Grenville
Considerations on the
Establishment of a
Regency
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
E STABLISHMENT
O F A
REGENCY;
WITH AN
APPENDIX:
CONTAINING PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO SETTLING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT DURING THE MINORITY OP
HENRY VI. AND DURING THE KING BEING DIS<VUALI-
FID BY INFIRMITIES.
LONDON:
fRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE OPPOSITE
BURLINGTON-HOUSE PICCADILLY, 1788.
( Price is. 6~d. )
S/0
CONSIDERATIONS,
NO public fentiment has ever been
more ftrongly exprefled, than that
general confternation and grief, which
his Majefty's affecting fituation has ex-
cited in the minds of a dutiful and loyal
people. Such a calamity muft at all
times have been feverely felt ; but there
are many circumftances which have ren-
dered it peculiarly diftrefling in the pre-
fent moment. It has come upon us fud-
B denly,
t * ]
denly, and without preparation ; inter-
rupting a courfe of the moft unexampled
profperity, and difturbing that confi-
dence in our public fituation which had
taken frefh root and vigour in the opi-
nions of mankind. Our former quiet
and fecurity have by this event been
changed to uncertainty and alarm ; we
are deprived by it of the ineftimable ad-
vantages of a fettled form and order of
government, and involved in all the
difficulties of a cafe nearly unprecedented
in our annals, and wholly unprovided
for by any pofitive regulation of our
laws.
Unlefs fome favourable turn fliould
take place with refpect to his Majefty's
diforder, there may foon exift an una-
voidable neceflity of doing that, which
muft be painful to the feelings of every
man
[ 3 ]
man of making fome temporary pro-
vifion for adminiftering the executive
power, during the fufpenfion of its exer-
cife in thofe hands in which the confti-
tution of our country has lodged it.
The public attention of this free com-
munity muft therefore be directed to the
difcuffion of this fubjeft, although it be
of fuch delicacy as is exceeded only by
its importance ; and although, even from
the difcuffion of it, many evils are to be
apprehended.
It is however the part of a good citi-
zen, neither to be difpirited by the mif-
fortunes, nor intimidated by the dangers,
of his country; but rather to be ani-
mated by both, to the difcharge of that
duty, which he may feel incumbent
upon him under fuch circumflances.
This is a point, in the decifion of which
B 2 we
[ 4 ]
we are all highly concerned. Every
Englifhman is, therefore, bound to exa-
mine it with care and diligence, to form
his opinion upon it deliberately and con-
fcientioufly, and to fupport that opi-
nion by all legal and conftitutional means,
according to the meafure of his abilities,
and the fituation of life in which he is
placed.
In the difcuflions to which this fub-
ject leads, fome reference will naturally
be made to the hiftory of former times,
and to thofe precedents which may be
thought to bear a refemblance to our
prefent fituation. But whatever refpedt
is due to the information derived from
thefe fources, the only rational ufe which
can be made of it for our prefent purpofe,
is to examine what were the leading
principles on which our anceftors pro-
ceeded
t S ]
ceeded in thofe cafes; and to enquire
how far, and in what manner, thofe prin-
ciples apply to the prefent crifis, under
all the changes which the revolution of
fo many ages has produced. Nor ought
we to go beyond this, in our adherence
to precedents, or to follow now the
practice of former ages, in points where
the reafon of that practice has ceafed to
operate.
The objects to be attended to in our
prefent proceedings, will beft be collected
from a confideration of the circum-
ftances of that emergency by which we
may be compelled to act. We are to
eftablifh fuch an intermediate form of
adminiftration as may be beft adapted
for carrying on the public bufmefs,
during his Majefty's illnefs, with the
neceflary difpatch and energy ; and for
fecuring,
[ 6 ]
fecuring, as far as human wifdom can
fecure it, that whenever it (hall pleafe
God to remove this heavy vifitation
from us, the Sovereign to whom we
have fworn allegiance, and for whom
we feel as one man the ftrongeft fenti-
ments of veneration, attachment, and gra-
titude, mail be effectually reftored, not
to the -poffeffion only, but ta the exer-
cife of his undoubted rights, which he
enjoys for the benefit of his fubjets, and
of which he cannot be deprived, without
an injury done to ourfelves.
An idea has indeed been thrown out,
which, if it were founded in truth, would
render any further reafoning upon thefe
points ufelefs and improper : It has been
faid by fome, that, in a cafe fuch as the
prefent, the whole power, authority, and
prerogative of the King, devolve imme-
diately
[ 7 1
diately and of right to the perfon next in
fucceffion to the Crown, in the fame man-
ner as in the unfortunate event of a de-
mife. The flighted acquaintance either
with Englifh hiftory or with Englifh law,
is fufficient for enabling us to reject at once
this notion, equally unwarranted and un-
juft. No trace of fuch a right can be found
upon the records of Parliament, nor has
any fuch opinion been cited from the
works of any writer upon the Britifh con-
ftitution. On the contrary we fhall find,
that even in periods infinitely lefs favour-
able than the prefent for the afTertion of
the true principles of our Government,
every interruption in the exercife of royal
authority has uniformly been provided
for in Parliament. The principle on which
this practice has been grounded, is ob-
vious and unqueftionable. The order
of hereditary fucceffion to the throne of
thefe
[ 8 ]
thefe realms, has been eftablifhed among
us, not for the advantage of any indivi-
dual family, however entitled to our grati-
tude and veneration, but for the benefit
of the nation, and for the fecurity and
happinefs of millions : and undoubtedly
it is a great bleffing to us, that on the
death of our Sovereigns, their Crown
fhould defcend, by a fundamental law of
the State, in a known and fettled courfe
of fuccefTion ; but beyond this cafe, nei-
ther the law itfelf, nor the reafon of the
law, extend. During the life of a Britifh
King, no man can claim an hereditary
right to the exercife of royal power, nemo
eft bteres viventis. This is the known and
acknowledged maxim of our laws, apply-
ing with equal force to every defcription
of right or property, and to every rank
and condition of men ; and it is parti-
cularly to be obferved, that at the sera of
the
[ 9 ]
the Revolution, when the Commons ap-
pointed a Committee to maintain, in a
conference with the other Houfe, the true
principles of that tranfaction, the great
lawyers chofen for this important truft
relied much on this very rule of law,
which they then cited as applying to the
cafe of the Crown, and as forming a ma-
terial branch of their argument, in fup-
port of that vote which laid the founda-
tion of all the fubfequent proceedings.
If then this principle be true, that the
hereditary right to the Crown, like every
other right of inheritance, attaches only
in the cafe of the death of the perfon in
pofleffion, the confequence cannot be dif-
puted. In thofe extraordinary and un-
forefeen emergencies, when an interrup-
tion arifes from other caufes in the admi-
niftration of this fovereign truft, it re-
C mains
mains with the people to exercife a powef
which they have referved, and to provide
a remedy adapted to the occafion which
requires it. Such a right, if it were flip-
pofed to veft in the whole body of the in-
habitants of a country, fo as to be exercifed
by each of them individually, might juft-
ly be confidered as one merely fpeculative.
