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America and Britain 
 
 THE STORY OF THE RELATIONS 
 BETWEEN TWO PEOPLES 
 
 BY 
 H. H. POWERS 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 "THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR 
 
 " AMERICA AMONG THE NATIONS 
 
 ETC. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1918 
 
 jlIl rights reserved 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1918, 
 BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Set up and clectrotyped. Published September, 1918. 
 
 3. B. Cashing Co. Berwick & Smith Co. 
 Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 THIS is not an argument but a story, the story of 
 our relation with that people with whom we have had 
 more to do, and must seemingly continue to have 
 more to do, than with any other in the world. If 
 the story seems to argue as it goes on, it is because, 
 like other stories, it has its moral, a moral which it is 
 not purposed either to emphasize or to avoid. Such 
 bias as it may have is the unconscious bias of an Ameri 
 can of American lineage, but an American who has 
 seen much of Britain s work in the world, as well as 
 that of other nations who work on somewhat different 
 lines. Whatever the result of these experiences, the 
 aim has been to tell the story just as it happened, 
 omitting details only because they seem unimportant, 
 never because they make for this or that conclusion. 
 If the conclusion reached is at variance with tradi 
 tion, it is because a juster balance is held between those 
 showy and dramatic happenings upon which the 
 popular imagination loves to dwell, and the quiet, 
 unobtrusive factors which so often quite outweigh 
 them in importance. An effort has also been made 
 to view these international situations somewhat from 
 both ends. We are prone to remember our end of a 
 transaction and forget the other, even though the one 
 may be quite unintelligible without the other. It is 
 hoped that in certain cases the key to an understand 
 ing has thus been supplied. 
 
 The story of Anglo-American relations is not an idyll 
 or a tale of mutual chivalry and devotion. It is the 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 record of two very human peoples, both keen in the 
 pursuit of self-interest and much more conscious of 
 immediate than of ultimate ends. But it is the story 
 of peoples that on the whole have gotten on together, 
 that have differed and even quarreled without perma 
 nent estrangement, and that have known how to tem 
 per the sordidness of self-interest with something of 
 magnanimity and broader vision. Often dwelling in 
 thought upon surface differences, they have never 
 escaped the subconscious realization that they were 
 one people, having infinitely more in common than in 
 contrast, and approaching by slightly different paths 
 an identical goal. Mutual helpfulness has not been 
 their constant care, but it has been their unfailing atti 
 tude in all great crises of their experience. Not a 
 single crisis of our history could have been safely passed 
 without the sympathy if not the positive help of Britain. 
 We may safely add that henceforth not a single crisis 
 in the history of either can be safely passed without 
 mutual aid and help. 
 
 But these general considerations of policy will not 
 of themselves insure the necessary mutuality. The 
 life of all peoples is much more instinctive than cal 
 culating, and if Anglo-Saxon mutuality is to be an 
 effective fact in the critical days before us, it will be 
 because the habit has been slowly forming in the past. 
 What has been the underlying instinct in Anglo- 
 American relations in the past? It is to answer 
 this question, not to beg the question, that these 
 pages are written. 
 
 iv 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 THE BRITISH ORIGIN OF AMERICA 
 
 IT is to be noted first of all that our nation is of 
 British origin. We are a development from the British 
 colonies planted in North America during our racial 
 the seventeenth century. It is true that complexity 
 other colonies, Spanish, French, Dutch, and Swedish, 
 were planted in America about the same tune, and that 
 these have made their contribution to the American 
 commonwealth. This fact, taken in connection with 
 the exceedingly varied immigration of later times from 
 all countries of Europe and even from Asia and Africa, 
 is often cited in refutation of this theory of British 
 origin. But this argument is really beside the mark. 
 It only proves that our people are of composite origin. 
 But that is true of every people. The ancient Greeks 
 were of very mixed origin, but they were none the less 
 Greek. The British people are sprung from ancient 
 Britons, Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, to say 
 nothing of the numberless immigrants of every sort 
 and the mingling of Welsh, Scotch, and Irish blood 
 which has gone on for centuries. Yet they are very 
 British. So the American people has been recruited 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 from ahncst every race under the sun, but it has been 
 assimilated or is being assimilated to a type as uniform 
 as that of any other people. 
 
 But the fact that our people are of mixed origin does 
 not mean that our nation is a conglomerate or that our 
 CivUization culture is a compromise between different 
 not complex contributing elements. Our language, for 
 instance, is not a medley of English, French, German, 
 Italian, Russian, Syrian, and the like. It is English, 
 the other languages being represented at most by a 
 few scattering words which rapidly become anglicized 
 beyond recognition. And the same is true of all that 
 is essential in our political and social institutions. The 
 influence of the French, Spanish, and Dutch can be 
 traced in our laws and customs, but only locally and 
 in matters of detail, much as in our speech. Even 
 where their language and institutions have a certain 
 independent existence, as in Louisiana and New Mex 
 ico, they are clearly losing ground. Those who speak 
 French or Spanish speak English also, or are learning 
 to do so. Only the British speech and British institu 
 tions have been able to persist, to enlarge their terri 
 tory, and to absorb or suppress competing systems. 
 It is therefore perfectly correct to say that our 
 country and our civilization are of British origin, 
 the non-British elements of our population hav 
 ing failed to maintain their earlier type and allowed 
 themselves to be assimilated to a type essentially 
 British. 
 
 This important truth is somewhat obscured by the 
 
 2 
 
THE BRITISH ORIGIN OF AMERICA 
 
 fact that immigration is still actively going on, and 
 large numbers of newcomers are always with us. 
 Some of these remain very foreign, and immigration 
 where many of a kind are congregated stm active 
 there may sometimes be found real foreign communi 
 ties, with foreign speech, foreign schools and churches, 
 and foreign customs and ideals. But if we study 
 these communities, we shall find that they are merely 
 receiving stations through which arriving foreigners 
 are constantly passing out into the great American 
 beyond. Individual Germans or Scandinavians may 
 stay in such communities all their lives and hardly 
 become American at all, but their descendants cannot 
 do so, and unless their places are taken by new arrivals, 
 the community soon loses its foreign character and 
 undergoes the inevitable transformation into a type 
 which though not present-day English, is plainly de 
 rived from the English of colonial days. 
 
 The British colonists who thus set the pace which 
 all others were to follow, were not average Englishmen. 
 They were for the most part malcontents Exce ^ona! 
 who protested against established beliefs character of 
 and practices. They were perhaps no more colomsts 
 reasonable than other people, but they were certainly 
 more independent and energetic, qualities of value if 
 turned to wise account. Meanwhile societies of es 
 tablished ways and settled traditions found them very 
 troublesome. They were a problem in all the Euro 
 pean countries, but different countries dealt with the 
 problem in very different ways. England early 
 
 3 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 adopted the policy of allowing these troublesome ele 
 ments to migrate to the New World and found com 
 munities according to their own ideas. She gave 
 them no help and attempted no interference. She 
 thought herself fortunate to be rid of them on these 
 terms, and they thought themselves lucky to get off 
 thus easily. Probably both were right. 
 
 France adopted a very different policy. She would 
 have no dissenters in the New France that she was 
 French creating. So she persecuted her dissenters 
 colonization and expelled them from all her dominions. 
 P ic y Meanwhile she sought for regular and nor 
 
 mal persons to people her colonies. But people who 
 are regular and in harmony with the ideas and prac 
 tices of those about them do not care to go to distant 
 lands and alien environments. They prefer to stay 
 where they are. So France found few colonists, 
 though she offered them moneyed assistance and large 
 inducements. The English colonies consequently grew 
 much faster than the French, and when, following the 
 lead of the home countries, they became involved in 
 hostilities with each other, the more energetic and more 
 populous English colonies inevitably prevailed. It is 
 a curious fact that Canada, Britain s chief possession 
 in America to-day, is the outgrowth of one of these 
 French colonies, the colonies of her own founding 
 having slipped the leash of her control. 
 
 One more fact must be noted if we are to under 
 stand this earlier situation. The colonies were far 
 away from England and communication was infrequent 
 
 4 
 
THE BRITISH ORIGIN OF AMERICA 
 
 and slow. This tended strongly to confirm the let- 
 alone policy which England had adopted with refer 
 ence to these troublesome dissenters. Most Politica i 
 matters that came up for discussion were too effect of 
 unimportant or too urgent to be referred isolatlon 
 to England for settlement. And since these matters 
 chiefly concerned the colonists, who were not savages 
 but Englishmen, and quite as competent as the Eng 
 lishmen at home, there was every reason for leaving 
 to them matters which they understood so much better 
 than any one in England. The colonists of course 
 regarded themselves as British subjects and were so 
 regarded at home, but they were stiff-necked and 
 opinionated, and a prudent statesman would avoid 
 unnecessary interference with them. And since their 
 geographical separation from the mother country made 
 pretty much all interference unnecessary, the policy 
 of letting them manage their own affairs became a 
 habit, and the habit in turn came to be a right which 
 only a very bold or a very foolish man would question. 
 Among the governors sent out to the colonies by the 
 British king there were occasionally such men, but 
 they came to grief, and their failure only confirmed 
 the habitual independence of the colonies. This in 
 dependence was not due to any of those later theories 
 about the universal right to liberty. It was due to 
 the fact that England allowed certain of the most 
 unmanageable of her people to move quite beyond 
 the reach of her effective control. 
 Meanwhile in the century and a half of this colonial 
 5 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 period England herself underwent very great changes. 
 The dissenters did not all go to the colonies. Many of 
 Political them remained to make trouble for the 
 changes in established order. They won adherents 
 England an( j b ecame b o ^ j n asserting their will. A 
 king and an archbishop who resisted them lost their 
 heads and another king his throne. English rulers 
 became circumspect, and habitual deference to the 
 will of the people developed those free institutions and 
 popular liberties which are the glory of England. Un 
 consciously the English people were coming over to 
 the position of the colonies, winning by a bitter struggle 
 the privileges which the colonists enjoyed by virtue 
 of their peculiar situation. Neither side realized for 
 a time where the other side stood, and so they were 
 less prompt to understand and help each other than 
 could have been wished. But there were not wanting 
 those who saw clearly that both stood for the same 
 things and proclaimed this fact in dark hours of con 
 fusion and distrust. It is but fair to say that these 
 men of broader vision were more numerous in England 
 than in the colonies. There was something very en 
 grossing about life in these primitive settlements which 
 did not tend to broad sympathies. England touched 
 the world so closely and at so many points that she 
 had even then something of that world consciousness 
 which has been the fruit of her wide experience. But 
 we lived much unto ourselves and touched the great 
 world very little. What wonder that we hardly real 
 ized the change that England had undergone. 
 
 6 
 
n 
 
 THE RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND 
 
 BOTH England and the colonies were rudely jostled 
 out of their comfortable habits by the attempt of a 
 foolish king to assert a vanished authority. For a 
 long time the kings, while maintaining the fiction of 
 royal authority, had been in the habit of respecting 
 the wishes of the people as expressed through Parlia 
 ment, and here, as in the colonies, habit had come to 
 be regarded as a right. But when George III came to 
 the throne, his ambitious mother is said to have given 
 him as her parting advice : " Be a king, George. Be 
 a king," which of course meant that he should exercise 
 real authority and not allow continued deference to 
 destroy his right to rule. This advice he proceeded to 
 follow, being intent, apparently, rather upon restor 
 ing his authority than upon accomplishing anything 
 definite by its exercise. But mindful of the fate of his 
 predecessors, he did not venture openly to resist Par 
 liament, but tried the more insidious method of cor 
 rupting it. In the colonies he adopted the direct 
 method of asserting his authority through his ministers. 
 In both cases he was entirely within his theoretical 
 legal rights, but in both cases he was overriding long 
 standing privileges, which was of course precisely what 
 he had set out to do. In both cases he encountered 
 bitter opposition, though a minority stood by him. In 
 
 7 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 both cases he ultimately failed, and the rights which 
 before had been nothing but habitual concessions were 
 established by firm guarantees. 
 
