TAFT PAPERS 
 
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 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
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TAFT PAPERS 
 
 ON 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 THEODORE MARBURG, M.A., LL.D. 
 
 AND 
 
 HORACE E. FLACK, P H ,D. 
 
 Jfteto 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1920 
 
 AU riahu reterved 
 
OOPYMGIHT, 1920. 
 
 BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Set up and electrotypcd. Published October, igao. 
 
Speeches and articles by William Howard Taft, 
 and extracts therefrom, covering period from May 
 12, 1915, to the adoption of the revised Paris 
 Covenant, April 28, 1919. One article on the 
 revised Covenant is added. 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 These addresses, articles and editorials were written when 
 the issue was purely on the merits of the League to Enforce 
 Peace plan for a League of Nations, and of the Covenant 
 of the League of Nations as signed by President Wilson in 
 Paris and by him submitted to the Senate. I have nothing 
 to recall in what is said in them. But the present issue over 
 the League is very different from that when these papers 
 were written, and is made so by the very unfortunate atti- 
 tude of President Wilson in refusing to allow the United 
 States to join the League of Nations because the Senate 
 would not consent to Article X as he had drafted it and put 
 it into the Covenant. 
 
 It is conceded that the other members of the League would 
 have accepted us as a member with the modification of Article 
 X insisted on by a sufficient number of senators to prevent 
 ratification. The Democratic party and its platform adopt 
 completely Mr. Wilson's position and, if Governor Cox is 
 elected, the League will be defeated and a deadlock ensue just 
 as before. 
 
 Two-thirds of the Republican senators have already voted 
 for the League with reservations and enough Democrats 
 have expressed themselves in the Senate and elsewhere on 
 this matter to ensure a ratification of the League with the 
 Republican reservations if Mr. Harding is elected and sub- 
 mits the German Treaty to the Senate. The doubt on this 
 point is whether Mr. Harding will do so, arising from his 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 failure to say, in his letter of acceptance, that he will do so. 
 My own belief is that, as Mr. Harding has already twice 
 voted for the League with reservations, and will find that a 
 Democratic minority will prevent his putting through a 
 separate treaty with Germany, he will conclude that the only 
 satisfactory solution is a ratification of the League Covenant 
 with reservations. 
 
 For these reasons though had I been a senator I would 
 have voted for the League Covenant just as submitted and 
 also for it with the reservations I shall vote for Mr. 
 Harding. 
 
 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT. 
 
 Pointe au Pic, 
 
 Province of Quebec, Canada, 
 July 23, 1920. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION .. . vii 
 
 LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE . I 
 
 VICTORY PROGRAM : . 2 
 
 THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS ... 4 
 
 PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO ENFORCE PEACE . . 28 
 
 PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE ... 46 
 
 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 52 
 
 A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT . . . 61 
 
 THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 74 
 
 STATEMENT MADE AT RICHMOND, VA., MARCH 21, 1917 . 79 
 
 THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 81 
 
 WORLD PEACE DEBATE 98 
 
 VICTORY WITH POWER 132 
 
 OUR PURPOSE 133 
 
 SELF DETERMINATION 136 
 
 PERIL IN HUN PEACE OFFER 138 
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 141 
 
 WORKINGMEN AND THE LEAGUE 152 
 
 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL POLICY . . .153 
 WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS Is NECESSARY . . . .156 
 
 LESSER LEAGUE OF NATIONS 160 
 
 DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS . 163 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN COLONIES . 164 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY . . 166 
 
 PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . 169 
 
 SENATOR LODGE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS .... 174 
 
 THE LEAGUE: WHY AND How 177 
 
 FROM ARTICLE IN THE PUBLIC LEDGER, JANUARY i, 1919 194 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE 195 
 
 CRITICISM SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE 198 
 
 ROOSEVELT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . 201 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT 
 
 MUST BE 205 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADVISERS . 210 
 
 " THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS Is HERE " 213 
 
 THE LEAGUE'S " BITE " 217 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN COLONIES . 221 
 FROM ADDRESS AT ATLANTIC CONGRESS FOR A LEAGUE OF 
 
 NATIONS, NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 5, 1919 .... 225 
 
 IRELAND AND THE LEAGUE 225 
 
 THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 228 
 
 To BUSINESS MEN 241 
 
 FROM ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO, FEBRUARY 19, 1919 . 2.17 
 FROM ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY, FEBRUARY 22, 1919 . 249 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN 
 
 FUTURE 257 
 
 THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . . 262 
 
 ANSWER TO SENATOR KN'OX'S INDICTMENT 280 
 
 PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 290 
 
 To MAKE PEACE SECURE 295 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAS NOT DELAYED PEACE . . . 300 
 
 " OPEN DIPLOMACY " SLOW 303 
 
 RUSSIA, FRANCE, DANZIG 305 
 
 THE ROUND ROBIN 307 
 
 GUARANTIES OF ARTICLE 10 308 
 
 RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FREEDOM 309 
 
 SECRET TREATY PROVISIONS THAT ARE AT THE ROOT OF 
 
 THE CRISIS AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE . . . . 3! I 
 ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED . .313 
 CORRESPONDENCE 321 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Here in the United States the main attack on both the 
 preliminary project and the perfected Covenant of the 
 League of Nations was on the ground that the League 
 would operate as an interference with our sovereignty and 
 with the Monroe Doctrine, that it involved abandonment of 
 our traditional policy against entangling alliances, and that 
 the country lacked the power, under its Constitution, to 
 enter into such a treaty. These objections are fully met 
 by Mr. Taft in the speeches and articles embraced in this 
 volume. Sovereignty is shown to be just so much liberty 
 of action on the part of States as is consistent with their 
 obligation, under international law and morality, to permit 
 of the exercise of equal sovereignty or liberty of action by 
 their sister States. The League Covenant secures all States 
 in their exercise of this sovereignty free from oppression 
 by other States, and he who wants more is really seeking 
 the license selfishly to disregard these obligations to 
 reject, for example, the just judgments of a properly con- 
 stituted tribunal which is the German conception of 
 sovereignty. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine is shown to be strengthened, not 
 impaired, by the Covenant. In its original form the 
 doctrine opposed future colonization on the American conti- 
 nents by European governments and all interference by 
 Europe with the free governments of America. Later on, 
 the United States, under the Polk and under the Taft admin- 
 
Viii INTRODUCTION 
 
 istrations, voiced its opposition to the transfer of American 
 territory by sale to any European or Asiatic government. 
 The original doctrine is strengthened by the League 
 Covenant in that it is, for the first time, specifically recog- 
 nized by the nations, and is extended to the world by the 
 provisions of Article X, which preserves " against external 
 aggression the territorial integrity and political independ- 
 ence of all members of the League." Certainly we are not 
 authorized by that, nor, in fact, by any other article of the 
 Covenant, to acquire territory in Europe by conquest or 
 purchase, and similarly European countries are not author- 
 ized by the Covenant to do it in this hemisphere. 
 
 The attitude both of Secretary Seward and of President 
 Roosevelt is cited to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine 
 does not forbid non- American Powers from justly disciplin- 
 ing American countries provided the action does not extend 
 to the point of interfering with the latter' s independence and 
 territorial integrity. Similarly the guaranties of territorial 
 integrity and political independence under Article X of the 
 Paris Covenant will not come into operation until the char- 
 acter of a war, otherwise legally begun, discloses itself as 
 aggressive in this respect. Neither are wars^of independ- 
 ence within the legal purview of the League though it will 
 naturally take notice of them and invite friendly settlement. 
 
 The sale of American territory to non-American Powers 
 is not specifically forbidden by the League Covenant ; but 
 the motive for such attempted action is lessened by the very 
 existence of the League. When the Monroe Doctrine is 
 to be enforced in the western hemisphere, it is natural to 
 expect that a strong American State, close to the seat of 
 trouble, will be selected to execute the mandate of the 
 League. Similar reason would control the action of the 
 
INTRODUCTION ix 
 
 League in employing the forces of a nearby State to quell 
 disturbances in other parts of the world ; so that, unless the 
 struggle be formidable or unless an international force be 
 needed to allay fear of abuse of power, the forces of the 
 United States will rarely be called upon to act abroad. 
 
 The " entangling alliance " argument is met by a whole 
 series of facts and considerations. The detached position 
 of the United States, which obtained in Washington's day, 
 is shown to have disappeared with the spread of dominion 
 and interests since then. From a country limited to a 
 comparatively narrow settlement along the Atlantic sea- 
 board, the United States has extended its empire over the 
 continent to the Pacific, has acquired Alaska, Hawaii, the 
 Philippines, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal strip, while 
 a multiplied commerce and social intercourse tie up her 
 fortunes intimately with the fortunes of other peoples. The 
 life that pulses through her veins today is the life of the 
 world and disease in the body politic elsewhere affects her 
 own health. We have seen that we cannot keep out of a 
 general world conflict and we risk less by assuming the 
 obligations of membership in the family of nations and 
 throwing our great influence in the scale for the preservation 
 of peace than if we were to attempt isolation and play the 
 role of onlooker until the conflagration drew us irresist- 
 ibly in. 
 
 Our presence will make the potential strength of the 
 League so overwhelming that the hand of the would-be 
 aggressor will be stayed, making serious assault on the 
 world's peace unlikely. In most instances the need for the 
 actual use of force will be avoided; just as the declared 
 purpose of the United States to maintain the Monroe 
 Doctrine has resulted in its being respected without our 
 
X INTRODUCTION 
 
 being called upon to fire a shot or sacrifice the life of a single 
 soldier in its defence. Accordingly there will be less likeli- 
 hood of our being called upon to go to war than if we 
 declined the commitments of the League with a view to 
 avoiding war. While the United States, in entering the 
 League, will assume new responsibilities, it will not assume 
 new burdens. The League will prove to be a source of 
 economy rather than of new expense to us; for it should 
 not only enable us to escape the crushing expense of actual 
 warfare, but, in course of time, should likewise relieve us of 
 part of the present burden of armaments. 
 
 So much from the standpoint of self-interest. But, 
 irrespective of self-interest, the United States, having become 
 a powerful nation in point of numbers, talent and resources, 
 has a duty to perform in this respect to her sister nations. 
 Modern ingenuity has so multiplied the destructiveness of 
 war that the very preservation of the race is dependent on 
 adequate organization to suppress war. Such organization 
 cannot come about without the participation of the United 
 States. Unless we join, other important countries will 
 remain out and we will witness the world divided once more 
 in hostile groups. Without a League of Nations, the many 
 new States which have come into being, lacking experience 
 and the self-restraint which makes successful self-govern- 
 ment possible, will not only be unable to maintain their 
 independence but will be a source of danger to the general 
 peace, by reason of quarrels among themselves and quarrels 
 with the States of which they were formerly a part ; for, on 
 the one hand, racial animosity and the memory of the 
 tyranny formerly practiced against them " will prompt them 
 to be impatient and headstrong" in dealing with their 
 former masters, while, on the other hand, the latter will 
 
INTRODUCTION XI 
 
 harbor resentment against States whose independent exist- 
 ence will remind them of their own " deserved humiliation." 
 Our experience in Cuba indicates what we may expect of 
 them. After three years of existence as an independent 
 republic, Cuba indulged in a revolution. " Mr. Roosevelt 
 sent me down there to stop it and launch the Republic once 
 more. Well, I could not stop it except by sending for the 
 army and navy of the United States. That step had a 
 wholesome, conciliatory, quieting effect. We were not 
 called upon to fight. We took over the island and held it 
 for two years. We passed a lot of good statutes, among 
 them an election law, held a fair election under it and then 
 turned over the government to those elected. We had 
 launched her once more. If she ever requires it we will 
 do the same thing over again and launch her again, and then 
 again, until she gets strong enough I hope she is now . 
 to stand alone." 
 
 This unpretentious and good-natured recital of the accom- 
 plishment of a task which for another might have proved 
 difficult indeed and lengthy, if not bloody shows, 
 more clearly than any abstract dissertation possibly could, 
 exactly the patience and fatherly concern which Mr. Taft 
 feels will be required of us in starting the new nations of 
 Europe safely on their way. 
 
 Our own sacrifices and the more awful sacrifices of our 
 allies, who were fighting our battle long before we awoke 
 to the fact, were made in order to suppress militarism, to 
 safeguard democracy and to make peace more lasting. 
 
 It was the United States, acting through its President, 
 that pointed the way to a league of nations. The hope of 
 it gave ne\v courage to the armies of our allies and to the 
 people that suffered toil and hardship at home; it helped 
 
Xll INTRODUCTION 
 
 nerve the arm of our own boys and encouraged the masses 
 in the enemy country to revolt against their leaders. Shall 
 we now disappoint their hope? Prove traitor to our pro- 
 fessions? Tell the maimed and the mothers of the dead, 
 at home and abroad, that we did not mean what we said? 
 Suffer conditions to grow up which will make similar 
 nay, far graver sacrifices necessary in the future? "I 
 say that the men who advocate our staying 1 out of the 
 League by reason of a policy against entangling alliances 
 laid down by Washington for a small nation struggling for 
 existence, whereas today we are one of the most powerful 
 nations in the world I say deliberately that these men 
 are little Americans and belittle the United States and its 
 people." Now is the time to set up the international organ- 
 ization which for generations thinking men have sought; 
 now, while the dreadful character of war has so impressed 
 itself on nations that they are willing to make the concessions 
 called for. 4 * 
 
 Should we not, then, say to the nations of Europe : " We 
 realize that the sea no longer separates us but is become a 
 bond of union. We know that if war comes to you, our 
 neighbor, it is apt to come to us, and we are ready to stand 
 with you in order to suppress this scourge of nations. For 
 love of our brother we will do our share as men and women 
 conscious of the responsibility to help along mankind, a 
 responsibility which God has given this nation in giving it 
 great power." 
 
 Led, by experience in furthering new measures, to expect 
 violent attack on the proposed League from the side of the 
 Federal Constitution, Mr. Taft took early occasion to deal 
 with that important question. His full and satisfactory 
 
INTRODUCTION xiii 
 
 treatment of it is among his most valuable contributions to 
 the discussion of the League project. 
 
 The United States is a nation, endowed with all the 
 powers, so far as external relations are concerned, that 
 appertain to a sovereign nation. Practice and legal decisions 
 are cited to show that its treaty-making power extends to 
 all subjects usually dealt with in treaties. These include, in 
 practice and in law, the right to agree to submit to arbitra- 
 tion not only existing disputes but likewise disputes which 
 may arise in future. Among the latter, instance the 
 approval, by the United States Senate, of the Hague conven- 
 tion for an international Court of Prize and of the Bryan 
 treaties. Such agreements may apply to extra-legal con- 
 troversies as well as to justiciable controversies. The latter 
 are defined as matters resolvable by the rules of law and 
 equity. Precedent for instituting an international Court 
 of Justice to pass upon the latter category of questions is 
 found in the Supreme Court of the United States which is 
 called upon at times to apply international law in con- 
 troversies between the States of the Union. Settlement of 
 extra-legal questions by a tribunal would simply be arbi- 
 tration as we commonly know it. A long series of agree- 
 ments of this nature, beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1/94, 
 affirms the practice of the country in respect thereto. Sub- 
 mission of an issue to a judge, which this is, is not a dele- 
 gation of power to an agent. 
 
 Nor is the Government exceeding its constitutional powers 
 when it enters into an agreement to go to war under certain 
 conditions. For the complete act, the exercise of two con- 
 stitutional functions is required. It is the President who, 
 by and with the consent of the Senate, makes a treaty. 
 " For this purpose the President and Senate are the United 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 States." That is one thing. It is the Congress which, 
 observing the requirements of the treaty, takes supplemen- 
 tary action. That is quite another thing. 
 
 A treaty calling for a declaration of war under certain 
 conditions can no more be carried out without action on the 
 part of Congress than a treaty calling for the payment of 
 money; because in Congress alone resides the power to 
 declare war just as in Congress alone resides the power to 
 make appropriations of money from the Treasury. The 
 requirements of the Constitution are fulfilled only by this 
 double action. But that fact cannot be interpreted as limit- 
 ing the constitutional power of the Government to make 
 treaties. The treaty we made with France during the 
 Revolution was of that character. The Senate accepted the 
 principle when it approved the treaties under which we 
 guaranteed the independence of Cuba and Panama. ' The 
 obligation was entered into in the constitutional way and is 
 to be performed in the constitutional way." 
 
 Neither can the constitutional power of the country to 
 enter into an agreement to limit armaments be questioned. 
 This power was exercised early in the history of the country 
 by the agreement with Canada ( 1817) to abolish armaments 
 on the Great Lakes and maintain no fortifications along our 
 lengthy common border. 
 
 The charge that the League sets up a Super-State like- 
 wise falls before an examination of the project. The central 
 organs of the League recommend they do not command 
 definite courses of action by the States of the League. 
 When armaments are in question, the limit prescribed for 
 each State is not definitive until that State has agreed to it. 
 For the United States, it is the Congress, acting under the 
 Constitution, which will finallv determine what our arma- 
 
INTRODUCTION XV 
 
 ments are to be. When mandates for administering back- 
 ward regions are assigned, the mandatory is free to accept 
 or reject the mandate. When the use of force is required, 
 each State of the League will decide for itself whether or 
 not it will observe the recommendation of the central organ 
 of the League that force be used. True, among the positive 
 agreements which may not be ignored, are two of major 
 importance, namely, the agreement to institute a boycott 
 against a member of the League which resorts to war in 
 violation of its covenants and the agreement to " afford 
 passage through their territory to the forces " engaged in 
 disciplining the recalcitrant. These provisions abolish neu- 
 trality in the case of an aggressive war; but it is a condi- 
 tion which arises not by reason of any command of the cen- 
 tral organs of the League but by reason of the act of the 
 recalcitrant itself in waging war illegally. 
 
 The power of the League rests, not on a super-govern- 
 ment, but on the covenants of the members to cooperate 
 voluntarily by boycott and by the use of force, to punish 
 aggression. 
 
 Combatting the views of persons who object to the ele- 
 ment of force in the League program, Mr. Taft declares 
 his respect for the motives of the advocates of non-resist- 
 ance but doubts whether nations are as yet proof against the 
 " temptations to cupidity, cruelty and injustice " manifested 
 in men, and whether, on that account, an international police 
 is not as requisite as the constabulary which " protects the 
 innocent and the just against the criminal and unjust " 
 within the State. 
 
 Mr. Bryan, in the written debate with Mr. Taft, urges 
 that the use of force invites violence, and cites the laying 
 aside of weapons by private persons as having made for the 
 
xv j INTRODUCTION 
 
 peace fulness of society. Mr. Taft replies that the instance 
 is not well chosen, because " men gave up weapons when 
 they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the 
 community, to protect them against violence. . . . Would 
 Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state and na- 
 tion?" "There is no means of suppressing lawless vio- 
 lence except lawful force." 
 
 Mr. Bryan's view that a popular referendum should be 
 taken before a nation may declare war is met by the supposi- 
 tion that the people of one country to a dispute might well 
 vote for war while that of the other country voted against 
 it. " Shall another vote be taken ? In which country ? 
 Or shall it be in both ? " We may add that when the na- 
 tional legislature had gone so far as to submit the question 
 of peace or war by referendum to the people, what likeli- 
 hood is there that the prospective enemy would await the 
 decision before striking? Picture any of the great Euro- 
 pean countries referring to popular vote the question of war 
 against a neighbor. "How long would the latter delay war- 
 like action? The debate offers an interesting comparison, 
 throughout, of the minds of the two participants. 
 
 The assertion, made in certain quarters, that the League 
 plan has little value because nations will disregard the obli- 
 gations of the pact is met by the admission that nations are 
 sometimes utterly immoral and shamelessly break treaties 
 on the plea of necessity but that we cannot, on that account, 
 abandon treaty-making " any more than we can give up com- 
 mercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor them- 
 selves by breaking them." Moreover, flying in the face of 
 an organized world opinion and combined world power 
 involves very different consequences from those which fol- 
 lowed breach of treaty under the old order. 
 
INTRODUCTION XV11 
 
 The fear that judgments of an international tribunal will 
 affect adversely the interests of the United States is dis- 
 missed in these words: "If the judgment against her is 
 just she ought to obey it. If it is not, why assume that it 
 will be rendered at all, or, that if rendered all nations 
 would join in world war to enforce it? Indeed, may not 
 our imagination, if we let it run riot, as easily conceive 
 such a union of the military forces of the world against 
 the United States without a league and its machinery as 
 with them?" No inconsistency is recognized between in- 
 tense love of country, which is regarded as helpful and 
 right, and universal brotherhood. " The relation of one 
 to the other should be as love of home and family is to 
 love of country." They strengthen each other. 
 
 A league, such as is now planned, is viewed as a necessary 
 and natural outgrowth of the treaty foreshadowed by the 
 demands of the Allies. In fact the proposed treaty is im- 
 possible of fulfillment without the aid of some such organi- 
 zation. Even though drawn " by the ablest lawyers who 
 ever drew a contract '' its numerous provisions will call for 
 authoritative interpretation. What instrument is there 
 better fitted than a court to interpret a contract authorita- 
 tively? Next, there are sure to be conflicts which are not 
 justiciable among the nations. What better institution for 
 settling such questions than a tribunal of inquiry and con- 
 ciliation? Unruliness on the part of backward countries, 
 or of those children among the nations to whom reference 
 has already been made, will call for the use of force to con- 
 fine and restrain it. " You do not always have to use the 
 broad hand but it is helpful to have it in the family." 
 That was the third plank in the platform of the League to 
 Enforce Peace. Lastly, we cannot escape the task of de- 
 
XV111 INTRODUCTION 
 
 veloping and defining international law, and that is the 
 fourth plank. 
 
 As the discussion proceeded Mr. Taft was led to change, 
 in the direction of enlarging, his view of the length to 
 which nations might be expected to go in conferring powers 
 on a central organization. Of the desirability of sanc- 
 tion for all the pronouncements of the League there was 
 never a question. The problem was to avoid wrecking 
 the project by demanding more than the nations would be 
 willing to concede at this time. 
 
 It will be observed, for example, that in the earliest 
 speeches, intention to enforce the judgment of an interna- 
 tional court is denied; whereas, later on and with Mr. Taft's 
 approval, the platform of the League to Enforce Peace 
 moved up to that demand. At the same time Mr. Taft has 
 stood, from the beginning, for the power to hale a nation 
 into court. The framers of the Paris Covenant were mani- 
 festly unwilling to confer both powers conjointly on an in- 
 ternational tribunal. They neglected to confer on the 
 League the power to hale offenders before a tribunal or 
 court in matters suitable for arbitration justiciable mat- 
 ters are included in the term but, having once submitted 
 the matter, the disputants are bound to respect the judg- 
 ment or award. On the other hand, disputants in the field 
 of extra-legal matters, including conflicts of political policy, 
 may be haled before a tribunal the Council or a com- 
 mittee thereof while the recommendation arrived at by 
 the tribunal is not en forcible. Mr. Taft is of the opinion 
 that there is still a way, through the instrumentality of the 
 Council, to bring a nation into the Court of International 
 Justice under the Covenant. Certainly it is not unreason- 
 
INTRODUCTION XIX 
 
 able to expect further development of the powers of its 
 tribunals, as well as of the general powers of the League, 
 as time may disclose the need for them. 
 
 So, too, the earlier position that the League should oper- 
 ate only on its own members was abandoned by Mr. Taft 
 and his associates in favor of insistence on resort to inquiry 
 in the hope of peaceful settlement before even nations out- 
 side the League were suffered to go to war. This is the 
 attitude of the Paris Covenant. The messages printed at 
 the end of the volume reveal the part played by Mr. Taft 
 in securing modification of the covenant originally reported 
 to the Paris Conference (February 14, 1919). His sug- 
 gestions were made with a view to meeting the objections 
 raised against the instrument by members of the United 
 States Senate. The attitude of the latter, after the ob- 
 jections voiced had been largely met by these modifications, 
 indicates the true nature of much of the opposition, namely, 
 desire to destroy the Covenant itself a fearful responsi- 
 bility in view of future consequences to the welfare of man- 
 kind. 
 
 In addition to meeting, with his usual touch of kindly 
 humor and convincing reasoning, the arguments advanced 
 against the League project, Mr. Taft discloses in these 
 papers a deep conviction that a League of Nations is neces- 
 sary and that within it lie boundless possibilities for good. 
 
 Some one has said that the man whom we are inclined to 
 regard as wise is the man with whose views we happen to 
 agree. Be that as it may, in reviewing Mr. Taft's utter- 
 ances one is struck with the extent to which the things he 
 has advocated are the things that have been realized or 
 are still regarded as desirable. His basket of discarded no- 
 
XX INTRODUCTION 
 
 tions notions discarded for him by the public is ex- 
 ceptionally small. 
 
 Among the speeches in his best vein is that of Montreal 
 (September 26, 1917) analysing German motive in the light 
 of Prussia's history and reviewing the events which led up 
 inevitably to our own entry into the war. While stamped 
 with his characteristic fairness, it constitutes such a sweep- 
 ing indictment of Germany, is so eloquent and full of fire, 
 so exact, comprehensive and satisfactory that it should live 
 as a masterpiece in the literature of the war. 
 
 It goes without saying that the Papers are replete with 
 new evidence of our honored ex-President's grasp of the 
 guiding legal principles of our government, gathered on the 
 bench and in executive office, and of the attitude of mind 
 which the best thought and feeling of the country heartily 
 accepts as true Americanism. 
 
 THEODORE MARBURG. 
 
 Baltimore, November n, 1919. 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE 
 OF NATIONS 
 
 LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 
 
 The League to Enforce Peace was organized in Independ- 
 ence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. Its objects are set 
 forth in the following: 
 
 PROPOSALS 
 
 We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join 
 a league of nations binding the signatories to the following: 
 
 First: All justiciable questions arising between the 
 signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject 
 to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tri- 
 bunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and 
 upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question. 
 
 Second: All other questions arising between the signa- 
 tories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a 
 council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recom- 
 mendation. 
 
 Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forth- 
 with both their economic and military forces against any 
 one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of 
 hostility, against another of the signatories before any ques- 
 tion arising shall be submitted as provided in the forego- 
 ing. 1 
 
 1 The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized 
 by the Executive Committee : 
 
 " The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic 
 
 i 
 
2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall 
 be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of 
 international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify 
 its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern 
 in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article 
 One. 
 
 VICTORY PROGRAM 
 
 Adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee, held in 
 New York, November 23, 1918, as the official platform 
 of the League to Enforce Peace, superseding the proposals 
 adopted at the organisation of the League in Philadelphia, 
 June 17, 1915. 
 
 The war now happily brought to a close has been above 
 all a war to end war, but in order to ensure the fruits of 
 victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe 
 there should be formed a League of Free Nations, as uni- 
 versal as possible, based upon treaty and pledged that the 
 security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the 
 whole. The initiating nucleus of the membership of the 
 League should be the nations associated as belligerents in 
 winning the war. 
 
 The League should aim at promoting the liberty, progress, 
 
 pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against 
 a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for inter- 
 national inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and 
 awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to 
 submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their 
 military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or com- 
 mits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any 
 question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing." 
 
VICTORY PROGRAM 3 
 
 and fair economic opportunity of all nations, and the orderly 
 development of the world. 
 
 It should ensure peace by eliminating causes of dissen- 
 sion, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by 
 uniting the potential force of all the members as a standing 
 menace against any nation that seeks to upset the peace of 
 the world. 
 
 The advantages of membership in the League, both 
 economically and from the point of view of security, should 
 be so clear that all nations will desire to be members of it. 
 
 For this purpose it is necessary to create 
 
 1. For the decision of justiciable questions, an impartial 
 tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the as- 
 sent of the parties to the controversy; provision to be made 
 for enforcing its decisions. 
 
 2. For questions that are not justiciable in their character, 
 a Council of Conciliation, as mediator, which shall hear, 
 consider, and make recommendations ; and failing acquies- 
 cence by the parties concerned, the League shall determine 
 what action, if any, shall be taken. 
 
 3. An administrate organisation for the conduct of af- 
 fairs of common interest, the protection and care of back- 
 ward regions and internationalized places, and such matters 
 as have been jointly administered before and during the 
 war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods 
 and through machinery that will ensure both stability and 
 progress ; preventing, on the one hand, any crystallization of 
 the status quo that will defeat the forces of healthy growth 
 and changes, and providing, on the other hand, a way by 
 which progress can be secured and necessary change effected 
 without recourse to war. 
 
 4. A representative Congress to formulate and codify 
 
4 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 rules of international law, to inspect the work of the ad- 
 ministrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the 
 tranquility of the world or the progress or betterment of 
 human relations. Its deliberations should be public. 
 
 5. An Executive Body, able to speak with authority in the 
 name of the nations represented, and to act in case the peace 
 of the world is endangered. 
 
 The representation of the different nations in the organs 
 of the League should be in proportion to the responsibilities 
 and obligations they assume. The rules of international 
 law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity. 
 
 [Similar provisions of the two drafts paralleled for comparison] 
 
 Text of the Plan Adopted by Text of the Plan Presented 
 the Paris Peace Confer- at the Paris Peace Con- 
 
 ence April 28, ipip ference Feb. 14, 
 
 PREAMBLE PREAMBLE 
 
 In order to promote inter- In order to promote interna- 
 
 national cooperation and to tional cooperation and to secure 
 
 achieve international peace and international peace and security 
 
 security, by the acceptance of by the acceptance of obligations 
 
 obligations not to resort to war, not to resort to war, by the pre- 
 
 by the prescription of open, just scription of open, just and 
 
 and honorable relations) between honorable relations between na- 
 
 nations, by the firm establish- tions, by the firm establishment 
 
 ment of the understandings of of the understandings of inter- 
 
 international law as the actual national law as the actual rule 
 
 rule of conduct among Govern- of conduct among governments, 
 
 ments, and by the maintenance and by the maintenance of jus- 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 of justice and a scrupulous re- 
 spect for all treaty obligations 
 in the dealings of organized 
 peoples with one another, the 
 high contracting parties agree to 
 this covenant of the League of 
 Nations. 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 The original members of the 
 League of Nations shall be those 
 of the signatories which are 
 named in the annex to this 
 covenant and also such of those 
 other states named in the annex 
 as shall accede without reserva- 
 tion to this covenant. Such ac- 
 cessions shall be effected by a 
 declaration deposited with the 
 Secretariat within two months 
 of the coming into force of the 
 covenant. Notice thereof shall 
 be sent to all other members of 
 the League. 
 
 Any fully self-governing state, 
 dominion or colony not named 
 in the annex may become a 
 member of the League if its ad- 
 mission is agreed to by two- 
 thirds of the Assembly, provided 
 that it shall give effective guar- 
 antees of its sincere intention 
 to observe its international obli- 
 gations and shall accept such 
 regulations as may be prescribed 
 by the League in regard to its 
 military, naval and air forces 
 and armaments. 
 
 Any member of the League 
 may, after two years' notice of 
 
 tice and a scrupulous respect for 
 all treaty obligations in the deal- 
 ings of organized people with 
 one another, the powers signa- 
 tory to this covenant adopt this 
 constitution of the League of 
 Nations : 
 
 ARTICLE VII 
 
 Admission to the League of 
 States, not signatories to the 
 covenant and not named in the 
 protocol hereto as States to be 
 invited to adhere to the cove- 
 nant, requires the assent of 
 not less than two-thirds of the 
 States represented in the body 
 of delegates, and shall be 
 limited to fully self-governing 
 countries, including dominions 
 and colonies. 
 
 No State shall be admitted to 
 the League unless it is able to 
 give effective guarantees of its 
 sincere intention to observe its 
 international obligations and un- 
 less it shall conform to such 
 principles as may be prescribed 
 by the League in regard to its 
 naval and military forces and 
 armaments. 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 its intention so to do, withdraw 
 from the League, provided that 
 all its international obligations 
 and all its obligations under this 
 covenant shall have been ful- 
 filled at the time of its with- 
 drawal. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 The action of the League un- 
 der this covenant shall be 
 effected through the instrumen- 
 tality of an Assembly and of a 
 Council, with a permanent Sec- 
 retariat. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 The Assembly shall consist of 
 representatives of the members 
 of the League. 
 
 The Assembly shall meet at 
 stated intervals, and from time 
 to time as occasion may require, 
 at the seat of the League, or at 
 such other place as may be de- 
 cided upon. 
 
 The Assembly may deal at its 
 meetings with any matter within 
 the sphere of action of the 
 League or affecting the peace 
 of the world. 
 
 At meetings of the Assembly 
 each member of the League 
 shall have one vote, and may 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 The action of the high con- 
 tracting parties under the terms 
 of this covenant shall be effected 
 through the instrumentality of 
 meetings of a body of delegates 
 representing the high contract- 
 ing parties, of meetings at more 
 frequent intervals of an Execu- 
 tive Council, and of a perma- 
 nent international secretariat to 
 be established at the seat of the 
 League. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 Meetings of the body of dele- 
 gates shall be held at stated in- 
 tervals and from time to time, 
 as occasion may require, for the 
 purpose of dealing with matters 
 within the sphere of action of 
 the League. Meetings of the 
 body of delegates shall be held 
 at the seat of the League, or at 
 such other places as may be 
 found convenient, and shall con- 
 sist of representatives of the 
 high contracting parties. Each 
 of the high contracting parties 
 shall have one vote, but may 
 have not more than three repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 have not more than three repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 ARTICLE IV 
 
 The Council shall consist of 
 representatives of the principal 
 allied and associated powers, to- 
 gether with representatives of 
 four other members of the 
 League. These four members 
 of the League shall be selected 
 by the Assembly from time to 
 time in its discretion. Until the 
 appointment of the representa- 
 tives of the four members of the 
 League first selected by the As- 
 sembly, representatives of Bel- 
 gium, Brazil, Spain and Greece 
 shall be members of the Council. 
 
 With the approval of the ma- 
 jority of the Assembly, the 
 Council may name additional 
 members of the League, whose 
 representatives shall always be 
 members of the Council; the 
 Council with like approval may 
 increase the number of members 
 of the League to be selected by 
 the Assembly for representation 
 on the Council. 
 
 The Council shall meet from 
 time to time as occasion. may re- 
 quire, and at least once a year, 
 at the seat of the League, or at 
 such other place as may be de- 
 cided upon. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 The Executive Council shall 
 consist of representatives of 
 the United States of Amer- 
 ica, the British Empire, France, 
 Italy, and Japan, together with 
 representatives of four other 
 States, members of the League. 
 The selection of these four 
 States shall be made by the 
 body of delegates on such prin- 
 ciples and in such manner as 
 they think fit. Pending the ap- 
 pointment of these representa- 
 tives of the other States, repre- 
 sentatives of shall be mem- 
 bers of the Executive Council. 
 
 Meetings of the council shall 
 be held from time to time as 
 occasion may require, and at 
 least once a year, at whatever 
 place may be decided on, or, fail- 
 ing any such decision, at the seat 
 of the League, and any matter 
 within the sphere of action of 
 the League or affecting the 
 peace of the world may be dealt 
 with at such meetings. 
 
 Invitations shall be sent to 
 any power to attend a meeting 
 of the council, at which matters 
 directly affecting its interests 
 are to be discussed, and no de- 
 cision taken at any meeting will 
 be binding on such a power un- 
 less so invited. 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 IV 
 
 The Council may deal at its 
 meetings with any matter with- 
 in the sphere of action of the 
 League or affecting the peace of 
 the world. 
 
 Any member of the League 
 not represented on the Council 
 shall be invited to send a repre- 
 sentative to sit as a member at 
 any meeting of the Council dur- 
 ing the consideration of matters 
 specially affecting the interests 
 of that member of the League. 
 
 At meetings of the Council, 
 each member of the League 
 represented on the Council shall 
 have one vote, and may have not 
 more than one representative. 
 
 ARTICLE V 
 
 Except where otherwise ex- 
 pressly provided in this cove- 
 nant, or by the terms of the 
 present treaty, decisions at any 
 meeting of the Assembly or of 
 the Council shall require the 
 agreement of all the membersi of 
 the League represented at the 
 meeting. 
 
 All matters of procedure at 
 meetings of the Assembly or the 
 Council, including the appoint- 
 ment of committees to investi- 
 gate particular matters, shall be 
 regulated by the Assembly or by 
 the Council and may be decided 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 9 
 
 by a majority of the members of 
 the League represented at the 
 meeting. 
 
 The first meeting of the As- 
 sembly and the first meeting of 
 the Council shall be summoned 
 by the President of the United 
 States of America. 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 
 The permanent Secretariat 
 shall be established at the seat of 
 the League. The Secretariat 
 shall comprise a Secretary Gen- 
 eral and such secretaries and 
 staff as may be required. 
 
 The first Secretary General 
 shall be the person named in the 
 annex; thereafter the Secretary 
 General shall be appointed by 
 the Council with the approval 
 of the majority of the Assembly. 
 
 The secretaries and the staff 
 of the Secretariat shall be ap- 
 pointed by the Secretary Gen- 
 eral with the approval of the 
 Council. 
 
 The Secretary General shall 
 act in that capacity at all meet- 
 ings of the Assembly and of the 
 Council. 
 
 The expenses of the Secre- 
 tariat shall be borne by the 
 members of the League in ac- 
 cordance with the apportion- 
 ment of the expenses of the In- 
 ternational Bureau of the Uni- 
 versal Postal Union. 
 
 ARTICLE V 
 
 The permanent secretariat of 
 the League shall be established 
 
 at , which shall constitute 
 
 the seat of the League. The 
 secretariat shall comprise such 
 secretaries and staff as may be 
 required, under the general di- 
 rection and control of a Secre- 
 tary General of the League, who 
 shall be chosen by the Execu- 
 tive Council. The secretariat 
 shall be appointed by the Secre- 
 tary General subject to con- 
 firmation by the Executive 
 Council. 
 
 The Secretary General shall 
 act in that capacity at all meet- 
 ings of the body of delegates or 
 of the Executive Council. 
 
 The expenses of the secre- 
 tariat shall be borne by the 
 States members of the League, 
 in accordance with the appor- 
 tionment of the expenses of the 
 International Bureau of the 
 Universal Postal Union. 
 
10 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ARTICLE VII 
 
 The seat of the League is 
 established at Geneva. 
 
 The Council may at any time 
 decide that the seat of the 
 League shall be established else- 
 where. 
 
 All positions under or in con- 
 nection with the League, includ- 
 ing the Secretariat, shall be open 
 equally to men and women. 
 
 Representatives of the mem- 
 bers of the League and officials 
 of the League when engaged on 
 the business of the League shall 
 enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
 immunities. 
 
 The buildings and other prop- 
 erty occupied by the League or 
 its officers or by representatives 
 attending its meetings shall be 
 inviolable. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII 
 
 The members of the League 
 recognize that the maintenance 
 of a peace requires the reduc- 
 tion of national armaments to 
 the lowest point consistent with 
 national safety and the enforce- 
 ment by common action of in- 
 ternational obligations. 
 
 The Council, taking account 
 of the geographical situation 
 and circumstances of each state, 
 shall formulate plans for such 
 reduction for the consideration 
 and action of the several 
 Governments. 
 
 Such plans shall be subject to 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 
 Representatives of the high 
 contracting parties and officials 
 of the League, when engaged in 
 the business, of the League, shall 
 enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
 immunities, and the buildings oc- 
 cupied by the League or its 
 officials, or by representatives 
 attending its meetings, shall en- 
 joy the benefits of extra-terri- 
 toriality. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 recognize the principle that the 
 maintenance of peace will re- 
 quire the reduction of national 
 armaments to the lowest point 
 consistent with national safety, 
 and the enforcement by com- 
 mon action of international obli- 
 gations, having special regard to 
 the geographical situation and 
 circumstances of each State, and 
 the Executive Council shall 
 formulate plans for effecting 
 such reduction. The Executive 
 Council shall also determine for 
 the consideration and action of 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS II 
 
 reconsideration and revision at 
 least every ten years. 
 
 After these plans shall have 
 been adopted by the several 
 Governments, the limits of arm- 
 aments therein fixed shall not be 
 exceeded without the concur- 
 rence of the Council. 
 
 The members of the League 
 agree that the manufacture by 
 private enterprise of muni- 
 tions and implements of war is 
 open to grave objections. The 
 Council shall advise how the 
 evil effects attendant upon such 
 manufacture can be prevented, 
 due regard being had to the 
 necessities of those members of 
 the League which are not able 
 to manufacture the munitions 
 and implements of war neces- 
 sary for their safety. 
 
 The members of the League 
 undertake to interchange full 
 and frank information as to the 
 scale of their armaments, their 
 military, naval and air programs 
 and the condition of such of 
 their industries as are adaptable 
 to warlike purposes. 
 
 ARTICLE IX 
 
 A permanent commission shall 
 be constituted to advise the 
 
 the several Governments what 
 military equipment and arma- 
 ment is fair and reasonable in 
 proportion to the scale of forces 
 laid down in the program of dis- 
 armament and these limits, when 
 adopted, shall not be exceeded 
 without the permission of the 
 Executive Council. 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree that the manufacture by 
 private enterprise of munitions 
 and implements of war lends 
 itself to grave objections, and 
 direct the Executive Council to 
 advise how the evil effects at- 
 tendant upon such manufacture 
 can be prevented, due regard 
 being had to the necessities of 
 those countries which are not 
 able to manufacture for them- 
 selves the munitions and imple- 
 ments of war necessary for their 
 safety. 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 undertake in no way to conceal 
 from each other the condition of 
 such of their industries as are 
 capable of being adapted to war- 
 like purposes or the scale of 
 their armaments, and agree that 
 there shall be full and frank 
 interchange of information as 
 to their military and naval 
 programs^ 
 
 ARTICLE IX 
 
 A permanent commission shall 
 be constituted to advise the 
 
12 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Council on the execution of the 
 provisions of Articles I and 
 VIII and on military, naval and 
 air questions generally. 
 
 ARTICLE X 
 
 The members of the League 
 undertake to respect and pre- 
 serve as against external ag- 
 gression the territorial integrity 
 and existing political independ- 
 ence of all members of the 
 League. In case of any such 
 aggression or in case of any 
 threat or danger of such aggres- 
 sion, the Council shall advise 
 upon the means by which this 
 obligation shall be fulfilled. 
 
 ARTICLE XI 
 
 Any war or threat of war, 
 whether immediately ^affecting 
 any of the members of the 
 League or not, is hereby de- 
 clared a matter of concern to 
 the whole League, and the 
 League shall take any action 
 that may be deemed wise and 
 effectual to safeguard the peace 
 of nations. In case any such 
 emergency should arise, the Sec- 
 retary General shall, on the re- 
 quest of any member of the 
 League, forthwith summon a 
 meeting of the Council. 
 
 It is also declared to be the 
 fundamental right of each mem- 
 ber of the League to bring to 
 the attention of the Assembly or 
 of the Council anv circum- 
 
 League on the execution of the 
 provisions! of Article VIII and 
 on military and naval questions 
 generally. 
 
 ARTICLE X 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 shall undertake to respect and 
 preserve as against external 
 aggression the territorial integ- 
 rity and existing political inde- 
 pendence of all States! members 
 of the League. In case of any 
 such aggression or in case of 
 any threat or danger of such ag- 
 gression the Executive Council 
 shall advise upon the means by 
 which the obligation shall be 
 fulfilled. 
 
 ARTICLE XI 
 
 Any war or threat of war, 
 whether immediately affecting 
 any of the high contracting 
 parties or not, is hereby declared 
 a matter of concern to the 
 League, and the high contract- 
 ing parties reserve the right to 
 take any action that may be 
 deemed wise and effectual to 
 safeguard the peace of nations. 
 
 It is hereby also declared and 
 agreed to be the friendly right 
 of each of the high contracting 
 parties to draw the attention of 
 the body of delegates or of the 
 Executive Council to any cir- 
 cumstance affecting interna- 
 tional intercourse which threat- 
 ens to disturb international 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 13 
 
 stance whatever affecting inter- 
 national relations which threat- 
 ens to disturb either the peace 
 or the good understanding be- 
 tween nations upon which peace 
 depends. 
 
 ARTICLE XII 
 
 The members of the League 
 agree that if there should arise 
 between them any dispute likely 
 to lead to a rupture, they will 
 submit the matter either to arbi- 
 tration or to inquiry by the 
 Council, and they agree in no 
 case to resort to war until three 
 months after the award by the 
 arbitrators or the report by the 
 Council. 
 
 In any case under this article 
 the award of the arbitrators 
 shall be made within a reason- 
 able time, and the report of the 
 Council shall be made within 
 six months after the submission 
 of the dispute. 
 
 ARTICLE XIII 
 
 The members of the League 
 agree that whenever any dispute 
 shall arise between them which 
 
 peace or the good understand- 
 ing between nations upon which 
 peace depends. 
 
 ARTICLE XII 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree that should disputes arise 
 between them which cannot be 
 adjusted by the ordinary pro- 
 cesses of diplomacy they will in 
 no case resort to war with- 
 out previously submitting the 
 questions and matters involved 
 either to arbitration or to in- 
 quiry by the Executive Council 
 and until three months after the 
 award by the arbitrators or a 
 recommendation by the Execu- 
 tive Council, and that they will 
 not even then resort to war as 
 against a member of the League 
 which complies with the award 
 of the arbitrators or the recom- 
 mendation of the Executive 
 Council. 
 
 In any case under this article 
 the award of the arbitrators 
 shall be made within a reason- 
 able time, and the recommenda- 
 tion of the Executive Council 
 shall be made within six months 
 after the submission of the dis- 
 pute. 
 
 ARTICLE XIII 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree that whenever any dispute 
 or difficulty shall arise between 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 they recognize to be suitable for 
 submission to arbitration and 
 which cannot be satisfactorily 
 settled by diplomacy, they will 
 submit the whole subject matter 
 to arbitration. Disputes as to 
 the interpretation of a treaty, as 
 to any question of international 
 law, as to the existence of any 
 fact which if established would 
 constitute a breach of any inter- 
 national obligation, or as to the 
 extent and nature of the repara- 
 tion to be made for any such 
 breach, are declared to be 
 among those which are generally 
 suitable for submission to arbi- 
 tration. For the consideration 
 of any such dispute the court 
 of arbitration to which the case 
 is referred shall be 'the court 
 agreed on by the parties to the 
 dispute or stipulated in any con- 
 vention existing between them. 
 The members of the League 
 agree that they will carry out 
 in full good faith any award 
 that may be rendered and that 
 they will not resort to war 
 against a member of the League 
 which complies therewith. In 
 the event of any failure to carry 
 out such an award, the Council 
 shall propose what steps should 
 be taken to give effect thereto. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV 
 
 The Council shall formulate 
 and submit to the members of 
 
 them, which they recognize to be 
 suitable for submission to arbi- 
 tration and which cannot be 
 satisfactorily settled by diplo- 
 macy, they will submit the whole 
 matter to arbitration. For this 
 purpose the court of arbitration 
 to which the case is referred 
 shall be the court agreed on by 
 the parties or stipulated in any 
 convention existing between 
 them. The high contracting 
 parties agree that they will carry 
 out in full good faith any award 
 that may be rendered. In the 
 event of any failure to carry 
 out the award the Executive 
 Council shall propose what steps 
 can best be taken to give effect 
 thereto. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV 
 
 The Executive Council shall 
 formulate plans for the estab- 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 5 
 
 the League for adoption plans 
 for the establishment of a perm- 
 anent Court of International 
 Justice. The court shall be 
 competent to hear and determine 
 any dispute of an international 
 character which the parties 
 thereto submit to it. The court 
 may also give an advisory 
 opinion upon any dispute or 
 question referred to it by the 
 Council or by the Assembly. 
 
 ARTICLE XV 
 
 If there should arise between 
 members of the League any dis- 
 pute likely to lead to a rupture, 
 which is not submitted to arbi- 
 tration in accordance with 
 Article XIII, the members of 
 the League agree that they will 
 submit the matter to the 
 Council. Any party to the dis- 
 pute may effect such submission 
 by giving notice of the existence 
 of the dispute to the Secretary 
 General, who will make all 
 necessary arrangements for a 
 full investigation and considera- 
 tion thereof. For this purpose 
 the parties to the dispute will 
 communicate to the Secretary 
 General, as promptly as possible, 
 statements of their case, all the 
 relevant facts and papers ; and 
 the Council may forthwith direct 
 the publication thereof. 
 
 The Council shall endeavor to 
 effect a settlement of any dis- 
 
 lishment of a permanent court 
 of international justice, and this 
 court shall, when established, be 
 competent to hear and determine 
 any matter which the parties 
 recognize as suitable for sub- 
 mission to it for arbitration 
 under the foregoing article. 
 
 ARTICLE XV 
 
 If there should arise between 
 States, members of the League, 
 any dispute likely to lead to a 
 rupture, which is not submitted 
 to arbitration as above, the high 
 contracting parties agree that 
 they will refer the matter to the 
 Executive Council; either party 
 to the dispute may give notice of 
 the existence of the dispute to 
 the Secretary General, who will 
 make all necessary arrangements 
 for a full investigation and 
 consideration thereof. For this 
 purpose the parties agree to 
 communicate to the Secretary 
 General, as promptly as possible, 
 statements of their case, with all 
 the relevant facts and papers, 
 and the Executive Council may 
 forthwith direct the publication 
 thereof. 
 
 Where the efforts of the 
 council lead to the settlement of 
 the dispute, a statement shall be 
 
i6 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 pute, and if such efforts are suc- 
 cessful, a statement shall be 
 made public giving such facts 
 and explanations regarding the 
 dispute and terms of settlement 
 thereof as the Council may deem 
 appropriate. 
 
 If the dispute is not thus 
 settled, the Council either unani- 
 mously or by a majority vote 
 shall make and publish a report 
 containing a statement of the 
 facts of the dispute and the 
 recommendations which are 
 deemed just and proper in re- 
 gard thereto. 
 
 Any member of the League 
 represented on the Council may 
 make public a statement of the 
 facts of the dispute and of its 
 conclusions regarding the same. 
 
 If a report by the Council is 
 unanimously agreed to by the 
 members thereof, other than the 
 representatives of one or more 
 of the parties to the dispute, 
 the members of the League 
 agree that they will not go to 
 war with any party to the dis- 
 pute which complies with the 
 recommendations of the report. 
 
 If the Council fails to reach 
 a report which is unanimously 
 agreed to by the members 
 thereof, other than the repre- 
 sentatives of one or more of the 
 parties to the dispute, the mem- 
 bers of the League reserve to 
 themselves the right to take 
 
 published, indicating the nature 
 of the dispute and the terms of 
 settlement, together with such 
 explanations as may be appro- 
 priate. If the dispute has not 
 been settled, a report by the 
 council shall be published, set- 
 ting forth with all necessary 
 facts and explanations the 
 recommendation which the 
 council think just and proper for 
 the settlement of the dispute. If 
 the report is unanimously agreed 
 to by the members of the 
 council, other than the parties 
 to the dispute, the high contract- 
 ing parties agree that they will 
 not go to war with any party 
 which complies with the recom- 
 mendations, and that, if any 
 party shall refuse so to comply, 
 the council shall propose meas- 
 ures necessary to give effect to 
 the recommendations. If no 
 such unanimous report can be 
 made it shall be the duty of the 
 majority and the privilege of the 
 minority to issue statements, in- 
 dicating what they believe to be 
 the facts, and containing the 
 recommendations which they 
 consider to be just and proper. 
 The Executive Council may 
 in any case under this article 
 refer the dispute to the body of 
 delegates. The dispute shall be 
 so referred at the request of 
 either party to the dispute, pro- 
 vided that such request must be 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 such action as they shall con- 
 sider necessary for the main- 
 tenance of right and justice. 
 
 If the dispute between the 
 parties is claimed by one of 
 them, and is found by the 
 Council, to arise out of a matter 
 which by international law is 
 solely within the domestic juris- 
 diction of that party, the 
 Council shall so report, and shall 
 make no recommendation as to 
 its settlement. 
 
 The Council may in any case 
 under this article refer the dis- 
 pute to the Assembly. The dis- 
 pute shall be so referred at the 
 request of either party of the 
 dispute, provided that such re- 
 quest be made within fourteen 
 days after the submission of the 
 dispute to the Council. 
 
 In any case referred to the 
 Assembly all the provisions of 
 this article and of Article XII 
 relating to the action and 
 powers of the Council shall 
 apply to the action and powers 
 of the Assembly, provided that 
 a report made by the Assembly, 
 if concurred in by the represen- 
 tatives of those members of the 
 League represented on the 
 Council and of a majority of the 
 other members of the League, 
 exclusive in each case of the 
 representatives of the parties to 
 the dispute, shall have the same 
 force as a report by the Council, 
 
 made within fourteen days after 
 the submission of the dispute. 
 In any case referred to the body 
 of delegates, all the provisions 
 of this article, and of Article 
 XII, relating to the action and 
 powers of the Executive 
 Council, shall apply to the action 
 and powers of the body of dele- 
 gates. 
 
i8 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 concurred in by all the members 
 thereof other than the repre- 
 sentatives of one or more of the 
 parties to the dispute. 
 
 ARTICLE XVI 
 
 Should any member of the 
 League resort to war in disre- 
 gard of its covenants under 
 Article XII, XIII or XV, it 
 shall ipso facto be deemed to 
 have committed an act of war 
 against all the other members 
 of the League, which hereby un- 
 dertake immediately to subject it 
 to the severance of all trade or 
 financial relations, the prohibi- 
 tion of all intercourse between 
 their nationals and the nationals 
 of the covenant-breaking State 
 and the prevention of all finan- 
 cial, commercial, or personal in- 
 tercourse between the nationals 
 of the covenant-breaking State 
 and the nationals of any other 
 State, whether a member of the 
 League or not. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the 
 Council in such case to recom- 
 mend to the several Govern- 
 ments concerned what effective 
 military, naval or air force the 
 members of the League shall 
 severally contribute to the arma- 
 ments of forces to be used to 
 protect the covenants of the 
 League. 
 
 The members of the League 
 agree, further, that they will 
 
 ARTICLE XVI 
 
 Should any of the high con- 
 tracting parties break or disre- 
 gard its covenants under Article 
 XII it shall thereby ipso facto 
 be deemed to have committed an 
 act of war against all the other 
 members of the League, which 
 hereby undertakes immediately 
 to subject it to the severance of 
 all trade or financial relations, 
 the prohibition of all intercourse 
 between their nationals and the 
 nationals of the covenant-break- 
 ing State and the prevention of 
 all financial, commercial, or per- 
 sonal intercourse between the 
 nationals of the covenant-break- 
 ing State and the nationals of 
 any other State, whether a mem- 
 ber of the League or not. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the 
 Executive Council in such case 
 to recommend what effective 
 military or naval force the mem- 
 bers of the League shall sev- 
 erally contribute to the armed 
 forces to be used to protect the 
 covenants of the League. 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree, further, that they will 
 mutually support one another in 
 the financial and economic meas- 
 ures which may be taken under 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 19 
 
 mutually support one another in 
 the financial and economic 
 measures which are taken under 
 this article, in order to minimize 
 the loss and inconvenience re- 
 sulting from the above meas- 
 ures, and that they will mutually 
 support one another in resisting 
 any special measures aimed at 
 one of their number by the cove- 
 nant-breaking State, and that 
 they will take the necessary 
 steps to afford passage through 
 their territory to the forces of 
 any of the members of the 
 League which are cooperating 
 to protect the covenants of the 
 League. 
 
 Any member of the League 
 which has violated any covenant 
 of the League may be declared 
 to be no longer a member of the 
 League by a vote of the Council 
 concurred in by the representa- 
 tives of all the other members 
 of the League represented 
 thereon. 
 
 ARTICLE XVII 
 
 In the event of a dispute be- 
 tween a member of the League 
 and a State which is not a mem- 
 ber of the League, or between 
 States not members of the 
 League, the State or States not 
 members of the League shall be 
 invited to accept the obligations 
 of membership in the League for 
 the purposes of such dispute, 
 upon such conditions as the 
 
 this article in order to minimize 
 the loss and inconvenience re- 
 sulting from the above meas- 
 nres, and that they will mutually 
 support one another in resisting 
 any special measures aimed at 
 one of their number by the 
 covenant-breaking State and 
 that they will afford passage 
 through their territory to the 
 forces of any of the high 
 contracting parties who are 
 cooperating to protect the cove- 
 nants of the League. 
 
 ARTICLE XVII 
 
 In the event of disputes be- 
 tween one State member of the 
 League and another State which 
 is not a member of the League, 
 or between States not members 
 of the League, the high con- 
 tracting parties agree that the 
 State or States, not members of 
 the League, shall be invited to 
 accept the obligations of mem- 
 bership in the League for the 
 
2O 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Council may deem just. If such 
 invitation is accepted, the pro- 
 visions of Articles XII to XVI 
 inclusive shall be applied with 
 such modifications as may be 
 deemed necessary by the 
 Council. 
 
 Upon such invitation being 
 given, the Council shall imme- 
 diately institute an inquiry into 
 the circumstances of the dispute 
 and recommend such action as 
 may seem best and most effect- 
 ual in the circumstances. 
 
 If a State so invited shall re- 
 fuse to accept the obligations of 
 membership in the League for 
 the purposes of such dispute, 
 and shall resort to war against 
 a member of the League, the 
 provisions of Article XVI shall 
 be applicable as against the 
 State taking such action. 
 
 If both parties to the dispute, 
 when so invited, refuse to ac- 
 cept the obligations of member- 
 ship in the League for the pur- 
 poses of such dispute, the 
 Council may take such meas- 
 ures and make such recom- 
 mendations as will prevent hos- 
 tilities and will result in the 
 settlement of the dispute. 
 
 purposes of such dispute, upcr 
 such conditions as the Execu- 
 tive Council may deem just, and 
 upon acceptance of any such in- 
 vitation, the above provisions 
 shall be applied with such modi- 
 fications as may be deemed 
 necessary by the League. 
 
 Upon such invitation being 
 given, the Executive Council 
 shall immediately institute ar 
 inquiry into the circumstances 
 and merits of the dispute and 
 recommend such action as may 
 seem best and most effectual in 
 the circumstances. 
 
 In the event of a power so in- 
 vited refusing to accept the obli- 
 gations of membership in the 
 League for the purposes of such 
 dispute, and taking any action 
 against a State member of the 
 League, which in the case of a 
 State member of the League 
 would constitute a breach of 
 Article XII, the provisions of 
 Article XVI shall be applicable 
 as against the State taking such 
 action. 
 
 If both parties to the dispute, 
 when so invited, refuse to ac- 
 cept the obligations of member- 
 ship in the League for the pur- 
 poses of such dispute, the 
 Executive Council may take 
 such action and make such 
 recommendations as will prevent 
 hostilities and will result in the 
 settlement of the dispute. 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 21 
 
 ARTICLE XVIII 
 Every convention or interna- 
 tional engagement entered into 
 henceforward by any member of 
 the League shall be forthwith 
 registered with the Secretariat 
 and shall as soon as possible be 
 published by it. No such treaty 
 or international engagement 
 shall be binding until so regis- 
 tered. 
 
 ARTICLE XIX 
 
 The Assembly may from time 
 to time advise the reconsidera- 
 tion by members of the League 
 of treaties which have become 
 inapplicable, and the considera- 
 tion of international conditions 
 whose continuance might en- 
 danger the peace of the world. 
 
 ARTICLE XX 
 
 The members of the League 
 severally agree that this cove- 
 nant is accepted as abrogating 
 all obligations or understandings 
 inter se which are inconsistent 
 with the terms thereof, and 
 solemnly undertake that they 
 will not hereafter enter into any 
 engagements inconsistent with 
 the terms thereof. 
 
 In case members of the 
 League shall, before becoming a 
 member of the League, have 
 undertaken any obligations in- 
 
 ARTICLE XXIII 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree that every treaty or inter- 
 national engagement entered 
 into hereafter by any State 
 member of the League shall be 
 forthwith registered with the 
 Secretary General and as soon 
 as possible published by him, and 
 that no such treaty or interna- 
 tional engagement shall be bind- 
 ing until so registered. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIV 
 It shall be the right of the 
 body of delegates from time to 
 time to advise the reconsidera- 
 tion by States members of the 
 League of treaties which have 
 become inapplicable and of in- 
 ternational conditions of which 
 the continuance may endanger 
 the peace of "the world. 
 
 ARTICLE XXV 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 severally agree that the present 
 covenant is accepted as abrogat- 
 ing all obligations inter se which 
 are inconsistent with the terms 
 thereof, and solemnly engage 
 that they will not hereafter 
 enter into any engagement in- 
 consistent with the terms 
 thereof. In case any of the 
 powers signatory hereto or sub- 
 sequently admitted to the 
 League shall, before becoming a 
 party to this covenant, have 
 
22 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 consistent with the terms of this 
 covenant, it shall be the duty of 
 such member to take immediate 
 steps to procure its release from 
 such obligations. 
 
 ARTICLE XXI 
 
 Nothing in this covenant shall 
 be deemed to affect the validity 
 of international engagements 
 such as treaties of arbitration or 
 regional understandings like the 
 Monroe Doctrine for securing 
 the maintenance of peace. 
 
 ARTICLE XXII 
 
 To those colonies and terri- 
 tories which as a consequence 
 of the late war have ceased to 
 be under the sovereignty of the 
 states which formerly governed 
 them and which are inhabited by 
 peoples not yet able to stand by 
 themselves under the strenuous 
 conditions of the modern world, 
 there should be applied the prin- 
 ciple that the well being and de- 
 velopment of such peoples form 
 a sacred trust of civilization and 
 that securities for the perform- 
 ance of this trust should be em- 
 bodied in this covenant. 
 
 The best method of giving 
 practicable effect to this prin- 
 ciple is that the tutelage of such 
 peoples should be intrusted to 
 advanced nations who, by 
 reasons of their resources, their 
 experience or their geographi- 
 cal position, can best undertake 
 
 undertaken any obligations 
 which are inconsistent with the 
 terms of this covenant, it shall 
 be the duty of such power, to 
 take immediate steps to procure 
 its release from such obligations. 
 
 ARTICLE XIX 
 
 To those colonies and terri- 
 tories which, as a consequence 
 of the late war, have ceased to 
 be under the sovereignty of the 
 States which formerly governed 
 them and which are inhabited by 
 peoples not yet able to stand by 
 themselves under the strenuous 
 conditions of the modern world, 
 there should be applied the prin- 
 ciple that the well-being and de- 
 velopment of such peoples form 
 a sacred trust of civilization and 
 that securities for the perform- 
 ance of this trust should be em- 
 bodied in the constitution of the 
 League. 
 
 The best method of giving 
 practical effect to this principle 
 is that the tutelage of such 
 peoples should be intrusted to 
 advanced nations, who by reason 
 of their resources, their exper- 
 ience, or their geographical posi- 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 23 
 
 this responsibility, and who are 
 willing to accept it, and that 
 this tutelage should be exercised 
 by them as mandataries on be- 
 half of the League. 
 
 The character of the mandate 
 must differ according to the 
 stage of the development of the 
 people, the geographical situa- 
 tion of the territory, its eco- 
 nomic condition and other 
 similar circumstances. 
 
 Certain communities formerly 
 belonging to the Turkish Empire 
 have reached a stage of develop- 
 ment where their existence as 
 independent nations can be pro- 
 visionally recognized, subject to 
 the rendering of administrative 
 advice and assistance by a man- 
 datary until such time as they 
 are able to stand alone. The 
 wishes of these communities 
 must be a principal considera- 
 tion in the selection of the man- 
 datary. 
 
 Other peoples, especially those 
 of Central Africa, are at such 
 a stage that the mandatary must 
 be responsible for the admin- 
 istration of the territory under 
 conditions which will guarantee 
 freedom of conscience and re- 
 ligion, subject only to the main- 
 tenance of public order and 
 morals, the prohibition of 
 abuses, such as the slave trade, 
 the arms traffic and the liquor 
 traffic and the prevention of the 
 
 tion, can best undertake this re- 
 sponsibility, and that this tute- 
 lage should be exercised by them 
 as mandatories on behalf of the 
 League. 
 
 The character of the mandate 
 must differ according to the 
 stage of the development of the 
 people, the geographical sit- 
 uation of the territory, its 
 economic conditions and other 
 similar circumstances. 
 
 Certain communities, form- 
 erly belonging to the Turkish 
 Empire, have reached a stage 
 of development where their 
 existence as independent nations 
 can be provisionally recognized, 
 subject to the rendering of ad- 
 ministrative advice and assist- 
 ance by a mandatory power until 
 such time as they are able to 
 stand alone. The wishes of 
 these communities must be a 
 principal consideration in the 
 selection of the mandatory 
 power. 
 
 Other peoples, especially those 
 of Central Africa, are at such 
 a stage that the mandatory must 
 be responsible for the admini- 
 stration of the territory, subject 
 to conditions which will guar- 
 antee freedom of conscience or 
 religion, subject only to the 
 maintenance of public order and 
 morals, the prohibition of abuses 
 such as the slave trade, the arms 
 traffic, and the liquor traffic, and 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 establishment of fortifications or 
 military and naval bases and of 
 military training of the natives 
 for other than police purposes 
 and the defense of territory, and 
 will also secure equal opportuni- 
 ties for the trade and commerce 
 of other members of the League. 
 
 There are territories, such as 
 Southwest Africa and certain of 
 the South Pacific Islands, which, 
 owing to the sparseness of their 
 population or their small size or 
 their remoteness from the cen- 
 ters of civilization or their geo- 
 graphical contiguity to the ter- 
 ritory of the mandatary and 
 other circumstances, can be best 
 administered under the laws of 
 the mandatary as integral 
 portions of its territory, subject 
 to the safeguards above men- 
 tioned in the interests of the in- 
 digenous population. In every 
 case of mandate, the mandatary 
 shall render to the Council an 
 annual report in reference to the 
 territory committed to its 
 charge. 
 
 The degree of authority, con- 
 trol or administration to be ex- 
 ercised by the mandatary shall, 
 if not previously agreed upon by 
 the members of the League, be 
 explicitly defined in each case by 
 the Council. 
 
 A permanent commission shall 
 be constitued to receive and ex- 
 amine the annual reports of the 
 
 the prevention of the establish- 
 ment of fortifications or military 
 and naval bases and of military 
 training of the natives for other 
 than police purposes and the de- 
 fense of territory, and will also 
 secure equal opportunities for 
 the trade and commerce of other 
 members of the League. 
 
 There are territories, such as 
 Southwest Africa and certain of 
 the South Pacific Islands, which, 
 owing to the sparseness of the 
 population, or their small size, 
 or their remoteness from the 
 centers of civilization, or their 
 geographical contiguity to the 
 mandatory State and other cir- 
 cumstances, can be best admin- 
 istered under the laws of the 
 mandatory States as integral 
 portions thereof, subject to the 
 safeguards above mentioned in 
 the interests of the indigenous 
 population. 
 