But in a free and well-ordered govern-
ment, like ours, a regular channel is pro-
vided, through which the rights of the
people may be exerted, according to the
different orders of fociety eftablifhed
amongft us. The fame mode, therefore^
by which the nobility and commonalty
of this realm exercife their (hare in the
Legiflature of their country, is naturally
pointed out to us, as that by which' they
are alfo to perform the ftill more import-
ant function, of fupplying the occafional
deficiencies in the remaining branch of
the
[. " 3
tlie conftitution, and of providing for the
difcharge of the duties of executive go-
vernment.
In earlier periods of our hiftory, when
the comparative importance of the Com-
mons was lefs than at prefent ; and when
their mare in the legislative ads of our
government was at leaft not fo diftindly
exprefled, the Lords fometimes appear
to have taken a more forward and leading
part in fuch tranfadions as bear a refem-
blance to the prefent crifis. But even
then, the confent of the Commons is al-
moft always ftated on our records, and
probably was always given : and, upon
the whole, this leading principle appears
to have been invariably adhered to, that
on any failure in the exercife of the royal
authority during the life of the King, the
deficiency could only be fupplied by that
C 2 body,
body, in whom, conjointly with the
King, the legiflative power had refided.
The fame principle applies with greater
force -'to the prefent times, when the infti-
tutlons of our government have been
more developed, and ; are more diftinctly
underftood. It is in Parliament that
the people ' of Great Britain exercife their
fhare of the government. It is on Par-
liament that the care of providing for this
emergency does unqueftionably devolve ;
and that 1 degree of authority, which it
may be neceflary to grant for this pur-
pofe, cannot be claimed as a right, but
muft be conferred as a truft, under fuch
fuch rcftridions as may bejudged advan-
tageous to the people at large. -
The proceedings in every cafe that can
be found in our annals, bearing either re-
femblance
[ '3 ]
femblance or analogy to the prefent, have
all been regulated in conformity to the
maxims- above ftated. Sometimes the
Britifh Crown has defcended on the heads
of minors. The guardianfhip, both of
the Sovereign and of his kingdoms, has
in fuch cafe been granted under the fanc-
tion of Parliament, either by a -previous
authority given for that purpofe by fta-
tute to the preceding King; or, in default
of fuch provifion, by actual nomination
immediately after the demife. It is by
no means true, that the perfon named to
this important truft has always been the
next in fucceffion to the Crown, or in-
deed that any general rule has obtained
to limit the difcretion of Parliament. In
one cafe *, where no previous parliamen-
tary provifion had been made, a claim of
* See Rolls of Parliament, vol. iv. p.-.ge 171.
j Hen. 6. Sec alfo ibid. p. 3^6. 6 Hen. 6,
right
[ '4 J
riglit was indeed urged by one of the
relations of the King to the Regency of
the kingdom during his minority. This
claim was formally examined and difal-
lowed by Parliament, who, " after long
*' and great deliberation and advice,fearch-
" ing precedents of the government of
" the land in fimilar times and cafes,
" when the Kings of this land have been
" of tender age, and taking information
c< of the laws of the land from fuch
" perfons as were learned therein, finally
" found the faid defire not grounded in
" precedent, nor in the law of the land.'*
They afterwards, however, granted to
the fame perfon a more limited power *,
fubjedt to the controul of a Council, and
held under a title,, conceived to be of lets
. * Rolls of Part. vol. v. p. 407, 408, &c. 5 H. 6.
dignity
t '5 3
dignity than that of Regent ; and upon
thefe terms the office fo granted was ac-
cepted and exercifed by him, and again
refigned at the requifhion of the fame au-
thority.
In another inftance *, the Monarch
was alleged to be difqualified by difeafe
from the exercife of his power. A Pro-
tedtor *) was chofen by the Lords at the
requeft of the Commons ; and his power
was, in like manner as 'in the preceding
cafe, limited by Parliament, at whofe
pleafure his commiflion was made revoc-
* Rolls of Parl. vol. v. p. 239 to 242. ji&: 32 H. 6,
f- It is remarkable, that the Duke of York, in ac-
cepting his office, delivered in a paper to the Lords,
in which he defires that it fliould be declared by the
authority of Parliament, that they, " of their free and
" mere difpofition," ha named him to that office, and
that he did not take it upon him from any prelumption
of himfelf, but in obed! :nce to the King and to the
peerage of the land ; " in whom, by the occafion of
** the infirmity of our faid fovereign Lord, re Us the
* ejtercifc of his authority." Rolls. Parl. vol. 3. p. 2.
able,
[ '6 ]
able, and by whom it was afterwards re-
pealed*.
At other periods of our hiftory, our
Sovereigns have been depofed for real or
alleged mifconduft. It is hardly necef-
fary to fay, that thefe cafes are cited as
bearing on the prefent qileftion in one
point only; namely, in fhewirtg the power
of Parliament in every cafe where the
exercife of royal authority is fufpended,
and not as by any means refembling it,
either in the particular occafion on which
this power is to exercifed, or in the na-
ture or extent of the meafures to be
adopted. But in all thefe inftances, what-
* The proceedings in thefe two cafes, as they ap-
pear on the Rolls of Parliament, are fo curious and
interefting, that an abftraft of them, with copies or
ttanilations of fome of the moft material parts, is Sn-
fertcd at the end" of this Pamphlet, as an Appendix
to ir.
ever
t '7 1
fever has been done, has proceeded from
Parliament alone: particularly in 1688,
fo far were Parliament from admitting
that, by the abdication of James the Se-
cond, the exercife of rbyal power de-
volved to his next heir, that they vefted
it in King William alone ; giving to
Queen Mary herfelf only the title of
Queen, without annexing any authority
to it*, and even poftponing the fucceflion
of the Princefs Anne to the Crown till af-
ter his death. And this is a precedent,
which, for the folemnity of the occafion,
the .regularity of the proceedings, and
the happy confequences which have re-
fulted from them^ may, as far as it ap-
plies to the prefent cafe, be juftly con-
* This was fo diftin&ly done, that when King
William went over to Ireland, an Adt of Parliament
\vas neceffary to enable the Queen to exercife royal au-
thority during his abfence. See Statute W. & M. c.
D fidered
[ '8 ]
fidered as affording the fureft foundation
for any meafures which muft now be
taken.
The feveral particulars in which this
laft cafe, as well as thofe before cited,
differ from the circumftances of the pre-
fent fituation;are fufficiently obvious.. The
principle has, however, been the fame
throughout, that the right of hereditary
fucceflion attaches only on the death of
our Sovereigns, but that every other in-
terruption in the exercife of royal au-
thority muft be efpecially provided for
by Parliament. And if this has been
done in the cafe of Monarchs who were
adjudged to have forfeited their claim to
the allegiance of their fubje&s^ and who
could therefore never be reftored to their
authority, how much more mull Parlia-r
mcnt feel it incumbent upon them to
take
take into their own hands the meafures
which are n6w to be purfued ; having, in
addition to the duty of providing for the
intermediate adminiftration of the go-
vernment, fo important a truft to dif-
charge, as the prefervation of the rights
of a Sovereign, fo juftly dear to the hearts
of all his fubje&s, and who may, at any
moment, be again in a fituation to re-
aflume the exercife of his power, for the
advantage and happinefs of his people.
