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 \
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 OX THE 
 
 LAW OF TRIALS 
 
 IN ACTIONS 
 
 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
 
 By SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, LL. D. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 VOL. I 
 
 CHICAGO 
 T. H. FLOOD S: COMPANY 
 
 1889
 
 r 
 
 T5n%t 
 
 KntcTcd according to Act of Congress, in the year 1 *>'-?, by 
 
 SEYMUUK 1). TIIO.MrSON, 
 In the oilice of tbe Librarian of Congress, at Wablungion.
 
 ^ 
 
 To Herr GUSTAF EDW. FAHLCRANTZ, 
 
 V. HARADSHOFDIXG, ADVOCATE, &c., 
 
 OF STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN. 
 
 Sir, — I ask leave to dedicate this work to you, in recognition 
 of the efforts which you have made, through various published 
 writings, to reform and improve the system of trials in your own 
 country, and especially to inculcate the obligation of speaking the 
 truth in forensic controversies. That a distinguished Swedish 
 advocate, after investigating the English S3'stem of trial by jury, 
 should recommend its adoption to his countrymen, cannot but be 
 regarded as a compliment to the English-speaking race. And yet, 
 while naturally partial to the institutions of my own great and 
 prosperous country, I feel that it would not be becoming in me to 
 offer the suggestion that the jury system of your country would be 
 improved by adopting ours. A system of jury trial which has 
 been found suitable to our institutions and habits of thought, 
 might be so out of keepmg with the ways of thinking of your 
 countrymen, that it would not work well if transplanted into your 
 country. But, allowing that this is so, you have certainly shown 
 that your jury system, if such it may be called, is not without 
 serious defects; and, for having drawn the attention of your 
 countrymen to those defects, you are entitled to their sincere 
 thanks, whether or not you have suggested the most expedient 
 remedy. Your struggle in behalf of the principle that mere 
 formalism and technicality ought to be expelled from the courts 
 of justice and the truth established there instead, is deserving 
 of universal sympathy; and if you shall not succeed in im- 
 
 (iii) 
 
 609S34
 
 IV DEDICATION. 
 
 pressing tho^e views upon your countrynicu in your owu 
 lifetime, your fate will be no worse than that of Bcnthani, who, 
 having spent his lifetime in a like struggle, died without seeing 
 the fruition of his hopes, })ut whost' wiitings have, siuee his 
 death, eonfcssedly shed an intiueucc upon the jurisprudciiee of 
 his eountry, surpassing that of any other man. If you are thus 
 *' equalled with him in fate," so may you be " e<]ualled with him 
 in renown ! " * 
 
 One who has traveled in your eountry and who has every- 
 where observed the pride of honesty whieh animates the Swedish 
 people, can scarcely understand how it is that you need courts 
 of justice at all. Several hundred thousand of your countrymen 
 have made homes in America. They are among our most honest, 
 industrious, peaceful and law-abid]""»g citizens. "Would that we 
 had more of them I It is not to be su))})osed that a feeling of 
 discontent with the institutions of their nati\(» land has caused 
 them to seek homes in our country. Their presence among us 
 is rather to be ascribed to that natural overflow which the New 
 "World has received from the overcrowded po))ulations of the 
 Old. 
 
 Your wi'itings \vA\r iin})ressed me with certain strong jioints of 
 resemblance })etwecn your jury system and ours. Your nacmd, 
 when the panel is full, is composed of twelve men; and, I believe 
 the jury of all the northern nations of luu'ope is composed either 
 of twelve men, or of a multiple, or an ali(iuot part of that mimber. 
 Y''our naemcU if I correctly understand you, has the power, con- 
 sidered as mere powei-, of judging of the law as w»ll as of the 
 facts, and of overruling the judge, by an unanimous vote, ui)on 
 the whole case, or upon any question which arises therein, whether 
 it be a question of law or a question of fact. The extravagant 
 coneeptions of liberty and of popular right, with which our Amer- 
 jcau republic commenced its career, invested juries, iu several
 
 DEDICATION. V 
 
 States of the Union, with the same power; and under the con- 
 stitutions of some of the American States, as you will see by 
 looking through the following pages, ^ juries in criminal cases are 
 invested with the power of judging of the law, of deciding the 
 law in opposition to the decision of the judge, and even of declar- 
 ing acts of the legislature to be null and void, because, in their 
 opinion, contrary to the constitution, which is the fundamental 
 or organic law. The jurisprudence of those States has thus un- 
 wisely invested twelve ignorant men, hastily gathered too-ether, 
 with the power of setting aside the law of the land and of declar- 
 ing acts of the legislature null and void. When I tell you that 
 such a state of things exists in several of the most Droo-ressive 
 States of the American Union, you will of course believe me ; 
 but you will none the less be surprised that a people Avho have 
 the reputation of possessing the practical sense of the American 
 people could have descended to such foWy. You must further 
 understand that the jury which is clothed with this extraordinary 
 power is not composed of men of the highest probity, chosen by 
 the electors for a term of years, as is the case with your Swedish 
 jury, but that it is composed of men who are selected for the 
 purpose of a single trial, — frequently of talesmen, gathered to- 
 gether from the court idlers who happen to be standing around,- — 
 and that those who happen to have intelligence enough to have 
 read the newspapers and to have formed or expressed an opinion 
 about the case which is to be tried, ^ are for that reason iueliixible 
 and are rejected upon challenge; so that the jury which reallv 
 tries the case is often composed of the most ignorant men who 
 can be found in the community. When you consider that this 
 body of twelve dolts, selected because they are ignorant of the 
 facts of the case about to be tried, no matter how notorious those 
 
 J Post, § 2140, et seq. ? Post, § 70, et seq. 
 
 - Tales de circumstantibus: post, § 23.
 
 VI DEDICATION. 
 
 facts may have becu, are entni.slecl with the power of judging of 
 the hnv agaiu.st the opiuion of the presiding judge, and even in 
 opposition to the ^Supreme Court, you will at U'ast eonelude, — 
 however nuuh you may be impi'essed in fa\()r of the English 
 system of trial by jury, — that there is one feature of our Amer- 
 ican system which you cannot recommend to }our countrymen. 
 Your Swedish jury, much to their credit, when the judge brings 
 in his decision, founded upon a record which they have not had 
 the opportunity of reading, exercise the mere otlice of nodding 
 their heads. But not so with our American jury. They not un- 
 frecpiently, in viohition of the plain obligation of the oaths which 
 they have taken, decide the case in opposition to the law as ex- 
 pounded to them by the judge in his instructions, and bring in 
 verdicts which have the result of turning the worst criminals 
 loose u\)on the comnuinity to repeat their crimes. 
 
 It is true that, in a majority of American jurisdictions, juries 
 are not invested with the power of judging of the law, except in 
 so far as they have the power, in criminal trials, of bringing iu 
 a verdict of not guiltv contrarv to the law as expounded bv 
 the judge, which verdict cannot l)e set aside,' — the nuixim of 
 the English law. embodied in all our American constitutions, 
 ))eing that no one shall ])v twice put in jeopardy of life or 
 limb for the same offense. lUit in all American jurisdictions 
 they are nevertheless invested with this j)ower to the extent that 
 the verdict of a jury which is even ])rocure(l by bribery or cor- 
 ruj)tiou, if it be ;i verdict of ac(|uitt:il, cannot be set aside, but 
 is forever conclusive. With this excei)tion, in a majority of 
 American jiuisdictions, juries aic not, even in ciiminal trials, 
 judges of the law, but are bound to accept the law as expounded 
 to them by the judge in his instructions. 
 
 • Po8l, § 2133, ct seq.
 
 DEDICATION. vii 
 
 But, although they may not be judges of the law, they are, in 
 many American jurisdictions, judges of the facts, in a manner so 
 conclusive that the judge is not permitted to advise them as to 
 the weight of the evidence, or as to the credibility of the witness, 
 or even to intimate to them his opinion upon any Cjuestion of fact.^ 
 It is true that this is not the rule in the Federal, and in some 
 of the State courts ; but it is the rule in many of fhe State juris- 
 dictions that the slightest intimation from the bench, of an 
 opinion as to how the jury should find an issue of fact, or as to 
 the weight or probative force of any evidence which has been 
 delivered to them, is sufficient to authorize a court of appeal to 
 reverse the judgment.^ The twelve common men, thus selected 
 haphazard from the community to sit as jurors in the particu- 
 lar trial, who have perhaps never sat in a trial before, who find 
 themselves discharging an office new and strange to them, sur- 
 rounded by strange scenes, like children attending for the first 
 time at school, — are by that law conclusively presumed to be 
 able to discriminate properly upon all questions of fact, to detect 
 the true from the false in the testimony delivered by the Avitnesses, 
 to weigh the evidence impartially, — and all this without any aid 
 or assistance from the bench, beyond instructing them in certain 
 general rules which they are told they may or must apply in 
 determining the weight to be attached to the various elements of 
 the evidence. 
 
 But unfortunately many of these rules which the judf^e is 
 authorized, and even required on request of one of the parties, 
 to give to the jury to aid them in weighing the evidence, are not 
 rules of common sense, but are rules which have been filtered 
 down to us from the impure fountains of the scholastic jurispru- 
 dence of the middle ages. They come to us in the form of what 
 
 I Post, §§ 1037, 2287, et seq. 2 p^^gt, §j< 2420. 2421.
 
 Vlli DEDICATION. 
 
 are called presinnptioi^s: and so it is that in many case? the jury 
 are instructed by the court that f/te law presumes, or draws a cer- 
 tain conclusion of fact from a certain other fact, although, in tho 
 case before the jury, viewed in conjunction with its surroundinijs, 
 an ordinary man, proceeding in accordance with his experience 
 and conscience, would not draw such conclusion, but the re- 
 verse. Among those so-called presumptions is the prcsuini)tion 
 that a man intends the natural and ordinary consequences of his 
 own acts.^ This is sometimes in accordance with experience and 
 and sometimes contrary to experience. A man does many things 
 unguardedly and accidentally, without intending or expecting 
 the natural and ordinary consequences of what he does. An- 
 other of these so-called presumptions arises generally in trials 
 for murder, and it is that malice is presumed from the unjustiti- 
 able use of a deadly weapon.' The use of the word unjustifiable, 
 and the language in which the courts expound this presumption 
 to juries,'' deprive it of much of its objectionable meaning; but 
 even as thus expounded, it is sometimes in accordance with 
 experience and sometimes contrary to it. A man very often 
 uses a deadly weapon in lethal combat when he is not justified in 
 using it, and yet when the jirinciples of tho common law do not 
 impute malice to him. He often uses it in that heat of passion 
 which the common law to some extent indulges, out of respect 
 to tho infirmities of human nature. This our law concedes; and 
 it would therefore seom that all the circumstances surrounding 
 an act imputed as a crime ouirht to be submitted lo the jury for 
 their free and conscientious verdict as to what the accused 
 intended, without throwing an artificial presumi^tion into the 
 scale against him. Another of these so-called j)resumptions is 
 that which ascribes guilt of the crime of larceny to the recent, 
 
 > Post, § 2528. * Post, § 2531. ' Post, § 2682.
 
 DEDICATION. IX 
 
 unexplained possession of stolen goods. ^ Suppose that a thief 
 Averc to secrete an article of stolen goods in your house, that 
 it should be found there soon after the fact of the larceny, 
 and that you should not deign to offer, or should not have 
 the power of offering, an explanation as to how it came there, — 
 the fact of its beino; found there without vour offeringr an ade- 
 quate explanation^ would, under the operation of this infamous 
 principle, require a jury to convict you of larceny, to brand you 
 with infamy, and to send you to the penitentiary to undergo a 
 term of penal servitude. ^ Such a consequence might not result 
 in the case of a man of standing in the community, who could 
 throw his good character into the scale as evidence in his behalf; ^ 
 but without doubt, under its operation, many obscure persons of 
 indifferent character have been convicted and sent to the peni- 
 tentiary, in my country, for larcenies which they never com- 
 mitted. 
 
 These artificial presumptions have no other effect than to dis- 
 turb and obscure the judgment of juries in dealing with the evi- 
 dence. Instead of dealing with the evidence in the natural way, 
 according to their conscience and experience, they are impressed 
 by this lesson, which they receive for the first time from the 
 bench, that they arc to decide, not according to common 
 sense, but according to legal sense, — according to some artificial 
 standard of sense which they but dimly understand, — and they 
 are thus driven in many cases to decide wrongly. The view 
 which, in the following pages, I have endeavored to inculcate is, 
 that the jury must be freely allowed to determine the truth ; that 
 they must, not be fettered by artificial rules and presumptions; 
 that the whole brood of so-called presumptions of law, except 
 those conclusive presumptions which rest upon grounds of -pub- 
 
 ^ Post, § 2534, et seq. ■ Post, § 2oi\. 3 Post, § 2538.
 
 X DEDICATION. 
 
 lit- i)olicy, and Kaving to their cliu' ollicc tlioso which the hiw 
 rai.<es in order to lix the l)urden of proof, — is an heretical hrood 
 which should he extir])ated from the hiw ; and that the grounds 
 on whieh tlie hiw raises those presumptions should he regarded 
 as mere evidentiary cireumstanccs, to be considered hy the jury 
 for what they are worth. 
 
 If ] understand you ariirhl, you are strugglin<r against similar 
 artificial rules of evidence, inherited from the Ciennan scholastic 
 jurisprudence. In this struggle in bciialf of truth and against 
 blind and unreasoning technicality in the administration of 
 justice, it is my happy fortune to be able to join hands with 
 you. 
 
 You thus perceive that our American system of jury trial is not 
 a homogeneous system ; that while we attempt to invest juries, on 
 the one hand, with the extravagant jjower of judging of the law, 
 and with the conclusive power of judging of the facts, we, on the 
 other hand, hamper their intelligence and conscience with arti- 
 ficial rules which interfere with their free judgment as to the 
 facts. But we have done more tiian this. Our American 
 judges have shown themselves cai)able of attenuatcnl retincments, 
 which would move laughter in the law courts of London. It is 
 a canon of Anglo-American criminal law that every person is pre- 
 sumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt. The phrase "reasonable doubt '' is one of the 
 simplest and mo.-t ea-ily understood phia<c^ in our language. 
 And yet our American judges, in their chaigcs to juries, have 
 endeavored to improve it l)y a variety of deHnitions: paraphras- 
 ing it, lengthening it, shortening it, and twisting it around from 
 side to side, and some of them landing in the c-onclusioit that 
 common sense is not a guide on this question ! ' I have found a 
 
 ' Pi'ft, LMSl'.
 
