Grenville 
 
 Considerations on the 
 
 Establishment of a 
 
 Regency
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 E STABLISHMENT 
 
 O F A 
 
 REGENCY; 
 
 WITH AN 
 
 APPENDIX: 
 
 CONTAINING PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO SETTLING THE 
 FORM OF GOVERNMENT DURING THE MINORITY OP 
 
 HENRY VI. AND DURING THE KING BEING DIS<VUALI- 
 
 FID BY INFIRMITIES. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 fRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE OPPOSITE 
 BURLINGTON-HOUSE PICCADILLY, 1788. 
 
 ( Price is. 6~d. )
 
 S/0 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS, 
 
 NO public fentiment has ever been 
 more ftrongly exprefled, than that 
 general confternation and grief, which 
 his Majefty's affecting fituation has ex- 
 cited in the minds of a dutiful and loyal 
 people. Such a calamity muft at all 
 times have been feverely felt ; but there 
 are many circumftances which have ren- 
 dered it peculiarly diftrefling in the pre- 
 fent moment. It has come upon us fud- 
 B denly,
 
 t * ] 
 
 denly, and without preparation ; inter- 
 rupting a courfe of the moft unexampled 
 profperity, and difturbing that confi- 
 dence in our public fituation which had 
 taken frefh root and vigour in the opi- 
 nions of mankind. Our former quiet 
 and fecurity have by this event been 
 changed to uncertainty and alarm ; we 
 are deprived by it of the ineftimable ad- 
 vantages of a fettled form and order of 
 government, and involved in all the 
 difficulties of a cafe nearly unprecedented 
 in our annals, and wholly unprovided 
 for by any pofitive regulation of our 
 laws. 
 
 Unlefs fome favourable turn fliould 
 take place with refpect to his Majefty's 
 diforder, there may foon exift an una- 
 voidable neceflity of doing that, which 
 muft be painful to the feelings of every 
 
 man
 
 [ 3 ] 
 
 man of making fome temporary pro- 
 vifion for adminiftering the executive 
 power, during the fufpenfion of its exer- 
 cife in thofe hands in which the confti- 
 tution of our country has lodged it. 
 The public attention of this free com- 
 munity muft therefore be directed to the 
 difcuffion of this fubjeft, although it be 
 of fuch delicacy as is exceeded only by 
 its importance ; and although, even from 
 the difcuffion of it, many evils are to be 
 apprehended. 
 
 It is however the part of a good citi- 
 zen, neither to be difpirited by the mif- 
 fortunes, nor intimidated by the dangers, 
 of his country; but rather to be ani- 
 mated by both, to the difcharge of that 
 duty, which he may feel incumbent 
 upon him under fuch circumflances. 
 This is a point, in the decifion of which 
 B 2 we
 
 [ 4 ] 
 
 we are all highly concerned. Every 
 Englifhman is, therefore, bound to exa- 
 mine it with care and diligence, to form 
 his opinion upon it deliberately and con- 
 fcientioufly, and to fupport that opi- 
 nion by all legal and conftitutional means, 
 according to the meafure of his abilities, 
 and the fituation of life in which he is 
 placed. 
 
 In the difcuflions to which this fub- 
 ject leads, fome reference will naturally 
 be made to the hiftory of former times, 
 and to thofe precedents which may be 
 thought to bear a refemblance to our 
 prefent fituation. But whatever refpedt 
 is due to the information derived from 
 thefe fources, the only rational ufe which 
 can be made of it for our prefent purpofe, 
 is to examine what were the leading 
 principles on which our anceftors pro- 
 ceeded
 
 t S ] 
 
 ceeded in thofe cafes; and to enquire 
 how far, and in what manner, thofe prin- 
 ciples apply to the prefent crifis, under 
 all the changes which the revolution of 
 fo many ages has produced. Nor ought 
 we to go beyond this, in our adherence 
 to precedents, or to follow now the 
 practice of former ages, in points where 
 the reafon of that practice has ceafed to 
 operate. 
 
 The objects to be attended to in our 
 prefent proceedings, will beft be collected 
 from a confideration of the circum- 
 ftances of that emergency by which we 
 may be compelled to act. We are to 
 eftablifh fuch an intermediate form of 
 adminiftration as may be beft adapted 
 for carrying on the public bufmefs, 
 during his Majefty's illnefs, with the 
 neceflary difpatch and energy ; and for 
 
 fecuring,
 
 [ 6 ] 
 
 fecuring, as far as human wifdom can 
 fecure it, that whenever it (hall pleafe 
 God to remove this heavy vifitation 
 from us, the Sovereign to whom we 
 have fworn allegiance, and for whom 
 we feel as one man the ftrongeft fenti- 
 ments of veneration, attachment, and gra- 
 titude, mail be effectually reftored, not 
 to the -poffeffion only, but ta the exer- 
 cife of his undoubted rights, which he 
 enjoys for the benefit of his fubjets, and 
 of which he cannot be deprived, without 
 an injury done to ourfelves. 
 
 An idea has indeed been thrown out, 
 which, if it were founded in truth, would 
 render any further reafoning upon thefe 
 points ufelefs and improper : It has been 
 faid by fome, that, in a cafe fuch as the 
 prefent, the whole power, authority, and 
 prerogative of the King, devolve imme- 
 diately
 
 [ 7 1 
 
 diately and of right to the perfon next in 
 fucceffion to the Crown, in the fame man- 
 ner as in the unfortunate event of a de- 
 mife. The flighted acquaintance either 
 with Englifh hiftory or with Englifh law, 
 is fufficient for enabling us to reject at once 
 this notion, equally unwarranted and un- 
 juft. No trace of fuch a right can be found 
 upon the records of Parliament, nor has 
 any fuch opinion been cited from the 
 works of any writer upon the Britifh con- 
 ftitution. On the contrary we fhall find, 
 that even in periods infinitely lefs favour- 
 able than the prefent for the afTertion of 
 the true principles of our Government, 
 every interruption in the exercife of royal 
 authority has uniformly been provided 
 for in Parliament. The principle on which 
 this practice has been grounded, is ob- 
 vious and unqueftionable. The order 
 of hereditary fucceffion to the throne of 
 
 thefe
 
 [ 8 ] 
 
 thefe realms, has been eftablifhed among 
 us, not for the advantage of any indivi- 
 dual family, however entitled to our grati- 
 tude and veneration, but for the benefit 
 of the nation, and for the fecurity and 
 happinefs of millions : and undoubtedly 
 it is a great bleffing to us, that on the 
 death of our Sovereigns, their Crown 
 fhould defcend, by a fundamental law of 
 the State, in a known and fettled courfe 
 of fuccefTion ; but beyond this cafe, nei- 
 ther the law itfelf, nor the reafon of the 
 law, extend. During the life of a Britifh 
 King, no man can claim an hereditary 
 right to the exercife of royal power, nemo 
 eft bteres viventis. This is the known and 
 acknowledged maxim of our laws, apply- 
 ing with equal force to every defcription 
 of right or property, and to every rank 
 and condition of men ; and it is parti- 
 cularly to be obferved, that at the sera of 
 
 the
 
 [ 9 ] 
 
 the Revolution, when the Commons ap- 
 pointed a Committee to maintain, in a 
 conference with the other Houfe, the true 
 principles of that tranfaction, the great 
 lawyers chofen for this important truft 
 relied much on this very rule of law, 
 which they then cited as applying to the 
 cafe of the Crown, and as forming a ma- 
 terial branch of their argument, in fup- 
 port of that vote which laid the founda- 
 tion of all the fubfequent proceedings. 
 
 If then this principle be true, that the 
 hereditary right to the Crown, like every 
 other right of inheritance, attaches only 
 in the cafe of the death of the perfon in 
 pofleffion, the confequence cannot be dif- 
 puted. In thofe extraordinary and un- 
 forefeen emergencies, when an interrup- 
 tion arifes from other caufes in the admi- 
 niftration of this fovereign truft, it re- 
 C mains
 
 mains with the people to exercife a powef 
 which they have referved, and to provide 
 a remedy adapted to the occafion which 
 requires it. Such a right, if it were flip- 
 pofed to veft in the whole body of the in- 
 habitants of a country, fo as to be exercifed 
 by each of them individually, might juft- 
 ly be confidered as one merely fpeculative. 
 But in a free and well-ordered govern- 
 ment, like ours, a regular channel is pro- 
 vided, through which the rights of the 
 people may be exerted, according to the 
 different orders of fociety eftablifhed 
 amongft us. The fame mode, therefore^ 
 by which the nobility and commonalty 
 of this realm exercife their (hare in the 
 Legiflature of their country, is naturally 
 pointed out to us, as that by which' they 
 are alfo to perform the ftill more import- 
 ant function, of fupplying the occafional 
 deficiencies in the remaining branch of 
 
 the
 
 [. " 3 
 
 tlie conftitution, and of providing for the 
 difcharge of the duties of executive go- 
 vernment. 
 