I have dwelt the longer upon this
point, becaufe the opinions which I
have combated have been fpread with
confidence and induftry ; and becaufe
they are faid, though with little proba-
bility, to have received the fan&ion of
fome legal authority. I am perfuaded,
however, that the difcuflion is, and al-
ways has been, wholly unneceiTary ; and
D 2 that
[.*>].
that the illuftrlous Perfon to whom it
principally relates, has too jufl a regard
to the rights of Parliament, and to the
laws and conftitution of his country, to
have liftened for a moment to fuch fug.,
geftions, if any fuch can have been made
to him.
If then the right of Parliament to pro-
vide for this emergency be clearly efta-
blifhed, the next queftion would natu-
rally be, in what hands they ought tq
place that portion of executive authority
which they may judge neceffary for, car^
rying on the government without pre-
judice to the rights of the King. On
this fubject two ideas naturally prefent
themfelves. The confiding this degree
of authority to the hands of a fingle
perfon, aided only by a Council of his
own appointment, and fubjeft to difinif-
fioa
[ i 3
fion by him ; or the veiling it in a Count
cil of Regency, to be appointed by Par-
liament, and to be removed only with the
confent of a majority of their own body.
All the precedents, or almoft all that can
be found on the records of Parliament,
incline to the latter of thefe two modes.
If any fubject in this country has ever ex-
crcifed royal authority, without being
fubject to the controul of a fixed and
permanent Council, it has been in times
of fuch confufion and anarchy, that no ar-
gument can be drawn from it to any re-
gulation of fettled government. While
on the other hand, the principle of fuch
a Council has been adopted in the moil
recent, and therefore the beft, iuftances
that we can refort to for the eftablimment
of Regencies. I mean the provifionmadeiii
jthe time of Queen Anne * for the ab-
* See Star. 6 Anne, 6, - ( , eft. 11. .
fence
fence of her fucceflbr from his domi-
nions, at the period of his acceflion, and
the bills pafled in the reigns of his * late
and prefent Majefty f, to provide for the
cafe of a minority.
Yet, notwithstanding thefe confidera*
tions, there are circumftances which feem
to make it defirable, fuppofmg it can be
done cOnflftently with the important ob-
jcds which have been ftated, to lodge
the truft now to be created, rather in the
hands of a fmgle perfon, and that per-
fort the Heir Apparent to the Crown,
than in thofe of any Council to be named
by Parliament. A confutation ftrch as
ours rs, has always fome tendency, on
the one fide or the other, to principles
* See Stat. 24 Geo. 2. c. 24.
f See Stat. 5. Geo, 3, c. 37,
unfa*
unfavourable to its continuance ; and k
is only by a minute attention to the leaft
inclination of the fcale, that its balance
can be maintained. We have feen with-
in a few years, at the period immediate-
ly preceding the diflblution of the Par-
liament in 1784, a ftruggte on the part
of a powerful ariftocracy to ufurp to
themfelves, by a cabal in Parliament,
the moft unqueftionable, and perhaps
the moft important branch of the royal
prerogative, the nomination to the offices
of executive government. And we aft.
remember, that this attempt " could no
otherwife have been defeated, than by
the fortunate union of the two other
parts of our conftitution, the legal power
of the monarchy, and the prevailing voice
and weight of the people. The prefent
occafion is, certainly, in many refpeclis,
widely
widely different from that which ha
been alluded to. There is now a tem-
porary fufpenfion of all monarchical
authority; and the nomination of a
Council by Parliament under thefe cir-
cumftances, would be at leaft a legal ex-
ercife of the power which has thus de-
volved to them, inftead of being a direct
infringement of the acknowledged rights
of the Sovereign. But it mould be the
particular object of thofe who love the
true conftitution of their country, to
guard, with the utmoft jealoufy, againft
the renewal of that principle which they
have already combated with fuccefs^
We mould remember, that the claim
then fet up againft the Crown, although
condemned at the time by the unanimous
decifion of the country, is nevertheless
ftill maintained and defended by a con-
fiderable
t ^ ]
fiderable body of public men. At fome
future period it may be revived, even
if the circumftances of the prefent mo-
ment render its fupporters lefs anxious
to bring it forward to public view. We
cannot therefore be too careful that no-
thing mould be done, efpecially at fuch
a moment as the prefent, which might
hereafter give countenance and fupport
to a principle destructive of the very
frame of the Britim conflitution. And,
notwithstanding the great difference in
the prefent cafe, it is impoffible not to fee
that fuch a conclufion might be drawn
from this precedent, if Parliament mould,
on any other grounds than that of the
moft urgent neceffity, proceed to name
a permanent Council, although compofed
of men in whom the Sovereign and the
people might befh confide.
E The
t *6- ]
The danger is indeed fo great, of fuffer-
ing any individuals, of whatever defcrip-
tion, to monopolize, directly or indirectly,
the adminiftration of public affairs, that
nothing but the utmoft exigency could
render it juftifiable. In addition to this
we are to obferve, that if, in the eftablifh-
ment of fuch a Council, the precedent of
any former regency mould be followd,
the fyftem fo eftablifhed, though ftrong
for the ends of perfonal intereft and am-
bition, would be weak and infufficient
to any purpofe of good government.
The executive Officers of the Crown
would almoft inevitably be at variance
with the Perfon reprefenting the fovereign
authority ; and this would happen at a
time, when, on the one hand, hrs great
natural weight and influence as Heir
Apparent to the Throne would be much
increafed by his actual fituation ; and
when,
when, on the other, the tenure by which
they held their authority would enable
them to retain a permanent pofleffion of
all the moft important offices in the ad-
miniftration of public affairs. The con-
fequences muft be, thofe of a confufed
and diffracted government, wholly occu-
pied with domeftic intrigues and ani-
moiities, and incapable of attending,
either to the maintenance of our internal
profperity, or to the prefervation of our
fyftem of foreign policy, the foundations
of which have fo recently been laid.
Whatever therefore may be the wifhes of
the Public, that the government may
continue in the hands of his Majefty's
prefent Minifters, this can be done with
fafety to the country by regular and
conPdtutlonal means alone. By the cdn-
currence of the Regent, both in the de-
clared fentiments of the King, whofe
E 2 autho-
authority will be committed to him by
a temporary delegation ; and in the
wfthes of the people, from whole hands
he will have have received fo important
a truft. Whether there is any reafon or
not to expect fuch a concurrence, the
principle is equally binding. No at-
tempt ought to be made, and \ve may
hope that none will be made, by the
prefent Minifters, to continue themfelves
in the poffeflion of their offices by the
appointment of Parliament, and inde-
pendently of whatever may be eftablifh-
ed as the executive power. They came
into office on different grounds ; nor can
they, in the prefent moment, better con-
fult their own characters, or more effec-
tually difcharge what honour, gratitude,
and duty require of them, than by pro-
viding every fecurity for the prefervation
of
[ '9 ]
of the King's authority, by providing
none for the prefervation of their own
power.