 DEDICATION. XI 
 
 great number of decisions upon the meaning of these two sim- 
 ple words, and have been obliged to devote many pages to a 
 discussion of the hair-drawn conceptions which those decisions 
 present.^ 
 
 But the manner in which we treat our juries in other respects 
 is not at all in keeping with the extravagant powers with which 
 we have clothed them. In capital cases, and in many jurisdic- 
 tions in other cases of felony, we lock them up in charge of a 
 sworn officer, from the time when the evidence is submitted to 
 them for their decision until they return into court with their 
 verdict.^ These twelve men who, in one juridical conception, 
 occupy almost the position of demigods, are now made pris- 
 oners, though worshiped, like the Abuna of Abyssinia. 
 Moreover, while we invest them with the exclusive power of 
 judging of the facts without the aid of the judge, we withhold 
 from them in many instances those sources of natural evidence 
 which every right-minded and conscientious man would seek in 
 endeavoring to solve the disputed questions of fact which are 
 committed to him. If a crime has taken place, and they inad- 
 vertently and without the consent of the court, visit the scene 
 wdiere it took place, their verdict is avoided and a new trial must 
 be had.-"^ Nay, even a law book,* a county map,^ or a deposition ^ 
 which has been read in the case, if accidental!}' found in the jury 
 room, will, in some of the narrow conceptions of American 
 jurisprudence, have the dreadful effect of vitiating their verdict; 
 and extravagances or improprieties in argument, which Avould be 
 thought trivial if the argument were addressed to the judge, 
 will require the granting of a new trial if addressed to the jury." 
 
 1 Fost, § 24G1, et seq. « Post, § 2588. 
 
 2 Post, § 2548, et seq. 6 Post, § 2578. 
 
 3 Post, §§ 1)04, 2C05. ' Post, § 9C3, et seq. 
 * Post, § 258G.
 
 Xll PEDICATIOX. 
 
 In the (liscussious of the following pagos, whcrcviT I have 
 encountered these conceptions, I have written of llu-ni with that 
 freedom which the .sul)ject seenicl to doscrvc. If I have not 
 always Avrilton wisely concerning them, I have at least written 
 faithfully. If what I have thus written could deserve of my 
 countrymen some small share of the approbation which similar 
 efforts on your part have deserved at the hands of your King 
 and Country, I should be more than satisHetl. 
 
 I am, with the highest respect, your obliged friend and servant, 
 
 Seymour I). Thompson.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 This is an attempt to sketch the leading outlines of a trial be- 
 fore a jury, or before a judge sitting as a jur}^ from the im- 
 paneling of the jury to the signing and filing of the bill of ex- 
 ceptions. The effort of the author has been to aid the judge and 
 practitioner in the work of getting a jnry, of examining the 
 witnesses, of presenting the documentary evidence, of arguing 
 the case to the jury, of instructing the jury, and of attending to 
 the custody and conduct of the jury, to the delivery and reception 
 of the verdict, to the motion for ncAv trial, and to the bill of 
 exceptions. By far the most important subjects which have 
 undergone discussion, and those which have received the greatest 
 attention and the greatest space, relate to the examination of 
 witnesses and to the instruction of juries. 
 
 At the threshold of the latter subject lies the constantly re- 
 curring question of the relative province of the court and jury. 
 This subject has been discussed in thirty-three chapters, in con- 
 nection with a great variety of questions. In these chapters the 
 author has not only considered what questions are questions of law 
 for the decision of the judge and what are questions of fact for 
 the jury, but he has also discussed the manner in which ques- 
 tions for the decision of the jury should be submitted to them ; 
 giving a great variety of precedents of instructions on questions 
 'ikely to arise in trials civil and criminal, all of which have 
 met with distinct approval in appellate courts on appeal or 
 
 (xiii)
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 crriM-. Those :irc followed hy six chapters, trcatiiii; of the 
 general rules which ohtaiii with reference to the manner ol" in- 
 structing juries. So nuuh space was thus consumed in what the 
 author judged to be a sutiicient treatment of the subject of tho 
 relative province of court and jury and of the manner of in- 
 structing juries, that it became necessary, in order to avoid ex- 
 panding the work into three volumes, to limit the treatment of 
 the tinal title, bills of exceptions, to a mere outline sketch. 
 
 Some years ago the author iHil)lishcd a small work on the 
 theory of instructing juries ^ wliich nut with considerable 
 favor at the hands of the bench and bar. That work beinff 
 now out of )irint, so much of it as was deemed ap[)ropriate 
 to this discussion has been preserved in the present work. 
 In order to a complete discussion of the leading incidents of a 
 trial, it also l)ccanie necessary to traverse some ground which 
 was gone over in a })revious work written in ]iart by the present 
 writer. ^ Under an arrangement with the pul)lisher of that work 
 and with Mr. Merriam, my learned co-author, some matter 
 •was drawn from it for use in these pages. The matter drawn 
 from these two works has been, as far as practicable, condensed, 
 restated, re-arranged, and brought down to the present time by 
 the citation of more recent decisions. 
 
 In several States there exists a system nnder which the judge 
 submits special interrogatories to juries, requiring of them special 
 findings of fact on particular matters raised by the evidence. It 
 was thought best to have a chapter detailing the jn-actice under 
 such statutes written ])y a prartitioiicr lisiiig in a state where such 
 a system is in vogue. The chapter on the special findings of 
 juries was accordiuLrly contributed by "\V. W. Thornton, Es(i., 
 
 ' "Chnruiim tlie.Iurv." St. Louis: 2 Thompson riiid Morriam on Juries. 
 
 Puhlislnd by tho Central Law Journal The same publisiicr. 
 Company.
 
 PREFACE. XV 
 
 of Crawforclsville, Indiana. The three chapters on motions for 
 new trial were contributed by Eugene McQuillin, Esq., of the 
 St. Louis bar. Both of these writers are favorably known to 
 the profession as contributors to the law magazines. In their con- 
 tributions to the present wr)rk they have examined and cited a 
 great many statutes and judicial decisions; and it is confidently 
 believed that their contributions will prove useful and satisfac- 
 tory to the profession. 
 
 It is customary for law writers to apologize to the profession 
 for the character of their work. If an author is conscientious 
 and capable, no one can know and feel the deficiencies of his 
 work as much as he knows and feels them himself. There can 
 be no such thing as perfection in a legal treatise, and this is es- 
 pecially true of American law books. Our law is the result of 
 the enactments of nearly fifty independent legislatures and of 
 the judgments of more than fifty independent judicial tribunals. 
 Our reported case- made law is being turned out at the rate of more 
 than thirteen thousand cases a year. On nearly every subject 
 which can engage the pen of a legal writer he is oppressed with 
 a multitude of decisions ; and it is within the bounds of literal 
 truth to say that there is scarcely any subject in the American 
 law on which contradictory decisions cannot be found. An 
 author who attempts to struggle with this superabundant mass 
 of material will finally conclude that all effort must stop some- 
 where. Even while he is writing, new decisions on the sub- 
 jects which engage his attention are multiplving in such numbers 
 that he cannot hope to retrace his steps and gather them all up 
 and fit them into their proper places. At last he finds that the 
 edifice which his ambition has attempted to build, thouijh to the 
 inexperienced eye it may seem symmetrical in its general outline, 
 and even stately in its appearance, must forever remain unfin- 
 ished.
 
 XV i PREFACE. 
 
 The subject of this work is :i very wide one. Nearly every title 
 iu the law can be touched upon or hinted at in a work on trials. 
 If one who is expert in the art of war were to write a technical his- 
 tory, iu fullness of detail, of a ])attU' by land, of a naval l)attle, and 
 of a siesre, it would be found that he had written a history of the 
 art of war. The gathered skill and preparation of years, in the 
 enirinccr, the ordnance, the quartermaster, the commissary de- 
 partments, and in the more general work of discipline and drill, — 
 are often expended in a single battle, nay, even in a single charge. 
 It is so in the practice of the law. The gathered learning and ex- 
 perience of a i)rofessional life time may be called into requisition 
 in a single forensic struggle. The hi.story of a trial, if written by 
 a competent hand and in fullness of detail, must therefore be iu 
 a large measure a history or description of the law itself. 
 
 If the author of the present work has not treated of evcrvthing 
 which might be supposed to be germane to so great a subject, 
 his apology is that he could not treat of everything in two vol- 
 umes. An examination of the index, containing 1214 titles, will 
 convey a hint to the reader of the number and variety of 
 subjects which have been drawn into the di.scussion. It has been 
 found necessarv to examine ncarlv sixteen thousand adjudged 
 cases,' ami to state, condense and arrange the doctrine of these 
 adjudications iu a text embracing 214(! pages, divided into 82 chap- 
 tors and 2 139 sections. ^ So that, what was originally intended 
 for treatment in a single volume has, notwithstanding efforts at 
 condensation in some of its parts, been expanded into two vol- 
 umes of much moif than tlu" usual size. And yi.-t some subjects, 
 which might jn'operly be imjudcd in a work on tiial-, iiave 
 
 1 Tlie exact uumbor is \r>/.3i. end of each chapter .niul article, thus 
 
 2 111 iiuinl>eriu<; the sections inter- reducing the real, from tlie apparent 
 vals liave been purposely left at the nuiulter , (2828), to that above stated..
 
 PREFACE, XVil 
 
 scarcely been touched upon ut all. Very little attempt has been 
 made to deal with minor or collateral matters. But such as this 
 work is, it is given to the profession in the confident belief that 
 it will in some measure lighten their labors. 
 
 THE AUTHOR.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE. I. 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY, 
 
 Chapter I. Of Juries and the Qualification of Jurors. 
 
 Chapter II. Of Selecting, Drawing and Summoning the 
 Panel ; and herein of Special Venires and 
 Talesmen. ...... 
 
 Chapter III. Of Challen2;es. 
 
 Paqes. 
 l-U 
 
 12-27 
 28-79 
 
 Article I. Challenges to the Array. .... 28-36 
 
 Article II. Peremptory Challenges. .... 36-46 
 
 Article III. Challenges for General Disqualification. . 46-50 
 Article IV, Challenges for Disqualification in respect of 
 
 the Particular Case. .... 61-79 
 
 Subdivision l. Challenges Grounded on Consanguinity, Affinity, 
 
 Interest, Affection. .... .'51-«0 
 
 Subdivision 2. Challenges Grounded on Bias, Prejudice, Scruple, 
 
 Opinion. ...... 61-79 
 
 Chapter IV. Of the Details of Practice in Challenging and 
 
 Impaneling. 
 
 80-130 
 
 Article I. Challenging, Impaneling, Swearing. . . 80-109 
 
 Article II. Objections ami the Waiver and Review of the 
 
 same 109-130 
 
 (xix)
 
 XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE II. 
 
 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF THE TRIAL. 
 
 Pages. 
 
 Chapteu v. Of the Preservation of Order and the Pun- 
 ishment of Coutempts 131-160 
 
 CuAPTKu VI. Of Compulsory Process against Witnesses. . lGl-190 
 
 CuAPTKK VII. Enforcing the Stipuhitions and Admissions 
 
 of Counsel 101-201 
 
 Chapteu VIII. Of other Subjects of Judicial Conduct and 
 
 Control 202-211 
 
 TITLE IIL 
 
 OPENING THE CASE AND PRESENTING THE EVIDENCE. 
 Chapteu IX. Of the Right to Open and Close. . . 213-244. 
 
 Aktici.e I. In Oriliuary Actious. .... 213-225 
 
 Article II. In Special Proceedlujrs .... 225-239 
 
 Article III. Certain Special Rules. .... 240-244 
 
 Chapteu X. Of the Opening Statement.. . . 245-251 
 
 Chapter XI. Excluding Witnesses from the Court 
 
 Room 252-259 
 
 Chapter XII. Of the Privilege of AVitnesscs. . . 2G0-287 
 Chaiter XIH. Prcliminar}' Questions of Fact for the 
 
 Judge 288-305 
 
 Chapter XIV. Control of the Court over the Examina- 
 tion of Witnesses 300-326 
 
 Chapter XV. Incidents of the Direct Examination. . 327-351 
 Chapter X\1. C)f the Use hy Witnesses of Memoranda 
 
 to refresh Recollection. . 352-366
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 XXI 
 
 Chapter XVII. Of the Cross-Examination. 
 
 Pages. 
 367-422 
 
 Article I. In General. ..... 
 
 Article II. American Rule of Strict Cross-Examination 
 Article III. Questions Affecting Credibility. 
 
 Chapter XVIII. Of the Re-Examination. 
 
 Chapter XIX. Of Indirect Impeachment. 
 
 Chapter XX. Of Direct Impeachment. 
 
 Chapter XXI. Corroborating and Sustaining Witnesses 
 
 Chapter XXII. Of tlie Examination of Experts. 
 
 Article I. Direct Examination. 
 Article II. Cross-Examination. 
 
 Chapter XXIII. Of the Accused as Witnesses. 
 Chapter XXIV. Of the Unsworn Statement of the Ac 
 
 cused. ..... 
 
 Chapter XXV. Objections to Evidence and Exceptions 
 
 to the Rulings thereon. 
 
 Article I. Tenders of Evidence. 
 
 Article II. Objections to Evidence and Exceptions. 
 
 Article III. Striking out and withdra wins:. 
 
 3G7-382 
 SS2-395 
 395-422 
 
 423-428 
 429-446 
 447-460 
 401-493 
 494-522 
 
 494-516 
 517-522 
 
 523-536 
 537-546 
 
 547-587 
 
 547-557 
 
 557-580 
 580-587 
 
 Chapter XXVI. Of the Production and Use of Books and 
 Papers. ...... 
 
