f" Letters to bet 1 of the |^ Present Parliament upon the Ex- jb traordinary and TTnprecedented |l Transactions In the L^st Hoiise ! of Cornrnons -, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES LETTERS T O A MEMBER OF THE > PRESENT PARLIAMENT, UPON THE EXTRAORDINARY AND UNPRECEDENTED TRANSACTIONS t THE t AT HOUSE OF COMMONS. LONDON: Printed for J. DE BRETT, oppofite Burlington-Houfe, Piccadilly. 1784* LETTERS I LETTER L .... DEAR. SIB, T has given me great fatisfac~lion to fiiid that JL you are eletled a member of the new Parlia- ment. That perfons of an independant fortune, and who have been at pains to .improve the ad- vantages of a liberal education, mould early acquire a knowledge of our Conftitution, and take an a&ive part in the government, is devoutly to be Iwiflied by every lover of his country. Give me leave to fay, that your promifing abilities, and the fpirit you have hitherto difcovered, encourage me to hope that, in the fituation in which you are now placed, your conduct will be fuch as to reflect B honor "354737 [ * ] honor upon yourfelf and your connexions. Toil are, indeed, beginning your political career at a very critical period; when the proceedings of Parliament are likely to draw the attention of all- Europe, and when its refolutions will not only afcertain deciGvety? the chara&er of- its members* but probably determine the fate of a Constitution, which has long been the boa ft of Englifbmen* as well as the admiration and envy of their neigh- bours. The defire you exprefs of knowing my opinion, concerning the ftate of our public affairs, is highly flattering to me ; and I lhali take the liberty of communicating, without referve, fuch thoughts -as I am unable to iupprefs on the pre- fent alarming crifis. In order to form a right judgment of the feveral quellions which are now likely to be agitated, it items neceffary that you fhould take a retrofpec- tive view of the public occurrences for feveral months pad, and examine the courfe of events which has led to the diflblution of the former, and given birth to the prefent Parliament. Permit me, therefore, to recall to your memory a few of thofe particulars, from which the conduct of the dif- ferent parties, the principles upon which they have 1 afted, and the defigns which they are profecuting, will appear in the fulled light. In a review of this kind, the extraordinary cir- cumftances attending the late change of Miniflry, aft [ 3 ] s they afford alcey to the fucceeding t ran factions, appear to demand ycur firft attention. The in- terference of the Crown, with all its weight, to in- fluence the determination of an important queftion th^n depending in the Houfe of Peers, was -un- doubtedly an -unconftitutioniJ meafure of the iirft magnitude. The vehement manner in which this was executed, the direct and even threatening an- imation that was given concerning the inclinations of Majefty, leave no doubt about the intention of the meafure : The fuccefs which attended it, renders its conferences truly alarming. That the King, during the dependance of a bill, mall uot -take notice of the proceedings of cither Houfe,is a maxim obvioufly founded upon the feparate departments belonging to the different "branches % of the Legiflature, and which is mani<* feftly effential to the freedom of debate, and to the independanoe of Parliament. There is accord- ingly no point, with refped to which parliament has been more watchful of its -privikges, or has difcovered greater jeak>ufy -of whatever might have the appearance of the leaft eBcroachment upon the ^)art of the Crown *. Tlie flagrant violation of B 2 parliamentary * See the proceedings of the Houfe of Commons colle&ed by Hatfell. This author mentions two exceptions to the maxim above-mentioned. The iiril where the King is in- terefted [ 4 ] parliamentary privileges, in this particular, has always been regarded as an indelible ftain upon the otherwife fortunate and glorious reign of Queen Elizabeth : And it was a rneafure of the fame fort which marked, in ftrong chafers, the diffimu- bnon and tyrannical principles of the infatuated Charles the Fii ft. I fancy you will agree with mc j n thinki that the appointment of the prefent Minifter* w, : fo properly a confluence, as it was a part of the late tranfaSion which I have mentioned. Tber* can be no doubt that the whole plan was laid with their advice and concurrence; that they approved of it in all its branches, and that their coming into office, was a neceflary and preconcerted link in the icheme. It cannot therefore be denied, that they are