The necefiity of making a flaivl
\vith refpeft to the former of theP:. wo
objects, is indeed a point which cannot
be too ftrongly infifted upon ; and this
the rather, becaufe, however important
and indifpenfable a duty, it is neverthelefs
liable to mifreprefentations, which every
one would wifh to avoid. It is eafy to
fee with what advantages fuch a prin-
ciple may be oppofed, by adverting to
confiderations of perfonal character, and
by making ufe of names which can never
be mentioned or received but with re-
fpecl: and deference. But let no man
on fuch grounds as thefe deceive himfelf,
or be deceived by others into a neglect
of that duty which he owes to his
Sove-
[ 3 ]
Sovereign and to his Country. It is the
very firft principle of legiflation in a free
country, that thofe points which are ef-
fential to the advantage or fecurity of the
community, fhould reft on a more folid
bafis than that of perfonal confidence.
We require even of our Kings, when
they receive the homage of their fubjects,
that they mould bind themfelves by an
oath to maintain our liberties, and to ob-
ferve our laws. Not certainly that we
mean, at fuch a moment as that, to ex-
prefs to our new Sovereign a diftruft of
his perfonal character ; but becaufe we
think it our duty to remind him of the
nature of the truft which he undertakes,
and, at the fame time, to give additional
fecurity and fandion to that conftitution
which we are bound to maintain in-
violate. Suppofe that any man, at the
beginning of a new reign, mould defire
us
[ 3' 3
us to difpenfe with this oath as implying
jealoufy and diftruft ; or, fhould advife
us to repeal the ftatutes which fecure our
liberties, becaufe the character of the
new Prince might juftly claim the con-
fidence of his people^-with how much
reafon would the author of fuch a pro-
pofal incur our indignation, for infufmg
into the mind of his Sovereign a diftruft
of the affections of his people ; and for
fetting the laws of his country at variance
with the perfonal cnarader of the Mo-
narch ? In what refpecl: will the conduct
of thofe men be lefs exceptionable, who
{hall tell us, that no fecurity can be ne-
ceflary for preferving the rights of his
Majefty, becaufe no attempt againft them
can be fufpected to proceed from the
Prince? We may all, as individuals,
feel ourfelves perfuaded, that his Royal
Highnefs is incapable of forming fuch a
defign.
[ 3' ]
defign. We may believe that he has
penetration to difcover, and firmnefs to
refift the attempts of any party to mif-
lead him into meafures calculated either
to eftablifh his power in the place of his
father's, or to eftablifh their own power in
the place of both. But as a legiflative
body, owing allegiance to their Sovereign
and duty to their fell ow-fubj eels, the
two Houfes of Parliament are bound,
not to fufpect his Royal Highnefs, God
forbid they mould ! but to iufpect and
to guard againft thofe who may become
his ' advifers. They are no more at li-
berty to furrender at difcretion, and on
grounds of perfonal confidence, the au-
thority of the King, and the intereil
which the people have in its prefervation,
than to yield up in the fame manner the
fecurities we enjoy for any other of our
rights, for the trial by juries, or for our
perfonal freedom.
If
[ 33 1
If, then, we lay afide the apprehenfion
of fuch unworthy imputations, and ap-
ply ourfelves to examine this cafe as a
point of hiftory, or as a queftion of ab-
ftract reafoning, we muft fee that there
. is in the prefent inftance a ftronger ne-
ceffity than in any former one, for fecu-
ring with jealous attention the rights of
the Sovereign. The more ftrongly it is
contended, that the perfon now to be
placed at the head of the Government
ihould not, like every other Regent, be
limited by the control of any permanent
Council ; fo much the more is Parliament
bound to look with jealoufy to the man-
ner in which the Counfellors whom he
employs may advife him to exercife his
power. Nor can that caution be deemed
injurious now, which has not been deem-
ed fo in former ages, and in the cafe of
fo many illuftrious perfons, entrufted only
F with
I 34 j
with concurrent, and not with fole autho-
rity. It has indeed been faid, that the ob-
jecl: in thofe cafes was, to provide a fecu-
rity for the rights of the perfon who was,
at the expiration of the Regency, to en-
ter upon the exercife of the Sovereign
authority: but that here the caution
would be unriecefTary, becaufe the power
would refide in the hands of the Heir
Apparent to the Crown. This reafoning
can be valid only in the opinion of thofe.
who call a temporary indifpofition by the
inaufpicious name of a demife. It can
be of no weight with the people of Eng-
land, who look with confidence to better
hopes, to the profpect of the King's
health being reflored within as fhort a pe-
riod as has been known in almoft innu-
merable inftances of private perfons who
have fuffered for a time from fimilar at-
tacks. If there were only a poffibility
that
t 35 ]
that the prayers of the kingdom would
be fuccefsful, even that poflibility muft
deftroy fuch an argument as that referred
to. How much lefs fhall we be inclined
to give credit to it, when common expe-
rience mews, that the moft probable event
of the prefent cafe is that which every
Englifhman earneftly defires,
It is therefore the indifpenfable duty of
Parliament, in providing for the prefent
exigency, to allow no degree of autho-
rity to be exercifed, which fhall be incom-
patible with maintaining the King in the
pofleffion of his rights, and enabling him
to re-affume the exercife of them when
ever his health fhall allow it. The pro-
vifions requifite for this purpofe are in-
deed fo far from being inconfiftent with
the objects to which we mould look in
(pftablifhing an intermediate Government,
F a that
[ 36 ]
that they form an indifpenfable part of
any fyftein of permanency and tranquil-
lity in the country. If this point were
unprovided for, and the cafe {liould af-
terwards occur, can any man believe that
the people of this country would fubmit
patiently to the confequences of fuch a
neglect? And might we not, on the con-
trary, by thefe means, inftead of a ftrong
Government, which is the language of
fome men, have fecured to ourfelves, in
an event neither improbable nor perhaps
diftant, the certainty of confufion and
tumult ? It follows therefore, not only
that it would be unjuftifiable, for the
fake of giving ftrength and energy to the
intermediate Government, to neglect
making full provifion for the prefervation
of his Majefty's rights ; but that no
ftrength or energy can exift in any fuch
Government, unlefs the country feels
that this effential object is fecured.
With
[ 37 ]
With refpect to the particular form
and mode in which the Regent's power
ihould be eftablifhed according to thefe con-
fiderations, this is an object which might
require a more detailed inveftigation than
is confiftent with the nature of this
enquiry. The principles, however, which
refult from what has already been faid,
are fufficiently obvious, and it cannot be
difficult to apply them to the feveral
queftions which may be expected to
arife, ,
It will, in the firft place, be clear, that
whatever authority is neceflary for carry-
ing on the ordinary bufmefs of executive
adminiftration, muft be granted to the
perfon in whom we veft the intermedi-
ate Government, unlefs it can be fhewn
to be incompatible with the prefervation
of the King's authority. It will be equally
evident,
[ 38 ]
evident, that no power ought to be fo given,
which is not neceflary for the purpofe
above ftated, even though it fhould not
be injurious to the rights of the Sovereign ;
becaufe the grant of any power what-
ever, in the prefent cafe, being entire-
ly grounded on the neceffity which
calls for it, fuch a grant ought, on the
one hand, to be made as nearly as poffible
co-extenfive with that neceffity ; but
fhould not, on the other hand, be fuffered
to reach beyond the foundation on which
it refts.