 But unfortunately the two cases were not outwardly 
 alike and the two natural allies did not at once see 
 Attitude of tne * r common interest. The British people 
 English and deeply resented the corruption of Parlia 
 ment and the perversion of the means by 
 which they were accustomed to express their will. 
 The colonists, on the other hand, hardly knew of this 
 and did not base their protest upon that ground. 
 They objected to the exercise of any home authority 
 over them, whether legitimate or otherwise. This 
 seemed to the people at home to be very extreme 
 ground. They respected the authority of Parliament 
 when it was not corrupted, and it seemed to them that 
 every Englishman should do so, no matter where he 
 lived. They did not realize that Englishmen living 
 thousands of miles away, and with little access or 
 communication, could not express their will through 
 Parliament as the home people could do. The trouble 
 was that in theory England had always governed her 
 colonies, and in practice they had always governed 
 themselves. Englishmen were conscious of the theory, 
 and the colonists were conscious of the practice. So 
 when the colonists declared that they were independ 
 ent, that they always had been so, and that no other 
 arrangement was practicable or right, most Englishmen 
 thought this a very monstrous doctrine. If the king 
 had not been alienating the home people at the same 
 
THE RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND 
 
 time, he would doubtless have had their very strong 
 support for the contention that every Englishman, 
 no matter where he lived, should recognize the authority 
 of Parliament, for they had not yet learned that there 
 are practical limitations to the exercise of such au 
 thority. As it was, he got very little support, for they 
 were righting their own battle for the right to manage 
 their own affairs, just as the colonists were doing. It 
 is a pity they did not see that the colonists were fight 
 ing for the same thing and that their very different 
 way of putting their case was only due to differences 
 of situation. It is a pity, too, that the colonists did 
 not perceive how the English people were recognizing 
 their principle in the very different application which 
 suited their circumstances. A pity, it is true, but not 
 surprising on either side. Great principles detach 
 themselves but slowly from entangling circumstance, 
 and Anglo-Saxons were feeling their way as yet toward 
 those principles which have since become the corner 
 stone of their civilization. 
 
 So with much of misunderstanding the English 
 people and the colonists fought in unconscious alliance 
 and succeeded where either alone would Am ance O f 
 have failed. It was settled once for all English and 
 that the king must not resist Parliament colonists 
 or try to influence its decisions in any way. So sensi 
 tive have the English people become on this point 
 that when, half a century later, a member of the royal 
 family went to the House of Commons to listen to a 
 debate, it evoked a storm of protest as a disguised 
 
 9 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 attempt to influence Parliamentary opinion. The 
 innocent attempt has never been repeated. The 
 royal family are the only Englishmen who have no 
 right to influence political opinion in England. 
 
 And it was settled equally and for all time that 
 the colonies were independent and had the right to 
 
 manage their own affairs. It was the 
 Independ- . in- 
 
 ence of colo- thirteen rebellious colonies mat first won 
 
 nies recog- this acknowledgment, which they em 
 phasized by brushing aside all the forms 
 of British rule which the king s ill-judged attempt had 
 made odious, but they were no more independent than 
 they always had been. That was the ground which 
 they took from the first and very wisely. They had 
 always managed their own affairs and had proved 
 themselves quite competent to do so. Moreover, as 
 they were situated, there was no other practicable 
 way in which these affairs could be managed. This 
 had always been recognized tacitly until the king 
 challenged it, and henceforth it was recognized con 
 sciously, both by the king and by the people. The 
 English people are a practical people, and when it was 
 really brought to their mind, they could see that 
 Parliament could not wisely manage the affairs of 
 Americans whom they never saw and of whose situa 
 tion they knew next to nothing. 
 
 And so there followed from our rebellion another 
 result that Americans are quite too prone to forget. 
 England not only recognized the independence of the 
 thirteen colonies that rebelled, but of all her other 
 
 10 
 
THE RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND 
 
 colonies where Englishmen held control. One after 
 another she has recognized the independence of 
 Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New ^ colonies 
 Zealand, and even of South Africa, though win inde- 
 its Dutch population had been so recently P endence 
 at war with the British Empire. These great colonies 
 have not discarded the British flag and the outward 
 forms of British rule as we did, simply because no 
 foolish monarch alienated them as he did us, but they 
 are just as independent as we are. Canada retains 
 the British flag, but she has been openly told that 
 she may discard it, may adopt the stars and stripes 
 or a flag of her own, any time she chooses. She 
 has a governor sent from England, but he does not 
 govern and his signature to bills passed by the Cana 
 dian Parliament is perfunctory and compulsory. 
 Canada makes her own laws, enacts her own tariffs, 
 against England as well as against other nations, 
 makes treaties with other nations independent of Eng 
 land, even decides upon war or peace independently 
 of the mother country. What more can we do? Our 
 case was merely the test case, that is all. Once settled, 
 it was settled for Canada, for Australia, for all the rest. 
 Slowly even India and Egypt, with their more back 
 ward peoples, are achieving the same independence. It 
 is the British principle, a principle first established in 
 connection with us, the first British Colony that came 
 of age. It is not strange that this first case caused 
 some misunderstanding and some mutual irritation. 
 It is not strange that the British people had to learn 
 
 ii 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 the great lesson once. The strange thing is that they 
 had to learn it only once. Most lessons require repe 
 tition. 
 
 This great achievement is in the main a matter for 
 profound congratulation. It taught the world how 
 
 nations could hold together, like Eng- 
 The Loyal- , . 
 
 ists and land, Canada, and Australia, and yet 
 
 their griev- remain free, giving us thus the key to the 
 great problem of the future. But it had 
 its unfortunate incidents as well. Those of the colo 
 nists who did not approve the policy of complete sepa 
 ration, but would rather have achieved independence 
 with union as Canada has done, a plan that then 
 seemed impracticable, found no sympathy with the 
 majority and were obliged to flee the country to avoid 
 a worse fate. Many of them went to Canada, where 
 they nursed and propagated their resentment in a way 
 which is much to be regretted. Their loyalty to 
 England made them enemies of the colonial cause and 
 aroused the antipathies which civil war more than any 
 other is sure to engender. These antipathies in their 
 turn made it impossible for them later to return and 
 effectually prevented any later exercise of magnanimity, 
 perhaps even of justice, by the victorious colo 
 nists towards them. It is in part due to this fact that 
 a war which closed with essential agreement did not 
 close with sympathy. 
 
 More serious still in its resulting sentiments was the 
 failure already noted of Americans to distinguish 
 between the king and his group of reactionaries on 
 
 12 
 
THE RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND 
 
 the one hand, and the English people on the other. 
 In the dim distance all seemed to the Americans to be 
 alike, hostile to their cause. Indeed they 
 at first thought themselves to be so. Thus distfn" 
 all alike became objects of our aversion, guished 
 Yet the English people and the people s 
 government were at the bottom in sympathy with the 
 principle for which we were fighting. 
 
m 
 
 INDEPENDENCE AND THE PEACE CRISIS, 
 1783 
 
 THE American War of Independence is a curious 
 illustration of the divided purpose of England at this 
 time. The king and his party of course urged the 
 war strongly, being determined to compel the colo 
 nists to recognize their authority. It certainly looked 
 as if they could do so, for England completely con 
 trolled the seas, she had a great army of trained sol 
 diers and ample wealth and military supplies. The 
 colonists were few and poor. Moreover they lacked 
 arms and ammunition, these things having previously 
 been imported from Europe, which was now obviously 
 impossible. Yet the colonists won the war for two 
 reasons. First, because the English people did not 
 support the king and his party. Second, because 
 France aided them, bringing them ships, men, and 
 supplies. Indeed the American war was only a little 
 episode in a very great war which was fought in Europe, 
 in India, and everywhere where these two great powers 
 found themselves in contact. Moreover in this great 
 war England won at every point except in America. 
 England s efforts were plainly rather half-hearted in 
 this part of the struggle. There was in fact a party 
 in England all this time which maintained that the 
 colonies ought to be independent, and this was the 
 
 14 
 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE PEACE CRISIS 
 
 real English party as opposed to the little party of 
 the king which was kept in power by bribery of Par 
 liament. 
 
 When at last the British failed at Yorktown, the 
 king s party fell from power and the party of the Eng 
 lish people came into control, a control } 
 which they have never since lost. This party will- 
 party at once showed itself ready to make **& make 
 
 , . . . peace 
 
 peace and to recognize the colonies as in 
 dependent states. Had the English public been agreed, 
 as in the conflict with Napoleon or in the present war 
 with Germany, that the war must be fought through 
 to victory, no matter at what cost, there can be no 
 doubt that England could have done so. But this 
 party the party of the English people did not 
 believe this, and hence they offered peace, not 
 grudgingly but willingly and on extremely favorable 
 terms. 
 
 But the attitude of England was most clearly mani 
 fested in another connection. It must be remembered 
 
 that we were allies of France and had made 
 
 . , Difficul- 
 
 the usual agreement to make peace only ties with 
 
 in common with our ally. Spain, too, France and 
 
 of) Am 
 
 though not formally our ally, was at war 
 
 with England at the time. It soon developed that 
 our relations with these nations involved grave 
 problems. It is an amazing fact that England, 
 even at this moment of rebellion against her 
 authority, took our side and saved us from the 
 gravest dangers. 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 France had designs of her own which we did not 
 
 suspect until the time came to make peace. The 
 
 Americans demanded that England should 
 
 France . .11 ,. i 
 
 schemes negotiate with them directly as an m- 
 against in- dependent power, for they had main 
 tained from the first that they had always 
 been independent. The French minister thought this 
 very unreasonable. He said that when the treaty was 
 concluded, it would make them independent and that 
 they should be satisfied with that. This may seem 
 to be a very little point, but it actually made a very 
 great difference. If the Americans were not inde 
 pendent until the treaty was concluded, then they 
 could not treat directly with 1 Britain at all, for only 
 independent nations can make treaties together. 
 France would thus have been the leader in conducting 
 the negotiations and would be in a position largely 
 to determine the terms of the treaty. This was what 
 the French minister wanted. It soon developed that 
 he did not intend the colonies to be really independent 
 even after the treaty. It was even suggested that 
 we should not ask England to recognize our independ 
 ence but should ask France to guarantee our inde 
 pendence. It is evident that if our independence 
 rested only upon the guarantee of France, we might 
 be independent of all other nations but we would be 
 dependent upon France. This was precisely what 
 France desired. She had aimed to control North 
 America and in her long wars with England she had 
 lost everything. Now she hoped, with the aid of the 
 
 16 
 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE PEACE CRISIS 
 
 colonists, to regain, in a different way, the ground she 
 had lost. So she held off about negotiating until the 
 Americans should recognize their helplessness and put 
 themselves in her hands. There was nothing pecul 
 iarly reprehensible in this attitude of France as such 
 matters were then judged. She had no reason to 
 favor these colonists who were not of her race and who 
 had done as much as England herself had done to 
 defeat French purposes in the New World. If she 
 could, by diplomatic manipulation, recover a place of 
 which she believed herself to have been unjustly de 
 prived, she saw no reason why she should not do so. 
 It must be remembered, too, that this was not the free 
 France of to-day, but the France of the ancien regime, 
 whose government, not in the least representative of 
 the people, was soon to go down in ruin. 
 
 As the Americans gradually perceived this purpose 
 of France they became greatly alarmed. They were 
 wholly at the mercy of France unless they 
 could find a powerful ally against her. It helps us to 
 
 was England that came to their rescue, 
 
 .,. -11 France 
 
 brie consented at once to treat with them 
 
 as an independent nation. The negotiation was most 
 difficult, for it had to be conducted clandestinely, 
 eluding the vigilance of French spies, but it was ac 
 complished, and a treaty was drawn up covering all 
 points at issue between them. England conceded not 
 only our claim of independence but much else in the 
 way of valuable privilege. The terms were such as 
 to amaze the governments of France and Spain, 
 c 17 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 who were dumbfounded to see England acting practi 
 cally as the ally of America and scheming for her 
 advantage. 
 
 The treaty thus drawn up and prepared for signa 
 ture was laid before the French minister (for it must 
 be remembered that we had promised to make peace 
 only in conjunction with France), and he was asked 
 to sign it with us. Thus we kept the letter of our 
 agreement, but we plainly evaded its spirit, for what 
 France wanted was that we should negotiate the treaty 
 together, not merely sign it together. The justifica 
 tion for this evasion must be sought in the fact that 
 France had proven herself plainly disloyal to the 
 spirit of the agreement. The French minister was 
 exceedingly angry, but he finally realized that he had 
 been caught napping and that there was no further 
 chance for the manipulations upon which he had 
 counted. He therefore signed the treaty, but yielded 
 with bad grace. 
 
