SANTA CRUZ 
 
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 Gift oi 
 
 Frances B. McAllister 
 
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 LIFE AND WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
 
 COMMEMORATIVE EDITION 
 
 EDITED BY MARION MILLS MILLER, LITT. D. 
 (PRINCETON) 
 
 IN TEN VOLUMES: VOLUME II 
 
PAINTED AND ENGRAVED BY WM. E. MARSHALL 
 
 LINCOLN AS PRESIDENT 
 
LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 (MARCH 4, 1861 TO MAY 3, 1865) 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY C. WHITNEY 
 
 Author of "LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN" 
 
 THE CURRENT LITERATURE PUBLISHING Co. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 1909 
 
Copyright, 1892, by Henry C. Whitney 
 Copyright, 1907, by William H. Lambert 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. THE CABINET , ; ; . ., . w -. i 
 
 II. FORT SUMTER AND THE VIRGINIA CONVEN- 
 TION . . . . . . . 29 
 
 III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . 49 
 
 IV. THE CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES . 65 
 V. THE FIRST MESSAGE 86 
 
 VI. BULL RUN AND MILITARY EMANCIPATION 102 
 
 VII. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MCCLELLAN 122 
 
 VIII. BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE . . 165 
 
 IX. THE ARMY IN THE WEST . . . 192 
 
 X. GENERAL GRANT 233 
 
 XI. EMANCIPATION 241 
 
 XII. OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR . . . 260 
 
 XIII. NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO MILITARY AU- 
 
 THORITY 277 
 
 XIV. THE SECOND ELECTION AND INAUGURATION 
 
 RECONSTRUCTION ... . . 296 
 
 XV. THE END . . 319 
 
 INDEX OF VOLUMES ONE AND Two . . 343 
 
LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE CABINET 
 
 NEXT morning (March 5, 1861) the President 
 began his official career. The heads of the de- 
 partments, and Senators and Congressmen, and 
 zealous and interested friends came in great 
 numbers, and were received, so far as time would 
 allow. At 11:30 A.M. Mr. John G. Nicolay 
 started to the Capitol with the first official com- 
 munication to the Senate : it contained the Presi- 
 dential nominees for the Cabinet. These were: 
 William H. Seward, of New York, Secretary of 
 State; Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Secretary of 
 the Treasury; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, 
 Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, of Connecti- 
 cut, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith, of 
 Indiana, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery 
 Blair, of Maryland, Postmaster-General; and 
 Edward Bates, of Missouri, Attorney-General. 
 These nominations were promptly confirmed by 
 the Senate, and the appointees entered at once 
 upon their duties. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln was not only the most consummate 
 statesman of his time, but he was also and equally 
 the most astute and sagacious politician ; he well 
 knew and realized that legitimate politics was 
 based on system and constancy that utility was 
 
2 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 its motor, and good faith its balance wheel ; that 
 political tergiversation and ingratitude would 
 handicap its success, in exact relation to the ex- 
 tent of the turpitude and flagitious cause at 
 issue. 
 
 Now Lincoln had been elected by a composite 
 vote, and he realized that political expediency, 
 good faith, propriety and justice all demanded 
 that he should make an equitable division of the 
 offices between the two political factors, which, 
 united, had secured his election. As soon as his 
 election had been assured, he resolved upon the 
 various members of his Cabinet, so far as his per- 
 sonal wish was concerned, the Administration 
 representing the old parties equally, thus: 
 
 Whigs Democrats 
 
 Illinois Lincoln Ohio Chase 
 
 New York Seward Connecticut Welles 
 
 Missouri Bates Maryland Blair 
 
 New Jersey Dayton Illinois Judd 
 
 And in point of fact, he desired Judd person- 
 ally, more than any of the others ; I confess I see 
 no reason why. But there were circumstances 
 which militated against the carrying out of this 
 policy. Judd came from the same State as the 
 President; his appointment would have been ex- 
 tremely obnoxious to all of Lincoln's old Whig 
 friends, as Davis, Swett, Logan, Dickey, Brown- 
 ing, Williams, Washburne, Yates, and Norton. 
 
 Lincoln's friends, including Judd, had without 
 authority promised the friends of Cameron and 
 of Smith places for these in the Cabinet. Judd 
 therefore could not displace either of them. Lin- 
 coln must have Chase, Seward, a man from New 
 
THE CABINET 3 
 
 England, and two Southern men, and Judd and 
 Dayton were necessarily thus ruled out. His 
 chief competitors for the nomination had been 
 Seward, Chase, Bates, and Cameron. He rea- 
 soned that these men were representative with 
 himself of the strength of the Republican party. 
 Cameron he omitted in his personal desire, by 
 reason of his malodorous political record; the 
 others he was resolved upon, and must have at 
 all hazards. 
 
 From the time the convention of 1860 ad- 
 journed, it was palpable that, if Lincoln was 
 elected, Seward must be Secretary of State; to 
 have omitted this, would have been worse than a 
 crime, for it would have been a gross political 
 blunder. Seward, more than any other man, had 
 built up the Republican party; of the non-mer- 
 chantable part of the convention, he was the 
 choice. Lincoln became the nominee only by vir- 
 tue of political dickers, unauthorized, it is true, 
 but nevertheless made in his behalf. That Seward 
 would be part of the Administration was every- 
 where conceded ; and he and his coterie expected 
 that he would be the Administration itself. 
 Seward took the stump accordingly, and made 
 a series of speeches which for classical style, 
 comprehensiveness of detail, and political erudi- 
 tion have never been excelled. Therein lay his 
 forte; he was the Burke and Fox combined of 
 American politics, but not the Pitt, for he was 
 the most unsafe of statesmen. 
 
 Seward took no pains to refute the assumption, 
 which was general, that he was to be the vis 
 inertia of the coming Administration. After a 
 short time for reflection, for looks' sake, on the 
 28th of December he accepted the high honor 
 
4 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 offered him, and cast a wary and critical eye on 
 the political field to ascertain the true policy for 
 the political future of William Henry Seward. 
 For he was nothing if not a politician, and an 
 optimistic one at that, and his hopeful fancy 
 penetrated through the angry and threatening 
 clouds of secession and civil war, and reveled in 
 the tranquil and serene azure of reconciliation 
 and peace. Inasmuch as he had been an actor in 
 the stirring era of 1850 when secession was 
 threatened, but was averted, he hoped for a simii 
 lar result now. 
 
 Seward's geniality, talents, and high political 
 position made him hosts of personal friends even, 
 among his political enemies, and he was looked 
 to as the political oracle of the times, the more 
 especially as the conventional head of the Admin- 
 istration, with wisdom and propriety, was mute. 
 That a statesman of Seward's great ability should 
 make so gross a mistake as to assume that he 
 was to run the Administration of a President 
 about whose characteristics he knew nothing, 
 and, on this assumption, to act in advance, is 
 strange, but it is nevertheless true. From the 
 time that Lincoln solicited his acceptance of a 
 Cabinet office, Seward assumed that he was to 
 be the " power behind the throne." 
 
 On Saturday, March 2, Mr. Seward had writ- 
 ten to the President-elect asking leave to with- 
 draw his consent to accept the office of Secretary 
 of State. Mr. Lincoln thought over the situation 
 until Monday, when he came to the conclusion 
 that Mr. Seward wished to dominate it by having 
 his resignation accepted and then either resum- 
 ing his place in the Senate of which he would be 
 the leader, or gracefully yielding to the public 
 
THE CABINET 5 
 
 outcry, which he felt sure would follow, thus re- 
 entering the council of the President as the mas- 
 ter-spirit of the Administration. This position 
 the President determined to maintain for him- 
 self. Remarking " I can't afford to let Seward 
 take the first trick," he handed the following 
 letter to Mr. Nicolay, his private secretary, for 
 him to copy and transmit to Mr. Seward : 
 
 Your note ... is the subject of the most painful 
 solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that 
 you will countermand the withdrawal. The public in- 
 terest, I think, demands that you should; and my 
 personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direc- 
 tion. Please consider and answer by 9 o'clock A.M. 
 to-morrow. 
 
 On March 5 Mr. Seward withdrew his letter 
 in season for the original " slate " to be pre- 
 sented to the Senate. However, not at once did 
 he give up the game. Indeed, he spread his entire 
 hand on the table, assured that Lincoln would 
 recognize its strength and throw up his own. 
 Instead, Lincoln held him to the rules of the 
 game, which required the Secretary to follow the 
 President's lead, and he bade him take up his 
 hand again. To Seward's credit it must be re- 
 corded that he did so. 
 
 On April i Secretary Seward submitted to Mr. 
 Lincoln a paper entitled : " Some Thoughts for 
 the President's Consideration." In this he out-' 
 lined the course needful to be pursued, first im- 
 pudently premising that no policy had as yet 
 been adopted. This document sounds very much 
 like pleasantry on the part of the Secretary, but 
 it was on too serious a matter, and at too serious 
 a time for this, and was delivered in expectation 
 
6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 that the President would abdicate his high pow- 
 ers and confer them on his ambitious and meddle- 
 some subordinate. The programme suggested 
 was thus : Change the question before the public 
 from one about slavery for a question about 
 union or disunion. Demand categorically and at 
 once explanations from Spain and France. Seek 
 explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and 
 send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central 
 America to rouse a vigorous spirit of independ- 
 ence on this continent against European inter- 
 vention. And if satisfactory explanations are 
 not received from Spain and France, convene 
 Congress and declare war against them. But 
 whatsoever be the policy adopted, there must be 
 an energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose 
 it must be somebody's business to pursue and 
 direct it incessantly. Either the President must 
 do it himself and be all the while active in it, or 
 he should let it devolve on some member of his 
 Cabinet. Once adopted, debate on it must end, 
 and all agree and abide. " It is not my especial 
 province, but I neither seek to evade nor assume 
 responsibility." And yet the author of this 
 idiotic performance came very near to being in 
 the position of dread responsibility held by the 
 sage Lincoln. The President did not need any 
 time for consideration of so senseless yet mis- 
 chievous a document. Indeed, had its existence 
 been made public, it would have made the Ad- 
 ministration as ridiculous as its hosts of 
 enemies could desire. 
 
 Before William Henry Seward closed his eyes 
 in sleep that night he was " a sadder and wiser 
 man/' for he had read a note from his master 
 both in position and in intellect which was 
 
THE CABINET 7 
 
 entirely free from ambiguity, and which, dis- 
 daining to reply to the bellicose matter broached, 
 gave the premier to understand that the trust 
 which the people had invested the President with 
 should be sacredly enforced by him without the 
 interference of any subordinate. It was respect- 
 ful and dignified in tone and diction, but it was 
 as sharp and trenchant as a Dasmascus blade. 
 It ended thus: 
 
 Upon your closing proposition [the adoption of a 
 fixed policy and its energetic prosecution either by the 
 President or one specially chosen member of the Cabi- 
 net] I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. 
 When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend 
 there is no danger of its being changed without good 
 reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary 
 debate ; still, upon points arising in its progress, I 
 wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of 
 all the Cabinet. 
 
 Throughout the dark winter of 1 860-61, Seward 
 had clearly seen the masked designs of the South- 
 ern leaders, and kept the President fully advised 
 of the true trend of affairs. He wrote that it 
 was the fell design of the Southern leaders to 
 break up the Union, by reason of their loss of 
 political power, and he added that the President 
 (Buchanan) didn't know which way to turn, or 
 what to do that Union men were alarmed, and 
 the situation was chaotic. Being thus convinced 
 of the animus of the Southern leaders, and of 
 the imbecility of the Administration, he deemed 
 it of supreme importance that the principle of 
 inertia should rule until after March 4, fearing 
 that a coup d'etat of some sort might be at- 
 tempted to prevent Mr. Lincoln from gaining 
 possession of the Government. He accordingly 
 
8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 affected a nonchalance he did not feel, stated his 
 opinions insincerely in optimistic language for 
 the ears of the Southern leaders, and predicted 
 that in " ninety days " (which would reach into 
 Lincoln's term) there would be political har- 
 mony. 
 
 That Seward compromised himself by these 
 utterances, which were not the substance of 
 things hoped for by him, is clear; the Southern 
 leaders interpreted it to mean that there would 
 be no coercion, but that they would be allowed 
 to secede in peace. Seward afterward claimed 
 that he promulgated these views in order to keep 
 the status quo intact till Lincoln could take hold. 
 This insincerity, if it were so, was not difficult 
 for Seward, for his political practices were 
 Machiavellian, and, like Talleyrand, he could use 
 language to conceal his thoughts. But whether 
 sincere or insincere, he did the one thing needful 
 at the time, and bound himself to a line of policy 
 which, if submitted to the people, in my judg- 
 ment and in that of men much more astute than 
 I, would never have been indorsed by them. 
 
 Seward's early policy was to yield to the 
 secession menace, back squarely down, and play 
 the coward, and then retrieve the resulting dis- 
 aster in some chance, haphazard way. Whether 
 he adopted this belief from timidity or ex- 
 pediency is not clear ; it was probably the latter, 
 but the weak men in the Cabinet and General 
 Scott shared his views, thus giving to the Ad- 
 ministration an appearance of irresolution which 
 was finally terminated by the President following 
 Blair's advice, and determining to attempt to re- 
 lieve Fort Sumter. Meanwhile Seward's course 
 was very perplexing to the Administration and 
 
THE CABINET 9 
 
 to the conspirators at Charleston and Montgom- 
 ery as well. Taking counsel of his hopes, the 
 Secretary had np hesitation in giving definite as- 
 surances to the friends and emissaries of the 
 secession cause that Sumter would be evacuated. 
 Martin J. Crawford, a Rebel commissioner, noti- 
 fied his government on March 6 that Seward 
 and Cameron were resolved on a peace policy, 
 which they could enforce on the President. And 
 Seward definitely assured Mr. Justice Campbell 
 that Sumter would be evacuated at once. 
 Finally, when it was apparent that Sumter was 
 to be relieved, the entire administration was ac- 
 cused of duplicity, and Campbell was discredited 
 by his own people. This arose from the lack 
 of harmony between Seward's optimistic hopes 
 and Lincoln's constancy and heroism. 
 
 One James E. Harvey became an attache of the 
 State department. On April 6, 1861, this Harvey 
 telegraphed to Judge McGrath at Charleston: 
 " Positively determined not to withdraw Ander- 
 son. Supplies go immediately, supported by 
 naval force under Stringham, if their landing be 
 resisted. A Friend." The Rebel commissioner 
 Caldwell indorsed it, " The above is by a reliable 
 man." But the telegraph office insisted upon 
 knowing the name of the sender, and it was then 
 given. Two days later Harvey sent this dis- 
 patch : " Orders issued for withdrawal of An- 
 derson's command. Scott declares it military 
 necessity. This is private." This dispatch was 
 immediately followed by another to the effect 
 that efforts were making to consider the with- 
 drawal, but it would be in vain, and still another 
 from the same source, stating that the final order 
 had not yet been made, and that in the Cabinet 
 
io LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 six were for withdrawal and one against it. It 
 will be seen that his information was as accurate 
 as he could have got had he been present in 
 the Executive Chamber throughout all the 
 Cabinet proceedings. And Seward afterward 
 appointed this spy and informer Minister to 
 Portugal. 
 
 Secretary Seward was a very sagacious and 
 subtle politician, and his ambition was not limited 
 by time or propriety, but reached out into the 
 illimitable regions of the hereafter and unknown, 
 the goal of his aspirations being immortality. 
 While out riding one day with a friend, toward 
 the close of his life, they passed through Union 
 Square in New York, and as they came opposite 
 the Lincoln statue in that park, Seward said bit- 
 terly, " Death has cheated me of immortality/' 
 his idea being that history would have garnered 
 into his fame the honors of Lincoln's administra- 
 tion, had not premature death placed the great 
 President in an elevation too lofty to be shared 
 with another. 
 
 Indeed Seward's friends claimed that he really 
 administered the government in Lincoln's name; 
 and so astute and generally accurate a critic as 
 Charles Francis Adams made this bold claim 
 after the eminent subjects were both dead. That 
 this claim has no basis at all is attested by events 
 considered both as a whole and in every detail. 
 Seward perhaps at first exercised more authority 
 than any other Cabinet minister, but when the 
 administration got worn to its bearings, he was 
 no more potent than Chase or Stanton. Seward's 
 famous dispatch to Minister Adams was radically 
 changed by the President, and that document 
 was the chef d'ceuvre of the Seward diplomacy. 
 
THE CABINET n 
 
 Mr. Lincoln attempted to provision Sumter, re- 
 leased Mason and Slidell, and retained McClel- 
 lan, all against Seward's policy. In point of 
 fact, everything 1 shows that Lincoln paid no more 
 attention to Seward than he did to even Welles, 
 and the only basis for the claim of Seward's 
 predominance lies in the fact that the Secretary 
 of State arrogated more to himself, and took 
 more liberties than the others did. Seward is an 
 interesting character; one can but admire the 
 cleverness of his methods while condemning 
 them. His political aims were preservative and 
 heroic, but his course was replete with " ways 
 that were dark and tricks that were vain." 
 
 As an illustration of his devious and mys- 
 terious methods the following facts may be 
 cited: Although he was a Protestant (an Epis- 
 copalian), yet during his whole political life he 
 was in close touch with Bishop Hughes, who was 
 then the most influential Catholic in America. 
 The most prominent of the founders of the Re- 
 publican party, he was on terms of extreme in- 
 timacy with Stephen A. Douglas, even during 
 this Senator's flagitious fight to repeal the Mis- 
 souri Compromise. Seward's intimacy with 
 Weed, the Mephistopheles and Fouche combined 
 of politics, was openly proclaimed by himself. 
 Seward said one day, after the name of Weed 
 had come up just before, in a Cabinet meeting, 
 " Weed and Seward are one ; what I say, he con- 
 curs in; what he does, I approve; we are one." 
 " I am very sorry to hear that remark," said 
 Secretary Chase ; " I would strain a point to 
 oblige Governor Seward, but I would not do any- 
 thing for the especial benefit of Mr. Weed ; they 
 never can be one to me." But Weed remained 
 
12 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the right bower of the administration of the 
 State department, as he had been the right bower 
 of the Secretary for years before. At the close 
 of Lincoln's term Weed retired from the political 
 world a man of great wealth. 
 
 Seward's dignity of character was rather the 
 result of intellectual force than of moral convic- 
 tions. The political morality of Albany was 
 alike in all its graduates. " To the victors belong 
 the spoils," said Marcy from the Democratic 
 ring ; " Weed and I are one," echoed Seward 
 from the Whig contingent. 
 
 Chase was different: he was not even a poli- 
 tician; he had no claque, no mentor, no devious 
 ways. He relied for success solely upon man- 
 hood, individuality, statesmanship. Not only 
 would rivalry keep Chase and Seward apart, but 
 their characteristics alone would do so, unaided. 
 They were civil and mechanically polite to each 
 other when they first met in Lincoln's Cabinet; 
 they were no more nor less so, the last time. 
 
 A serious difficulty lay in harmonizing the 
 " Seward " and " Chase " factions. Seward ex- 
 pected and designed to " run " the administra- 
 tion, that is, to administer the government in Lin- 
 coln's name ; and he did not intend to " brook a 
 rival near the throne." Chase feared this domi- 
 nating influence of Seward, and felt no assurance 
 of amity or concord in such companionship, and 
 their several friends were even more bitter in 
 their opposition than the principals themselves. 
 
 The radical majority of Congress in 1862 was 
 more in sympathy with the principles represented 
 by Secretary Chase in the national council than 
 with those of the President. This was clearly 
 indicated by the favor with which the financial 
 
THE CABINET 13 
 
 propositions of the message of that year were re- 
 ceived, and by the lack of consideration paid to 
 the President's pet measure of compensated 
 emancipation. As early as September 12, 1862, 
 Secretary Chase recorded in his diary an im- 
 pression of the President that prevailed among 
 the radicals: 
 
 I think that the President, with the most honest in- 
 tentions in the world, and a naturally clear judgment 
 and a true, unselfish patriotism, has yielded so much to 
 border-State and negrophobic counsels that he now 
 finds it difficult to arrest his own descent towards the 
 most fatal concessions. He has already separated him- 
 self from the great body of the party which elected 
 him; distrusts most those who represent its spirit, and 
 waits for what? 
 
 The radicals in Congress considered the Presi- 
 dent a weak man, too greatly swayed by certain 
 of his counselors, chiefly Secretary Seward, who 
 had incurred the enmity of the anti-slavery men 
 by the statement in a letter to Minister Adams 
 on July 5, 1862, that by demanding an edict of 
 universal emancipation they were acting in con- 
 cert with the secessionists to precipitate a servile 
 war. The Republican Senators went so far as 
 to hold a caucus which adopted a resolution re- 
 questing the President to reconstruct his Cabinet. 
 Hearing of this action, Secretary Seward offered 
 his resignation to the President. 
 
 The committee appointed to present the reso- 
 lution of the caucus waited on the President on 
 December 19. As the President afterwards re- 
 ported to the Cabinet, in language wherein humor- 
 ous candor triumphed over personal humilia- 
 tion : " While they seemed to believe in my hon- 
 esty, they also appeared to think that, when I 
 
14 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 had in me any good purpose or intention, 
 Seward contrived to suck it out of me unper- 
 ceived." 
 
 Lincoln asked the committee to call again that 
 evening, at which time he also convened the 
 Cabinet, with the exception of Seward. He in- 
 , formed neither the Senators nor the Ministers 
 that the other party would be present. The com- 
 mittee presented its charges against the Cabinet 
 in general and the Secretary of State in par- 
 ticular, and the President and the Cabinet, even 
 Secretary Chase, who had in private endorsed 
 the opinions of the Senators, defended them- 
 selves, and either implicitly or explicitly their ab- 
 sent colleague. The Secretary of the Treasury, 
 however, protested that the President had placed 
 him in a false position by not notifying the 
 Cabinet that the committee would be present at 
 the meeting, in which case he would not have 
 come. As the committee were departing, de- 
 feated by the unanimity of the Cabinet, which 
 Chase had told them was in discord, Senator 
 Trumbull, of Illinois, informed the President 
 with some heat of the two-faced attitude of the 
 Secretary of the Treasury that had led the Sen- 
 ators into such a humiliating situation. 
 
 At the Cabinet meeting next day Secretary 
 Chase tendered his written resignation. This 
 was what the President, ever since the resigna- 
 tion of Secretary Seward, had been playing for. 
 He promptly received the paper, and closed dis- 
 cussion by dismissing the meeting. Then he sent 
 the following note to both Seward and Chase : 
 
 You have respectively tendered me your resignations 
 as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury of 
 the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances 
 
THE CABINET 15 
 
 which may render this course personally desirable to 
 each of you; but after most anxious 'consideration my 
 deliberate judgment is that the public interest does not 
 admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will 
 resume the duties of your Departments respectively. 
 
 As neither Secretary by insisting on resigning 
 would permit his rival to obtain the victory, each 
 decided to remain in the Cabinet. Seward, 
 from the day that Lincoln rejected his " Some 
 Thoughts for the President's Consideration," had 
 recognized him as master. Chase now had 
 learned the same lesson. Thereafter Lincoln had 
 a harmonious Cabinet of balanced opinion, ad- 
 visory but subordinate to his own. As he quaintly 
 remarked to a friendly Senator (Ira Harris, of 
 New York) : " Now I can ride; I've got a pump- 
 kin in each end of my bag." 
 
 In the formation of the Cabinet David Davis 
 made it very disagreeable for the President- 
 elect, by constantly causing it to be represented 
 that his cousin, H. Winter Davis, ought to receive 
 a Cabinet appointment. Of course this was im- 
 possible, and David Davis probably knew it, as 
 any such appointment as that would alienate the 
 whole Blair family : Francis P. Blair, Sr., 
 Francis P. Blair, Jr., Montgomery Blair, B. 
 Gratz Brown, and the rest. This would amount 
 to surrendering the political allegiance of Mary- 
 land and Missouri, and possibly Kentucky. No! 
 that never would do. I suppose the Judge 
 shrewdly thought that the President-elect might 
 placate him by appointing him instead of Winter 
 Davis. 
 
 However, it was more than an annoyance. 
 Lincoln found considerable difficulty in ignoring 
 Winter Davis and his pretensions, and Winter 
 
1 6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Davis kept up a " fire in the rear " on the Admin- 
 istration ever afterward, though nothing serious 
 came of it. 
 
 Really, the most difficult matter was the cases 
 of Smith and Cameron. Without the aid of In- 
 diana and Cameron's Pennsylvania contingent in 
 the convention, the nomination would have gone 
 to Seward, and those factors would have been 
 traded off to Seward had not the " Lincoln " 
 coterie acquired them beforehand. Smith and 
 Cameron were after the " spoils," and these were 
 promised them as emphatically as David Davis, 
 Swett, Logan, and Judd could do it. Lincoln was 
 bound in fealty to his friends and supporters, and 
 it would savor strongly of ingratitude, if not of 
 dishonor, to repudiate their bargains. In case of 
 Smith there was no serious difficulty. He had 
 never been in a position to show his quality. The 
 murky condition of the " Smith " horizon was 
 caused by his followers, their demands, and their 
 too plainly apparent greed. All danger from that 
 source might be forestalled, and perhaps coun- 
 teracted at all events, that appointment would 
 not evoke violent criticism. The great strain 
 came to Lincoln in being obliged to discard Judd 
 in order to pay Indiana for its vote in the con- 
 vention. Yet Judd could not complain, since he 
 had made the bargain. The case of Cameron 
 was different; he had a national reputation for 
 tergiversation, and, while Swett, Davis, and Logan 
 were compelled to demand his appointment, party 
 leaders from all quarters violently protested 
 against it. The very best Republican leaders in 
 Pennsylvania, such as Governor Andrew G. Cur- 
 tin, were also opposed to it, and Lincoln came to 
 a pretty firm resolve not to make the appoint- 
 
THE CABINET 17 
 
 ment He said to Swett one day: "You know 
 I am called ' Honest old Abe ;' how will it appear 
 to the world for me to appoint Cameron as one 
 of my political family, and thus indorse him and 
 his record especially as leading men all over 
 the nation, and particularly in Pennsylvania, 
 vehemently oppose it? I can't do it." And he 
 informed Cameron that he could not. But the 
 political sagacity of Cameron was superior to 
 Lincoln's determination. He insisted on the con- 
 sideration for his votes in the convention; the 
 Pennsylvania opponents would not prefer writ- 
 ten charges, and Lincoln, with extreme re- 
 luctance, gave Cameron the War Department, 
 which he, of course, at once proceeded to run in 
 the " Cameronian " way, and very soon " ran 
 it into the ground." 
 
 Secretary Cameron was a man of shrewd 
 political ability, but with no talent for executive 
 administration. Thoroughly loyal to his chief, 
 he nevertheless placed him in a most delicate 
 position by inserting in the annual report of the 
 Secretary of War, which was printed on Decem- 
 ber i, 1861, an unauthorized dictum in regard to 
 the arming of slaves by the Federal Government, 
 saying : 
 
 It is as clearly a right of the Government to arm 
 slaves, when it may become necessary, as it is to use 
 gunpowder taken from the enemy. Whether it is ex- 
 pedient to do so is purely a military question. . . . 
 If it shall be found that the men who have been held 
 by the Rebels as slaves are capable of bearing arms 
 and performing efficient military service, it is the right, 
 and may become the duty, of the Government to arm 
 and equip them, and employ their services against the 
 Rebels, under proper military regulation, discipline, and 
 command. 
 
l8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 While this was also the President's secret be- 
 lief and intention, he was not ready to announce 
 it, and had indeed censured General Fremont for 
 his unauthorized proclamation of military eman- 
 cipation of slaves coming within his lines. Ac- 
 cordingly he suppressed the first edition of the 
 Secretary's report containing this pronounce- 
 ment. This suppression was the only rebuke that 
 the President administered, yet the offending 
 Secretary realized that his tenure of office was a 
 slight one. His position became irksome, and he 
 was greatly relieved accordingly by his transfer 
 on January n, 1862, to the congenial post of a 
 foreign minister, going to represent our country 
 at the friendly court of St. Petersburg. 
 
 On April 30, 1862, the House of Representa- 
 tives passed a resolution censuring Mr. Cameron 
 for entrusting, while Secretary of War, large 
 sums of money to an irresponsible and unbonded 
 agent for the purchase of military supplies, and 
 for dealing with illegitimate contractors of such 
 supplies. On the 2/th of May, 1862, the Presi- 
 dent sent a special message to Congress on the 
 subject, showing in detail that he and the heads 
 of the Government department had authorized 
 the acts complained of, and justifying them as 
 necessary to save the Government in the crisis 
 that then existed. " Congress," he said, " will 
 see that I should be wanting in candor or in jus- 
 tice if I should leave the censure ... to 
 rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron." 
 
 Lincoln's worst fears were realized in the ap- 
 pointments of Smith and Cameron. And he got 
 rid of both as soon as he could. He didn't im- 
 prove matters much in case of Smith, for he 
 replaced him with a man (John T. Usher) of 
 
THE CABINET 19 
 
 the same political school and tendencies. But in 
 Stanton, who replaced Cameron, he secured the 
 right man in the right place the bete noire of 
 skulkers, plunderers, and incompetents; a man 
 who never tired, and who followed his duties 
 and the courage of his convictions to a premature 
 grave. 
 
 The appointment of Edwin M. Stanton to the 
 most important position in the Cabinet was 
 thoroughly characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. Of all 
 the lawyers with whom Lincoln had come in con- 
 tact in his professional career, Stanton was the 
 only one who had inflicted a slight upon him 
 which continued to rankle in his sensitive nature. 
 In a celebrated patent suit, the McCormick-Man- 
 ney reaping-machine case, tried at Cincinnati 
 in 1859, Lincoln and Stanton were associated 
 with George Harding, a patent lawyer, as as- 
 sociate counsel. Only one lawyer besides Hard- 
 ing was permitted to speak, and the choice fell 
 on Stanton. Stanton completely ignored Lincoln, 
 who was present and ready to offer suggestions. 
 Lincoln was cut to the heart by his treatment, 
 and thought of returning home. His sense of 
 duty toward his client, however, kept him as an 
 auditor in the courtroom. As he listened to 
 Stanton's masterly conduct of the case, his sense 
 of personal injury was lost for the moment in 
 professional admiration of the " college-bred " 
 attorney from Washington, and he returned to 
 Illinois with the resolution, as a " corn-field law- 
 yer," to prepare himself to cope with the edu- 
 cated class of his professional rivals that was 
 " working out toward the West." 
 
 Again, in the trying months succeeding his in- 
 auguration, President Lincoln was cognizant of 
 
so LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Stanton's contemptuous criticism of his character 
 and acts, privately expressed, it is true, to public 
 men whose opposition to the President could and 
 did work him much injury. Indeed, for a time 
 General McClellan and Stanton collogued to- 
 gether, being drawn to one another by a common 
 contempt for the " imbecile " at the head of the 
 nation. Nevertheless, the President recalled 
 that, as Attorney-General in Buchanan's Cabinet, 
 Stanton had, under the most trying and critical 
 circumstances, acted the part of a patriot, and 
 with supreme genius secretly forestalled the 
 machinations of the secessionist conspirators 
 among his fellow Presidential advisers. 
 
 Laying personal feeling aside, and considering 
 only the interest of the nation, President Lincoln 
 chose as his War Minister the man whom he be- 
 lieved to be best qualified for the position Ed- 
 win M. Stanton. From a moral point of view, 
 this, and not the Emancipation Proclamation, 
 was " the greatest act of the Administration." 
 
 And so the Cabinet was made up of somewhat 
 combustible material, but, with four former 
 Democrats and three former Whigs, the Presi- 
 dent made a perfect equipoise by counting him- 
 self as a Whig. Later in his administration, 
 however, there were times when he outweighed 
 the entire Cabinet. Immediately after the second 
 disaster at Bull Run, and while the demoralized 
 troops were crowding into the defenses of Wash- 
 ington, a Cabinet meeting was called, and, before 
 the President came in, a rumor was rife that Mc- 
 Clellan had been reinstated in command of the 
 Army of the Potomac. This rumor Lincoln con- 
 firmed when he entered. Stanton showed fight 
 at once. " No such order has come through the 
 
THE CABINET 21 
 
 War Department," he said. " No," said the 
 President, " I did it of my own independent 
 motion, under my sense of responsibility to the 
 country;" and he proceeded to explain his rea- 
 sons kindly but firmly to the angry Cabinet, and 
 to show them that it was as bitter a dose for him 
 personally as it possibly could be to them. Had 
 it not been for the President's soothing manner, 
 Stanton, Chase, and Blair would probably have 
 resigned. 
 
 Lincoln's action regarding the Emancipation 
 PVoclamation was similar to this. He said to his 
 Cabinet : " About the main object, that of issu- 
 ing a proclamation, I have fully made up my 
 mind, but upon minor and formal matters, I will 
 receive advice in connection with it." 
 
 And Chase was the only member of his Cabinet 
 who ever left on account of dissatisfaction with 
 the President, and his dissatisfaction arose from 
 the fact that he had a very big head in a double 
 sense, and thought he ought to sit at the head of 
 the council board, instead of at one side thereof. 
 Two or three Congressmen had a measure ap- 
 purtenant to the War Department, in behalf of 
 which they sought the aid of the President ; and 
 he made the order on the department. This, 
 however, Stanton utterly ignored. " I shan't 
 obey it," sai4 he, " and the President is a d d 
 fool to make such an order." " What remark 
 w"as that ? " said the Congressman. " I said the 
 President was a d d fool to make such an 
 order," repeated Stanton. Back to the President 
 the Congressman went in high dudgeon, and 
 reported what Stanton said. " Did he say 
 that ?" queried Lincoln carelessly. " Yes, he 
 did," said the indignant Congressman. " Well, 
 
22 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 then, I reckon it must be so if Stanton said it, for 
 he is generally right," was the reply. However, 
 the President saw Stanton soon after, and the 
 order was enforced. 
 
 Assistant-Adjutant-General Long narrates a 
 similar incident. Some outsiders had persuaded 
 Lincoln to adopt a certain line of policy which 
 apparently was impolitic, and Stanton refused to 
 carry out the order. The President called on the 
 great War Secretary, who substantially demon- 
 strated to him that he was wrong, and repeated 
 that he shouldn't carry out the order. Lincoln 
 sat carelessly on a lounge nursing his left leg, and 
 said : " I reckon it'll have to be done, Mr. Sec- 
 retary." " Well, I shan't do it," said Stanton. It 
 was getting unpleasant for the Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral, and he started to go. As he passed through 
 the door, he heard the President say good-humor - 
 edly, " I reckon you'll have to do it, Mr. Sec- 
 retary." In a half-hour the order came over, 
 signed by Stanton. 
 
 At the Presidential election of 1864, as the 
 War Department had the best facilities for get- 
 ting dispatches, the President would go there after 
 dinner to get the news. Once, stretching him- 
 self out on a lounge, he took a book of jokes he 
 had with him out of his pocket and commenced 
 to read aloud, chuckling with laughter, in which 
 the three or four public men who were present 
 likewise joined. Returns soon began to come 
 in, and he read the dispatches languidly and re- 
 sumed his reading and laughter where he left off. 
 After this had gone on for a while, Stanton got 
 very angry, and, beckoning one of those present 
 into an adjoining room, he almost exploded with 
 suppressed rage. " See that d d fool there, act- 
 
THE CABINET 23 
 
 ing like a monkey while the country is on the 
 brink of hell ! " he muttered. But Lincoln paid 
 no attention to Stanton, and stuck to his stories 
 till the news indicated no doubt of the result. 
 Then he put his .book in his pocket, got up, 
 stretched his arms and legs, yawned, and went 
 home. 
 
 When Chase resigned the President said, 
 " Chase is all right, but he's got the Presidential 
 itch and that'll spoil anyone. He's the very kind 
 of timber for a good Chief Justice." 
 
 Governor Tod, of Ohio, whom Lincoln had ap- 
 pointed as Chase's successor, declined the office, 
 and Lincoln went to bed greatly worried, for the 
 appointment was a most critical one. Next morn- 
 ing he selected William Pitt Fessenden for the 
 place. He had dreamed that name, or, more 
 properly, had balanced all suitable candidates 
 during the silent watches of the night, and Fes- 
 senden's was the name that tipped the scale. Lin- 
 coln then wrote a note to Fessenden telling him 
 what he had done, and sent for the Register of the 
 Treasury; then forwarded the appointment to 
 the Senate. Soon Fessenden came in pale with 
 excitement, exclaiming : " I can't take it ; my 
 health won't stand it ; you must not insist on it ! " 
 The President came forward, and, putting his 
 arms affectionately about his neck, said, " Fessen- 
 den, we've got to put down this war, and you're 
 one of the instruments to do it, and you've no 
 right to decline. I would like to be set free my- 
 self, but I can't, neither can you; your name is 
 now at the Senate ; it will be confirmed forthwith, 
 and you must be at the Treasury, signing war- 
 rants, by two o'clock." And Fessenden was. 
 
 When the President desired to enforce any- 
 
24 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 thing he did it, but he greatly disliked to come 
 in collision with his Secretaries. The old story 
 is worn threadbare, that he sent someone to 
 Stanton for some action and the party returned 
 saying that the Secretary wouldn't do it. " Then 
 I can't help you," said Lincoln, " for I have very 
 little influence with this Administration." And 
 another story is also told of the President wait- 
 ing to complete some action till Stanton had tem- 
 porarily left the capital, and then putting it 
 through under the imprimatur of the Assistant 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 In the routine work of the departments the 
 great President disliked to interfere and rarely 
 did so ; anything he did do was not in the shape 
 of an order but of a request or suggestion. I 
 once was with him when an applicant for some 
 place in the Baltimore Customhouse was present. 
 The President wrote on a card on his knee, being 
 seated at the south window : " Mr. Chase : The 
 bearer, Mr. , wants to be in the Custom- 
 house at Baltimore; if his recommendations are 
 satisfactory, and I recollect them to have been 
 so, the fact that he is a Methodist should not be 
 against him, as they complain of us some." And 
 Dennis Hanks relates that Lincoln once wrote 
 a note to Stanton in behalf of a very pretty 
 woman, who wanted some favor : " This woman, 
 dear Stanton, is smarter than she seems." And, 
 as a rule, Chase and Stanton did just as they 
 pleased with his recommendations. 
 
 It was currently understood during Lincoln's 
 administration that there was no regularity nor 
 system about Cabinet meetings, and that unless 
 there was a summons they did not pretend to 
 meet regularly. The President preferred to have 
 
THE CABINET 25 
 
 one of them drop in as Se ward did in my pres- 
 ence, if he wanted anything badly enough to 
 come for it. Sitting at the window with a spy- 
 glass in his hand, he would talk in a free-and-easy 
 manner, with whomsoever came write a note 
 on a card on his knee with a lead pencil, look 
 through the spy-glass at the distant Virginia 
 hills and down the vista of the Potomac. I recol- 
 lect once seeing a vessel as far down as we 
 could see. near to Alexandria, with its masts lean- 
 ing toward the Virginia shore. Lincoln was 
 puzzled about it; he looked long and earnestly 
 at it. " I wonder what that can mean," he said 
 half a dozen times. He liked to go from one 
 thing to another in his office ; he would sit and 
 sign commissions for a while then take a docu- 
 ment out of his drawer or off the table and read 
 it possibly sign it reflect on it a while, and 
 then put it back for further consideration. Then 
 he would gaze out of the window then a 
 thought would strike him, and he would go to his 
 table or desk, and write vigorously for a while, 
 then lapse into thought. Sometimes he would sit 
 and write for an hour at a time, and of course 
 when people came in he would attend to them in 
 a purely informal way. 
 
 The painting of the " Reading of the Emanci- 
 pation Proclamation," by F. B. Carpenter, is 
 merely a fancy sketch. Everything is idealized, 
 since the artist was posing his subjects 'for pos- 
 terity. In fact, the idea of the painting was ex 
 post facto. Lincoln and his Cabinet never pre- 
 sented a classical tableau except on canvas. Ex- 
 actly how the group appeared at the supreme 
 moment the Proclamation was read, we are not 
 advised, but just before it the spectacle might 
 
26 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 have been witnessed of the President reading a 
 joke of Artemus Ward or Petroleum Nasby, with 
 laughter sandwiched in, in which all joined per- 
 functorily except Chase and Stanton, the former 
 of whom was dignified and shocked the latter 
 of whom was black and mad. Were this pro- 
 pensity to be jocular a mere device to aggran- 
 dize himself or to amuse others, I should call it a 
 blemish; as it was, however, a device to banish 
 dull care and to enable him to " plow around " 
 people (as he termed it), it was, in his case, like 
 other utilities, a meritorious quality. 
 
 Other matters which confronted Mr. Lincoln 
 at the outset of his administration, and which 
 caused him extreme annoyance, were the pres- 
 ence of so many disloyal persons in all official 
 positions and the importunity of office-seekers. 
 
 That new and loyal officers should replace the 
 disloyal incumbents was sufficiently obvious, but 
 the mad rush and unexampled persistency with 
 which the Administration was assailed, usurping 
 the necessary time demanded for the considera- 
 tion of even grave matters, was where and how 
 the moral outrage was exhibited. Office-seeking 
 lust and venality were never so ungraciously ex- 
 hibited as then; men formerly of high character 
 and influence, even some who were surpliced ser- 
 vants of the Most High, prostituted their charac- 
 ters by office-broking and huckstering. Politi- 
 cal influence was an acknowledged subject of 
 purchase in many quarters. One case was re- 
 ported to me on conclusive authority of a man of 
 influence, afterwards a Cabinet minister, who of- 
 fered his influence to procure an office for one 
 hundred dollars. Of these importunate and per- 
 sistent devices, Mr. Lincoln complained most bit- 
 
THE CABINET 27 
 
 terly, frequently using as an illustration this 
 figure : " I am like a man who has a large tene- 
 ment house to let, but one end is on fire; and y 
 while it needs all his efforts to extinguish that,, 
 tenants are importuning him to rent them apart- 
 ments at the other end." He complained to me 
 most bitterly of Judge Davis's importunities for 
 his friends, evidently with the view that I should 
 repeat the complaint to Davis (which I did not), 
 and he also informed me that the most annoying 
 matters he had encountered, of a minor and petty 
 nature, were two quarrels about post-offices in 
 places of less than 10,000 inhabitants, one of 
 them being Davis's own town of Bloomington,, 
 111. 
 
 To this generation it would appear that Mr. 
 Lincoln's entire administration was invested with 
 the glamour of lustrous deeds and great renown. 
 Such was not the fact by any means ; on the con- 
 trary, in the beginning of his term of office, he 
 was considered as a President of " shreds and 
 patches," with a warring and uncomfortable 
 Cabinet, and no adequate political or moral sup- 
 port; it was thought that he had no proper 
 ability for his high position, and no substantial 
 policy or adequate comprehension of its duties. 
 He was a minority President and entirely untried 
 in the problems of statesmanship. Seward ac- 
 cepted the premiership only on the assumption 
 that he would be the controlling and dominant 
 spirit of the Administration. Had he supposed 
 that he would be compelled merely to play second 
 fiddle to the " rail-splitter," he never would have 
 accepted the place, but would have preferred his 
 old leadership in the Senate. As it was, even 
 after he had accepted the position, he again de- 
 
28 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 clined it, and only re-accepted on the urgent im- 
 portunity of Mr. Lincoln. Chase went into the 
 Cabinet with great reluctance, and only from an 
 abiding sense of duty. The truth was, that Mr. 
 Lincoln's administration in its incipiency was 
 decidedly " below par/' even had it not been con- 
 fronted by a rebellion ; and it was an object of al- 
 most undisguised contempt in the view of the cul- 
 tured political classes of the nation. 
 
 The reason of this was to be found in the 
 previous obscurity of its head; in the marked 
 prejudice against the negro, whose ally this Ad- 
 ministration was supposed to be; in the extreme 
 modesty of the President's pretensions, the ag- 
 gressiveness of the secessionists' government at 
 Montgomery, and in the intrenched position in 
 society of those in sympathy with it. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln had to hew his way to eternal 
 fame from the primeval forest of obscurity, 
 through the deep-tangled wildwood of unmerited 
 popularity, obloquy, and disdain. He patiently 
 endured rebuffs, insults, and insolence which he 
 would have resented in unequivocal terms had he 
 occupied a private station. He yielded ease, 
 comfort, happiness; he abnegated self entirely 
 for the public need; the ends he aimed at were 
 his " country's, God's, and truth's." 
 
 It was the solemn sense of his responsibility 
 that caused him to fight for the supreme place in 
 the government. It was not until later, when his 
 predominance was assured in all important 
 policies, that he could afford to joke about " hav- 
 ing very little influence with the administration." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 FORT SUMTER AND THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION" 
 
 AT this time there was, in form, another gov- 
 ernment at Montgomery, Ala., which pro- 
 fessed to hold sway over the seven so-called Cot- 
 ton States of the Union ; and which also affected 
 to believe that the establishment of their so- 
 called government would be acquiesced in; 
 proper accounts taken ; division of public prop- 
 erty made, and a treaty of peace entered into be- 
 tween the two governments. 
 
 South Carolina had seceded December 2O r 
 1860; Mississippi, January 9, 1861 ; Florida, 
 January 10 ; Alabama, January 1 1 ; Georgia, 
 January 19; Louisiana, January 26; Texas, Feb- 
 ruary i. The secession conventions of these 
 States had appointed delegates equal in number 
 to their former representation in the Federal 
 Congress, to meet in convention to form a South- 
 ern Confederacy. These assembled on February 
 4 at Montgomery, Ala. On February 8 the 
 seven States represented were organized into 
 " The Confederate States of America," and Jeff- 
 erson Davis, of Mississippi, and Alexander H. 
 Stephens, of Georgia, were elected President and 
 Vice-President respectively of the Confederacy. 
 
 The secessionists had their agents and emis- 
 saries everywhere. Washington and the depart- 
 ments were full of their spies, and men in high 
 
 29 
 
30 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 official station were constantly giving aid and 
 comfort to the Confederate government at Mont- 
 gomery. 
 
 Just after Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, John 
 W. Drinkard, chief clerk of the War Depart- 
 ment, and Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General of 
 the Army, resigned their positions and at once 
 .accepted similar positions in the Confederate 
 government, which they held through the war. 
 Louis T. Wigfall, lately Senator from Texas and 
 a native of Charleston, S. C, set up a Con- 
 federate recruiting office in Baltimore, opening 
 a bank account for its financial support with 
 Walters & Co., 68 Exchange Place. On March 
 23, sixty-four volunteers reached Castle Pinck- 
 ney from that station, passing right by the Cap- 
 itol at Washington en route. 
 
 Prior to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln the 
 Montgomery government had selected three 
 citizens of facile and suave manners to act as 
 commissioners in adjusting the "differences-" 
 which existed between the two governments. 
 They were Martin J. Crawford, a former Demo- 
 cratic Member of Congress from Georgia; John 
 Forsyth, editor of a Democratic paper at Mobile, 
 Ala., and Andrew B. Roman, a former Gov- 
 ernor of Louisiana, and a Whig who had used all 
 his influence to prevent disunion. 
 
 The first named reached Washington on March 
 3, when all was bustle and confusion at the White 
 House, owing to the removal of the retiring 
 President's baggage to a private house whither 
 Mr. Buchanan was going to be domiciled that 
 and the succeeding day and night. Crawford 
 went to work promptly ; guessed his way to a 
 conclusion, and wrote to his government that he 
 
FORT SUMTER 31 
 
 was " fully satisfied that it would not be wise to 
 approach Mr. Buchanan with any hope of his do- 
 ing anything which would result advantageously 
 to our government. Buchanan's fears for his 
 personal safety, his apprehensions for security 
 to his property, together with the cares of state 
 and his advanced age, render him wholly dis- 
 qualified for his present position. He is as in- 
 capable now as a child." Crawford further wrote 
 that Buchanan had played fast and loose with 
 the Confederacy, agreeing to treat with it to-day, 
 and recanting to-morrow; and that whatever he 
 might agree to his Cabinet would countermand 
 so soon as it came to their notice. His views 
 were substantially correct. 
 
 Crawford also reported that Mr. Lincoln was 
 under the control of a mob which rendered his 
 opinion vacillating and unreliable; that Chase 
 and Blair of the incoming Administration would 
 be for war, and Seward and the rest for peace; 
 that John Bell, of Tennessee, had the ear of the 
 President-elect, and was sedulous in his moni- 
 tions that he let the Gulf States alone; that Bell 
 had assured Mr. Lincoln that, while a majority 
 of the Southerners were for the Union, they were 
 so sensitive on the subject of force that every 
 slave State would secede on its first application; 
 that Bell advised Mr. Lincoln to let the seceded 
 States do as they chose, and to pay no attention 
 to them, saying that they would grow restless 
 without the affiliation of the border States, and by 
 reason of increased taxation of the new govern- 
 ment, and so would soon make overtures for a 
 reconciliation with the Federal Government. On 
 the 6th of March, the commissioner reported to 
 " J. Davis " at Montgomery, that Seward and 
 
32 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Cameron were determined to maintain a pacific 
 course at all hazards, and that they probably 
 could enforce it ; and he recommended an ad- 
 hesion to that policy by the Confederate Govern- 
 ment for the present. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth joined Mr. Crawford on March 
 8, and concurred upon investigation with his col- 
 league that Seward was in favor of a policy of 
 peace. The two visited R. M. T. Hunter, Sen- 
 ator for Virginia, and urged his mediation. The 
 latter accepted the office and put himself in com- 
 munication with the new Secretary of State, 
 who, full of the opinion that he was expressing 
 the vital tone of the Administration, as well as of 
 the party behind it, thus defined his position to 
 Senator Hunter : 
 
 I have built up the Republican party; I have brought 
 it to triumph, but its advent to power is accompanied 
 by great difficulties and perils. I must save the party, 
 and save the Government in its hands. To do this, 
 war must be averted, the negro question must be 
 dropped, the irrepressible conflict ignored, and an 
 Union party to embrace the border slave States in- 
 augurated. I have already whipped Mason and Hunter 
 in their own State. I must crush out Davis, Toombs, 
 and their colleagues in sedition in their respective 
 States. Saving the border States to the Union by mod- 
 eration and justice, the people of the cotton States, un- 
 willingly led into secession, will rebel against their 
 leaders, and reconstruction will follow. Crawford's 
 Genesis of the Civil War, page 232. 
 
 The Confederate Government had instructed 
 its commissioners to play with Seward for delay 
 until they could get ready for war, and they pur- 
 sued that policy; but what they desired was an 
 unequivocal pledge that the military status 
 would be preserved for twenty days, during 
 
FORT SUMTER 33 
 
 which they would not press the object of their 
 mission, which Seward averred he was not em- 
 powered to consider, and so urged that matters 
 be allowed to drift along as they were. This the 
 Confederate commissioners declined to do, and 
 on the 1 3th of March they sent a diplomatic dis- 
 patch to the Federal State Department inform- 
 ing the Federal Government that they had been 
 appointed by the Confederate authorities as com- 
 missioners empowered to open negotiations for 
 the settlement of all controverted questions be- 
 tween the two governments, and to conclude 
 treaties of peace between " the two nations." 
 
 To this note no reply was returned, but Secre- 
 tary Seward made out a memorandum and filed 
 it with the document, simply stating that the 
 Government could not recognize the authority 
 under which the alleged commissioners acted, 
 nor reply to them. The memorandum stated that 
 " it could not be admitted that the States referred 
 to had, in law or fact, withdrawn from the Fed- 
 eral Union, or that they could do so in any other 
 manner than with their consent, and the consent 
 of the people of the United States, to be given 
 through a national convention to be assembled in 
 conformity with the provisions of the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States." 
 
 This memorandum was withheld until April 
 8, when it was at once telegraphed both to Mont- 
 gomery and Charleston, where it created great 
 excitement. 
 
 In the meanwhile, Chief Justice Taney and As- 
 sociate Justices Campbell and Nelson had of their 
 own volition, as good citizens, examined the legal 
 question of the right of the President to coerce 
 a State, and had concluded that there was no con- 
 
34 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 stitutional right so to do ; and they gratuitously 
 advised the several members of the Cabinet of the 
 conclusions to which they had come, and recom- 
 mended that terms of conciliation be proposed to 
 the Confederate Government through the com- 
 missioners. At this time Judge Nelson, of New 
 York, was the ablest jurist on the bench. He had 
 been appointed by President Tyler, and had con- 
 curred in the Dred Scott decision. Justice 
 Campbell was from Mobile, Ala. He had 
 manumitted his slaves when he was a young 
 man, and, though a Southern man, was strictly 
 upright, and earnestly desired to avert war and 
 restore the Union, if possible; if not, to let the 
 South peaceably secede. The animus of both of 
 these eminent jurists was as disinterested as could 
 be expected, consonant with their political opin- 
 ions; and their pacificatory efforts were highly 
 commendable. Secretary Seward was in favor of 
 evacuating Fort Sumter and was anxious it 
 should be done, and he informed Judge Camp- 
 bell, who was acting as mediator, that it would 
 be evacuated ; and Campbell so informed the 
 Confederate commissioners, who in turn in- 
 formed their government. But the fort was not 
 evacuated, and Judge Nelson retired from any 
 further action in the premises and went home. 
 Campbell remained, however, hoping that Sum- 
 ter would be evacuated, and receiving constant 
 assurances from Seward that it would be done. 
 Mr. Lincoln was taking ample time to deliberate 
 what to do, being uncertain as to the best policy. 
 He was hopeful that Virginia would not secede, 
 and that the Virginia convention, which was de- 
 liberating upon the question, would adjourn and 
 so cease to be a menace to him. He dared not 
 
FORT SUMTER 35 
 
 attempt to supply Sumter, and thus invite an at- 
 tack, fearing its effects upon the Virginia con- 
 vention. He dared not remove the garrison 
 from Sumter, fearing the effect upon public 
 opinion at the North, and in point of fact, had he 
 done so, he would have been much more unmerci- 
 fully attacked than ever Buchanan was. 
 
 On the Qth of April the Confederate commis- 
 sioners sent a letter to the Secretary of State in 
 which they proffered as their ultimatum of 
 negotiation the evacuation of Sumter. With this 
 letter the State Department filed a memorandum 
 as follows: 
 
 Messrs. Forsythe, Crawford and Roman having been 
 apprised by a memorandum which has been delivered 
 to them, that the Secretary of State is not at liberty to 
 hold official intercourse with them, will, it is pre- 
 sumed, expect no notice from him of the new com- 
 munication which they have addressed to him under 
 the date of the gth inst., beyond the simple acknowledg- 
 ment of the receipt thereof, which he hereby very 
 cheerfully gives. 
 
 Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1861. 
 Crawford's Genesis of the Civil War, page 343. 
 
 Of this action the Confederate authorities were 
 duly apprised, and the commissioners left Wash- 
 ington on April 1 1 , and returned to Montgomery. 
 
 The two critical questions which animated 
 political councils both in Washington and Mont- 
 gomery, as well as at Charleston, were, " Will 
 Fort Sumter be abandoned ? " " Will Virginia 
 secede ? " and these questions assumed the logical 
 relation of antecedent and consequent, or cause 
 and effect. While the secessionists desired the 
 evacuation of Fort Sumter, they yet believed that 
 its reduction by force would result in the seces- 
 
36 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 sion of Virginia; the latter was a consummation 
 they devoutly wished, but they desired " peace- 
 able secession." If Sumter was evacuated, they 
 reasoned that that was the sign and promise that 
 no further attempt at coercion would be made, 
 but that secession would be thus accomplished 
 ipso facto, and all that would be further needed 
 was a division of property and a treaty. On the 
 other hand, they reasoned that if Sumter was as- 
 saulted and carried, it would force Virginia into 
 seceding and entering the Confederacy ; Ken- 
 tucky and Maryland would follow Virginia's ex- 
 ample; and Maryland's secession would involve 
 the possession of Washington, the Federal 
 capital,* and with the material and moral 
 strength thus acquired, a recognition by Eng- 
 land and France would be inevitable. These fond 
 hopes were enhanced by the concurrence of a 
 popular sentiment at the North as well as at the 
 South, more extensive than was known at the 
 time or will be credited by posterity. According 
 to this sentiment Mr. Lincoln was a parvenu; 
 what little personal following he had was of ob- 
 scure persons and with no cohesion ; his party 
 was raw and undisciplined; its nucleus was the 
 Abolition coterie, which was a pariah among par- 
 ties; so far as the Republican party had aggres- 
 sive strength beyond the Abolitionists, it marched 
 under the personal banners of Seward, Chase, 
 
 *Senator Iverson, of Georgia, said : " I see no rea- 
 son why Washington City should not be continued the 
 capital of the Southern Confederacy." The Richmond 
 Examiner said : " Our people can take Washington, and 
 they will. Scott, the arch-traitor [General Scott was 
 a native of Virginia] and Lincoln, the beast, combined 
 cannot prevent it. The Illinois Ape must retrace his 
 journey back home quicker than he came." 
 
FORT SUMTER 37 
 
 Cameron, Jim Lane, of Kansas, and Henry Win- 
 ter Davis, of Maryland, and not under a cohesive 
 party flag. Abraham Lincoln is now a name to 
 conjure with, but in those dark days he was re- 
 garded by the nation either as a disagreeable ac- 
 cident or as a moral usurper. 
 
 When Mr. Lincoln returned to his office in the 
 afternoon of March 4, he found a communica- 
 tion from Secretary Holt of the War Depart- 
 ment, conveying Major Anderson's estimate that 
 the force required to reenforce Fort Sumter 
 would be at least 20,000 disciplined men. 
 
 On reading Anderson's statement and Secre- 
 tary Holt's comment that it " takes the depart- 
 ment by surprise, as his previous correspondence 
 contained no such intimation," the President at 
 once sent for the Secretary of War and taking 
 him aside and looking at him earnestly, said, 
 " Mr. Holt, I have been looking at Major An- 
 derson's statement, which surprises me some- 
 what, and I want to know if there is ally doubt 
 at all about his loyalty to the Government ? " The 
 Secretary replied promptly that he had never 
 had any reason at all to doubt Major Anderson's 
 perfect loyalty. The President replied that he 
 himself had seen no reason to doubt it ; but, as he 
 was new in his office, he asked out of a super- 
 abundant caution, as much might depend upon 
 Major Anderson's loyalty in the days to come. 
 
 The public interest was centered on Fort Sum- 
 ter and Charleston. The secessionists closely be- 
 leaguered the little garrison, preventing it from 
 securing any supplies of any sort, and they 
 opened and read the private correspondence of 
 its members after it had been committed to the 
 mail. The public mind at the North was in a 
 
38 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 state of exasperation over the bold actions of the 
 secessionists in erecting powerful batteries upon 
 every spot which would command Fort Sumter, 
 and mounting upon them cannon which belonged 
 to the United States, as well as in denying the gar- 
 rison the common necessaries of life, and inter- 
 course by means of the mail with their friends 
 and families. A demand was made by the North- 
 ern press that, before our forces should leave 
 Fort Sumter, it should be ruined so as to insure 
 its destruction. The Commercial Advertiser, of 
 New York, published the following editorial : 
 
 Shall Fort Sumter be Destroyed? If, therefore, 
 Major Anderson must abandon it, let him employ the 
 few remaining days his provisions still hold out in 
 undermining inside the entire foundations, then let him 
 make his preparations to leave, apply the fuse, and, at 
 a safe distance, watch its being leveled to the ground. 
 This would be a gloomy, but nevertheless a more 
 worthy ending of the sad history, than to leave it a 
 stronghold in the possession of a foreign foe. If Sum- 
 ter must be abandoned to the enemy, let it be a shape- 
 less mass of ruins. 
 
 At this time Lieutenant-General Winfield 
 Scott, hero of the two preceding wars of the 
 nation, was general-in-chief of the army. 
 
 Winfield Scott was born at Petersburg, Va., 
 in 1786, and in 1841 he became general-in- 
 chief of our armies. To this illustrious and 
 patriotic soldier the nation owes a debt of grati- 
 tude of great magnitude for his share in the 
 preservation of its autonomy and establishment 
 in the dark days of 1860-61. His wisdom in the 
 crisis may be challenged his firmness and patri- 
 otism, not at all. 
 
 Scott's headquarters were at New York; but 
 
FORT SUMTER 39 
 
 on December 12, 1860, he came on to Washing- 
 ton, took lodgings in an old-fashioned house, 
 where Owen Lovejoy also lodged, at the north- 
 west corner of 6th and D Streets, and put him- 
 self in communication with the Administration. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln had supported Scott for the Presi- 
 dency in 1852, and had a high opinion both of 
 his patriotism and his moral and physical cour- 
 age, and relied very much on him to keep the ship 
 of state afloat till the time should come when he 
 should secure the helm. In January, 1861, 
 Thomas S. Mather, of Springfield, Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral of Illinois, was going to Washington, and 
 Lincoln wrote a letter introducing him to General 
 Scott, and stating that he (Lincoln) was in re- 
 ceipt of sundry letters which indicated that an at- 
 tempt might be made upon his life prior to, or 
 during the inauguration, and asking his opinion 
 on the subject and as to his proper course of 
 action. The old hero was confined to his bed at 
 his lodgings by gout, but Mather sent up the let- 
 ter, and in a few minutes was himself invited up. 
 He found the old veteran quite enfeebled in body, 
 but vigorous in mind and courage. As soon as 
 Mather was shown into the room the old war- 
 rior, sitting uneasily, drew himself up with evi- 
 dent pain, and exclaimed nervously : " General, 
 give my compliments to Mr. Lincoln, and tell him 
 to come to Washington whenever he pleases. 
 These Maryland and Virginia rangers I'll look 
 after myself. I'll put cannon at both ends of 
 Pennsylvania Avenue, and if they make the first 
 signs of mischief I'll blow them to hell ! " The 
 martial spirit and lofty patriotism of Winfield 
 Scott were the bulwark of defense for the cause 
 of the Union, and of established government, 
 
40 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 throughout the dreary and portentous fall and 
 winter of 1 860-61, and the docility of the seces- 
 sionists who abounded in Washington on in- 
 auguration day was assured by the appearance of 
 that stately and impressive heroic figure on horse- 
 back, who had ridden in triumph through the 
 capital of the Montezumas, and for a half cen- 
 tury had carried two English bullets in his body 
 from the little graveyard at Lundy's Lane. 
 
 The only available military forces of the gov- 
 ernment, in addition to the feeble garrisons in 
 part of the Southern forts, were five companies 
 respectively at Fort Warren, Boston ; Fort Ham- 
 ilton, New York; Pittsburg, Pa.; Augusta, Ga., 
 and Baton Rouge, La. 
 
 The maximum of the army was 18,000 men, 
 and these were all required for the protection of 
 the frontier. As early as 1857, General Scott 
 had tried to secure an addition of five regiments 
 to the regular army, but his request had never 
 been acted on. 
 
 To General Scott Mr. Lincoln at once sub- 
 mitted Major Anderson's report. That same 
 evening (March 5) Scott returned it with the 
 discouraging reply : " Evacuation seems almost 
 inevitable and in this view our chief engineer 
 (Brigadier Totten) concurs if indeed the worn- 
 out garrison be not assaulted and carried in the 
 present week." 
 
 On March 9, the President wrote to General 
 Scott, making the following interrogatories : 
 
 (1) To what point of time can Major Anderson, 
 maintain his position at Fort Sumter, without fresh 
 supplies or reinforcements? 
 
 (2) Can you, with all the means now in your con- 
 
FORT SUMTER 41 
 
 trol, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within that 
 time? 
 