In cafes where thefe principles might
appear to clam, and where the neceffity
of carrying on a prefent government
might interfere with the duty of referving
to the King the full power to re-aflume
the exercife of his rights, the decifion
muft be made according to the importance
of
[ 39 1
of the efeds which might be produced
on either fide. But it may be faid with
confidence, that although this decifion
may in a few particular inftances appear
embarrafling; yet that, generally fpeaking,
the two objects are far from being in-
compatible ; and that the providing for
both, is the only way to fecure the tran-
quillity and good government of the
country.
In addition to what has been ftated,
there is one inconteftible maxim, to which
the utmoft regard is to be paid. The
powers of an intermediate, temporary, and
delegated authority, ought not to bind
that which is primary, permanent, and
original, except with regard to thofe acts
only which are of the moft abfolute ne-
ceffity, and which are in their own nature
final and conclufive. Such, forinftance, are
the negotiations with foreign powers ;
fuch
I 40 ]
fuch are alfo the nominations of judges,
and of a few other officers who muft by
law be appointed during good behaviour*
We may fafely admit thefe exceptions,
without prejudice to the general rule, and
in the fulleft confidence, that his Majefty
will in no cafe regret the confequence of
a principle to which he himfelf gave addi-
tional force and efficacy in the very firftmo*
ments of his reign*, by further fecuring the
independence of the judges. Butwlth thefe
exceptions it may fafely be afferted, that
no power can with propriety be given to
the Regent, in the prefent inftance, to do
any one act which the Sovereign may not
revoke whenever he mail return to the
exercife of his authority.
The force and evidence of thefe prin-
ciples cannot be refilled by any juft or
* See Stat. i. G. 3. p. 23.
folid
[ 4' 1
ifolid 'argument. If they can at all be
combated, it muft be by oppofmg to
them fome general topics of the advan-
tages of a ftrong Government. Such a
mode of reafoning, if followed up to its
true conclufion, would apply not only to
overthrow the precautions which we may-
think necefTary in this particular inftance,
but to deftroy at once every fecurity that
has ever been eftablifhed, in any Govern*-
ment, againft the extent or the poffible
abufe of power* There is no doubt, that
abfolute and uncontrouled authority, not
re (trained by any law?, nor checked by
any councils, nor liable to be queftioned in
any tribunals, would be to many purpofes
the ftrongeft Government that could be
devifed. But the evils of this form are
fo intolerable, that there is hardly any
country where it has not been found ne-
ceffary to deftroy fomething of the energy
G that
[ 4' I
that would refult from fuch a fyftem'.?
in order to provide for the more import-
ant ends, of the fecurity of thofe who
are governed, arid the ftability of thofe
who govern. It is, therefore, now held
in almoft every country in Europe, that
the Sovereign muft at leaft be bound by
the laws which he has himfelf eftablifhed.
In thefe kingdoms, happily for us, we
have proceeded a great deal further : we
have provided, not only that the King
{hall be bound by the law, but that the
law fhall no otherwife be eftablifhed, al-
tered, or repealed, than by the whole
body of the people acting in conjunction
with the Sovereign, through the medium
of their great national AiTembly. No
man can doubt, that by thefe provifions
the energy of the Britifh Government is,
in many refpe&s, very confiderably
weakened ; although this inconvenience
t 43 1
is much more than counterbalanced 'by
inumerable advantages. This then is the
principle of every Government, but more
efpecially of ours, that its energy mould
not alone be confidered, but that in any
<meftion relating to it, the benefits to
arife on that account mould be contrafted
with the dangers to be apprehended on
other grounds ,; and that on this com-
parifon the decifion mould be formed.
In the ordinary courfe of our Govern-
ment this balance has already been ex-
amined,, and the machine regulated ac-
cording to it If, in providing for an un-
forefeen emergency like the prefent, we
-mould find, that an .additional ground of
danger arifes from the very nature of our
remedy, and that it is, perhaps, attended
alfo with additional inducements to the
abufe of power, the confequence una-
ypidably follows, that we muft fecure
G 2 our-
[ 44 ]
ourfelves againft thefe rnifchiefs, even at
the hazard of deftroying fome degree of
energy ; in the fame manner as our an-
ceftors have fecured us againft many
others, by a fimilar facriilce.
We are then to obferve, that in the
prefent cafe, befides the provifions necef-
fary for the prefervation of the liberties
of the people againft the executive power,
and againft the attempts of powerful
individuals in the country, we are to fe-
cure the executive power itfelf, in thofe
hands in which it is permanently vefted,
againft the mifchiefs that might refult to
it from the unreftrained exercife of an in-
termediate authority, mould fuch exer-
cife unfortunately be influenced by the
counfels of interefted and defigning men.
We are to do this, not merely for the
fake of the Sovereign individually
(though
[ 45 ]
(though to him we have fworn allegiance
and owe a pofitive duty), but for the
fake of the people at large, whofe fecu-
rity, whofe tranquillity, and whofe liber-
ties, are interefted in preferring his rights
inviolate and unimpaired.
If, for this purpofe, it fhould be ne-
ceflary in fome degree to weaken the
energy of the temporary government,
we may regret this as a part of the cala-
mity under which we are fallen, but we
cannot certainly confider it as an object
to which we ought to facrifice fo many
Interefts infinitely more important. We
may obferve, in eftimating the amount of
this inconvenience, how much lefs it is,
than the mifchief of a fimilar nature to
which Parliament has thought it would be
prudent to fubmit in the cafe of other
Regencies, in order to provide for the very
objed
object which we are now anxious to fe-
cure. We may confider, that in this in-
flance a fole Regent would be appointed,
imreftrained by any council of Regency ;
that the Adminiftration acting under the
illuftrious perfon on whom the choice of
Parliament will naturally fall, would pof-
fefs, under fuch circumftances as the pre-
fent, many fources of weight and influence
which do not belong to the Government
even of the Sovereign himfelf. We fhould
alfo reflect, that even if under all thefe
circumftances it mould be the effect of
the principles here ftated to lefTen in fome
degree the energy of Government, yet
that the inconvenience of doing fo is
much lefs in fuch a moment as the pre-
fent than at any other period. In times
of difficulty or danger there exifts a greater
neceflity for vigour and exertion ; but in
a ftate of tranquillity, of domeftic har-
mony,
[ 47 1
mony, and of general profperity, there
can be no fufficient grounds for neglect-
ing on this account the duties of allegiance
and of juftice, and thereby incurring a
rifk, fuch as has already been mention-
ed, and which, if it ihould turn againft us,
would at once deftroy every favourable
circumftance in our prefent fituation.
Thefe reafonings apply for the morl
part to any form of Government. But
there is an additional confideration, which
arifes from the peculiar nature of our con-
ftitution, and which is therefore entitled
to our particular attention.