refponfible for this, as well as for every fucceed- /\ mg meaftire of the Crown. The resolutions of the Houfe of Commons, hich followed this tranfadion, were fuch as the rcumftances of the cafe loudly demanded. Had thereprefcntacivesofthe nation allowed thcmfejves to wink at fuch extraordinary proceedings, or Faffed them over in filence, they would have been julllyconfidertd as callous to every infult upon termed ! as , party, having ap.cuniary intereft. The frc apphcations for public m oney. It will not, furely, be "hlol H r hCJateinterfCrenCe f t either of thefe exceptions. their [ 5 ] their own dignity, as betraying the truft repofed in them by their Conftituents, and as tamely aban- doning the^moft important rights of the people. It was not poffible, at the fame time, to condemn thefe proceedings, without cenfuring the perfons who had been chiefly inflru mental in the execu- tion of them. It was not poffible to condemn the crime, and with the fame breath to approve of the criminal ; far Jefs to cherifh and reward him, or to employ him in thofe important departments which require the higheft national confidence. The ftrong cenfures expreffed by the Houfe of Commons againft the advifers of this meafure, and the repeated addrefles which they carried to the Throne, for the removal of the prefent Miniftry, Jiave given rife to a queltion the moft important,' perhaps, of any that can be agitated with refped to the Britifti Conftitution. That the Crown has the ible right of naming its Minifters, is indifputable, But is this right to be exercifed, in all cafes, with- out any fort of limitation or controul ? Is it not neceffary that Minifteis fliaJl have the confidence of Parliament ? in particular, that they fhall have the confidence of the Houfe of Commons, by whom the fupplies are granted, and committed to the immediate direction of Miniflry ? And if the Re, prefentatives of the nation (hall entertain a ftif- picion, from whatever caufe, of the peifons ap- pointed by the Crown for that purpofe, and mail think t < j tkinkthem unlit for the trufl committed to them, is it not the duty of the executive power to remove them from their offices ? This is a queftion which every Englifhman ought feiioufly to confider^ as it involves, riot the interefl of this or that political party, but the dearefland moft important rights of the nation. The determination of this point ap- pears to me to decide, whether we are to remain in the condition of a free people, or to be reduced under an abfolute government. According to the fyflem of government efia- blifhed at the Revolution, by which a proper line was drawn between the prerogative of the Crown and the privileges of the People, the Legiflative power, including that of impofing taxes, was vefted in the three branches of parliament ; and it was underftood that, in conformity to the ancien,t Conflitution, the particular (hare of the Legifla- ture, committed to the Crown, fhould be exercifed, in the way of a negative only, to fuch bills as might be palled in the two Houfes. Such was the dif- tribution of the pre-eminent and controuling power in the State, which, at that glorious asra of our hillory, received the fantion of public authority, and was intended to remain inviolable to futuie ages. he feitkment, which was made at that period, is to be confidered as the great ftandard, for afcertaining the nature of our limited monar- chy, h is the fixed ftar which we, o. this ifland, ought r 7 T ought never to lofe fight of in all the mazts of polirical fpeculation. The rights of the Sovereign and of the people were then balanced \vith fucfo peculiar propriety, that no fuperiority of power could aftewards be acquired by either party,, without being fatal to that mixed' form of goverr*- ment which it had been the general intention to iecure. The natural courfe of things, however, and the almoft unavoidable modes of conducting public bufinefs, have, fince that period, produced eonfiderable deviations from the ftrift form of the Revolution fettlement : but thefe deviations havs been- invariably of fuch a nature as to preferve the fpirit and the efience of that happy eftabliQV ment. If any new powers have been affumed by one party, which might feem an ineroachmens upon the rights of the other, thefe have been counterbalanced by a direli&ion of other powers, or by the exjercife of privileges upon the other fide, from which the general equilibrium, has been maintained, and the fyftem of our liberties has remained upon its former bafis. Thus the unqueftionable prerogative of refuf- fing the Royal