 In every case of mandate, the 
 mandatory State shall render to 
 the League an annual report in 
 reference to the territory com- 
 mitted to its charge. 
 
 The degree of authority, con- 
 trol, or administration, to be ex- 
 ercised by the mandatory State, 
 shall, if not previously agreed 
 upon by the high contracting 
 parties in each case, be ex- 
 plicitly defined by the Executive 
 Council in a special act or 
 charter. 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 25 
 
 mandataries and to advise the 
 Council on all matters relating 
 to the observance of the man- 
 dates. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIII 
 Subject to and in accordance 
 with the provisions of interna- 
 tional conventions existing or 
 hereafter to be agreed upon, the 
 members of the League (a) will 
 endeavor to secure and maintain 
 fair and humane conditions of 
 labor for men, women and chil- 
 dren both in their own countries 
 and in all countries to which 
 their commercial and industrial 
 relations extend, and for that 
 purpose will establish and main- 
 tain the necessary international 
 organizations; (b) undertake to 
 secure just treatment of the 
 native inhabitants of territories 
 under their control; (c) will in- 
 trust the League with the gen- 
 eral supervision over the execu- 
 tion of agreements with regard 
 to the traffic in women and chil- 
 dren, and the traffic in opium 
 and other dangerous drugs; (d) 
 will intrust the League with the 
 general supervision of the trade 
 in arms and ammunition with 
 the countries in which the con- 
 trol of this traffic is necessary 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 further agree to establish at the 
 seat of the League a mandatory 
 commission to receive and ex- 
 amine the annual reports of the 
 mandatory powers, and to assist 
 the League in insuring the ob- 
 servance of the terms of all 
 mandates. 
 
 ARTICLE XX 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 will endeavor to secure and 
 maintain fair and humane con- 
 ditions of labor for men, women, 
 and children, both in their own 
 countries and in all countries to 
 which their commercial and in- 
 dustrial relations extend ; and to 
 that end agree to estalish as part 
 of the organization of the 
 League a permanent bureau of 
 labor. 
 
 ARTICLE XVIII 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree that the League shall be 
 intrusted with the general su- 
 pervision of the trade in arms 
 and ammunition with the 
 countries in which the control 
 of this traffic is necessary in the 
 common interest. 
 
 ARTICLE XXI 
 The high contracting parties 
 
26 
 
 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 in the common interest; (e) will 
 make provision to secure and 
 maintain freedom of communi- 
 cation and of transit and equit- 
 able treatment for the commerce 
 of all members of the League. 
 In this connection the special 
 necessities of the regions devas- 
 tated during the war of 1914- 
 1918 shall be in mind; (f) will 
 endeavor to take steps in matters 
 of international concern for the 
 prevention and control of dis- 
 ease. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIV 
 
 There shall be placed under 
 the direction of the League all 
 international bureaus already 
 established by general treaties 
 if the parties to such treaties 
 consent. All such international 
 bureaus and all commissions for 
 the regulation of matters of in- 
 ternational interest hereafter 
 constituted shall be placed under 
 the direction of the League. 
 
 In all matters of international 
 interest which are regulated by 
 general conventions but which 
 are not placed under the control 
 of international bureaus or com- 
 missions, the Secretariat of the 
 League shall, subject to the con- 
 sent of the Council and if de- 
 sired by the parties, collect and 
 distribute all relevant informa- 
 tion, and shall render any other 
 assistance which may be neces- 
 sary or desirable. 
 
 agree that provision shall be 
 made through the instrument- 
 ality of the League to secure 
 and maintain freedom of transit 
 and equitable treatment for the 
 commerce of all States members 
 of the League, having in mind, 
 among other things, special ar- 
 rangements with regard to the 
 necessities of the regions devas- 
 tated during the war of 1914- 
 1918. 
 
 ARTICLE XXII 
 
 The high contracting parties 
 agree to place under the control 
 of the League all international 
 bureaus already established by 
 general treaties, if the parties to 
 such treaties consent. Further- 
 more, they agree that all such 
 international bureaus to be con- 
 stituted in future shall be placed 
 under control of the League. 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 The Council may include as 
 part of the expenses of the Sec- 
 retariat the expenses of any 
 bureau or commission which is 
 placed under the direction of 
 the League. 
 
 ARTICLE XXV 
 
 The members of the League 
 agree to encourage and promote 
 the establishment and coopera- 
 tion of duly authorized volun- 
 tary national Red Cross organi- 
 zations having as purposes im- 
 provement of health, the preven- 
 tion of disease and the mitiga- 
 tion of suffering throughout the 
 world. 
 
 ARTICLE XXVI 
 Amendments to this covenant 
 will take effect when ratified by 
 the members of the League 
 whose representatives compose 
 the Council and by a majority of 
 the members of the League 
 whose representatives compose 
 the Assembly. 
 
 No such amendment shall bind 
 any member of the League 
 which signifies its dissent there- 
 from, but in that case it shall 
 cease to be a member of the 
 League. 
 
 ANNEX TO THE COVENANT 
 One. Original members of 
 
 the League of Nations. 
 
 Signatories of the Treaty of 
 
 Peace. 
 
 ARTICLE XXVI 
 Amendments to this covenant 
 will take effect when ratified by 
 the States whose representatives 
 compose the Executive Council 
 and by three-fourths of the 
 States whose representatives 
 compose the body of delegates. 
 
28 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 United States of America, 
 Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British 
 Empire, Canada, Australia, 
 South Africa, New Zealand, 
 India, China, Cuba, Ecuador, 
 France, Greece, Guatemala, 
 Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, 
 Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, 
 Panama, Peru, Poland, Portu- 
 gal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam, 
 Czecho-Slovakia, Uruguay. 
 
 States invited to accede to the 
 covenant. 
 
 Argentine Republic, Chile, 
 Colombia, Denmark, Nether- 
 lands, Norway, Paraguay, Per- 
 sia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, 
 Switzerland, Venezuela. 
 
 Two. First Secretary Gen- 
 eral of the League of Nations, 
 The Honorable Sir James Eric 
 Drummond, K.C.M.G.', C.B. 
 
 PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 TO ENFORCE PEACE 1 
 
 Institutional advances in the progress of the world are 
 rarely made abruptly. They are not like Minerva who 
 sprang full armed from the brain of Jove. If they are to 
 have the useful feature of permanence, they must be a 
 growth so that the communities whose welfare they affect 
 may come to regard them as natural, and so accept them. 
 Our so-called Anglo-Saxon civil liberty with its guaranties 
 of the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of 
 
 1 Address before the World Court Congress, at Cleveland, Ohio, 
 May 12, 1915. 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 29 
 
 Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act and the Independence of the 
 Judiciary, constituting the unwritten British Constitution, 
 made our American people familiar with a body of moral 
 restraints upon executive and legislative action to secure the 
 liberty of the individual. The written limitations upon 
 legislative action in colonial charters granted by the Crown 
 and their enforcement by the Privy Council of England, 
 probably suggested to the framers of our Federal Constitu- 
 tion that the principles of British Constitutional liberty be 
 given written form and be committed to a supreme and inde- 
 pendent Court to enforce them, as against the Executive and 
 Congress, its coordinate branches in the Government. The 
 step, epochal as it was, from judicially enforcing such 
 limitations against a subordinate legislature under a written 
 charter of its powers, to a judicial enforcement of the limita- 
 tions imposed by the sovereign people on the legislature and 
 executive that they, the people, had created in the same 
 instrument, was not radical but seemed naturally to follow. 
 The revolted colonies after the Revolution, though united by 
 a common situation and a common cause in their struggle 
 with Great Britain, and acting together through the Con- 
 tinental Congress in a loose and voluntary alliance, were 
 sovereigns independent of one another. The Articles of Con- 
 federation which declared their union to be permanent were 
 not agreed to and ratified in such a way as to be binding 
 until some five years after the Declaration of Independence. 
 Meantime, it had become increasingly evident that, strong as 
 were their common interests, they had divergent ones, too, 
 which might embarrass their kindly relations. The leagues 
 of Greece had furnished an example of confederations of 
 small states forced together by a common oppressor and 
 foe, which had found it wise to settle their own differences 
 by some kind of an arbitral tribunal. The office which the 
 
3<3 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Privy Council and the Crown had performed in settling 
 intercolonial controversies suggested an analogy less remote 
 than those in Grecian history and prompted the adoption of 
 a substitute. So there was inserted in the Articles of Con- 
 federation a provision for a " court to determine disputes 
 and differences between two or more States of the Con- 
 federation concerning boundary jurisdiction or any other 
 cause whatever." The complainant state was authorized to 
 present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question, 
 and praying for a hearing. Notice of this was to be given 
 by order of Congress to the other state in the controversy 
 and a day was assigned for the appearance of the two parties 
 by their lawful agents who should agree upon judges to 
 constitute a court for hearing the matter in question. If 
 they could not agree, Congress was then to name three 
 persons out of each of the thirteen states. From this list 
 each party was required alternately to strike out one until 
 the number was reduced to thirteen, and from these thirteen 
 not less than seven or more than nine names, as Congress 
 should direct, were in the presence of Congress to be drawn 
 by lot, and the persons whose names were so drawn, or any 
 five of them, constituted the court to hear and finally de- 
 termine the controversy. 
 
 Proceedings were instituted under this provision before 
 the Constitution by New Jersey against Vermont, by New 
 York against Vermont, by Massachusetts against Vermont, 
 by Pennsylvania against Virginia, by Pennsylvania against 
 Connecticut, by New Jersey against Virginia, by Massachu- 
 setts against New York, and by South Carolina against 
 Georgia. Only one of these cases came to hearing and deci- 
 sion by a court selected as provided. That was the case of 
 Pennsylvania against Connecticut involving the govern- 
 mental jurisdiction over the Valley of Wyoming and Luzerne 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 3! 
 
 County. The court met and held a session of forty-one days 
 at Trenton, in New Jersey. Able counsel represented the 
 parties, and the court made a unanimous decision in favor of 
 Pennsylvania, without giving reasons. A compromise is 
 suspected, because Connecticut promptly acquiesced and soon 
 thereafter, with the approval of the Pennsylvania delega- 
 tion, Congress passed an act accepting a cession by Connecti- 
 cut of all the lands claimed by it west of the west line of 
 Pennsylvania, except the Western Reserve, now in Ohio, 
 which Connecticut was thus given ownership of, and which 
 it sold and settled. A number of the other cases were com- 
 promised and, in some, no proceedings were taken after the 
 initial ones. 
 
 In the Constitutional Convention the necessity for some 
 tribunal to preserve peace and harmony between the states 
 was fully conceded by all, but the form of the court was 
 the subject of some discussion. One proposal was that the 
 Senate should be a court to decide between the states all 
 questions disturbing peace and harmony between the states 
 while the Supreme Court was given only jurisdiction in con- 
 troversies over boundaries. Ultimately, however, the judi- 
 cial power of the United States exercised through the Su- 
 preme Court was extended to " controversies between 
 States," without exception. 
 
 To those who do not closely look into this jurisdiction 
 of the Supreme Court, it seems no different from that of 
 the ordinary municipal court over controversies between in- 
 dividuals. The states are regarded merely as municipal or 
 private corporations subject to suit process, trial and judg- 
 ment to be rendered on principles of municipal law declared 
 by statute of State Legislature or Congress, or established 
 as the common law. It is assumed that the Constitution 
 destroyed the independence and sovereignty of the states 
 
32 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 and made the arrangement a mere domestic affair. This 
 is a misconception. The analogy between the function of 
 the Supreme Court in hearing and deciding controversies 
 between states and that of an international tribunal sitting 
 to decide a cause between sovereign nations is very close. 
 When the suit by one state against another presents a case 
 that is controlled by provisions of the Federal Constitution, 
 of course there is nothing international about it. But most 
 controversies between states are not covered by the Federal 
 Constitution. That instrument does not, for instance, fix 
 the boundary line between two states. It does not fix the 
 correlative rights of two states in the water of a non-nav- 
 igable stream that flows from one of the states into another. 
 It does not regulate the use which the state up stream may 
 make of the water, either by diverting it for irrigation, or by 
 using it as a carrier of noxious sewage. Nor has Congress 
 any power under the Constitution to lay down principles by 
 Federal Law to govern such cases. The legislature of 
 neither state can pass laws to regulate the right of the other 
 states. In other words, there is nothing but international 
 law to govern. There is no domestic law to settle this class 
 of cases any more than there would be if a similar con- 
 troversy were to arise between Canada and the United 
 States. 
 
 For many purposes the states are independent sovereigns 
 and not under Federal control. They have lost the 
 powers which the people in the Constitution gave to the 
 Central Government; but in the field of powers left to 
 them, each is supreme within its own limits, and by the 
 exercise of that power may trespass on the exercise of sim- 
 ilar power by its neighbor. How is such a conflict to be 
 settled? It may be by diplomacy, i. e., by negotiation and 
 compromise agreement; but this, under the Constitution, 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 33 
 
 must be with the consent of Congress. It might be settled by 
 war; but the Constitution forbids. And the state invaded 
 by the forces of another state can appeal to the General 
 Government to resist and suppress the invasion, no matter 
 what the merits of the quarrel. In other words, one of the 
 attributes of sovereignty and independence which the people 
 in ordaining the Constitution took away from the states 
 was the unlimited power to make agreements between each 
 other as to their respective rights, and the other was that of 
 making war on each other when other means of settlement 
 failed. 
 
 What did the people through the constitution substitute 
 for these attributes of unrestricted diplomatic negotiation 
 and compromise and the right to go to war over such in- 
 terstate issues? The right of the complaining state to hale 
 the offending state before the Supreme Court and have the 
 issue decided by a binding judgment. 
 
 Now, can the complaining state bring every issue between 
 it and another state before the Supreme Court? No. The 
 only issues which the Court can hear and decide are questions 
 which in their nature are capable of judicial solution. Mr. 
 Justice Bradley first called such questions " justiciable " * 
 and Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Brewer used the 
 same terms. There are issues between states of a character 
 which would be likely to lead to high feeling and to war if 
 they arose between independent sovereignties, and which the 
 Supreme Court can not decide because they are not capable 
 of judicial solution. In such cases between states, of course 
 there can be no war because the Federal Government would 
 suppress it. Therefore, if an amicable understanding can 
 not be reached, the states are left with an unsettled dispute 
 
 *A conventional French word [Ed.]. 
 
'34 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 between them and no way of deciding it. They must put 
 up with the existing state of things. 
 
 There have been several interesting cases before our 
 Supreme Court illustrating the character of the jurisdiction 
 I have been describing. Chicago built a sewage canal to 
 drain her sewage with the aid of the waters of Lake Mich- 
 igan into the Desplaines River, thence into the Illinois and 
 thence into the Mississippi from which St. Louis and other 
 Missouri towns derived their water supply. The State of 
 Missouri brought suit in the Supreme Court of the United 
 States to enjoin the State of Illinois and the Sanitary Dis- 
 trict of Chicago from continuing the flow, on the ground 
 that the impurities added to the Mississippi water had 
 greatly increased the typhoid fever in Missouri. It was held 
 that this was a subject matter capable of judicial solution, 
 that Missouri was the guardian of her people's welfare and 
 had a right to bring such a suit and, if she made a clear case, 
 to enjoin such use of the Mississippi and its tributaries. 
 
 Mr. Justice Shiras, in upholding the jurisdiction (Mis- 
 souri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241), spoke of the court as 
 follows : 
 
 " The cases cited show that such jurisdiction has been exercised 
 in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over land and their 
 inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and 
 interests of a state. But such cases manifestly do not cover the 
 entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which 
 the Constitution has provided a remedy ; and it would be objection- 
 able, and indeed impossible, for the court to anticipate by definition 
 what controversies can and what cannot be brought within the 
 original jurisdiction of this court. 
 
 " An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury 
 complained of is such that an adequate remedy can only be found 
 in this court at the suit of the State of Missouri. It is true that 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 35 
 
 no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights 
 belonging to the complainant state. But it must surely be con- 
 ceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state 
 are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and de- 
 fend them. If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state, 
 all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, 
 that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make 
 war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to 
 be expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of 
 providing a remedy and that remedy, we think is found in the con- 
 stitutional provisions we are considering." 
 
 This hearing was on demurrer. When the case came be- 
 fore the court again on the merits, Mr. Justice Holmes de- 
 livered the judgment of the court and, while affirming the 
 jurisdiction of the court, points out the difficulties the 
 court has in exercising it and the care it must take in doing 
 so. He said in the course of his opinion: 
 
 " It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a 
 state upon a navigable river like the Danube which would amount 
 to a casus belli for a state lower down unless removed. If such 
 a nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi, the 
 controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of 
 a suit in this court." 
 
 Speaking of this provision in the Constitution extend- 
 ing the judicial power to controversies between states, Mr. 
 Justice Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana ( 134 U. S. 1-15) said: 
 
 " Some things, undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were 
 not known as such at the common law ; such, for example, as 
 controversies between states as to boundary lines, and other ques- 
 tion admitting of judicial solution. And yet the case of Penn 
 v. Lord Baltimore (i Ves. Sen. 444), shows that some of these 
 unusual subjects for litigation were not unknown to the courts 
 ven in colonial times; and several cases of the same general 
 
36 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 character arose under the Articles of Confederation, and were 
 brought before the tribunal provided for that purpose in those 
 articles (131 U. S. App. i). The establishment of this new 
 branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extin- 
 guishment of diplomatic relations between the states. Of other 
 controversies between a state and another state, or its citizens, 
 which, on the settled principles of public law, are not subjects 
 of judicial cognizance, this court has often declined to take juris- 
 diction." 
 
 A very satisfactory discussion of the scope of the power 
 of the Supreme Court to settle controversies between states 
 is contained in Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion in the suit 
 brought by Kansas against Colorado to restrain the latter 
 from absorbing so much of the water of the Arkansas River 
 flowing from Colorado into Kansas as to interfere seri- 
 ously with the supply of water from the river for irrigation 
 purposes in Kansas. He said (206 U. S. 95, 99) : 
 
 " When the States of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into 
 the Union they were admitted with the full powers of local sov- 
 ereignty which belonged to other states, Pollard v. Hagan, supra; 
 Shively v. Bowlby, supra; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 519; 
 and Colorado by its legislation has recognized the right of ap- 
 propriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation. 
 Now the question arises between the states, one recognizing gen- 
 erally the common law rule of riparian rights and the other pre- 
 scribing the doctrine of the public ownership of flowing water. 
 Neither state can legislate for or impose its own policy upon 
 the other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy 
 is presented as to the flow of that stream. It does not follow, 
 however, that because Congress can not determine the rule which 
 shall control between the two states or because neither state 
 can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy 
 ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power 
 which can take cognizance of the controversy and determine the 
 relative rights of the two states. Indeed, the disagreement, 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 37 
 
 coupled with its effect upon a stream passing through the two 
 states, makes a matter for investigation and determination by this 
 court. . . . 
 
 " As Congress cannot make compacts between the states, as 
 it cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel 
 their separate action, disputes between them must be settled 
 either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to de- 
 termine the right and wrong thereof. Force under our system of 
 Government is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution 
 vests in this court the power to settle those disputes. We have 
 exercised that power in a variety of instances, determining in the 
 several instances the justice of the dispute. Nor is our juris- 
 diction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are states 
 sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations between 
 them depend in any respect upon principles of international law. 
 International law is no alien in this tribunal. 
 
 " One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to 
 each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the 
 same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation 
 on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views 
 to none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, 
 180 U. S. 208, the action of one state reaches through the agency 
 of natural laws into the territory of another state, the question 
 of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two states 
 becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this 
 court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will 
 recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time estab- 
 lish justice between them. In other words, through these succes- 
 sive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up 
 what may not improperly be called interstate common law." 
 
 Controversies between one state and another or its citizens 
 which are not justiciable or capable of judicial solution find 
 examples in the suits brought before the Supreme Court. 
 One case of which the Supreme Court refused to take juris- 
 diction was Wisconsin v. The Pelican Insurance Company 
 
38 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 (i U. S.)> in which the State of Wisconsin sought to enforce 
 against a Louisiana Insurance Company a judgment 
 rendered in a Wisconsin court for penalties by a Wisconsin 
 Statute upon Foreign Insurance Companies for failure to 
 comply with statutory regulations of its business. It was 
 held that neither under international comity nor law was one 
 nation required to enforce extraterritorially the criminal law 
 of another nation and therefore that the controversy pre- 
 sented was not one of which, as between the states of the 
 Union, the Supreme Court could take cognizance. Again 
 in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. i, Louisiana sought to 
 restrain the Governor of Texas from so enforcing a quaran- 
 tine law as to injure the business of the people of Louisiana. 
 The law itself on its face was a proper one for the protection 
 of Texas. In dismissing the suit the court said : 
 
 " But in order that a controversy between states, justiciable 
 in this court, can be held to exist, something more must be put for- 
 ward than that the citizens of one state are injured by the mal- 
 administration of the laws of another. The states cannot make 
 war, or enter into treaties, though they may, with the consent of 
 Congress, make compacts and agreements. When there is no 
 agreement, whose breach might create it, a controversy between 
 states does not arise unless the action complained of is state 
 action, and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers 
 cannot be laid hold of as in themselves committing one state to 
 distinct collision with a sister state. 
 
 "In our judgment this bill does not set up facts which show 
 that the State of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged 
 action of her health officer as to make it her own, or from which 
 it necessarily follows that the two states are in controversy within 
 the meaning of the Constitution." 
 
 Controversies between independent nations suggest them- 
 selves which are not capable of judicial solution and yet are 
 quite capable of leading to war. 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 39 
 
 Thus suppose C nation in the exercise of its conceded 
 powers admits to its shores and indeed to its citizenship 
 the citizens or subjects of A nation and excludes those of B 
 nation from both. The discrimination is certainly within 
 the international right of C nation, but it may lead to 
 acrimony and war. This is not a justiciable question nor 
 one that could be settled by a court. 
 
 The so-called General Arbitration Treaties negotiated by 
 Secretary Knox with France and England used the word 
 " justiciable " to describe the kind of questions which the 
 parties bound themselves to submit to arbitration. They 
 defined this to include all issues that could be decided on 
 principles of law or equity. The issue whether a question 
 arising was justiciable and arbitrable was to be left to the 
 decision of a preliminary investigating commission. The 
 term justiciable and indeed the whole scheme of these 
 treaties were suggested by the provision for settling con- 
 troversies between states in the Federal Constitution and the 
 construction of it by the Supreme Court. The controversies 
 between states, decision of which was not determined by 
 rules furnished by the Constitution or by congressional 
 regulation, were strictly analogous to questions arising be- 
 tween independent nations and were to be divided into 
 justiciable and non-justiciable questions by the same line of 
 distinction. 
 
 The treaties were not ratified but their approval by Eng- 
 land and France and by the Executive of this country con- 
 stitute a valuable and suggestive precedent for the framing 
 of the constitution and jurisdiction of an arbitral court to 
 be one of the main features of a League of Peace between 
 the great nations of the world. 
 
 Is it idle to treat such a league as possible? Well, let us 
 
4O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 take England and Canada. For a hundred years we have 
 been at peace. For that period of time the frontier between 
 us and Canada, four thousand miles long, has been entirely 
 undefended by forts or navies. \Ye have had issue after 
 issue between the two peoples that, because of their nature, 
 might have led to war. But we have settled them by negotia- 
 tion or, when that has failed, by arbitration, until now it is 
 not too much to say that the " habit " of arbitration between 
 us is so fixed that a treaty to secure such a settlement in 
 future issues would not make it more certain than it is. I 
 concede that conditions have been favorable for the creat- 
 ing of such a customary practice. The two peoples have 
 the same language and literature, the same law and civil 
 liberty and the same origin and history. Each has had a 
 wide domain, in the settlement and development of which 
 their energies and ambitions have been absorbed. The 
 jealousies and encroachments of neighbors in the thickly pop- 
 ulated regions of Europe have not been present to stir up 
 strife. And yet we ought not to minimize the beneficent 
 significance of this century of peace by ignoring the fact that 
 many of the issues which we have settled peaceably seemed 
 at the time to be difficult of settlement and likely to lead to 
 war. The Alabama Claims issue and the Oregon Boundary 
 dispute were two of this kind. 
 
 It is interesting to note that we now have two permanent 
 arbitral English-American Commissions settling questions. 
 One of them is to determine the equitable rules to govern 
 the use of waters on our national boundary, in which both 
 nations and their citizens have an interest, and to apply them 
 to causes arising. The analogy between the function which 
 the Supreme Court performed in the Kansas and Colorado 
 case in regard to the use of the Arkansas River and that 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 41 
 
 of this Commission in respect to rivers traversing both coun- 
 tries and crossing the border is perfect. Having thus 
 reached what is practically the institution of a League and 
 Arbitral Court with England and Canada for the preserva- 
 tion of peace between us, may we not hope to enlarge its 
 scope and membership and give its benefits to the world ? 
 
 Will not the exhaustion in which all the belligerents, 
 whether victors or vanquished, find themselves after this 
 awful sacrifice of life and wealth make them wish to make 
 the recurrence of such a war less probable ? Will they not 
 be in a mood to entertain any reasonable plan for the settle- 
 ment of international disputes by peaceable means? Can 
 we not devise such a plan ? I think we can. 
 
 The Second Hague Conference has proposed a perma- 
 nent court to settle questions of a legal nature arising be- 
 tween nations. But the signatories to the convention would, 
 under such a plan, not be bound to submit such questions. 
 Nor were the conferring nations able to agree on the consti- 
 tution of the court. But the agreement on the recommenda- 
 tion for the establishment of such a court shows that the 
 idea is within the bounds of the practical. 
 
 To constitute an effective League of Peace, we do not 
 need all the nations. Such an agreement between eight or 
 nine of the Great Powers of Europe, Asia and America 
 would furnish a useful restraint upon possible wars. The 
 successful establishment of a Peace League between the 
 Great Powers would draw into it very quickly the less power- 
 ful nations. 
 
 What should be the fundamental plan of the League? 1 
 
 1 This is the earliest public utterance of these four principles which 
 correspond to the four articles of the program of the League to En- 
 force Peace as formally adopted at Phila., June 17, 1915. The prin- 
 ciples were worked out at a series of meetings the last of which, 
 
42 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 It seems to me that it ought to contain four provisions. 
 First: It ought to provide for the formation of a court, 
 which would be given jurisdiction by the consent of all the 
 members of the League to consider and decide justiciable 
 questions between them or any of them, which have not 
 yielded to negotiation, according to the principles of inter- 
 national law and equity, and that the court should be vested 
 with power, upon the application of any member of the 
 League, to decide the issue as to whether the question arising 
 is justiciable. 
 
 Second: A Commission of Conciliation for the con- 
 sideration and recommendation of a solution of all non- 
 justiciable questions that may arise between the members of 
 the League should be created, and this Commission should 
 have power to hear evidence, investigate the causes of differ- 
 ence, mediate between the parties and then make its recom- 
 mendation for a settlement. 
 
 Third: Conferences should be held from time to time 
 to agree upon principles of international law, not already 
 established, as their necessity shall suggest themselves. 
 When the conclusions of the Commission shall have been 
 submitted to the various parties of the League for a reason- 
 able period of time, say a year, without calling forth objec- 
 tion, it should be deemed that they acquiesce in the principles 
 thus declared. 
 
 Fourth: The members of the League shall agree that 
 if any member of the League shall bring war against any 
 other member of the League, without first having submitted 
 the question, if found justiciable, to the arbitral court pro- 
 April 9, 1915, was attended by Mr. Taft were formulated by a 
 small group on April loth and immediately submitted to Mr. Taft who 
 gave them the final form substantially embodied, later on, in the 
 Phila. platform. (Editor.) 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 43 
 
 vided in the fundamental campact, or without having sub- 
 mitted the question, if found non- justiciable, to the Commis- 
 sion of Conciliation for its examination, consideration and 
 recommendaton, then the remaining members of the League 
 agree to join in the forcible defense of the member thus 
 prematurely attacked. 
 
 First: The first feature involves the principles of the 
 general arbitration treaties with England and France, to 
 which England and France agreed, and which I submitted 
 to the Senate, and which the Senate rejected or so mutilated 
 as to destroy their vital principle. I think it is of the utmost 
 importance that it should be embraced in any effective 
 League of Peace. The successful operation of the Supreme 
 Court as a tribunal between independent states in deciding 
 justiciable questions not in the control of Congress, or under 
 the legislative regulation of either state, furnishes a prece- 
 dent and justification for this that I hope I have made clear. 
 Moreover, the inveterate practice of arbitration, which has 
 now grown to be an established custom for the disposition of 
 controversial questions between Canada, and the United 
 States, is another confirmation of the practical character of 
 such a court 
 
 Second : We must recognize, however, that the questions 
 within the jurisdiction of such a court would certainly not 
 include all the questions which might lead to war, and that, 
 therefore, we should provide some other instrumentality 
 for helping the solution of those questions which are non- 
 justiciable. This might well be a Commission of Concilia- 
 tion, a commission to investigate the facts, to consider the 
 arguments on both sides, to mediate between the parties, to 
 see if some compromise cannot be effected, and finally to 
 formulate and recommend a settlement. This may involve 
 
44 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 time; but the delay, instead of being an objection, is really 
 one of the valuable incidents of the performance of such a 
 function by a commission. We have an example of such a 
 Commission of Conciliation in the controversy between the 
 United States and Great Britain over the Seal Fisheries. 
 The case on its merits as a judicial question was decided 
 against the United States; but the world importance of not 
 destroying the Pribilof Seal Herd by pelagic sealing was 
 recognized, and a compromise was formulated by the arbitral 
 tribunal, which was ultimately embodied in a treaty between 
 England, Russia, Japan and the United States. Similar 
 recommendations were made by the court of arbitration 
 which considered the issues arising between the United 
 States and Great Britain in respect to the Newfoundland 
 Fisheries. 
 
 Third: Periodical conferences should be held between 
 the members of the League for the declaration of principles 
 of international law. This is really a provision for some- 
 thing in the nature of legislative action by the nations con- 
 cerned in respect to international law. The principles of in- 
 ternational law are based upon custom between nations 
 established by actual practice, by their recognition in treaties 
 and by the consensus of great law writers. Undoubtedly 
 the function of an arbitral court established as proposed in 
 the first of the above suggestions would lead to a good deal 
 of valuable judge-made international law. But that would 
 not cover the whole field. Something in the nature of 
 legislation on the subject would be a valuable supplement to 
 existing international law. It would be one of the very 
 admirable results of such a League of Peace, that the scope 
 of international law could be enlarged in this way. Mr. 
 Justice Holmes, in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, to which 
 
PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 45 
 
 I have already referred, points out that the Supreme Court, 
 in passing on questions between the states, and in laying 
 down the principles of international law that ought to 
 govern in controversies between them, should not and can- 
 not make itself a legislature. But in a League of Peace, 
 there is no limit to the power of international conferences of 
 the members, except the limit of the wise and the practical. 
 Fourth : The fourth suggestion is one that brings in the 
 idea of force. In the League proposed, all members are 
 to agree that if any one member violates its obligation and 
 begins war against any other member, without submitting 
 its cause for war to the arbitral court, if it is a justiciable 
 question, or to the Commission of Conciliation, if it is other- 
 wise, all the members of the League will unite to defend the 
 member attacked against a war waged in breach of plighted 
 faith. It is to be observed that this does not involve mem- 
 bers of the League in an obligation to enforce the judgment 
 of the court or the recommendation of the Commission of 
 Conciliation. It only furnishes the instrumentality of force 
 to prevent attack without submission. It is believed that is 
 more practical than to attempt to enforce judgment after the 
 hearing. One reason is that the failure to submit to one of 
 the two tribunals the threatening cause of war for the con- 
 sideration of one or the other is a fact easily ascertained, 
 and concerning which there can be no dispute, and it is a 
 palpable violation of the obligation of the members. It is 
 wiser not to attempt too much. The required submission 
 and the delay incident thereto, will in most cases lead to 
 acquiescence in the judgment of the court or in the recom- 
 mendation of the Commission of Conciliation. The threat 
 of force against plainly unjust war, for that is what is in- 
 volved in the provision, will have a most salutary deterrent 
 
46 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 effect. I am aware that membership in this League would 
 involve, on the part of the United States, an obligation to 
 take part in European and Asiatic wars, it may be, and that 
 in this respect it would be a departure from the traditional 
 policy of the United States in avoiding entangling alliances 
 with European or Asiatic countries. But I conceive that the 
 interests of the United States, in view of its close business 
 and social relations, with the other countries of the world, 
 much closer now than ever before, would justify it, if such 
 a League could be formed, in running the remote risk of 
 such a war in order to make more probable the securing of 
 the inestimable boon of peace to the world, an object of 
 desire that now seems so far away. 
 
 PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE 
 . PEACE 1 
 
 In calling this meeting my associates and I have not been 
 unaware that we might be likened to the Tailors of Tooley 
 Street who mistook themselves for the people of England. 
 We wish, first, to say that we do not represent anybody but 
 ourselves. We are not national legislators, nor do we con- 
 trol the foreign policy of this Government. But we are 
 deeply interested in devising a plan for an international 
 agreement by which, when the present war shall cease, a 
 recurrence of such a war will be made less possible. 
 
 We are not here to suggest a means of bringing this war 
 to an end ; much as that is to be desired and much as we 
 
 1 Address delivered at the Convention of the League to Enforce 
 Peace which was held at Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. 
 
PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 47 
 
 would be willing to do to secure peace, that is not within 
 the project of the present meeting. 
 
 We hope and pray for peace, and our hope of its coming 
 is sufficient to make us think that the present is a good time 
 to discuss and formulate a series of proposals to which the 
 assent of a number of the Great Powers could be secured. 
 We think a League of Peace could be formed which would 
 enable nations to avoid war by furnishing a practical means 
 of settling international quarrels or suspending them until 
 the blinding heat of passion had cooled. 
 
 When the world conference is held, our country will have 
 its official representatives to speak for us. We, Tailors of 
 Tooley Street, shall not be there; but, if in our post-prandial 
 leisure we shall have discussed and framed a practical plan 
 for a League of Peace, our official representatives will be 
 aided and may in their discretion accept it and present it to 
 the Conference as their own. 
 
 There are Tooley Streets in every nation to-day and the 
 minds of earnest men are being stirred with the same thought 
 and the same purpose we have heard from them through 
 various channels. The denizens of those Tooley Streets 
 will have their influence upon their respective official repre- 
 sentatives. No man can measure the effect upon the peoples 
 of the belligerent countries and upon the peoples of the 
 neutral countries which the horrors and exhaustion of this 
 unprecedented war are going to have. It is certain that 
 they all will look with much more favorable eye to leagues 
 for the preservation of peace than ever before. In no war, 
 moreover, has the direct interest that neutrals have in pre- 
 venting a war between neighbors been so clearly made 
 known. This interest of neutrals has been so forced upon 
 them that it would require only a slight development and 
 
48 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 growth in the law of international relations to develop that 
 interest into a right to be consulted before such a war among 
 neighbors can be begun. This step we hope to have taken by 
 the formation of a Peace League of the Great Powers, 
 whose primary and fundamental principle shall be that no 
 war can take place between any two members of the League 
 until they have resorted to the machinery that the League 
 proposes to furnish to settle the controversy likely to lead 
 to war. 
 
 If any member of the League refuses to use this ma- 
 chinery, and attacks another member in breach of his League 
 obligation, all members of the League agree to defend the 
 member attacked by force. 
 
 We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely 
 omitted from an effective League of Peace. We sincerely 
 hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deter- 
 rent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the 
 League obligation will help materially to give sanction to 
 the laws of the League and to render a resort to force avoid- 
 able 
 
 We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not 
 think we have reached the time when a plan based on the 
 complete abolition of war is practicable. As long as nations 
 partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a 
 possibility and that possibility should not be ignored in any 
 League of Peace that is to be useful. We do not think it 
 necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards, or apply 
 other epithets to them. We have known in history the most 
 noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet the ex- 
 ample of their physical and moral courage is a heritage of 
 mankind. To those who differ with us in our view of the 
 necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say 
 
PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 49 
 
 we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere 
 patriotism to be as just as ours. We do not ascribe your de- 
 sire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your 
 sons ; but rather to your sense of the horror, injustice and 
 ineffectiveness of settling any international issue by such a 
 brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in 
 judgment that, in the world of nations as they are, war can 
 be completely avoided. We believe it is still necessary to use 
 a threat of overwhelming force of a great League with a 
 willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten na- 
 tions into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their 
 issues with their associates of the League. Nor are we 
 militarists or jingoes we are trying to follow a middle 
 and practical path. 
 
 Now what is the machinery, a resort to which we wish to 
 force on an intending belligerent of the League? It consists 
 of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be sub- 
 mitted. Issues between nations are of two classes : 
 
 ist. Issues that can be decided on principles of international 
 law and equity, called justiciable. 
 
 2nd. Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and 
 equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative 
 of war, called non-justiciable. 
 
 The questions of the Alaskan Boundary, of the Bering Sea 
 Seal Fisheries, and of the Alabama Claims were justiciable 
 issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme 
 Court would settle claims between States. 
 
 The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized, 
 whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia 
 as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable 
 of causing great irritation against the nation denying the 
 privilege ; and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on 
 
5O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 the subject, are completely within their international right 
 and the real essence of the trouble can not be aided by a 
 resort to a court. The dispute is non-justiciable. 
 
 We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an 
 impartial court to which all questions arising between mem- 
 bers of the League shall be submitted. If the court finds the 
 question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall 
 refer it to a Commission of Conciliation to investigate, con- 
 fer, hear argument and recommend a compromise. 
 
 We do not propose, in our plan, to enforce compliance 
 either with the Court's judgment or the Conciliation Com- 
 mission's recommendation. We feel that we ought not to 
 attempt too much. We believe that the forced submission, 
 the truce taken to investigate and the judicial decision, or 
 the conciliatory compromise recommended, will form a ma- 
 terial inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion 
 and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still 
 the jingoes. 
 
 The League of Peace will furnish a great opportunity for 
 more definite formulation of the principles of international 
 law. The arbitral court will amplify it and enrich it in their 
 application of its general principles to particular cases. 
 They will create a body of judge-made laws of the highest 
 value. 
 
 Then the existence of the League will lead to ever recur- 
 ring congresses of the League, which, acting in a quasi- 
 legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law 
 in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do. 
 
 This is our plan. It is not complicated, at least in state- 
 ment. In its practical application, difficulties now unfore- 
 seen may arise, but we believe it offers a working hypothesis 
 upon which a successful arrangement can be made. 
 
PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 5! 
 
 \Ye are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can 
 prevent war. We are not called upon to deny this in order 
 to justify or vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize 
 that nations are sometimes utterly immoral in breaking 
 treaties and shamelessly bold in avowing their right to do so 
 on the ground of necessity. But this is not always the case. 
 We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they are 
 broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts 
 because men sometimes dishonor themselves by breaking 
 them. We decline to assume that all nations are always 
 dishonorable or that a solemn treaty obligation will not have 
 some deterrent effect upon a nation which has plighted its 
 faith, to prevent its breach. In every nation there are people 
 who are in favor of peace and opposed to war, and when you 
 furnish a treaty that binds the nation not to go to war, you 
 strengthen the hands of the people in that nation that do 
 not want to go to war and are in favor of preserving the 
 honor of the nation. When we add to this the sanction of 
 an agreement by a number of powerful nations to enforce 
 the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we 
 think \ve have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of 
 paper " and we base our faith in this on a common sense 
 view of human nature. 
 
 We have got to depart from the traditional policy of this 
 country, I agree. But this war has borne in on us the fact 
 that we are so near to all the nations of the world to-day 
 that we are vitally interested in keeping war down as far as 
 we can, and that we had better step forward and assume 
 certain obligations in the interest of the world and in the 
 interest o'f mankind, because there is a utilitarian reason for 
 it we are likely to be drawn in ourselves. Therefore we 
 ought to depart from the policy of isolation that heretofore 
 
52 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 has served us so well, because we are a strong nation. We 
 must bear our share of the responsibilities of the moment, 
 and we must help along the world, and incidentally help 
 along ourselves, for I believe, even if you view it from a 
 selfish standpoint, in the long run it will be a better policy. 
 It is objected that we only propose to include the more 
 powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we 
 don't propose to have the constitution of our court compli- 
 cated by a demand for equal representation of the many 
 smaller nations. We believe that when we have a League 
 initiated by the larger powers, the smaller powers will be 
 glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the League will 
 afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against 
 the weak. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS x 
 
 To me has been assigned the discussion of the constitu- 
 tional objections to the proposals of the League to Enforce 
 Peace. These objections, so far as I understand them, are 
 directed against the first and third planks in our platform. 
 The first plank reads as follows : 
 
 "First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory 
 powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations 
 of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and 
 judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issues as to its 
 jurisdiction of the question." 
 
 This looks to an organization of a permanent court by 
 
 1 Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League 
 to Enforce Peace, Washington, D. C, May 26, 1916. 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 53 
 
 the signatories to the League. It contemplates the oppor- 
 tunity of any member of the League, having a cause of com- 
 plaint against any other member of the League, to sue such 
 member in this court and bring it into court by proper pro- 
 cess. The complainant's pleading will, of course, state its 
 cause of action. The defendant may wish to question the 
 jurisdiction of the court on the ground, for instance, that 
 the cause of action stated by the complainant does not involve 
 a justiciable issue; that it can not be decided on principles 
 of law or equity. 
 
 The court, upon this preliminary question, must decide 
 upon its jurisdiction. If it finds the question not to be 
 justiciable, it must dismiss the complaint ; but it may properly 
 refer its investigation to the Commission of Conciliation. 
 If it finds that it is justiciable, it must require the defendant 
 nation to answer. 
 
 What I have to discuss is whether the President and the 
 Senate, constituting the treaty-making power for this 
 Government, may consent, for and on behalf of the United 
 States, to the settlement of any justiciable issue arising be- 
 tween the United States and any other member of the League 
 by this permanent court; and whether it may leave to that 
 court the power to decide whether the issue raised is a jus- 
 ticiable one. It was argued against a similar provision in 
 the general arbitration treaties with England and France that 
 such a stipulation constituted a delegation by the President 
 and Senate of the authority reposed in them over the foreign 
 relations of our Government and therefore that it was ultra- 
 vires. Both upon reason and authority this objection is 
 untenable. The United States is a nation, and, from a 
 foreign standpoint, a sovereign nation, without limitation 
 of its sovereignty It may, therefore, through its treaty- 
 
54 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 making power, consent to any agreement with other powers 
 relating to subject matter that is usually considered and made 
 the subject of treaties. The well-known language of Mr. 
 Justice Field, in the case of Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 
 258, leaves no doubt upon this point. It is as follows : 
 
 " That the treaty power of the United States extends to all 
 proper subjects of negotiations between our Government and the 
 Governments of other nations, is clear. . . . The treaty power, as 
 expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited, except by 
 those restraints which are found in that instrument against the 
 action of the Government, or of its Departments, and those aris- 
 ing from the nature of the Government itself, and of that of the 
 States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to 
 authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the char- 
 acter of the Government, or in that of one of the States, or 
 a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without 
 its consent. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that 
 there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touch- 
 ing any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with 
 a foreign country." 
 
 Issues that can be settled on principles of law and equity 
 are proper subjects for decision by a judicial tribunal. Such 
 issues have been settled by Boards of Arbitration, agreed 
 to by independent sovereigns since there were governments. 
 The first provision agreed to by the United States for an 
 arbitration of this kind was in the Jay Treaty in 1794; and 
 since that time there have been eighty-four international 
 arbitrations to which an American nation was a party. In 
 forty, or nearly one-half of these, the other party was an 
 European Power, while the arbitrations between American 
 nations were forty-four. To about two-thirds of all of these 
 the United States was a party, the number of arbitrations be- 
 tween other American powers being fourteen. Of this 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 55 
 
 number, there were ten that related to questions of boundary, 
 which are, of course, questions capable of solution on princi- 
 ples of law and equity. 
 
 In such cases, it was never suggested that the Govern- 
 ment was delegating any power at all to the tribunal. A 
 submission to a judicial decision is not a delegation of power 
 as to an agent. It is a submission of an issue to a judge. 
 It is an error to call such a submission a delegation, or to 
 determine its validity on principles of delegation of power 
 as that is limited in constitutional law. In the discussion of 
 the general arbitration treaties in the Senate, there was a 
 suggestion that the agreement to submit to a court questions 
 which had not yet arisen described only by definition and 
 classification, with power in the court to take jurisdiction, 
 was more of a delegation of power than the mere submis- 
 sion of an existing question to arbitrators. There is, how- 
 ever, not the slightest difference in principle between the two. 
 If one is a delegation, the other is. If one is invalid, the 
 other is ; and if one is not invalid, the other is not. 
 
 Nor does the right to determine jurisdiction of the court 
 involve in principle any more of a delegation than the mere 
 voluntary submission of the issue to the court. It only 
 somewhat enlarges the issues to be submitted. The question 
 whether the court has jurisdiction of an issue is dependent 
 on the question of law, involving the construction of the 
 treaty, and such a subject matter is the commonest instance 
 of the class of questions submitted to arbitration or a court. 
 More than this, the Senate has consented from time to time 
 to arbitrations on issues which may arise in the future and 
 defined by language of the treaty of submission. 
 
 The last notable instance, and the one which involved a 
 really permanent court is the advice and consent by our 
 
56 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Senate to the Hague International Prize Court Convention 
 in which a permanent international prize court was estab- 
 lished, and the United States bound itself to submit all 
 questions, arising between it and foreign nations in respect 
 to questions of prize in naval warfare, to this international 
 prize court, and to abide the decision, even though that de- 
 cision might involve, as it generally would, the reconsidera- 
 tion of an issue already decided by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States. The treaty is not in force because Eng- 
 land did not finally approve, but our Senate approved it. 
 The International Prize Court must of necessity pass upon 
 its own jurisdiction, and by agreement between the parties, 
 its decision is to be accepted and to be carried out in good 
 faith. The question as to whether commissioners of arbi- 
 tration, under the Jay Treaty, had power to determine their 
 own jurisdiction was brought by Rufus King, American 
 Minister in London, to the attention of Lord Grenville who 
 submitted the question to Lord Chancellor Loughbo rough. 
 The Lord Chancellor resolved the difficulty by declaring : 
 
 " That the doubt respecting the authority of the Commissioners 
 to settle their own jurisdiction was absurd; and that they must 
 necessarily decide upon cases being within, or without, their com- 
 petency." 
 
 A similar question was raised by the British Government 
 in regard to the power of the Geneva Tribunal to deal with 
 what were known as the " indirect claims," and her arbi- 
 trators decided that they did not have jurisdiction of the 
 indirect claims, and this was acquiesced in by both Govern- 
 ments. 
 
 In correspondence with the Chilean Minister over an arbi- 
 tration between this country and Chile, Mr. Olney, then 
 Secretary of State, used this language : 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 5/ 
 
 " But the question whether any particular claim is a proper one 
 for the consideration and decision of an international commis- 
 sion is necessarily one which the commission itself must deter- 
 mine. The conventions under which such commissions are 
 organized usually describe in general terms the class of cases of 
 which the commission is to take jurisdiction, and whether any 
 particular case presented to it comes within this class the com- 
 mission must, of course, determine. The decisions of the late 
 commission, both interlocutory and final, are binding upon both 
 Governments, the latter absolutely so, the former unless reversed, 
 after proper proceedings for a rehearing." 
 
 I come now to the other objection. The third plank of 
 the platform is as follows: 
 
 "Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith 
 both their economic and military forces against any one of their 
 number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against 
 another of the signatories before any question arising shall be sub- 
 mitted as provided in the foregoing." 
 
 It is objected to this clause that it violates the Constitution 
 in that the effect of such a treaty signed by the United States 
 would take away from Congress the power, conferred upon 
 it by section eight of article one, to declare war. 
 
 I had the pleasure and privilege of hearing Mr. Bryan 
 advance this argument at the Lake Mohonk Conference. 
 He said that we should need an amendment to the Consti- 
 tution before we could agree to any such provision. He said 
 that in order to carry out the provision we must have a joint 
 council of the powers to determine when the time had arrived 
 for military action and war, and that this would substitute 
 the action of the council for the constitutional discretion of 
 Congress. 
 
 I venture to think that this view is wholly without founda- 
 
58 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 tion. Although it is not necessary, I am willing to accept 
 the assumption that some kind of a council would be ap- 
 pointed by the powers to make the announcements when the 
 time had come for the use of economic and military forces 
 against the recalcitrant member. Does that take away from 
 Congress the power to declare war? It does not. If the 
 war is a foreign war, it could not be begun under the Consti- 
 tution until Congress had declared war. The President 
 would not be authorized to direct the Army and the Navy to 
 begin war until Congress had declared it. 
 
 What, then, would be the situation if the fact were an- 
 nounced upon which the obligation of the United States to 
 make war arose under this treaty? It would be to make 
 war by Constitutional means, that is, by the preliminary 
 declaration of Congress that war existed. Congress might 
 decline to exercise that power and refuse to declare war. 
 What would be the effect of that? It would merely be a 
 breach of faith on the part of Congress, and so a breach of 
 faith on the part of the United States and we would not go 
 to war. The treaty-making power under the Constitution 
 creates the obligation to declare war in certain contingencies. 
 That obligation is to be discharged by Congress under its 
 Constitutional power to declare war. If it fails to do 
 so, and thus comply with the binding obligation created by 
 the treaty-making power, then it merely breaks the contract 
 of the Government. It is left to Congress to carry out that 
 which we in a Constitutional way have agreed to do. Thus 
 to impose in a Constitutional way by treaty an obligation on 
 Congress is not to take away its power to discharge it or to 
 refuse to discharge it. 
 
 In 1904 we entered into a treaty with the Republic of 
 Panama, the first article of which is: 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 59 
 
 " The United States guarantees and will maintain the independ- 
 ence of the Republic of Panama." 
 
 What is the necessary effect of this guaranty? It neces- 
 sarily means that if any nation attacks Panama and attempts 
 to take territory from her or to subvert her Government, the 
 United States is under treaty obligation to make war to de- 
 fend Panama. Was it ever supposed that such an obligation 
 took away from Congress the power to declare war? This 
 treaty obligation makes it the duty of the Government to 
 declare war under certain conditions that may arise, creates 
 a contract obligation to the Republic of Panama that it shall 
 do so, and this duty can only be discharged through the action 
 of Congress in declaring war. Does that deprive Congress 
 of its Constitutional power to declare war? It seems to me 
 the question answers itself. 
 
 In our relations with Cuba we find in the present treaty: 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 " The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or 
 other compact with any foreign power or powers which will im- 
 pair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any 
 manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain 
 by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, 
 lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island." 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 " The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may 
 exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban in- 
 dependence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the 
 protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for dis- 
 charging the obligation with respect to Cuba imposed by the 
 Treaty of Paris on the United States now to be assumed and under- 
 taken by the Government of Cuba." 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 " To enable the United States to maintain the independence of 
 
6O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own de- 
 fense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United 
 States, lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at 'certain 
 specific points to be agreed upon with the President of the United 
 States." 
 
 It is quite clear from these three articles that the Govern- 
 ment of the United States binds itself to maintain the inde- 
 pendence of Cuba and to exclude other governments from 
 lodgment in the Island. If any Government attempts to 
 filch territory from Cuba or to subvert the government, it 
 becomes .the duty of the United States to make war and 
 defend against such invasion. Does this treaty obligation 
 thus created take away from Congress the power to declare 
 war? It only creates the obligation on the part of the 
 United States to wage war, and in discharging this obliga- 
 tion Congress must act, or the Government must be recreant 
 to its agreement. 
 
 Thus, by reason and precedent, it would appear clear that 
 this third plank of the platform of the League is not in any 
 way an attempt to take from Congress the power which it 
 has to declare war under the Constitution. The suggestion 
 that in order to carry out such an obligation on the part of 
 the United States, it would be necessary to amend the Con- 
 stitution, grows out of a confusion of ideas and a failure to 
 analyze the differences between the creation of an obligation 
 of the United States to do a thing and the due, orderly and 
 Constitutional course to be taken by it in doing that which 
 it has agreed to do. 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 6l 
 
 A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN 
 BETTERMENT * 
 
 What is International Law? It is the body of rules 
 governing the conduct of the nations of the world toward 
 one another, acquiesced in by all nations. It lacks scope 
 and definiteness. It is found in writings of international 
 jurists, in treaties, in the results of arbitration, and in the 
 decisions of those municipal courts which apply international 
 law, like the Supreme Court of the United States and courts 
 that sit in prize cases to determine the rules of international 
 law governing the capture of vessels in naval warfare. It 
 is obvious that a Congress of the League with quasi-legisla- 
 tive powers could greatly add to the efficacy of international 
 law by enlarging its application and codifying its rules. It 
 would be greatly in the interest of the world and of world 
 peace to give to such a code of rules the express sanction of 
 the family of nations. 
 
 As to the submission of all questions at issue of a legal 
 nature to a permanent international court, it is sufficient to 
 point out that the proposal is practical and is justified by 
 precedent. The Supreme Court of the Unted States., exer- 
 cising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution, 
 sits as a permanent international tribunal to decide issues 
 between the States of the Union. The law governing the 
 settlement of most of the controversies between the States 
 cannot be determined by reference to the Constitution, to 
 statutes of Congress, or to the legislation of the States. 
 Should Congress in such cases attempt to enact laws they 
 would be invalid. The only law which applies is that which 
 
 1 Address delivered before the National Educational Association, 
 New York City, July 3, 1916. 
 
62 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 applies between independent governments, to wit: Inter- 
 national Law. Take the case of Kansas against Colorado, 
 heard and decided by the Supreme Court. Kansas com- 
 plained that Colorado was using more of the water of the 
 Arkansas River which flowed through Colorado into Kansas 
 than was equitable for purposes of irrigation. The case 
 was heard by the Supreme Court and decided, not by a law 
 of Congress, not by the law of Kansas, not by the law of 
 Colorado, for the law of neither applied. It was decided 
 by principles of International Law. 
 
 Many other instances of similar decisions by the Supreme 
 Court could be cited. But it is said that stick a precedent 
 lacks force here because the States are restrained from going 
 to war with each other by the power of the National Govern- 
 ment. Admitting that this qualifies the precedent to some 
 extent, we need go no further than Canada to find a com- 
 plete analogy and a full precedent. There is now sitting 
 to decide questions of boundary waters (exactly such 
 questions as were considered in Kansas and Colorado) a 
 permanent court, consisting of three Americans and three 
 Canadians, to settle the principles of international law that 
 apply to the use of rivers constituting a boundary between 
 the two countries and of rivers crossing the boundary. The 
 fact is, that we have gotten so into the habit of arbitration 
 with Canada that no reasonable person expects that any issue 
 arising between us and that country, after a hundred years 
 of peace, will be settled other than by arbitration. 
 
 If this be the case between ourselves and Canada and 
 England, why may it not be practical with every well- 
 established and ordered government of the Great Powers? 
 The Second Hague Conference, attended by all nations, 
 recommended the establishment of a permanent International 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 63 
 
 Court to decide questions of a legal nature arising between 
 nations. 
 
 The second proposal of the League involves the submis- 
 sion to a Commission of Conciliation of all questions that 
 cannot be settled in court on principles of law or equity. 
 There are such questions which may lead to war, and fre- 
 quently do, and there are no legal rules for decision. We 
 have such questions giving rise to friction in our domestic 
 life. If a lady who owns a lawn permits children of one 
 neighbor to play upon that lawn and refuses the privilege to 
 the children of another neighbor because she thinks the 
 latter children are badly trained and will injure her lawn or 
 her flowers, it requires no imagination to understand that 
 there may arise a neighborhood issue that will lead to friction 
 between the families. The issue is, however, a non-jus- 
 ticiable one. Courts cannot settle it, for the reason that 
 the lady owning the lawn has the right to say who shall 
 come on it and who shall be excluded from it. No jus- 
 ticiable issue can arise, unless one's imagination goes to the 
 point of supposing that the husbands of the two differing 
 ladies came together and clashed, and then the issue in court 
 will not be as to the comparative training of the children of 
 the families. 
 
 We have an analogous question in our foreign relations 
 with reference to the admission of the Chinese and Japanese. 
 We discriminate against them in our naturalization and im- 
 migration laws and extend the benefit of those laws only to 
 whites and persons of African descent. This discrimina- 
 tion has caused much ill-feeling among the Japanese and 
 Chinese. \Ve are within our international right in exclud- 
 ing them ; but it is easy to understand how resentment, be- 
 cause of such discrimination, might be fanned into a flame, 
 
64 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 if through lawless violence or unjust State legislation the 
 Japanese should be mistreated within the United States. 
 
 We have had instances of the successful result of com- 
 missions of conciliation where the law could not cover the 
 differences between the two nations. Such was the case 
 of the Bering Sea controversy. l We sought to prevent the 
 
 1 In an address before the National Geographic Society in Wash- 
 ington, D. C., Jan. 17, 1919, Mr. Taft has the following to say in re- 
 gard to this arbitration : 
 
 " The United States, by a transfer from Russia, became the owner 
 of the Pribiloff Islands, in the middle of the Bering Sea. Upon those 
 islands was the breeding place of the largest herd of fur-bearing seals 
 in the world. They were a valuable property ami a considerable annual 
 income was derived by the United States from the sale of the fur. 
 Canadian schooners began what was called pelagic scaling. They shot 
 the seals in the open Bering Sea. This indiscriminate hunting killed 
 the females of the herd and was destroying it. Revenue cutters of the 
 United States, by direction of the government, scixed such sealing 
 vessels, brought them into a port of the United States, where were 
 instituted proceedings to forfeit them. Great Britain objected on the 
 ground that the United States had no legal jurisdiction. The case was 
 submitted to an arbitration. The treaty contained a provision that the 
 arbitrators, should they reach the conclusion that the United States 
 had no legal right, might recommend a basis of compromise. The 
 United States asserted its right, on the ground, first, that it had terri- 
 torial jurisdiction over the open waters of the Bering Sea by transfer 
 from Russia, which had asserted, maintained, and enjoyed such juris- 
 diction, and, second, that it owned the seals while in the sea in such 
 a way that the Canadian schooners were despoiling its personal prop- 
 erty. The court of arbitration held against the United States on both 
 points, deciding that Russia never had any territorial jurisdiction over 
 the open Bering Sea to transfer to the United States, and that when 
 the seals left the islands and swam out into the open sea they were 
 the property of no one and were subject to capture by any one. The 
 judgment of the court, therefore, was against the United States and 
 awarded damages. Pursuing, however, the recommendation of the 
 treaty, the court made itself into a council of mediation. It said that 
 while the killing of seals in the open sea was not a violation of the 
 legal rights of the United States of which that country could legally 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 65 
 
 killing of female seals in the Bering Sea and asserted our 
 territorial jurisdiction over that sea for this purpose. The 
 question was submitted to international arbitrators and the 
 decision was against us ; but the arbitrators, in order to save 
 to the world the only valuable and extensive herd of fur 
 seals, recommended a compromise by treaty between the na- 
 tions concerned, and accordingly treaties have been made 
 between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan 
 which have restored the herd to its former size and value. 
 So much, therefore, for the practical character of the first 
 two proposals. 
 
 The third proposal is more novel than the others and 
 gives to the whole plan a more constructive character. It 
 looks to the use of economic means first, and military force 
 if necessary, to enforce the obligation of every member of 
 
 complain, it was nevertheless a great injury to the common welfare 
 of the world to destroy this greatest seal herd of the world, first, because 
 the fur was valuable and useful for the garments of men and women, 
 and, second, because the destruction of the herd would destroy valuable 
 and useful industries in the preparation of the seal pelts for use. 
 Therefore, they said it was good form and in the interest of the world 
 that the four nations concerned should agree upon a compromise by 
 which the United States might continue to maintain the herd and sell 
 the seal pelts gathered on the islands and that pelagic sealing should 
 be stopped, but that the United States, in consideration of the other 
 three nations restricting their citizens from pelagic sealing, should 
 divide with the other three nations some of the profits of the herd. 
 Accordingly, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, and the United States 
 made such a treaty, which is still in force and under which the herd 
 has been restored to its former size and value. Here we have an 
 example of a court passing on questions of legal right and deciding 
 them against the United States. Then we have the court changing 
 itself into a council of mediation and recommending a compromise, 
 prompted by considerations of decency and good form and the public 
 welfare of the world, which the nations appealed to have adopted 
 and embodied in a treaty." 
 
66 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 the League to submit any complaint it has to make against 
 another member of the League, either to the permanent inter- 
 national court, or to the Commission of Conciliation, and to 
 await final action by that tribunal before beginning hostili- 
 ties. It will be observed that it is not the purpose of this pro- 
 gram to use the economic boycott or the jointly acting armies 
 of the League to enforce the judgment declared or the com- 
 promise recommended. These means are used only to pre- 
 vent the beginning of war before there has been a com- 
 plete submission, hearing of evidence, argument and de- 
 cision or recommendation. We sincerely believe that in 
 most cases, with such a delay and such a winnowing out of 
 the issues and such an opportunity for the peoples of the 
 different countries to understand the position of each other, 
 war would generally not be resorted to. Our ambition is 
 not to propose a plan, the perfect working out of which will 
 absolutely prevent war; first, because we do not think such 
 a plan would work; and second, because we are willing to 
 concede that there may be governmental and international 
 injustice which cannot be remedied except by force. If, 
 therefore, after a full discussion and decision by impartial 
 judges or a recommendation by earnest, sincere and equit- 
 able compromisers, a people still thinks that it must vindicate 
 its rights by war, we do not attempt in this plan to prevent 
 it by force. 
 
 Having thus explained what the plan is, let us consider the 
 objections which have been made to it. 
 
 The first objection is that, in a dispute between two mem- 
 bers of the League, it would be practically difficult to de- 
 termine which one was the aggressor and which one, there- 
 fore, in fact, began actual hostilities. There may be some 
 trouble in this, I can see ; but what we are dealing with is a 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 67 
 
 working hypothesis, a very general plan. The details are 
 not worked out. One can suggest that an International 
 Council engaged in an attempt to mediate the differences 
 might easily determine for the League which nation was at 
 fault in beginning hostilities. It would doubtless be neces- 
 sary where some issues arise to require a maintenance of the 
 status quo until the issues were submitted and decided in one 
 tribunal or the other; but it does not seem to me that these 
 suggested difficulties are insuperable or may not be com- 
 pletely met by a detailed procedure that, of course, must be 
 fixed before the plan of the League shall become operative. 
 The second objection is to the use of the economic boycott 
 and the army and the navy to enforce the obligations entered 
 into by the members of the League. I respect the views 
 of Pacifists and those who advocate the doctrine of non- 
 resistance as the only Christian doctrine. Such is the view 
 of that Society of Friends which, with a courage higher than 
 that possessed by those who advocate forcible means, are 
 willing to subject themselves to the injustice of the wicked 
 in order to carry out their ideal of what Christian action 
 should be. They have been so far in advance of the general 
 opinions of the world in their history of three hundred years, 
 and have lived to see so many of their doctrines recognized 
 by the world as just, that I always differ from them with 
 reluctance. Still, it seems to me that in the necessity of 
 preserving our civilization and saving our country's freedom 
 and individual liberty maintained now for one hundred and 
 twenty-five years, we have no right to assume that we have 
 passed beyond the period in history when nations are affected 
 by the same frailties and the same temptations to cupidity, 
 cruelty and injustice as men. In our domestic communities 
 we need a police force to protect the innocent and the just 
 
68 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 against the criminal and the unjust, and to maintain the 
 guaranty of life, liberty and property. The analogy be- 
 tween the domestic community and that of nations is suf- 
 ficently close to justify and require what is in fact an inter- 
 national police force. The attitude of those who oppose 
 using force or a threat of force to compel nations to keep 
 the peace is really like that of the modern school of theoreti- 
 cal anarchists, who maintain that if all restraint were re- 
 moved and there were no government, and the children and 
 youth, and men and women were trained to self-responsibil- 
 ity, every member of society would know what his or her 
 duty was and would perform it. They assert that it is the 
 existence of restraint that leads to the violation of right. I 
 may be permitted to remark that with modern fads of educa- 
 tion we have gone far in the direction of applying this prin- 
 ciple of modern anarchy in the discipline and education of 
 our children and youth, but I do not think the result can be 
 said to justify the theory if we can judge from the strikes of 
 school children or from the general lack of discipline and 
 respect for authority that the rising generation manifests. 
 The time has not come when we can afford to give up the 
 threat of the police and the use of force to back up and sus- 
 tain the obligation of moral duty. 
 
 The third objection is that it would be unconstitutional for 
 the United States, through its treaty-making power, to enter 
 into such a League. This objection is based on the fact that 
 the Constitution vests in Congress the power to declare war. 
 It is said that this League would transfer the power to de- 
 clare war away from Congress to some foreign council, in 
 which the United States would only have a representative. 
 This objection grows out of a misconception of the effect of 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT <X) 
 
 a treaty and a confusion of ideas. The United States makes 
 its contract with other nations under the Constitution 
 through the President and two-thirds of the Senate, who 
 constitute the treaty-making power. The President and the 
 Senate have a right to bind the United States to any contract 
 with any other nation covering the subject matter within 
 the normal field of treaties For this purpose the President 
 and the Senate are the United States. When the contract 
 comes to be performed, the United States is to perform it 
 through that department of the government which, by the 
 Constitution, should perform it, should represent the govern- 
 ment and should act for it Thus, the treaty-making power 
 may bind the United States to pay to another country under 
 certain conditions a million dollars. When the conditions 
 are fulfilled, then it becomes the duty of the United States 
 to pay the million dollars. Under the Constitution, only 
 Congress can appropriate the million dollars from the 
 treasury. Therefore, it becomes the duty of Congress to 
 make that appropriation. It may refuse to make the appro- 
 priation. If it does so, it dishonors the written obligation 
 of the United States. It has the power either to perform 
 the obligation or to refuse to perform it. That fact, how- 
 ever, does not make the action of the treaty power in bind- 
 ing the United States to pay the money unconstitutional. 
 So the treaty-making power may bind the United States 
 under certain conditions to make war. When the conditions 
 arise requiring the making of war, then it becomes the duty 
 of Congress honorably to perform the obligation of the 
 United States. Congress may shirk this duty and exercise 
 its power to refuse to declare war. It thus dishonors a bind- 
 ing obligation of the United States. But the obligation was 
 
7O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 entered into in the constitutional way and it is to be per- 
 formed in the constitutional way. 
 