 Our relation to Spain was much less vital, but it 
 was hardly less significant. Spain had settled Florida, 
 but had recently surrendered it to Britain in exchange 
 for Havana. It of course did not take the part of the 
 colonies in the war and was not included in the treaty 
 of independence. It was anticipated, however, that 
 when Britain made peace with Spain the whole problem 
 of their vast colonial possessions would be taken up and 
 that exchanges would probably be made. Now that 
 Britain had lost the colonies, Florida with its Spanish 
 population had lost much of its former value and would 
 
 18 
 
INDEPENDENCE AND THE PEACE CRISIS 
 
 very likely be given to Spain in exchange for some 
 thing more valuable to England. 
 
 There was a tract of land known as the Yazoo Lands 
 constituting the northern part of the present states 
 
 of Mississippi and Alabama, which did not 
 
 The Yazoo 
 belong originally either to Florida (which Lands; 
 
 then extended west to the Mississippi) or to *^ e secret 
 any of the British colonies. When England 
 acquired Florida, this no-man s-land, which required 
 some attention, was brought under the adminis 
 trative control of Florida. As none of the thirteen 
 colonies claimed it, it would seem natural that it 
 should stay there, and such was England s deter 
 mination if she retained Florida. But if Florida 
 were to be returned to Spain, she was not minded to 
 make it any larger than was necessary. Hence a 
 secret agreement was included in the treaty (it was 
 not shown to the French minister) that if Florida re 
 mained British, its northern boundary should be 
 latitude 32 30 ; but if Florida became Spanish, its 
 northern boundary should be 31. We need not here 
 discuss the legitimacy of such a secret agreement nor 
 the disputes to which it afterward gave rise. It con 
 cerns us merely to note the attitude of England toward 
 this new American nation which she had just rescued 
 from France and set upon its feet. She said in effect 
 by this agreement : "If Florida is to be ours, we want 
 this unappropriated strip, but if Florida is to be Spanish, 
 we want you to have it, even though you have never 
 had any claim to it," 
 
 19 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 Thus the English people, having overthrown the 
 government which challenged their liberties and ours, 
 The English not on ^ recognized our independence, but 
 people early saved us in the first great crisis of our na- 
 our friends ti ona ] ijf e anc j even conspired to extend our 
 
 territory at the expense of unfriendly neighbors. 
 
IV 
 
 AMERICA AND THE NAPOLEONIC CRISIS, 
 1812-1815 
 
 THE first years of our national life were years of 
 unprecedented commotion in Europe. France, in the 
 throes of revolution and later in war with all Europe, 
 counted somewhat overconfidently on our aid if not 
 our open alliance. It was plain that she had not by 
 any means learned the lesson of the peace treaty. 
 The great wisdom of Washington saved us from in 
 curring the obligations and the enmities which at that 
 stage of development might have been fatal. The 
 tradition of French friendship, however, which had 
 followed the war was pretty effectually shattered. 
 The change is perhaps best indicated by the attitude of 
 Jefferson, who began his political career as an ardent 
 friend of France and bitter enemy of England, but 
 closed it, after eight years in the president s office, 
 as a strong advocate of friendship with England. 
 
 But with the rise of Napoleon the European situa 
 tion became desperate and drove the contestants to 
 unheard-of expedients. Napoleon had England is 
 brought all the continent under his rule and p *e ssed by 
 only England stood at bay. At Boulogne, Napoleon 
 where the emperor had gathered his huge army for 
 the invasion of England, he looked across, as Caesar 
 had done, to the white cliffs of Dover and waited 
 impatiently for news that his fleet had overcome the 
 
 21 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 watchful British navy that kept him from his prey. 
 That news never came. Down close by Gibraltar 
 the British fleet met the great fleet of Napoleon and 
 broke its power forever. There is something inspiring 
 in that simple message that Nelson flew from his mast 
 head that night at Trafalgar, a message so different 
 from the bombastic speeches of the emperor: " Eng 
 land expects every man to do his duty." The duty 
 was done and England was saved. And not Eng 
 land only. It is easier now than it was then to see 
 what was at stake in the titanic contest. Had Eng 
 land been conquered Napoleon would have been the 
 undisputed master of Europe. And the mastery of 
 Europe in that day, perhaps in any day, cannot but 
 mean the mastery of America and of the world. Does 
 any one doubt as to what would be the fate of America 
 to-day if a single power should get control of Europe? 
 Of all this we were then unconscious. Napoleon s 
 career might interest us but it did not in the least 
 concern us. We read of it, what little there was 
 to read, much as we now read of the exploits of a 
 rebel general hi China. Napoleon had a very dif 
 ferent idea as to the relation of his plans to ourselves, 
 but we knew nothing of his ideas, and had we known 
 them, they would probably have influenced us but 
 little. 
 
 But England touched us where we were sensitive. 
 She maintained the great fleet which saved her and 
 the liberties of the world, only by the most strenuous 
 effort. Her population was much less than now and 
 
 22 
 
AMERICA AND THE NAPOLEONIC CRISIS 
 
 her supply of seamen scarcely sufficient. Discipline 
 was harsh and the hardships of the service very great. 
 Unfortunately patriotism was at low ebb, Desertion 
 not only in England but the world over, of English 
 It is said that in the war that followed Seamen 
 our own country drafted four hundred thousand men, 
 yet never succeeded in getting more than six thousand 
 under arms at any one time. England met similar 
 difficulties. Desertions of seamen were common. Ob 
 viously the most practicable thing for a deserter to do 
 was to ship aboard an American vessel, where he 
 stood a pretty good chance of passing himself off as an 
 American. And since England had technically no right 
 to search our ships, the chance of escape seemed good. 
 
 But England simply had to have her seamen. If 
 for one moment the fleet failed in its great task, every 
 thing that England was and stood for would perish. 
 Her moral claim to the surrender of these deserters 
 was a pretty strong one, and if we enlisted them 
 knowingly, we were assuredly at fault. So in defiance 
 of precedent England boarded our ships and took her 
 seamen where she found them. In case of doubt, she 
 gave herself the benefit of the doubt. She certainly 
 sometimes took American citizens, perhaps even in 
 some cases took them knowingly. 
 
 This boarding of our ships and impressment of our 
 seamen incensed us. We did not take A^^ 
 account of England s desperate situation resents 
 or of our interest in the battle she was seizures 
 waging. These were nothing to us. Nor do we seem to 
 
 23 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 have considered the question of our right to admit 
 deserters to our service. The outrage angered us and 
 we declared war. It is doubtful if any nation to-day 
 would declare war under such circumstances unless 
 looking for a pretext. There would be protests, 
 diplomatic exchanges, mutual concessions and pre 
 cautions, and finally reparation for any injuries in 
 flicted. But we were young and had the limitations 
 of youth. 
 
 In the war that followed there were a number of 
 brilliant naval engagements in which our ships dem- 
 Indecisive onstrated, much to England s surprise, 
 naval vie- their superior sailing and fighting qualities. 
 England had been too busy in these years 
 of warfare to study the art of ship building and make 
 improvements as we had been free to do. Hence we 
 won some brilliant victories, of which we have perhaps 
 been inclined to make too much account. But none 
 of these victories gave us command of the sea or con 
 tributed appreciably to the winning of the war. Mean 
 while on land our record was inglorious. The only 
 battle which ended in victory for the American arms 
 was the battle of New Orleans fought after peace had 
 been signed, while the enemy ravaged our country 
 and burned our capitol. The impression is prevalent 
 in America that we were victorious in this war, an 
 impressiori to which English apathy in the conduct of 
 the war and the favorable terms of peace which we 
 secured lend a certain color. But if the Allies in the 
 present war should make peace with Germany after 
 
 24 
 
AMERICA AND THE NAPOLEONIC CRISIS 
 
 occupying Berlin and burning the emperor s palace, 
 we should hardly count it a German victory. It was 
 under such circumstances that England made peace 
 with us. 
 
 And now again we have to note a very remarkable 
 treaty of peace. There could be no question that 
 England had us in her power. It was freely Favorable 
 surmised that she would now reestablish terms of 
 her authority over us. A power like France peace 
 or Germany would certainly have done so. But Eng 
 land had espoused the cause of liberty and independ 
 ence and was about to carry it farther rather than to 
 curtail it. So the treaty merely stipulated that each 
 should surrender all territory, prisoners, and property 
 taken from the other, a very one-sided provision 
 when we consider that America had taken virtually 
 nothing. The only other positive article which it is 
 important to recall is a pledge of cooperation in sup 
 pressing the African slave trade, a provision strangely 
 irrelevant to the struggle in question, but profoundly 
 significant of the deeper currents of the national life 
 of each. The issue over which the war was begun 
 was not mentioned. England did not wish the right 
 of search save in the supreme emergency which had 
 passed. She has never claimed it since. On the other 
 hand we were in no position to ask her to renounce 
 the privilege. It was an issue that had died. 
 
 This we may regard as the second great crisis of 
 our national life in its relation to other powers. It 
 was a crisis which we did not create but which we 
 
 25 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 precipitated and aggravated by our failure to recog 
 nize the significance of the European situation and 
 We pass our our re ^ usa ^ to m &ke the fullest use of 
 second diplomatic means of settlement. At the close 
 
 of this crisis England was the most powerful 
 nation in the world, her great enemy having seemingly 
 been permanently disposed of. Despite our scant 
 claim to her consideration, she was considerate, even 
 magnanimous. Once more she had saved us to in 
 dependence and to Anglo-Saxon liberty. 
 
 26 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BOUNDARIES, 1815-1848 
 
 FOR the next thirty years our country remained at 
 peace save for Indian wars which were but minor 
 incidents of our growth. Yet minor crises were not 
 wanting, and with England among others. 
 
 In the treaty of independence an honest attempt 
 had been made to establish a natural boundary be 
 tween Maine and the adjacent British pos- The Maine 
 sessions, but the watersheds designated for boundary 
 that purpose were unknown and proved less dispute 
 definite than had been expected. The result was a 
 disputed territory of over twelve thousand square 
 miles. Maine claimed it all of course, and New Bruns 
 wick was equally enterprising. When persuasion failed 
 to establish extreme claims (there seems to have been 
 no hint of compromise) , Maine decided to take military 
 possession and voted men and money for the purpose. 
 This preposterous move was promptly matched by 
 New Brunswick. It was plainly a case for the soberer 
 powers behind to call down these presumptuous 
 youngsters of the frontier. But one of these powers 
 did not see it that way. Our Congress approved the 
 action of Maine and voted further men and supplies. 
 
 But England took a different course. It was pro 
 posed to submit the dispute to arbitration and the 
 King of the Netherlands was chosen as referee. After 
 painstaking investigation he rendered a decision which 
 
 27 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 gave us about three fifths of the disputed territory 
 and New Brunswick two fifths. This award was re- 
 England jected by our minister to the Netherlands 
 proposes without even submitting it to his govern 
 ment, a procedure which would seem 
 ingly have called for a reprimand from Washington. 
 On the contrary his action was approved, apparently 
 for no other reason than that the award did not give 
 us all that we claimed. Thus began our experience 
 with arbitration. The matter remained for some time 
 unsettled but was finally closed by a treaty negotiated 
 by large-minded representatives of both sides. We 
 got about the amount that the award had given us, 
 but somewhat differently located. There was much 
 dissatisfaction, for we had not yet learned the neces 
 sity of compromise, but Webster, our representative, 
 consoled us by saying that we had gotten the good 
 land and New Brunswick the mountains. The matter 
 is so small a one that it is now well-nigh forgotten, 
 but it gives us pause to think what might have hap 
 pened, had England been unfriendly toward us. 
 