The reafons have already been {rated,
which prove, that a permanency of power
in the hands of any individuals in this
country, to be held againft the executive
authority, is dangerous to the public wel-
fare.
i 48 ]
fare* If thefe apply even in fitch a cafe
as the prefent, and induce us to render it
at leaft poffible that his Majefty may oil
his recovery find the Adminiflration of
his affairs in other hands than thofe to
which he had confided them ; they cer-
tainly are much more conclufive againft
allowing any other body of men to avail
themfelves of the interval, as againft him,
and to eftablim themfelves in fuch a man-
ner as might hereafter be prejudicial to
his authority. Many of the means which
might occur for this purpofe would fall
under the laft of the principles above
ftated. But if there mould be any others
peculiarly applicable to our conftitution,
and capable of producing any fuch effect,
it is to be hoped that the wifdom of the
two legiflative bodies, to whom we look
on this occafion, will watch Over thefe
with a more than ordinary degree of cau-
tion y
t 49 ]
tion ; it fhould be remembered, with how
much difficulty an attempt to eftablifh the
power of a confederacy in Parliament was
defeated by our prefent Sovereign, in the
full exercife of his authority, and fupport-
ed by the almoft unanimous voice of his
people. Whatever meafures may appear
on full confideration to be neceflary to
prevent a repetition of this evil, at a pe-
riod fo much more dangerous, cannot
but meet the full eft afTent, approbation,
and fupport of every true Englishman.
There are fome other points to be at-
tended to, fully equal to the former in
their importance, but perhaps lefs like-
ly to be contefted. Parliament muft un-
doubtedly provide fome regular channel
of information, to the intent that when-
ever it mail pleafe God to reftore his Ma-
jefty to the wifhes of his people, the pro-
H grefe
[ 5 ]
grels of his recovery may b<2 known, and
the interesting period afcertained at which
we are to be again placed under his pa-
ternal care, Provifion muft alfo now be
made for whatever folemnity fuch an oe-
cafion may be thought to require, and
for the confcquent ceflation of all inter-
mediate authority. It will alfo be the
<3uty of Parliament, to fecure and regulate
the fervices of thofe whom his Majefty
had before chofen to attend him ; as weU
as to give the necefTary aid and fanction
to that affectionate care of his Majefty 's
perfon, which is fo juftly to be expected
from HER, whofe conduct has afforded
the brighteft example of dcmeilic union
and attachment.
Thefe, however, are topics on which
it is not neceflary to enlarge. It is in-
deed much to be wiihed, that a refped-
ful
t 5' 1
ful filence could have been obferved with
regard to the whole fubjet to which
thefe confederations relate, Nor fhould
they have ever been fubmitted to the
Public in this form* if by avoiding the
difcuflion of fuch queftions, it had been
poffible to avoid the neceffity of decid-
ing upon them ; or if the forbearance of
one individual could have reftrained the
eagernefs of many. But as this fubjeft
has been daily brought forward into pub-
lic view ; and attempts have been made to
prejudice the minds of the people upon
it, in favour of opinions contrary to the
firft principles of truth and juftice ; it
feems a point of duty, that fome fug-
geftions of a different nature fhould be
fubmitted to the confideration of the
country. This could no otherwife have
been done, than with that freedom with
which an Englifhman accuftoms himfelf
H 2 t
to examine queftions of great national
importance : but it is hoped, that it has
been done with moderation, decency, and
temper ; and above all, that nothing
has been faid repugnant either to thofe
feelings which our common calamity has
imprefled on all our minds, or to thofe
fentiments of perfonal refped:, fubmiffion^
and deference, which are due to all the
branches of that illuftrious family, under
whofe aufpicious Government we have
enjoyed a greater degree of profperity
than has fallen to the lot of any other
nation in the annals of Mankind. The
object of thefe pages will have been com-
pletely anfwered, if they fhould at all
contribute to fettle, on conflitutional prin-
ciples, a tranfaction which is interefling
to our prefent happinefs, and which inuft
form an important sera in our future hif-
tory ; or if they mould be the means of
prevent-
[ 53 ]
preventing any ftep, which might here-
after occafion one painful fenfation in the
heart of a Sovereign, whofe return to
the exercife of his power we muft all
wifh to be attended with as much eafe to
himfelf, as it will diffufe fatisfaction and
joy through every part of his dominions.
APPENDIX,
No. i.
Proceedings relative to fettling the Form
of Government during the Minority of
Henry VI.
Rot. Parl. Vol. iv. Page 171. i Henry VI.
No. 1 2, n EXCITES, that at the death of
JLv Henry V. confidering the tender age
of the prefent King, feveral Lords Spiritual and
Temporal met for the imminent neceflity of the
kingdom j that, by their advice, feveral commiflions
were iflued under the Great Seal of the King to
divers officers j and alfo writs for fummoning the
Parliament , to the intent that by the common
afTembly of all the Eftates of the Kingdom, and
their wife council and difcretion, the government
of the perfon and dominions of the King might
be
56 A P P E N D I X, No. i.
be provided 'for in the faid Parliament. The Par-
liament approved and confirmed the faid commif-
Cons and writs.
Ibid. p. 174. No. 24. The Duke ef Bedford,
then out of the kingdom, is ordained and confli-
tuted, by letters patent of the King in Parliament,
Protestor, Defender, and Principal Councellor of
the kingdom of England ; and in his abfence, the
Duke of Gloucefter.
Ibid. p. 175. No. 25. All offices relating to
the King's forefts, parks, warrens, and all bens-
fices below a certain value, ultra vigenti nfque ad
trlgcnta manas, are to be given, as often as they
ihall become vacant, at the difcretion of the Pro-
tetor: but all other oflices and benefices by the
Prqtector and other Lords of the King's Council.
Ibid. No-. 26. Certain perfons conflituted by
name in Parliament to be Aflillant Councellors to
the Government, who accepted of the fame under
certain articles j in which it is exprefsly flated, that
the nomination to all offices (with the exceptions
mentioned in No. 25.), and the difpofal of aH
wards, marriages, farms, and other cafualties o
the Crown, (hould be in the Council.
lUid. 2 Henry VI. p. 201. No. 15, At clivers
particular requefls of the Commons of the realm,,
APPENDIX, ttb, r. 57
and by the advice and aflent of the Lords Spiritual
ind Temporal, certain perfons v/ere chofcn and
bonftituted Afliftant Councellors to the Government
iinder certain further articles ; by which it is pro- 4
videdj that no matters of importance fhould be de-
termined or tranfacxed, but by the approbation of
the majority of the Council.
Rot; Parl; Vol. v. 5 Henry VL p. 407, 408*
No. 6; States the names of the perfons appointed
to 'conftitute the King's Council, and the fevera*
articles agreed to and fubfcribed by them. In.thefe
it is ftated, that neither the Protedor, nor any
member of the Council, mail determine upon anjr
fuitj or {hew any further favour than tht procuring
it to be read in Council. That in cafe of a differ-
ence of opinion in the Council, if the Protector'
be in the minority, the matter mail ftand over tor
the next day, when it mail be determined accord-
Ing to the majority ; the Protector to have the call-
ing vote, when the numbers arc equal. In cafe of
vacancies happening in offices and benefices be-
longing to the King, thofe that have been fervants
to the King's father, or his grandfather, or thofe
who ferve the King himfelf, to be preferred. In
cafe of matters being brought before the Council,
refpetHng the King's prerogative -on the one fide,
and the rights of his fubjets on the other, the
opinions of the judges to be taken and entered on
record*
I Thefe,
5 S A P P E N D I X, No. i.
Thefe, and feveral other articles, relating to dif-*
ferent fubjeb, were figned by the Protector and
the other Lords of the Council.