 In earlier periods of our hiftory, when 
 the comparative importance of the Com- 
 mons was lefs than at prefent ; and when 
 their mare in the legislative ads of our 
 government was at leaft not fo diftindly 
 exprefled, the Lords fometimes appear 
 to have taken a more forward and leading 
 part in fuch tranfadions as bear a refem- 
 blance to the prefent crifis. But even 
 then, the confent of the Commons is al- 
 moft always ftated on our records, and 
 probably was always given : and, upon 
 the whole, this leading principle appears 
 to have been invariably adhered to, that 
 on any failure in the exercife of the royal 
 authority during the life of the King, the 
 deficiency could only be fupplied by that 
 C 2 body,
 
 body, in whom, conjointly with the 
 King, the legiflative power had refided. 
 
 The fame principle applies with greater 
 force -'to the prefent times, when the infti- 
 tutlons of our government have been 
 more developed, and ; are more diftinctly 
 underftood. It is in Parliament that 
 the people ' of Great Britain exercife their 
 fhare of the government. It is on Par- 
 liament that the care of providing for this 
 emergency does unqueftionably devolve ; 
 and that 1 degree of authority, which it 
 may be neceflary to grant for this pur- 
 pofe, cannot be claimed as a right, but 
 muft be conferred as a truft, under fuch 
 fuch rcftridions as may bejudged advan- 
 tageous to the people at large. - 
 
 The proceedings in every cafe that can 
 be found in our annals, bearing either re- 
 
 femblance
 
 [ '3 ] 
 
 femblance or analogy to the prefent, have 
 all been regulated in conformity to the 
 maxims- above ftated. Sometimes the 
 Britifh Crown has defcended on the heads 
 of minors. The guardianfhip, both of 
 the Sovereign and of his kingdoms, has 
 in fuch cafe been granted under the fanc- 
 tion of Parliament, either by a -previous 
 authority given for that purpofe by fta- 
 tute to the preceding King; or, in default 
 of fuch provifion, by actual nomination 
 immediately after the demife. It is by 
 no means true, that the perfon named to 
 this important truft has always been the 
 next in fucceffion to the Crown, or in- 
 deed that any general rule has obtained 
 to limit the difcretion of Parliament. In 
 one cafe *, where no previous parliamen- 
 tary provifion had been made, a claim of 
 
 * See Rolls of Parliament, vol. iv. p.-.ge 171. 
 j Hen. 6. Sec alfo ibid. p. 3^6. 6 Hen. 6, 
 
 right
 
 [ '4 J 
 
 riglit was indeed urged by one of the 
 relations of the King to the Regency of 
 the kingdom during his minority. This 
 claim was formally examined and difal- 
 lowed by Parliament, who, " after long 
 *' and great deliberation and advice,fearch- 
 " ing precedents of the government of 
 " the land in fimilar times and cafes, 
 " when the Kings of this land have been 
 " of tender age, and taking information 
 c< of the laws of the land from fuch 
 " perfons as were learned therein, finally 
 " found the faid defire not grounded in 
 " precedent, nor in the law of the land.'* 
 
 They afterwards, however, granted to 
 the fame perfon a more limited power *, 
 fubjedt to the controul of a Council, and 
 held under a title,, conceived to be of lets 
 
 . * Rolls of Part. vol. v. p. 407, 408, &c. 5 H. 6. 
 
 dignity
 
 t '5 3 
 
 dignity than that of Regent ; and upon 
 thefe terms the office fo granted was ac- 
 cepted and exercifed by him, and again 
 refigned at the requifhion of the fame au- 
 thority. 
 
 In another inftance *, the Monarch 
 was alleged to be difqualified by difeafe 
 from the exercife of his power. A Pro- 
 tedtor *) was chofen by the Lords at the 
 requeft of the Commons ; and his power 
 was, in like manner as 'in the preceding 
 cafe, limited by Parliament, at whofe 
 pleafure his commiflion was made revoc- 
 
 * Rolls of Parl. vol. v. p. 239 to 242. ji&: 32 H. 6, 
 f- It is remarkable, that the Duke of York, in ac- 
 cepting his office, delivered in a paper to the Lords, 
 in which he defires that it fliould be declared by the 
 authority of Parliament, that they, " of their free and 
 " mere difpofition," ha named him to that office, and 
 that he did not take it upon him from any prelumption 
 of himfelf, but in obed! :nce to the King and to the 
 peerage of the land ; " in whom, by the occafion of 
 ** the infirmity of our faid fovereign Lord, re Us the 
 * ejtercifc of his authority." Rolls. Parl. vol. 3. p. 2. 
 
 able,
 
 [ '6 ] 
 
 able, and by whom it was afterwards re- 
 pealed*. 
 
 At other periods of our hiftory, our 
 Sovereigns have been depofed for real or 
 alleged mifconduft. It is hardly necef- 
 fary to fay, that thefe cafes are cited as 
 bearing on the prefent qileftion in one 
 point only; namely, in fhewirtg the power 
 of Parliament in every cafe where the 
 exercife of royal authority is fufpended, 
 and not as by any means refembling it, 
 either in the particular occafion on which 
 this power is to exercifed, or in the na- 
 ture or extent of the meafures to be 
 adopted. But in all thefe inftances, what- 
 
 * The proceedings in thefe two cafes, as they ap- 
 pear on the Rolls of Parliament, are fo curious and 
 interefting, that an abftraft of them, with copies or 
 ttanilations of fome of the moft material parts, is Sn- 
 fertcd at the end" of this Pamphlet, as an Appendix 
 to ir. 
 
 ever
 
 t '7 1 
 
 fever has been done, has proceeded from 
 Parliament alone: particularly in 1688, 
 fo far were Parliament from admitting 
 that, by the abdication of James the Se- 
 cond, the exercife of rbyal power de- 
 volved to his next heir, that they vefted 
 it in King William alone ; giving to 
 Queen Mary herfelf only the title of 
 Queen, without annexing any authority 
 to it*, and even poftponing the fucceflion 
 of the Princefs Anne to the Crown till af- 
 ter his death. And this is a precedent, 
 which, for the folemnity of the occafion, 
 the .regularity of the proceedings, and 
 the happy confequences which have re- 
 fulted from them^ may, as far as it ap- 
 plies to the prefent cafe, be juftly con- 
 
 * This was fo diftin&ly done, that when King 
 William went over to Ireland, an Adt of Parliament 
 \vas neceffary to enable the Queen to exercife royal au- 
 thority during his abfence. See Statute W. & M. c. 
 
 D fidered
 
 [ '8 ] 
 
 fidered as affording the fureft foundation 
 for any meafures which muft now be 
 taken. 
 
 The feveral particulars in which this 
 laft cafe, as well as thofe before cited, 
 differ from the circumftances of the pre- 
 fent fituation;are fufficiently obvious.. The 
 principle has, however, been the fame 
 throughout, that the right of hereditary 
 fucceflion attaches only on the death of 
 our Sovereigns, but that every other in- 
 terruption in the exercife of royal au- 
 thority muft be efpecially provided for 
 by Parliament. And if this has been 
 done in the cafe of Monarchs who were 
 adjudged to have forfeited their claim to 
 the allegiance of their fubje&s^ and who 
 could therefore never be reftored to their 
 authority, how much more mull Parlia-r 
 mcnt feel it incumbent upon them to 
 
 take
 
 take into their own hands the meafures 
 which are n6w to be purfued ; having, in 
 addition to the duty of providing for the 
 intermediate adminiftration of the go- 
 vernment, fo important a truft to dif- 
 charge, as the prefervation of the rights 
 of a Sovereign, fo juftly dear to the hearts 
 of all his fubje&s, and who may, at any 
 moment, be again in a fituation to re- 
 aflume the exercife of his power, for the 
 advantage and happinefs of his people. 
 