 A much larger question was that of Oregon, which 
 made trouble for more than thirty years. Spain 
 The Oregon (later, Mexico) owned the western coast to 
 controversy the northern boundary of California. Rus 
 sia owned Alaska. All the country between was 
 known as Oregon. We claimed it all, and were deter 
 mined to give England no access to the Pacific. Eng 
 land, though asserting that she might just as fairly 
 claim it all as we did, never did so, but she greatly 
 
 28 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BOUNDARIES 
 
 desired to have the Columbia River as the boundary, 
 as that was the only means of inland communication. 
 She urged her claim on the ground of its inherent rea 
 sonableness, while we based ours on discovery* and 
 exploration, in which, however, her claims pretty 
 nearly matched ours. When agreement seemed im 
 possible England suggested a ten years truce until 
 we could see how the country settled up. This was 
 agreed to, and then another ten years following it, 
 both parties meanwhile clinging tenaciously to their 
 claims. England felt that she could not surrender 
 all outlet to the Pacific or her right to navigate the 
 great river. She was willing to grant us the same. 
 But we claimed all the coast and the exclusive navi 
 gation of the river. It was impossible to make this 
 extreme claim seem reasonable to the English people, 
 and as we pushed our claim unsparingly, relations be 
 came for a time somewhat strained. An American 
 presidential campai^.i was waged and a candidate 
 elected on the slogan: " Fifty-four forty or fight," 
 which meant that the candidate (Polk) pledged him 
 self, if elected, to secure all of Oregon up to latitude 
 fifty-four degrees and forty minutes (the Alaskan 
 boundary) or go to war for it. It is true that when 
 elected he did nothing of the kind, but England could 
 hardly know that at the time, and this virtual threat 
 of the American people to go to war to enforce what 
 seemed to Englishmen to be a wholly unreasonable 
 claim put their patience to a severe test. 
 In view of these facts their action was significant. 
 29 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 Instead of threatening us in return or sending a mili 
 tary force to occupy the disputed territory, they sent 
 Britain s an a & ent to ascertain how many settlers of 
 special each nation were located there and which 
 inquiry government they preferred. He found 
 that Americans greatly predominated on both sides of 
 the Columbia River and that they preferred their own 
 government. His report was published, and as the 
 facts became known to the English people, their 
 indignation at American high-handed procedure was 
 so far allayed that the government was able to propose 
 the present boundary, which was accepted. England 
 thus lost the navigation of the Columbia, which she 
 had deemed indispensable, but Canada was not de 
 prived of her outlet to the Pacific. 
 
 The English conviction that Americans were un 
 reasonable in their claims was not without its unfor 
 tunate reactions. There was a marked dis- 
 Bntain op 
 poses ex- position for a time to retaliate and to resist 
 pansion American expansion. When Texas was 
 about to enter the Union, both England and France 
 used their influence against it, offering to guarantee 
 her independence against Mexico on condition that 
 she should not enter the American union. As this 
 was about the period of "fifty-four forty or fight," 
 we may safely attribute England s action in part to 
 resentment. But it must not be forgotten that Texas, 
 after achieving her independence from Mexico, had 
 adopted a constitution prohibiting slavery, and that 
 the proposal now was to admit her to the Union as a 
 
 30 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BOUNDARIES 
 
 slave state, a proposal intensely repugnant to English 
 sentiment as also to the best sentiment of our own 
 people. It is questionable whether this brief attitude 
 of opposition is to be chiefly attributed to resentment 
 or to magnanimity. 
 
 A dispute regarding the proposed Nicaragua Canal 
 at this time also felt the influence of the Oregon con 
 troversy, and again, in its final settle- The Q 
 ment, disclosed the persistent attitude of ton-Bulwer 
 the English people. England was gradu- reaty 
 ally acquiring control of territories in Central America 
 which would give her control of such a canal when 
 built. We did not wish the canal to be under her 
 control, though at that time we had no thought of hav 
 ing it under our own. We began by objecting to the 
 occupation of these territories. But this occupation 
 rested on settlements and commercial relations, some 
 of them of long standing, and England naturally 
 stood her ground. Then we took up the canal project 
 as such, and England agreed, in the famous Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, that the canal should be built and con 
 trolled by the two nations in common, and accepted a 
 limitation of her territorial possessions in the vicinity. 
 These limitations were vaguely defined and led to 
 disputes in which England was the less reasonable 
 party. Ultimately she yielded a considerable part 
 of the disputed claims. Taken as a whole, we must 
 again characterize her attitude as conciliatory. 
 
 It is perhaps appropriate to anticipate here the 
 sequel of this story which came half a century later. 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 Slowly the opinion developed in America that the 
 canal should be our own. When it became clear that 
 
 Britain s ^ s was ^ ^ e ^ e P ermanen t judgment of 
 voluntary the American people, we asked England to 
 concession releage ug frQm ^ pledge of ^ Clayton . 
 
 Bulwer treaty. This she promptly did, asking only 
 that we carry out the other provisions of the treaty, 
 to leave the canal unfortified and open to the use of 
 all nations on equal terms. John Hay reported this 
 agreement with much satisfaction, only to meet with 
 rebuff. It was justly objected that if we were to 
 build and control the canal, we must be free to fortify 
 it. Again he turned to England and asked the further 
 concession and again the request was granted without 
 a moment s hesitation. But this was at a later day, 
 when Oregon was a fading memory. 
 
 The attitude of England during this period of minor 
 crises was neither altruistic nor timid. It was charac- 
 Engiand s terized throughout by that keen regard for 
 wise self- British interests which has ever marked the 
 action of that enterprising people. There 
 has been no romantic knight-errantry in British policy. 
 Nor will any one familiar with the facts construe her 
 concessions as due to fear. Never before or since was 
 her power so great relative to that of other nations. 
 Never did she have so free a hand. It is beyond doubt 
 that she could have forced a more favorable settlement 
 of the Maine and Oregon boundary disputes had she 
 chosen to do so. She did not choose. Possibly her 
 wiser statesmen looked forward to a time when a 
 
 32 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE BOUNDARIES 
 
 strong America might stand her in good stead, but the 
 English people, whose clearly expressed will determined 
 British policy, can hardly have been so far-seeing. It 
 is to the simpler virtues of fairness and the deeply im 
 planted spirit of liberty that we must attribute their 
 dominant attitude. If the Oregon settlers were mostly 
 American and preferred American government, it was 
 repugnant to English principles and to English instincts 
 to deny them the Anglo-Saxon privilege. In familiar 
 parlance perhaps we may say, the Englishman is a true 
 sportsman. He detests the unsportsmanlike thing, at 
 least among his peers. That he does not feel quite the 
 same toward other races is not strange. They are not 
 his race nor usually the equals of his race. He goes 
 by facts, not by theories. 
 
 33 
 
VI 
 
 THE CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865 
 
 OUR Civil War brought a crisis in our relations with 
 England. Nothing in her relation to us has been so 
 much resented and possibly nothing so misunderstood 
 as her action at this time. If, as the foregoing narra 
 tive seems to warrant, the attitude of England at the 
 outbreak of the war was one of moderate friendliness, 
 the situation was not the less an embarrassing one. 
 Both sides were American, and in so far both might 
 claim English friendship. In their differences also 
 each could appeal to English sympathy. The southern 
 states were fighting for independence, a principle 
 which had taken a very deep hold on English thought. 
 The northern states were fighting, really if not avow 
 edly, for human liberty and the abolition of slavery, 
 a cause to which England was irrevocably committed. 
 What the line-up would have been if England had been 
 an unconcerned onlooker it is difficult to say. 
 
 But England was very much concerned. One of 
 the most important of her industries was the manu- 
 The English ^ ac t ure of cotton, an industry in which 
 cotton whole cities and districts were almost ex 
 
 clusively engaged. But England herself 
 raises no cotton, and at that time her whole supply 
 came from the southern states. It was a part of our 
 military policy to blockade the southern ports and 
 prevent both export and import. This deprived the 
 
 34 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 English manufacturers of cotton and brought their 
 industry to a standstill. Thousands of operatives 
 were thrown out of employment and brought to the 
 verge of starvation. Discontent was widespread and 
 sentiment naturally inclined toward the South. 
 
 The situation was much aggravated by our action 
 in boarding an English vessel and taking off two rep 
 resentatives which the South was sending We seize 
 to England. This was precisely what we confederate 
 had gone to war about in 1812. In a way agents 
 it was much worse, for England had boarded our ships 
 in search of deserters, while we had taken two men who 
 had pretty nearly the character of diplomatic represent 
 atives, who enjoy immunity from seizure in all civi 
 lized nations. We were palpably in the wrong, as we 
 soon realized, surrendering the two representatives 
 with due apologies in response to England s peremp 
 tory demand. This averted the worst results, but 
 it did not altogether remove the irritation which our 
 action had caused. 
 
 No government worthy of the name will see its 
 people hunger without trying to relieve their suffering. 
 The British government scanned the situa- Britain 
 tion closely and questioned our procedure resists 
 at every doubtful point, seeking if possible blockade 
 to open our blockade. The laws governing blockade 
 were far from definite, and disagreements were nu 
 merous. Much turned on the question of the status 
 of the Confederacy as a nation and as a belligerent, 
 a question which neutral nations were free to decide 
 
 35 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 at their discretion, little hampered by definite rules or 
 fixed precedents. Naturally such decisions were 
 likely to be much influenced by their interests, and 
 England had the most obvious motives for deciding 
 in favor of the Confederacy. 
 
 In this emergency we appealed to the English 
 people. The eloquent Henry Ward Beecher was sent 
 We appeal to England to present the cause of the 
 to the Eng- Union. Landing at Liverpool, he pro- 
 Ush people ceec [ed at once to t h e disaffected districts 
 of the cotton industry. His first audience was sullen 
 and discourteous. But taking the disturbances good- 
 humoredly, he soon provoked a laugh, and taking ad 
 vantage of this momentary favor, he launched out 
 into an eloquent appeal for the cause of human free 
 dom. There was attention, then applause, and finally 
 an ovation. He was passed on to the next town and 
 the next, until his progress to London became almost 
 a triumphal procession. Then came perhaps the most 
 astonishing fact in the history of this or any other 
 people. A petition was circulated in these same in 
 dustrial cities whose livelihood had been cut off by 
 our blockade, praying the British government not to 
 take the part of a government based on human slavery. 
 The prayer was heeded and the contemplated aid 
 was not given. As a result the blockade was continued 
 and the cause of the Union prevailed. Much has been 
 said of the momentary defection of Mr. Gladstone 
 and his colleagues from the high cause of human 
 liberty to which they professed allegiance, but little 
 
 36 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 is known of the deliberate choice of the English people 
 at that time to suffer hunger and loss for our cause. 
 Whatever the wisdom of their decision, there can be 
 no doubt of its heroic disinterestedness. A petition 
 is a very undramatic thing, and it easily escapes at 
 tention, but this one must be counted among the great 
 forces that contributed to the preservation of the Union 
 in a moment of extreme peril. 
 
 But while few have heard of this act of popular 
 sympathy, all have heard of the Alabama, that famous 
 sea-rider that for so long terrorized the high The Ala _ 
 seas. To the popular mind the exploits of bama dep- 
 this modern buccaneer are the real index of redations 
 British sympathies during the war. This ship, to 
 gether with a number of others, was fitted out in a 
 British shipyard to raid our commerce. She was built 
 on private contract like any other ship, and neither 
 the British government nor the English people knew 
 anything about it. The American consul at Liver 
 pool found out about it, and the British government 
 was asked to prevent its sailing. This it consented 
 to do, but the action involved formalities and delay, 
 and the ship got away a few hours before the decisive 
 action was attempted. Probably there were Americans 
 at the time who thought the government connived at 
 this escape, but no such charge was ever proved or 
 even alleged. Certainly those who are familiar with 
 the red tape of our own government will not find it 
 difficult to account for the delay. After the war 
 England willingly consented to refer the matter to ar- 
 
 37 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 bitration, and she paid promptly the damages which 
 the commission assessed, though she regarded the award 
 as excessive, as our later settlement with the individual 
 losers seemed also to demonstrate. The only part 
 which the British government and the English people 
 had in this deplorable transaction was carelessness 
 in permitting the abuse of their neutrality and prompt 
 ness in paying the damages thus unwittingly incurred. 
 
 Britain was peculiarly unfortunate in this crisis 
 in our national affairs. She was neither unfriendly to 
 Britain s America nor yet to the Union cause. In 
 disadvan- the end she was strikingly favorable, and 
 that under extreme difficulties. But her 
 sympathy was necessarily expressed only by for 
 bearance and in negative ways, while injuries inflicted 
 by individual citizens without her warrant were of a 
 nature to powerfully impress the imagination. The 
 British government and people, at the moment of 
 their greatest disinterestedness, suffered as never be 
 fore in the opinion of Americans. It was long before 
 the misunderstandings of this period were finally re 
 moved. 
 
VII 
 
 THE CRISIS OF ARBITRATION, 1881-1899 
 
 THE period of peace between the Civil War and the 
 War with Spain was not marked by any of those 
 dramatic events which appeal to the imagination. It 
 was none the less a period of real crises and one which 
 at one time subjected the friendship between the two 
 countries to a severe strain. The striking event of 
 the period was a demand on the part of the United 
 States, enforced by a virtual threat of war, that Brit 
 ain should submit to arbitration her claim, not against 
 ourselves, but against another country. It was the 
 extraordinary nature of this demand rather than the 
 character of the claim itself, which constituted the 
 great issue of the period. This we may appropriately 
 call the crisis of arbitration. There were other and 
 earlier issues, however, in this period, at least one of 
 which is worthy of notice. 
 