aDTent to bills which have paffed the two Houfes of Parliament, appears to be in a great meafure relinquilhed ; fince only one, in- fiance of its exertion is to be found from the period above-mentioned ; that is, during the courl* [ 8 3 of near a century. On the other hand, the Crown has, during the fame courfe of time, been accuftomed to the regular exercife of another branch of power, in reality of much greater con- fequence ; that of introducing , by its Miniders, the greater part of bills which come under the deliberation of Parliament. It is now regarded as a fingularity, when debates of. a public nature, and in matters of importance, originate from a different quarter. In place of a mere negative, in the lalt inflance. upon the refolutions of that affembly, the Crown has thus acquired the means of fuggefting every fubjecl: of deliberation. In- Itead of intcrpofing a reftraint upon any innova- tion, it has in this manner become the prime mover of new regulations. From furnifhing merely the ballufl, it now fills the fails of the veffel. This "however is not the only alteration which time has introduced in the- partition of the great powers of government. It is well known that in ordinary cafes, the miniftry are accuftomed, not only to bring in, but to carry through, thofe bills which are agreeable to the wifhes of the Crown. The influence derived from the ma- iiagement of the public revenue, and from the Various expedients in the hands of the Crown, is fuch as commonly to fecure the fuccefs of every new regulation propofed by the Court, and to render [ 9 1 render the public deliberation little more than a matter of form. There are feldom wanting, in- deed, combinations of individuals, who endea- vour to oppofe the meafures of Adminiftration ; but the efforts of thofe men, in ordinary fitua- tions, have ufually no other confequence than to afford the entertainment of a debate, or at mod to occafion a little delay of the bufinefs. That this is the real (late of the matter, is acknow- ledged by all the world ; and while we reafon upon the nature of the Britifh Government, we are forced to admit that its operations, in this par- ticular, are by no means performed according to thofe general principles upon which the political machine has been conftru&ed. If what I have now pbferved were to hold uni- verfally, if the influence of "the Crown were, in all cafes, to over-rule the determinations of Par- liament, it is evident that our liberties would be at an end , and that, fo far from maintaining the principles of the Revolution fettlemenr, we fhould be unqueflionably under the abfolute dominion of a fingle perfon. But in this, as in many other inftances which occur in the hiftory of the Englifh government, a remedy has been quickly provided, capable of flopping the pro- grefs at lead, if not of compleatly curing the dif- order. From the very circumstances which pro- duced this irregular exertion of Crown-influence, C there IQJ J tBere has arifen a method of controufing and limiting the extent of ft, from which its dangei- oUs confequences appear to be in a great meafure removed. Though, from the concurrence of ordinary caufes, the national a {Terribly is com- monly induced to foll'ow the guidance of miniftry,. yet in peculiar circumftances a different difpofi- tion may prevail ; and the conduct of particular Minifters may be fo a-bfurd, or of fuch a hurtful tendency, as to excite indignation and refent- ment, or to create a general diftruft of their in- tentions. In fuch a fuuation, it feems to be the duty, as it is likely to be the inclination of Par- liament, not only to rejet with violence the mea- fures which have been prefentcd to their confide- ration, but even to require the difmiflron of thofe Mim'fters who have incurred their difpleafure. To carry their views into execution, the Houfe of Commons may refufe the fupplies, and by fufpending the operations of Government, ren- der it neceflary for the rown to comply with their requdt. If Parliament, on thefe extraordinary occafions, were only to refufe its concurrence to particular meaCures, allowing the Miniflers to remain office, fuch- a feeble teftirnony of its difpleafure would be of little confequence. It would be of no avait in preventing miniftry from acquiring the entire direction of parliamentary bufmels. Jt would only -ymly teach them to change their ground, and to vary their method of attack ; or 1,0 wait for par- ticular conjunctures in order to accomplish a fa- vourite meafure. As the fituations when a ma- jority in either Houfe can be formed in