 I have dwelt the longer upon this 
 point, becaufe the opinions which I 
 have combated have been fpread with 
 confidence and induftry ; and becaufe 
 they are faid, though with little proba- 
 bility, to have received the fan&ion of 
 fome legal authority. I am perfuaded, 
 however, that the difcuflion is, and al- 
 ways has been, wholly unneceiTary ; and 
 D 2 that
 
 [.*>]. 
 
 that the illuftrlous Perfon to whom it 
 principally relates, has too jufl a regard 
 to the rights of Parliament, and to the 
 laws and conftitution of his country, to 
 have liftened for a moment to fuch fug., 
 geftions, if any fuch can have been made 
 to him. 
 
 If then the right of Parliament to pro- 
 vide for this emergency be clearly efta- 
 blifhed, the next queftion would natu- 
 rally be, in what hands they ought tq 
 place that portion of executive authority 
 which they may judge neceffary for, car^ 
 rying on the government without pre- 
 judice to the rights of the King. On 
 this fubject two ideas naturally prefent 
 themfelves. The confiding this degree 
 of authority to the hands of a fingle 
 perfon, aided only by a Council of his 
 own appointment, and fubjeft to difinif- 
 
 fioa
 
 [ i 3 
 
 fion by him ; or the veiling it in a Count 
 cil of Regency, to be appointed by Par- 
 liament, and to be removed only with the 
 confent of a majority of their own body. 
 All the precedents, or almoft all that can 
 be found on the records of Parliament, 
 incline to the latter of thefe two modes. 
 If any fubject in this country has ever ex- 
 crcifed royal authority, without being 
 fubject to the controul of a fixed and 
 permanent Council, it has been in times 
 of fuch confufion and anarchy, that no ar- 
 gument can be drawn from it to any re- 
 gulation of fettled government. While 
 on the other hand, the principle of fuch 
 a Council has been adopted in the moil 
 recent, and therefore the beft, iuftances 
 that we can refort to for the eftablimment 
 of Regencies. I mean the provifionmadeiii 
 jthe time of Queen Anne * for the ab- 
 
 * See Star. 6 Anne, 6, - ( , eft. 11. . 
 
 fence
 
 fence of her fucceflbr from his domi- 
 nions, at the period of his acceflion, and 
 the bills pafled in the reigns of his * late 
 and prefent Majefty f, to provide for the 
 cafe of a minority. 
 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding thefe confidera* 
 tions, there are circumftances which feem 
 to make it defirable, fuppofmg it can be 
 done cOnflftently with the important ob- 
 jcds which have been ftated, to lodge 
 the truft now to be created, rather in the 
 hands of a fmgle perfon, and that per- 
 fort the Heir Apparent to the Crown, 
 than in thofe of any Council to be named 
 by Parliament. A confutation ftrch as 
 ours rs, has always fome tendency, on 
 the one fide or the other, to principles 
 
 * See Stat. 24 Geo. 2. c. 24. 
 f See Stat. 5. Geo, 3, c. 37, 
 
 unfa*
 
 unfavourable to its continuance ; and k 
 is only by a minute attention to the leaft 
 inclination of the fcale, that its balance 
 can be maintained. We have feen with- 
 in a few years, at the period immediate- 
 ly preceding the diflblution of the Par- 
 liament in 1784, a ftruggte on the part 
 of a powerful ariftocracy to ufurp to 
 themfelves, by a cabal in Parliament, 
 the moft unqueftionable, and perhaps 
 the moft important branch of the royal 
 prerogative, the nomination to the offices 
 of executive government. And we aft. 
 remember, that this attempt " could no 
 otherwife have been defeated, than by 
 the fortunate union of the two other 
 parts of our conftitution, the legal power 
 of the monarchy, and the prevailing voice 
 and weight of the people. The prefent 
 occafion is, certainly, in many refpeclis, 
 
 widely
 
 widely different from that which ha 
 been alluded to. There is now a tem- 
 porary fufpenfion of all monarchical 
 authority; and the nomination of a 
 Council by Parliament under thefe cir- 
 cumftances, would be at leaft a legal ex- 
 ercife of the power which has thus de- 
 volved to them, inftead of being a direct 
 infringement of the acknowledged rights 
 of the Sovereign. But it mould be the 
 particular object of thofe who love the 
 true conftitution of their country, to 
 guard, with the utmoft jealoufy, againft 
 the renewal of that principle which they 
 have already combated with fuccefs^ 
 
 We mould remember, that the claim 
 then fet up againft the Crown, although 
 condemned at the time by the unanimous 
 decifion of the country, is nevertheless 
 ftill maintained and defended by a con- 
 
 fiderable
 
 t ^ ] 
 
 fiderable body of public men. At fome 
 future period it may be revived, even 
 if the circumftances of the prefent mo- 
 ment render its fupporters lefs anxious 
 to bring it forward to public view. We 
 cannot therefore be too careful that no- 
 thing mould be done, efpecially at fuch 
 a moment as the prefent, which might 
 hereafter give countenance and fupport 
 to a principle destructive of the very 
 frame of the Britim conflitution. And, 
 notwithstanding the great difference in 
 the prefent cafe, it is impoffible not to fee 
 that fuch a conclufion might be drawn 
 from this precedent, if Parliament mould, 
 on any other grounds than that of the 
 moft urgent neceffity, proceed to name 
 a permanent Council, although compofed 
 of men in whom the Sovereign and the 
 people might befh confide. 
 
 E The
 
 t *6- ] 
 
 The danger is indeed fo great, of fuffer- 
 ing any individuals, of whatever defcrip- 
 tion, to monopolize, directly or indirectly, 
 the adminiftration of public affairs, that 
 nothing but the utmoft exigency could 
 render it juftifiable. In addition to this 
 we are to obferve, that if, in the eftablifh- 
 ment of fuch a Council, the precedent of 
 any former regency mould be followd, 
 the fyftem fo eftablifhed, though ftrong 
 for the ends of perfonal intereft and am- 
 bition, would be weak and infufficient 
 to any purpofe of good government. 
 The executive Officers of the Crown 
 would almoft inevitably be at variance 
 with the Perfon reprefenting the fovereign 
 authority ; and this would happen at a 
 time, when, on the one hand, hrs great 
 natural weight and influence as Heir 
 Apparent to the Throne would be much 
 increafed by his actual fituation ; and 
 
 when,
 
 when, on the other, the tenure by which 
 they held their authority would enable 
 them to retain a permanent pofleffion of 
 all the moft important offices in the ad- 
 miniftration of public affairs. The con- 
 fequences muft be, thofe of a confufed 
 and diffracted government, wholly occu- 
 pied with domeftic intrigues and ani- 
 moiities, and incapable of attending, 
 either to the maintenance of our internal 
 profperity, or to the prefervation of our 
 fyftem of foreign policy, the foundations 
 of which have fo recently been laid. 
 Whatever therefore may be the wifhes of 
 the Public, that the government may 
 continue in the hands of his Majefty's 
 prefent Minifters, this can be done with 
 fafety to the country by regular and 
 conPdtutlonal means alone. By the cdn- 
 currence of the Regent, both in the de- 
 clared fentiments of the King, whofe 
 E 2 autho-
 
 authority will be committed to him by 
 a temporary delegation ; and in the 
 wfthes of the people, from whole hands 
 he will have have received fo important 
 a truft. Whether there is any reafon or 
 not to expect fuch a concurrence, the 
 principle is equally binding. No at- 
 tempt ought to be made, and \ve may 
 hope that none will be made, by the 
 prefent Minifters, to continue themfelves 
 in the poffeflion of their offices by the 
 appointment of Parliament, and inde- 
 pendently of whatever may be eftablifh- 
 ed as the executive power. They came 
 into office on different grounds ; nor can 
 they, in the prefent moment, better con- 
 fult their own characters, or more effec- 
 tually difcharge what honour, gratitude, 
 and duty require of them, than by pro- 
 viding every fecurity for the prefervation 
 
 of
 
 [ '9 ] 
 
 of the King's authority, by providing 
 none for the prefervation of their own 
 power. 
 