 By the purchase of Alaska we had acquired the 
 chief breeding ground of the seals, the only other 
 breeding ground being in Russian posses- The Bering 
 sion. Americans and Russians could there- Sea contro- 
 fore take the seals on land and under condi- versy 
 tions which permitted of regulation and protection to 
 the herds. But the Canadians, who had always been 
 enterprising sealers, could take the seals only on the 
 high seas, a method which threatened the existence of 
 
 39 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 the herds. America and Russia were therefore in 
 terested in protecting the seals, but Britain, acting in 
 these outside matters for Canada, was interested in 
 maintaining this destructive freedom of the sealer. 
 In this Britain and Canada were certainly on unen 
 viable ground, sacrificing a valuable human interest 
 to the interests of a local industry. But men whose 
 all was invested in the sealing industry could not be 
 expected to sacrifice it willingly. And whatever 
 Britain herself might have thought of the issue, it 
 was contrary to the principles of colonial liberty for 
 which we had fought for her to coerce Canada. And 
 though America and Russia protested against the 
 destructive selfishness of taking the seals at sea, they 
 did not seem inclined to share with the Canadians 
 the privilege of taking seals on land, a privilege of 
 which they enjoyed a monopoly. 
 
 Having failed to secure the necessary international 
 agreement, our government resorted to the extraor- 
 We seize dinary measure of assuming jurisdiction 
 Canadian over Bering Sea, and seized, condemned, and 
 vessels so ^ cer j- a j n Canadian sealing vessels sixty 
 miles from land. It had long been the rule of all 
 civilized nations that nations exercised jurisdiction 
 over the sea adjoining their coasts for a distance of 
 three miles from the shore. The high seas beyond 
 this limit are no-man s land or every man s land, and 
 all are united to prevent their appropriation. Britain 
 was therefore instant and sharp in her protest. She 
 had quite as much warrant for war as we had in 1812 
 
 40 
 
THE CRISIS OF ARBITRATION 
 
 if she had been inclined to use it. She chose instead 
 to negotiate and finally to arbitrate. 
 
 In the negotiations which followed and in the later 
 arbitration, we advanced the most novel and extraor 
 dinary claims, first that Bering Sea was a Mare 
 Clausum or closed sea, and therefore subject to national 
 control. This claim, however, was soon dropped as 
 being obviously indefensible. Other claims were ad 
 vanced looking to the same end. It was even urged 
 that the seals were semi-domestic animals and that 
 we might therefore claim a sort of ownership of them, 
 no matter where they might stray. These and other 
 arguments were solemnly urged before the arbitration 
 commission, but all were decided against us, and we 
 were compelled to pay damages for the vessels we had 
 seized. The controversy was aggravated, perhaps, by 
 the reputed anti-British sentiment of Mr. Blaine, our 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 From a diplomatic standpoint Britain appears in 
 this transaction to great advantage. She was cool, 
 firm, and eminently correct, maintaining The right 
 her clear right as defined by long-standing and wrong 
 usage. In contrast, the American proce- of the case 
 dure was precipitate, hazardous, and innovating. Yet 
 it is not to be forgotten that the net result of it all 
 was the destruction of the seals and the sacrifice of 
 human interests. It was a case where law and prece 
 dent were clearly inadequate for their purpose in 
 this vague and remote part of the world. Britain, 
 respecting Canadian liberty even in its narrow and 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 shortsighted exercise, stood by law and precedent. 
 We attempted, from mixed motives and by ill-con 
 sidered methods, to defend real interests. But what 
 ever the merits of the case, it was peaceably settled 
 despite its incidents of asperity and needless prov 
 ocation. 
 
 There soon followed a controversy over the Vene 
 zuelan boundary, which assumed a much more serious 
 Venezuela character. Venezuela adjoins on the east 
 boundary the British colony of Guiana, and a dispute 
 dispute as to fa e boundary between them had long 
 existed. Finally Venezuela arrested two British officers 
 on the disputed territory and then appealed to the 
 United States for protection against the inevitable 
 British claim for reparation. This aid was finally 
 granted. President Cleveland, taking his stand upon 
 the Monroe Doctrine, virtually threatened war against 
 Britain unless she consented to submit the matter in 
 dispute to arbitration. 
 
 It is difficult for an American to understand how 
 
 this demand impressed the British public. To begin 
 
 with, the Monroe Doctrine was little known 
 
 Britain re- 7 
 
 sents our outside our own country, and its validity 
 demands had never been ac } m itted b y any other na 
 tion. Great Britain had challenged it almost at the 
 moment of its announcement. Bismarck had called 
 it a piece of international impertinence. It had no 
 precedent and rested solely upon our own fiat. This 
 is quite enough for us, but it is hardly satisfactory to 
 others. 
 
 42 
 
THE CRISIS OF ARBITRATION 
 
 But even conceding the validity of the Monroe 
 Doctrine, this seemed a most preposterous applica 
 tion of it. That doctrine was originally a warning to 
 certain European powers engaged in a reactionary 
 effort to restore the authority of antiquated govern 
 mental systems at home, and incidentally, to re 
 store the authority of Spain over her revolted colo 
 nies, against extending their " system " to the Western 
 Hemisphere. England was not one of these countries, 
 and indeed it was at her suggestion that the step was 
 taken. Gradually, however, the doctrine was broad 
 ened into the popular slogan, "America for the Amer 
 icans," and it became a general warning to European 
 powers not to seek territorial acquisitions in the 
 Western Hemisphere. Existing territorial posses 
 sions it did not undertake to disturb. Thus far it 
 was intelligible and fairly justifiable as an assertion 
 of national self-interest. Englishmen could under 
 stand why we did not wish such a power as Germany 
 to get a foothold on our side. They could understand 
 why we did not wish France to occupy Mexico as she 
 tried to do during our Civil War, even though she 
 already occupied islands in the Caribbean and her 
 colony of Guiana. Her position in Mexico was much 
 nearer and more dangerous to us. 
 
 But why England, whose possessions bordered ours 
 for three thousand miles, should be restrained from 
 punishing a border outrage on a disputed boundary 
 with a semibarbarous nation thousands of miles 
 away, was not clear. If the theory of the Monroe 
 
 43 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 Doctrine covered the case, its spirit did not, or if it 
 did, then that spirit was one of meddlesomeness rather 
 than of reasonable self-interest. So the Englishman 
 reasoned. 
 
 To all this was added the immense disparity between 
 the two civilizations. Britain incontestably stood in 
 The inter ^ e ^ ron ^ ran k of civilized powers. Her ad- 
 ests of civ- ministration of backward colonies was the 
 best the world had known, incomparably 
 better than any such people itself could supply. Vene 
 zuela was the veriest caricature of civilization and 
 free government as we, above all nations, should know. 
 If any stretching was to be done, the interests of civili 
 zation required that the British authority rather than 
 the Monroe Doctrine should be stretched. 
 
 Finally, it did not help matters to the English 
 mind that this seemingly unreasonable demand should 
 have been made so peremptorily and under threat of 
 war. It will be clear that President Cleveland s 
 procedure subjected the friendliness of the British 
 people to a pretty severe test. 
 
 On the American side two facts were discernible, 
 though inextricably intermingled. The first was lin- 
 Aftermath S erm S resentment toward Great Britain, 
 of the Civil whom we unjustly held responsible as a 
 nation for the Alabama injuries and the 
 effort to break our blockade. The opinion was preva 
 lent that Great Britain, or at least her governing 
 classes, hated our democracy, feared our expansion, 
 and desired the disruption of the Union. The nu- 
 
 44 
 
THE CRISIS OF ARBITRATION 
 
 merous occasions in which the British people had 
 saved us from disaster, favored our independence, 
 and encouraged our expansion, had all been of the 
 inconspicuous and undramatic sort which appeal 
 little to popular imagination. Not until the next 
 crisis in our history was Britain s attitude toward 
 us to become really apparent. This prevalent sus 
 picion and dislike of Britain our President at that 
 time is said to have shared. 
 
 But another and far worthier motive was present 
 in the mind both of the President and of the people. 
 It was the conviction that the relations American 
 between all nations should be regulated idealism 
 by reason rather than by force. It mattered not 
 that England was a worthy nation and Venezuela 
 an unworthy one. If England had a just case against 
 her adversary as she claimed, a fair tribunal would 
 establish her claim. This broad generalization is a 
 typical example of sincere American idealism which 
 is often heard among us to-day. 
 
 It is undeniable that Britain was less disposed to 
 recognize such ideal methods than we believed our 
 selves to be. Perhaps it may be said that English 
 experience with backward peoples, and practicability 
 even with developed peoples, had made her skep 
 tical as to the practicability of such methods. Ex 
 perience generally has a tendency to qualify our 
 faith in the practicability of ideals. Lord Salisbury 
 at the time expressed the feeling of the British Gov 
 ernment and of the British people that reasonable 
 
 45 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 as the principle of arbitration might seem, much ex 
 perience would be required before it could become a 
 practical and just procedure. For instance, in the 
 present case, if arbitration were agreed upon, what 
 kind of evidence would such a tribunal consider? 
 Ancient treaties and agreements would of course be 
 studied, but suppose these proved hopelessly am 
 biguous, as has so often happened! On what would 
 they then base their decision? On governmental 
 efficiency? On developed commercial or industrial 
 interests? Would Venezuela agree to admit such 
 considerations? Would Britain consent, should 
 Britain consent, to have them altogether excluded ? 
 And considering the case more broadly, could any 
 tribunal of arbitration venture to assess the merits of 
 competing civilizations? Would not prejudice run 
 riot in such a case? Would any people accept a ver 
 dict which seemed to brand them as inferiors? And 
 yet have the merits of competing civilizations no right 
 to be heard in such a case ? Do we realize that if our 
 quarrel with Spain had been submitted to arbitration, 
 any tribunal that could have been formed would have 
 left Cuba in the control of Spain, that arbitration 
 would call a halt to all of that forcible revision of human 
 affairs to which so much of our progress has been due ? 
 Such considerations as these, very real to the 
 minds of those widely experienced in dealing with all 
 kinds of peoples, were far more present to the 
 British mind than to our own. They saw in Presi 
 dent Cleveland s ultimatum, therefore, not only 
 
 46 
 
THE CRISIS OF ARBITRATION 
 
 meddlesomeness, for by universal agreement the 
 matter did not in the least menace our interests, 
 but an offensive peremptoriness, and finally a doc 
 trinaire idealism which might easily result in a mis 
 carriage of justice. The situation was a serious one. 
 
 None the less the British government acquiesced in 
 our demand. This was not done at once, for feeling 
 ran high in England against a demand Britain 
 which seemed both arrogant and un- yields to 
 reasonable. Moreover much work re- demands 
 mained to be done in the arrangement of preliminaries 
 before there could be any hope of a satisfactory de 
 cision. Several years passed in this patient work of 
 preliminaries and in the even more important work 
 of influencing the feeling of the two peoples. The 
 work was at last finished, and at about the moment 
 when we peremptorily refused to arbitrate our quarrel 
 with Spain, the Venezuelan boundary dispute was 
 settled by arbitration. It must not be forgotten, 
 however, that opinion in Britain has never wavered 
 that our action in the matter was one of high-handed 
 injustice. It was therefore with mutual heart burn 
 ings that we drew near the great crisis which at the 
 end of the century was to modify profoundly both our 
 national destiny and the relations of the two peoples. 
 
 47 
 
VIII 
 THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS, 1897-1898 
 
 THE Spanish-American War marks an epoch in the 
 relation of the two countries. Not that it called for 
 definite cooperation or involved any nominal change, 
 but it afforded abundant occasion for the display of 
 national feeling. It is not too much to say that the 
 attitude of Britain at this time was a revelation to 
 the American people. Entering the war with a vague 
 consciousness of grievances dating from Civil War 
 days, and with the memory of recent clashes and 
 partial diplomatic defeats, our general attitude toward 
 Britain was one of suspicion. We spoke of her as 
 our traditional enemy and fancied that she was jealous 
 of our prosperity and that she feared the reaction of 
 our democracy upon her effete monarchical institu 
 tions. Prudence might restrain her from attacking 
 us, but she was secretly hostile to our expansion and 
 to the growth of our institutions. It had been for 
 years the standing resource of our politicians to " twist 
 the lion s tail," as this appeal to anti-British sentiment 
 was called. 
 
