 1907) under Rosmini 's name. VITA John Favata Bnino was born the 10th February, 1877, at Santa Caterina Villarmosa (Italj-). He had his preliminary education, and pursued literary, scientific, and philosophic studies in his native country. After receiving his Licenza Liceale (1897), he achieved a course of high religious studies in the Great French Seminary St. Louis which lies upon the ruins of the old Carthage. In Columbia University, he studied (1910-13) philosophy under Professors John Dewey, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Wendell T. Bush, George Stuart Fullerton, Felix Adler, William Pepperrell Montague, and Walter B. Pitkin; and psychology under Professors James McKeen Cattell, Robert Sessions Woodworth, S. S. Colvin, and the Kaiser Wilhelm Exchange Professor. Felix Krueger. 54 ARClIIVEiS or PHILOSOPHT Editorial oommunieatioDM should be addressed to Professor F. J. E Wood- bridge, Colombia UniTersity, New York City. Tlie numbers are as follows : 1. l*be Concept of Control: Savilla Alice Klkns, Ph.D. 40 cents. 2. The Will to Believe as a Basis for Defense of Keligions Faith : Ettie Stettheimer, Ph.D. $1.00. 3. The Individual : A Metaphysical Inquiry : William Forbes Cooley, B.D., Ph.D. $1.00. 4. 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