 The necefiity of making a flaivl 
 \vith refpeft to the former of theP:. wo 
 objects, is indeed a point which cannot 
 be too ftrongly infifted upon ; and this 
 the rather, becaufe, however important 
 and indifpenfable a duty, it is neverthelefs 
 liable to mifreprefentations, which every 
 one would wifh to avoid. It is eafy to 
 fee with what advantages fuch a prin- 
 ciple may be oppofed, by adverting to 
 confiderations of perfonal character, and 
 by making ufe of names which can never 
 be mentioned or received but with re- 
 fpecl: and deference. But let no man 
 on fuch grounds as thefe deceive himfelf, 
 or be deceived by others into a neglect 
 of that duty which he owes to his 
 
 Sove-
 
 [ 3 ] 
 
 Sovereign and to his Country. It is the 
 very firft principle of legiflation in a free 
 country, that thofe points which are ef- 
 fential to the advantage or fecurity of the 
 community, fhould reft on a more folid 
 bafis than that of perfonal confidence. 
 We require even of our Kings, when 
 they receive the homage of their fubjects, 
 that they mould bind themfelves by an 
 oath to maintain our liberties, and to ob- 
 ferve our laws. Not certainly that we 
 mean, at fuch a moment as that, to ex- 
 prefs to our new Sovereign a diftruft of 
 his perfonal character ; but becaufe we 
 think it our duty to remind him of the 
 nature of the truft which he undertakes, 
 and, at the fame time, to give additional 
 fecurity and fandion to that conftitution 
 which we are bound to maintain in- 
 violate. Suppofe that any man, at the 
 beginning of a new reign, mould defire 
 
 us
 
 [ 3' 3 
 
 us to difpenfe with this oath as implying 
 jealoufy and diftruft ; or, fhould advife 
 us to repeal the ftatutes which fecure our 
 liberties, becaufe the character of the 
 new Prince might juftly claim the con- 
 fidence of his people^-with how much 
 reafon would the author of fuch a pro- 
 pofal incur our indignation, for infufmg 
 into the mind of his Sovereign a diftruft 
 of the affections of his people ; and for 
 fetting the laws of his country at variance 
 with the perfonal cnarader of the Mo- 
 narch ? In what refpecl: will the conduct 
 of thofe men be lefs exceptionable, who 
 {hall tell us, that no fecurity can be ne- 
 ceflary for preferving the rights of his 
 Majefty, becaufe no attempt againft them 
 can be fufpected to proceed from the 
 Prince? We may all, as individuals, 
 feel ourfelves perfuaded, that his Royal 
 Highnefs is incapable of forming fuch a 
 
 defign.
 
 [ 3' ] 
 
 defign. We may believe that he has 
 penetration to difcover, and firmnefs to 
 refift the attempts of any party to mif- 
 lead him into meafures calculated either 
 to eftablifh his power in the place of his 
 father's, or to eftablifh their own power in 
 the place of both. But as a legiflative 
 body, owing allegiance to their Sovereign 
 and duty to their fell ow-fubj eels, the 
 two Houfes of Parliament are bound, 
 not to fufpect his Royal Highnefs, God 
 forbid they mould ! but to iufpect and 
 to guard againft thofe who may become 
 his ' advifers. They are no more at li- 
 berty to furrender at difcretion, and on 
 grounds of perfonal confidence, the au- 
 thority of the King, and the intereil 
 which the people have in its prefervation, 
 than to yield up in the fame manner the 
 fecurities we enjoy for any other of our 
 rights, for the trial by juries, or for our 
 
 perfonal freedom. 
 
 If
 
 [ 33 1 
 
 If, then, we lay afide the apprehenfion 
 of fuch unworthy imputations, and ap- 
 ply ourfelves to examine this cafe as a 
 point of hiftory, or as a queftion of ab- 
 ftract reafoning, we muft fee that there 
 . is in the prefent inftance a ftronger ne- 
 ceffity than in any former one, for fecu- 
 ring with jealous attention the rights of 
 the Sovereign. The more ftrongly it is 
 contended, that the perfon now to be 
 placed at the head of the Government 
 ihould not, like every other Regent, be 
 limited by the control of any permanent 
 Council ; fo much the more is Parliament 
 bound to look with jealoufy to the man- 
 ner in which the Counfellors whom he 
 employs may advife him to exercife his 
 power. Nor can that caution be deemed 
 injurious now, which has not been deem- 
 ed fo in former ages, and in the cafe of 
 fo many illuftrious perfons, entrufted only 
 F with
 
 I 34 j 
 
 with concurrent, and not with fole autho- 
 rity. It has indeed been faid, that the ob- 
 jecl: in thofe cafes was, to provide a fecu- 
 rity for the rights of the perfon who was, 
 at the expiration of the Regency, to en- 
 ter upon the exercife of the Sovereign 
 authority: but that here the caution 
 would be unriecefTary, becaufe the power 
 would refide in the hands of the Heir 
 Apparent to the Crown. This reafoning 
 can be valid only in the opinion of thofe. 
 who call a temporary indifpofition by the 
 inaufpicious name of a demife. It can 
 be of no weight with the people of Eng- 
 land, who look with confidence to better 
 hopes, to the profpect of the King's 
 health being reflored within as fhort a pe- 
 riod as has been known in almoft innu- 
 merable inftances of private perfons who 
 have fuffered for a time from fimilar at- 
 tacks. If there were only a poffibility 
 
 that
 
 t 35 ] 
 
 that the prayers of the kingdom would 
 be fuccefsful, even that poflibility muft 
 deftroy fuch an argument as that referred 
 to. How much lefs fhall we be inclined 
 to give credit to it, when common expe- 
 rience mews, that the moft probable event 
 of the prefent cafe is that which every 
 Englifhman earneftly defires, 
 
 It is therefore the indifpenfable duty of 
 Parliament, in providing for the prefent 
 exigency, to allow no degree of autho- 
 rity to be exercifed, which fhall be incom- 
 patible with maintaining the King in the 
 pofleffion of his rights, and enabling him 
 to re-affume the exercife of them when 
 ever his health fhall allow it. The pro- 
 vifions requifite for this purpofe are in- 
 deed fo far from being inconfiftent with 
 the objects to which we mould look in 
 (pftablifhing an intermediate Government, 
 F a that
 
 [ 36 ] 
 
 that they form an indifpenfable part of 
 any fyftein of permanency and tranquil- 
 lity in the country. If this point were 
 unprovided for, and the cafe {liould af- 
 terwards occur, can any man believe that 
 the people of this country would fubmit 
 patiently to the confequences of fuch a 
 neglect? And might we not, on the con- 
 trary, by thefe means, inftead of a ftrong 
 Government, which is the language of 
 fome men, have fecured to ourfelves, in 
 an event neither improbable nor perhaps 
 diftant, the certainty of confufion and 
 tumult ? It follows therefore, not only 
 that it would be unjuftifiable, for the 
 fake of giving ftrength and energy to the 
 intermediate Government, to neglect 
 making full provifion for the prefervation 
 of his Majefty's rights ; but that no 
 ftrength or energy can exift in any fuch 
 Government, unlefs the country feels 
 
 that this effential object is fecured. 
 
 With
 
 [ 37 ] 
 
 With refpect to the particular form 
 and mode in which the Regent's power 
 ihould be eftablifhed according to thefe con- 
 fiderations, this is an object which might 
 require a more detailed inveftigation than 
 is confiftent with the nature of this 
 enquiry. The principles, however, which 
 refult from what has already been faid, 
 are fufficiently obvious, and it cannot be 
 difficult to apply them to the feveral 
 queftions which may be expected to 
 arife, , 
 
 It will, in the firft place, be clear, that 
 whatever authority is neceflary for carry- 
 ing on the ordinary bufmefs of executive 
 adminiftration, muft be granted to the 
 perfon in whom we veft the intermedi- 
 ate Government, unlefs it can be fhewn 
 to be incompatible with the prefervation 
 of the King's authority. It will be equally 
 
 evident,
 
 [ 38 ] 
 
 evident, that no power ought to be fo given, 
 which is not neceflary for the purpofe 
 above ftated, even though it fhould not 
 be injurious to the rights of the Sovereign ; 
 becaufe the grant of any power what- 
 ever, in the prefent cafe, being entire- 
 ly grounded on the neceffity which 
 calls for it, fuch a grant ought, on the 
 one hand, to be made as nearly as poffible 
 co-extenfive with that neceffity ; but 
 fhould not, on the other hand, be fuffered 
 to reach beyond the foundation on which 
 it refts. 
 