 This anticipated attitude on the part of England 
 
 Unexpected was not rean ze d> but it found its counter- 
 hostility of part in the hostility of other nations whom 
 we had not thought of as unfriendly. 
 Popular sentiment in Germany, Austria, and espe 
 cially in France, was astonishingly bitter. Americans 
 
 48 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 living in Germany were treated with a discourtesy 
 which prepared them not a little to understand the 
 German attitude during the present war. In Paris, 
 feeling ran so high that it provoked a temporary 
 American boycott of French millinery and dress 
 making, which caused the utmost alarm in the trade. 
 Austria, more remote, manifested her religious and 
 dynastic sympathies for Spain in a not unnatural 
 manner. The explanation of all this was precisely 
 that which popular opinion had attributed to Great 
 Britain, a jealousy of the great power whose growth 
 had at last brought it into conflict with Europe with 
 certain menace to the less vigorous life of the latter. 
 
 The surprise evoked by this unanticipated hostility 
 emphasized by contrast the unexpected friendliness of 
 Britain. Sympathy for our cause was in- unexpected 
 stant and general. It was manifested by friendship 
 every organ of popular expression, popular c 
 demonstrations, the press, and private utterances of 
 every sort. The attitude was best expressed by the 
 blunt statement of the London Spectator, "We are not, 
 and we do not pretend to be, an agreeable people, but 
 when there is trouble in the family, we know where 
 our hearts are." 
 
 The surprise of it all was not lessened by any ap 
 parent motive of self-interest on Britain s part. Spain 
 was not an enemy that she dreaded, as was Russia 
 when attacked by Japan. We were not in any way 
 pulling her chestnuts out of the fire. Neither directly 
 nor indirectly could she hope to profit by the humilia- 
 * * 49 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 tion and despoiling of Spain. It was purely a family 
 sentiment. We had not felt it, had not known that 
 she felt it. Perhaps she did not know that we did 
 not feel it though our attitude during the Boer War 
 and in the Venezuela controversy must have been 
 rather a chilling revelation of American sentiment. 
 Nor was this British sentiment studied. It is simply 
 impossible to work up a general and popular demonstra 
 tion of sympathy on short notice, especially in a coun 
 try where the press is really free. If we were in any 
 doubt as to the sincerity and spontaneity of this sym 
 pathy, Spain, at least, was not. No, nor France nor 
 Germany. The latter in particular saw in it an 
 ominous hint of an Anglo-Saxon solidarity which 
 she strove thenceforth to prevent by every means in 
 her power. 
 
 But there was more than popular sympathy. The 
 Favor of British government rendered us the most 
 British signal services and in more than one 
 
 emergency saved us from disaster. 
 
 Lord Cromer, at that time British administrator in 
 Egypt, has recently recounted his own part in one of 
 these transactions. The American fleet had been sent 
 to destroy the Spanish warships in Manila. An 
 ticipating this, the more powerful Spanish fleet, which 
 later sailed to Santiago, was dispatched from Spain 
 to Manila via Suez to reenforce the Spanish fleet 
 there. They could reach their destination only by 
 coaling en route, and this was begun at the great 
 British coaling station of Port Said, When Lord 
 
 5 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 Cromer heard of it, he peremptorily stopped the pro 
 ceeding, even compelling them to take out part of the 
 coal already shipped. International law on this point, 
 as on most points, is rather vague. It is understood 
 that a belligerent vessel may legitimately take enough 
 coal in a neutral port to take it to the nearest home 
 port. But the practice is such, as Lord Cromer says, 
 that he could easily have "stretched" the principle 
 sufficiently to allow them coal enough to reach Manila, 
 the nearest home port in the direction of their voyage. 
 He chose to stretch it in our favor, allowing them only 
 enough to take them to Barcelona. As a result the 
 Spanish fleet in Manila was not reenforced and our 
 fleet won the victory. Suppose our fleet had been 
 destroyed and the combined Spanish fleets had then 
 sailed for America ! Suppose a German administrator 
 had been in control of Egypt ! What would have been 
 the result to America? 
 
 But a far greater danger confronted us at that time 
 than the combined Spanish fleets. It will be remem 
 bered that our destruction of the Spanish Dan er , 
 fleet at Manila had unexpected conse- clash with 
 quences. When Dewey started, there was Gennan y 
 no thought of occupying the Philippines, either perma 
 nently or temporarily. But when the Spanish fleet 
 had been destroyed, we found ourselves confronted by 
 an unexpected situation. The Filipinos were in revolt 
 against the Spanish government. That government 
 depended upon the fleet for support, and the destruc 
 tion of the fleet left it helpless. There was the gravest 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 danger that the Spanish population would be massacred. 
 It became necessary, therefore, to occupy the Islands 
 in the interest of the Spaniards themselves, and Dewey 
 stayed, at first on his own authority, and later with 
 sanction and military reinforcements. This temporary 
 occupation developed, quite unexpectedly, into annexa 
 tion. 
 
 The American people had not the slightest anticipa 
 tion of this development, but other nations were more 
 
 thoughtful. Germany, in particular, 
 Germany . . 
 
 anticipates though not anticipating our annexation 
 Spain s o f the Islands, quite foresaw that our 
 victory would leave them helpless and 
 result in their loss to Spain. It was at the moment 
 of her fullest enthusiasm for colonies. If Spain lost 
 the Philippines and we did not take them, here was 
 her chance. 
 
 Hence a German squadron more powerful than that 
 of Admiral Dewey was dispatched to the Philippines 
 to be prepared for whatever might happen. It arrived 
 after the destruction of the Spanish fleet and found 
 Manila Bay in occupation of the Americans, who had 
 taken over the necessary task of policing the harbor, 
 assigning anchorages to arriving ships, forbidding 
 movement after dark lest there be collisions, etc. 
 What happened is variously told, doubtless with 
 much picturesque modification of detail, but with 
 agreement as to essentials. Perhaps the brief account 
 current in Manila will serve our purpose as well as 
 any. It condenses into one brief incident what was 
 
 52 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 in reality a prolonged and harassing negotiation, but 
 it faithfully portrays the true relation involved. 
 
 According to this account, the Germans on arrival 
 were assigned an anchorage as usual. The German 
 Admiral replied with much hauteur: "I Dewey . s 
 am here by the order of his majesty the clash with 
 German Emperor," and he proceeded to Germans 
 anchor elsewhere than in the place indicated. The 
 meaning of this was that he did not recognize the 
 right of the Americans to exercise authority there, 
 this doubtless in accordance with his instructions, for 
 even the briefest and most tacit recognition of that 
 authority might have had grave consequences in later 
 diplomatic negotiations. Care must therefore be taken 
 from the outset to acknowledge no other authority 
 than that of the Kaiser. 
 
 This and other deliberate repudiations of American 
 authority at last raised a definite issue. Admiral 
 Dewey finally sent a peremptory note to the German 
 Admiral, demanding that he keep the anchorage as 
 signed and adding, so the popular version goes, 
 that "if he wanted fight he could have it at the drop 
 of the hat." The German Admiral now called on the 
 commander of a British cruiser lying in Manila and 
 asked him this question: "What would you do in 
 the event of trouble between Admiral Dewey and 
 myself?" To which the latter is said to have re 
 plied : "What I would do in that event is known only 
 to Admiral Dewey and myself." The German Admiral 
 returned to his flagship and made no further trouble. 
 
 53 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 The next morning the British cruiser was found an 
 chored between the flagship of Admiral Dewey and 
 that of the German Admiral. Shortly after, the 
 German squadron weighed anchor and sailed away. 
 
 Whatever the details regarding this much disputed 
 incident, the main facts are perfectly clear. The 
 German squadron was there to take possession of the 
 Philippines if possible, and with distinct instructions 
 not to recognize American authority there. Nor can 
 it be doubted that these instructions were further to 
 the effect that while American opposition was to be 
 ignored, even resisted if necessary, a clash with Britain 
 was to be avoided. The reported answer and action of 
 the British commander, both undoubtedly in accord 
 with the instructions of his government, was sig 
 nificant of the relation which that government main 
 tained toward us in that momentous crisis. "What I 
 would do is known only to Admiral Dewey and my 
 self." That is, " there is an understanding between 
 the two peoples and they may be expected to act in 
 concert in any serious emergency." And the position 
 of that cruiser between the two flagships, insignificant 
 though it might be in itself, was a symbol of the posi 
 tion which the mighty power of the British navy has 
 steadfastly maintained, between ourselves and those 
 that would do us harm. Once more let us imagine the 
 case as it might have been. Without the certain 
 intervention of Britain the least that could have hap 
 pened would have been ignominious surrender to 
 German demands, the most, a conflict which would 
 
 54 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 have brought us crushing defeat with consequences 
 which it must make us shudder to contemplate. We 
 have been accustomed to think lightly of our war 
 with Spain as one that at no time involved serious 
 danger to ourselves. It was in fact a period of extreme 
 crisis, in which destruction yawned before us, a destruc 
 tion from which we were saved by the friendship of 
 Britain. If we are inclined to discount this friendship, 
 it is well to remember that Germany at least took it 
 seriously, the action of the British commander having 
 been made the subject of serious diplomatic protest 
 on the part of the German government. 
 
 Again we need not assume that Britain s friendship 
 was wholly disinterested. Such friendships are rare 
 in the world, even between individuals, and between 
 nations are hardly to be expected. No doubt British 
 statesmen have been conscious for some time that 
 with the growing tendency of her rivals to unite for 
 purposes hostile to her interests, it was becoming in 
 creasingly difficult for her to protect those interests 
 alone and the need of cooperation was becoming 
 ever more urgent. What more natural than that 
 she should look to her nearest kin for cooperation in 
 defense of interests that were at once hers and theirs. 
 But if statesmen reasoned thus, the people did not. 
 They have been far from appreciating the dangers 
 ahead of them and have been almost as unconscious 
 as we have been of the designs of their enemies. Yet 
 it was the British people even more than the British 
 statesmen who gave us their sympathy at that time. 
 
 55 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 If they had been jealous and unfriendly, they would 
 have shown it. There is no country in the world 
 where people express their feelings more freely. They 
 were not jealous but friendly, the only people in the 
 world who were friendly to us at that time. 
 
 In estimating this attitude of the British people it is 
 well to remember that this war marked an epoch in our 
 Our new national policy. Up to this time we had 
 colonial been a continental nation and had sought 
 policy no colonies. When the war broke out, we 
 
 did not possess a single square mile of territory outside 
 of the American continent. When it ended, we pos 
 sessed Hawaii (which otherwise would have become 
 an important British station), Puerto Rico, Samoa, 
 Guam, and the Philippines, while we had acquired 
 naval stations in Cuba and rights of control that 
 amounted to partial possession. In all of these we 
 encroached upon areas where Britain was our nat 
 ural rival. Had we not occupied Hawaii, Britain 
 would have acquired it by the will of its people. We 
 had long been rivals of Britain in Samoa. The Philip 
 pines are near Hong Kong, the headquarters of British 
 power in the Far East, and are in that great island 
 area which is unquestionably dominated by Britain. 
 The Caribbean Sea is the gateway to Panama and was 
 controlled by Jamaica and other British possessions 
 there, while Britain held the right by treaty to share 
 with us in the building and control of the Canal. 
 Nations are generally very jealous of a power that 
 thus pushes into their "sphere of influence," appropri- 
 
 56 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 ating desirable territories, bidding for coveted trade, 
 and establishing uncomfortable neighbor relations. We 
 can imagine what Germany would have felt if we had 
 pushed into regions where her influence was paramount. 
 We know what Britain feels when Germany tries to 
 establish herself in Morocco over against Gibraltar or 
 elsewhere in proximity to her interests. Britain has 
 striven for years to avoid this unwelcome proximity, 
 for the two peoples are not friendly and do not trust 
 each other. 
 
 But from the first Britain has welcomed the Amer 
 ican advance. She did not try to get the Philippines, 
 but assisted us to get them. She withdrew from 
 Samoa, leaving us thus a freer hand. She allowed us 
 to take Hawaii, though her possession would have 
 been the alternative soon or late. She encouraged our 
 expulsion of Spain from the West Indies and has since 
 favored every extension of our influence there, though 
 both Germany and France have opposed it. Above all 
 she voluntarily surrendered her rights in the Panama 
 Canal without compensation on the sole condition that 
 we should permit its use by all nations on equal terms. 
 