 It is said that to enter into such a compact would require 
 us to maintain a standing army. I do not think this fol- 
 lows at all. If we become, as we should become, reason- 
 ably prepared to resist unjust military aggression, and have 
 a navy sufficiently large, and coast defenses sufficiently well 
 equipped to constitute a first line of defense, and an army 
 which we could mobilize into half a million trained men 
 within two months, we would have all the force needed to 
 do our part of the police work in resisting the unlawful ag- 
 gression of any one member of the League against another. 
 
 Fourth, it has been urged that for us to become a party to 
 this League is to give up our Monroe Doctrine, under which 
 we ought forcibly to resist any attempt on the part of Euro- 
 pean or Asiatic powers to subvert an independent govern- 
 ment in the Western Hemisphere or to take from such a 
 government any substantial part of its territory. It is a 
 sufficient answer to this objection to say that a question 
 under the Monroe Doctrine would come under that class of 
 issues which must be submitted to a Council of Conciliation. 
 Pending this, of course, the status quo must be maintained. 
 An argument and recommendation of compromise would fol- 
 low. If we did not agree to the compromise and proceeded 
 forcibly to resist violation of the Doctrine, we should not be 
 violating the terms of the League by hostilities thereafter. 
 More than this, as Professor Wilson, of Harvard, the well- 
 known authority upon international law, has pointed out, 
 we are already under a written obligation to delay a year 
 before beginning hostilities in respect to any question arising 
 between us and most of the Great Powers, and this neces- 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 71 
 
 sarily includes questions relating to a violation of the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the obli- 
 gation of such a League as this would put us in any different 
 position from that which we now occupy in regard to the 
 Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 Finally, I come to the most formidable objection, which 
 is that entering into such a League by the United States 
 would be a departure from the policy that it has consistently 
 pursued since the days of Washington, in accordance with 
 the advice of his farewell address that we enter into no 
 entangling alliances with European countries. Those of us 
 who support the proposals of the League believe that were 
 Washington living to-day he would not consider the League 
 as an entangling alliance. He had in mind such a treaty 
 as that the United States made with France, by which we 
 were subjected to great embarrassment when France 
 attempted to use our ports as bases of operation against 
 England while we were at peace with England. He cer- 
 tainly did not have in mind a union of all the Great Powers 
 to enforce peace ; and while he did dwell, and properly dwelt, 
 on the very great advantage that the United States had in 
 her isolation from European disputes, it was an isolation 
 which does not now exist. In his day we were only three 
 and a half millions of people, with thirteen States strung 
 along the Atlantic seaboard. We were five times as far 
 from Europe as we are now in speed of transportation, and 
 many times as far in speed of communication. We are now 
 one hundred millions of people between the two oceans and 
 between the Canada line and the Gulf. We face the Pacific 
 with California, Oregon and Washington, which alone makes 
 us a Pacific power. We own Alaska, the northwestern 
 corner of our continent, a dominion of immense extent with 
 
72 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 natural resources as yet hardly calculable and with a country 
 capable of supporting a considerable population. This 
 makes us a close neighbor of Russia across the Bering 
 Straits; while ownership of islands in that sea brings us 
 close to Japan. We own Hawaii, 2,000 miles out to sea 
 from San Francisco, with 75,000 Japanese laborers consti- 
 tuting the largest element of its population. We own the 
 Philippine Islands, 140,000 square miles, with eight millions 
 of people, under the eaves of Asia. We are properly 
 anxious to maintain an open door to China, and to share 
 equally in the enormous trade which that country, with her 
 400 teeming millions, is bound to furnish when organized 
 capital and her wonderful laboring populations shall be 
 intelligently directed toward the development of her rich 
 natural resources. Our discrimination against the Japanese 
 and the Chinese presents a possible cause of friction, since 
 the resentment that they feel may lead to untoward incidents. 
 We own the Panama Canal in a country which was recently 
 a part of a South American confederation. We have in- 
 vested 400 millions in that great world enterprise to unite 
 our Eastern and Western seaboards by cheap transportation, 
 to increase the effectiveness of our navy and to make a path 
 for the world's commerce between the two great oceans. 
 
 We own Porto Rico, with a million people, and we owe 
 to those people protection at home and abroad, as they owe 
 allegiance to us. 
 
 We have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, and have 
 reserved the right to enter and maintain the guaranty of life, 
 liberty and property and to repress insurrection in that 
 island. Since originally turning over the island to its people 
 we have had once to return there and restore peace and 
 order. We have on our southern border the international 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 73 
 
 nuisance of Mexico, and nobody can foresee the complica- 
 tions that will arise out of the anarchy there prevailing. 
 We have the Monroe Doctrine still to maintain. Our rela- 
 tions to Europe have been shown to be very near by our 
 experience in pursuing lawfully our natural rights in our 
 trade upon the Atlantic Ocean with European countries. 
 Both belligerents have violated our rights, and in the now 
 nearly two years which have elapsed since the war began 
 we have been close to war in the defense of those rights. 
 Contrast our present world relations with those we had in 
 Washington's time. It would seem clear that the conditions 
 have so changed as to justify a seeming departure from 
 advice directed to such a different state of things. One 
 may reasonably question whether the United States, by 
 uniting with the other great powers to prevent the recur- 
 rence of future world war, may not risk less in assuming 
 the obligations of a member of the League than by refusing 
 to become such a member in view of her world-wide in- 
 terests. But even if the risk of war to the United States 
 would be greater by entering the League than by staying 
 out of it, does not the United States have a duty, as a mem- 
 ber of the family of nations, to do its part and run its neces- 
 sary risk to make less probable the coming of such another 
 war and such another disaster to the human race ? 
 
 We are the richest nation in the world, and in the sense of 
 what we could do were we to make reasonable preparation 
 we are the most powerful nation in the world. We have 
 been showered with good fortune. Our people have enjoyed 
 a happiness known to no other people. Does not this im- 
 pose upon us a sacred duty to join the other nations of the 
 world in a fraternal spirit and with a willingness to make 
 sacrifices if we can promote the general welfare of men? 
 
74 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 At the close of this war the governments and the people 
 of the belligerent countries, under the enormous burdens and 
 suffering from the great losses of the war, will be in a con- 
 dition of mind to accept and promote such a plan for the 
 enforcement of future peace. President Wilson, at the head 
 of this administration and the initiator of our foreign 
 policies under the Constitution; Senator Loclge, the senior 
 Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
 and therefore the leader of the opposition on such an issue, 
 have both approved of the principles of the League to En- 
 force Peace. Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce have indi- 
 cated their sympathy and support of the same principles, 
 and we understand that M. Briand, of France, has similar 
 views. 
 
 THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE * 
 
 The purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is, after the 
 present war, to organize the world politically so as to enable 
 it to use its power to prevent the hotheadedness of any nation 
 from lighting a fire of war which shall spread into another 
 general conflagration. It proposes to effect this by securing 
 membership in the League of all the great nations of the 
 world. The minor stable nations will then certainly join 
 because of the protection which the League would afford 
 them against sudden attack by a great power. The League 
 will then become a World League. If it does not, it will 
 fail of its purpose. No member of the League is to begin 
 
 1 Address delivered at the dinner of the Chamber of Commerce of 
 the Borough of Queens, New York City, Saturday evening, January 
 20, 1917. 
 
THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 75 
 
 war against any other member until after the question be- 
 tween them shall have been submitted to a Court, if the 
 question is of a legal nature, or a Commission of Concilia- 
 tion, if it can not be settled on principles of law. The mem- 
 bers agree to await the judgment in the one case or the 
 recommendation of a compromise in the other, before begin- 
 ning hostilities. If any member violates this agreement and 
 begins hostilities before the appointed time, the whole power 
 of the League, by the joint use of the military and naval 
 force of its members, is to be exerted to defend the nation 
 prematurely attacked against the nation attacking it. The 
 compulsion thus to be exercised is directed only to securing 
 deliberation and delay sufficient to permit a hearing and 
 judgment on questions of a legal nature, and a hearing and 
 recommendation of compromise on other questions. 
 
 There would be practical difficulties in attempting to en- 
 force judgments, difficulties which may some day be over- 
 come but which the League has now no purpose to attempt 
 to solve. It would be still more difficult to enforce com- 
 promises. The League contents itself, and believes that it 
 will make a long step forward if it succeeds, in securing a 
 world agreement by which hearings of the irritating issues 
 may be had and a decision rendered before war is allowed to 
 begin. It is confident that, in most cases, a war thus delayed 
 for a full discussion of the issues and a fair decision will 
 never come. 
 
 Mr. Roosevelt objects to the League with great emphasis. 
 It would have added to the usefulness of his criticism if he 
 had read carefully the proposals of the League. He as- 
 sumes that the League proposes that the judgments and 
 recommendations of compromise reached shall be enforced 
 
76 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 by the League. This is a fundamental error. We may 
 therefore dismiss further consideration of Mr. Roosevelt's 
 objections. 
 
 Senator Borah objects to the League because he says it 
 will involve the United States in a surrender of the Monroe 
 Doctrine and in momentous obligations which he does not 
 think the people would be willing to assume. I quite agree 
 that the League will involve momentous consequences, and 
 I also quite agree that the people of the United States ought 
 to understand exactly what those consequences are and the 
 burdens that they would assume in entering such a League. 
 It would be a great deal better not to enter such a League 
 than to suffer the humiliation of having made an agreement 
 and then repudiate it. There is no disposition on the part 
 of those who are urging the adoption of the League to avoid 
 a discussion of its necessary consequences. They, on the 
 contrary, seek the fullest discussion because it would be idle 
 for the treaty-making power to enter into a treaty of this 
 kind until after Congress and all the people of the United 
 States shall know and fully approve our participation in 
 such a movement. 
 
 Senator Borah supposes three cases to show its dangers. 
 In the first, Russia and Japan, being members of the League 
 with all the other great nations of the World, have a con- 
 troversy over a matter in Manchuria. Russia refuses sub- 
 mission to a Court or Commission, and begins hostilities 
 against Japan. Under the League, England, France, Ger- 
 many, Austria, Italy and the United States would unite 
 forces with Japan to defeat Russia's attack. The United 
 States would have to contribute men and vessels according 
 to some equitable rule prescribed in the Treaty, proportioned 
 to resources and geographical location. This is the extreme 
 
THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 77 
 
 responsibility which the United States must face. This is 
 the burden she might have. But it is improbable. With a 
 knowledge of this union of tremendous forces against her, 
 Russia would not be likely to violate her plighted faith. 
 The moral effect of the power of the world would prevent 
 her. Ought the United States not be willing to run the risk 
 of being called upon to contribute her quota in such a remote 
 contingency in order that the power of the world may be- 
 come effective without actual use of force to stop war? 
 Each instance of its successful exercise would strengthen its 
 future moral influence. 
 
 The second case suggested by Senator Borah is this. 
 Mexico transfers part of her territory to Japan, and Japan 
 takes it. Thus the Monroe Doctrine is violated. The 
 United States protests and Japan demands a submission 
 under the League. The question is a political one; the 
 Monroe Doctrine does not involve or rest on principles of 
 international law. It would be submitted to the Commission 
 of Conciliation which would, after needed time, recommend 
 a compromise. The United States, if it did not subscribe 
 to the compromise, might honorably refuse to accept it and 
 begin hostilities against Japan. Under the thirty treaties 
 initiated by Mr. Bryan, and consented to by the Senate, the 
 United States could not even now begin such hostilities 
 within a year. In what respect, therefore, is the United 
 States at a disadvantage in the maintenance of the Monroe 
 Doctrine? 
 
 The third case supposed by Senator Borah is that Argen- 
 tine and a European government have a dispute and Argen- 
 tine refuses to submit. If Argentine begins war against the 
 European country, then the powers of the League must be 
 used against her, and European forces jointly with our own 
 
78 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 will punish her for violating her plighted faith and treaty 
 obligations. This is said to involve an abandonment of the 
 Monroe Doctrine. Why? Mr. Seward in 1866, and Mr. 
 Roosevelt in his administration, said most emphatically that 
 the Doctrine can not be used to shelter South American 
 countries against punishment by European countries for 
 their shortcomings. The only limitation set by the Doctrine 
 is that the punishment inflicted shall not involve subverting 
 the independence of Argentine or appropriating and coloniz- 
 ing her territory. I submit, therefore, that the three cases 
 suggested by Senator Borah do not present the difficulties he 
 supposes. 
 
 The two questions for us are whether the League is prac- 
 tical and whether the United States ought to enter it. Of 
 course it is only a general plan, and the details would have 
 to be worked out in a world conference. That it is feasible, 
 and that such details may be worked out, is indicated by the 
 approval which the League has received from Germany, on 
 the one hand, and from the Allies, on the other. There are 
 of course very great difficulties in a practical union of the 
 forces of the world to accomplish a definite single purpose, 
 but they are not insuperable. The League is only applying 
 to the international community the same principle that has 
 been applied to the domestic community, that of using the 
 force of all to suppress the lawless force of the few for the 
 common good. 
 
 We are now entering upon a policy of preparation to de- 
 fend ourselves against the unjust aggression of any nation. 
 I believe this to be absolutely essential to our country's in- 
 terest. The League has officially recognized that such 
 preparation is necessary to its progress. When we have 
 
THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 79 
 
 made this preparation and have the forces of our army and 
 navy adequate to it, we shall be in a position to contribute 
 our share to any force that we may be called upon to furnish 
 in a joint exercise of power by the world to suppress war. 
 President Wilson has said that in the next war there will be 
 no neutrals. If the science of war advances in the next war 
 as much as it has advanced in this over the last war, he is 
 certainly right there will be no room for neutrals. In 
 this aspect, and from a selfish standpoint, therefore, our 
 membership in the League in the future would prove to be 
 safer for our interests than if we stayed out of it. 
 
 But is the selfish standpoint the only one from which we 
 should view this question ? We are potentially the strongest 
 nation in the world. We have a vast population with high 
 intelligence, solidarity and homogeneity. We have enor- 
 mous resources and incomparable wealth. We are so 
 situated that our position between the nations of Europe 
 and between those of Asia is an impartial one and we could 
 therefore exercise a just and commanding influence in a 
 council of nations. We do not realize our power in this 
 respect. Lord Grey says that we are necessary to the suc- 
 cessful launching of such a League. We must lead it. 
 Have we any right, therefore, to stay out of a world-ar- 
 rangement calculated to make a world- war improbable, be- 
 cause we shall risk having to contribute our share to an 
 international police force to suppress the disturbers of peace? 
 To-day war in any part of the world may rapidly manifest 
 itself in another part, and the advantage of suppressing it 
 or hedging it about so as to prevent its spread is inestimable. 
 
 [The following statement was made on the occasion of a mass meeting 
 at Richmond, Va., Wednesday evening, March 21, 1917:] 
 
 The break with Germany and the imminence of war 
 
8O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 furnish the strongest arguments for the League to Enforce 
 Peace. 
 
 Preparedness is one of the watchwords of the hour. The 
 Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace has 
 pronounced more than once in favor of national prepared- 
 ness to meet all emergencies and pointed out the fact that the 
 plan it puts forward makes preparedness a necessity. 
 
 The duty to support the President in his foreign policy 
 is plain. The League has declared a thousand times that 
 it is not a stop-the-war movement, and has pledged its sup- 
 port in the defense of civilization and the rights of our 
 citizens. 
 
 The reason we have protested against Germany's ruthless 
 submarine warfare and broken off relations with her is be- 
 cause her conduct is subversive of any peace that is worth 
 having. 
 
 As we are forced into the war, our sole purpose must be 
 to secure the right kind of a peace after the war, for our- 
 selves and for the whole world a permanent and righteous 
 peace. 
 
 This fact is fundamental to the whole situation, and ought 
 to be kept constantly before the minds of all our people. 
 We are contending for a righteous and permanent peace 
 and for nothing else whatsoever. Preparation for such a 
 peace is the most important part of preparedness. The 
 President has this strongly in mind. If, through the growth 
 of hatred and the cry for vengeance, the world should lose 
 sight of its real purpose and come to the end of the war not 
 knowing what it most wants and needs, and so should fail 
 to roll the burden of militarism off its shoulders and to 
 establish lasting peace, it would be a tragedy in the history 
 of the world. 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 8l 
 
 The League to Enforce Peace presents the elements of a 
 program that has been recognized as having in it promise 
 of a better future, a program that has the support in general 
 terms not only of the President but of leading statesmen in 
 all or nearly all of the leading nations. The latter have 
 espoused it while their countries were at war and both they 
 and the President are watching the growth and expression 
 of public opinion in the United States as the deciding factor 
 in the formation of a league. 
 
 During the present crisis and throughout the war which 
 is at hand, the duty of the League to Enforce Peace is to 
 stimulate military preparedness on the one hand, and on 
 the other to spread its gospel of world organization for 
 permanent peace after this conflict is over. 
 
 THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 1 
 
 We are engaged in the greatest war of history to secure 
 permanent world peace. We are fighting for a definite 
 purpose, and that is the defeat of German militarism. If the 
 Prussian military caste retains its power to control the mili- 
 tary and foreign policy of Germany after the war, peace 
 will not be permanent, and war will begin again when the 
 chauvinistic advisers of the Hohenzollern dynasty deem a 
 conquest and victory possible. 
 
 Our Allies have made a stupendous effort and have 
 strained their utmost capacity. Unready for the war, they 
 have concentrated their energy in preparation. In this im- 
 
 1 Address delivered at General Conference of Unitarian and other 
 Christian Churches at Montreal, September 26, 1917. 
 
82 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 portant respect they have defeated the plan of Germany " in 
 shining armor " to crush her enemies in their unreadiness. 
 
 But the war has not been won. Peace now, even though 
 it be made on the basis of the restoration of the status quo, 
 " without indemnities and without annexations," would be 
 a failure to achieve the great purpose for which the Allies 
 have made heartrending sacrifice. Armaments would con- 
 tinue for the next war, and this war would have been fought 
 in vain. The millions of lives lost and the hundreds of 
 billions' worth of the product of men's labor would be 
 wasted. 
 
 He who proposes peace now, therefore, either does not 
 see the stake for which the Allies are fighting, or wishes the 
 German military autocracy still to control the destinies of 
 all of us as to peace or war. Those who favor permanent 
 world peace must oppose with might and main the proposals 
 for peace at this juncture in the war, whether made in 
 socialistic councils, in pro-German conferences or by Pope 
 Benedict. That the Pontiff of the greatest Christian Church 
 should wish to bring to an end a war in which millions of 
 its communion are on both sides is to be expected. That 
 he should preserve a difficult neutrality is also natural. 
 That his high purpose is to save the world from further 
 suffering goes without saying. But the present is not the 
 opportunity of an intervening peacemaker who must assume 
 that compromise is possible. 
 
 The Allies are fighting for a principle the maintenance 
 of which affects the future of civilization. If they do not 
 achieve it they have sacrificed the flower of their youth and 
 mortgaged their future for a century, and all for nothing. 
 This is not a war in which the stake is territory or sphere 
 of influence. The Allies cannot concede peace until they 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 83 
 
 conquer it. When they do so, it will be permanent. 
 Otherwise they fail. 
 
 There are wars like that between Japan and Russia, in 
 which President Roosevelt properly and successfully inter- 
 vened to bring about a peace that helped the parties to a 
 settlement. The principle at stake and the power and ter- 
 ritory were of such a character that a settlement might be 
 made substantially permanent. But the present issue is like 
 that in our Civil War, which was whether the Union was to 
 be preserved and the cancer of slavery was to be cut out. 
 Peace proposals to President Lincoln were quite as numer- 
 ous as those of to-day, and were moved by quite as high 
 motives. But there was no compromise possible. Either 
 slavery and disunion lost or won. So to-day the great moral 
 object of the war must be achieved or defeated. 
 
 An organization of citizens in the United States, known 
 as the League to Enforce Peace, has been active for three 
 years past in promoting its propaganda. There is a similar 
 association in England. In that League are many persons 
 who for years urged the settlement of all international con- 
 troversies by arbitration or judicial decision. The vortex 
 of death and destruction for the peoples of the world, which 
 the breaking out of the war portended, roused these peace 
 lovers and promoters to devise a plan for avoiding war after 
 this should end. The English plan is more ambitious in 
 providing that if the council of nations so decide they must 
 enforce the judgment or settlement. 
 
 Whatever the detailed stipulations of such a league, its 
 operation and success must depend on the obligations of the 
 treaty stipulations. Unless their binding effect is recognized 
 by the nations as a sacred principle, the stipulations of the 
 
84 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 league will be " writ in water." The revelations and dis- 
 closures of this war will satisfy the members of the league 
 that as long as the present military caste controls the German 
 military and foreign policy, the league is impracticable, and 
 would not be worth the parchment on which its obligations 
 would be recorded. Why have they reached this conclusion ? 
 Why, as citizens of the United States, and as citizens of the 
 world anxious to promote peace, do they feel that any pro- 
 posal of peace in the present situation would defeat perm- 
 anent world peace and should be opposed by them with all 
 the energy they can command ? The answer to this question 
 must be found in the causes of this war and the revelations 
 it has made of Germany's purpose, stripped of confusing 
 pretence and naked for the whole world to see. 
 
 Germany was long divided into little states, kingdoms, 
 duchies and other forms of one-man rule. She was the 
 prey of political intrigue and manipulation of other powers. 
 All her well-wishers hoped for and looked forward to her 
 union. The Germans of yore had loved freedom. We 
 Anglo-Saxons were Germans once and our representative 
 system can be traced back to institutions found first in the 
 forests of Germany. In the wars of the first Napoleon, 
 Prussia and other German states were subjected to a great 
 humiliation. But *he German youth rebelled, organized 
 themselves into military reserves, and finally contributed 
 much to the defeat of the man whose lust for universal 
 power finds its counterpart in the aim of the Hohenzollerns 
 of to-day. Later, the Holy Alliance, retaining the principle 
 of the divine right of kings, and supporting it in all of 
 Germany, left no opportunity for the free exercise of politi- 
 cal power by these liberty-loving German youths. In 1848 
 democratic revolutions occurred throughout Germany and 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 85 
 
 in Austria, but they were overcome. Many of the leaders 
 came to the United States and with their followers became 
 our best adopted citizens. When our Civil War came on, 
 their hatred of slavery led them to volunteer for their 
 adopted country, and every battlefield of the war was wet 
 with German blood. 
 
 In Germany itself, however, the liberal element was not 
 allowed to work out its hopes. It had looked to a united 
 and liberal Germany with a government based on the repre- 
 sentative system. It was not to be. Under the first Wil- 
 liam with his Prime Minister Bismarck, who came to power 
 in 1862, a definite plan was adopted of perfecting the 
 already well-disciplined Prussian army so that by " blood 
 and iron " the unity of Germany should be achieved. The 
 whole Prussian nation was made into an army, and it soon 
 became a machine with a power of conquest equaled by no 
 other. The cynical, unscrupulous, but effective, diplomacy 
 of Bismarck first united Prussia with Austria to deprive 
 Denmark of Schleswig-Holstein by force, then secured a 
 quarrel with Austria over the spoils, and deprived her of 
 all influence over the German states by humiliating defeat in 
 the six weeks' war of 1866. After this war, several Ger- 
 man states were annexed forcibly to Prussia and offensive 
 and defensive alliances were made with others. 
 
 Then in 1870 the occasion was seized, when it was known 
 that France was not prepared, to strike at her. France was 
 beaten, and Alsace and Lorraine were taken from her. The 
 German Empire was established with a Prussian King at its 
 head. France was made to pay an indemnity of one billion 
 dollars, with which the military machine of Germany was 
 strengthened and improved. Then Germany settled down 
 to a period of peace to digest the territory which by these 
 
86 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 three wars had been absorbed. Bismarck's purpose in main- 
 taining the superiority of his army was to retain what had 
 been taken by blood and iron, and at the same time by a 
 period of prolonged peace to give to Germany a full oppor- 
 tunity for industrial development and the self-discipline 
 necessary for the highest efficiency. 
 
 The marvelous work which the Germans have accom- 
 plished in their field of industrial activity is known to all. 
 The prosperity which followed increased the population of 
 Germany and crowded her borders. Bismarck was dis- 
 missed by the present Emperor, but his policy of maintain- 
 ing the highest efficiency of the army was continued. And 
 then, as the success of the German system in the material 
 development of the Empire showed itself and became the 
 admiration of the world, the destiny of Germany grew larger 
 in the eyes of her Emperor and her people, and the blood 
 and iron policy which had been directed first to the achieve- 
 ment of the unity of Germany and then to the defense of 
 the German Empire in the enjoyment of what had been taken 
 in previous wars, expanded into a dream of Germanizing the 
 world. The German people were impregnated with this 
 idea by every method of official instruction. A cult of 
 philosophy to spread the propaganda developed itself in the 
 universities and schools. The principle was that the state 
 could do no wrong, that the state was an entity that must 
 be sustained by force ; that everything else must be sacrificed 
 to its strength ; that the only sin the state could commit was 
 neglect and failure to maintain its power. 
 
 With that dogmatic logic which pleases the German mind, 
 and to which it readily adapts itself, this proposition easily 
 led to the further conclusion that there could be no inter- 
 national morality; that morality and its principles applied 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 87 
 
 only to individuals, but that when the action of the state was 
 involved, considerations of honor, of the preservation of ob- 
 ligations solemnly made, must yield if the interests of the 
 state required. These were the principles taught by 
 Treitschke in the University of Berlin and maintained by 
 German economic philosophers and by the representative of 
 the military regime in the person of Bernhardi. 
 
 Bismarck had been keen enough in his diplomacy to await 
 the opportunity that events presented for seeming to be 
 forced into a war which he had long planned. This was the 
 case with Denmark. This was the case with Austria. 
 This was the case with France. German diplomacy has lost 
 nothing of this characteristic in the present war. Germany 
 did not plan the killing of the Austrian Archduke and his 
 consort ; but the minute that that event presented the likeli- 
 hood of war, Germany accepted it as the opportunity for her 
 to strike down her neighbors, Russia and France, and to 
 enlarge her power. She gladly gave her consent to the ulti- 
 matum of Austria to Servia that was sure to bring on war, 
 and then posed as one driven into war by the mobilization of 
 Russia. 
 
 She knew that Russia was utterly unprepared. She knew 
 that France was unprepared. She knew that Great Britain 
 was unprepared. She herself was ready to the last cannon 
 and the last reservist. Therefore, when appealed to by 
 Great Britain and by all the other Powers to intervene and 
 prevent Austria from forcing a universal war, Germany 
 declined to act. Not a telegram or communication between 
 Germany and Austria has ever been given to the public to 
 show the slightest effort to induce delay by Austria. While 
 Germany would pose as having acted only as Austria's ally 
 and as unwilling to influence her against her interest and 
 
88 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 independent judgment, the verdict of history unquestionably 
 will be that the war is due to Germany's failure to prevent 
 it and to her desire to accept the opportunity of the assassina- 
 tion of the Austrian Archduke as a convenient time to begin 
 a war she long intended. The revelation of their unpre- 
 paredness is sufficient to show that England, France and 
 Russia did not conspire to bring on the war. On the other 
 hand, before the war began Germany had constructed a 
 complete system of strategic railways on her Belgian border, 
 adapted not to commercial uses, but only to the quick in- 
 vasion of Belgium. 
 
 Indeed, every fact as the war has developed forms one 
 more circumstance in the irrefragable case against Germany 
 as the Power responsible for this world-disaster. The 
 preparation of fifty years, the false philosophy of her destiny 
 and of the exaltation of force, had given her a yearning for 
 conquest, for the expansion of her territory, the extension 
 of her influence, an4 the Germanization of the world. She 
 alone is responsible for the incalculable destruction of this 
 war. She led on in the armament of the world that she 
 might rule it. She promoted therefore the armament of 
 other nations. Her system was followed, though not as 
 effectively, by other countries in pure defense of their peace 
 and safety. 
 
 And now her Emperor, her Prussian military caste, and 
 her wonderful but blinded people, have the blood of the 
 millions who have suffered in this world catastrophe on their 
 heads. The German military doctrine, that when the in- 
 terests of the state are concerned, the question is one of 
 power and force, and not of honor or obligation or moral 
 restraint, finds its most flagrant examples in Germany's 
 conduct of this war. 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 89 
 
 Her breach of a solemn obligation entered into by her and 
 all the powers of Europe, in respect to Belgium's neutrality, 
 was its first exhibition. It was followed by the well-proven 
 deliberate plan of atrocities against the men, women and 
 children of a part of Belgium in order to terrorize the rest 
 of the population into complete submission. It was shown 
 in the prompt dropping of bombs on defenceless towns from 
 Zeppelins and other aircraft; in the killing of non-combat- 
 ant men, women and children by the naval bombardment of 
 unfortified towns; in the use of liquid fire and poison gases 
 in battle. All of these had been condemned as improper 
 in declarations in the Hague treaties. 
 
 The Reptile Fund, which was used under Bismarck for the 
 bribery of the press and for the maintenance of a spy system, 
 has been enlarged and elaborated, so that German bribery has 
 extended the world over, and the German espionage has 
 exceeded anything known to history. The medieval use 
 by the Hohenzollerns of dynastic kinship has paralyzed the 
 action of the peoples of Greece and Russia. And now we 
 know, by recent revelation, of the aid that Swedish diplomats 
 are furnishing to Germany in her submarine warfare against 
 neutral ships, and that it is made possible by the influence 
 of the German consort of the Swedish King. 
 
 Intrigue, dishonor, cruelty, have characterized the entire 
 military policy of Germany. The rules of international 
 law have been cast to the winds. The murderous submarine 
 has sunk without warning the non-combatant commercial 
 vessels of the enemy and sent their officers, their crews and 
 their passengers, men, women and children, to the bottom 
 without warning. Not only has this policy been pursued 
 against enemy commercial vessels, but also against neutral 
 commercial vessels, and parts of the crew have been 
 
9O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 assembled on the submarines and then the submarine has 
 been submerged and the victims left struggling in the ocean's 
 waste to drown. We find a German diplomat telegraphing 
 from a neutral port to the German headquarters advising 
 that if the submarine be used against the vessels of that 
 neutral Power it leave no trace of the attack. In other 
 words, the murder of the crews must be complete, because 
 " dead men tell no tales." 
 
 Having violated the neutrality of Belgium, having broken 
 its sacred obligations to that country and her people, it is 
 now enslaving them by taking them from Belgium and en- 
 forcing their labor in Germany. This is contrary to every 
 rule of international law, and is in the teeth of the plainest 
 principles of justice and honor. All these things are done 
 for the state. It is not that the nature of the German people 
 generally is cruel that is not the case. But the minds of 
 the German people have been poisoned with this false 
 philosophy ; and the ruling caste in Germany, in its desperate 
 desire to win, has allowed no consideration of humanity or 
 decency or honor to prevent its use of any means which in 
 any way could by hook or crook accomplish a military pur- 
 pose. 
 
 When the war began, Germany was able to convince her 
 people and to convince many in the world that the issue in 
 the war was not the exaltation of the military power of 
 Germany and the expansion of her plan of destiny, but that 
 it was a mere controversy between the Teuton and the Slav, 
 and Germany asked with great plausibility, " Will you have 
 the world controlled by the Slav or by the German ? " 
 Those who insisted that the issue was one of militarism 
 against the peace of the world, of democracy against military 
 autocracy, of freedom against military tyranny, were met 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 91 
 
 with the argument : " Russia is an ally. She is a greater 
 despotism and a greater military autocracy than Germany." 
 As the war wore on, the real issue was cleared of this con- 
 fusion. Russia became a democracy. The fight was be- 
 tween governments directed by their people on the one hand, 
 and the military dynasties of Germany, Austria and Turkey, 
 on the other. 
 
 President Wilson says the Allies are fighting to make 
 the world safe for democracy. Some misconception has 
 been created on this head. The Allies are not struggling to 
 force a particular form of government on Germany. If the 
 German people continue to prefer an Emperor it is not the 
 purpose of the Allies to require them to have a republic. 
 Their purpose is to end the military policy and foreign policy 
 of Germany that looks to the maintenance of a military and 
 naval machine, with its hair-trigger preparation for use 
 against her neighbors. If this continues, it will entail on 
 every democratic government the duty of maintaining a 
 similar armament in self-defense, and, what is likely, the 
 duty will be wholly or partly neglected. Thus the policy 
 of Germany, with her purpose and destiny, will threaten 
 every democracy. This is the condition which it is the 
 determined purpose of the Allies, as interpreted by President 
 Wilson, to change. 
 
 How is the change to be effected ? By defeating Germany 
 in this war. The German people have been very loyal to 
 their Emperor, because his leadership accords with the false 
 philosophy of the state and German destiny, with which 
 they have been indoctrinated and poisoned. A defeat of 
 the military machine, a defeat of the Frankenstein of the mil- 
 itary dynasty to which they have been sacrificed, must open 
 their eyes to the hideous futility of their political course. 
 
92 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 The German Government will then be changed, as its people 
 will have it changed, to avoid a recurrence of such a tragedy 
 as they have deliberately prepared for themselves. 
 
 Men who see clearly the kind of peace which we must 
 have, in order to be a real and lasting peace, can have no 
 sympathy therefore with a patched-up peace, one made at 
 a council table, the result of diplomatic chaffering and 
 bargaining. Men who look forward to a League of the 
 World to Enforce Peace in the future can have no patience 
 with a compromise that leaves the promoting cause of the 
 present awful war unaffected and unremoved. This war 
 is now being fought by the Allies as a League to Enforce 
 Peace. Unless they compel it by victory, they do not 
 enforce it. They do not make the military autocracies of 
 the world into nations fit for a World League, unless they 
 convince them by a lesson of defeat. 
 
 When the war came on, there were a few in the United 
 States who felt that the invasion of Belgium required a 
 protest on the part of our government, and some indeed who 
 felt that we should join in the war at once. But the great 
 body of the American people, influenced by our traditional 
 policy of avoiding European quarrels, stood by the Admini- 
 stration in desiring to maintain a strict neutrality. I think 
 it is not unfair to say that a very large proportion of the 
 intelligent and thinking people of the United States and 
 that means a great majority sympathized with the Allies 
 in the struggle which they were making. But many of Ger- 
 man birth and descent, prompted by a pride in the notable 
 advance in the world of German enterprise, German in- 
 genuity, German discipline, German efficiency, and regard- 
 ing the struggle as an issue between Teuton and Slav, 
 extended their sympathy to their Fatherland. 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 93 
 
 As conscientiously as possible, the Administration and the 
 country pursued the course laid down by international law 
 as that which a neutral should take. International lav/ is 
 the rule of conduct of nations toward one another accepted 
 and acquiesced in by all nations. It is not always as definite 
 as one would like, and the acquiescence of all nations is not 
 always as clearly established as it ought to be. But in the 
 law of war as to capture at sea of commercial vessels, the 
 principles have been established clearly by the decision of 
 prize courts of all nations, English, American, Prussian and 
 French. The right of non-combatants on commercial ves- 
 sels, officers, crew and passengers, either enemy or neutral, 
 to be secure from danger of life, has always been recognized 
 and never contested. Nevertheless, by submarine attack on 
 English and American merchant ships without warning, 
 Germany sent to their death one hundred and fifty American 
 men, women and children. We protested and Germany 
 halted for a time. We thought that if we condoned the 
 death of one hundred and fifty we might still maintain peace 
 with that Power. 
 
 But it was not to be, and after more than a year Germany 
 announced her purpose to resume this murderous and illegal 
 course toward innocent Americans. Had we hesitated, we 
 would have lost our independence as a people; we would 
 have subscribed abjectly to the doctrine that might makes 
 right. Germany left no door open to us as a self-respecting 
 nation except that which led to war. She deliberately 
 forced us into the ranks of her enemies, and she did it be- 
 cause she was obsessed with the belief that the submarine 
 was the instrument of destruction by which she might win 
 the war. She recked not that, as she used it, it was a weapon 
 of murder. Making military efficiency her god, and exalt- 
 
94 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ing the appliances of science in the killing of men, she 
 ignored all other consequences. 
 
 Germany's use of the submarine brought us into the war. 
 But being in, we recognized as fully as any of our Allies do 
 that its far greater issue is whether German militarism shall 
 continue after this war to be a threat to the peace of the 
 world, or whether we shall end that threat by this struggle 
 in which we are to spend our life's blood. We must not 
 therefore be turned from the stern necessity of winning this 
 war. 
 
 When the war began and its horrible character was dis- 
 closed, there were many religious persons who found their 
 faith in God shaken by the fact that millions of innocent 
 persons could be headed into this vortex of blood and 
 destruction without the saving intervention of their Creator. 
 But the progress of the war has revealed much, and it has 
 stimulated our just historic sense. It shows that the world 
 had become, through the initiative of Germany and the fol- 
 lowing on of the other nations, afflicted with the cancer of 
 militarism. God reveals the greatness of His power and 
 His omnipotence not by fortuitous and sporadic intervention, 
 but by the working out of His inexorable law. A cancer, 
 if it is not to consume the body, must be cut out, and the 
 cutting out necessarily involves suffering and pain. The 
 sacrifices of lives and treasure are inevitable in the working 
 out of the cure of the world malady. But we must win the 
 war to vindicate this view. 
 
 We are now able to see the providential punishment and 
 weakness that follows the violation of moral law. The 
 crass materialism of the German philosophy that exalts force 
 above morality, power above honor and decency, success 
 above humanity, has blinded the German ruling caste to 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 95 
 
 the strength of moral motives that control other peoples, and 
 involved them in the fundamental mistakes that will cause 
 their downfall. They assumed that England, burdened with 
 Ireland, would violate her own obligation and abandon Bel- 
 gium and would leave her ally France to be deprived of all 
 her colonial possessions. They assumed that France was 
 decadent, permeated with socialism, and unable to make a 
 contest in her state of unpreparedness. They assumed that 
 England's colonies, attached only by the lightest tie, and 
 entirely independent, if they chose to be, would not sacrifice 
 themselves to help the mother land in her struggle. How 
 false the German conclusion as to England's national con- 
 science and fighting power, as to France's supposed deca- 
 dence and her actual patriotic fervor and strength, and as 
 to the filial loyalty of England's daughters! 
 
 England and France since 1914 have been fighting the 
 battle of the world and fighting for us of America. The 
 war has drained their vitality, strained their credit, exhausted 
 their man-power, subjected many of their non-combatants to 
 suffering and destruction, and they have the war weariness 
 which dulls the earlier eager enthusiasm for the principles at 
 stake. Now, specious proposals for peace are likely to be 
 most alluring to the faint-hearted, and most powerful in the 
 hands of traitors. 
 
 The intervention of the United States, by her financial aid, 
 has helped much; but her armies are needed and she, a 
 republic unprepared, required time to prepare. The war 
 is now to be determined by the active tenacity of purpose of 
 the contestants. England showed that tenacity in the wars 
 of Napoleon. Napoleon succumbed. General Grant, in his 
 Memoirs, says that the battle is won not in the first day, but 
 by the commander and the army which is ready, even after 
 
96 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 apparent defeat, to begin the next day. It is the side which 
 has the nerve that will win. The intervention of the United 
 States has strengthened that nerve in England, France and 
 Italy. But delay and disappointment give full opportunity 
 to the lethargic, the cowardly, the factious, to make the task 
 of the patriot and the loyal men doubly heavy. This is the 
 temper of the situation among our European Allies. 
 
 With us at home the great body of our people are loyal 
 and strong for the war. Of course, it takes time to con- 
 vince a people, however intelligent, when very prosperous 
 and comfortable and not well advised as to the vital concern 
 they have in the issue of a war across a wide ocean, thou- 
 sands of miles away. But we have, for the first time in the 
 history of our republic, begun a war right. We have begun 
 with a conscription law which requires service from men of 
 a certain age from every walk of life. It is democratic in 
 principle, and yet it offers to the Government the means of 
 selection so that those who shall be sent to the front may 
 be best fitted to represent the nation there, and those best 
 able to do the work in field and factory, essential to our 
 winning at the front, may be retained. We have adopted 
 a merit system of selecting from the intelligent and educated 
 youth of the country the company officers. The machinery 
 of the draft naturally creaked some because it had to be so 
 hastily constructed, but on the whole it has worked well. 
 Those who devised it and have carried it through are entitled 
 to great credit. 
 
 The lessons of the war are being learned and applied in 
 our war equipment and in neutralizing, by new construction, 
 the submarine destruction of commercial transports. Ade- 
 quate measures for the raising of the money needed to 
 finance our Allies have been carried through Congress. 
 
THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 97 
 
 Food conservation is provided for. But of course it took 
 time for a hundred million of peace lovers and non-mili- 
 tarists to get ready, however apt, however patriotic, how- 
 ever determined. 
 
 " It is ' dogged ' that does it." Reject all proposals of 
 peace as ill advised or seditious, and then time will make for 
 our certain victory. 
 
 While there has been pro-German sentiment in the United 
 States, and while the paid emissaries of Germany have been 
 busy trying to create as much opposition to the war as pos- 
 sible and have found a number of weak dupes and unin- 
 telligent persons, who don't understand the importance of 
 the war, to aid them, our Allies should know that the whole 
 body of the American people will earnestly support the 
 President and Congress in carrying out the measures which 
 have been adopted by the United States to win this war. 
 
 When the war is won, the United States will wish to be 
 heard and will have a right to be heard as to the terms of 
 peace. The United States will insist on a just peace, not 
 one of material conquest. It is a moral victory the world 
 should win. I think I do not mistake the current of public 
 sentiment throughout our entire country in saying that our 
 people will favor an international agreement by which the 
 peace brought about through such blood and suffering and 
 destruction and enormous sacrifice shall be preserved by the 
 joint power of the world. Whether the terms of the League 
 to Enforce Peace, as they are, will be taken as a basis for 
 agreement, or a modified form, something of the kind must 
 be attempted. 
 
 Meantime, let us hope and pray that all the Allies will 
 reject proposals for settlement and compromise of every 
 nature; that they will adhere rigidly and religiously to the 
 
98 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 principle that, until a victorious result gives security that 
 the world shall not again be drenched in blood through the 
 insanely selfish policy of a military caste ruling a deluded 
 people intoxicated with material success and power, there 
 will be no peace. 
 
 WORLD PEACE DEBATE * 
 
 A. Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace 
 Feasible? 
 
 I 
 
 The platform is not a program to stop the present war. 
 It looks to a treaty to be adopted at or after its close. Its 
 purpose is to enforce deliberation, impartial investigation 
 and judgment of a cause of international quarrel before 
 hostilities. It does not seek to enforce the decision after it 
 is rendered ; but by making clear to the threatening nations 
 and to the world what the real issue is, and what an impartial 
 Tribunal thinks about it, the enforced procedure and the 
 necessary delay will prevent most wars. 
 
 To make the platform work, the eight or nine great 
 Powers should join the League. The weaker nations will 
 then be glad to secure the benefit of its protection. Will 
 the great belligerent Powers join? Lord Grey and Mr. 
 Asquith of Great Britain, M. Briand of France, and Dr. 
 Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany are representative of them. 
 They have approved the principles of the League. Lord 
 Grey says that the war should not end without it. President 
 
 1 Written debate between Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan during the first 
 four months of 1917. World Peace (Doran). 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 99 
 
 Wilson, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Lodge uphold it. These 
 personal expressions do not bind the Nations; but they 
 show that the general plan is feasible and supplies a want 
 which the world feels. 
 
 The platform only lays down broad lines. Its machinery 
 must be worked out in International Conference. Its feasi- 
 bility is not successfully attacked by exceptional hypotheses 
 under which it would fail of its purpose. The most practical 
 plan of government may thus be shown to be futile. If the 
 platform will work in most cases, the value of the result 
 justifies its adoption. 
 
 Are the four planks considered in detail feasible ? 
 
 1. A Court to administer international justice is not new. 
 Our own Supreme Court is one. Questions arise between 
 States not settled by the Federal Constitution or Federal 
 statutes. In the Kansas-Colorado case, Congress had no 
 power to control Colorado. International Law alone fixed 
 the rights between the States; and the Supreme Court en- 
 forced these rights. 
 
 Our relations with Canada are such that we settle all 
 questions by negotiation or arbitration. We have now two 
 permanent Tribunals to decide controversies between us 
 one to adjudge questions of boundary waters like that be- 
 tween Kansas and Colorado, and the other to pass upon 
 claims of the citizens of one country against the other. We 
 have thus contracted the habit of arbitration ; and, when 
 negotiation fails, no one expects anything else. In our 
 League, the quarrelling nations, moved by their obligation, 
 sanctioned by the threat of compulsion by their associates, 
 will contract the same habit. 
 
 2. There may be, however, political or other irritating 
 and threatening issues between nations which cannot be 
 
IOO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 settled on principles of law. They are to be submitted under 
 the second plank for hearing and recommendation of com- 
 promise just as our Fur Seal Arbitration with England. 
 
 3. The third or Force plank gives vitality to the platform. 
 It appeals to practical men. It provides for economic 
 pressure and a Police Force to hold off members of the 
 League from war until the cooling and curative influence of 
 the League's judicial procedure may have time to operate, 
 
 No matter how law-abiding a community, neither the 
 statutes nor judgments of the Courts enforce themselves so 
 as to dispense with police or sheriffs. The latter may be 
 called on infrequently to suppress disorder or to remove 
 obstruction to judicial decree. The fact that they are 
 present, however, in the community, or in the Court, with 
 the power to act and the intention to act when necessary, 
 stays would-be disturbers or obstructors. Fear of police 
 action is usually effective without actual use of force. 
 " They also serve who only stand and wait." 
 
 4. No one will doubt the feasibility of the fourth plank. 
 Successful Congresses for declaring the principles of Inter- 
 national Law and enlarging their scope have been held 
 before. Such was the Congress at Paris in 1856 in which 
 privateering was abolished. 
 
 The agreement of all the powerful nations of the world 
 to unite their armies and their navies to resist the prema- 
 ture hostilities of one or more nations against another must 
 increase the binding effect of the obligation of the League 
 members not to rush into sudden war. The fear of forcible 
 restraint would thus, in most cases, render actual resort to it 
 unnecessary. 
 
 The League is to be a world alliance. We have had 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE IOI 
 
 precedents of successful alliances for the purpose of protect- 
 ing the parties to them against outside attack. In various 
 junctures in the past, these alliances have preserved peace. 
 The fear of their united force has prevented others from 
 attacking a single member. 
 
 Moreover, the binding effect of such alliances has shown 
 itself. France, with no interest in Servia, and with the 
 danger of being crushed by Germany, keeps the letter of her 
 agreement with Russia. England, with no interest in 
 Servia, maintains her obligation to Belgium ; while Germany, 
 without interest in Servia, upholds her word to Austria. 
 Treaties may sometimes be broken ; but as the best hope of 
 securing international progress, we should not abandon them. 
 The fear of another World War, which will lead the great 
 Powers into our League, will also lead them to meet its 
 obligation. 
 
 II 
 
 The League is not a defensive league against outside 
 nations. It does not defend its members against non-mem- 
 bers. Its purpose is to furnish a means of keeping peace 
 among its own members only. It proposes to secure World 
 Peace by attracting to its membership, first, all the Great 
 Powers, and then the lesser Powers which will surely follow. 
 The logic of circumstances must inevitably force the Great 
 Powers engaged in this war to membership. In seeking 
 permanent peace, whether they wish it or not, the League 
 must be their common goal. 
 
 The Allies proclaim their purpose to be to secure a perma- 
 nent basis for peace, safeguarded by practical guaranties, 
 that is, of superior force. What is that but the League? 
 
 Germany's Chancellor avows her willingness to join a 
 
IO2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 league to " suppress disturbers of peace." The League is 
 only a wise preparation of the members, by organization of 
 their united potential force, to frighten from its purpose a 
 would-be disturber of the World's Peace, and thus probably 
 make the use of actual force unnecessary. 
 
 Germany now proposes peace with suggestion of a limita- 
 tion of armaments. In the Hague conferences, Germany 
 declined to consider such a limitation. Such a suggestion 
 by her now looks necessarily to a continuing " Bund " to 
 exact the limitation. This is only a logical corollary to our 
 proposals. Our League must deal with armaments and fix 
 a minimum to secure effective joint action. Why not a 
 maximum ? 
 
 Again, whether Germany's present proposals are now to 
 lead to peace or not, serious negotiations must sometime 
 come ; and then conditions will make for a League like ours. 
 One of Germany's motives in offering peace is, of course, her 
 desire to satisfy her own people that their Government is 
 anxious to end their almost unbearable burdens. In Russia, 
 the power of control is passing from the Bureaucracy to the 
 Council and the Duma. When whole peoples constitute 
 the armies and the makers of war supplies, as never before, 
 and all of them are enduring the sweat and woe and blood, 
 their will determines policies. Otherwise, dynasties fall. 
 In all history, no time can find the contending peoples so 
 anxious for guaranties of permanent peace as at the end 
 of this war. Lord Grey's words, that the war cannot and 
 should not end without such a League, will find an echo 
 in all their hearts. 
 
 It is these circumstances that make the League feasible. 
 Difficulties are suggested. They concern the detail of 
 operation rather than the main principles. If the nations 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 103 
 
 are determined to create such a League, as they will be. they 
 can arrange the details. 
 
 Of course, a council or other joint body of representatives 
 of the League must act in case of strained relations between 
 League members. It will naturally use diplomatic pressure 
 to prevent a rupture. Such a body in negotiation with them 
 will have excellent opportunity to learn which of the con- 
 testants intends a breach of its plighted faith. Upon the 
 decision of such a council, all members of the League, in 
 compliance with the third article, will withhold commerce or 
 dealing with the recalcitrant. A boycott of this kind would 
 be a powerful deterrent weapon and probably make resort 
 to force unnecessary. 
 
 But it is said that force is not a feasible means of securing 
 and maintaining peace. To say so is to ignore history and 
 experience, domestic and international. Fear of forcible 
 restraint and punishment is often an indispensable motive to 
 strengthen moral impulse to obey the law and follow the 
 right. That it may not be needed by some does not render 
 it safe to dispense with it in the case of others. If we need 
 restraint to keep men in paths of peace and law, why not 
 nations ? Nations are only men united in communities ; and 
 they have not the moral self-restraint of the average man. 
 Force used for selfish, vicious or improper ends is, of course, 
 to be deplored. But is there any method of defeating force 
 used for such ends, except superior force threatened or 
 applied for the common good? Has force, or fear of it, 
 never done any good among the nations ? What was it that 
 kept Louis XIV's greedy hand out of the Spanish Nether- 
 lands but the fear of the league of England, Holland and 
 Sweden? What was it that stopped Napoleon in his mad 
 lust for universal domination but a league of all Europe, 
 
104 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 welded by England, against him? The fact that, after the 
 Napoleonic wars, this league degenerated, as the Holy Alli- 
 ance, into a selfish plot of an inner ring to promote the divine 
 right of kings, does not detract from the useful purpose it 
 originally served. What was it but force that cut out the 
 cancer of slavery in our body politic? What was it but 
 force that freed Cuba from oppression ? Have men changed 
 since these wars, that force or fear of force is not now 
 needed at times to help a just cause to prevail? 
 
 Before the present war, the Triple Alliance on the one side 
 and the Triple Entente on the other, divided Europe into 
 two vast and powerful camps ; and men spoke of their pro- 
 moting peace on the theory that one sword would keep the 
 other in its scabbard. These leagues did for a time prevent 
 attack upon single members ; but ultimately they failed. 
 This war was precipitated because they were divided against 
 each other; and there were other motives in their main- 
 tenance than a mere preservation of peace. Their failure 
 offers no argument against the feasibility and success of our 
 League. Its members could not organize separate leagues 
 and be honest or consistent members of ours. The League's 
 simple plan of unity of power, with but one purpose of 
 forcibly maintaining World Peace by deliberation, hearing 
 and decision before hostilities, distinguishes it in its aim 
 and practical moderation from all others. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Mr. Bryan objects that if only a part of the nations 
 entered the League, there would ensue a test of military 
 strength between the League group of nations and other 
 groups. This objection finds no warrant in our plan because 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 05 
 
 the League deals not at all with non-members, but only with 
 differences between League members. Of course, if but a 
 part of the nations consented to join the League, the plan 
 would not work. To be useful and accomplish its purpose, 
 it must have world membership. In my last paper, I showed 
 why it would have this, because the great Powers now in war, 
 and then the lesser Powers, would and must seek such a 
 League when peace comes. 
 
 Mr. Bryan objects that confidence in the armed support 
 of the League would prompt a League member to acts 
 rendering peaceful settlement impossible and precipitating 
 war. This rests on the same misconception as to the 
 League's attitude toward non-members. As between mem- 
 bers, such motive would be slight. The Council of the 
 League, in using diplomatic pressure to prevent a rupture 
 between two members, would have full opportunity to know 
 and report which was really forcing hostilities; and the 
 League would act accordingly. 
 
 He also objects to a League with force in it because we 
 have already made thirty-one treaties agreeing to investiga- 
 tion before war which contain no provision for force. An 
 agreement for investigation and orderly procedure before 
 war and a subsequent agreement providing a world police 
 force to compel such procedure are not inconsistent. 
 
 Mr. Bryan asks what is meant by " economic pressure." 
 I answer a boycott of the unruly nation an embargo 
 threatened or imposed by all the members of the League on 
 their trade with the recalcitrant member. Such an embargo 
 must of necessity accompany war, because war means the 
 cessation of commerce between the belligerent parties. The 
 boycott or embargo may, however, precede war and prevent 
 it. This is the part which it is intended to play in our plan. 
 
IO6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Mr. Bryan's whole argument thus far against the League 
 is an argument against the evils of war. But I submit this 
 is not to the point if war persists. The use of force to sup- 
 press a small war, however undesirable, is better than a 
 world war, and is justified in avoiding it. Mr. Bryan says, 
 " Why not test the friendship plan among nations? " His- 
 tory has oftentimes tested it and found that it did not work. 
 While peaceful means of avoiding war are becoming more 
 successful than in the past, the present war has convinced the 
 world that a plan for the peaceful settlement of international 
 quarrels will be more certainly effective if the nations of the 
 world unite in their own interest to compel the working of 
 the plan. The present war has brought home to them their 
 deep interest in stopping every war, however remote, in order 
 to prevent the conflagration's spread. 
 
 Mr. Bryan says that force breeds violence and cites the 
 useful change from the time when all men carried weapons 
 to the time when they gave up the practice. The instance is 
 not helpful to his argument. Men gave up weapons when 
 they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the 
 community, to protect them against violence. By analogy, 
 if our plan becomes effective, it will offer a strong induce- 
 ment to limit armaments a proposal that Germany has 
 already unofficially given out. 
 
 Would Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state 
 and nation? Does he think a state or national prohibition 
 law would enforce itself without the arrest of offenders and 
 their restraint and punishment? Will "the friendship 
 plan," without any public force in the background, work 
 well in any of our communities, however law-abiding? If 
 not, why should it among the nations ? 
 
 I agree that the analogy between the domestic police force 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 07 
 
 and the union of the forces of the nations of the world is 
 not complete because of the difficulty of effective interna- 
 tional cooperation ; but the essential principle which justifies 
 and requires the use of force in each case is the same, to 
 wit, that all the people have a right and duty to exert their 
 united force to suppress violence between individuals dis- 
 turbing the community, and that all nations have a right 
 and duty to use their united forces to suppress a disturbance 
 of international peace which may involve the whole world. 
 
 Mr. Bryan questions whether the President's words or 
 those of Mr. Hughes, in respect to the League, are suf- 
 ficiently specific to justify my use of them. They were used 
 by the speakers with the League's proposals in mind, not 
 only to approve them all, but especially the third or force 
 proposal, which is the one to which Mr. Bryan chiefly 
 objects. 
 
 Of course, if the United States or any other nation is to 
 join the League, its principles will be embodied in a treaty 
 with all the necessary working details. This treaty should 
 not be ratified unless it is approved, after full knowledge 
 and consideration of the details, not only by the treaty-mak- 
 ing agency of each power, but also by the great body of its 
 people and its legislature or congress, upon whom must fall 
 the serious burden of performance of the treaty obligations. 
 This would be needed to give assurance that the League 
 would really hold the nations when the strain comes. 
 
 B. Does the League Platform Offer the Most Practical 
 Plan for Securing Permanent Peace ? 
 
 IV 
 
 Is the platform of the League the most practical plan for 
 securing permanent peace after the war? 
 
IO8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Should the League attempt more than it does ? Should it 
 enforce the judgments of the Court and the recommenda- 
 tions for compromise by the Commission? The two must 
 be distinguished. A judgment between nations, like a 
 domestic judgment, might be enforced. But nations will 
 reasonably object to final submission of vital interests to 
 the discretion of arbitrators, however impartial, in recom- 
 mending compromise of an issue -not covered by principles 
 of law. The Supreme Court of the United States renders 
 and enforces judgments between the States on justiciable 
 issues ; but, although given broad authority to hear " con- 
 troversies between States," it refuses to decide issues not 
 involving the application of principles of law. They must 
 be settled by agreement or go unsettled. A judgment binds 
 the parties in honor to its terms. This helps to secure 
 acquiescence. But a recommendation of compromise im- 
 plies no such moral sanction. The League has deemed it 
 best not to attempt the enforcement of either judgments or 
 compromises. It is wise for it not to try too much, lest 
 being over ambitious, it fail. 
 
 There are said to be wrongs which only war can remedy. 
 If so, our plan does not prevent such a remedy. It enforces 
 investigation, discussion, deliberation and impartial decision 
 before war is begun and avoids most wars. If a war be- 
 tween members of the League is inevitable and necessary, 
 the delay secured will enable the remainder of the League 
 to hedge it about so as not to permit its spread. 
 
 Is a plan without force in it more practical than that of 
 the League? It is not practical at all because the present 
 belligerent powers could not be induced to adopt it. They 
 demand effective guaranties of future peace. They will not 
 trust to the security of a League which depends for its main- 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 109 
 
 tenance of peace on the mere promises of its members to abide 
 a judicial settlement. In their minds, nothing will be effec- 
 tive which will not unite the superior force of all for the 
 common good to secure the world against the aggression of 
 reckless and faithless disturbers of its peace. Without such 
 a result, the war will, in their view, have been fought in vain. 
 
 The psychological effect of this war upon the world has 
 not been to vindicate the purely non-resistant pacifists or to 
 increase their number. It has been to increase " the militant 
 pacifists," to use a paradox, who are now willing to consent 
 to the use of force if it be directed to the maintenance of the 
 just peace of the world. 
 
 Mr. Bryan objects to the obligation of every member of 
 the League to be ready to do its share in creating the police 
 force. What good could come from a police force if it had 
 to be organized after the riot alarm was turned in? Each 
 nation, therefore, must know what force it should furnish, 
 and should in good faith keep in a state of reasonable 
 preparation to respond to a call. The share of each member 
 will have to be generally prescribed in the fundamental 
 agreement of the League, and must vary in number and 
 kind with the geographical location and resources of the 
 member and other circumstances. A self-respecting nation, 
 bound jointly with others to constitute an international 
 police force, may agree without the least sacrifice of dignity, 
 to keep ready a force to fulfil its obligation. It could well 
 afford to do so, because the security afforded by the joint 
 forces of the League will reduce the reasonable preparation 
 needed for its own defence. 
 
 Mr. Bryan insists that our League with its obligation will 
 increase armaments. On the contrary, it will reduce them 
 and the taxes necessary to maintain them. Indeed the work- 
 
IIO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ing out of our plan must inevitably furnish the strongest 
 motive for an agreement to reduce and limit armaments, in 
 accord with the intimation of Germany already referred to. 
 
 Mr. Bryan objects to the surrender by each member of 
 its control over its own military and naval policy. If so, 
 he objects to the reduction and limitation of maximum 
 armaments supervised by the League, a plan which I sup- 
 posed had the approval of the most extreme pacifists. Every 
 treaty between two nations which accomplishes any good 
 involves a surrender on the part of each of some right which 
 it is willing to limit to accomplish a greater benefit. 
 
 The fear, expressed by Mr. Bryan and others that such 
 a league would degenerate into a trap for the peaceful 
 nations, causing them to serve the purpose of designing and 
 ambitious warlike members, has little to justify it. The 
 unity, strength and permanence of the League must depend 
 on its justice and fairness. The perversion of its high 
 purpose, shown in the action of any group attempting its 
 control, must inevitably and promptly lead to its dissolution. 
 
 A league for judicial settlement of international disputes 
 without force would prove a step forward; but it would be 
 far short of our League in efficacy and scope. It would 
 cover only questions of legal nature. Many issues likely 
 to provoke war would not come within its scope. The 
 element of force in our League gives it an advantage not 
 measured solely by the sanction it adds to its obligations. 
 It will give to every member of the League a sense of respon- 
 sibility for the peace of the world. It will create a union of 
 interest among the members, wholly absent in a league for 
 judicial settlement in which a refusal to submit to the court 
 concerns only the refusing member and its opponent and 
 involves the other members of the league in no responsibility. 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE HI 
 
 Our League, through the active and stimulated concern of 
 every member in the continuing friendship of all, would 
 bring the nations much nearer to " the Parliament of Man 
 and the Federation of the World." 
 
 V 
 
 Mr. Bryan suggests a League of Nations of which the 
 members agree to delay war for a year of investigation and 
 report by a permanent tribunal. This is on the basis of the 
 stipulations of treaties negotiated by him as Secretary of 
 State with thirty-one separate nations. Our League's pro- 
 posals recognize the value of delay and investigation in 
 avoiding hotheaded resort to war. But Mr. Bryan's plan 
 did not include a judgment by a Court or a recommendation 
 of compromise by a Commission. Thus he has advanced 
 some, but little. He suggests that an arbitral judgment or 
 recommendation after investigation and hearing is less likely 
 to secure a peaceful adjustment than a mere investigation 
 and report without conclusion and decision. This is not 
 sound. The decision of an impartial tribunal must always 
 be of some moral weight in securing from the disputing 
 parties peaceful acquiescence in a settlement. He says that 
 investigators will appeal to the reason and sense of justice 
 of the parties, while arbitrators, in dealing with parties 
 bound to abide their decision, are not so likely to do so. On 
 the contrary, the most searching and just criticism of inter- 
 national arbitrations is that their judgments are com- 
 promises, intended to appeal to the acquiescence of the 
 parties, rather than straight decisions on principles of law. 
 
 Mr. Bryan urges that a treaty obligation of two nations to 
 maintain a period of delay and investigation before hos- 
 
112 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 tilities, is inconsistent with a compact of all other nations 
 forcibly to require the two nations to keep their engagement. 
 Why should this make the delay and investigation less likely 
 than when dependent on the naked promises of the two 
 nations in the heat of quarrel ? How is the insistence of all 
 other nations upon the delay likely to create war between 
 the quarrelling nations? Mr. Bryan says "the League to 
 Enforce Peace violates the spirit of our treaty plan; it 
 would send forth a dove of peace, to be sure, but its dove 
 would carry a sword instead of an olive branch." With 
 deference, this is mere rhetoric. It is not dealing with facts 
 as they are, or with human nature as it is. If it be a logical 
 argument, then the presence of a policeman in a community 
 to arrest law breakers and of a court to punish them violates 
 the spirit of the law which all are under a moral obligation 
 to obey. Mr. Bryan says that when two neighbors fall out 
 they call in their friends and allow time for investigation 
 and friendly advice, each party reserving the right of inde- 
 pendent action after the conference, and that the prospect of 
 settlement is much lessened if the conference is opened with 
 a display of weapons. This is not the usual way of settling 
 such disputes, but assume that it is. Would Mr. Bryan con- 
 tend that the prospect of a settlement would be improved if 
 the disputants knew that, in their failure to agree, there were 
 no law and no courts and no police to enforce their mutual 
 rights and duties? In our League to Enforce Peace, there 
 is no display of weapons by one party to the controversy 
 against the other. The element of world force in the third 
 article is no more obtrusive and no more provocative of 
 temper or heat than the machinery of justice in the domestic 
 environment of the two supposed neighbors. 
 
 There is no proof of the feasibility of Mr. Bryan's World 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 113 
 
 League in his thirty-one treaties between other nations and 
 the United States. Many, but not all, nations were willing 
 to sign such treaties because they were revocable within a 
 short period, and because they were made with the United 
 States which is notoriously unprepared for war. They 
 would, doubtless, decline to make such an agreement with 
 their immediate and powerful neighbors; and no such 
 treaties have been made between other important nations. 
 Mr. Bryan says that all nations would enter such a League 
 if they would enter ours. On the contrary, the sanction of 
 the world's united command in securing performance of the 
 promises under our League will induce nations to yield their 
 power to strike at once for their rights in the confidence that 
 any opponent, however tricky or faithless, will not be per- 
 mitted to take advantage of their concession. What the 
 belligerent nations, in ending this war, "are yearning for is 
 a guaranty of peace, not only in the promise of each nation 
 but in the assurance of the sanction of a superior force of all 
 for the common good to compel observance of its promise. 
 Mr. Bryan's proposal in this aspect would seem to them a 
 rope of sand ; and they would have none of it as a practical 
 object in ending the war. 
 
 Mr. Bryan thinks that the present war demonstrates the 
 fallacy of what he calls " peace by terrorism." What the 
 present war really demonstrates is the truth of the conclusion 
 of Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher, that universal 
 peace cannot be expected until the world is politically organ- 
 ised, that is, until the nations of the world use the prestige 
 and force of all for the common good to suppress disturbers 
 of peace. The League to Enforce Peace, if it becomes an 
 accomplished fact, will be a step in this world political organ- 
 ization. 
 
114 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Mr. Bryan's League would be nothing but a series of 
 treaties between " couples "of nations. If two nations fell 
 out, the nations of the world other than the disputants, 
 would have no active function except to watch the two 
 quarrelling nations keep or break their promises to wait a 
 year. There would be no " political organisation " of the 
 world to preserve and secure peace. Our League makes 
 every member active and selfishly interested in maintaining 
 peace to escape the burden of acting as policeman. Thus we 
 have the " team work " of the world. 
 
 VI 
 
 Mr. Bryan proposes four plans which he thinks more 
 practical than that of our League. The first one I have 
 already considered. 
 
 The second is a World Court, in which all nations are to 
 be represented, to consider and decide justiciable issues, and 
 to investigate and make findings on non-justiciable issues, 
 the judgment or finding to be enforceable only by the parties. 
 This is similar to the first two proposals of our League, with 
 the force article left out. There is no sanction, beyond its 
 agreement, that any nation will delay hostilities until hear- 
 ing and judgment. It does not differ from Mr. Bryan's 
 first proposal except that his tribunal gives a decision here; 
 and, in his first, it did not. This is an improvement; but, 
 with that exception, it is open to the same objections. It 
 lacks the essential quality of world organization and pressure 
 for peace. It is a mere combination of separate treaties of 
 arbitration between every two nations. This suggestion of 
 force adds nothing. The optional use of force by one party 
 to an arbitration to compel performance by the other of an 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 
 
 award would be implied. Mr. Bryan says, "If the nations 
 agreed to such a plan, the chances against war would be 
 a hundred to one, if not a thousand to one." Mr. Bryan's 
 " If " is a formidable obstacle. The view of both the Allies 
 and the Central Powers, shown in the peace correspondence, 
 is clear. They both demand sanctions of force. Germany 
 will enter a league to suppress disturbers of peace. The 
 Allies declare in favor of " international agreements imply- 
 ing the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus 
 prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new 
 aggressions." Lloyd George, in his Guildhall speech on 
 January nth, said: "The peace and security for peace 
 will be that the nations will band themselves together to 
 punish the first peace breaker who comes out. As to the 
 armies of Europe, every weapon will be a sword of justice 
 in the Government of men ; every army will be a constabulary 
 of peace." 
 