 In cafes where thefe principles might 
 appear to clam, and where the neceffity 
 of carrying on a prefent government 
 might interfere with the duty of referving 
 to the King the full power to re-aflume 
 the exercife of his rights, the decifion 
 muft be made according to the importance 
 
 of
 
 [ 39 1 
 
 of the efeds which might be produced 
 on either fide. But it may be faid with 
 confidence, that although this decifion 
 may in a few particular inftances appear 
 embarrafling; yet that, generally fpeaking, 
 the two objects are far from being in- 
 compatible ; and that the providing for 
 both, is the only way to fecure the tran- 
 quillity and good government of the 
 country. 
 
 In addition to what has been ftated, 
 there is one inconteftible maxim, to which 
 the utmoft regard is to be paid. The 
 powers of an intermediate, temporary, and 
 delegated authority, ought not to bind 
 that which is primary, permanent, and 
 original, except with regard to thofe acts 
 only which are of the moft abfolute ne- 
 ceffity, and which are in their own nature 
 final and conclufive. Such, forinftance, are 
 the negotiations with foreign powers ; 
 
 fuch
 
 I 40 ] 
 
 fuch are alfo the nominations of judges, 
 and of a few other officers who muft by 
 law be appointed during good behaviour* 
 We may fafely admit thefe exceptions, 
 without prejudice to the general rule, and 
 in the fulleft confidence, that his Majefty 
 will in no cafe regret the confequence of 
 a principle to which he himfelf gave addi- 
 tional force and efficacy in the very firftmo* 
 ments of his reign*, by further fecuring the 
 independence of the judges. Butwlth thefe 
 exceptions it may fafely be afferted, that 
 no power can with propriety be given to 
 the Regent, in the prefent inftance, to do 
 any one act which the Sovereign may not 
 revoke whenever he mail return to the 
 exercife of his authority. 
 
 The force and evidence of thefe prin- 
 ciples cannot be refilled by any juft or 
 
 * See Stat. i. G. 3. p. 23. 
 
 folid
 
 [ 4' 1 
 
 ifolid 'argument. If they can at all be 
 combated, it muft be by oppofmg to 
 them fome general topics of the advan- 
 tages of a ftrong Government. Such a 
 mode of reafoning, if followed up to its 
 true conclufion, would apply not only to 
 overthrow the precautions which we may- 
 think necefTary in this particular inftance, 
 but to deftroy at once every fecurity that 
 has ever been eftablifhed, in any Govern*- 
 ment, againft the extent or the poffible 
 abufe of power* There is no doubt, that 
 abfolute and uncontrouled authority, not 
 re (trained by any law?, nor checked by 
 any councils, nor liable to be queftioned in 
 any tribunals, would be to many purpofes 
 the ftrongeft Government that could be 
 devifed. But the evils of this form are 
 fo intolerable, that there is hardly any 
 country where it has not been found ne- 
 ceffary to deftroy fomething of the energy 
 G that
 
 [ 4' I 
 
 that would refult from fuch a fyftem'.? 
 in order to provide for the more import- 
 ant ends, of the fecurity of thofe who 
 are governed, arid the ftability of thofe 
 who govern. It is, therefore, now held 
 in almoft every country in Europe, that 
 the Sovereign muft at leaft be bound by 
 the laws which he has himfelf eftablifhed. 
 In thefe kingdoms, happily for us, we 
 have proceeded a great deal further : we 
 have provided, not only that the King 
 {hall be bound by the law, but that the 
 law fhall no otherwife be eftablifhed, al- 
 tered, or repealed, than by the whole 
 body of the people acting in conjunction 
 with the Sovereign, through the medium 
 of their great national AiTembly. No 
 man can doubt, that by thefe provifions 
 the energy of the Britifh Government is, 
 in many refpe&s, very confiderably 
 weakened ; although this inconvenience
 
 t 43 1 
 
 is much more than counterbalanced 'by 
 inumerable advantages. This then is the 
 principle of every Government, but more 
 efpecially of ours, that its energy mould 
 not alone be confidered, but that in any 
 <meftion relating to it, the benefits to 
 arife on that account mould be contrafted 
 with the dangers to be apprehended on 
 other grounds ,; and that on this com- 
 parifon the decifion mould be formed. 
 In the ordinary courfe of our Govern- 
 ment this balance has already been ex- 
 amined,, and the machine regulated ac- 
 cording to it If, in providing for an un- 
 forefeen emergency like the prefent, we 
 -mould find, that an .additional ground of 
 danger arifes from the very nature of our 
 remedy, and that it is, perhaps, attended 
 alfo with additional inducements to the 
 abufe of power, the confequence una- 
 ypidably follows, that we muft fecure 
 G 2 our-
 
 [ 44 ] 
 
 ourfelves againft thefe rnifchiefs, even at 
 the hazard of deftroying fome degree of 
 energy ; in the fame manner as our an- 
 ceftors have fecured us againft many 
 others, by a fimilar facriilce. 
 
 We are then to obferve, that in the 
 prefent cafe, befides the provifions necef- 
 fary for the prefervation of the liberties 
 of the people againft the executive power, 
 and againft the attempts of powerful 
 individuals in the country, we are to fe- 
 cure the executive power itfelf, in thofe 
 hands in which it is permanently vefted, 
 againft the mifchiefs that might refult to 
 it from the unreftrained exercife of an in- 
 termediate authority, mould fuch exer- 
 cife unfortunately be influenced by the 
 counfels of interefted and defigning men. 
 We are to do this, not merely for the 
 fake of the Sovereign individually 
 
 (though
 
 [ 45 ] 
 
 (though to him we have fworn allegiance 
 and owe a pofitive duty), but for the 
 fake of the people at large, whofe fecu- 
 rity, whofe tranquillity, and whofe liber- 
 ties, are interefted in preferring his rights 
 inviolate and unimpaired. 
 
 If, for this purpofe, it fhould be ne- 
 ceflary in fome degree to weaken the 
 energy of the temporary government, 
 we may regret this as a part of the cala- 
 mity under which we are fallen, but we 
 cannot certainly confider it as an object 
 to which we ought to facrifice fo many 
 Interefts infinitely more important. We 
 may obferve, in eftimating the amount of 
 this inconvenience, how much lefs it is, 
 than the mifchief of a fimilar nature to 
 which Parliament has thought it would be 
 prudent to fubmit in the cafe of other 
 Regencies, in order to provide for the very 
 
 objed
 
 object which we are now anxious to fe- 
 cure. We may confider, that in this in- 
 flance a fole Regent would be appointed, 
 imreftrained by any council of Regency ; 
 that the Adminiftration acting under the 
 illuftrious perfon on whom the choice of 
 Parliament will naturally fall, would pof- 
 fefs, under fuch circumftances as the pre- 
 fent, many fources of weight and influence 
 which do not belong to the Government 
 even of the Sovereign himfelf. We fhould 
 alfo reflect, that even if under all thefe 
 circumftances it mould be the effect of 
 the principles here ftated to lefTen in fome 
 degree the energy of Government, yet 
 that the inconvenience of doing fo is 
 much lefs in fuch a moment as the pre- 
 fent than at any other period. In times 
 of difficulty or danger there exifts a greater 
 neceflity for vigour and exertion ; but in 
 a ftate of tranquillity, of domeftic har- 
 mony,
 
 [ 47 1 
 
 mony, and of general profperity, there 
 can be no fufficient grounds for neglect- 
 ing on this account the duties of allegiance 
 and of juftice, and thereby incurring a 
 rifk, fuch as has already been mention- 
 ed, and which, if it ihould turn againft us, 
 would at once deftroy every favourable 
 circumftance in our prefent fituation. 
 
 Thefe reafonings apply for the morl 
 part to any form of Government. But 
 there is an additional confideration, which 
 arifes from the peculiar nature of our con- 
 ftitution, and which is therefore entitled 
 to our particular attention. 
 