oppofition ad humour, contracted by the late ferment, were not immediately removed ; and the different par- ties were ftill eager to gratify tljeir prevailing paf- fjons, by humbling the respective leaders of the oppofite fide. How (evere and mortifying tht; difapointment therefore, when Lord North and Mr. Fox, inttead of fuffering that difgrace which the enemies of either had been treafuring -up for them, were brought immediately into power, and became members of a joint Adminiftration. The altercation at the fame time, which had taken place betwixt thofe different leaders, had "been managed with uncommon warmth ; and the oppofition of their fentiments had been remark- D SL ' ably jddy -pointed. The nation feemed, upon that ac- count, to fuppofe, that the public divifions be- tween thofe twp perfons were to become the fource of a private quarrel, and that the acrimony of particular expreffipns which foad efcaped them in the heat and violence of debate, was to rankle in their bpfoms, and to produce a rooted per- fonal animofity. But when we reflect: upon this .matter with coolnefs and impartiality, it furely .muft be acknowledged, that there was no good ground for entertaining fiich an opinion. Thofe .who are the fondeft of the Britiflh Conflitutipn, will, perhaps, be willing to admit, that the keen- .nefs of debate in Parliament which it occafions, and the feverity of cenfure which it encourage? againft Adminillration, is a fmall inconvenience .which we derive from pur happy form of govern- ment. It is a fort of tax upon good manners, \vhich Knglifhmen ought to condder as the price of their freedom. But perfons whp are much converfant in Parliamentary debate, learn to ^ftiinate the expteflions ufed on fuch occafions at their juft rate. They make allowance for the in- tention of the Speaker ; and they acknpwledge the diflinftion, according to Parliamentary language, between the imputations thrown upon political conduct, and thofe which have a reference to pri- vate character. Indeed, without fuch a diflinc- tion, it would be impofLble to fift, and bring to light, light, the conduct of Adminiftration in fuch a manner as the intereft of the public feems to require. ^ faui* r* fjt i4 In any other view than what is fuggefted by the fuppofition of private refentment between thofe two perfons, or between their refpeftive adherents, their union, fo far from deferving cenfure, appears to merit approbation. In the circumftances in which the coalition was made, this, or fome other agreement, equally liable to objection, was neceflary for carrying on the buii- nefs of the nation. The Houfe of Commons was at that time di- vided into three great parties, 1 who had been diftinguifhed by their oppofite opinions upon fe- veral very important fubjefis; and thefe parties were fo equally balanced, that no one of them was capable, by itfelf, of executing public mea- fures. Without a coalition between two of them, it was impoflible to give coniiQency and dignity to the national conduct, by forming a ftrong and eScient Admirrifl ration. But would it have been better, that Lord North fhould have coalefccd with Loid Shelburne ? or that the latter mould have again united with Mr. Fox, whom he had formerly abandoned ? The opinions, the political connexions, the perfonal altercation, the recipro- cal exprelfions of refentment or of contempt, which appeared to fland in the way of an union between between Lord Shelbume and Lord North, were at lead as coofpicuous as any circum fUnces of a fimilar nature which bad occurred betwixt the latter and Mr. Fox. Was the character of Lord Shelburne fuch, as to create a firmer reliance upon his profetfions ? Had be appeared lefs aclive and zealous, in declaiming againft the influence of the Crown, or in turning out of office the fupporters of the American war ? Yet there is hardly any man fo fimple as not to be firmly per- fuaded, that if Lord North had been willing to coalefce with Lord Sheburne, he would have been received with open arms, and this coalition would "have been highly extolled, and zealoufly defended, by all the friends and connections of that party, who now endeavour to reprefent the coalition with Mr. Fox in the mod odious colours. But the India Bill, brought in by Mr. Fox, is the great circumflance which has given offence to a numerous and powerful defcription of peo~ pie, and whiWfiJ's excited them to move Heaven and Earth in order to. overturn a Miniftry, from which they dreaded the accomplithment of a mea- fare that is fo obnoxious to them. Thcdiforders that 'have prevailed in the