 Mr. Bryan's third plan is that all the nations shall agree 
 to a referendum before declaring war. Mr. Bryan can 
 hardly think that the Great Powers, Russia, Germany, 
 France, England, Austria, Japan and Italy, or any of them, 
 whose consent is necessary to form as effective league, would 
 agree not to begin a war until the question should be left to 
 a vote of their respective electorates and an affirmative vote 
 given. If not, his proposal is not feasible. Suppose the 
 electorate of one country decides for war and that of the 
 other does not. Shall another vote be taken? In which 
 country ? Or shall it be in both ? The difficulty in answer- 
 ing these questions shows how chimerical the proposal is, 
 and how ill adapted to the settlement of a pressing interna- 
 tional issue between two governments. The Federal Con- 
 
Il6 TAFT PAPERS. ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 stitution gives to Congress the power to declare war. 
 Without amendment, Mr. Bryan's proposal could not be 
 seriously entertained. Such an amendment is not likely 
 before this war ends. 
 
 As a fourth plan, Mr. Bryan suggests a reduction of arma- 
 ments. We all strongly favor this. But Mr. Bryan offers 
 no plan for securing and maintaining the reduction. Until 
 all strongly-armed nations reduce their armaments, every 
 wise nation will insist on providing and maintaining an 
 armament enabling it to make effective defence against the 
 possible unlawful aggression of any other armed nation. 
 A general reduction of armaments is entirely impractical 
 under a league unless the league offers to each country a 
 security of peace equivalent to the armament it abandons. 
 I have already pointed out that Germany has expressed a 
 willingness to consent to a limitation of armament. The 
 Allies, in their answer to President Wilson, have intimated 
 that agreements as to armament should be one of the 
 sanctions of a secure peace. How is the reduction to be con- 
 tinuously maintained unless by the united and enforceable 
 command of all the members of the League? An agreed 
 reduction of armament is a corollary to our League's pro- 
 posals, because a world compact embodying them will fur- 
 nish the security to each nation it requires, and justify a 
 lessening of its self-protection. But Mr. Bryan suggests no 
 such security. 
 
 Mr. Bryan, irrelevantly, as it seems to me, charges that 
 all army and navy officers, including our own, " make it 
 their business to imperil peace." This is prompted by their 
 insistence on due preparedness. Applied to our officers, it 
 is a grave injustice to a fine body of men, fully imbued with 
 the true American spirit of subordination of the military 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 117 
 
 to the civil. If war were to come, our sudden sense of de- 
 pendence on their tried skill, courage and high patriotism 
 would cause us deep humiliation for such words, uttered 
 merely because they had warned their countrymen truly. 
 
 The practical advantage of the League is in its organizing 
 the political, economic and military forces of the world to 
 command resort to impartial tribunals for the decision and 
 settlement of all irritating questions between nations before 
 they begin war. The educational effect of this practice will 
 accustom them to such a mode of settlement. 
 
 They will acquire the habit of arbitration as Canada and 
 the United States have done. The sanction of world force, 
 though present, will thus become less compulsive upon the 
 nations ; and they will, as a matter of due course, as a habit 
 and by preference, seek only a peaceful form. 
 
 C. Should the United States Become a Member of the 
 League to Enforce Peace? 
 
 VII 
 
 The war in Europe will have weakened all nations engaged 
 in it by the loss of the flower of their youth and by the 
 destruction of industries and homes in the thousands of 
 miles in its train, the cost of the rehabilitation of which can 
 hardly be measured. The belligerents will stagger under 
 a stupendous debt and interest charge. The primacy of the 
 United States among the nations of the world will thus 
 become clearer than it ever was ; and this, taken with its real 
 neutrality, must give it a great influence in a council of na- 
 tions which can and ought to be exerted for the world's 
 benefit. Its advocacy of such a League will strongly make 
 
I 1 8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 for its acceptance by the other Great Powers, but only on 
 condition that it becomes a member and bears its share of 
 the risk and receives its share of the benefit of membership. 
 
 Our wealth in the last three years has been added to by 
 billions in the profits that have been reaped from the sale of 
 war material and war equipment to the nations of Europe 
 and thus from the blood and the suffering of the people of 
 these stricken countries. We had the right to take advan- 
 tage of the situation for which we were not responsible; but 
 the fact should make us sensitive to our duty when occasion 
 and opportunity arise for us to help our brethern of Europe 
 to avoid a recurrence of such woe. We have been blessed 
 beyond any other nation. Our good fortune seems to have 
 no limit. We shall not be worthy of it unless we recognize 
 our responsibility and run our share of risk in securing the 
 world from a return of the scourge visiting it now. Of 
 course, the first duty of a nation is to its own people and 
 to itself; and it shquld not, out of a mere ideal of self-sac- 
 rifice, endanger the integrity of its government or its civiliza- 
 tion. But it has a duty as a member of the family of 
 nations; and that duty is commensurate with its power for 
 good to the world. 
 
 Moreover the risk which the United States would run in 
 joining such a League should not be exaggerated. If the 
 United States makes adequate preparation, as it intends to 
 do, to defend itself against the unlawful aggression of any 
 nation, the army and navy which it has projected will furnish 
 ample constabulary force to fill any quota which may be 
 allotted to it in the formation of the world police to suppress 
 the beginnings of war in violation of the regulations of the 
 League. 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 19 
 
 In the preliminary conference as to the proposals of the 
 League, one member present put this question to another: 
 Would you be willing that your boy, the apple of your eye 
 and the pride of your heart, should lay down his life in a 
 struggle over a question between Servia and Austria in 
 which America has no concern? The answer was: "If 
 the suppression of that struggle by the police force of the 
 world would prevent a spread of the local fire into a general 
 world conflagration, my boy's life could not be sacrificed in 
 a higher cause." It is the duty of the United States, in its 
 own interest and in the interest of mankind, to lead the 
 nations into a League to Enforce Peace. 
 
 VIII 
 
 Washington's advice has no application to the League. 
 The alliances which he condemned were like that with France 
 during the Revolution because of which we were called on 
 twenty years later to serve the selfish motive of our ally. 
 Jefferson advocated a permanent alliance with Great Britain 
 to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. Our League is a league 
 of all nations to support the selfish purposes of none. It 
 has only one object : to prevent unnecessary wars. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine rests ultimately on force. The 
 traditions of ninety-three years strengthen it; but the Zim- 
 mermann note advises us that they may not be sufficient. 
 Indeed our interests the world over require us to protect 
 and maintain them. Our enormous trade with all the 
 countries of Europe makes it most difficult, in a European 
 war, to preserve our rights and interests as neutrals, and is 
 most likely to involve us in the war. We are now on the 
 
12O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 brink of hostilities with Germany. Why, then, should 
 Washington's advice be controlling, advice given us in a day 
 of small things, based on an isolation and a remoteness from 
 the rest of the world which has ceased? Our coming war 
 with Germany demonstrates, from the selfish point of view 
 alone, the wisdom of our joining in a world movement to 
 prevent the recurrence of another European war, even 
 though it imposes on us the burden of contributing our quota 
 to an international police force. 
 
 But Mr. Bryan says that in joining the League we would 
 abandon the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, 
 shortly described, is our national policy of preventing, by 
 protest and by force if necessary, any non-American Power 
 from subverting any independent American government and 
 from colonizing, by such means or by purchase, American 
 territory under a government of its own. Our reason for 
 maintaining the Doctrine is that we think such a course by 
 a non-American Power would endanger our interests. The 
 Doctrine does not rest on International Law. Should a 
 question arise as to its enforcement between us and a non- 
 American Power, therefore, it would be non-justiciable and 
 must go to the Commission under the second article for a 
 recommendation of compromise in which we would not be 
 bound in honor to acquiesce. We would then have the same 
 opportunity to maintain the Doctrine by force as if there 
 were no league. Under the thirty-one treaties of Mr. 
 Bryan, we would now have to abide a year of investigation 
 before using force. The disadvantage to us, if any, of 
 delay, therefore, will certainly be no greater under the terms 
 of the League. 
 
 Instead of hampering our maintenance of the Doctrine, 
 the League would help us in any case where its violation 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 121 
 
 might be attempted, for by the terms of the League, the non- 
 American Power must submit its cause for hearing to one 
 of the Tribunals of the League before hostilities; and, if it 
 failed to do so, we could summon the international police 
 force to drive it off American shores. 
 
 But it is said that, if we mix in European politics to the 
 extent required by this League, we cannot exclude European 
 Powers from taking part in those of this hemisphere. 
 There is nothing in the League requiring us or authorizing 
 us to participate in the internal politics of any European 
 country or to do other than to use our good offices to prevent 
 a war between any two of such countries. We are to fur- 
 nish our quota to suppress a premature war between them. 
 They are to exercise the same functions in this hemisphere. 
 In what respect does that violate the Monroe Doctrine? 
 The League does not enable us nor authorize us to acquire 
 and colonize territory in Europe by purchase or conquest 
 any more than it authorizes a European nation to do so on 
 this side ; and that is all the Monroe Doctrine forbids. 
 
 Mr. Bryan suggests that we should not join a World 
 League because our citizens of foreign nativity would divide 
 in their sympathies as between European nations. If our 
 foreign policies, needed for our protection and for that of 
 the world, are to be abandoned because of race prejudice in 
 a comparatively small group of our foreign-born citizens, we 
 have failed in our experiment of naturalization. I cannot 
 acquiesce in such a view. This would indeed be a humiliat- 
 ing surrender to the so-called " hyphen." 
 
 IX 
 
 Mr. Bryan's eighth article commends the attitude of the 
 President in his message read to the United States Senate on 
 
122 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 January 22nd. I have altogether misinterpreted the notes 
 of the President to the belligerent powers, his speech at the 
 dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916, as 
 well as the message of January 22nd last, if he has not, in 
 all of these, intended to approve the general principles of our 
 League. His reference to " the major force of the world " 
 was certainly an approval of the political organization of the 
 world to the extent of creating an international police force 
 to secure compliance with a peaceable procedure for the set- 
 tlement of international questions likely otherwise to lead to 
 war. Mr. Bryan's citation of the President as authority 
 does not sustain his contention. 
 
 The question who shall command the joint military force 
 in a campaign is not material, provided it be understood in 
 advance, as it must be, what the purpose of the campaign is. 
 The United States has had no difficulty in the past in acting 
 with other nations to carry out a common purpose of a mili- 
 tary character, as the taking of Pekin by the Allied force 
 during the Boxer trouble proves. Nations have acted 
 together often in history; and the question who shall have 
 the military command or how the joint armies should be 
 directed is a practical military question to be agreed upon by 
 the joint powers in war council. The purpose of League 
 campaigns would be settled by the terms of the League 
 before the mobilization begins. It would be to restrain the 
 warlike activities of a nation unlawfully breaking a peace 
 to which it is pledged. To characterize this as placing the 
 destiny of the toiling millions of the United States in the 
 hands of aliens for their selfish purposes is to reveal a com- 
 plete misunderstanding of the normal operation of the 
 League. The United States retains complete control of its 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 123 
 
 forces and can withdraw them whenever the lawful and com- 
 mendable purpose of preserving the peace of the world shall 
 cease to be the object of the military campaign. 
 
 Those who are promoting the League are not committed 
 to any particular means by which the necessary military 
 preparation shall be secured. Personally, I favor universal 
 compulsory military training, for a year, of our youth 
 between the ages of nineteen and twenty- four as the most 
 effective and most democratic plan that can be adopted. It 
 will fall equally upon the rich and poor. It will give a year 
 of valuable disciplinary education to our youth who need it 
 much. It will furnish a citizenship from which we can sum- 
 mon a trained army to defend our country. I repeat, how- 
 ever, this is not a part of the League plan. 
 
 The war with Germany which we now face, after every 
 effort to escape it and when our national conscience is wholly 
 void of offence toward her, is a sufficient answer to Mr. 
 Bryan's view that love is all that is needed to make effective 
 a world league to insure peace. If this war teaches us any- 
 thing, it is that our civilization has not advanced beyond 
 the time when the major force of the world is sometimes 
 needed for defense against selfish greed and ambition on the 
 part of nations. If we fail to prepare ourselves to defend 
 our rights against lawless aggression by ruthless military and 
 naval power, we are blind to the simplest lessons of current 
 history. If we can avail ourselves of the same preparation 
 to do our part in defending the peace of the world, should 
 we not seize the opportunity? 
 
124 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 X 
 
 We have now reached the end of the discussion. This 
 tenth article offers an opportunity for a summary of the 
 positions taken in the previous papers. The program of 
 the League looks to a treaty binding all nations to adopt, in 
 the settlement of controversies likely to lead to war between 
 them, a peaceable procedure for the hearing and decision 
 of issues capable of being settled on principles of law and 
 of issues that may not be so settled. It does not attempt 
 to enforce the decisions. The aim of the League is, by 
 elucidation of the facts and arguments on both sides of the 
 issue and by a decision of it by an impartial tribunal, to 
 practice nations in the art of settling irritating questions by 
 judicial investigation and conclusion. The example of our 
 relations with Canada and the constant use of arbitration to 
 settle our difficulties which has become a habit offer a 
 precedent from which we believe that, when such a proced- 
 ure is enforced, it will train all nations to adopt it rather 
 than to resort to war. . . . The force of the world is to be 
 used to compel nations to adopt this procedure before resort- 
 ing to hostilities. ... A pacifist who will admit a police- 
 man to be a proper official in the community yields the whole 
 case against the creation of an international police force in 
 our League. 
 
 Mr. Bryan attempts to meet this argument by saying that 
 the analogy is misleading and uses these words : 
 
 " The nations cannot, in fairness, be likened to criminals, 
 although we often describe their public acts as criminal, especially 
 in time of war. The criminal is one who intentionally violates 
 a law duly enacted by those having authority to make laws. He 
 disregards an obligation confessedly binding upon him ; and the 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 
 
 125 
 
 policeman, acting for the outraged community, arrests the guilty 
 party and brings him before the bar of justice. There is no in- 
 ternational law-making power; and, if such a law-making power 
 existed, there are certain questions upon which it would not as- 
 sume to act certain questions upon which each nation, whether 
 large or small, is conceded the right to decide for itself without 
 regard to the views or interests of other nations. Our arbitra- 
 tion treaties, the most advanced in the world, contain excep- 
 tions, questions of honor, questions of independence, vital in- 
 terests and the interests of third parties. These questions are 
 not to be submitted to arbitration; and yet these are the very 
 questions out of which wars grow." 
 
 Of all men in the world, Mr. Bryan, by reason of his 
 general views, is the one least entitled to put forth these 
 reasons in order to escape the analogy of state police. No 
 one has spoken more eloquently against war as a crime than 
 Air. Bryan. No one has upheld more fully international 
 law as a binding force upon the nations. International law 
 is the law of nations agreed to between the nations and 
 deriving its sanction from their general acquiescence. A 
 nation which violates international law is a criminal before 
 the bar. The exceptions from our existing treaties of arbi- 
 tration of questions of vital interest and national honor, to 
 which Mr. Bryan refers, were exceptions which were not 
 recognized in the unratified general arbitration treaties made 
 with France and Great Britain which Mr. Bryan approved 
 and to which he gave effective support. More than that, 
 the Senate itself did not seek, in its proposed amendments, 
 to except questions of honor and vital interest from arbitra- 
 tion. Mr. Bryan's distinction is a forced one and has no 
 foundation, certainly as applied to the plan of the League 
 to Enforce Peace. The treaty forming the League is an 
 agreement by all nations to comply with its stipulations and 
 
126 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 not only to comply with its stipulations, but, in case of non- 
 compliance by any member, to contribute their quotas to an 
 international police to restrain and punish that member for 
 non-compliance. In other words, it furnishes an interna- 
 tional constitution. It creates an international law and 
 denounces as a crime violation of the legal obligations into 
 which the nations voluntarily enter. The very object of 
 the League is to organize the world politically; and that 
 means to enact law and to provide for its enforcement. 
 I submit that the analogy of the state police is not only a fair 
 one but a clinching and convincing one in showing the funda- 
 mental fallacy and error of those who have the international 
 pacifist views of Mr. Bryan and still are in favor of a state 
 and city police. 
 
 That the League is practical may be inferred from the 
 approval which its general principles have received from the 
 leading statesmen of the Great Powers in answer to direct 
 questions upon the. subject, and also in official expression 
 in the correspondence between President Wilson and the 
 belligerent Powers engaged in the present war. It is prac- 
 tical because there is precedent for every detail in the League, 
 and because it embodies the elemental principle of govern- 
 ment as it should be in city, state, and nation and in the 
 world: to wit, the organization of the force of all to sup- 
 press lawless force of the few. The lines upon which the 
 League has been framed are very general; the plan is only 
 a working hypothesis. That it may be changed in inter- 
 national conference in detail goes without saying. But that 
 it furnishes a broad and correct foundation for the political 
 organization of the world, as Kant foresaw it, I submit, is 
 clear. 
 
 The United States should enter the League ; first, because 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 127 
 
 of all nations in the world, it wishes to avoid war and to 
 make it as remote as possible; second, because its interests 
 have now become so world-wide and it has become so close 
 a neighbor of all the Great Powers of Europe and of Asia 
 that a general war must involve the United States. It is 
 therefore of the highest importance to the United States, 
 viewed from the standpoint of self-interest, to secure the 
 joint effort of the world to prevent such a war or to confine 
 it to a local struggle. The present difficulty with Germany is 
 a most striking demonstration of the danger in which the 
 United States will be involved in every general war in the 
 future, struggle as it may to escape being drawn in. 
 
 Nor does the League involve the delegation to an inter- 
 national council, in which the United States has but one 
 vote, of the power to hurry this country into war. The 
 President and the Senate sign the treaty of the League and 
 bind the United States to its obligations. Congress is the 
 authority which will decide whether the fact exists, calling 
 for action by the United States, and then will take such 
 action as the obligation requires. Should the purpose of 
 the International Police under the League be perverted to 
 anything other than enforcing the peaceable procedure in the 
 settlement of international controversies, Congress will have 
 full power to withdraw the United States forces and decline 
 further to take part in the proceedings. 
 
 With the blessings which God has showered on this 
 country, it should not hesitate to help the world and the 
 family of nations to protect itself against the recurrence of 
 such an awful disaster and retrograde movement in Christian 
 civilization as the present war. 
 
128 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 XI 
 
 Since this discussion began, and indeed since the tenth 
 paper was written, the plot of the world drama now being 
 enacted has developed with startling rapidity. Even as we 
 have been arguing, a World League to Enforce Peace has 
 been formed; and the United States has taken its proper 
 place therein. The absolutism of Russia has toppled over 
 in the twinkling of an eye ; and the Russia people have taken 
 charge. Germany, in a ruthless disregard of the rights of 
 American citizens, has forced the United States, as a self- 
 respecting nation, to take up the sword against her. The 
 United States is thus driven into an alliance with the Entente 
 Allies. The democracies of Russia, Italy, France, England 
 and the United States are now engaged in a death struggle 
 with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs 
 to end the only substantial military absolutism remaining in 
 the world. Military dynasties are a threat against the peace 
 of the world. With their lust for power and the selfish 
 considerations that affect their policies, their respect for the 
 solemn obligations of a treaty are much less than that of 
 democracies. Democracies are not perfect in their sense of 
 justice, in the certainty of peaceful policies, nor in their exact 
 observance of treaty obligations; but they are a vast im- 
 provement in these respects over an autocracy dependent on 
 military force. 
 
 The Prussian autocracy of Germany is the great interna- 
 tional criminal. It has sacrificed honor; it has murdered 
 men and women and has, in numberless ways, violated with 
 ruthless cruelty the principles of international law to accom- 
 plish its dynastic purposes. It has dragged its allies with 
 it, and made them participes criminis. The League of the 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 29 
 
 United States and the Entente Allies, and the Central and 
 South American countries that may join us, is an organiza- 
 tion of world power to visit destruction on the dynasties 
 whose continued existence constitutes an obstruction to Law 
 and Peace. We are properly separating the Hohenzollerns 
 and the Hapsburgs, from the great German people and the 
 great people of the Dual Monarchy. If we succeed, as we 
 must, the war, dreadful as it has been in the losses and suf- 
 fering it has entailed, painful and destructive as it is likely 
 to be, will be worth all it cost. It will make the future of 
 the world depend upon the rule of the peoples of the world, 
 will exalt the reign of international justice, and will organize 
 the joint forces of the world to maintain it. With the Ger- 
 man and the Austrian and Hungarian peoples on the one 
 hand, and the American, English, French, Italian and 
 Russian peoples on the other, in an international conference, 
 none will hesitate to enter a League to Enforce Peace. The 
 popular character of all the governments, in and of itself, 
 will render war between them less probable, will give greater 
 sanction to their promises, and will make more practical and 
 less burdensome a League having for its purpose compulsory 
 procedure for the settlement of irritating international dis- 
 putes. 
 
 " Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad." 
 The people of the United States, immersed in business, 
 lethargic with prosperity, naturally averse to war and its new 
 horrors as shown in the present struggle, have been loath 
 to take up the sword. They have made every honorable 
 effort to keep out of the vortex. But Germany, in her mad 
 desperation and with a lack of foresight that has charac- 
 terized all her diplomatic policies, has forced an unwilling 
 people to join the league of her opponents. The triumph 
 
I3O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 of Democracy in Russia and the entry of the United States 
 into the war make clear to the world and to history that this 
 is a war for the benefit of mankind. 
 
 The rulers of Germany have undervalued the power of 
 the United States. They have made military efficiency their 
 national god. A country which has, up to this time, ignored 
 military science, and failed to maintain a trained army, 
 arouses in them contempt. In their mad rage at England 
 and in their desire to starve her people, they have stupidly 
 aroused against themselves the only dangerous antagonist 
 remaining. When money and food and supplies are more 
 clearly the determining factor in the war than ever before, 
 they deliberately make an enemy of the country which has 
 greater capacity to furnish them than all other countries 
 combined. The military unpreparedness of the United 
 States blinds them to the enormous advantage which her 
 accession to the ranks of their opponents gives in the test 
 of endurance which must decide the struggle. Within a 
 month after her declaration of war, the United States will 
 place at the disposal of her allies the enormous sum of three 
 billions of dollars to replenish their depleted treasuries and 
 to strengthen the effectiveness of their serried hosts. Her 
 resources in the production of food and war supplies are 
 being promptly organized so that the energies of this country 
 will be directed to feeding the peoples of her allies and sup- 
 porting and maintaining the equipment of their armies. 
 The skill and courage of her navy, with the ingenuity of her 
 inventors, will be directed to the suppression of the sole hope 
 of the Prussian military hierarchy, their cruel, lawless and 
 murderous submarine. 
 
 The broad conception of the world-cause for which the 
 United States is fighting will send the blood tingling through 
 
WORLD PEACE DEBATE 13 I 
 
 her giant limbs and awaken in her that moral strength which 
 the Hohenzollern in his plan to conquer the world has con- 
 sistently ignored. 
 
 The struggle may be a long one. We do not aid our 
 cause by under-estimating the power of our enemy or the 
 perfection attained by her in the organization and use of 
 physical and material resources, and of a people educated 
 and moulded to the needs of a military autocracy. We hope 
 the contest may end in a year. It may last double that or 
 longer; but however long it lasts, the end is not in doubt. 
 We were slow in getting in. We will never quit until our 
 high purpose is attained; and the cause of Democracy is 
 triumphant. We should not rely on the pleasing hope that 
 our losses will chiefly be in money. We should organize our 
 efforts and make our plans with the stern thought that many 
 of our best lives and the flower of our youth will figure 
 largely in the cost of our victory ; but the greatness of our 
 cause should reconcile us to every sacrifice. When we, by 
 our intervention, shall have contributed largely to the vic- 
 tory, when our real enemies shall have disappeared in the 
 deposition of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, the 
 influence for good that we, without motive of aggrandize- 
 ment, without hope or wish to increase our territory or 
 power, can wield in the councils of the world will be com- 
 manding and will make for a just peace and a world league 
 to maintain it. 
 
 " God works in mysterious ways his wonders to perform." 
 It would seem that there was now being disclosed the 
 providential plan for securing the future peace of the world. 
 Everything that has happened is forcing on the adoption of 
 a League to Enforce Peace. Events are shaping themselves 
 so that when the Congress of Nations meets, after the end 
 
132 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 shall have come, the League will be as natural a result as 
 peace itself. How futile in the face of the facts of to-day 
 seem the arguments that we must preserve our isolation and 
 avoid entangling alliances ! How inapplicable Washing- 
 ton's words, wise when uttered, become to the needs and 
 policy of the present! The League to Enforce Peace is 
 formed; and we have joined it. On its success and perma- 
 nence depends the future peace of the sons of men. 
 
 VICTORY WITH POWER l 
 
 No one in the wildest flight of his imagination now can 
 think of undefeated Germany yielding either proper in- 
 demnity to Belgium or justice to Alsace-Lorraine, each of 
 which Great Britain and the United States have made a sine 
 qua non. Nor will the unconquered German ruling class 
 consent to lift the German paw and remove its crushing 
 weight from prostrate Russia or give over to decent rule the 
 blood-stained Christian provinces of Turkey. If the wrongs 
 of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and of Russians, Italians, 
 Poles, Armenians, Serbians and other Slav peoples are not 
 righted, the sacrifices of the war will have been for naught. 
 We must, therefore, conquer the Germans if a just and lasting 
 peace is to be secured. Therefore, the slogan of the Allies, 
 and the cry of this country must be " Victory with Power." 
 
 Our Society was organized to make this war an instru- 
 ment for the promotion of peace. It holds that the horrors 
 of the war and the awful misery it involves must make the 
 
 1 Extracts from an address before League to Enforce Peace Con- 
 vention, Phila., May, 1918. 
 
OUR PURPOSE 133 
 
 nations bind themselves to a common obligation for the 
 future to suppress war. We call for a primitive political 
 organization of the world, affording judicial and mediating 
 agencies and an international police to stamp out the begin- 
 nings of every riot of world violence. A member of the 
 family of nations which looks upon war as a normal means 
 of acquiring power and a justifiable condition of growth 
 destroys hope for the future. Such member must be 
 whipped into a different view and into conformity with the 
 public opinion of the world. Nothing but force can cure 
 the brutality and ruthlessness of force. In such a case the 
 maxim, " Similia similibus curantur" has full application. 
 The peaceful countries of the world are obliged to assume 
 the habits and the panoply of war. When they, in spite of 
 their lack of preparation, in spite of their peace-loving 
 instincts, shall strike down in battle a people that makes war 
 its god, the cure of that people will be complete, the scales 
 will fall from their eyes, and with a clear vision they will 
 see that he whom they have ignorantly worshipped is the 
 devil and not God. Until so cured, the Central Powers can 
 never be amenable and law-abiding members of a peaceful 
 world community. 
 
 OUR PURPOSE x 
 
 We are in the war first of all to make the world safer 
 and a better place to live in. We are fighting to bring about 
 a lasting peace. There was a time when many cherished 
 the hope that such a peace could be established by the moral 
 
 1 Newspaper article, June 30, 1918. 
 
134 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 force of public opinion. Now we know that peace has a 
 more terrible price, and we are ready to pay the price. 
 
 We have had nothing to do with the politics of Europe; 
 but this war is not a matter of European politics. It is 
 world politics; and we announced ourselves as citizens of 
 the world when we declared war against Germany. World 
 politics, after all, are only fundamental questions of right 
 and wrong. We are for the right against the wrong. 
 
 We are righting to make it impossible for military autoc- 
 racy ever again to endanger the peace of the world. Re- 
 publics make mistakes, but this war has proved that they are 
 slow to fight. 
 
 One thing this war will accomplish: when it is over we 
 shall hear no more talk about the advantages of national 
 isolation. In taking our place among the nations we have 
 come with an international policy already prepared and we 
 have made it clear to the world that the success of this policy 
 is our main purpose. We are fighting, as our President has 
 put it, " to make the world safe for democracy." 
 
 We have not tried to set a price upon our participation in 
 the war. We have made no bargain. Europe knows our 
 purpose. When the war is over we expect to cast our vote 
 at the peace council for what the President called " such 
 cooperation of force among the great nations as may be 
 necessary to maintain peace and freedom throughout the 
 world." 
 
 The war has demonstrated the weakness of international 
 law unsupported by force. Such support can be furnished 
 by a system of international police. 
 
 I do not pretend to know just what our views will be 
 
OUR PURPOSE 135 
 
 when the war is over. Nobody realized where the Spanish 
 war would carry us. We went into it in Cuba and came 
 out in the Philippines. But this is how the thing looks now. 
 The policy and the purpose I have explained are so broad 
 and their application so universal that it is difficult to see 
 how any event can change them. 
 
 In principle this policy and purpose have been endorsed 
 by many of the leading European statesmen who may sit at 
 the peace council beside the delegates from this side of the 
 Atlantic. In his speech before the United States Senate, 
 M. Viviani, the former premier of France and head of the 
 French mission, said : 
 
 " Together we will carry on that struggle ; and when by 
 force we have at last imposed military victory, our labors 
 will not be concluded. Our task will be I quote the noble 
 words of President Wilson to organize the society of 
 nations. . . . We will shatter the ponderous sword of mili- 
 tarism; we will establish guarantees of peace; and then we 
 can disappear from the world's stage, since we shall leave 
 at the cost of our common immolation the noblest heritage 
 future generations can possess." 
 
 And Russia has joined the consensus of the enlightened 
 nations with this declaration by Prof. Milyukoff, first 
 Foreign Minister of the young Republic : 
 
 " The definition by President Wilson of the purposes of 
 the war corresponds entirely with the declarations of the 
 statesmen of the allied powers: M. Briand, Mr. Asquith 
 and Viscount Grey all expressed themselves continually on 
 the necessity of seeking to prevent conflicts of armed forces 
 by providing peaceful methods of solution for international 
 disputes and creating a new organization of nations based 
 
136 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 upon order and justice in international life. The democracy 
 of free Russia is able to associate itself completely with these 
 declarations." 
 
 Our allies have accepted the definition of the high purpose 
 of the war as it came to them from this side of the Atlantic. 
 Now let us show them that we can wage war as well as 
 analyze and define it. 
 
 SELF DETERMINATION * 
 
 The task of the League of Nations called to decide the 
 terms of peace will be as huge as that of the war which the 
 peace will end. The issues as to Alsace-Lorraine, the 
 Trentino and Trieste will be simple as compared with the 
 Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav questions. The restrictions 
 of the Turkish domain, the protection and freedom of 
 Armenia, the Balkan boundaries and the government of 
 Albania will try the ingenuity of statesmen in working out 
 a just result. Above all in difficulty will be the settlement 
 of the questions as to Russia. Shall it be a confederation of 
 States like ours, or shall they be independent? Who shall 
 determine this? 
 
 " Let the people themselves decide," it is said. Every one 
 agrees that this general rule should prevail in post-war 
 arrangements. But how large or how small shall the unit 
 of a people for such decision be? Shall units be racial or 
 geographical ? Suppose a people as small in number as the 
 Belfast Orangemen compared with the whole population of 
 Ireland insists on a separate government, though geography, 
 
 1 Philadelphia Public Ledger Oct. 3, 1918. 
 
SELF DETERMINATION 137 
 
 trade conditions and every consideration but religious differ- 
 ence and tradition require that the whole island be under one 
 Government ? 
 
 It becomes apparent at once that the general principle of 
 popular rule is not a panacea and that many issues will have 
 to be settled by the Congress of Nations, according to ex- 
 pedient and practical justice, over the objection of some part 
 of the people affected. The result will illustrate the in- 
 herent error in the frequent assumption that a Government 
 by the people is a Government in which that which is done 
 is the will of each one. A practical Government by the 
 people is a Government by a majority of the voters. The 
 rest of the people must yield their will to the will of this 
 majority. However, in the purest democracy, the voters 
 are not a half of the population, and the prevailing majority 
 is usually not more than 20 per cent, of all. The guide of 
 the popular will is still less helpful when the issue is the fix- 
 ing of the proper self-governing unit. In the intoxicating 
 fumes of a new freedom, municipal Councils in Russia de- 
 clared themselves independent governments. Should Lithu- 
 ania, Esthonia, the Ukraine and Great Russia be separate 
 entities ? This cannot be certainly and properly determined 
 by a plebiscite of the population of the particular district, if 
 its relation to the neighboring communities or to Russia 
 as a whole make it best for all concerned that they be united. 
 More than this, an ignorant people without the slightest 
 experience in the restraints necessary in successful self- 
 government and subject to the wildest imaginings under the 
 insidious demagoguery of venal leaders may well not know 
 what is best for them. 
 
 Thus, flowing phrases as to liberty and the rule of the 
 people do not offer a complete solution for all the problems 
 
138 TAFT PAPERS OX LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 which the world's peacemakers will face. Still, if we can 
 make the adjustment to depend on just provision for the 
 welfare of the peoples affected instead of on the greed of 
 the parties, we shall secure an enormous advance over past 
 international settlements. 
 
 PERIL IN HUN PEACE OFFER l 
 
 The European situation is working out exactly as one 
 might have anticipated. Indeed, when we read the resolu- 
 tions of the League to Enforce Peace, adopted in the con- 
 vention which the League held in this city in May. their 
 language is like a prophecy. The league in its platform 
 said: 
 
 " Apprehensive of the lure of an inconclusive peace, which 
 would enable the present masters of Germany to continue 
 their dominion of Central Europe and sooner or later again 
 to menace the peace and freedom of the world, the league 
 feels that our people should be forewarned in case Germany 
 should propose to make peace on terms that might well 
 deceive the unsuspecting. Suppose she should offer to retire 
 from Belgium and France; to cede the Trentino to Italy; 
 even to relinquish all claims to her captured colonies and to 
 promise some kind of antonomy to the various races of 
 Central and Eastern Europe. Such an offer would be highly 
 seductive, and if we are not prepared to understand what it 
 means might well beguile the Allies into a peace which would 
 be inconclusive, because unless the principle of militarism is 
 destroyed the promise would be kept no better than those 
 
 1 Philadelphia Public Ledger Oct 8, 1918. 
 
PERIL IN HUN PEACE OFFER 139 
 
 broken in the past. Autonomy of the other races would 
 mean their organization for the strengthening of Germany 
 until she had control of the resources of 200,000,000 for her 
 next war. . . . Such a settlement would be a mere truce 
 pending a strife more fierce hereafter. So long as pre- 
 datory militarism is not wholly destroyed no lasting peace 
 can be made." 
 
 Germany now proposes an armistice in order to enable 
 the representatives of the Central Powers and the Allies to 
 negotiate a peace on the general basis of peace indicated by 
 President \Yilson in his address to Congress on January 8, 
 1918. This does not really commit Germany to anything 
 except that she is willing to talk about the subject matter 
 covered in the fourteen points by President Wilson in that 
 address. It involves an interminable discussion of what his 
 fourteen points mean and include. That address was made 
 nearly nine months ago. It was made before the Czecho- 
 slovak and Jugoslav movements had crystalized into a de- 
 mand for independent governments. The President in his 
 reference to a settlement of an Austrian peace asked for ' the 
 freest opportunity for autonomous development.' Austria 
 evidently looks to a confederation under the dual monarchy. 
 \Ye have now gone further as to the Czecho-Slavs and 
 recognized their independence. The message of January 8 
 was made before the full revelations as to Germany's poli- 
 cies in respect to Russian and the Baltic provinces, which 
 reek with bad faith, cruelty and a murderous plotting 
 with the insane Bolsheviki against the decent people of 
 Russia. 
 
 The President's fourteen points are stated in general 
 words, the only ones which he could use at such a time. 
 They are not stated in the specific terms upon which a treaty 
 of peace could be formulated or upon which any offer of the 
 
I4O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Germans could be accepted. The Germans do not agree to 
 submit to the terms stated by the President, general as they 
 are. All they agree to is to negotiate after an armistice, a 
 treaty " on the basis " of the President's address. Nothing 
 could be more unsatisfactory and uncertain. 
 
 The attitude of the German Kaiser is important only as it 
 shows the iron ring closing about him. He sees the hand- 
 writing on the wall, and he struggles in a peace offensive for 
 a halt which shall enable him to rehabilitate his forces. 
 Then, if he does not secure peace, with the Hohenzollern 
 dynasty still in the saddle, he can resist with a rested army 
 to the last. He sets his snare in the sight of the bird. His 
 offer should be rejected with the same curt rejoinder as that 
 which met the Austrian approach. We, of course, should 
 not deceive ourselves. A prompt and decided refusal on 
 our part to accept this offer of the Kaiser will be used by 
 him to arouse his people to further resistance. This is the 
 great alternative object which he has in mind. He will say 
 that this refusal indicates that the Allies seek to annihilate 
 the German people. He hopes that this will stiffen all his 
 subjects to further effort. In his dire extremity he has 
 called on the most peaceful and the most liberal of the promi- 
 nent political personages in his empire. 
 
 But this personage is a cousin of the Emperor, is a 
 Hohenzollern and would, of course, maintain the dynasty. 
 His speech reads well, but we who have at hand the damning 
 evidence of the militaristic treachery and the wicked ambi- 
 tion of the Kaiser and his crew know that the Prince is but 
 a pawn advanced now for the single purpose of securing a 
 negotiated peace. The Prince will not sit at the council 
 table to carry out his own ideas. Surrounding him and at 
 his back will be the Kaiser, Hindenburg, Ludendorff and the 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 141 
 
 Crown Prince, the leaders of Junkerclom, ready to refuse 
 any terms in the treaty which will hamstring the dynasty or 
 prevent the possihility of the resurrection of the German 
 army and a future renewal of the Potsdam conspiracy. 
 
 We should read the spirit of the Kaiser's offer in the light 
 of burning Douai and the cruel looting and devastation of 
 Belgium and Northern France. He says he will consent 
 only to " an honorable peace." What does that mean? It 
 means a settlement which assures for the German High 
 Command and the Kaiser the position of honorable and 
 trustworthy foes. This, in view of their conduct, is im- 
 possible if we are to achieve what this war is fought for. 
 The Kaiser's offer should be sternly rejected and he and 
 Austria should be advised that in the present situation we 
 can have no armistice and no negotiation except upon the 
 same terms as those which were meted out to Bulgaria. 
 Any other resub will be a profound disappointment to the 
 American people and our allies. 
 
 THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 1 
 
 The international compact which is to follow this war 
 is to be more ambitious than any ever made before. The 
 world is larger, the nations are more numerous, the field of 
 war has been greater, and the political changes are to be 
 far more extensive than the world has ever known. 
 
 The only peace comparable with this is that which was 
 made after Napoleon's fall by the monarchs who constituted 
 
 1 Address delivered at Convention of the League to Enforce Peace, 
 Madison, Wisconsin, under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin, 
 November 9, 1918. 
 
142 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 the Holy Alliance. That was a League of Nations, with a 
 high sounding declaration of disinterestedness and love of 
 peace. It was a failure because the real purposes which 
 governed its formation and life were wrong and unstable. 
 It rested on the divine right of kings, and its objects were 
 to recognize dynastic claims and to establish and maintain 
 them. It took into consideration neither the interest nor 
 the will of the peoples under the governments which it was 
 setting up and proposed to maintain. After a few years it 
 became a by-word of reproach. 
 
 The difference between the Holy Alliance and the League 
 of Nations we now propose is in the purpose and principle 
 of its formation. Our League looks to a union of the 
 democratic nations of the world, to the will of the peoples, 
 expressed through their governments, as its basis and 
 sanction. It looks to the establishment of new governments 
 by popular choice and control. It is to be founded on jus- 
 tice, impartially administered, and not on the interests of 
 kings or emperors or dynasties. It is to rise as a structure 
 built upon the ashes of militarism, and it is to rest on the 
 pillars of justice and equality and the welfare of peoples. 
 
 I have referred to the Holy Alliance not only to answer 
 an argument, but also as a precedent to prove that a treaty 
 of peace rearranging the map of Europe can not be made 
 without a League of Nations. Think of what this present 
 peace has to compass. We can realize it by considering the 
 points of President Wilson's message of January 8th, out- 
 lining the terms of the future peace. 
 
 In the first place, we are to have disposition of the German 
 colonies in accord with the interests of the people who live 
 in them. Germany has made such cruel despotisms of her 
 colonies that it is quite likely the Allies will insist that they 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 143 
 
 shall be put under some other power more to be trusted in 
 securing the welfare of backward peoples. Thus we are to 
 set up a new government in East and West Africa, in 
 Australasia, in China, and in some of the islands of the 
 Pacific. Then we are to deal with Russia. If we separate 
 from her the Ukraine, and the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 
 there are three or four new nations to establish. Great 
 Russia is now under the domination of bloody anarchists, 
 and we must free her and give to her good people the oppor- 
 tunity to organize and establish a free and useful govern- 
 ment. This is a problem of the utmost complexity. In 
 Austria we are to create a nation of the Czecho-Slavs, em- 
 bracing Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. We are to cut 
 this nation out of the Dual Empire, and take it from Austria 
 and from Hungary. W r e are to do the same thing with the 
 Jugo-Slavs on the south of Austria and Hungary and 
 establish new boundaries there. We are to settle the bound- 
 aries of the Balkans. We are likely to give to Rumania 
 the Rumanians of Hungary and of Bessarabia. We are to 
 establish a new state of Poland out of Russian, Austrian and 
 German Poland, and we are to give this state access to the 
 sea. The fixing of these boundaries and the determination 
 of the method of reaching the sea present issues of the 
 utmost delicacy and difficulty. We are to determine the 
 status of Constantinople and the small tract now known as 
 Turkey in Europe. We are to fix the limits of Turkey in 
 Asia, to set up a new government in Palestine, to recognize 
 a new government of Arabia, to father, it may be, the 
 creation of a new state in the Caucasus and to establish the 
 freedom of Armenia. 
 
 The mere recital of them is most convincing of the 
 intricacy of these problems. The Congress of Nations will 
 
144 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 probably find it impossible definitely to settle them all. It 
 will have to create Commissions, with judicial and concilia- 
 tory powers, able to devote time enough to make proper in- 
 vestigation and thus to reach just, defensible and practical 
 conclusions. When the boundaries are all fixed, when the 
 innumerable rights growing out of access to the Baltic, 
 access to the Danube, access to the Black Sea and access to 
 the Aegean, together wtih rights of way across neighboring 
 states for freedom of trade, are defined, with as much clarity 
 as possible, there still will arise, in the practical operation 
 of the treaty, a multitude of irritating questions of interpre- 
 tation. In fixing boundaries on distinctions of race and 
 language, the Congress will encounter the obstruction of 
 racial prejudice and blindness to reasonable conclusions. 
 Lines of race and of language are not always so clearly 
 drawn that convenient and compact states may be estab- 
 lished within them. To attempt in a great world-agree- 
 ment to settle the boundaries and mutual rights of so many 
 new nations, without providing a tribunal whose decisions 
 are to control and are to be enforced by the major force of 
 the world, will be to make a treaty that will become a laugh- 
 ing stock. 
 
 We know that we have got to rearrange the map of 
 Europe, and, in so far as it is practicable in that arrange- 
 ment, to follow popular choice of the peoples to be governed. 
 But such a flowing phrase will not settle the difficulty. It is 
 merely a general principle that in its actual application often 
 does not offer a completely satisfactory solution ; and after 
 the Congress shall have made the decisions, sore places will 
 be left, local enmities will arise, and if that permanent peace 
 which is to justify the war is to be attained, the world com- 
 pact must itself contain the machinery for settlement of such 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 145 
 
 inevitable disputes. In other words, we do not have to 
 argue in favor of a League to Enforce Peace the nations 
 which enter this Congress can not do otherwise than establish 
 it. It faces them as the only possible way to achieve their 
 object. 
 
 Germany and Austria and Bulgaria and Turkey are to 
 indemnify the countries which they have outraged and de- 
 vastated. Commissions must be created, judicial in their 
 nature, to pass upon what the amount of the indemnity shall 
 be, and then an international force must exist to levy execu- 
 tion if necessary for the judgment upon the countries whose 
 criminal torts are to be indemnified. We must, therefore, 
 not only have, as a result of the Congress, the machinery of 
 justice and conciliation, but we must retain a combined mili- 
 tary force of the Allies and victors to see to it that these 
 just judgments are carried out. Moreover, the Congress 
 can not meet without enlarging the scope of international 
 law and making more definite its provisions. The very 
 functions which the Congress is to exercise in fixing the 
 terms of peace will necessitate a statement of the principles 
 upon which it has been guided. That will lead to a broaden- 
 ing of the scope of existing principles of international law 
 and a greater variety in their applications. Therefore, 
 whether those who are in the Congress wish it or not, they 
 can not solve the problems which are set before them with- 
 out adopting the principles of our League to Enforce Peace 
 as embodied in the four planks of our original platform 
 Court, Commission of Conciliation, enforcement of submis- 
 sion and a Legislative International Congress to make Inter- 
 national Law. They will have to create such machinery for 
 the administration and enforcement of the treaty as to the 
 Central Powers, the new nations created and Russia. 
 
146 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Having gone so far as they must, can they fail to extend 
 their work only a little to include the settlement of all future 
 differences between all the nations that are parties to the 
 League? A League for such future purposes will be no 
 more difficult to make and maintain than the temporary 
 League into which they are driven by the necessities of the 
 situation. 
 
 Now I want to take up some of the arguments made 
 against the League. In the first place, a good many have 
 created a straw League which they have knocked down with- 
 out difficulty. They have attributed to us the views and 
 principles held by extremists who perhaps support our 
 League, but whose extreme views we do not and need not 
 adopt. Thus it is said that we favor internationalism, that 
 we are opposed to nationalism, that we wish to dilute the 
 patriotic spirit into a vague universal brotherhood. That 
 there are socialists and others who entertain this view, and 
 who perhaps support .the League to Enforce Peace, may be 
 true ; but the assumption that such views are necessary to a 
 consistent support of the League is entirely without war- 
 rant. I believe in nationalism and patriotism, as dis- 
 tinguished from universal brotherhood as firmly as any one 
 can. I believe that the national spirit and the patriotic love 
 of country are as essential in the progress of the world as 
 the family and the love of family are essential in domestic 
 communities. But as the family and the love of family are 
 not inconsistent with the love of country, but only strengthen 
 it, so a proper, pure and patriotic nationalism stimulates a 
 sense of international justice and does not detract in any 
 way from the spirit of universal brotherhood. 
 
 Again, it is said that in the League we injure nationalism 
 by abridging the sovereignty of our country in that we are 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 147 
 
 to yield to an international council and an international 
 tribunal, in which we have only one representative, the de- 
 cisions of questions of justice and of national policy. l 
 
 1 Mr. Taft has expressed himself elsewhere on this topic as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 " Certainly we do not wish to contend for a sovereignty that shall not 
 be limited by international law. That law should prevail in a decent 
 community of nations I mean the law of good form, the law of uni- 
 versal brotherhood, the law of neighborly feeling, which is over and 
 above the absolute rules of international law. All that this League 
 proposes is that every nation shall enjoy complete sovereignty within 
 the limitations of that international law and that good form among 
 nations. 
 
 "What is this League of Nations to do to uphold that sovereignty? 
 It agrees to give sanction to law that regulates sovereignty. That 
 sovereignty, regulated by law, is to be clinched through the organized 
 action of all the nations of the world. 
 
 "Any other view, any objection to that view, savors of what? It 
 savors of the desire to use the sovereignty of our nation to achieve 
 purposes that will be defeated by the restraints which the League 
 offers. That is what it means. It is the German idea of sovereignty 
 the power to use that sovereignty to achieve your purpose even when 
 that purpose transgresses international law or moral law." The 
 Atlantic Congress for a League of Nations, New York, Feb. 5, 1919. 
 
 "To recur again to the objections which run as a thread through all 
 of Senator Poindexter's attacks upon the constitution of the League, 
 namely, that the League minimizes the sovereignty of the United States 
 and of every nation which joins it, there is a misconception in the 
 mind of the Senator as to sovereignty that needs to be pointed out. 
 No reasonable and patriotic and properly self-respecting citizen of the 
 United States can claim that our sovereignty should be more than a 
 right to freedom of action within the limitations of international law, 
 international morality, and a due regard for the rights of other nations. 
 The only sovereignty which we ought to claim is sovereignty regulated 
 by these limitations. It is exactly analogous to the liberty that we enjoy 
 as individuals, which is liberty curtailed and regulated by law in order 
 that other citizens may enjoy the same liberty. It is an exercise of 
 rights on my part consistent with the exercise of the same rights on 
 the part of every other man. It is not complete liberty of action. 
 Proper national sovereignty is similarly restricted. Now the League 
 does not proceed to restrict that sovereignty further than, through the 
 
148 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Sovereignty is a matter of definition. The League does not 
 contemplate the slightest interference with the internal 
 government of any country. The League does not propose 
 to interfere, except where the claims of right of one country 
 
 joint compulsion of all nations, to keep a would-be outlaw nation 
 within the proper existing limitation. 
 
 " The League is not a super-sovereign. It is only a partnership. Its 
 power is in only a partnership. Its power is in joint agreement not 
 in the establishment of government. The Senator's objection is funda- 
 mental. If it were analyzed and logically developed it would be seen 
 to be a reactionary doctrine that belongs to the German view of the 
 state and its needs and rights. It is not consonant with any hope of 
 settling international differences other than by the power of the sword. 
 It leads directly to the proposal that ' might makes right.' It is based 
 on a doctrine of supreme national selfishness. It is the pessimistic and 
 despairing view of any possibility of restricting war. It contemplates 
 with entire complacence the prospect of another war in ten or twenty 
 years like that through which we have passed. It perverts the glorious 
 idea of a national sovereignty and prevents its aiding the family of 
 nations. It perverts our grand federal constitution rendering helpless 
 so far as aiding the outside world is concerned a nation which, 
 under the providence of .God, has become the world's greatest Power. 
 
 " Will the American people acquiesce in such a small view of our 
 responsibilities toward mankind and of our governmental capacity to 
 be helpful? We may be confident they will not." Address at Portland, 
 Oregon, Feb. 16, 1919. 
 
 "And then 'sovereignty' what is sovereignty? Well, I can give 
 you the German view and I can give you the American view. The Ger- 
 man view is that sovereignty is the power to overcome the sovereignty 
 of other nations by force. That is all. What is the American idea 
 of sovereignty? It is a sovereignty regulated by international law and 
 international morality and international decency and international 
 neighborly feeling. Do we wish any sovereignty greater than that? 
 Sovereignty is analogous to the liberty of the individual. The latter is 
 liberty regulated by law which protects that liberty ; and sovereignty 
 is the same thing applied to nations. We do not change that in this 
 League of Nations. All we do is to furnish the means of determining 
 peaceably and justly what those limitations are, and provide the means 
 of maintaining them. Does that deprive us of any sovereignty?" Ad- 
 dress at San Francisco, Feb. 19, 1919. 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 149 
 
 clash with the claims of right of another. To submit such 
 claims of right to an impartial tribunal no more interferes 
 with the sovereignty of a nation than the submission of an 
 individual to a hearing and decree of court interferes with 
 his liberty. The League is merely introducing, into the 
 world's sphere, liberty of action regulated by law instead of 
 license uncontrolled except by the greed and passion of the 
 individual nation. 
 
 It is said that we are giving up our right to make war or 
 to withhold from making it. We can not take away from 
 our Congress the right to declare war, and no one would 
 wish to do so. But that is no reason why we should not 
 enter into an agreement to defend the impartial judgments 
 of the League and to repress palpable violations of its 
 covenants by those who have entered it. The question must 
 always be for the decision of Congress whether our obliga- 
 tions under the League require us in honor to make war. 
 \Ye have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, we have guar- 
 anteed the integrity of Panama. Does that deprive us of 
 sovereignty ? Yet we are under an obligation to make war 
 if another country attacks them. 
 
 The fourth of the President's fourteen points contains 
 the provision that adequate guaranties must be given and 
 taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest 
 point consistent with domestic safety. That can not be 
 done immediately. It represents an aim and an aspiration. 
 \Ye are the victors in this war which grew out of the exten- 
 sive armament and military power of Germany. It will be 
 a legitimate condition of peace exacted by the victors that 
 Germany shall substantially disarm and leave the Allied 
 Powers in a position with armament sufficient to keep 
 Germany within law and right. How far disarmament can 
 
I5O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 be carried must be determined by experience. Disarma- 
 ment will be accomplished effectively in great measure by 
 the economic pressure that will be felt intensely by all nations 
 after this war, by such mutual covenants and general super- 
 vision of an international council as experience may dictate, 
 and ultimately by a sense of security in the successful opera- 
 tion of this League to Enforce Peace. 
 
 For the time being the people who are afraid that the 
 United States will make itself helpless to defend its rights 
 against unjust aggression are unduly exercised. Any prac- 
 tical League of Nations will require the United States to 
 maintain a potential military force sufficient to comply 
 promptly with its obligations to contribute to an interna- 
 tional army whenever called upon for League purposes. 
 Such obligation may well be made the basis and reason for 
 universal training of youth, in accord with the Australian 
 or the Swiss system a system that trains youths for a 
 year physically and mentally and gives them a proper sense 
 of duty and obligation to the state. There may be a differ- 
 ence of opinion as to whether we should have such a system ; 
 but there is nothing in the League to Enforce Peace and its 
 principles which prevents its adoption; and either that or 
 some other means of maintaining an adequate force to dis- 
 charge our obligations under a League must be found. 
 While we should lay broad the foundations for a League 
 looking as far into the future as we may, we must trust to 
 the future to work out the application of those principles, 
 to amend the details of our machinery and to adapt it to 
 the lessons of experience. We know that the real hope of 
 reducing armament and keeping it down is the maintenance 
 of a League which shall insure justice and apply in its aid the 
 major force of the world. As the operation of that League 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 151 
 
 is more and more acquiesced in, the possibility of the safe 
 reduction of armaments in all countries will become apparent 
 to all and will be realized. 
 
 Another question that has agitated a good many people 
 is whether we should admit Germany to the League. That 
 depends upon whether Germany makes herself fit for mem- 
 bership in the League. If she gets rid of the Hohenzollerns, 
 if she establishes a real popular government, if she shows by 
 her national policies that she has acted on the lessons which 
 the war should teach her, in short if she brings forth works 
 meet for repentance, then of course we ought to admit her 
 and encourage her by putting her on an equality with other 
 nations and use her influence and power to make the League 
 more effective. The long-drawn-out payment of indemni- 
 ties will keep her in a chastened mood and will keep alive 
 in her mind the evils of militarism. 
 
 I shall not now discuss the difference in the obligations of 
 the members of such a League as between the Great Powers 
 and the lesser Powers. All should have a voice in the gen- 
 eral policy of the League ; but it is well worthy of considera- 
 tion whether, with the burden of enforcing the obligations 
 of the League by military force which the greater Powers 
 must carry, they should not have the larger voice in executive 
 control. As they are the only ones likely to be able to 
 create the major force of the world, they may reasonably 
 claim a right to more administrative power. The rights of 
 the smaller nations will be protected in the Congress, in 
 which they have a full voice, and by the impartial judgments 
 of the judicial tribunals and the recommendations of the 
 Commission of Conciliation. There is not the slightest 
 likelihood that the mere executive control by the larger 
 Powers would lead to oppression of the smaller Powers be- 
 
152 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 cause, should selfishness disclose itself in one of the Great 
 Powers, we could be confident of the wish of the other Great 
 Powers to repress it. 
 
 One of the difficulties in the maintenance of a League of 
 all nations will be the instability of the governments of its 
 members if the League embraces all nations. On the whole, 
 the Greater Powers are the more stable and the more respon- 
 sible. It is well therefore that upon them shall fall the chief 
 executive responsibility. While the principles of the 
 League would prevent interference with the internal govern- 
 ments as a general rule, the utter instability of a government 
 might authorize an attempt to stabilize it. That this can be 
 done better by a disinterested League than by a single nation 
 goes without saying. 
 
 The possibilities of many-sided world benefit from a 
 League after it is well established and is working smoothly, 
 it is hard to overestimate. For the present, as the result of 
 this Congress of Nations to meet and settle the terms of 
 peace, we may well be content to have a League established 
 on broad lines, with principles firmly and clearly stated, and 
 with constructive provisions for amendment as experience 
 shall indicate their necessity. 
 
 I verily believe we are in sight of the Promised Land. I 
 hope we may not be denied its enjoyment. 
 
 WORKINGMEN AND THE LEAGUE 
 
 The pressing imminence of the issue of a League is not 
 as fully understood in this country as it is in Great Britain, 
 
 1 Extract from article in Public Ledger Nov. 13, 1918. 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL POLICY 153 
 
 in France and in Italy. The movement was initiated in the 
 United States in 1915 by the formation of the American 
 League to Enforce Peace; but the question then had more 
 or less of an academic aspect because of the remoteness of 
 peace, and, indeed, at that time, for us, the remoteness of 
 the war. Associations were subsequently formed in Great 
 Britain and in France. As the peoples of these countries 
 became war-weary, as the working population felt the suffer- 
 ing and dreadful pinch of starvation and want, their souls 
 were gripped with a determination to have no more war. 
 The subject was given world-wide attention through the 
 addresses of President Wilson. The Socialists had always 
 included the abolition of war as a fundamental plank in their 
 platform. While the great majority of the Socialists and 
 the workingmen in the allied countries admitted the necessity 
 of fighting this war through, they made a peremptory de- 
 mand for a League of Nations to Enforce Peace after this 
 war was over and after the unconditional surrender of mili- 
 tarism. 
 
 The League of Nations, therefore, in England, France 
 and Italy has become the slogan of workingmen and Social- 
 ists and they will brook no hesitation on this subject by the 
 representatives of their countries in the Peace Congress. 
 
 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL 
 POLICY * 
 
 Speeches are made from time to time in the Senate on 
 the plan of a League of Nations to Enforce Peace. Sena- 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. I, 1918. 
 
154 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 tors Poindexter and Reed have pronounced judgment upon 
 the plan as dangerous to the Republic and contrary to the 
 established traditions of the nation. With deference, this 
 judgment is not up to date. It fails to note that the war, 
 our participation and avowed purpose in it and the treaty 
 which is to end it have so changed our relation to Europe 
 and the world that such traditions have ceased to be 
 applicable. These traditions were shown to be outworn by 
 the fact that we could not keep out of the war. We were 
 driven into it because of our relations as close neighbors 
 to the European belligerents. Having been thus driven 
 into war, are we to make a separate peace with Germany, 
 merely securing a guaranty from her that in the future we 
 shall be immune, as a neutral, from submarine attack upon 
 our commerce? This would be the logical outcome of the 
 attitude of the opposing Senators. Are we not rather to 
 take part in framing the articles of a general treaty as to 
 Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the Trentino, the Czecho-Slavs, the 
 Jugo-Slavs, Russia, Armenia and in respect to the numerous 
 other questions that must be constructively answered in the 
 treaty? 
 
 Certainly the American people have no doubt that we are 
 to have a full share in the settlement of all these issues. No 
 other inference can be drawn from the messages of the Presi- 
 dent, acquiesced in by all. If we sit at the international 
 council table and make this general treaty, it is idle to talk 
 of our taking no further part in European world politics. 
 If we enter into this treaty rearranging the map of Europe 
 and the world in the interest of the rule of, by and for the 
 various peoples of the world, and to secure them the bless- 
 ings of permanent peace, we have got to see it through. We 
 can't make such a treaty and run away from it as our 
 
A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL POLICY 155 
 
 abandoned child. We must share, with those with whom we 
 act in making it, the responsibility of securing and maintain- 
 ing its full and beneficent operation. If we make a treaty 
 to fill the outlines of President Wilson's message of January 
 8, as amended by the Allies, we shall have the job of its 
 execution lasting a number of years. It will not execute 
 itself. 
 
 W r e have put our hand to the plow and we cannot turn 
 back. The opposing Senators do not see the problems which 
 confront us. 
 
 The imagination of Senators has been strained to conceive 
 a situation in which the United States shall have had a judg- 
 ment against her, in the international court, of vital char- 
 acter which she resists, and the united military forces of the 
 world combine to destroy her. If the judgment against her 
 is just, she ought to obey it. If it is not, why assume that 
 it will be rendered at all or that, if rendered, all nations 
 would join in a world war to enforce it? Indeed, may not 
 our imagination, if we let it run riot, as easily conceive such 
 a union of military forces of the world against the United 
 States without a league and its machinery as with them ? 
 
 Thus far the opponents of the League on the Senate floor 
 have been from both parties. If President Wilson returns 
 to his first view of the need for such a League of Nations to 
 Enforce Peace and succeeds in securing the concurrence of 
 our European allies in this view, we may assume that the 
 Democratic party will support him in his policy. The 
 League of Nations to maintain peace will likewise have the 
 passionate support of all the peoples of our Allies and of 
 neutral nations. It will have the earnest support of organ- 
 
156 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ized labor in this country. It will arouse the enthusiasm of 
 the peace-loving people of this country, who are vastly in 
 the majority. The Republican members of the Senate will 
 do well to consider whether it would be wise for them to 
 furnish to Mr. Wilson and the Democratic party an issue 
 upon which the Administration would be most likely to win, 
 and one which would dwarf all others upon which the 
 Republicans now base their hope of success. Of course, 
 this is no reason for yielding in the face of fundamental 
 principle, but it may well weigh heavily when objection to 
 the League is based on hypotheses, strained and improbable. 
 
 WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY l 
 
 My feeling about the League of Nations to Enforce Peace 
 is that the stars in their courses are fighting to make it inevit- 
 able. 
 
 We are in a League of Nations to Enforce Peace, we have 
 been enforcing peace, and we are in a place where we cannot 
 escape it. 
 
 We went into this war because we were driven into it. 
 We had to be driven because of the Washington policy and 
 entangling alliance doctrine ; and we stayed out of it a long 
 time after, as we look at it now, we ought to have gone in. 
 We were forced in to defend our rights on the seas. That 
 was why those men who feared entangling alliances were 
 willing to waive their objection or reached the conclusion 
 
 1 Address delivered at dinner of editors and publishers, in New York, 
 Dec. 6, 1918. 
 
WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY 157 
 
 that we were not departing from that policy: our rights 
 on the seas had really been invaded by murderous submarine 
 attacks on neutral ships and on enemy merchant ships, bear- 
 ing our citizens. And they had a right, under international 
 law, to be there. 
 
 When we got into the war Mr. Wilson stated and I 
 never heard any objection from anybody that our pur- 
 pose in this war was to make the world safe for democracy. 
 Not the United States, the world. It was to suppress mili- 
 tarism. Where? Not in the United States. Not in 
 Europe. In the world. To say that we are not to take 
 our part in world politics is to ignore just exactly where 
 we are, what our position is a position we cannot escape 
 from. 
 
 We have made an armistice, we have imposed terms on 
 Germany with respect to that armistice; but we made that 
 armistice on a basis of a treaty which was to deal in a 
 general way with fields that were outlined in the message of 
 January 8, 1918, as amended by the Allies before the armis- 
 tice was submitted to the Germans. One amendment refer- 
 red to the freedom of the seas, the Entente Allies reserving 
 the right to deal with that subject as they were advised. 
 The other concerned the meaning of the word " restoration," 
 which was made entirely free from doubt with reference to 
 indemnities. 
 
 That is the basis of the treaty; those are the fields to be 
 covered in the treaty. And now it is a matter of good 
 faith, as I understand, between the parties. 
 
 How are you going to regulate the question of how much 
 armament each nation shall have? How maintain the limit 
 
158 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 
 
 fixed upon? Of course, everybody understands that the 
 armament we are especially interested in is Germany's arma- 
 ment. We are going to see to it that that is only such 
 " as domestic safety shall require." 
 
 Are we just going to leave that requirement in the treaty 
 and make no provision for enforcing it or maintaining it? 
 Is that the way we are to deal with Germany ? Under such 
 conditions, what will happen if Germany unites with German 
 Austria to make a very considerable power and retains her 
 military spirit ? Shall we not rather create an agency which 
 shall see to it that this Covenant is effective? 
 
 Then there is Russia, controlled by the Bolsheviki. I do 
 not know what we are going to do about Russia. I know 
 what we ought to have done. We ought to have sent two 
 hundred thousand men in there originally, and with addi- 
 tional forces from our Allies we could have stamped out 
 Bolshevism. When a man says you encumber the earth 
 and that the only way to have happiness on earth is to kill 
 you the only way you can deal with him is to kill him. 
 That is all there is about it; and the idea of dealing with 
 Bolshevism in any other way is an iridescent dream. We 
 will have to stamp it out. That will have to be done by 
 the Allies, and we will have to maintain a force for that 
 purpose. 
 
 The countries we propose to set up have got to be held in 
 leading strings. You cannot do that except by a League 
 of Nations that notifies them every one of them : ' This 
 war was fought for your liberty and that democracy might 
 be safe, and we do not propose to have you start a conflagra- 
 tion and bring about another war that we have sacrificed 
 
WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY 159 
 
 millions and billions and endured all sorts of suffering to 
 avoid." 
 
 We created a republic in Cuba. We surrounded it with 
 all possible safeguards, and then we had to send a force 
 down there to compose a revolution of gentlemen on the 
 outs who wanted to get in and gentlemen on the ins who 
 did not want to get out. That is the trouble we will find in 
 these new republics. 
 
 I say this with deference, but if there is not a League of 
 Nations created in Paris the whole thing is a failure and 
 I do not think they are going to make a failure at Paris. 
 
 It is perfectly easy to suggest objections to a plan like 
 this. Take the Constitution of the United States. When 
 it was adopted, the prophecies in respect to it were quite 
 as formidable as certain distinguished Senators hold the dif- 
 ficulties in the operation of the League to be. And you can 
 imagine cases now with reference to the operation of the 
 Constitution that would lead to such a disturbance as to de- 
 stroy the Government. We had one but survived it. We 
 had to camp outside the Constitution until we did, and then 
 we got back under it again. 
 
 In the disputed election between Hayes and Tilden we had 
 to create an extra-constitutional body to settle that question, 
 but we were self-governing people and we did it. 
 