 The reafons have already been {rated, 
 which prove, that a permanency of power 
 in the hands of any individuals in this 
 country, to be held againft the executive 
 authority, is dangerous to the public wel- 
 fare.
 
 i 48 ] 
 
 fare* If thefe apply even in fitch a cafe 
 as the prefent, and induce us to render it 
 at leaft poffible that his Majefty may oil 
 his recovery find the Adminiflration of 
 his affairs in other hands than thofe to 
 which he had confided them ; they cer- 
 tainly are much more conclufive againft 
 allowing any other body of men to avail 
 themfelves of the interval, as againft him, 
 and to eftablim themfelves in fuch a man- 
 ner as might hereafter be prejudicial to 
 his authority. Many of the means which 
 might occur for this purpofe would fall 
 under the laft of the principles above 
 ftated. But if there mould be any others 
 peculiarly applicable to our conftitution, 
 and capable of producing any fuch effect, 
 it is to be hoped that the wifdom of the 
 two legiflative bodies, to whom we look 
 on this occafion, will watch Over thefe 
 with a more than ordinary degree of cau- 
 tion y
 
 t 49 ] 
 
 tion ; it fhould be remembered, with how 
 much difficulty an attempt to eftablifh the 
 power of a confederacy in Parliament was 
 defeated by our prefent Sovereign, in the 
 full exercife of his authority, and fupport- 
 ed by the almoft unanimous voice of his 
 people. Whatever meafures may appear 
 on full confideration to be neceflary to 
 prevent a repetition of this evil, at a pe- 
 riod fo much more dangerous, cannot 
 but meet the full eft afTent, approbation, 
 and fupport of every true Englishman. 
 
 There are fome other points to be at- 
 tended to, fully equal to the former in 
 their importance, but perhaps lefs like- 
 ly to be contefted. Parliament muft un- 
 doubtedly provide fome regular channel 
 of information, to the intent that when- 
 ever it mail pleafe God to reftore his Ma- 
 jefty to the wifhes of his people, the pro- 
 H grefe
 
 [ 5 ] 
 
 grels of his recovery may b<2 known, and 
 the interesting period afcertained at which 
 we are to be again placed under his pa- 
 ternal care, Provifion muft alfo now be 
 made for whatever folemnity fuch an oe- 
 cafion may be thought to require, and 
 for the confcquent ceflation of all inter- 
 mediate authority. It will alfo be the 
 <3uty of Parliament, to fecure and regulate 
 the fervices of thofe whom his Majefty 
 had before chofen to attend him ; as weU 
 as to give the necefTary aid and fanction 
 to that affectionate care of his Majefty 's 
 perfon, which is fo juftly to be expected 
 from HER, whofe conduct has afforded 
 the brighteft example of dcmeilic union 
 and attachment. 
 
 Thefe, however, are topics on which 
 it is not neceflary to enlarge. It is in- 
 deed much to be wiihed, that a refped- 
 
 ful
 
 t 5' 1 
 
 ful filence could have been obferved with 
 regard to the whole fubjet to which 
 thefe confederations relate, Nor fhould 
 they have ever been fubmitted to the 
 Public in this form* if by avoiding the 
 difcuflion of fuch queftions, it had been 
 poffible to avoid the neceffity of decid- 
 ing upon them ; or if the forbearance of 
 one individual could have reftrained the 
 eagernefs of many. But as this fubjeft 
 has been daily brought forward into pub- 
 lic view ; and attempts have been made to 
 prejudice the minds of the people upon 
 it, in favour of opinions contrary to the 
 firft principles of truth and juftice ; it 
 feems a point of duty, that fome fug- 
 geftions of a different nature fhould be 
 fubmitted to the confideration of the 
 country. This could no otherwife have 
 been done, than with that freedom with 
 which an Englifhman accuftoms himfelf 
 H 2 t
 
 to examine queftions of great national 
 importance : but it is hoped, that it has 
 been done with moderation, decency, and 
 temper ; and above all, that nothing 
 has been faid repugnant either to thofe 
 feelings which our common calamity has 
 imprefled on all our minds, or to thofe 
 fentiments of perfonal refped:, fubmiffion^ 
 and deference, which are due to all the 
 branches of that illuftrious family, under 
 whofe aufpicious Government we have 
 enjoyed a greater degree of profperity 
 than has fallen to the lot of any other 
 nation in the annals of Mankind. The 
 object of thefe pages will have been com- 
 pletely anfwered, if they fhould at all 
 contribute to fettle, on conflitutional prin- 
 ciples, a tranfaction which is interefling 
 to our prefent happinefs, and which inuft 
 form an important sera in our future hif- 
 tory ; or if they mould be the means of 
 
 prevent-
 
 [ 53 ] 
 
 preventing any ftep, which might here- 
 after occafion one painful fenfation in the 
 heart of a Sovereign, whofe return to 
 the exercife of his power we muft all 
 wifh to be attended with as much eafe to 
 himfelf, as it will diffufe fatisfaction and 
 joy through every part of his dominions.

 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 No. i. 
 
 Proceedings relative to fettling the Form 
 of Government during the Minority of 
 Henry VI. 
 
 Rot. Parl. Vol. iv. Page 171. i Henry VI. 
 
 No. 1 2, n EXCITES, that at the death of 
 JLv Henry V. confidering the tender age 
 of the prefent King, feveral Lords Spiritual and 
 Temporal met for the imminent neceflity of the 
 kingdom j that, by their advice, feveral commiflions 
 were iflued under the Great Seal of the King to 
 divers officers j and alfo writs for fummoning the 
 Parliament , to the intent that by the common 
 afTembly of all the Eftates of the Kingdom, and 
 their wife council and difcretion, the government 
 of the perfon and dominions of the King might 
 
 be
 
 56 A P P E N D I X, No. i. 
 
 be provided 'for in the faid Parliament. The Par- 
 liament approved and confirmed the faid commif- 
 Cons and writs. 
 
 Ibid. p. 174. No. 24. The Duke ef Bedford, 
 then out of the kingdom, is ordained and confli- 
 tuted, by letters patent of the King in Parliament, 
 Protestor, Defender, and Principal Councellor of 
 the kingdom of England ; and in his abfence, the 
 Duke of Gloucefter. 
 
 Ibid. p. 175. No. 25. All offices relating to 
 the King's forefts, parks, warrens, and all bens- 
 fices below a certain value, ultra vigenti nfque ad 
 trlgcnta manas, are to be given, as often as they 
 ihall become vacant, at the difcretion of the Pro- 
 tetor: but all other oflices and benefices by the 
 Prqtector and other Lords of the King's Council. 
 
 Ibid. No-. 26. Certain perfons conflituted by 
 name in Parliament to be Aflillant Councellors to 
 the Government, who accepted of the fame under 
 certain articles j in which it is exprefsly flated, that 
 the nomination to all offices (with the exceptions 
 mentioned in No. 25.), and the difpofal of aH 
 wards, marriages, farms, and other cafualties o 
 the Crown, (hould be in the Council. 
 
 lUid. 2 Henry VI. p. 201. No. 15, At clivers 
 particular requefls of the Commons of the realm,,
 
 APPENDIX, ttb, r. 57 
 
 and by the advice and aflent of the Lords Spiritual 
 ind Temporal, certain perfons v/ere chofcn and 
 bonftituted Afliftant Councellors to the Government 
 iinder certain further articles ; by which it is pro- 4 
 videdj that no matters of importance fhould be de- 
 termined or tranfacxed, but by the approbation of 
 the majority of the Council. 
 
 Rot; Parl; Vol. v. 5 Henry VL p. 407, 408* 
 No. 6; States the names of the perfons appointed 
 to 'conftitute the King's Council, and the fevera* 
 articles agreed to and fubfcribed by them. In.thefe 
 it is ftated, that neither the Protedor, nor any 
 member of the Council, mail determine upon anjr 
 fuitj or {hew any further favour than tht procuring 
 it to be read in Council. That in cafe of a differ- 
 ence of opinion in the Council, if the Protector' 
 be in the minority, the matter mail ftand over tor 
 the next day, when it mail be determined accord- 
 Ing to the majority ; the Protector to have the call- 
 ing vote, when the numbers arc equal. In cafe of 
 vacancies happening in offices and benefices be- 
 longing to the King, thofe that have been fervants 
 to the King's father, or his grandfather, or thofe 
 who ferve the King himfelf, to be preferred. In 
 cafe of matters being brought before the Council, 
 refpetHng the King's prerogative -on the one fide, 
 and the rights of his fubjets on the other, the 
 opinions of the judges to be taken and entered on 
 record* 
 
 I Thefe,
 
 5 S A P P E N D I X, No. i. 
 
 Thefe, and feveral other articles, relating to dif-* 
 ferent fubjeb, were figned by the Protector and 
 the other Lords of the Council. 
 