govern- ment of India are of fuch a nature, as cannot fail to awaken the companion and the indignation of and fubje&ed to all the miferies that can be con- ceived to arife from the lawlefs fury and rapacity of an undifciplined, and ill regulated body of mercenaries, directed and goaded on, by the un- remitting and unfatiable avarice of a fet of mer- chants, or fervants of merchants, in whom, by long habit, every other feeling but that of avarice feems to be totally cxtincl. It mull be impoffible, cne fhould think, for any member of the Britifh Legiflature to reic& r that he is, in fome meafure, acceflary to thefe depredations and enormities, without experiencing very painful fenfations, and without being difpofed to exert himfelf in putting a flop to thole evils. la the beginning of the prefent feffion, there was accordingly an univer- al cry for a firong and efficient fciE, in order to correct the diforders, and to Tcgalate the future government of India. No palliatives, it was faid, by the prefent Minifter, then in oppofition, would be fufficient; and nothing lefs was requi- fite, than a compleat fyftem of regulations, fuch as would operate a radical cure. JBut ( 24 ) But when thefe were the general fentirnents ex-* prelTed in Parliament, and throughout the nation, the Eafl India Company were meditating fchemes of a very different nature ; and nothing could be farther from their thoughts, than to fubmit to thofe intended innovations. In order to form an idea of the motives and principles, by which their con- duel, in this refpeft, was directed, you will pleafe m recollect, that the Proprietors of the India * Company are not to be confidered merely in the light of a focicty of merchants, depending for their fuppoit upon the regular profits of the J India trade. The regular and fair profits of that trade ate now, by neglect and milmanagement, reduced to a rate which is below the attention of a great mercantile Compariy. The emoluments . derived from our intercom fe with that part of the v world, are chiefly iuch as arife from depredation ; and the form cf trade, which is flill kept up with the country, is little more than the mode of re- mitting the fpoils which have been amalTed by illegal violence. The Proprietors of India Stock at home arc, of cou'ffe, the real dependants of their nominal fcrvants abroad. The dividends of the former depending chiefly upon the fuccefsful rapacity of the latter, both of them are excited by the ftrongeft motives of intereft, to ftrain every A nerve in promoting their common views. A great part of the India Proprietors have, in faft, purchafed plirchafed their flock for rid other purpofe, than to fupport the interefl of the piarticular fervants of the Company abroad, with wborh they are con- nected. To fuch Proprietors, any effectual rneai fure for regulating the government of India, muft appear in the light of a propofal for draining the fources of all their wealth, as well as for anni- hilating their political connections ; and a tame acquiefcence in fuch a meafure can as little be expected from them, as it can be expected from the fervants of the Company abroad, who are fattening upon the fpoils of India, and acquiring immenfe fortunes, by which, when imported into this country, they Ihall afterwards be enabled to fmother any enquiry into their mbfl atrocious mifdeeds. In thefe circum fiances, it occafioris no fur- prize, that the India Bill presented to Parliament by Mr. Fox^ however well it might be calculated for repreffing thefe diforders, was in the higheft degree offenfive and alarming to the India Com- pany. The more it was likely to be effectual in promoting fo falutary a purpofe, the alarm which it excited became neceffarily fo much the greater. The utmoft oppofition, therefore, was made to it in every flage of its progrefs, by that nu- merous and powerful body of men ; and the mofl outrageous and bitter invectives were poured out againft it. When we confider, however, the . - E different [ 26 } different arguments which have been dated ra- the courfe of this oppoEtion, we find that they are altogether of a fecondary nature ; that they relate, not to the tendency of the biH, with re- gard to its main purpole, the government of India, (for in this refpeft it appears to be un- exceptionable) but to the effects of k upon the ftate of the Company, and of the government at home. In this view, it has been reprefented as violating trie Chartered Rights of the India Company, and as injurious to- the Royal Prero- gative. As to the violation of the Chartered Rights of the Company, I