 Article I. Discovery and Inspection. . . , 
 
 Subdivision 1. Under the Federal Statute. 
 Subdivision 2. Under the Statute of New York. 
 
 588-643 
 
 58S-60G 
 
 5fS-595 
 595-006 
 
 xVrticle II. Notice to Produce and Secondary Evidence. 60G-G43 
 
 Subdivision l. Notice to Produce. .... 606-619 
 
 Subdivision 2. Secondary Evidence of Lost Instruments. . 6rJ-623 
 
 Article III. Use of Books and Papers at tlie Trial. 
 
 623-643
 
 XXU TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Pages 
 Chapter XXVII. Of Natural Evidence. ... 644-701 
 
 Article I. luspcctiou of rcrsons aud Thiugs iu Court: 
 
 Trial by luspectiou. .... 644-6G4 
 
 Article II. View of Thius:?! out of Court. . . . ClU-701 
 
 TITLE IV. 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. 
 
 Chaptku XXVIII. Of the Right of Argument Generally. . 702-719 
 Chapti:u XXIX. Of the Right to Argue Questious of 
 
 Law to the Jury 720-733 
 
 Chapter XXX. Abuses of the Right of Argument. . 734-798 
 
 TITLE Y. 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY: QUESTIONS OF LAW AND 
 
 FACT. 
 
 Chapter XXXI. General Rules 800-815 
 
 Article I. Questions of Law for the Court. . . 800-808 
 
 Article II. Quostious of Fact for tlie Jury. . . 809-816 
 
 Chapter XXXII. Existence and Interpretation of Laws, 
 
 Ordinances, Rules and Customs. . 81G-823 
 Chapter XXXIII. Interpretation of Private "Writings. . 824-850 
 Chapter XXXIV. Verbal Speech : Oral Contracts. . 851-857 
 Chapter XXXV. Existence and Terms of Express Con- 
 tracts 858-887 
 
 Chapter XXXVI. Implied Promises 888-004 
 
 Chapter XXXVII. S.-iles of Personal Property. . 905-923 
 
 Airmir I. What Questions for the rouit :im(1 whnt fur 
 
 the Jury . . ... 905-919 
 
 Article II. Precedfuts of Instructions to .lurio. . . 91Ii-923
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 XXIU 
 
 Chapter XXXVIII. Warranties in Sales of Chattels. 
 Chapter XXXIX. Negrotiable Instruments. . 
 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XL. Payment: Accord and Satisfaction. 
 XLI. Statute of Limitations: Bankruptcy 
 New Promise and Part Payment to 
 Revive Barred Debt. 
 XLII. Insurance. .... 
 
 Article I. Fire Insurance. 
 
 Article II. Life and Accident Insurance. 
 
 Article III. Marine Insurance. 
 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 
 Chapter 
 Chapter 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLIII. 
 
 XLIV. 
 
 XLV. 
 
 XLVI. 
 
 XLVII. 
 
 XLVIII. 
 XLIX. 
 
 L. 
 LI. 
 
 LII. 
 
 Intent. ..... 
 
 Autliority : Agency : Ratification. 
 Alteration of Written Instruments. 
 Possession. .... 
 
 Waiver: Abandonment: Laches: Ac 
 
 quiescence. .... 
 Identit}': Resemblance. . 
 Place: Locality: Boundarj^: Identity 
 
 of Land. .... 
 
 Notice. ..... 
 
 Description : Qualitj' : Characteriza 
 
 tion. . . , , . 
 Reasonableness. 
 
 Article I. Reasonable Time. 
 Article IL Reasonable Things. 
 
 Pages. 
 924-932 
 933-954 
 955-963 
 
 96-4-969 
 970-999 
 
 970-989 
 989-992 
 993-999 
 
 1000-1016 
 1017-1028 
 1029-1038 
 1039-1056 
 
 1057-1070 
 1071-1075 
 
 1076-1091 
 1092-1105 
 
 1106-1115 
 1116-1159 
 
 1116-1145 
 1U5-1159 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LIII. Malicious Prosecution. 
 
 1160-1203 
 
 Article I. "What Questions for the Judge and what for 
 
 the Jury ilGO-1184 
 
 Article II Jury how Instructed in such Actions. . 1184-1203
 
 XXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 CHAPTEU 
 
 LIV. Neirliffence. 
 
 Article 
 
 I. What Questions for tlio Court aiul what for 
 the jury. .... 
 
 Article II. Precetlciits of Iiistruciious. 
 Subdivision 1. General Principles. 
 Sdbpivision 2. Injuries to Children. 
 SrBDivisioN 3. Master and .Serv.int. 
 SCBDivisiON 4. Municipal Corporations. 
 Subdivision 5. Carriers of Passengers. 
 Subdivision 6. Travelers at Railway Crossings. 
 Subdivision 7. Trespasses on Hallway Tracks. . 
 Subdivision 8. Railway Injuries to Domestic .\nlmals. 
 Subdivision 9. Railway Fires. 
 Subdivision 10. Mi^scellaneous. 
 
 Pages. 
 120-1-1316 
 
 1204-1252 
 12oJ-131<; 
 
 1252-1257 
 1257-12C0 
 12C0-1263 
 1263-1281 
 1281-1299 
 129'.1-13M 
 1304-1306 
 130fi-1309 
 1310-1311 
 1312-1316 
 
 Chapter LV. Carriers of Goods and other Bailees. . 1317-1374 
 
 Article I. Burden of Proof and doctrine of Prima Facie 
 Case iu Actions against Carriers and other 
 
 Bailees. ..... 
 
 Article II. Precedents of Instructions iu such Actions 
 
 Chapter LVI. Nuisance and Obstruction. 
 
 Chapter LVII. Fraud. ..... 
 
 Article I. In General. ..... 
 
 Article II. Misrepresentation and Deceit. 
 
 Subdivision 1. "What Questions for Court and what for Jury 
 Subdivision 2. Precedents of Instructions. 
 
 Article III. Fraudulent Conveyances. . 
 
 Chapter LVIII. Lilicl and Slander. 
 
 Article I. What Questions for the Court and what for 
 the Jury. ...... 
 
 Article II. Precedents of Instructions in such .Vet Jons. 
 
 1317-1368 
 1368-1374 
 
 1375-1105 
 1406-1451 
 
 U06-1413 
 1414-U35 
 
 1414-1419 
 1420-1435 
 
 1435-U51 
 1452-1471 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LIX. Measure of Daniapfcs. 
 
 Article I. What Questions for tlie Court and wiiat for 
 the .Iiirv. 
 
 1452-14C8 
 1468-1471 
 
 1472-1503 
 
 147L'-1477
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 Pages. 
 
 Article II. Precedents of lDStmctiou.s. . . . 1477-1503 
 
 SCBDivisiON 1. In Actions for Injuries to Person and Character. 1477-1492 
 
 Subdivision 2. In Actions for injuries to Property Kiglits. . ]-i9-2-150$ 
 
 Chapter LX. Of the Power of Juries as Judges of 
 
 the Law 1504-1531 
 
 Chaptek LXI. Matters of Crime. .... 1532-1577 
 
 Article I. "What Questions for the Court and what for 
 
 the Jury 1532-15C1 
 
 Article II. Precedeuts of Instructions as to Particular 
 
 Crimes. ...... 1501-1577 
 
 Chapter LXII. Of Nonsuits. ..... 1578-1594 
 
 Chapter LXIII. Directiusf the Verdict 1595-1627 
 
 TITLE YI. 
 
 CH. URGING THE JURY. 
 
 Chapter LXIV. Invading the Province of the Jury. . 1628-1659 
 Chapter LXV. Elements of the Charge. . . . 16C0-1691 
 
 Chapter LXVI. Of Requests for Instructions. . . 1692-1724 
 Chapter LXVII. Of Written Instructions. . . . 1725-1736 
 
 Chapter LXVIII. Of the Appellate Review of Insti'uc- 
 
 tions. ...... 1737-1758 
 
 Chapter LXIX. Cautionary Instructions as to Weigh- 
 ing Evidence 1759-1900 
 
 Article I. Cautions as to Probative Value of Various 
 
 Kinds of Evidence. .... 1759-1812 
 
 Article II. As to the Presumption of Innocence and tlie 
 
 Doctrine of Keasouable Doubt. . . 1S13-1854 
 
 Article III. As to Circumstantial Evidence. . . . 1854-1877 
 
 Article IV. As to Certain Other Presumptions. . . 1877-1960
 
 XXVI 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 TITLE VII. 
 
 CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF THE JURY. 
 
 Pages. 
 
 Chapteu LXX. Of the Conduct of the Jury. . . 10O1-19.3-4 
 
 Cii.vrxER LXXl. Of Books and Papers in the Jury Hoom. rj35-1902 
 CiiAPTEK LXXII. Of Improper Methods of Arriving at 
 
 the Verdict 19G3-1972 
 
 Chapter LXXIII. Of the Misconduct of Juries as Ground 
 
 of New Trial . , . . 1973-1995 
 
 TITLE YIII. 
 
 THE VERDICT. 
 
 Chapter LXXIV. Delivery and Reception of the Verdict. 1996-2000 
 
 Chapter LXXV. Of General Verdicts. . . 2001-2005 
 
 Chapter LXXVI. Of Special Verdicts 200G-2019 
 
 Chapter LXXVII. Of Special Findings of Juries. . . 2020-204-1 
 
 TITLE IX. 
 
 I^IOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL. 
 
 Chapter LXXVIII. Of the Motion in General. . . 204.5-2069 
 Chapter LXXIX. Time of Making the Motion. . . 2070-2US0 
 Chapter LXXX. Manner of Making the Motion. . 2081-2102 
 
 TITLE X. 
 
 BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 CnAPTEK LXXXI. Form and Sul)stance of the Bil! . 2103-2124 
 
 Chaptkr LXXXII. Taking P^xccptions: Signing, Filing 
 
 and Amendinor the Bill. . . 2125-2146
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Abbey v. Dewey, 25 Pa. .St. 413. p. 1417. 
 Abbev V. Kingsland, 10 Ala. 355; «. c. 44 Am. 
 
 Doc. 491. \>. 310. 
 Abbott V. Abbott, 51 Me. 575. pp. 1077, 10S5. 
 Abbott V. Pearsou, 130 Mass. 191. p. 63S. 
 Abbott V. People, 86 N. Y. 460. p. 78. 
 Abbott V. Semple, 25 111. 107. p. 1060. 
 Abel r. Illinois &c. K. Co., 59 111. 131. p. 1229. 
 Abel V. Kennedy, 3 G. Greene (la.), 47. pp. 
 
 19.55. 1994. 
 Aberi^TOinbie v. Bradford, 16 Ala. 550. p. 1439. 
 Abraliams r. Swauu, 18 W. \a. 274. p. 597. 
 Abruin.s v. Carlisle, 18 .•^. C. 24.5. p. 2073. 
 Abrains v. People, 6 Hua (X. Y.), 491. p. 
 
 1.560. 
 Achey v. State, 64 Ind. SG. pp. 114, 1074. 
 Aclitenhageu v. Waterlown, 18 Wis. 331. pp. 
 
 1225, 1233. 
 Aclvurly v. Parkinson, 3 Maule & S. 425. p. 
 
 16(1. 
 Ackbartr. Lausiug, 48 How. Pr. 374. p. 1210. 
 Acklen v. Hickman, 63 Ala. 494. p. 365. 
 Ackley v. People, 9 Barb. (X. Y'.) 509. p. 761. 
 Acti>n r. Dooley. 16Mo. Apn.44I. p. 2003. 
 Acton V. Kuowles, 14 Ohio St. 18. p. 1140. 
 Adal V. Zangs, 41 Iowa, 541. p. 922. 
 Adam's Case, 3 Keb. 51. p. 177. 
 Adams v. Ashby, 2 Bibb (Kv.), 237. pp. 2093, 
 
 20'jt;. 
 Adams V. Betz, 1 Watts (Pa.), 425. p. 827. 
 Adams v. Carlisle, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 146. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Adams v. Cosby, 48 Ind. 153. p. 2038. 
 Adams V. Davis, 16 Ala. 748. ]>. 862. 
 Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 Grav (Mass.), 423. 
 
 p. .560. 
 Adams V. Frye, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 105. p. 1031. 
 Adams v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 70 X. Y. 166. 
 
 )>. 4.56. 
 Ailains V. Helm, .55 Mo. 463. pp. 9.56, 1712. 
 AilamS t\ Holmes, 48 Iml. 299. p. 2029. 
 Adams v. Kellv, Kv. A M. 157. p. 360. 
 Adams f.l\'enne<lv, 90 Ind. 318. pp. 161f>, 1647. 
 Adams v. McFarlane, 65 Me. 143. p. 1633. 
 Adani'^ v. Xantucket, 11 Allen (Mass.), 203. 
 
 pp. 1747, 17.56. 
 Adams v. People, 47 111. .376; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 Tlioin)). Ca-. Self-Def. 208. pp. 1520, 1906. 
 Adams r. Itoberts, 2 How. (U. S.)4S6. pp. 
 
 1638. 16S6. 
 Adams v. Kobinson, Go Ala. 587. ]). 337. 
 Adams r. Kobinson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 462. p. 
 
 19 !. 
 Adams r. Rockwell, 16 Weud. (X. Y'.) 285. p. 
 
 1080. 
 Adams v. State, 6 Ark. 497. p. 109. 
 Adams v. State, 11 .Vrk. 4(j6. p. 103. 
 Adams v. State, 22 (in. 417. )>. 17.53. 
 Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 565. pp. 1574, 1694. 
 Adams r. State, 25 Oil. St. 534. p. 1741. 
 Adams v. State, 29 Oh. St. 412. pp. 1555, 1557, 
 
 1.5.5S, 1741, 1851. 
 Adams v. Stringer, 78 Ind. 180. p. 1006. 
 
 Adams r. Wheeler, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 199. p. 
 