 (3) If not, what amount of means, and of what 
 description, in addition to that already at your control, 
 would enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress 
 within the time? 
 
 That night the first Cabinet meeting was held. 
 The Attorney-General, Edward Bates, has left in 
 his diary a report of the deliberations, which 
 were wholly concerned with the question of Fort 
 Sumter. He wrote. 
 
 The army officers and navy officers differ widely 
 about the degree of danger to rapid-moving vessels 
 passing under the fire of land batteries. The army 
 officers think destruction almost inevitable, where the 
 navy officers think the danger but slight. The one be- 
 lieve that Sumter cannot be relieved not even pro- 
 visioned without an army of twenty thousand men 
 and a bloody battle. The other (the naval) believe that 
 with light, rapid vessels they can cross the bar at high 
 tide of a dark night, run the enemy's forts (Moultrie 
 and Cummings Point), and reach Sumter with little 
 risk. They say that the greatest danger will be in land- 
 ing at Sumter, upon which point there may be a con- 
 centrated fire. They do not doubt that the place can be 
 and ought to be relieved. Mr. Fox is anxious to risk 
 his life in leading the relief, and Commodore String- 
 ham seems equally confident of success. 
 
 On March n and 12, General Scott replied to 
 the President's questions of the 9th inst., saying 
 that, while the garrison could hold out for about 
 forty days longer with its present provisions, 
 the enemy could wear it out by a succession of 
 pretended night attacks, so that it could be easily 
 taken by a culminating real assault. To supply 
 and reenforee the fort would require a fleet and 
 transports which would be at least four months 
 in collecting, and 5,000 regulars and 20,000 vol- 
 
42 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 tmteers, the use and enlistment of which could 
 be authorized only by new acts of Congress, 
 after which it would take from six to eight 
 months to prepare the troops for action. Scott 
 therefore gave it as his opinion, " that Major An- 
 derson be instructed to evacuate the fort so long 
 gallantly held by him and his companions, im- 
 mediately on procuring suitable water transpor- 
 tation, and that he embark with his command 
 for New York." 
 
 As Lincoln observed in his message to Con- 
 gress of July 4, 1 86 1 : " In a purely military 
 point of view this reduced the duty of the Ad- 
 ministration in the case to the mere matter of 
 getting the garrison safely out of the fort. Ac- 
 cordingly, on March 15, the President sent to 
 -each member of his Cabinet the inquiry : " As- 
 suming it to be possible to now provision Fort 
 Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to 
 attempt it?" 
 
 All answered in the negative except Secretaries 
 Chase and Blair. Mr. Francis P. Blair, Sr., at 
 this juncture, earnestly urged the President not 
 to abandon Sumter, and even assured him that 
 he thought he would be impeached if he did so. 
 
 The President next sent Captain Fox to Sum- 
 ter to obtain actual information as to the state of 
 the fort. Upon his return and report, which ex- 
 pressed the feasibility of the plan, Mr. Lincoln 
 determined to supply it with provisions. On 
 March 29, after consultation with his Cabinet, 
 he ordered Secretary Cameron of the War De- 
 partment to cooperate with Secretary Welles of 
 the Navy Department in preparing an expedition 
 to sail with provisions for Fort Sumter as early 
 as April 6. 
 
FORT SUMTER 43 
 
 Owing to a gale only the Baltic of the fleet ar- 
 rived in time to be of service to Major Ander- 
 son, and that only to bear away the surrendered 
 garrison. The Confederate Government heard of 
 the coming of the provisioning expedition, and, 
 considering the capture of the fort necessary to 
 the life of the rebellion, ordered General P. G. T. 
 Beauregard, who was in charge of the invest- 
 ment, to procure its surrender, or, failing in this, 
 to bombard it. On the nth Beauregard sent to 
 Major Anderson a summons to surrender, offer- 
 ing to him, in case of compliance, facilities to re- 
 move the troops, and to the garrison the privilege 
 of saluting their flag. To this Anderson replied 
 that he would surrender the fort on the i$th if 
 supplies did not reach him by that time, or if he 
 did not before then receive orders to the con- 
 trary from his government. 
 
 These conditions did not suit the Confederates, 
 and on Friday, April 12, at 3 A. M., they gave 
 Anderson notice that their batteries would open 
 on the fort in an hour. At 4.30 the bombard- 
 ment began, and continued throughout that day 
 and into the next. At nine o'clock on Saturday 
 morning the fort took fire, and Major Anderson 
 felt compelled to throw all but five barrels of 
 powder into the sea to prevent an explosion. 
 The flag- staff was shot through at i P. M., and 
 the Confederates, observing the fall of the flag, 
 sent messengers to receive the surrender of the 
 fort. The first of these to arrive was Senator 
 Wigfall, who was a colonel on Beauregard's 
 staff. 
 
 Anderson accepted the conditions of surrender 
 offered upon the nth, and Wigfall agreed to the 
 capitulation. Although Wigfall had not been au- 
 
44 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 thorized to take this action, Beauregard ratified 
 the arrangement. By 8 p. M. the capitulation was 
 arranged, and on the following day, Sunday, 
 April 14, the garrison sailed northward in the 
 Baltic. 
 
 The extreme caution displayed by Mr. Lincoln 
 in this affair of Fort Sumter, the most important 
 matter which confronted his Administration, can- 
 not be too highly commended. That this provi- 
 sioning of the fort would inaugurate a war was 
 certain ; it was in the highest degree salutary to 
 avoid the initiative altogether if possible, or, if 
 it must needs come, to have it charged up to the 
 enemy. In a war such as was inevitable the 
 moral aspect was of primary importance ; and the 
 President displayed great talent and adroitness in 
 doing no act which could properly be considered 
 a casus belli. 
 
 Nor can this war be charged to haste or want 
 of proper deliberation, or considered as inau- 
 gurated in passion or by an accident of any sort. 
 On the contrary, it was a cold-blooded affair, be- 
 gun after the most profound and painstaking de- 
 liberation and warning. The good offices of Jus- 
 tice Campbell, of the Russian Minister, of James 
 L. Pettigru, of Charleston, of ex-Governor Wil- 
 liam Aiken, and others were exerted to the ut- 
 most in favor of pacification, but no marplots or 
 conspirators were any more fatally bent on mis- 
 chief and ruin than were the Montgomery and 
 Charleston secessionists. The people of South 
 Carolina were nearly unanimous in their wishes ; 
 but the representatives at Montgomery were be- 
 traying their constituents, who had acquiesced re- 
 luctantly in secession on the assurance from all 
 the politicians that it would be peaceably ac- 
 
THE VIRGINIA CONVENTIO 45 
 
 complished. Had they suspected that they were 
 to achieve their independence through the arbit- 
 rament of war, and that blood would bedew the 
 " sacred soil " of every Southern State, not a 
 single State except South Carolina would have 
 seceded. 
 
 Poor old Virginia, the mother of States and 
 statesmen, was slaughtered at last in the house of 
 her friends. Since February 13 the State had 
 been holding a convention to consider its policy in 
 the crisis. The Union delegates were in a ma- 
 jority. An ordinance of secession was voted 
 down on March 17 by a majority of ninety to 
 forty-five; and a similar proposition was de- 
 feated on April 4, but still the convention declined 
 to adjourn. Mr. Lincoln therefore caused a let- 
 ter to be sent to George W. Summers, of Charles- 
 ton, Va., the most talented of the Union men in 
 his State, requesting that he come to Washing- 
 ton for conference. Summers, who died during 
 the war of softening of the brain, induced by the 
 mental anxiety which the war aroused, was kept 
 by timidity from accepting the President's in- 
 vitation; but he sent John B. Baldwin in his 
 place. 
 
 The interview was held on the morning of 
 April 4. Baldwin returned to the convention re- 
 porting that his conference with the President 
 was inconclusive ; that Mr. Lincoln had charac- 
 terized the convention as a " standing menace 
 which embarrassed him very much," and there- 
 fore he desired that it adjourn sine die, but that 
 he had given no promise of what return he would 
 make to it for compliance with his wishes. John 
 Minor Botts, another member of the convention, 
 called on the President two days afterwards, and 
 
46 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 held a conversation in which Mr. Lincoln gave 
 an account of the interview with Baldwin which, 
 as remembered by Mr. Botts, differed materially 
 from Baldwin's report. The President, said 
 Botts, spoke of the fleet in New York harbor pre- 
 paring to sail that afternoon to provision Fort 
 Sumter. " Now," said Mr. Lincoln, " your con- 
 vention in Richmond has been sitting for nearly 
 two months, and all it has done has been to shake 
 the rod over my head [threatening to secede if 
 coercion should be used to bring back South 
 Carolina into the Union] . If the Union majority 
 in the Virginia convention will adjourn it with- 
 out its passing an ordinance of secession, this 
 fleet shall be kept from sailing, and instead, Fort 
 Sumter shall be evacuated. I think it is a good 
 swap to give a fort for a State any time." 
 
 As a result of Baldwin's report, the Virginia 
 convention remained in session, and on April 8 
 appointed another delegation, consisting of Wil- 
 liam Ballard Preston, Alexander H. H. Stuart, 
 and George W. Randolph, to wait on President 
 Lincoln, and ask him to communicate to the con- 
 vention " the policy which the Federal executive 
 intends to pursue in regard to the Federal 
 States." 
 
 The committee had an audience with the Presi- 
 dent at Washington on April 13, the day after 
 Fort Sumter had been fired upon by the South 
 Carolinian secessionists. He referred the con- 
 vention to the policy expressed in his inaugural 
 address : 
 
 As I then and therein said, I now repeat : " The 
 power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and 
 possess the property and places belonging to the Gov- 
 ernment, and to collect the duties and imposts; but 
 
THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION 47 
 
 beyond what is necessary for these objects, there will 
 be no invasion, no using of force against or among 
 the people anywhere." ... In case it proves true 
 that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I 
 shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be with- 
 drawn from all the States which claim to have seceded,, 
 believing that the commencement of actual war against 
 the Government justifies and possibly demands this. . . . 
 Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not 
 attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed 
 invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by 
 this, however, that I may not land a force deemed 
 necessary to relieve a fort upon a border of the country. 
 
 Baldwin was nominally a Union man, and had 
 voted against secession, but for some reason he 
 had fallen into the toils of the secessionists; ac- 
 cordingly he reported that his mission was a fail- 
 ure, and that the President would make no prom- 
 ise whatever about Sumter. The reason for this 
 reprehensible conduct, which led to the disman- 
 tlement, invasion, and ruin of Virginia, was prob- 
 ably that Baldwin was in favor of secession, but 
 feared to vote openly for it by reason of the cer- 
 tain wrath of his constituents, and therefore en- 
 deavored to accomplish secession in an indirect 
 and covert way. 
 
 The report of this committee, followed as it 
 was by the President's call of April 15 for 
 75,000 militia to suppress the rebellion and 
 to be raised by the several States of the 
 Union, which included Virginia, caused the con- 
 vention, on April 17, to pass an ordinance of 
 secession. This was followed by a similar ordi- 
 nance in Arkansas on May 6, a military league 
 with the Confederacy in Tennessee on May 7, and 
 an ordinance of secession in North Carolina on 
 May 20. 
 
48 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 No doubt can exist that if the first delegate, 
 Baldwin, had correctly reported the President, 
 the convention would promptly have adjourned; 
 Sumter would have been evacuated ; the cotton 
 States' cabal would have had no support of any 
 kind from the border States ; North Carolina, Ar- 
 kansas, and Tennessee would have refused to go 
 with them ; the people of the Gulf States would 
 have grown restless at their anomalous position, 
 and under the lead of Stephens, Hill, Sam Hous- 
 ton, Bouligny, Hamilton, and other Union men 
 would have effected a counter-revolution which 
 would have disintegrated the Confederacy. 
 
 The Confederate Government established its 
 capital at Richmond on the 2ist of May; and 
 North Carolina, being surrounded by secession 
 territory, seceded the same day. So the most 
 conspicuous battlefield was transferred of neces- 
 sity to the territory about and between the capi- 
 tals ; and to the most ordinary apprehension it 
 was palpable that nothing but ruin, temporarily 
 at least, was in store for that proud State which 
 had furnished the Union seven sovereign States 
 and seven Presidents. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 THERE is an ancient story, which was a favor- 
 ite with Lincoln, of a hunter who at a critical 
 juncture in a fight with a bear prayed: "O 
 Lord, be on my side if you will, but if you won't, 
 don't help the bear ! " 
 
 At the same time that the President was en- 
 deavoring to win Maryland, Kentucky, and Mis- 
 souri to the Union cause, and, failing in this, to 
 prevent their joining the Confederacy, he was 
 exerting every available influence of his Admin- 
 istration to maintain cordial relations with 
 European governments and to block the strenu- 
 ous efforts which the Confederacy was making 
 to s secure from them recognition as a nation. 
 
 He chose most admirable men for his foreign 
 ministers. For the two most important countries, 
 Great Britain and France, his choice was par- 
 ticularly happy. Charles Francis Adams, of 
 Massachusetts, who was accredited to the Court 
 of St. James, was the grandson of one Presi- 
 dent, and the son of another, both brave and 
 brilliant men, and he had inherited their qualities. 
 William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, who went 
 to the French court, was a man whom Lincoln 
 revered for his high character, and whom he 
 had been anxious to honor from the day when his 
 
 49 
 
50 'LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 own elevation to dignity and power was 
 assured. 
 
 That the illegitimate, but then powerful gov- 
 ernment of Louis Napoleon, and likewise the 
 aristocracy or ruling power of Great Britain, 
 would deeply sympathize with, and aid any 
 movement to enfeeble, humiliate, or destroy our 
 Government was nowise in doubt. And it also 
 was assumed that England must, at all hazards, 
 secure the cotton crops of the South, and to this 
 end would accede to any reasonable commercial 
 treaty which would enforce the autonomy of a 
 
 overnment composed chiefly of the Cotton 
 tates. In fact, had it not been for this belief, the 
 South would never have rebelled. 
 
 The corollary was inevitable that, in the event 
 of recognition of the Southern Confederacy by 
 England and France, the United States would 
 declare war against these nations, the certain out- 
 come of which would be the defeat of the United 
 States, and the establishment of the Confederate 
 States as a nation. 
 
 In view of the anomalous character of our 
 national affairs, it was deemed politic and neces- 
 sary by the Administration to issue a more elab- 
 orate letter of instructions, primarily and os- 
 tensibly for the guidance of all our ambassadors 
 in Europe, but even more emphatically designed 
 as an official declaration by the Government itself 
 of its purposes with reference to the domestic in- 
 surrection within its borders, and of its expecta- 
 tions and its desires in reference to the attitude 
 and the conduct of the powers of the world in 
 that crisis. 
 
 This important document was drawn with 
 great skill and care by the Secretary, and then 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 51 
 
 submitted to the President for his approval. The 
 President was equal to the dignity and impor- 
 tance of the occasion, and this was his first ex-. 
 perience in the important role of diplomacy. He 
 took the document and amended it in many par- 
 ticulars, which relieved it of an objectionable 
 style, while preserving its firmness of attitude 
 and dignity of character. It was a wonderful 
 performance, and when known, as it was not till 
 after the death of the performer, gained him the 
 plaudits of publicists everywhere. No jeweler's 
 scale ever weighed diamond dust with more 
 equal poise than Fate weighed the contingency 
 of war with England in 1861. The British 
 nation had an earnest desire to take the first step 
 thereto, by recognizing the insurgents as a nation 
 de facto; and simply waited a chance to do so. 
 An ill-mannered phrase a hint of defiance a 
 gleam of superciliousness would be sufficient, and 
 so matters stood when the President signed the 
 letter. 
 
 By this letter Adams was instructed to ac- 
 knowledge on behalf of the President the ex- 
 pression of the British Government's good-will 
 to the United States, but was advised not to rely 
 on any mere national courtesies, nor to let fall any 
 " admissions of weakness in our constitution, or 
 of apprehension on the part of the Government/' 
 but on the contrary, to claim by comparison with 
 other countries that our " constitution and gov- 
 ernment are really the strongest and surest which 
 have ever been erected for the safety of any 
 people." Any suggestion of foreign intervention 
 on behalf of the seceding States, with a view to 
 compromise, was to be sternly discountenanced, 
 and war was to be threatened in case of recogni- 
 
52 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 tion of the Confederate Government. The min- 
 ister was further advised to be discreet. 
 
 You will not consent to draw into debate before the 
 British Government any opposing moral principles 
 which may be supposed to lie at the foundation of the 
 controversy between those States and the Federal 
 Union. You will indulge in no expressions of harsh- 
 ness or disrespect, or even impatience concerning the 
 seceding States, their agents, or their people. But you 
 will, on the contrary, all the while remember that those 
 States are now, as they always heretofore have been, 
 and, notwithstanding their temporary self-delusion, they 
 must always continue to be, equal and honored members 
 of this Federal Union, and that their citizens, through- 
 out all political misunderstandings and alienations, still 
 are and always must be our kindred and countrymen. 
 In short, all your arguments must belong to one of 
 three classes, namely: First. Arguments drawn from 
 the principles of public law and natural justice, which 
 regulate the intercourse of equal States. Secondly. 
 Arguments which concern equally the honor, welfare, 
 and happiness of the discontented States, and the honor, 
 welfare, and happiness of the whole Union. Thirdly. 
 Arguments which are equally conservative of the rights 
 and interests, and even sentiments of the United States, 
 and just in their bearing upon the rights, interests, and 
 sentiments of Great Britain and all other nations. 
 
 Before the arrival of Mr. Adams in London 
 with the letter, however, the British and French 
 governments, acting with indecent haste, had con- 
 cluded to intervene in our affairs to the extent of 
 recognizing the bastard government at Mont- 
 gomery as a belligerent, which was a step in the 
 direction of recognizing it as a nation on an 
 equality with the United States. Against this 
 unjust and impertinent interference in our affairs 
 our Government protested with emphasis, and 
 when on June 15 succeeding, the English and 
 French ministers, acting in concert, desired dip- 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 53 
 
 lomatically to present sundry instructions which 
 had been received from their respective govern- 
 ments, the President, who had been unofficially 
 advised of its contents, declined to receive the 
 document, though our Government did take suffi- 
 cient note of the memorandum to notify Ministers 
 Adams and Dayton of the attitude of the United 
 States toward it. This paper (wrote Secretary 
 Seward to Minister Adams) purports to contain 
 a decision of the British Government that this 
 country is divided into two belligerent parties 
 toward which Great Britain assumes the attitude 
 of a neutral. Against this view the Secretary pro- 
 tested. The United States, he said, are the sole 
 sovereign power in the country, fulfilling all 
 national obligations to other countries, and until 
 this sovereignty was impaired to the detriment 
 of foreign nations, none of them had a right to 
 intervene, or to cast off its obligations to the 
 United States. " Any other principle," he ob- 
 served, " would be to resolve government every- 
 where into a thing of accident and caprice, and ul- 
 timately all human society into an estate of war." 
 
 Upon receiving this dispatch Minister Adams 
 called upon Lord John Russell, the British For- 
 eign Secretary, and told him that a continuation 
 of the apparent relation of the British Govern- 
 ment with the Rebel commissioners, then in Lon- 
 don, " could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as 
 hostile in spirit, and to require some correspond- 
 ing action accordingly." Lord John Russell re- 
 plied that he " had no expectation " of seeing the 
 Rebel commissioners again. 
 
 Nevertheless our complaints and protests pro- 
 duced no change in the unofficial attitude of those 
 powerful governments toward the rebellion ; these 
 
54 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 still remained as earnest sympathizers and en- 
 couragers of a faction whose aim and intent was 
 to establish a government upon the corner stone 
 of an institution which England and France had 
 been zealous and enthusiastic in declaring as 
 piracy. Their antipathy to the Government of 
 the United States was equally pronounced; the 
 leading statesmen and newspapers treated our 
 Government with disparagement and contempt; 
 their chief comic paper used our honored and de- 
 voted President as its chief butt of ridicule. 
 While Mr. Lincoln was winning the esteem of 
 publicists and disinterested statesmen in Ger- 
 many, Russia, Switzerland, and Italy, for his 
 masterly and philanthropic conduct of affairs in 
 an era of the sternest difficulty, the leading 
 political exponents of England lost no oppor- 
 tunity to belittle and disparage our efforts, in- 
 tentions, and deeds. In every way that sympathy* 
 could be accorded, or material help afforded to 
 the Rebels without cause for an open rupture, it 
 was done in England. Union adherents in Eng- 
 land were vilified and insulted, and Rebels cor- 
 respondingly honored ; the Rebel navy and block- 
 ade-runners were products of British shipyards, 
 and, but for them, there would not have been a 
 decent vessel afloat adorned with the Confeder- 
 ate flag. It is reasonably safe to say that had 
 England maintained its obligations of truth, 
 humanity, and national honor, the war would have 
 been crushed out two years earlier than it was, 
 and had it not been for preliminary assurances of 
 support from England, France, and the " Copper- 
 heads " of the Northern States it never would 
 have been initiated. 
 
 The firm, just, and unyielding attitude of the 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 55 
 
 [Administration compelled the governments of 
 England and France to delay their recognition 
 of the Confederacy as a nation, but an event 
 occurred in the fall which caused the secession- 
 ists the greatest delight and induced a belief that 
 the long-wished-for time had at length arrived, 
 and that not only would the South be recognized 
 as a nation, but that war would also be declared 
 by England against the United States. 
 
 The Rebel Government decided to dispatch 
 agents or ambassadors to England and France, 
 in order to bring about a consummation of their 
 hopes, and James M. Mason, of Virginia, and 
 John Slidell, of Louisiana, were selected. On 
 October 12, 1861, accompanied with their fam- 
 ilies, they sailed from Charleston for Cuba in the 
 blockade-runner Theodora, and left Havana for 
 St. Thomas en route to Europe in the British 
 mail steamer Trent, on which vessel on Novem- 
 ber 8 they were captured by Captain Wilkes of 
 our navy, and taken on board his frigate San 
 Jacinto, and carried to Fort Warren in Boston 
 Harbor, where they were held as prisoners of 
 war. This action was approved by Congress, by 
 the Cabinet, and by the public. The report of 
 the Secretary of the Navy of December 2 said : 
 
 The prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes 
 on this occasion merited and received the emphatic ap- 
 proval of the department ; and if a too generous for- 
 bearance was exhibited by him in not capturing the ves- 
 sel which had these Rebel enemies on board, it may, in 
 view of the special circumstances, and of its patriotic 
 motives, be excused; but it must, by no means, be per- 
 mitted to constitute a precedent hereafter, for the treat- 
 ment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obliga- 
 tions by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the 
 carrying trade. 
 
56 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 However, Lincoln's logical instincts engen- 
 dered in his mind the opinions that Wilkes' action 
 was technically unauthorized, and would be 
 seized upon by England as a pretext to involve 
 the nation in a war. He therefore conferred 
 with Hon. Thomas Ewing, a retired statesman 
 of the preceding generation, who assured him 
 that Captain Wilkes had been wrong by the law 
 of nations. Accordingly, on November 30 a 
 dispatch was sent to our minister recounting the 
 facts, disavowing any complicity in Captain 
 Wilkes' act, and expressing a desire to treat with 
 England on the subject. On the same day the 
 British minister for foreign affairs sent a note 
 to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washing- 
 ton, expressing the desire of the British Cabinet 
 that our nation would disavow any authority in 
 the affair, would yield up the prisoners, and make 
 an apology; all of which were impressed with 
 the force and authority of an ultimatum. On 
 December 26 Secretary Seward handed Lord 
 Lyons a dispatch in which he claimed a right 
 and duty on the part of Captain Wilkes to do 
 precisely as he did, but admitted that Wilkes 
 erred in not bringing the prisoners into a prize 
 court for adjudication, hence that the nation 
 could not technically hold them, and therefore 
 he ordered their discharge. This dispatch 
 contained a very ingenious device for getting 
 out of a serious dilemma. If we were right, 
 we must maintain our position even at the 
 expense and hazard of a war with England. 
 We could not display cowardice; it would 
 ruin our nation abroad and destroy its pres- 
 tige at home; our soldiers would have re- 
 tired from the war, and our resistance to 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 57 
 
 the rebellion would have ended. On the other 
 hand, if we were wrong, we were equally bound 
 to make reparation, but no sophistical case of 
 being wrong would answer; the whole array of 
 nations stood as an impenetrable phalanx of 
 critics the secessionists in the South, and their 
 aiders and abetters in Congress and elsewhere, 
 were ready to seize any pretext to humiliate and 
 contemn the Administration. Captain Wilkes 
 stood high in a conventional and moral sense, 
 and his act, done in good faith and for the honor 
 of the nation, had been applauded by the Navy 
 Department, by Congress, and by universal acclaim 
 of the people; hence now to sacrifice him would 
 be deemed an act of cowardice and certainly un- 
 just. The dilemma was to appease England 
 without losing caste with our people and with 
 the world. Our enemies did not see the pos- 
 sibility of escape from this dilemma, and a war 
 with England was deemed certain and inevitable. 
 The " Copperhead " contingent in Congress did 
 their " level best " to foment it, while it was 
 declared in the London newspapers that " the 
 war will be terrible; it will commence with a 
 recognition of Southern independence, their al- 
 liance and sure independence." 
 
 Mr. Seward's dispatch dispelled these florid 
 and flagitious hopes. The Vallandighams and 
 Pendletons raged in Congress over their dis- 
 comfiture, and in Dixie feelings of chagrin were- 
 almost too full for utterance, although one of the 
 Southern paragraphers did venture to advise us. 
 that " the surrender was an exhibition of mean- 
 ness and cowardice unparalleled in the political 
 history of the civilized world." 
 
 These Confederate commissioners were given 
 
5 8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 over to the custody of a British vessel by which 
 they were transported to London; upon which 
 they dropped completely out of sight. They 
 made no political impression, and remained 
 abroad until they died, expatriated. 
 
 It may be stated that the hopes of foreign in- 
 tervention attained their acme on the day that 
 news of the Trent affair reached London, but 
 that they lapsed into nothingness immediately 
 after the surrender of Mason and Slidell. 
 
 That the English Government desired a war, 
 with an excusing cause behind it, is clear; and 
 that our Administration was as zealous (or at 
 least that its head was) to avoid it is equally so. 
 To any suggestions, of which there were many, 
 made to the Executive, tending to stimulate and 
 enliven his warlike spirit, his terse answer, em- 
 bodying his policy, was, " one war at a time." The 
 Trent affair was really beneficial to our relations 
 with England, for it assured England that our 
 Cabinet was ruled and animated by knowledge, 
 justice, firmness, and moderation, rather than by 
 enthusiasm and popular clamor; and a spirit of 
 respect for it was observed ever afterwards, in 
 Great Britain and France. On February 18, 
 1862, our minister complained to the British Ad- 
 miralty that a gunboat was being built at Liver- 
 pool for the Rebel service. The Foreign Secre- 
 tary evaded the protest on a flimsy pretext, which 
 proved fallacious, and she turned up at Nassau 
 as a Rebel privateer immediately thereafter. In 
 June succeeding the attention of the British Cab- 
 inet was drawn to the fact that another war 
 steamer was being built for the Rebels. The 
 Cabinet temporized till the vessel got away, sailed 
 ,to the Azores, and took on an armament. First 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 59 
 
 as " 290," and afterward as the Alabama she 
 preyed upon our shipping till June 19, 1864, 
 when she was sunk off the French port of Cher- 
 bourg by the Kearsarge. 
 
 Louis Napoleon, himself an usurper, conceived 
 likewise an ardent affection for this bastard gov- 
 ernment, and, after trying to secure the coopera- 
 tion of England and Russia in a mediation in our 
 affairs, resolved to make the attempt single- 
 handed. Accordingly, on January 9, 1863, the 
 French Government sent to its minister a pro- 
 posal for mediation, in which it suggested a 
 meeting of the Government with the Rebels. To 
 this the President instructed his Secretary to 
 make a reply whose vigor and stern independence 
 will doubtless be appreciated by all patriotic 
 hearts. It said in part : 
 
 This Government has not the least thought of relin- 
 quishing the trust which has been confided to it by the 
 nation under the most solemn of all political sanctions ; 
 and if it had any such thought, it would still have abun- 
 dant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost 
 of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and 
 indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a 
 great mistake that European statesmen make, if they 
 suppose this people are demoralized. Whatever, in the 
 case of an insurrection, the people of France, or of 
 Great Britain, or of Switzerland, or of the Netherlands 
 would do to save their national existence, no matter 
 how the strife might be regarded by or might affect 
 foreign nations, just so much, and certainly no less, the 
 people of the United States will do, if necessary to save 
 for the common benefit the region which is bounded by 
 the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts, and by the shores 
 of the Gulfs of St. Lawrence and Mexico, together with 
 the free and common navigation of the Rio Grande, 
 Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, St. Lawrence, 
 Hudson, Delaware, Potomac, and other natural high- 
 
60 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 ways by which this land, which to them is at once a 
 land of inheritance and a land of promise, is opened and 
 watered. Even if the agents of the American people 
 now exercising their power should, through fear or fac- 
 tion, fall below this height of the national virtue, they 
 would be speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by 
 others of sterner character and patriotism. 
 
 The question of foreign intervention was for- 
 ever put to rest by this dispatch. Foreign nations 
 admired the dignity and spirit with which the Ad- 
 ministration bore itself in its era of misfortune, 
 and respected it accordingly. In the vigor of its 
 management of foreign relations it compared 
 favorably with any preceding Administration. 
 The unostentatious dignity, unyielding firmness, 
 and delicate tact displayed secured the approval 
 of nations, and commanded the respect of the 
 civilized world. 
 
 In 1863 Rebel rams destined for the Rebel 
 navy (so-called) were being built in England, 
 and our minister, unwearied and assiduous amidst 
 discouragements, made energetic protests which 
 finally, after much diplomacy, took effect, and 
 at last, on September 8, he had the satisfaction of 
 receiving assurances from the Cabinet that the 
 rams would not be suffered to depart. 
 
 But the British Cabinet and the British ad- 
 miralty alike strained every point in favor of the 
 Rebels, and in a case which found its way into 
 the Admiralty Court the doctrine was adjudged 
 that gave license, or at least excuse, for the 
 Rebels to fit out their war vessels in British 
 ports. Our Government informed the British 
 Cabinet in diplomatic language that, if that policy 
 was persisted in, those vessels would be deemed 
 pirates, and they would be pursued into any port. 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 61 
 
 One of the most remarkable occurrences, diplo- 
 matic and other, occurred in connection with 
 the building of two Rebel rams by the Messrs. 
 Laird of Birkenhead. Minister Adams had a 
 detective watching progress and securing in- 
 formation, and as the vessels approached com- 
 pletion he notified the British ministry, which at- 
 tempted to evade the scrutiny and investigation, 
 and succeeded well for a time until the proofs 
 were forced so clearly on the Government that it 
 expressed its willingness to detain the vessels, 
 but required a deposit of one million pounds in 
 gold coin as security for any damage that might 
 accrue should the detention prove wrongful. 
 
 There was very little time to obtain and make 
 the deposit, even if our Government had the gold, 
 which it did not at that time. At this juncture 
 an unknown American visited Mr. Adams and 
 offered to furnish the gold required, but sug- 
 gested that the Government had better approve 
 the act and secure the amount to him. Mr. 
 Adams suggested that he would ask the Govern- 
 ment to deposit $10,000,000 of 5-20 bonds as 
 collateral in refunding the $5,000,000 so to be 
 advanced. 
 
 The news reached the Department on a Friday 
 morning, and the bonds must be on shipboard by 
 noon of next Monday. Of blank bonds there 
 were on hand $7,500,000 in denomination of 
 $1,000 only; the remaining $2,500,000 must be 
 made up from those of the denomination of $500. 
 And all of these bonds to be valid must be signed 
 by the Register of the Treasury in person. 
 Twelve thousand five hundred signatures to be 
 made in sixty-four hours, including the time in- 
 dispensable to eat and sleep ! It was not thought 
 
62 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 possible for one man to accomplish it, so the plan 
 proposed was for Mr. Chittenden, the Register, 
 to sign as long as he could endure it, and then to 
 resign his office and have a new Register ap- 
 pointed who should sign the rest. Mr. Chitten- 
 den summoned his physician, had his diet pre- 
 scribed and brought to the office, and his lodging 
 provided, and at noon of Friday set about his 
 long task. The physician watched his pulse, ad- 
 ministered stimulants and nervines as required, 
 and indicated small intervals of repose: but no 
 extended delay could be allowed, as his arm and 
 fingers would become unserviceable by rest for 
 any length of time. Mr. Chittenden was a sin- 
 cere patriot and a great man, and was very am- 
 bitious to complete the task himself, as it would 
 not appear legitimate to have two different Regis- 
 ters' names on the bonds, and there were other 
 reasons. So he kept at work. His fingers con- 
 tracted and swelled, became very painful so he 
 could hardly hold the pen ; his arm and whole 
 right side sympathized ; his brain and spinal cord 
 partook of the nervous derangement; but he 
 accomplished his task alone then took to his 
 bed. He suffered more or less all his later life 
 from the reflex consequences of this terribly 
 severe task. 
 
 The assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in re- 
 gard to Mexico was thus stated in our instruc- 
 tions to the American minister at Paris : 
 
 The United States have neither the right nor the dis- 
 position to intervene by force on either side in the 
 lamentable war which is going on between France and 
 Mexico. On the contrary, they practice in regard to 
 Mexico, in every phase of that war, the non-interven- 
 tion which they require all foreign powers to observe 
 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 
 
 in regard to the United States. But notwithstanding 
 this self-restraint this Government knows full well that 
 the inherent normal opinion of Mexico favors a govern- 
 ment there republican in form and domestic in its or- 
 ganization, in preference to any monarchical institu- 
 tions to be imposed from abroad. This Government 
 knows also that this normal opinion of the people of 
 Mexico resulted largely from the influence of popular 
 opinion in this country, and is continually invigorated 
 by it. The President believes, moreover, that this 
 popular opinion of the United States is just in itself 
 and eminently essential to the progress of civilization on 
 the American continent, which civilization, it believes, 
 can and will, if left free from European resistance, 
 work harmoniously together with advancing refinement 
 on the other continents. This Government believes that 
 foreign resistance, or attempts to control American civ- 
 ilization, must and will fail before the ceaseless and 
 ever-increasing activity of material, moral, and political 
 forces, which peculiarly belong to the American conti- 
 nent. Nor do the United States deny that, in their 
 opinion, their own safety and the cheerful destiny to 
 which they aspire are intimately dependent on the con- 
 tinuance of free republican institutions throughout 
 America. . . . Nor is it necessary to prac- 
 tice reserve upon the point that if France should, 
 upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in 
 Mexico adverse to the American opinion and senti- 
 ments which I have described, that policy would prob- 
 ably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies 
 which might ultimately ripen into collision between 
 France and the United States and other American re- 
 publics. 
 
 Although the House of Representatives passed 
 a resolution to the effect that this nation ought 
 not to view with complacency the attempt to set 
 up a monarchy in Mexico, yet the Senate did not 
 concur in it. But the triumph of Benito Juarez 
 and the execution of Maximilian solved the prob- 
 lem in our favor. 
 
 In 1863 one Arguelles, a colonel in the Spanish 
 army and Lieutenant-Governor in Colon, Cuba, 
 
64 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 had captured a large number of slaves that had 
 been imported from Africa within his district, 
 and turned them over to the Government, receiv- 
 ing $15,000 as prize money therefor. He then 
 came to New York City and embarked in the 
 publishing business. The Spanish Government 
 thereafter ascertained that her had .sold 
 140 of the negroes into slavery, represent- 
 ing officially that they had died, and so it 
 stated to our Government that his presence was 
 needed in Cuba to secure the liberty of the slaves. 
 The matter was secretly arranged; the Govern- 
 ment decided that to furnish an asylum for a 
 wretch charged by his own government with the 
 awful crime of enslaving 140 human beings was 
 not in keeping with the spirit of our institutions, 
 and that he should be surrendered to his own 
 country, and it was done. The whole Copper- 
 head and Rebel press were venomous in their de- 
 nunciations of the Administration for its action. 
 Secretary Seward, on the whole, was an ad- 
 mirable and adroit minister. His personal pop- 
 ularity and magnetism were very great. His 
 cheerfulness and magnetism were needed ad- 
 juncts; and his dexterity and insouciance were 
 valuable agents in aid of a correct performance of 
 his difficult role. Secretary Seward was a re- 
 markable man. His varied talents were always 
 at the front ; he was a statesman of infinite re- 
 sources ; he had a facile adaptation of political 
 morality of great use to a diplomatist. His con- 
 science did not prevent him from using language 
 to dissemble and also to conceal his thoughts. A 
 constitutionally candid man would make a poor 
 diplomatist. Seward was not troubled on that 
 account. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 
 
 WHEN the somber shadow of sectional strife 
 darkened our political horizon Mr. Lincoln 
 recognized that the thunderbolt of war then be- 
 ing forged could mean no other than a popular 
 war, both in essence and in name. In his first 
 official utterance, his Inaugural Address, Lincoln 
 avowed his intention to execute the laws in all 
 the States, unless his " rightful masters, the 
 American people, should withhold the requisite 
 means or in some authoritative manner direct the 
 contrary." 
 
 Now an autocratic war has elements of 
 strength, and also those of weakness; it has 
 unity, secrecy, and constancy of aim ; it may lack 
 spirit, enthusiasm, and esprit du corps. A pop- 
 ular war has the strength and spirit of enthusi- 
 asm ; but lacks constancy, secrecy, and discipline. 
 Politics become, necessarily, in practice, inter- 
 woven with arms. Mr. Lincoln was obliged to 
 make generals of several blatant politicians to 
 keep them from fighting against the war with 
 their mouths in Congress. These spent their time 
 in witnessing battles and in glorifying their own 
 prowess to their Northern constituencies at the 
 end of each campaign or oftener. 
 
 The Administration was obliged to storm the 
 citadels of popular opinion wherein it was in- 
 
 65 
 
66 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 trenched; it was as needful to capture the 
 York Herald as it was New Orleans; it was as 
 imperative to keep Horace Greeley quiet as to 
 prevent the invasion of Ohio; it was no less an 
 object to put Democratic Congressmen in good 
 humor than to take Richmond. 
 
 Men possessing social or political or financial 
 power were sedulously and systematically culti- 
 vated, and their adhesion ostentatiously pro- 
 claimed. The Administration was to make the 
 war technically and actually popular. 
 
 To James Gordon Bennett was tendered the 
 mission of France because of the power of his 
 great paper. No other war was ever so 
 thoroughly superimposed upon popular opinion. 
 Not only was popular opinion at home catered to 
 and cajoled, but likewise that of foreign nations. 
 Archbishop Hughes and Henry Ward Beecher 
 were sent by the Government to England on a 
 mission of diplomatic politics, and Mr. Lincoln 
 took especial pains to cultivate the English labor- 
 ing classes in his addresses to the workingmen of 
 Manchester and London. 
 
 The War of the Rebellion on the side of the 
 South was unpopular in its incipiency, but be- 
 came popular upon the North's invasion of 
 Southern soil. The war was waged on one side 
 to maintain the supremacy of the Government; 
 and on the other, as was confidently believed by 
 the combatants, to maintain the inviolability of 
 their homes. It was therefore, in the main, a 
 popular war on both sides, although a strong 
 party in Georgia and North Carolina resented 
 the use of their citizens in arms beyond the State 
 lines. Towards the last the mainstay and vital 
 principle was the imperious will of Davis; and, 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 67 
 
 although the Federal Administration had to cater 
 and truckle to the popular will in many ways to 
 keep the armies intact, its trump card at last 
 proved to be that most radical of measures, the 
 Emancipation Proclamation. 
 
 At the beginning of the war Mr. Lincoln was 
 hindered rather than helped by the fact that in 
 each and every State there were citizens zealous 
 in the behalf of the Union, and demanding the 
 rights of American citizenship. In Texas there 
 were Sam Houston and Andrew J. Hamilton ; in 
 Louisiana there was John E. Bouligny ; in North 
 Carolina there were John A. Gilmer and his ad- 
 herents ; in South Carolina there was James L. 
 Pettigru, probably the best lawyer in the State. 
 In Tennessee, a third part of the State (East 
 Tennessee), and a majority of the people in the 
 States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Ken- 
 tucky, and Missouri, were in favor of the Union. 
 
 If it was lawful and competent for General 
 Scott, in a moment of panic, to advise that the 
 " wayward sisters " might " go in peace," and for 
 Horace Greeley to echo that sentiment, a mo- 
 ment's reflection will disclose that the door to the 
 utterance of such sentiments was barred and 
 bolted to the President. Scott, Greeley, et id 
 genus omne could indulge in their political 
 fancies; the President was bound by an oath to 
 maintain the Union inviolate. 
 
 Thus understanding that a conflict was inevi- 
 table, the President in his inaugural made plain to 
 all unprejudiced men the political situation, his 
 duty in the then approaching crisis, and the re- 
 sponsibility which rested on the people. Much 
 discretion rested in him ; he could have instructed 
 the District-Attorney of Alabama to swear out a 
 
68 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 complaint against the Confederate conspirators 
 at the first overt act of treason, and in like man- 
 ner he could have instructed the District-Attor- 
 ney of South Carolina to cause the arrest of 
 Beauregard and his army after the assault on 
 Sumter. Either would have been a brutem ful- 
 men under the circumstances, but would have 
 been within the strict line of Presidential duty. 
 Mr. Lincoln, however, was as practical a states- 
 man as he had been a lawyer, and he attempted 
 nothing for show. As the South was raising 
 armies, he deemed it to be his indispensable duty 
 also to raise an army of resistance to act in any 
 needed emergency ; this he did, and then referred 
 the entire political anomaly to the people's repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 On April 15, the day after the surrender of 
 Fort Sumter to the armed force of the Confed- 
 eracy, the President issued a proclamation call- 
 ing forth the militia of the several States of the 
 Union to the aggregate number of 75,000 to sur- 
 press combinations which existed in the seceding 
 States for the purpose of opposing and obstruct- 
 ing the enforcement of Federal laws, and which 
 were " too powerful to be suppressed by the or- 
 dinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the 
 powers vested in the marshals by law." The 
 concluding paragraph of the proclamation con- 
 vened Congress to meet on July 4 " to consider 
 and determine such measures as, in their wis- 
 dom, the public safety and interest might seem 
 to demand." 
 
 The fall of Fort Sumter is the most momen- 
 tous event in political history. It changed at 
 once in a great nation the question of union or 
 secession from an intellectual proposition to an 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 69 
 
 emotional issue. No matter how differently the 
 people in each section had thought before, they 
 now felt as one. It is true that there still re- 
 mained many Unionists in the South, and still 
 more persons in the North who were in sympathy 
 with the Southern cause, but these were com- 
 prised respectively in the terms " North " and 
 " South," which became thereafter psychological 
 rather than geographical divisions of the country. 
 The passion of nationality unified both the 
 Union and the Confederacy, and, though in each 
 section the beloved object was different, the 
 emotions were identical in kind. Political and 
 moral philosophy had and continued to have op- 
 posing basic principles in the divisions. Govern- 
 ment was a matter of equal and constituted 
 rights of States to the chief party in the South, 
 and of equal national rights of men to the chief 
 party in the North. Southern ethics demanded 
 the recognition of rights to property vested in 
 its possessors, and Northern ethics the establish- 
 ment of rights to property inherent in its pro- 
 ducers. But patriotism superseded all intel- 
 lectual and moral considerations and impulses, 
 and used these for its own ends, overriding or 
 exaggerating them as necessity required. This 
 led to striking contradictions and paradoxes in 
 action. Jefferson Davis became even more of an 
 autocrat than the " tyrant " Lincoln as the 
 secessionists were wont to style the constitu- 
 tionally elected commander-in-chief of the armies 
 and navies of the republic. Robert E. Lee would 
 have used national power to deprive citizens of 
 their property by freeing the slaves in order to 
 save the Confederacy. Abraham Lincoln was 
 ready to abandon Federal property, and leave to 
 
70 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the indefinite future the establishment of human 
 rights, in order to preserve the political integrity 
 of the Union. And Stephen A. Douglas who had 
 made a fetich of " popular sovereignty," and 
 stripped himself of the bright endowments of in- 
 tellectual consistency and moral independence to 
 cast them before its shrine, came forward the 
 very first of all citizens of the republic to offer 
 to his old and triumphant antagonist his services 
 for the preservation of the country. 
 
 The call for troops was really signed on Sim- 
 day, April 14, though dated April 15. On the 
 evening of the I4th Senator Douglas called upon 
 President Lincoln and was closeted with him for 
 two hours. He went forth from the conference 
 to publish by telegraph to the country the declara- 
 tion that he was " prepared to sustain the Presi- 
 dent in the exercise of all his constitutional func- 
 tions to preserve the Union, and maintain the 
 Government, and defend the Federal capital." On 
 April 25, before the Illinois Legislature, he made, 
 in behalf of the Union, the most eloquent 
 speech of his life. Unfortunately for the cause 
 which had become the paramount passion of his 
 soul, he died a little more than a month there- 
 after, on June 3, at his home in Chicago. Even 
 measured by his few weeks of service, his place 
 is secure in American history as the first and 
 greatest of " War Democrats." 
 
 There was a rending pull of patriotism in op- 
 posing directions in the case of a number of men 
 who were citizens of a seceding State and also 
 owed allegiance to the national Government. Of 
 these Robert E. Lee may be taken as the chief 
 example. Lee was a graduate of West Point, 
 whose ability had been recognized and rewarded 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 71 
 
 by the Government. On March 16 he had been 
 made colonel of the First Cavalry by the new 
 Administration. He was the favorite of General 
 Scott, who intended, in case of armed conflict with 
 the Confederacy, to make him the chief of his gen- 
 erals in the field. On the i8th of April, Francis 
 P. Blair, Sr., at the request of the President, held 
 an interview with Lee in which he unofficially 
 offered him the command of the Union army. 
 
 There is a conflict of testimony as to Lee's 
 answer. Lee in 1868 wrote to Reverdy Johnson: 
 " I declined the offer . . . stating as candidly 
 and courteously as I could that, although op- 
 posed to secession and deprecating war, I could 
 take no part in the invasion of the Southern 
 States." Montgomery Blair, the son of Francis 
 P. Blair, Sr., and Postmaster-General at the time, 
 deriving his information from his father, said in 
 1866 that Lee was undecided as to what he would 
 do, answering that " he would consult with his 
 friend, General Scott," and that Lee " went on 
 the same day to Richmond, probably to arbitrate 
 difficulties; and we see the result." 
 
 On April 20, after Lee had talked with friends 
 in Richmond, he wrote to Scott, saying: 
 
 GENERAL: Since my interview with you on the i8th 
 instant, I have felt that I ought not longer to retain my 
 commission in the army. I therefore tender my resig- 
 nation, which I request you will recommend for accept- 
 ance. It would have been presented at once, but for the 
 struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a 
 service to which I have devoted all the best years of 
 my life and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in 
 defense of my native State, I never desire again to 
 draw my sword. 
 
 On April 22 Lee accepted from the Governor 
 
72 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and Convention of Virginia the chief command 
 of the Virginia State troops. 
 
 Throughout the North disinterested patriots 
 and scheming politicians alike joined in the de- 
 mands of duty, and urged that the insult to our 
 glorious flag be avenged. Meetings were every- 
 where held, and fervid orators in impassioned 
 strains fanned the people into a fierce flame of 
 enthusiasm in behalf of our menaced Govern- 
 ment. Politicians who, but ten months before, at 
 Charleston, had clasped the hands of these trai- 
 tors in fraternal concord, were now eager to raze 
 that city of unsavory political memories to the 
 ground. Benjamin F. Butler, an uneasy New 
 England politician, who at Charleston had voted 
 fifty-seven times for Jefferson Davis as his choice 
 for President of the United States, was one of 
 the earliest in the field. Obtaining a militia gen- 
 eral's commission, he started promptly at the 
 head of the hastily improvised Massachusetts 
 regiment for the front. 
 
 Some of the lesser politicians who had opposed 
 Mr. Lincoln's election at the North promptly 
 joined in the general acclaim of patriotism; 
 others, less enthusiastic and patriotic, were 
 seized by the oncoming tide and borne on to 
 their patriotic duty, while still others, more ob- 
 durate, headed the reactionary forces, and were 
 Jacobins, and sometimes worse, to the bitter end. 
 I almost distrust my own memory when I reflect 
 on some utterances which in the opaque moral 
 and political days which tried men's souls I heard 
 from those in behalf of whom the voice of pa- 
 triotic eulogy now emblazons the sober historic 
 page. 
 
 The Governors of all the free States responded 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 73 
 
 nobly and with enthusiasm. They promptly 
 offered more men than were required or could be 
 armed. Places where " men most do congre- 
 gate " were converted into recruiting stations ; 
 and the sound of the " ear-piercing fife " and the 
 " spirit-stirring drum " resounded all over the 
 land. The Governors of the border States, how- 
 ever, chose to bite against a file. Governor Jack- 
 son, of Missouri, said, " not one man will Mis- 
 souri furnish to carry on such an unholy cru- 
 sade ; " Governor Magofiin, of Kentucky, said : 
 " I say emphatically, Kentucky will furnish no 
 troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her 
 sister Southern States ; " and Governor Harris, 
 of Tennessee, said : " Tennessee will not furnish 
 a man for coercion, but 50,000 for the defense of 
 our Southern brothers." And in each of these 
 statements the author was guilty of unpremedi- 
 tated error, for each of those States did furnish 
 thousands of valiant Union troops to aid in put- 
 ting down the rebellion. 
 
 As an answer to Lincoln's call for troops, Jef- 
 ferson Davis, President of the Southern Confed- 
 eracy, issued a proclamation on April 17, offer- 
 ing letters of marque and reprisal to privateers 
 desiring to prey upon the commerce of the 
 United States. Two days later President Lincoln 
 replied by proclaiming a blockade of all the Con- 
 federate ports, and giving notice that privateer- 
 ing would be treated as piracy. 
 
 Massachusetts was the first Union State in the 
 field. Governor John A. Andrew had the State 
 militia equipped ready for the call; within two 
 days thereafter the Sixth Massachusetts was en 
 route to Washington, and on the morning of April 
 19 they reached Baltimore. There was a distance 
 
74 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 of a mile between the Philadelphia station at 
 which they arrived and the one for Washington. 
 A number of the companies made the transfer 
 in street-cars, amid the hooting of a gathering 
 mob. The windows of the ninth car were broken 
 by paving stones thrown by the rioters, who also 
 fired pistols into the car. Several soldiers were 
 injured, and Major Watson, who was aboard, 
 finally gave orders to the soldiers to shoot back, 
 which was done. The mob laid obstructions on 
 the track, so that the last four companies were 
 compelled to march between the stations. They 
 had to fight their way through the mob, and sev- 
 eral persons were killed on both sides. 
 
 A mass meeting of citizens was held at 4 P.M., 
 in Monument Square, at which Governor Thomas 
 H. Hicks of the State, and Mayor George W. 
 Brown of the city, made speeches, the universal 
 sentiment being in opposition to Federal " co- 
 ercion " of the seceding States. After the meet- 
 ing the city authorities, with the sanction of the 
 State executive, ordered the railroad bridges 
 between Baltimore and Philadelphia and Harris- 
 burg to be destroyed. This was done, and Wash- 
 ington was thereby entirely cut off from railroad 
 communication with the North. 
 
 In order that Maryland might not be incited 
 to rebellion at this critical juncture, President 
 Lincoln bowed to the aggression. 
 
 After correspondence with Governor Hicks 
 and Mayor Brown, and two interviews with 
 Mayor Brown in which these executives opposed 
 further transit of Federal troops through Balti- 
 more, or over an alternative route through An- 
 napolis, the President on April 22 sent a diplo- 
 matic note through Secretary Seward to the 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 75 
 
 Governor, of which the tenor may be judged byj 
 the following appealing passage: 
 
 He [Lincoln] cannot but remember that there has 
 been a time in the history of our country when a gen- 
 eral of the American Union, with forces designed for 
 the defense of its capital, was not unwelcome anywhere 
 in the State of Maryland. 
 
 The Administration and our leading patriotic 
 public men regarded the on-coming war as an 
 awful but inevitable calamity, which it would tax 
 the highest energies of the nation to sustain. Nor 
 was our Administration at all confident of suc- 
 cess. Senator Douglas' opinion, that a necessity 
 existed for 200,000 troops at the first call, at- 
 tested his opinion of the gloomy outlook. The 
 Confederate cabal at Montgomery was more 
 optimistic. The sanguine expression of expecta- 
 tion made by its Secretary of War attested its 
 belief. The superficial on both sides regarded it 
 as a national interlude of a few months' duration. 
 
 Beauregard was ordered into Northern Vir- 
 ginia to assume command of the forces gather- 
 ing there from the Gulf States. Our troops were 
 concentrating around the national capital. The 
 scions of a slave-holding aristocracy took the 
 field with all the paraphernalia of gentility : body- 
 servants, kid gloves, " Byron " collars, perfum- 
 ery, and pomatum. The backwoodsmen flocked 
 in with ancient rifles, buckhorn-handled knives, 
 and hunting shirts. In camp they wrestled, 
 fought, pitched horseshoes, and talked " horse." 
 
 Although the Virginia secessionists had burned 
 the Federal armory at Harper's Ferry on April 
 1 8, and seven ships and half the buildings at the 
 Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, Mr. Lincoln ap- 
 
76 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 plied his policy of non-aggression to Virginia 
 no less than to Maryland. On April 24 he wrote 
 a letter to Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland (who 
 liad taken a leading part in attempting to adjust 
 amicably the relations of Virginia to the Federal 
 government), which concluded with the words: 
 " I have no objection to declare a thousand times 
 that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any 
 other State, but I do not mean to let them invade 
 us without striking back." 
 
 On April 25 Lincoln wrote to General Scott 
 upon the question which had been submitted to 
 him, of arresting and dispersing the Maryland 
 Legislature, in view of its threatened action to 
 arm the citizens of the State against the United 
 States. He thought such repression neither jus- 
 tifiable nor efficient for the reasons that their ac- 
 tion, whether peaceful or hostile, could not be 
 known in advance ; and even if the Legislature 
 were dispersed it would reassemble elsewhere. 
 
 I therefore conclude that it is only left to the com- 
 manding general to watch and await their action, which 
 if it shall be to arm their people against the United 
 States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient 
 means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bom- 
 bardment of their cities, and, in the extremest neces- 
 sity, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 Annapolis, the capital of Maryland, being oc- 
 cupied by Massachusetts volunteers under com- 
 mand of Brigadier-General Benjamin F. Butler, 
 Governor Hicks thought it wise to convene the 
 Legislature at Frederick. Here on the 2/th of 
 April he sent it a special message, in which he 
 admitted the right of transit through the State 
 for Federal troops going to the defense of Wash- 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 77 
 
 ington, and counseled " that we shall array our- 
 selves for Union and peace." He expressed the 
 conviction that " the only safety of Maryland 
 lies in preserving a neutral position between our 
 brethren of the North and of the South." 
 
 The Legislature was divided in its sentiments. 
 The Senate was secessionist; as it was about to 
 pass a bill vesting the military control of the 
 State in a secession " Board of Public Safety," 
 it became alarmed at the evidence of a strong 
 Union feeling in the lower house, and through- 
 out the State, and desisted. Scharf, in his " His- 
 tory of Maryland," says that Senator Mason, of 
 Virginia, appeared before the Legislature to ar- 
 range a military alliance of the two States. The 
 only action taken, however, was to send a com- 
 mittee consisting of Otho Scott, R. M. McLane, 
 and W. J. Ross to confer with President Lincoln. 
 This they did on May 4; and on May 6 they re- 
 ported to the Legislature that as a result of the 
 conference they felt " painfully confident that a 
 war is to be waged to reduce all the seceding 
 States to allegiance to the United States Govern- 
 ment." 
 
 On May 14 the Legislature adjourned to meet 
 again on June 14, and at once Governor Hicks 
 issued a proclamation calling into Federal service 
 four regiments of State militia, in accordance 
 with the President's call for troops. Already 
 General Butler had occupied Baltimore [on 
 May 13]. 
 
 On April 27 the War Department organized 
 the contemplated seat of war into departments as 
 follows, viz. : 
 
 I. Washington, embracing the original Dis- 
 trict, Fort Washington and coterminous country 
 
78 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and Maryland to and including Bladensburg; 
 under command of Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield. 
 
 2. Annapolis, embracing the country for twenty 
 miles on both sides of the railway, between Wash- 
 ington and Annapolis; in charge of the militia 
 general, Benjamin F. Butler. 
 
 3. Pennsylvania, embracing the rest of Mary- 
 land, Pennsylvania and Delaware; under com- 
 mand of the militia general, Robert Patterson. 
 
 On May 3, 1861, the President issued a 
 proclamation calling for 42,034 more volunteers 
 from the several States, and an increase in the 
 regular army of 22,714 men, and in the navy of 
 18,000. 
 
 On the same day the Department of the Ohio, 
 consisting of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, was 
 created, and placed under the command of 
 George B. McClellan, who had on April 23 been 
 appointed by Ohio as major-general of its volun- 
 teers. 
 
 At that time McClellan was reputed the best 
 military engineer in the country. He was gradu- 
 ated from West Point on July I, 1846, being the 
 leader of his class in mathematics. He went 
 through the Mexican War as a lieutenant of 
 engineers, and after it served for a few years 
 as an instructor of practical engineering at West 
 Point. This was followed by engineering duty 
 in the West. In 1855 he was sent to Europe with 
 two other officers to report on the conditions of 
 the Crimean War. Captain McClellan's report, re- 
 published in 1861, under the title of " The Armies 
 of Europe," is admirable for its clearness, full- 
 ness, and accuracy. In 1857 he resigned his 
 commission to accept the place of civil engineer 
 of the Illinois Central Railroad. He became its 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 79 
 
 vice-president in 1858. In 1859 he was elected 
 president of the eastern division of the Ohio and 
 Mississippi Railroad, with headquarters at Cin- 
 cinnati. In 1860 he became president of the St. 
 Louis, Missouri, and Cincinnati Railroad, which 
 office he held at the outbreak of the war. 
 
 The frontier of the department being along the 
 border State of Kentucky, which had not taken 
 decisive action on the question of Union or 
 secession, General McClellan recommended or- 
 ganization for observation rather than for action. 
 
 Many Kentuckians regarded with apprehension 
 the presence of Federal troops on their border. 
 A State Senator wrote to the President protest- 
 ing in particular against the stationing of United 
 States troops at Cairo. Lincoln dryly replied 
 through his secretary, John Hay : 
 
 The President . . directs me to say that the views 
 so ably stated by you shall have due consideration, and 
 to assure you that he would never have ordered the 
 movement of troops complained of had he known that 
 Cairo was in your senatorial district. 
 
 The position generally taken by Kentucky in 
 regard to the burning issue of the day was that 
 known as " armed neutrality." It was expressed 
 in a resolution of a public meeting in Louisville, 
 April 1 8, which declared that: 
 
 The present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her 
 present independent position, taking sides not with the 
 Administration, nor with the seceding States, but with 
 the Union against them both; declaring her soil to be 
 sacred from the hostile tread of either; and, if neces- 
 sary, to make the declaration good with her strong 
 right arm. 
 
 Governor Magoffin and General Simon B. 
 
8o LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Buckner, commander of the State militia, who, as 
 transpired in their later acts, were secessionists 
 at heart, adopted this position. The Governor 
 replied to President Lincoln's call for troops: 
 " Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked 
 purpose of subduing their sister Southern 
 States," and this declaration was approved by the 
 Kentucky Legislature. 
 
 The President, therefore, on May 7 sent Major 
 Anderson, the hero of the hour on account of his 
 defense of Fort Sumter, to Cincinnati to recruit 
 volunteers from Kentucky and western Virginia. 
 Recruiting camps were established in Kentucky 
 by other officers, and by June 10 the First and 
 Second Regiments of Kentucky volunteer infan- 
 try were organized. An election of Congress- 
 men, which was rendered necessary by the Presi- 
 dent's call convening a special session of Con- 
 gress upon July 4, was held on June 20, and re- 
 sulted in the election of nine outspoken loyalists 
 out of ten Kentucky Representatives. 
 
 Missouri was a Unionist State with a seces- 
 sionist Governor and Legislature. The Gov- 
 ernor, Claiborne F. Jackson, though elected upon 
 the Douglas ticket, had become a disunionist, 
 and the Breckinridge or pro-slavery party, owing 
 to the division of their opponents among the 
 Douglas, Bell, and Lincoln parties, had secured 
 a majority of the Legislators. These called a 
 State convention with the intention that it should 
 pass an ordinance of secession. Instead a strong 
 majority of Union delegates was elected, and 
 when the convention met on February 28, it con- 
 demned secession; on March 22 it adjourned to 
 December. 
 
 Governor Jackson thereupon established under 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 81 
 
 State laws a camp near St. Louis, nominally for 
 the instruction of militia, but really to capture 
 the State for the Confederacy. It was called 
 " Camp Jackson," and was placed under the 
 command of Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, a 
 West Point graduate. Frost and Jackson 
 planned to capture the Federal arsenal at St. 
 Louis, and another secessionist, Jefferson M. 
 Thompson, began drilling another camp at St. 
 Joseph for the purpose of capturing the arsenal 
 at Leavenworth, Kan. To oppose these pur- 
 poses the Union men organized " Home Guards " 
 and a " Committee of Safety." 
 
 The Government, feeling that General William 
 S. Harney, commander of the department in 
 which Missouri was situated, had been lax in 
 repressing sedition, summoned him to Washing- 
 ton. On the way he was captured by Confeder- 
 ates at Harper's Ferry, and taken to Richmond, 
 but was there released in order not to provoke 
 wavering Missouri against the Confederacy, and 
 was sent on to Washington. While he was ab- 
 sent from St. Louis the Government at Washing- 
 ton seized the opportunity to make a strong 
 move. 
 
 On April 20 Secretary Cameron, of the War 
 Department, wrote to Captain Nathaniel Lyon, 
 an ardent anti-slavery man, who was in com- 
 mand of the St. Louis arsenal, the following 
 order : 
 
 The President of the United States directs that you 
 enroll in the military service of the United States the 
 loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, 
 with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, 
 for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the 
 United States for the protection of the peaceable in- 
 
82 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 habitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed neces- 
 sary, proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis. 
 
 Upon this order General Scott made the in- 
 dorsement, " It is revolutionary times, and there- 
 fore I do not object to the irregularity of this." 
 
 This was the first act of President Lincoln 
 which can be criticised as arbitrary. It was sig- 
 nificant of his determination to use the strongest 
 measures to save the Union when nothing milder 
 would suffice. 
 
 On May 8 Camp Jackson was supplied by 
 Jefferson Davis with arms and ammunition from 
 the stores of the captured arsenal at Baton 
 Rouge, La. 
 
 The Safety Committee knew of this action, but 
 permitted the consignment to reach its destina- 
 tion in order to have a legal excuse for capturing 
 the camp. The next day Captain Lyon went in 
 disguise to Camp Jackson to plan the method of 
 taking it. On the following day, May 10, he sud- 
 denly surrounded the camp with Home Guards 
 and Federal volunteers, and planted batteries in 
 commanding positions. General Frost sur- 
 rendered, protesting that he meant no hostility 
 to the United States an idle plea, since he was 
 " caught with the goods." 
 