 No. 7. p. 409 and 410, contain the proteftation 
 of the Lords of the Council, refpe&ing their obe- 
 
 * f Item, That the faid Lords have a King, whom 
 *' they acknowledge, and none other ; and always, 
 " fo long as it {hall pleafe God to grant him life, 
 " will, and ought to acknowledge, under God, 
 " for their Sovereign here on earth. Moreover, 
 " they underfland that all .others who be in or 
 " of this land, from the higheft unto the loweft, 
 /" of whatever eftate, condition, or degree, they 
 " be, are his liegemen and his fubjetls, and ought 
 " to obey him and his laws. 
 
 " Item, The faid Lords underfland, that al- 
 *? though the King is now of tender age, yet 
 " neverthelefs the fame authority refteth, and is, 
 " at this day, in his perfon, that fhall be in him 
 1 " at any time hereafter, when he fhall come, by 
 " God's grace, to years of difcretion. 
 
 " Item, That forafmuch as the King is now of 
 " fuch tendernefs of age, that by poffibility of na- 
 " ture he may not indeed rule or govern in his own 
 " perfon, and that neither God nor reafon require 
 
 " that
 
 APPENDIX, No. i. 59 
 
 ** that this land (hall be without government. For 
 " fo much of the execution of the King's authority 
 " as relates to the politic rule and government of 
 ** his land, and to the obfervance and keeping of 
 " his laws, belongs to the Lords Spiritual and 
 **' Temporal of his land, at fuch time as they be 
 " aflembled in Parliament, or in great Council : 
 " and other wife, when they are not fo aflembled, 
 " unto the Lords chofen and named to be-of his 
 " continual Council ; of the which my Lord of 
 " Bedford is chief, as long a,s he is in this land, 
 " and in his abfence, my Lord of Gloucefter, if 
 " he be therein : the which Council, the King 
 " being of fuch tendernefs of age, reprefent his 
 '* perfon as toward execution of the fame politic 
 " rule And government of his land, and obfervance 
 " and keeping of his faid laws, and that no other 
 *' perfon may or ought to' afcribe to hlmfelf the faid 
 " rule and government. Saving always unto my 
 " faid Lord of Bedford, and of Gloucefter, what 
 " is efpecially referved and applied to them by Aft 
 of Parliament," &c. &e. 
 
 The above articles being fhewn to the Duke 
 of Bedford, by certain Lords of the Council 
 deputed for that purpofe, and his . anfwer required ; 
 he replied, " That he had well heard, and 
 " underftood, the matters abovefaid ; and that he 
 ** thanked them with all his heart for fending to 
 ** him ; and informed them, that it was to him. 
 la " one
 
 tfe A P P E N D I X, No. i, 
 
 *' one of the greateft gladnefs that ever fell to 
 " his heart, to fee the King {landing in this 
 tendernefs of age to have fo fedate, fo fub* 
 " ftantial, and true a Council That he . acknow^ 
 " ledged the King for his Sovereign Lord, and 
 " himfelf for his liegeman, and fubjecl to him 
 (c and to his laws, according to that which was 
 " before rehearfed j althoggh God had, by way of 
 t( birth,' made him nearer the King than any 
 (f other : and that in all things which belong unto 
 " the rule of the land, and to the cbiervance of 
 " the King's laws, and generally in all things that 
 " belong to the King, and fo his eftate, he would 
 * ( be advifed, directed, and ruled by the Lords of 
 " the Council, and obey the King, and them as 
 <f for the King, as lowly as the lead and pooreft 
 " fubjeft that the King had in his land." 
 
 " And if he did, or attempted to do, any thing 
 ** contrary thereto, he would at all times, with as 
 " good heart and will, be reformed and amended 
 " by them as any man mould } knowing this foy 
 *' his duty, and that he ought fo to do," 
 
 The above articles were fubfcribed to by the 
 Duke of Bedford, who alfo voluntarily took an, 
 oath to truly obferve and keep them. In like 
 manner the Duke of Gloucefler, as Protector in 
 the abfence of the Duke of Bedford, fubfcribed to 
 the fame, in the fame words.
 
 APPENDIX, No, 2, 61 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Proceedings relative to fettling the Form of 
 Government during the King's being dif 
 qualified by Infirmities. 
 
 Rot. Parl. Vol. v. 32 Henry VI. 
 
 P. 239. No. 24. T ETTERS patent empowering 
 J-' the Duke of York, in the 
 King's abfence, with the aflent of the King's Goun- 
 cil, to call or diflblve Parliament, and tranfacl all 
 bufmefs therein as the King might do, 
 
 P. 240. No, 30. The Commons requeft the Duke 
 of York, as the King's Lieutenant, and the other 
 Lords in Parliament, that a permanent Council may 
 be eftablifhed to adminifler juflice and equity. 
 
 Ibid. No. 31. Certain Lords fent to the King 
 at Windfor, to acquaint him of the death of the 
 Archbifhop of Canterbury, Chancellor of Eng* 
 land ; and to be informed whom the King intends 
 to appoint to thofe ftations Alfo to (late, that the 
 King had, during the Parliament held at Reading, 
 informed the Commons of his gracious intent to
 
 6^ A P P E N D I X, No. 2 . 
 
 ordain and eftablifh a difcreet and fedate Council 
 to conduct the affairs of Government That the 
 Commons had made two requefts to the King's 
 Lieutenant and the Lords on that head ; they there- 
 fore requefted to know the King's pleafure re- 
 fpe&ing the nomination of the members of the faid 
 Council, 
 
 P.. 241. No. 32. The Lords who were fcnt to 
 the King, on their return, report that they could 
 obtain no anfvver from him to any of their re- 
 quefts. 
 
 J*. 242. No. 33. The Lords Spiritual and Tem- 
 poral in Parliament afiembled, for certain caufes 
 moving them thereto, elect and nominate Richard 
 Duke of York Protector and Defender of the 
 kingdom of England during the King's pleafure : 
 the next day the Duke delivered in a paper con- 
 taining feveral articles which he requefted might 
 be enacted in Parliament. 
 
 No. 34. The Duke of York ftates, that he ac-i 
 cepts of the Protectorfhip at the defire of Parlia- 
 ment.. " I defire and pray you, that in this pre- 
 *' fent Parliament, and by authority thereof, it be 
 " enacted, that of yourfehes, and of your free and 
 " mere difpofition, ye deftre, name y and call me to the 
 " faid name and charge, and that I take them not upon 
 *i me of any prefumption of myfelf, but only of the 
 
 " due
 
 APPENDIX, No. 2. $3 
 
 " due and humble obedience that I ought to do 
 '* unto the King, our mod dread and fovereign 
 *' Lord, and to you the Peerage of this land, in 
 tf whom, by the occafion of the infirmity of out 
 " faid fovereign Lord, reds the exercife of his 
 " authority, whofe noble commands I am as ready 
 " to perform and obey as any liegeman alive ; and 
 " that at fuch time as it fliall pleafe our blefied 
 " Creator to reftore his moft noble perfon to 
 " healthful difpofition, it fhall pleafe you to declare 
 " and notify to his good grace." 
 
 The Lords agree to the propriety of the Duke's 
 requeft, and think that for their di&harge in this 
 behalf there mould be fuch an -Aft rrnde for them 
 in this Parliament, according t6 an At made in 
 the tender age of the King, by which, in a finilar 
 cafe of neceflity, they were compelled to ckufc and 
 name a Protector and Defender. i: 
 
 No. 36. The Duke requefts to be informed of 
 the extent of his power, and that it be enacted, 
 ratified, and confirmed, by the authority of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 The Lords anfwer, that he is chief of the King's 
 Council, and therefore they have devifed him a 
 name (Protector and Defender) different from 
 other Counfellors, but which imports no authority 
 of governance of the land, only a perfonal duty of 
 
 attendance
 
 6 4 A P P E N D I X, No. 2 V 
 
 attendance to its actual defence. That he is iG 
 hold this office during the King's pleafure, fo that 
 it be without prejudice to the Prince ; and there ~ 
 upon an Al to be made by authority of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 Ibid. No. 38; Letters patent, Mating the King's 
 infirm ftate of health, his inability to attend to 
 the bufinefs of his kingdom ; and appointing, with 
 the aflent and advice of the Lords* and die afTent o 
 the Commons in Parliament affembled, the Duke 
 of York Protector, Defender, and principal Coun- 
 fellor of the Rtalm during the King's pleafure. The 
 office of Protector to be exercifed by Edward, the 
 King's eldefl fon, t s$ien he mould arrive at years 
 of difcretion. ^ 
 
 P ?.i3. No. 39. Letters patent, to the fame 
 purpor ' the above, conferring the office of Pro- 
 teclor, &c, on Prince Edward, when he mould ar-* 
 rive at years of difcretion, provided that he mould 
 chufe to take it upon him. 
 