No. 7. p. 409 and 410, contain the proteftation
of the Lords of the Council, refpe&ing their obe-
* f Item, That the faid Lords have a King, whom
*' they acknowledge, and none other ; and always,
" fo long as it {hall pleafe God to grant him life,
" will, and ought to acknowledge, under God,
" for their Sovereign here on earth. Moreover,
" they underfland that all .others who be in or
" of this land, from the higheft unto the loweft,
/" of whatever eftate, condition, or degree, they
" be, are his liegemen and his fubjetls, and ought
" to obey him and his laws.
" Item, The faid Lords underfland, that al-
*? though the King is now of tender age, yet
" neverthelefs the fame authority refteth, and is,
" at this day, in his perfon, that fhall be in him
1 " at any time hereafter, when he fhall come, by
" God's grace, to years of difcretion.
" Item, That forafmuch as the King is now of
" fuch tendernefs of age, that by poffibility of na-
" ture he may not indeed rule or govern in his own
" perfon, and that neither God nor reafon require
" that
APPENDIX, No. i. 59
** that this land (hall be without government. For
" fo much of the execution of the King's authority
" as relates to the politic rule and government of
** his land, and to the obfervance and keeping of
" his laws, belongs to the Lords Spiritual and
**' Temporal of his land, at fuch time as they be
" aflembled in Parliament, or in great Council :
" and other wife, when they are not fo aflembled,
" unto the Lords chofen and named to be-of his
" continual Council ; of the which my Lord of
" Bedford is chief, as long a,s he is in this land,
" and in his abfence, my Lord of Gloucefter, if
" he be therein : the which Council, the King
" being of fuch tendernefs of age, reprefent his
'* perfon as toward execution of the fame politic
" rule And government of his land, and obfervance
" and keeping of his faid laws, and that no other
*' perfon may or ought to' afcribe to hlmfelf the faid
" rule and government. Saving always unto my
" faid Lord of Bedford, and of Gloucefter, what
" is efpecially referved and applied to them by Aft
of Parliament," &c. &e.
The above articles being fhewn to the Duke
of Bedford, by certain Lords of the Council
deputed for that purpofe, and his . anfwer required ;
he replied, " That he had well heard, and
" underftood, the matters abovefaid ; and that he
** thanked them with all his heart for fending to
** him ; and informed them, that it was to him.
la " one
tfe A P P E N D I X, No. i,
*' one of the greateft gladnefs that ever fell to
" his heart, to fee the King {landing in this
tendernefs of age to have fo fedate, fo fub*
" ftantial, and true a Council That he . acknow^
" ledged the King for his Sovereign Lord, and
" himfelf for his liegeman, and fubjecl to him
(c and to his laws, according to that which was
" before rehearfed j althoggh God had, by way of
t( birth,' made him nearer the King than any
(f other : and that in all things which belong unto
" the rule of the land, and to the cbiervance of
" the King's laws, and generally in all things that
" belong to the King, and fo his eftate, he would
* ( be advifed, directed, and ruled by the Lords of
" the Council, and obey the King, and them as
<f for the King, as lowly as the lead and pooreft
" fubjeft that the King had in his land."
" And if he did, or attempted to do, any thing
** contrary thereto, he would at all times, with as
" good heart and will, be reformed and amended
" by them as any man mould } knowing this foy
*' his duty, and that he ought fo to do,"
The above articles were fubfcribed to by the
Duke of Bedford, who alfo voluntarily took an,
oath to truly obferve and keep them. In like
manner the Duke of Gloucefler, as Protector in
the abfence of the Duke of Bedford, fubfcribed to
the fame, in the fame words.
APPENDIX, No, 2, 61
No. 2.
Proceedings relative to fettling the Form of
Government during the King's being dif
qualified by Infirmities.
Rot. Parl. Vol. v. 32 Henry VI.
P. 239. No. 24. T ETTERS patent empowering
J-' the Duke of York, in the
King's abfence, with the aflent of the King's Goun-
cil, to call or diflblve Parliament, and tranfacl all
bufmefs therein as the King might do,
P. 240. No, 30. The Commons requeft the Duke
of York, as the King's Lieutenant, and the other
Lords in Parliament, that a permanent Council may
be eftablifhed to adminifler juflice and equity.
Ibid. No. 31. Certain Lords fent to the King
at Windfor, to acquaint him of the death of the
Archbifhop of Canterbury, Chancellor of Eng*
land ; and to be informed whom the King intends
to appoint to thofe ftations Alfo to (late, that the
King had, during the Parliament held at Reading,
informed the Commons of his gracious intent to
6^ A P P E N D I X, No. 2 .
ordain and eftablifh a difcreet and fedate Council
to conduct the affairs of Government That the
Commons had made two requefts to the King's
Lieutenant and the Lords on that head ; they there-
fore requefted to know the King's pleafure re-
fpe&ing the nomination of the members of the faid
Council,
P.. 241. No. 32. The Lords who were fcnt to
the King, on their return, report that they could
obtain no anfvver from him to any of their re-
quefts.
J*. 242. No. 33. The Lords Spiritual and Tem-
poral in Parliament afiembled, for certain caufes
moving them thereto, elect and nominate Richard
Duke of York Protector and Defender of the
kingdom of England during the King's pleafure :
the next day the Duke delivered in a paper con-
taining feveral articles which he requefted might
be enacted in Parliament.
No. 34. The Duke of York ftates, that he ac-i
cepts of the Protectorfhip at the defire of Parlia-
ment.. " I defire and pray you, that in this pre-
*' fent Parliament, and by authority thereof, it be
" enacted, that of yourfehes, and of your free and
" mere difpofition, ye deftre, name y and call me to the
" faid name and charge, and that I take them not upon
*i me of any prefumption of myfelf, but only of the
" due
APPENDIX, No. 2. $3
" due and humble obedience that I ought to do
'* unto the King, our mod dread and fovereign
*' Lord, and to you the Peerage of this land, in
tf whom, by the occafion of the infirmity of out
" faid fovereign Lord, reds the exercife of his
" authority, whofe noble commands I am as ready
" to perform and obey as any liegeman alive ; and
" that at fuch time as it fliall pleafe our blefied
" Creator to reftore his moft noble perfon to
" healthful difpofition, it fhall pleafe you to declare
" and notify to his good grace."
The Lords agree to the propriety of the Duke's
requeft, and think that for their di&harge in this
behalf there mould be fuch an -Aft rrnde for them
in this Parliament, according t6 an At made in
the tender age of the King, by which, in a finilar
cafe of neceflity, they were compelled to ckufc and
name a Protector and Defender. i:
No. 36. The Duke requefts to be informed of
the extent of his power, and that it be enacted,
ratified, and confirmed, by the authority of Parlia-
ment.
The Lords anfwer, that he is chief of the King's
Council, and therefore they have devifed him a
name (Protector and Defender) different from
other Counfellors, but which imports no authority
of governance of the land, only a perfonal duty of
attendance
6 4 A P P E N D I X, No. 2 V
attendance to its actual defence. That he is iG
hold this office during the King's pleafure, fo that
it be without prejudice to the Prince ; and there ~
upon an Al to be made by authority of Parlia-
ment.