 Lyon's troops marched with the prisoners back 
 to the arsenal. On the way they were attacked 
 by a mob who killed two or three soldiers. The 
 comrades of these fired into the crowd, killing 
 a number of men, women, and children, most of 
 whom, if not all, were innocent spectators. 
 
 The next morning the prisoners were paroled 
 and disbanded. On the same day, General Har- 
 nev returned from Washington, having been re- 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 83 
 
 instated in command largely because of the loy- 
 alty he had shown at Richmond in refusing over- 
 tures made by the Confederacy to win his inter- 
 est and friendship. 
 
 General Harney at once assumed the leader- 
 ship of the conservative pro-slavery faction of 
 the Missouri Unionists. Captain Lyon was at 
 the head of the radicals. A clash of policy and 
 of personal interest ensued, which lasted almost 
 throughout the war, and caused the President 
 from first to last a great deal of concern and an- 
 noyance. The division entered even into his 
 Cabinet, where Attorney-General Bates espoused 
 the cause of the Harney faction, and Postmaster- 
 General Blair that of the Lyon radicals. 
 
 Lincoln admired Captain Lyon for the wisdom 
 and energy he had displayed in the capture of 
 Camp Jackson. He distrusted Harney, not as 
 disloyal, but as weak and temporizing. So he 
 made Lyon a brigadier-general of volunteers, 
 and on May 18 caused the War Department to 
 send an order to Frank Blair, Jr., at St. Louis, 
 relieving General Harney from his command, 
 and appointing Lyon in his stead. At the same 
 time Lincoln wrote Blair telling him to withhold 
 the execution of this order until the necessity to 
 the contrary became very urgent. This necessity 
 arose within a fortnight. 
 
 On the night of the capture of Camp Jack- 
 son (May 10), Governor Jackson hastily con- 
 vened the Legislature at Jefferson City and 
 caused it to pass a military bill appointing the 
 Governor a military dictator, and appropriating 
 for his purposes three million dollars to be raised 
 by diverting the school fund, issuing bonds, and 
 anticipating two years' taxes. As his first step 
 
84 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 under this dictatorship to force the State into 
 the Confederacy, Governor Jackson appointed 
 ex-Governor Sterling Price as Major-General 
 in command of the Missouri State Guard. This 
 was a clever appointment, for Price, while an 
 ardent secessionist at heart, had impartially pre- 
 sided over the State convention which voted 
 down secession, and since then had been active in 
 allaying discord in the State, thereby winning the 
 confidence of General Harney. On May 21 
 Price made a compact with Harney whereby 
 the Federal officer agreed that he would not 
 molest the State officer in his effort " to maintain 
 order within the State," and that he would re- 
 frain from military movements of his own which 
 might " create excitements and jealousies." 
 
 With this assurance Price began the organiza- 
 tion all over the State of secessionist companies 
 under the guise of militia. The Federal Govern- 
 ment heard of this, and on May 27 the Adjutant- 
 General wrote to Harney a warning to be watch- 
 ful, saying, " The authority of the United States 
 is paramount, and whenever it is apparent that a 
 movement, whether by color of State authority 
 or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate to put it 
 down." 
 
 On May 30, before General Harney had time 
 to heed this warning, Mr. Blair exercised his dis- 
 cretionary power, and delivered to Harney the 
 order relieving him. 
 
 General Lyon, now in command, arranged a 
 conference with Jackson and Price on June u. 
 He demanded that they disband the " State 
 Guards " and give up the military bill. Jack- 
 son and Price refused to do so, and hurried to 
 Jefferson City, burning the bridges behind them. 
 
CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES 85 
 
 Arrived at the State capital, the Governor pub- 
 lished a proclamation of war, and called 50,000 
 militia into service. 
 
 Lyon's answer was to embark batteries and 
 troops on swift river steamboats, and on June 
 13 to steam to Jefferson City. He arrived on 
 June 15 before resistance could be organized, and 
 found the secessionists were fled. Lyon followed 
 Price fifty miles up the river to Boonville, where 
 on the 1 7th he defeated him in a skirmish and 
 dispersed his militia. 
 
 The State convention, which had adjourned to 
 December, met by special call on July 22; it 
 abrogated the arbitrary acts of the Jackson ad- 
 ministration and of the Legislature, and in- 
 augurated a provisional government at St. Louis, 
 choosing Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative 
 Unionist, as governor. Jackson, fleeing from 
 place to place in the State, kept up the pretense 
 of a State government. This the Jefferson Davis 
 Government recognized, admitting the State into 
 the Confederacy, but the substance of power lay 
 entirely with the Union Government throughout 
 the war. 
 
 Governor Gamble resorted to vigorous meas- 
 ures to purge from the politics of the State every- 
 thing which at all savored of an adhesion to the 
 Rebel Government. To this end he ordered all 
 troops which had gone into the Rebel army from 
 Missouri to return to their allegiance, promising, 
 with the assent of the Federal Government, se- 
 curity to all who did so. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FIRST MESSAGE 
 
 ^ WHEN the Virginia convention voted the 
 State into the Confederacy, the western 
 mountain counties, which had always been 
 at odds with the eastern seaboard over 
 the question of slavery, determined to re- 
 main in the Union. Their leaders appealed 
 to Lincoln, with the result that on May 26 Gen- 
 eral McClellan sent four regiments into the 
 State, under protection of which a provisional 
 loyal State government was organized at Wheel- 
 ing, on June 19. With such an encouraging 
 opening General McClellan began planning to 
 enter Confederate Virginia by way of the Kan- 
 awha river, and to capture Richmond. In the 
 meantime, General Lee had arranged the militia 
 of Virginia along the northern boundary of the 
 State ostensibly as an army of defense against 
 the Federal troops gathering at Washington, and 
 thereby he invited the first attack upon the Con- 
 federacy from that quarter. As President Lincoln 
 was soon to recall in his message to Congress in 
 special session, the presence of troops from other 
 Southern States in this Virginian army, as well 
 as the seizure of the Federal Gosport navy-yard 
 and the armory at Harper's Ferry, clearly showed 
 that Virginia was in open rebellion, and there- 
 86 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 87 
 
 fore invasion of the State by Federal troops was 
 not an act of aggression but of imperative neces- 
 sity as a measure of defense. 
 
 On May 24 the first Michigan regiment under 
 Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth occupied Alexan- 
 dria, causing the Rebel garrison at that place to 
 retire. Colonel Ellsworth proceeded to the prin- 
 cipal hotel, over which the Rebel flag had been 
 flying in plain sight of the national capital for 
 several weeks, and, climbing upon the roof with 
 three companions, cut down the flaunting ban- 
 ner with his own hand. As he descended the 
 stairs the hotel proprietor killed him with a shot- 
 gun, and was himself instantly done to death 
 with rifle and bayonet by Francis E. Brownell, 
 one of Ellsworth's companions. 
 
 No more grievous blow, except the assassina- 
 tion of one of his family, could have been struck 
 at the tender heart of Lincoln than this murder 
 of the gallant young colonel. Ellsworth had 
 been a student in Lincoln's law office, and, com- 
 ing with him to Washington, had formed a part 
 of his household there. 
 
 A relation like that of knight and squire of the 
 age of chivalry existed between the two. Lin- 
 coln had grown too wise to give of his confi- 
 dences to the young men about him, but he none 
 the less took a deep interest in them, studying 
 their natures and loving them for their personal 
 loyalty to him, and for their enthusiasm in his 
 cause which they had made their own. Ells- 
 worth had displayed no talent for law, and was 
 something of a nuisance in the office, owing to his 
 mislaying papers (one of Lincoln's most impor- 
 tant speeches was lost to the world through Ells- 
 worth losing the transcription of it), yet Lincoln 
 
88 , LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 patiently bore with him, because he recognized 
 in the young man's one passion, which was for 
 arms, evidence of capacity for military leadership, 
 and he sincerely respected him for it. On the day 
 following Ellsworth's death Lincoln wrote a letter 
 of condolence to the young officer's parents in 
 which his reserve in not obtruding his own al- 
 most fatherly affection upon those in whom the 
 natural jealousy of parenthood would be intensi- 
 fied by grief, reveals a courtesy even finer than 
 his expression of that admiration for the noble 
 qualities of the dead son which would bring un- 
 alloyed consolation to the bereaved father and 
 mother. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR AND MADAM : In the untimely loss of 
 your noble son, our affliction here is scarcely less than 
 your own. So much of promised usefulness to one's 
 country, and of bright hopes for one's self and friends, 
 have rarely been so suddenly dashed as in his fall. 
 In size, in years, and in youthful appearance a boy only, 
 his power to command men was surpassingly great. 
 This power, combined with a fine intellect, an indomi- 
 table energy, and a taste altogether military, consti- 
 tuted in him, as seemed to me, the best natural talent 
 in that department I ever knew. 
 
 And yet he was singularly modest and deferential in 
 social intercourse. My acquaintance with him began 
 less than two years ago ; yet through the latter half of 
 the intervening period it was as intimate as the dis- 
 parity of our ages and my engrossing engagements 
 would permit^ To me he appeared to have no indul- 
 gences or pastimes ; and I never heard him utter a pro- 
 fane or an intemperate word. What was conclusive of 
 his good heart, he never forgot his parents. The honors 
 he labored for so laudably, and for which in the sad 
 end he so gallantly gave his life, he meant for them 
 no less than for himself. 
 
 In the hope that it may be no intrusion upon the 
 sarredness of vour sorrow, I have ventured to address 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 89 
 
 you this tribute to the memory of my young friend and 
 your brave and early fallen child. 
 
 May God give you that consolation which is beyond 
 all earthly power. 
 
 Sincerely your friend in a common affliction, 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 
 The capture of Alexandria inaugurated open 
 conflict between the Confederacy and the Union 
 in Virginia. General Beauregard, who was 
 looked upon by the South as the hero of Fort 
 Sumter, was sent on May 31 to command the 
 Confederate forces centering about Manassas. 
 General Joseph E. Johnston was in command at 
 Winchester, having fallen back from Harper's 
 Ferry before a superior Union force under Gen- 
 eral Robert Patterson. On June 19 President 
 Lincoln called his Cabinet and the leading gen- 
 erals to a council of war, at which it was decided 
 that General Irvin McDowell should lead the 
 Union forces against Beauregard, while Patter- 
 son should remain confronting Johnston in the 
 Shenandoah Valley, following him in a rear at- 
 tack if he should attempt to join Beauregard. 
 
 This was the situation when Congress met in 
 special session on July 4, and listened to the 
 President's message. 
 
 In this important paper Mr. Lincoln described 
 the state of affairs at the time of his inaugura- 
 tion ; the suspension of all functions of the Fed- 
 eral Government, save those of the Post-office, 
 in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missis- 
 sippi, Louisiana, and Florida; the seizure by the 
 several governments of these States of forts and 
 other Federal property, and the organization of 
 these States into a Confederation which " was al- 
 ready invoking recognition, aid, and intervention 
 
90 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 from foreign powers." The President recounted 
 his forbearance in pursuing the policy expressed 
 in his inaugural address of exhausting all peace- 
 ful measures before resorting to stronger ones. 
 
 He then lucidly recited the story of the assault 
 upon Fort Sumter by South Carolina, demon- 
 strating that it was in no sense an act of defense, 
 but on the contrary of deliberate aggression, de- 
 signed to force the hand of the Federal Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 That this was their object the Executive well under- 
 stood; and having said to them in the inaugural ad- 
 dress, " You can have no conflict without being your- 
 selves the aggressors," he took pains not only to keep 
 this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free 
 from the power of ingenious sophistry that the world 
 should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at 
 Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that 
 point was reached. ... In this act, discarding all 
 else, they have forced upon the country the distinct is- 
 sue, " immediate dissolution or blood." 
 
 And this issue embraces more than the fate of the 
 United States. It presents to the whole family of man 
 the question whether a constitutional republic or 
 democracy a government of the people by the same 
 people can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity 
 against its own domestic foes. It presents the question 
 whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers 
 to control administration according to organic law in 
 any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this 
 case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without 
 any pretense, break up their government, and thus 
 practically put an end to free government upon the 
 earth. It forces us to ask : " Is there, in all republics, 
 this inherent and fatal weakness?" "Must a govern- 
 ment, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its 
 own people, or too weak to maintain its own ex- 
 istence? " 
 
 So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call 
 out the war power of the Government; and so to resist 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 91 
 
 force employed for its destruction by force for its 
 preservation. 
 
 The President then discussed the action of the 
 border States, particularly Virginia, pursuant to 
 the attack on Sumter. 
 
 The course taken in Virginia was the most remark- 
 able perhaps the most important. A convention 
 elected by the people of that State to consider the very 
 question of disrupting the Federal Union was in ses- 
 sion at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. 
 To this body the people had chosen a large majority 
 of professed Union men. Almost immediately after the 
 fall of Sumter, many members of that majority went 
 over to the original disunion minority, and with them 
 adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from 
 the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their 
 great approval of the assault upon Sumter or their 
 great resentment at the Government's resistance to that 
 assault, is not definitely known. Although they sub- 
 mitted the ordinance for ratification to a vote of the 
 people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than 
 a month distant, the convention and the Legislature 
 (which was also in session at the same time and 
 place), with leading men of the State not members of 
 either, immediately commenced acting as if the State 
 were already out of the Union. They pushed military 
 preparations vigorously forward all over the State. 
 They seized the United States armory at Harper's 
 Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. 
 They received perhaps invited into their State large 
 bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from 
 the so-called seceded States. They formally entered 
 into a treaty of temporary alliance and cooperation with 
 the so-called " Confederate States," and sent members 
 to their Congress at Montgomery. And, finally, they 
 permitted the insurrectionary government to be trans- 
 ferred to their capital at Richmond. 
 
 The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant 
 insurrection to make its nest within her borders; and 
 this Government has no choice left but to deal with it 
 where it finds it. And it has the less regret as the loyal 
 
92 LINCOLN TPIE PRESIDENT 
 
 citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. 
 Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recog- 
 nize and protect, as being Virginia. 
 
 The attitude of " armed neutrality " adopted 
 by Kentucky, the President characterized as 
 "" disunion completed." 
 
 Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an 
 impassable wall along the line of separation and yet 
 not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of 
 neutrality it would tie the hands of Union men and 
 freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrec- 
 tionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. 
 ... It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no 
 obligation to maintain the Union; and while very many 
 who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is, 
 nevertheless, very injurious in effect. 
 
 The President proceeded to justify his orders 
 to Lieutenant-General Scott authorizing him at 
 -discretion to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 
 an order which had been harshly criticised as 
 arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
 
 The provision of the Constitution that " the privilege 
 of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, un- 
 less when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public 
 safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision is 
 a provision that such privilege may be suspended 
 when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety 
 does require it. It was decided that we have a case of 
 rebellion, and that the public safety does require the 
 qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which 
 was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that 
 Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this 
 power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which 
 or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision 
 was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can- 
 not be believed the framers of the instrument intended 
 that in every case the danger should run its course until 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 93 
 
 Congress could be called together, the very assembling 
 of which might be prevented, as was intended in this 
 case, by the rebellion. 
 
 The President concluded his message proper 
 with an appeal to Congress to pass those meas- 
 ures which would enable him to suppress the 
 rebellion quickly and decisively: 
 
 It is now recommended that you give the legal means 
 for making this contest a short and decisive one : that 
 you place at the control of the Government for the work 
 at least four hundred thousand men and $400,000,000. 
 That number of men is about one-tenth of those of 
 proper ages within the regions where, apparently, all 
 are willing to engage ; and the sum is less than a 
 twenty-third part of the money value owned by the 
 men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of 
 $600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the 
 debt of our Revolution when we came out of that 
 struggle ; and the money value in the country now bears 
 even a greater proportion to what it was then than 
 does the population. Surely each man has as strong 
 a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had 
 then to establish them. 
 
 A right result at this time will be worth more to the 
 world than ten times the men and ten times the 
 money. The evidence reaching us from the country 
 leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abun- 
 dant, and that it needs only the hand of legislation to 
 give it legal sanction, and the hand of the Executive 
 to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the 
 greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid re- 
 ceiving troops faster than it can provide for them. In 
 a word, the people will save their Government if the 
 Government itself will do its part only indifferently 
 well. 
 
 The latter half of the message was in its 
 nature an address to the country upon the fal- 
 lacies of secession and the constitutional duty 
 imposed upon the President to suppress it by 
 arms. The movers of secession, said Mr. Lincoln, 
 
94 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 in order to undermine the loyalty of the South 
 to the Union " invented an ingenious sophism, 
 which if conceded was followed by perfectly 
 logical steps through all the incidents, to the 
 complete destruction of the Union. The sophism 
 itself is that any State in the Union may, consist- 
 ently with the national Constitution, withdraw 
 from the Union without the consent of the Union 
 or pf any other State. The little disguise that 
 the supposed right is to be exercised only for 
 just cause, themselves to be the sole judges of its 
 justice, is too thin to merit any notice." 
 
 This sophism, said Mr. Lincoln, is based upon 
 the false doctrine of State sovereignty. " Our 
 States," he said, " have neither more nor less 
 power than that reserved to them in the Union by 
 the Constitution no one of them ever having 
 been a State out of the Union. . . . The States 
 have their status in the Union, and they have no 
 other legal status. If they break from this, they 
 can only do so against law and by revolution. 
 The Union, and not themselves separately, pro- 
 cured their independence and their liberty. . . . 
 The Union is older than any of the States, and, 
 in fact, it created them as States." 
 
 The rights of the States reserved to them by 
 the Constitution, argued Mr. Lincoln, are ob- 
 viously administrative powers, and certainly do 
 not include a power to destroy the Government 
 itself. " This relative matter of national power 
 and State rights, as a principle, is no other than 
 the principle of generality and locality. What- 
 ever concerns the whole should be confined to the 
 whole to the General Government; while what- 
 ever concerns only the State should be left ex- 
 clusively to the State." 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 55 
 
 " The nation purchased with money," con- 
 tinued Mr. Lincoln, " the countries out of which 
 several of these States were formed; is it just 
 that they shall go off without leave and without 
 refunding? . . . The nation is now in debt for 
 money applied to the benefit of these so-called 
 seceding States in common with the rest; is it 
 just that . . . the remaining States pay the 
 whole? . . . Again, if one State may secede, 
 so may another ; and when all shall have seceded 
 none is left to pay the debts. . . The principle 
 itself is one of disintregation, and upon which no 
 government can possibly endure." 
 
 It may be affirmed, without extravagance, that the 
 free institutions we enjoy have developed the powers, 
 and improved the condition of our whole people be- 
 yond any example in the world. Of this we now have a 
 striking and an impressive illustration. So large an army 
 as the Government has now on foot was never before 
 known without a soldier in it but who had taken his 
 place there of his own free choice. But more than this ;. 
 there are many single regiments whose members, one 
 and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the 
 arts, sciences, professions, and whatever else, whether 
 useful or elegant, is known in the world ; and there is 
 scarcely one from which there could not be selected a 
 President, a Cabinet, a Congress and perhaps a court, 
 abundantly competent to administer the Government 
 itself. Nor do I say this is not true also in the army of 
 our late friends, now adversaries in this contest ; but 
 if it is, so much better the reason why the Government 
 which has conferred such benefits on both them and us 
 should not be broken up. Whoever, in any section, pro- 
 poses to abandon such a Government, would do well to 
 consider in deference to what principle it is that he does 
 it; what better he is likely to get in its stead; whether 
 the substitute will give, or be intended to give, so much, 
 of good to the people? There are some foreshadow- 
 ings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted 
 some declarations of independence, in which, unlike the 
 
96 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit the words, 
 " all men are created equal." Why? They have adopted 
 a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of 
 which unlike our good old one, signed by Washing- 
 ton, they omit, " We, the people," and substitute, " We, 
 the deputies of the sovereign and independent States.'* 
 Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the 
 rights of men and the authority of the people? 
 
 This is essentially a people's contest. On the side 
 of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the 
 world that form and substance of government whose 
 leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift 
 artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths 
 of laudable pursuits for all ; to afford all an unfettered 
 start and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to 
 partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is 
 the leading object of the Government for whose ex- 
 istence we contend. 
 
 I am most happy to believe that the plain people 
 understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note, 
 that while in this the Government's hour of trial, large 
 numbers of -those in the army and navy who have been 
 favored with the offices have resigned and proved false 
 to the hand which had pampered them, not one common 
 soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted 
 his flag. 
 
 Great honor is due to those officers who remained 
 true, despite the example of their treacherous associ- 
 ates ; but the greatest honor, and most important fact of 
 all, is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers 
 and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, 
 they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of 
 those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed 
 as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain 
 people. They understand, without an argument, that 
 the destroying the Government which was made by 
 Washington means no good to them. 
 
 Our popular Government has often been called an ex- 
 periment. Two points in it our people have already 
 settled the successful establishing and the successful 
 administering of it. One still remains its successful 
 maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to 
 overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the 
 world that those who can fairly carry an election can 
 also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 97 
 
 and peaceful successors of bullets; and that when bal- 
 lots have fairly and constitutionally decided, there can 
 be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can 
 be no successful appeal, except to ballots themselves, at 
 succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of 
 peace; teaching men that what they cannot take by an 
 election, neither can they take by a war; teaching all 
 the folly of being the beginners of a war. 
 
 It was with the deepest regret that the Executive 
 found the duty of employing the war power in de- 
 fence of the Government forced upon him. He could 
 but perform this duty or surrender the existence of 
 the Government. No compromise by public servants 
 could, in this case, be a cure; not that compromises are 
 not often proper, but that no popular Government can 
 long survive a marked precedent that those who carry 
 an election can only save the Government from im- 
 mediate destruction by giving up the main point upon 
 which the people gave the election. The people them- 
 selves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their 
 own deliberate decisions. 
 
 As a private citizen the Executive could not have 
 consented that these institutions shall perish; much less 
 could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust 
 as the free people have confided to him. He felt that 
 he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the 
 chances of his own life in what might follow. In full 
 view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done 
 what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according 
 to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely 
 hopes that your views and your actions may so accord 
 with his, as to assure all faithful citizens who have 
 been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy 
 restoration to them, under the Constitution and the 
 laws. 
 
 And having thus chosen our course without guile 
 and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, 
 and go forward without fear and with manly hearts. 
 
 Congress, like the President, rose to heroic 
 stature in meeting the crisis thrust upon the 
 nation. It sat for a month and in that time did 
 all that the Executive desired. All the acts of 
 
98 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the President for the suppression of the rebellion 
 which he performed were declared valid, and he 
 was authorized to accept the service of 500,000 
 volunteers, and $500,000,000 were voted to prose- 
 cute the war. 
 
 The press and people heartily indorsed the 
 action of Congress and the President; and Mr. 
 Lincoln entered into consideration of the mighty 
 problem of war with a resolute purpose and a 
 single aim to restore the Union of the States as 
 they were. That the country had thus settled 
 down to the serious business of war, and that 
 Congress and the loyal people were en rapport 
 with the Executive, armed that branch of govern- 
 ment with the mighty power of unity and con- 
 cord. If there could have been celerity and effec- 
 tiveness in military operations, or if the people 
 had remained constant and patient, all would have 
 gone well, but no such gratifying conditions ex- 
 isted, for military matters were unsatisfactory. 
 In time diversity of policy and feeling was engen- 
 dered, the President's current policy and ability 
 were criticised, and the entente cordiale which 
 had existed between the Administration and the 
 people was strained. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln's conception of the situation was 
 tersely stated to me, with the license and unre- 
 strained freedom of intimate friendship, on the 
 26th day of July, 1861. He then said: "We 
 must make a feint against Richmond and in that 
 way dislodge them [the Rebels] from Manassas; 
 we must pursue as rigidly as possible the block- 
 ade; we musf march a column of the army into 
 East Tennessee, so as to liberate the Union sen- 
 timent there; and then we must rely upon the 
 time coming when the people down South will 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 99 
 
 rise and say to their leaders : ' This thing has 
 got to stop; ' for [said he impressively], it is no 
 use trying to conquer those people if they remain 
 united and bound not to be conquered." 
 
 Leonard Swett said, that during the first and 
 second years of the war Mr. Lincoln had little 
 hope of preserving the Union, but that after the 
 issuance and reception of the Emancipation 
 Proclamation he then and thereafter expected 
 to prevail. Such is my own view. Mr. Lincoln 
 was not of a hopeful and enthusiastic, but of a 
 despondent and somber character. He fully 
 apprehended the odds against us, including the 
 hostility of England and France, and the sym- 
 pathy of border State slave-holders with their 
 brethren in the Cotton States. 
 
 The disadvantage which the Administration 
 of a constitutional government labors under, in 
 conducting an internecine war, was exhibited by 
 the sedulous care necessary to be observed in not 
 invading the area of constitutional right, or in 
 making ample apology for doing so, and showing 
 its inherent necessity. Both in his official utter- 
 ances and in his loose talk, Lincoln was careful 
 to guarantee to all classes their utmost rights and 
 privileges, and to " curry favor " personally with 
 all classes and conditions in an indirect, unob- 
 trusive, and manly way, thus weakening the 
 power of the opposition, and gaining accretions 
 of power to his own side. 
 
 Monarchical powers do none of these things ; 
 they decide on the war in the Cabinet ; order the 
 lines, and organize the army ; conscript the 
 needed troops or hire mercenaries, as may be 
 needed, but they omit to take the people into 
 their confidence. While Mr. Lincoln was en- 
 
ioo LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 gaged in defining his proposition in all ways he 
 could, Jefferson Davis embraced opportunities to 
 do the same in reference to his government. 
 Both appealed to their several constituencies for 
 strength to uphold their governments, and both 
 laid their claim before the civilized world for its 
 approval. 
 
 The differences between the two governments 
 and the modes of their action were apparent ; for, 
 while Mr. Lincoln's government never at any 
 time showed infringements upon constitutional 
 liberty beyond a moderate draft, the issue of fiat 
 money, and a suspension of the writ of habeas 
 corpus, scarcely exercised, the Davis government, 
 though vaunting its devotion to enlarged liberty 
 and almost the freedom of license, became an ab- 
 solute and implacable despotism : fiercely taking 
 supplies and products, enforcing the currency of 
 a circulating medium of neither present nor 
 prospective value, and robbing the fireside and 
 the cradle and the grave by press gangs to re- 
 cruit its armies. The people were impoverished 
 and deprived of almost every vestige of liberty. 
 
 Almost the sole business of the Southern coun- 
 try was to furnish supplies and men for the 
 army; there was but little progress in emigra- 
 tion, manufactures, commerce, science, education 
 or the arts; cruel, unrelenting war was the sole 
 business, and all of the current and floating capi- 
 tal having been engulfed in the vortex, the fixed 
 capital and reserved wealth were rapidly disap- 
 pearing in the same way. 
 
 Despite the fact that State rights and slavery 
 were the twin pillars of their fabric of govern- 
 ment, the former was disregarded entirely, and 
 the protests of Governors Brown, of Georgia, and 
 
THE FIRST MESSAGE 101 
 
 Vance, of North Carolina, against the improper 
 use of their troops were wholly disregarded. 
 Had Mr. Lincoln attempted to administer his 
 government in such utter disregard of constitu- 
 tional rights and of the primary principles of lib- 
 erty, it would not have endured for a single 
 year. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 BULL RUN AND MILITARY EMANCIPATION 
 
 TEN days after the President had promulgated 
 his enheartening message, Congress, as well as 
 the Northern people, were mightily encouraged 
 by the report of General McClellan that he had 
 defeated the " crack regiments of Eastern Vir- 
 ginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and 
 Carolinians," at Rich Mountain and Carrick's 
 Ford, killing in the second battle their general, 
 Robert S. Garnett. " Our success is complete," 
 said McClellan, " and secession is killed in this 
 country." These quickly succeeding and decisive 
 victories recalled Napoleon's campaign in Italy, 
 and comparisons were drawn between the " Lit- 
 tle Corporal" and "Little Mac," as McClellan 
 was affectionately dubbed. It was thought that 
 he who had so quickly won an entire province, 
 virtually a State, to the Union, was the military 
 genius of the war, and the commander destined 
 to lead the soldiers of the Union, now proved to 
 be superior to the boasted Southern chivalry, 
 " on to Richmond," the speedy capture of which 
 would undoubtedly " kill secession " in the entire 
 South. 
 
 However, these anticipations of a " ninety days' 
 conquest " were rudely shattered by the defeat 
 at Bull Run, or Manassas. On July 18 Johnston 
 
 102 
 
BULL RUN 103 
 
 executed a stolen march which completely de- 
 ceived Patterson, his opponent, and by Saturday, 
 July 20, 6,000 of his 9,000 men had joined 
 the 22,000 under Beauregard, in time to resist 
 McDowell's attack on Sunday, the 2ist, and the 
 remaining 3,000 arrived in time to turn the 
 tide of victory in favor of the Confederates. 
 The Union retreat became a disorderly flight 
 back to Washington. Many civilians had gone 
 to see the battle, and these, mingling with the 
 retreating soldiers, contributed to the confusion. 
 One Congressman was captured by the Rebels 
 a salutary lesson to his colleagues of the evil 
 effects of over-confidence. 
 
 Jefferson Davis, hurrying from Richmond, 
 reached the scene of conflict just before the final 
 denouement, and, impressing a cavalry horse, 
 reached the immediate theater of operations in 
 time to exclaim to the troops of a division just 
 ordered forward, " Forward ! my brave boys, and 
 win." In 1880 I spent an entire day with Hon. 
 T. H. Watts, of Alabama, who was the Attorney- 
 General of the Confederacy for a time, and he 
 told me very much of his side of the rebellion; 
 among which was this fact, that Davis accepted 
 the Presidency with extreme reluctance, deeming 
 his forte to be as Commander of the Army. This 
 idea possessed him throughout, and he was 
 in a frequent state of nervous irritation at what 
 he deemed the bad policy and mistakes of his 
 generals. Governor Watts thought that if the 
 authorities had rated his military qualities as 
 highly as he did himself, and allowed him to 
 take supreme command of the army, he would 
 willingly at any time have resigned the Executive 
 chair for that purpose. Governor Watts said 
 
104 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 he and Davis had often talked about it, both 
 in the office and in the social circle. It was, 
 in fact, a hobby with Davis. Beauregard, how- 
 ever, in his report on the battle ignored Davis' 
 services, if any, in the battle, and simply said 
 that the President came on the field at, or toward, 
 the close of the battle; and General Johnston 
 made no mention of the President at all. Davis 
 never forgave either of these gallant officers, 
 but, in all ways that he could, crippled and in- 
 jured each of them throughout the war. John- 
 ston's preeminent talents generally assured him 
 an independent command; but Beauregard's les- 
 ser abilities were unable to enforce such a posi- 
 tion, and he was relegated to subordinate places. 
 I reached Washington from Chicago on the 
 Monday evening after the rout, and recollect viv- 
 idly the disorganized condition of the capital; 
 the weather was unusually I might say, phe- 
 nomenally hot; showers would fall, and imme- 
 diately it seemed as if the heat was more intense 
 and stifling than before. The night brought little 
 relief. Judiciary Square and Capitol Hill af- 
 forded comfortable lodging places for our brave 
 boys, whose mattress was Mother Earth and 
 whose covering was the blue dome of Heaven. 
 At each street pump soldiers might be seen 
 washing some rude article of clothing, the iron 
 railings of the elite serving in lieu of clothes-lines 
 for laundry uses ; the boys would break up in 
 squads, and each take a block where three of 
 them together would visit each house and respect- 
 fully solicit their breakfasts, nor was the request 
 ever denied, and their dinners and suppers were 
 procured similarly, nor was there any complaint 
 of misbehavior. General Mansfield was intrusted 
 
BULL RUN 105 
 
 with the duty of reorganization, a task which was 
 accomplished in a few days. 
 
 Lincoln held a Cabinet meeting at General 
 Scott's office late Sunday afternoon to take meas- 
 ures to save the capital. Soldiers were hurried 
 from recruiting stations to Washington. McClel- 
 lan was ordered to come down to the Shenandoah 
 Valley with all his available troops. 
 
 The entire country was thrown into a panic 
 from which it was some time in recovering. As 
 an evidence of the general demoralization the fol- 
 lowing letter to Lincoln from Horace Greeley, 
 editor of the New York Tribune, may be cited : 
 
 NEW YORK, Monday, July 29, 1861. (Midnight.) 
 This is my seventh sleepless night yours, too, doubt- 
 less yet I think I shall not die, because I have no 
 right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. 
 But to business. You are not considered a great man, 
 and I am a helplessly broken one. . . . Can the 
 Rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in 
 view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late, 
 awful disaster? If they can, and it is your business 
 to ascertain and decide, write me that such is your 
 judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And 
 if they cannot be beaten, if our recent disaster is fatal, 
 do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If 
 the Rebels are not to be beaten, if that is your judg- 
 ment in view of all the light you can get, then every 
 drop of blood henceforth shed in this quarrel will be 
 wantonly, wickedly shed, and the guilt will rest heav- 
 ily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray 
 you to decide quickly and let me know my duty. . . . 
 If it is best for the country and for mankind that we 
 make peace with the Rebels at once and on their own 
 terms, do not shrink even from that. 
 
 Lincoln had spent sleepless nights, not in self- 
 ish nursing of grief, but in planning for the sal- 
 vation of the republic. On July 23 he wrote 
 
io6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 memoranda looking to the vigorous maintenance 
 of every defensive policy that had been entered 
 upon, and on July 27 he added to these memo- 
 randa of three offensive operations ; recovery of 
 the railroad connections lost by the defeat, and 
 joint movements from Cairo on Memphis, and 
 from Cincinnati on East Tennessee. 
 
 Congress ably supported the President in this 
 emergency. On July 22, following the defeat at 
 Bull Run, John J. Crittenden, an aged Represent- 
 ative from Kentucky, the State where the policy 
 of neutrality had been strongest, voiced the spirit 
 of his legislative body in a resolution declaring 
 that the war had been forced upon the country 
 by the disunionists, and would be waged by the 
 Federal Government not for subjugation, " but to 
 defend and maintain the supremacy of the Consti- 
 tution, and to preserve the Union with all the 
 dignity, equality, and rights of the several States 
 unimpaired ; and that as soon as these objects are 
 accomplished the war ought to cease." 
 
 This, and a similar resolution offered in the 
 Senate by Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, were 
 passed with but few dissenting votes. 
 
 On July 27 General McClellan was endued 
 with the chief command at Washington, and em- 
 powered to organize a new army out of the three 
 years' regiments beginning to pour in upon the 
 capital. 
 
 History does not recount a career in which the 
 road to immortal fame was so manifest, obvious, 
 and clearly defined as that upon which McClellan 
 now entered. He had a good army record, the 
 prestige of excellent scholarship, fine oppor- 
 tunities for military observation, admirable social 
 qualities, an excellent moral character, a fine 
 
BULL RUN 107 
 
 (parlor) presence, a polished address, the friend- 
 ship of the commanding General, and great poli- 
 tical influence. Unfortunately, he fell into the 
 embraces of society people at Washington, which 
 was a clog to proper vigor and progress in field 
 operations, especially as the class most in favor 
 with him was not favorable to a rigorous prosecu- 
 tion of the war. In addition, he accepted the 
 proffered services of many carpet knights as vol- 
 unteer and other staff officers, who, when in 
 commission and on dress parade, were brilliant 
 and imposing in appearance, but constituted only 
 the edging and passementerie, and not the sub- 
 stance of war. 
 
 Instead of taking up his headquarters in the 
 field with his army, he procured an aristocratic 
 mansion close by the White House, and fell into 
 luxurious and methodical habits of empty reviews 
 and dull routine instead of campaigning and field 
 operations. He had a cavalry bodyguard which 
 did nothing except attend him in his diurnal re- 
 views. He had also an infantry bodyguard 
 which did nothing but attend at his magnificent 
 headquarters. Two French princes were on his 
 staff ; one of them afterwards said : " I here point 
 out a characteristic trait of the American people 
 delay ! " It is needless to say that this prince 
 had not served with Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan. 
 John Jacob Astor was a volunteer on his staff, 
 and he paid all his own expenses and lived as he 
 was wont to in Fifth Avenue, served by a chef 
 and a steward. This was patriotic in Mr. Astor, 
 but it was not war; and such surroundings emas- 
 culated McClellan of vigor, self-reliance, and the 
 real business which the nation had employed him 
 to do. When he was finally forced to take the 
 
io8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 field after seven weary months of fanfaronade 
 and pinchbeck reviews, it required six immense 
 four-horse wagons, drawn by twenty-four horses, 
 to haul the baggage of himself and his staff. 
 
 On the same day that the House was debating 
 the Crittenden resolution, the Senate voted to 
 confiscate the slaves employed in aid of the rebel- 
 lion. This act was a long stride onward toward 
 emancipation. Credit for pointing out the mili- 
 tary principle upon which the confiscation was 
 justified is due to General Butler. He was in 
 command at Fortress Monroe, and had as his op- 
 ponent John B. Magruder, who with scant troops, 
 set to work to construct earthworks, putting ne- 
 groes at the task. A number of these ran away 
 to Fortress Monroe. Three of them were farm- 
 hands, belonging to Colonel Mallory, who de- 
 manded their return under the Fugitive Slave 
 Act. Now General Butler had been the keenest 
 lawyer in Massachusetts, and he took a reasonable 
 legal position rather than a military course in re- 
 fusing the bold demand. He replied that Virginia 
 claimed to be a foreign state, and therefore its 
 citizens, at least those that indorsed this claim, 
 could not consistently assert as their right a duty 
 of the Nation to one of its States. 
 
 This reasoning led to an even more advanced 
 position, which was concisely summed up in a 
 single phrase, viz., that negroes employed in aid 
 of rebellion were " contraband of war." Since 
 the Southerners regarded slaves as chattels they 
 could not consistently except to this conclusion. 
 
 The Government heartily approved General 
 Butler's course. On May 30 Secretary Cameron 
 of the War Department gave him a formal order 
 authorizing him to pursue the policy he had 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 109 
 
 adopted, and this was subsequently enacted into 
 law by Congress. Even the border-State Union 
 men did not voice any objections, for to do so 
 would impeach their loyalty. The public gener- 
 ally applauded Butler. When, however, Major- 
 General John C. Fremont, in command of the 
 Western Department, consisting of Illinois and 
 all the region between the Mississippi and the 
 Rocky Mountains, attempted to gain a similar 
 popular acclaim by issuing on his own responsi- 
 bility a proclamation confiscating all property of 
 persons in rebellion, and emancipating their 
 slaves, neither the Administration nor the country 
 as a whole supported him. General Fremont had 
 already proved himself an incompetent com- 
 mander. His neglect to reenforce the brave 
 General Lyon, isolated at Springfield in south- 
 western Missouri among gathering Rebel forces, 
 had led to the defeat and death of Lyon at Wil- 
 son's Creek on August 10 ; and his egotism in re- 
 fusing to consult with the civil authorities and his 
 subordinate officers had thoroughly demoralized 
 his entire department. 
 
 President Lincoln therefore was watching for 
 danger in that quarter, and as soon as he was 
 informed of Fremont's proclamation on August 
 30 of military emancipation, wrote him on Sep- 
 tember 2 to modify it so that it should conform 
 to the Act of Congress confiscating property 
 used for insurrection, giving as a reason for his 
 objection that the liberation of slaves would 
 alarm Southern Unionists, and perhaps precipi- 
 tate Kentucky into the Confederacy. 
 
 Before Lincoln received a reply to this, he 
 wrote to General David Hunter a letter full of 
 shrewd foresight and delicate diplomacy: 
 
no LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 September 9, 1861. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: General Fremont needs assistance 
 which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confi- 
 dence of men near him, whose support any man in his 
 position must have to be successful. His cardinal mis- 
 take is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to 
 see him ; and by which he does not know what is going 
 on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to 
 have by his side a man of large experience. Will you 
 not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade 
 too high to be ordered to it ; but will you not serve the 
 country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily? 
 
 Two days later he received an answer from 
 Fremont to his letter of September 2. It was full 
 of excuses and self-justification. Mrs. Fremont 
 brought it in person. She adopted a hostile atti- 
 tude toward the President, and, insinuating that 
 there was a conspiracy against her husband, de- 
 manded a copy of the President's Missouri corre- 
 spondence. To this Lincoln courteously but firmly 
 replied : 
 
 I do not feel authorized to furnish you with copies 
 of letters in my possession, without the consent of the 
 writers. No impression has been made on my mind 
 against the honor or integrity of General Fremont, and 
 I now enter my protest against being understood as 
 acting in any hostility towards him. 
 
 The situation precipitated by General Fre- 
 mont's proclamation was most critical. The bor- 
 der States, for whose adherence to the Union Lin- 
 coln had thus far most successfully played, 
 seemed about to escape from his control. Be- 
 sides, soldiers from the Northern States, who had 
 enlisted to save the Union and not to free the 
 negro, were greatly disaffected by Fremont's 
 proclamation. On the other hand events had 
 rapidly developed many conservative Northern- 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 1 1 r 
 
 ers into anti-slavery radicals, and these, together 
 with the original Abolitionists, made a hero of 
 General Fremont. Such persons had to be 
 treated with utmost consideration. 
 
 One of these was an old friend and adviser of 
 Lincoln, Orville H. Browning, who had suc- 
 ceeded Stephen A. Douglas in the Senate. On 
 September 17 he wrote to the President objecting 
 to his attitude toward Fremont's proclamation. 
 To this letter Lincoln replied on the 22d : 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the. 1 7th is just received; and 
 coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That 
 you should object to my adhering to a law which you 
 had assisted in making and presenting to me less than 
 a month before is odd enough. But this is a very 
 small part. General Fremont's proclamation as to 
 confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves 
 is purely political and not within the range of military 
 law or necessity. If a commanding general finds a 
 necessity to seize the farm of a private owner for 
 a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the 
 right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the neces- 
 sity lasts; and this is within military law, because 
 within military necessity. But to say the farm shall 
 no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, 
 and this as well when the farm is not needed for mili- 
 tary purposes as when it is, is purely political, with- 
 out the savor of military law about it. And the same 
 is true of slaves. If the general needs them, he can 
 seize them and use them; but when the need is past, 
 it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. 
 That must be settled according to laws made by law- 
 makers, and not by military proclamations. The proc- 
 lamation in the point in question is simply " dictator- 
 ship." It assumes that the general may do anything he 
 pleases confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal 
 people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the 
 whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular 
 with some thoughtless people than that which has been 
 done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor 
 allow others to assume it on my responsibility. 
 
112 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 You speak of it as being the only means of saving 
 the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the sur- 
 render of the Government. Can it be pretended that 
 it is any longer the Government of the United States 
 any government of constitution and laws wherein a 
 general or a president may make permanent rules of 
 property by proclamation? I do not say Congress 
 might not with propriety pass a law on the point just 
 such as General Fremont proclaimed. I do not say 
 I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. 
 What I object to is, that I, as President, shall ex- 
 pressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent 
 legislative functions of the Government. 
 
 So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No 
 doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and 
 would have been more s"o if it had been a general 
 declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature 
 would not budge till that proclamation was modified ; 
 and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news 
 of General Fremont having actually issued deeds of 
 manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw 
 down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as 
 to think it probable that the very arms we had fur- 
 nished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think 
 to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the 
 whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, 
 nor, as I think, Maryland. These ah against us, and the 
 job on our hands is too large for us. We would as 
 well consent to separation at once, including the sur- 
 render of this capital. On the contrary, if you will 
 give up your restlessness for new positions, and back 
 me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other 
 kind friends gave me the election and have approved 
 in my public documents, we shall go through trium- 
 phantly. You must understand I took my course on 
 the proclamation because of Kentucky. I took the 
 same ground in a private letter to General Fremont 
 before I heard from Kentucky. 
 
 There has been no thought of removing General 
 Fremont on any ground connected with his proclama- 
 tion. ... I hope no real necessity for it exists on any 
 ground. 
 
 After his victory over General Lyon, the Con- 
 federate General Price advanced northward with- 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 113 
 
 out opposition till on September 18 he met the 
 Chicago Irish Brigade under Colonel James A. 
 Mulligan at Lexington on the Missouri River. 
 Mulligan had held the place against great odds 
 for more than two days, during which Fremont 
 could easily have sent him reinforcements, but 
 neglected to do so. Mulligan was forced to sur- 
 render on the 2Oth. General Scott wrote to Fre- 
 mont that " The President . . . expects 
 you to repair the disaster at Lexington without 
 loss of time." 
 
 So desirous was President Lincoln that General 
 Fremont should take the offensive that, in a 
 memorandum which he made about October I 
 proposing a defensive plan of campaign, he speci- 
 fically exempted him from the general inaction 
 (see p. 195). 
 
 Nevertheless General Fremont continued inac- 
 tive. Accordingly, Secretary Cameron and Ad- 
 jutant-General Lorenzo Thomas went to Mis- 
 souri to investigate the situation, and if advisable, 
 to remove General Fremont. They arrived at 
 Fremont's camp on October 13, and on the I4th 
 Cameron wrote the President informing him that 
 he had shown Fremont the order for his removal 
 and that the General, greatly mortified, had made 
 an earnest appeal for further trial. " In reply to 
 this appeal," wrote Cameron, " I told him that I 
 would withhold the order until my return to 
 Washington, giving him the interim to prove the 
 reality of his hopes as to reaching and capturing 
 the enemy ; giving him to understand that, should 
 he fail, he must give place to some other officer. 
 He assured me that, should he fail, he would re- 
 sign at once." 
 
 President Lincoln waited until October 24 for 
 
H 4 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 signs of activity by Fremont and, none forthcom- 
 ing, he sent to Brigadier-General Samuel R. Cur- 
 tis at St. Louis an order to General Fremont to 
 turn over his command to Major-General David 
 Hunter. However, he gave Curtis instructions 
 that the order was to be withheld if, by the time 
 the messenger reached Fremont, the general had 
 won a victory or was in the midst or on the eve 
 of battle. 
 
 General Hunter by the President's orders was 
 on hand when the message was delivered. Gen- 
 eral Fremont had given orders to attack the Con- 
 federates who were supposed to be at Wilson's 
 Creek. Hunter sent a reconaissance to this place 
 and found no enemy there. General Fremont 
 thereupon gracefully resigned his command to 
 General Hunter and returned to St. Louis, where 
 he was publicly welcomed by the radical faction 
 of the Unionists. General Hunter, in accordance 
 with the instructions of the President, drew back 
 the troops from Springfield to Rolla, the terminus 
 of a railroad, and dispatched most of them to 
 other points that were threatened. Thereupon 
 the Confederate Brigadier-General Ben McCul- 
 loch occupied Springfield. 
 
 On November 9 the Department of the West 
 was divided into the Department of Kansas and 
 the Department of Missouri. The Department 
 of Kansas included the State of Kansas and 
 the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota, 
 and Indian Territory; General Hunter was as- 
 signed to its command, with headquarters at Fort 
 Leavenworth. The Department of Missouri em- 
 braced Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, 
 Wisconsin, Illinois, and that part of Kentucky 
 lying west of the Cumberland River; General 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 115 
 
 Henry W. Halleck was assigned to its command, 
 with headquarters at St. Louis. 
 
 General Halleck set himself at once to settle 
 the vexatious problem of the relation of the army 
 to fugitive slaves. Contrary to Fremont's policy 
 he issued an order on November 20 excluding 
 these fugitives from the army lines on the ground 
 that they conveyed information to the enemy. 
 For this order he was violently attacked by the 
 anti-slave press and Congressmen, who averred 
 that, on the contrary, the fugitives brought in 
 valuable information about the enemy. 
 
 13 urh whacking on both sides had brought Mis- 
 souri into a state of anarchy, and Halleck turned 
 his attention to its suppression. Various Confed- 
 erate detachments were ravaging northern Mis- 
 souri, and he sent troops to drive them south- 
 ward. He assigned to General John Pope the 
 duty of intercepting and capturing them as they 
 crossed the Missouri River. On December 19, 
 near Milford, Colonel Davis of Pope's command 
 captured 2,000 of these Confederates, with a 
 great quantity of arms, horses, and supplies. 
 
 General Halleck was equally severe upon the 
 Union bushwhackers. In the beginning of the 
 war the President had given Senator James H. 
 Lane, of Kansas, authority to raise a brigade in 
 his State. The men who enlisted under him were 
 wild spirits who had taken part in the merciless 
 strife over the admission of Kansas, and they 
 now continued the same order of barbaric war- 
 fare. Halleck ordered that they be expelled from 
 his department, and if caught, disarmed and held 
 as prisoners. " They are no better than a band 
 of robbers," he wrote to McClellan. " They cross 
 the line, rob, steal, plunder, and burn whatever 
 
n6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 they can lay hands upon. They disgrace the 
 name and uniform of American soldiers, and are 
 driving good Union men into the ranks of the 
 secession army." 
 
 Lincoln tried to hold Lane and his soldiers 
 within bounds by making him clearly understand 
 that he was under command of General Hunter. 
 As a result, Lane, who had contemplated an ex- 
 pedition against Texas which should bring him 
 great glory, became disgruntled and inactive. 
 Hunter, disgusted with his small and insubor- 
 dinate forces, and believing that he should have 
 had the command assigned to General Buell, 
 wrote to the President expressing his humiliation 
 and disappointment. 
 
 To this Lincoln replied on December 31 but 
 allowed the letter to remain on his table a month, 
 and then sent it by special conveyance to General 
 Hunter, directing that it be given him only when 
 he was in good humor. As one of the most char- 
 acteristic letters written by the President it is 
 here presented in full : 
 
 DEAR SIR: Yours of the 23d is received, and I am 
 constrained to say it is difficult to answer so ugly 
 a letter in good temper. I am, as you intimate, losing 
 much of the great confidence I placed in you, not from 
 any act or omission of yours touching the public 
 service, up to the time you were sent to Leavenworth, 
 but from the flood of grumbling dispatches and letters 
 I have seen from you since. I knew you were being 
 ordered to Leavenworth at the time it was done ; and 
 I aver that, with as tender a regard for your honor 
 and your sensibilities as I had for my own, it never 
 occurred to me that you were being " humiliated, in- 
 sulted and disgraced " ; nor have I, up to this day, 
 heard an intimation that you have been wronged, com- 
 ing from any one but yourself. No one has blamed 
 you for the retrograde movement from Springfield, nor 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 117 
 
 for the information you gave General Cameron; and 
 this you could readily understand, if it were not for 
 your unwarranted assumption that the ordering you to 
 Leayenworth must necessarily have been done as a 
 punishment for some fault. I thought then, and think 
 yet, the position assigned to you is as responsible, and 
 as honorable, as that assigned to Buell I know that 
 General McClellan expected more important results 
 from it. My impression is that at the time you were 
 assigned to the new Western Department, it had not 
 been determined to replace General Sherman in Ken- 
 tucky; but of this I am not certain, because the idea 
 that a command in Kentucky was very desirable, and 
 one in the farther West undesirable, had never occurred 
 to me. You constantly speak of being placed in com- 
 mand of only 3,000. Now tell me, is this not mere 
 impatience? Have you not known all the while that 
 you are to command four or five times that many? 
 
 I have been, and am sincerely your friend; and if, 
 as such, I dare to make a suggestion, I would say you 
 are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself. 
 " Act well your part, there all the honor lies." He who 
 does something at the head of one regiment, will eclipse 
 him who does nothing at the head of a hundred. 
 
 Your friend, as ever, A. LINCOLN. 
 
 It became apparent that the division of the De- 
 partment of the West had been a mistake, and on 
 March n, 1862, the two commands were re- 
 united under Halleck, and Hunter was sent to 
 command a new Department, that of the South, 
 composed of Georgia, Florida, and South Caro- 
 lina. 
 
 The division of feeling concerning the action 
 of the Government in regard to Fremont tended 
 to foment other disorders, and to create other 
 and further political divisions, and to render life 
 in Missouri not worth living, for there was no 
 escape from the political complications which 
 equally affected men and women, churches, Sab- 
 bath Schools, and even made its appearance with- 
 
u8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 in the sanctity of the family circle, and at the 
 family altar. Men who had been sworn friends 
 for a half century suddenly became bitter and 
 unrelenting enemies. Later, when the Rebel 
 army had been driven from the State, the Rebels 
 of Missouri, who had not had the courage and 
 manhood to enter the army, resorted to guerrilla 
 warfare. They infested sparsely populated 
 neighborhoods, stole horses, murdered defense- 
 less and unarmed men and women, plundered 
 banks, and committed acts even more reprehen- 
 sible, making life in the rural districts of Missouri 
 as wretched and uncomfortable as was possible. 
 The culmination of these atrocities took place in 
 the raid on Lawrence, Kan., on August 21, 1863, 
 by which all the men in the place were cruelly 
 massacred. Stores were pillaged and burned, 
 and kindred disorders were perpetrated. 
 
 Governor Gamble got up an effective State 
 militia, and soon cleared the State of guerrillas; 
 and General Thomas Ewing, Jr., commanding 
 at Kansas City, issued Order 409 requiring citi- 
 zens of the border counties to leave their farms 
 and resort to the towns, where they were kept 
 under surveillance, and thus debarred the privi- 
 lege of harboring and secreting guerrillas at their 
 homes. General Ewing was a brother-in-law to 
 General Sherman and had been his law partner. 
 Although he was a son of Thomas Ewing, the old 
 veteran Whig statesman, he was nevertheless a 
 candidate for Vice-President at the Democratic 
 convention in New York in 1868, and was de- 
 feated chiefly by an exhibition of this order No. 
 409, which Frank Blair, the successful candidate 
 for the position, had procured, duplicated, and 
 circulated among the rebel delegates, of whom 
 
MILITARY EM AN C IP A TION 1 1 9 
 
 Forrest, the hero of the massacre at Fort Pillow, 
 was one of the most highly honored. 
 
 General Curtis of Iowa was put in command, 
 succeeding Halleck. After a brief and stormy 
 career, he was removed in the spring of 1863, 
 and General J. M. Schofield put in his place. 
 Schofield got into trouble at once; there was an 
 irreconcilable hostility and rivalry between the 
 two Union factions in Missouri, and no com- 
 mander could please both sides. 
 
 In July the Missouri State Convention passed 
 an act amending the Constitution, barring slavery 
 after July 4, 1870. That gave great offense to 
 the Radical party, who desired immediate eman- 
 cipation, and political excitement became more 
 intense than ever. In September, an immense 
 mass convention was held in Jefferson City, at 
 which a committee was appointed to visit the 
 President, to obtain a change in the military pol- 
 icy, and other executive action. Likewise a Com- 
 mittee of Public Safety was appointed to organ- 
 ize and arm the loyal men of the State and, fail- 
 ing to interest the President in their behalf, to 
 call on the people in their sovereign capacity to 
 " take such measures of redress as the emergency 
 of the case might require;" in other words, a 
 counter-revolution was proposed. And this 
 committee of one hundred of the leading citizens' 
 of Missouri, headed by Charles D. Drake, later 
 eminent as a U. S. Senator and Chief Judge of 
 the Court of Claims, visited the President, and 
 forcibly stated their demands, having besides the 
 moral courage or impudence to present resolu- 
 tions censuring the President " for closing his 
 ears to the just, loyal, and patriotic demands of 
 the Radical party, while he endorsed the disloyal 
 
120 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and oppressive demands of Governor Gamble, 
 General Schofield and their adherents. " 
 
 The President heard them respectfully and 
 patiently; and on October 5 presented them a 
 letter in which he said : 
 
 We are in civil war. In such cases there always is 
 a main question, but in this case that question is a 
 perplexing compound Union and slavery. It thus 
 becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at 
 least four sides, even among those who are for the 
 Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. 
 Thus, those who are for the Union with, but not 
 without slavery; those for it without, but not with; 
 those for it with or without, but prefer it with; and 
 those for it with or without, but prefer it without. 
 
 Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are 
 for gradual, but not for immediate; and those who are 
 for immediate, but not for gradual extinction of slavery. 
 
 It is easy to conceive that all these shades of ooinion, 
 and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest 
 and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by 
 reason of these differences, each will prefer a different 
 way of sustaining the Union. At once, sincerity is 
 questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war com- 
 ing, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought 
 is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception 
 breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal sus- 
 picion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his 
 neighbor, lest he be killed by him. Revenge and re- 
 taliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be 
 among honest men only. 'But this is not all. Every 
 foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises 
 up. Tnese add crime to confusion. Strong measures 
 deemed indispensable but harsh at best, such men make 
 worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, 
 and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that 
 will best serve for the occasion. 
 
 These causes amply account for what has occurred 
 in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or 
 wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those 
 chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils 
 now complained of were quite as prevalent under Fre- 
 mont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. 
 
MILITARY EMANCIPATION 121 
 
 Accordingly the President sustained General 
 Schofield and Governor Gamble in their respect- 
 ive administrations. The disorder continuing, 
 however, on January 24, 1864, he substituted 
 General Rosecrans for Schofield. This, however, 
 did not end the strife in fact, it continued until 
 the close of the war, and even afterwards. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN 
 
 ALL this while troops were pouring into Wash- 
 ington, where they were organized, equipped, 
 and drilled by General McClellan and his staff of 
 officers with great expedition. The 50,000 soldiers, 
 of whom the " Young Napoleon " took command 
 on July 27, swelled in three months to 168,318, 
 with more troops on the way. Yet by a strange 
 paradox General McClellan became pessimistic 
 in just the ratio of the increase of his army. On 
 taking command he wrote enthusiastically to his 
 wife : " I find myself in a new and strange posi- 
 tion here ; President, Cabinet, General Scott, and 
 all deferring to me. By some strange operation 
 of magic I seem to have become the power in the 
 land." Then he became panic-stricken over the 
 increase of the enemy, acquiring the hallucination 
 that the Confederate forces in Virginia, which 
 were really about one-third his own, greatly out- 
 numbered the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 On August 4 he presented to the President his 
 plan of campaign, which was the same as the 
 " Anaconda " plan of General Scott, already in- 
 dorsed by the Government, except that he 
 would thin the coil which was to surround the 
 .Confederacy in all other parts but where he was 
 
 122 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 123 
 
 in command, which portion he proposed to swell 
 to the enormous aggregate of 273,000 men. 
 
 On August 16 he wrote to his wife : " I am 
 here in a terrible place ; the enemy have from three 
 to four times my force; the President, the old 
 general [Scott] cannot or will not see the true 
 state of affairs . . . [but] Providence is aid- 
 ing me by heavy rains which are swelling the 
 Potomac, which may be impassable for a week; 
 if so, we are saved." 
 
 On September he wrote to War Secretary 
 Cameron demanding that his army be reenforced 
 at once " by all the disposable troops that the East 
 and West and North can furnish," as well as 
 " the whole of the regular army," and the 
 choicest of its officers. So loath was he to act on 
 the offensive until he had what he considered the 
 proper number of troops, that he permitted the 
 enemy unmolested to put their batteries on the 
 Virginia bank of the Potomac, and so to cut off 
 transportation by water to and from the national 
 capital. 
 
 Indeed, the first battle of McClellan's new com- 
 mand occurred not by his intention. On the 
 evening of October 20 Brigadier-General Charles 
 P. Stone sent troops under the command of Colo- 
 nel Edward D. Baker, Lincoln's old comrade, 
 who had resigned from the Senate to enter the 
 army, across the Potomac into Virginia near 
 Leesburg, to make a reconnaissance in force. 
 They met the enemy at Ball's Bluff. Baker was 
 a man of fiery courage, and, though he had orders 
 to retire if advisable, he bravely resisted the 
 enemy's attack, with the result that he was killed 
 while rallying his fleeing troops, and nearly all 
 of his command was captured. 
 
124 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 General Stone was made a scapegoat for the 
 defeat, being incarcerated for six months in Fort 
 Lafayette on the absurd charge of treason. Gen- 
 eral McClellan's prestige was even increased by 
 the disaster, which revealed the prowess of the 
 enemy, and thereby justified the Union com- 
 mander's policy of careful preparation to meet 
 him. 
 
 On November i McClellan's ambition was 
 realized by the retirement of the " old general," 
 Scott, who with Lincoln " could not or would not 
 see the true state of affairs," and by his own ele- 
 vation to the vacant position of chief commander. 
 While General Scott gave his advanced age and 
 physical infirmities as his reason for resigning, 
 the real cause was his indignation at McClellan's 
 treatment of him in " going over his head " to the 
 War Department, and even ignoring his positive 
 orders. McClellan's treatment of his chief had 
 not passed without reproof from the veteran. At 
 a Cabinet meeting held in September, at the head- 
 quarters of General Scott, the President asked 
 what was the number of troops. McClellan, who 
 was present, said he had no reports with him, 
 and did not know. As the meeting was breaking 
 up, General Scott said that he wished to talk to 
 McClellan, and desired the President and Cabinet 
 to remain and hear. McClellan had his hand on 
 the knob of the door, about to leave the room, and 
 seemed very much embarrassed by the situation. 
 Scott then said : 
 
 You are perhaps aware, General McClellan, that you 
 were brought to these headquarters by my advice, and 
 by my orders, after consulting the President. I knew 
 you to be intelligent, and to be possessed of some ex- 
 cellent military qualities, and after our late disaster, 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 125 
 
 it appeared to me that you were a proper person to 
 organize and take active command of the army. I 
 brought you here for that purpose. Many things have 
 been, as I expected they would be, well done, but in 
 some respects I have been disappointed. You do not 
 seem to be aware of your true position, and it was for 
 this reason I desired that the President and these 
 gentlemen should hear what I have to say. You are 
 here upon my staff, to obey my orders, and should daily 
 report to me. This you have failed to do, and you 
 appear to labor under the mistake of supposing that 
 you, and not I, am General-in-Chief, and in command 
 of all the armies. I, more than you, am responsible 
 for military operations, but since you came here, I have 
 been in no condition to give directions, or to advise the 
 President, because my Chief-of-Staff neglects to make 
 reports to me. I cannot answer simple inquiries which 
 the President or any member of his Cabinet makes, as 
 to the number of troops here. They must go to the 
 State department, and not come to military headquarters 
 for that information. 
 
 At a later period the General-in-Chief thus 
 lectured his overweening subaltern. 
 
 You are too intelligent and too good a disci- 
 plinarian not to know your duties and the proprieties 
 of military intercourse. You seem to have misap- 
 prehended your right position. I, you must under- 
 stand, am General-in-Chief; you are my Chief-of- 
 Staff. When I brought you here, you had my confi- 
 dence andfriendship. I do not say you have yet lost 
 my confidence entirely. Good-by, General McClellan. 
 
 But these appeals made no impression, and did 
 not cause any change to occur in McClellan's 
 treatment of the old hero. The general was ap- 
 proaching senility, and McClellan was satisfied 
 that, if he continued his contemptuous neglect and 
 cavalier treatment, the general would ask to be 
 relieved. 
 
 The plan worked to a charm. The old veteran 
 
126 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 had great pride of character; had been conven- 
 tionally honored and affectionately revered by all 
 the juniors, except McClellan, and his tempera- 
 ment and the premonitory symptoms of second 
 childhood made the ingratitude of McClellan 
 especially bitter to his soul. 
 