 1443. 
 Adams v. Woods, S Cal. 315. p. 2057. 
 Adams v. Younir, 44 Oh. Si. 80; s. c. 4 X.East. 
 
 Hep. 599. p. i'311. 
 Adams, Ex parte, 25 Miss. 883. pp. 132, 152, 
 
 1.53. 
 Adams' Express Co. v. Haynes, 42 111. 89. p. 
 
 1364. 
 Adams' Express Co. v. King, 3 111. App. 316. 
 
 p. 1364. 
 Adams' Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 111. 134. 
 
 pp. 1321,1345, 136.5. 
 Ldr "' ' 
 
 Adcock v. Marsh, 8 Ired. L. (X. C.) 360. pp. 
 
 14.59, 1462. 
 Addem.- i: Saver, 89 111. 432. p. 1735. 
 Addingtou v. Etheridge, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 436. 
 
 J). 827. 
 Addison v. State, 48 Ala. 478. pp. 321, 372, 
 
 1775. 
 Ad kins r. Hill. Cowp. 283. p. 839. 
 Adkius r. Williams, 23 Ga. 222. p. 1905. 
 Adler r. Couwav County, 42 Ark. 488. pp. 
 
 2129, 2137. 
 .^tna Life Ins. Co. r. France, 94 U. S. 561. 
 
 11. 991. 
 Agau V. McManus, 11 Johns. (X. Y'.) ISO. p. 
 
 948. 
 Agate I'. Morrison, 84 X. Y. 672. p. 307. • 
 Asrawau Bk. v. Strever, 18 X. Y. 502; s. c. 16 
 
 Barb. (X. Y.) 82. p. 939. 
 A hern r. Bovce, 19 ^lo. App. 552. p. 893. 
 Aheru r. Collins, 39 iMo. 146. pp. 1195,1198, 
 
 1481. 
 Ablraau v. Mever, 19 Xeb. 66. pp. 1411, 1437. 
 Ahreus v. State I'.ank, 3 S. C. 401. p. 1608. 
 Aiken v. Mendenhall. 25 Cal. 213. p. 392. 
 Aikln V. State, 35 Ala. 399. pp. 17, 18, 19, 
 
 1670. 
 Ainsworth r. Huchins, 52 Vt. 5.54. p. 326. 
 Aiscough, Ex parte, 2 P. AVms. 591. pp. 646, 
 
 647. 
 Aitkin V. Young, 12 Pa. St. 15. pp. 1698, 1702. 
 Akers r. Demond, 103 Mass. 322. p. .569. 
 Alabama &c. 11. Co. v. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209. p. 
 
 1374. 
 Albany Citv Bank v. Schcrmerhorn, 9 Paige 
 
 (X. Y.),372. p. 145. 
 Albee v. Havden. 25 Minn. 267. p. 192. 
 Albert r. lileeker Street K. Co., 2 Daly 
 
 (X. Y.),3S'.>. p. 1210. 
 Albertson r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 48 Iowa, 
 
 292. p. 1257. 
 Albiu r. Lord, 39 X. H. 196. pp. 1007, 1047. 
 Albrecht v. Walker, 73 111. 69. p. 63. 
 Aloock V. Uoval Exchange Ins. Co., 13 Ad. & 
 
 El. (N. S.) 292. p. otij. 
 Alcott i: Hostou vVc. Mill Co., 11 Cash. 
 (Mass.) 91. p. 19.54. 
 
 Alden V. Minneaiiolis, 24 Minn. 255. p. 1265. 
 Alden v. Pearsou, 3 Grav (Mass.), 342. pp. 
 
 1321, 1345. 
 Alder c. SaviUc, 5 Taunt. 454. p. 19SS. 
 
 (xxvii)
 
 XX\ 111 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 AUlorman r. French, 1 Pick. (^lass.) 1. pp. 
 
 14»;f.. I4i;7. 
 Al'K'nuan v. Pooplo, 4 :Mlrli. 414. p. 2S3. 
 Aldruh r. IHinh.-un. Hi 111. 404. p. ir:.'.. 
 Aldrich f. llowanl, 7 U. 1. t-7; s. c. a U. 1.246. 
 
 I., i.m. 
 Af.lritlire v. Mardoff. 32 To\-. lOy p. 2070. 
 Ak'scn r. Aleson, 2 \.vi\ ")7i;. pp. <UG, (i4S. 
 Ali'xamlor r. iriircLliuld. 7 Man. & G. lOCl. 
 
 pp. !t;!7. IM4,W.'>. 
 AlfxandiT V. DiMiavoaux, 5;^ Cal. 6G.l;s. c. 
 
 .V,t("al. 47i>. p. 1'.'-. 
 Ali'xaiKlor I". bunn.Slml. 122. pp. 110, 120, 
 
 145. I'.Hrt-,. I'.MS. 
 Ali-\an.ii"r v. Diiiton. .'i^ X. II. 282. p. 029. 
 Al''xaiulcr r. Giuihucr, 14 U. I. 13. pp. 1719, 
 
 1738. 
 Alf'xaiuler v. Ganlncr, 1 Ding. N. Cas. 671. 
 
 p. 111(1. 
 AK'xander v. llarrlsnn, 3S ^lo. 2.1?. p. l.TOi^. 
 AloxandiT r. .Jnmosou, o liiuu. (I'a.) 2.J3. 
 
 pp. I'.m, 1937. 1".i42. 
 Ak'xan.ior r. Knox, 7 Ala. rm. p. 2fio. 
 Alexander r. Mount Stcrlinj?, 71 111. 366. p. 
 
 1247. 
 Alexander r. Oshkosh, T, Wis. 277. p. S^t. 
 Alexander r. tJoulhc\ , .i IJaru. & Aid. 247. p. 
 
 11. i6. 
 Alexander v. State. 21 Tex. App. 407. p. 1762. 
 Alexander r. Thomas, 25 lud. 268. pp.1477, 
 
 1'.164. 
 Alexandria v. Hrockett, 1 Craach C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)505. p. 35. 
 Alford i: Mneeut. ."iS Mich. .555. p. .521. 
 Alfred 1-. Fitzjame*. 3 Esp. 3. pp. 8&«, S95. 
 Alfreil i: SUHi\ 37 Miss. 2'.ii;. pp. 73, 76. 
 Alfred r. Slate, 3 Swan fTenn.), .381. )). 70. 
 Aljrer v. M.Trilt, 16 la. 121. pp. 2074,2073,2100. 
 Alper v. Thompson, 1 Allen (Mass.), 453. pp. 
 
 1943, 194*;. 
 Alpheri t: State, 25 Miss. 584. pp. 1856, 1860, 
 
 1863, 1864. 
 Alpier V. Steamer Maria, 14 Cal. 167. p. 60. 
 Alimmbra &c. Water C^o. r. Richardson, 73 
 
 Cal. f.98; s. c. 14 Tac. Uep. 379. p. 2U38. 
 Allan r. Wanamakcr, 31 N. .1. L. 370. p. 1671. 
 Allard v. Smith, 2 .Mete. (Kv.) •2!)7. p. 19(;3. 
 Allen V. Alilrlch, 29 X. H. 63. pp. 1915, 1923, 
 
 2021. 
 Allen V. Allen. ,38 Wis. 202. p. 1010. 
 Allen r. Ulunl, 2 Woodlj. & M. (U.S.) 121. 
 
 pp. 1917, 1976, 1977. 
 Allen V. IMdin.-. 6 Barb. (X. Y.) 333. p. 40.3. 
 Allen f. IJond, 112 Ind. 323; 14 X. E. Rep. 492. 
 
 p. 2093. 
 Allen 1'. Charleston Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 
 
 Grav (Mass.), 384. p. 974. 
 Alleni'. fowan, 28 I'.arh. (X. Y.) 99. p. 1441. 
 Allen f. Davidson, 16 Ind. 416. p. 20.30. 
 Allen V. Ferguson, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 13. pp. 
 
 »«, 2010. 
 Allen f. Gali)ln, 9 Rarb. (N. Y.) 246. p. 830. 
 Allen V. Gillum, 16 Ind. 234. p. 2101. 
 Allen V. Grav, II Conn. 93. p. 160. 
 Allen v.Grlpper, 2Cromii. & J.218. p. 1020. 
 Allen r. Ilancock, 16 VI. iiO. p. 1224. 
 Allen V. FIUI, 16 Cal. Hi. p. 2086. 
 Allen V. St.ite, 73 Ala. 23. p. 2129. 
 Allen r. Slate, 31 (Ja. 2iU. p. 4. 
 Allen V. Slate, 61 (;a. W,. p. 1974. 
 Allen V. Stale, .34 In>l. 461. |ip. 5, G. 
 Allen V. Slat--, 1 T.x. App. 314. p. 1.360. 
 Allen r. stall-, 16 Tex. App. 237. p. KW. 
 Allen V. Wlllard,37 I'a. St. 374. p. 1225. 
 All-m r. Woodson. .30 Ga. .33 p. 16.3:!. 
 Allen, Matter of, 13 Ulatchf. (U. S.j 271. p. 
 
 171. 
 Allender r. Chicago &c. U. Co., 37 Iowa, 264. 
 
 pp. 1207, 1294. 
 
 Allcwny r. Rowdcn, 2 Show. 422. pp. 96. 112. 
 Allis r. Leonard. 38 N. Y. 288. i>p. 1643, 1740. 
 .Mlison t'. Com., \0 I'a. .St. 17. pp. 73, 78. 
 Allison V. Stale, 43 HI. 37. p. r-'lii. 
 Allvn V. l!<)>t(tn .Se. 11. Co., 103 Mass. 77. 
 
 i>p. 1224, 12 .0. 
 Al-op r. .Matrlll, 4 Dav ^Conn.V 42. p. 1750. 
 Alspaugh V. 15en Franklin, The, 51 lud. 271. 
 
 p. 2108. 
 Alston I'. Manning. Chase's Dec. 460. p. 14. 
 Altman v. Wlueier. 18 .Mich. 240. p. 1741. 
 Al\ ord V. Collins, 20 Pick. 418. p. 362. 
 Ambrose V. McDonald, 53 Cnl. 28. pp. 191, 
 
 192. 
 Amlis r. mil, 13 Mo. App. .385. pp. lill. 1112. 
 American r. IMmperi. 73 III. 228. p. 1646. 
 American Co. f. Bradford, 27 Cal. 360. p. 
 
 2030. 
 American Contract Corp. r. Cross, S Bush 
 
 (Kv.),472. p. 11,34. 
 American i:.\. Co. v. Parsons, 44 111,312. p. 
 
 p;7o. 
 American Exchange Hank c. Inloes, 7 Md. 
 
 380. in). 827. 1410, 1436. 
 American Express Co. r. Milk, 73 111. 226, 
 
 p. 1370. 
 Amerlc:'.n Express Co. r. Sands, .35 Pa. St. 
 
 1411. pp. I:;.'.', j:U3, 1314, 1313, 1361. 
 American lus. Co. v. liutler, 70 Ind. 1. p. 
 
 1647. 
 American Ins. Co. v. Canter. 1 Pet. 511, p. 14. 
 American lus. Co. f. Mahone, 56 -Miss. 180. 
 
 pp. 11.8.3. 
 Amerii-au Ins. Co. v. Smith, 19 Mo. App. 627. 
 
 p. 971. 
 American Life Ins. Co. r. Uoscnagle, 77 Pa. 
 
 St. .307. p. i;j2. 
 American Traus. Co. r. Moore, 5 Mich. 3G8. 
 
 p. 1669. 
 Ames r. (iilmore, .39 Mo. .349. p. 1447, 
 Amcv J". Long. 9 East, 473; a. c. 6 Esp. 116; 1 
 
 Camp. 16. )ip. 180,273,278,331. 
 Amherst r. Hadley, 1 Pick. (.Mass.) 38. pp. 
 
 110, 11'.), 122. 
 Amick V. U'llarc, C Blackf, (Ind.) 258. p. 
 
 P!70. 
 Amidon r. (iaff. 24 Ind. 128. p. 2036. 
 .Vmis r. Steamlii)atLoulsa,9Mo. 629. p.lUl. 
 Ammarat i: Turnpike, 13 Serg. & R. '>Pa.) 
 
 210. p. 1087. 
 Ammermaii c. Crosbv, 26Tnd. 4.31. p. 1197. 
 Ammerman r. Teeter. 4'.t 111. 402. p. 1768. 
 Amory r. Fellows, 3 Mass. 21.». pp. 328. 3.^1. 
 Amos r. Hughes, 1 Mood. & U. 464. jip. 218, 
 
 219. 224. 
 Amsbv i: Dlckhonse. 4 Cal. 102. p. 1982. 
 Anarchists. Case of the. 122 III. 1 ; s. c. 12 N. 
 
 East. Hep. 865. pp. 63. 124. 130. 
 Ancell i: t^ape Glr.irdeau. 48 .Mo. SO. p. 20,3,5. 
 Anchor Line v. Daier, 68 lU. 369. pp. 1332, 
 
 13i;-l. 
 Anderson v. Bock, 13 How. (U. S.) 323. p. 
 
 10-17. 
 Anderson c. Chicago Marine & Fire Inx. Co., 
 
 21 111.602. p. lOi).'). 
 An<ler«on v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 204. p. 
 
 P.O. 
 
 Andi-rson r. Green, 46Ga.361. pp. 1084, 1998. 
 Ander-on v. Il.all. ^7 N. C. 381. p. 1H3. 
 An.ler^ion v. Hubble, 93 Ind. 570. pp. 2036, 
 
 2043. 
 AndiTson c. Keller. 67 Ga. .38. pp. 1171. 1176. 
 Ander-on f. Kln>;heloe, 30 .Mo. 520. pp. 1642, 
 
 An<ler8on v. McPlkc, 86 Mo. 293. pp. 794, 
 
 1116. 
 