Ibid. No. 38; Letters patent, Mating the King's
infirm ftate of health, his inability to attend to
the bufinefs of his kingdom ; and appointing, with
the aflent and advice of the Lords* and die afTent o
the Commons in Parliament affembled, the Duke
of York Protector, Defender, and principal Coun-
fellor of the Rtalm during the King's pleafure. The
office of Protector to be exercifed by Edward, the
King's eldefl fon, t s$ien he mould arrive at years
of difcretion. ^
P ?.i3. No. 39. Letters patent, to the fame
purpor ' the above, conferring the office of Pro-
teclor, &c, on Prince Edward, when he mould ar-*
rive at years of difcretion, provided that he mould
chufe to take it upon him.
No. 40. An Act, conferring on Prince Edward.,
when he mould arrive at years of difcretion, and
have taken the office of Protector, &c. and on the
Duke of York, who then poflefled that office, the
privilege of appointing to all offices relating to fo-
refts, parks, and warrens belonging to the Crown,
as often as they mould become vacant, and to all
benefices
APPENDIX, No. 2. <5j-
benefices of a certain value. All other offices and
benefices, as they become vacant, to be difpofed of
by the advice of the Prote&or and the other Lords
of the Council.
This Act is expreffed in nearly the fame words as
that in Vol. iv. p. 175.
Rolls, Parl. Vol. v. 33 Hen. VI. p. 280, 281,
282. No. r8. to 24. After the battle of St. Albaivs,
the King, by the advice and aflent of his Parlia-
ment, declares the Duke of York, and the Earls of
Warwick and Salifbury, and their party, to be his
irue and faithful liegemen. The inflrument recites
the letters written by them to the King before the
battle, and grants them full pardon for any thing
fuppoied to have been done againft his perfon, crown,
or dignity.
Ibid. No. 25. Contains the oath taken by them
and the other Lords Spiritual and Temporal.
P. 284. No. 30. Letters patent, empowering the
Duke of York to call a Parliament, &c. the fame as
No. 24. p. 239.
Ibid. No. 31. In confequence of the Duke of
York being appointed, by the above, the King's
Lieutenant in Parliament, the Commons recom-
mend to him and the Lords, that the King, by their
K. advice,
66 APPENDIX, No. 2.
advice, mould appoint a Protector and Defender of
the land, to act in the place of the King during his
abfence ; {lating the neceflity of fuch an appoint-
ment.
P. 285. No. 3 2. ---The Commons repeat their re-
tjueft, &c.
Ibid. No. -}}. The requeft of the Commons,
1 hi ted by the Chancellor to the Lords, and inform-
ing them, that the Commons will not proceed in
'natters of Parliament till they receive an anfwer.
Tf-e Lords agree to the propriety of their requeft,
and <c every Lord federally giving his voice and ajjent*
they elect the Duke of York Protector, &c. on the
lame conditions as he held the office before.
Ibid. No. 34. The Commons repeat their re-
quett, &c.
P. 286. No. 35. The Lords acquaint the Com-
mons, that the King, by their advice and afient, had
appointed the Duke of York to the office of Protec-
tor, &c.
Ibid. No. 36. The Duke of York propofes cer-
tain articles to be enacted by the authority of Par-
liament, respecting his accepting the office of
Protector.
Part
A P P E N D I X. No. 2. 67
Tart of thefe articles is to the fame effel as that
Hated in p. 242. No. 34.
In Art. 4. He requefts the Lords " to ordain,
' appoint , name, and eftablijh in the fold Parliament,
u and by authority thereof, a fitfficient and convenient
" number of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, to be of tht
" faid Council *."
P. 287. No. 37. The Chancellor flates to all the
Lords, the articles on which the Duke of York has
accepted the Prote&orfhip ; to which they agree,
and ordain, that he (hall have the fame power as be-
fore, with the following alteration in the patent :
" And whereas, in his laft power were thefe words,
" Quamditt nobis placuerit (during the King's plea-
" fure), mould now be in his power thefe words,
*' ^ttoufqite idem confan guineas nojler de occupations Jive
" onere et nomine hujttfmodi per nos in Parliament*) de
" avifamentoet ajjenfu Dominorum SpiritualiumetTem-
<( poralittm in Parliaments exifterf, exonerettir" (until
our faid kinfman be difcharged from that office by
the King in Parliament, with the advice and aflent
of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in parliament
aflembled).
* In Art. i. The King's " Privy Council, to nvtofe ad-
" vice, counfel, and a/ent, I will obey ami apply nyfelf, as J
" know it accordetk with my duty to Jo"
K 2 No. 38,
68 APPENDIX, No. 2.
No. 38. The Commons confer with the Chan-
cellor and Duke of York, and defire and pray the
Duke to take upon him the name and charge of Pro-
tector, &c. to which he aflents.
No. 39. Letters patent to the fame effect as thofe
ftated in p. 242. No. 38. appointing the Duke of
York Protector, &c. with the alteration in the
words, as above in No. 37. and with a preamble,
{Kiting, that it was at the requefb of the Commons
that the appointment was made. Alfo Letters pa*
tent to the fame effedt, appointing Edward, the
King's eldeft fon, Protector, &c. when he Ihould
arrive at years of discretion, under the fame condi-
tions.
P. 289. No. 40. An Act exactly to the fame
purport as that in p. 243. No. 40.
P. 289. No. 41. The King, considering that the
diligence and actual labour appertaining to the go-
vernment and rule of the realm would be tedious
to his perfon, &c. ordains and grants " that bis
*' Council Jl all provide ', commune, ordain, fpeed, and
, * coticlude, allfuch matters as touch and cancer tit he good
*' and politic rule and government of his land; referring,
" that In tillfuch matters as touch the honour, ivorj!j'tp y
" andftirety of his per/on, theyjball let him know what
" direction they take in them; defiring his f aid Council t
*' for the welfare and eafe of his f aid perfon , and keep-
ing
A P P E N D I X, No. 2. 6 9
* c ing and bearing ttp his royal eftate, to take this bis ivill
" and ordinance upon them. The Lords take tlx above
tf duties upon them, protejling that the high prerogative^
<c pre-eminence, and authority of his Majejly Royal, and
** alfo the fovereignty of them and all this land, is, and
" always mitft reft) and /ball rej} y in his mojl excel-
lent Perfon."
Ibid. p. 321. No. 50. The King in Parliament,
by the advice and afient of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and the afient of the Commons in Par*
liament aflembled, exonerates and difcharges the
Duke of York from the office, duty, and name of
Prote&or, Defender, and principal C.owncellor of
she Realm.
'
This Day is pulifljed, Price is. 6d. '
THE
PARLIAMENTARY OPINIONS
O F
SIR DUDLEY RYDER, I Ma. CHARLES YORKE,
LORD MANSFIELD, | MR. W. BECKFORD, &c.
ON THE CHOICE OF A
REGENCY OR REGENT.
.WITH OTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THAT IN-
TERESTING QUESTION.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
THE UNIVERSITY LIBR/JIY
A fee of 3c per day is charged for this book which was withdrawn on
the last date stamped below.
floret :
PAMPHLET BINDER
Syracuse, N. Y.
Stockton, Calif.
DA
510
G866c
A PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
THIS BOOK CARDS
University Research Library