 Nothing that McClellan did or omitted to do 
 exhibits his character in a more somber shade than 
 this unworthy treatment of General Scott. No 
 other officer of the army, no matter how brusque 
 and unamiable as a rule, failed to entertain and 
 exhibit a profound respect for the grandest mili- 
 tary hero of our history after Washington ; it was 
 a duty incumbent on junior officers to recognize 
 and obey him, and all but McClellan not only 
 did this, but they deemed it a privilege to 
 honor and revere him as well. Now these re- 
 quirements applied with tenfold force to McClel- 
 lan, for Scott had passed by all other officers of 
 the army, of whom there were many in and about 
 Washington at that time, and singled out McClel- 
 lan to achieve the most brilliant destiny of that 
 <era, had he been true. The now attenuated 
 coterie which can still excuse the shortcomings 
 of McClellan's career should not be oblivious to 
 the facts that, at the start, he had the very best 
 wishes and sympathy of Abraham Lincoln, Win- 
 field Scott, Edwin M. Stanton, William D. Kelley 
 and men closely approaching them in character; 
 and that these early realized the methods and ani- 
 mus of McClellan, so that, in less than ninety 
 days from the commencement of his brilliant 
 career, McClellan had lost the support of all those 
 who might be considered above him in power, 
 except Lincoln. By Lincoln's sufferance alone he 
 remained in power a year. Had the matter been 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 127 
 
 left to Scott, Stanton, Lincoln's Cabinet, or the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, McClel- 
 lan's inglorious career would have terminated 
 at least eight months earlier than it did. 
 
 The head of the army, kept indoors by illness 
 and the infirmities of age, chafed vainly at the 
 supercilious and cavalier treatment accorded to 
 him by his ambitious junior. Unable to endure 
 it longer, on the 3ist of October, 1861, Scott 
 took leave of the army. And the President, at- 
 tended by his entire Cabinet, waited on the dis- 
 tinguished patriot, and assured him of the appre- 
 ciation of the Administration of his worth and 
 patriotism, and with reluctance parted with him, 
 and placed him on the retired list of the army. 
 
 My judgment was and is that, if Winfield Scott 
 had been twenty years younger, or if he had not 
 carried about British lead in his body for nearly 
 a half century, or if the gout had left him alone 
 so that his body had been equal to his valor and 
 military prowess, he would have marched into 
 Richmond at the head of a victorious army 
 almost as promptly as he marched in military ar- 
 ray to the City of Mexico. 
 
 McClellan now began to employ the same tac- 
 tics with the " obstructionist " who still remained 
 his superior President Lincoln. Lincoln had 
 great faith in the young general, and a friendly 
 regard that even promised to develop into affec- 
 tion. He personally called at McClellan's head- 
 quarters a number of times early in November, 
 and placed himself at the General's service. 
 These visits were abruptly terminated by the 
 rudeness of McClellan, who, returning one even- 
 ing to his house and finding that the President 
 was waiting for him in the drawing-room, 
 
128 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 slipped upstairs and went to bed. On another 
 occasion McClellan failed to appear at a confer- 
 ence arranged between the President, McClellan, 
 General O. M. Mitchel, and Governor Dennison, 
 of Ohio. As reported by General Mitchel's son 
 and aide, F. A. Mitchel, either General Mitchel 
 or Governor Dennison commented upon the dis- 
 respect shown to the President by McClellan 
 absenting himself, whereupon Lincoln remarked. 
 " Never mind ; I will hold McClellan's horse if 
 he will only bring us success." 
 
 While the President refrained for a time from 
 further personal visits upon General McClellan, 
 he continued to offer him suggestions by letter. 
 Early in December he did so in the form of 
 hypothetical inquiries about a forward movement 
 of the Army of the Potomac by the road from 
 Alexandria to Richmond, to which McClellan 
 contemptuously responded with studied brevity 
 and restraint of confidence, saying : " I have now 
 my mind actively turned toward another plan of 
 campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by 
 the enemy nor by many of our own people." 
 
 This forward movement was further delayed 
 by McClellan's illness about the beginning of the 
 year. Because of this inaction the President was 
 greatly cast down. 
 
 General Irvin McDowell has described this 
 despondent condition of the President in a memo- 
 randum of a visit he made him on January 10, 
 1862. This account was submitted to the Presi- 
 dent in 1864 by Henry J. Raymond, who desired 
 to use it in his " Life of Abraham Lincoln." The 
 President indorsed upon it : " See nothing for me 
 to object to in the narrative . . . except the 
 phrase attributed to me of the Jacobinism of 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 129 
 
 Congress, which phrase I do not remember using 
 literally or in substance, and which I wish not to 
 be published in any event." 
 
 General McDowell's account is in part as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 Repaired to the President's house at eight o'clock 
 P.M. Found the President alone. Soon after, we were 
 joined by Brigadier-General Franklin, the Secretary of 
 State, Governor Seward, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 and the Assistant Secretary of War [Thomas A. Scott]. 
 The President was greatly disturbed at the state of 
 affairs. Spoke of the exhausted condition of the Treas- 
 ury; of the loss of public credit; of the Jacobinism in 
 Congress ; of the delicate condition of our foreign 
 relations ; of the bad news he had received from the 
 West, particularly as contained in a letter from Gen- 
 eral Halleck on the state of affairs in Missouri ; of 
 the want of cooperation between General Halleck and 
 General Buell; but, more than all, the sickness of 
 General McClellan. 
 
 The President said he was in great distress, and, 
 as he had been to General McClellan's house, and the 
 General did not ask to see him, and as he must talk 
 to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and 
 myself, to obtain our opinion as to the possibility of 
 soon commencing active operations with the army of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 To use his own expression, if something was not 
 soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole 
 affair ; and if General McClellan did not want to use 
 the army he would like to " borrow it" provided he 
 could see how it could be made to do something. 
 
 As a result of this consultation, and of suc- 
 ceeding conferences at which General McClellan, 
 who had recovered from his illness, and other 
 officers were present, and in connection with his 
 study night and day of strategical works and re- 
 ports of the military situation, Mr. Lincoln issued 
 the 
 
I 3 
 
 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. I. 
 JANUARY 27, 1862. 
 
 Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be 
 the day for a general movement of all the land and 
 naval forces of the United States against the insurgent 
 forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress 
 Monroe ; the Army of the Potomac ; the Army of 
 Western Virginia ; the army near Munfordville, Ky. ; 
 the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in 
 the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 
 
 That all other forces, both land and naval, with their 
 respective commanders, obey existing orders for the 
 time, and be ready to obey additional orders when 
 duly given. 
 
 That the heads of departments, and especially the 
 Secretaries of War and of the Navy with all their 
 subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other 
 commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, 
 will severally be held to their strict and full responsi- 
 bilities for prompt execution of this order. 
 
 Taken in connection with the recent appoint- 
 ment of a man of proved executive ability as Sec- 
 retary of War, this assumption of military leader- 
 ship by the President inspired new hope in the 
 country and filled the soldiers of the field, impa- 
 tient for advance, with high enthusiasm. 
 
 Three days later this was supplemented by 
 the 
 
 PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. i. 
 JANUARY 31, 1862. 
 
 Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army 
 of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense 
 of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the 
 immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon 
 the railroad southwestward of what is known as 
 Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion 
 of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move 
 before or on the 22d day of February next. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 131 
 
 This special order was in direct conflict with 
 General McClellan's plan. Accordingly, on Feb- 
 ruary 3, the President wrote him the following 
 letter : 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: v ou and I have distinct and different 
 plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac 
 yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahan- 
 nock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the 
 railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a 
 point on the railroads southwest of Manassas. 
 
 If you will give me satisfactory answers to the fol- 
 lowing questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to 
 yours : 
 
 First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger 
 expenditure of time and money than mine? 
 
 Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your 
 plan than mine? 
 
 Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your 
 plan than mine? 
 
 Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, 
 that it would break no great line of the enemy's com- 
 munications, while mine would? 
 
 Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more 
 difficult by your plan than mine? 
 
 In reply General McClellan, with his exag- 
 gerated view of the enemy's strength, vehemently 
 opposed attacking him at Manassas with its 
 " strong line of defense enabling him to remain 
 on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, 
 while he concentrates everything on the other for 
 a decisive action." Instead he urged the ad- 
 vantages of his own plan, whereby he expected 
 to cut off the enemy in detail, take Richmond, 
 and end the war. 
 
 By direction of the President, General McClel- 
 lan called a council of war of twelve general 
 officers, who voted 8 to 4 in favor of McClellan's 
 plan. Accordingly the President abandoned his 
 
I 3 2 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 plan and set heartily to work promoting the exe- 
 cution of McClellan's. 
 
 Congress, as indicated by the protest of its 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the 
 country in general, which had come to distrust 
 its former military hero, " the young Napoleon," 
 for his inaction, were greatly displeased and dis- 
 heartened by the President's relinquishment of 
 the helm of military policy he had seized with so 
 vigorous a hand, especially since his " Plan of 
 Campaign" (see p. 195) had already resulted in 
 signal victories. 
 
 The descent upon the Atlantic coast was in- 
 augurated by the expedition of Flag-Officer Silas 
 H. Stringham and Major-General Butler against 
 Forts Hatteras and Clark commanding Hatteras 
 Inlet, the main entrance to Albemarle and 
 Pamlico Sounds off the coast of North Carolina. 
 These forts were surrendered on August 29, to 
 the great joy of Union men not only in the North 
 but in North Carolina. At the suggestion of 
 the President a meeting was held in New York 
 early in November to take measures to relieve the 
 loyalists of Hatteras who had suffered by the 
 blockade. George Bancroft, the distinguished 
 historian and statesman, presided at the meeting. 
 He reported its action to the President on Novem- 
 ber 15, in a letter which closed with the following 
 paragraph : 
 
 Your administration has fallen upon times which will 
 be remembered as long as human events find a record. 
 I sincerely wish to you the glory of perfect success. 
 Civil War is the instrument of Divine Providence to 
 root out social slavery. Posterity will not be satisfied 
 with the result unless the consequences of the war shall 
 effect an increase of free States. This is the universal 
 expectation and hope of men of all parties. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 133 
 
 To this Lincoln replied on the i8th : 
 
 The main thought in the closing paragraph of your 
 letter is one which does not escape my attention, and 
 with which I must deal in all due caution and with 
 the best judgment I can bring to it. 
 
 On October 29 an expeditipn under Captain 
 Samuel F. DuPont and General Thomas W. 
 Sherman sailed from Fortress Monroe against 
 Port Royal, S. C, a harbor between Charleston 
 and Savannah, commanded by Forts Beauregard 
 and Walker. These forts were captured on 
 November 7, and with them fell into Federal 
 possession, to quote from General Sherman's 
 report, " the whole coast from the North Edisto 
 to Warsaw Sound," and " a network of waters, 
 an inland water communication, running all the 
 way from Charleston to Savannah." 
 
 On January 7 General McClellan gave General 
 Ambrose E. Burnside command of the newly 
 created Department of North Carolina. Acting 
 in conjunction with a fleet of twenty vessels 
 under Lieutenant Louis M. Goldsborough, on 
 February 8 Burnside captured Roanoke Island 
 which, dividing Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, 
 commanded both of these inland waters. Five 
 forts, 32 guns, 300 stands of arms, and 2,700 men 
 were taken. Two days later the entire Con- 
 federate fleet in North Carolina waters was 
 destroyed near Elizabeth City. Thereafter the 
 fortified places on the North Carolina coast were 
 reduced one by one New Berne on March 14, 
 and Beaufort on April 26, being the most con- 
 siderable conquests. An advance from the coast 
 on Goldsboro, which commanded the railroad 
 running southward from Richmond, was contem- 
 
LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 plated, but abandoned in July, when the disasters 
 of McClellan in Virginia forced him to call Burn- 
 side's troops to his aid. 
 
 During the month of March a combined mili- 
 tary and naval expedition under Flag-Officer 
 Samuel F. DuPont and General H. G. Wright, 
 operating from Port Royal, occupied all the At- 
 lantic coast from that harbor south to St. Augus- 
 tine. 
 
 Appalling disaster, however, was threatened in 
 Virginia waters. In the destruction of the Gos- 
 port Navy Yard at Norfolk, Va., the United 
 States steam-frigate Merrimac had been burned 
 and sunk. The Confederates raised the hull, 
 which, together with her engines, was found to 
 be capable of restoration, and converted her, at 
 the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, into an 
 ironclad with a heavy ram, which they named 
 the Virginia. At noon, on Saturday, March 8, 
 she steamed out of the James River accompanied 
 by five armed vessels, two steam tugs and three 
 side-wheel steamers, into Hampton Roads. 
 Three United States wooden frigates, the Minne- 
 sota, St. Lawrence, and Roanoke, lying at For- 
 tress Monroe, went out to meet her, but were 
 grounded, owing to unusually low water. Two 
 other wooden frigates, the sailing vessel Con- 
 gress, and the Cumberland, at Newport News, 
 remained to give battle. They proceeded bravely 
 against the steel-scaled and steel-nosed leviathan 
 with no hope of victory. The Virginia met the 
 Cumberland first, rammed her, and, as she was 
 sinking, poured into her wooden hull a hail of 
 iron metal. The devoted vessel answered broad- 
 side with broadside until the last gun was sub- 
 merged, and ship and crew sank beneath the 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 135 
 
 waves. With her iron ram torn off in the en- 
 counter, and two guns put out of action, the Vir- 
 ginia then attacked the Congress. Knowing that 
 her comrade's fate awaited her if she resisted, 
 the Union vessel ran ashore where the Confed- 
 erate destroyer could not follow. Nevertheless 
 the Virginia was able to reach her with her guns, 
 which soon silenced those of the Congress and 
 forced her to surrender. The Union vessel caught 
 fire, which reached the magazine, causing an ex- 
 plosion which destroyed her. The Virginia and 
 her consorts anchored for the night under protec- 
 tion of the Rebel shore-batteries at Sewell's Point, 
 the head of the Norfolk channel. During the 
 night tugs managed to pull the St. Lawrence and 
 Roanoke off the shoals, and take them back to 
 Fortress Monroe. But the Minnesota could not 
 be moved, and remained awaiting her fate on the 
 morrow. 
 
 The Cabinet at Washington met early next 
 morning in utter despair of saving the seaboard 
 cities of the Union. To prevent the approach 
 of the impenetrable war-monster to Washington, 
 orders were given to sink loaded canal-boats in 
 the Potomac channel. Yet so little time remained 
 for this measure that Secretary Stanton pre- 
 dicted that that very Cabinet meeting might be 
 terminated by a shell fired into the room from the 
 Virginia. 
 
 However, the salvation of the Union had al- 
 ready been assured by the provident policy of the 
 President and his faithful and efficient Secretary 
 of the Navy, Gideon Welles, upon whose recom- 
 mendations the special session of Congress had 
 appropriated $1,500,000 for experiment in con- 
 structing the best possible form of the ironclad, 
 
136 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 which naval experts foresaw was the coming type 
 of war-vessel. The board of officers to whom 
 the matter was intrusted had decided upon a ves- 
 sel " invulnerable to shot, and of light draught," 
 had adopted three plans of such an iron-clad, and 
 had ordered a vessel to be constructed in accord- 
 ance with each plan. One vessel, that according 
 to the plan of John Ericsson, of New York, an in- 
 ventor, of Swedish birth, had been completed, and 
 was on her way to Hampton Roads, at the time of 
 the destruction of the Cumberland and Congress. 
 She arrived in tow on Saturday night under com- 
 mand of Lieutenant John L. Worden, and took 
 her station near the grounded Minnesota. 
 
 The Monitor, as the new invention was 
 modestly named, was 127 feet over all, 36 feet in 
 beam, and 12 feet draught, and with closed deck 
 rising but a few feet above the water-line. She 
 was symmetrically shaped fore and aft, each end 
 terminating in a steel point for ramming. In the 
 center rose a cylindrical turret nine feet high 
 and twenty feet in diameter, which revolved, 
 enabling the two n-inch Dahlgren guns it car- 
 ried upon one side to be wheeled around after 
 firing and recharged in safety in the lee of the 
 storm of war. The term popularly applied to it, 
 " a cheesebox on a raft " very aptly describes its 
 appearance. 
 
 The Virginia was four times the Monitor in 
 bulk and displacement, and had five times the 
 number of guns. When on Sunday morning the 
 two iron-clads approached each other to give 
 battle the contrast presented was that of a giant 
 and pygmy, an inevitable comparison which ap- 
 peared in all reports of the battle. The duel 
 lasted three hours; while the fire of each was 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 137 
 
 comparatively ineffective, the lighter draught and 
 greater mobility of the little Monitor enabled 
 her to tire out her big antagonist in a contest of 
 endurance, and the Virginia, leaking badly, at 
 last was forced to retire. 
 
 This was the last battle of the Virginia. When 
 the Confederates abandoned Norfolk on May 10, 
 1862, as the result of the evacuation of Yorktown 
 on May 3, they burned the Gosport Navy Yard, 
 and also beached and blew up the Virginia on 
 May ii. It was also the Monitor's last battle. In 
 December, 1862, while being towed around Cape 
 Hatteras by the Rhode Island to join in the con- 
 quest of the Southern coast, she foundered in a 
 gale, her crew, however, having been transferred 
 before she sank to the Rhode Island. She was 
 commemorated in the most fitting of monuments 
 the creation of a fleet of ironclads built after 
 her model and bearing her name as a generic 
 designation. 
 
 On the day preceding the battle of the Virginia 
 and Monitor, the President had issued two gen- 
 eral war orders, Nos. 2 and 3. No. 2 divided that 
 part of the Army of the Potomac intended to ad- 
 vance upon Richmond into four army corps, com- 
 manded respectively by Major-General Irvin 
 McDowell and Brigadier-Generals E. V. Sumner, 
 S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes, and pro- 
 vided that a reserve be left for the defense of 
 Washington under Brigadier-General James S. 
 Wadsworth. It also ordered the formation of a 
 fifth army corps from the troops of Brigadier- 
 General Shields and Major-General Nathaniel P. 
 Banks in the Shenandoah Valley and placed 
 General Banks in its command. Order No. 3 
 gave more specific directions for the defense 
 
138 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 of the capital, and the capture of the enemy's 
 batteries upon the Potomac between Washington 
 and Chesapeake Bay. Special War Order No. 
 3 was issued by the President on March n. It 
 relieved General McClellan from chief command 
 of all the armies, retaining him only as the head 
 of the Army of the Potomac. It consolidated 
 the commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter 
 and the western part of Buell's into the 
 Department of the Mississippi, under Halleck. 
 It created a third department out of the eastern 
 part of Buell's command and West Virginia, 
 which was designated as the Mountain Depart- 
 ment, and was placed under the command of 
 Major-General Fremont. 
 
 In most leisurely fashion McClellan conducted 
 through April the siege of Yorktown, the first 
 place to be reduced in his plan of campaign 
 against Richmond. He refused to be hurried by 
 the Government at Washington, which was ex- 
 ceedingly anxious that no time should be per- 
 mitted the enemy to concentrate^ its forces against 
 him. Instead, he clamored for reinforcements. 
 In reply, President Lincoln wrote him on April 
 9, stating that the troops left to defend Washing- 
 ton were already reduced below the limit of 
 safety, and questioning McClellan's low estimate 
 of the strength of his forces. The letter closed 
 as follows : 
 
 I suppose the whole force which has gone forward 
 to you is with you by this time ; and if so, I think 
 it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay 
 the enemy will relatively gain upon you that is, he 
 will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements 
 than you can by reinforcements alone. 
 
 And once more let me tell you it is indispensable 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 139 
 
 to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help 
 this. You will do me the justice to remember I always 
 insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, 
 instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only 
 shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would 
 find the same enemy and the same or equal intrench- 
 ments at either place. The country will not fail to 
 note is noting now that the present hesitation to 
 move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of 
 Manassas repeated. 
 
 I beg to assure you that I have never written you 
 or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than 
 now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so- 
 far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can; 
 but you must act. 
 
 During the first two weeks of April General 
 McClellan delayed storming Yorktown, although, 
 according to the testimony of its Confederate 
 commander, Major-General John B. Magruder, 
 it could easily have been captured. On April 17 
 General Joseph E, Johnston took command of 
 the Confederate forces, 53,000 strong as opposed 
 to 133,000 Federal troops investing Yorktown. 
 Valuing every day's delay, he determined to hold 
 the place until McClellan should at last feel him- 
 self strong enough to assail it, and then retire be- 
 fore the overwhelming numbers. On May 3, 
 finding that McClellan's batteries were ready to 
 open on him, Johnston evacuated Yorktown with 
 his forces. McClellan on the 4th telegraphed to 
 Washington of his " victory." 
 
 The President and Secretaries Chase and Stan- 
 ton determined to visit the seat of war and ob- 
 serve conditions for themselves. They arrived at 
 Fortress Monroe on May 6. By the President's 
 orders the fleet made an attack on May 8 upon 
 the Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point, dur- 
 ing which the President and his party saw the 
 
I 4 o LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Virginia retire before the approach of the Moni- 
 tor. It was observed that Sewell's Point, de- 
 fended by the ironclad, was too strong to be 
 taken. 
 
 The President, after talking with the pilot and 
 studying a chart of the waters, selected a place 
 where a landing might be made, and here on May 
 10 General Wool debarked with 6,000 men, and 
 marched upon Norfolk. This precipitated the 
 evacuation of both Sewell's Point and Norfolk, 
 and the destruction of the Virginia, which the 
 Confederates had already determined upon when 
 Yorktown fell. Secretary Chase, who was with 
 Wool, received the surrender of Norfolk, and the 
 President and Stanton next day visited the cap- 
 tured town, passing the ruined hulk of the Vir- 
 ginia on the way. " So," wrote Chase, with 
 excusable extravagance to his daughter, " has 
 ended a brilliant week's campaign of the Presi- 
 dent; for I think it quite certain that if he had 
 not come down, Norfolk would still have been in 
 possession of the enemy, and the Merrimac as 
 grim and defiant and as much a terror as ever. 
 The whole coast is now virtually ours." 
 
 McClellan was caught napping by John- 
 ston's sudden retreat from Yorktown, and there 
 was much confusion in the pursuit. While 
 McClellan remained at Yorktown preparing an 
 advance on Richmond up the James River, Gen- 
 eral Joseph Hooker came upon the Confederate 
 rear-guard under General James Longstreet at 
 Williamsburg, and hotly engaged him during the 
 forenoon of May 5. Owing to an entire lack of 
 support, Hooker was beaten back. In the after- 
 noon General Winfield S. Hancock regained the 
 lost ground ; this General McClellan, who arrived 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 141 
 
 late in the day, was satisfied to hold, fearing the 
 " superior force " of the enemy. Accordingly, 
 Johnston reached Richmond in good order on the 
 1 7th, and occupied the strong intrenchmetits be- 
 fore that city. 
 
 McClellan protested vigorously to the Govern- 
 ment against the organization of the army as 
 determined by the President in the General War 
 Order No. 2, ascribing to it the lack of success 
 in the Williamsburg engagement. In reply the 
 President, who was still at Fortress Monroe, sent 
 an order authorizing him to adopt the organiza- 
 tion he desired, but accompanied it with a private 
 letter of frank criticism : 
 
 I ordered the army corps organization not only on 
 the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom 
 you had selected and assigned as generals of division, 
 but also on the unanimous opinion of every military 
 man I could get an opinion from (and every modern 
 military book), yourself only excepted. Of course I 
 did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the 
 subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know 
 how your struggle against it is received in quarters 
 which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon 
 as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to 
 persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had 
 no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The 
 commanders of these corps are of course the three 
 highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that 
 you have no consultation or communication with them ; 
 that you consult and communicate with nobody but 
 General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. 
 I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at 
 all events it is proper you should know of their exist- 
 ence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your 
 orders in anything? 
 
 When you relieved General Hamilton of his com- 
 mand the other day, you thereby lost the confidence 
 of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And 
 here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, 
 
I 4 2 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 that senators and representatives speak of me in their 
 places as they please without question, and that officers 
 of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to 
 them for taking no greater liberty with them. 
 
 But 'to return. Are you strong enough are you 
 strong enough, even with my help to set your foot 
 upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes 
 all at once? This is a practical and very serious ques- 
 tion for you. 
 
 The success of your army and the cause of the coun- 
 try are the same, and of course I only desire the good 
 of the cause. 
 
 McClellan at once proved the truth of the 
 President's criticism that he made favorites of 
 Porter and Franklin by reforming the army into 
 two provisional corps and placing these officers in 
 command. At the earnest request of McClellan 
 for reinforcements, the President, who was now 
 back in Washington, ordered General McDowell 
 to march upon Richmond with 35,000 or 40,000 
 men by the shortest route. " McDowell," wrote 
 Secretary Stanton to McClellan on May 18, " is 
 sent forward to cooperate in the reduction of 
 Richmond, but charged in attempting this not to 
 uncover the city of Washington; and you will 
 give no order, either before or after your con- 
 junction, which can put him out of position to 
 cover this city." 
 
 However, General McDowell and his troops 
 were forced to be retained where they were 
 owing to circumstances that are indicated in the 
 following telegram of May 24 to General Halleck 
 who, like McClellan, was crying for reenforce- 
 ments : 
 
 Several dispatches from Assistant Secretary Scott 
 and one from Governor Morton asking reinforcements 
 for you have been received. I beg you to be assured 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 143 
 
 we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when 
 I tell you each of our commanders along our line from 
 Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted 
 by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure 
 we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yes- 
 terday it was broken at heavy loss to us, and General 
 Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet 
 extricated, and may be actually captured. We need 
 men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. 
 My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on 
 you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with 
 you can and will get the victory at Corinth. 
 
 On the same day the President telegraphed 
 McDowell at Fredericksburg to move with 20,000 
 men for the Shenandoah for the purpose of cap- 
 turing Jackson and Ewell, who was at that mo- 
 ment fighting Banks near Winchester. General 
 McDowell obeyed the order with alacrity, at 
 which the President expressed by telegraph his 
 gratification, saying: "The change (of plans) 
 was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you 
 or to anyone." 
 
 On the following day, with shrewd inference 
 of what is now known to have been the real situa- 
 tion at Richmond, the President telegraphed to 
 McClellan : 
 
 The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to 
 drive General Banks before him precisely in what 
 force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg 
 and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both 
 north and south in precisely what force we cannot tell. 
 I think the movement is a general and concerted one, 
 such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose 
 of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the 
 time is near when you must either attack Richmond 
 or give up the job and come to the defense of Wash- 
 ington. Let me hear from you instantly. 
 
 Later in the day the President telegraphed 
 
144 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 McClellan more detailed information : that Banks, 
 weakened by the detail of a part of his forces 
 for the march on Richmond, was retreating 
 in probable rout to Martinsburg; and that two 
 other Confederate forces of 10,000 each, one of 
 them led by Stonewall Jackson, were pressing for- 
 ward in the same direction. " Stripped bare, as 
 we are here," said the President, " it will be all 
 we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac 
 at Harper's Ferry or above." McDowell and 
 Fremont, he continued, were moving to get in 
 the enemy's rear. " If McDowell's force," his 
 telegram concluded, " was now beyond our reach 
 we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of 
 something like this, and no unwillingness to sus- 
 tain you, had always been my reason for with- 
 holding McDowell's force from you. Please 
 understand this and do the best you can with the 
 force you have." 
 
 On May 21 forces under General McClellan 
 had arrived at the Chickahominy about ten miles 
 east of Richmond, and McClellan set to work 
 with energy and enthusiasm to solve the difficult 
 engineering problem of quickly bridging a river 
 which had a swamp on either bank, and was liable 
 to sudden freshets. The work was completed in 
 little more than a week, and on the 3Oth Johnston 
 was informed that two of McClellan's original 
 five army corps had crossed the river. The Con- 
 federate* general resolved to attack them next 
 morning. A heavy rainstorm in the night, which 
 he hoped would prevent the crossing of more Fed- 
 eral troops, encouraged him in the project. One 
 of the Federal divisions was at Seven Pines on 
 the left (east) and the other at Fair Oaks on the 
 right (west). By night Johnston had driven 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 145 
 
 back the left division toward the river. The 
 right, however, retained its position, having been 
 reenforced by General Sumner from the opposite 
 bank, who with soldierly promptitude, as soon as 
 he heard firing, had anticipated in his prepara- 
 tions the order to cross the river, and, marching 
 his men over a bridge that was on the point of 
 sweeping away, and through thick mud, had 
 come in the nick of time to the rescue. On June 
 i the battle was renewed with General Robert E. 
 Lee in Confederate command, General Johnston 
 having been severely wounded in the first day's 
 battle. The Federal right regained its position. 
 At two o'clock in the afternoon Lee stopped his 
 attack, and at night withdrew his disheartened 
 troops to Richmond. 
 
 Increasing rain prevented further Federal 
 troops from crossing the river, and both divisions 
 employed themselves intrenching. General Lee 
 set to work to organize and reenforce his army 
 for the desperate conflict which he saw before 
 him. 
 
 In the meanwhile the President was arduously 
 engaged in the active duties of Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Army, which had devolved upon him 
 after General McClellan's reduction from the 
 general command. His particular concern was 
 the critical situation in the Shenandoah Valley, 
 the danger of which he and Secretary Stanton 
 seemed alone to realize. Even the officers in the 
 field lightly regarded the Confederate movement 
 down the valley. McDowell, whom the President 
 ordered to strike eastward from Fredericksburg 
 and follow after Jackson, thought that, by the 
 time he reached the valley, the enemy would have 
 retired. Nevertheless he was prompt in sending 
 
i 4 6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 on the mission a detachment under Brigadier- 
 General James Shields, Lincoln's old-time antag- 
 onist in his one " affair of honor," who had 
 proved himself in the Mexican War a soldier of 
 courage and ability. Shields was even con- 
 temptuous of his task, boasting that he could 
 thrash Jackson without assistance and asking 
 disrespectfully if he could do anything else for 
 the President. 
 
 On the 3Oth of May Shields was at the place 
 appointed, Fort Royal, in advance of the time 
 set, ready to intercept Jackson, whose advance 
 had been blocked at Harper's Ferry, if he should 
 retreat in that direction. It was Fremont, who 
 had been ordered to block the other possible line 
 of Jackson's retreat, that failed to appear at his 
 station, which was Harrisonburg in the Shenan- 
 doah Valley. Indeed, believing that Jackson 
 would remain before Harper's Ferry, he deliber- 
 ately disobeyed instructions, and proceeded north 
 by the more convenient valley to the west of the 
 Shenandoah Mountains. When this action was 
 discovered at Washington, there was still time for 
 him to intercept Jackson, who had not yet begun 
 his retreat, lower down the valley at Strasburg, 
 and the President ordered him to do so. Still 
 acting upon his own judgment, Fremont gave his 
 troops an entire day of rest, and, in consequence, 
 arrived at Strasburg just after Jackson's rear- 
 guard had passed through it in retreat. Had 
 Fremont occupied the place the day before, Jack- 
 son would have been caught between three 
 commands each equal in size to his own: Fre- 
 mont's in front, the pursuing column of Banks, 
 and Shields's detachment twelve miles to the east. 
 A few weeks after this (on June 26) the Army of 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 147 
 
 Virginia was* formed from the commands of Fre- 
 mont, Banks, and McDowell, and placed under 
 General John Pope. Fremont refused to serve 
 under one who had been his subordinate (when 
 he commanded the Department of the West), and 
 was relieved from duty. 
 
 In place of Shields's division, which had been 
 put " terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and 
 out at toes," by the campaign against Jackson, 
 as Lincoln wrote McClellan on June 15, the 
 President sent the importunate commander of the 
 Army of the Potomac 10,000 new recruits, and 
 as many more old troops from Fortress Monroe, 
 where General Wool was replaced by General 
 John A. Dix. " Doubtless," wrote Mr. Lincoln, 
 " the battles and other causes have decreased 
 you half as much in the same time ; but then the 
 enemy have lost as many in the same way. I 
 believe I would come and see you were it not 
 that I fear my presence might divert you and the 
 army from more important matters." 
 
 On the 1 8th the President telegraphed Mc- 
 Clellan the report that Lee had sent 10,000 to 
 15,000 reinforcements to Jackson. " This," said 
 he, " is as good as a reinforcement to you of an 
 equal force." He asked McClellan what day he 
 could attack Richmond. McClellan promptly 
 replied that the army were about to advance at 
 once, and that this would undoubtedly bring on a 
 general engagement, since " the enemy exhibit 
 at every point a readiness to meet us. They 
 certainly have great numbers and extensive 
 works," he added; and he drew an inference 
 directly contrary to the President's hopeful de- 
 duction from the fact of Jackson's reenforce- 
 ment, saying that it illustrated Lee's strength and 
 
148 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 confidence. Lincoln replied on the iQth, giving 
 another alternative to McClellan's deduction: 
 
 If large reenforcements are going from Richmond 
 to Jackson, it proves one of two things : either that they 
 are very strong at Richmond, or do not mean to defend 
 the place desperately. 
 
 McClellan soon learned that Jackson was coin- 
 ing to the aid of Lee rather than lessening Lee's 
 forces, and foregoing his former logic, and ac- 
 cepting Lincoln's, he clamored even more loudly 
 than before for reenforcements. To this appeal 
 the President replied on June 26 : 
 
 Your dispatch suggesting the probability of your be- 
 ing overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the 
 responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give 
 you all I can, and act on the presumption that you 
 will do the best you can with what you have, while 
 you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I 
 could give you more if I would. I have omitted and 
 shall omit no opportunity to send you reenforcements 
 whenever I possibly can. 
 
 The Federal army had now advanced within 
 four miles of Richmond. On the afternoon of the 
 26th the Confederates made a desperate attack 
 on the Union position at Beaver Dam Creek, held 
 by Porter, and were repulsed with great loss. 
 As Longstreet, one of the Confederate command- 
 ers testified, they were thoroughly demoralized. 
 Yet McClellan abandoned this strong position, 
 which could easily have been further strength- 
 ened by reenforcements, and ordered Porter to 
 retire to a more protected place, where McClellan 
 evidently considered reenforcements were not 
 needed, for, on the morrow, when Porter was 
 again attacked by almost the entire Southern 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 149 
 
 army, he sent no troops to his aid until late in 
 the day, when he ordered Slocum's division to 
 support him. This was the Battle of Gaines's 
 Mill, or the Chickahominy. Lee commanded his 
 army in person. Porter, thinking that the pur- 
 pose of his chief was to enter Richmond with 
 the rest of his troops while the enemy was thus 
 engaged, fought the unequal contest bravely and 
 serenely, and at nightfall retired in good order, 
 having inflicted a loss equal to his own on the 
 enemy. 
 
 But McClellan was deterred from his march to 
 Richmond by the demonstration made against 
 him by Magruder with a comparatively small 
 force, which the apprehension of McClellan mag- 
 nified into a greater one than that attacking 
 Porter. Accordingly he changed his base to the 
 James, to approach the Confederate capital from 
 that quarter. On the 29th Sumner repulsed Ma- 
 gruder at Allen's Farm, and, later in the day, he 
 and Franklin completely defeated him at Savage's 
 Station, opening the way for a direct advance on 
 Richmond, but they were compelled to fall back 
 by McClellan's orders. Again the golden oppor- 
 tunity was lost, when on the next day Franklin 
 held his position at Glendale against a fierce at- 
 tack by Longstreet and A. P. Hill, for if the 
 Union forces had been concentrated here, in the 
 opinion of military strategists, Richmond must 
 have fallen. 
 
 On July i came the general engagement to 
 which events had been leading. Lee, inferring 
 from its successive retirements from strong posi- 
 tions that his enemy was demoralized, drove the 
 whole force of his army in charge after charge 
 upon the strong position of the Union army on 
 
'50 
 
 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Malvern Hill, without effect and with fearful 
 loss to himself. It would have been an easy 
 matter for McClellan on the morrow to have put 
 to rout the broken enemy, but, persisting in his 
 view of the superior force of Lee, he gave the 
 order instead to retire to Harrison's Landing on 
 the James, where supplies could be readily landed 
 for a siege of the city. 
 
 On the day after the battle of Gaines's Mill 
 McClellan wrote a bitter letter to Secretary 
 Stanton, casting the blame upon the Government. 
 It closed as follows : 
 
 I only wish to say to the President that I think he 
 is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said 
 that my force was too weak. ... I know that a few 
 thousand more men would have changed this battle 
 from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government 
 must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. 
 I feel too earnestly to-night ; I have seen too many dead 
 and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the 
 Government has not sustained this army. If you do not 
 do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I 
 tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any 
 other persons in Washington. You have done your 
 best to sacrifice this army. 
 
 Recognizing the sincerity of this letter, the 
 President overlooked its insolence and insubor- 
 dination. He answered it, promising to send re- 
 enforcements as rapidly as possible. He said : 
 
 I have not said you were ungenerous for saying 
 you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungen- 
 erous in assuming that I did not send them as fast 
 as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your 
 army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you 
 have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price 
 we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We 
 protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on 
 you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 151 
 
 been upon us before the troops could have gotten to 
 you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reen- 
 forcements were leaving Richmond to come in front 
 of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you 
 nor the Government are to blame. 
 
 On the same day the President telegraphed to 
 Halleck to send 25,000 of his troops by the near- 
 est route to Richmond. Burnside in North Car- 
 olina was also ordered to contribute all ,the troops 
 he could spare without abandoning his position, 
 and as a result was forced to give up his expedi- 
 tion against Goldsboro, the important railroad 
 centre, on the eve of almost certain success. At 
 the same time Lincoln wrote to Secretary Seward 
 his view of the situation, taking that shrewd polit- 
 ical counselor into confidence upon the raising 
 of more troops, a matter which required the 
 greatest discretion : 
 
 The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the 
 flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy 
 to concentrate too much force in Richmond for Mc- 
 Clellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon 
 will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But 
 if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the 
 enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force 
 from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large 
 part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, 
 they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, 
 Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is 
 to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, 
 and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without 
 more. A reasonable force should in every event be 
 kept about Washington for its protection. Then let 
 the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in 
 the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan 
 directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without 
 endangering any other place which we now hold, and 
 . will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain 
 this contest until successful, or till I die, or am con- 
 
152 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 quered, or my term expires, or Congress or the coun- 
 try forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the 
 country for this new force were it not that I fear a 
 general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is 
 to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the 
 new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, princi- 
 pally because such can be raised most cheaply and 
 quickly. 
 
 On June 30 the President solved the question 
 of calling for more soldiers without causing a 
 panic by getting the loyal State Governors to sign 
 a request that more troops be raised, the request 
 being dated back a few days. In accordance with 
 this " spontaneous demand," on July i, the Presi- 
 dent called for 300,000 troops three times the 
 number he had suggested to Secretary Seward 
 as sufficient assigning to each State its quota. 
 On the 2d he wrote General McClellan in answer 
 to his insistent demand for 50,000 reenforce- 
 ments to be sent him at once, to be patient, 
 hold his position, and wait for the new levy. On 
 the 3d he offered to all the Governors a reduc- 
 tion in their quota if they hurried forward enough 
 troops to sum up 50,000, which he believed to be 
 sufficient reinforcements to end the war sub- 
 stantially in two weeks. 
 
 General McClellan had for some time been 
 preparing a statement of his " general views con- 
 cerning the existing state of the rebellion," which, 
 he confessed, did not " strictly come within the 
 scope of his official duties." This, on July 7, he 
 laid before the President. In the course of this 
 lecture on executive policy he said : 
 
 A declaration of radical views, especially upon slav- 
 ery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The 
 policy of the Government must be supported by concen- 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 153 
 
 trations of military power. The national forces should 
 not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, 
 and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected 
 into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of 
 the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly de- 
 feated, the political structure which they support would 
 soon cease to exist. 
 
 In carrying out any system of policy which you may 
 form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the 
 army; one who possesses your confidence, understands 
 your views, and who is competent to execute your 
 orders by directing the military forces of the nation 
 to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. 
 I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to 
 serve you in such position as you may assign me, 
 and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served 
 superior. 
 
 I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope 
 forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter 
 with sincerity towards you and from love for my 
 country. 
 
 On July 8 tHe President visited General Mc- 
 Clellan at his headquarters before Richmond, and 
 catechised him and his corps commanders most 
 searchingly concerning the numbers, health, etc., 
 of their forces, the position and condition of the 
 enemy, safety of retreat from Richmond, and the 
 maintenance of the present position before it. 
 Returning to Washington, he adopted General 
 McClellan's suggestion about appointing a Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, but did not choose the man for 
 the place whom the adviser had in mind. It was 
 the captor of Corinth that was selected rather 
 than the befooled strategist before Richmond. 
 On the nth the President issued an order assign- 
 ing Major-General Henry W. Halleck " to com- 
 mand the whole land forces of the United States, 
 as General-in-Chief," and ordering him to repair 
 as soon as possible to the capital. 
 
154 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 In order to prevent misunderstanding of the 
 military situation, the President determined to 
 take the public into his confidence. He seized 
 the opportunity presented by a Union meeting at 
 the capital on August 6 to make an address, in 
 which he confirmed the general rumor of dis- 
 agreement between General McClellan and Secre- 
 tary Stanton, and at the same time dispelled the 
 panic fear which was spreading among the people 
 because of the rumor, by showing how natural 
 and inevitable was the clash between two public 
 servants who were equally zealous in performing 
 their duties, the one by increasing his particular 
 army, the other by conserving all the Union 
 forces and preventing waste of the nation's 
 greatest resources, the lives of its citizen-soldiers. 
 
 Said Mr. Lincoln: 
 
 Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men 
 General McClellan has had, and those who would dis- 
 parage him say that he has had a very large number, 
 and those who would disparage the Secretary of War 
 insist that General McClellan has had a very small 
 number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide 
 difference . . . between the grand total on McClellan' s 
 rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who 
 would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, 
 and those who would disparage the Secretary of War 
 talk of those present fit for duty. General McClellan 
 has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of 
 War did not give him. General McClellan is not to 
 "blame for asking for what he wanted and needed, and 
 the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving 
 when he had none to give. And I say here, as far as 
 I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one 
 thing at any time in my power to give him. I have 
 no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and 
 able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to 
 do, to take upon myself what has been charged on 
 the Secretary of War, as withholding from him. 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 155 
 
 Halleck, upon assuming the general military 
 command, visited the Army of the Potomac on 
 the James. Upon his return to Washington he 
 ordered its withdrawal from Richmond, and its 
 union with the newly created Army of Virginia 
 under Pope. This was not accomplished until 
 late in August. 
 
 Pope, in taking his new command, had aroused 
 the enmity of McClellan and his subordinates by 
 an address in which he instituted a contrast be- 
 tween the aggressive methods of the Western 
 commanders and the defensive tactics of the East- 
 ern. By thus rendering harmonious action be- 
 tween himself and his future coadjutors impos- 
 sible he prepared his own downfall. 
 
 Pope set out vigorously to drive back Jackson 
 in order to aid McClellan's withdrawal from 
 Richmond. Banks, one of his three corps com- 
 manders, attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain on 
 August 9 so impetuously that, impressed by the 
 Union strength, two days later the Confederate 
 general withdrew to the Rapidan, whither Lee 
 sent Longstreet with 54,000 men to oppose Pope's 
 advance on Richmond. In view of this force,, 
 which was greater than his own, Pope in turn 
 withdrew behind the Rappahannock, and for eight 
 days prevented the Confederates from crossing 
 that river. Lee then sent Jackson around to the 
 left to break Pope's line of communications. This 
 Jackson did by occupying Manassas Junction. 
 Pope saw the opportunity afforded by Jackson's 
 separation from Longstreet to effect Jackson's 
 capture. While he confronted the " Stonewall 
 Brigade " with his main army, and while McDow- 
 ell was holding back Longstreet, Pope ordered 
 Porter to attack Jackson on the right and rear. 
 
156 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 This Porter did not do. Pope in anger ordered 
 him to report in person with his command next 
 morning. This Porter did, and, in the afternoon 
 of that day, August 30, without waiting for 
 Franklin's corps, approaching from Alexandria 
 with culpable slowness, Pope resolved on a 
 decisive battle. Erroneously thinking that Jack- 
 son's was the stronger of the two Confederate 
 divisions, he threw his main force against the 
 position which Jackson had taken near the site of 
 the first battle of Bull Run, and so permitted 
 Longstreet, really the more powerful of his 
 opponents, to crush the Union attack from the 
 side with his batteries. Disastrously defeated, 
 Pope retreated to Centreville. On the morrow 
 Lee did not follow up his victory with a direct 
 attack, but pursued his favorite tactics by send- 
 ing Jackson to flank the Union right wing. Pope 
 was prepared for this, and repulsed him at Chan- 
 tilly, though with the loss of two brave and 
 efficient Union generals, Philip Kearny and 
 Isaac I. Stephens. 
 
 Pope, attributing Porter's disobedience and 
 Franklin's delay to hostility against him, asked 
 consent of Halleck to withdraw the army to the 
 intrenchments before Washington, where it could 
 be reorganized. This was granted, and the 
 retreat was safely accomplished. A court-mar- 
 tial was instituted, and it cashiered Porter for 
 disobedience. Porter justified himself for fail- 
 ing to obey his superior's order by the lateness 
 of the hour when he received it, and by the 
 strength and nearness, unsuspected by Pope, of 
 Longstreet. After a contest of a quarter of a 
 century he was reinstated in command. It de- 
 veloped that Franklin's slowness in reenforcing 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 157 
 
 Pope had been due to McClellan's inertia, if not 
 to his positive disinclination to assist his fellow 
 commander. 
 
 Owing to the discord between its commanders, 
 and the lack of confidence of its soldiers in their 
 leaders, the army was thoroughly demoralized. 
 And, by a strange paradox, the man who was 
 chiefly responsible for this situation was the only 
 one that could restore the army's morale. The 
 President realized this, and, against the advice 
 of almost all his ministers, on September 2 placed 
 General McClellan in charge of the defense of 
 Washington. McClellan justified the appoint- 
 ment by setting to work " like a beaver," as 
 Lincoln expressed it, and within five days he had 
 the army in excellent shape even to take the 
 offensive. 
 
 On September 3 General Pope at his own 
 request was relieved from command of the Army 
 of Virginia. He was assigned to the Depart- 
 ment of the Northwest, where shortly afterwards 
 he completely quelled an insurrection of the Min- 
 nesota Indians. 
 
 Lee crossed the Potomac near Leesburg, Va., 
 on September 4-7, and encamped near Frederick, 
 Md., intending to move northward into Pennsyl- 
 vania, and choose the field upon which to fight a 
 decisive battle with McClellan. He was deceived, 
 however, in his expectations that Maryland would 
 rise in revolt against the Union, and " cast from 
 her neck the tyrant's heel " when the opportunity 
 for doing so was afforded. Instead, he found the 
 State inimical to him as an invader of its soil. 
 Furthermore, the Federal Government did not 
 withdraw in panic its garrison from Harper's 
 Ferry, as he had hoped it would. Accordingly 
 
158 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 lie sent a division under Jackson to capture Har- 
 per's Ferry, and for greater safety crossed the 
 Blue Ridge to Boonesboro with the rest of his 
 army. In the meantime McClellan was march- 
 ing toward Frederick, very slowly, in spite of the 
 proddings of the President, who, informed that 
 the movement of Jackson was a retreat across the 
 Potomac, was anxious that the enemy should not 
 " get off without being hurt." On the I3th 
 McClellan arrived at Frederick, where he had the 
 good fortune to discover Lee's entire plan of 
 campaign. Instead of striking the divided Con- 
 federate Army at once, however, he waited till 
 the morrow, by which time the rear-guard of 
 the Jackson division was able to hold back for 
 a day the Federal detachment sent under Franklin 
 to the relief of Harper's Ferry, by a stubborn 
 resistance at Crampton's Gap, and so to enable 
 Jackson to rejoin Lee, who was hastening south 
 to the meeting, his rear-guard having held back 
 for a day the Federal detachment sent against 
 him, by sharp resistance at Turner's Gap. 
 Another day was lost by McClellan's slowness, 
 and on the I7th both armies were arrayed against 
 each other at Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, 
 Lee having succeeded in uniting all his forces, 
 and obtaining the advantage of position on the 
 field of contest. McClellan with superior num- 
 bers won the battle which ensued by brute 
 strength, losing about 12,000 killed and wounded 
 to Lee's 11,000. On the i8th and igth the Con- 
 federate general withdrew his broken army, 
 reduced to less than three-fourths of the num- 
 bers with which he had invaded Maryland, across 
 the Potomac, entirely unmolested. The " hurt " 
 which McClellan had given him was severe, but 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 159 
 
 not the completely disabling blow which the 
 President had expected, and which such a com- 
 mander as Grant, had he been in McClellan's 
 place, would have inflicted upon the demoralized 
 enemy in its retreat. 
 
 The failure of General McClellan to crush 
 General Lee's army when it was in his power, and 
 so to end the war in the East, caused a murmur 
 to run throughout the country that McClellan 
 and his officers were deliberately prolonging the 
 conflict for purposes of their own. Color was 
 given to this rumor by the reply of an officer,. 
 Major John K. Key, brother of a colonel upon 
 General McClellan's staff, to the inquiry of Major 
 Levi C. Turner, a judge-advocate, " Why was 
 not the Rebel army bagged immediately after 
 Antietam ? " Key answered : " That is not the 
 game. The object is that neither army shall get 
 much advantage of the other, that both shall be 
 kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we 
 will make a compromise and save slavery." This 
 conversation was reported directly to the Presi- 
 dent, and, bringing its participants before him on 
 September 27, he secured from Key an ac- 
 knowledgment that his sentiments had been cor- 
 rectly reported. Thereupon the President dis- 
 missed Major Key from the service. 
 
 About two months later Mr. Key, affected by 
 the recent loss of a son in the army, wrote a 
 pleading letter to the President protesting his 
 loyalty, which he thought had been impugned by 
 his dismissal. The President replied, expressing 
 sympathy with him in the death of his " brave 
 and noble son," and expressly disclaiming that he 
 had charged Mr. Key with disloyalty. The 
 reason for the dismissal he gave as follows : 
 
160 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 I had been brought to fear that there was a class 
 of officers in the army, not very inconsiderable in 
 numbers, who were playing a game to not beat the 
 enemy when they could, on some peculiar notion as 
 to the proper way of saving the Union; and when you 
 were proved to me, in your own presence, to have 
 avowed yourself in favor of that " game," and did not 
 attempt to controvert the proof, I dismissed you as an 
 example and a warning to that supposed class. 
 
 General McClellan remained north of the Poto- 
 mac demanding reinforcements of men and 
 horses, and more equipments and supplies in 
 order to drive Lee southward, for the Confeder- 
 ate general, in seeming contempt for his opponent, 
 held his ground near the Potomac, and, indeed, 
 early in October, sent his most dashing cavalry 
 general, J. E. B. Stuart, on a raid into Maryland, 
 which successfully encompassed the entire North- 
 ern Army. The Federal Government faithfully 
 fulfilled, so far as it was able, the demands made 
 upon it, but McClellan complained that he did 
 not receive all the reinforcements which, it was 
 told him, were sent forward. Lincoln, in despair, 
 remarked, " Sending men to that army is like 
 shoveling fleas across a barnyard; not half of 
 them get there," and early in October went to the 
 front to observe conditions for himself. There 
 he found over 100,000 men, fully equipped and 
 ready for action. But their commander turned 
 aside all of the President's suggestions for 
 an immediate forward movement. Sorrowfully 
 remarking to a friend, " They call it the 
 Army of the Potomac, but it is only Mc- 
 Clellan's bodyguard," Lincoln left the great 
 encampment, and returned to Washington, with 
 the resolution, it would appear from his subse- 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 161 
 
 quent correspondence with General McClellan, 
 to stir him to action, and, if he failed to respond, 
 to replace him with a more energetic com- 
 mander.* 
 
 On October 6, through Halleck, the President 
 ordered McClellan " to cross the Potomac, and 
 give battle to the enemy, or drive him south." 
 " Your army/' said Halleck, " must move now, 
 while the roads are good. . . . You will 
 immediately report what line you adopt and when 
 you intend to cross the river." 
 
 In response to this peremptory order, Mc- 
 Clellan urged the impossibility of supplying the 
 army on its advance until certain pending ar- 
 rangements were completed. To this Lincoln 
 sharply replied on October 13 as follows: 
 
 You remember my speaking to you of what I called 
 your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when 
 you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is 
 constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least 
 his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? 
 
 As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck 
 that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless 
 the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put 
 in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his 
 army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great 
 from railroad transportation as you would have to do 
 without the railroad last named. He now wagons from 
 Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as 
 far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. 
 He is certainly not more than half as well provided 
 with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased 
 for you to have the advantage of the railroad from 
 Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the re- 
 
 * General Keyes related an almost identical con- 
 versation as occurring between the President and him- 
 self at Harrison's Landing, when McClellan was besieg- 
 ing Richmond. 
 
i6a LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 mainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, 
 ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not 
 be ignored. 
 
 Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you 
 know, is, "to operate upon the enemy's communica- 
 tions as much as possible, without exposing your own." 
 You seem to act as if this applies againstyou, but can- 
 not apply in your favor. Change positions with the 
 enemy, and think you not he would break your com- 
 munication with Richmond within the next twenty-four 
 hours ? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But 
 if he does so in full force, he gives up his communica- 
 tions to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but 
 to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than 
 full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all 
 the easier. 
 
 Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer 
 Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can 
 and he must take. Why can you not reach there before 
 him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal 
 on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while 
 yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours 
 as on his. ... I say " try " ; if we never try, we shall 
 never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, . . . 
 I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot 
 beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, 
 we never can when we bear the wastage of going to 
 him. . . . We should not so operate as to merely drive 
 him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail 
 finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than 
 far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now 
 is, we never can, he again being within the intrench- 
 mnts of Richmond. Recurring to the idea of going to 
 Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying 
 from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as 
 it were, by the different spokes of a wheel, extending 
 from the hub towards the rim, and this whether you 
 move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hug- 
 ging the Blue Ridge more closely. ... I should think 
 it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, dis- 
 abling him to make an important move without your 
 knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces to- 
 gether for dread of you. The gaps [in the Blue Ridge] 
 would enable you to attack if you should wish. For 
 a great part of the way you would be practically between 
 
LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN 163 
 
 the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, en- 
 abling us to spare you the greatest number of troops 
 from here. When, at length, running to Richmond 
 ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does 
 so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he 
 should be engaged long before such point is reached. 
 It is all easy if our troops march as well as the 
 enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. 
 This letter is in no sense an order. 
 
 McClellan still delayed obeying the President's 
 instructions, wasting in his camp week after 
 week of fine marching weather. To promptings 
 from Washington he made excuse after excuse. 
 Finally, on his report of October 24, that his 
 horses were unfit for duty, he was cuttingly re- 
 buked by the President, who telegraphed : " Will 
 you pardon me for asking what the horses of 
 your army have done since the battle of Antietam 
 that fatigues anything ? " 
 
 As in the promulgation of his emancipation 
 policy (see p. 254), Lincoln in despair resorted 
 to the lot of events. He decided to remove Mc- 
 Clellan if Lee safely escaped behind the Blue 
 Ridge. By November i the Army of the Poto- 
 mac had crossed the river whence it received its 
 name, and behind whose protection its long 
 retirement had tinged with satire the appellation. 
 Thereupon Lee began his retreat and by No- 
 vember 5 was at Culpeper Court House far 
 to the east of the Blue Ridge. The President 
 thereupon issued an order replacing General 
 McClellan with Major-General Burnside, who 
 had won the honor by his successful campaign in 
 North Carolina. At the same time he re- 
 placed Major-General Porter with Major-Gen- 
 eral Hooker. General McClellan retired to 
 
164 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 private life, shortly to reappear in public affairs 
 as the Presidential candidate of the opposition 
 party. 
 
 The magnanimity of the great President did 
 not end with McClellan's expulsion from the 
 army, but the succeeding year Mr. Lincoln sent a 
 message to him that if he, McClellan, would pre- 
 side at a Union meeting to be held in Union 
 Square, New York, and make a Union speech, 
 he, Lincoln, would stand aside at the next elec- 
 tion, and do all in his power to make McClellan 
 his successor ; to this McClellan agreed in writing 
 and the meeting was arranged, but McClellan 
 backed out just before the meeting was held, and 
 then denied ever having promised to preside. 
 He probably thought it would be distasteful to 
 the " peace-at-any-price " crowd which held him 
 in hand. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 
 
 GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE was, through 
 the instrumentality of General McClellan, his 
 classmate, made cashier of the Illinois Central 
 Railroad Company, at Chicago, at the same time 
 that McClellan was vice-president and chief 
 engineer, and I was brought frequently in con- 
 tact with him in an official capacity. He was a 
 man of commanding presence, then as always 
 thereafter, and equally affable, courteous, and 
 accommodating. During the war, it chanced that 
 I was on duty in the city (Cincinnati) where he 
 had his headquarters, and my acquaintance with 
 him was renewed, and to it was added the ac- 
 quaintance and friendship of his staff officers, 
 which I esteemed to be a great honor, as well as a 
 great pleasure. General Burnside in my judg- 
 ment was fully as accomplished, valiant, and ef- 
 ficient a soldier as Hooker or Meade, but lacked 
 self-confidence. The President considered that he 
 was not properly supported by Hooker and some 
 others. When Burnside, with extreme reluc- 
 tance and self-distrust, took command of the 
 Army of the Potomac on November 8, he 
 promptly formulated a plan of movement which 
 he wrote out and sent to the War Department on 
 the succeeding day. It was, in general terms: 
 
 165 
 
1 66 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 to make a feint of moving to the southwest of 
 Warrenton on Culpeper or Gordonsville, under 
 cover of which he would advance his army to, and 
 capture Fredericksburg ; then, making that fine 
 strategic point a base of operation, and Aquia 
 Landing a base of supplies, to operate on that 
 line against Richmond. This plan was fore- 
 doomed to failure. Lacking the engineering abil- 
 ity of McClellan, Burnside had opposed to him 
 the greatest engineer of the Confederacy, if not, 
 indeed, of the war, General Robert E. Lee, in- 
 trenched in the strongest fortifications. Had 
 Burnside's appointment been made before Antie- 
 tam, with his superior forces and energetic tactics 
 he would undoubtedly have annihilated the Con- 
 federate general in pitched battle on the open 
 fields of Maryland and in the retreat of the de- 
 moralized enemy through the valleys of north- 
 western Virginia. Burnside recommended the 
 division of the army into three parts : right, left, 
 and centre, each under command of the senior 
 generals, Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker respect- 
 ively. 
 
 To this plan the Government acceded, and 
 professed faith in its success provided he moved 
 rapidly, and General Halleck, the Commander- 
 in-chief and -General Meigs, the Quartermaster- 
 General, at once visited his headquarters and had 
 a full and satisfactory conference about it. As 
 an indispensable part of the plan a pontoon train 
 should have been started from Washington for 
 Falmouth at once, and the General supposed 
 it had been ordered by Halleck, but, on account 
 of a misunderstanding, it was not started till the 
 I9th, or one week from the time it was ordered, 
 and did not reach the army till the 25th. The 
 
BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 167 
 
 evidence indicates no fault on the part of General 
 Burnside, but must be charged to apathy, in- 
 difference, red tape, and inherent difficulties at 
 Washington. Meanwhile the army was put in 
 motion and Sumner reached Falmouth, opposite 
 Fredericksburg, on the I7th, and found no pon- 
 toon train. The army was therefore compelled to 
 lie there and wait for the pontoons, and it was not 
 till the loth day of December that these were 
 finally laid. The army moved across on the 
 nth and I2th. On the i3th the Federal forces, 
 led by their bravest generals, charged upon 
 the fortifications, and were beaten back with 
 fearful loss. At last the reserves under " Fight- 
 ing Joe Hooker," who had protested against the 
 waste of life in the impossible attempt, were sent 
 against the works. They fought desperately, 
 even attempting to rush the Confederate batteries 
 on Marye's Heights in a bayonet charge. Beaten 
 back with a loss of one man in four, they with- 
 drew at dusk. 
 
 Since Hooker had advised against the attack, 
 Burnside believed that he had been half-hearted 
 in it, and so determined to lead a charge in person 
 on the morrow. From this he was dissuaded by 
 his other division generals, Sumner and Franklin, 
 and on the night of the I5th he withdrew across 
 the river. 
 
 In his report to the Government on the I7th, 
 General Burnside assumed all the blame for the 
 disaster. The President, in acknowledgment of 
 his manly spirit and in congratulation of the 
 bravery of his troops, wrote, on December 22, 
 the following : 
 
1 68 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 CONGRATULATIONS TO THE ARMY OF THE 
 POTOMAC: 
 
 I have just read your commanding general's report 
 of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although you were 
 not successful, the attempt was not an error, nor the 
 failure other than accident. The courage with which 
 you, in an open field, maintained the contest against 
 an intrenched foe, and the consummate skill and suc- 
 cess with which you crossed and recrossed the river 
 in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all 
 the qualities of a great army, which will yet give 
 victory to the cause of the country and of popular 
 government. 
 
 The country, in the midst of high hopes of good 
 fortune under the new commander of the Army 
 of the Potomac, was appalled by this defeat, 
 greater than any disaster of McClellan's ; a muti- 
 nous spirit spread in the army itself, many officers 
 resigning, and many privates deserting; even the 
 generals voiced their censure, General Hooker 
 denouncing the President as well as General 
 Burnside for the defeat, and saying that nothing 
 would go well until the country had a dictator. 
 
 In the face of this universal disapproval, Burn- 
 side determined to go ahead with his plan of 
 campaign. Thereupon, on January i, 1863, the 
 President wrote to the General-in-chief, Halleck, 
 requesting him to confer with Burnside and his 
 officers upon it, and, by approving or disap- 
 proving it, assume the responsibility for results. 
 He closed his letter with the sentence, " Your 
 military skill is useless to me if you do not do 
 this." 
 
 Halleck, offended by the harshness of the 
 President's tone, offered his resignation. Mr. 
 Lincoln, feeling himself in the wrong, withdrew 
 
BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 169 
 
 his letter, whereupon General Halleck consented 
 to remain in his position. 
 
 Finding that his general officers were opposed 
 to the forward movement which commended it- 
 self to his judgment, General Burnside offered to 
 the President on January 5 the choice of in- 
 dorsing the movement or accepting his resigna- 
 tion. To this General Halleck replied, approving 
 ing the movement, but leaving Burnside to decide 
 upon the " time, place, and character " of cross- 
 ing the Rappahannock. This letter the President 
 indorsed, saying: 
 
 I deplore the want of concurrence with you in 
 opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the 
 remedy. Be cautious, and do not understand that the 
 Government or country is driving you. I do not yet 
 see how I could profit by changing the command of 
 the Army of the Potomac ; and if I did, I should not 
 wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your 
 commission. 
 
 The march to Banks's Ford, where it was in- 
 tended to cross the river, was made on January 
 21. Rain began to fall, rendering the ground so 
 muddy that it became impassable for wagons 
 and artillery, and the expedition had to return 
 to camp, amid the jeers of the soldiers. 
 
 Stung by the criticisms of General Hooker and 
 others of his subordinates, General Burnside, on 
 January 23, again offered an alternative to the 
 President the dismissal of the offending officers 
 or the acceptance of his resignation. This time 
 the President accepted the resignation, appointing 
 Burnside to the Department of Ohio, with head- 
 quarters at Cincinnati. 
 