 Anderson t'. Morris. 12 Wis. 6S9. p. 1060. 
 An. lemon v. Uoiuc .^tc. U. Co., .34 X. Y. 334. 
 p. 577.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXIX 
 
 Anderson v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 
 
 7 Kust, :iS. p. 9V)5. 
 Audersou v. Kussell, 34 Mich. 109. pp. 462, 
 
 775. 
 Anderson v. State, 5 Ark. 4U. ji)>. 20, HO. 
 Anderson r. State, 14 Ga. 70'J. i'i>. Oil, G7, 113, 
 
 123, 124, 1634. 
 Anderson v. ."^tate, 42 Ga. 9. p. I.'n9. 
 Anderson v. State, 63 Ga. 675. j). 68. 
 Anderson v. Stale, 28 Ind. 22. pp. 1902, 1905. 
 Ander.son v. Stale, 104 Ind. 467. pp. 1564, 1776, 
 
 1S02, 1803, ]'.M)(). 
 Anderson r. State, 15 Tex. App. 447. p. 16S0. 
 Anderson v. State, 20 Tex. App. 312. \). 1777. 
 Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113. p. 376. 
 Anderson v. Wasatch &c. K. Co., 2 Utah, 51S. 
 
 p. 81. 
 Anderson v. AVhite, 27 111. 57. p. 201. 
 Anderson liridge Co. v. Applegate, 13 Ind. 
 
 39;^. p. 607. 
 Andrea v. Thatcher, 24 Wis. 471. p. 1734. 
 Andreas v. Ketcliani, 77 111. 377. p. 1647. 
 Andrews v. Andrews, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 109 ; s. c. Coleman's Cases (X. Y.), 119. p. 
 
 170. 
 Andrews v. Durant, IS X. Y. 496. p. 1494. 
 Andrews v. Fo.ster, 17 \t. 556. pp. 888. 894. 
 Andrews v. Fr\ e, 104 Mass. 234. pp. 287, 527. 
 Andrews v. Graves, 1 Dillon C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 108. pp. 807, 1756. 
 Andrews v. ICeteham, 77 111. 377. p. 1652. 
 Andrews v. Marshall, 26 Tex. 212. p. 1672. 
 Andrews v. Mile.<, 15 Week. Dig. 290. ]>. 1559. 
 Andrews v. I'arker, 48 Tex. 94. p. 1641. 
 Andrews v. I'ond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 77. pp. SS4, 
 
 886, 950. 
 Andrews r. Runyau, 65 Cal. 629. pp. 1640, 1691. 
 Andrews v. Siiiitliwiek, 20 Tex. 111. p. 1668. 
 Andrews v. Tinsley, I'J Ga. 303. )>. 1942. 
 Andrews v. Towiiseud, 14 Week. Ditr. (X. 
 
 Y.)243. p. 598. 
 Andrews, In re, 5 C. B. 226. pp. 132, 152. 
 Angell V. Rosenburg, 12 Mich. 241. p. 336. 
 Angelo V. I'eople, 96 111. 209. p. 789. 
 Annelly v. Sansure, 12 S. C. 48S. p. 192. 
 Annesley v. Aug.'esea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1348. 
 
 p. 467. 
 Annis v. Pcoi)lc, 13 Mich. 511. pp. 540, 542, 
 
 543. 
 Anon., Anderson, 272. p. 112. 
 Anon. ,.35 Ala. 226. ]<]<. 646. 649, 650. 
 Anon., 1 Browne (Penn.), 121. p. 32. 
 Anon., 1 Browne (Penn.), 200. p. 20. 
 Anon., 2 Dall. (U. S.^ 382. p. 25. 
 Anon., Dean & .S, 33.3. pp. 646, 643. 
 Anon., Dver, 177. h. pi. (34). p. 3). 
 Anon., 1 bver, 37. b. pi. 45. p. 1931. 
 Anon., 2 Dver, 176. a. pi. (27). p. 59. 
 Anon., 3 Dver, 300. b. (35). p. 29. 
 Anon., 1 Hill (S. C.),251. p. 259. 
 Anon., 2 Hill (X. Y.),375. p. 2080. 
 Anon., 1 Jotins. (X. Y.) 314. p. 7. 
 Anon., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 196. p. 19. 
 Anon., I Salk. 152. p)). 97, 101, 102. 
 Anon., 2 Freem. (Miss.) 107. p. 918. 
 Anon. (2 cases), 2 Salk. 66.5. pp. 667, 1330. 
 Anon. r. Anon., 23 Beav. 273 : s. c. 22 Beav. 
 
 481. p. 319. 
 Ansehicks v. State, 6 Tex. App. 524. pp. 1564. 
 
 1990, 1995. 
 Aii.sou r. Ballev, Bnl. X. P. 276. p.94S. 
 An.sou V. Dwight, 18 la. 241. p. 62. 
 Anson v. Ins. Co., 23 la. ■>^4. p. 977. 
 Anthony c. J5arlliluw, 69 .Mo. 186. yy. 1708. 
 Anthony r. Gilbert, 4 Blackf. (lud.) 349. p. 
 
 1479. * 
 
 Anthony r. Smith, 4 Bosw. (X. Y.) ,503. pp. 
 
 516, I'..(i6. 
 Anthony v. Stinson, 4 Kan. 221. p. 1780. 
 
 Antisdel v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 26 Wis. 145. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 Apperson r. Logwood, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 262. p . 70. 
 Applebv r. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 45 
 
 Barb. (X. Y.) 4.54. p. 98.i. 
 Applegate r. Bovles, 10 Ind. 4^5. p. 108. 
 Apideton r. Xantucket, 121 Mass. 161. p. 
 
 1379. 
 Apthorp f. Comstock, 2 Paige (X. Y.),482. 
 
 p. 351. 
 
 Arbuckle v. Biedcrnian, 94 Ind. 169. p. 2090. 
 Lrchiljal " 
 p. 1473. 
 
 Archil>ald v. Davis, 4 Jones L. (X. 
 
 SS 
 
 133. 
 
 Archibald v. Thomas, 3 Cow. (X. Y.) 289. p. 
 
 886. 
 Arding v. Flower, 8 Term R. 534. p. 188. 
 Argent v. Darrell, 2 Salk. 648. p. 60. 
 Argotsinger v. Vines, 85 X. Y. 308. p. 1044. 
 Armistead's Case, 11 Leigh (Va.), 657. pp. 
 
 67, 69, 70, 74, 75. 
 Armleder v. Lieberman, 33 Oh. St. 77. pp. 
 
 1906, 1912, 1913. 
 Armour?;. Ilahu, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 433. 
 
 p. 1239. 
 Armsbv v. People, 2 Thomp. cS: C. (X. Y.) 157. 
 
 p. 47. 
 Arud V. Amiinff, 53 Md. 192. p. 26i. 
 Arnold v. Arnold, 20 Iowa, 273. ;>. 106. 
 Arnold v. Com., 80 Ky. 300: s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 
 
 480. p. 13;j. 
 Arnold v. Xorton, 25 Conn. 92. p. 1096. 
 Arnold v. Skaggs, 35 Cal. 684. pn. 2095, 2098. 
 Arnold v. State, 23 Ind. 170. p. 1827. 
 Arnold v. A\'altz, 53 la. 706; s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 
 
 248. p. 817. 
 Arrington v. Cherrv, 10 Ga. 434. pp. 1748, 
 
 1760. 
 Arrowsmith v. Durell, 14 La. Ann. 849. p. 
 
 1042. 
 Arthur i: Commissioners, 67 Ga. 221. p. 237. 
 Arthur v. Wallace, 8 Kan. 270. ]>p. 1451, 2041. 
 Artope V. Goodall, 53 Ga. 318. pp. 477, 481. 
 Artz V. Chicago Ac. R. Co., 34 la. 153. p. 1300. 
 Artz t-. Chicago &c. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 284. p. 
 
 575. 
 Arundel! v. Phillips, 10 Yes. 145. p. 1442. 
 Asay r. Hay, 89 Pa. St. 77. pp. 310, 312. 
 Asbury Ins. Co. r. ^^■arren, 66 Me. 523. p. 64. 
 Ash r. Marlow, 20 Oh. 119. pp. 1163, 1170, 1181, 
 
 1186. 
 Ash V. Savage, 5 X. H. 545. p. 1442. 
 Ash V. Stale, 56 Ga. 583. p. 123. 
 Ashbury r. Flesher, II Mo. 6iii. p. 899. 
 Ashby r. Bales, 15 Mees. & W. 589. pp. 214, 
 
 222 224. 
 Ashing V. Miles, 16 Ind. 320. pp. 215, 224. 
 Ashlock r. State, 16 Tex. App. 14. p. 178S. 
 Ashtou 1-. Thompson, 28 Minn. 330. p. 2070. 
 Ashworthr. Ins. Co.. 112 :\Iass. 422. p. 981. 
 Ashwcrth v. Kittridge, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 193. 
 
 pp. 783, 784. 
 Ash worth r. State, 19 Tex. App. 182. p. 1695. 
 Askew c. Reynolds, 1 Dev. & Bat. (X.C.) 367. 
 
 ji. 1441. 
 Aspiuwall V. Knox Countr, IS Ind. 372. p. 
 2111. ■ ^ 
 
 Astley V. Cn.pron, S9 Ind. 167. p. 2043. 
 Astley I-. Youugc, 2 Burr. S07. p. 795. 
 Atchcson V. Kveritt, Cowp. 389. p. 3,30. 
 Atcliisou V. McCuUoch, 5 Watts (Pa.). 13. 
 
 p. 1063. 
 
 Atchison v. Morris, 11 Fed. Rep. 5S2. p. 183. 
 
 Atchison v. State, 77 Teuu. (13 Lea) 275. p. 
 
 1631. ^ 
 
 Atchison &c. R. Co. r. Blackshirc. 10 Kan. 
 
 477. pp. 373, 374, 375, 376, 397, 1502, 
 Atciiison &c. R. Co. v. Cone, 37 Kan. 567; s. c. 
 15 I'ac. Rep. 499. p. 2032.
 
 XXX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 AtchUon itc. II. Co. r. Frauklin. 2:! Knn. 7."). 
 
 p. f*-.'. 
 Atchl-jon &c. R. Co. f. Pluukctt, 25 Kan. is^. 
 
 J., io.n. 
 Atfhison Ac. K. Co. r. St.infoni, 12 Kan. 351. 
 
 p|). 5«s, 1221, 1311. 
 Atchison \c. R. Co. r. Thul, 20 Kan. 4t'^. p. 
 
 C&l. 
 Atfliison t^o. Ti. Co. r. Thul. .T2 Kan. 25.') ; «. c. 
 
 40 .\in. Hip. 4!>1. p. 1779. 
 Atchl.-on iVc. R. Co. v. Wagner, 19 Kan. 335. 
 
 p. 2110. 
 Atchison &c. R. Co. r. Washburn, 5 Neb. 1 17. 
 
 p. 134S. 
 AtluTioii r. John.eon, 2 X. H. 31. p. 1044. 
 Athcrioii f. Sugar Creek &c. Co., 67 lud. 334. 
 
 p. 1621. 
 At kins r. Barnwell, 2 East, 505. pp. 897, SOS, 
 
 eoit. 
 
 Atkins V. Nicholson, 31 Mo. 4.SS. p. 1670. 
 
 Atkins r. State, 60 Ala. 45. p. 69. 
 
 Atkins V. State, 16 Ark. 66S. pp. 65, 350, 1944, 
 
 105;:. 
 Atkinson r. Allen. 12 Vt. G19. p. f.O. 
 Atkinson r. Lester, 2 111. 4U7. p. It^iO. 
 Atlanta r. Perdue, 53 Ga. <iOS. )>. J240. 
 Atlanlic&c. U.Co. i'. Avres,53Ga. 12. p. 1229. 
 Atlantic &c. R. Co. v. "Dunn, 10 Oil. St. 162. 
 
 I). 14ti6. 
 Atlas Miniup: Co. v. Johnson, 23 Mich. 36. 
 
 pp. 40, SI, 82. 
 Atlec r. Shaw, 4 Ycates (Pa.), 230. p. 25. 
 Atty.-Geu. v. Fadtion, 1 Price, 4U3. p. r,52. 
 Atty.-Gen. v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91. i)p. 4U, 
 
 416. 
 Attv.-Gen. r. TTitchrock, 11 Jnr. 47S. p. 390. 
 Alt V. -Gcii. r. Lo Merchant, 2 T. R. 203u. p. 
 
 612. 
 Atty.-Gen. v. Parsons. 2 Mccs. AW- 23. p. 25. 
 Attv.-Geu. V. Plate Glass Co., 1 Austr. 30. p. 
 
 7S3. 
 Atwater v. Schenck. 9 AVls. 160. p. 1072. 
 Atwell V. ^liller, t! Md. 11. p. 013. 
 Atwooil V. ( lark, 2 Me. 240. p. 1122. 
 AtwoocI V. ( Knnvall, 2S Mich. :«0. p. 1133. 
 Atwood V. Dearborn, 1 ^VUeu (Mass.;, 4S3. p. 
 
 471. 
 Atwood V. Emery, 1 Com. Bench (N. s.) 110. 
 
 p. 1122. 
 Atwood V. Reliance Tr.insportatlon Co., 9 
 
 Watts (Pa.),l>7. p. 1346. 
 Atwood r. Scott, tX) Ma?s. 177. p. 16S. 
 Atwood c. Small, 1 ."Man. .t Kvl. 246. p. 1584. 
 Atwood I-. Weenis, W U. S. 183. p. 101. 
 Auidfiirainp v. Sinitli, 00 Iml. 328. p. 570. 
 Aii^ur Steel &c. Co. v. Whlttler, 117 Mass. 
 
 451. p. 01 18. 
 Aul<l V. Hepburn, 1 Crauch C. C. 122. p. 215, 
 
 222. 
 Auir'savlnps Hank r. Anil. 80 Mo. 199. p. .551. 
 Ault v. Sloan, 4 la. .10^. p. 169S. 
 Auitman v. Theirer. 31 Iowa, 272. p. 931. 
 Aurora v. Bltucr, 100 Ind. 306. pp. 1208, 1271, 
 
 1272. 
 Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 49-2. pp. 215, 219, 220, 
 
 222,385,451. 
 Aurora i-. (.illott, .'iO 111. 134. p. 1207. 
 Aurora v. Ililliiiiin, '.mi HI 62. ji. 310. 
 Aurora Br.nicli K. Co. v. Grimes, 13 111. .5S5. 
 
 |.I>. 1224, 1314. 
 Aurora Fire Iiis. Co. r. Johnson, 40 Ind. 315. 
 
 pp. 210S, 2123. 
 Austen v. Baker, 12 Mod 2.10. p. 3020. 
 Au-tin r. Au-Iln. 45 W's. .V23. j). 713. 
 Austin r. fox, tio «.a. 5.'>i. p. .57. 
 Austin f. Great Western It. Co., 3 Best & S. 
 