 Perhaps nothing is more significant of the relation 
 of Britain to America than her attitude toward Ger 
 many in the period immediately preceding Relations 
 the World War. We have only slowly preceding 
 come to realize how far-reaching were WorldWar 
 Germany s designs. Not even yet do we realize 
 how far they concerned America. We have heard, 
 rather incredulously perhaps, of Germany s designs on 
 
 57 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 South America, and have realized, although very 
 feebly, that these designs might concern us. But 
 Germany had plans for regions much nearer to us 
 than South America and was much nearer than we 
 realize to carrying them out. 
 
 It must be remembered that in her plans of expansion, 
 which embraced the entire world, Germany figured 
 largely on enlisting the cooperation of other nations 
 until such time as she could do without them. In 
 particular she counted on the aid of Britain, as her 
 imperialist writers in recent years have plainly in 
 dicated. For this cooperation Britain was to receive 
 very large rewards, though it is an open secret that 
 Germany expected the British Empire soon to collapse, 
 with the result that Germany would become virtually 
 supreme. The concessions made to these temporary 
 allies were therefore not to be permanent. 
 
 In San Domingo the United States had established 
 an unofficial receivership for the payment of the bank 
 rupt nation s debts. This worked well until 
 The San ... . 
 
 Domingo a revolution broke out which interrupted 
 
 receiver- fts operation and endangered the lives and 
 property of foreigners. The United States, 
 mindful of the sensibilities of Latin America, was re 
 luctant to intervene by force and did so only when a 
 German cruiser approached, when order was restored 
 and the interests of foreigners again protected. 
 
 Similar conditions existed in Hayti, and it was ap 
 parent that there too intervention would be necessary. 
 When this became apparent early in 1914, a joint note 
 
 58 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 was received by our government from France and 
 Germany to the effect that in the event that in 
 tervention should become necessary in the The Ha 
 affairs of Hayti, the intervention of a single tian prob- 
 power would not be satisfactory to them. lem 
 This meant, of course, that they demanded the right 
 to intervene, either with or without our cooperation. 
 This was precisely the thing that we wished to avoid, 
 for intervention in the affairs of a thoroughly de 
 moralized people may easily become permanent oc 
 cupation, as the history of Egypt has shown. Above 
 all things, we did not wish Germany in Hayti, for we 
 knew she wished a foothold in the West Indies with a 
 view to extending her power in our part of the world, 
 and that she would be disposed to take advantage of 
 any pretext to remain. It is difficult to say what 
 the outcome of this challenge of the Monroe Doctrine 
 might have been if the Great War had not followed 
 almost immediately afterward, giving us a chance to 
 bring Hayti under our protection and restore order to 
 her distracted state. 
 
 But the important thing to note is this cooperation 
 between Germany and France. There can be little 
 doubt that it was Germany that made the German 
 proposal. She felt that we would be less and France 
 jealous of two powers than of one, for it co P erate 
 would look less like annexation. Moreover, the par 
 ticipation of France was plausible, for Hayti was 
 once a French possession and it is the only Latin- 
 American republic whose people speak French. Now 
 
 59 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 that we have learned that Germany was even then 
 contemplating the seizure of the French colonies, we 
 can of course understand that she looked upon this 
 arrangement with France merely as a temporary ex 
 pedient. But the point for us to note is that even so 
 friendly a country as France was induced to cooperate 
 in a plan which she knew would be bitterly resented 
 by our country. She was not particularly hostile to 
 us, though as we have seen she had been unsympa 
 thetic toward us during our war with Spain, but 
 she was willing to seek even a very slight and un 
 certain advantage at our expense. 
 
 German schemes for cooperation with Britain were 
 much more extensive and involved much greater and 
 Germany more permanent advantages to the latter, 
 approaches A book published in 1911 in Germany by a 
 recognized German authority elaborated 
 a plan for the virtual division of the whole world be 
 tween these two powers, giving maps to show the 
 spheres of each. Thus the map of South America 
 gave the southern portion, Chili, Argentina, and 
 a part of Brazil to Germany, and the great tropical 
 portion, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, etc., to Britain. 
 Similar divisions were to be effected elsewhere, all very 
 flattering to Britain. 
 
 It was in pursuance of this policy that a German 
 of distinguished title, in the month of June, 1914, 
 sought an audience with the highest authority of the 
 British government. He guided the conversation as 
 soon as possible to the affairs of Mexico, then in a 
 
 60 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 most hopeless condition, and added: "Do you not 
 think it would be a good thing if your government 
 and ours should jointly intervene in Mexico? There 
 would be no difficulty in agreeing upon our different 
 spheres of influence." The proposal was peremptorily 
 rejected and the distinguished visitor virtually shown 
 the door. 
 
 Let us be careful to note what this proposal meant. 
 A "sphere of influence" is but a euphemism for a 
 colony in the early stages of occupation and consolida 
 tion. Such a move would therefore have given Ger 
 many a colony adjoining the United States, where she 
 would have been free to establish her military power 
 and to develop that much-dreaded institution, a mili 
 tary and naval base. A base of operations on our 
 frontier is the Greek horse inside our walls. So long 
 as Germany has no possessions in the Western Hemi 
 sphere, she is greatly handicapped in any aggressive 
 policy which she may be tempted to adopt there. 
 She would have to begin by seizing some point and 
 creating a base and accumulating supplies, all against 
 the opposition of an enemy whose own supplies were 
 near at hand. This could be accomplished only by 
 an overwhelming initial superiority. But with her 
 base ready in advance and her munitions accumulated 
 there, her task would be comparatively easy. 
 
 It therefore becomes the corner stone of our policy 
 not to allow Germany or any power that we fear to 
 establish a base of operations near us, either by ac 
 quiring a colony or by "intervening to restore order," 
 
 61 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 or by an alliance with some of our lesser neighbors. A 
 German base in Mexico would be the worst possible 
 Our polk situation for us, because it would not only 
 toward expose us to attack by land, but by furnish- 
 
 Germany ing ^ necessar y base for the German 
 
 navy, it would furnish the necessary facilities for 
 attacking the Panama Canal, our most vital and 
 most vulnerable possession. All this, of course, the 
 British government perfectly understood when the 
 distinguished visitor made his tempting proposition. 
 
 But it is to be noted that Britain had no such interest 
 at stake as we had. A German base in the Caribbean 
 Britain s would endanger Jamaica and a few other 
 lesser in- minor possessions, but Britain realized per 
 fectly that if she were ever at war with Ger 
 many, the war would be fought in Europe. A hostile 
 base in the West Indies, therefore, while it might be 
 fatal to us, could injure her very little. 
 
 On the other hand, let us note the advantage which 
 Britain would have gained by such a scheme. First 
 German s ^ a ^ ^ would have given her valuable 
 bribe to territory in Mexico. No doubt Britain 
 cares little for further additions of terri 
 tory as such. Her hands are already very full. But 
 Mexico contains some of the most valuable oil fields 
 in the world, and their product, largely controlled by 
 British capital, is a chief dependence of the British 
 navy which now burns oil instead of coal. The Ger 
 man proposal plainly indicated that this British in 
 terest would be respected in the division. Since the 
 
 62 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 struggle in Mexico has largely turned on the possession 
 of these oil fields and attempts have been made re 
 peatedly to withhold the oil from Britain, the tempta 
 tion to assure that supply by occupation was a very 
 great one. 
 
 But an infinitely greater temptation was involved in 
 this proposal. Germany, as Britain very well knew, 
 was determined to expand. There were Germany . s 
 various plans, any of which would have plans for 
 satisfied her for the time being at least, ex P anslon 
 through Belgium to the Channel, through the 
 Balkans and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, or in 
 the Western Hemisphere. The first two were wholly 
 inadmissible from the standpoint of British inter 
 ests. The last was infinitely less dangerous to her 
 and might easily have seemed advantageous. If 
 Britain had consented to this last scheme, Germany 
 would have renounced the others. It is stated on 
 credible authority that Germany has repeatedly inti 
 mated to the British government her willingness to 
 meet the latter s demands in the Old World if given 
 a free hand in the New. Britain refused to give this, 
 and the present war is the price she pays for her refusal. 
 
 Again it must not be imagined that Britain had any 
 other motive in all this than wise self-interest. It was 
 to protect herself that she protected us. 
 But how is it that it was for her interest strength 
 to strengthen us and against her interest Britain s 
 to strengthen Germany? In population, 
 in territory, in wealth we far surpass the German Empire. 
 
 63 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 If she regarded us in the same way, it would seem to 
 be to her interest to check our growth by developing 
 a rival in our vicinity. Evidently she does not regard 
 us in the same way. Concessions granted to Germany 
 would strengthen her without assuring her friendship. 
 With America she feels that that friendship is assured. 
 The English people simply cannot feel, have never 
 felt, that we are a separate people. We are a sepa 
 rate nation, no doubt, but so are Canada and Australia. 
 But the distinction is simply one of geographical con 
 venience. We have the same language, the same kind 
 of government, the same notions of life and all its 
 higher interests. We are and have always been to 
 England a part of her own people. There has been 
 plenty of bickering in the family, as there is in families 
 generally, but never a serious risk that the family could 
 be divided against itself when threatened by a great 
 danger from without. These bickerings and heart 
 burnings have especially characterized periods of peace. 
 From the War of 1812 to our Civil War was such a 
 period with the sense of grievance predominantly on 
 the side of Britain. From our Civil War to the War 
 with Spain was again a period of relative coldness and 
 misunderstanding with the sense of alienation rather on 
 our own side. But no estrangement prevented Britain 
 from supporting us against Germany in 1898 as she had 
 done a century earlier against France. And again in 
 the present war, the greatest convulsion that the 
 world has ever known, the struggle was precipitated 
 by a peremptory refusal on Britain s part to sacrifice 
 
 64 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 our interests, even for the greatest of advantages, and 
 is continued by the cooperation of our arms in that 
 far-away Europe that we fancied we had left forever. 
 
 The history of the two countries is thus a history of 
 surface differences and underlying unity. When free 
 from danger, we have differed, quarreled, Differences 
 even fought, but a serious crisis has always conceal 
 found us united. On the whole, Britain real unity 
 has been more conscious of the underlying unity than 
 we have been. This is not strange. Britain is a world 
 power ; we are an American power. Her great family 
 of free dominions, Canada, Australia, and the rest, 
 have familiarized her with the idea of a scattered and 
 yet united people. She has also had much more to 
 do with such powers as Germany, Austria, and Russia, 
 and knows how different is the underlying feeling of 
 such alien peoples. We, lacking these experiences, 
 have lived our lives much more unconsciously, enjoy 
 ing our sense of security without attempting to ex 
 plain it. 
 
 Yet our very unconsciousness is testimony to the 
 fact. Why have we never worried about our Canadian 
 frontier, never fortified or cared to fortify The un _ 
 it? There is not another frontier in the guarded 
 world that is left unguarded like that. frontier 
 Why have we never tried or seemingly cared to annex 
 Canada? She adjoins our territory, shares our in 
 terests, and has the only population in the Western 
 Hemisphere which could be easily assimilated to our 
 own. Britain has said that she is free to unite with 
 
 65 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 us if she chooses. Yet while the project has been 
 freely discussed, even urged, and that by Canadians 
 themselves, we have never shown the slightest inclina 
 tion to unite, though we have pushed our other frontiers 
 out much more hazardously. The true reason is that 
 we feel no real sense of division between us. The 
 arbitrary boundary between us does not separate us. 
 
 Even more significant is our perfect indifference to 
 the power which the British Empire has over us. We 
 have been most careful that Germany should get no 
 base in the Caribbean, that Cuba and our other Latin- 
 American neighbors should enter into no relations with 
 foreign powers. We have bought the Danish Islands 
 and are looking anxiously at other foreign possessions 
 lest by sale or conquest they fall into the possession of 
 some doubtful power. But it does not worry us in 
 the least that from a score of posts in the West Indies 
 Britain could strike our canal, that from Canada she 
 could invade our states, that from Fiji she could seize 
 Samoa, and from Hong Kong the Philippines are at 
 her mercy. In a war with her our navy would dis 
 appear from the seas as promptly as did that of Ger 
 many, and no Heligoland prevents a descent on our 
 long coasts. But we refuse to be worried. All such 
 considerations seem fantastic. And they are fantastic. 
 There will be no war. We know it. We may think 
 about our differences, but we build our whole national 
 policy upon the unconscious recognition of our unity. 
 