can hardly perfuade myfelf that the terrors which have been held out by fo many people, and difplayed with fo much parade, are to be confidered as real. The danger of trading companies, and to corporations in general, which forne people appear to apprehend from the inter- ference of government in regulating the affairs of this Company, on fuch an extraordinary emer- gency, I can regard in no other light than that of a mere bug -bear. I muft coufefs, indeed, that the reafon, which I have fometimes met with in converfation, for in- terfering in the affairs of the Company, that, by their bad behaviour, they have forfeited their rights, does not appear to me a fatisfactory one. It docs not appear tkat a corporation can juftly be be deprived of its rights, as a punishment for the / offences committed by its managers. But, furely, it will not be difputed, that the good of the nation, and the general intereft of fociety* J may afford a fufficient reafon for reftraining and modifying the rights of any individual, as well as ojf any corporation whatever. That the ftate has a. right of regulating the property of ail its mem- bers, with a view to the public advantage, has been uriiverfally admitted. It has never been doubted that Parliament may force a man to fell his ground / for the purpofe of making a turnpike road. The law by which heritable jurifdi6Hons in Scotland were aboliihed, upon giving a pecuniary recora* pence to the perfons thus deprived of their rights, has never been arraigned, as contrary either to juftice, or to found policy. Even the Sovereign of the Jfle of Man was, without any complaint, obliged, from confiderations of public utility, to furrender his regal authority, and to accept of a reafonaWe compensation. The privileges of the India Company will not furely be looked upon as more facred than the common rights of pro- * perty. They are privileges derived merely from the pofitive interpofition of the Legiflature ; and the eftablifhment of them was, in fact, an en- croachment upon the rights belonging to the other members of the community ; an encroach- 2 ment nicnt which nothing but the confideration of great public utility could juftify. At the fame time it ought to be remetribered, that the pecuniary in- Bereft of the Company, fo far as it arifes from a fair trade, in confequence of their exclude pri- vileges, would not, in any degree, have been hurt by the bill ; but would, on the contrary, have been promoted, by turning the general attention from depredation to the ordinary profits of commerce. Nothing more was intended, than to regulate the trade and government of India, in a manner con- fiftent with the interett of Great Britain, with the principles of humanity, and with the unalieu- able rights of mankind. 2. As to what is pretended that the fyftem of regulation propofed by Mr. Fox would have created a fourth ePtate independant of the Crown, you will recollel that this pretence appeared to have little weight with any perfon, during the early ftages of the bill, though it was afterwards aflumed with greater confidence, in order to ierve a temporary purpofe. The circumftance of the Directors of the Company being appointed by Parliament, mftead of being appointed by the King, cannot be thought to be of great moment, when it is conGdered, that, in either cafe, they would have been really fuggetled by the Miniuei. Neither would their being eftablilhed for a certain fericd, a circumftance neceffary to give energy and and vigour to their proceedings, render them in- dependant of the Crown ; fince by the regulation propofed, they were to have been removeable by an addrefs from either Houfe of Parliament ; and that the Crown might at pleafure procure fuch an addrefs, at leaft from the Houfe of Lords> no perfon who has been attentive to recent tranf- adions will be difpofed to queftion. It has indeed been argued, that, as the appoint- ment of thofe Directors was to proceed from the late Miniftry, their friends would of courfe retain the government of India, independant of any future changes of Adminift ration, and the Crown would thus find itfelf hampered and limitted in the nomination of its fervants. This argument goes upon the fuppoution, that perfons who havo obtained the independant poffeffion of an office will afterwards retain a conftant difpofition to ferve thofe individuals to whom they are indebted for their preferment. It fuppofes that they will be fo corrupted, as to make their public conduct fubfervient to the private views or a party, and fo virtuous, as to prefer the interest of