 In spite of General Hooker's insubordination, 
 the President felt that, more than any other 
 
170 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 officer, he possessed the confidence of the Army 
 of the Potomac, and therefore, on January 25, 
 appointed him as its head. Next day he sent him 
 a letter frankly criticising his unsoldierly conduct 
 towards General Burnside and the Government. 
 It read : 
 
 GENERAL: I have placed you at the head of the Army 
 of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon 
 what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet 
 I think it best for you to know that there are some 
 things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with 
 you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, 
 which of course I like. I also believe that you do 
 not mix politics with your profession, in which you 
 are right. You have confidence in yourself, which 
 is a valuable if not an indispensable quality. You are 
 ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good 
 rather than harm; but I think that during General 
 Burnside's command of the army you have taken coun- 
 sel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you 
 could, in which you did a great wrong to the country 
 and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. 
 I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your 
 recently saying that both the army and the Government 
 needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but 
 in spite of it, tLat I have given you the command. 
 Only those generals who gain success can set up dic- 
 tators. What I now ask of you is military success, and 
 I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will sup- 
 port you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither 
 more nor less than it has done and will do for all 
 commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you 
 have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their 
 commander and withholding confidence from him, will 
 now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I 
 can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he 
 were alive again, could get any good out of an army 
 while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of 
 rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and 
 .sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories. 
 
 General Halleck and Secretary Stanton de- 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 171 
 
 sired the appointment of General Rosecrans, in- 
 stead of that of General Hooker, to the command 
 of the Army of the Potomac, but it was probably 
 with the unfortunate appointment of General 
 Pope in mind that the President chose a com- 
 mander who already possessed the confidence of 
 his officers and men. General Hooker was 
 greatly moved by the President's letter reproving 
 him for his treatment of his predecessor. " He 
 talks to me like a father," he said ; " I shall not 
 answer the letter until I have won him a great 
 victory." 
 
 He set to work with enthusiasm disciplining 
 and drilling his men, until, when spring opened, 
 it was with reason that he called his army " the 
 finest on the planet." 
 
 On April n he presented to the President his 
 plan of campaign against Richmond. On this 
 Lincoln indorsed the very cogent criticism : 
 
 My opinion is that, just now, with the enemy di- 
 rectly ahead of us, there is no eligible route for us 
 into Richmond; and consequently a question of pref- 
 erence between the Rappahannock route and the James 
 River route h a contest about nothing. Hence our 
 prime object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is 
 not with or about Richmond at all unless it be inci- 
 dental to the main object. 
 
 What then? The two armies are face to face with 
 a narrow river between them. Our communications are 
 shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. For 
 this reason we can, with equal powers, fret him more 
 than he can us. I do not think that by raids towards 
 Washington he can derange the Army of the Potomac 
 at all. He has no distant operations which can call 
 any of the Army of the Potomac away; we have such 
 operations which may call him away, at least in part. 
 While he remains intact, I do not think we should take 
 the disadvantage of attacking him in his intrenchments ; 
 but we should continually harass and menace him, so 
 
172 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending away 
 detachments. If he weakens himself, then pitch into 
 him. 
 
 By the 3Oth of April Hooker had crossed both 
 the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above Fred- 
 ericksburg under cover of a feigned attack below 
 the town by three army corps under General 
 John Sedgwick. Hooker did not pursue the ad- 
 vantage of this surprise, but on May i advanced 
 cautiously toward Lee from Chancellorsville, 
 a small town lying about ten miles west of Fred- 
 ericksburg. 
 
 At night Hooker, in the words of General Lee, 
 his opponent, " assumed a position of great 
 natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a 
 dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, 
 in the midst of which breastworks of logs had 
 been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as 
 to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His 
 artillery swept the few narrow roads by which 
 his position could be approached from the front, 
 and commanded the adjacent woods." However, 
 the extreme right of the line, under General 
 Oliver O. Howard, was unprotected. Around 
 this, on the 2d, Jackson made a forced march, 
 and late in the afternoon took the right wing of 
 the army in reverse, driving it in confusion 
 toward the center. In his ardor General Jackson 
 rode ahead of his men, and, turning to rejoin 
 them, was killed from a shot from one of his own 
 soldiers. General J. E. B. Stuart succeeded him. 
 On the morning of the 3d Stuart attacked desper- 
 ately the compacted front before him near the 
 Chancellor House, which formed Hooker's head- 
 quarters. As Hooker was standing on the ve- 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 173 
 
 randa, a cannon ball struck one of the pillars and 
 hurled it against him. For some time he lay un- 
 conscious, and it would appear that he did not 
 thoroughly recover his wits during ,the day. 
 Certainly his orders were the reverse of what was 
 to be expected of a general with his militant so- 
 briquet. He withdrew from his strong position 
 which his troops were bravely and successfully 
 defending, and clearly indicated to the soldiers 
 that he was preparing to retreat over the river, 
 by reforming them in an arc in front of the 
 United States Ford below the junction of the 
 Rapidan and Rappahannock. He had already 
 ordered Sedgwick, who had made the attack on 
 the east which deceived Lee, to march to his aid 
 through Fredericksburg. 
 
 Hooker complained that Sedgwick failed to obey 
 his order with all possible energy and dispatch, 
 and this charge was sustained by an investiga- 
 tion by a committee of Congress. Military 
 opinion, however, has generally exonerated 
 Sedgwick. He had to fight his way by flanking 
 movements through Fredericksburg, and on the 
 3d at Salem Church, on the road to Chancellors- 
 ville, he had a pitched battle with the Confeder- 
 ate rear-guard, reenforced by the main army. 
 He continued fighting on the 4th, and then, find- 
 ing his advance was blocked, crossed the river by 
 Hooker's permission. Hooker that night held a 
 council of war with his division commanders, the 
 result of which was that the army withdrew 
 across the river on the 5th. 
 
 As soon as the President heard the sad tidings 
 of this second disaster to the Army of the Po- 
 tomac, he and Halleck took a steamer to Hook- 
 er's headquarters. Arriving there in the gener- 
 
174 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 al's absence, he wrote him the following note, 
 assuring him of confidence and cooperation: 
 
 The recent movement of your army is ended with- 
 out effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important 
 breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? 
 If possible, I would be very glad of another move- 
 ment early enough to give us some benefit from the fact 
 of the enemy's communication being broken; but neither 
 for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done 
 in desoeration or rashness. An early movement would 
 also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the 
 recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. 
 Have you already in your mind a plan wholly or 
 partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without 
 interference from me. If you have not, please inform 
 me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and 
 assist in the formation of some plan for the army. 
 
 On his return to Washington, the President 
 telegraphed encouraging news to General Hooker, 
 informing him of General Grant's capture of 
 Grand Gulf; of Federal cavalry raids near Rich- 
 mond, that, on the information of an exchanged 
 prisoner, could have easily captured the city had 
 the raiders known its weakness, there being " not 
 a sound pair of legs in Richmond ; " and of a 
 captured despatch of General Lee telling of the 
 " fearful loss " he had sustained in the recent 
 battle. 
 
 General Hooker replied to the President's note 
 intimating that he was contemplating a forward 
 movement as soon as he had tested the temper of 
 his troops. He wrote again on the I3th, explain- 
 ing his delay, and saying that he hoped to be able 
 to commence his movement upon the morrow. 
 To this the President replied that, " the enemy 
 having reestablished his communications, re- 
 gained his positions, and actually received ree'n- 
 
BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 175 
 
 forcements," any attempt of Hooker's to cross, 
 the Rappahannock at this time was not practic- 
 able. He advised the general to hold the enemy 
 at bay with occasional attacks and cavalry raids, 
 and to put his own army in good condition. If, 
 however, Hooker believed he could succeed at 
 the intended movement, the President would not 
 restrain him. But, said Lincoln, " bearing upon 
 this last point, I must tell you that I have some 
 painful intimations that some of your corps and 
 division commanders are not giving you their 
 entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true, 
 and you should therefore, first of all, ascertain 
 the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt." 
 
 Upon this hint it was easy for Hooker to 
 discover who were the offending officers. Yet, 
 because of the more active disloyalty he had 
 shown toward Burnside, he was compelled to 
 exercise forbearance and discretion instead o 
 taking drastic action, as Burnside had proposed. 
 Thereby, while he did not prevent his downfall, 
 he delayed it. 
 
 By the first of June it became apparent that 
 Lee was contemplating another invasion of the 
 North. On the 5th of the month General 
 Hooker advised the President that in the case of 
 such a movement the enemy ought to be attacked 
 in the rear at Fredericksburg. Lincoln turned 
 over the proposition to Halleck for consideration, 
 and in the meantime gave it as his opinion to 
 Hooker that such an attack was inadvisable. He 
 said, using a characteristic simile: 
 
 I would not take the risk of being entangled upon 
 the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and 
 liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a 
 fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. II 
 
176 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 I^ee would come to my side of the river, I would keep 
 on the same side, and fight him or act on the defense, 
 according as might be my estimate of his strength 
 relatively to my own. 
 
 While this correspondence was going on the 
 Confederate movement was already in progress, 
 following the south bank of the Rappahannock up 
 toward the Blue Ridge. It was headed by the 
 strong force of the Confederate cavalry. 
 Against this Hooker sent his cavalry under Gen- 
 erals Alfred Pleasonton and David McM. Gregg. 
 Pleasonton met the enemy at Brandy Station 
 before Gregg arrived, and engaged him fiercely, 
 forcing the Confederate movement to change its 
 course westward into the Shenandoah Valley. 
 Feeling that Washington was less immediately 
 threatened, Hooker proposed to march directly 
 upon Richmond, trusting to be able to hurry his 
 troops back after the capture of the Confederate 
 capital in time to save the Federal. But the 
 President would not agree to this. On the loth 
 he telegraphed Hooker : 
 
 If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not 
 be able to take it in twenty days ; meanwhile your 
 communications, and with them your army, would 
 be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is 
 your objective point. If he comes toward the upper 
 Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, 
 shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight 
 him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where 
 he is, fret him and fret him. 
 
 Hooker's plan was one that Lee hoped he would 
 attempt, since the Confederate general was ready 
 to risk the capture of Richmond for the chance 
 of taking Washington. He had already ex- 
 pressed his willingness to " swap queens " in the 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 177 
 
 game of war. It was the wearing down of his 
 lesser strength by equal losses on both sides, such 
 as Lincoln's plan involved, that Lee dreaded. 
 Through his foolhardiness, Major-General 
 Robert H. Milroy, commanding a Federal de- 
 tachment at Winchester in the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley, allowed himself to be surrounded on the 
 1 3th. On the I4th the President telegraphed 
 Hooker : 
 
 So far as we can make out here, the enemy haVe 
 Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martins- 
 burg. If they could hold out a few days, could you 
 help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martins- 
 burg and the tail of it on the plank road between 
 Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be 
 very slim somewhere. Could you not break him? 
 
 But Milroy had already been driven back with 
 heavy loss. On the i5th the Confederate van 
 under Ewell was crossing the Potomac at 
 Williamsport. The President immediately called 
 for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
 Ohio, and West Virginia to serve for six months. 
 On the 1 6th he wrote to Hooker, who was com- 
 plaining of Halleck withholding confidence and 
 support from him, that the complaint was 
 groundless and that the two must act in concert 
 in the crisis that confronted the country. He 
 said: 
 
 I believe you are aware that since you took command 
 of the army I have not believed you had any chance 
 to effect anything till now. As it looks to me, Lee's 
 now returning toward Harper's Ferry gives you back 
 the chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. Quite 
 possibly I was wrong both then and now ; but, in the 
 great responsibility resting upon me, I cannot be en- 
 tirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be in such 
 
178 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 mood that we can get into our action the best cordial 
 judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my 
 poor mite added, if indeed he and you shall think it 
 entitled to any consideration at all. 
 
 ' Later in the day, to prevent misunderstanding, 
 he telegraphed General Hooker, placing him in 
 "strict military relation to General Halleck of a 
 commander of one of the armies to the general- 
 in-chief of all the armies." 
 
 Leaving Stuart's cavalry to obstruct the 
 parallel advance of the Federal troops, Lee 
 rushed the rest of his army after Ewell across 
 the Potomac, in the vicinity of Hagerstown. 
 Thence he marched along the rich Cumberland 
 Valley into Pennsylvania, causing the inhabitants 
 to flee before him. Ewell occupied Carlisle ; and 
 Early, York. Harrisburg, the State capital, was 
 menaced, as well as other cities on the Susque- 
 hanna. Along this river the newly enlisted 
 militia gathered to stop Lee's advance upon 
 Philadelphia and the other Eastern cities, in all of 
 which panic reigned. 
 
 Stuart's cavalry was entirely ineffectual in 
 hindering Hooker, and indeed, was so harassed 
 itself, that it failed to regain the main army 
 either in time or condition to render much serv- 
 ice in the decisive battle. Hooker waited to 
 cross the Potomac until Lee's troops had all 
 passed it; and then proceeded to follow after 
 him. Fearing his enemy's strength, he asked 
 Halleck to let him add to his army of pursuit 
 the now useless garrison at Harper's Ferry. 
 This the general-in-chief refused him. There- 
 upon, the date being June 27, Hooker telegraphed 
 to Halleck that he was not able with his forces to 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 179 
 
 garrison both Harper's Ferry and Washington 
 and at the same time fight the superior force of 
 the enemy in front, and so he tendered his resig- 
 nation. This the President at once accepted, and 
 appointed to the vacant place Major-General 
 George G. Meade, who by strange nemesis, had 
 been the chief critic of Hooker among the 
 division generals, as Hooker had formerly been 
 of Burnside. Meade desired not to have his 
 former chief under him, and so Hooker was sent 
 to the West, where, in the battles about Chat- 
 tanooga, he won back his old reputation as a 
 fighting division general. 
 
 General Meade made few changes in his pred- 
 ecessor's plan of campaign; he compromised 
 upon the question of adding the garrison at 
 Harper's Ferry to his army of attack, by accepting 
 half of it. By the 3oth his left wing had crossed 
 the Pennsylvania line, south of Gettysburg, while 
 the right remained in Maryland thirty miles to 
 the southwest. Learning, however, that Lee 
 was returning to attack him, Meade determined 
 to take up his position of defense along Pipe 
 Creek in Maryland, near to and parallel with the 
 State line. But on July i, before the formation 
 could be made, the van of Lee's forces was upon 
 Meade's left wing, the First Corps, which, under 
 General John F. Reynolds, was guarding the 
 roads from Chambersburg and Hagerstown 
 which entered Gettysburg on the west. 
 
 Reynolds realized that his duty was to check 
 the advance of the superior forces at any cost, 
 until Meade could bring up his troops and estab- 
 lish his lines of battle. Part of the cost that he 
 paid was his own life. On his death General 
 Abner Doubleday took command. For a time 
 
180 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the advantage was with the Federal troops. The 
 Eleventh Corps then arrived on the field, and its 
 commander, General O. O. Howard, being higher 
 in rank, superseded Doubleday. But the Con- 
 federate forces also received accessions in the 
 form of Ewell's and Early's cavalry, and the 
 Eleventh Corps was beaten back through Gettys- 
 burg. It halted on Cemetery Hill, south of the 
 town. 
 
 Meade remained in headquarters at Taneytown 
 throughout the day, still intending to mass his 
 army on the line of Pipe Creek for the defense 
 of Washington and Baltimore; Manchester and 
 Taneytown forming the extremes of the line. 
 It would appear that this absence from a battle 
 that was raging within his hearing did not com- 
 mend itself to the army. At noon he obtained 
 news of the death or severe wounding of Reyn- 
 olds, and he sent Hancock forward to assume 
 command and also to report to Meade if the 
 ground was favorable for a general engagement. 
 Hancock returned at night and reported favor- 
 ably as to the field, and Meade then abandoned 
 the idea of the Pipe Creek campaign and rode to 
 Howard's headquarters at Cemetery Hill, reach- 
 ing there at eleven o'clock at night. An im- 
 mediate concentration of the army was ordered 
 and a posting of the various divisions was begun. 
 Howard with the Eleventh, Doubleday with the 
 First, and Hancock with the Second, held the 
 center. The Twelfth, under Slocum, formed the 
 right; the Third, under Sickles, constituted the 
 left. The Fifth, under Sykes, was posted in re- 
 serve to the right. Sedgwick, with the Sixth, was 
 at Manchester, thirty-two miles distant from 
 Gettysburg, and at seven o'clock in the evening 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 181 
 
 he got orders to march to Taneytown, and 
 about nine o'clock received another order to 
 make a forced march to Gettysburg. He reached 
 there at 2 o'clock p. M. on the afternoon of the 
 2d, and was ordered in reserve to the right, 
 taking the place of Sykes's Corps, which latter 
 corps was then posted to the extreme left of the 
 line. The center and headquarters were on 
 Cemetery Hill ; the right extended down to 
 Rocky Creek, and so on to Wolf Hill; and the 
 left reached to an eminence called Round Top. 
 The army line was in shape like a crescent and 
 had a great advantage of position. Meade had 
 one hundred guns, which were under the com- 
 mand of General Hunt ; Lee had one hundred and 
 fifty guns. 
 
 Both sides remained on the defensive until 2.29 
 p. M., when Longstreet prepared to attack 
 Sickles with his whole corps, to be followed by 
 A. P. Hill. Sickles, having been informed of the 
 design of Longstreet by Berhan, of the sharp- 
 shooters, who had made a reconnoissance in force, 
 moved out further and disconnected his corps 
 from the center, his right resting on Round Top. 
 The battle was opened by the Rebel artillery, 
 which was responded to by Sickles' guns, and the 
 enemy came defiantly on with the " Rebel yell/' 
 but were met with volley after volley of grape 
 and canister, and sent back in confusion. An- 
 other intact line, however, advanced from out of 
 the woods, and Warren, Meade's Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral, ordered up reinforcements, which were slow 
 in coming. Meanwhile Sickles was slowly 
 forced back by superior numbers. At this 
 juncture, the Fifth came up, steadied the Third, 
 and, united, they repelled Longstreet and Hill, 
 
x8 2 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 but Sickles lost his leg here, and was borne off 
 the field, Birney assuming his command. 
 
 Anderson then assailed the center; Hancock 
 met the attack with heroic valor, being wounded 
 in the thigh, while Gibbon was wounded in the 
 shoulder. The Rebel onslaught was here ter- 
 rific ; in some instances the antagonists fought 
 with clubbed guns, and hand-to-hand. The 
 First and Second were thrown into confusion, 
 when Sedgwick came up opportunely with the 
 Sixth, relieved the ill fortunes, and repulsed the 
 enemy with great loss. Our right had been 
 severely drawn upon to aid the center and left; 
 and Ewell made a furious onslaught on Slocum's 
 extreme right, designing to turn it. After a 
 bloody conflict, the First and part of the Sixth 
 came and took part, repulsing the Rebels, and 
 night closed on the scene, with Union victories 
 throughout. All houses, barns, and outbuildings 
 were occupied as hospitals ; the floors were filled 
 with wounded and dying, and the surgeons and 
 nurses were busy without a moment for rest or 
 sleep, all night, amputating legs or arms, probing 
 for bullets, stanching wounds, administering 
 morphine, etc. It was no unusual sight to see a 
 soldier handing some memento or trinket, a ring, 
 or a lock of hair, or a pistol, or a watch, or a 
 button, to a comrade or a surgeon, with a charge 
 to deliver it to the one he loved best. Friday 
 morning the gallant Sickles was sent to Washing- 
 ton to have his leg properly attended to. 
 
 At daylight the Rebels resumed the offensive 
 by pouring artillery charges into our ranks, and 
 Slocum, with Humphreys's and Sykes's divisions 
 of the Third Corps, charged resolutely upon 
 EwelFs Corps; after a gallant contest qn both 
 
BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 183 
 
 sides, for six hours, our forces prevailed, and 
 Ewell was overpowered and the battle ceased 
 for two or three hours. Lee was now in 
 a desperate condition, which he determined to 
 retrieve by a coup-de-main on the key to our 
 position on Cemetery Hill, where our headquar- 
 ters were. To that end, he dexterously ranged 
 his guns to the number of an hundred, in a 
 sort of semicircle, all bearing on the hill, and 
 upon the stroke of one, unexpectedly to our 
 troops, one hundred or more guns simultaneously 
 burst forth, dealing death and destruction to the 
 Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, who were not in 
 battle line. Many were killed and many dis- 
 abled, and every man that could escape did so, 
 but the terrible cannonade continued for an hour 
 and a half, being replied to by our batteries on 
 the side hills. This terrible cannonade was kept 
 up till four o'clock, when General Hunt slack- 
 ened our fire so that the guns, which were much 
 heated, might cool. The enemy thought they had 
 silenced our guns permanently, and a charge 
 under Pickett was ordered. On came the 
 Rebels, their whole destiny being borne on the 
 advancing banners ; they were met with a terrific 
 artillery fire from forty guns, but though mowed 
 down, they pressed on with bravery and despera- 
 tion. They crossed the Emmetsburg road, and 
 were near to our infantry. Gibbon was in com- 
 mand ; he watched closely, saying, " Steady, boys, 
 don't fire till I command." The Rebels set up 
 the " Rebel yell," and came double-quick, with 
 fixed bayonets. " Fire ! " cried Gibbon ; one 
 simultaneous sheet of flame and smoke enveloped 
 the whole front, and down went half the Rebels ; 
 the rest kept on, and were mowed down with 
 
1 84 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 grape and canister, till it was unendurable 
 those who survived threw down their arms and 
 guns and gave themselves up. A great many 
 others of the Rebels gave up besides, and our 
 forces were overburdened with prisoners. The 
 Rebel loss was 25,000 killed, wounded, and miss- 
 ing; and 14,000 prisoners. The Union loss was 
 23,000 in all. 
 
 The " high-water mark " of the Rebellion was 
 here attained; henceforth the Rebellion ebbed 
 until the bottom was reached, at Appomattox. 
 Had our side been vanquished as Lee's army was, 
 the victor would have taken his choice of march- 
 ing on to Baltimore and Washington, or to 
 Harrisburg and Philadelphia. 
 
 Meade, however, did not realize the extent of 
 the disaster to Lee, and was disheartened by his 
 own losses, especially the disablement by wounds 
 of Sickles, Hancock, and other generals upon 
 whom he specially relied. Therefore, though 
 Hancock, from his stretcher, wrote him urging 
 immediate pursuit of the enemy, Meade decided 
 to wait until the next day, which was the Fourth 
 of July. Yet even this auspicious day passed 
 without action, Meade deciding that it should 
 be spent in burying the dead, caring for the 
 wounded, and bringing up supplies. A storm 
 came up late in the afternoon, and under cover 
 of this, and the succeeding night, Lee began to 
 retreat. By morning, when his movement was 
 discovered, he had passed through Fairfield Pass, 
 where he left a strong rear-guard, and was on 
 the other side of the Blue Ridge. 
 
 The President, grieved to learn that Meade had 
 allowed the enemy to slip out of his hands, heard 
 with joy on the same day that Major-General 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 185 
 
 William H. French had destroyed the pontoon 
 bridge by which Lee expected to retreat across 
 the Potomac. Then his high hopes for ending the 
 war by capturing the enemy's chief general and 
 army were cast down by indications that Meade 
 and French, and other officers in the field, pre- 
 ferred that the enemy should be allowed to escape. < 
 Troops were so slowly advancing down the 
 Cumberland Valley that, in Lincoln's words, they 
 were " quite as likely to capture the man in the 
 moon " as any part of Lee's army. On July 6 
 the President telegraphed from the Soldiers' 
 Home in Washington, where he was accustomed 
 to spend much of the heated term, to the general- 
 in-chief, saying: 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK: I left the telegraph office 
 a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the 
 phrase in [Meade's] Orders, No. 68, I believe 
 " Drive the invaders from our soil." Since that, I see 
 a dispatch from General French, saying the enemy 
 is crossing his wounded over the river in flats, with- 
 out saying why he does not stop it, or even intimating 
 a thought that it ought to be stopped. Still later, an- 
 other dispatch from General Pleasonton, by direction of 
 General Meade, to General French, stating that the 
 main army is halted because it is believed the rebels 
 are concentrating " on the road toward Hagerstown, 
 beyond Fairfield," and is not to move until it is ascer- 
 tained that the rebels intend to evacuate Cumberland 
 Valley. 
 
 These things all appear to me to be connected with 
 a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to 
 get the enemy across the river again without a further 
 collision, and they do not appear connected with a 
 purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I 
 do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter 
 is rejected, 
 
 If you are satisfied the latter purpose is entertained, 
 and is judiciously pursued, I am content. If you are not 
 so satisfied, please look to it. 
 
186 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 By repeated urgings from Halleck, Meade 
 brought his army up to the Potomac by the loth 
 in front of the strong intrenchments which 
 Lee had thrown up to protect himself while 
 repairing the bridge. Upon the I2th Meade 
 called a council of war of his officers. The 
 majority overruled his own desire to fight Lee. 
 Upon reporting this decision next day to Wash- 
 ington he was sharply reproved by Halleck for 
 calling the council, and was ordered not to let 
 the enemy escape. Upon the following morning 
 Lee crossed the river. Meade, knowing that 
 the President held him responsible for the 
 enemy's escape, asked to be relieved of his com- 
 mand. This request Mr. Lincoln refused 
 through Halleck. In every way he tried to make 
 the best of the disappointing situation. Feeling 
 that another change of command in the Army of 
 the Potomac was for the time inadvisable, and 
 that the present commander should feel that the 
 Government was heartily supporting him, the 
 President refrained from any remark that Meade 
 could construe as censure, and forced himself to 
 look only at the positive services the general had 
 rendered the Union. This is indicated in a letter 
 from him to General Howard upon July 21. 
 
 I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across 
 the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his 
 army would have ended the war, and because I believed 
 such destruction was perfectly easy believed that Gen- 
 eral Meade and his nolle army had expended all the 
 skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and 
 then let the crop go to waste. 
 
 Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I 
 had always believed making my belief a hobby, possi- 
 bly that the main Rebel army going north of the Poto- 
 ,mac could never return, if well attended to; and because 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 187 
 
 I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations 
 at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now 
 profoundly grateful for what was done, without criti- 
 cism for what was not done. 
 
 General Meade has my confidence, as a brave and 
 skillful officer and a true man. 
 
 The success of the navy continued throughout 
 1863. Admiral DuPont had maintained a very 
 successful blockade of the Atlantic coast. On 
 the 27th of February Commander Worden, of 
 Monitor fame, went in with the monitor Montauk 
 under the very guns of Fort McAllister near the 
 mouth of the Ogeechee River, and, coolly 
 receiving the fire of the fort, destroyed with his 
 shells the blockade-runner Nashville, which was 
 stranded in the river. On April 7 DuPont 
 attacked the defenses of Charleston with his 
 whole strength of ironclads and met with com- 
 plete failure. He retired, informing the Govern- 
 ment that it was impossible to take Charleston 
 by naval attack. On April 14 the President, 
 being desirous to hold Carolinian reenforce- 
 ents from Lee, gave orders to Admiral DuPont 
 and General Hunter to act in cooperation in 
 renewing the attack, either in earnest or as a 
 demonstration merely. 
 
 " Once again before Charleston, do not leave 
 till further orders from here." Admiral DuPont 
 chose to consider this order as a rebuke for his 
 failure to take Charleston at the first attempt, 
 and an ignoring of his opinion that the sea- 
 defenses were impregnable. Accordingly he 
 asked to be relieved of his command, as soon as 
 it was convenient for the Government to do so, 
 promising to obey his instructions faithfully in 
 the meantime. He was relieved late in June by 
 
1 88 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Admiral John A. Dahlgren. Shortly before this, 
 on June 17, a monitor of his fleet, the Weehawken, 
 had captured the swiftest and most powerful 
 ironclad of the Confederacy, the Atlanta, in an 
 engagement which lasted only a quarter of an 
 hour, and in which the Weehawken fired only 
 four shots. 
 
 Early in June General Hunter had also been 
 relieved of his command, being replaced by Gen- 
 eral Quincy A. Gillmore, who possessed unusual 
 ability as an engineer, and was therefore better 
 fitted than Hunter to reduce such a stronghold as 
 the Confederacy had, by this time, made of the 
 city of its birth. The President wrote to General 
 Hunter a letter of commendation for his dis- 
 tinguished services, assuring him that he had 
 been superseded for causes which seemed suf- 
 ficient for the Government, but which conveyed 
 no imputation upon his " known energy, efficiency 
 and patriotism." Secretary Welles sent a sirn- 
 iliar letter to Admiral DuPont, for, while an un- 
 sparing critic of official misconduct, in a case 
 like this the " Father Neptune " of the Cabinet 
 was as kindly-hearted as " Father Abraham " 
 himself. 
 
 During the summer of 1863 General Gillmore 
 and Admiral Dahlgren cooperated in the reduc- 
 tion of the strong harbor defenses of Charleston, 
 meeting with gratifying success in view of the 
 smallness of Gillmore's forces, a large part of 
 which was negro troops. On the gth of July 
 Morris Island was taken with the exception of 
 that part of it commanded by Fort Wagner. 
 Two assaults were made on this fort, one on July 
 ii and the other on July 18. Of the second as- 
 sault, which took place at nightfall, a negro regi- 
 
BURN SIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 189 
 
 ment led the advance. They were met by a deadly 
 fire from the defenders of the fort, which killed 
 their colonel, Robert George Shaw, a young Mas- 
 sachusetts Abolitionist, and swept them back in 
 disorder. Two brigades gained a foothold upon 
 the works, but were dislodged by the severe fire 
 of the enemy which killed their commanders. 
 The total loss was great, 1,500 men. The death 
 of Colonel Shaw was especially deplored in the 
 North. The indignity that the enemy intended 
 to his remains by " burying him under a layer 
 Qf his negroes " was celebrated by Northern poets 
 as the highest and most fitting honor that could 
 have been accorded him, and in later years 
 Harvard University, his Alma Mater, erected to 
 him one of the most artistic memorials in 
 America, the work of Augustus St. Gaudens. 
 
 General Gillmore advanced his works toward 
 the enemy by constructing parallel after parallel. 
 He built a battery (christened by his soldiers the 
 " Swamp Angel ") upon a morass, whence he 
 threw shells a distance of five miles into Charles- 
 ton. On the 1 7th of August, by a combined 
 bombardment of land batteries and gunboats, 
 Gillmore and Dahlgren pounded Fort Sumter 
 into a pile of ruins. And on September 5 they 
 began a furious attack upon Fort Wagner, which 
 resulted on the 7th in its evacuation by the enemy. 
 
 The burial of the dead at Gettysburg was a 
 duty which fell upon Pennsylvania and Governor 
 Curtin of that State, who set about performing 
 it in a fitting manner. The governors of the six- 
 teen other Northern States that were represented 
 in the battle gave him their hearty cooperation 
 in his design, which was to form a permanent 
 national cemetery upon the battlefield. Thurs- 
 
190 
 
 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 day, November 19, was set for the dedication 
 ceremonies, and Edward Everett, a veteran 
 orator of Massachusetts, was selected to deliver 
 the chief address. President Lincoln was in- 
 vited, in the words of the committee, to "for- 
 mally set apart these grounds to their sacred use 
 by a few appropriate remarks." 
 
 Mr. Everett delivered a long and eloquent 
 oration, befitting the occasion and honorable 
 to the distinguished orator. Mr. Lincoln then 
 gave his simple tribute, which would consign him 
 to immortality if he had no other title thereto. 
 When he had concluded, Mr. Everett seized him 
 with a fervent grasp of the hand and exclaimed 
 wistfully : " Ah, Mr. Lincoln ! how gladly I 
 would exchange all my hundred pages to be the 
 author of your twenty lines." 
 
 This is the authoritative text of the President's 
 speech : 
 
 Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought 
 forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in 
 liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men 
 are created equal. 
 
 Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing 
 whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so 
 dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great 
 battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate 
 a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those 
 who here gave their lives that that nation might live. 
 It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do 
 this. 
 
 But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate we can- 
 not consecrate we cannot hallow this ground. The 
 brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have 
 consecrated it far above our poor power to add or 
 detract. The world will little note nor long remember 
 what we say here, but it can never forget what they 
 did here. It is for us, the living rather, to be dedicated 
 here to the unfinished work which they who fought 
 
BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE 191 
 
 here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather 
 for us to be here dedicated to the great task remain- 
 ing before us that from these honored dead we take 
 increased devotion to that cause for which they gave 
 the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly 
 resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; 
 that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of 
 freedom ; and that government of the people, by the 
 people, for the people shall not perish from the earth. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE ARMY IN THE WEST 
 
 IN striking contrast to the favorable conditions 
 inaugurating the career of McClellan were the 
 straitened circumstances under which began the 
 upward rise of the man destined to become the 
 great soldier of the war Ulysses S. Grant. In 
 the Mexican War he had been faithful over the 
 few things committed to his charge as lieutenant, 
 chiefly in expeditiously handling with a few men 
 a large supply train. After this war, when 
 going in 1852 with his regiment to California by 
 way of Panama, he displayed the same skill and 
 dispatch in his care and transportation of sol- 
 diers who had been stricken with cholera on the 
 Chagres River, and left behind in his charge to 
 be sent forward as circumstances best permitted. 
 Grant was appointed Colonel of the Twenty-first 
 Illinois Volunteers by Governor Yates, and 
 assumed command on June 17. The regiment 
 was noted for insubordination, and Grant at once 
 set to work, in citizen's clothes and with a stick 
 for a sword, drilling them, patiently and perti- 
 naciously, but with little success in reducing 
 them to soldierly order. Accordingly, when 
 orders came to take the regiment to Quincy, 
 111., whence they were to be sent against the bush- 
 whackers in northern Missouri, Grant seized the 
 192 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 193 
 
 opportunity afforded for more drastic discipline 
 by marching them thither, instead of transport- 
 ing- them by rail. 
 
 On July 31 he was assigned to the command 
 of a sub-district under General Pope, and on 
 August 7 he was appointed a brigadier-general 
 of volunteers. On August 28 General Fremont 
 sent him to southeastern Missouri to concentrate 
 the scattered Federal forces in the region, and 
 to drive out the enemy, particularly from Bel- 
 mont on the Mississippi River, where it was 
 rumored that a rebel battery was established. 
 Grant discovered that the Confederates under 
 General Leonidas Polk were advancing along 
 the Kentucky shore, and before they could be 
 prevented would seize Columbus, which is situ- 
 ated on a high bluff commanding the river. 
 Accordingly he abandoned operations in Mis- 
 souri, and quickly formed an expedition, with 
 which, on September 5 and 6, he descended from 
 Cairo, 111., his headquarters, upon Paducah, Ky., 
 the possession of which, from its position at 
 the mouth of the Tennessee River and near that 
 of the Cumberland, was even more strategically 
 important than that of Columbus. Having ar- 
 ranged for the fortification of the place, he re- 
 turned to Cairo to forward reinforcements. 
 
 At the time of Grant's descent on Paducah, 
 General Anderson was transferring his head- 
 quarters from Cincinnati to Louisville. With 
 his two efficient subordinates, Brigadier-Generals 
 William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas, he 
 set about resisting the Confederate invasion of 
 Kentucky, which had assumed threatening pro- 
 portions, General F. K. Zollicoffer entering the 
 State through Cumberland Gap on September 
 
I 9 4 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 10, shortly after General Polk had captured 
 Columbus. 
 
 In cooperation with these movements, the 
 secession militia of the State under General 
 Simon B. Buckner occupied Bowling Green on 
 the i8th, and threatened to move on Frankfort, 
 the State capital, and disperse the Union Legis- 
 lature there assembled. 
 
 There was not only consternation throughout 
 northern Kentucky over this advance, but also 
 serious apprehension in the States north of the 
 Ohio River. Governor Oliver P. Morton of In- 
 diana wrote to President Lincoln asking for 
 arms and troops for the defense of the southern 
 boundary of his State, and in compliance the 
 President sent ten heavy guns, directing the 
 Governor to supply the troops. Later, Governor 
 Morton wrote again, urging the importance of 
 defending Louisville. To this Lincoln replied 
 on September 29 in a letter which displays his 
 thorough grasp of the military situation : 
 
 As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as 
 more important than I do, but I am compelled to watch 
 all points. While I write this I am, if not in range, at 
 least in hearing of cannon-shot from an army of ene- 
 mies more than 100,000 strong. I do not expect them 
 to capture this city; but I know they would if I were 
 to send the men and arms from here to defend Louis- 
 ville, of which there is not a single hostile armed 
 soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be 
 moving upon it from any distance. It is true, the army 
 in our front may make a half-circle around southward 
 and move on Louisville, but when they do we will make 
 a half-circle around northward and meet them; and 
 in the meantime we will get up what forces we can from 
 other sources to also meet them. 
 
 Within a day or so after writing* this letter to 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 195 
 
 Governor Morton, the President elaborated his 
 military policy in the following: 
 
 MEMORANDA FOR A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 
 
 On or about the 5th of October (the exact date to be" 
 determined hereafter) I wish a movement made to 
 seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting 
 Virginia and Tennessee near the mountain-pass called 
 Cumberland Gap. That point is now guarded against 
 us by Zollicoffer, with 6,000 or 8,000 rebels at Bar- 
 boursville. Ky., say twenty-five miles from the Gap, 
 toward Lexington. We have a force of 5,000 or 6,000 
 under General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, about 
 twenty-five miles from Lexington and seventy-five from 
 Zollicoffer's camp, on the road between the two. There 
 is not a railroad anywhere between Lexington and the 
 point to be seized, and along the whole length of which 
 the Union sentiment among the people largely predomi- 
 nates. We have military possession of the railroad from 
 Cincinnati to Lexington, and from Louisville to Lex- 
 ington, and some home guards, under General Critten- 
 den, are on the latter line. We have possession of 
 the railroad from Louisville to Nashville, Tenn., so 
 far as Muldraugh's Hill, about forty miles, and the 
 rebels have possession of that road all south of there. 
 At the Hill we have a force of 8,000, under General 
 Sherman, and about an equal force of rebels is a very 
 short distance south, under General Buckner. 
 
 We have a large force at Paducah, and a smaller 
 at Fort Holt, both on the Kentucky side, with some 
 at Bird's Point, Cairo, Mound City, Evansville, and 
 New Albany, all on the other side, and all which, with 
 the gunboats on the river, are perhaps sufficient to 
 guard the Ohio from Louisville to its mouth. 
 
 About supplies of troops, my general idea is that 
 all from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, 
 and Kansas, not now elsewhere, be left to Fremont. 
 All from Indiana and Michigan, not now elsewhere, be 
 sent to Anderson at Louisville. All from Ohio needed 
 in Western Virginia be sent there, and any remainder 
 be sent to Mitchel at Cincinnati, for Anderson. All 
 east of the mountains be appropriated to McClellan and 
 to the coast. 
 
196 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 As to movements, my idea is that the one for the 
 coast and that on Cumberland Gap be simultaneous, 
 and that in the meantime preparation, vigilant watching, 
 and the defensive only be acted upon; this, however, 
 not to apply to Fremont's operations in northern and 
 middle Missouri. That before these movements Thomas 
 and Sherman shall respectively watch but not attack 
 Zollicoffer and Buckner. That when the coast and Gap 
 movements shall be ready Sherman is merely to stand 
 fast, while all at Cincinnati and all at Louisville, with 
 all on the line, concentrate rapidly at Lexington, and 
 thence to Thomas's camp, joining him, and the whole 
 thence upon the Gap. It is for the military men to 
 decide whether they can find a pass through the moun- 
 tains at or near the Gap which cannot be defended 
 by the enemy with a greatly inferior force, and what 
 is to be done in regard to this. 
 
 The coast and Gap movements made, Generals Mc- 
 Clellan and Fremont, in their respective departments, 
 will avail themselves of any advantages the diversions 
 may present. 
 
 General Anderson was in poor health, and, in 
 view of the grave responsibility thrust upon him 
 of repelling the Confederate advance through 
 Kentucky, he resigned his position on October 8. 
 General Sherman was appointed to succeed him. 
 
 From the beginning Sherman had prophesied 
 that the war would be a long and bitter conflict, 
 and had received the sobriquet of " Crazy Billy " 
 because of this prediction. On assuming com- 
 mand, he at once began to urge upon the Gov- 
 ernor the necessity of supplying troops to his 
 command. About the middle of October, Secre- 
 tary Cameron, returning from his visit to Fre- 
 mont, stopped at Louisville to see Sherman. 
 
 President Lincoln, with his great political 
 genius and warm sympathy for the Southern 
 Unionists, had his mind and heart set upon re- 
 lieving the loyalists of East Tennessee, so sorely 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 197 
 
 oppressed by the Confederate Government. 
 Knowing the desire of his chief, Secretary Cam- 
 eron urged upon General Sherman that Cumber- 
 land Gap should be occupied and the East Ten- 
 nessee and Virginia railroad be seized, thus cut- 
 ting off " the artery that supplied the rebellion." 
 General Thomas had already expressed his will- 
 ingness to undertake this movement if four regi- 
 ments were supplied him. The Government, 
 however, had picked upon General Ormsby M. 
 Mitchel for the duty, whereat General Thomas 
 was offended and asked to be relieved. Sherman, 
 however, now superior to both Thomas and 
 Mitchel, persuaded Thomas to remain in his com- 
 mand, intimating that he would be his choice for 
 the task when the time came to execute it. 
 
 But Sherman was not ready to take the of- 
 fensive with his scant forces, and he directed 
 Thomas merely to hold Zollicoffer in check. He 
 himself grew despondent because of the failure 
 of the Government tp increase his forces, which 
 " were too small to do good, and too large to 
 sacrifice," and so, on November 6, he asked 
 that his command be transferred to some one of 
 " more sanguine mind," since he was " forced to 
 order according to his convictions." 
 
 Accordingly, on November 9, the Depart- 
 ment of the Ohio was formed out of Sherman's 
 forces, and General Don Carlos Buell, a per- 
 sonal friend of McClellan, now General-in-Chief, 
 was placed in command, with McClellan's par- 
 ticular injunctions to capture East Tennessee, 
 and, if possible, Nashville. By Lincoln's special 
 request Sherman was retained in the Louisville, 
 command. 
 
 Grant had not yet made good soldiers out of 
 
198 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 his troops, as was shown in the battle of Bel- 
 mont. Belmont was a steamboat landing on 
 the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, and here 
 the Confederates had established an encampment. 
 Against this Grant led an expedition on Novem- 
 ber 6 and 7, capturing the fortified camp after 
 a closely contested engagement. But his troops 
 gave themselves up to disorderly rejoicing, and 
 thereby offered the Confederate General Polk 
 an opportunity to retrieve his defeat by throw- 
 ing reinforcements across the river and driv- 
 ing the victors from the field in confusion. 
 
 The movement urged by President Lincoln 
 for the capture of East Tennessee, or, rather, for 
 the relief of the oppressed loyalists there, was 
 shelved by Buell, who had been appointed for the 
 express purpose of executing it, in favor of a 
 movement along the more direct and less ar- 
 duous route through Bowling Green against 
 Nashville, which, in view of his small force, 
 seemed much more feasible to him ; for having 
 an essentially military mind, he could not appre- 
 ciate the political importance of the relief of the 
 Tennessee loyalists that loomed so large in Lin- 
 coln's eyes as a means of dividing the South not 
 only into separate, disconnected geographical 
 sections, but also into parties of opposing po- 
 litical sentiment. Lincoln believed that if the 
 Tennessee loyalists were supported the suppressed 
 Union sentiment would be encouraged to revive 
 throughout the entire South, and lead to the 
 overthrow of the secessionists. 
 
 In spite of Lincoln's instructions, and a tele- 
 gram from McClellan, who heartily supported 
 the President in his plan, and a pleading message 
 from Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard that 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 199 
 
 he move to the relief of their fellow Tennesseean 
 loyalists, " oppressed and pursued as beasts of 
 the forest," Buell kept on concentrating troops at 
 Louisville, though he returned assuring, but 
 evasive, answers to Washington. Finally, on 
 January 4, 1862, Lincoln sent a direct inquiry: 
 " Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? " 
 In reply Buell, for the first time, revealed his in- 
 tentions, which were to do nothing that " should 
 render at all doubtful the success of a movement 
 against the great power of the rebellion in the 
 West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from 
 Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily 
 be concentrated at any point of that line which 
 is attacked singly." 
 
 To this cool confession Lincoln replied on 
 January 6, with great forbearance: 
 
 Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it 
 disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to Gen- 
 eral McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I 
 am not competent to criticise your views, and there- 
 fore what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the 
 two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south 
 of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it 
 cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which 
 Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the 
 midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while 
 Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the move- 
 ment on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in 
 your favor, rather than a disadvantage, assuming that 
 a movement towards Nashville is the main object. But 
 my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are 
 being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I 
 fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake 
 of personal protection. In this we lose the most val- 
 uable stake we have in the South. My dispatch, to 
 which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowl- 
 edge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard 
 of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know 
 
200 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the answer, which I cannot safely show them. They 
 would despair, possibly resign to go and save their fam- 
 ilies somehow, or die with them. I do not intend this 
 to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated 
 before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety. 
 
 General McClellan heartily indorsed the move- 
 ment against East Tennessee, since this would 
 undoubtedly divert, for defense of that region, 
 Confederate troops from reenforcing the army 
 which opposed him, and whose numbers he so 
 greatly magnified. He was sick at the time, and, 
 possibly embittered by his illness, he wrote Gen- 
 eral Buell a letter which, while polite in phrase, 
 was stinging in its censure. He told his sub- 
 ordinate that he had deceived him and disar- 
 ranged his plans. His letter closed with a cut- 
 ting inference that Buell was consulting his own 
 ambition rather than furthering the plans of his 
 chief and the highest good of the nation. 
 
 Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville 
 interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very 
 secondary importance in comparison with the immense 
 results that would arise from the adherence to our 
 cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North 
 Carolina, North Georgia, and Alabama; results that 
 I feel assured would ere long flow from the movement 
 I allude to. 
 
 Nevertheless Buell adhered to his plans, which 
 he thought too far advanced to be relinquished. 
 General Halleck, who had been asked by Presi- 
 dent Lincoln to cooperate with General Buell by 
 attacking Columbus, in reply on January 9, ex- 
 pressed his disapproval of the movement 
 against Bowling Green as inviting a disaster 
 similar to Bull Run. He said : " To operate on 
 exterior lines against an enemy occupying a cen- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 201 
 
 tral position will fail, as it always has failed, 
 ninety-nine cases out of a hundred/' 
 
 Upon this letter Lincoln wrote on January 10 
 the heart-sick indorsement : " It is exceedingly 
 discouraging. As everywhere else nothing can 
 be done." 
 
 Realizing that the War Department required 
 thorough reorganization, the President next day 
 procured the resignation of Simon Cameron, 
 Secretary of War, by appointing him Minister to 
 Russia, replacing him in the War Department by 
 Edwin M. Stanton. 
 
 For three days after Lincoln wrote his melan- 
 choly indorsement upon Halleck's letter, he 
 cogitated upon the parallel that general had 
 drawn between the cases of Bull Run (Manas- 
 sas) and Bowling Green. On the I3th he wrote 
 to both Buell and Halleck a letter, in which he 
 said: 
 
 I state my general idea of this war to be that we 
 have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater 
 facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision ; 
 that we must fail unless we can find some way of mak- 
 ing our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this 
 can only be done by menacing him with superior forces 
 at different points at the same time, so that we can 
 safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and 
 if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear 
 to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the 
 weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate. Sup- 
 pose, last summer, when Winchester ran away to re- 
 enforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, 
 but had seized and held Winchester. . . . Applying the 
 principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall 
 menace Columbus and " down river " generally, while 
 you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If 
 the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not 
 retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, 
 but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, 
 
202 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. 
 It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which 
 I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Ten- 
 nessee line is so long and over so bad a road. 
 
 In the meantime General Halleck had decided 
 to meet the President's wishes in part, and, on 
 the same day that he wrote his discouraging let- 
 ter to the President, had ordered General Grant 
 and Flag-Officer Foote to make a combined mili- 
 tary and naval demonstration to the south of Pa- 
 ducah, which should lead the enemy to suppose 
 an attack was to be made on Fort Donelson at 
 Dover, Tenn., on the Cumberland River. This 
 reconnaissance, made during the following week, 
 discovered the weakness of Fort Henry, on the 
 Tennessee River, parallel with Fort Donelson. 
 
 General Buell had also responded to the prod- 
 dings from Washington so far as to order Gen- 
 eral Thomas to attack General Zollicoffer at his 
 fortified camp at Mill Springs on the Cumber- 
 land River, whither Zollicoffer had advanced 
 from Cumberland Gap. Here, on January 19, 
 with six regiments Thomas defeated ten of the 
 enemy's. General Zollicoffer was killed, and, de- 
 moralized by the death of their leader, the Con- 
 federates dispersed among the mountains, leaving 
 Cumberland Gap open for entrance into East 
 Tennessee. Had not Grant already shown the 
 way by which Western Tennessee could be cap- 
 tured, Buell would undoubtedly have invaded the 
 State by this eastern door. 
 
 Grant, the man of action, by repeated urging, 
 had secured an order from Halleck to attack 
 Fort Henry. Taking 15,000 men on trans- 
 ports, and accompanied by Foote with seven 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 203 
 
 gunboats, he steamed up the Tennessee River, 
 landing four miles below the fort on February 
 4. He captured it easily on the 5th, since Gen- 
 eral Lloyd Tilghman, its commander, convinced 
 that it would fall, had sent all his forces but one 
 artillery company on to Fort Donelson. Grant 
 telegraphed to his chief, " Fort Henry is ours. I 
 shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 
 8th." 
 
 The Confederate general, Albert Sidney John- 
 ston, at once fell back from Bowling Green, 
 sending 8,000 men under Generals Buckner and 
 Floyd to Fort Donelson (alsoreenforced by 4,000 
 under Pillow from Columbus), and 14,000 men 
 under Hardee to the defense of Nashville. Ris- 
 ing waters delayed the plans of Grant a week. In 
 the meantime President Lincoln threw his whole 
 soul into encouragement of the enterprise, as his 
 telegram to Halleck on the i6th gives evidence. 
 
 You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be 
 overwhelmed from outside ; to prevent which latter will, 
 I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of 
 yourself and Buell, acting in full cooperation. Colum- 
 bus will not get at Grant, but the for.ce from Bowling 
 Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling" 
 Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with 
 the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to 
 rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to 
 Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly 
 towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they 
 go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Mean- 
 time Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces 
 from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. 
 Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the 
 Upper Cumberland dash across almost unresisted, and 
 cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tenn. ? In 
 the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why 
 could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge 
 
204 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donel- 
 son is vastly important, and I beg you to put your 
 soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell. 
 
 Even while this telegram was in transmission 
 Buckner was proposing to Grant an armistice to 
 arrange terms of capitulation, to which Grant 
 replied : " No terms except unconditional and im- 
 mediate surrender can be accepted. I propose 
 to move immediately upon your works." 
 
 To these " ungenerous and unchivalric terms," 
 as Buckner characterized them, the Confed- 
 erate general felt himself compelled to yield, 
 and thereupon he surrendered. That same day 
 Grant telegraphed to Halleck : " We have taken 
 Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prison- 
 ers, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod R. 
 Johnson ; also about 20,000 stands of arms, 48 
 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 
 4,000 horses and large quantities of commissary 
 stores." 
 
 Because of this sweeping victory the whole 
 country rang with Grant's praises and, recog- 
 nizing in him the uncompromising spirit destined 
 to end the war, it dubbed him from the striking 
 phrase in his reply to Buckner which by happy 
 chance bore the initials of his Christian names 
 " Unconditional Surrender Grant." 
 
 General Halleck lost no time in attempting to 
 secure honor and an increase of power for him- 
 self out of the victory of his subordinate. On 
 February 17 he telegraphed to General McClellan : 
 
 Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of 
 volunteers, and give me command in the West. I ask 
 this in return for Fort Henry and Donelson. 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 205 
 
 On the next day Halleck sent a frantic mes- 
 sage to Buell, in which he said : 
 
 To remove all question as to rank I have asked the 
 President to make you a major-general. Come down 
 to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of 
 the West is to be fought in that vicinity. . . . Throw 
 all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland. 
 
 It was Halleck's intention to have Buell move 
 up the Cumberland, while Grant acted on the 
 Tennessee, with himself in command of both 
 movements. This command he demanded of Mc- 
 Clellan in telegrams on the iQth and 2Oth. Mc- 
 Clellan answered, temporizing until he should 
 hear from Buell. Secretary Stanton, on behalf 
 of the President, who was at the bedside of his 
 dying son, William Wallace Lincoln, telegraphed 
 to Halleck on the 22d that the President did not 
 think any change in military organization ad- 
 visable, and desired Halleck and Buell to coop- 
 erate as equals. 
 
 Meantime General Grant and Flag-Officer 
 Foote, unconcerned by this contest for honors, 
 had occupied Qarksville. Buell hurried forward 
 a division of his troops under Major-General 
 William Nelson, and by Grant's orders these oc- 
 cupied Nashville on the 25th. On May i Halleck 
 ordered Grant to proceed farther into Tennessee 
 upon a railroad-destroying and telegraph-cutting 
 expedition. Owing to rising waters, Grant did 
 not at once obey the order; he also failed to re- 
 port to Halleck. His chief reported to Wash- 
 ington that Grant had become insubordinate, 
 probably because of a sense of importance he had 
 acquired from the popular acclaim of his capture 
 of Fort Donelson. McClellan, with Stanton's 
 
206 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 approval, answered : " Do not hesitate to arrest 
 him at once, if the service requires it, and place 
 C. F. Smith [who led the second division at the 
 storming of Fort Donelson] in command." 
 Halleck at once ordered Grant to remain at Fort 
 Henry, and he gave the command of the pro- 
 posed expedition into Tennessee to Smith. Grant, 
 giving an explanation of his seeming insubor- 
 dination, obeyed. Later, he asked to be relieved 
 from duty; not only did Halleck refuse this re- 
 quest, but, because convinced that Grant had 
 been guilty of only a technical violation of mili- 
 tary discipline, he reinstated him in his old com- 
 mand on March 13. 
 
 While Grant was justifying Halleck's objec- 
 tion to a frontal attack on Johnston at Bowling 
 Green by cutting in behind, Brigadier-General 
 Samuel R. Curtis, another subordinate of the 
 commander of the Western Department, had 
 rendered the Confederate general Price's posi- 
 tion at Springfield, Mo., untenable, and caused 
 him to retreat fighting into Arkansas. On 
 February 18, in announcing the victory of Fort 
 Donelson to his troops, General Curtis congratu- 
 lated them on their own heroic achievement : 
 
 You have moved in the most inclement weather, over 
 the worst of roads, making extraordinary long marches, 
 subsisting mainly on meat without salt, and for the 
 past six days you have been under the fire of the 
 fleeing enemy. You have driven him out of Missouri, 
 restored the Union flag to the virgin soil of Arkansas, 
 and triumphed in two contests. 
 
 The Confederate commander of the Trans- 
 Mississippi district south of Price's, Major-Gen- 
 eral Earl Van Dorn, marching north, joined 
 Price and McCulloch's detachments and, assum- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 207 
 
 ing command of the combined forces, attacked 
 Curtis on March 6 at Pea Ridge, Ark., and 
 flanked him during the night. Curtis re-formed 
 his line and resisted the Confederate attack 
 throughout the next day, killing General McCul- 
 loch and other Confederate officers. On the 8th 
 Curtis took the offensive and so completely 
 routed the enemy that their scattered portions 
 were never again united. 
 
 Upon the evacuation of Columbus, the Con- 
 federates occupied and fortified Island No. 10 in 
 a bend in the Mississippi River, on the line be- 
 tween Kentucky and Tennessee, and New 
 Madrid, Mo., a few miles to the north and 
 down the river. Halleck sent General Pope 
 against New Madrid, who, on March 3, cut off 
 the enemy's reinforcements and supplies by 
 erecting batteries on the river below. On the 
 1 3th the Confederates evacuated the town, going 
 up the river to Island No. 10. Thereupon Flag- 
 Officer Foote was summoned from Cairo with 
 nine gunboats to reduce the place. Two of his 
 vessels ran safely by the enemy's batteries at 
 night to act as protection in transporting Pope's 
 soldiers to the Tennessee shore, where Island No. 
 10 might be attacked. To serve as transports 
 four steamboats and six coal barges were 
 brought to New Madrid with great engineering 
 skill, partly by bayou and partly overland, 
 across the chord of the arc of the river in which 
 the island lies. 
 
 The Confederates did not wait to be attacked, 
 but on April 7 began a retreat southward 
 through Tennessee, leaving a small garrison to 
 surrender to Foote. Pope intercepted the fugi- 
 tives, and took 6,000 prisoners. 
 
2o8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 The railroad-wrecking expedition under Gen- 
 eral C. F. Smith had established a base for its 
 operations at Pittsburg Landing, on the west 
 bank of the Tennessee River, within striking 
 distance of Corinth, Miss., an important rail- 
 road town. Grant, resuming his command on 
 March 15, assembled five divisions of his forces 
 at this point. By March 23 Generals Beauregard 
 and A. S. Johnston had united their armies at 
 Corinth. On Saturday, April 5, they stole a 
 march on Grant, encamping that night two miles 
 from Pittsburg Landing. At five o'clock next 
 morning they began the attack by driving in the 
 Federal pickets. Although taken by surprise, 
 the nearest Federal division under Generals 
 Sherman and B. M. Prentiss quickly formed in 
 battle near Shiloh Church and stubbornly op- 
 posed the Confederate advance. But, although 
 reenforced by the other divisions , they were 
 slowly pressed backward upon the left and 
 right, the center under Prentiss, reenforced by 
 General W. H. L. Wallace's division, standing 
 firm by Grant's orders. The battle continued all 
 day, and, by five o'clock in the afternoon, the 
 Union center, commanded by Prentiss alone for 
 Wallace had been mortally wounded was cap- 
 tured. But the Confederate troops were some- 
 what demoralized by the loss of General John- 
 ston, who had been killed two hours before, and, 
 worn out by the gallant resistance of the center, 
 which they called " the Hornet's Nest," they 
 hesitated to press on in their course. This was 
 against the Federal left, which had fallen back 
 to the river, where it was protected by a line of 
 artillery on a crest at right angles to the river, 
 and by the gunboats which commanded the hoi- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 209 
 
 low between the armies. The Federal line 
 shortened the right, closing up the central gap. 
 Its position was stronger than before, and, since 
 the forces were fairly equal, 40,000 attacking 
 Confederates to 33,000 defending Federals, and 
 the losses were the same, about 10,000 on each 
 side, Beauregard, now in sole command of the 
 Confederates, realized that he would have a still 
 harder contest on the morrow if he would drive 
 the Federals into the river. 
 
 Grant had been absent on Saturday at Savan- 
 nah, nine miles down the river on the eastern 
 bank, awaiting reinforcements from Buell, which 
 arrived on that day. He landed at the battle- 
 field early Sunday morning, April 6. Grasping 
 the situation he summoned to his aid his sixth 
 division under General Lew. Wallace, stationed 
 at Crump's Landing six miles down the river on 
 the western bank, and Buell's forces at Savan- 
 nah. The arrival of these at nightfall and on the 
 next morning swelled the effective Federal 
 forces to nearly 50,000 men, and justified Buell 
 and Grant taking the offensive in the morning. 
 This they did, driving back the disheartened and 
 demoralized Confederates to Corinth. 
 
 While the Federal army was forcing its way 
 down the Mississippi, the Federal navy was 
 coining up the river from its mouth in a progress 
 of even more glorious conquest. In September, 
 1861, Ship Island, midway between Mobile and 
 New Orleans, had been occupied by the Federal 
 Government, and, on November 15, a council, 
 consisting of the President, General McClellan, 
 Secretary Welles, his assistant secretary, Fox, 
 and Commander David D. Porter, determined 
 upon an expedition from Ship Island as a base 
 
210 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 against New Orleans. The expedition was 
 placed in command of Captain David G. Far- 
 ragut, a Southerner, who had proved his loyalty 
 to the Government he had served for almost half 
 a century by leaving his home at Norfolk and 
 coming North at the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 Early in February Farragut sailed from 
 Hampton Roads for Ship Island in the steam- 
 sloop Hartford, which he made his flagship. After 
 him followed Porter with a mortar flotilla, and 
 General Butler with 6,000 soldiers. On April 18 
 Porter's flotilla appeared before Forts Jackson 
 and St. Philip, the defenses of New Orleans on 
 either side of the river below the city. For five 
 days Porter bombarded these forts, especially 
 Fort Jackson, furiously. Upon the fifth Farra- 
 gut sent in his ships, two gunboats having previ- 
 ously cut away by night a barrier of rafts and 
 hulks stretched across the river. He ran the 
 gauntlet in two divisions of respectively eight 
 and nine ships, pouring in broadsides upon the 
 forts as they passed them and receiving a hail of 
 metal in return, by which all the ships were more 
 or less riddled. Three of the gunboats were so 
 injured that they returned to the mortar flotilla. 
 
 The Hartford was set burning by a fire-raft, 
 but the flames were quickly extinguished. 
 Beyond the forts the fleet encountered the Con- 
 federate gunboat flotilla, including an ineffective 
 ram called the Manassas, and destroyed them all. 
 
 The few Confederate forces in New Orleans 
 destroyed their war material and evacuated the 
 city before Farragut arrived, on April 25. For 
 several days the Mayor of the city temporized 
 about surrendering it. During this period a 
 Union flag, that had been hoisted over the Mint 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 211 
 
 by Farragut's order, was hauled down and 
 trampled upon by citizens, one of whom was 
 hanged by General Butler some weeks later for 
 the act. Finally Farragut sent marines, who re- 
 placed the Rebel flags on the public buildings 
 with Union ones and took forcible possession of 
 the city. 
 
 Already, on the 28th, Fort Jackson, in which 
 there was a mutiny, and Fort St. Philip capitu- 
 lated, leaving the way clear for Butler's troops to 
 enter the city. On May I Farragut turned its 
 possession over to him. Of Butler's strong and 
 effective military administration of New Orleans, 
 in which he fed the hungry of the city, cleaned 
 its streets, prevented the entrance of yellow 
 fever, and sternly punished and repressed insult 
 to his Government as represented by the Union 
 flag and the persons of Union soldiers, there is 
 not space here to tell in detail, or to present a 
 justification. Suffice it to say that Lincoln 
 heartily approved of this administration. On De- 
 cember 12, 1862, the President sent a message to 
 Congress with a present of three swords, 
 formerly the property of General David E. 
 Twiggs of Mexican War fame, which had been 
 forwarded to him by General Butler, and recom- 
 mended that, if Congress should dispose of them 
 in compliment of military service, General Butler 
 be entitled to the first consideration. This recom- 
 mendation was, of course, adopted. 
 
 Farragut proceeded up the Mississippi and, by 
 May 20, when he arrived before Vicksburg, he 
 had captured all the important places on the 
 river between New Orleans and that city. It 
 was evident that the Confederates designed to 
 concentrate all their available strength to hold 
 
212 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Vicksburg, the " Gibraltar of the West." To- 
 ward it Beauregard fell back with his 50,000 men 
 from Corinth on May 29, when Halleck, who as- 
 sumed command of the Federal forces after the 
 battle of Pittsburg Landing, had made Corinth 
 untenable by a careful and leisurely siege. On 
 June 6 the Federal gunboats engaged in a spec- 
 tacular contest with the Confederate flotilla be- 
 fore Memphis, and won a signal victory, sink- 
 ing four of the enemy's gunboats and pursuing 
 and capturing three of the four that remained. 
 The Confederate strength in the West was now 
 confined and concentrated in central Mississippi. 
 Halleck's departure to Washington, to become 
 General-in-Chief of the Union armies, left two 
 generals in command of the Western armies at 
 the front, Grant at the head of the Army of the 
 Tennessee and Buell at the head of the Army of 
 the Cumberland. Grant held his line from Mem- 
 phis to Corinth, but because of the scantiness of 
 his forces, detachments having been sent to 
 strengthen Buell, and the new levies going all to 
 McClellan, was unable to take the offensive. 
 This the enemy did about the middle of Septem- 
 ber, General Price attacking and capturing luka, 
 twenty miles southeast of Corinth, in a move- 
 ment designed to join his forces with Van 
 Dorn's, near Ripley, thirty miles southwest of 
 Corinth. Grant sent Generals Rosecrans and E. 
 O. C. Ord to recapture the town and prevent the 
 junction of the Confederate forces. Owing to 
 lack of concert between the Union detachments, 
 Rosecrans bore the brunt of the battle alone, and, 
 on September 19 was repulsed, the enemy suc- 
 cessfully withdrawing to Ripley. Van Dorn took 
 command of the united forces, and, on October 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 213 
 
 3, attacked Corinth, intending to break his way 
 through the Union line at this point to join Gen- 
 eral Braxton Bragg in Kentucky. Rosecrans, in 
 command of Corinth, beat the enemy back, and 
 Ord, coming to Rosecrans' aid from Bolivar, 
 Tenn., hastened Van Dorn's retreat. General 
 Rosecrans was promoted to the command of 
 the Army of the Cumberland for his victory, re- 
 placing Buell, whose delay in going to the aid of 
 the loyal East Tennesseeans had lost him the con- 
 fidence of the President. 
 