 No. 40. An Act, conferring on Prince Edward., 
 when he mould arrive at years of difcretion, and 
 have taken the office of Protector, &c. and on the 
 Duke of York, who then poflefled that office, the 
 privilege of appointing to all offices relating to fo- 
 refts, parks, and warrens belonging to the Crown, 
 as often as they mould become vacant, and to all 
 
 benefices
 
 APPENDIX, No. 2. <5j- 
 
 benefices of a certain value. All other offices and 
 benefices, as they become vacant, to be difpofed of 
 by the advice of the Prote&or and the other Lords 
 of the Council. 
 
 This Act is expreffed in nearly the fame words as 
 that in Vol. iv. p. 175. 
 
 Rolls, Parl. Vol. v. 33 Hen. VI. p. 280, 281, 
 282. No. r8. to 24. After the battle of St. Albaivs, 
 the King, by the advice and aflent of his Parlia- 
 ment, declares the Duke of York, and the Earls of 
 Warwick and Salifbury, and their party, to be his 
 irue and faithful liegemen. The inflrument recites 
 the letters written by them to the King before the 
 battle, and grants them full pardon for any thing 
 fuppoied to have been done againft his perfon, crown, 
 or dignity. 
 
 Ibid. No. 25. Contains the oath taken by them 
 and the other Lords Spiritual and Temporal. 
 
 P. 284. No. 30. Letters patent, empowering the 
 Duke of York to call a Parliament, &c. the fame as 
 No. 24. p. 239. 
 
 Ibid. No. 31. In confequence of the Duke of 
 York being appointed, by the above, the King's 
 Lieutenant in Parliament, the Commons recom- 
 mend to him and the Lords, that the King, by their 
 K. advice,
 
 66 APPENDIX, No. 2. 
 
 advice, mould appoint a Protector and Defender of 
 the land, to act in the place of the King during his 
 abfence ; {lating the neceflity of fuch an appoint- 
 ment. 
 
 P. 285. No. 3 2. ---The Commons repeat their re- 
 tjueft, &c. 
 
 Ibid. No. -}}. The requeft of the Commons, 
 1 hi ted by the Chancellor to the Lords, and inform- 
 ing them, that the Commons will not proceed in 
 'natters of Parliament till they receive an anfwer. 
 Tf-e Lords agree to the propriety of their requeft, 
 and <c every Lord federally giving his voice and ajjent* 
 they elect the Duke of York Protector, &c. on the 
 lame conditions as he held the office before. 
 
 Ibid. No. 34. The Commons repeat their re- 
 quett, &c. 
 
 P. 286. No. 35. The Lords acquaint the Com- 
 mons, that the King, by their advice and afient, had 
 appointed the Duke of York to the office of Protec- 
 tor, &c. 
 
 Ibid. No. 36. The Duke of York propofes cer- 
 tain articles to be enacted by the authority of Par- 
 liament, respecting his accepting the office of 
 
 Protector. 
 
 Part
 
 A P P E N D I X. No. 2. 67 
 
 Tart of thefe articles is to the fame effel as that 
 Hated in p. 242. No. 34. 
 
 In Art. 4. He requefts the Lords " to ordain, 
 ' appoint , name, and eftablijh in the fold Parliament, 
 u and by authority thereof, a fitfficient and convenient 
 " number of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, to be of tht 
 " faid Council *." 
 
 P. 287. No. 37. The Chancellor flates to all the 
 Lords, the articles on which the Duke of York has 
 accepted the Prote&orfhip ; to which they agree, 
 and ordain, that he (hall have the fame power as be- 
 fore, with the following alteration in the patent : 
 " And whereas, in his laft power were thefe words, 
 " Quamditt nobis placuerit (during the King's plea- 
 " fure), mould now be in his power thefe words, 
 *' ^ttoufqite idem confan guineas nojler de occupations Jive 
 " onere et nomine hujttfmodi per nos in Parliament*) de 
 " avifamentoet ajjenfu Dominorum SpiritualiumetTem- 
 <( poralittm in Parliaments exifterf, exonerettir" (until 
 our faid kinfman be difcharged from that office by 
 the King in Parliament, with the advice and aflent 
 of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in parliament 
 aflembled). 
 
 * In Art. i. The King's " Privy Council, to nvtofe ad- 
 " vice, counfel, and a/ent, I will obey ami apply nyfelf, as J 
 " know it accordetk with my duty to Jo" 
 
 K 2 No. 38,
 
 68 APPENDIX, No. 2. 
 
 No. 38. The Commons confer with the Chan- 
 cellor and Duke of York, and defire and pray the 
 Duke to take upon him the name and charge of Pro- 
 tector, &c. to which he aflents. 
 
 No. 39. Letters patent to the fame effect as thofe 
 ftated in p. 242. No. 38. appointing the Duke of 
 York Protector, &c. with the alteration in the 
 words, as above in No. 37. and with a preamble, 
 {Kiting, that it was at the requefb of the Commons 
 that the appointment was made. Alfo Letters pa* 
 tent to the fame effedt, appointing Edward, the 
 King's eldeft fon, Protector, &c. when he Ihould 
 arrive at years of discretion, under the fame condi- 
 tions. 
 
 P. 289. No. 40. An Act exactly to the fame 
 purport as that in p. 243. No. 40. 
 
 P. 289. No. 41. The King, considering that the 
 diligence and actual labour appertaining to the go- 
 vernment and rule of the realm would be tedious 
 to his perfon, &c. ordains and grants " that bis 
 *' Council Jl all provide ', commune, ordain, fpeed, and 
 , * coticlude, allfuch matters as touch and cancer tit he good 
 *' and politic rule and government of his land; referring, 
 " that In tillfuch matters as touch the honour, ivorj!j'tp y 
 " andftirety of his per/on, theyjball let him know what 
 " direction they take in them; defiring his f aid Council t 
 *' for the welfare and eafe of his f aid perfon , and keep- 
 
 ing
 
 A P P E N D I X, No. 2. 6 9 
 
 * c ing and bearing ttp his royal eftate, to take this bis ivill 
 
 " and ordinance upon them. The Lords take tlx above 
 
 tf duties upon them, protejling that the high prerogative^ 
 
 <c pre-eminence, and authority of his Majejly Royal, and 
 
 ** alfo the fovereignty of them and all this land, is, and 
 
 " always mitft reft) and /ball rej} y in his mojl excel- 
 
 lent Perfon." 
 
 Ibid. p. 321. No. 50. The King in Parliament, 
 by the advice and afient of the Lords Spiritual and 
 Temporal, and the afient of the Commons in Par* 
 liament aflembled, exonerates and difcharges the 
 Duke of York from the office, duty, and name of 
 Prote&or, Defender, and principal C.owncellor of 
 she Realm. 
 
 ' 
 
 
 This Day is pulifljed, Price is. 6d. ' 
 THE 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY OPINIONS 
 
 O F 
 
 SIR DUDLEY RYDER, I Ma. CHARLES YORKE, 
 LORD MANSFIELD, | MR. W. BECKFORD, &c. 
 
 ON THE CHOICE OF A 
 
 REGENCY OR REGENT. 
 .WITH OTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THAT IN- 
 TERESTING QUESTION.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBR/JIY 
 
 A fee of 3c per day is charged for this book which was withdrawn on 
 the last date stamped below. 
 

 
 floret : 
 
 PAMPHLET BINDER 
 Syracuse, N. Y. 
 Stockton, Calif. 
 
 DA 
 
 510 
 
 G866c 
 
 A PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
 THIS BOOK CARDS 
 
 University Research Library