their bene- factor to their own, whenever the former is brought in competition with the latter. How far this fuppofition is confident, or how far it agrees with experience, I leave you to determine. How far the principle of private friendfhip is likely to extend in politics, I {hall not take upon me to calculate. [ 3 1 calculate. But this I think may be fdid without offence: That fuppofmg a fet of Directors ap- pointed upon the plan above-mentioned, their own intereft would concur with that of the public, in requiring that they fhould maintain a good correfpondence with any fet of Minifters who might hereafter be cftablimed ; and I fee no rea- fon to apprehend that they would be under much temptation to facrifiCe thofe important objects to the mere punctilio of gratitude, by the dilplay of a romantic attachment to their old benefactors *. In all thefe articles which have been objected to the laft Miniury, we have an opportunity of com- paring their conduct with that of the prefent Ad- miniflration. Both have approved of the Receipt Tax -, but the difference lies in this, that Lord John Cavendilh, both when he was in office and out of it, had the maniinefs to ftand forth as the avowed fupponer of the meafure, wh le his iuc- ceflbr in office thought it neceffary to fculk and (huffle, in order to avcid an explanation of his fentiments, and permitted his emiflaries to load the oppofite party with the odium of a meafure which he himfelf fecretly approved of. Both have produced an India Bill ; but the principle which they adopted in their feveral bills was very diffe- * I would by no means however be thought to degrade the itandard of political gratitude fo much, as to refer you to the noted examples of Mr. R n or Sir C 1 W y. rent. f 31 ] rent. Mr. Fox appears to have proceeded u'pon the principle of public utility, and endeavoured to produce an effectual fyftem of regulation. Mr. Pitt feems to have embraced the expedient of temporifmg, and to have no farther view than of extricating himfelf from the prefent embarraflT- ment. He fupported his bill chiefly by the con- fent of the India Company, who, as might be eafily fuppofed, were prevailed upon to prefer that fyftem which had the lead tendency to re- ftrain the conduct of their fervants. What pro- portion of the India Proprietors concurred in giv- ing this confent, it is needlefs to enquire ; for fure- ly, nothing can be more evident, than that no par- ticular members of the Company had a right, by a voluntary furrender, to give up the privileges belonging to the corporation. This is a point of law that appears to have been fufficiently under- itood as far back as the reign of Charles the Second, when the boroughs were fo much mif- Jed to refign their privileges to the Crown, for the purpofes of promoting the defpotical views of the Court. Laftly, We may turn our attention to the pre- fent coalition of individuals, by whom the conduct of Lord North and Mr. Fox, in this refpecl, has been fo much arraigned. It is not a little remark- able that Gentlemen, who have complained of this meafure in others, ihould have fet an ex- ample ample of fo fmgular a conjunction in themfelves; V Is it poffible for the whole compafs of nature to colle6l a more heterogeneous mafs of jarring ele- ments, than go to the political compofition of what the poverty of our language forces me to /\ call the prefent Mini dry. And yet they would make us expect that their union is to be produc- tive of the public falvation. They have even modeflly told us, that, from mere motives of pu- blic fpirit, they could not think of refigning. When we fee Lord T w united with Lord S y, and Mr. D s in a ftritl league with Mr. P< t, we may look for fomething extraordinary indeed we may expecl: a new progeny upon the face of the earth And perhaps it is reafon- able to conclude, that the happy time is not far off, when the wolf fhall d.indle the kid, and the fuck- ing child fhall put its hand upon the den of the cockatrice. Jam rcdcat virgo, rcdcant Saturnia rrgna I am, &c. LETTER [ 33 1 LETTER II. J\1R. Fox's India Bill, mentioned in my laft * Letter, how offenfive foever it was to the India Company, and whatever clamour it might have excited throughout the nation, would not, in all probability, have effe&ed a change of miniftry, had it not been for the concurrence of another circumftance, to which I muft now beg leave to call your attention. That in Great Britain the influence of the Crown has, for a long time, been gradually en- creafmg, arid this, from the natural courfe of things, independant of the defigns