 When a few years since we were urged to conclude 
 treaties of arbitration with foreign powers, an American 
 
 66 
 
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS BEGINS 
 
 statesman, noted for his keen insight into realities, 
 expressed himself somewhat as follows : "I am in favor 
 of such a treaty with Great Britain be- p ossibility 
 cause I believe we would keep our promise, of arbitra- 
 I cannot conceive of any difference arising tion 
 between the two countries which our people would 
 be afraid or unwilling to submit to arbitration. 
 Such a treaty would therefore be sincere. But as 
 between this country and certain other countries, I 
 think that issues might arise and probably will arise 
 which the American people would refuse to arbitrate. 
 If Germany were to seize territory near our shores 
 on whatsoever pretext, and should propose to submit 
 the matter to arbitration, we would not arbitrate but 
 would fight. We would not take any chance of having 
 such an issue decided against us. It would therefore 
 be wrong and hypocritical for us to promise to arbi 
 trate such an issue with such a power, when we know 
 in advance that we are likely to refuse to do so when 
 the time comes." This may not have been a con 
 clusive argument against arbitration treaties with 
 such powers, but we can hardly doubt that the dis 
 tinction that he draws between Britain and other 
 powers is a correct one. We do not fear serious trouble 
 with Britain. We do not feel the same confidence 
 as regards any other great power. 
 
IX 
 SUPER-EMPIRE 
 
 WHAT is the character of this power with which we 
 are thus closely related? It is called an empire, but 
 The Super- this is true only in a partial sense. Empire 
 Empire implies authority exercised by some person 
 or people over others who do not share this authority 
 or help to determine who shall exercise it. Rome 
 was an empire, even before she called herself by that 
 name, for the Roman people bore rule over other 
 peoples who did not have a voice in determining the 
 character of that rule. Britain exercises such an 
 authority over Nigeria, Guiana, and other colonies 
 whose people seem unable either wisely to order their 
 own affairs or intelligently to assist in doing so. In a 
 less degree she exercises such an authority over India 
 and Egypt. In so far Britain is an empire precisely 
 as we are in so far as we exercise authority over the 
 Philippines, Samoa, Puerto Rico, Hayti, and the like. 
 But in all these cases that authority is lessening, both 
 in the British Empire and in our own, and these de 
 pendencies, as we may truly call them, are gradually 
 learning the art of self-management and becoming 
 independent. 
 
 It is to the great self-governing dominions that we 
 turn for that which is truly characteristic of Britain. 
 There are five of these: Canada, Newfoundland, 
 Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, It has 
 
 68 
 
SUPER-EMPIRE 
 
 already been explained that these dominions are free 
 and independent. They make their own laws, estab 
 lish their own tariffs, make their own Theself _ 
 treaties, choose their own officers, and even governing 
 decide questions of peace and war for them- c 
 selves, entirely without interference from the mother 
 country. In all that regards these dominions, there 
 fore, Britain is not an empire, but a group of nations. 
 
 If we ask what holds these nations together it is at 
 first rather difficult to answer. We are accustomed 
 in such cases to look for some kind of au- Union 
 thority, some compulsion. History records without 
 no other example of a group of nations coercion 
 permanently united without some sort of authority 
 constraining them. But there is no such authority, 
 no compulsion, none at all. There never was such 
 a group before, so far as we know. No wonder 
 that German philosophers, studying this strange 
 group, concluded that it really was not united at all ; 
 that if it jostled against some crisis, the group 
 would break to pieces and each member would go after 
 its own interest just as other independent nations do. 
 But the great crisis of the World War has not separated 
 it. All the members of the group have taken their 
 place in the line just as though they were obeying the 
 command of an emperor of recognized authority. 
 Yet they all decided the question quite for themselves 
 just as we did. Is not this the very thing that 
 thoughtful men are trying to bring about in the world, 
 a union among the peoples in which all shall cooperate 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 fully in matters of common concern, and yet do so 
 freely without constraint ? 
 
 This group is not a fixed group. Indeed there is 
 nothing fixed about it except the fact of the group 
 The open itself. It is not confined to a single race or 
 member- speech. It has no constitution and by- 
 ship laws, no fixed initiation or rules of proce 
 
 dure. It is like a group of friends. There are no 
 terms of admission except the ability to play the part, 
 to be friendly and to command the confidence of the 
 group. The last addition to the group is a very wonder 
 ful one, South Africa, only a few years ago at war with 
 the group, bitter against it, and speaking an alien tongue. 
 Yet Britain had no sooner conquered South Africa, 
 destroying all chance of that dreaded alliance with 
 Germany which was the real cause of the war, than she 
 gave South Africa back to herself, allowing her all 
 the liberties for which she had fought, and inviting 
 her into the group on even terms. Probably no one 
 knew at that time how soon the group was to be put 
 to the great test, but when the test came South Africa 
 was ready. In a two-hour speech her prime minister, 
 a Dutchman who had led her troops against Britain, 
 made it plain to his countrymen that every considera 
 tion of safety and interest and honor required them 
 to be loyal to the new fellowship, and to-day another 
 Dutchman from South Africa and another former 
 enemy is one of the little group of six men who guide 
 the supreme affairs of Britain. 
 
 Slowly but surely other peoples are approaching mem- 
 70 
 
SUPER-EMPIRE 
 
 bership in this fellowship. India and Egypt are qualify 
 ing for full participation, slowly, to be sure, yet so rapidly 
 that those who know their peoples cannot avoid occa 
 sional misgivings. Possibly others who now depend on 
 British protection will graduate into independence and 
 participation in the shaping of British policy. 
 
 But the proteges of Britain are not the only ones 
 that may strengthen her fellowship. France is no 
 part of the British empire and never has France and 
 been. A suggestion that she enter that Britain 
 empire in any such formal sense as is true of India or 
 Canada would be resented by every Frenchman. Yet 
 it seems likely that the alliance now existing between 
 the two countries is destined to be permanent. In 
 no part of the world do their interests now clash or 
 seem likely to do so henceforth. On the other hand, 
 it is difficult to look forward to a time when certain 
 great dangers will not confront them both. Present 
 companionship in arms and prospective long compan 
 ionship rebuilding the defenses of a shattered world 
 will go far to insure the permanent cooperation of 
 these two peoples, so long hostile and now so necessary 
 as friends. And permanent cooperation and comity 
 based on willing recognition of common interest is 
 all there is to membership in this group, all there is to 
 the free union of the British Empire. As the group 
 grows it will no longer call itself by the misnomer of 
 British Empire, nor will further accessions to the group 
 call themselves British. The essence of the group does 
 not lie in its name but in its union and its freedom. 
 
AMERICA. 
 
 WHAT is the relation of America to this group of 
 nations that are thus bound fast in unpledged friend 
 ship? The answer is that we are a friend, a friend 
 of them one and all. The friendship is of long stand 
 ing, a development from an earlier dependence, and 
 a deep-seated instinct of protection. It has had its 
 ups and downs, it is not ideal ; but on the whole it has 
 stood the test. It may be objected that under normal 
 conditions we are a friend of all nations, but it is clear 
 that the word so used means something much less. 
 So we may say that the right-minded man is the 
 friend of all men, but we mean something different 
 when we speak of some one as one of his friends. As 
 compared with our friendship for these peoples who 
 are of our family, who speak our language and share 
 our ways of thought and life, our profession of friend 
 ship for all peoples is but an empty phrase, a mere 
 negative disclaimer of ill will. We are not merely 
 friendly toward this group. We are their friend, and 
 they are ours. 
 
 This friendship is a very substantial fact. No 
 doubt exists in the mind of any reasonable man that 
 it is an adequate guarantee of peace between us. If 
 it were not, we should not feel as we do about the 
 Canadian boundary and the British bases near the 
 
 72 
 
AMERICA 
 
 vital points of our defense. But no man worries 
 about these. We are sure the friendship will hold. 
 We do not feel equally sure about any other friend 
 ship. We are on friendly terms with Japan and Spain, 
 but we are by no means certain that we shall always 
 be so. These friendships are not based on positive 
 attachment, on intimacy of thought and purpose. 
 They are merely relations of present amenity. The 
 sentinels that guard the frontier salute each other as 
 they pass. 
 
 We are friends, but we are no more than friends. 
 We belong only to ourselves. We are not even allies, 
 for we have not pledged ourselves to any America 
 community of action, not even in the Great always in- 
 War. We have kept ourselves free from d P endent 
 " entangling alliances," as we were wisely advised to 
 do from the first. Between us there exists only the 
 single written pledge to submit our differences to ar 
 bitration, a treaty which needlessly binds us to 
 follow a well-established habit. No, we are nothing 
 more than friends. 
 
 But now that we recall it, that is all there is to this 
 group. They are friends, uncoerced and unpledged. 
 No written agreements are the basis of this friendship 
 or are necessary to strengthen it. Canada, in antici 
 pation of this war, is asked to pledge her aid to Brit 
 ain, but refuses to do so. She will not promise, 
 though she helps freely and even coerces her citizens 
 to do so. Australia will not promise, will not even 
 coerce her citizens, but country and citizens alike 
 
 73 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 help to the limit of their power. They are friends 
 and recognize the compulsion of friendship, but will 
 recognize no other compulsion. 
 
 And since we are friends of a group whose only bond 
 is friendship, it follows that in a sense we are a member 
 of the group, a member in a very real sense, too, 
 for the reason for the group s existence is its friendship 
 and peace, and we have that friendship and peace 
 in assured permanency. 
 
 Yet there is an obvious difference. They are 
 British and we are not and never shall be. That 
 United but was settled long ago, and no one, American 
 not British or British, would change it now. What 
 does it mean to be British? It does not mean blood, 
 for if it did, we would be as British as Canada or Aus 
 tralia, and far more so than India or Egypt. What 
 makes Anglo-Saxon Canada British while Anglo-Saxon 
 America is not? It is the flag, the governor general, 
 the king s head on the postage stamp. These are 
 signs of political allegiance. When the king commands, 
 the subject must obey. Where the flag leads, he must 
 follow. The obligation suggests authority and seems 
 to rest on coercion. In all this we have no part. 
 
 But these things are deceptive. Their traditional 
 meaning has wholly faded away. The king does 
 not command nor does any one command in his name. 
 If he did, they would not obey. The flag does not 
 lead save where they carry it. These symbols, there 
 fore, are memories, not present facts. And it is these 
 things that are British, that make those who own them 
 
 74 
 
AMERICA 
 
 British. These things we have discarded beyond re 
 call. We have no king on our stamps and no governor 
 to represent his nominal authority. We follow another 
 flag. We are not British but American. 
 
 But though this difference represents no important 
 living fact, it is a real difference. These symbols 
 stand no longer for authority, for the power 
 to command, but they are still an outward changed 
 sign of union which appeals powerfully to meaning of 
 all who call them theirs. Canada is as free Sym 
 to go her own way as we are, but she is much less likely 
 to do so. The flag is familiar and the sovereign s 
 countenance, and where these are found the Canadian 
 is at home. No longer the symbols of authority, 
 they have become very potent vehicles of sympathy. 
 It still means much to be British. Ruled as we all 
 are by catchwords and signs, these symbols are a 
 powerful bond of union among this group of friends, 
 a bond which we do not share. 
 
 But while this makes the friendship less easy for 
 us, less intimate, it does not make it less vital. The 
 crises of the future, even more than those of the past, 
 require cooperation on the part of those who have 
 ideals and interests to guard. Such cooperation is 
 assured on the part of those whom we must face. It 
 is necessary on the part of those who would face 
 them. Whatever the possibilities of a universal league 
 among the nations, it must be apparent at a glance 
 that the universal friendliness upon which such a 
 league must rest is a far less substantial thing than the 
 
 75 
 
AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
 
 bond that unites a group of friends. If such a league 
 ever becomes possible, it will be because it is built 
 about a substantial nucleus of tried and assured 
 friends. Within this group, if not in the center of its 
 closest intimacy, we stand, less holden by outward 
 symbols, but not less dependent or depended upon. 
 This is our relation to the greatest spontaneous union 
 of free peoples that the world has thus far known. 
 
 Printed in the United States of America. 
 
 7 6 
 
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