 General Buell had spent a large portion of the 
 summer in preparing to attack Chattanooga, the 
 gateway from the South into East Tennessee. 
 It was the enemy, however, that took the of- 
 fensive. General Braxton Bragg, in charge of 
 the forces against Buell, late in August sent 
 General Kirby Smith with a detachment through 
 Cumberland Gap into eastern Kentucky, where, 
 on the 29th, he defeated a smaller Union force 
 under General William Nelson. Marching north- 
 ward, he occupied Lexington and Frankfort, the 
 state capital, where he established a Confederate 
 State Government. He even threatened Cincin- 
 nati, causing a hasty muster for the defense of 
 that place of Ohio farmers, who flocked into the 
 city with their shotguns and rifles, from which 
 they received the name of " Squirrel-hunters." 
 
 Bragg set out for Louisville through central 
 Tennessee. Buell, believing that his objective 
 point was Nashville, massed his forces at Mur- 
 freesboro, thirty-five miles to the southeast, to 
 intercept him. But Bragg slipped by, and so 
 secured a considerable start in the race for Louis- 
 ville. However, Bragg lingered on the way to 
 capture a Union garrison at Munfordville, Ky., 
 
214 
 
 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 thus enabling Buell and Thomas to overtake him. 
 Lacking supplies, Bragg feared to risk battle, 
 and turned aside from the road to Louisville to 
 Bardstown, in order to be near Kirby Smith at 
 Lexington, whom he had furnished with extra 
 supplies and equipment for the Kentucky volun- 
 teers they expected to enroll an anticipation 
 which utterly failed of fulfilment. 
 
 Arriving at Louisville, General Buell found an 
 order awaiting him, which directed him to tarn 
 over his command to General Thomas. Thomas 
 earnestly protested to the Government against 
 the order, and it was withdrawn. Buell, with 
 Thomas as his second in command, then ad- 
 vanced against the enemy. On October 8 they 
 came upon Bragg at Perryville, near Harrods- 
 burg, where he had ordered Smith to join him 
 with his forces. Chiefly by the gallantry of 
 Brigadier-General Philip H. Sheridan the bat- 
 tle was won for the Union forces. Following 
 hard after the retreating enemy, Buell drove him 
 into East Tennessee, where he desisted from pur- 
 suit and returned to Nashville. For his failure 
 to follow Bragg the President severely repri- 
 manded him in a telegram sent through Halleck, 
 on the 1 9th. 
 
 The capture of East Tennessee should be the main 
 object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of 
 the enemy's resources ; majte it the heart of yours. 
 Your army can live there if the enemy's can. You 
 must in a great measure live upon the country, paying 
 for your supplies where proper, and levying contribu- 
 tions where necessary. I am directed by the President 
 to say to you that your army must enter East Ten- 
 nessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while 
 the roads are passable. Once between the enemy and 
 Nashville, there will be no serious difficulty in reopen- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 215 
 
 ing your communications with that place. He does not 
 understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, 
 live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit 
 the inferiority of our troops and of our generals. Once 
 hold the valley of the upper Tennessee, and the opera- 
 tions of guerrillas in that State and Kentucky will soon 
 cease. 
 
 To this General Buell shrewdly replied : " In- 
 stead of imitating the enemy's plan [cutting loose 
 from communications and marching with in- 
 sufficient supplies], I should say that his failure 
 had been in a measure due to his peculiar meth- 
 od." Finding Buell incorrigible, the Government, 
 on October 24, ordered him to turn over his 
 command to General Rosecrans, the victor of 
 Corinth. Rosecrans began to accumulate sup- 
 plies at Nashville, as if to go into winter quar- 
 ters. General Bragg thereupon went into winter 
 quarters at Murfreesboro, about thirty miles 
 southeast of Nashville, on the road to Chat- 
 tanooga, sending half of his cavalry, the one arm 
 of service in which he was greatly superior to 
 Rosecrans, some against Grant and some to Ken- 
 tucky. Hearing of this, Rosecrans marched 
 against him, arriving before Murfreesboro on 
 December 30. Here they found Bragg's army 
 intrenched north of the town to the east and 
 west of a stream called Stone or Stone's River. 
 Major-Generals A. McD. McCook, George M. 
 Thomas, and Thomas L. Crittenden commanded 
 respectively the right, center, and left of the 
 Federal line. These were opposed respectively 
 by Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, Lieu- 
 tenant-General Leonidas Polk, and Major-Gen- 
 eral John C. Breckinridge, with Major-General 
 John P. McCown commanding the reserves. 
 
216 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Rosecrans's plan of battle and Bragg's were 
 identical : Holding firm on the right and turning 
 upon the center as a pivot, to bend back and 
 flank the enemy's right, thus getting to his rear 
 and on the road to his headquarters. Bragg was 
 more successful in his plan at the beginning than 
 Rosecrans. By the use of McCown's reserves, 
 he overlapped McCook and crushed his extreme 
 right, pressed back his center, but was held by 
 his left under Sheridan. Rosecrans was forced 
 to desist from his attack on the Confederate 
 right under Breckinridge, and, holding him en- 
 gaged sufficiently to prevent him reenforcing the 
 Confederate left, he diverted Thomas's forces to 
 the defense of the Federal right. The winter's 
 day came to a close with the lines of battle at right 
 angles to those of the morning. Rosecrans drew 
 in his left toward the center during the night, ob- 
 serving which on the morrow Bragg telegraphed 
 to Richmond that the enemy had yielded his 
 strong point and was falling back. " We occupy 
 the whole field, and shall follow. . . . God has 
 granted us a happy New Year." All of the sec- 
 ond day Rosecrans held the defensive in his com- 
 pact formation; then, on January 2, he sent 
 Crittenden forward again to occupy his old posi- 
 tion. Breckinridge assailed him impetuously, 
 and was driven back in rout, losing 2,000 men in 
 forty minutes. On the 3d Crittenden would 
 have captured Murfreesboro had not the con- 
 tinuing rain made the ground impassable for 
 artillery. Bragg, repulsed in his attempt to turn 
 the Federal right, therefore prepared to retreat, 
 doing so at midnight of the 3d. Rosecrans oc- 
 cupied Murfreesboro on the 4th, but refrained 
 from pursuit owing to the heavy condition of the 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 217 
 
 roads. Rosecrans had won Kentucky and West- 
 ern Tennessee for the Union, and he and his 
 troops well deserved the congratulations sent by 
 the President on the 5th : " Please tender to all, 
 and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for 
 your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless 
 courage." 
 
 Rosecrans was not magnanimous enough to 
 receive this praise as the highest reward of 
 service, but clamored for military honors at the 
 expense of his fellow generals, in particular, 
 Grant, whose commission as major-general of 
 volunteers ante-dated his. Rosecrans asked that 
 his commission should date from December, 
 1861, which would give him precedence over the 
 captor of Fort Donelson. But the President, dis- 
 gusted with his mean and selfish ambition, put 
 back the date only to March 2, 1862, and wrote 
 him a letter in which he said : 
 
 Now as to your request that your commission should 
 date from December, 1861. Of course you expected 
 to gain something by this; but you should remember 
 that precisely so much as you should gain by it others 
 would lose by it. If the thing you sought had been 
 exclusively ours, we would have given it cheerfully; 
 but, being the right of other men, we having a merely 
 arbitrary power over it, the taking it from them and 
 giving it to you became a more delicate matter and 
 more deserving of consideration. Truth to speak, I 
 do not appreciate this matter of rank on paper as you 
 officers do. The world will not forget that you fought 
 the battle of Stone River, and it will never care a fig 
 whether you rank General Grant on paper or he so 
 ranks you. 
 
 In the meantime General Grant was attending 1 
 quietly to his duty, working in close connection 
 with Halleck, between whom and himself there 
 
218 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 now existed the utmost harmony. On Novem- 
 ber 1 1 the General-in-Chief telegraphed him : 
 " You have command of all troops sent to your 
 department, and have permission to fight the 
 enemy where you please." Grant, therefore, set 
 out to capture Vicksburg, which was under 
 Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton, with 
 whom the Confederate Government had replaced 
 Van Dorn after the latter's defeat at Corinth. In 
 the course of a month Grant extended the con- 
 quest of Mississippi as far south as Grenada, 
 causing the Confederate Government to place 
 General Joseph E. Johnston in command and 
 against him. Grant then ordered Sherman to 
 lead a cooperating expedition against Vicks- 
 burg by the Mississippi River. Sherman started 
 on the 2Oth of December. Then the superiority 
 of the enemy in cavalry made itself felt: 
 Lieutenant-General Nathan B. Forrest, the most 
 brilliant cavalry leader of the western Confeder- 
 ates, broke Grant's lines of communication with 
 the North, and General Van Dorn, in a similar 
 cavalry raid, captured on December 20 his sup- 
 plies at Holly Springs, thereby effectually check- 
 ing Grant's advance. Sherman arrived at Milli- 
 ken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, on 
 December 25. Cut off from communication with 
 his chief, he was ignorant of his movements. 
 Nevertheless, after two days' reconnaissance, he 
 ordered General Frank P. Blair, Jr., and Colonel 
 John F. De Courcey to charge with their bri- 
 gades upon the enemy's strong works at Chicka- 
 saw Bluffs, several miles up the Yazoo from its 
 mouth, and north of Vicksburg. They were 
 beaten back with the loss of one man in three. 
 Sherman retired to Milliken's Bend, where he 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 219 
 
 found General McQernand waiting with orders 
 from Washington through Grant to supersede 
 him. Sherman, smarting under the degradation, 
 asked McClernand for a chance to redeem his ill- 
 fortune by attacking an important fort forty 
 miles up the Arkansas River, called by the Con- 
 federates Fort Hindman, and by the Federals. 
 Arkansas Post. McClernand thought so well of 
 the proposition that he led the expedition him- 
 self. With the aid of Porter's flotilla he cap- 
 tured the fort on January u, 1863. 
 
 The President had been influenced by political 
 considerations to give the command to McCler- 
 nand, who was a Democrat, and a former mem- 
 ber of Congress. Grant was incensed that a 
 civilian soldier had been forced upon him, taking- 
 the place of his favorite subordinate, Sherman, a 
 West Pointer, and he resented the success of Mc- 
 Clernand in a manner that would have been 
 harsh even if the expedition had ended in failure. 
 McClernand replied with natural indignation, in 
 an insolent and insubordinate tone. Halleck, who- 
 had already been in controversy with McCler- 
 nand, gave Grant a loose rein in the matter, with 
 the result that McClernand eventually was re- 
 lieved from the command. On January 22 the 
 President wrote a conciliatory and at the same 
 time reproving letter to the man whose ambitions 
 he himself had unwisely and unadvisedly at- 
 tempted to further. 
 
 I have too many family controversies, so to speak, 
 already on my hands to voluntarily, or so long as I 
 can avoid it, take up another. You are now doing^ 
 well well for the country and well for yourself much 
 better than you could possibly be if engaged in open 
 war with General Halleck. Allow me to beg that, for 
 
220 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 your sake, for my sake, and for the country's sake, 
 you give your whole attention to the better work. 
 
 Your success upon the Arkansas was both brilliant 
 and valuable, and is fully appreciated by the country 
 and government. 
 
 It was on the 29th of January, 1863, that 
 Grant had taken personal charge of the opera- 
 tions against Vicksburg, which ended in the cap- 
 ture of that stronghold. Upon that day he ar- 
 rived at Young's Point, the headquarters of the 
 Union army on the west bank of the Mississippi, 
 opposite the mouth of the Yazoo River. His 
 forces were 50,000 soldiers, and a fleet of gun- 
 boats under Admiral Porter, carrying 280 guns. 
 The problem presented was to reach the high 
 grounds behind Vicksburg, the only point from 
 which the place could be successfully reduced, 
 To gain this position it was necessary for the 
 troops to get below the town and cross over to 
 the east bank of the river. Grant wasted several 
 months in constructing a canal across the loop of 
 the river, which bent to the east at Vicksburg, 
 and, upon the failure of this engineering work 
 owing to floods, in trying to divert the course of 
 the river itself through Lake Providence into the 
 Red River, an enterprise which was also unsuc- 
 cessful. Then General Grant determined to take 
 the bull by the horns and run the Vicksburg 
 batteries with the gunboats and transports, 
 marching his forces across the peninsula on the 
 west bank. The passage of the batteries was 
 successfully accomplished on the night of April 
 1 6. Ordering Sherman to make a feigned at- 
 tack on Haines's Bluff to hold Pemberton's forces 
 in Vicksburg, on the 3Oth of the month Grant 
 crossed the river with his main army, and on the 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 221 
 
 following day defeated a force under Brigadier- 
 General J. S. Bowen, near Port Gibson. On May 
 3 he entered Grand Gulf, which had been evacu- 
 ated by the enemy. By this time B. H. Grierson, 
 whom Grant had sent through Mississippi upon 
 a destructive, cavalry raid, had joined Banks's 
 army at Baton Rouge. The President expected 
 that Grant would proceed south and assist Banks 
 and Farragut in the reduction of Port Hudson, a 
 Confederate stronghold, twenty miles north of 
 Baton Rouge, and thus effect a junction of all 
 the Federal forces on the Lower Mississippi, and 
 clear the river for supplies from New Orleans, 
 in the campaign against Vicksburg. But Grant 
 feared more a union of the Confederate forces 
 than he desired an increase of his own. General 
 Joseph E. Johnston was moving from Jackson, 
 fifty miles east of Vicksburg, to reenforce Pem- 
 berton. Grant determined to prevent this junc- 
 tion at any cost. He ordered Sherman, whose 
 demonstration against Pemberton had success- 
 fully accomplished its object, to join him at 
 Grand Gulf; when Sherman did so on the 6th, 
 Grant cut loose from his supplies and moved 
 rapidly against Johnston. On the I2th he met 
 him at Raymond marching westward, and de- 
 feated him and dispersed his troops. On the I4th 
 he captured Jackson. Then he marched swiftly 
 toward Vicksburg. On the i6th he attacked 
 Pemberton in a strong position at Champion's 
 Hill, and completely routed him. The enemy 
 made a stand at Big Black River, but was driven 
 across it on the I7th with heavy loss. On the 
 1 8th Pemberton was completely invested in 
 Vicksburg and so cut off from all supplies. For 
 six weeks Grant bombarded the city. By this 
 
222 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 time Pemberton's stores were exhausted, and, 
 realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he 
 capitulated to Grant's terms of " unconditional 
 surrender." The victor was generous, however; 
 he paroled all the prisoners, supplied them with 
 rations, and allowed each officer to retain his side 
 arms, and, if mounted, his horse. On the Fourth 
 of July the garrison, over 30,000 strong, marched 
 out through the Union troops, who, by Grant's 
 orders, refrained from offensive conduct and re- 
 marks. On July 9 Port Hudson, the last remain- 
 ing Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi, 
 surrendered to Banks, and once again, to use the 
 language of Lincoln, " the Father of Waters 
 went unvexed to the sea." 
 
 Upon the same day that Meade refrained from 
 crushing the broken ranks of Lee at Gettysburg, 
 Grant received the surrender of Pemberton at 
 Vicksburg. This was a victory complete and sat- 
 isfying to Lincoln. When the news of it arrived 
 in Washington, citizens of the capital gathered 
 at the White House to serenade the President. 
 He responded on the theme of notable Fourths of 
 July. Referring to the important events that had 
 occurred in our country's history upon the an- 
 niversary of the Declaration of Independence, he 
 concluded the list with the recent victories which 
 enforced the principles of that declaration, al- 
 though not forbearing to hint at the " trying 
 want of success " that accompanied the eastern 
 triumph. 
 
 In the presence of the supreme military genius 
 exhibited by Grant, the President humbly ac- 
 knowledged his former presumption in criticising 
 his plan of campaign. On the 1 3th of the month 
 he wrote him the following letter : 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 223 
 
 I do not remember that you and I ever met per- 
 sonally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment 
 for the almost inestimable service you have done the 
 country. I wish to say a word further. When you 
 first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you 
 should do what you finally did march the troops across 
 the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and 
 thus go below ; and I never had any faith, except a 
 general hope that you knew better than I, that the 
 Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. 
 When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, 
 and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river 
 and join General Banks, and when you turned north- 
 ward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. 
 I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that 
 you were right and I was wrong. 
 
 Rosecrans, on the plea that he did not wish to 
 increase the forces of the enemy against Grant 
 before Vicksburg by attacking Bragg, and so 
 causing him to join Johnston, remained inactive 
 until near the close of the Vicksburg campaign, 
 save for cavalry raids, which, on the suggestion 
 of the President, he had made in order to counter 
 the bold forays of the Confederate horse. Of 
 these expeditions on either side the most spectacu- 
 lar was the raid by the Confederate general, John 
 H. Morgan, through Kentucky and southern In- 
 diana and Ohio, in July, 1863. After terrifying 
 the entire Middle West for thirty days, he was 
 defeated and captured while trying to recross the 
 Ohio River. Incarcerated in the Ohio peni- 
 tentiary in retaliation for the refusal of the Con- 
 federate Government to exchange Colonel A. D. 
 Streight, a Union cavalryman who had been cap- 
 tured while on a raid, Morgan contrived to 
 escape and return to the South, where he was 
 received with acclaim by the people, and with re- 
 buke by his commmander for disobeying orders 
 
224 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 in extending his raid beyond Kentucky, and so 
 putting himself beyond recall in the hour of the 
 main army's need. 
 
 Beginning June 24, in nine days, during which 
 there occurred a succession of violent storms, 
 Rosecrans executed a series of rapid and brilliant 
 movements which culminated in expelling Bragg 
 from Tennessee. The Confederate general with- 
 drew to Chattanooga. Rosecrans was slow to 
 follow him up and attack him. Although the 
 bridges and railroad tracks were repaired by July 
 1 8, he delayed his movement against Chatta- 
 nooga almost a month longer, complaining to 
 Washington of lack of horses and supplies, and 
 of the disaffection of the Administration towards 
 him. Accordingly, on August 10, the President 
 wrote him a very frank letter, telling exactly the 
 feeling he had toward him, and criticising his 
 past and present inaction, the former directly, 
 and the latter indirectly in the rhetorical figure of 
 interrogation of which Lincoln was a master. 
 
 I think you must have inferred more than General 
 Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine 
 with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would 
 not have been wounded could you have heard all my 
 words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. 
 I have not abated in my kind feeling for you and 
 confidence in you. I have seen most of your dispatches 
 to General Halleck probably all of them. After Grant 
 invested Vicksburg I was very anxious lest Johnston 
 should overwhelm him from the outside, and when 
 it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone 
 and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was 
 exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with 
 what force he had left. In all kindness let me say it 
 so seems to me yet. Finding from your dispatches to 
 General Halleck that your judgment was different, and 
 being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 
 
 -25 
 
 General Halleck I thought he should direct you to 
 decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand 
 on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. 
 He replied he had already so directed in substance. 
 Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety 
 for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about 
 any movement of yours. When afterward, however, I 
 saw a dispatch of yours arguing that the right time 
 for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would 
 be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very 
 strangely, and I think I so stated to the Secretary of 
 War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than 
 the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when 
 Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him 
 than you could before he could so return to his 
 assistance. 
 
 Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall 
 of Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved, it has 
 seemed to me that your chance for a stroke has been 
 considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing 
 you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for 
 East Tennessee to be occupied by us ; but I see and 
 appreciate the difficulties you mention. The question 
 occurs, Can the thing be done at all ? Does prepara- 
 tion advance at all? Do you not consume supplies 
 as fast as you get them forward? Have you more 
 animals to-day than you had at the battle of Stone's 
 River? And yet have not more been furnished you 
 since then than your entire present stock? I ask the 
 same questions as to your mounted force. 
 
 Do not misunderstand : I am not casting blame upon 
 you ; I rather think by great exertion you can get to 
 East Tennessee ; but a very important question is, Can 
 you stay there? I make no order in the case that I 
 leave to General Halleck and yourself. 
 
 And now be assured once more that I think of you 
 in all kindness and confidence, and that I am not 
 watching you with an evil eye. 
 
 Rosecrans shortly after this, with that remark- 
 able energy of which he was capable when once 
 he had entered upon a movement, plunged into a 
 campaign which was none the less brilliant be- 
 cause the most bloodless stroke of the war; yet, 
 
226 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 although thus employed, his contentious mind 
 sought out and seized upon an opening in Lin- 
 coln's letter into which he could force the wedge 
 of controversy. The President, however, re- 
 fused to be drawn into dispute, as his answer of 
 August 31 indicates : 
 
 When I wrote you before, I did not intend, nor 
 do I now, ^to engage in an argument with you on mili- 
 tary questions. You had informed me you were im- 
 pressed through General Halleck that I was dissatisfied 
 with you : and I could not bluntly deny that I was, with- 
 out unjustly implicating him. I therefore concluded to 
 tell you the plain truth, being satisfied the matter would 
 thus appear much smaller than it would if seen by mere 
 glimpses. I repeat that my appreciation of you has not 
 abated. I can never forget whilst I remember any- 
 thing that about the end of last year, and beginning 
 of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had 
 there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely 
 have lived over. 
 
 Neither can I forget the check you so opportunely 
 gave to a dangerous sentiment which was spreading in 
 the North. 
 
 On August 14 Rosecrans began his long de- 
 ferred movement. He deceived Bragg into 
 thinking that the attack was to come from the 
 north by making a demonstration from that di- 
 rection, under cover of which he crossed the Ten- 
 nessee river to the south and west of Chatta- 
 nooga with his main army, and by September 6 
 had occupied the northwestern slope of Lookout 
 Mountain, threatening Bragg' s line of communi- 
 cations. Thereupon the Confederate commander 
 evacuated the city. On the Qth it was occupied 
 by Rosecrans's troops. Bragg, however, had not 
 retreated. Joined by Buckner's forces, which 
 had retreated from Knoxville before the ap~ 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 227 
 
 proach of Burnside from the north, and by a de- 
 tachment of Johnston's army, he concentrated his 
 troops in a valley to the east of the parallel 
 ranges of Lookout Mountain and Missionary 
 Ridge, and opposite to the Union center under 
 Thomas. There he prepared to take the Union 
 army in detail as its three corps came stringing 
 along, a day's march apart, in pursuit of an 
 enemy whom they supposed to be in full flight. 
 Thomas's corps arrived first, pouring through a 
 gap in Lookout Mountain. But the division 
 commander, General T. C. Hindman, whom 
 Bragg ordered to begin the attack, through sheer 
 perversity delayed doing so until Thomas, realiz- 
 ing his danger, had withdrawn into the mountain 
 passes behind him, thereby incurring the censure 
 of Rosecrans for undue caution. Bragg then 
 ordered General Polk to attack Crittenden's 
 corps, which, his cavalry informed him, was 
 marching hard after Bragg up the valley. But 
 while Polk was awaiting Crittenden in a place of 
 strong defense, Crittenden, realizing his isola- 
 tion, had withdrawn from his advanced position. 
 Thus Braggs' plan completely miscarried. Rose- 
 crans, learning the situation, set to work to con- 
 centrate his army along the road from Chatta- 
 nooga, heading south to Lafayette. But Mc- 
 Cook, commander of the right wing, had been 
 sent far to the south to intercept the enemy's re- 
 treat, and he was four days in effecting the de- 
 sired junction with the Union center. 
 
 The two armies now faced each other along 
 Chickamauga Creek. The battle began on the 
 1 9th. Bragg attempted to turn the Union left, 
 but this was thwarted by Rosecrans shifting 
 Thomas's corps to the rear of Crittenden's. That 
 
228 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 night Longstreet arrived from Virginia, and 
 Bragg, dividing his army in two, gave him com- 
 mand of the left division and Polk command of 
 the right. Polk made a furious assault on the 
 20th, chiefly against Thomas. But the Union 
 general stood firm. Longstreet's attack was de- 
 layed, and came upon the Union right, which had 
 been weakened to support the left, with the 
 crushing force of an unexpected blow, sweeping 
 back such brave and capable generals as McCook 
 and Sheridan. Rosecrans thought the day was 
 lost, and rode to Chattanooga to prepare for re- 
 treat. 
 
 Then Thomas, having withstood the attack 
 upon him, came to the rescue. He threw his 
 troops in a line across the valley, which his 
 soldiers, with desperate valor, clubbing their 
 muskets when ammunition was lacking, held the 
 rest of the afternoon, thus earning for their com- 
 mander the sobriquet of " Rock of Chicka- 
 mauga." At night Thomas, whom Rosecrans 
 had placed in chief command, withdrew the army 
 in good order to Rossville beyond Missionary 
 Ridge. 
 
 Rosecrans had already notified Washington of 
 the disaster. The President, with remarkable 
 calm, wrote to General Halleck on the 2ist, 
 recommending that " means to the utmost of our 
 ability" be furnished Rosecrans to hold Chatta- 
 nooga, and that he be not pushed beyond this. 
 
 If he can only maintain this position, without more, 
 this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble exist- 
 ence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its 
 vitals. 
 
 At the same time he sent an encouraging mes- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST 229 
 
 sage to Rosecrans, assuring him of the con- 
 fidence of the Administration and promising him 
 utmost support, a promise which he set about ful- 
 filling by urging forward the slowly moving 
 Burnside at Knoxville, getting him reenforce- 
 ments from Sherman, and sending him two small 
 army corps, Howard's and Slocum's, under gen- 
 eral command of Hooker. He further encour- 
 aged him by transmitting Bragg's report of his 
 heavy losses, especially in officers, which ap- 
 peared in the Richmond papers. 
 
 Bragg laid siege to Chattanooga, cutting off all 
 communications save over the mountains to the 
 north. On October 4 the President suggested 
 to Rosecrans as the " best move of counteract- 
 ing " this raid on his communications, to make 
 frequent demonstrations against the enemy. " I 
 understand," said he, " the main body of the 
 enemy is very near you, so near that you could 
 ' board at home,' so to speak, and menace or at- 
 tack him any day." In reply to Rosecrans's sug- 
 gestion that he offer a general amnesty to the 
 Rebels, to give moral strength to the Union cause 
 and weaken the enemy, the President wrote : " I 
 intend doing something like what you suggest 
 whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to 
 have it accepted in the true understanding rather 
 than as a confession of weakness and fear." 
 
 Studying the situation, the President came to a 
 conclusion regarding the purpose of the enemy 
 which proved to be a remarkably accurate fore- 
 cast. On October 12 he wrote to Rosecrans: 
 " I now think the enemy will not attack Chat- 
 tanooga, and I think you will have to look out 
 for his making a concentrated drive at Burnside. 
 You and Burnside now have him by the throat; 
 
130 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and he must break jour hold or perish." Despite 
 this encouragement, Rosecrans became more and 
 more despondent. Already poorly supplied with 
 food, he feared that the Confederates would 
 break his communications with Burnside, and 
 starve him out. Charles A. Dana, assistant sec- 
 retary of war, was with the army, and he re- 
 ported that there were indications that Rosecrans 
 was contemplating a retreat. In order to pre- 
 vent this disastrous movement, Secretary Stan- 
 ton met General Grant by appointment at Louis- 
 ville, and gave him command of the Military 
 Division of the Mississippi, including all the 
 armies in the West north of Banks's department. 
 Grant had the option of either retaining Rose- 
 crans as the head of the Army of the Cumber- 
 land, or replacing him with Thomas. He chose 
 Thomas, and at once telegraphed him instruc- 
 tions to hold Chattanooga, to which Thomas re- 
 plied : " We will hold the town till we starve." 
 
 By an energetic movement entirely unex- 
 pected by the enemy, Grant crossed the river and 
 occupied Lookout Valley. On October 29 Long- 
 street made a night attack upon Hooker's divi- 
 sion in the valley, and was driven back. 
 
 Bragg then ordered Longstreet to make the 
 movement against Burnside which Mr. Lincoln 
 had anticipated, and which, indeed, had been 
 suggested by the Confederate President in a 
 visit to the besieging army before Chattanooga. 
 It was not until November 15 that Longstreet 
 was ready to begin this movement. On this date 
 Sherman, who had succeeded Grant in command 
 of the Army of the Tennessee, arrived in Chat- 
 tanooga, slightly in advance of his forces. Grant 
 had heretofore been held back by the wise insub- 
 
THE ARMY IN THE* WEST 231 
 
 ordination of Thomas from an attack on Bragg's 
 strong position on the north end of Missionary 
 Ridge, which was intended to retain Longstreet 
 from attacking Burnside. Now he set in motion 
 a general attack on Lookout Mountain. This 
 took place on November 24, and proved to be one 
 of the most gallant and successful actions in the 
 war. The soldiers of Hooker's division, to quote 
 from their general's report, " passed directly 
 under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the 
 summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up 
 hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from 
 his camp and from position after position." 
 
 Bragg now concentrated all his forces on Mis- 
 sionary Ridge. Here, on the 25th, the daring of 
 the charge on Lookout Mountain was outdone by 
 Thomas's soldiers. They were ordered to take 
 the rifle pits, half-way up the mountains, and halt 
 there. They took the pits, and, rinding them 
 commanded by batteries higher up, of their own 
 volition continued the charge up the slope. 
 On reaching the summit of the Ridge, they dis- 
 persed the Confederates there, turning their own 
 batteries upon them as they fled down the farther 
 side of the mountain. General Sheridan, who 
 was in the van of the charge, pressed the pur- 
 suit even by moonlight, and stormed a second 
 ridge, where the retreating enemy had made a 
 stand. 
 
 In the meantime Longstreet was besieging 
 Knoxville so closely that little news escaped from 
 Burnside. General John G. Foster was sent with 
 a relieving force to replace Burnside, but was 
 able to get only within hearing distance of Knox- 
 ville. As recorded by F. B. Carpenter, the 
 President, upon hearing from Foster that " fir- 
 
232 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 ing was heard in the direction of Knoxville," re- 
 membered that he was " glad of it," explaining 
 the reason of his gratification by telling a story : 
 
 It reminds me of Mistress Sallie Ward, a neighbor 
 of mine, who had a very large family. Occasionally 
 one of her numerous progeny would be heard crying in 
 some out-of-the-way place, upon which Mrs. Ward 
 would exclaim, " There's one of my children that isn't 
 dead yet." 
 
 Upon the retreat of Bragg from Chattanooga, 
 Grant sent Sherman with his own and Howard's 
 corps to the rescue of Burnside. Longstreet, 
 hearing of Bragg's defeat, made a desperate at- 
 tempt on November 29 to storm Burnside's forti- 
 fications, but was beaten back with heavy loss. 
 On December 3 he began a retreat toward the 
 fertile valley of the Holston River, where he 
 passed the winter. Foster arrived at Knoxville 
 on December 10, and assumed command on the 
 following day. Sherman returned with his forces 
 to Chattanooga. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 GENERAL GRANT 
 
 [In order that this study of Lincoln's character as 
 revealed in his most significant acts and utterances 
 might not swell to the dimensions of a history of the 
 Civil War as well as a biography of the President, the 
 account of the close of the war has been greatly abbre- 
 viated. In this Grant was the dominant figure, and the 
 reader is, therefore, referred to any biography of this 
 general for the details of his final campaign.] 
 
 ON March 2, 1864, chiefly through the exer- 
 tions of Grant's friend, Elihu B. Washburne, 
 Congressman from Illinois, a bill was passed re- 
 viving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and in- 
 vesting the holder with the command of all the 
 Federal armies. To this position the President 
 promptly appointed Grant. 
 
 At request of the President, Grant came on to 
 Washington on March 9, and Lincoln handed 
 him the commission, it being the third one that 
 ever was issued, and made to its recipient a 
 speech, as follows : 
 
 The expression of the nation's approbation of what 
 you have already done, and its reliance on you for what 
 remains to do in the existing great struggle, is now 
 presented with this commission, constituting you Lieu- 
 tenant-General of the Army of the United States. 
 
 With this high honor devolves on you an additional 
 responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, 
 
 233 
 
234 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need add, 
 that with what I here speak for the country goes my 
 own hearty personal concurrence. 
 
 Grant, with eyes riveted on the floor, re- 
 sponded : 
 
 MR. PRESIDENT: I accept this commission, with 
 gratitude for the high honor conferred. 
 
 With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on 
 so many fields for our common country, it will be my 
 -earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. 
 
 I feel the full weight of the responsibility now de- 
 volving on me, and I know that if they are met, it 
 will be due to those armies; and above all, to the 
 favor of that Providence which leads both nations 
 and men. 
 
 The Lieutenant-General then visited the Army 
 of the Potomac and returned to Washington, 
 where Mrs. Lincoln prepared an elegant dinner 
 in his honor, inviting the leaders in politics and 
 fashion to meet him. After concluding his busi- 
 ness with the War Department, Mr. Lincoln 
 .said he must stay to the dinner. The General 
 said : " I can't do it I must leave by the first 
 train, to keep my appointment with Sherman." 
 " We can't let you go," said the President ; " one 
 train later will answer your purpose." " I can't 
 do it," said the Lieutenant-General impatiently; 
 " I already have had too much of the show busi- 
 ness ;" and the state dinner was eaten without its 
 principal guest. After consulting at length with 
 Sherman, who had taken his place as commander 
 of the military division of Mississippi, Grant re- 
 turned to Washington, but in order to finish his 
 talk with Sherman the latter accompanied him 
 as far as Cincinnati. On March 17 Grant an- 
 aiounced that his headquarters would be with the 
 
GENERAL GRANT 235 
 
 Army of the Potomac. It was evident that the 
 day of employing the Army of the Potomac solely 
 for dress parades had passed, and that the stem 
 business of the war had begun. At this time the 
 aggregate of the army was nearly 1,000,000, with 
 about 30,000 more on detached service. On 
 March 28 the Lieutenant-General took up his 
 quarters at Culpeper Court House, on April 4 he 
 issued instructions for a plan of campaign to 
 Sherman, and on the Qth to Meade, commanding 
 the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 The President heartily indorsed these plans, as 
 is indicated in a letter of April 30 : 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, April 30, 1864. 
 Lieutenant-General Grant : 
 
 Not expecting to see you again before the spring cam- 
 paign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire sat- 
 isfaction with what you have done up to this time, so 
 far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans 
 I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant 
 and self-reliant ; and, pleased with this, I wish not to 
 obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While 
 I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of 
 our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know 
 these points are less likely to escape your attention than 
 they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which 
 is within my power to give, do not fail to let me 
 know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, 
 may God sustain you. 
 
 The 5th of May had been designated as the 
 time when the campaign was to be opened sim- 
 ultaneously by Meade in the East and by Sher- 
 man in the West ; and at midnight on May 3-4 
 the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, 
 and was entirely across by the night of the 4th, 
 and the forces were engaged early on the morn- 
 ing of the 5th, the day fixed. Sherman took the 
 
236 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 field and commenced his campaign on the 5th 
 likewise ; the former receiving the appellation of 
 the " Wilderness" campaign and the latter being 
 designated as the " Atlantic" campaign. In 
 Georgia, Johnson, the Rebel general, adopted the 
 Fabian policy of retreating and drawing his ad- 
 versary away from his base of supplies, and when 
 November came, Sherman's army held Atlanta, 
 with his adversary in his rear. He left him 
 there, however, confronted by Thomas at Nash- 
 ville and, cutting loose from his base, marched 
 unresisted to Savannah, where he arrived on 
 December 21. On January 19 succeeding, he 
 marched north, and on the 26th of April, 1865, 
 he received the surrender of Johnston's army. 
 
 The policy and results of Grant's campaign 
 were different: his aim and object was not to 
 occupy or fight for territory, but to destroy Lee's 
 army ; for he reasoned that, as long as the army 
 remained intact, so long would the war continue. 
 So on May n, at night, the Lieutenant-General 
 summarized the result thus: 
 
 We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fight- 
 ing. The result up to this time is very much in our 
 favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those 
 of the enemy. We have lost to this time, eleven gen- 
 eral officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 
 twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy 
 must be greater we having taken over four thousand 
 prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few, 
 except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to 
 Bell Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of pro- 
 visions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out 
 on this line if it takes all summer. 
 
 The arrival of reinforcements here will be very en- 
 couraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as 
 fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object 
 in having them sent to Bell Plain was to use them 
 
GENERAL GRANT 237 
 
 as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more con- 
 venient to send them out by train to march from the 
 railroad to Bell Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so. 
 I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only 
 kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the 
 part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched 
 in every position they take. Up to this time, there 
 is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being 
 detached for the defense of Richmond. 
 
 On the 1 2th he sent the following dispatch : 
 
 The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between 
 three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the 
 day's work, including two general officers and over 
 thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate and 
 seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no 
 organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we 
 have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), 
 one brigade (Dale's), and one regiment entire from 
 the enemy. 
 
 During that awful week the President suf- 
 fered intense agony of mind, at the fearful loss 
 of life in the Wilderness. The carnage was sim- 
 ply horrible and with no prospect of immediate 
 abatement, for the tenacity of the opposing com- 
 manders was as enduring as life itself. 
 
 Carpenter relates in his interesting and valu- 
 able " Six Months in the White House " that 
 during that week the President scarcely slept at 
 all ; that he met him " pacing a narrow hallway, 
 clad in an old faded wrapper, with a pair of slip- 
 pers, run down at the heel, great rings under his 
 eyes " an image of grief and misery. Losses 
 from May 5 to June 12 were 6,586 killed ; 26,047 
 wounded ; 6,626 missing a frightful list ! 
 
 By the middle of June the army had reached 
 and invested Petersburg, which was understood, 
 on both sides, to be the key to Richmond. 
 
238 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 The President now was convinced that Grant 
 was a man of his own inflexible temper, resolved 
 to crush the enemy and so end the war. Ren- 
 dered distrustful of the War Department in this 
 respect by his repeated sad experiences, the 
 President sent a cipher telegram to the Lieu- 
 tenant-General, which is perhaps the most cynical 
 thing he ever penned : 
 
 I have seen your dispatch in which you say, " I want 
 Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, 
 with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, 
 and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy 
 .goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly 
 right as to how our forces should move ; but please 
 look over the dispatches you may have received from 
 here, ever since you made that order, and discover, if 
 you can, that there is any idea in the head of anyone 
 here of " putting our army south of the enemy," or of 
 following him to the " death," in any direction. I re- 
 peat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, 
 unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it. 
 
 A. LINCOLN. 
 
 Two weeks later he sent a characteristic tele- 
 gram of encouragement: 
 
 August 17, 1864. 10.30 A.M. 
 
 I have seen your dispatch expressing your unwilling- 
 ness to break your hold where you are. Neither am 
 I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and 
 choke as much as possible. 
 
 After remaining in a state of siege all the 
 summer, fall, and winter, with some episodes, 
 such as the unsuccessful springing of a mine, and 
 occasional raids, the Rebels were forced to evacu- 
 ate Petersburg on the morning of April 3, and 
 Grant's army took immediate possession; while, 
 at the same time, Weitzel's command occupied 
 Richmond, it having also been evacuated on the 
 
GENERAL GRANT 239 
 
 night of the 26. by the Army and Government, the 
 latter leaving by the (only) Danville road. The 
 pursuit of Lee and his army and the surrender 
 at Appomattox are the most familiar episodes in 
 our American history. On the night of March 
 3 the President sent the following dispatch to> 
 Grant: 
 
 The President directs me to say that he wishes you 
 to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for 
 capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor 
 or purely military matter. He instructs me to say 
 that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any 
 political questions. Such questions the President holds 
 in his own hands, and will submit them to no military 
 conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press 
 to the utmost your military advantages. 
 
 EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 
 
 Yet the Lieutenant-General did, by the terms 
 of the agreement, absolve everybody surren- 
 dered, including Lee, from the consequences of 
 their treason, which was a highly important and 
 significant act, but it was overlooked at the time 
 as it was in harmony with the policy of the 
 Administration. Lee being thereafter indicted 
 by the judicial authorities, the Administration of 
 Andrew Johnson was desirous to press the indict- 
 ment; but Grant promptly notified the Adminis- 
 tration that he should resign if it was pressed; 
 and the prosecution was abandoned. 
 
 The surrender came at Appomattox upon the 
 9th of April, two days after Lincoln, from the 
 army headquarters at City Point, had telegraphed 
 to Grant: 
 
 General Sheridan says, "If the thing is pressed I 
 think that Lee will surrender." Let the thing be 
 pressed. 
 
240 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 When Grant was riding to camp after the sur- 
 render he heard the firing of salutes. He gave 
 orders at once to cease such manifestations of 
 exultation, saying : " The war is over ; the Rebels 
 are again our countrymen, and the best sign of 
 rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from 
 all demonstrations in the field/' 
 
 The number of Grant's captures during the 
 campaign beginning with the battle of the Wil- 
 derness was 66,512. The Union losses for the 
 same period were 12,663 killed, 49,559 wounded, 
 and 20,498 missing a total of 82,720. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 EMANCIPATION 
 
 SECRETARY WELLES said, in an article appear- 
 ing in the Galaxy, October, 1877: 
 
 Emancipation had constituted no part of the policy 
 of the President at the time of his inauguration, and, 
 when finally decreed, he connected with it, as an essen- 
 tial and indispensable part of his policy, a plan of 
 deportation of the colored population. Long before 
 he yielded to emancipation, and in the belief that it 
 was necessary to rid the country of the African race, 
 he had schemes for their migration more advanced than 
 those of the colonizationists. From a conviction that 
 the white and black races could not abide together on 
 terms of social and political equality, he thought they 
 could not peaceably occupy the same territory that 
 one must dominate the other. Opposed to the whole 
 system of enslavement, but believing the Africans were 
 mentally an inferior race, he believed that any attempt 
 to make them and the whites one people would tend 
 to the degradation of the whites without materially 
 elevating the blacks, but that separation would promote 
 the happiness and welfare of each. . . . The two (de- 
 portation and emancipation) were, in his mind, indis- 
 pensably and indissolubly connected. Colonization in 
 fact had precedence with him, ... he wished it dis- 
 tinctly understood that deportation was in his mind 
 inseparably connected with this measure, that he con- 
 sidered the two to be parts of one system, and that 
 they must be carried forward together. . .. . There 
 was not a member of the Cabinet who did not coincide 
 with the President as to the desirableness of relieving 
 the country of a conflict or of an amalgamation of the 
 two races, one or both of which results lay in the 
 future, were they to occupy the same territory. . . , 
 
 241 
 
242 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 They would increase in numbers, have leaders of their 
 own, or of a mixed race of exceptional ability and am- 
 bition, and also white demagogues to excite and mis- 
 lead them, until, if they remained with us, a war more 
 terrible than that in which we were now engaged might 
 be expected. . . . Colonization he believed to be the 
 only remedy. 
 
 In Lincoln's first annual message on December 
 2, 1 86 1, he asked Congress to provide means for 
 colonizing negroes who had been confiscated by 
 Union troops as contraband of war under the 
 act of August 6. " If a new law upon the same 
 subject [confiscation of slaves] shall be proposed, 
 its propriety will be duly considered. The 
 Union must be preserved; and hence all indis- 
 pensable means must be employed. We should 
 not be in haste to determine that radical and ex- 
 treme measures, which may reach the loyal as 
 well as the disloyal, are indispensable." 
 
 From the debates upon resolutions that were 
 offered in Congress, and referred to the appro- 
 priate committees, it developed that the Presi- 
 dent could go no farther than he had done in the 
 disposition of slaves belonging to Rebel masters, 
 and receive legislative backing. The principle 
 was generally asserted that slaves should be 
 freed whenever and wherever this would tend 
 to weaken the rebellion. Indeed, the orders is- 
 sued by McClellan and Halleck prohibiting fugi- 
 tive slaves from coming within the army lines 
 were severely censured. 
 
 One year of warfare had accomplished the oc- 
 cupation of the border States, including West 
 Virginia, but had made no impression upon the 
 seceding States. In order that the occupied ter- 
 ritory might be permanently attached to the free 
 
EMANCIPATION 243 
 
 States in interest, with no case of a triumph of 
 Southern arms, the President now bent his ener- 
 gies to secure the abolition of slavery in this sec- 
 tion. In his Annual Message he had proposed 
 to Congress the passage of a joint resolution 
 offering pecuniary aid to any State which should 
 adopt gradual and compensated emancipation. 
 On March 6 he sent a special message to Con- 
 gress on the subject, presenting the feasibility of 
 the proposition from a financial point of view. 
 
 Any member of Congress, with the census tables and 
 treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself 
 how very soon the current expenditures of this war 
 would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any 
 named State. Such a proposition on the part of the 
 General Government sets up no claim of a right by 
 Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State 
 limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the 
 subject in each case to the State and its people imme- 
 diately interested. It is proposed as a matter of per- 
 fectly free choice with them. . . . 
 
 The proposition now made, though an offer only, I 
 hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the 
 pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more 
 value to the States and private persons concerned than 
 are the institution and property in it, in the present 
 aspect of affairs? 
 
 While it is true that the adoption of the proposed 
 resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within 
 itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the 
 hope that it would soon lead to important practical 
 results. In full view of my great responsibility to my 
 God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention 
 of Congress and the people to the subject. 
 
 In private letters, one to Henry J. Raymond 
 of the New York Times on March 9, and an- 
 other to James A. McDougall on March 14, 
 the President presented statistics which very con- 
 clusively supported his general statement. To 
 
244 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Raymond, whose paper had objected to the ex- 
 pense involved in the proposition, he wrote: 
 
 Have you noticed the facts that less than one-half day's 
 cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Dela- 
 ware at $400 per head that eighty-seven days' cost of 
 this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, 
 District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the 
 same price? Were those States to take the step, do you 
 doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty- 
 seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense? 
 
 Please look at these things and consider whether 
 there should not be another article in the Times. 
 
 On March 10 the President invited Congress- 
 men from the border States to the Executive 
 Mansion to discuss the proposed measure. 
 
 They were very distrustful of the President's 
 ultimate intentions in regard to slavery ; indeed, 
 one of them put to him the pointed query : " Do 
 you look to any policy beyond the acceptance or 
 rejection of this scheme ? " To this he replied 
 very directly, as reported by one of the Repre- 
 sentatives present, John W. Cresfield of Mary- 
 land, that he should lament the refusal of the 
 slave States to accept the offer but he had no 
 designs beyond their refusal of it, and that he 
 should occupy that house for three years, and as 
 long as he remained there Maryland had nothing 
 to fear, either for her institutions or her inter- 
 ests, on the points referred to. 
 
 Reciting the resolution he had presented to 
 Congress in his special message of March 6, he 
 continued : 
 
 The resolution, in the language above quoted, was 
 adopted by large majorities in both branches of Con- 
 gress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn 
 proposal of the nation to the States and people most 
 
EMANCIPATION 245 
 
 immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the 
 people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do 
 Tiot argue I beseech you to make arguments for your- 
 selves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs 
 of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged con- 
 sideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above 
 personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes 
 common cause for a common object, casting no re- 
 proaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The 
 change it contemplates would come gently as the dews 
 of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will 
 you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, 
 by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of 
 God it is now your high privilege to do. May the 
 vast future not have to lament that you have neg- 
 lected it. 
 
 A resolution embodying the President's recom- 
 mendation was introduced in the House on 
 March 10, and in the Senate on March 24. In 
 the debates which ensued it was weakly sup- 
 ported by the anti-slavery Representatives and 
 Senators who were ready for a more radical 
 measure, and vehemently opposed by the pro- 
 slavery legislators, who declared it to be an un- 
 constitutional interference with a State institu- 
 tion. The resolution passed both legislative 
 chambers, and it was signed by the President on 
 April 10. While no slave State took advantage 
 of its provisions, the fact that any or all might 
 have done so destroyed the force of the objection 
 to the ultimate Emancipation Proclamation that 
 the North was unwilling to share the cost of 
 abolishing a system which, however evil, had 
 grown up with the legal sanction of the national 
 government. 
 
 President Lincoln stood loyally by his resolu- 
 tion. On May 9, 1862, General David Hunter, 
 of the Department of the South, in a proclama- 
 
246 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 tion placing the States of the department under 
 martial law, declared that, since slavery and mar- 
 tial law are incompatible in a free country, the 
 persons in these States Georgia, Florida, and 
 South Carolina heretofore held as slaves were 
 declared forever free. Upon this order on May 
 16 the President wrote the indorsement, " No 
 commanding general shall do such a thing upon 
 my responsibility without consulting me." On 
 the igth he issued a general proclamation, 
 repudiating and annulling Hunter's proclama- 
 tion. In this he said : 
 
 I further make known that, whether it be competent 
 for me, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, 
 to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and 
 whether, at any time, in any case, it shall have become 
 a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Gov- 
 ernment to exercise such supposed power, are questions 
 which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and 
 which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision 
 of commanders in the field. These are totally different 
 questions from those of police regulations in armies 
 and camps. 
 
 In the one portion of the Union over which the 
 Federal Government had complete and unques- 
 tioned jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, 
 compensated emancipation which also provided 
 for colonizing the freedmen was adopted by Con- 
 gress, the bill being signed by the President on 
 the 1 6th of April. In 1849, when he was a mem- 
 ber of Congress, Mr. Lincoln had introduced a 
 bill abolishing slavery in the District. The pres- 
 ent act was therefore especially gratifying to 
 him as the first fruit of his long and continuous 
 battle for the cause of emancipation the earnest 
 of complete triumph that was shortly to be con- 
 summated. 
 
EMANCIPATION 247 
 
 By midsummer the drift of sentiment in the 
 country toward emancipation of the slaves had 
 developed into a strong current which the opposi- 
 tion to the Administration, beginning to center 
 about General McClellan, was vainly -trying to 
 stem. On July 17 Congress passed an " Act to 
 suppress insurrection, to punish treason and re- 
 bellion, to seize and confiscate the property of 
 rebels," etc., which by proclaiming the forfeiture 
 of slaves of Rebels to the Government, was virtu- 
 ally an emancipation proclamation. This act the 
 President approved, although before he was in- 
 formed of its passage he had prepared a draft of 
 a message to Congress ably criticising the con- 
 stitutionality of some of its provisions. Un- 
 doubtedly, in giving his approval he had in mind 
 to issue shortly his broad and thoroughly con- 
 stitutional Emancipation Proclamation which 
 should cure all defects in the act. Indeed, it may 
 be said that Congress was " forcing his hand," 
 rather as his partner than antagonist. 
 
 The President, by Seward's advice, had been 
 waiting for a Union victory before he issued the 
 Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation which 
 had been agreed upon in Cabinet councils. 
 
 Mr. F. B. Carpenter, the artist who lived at 
 the White House in 1864 while engaged in 
 painting his noted picture, " The First Reading 
 of the Emancipation Proclamation before the 
 Cabinet," has recorded Lincoln's own account of 
 these early deliberations upon the momentous 
 state paper. Said the President: 
 
 It had got to be midsummer, 1862. Things had gone 
 on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached 
 the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had 
 been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, 
 
248 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and must change our tactics, or lose the game ! I now 
 determined upon the adoption of the emancipation pol- 
 icy ; and, without consultation with, or the knowledge 
 of the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the 
 proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called 
 a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. This was the last 
 of July, or the first part of the month of August, 
 1862. This Cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon 
 a Saturday. All were present, excepting Mr. Blair, 
 the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening 
 of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to 
 the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had 
 not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay 
 the subject-matter of a proclamation before them; sug- 
 gestions as to which would be in order, after they had 
 heard it read. Various suggestions were offered. Sec- 
 retary Chase wished the language stronger in reference 
 to the arming of the blacks. Mr. Blair, after he camq 
 in, deprecated the policy, on the ground that it would 
 cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, 
 however, was offered that I had not already fully antic- 
 ipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary 
 Seward spoke. He said in substance : " Mr. President, 
 I approve of the proclamation, but I question the ex- 
 pediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression 
 of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated 
 reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so im- 
 portant a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of 
 an exhausted government, a cry for help ; the govern- 
 ment stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of 
 Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government." 
 His idea was that it would be considered our last 
 shriek, on the retreat. " Now," continued Mr. Seward, 
 " while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you 
 postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country 
 supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as 
 would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of 
 the war ! " The wisdom of the view of the Secretary 
 of State struck me with very great force. It was an 
 aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the 
 subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was 
 that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you 
 do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. 
 From time to time I added or changed a line, touching 
 it up here and there, anxiously watching the progress 
 
EMANCIPATION 249 
 
 of events. Well, the next news we had was of Pope's 
 disaster, at Bull Run. Things looked darker than 
 ever. Finally, came the week of the battle of Antietam. 
 I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I 
 think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our 
 side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home (three 
 miles out of Washington). Here 1 finished writing the 
 second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up 
 on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, 
 and it was published the following Monday. 
 
 After the President had determined to issue 
 the Proclamation, he set himself to forestall the 
 objections which he knew the document would 
 call forth, such as : that it was intended to estab- 
 lish negro equality ; that it proved the insincerity 
 of the declared purpose of the Administration to 
 save the Union by showing this to have been 
 from the beginning to free the slave, etc. On 
 August 14. addressing a deputation of negroes 
 on the subject of colonization, he said, in regard 
 to the vexed question of race equality: 
 
 Why should the people of your race leave the coun- 
 try? It is because you and we are different races. 
 We have between us a broader physical difference than 
 exists between any other two races. Whether this is 
 right or wrong I need not discuss; but this physical 
 difference is a great disadvantage to us both. Your 
 race suffer greatly, many of them, by living among us, 
 while ours suffer from your presence. This affords a 
 reason why we should be separated. Your race is 
 suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted 
 on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, 
 you are yet far remote from being placed on an equality 
 with the white race. You are cut off from many of 
 the advantages which the other race enjoys. The aspi- 
 ration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when 
 free, but on this broad continent not a single man of 
 your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. 
 Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still 
 upon you. I do not propose to discuss this, but to 
 
250 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 present it as a fact with which we have to deal. I can- 
 not alter it if I would. ... I believe in its general 
 evil effects on the white race. See our present condi- 
 tion white men cutting one another's throats none 
 knowing how far it will extend. . . . But for your race 
 among us there could not be war, although many men 
 engaged on either side do not care for you one way 
 or the other. ... It is better for us both, therefore, 
 to be separated. 
 
 In regard to the paramount purpose of the 
 war, the President, on August 22, refuted the 
 assumption in an open letter of Horace Greeley, 
 in the Tribune of the 2Oth, that slavery, rather 
 than the salvation of the Union, was the real 
 issue. He said: 
 
 As to the policy I " seem to be pursuing," as you 
 say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt. 
 
 I would save the Union. I would save it the short- 
 est way under the Constitution. The sooner the na- 
 tional authority can be restored, the nearer the Union 
 will be " the Union as it was." If there be those who 
 would not save the Union unless they could at the 
 same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If 
 there be those who would not save the Union unless they 
 could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree 
 with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to 
 save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy 
 slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any 
 slave, I would do it ; and if I could save it by free- 
 ing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it 
 by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also 
 do that. What I do about slavery and the colored 
 race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; 
 and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe 
 it would help to save the Union. I shall do less when- 
 ever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, 
 and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more 
 will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when 
 shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so 
 .fast as they shall appear to be true views. 
 
 I have here stated my purpose according to my 
 
EMANCIPATION 251 
 
 view of official duty; and I intend no modification of 
 my oft-expressed personal wish that all men every- 
 where could be free. 
 
 But the most astute of the President's pre- 
 paratory statements was his reply, on September 
 13, to a committee from the religious denomina- 
 tions of Chicago asking him to issue a proclama- 
 tion of emancipation. In this he reviewed the 
 arguments for the proclamation as if he were an 
 opponent of them, and so, by admitting their 
 cogency, he put himself, when ultimately he did 
 issue the proclamation, in the politically advan- 
 tageous position of being forced to do so. Also, 
 by bringing expediency as a consideration to the 
 fore, he prepared the country for an indefinite 
 postponement of emancipation, which would be 
 the case if there was delay in achieving the victory 
 upon which its promulgation depended. The 
 President said : 
 
 The subject presented in the memorial is one upon 
 which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may 
 even say for months. I am approached with the most 
 opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men 
 who are equally certain that they represent the divine 
 will. I am sure that either the one or the other class 
 is mistaken in that belief and perhaps in some respects 
 both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say 
 that if it is probable that God would reveal his will 
 to others on a point so connected with my duty, it 
 might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; 
 for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often 
 am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Provi- 
 dence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, 
 I will do it. These are not, however, the days of mira- 
 cles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to 
 expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain 
 physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, 
 and learn what appears to be wise and right. . . . 
 
252 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 What good would a proclamation of emancipation from 
 me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not 
 want to issue a document that the whole world will 
 see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull 
 against the comet! Would my word free the slaves, 
 when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the 
 rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, 
 or individual that would be influencd by it there? And 
 what reason is there to think it would have any greater 
 effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, 
 which I approved, and which offers protection and 
 freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within 
 our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused 
 a single slave to come over to us. And suppose they 
 could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from 
 me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do 
 with them? How can we feed and care for such a 
 multitude? General Butler wrote me a few days since 
 that he was issuing more rations to the slaves who have 
 rushed to him than to all the white troops under his 
 command. They eat, and that is all ; though it is true 
 General Butler is feeding the whites also by the thou- 
 sand ; for it nearly amounts to a famine there. If, 
 now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces 
 from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is 
 to prevent the masters from reducing the blacks to 
 slavery again; for I am told that whenever the rebels 
 take any black prisoners, free or slave, they immediately 
 auction them off! They did so with those they took 
 from a boat that was aground in the Tennessee River 
 a few days ago. And then I am very ungenerously 
 attacked for it ! For instance, when, after the late bat- 
 tles at and near Bull Run, an expedition went out from 
 Washington under a flag of truce to bury the dead and 
 bring in the wounded, and the rebels seized the blacks 
 who went along to help, and sent them into slavery, 
 Horace Greeley said in his paper that the Government 
 would probably do nothing about it. What could I do? 
 
 Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result 
 of good would follow the issuing of such a proclama- 
 tion as you desire? Understand, I raise no objections 
 against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as 
 commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of 
 war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which 
 may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of 
 
EMANCIPATION 253 
 
 a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of 
 insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this 
 matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on 
 according to the advantages or disadvantages it may 
 offer to the suppression of the rebellion. 
 
 The committee at this point replied to the 
 President's objection that the measure was inex- 
 pedient, by contending that it would secure at 
 once the sympathy, heretofore in suspense, of 
 England and France, and, indeed, of the whole 
 civilized world ; further, that, as slavery was 
 clearly the root of the rebellion, it must be eradi- 
 cated if the war was to be decisively ended. The 
 President said: 
 
 I admit that slavery is at the root of the rebellion, 
 or at least its sine qua non. The ambition of politicians 
 may have instigated them to act, but they would have 
 been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I 
 will also concede that emancipation would help us in 
 Europe, and convince them that we are incited by some- 
 thing more than ambition. I grant, further, that it 
 would help somewhat at the North, though not so 
 much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. 
 Still, some additional strength would be added in that 
 way to the war, and then, unquestionably, it would 
 weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which 
 is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could 
 do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, 
 I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the 
 hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far, we have not 
 had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will 
 mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn 
 and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in 
 the Union army from the Border Slave States. It 
 would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proc- 
 lamation such as you desire, they should go over to the 
 rebels. I do not think they all would not so many, 
 indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago not so 
 many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their 
 Union feeling. They are also getting their pride en- 
 
254 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 listed, and want to beat the rebels. Let me say one 
 thing more: I think you should admit that we already 
 have an important principle to rally and unite the peo- 
 ple, in the fact that constitutional government is at 
 stake. This is a fundamental idea, going down about 
 as deep as anything. 
 
 In dismissing the committee the President said 
 assuringly : 
 
 Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned 
 these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have 
 thus far prevented my action in some such way as you 
 desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of 
 liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advise- 
 ment. And I can assure you that the subject is on my 
 mind, by day and night, more than any Bother. What- 
 ever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust 
 that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your 
 views I have not in any respect injured your feelings. 
 
 Already the President had laid the event in the 
 hands of God by vowing to issue the proclama- 
 tion if Lee were driven back over the Potomac. 
 This result of the battle of Antietam was not at 
 once apparent. As Lincoln said to George S. 
 Boutwell : " The battle of Antietam was fought 
 Wednesday, and until Saturday I could not find 
 out whether we had gained a victory or lost a 
 battle. It was then too late to issue the proc- 
 lamation that day ; and ... I fixed it up a little 
 Sunday, and Monday [September 22] I let them 
 have it." 
 
 Secretary Chase recorded in his diary the 
 President's address to his ministers upon this, the 
 most momentous occasion in the nation's history. 
 
 All the members of the Cabinet were in attendance. 
 There was some general talk, and the President men- 
 tioned that Artemus Ward had sent him his book. 
 
EMANCIPATION 255 
 
 Proposed to read a chapter which he thought very 
 funny. Read it, and seemed to enjoy it very much; the 
 heads also (except Stanton), of course. The chapter 
 was " High-handed Outrage at Utica." The President 
 then took a graver tone, and said, " Gentlemen : I have, 
 as you are aware, thought a great deal about the rela- 
 tion of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, 
 several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had pre- 
 pared on this subject, which, on account of objections 
 made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then 
 my mind has been much occupied with this subject, 
 and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting 
 on it might probably come. I think the time has come 
 now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we 
 were in a better condition. The action of the army 
 against the rebels has not been quite what I should 
 have best liked. But they have been driven out of 
 Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of 
 invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I 
 determined, as soon as it should be driven out of 
 Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such 
 as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing 
 to anyone, but I made the promise to myself and [hesi- 
 tating a little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now 
 driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I 
 have got you together to hear what I have written down. 
 I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for 
 that I have determined for myself. This I say with- 
 out intending anything but respect for any one of you. 
 But I already know the views of each on this ques- 
 tion. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have 
 considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. 
 What I have written is that which my reflections have 
 determined me to say. If there is anything in the ex- 
 pressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any one 
 of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to 
 receive the suggestions. One other observation I will 
 make. I know very well that many others might, in 
 this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if 
 I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully 
 possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew 
 of any constitutional way in which he could be put 
 in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield 
 it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so 
 much of the confidence of the people as I had some time 
 
256 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 since, I do not know that, all things considered, any 
 other person has more; and however this may be, there 
 is no way in which I can have any other man put 
 where I am. I am here ; I must do the best I can, 
 and bear the responsibility of taking the course which 
 I feel I ought to take." 
 