 327. p. 120-i. 
 Austin V. Holland, 09 X. Y. .571. p. 1101. 
 Ausiiu r. Keating, 21 Mo. Ai>|i. .30. ]>. *}3. 
 
 Austin f. Manchester &c. R. Co., 10 Com. 
 
 Bench, 4.54. p. I(i0.5. 
 Austin V. Uol)ertson, 25 Minn. 431. p. 554. 
 Austin V. State, 42 Tex. a55. ji. 1010. 
 Austin V. Talk, Jo Tex. 104. pp. 1070. 20C5. 
 Aveline, E>tai.' of. 53 Cal. 250. p. 2056. 
 Avereil r. Itradv. JO (ia. 523. p. 1008. 
 Avery i-. A<lam>. t.'.i Mo. 608. ii. 611. 
 Avery i: Chaioiian, 02 I"wa, 144. p. 1429. 
 Averv v. Cleinons, 18 Conn. 306. \t. 10ti2. 
 Avery i-. State, 10 Tex. App. 199. p. 2,53. 
 Aves'on v. Kinnaird.6 East, 118. p. 407. 
 .\wde f. Dixon, (i Kxch. htSO. p. 1033. 
 Axlell i: Warden. 7 Neb. IsO. pp. -JldO. JlOl. 
 AvcrigK f. New York &c. K. Co., 30 N. J. I.. 
 
 400. p. 1.58>-.. 
 Aver I'. Austin, C Pick. (Mass.) 225. pp. 210, 
 
 221. 
 Avers r. Metcalf. 39 111. 307. p. 81. 
 xVvers f. State, 88 Ind. 27.5. p. 1777. 
 Avers v. State. 21 Tex. .\pp. SOil. |ip. 1700, 1736. 
 Avers V, Watson, 113 I'. S. .504. p. lost. 
 Avlett V. Jewell, 2 W. Bl. 1209. pp. 1064, 10C6, 
 
 1000. 
 Aviiiar V. Beers, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 705; s. c. 17 
 
 Am. Dec. 538. ji. i«0. 
 Avrault r. Chamberlain, 33 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 "220. p|). 214, 221 . 222, 247, 240, .UT. 88,5. 
 Ayrcs v. Barr, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 286. p. 5. 
 Ayres v. Hull, 5 Kans. 410. p. 003. 
 
 B. 
 
 B. V. L., L. R. 1 Prob. & DIv. 639. pii. 04fi. 050. 
 Bnbcock r. Chicago .%c. R. Co.. 72 Iowa, rj7; 
 
 s. c. 28 X. W. Kep. 044. i>. i:{12. 
 Babcock v. Eckler, 24 X. V. 623. p. 410. 
 Babcockr. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 347. pp. 
 
 100, 528. 
 Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93. pp. 1209, 
 
 1210. 
 Bacchus V. State, IS Tex. App. 15. p. lotu?, 
 B.nckus V. (tallentlnc. 70 Ind. 367. p. 2136. 
 Backus V. Tavlor, 84 Ind. 503. p. Ilii3. 
 Bacon v. Brown, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 35. p. 020. 
 Bacon v. Charlton, 7 Cush". (Mass.; 5>1. p. 
 
 407. 
 Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cash. (Mass.) 239. pp. 
 
 110:5,1190. 
 Badgelt i: Jordan, 32 Ark. 1.54. p. 2a'>5. 
 Badjrley v. Decker, 44 Barb. (X. Y.; 577. p. 
 
 1401. 
 Badlainr. Tucker, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 389. p. 1442. 
 Baehler i'. Consolidated Ranch Co. ,31 Kan. 
 
 502. p. 20 K'. 
 B.'igby i: Kniberson, 79 Mo. 139. p. 2055. 
 H!ig;r r. Jerouie, 7 Mich. 145. j). 14:'.s. 
 Hagiev V. Ludlow, 41 \ l. 42.'.. p. 1247. 
 Baglev r. Peddle, 5 Saudi. S. C. uN- V.) 192. 
 
 ).: 871. 
 Baierr. l5crberlch,S5Mo.50; a.c. 13 Mo. App. 
 
 .587. pi>. .500. 2018. 
 Baikle i'. Cliandless, 3 Camp. 19. jip. 1242, 
 
 1214. 
 Bailey v. I'.eck. 21 Kan. 402. p. 1905. 
 Bailey c. Bodenham. 10 Com. 15. (N. s.) 288; 
 
 ». c. .53 L. .J. (C. P.) ■2.'i2. It. 044. 
 B.illev c. Dean. 5 Barb. (N. Y.)297. p. 1470. 
 iSalley r. t;ibbs, .Mo. 45. p. 808. 
 Bailey v. Hvde, 3 Ciiin. 40.'5. p. 1407. 
 Bailey f. Jov, l:!2 .Mass. 3;50. pp. 2, 3. 
 Bailey v. Kimball, 26 X. 11. 351. pp. 158G, 
 
 1003. 
 Bailey v. Laudlngham. .52 la. 41.5. p. 2093. 
 I'.allcv i: Macaul.iv, .[ i). B. 815. p. 118. 
 Hailey c. Pool, 13 4i-.m1. I,. iN.C.) 404. p. 400. 
 li.iilcv V. Porter. 14 M.-c>. .v W. 4«o. p. 045. 
 f.allev V. State, Tex. .\]i\}. 08. pp. 4bl, 482. 
 Builey V. Tavlor, 11 Conn. 531. j). IttJO.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXI 
 
 Bailey V. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 5S1. pp. 55, 11,3. 
 Baillie i". Inchiquiu, 1 Esp. 435. p. yti7. 
 Bain v. Dorau, 54 Pa. St. 1-24. p. 1698. 
 Bain v. State, 74 Ala. 38. p. lS3'.t. 
 Bainbricige v. State, 30 Oh. St. '165. p. 1910. 
 Bainbridge t: Wilcox, 1 Baldw. (U. S.) 536. 
 
 p. 1131. 
 Baird v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 55 la. 121. p. 
 
 •->036. 
 Baird v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 61 la. 359. p. 
 
 2(42. 
 Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 397. p. 
 
 265. 
 Baird v. Dalv, 68 X. Y. 547. p. 385. 
 Baird v. Mavor, 74 X. Y. 3S2. p. 2. 
 Baird v. Plauque, 1 Fost& Fin. 344. p. 1098. 
 Baird v. State, 38 Tex. 599. p. 127. 
 Balicmau v. Rose, 14 V/end. (X. Y.) 110. pp. 
 
 449, 450, 455, 456. 
 Balier v. Hrinson. 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 201. pp. 
 
 l:-!22, 1345, 1347, 1348, 1350, 1352. 
 Baljer v. Harris, 1 \Vinst. (X. C.) 277. pp. 35, 
 
 76, 125, 127. 
 Baljer v. Joseph, 16 Cal. 173. pp. 435, 460, 
 
 2094, 2095, 
 Baker v. Lvman, 53 Ga. 339. pp. 215, 239. 
 Baker v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137. pp. 741, 748, 
 
 769. 
 Baker v. Pendergast. 32 Oh. St. 494. p. 2091. 
 Baker v. Portland, 58 .Me. r.)9. pp. 1209, 1210. 
 Baker v. Robiii-ou, 49 111. 299. p. 1669. 
 Baker v. Simmons, 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 198. 
 
 p. 1917. 
 Baker v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 491. p. 1012. 
 Baker v. State, 15 Ga. 498. p. 67. 
 Baker r. State, 3 Tex. App. 52.5. pp. 89, 93. 
 Baker v. Slate, 4 Tex. App. 223. pp. 24, 118, 
 
 1904. 
 Baker r. State, 69 Wis. 32; s. c. 33 X. W. Rep. 
 
 52. pp. 247, 323, 433, 745, 749. 
 Baker r. SteamerMilwaukee, 14Ia.214. p. 32. 
 Baker v. Swan, 32 Md. 355. p. 1044. 
 Baker r. Trotter, 73 Ala. 277. p. 346. 
 Baker r. Wilford. Kirbv (Conn.), 235. p. 145. 
 Baker r. Youni;, 44 111. 44. pp. 1490, 1496. 
 Balbo r. People, 19 IIuu (X. Y.), 424; s. c. 
 
 80 X. Y. 484. pp. 63, 70, 77, 78. 
 Balch r. Patten, 45 Me. 41. p. 890. 
 Balding v. State (Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep. 579. 
 
 pp. 75, 116. 
 Baldnev v. Ritchie, 1 Stark. 333. p. 615. 
 Baldwin v. Blauchard. 15 Minn. 189. p. 1741. 
 Baldwin v. Bricker, 86 Ind. 221. p. 781. 
 Baldwin v. Gregg, 13 Mete. (.Mass.) 253. p. 
 
 793. 
 Baldwin r. Peet,22 Tex. 70S. pp. 1436, 1437, 
 
 1439. 1444. 
 Baldwin's Appeal, 44 Conn. 37. p. 729. 
 Bales V. State, 63 Ala. 30. pp. 70, 75, 99, 
 
 121. 
 Ball V. Carley, 3 Ind. 577. pp. 1945, 1954, 1955, 
 
 1974. 
 Ball r. Farley, 1 South. Rep. (Ala.) 253; «. c. 
 
 81 Ala. .288. p. 345. 
 
 Ball r. l{av, L. U. 8 Ch. 467. pp. 1394, 1395. 
 Ballance v. I'nderhill, 4 111. 453. p. 330. 
 Ballard v. Ballard, 5 Rich. I.. 495. p. 354. 
 Ballard v. Lockwood, 1 Daly (X. Y.) 153. 
 
 p. 346. 
 Ballard r. State, 43 Oh. St. 431. p. 15.50. 
 Ballentine v. State, 48 Ark. 4.5. p. 210;^. 
 Ballinger v. Elliott, 72 .V. C. 596. p. 188. 
 Ballstun Spa Bank v. Marine Bank, 18 Wis. 
 
 4ii0. p. 151. 
 Balsley v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 119 111. 68; 
 
 s. c. 8 X. Ea.«t. Kep. 859. p. 1311. 
 Baltimore v. Marriott. 9 .Md. 160. p. 1225. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. i: Barnum, 79 Ind. 261. 
 
 p. 2113. 
 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 47 Md. 32. 
 
 p. 1682. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Boyd, 10 Atl. Rep. 
 
 315; s. c. 7 Cent. Rep. 435. pp. 725, 736. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Bradv, 32 Md. 333. 
 
 p. 1364. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Christie, 5 AV. Va. 
 
 325. p. 106. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist 
 
 Church, 108 U. S. 317; s. c. 2 Sup. C. Rep. 
 
 719. p. 1399. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. w.'Fryer, 30 Md. 47. p. 
 
 V2M. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74. 
 
 p. 1485. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Lansing, 53 Ind. 229. 
 
 )>. 1501. 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 
 
 .534. )>. 1231. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. i'. McWhinnev, 36 Ind. 
 
 436. p]>. 215, 219. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh &c. R. 
 
 Co., 17 W. Va. 812. p. 56. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 447. i).673. 
 Baltimore &e. R. Co. v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88. 
 
 pp. 2009,2037, 2039. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Strickler, 51 Md. 47. 
 
 p. 1262. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Thompson, 10 Md. 
 
 76. p. 334. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Wheeling, 13 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.; 40. p. 150. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.)431. p. 1236. 
 Baltimore Ac. R. Co. v. Wilkinson, 30 Md. 
 
 224. p. 1229. 
 Baltimore &c. R. Co. r. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242. 
 
 p. 1646. 
 Bamberger i\ Griener, 18 Iowa, 477. p. 931. 
 Bamberger r. Terry, 10.> U. S. 40. pp. 2, 3. 
 Bancroft v. Boston &c. R. Co., 11 Allen 
 
 (Ma.-^s.), 34; s. c. 97 Mass. 275. p. 1235. 
 Bancroft r. Grover, 23 Wis. 463. p. 1072. 
 Bancroft c. Sheehan, 21 Huu (X. Y.), 550. 
 
 pp. 308, 310. 
 Banghart r. Flummerfelt, 43 X^. J. L. 28. 
 
 p. 201. 
 Bangs c. Snow, 1 Mass. 181. pp. 220, 221. 
 Bank i: Barry. 20 Md. 287. p. 819. 
 Bank r. Bovkin, 9 Ala. 320. p. 966. 
 Bank r. Brown, Dudley (Ga.), 69. p. 361. 
 Bank v. Eitemiller, 14 Bradw. UH-) 22. p. 
 
 1681. 
 Bank v. Evans, 51 Mo. 335. p. 1055. 
 Bank r. Klingensmith, 7 Watts (Pa.), 523. 
 
 II. 1023. 
 Banks i: Lades, 39 Mo. 406. p. 2056. 
 Bank v. Sawyer, 33 Ohio St. 339. p. 878. 
 Bank v. Slemmons, 34 Oh. St. 142. p. 403, 
 Bank c. Zorne, 14 S. C. 444. p. 364. 
 Bank of Alabama v. McDade, 4 Port. (Ala.) 
 
 252. p. 1443. 
 Bank of (.'tiarleston v. Emerich, 2 Sandf. 
 
 (X. Y.)718. p. 749. 
 Bank of Columbia r. Lawrence, 1 Pet. (U. 
 
 S.) 578. pp. 942, 'Mi. 
 Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, 14 Mo. 
 
 App. 152. p. 940. 
 Bank of Commerce v. Ginocchio, 27 Mo. 
 
 App. (!61. p. 1222. 
 Bank of Commerce v. Hoeber, 11 Mo. App. 
 
 475. p. 1(X;8. 
 Bank of Commerce, Appeal of, 44 Pa. St, 
 
 423. pp. 952, 953. 
 Bank of Genessee v. Patchin Bank, 19 X. Y. 
 