 What seems to me important is to get nations into the 
 habit of settling their differences otherwise than by war. 
 You can't get rid of war until some substitute is offered 
 to prevent injustice and to enable you to get justice. Of 
 course, we have produced that in our constitutional system. 
 Every state has the right to go into the Supreme Court to 
 
l6o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ask justice against every other state. In many cases there 
 is no law which governs the behavior of states except inter- 
 national law, and that is administered by the Supreme Court 
 of the United States in such cases. 
 
 I do not care what you call it, you have, got to have a 
 court, you have got to have a committee of conciliation, 
 you have got to have force, you have got to fix rules of inter- 
 national law. You cannot get away from these. 
 
 LESSER LEAGUE OF NATIONS l 
 
 Subjects for consideration by the conference at Versailles 
 will naturally divide themselves into two great classes. 
 The first will embrace those terms exacted of Germany and 
 the other conquered nations to prevent them from again 
 beginning war now or in the near future ; the indemnities to 
 be assessed against them for damage inflicted on France, 
 Belgium, Serbia and the other Allies; the redistribution of 
 their territories and carving out of them the new republics 
 to be set up ; together with the machinery for securing those 
 terms and their maintenance. The second class of subjects 
 for discussion and settlement will be less exigent and have 
 more of a world-wide character. Such will be the definition 
 of freedom of the seas, open diplomacy, the prevention of 
 discriminating economic barriers and the machinery for a 
 general League of Nations to Enforce Peace. 
 
 This league may well consist of only the Allied nations, 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 9, 1918. 
 
LESSER LEAGUE OF NATIONS l6l 
 
 England, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. These 
 are now the only " great " Powers for practical purposes. 
 They cannot achieve the end of this war without such a 
 league. How, if at all, this league shall be expanded to 
 include other or all nations may be properly inquired into by 
 a Congress of Nations of the World, continuing the sessions 
 of the Versailles conference. The greater league would 
 thus be a growth from the smaller league into which the 
 Allied Powers will find themselves forced by the necessities 
 of the situation. This is the best method of developing 
 political institutions. It is the Anglo-Saxon way. They 
 are framed and set in operation to meet immediate needs 
 and then are expanded as their adaptation to larger useful- 
 ness makes itself clear. 
 
 A question as to the first or smaller league will at once 
 demand answer from us. That is, whether we shall join it. 
 The reactionaries, of whom there seem to be several in our 
 Senate, will insist that we should keep our skirts clear of it 
 and leave it to the other four Great Powers. After we have 
 signed and approved the treaty, in their view, we should rid 
 ourselves of any responsibility for its enforcement or the 
 maintenance of the just, equitable and democratic status 
 which its signatories seek to establish. This is the counsel 
 of cowardice and atavism. It breaks the word of promise 
 to the oppressed peoples of. Europe. It would take out of 
 the executive council of such a league the only member of 
 it to which the peoples of the new republics and the rest of 
 Europe would look with confidence for purely disinterested 
 counsel and action. After our magniloquent declarations of 
 purpose in this war, after our high-sounding announcement 
 of the equitable bases of settlement of the war upon which 
 the armistice and the treaty to follow are conditioned, what 
 
1 62 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 a lame and impotent conclusion it would be for our President 
 to come back to this country, leaving, as an arbiter of half 
 the world, a League of Nations in which we were to have 
 no voice and over whose actions we were to have no con- 
 trol! 
 
 Could we thus selfishly retire to our isolated seclusion and 
 repudiate the responsibility that our participation in the war 
 and in the terms of peace must thrust upon us as the most 
 powerful and most impartial member of the family of na- 
 tions? It is inconceivable that President Wilson, after what 
 he has written and said to the world, would consent to play 
 such a humiliating part. If, on the contrary, he is consistent 
 with himself, if he stands up to the character he has assumed 
 before to the plain people of Europe and the world, and signs 
 a treaty by which the United States becomes a responsible 
 factor in the world's progress, the men of small vision in the 
 Senate and Congress will be swept from their opposition by 
 a public opinion they cannot withstand. 
 
 Such a general league must always be of the highest 
 benefit to every small nation. It would offer protection 
 against any oppression by a greater nation, and it would give 
 relief from the burden of armament. Full reliance could be 
 had on the fairness of the league, because a conspiracy by 
 all the Great Powers, including the United States, to oppress 
 a small Power is unthinkable. Therefore, every small 
 nation would ultimately seek admission. It would then 
 willingly submit to reasonable restrictions on its own repre- 
 sentative weight in the league to which, as an initiating con- 
 stituent member, it might make vociferous objection. 
 
DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS 163 
 
 DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS AND FREEDOM 
 
 OF THE SEAS l 
 
 The original program of the League to Enforce Peace 
 contained no clause with reference to disarmament of 
 nations. This was not because the projectors of the league 
 did not deem disarmament of the utmost importance in the 
 ultimate maintenance of permanent peace but because they 
 deemed real disarmament possible only as the result of the 
 successful operation of the league. The league could only 
 serve its purpose by furnishing to the nations the protection 
 that the nations secured by armament. It was to be substi- 
 tuted for armament. Until it proved its usefulness as such, 
 the armed nations could not be expected to part with their 
 own insurance. 
 
 In a league of nations to Enforce the Versailles Treaty 
 the Allied Powers must retain armament to constitute a 
 police force to secure peace between the new nations of 
 Middle and Eastern Europe and Asia Minor. This will 
 justify the United States in maintaining a potential army 
 by a system of universal training. It accords with Secretary 
 Daniels' recommendations that we continue the peace plan 
 of increasing our navy. 
 
 As the smaller league of peace proves its adequate pro- 
 tection against war the motive of economy will prompt com- 
 pliance with Mr. Wilson's armament clause in the fourteen 
 points by a proportionate decrease in all armaments, and a 
 mutual agreement will become possible and practical. 
 Meantime we must be patient. Reforms of this kind do 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. n, 1918. 
 
164 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 not come at once and should not be expected to. We take 
 an important step, and its success leads to another forward 
 movement. 
 
 There is nothing in England's position respecting her fleet 
 that should discourage the friends of the League of Nations 
 to Enforce Peace. The exaggerated language of a Winston 
 Churchill should not discourage us. It is the language of 
 an advocate in a heated political campaign. We must ad- 
 mit the justice of England's position that she cannot give 
 up her fleet in the absence of the test of a new league of na- 
 tions. She cannot know whether the League will be 
 sufficient protection to her against attack. Her isolated 
 position requires her to protect herself against starvation in 
 time of war. She is dependent on other countries for food 
 and raw materials. These can only reach her by the sea. 
 She must keep open the access by sea in time of war. Only 
 by her fleet can she do this. Not until the operation of the 
 League of Nations demonstrates that this danger in war is 
 minimized can she be' expected to reduce her fleet. 
 
 So far as freedom of the seas in time of peace is con- 
 cerned, wherever the British flag floats there is and always 
 has been freedom of the seas. 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN 
 COLONIES 1 
 
 No one can overestimate the weight in winning this war 
 of the morale of the Allies born of the righteousness of their 
 cause. They said, and the world believed them, that they 
 were engaged in this war for no selfish purpose. They were 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 16, 1918. 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 165 
 
 enlisted in the terrible struggle to end the hideous immorality 
 and unmorality of militarism, to restore stolen goods and 
 to further the establishment of governments in accordance 
 with the will of those governed. 
 
 France sought Alsace-Lorraine as a measure of justice. 
 Italy sought the Trentino and Trieste on the same ground. 
 The United States and Great Britain sought the acquisition 
 of no new territory. Great Britain has indicated that she 
 does not desire the return of Helgoland, that island off the 
 mouth of the Elbe which Lord Salisbury sold to Germany 
 and which has proved so formidable a naval outpost of the 
 German empire in this war. 
 
 The question as to the German colonies, however, has 
 raised a doubt among some whether Great Britain will adhere 
 religiously to the attitude of seeking no additional territory. 
 Germany has colonies in East and West Africa of large 
 extent. She has a colony of large area in the neighborhood 
 of Australia, part of the island of New Guinea. The 
 Australians, the New Zealanders and the South Africans 
 among the English colonists object to the return of these 
 colonies to Germany, because Germany's ownership of them 
 has been a threat to Australia and New Zealand and has 
 required special defenses by them. 
 
 It is to be inferred from the clearly proved outrageous 
 treatment by Germany of her colonists that the Peace Con- 
 ference in Versailles will conclude that none of her colonies 
 should be returned to Germany. They have not been ad- 
 ministered for the benefit of the backward peoples in the 
 colonies. The treatment of these peoples is of a piece with 
 the atrocious conduct of the Germans in this war. 
 
 Under the principles laid down in the fourteen points, 
 therefore, the only question which the conferees can take up 
 
1 66 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 is how shall these colonies be administered. That they are 
 not now capable of self-government goes without saying. 
 The Australians and New Zealanders would doubtless wish 
 that the German colony in New Guinea should be taken over 
 by Great Britain. The South African English colonists will 
 probably seek the same result. 
 
 It would be too bad for Britain to yield to the urgings of 
 her daughters in this regard. She cannot afford to do it. It 
 will arouse at once the attack that she is exhibiting the same 
 land-grabbing propensities which have been charged to her 
 in the past. 
 
 There is no argument making more strongly for the estab- 
 lishment and maintenance of a league of nations in connec- 
 tion with this treaty than the need of a proper method of 
 providing for these German colonies. They should be 
 governed by an agency of the league of nations charged with 
 the duty of educating the natives, leading them on in the 
 paths of civilization and extending self-government to them 
 as rapidly as their fitness will permit. They will thus prove 
 to the world the equitable and just motives and aims of the 
 nations who frame the provisions of this epoch-making 
 treaty. 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND RELIGIOUS 
 LIBERTY l 
 
 The earnest effort of the Jews of the United States to 
 induce our executive to remedy the intolerable condition of 
 their co-religionists in the backward countries of Europe has 
 often been met and defeated by the argument that our 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 17, 1918. 
 
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 167 
 
 government can not interfere with the domestic affairs of 
 another nation. This argument has little if any application 
 to the present situation. There is much evidence accumulat- 
 ing to show that the pogroms and abuses of the Jews con- 
 tinue in the countries where they have heretofore existed, 
 and that the chaotic and lawless condition in these countries 
 has offered an opportunity for the cruel gratification of race 
 and religious prejudice. On the whole, it is not too much 
 to say that the people of the Jewish race have suffered more 
 in this war, as noncombatants, than any other people, unless 
 it be the Serbians and the Armenians. 
 
 In Poland and in Galicia the true story of their agonies 
 and losses is heartrending. The five nations who are to 
 draft the treaty at Versailles are setting up governments in 
 Poland, in the Ukraine and in the Baltic provinces. In all 
 of these the Jewish population is a substantial percentage of 
 the whole. In their sad story we find the Jews in the Middle 
 Ages seeking refuge from the oppression and cruelty of 
 Western Europe and rushing to the great empire of Poland, 
 then stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, to take 
 advantage of a charter of religious tolerance and oppor- 
 tunity granted by one of the liberal Polish kings. The irony 
 of fate, however, ended the Polish kingdom and a large part 
 of it was turned over to Russia, which ground the Jews 
 under its tyrannous heel. This is why half of the thirteen 
 millions of Jews living in the world were at the beginning 
 of this war to be found in the Russian pale in which Jews 
 were permitted to live, to which they were limited, and which 
 was practically coterminous with the territory which Russia 
 had taken from old Poland. 
 
 One of the great projects of this Congress of Powers at 
 Versailles is to set up independent governments in these ter- 
 
1 68 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ritories of the Russian Jewish pale. We shall be derelict in 
 our duty if we do not require, as part of the fundamental 
 law of these new republics, that the Jews shall have as great 
 religious freedom as they have in the United States. But 
 we must do more. We must have a league of nations to 
 see to it that such fundamental law exacted by the treaty shall 
 be enforced. We find full precedent for such a provision 
 in the law in the treaty made by the Congress of Berlin, in 
 which Bulgaria and Rumania were established as independ- 
 ent countries. Rumania, which had long been a heinous 
 sinner against the Jews, was forced by the Berlin Congress 
 to accept, as part of its constitution, a declaration that there 
 should be complete religious freedom and that no citizen 
 should be discriminated against on account of his religion 
 in any respect. The Rumanian government had the 
 audacity, after incorporating the guaranty in its fundamental 
 law, to declare and hold that Jews who had lived in Rumania 
 for two or three hundred years, father and son, were aliens. 
 In this way the protection of the Jews provided for in the 
 treaty of Berlin was denied, and this was after Rumania had 
 secured recognition as a government on an additional 
 promise of fair treatment of the Jews. 
 
 Let us have no farcical result in working out this treaty of 
 Versailles. Could we find a stronger argument for the con- 
 tinuance of our league of nations than this ignominious fail- 
 ure of that congress of 1879, under the presidency of Bis- 
 marck, to carry out its declared purpose? If there be any 
 people who should be earnestly in favor of a league of na- 
 tions as the outgrowth and the condition of this treaty now 
 being framed at Versailles the Jews are that people. 
 
PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 169 
 
 PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF 
 NATIONS 1 
 
 President Wilson says that the statement of the Chicago 
 Tribune that, before sailing, he approved the plan of the 
 League to Enforce Peace is untrue and that he never directly 
 or indirectly indorsed the plan. It is not believed that any 
 one, for the American League, ever claimed that he did. 
 From what he has said, however, he has given the world 
 reason to believe that he favored action by a league of 
 nations to achieve results only to be brought about along 
 the lines of the American League to Enforce Peace. He 
 has, because of his addresses and messages on the subject, 
 come to be regarded as the foremost champion of a league 
 of nations to maintain peace after this war. It is the con- 
 fident belief of the people of France that he has attended the 
 conference in order to secure such a league which prompts 
 their enthusiastic and affectionate acclaim. He will do well 
 to bear this in mind. He must not give the word of promise 
 to the ear and break it to the hope. He has spoken so much 
 on the objects of this war, he has laid down in a didactic 
 form so many principles in their application to all the peoples 
 in the sphere of the war, he has pictured with such eloquence 
 the idealistic results for the freedom, justice and peace of the 
 large and small nations affected by the war, that if he now 
 fails to propose and secure in the treaty practical machinery 
 for a real league of nations, which shall enforce peace, he 
 will properly be held responsible for a lame and impotent 
 conclusion before the world and its expectant peoples. 
 
 Mr. Wilson is master of an inspiring style of promise, in 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 23, 1918. 
 
I7O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 which he encourages hopes and ideals and awakens the 
 enthusiasm of popular expectancy without committing him- 
 self to constructive suggestions for a definite method of 
 achievement. In dealing with the peoples of the world, who 
 are looking to him as a savior from future war and a pre- 
 server of peace and democracy, this habit of mind and 
 expression is now to be subjected to the severest test in his 
 career. He has in his keeping not alone his own reputation 
 for good faith, but that of the great people for whom he is 
 the spokesman. 
 
 Let us see what this League of Nations, whose formation, 
 he says, is absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of 
 peace, is. Let us study it from his speeches. 
 
 On May 27, 1916, Mr. Wilson delivered a written address 
 at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in Washington. 
 He expressly declined to discuss the program of the League, 
 whose guest he was, but he clearly specified certain objects 
 and laid down principles of international action which ac- 
 corded with the objects and principles of the league. He 
 said the people of the United States would wish " a universal 
 association of the nations to maintain an inviolate security of 
 the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use 
 of all nations of the world and to prevent any war begun 
 either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and 
 full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world 
 a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political inde- 
 pendence." He further said at this dinner that " the world 
 was even then upon the eve of a great consummation, when 
 some common force will be brought into existence which 
 shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental 
 interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion 
 shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition 
 
PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 17! 
 
 or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a 
 common justice and a common peace." 
 
 He delivered these words to a society whose plan included 
 for its proposed league of nations a congress of Powers 
 to improve international law, an international court and an 
 international council of conciliation, to which all interna- 
 tional differences were to be submitted, and, finally, a com- 
 mon and combined police force of the nations together with 
 combined economic boycott to prevent the advent of war 
 before there has been full submission of the dispute to such 
 tribunals. It was impossible for those who heard the Presi- 
 dent against this background to escape the conviction that 
 he was in general and almost specific accord not only with 
 the purposes but with the method of the league. How could 
 the just results which he sought be obtained without interna- 
 tional tribunals ? How could a league of nations act through 
 a common force without obligation of its members to respond 
 with contributors to such a common force when war was 
 begun without submission? 
 
 Since that speech much has happened. But the President 
 has continued to refer to a league of nations and to the 
 major force of the world as a means of securing peace and 
 justice. 
 
 In the fourteen points of the message of January 8, 1918, 
 we find references to a League of Nations and its guarantee 
 as follows: 
 
 In the second point it is said that the high seas may be 
 closed only " by international action for the enforcement of 
 international covenants." 
 
 In the third point establishment of equality of trade con- 
 ditions is to be required " among all nations consenting 
 to the peace and associating themselves for its mainte- 
 nance." 
 
172 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 In the fourth point adequate guarantees are to be " given 
 and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the 
 lowest point consistent with domestic safety." 
 
 In the eleventh point it is provided that " international 
 guarantees of the political and economic independence and 
 territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be 
 entered into." 
 
 By the twelfth it is enjoined that " the Dardanelles should 
 be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and 
 commerce of all nations under international guarantees." 
 
 In the thirteenth point it is required that Poland shall be 
 secured " a free passage to the seas," and her " political and 
 economic independence and territorial integrity should be 
 guaranteed by international covenants." 
 
 In the fourteenth point it is said that a " general associa- 
 tion of nations must be formed under specific covenants for 
 the purpose of political independence and territorial integrity 
 to great and small States alike." 
 
 In his address of September 27, 1918, he said: "There 
 can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and un- 
 derstandings within the general and common family of the 
 League of Nations." 
 
 " There can be no special, selfish economic combinations 
 within the League and no employment of any form of 
 economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of 
 economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the 
 world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a 
 means of discipline and control." 
 
 He signaled the entry of the United States into the war 
 by his message of April 2, 1917, in which he said we were 
 to fight " for a universal dominion of right by such concert 
 
PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 173 
 
 of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations 
 and make this world itself at last free." 
 
 Other passages of similar import might be cited, but these 
 are enough to show that those who read them had a right to 
 believe the President was committing himself to a league 
 of nations, bound by covenants of its members to maintain 
 justice, freedom and peace among nations large and small 
 and to do this by force; i. e., by the combined armies and 
 navies of the members of the League. The maintenance of 
 justice necessarily carries with it the conception of a court 
 to administer it : to hear the differences submitted, pronounce 
 judgment and enforce it through the executive agencies of 
 the League. 
 
 This is the general plan of the League to Enforce Peace. 
 Mr. Wilson's plan is more ambitious in that the members 
 of the League are mutually to guarantee the political and 
 territorial integrity of all the signatories of the treaty. By 
 this the United States would bind itself to preserve by arms 
 the boundaries and independence of Poland, of the Balkans, 
 of the Czecho-Slavs and all the new republics to be born of 
 this treaty, as Great Britain did those of Belgium. 
 
 We cannot suppose that, after giving these assurances to 
 the peoples of Europe, President Wilson will be content with 
 a treaty of mere good intentions and with declarations obli- 
 gating no nation to do anything to maintain justice, freedom 
 and peace, but leaving it to the uncertain moral sanction of 
 the conscience of each nation to find out what justice is and 
 then to do it. 
 
174 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 SENATOR LODGE ON THE LEAGUE OF 
 NATIONS l 
 
 Senator Lodge's speech in the senate on the twenty-first 
 of this month was the best yet made on the aims of the Allies 
 and the elements of a satisfactory treaty of peace. It was 
 comprehensive and accurate, lucid and forcible, felicitous in 
 phrase and elevated in tone. It was in the senator's best 
 style, and that is a high standard. 
 
 Its great merit is in its broad vision of the real purposes of 
 the United States and her present obligation. The senator 
 summarizes certain objections to the general League of Na- 
 tions. These are, as lawyers would say, obiter dicta in this 
 speech, because he now asks a postponement of that subject 
 matter, not its rejection on its merits. 
 
 There are those who minimize the burden the United 
 States should assume in execution of this peace; they deny 
 that she should share it with her Allies. Mr. Lodge is not 
 one of those. He is not a little American. He does not 
 recur to the farewell address of Washington and the phrase, 
 " entangling alliances," enjoined by Jefferson in order to 
 employ them narrowly to limit the responsibilities of the 
 United States, now that it has become the most powerful 
 nation in the world. 
 
 * 
 
 In his address he said : 
 
 " We went to war to save civilization. For this mighty 
 purpose we have sacrificed thousands of American lives and 
 spent billions of American treasure. We cannot, therefore, 
 leave the work half done. We are as much bound, not 
 merely by interests and every consideration for a safe future, 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 30, 1918. 
 
SENATOR LODGE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 175 
 
 but by honor and self-respect, to see that the terms of peace 
 are carried out, as we were to fulfill our great determination 
 that the armies of Germany should be defeated in the field. 
 We cannot halt or turn back now. We must do our share 
 to carry out the peace as we have done our share to win the 
 war, of which the peace is an integral part. We must do 
 our share in the occupation of German territory which will 
 be held as security for the indemnities to be paid by Germany. 
 We cannot escape doing our part in aiding the peoples to 
 whom we have helped to give freedom and independence in 
 establishing themselves with ordered governments, for in 
 no other way can we erect the barriers which are essential to 
 prevent another outbreak by Germany upon the world. We 
 cannot leave the Jugo-Slavs, the Czecho-Slovaks and the 
 Poles, the Lithuanians and the other states which we hope to 
 see formed and marching upon the path of progress and de- 
 velopment, unaided and alone.'' 
 
 He says that the United States is obliged to aid Russia in 
 rising from the chaos and disorder which has come upon her 
 to the place which she ought to occupy in the family of na- 
 tions; that the object of the Russian Bolsheviki has been to 
 destroy their fellow citizens and every element which was 
 necessary to a social fabric under which men could live and 
 prosper while they themselves profit in money and in power 
 from the ruin they have wrought; that they indulged in 
 murder and massacre, destroyed property and all the instru- 
 ments of industry, and the unhappy and ignorant people of 
 Russia, in whose name they undertook to act, are to-day suf- 
 fering from famine and disease, and are in a worse condition 
 than they were in the days of the Romanoffs; that if Russian 
 anarchy should be permitted to spread through western civil- 
 ization, that civilization would fall; that we cannot leave 
 
1/6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Russia lying helpless and breathing out infection on the 
 world ; and that it would be discreditable to the United States 
 if we failed to recognize our duty to her. 
 
 The Senator's speech was delivered to establish the neces- 
 sity for postponing the consideration by the conference of 
 five of the fourteen points of the President's message of 
 January 8, referring to secret diplomacy, to freedom of navi- 
 gation and the seas, to the removal of economic barriers, to 
 the reduction of armament, and to the central League of 
 Nations. 
 
 It must be admitted the Senator's argument for a post- 
 ponement of these questions to an adjourned conference has 
 weight. It may be that in the immediate settlement of them 
 is to be found a means of solving difficulties in agreement 
 upon specific terms of peace, of which neither the Senator 
 nor we are advised. 
 
 A stipulation that the five Allies dictating this treaty 
 should not make any treaty as between themselves incon- 
 sistent with the purpose of the great treaty and should make 
 no secret treaties at all, may well strengthen mutual con- 
 fidence in the good faith of all in the main treaty. 
 
 The general reduction of armaments of all nations does 
 not immediately concern the peace in the sphere of war, pro- 
 vided Germany's teeth are effectively drawn. 
 
 The provision against economic barriers is a general 
 question of world trade, the immediate settlement of which 
 does not, on the surface, seem essential to the adjustment of 
 the purposes of the nations in winning this war. The sub- 
 currents of selfish purpose in respect to trade, however, may 
 require a preliminary settlement of such a general principle 
 as the best basis for adjusting special interests. 
 
 The freedom of the seas in time of war is a very general 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 177 
 
 issue, postponement of which to the adjourned conference 
 would hardly interfere with a satisfactory peace settlement 
 for the present. 
 
 What should be emphasized, however, and what Senator 
 Lodge brings out with force of argument that cannot be 
 met, is the fact that we now have a league of nations 
 the United States, England, France, Italy and Japan - 
 whose obligations in respect to securing the results of the 
 war in Europe are equal. They are dictating this peace. 
 The treaty will not enforce itself. 
 
 Unless we stamp out the poisonous infection of Russian 
 Bolshevism and prevent its spread throughout the countries 
 of Europe, we shall only substitute anarchy, chaos and 
 plundering, murderous violence for imperial despotism. 
 
 We can only achieve these results by continuance of this 
 existing league of Great Powers. Of this Senator Lodge's 
 great address is a demonstration.* 
 
 THE LEAGUE : WHY AND HOW l 
 
 It is possible that we need not include all the nations in 
 the League in order to perform the task that we have set 
 for ourselves ; but it is essential that we should have a league 
 of the Great Nations to enforce peace, if the treaty of peace 
 is to accomplish any of the objects that we and the Allies 
 have had in the war. 
 
 1 Address delivered at Montclair, N. J., Dec. 30, 1918, under the 
 auspices of the College Women's Club. 
 
178 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Now, the expression league of nations is used to indicate 
 something, and I think it is just as well to define it so that 
 we may know what we are talking about. Of course it 
 serves some purposes to have a slogan which you do not 
 have to define. It gives you an opportunity to make a cam- 
 paign without reference to details. You shout it to the 
 crowd, and when anybody presents objections you can say 
 that that is not the kind of a league of nations you favor. 
 Therefore I think it best to define what we mean. I say 
 we; I mean a party of dreamers, mayhap, who got together, 
 after the war began, to formulate something. Way back in 
 an administration that is now forgotten I did not wish 
 to bring it up again, but I only refer to it as a reminiscence 
 and a date treaties of peace were negotiated with Eng- 
 land and with France by the United States. They provided 
 for arbitration of all justiciable issues between the contract- 
 ing parties. We thought we had made a good deal of pro- 
 gress in negotiating and signing those treaties, and the Sec- 
 retary of State and the Ambassadors who signed were 
 photographed and there was a general feeling that something 
 had been done that was of historical interest. Well, that 
 is the only interest it has now ; because when they got to the 
 Senate, that august body truncated them and amended them 
 and qualified them in such a way that their own father could 
 not recognize them. 
 
 There was no danger of war between the United States 
 and either France or England; we had proven the lack of 
 danger by a hundred years of peace. And since the treaties 
 had really been framed as models, when they came back thus 
 crippled and maimed, they were not very useful. So I put 
 them on the shelf and let the dust accumulate on them in 
 the hope that the Senators might change their minds, or 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 179 
 
 that the people might change the Senate ; instead of which 
 they changed me. Now those treaties were an improvement 
 on previous treaties. The previous treaties, of which there 
 were many (there is no trouble in getting treaties of arbi- 
 tration; you can get them by the bushel when they do not 
 clinch anything), had provided that the contracting nations 
 would arbitrate every question except one that concerned 
 vital interests, honor or territorial integrity, leaving it, of 
 course, to either party to determine what concerned its vital 
 interests or its honor. Well, as no nation would ever go 
 to war for anything but what did, in its opinion, concern its 
 vital interests or its honor, the treaties ought to have read, 
 and properly and freely rendered did read, " we agree to 
 arbitrate every question which is not likely to lead to war." 
 Therefore the assistance such treaties gave in the matter of 
 peace was not perceptible. 
 
 So we adopted this form by which we agreed to arbitrate 
 every justiciable question. It is necessary to know what 
 justiciable means. Old Noah Webster said that the word 
 had become obsolete. Well, since his time it has been 
 revived, notably in the decisions and opinions of the Supreme 
 Court. It is used by Mr. Justice Bradley, by Chief Justice 
 Fuller and by Mr. Justice Brewer, and it means a contro- 
 versy that can be settled in court on principles of law; one 
 capable of settlement by the disposition of justice. 
 
 Those of us who have been engaged in promoting the 
 settlement of difficulties by arbitration were of course over- 
 come with disappointment when the war broke out. We 
 knew that armament was heavy ; but we thought it would be 
 a brake on the people, who must realize from the armament 
 itself first, how destructive war would be, and second, how 
 
l8o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 enormously expensive it would be. Nevertheless, within 
 a week after the first of August, 1914, Europe was at war. 
 And then those of us who had suffered this disappointment 
 gathered ourselves together to see if we could not get some 
 plan to discourage war, some plan which we could induce the 
 nations to adopt after this war was over, after this dreadful 
 destruction had come to an end, and when men would be 
 longing for some means of promoting and making peace 
 permanent. We met at the Century Club and afterwards at 
 the Independence Hall, and organized the League to Enforce 
 Peace. 
 
 When the war began the people of this country were anxious 
 to keep out of it. The President's proclamation of neu- 
 trality was received by them with approval. We did not 
 realize then what was at stake. We thought we could be 
 neutral and keep within the lines of international law and 
 avoid being drawn into the struggle. We were neutral and 
 we did keep within the lines of international law; but we 
 found it was impossible to avoid being drawn into the 
 struggle. Of course we say we were drawn into it, as we 
 were, by the blindness and cruelty of Germany's submarine 
 policy. But what did that grow out of? It grew out of 
 the circumstance that in war, as it is now carried on, it is 
 impossible for a nation, which furnishes to the world what 
 we furnish, to remain neutral. We were the market to 
 which all the nations engaged in this war resorted for food, 
 munitions and war equipment. Until the British navy 
 swept the German navy from the seas, we furnished to both 
 sides with impartiality what they came to buy. The 
 fortunes of war having limited us to the Allies as our 
 customers, that which was inevitable came about : Germany 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 181 
 
 came to realize that our resources were going to enable the 
 Allies to win the war. We were within our rights under 
 international law in doing what we did. But it was found 
 that we were so close to Europe, so much involved by our 
 trade with all of Europe, that it was practically impossible 
 for us to exercise our rights as international tradesmen with- 
 out in effect so strengthening one side that that side was 
 bound to look upon us as the means by which they could 
 carry on the war ; and its enemy was bound to take the same 
 view. Accordingly Germany determined to resort to the 
 murderous policy of the submarines, in which she was will- 
 ing to sacrifice the rights of innocent noncombatants and 
 citizens of the United States in order to frighten us out of 
 exercising our international rights upon the seas. That is 
 what drove us into the war; and any future European war 
 will probably bring about the same result. It shows how 
 deeply interested we are, even from a selfish standpoint, in 
 suppressing European war or war anywhere that is likely 
 to spread. The world is now so closely knit together, 
 oceans to-day being means of union rather than of separa- 
 tion, that in future wars there will be no great neutral. 
 
 When we got into this war we found that its issues were 
 infinitely greater than that which drove us in. Our vision 
 broadened. We discovered that our purposes in the war 
 must be as broad as the purpose of the enemy we were 
 fighting, that we must utterly crush him in order to cure his 
 lust for power and to defeat that which was divulged as no 
 less than a purpose to rule the world. Germany had, for 
 forty years, been preparing for this war. Bismarck had 
 taught her the value of military force. By wonderful suc- 
 cesses in three wars, in each of which Germany, or Prussia, 
 acquired territory and by all of which Germany was solidi- 
 
1 82 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 fied, the German people became convinced that they were 
 supermen, became convinced that they had learned the secret 
 of applying scientific principles to the military art. They 
 were taught in their schools that the highest development of 
 national greatness was military force. They were taught to 
 worship the supremacy of the German State. Having ap- 
 plied this system of efficiency and thoroughness and these 
 scientific principles to the military art, they proceeded to 
 extend them to every field of human activity. That 
 thoroughness, that system, that efficiency, which they called 
 " kultur," enabled them to win in agriculture, manufacture, 
 business, transportation, and every field of applied science. 
 It also added to the size of their heads, already enlarged 
 by military successes. They prospered under that false and 
 wicked philosophy. Materialism forced itself into their 
 schools and dominated their general view ; and while grow- 
 ing ever more materialistic they began to use the conception 
 of God as a partner in the enterprise. They said that He 
 needed them in supporting His philosophy, that it was their 
 design, under His direction, to spread this kultur by force 
 in order to help Him make civilization a success. No con- 
 sideration of decency, humanity, honor or morality must be 
 allowed to interfere. That was the doctrine; you can see 
 it in the lectures from their university platforms. The 
 whole people were saturated with this dreadful principle, 
 namely, that the victories of the state must be achieved at all 
 hazards and without regard to those ordinary considera- 
 tions that restrain individuals in society. And that led to 
 their atrocious conduct of the war. They became obsessed 
 with a madness. When we got into the war we began to 
 realize what our Allies had realized before that the 
 only thing that could rid the world of this danger was com- 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 183 
 
 plete defeat of the German people. We were righting the 
 German people, not the Hohenzollerns alone; for until we 
 cured the German people of this obsession, until we cured 
 them of this disease which was in their heads, we had not 
 achieved the purposes of the war that had forced itself on 
 us. We could only do this by a surgical operation on their 
 heads to be performed with a club. We have been using 
 that club and now we have got to keep our grip on it for 
 some time until they show, by bringing forth works meet for 
 repentance, that the cure has been effected. 
 
 That is the purpose of the war. How are we going to 
 achieve it? We have got through the first act, a very im- 
 portant one; but others remain. The armistice was made 
 as the basis of a future treaty which was to cover the sub- 
 ject matter and to achieve the purposes outlined in President 
 Wilson's message of January 8, 1918, as modified and quali- 
 fied by the Allies' insistence upon indemnities and by the 
 refusal on their part to yield to the clause with respect to 
 freedom of the seas, which they said was too indefinite. 
 
 We shall have to use some agency like the League of 
 Nations in dealing with Constantinople, which will have to 
 be internationalized, because the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, 
 and the Sea of Marmora constitute a throat through which 
 the countries on the Black Sea obtain access to the Mediter- 
 ranean, Constantinople must therefore not be presided over 
 by any nation having a selfish motive to close that passage. 
 
 Then we come to Russia, what are we going to do about 
 Russia? Russia had the Romanoffs, but as between a one 
 man despot and a mob I prefer the one man. The Bol- 
 sheviki are the lowest proletarians led by a few professionals 
 and if you can get a worse combination than that, I do not 
 
184 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 know what it is. They proceed on the theory that anybody 
 with thrift, anybody with enterprise, anybody who dresses 
 well and tries to help his family to a higher level, is an enemy 
 of society. In order to be rid of them they get the country 
 into a condition where there is not enough food to go round, 
 divide the people into classes the rich, or rather those who 
 were rich, the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the pro- 
 letariat feed the lowest element of the proletariat, starve 
 the other classes, and then, if the latter do not disappear 
 rapidly enough, imprison the leaders and shoot them en 
 masse without trial. This is simple, if it does not commend 
 itself in any other way; and that minority for they are a 
 minority of the proletariat will ultimately become a ma- 
 jority if they just keep it up. The Bolsheviki are, in fact, 
 deadly enemies of society. They are not democrats; they 
 are not republicans; they are not in favor of popular rule. 
 They called a constituent assembly and then drove the dele- 
 gates out of the assembly chamber. On what ground? On 
 the ground that a majority of those elected were bourgeoisie ; 
 they were respectable; and they could not brook having a 
 respectable majority in power. Therefore they took forcible 
 possession of the country and through the Soviet they are 
 maintaining a tyranny the like of which has never been seen 
 in history. They have far exceeded the tyranny of the 
 French Revolution, without any justification. Unless we 
 suppress that, unless those nations that are responsible for 
 this loosening of the social ties see to it that that poison is 
 stamped out, they have not done their work, they have not 
 achieved their purpose. We must (when I say we, I mean 
 the Allies), by some means, and force is the only means, give 
 to these poor people of Russia an opportunity themselves to 
 set up government by majority ; and we cannot do that unless 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 185 
 
 we maintain a combined force of the Allies. That is an 
 essential part of it, and that is one of the provisions of our 
 League. 
 
 Then there are half a dozen republics, perhaps more, 
 which we are to launch. Their peoples have not had any 
 experience in self-government. Self-government, which has 
 been defined by President Wilson as character, is a great 
 boon to people who are able to practice it. It needs train- 
 ing, self-restraint. We do not realize that in this country. 
 We seem to think that it is a panacea which we can apply 
 to the troubles of Hottentots or anybody else. The same is 
 true of our idea of liberty. We talk about liberty, but we 
 really don't understand its value, because it comes to us as 
 the air we breathe. It is hard to make people understand 
 the benefits which they are enjoying under this government 
 and to realize that our liberty has been the result of sacrifices 
 and blood and struggle for a thousand years by our Anglo- 
 Saxon ancestors. And so it is with self-government. We 
 had to take our liberty by forcibly separating ourselves from 
 England ; but she had herself enabled us to learn self-govern- 
 ment even before we separated. This country has since be- 
 come the great exemplar of self-government by the power 
 of popular self-restraint. At no time is this self-restraint 
 more in evidence than in the period between the presidential 
 conventions and the second day after the election. Each 
 party holds a convention and makes a platform. The plat- 
 form explains with elaborate detail, with eloquence and with 
 perfect fairness, what a horrible thing it will be to let in the 
 other party or to continue the other party in power. Candi- 
 dates are nominated and subjected to a scrutiny which be- 
 littles the power of the microscope. I know something 
 
l86 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 about it. And then the orators, the torch-light procession, 
 and the party activity! The visitor from Mars, interested 
 only in the developments attending these great mass meet- 
 ings and heated discussions, says : " Well, I will stay here 
 until the election, because, with all this feeling, with people 
 dividing into such equal forces and determined to win, there 
 is certain to be an explosion then." The election comes 
 and it is as quiet as a May morning. Each voter, man or 
 woman, goes into the booth and votes as he or she wishes, 
 or he votes as she wishes or she votes as he wishes. The 
 votes are counted and the result is announced, perhaps that 
 night, perhaps the next day or the next afternoon. But 
 when the result is known, every man and woman is aware 
 who it is that is certain, if he lives, to carry on and guide 
 the destinies of this country in the executive branch of the 
 government. Everybody acquiesces, and men, women and 
 children follow the pursuits of the day as usual. Now, that 
 is self-government. The minority acquiesce. They may 
 think of the next 'election, but they make no trouble. 
 Why? Because they realize that the majority, when they 
 come into power, will administer the government as a trust 
 for all the people, and that the rights of all will be preserved 
 equally. That is what makes self-government possible. In 
 Central America you find a very different state of affairs. 
 There, whenever they have an election, the minority take to 
 the woods, with their guns, and try to shoot themselves into 
 a majority. Those are the two extremes. But any people, 
 who have not had the training in popular self-restraint that 
 we have had this understanding of the responsibility of 
 the majority for all the people are likely to stumble and 
 fall. We have tried it in the Philippines and in Cuba. We 
 gave Cuba self-government. After three years they had an 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 187 
 
 election which caused a revolution. Mr. Roosevelt sent me 
 down there to stop it and launch the Republic once more. 
 Well, I could not stop it except by sending for the army and 
 navy of the United States. That step had a wholesome, 
 conciliating, quieting effect. We were not called upon to 
 fight. We took over the island and held it for two years. 
 We passed a lot of good statutes, among them an election 
 law, held a fair election under it and then turned over the 
 government to those elected. We had launched her once 
 more. If she ever requires it, we will do the same thing over 
 again and launch her again, and then again, until she gets 
 strong enough I hope she is now to stand alone. And 
 now, instead of setting up one Cuba we are setting up half 
 a dozen. We are carving them out of the dominion of the 
 empires that we have been engaged in fighting. We are 
 putting them where the racial resentment, combined with 
 memory of the tyranny practiced, will prompt them to be im- 
 patient and headstrong in dealing with those empires. And 
 the people of those empires will harbor the resentment which 
 always comes against persons that have broken away from 
 one's control. We are setting up these governments for two 
 reasons: first, because we are in favor of giving people a 
 chance to choose their own government ; and second, because 
 we are hemming in Germany, taking away the territories she 
 ought not to have so that she may never again raise her head 
 in pursuit of world power. 
 
 In order to do this we have got to arrange the machinery 
 that shall maintain peace. The old powerful empires were 
 much more likely to maintain peace than are these numerous 
 new governments left to themselves. Unless we exercise 
 the power of the father over these new children of ours they 
 will prove unruly and bring about the very war that we are 
 
1 88 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 trying to prevent by creating them. I do not know any 
 mathematical demonstration that is clearer than that. The 
 danger is that these nations do not know their rights. They 
 have the frailties of human nature, and it is an unaccustomed 
 business for them. They are ambitious. Each one is deal- 
 ing, without experience, with liberty and independence and 
 self -development. Our liberty is liberty regulated by law. 
 And when you say liberty regulated by law, you mean liberty 
 regulated and limited by the rights of others so that all may 
 enjoy the same liberty and equal rights. Just so nations 
 must have independence limited and regulated by law by 
 international law ; and we have got to devise and maintain 
 the machinery that shall make it possible. 
 
 This treaty is going to be as long as the moral law. 
 There never was a treaty so complicated as this will be. 
 No matter what the character of the contract, even though 
 drawn by the ablest lawyer who ever drew a contract, if it 
 has many provisions, if it is complicated, it will need inter- 
 pretation in application. But how interpret a contract 
 authoritatively? That is a justiciable matter. That is what 
 we have courts for ; and it is impossible for this treaty to be 
 executed unless you have a court, appointed by the same 
 power that made the treaty, to interpret the treaty. It will 
 be especially needed when the new events arise that are 
 certain to arise in the lives of these new nations. If you 
 know any way by which those questions can be satisfactorily 
 decided other than by a court with authority to decide them, I 
 shall be glad to hear of it. And there you have the first 
 plank in the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. 
 
 Next, there will be questions of policy which do not come 
 under the head of justiciable questions. You have got to 
 have somebody representing the League to negotiate and ad- 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 189 
 
 just compromises of that kind. This League that is meeting 
 in Paris is a ponderous body. Premiers and Presidents 
 cannot be there all the time. They have got to leave an 
 agency there and that agency must represent the League in 
 the matter of settling differences which arise between the 
 nations they are creating and the nations out of which they 
 are created. And so you have the second provision as to 
 a commission of conciliation. These new nations are going 
 to manifest all the faults and the weaknesses of children. 
 It is inevitable. And the thing that makes children better 
 and leads them on is discipline. You do not always have to 
 use the broad hand, but it is helpful to have it in the family. 
 Therefore we need a combined force, which can be counted 
 on when needed, to convince these creations of this treaty, 
 these governments, and these people, that there is a power 
 having the means of enforcing the judgments and the com- 
 promises that will be reached under the court or the com- 
 mission. This is the third or force plank of the League 
 platform. 
 
 Then the Congress of Powers is bound to enlarge and, in 
 a way, codify and make more definite the principles of inter- 
 national law, and this is the fourth plank of the platform of 
 the League to Enforce Peace. 
 
 Now, having that League before us as a necessity, the 
 question arises, shall we go on to the larger League? 
 Shall we invite in the other nations of the world to form a 
 league that shall assume the responsibility of this treaty and 
 also endeavor to make war less probable in the world at 
 large? Shall we introduce a league which shall work not 
 only to keep peace in that sphere but also to keep peace be- 
 tween the very Powers that make this league, and between all 
 the other Powers of the world? The question whether that 
 
I9O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 shall be done now or later is a question that can be de- 
 termined on the ground. Even if it is not determined 
 now, the step that is taken by creating this smaller league 
 to achieve its purpose of maintaining peace, where peace 
 is more doubtful and where the problems are so much 
 more difficult than in a normal world at peace, will be a long 
 step towards the possibility of a general League of Nations. 
 Heretofore this has been an academic question. People 
 have been interested in its discussion, but the war seemed 
 remote and peace seemed remote. Now the question is live ; 
 it is before us ; since the President will bring back with him 
 this treaty with a provision for a league of nations in it. 
 
 If the President does come home with a treaty like this, 
 then it behooves us all to unite in support of it; if there be 
 difficulties in it, to suggest how the difficulties may be over- 
 come; but to appreciate the purposes of that League, to ap- 
 preciate the fact that the world is longing for it and the 
 oppressed and suffering peoples of the Allies are longing for 
 the machinery that shall prevent a recurrence of the dread 
 disaster through which they have passed. We should look 
 at it from a progressive standpoint, should realize that some- 
 thing has happened since the war began, that the assumption 
 that everything which has occurred in the past is going to 
 recur, that there is no hope of change, is the doctrine of 
 pessimism and fatalism. This war has been fundamental in 
 its character. It has shaken the foundations of society. 
 And people who look forward, who look for better things, 
 are not discouraged because something like that which is 
 now proposed has been tried before and failed. They refuse 
 to assume that it will therefore fail again. Progress is not 
 made without some risk. We never enter into new experi- 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 191 
 
 ments without realizing that there may be a failure. But 
 is that a reason why we should not go forward ? Eloquence 
 is all right, platforms are all right, declarations of ideals are 
 all -right, provided they are accompanied by willingness to 
 make sacrifices and run risks to accomplish the ideals. But 
 they must not be treated as things of substance, their mere 
 declaration an end in itself, imposing no obligations on those 
 who have uttered them to go on and do the things they extol. 
 I have heard it said that this League of Nations takes 
 away sovereignty. Now, if we say to a nation we are going 
 to keep you within the bounds of international law by this 
 organization, do we limit its independence any more than 
 we limit our own independence under a system of laws that 
 are enacted for the benefit of society and for our own bene- 
 fit? Every time we make a treaty by which we bind our- 
 selves to do anything we limit our sovereignty. Sovereignty 
 is only a matter of definition and degree. The question is: 
 how far are we willing to go in yielding that entire freedom 
 of action and that license to wage war for aggressive and 
 selfish purposes. We need not be frightened by a definition. 
 We agree to arbitrate; we agree to abide the result of an 
 arbitration. That limits our sovereignty, does it not? 
 Well, is that so heinous? We have agreed not to put war- 
 ships on our great lakes. That is a limitation of our sov- 
 ereignty, is it not? If we were a jingo nation which in- 
 sisted on doing everything it wanted to do, right or wrong, 
 we ought to be able to put men of war on that water bound- 
 ary; but we have agreed not to. Are we ashamed of that 
 limitation on our sovereignty? Are we not on the contrary, 
 proud of it? We know that England and the United States 
 will never get into a war. Everybody knows that ; we have 
 got the habit of arbitrating. It took us fifty years to get it 
 
192 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 and then we had each to lose a case. England lost the Ala- 
 bama Claim and we lost that Fisheries Case. They said we 
 had stolen five millions worth of fish and apparently they 
 proved it. They got a judgment and we paid it just as they 
 paid the judgment against them. Well, that limited our 
 sovereignty. Was it so disgraceful? We learned to play 
 the game. You can't go into an arbitration and play it on 
 the theory of heads I win, tails you lose ; that unless you do 
 win you won't play. You have got to be good losers. 
 When we go on and say that we are going to have this great 
 court lay down the law and that we are going to enforce 
 the judgment, of course that interferes with our freedom of 
 action to the extent that we cannot escape execution of 
 the judgment exactly as a man's freedom is limited when 
 he agrees to pay a thousand dollars and does not pay it and 
 his creditor comes into court and gets a judgment under 
 which an execution is levied on his property. 
 
 Now I am ready to answer any questions concerning the 
 League that may occur to the audience. 
 
 A VOICE: I would like to have you state, if you will, 
 what membership you would begin with, and what limita- 
 tions, if any, you would impose upon it. 
 
 MR. TAFT: That is a very apt question. I think it is 
 wise to begin with the Great Powers. When you organize 
 a club and you want clubable members you make your se- 
 lections with care. There are a lot of nations that are ir- 
 responsible. If you call them all into a convention at once, 
 they will insist on having equal voice with the most re- 
 sponsible and powerful nations, and I am not in favor of 
 that. I am in favor of a practical arrangement; and this 
 peace creates the opportunity for it. These five nations are 
 an initiating nucleus that is most valuable in creating a 
 
THE LEAGUE: WHY AND HOW 193 
 
 real league of all nations which are responsible nations. 
 If we call a convention of all then every one will want to 
 be heard and they will object if they are not given full 
 representation. Now you have got to make a practical ar- 
 rangement. Every nation ought to be heard in a congress 
 that lays down the rules of law. What the proportion of 
 representation should be is a matter of expediency and jus- 
 tice. You cannot fix it according to population alone, be- 
 cause China would then have four times as many votes as 
 the United States. There ought to be a proportionate rep- 
 resentation on some fixed basis, depending on importance and 
 power, and perhaps on the average intelligence of the people ; 
 but you can fix that when you have a managing commit- 
 tee that passes on qualifications for admission. Such a 
 league is going to be a great boon for the small nations. 
 It is going to give them protection; and therefore it is go- 
 ing to be such an advantage that they will be glad to 
 come in under reasonable conditions. But if you consult 
 them all at once they will not be able to agree. We have 
 had experience in that matter. In arranging the framework 
 of an international court of admiralty prize, a court to 
 deal with captures at sea, we were able to agree upon the 
 membership because there were a lot of nations which had 
 no navies and no merchantmen and which were therefore 
 not concerned about naval prizes. But just as soon as we 
 tried to establish a world-court, passing on general disputes 
 between nations, then every nation wanted a judge on that 
 court. That would have made the court worse than a town 
 meeting, and it became impossible. 
 
 I am not in favor of letting in Germany for a long time. 
 She must show herself worthy. She is a criminal before 
 
194 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 the bar of justice. When you arrest a criminal and find a 
 pistol on him you take it away. That is why, in this matter 
 of reduction of armament, we have the right to say to 
 Germany, " we will draw your teeth," and that is what we 
 have been doing. I do not know whether you share my 
 feeling, but nothing has occurred since the armistice that 
 has given me more satisfaction than the delivery of those 
 great war vessels at the Firth of Forth, and of those sub- 
 marines at the mouth of the Thames. The punishment was 
 richly deserved. 
 
 FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE PUBLIC LEDGER, 
 JAN. i, 1919 
 
 The League of Nations, to be useful, must command the 
 respect of the world as upholding right and justice. The 
 United States is the least interested of all the nations of the 
 League in the terms of peace from a selfish standpoint. Our 
 membership in it is, therefore, of the highest value. It will 
 give confidence to the peoples of Europe in the purity and 
 sincerity of the League's intentions to secure the good of all. 
 President Wilson's trip has shown clearly the weight the 
 United States has in this respect. It is not too much to say 
 that he is stronger to-day with the people of Great Britain, 
 France and Italy than are the respective Premiers of these 
 countries. The longing of these peoples for a league of 
 nations to maintain peace and his championing of such a 
 league have had much to do with bringing about this result. 
 It has secured the support of Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
 for the League. This phase of the situation imposes the 
 
REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE 195 
 
 heaviest obligation on the United States to retain an active 
 part in the execution of all the provisions of the treaty. 
 
 REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE ' 
 
 An objection made to the general idea of a League of 
 Nations is the impossibility of adjusting properly and satis- 
 factorily the representation of the small and large nations in 
 the governmental agencies of the League. Every one is 
 aware of this difficulty. It was one upon which the proposal 
 for a world court halted before the war. The Study Com- 
 mittee of the League to Enforce Peace, believes the solution 
 is to be found in giving representation, where representation 
 is necessary, according to responsibility. 
 
 The functions of the League may conveniently be divided 
 into the legislative, the judicial, the mediating and the execu- 
 tive. The congress of all the world Powers, great and 
 small, will consider and determine general principles of inter- 
 national law and policy for the guidance of the judicial and 
 executive branches. It may well codify international law 
 and give it that definite legislative sanction the absence of 
 which has led some jurists to deny that it is law at all. In 
 such a congress the nations should have representation in 
 accord with their world importance, measured by power, 
 population and responsible character. 
 
 The great advantage of having a small league of the 
 great Powers formed first for the immediate necessities of 
 maintaining the terms of this peace and constituting the 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Jan. 3, 1919. 
 
196 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 initiating nucleus of a larger world league is that the small 
 league could work out the equitable representation of the 
 smaller nations as they apply for admission. The protection 
 the greater league will assure them will induce them to seek 
 the boon of membership. 
 
 The great Powers of the small league as the trustees for 
 all, made so by circumstances, may then fairly adjust the 
 representation which each incoming member of the great 
 league should have. 
 
 The judicial branch or court of the League should not be 
 a representative body at all. It should be a tribunal made 
 up of great international jurists, selected for their high 
 character, judicial and impartial bent of mind, their learning 
 in jurisprudence and their ability. They should be perma- 
 nent judges, made independent in tenure and compensation. 
 Citizenship in countries parties to the controversy should 
 disqualify members of the court in the particular case. They 
 should have jurisdiction only to hear pure questions of law 
 and fact. 
 
 No political question should come before them. They 
 should interpret treaties and declare and apply the inter- 
 national law as now established or as qualified and enacted 
 by the congress of Powers. The difficulty as to representa- 
 tion should not, therefore, arise as to the constitution of the 
 court. Of course, to give confidence in its broad view of the 
 world law, care should be taken to select judges from dif- 
 ferent countries with different systems of law, and thus give 
 the tribunal a world character. 
 
 The commission of conciliation, which is a negotiating, 
 mediating body, should have the representative feature. 
 The small nations are too many to have members of it 
 permanently ; but every nation having a real interest in the 
 
REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE 197 
 
 issue to be settled should be represented on it for the time 
 being, and its representative should take part in the media- 
 tion, hearing and recommendation of settlement. 
 
 In its practical working the great Powers will furnish the 
 police force of the League, and their representatives should 
 exercise the executive function. The safety and security of 
 the lesser nations who cannot be expected to share the burden 
 of military contribution will be found in the judgments of the 
 impartial international court, in the recommendation of the 
 commission of conciliation and the principles of international 
 justice ordained in a congress of the world's nations. More- 
 over, without representatives in the executive, they may well 
 confide in the friendly and just attitude of the united execu- 
 tive council of great Powers in carrying out the judgments 
 of the League court and in dealing with the compromises 
 recommended by the League commission of conciliation. 
 The great Powers in the executive council will have no united 
 interest adverse to small nations as a group or individually. 
 On the contrary, they will watch one another in dealing with 
 every small nation. The resultant action will be dictated by 
 the common purpose of the League. 
 
 We are not now considering the representation of the 
 United States in the branches of the League. As one of the 
 great Powers, it will have an influential voice in all of them. 
 We are only suggesting a method of giving the small nations 
 the protection they should have and a representation when 
 practical and needed. 
 
198 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 CRITICISM SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE 
 
 Objections to a general League of Nations are numerous. 
 Senator Borah makes merry over it. The funny column of 
 the Evening Sun is filled with hypotheses of its operation and 
 its absurd results. Mr. Lodge and Mr. Knox treat the pro- 
 posal with more deference. Mr. Lodge in a speech at the 
 dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916, advo- 
 cated the use of force to support an international tribunal's 
 judgment. Since that time he has changed his mind, but in 
 his last speech he appreciates the seriousness of the proposal 
 sufficiently to discuss in more detail the plan of the League. 
 Mr. Knox has favored treaties of universal arbitration of 
 justiciable questions and therefore has also a past to observe. 
 
 The force and weight of objections to the League should 
 be gathered first from the attitude of mind of the objector. 
 If he is content to dispose of the matter on the ground that 
 the idea is an old one and has never been realized, we are 
 not likely to have useful help from him. One who does 
 not hope that the great war has changed the feeling of the 
 peoples of the world toward war so that they are willing to 
 bind themselves to a world policy of peace as they never 
 were before will certainly not entertain the plea of the 
 League with patience. He must be waked up before he will 
 give it his consideration. One who has no sense of respon- 
 sibility about future world peace, but is anxious to return to 
 domestic business and politics, is equally beyond reach. 
 
 It is only from those who appreciate our great oppor- 
 tunity in the dreadful results of this war to arouse all peoples 
 to the wisdom of uniting the major force of the world to 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Jan. 5, 1919. 
 
CRITICISM SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE 199 
 
 prevent their recurrence that we can have sympathetic dis- 
 cussion and constructive thought. The proposal of a league 
 of nations should not be flouted because the members of the 
 Senate are justifiably indignant over the way in which the 
 President has ignored them and ignored Congress in this 
 matter. When he returns with a treaty providing for some 
 kind of a league of nations to maintain peace, the people 
 are unlikely to be interested in the personal soreness of the 
 Senate or to accept that as any factor in judging the treaty. 
 The Democrats of the Senate, with only one or two excep- 
 tions, will approve what the President submits. If the 
 Republicans who object to the League are numerous enough 
 to defeat the treaty they will have to decide whether their 
 objection is really so weighty and sincere that they wish to 
 furnish it as an issue to the President and his party in the 
 next campaign. The pressure of the popular desire will be 
 to have immediate peace. The party which delays that must 
 have a strong case. 
 
 The League of Nations is very strong with the peoples of 
 Europe. It is growing stronger here. Organized labor has 
 approved it. It is going to attract the mass of wage-earners 
 and the plain people as it has abroad. With the President 
 and the Democratic party behind it, Republican objectors 
 who manifest no constructive desire to create machinery to 
 keep the peace, but depend wholly as of old on armament 
 and troops to settle difficulties, will not be heard with favor. 
 The contemptuous skepticism of the Senate cloakroom, the 
 cheap sarcasms of " the old diplomatic and senatorial band," 
 the manifest spirit of " how not to do it," will be very poor 
 weapons with which to combat an idealistic campaign for a 
 definite plan for permanent peace and democracy. 
 
 The next presidential campaign promises well for the 
 
2OO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Republican party if that party, through its congressional 
 representatives, does nothing to change the present trend. 
 But if enough Republican senators attempt to defeat or hold 
 up the treaty of peace because it makes the United States a 
 member of a League of Nations to maintain peace they will 
 seriously endanger the chance of Republican success. 
 
 The Senators who discuss any plan for a League should 
 show their interest, not by knocking it out with one blow, 
 but by suggesting changes in it which would be more prac- 
 tical than the ideals proposed and would still serve the gen- 
 eral purpose. They should make their consideration hope- 
 ful and optimistic by searching for alternative details of 
 method which might avoid the objections they conceive. If 
 any of the critics of the League in the Senate, or out of it, 
 have given such evidence of their sympathetic interest in 
 the project and its purpose, it has not been brought to our 
 knowledge. The whole tone of the objectors has been 
 pessimistic. Running through all their attacks is the cynical 
 assumption that the great war has made no difference in the 
 attitude and duty of the peoples of the world toward war 
 and peace, except that for the time it has injured the power 
 of Germany to make further trouble. They, in effect, ad- 
 vocate the retirement of the United States to its shell of 
 isolation, to reappear again only when the war-making 
 proclivities of any nation, Germany, or any other country, 
 shall threaten the interests of the United States. This is 
 the gospel of despair and national selfishness. 
 
 The possibility of a breach of national faith may be 
 pointed out as a weakness of the League. If so, it is 
 inherent in every treaty, the value and utility of which must 
 ultimately rest in the honor of the nations making it. The 
 more responsible the nations the greater their power of per- 
 
ROOSEVELT S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE 2OI 
 
 formance, the keener their appreciation of their honor, the 
 clearer their perception of the value to themselves and the 
 world of maintaining the treaty, the greater the certainty 
 that the treaty will live and effect its purpose. 
 
 ROOSEVELT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE 
 OF NATIONS 1 
 
 The last editorial of Colonel Roosevelt on the League of 
 Nations, posthumously published, is one of the most im- 
 portant he ever wrote. It is important in its useful sug- 
 gestions and limitations as well as in the spirit of construc- 
 tive statesmanship which prompted it and shines through it. 
 
 The idea of a League of Nations is not a new one, as 
 Senator Knox pointed out in his Senate speech. Among 
 others, Sully, the great minister of France, proposed it. 
 Tennyson with his poetic vision and pen fixed it forever in 
 memory. In more recent times Theodore Roosevelt, in his 
 speech accepting the Nobel peace prize, revived the thought 
 and gave it more definite character by emphasizing the 
 feature of an international police force which could impose 
 international justice. 
 
 During the war, men of action, intensely absorbed in the 
 great and critical task of developing all the energies of the 
 Allies to win in a contest so fraught with the fate of the 
 world, found it difficult to be patient with the discussion of 
 a plan for peace which could only be realized after the war 
 was won, and under which they saw lurking a tendency to 
 a peace by negotiation and without victory. Roosevelt, 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger, Jan. 15, 1919. 
 
2O2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Clemenceau and Lloyd George shared this feeling. As 
 might be expected, it found freer expression from the Ameri- 
 can leader, in his unofficial status, than from the other two. 
 Colonel Roosevelt's nature recoiled from association with 
 an idea he found supported by men without a country who 
 exalt internationalism and deprecate nationalism. With 
 them the League of Nations seems to mean the dilution of 
 that intense and moving love of country, the source of all 
 real effective progress, into a nervous, colorless, flabby and 
 transcendental brotherhood of man. Universal brotherhood 
 should, of course, be an increasing influence in the world 
 and is, but it will never be useful if it means the loss of 
 patriotism. The relation of one to the other should be as 
 love of home and family is to the love of country. The one 
 strengthens the other. The emasculated supporters of inter- 
 nationalism as an antidote for love of country are inclined 
 to regard the home and family as reactionary. Those insti- 
 tutions find no sympathetic protection among the Bolsheviki, 
 foreign or domestic. . 
 
 Moreover, men of the dynamic type, like Roosevelt, had a 
 suspicion that all pacifists were pressing a league of nations 
 as a stalking horse for compromising the vital principles at 
 stake in the war. Hence their coldness toward the subject 
 and their criticism of any definite plan. But proceeding in 
 due order, these men of action now find themselves con- 
 fronted by a situation that demands an organization of world 
 force to secure the just fruits of the war. Now they look 
 upon a league of the Great Powers, who won the war, as an 
 existing fact, and they face the problem of how the mani- 
 fold and complicated purposes of the treaty, after they have 
 been defined and the treaty signed, shall be effectively car- 
 ried out and maintained. As practical men they now take 
 
ROOSEVELT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE 203 
 
 up the League of Nations and study it in the earnest desire 
 to make it work. 
 
 In this way Theodore Roosevelt, having long ago pro- 
 posed a league in his Nobel prize address, was brought 
 around by logic of events to a sincere effort to frame a plan 
 which would avoid the numerous objections that have been 
 suggested by himself and others and still make progress 
 toward the ideal he held out at Christiania. He studied all 
 the plans proposed, considered their possible weaknesses and 
 defects and busied his ingenious mind with finding alterna- 
 tives which would be practical and still achieve the main 
 purpose. He had in his mind the thought that under the 
 general obligations of the League, when force had to be 
 threatened or used, a great Power like the United States 
 should act as a policeman in the western hemisphere, while 
 the great Powers of Europe should in the first instance keep 
 the peace of the world in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe. 
 
 It was clearer to him than it seems to be to others who 
 do not see the real need of a league and who are not so 
 anxious, therefore, to make it useful to the world, that the 
 European nations will only be too glad to recognize our 
 Monroe Doctrine as a policy in the interest of world peace. 
 Why should they not, when the principles and operation of 
 the League are really directed to the creation of a Monroe 
 Doctrine of the world? 
 
 What Colonel Roosevelt always insisted on was that the 
 United States should not promise in a treaty to do things 
 which it could not or would not perform. Certainly, every 
 one must sympathize with this common-sense restriction 
 upon unwise and transcendental enthusiasm. He feared 
 there were issues not to be settled on principles of law and 
 thus called non justiciable, which might, nevertheless, be sub- 
 
2O4 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 mitted to a court and decided against the will of a party to 
 the treaty. His suggestion is that each nation might state 
 those issues and after discussion have them specifically in- 
 corporated in the treaty as nonjusticiable. 
 
 He feared, too, that the United States might be committed 
 to an obligation not to maintain military preparedness 
 sufficient to protect itself against unjust aggression. He 
 protested against reduction of armament which was on the 
 theory that the League of Nations would form a substitute 
 for reasonable defense, at least until its efficacy for such a 
 purpose had been fully demonstrated by actual test of time. 
 Certainly, many who earnestly support a League concur 
 in such a view and believe with him that universal military 
 training of the Swiss type may well be instituted in this 
 country, both as an insurance against unjust aggression and 
 as a proper preparation for such contribution to the world's 
 police force as the United States may be called upon to make. 
 Incidentally it will constitute an important factor in the edu- 
 cation of our youth in the duties of life. 
 
 For these reasons the proponents of the League of Nations 
 to enforce peace may rejoice in this posthumous aid that 
 Theodore Roosevelt gives to the League. He has the great- 
 est personal following in this country, and his words go far. 
 
 His attitude toward the problems involved in the League 
 may well furnish an example to the doubters and opponents. 
 Let them treat the League as something in its purpose to be 
 desired, and let them lend their thoughts not to devising 
 and imaging objections but to finding alternative substitutes 
 in its structure which will not be subject to their own objec- 
 tions. 
 
WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BE 205 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WHAT IT MEANS 
 AND WHY IT MUST BE 
 
 The original program of the League to Enforce Peace z 
 adopted at Philadelphia June 17, 1915, was enlarged and 
 made more ambitious at a meeting of the governing body 
 of the League on November 24, 1918. It then declared 
 that the initiating nucleus of the membership of the League 
 should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the 
 war. 
 
 It declared further: 
 
 First, that the judgments of the international court on 
 justiciable questions should be enforced ; 
 
 Second, that the League should determine what action, if 
 any, should be taken in respect to recommendations of the 
 Council of Conciliation in which the parties concerned did 
 not acquiesce ; 
 
 Third, that provision should be made for an administra- 
 tive organization of the League to conduct affairs of common 
 interest and for the protection and care of backward regions 
 and international places and other matters jointly adminis- 
 tered before and during the war, and that such administra- 
 tive organization should be so framed as to insure stability 
 and progress, preventing defeat of the forces of healthy 
 growth and changes, and providing a way by which progress 
 could be secured and the needed change effected without 
 recourse to war ; 
 
 Fourth, that a representative Congress of Nations should 
 formulate and codify rules of international law, inspect the 
 
 1 An address delivered before the National Geographic Society, in 
 Washington, D. C., January 17, 1919. 
 
 2 The Program is printed in full on page I. 
 
2OO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 work of the League's administrative bodies, and consider 
 any matter affecting the tranquillity of the world or the 
 progress or the betterment of human relations ; 
 
 Fifth, that the League should have an executive council to 
 speak with authority in the name of the nations represented 
 and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered. 
 
 It further declared that the representation of the different 
 nations in the organs of the League should be in proportion 
 to the responsibilities and obligations that they assume, and 
 that rules of international law should not be defeated for 
 lack of unanimity. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the American association has be- 
 come more ambitious in its aims since its first declarations. 
 Under the first declaration it did not propose to enforce 
 judgments of the court or in any way to deal with the recom- 
 mendations of compromise, the exercise of force by the 
 League being directed only against a nation beginning war 
 before submission to % the Court or the Council. 
 