of any par- ticular miniftiy, is the opinion, you know, of many perfons; and for my part, I cannot help thinking that it is well founded. There are two circumftances, refpe&ing the Hate of the nation in this particular, which I fhall take the liberty of fubmitting to your confideration. i. The prodigious increafe of the Crown re- ^ venue, fo far as it has arifen from an increafe of the number of people, by whom that revenue is fupplied, muft infallibly, I imagine, have ex- pended the influence of the Crown. Suppofe F that { 34 } that a State is fo fmall as to contain only fifty thou- fand inhabitants, each of whom can afford, in taxes to government, to pay at an average twenty {hillings; the revenue under the management of the chief magiftrate, would, in fuch a cafe, be the fource of very little authority. It would pro- bably render him very little richer than feveral of his moft opulent fubjeds ; and as the fupport of his dignity would require that he mould live at more expence than they,-he could not be expeded to have any furplus remaining, to maintain either a military eftablifhwent, or a numerous train of civil officers. If we fuppofe a nation fo large as to contain five hundred thoufand free inhabitants, and paying taxes in the fame proportion, the fo- vereign, poflefling a revenue of 500,000!. fterling would, by the management thereof, be raifed to proportionably greater confideration and import- ance. As his income might polfibJy be ten times greater than that of any of his fubjeas, he might, after defraying the nccelfary expence of his houfe- hold, be in a condition to beftow a confiderable fum for the mere purpofe of creating dependance. lie might maintain a fmall body of troops, to fei-ve as a kind of body guard ; and he might have a variety of fervants and retainers in the feveral departments of government. The authority of fuch a Prince, however, could.never be very great. H3 t 35 ] He could never afford to hire an army that would be able to fubdue the inhabitants, nor to gain fuch a body of dependants as would be fufficient ,to counteract tbofe combinations among his fubjeb, to which his tyranny might eafily give occafion. . But if a State, inftead of containing five hun- dred thoufand, were to contain twenty millions of inhabitants, contributing at the fame rate to the public revenue, it would be fcarcely poflible to pre- vent the Sovereign, who had thus the management and difpofal of the annual fum of twenty .millions, from eftablifhing an abfolute authority. He could A. afford to maintain, and the Mate of the kingdom would probably give him a pretext for maintaining, two or three hundred thoufand regular troops ; an army that would be matter of the lives and for- tunes of all his fubje&s. The multitude of of- ficers neceffary for colleting this revenue, the " great variety of magiftrates requifite for preventing disorders in fo extenfive a -country, the great num- ber of clergy, together with fuch as were employed at the public expence for the inftru&ioh of youth, the numerous penfioners and placemen, unavoid- able in fo large an empire, and whom the Sove- reign would be in a condition to fupport ; not to mention the ftill greater number of expectants in each of thefe departments : all thefc, having a con- ftant intereft to attach themfelv.es to the fortunes . The Firlt and Second Sefiions of the iaft Parliament, in right volumes. Price 3!. 35. Tne Third (or laft) Seflion of the laft Parliament, in three volumes. Price il. 4$. all.toalf-bound and lettered. The eight Numbers of the laft feflion. Price is. each. \* Thofe Gentlemen who want any particular Numbers to complete their Sets, are earneftly defited to order them as foon as poflible. OBSERVATIONS on tSe COMMERCE of the AME-' RICAN STATES; by.jo IN LORD .SHEFFIELD. A New Edition, mucn'rnirfrgrd, with an Appendix, contain- ing Tables of the Imports and Exports of Great Biiuiin, to au 1 from all Parts: aifu the Export* of America, &c. with Remarks O'i thofe TableN, and on the late Proclamations, &c. Price 55. in Bo-in s. The TRUE STATE of the QUESTION. Price is. 6d. The Subftance of the Speech of the Right Honourable \VIuLlAWPITI, onfrLay, February 21, 1783. Price SHORT STATE O F T H E PRESENT. SITUATION OF THE ' INDIA COMPANY. [ PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIXPENCE, ] 27 35 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. Form L9-32m-8,'58(5876s4)444 'ERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES DS I 463 A2P2 17* v.4 Letters to a Member of the Present Parliament... 000017727 9 DS 463 A2P2 1784 v.4