 312. p. 1022. 
 Bank of Georgetown v. Gearv, 5 Pet. {\J. S 
 
 99. p. 192.
 
 XXXll 
 
 TABLE or CASES. 
 
 Bank of Kontuckv r. Ailams Express Co., 93 
 
 I'. S. 174. i)|>. liMS, lAW. li'M. 
 Bank of .Missouri v. Merchants' Bank, 10 Mo. 
 
 l.a. i>. .')<''('. 
 Bank of Mouroo r. Culver, 2 lUll (X. Y.), 
 
 33-2. l>. tvi:. 
 Bank of N. Y. r. Bauk of Ohio, 29 X. Y. 619. 
 
 !>. 10-.'3. 
 Bank of Plttsbarsr v. Xeal, 22 How. (U. S.) 
 
 Hi. 11. '.i.'>n. 
 Bank of Tleasanl Hill v. WllL*.-l>Mo. 275. p. 
 
 5:.l. 
 Bank of U. S. r. Davis, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 5.W. I). 1022. 
 Bank of U. .»;. v. \Vagjreiier,9 Pet. (U.S.) 378. 
 
 1>1>. 8?t>. S87. 
 Bank of Ullca r. Illllard, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 419. 
 
 Bank of Utica r. Mcr?eran, 3Barb. Cli. (X. 
 
 Y.l ."v2S. 1).«'7<;. 
 Bankanl r. Baltimore &c. R. . Co., 34 Md. 
 
 Ilt7. p. 728. 
 Bank." r. .\nierican Tract Societv, 4 .Sandf. 
 
 CU. (X. Y.) 438. pp. VM, 19.5. 
 Banner Tobacco Co. r. Jeulsou, 4S Micli.4.")'j. 
 
 pp.2«31, 203S. 
 Banning v. Banning, 12 Oh. St. 167. pp. 21(!, 
 
 230. 
 Bannister r. Alderman, 111 Mass. 261. p. 32(i. 
 Baradough v. Johnson, 8 Ad. & El. 9'.t. i). 
 
 1012. 
 Bart)er r. Es«fcX. 27 Vt. 62. p. 1225. 
 Barber r. Fo.\. 2 .Saund. 136. p. 889. 
 Barber r. Murrlam, 11 .Vllcu (Mass.), 322. p. 
 
 497. 
 Barber r. State, 13 Fla. 675; s. c. 1 Greeu Cr. 
 
 L. Hep. 723. pp. 88, 540, r>ll, 1805, 18IK). 
 Barblshire v. Parker, 6 Ea.-t, 2. i>. 940. 
 Barbofs Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 12.33. p)). 68. S3. 
 Barljour v. .iVrcher, 3 Bibb (K v.) , 8. pi). 1912, 
 
 1913. 
 Barbour r. FuUertou, 36 Pa. St. lO.i. p. 938. 
 P.iirbour r. Kee, 7 Mo. App. 587. p. 737. 
 Barclav r. Bailev, 2 C'aiiii>. .")27. ]». 939. 
 Bardeii i\ Brisci'.o, 30 Mi<-h. 2.V). |ip. 718, 719. 
 Bare r. Hoffman, 79 Pa. ^t. 71. p. 697. 
 Barlield r. Imp^on.l ,Sin. & M. (Miss.) 326. 
 
 p. 108. 
 Barker r. Bell, 46 Ala. 216. p. lOOS. 
 Barker c. Bell, 49 Ala. 2>*1. p. 2.'>. 
 Barker v. Blount, 63(;a. 423. pp. 370,573. 
 Barker r. Hinc, 54 Ind. .542. p. 50. 
 Barker r. People, 3 Cow. (X. V.) 6.''6, p. 1578. 
 Barker r. Perrv, 67 la. 146. pp. 651,(^)3. 
 Barker r. Savage, 45 X. Y. 191. p. 1305. 
 Barker !•. Mate, 4.>i Ind. 163. j>. 1646. 
 Barker r. Tn.v &<■. K. Co., 27 Vt. 780. p. 892. 
 Barkiev r. Tajip. b7 Ind. 25. ]>. 2015. 
 B.'irkow r. .'ganger, 47 Wis. 500. iip. 2034, 2041. 
 Barksdiill r. Xew Orleans &c. U. Co., 33 La. 
 
 Ann. 180. pp. 1233, 12.34. 
 Barlow r. State, 2 ISlackf. (Ind.) 114. pp. 
 
 low;, 1912, 1977, 1983. I'.'M. 
 Barlow r. Steel, 6.") Mo. 611. p. 193. 
 T'.arnabv r. State, KHi Ind. .539. pp. 2042. 2143. 
 Barnard i-. HackliaU'. 52 Wis. 593. p BS2. 
 Barnes r. Barber, «i 111. 401. p. 2053. 
 P.arnes f Brown, 69 X. C. 439. p. 956. 
 Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cu.xli. f.Ma'S.)576. p. 272. 
 P.arnes r. Hedbv, 2 Taunt. 184. p. 8>9. 
 Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wlr.. 240. \\. 762. 
 Barnes r. Mavor of Mobile, 19 Ala. 707. pp. 
 
 816, 1507. 
 Barnes r. Xewton, 46 Iowa, .567. pp. 115, 1249. 
 P.arms r. Perliie, 12 X. Y. 18. p. 1739. 
 Barnes r. .State, 41 Tex. 312. p. 18."w. 
 Barn.s r. Webb, 1 Tvler (Vt.), 17. p. 1467. 
 Barnes .-. Wllllains,' 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 415. 
 
 pp. 2008, 2009. 
 
 Barnes, Ex parte, 1 Sprague (U. S.), 133. p. 
 
 178. 
 Barnett r. Allen. 3 Hurl. & X. 376. p. 1507. 
 Barnett r. Eaton, (i2 .Mis> 768. p. 1917. 
 Barnett r. Kearv. Kd Ind. 9.5. p. 2043. 
 iSarnett r. rotate, liiolnd. 171. p. 1709. 
 Barnewall r. Cliurch, 1 Calues (X. Y.),217. 
 
 p. 993. 
 Baiuev «•. Grinin.2 X. Y. 365. pp. 1439, 1444. 
 Barney t: People. 22 111. 160. p. 107. 
 Baron's r. Anderson, 37 Kan. 399; 15 Pnc. 
 
 Hep. 226. p. 20S4. 
 Barough r. wliitc, 4 Barn. & Cres. 325. p. 
 
 9:58. 
 Barr r. Armstronir, 56 Mo. 577. pp. 1647, 1668. 
 Barr c. Stale, 10 i e\. App. Ml. p. 18.55. 
 Barrara c. State, 42 Tex. 392. j). 1778. 
 Barreda r. Silsbee, 21 How. (L . S.) 147. p. 
 
 8.50. 
 Barrett v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 9 Mo. 
 
 App. 226. p. 1(117 
 Barrett v. Keniii, 7 I'ing. 332. p. 297. 
 Barrett r. Loun, 8 Irish L. 331 ; 8. c. 1 Irish L. 
 
 439. p. 95. 
 Barrett r. Pritchard, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 612. p. 
 
 909. 
 Barrett v. St. .Tnsci>h. 53 Mo 290. p. 1243. 
 Barrett v. State, 1 Wl>. 17.5. p. 1904. 
 Barretto j. Boughtou, 5 Wend. (X. Y.) 181. 
 
 p. 88<'). 
 Barrlck v. Austin, 21 Barb. (X. Y.) 241. p. 
 
 1023. 
 Barren r. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 243. p. 1578. 
 Barrow f. Paxton, 5 Johns. (X. Y.)258. p. 
 
 1443. 
 Barrow r. Roliichaux, 15 La. Ann. 70. p. 1588. 
 Barrows r. Keene, 15 R. I. 484; 8. c. 8 Atl. 
 
 Hei). 713. p. 2101. 
 Barry r. Citv of Lowell, 8 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 127. p. 1266. 
 Barrv i: Ilolfmau, 6 Md. 79. p. 875. 
 Barry c. (HI<j, .56 Mo. 117. pp. 1055, 1077, 1078. 
 BjirrVmore r. Tavlor. 1 F^sj). 326. ji. 6:V.t. 
 Itarstow /•. Berlin, 31 Wis. ;5.57. pp. 120'.i, 1247. 
 Barstow r. Marsh, 4Cirav (Mass.), 165. pp. 
 
 2136, 2141. 
 P.arstow r. Spracue, 40X. H. 27. pp. 2021,2027. 
 Bartel i: Tleman. 55 In.i. 438. p. 2114. 
 Bartelott / . International Bank, 119 111. 259. 
 
 pp. 1214, lfi21, 162.5. 
 Bartliet r. E^lebene, 5 La. Ann. 315. p. 2.5. 
 Bartlioiomew r. J;icksou, 20 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 28. p)i. 88;l, 898. 
 Bartholcnnew r. Langsdale, 85 Ind. 278. p. 
 
 2090. 
 Bartiiolonicw v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 25 la. 
 
 518. p. 1670. 
 Bartlett r. Uoyt, 33 X. H. 151. pp. 292,358, 
 
 5611. 
 Bartlett r. Pittsburgh Ac. R. Co., 94 Ind. 281. 
 
 p. 2039. 
 Bartlett r. Smith, 11 Mccs. & W. 483. jip. 289, 
 
 290, 293,295. 1739. 
 Bartlett t: State. 28 Ohio St. 669. ji. 108. 
 Bartlett i: Tarbeil, 12 Allen (Mass.), 123. 
 
 p. &54. 
 Bartlev v. Phillips, 13 West. Rep. 792. p. 2062. 
 Bartlev r. Williams. 6»! Pa. St. 329. p. 1681. 
 Bartlliig i: Belirends, 20 Xeb. 211. p. 17.56. 
 Bartiingr. I'.ehrends (Xeb.), 29 X. W. Hop. 
 
 472. p. 16sl. 
 Barlling f. Jamison, 44 Mo. 141. pp. 2047, 
 
 2060. 
 Barton r. P'.rickson, 14 Xeb. 164. p. .57. 
 Barton v. Hohuee. 16 la. 2.52. pp. 1961, 1968, 
 
 1993. 
 Barton r. Murrain. 27 Mo. 22.5. p. fill. 
 Barton r. Quiuu, Battv (Irish Hep.), 552. p. 
 112.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXlll 
 
 Barton v. Springfield, 110 Mass. 131. p. 1209. 
 Barton r. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 52 Mo. 253. pp. 
 
 1207, 1212, 1236, 1296. 
 Bartow r. Murrv, 2 NT. J. L. 97. p. 19. 
 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 
 
 2 Excll. 259. p. 1022. 
 Basking v. Shannon, 3 X. Y. 310. p. 1440. 
 Bas.sr. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 Wis. 450. p. 
 
 1283. 
 Bass V. Elliott, 105 Ind. 517. p. 2051. 
 Bass V. Irwin, 49 Ga. 436. p. 1997. 
 Bass V. State, 6 Baxter (Tenn.), 579. p. 128. 
 Bass V. State, 16 Tex. App. 62. p. 1564. 
 Bas.s c. AValsli, 39 Mo. 192. pp. 9(i7, 913, 920. 
 Bas(*ett V. Glover, No. 3895, St. Louis Ct. of 
 
 App. p. 869. 
 Bassett v. Salisbury Man. Co., 28 N. H. 438. 
 
 p. 1915. 
 Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. p. 1280. 
 Bassham r. State, 3S Tex. 622. p. 391. 
 Bast r. Alford, 20 Tex. 226. p. 1702. 
 Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412, p. 1.37. 
 Batdorff v. Farmers' Bank, 61 1'a. St. 179. pp. 
 
 396, 398, 443, 560. 
 Bate V. Lewis, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 316. p. 
 
 108. 
 Bate Ref. Co. v. Gillett, 24 Fed. Rep. 697. p. 
 
 167. 
 Batemani-. Phillips, 4 Taunt. 157. pp. 275, 
 
 589. 
 Bateman v. Ruth, 3 Daly (N. Y.), 378. p. 
 
 1209. 
 Bates V. Bates, 19 Tex. 124. p. 84. 
 Bates V. Couklin, 10 Wend. (X. Y.) 389. p. 
 
 914. 
 Bates V. Dehaven, 10 Ind. 319 p. 838. 
 Bates r. Gage, 49 Cal. 126. p. 2084. 
 Bates r. Holladv, No. 3864, St. Louis Court 
 
 of Appeals, M"S. p. 399. 
 Bates v. State, 19 Tex. 122. pp. 17, 22. 
 Bates r. Todd, 1 Mood. & R. 106. p. 1367. 
 Bateson v. Clark, 37 Mo. 31. p. 2107. 
 Batman v. Megowau, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 548. p. 
 
 2U8'). 
 Batre r. State, 11 Ala. 119. pp. ^lOS, 1517. 
 Batten r. State, 80 Ind. 395. p. 551. 
 ISattersbv v. Aljbott, 9 Cal. 565. p. 1637. 
 Batterf^oii v. State,63Ind.531. pp. 1950, 1964. 
 Battin r. Taggert, 17 How. (U. S.) 74. p. 1075. 
 Battishill V. Humphrey (Mich.), 31 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 894. p. 250. 
 Batturs i\ Sellers, 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 117. p. 
 
 925. 
 Bander v. Tvrrel, 59 Cal. 99. p. 2085. 
 Baum V. Fryrear, 85 Mo. 151. p. 1598. 
 Baum V- Stephens, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 411. p. 
 
 926. 
 Baumeier v. Autlau (Mich.), 31 N. W. Rep. 
 
 88,S. p. 379. 
 Ilaumgardner v. Buruham, 93 Pa. St. 88. p. 
 
 868. 
 Hawser v. Lane, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 311. p. 1291. 
 Baxter v. Nurse, Man. & G. 939. p. 1137. 
 Baxter r. People, 8 111. 368. pp. 1706, 1976, 
 
 l'.i88, 1997, 
 Baxter v. Putney, 37 IIow. Pr. (N. Y.) 140. 
 
 p. 4. 
 Baxter r. Second Avenue R. Co., 3 Robt. 
 