 In England, after the organization of the American 
 League, a British League of Free Nations Association was 
 formed, proposing a Court and a Commission of Concilia- 
 tion, the use of force to execute the decisions of the Court, 
 and the joint suppression, by all means at their disposal, 
 of any attempt by any State to disturb the peace of the 
 world by acts of war. 1 
 
 1 The first important group formed in England for advancing the 
 idea of a League of Nations was the Bryce group. Others which fol- 
 lowed were the League of Nations Society, the Fabian Society group 
 and the Union of Democratic Control. The London International Allied 
 Labor and Socialist Conference Feb. 22, 1918, likewise put out a most 
 important program. Following the formation of the League of Free 
 Nations Association, to which Mr. Taft refers, that body and the 
 League of Nations Society merged into the League of Nations Union. 
 [Editor]. 
 
WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BE 2OJ 
 
 It looked to the immediate organization of a League of 
 Great Britain and her then allies, with a view to the ultimate 
 formation of a League of Nations on a wider basis, includ- 
 ing states then neutral or hostile. It excluded the German 
 peoples until they should bring forth works meet for repent- 
 ance and become a democracy. 
 
 It contained a provision for action by the League as trustee 
 and guardian of uncivilized races and undeveloped terri- 
 tories. It proposed as a substitute for national armaments 
 an international force to guarantee order in the world, and 
 proposed a further function for the Council of the League 
 in supervising, limiting, and controlling the military and 
 naval forces and the armament industries of the world. 
 
 Late in 1918 a French Association for the Society of Na- 
 tions * recommended that the Society of Nations should be 
 open to every nation who would agree to respect the right 
 of peoples to determine their own destiny, and to resort only 
 to judicial solutions for the settlement of their disputes; that 
 the use of force be reserved exclusively to the international 
 society itself as the supreme sanction in case one of the 
 member states should resist its decisions; that the Allies 
 should form their association immediately and should work 
 it out as completely as possible in the direction of sanctions 
 of every kind moral, judicial, economic, and in the last 
 resort military as well as in that of promulgating gen- 
 eral rules of law. 
 
 The French Society further provided that the Society of 
 Nations thus immediately formed should control and con- 
 duct the negotiations for the coming peace. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the League of Nations, as con- 
 
 1 In France we had, antedating the French Association for the 
 Society of Nations, two very active groups, The League of the Rights 
 of Man and League for a Society of Nations. [Editor]. 
 
2O8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ceived by its proponents in three of the four great nations 
 that have won this war, has substantially the same structure. 
 It includes a court to decide justiciable questions, a Council 
 of Conciliation to consider other or non justiciable questions 
 and to recommend a compromise. It calls for the organiza- 
 tion of the combined economic and military forces of the 
 world to enforce the judgments of the courts, and to deal 
 with a defiance of the recommendations of the mediating 
 council as the executive body of the League shall deem wise. 
 
 The American, English, and French plans all show a pur- 
 pose to create a smaller League of the allied nations fighting 
 this war, who are, so to speak, to be charter members of a 
 larger League, which they are to form by inviting other 
 nations into it as they show themselves fitted to exercise the 
 privileges of the League, to enjoy its protection and to meet 
 their obligations as members. The American plan refers to 
 these allied nations who won the war as the initiating nucleus 
 of the larger League. ' 
 
 Each plan looks to the enforcement of judgments and 
 leaves open to the League the question of what shall be done 
 with reference to compromises recommended and not 
 acquiesced in. Each one looks to a congress of nations to 
 declare and codify international law. 
 
 One of them provides for the reduction of armament ; 
 the others omit it. It does not appear in the American plan. 
 I may say that this was not because the ultimate reduction 
 of armament was not regarded as important, but because it 
 was thought that this feature of a League of Nations might 
 meet serious objection until the League should be shown to 
 be an effective substitute for the insurance which reasonable 
 
WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BE 2CX) 
 
 preparation for self-defense gives against unjust foreign 
 aggression. 
 
 What are the objections to a League of Nations developed 
 in this way and thus constituted ? The first and chief objec- 
 tion is that the United States ought not to bind itself to make 
 war upon the decree of an executive council in which it has 
 but one vote out of four or five. 
 
 What authority and duty does the executive council have 
 in the League? It will be its duty to see that judgments are 
 executed. 
 
 Why should we object if called upon to declare war and 
 make our contribution to the police force to maintain peace 
 by enforcing a judgment of an impartial court? Such a 
 judgment is not the result of the vote of other powers than 
 our own. It is merely a decision on principles of inter- 
 national law as between two contending nations. 
 
 We have heard a great deal during this campaign of inter- 
 national justice. Why should we favor international justice 
 and then refuse to furnish the machinery by which that jus- 
 tice can be declared and enforced? What risk do we run? 
 
 With reference to the enforcement of recommendations 
 of compromise, the executive council should consider 
 whether it is a case in which peace would be promoted more 
 by economic or military enforcement than merely by inter- 
 national public opinion. 
 
 If, in such a case, it is thought that a majority of the 
 executive council should not control the right to call for 
 military execution of the compromise, such action might be 
 limited to a unanimous decision of the executive council. 
 
2IO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 This would prevent the imposition of the burden of war, by 
 the determination of the League members, upon any nation 
 without its consent. Or the enforcement of such a com- 
 promise, if determined on by a majority of the executive 
 council, might be left to that majority. 
 
 Senator Knox seems to anticipate that the United States 
 will be drawn into war against its will by a majority vote of 
 a convention of heterogeneous nations. 
 
 No such result could follow from the organization of a 
 League as indicated above. The assumption that the votes 
 of Haiti, or San Salvador, or Uruguay could create a ma- 
 jority forcing the United States into a war against its interest 
 and will, under a practical League of Nations, is wholly 
 unfounded. It would be left to the vote of an executive 
 council of the Great Powers, and even then the United 
 States, under the modifications above suggested, could not 
 be drawn into war against its will. 
 
 Objectors who rely on the Constitution seem to assume 
 that the League plans contemplate a permanent international 
 police force, constantly under command of a Marshal Foch, 
 who may order the international army to enforce a judgment 
 or a compromise without the preliminaries of declarations 
 of war by the League members. This is wholly unwar- 
 ranted and no plan justifies it. When force has to be used, 
 war will be begun and carried on jointly in the usual way. 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND PRESIDENT 
 WILSON'S ADVISERS l 
 
 The reports of correspondents to whom has been attrib- 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Jan. 20, 1919. 
 
LEAGUE AND PRESIDENT WILSONS ADVISERS 211 
 
 uted the privilege of peeping into the presidential mind give 
 rise to some concern among the sincere advocates of a 
 League of Nations to Enforce Peace. The failure of the 
 President to indicate any definite structure for the League, 
 as the champion of which he is now hailed by the world with 
 such acclaim, creates an uneasy suspicion that he has not 
 thought out any definite plan of his own. In his frequent 
 references to the League, he has stated what it will not be 
 rather than what it will be. His attitude is that of one seek- 
 ing a plan which will encounter no objections either in the 
 congress at Paris or in the congress at Washington. In 
 the formulation of a new political institution the sincere and 
 successful builder works by the affirmative method primarily. 
 He has before him always the object to be achieved, and he 
 frames the cooperating parts of his plan with that first in 
 view. He should be trying to do something. He should not 
 be trying merely to fulfill a promise to do something by com- 
 ing as near to it as he can without meeting criticism. No 
 reform worth having was ever put through without a fight. 
 Faith not only in the value of the ideal but faith in a prac- 
 tical plan needed to realize the ideal is required to bring real 
 results. 
 
 The element of the plan of a present League of Nations, 
 which must distinguish it from past efforts to secure peace 
 by agreement of nations, is the organization of the forces of 
 lawful nations to compel justice from lawless nations. The 
 President loves to dwell on the moral sanction of justice 
 which is to prevail after this war. Let us agree with him 
 that it will be stronger than before the war and that in and 
 of itself it will help to make war less probable. But if that 
 is the only sanction the League of Nations is going to furnish 
 for the judgments of its court and for the suppression of 
 
212 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 lawless violence by recalcitrant nations, it will be a failure 
 and a laughing stock at least the influence of such moral 
 force will be as great without the League as with it. 
 
 It is unfortunate that the President, with his apparent lack 
 of any definite plan for a league should not be able to find 
 a single earnest supporter of a real league of nations to 
 secure peace in the commission which he has taken with 
 him. 
 
 Secretary Lansing has heretofore always been opposed to 
 a league of nations to enforce peace. His confidential ad- 
 viser, James Brown Scott, has always opposed it and vigor- 
 ously urged merely an international court, whose judgments 
 are to be enforced by the obligations of honor and moral 
 suasion. Mr. White has had the traditional attitude of the 
 old diplomatic hand toward such an innovation. Few know, 
 if any, what Mr. House's real attitude is or that of General 
 Bliss. The commission is now engaged in examining forty 
 different plans, we are told, with the hope, by the selective 
 method, of hitting upon something as innocuous to Senate 
 predilections as possible. A reported interview with Mr. 
 White makes conformity to the Senate's views his objective. 
 Has the cold attitude of the commission toward an effective 
 league been changed by the eagerness of the common peoples 
 of the Allies for it and by the enthusiasm with which the 
 President's eloquent periods concerning the League have been 
 greeted? Let us hope so. 
 
 Lloyd George and Clemenceau are practical men. They 
 have declared for a league. They will wish to create some- 
 thing which will be a real instrument to do the things that 
 have to be done by the treaty. They have men about them, 
 Lord Robert Cecil, M. Leon Bourgeois and others, who, as 
 earnest advocates of a league, have been framing plans and 
 
' THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS HERE" 213 
 
 studying details under the official authority of their respec- 
 tive governments. May we not hope that in this way there 
 will be offered to the President by Great Britain and France 
 the constitution of a league which will have vigor and clinch- 
 ing efficacy and which, after full consideration and needed 
 qualification, he will accept? A mere reliance on moral 
 force and good intentions to maintain peace among the new 
 and old nations of Central and Eastern Europe and to resist 
 and suppress the pacifistic ideals of the Bolsheviki, and the 
 massacres and destruction wrought by them, will make the 
 congress a dangerous and discouraging farce. It will be 
 retreat and not advance. 
 
 " THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS HERE " l 
 
 The expression at the Peace Conference of President 
 Poincare and Premier Clemenceau in reference to the 
 League of Nations and the published rules of the Congress 
 are reassuring to those who look to the growth of an effec- 
 tive and real league out of the situation. The French 
 leaders see clearly, and say with emphasis, that we have a 
 league of nations now, and that it must be maintained in 
 order to achieve the purpose of the war. The circumstances 
 of the struggle forced the Allies into an interallied council 
 and then into a common command of the armies under Foch. 
 But for that the war might not have been won. 
 
 The rules of the Congress recognize that the five great 
 nations, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United 
 States, are the ones which have an interest in all the 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger, Jan. 23, 1919. 
 
214 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 questions coming before the Congress as guardians of the 
 welfare of the world, made so by the logic of their winning 
 the war. They are thus established as the initiating nucleus 
 of a world union, as the charter members of a league of 
 nations. 
 
 It is to be noted that the League of Nations is the first 
 subject to be considered by the Congress. This seems to be 
 at variance with the views of James M. Beck and Senators 
 Lodge and Knox. Mr. Beck argues that, as our fathers 
 waited five years after winning independence before mak- 
 ing a constitution, the nations ought to be equally deliberate 
 in discussing and framing a constitution for the world. 
 Most people agree, after reading the description by Hamilton 
 and Madison of conditions existing in the interval between 
 our independence and the convention of 1787, that it would 
 have been much better if the convention could have been 
 called earlier. Of course it may be said that the bad state 
 of affairs during the interval was necessary to bring the 
 people to see the necessity for a stronger government. But 
 surely Mr. Beck would not wish a recurrence of the quarrels 
 of nations and another war to convince the peoples of the 
 world of the necessity and advantage of world unity to sup- 
 press war and maintain peace. It is now, just after this 
 horrible war when its agonies, its sufferings, its lessons, its 
 inhuman character, all are fresh in the minds of men, that 
 they will be willing to go farther in making the needed and 
 proper concessions involved in a useful and real league of 
 nations. Delay will dull their eagerness to adopt the ma- 
 chinery essential to organized protection against war. 
 
 But another fact which Mr. Beck and Mr. Knox seem to 
 ignore is that a treaty of peace cannot be made at Paris, by 
 which the peace of Europe can be secured and maintained 
 
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS HERE 215 
 
 without a league of nations. These gentlemen may well 
 be challenged to tell us what arrangements they would sug- 
 gest to the five nations engaged in forming this treaty for 
 peace and in making it work, unless it be a continuing league 
 of those five nations to maintain it. 
 
 How can the objects and purposes of the fourteen points, 
 especially those directed to rearranging the map of Eastern 
 and Central Europe and Asia Minor, be achieved and carried 
 to peaceful realization except through a league of nations 
 embracing the five great powers? No one opposed to the 
 league of nations idea has essayed to answer this very 
 practical question. The Paris conference is confronted with 
 it and must answer it suggestively by making the League of 
 Nations the first subject for discussion. Premier Clemen- 
 ceau said: 
 
 " The League of Nations is here. It is for you to make 
 it live." Senator Lodge in his speech fully recognized the 
 existence of the League of great nations in the war and the 
 necessity for its continuance. Indeed it is probable that if 
 Senator Knox and Mr. Beck were cross-examined, their ad- 
 missions would show them to be not very far removed from 
 the view that something substantially equivalent to a league 
 of great nations must be definitely formed by this Congress 
 with agreed-upon means of enforcing the stipulated peace. 
 
 The Associated Press informs us that a league of nations 
 is in the forming, but that the super-sovereignty of an inter- 
 national police force is to be rejected as part of it. This 
 negation is not very helpful. Except in Tennyson's poetic 
 vision and in the plans of impracticables, no such suggestion 
 as super-sovereignty has been advanced. 
 
 Most opponents of the League idea have assumed that the 
 
2l6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 so-called international police is to be a permanent body under 
 an international commander and subject to orders without 
 invoking consent of the nations contributing to the force. 
 This is a misconception. A potential international police 
 force will be erected by an agreement of the Great Nations 
 to furnish forces when necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
 purpose of the League. In most instances, no actual force 
 will need to be raised. The existence of an agreement and 
 confidence that the nations will comply with it is all that will 
 be needed. Nations who have judgments against them in a 
 court of the nations will generally perform them. It will 
 only be where defiances of such judgments will lead to a 
 dangerous war that the League force need be raised. 
 
 Of course, during the interval after the conclusion of 
 peace, the possibility of differences and the danger of Bol- 
 shevism may require a retention of some of the war army 
 strength of the Allies to see the treaty through to its effective 
 execution. But after the return of normal times the 
 strength of the League to secure compliance with the treaty 
 obligations and justice will not be in its serried columns, but 
 in its potential power under the joint agreement. 
 
 In the convenient division of the world into zones, in 
 which the respective Great Powers shall undertake the 
 responsibility of seeing to it that members of the League 
 conform to the rules laid down by the treaty, it will be 
 unnecessary for any nation to send forces to a distant 
 quarter. The United States can properly take care of the 
 Western Hemisphere and need not maintain in normal times 
 a military establishment more extensive than she ought to 
 maintain for domestic use and the proper maintenance of 
 the Monroe Doctrine without such a league. They may be 
 well supplied, not by a professional army, but by a system 
 
THE LEAGUE'S "BITE" 217 
 
 of universal training on democratic principles like that in 
 Switzerland or New Zealand. If this be conscription, its 
 opponents may make the most of it. It will help our boys 
 in discipline of character and in a most useful educational 
 way. It will provide for the prompt display of democratic 
 power to achieve justice. The picture painted by Senator 
 Borah of the army of the United States needed for the pur- 
 poses of the League is the result of a lively imagination, but 
 does not find support in the real need of the League. 
 
 After the League of the Great Powers has been estab- 
 lished for the purpose of executing the plans of the new 
 treaty, it will be time enough to take in all other responsible 
 Powers. The lesser League will grow naturally into a 
 larger League. Experience will test the practical character 
 of the lesser League and in this wise and in due course the 
 world League will come into being. But meanwhile as a 
 necessary condition precedent to the success of the treaty 
 of peace, it must provide for a League of the Great Nations. 
 
 THE LEAGUE'S " BITE " l 
 
 Those who are looking for something real in a league of 
 Nations to preserve peace, in creating sanctions for inter- 
 national law, justice and equity, may well feel concerned 
 over the developments in Paris. Such persons have based 
 their hopes on the psychological effect of the horrors of the 
 war upon all nations, which should make them willing to 
 concede much to achieve the main object of the war. They 
 have counted on securing a covenant between the members 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger, Jan. 29, 1919. 
 
2l8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 of the League to unite, whenever necessity may arise, with 
 the powerful members of the League to compel compliance 
 with judgments of the League and to suppress recalcitrant 
 members faithless to the principles of the League and to their 
 obligations. They can hardly be blamed for so doing, in 
 view of President Wilson's words, as follows: 
 
 " I pray God that if this contest have no other result, it 
 will at least have the result of creating an international 
 tribunal and producing some sort of joint guaranty of peace 
 on the part of the great nations of the world." ..." Now, 
 let us suppose that we have formed a family of nations and 
 that family of nations says : ' The world is not going to 
 have any more wars of this sort without at least first going 
 through certain processes to show whether there is any- 
 thing in the case or not.' If you say, * We shall not have 
 any war,' you have got to have the force to make the ' shall ' 
 bite. And the rest of the world, if America takes part in 
 this thing, will have the right to expect from her that she can 
 contribute her elemeht of force to the general understanding. 
 Surely that is not a militaristic idea. That is a very prac- 
 tical ideal." 
 
 The indorsement of these views by Mr. Lloyd George was 
 as follows: 
 
 " The best security for peace will be that nations will band 
 themselves together to punish the peace-breaker." 
 
 Mr. Asquith's comment on the President's views was as 
 follows : 
 
 " The President held out to his hearers the prospect of an 
 era when the civilization of mankind, banded together for the 
 purpose, will make it their joint and several duty to repress 
 by their united authority and, if need be, by their combined 
 naval and military forces, any wanton or aggressive invasion 
 
THE LEAGUES BITE 
 
 of the peace of the world. It is a fine ideal, which must 
 arouse all our sympathies." 
 
 From these statements of this ideal it is a descending 
 climax now to hear that no member of the League is to bind 
 itself to unite its forces with any other in enforcing the 
 judgments of the league court or in punishing the peace- 
 breaker. We are now to depend on moral force or the exer- 
 cise of an economic boycott, it may be, and on the general 
 public opinion of the world. If a nation which is interested 
 in a judgment in its behalf desires, it is to be given the right 
 to go to war to enforce it. We have still the wonderful 
 and eloquent preaching of the ideal of a League of Nations 
 while we see its strength and " bite," to use Mr. Wilson's 
 expression, fading into merely moral aspirations and moral 
 sanctions. 
 
 This is doubtless in part due to the difficulties that the 
 nations now sitting around the council board in Paris are 
 having in maintaining their armies. After four years of 
 war the pressure of the men engaged in it to be released from 
 their military duty is so strong that the nations cannot resist 
 it. That is probably the explanation of the very weak policy 
 adopted in respect to the Bolsheviki. The Congress cer- 
 tainly would not have run the risk of exposing its members 
 to just criticism had they not felt deeply the difficulty con- 
 fronting them in sending an adequate force to Russia to 
 stamp out the contagion, to rescue the Czecho-Slavs and to 
 give Russia a chance. The error that our administration 
 made during the war was in resisting the urgent appeal of 
 our Allies to send a large force into Russia, through 
 Vladivostok and Archangel, to create an eastern front. 
 Such a force would have largely obviated the Bolsheviki 
 complication. The Czecho-Slovaks, whom we have 
 
22O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 promised to help, are in a perilous situation, while our own 
 little handful of men are fighting an aimless fight against 
 great odds near Archangel. 
 
 Should they who have expected real " bite," to repeat Mr. 
 Wilson's expression, in the League of Nations, be dis- 
 couraged? Institutions like the League of Nations, which 
 represent an advance in civilization, are created by the 
 necessity of the situation. 
 
 It is, of course, difficult to comment on plans for the 
 League as they are outlined in the cabled reports of cor- 
 respondents. They seem to be anxious to convince every- 
 body that, while the League of Nations is a beautiful idea 
 and inspires emotion when urged as President Wilson urged 
 it in the congress at Saturday's session, nevertheless, its 
 covenants are not going to involve any trouble or obliga- 
 tion or burden for the United States, but will permit com- 
 plete freedom of action or withholding of action when war 
 shall come again. 
 
 Lord Robert Cecil is reported to have suggested a court 
 to which all justiciable questions are to be submitted, while 
 nonjusticiable questions leading to trouble are to go to a 
 council of conciliation. This is accompanied, however, by 
 the notable proviso that every nation may determine for 
 itself whether the question threatening war is justiciable or 
 not. This is equivalent to saying that every nation may 
 keep out of the court of the League if it chooses, no matter 
 what the issue. The court is thus to be constituted to decide 
 questions which both quarreling nations are willing to sub- 
 mit to it. It is thus as effective as the present voluntary 
 arbitration of the Hague tribunal and no more. If, now, 
 every proposal with anything of a " bite " in it is to be 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 221 
 
 weakened to ineffectiveness, the common peoples of France, 
 England, Italy and the United States, who have been look- 
 ing upon the League as a real machine, with the " bite " in 
 it to prevent future wars, may well feel that there has been 
 much thundering in the index about the League of Nations 
 without tangible result. If the League is only to be an 
 agreement to confer over any breach of peace by the nations, 
 and will not even bind nations to submit legal differences 
 to a court, the man in the street will not put much faith in 
 fine words in the future. 
 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN 
 COLONIES 
 
 It was to be expected that selfish desire to take advantage 
 of the victory over Germany would appear in the congress 
 at Paris ; but it should not be gratified. The strength of the 
 Allies was in the justice of their cause. German lies and 
 propaganda concealed the facts and at first misled many. 
 As the war progressed, Germany's sole responsibility for the 
 war and the grinning skeleton of her vicious purposes were 
 revealed. They were confirmed by her atrocious conduct of 
 the war. The claim of the Allies that theirs was only a de- 
 fensive struggle to save the world from the German monster 
 of militarism, in which they were prompted by no spirit of 
 conquest or self-aggrandizement, gained credence among all 
 nations. Declarations of war against Germany as the enemy 
 of mankind followed from every quarter of the globe. Her 
 isolation from all the world save from her allies, who were 
 under her iron heel, became a greater and greater factor in 
 lowering the morale of her people. The material influence 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Feb. 3, 1919. 
 
222 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 of the moral righteousness of the cause of the Allies is one 
 of the inspiring circumstances in the history of the Great 
 War. 
 
 This feature of the victory should not be allowed to lose 
 its beneficent force by a yielding to selfish claims of partici- 
 pants in the peace pact. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine 
 to France or even of the coal mines of the neighboring Saar 
 district is only justice. The German outrageous destruction 
 of the mines at Lens and elsewhere makes the transfer of the 
 Saar district only an equitable indemnity. The same view 
 justifies the delivery to Italy of Italia Irridenta. But no 
 such principle applies in respect to the German colonies. 
 
 All will applaud and support the conclusion that Germany 
 has forfeited ownership of her colonies. She has grossly 
 mistreated the backward peoples living in them, and in whose 
 interest they should be administered. How are they to be 
 governed? It is agreed that their peoples are now incap- 
 able of self-government; that to attempt to extend it to them 
 would be only less hurtful to them than German domination. 
 Who then shall govern them? As a member of the confer- 
 ence, Australia asks the transfer of the South Pacific colonies 
 to it or to Great Britain, while British South Africa presses 
 for British control over the former German dependencies 
 in her neighborhood. 
 
 These pretensions are advanced on two grounds. First, 
 that in the past the proximity of German possessions has 
 been a continual threat to them, and, second, that their sacri- 
 fices in the war entitle them to take these territories over as 
 an indemnity. As to the first, the exclusion of German 
 control should remove any danger. As to the second, it is 
 contrary to principles upon which, under the armistice terms, 
 the treaty was to be framed. It involves in its essence the 
 
THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 223 
 
 proposal that these countries and their backward peoples are 
 to be traded as a commodity to compensate the two British 
 dominions for sacrifices in war. They are thus to be treated 
 as something of value belonging to Germany and are to be 
 used as a substitute for money indemnity. 
 
 President Wilson insists that they should be administered 
 by the League of Nations for the benefit of their peoples. In 
 this he is clearly right. Where his proposal lacks strength, 
 however, is in his suggestion that the League shall 
 administer them through the British dominions as " manda- 
 tories." Theoretically this means that the League -shall 
 supervise while the respective dominions actually govern. 
 Previous experience shows that such arrangements are a 
 source of much friction and interfere with effectiveness. 
 The Algeciras method of dealing w r ith Tangier and Morocco 
 was like this and was not satisfactory. Moreover, the deal- 
 ing by Australia and by South Africa with native races is 
 not likely to be as just and equitable as that of their mother 
 country. 
 
 Why should not the League itself establish and maintain 
 a proper government of these countries? We could be in 
 this way much more certain of right treatment of the back- 
 ward peoples than under the " mandatories." No danger 
 to their British colonial neighbors could arise from a govern- 
 ment of the League. 
 
 Why then does Mr. Wilson suggest this plan which really 
 hides territorial acquisition and complete possession and con- 
 trol under a thin cloak of League supervision? It is 
 because he has not given any life to his ideal of a league. 
 If he gave it flesh and bones in real and definite machinery 
 and power, the purpose he has as to these German colonies 
 might be successfully worked out. As it is, these colonies 
 
224 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 will in fact meet the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
 Austria, which was complete absorption. It would seem to 
 be better for the backward peoples who are the wards of the 
 Peace Congress to give them directly and openly to Great 
 Britain, who will govern them more sympathetically and 
 wisely than will her own colonial daughters. 
 
 The President is being further embarrassed by the pro- 
 posal that the United States shall administer Constantinople. 
 Palestine and Armenia as a mandatory of the League. He 
 does not wish to entangle the United States in the compli- 
 cations of the near Eastern question, and no wonder ! Had 
 he and his colleagues planned a real League of Nations and 
 not a mere figure of rhetoric, or noble conception without 
 body, the international agency to discharge this important 
 function would be at hand. 
 
 Will not these troublesome experiences with the very first 
 problems, simpler indeed than many yet to come, convince 
 the Congress that a real league of nations with a " bite " in 
 it is indispensable in achieving their purpose ? 
 
 Is it too much to hope that the history of the framing of 
 the Constitution of the United States may repeat itself in 
 the present Congress and the proposed League of Nations? 
 When the members of the convention met there were no 
 definite plans of government except one which Hamilton had 
 formulated and which was not adopted. Few thought they 
 would be successful in framing a real nation. Hamilton 
 and a few other constructive statesmen were the only ones 
 who were not faint-hearted. As their deliberations pro- 
 ceeded, as the necessities of the situation developed, proposals 
 which at first were thought to be chimerical and impossible 
 seemed to become more practical and necessary, and out of 
 it all we got our wonderful fundamental instrument of 
 
FROM AN ADDRESS AT THE ATLANTIC CONGRESS 225 
 
 government. May not the League in the same way become 
 a living thing? 
 
 FROM AN ADDRESS AT THE ATLANTIC CON- 
 GRESS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS, NEW 
 YORK, FEBRUARY 5, 1919. 
 
 You will only get the ideal court when the members are 
 independent, their only qualifications being their probity, 
 their ability, their learning and their experience. 
 
 They will not represent anybody, but simple justice, on 
 that court. They are to apply pure principles of law and 
 exercise their acumen to determine facts impartially in the 
 disposition of the legal questions which come before them. 
 Therefore it is not representative. But, appointees should 
 be distributed with reference to bringing in knowledge of 
 all law throughout the world, just as our own Supreme 
 Court is distributed, not by any law, but through the dis- 
 cretion of the Executive, so that the different parts of the 
 country, with different methods of administration of law, 
 may be brought in. 
 
 IRELAND AND THE LEAGUE * 
 
 The resolution proposed in the House of Representa- 
 tives to urge upon the President in Paris that he take steps 
 to secure a government in Ireland independent of the gov- 
 ernment of Great Britain is ill-timed. It can only embarrass 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Feb. 13, 1919. 
 
226 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 him in securing an agreement between the Great Powers 
 who are dictating the terms of peace to Germany and rear- 
 ranging the map of Middle and Eastern Europe. 
 
 The relation of Ireland to Great Britain is a British 
 domestic question, and cannot properly be made other by 
 the intervention of the United States. Hope of a satis- 
 factory peace in which the whole world is interested would 
 have to be abandoned if the Great Powers were to look 
 into and discuss the internal affairs of one another. The 
 relations of the government of France to Algiers, to Tunis, 
 to Morocco and her African interests, the relation of Japan 
 to Formosa, that of the United States to the Philippines, 
 to the Indian tribes or to the colored voters of the States of 
 the South, might all be thus added to the bewildering issues 
 that now claim the attention of the delegates at the Paris 
 conference. This treaty is to close the war with Germany 
 and her Allies, and England's relation to Ireland is not 
 germane to that war and has no connection with it. 
 
 Irishmen must know that the wrongs of Ireland in the 
 past have sunk deep in the minds and memories of the 
 people of the United States. Whenever there has been a 
 movement to remedy these wrongs, whenever the issue of 
 home rule has been raised, it has awakened the strongest 
 sympathy in the hearts and souls of Americans, whether of 
 Irish blood or not. Americans have had immense satis- 
 faction in learning that the land laws of Ireland have been 
 so improved and changed that now there is a large increase 
 in the number of small farms owned in fee simple by the 
 farmers. 
 
 Sir Horace Plunkett, an Irishman, has led Irish farmers 
 into associations by which they have learned to improve their 
 agriculture and dairy farming, to unite in the disposition 
 
IRELAND AND THE LEAGUE 227 
 
 of their product and get rid of the heavy toll of the middle- 
 men, so that to-day it is not too much to say that rural Ire- 
 land is in better economic condition than any other agri- 
 cultural part of the British Islands. This has been directly 
 due to the legislation of Parliament, the leadership of such 
 men as Plunkett, and the capacity for organization developed 
 among the farmers. 
 
 The political blundering of the English government and 
 what, to many of us, seems the unreasonable obstinacy of the 
 Protestant half of Ulster have prevented that home rule to 
 which most Americans believe that Ireland is entitled. If 
 she could have been made a Dominion like Canada, with 
 hardly more than nominal union to Great Britiain, except in 
 international matters, Ireland would certainly have been 
 satisfied before Sinn Feinism was fanned into flame by the 
 delay in home rule. 
 
 Self-determination is not a certain solvent of political 
 difficulty. Self-determination means a rule of the majority; 
 but the question what the unit shall be, of which the majority 
 is to rule, still remains. This is affected by considerations 
 of geography, language, race, religion and other factors of 
 solidarity or variety in the mental attitudes of the people con- 
 cerned. Geography forbids a separation of Ulster from Ire- 
 land, especially in view of the fact that Ulster has been repre- 
 sented in Parliament by half home rule and half unionist 
 members of Parliament. On the other hand, the geographi- 
 cal relation of Ireland to Great Britain makes the former a 
 necessary outpost against hostile attack, while the difference 
 in race and the traditional lack of sympathy justify the great- 
 est autonomy in Ireland consistent with British protection. 
 
 It is remarkable that Great Britain, which has been won- 
 derfully successful in dealing with colonial dependencies of 
 
228 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 all kinds, should have been so unsuccessful in Ireland. This 
 has been true, even since her statesmen have been sincerely 
 and earnestly anxious to be just to Ireland, and to eliminate 
 completely from her Irish policy the motive which so long 
 disgraced it, that of exploiting Ireland and her people for 
 the profit of England. In Irish affairs, English statesmen 
 are always a length behind. They are always willing to give, 
 when it is too late, that which would have satisfied Irishmen 
 at an earlier stage. 
 
 Whatever the merits of the issue now, it is not within the 
 field of jurisdiction of the Paris conference, and those who 
 press it there, whatever their motive, are not helping the 
 successful outcome of that fateful congress. Pressure for 
 the proposed resolution is due, first, to the sincere sentiment 
 for it of men of Irish blood in this country; second, to the 
 desire of reckless politicians to win political support by its 
 advocacy, and, third, to the timidity of others who, though 
 really opposed to it as unwise, are afraid of the personal 
 political consequences' of their opposition. Nor should we 
 omit from the elements pressing for its adoption a class of 
 persons anxious to make the conference at Paris a failure. 
 It is to be hoped that the resolution will be tabled. 
 
 THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS l 
 
 The League to Enforce Peace, of which this is a congress 
 called for Oregon, Washington and Idaho, is a voluntary 
 association of men and women of the United States organ- 
 ized early in 1915 to spread propaganda in favor of a plan 
 
 1 Address at Portland, Oregon, Feb. 16, 1919. 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 
 
 for world cooperation to maintain peace, by enforced settle- 
 ment of differences likely to lead to war, on principles of 
 justice and fairness. Its promoters had long been interested 
 in promoting arbitration between nations. They thought 
 that the end of this world-destructive war would find the 
 peoples of the various countries in a frame of mind in which 
 they would gladly accept any reasonable international co- 
 operation to prevent war. Accordingly the League adopted 
 a platform in which it recommended that the United States 
 enter a League of Nations, in which the members of the 
 League should stipulate that all differences arising between 
 them of a justiciable character should be submitted to a 
 court and those of a non-justiciable character to a council 
 of conciliation; that every member of the League should 
 agree to refrain from going to war until after judgment by 
 the court or recommendation by the council of conciliation, 
 and that any member who violated this obligation by attack- 
 ing any other member should be overwhelmed by the 
 economic pressure of all the members of the League and the 
 joint military forces of the League, if need be. Similar 
 associations were formed in England and France, with 
 similar platforms, except that they provided for a forcible 
 execution of the judgments and a dealing with the recom- 
 mendations of the councils of conciliation by the League. 
 
 There has been until now no means of knowing exactly 
 what is meant by a league of nations except by reference 
 to the platforms of these voluntary associations. The 
 governments of England and France created commissions 
 for the special purpose of studying the proper framework 
 of a league of nations, but the result of their studies was 
 not given to the public. Our government had declined to 
 create such a commission. On Friday last, however, the 
 
230 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 committee to whom the great Paris congress had delegated 
 the work of preparing a plan for a league of nations, of 
 which President Wilson was the chairman, made a report 
 which was concurred in by the representatives of all of the 
 fourteen nations at the conference. Now therefore we have 
 an authoritative statement of the constitution of a league of 
 nations and an official basis for its discussion. 
 
 This constitution is indeed wider in the scope of its pur- 
 pose than was the platform of our League to Enforce Peace. 
 The platform of our League was a mere skeleton. It had 
 prepared a tentative draft of a treaty to give it body and 
 constructive details, but that tentative draft was never given 
 to the public, because it was thought wiser by governmental 
 authority to withhold it. The sole object of the League to 
 Enforce Peace platform was to promote peace and avoid war 
 by instrumentalities for administering justice between na- 
 tions and by enforcing submission to such instrumental- 
 ities. It did not even contain a provision with respect to 
 the limitation of armament. The purpose of the constitu- 
 tion reported at Paris, which we may properly call " the great 
 covenant of Paris," is much wider. It is to organize a real 
 and permanent league, whose first object is to provide for 
 the just settlement of differences between nations and the 
 prevention of war, and for this purpose to limit armaments. 
 Its second object is to exercise executive functions in the 
 administration of international trusts like the government of 
 backward peoples whom this war has released from the 
 sovereignty of the Germans and the other Central Powers. 
 Its third object is to promote cooperation between the na- 
 tions, with a view to the betterment of the condition of labor 
 in all the nations and for joint action in respect to other use- 
 ful matters now dealt with by international bureaus, like the 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 23! 
 
 postal union. This provides a constant series of functions 
 for the League to perform and gives it substance. 
 
 The League is to be formed by a covenant which recites 
 in its preamble its general purpose, and then states in twenty- 
 six different articles the agreements included in the covenant. 
 
 The present membership of the League is to consist of 
 the fourteen nations who are to be signatories to the covenant 
 and to sign the treaty of peace. The most numerous acting 
 governmental branch of the League is a body of delegates to 
 meet once a year or oftener if necessary, to consist of at least 
 one representative and not more than three from each nation, 
 with but one vote for each state. This body of delegates is 
 to pass upon the question of membership of other nations 
 applying to be admitted. Before a nation shall be admitted 
 it must show itself able and willing to conform to the cove- 
 nant and must receive the vote of two-thirds of the members 
 of the League. This is drawn to keep Germany out until 
 she is fit. The body of delegates also has the function of 
 taking the place of the executive council as a tribunal of 
 conciliation and compromise when either party to the con- 
 troversy demands it. The most important agency of the 
 League is the executive council, which consists of representa- 
 tives of the five Great Powers and of four other members 
 to be selected by the body of delegates. This council has 
 numerous executive duties for the League and in most 
 respects is the League, and it performs an important function 
 in mediation and settlement of differences. There is a 
 permanent secretariat of the League, which is to be estab- 
 lished at the seat of the League, there to perform the duties 
 indicated by its name. A permanent military commission is 
 to advise the council on questions of the limitation of arma- 
 ment and upon military and naval matters. The League is 
 
232 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 given a definite diplomatic status by securing to its repre- 
 sentatives the immunity and privileges of ambassadors and 
 extra-territorial ity for the buildings and home in which it 
 has its headquarters. 
 
 States members of the League, having a difference, may 
 submit it by agreement to arbitration. The members of 
 the League covenant that if they become parties to an arbi- 
 tration they will abide the award of the arbitrators. If 
 either party objects to arbitration, then the difference is to 
 be submitted to the executive council for mediation or recom- 
 mendation. If the council succeeds in securing an agree- 
 ment it is to be published. If not, then the council may 
 report a recommendation. If it is unanimous, excluding 
 representatives of interested parties, then the council must 
 take measures to carry the recommendation into effect. 
 Should the executive council divide, the majority is required 
 to publish its recommendations with reasons and the minority 
 may do so, without further action. 
 
 Every member of 'the League agrees not to resort to 
 any war until three months after the difference between it 
 and its opponent has been submitted to arbitration and an 
 award made, or to the executive council and a recommenda- 
 tion made, and not then if the party against whom war is 
 threatened complies with the award or the recommendation. 
 If any member of the League begins war prematurely and in 
 violation of its agreement, such breach of its covenant is an 
 act of war against all other members of the League and is 
 to be met by universal boycott of all the members of the 
 League against the recalcitrant member. Not only is this 
 boycott to be conducted by members of the League, but they 
 are required to prevent non-members of the League also 
 from having any commercial or personal relations with the 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 233 
 
 outlaw member and its nationals or citizens. The boycott 
 is to include a complete severance of all trade, financial and 
 personal relations between the citizens of the respective 
 countries, and a sundering of all diplomatic and consular 
 relations. The executive council is to recommend to the 
 members of the League the effective military or naval forces 
 which they should severally contribute to the armed forces 
 of the League to be used to protect the covenants of the 
 League. The members of the League are to divide the loss 
 incident to the boycott falling on some members and not on 
 others, and mutually to support one another in resisting any 
 special measure of hostility brought by the outlaw state 
 against any one or more of them. The League members 
 are bound to afford passage through their territory for the 
 force of any member or members who are cooperating to 
 protect the covenants of the League. The participation in 
 the boycott is obligatory upon all members of the League. 
 The contribution of needed military force from the several 
 members of the League, while fixed by the council, is not 
 obligatory. The result is, however, to create a state of war 
 between the recalcitrant member and all the members of 
 the League at their option, much like that existing between 
 certain South American countries and Germany during the 
 late war. 
 
 The Paris Covenant does not immediately provide a 
 permanent international court. It directs that the executive 
 council shall formulate plans for its establishment, and that, 
 when established, it shall be competent to determine any 
 matter which the parties recognize as proper to submit to it. 
 Its jurisdiction, therefore, even when created, will be de- 
 pendent on the voluntary submission by the parties. 
 
 When a difference arises between a non-member and a 
 
234 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 member or between two non-members, they are to be invited 
 to accept temporary membership of the League for the pur- 
 pose of settling the dispute, in accordance with the proced- 
 ure just described. If the non-member refuses to accept 
 the obligations of the League, it is to be treated as a mem- 
 ber of the League would be treated which violated its 
 covenant. This attitude toward non-members is in pur- 
 suance of a declaration of the constitution that the League 
 is interested in the maintenance of universal peace and holds 
 any threatened breach of it as a matter of its concern as to 
 which it may take action. 
 
 Three classes of countries with peoples not ready for 
 self-government are committed to the trusteeship of the 
 League, which administers them through competent govern- 
 ments as mandatories of the League. 
 
 A permanent mandatory commission is established, 
 which is to require annual reports of the mandatories and 
 to see that the restrictions contained in the constitution or in 
 the special charters which are issued by the executive council 
 to mandatories have been observed. 
 
 Amendments to the covenant are to be made only upon a 
 unanimous vote of the executive council and a two-thirds 
 vote of the delegates. 
 
 This summary of the constitution of the League shows 
 very clearly that the nations that agreed to it intended to 
 give the League real power. This power rests on the cove- 
 nants of the members of the League and on their agreed 
 cooperation in the universal boycott and in their voluntary 
 cooperation by the use of military force to punish any cove- 
 nant-breaking member. 
 
 This Paris covenant has been made by the five nations 
 who are to prescribe the terms of the treaty of peace. It 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 235 
 
 has been made in view of the necessities of that treaty and 
 the machinery required for its execution. This is a very 
 fortunate circumstance in the creation of the League and its 
 growth into a League of all Nations. A convention of all 
 the nations would never have agreed on anything as prac- 
 tical as this. Though the ultimate object of the League is 
 the protection of the interest of weaker nations, such nations 
 are most likely to be obstructive in their insistence upon 
 excessive representation. This League is growing up as an 
 institution forced by the necessities of the situation. It is 
 a wholesome and natural process in the establishment of 
 needed and permanent institutions. Out of a clear sky in 
 normal times it would be a matter of the utmost difficulty to 
 form such a League of Nations. Here the condition which 
 confronts the world and those responsible for its welfare 
 calls for immediate action. Out of that immediate action 
 comes this League, adapted to present uses and admirably 
 available as a foundation for a world league. 
 
 On the whole, the short program of the League to En- 
 force Peace, adopted in June, 1915, differs but little from 
 the nub of this, except that military contribution is not 
 expressly obligatory and that in this either party to a differ- 
 ence may avoid a court and an award and seek a council of 
 conciliation in the executive body of the League where 
 unanimity of recommendation is required. The proposal 
 to use compulsion to secure submission rather than execu- 
 tion of judgment or recommendation came from the pro- 
 gram of the League to Enforce Peace, and was adopted by 
 General Smuts in a remarkable brochure submitted by him 
 December 1 6, 1918. It is understood that the President was 
 much impressed with the paper of General Smuts and with 
 his plan as well. We may be certain the constitution as 
 
236 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 now adopted was largely taken from his recommendation. 
 He argued for the joint obligation of League members to 
 use force, which was only partly adopted, as I have pointed 
 out. He, too, recommended required submission of the 
 justiciable questions to a court and of non justiciable 
 questions to a conciliation council as the League to Enforce 
 Peace had done. But the Smuts plan was much more com- 
 prehensive than that of the League to Enforce Peace. From 
 that plan came the mandatory system of administering 
 backward countries and internationalizing cities as wards of 
 the League through competent and existing governments as 
 agents answerable to the League. From that plan came the 
 union of all present international bureaus under the League, 
 as well as the permanent secretariat. He advocated inter- 
 national labor reforms through the League, and this function 
 is left to be developed under the League. He, too, brought 
 non-members of the League under its influence and action. 
 
 The giving to the Great Powers five votes in an executive 
 council of nine is one of the most imp; riant features of the 
 constitution and is indispensable to any practical working 
 of it. They are the responsible members who are to do the 
 work. The minor states of the League enjoy its protection, 
 but will not be willing to expend money or effort in main- 
 taining its authority. They should not be permitted to 
 arrogate to themselves equal authority with the Great Powers 
 and thus seriously interfere with the League's efficient 
 operations. This is a sufficient safeguard against a too early 
 admission of Germany. 
 
 The treaty of peace to be framed is to deal with Middle 
 and Eastern Europe, the Near East and the German colonies. 
 The plan is to create ten or a dozen new states, more than 
 half of them independent republics and the remainder under 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 237 
 
 some sort of suzerainty of the League. These new states 
 are to be founded not only in the interest of the peoples who 
 form them, but also to constitute bulwarks against a revival 
 of German power. Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, 
 the Czecho-Slovak state, the Ukraine, the Jugo-Slav state 
 are all to be republics to curb and make impossible a revival 
 of Germany's dream of Middle Europe and of an empire 
 reaching from Hamburg to the Persian gulf. They are to 
 prevent the extension of Germany's influence in Russia, 
 where her commercial schemes have had in the past a con- 
 trolling influence. These new nations must be rendered 
 stable and must be kept at peace with each other and at 
 peace with the countries out of which they have been carved. 
 They will cherish resentments against their former owners 
 because of the oppression which they suffered at their hands 
 and the latter will feel bitter toward them because their inde- 
 pendent existence will remind them of their deserved humi- 
 liation and defeat. Moreover, their peoples have never been 
 used to self-government and we must expect internal dis- 
 orders, due to that lack of self-restraint that practice in self- 
 government gives. They are to be six or seven Cubas and 
 must remain under the kindly assistance of the nations who 
 dictate this peace until their stability is secured. 
 
 The League of Nations which existed during the war, 
 and by which the war was won, continues in the conference 
 at Paris and must be continued, after the signing of the 
 treaty, with machinery to secure the peaceful settlement of 
 the myriad questions and differences that will arise between 
 the new countries and the old in the ultimate establishment 
 of their relations. The fixing and the maintenance of the 
 boundaries in the Balkans, always a most difficult question, 
 and the determination of the rights of new neighbors will be 
 
238 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 a continuous source of adjudication and adjustment if peace 
 is to be enjoyed instead of a continual state of war. In 
 responding to these necessities this League has been con- 
 stituted. No one could look into the problems before the 
 nations conferring at Paris without realizing that a league 
 with judicial and adjustment machinery and provision for 
 the enforcement of judgments and settlements was an abso- 
 lute requirement. As the conferees proceed to consider the 
 details of the treaty and the need for speedy and in forced 
 settlements and measures repressive of war, they may con- 
 clude that the provisions contained in this constitution are 
 not fully adapted to the present needs. If so, special articles 
 can be added to the constitution to meet such exigencies. 
 Indeed one may reasonably predict that within the elastic 
 provisions of this constitution new means will be developed 
 to increase the effectiveness of the League as a peacemaker. 
 
 On the whole, we should thank God that such a great 
 advance toward the suppression of war and the promotion 
 of permanent peace has been make as in the agreement upon 
 this constitution, with every reasonable prospect of its em- 
 bodiment into the permanent treaty at Paris. Is it possible 
 that such a vital feature of the treaty, upon which fourteen 
 states through their representatives at Paris agree, is to be 
 defeated by the lack of the necessary two-thirds vote in our 
 Senate? I cannot think so. When President Wilson 
 returns to present the result of his visit to Europe it must 
 be that the American people will welcome him with approval 
 and congratulations upon the success of the congress in 
 which he has taken so prominent a part. 
 
 In the President's addresses and messages during the 
 war and since, he has promised to the long-harassed peoples 
 of the Allied nations that the United States would press for 
 
THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 239 
 
 a League of Nations which should secure permanent peace 
 when this war ended. Thus he revived the morale of the 
 war-weary soldiers and workers of our Allies. These 
 promises were not repudiated by any American when they 
 were made. They were echoed in all the appeals to the 
 American people and they found ready response among them 
 and no protest. The nation is thus pledged to the idea of 
 a League of Nations to render peace permanent. Good 
 faith requires that what other nations are willing to under- 
 go to secure the peace of the world we should ourselves be 
 willing to undergo. 
 
 Only now, after the reaction that the end of the war 
 brings and after impatience at the delays in reaching peace 
 conditions, do we hear on the floor of the Senate the criti- 
 cisms of the President's promise of a league of nations. 
 If uttered during the war they would have been out of tune 
 with the overflowing spirit of the American people and their 
 determination to win this war and end the possibility of any 
 such war in the future. Now for the first time do we hear 
 the claim that we did not go into this war for the benefit of 
 the world, but for our own selfish purposes. 
 
 Senator Poindexter attacks the eighth article of the con- 
 stitution of the League on disarmament as follows: 
 
 " The provision is unconstitutional and an impairment 
 of the sovereignty and independence of this country." 
 
 Congress under the constitution determines what our 
 armament shall be; and therefore, even if we made an agree- 
 ment, Congress would retain the constitutional power of 
 violating that agreement and increasing the armament be- 
 yond the limit set ; but that does not prevent the treaty-mak- 
 ing power from entering into the obligation. It is not a 
 transfer of sovereignty it is only an agreement to limit 
 
240 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 our fortifications and our means of attack in consideration 
 of other nations doing the same thing. The most famous 
 agreement that we have made on this point is the agreement 
 we have with Great Britain, by which we bind ourselves not 
 to fortify the water boundary between Canada and the 
 United States, or to place war vessels on the lakes. That 
 agreement is of one hundred years' standing, and has been 
 praised by every statesman who has referred to it. It was 
 first made by correspondence between two secretaries of state 
 and afterwards was embodied in a treaty. Does Senator 
 Poindexter claim that this was unconstitutional and 
 destroyed the sovereignty of the United States? The Sena- 
 tor says we cannot agree with another nation to take over 
 and govern the exclusive right of manufacturing munitions 
 and instruments of war. Why not, if other nations agree 
 to do the same thing and to limit their production in the 
 same way ? The trouble with Senator Poindexter's concep- 
 tion of this government is that it hasn't the powers of other 
 great nations to help along the world by a joint agreement 
 that shall prevent the dangerous increase of armament on 
 the part of any nation. In assuming to exalt the sovereignty 
 of the nation as above everything, he falls into the error of 
 minimizing its power to do anything to help the preservation 
 of peace. 
 
 Senator Poindexter objects to article XVIII, in which 
 the League is to supervise the traffic of arms in countries 
 where it is deemed necessary, for the public welfare, to re- 
 strict the traffic. No one who is not a searcher for objec- 
 tions could apply that article to the United States. It of 
 course refers to countries of backward peoples who cannot be 
 trusted with firearms, and whose use of them the world may 
 well restrict to maintain its safety. 
 
TO BUSINESS MEN 24! 
 
 The most extreme position of Senator Poindexter is 
 that the United States cannot consent to arbitration of issues 
 between it and other countries because it might affect the 
 vital interests of the nation. There have been scores of 
 arbitrations between the United States and other countries, 
 many of them of very great concern. The question of the 
 payment of the Alabama claims related to a principle of 
 international law and international safety that was of 
 the highest importance. The arbitration of the Alaskan 
 boundary was another. The arbitration of our rights in the 
 Bering Sea and in the seal herd of the Pribilof islands was 
 another. On this arbitration we submitted to the decision 
 of an impartial tribunal the question whether we had the 
 rights or not which we claimed. The assumption that either 
 the court of arbitration or the executive council of the 
 League by unanimous judgment would seek to take away 
 the sovereignty or the liberty or the independence of the 
 United States is utterly gratuitous. It is so extreme a view 
 that it ought not to be given any weight as an objection to 
 machinery for the peaceful adjustment of differences by 
 decision of international courts. 
 
 TO BUSINESS MEN l 
 
 We have been discussing the question for four years as 
 to how the world could make anything out of this war that 
 would be useful for its further progress. Four years ago 
 we adopted a plan in the League to Enforce Peace which 
 
 1 Address before the Commonwealth Club of California, at San 
 Francisco, Feb. 19, 1919. 
 
242 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 provided for the cooperation of nations in attempting to stop 
 the spread of war. We thought that if there was anything 
 silly, anything cruel, it was war, and that the nations could 
 not be said to be forward-looking or intelligent or business- 
 like, or even to have common sense, if they permitted the 
 condition of affairs to continue which made possible such a 
 war as we have just had. That was an academic question 
 when we raised it academic in the sense that people were 
 thinking rather of how the war could be ended than what 
 we should do after it ended. 
 
 Then we got into the war ourselves. We were a long 
 time in getting in. As we look back upon it now, I think 
 we regret that we did not get in earlier. I am offering no 
 criticism that we did not, because our hindsight is always 
 a great deal better than our foresight ; but what I would like 
 to say to you gentlemen, business men of San Francisco, is 
 this: use your foresight now rather than your hindsight 
 hereafter in respect to this particular question that we are 
 bringing before you. 'I do not want you to be in the attitude 
 of the man who rides with his back to the engine and does 
 not see anything until he gets by it. And that is what you 
 are likely to do unless you take this thing to heart and under- 
 stand what the necessity of it is and what it means. 
 
 If, in ten or twenty years, we are called into another war, 
 that war will be world suicide. The instrumentalities now 
 capable of being used in war are far more destructive than 
 they were when this war began; we have discovered 
 explosives and poisonous gases which can destroy a whole 
 community. 
 
 Are we going deliberately to allow that condition to con- 
 tinue which will make such a war possible? Are we going 
 to sit down here in San Francisco and think that we are so 
 
TO BUSINESS MEN 243 
 
 many thousand miles away from Paris that we are not con- 
 cerned in that matter? 
 
 That is what we thought for three years of this war, and 
 then we were drawn into it. And even when we were drawn 
 into it we did not realize it : it was still remote. I know 
 what I am talking about. I was going around the country. 
 Those in Washington and those in responsible positions 
 began to realize what it meant. But it was a long time 
 before the real spirit of earnestness entered into the people 
 of the United States; and it spread west with a good deal 
 of slowness. Finally it became the solidest public opinion 
 that America ever had. 
 
 Now comes the reaction from the efforts made to win 
 the war and we are looking around to get on a peace basis. 
 We feel that the war is over and that Germany, under this 
 armistice, cannot again come to the front as it did. There- 
 fore we will let the world wag as it will and we will not 
 concern ourselves about finishing a task in such a way as to 
 make another war impossible. 
 
 I want to stir you up, men of business ! The labor men 
 are getting stirred up; they are receiving communications 
 from their brethren over there and they are beginning to 
 understand it. Now, I want you to study this thing, and 
 take it to your hearts and souls, and understand that no 
 one has a deeper interest in getting this League of Nations 
 than you have. 
 
 The American people are intelligent, but the difficulty is to 
 challenge their attention. They have got their minds on 
 something else. That something else is the question of 
 domestic readjustment, and this deliberation at Paris and the 
 telegrams concerning it, though they fill the front page of 
 the newspapers, do not bring home to you the issues that 
 
244 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 are in Paris. The question is whether you are up to date; 
 whether you sympathize with the forward-looking men that 
 are trying to take a great step forward in civilization and end 
 war or make it so remotely possible that you can say that 
 the prospect is that it is ended; whether you are going to 
 agree with men who believe that the sovereignty and the Con- 
 stitution of the United States lend themselves to going for- 
 ward with other nations, or whether you agree that they are 
 to be perverted to defeat the plans of the world framed to 
 benefit mankind. 
 
 Is it possible that we cannot agree to settle our differ- 
 ences peaceably and refrain from appealing to the arbitra- 
 ment of war, which seldom results in justice but always in 
 the victory of the strongest? Sometimes the strongest is 
 right ; sometimes it is wrong. Now let us adopt some means 
 of settling differences that shall lean on justice as a guide, 
 and not on force. 
 
 Our President, representing this country, and the thirteen 
 nations there in Paris have agreed upon a League of Na- 
 tions. 
 
 I wish you would study that covenant ; I wish you would 
 work out what it means. It is a well-conceived plan. It 
 does not involve as much compulsory force as our League 
 to Enforce Peace has recommended, but it comes very near 
 it ; and it carries with it an arrangement for amendment and 
 for an elasticity that, as experience goes on, will enable the 
 League to adopt other methods. 
 
 Those nations that are gathered at Paris are in the 
 presence of a very serious problem. Study it; analyze it; 
 see whether they can get along without a League; see 
 whether they can get along without the instrumentality for 
 deciding questions justly by a tribunal of judges ; see whether 
 
TO BUSINESS MEN 245 
 
 they can get along without a council of conciliation to adjust 
 and readjust matters between the many new states there 
 created. 
 
 We are interested in that problem. Our soldiers are over 
 there to see that this peace is carried through. We are 
 going to be involved in any mix-up that comes from an 
 attempt to settle this war without having the instrumentality 
 for making that settlement effective. It is not a remote 
 thing. It is at your door. We have got the responsibility 
 for this peace along with all the other nations. These 
 nations have realized that responsibility and have established 
 the League of Nations, founded now with fourteen mem- 
 bers, with a view of enlarging it afterwards and letting in 
 others as they shall show themselves fit. 
 
 The covenant provides a way for the nations constantly 
 to confer, to get closer together, to bring about a better 
 understanding and to resort to joint action, when necessary, 
 to secure justice. 
 
 Can we avoid that ? Are we going to retire into our shells 
 and say, " We are all right ; we have resources within our- 
 selves ; we can live against the boycott ; we can go on chasing 
 the dollar comfortably and keep our people prosperous. 
 What is the use? Why should we bother ourselves about 
 other nations ? " That is what we thought before this war, 
 but we thought wrong. 
 
 Now, merely on selfish grounds, in order to avoid the 
 disasters that may come to us in another war, we ought to 
 do everything \ve can in the way of reasonable contribution 
 to the general safety and, certainly, all that is asked of us 
 here is reasonable contribution. We are asked to join in 
 a boycott, to unite with the other members of the League to 
 
246 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 say to any outlaw or recalcitrant nation that threatens to 
 bring on war, " When you do, we will suspend all contracts 
 and the payment of all monies which may be owing to your 
 citizens; all the food, all the products, manufactures and raw 
 materials, we are sending you will be stopped. We will 
 withdraw our ambassadors and consular agents." And 
 when all the world says that to a nation, that nation will 
 occupy a position grand and gloomy, but peculiar. 
 
 We agree among ourselves that if there is any special loss 
 to individual nations, all the other nations of the League will 
 share that loss. The boycott may prove to be expensive. 
 It may prove troublesome to some of our merchants who 
 have dealings with the outlaw nation. But we can indem- 
 nify them, and doubtless the country would be entirely will- 
 ing to do so. 
 
 So far as forcing this country into war is concerned, there 
 is nothing in the constitution of the League that does this. 
 Such a provision is found in the program of the League to 
 Enforce Peace, and I'should be glad to have it in the cove- 
 nant. France wanted it. She is at the point of danger 
 and she thinks she needs an obligation on the part of the 
 other nations to come to her assistance ; but the other nations 
 did not agree to go so far. All they did was to provide that 
 the executive council should recommend the number of 
 forces that each country should contribute to make the 
 League effective, and any neighbor of the outlaw nation 
 is bound to allow the League's soldiers to go over its terri- 
 tory. The agreement does unite us with other nations; it 
 does say that we shall live up to our ideals in dealing justly 
 with other nations and respect their sovereignty ; but that is 
 all it entails. 
 
 We are told in a set of lurid speeches that we are sur- 
 
FROM AN ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO 247 
 
 rendering our sovereignty and violating the Constitution. 
 My friends, I recommend you to read the speeches that were 
 made after the Constitution of the United States was 
 framed, the speeches of George Mason and Patrick Henry 
 and Samuel Adams, and of all those patriots who were 
 vociferous in denunciation of the Constitution of the United 
 States. You will find nothing in the present speeches in 
 the Senate more startling. 
 
 Accompanying a forward movement there are always 
 some who are looking backward. You always have those 
 who see the difficulties without seeing the advantages. In 
 the enthusiasm of debate they exaggerate difficulties; 
 whereas, after the thing is done, they are very willing to for- 
 get it, and others have not time to look back to see how 
 lacking in foresight these men were. 
 
 FROM AN ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO, 
 FEBRUARY 19, 1919 
 
 In addition to its functions in respect to peace and war 
 and the administration of territories containing backward 
 peoples formerly administered by the defeated Central 
 Powers, there are to be gathered, to act under the auspices 
 of the League, all existing international bureaus like the 
 postal union and all future international bureaus, including 
 a new international bureau of labor under which it is pro- 
 posed that, by international agreement, more humane con- 
 ditions in respect to labor of men, women and children may 
 be effected. 
 
 They give the Paris covenant wider scope and are greatly 
 
248 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 to be commended. They give the League substance and 
 constant operation in some of its functions which will greatly 
 promote the unity of nations. Out of this nucleus will come 
 closer understanding and greater mutual interest suggesting 
 new fields of international action for the betterment of man- 
 kind. 
 
 The administration of the German colonies with back- 
 ward peoples in Africa and in the Pacific and the 
 government of countries like Palestine, Syria, Armenia, 
 Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, not yet ready for self- 
 government, is a problem forced upon the League because 
 these countries cannot be trusted to the suzerainty or govern- 
 ment of the defeated Powers. Their previous conduct 
 toward them has forfeited all right, if any ever existed, to 
 have them restored. 
 
 We agree to limit our armament in consideration of the 
 other parties to this treaty limiting their armament, thus 
 reducing the necessity for our maintaining an armament 
 beyond that stipulated. The limitation upon our armament 
 is not arbitrarily fixed by somebody else. It is to be fixed 
 upon the recommendation of the executive council and 
 agreed to by us. As our armament potentially threatens 
 the other countries if used in a sinister way, so their arma- 
 ment potentially threatens us, and so by joint agreement we 
 reduce the mutual threat by common proportionate reduc- 
 tion. To hold this beyond our power would be to hold that 
 there is no possibility of curbing competitive armament, 
 which, if it is to go on and it will go on unless restrained 
 will invite world suicide. 
 
FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 249 
 
 FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY, 
 FEBRUARY 22, 1919 
 
 When they object to certain features of this covenant let 
 them tell us what they would substitute for them in order to. 
 accomplish the same purpose. Have you heard any con- 
 structive suggestions from them? They do not enter into 
 the consideration of this League in the proper spirit. The 
 President has been struggling over there, with his colleagues 
 in that conference, to work out the most difficult problem 
 that has ever been presented to a congress. They have 
 criticized him for going over. I am glad he went, because 
 he got into the atmosphere of the conference, and there on 
 the ground it was brought home to him what a tremendous 
 problem it is for those nations, in conference, to settle ; and 
 there he learned, as he never had before, the necessity for a 
 league of nations. 
 
 Why should we enter into the League? Well, I want to 
 give you three commanding reasons : In the first place, we 
 fought this war to secure permanent peace. That is what 
 we promised our people when we came here and elsewhere, 
 through our speakers, pleading for the Liberty Loan. They 
 offered to you what? They offered to you the prospect of 
 victory; and with the victory the defeat of militarism; and 
 with the defeat of militarism, safety for democracy; and as 
 a basis for safety for democracy, permanent peace. Those 
 were the great objects proclaimed when we roused our 
 people to action. Those were the objects proclaimed to 
 our boys as they went over: " Go," we said; " we follow 
 you with our hearts ; we offer to make every necessary sacri- 
 fice because the struggle is worthy of every sacrifice." 
 
 Did we mean that, or didn't we mean it? That is the 
 
250 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 question. If we meant it, are we going to abandon the task 
 and run away just at the moment when we can clinch it? 
 Are we going to say to other nations : " No, we will not run 
 any further risk. We have done all we ought to do. We 
 will let you try to maintain the peace without us." Is that 
 what we promised when we went in ? Is that what we gave 
 those peoples to expect when we sent the messages of our 
 President across the seas? What did those messages con- 
 tain? They contained a promise that we would fight this 
 war through to victory, to the defeat of militarism, to 
 making the world safe for democracy, to permanent peace. 
 By what by what, my friends? By a league of nations. 
 That is what we said. That is what the President said ; and 
 he said it in a number of notes. The premiers on the other 
 side said, " We agree to a league of nations." Now, what 
 was the effect of those promises? It was to stiffen the 
 morale of the plain people of those countries. At other 
 conventions we have had present, as speakers, members of 
 labor commissions and socialist commissions that were sent 
 over by our government to talk with labor and socialist 
 groups on the other side. What for ? To offset the insid- 
 ious conspiracies of German socialist and labor groups, 
 aimed to defeat, to destroy the morale of those suffering 
 peoples in France and Italy and England, who had been 
 three long years in the war with the end nowhere in sight. 
 When we came in with the promise of an army, their morale 
 improved ; though when our soldiers failed to come soon in 
 great numbers, it began to weaken again. Then we followed 
 with a promise to send more, and with the promise that we 
 would give them a league of nations in order to make the 
 peace permanent when it was won. These labor delegates 
 testified to us that what maintained the morale of those 
 
FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 25! 
 
 people to fight the war through soldiers, working men. 
 all was the promise of a league of nations in which the 
 United States would take part. No one, at that time, when 
 the President was promising this league of natoins, no one 
 said nay, in the Senate or elsewhere. Why not? Because 
 the spirit of the people was aroused. They were willing to 
 go the whole length in order to achieve this purpose; and 
 there could not be a higher or a more glorious purpose. I 
 do not mean to say that we did not enter this war with the 
 idea that our interests were affected; but I do say there 
 never was a war fought through in which a nation was less 
 motived by desire for gain of power, for gain of money, 
 for gain of territory, for the acquisition of anything 1 
 permanent peace, than this war. 
 
 Some say : " Let them have a league of European na- 
 tions and leave the United States out." That is a great 
 mistake. Who would constitute such a league? England, 
 France and Italy three nations. You would have an 
 Entente Alliance; that is all a balance of power with all 
 the disappointing results that we have had in previous bal- 
 ances of power. The United States is indispensable to 
 make that league go as a general league of nations, for the 
 reason that it is the most disinterested member, the purest 
 type of democracy, and its presence in the League will 
 repudiate and refute any suggestion that it is an intrigue for 
 autocratic action. Our presence will give to the League a 
 potential strength and prestige which it will not have without 
 us. So it is our duty to join, if we want to see the thing 
 through, if we want to be square with those who fought 
 this war for three years for us. We did not know they were 
 fighting the war for us; but we found it out. They made 
 enormous sacrifices before we went in. Are we going to 
 
252 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 say to them now : " We will not help further ; our Consti- 
 tution forbids; our policy against entangling alliances for- 
 bids. Oh, yes, we want to help you, but really, . . ."? 
 How do you like that? How would you like to play that 
 role in a partnership ? I say that the men who advocate our 
 staying out of the League by reason of a policy against 
 entangling alliances laid down by Washington, for a small 
 nation struggling for existence, whereas to-day we are one 
 of the most powerful nations in the world I say that 
 these men belittle the United States and its people. 
 