 In accordance with the request of Mr. Lincoln 
 Secretary Seward suggested a few minor 
 changes in the document, which were indorsed 
 by his colleagues and accepted by the President. 
 The proclamation then received the unqualified 
 approval of the entire Cabinet except Postmaster- 
 General Blair, who, while personally in favor of 
 it, expressed apprehension of its evil effect on 
 the border States and the army, which contained 
 many opponents of abolition. He asked leave to 
 file a paper which he had prepared on the sub- 
 ject, with the proclamation. This the Presi- 
 dent readily granted. Secretary Blair, however, 
 changed his mind over night, and next morning 
 withdrew his objections. The proclamation was 
 published in the newspapers of the 23d. As the 
 President said in response to a serenade from 
 approving Washington citizens at the White 
 House that evening: "It [was] now for the 
 country and the world to pass judgment, and, 
 may be, take action upon it." The proclamation, 
 after solemnly affirming that the purpose of the 
 war was, and should continue to be, the res- 
 toration of the Union, and promising measures 
 of compensated emancipation to those slave 
 States which should adhere or return to the 
 Union, and of colonization to the freedmen, de- 
 clared that on January i, 1863, "all persons 
 held as slaves within any State, or designated 
 part of a State, the people whereof shall then be 
 
EMANCIPATION 257 
 
 in rebellion against the United States, shall be 
 then, thenceforward, and forever free." 
 
 The country quickly gave its approval of the 
 proclamation in the most official way possible at 
 the time. When Confederate invasion of Penn- 
 sylvania was imminent, Governor Andrew G. 
 Curtin of that State had invited the governors of 
 the Northern States to meet at Altoona on Sep- 
 tember 24 to consult on emergency measures for 
 the common defense. Before this date arrived 
 the defeat of Lee had removed the original pur- 
 pose of the convocation, and the governors, after 
 spending a day or so at Altoona in a helpful ex- 
 change of information upon military methods 
 employed by their several States, proceeded to 
 Washington and presented a written address to 
 the President, pledging their support in sup- 
 pressing the rebellion, with the recommendation 
 that an army of 100,000 men be held in reserve 
 at home ready for such emergencies as that 
 which had recently occurred. To this was added 
 an indorsement of the new proclamation. All 
 the governors of the loyal States, those who were 
 present, and the absentees to whom it was shortly 
 sent, signed that portion relating to the sup- 
 pression of. rebellion, and all but the governors 
 of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky 
 and Missouri signed the indorsement of the 
 Emancipation Proclamation. 
 
 The measure was acclaimed by the newspapers 
 in general and by men of prominence all over 
 the country. Nevertheless the President de- 
 plored the absence of material results. On Sep- 
 tember 28 he wrote to Vice-President Hamlin in 
 reply to his congratulation upon the Proclama- 
 tion: 
 
258 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 It is six days old, and while commendation in news- 
 papers and by distinguished individuals is all that a vain 
 man could wish, the stocks have declined, and troops 
 come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked 
 soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. We have 
 fewer troops in the field at the end of the six days 
 than we had at the beginning the attrition among the 
 old outnumbering the addition by the new. The North 
 responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath; but 
 breath alone kills no rebels. 
 
 In the fall elections to Congress the ranks of 
 the opposition to the President's policy were 
 greatly increased. 
 
 Abroad, however, the Proclamation secured im- 
 mediately and enduringly the sympathy of the 
 common people and their representative states- 
 men for the Northern cause, and so sounded the 
 knell of Southern expectations of foreign aid and 
 intervention. 
 
 On January i, 1863, none of the States, or por- 
 tions of States, in rebellion having laid down their 
 arms, the emancipation of the slaves therein was 
 formally proclaimed, as declared in the Prelimi- 
 nary Proclamation. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln's temperamental despondency, that 
 in practical affairs inclined him toward pessimism, 
 in spiritual matters led him into fatalism. From 
 the time of the Proclamation onward he believed 
 himself to be but a " humble instrument in the 
 hands of our Heavenly Father," as he remarked 
 in a reply, late in September, to an address by a 
 Friend, Mrs. Eliza P. Gurney. He continued : 
 
 I have desired that all my words and acts may be 
 according to His will, and that it might be so, I have 
 sought His aid ; but if, after endeavoring to do my best 
 in the light which He affords me, I find my efforts 
 fail, I must believe that for some purpose, unknown to 
 
EMANCIPATION 259 
 
 me, He wills it otherwise. If I had had my way, this 
 war would never have been commenced. If I had been 
 allowed my way, this war would have been ended be- 
 fore this; but we find it still continues, and we must 
 believe that He permits it for some wise purpose of 
 His. own, mysterious and unknown to us, and, though 
 with our limited understandings we may not be able 
 to comprehend it, yet we cannot but believe that He who 
 made the world still governs it. 
 
 In the same strain he wrote, a day or so later, 
 the following meditation on the Divine Will : 
 
 The will of God prevails. In great contests each 
 party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. 
 Both may be, and one must be, wrong. God cannot be 
 for and against the same thing at the same time. In 
 the present civil war it is quite possible that God's pur- 
 pose is something different from the purpose of either 
 party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working 
 just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect 
 his purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is 
 probably true; that God wills ^this contest, and wills 
 that it shall not end yet. By his mere great power on 
 the minds of the now contestants, he could have either 
 saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. 
 Yet the contest began. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 
 
 THE President's fear that the Emancipation 
 Proclamation would alienate many supporters of 
 the Administration was verified in the succeeding 
 election. Horatio Seymour, a Democrat of the 
 extremely conservative type, was elected Governor 
 of New York, and many Republican Congress- 
 men were replaced by Democrats, especially in the 
 Middle West. And yet Lincoln was afflicted by 
 the recriminations of the radicals of his party, 
 who blamed him for losing the confidence of the 
 country by his feeble conduct of the war. To one 
 such fault-finder, General Carl Schurz, he replied 
 in a spirited letter in which he did not refrain 
 from thrusting by keen innuendo at the weak 
 points in his critic's armor, for the righteous ire 
 of the President was roused by strictures upon 
 brother officers from one who had failed to ex- 
 hibit any marked military ability in the disastrous 
 second battle of Bull Run : 
 
 November 24, 1862. 
 
 I have just received and read your letter of the 
 2Oth. The purport of it is that we lost the late elec- 
 tions and the Administration is failing because the war 
 is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that 
 I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that 
 if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I 
 will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And 
 
 260 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 261 
 
 I ought to be blamed if I could do better. You think 
 I could do better; therefore, you blame me already. 
 I think I could not do better ; therefore I blame you for 
 blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to 
 accept the help of men who are not Republicans, pro- 
 vided they have " heart in it." Agreed. I want no 
 others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of 
 " heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment 
 and take yours, I must also take that of others; and 
 by the time I should reject all I should be advised 
 to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or 
 others not even yourself. For be assured, my dear 
 sir, there are men who have " heart in it " that think 
 you are performing your part as poorly as you think 
 I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied 
 with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I 
 relieved them I had great fears I should not find suc- 
 cessors to them who would do better; and I am sorry 
 to add that I have seen little since to relieve those 
 fears. 
 
 The President sent his second Annual Message 
 to Congress on December i, 1862. In it he first 
 reviewed foreign relations, ascribing the con- 
 tinued recognition abroad of the Confederate 
 States as belligerents to the injury of commercial 
 interests caused by the Federal blockade. He 
 showed, however, that in England there was aris- 
 ing a " respect for the authority of the United 
 States, and the rights of their moral and loyal 
 citizens," this being indicated in a treaty between 
 this country and Great Britain for the suppression 
 of the slave trade, signed on April 7. Upon his 
 favorite project of colonization the President was 
 forced to report that no countries were willing to 
 accept the freedmen as citizens except Liberia 
 and Hayti, and to these the freedmen were unwill- 
 ing to migrate. 
 
 Of the country's finances, as conducted by the 
 wonder-working Secretary of the Treasury, the 
 
262 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 President made a wholly encouraging report. 
 He said: 
 
 The vast expenditures incident to the military and 
 naval operations required for the suppression of the 
 rebellion have hitherto been met with a promptitude 
 and certainty unusual in similar circumstances, and 
 the public credit has been fully maintained. 
 
 Of the success of the issue of " greenbacks " as 
 legal tender by Act of February 25, 1862, the 
 President reported : 
 
 The suspension of specie payments by the banks, 
 soon after the commencement of your last session, made 
 large issues of United States notes unavoidable. In no 
 other way could the payment of the troops, and the 
 satisfaction of other just demands, be so economically 
 or so well provided for. The judicious legislation of 
 Congress, securing the receivability of these notes for 
 loans and internal duties, and making them a legal 
 tender for other debts, has made them a universal cur- 
 rency, and has satisfied, partially at least, and for the 
 time, the long-felt want of a uniform circulating 
 medium, saving thereby to the people immense sums in 
 discounts and exchanges. 
 
 A National Bank Act had been drawn up under 
 the direction of Secretary Chase. The President 
 earnestly advocated its passage : 
 
 A return to specie payments, however, at the earliest 
 period compatible with due regard to all interests con- 
 cerned, should ever be kept in view. Fluctuations in 
 the value of currency are always injurious, and to 
 reduce these fluctuations to the lowest possible point 
 will always be a leading purpose in wise legislation. 
 Convertibility prompt and certain convertibility into 
 coin is generally acknowledged to be the best and 
 surest safeguard against them; and it is extremely 
 doubtful whether a circulation of United States notes, 
 payable in coin, and sufficiently large for the wants 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 263 
 
 of the people, can be permanently, usefully, and safely 
 maintained. 
 
 Is there, then, any other mode in which the necessary 
 provision for the public wants can be made, and the 
 great advantages of a safe and uniform currency 
 secured? 
 
 I know of none which promises so certain results, 
 and is at the same time so unobjectionable, as the 
 organization of banking associations under a general act 
 of Congress well guarded in its provisions. To such 
 associations the Government might furnish circulating 
 notes, on the security of United States bonds deposited 
 in the treasury. These notes, prepared under the su- 
 pervision of proper officers, being uniform in appear- 
 ance and security, and convertible always into coin, 
 would at once protect labor against the evils of a 
 vicious currency, and facilitate commerce by cheap and 
 safe exchanges. 
 
 A moderate reservation from the interest on the 
 bonds would compensate the United States for the prep- 
 aration and distribution of the notes and a general 
 supervision of the system, and would lighten the burden 
 of that part of the public debt employed as securities. 
 The public credit, moreover, would be greatly improved 
 and the negotiation of new loans greatly facilitated by 
 the steady market demand for government bonds which 
 the adoption- of the proposed system would create. 
 
 It is an additional recommendation of the measure, 
 of considerable weight in my judgment, that it would 
 reconcile, as far as possible, all existing interests, by 
 the opportunity offered to existing institutions to re- 
 organize under the act, substituting only the secured 
 uniform national circulation for the local and various 
 circulation, secured and unsecured, now issued by them. 
 
 The President reported the successful estab- 
 lishment and operation of the Department of 
 Agriculture, created by the Act of Congress of 
 May 15. He then came to the " central act of 
 his administration/' to employ his own phrase, 
 uttered on a subsequent occasion, the Emancipa- 
 tion Proclamation. He confined the rest of his 
 message to the first provision of the Proclamation, 
 
264 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 that of " compensated emancipation," so earnestly 
 did he desire to do justice to the loyal border 
 States, and so convinced was he that it provided a 
 means for the amicable restoration of the Union. 
 
 Our national strife springs . . . not from the land 
 we inhabit, not from our national homestead. There is 
 no possible severing of this but would multiply, and 
 not mitigate, evils among us. In all its adaptations and 
 aptitudes it demands union and abhors separation. In 
 fact, it would ere long force reunion, however much of 
 blood and treasure the separation might have cost. 
 
 Our strife pertains to ourselves to the passing gen- 
 erations of men ; and it can without convulsion be 
 hushed forever with the passing of one generation. 
 
 The President therefore proposed amendments 
 to the Constitution which would provide compen- 
 sation in United States bonds to those States or 
 loyal individuals which should free the slaves 
 under their control at any time before January i, 
 1900, and which would authorize Congress to 
 colonize freedmen abroad. The articles he dis- 
 cussed at length, advocating them as embodying a 
 plan of mutual concession between loyal and 
 honest slaveholders and loyal and honest Aboli- 
 tionists. 
 
 Doubtless some of those who are to pay, and not to 
 receive, will object. Yet the measure is both just and 
 economical. In a certain sense the liberation of slaves 
 is the destruction of property property acquired by 
 descent or by purchase, the same as any other property. 
 It is no less true for having been often said, that the 
 people of the South are not more responsible than are 
 the people of the North ; and when it is remembered how 
 unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar and share 
 the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite 
 safe to say that the South has been more responsible 
 than the North for its continuance. If, then, for a 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 265 
 
 common object this property is to be sacrificed, is it 
 not just that it be done at a common charge? 
 
 Of the economic advantage of this plan the 
 President said, prophesying a population at the 
 end of the century of 100,000,000: 
 
 The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, 
 perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and 
 proportionately the wealth of the country. With these, 
 we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together 
 with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other 
 debt without it. 
 
 On the subject of the competition of the freed- 
 men with white laborers the President remarked 
 at length, presenting very sound economic argu- 
 ments as to the advantages of freeing the negroes 
 and retaining them in the country, and very un- 
 sound arguments as to the advantages of deport- 
 ing them. Mr. Lincoln's economic propositions 
 were strangely opposed to his economic principles. 
 While he was continually uttering the sound aph- 
 orism that " Labor was prior to, and independent 
 of capital " (he used this expression in his Agri- 
 cultural Address at Milwaukee, September 30, 
 1859, and repeated and elaborated it in his First 
 Annual Message), he did not fully realize that 
 this independence was due to the fact that labor 
 created its own wage, but, on the contrary, he 
 acted upon what is known as the "wage fund " 
 theory (so named by John Stuart Mill who, 
 shortly after Mr. Lincoln's death, discarded it as 
 erroneous), namely, that capital bought labor 
 exactly as it did commodities, and therefore the 
 amount and rate of wages were entirely and con- 
 tinuously dependent upon the labor supply in the 
 
2 66 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 market. Said Mr. Lincoln in the present mes- 
 sage: 
 
 With deportation [of negroes] even to a limited ex- 
 tent, enhanced wages to white labor is mathematically 
 certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the mar- 
 ket increase the demand for it, and you increase the 
 price of it. Reduce the supply of black labor by 
 colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and 
 by precisely so much you increase the demand for, 
 and wages of, white labor. 
 
 Nowhere is the fact more clearly recognized to- 
 day than in the South that, had its black labor 
 been deported after the war, the revival of indus- 
 try in that region, with its consequent increase in 
 both amount and rate of returns to capital and 
 labor, would have been far slower and less vigor- 
 ous than actually occurred. 
 
 The President supplemented that portion of his 
 Annual Message relating to the finances by a 
 special message of January 17, 1863, giving his 
 approval to an additional issue of $100,000,000 
 in United States notes, for payment of the army 
 and navy, of which there was immediate and 
 urgent need, as the pay of the soldiers and sailors 
 was greatly in arrears. With his superficial 
 economic mind, he omitted to discuss the vital 
 danger of an increase of currency, the impair- 
 ment of real value of debts, and, confounding 
 nominal with real prices, he wasted his apprehen- 
 sions upon the injury wrought by " increase in 
 the cost of living " to labor whose wages, if he 
 had stopped to consider, must rise in the same 
 ratio as prices of commodities. 
 
 While giving this approval, however, I think it my 
 duty to express my sincere regret that it has been 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 267 
 
 found necessary to authorize so large an additional 
 issue of United States notes, when this circulation, and 
 that of the suspended banks together, have become 
 already so redundant as to increase prices beyond real 
 values, thereby augmenting the cost of living, to the 
 injury of labor, and the cost of supplies to the injury 
 of the whole country. It seems very plain that con- 
 tinued issues of United States notes, without any check 
 to the issues of suspended banks, and without adequate 
 provision for the raising of money by loans, and for 
 funding the issues, so as to keep them within due limits, 
 must soon produce disastrous consequences ; and this 
 matter appears to me so important that I feel bound to 
 avail myself of this occasion to ask the special attention 
 of Congress to it. 
 
 As a commentary upon that portion of the An- 
 nual Message relating to the selfish interests of 
 the commercial, classes abroad as causing the con- 
 tinued recognition of the Confederate States as 
 belligerents, it will be interesting to note two let- 
 ters written by the President shortly after the 
 Message, to the workingmen of England who 
 were loyal to the cause of the Union in spite of the 
 distress wrought among them through the cutting 
 off by the blockade of the supply of raw cotton 
 to the mills of Europe. 
 
 On January 19, 1863, he wrote a letter to the 
 cotton-spinners of Manchester who had sent him 
 an address in support of the Union. After giv- 
 ing them an account of his stewardship in the 
 cause of free labor and civilization, he said : 
 
 I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the 
 workingmen at Manchester, and in all Europe, are 
 called to endure in this crisis. It has been often and 
 studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow 
 this government, which was built upon the foundation 
 of human rights, and to substitute for it one which 
 should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery, 
 was likely to obtain the favor of Europe. Through the 
 
268 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 action of our disloyal citizens, the workingmen of 
 Europe have been subjected to severe trials, for the 
 purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. 
 Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your 
 decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of 
 sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed 
 in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic 
 and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of 
 truth, and of the ultimate and universal triumph of 
 justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that 
 the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by 
 your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have no 
 hesitation in assuring you that they will excite ad- 
 miration, esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of 
 friendship among the American people. I hail this 
 interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that 
 whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may 
 befall your country or my own, the peace and friend- 
 ship which now exist between the two nations will 
 be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual. 
 
 On February 2, upon receiving a similar ad- 
 dress from the " Workingmen of London," he 
 replied with a letter in the same vein. 
 
 Congress followed the recommendations of the 
 President's Message to pass Legal Tender and 
 National Bank Acts, but failed to legislate upon 
 the subject of compensated emancipation; the 
 Senators and Representatives from the border 
 States holding that Congress under the Constitu- 
 tion had no authority to appropriate public money 
 for such a purpose. 
 
 In other respects, Congress loyally upheld the 
 hands of the President. It ratified his suspension 
 of the writ of habeas corpus in the cases of per- 
 sons suspected of treason, and broadly authorized 
 him to suspend the writ in the future " at such 
 times, and in such places, and with regard to such 
 persons, as in his judgment the public safety may 
 require." An act was passed to enroll and draft 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 269 
 
 in the national service the militia of the whole 
 country, each State contributing its quota in the 
 ratio of its population. On December 31, 1862, 
 Congress authorized the President to admit West 
 Virginia into the Union, upon its making certain 
 changes in its proposed constitution. These 
 changes having been made, the President admitted 
 it by proclamation on April 20, 1863. Two Con- 
 gressmen, chosen in New Orleans at an election 
 ordered by the military governor of the State, 
 Brigadier-General G. F. Shepley, were seated 
 after a thorough discussion of the constitutional- 
 ity of their election. 
 
 So earnest was the President in his desire for 
 the ending of the war by the restoration of the 
 Union, that he was ready to eliminate all partisan 
 advantages and personal ambitions to attain the 
 object. Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, who 
 was a leader of the radical faction in Congress 
 which was becoming more and more hostile to the 
 Administration, asked him in March for his 
 opinion on the Speakership of the new House of 
 Representatives. Lincoln replied on the i8th : 
 
 The supporters of the war should send no man to 
 Congress who will not pledge himself to go into caucus 
 with the unconditional supporters of the war, and to 
 abide the action of such caucus and vote for the person 
 therein nominated for Speaker. Let the friends of the 
 government first save the government, and then ad- 
 minister it to their own liking. 
 
 In accordance with this principle, Lincoln also 
 made overtures to the conservatives, hoping to 
 commit them to a vigorous enforcement of the 
 war. As has been stated already (p. 164), he 
 was willing to support McClellan's aspirations for 
 
270 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the Presidency if the deposed commander of the 
 Army of the Potomac would openly speak for the 
 prosecution of the war. In a similar self-sacri- 
 ficing spirit he subjected himself to a rebuff from 
 Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York, and 
 probably the leading member of the Democratic 
 party. He wrote him on March 23 : 
 
 You and I are substantially strangers, and I write 
 this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, 
 for the time being, am at the head of a nation that is 
 in great peril, and you are at the head of the greatest 
 State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's 
 life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot 
 be a difference of purpose between you and me. If 
 we should differ as to the means, it is important that 
 such difference should be as small as possible; that it 
 should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one 
 side or the other. In the performance of my duty 
 the cooperation of your State, as that of others, is 
 needed in fact, is indispensable. This alone is a suffi- 
 cient reason why I should wish to be at a good under- 
 standing with you. Please write me at least as long a 
 letter as this, of course saying in it just what you 
 think fit. 
 
 Governor Seymour responded but coldly to this 
 warm invitation. 
 
 Davis shortly became the President's bitterest 
 antagonist in his own party, and Seymour his 
 most troublesome adversary in the ranks of the 
 opposition, while McClellan opposed him for the 
 Presidency in 1864. That Lincoln had left nothing 
 undone which could win their favor and friend- 
 ship, to a lesser man might have been a matter 
 for regret ; to him, if he thought upon it at all, it 
 undoubtedly brought the consolation of duty per- 
 formed. 
 
 During this period the President applied him- 
 self to the subject of negro enlistment in the army. 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 271 
 
 His old fear that the former slaves would make 
 inefficient soldiers had been outweighed by con- 
 sideration of the great moral force of the policy. 
 To Governor Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, who- 
 was contemplating the raising in his State of a 
 negro military force, he wrote on March 26 : 
 
 In my opinion the country now needs no specific thing: 
 so much as some man of your ability and position to 
 go to this work. When I speak of your position, I 
 mean that of an eminent citizen of a slave State and 
 himself a slaveholder. The colored population is the 
 great available and yet unavailed of force for restor- 
 ing the Union. The bare sight of fifty thousand armed 
 and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the 
 Mississippi would end the rebellion at once; and who 
 doubts that we can present that sight if we but take 
 hold in earnest ? If you have been thinking of it, please 
 do not dismiss the thought. 
 
 Although from the beginning of the war the 
 Confederate Government had been urged by vari- 
 ous of its soldiers and statesmen to arm the 
 negroes, such action by the North evoked dire 
 threats of reprisal. White officers of colored 
 troops were to be treated as outlaws, and shot 
 when captured. This was a challenge which the 
 Abolitionists were eager to accept. To them the 
 war now assumed the character of a holy crusade. 
 Many of them offered the Government their serv- 
 ices as officers of negro regiments. 
 
 A letter of the President to General Banks at 
 New Orleans is a record of such devotion. It is 
 dated March 29, 1863. 
 
 Hon. Daniel Ullman, with a commission of a briga- 
 dier-general and two or three hundred other gentlemen 
 as officers, goes to your department and reports to you> 
 for the purpose of raising a colored brigade. To now 
 
272 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 avail ourselves of this element of force is very im- 
 portant, if not indispensable. I therefore will thank 
 you to help General Ullman forward with his under- 
 taking as much and as rapidly as you can ; and also to 
 carry the general object beyond his particular organ- 
 ization if you find it practicable. The necessity of this 
 is palpable if, as I understand, you are now unable 
 to effect anything with your present force; and which 
 force is soon to be greatly diminished by the expiration 
 of terms of service, as well as by ordinary causes. I 
 shall be very glad if you will take hold of the matter in 
 earnest. 
 
 General David Hunter had already organized 
 negro troops in his department. From the be- 
 ginning the experiment was an unqualified suc- 
 cess. It was a pleasure to the President that he 
 could now write a letter of congratulation to the 
 Abolitionist general whom less than a year before 
 he had been compelled to reprimand for his pre- 
 mature act of emancipation. 
 
 I am glad to see the accounts of your colored force 
 at Jacksonville, Fla. I see the enemy are driving at 
 them fiercely, as is to be expected. It is important to 
 the enemy that such a force shall not take shape and 
 grow and thrive in the South, and in precisely the same 
 proportion it is important to us that it shall. Hence the 
 utmost caution and vigilance is necessary on our part. 
 The enemy will make extra efforts to destroy them, 
 and we should do the same to preserve and increase 
 them. 
 
 In all their subsequent battles the negro sol- 
 diers acquitted themselves with such valor that in 
 the war reports the sentence, " the colored troops 
 fought bravely," became a stock expression. 
 
 On the occasion of their soldierly conduct at 
 the assault of Port Hudson late in May, 1863, 
 George Henry Boker wrote a poem called " The 
 Black Regiment," in which he extolled their pa- 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 273 
 
 triotism, and pleaded for their recognition as com- 
 rades by the white soldiers. 
 
 " Freedom ! " their battle cry, 
 " Freedom ! or leave to die ! " 
 Ah ! and they meant the word, 
 Not as with us 'tis heard, 
 Not a mere party shout; 
 They gave their spirits out, 
 
 Hundreds on hundreds fell; 
 
 Oh, to the living few, 
 Soldiers, be just and true, 
 Hail them as comrades tried; 
 Fight with them side by side; 
 Never, in field or tent, 
 Scorn the black regiment ! 
 
 On June i, through Senator Charles Sumner 
 of Massachusetts, the President made a tentative 
 offer to General Fremont to place him in com- 
 mand of all the negro troops to be raised. The 
 offer was not accepted. Had it been, Fremont 
 at the close of the war would have commanded an 
 army of almost 200,000 men, second in number 
 only to Grant's. 
 
 The threat of the Confederates to remand cap- 
 tured negro soldiers to slavery evoked an " Order 
 of Retaliation " from the President, issued July 
 
 3: 
 
 It is the duty of every government to give protection 
 to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition, and 
 especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers 
 in the public service. The law of nations, and the 
 usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized 
 powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treat- 
 ment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell 
 or enslave any captured person on account of his color, 
 and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse 
 
274 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of 
 the age. 
 
 The Government of the United States will give the 
 same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall 
 sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense 
 shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's pris- 
 oners in our possession. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the 
 United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a 
 rebel soldier shall be executed; and for everyone en- 
 slaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier 
 shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and 
 continued at such labor until the other shall be re- 
 leased and receive the treatment due to a prisoner 
 of war. 
 
 Either the threat of the Confederates was an 
 idle one, or Lincoln's order deterred them from 
 putting it into execution, for with but one impor- 
 tant exception they gave negroes captured in bat- 
 tle the same treatment that was accorded white 
 prisoners. At the storming of Fort Pillow, Ten- 
 nessee, on April 12, 1863, the Confederate Gen- 
 eral Forrest massacred at least three hundred of 
 the garrison, mostly negroes and their white offi- 
 cers, after these had thrown down their arms. 
 
 A rumor of this fiendish act came to the Presi- 
 dent just before he delivered an address at a 
 Sanitary Fair in Baltimore on April 18, 1864, and 
 in his speech he solemnly promised that, if the 
 charge against Forrest proved upon investigation 
 to be true, retribution would be surely executed. 
 He said: 
 
 There seems to be some anxiety in the public mind 
 whether the Government is doing its duty to the col- 
 ored soldier, and to the service, at this point. At the 
 beginning of the war, and for some time, the use of 
 colored troops was not contemplated ; and how the 
 change of purpose was wrought I will not now take 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 275 
 
 time to explain. Upon a clear conviction of duty I 
 resolved to turn that element of strength to account; 
 and I am responsible for it to the American people, to 
 the Christian world, to history, and in my final account 
 to God. Having determined to use the negro as a 
 soldier, there is no way but to give him all the pro- 
 tection given to any other soldier. ... If after all that 
 has been said it shall turn out that there has been no 
 massacre at Fort Pillow, it will be almost safe to say 
 there has been none, and will be none, elsewhere. If 
 there has been the massacre of three hundred there, 
 or even the tenth part of three hundred, it will be con- 
 clusively proved; and being so proved, the retribution 
 shall as surely come. It will be matter of grave con- 
 sideration in what exact course to apply the retribution ; 
 but in the supposed case it must come. 
 
 A Congressional investigation proved that the 
 rumor was true, and had not been exaggerated. 
 Yet the brutality revealed was so monstrous that 
 the tender-hearted President refrained, in spite 
 of his promise, from a retribution which, to be 
 effective, would have to be coextensive with the 
 offense, and, because visited in cold blood upon 
 innocent prisoners, even more brutal than the 
 massacre, which was perpetrated in the blood- 
 lust of conquest. 
 
 Accordingly, the public interest being concen- 
 trated at the time on the bloody campaign of 
 Grant in Virginia, the Fort Pillow incident was 
 allowed by the Government to pass without action 
 upon it. 
 
 Toward the end of the war, when the collapse 
 of the Rebellion was in plain sight, the Confed- 
 erate Government debated the question of arming 
 the slaves ; the measure failed by one vote. Mr. 
 Lincoln expressed his sentiments upon this unique 
 phase of the conflict begun in defense of slavery 
 in a speech on the occasion of a presentation of a 
 
276 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 captured Rebel flag to Governor Morton of In- 
 diana. 
 
 While I have often said that all men ought to be 
 free, yet would I allow those colored persons to be 
 slaves who want to be, and next to them those white 
 people who argue in favor of making other people 
 slaves. I am in favor of giving an appointment to such 
 white men to try it on for these slaves. I will say one 
 thing in regard to the negro being employed to fight for 
 them. I do know he cannot fight and stay at home 
 and make bread too. And as one is about as important 
 as the other to them, I don't care which they do. I am 
 rather in favor of having them try them as soldiers. 
 They lack one vote of doing that, and I wish I could 
 send my vote over the river so that I might cast it in 
 favor of allowing the negro to fight. But they cannot 
 fight and work both. We now see the bottom of the 
 enemy's resources. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO MILITARY AUTHORITY 
 
 THE bloodiest episode of the War, outside of 
 the actual operations in the field, was the resist- 
 ance to the enforcement of the draft ordered by 
 act of Congress. Of course this was not a very 
 popular law anywhere, but it was carried into ef- 
 fect generally with no trouble and even when it 
 was troublesome it was not serious, except in New 
 York City. Here the resistance to the draft al- 
 most engendered a counter-revolution. On Sat- 
 urday, July n, the draft commenced and pro- 
 ceeded quietly, the sullen crowds which gathered 
 in the streets confining their opposition to sup- 
 pressed rage and portentous scowls and mutter- 
 ings. On Sunday, however, the opposition began 
 to become coherent and gather to a big black 
 ominous cloud,, and when the draft was resumed 
 on the next day, an unrelenting mob broke into 
 the room, destroyed the wheel which contained 
 the names, and set fire to the building. The fire- 
 men appeared, but the rioters refused to let them 
 do anything, and they were obliged to look on and 
 see the entire block needlessly sacrificed. The 
 Superintendent of Police attempted to enforce 
 order, and was seized by the insensate mob, and 
 barely escaped with his life. Of course, the Rebel 
 emissaries were active, inciting to new and in- 
 creased outrages; and thieves, pickpockets, bur- 
 277 
 
278 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 glars, and criminals of all sorts flocked into the 
 city from other places, and plied their foul voca- 
 tions, while the dangerous elements of all classes 
 and both sexes exerted the most untiring efforts 
 to promote the cause of disorder, riot, and rapine, 
 Unfortunately, the militia had gone to Pennsyl- 
 vania to aid the troops at the battle of Gettysburg, 
 and the police were powerless to cope with a mob 
 which now numbered thousands of the worst 
 enemies of society, and the riot went madly on for 
 the space of four days until the troops could be 
 restored to the city. The draft was forgotten and 
 the mob was fatally bent on mischief of any sort, 
 crime of every name, outrage of every degree. 
 The weakest and the most powerful alike were 
 targets for the violence of the mad mob. Lead- 
 ing citizens were assaulted, and their houses pil- 
 laged. The mob had an especial antipathy to 
 negroes, and although the blacks were unoffend- 
 ing, yet any one caught on the streets was in- 
 stantly strung up to the first lamp-post. There 
 was a negro orphan asylum on Fifth Avenue 
 which afforded a home for about 750 colored or- 
 phans ; this was set afire by the brutal mob, the 
 poor orphans were driven off and beaten, and the 
 building and contents were destroyed, after being 
 pillaged. 
 
 The only consistency in the acts of this mad 
 mob was to steal all they could, kill every negro 
 they could see, and attack every policeman they 
 could discover ; they aimed at no other specific re- 
 sult, but simply did all the mischief they dared; 
 they did indeed intend to destroy the buildings in 
 which the loyal newspapers, especially the Tribune, 
 were printed, but the riot was quelled just before 
 it attained those results. Governor Seymour 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 279 
 
 made a speech to the rioters from the steps of the 
 City Hall ; and on Tuesday issued a proclamation, 
 neither of which produced any effect. Both the 
 Governor and the police did the best they could, 
 but they could not control so fearful, desperate, 
 and bloody-minded a mob ; naught but the force 
 of regiments could suppress them. The riot was 
 not quelled till the serried ranks of infantry, with 
 lines of glistening steel, gave notice to the rioters 
 that henceforth they could not longer murder, 
 pillage, and burn with impunity ; but that the con- 
 test henceforth would be with organized force. 
 This issue the rioters were eager to decline and 
 did, in fact, decline. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac was weakened botli 
 by the withdrawal of troops and the impairment 
 of the army's morale on account of this riot, and 
 the Rebel army was strengthened correspond- 
 ingly. Lee was thereby emboldened to weaken 
 his army in the East by sending Longstreet to the 
 support of Bragg, who was confronted by Rose- 
 crans in Middle Tennessee. 
 
 Meanwhile the draft had not been enforced in 
 New York City and on August 3 Governor Sey- 
 mour appealed to the President to suspend the 
 draft until the courts could adjudge the constitu- 
 tionality of the law, which was in doubt, and for 
 other reasons. To this letter the President made 
 the following reply : 
 
 I do not object to abide a decision of the United 
 States Supreme Court, or of the Judges thereof, on the 
 constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should be 
 willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But I cannot 
 consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We 
 are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, 
 drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his 
 
2 8o LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a 
 slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. 
 This produces an army which will soon turn upon our 
 now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall 
 not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It pro- 
 duces an _ army with a rapidity not to be matched on 
 our side, if we first waste time to reexperiment with the 
 volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and 
 palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate; 
 and then more time to obtain a Court decision as to 
 whether a law is constitutional which requires a part 
 of those not now in the service to go to the aid of 
 those who are already in it; and still more time to 
 determine with absolute certainty that we get those who 
 are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who 
 are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just 
 and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the 
 important duty with which I am charged, of maintain- 
 ing the unity and the free principles of our common 
 country. 
 
 The draft was resumed on August 19, and as 
 the thugs found they would be confronted by men 
 with guns and the animus to shoot, instead of by 
 helpless negroes and children, they concluded that 
 discretion was the better part of valor, and did 
 nothing unseemly; and the draft was concluded 
 in an orderly fashion. I recollect in November, 
 1864, paying some of the very men drafted at 
 this time: they were members of the 68th New 
 York Infantry, and were guarding blockhouses 
 between Bridgeport (Ala.) and Chattanooga. 
 They looked sullen and discontented, but had no 
 scruples about drawing their pay. 
 
 A less tragic, yet far more important, develop- 
 ment of Northern resistance to military authority 
 occurred in Ohio during the summer and fall of 
 1863. General Burnside in his new depart- 
 ment had little chance to repeat his military blun- 
 ders, but his well-meaning stupidity soon caused 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 281 
 
 him to involve the Administration in a political 
 complication which it required all the finesse of 
 the President to bring to a successful conclusion. 
 Clement L. Vallandigham, an extreme States- 
 rights Democrat, who as a member of the preced- 
 ing Congress had in a speech in the House of 
 Representatives eloquently denounced the war, 
 declaring the purpose of the Administration to be 
 to " change our present democratical form of gov- 
 ernment into an imperial despotism," repeated 
 these sentiments in Democratic meetings through- 
 out Ohio, and, in particular, assailed General 
 Burnside for an edict he had issued known as 
 " General Order No. 38," forbidding acts com- 
 mitted for the benefit of the enemy, and stating 
 that persons committing such offenses would be 
 tried as spies or traitors, or sent over into the 
 lines of their friends. On May 4 General Burn- 
 side arrested Mr. Vallandigham at his home in 
 Dayton, and brought him to headquarters at Cin- 
 cinnati for trial by court-martial. His counsel, 
 Senator Pugh, applied for a writ of habeas 
 corpus, which the judge refused, on the ground 
 that the action of General Burnside was in the 
 interest of public safety. Mr. Vallandigham was 
 tried on the 6th, found guilty, and sentenced to 
 imprisonment in a Federal fortress. General 
 Burnside designated Fort Warren in Boston Har- 
 bor as the place of incarceration. The President, 
 however, modified this sentence into the alternative 
 presented by Order No. 38, and sent the prisoner 
 over into the Confederate lines. From the South 
 he ran through the blockade, finally arriving in 
 Canada. 
 
 The opponents of the war, being sadly in need 
 of a concrete example of the tyranny against 
 
282 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 which they were inveighing, seized upon the case 
 as fulfilling every desired specification. In Val- 
 landigham himself, an eloquent fanatic, they pos- 
 sessed an ideal hero and martyr of the cause. 
 Public meetings were held all over the country to 
 denounce the Administration for its despotic act. 
 General Burnside, fearing that he had been un- 
 wise in bringing this storm of criticism upon the 
 Government, offered his resignation. In reply 
 the President telegraphed him on May 29 as 
 follows : 
 
 When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you 
 Icnow. All the cabinet regretted the necessity of arrest- 
 ing, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubt- 
 ing there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, 
 all were for seeing you through with it. 
 
 The brunt of seeing Burnside through, how- 
 ever, fell on the President, and ably did he fulfil 
 the difficult task. Opposed to him were some of 
 the shrewdest constitutional lawyers in the coun- 
 try. At their instigation meetings in denuncia- 
 tion of Vallandigham's arrest were held in vari- 
 ous parts of the country. The President chose 
 to reply to the resolutions passed by a meeting at 
 Albany, N. Y., on May 19. To this Governor 
 Seymour had sent an address, in which he said : 
 " If this proceeding is approved by the Govern- 
 ment, and sanctioned by the people, it is not 
 merely a step toward revolution it is revolution ; 
 it will not only lead to military despotism it es- 
 tablishes military despotism." The resolutions 
 closed with a denunciation of " the blow struck at 
 a citizen of Ohio " as " aimed at every citizen 
 of the North," and "against the spirit of our 
 laws and Constitution." They earnestly called on 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 283 
 
 the President "to reverse the action of the mili- 
 tary tribunal which has passed a cruel and un- 
 usual punishment upon the party arrested, pro- 
 hibited in terms by the Constitution," and to re- 
 store him to liberty. 
 
 The President took his time in preparing a re- 
 ply, with the result that the letter, when it was 
 finished on June 12, proved to be one of his not- 
 able papers, comparable for its cogent argument 
 to his Cooper Union address. 
 
 He began by analyzing the resolutions of the 
 meeting and showing that their movers and him- 
 self had a common purpose, the maintenance of 
 the nation, differing only in the choice of meas- 
 ures for effecting that object. " The meeting, by 
 their resolutions, assert and argue that certain 
 military arrests . . . for which I am ultimately 
 responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they 
 are not." He then argued that these arrests were 
 not made for " treason," as charged, but on 
 " totally different grounds," i. e., for purely mili- 
 tary reasons. He narrated the manner in which 
 the enemy with which the country was in open 
 war had, under cover of " liberty of speech,"* 
 " liberty of the press," and " habeas corpus" kept 
 a corps of spies in the North, which had aided 
 the secessionist cause in a thousand ways. " Yet/' 
 said the President, " thoroughly imbued with a 
 reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, 
 I was slow to adopt the strong measures which 
 by degrees I had been forced to regard as being 
 within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as. 
 indispensable to the public safety." But the evil 
 had to be dealt with, and by more effective means 
 than afforded by the civil courts, on whose juries 
 sympathizers with the accused were apt to sit, 
 
284 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 *' more ready to hang the panel than to hang- the 
 traitor." And again, said Lincoln, there are 
 crimes against the country which may be so con- 
 ducted as to evade the cognizance of a civil court, 
 such as dissuading a man from volunteering or 
 inducing a soldier to desert. These are cases 
 clearly coming under that clause of the Constitu- 
 tion which permits suspension of the writ of 
 habeas corpus " when, in cases of rebellion or 
 invasion, public safety may require it." 
 
 The President then proceeded to draw a dis- 
 tinction between civil and military law. He said : 
 
 The former is directed at the small percentage of 
 ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while 
 the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings 
 against the Government, which, at most, will succeed 
 or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case 
 arrests are made not so much for what has been done, 
 as for what probably would be done. The latter is 
 more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than 
 the former. In such cases the purposes of men are 
 much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary 
 crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when 
 the peril of his Government is discussed cannot be mis- 
 understood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the 
 enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously talks for 
 liis country with " buts," and " ifs," and " ands." 
 
 The President showed how greatly the country 
 had suffered through deferring arrests for trea- 
 son, by citing the cases of Breckinridge, Lee, 
 Joseph E. Johnston, and other commanders in the 
 Confederate service who had all been within the 
 power of the Government after the outbreak of 
 the war, and who were well known to be traitors 
 at the time. Said the President : 
 
 In view of these and similar cases, I think the time 
 not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having 
 made too few arrests rather than too many. 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 285 
 
 Mr. Lincoln then examined the contention of 
 the committee that even during a war military ar- 
 rests were unconstitutional outside of the region 
 of hostilities. To this the President replied: 
 
 Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes 
 no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there 
 is any such constitutional distinction. I concede that 
 the class of arrests complained of can be constitutional 
 only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public 
 safety may require them ; and I insist that in such cases 
 they are constitutional wherever the public safety does 
 require them, as well in places to which they may 
 prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it 
 may be already prevailing; as well where they may 
 restrain mischievous interference with the raising and 
 supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion, as where 
 the rebellion may actually be ; as well where they may 
 restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where 
 they would prevent mutiny in the army. . . . 
 
 Mr. Vallandigham's arrest was made because he was 
 laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of 
 troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to 
 leave the rebellion without an adequate military force 
 to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was 
 damaging the political prospects of the Administration 
 or the personal interests of the commanding general, 
 but because he was damaging the army, upon the exist- 
 ence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. 
 He was warring upon the military, and this gave the 
 military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon 
 him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the mili- 
 tary power of the country, then his arrest was made on 
 mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on 
 reasonably satisfactory evidence. 
 
 With an argument appealing even more to the 
 hearts than the heads of his critics, Mr. Lincoln 
 continued : 
 
 I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am 
 considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion 
 by military force by armies. Long experience has 
 
286 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion 
 shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The 
 case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, 
 this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier 
 boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a 
 wily agitator who induces him to desert? ... I think 
 that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save 
 the boy is not only constitutional, but a great mercy. 
 
 In fine, said the President: 
 
 I can no more be persuaded that the Government can 
 constitutionally take no strong measures in time of 
 rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could 
 not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be 
 persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine 
 for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good 
 food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the 
 danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American 
 people will by means of military arrests during the 
 rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty 
 of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by 
 jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peace- 
 ful future which I trust lies before them, any more than 
 I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong 
 an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to 
 persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of 
 Ms healthful life. 
 
 The President gently rebuked the memorial- 
 ists for introducing partisan politics into the af- 
 fair by designating themselves as " Democrats " 
 rather than " American citizens." Nevertheless 
 he accepted the challenge, and showed that An- 
 drew Jackson, the idol of the Democratic party, 
 had made a military arrest of the author of a 
 denunciatory newspaper article, and refused the 
 service upon himself of a writ of habeas corpus, 
 being fined for so doing ; thirty years later, after 
 a full discussion of the constitutional aspects of 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 287 
 
 the case, a Democratic Congress refunded him 
 principal and interest of the fine. 
 
 At the conclusion of his letter the President 
 stated that he had been pained when he learned 
 of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest, and he prom- 
 ised to release him with pleasure when he felt 
 assured that the public safety would not suffer 
 by it. 
 
 On June n the Ohio Democratic Convention 
 nominated Vallandigham for Governor- of the 
 State upon a platform which protested against the 
 Emancipation Proclamation, military arrests in 
 loyal States, and in particular, the banishment 
 of Vallandigham. A committee presented these 
 resolutions to the President, and on June 29 he 
 replied to them in the tenor of his letter to the 
 Albany meeting, elaborating the constitutional 
 argument, and closing with the following proposi- 
 tion : 
 
 Your nominee for Governor . . is known . . . to 
 declare against the use of > an army to suppress the 
 rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages 
 desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because 
 it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the 
 draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and 
 to hope that you will become strong enough to do 
 so. ... 
 
 I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow 
 your attitude ; but I assure you that both friends and 
 enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It 
 is a substantial hope, and, by consequence, a real 
 strength to the enemy. If it is a> false hope, and one 
 which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way 
 exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter,, 
 in order that you, or a majority, may, if you choose, 
 indorse your names upon one of them, and return it 
 thus indorsed to me, with the understanding that those 
 signing are thereby committed to the following proposi- 
 tions, and to nothing else : 
 
288 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 1. That there is now rebellion in the United States, 
 the object and tendency of which is to destroy the Na- 
 tional Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and 
 navy are constitutional means for suppressing that 
 rebellion. 
 
 2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his 
 own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor 
 the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army and 
 navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that 
 rebellion ; and, 
 
 3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he 
 can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the 
 army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress 
 the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well pro- 
 vided for and supported. 
 
 And with the further understanding .that upon receiv- 
 ing the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause 
 them to be published, which publication shall be, within 
 itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. 
 Vallandigham. 
 
 The committee, put upon the defensive by this 
 clever device of the President, took the only atti- 
 tude which was possible short of capitulation, and 
 rejected the proposition as an insult to their 
 loyalty. They went into the campaign fore- 
 doomed to defeat. The Republican party deter- 
 mined to " make treason odious " by piling up an 
 enormous majority of votes against him. They 
 nominated John Brough, a " War Democrat," to 
 make the issue as clear as possible. By a State 
 law the soldiers in the field were permitted to 
 vote, and they, as well as the citizens at home, 
 cast their ballots under conditions which would 
 be far from satisfactory to a ballot reformer of 
 the present day. Brough won the election with 
 over 100,000 votes to spare. Soon after his de- 
 feat, Vallandigham returned openly to Ohio, evi- 
 dently daring the Government to arrest him again. 
 The President, however, realizing that Vallan- 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 289 
 
 digham's power to injure the draft was broken, 
 ignored his presence in the country. Undoubt- 
 edly he would have taken a similar course from 
 the beginning, had not Burnside's action in ar- 
 resting Vallandigham forced him to carry out an 
 autocratic policy. For Lincoln did not approve 
 of supplying martyrs to the opposition, and, there- 
 fore, when forced to do so, he contrived to make 
 them as unheroic, and even ridiculous, as possible. 
 Brilliant orator though he was, Clement L. Vallan- 
 digham's connection with his party became a posi- 
 tive detriment to it, and he soon retired from 
 politics to devote himself to law, in the practice 
 of which he met his death in a strange and tragic 
 fashion. In defending a man accused of murder 
 he shot himself, as he was illustrating the manner 
 in which his client might have discharged his 
 pistol by accident while drawing it from his 
 pocket. 
 
 The political campaign of 1863 in other States 
 as well as in Ohio was waged along the lines laid 
 down by the President, with the result of sweep- 
 ing gubernatorial victories for the Administration. 
 
 The President not only sounded the keynote 
 of the campaign, and formulated the Administra- 
 tion's platform, but wrote, as it were, the cam- 
 paign text-book of his party, reviewing the acts 
 of the Administration and supporting its policies 
 so completely and cogently that nothing essential 
 could be added. All this he did in an address 
 which he sent to a mass-meeting of " uncondi- 
 tional Union men," at Springfield, 111., and which 
 was there read on September 3 amid the greatest 
 enthusiasm. 
 
 After tendering the nation's gratitude to those 
 " noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan 
 
290 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 hope can make false to the nation's life," the 
 President plunged at once into a justification of 
 his course. 
 
 There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To 
 such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame 
 me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? 
 There are but three conceivable ways : First, to suppress 
 the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying 
 to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are 
 agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to 
 give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for 
 it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you 
 are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only 
 remains some imaginable compromise. I do not be- 
 lieve any compromise embracing the maintenance of 
 the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a 
 directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion 
 is its military, its army. That army dominates all the 
 country and all the people within its range. Any offer 
 of terms made by any man or men within that range, 
 in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the 
 present, because such man or men have no power what- 
 ever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were 
 made with them. 
 
 To illustrate. Suppose refugees from the South and 
 peace men of the North get together in convention and 
 frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restora- 
 tion of the Union. In what way can that compromise 
 be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? 
 Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsyl- 
 vania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out of ex- 
 istence. But no paper compromise to which the con- 
 trollers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect 
 that army. In an effort at such compromise we should 
 waste time which the enemy would improve to our 
 disadvantage; and that would be all. A compromise, 
 to be effective, must be made either with those who 
 control the rebel army, or with the people first lib- 
 erated from the domination of that army by the suc- 
 cess of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you 
 that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or 
 from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any 
 peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 291 
 
 belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary 
 are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that 
 if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall 
 not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely 
 acknowledge myself the servant of the people, accord- 
 ing to the bond of service the United States Constitu- 
 tion and that, as such, I am responsible to them. 
 
 But to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about 
 the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion 
 between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly 
 wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you 
 do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed 
 any measure which is not consistent with even your 
 view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested 
 compensated emancipation, to which you replied you 
 wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had 
 not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in 
 such way as to save you from greater taxation to save 
 the Union exclusively by other means. 
 
 You dislike the emancipation proclamation, and per- 
 haps would have it retracted. You say it is unconsti- 
 tutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution 
 invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in 
 time of war. The most that can be said if so much 
 is that slaves are property. Is there has there ever 
 been any question that by the law of war, property, 
 both of enemies and friends, may be taken when 
 needed ? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps 
 us, or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, de- 
 stroy enemies' property when they cannot use it ; and 
 even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. 
 Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help them- 
 selves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded 
 as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the 
 massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male 
 and female. 
 
 But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is 
 not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. 
 If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than 
 the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess 
 to think its retraction would operate favorably for 
 the Union. Why better after the retraction than before 
 the issue? There was more than a year and a half 
 of trial to suppress the Rebellion before the Proclama- 
 tion was issued, the last one hundred days of which 
 
292 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, 
 unless averted by those in revolt returning to their 
 allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favor- 
 ably for us since the issue of the Proclamation as 
 before. 
 
 I know as fully as one can know the opinions of 
 others that some of the commanders of our armies 
 in the field, who have given us our mosjt important 
 victories, believe the Emancipation policy and the use 
 of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt 
 to the Rebellion, and that at least one of those im- 
 portant successes could not have been achieved when 
 it was but for the aid of black soldiers. 
 
 Among the commanders who hold these views are 
 some who have never had any affinity with what is 
 called " Abolitionism," or with " Republican party poli- 
 tics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. 
 I submit their opinions as entitled to some weight 
 against the objections often urged that emancipation 
 and arming the blacks are un,wise as military measures, 
 and were not adopted as such in good faith. 
 
 You say that you will not fight to free negroes. 
 Some of them seem willing to fight for you ; but no 
 matter. Fight you, then, exclusively, to save the Union. 
 I issued the Proclamation on purpose to aid you in 
 saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered 
 all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to con- 
 tinue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you 
 to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought 
 that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent 
 the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that 
 extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. 
 Do you think differently? I thought that whatever 
 negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so 
 much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. 
 Does it appear otherwise to you ? But negroes, like 
 other people, act upon motives. Why should they do 
 anything for us if we will do nothing for them ? If they 
 stake their lives for us they must be prompted by the 
 strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And 
 the promise, being made, must be kept. 
 
 The letter closed with a glowing exordium, 
 such as those which, in the days of the fight for 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 293 
 
 free territory, had roused his auditors to a frenzy 
 of enthusiasm. In classic phrase it pictured the 
 soldiers and sailors of the Union marching on to 
 certain victory. It paid tribute to the courage of 
 the negro troops, and with Cromwellian ire con- 
 trasted their patriotism with the hypocritical pre- 
 tensions of the " malignants " of the peace party. 
 Yet its oratorical fervor was restrained from 
 soaring into bombast by a ballast of common- 
 sense, and its tense feeling was relieved by a 
 touch of grotesque humor, to which, as President 
 even more than as citizen, Lincoln was wont to 
 give loose in his most serious moments. Virtually 
 his " last stump-speech," it was unquestionably 
 his most characteristic and best one. 
 
 The signs look better. The Father of Waters again 
 goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North- 
 west for it; nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred 
 miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and 
 Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny 
 South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a help- 
 ing hand. On the spot, their part of the history was 
 jotted down in black and white. The job was a great 
 national one, and let none be slighted who bore an 
 honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared 
 the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. 
 It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely 
 and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettys- 
 burg, and on many fields of less note. Nor must Uncle 
 Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery mar- 
 gins they have been present. Not only on the deep 
 sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up 
 the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground 
 was a little damp, they have been and made their 
 tracks. Thanks to all: for the great republic for the 
 principle it lives by and keeps alive for man's vast 
 future thanks to all. 
 
 Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope 
 it will come soon, and come to stay, and so come as 
 to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then 
 
294 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 have been proved that among free men there can be no 
 successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that 
 they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case 
 and pay the cost. And then there will be some black 
 men who can remember that with silent tongue, and 
 clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, 
 they have helped mankind on to this great consumma- 
 tion, while I fear there will be some white ones unable 
 to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech 
 they strove to hinder it. 
 
 Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final 
 triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently 
 apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his 
 own good time, will give us the rightful result. 
 
 That reference in the address t6 offers of 
 compromise made by representatives of the Con- 
 federacy was evoked by various propositions 
 made for self-advertisement by irresponsible par- 
 ties such as Fernando Wood, a Democratic 
 politician of New York, who boldly confessed his 
 sympathy with the South and virtually offered 
 himself as a mediator. To him Lincoln had re- 
 plied (on December 12, 1862) : 
 
 Understanding your phrase, " The Southern States 
 would send representatives to the next Congress," to 
 be substantially the same as that "the people of the 
 Southern States would cease resistance, and would re- 
 inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national author- 
 ity within the limits of such States, under the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States," I say that in such case the 
 war would cease on the part of the United States, and 
 that if, within a reasonable time, " a full and general 
 amnesty " were necessary to such end, it would not be 
 withheld. I do not think it would be proper now for 
 me to communicate this formally or informally to the* 
 people of the Southern States. My belief is that 
 they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, 
 they can communicate with me unequivocally. Nor 
 do I think it proper now to suspend military operations 
 to try any experiment of negotiation. 
 
NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY 295 
 
 It is true, however, that a no less responsible 
 party than Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-Presi- 
 dent of the Confederacy, had presented to the 
 Navy Department on July 4, 1863, a request that 
 he be permitted to come to Washington bearing 
 " a communication in writing from Jefferson 
 Davis, Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval 
 forces of the Confederate States, to Abraham 
 Lincoln, Commander-in-Chief of the land and 
 naval forces of the United States," but there was 
 no statement of the nature of the communication. 
 As the request studiously avoided recognition of 
 the President in other than the military capacity 
 of that office, Mr. Lincoln very wisely and 
 properly ordered the Secretary of the Navy to 
 reply : 
 
 The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The 
 customary agents and channels are adequate for all 
 needful communication and conference between the 
 United States forces and the insurgents. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE SECOND ELECTION AND INAUGURATION RE- 
 CONSTRUCTION 
 
 IT could not, in the nature of things, be ex- 
 pected that Mr. Lincoln's policy would be in- 
 dorsed by all members of his own party. His 
 efforts were conscientiously directed toward the 
 preservation of the Union, and not to the enforce- 
 ment of any partisan or sectional policy ; the radi- 
 cals were dissatisfied with his conservative policy 
 in reference to slavery and to his retention of Mc- 
 Clellan ; likewise to his fraternity with the Blairs, 
 and his pandering to the border slave States ; and 
 there were many personal grievances inherent in 
 the distribution of so much official patronage. 
 The net result was, the organization of a faction 
 within his own party to secure the retirement of 
 Mr. Lincoln at the end of his first term, and a 
 change of dynasty. The great leaders in this 
 movement were Salmon P. Chase and Benjamin 
 F. Wade of Ohio, H. Winter Davis of Maryland, 
 and Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas. Chase had 
 been generally regarded as the candidate whom 
 they should rally the opposition to, but not meet- 
 ing with the support he deemed necessary for any 
 show of success, he retired from the contest early. 
 About May I a call for a convention was issued ; 
 and still another call by some Germans of St. 
 296 
 
THE SECOND ELECTION 297 
 
 Louis ; and yet another by some radical Abolition- 
 ists, all centering in this same movement. 
 
 Chase, however, soon realized the hopelessness 
 of his Presidential aspiration, and retired from the 
 contest. The malcontents then picked upon Fre- 
 mont as their candidate, and called a convention 
 to nominate him at Cleveland on May 31. 
 
 On that day about one hundred and fifty per- 
 sons assembled at the Weddell House in Cleve- 
 land, professing to hail from fifteen different 
 States and the District of Columbia. As no con- 
 ventions had been held, however, the gathering- 
 could assume no higher significance than that of 
 a mass-meeting of one hundred and fifty recusant, 
 disgruntled politicians, who did not approve of 
 Mr. Lincoln's administration, and would have 
 liked to put someone else in his place. As a rule, 
 they were distinguished men and disappointed 
 politicians, many of them " cranks," whose ruling 
 idea was, that the rebellion should be crushed 
 forthwith, and the property of the Rebels confis- 
 cated. But none of the great leaders were there : 
 Chase, Wade, Davis, and Pomeroy, who had 
 started the movement, were conspicuous by their 
 absence. The one hundred and fifty were gen- 
 erally strangers to public life, and to each other, 
 and the only external manifestation presented was 
 of a lot of small political philosophers, wandering 
 aimlessly through the hotel exchange, trying to 
 find out what they had come there for. As they 
 had come there on their own hook, and had no 
 credentials, and represented nobody but them- 
 selves, so also, to make matters harmonious, no 
 hall had been provided, nor had any other ar- 
 rangement been made for the purposed meeting. 
 The ridiculousness of the whole affair was palp- 
 
398 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 able, and it is probable that the majority of the 
 crowd would have slunk away and got quietly out 
 of town, had it not been that it would have added 
 to the grotesqueness of the situation. Finally, 
 someone started a fifty-cent subscription and en- 
 gaged a hall, borrowed a pen and bottle of ink, 
 cabbaged a dozen sheets of hotel notepaper, and 
 gathered the " delegates " together in the front 
 part of the hall. They opened proceedings by 
 electing the greatest man there, John Cochrane of 
 New York, to be chairman. In the afternoon 
 resolutions were adopted. Then the luckless and 
 troublesome Fremont was nominated for Presi- 
 dent by acclamation, and the chairman as Vice- 
 President, after which the " convention " ad- 
 journed. The platform was a string of gener- 
 alities, some of which no one could object to. 
 The " party " acquiesced in the suppression of 
 the rebellion ; favored the right of habeas corpus, 
 right of asylum, the Monroe Doctrine, an amend- 
 ment of the Constitution to debar the reestablish- 
 ment of slavery, one term of the Presidency, elec- 
 tion of President by direct vote of the people, con- 
 fiscation of the land of Rebels, and its distribution 
 among soldiers and actual settlers. 
 
 Fremont, visionary as usual, seems to have 
 thought he was going to be elected. He accepted 
 the nomination in a splenetic letter, abusing the 
 Administration for infidelity to the principles 
 upon which it came into being, and for " its dis- 
 regard of constitutionaal rights, its violation of 
 personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, 
 .as a crowning shame, its abandonment of the right 
 of asylum, dear to all free nations abroad." What 
 was meant by the last sentence is a deep mystery. 
 He concurred in the platform except the plank 
 
THE SECOND ELECTION 299 
 
 about confiscation; agreed tentatively to with- 
 draw from the canvass if Lincoln would ; and ris- 
 ing to the mock solemnity of the occasion, loftily 
 exclaimed : " If Mr. Lincoln be renominated, as 
 I believe it would be fatal to the country to in- 
 dorse a policy and renew a power which has cost 
 us the lives of thousands of men and needlessly 
 put the country on the road to bankruptcy, there 
 will remain no alternative but to organize against 
 him every element of conscientious opposition,, 
 with the view to prevent the misfortune of his 
 election." And so certain was he of election, 
 that, with no well-defined basis of support, he 
 resigned his position in the army. 
 
 It is astonishing how the Presidential maggot, 
 working in a man's brain, addles his good sense. 
 That Fremont should refer to national bank- 
 ruptcy showed imbecility of the supreme type, 
 inasmuch as his course in Missouri, had it been: 
 adopted by the Government generally, would 
 have made the country bankrupt in ninety days. 
 
 On the same day that Fremont wrote his letter 
 of acceptance, a meeting was held in New York, 
 ostensibly to thank General Grant for his success 
 in his campaign toward Richmond, but really to 
 launch him as a candidate for the Presidency. 
 Mr. Lincoln was invited to attend, and in reply- 
 he wrote a letter which completely nullified the 
 Presidential part of it. His letter read thus : 
 
 It is impossible for me to attend. I approve, never- 
 theless, of whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain 
 General Grant and the noble armies now under his 
 direction. My previous high estimate of General Grant 
 has been maintained and heightened by what has oc- 
 curred in the remarkable campaign he is now con- 
 ducting, while the magnitude and difficulty of the task 
 
3 oo LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 before him does not prove less than I expected. He 
 and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of their 
 great trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will 
 so shape your good words that they may turn to men 
 and guns, moving to his and their support. 
 
 At the convention which met in Baltimore on 
 the 8th day of June Mr. Lincoln received every 
 vote for President, except the Missouri vote, 
 which, under instructions, was cast for General 
 Grant, in honor of his having- once lived there. 
 
 The President accepted the nomination in a 
 brief speech, and thereafter in an equally brief 
 letter. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee was nomi- 
 nated as Vice-President. 
 
 The Democratic Convention met at Chicago on 
 August 29. Governor Seymour of New York 
 presided, and Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio drafted 
 the only plank of the platform which received any 
 attention during the campaign. This was a dec- 
 laration that the war was a failure, and that a 
 convention of the States, or some other peaceable 
 means, be arranged to restore peace " on the 
 basis of the Federal Union of the States." 
 
 General McClellan of New Jersey was nomi- 
 nated for President, and George H. Pendleton 
 of Ohio, an extreme peace man, for Vice-Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 On the day after the convention adjourned 
 came the news of the fall of Atlanta, and Lin- 
 coln's victory, which he himself had previously 
 doubted, was assured. 
 