 It is alleged that our entry into a league of nations would 
 imperil the Monroe Doctrine. Now, what is the origin 
 and nature of this doctrine? It was announced in a mes- 
 sage of President Monroe to Congress in 1823 under the 
 following circumstances. Many of the Spanish colonies 
 had, from time to time, declared their independence and the 
 United States had recognized them as independent govern- 
 ments. The Holy 'Alliance, formed to perpetuate the 
 " Divine Right of Kings," and consisting of Russia, Austria 
 and Prussia, had threatened to help Spain recover these 
 colonies. Mr. Canning, the British foreign minister, had 
 urged upon our minister at London, Mr. Rush, the necessity 
 for action to prevent this step and proposed that the United 
 States and Great Britain unite in a protest against any such 
 attempt. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, both of 
 whom were consulted by Mr. Monroe, thought the suggestion 
 of Great Britain should be accepted and that there should be 
 such an agreement to prevent the Holy Alliance from inter- 
 fering with governments in this hemisphere. John Quincy 
 Adams, who was Secretary of State, opposed the suggestion 
 of a joint declaration. He felt that we should make the 
 
FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY ^53 
 
 announcement alone, and his view prevailed. The message, 
 probably drafted by Adams, opposed any extension of the 
 monarchical system by interference with independent repub- 
 lics on this side of the water, and, having in mind Russia's 
 attempt to push down her boundary in the old territory of 
 Oregon, asserted that there was no longer room for future 
 colonization by European governments in the Western 
 Hemisphere. * That is the Monroe Doctrine as originally 
 proclaimed. Later, on, occasion gave rise to the extension 
 of the doctrine in two instances. On one occasion some 
 filibusters, who had gotten temporary control of Yucatan, 
 offered to sell it to President Polk. When he said to them 
 " I do not want Yucatan," they threatened to sell it to 
 France or England. To this threat Polk responded, " No, 
 you will not; we will not permit it." It was Polk who in- 
 troduced that new feature of the Doctrine. Again, in my 
 administration, a resolution was introduced in the Senate de- 
 manding to know the circumstances under which certain 
 lands on the shores of Magdalena Bay in Southern Califor- 
 
 1 The language of Monroe's message is : 
 
 "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle 
 in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, 
 that the American continents, by the free and independent condition 
 which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be 
 considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. 
 
 " We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their 
 system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace 
 and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any 
 .European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But 
 with the governments who have declared their independence and 
 maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration 
 and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter- 
 position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other 
 manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than 
 as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
 States." 
 
254 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ma were being taken over by a syndicate. It was reported 
 that the Japanese were trying to get a base there. On inves- 
 tigation the State Department found the facts to be the fol- 
 lowing. A syndicate, which had acquired some thousands 
 of acres on Magdalena Bay as an investment, were disap- 
 pointed in their venture and attempted to unload. The at- 
 torney, in whose hands they had placed the matter, tried 
 unsuccessfully to sell the property to a Japanese company, 
 and thereupon told the " cock and bull " story about a Jap- 
 anese corporation trying to acquire the land with a view to 
 turning it over to the Japanese Government. But the Senate 
 passed a resolution to the effect that outside nations could 
 not be allowed to acquire strategic points near the United 
 States and thus endanger its interests. I do not object to 
 this extension of the Monroe Doctrine. On the contrary 
 I think it is a good thing. But the spirit of the League 
 covenant would prevent that sort of transaction; though, if 
 we desire our view of the matter to be doubly fortified, I 
 have not the slightest doubt that we could get it specifically 
 recognized in the covenant. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has never been violated, except 
 when France, under Napoleon III, seized Mexico. That 
 trespass was shortlived; for when we got through with the 
 Civil War and sent Sheridan to the border, France with- 
 drew. The Monroe Doctrine, in so far as it forbids the 
 overthrow of independent governments, is in accord with the 
 principles of any league of nations thus far proposed. It 
 is covered over as with a blanket by Article X of the present 
 covenant. Therefore, if any government did attempt to 
 come over here to violate it and when you are in the 
 Senate you just see them coming we could, under the 
 provisions of the League, summon the united forces of the 
 
1-ROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 255 
 
 League to prevent it. We would not be compelled to act 
 as the sole policeman of this hemisphere, as we are now 
 under the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of the doctrine being 
 imperiled, it is strengthened. Its violation would, in every 
 case except that of the sale of territory, be a direct violation 
 of the legal rights of one of the nations of this hemisphere 
 and would be a case for the League Court, brought by the 
 assailed nation against its assailant. The judgment would 
 be one which the United States would probably be delegated 
 to enforce, acting exactly as it does in enforcing the Monroe 
 Doctrine independently. 
 
 President Wilson said that a league of nations would 
 extend the Monroe Doctrine to the world. Now, if it is 
 extended to the world, I presume it would remain in the 
 Western Hemisphere. The object of such extension of the 
 doctrine would be to prevent the very thing which the United 
 States resents, namely, the overthrow of weaker nations by 
 force, and that is what all this machinery is provided for. 
 The language of Article X is : " The members of the 
 League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
 aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
 independence of all members of the League. In case of 
 any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of 
 such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by 
 which this obligation shall be fulfilled." 
 
 This is a declaration against the disturbers of political 
 independence and territorial integrity everywhere. I can- 
 not read it in any other way. If that be so, the League and 
 the United States will be maintaining the same thing, and 
 signing the treaty will only give to the United States the 
 protection of the League in its traditional attitude. 
 
 When the Monroe Doctrine was declared by the United 
 
'256 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 States, many American statesmen thought that it would 
 certainly involve us in constant wars. For nearly a century, 
 however, it has been peacefully and successfully maintained. 
 Not a shot has been fired by the United States, not a soldier 
 of the United States has been killed or injured in support 
 of it. Its mere announcement, coupled with our known 
 determination to enforce it, has dispensed with the necessity 
 for the exercise of force. 
 
 It is a mistake to suppose that, under the League covenant, 
 the armies of the United States are to be called into distant 
 countries. We must expect the Executive Council to be 
 reasonable in its recommendations in this respect not only 
 because it will wish to be just but because it will want to 
 act promptly in suppressing disturbance and the threat of 
 war, and it can do this best by calling upon nations which 
 are close at hand and which can do the work of the League 
 most conveniently and economically. Moreover, with the 
 unanimity required of the Council by a proper construction 
 of the covenant, the presence of our representative in that 
 Council will naturally make certain only a proper assign- 
 ment of the League's work to the United States. The as- 
 sumption that membership in the League will involve us 
 in frequent wars is directly contrary to its purpose and 
 natural operation. Its potential primitive force will prevent 
 the coming of war. 
 
 Finally comes the question, my friends, whether we are 
 willing to run the risk involved in joining the League. 
 How much risk is there? I have tried to show that the 
 risk is the danger of a boycott, the cost of a boycott, divided 
 up between all the nations of the League, the risk involved 
 in consenting to limit armament, after we have learned 
 and consented to that limit, and the agreement to pay the 
 
BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 257 
 
 expenses of a secretariat of the League jointly with other 
 nations. As a consideration, we secure the strength of the 
 union of nations in common action and a common purpose 
 to suppress war and make peace permanent. 
 
 I appeal to the women who hear me: Do they want 
 war again ? Are they not willing that we should make con- 
 cessions now in order that we may avoid war ten and twenty 
 years hence? Do they wish their children and their grand- 
 children subjected to the suffering that we have seen Eng- 
 land and France and Italy undergo? It not this the time 
 when enduring peace is to be born when everybody is 
 impressed with the dreadful character of war, and the ne- 
 cessity for avoiding it, when all the nations are willing to 
 make concessions? Isn't now the time to take our share 
 of the responsibility and say to our brothers : " We realize 
 that the sea no longer separates us but is become a bond of 
 union. We know that if a war comes to you, our neighbor, 
 it will come to us, and we are ready to stand with you 
 in order to keep off that scourge of nations. In the love 
 of our brother we will do our share as men and women con- 
 scious of the responsibility to help along mankind, a re- 
 sponsibility which God has given this nation in giving it 
 great power." 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS BARRIER TO ANY 
 GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 1 
 
 The practical working of this covenant will be to suppress 
 and avoid most wars. Of course, hypotheses can be imag- 
 
 1 Address at the National Congress for a League of Nations at the 
 Odeon, St. Louis, Feb. 25, 1919. 
 
258 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ined that will break down any constitution, even that of the 
 United States, or any plan of the kind I have described; but 
 this plan has a real bite in it, a real mutual obligation for 
 union of the lawful economic and military forces of the 
 world to police the world and prevent the recurrence of 
 such another awful war as that from which we have just 
 emerged. I have said " from which we have just emerged." 
 That is a wrong term to use. I should use the expression 
 " which we are now trying to end in such a way as to achieve 
 its purpose and make the peace a stable and permanent one." 
 
 You have heard Mr. Morgenthau describe, with trenchant 
 accuracy, the conditions that now prevail in the sphere of 
 war in Europe, and the danger there is from the spread of 
 Bolshevism and from a reaction to autocracy as a desperate 
 antidote for Bolshevism. Some who oppose the covenant 
 most are blind to the critical conditions now existing in 
 Europe, are blind to the absolute necessity for a league such 
 as this covenant creates. 
 
 . . . From time immemorial a most frequent subject 
 matter of treaties is an agreement to submit differences 
 to arbitration. The earliest treaties made by the United 
 States with England and the Barbary States, and with other 
 countries, contained a clause providing for such arbitration. 
 
 Since that time we have had numbers of treaties of arbi- 
 tration, among them general treaties of arbitration. These 
 latter excepted some classes of questions, it is true, but they 
 were general treaties, notwithstanding, in that the character 
 of the differences could not be anticipated. Not by the 
 \vildest stretch of the imagination can such an agreement be 
 construed to be a delegation of governmental powers or a 
 parting with sovereignty. It is no more a curtailment of 
 sovereignty than is the obligation of a man to abide the judg- 
 
BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 259 
 
 ment of an impartial court, or the award of an agreed 
 arbitration, an infringement on his liberty secured by the 
 constitution. 
 
 . . . This covenant does not create a super-sovereignty 
 it is only a loose obligation among the nations of the world 
 by which they agree to unite together in a policy of sub- 
 mitting their differences to arbitration and mediation, to 
 withhold war until those efforts have proved unsuccess- 
 ful and to boycott any nation which violates the covenant 
 to comply with this obligation. It provides a method for 
 reaching an agreement as to a limit of armament and an obli- 
 gation to keep within that limit of armament until condi- 
 tions shall require a change by a new agreement. The 
 agreement on the part of one balances the agreement on 
 the part of others in securing a general reduction of arma- 
 ment. It does not impair our just sovereignty in the slight- 
 est it is only an arrangement for the maintenance of our 
 sovereignty within its proper limits : to wit, a sovereignty 
 regulated by international law and international morality 
 and international justice, with a somewhat rude machinery 
 created by the agreement of nations to prevent one sov- 
 ereignty from being used to impose its unjust will on other 
 sovereignties. Certainly we, with our national ideals, can 
 have no desire to secure any greater sovereignty than this. 
 
 The argument that to enter this covenant is a departure 
 from the time-honored policy of avoiding entangling alli- 
 ances with Europe is an argument that is blind to the 
 changed circumstances in our present situation. The war 
 itself ended that policy. Res ipsa loquitur. We attempted 
 to carry it out. We stayed out of the war three years 
 when we ought to have been in it, as we now see. 
 
 We were driven into it because, with the dependence of all 
 
260 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 the world upon our resources of food, raw material and 
 manufacture, with our closeness, under modern conditions 
 of transportation and communication, to Europe, it was im- 
 possible for us to maintain the theory of an isolation that 
 did not in fact exist. It will be equally impossible for us 
 to keep out of another general European war. We are, 
 therefore, just as much interested in stopping such a war 
 as if we were in Europe. This war was our war. The 
 settlement of the war is our settlement. The maintenance of 
 the terms of that settlement is our business, as it is the 
 business of the other nations. To say that we should avoid 
 it is to say that we should be recreant to our duty to our- 
 selves and to the world and blind to the progress of events. 
 To say that it mixes us up with kings is amusing when 
 we consider the dominance of democracy in Europe. 
 
 The superlative expressions contained in the denunciations 
 of Mr. Fess and Mr Reed and Mr. Borah and Mr. Poin- 
 dexter as to the dangerous working of this covenant find 
 no basis in a clear understanding of its provisions. The 
 contention that we are to be bound by the decision of the 
 Executive Council on a critical issue of war or peace, of 
 arbitration or no arbitration, of limit of armament or no 
 armament, finds no justification in the covenant itself. 
 
 The Executive Council is an executive body only to recom- 
 mend measures to be adopted by the nations in the matter 
 of the reduction of armament and in the matter of the fur- 
 nishing of military forces and in other lines of action. 
 The obligation is upon the governments through their usual 
 constitutional agencies (which, in our case, is Congress) 
 to perform the obligations they have assumed. Our obli- 
 gations are: first, to submit differences to arbitration or 
 mediation; second, not to make war until three months 
 
BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 26l 
 
 after an award or a report of a proper settlement and not 
 then if the losing nation complies ; third, to lay an embargo 
 or boycott against a covenant-breaking nation; fourth, to 
 keep within an armament Congress agrees to. These are 
 the " bite " of the League. 
 
 The fundamental weakness of the attitude of Senator 
 Poindexter and Senator Reed and Senator Borah is that 
 they confine their arguments to pointing out the dangers of 
 this Covenant to the United States, which, as I think I have 
 shown, are comparatively slight, while they utterly fail to 
 tender any constructive suggestions to the conference for a 
 method by which peace can be maintained and the just re- 
 sults of the war can be secured. They are merely destruc- 
 tive critics and are not in search of a solution of the diffi- 
 culty that we, in common with the other nations at the Paris 
 conference, have to meet and solve. Such criticisms are not 
 helpful. They are apparently prompted by a desire to find 
 fault rather than by the duty of suggesting a remedy. 
 
 General Smuts, who recommended the system of manda- 
 tories, thought that the League itself could not get up an 
 organization sufficiently effective to conduct these govern- 
 ments, that therefore it ought to employ competent govern- 
 ments as agencies to carry on the governments of these 
 dependencies for the benefits of the people in them and 
 that they should make a report of their trusteeship at the 
 end of each year. In his opinion the principles should be 
 laid down in the treaty or be contained in a charter granted 
 by the Executive Council, so as to make a rule of conduct 
 for the agencies acting as mandatories. 
 
 Now, there is nothing in the League that requires any gov- 
 ernment to accept the position of a mandatory. The South 
 Sea colonies and the Pacific colonies of Germany will doubt- 
 
262 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 less come under England or under Australia. There are 
 some Northern islands, perhaps, that may come under Japan 
 as a mandatory. Then Palestine and Armenia and Con- 
 stantinople may come under some other government. They 
 would be glad to have the United States take that, but 
 you will remember that the representatives of the United 
 States said in the Council, that this was impossible, that 
 they could not agree to it. 
 
 Now, if they took that attitude in the Council, how un- 
 reasonable it is to contend that they would have consented 
 to a league which obliged a member to accept a mandate 
 of this character. You will find nothing compulsory in 
 this provision of the League. 
 
 THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE 
 OF NATIONS 1 
 
 We are here to-night in sight of a league of peace, of 
 what I have ever regarded as the " promised land." Such 
 a war as the last is a hideous blot on our Christian civili- 
 zation. The inconsistency is as foul as was slavery under 
 the Declaration of Independence. If Christian nations 
 cannot now be brought into a united effort to suppress a re- 
 currence of such a contest it will be a shame to modern 
 society. 
 
 During my administration I attempted to secure treaties 
 of universal arbitration between this country and France 
 and England, by which all issues depending for their set- 
 
 1 Address delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House on March 4, 
 1919. 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 263 
 
 tlement upon legal principles were to be submitted to an 
 international court for final decision. These treaties were 
 emasculated by the Senate, yielding to the spirit which pro- 
 ceeds, unconsciously doubtless, but truly, from the conviction 
 that the only thing that will secure to a nation the justice it 
 wishes to secure is force; that agreements between nations 
 to settle controversies justly and peaceably should never be 
 given any weight in national policy ; that in dealing between 
 civilized nations we must assume that each nation is 
 conspiring to deprive us of our independence and our 
 prosperity; that there is no impartial tribunal to which 
 we can entrust the decison of any question vitally affect- 
 ing our interests or our honor, and that we can afford to 
 make no agreement from which we may not immediately 
 withdraw, and whose temporary operation to our detriment 
 may not be expressly a ground for ending it. This is the 
 doctrine of despair. It leads necessarily to the conclusion 
 that our only recourse to avoid war is competitive armament, 
 with its dreadful burdens and its constant temptation to 
 resort to the war it seeks to avoid. 
 
 The most important covenant with reference to peace and 
 war in the constitution of the League is that looking to a 
 reduction of armament by all nations. The Executive 
 Council, consisting of representatives of the United States, 
 the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and of four other 
 nations to be selected by the body of delegates, is to con- 
 sider how much the armaments of the nations should be 
 reduced, having regard to the safety of each of the nations 
 and their obligations under the League. Having reached a 
 conclusion as to the proportionate limits of each nation's 
 armament, it submits its conclusion to each nation, which 
 may or may not agree to the limit thus recommended; but 
 
264 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 when an agreement is reached it covenants to keep within 
 that limit until, by application to the Executive Council, the 
 limit may be raised. In other words, each nation agrees 
 to its own limitation. Having so agreed, it must keep 
 within it. 
 
 Our Constitution contains no inhibition, express or im- 
 plied, against making such an agreement. On the contrary, 
 for one hundred years we have maintained an agreement 
 to limit armaments between this country and Canada. The 
 evil of competition in armament as between us has been 
 avoided by abstaining from armament altogether. Could 
 there be a more complete precedent for this provision of the 
 Paris Covenant? 
 
 The importance of providing for a reduction of armament 
 every one recognizes. It is affirmed in the newly proposed 
 Senate resolution. Can we not trust our Congress to fix a 
 limitation which is safe for the country and to stick to it? 
 If we cannot, no country can. Yet all the rest are anxious 
 to do this and they are far more exposed than we. 
 
 The character of this obligation is affected by the time 
 during which the covenants of the League remain binding. 
 There is no stipulation as to how long this is. In my judg- 
 ment there should be a period of ten years or a permis- 
 sion for any member of the League to withdraw from the 
 covenant by giving a reasonable notice of one or two years 
 of its intention to do so. 
 
 The members of the League and the non-members are re- 
 quired, the former by their covenant, the latter by an en- 
 forced obligation, to submit all differences between them, 
 not capable of being settled by negotiation, to arbitration 
 before a tribunal composed as the parties may agree. They 
 are required to covenant to abide the award. Should either 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 265 
 
 party deem the question one not proper for arbitration, 
 then it is to be taken up by the Executive Council of the 
 League. The Executive Council mediates between the par- 
 ties and secures a voluntary settlement of the question if 
 possible. If it fails, it makes a report. If the report is 
 unanimous, the Executive Council is to recommend what 
 shall be done to carry into effect its recommendation. If 
 there is a dissenting vote, then the majority report is pub- 
 lished, and also the minority report, if desired, and no 
 further action is taken. If either party or the Executive 
 Council itself desires, the mediating function is to be dis- 
 charged by the Body of Delegates in which every member 
 of the League has one vote. There is no direction as to 
 what shall be done with reference to the recommendation 
 of proper measures to be taken, and the whole matter is 
 then left for such further action as the members of the 
 League agree upon. There is no covenant by the defeated 
 party that it will comply with the unanimous report of the 
 Executive Council or the Body of Delegates. 
 
 And right here I wish to take up the objection made to 
 the League that under this machinery we might be compelled 
 to receive immigrants contrary to our national desire from 
 Japan or China. We could and would refuse to submit 
 the issue to arbitration. It would then go to mediation. 
 In my judgment the Council, as a mediating body, should 
 not take jurisdiction to consider such a difference. Im- 
 migration by international law is a domestic question com- 
 pletely within the control of the Government into which im- 
 migration is sought, unless the question of immigration is 
 the subject of treaty stipulation between two countries. 
 If, however, it be said that there is no limitation, in the 
 Covenant, of the differences to be mediated, clearly we would 
 
266 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 run no risk of receiving from the large body of delegates 
 of all the members of the League a unanimous report recom- 
 mending a settlement by which Japanese immigrants shall 
 be admitted to our shores, or Japanese applicants be ad- 
 mitted to citizenship, against our protest. But were it 
 made, we are under no covenant to obey such recommenda- 
 tion. If it could be imagined that all of the other nations 
 of the world would thus unite their military forces to com- 
 pel us to receive Japanese immigrants under the covenant, 
 why would they not do so without the covenant? 
 
 These articles compelling submission of differences either 
 to arbitration or mediation are not complete machinery for 
 settlement by peaceable means of all issues arising between 
 nations. But they are a substantial step forward. They 
 constitute an unambitious plan to settle as many ques- 
 tions as possible by arbitration or mediation. They illus- 
 trate the spirit of those who drafted this covenant and their 
 sensible desire not to attempt more till after actual experi- 
 ence. 
 
 The next covenant is that the nations shall not begin war 
 until three months after the arbitration award or the recom- 
 mendation of compromise, and not then if the defendant 
 nation against whom the award or recommendation has 
 been made shall comply with it. This is the great restraint 
 of war imposed by the Covenant upon members of the 
 League and non-members. It is said that this would pre- 
 vent our resistance to a border raid of Mexico or self-de- 
 fense against any invasion a most extreme construction. 
 If a nation refuses submission at all, as it does when it 
 begins an attack, the nation attacked is released instanter 
 from its obligation to submit and is restored to the com- 
 plete power of self-defense. Had this objection not been 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 267 
 
 raised in the Senate one would not have deemed it neces- 
 sary to answer so unwarranted a suggestion. 
 
 If the defendant nation does not comply with the award 
 or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation can begin 
 war and carry out such complete remedy as the circum- 
 stances enable it to do. But if the defendant nation does 
 comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plain- 
 tiff nation must be content with such compliance. It runs 
 the risk of not getting all that it thought it ought to have 
 or might have by war, but as it is asking affirmative relief 
 it must be seeking some less vital interest than its political 
 independence or territoral integrity, and the limitation is 
 not one which can be dangerous to its sovereignty. 
 
 The third covenant, the penalizing covenant, is that if a 
 nation begins war in violation of its covenant, then ipso 
 facto that is an act of war against every member of the 
 League and the members of the League are required definitely 
 and distinctly to levy a boycott on the covenant-breaking 
 nation and to cut off all commercial, trade, financial, per- 
 sonal and official relations between them and their citizens 
 and it and its citizens. Indeed, the boycott is compound 
 or secondary in that it is directed against any non-members 
 of the League continuing to deal with the outlaw nation. 
 This is an obligation operative at once on each member of 
 the League. With us the Executive Council would report 
 the violation of the covenant to the President and it would 
 be reported to Congress. Congress would then, by reason 
 of the covenant of the League, be under a legal and moral 
 obligation to levy an embargo and prevent all intercourse 
 of every kind between this nation and the covenant-break- 
 ing nation. 
 
 The extent of this penalty and its heavy, withering effect, 
 
268 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 when the hostile action includes all members of the League 
 as well as all non-members, may be easily appreciated. The 
 prospect of such an isolation would be likely to frighten 
 any member of the League from a reckless violation of its 
 covenant not to begin war. It is inconceivable that any 
 small nation, dependent as it must be on larger nations for its 
 trade and sustenance, indeed for its food and raw material, 
 would for a moment court such a destructive ostracism as 
 this would be. 
 
 Other covenants of the penalizing article impose on the 
 members of the League the duty of sharing the expense of a 
 boycott with any nation upon which it has fallen with un- 
 even weight and of supporting such a nation in its resistance 
 to any special measure directed against it by the outlaw 
 nation. But there is no specific requirement as to the 
 character of the support beyond the obligation of the boy- 
 cott, the contribution of expenses and the obligation of 
 each member of the League to permit the passage through 
 its territory of forces of other members of the League co- 
 operating with military forces against the outlaw nation. 
 
 If, however, the boycott does not prove sufficient, then 
 the Executive Council is to recommend the number of the 
 military and naval forces to be contributed by the members 
 of the League to protect the covenants of the League in 
 such a case. There is no specific covenant by which they 
 agree to furnish a definite force, or, indeed, any force at 
 all, to a league army. The use of the word " recommend " 
 in describing the function of the Executive Council shows 
 that the question whether such forces shall be contributed 
 and what shall be their amount must ultimately address 
 itself to the members of the League severally for their sev- 
 eral decision and action. There is this radical and impor- 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 269 
 
 tant difference, therefore, between the obligation to lay a 
 boycott and the obligation to furnish military force, and 
 doubtless this distinction was insisted upon and reached by 
 a compromise. The term " recommendation " cannot be 
 interpreted to impose any imperative obligation on those 
 to whom the recommendation is directed. 
 
 By Article X, the high contracting parties undertake to re- 
 spect and preserve against external aggression the political 
 independence and territorial integrity of every member of 
 the League, and when these are attacked or threatened the 
 Executive Council is to advise as to the proper means to 
 fulfill this obligation. The same acts or series of acts 
 which make Article X applicable will be a breach of the 
 covenant which creates an outlaw nation under Article XVI, 
 so that all nations must begin a boycott against any nation 
 thus breaking the territorial integrity or overthrowing the 
 independence of a member of the League. Indeed Article X 
 will usually not be applicable until a war shall be fought to 
 the point of disclosing its specific purpose. Action under it 
 will usually take the form of preventing, in a treaty of 
 peace, the appropriation of territory or the interference 
 with the sovereignty of the attacked and defeated nation. 
 We have seen this in the construction put upon the Monroe 
 Doctrine by Secretary Seward and President Roosevelt. 
 The former, when Spain attacked Chili and that country 
 appealed to the United States to protect it, advised Spain 
 that under our policy we would not interfere to prevent the 
 punishment by war of an American nation by a non-Ameri- 
 can nation, provided it did not extend to a permanent de- 
 privation of its territory or an overthrow of its sovereignty. 
 President Roosevelt, in the Venezuelan matter, also an- 
 nounced that the Monroe Doctrine did not prevent nations 
 
2/O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 from proceeding by force to collect their debts provided 
 oppressive measures were not used which would deprive the 
 nation of its independence or territorial integrity. This 
 furnishes an analogy for the proper construction of 
 Article X. 
 
 The fact that the Executive Council is to advise what 
 means shall be taken to fulfill the obligation shows that 
 they are to be such as each nation shall deem proper and 
 fair under the circumstances. Remoteness from the seat of 
 trouble and the fact that the nearer presence of other nations 
 should induce them to furnish the requisite military force 
 would naturally be included among the factors considered. 
 It thus seems to me clear that the question, both under 
 Article XVIII, and under Article X, as to whether the 
 United States shall declare war and what forces it shall 
 furnish, are remitted to the voluntary action of the Con- 
 gress of the United States under the Constitution, regard 
 being had to the matter of a fair division between all the 
 nations of the burden to be borne under the League and 
 the proper means to be adopted, whether the enjoined and 
 inevitable boycott alone, or the advance of loans of money, 
 or the declaration of war and the use of military force. 
 This is as it should be. It fixes the obligation of action 
 in such a way that American nations will attend to America, 
 European nations will attend to Europe, and Asiatic nations 
 to Asia, unless all deem the situation so threatening to the 
 world and to their own interests that they should take a 
 more active part. It seems to me that appropriate words 
 might be added to the pact which would show distinctly 
 this distribution of obligation. This would relieve those 
 anxious to exclude European or Asiatic nations from for- 
 cible intervention in issues between American nations until 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 271 
 
 requested to intervene by the United States, or by an exe- 
 cutive council of the American nations formed for the 
 purpose. 
 
 Objection is made that Great Britain might have more 
 representatives in the Executive Council than other coun- 
 tries. This is an error. The British Empire, which, of 
 course, includes its dominions, is limited to one delegate in 
 the Executive Council. As regards the other central organ, 
 known as the Body of Delegates, provision is made by 
 which, upon a two-thirds vote of that body, new members 
 may be admitted who are independent states or are self-gov- 
 erning dominions or colonies. Under this Canada and 
 Australia and South Africa might be allowed to send dele- 
 gates. I presume, too, the Philippines might be admitted. 
 But the function of the Body of Delegates is not one which 
 makes membership in it of great importance. When it acts 
 as a mediating and compromising body, its reports must be 
 unanimous to have any effect. And the addition of 
 members is not likely to create greater probability of 
 unanimity. More than this, the large number of countries 
 who will become members will minimize any increase of 
 British influence from the addition of such dominions and 
 colonies, which are really admitted because they have dif- 
 ferent interests from their mother country. When analyzed, 
 the suggestion that Great Britain will have any greater 
 power than other member nations in shaping the policy 
 of the League in really critical matters will be seen to have 
 no foundation whatever. 
 
 A proposed resolution in the Senate recites that the Con- 
 stitution of the League of Nations in the form now offered 
 should not be accepted by the United States, although the 
 sense of the Senate is that the nations of the world should 
 
2/2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 unite to promote peace and general disarmament. The 
 resolution further recites that the efforts of the United 
 States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedi- 
 tion of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with 
 Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations 
 with whom the United States is associated in the war against 
 the German Government, and that the proposal for a League 
 of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should 
 be taken up for careful and serious consideration later. It 
 is said that this resolution will be supported by thirty-seven 
 members of the new Senate, and thus prevent the confirma- 
 tion of any treaty which includes the present proposed 
 Covenant of Paris. 
 
 The President of the United States is the authority under 
 the Federal Constitution which initiates the form of treaties 
 and which at the outset determines what subject matter they 
 shall include. Therefore, if it shall seem to the President 
 of the United States, and to those acting with him with 
 similar authority for other nations, that a treaty of peace 
 cannot be concluded except with a covenant providing for 
 a league of nations, in substance like that now proposed, 
 as a condition precedent to the proper operation and effect- 
 iveness of the treaty itself, it will be the duty of the Presi- 
 dent and his fellow delegates to the Conference to insert 
 such a covenant in the treaty. If accordingly such a cov- 
 enant should be incorporated in a Treaty of Peace, signed 
 by the representatives of the Powers and should be brought 
 back by the President and submitted by him to the Senate, 
 the question which will address itself to the proponents of 
 this Senate resolution will be not whether they would pre- 
 fer to consider a league of nations after a Treaty of Peace 
 but whether they will feel, justified in defeating or post- 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 273 
 
 poning a treaty because it contains a constitution of a league 
 of nations deemed by the President necessary to the kind of 
 peace which all seek. 
 
 ... In the dark background is the threatening specter 
 of Bolshevism, hard, cruel, murderous, uncompromising, de- 
 structive of Christian civilization, militant in pressing its 
 hideous doctrines upon other peoples, and insidious in its 
 propaganda among the lowest element in every country. 
 Confronted with the chaos and the explosive dangers of 
 Bolshevism throughout all the countries of Europe, a League 
 of Nations must be established to settle controversies peace- 
 ably and to enforce the settlement 
 
 Were the United States to withdraw, the League would be 
 nothing but a return to the system of alliances and the bal- 
 ance of power. We would witness a speedy recurrence 
 of war in which the United States would be as certainly 
 involved as it was in this war. New inventions for the de- 
 struction of men and peoples would finally result in world 
 suicide, while in the interval there would be a story of 
 progressive competition in armaments, with all their heavy 
 burdens upon peoples already burdened almost to the point 
 of exhaustion. With such a prospect, and to avoid such 
 results, the United States should not hesitate to take its 
 place with the other responsible nations of the world and 
 make the light concessions and assume the light burdens 
 involved in membership in the League. 
 
 No critic of the League, has offered a single constructive 
 suggestion to meet the crisis that I have thus summarily 
 touched upon. The resolution of the Senate does not sug- 
 gest or refer in any way to machinery by which the func- 
 tion of the League of Nations in steadying Europe and 
 maintaining the peace agreed upon in the treaty shall be 
 
274 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 secured. Well may the President, therefore, decline to 
 comply with the suggestions of the proposed resolution. 
 Well may he say when he returns with the treaty, of which 
 the covenant shall be a most important and indispensable 
 part, " If you would postpone peace, if you would defeat 
 it, you can refuse to ratify the treaty. Amend it by striking 
 out the Covenant and you will leave confusion worse con- 
 founded, with the objects of the war unattained and sacri- 
 ficed and Europe and the world in chaos." 
 
 . . . Whatever nation secures the control of the seas will 
 make the United States its ally, no matter how formal and 
 careful its neutrality, because it will be the sole customer 
 of the United States in food, raw material and war necessi- 
 ties. Modern war is carried on in the mines and the work- 
 shops and on the farm, as well as in the trenches. The 
 former are indispensable to the latter. Hence the United 
 States will certainly be drawn in, and hence its interests are 
 inevitably involved in the preservation of European peace. 
 These conditions and 'circumstances are so different from 
 those in Washington's day and are so unlike anything which 
 he could have anticipated that no words of his, having 
 relation to selfish, offensive and defensive alliances, should 
 be given any application to the present international status. 
 
 Objection is made that the Covenant destroys the Monroe 
 Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was announced and 
 adopted to keep European monarchies from overthrowing 
 the independence of, and fastening their system upon, gov- 
 ernments in this hemisphere. It has been asserted in various 
 forms, some of them extreme I presume that no one now 
 would attempt to sustain the declarations of Secretary Olney 
 in his correspondence with Lord Salisbury. But all will 
 probably agree that the sum and substance of the Monroe 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 2/5 
 
 Doctrine is that we do not propose in our own interest to 
 allow European nations or Asiatic nations to acquire, 
 beyond what they now have, through war or purchase or 
 intrigue, territory, political power or strategical opportunity 
 from the countries of this hemisphere. Article X of the 
 Constitution of the League is intended to secure this to all 
 signatory nations, except that it does not forbid purchase of 
 territory. 
 
 In recent speeches in the Senate the Monroe Doctrine has 
 been enlarged beyond what can be justified. Those who 
 seek to set up a doctrine which would make the Western 
 hemisphere a preserve in which we may impose our sov- 
 ereign will on other countries in what we suppose to be 
 their own interest because, indeed, we have done that in 
 the past should not be sustained. Our conquests of 
 Western territory made for civilization have increased our 
 own usefulness and the happiness of those who now occupy 
 that territory. But we have reached a stage in history 
 when the world's progress should be determined and se- 
 cured under just and peaceful conditions, and attempted 
 progress through conquest by powerful nations should be 
 prevented. 
 
 To suppose that, with the great trade relations between 
 North America and Europe, we can isolate ourselves is to 
 look backward, not fonvard. It does not face existing con- 
 ditions. 
 
 The European nations desire our entrance into this League 
 not that they may control America but to secure our aid in 
 controlling Europe ; and I venture to think that they would 
 be relieved if the primary duty of keeping peace and policing 
 this Western hemisphere were relegated to us and our West- 
 ern colleagues. I object, however, to such a reservation as 
 
276 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 was contained in the Hague Conference against entangling 
 alliances, because the recommendation was framed before 
 this war and contained provisions as to the so-called policy 
 against entangling alliances that are inconsistent with the 
 present needs of this nation and of the rest of the world 
 if a peaceful future is to be secured to both. I would 
 favor, however, a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as 
 I have stated it above by specific words in the covenant, 
 and with a further provision that the settlement of purely 
 American questions should be remitted primarily to the 
 American nations, with machinery like that of the present 
 League, and that European nations should not intervene un- 
 less requested to do so by the American nations. 
 
 Objection is made to this League on constitutional 
 grounds. . . . The Supreme Court has over and over again, 
 through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, indicated that the 
 United States was a sovereign nation capable of dealing with 
 other nations as such, and seized of all the powers inferable 
 from sovereignty. It 1 is said that the League will change the 
 form of our government. But no function or discretion 
 which it now exercises is taken from any branch of the gov- 
 ernment. It is asserted that the Covenant delegates to an 
 outside tribunal, viz., the Executive Council, the power vested 
 by the Constitution in Congress or the Senate. But the 
 Executive Council has no power but to recommend to the 
 nations of the League courses which those nations may ac- 
 cept or reject, save in the matter of increasing the limit of 
 armament, to which, after full consideration, a nation shall 
 have consented. In our case it would be Congress that 
 had considered and consented to the limitation. Neither 
 the Executive Council nor the Body of Delegates, in the 
 machinery for the peaceful settling of differences, does 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 277 
 
 other than recommend a compromise which the United 
 States does not, under the League, covenant to obey. In 
 all other respects these bodies are mere instruments for 
 conference by representatives for devising plans which are 
 submitted to the various governments of the League for their 
 voluntary acceptance. No obligation of the United States 
 under the League is fixed by action of either the Executive 
 Council or the Body of Delegates. 
 
 Then it is said we have no right to agree to levy an em- 
 bargo and a boycott. It is true that Congress determines 
 what our commercial relations shall be with other countries 
 of the world. It is true that if a boycott is to be levied 
 Congress must levy it in the form of an embargo, as that 
 which was levied by Congress in Jefferson's administration 
 and sustained by the Supreme Court, with John Marshall 
 at its head. It is also true that Congress might repudiate 
 the obligation entered into by the treaty-making power 
 and refuse to levy such an embargo. But none of these 
 facts would invalidate or render unconstitutional a treaty 
 by which the obligation of the United States was assumed. 
 
 In other words, the essence of sovereign power is that 
 while the sovereign may make a contract it retains the 
 power to repudiate it if it chooses to dishonor its promises. 
 That does not render null the original obligation or lessen 
 its binding moral force. The nations of Europe are will- 
 ing to accept, as we must be willing to accept from them, 
 mutual promises, the one in consideration of the other, in 
 the confidence that neither will refuse to comply with such 
 promises honorably entered into. 
 
 Finally, it is objected that we have no right to agree to 
 arbitrate issues since we might, by arbitration, lose our ter- 
 ritorial integrity or political independence. This is a mar- 
 
278 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 velous stretch of imagination by the distinguished Senator 
 who made it. In the face of Article X, which is an under- 
 taking to respect the territorial integrity and political in- 
 dependence of every member of the League, how could a 
 board of arbitration possibly reach such a result? More- 
 over, we are not compelled to arbitrate a dispute. If pre- 
 ferred, we can throw the matter into mediation and con- 
 ciliation, and we do not covenant to obey the recommenda- 
 tion of compromise by the conciliating body. 
 
 We have agreed in treaties to arbitrate classes of ques- 
 tions long before the questions arise. Now, in the present 
 treaty, the issue to be arbitrated would have to be formu- 
 lated by our treaty-making power the President and the 
 Senate of the United States. The award would have to be 
 executed by that branch of the government which executes 
 awards, generally the Congress of the United States. If 
 it involved payment of money, Congress would have to ap- 
 propriate it. If it involved limitation of armament, Con- 
 gress would have to limit it. If it involved any duty with- 
 in the legislative power of Congress under the Constitu- 
 tion, Congress would have to perform it. If Congress sees 
 fit to comply with the report of the compromise by the con- 
 ciliating body, Congress will have to make such compliance. 
 
 The Covenant takes away the sovereignty of the United 
 States only as any contract curtails the freedom of action 
 which an individual has voluntarily surrendered for the pur- 
 pose of the contract and to obtain the benefit of it. The 
 Covenant creates no super-sovereignty. It merely creates 
 contract obligations. It binds nations to stand together 
 to secure compliance with those obligations. That is all. 
 This does not differ from a contract between two nations. 
 If we enter into an important contract with another nation 
 
THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 2/9 
 
 to pay money or to do things of vital importance and we 
 break it, then we expose ourselves to the just effort of 
 that nation to attempt by force of arms to compel us to com- 
 ply with our obligations. This covenant is only a limited 
 and loose union of many nations to do the same thing. 
 The assertion that we are giving up our sovereignty carries 
 us logically and necessarily to the absurd result that we can 
 not make a contract to do anything with another nation 
 because it limits our freedom of action as a sovereign. 
 
 Sovereignty is freedom of action of nations. It is exactly 
 analogous to the liberty of the individual regulated by law. 
 The sovereignty that we should insist upon and the only 
 sovereignty we have a right to insist upon is a sovereignty 
 regulated by international law, international morality and 
 international justice, a sovereignty enjoying the sacred 
 rights which sovereignties of other nations may enjoy, a 
 sovereignty consistent with the enjoyment of the same sov- 
 ereignty by other nations. It is a sovereignty limited by the 
 law of nations and limited by the obligation of contracts 
 fully and freely entered into as in respect to matters which 
 are usually the subject of contracts between nations. 
 
 Those persons who require more than this are really de- 
 manding the license they term it necessary American sov- 
 ereignty to trample upon all tribunals and to assert their 
 own unregulated desires. That is not in accord with Ameri- 
 can principles nor with the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 The President is now returning to Europe. As the repre- 
 sentative of this nation he has joined in recommending, 
 in this proposed covenant, a league of nations for consid- 
 eration and adoption by the conference. He returned home 
 to discharge other executive duties and this has given him 
 an opportunity to follow the discussion of the question 
 
2&> TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 in the Senate of the United States and elsewhere. Some 
 speeches, notably that of Senator Lodge, have been useful 
 in taking up the League Covenant, article by article, criticis- 
 ing its language and expressing doubts either as to its mean- 
 ing or as to its wisdom. 
 
 The President will differ, as many others differ, with 
 Senator Lodge in respect to many of the criticisms, but in 
 the constructive part of his speech he will find useful sug- 
 gestions which he will be able to present to his colleagues 
 in the conference. These suggestions should prove 
 especially valuable in the work of revising the form of the 
 Covenant and in making changes, to which the conference 
 may readily consent, where Senator Lodge and other critics 
 have misunderstood the purpose and meaning of the words 
 used. 
 
 The League Covenant should be in the Treaty of Peace. 
 It is indispensable if the war is to accomplish the declared 
 purpose of this nation and of the world and if it is to bring 
 the promised benefit to mankind. We know the President 
 believes this and will insist upon including the Covenant. 
 Our profound sympathy in his purpose and our prayers for 
 his success should go with him in his great mission. 
 
 ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX'S INDICTMENT 1 
 
 My friend, Senator Knox, has presented a formidable in- 
 dictment against the proposed Covenant of the League of 
 Nations. A number of his colleagues seem to have accepted 
 his views as to its meaning. He says that it is unconstitu- 
 
 1 Address at dinner of Economic Club of New York, March nth, 1919. 
 
ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 28l 
 
 tional in that it turns over to the Executive Council of the 
 League the power to declare and make war for us, to fix 
 our armament and to involve us as a mandatory in all sorts 
 of duties in the management of backward peoples. He 
 says that it thus transfers the sovereignty of this nation to 
 the governing body of the League, which he asserts the 
 Executive Council to be. 
 
 When Senator Knox's attack upon the validity of the Cov- 
 enant is analyzed, it will be seen to rest on an assumption 
 that the Executive Council is given executive powers, which 
 is unwarranted by the text of the instrument. The whole 
 function of the Executive Council is to be the medium 
 through which the League members are to exchange views, 
 the advisory board to consider all matters arising in the 
 field of the League's possible action and to advise the 
 members as to what they ought, by joint action, to do. 
 
 The Council makes few if any orders binding on the 
 members of the League. After a member of the League 
 has agreed not to exceed a limit of armament, the Execu- 
 tive Council must consent to raising the limit. Where the 
 Executive Council acts as a mediating and inquiring body 
 to settle differences not arbitrated, its unanimous recom- 
 mendation of a settlement must satisfy the nation seeking 
 relief, if the defendant nation complies with the recom- 
 mendation. 
 
 These are the only cases in which the United States as a 
 member of the League would be bound by action of the 
 Executive Council. All other obligations of the United 
 States under the League are to be found in the covenants of 
 the League, and not in any action of the Executive Council. 
 When this is understood clearly, the whole structure of 
 Senator Knox's indictment falls. 
 
282 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 The Executive Council is a most necessary and useful 
 body for coordinating the activities of the League, for 
 initiating consideration by the members of the League of 
 their proper joint and individual action, and for keeping 
 all advised of the progress of events in the field of the League 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 It is impossible, in the time I have, to follow through 
 Senator Knox's argument in all the Articles of the League, 
 but his treatment of Article XVI is a fair illustration of the 
 reasons he advances for ascribing to the Executive Council 
 super-sovereign power. 
 
 Article XVI is the penalizing section. Whenever a 
 member of the League violates its covenant not to make 
 war under Article XII, it is an act of war against the other 
 members and they are to levy a boycott against the outlaw 
 nation. There is in the Covenant no agreement to make 
 war. An act of war does not produce a state of war unless 
 the nation acted against chooses to declare and wage war 
 on account of it. The Executive Council is given the duty 
 of recommending what forces should be furnished by 
 members of the League to protect the covenants of the 
 League. The members are required to allow military forces 
 of a member of the League, cooperating to protect the 
 covenants, passage through their territory. 
 
 Of this article Senator Knox says : 
 
 " If any of the high contracting parties breaks its cov- 
 enant under Article XII, then we must fly to arms to pro- 
 tect the covenants." Again he says of it: "Whether or 
 not we participate, and the amount of our participation in 
 belligerent operations, is determined not by ourselves but 
 by the Executive Council in which we have seemingly, at 
 most, but one voice out of nine, no matter what we 
 
ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 283 
 
 think of the controversy, no matter how we view the wisdom 
 of a war over the cause, we are bound to go to war when 
 and in the manner the Executive Council determines." He 
 asserts that the power of the Executive Council is that of 
 " recommending what effective military or naval forces each 
 member of the League shall contribute to protect the cov- 
 enants of the League, not only against League members but 
 non-League members: that is, as a practical matter, the 
 power to declare war." 
 
 I submit in all fairness that there never was a more palp- 
 able non sequitur than this. I venture to think that were 
 Senator Knox charged as Secretary of State with construing 
 the obligation of the United States under this Covenant, he 
 would on behalf of the United States summarily reject such 
 a construction. 
 
 By what manner of reasoning can the word " recom- 
 mend " be converted into a word of direction or command? 
 Yet upon this interpretation of the meaning of the words 
 " recommend," " advise '' and words of like import, as they 
 occur in many articles, depends his whole argument as to the 
 powers of the Executive Council under the Covenant, and 
 their super-sovereign character. 
 
 Senator Knox contends that the plan of the League will 
 create two Leagues one of the Allies and one of the out- 
 cast nations. The Covenant provides for a protocol to in- 
 vite in all nations responsible and fit for membership. Cer- 
 tainly Germany and the other enemy countries ought not now 
 to be taken in, but they ought to be kept under control. The 
 League wishes to prevent war in the world and realizes, of 
 course, that excluded nations are quite as -likely to make war 
 as their own members. 
 
 The Covenant therefore declares the concern of the League 
 
284 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 in threatened war between nations whether members or not 
 and asserts its right to take steps to prevent it. This dec- 
 laration is made as the justification for Article XVII, by 
 which a nation or nations not members of the League 
 who threaten war are invited to become temporary mem- 
 bers of the League in order to enable them to settle their 
 disputes peaceably as permanent members covenant to do. 
 These temporary members are visited with the same 
 penalties for acts which would be, if committed by per- 
 manent members, breaches of their covenants not to begin 
 war. Thus the scope of the League's action is extended to 
 all nations. 
 
 This is the explanation and the purport of Articles XI 
 and XVII. They involve the whole world in the covenants 
 of the League not to make war. They operate to defeat the 
 formation and warlike organization of a rival league of 
 nations, composed of countries not admitted as permanent 
 members to this league. They unite the rest of the world 
 against such nations in any case of war threatened by them. 
 
 There is no supreme court to construe this Covenant and 
 bind the members, and each nation, in determining its own 
 obligations and action under it, must construe it for itself. 
 Our duties under it are not to be declared and enforced 
 against us by a hostile tribunal or by one actuated by dif- 
 ferent principles and spirit from our own. Its whole 
 strength is to rest in an agreed interpretation by all. Its 
 sanction must be in the good sense of the covenanting na- 
 tions who know that, in order that it may hold together and 
 serve its purpose, they must all be reasonable in their con- 
 struction. What rules of interpretation should and must we 
 therefore apply? 
 
 The President and Senate are to ratify this Covenant if it 
 
ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 285 
 
 be ratified, by virtue of their constitutional power to make 
 treaties. This power, as the Supreme Court has held, en- 
 ables them to bind the United States to a contract with an- 
 other nation on any subject matter usually the subject matter 
 of treaties between nations, subject to the limitation that 
 the treaty may not change the form of government of the 
 United States, and may not part with territory belonging to 
 a State of the United States, without the consent of the 
 State. The making of war, of embargoes, or armament, 
 and of arbitration are frequently subject matter of treaties. 
 ' The President and Senate may not, however, confer on 
 any body, constituted by a league of nations, the power and 
 function to do anything for the United States which is 
 vested by the Federal Constitution in Congress, the treaty 
 making power or any other branch of the United States 
 Government. 
 
 It, therefore, follows that whenever the treaty-making 
 power binds the United States to do anything, it must be 
 done by the branch of that Government vested by the Con- 
 stitution with that function. A treaty may bind the United 
 States to make or not make war in any specific contingency; 
 it may bind the United States to levy a boycott, to limit its 
 armament to a fixed amount ; it may bind the United States 
 to submit a difference or a class of differences to arbitration. 
 But the only way in which the United States can perform 
 the agreement is for Congress to fulfill the promise to de- 
 clare and make war ; for Congress to perform the obligation 
 to levy a boycott; for Congress to fix or reduce armament 
 in accord with the contract; and for the President and 
 Senate, as the treaty-making power, to formulate the issues 
 to be arbitrated and agree with the opposing nation on the 
 character of the court. 
 
286 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 When the treaty provides that the obligation arises upon a 
 breach of a covenant, and does not make the question of the 
 breach conclusively determinable by any body or tribunal, 
 then it is for Congress itself to decide in good faith whether 
 or not the breach of the Covenant upon which the obligation 
 arises, has in fact occurred, and finding that, it has to per- 
 form the obligation. 
 
 These plain limitations upon the Federal treaty-making 
 power are known to nations of this conference, and any 
 treaty of the United States is to be construed in the light 
 of them. Following these necessary rules of construction, 
 the provisions of the Covenant entirely and easily conform 
 to the Constitution of the United States. They lose alto- 
 gether that threatening and dangerous character and effect 
 which Senator Knox and other critics would attach to them. 
 They delegate to no body but to our own Federal consti- 
 tutional agencies the duty of deciding in good faith what 
 our obligations under the Covenant are, when they become 
 immediate, the appropriate means and method by which they 
 are to be performed, and the performance of them. 
 
 By the first article the action of the high contracting par- 
 ties under the Covenant are to be " effected through the in- 
 strumentality of a meeting of a body of delegates represent- 
 ing the high contracting parties, of meetings at more fre- 
 quent intervals of an Executive Council, and of a permanent 
 international secretariat." 
 
 This means only that when the high contracting parties 
 wish to take joint action, it is to be taken through such 
 meetings. This does not vest these bodies with power ex- 
 cept as it is especially described in the succeeding articles. 
 The unusual phrase " effected through the instrumentality 
 of meetings " means what it says. It does not confer 
 
ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 287 
 
 authority on the Body of Delegates or the Executive Coun- 
 cil, but only designates the way in which the high contract- 
 ing parties shall, through their representatives, express their 
 joint agrement and take action. 
 
 On this head, Lord Robert Cecil, who had much to do with 
 formulating the Covenant, made an illuminating remark in 
 his address following the report by the Committee of the 
 Covenant to the Conference. He said: 
 
 "Secondly We have laid down (and this is the very 
 great principle of the delegates, except in very special cases, 
 and for very special reasons which are set out in the Cov- 
 enant) that all action must be unanimously agreed to in 
 accordance with the general rule that governs international 
 relations. That this will to some extent, in appearance at 
 any rate, militate against the rapidity of action of the organs 
 of the League is undoubted. In my judgment, that de- 
 fect is far more than compensated by the confidence that it 
 will inspire that no nation, whether small or great, need 
 fear oppression from the organs of the League." 
 
 This interpretation by one of the most distinguished 
 draftsmen of the League shows that all its language, rea- 
 sonably contrued, delegates no power to these bodies to act 
 for the League and its members without their unanimous 
 concurrence unless the words used make such delegation 
 clear. 
 
 Senator Knox asserts that, as the recommendation for a 
 reduction of armaments will be made with the consent of 
 our representative on the Council, we shall be in honor 
 bound to accept the limit and bind ourselves. It is difficult 
 to follow this reasoning. The body which is to accept the 
 limitation is the Congress of the United States. Why 
 should the Congress of the United States be bound by a 
 
288 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 representative selected by the President to represent the 
 United States in this function, in respect to a matter of great 
 importance under the control of Congress? 
 
 That the United States should recognize the wisdom of a 
 reduction of armament, under a world plan for it, seems 
 manifest. The history of competitive armaments, with its 
 dreadful sequel, is too fresh in the minds of the peoples 
 of the world for them not to recognize the wisdom of an 
 agreed reduction. If we are to have an agreed reduction, 
 then there must be some limit to which the governments 
 agree to submit. If the nations of Europe, with so many 
 dangerous neighbors, are content to bind themselves to a 
 limitation, why should we hesitate to help this world move- 
 ment? There is not the slightest probability that we will 
 wish to exceed the limit proposed. Our national failing has 
 been not to maintain enough armament. 
 
 Senator Knox objects to the provision that no treaties 
 made by members of 'the League shall have effect until after 
 they have been registered in the office of the League. He 
 says this is contrary to the Constitution, because treaties 
 are to take effect when ratified by the Senate and proclaimed 
 by the President. 
 
 This objection is not very formidable. All this requires 
 is that the United States shall provide, in every one of its 
 future treaties, that the treaty shall not take effect until it is 
 registered in the Secretariat of the League. Certainly an 
 agreement on the part of the United States and the nation 
 with whom it is making a treaty as to conditions upon which 
 it shall take effect is not in violation of the constitutional 
 requirements to which Senator Knox refers. 
 
ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 289 
 
 Senator Knox criticizes the League because it recognizes 
 the possibility of war and proposes to use war to end war. 
 Certainly there is no means of suppressing lawless violence 
 but by lawful force, and any League which makes no provi- 
 sion for that method, and fails to recognize its validity, 
 would be futile. He points out that the plan of the League 
 is not war-proof, and that war may come in spite of it. 
 Then he describes the kind of league which he would frame, 
 a league which will involve the United States in quite as 
 many wars and in just as great a transfer of its sovereignty 
 as he charges this Covenant with doing. 
 
 He proposes to have compulsory arbitration, before an in- 
 ternational court, of international differences, including 
 questions of policy. His court would not settle all differ- 
 ences likely to lead to war, for questions of policy are just 
 as likely to produce war as questions which are justiciable. 
 Then he would declare war a crime and punish any nation 
 engaged in it, other than in self-defense, as an international 
 criminal. Would not punishing a nation as a criminal be 
 likely to involve war? The court would have the right to 
 call on powers constituting the league to enforce its decrees 
 and awards by force and economic pressure. It would be 
 difficult to conceive a league more completely transferring 
 sovereignty to an outside body and giving it power to in- 
 volve us in war than the plan of Senator Knox. It is far 
 more drastic and ambitious, and derogates much more 
 from national control than anything in this league. In 
 contrast with it, the present league is modest. 
 
 The supporters of the present covenant do not claim it 
 to be a perfect instrument. It does not profess to abolish 
 war. It only adopts a somewhat crude machinery for mak- 
 ing war improbable, and it furnishes a basis for the union 
 
TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 of nations by which, if they are so minded, they can pro- 
 tect themselves against the recurrence of the disaster of 
 such a war as that with which Europe has been devastated 
 during the last four years. Experience under the League 
 will doubtless suggest many improvements. But it is the 
 first step that counts. Let us take it now when the whole 
 world is yearning for it. 
 
 PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 1 
 
 Many misconceptions of the effect of the Covenant of 
 Paris have been set afloat by broadside denunciations of the 
 League based on loose constructions of it entirely unwar- 
 ranted by the text. The attitude of those who favor the 
 Covenant has been misconstrued, increasing the confusion 
 in the mind of the public in respect to the inestimable value 
 of the instrument as it is. Were the alternatives presented 
 to me of adopting the Covenant exactly as it is, or of post- 
 poning the coming of peace and continuing the state of war 
 until the conference could reconvene and make other provi- 
 sions for peace, I should, without the slightest fear as to 
 the complete safety of my country under its provisions, 
 vote for it as the greatest step in recorded history in the 
 betterment of international relations for the benefit of the 
 people of the world and for the benefit of my country. 
 
 I was president of the League to Enforce Peace and 
 continue to be. Our plan was somewhat more ambitious 
 in the method of settling differences peaceably, in that fewer 
 might escape a binding peaceful settlement. The proposed 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Mar. 16, 1919. 
 
PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 2QI 
 
 covenant, however, makes provision for peaceful settlement 
 of most differences Both plans include a definite obliga- 
 tion on the part of all members of the League to use 
 economic power to suppress an outlaw nation by wither- 
 ing world ostracism. Ours also provided for definite con- 
 tributions of force to an army to be called upon if the boy- 
 cott failed to effect its purpose. The present covenant does 
 not, in my judgment, impose such a definite obligation on 
 the members of the League, but its theory, doubtless sound, 
 is that their voluntary action in their own interest will lead 
 to the raising of sufficient force without a covenant. The 
 proposed league has real teeth and a bite to it. It furnishes 
 real machinery to organize the power of the peaceful nations 
 of the world and translate it into economic and military 
 action. This, by its very existence and certainty, will keep 
 nations from war, will force them to the acceptance of a 
 peaceable settlement, and will dispense with the necessity for 
 the exercise of economic pressure or force. 
 
 Why, then, it is asked, if this is my view, have I ani- 
 madverted upon the language of the League Covenant and 
 suggested changes ? I have done this not because I wished 
 to change the structure of the League, its plan of action or 
 its real character. I have done it for the purpose of re- 
 moving objections to it created in the minds of conscientious 
 Americans. There are many such anxious for a league of 
 nations, anxious to make this peace permanent, whose fears 
 have been roused by suggested constructions of the Cov- 
 enant which its language does not justify. These fears can, 
 without any considerable change of language or additions, 
 be removed. 
 
 The language of the Covenant is in diplomatic phrases, is 
 verbose and not direct. When, however, we examine the 
 
292 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 important treaties of history, including those negotiated- by 
 our own country, we find that this is characteristic of most 
 of them. They are not drawn with the concise, direct words 
 of a business contract, nor in the clear style of a domestic 
 statute. When reduced to such a style, the Covenant be- 
 comes quite clear and presents to me no danger whatever 
 of involving the United States in any obligation or burden 
 which its people would not be, and ought not to be, glad to 
 bear for the preservation of the peace of the world and 
 their own. 
 
 Take, for instance, the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe 
 Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy of the United States 
 which forbids any non-American nation, by external ag- 
 gression, by purchase or by intrigue, to acquire the terri- 
 tory in whole or in part, or the governmental power in 
 whole or in part, of any country or nation in this Western 
 Hemisphere. So far as external aggression is concerned, 
 the policy is fully covered by Article X of the Covenant, 
 which would enable tlie United States to use the whole power 
 of the League, in addition to its own, to preserve the doc- 
 trine. So far as the acquisition of such territory or power 
 by purchase or intrigue is concerned, the United States 
 could at once bring the matter before the Body of Dele- 
 gates, which will include representatives of all the na- 
 tions of North, South and Central America. Unless the 
 whole Body of Delegates, so constituted, unanimously re- 
 jects the Monroe Doctrine, the United States is completely 
 at liberty to proceed to enforce it. Can it be supposed, 
 by the wildest flight of imagination, that such a unanimous 
 report could be obtained from a body including representa- 
 tives of seventeen or eighteen countries of this Western 
 Hemisphere? Though I have this view, I am entirely will- 
 
PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 293 
 
 ing to see, and will be glad to see, a reservation introduced 
 into the Covenant which shall be more explicit and more 
 satisfying to those whose fears are roused. 
 
 From the plan of the Covenant, from the language of 
 Lord Robert Cecil, one of its chief draftsmen, and from the 
 general rules of construction of international agreements, I 
 think that the action of the executive council, unless other- 
 wise expressly provided, must be unanimous. This would 
 necessitate the concurrence of a representative of the United 
 States in such recommendations and other actions as it may, 
 in the course of its duties in the League, have to take. The 
 same is true of the Body of Delegates. But I would be 
 entirely willing to have the rule of unanimity stated ex- 
 pressly ; it would clarify a matter which troubles many. 
 
 Doubt has been expressed as to the time during which this 
 Covenant is to run. There is now no express limitation. 
 I would be glad to have a definite time limitation, say of 
 ten years, for the League as a whole, and perhaps of five 
 years for the obligation to restrict armament within a limit 
 agreed to by the Congress of the United States. This 
 would relieve many who reasonably fear perpetual obliga- 
 tions. My own view is that, unless this be done, the nations 
 composing the League will construe this to be a covenant 
 from which any one of them may withdraw after reasonable 
 notice. I think it is wiser to give it a definite term than 
 to have it a covenant from which any member may with- 
 draw at will. 
 
 I do not mean to say there may not be other changes 
 of a similar character that would aid in relieving unfounded 
 objections. But I am distinctly opposed to a revision of 
 the form of the League so as to change its nature. This is 
 the League which, as amended in the conference, must be 
 
294 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 adopted unless we are to have an indefinite postponement 
 of peace. 
 
 The suggestions of the impossible and radically different 
 leagues which have been put forward as a better solution 
 than tfie present one will not be particularly relevant or 
 helpful. To provide for amendments and reservations, 
 that do not change the structure of the League and its es- 
 sence and do satisfy doubting, conscientious Americans in 
 respect to the safety of the United States in the obligations 
 assumed, is a high and important duty of the representa- 
 tives of the United States in this conference. If they per- 
 form it, they will help materially to secure the ratification of 
 the treaty. 
 
 Of course the securing of amendments after fourteen na- 
 tions have fought their way by earnest discussion to an agree- 
 ment in committee is not free from difficulty. European 
 nations, anxious to have us join the League, will consent 
 to reservations and limitations as to strictly American ques- 
 tions and policies; but it is not the easiest task to draw 
 these in such form as to prevent their having wider effect. 
 The solution of this problem will be facilitated by a con- 
 sideration and study of the criticisms which are construc- 
 tively directed to rendering this league unobjectionable, 
 I regret to say that many of the speeches are so far afield 
 and so entirely unwarranted by the present language of the 
 Covenant that they are not helpful. 
 
TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 295 
 
 TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 1 
 
 I favor the obligation on the part of all the nations to use 
 their military force to maintain the covenants of the League. 
 That was a feature of the plan of the League to Enforce 
 Peace. I do not think it is clearly set forth in the present 
 Covenant. The nearer it comes to that the more satisfactory 
 it is to me, and the more effective that League will become. 
 The burden of carrying on war, which has been held up 
 as a reason for not entering the League, is one entirely re- 
 moved by the certainty of cooperation of the nations. The 
 usefulness of such a league is far greater in its warning 
 and restraining effect upon reckless nations willing to begin 
 war than even in its actual suppression of war. It is vastly 
 more economical on our part to agree that, should occasion 
 arise, we will contribute economic and military pressure to 
 suppress war than it is to refuse such an agreement and 
 then be drawn into a war like the one we have just passed 
 through, leaving an indebtedness of twenty-five billions, 
 a war that would have been avoided by the knowledge on 
 the part of Germany and Austria that aggression would 
 array the whole world against them. The arguments that 
 Senator Borah advances in this regard are arguments that 
 are the figments of his imagination. The very object of 
 the League is to prevent war, not to fight little wars, and 
 the clearer the obligation to exert economic pressure and 
 military force against the aggressor, the greater the im- 
 probability that wars will come. Instead of being a source 
 of increased expense, the League will greatly reduce ex- 
 penses to the government of the United Stats, first, in re- 
 
 1 From an Address at the Methodist Church in Augusta, Georgia, 
 March 23, 1919. 
 
296 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ducing armaments, and second, in reducing the number of 
 the wars into which it is likely to be drawn. 
 
 If the provisions I have mentioned were limited to the 
 members of the League they would lack comprehensiveness 
 in preserving world peace, because it may be some time be- 
 fore two-thirds of the Body of Delegates shall conclude 
 that it is wise to admit to permanent membership in the 
 League countries like Germany, Austria, Turkey or Bul- 
 garia, or countries with no sense of responsibility and so 
 weak in police power and self-restraint as not to be able to 
 perform the covenants of the League. To correct what 
 otherwise would be a defect in the constitution of the League, 
 there is a declaration that the League is interested in war 
 between any countries whether members of the League or 
 not, and will take such action as the peace of the world 
 may require in order to prevent injury from such a war. 
 
 The four great steps to secure peace are, first, reduction 
 of armament; second, union against conquest by arms; 
 third, peaceful settlements of differences and a covenant 
 not to begin war until every effort has been made to secure 
 such peaceful settlement, together with a world boycott of 
 the outlaw nation and the exercise of military compulsion, 
 if necessary; and finally, fourth, the inhibition of all secret 
 treaties and an enforcement of open diplomacy. Nothing 
 like it has heretofore been attempted in the history of the 
 world. The problem of German peace has forced it. 
 
 We have fourteen nations, seven of them being the na- 
 tions who won the war with Germany, agreeing through 
 their representatives at Paris upon these steps. The ques- 
 tion now is whether the Senate of the United States is to 
 destroy the possibility of this advance in the civilization of 
 
TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 297 
 
 the world by its vote against the action of the President 
 and against what I verily believe to be the opinion of the 
 majority of the people of the United States. I would un- 
 hesitatingly vote for the Covenant just as it was unanimously 
 reported by the committee of representatives of the fourteen 
 countries engaged in drafting the treaty. I am hopeful, 
 however, that the fears of some, who conscientiously favor 
 the treaty, as to certain possibilities of danger may be re- 
 moved by more express limitation. The treaty is in process 
 of amendment now and any clarifying amendments should 
 be welcomed in order, if possible, to secure ratification. I 
 believe the President and the Commission have a sense of 
 duty in this regard and that we may look for amendments of 
 this character. 
 
 What are the objections to the League? They are, first, 
 that the United States has gotten along so well since the 
 beginning without being drawn into the politics of the out- 
 side world that it ought to keep out of them and ought not 
 to involve itself in a league of nations. This opinion, I think 
 we may say, is confined to a small body of persons rep- 
 resented by Senators Borah, Reed and Poindexter. If there 
 are others who take this position in the Senate, their names 
 do not occur to me. All the other members of the Senate 
 who have objected to this covenant have averred that they 
 are in favor of a league of nations to secure peace. If 
 they are, they are in favor of something that binds the 
 United States to some kind of an obligation to help in the 
 preservation of peace. A league of nations means some- 
 thing that binds one nation to another in respect to certain 
 obligations. That is the etymological derivation of the 
 word and that is its actual meaning. If they are therefore 
 in favor of a league of nations, they have, by that fact, ad- 
 
298 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 mitted the necessity of departing from the traditional policy 
 of the United States to enter into no alliances with foreign 
 nations, because a league is an alliance, and, as a league 
 contains obligations, it must entangle the United States to 
 the extent at least of the performance of those obliga- 
 tions. 
 
 We cannot avoid being affected by international quarrels 
 in Europe. It is economical for us to unite with the other 
 countries to maintain peace instead of waiting until we are 
 driven into war and then making a superhuman effort to 
 defend ourselves against a war that has meantime grown 
 into enormous proportions because of our failure, and that 
 of the other nations, of the world to suppress it in its in- 
 ception. 
 
 The Executive Council has no power to fix the obligation. 
 It does not determine conclusively for any member of the 
 League any fact upon which the obligation of that member 
 becomes immediate. Jts duties are executive in the sense 
 that it acquires all the necessary information, follows 
 closely matters with which the League has to do and takes 
 action in the sense of making a recommendation to the 
 various Powers as to how the difficulties shall be met. It 
 furnishes a means by which the Powers confer together 
 in order that they may agree upon joint action; but in no 
 sense is any power delegated to it to declare war, to wage 
 war, to declare a boycott, to limit armament or to force 
 arbitration. 
 
 The only two things which it does, things that can be 
 said in any way to be binding on nations, are, first, not to 
 increase the limit of armament to which a nation has agreed 
 to confine itself after full consideration, and, second (where 
 
TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 299 
 
 jurisdiction is not taken from it by reference to the Body 
 of Delegates) if it can act unanimously, to make a report 
 of settlement of a difficulty such that if the defendant nation 
 complies with it, the plaintiff nation may not begin war to 
 get more. It may propose measures to the members of the 
 League by which they can carry out its recommendations of 
 settlement, but it does not decide upon those measures and 
 it is left to the members of the League to agree whether 
 they desire to use force to carry out recommendations or 
 not. In every other respect its action is advisory and of a 
 recommending character. 
 
 Still less can there be said to be sovereign authority dele- 
 gated to the Body of Delegates. The Body of Delegates 
 selects the four countries whose representatives are to enter 
 the Executive Council. It elects, by two-thirds vote, new 
 members to the League after they have shown themselves 
 able to fulfill the covenants of the League. It may be sub- 
 stituted as a mediating body and a body to recommend set- 
 tlement in place of the Executive Council. It may also ad- 
 vise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties 
 which have become inapplicable to international conditions 
 and which may endanger the peace of the world. This is 
 all. 
 
 It is impossible, therefore, for one looking through the 
 Covenant, without a determined purpose to formulate ob- 
 jections to it, to find any transfer of sovereignty to the 
 Executive Council or the Body of Delegates. The whole 
 theory of the Covenant is that the nations are to act to- 
 gether under obligations of the Covenant, that they are to 
 come to an agreement, through these two bodies, but that 
 the action to be taken is to be determined by each nation 
 on its conscience under its agreement, and that when the 
 
3OO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 action is to be taken it is to be taken by that nation in ac- 
 cord with its constitution. 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAS NOT DELAYED 
 THE PEACE ' 
 
 The project of the League of Nations has, in the minds of 
 its opponents, to bear the blame for many things. Ac- 
 cording to their view, if it had not been for the League of 
 Nations, peace would now have been declared and every- 
 thing would be smooth and easy in the sphere of the late 
 war. It is their view that only the absurd insistence of 
 idealists has postponed the settlement needed to produce 
 normal times. The fact is entirely otherwise. The League 
 of Nations was made the first subject of consideration by 
 the conference because it could be more promptly and easily 
 disposed of than other issues rearing their ugly heads among 
 the Allies. These latter needed earnest and painful con- 
 sideration in confidential interviews between the represen- 
 tatives of the leading powers. The full facts were not 
 known to the conference and the issues were not ready for 
 open discussion. 
 
 The delay in fixing the terms of the League would not 
 have happened but for the need of settling the other ques- 
 tions. One of the most troublesome of these is the amount 
 of the indemnities which France and Belgium and Italy and 
 England and Serbia should exact from the Central Powers. 
 It is complicated with the question how much the Central 
 Powers can pay. Each premier has found himself em- 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Mar. 29, 1919. 
 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAS NOT DELAYED PEACE 30! 
 
 barrassed by promises to his people as to what the treaty 
 must contain. In this regard, each one has found that his 
 claims, based only on the viewpoint of himself and his 
 countrymen, must be moderated. 
 
 Another burning question is that of the boundary of 
 Italy on the Adriatic. Italy insists on having Fiume be- 
 cause the port has probably a majority of Italians in it. 
 But it has always been the port of the Slav dependency 
 of Hungary and it is surrounded by a country with which 
 it has the closest business connection, a country which is 
 overwhelmingly Slav. 
 
 It is the normal and appropriate seaport of the projected 
 Jugo-Slav State. Sonnino, the Minister of Foreign Af- 
 fairs of Italy, is reported to be uncompromising in his de- 
 mand. Fiume has become a political issue in Italy. Or- 
 lando, a man of more judicial and conciliatory mind, is said 
 to be embarrassed by Sonnino. Both are affected by the 
 fact that the Italian elections are near at hand. 
 
 Then, as a background to the whole settlement, there is 
 the question of the defense of France against another and 
 sudden attack by Germany. Marshal Foch and the French 
 military strategists see no complete protection unless France, 
 in some way, controls the crossing of the Rhine. A pro- 
 posal which has received great support in the French papers 
 and which has been urged by France has been the creation 
 of a buffer state called Rhineland. The objection to this 
 is that Rhineland is really German. Its separation from 
 Germany is not within the basis of the armistice. It has 
 never within centuries been French. Its sympathies would 
 all be with Germany. It would create a new Alsace-Lor- 
 raine, with the boot on the other leg. It would be a con- 
 stant source of irritation in Germany and a persistent in- 
 
3O2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 vitation to a new war by her when opportunity offered. 
 
 Lloyd George is seeking to make such a frontier unneces- 
 sary by a required limitation on conscription in Germany 
 and an agreed limitation of armament among the Allied 
 Powers. This, of course, would become a part of 
 the machinery of the League of Nations for securing peace. 
 
 The question of Hungary, which is now being made 
 prominent by the threat of Bolshevism or its actual appear- 
 ance at Budapest and in the surrounding country, is also 
 a difficult one. Unscrupulous leaders of Hungarian politics 
 seem to have invited Bolshevism in order to fight a settle- 
 ment which would limit Hungary to the Magyar country 
 and the Danubian plains. The Magyars are a masterful 
 race, a race of aristocrats, who have arbitrarily oppressed 
 the Slovaks in mountainous northern Hungary, the 
 Rumanians in Transylvania and indeed the Germans where 
 they have settled within the Hungarian kingdom. As they 
 see their power passing, they have become desperate and 
 war threatens again.' 
 
 The specter of Bolshevism will not down. To charge this 
 to delay due to seeking an agreement upon the League of 
 Nations is ridiculously opposed to the facts. The outbreak 
 in Hungary only demonstrates the necessity for a strong, 
 firm league. The signing of a treaty which formally re- 
 stores peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary will not 
 give us peace unless there is guaranty in the power of 
 the united Allies to compel peace. That power will be dis- 
 solved unless a league of allies, the nucleus of the League 
 of Nations, shall be established, not only to suppress im- 
 mediate disorder, but also to settle differences (a great 
 number of which will at once arise between the new gov- 
 
' OPEN DIPLOMACY " SLOW 303 
 
 ernments established and the old ones cut down) and to 
 enforce the settlements peaceably arrived at. 
 
 The news that amendments are being considered in the 
 League of Nations and that it is nearly ready for incorpora- 
 tion in the treaty itself demonstrates that it has not inter- 
 fered at all with reaching terms of peace with Germany. 
 The truth is, a league of nations is necessary to a satis- 
 factory treaty. It helps and speeds it. 
 
 " OPEN DIPLOMACY " SLOW 1 
 
 The fluid conditions in the countries of the Central Pow- 
 ers lead all to press for a speedy peace treaty that shall 
 stabilize them. But this very fluidity adds to the com- 
 plexity of the problem and delays its solution. The Allies 
 are also embarrassed by the unrest of their troops, who re- 
 garded the armistice as the end of the war and wish now 
 to be released and to go home. Yet armies of occupation, 
 and perhaps armies for further campaigns, are necessary. 
 Then, between the seven Powers which fought the war, the 
 peace terms are not easy to agree upon the treatment 
 Germany is to receive, the amount of indemnity -she is to 
 pay, the restrictions, if any, upon her competition in the 
 world trade pending the slow industrial recovery of France 
 and Belgium, the balancing considerations of the heavy in- 
 demnity and her opportunity for freedom in trade to enable 
 her to pay it, the defensive frontier of France, the Italian 
 frontier on the Adriatic shore, the boundaries of the new 
 States, the definition of neighborhood rights, the Balkan 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 5, 1919. 
 
304 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 boundaries, the autonomous units in Asia Minor, the dis- 
 position of the German colonies all involve controversy, 
 some of it of the most acute and irritating character. 
 
 We must bear in mind that the conference was delayed 
 by the need to gather together, from fourteen nations from 
 all over the world, men who are to frame the treaty. Special 
 commissions had to be formed to get at the facts. Hear- 
 ings had to be held for claimants. The British elections 
 kept Lloyd George at home, and during that time made it 
 impossible for him to join in those confidential interviews 
 with other leaders and premiers so necessary in smoothing 
 out difficulties and reaching understandings. While the 
 making of the terms has been in the absence of the defeated 
 powers, the interests of the conferees themselves are often 
 acutely adverse. Then, too, the disinterested attitude of the 
 United States leads its representatives to consider more care- 
 fully than those of the conferees seeking purely selfish ob- 
 jects the wisdom of restrictions upon Germany. Too great 
 severity may defeat its own purpose. 
 
 The treaty is being negotiated by representatives of pop- 
 ular constituencies and not by kings. Explanation is easier 
 to one man than to a people. Room has to be given for 
 what is called in this country "buncombe." A show of 
 fight must be made on hopeless issues for home consumption. 
 " Open " diplomacy cannot move so swiftly as the old- 
 fashioned kind. 
 
 Then, there is a more substantial reason for time in the 
 deliberations: the negotiators must discuss and argue all of 
 the conflicting issues over and over again until each one has 
 deeply impressed on him the real point of view of every 
 other. This often takes the form of heated criticism and 
 even recrimination, apparently most discouraging to a pros- 
 
RUSSIA, FRANCE, DANZIG 305 
 
 pect of agreement but necessary to clear the air. Such talk 
 is not waste of time. It is the usual and the only way to 
 reach a compromise. 
 
 The armistice in our Spanish war was signed on the I2th 
 of August, 1898, and the treaty of Paris was not signed till 
 December 12, a period of four months. This was in con- 
 nection with a war which had only begun in the previous 
 April. And it was a peace which involved the settlement 
 of rather simple issues between only two nations. 
 
 The period between the armistice and the treaty of peace 
 in the Franco-Prussian War was about the same and there, 
 also, the issues were simple and limited to two countries. 
 
 The Congress of Vienna, convened to arrange the map of 
 Europe after the Napoleonic wars, took a year for its delib- 
 erations, and the conferees had only kings and emperors 
 to satisfy. We see, therefore, that the delegates now at 
 Paris have not been unreasonably slow in their work, con- 
 sidering the great detail and the many conflicting interests 
 they have to settle and agree upon. 
 
 RUSSIA, FRANCE, DANZIG 1 
 
 One may admit that a great mistake was made in not 
 sending large armies to Archangel and Vladivostok to es- 
 tablish an Eastern front in Russia during the war. Had 
 this been done, Bolshevism could have been then repressed 
 and an opportunity for a Russian constituent assembly and 
 popular government could have been secured. But that is 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 7, 1919. 
 
306 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 past history and the conference at Paris is dealing with 
 present conditions. One of these is the difficulty of main- 
 taining large armies at this juncture to enter upon a mili- 
 tary crusade against Bolshevism in Russia. All the Allies 
 hope to do is to prevent its spread into other countries. It 
 will probably burn itself out in Russia because of its un- 
 fulfilled and impossible promises. 
 
 The issue with France as to proper provisions for her 
 safety is not by any means so clear as these cocksure 
 statesmen and correspondents would have their readers 
 believe. 
 
 The razing of fortresses on the German front, the en- 
 forced limit of German armament, the restriction upon Ger- 
 man conscription, the appropriation of the German navy, 
 the taking over of German guns and the united power of 
 the League of Nations to defend France and restrain Ger- 
 many will in the long run be far better protection to French 
 territory and independence than what France now seeks at 
 the instance of her military strategists. 
 
 The hesitation over Danzig is regarded as another damn- 
 ing proof of a weak yielding to German truculence. Dan- 
 zig is a German city. The people object to Polish sov- 
 ereignty. It is the only practical port of access to the 
 sea for Poland. Can it be made a free port for full use 
 by Poland without complete sovereignty? This is being 
 argued in the conference. It is not a question which an- 
 swers itself. One may differ with the statesmen, corres- 
 pondents and critics and still not be guilty of basely betray- 
 ing Poland or truckling to Germany. A similar question 
 is presented, as to Fiume, between the Italians and the 
 Jugo-Slavs. 
 
THE ROUND ROBIN 307 
 
 THE ROUND ROBIN l 
 
 The League of Nations is an organization which cannot 
 disclose its advantages in the rapid manner an army or a 
 military expedition can. Its operation is bound to be slow 
 and cumbersome at first. Its influence on its members 
 and on outside nations in avoiding war and promoting jus- 
 tice will grow as the real strength of the uniting and common 
 covenants comes to be clearly perceived. Experience under 
 the League will disclose defects and suggest useful changes 
 to make it more practical and effective. But the agreement 
 upon a covenant providing for reduction and limitation of 
 armament, for union of nations to prevent conquest, for 
 definite postponement of war till after every opportunity 
 for peaceful settlement has been secured, and for spreading 
 international agreements on the table before the world is 
 a series of steps forward toward permanent peace which 
 only " ready made " military correspondents can belittle. 
 
 If the cabled information as to the character of the 
 amendments adopted is reliable, we may now confidently 
 hope that the Senators who signed the Round Robin will 
 be able to vote for the League as it is amended without 
 being embarrassed in any degree by their signatures to that 
 document. It will be remembered that they merely said that 
 the Covenant in its then form was unacceptable to them, 
 which of course does not prevent their consistently sup- 
 porting the Covenant as at present amended. The further 
 statement in the Round Robin was that they thought the 
 peace treaty ought to be adopted at once and that the League 
 should be postponed for further consideration. Of course 
 
 1 From an article in the Public Ledger April 12, 1919. 
 
308 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 such a view, which rested on the importance of having peace 
 come at once without delaying it for the sake of framing a 
 league of nations covenant, ceases to apply when the peace 
 treaty has been signed, with the League of Nations Cov- 
 enant as a part of it, and indeed as an indispensable con- 
 dition to its effective enforcement. The Round Robin 
 Senators may well say that the second objection is removed, 
 because now to insist upon opposing or amending the League, 
 which is web and woof of the peace treaty submitted to 
 them, is to postpone peace rather than to expedite it. 
 
 GUARANTIES OF ART. X 
 
 It has been suggested that this Article X is in the interest 
 of Great Britain, that it is designed to preserve the terri- 
 torial integrity of her far-flung empire through the aid of 
 the United States and pther countries. There is no founda- 
 tion for such a suggestion. Can any one point out in the 
 history of the last fifty years any war against Great Britain 
 by a foreign country to take away territory from her ? No ; 
 war of that sort is not ordinarily begun against a nation 
 as powerful as Great Britain. Wars are begun as Austria 
 began the war against Servia, namely, because Servia was 
 a weak nation and Austria a strong one ; and this guaranty 
 is for the benefit of the weaker nations whom it is to our in- 
 terest to protect against a war of conquest that will ulti- 
 mately involve the world, as the attack upon Servia did. 
 
 Another objection made to this Article is that if Ireland 
 were to rebel against England and seek to establish her- 
 
 1 From an address at Kansas City, April 19, 1919. 
 
RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FREEDOM 309 
 
 self as an independent republic, England could invite, under 
 this Article X, the other nations of the world to assist her 
 in suppressing the rebellion. This is utterly unfounded, be- 
 cause Article X is only an undertaking to preserve territorial 
 integrity and political independence against external aggres- 
 sion. Nations must take care of their own revolutions, and, 
 if their conduct of government is such that revolutions 
 occur and new nations are established out of old ones, there 
 is nothing in Article X to prevent this happening. 
 
 RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FREEDOM * 
 
 News comes from Paris that the effort of a committee 
 of the Jews to secure, in the constitution of the League, 
 a declaration in favor of religious tolerance and the means 
 of securing it has failed. This is not accurate. There is 
 in the League Covenant a provision that in all countries 
 which are to be governed by a mandatory of the League, 
 the charter, under which the mandatory acts, shall require 
 protection of religious freedom. This provision will apply 
 in Constantinople, in Palestine, in Syria, in Armenia, in 
 Mesopotamia and in the former colonies of Germany in 
 Africa and the Pacific. 
 
 The Executive Council may add to such general provi- 
 sions detailed guaranties and machinery to make the general 
 declaration effective. The mandatories have to render 
 yearly reports of their stewardship, so that violations of 
 such guaranties may be brought before the organs of the 
 League for remedy. 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 24, 1919. 
 
3IO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 The failure of the application for a general declaration 
 in respect to freedom of religion was doubtless due to the 
 sensitiveness of the British colonies and, indeed, of the 
 United States, toward the attempt of Japan to obtain a 
 declaration in favor of social equality and against racial 
 discrimination in any state of the League. The American 
 representatives probably felt that such a declaration, however 
 neutral in its effect in this country because our Constitution 
 secures the equal protection of the law to all, would be suc- 
 cessfully used to defeat the ratification of the League Cov- 
 enant as part of the treaty. They were therefore obliged 
 to sacrifice the clause securing religious tolerance. 
 
 But there still remains an opportunity to achieve every 
 useful and practical end in regard to religious freedom. 
 There exists no danger of pogroms and oppressive laws 
 against the Jews in the United States or Britain or France 
 or Italy. It exists only in certain states like Poland, 
 Rumania, the Ukraine and possibly in the Czecho-Slav and 
 Jugo-Slav countries. ' Of these, Rumania is the chief of- 
 fender. Poland, under Paderewski, also shows obduracy in 
 the matter. All these states are, so to speak, children of the 
 League; they may well be required, as a condition of their 
 national independence and the protection they are to en- 
 joy from the League, to give pledges against racial and 
 religious discrimination in their laws and in favor of com- 
 plete religious freedom. Means should be retained by the 
 League to enforce the pledges. 
 
 Pledges were required by the Congress of Berlin in 1879 
 from Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania that their fundamental 
 laws would put Jews on an equality with all other citizens 
 and protect them in the exercise of their religion. Bulgaria 
 and Servia faithfully complied, but Rumania deliberately 
 
SECRET TREATY PROVISIONS 3! I 
 
 and dishonestly evaded, and dishonored, her solemn obliga- 
 tion. If now she is to receive Transylvania from Hungary 
 by decree of the League, she may well be put under effective 
 bond to give to her Jewish people that freedom and justice 
 which she has faithlessly denied to them for forty years. 
 Poland, too, which was long the only refuge for the op- 
 pressed and unhappy children of Israel, should be made, 
 as the price of her restoration to nationality, to issue a new 
 charter of religious liberty and civic equality to her Jewish 
 citizens. 
 
 The Jews are not the only denomination who need pro- 
 tection. There are Unitarians and others who, in some of 
 these new states, have suffered for their faith. It will be 
 an important accomplishment if the League uses its power 
 to remove this last vestige of medievalism. 
 
 SECRET TREATY PROVISIONS THAT ARE AT 
 
 THE ROOT OF THE CRISIS AT THE 
 
 PARIS CONFERENCE 1 
 
 ITALIAN CLAIMS TO FIUME WOULD, IF GRANTED, SOW THE 
 
 SEEDS OF TROUBLE AND DISCONTENT AMONG THE 
 
 JUGO-SLAVS 
 
 The peace treaty with Austria-Hungary is delayed by the 
 controversy over the disposition of the port of Fiume, near 
 the head of the Adriatic. When the war broke out in 1914 
 the Entente Allies and Germany wooed Italy intensively to 
 induce her to join their respective sides. The obligations of 
 the Triple Alliance had not been made public, but it was 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger, Apr. 25, 1919. 
 
312 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 understood that Italy was bound to lend her aid to Austria 
 and Germany in case of a defensive war. Italy positively 
 insisted that this was not such a war, and so maintained 
 her neutrality for a time. Then she was induced by 
 promises of the Entente Allies (Great Britain, France and 
 Russia) to declare war on Austria and subsequently on 
 Germany. Her course was criticized as one wholly in- 
 fluenced by greed of territory. The treaty by which she 
 became an ally of France and Great Britain was secret, 
 but enough was known to enable Italy's critics to aver that 
 it was the consummation of a successful bid. Italy's de- 
 fenders met these attacks by showing that she was entitled 
 under the treaty of the Triple Alliance to be consulted be- 
 fore Austria attacked Serbia, and by revealing the bad faith 
 of Germany and Austria in Italy's war with Turkey and 
 their secret aid to the Sultan. This aroused sympathy with 
 Italy, and it was assumed that the heart cry of the Irre- 
 dentists for a restoration of Italy's territory everywhere had 
 been satisfied by an agreement that Trentino and Trieste 
 should become hers. 
 
 It now appears that the Dalmatian coast was also included 
 in territory promised to Italy. As to Fiume, Italians per- 
 haps form a majority of the inhabitants, but it is, and has 
 been for years, a Croatian city. It is, and has been always, 
 the port by which the solidly Slav population in the country 
 behind the city reach the sea. 
 
 Italy seeks to push the principle of self-determination too 
 far. The unit of population in which the majority is to 
 determine the nation's control should include the back 
 country with which the port is united. 
 
 Unless some explanation is given, Italy's insistence will 
 tend to revive the charge that greed was her chief motive 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 313 
 
 in this war. Our entrance into the war was accompanied 
 by a declaration in favor of only just restitution of ter- 
 ritory and upon the assumption, often stated, that it was not 
 a war of conquest by the Allies. The terms of the armistice 
 followed these lines. 
 
 If the facts are correctly stated, the public opinion of the 
 United States and the disinterested world will sustain the 
 President in resisting Italy's determination to take over 
 Fiume and close Croatian access to the sea. The question 
 is one of Italian politics. Italy has taken possession of 
 Fiume with the strong hand of conqueror against the 
 Croatians. Orlando may lose power in the Italian Parlia- 
 ment if he fails to stand by the Italian claim. Sonnino, 
 his colleague at the conference and his associate as premier, 
 is rigid and uncompromising. He would probably resist 
 Orlando if the latter yielded. The situation is therefore 
 acute. But can Italy afford to break, on such an issue, 
 with the conference? One would think not. The Presi- 
 dent would seem to be clearly right in maintaining that at 
 least Fiume be made a free port for Croatia as Danzig is 
 to be for Poland. If Italy's wish were to prevail, the set- 
 tlement, with palpable injustice in it, would create a sense 
 of wrong among the Jugo-Slavs that would return to plague 
 Italy when most inconvenient. 
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT 
 AS AMENDED 1 
 
 The amendments to the Covenant of the League of Na- 
 tions adopted in Paris on Monday will bear careful study, 
 
 1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 30, 1919. 
 
314 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 and perhaps it is unwise hastily to express a confident 
 opinion. But several readings suggest the following com- 
 ment: 
 
 In the first place, the language and arrangement of the 
 articles have been greatly improved. The use of different 
 terms to mean the same thing, which tended to prevent an 
 easy reading of the document, has been largely corrected. 
 Provisions having immediate relation to one another have 
 been assembled where they belong, avoiding application of 
 them to subjects or countries which they were not intended 
 to affect. Then names, misleading or clumsy, have been 
 changed. The Executive Council, which was and is not 
 executive but advisory, has become the Council. The Body 
 of Delegates has become the Assembly, a much more suit- 
 able term. 
 
 Second, rules of construction that ought to have ob- 
 tained in interpreting the original Covenant are now made 
 express and relieve the real doubts of friends and supporters 
 of the League. The most important of these, perhaps, is 
 the privilege specifically reserved to any member of the 
 League to withdraw from it after two years' notice and 
 after a compliance with its obligation under international 
 law and under the League Covenant incurred before with- 
 drawal. This gives any nation an opportunity to test the 
 operation of the League and its usefulness and to avoid 
 undue and unreasonable danger or burden in the future 
 which actual trial may develop. Moreover, taken with the 
 power of amendment which can be effected by a unanimous 
 vote of the nine countries whose representatives compose the 
 Council and by a majority of the members of the League, 
 there is ample opportunity for such a country as the United 
 States to secure a revision of the Covenant and a reexami- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 315 
 
 nation of the status of the states composing the League 
 after peace has stabilized conditions and has shown where 
 changes should be made. We are so important a member of 
 an effective world league, and so indispensable to its suc- 
 cessful working, because of our impartial position and 
 world power, that an announcement of our purpose to with- 
 draw unless amendments were made would be most per- 
 suasive. In this view Mr. Root's suggestion, that it would 
 be well to reexamine treaty provisions made just after the 
 war in the light of the test of five years or more of peace, 
 can be carried out. 
 
 The second change of the same character is the provision 
 that, except where otherwise specifically provided, the action 
 of the Council or the Assembly shall be by unanimous vote. 
 The original covenant, properly interpreted, meant this, but 
 it is of great importance to remove objections of those who 
 did not think so. There are some who believe that such 
 required unanimity will make the League ineffective and that 
 a majority would have sufficed. But progress toward com- 
 plete international cooperation in a new field like this must 
 be gradual, and must, for the present, leave safeguards 
 to nations against abuse of joint power which, experience 
 may show, can be dispensed with later. The required 
 unanimity in the action of the Council is very important in 
 the answer it gives to the claim that under Articles X and 
 XVI the United States may be required to send expedi- 
 tionary forces into distant parts of the world to defend 
 the integrity and independence of a country with which we 
 have no relation of interest or to suppress remote wars not 
 affecting us. Such expeditions are to be planned and recom- 
 mended by the Council, and the plan is to be accepted in 
 the discretion of the countries to whom the recommendation 
 
316 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 is addressed. The plan would certainly mark the limit of 
 the obligation of the nations to whom it is presented. The 
 United States will have a representative on the Council, 
 whose vote must approve the plan before its presentation. 
 Is it likely, then, that the plan will be unreasonable in pro- 
 posing an undue share of the League's work to the United 
 States? May we not be sure that what is to be done will 
 be apportioned according to the convenience and natural 
 interest of the members of the League, because it must in ef- 
 fect be by mutual agreement? 
 
 It is now made clear that under Article VIII the limit 
 of armament for each country, under a general plan of 
 reduction proposed by the Council, is only to be adopted 
 and made binding as a covenant for each member of the 
 League after its full examination and acceptance by that 
 member. Moreover, there is to be a reexamination of the 
 plan and the limits every ten years, and meantime a specific 
 limit may be increased by consent of the Council. 
 
 It is now made an express provision that only nations who 
 choose to accept the duty may be made mandatories of the 
 League. This removes another objection that was strongly 
 pressed. We do not have to take charge of Constantinople 
 or Armenia unless we choose to do so. 
 
 One important change made by addition is the result of 
 Mr. Root's constructive criticism. Mr. Root thought, and 
 all who supported the plan of the League to Enforce Peace 
 agreed with him, that the provision for arbitration ought 
 to have required arbitration in justiciable issues, and he de- 
 fined what he thought was clearly within the meaning of 
 that term. By the present Article XIII the members agree 
 to submit to arbitration any dispute which they recognize as 
 suitable for arbitration. The Covenant then declares dis- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 317 
 
 putes of the character described by Mr. Root, and, as the 
 writer recollects, in Mr. Root's language, to be suitable 
 for arbitration. Disputes as to interpretations of treaties, 
 as to international law, as to facts upon which its applica- 
 tion turns and damages for its breach are all declared to be 
 arbitrable, or, in other words, justiciable. This imposes on 
 members of the League having a dispute the duty of recog- 
 nizing such disputes to be arbitrable and to submit them to 
 arbitration. Can this duty be enforced under the League? 
 Practically yes. If a nation declines to arbitrate such an 
 issue, it goes to the Council or Assembly, with interested 
 members excluded. Such body will at once recommend 
 arbitration or will refer the issue to an international court 
 of the League, as it may, to determine whether the issue 
 is arbitrable under the obligations of the Covenant and will 
 doubtless follow the judicial advice thus given. As this 
 machinery thus works out indirectly the result sought for 
 in the plan of the League to Enforce Peace, an amendment 
 to substitute a court of the League to take up and decide 
 such questions directly will doubtless approve itself to the 
 nations. 
 
 Mr. Root was anxious that, in addition to the declaration 
 in the preamble, there should be practical recognition of 
 international law as a guiding star of the League, its tri- 
 bunals and its action. In the addition to Article XIII, 
 which we have been discussing, we find such a recognition 
 in the present Article XIV providing for a permanent 
 international court of justice which is competent to hear and 
 determine any dispute of international character submitted 
 to it and to give an advisory opinion upon any dispute 
 or question referred to it by the Council or Assembly. 
 
 The provision for mediation and recommendation of set- 
 
318 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 tlement in the first report of the Covenant, which met Mr. 
 Root's unqualified approval, has not been changed, except 
 that the unanimity required for an effective recommendation 
 by the Body of Delegates is now made unanimity by coun- 
 tries represented in the Council and a majority of the As- 
 sembly, a change which makes for effectiveness. Another 
 important change is the addition of Article XXI, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity 
 of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or 
 regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the 
 maintenance of peace 
 
 This meets two of Mr. Root's criticisms in full. First, 
 it removes all doubt that all present arbitration treaties are 
 to stand and bind the parties to them whether members of 
 the League or not, and relieves those who were concerned 
 lest progress toward peace by arbitration already made 
 might be lost. 
 
 Second, it not only 'enables the United States to maintain 
 the Monroe Doctrine, which was all that friends of that 
 doctrine asked, but it recognizes it as a regional understand- 
 ing for the securing of international peace. Never before 
 in our history has the world set its approval upon the doc- 
 trine as in this Covenant. It is really a great triumph for 
 the supporters of the doctrine. It is not only a reservation 
 in favor of the United States asserting it, but it is an af- 
 firmative declaration of its conventional character and of its 
 value in securing international peace. 
 
 The exclusion of immigration and tariff and other in- 
 ternal and domestic questions is secured by the following: 
 
 If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them and 
 is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by inter- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED .319 
 
 national law is solely within the jurisdiction of that party, the 
 Council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to 
 its settlement. 
 
 If anything is clearly settled in international law, it is that, 
 except where a nation limits its rights by treaty, it may 
 impose whatever condition it chooses upon the admission of 
 persons or things into its territory. Those who express 
 alarm lest the Council should reach a different conclusion, 
 in spite of international law, can hardly be aware how 
 jealous all countries must and will be of their right to deter- 
 mine methods of raising taxes and protect their industries, 
 and how strenuously many of the nations will insist on the 
 right to exclude persons not desirable as permanent resi- 
 dents. Indeed, Japan has not urged, in the conference, 
 the view that immigration was anything but a domestic ques- 
 tion, but only pressed for an express recognition of racial 
 equality in the treatment of foreign persons resident in each 
 country. Even this the conference did not deem it wise 
 to grant. 
 
 Finally, we come to Article X, by which the members of 
 the League undertake to respect and preserve against ex- 
 ternal aggression the territorial integrity and political in- 
 dependence of every member. Mr. Root, as the writer 
 understands, strongly favors this article ; but he thinks there 
 should be a ree'xamination of the arrangements made under 
 the influence of the recent war, after conditions have be- 
 come stabilized by peace, to remedy the possible mistakes 
 made and to avoid too great rigidity. How this can be 
 brought about indirectly through powers of amendment and 
 withdrawal has already been pointed out. 
 
 The arguments against Article X which have been most 
 pressed are those directed to showing that under its obli- 
 
32O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 gallons the United States can be forced into many wars 
 and burdensome expeditions to protect countries in which 
 it has no legitimate interests. This objection will not bear 
 examination. If Germany were to organize another con- 
 spiracy against the world, or if she and her old allies, to- 
 gether with Russia, were to organize a militant campaign 
 for Bolshevism against the world, we should wish to do 
 our share in fighting her, and in doing so quickly. If a 
 stronger nation were to attack a weaker nation, a member 
 of the League, our immediate and selfish interest in the 
 matter would be determined by the question whether it would 
 develop into a world war and so drag us in. But we are 
 interested as a member of the family of nations in main- 
 taining international justice in the interest of international 
 peace everywhere, and we should share the responsibility 
 and burden. It was a mixture of all these motives which 
 carried us into this war and we accepted as a slogan the 
 cry: " The world must be made safe for democracy. We 
 make this war to secure the liberty and independence of 
 nations against the doctrine that ' might makes right.' ' 
 This is all that Article X proposes. It is an answer to 
 Germany's assertion of her right of conquest. It organizes 
 the powers of the world to maintain the international com- 
 mandment, " Thou shall not steal." 
 
 To what extent will it involve us in war? Little, if any. 
 In the first place, the universal boycott, first to be applied, 
 will impose upon most nations such a withering isolation and 
 starvation that in most cases it will be effective. In the 
 second place, we will not be drawn into any war in which it 
 will not be reasonable and convenient for us to render ef- 
 ficient aid, because the plan of the Council must be approved 
 by our representative, as already explained. 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 32 1 
 
 In the third place, the threat of the universal boycott and 
 the union of overwhelming forces of the members of the 
 League, if need be, will hold every nation from violating 
 Article X and Articles XII, XIII and XV, unless there is a 
 world conspiracy, as in this war, in which case the earlier 
 we get into the war the better. 
 
 The warning effect of such a threat from a combination 
 of nations, like those in the League, is shown conclusively 
 in the maintenance of our Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine 
 was announced in 1823. Its declaration was deprecated by 
 American statesmen because it would involve us in con- 
 tinual friction and war. It was directed against most 
 powerful European nations. Yet we have maintained it 
 inviolate without firing a shot or losing a soldier for now 
 near a century. Article X merely extends the same pro- 
 tection to the weaker nations of the world which we gave 
 to the weaker nations of this hemisphere against the greed 
 of non- American nations. If our declaration accomplished 
 this much, how much more can we count upon the effective- 
 ness of the declaration of a powerful world-league of nations 
 as a restraint upon a would-be bully and robber of a small 
 nation ! 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 The following correspondence is published with the con- 
 sent of President Wilson. 
 
 Washington, Tuesday, March 18, 1919. 
 Personal. 
 Dear Mr. Tumulty: 
 
 I enclose a memorandum note to the President that is 
 
322 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 probably superfluous, but may contain a suggestion. Do 
 with the note as you choose for the next ten days, the 
 situation in Paris will be crucial and critical. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 WM. H. TAFT. 
 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty, 
 Secretary to the President, 
 The White House, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 931 Southern Building, 
 
 March 18, 1919. 
 Mr. President: 
 
 If you bring back the treaty with the League of Nations 
 in it, make more specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine, 
 fix a term for duration of the League and the limit of arma- 
 ment, require expressly unanimity of action in Executive 
 Council and Body of Delegates, and add to Article XV a 
 provision that, where .the Executive Council of the Body 
 of Delegates finds the difference to grow out of an exclu- 
 sively domestic policy, it shall recommend no settlement, 
 the ground will be completely cut from under the opponents 
 of the League in the Senate. Addition to Article XV will 
 answer objection as to Japanese immigration as well as 
 tariffs under Article XXI. Reservation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine might be as follows: 
 
 Any American State or States may protect the integrity 
 of American territory and the independence of the govern- 
 ment whose territory it is, whether a member of the League 
 or not, and may, in the interests of American peace, object 
 to and prevent the further transfer of American territory 
 or sovereignty to any European or non-American power. 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 323 
 
 Monroe Doctrine reservation alone would probably carry 
 the treaty but others would make it certain. 
 
 WM. H. TAFT. 
 Hon. Woodrow Wilson, 
 President of the United States, 
 Paris, France. Augusta, Georgia. 
 
 March 19, 1919. 
 My dear Mr. Tumulty: 
 
 Gus Karger has telegraphed me that the President will 
 welcome any suggestions, and the sooner the better. I have 
 thought perhaps it might help more if I was somewhat more 
 specific than I was in the memorandum note I sent you yester- 
 day, and I therefore enclose another memorandum for 
 such action as you deem wise. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 WM. H. TAFT. 
 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty, 
 Secretary to the President, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Augusta, Ga., March I9th, 1919. 
 Memorandum for the President: 
 From William H. Taft. 
 
 Duration of the Covenant 
 
 Add to the Preamble the following: 
 
 4< from the obligations of which any member of the 
 League may withdraw after July I, 1929, by two years' 
 notice in writing, duly filed with the Secretary General of 
 the League." 
 
 Explanation. 
 
 I have no doubt that the construction put upon the agree- 
 
324 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 ment would be what I understand the President has already 
 said it should be, namely that any nation may withdraw 
 from it upon reasonable notice, which perhaps would be a 
 year. I think, however, it might strengthen the Covenant 
 if there was a fixed duration. It would completely remove 
 the objection that it is perpetual in its operation. 
 
 Duration of Armament Limit 
 
 Add to the first paragraph of Article VIII, the following : 
 " At the end of every five years, such limits of armament 
 for the several governments shall be reexamined by the Exe- 
 cutive Council, and agreed upon by them as in the first in- 
 stance." 
 
 Explanation 
 
 The duration of the obligation to limit armament, which 
 now may only be changed by consent of the Executive 
 Council, has come in for criticism. I should think this 
 might be thus avoided, without in any way injuring the 
 Covenant. Perhaps three years is enough, but I should 
 think five years would be better. 
 
 Unanimous action of the Executive Council or Body of 
 Delegates 
 
 Insert in Article IV, after the first paragraph, the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 " Other action taken or recommendations made by the 
 Executive Council or the Body of Delegates shall be by the 
 unanimous vote of the countries represented by the members 
 or delegates, unless otherwise specifically stated." 
 
 Explanation 
 
 Great objection is made to the power of the Executive 
 Council by a majority of the members and the Body of 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 325 
 
 Delegates to do the things which they are authorized to do 
 in the Covenant. In view of the specific provision that 
 the Executive Council and the Body of Delegates may act 
 by a majority of its members as to their procedure, I feel 
 confident that, except in cases where otherwise provided, 
 both bodies can only act by unanimous vote of the countries 
 represented. If that be the right construction, then there 
 can be no objection to have it specifically stated, and it will 
 remove emphatic objection already made on this ground. 
 It is a complete safeguard against involving the United 
 States primarily in small distant wars to which the United 
 States has no immediate relation, for the reason that the 
 plan for taking care of such a war, to be recommended or 
 advised by the Executive Council, must be approved by a 
 representative of the United States on the Board. 
 Add to Article X. 
 
 a. " A state or states of America, a member or members 
 of the League and competent to fulfil this obligation in 
 respect to American territory or independence, may, in event 
 of the aggression actual or threatened, expressly assume 
 the obligation and relieve the European or non-American 
 members of the League from it until they shall be advised 
 by such American state or states of the need for their 
 aid." 
 
 b. " Any such American state or states may protect the 
 integrity of any American territory and the sovereignty of 
 the government whose territory it is, whether a member 
 of the League or not, and may, in the interest of American 
 peace, object to and prevent the further transfer of Ameri- 
 can territory or sovereignty to any European or non-Ameri- 
 can power." 
 
326 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Explanation 
 
 Objection has been made that, under Article X, European 
 governments would come to America with force and be con- 
 cerned in matters from which heretofore the United States 
 has excluded them. This is not true, because Spain fought 
 Chili, in Seward's time, without objection from the United 
 States, and so Germany and England instituted a blockade 
 against Venezuela in Roosevelt's time, This fear could be 
 removed, however, by the first of the above paragraphs. 
 
 Paragraph (b) is the Monroe Doctrine pure and simple. 
 I forwarded this in my first memorandum. 
 
 It will be observed that Article X only covers the integ- 
 rity and independence of members of the League. There 
 may be some American countries which are not sufficiently 
 responsible to make it wise to invite them into the League. 
 This second paragraph covers them. The expression 
 " European or non-American " is inserted for the purpose of 
 indicating that Great Britain, though it has American 
 dominion, is not to acquire further territory or sovereignty. 
 
 Japanese Immigration and Tariffs 
 
 Add to Article XV: 
 
 "If the difference between the parties shall be found by 
 this Executive Council or the Body of Delegates to be a 
 question which by international law is solely within the do- 
 mestic jurisdiction and polity of one of the parties, it shall 
 so report and not recommend a settlement of the dispute." 
 
 Explanation 
 
 Objection is made to Article XV that under its terms the 
 United States would be bound by unanimous recommenda- 
 tion for settlement of a dispute in respect to any issue foreign 
 or domestic; that it therefore might be affected seriously 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 327 
 
 and unjustly by recommendations against the exclusion of 
 Japanese or Chinese, or by recommendations forbidding 
 tariffs on importations. In my judgment, we could rely on 
 the public opinion of the world, evidenced by the Body of 
 Delegates, not to interfere with our domestic legislation and 
 action. Nor do I think that under the League as it is, we 
 covenant to abide by a unanimous recommendation. But if 
 there is a specific exception made in respect to matters com- 
 pletely within the domestic jurisdiction and legislation of a 
 country, the whole criticism is removed. The Republican 
 Senators are trying to stir up anxiety among Republicans, 
 lest this is to be a limitation upon our tariff. The President 
 has already specifically met the objection as to limitation 
 upon the tariff when the fourteen points were under discus- 
 sion. Nevertheless, in respect to the present language of 
 the Covenant, it would help much to meet and remove ob- 
 jections, and cut the ground under Senatorial obstruction. 
 Prospect of Ratification 
 
 My impression is that if the one article already sent, on 
 the Monroe Doctrine, be inserted in the treaty, sufficient 
 Republicans who signed the Round Robin would probably 
 retreat from their positions and vote for ratification so that 
 it would carry. If the other suggestions were adopted, I 
 feel confident that all but a few who oppose any League at 
 all would be driven to accept them and to stand for the 
 League. 
 
 TELEGRAM 
 
 The White House, Washington, D. C, 
 
 March 22nd, 1919. 
 Hon. William H. Taft: 
 
 Have just received following from the President. 
 
328 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 " Please thankfully acknowledge to Mr. Taft his message 
 and say that I hope it will be very useful." 
 
 J. P. TUMULTY. 
 
 TELEGRAM 
 
 Augusta, Georgia, 
 
 March 28, 1919. 
 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty, 
 White House, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Venture to suggest to President that failure to reserve 
 Monroe Doctrine more specifically, in face of opposition in 
 conference, will give great weight to objection that League as 
 first reported endangers Doctrine. It will seriously em- 
 barrass advocates of League. It will certainly lead to 
 Senate amendments embodying Doctrine and other provi- 
 sions in form less likely to secure subsequent acquiescence of 
 other nations than proper reservation now. Deem some 
 kind of Monroe Doctrjne amendment now to Article Ten 
 vital to acceptance of League in this country. I say this 
 with full realization that complications in conference are 
 many and not clearly understood here. A strong and suc- 
 cessful stand now will carry the League. 
 
 WM. H. TAFT. 
 
 The White House, Washington, D. C., 
 
 Mar. 31, 1919. 
 Hon. Wm. H. Taft, 
 Dayton, Ohio. 
 
 The President has asked me to thank you for your cable- 
 gram about the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 J. P. TUMULTY. 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 329 
 
 New York, N. Y., 
 
 April loth, 1919. 
 My dear Mr. Tumulty: 
 
 We are very much troubled over the report that the 
 Monroe Doctrine amendment to the Covenant is being op- 
 posed by England and Japan. Will you be good enough to 
 send the enclosed to the President? We had a meeting to- 
 day of the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce 
 Peace, and Dr. Lowell and I, at the instance of the League, 
 will be glad to have this matter presented directly to the 
 President by cable. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 WM. H. TAFT. 
 Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty, 
 Secretary to the President, 
 The White House, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 New York, N. Y., 
 
 April loth, 1919. 
 The President, 
 Paris. 
 
 Friends of Covenant are seriously alarmed over report 
 that no amendment will be made more specifically safeguard- 
 ing Monroe Doctrine. At full meeting of Executive Com- 
 mittee of League to Enforce Peace, with thirty members 
 from eighteen States present, unanimous opinion that, with- 
 out such amendment, Republican Senators will certainly 
 defeat ratification of treaty because public opinion will sus- 
 tain them. With such amendment treaty will be promptly 
 ratified. f 
 
 WILLIAM H. TAFT. 
 A. LAWRENCE LOWELL. 
 
33O TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
 Washington 
 
 14 April, 1919. 
 Dear Mr. Taft: 
 
 I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the tenth 
 instant, and to say that I have transmitted to the President 
 by cable the message enclosed. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 J. P. TUMULTY, 
 Secretary to the President. 
 Hon. William H. Taft, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 WILLIAM H. TAFT 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 May 5, 1919. 
 My dear Mr. Tumulty : 
 
 I am very much troubled that this conference at Paris was 
 unable to adopt a provision in favor of religious freedom 
 throughout the world. > There is no necessity for such a reso- 
 lution in respect to the allied countries, because there is now 
 religious freedom there. The acute necessity for it is with 
 respect to Poland, Rumania, and those other new States 
 carved out of Russia, Austria and Germany. I would like, 
 therefore, to have you transmit to the President, as coming 
 from me, a cable message of the following purport : 
 
 " The Tews of the United States are greatly disturbed over re- 
 liable reports coming to them of continued abuses of their co- 
 religionists in Poland, Rumania and in the new Slav States created 
 under the auspices of the conference. Is it not possible to im- 
 pose on these States, as a condition of their recognition and 
 membership in the League, the maintainence of religious free- 
 dom under their respective governments? What was done in the 
 
CORRESPONDENCE 331 
 
 Berlin Conference of 1879 ought to be possible in the more 
 favorable atmosphere of this conference, with the additional 
 securities of performance that the League will give." 
 
 I understand that unless something of this sort is done, 
 there will be a strong movement among the Jews to attack 
 the League and I do not need to tell you that there are men in 
 the Senate who will seize every opportunity of this kind as 
 an instrument to defeat its ratification. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 WILLIAM H. TAFT. 
 
 Hon. Jos. P. Tumulty, 
 
 Secretary to the President, 
 
 The White House, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
 Washington, 
 
 6 May 1919. 
 My dear Mr. Taft: 
 
 Let me acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the fifth 
 of May quoting a message regarding religious freedom which 
 you wish me to transmit to the President. I am doing so 
 to-day by cable. 
 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 J. P. TUMULTY, 
 Secretary to the President. 
 Hon. William H. Taft, 
 931 Southern Building, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 PRINTED IN TH UNITED 8TAT18 OV AMBBICA 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, reference 
 
 to, 252 
 Administrative Organization of 
 
 League, 3 
 
 Alabama Claims, 40, 49, 192 
 Alaskan Boundary Arbitration, 49, 
 
 241 
 Alsace-Lorraine, reference to, 85, 
 
 132, 136, 165, 222 
 Ammunition, Supervision of trade 
 
 in, 25 
 
 Appeal to Business Men, 241 
 Appeal to Women, 257 
 Arbitration (see " Arbitration 
 
 Treaties " and " Concilia- 
 tion"), 13, 191, 220, 232, 241, 
 
 264, 316 
 
 Concerning Seal Fisheries, 44 
 With Canada, 62 
 Arbitration, compulsory, 289 
 Arbitration Treaties, 39, 43, 178, 
 
 262 
 Arbitration Treaties of the United 
 
 States, 54 
 Armaments 
 Limitation of, 102, 109, 157, 298, 
 
 324 
 
 Reduction of, 10, 116, 149, 178, 
 208, 248, 263, 264, 288 
 
 Armenia, reference to, 136, 143, 
 154, 248 
 
 Armenia as mandatory, 224 
 
 Armenians, 167 
 
 Armistice, basis of, 183 
 
 Arms (see " Munitions ") 
 
 Articles of Confederation, refer- 
 ence to, 29, 30 
 
 Article 10 of the League 
 Arguments against answered, 
 319 
 
 Article 10 of the League confd. 
 
 Discussion of, 255, 269, 325 
 
 Guaranties of, 308 
 Asquith, Mr., quoted, 218 
 
 Referred to as favoring the 
 
 League, 98 
 
 Assembly, reference to, 6, 7, 314 
 Australian System of Military 
 
 Training (see " Military 
 Training ") 
 
 B 
 
 Balkan States, reference to, 136, 
 
 143, 237 
 
 Baltic Provinces, 139, 143, 237 
 Beck, James M., reference to, 214, 
 
 215 
 
 Belgium, invasion of, 92 
 
 Belgium's Neutrality, Violation of 
 obligation to protect, 89 
 
 Bering Sea Controversy, arbitra- 
 tion of, 44, 64, 241 
 
 Bernhardi, reference to, 87 
 
 Bessarabia, 143 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg referred to as 
 favoring League, 98 
 
 Bismarck, reference to, 85, 86, 89, 
 181 
 
 Body of Delegates, 265, 271, 299 
 
 Bohemia, 143 
 
 Bolsheviki, 175, 183, 184, 213, 219 
 
 Bolshevism, 158, 177, 273, 302, 305 
 
 Bourgeois, M. Leon, reference to, 
 212 
 
 Borah, Senator 
 Objections of to League an- 
 swered, 76 
 
 Reference to, 198, 217, 260, 295, 
 297 
 
 Bosnia, reference to, 224 
 333 
 
334 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Boycott, reference to, 65, 219, 232, 
 
 245, 267, 268, 321 
 Objections to answered, 67 
 Use for prevention of war, 105 
 When to be instituted, i, 18 
 Boxer Affair, reference to, 122 
 British League of Free Nations, 
 
 206 
 
 Briand, M., referred to as favor- 
 ing the League, 74, 98 
 Bryan, W. J., answered as to con- 
 stitutionality of plank for use 
 of military forces, 57 
 Debate with on League to En- 
 force Peace, 98-132 
 Bryce, Lord, referred to, 74 
 Business Men, appeal to, 241 
 
 Canada 
 
 Agreement with as to fortifica- 
 tions, etc., XIV, 240, 264 
 
 Arbitration with, 62 
 
 Our relations with, 40 
 Caucasus, the, reference to, 248 
 Canning, reference to, 252, 
 Cases Cited 
 
 Geoffrey v. Riggs, 54 
 
 Hans v. Louisiana, 35 
 
 Kansas v. Colorado, 36, 52 
 
 Louisiana v. Texas, 38 
 
 Missouri v. Illinois, 34 
 
 Wisconsin v. The Pelican In- 
 surance Co., 37 
 Cecil, Lord Robert, 
 
 Quoted, 287 
 
 Reference to, 212, 220 
 Children, Traffic in, 25 
 Chinese, Question as to naturali- 
 zation of, 63 
 Civil War, Analogy to war with 
 
 Germany, 83 
 Clemenceau 
 
 Quoted, 215 
 
 Reference to, 194, 202, 212, 213 
 
 Commission on Conciliation, 42, 
 43, 50, S3, 189, 196 
 
 Compulsory Military Training, 123 
 
 Conciliation, Instances of, 63, 64 
 
 Conciliation, Commission of (see 
 " Commission on Concilia- 
 tion " and " Council of Con- 
 ciliation ") 
 
 Confederations of small States, 
 example of, 29 
 
 Congress of Nations, 205 
 
 Congress, Power to declare war 
 (see Treaty-making power), 
 68 
 
 Conscription law, reference to, 96 
 
 Constantinople as mandatory, 224 
 
 Constitution of United States, 
 framing of, 224 
 
 Constitutionality of Proposals of 
 the League to Enforce Peace, 
 52 
 
 Constitutionality of the League, 
 276 
 
 Council of Conciliation, 100, 160, 
 205 
 
 Court (see "International 
 Court ") 
 
 Court Decisions (see " Cases 
 Cited ") 
 
 Court of International Justice, 14 
 
 Covenant of Paris (see " Paris 
 Covenant ") 
 
 Criticism of League, should be 
 constructive, 198, 200 
 
 Cuba 
 
 Integrity guaranteed, 149 
 Our relation to, 72 
 Reference to, 159, 187 
 Treaty with, 59 
 
 Czecho-Slovaks, reference to, 136, 
 
 139, 175, 237 
 Czecho-Slavs, 143, 154 
 Czecho- Slavs, in Russia, 219 
 
 D 
 
 Dalmatian Coast, 312 
 Danzig, 306 
 
INDEX 
 
 335 
 
 Dardanelles, 183 
 
 Delegates, Body of (see " Body 
 
 of Delegates") 
 Democrats, Support of League by, 
 
 199 
 
 Denmark 
 Schleswig-Holstein taken from, 
 
 85 
 
 Disarmament, 149, 163, 239 
 
 Disarmament and Freedom of the 
 Seas, 163 
 
 Disease, Control of, 26 
 
 Disputes 
 
 Cases before Court to determine 
 disputes between States un- 
 der Articles of Confederation, 
 30 
 
 Procedure for settlement of, 15, 
 19 
 
 Divine Right of Kings, 142 
 
 Draft, reference to, 96 
 
 England, Our relations with, 40 
 England and Her Navy, 164 
 Entangling Alliances (see " Wash- 
 ington's Advice ") 
 Economic Barriers, discussion of, 
 
 176 
 Europe, to rearrange map of, 144, 
 
 154 
 
 Executive Council 
 Power of, 209, 298 
 Reference to, 206, 260, 265, 276, 
 281, 314 
 
 Fess, Mr., reference to, 260 
 Finland, 143, 237 
 Fisheries Case, 192 
 Fiume, reference to, 301, 306, 311, 
 Foch, Marshal, reference to, 301 
 Forf (see "Military Force") 
 Discussion of, XV, 103, 124, 160, 
 189 
 
 Necessary for effective League, 
 
 108 
 
 Necessary to use force against 
 force, 133 
 
 Fourteen Points, reference to, 139, 
 142, 149, 155, 157, 163, 165, 
 171, 176, 183, 215 
 
 France, War of 1870, 85 
 
 Freedom of the Seas, 160, 163, 176 
 
 French Association for the Soci- 
 ety of Nations, 207 
 
 German Colonies, reference to, 22, 
 
 142, 164, 248 
 German Colonies and the League, 
 
 221 
 
 German efficiency, 182 
 German Militarism, reference to, 
 
 81, 91, 94 
 
 German Preparedness for War, 87 
 Germany, 157 
 And the membership in the 
 
 League, 151 
 
 Essential to defeat, 132 
 Growth and development of, 85 
 Hemming in, 187 
 Not to join League at once, 193 
 War of 1870, 85 
 Grant, General, quoted, 95 
 Great Britain, Representation of, 
 
 271 
 
 Greater League, 101, 161 
 Great Powers and the League, 151, 
 161, 162, 177, 192, 195, 196, 197, 
 202, 215, 216, 217 
 Greece, Leagues of, 29 
 Grey, Lord 
 In favor of League, 74, 98 
 Quoted, 79 
 
 H 
 
 Hague Conference, Second, 41 
 Hague Tribunal, referred to, 220 
 
336 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Hamilton, reference to, 224 
 Hayes and Tilden dispute, 159 
 Henry, Patrick, reference to, 247 
 Herzegovinia, reference to, 224 
 Holy Alliance, reference to, 142 
 Hughes, Mr., referred to as fav- 
 oring League, 99 
 Hungary, 302 
 
 Immigration, 318 
 Indemnities, 300 
 International Bureau of Labor 
 
 provided for in League, 247 
 International Army, Necessity for, 
 
 ISO 
 
 International Bureaus, 26 
 International Court, 50, 53, 61, 99, 
 
 160, 188, 196, 205, 225, 317 
 Supreme Court as precedent 
 
 for, 43 
 International Law, 50, 189, 195, 
 
 205, 208 
 Conferences to agree upon, 42, 
 
 44 
 
 Definition of, 61, 93, 125 
 Method for formulating, and 
 
 codifying, 2, 3 
 
 The League to formulate princi- 
 ples of, loo 
 
 International Police (see " Mili- 
 tary Police") 
 
 International Prize Court, 56 
 Internationalism, Argument as to 
 
 answered, 146 
 Ireland and the League, 225 
 Isolation inconceivable, 162 
 Italy and Her Entrance into the 
 War, 311, 312 
 
 Japanese, Immigration and natu- 
 ralization of, 49, 63, 266, 310, 
 326 
 
 Jay Treaty, 54, 56 
 
 Jefferson, Thos., reference to, 119, 
 
 174, 252 
 Jews and religious liberty, 166, 
 
 309, 330 
 Jews in Rumania, Poland, etc., 
 
 310 
 Jugo Slavs, 136, 139, 143, 154, 175, 
 
 237 
 
 Justiciable, definition of, 179 
 Justiciable questions, I, 3, 33, 39, 
 
 49, 53 
 
 Kaiser, reference to, 140 
 Kant, reference to, 113 
 Knox, Senator 
 
 Answered, 280 
 
 Discussion of plan of League 
 proposed by, 289 
 
 Reference to, 198, 201, 210, 214, 
 
 215 
 
 L 
 
 Labor, to improve conditions as 
 
 to in all countries, 25 
 Lansing, Secretary, reference to, 
 
 212 
 
 Larger League, 189 
 League 
 
 A barrier to wars, 257 
 
 Analogy to Domestic Govern- 
 ment, 78 
 
 British, 206 
 
 Constitutionality of, 276, 277, 
 280 ff 
 
 Covenant, As amended, Analysis 
 of, 313 
 
 English plan referred to, 83 
 
 Feasibility of, discussed, 78 
 
 Functions of, 195 
 
 Fundamental plan of, 41 ff 
 
 Greatest step in history, 290 
 
 Members of, 27 
 
 Objections to, 297 
 
 Reasons for entering, 249 
 
 Withdrawal from, 323 
 
INDEX 
 
 337 
 
 League of Nations (sec " Paris 
 
 Covenant"), 52 
 Defined, 178 
 
 League to Enforce Peace 
 Constitutionality of Proposals, 
 
 52 
 
 Planks of Platform, 188 
 Platform of, I, 205 
 Purposes of, 74 
 Steps in organization of, 180 
 Legislative Body of League (see 
 " Assembly " and " Body of 
 Delegates "), 3 
 Lesser League, 101, 160, 163, 195, 
 
 208, 217 
 Lesser Powers and the League, 
 
 151 
 
 Lincoln, referred to, 83 
 Lithuanians, 175 
 Lloyd George 
 Quoted, 115, 218 
 Reference to, 194, 202, 212, 302 
 Lodge, Senator 
 Reference to, 74, 198, 214 
 Referred to as favoring the 
 
 League, 99, 174 
 
 Loughborough, Lord Chancellor, 
 quoted, 56 
 
 M 
 
 Madison, James, reference to, 252 
 Mandatories, 22, 223, 224, 234, 262, 
 
 309, 3i6 
 
 Mason, George, reference to, 247 
 Members of League, 27 
 Mesopotamia, reference to, 248 
 Milyukoff, quoted, 135 
 Militarism, 94, 138, 142, 157, 165, 
 
 221 
 
 Military Aid, when to be given, 18 
 Military Force 
 Analogy to police in maintain- 
 ing order, 106 
 Discussion of, 65, 100, 112 
 Objections to answered, 57, 67 
 When to be used, I, 18, 42, 45, 
 48 
 
 Military Training, Universal, 150, 
 
 163, 204, 217 
 Missouri v. Illinois, 34 
 Monroe Doctrine 
 Interpretation of, 269 
 Message of President Monroe 
 
 enunciating, 253 
 
 Reference to or discussion of, 
 VII, VIII, 22, 70, 77, 119, 203, 
 216, 252, 254, 274, 275, 276, 292, 
 322, 328, 329 
 Reservation as to, 318 
 Morgenthau, Mr., reference to, 
 
 258 
 Munitions, manufacture of, n 
 
 N 
 
 Napoleon, reference to, 95, 103, 
 141 
 
 National isolation impossible in 
 the future, 134 
 
 Nationalism, League not incon- 
 sistent with, 146 
 
 Naturalization, 63 
 
 Neutrality of Belgium, Violation 
 of, 90 
 
 New Nations or Republics to be 
 created, X, 143, 145, 160, 185, 
 187, 188, 236 
 
 Non-Justiciable Questions, 49 
 
 O 
 
 Objections to League, 198, 200, 
 
 209, 249 
 Answered: 
 
 (1) As to Boycott, 67 
 
 (2) As to Military Force, 67 
 
 (3) As to Unconstitutional- 
 
 ity of, 68 
 Olney, former Secretary of State, 
 
 quoted, 57-58 
 Opium, Traffic in, 25 
 Oregon Boundary Dispute, 40 
 Orlando, reference to, 313 
 
INDEX 
 
 Paderewski, reference to, 310 
 Palestine, 248 
 
 As Mandatory, 224 
 Panama 
 Independence of, guaranteed, 59 
 
 149 
 
 Treaty with, 58 
 
 Panama Canal, reference to, 72 
 Paris Covenant, discussion of, 
 
 228, 233, 262, 290 
 Peace 
 
 Dangers of Premature, 81 
 Not delayed by League, 300 
 Steps to secure, 296 
 Peace Offer, Danger of, 138 
 Pennsylvania v. Connecticut, un- 
 der Articles of Confederation, 
 30 
 Platform of League (see 
 
 " League ") 
 
 Discussion of, 98, 107, 145 
 Plunkett, Sir Horace, reference 
 
 to, 226 
 Poincare, President, reference to, 
 
 213 
 
 Poindexter, Senator 
 Answered, 147, 240 
 Quoted, 239 
 
 Reference to, 154, 260, 297 
 Pogroms, reference to, 167 
 Poland, 143, 154, 237 
 Poles, 175 
 
 Police (see " International Po- 
 lice ") 
 
 Polk, President, quoted, 253 
 Preparedness, in relation to 
 
 League, 80 
 Presidential Election, description 
 
 of, 185-186 
 
 Pro-German sentiment, 92, 97 
 Purpose of United States in the 
 War, 133 
 
 R 
 Racial Freedom, 309 
 
 Reasons for entering the League, 
 249 
 
 Reed, Senator, reference to, 154, 
 260, 297 
 
 Referendum, discussion of use be- 
 fore declaring war, 115 
 
 Regional Understandings, Reser- 
 vations as to, 318 
 
 Religious Liberty, 166, 309, 330 
 
 Republicans and the League, 199 
 
 Reptile Fund, reference to use of 
 to bribe the press, 89 
 
 Republics, New (see "New Re- 
 publics ") 
 
 Roosevelt, Former President, re- 
 ferred to, 75, 201, 202, 203 
 
 Roosevelt and the Japanese-Rus- 
 sian War, 83 
 
 Root, Mr., reference to, 315, 317, 
 
 319 
 
 Round Robin, the, 307 
 Rumania, 143 
 
 Rumania and the Jews, 168, 310 
 Russia 
 
 Discussion of problems of, 183 
 Reference to, 87, 91, 135, 136, 
 143, 154, 175, 219, 305 
 S 
 
 Scott, James Brown, reference to, 
 
 212 
 Seal Fisheries (see " Bering Sea 
 
 Controversy ") 
 Secret Treaties, 311 
 Self -Determination, 136 
 Self-Government, definition of, 
 
 185 
 Separate Peace, Logical result of 
 
 those opposing League, 154 
 Slovakia (see " Czecho-Slavs ") 
 Smuts, General, reference to, 235, 
 
 261 
 
 Saar District, 222 
 Small Nations, 196, 197 
 
 Protection of by League, 193 
 Smaller League (see "Lesser 
 
 League ") 
 
INDEX 
 
 339 
 
 Socialists, reference to, 146, 153 
 
 Sonnino, reference to, 301, 313 
 
 Sovereignty, discussion of, VIII, 
 147, 148, 191, 279 
 
 Submarine Warfare, reference to 
 use of, 80, 89, 93, 94, 157, 180, 
 181 
 
 Sully, reference to, 201 
 
 Super-sovereignty, League not to 
 establish, XIV, 148, 215, 259 
 
 Supreme Court, Analogy to inter- 
 national tribunal, 32 
 
 Swiss System of Military Train- 
 ing (see "Military Train- 
 ing ") 
 
 Syria, reference to, 248 
 
 Tariff, Exclusion from League, 
 
 3i8, 326 
 
 Tennyson, reference to, 201 
 Treaties 
 Secret, 311 
 To be registered with League, 
 
 20 
 Those negotiated by Mr. Bryan, 
 
 in 
 
 Treaty of Versailles 
 Delay in making, 303 
 Long and complicated, 188 
 Treaty-making Power, discussion 
 
 of, 53, 58, 68, 239, 285, 286 
 Treaty of Peace and the League 
 
 of Nations, 272, 280 
 Trentino, reference to, 136, 154, 
 
 165, 312 
 Triple Alliance, reference to, 104, 
 
 312 
 Triple Entente, reference to, 104, 
 
 312 
 
 Turkey, reference to, 136, 143 
 Turkish Empire, Disposition of 
 
 certain communities, 23 
 
 U 
 Ukraine, reference to, 143, 237 
 
 United States 
 Discussion as to whether the 
 United States should join the 
 League, 117 
 
 Driven to the war, 156 
 Influence in League, 194 
 Power, wealth and growth of, 
 
 71 ff, 79 
 
 Purpose of in the war, 133, 181 
 Universal Training (see " Mili- 
 tary Training ") 
 
 Victory, Obligations of, 141 
 Victory Program, 2 
 Victory with Power, 132 
 Viviani, M., quoted, 135 
 
 W 
 
 War 
 
 Delay of by investigation, ni 
 Right of Congress to declare, 
 
 149 
 
 Washington's advice against en- 
 tangling Alliances, Discussion 
 of, IX, XII, 71 ff, 119, 132, 156, 
 174, 274 
 
 White, Henry, reference to, 212 
 Wilson, President 
 And the Fiume Controversy, 
 
 313 
 
 Correspondence with in refer- 
 ence to the League, 321 ff 
 Influence in Europe, 194 
 Quoted, 79, 91, 134, 157, 218 
 Reference to, 74, 153, 154, 162, 
 
 169, 211, 223, 230, 238, 255 
 Referred to as favoring the 
 
 League, 98 
 
 Wilson, Professor, quoted, 70 
 Women, Appeal to, 257 
 Workingmen and the League, 152 
 World Court, discussion of, 114 
 
340 INDEX 
 
 World Court Congress, Address Z 
 
 before, 28 
 
 World Politics, 134 Zeppelins, reference to use of, 89 
 
 World War, Beginning of, 87 Zones, Division of world into, 
 
 216 
 
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