 Fremont realized the disloyal attitude in which 
 he appeared before the country, and withdrew his 
 candidacy in favor of Lincoln. General McClel- 
 lan tried to stem the set, of the tide toward Lincoln 
 by repudiating the " peace " plank of his plat- 
 
THE SECOND ELECTION 301 
 
 form. The President greatly increased his popu- 
 larity by a number of cheering speeches he made 
 to troops returning from the front through Wash- 
 ington, and in response to serenades of citizens 
 of Maryland (on the occasion of the State's adop- 
 tion of a new constitution without slavery) and of 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 His tender solicitude for the wounded sol- 
 diers, as shown by his speaking at sanitary fairs 
 in neighboring cities, as well as consoling letters 
 to the bereaved relatives of those killed in battle 
 and the pardons he gave to soldiers condemned to 
 die for such offenses as sleeping at their posts, 
 endeared him more and more to the people, until 
 the term " Father Abraham " became fastened 
 upon him in loving regard, untinged with its 
 original comic suggestion. F. B. Carpenter, the 
 artist, whose reminiscences of Lincoln in his book 
 " Six Months in the White House " cover this 
 period, has so completely presented this side of 
 the President's character, that it would be super- 
 fluous to give such anecdotes here. One letter 
 of condolence is so beautiful in language, as well 
 as tender in sympathy, that lovers of Lincoln 
 rightly look for it in every book about him that is 
 published, and hence it is reproduced here. It 
 was to Mrs. Bixby of Boston, who had lost five 
 sons in the war, and whose sixth was lying 
 severely wounded in the hospital. 
 
 DEAR MADAM : I have been shown in the files of the 
 War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General 
 of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons 
 who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel 
 how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine 
 which should attempt to beguile you from the grief 
 of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from 
 
3 02 
 
 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 tendering to you the consolation that may be found in 
 the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray 
 that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish 
 of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished 
 memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride 
 that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice 
 upon the altar of freedom. 
 
 Yours, very sincerely and respectfully, 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 Space is wanting here to present examples of 
 the many proclamations of days of fasting and 
 prayer, as well as of thanksgiving, all of which 
 are permeated with a devout sense of the im- 
 manence of the Divine Will, guiding the destinies 
 of the nation through such humble means as him- 
 self. It was a feeling general at the time not 
 only with church people, but many who, like him- 
 self, were not communicants in any particular 
 religious denomination. The motto upon some 
 of our coins, " In God We Trust " was placed 
 upon them at this time, and therefore has an his- 
 toric as well as a religious significance which 
 should cause it to be retained to the end of the 
 nation's history, whatever views may be adopted 
 by the Executive in particular, or the Govern- 
 ment in general, about the separation of church 
 and state. 
 
 The good people of the country, breaking over 
 party lines, cast an overwhelming vote for Lin- 
 coln and Johnson, and this ticket received the 
 -electoral votes of every Northern State but New 
 Jersey, and also of the former slave States: 
 Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and West Vir- 
 ginia. 
 
 The President delivered the last Annual Mes- 
 sage to Congress of his first term (and, as it 
 
THE SECOND INAUGURATION 303 
 
 proved, the last one of his life) on December 6 r 
 1864. 
 
 After reporting on the favorable condition of 
 the various departments, the Foreign, the Treas- 
 ury, the Navy, etc., he commented upon the re- 
 sults of the late election as proving the almost 
 unanimous sentiment of the nation to be in favor 
 of prosecuting the war for the Union. He 
 therefore promised that there should be no steps 
 backward, saying in conclusion : 
 
 In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance 
 to the national authority on the part of the insurgents 
 as the only indispensable condition to ending the war 
 on the part of the Government, I retract nothing here- 
 tofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made 
 a year ago, that while I remain in my present position 
 I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipa- 
 tion Proclamation. Nor shall I return to slavery any 
 person who is free by the terms of that proclamation 
 or by any of the acts of Congress. 
 
 If the people should, by whatever mode or means, 
 make it an executive duty to reenslave such persons, 
 another, and not I, must be their instrument to per- 
 form it. 
 
 In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply 
 to say, that the war will cease on the part of the Gov- 
 ernment whenever it shall have ceased on the part of 
 those who began it. 
 
 On January 31 Congress passed the Thirteenth 
 Amendment of the Constitution, prohibiting slav- 
 ery throughout the entire country, and before his 
 death the President had the gratification of learn- 
 ing that his own State of Illinois was the first to> 
 ratify it. 
 
 A numerous assemblage was convened in front 
 of the Capitol on March 4, 1865, to witness the 
 second inauguration of the great President. The 
 
304 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 morning was very stormy, however, and the com- 
 mittee of arrangements began to take measures 
 to have the ceremonies performed in the Senate 
 Chambers, which would have proved a great dis- 
 appointment to the congregated masses. A 
 providential interference however took place, 
 which brought a complete change in the space of 
 sixty seconds ; at 11.40 the rain ceased, the clouds 
 parted, revealing the brilliancy of a deep azure 
 sky; and at the moment when Chief- Justice 
 Chase arose to administer the oath, the glorious 
 sunlight fell through a rift in the clouds upon the 
 head of the newly consecrated President, and a 
 brilliant silver cloud floated near the earth just 
 above the President, as if the benison of Heaven 
 rested upon him. His Inaugural Address is an 
 English classic, and for both its style and sub- 
 stance will live as long as English literature. 
 
 After reviewing the situation at the time of his 
 First Inaugural Address, when the country was 
 divided into two hostile parties over the question 
 of slavery, the President said: 
 
 Neither party expected for the war the magnitude 
 or the duration which it has already attained. Neither 
 anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease 
 [with the conflict], or even before the conflict itself 
 should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and 
 a result less fundamental and astounding. 
 
 Both read the same Bible and pray to the same 
 God, and each invokes His aid against the other. It 
 may seem strange that any men should dare to ask 
 a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from 
 the sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not, 
 that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not 
 be answered. That of neither has been answered fully. 
 The Almighty has His own purposes. " Woe unto the 
 world because of offenses, for it must needs be that 
 offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the 
 
THE SECOND INAUGURATION 305 
 
 offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American 
 slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence 
 of God, must needs come, but which having continued 
 through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, 
 and that He gives to both North and South this terrible 
 war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, 
 shall we discern therein any departure from those Di- 
 vine attributes which the believers in a living God al- 
 ways ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do 
 we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily 
 pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all 
 the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and 
 fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until 
 every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid 
 by another drawn with the sword, as was said three 
 thousand years ago, so still it must be said, " The judg- 
 ments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." 
 
 With malice towards none, with charity for all, with 
 firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, 
 let us finish the work we are in : to bind up the nation's 
 wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the Bat- 
 tle, and for his widow and his orphan to do all which 
 may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace 
 among ourselves and with all nations. 
 
 Following this speech, so full of revelation to 
 the people of the greatness of the heart and mind 
 of the man they had chosen for their President, 
 came the address of the Vice-President, which 
 shocked those present exceedingly by its proof 
 that they had elected a demagogue to the second 
 highest place in their gift, and as a possible suc- 
 cessor to the great Lincoln. To speak plainly, 
 Andrew Johnson was drunk. While his friends 
 claimed that he was ordinarily an abstainer, 
 and therefore was peculiarly susceptible to the 
 effect of the liquor he had taken to fortify him- 
 self for the memorable occasion, he is not to be 
 excused for the sentiments he expressed when in 
 this deplorable condition. In vino veritas is a 
 
3 o6 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 wise saying^and the words of Johnson drunk were 
 afterward proved to be in accord with the nature 
 of the man by the acts of Johnson sober. He 
 showed himself in every way to be the most vul- 
 gar type of demagogue. 
 
 Andrew Johnson was literally and from choice 
 one of the common people, preferring the society 
 of the uncultured classes to that of the elite of 
 the nation. When he was about to be inaugu- 
 rated as Governor of Tennessee upon his first 
 election to the office, elaborate preparations for the 
 ceremony were made by the people of Nashville. 
 A procession was formed of the militia, civic so- 
 cieties, and other organizations in uniform and 
 fegalia, and an elegant barouche, drawn by four 
 horses gayly caparisoned with flags and pompons 
 was driven to the St. Cloud Hotel, where the out- 
 going Governor waited on the newly-elected Gov- 
 ernor to escort him to the Capitol. But, to the 
 consternation of everybody, as Johnson stepped 
 out of the hotel, he rejected the proffered escort, 
 saying : " I guess I'll go up with the people " ; 
 and, letting the procession go without him, 
 plodded along on foot, surrounded by hoi polloi, 
 feeling consciously proud as if he had performed 
 an heroic feat. 
 
 While he was a Senator at Washington he 
 lodged at the St. Charles, a fourth-rate hotel, 
 where he received few callers. On account of 
 his humble origin and his pronounced Union 
 sentiments, Southern Senators ignored him so- 
 cially, and his quality did not assure associates 
 from the Northern States ; so when the Southern 
 States began to secede, he was the most nearly 
 isolated of all the Senators. 
 
 In February, 1861, Joseph Lane, a Senator 
 
THE SECOND INAUGURATION 307 
 
 from Oregon (and who had been associated with 
 Breckinridge on the Presidential ticket) read in 
 the Senate an elaborate speech in favor of seces- 
 sion, to which Johnson made a most scathing re- 
 ply in which he abused Lane unmercifully, not 
 only politically but personally. This speech made 
 Johnson immensely popular at the North, and 
 especially with the Administration, and after the 
 secession governor (Harris) fled from Tennes- 
 see, the President made Johnson a Brigadier- 
 General of Volunteers and assigned him to duty 
 as Military Governor of Tennessee, which office 
 he held until he was elected Vice-President. 
 
 At the time of his Vice-Presidential inaugura- 
 tion Johnson was stopping at the Kirkwood, one 
 of the inferior hotels of Washington. In his in- 
 augural address he made an even more dema- 
 gogic display of his sentiments than he had done 
 at Nashville. The Associated Press dispatch 
 thus narrated the occurrence : 
 
 " The Vice-President (Johnson) followed, re- 
 ferring to his elevation from the ranks as an illus- 
 tration of American privilege, and proceeded at 
 length upon the subject of the subordination of 
 Presidents and Secretaries to the will of the peo- 
 ple. When the oath of office was administered," 
 continues the account, " the Vice-President took 
 the Bible in his hand, and, elevating it before the 
 audience, exclaimed : ' I kiss this book before my 
 nation of the United States.' ' The dispatch 
 concluded with the statement that : " The address 
 of Vice-President Johnson is very severely cen- 
 sured on all hands. His friends allege he must 
 have been laboring under a very severe indisposi- 
 tion." 
 
 Here is the speech verbatim as taken from the 
 
3 o8 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 " Year Book " : " I'm a-goin' for to tell you 
 here to-day; yes, I'm a-goin' for to tell you all, 
 that I am a plebeian ! I glory in it ; I am a 
 plebeian! The people yes, the people of the 
 United States have made me what I am; and I 
 am a-goin' for to tell you here to-day yes, to- 
 day, in this place that the people are everything. 
 We owe all to them. If it be not too presumptu- 
 ous, I will tell the foreign ministers a-sittin' there, 
 that I am one of the people. I will say to Sena- 
 tors and others before me I will say to the Su- 
 preme Court, which sits before me that you all 
 get your power and place from the people. And, 
 Mr. Chase," he said, suddenly addressing the 
 Chief Justice by name, " your position depends 
 upon the people." Turning to the other side of 
 the house where sat Mr. Seward and the other 
 Cabinet officers, he severally addressed them as he 
 had addressed Mr. Chase : " And I will say to 
 you, Mr. Secretary Seward, and to you Mr. Sec- 
 retary Stanton, and to you, Mr. Secretary " 
 
 here he hesitated for a name, and bent down and 
 asked Mr. Hamlin if he knew who was Secretary 
 of the Navy. Having been informed, he con- 
 tinued in the same loud tone " And you, Mr. 
 Secretery Welles, you, all of you, derive your 
 power from the people." 
 
 It is impossible to attempt to describe the feel- 
 ings of this august assemblage. I well recollect 
 that Sumner refused to talk about it at all, say- 
 ing that it was too terrible an event, and should 
 be relegated to oblivion as soon as possible. Lin- 
 coln, charitable and magnanimous as ever, said: 
 " Don't you fear for Andy ; he's all right." 
 
 The editor of the New York Independent, how- 
 ever, came out with this statement : " Truth com- 
 
THE SECOND INAUGURATION 309 
 
 pels me to write that he [Johnson] indulged in a 
 vile harangue, in presence of the assembled thou- 
 sands, including the representatives of all the 
 foreign governments; and the source of his in- 
 spiration was, not patriotism, but whisky." The 
 same paper in a scathing editorial demanded his 
 resignation ; but, as we have said, the sentiment of 
 the nation was in favor of covering the sad event 
 with the mantle of oblivion. 
 
 At the Inauguration Ball that evening John- 
 son made himself very conspicuous, paying 
 marked attention to Mrs. Lincoln (as the report 
 says), although he had not fully recovered from 
 his " indisposition." 
 
 Mrs. Lincoln, as reported in Herndon's " Life 
 of Lincoln," makes the following statement : " He 
 [Lincoln] greatly disliked Andrew Johnson. 
 Once the latter, when we were in company, fol- 
 lowed us around not a little. It displeased Mr. 
 Lincoln so much he abruptly turned and asked, 
 loud enough to be heard by others, ' Why is this 
 man forever following me ? ' At another time, 
 when we were down to City Point, Johnson, still 
 following us, was drunk. Mr. Lincoln, in despera- 
 tion, exclaimed : ' For God's sake don't ask John- 
 son to dine with us ! ' Sumner, who was along, 
 joined in the request." 
 
 At the death of Hannibal Hamlin on July 4, 
 1891, a sharp controversy arose between Colonel 
 A. K. McClure, the veteran editor of the Philadel- 
 phia Times, and John G. Nicolay, Mr. Lincoln's 
 private secretary, as to whom Mr. Lincoln de- 
 sired to be associated with him on the ticket in the 
 Presidential contest of 1864. 
 
 This controversy commenced by the assertion of 
 Colonel McClure in his paper of July 6, 1891, that 
 
3 io LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 Mr. Lincoln " gravely urged " upon him to eome 
 as a delegate at large to the convention to support 
 Johnson for Vice-President, and that he sup- 
 ported Johnson in accordance with such request, 
 against Hamlin, his personal choice. The next 
 day Mr. Nicolay stated in the public press that the 
 " statement " that Lincoln opposed the nomina- 
 tion of Mr. Hamlin was " entirely erroneous " ; 
 that Lincoln had confidentially expressed to Nico- 
 lay his personal preference for Hamlin. This 
 was an indiscreet way of contradicting a man of 
 McClure's standing and well-known relation to 
 Lincoln, in his lifetime. The editor promptly re- 
 plied with 'a very caustic article in which he af- 
 firmed his previous statement with emphasis and 
 circumstances, and corroborated his view as to 
 Lincoln's sentiments by the testimony of Charles 
 A. Dana, who was Assistant Secretary of War 
 under Lincoln, and who shared the President's 
 confidence to a considerable extent. 
 
 To this Nicolay replied, and, in maintaining his 
 position, unnecessarily made an issue of veracity 
 between himself and McClure, which was not only 
 an unwise but an unjust thing to do. Colonel 
 McClure might have erred in his inferences, 
 but a man of his intellectual and moral character 
 could not mistake as to his facts, and he stated as 
 a fact, apprehensible to his senses, that Lincoln 
 urged him to drop Hamlin and support Johnson. 
 
 Meanwhile Judge Pettit of Pennsylvania 
 stated that, on the morning of the sitting of the 
 convention, Mr. Lincoln told him that his prefer- 
 ence was for Johnson ; and Colonel Lamon said 
 that he heard Lincoln urge Swett to support 
 Johnson, and that Lincoln even wrote a letter in- 
 ferentially in favor of Johnson (which, however, 
 
THE SECOND IN A UGURA TION 3 t i 
 
 was not used). The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. 
 Welles, also intimated that Lincoln did not want 
 Hamlin, but says that he was " careful to avoid 
 the expression of any opinion." However, the 
 Secretary intimated that the President's choice 
 was Johnson. And one of Nicolay's strong 
 points is that Lincoln himself sent him word at 
 Baltimore that he would not express any pref- 
 erence. 
 
 Now, a further fact tending to corroborate 
 McClure is that Mr. Lincoln sent General Cam- 
 eron to General Butler, asking the latter to be- 
 come a candidate. This Lincoln would not have 
 done had he been, as Nicolay claims, in favor of 
 Hamlin, for if he wanted Butler as against Ham- 
 lin, it is plain that he did not want Hamlin, i. e., 
 it is not at all probable that Hamlin was his 
 second choice. Governor Stone of Iowa stated 
 that Lincoln wanted Dickinson, Dix, Johnson, or 
 some other War Democrat, thus attesting that 
 the President did not want Hamlin. Thurlow 
 Weed says, ex cathedra, that Lincoln did not 
 want Johnson, but wanted Dickinson, thus also 
 attesting, from his standpoint, that Lincoln did 
 not want Hamlin. Swett was working for Holt 
 at Baltimore, which indicates that Mr. Lincoln 
 did not want Hamlin, for Swett was nearer to 
 Lincoln in the way of knowing his preference 
 in that respect than anybody in the nation. 
 
 In favor of the position that Lincoln did want 
 Hamlin, I know of but three authorities, viz., Mr. 
 Nicolay, Burton C. Cook, and Mr. Hamlin him- 
 self, all of whom, however, are very strong au- 
 thorities. Mr. Nicolay said that Mr Lincoln 
 confidentially expressed to him his preference 
 for Hamlin. I think this cannot be literally true : 
 
312 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 there is nothing in either written or unwritten 
 history to show that the President ever said any- 
 thing of confidence or consequence to Mr. Nico- 
 lay. Their relative positions warranted confi- 
 dences, but somehow these seem never to have 
 passed from the principal to his subordinate. 
 
 Mr. Cook was an astute and secretive man, a 
 veteran and cautious politician. He went to Lin- 
 coln to ascertain whom the latter wanted as Vice- 
 President, so that the powerful Illinois delegation 
 could execute his desire, and he said " That he 
 had a preference I positively know. After my 
 interview with him, I was as positive that Hanni- 
 bal Hamlin was his favorite as I am that I am 
 alive to-day." 
 
 Shortly before his death Hamlin said : " Lin- 
 coln evidently changed his position [from desir- 
 ing him] ; that is all I can say. If we shall ever 
 meet again, I may say something more to you. 
 I will write no more." This means that at one 
 time Lincoln either was, or pretended to be, for 
 Hamlin. 
 
 That Mr. Lincoln preferred some War Demo- 
 crat to Hamlin at a certain time is apparent from 
 his sending Cameron to Butler ; from Thurlow 
 Weed's statement; from Governor Stone's state- 
 ment ; from Colonel McClure's statement ; from 
 Judge Pettit's statement; from General Butler's 
 statement ; from Swett's actions at Baltimore ; 
 from Lamon's statement; and from Mr. Dana's 
 statement. That Lincoln preferred Hamlin is 
 attested (so far as I know) only by Cook and 
 Nicolay. Hamlin does not testify that Lincoln 
 was for him then ; his judgment seems to be that 
 Lincoln had changed. And the same might be 
 said of Nicolay. Lincoln might have been for 
 
THE SECOND INAUGURATION 313 
 
 Hamlin when he informed Nicolay, and changed 
 afterward. But Cook's testimony complicated 
 matters. He was the chairman of the Illinois 
 delegation at the convention, and had many votes 
 to cast as Lincoln might desire. The argument 
 is that Lincoln wanted Johnson, and yet he de- 
 liberately throws away the sure and, peradven- 
 ture, controlling vote of his own State, and in 
 fact caused it to be cast affirmatively against his 
 earnest desire. Cook cannot be mistaken. He 
 is as sagacious a politician as McClure; he di- 
 vined what Lincoln meant to make him believe. 
 Lincoln knew that Cook was going to Baltimore 
 to work for Hamlin because, inter alia, Lincoln 
 wanted it so. 
 
 The two strong opposing features in the con- 
 tention are the statements of McClure and Cook ; 
 to one of whom he represented that he wanted 
 Johnson and to the other Hamlin, doing so at 
 the same time and for the same object. The 
 mystery is deepened by the reflection that Lincoln 
 sent for McClure in order to solicit the vote of 
 Pennsylvania for Johnson, while upon the volun- 
 tary offer of Illinois he placed that State in the 
 Hamlin column, a complete neutralization of ef- 
 fort. His reply to Nicolay, " Swett's all right," 
 to which McClure attaches much importance, is, 
 I think, inconsequential. The question was gro- 
 tesque under the circumstances. The further 
 reply : "Wish not to interfere/' etc., which Nico- 
 lay lays much stress upon, I think amounts to 
 nothing. In the position in which he stood, he 
 must say that, no matter how ardent were his. 
 personal feelings. 
 
 In looking over the whole field, I think that 
 at first Lincoln expected to be defeated anyway, 
 
314 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 and took no anxious thought about his running 
 mate, expecting the ticket to be the old one by 
 force of political inertia. I think that Hamlin 
 and Nicolay saw Lincoln while in this mood; 
 afterward he thought it well to make the best 
 struggle possible, and, while deeming a coalition 
 with the acting War Democrats necessary, he 
 did not settle down on Johnson at first, which 
 may account for Weed's and Stone's opinion; 
 and that the reason of Swett's action and Cook's 
 opinion is that Lincoln feared that, if they came 
 out for Johnson, his hand would appear, for, 
 next to nominating Johnson, it was desirable that 
 Lincoln should not be known in the matter. 
 
 On the whole, therefore, I think Lincoln 
 wanted Johnson, and that, for policy's sake, he 
 suffered Swett to dissemble his sentiments at 
 Baltimore, while he dissembled his real senti- 
 ments to Cook; though I don't think he com- 
 mitted any positive act of deceit with Cook, but 
 allowed him to deceive himself. As to Hamlin, 
 I think that Lincoln's only indirection toward 
 him, if any, was in changing his mind according 
 to the pressure of circumstances, but without ad- 
 vising him of it. ' But all that Lincoln did, posi- 
 tively or negatively, was for the sake of the 
 sacred cause of the Union. 
 
 Worn out by the importunities of office-seekers, 
 the President on March 25 sought refuge in a 
 visit to the headquarters of the Army of the 
 Potomac at City Point. Here he held a consulta- 
 tion with General Grant and General Sherman, 
 the latter coming up from Goldsboro, N. C, to 
 the meeting. On the 2d of April Richmond 
 -was occupied by the Federal troops, and on the 
 3d the President visited the captured capital of 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 315 
 
 the Confederacy. He went unannounced, and 
 without a military guard, even walking from 
 the wharf to General Weitzel's headquarters, 
 which were in the house occupied only two days 
 before by the Confederate President. The 
 colored people, however, recognized their deliv- 
 erer, and crowded about him with exclamations 
 of religious fervor. A spectator of the scene de- 
 scribed it in the Atlantic Monthly: 
 
 The walk was long, and the President halted a mo- 
 ment to rest. " May de good Lord bless you, President 
 Linkum ! " said an old negro, removing his hat and 
 bowing, with tears of joy rolling down his cheeks. The 
 President removed his own hat, and bowed in silence; 
 but it was a bow which upset the forms, laws, customs, 
 and ceremonies of centuries. It was a death-shock to 
 chivalry and a mortal wound to caste. Recognize a 
 nigger! Faugh! A woman in an adjoining house be- 
 held it, and turned from the scene in unspeakable 
 disgust. 
 
 The President returned to Washington on 
 Sunday, April 9, recalled by a carriage accident 
 in which Secretary Seward had broken his right 
 arm and his jaw. Shortly after his arrival the 
 news came of Lee's surrender, and the citizens of 
 Washington, wild with delight, waited on him on 
 Monday afternoon with congratulations. He dis- 
 missed them, promising a speech on the next 
 evening. 
 
 This, his last public address, he devoted almost 
 entirely to the reinauguration of the national au- 
 thority reconstruction, which now faced the 
 Government. He said of the problem: 
 
 It is fraught with great difficulty. Unlike a case of 
 war between independent nations, there is no author- 
 ized organ for us to treat with no one man has 
 
316 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 authority to give up the rebellion for any other man. 
 We simply must begin with and mold from disor- 
 ganized and discordant elements. Nor is it a small 
 additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, 
 differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and 
 measure of reconstruction. As a general rule, I abstain 
 from reading the reports of attacks upon myself, wish- 
 ing not to be provoked by that to which I cannot 
 properly offer an answer. In spite of this precaution, 
 however, it comes to my knowledge that I am much 
 censured for some supposed agency in setting up and 
 seeking to sustain the new State government of 
 Louisiana. 
 
 In this I have done just so much as, and no more 
 than, the public knows. In the annual message of 
 December, 1863, and in the accompanying proclama- 
 tion, I presented a plan of reconstruction, as the phrase 
 goes, which I promised, if adopted by any State, should 
 be acceptable to and sustained by the executive gov- 
 ernment of the^ nation. I distinctly stated that this 
 was not the only plan which might possibly be ac- 
 ceptable, and I also distinctly protested that the execu- 
 tive claimed no right to say when or whether members 
 should be admitted to seats in Congress from such 
 States. This plan was in advance submitted to the 
 then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by every mem- 
 ber of it. ... The message went to Congress, and I re- 
 ceived many commendations of the plan, written and 
 verbal, and not a single objection to it from any pro- 
 fessed emancipationist came to my knowledge until after 
 the news reached Washington that the people of Lou- 
 isiana had begun to move in accordance with it. 
 
 I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed 
 to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret 
 that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed upon 
 the question whether the seceded States, so called; are 
 in the Union or out of it. It would perhaps add as- 
 tonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I 
 have found professed Union men endeavoring to answer 
 that question, I have purposely forborne any public 
 expression upon it. As appears to me, that question 
 has not been nor yet is a practically material one, and 
 that any discussion of it, while it thus remains prac- 
 tically immaterial, could have no effect other than the 
 mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, what- 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 317 
 
 ever it may become, that question is bad as the basis 
 of a controversy, and good for nothing at all a merely 
 pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded 
 States, so called, are out of their proper practical rela- 
 tion with the Union, and that the sole object of the 
 Government, civil and military, in regard to these 
 States, is to again get them into their proper practical 
 relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in 
 fact easier, to do this without deciding or even consid- 
 ering whether those States have ever been out of the 
 Union than with it. Finding themselves safely at 
 home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had 
 been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts neces- 
 sary to restore the proper practical relations between 
 these States and the Union, and each forever after inno- 
 cently indulge his own opinion whether, in doing the 
 acts, he brought the States from without into the 
 Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never 
 having been out of it. The amount of constituency, 
 so to speak, on which the Louisiana government rests, 
 would be more satisfactory to all if it contained fifty 
 thousand, or thirty thousand, or even twenty thousand, 
 instead of twelve thousand, as it does. It is also unsat- 
 isfactory to some that the elective franchise is not 
 given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that 
 it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on 
 those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still, the ques- 
 tion is not whether the Louisiana government, as it 
 stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, 
 Will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve 
 it, or to reject and disperse? Can Louisiana be brought 
 into proper practical relation with the Union sooner 
 by sustaining or by discarding her new State govern- 
 ment? Some twelve thousand voters in the heretofore 
 Slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the 
 Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of 
 the State, held elections, organized a State government, 
 adopted a Free State Constitution, giving the benefit of 
 public schools equally to black and white, and empow- 
 ering the Legislature to confer the elective franchise 
 upon the colored man. This Legislature has already 
 voted to ratify the Constitutional Amendment recently 
 passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the 
 nation. These twelve thousand persons are thus fully 
 committed to the Union and to perpetuate freedom in 
 
318 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the State committed to the very things, and nearly all 
 things, the nation wants and they ask the nation's 
 recognition and its assistance to make good this com- 
 mittal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our 
 utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in fact, 
 say to the white man : You are worthless or worse ; 
 we will neither help you nor be helped by you. To 
 the blacks we say : This cup of liberty which these, 
 your old masters, held to your lips, we will dash from 
 you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the 
 spilled and scattered contents in some vague and unde- 
 fined when, where, and how. If this course, discourag- 
 ing and paralyzing both white and black, has any tend- 
 ency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations 
 with the Union, I have so far been unable to perceive 
 it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the 
 new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this 
 is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the 
 arms of twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and 
 argue for^ it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, 
 and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete 
 success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for 
 him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring 
 to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective 
 franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the 
 already advanced steps towards it, than by running 
 backward over them? Concede that the new govern- 
 ment of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the 
 egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by 
 hatching the egg than by smashing it. ... 
 
 What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally 
 to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain 
 to each State, and such important, and sudden changes 
 occur in the same State, and withal so new and un- 
 precedented is the whole case, that no exclusive and 
 inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and 
 collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would 
 surely become a new entanglement. Important princi- 
 ples may and must be inflexible. In the present situa- 
 tion, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make 
 some new announcement to the people of the South. 
 I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satis- 
 fied that action will be proper. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE END 
 
 THE animus of murder existed against Mr. 
 Lincoln from the period of his election. In 
 January, 1861, he showed me several vulgar let- 
 ters, all having Southern postmarks, containing 
 threats against his life; also some apparently 
 friendly warnings on the same subjects, from the 
 same sources. There were some newspaper arti- 
 cles in the Southern press, having the same 
 animus and intent. 
 
 The President not only took no precautions 
 against assassination himself, but allowed none to 
 be taken by others in his behalf. The Secretary 
 of War did indeed, for a time, send an escort 
 with him to and from the Soldiers' Home on the 
 outskirts of Washington where he spent the hot 
 summer nights, but it was ultimately abandoned, 
 being thoroughly distasteful to the President. 
 
 Upon one occasion, when remonstrated with on 
 the subject of his indifference to danger, he drew 
 from a pigeon-hole a large package of letters, 
 and said : " Every one of these letters contains a 
 threat of assassination. Were I to give it 
 thought it might make me nervous, but I have 
 concluded that there are opportunities to kill me, 
 every day of my life, if there are persons dis- 
 posed to do it. It is not possible to avoid ex- 
 
 319 
 
320 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 posure to such a fate, and I shall not trouble my- 
 self about it." 
 
 And so daily he heroically pursued the even 
 tenor of his way, and the prescribed path of 
 duty, with the sword of Damocles suspended 
 above his head. He continued to walk alone, un- 
 guarded at all hours of the day or night, between 
 the White House and War Office and elsewhere. 
 
 Toward the close of the war the threats of 
 assassination became especially bold and bitter. 
 Of these, the following advertisement appearing 
 in a Selma (Ala.) newspaper is a fair example: 
 
 A million dollars wanted to have peace by ist of 
 March. If the citizens of the Southern Confederacy 
 will furnish me with the cash or good securities for 
 the sum of $1,000,000, I will cause the lives of Lincoln, 
 Seward, and Andrew Johnson to be taken by the ist 
 of March next. This will give us peace and satisfy 
 the world that tyrants cannot live in a land of liberty. 
 If this is not accomplished, nothing will be claimed 
 beyond the sum of $50^000 in advance, which is sup- 
 posed to be necessary to reach and slaughter the three 
 villains. I will give myself $1,000 toward the patriotic 
 purpose. Everyone wishing to contribute will address 
 H. Catawba, Ala., December i, 1864. 
 
 This advertisement, it transpired, had been 
 inserted by Colonel George Washington Gayle, a 
 leading lawyer of the city. 
 
 Whether the damnable deed was the sequence 
 and denouement of this advertisement has never 
 been ascertained ; but the sequel attested that the 
 lives aimed at by the Booth conspiracy were the 
 same as those mentioned in this odious and de- 
 testable advertisement. 
 
 During that same winter the Rebel agents in 
 Canada were endeavoring to secure someone to 
 remove (as it was euphemistically termed) the 
 
THE END 321 
 
 President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, 
 Secretary of the Treasury,, Secretary of War, 
 and General Grant. When interrogated by an 
 assassin who contemplated undertaking the 
 bloody enterprise, if they wanted Secretary 
 Welles also killed, the reply was, " No ! he 
 isn't worth killing." These agents tried to im- 
 press the prospective murderer with the idea, 
 that " killing tyrants was no murder," and 
 they reasoned out the conclusion with self- 
 gratulation, that the murder of these officers 
 would produce anarchy, as there was no de- 
 signated officer to succeed any of them. There 
 is much reason to suppose that this, and not 
 the Selma scheme, was the initial movement 
 which culminated in the diabolical denouement of 
 April 14, 1865, but the chief agent was killed 
 prematurely ; the Rebel messenger who communi- 
 cated . between the conclave in Canada and the 
 assassins escaped to Europe ; the Rebel agents in 
 Canada disappeared ; those who knew much were 
 awed to silence, and conclusive proof, such as 
 was needful for such a crime, could not be had ; 
 but this complicity in this dastardly crime has 
 many reasons to fortify it, among which was the 
 approval of the crime by Jefferson Davis and 
 other leaders of the " lost cause." 
 
 The conspiracy being formed, it required only 
 an emotional" incentive to fire the chief agent to 
 the deed. 
 
 This occurred in the last address of Lincoln. 
 On the outskirts of the crowd assembled to hear 
 him was one J. Wilkes Booth, an actor, who had 
 come to Washington the previous Saturday, and 
 was stopping at the National Hotel. With him 
 was a young man named David E. Herold. The 
 
322 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 two seemed nervous and uneasy; and were no- 
 ticeably so, when the tall form of the President 
 appeared and commenced his speech. Finally, 
 Lincoln made use of this expression : ..." It 
 is also unsatisfactory to some that the election 
 franchise is not given to the colored man. / 
 would myself prefer that it were now conferred 
 on the very intelligent, and on those who serve 
 our cause as soldiers." It was at that juncture, 
 Herold relates, that Booth nudged him, and said 
 in a tone of bitter resentment : " That means 
 nigger equality; now, by God! I'll put him 
 through." 
 
 Booth was a young man of twenty-six, un- 
 stable and erratic in character, and full of vanity, 
 felicitating himself on his personal beauty. He 
 had quit the stage some time before on account 
 of a throat affection (I have seen a playbill an- 
 nouncing his appearance at the Boston Museum 
 in 1862), and was doing a little speculating in 
 petroleum stocks as a business. He occupied 
 much of his time of late in playing " stud poker " 
 and drinking whisky. Although his people were 
 all thoroughly devoted to the cause of the Union, 
 he had fanatically championed the Southern 
 cause. In November, 1864, he left a sealed en- 
 velope with the actor John S. Clarke, his brother- 
 in-law, which he withdrew after a time, and 
 deposited again. Neither Clarke nor his wife, 
 Booth's sister, had any idea of the contents of the 
 package, but when ultimately opened it was 
 found to contain some U. S. bonds and oil stocks, 
 also a letter written by Booth, full of vapid, inane, 
 and obscure rigmarole. The signature was evi- 
 dently made at a different time from the body of 
 the letter, and Mr. Clarke is of opinion that 
 
THE END 323 
 
 Booth added his signature at the time when he 
 withdrew the package. 
 
 General Grant reached Washington on the 
 1 3th, and held a long consultation with the Presi- 
 dent and Secretary of War. Next day was Good 
 Friday and also Cabinet day, and the President 
 laid down, in general terms, his contemplated 
 poliqy toward the Rebels, which was a general 
 amnesty and obliteration of the past. He held a 
 long conversation with his son, Robert, who, as 
 an aide on Grant's staff, had been at Lee's sur- 
 render, and had returned to the White House. 
 He had a lengthened interview with Speaker Col- 
 fax, who was about to depart on a tour to the 
 mining regions of California. He also saw sev- 
 eral callers on business matters, the last one being 
 Hon. George Ashmun, who had sat in Congress 
 with him, and had also presided over the " wig- 
 wam " convention. As there was not time to 
 complete Mr. Ashmun's business, the President 
 agreed to meet him and Judge C. P. Daly early 
 next morning; and, in order to facilitate his en- 
 trance, wrote on a card : " Allow Mr. Ashmun 
 and friend to come in at 9 A.M. to-morrow. A. 
 Lincoln." This is the last word he ever wrote. 
 
 The enterprising proprietor of Ford's Theater, 
 in virtue of a partial promise he had extracted 
 from Mrs. Lincoln, inserted in all the daily 
 papers of that day, as a news item, the following : 
 " Lieutenant-General Grant, President and Mrs. 
 Lincoln and ladies, will occupy the State box at 
 Ford's Theater to-night, to witness Miss Laura 
 Keene's company in Tom Taylor's ' American 
 Cousin/ " 
 
 General Grant, however, preferred to visit his 
 family at Burlington, N. J., and started thither 
 
324 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 on the late afternoon train. The President really 
 did not wish to go to the theater, but, in view of 
 the newspaper announcement, deemed it his duty 
 to do so; and Speaker Colfax, though invited, 
 failing to go, the President and Mrs. Lincoln 
 secured the company of Major H. R. Rathbone 
 and Miss Clara W. Harris, the stepson and 
 daughter respectively of Senator Harris of New 
 York. They reached the theater at about nine 
 o'clock, while the play was in progress, and were 
 ushered into the State box, according to pro- 
 gramme. 
 
 Booth was still at Washington on the I4th, and, 
 seeing the announcement of the engagement at 
 Ford's Theater, visited the theater at about 
 eleven o'clock in the morning, knowing the pro- 
 prietor and employees well. He found the two 
 private boxes on the left hand of the stage being 
 made into one by removal of the partition, and 
 decorated with the American flag. Little did he 
 then think that that sacred flag was to be the 
 nemesis of his fate ! Upon some pretext, not 
 clearly appearing, he induced Spangler, the stage 
 carpenter, to fit a brace to the door which led 
 from the auditorium to the box, so that, when it 
 was in place, the box could not be reached from 
 the auditorium. He then took in the whole situa- 
 tion fully, and, in order not to be baffled by the 
 closing of the door which led from the box itself 
 to the sub-hall, he had the screws carefully re- 
 moved from the snaplock which secured them. 
 There was a deliberate method in his madness, if 
 indeed, as has been claimed, he was mad. Hav- 
 ing thus fitted up his workshop to suit his infernal 
 object, he next repaired to a livery stable and 
 engaged a fleet horse for a horseback ride, to be 
 
THE END 325 
 
 used about the middle of the afternoon. Next 
 in the order of his industries, with what object is 
 not clear, he stopped in at the Kirkwood House 
 and called for the Vice-President. The latter 
 was engaged and declined the visit. The assassin 
 then wrote on a card and left it : "I don't want 
 to disturb you; are you at home? J. Wilkes 
 Booth." It should be stated that Vice-President 
 Johnson had remained at Washington since the 
 inauguration attending to department business 
 for his constituents, but was intending to return 
 home on the succeeding day, also that he had no 
 connection with Booth, and that it was part of 
 the conspiracy to assassinate the Vice-President. 
 
 At four o'clock P.M. Booth, in a visible state 
 of nervous unrest, called for and rode off on his 
 hired horse, and after a brief formal ride, hid 
 him away in a stable in rear of Ford's Theater, 
 which he had previously engaged for that 
 purpose. 
 
 In course of the evening Booth brought the 
 horse to the rear of the theater, and Spangler 
 assumed its charge, employing a boy to hold it. 
 Booth and one or two of his confederates next 
 appeared in front of the theater, and as the hour 
 or half hour and sometimes quarter of the hour 
 would occur, they would dramatically exclaim 
 " nine o'clock," etc. 
 
 At nine o'clock one of the conspirators ap- 
 proached the President's servant, who kept guard 
 at the outer door leading toward the private box, 
 having a large official envelope for General 
 Grant, and, asking for the General, retired. He 
 had been sent to spy out the land, in all prob- 
 ability. 
 
 Three-quarters of an hour thereafter one of 
 
326 'LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the conspirators, standing near the audience door, 
 said solemnly : " Nine o'clock and forty-five min- 
 utes " ; another repeated the expression, and still 
 others till it reached the sidewalk. Ten minutes 
 afterwards the party vociferated, " Nine o'clock 
 and fifty-five minutes " ; which was taken up and 
 passed along as the former had been. At ten 
 o'clock the hour was again called, echoed, and 
 repeated; also at 10.10, at which time J. Wilkes 
 Booth appeared, and the conspirator sentinels dis- 
 appeared suddenly. 
 
 At 10.15 the hour of fate had struck and Booth 
 entered the dress circle, and with apparent non- 
 chalance sauntered around the outer lobby of the 
 dress circle, reaching the President's servant, 
 who was watching the play several feet away 
 from the door. He showed the servant a card, 
 saying that Mr. Lincoln had sent for him, which 
 quieted the servant, who continued watching the 
 stage. Booth also stood, for two minutes, look- 
 ing with apparent interest at the performance. 
 He then quietly entered into the vestibule, softly 
 closing the door behind him, and with the accom- 
 modating brace fitted by Spangler, secured it 
 from any entrance or interference from the main 
 auditorium. The two doors to the boxes them- 
 selves were shut, and the assassin deliberately 
 bored a gimlet hole through one of them, and 
 with his knife reamed out the hole so that he 
 might get a range of vision over the entire box ; 
 thus he became master of the situation. Then, 
 drawing a small silver-mounted Derringer pistol 
 and carrying it in his right hand, and taking a 
 long dagger in the left, he swiftly opened the 
 door, and when within four feet, fired directly at 
 the back of the President's head. The aim and 
 
THE END 327 
 
 fell purpose were alike unerring; the doomed 
 President's head fell a little forward, his eyes 
 closed, but otherwise his attitude was unchanged. 
 He never was conscious of what had occurred, 
 but passed, in the twinkling of an eye, into the 
 fathomless realms of insensibility and eternity. 
 At this time Mr. Lincoln sat in an armchair 
 nearest the audience, with his wife immediately 
 on his right, her hand resting on his knee. The 
 President was leaning a little on his right arm, 
 his left lightly holding back the curtain so as to 
 afford a wider range of view. Major Rathbone 
 and Miss Harris sat a little to the right, and the 
 whole party were, at the particular moment, in- 
 tently engrossed with the play. The sole speaker 
 on the stage at the time was Harry Hawk, who 
 played the part of Asa Trenchard; and he had 
 just got off the gag suited to the occasion: 
 " Well, neow I'll tell yeow one o' Mr. Linkin's 
 stories," when the fatal shot rang out. Those 
 were the last sounds that Mr. Lincoln heard this 
 side of eternity. Major Rathbone, with admir- 
 able presence of mine, sprang for the murderer, 
 who, dropping his pistol, struck a vicious blow 
 with the dagger which wounded the Major in the 
 arm and disconcerted him for the moment, dur- 
 ing which the miscreant jumped over the railing 
 on to the stage, where he shouted, " Sic semper 
 tyrannis! " 
 
 In his leap, however, his spur caught in the 
 folds cvf the American flag, which caused him 
 to fall in such a manner as to fracture the small 
 bone of his leg, below the knee. He arose at 
 once, however haste was needful and again 
 shouting in a theatrical style. " The South is 
 avenged ! " he started, with the dagger glistening, 
 
328 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 toward the rear of the stage, in a rapid gait. 
 Hawk was alone upon the stage, and supposing 
 that the seeming madman was after him, darted 
 behind the flies, where he escaped up a flight of 
 stage stairs. Booth made his way unimpeded to 
 the rear of the theater, and, hastily mounting the 
 horse, galloped off in the darkness, crossed the 
 Anacosta bridge and was temporarily sheltered 
 by the Maryland Rebels, and ultimately shot like 
 a mad dog by one Boston Corbett, a sergeant in 
 the regular army. 
 
 Of all persons present in that vast audience 
 there were two who had perfect presence of 
 mind: one was Joseph B. Stewart, a lawyer of 
 herculean build, who was sitting in the parquette 
 and who clambered on the stage as rapidly 
 as he could, and pursued the fleeing assassin. 
 Booth, however, had too much the start of him, 
 and when Stewart reached the rear of the theater, 
 he had mounted his horse and was galloping off. 
 The other person with presence of mind was Miss 
 Keene, who was behind the flies waiting for her 
 cue, when, attracted by the firing, she rushed to- 
 ward the stage just in time to see Booth before 
 he disappeared. Coming immediately, to the 
 front she exclaimed, " It's Wilkes Booth/' and 
 in a commanding voice ordered the audience to 
 be quiet. Then at once she ran to her dressing- 
 room and procured some water, spirits, etc., 
 returning with which she went hastily to the 
 President's box. Meantime pandemonium reigned 
 supreme. Women went into hysterics, fainted, 
 cried, wrung their hands, tore their hair, and 
 screamed. Men swore, raved, shook their 
 clenched fists, stamped, and shouted. Major 
 Rathbone's arm bled profusely; Mrs. Lincoln 
 
THE END 329 
 
 screamed, shrieked, cried, and became hysterical ; 
 the news flew; the doorkeepers left their posts, 
 and the public surged in. A boy ran down Penn- 
 sylvania Avenue, which was thronged with peo- 
 ple, exclaiming, " Man shot at the theater," and 
 the people rushed thither. It is astonishing with 
 what rapidity bad news can travel, and also that 
 its speed is increased in direct ratio to the inten- 
 sity of its sadness ; and so it would seem as if all 
 Washington knew of the awful tragedy within a 
 few moments after its occurrence. Two sur- 
 geons appeared on the scene while the excitement 
 raged, and gained access to the victim ; one of 
 them felt the President's fluttering pulse and 
 gazed at his closed eyes and impassive face; the 
 other parted the hair and glanced at the wound. 
 Their eyes met in glances which effectually con- 
 curred that no basis existed for hope. They 
 quietly exchanged a few words together, and in 
 reply to Mrs. Lincoln's agonizing entreaties, sim- 
 ply shed involuntary tears, and made no answer, 
 which the unerring instinct of a woman inter- 
 preted aright. Meanwhile, some one, hurriedly 
 crossing the street, and ringing the bell of Mr. 
 Peterson's house, hastily explained the needs of 
 the moment, and requested the instant use of a 
 lower room, which was readily accorded. Im- 
 mediately thereafter four brawny men appeared 
 in the fatal box, gently lifted the armchair con- 
 taining the unconscious form of the martyr, and, 
 the way being forcibly cleared by the police and 
 others, tenderly bore it across the street, and 
 carried it to a little bedroom at the end of the 
 hall. The door was guarded, and none admitted 
 but the friends. Most of the Cabinet officers had 
 reached there as soon as the inanimate form of 
 
330 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 the President. The Surgeon-General of the 
 Army had also come, and he was making a thor- 
 ough examination of the wound. At length, 
 looking into the anxious faces who sought his, he 
 said to Stanton, who had caught him by the arm 
 impulsively, as if to pull the secret from him, " I 
 fear, Mr. Stanton, that there is no hope," and pro- 
 ceeded calmly to wipe his probe. The Secretary 
 of War exclaimed in tones of heartrending 
 anguish, " No ! no ! General ! oh, no ! " and burst 
 into a series of convulsive sobs, which shook his 
 burly frame. Senator Sumner sat on the bed, 
 holding one of the dying man's hands and crying 
 bitterly. No such august assembly had ever 
 gathered before about a deathbed. The strong 
 men of the nation were there, men used to battle 
 and conflict, leaders in moral and physical war- 
 fare, but it was a necessity, as well as a virtue, to 
 weep, and the walls of that obscure little apart- 
 ment were resonant with the pent-up grief of 
 strong men, hardened by sorrow and unused to 
 tears. 
 
 In an adjacent room the most tender offices of 
 love and sympathy were beneficently and affec- 
 tionately bestowed upon the stricken one, already 
 doomed to, drain the chalice of bereavement and 
 widowhood to the bitter dregs ; and when the 
 solemn vigils of that morally black and tempestu- 
 ous night the mx tristis of this century had 
 passed, and morning broke, peace came to the 
 most illustrious and deeply deplored political 
 martyr of all time. 
 
 A hush fell upon the august assemblage of 
 mourners; it was as if grief had petrified them. 
 The solemn silence was broken by the voice of 
 Secretary Stanton, usually harsh and imperious, 
 
THE END 331 
 
 but now pitiful and humble by emotion, tear- 
 fully soliloquizing : " There lies the greatest 
 leader of men the world ever saw." 
 
 At nine o'clock an undertaker's wagon appeared 
 at the door of the Peterson mansion ; the body of 
 the great martyr was placed in it, and guarded 
 and escorted by a company of regular soldiers, it 
 was conveyed to the White House prepared for 
 burial, embalmed, and placed in a mahogany 
 casket, which, in turn, was placed in a grand 
 catafalque, four feet high, in the center of the 
 Green Room, which had been appropriately 
 draped for the sad occasion, and where a guard 
 of honor had been posted. Soon the rich coffin 
 containing the sacred remains was piled high 
 with rare exotics and domestic flowers, tokens of 
 patriotic love, from the lowly clerk and exalted 
 statesman alike. 
 
 Within five minutes of the time when the 
 President was shot a conspirator with Booth, 
 Lewis Payne Powell, generally known as Payne, 
 called at Mr. Seward's residence, pushed aside 
 the servant who answered the bell, ran upstairs 
 to the bedroom where the disabled Secretary was 
 lying, and, admission being refused him by Mr. 
 Seward's son Frederick, the Assistant Secretary 
 of State, beat him on the head with a pistol, frac- 
 turing his skull. Hearing the noise, Miss Fannie 
 Seward, who was attending her father within, 
 then opened the door, through which Payne 
 darted; he fell upon Mr. Seward in bed with a 
 bowie-knife and stabbed him three times about 
 the throat before he was seized by an invalid 
 soldier named Robinson, who was attending as 
 nurse. Payne turned upon Robinson, and gave 
 him a number of severe wounds. While the as- 
 
332 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 sassin was thus engaged, Mr. Seward contrived 
 to roll off the bed on its farther side ; seeing that 
 his victim was out of reach, and hearing Miss 
 Seward at the window crying " Murder ! " Payne 
 broke away from Robinson and rushed down- 
 stairs. On his way he met another son of the 
 Secretary, Major Augustus Seward, whom he 
 struck with his dagger, and another attendant 
 upon the sick man, Mr. Hanswell, whom he 
 stabbed ; gaining the street, he mounted his horse 
 and rode away. 
 
 He was apprehended later, and, with Herold, 
 Booth's accomplice, Mrs. Surratt, a tavern- 
 keeper who had harbored Booth, and another 
 conspirator, Atzerodt, was condemned to death 
 and hanged on July 7. Other conspirators were 
 condemned to various terms of imprisonment. 
 
 Meetings were held everywhere to give ex- 
 pression to the unusual grief ; even the Rebels, in 
 many instances, clothed their hearts in semi- 
 mourning, seeing through the mists of partisan 
 prejudice the kindly spirit, ardent patriotism, 
 and beneficent charity of this Father of his 
 people. 
 
 On the succeeding Sabbath every church in 
 the Northern part of the nation held memorial 
 services, and the voice of eulogy filled the land, 
 even extending to parts of the South. At Char- 
 lotte, N. C, where Jefferson Davis was stopping 
 in his flight southward, the preacher at a serv- 
 ice attended by Mr. Davis severely condemned 
 the act, looking sharply at the Confederate 
 President, " as if," reported Mr. Davis, " he 
 thought I had something to do with it." 
 
 Undoubtedly Mr. Davis had nothing to do with 
 the crime, but there is sworn testimony that he 
 
THE END 333 
 
 expressed his sympathy with it. According to 
 the evidence of Lewis F. Bates, subsequently 
 superintendent of the Southern Express Com- 
 pany for the State of South Carolina, at whose 
 house in Charlotte, N. C, Davis was stopping, 
 the Confederate President on receiving a tele- 
 gram from General Breckinridge announcing 
 Lincoln's assassination, coldly remarked : " If it 
 were to be done, it were better it were well 
 done " ; and two days later, when Breckinridge 
 was present, in reply to the general's expression 
 of regret for the murder, Mr. Davis said : " Well, 
 General, I don't know; if it were to be done at 
 all, it were better that it were well done, and if 
 the same had been done to Andy Johnson, the 
 beast, and to Secretary Stanton, the job would 
 then be complete." 
 
 On Monday, the I7th of April, a Congressional 
 meeting was held, and Senator Sumner moved 
 for a Committee of Arrangements for the fu- 
 neral, which was appointed, with himself at the 
 head. The following were designated as pall- 
 bearers, viz. : Foster, Morgan, Johnson, Yates, 
 Wade, and Conness, Senators; and Dawes, Cof- 
 froth, Smith, Colfax, Worthington, and Wash- 
 burne from the House of Representatives; also 
 one member from each State and Territory was 
 selected to form a Committee of Escort. It was 
 one of the most august bodies of men that ever 
 assembled anywhere. Except the Duke of Well- 
 ington, no man in all history ever had so eminent 
 a body of pall-bearers. On the ensuing day the 
 White House was opened to all who desired to 
 view the remains which lay in state in the East 
 Room, adorned with huge flower emblems; and 
 fully twenty-five thousand persons availed them- 
 
334 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 selves of the privilege, and several thousand more 
 were denied it for want of time. 
 
 The succeeding day (Wednesday) the funeral 
 took place in the East Room. It was a most im- 
 pressive and solemn service. The President of 
 the United States, the entire Cabinet, the Su- 
 preme Court Justices, the Lieutenant-General of 
 the Army and a brilliant suite, the Senior Ad- 
 miral of the Navy and many other naval officers, 
 the Diplomatic Corps, and a large array of Sena- 
 tors and Congressmen, besides many influential 
 citizens, made up an audience of worth and bril- 
 liancy rarely convened. Mrs. Lincoln herself 
 was thoroughly prostrated with grief, and unable 
 to leave her bed, and Robert T. Lincoln and little 
 " Tad," the latter inconsolable with grief, were 
 the chief personal mourners. Several of Mrs. 
 Lincoln's relatives were present, but none of Mr. 
 Lincoln's. 
 
 The solemn service began by Rev. Dr. Hall, an 
 Episcopal clergyman, reading in an impressive 
 manner the Episcopal Scripture Service for the 
 burial of the dead. The venerable Bishop Simp- 
 son of the Methodist Episcopal Church, then 
 offered a fervent prayer, after which Dr. Gurley, 
 pastor of the Presbyterian Church which Mrs. 
 Lincoln attended, preached the funeral discourse 
 from the text in Mark xi., 22 : " Have faith in 
 God ! " The services were then concluded by 
 prayer by Rev. Dr. Gray, Chaplain of the Senate, 
 a Baptist clergyman. 
 
 The remains were immediately transferred to 
 a stately funeral car which had been improvised 
 for the occasion, and, attended by a brilliant and 
 imposing military cortege with arms reversed, the 
 solemn procession moved towards the Capitol. 
 
THE END 335 
 
 The weather was perfect, and the arrangements 
 were carried out with faultless precision. The 
 wagon way of the wide avenue was kept entirely 
 clear by policemen, but the sidewalks, windows, 
 and roofs along the route were a perfect mass of 
 humanity, solemn, awe-struck, reverential; and 
 as the plaintive dirges from the bands of music 
 with muffled drums floated out on the air, and the 
 precise tread of the veterans animated the sub- 
 lime scene, tears welled up from the hearts of 
 thousands, attesting the strength of the affection 
 which the benign ruler had inspired in the breasts 
 of the people. 
 
 The procession reached the Capitol, and the 
 remains were borne into the rotunda, where Rev. 
 Dr. Gurley read the usual service for the burial 
 of the dead, while the President and Cabinet, 
 relatives, and some members of Congress at- 
 tended. The casket was placed on the cata- 
 falque and a short prayer followed : and the serv- 
 ices were at an end. 
 
 It was earnestly desired that the body should 
 be buried in the vault beneath the rotunda of the 
 Capitol which had* been prepared for the body of 
 Washington, but not used; and this plan, so 
 obviously proper, would probably have been car- 
 ried out, but for the interference of Senator 
 Yates, Congressman Washburne, and Governor 
 Oglesby, who, animated by considerations of 
 State pride, carried the day in favor of interment 
 at the late home of the martyr. Accordingly, at six 
 o'clock A.M., on the 21 st inst., the casket, after 
 having been visited by many thousands of people 
 on the day before, was closed ; and an hour later 
 was transferred, in the presence of the President, 
 his Cabinet, the General of the Army and his 
 
336 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 staff, and a distinguished assemblage of eminent 
 personages, to a special car which had been fitted 
 up for the purpose. Attended by the guard of 
 honor, the two sons and other relatives, and the 
 Congressional Committee of Escort, it started on 
 its way to the receptacle of final repose. 
 
 The first intention, and indeed, desire of the 
 family, was to transfer the casket to Springfield 
 with as little pomp as possible, but in deference to 
 the earnest desire of the people, this simple plan 
 yielded to the adoption of substantially the same 
 route which had been taken by the untried 
 Lincoln of four years previously, en route to a 
 martyr's death and immortality. At eight o'clock 
 A.M. on the 2 ist the solemn procession, consist- 
 ing of seven coaches and a locomotive, all 
 solemnly draped in black, slowly moved out from 
 the depot, amidst an immense concourse of peo- 
 ple, all reverently uncovered. 
 
 A methodical programme had been made out 
 in the War Department, adopted by the various 
 railway companies and committees en route, 
 which was rigidly adhered to, and carried into 
 effect without a flaw, from inception to close. 
 A low rate of speed was ordered, and a pilot 
 engine preceded the train. At ten o'clock, the 
 train reached Baltimore, the city through which, 
 but four years and two months before, President 
 Lincoln had had to flee in the night to avoid assas- 
 sination. But how changed ! All that earnest af- 
 fection could do to show respect and reverence 
 to the ashes of the illustrious dead was done ; 
 a very large and imposing military escort was at 
 the depot, and a stately funeral car, tastefully 
 draped, was in attendance, to which the remains 
 were transferred. A procession escorted the 
 
THE END 337 
 
 body to the Exchange, where it was placed on a 
 raised dais, decorated with funereal flowers. A 
 constant stream of citizens passed in double file 
 for four hours to gaze on the face of the dead, 
 and then not more than a tenth of the people 
 assembled were able to take part in such homage. 
 The funeral train then proceeded to Harris- 
 burg, the Governor of the State accompanying it. 
 At all way stations crowds assembled to catch a 
 glimpse of the train, and at York, where the 
 train halted for a few moments, six girls, dressed 
 in mourning, obtained permission to enter the 
 funeral car and deposit a beautiful wreath of 
 white flowers upon the casket. Bells tolled, can- 
 non reverberated, and dirges were played by 
 bands at each village. The grief was universal 
 and equal everywhere. At Harrisburg the re- 
 mains were conveyed to the Capitol, and placed 
 upon a catafalque, bedecked with flowers. The 
 casket was opened, and the citizens were per- 
 mitted to review the remains till midnight. 
 Philadelphia was the next stopping point. An 
 immense procession escorted the casket from 
 Broad Street station to Independence Hall, where 
 the remains of America's greatest martyr were 
 placed in the chamber where, ninety years before, 
 Liberty was proclaimed to the world. The 
 casket was opened, and from ten o'clock till mid- 
 night opportunity was given to the vast crowd 
 to view the remains; and hundreds remained 
 crowded about the hall door so as to have an 
 early opportunity of inspection the ensuing morn- 
 ting. The next day was Sunday, but the doors 
 were opened at six o'clock, and remained so till 
 one o'clock on Monday morning ; and all through 
 these nineteen hours a double row of people filed 
 
338 'LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 past the casket which contained all that was mor- 
 tal of him who, four years before, in that same 
 place, had said, " If this country cannot be saved 
 without giving up that principle [of constitu- 
 tional liberty], I would rather be assassinated 
 upon this spot than surrender it." Early Mon- 
 day morning the train, bearing its most precious 
 burden, moved majestically off for New York, at- 
 tended with the sound of funeral dirges, boom- 
 ing cannon, and suppressed farewells from thou- 
 sands of uncovered patriots. Throughout the entire 
 journey through New Jersey crowds appeared at 
 every station, every crossroads, at every farm- 
 stead. It seemed as if all the inhabitants of that 
 State of Revolutionary memories had assembled 
 along the line of travel, to see at least the train 
 which bore the remains of him they loved. Guns 
 were fired, mourning emblems displayed, bands 
 played, crowds stood silent, and respectfully and 
 reverently uncovered. Reaching Jersey City, 
 where the depot was draped in mourning, the 
 train was greeted by a chorus of seventy singers 
 chanting dirges. Ten stalwart soldiers then bore 
 the casket to the hearse which had been specially 
 provided, and which was drawn by six gray 
 horses heavily draped in black. It was received 
 across the river by a great procession, which, mar- 
 shaled by General Dix, escorted the remains to 
 the City Hall, where a trained chorus of eight 
 hundred of the best vocalists in the city chanted 
 the " Chorus of the Spirits " ; and this sad but 
 beautiful melody together with the sound of tolling 
 bells, booming cannon, and waving flags draped 
 with funereal emblems, made theiscene appear like 
 one of weird and fated enchantment. Arrived at 
 the City Hall, the casket was placed under the 
 
THE END 339 
 
 dome which was arranged to allow of a subdued 
 light; and, for twenty-four consecutive hours, a 
 stream of people passed rapidly through, while 
 crowds without, as far as the eye could reach in 
 all directions, looked enviously on, knowing that 
 their opportunity would never come. The first 
 line was three-quarters of a mile long, and ex- 
 tended the whole length of Chatham Street, Chat- 
 ham Square, and into the Bowery. It was esti- 
 mated that one hundred and fifty thousand per- 
 sons viewed the remains, while double that num- 
 ber were present who failed to do so. And yet 
 this was at the very spot where, less than two 
 years before, an equal crowd had gathered to 
 resist the draft ordered by him who lay within 
 the coffin. 
 
 At twenty minutes before twelve o'clock on the 
 25th the casket was transferred to the funeral 
 car, and escorted to the Hudson River Railway 
 depot by the finest military cavalcade ever wit- 
 nessed in New York. It consisted of at least fif- 
 teen thousand men in most brilliant uniforms, 
 and accompanied by the finest bands in the nation. 
 The civic procession was equally noteworthy, for 
 the Federal and State dignitaries and representa- 
 tives of foreign governments, in full costume, 
 were there by hundreds, and all the streets lead- 
 ing to the depot were thronged with people. As 
 the New York Herald said: "Such an occasion, 
 such a crowd, and such a day New York may 
 never see again." 
 
 The trained stopped at Albany, Buffalo, Cleve- 
 land, Columbus, and Indianapolis, where similar 
 scenes occurred to those which have been de- 
 scribed. As in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 
 people gathered all along the route to pay honor 
 
340 LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT 
 
 to the passing corpse of their beloved " Father 
 Abraham/' The New York Tribune well said: 
 " A funeral in each house . . . would hardly 
 have added solemnity to the day." 
 
 Chicago was reached on the first day of May. 
 The whole city was clad in mourning; the body 
 of the President was placed in the rotunda of the 
 Court House, over the north door of which was 
 the motto : " The altar of freedom has borne no 
 nobler sacrifice," and over the south door of 
 which was the motto, "Illinois clasps to her 
 bosom her slain, but glorified, son" 
 
 The last stage of the long, sad journey was 
 now reached on the morning of May 3. The en- 
 tire city of Springfield was clad in mourning, 
 and the body of him whose living presence had 
 been so familiar in these streets was borne 
 through them to the Representatives' Hall in the 
 State House, being the same hall where, eleven 
 years before, he had uttered his terrible philippic 
 against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. 
 At ten o'clock A.M. of May 4 the casket was borne 
 to the hearse, and a long and mournful procession 
 wended its way to Oak Ridge Cemetery. The 
 journey of eighteen hundred miles was ended, and 
 Abraham Lincoln was henceforth to be a tender 
 and sacred memory. Rev. Dr. Hall made a fer- 
 vent prayer ; the choir sang a hymn ; a Scripture 
 lesson and the dead President's last inaugural were 
 read ; and Bishop Matthew Simpson of the Meth- 
 odist Episcopal Church made an eloquent address. 
 Rev. Mr. Gurley of Washington closed the service 
 with prayer; the vault door opened; and, as the 
 choir sang softly, " Unveil thy Bosom, Faithful 
 Tomb," the casket was placed in the vault, and 
 the body of the great martyr was, like his soul, 
 at rest.