 (N. Y.) 510. ))p. 1209, 1223. 
 Bay r. Sullivan, 30 Mo. 191. p. 1708. 
 Bayard v. Holtniau, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 450. 
 
 p". 1445. 
 Bavless v. Davis, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 206. p. 1755. 
 Kayley v. Buckland, 1 Excli. 1. p. 193. 
 Baylis r. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 920. p. 1454. 
 Havlis V. Lucas, Cow]). 112. p. 29. 
 Baylis V. Stout, 49 Mich. 215. p. 174L 
 l!a"vna;d r. Eddiugs, 2 Strobh. Law (N. C), 
 374. p. 1078. 
 
 Bavoajon v. Criswell, 5 Martin (N. s.) (La.), 
 
 232. p. 25. 
 Bays V. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 252. pp. 317, 1468. 
 Baysinger v. Peo]jle, 115 111. 420. i). 772. 
 Beach v. Covillaud. 2 Cal. 237. p. 328. 
 Beach v. Frankenberger, 4 W. Va. 718. p. 
 
 1313. 
 Beach v. Vandenburg, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 361. 
 
 p. 898. 
 Beal V. Finch, II X. Y. 128. pp. 552, 553. 
 Beal V. Niciiole, 2 Gray (Mass.), 262. pp. 383, 
 
 387 391 394 
 Beal'r. Stone, 22 la. 447. pp. 2088, 2089, 2090. 
 Beale r. Newton, 1 Cranch C. C. 405. p. 215. 
 Beall r. Campbell, 1 How. (Miss.) 24. p. 128. 
 Beall V. Mann, 5 Ga. 456. p. 1748. 
 Beals v. Beals, 20 Ind. 163. p. 2071. 
 Beals V. Guernsey, 6 Johns. (X. Y.) 446. p. 
 
 1442. 
 Bean r. State, 17 Tex. App. 60. p. 1779. 
 Bear River &c. R. Co. r. Boles, 24 Cal. 351. p. 
 
 2086. 
 Beardslee i\ Richardson, 11 Wend. (X. Y.) 
 
 25. 1). 1321. 
 Beardsley v. Littell, 14 Blatchf. (U.S.) 102. 
 
 p. 592. 
 Beardsley v. Wildman, 41 Conn. 515. pp. 428, 
 
 440. 
 Bearse v. Ropes, 1 Sprague (U. S.), 331. pp. 
 
 1322, 1346, 1356. 
 Beasley v. Evans, 35 Miss. 192. p. 964. 
 Beasley r. State, 71 Ala. 328. p. .541. 
 Beason r. Southard, 10 N. Y. 236. p. 1173. 
 Beatie v. Butler, 21 Mo. 313. p. 1092. 
 Beatson v. Skene 5 Hurl. & N. 838. p. 1461. 
 Beattie r. Hill, 60 Mo. 72. p. 1641. 
 Beattv V. Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463. p. 1225. 
 Beatty v. Hatcher, 13 Oh. St. 115. p. 236. 
 Beatty I'. Lycoming County Ins. Co., 52 Pa. 
 
 St. 456. p. 986. 
 Beatty v. Mason, 30 Md. 409. p. 1045. 
 Beaubien v. Cicott, 12 Mich. 459. j). 356. 
 Beauchamp v. Saginaw M. Co., 50 Mich. 163. 
 
 p. 2051. 
 Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299. 
 
 pp. 89,91,489, 1571,1890. 
 Beaulieu v. Parsons, 2 Minn. 37. pp. 177, 
 
 313. 
 Beaulieu v. Portland Co.. 48 Me. 291. pp. 
 
 1216, 1602, 1604. 
 Beaurain v. Scott, 3 Camp. 388. p. 160. 
 Beaver i: Taylor, 1 WaU. (U. S.) 637. pp. 
 
 1671, 1755. 
 Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 531. p. 1860. 
 Beazan v. Mason Citv, 58 Iowa, 234. p. 1268. 
 Beazley r. Reid, 68 Ga. 386. p. 1454. 
 Bebee f. People, 5 Hill(X. Y.), 32. pp.1902, 
 
 1905. 
 Beck V. Bellamy, 93 X. C. 129. p. 192. 
 Beck V. Cole, 16 Wis. 95. p. 585. 
 Heck V. Ferrara, 19 Mo. 30. p. 1609. 
 Beck i\ Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180. p. 908. 
 15eck r. State, 20 Ohio St. 223. pp. 119, 120. 
 Beckdolt V. Grand Rapids &c. R. Co.,15X. 
 
 E. Rep. 686. pp. 2036, 2038. 
 Becker r. Hecker, 9 Ind. 497. p. 868. 
 Beckman v. Richardson, 28 Kan. 648. p. 
 
 2067. 
 Beckman i-. Shousc, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 179. pp. 
 
 11.55, 1321, 1345. 
 Beckwilh v. Beckwith, 22 Oh. St. 180. p. 
 
 109(1. 
 Beckwith v. Philby, 6 Barn. & Cres. 635. p. 
 
 1175 
 Beckwith v. AYindsor Manf. Co., 14 Conn. 
 
 594. p. 886. 
 Bedard r. Bouville, 57 Wis. 270. p. S39. 
 Hedell r. farll, 33 N. Y. .581. p. 308. 
 Bedell i: Russell, Ry. & M. 293. p. 21T. 
 
 3a
 
 XXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Bedford r. Flowers, 11 llnniph. (Tonn.) 
 
 Boiirord r. Kallmad Co., 46 Mo. 4S7. p. 1311. 
 BedfonI \f. K. ('i>. v. Kaliibolt. IfJ Ind. Sol. 
 
 pp. l-.'(>4, l-.'SC, 2(141. 
 Bi'illtiKlU-l.l r. Aslili'V.Crow. Ellz.741. p. 886. 
 Bi'doe r. .\lpi'. W. Join's, U*;. p. lltl»7. 
 Bedwell t: Bodwull, 77 Ala. 587. pp. 1740, 
 
 21-2;t. 
 Beehe r. Bull, 12 Wend. .')04. p. 565. 
 Beebei-s, Kx parte. 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 127. 
 
 pp. Iti6, Kill. 
 Becrh r. Curie, LI Mo. 105. p. 1613. 
 Beeclier v. Derby Bridge Co., 24 Couii. 491. 
 
 p. 1246. 
 Beedv r. Macombcr, 47 Me 451. p. 1010. 
 Beekiiiau r. Wright, 11 Johns. (N. \.) 442. 
 
 p. l'.H)2. 
 Beeniun r. Buck, 3 Vt. .53- V- W7. 
 Beenis r. t'hleago &c. R. Co., 56 la. 150. pp. 
 
 2054,2076. 
 Beeuis r. Chicago &c. H. Co., 67 Iowa, 440. 
 
 p. 1261. 
 Beer v. Ward, Jacob, 77. p. 277. 
 Beers r. Beer.*, 4 Conn. .53.5. p. 43. 
 Beers r. Hoiisatonic H. Co., ID Conu. 566. 
 
 pp. 1208, 1212. ]^.>4, 1227. 1255. 
 Beerv v. United .''States, 2 Colo. 186. p. 14. 
 Beesi'ton r. Collver, 4 Hlng. IWX p. 1137. 
 Bepg r. Hegg, .'i6 Wis. 5:U. )>. 1072. 
 Behvmer c. State, tt.i Ind. 140. p. lC.f)8. 
 Belalr t. Chicago &c. 11. Co., 43 la. 674. p. 1262. 
 Belch I-. Uallroad Co., is Mo. .Kj.p.SO. p. 343. 
 Belcher r. I'rittlc, 4 Moore A: .S. 2'J5; s. c. 10 
 
 King. 408. p. 1643. 
 Bclden r. Gray, 5 Fla. 504; s. c. 3 Fla. 110. 
 
 p. 884. 
 Belden v. I.amb, 17 Conn. 441. p. 886. 
 Belfast Nat. llank f. llurrhnan, 68 Me. 522. 
 
 J. p. 102'.i, 1031, 1033. 
 Belfa.st iVc. U. Co. r. Kevs, 11. L. Cas. 556; 
 
 8. c. 8 Jur. (N. 6.) 367. j>. ll.V>. 
 Belger v. Dlu.sniore, 51 N. Y. 166. pp. 1360, 
 
 1365. 
 Belkln f. Rhodes, 76 Mo. 643. p. 2144. 
 Belknap v. Godfrey, 22 Vt. 288. p. 1060. 
 Bi-lknap r. W.ii<ic"ll. 21 X. 11. 1<5. pp. 215, 
 
 216, 218, ■:]'.*, 230, 23:5. 
 Bell r. Cunnnings, 3 Snccd (Tenn.), 275. 
 
 p. 10»)'.i. 
 Bell V. (iolding, 27 Ind. 173. j). 838. 
 Bell r. Graham. 1 Xolt & McC. (S. C.) 278. 
 
 p. 1161. 
 Bell r. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 72 Mo. .'JO. pp. 
 
 1207, 1208. 
 Bell I-. Hartley, 4 Watts&s. (Pa.) 32. p. 1044. 
 lU-ll r. n<)\yanl,4 Mil. 117. p. 113. 
 Bell I-. Ingcstrc, v>4 Kng. C. L. 317; s. c. 12 
 
 Ad. & Kl. (N. .s.) 317. p. 876. 
 Bell i: Keefe, 12 La. Ann. 340. p. 620. 
 Bell r. .Morrison, 1 IVl. (f. .S.) 351, p. 066. 
 Bell r. Newton, 4 K. 1). Smith,. V.t. p. WM. 
 Hell r. (Milo.Vc. H.C0..25 I'n.SI. 161. p. 1379. 
 Bell r. IM.rs.in, 1 la. 21. p. 1060. 
 Bell I-. I'rewllt. 62 III. 361. p|). 385, 387, 389, 
 Bell >•. Ueed,4 Blun. (I'a.) 127. pp. 1322, 1345, 
 
 1:{.'>8. 
 I!<dl r. Ulnker, 2'.l Ind. 267. p. 2107. 
 Ilcll r. S<oll,5Mo. 212. p. 1618. 
 I{«ll r. Sliutz, IMCal. 449. p. 341. 
 Hell r. .StJitu, 44 Ala. .3'.«. pp. 69, 2-57. 
 Bell V. SlJile, cital 51 Ala. 30. p. 31. 
 Hell V. State, 59 Ala. 5'.. p. 16. 
 Bell r. .'*tato, 10 Ark. .'".36. p. 108. 
 Hell r. Stale, 57 Md. 12o. j.. 72.'). 
 Bell V. State. 17 Tex. App. 538. pp. 1095, 1696, 
 
 1744. 
 Bell i: State, 21 Tex. App. 270. p. 1695. 
 Bdi t'. Troy, 35 Ala. 184. vp- 1~^> X'U. 
 
 Bell V. Ursnrv, 4 LItt. (Kv,) 834. p. 1198. 
 Hell r. Warden, Wllles, 'iiH. pp. 1145, 1147. 
 Hell I-. Woodward, 46 X. H. 315. pp. 848^ 
 
 1076. 
 Hellefontalno&c. H. Co. r. Hunter, 33 Ind. 
 
 3l'>. p. 12.30. 
 Heller r. Schiilt/, 44 -Mich. 529; «. c. 38 Am. 
 
 Kep. 280. p. 132S. 
 Hellett, Ex parte, 1 Cox Chan. Cas. 297. 
 
 p. 647. 
 Bellows r. .Vngnsta Bank, 2 Mason (U. S.), 
 
 31. pp. 2013, jdU. 
 H.llows i: tJalliip. Klrby (Conn.), 166. p. 113. 
 Hellow.s r. Week.-, 41 VI. .V.M». p. SI. 
 Helo f. Wren, 6 Tex. (>8<>. pp. 1469, 1471. 
 Helote r. state, :i(i .Miss. 97. p. IWI2. 
 Heltr. Hell, I llarr. .V Mell. (Md.) 109. |). 1008. 
 Helt r. lioude, 31 .Mo. 1J8. jip. .s,V2, 1682. 
 Helt V. Marriott, 9 Gill (Md.), ;J31. pp. a06, 
 
 15;H!, 1604. . 
 Helt c. I'eople, 97 III. 461. p. .•«, 
 Helton r. Baxter, . "18 X. Y. 411; a. c. 54 X. Y. 
 
 245. p. I2<r.t. 
 Benils f. Phelps. 41 Vt. 1. p. 869. 
 Benawav r. Conyne, 3 Chand. (Wis.) 214. 
 
 pp. 94." 253. 
 Bender v. Sherwooil, 21 Ind. 167. l>. 2a59. 
 Benedict i: Klanigan, 13 S. C. 50ti; s. c. 44 
 
 Am. Kep- 583. p. 779. 
 Iknedict c. Kond du Lac, 7 Cent. L. J. 258; 
 
 s. c. 6 Ueporter, 7'.»9. p. 1247. 
 Beneyldes estate, 14 Tex. App. 378. p. 1679. 
 Benhain r. Carey, 11 Wend. (X. V.)83. pp. 
 
 1746, 17.54. 
 Benhain r. Rowe, 2 Cal. 387. p. 214. 
 Benjamin i-. Kllinger, SO Ky. 4<2. p. 618. 
 Benjarano r. Slate. 6 Ti-x. Apj). 26.). j>. 115. 
 Benner c. I'orter, 9 How. (V. ».) 235. p. 14. 
 Bennett r. Agricultural Insurance Co., 51 
 
 Conn. 504. p. 833. 
 Bennett c. Baker, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 399. 
 
 pp. 19f4, I'.HWi, 1984. 
 Bennett r. Black, 1 Stew. (Ala.) .39. p. 1195. 
 Bennett f. Com., 8 Leigh (Va.), 745. pp. 1902, 
 
 190-J. 
 Bennett r. Eyerctt, 3 R. T. 152. pp. 904, 966. 
 Bennett v. Fall, 20 .Ma. 60.5. p. .',09. 
 Bennett r. K(>rd,47 Ind. 2t;4. p. 1006. 
 Bennett r. Hol.ro, 72 ( al. 178. p. 2099. 
 Bennett r. Howarrl, 3 Day (Coun.), 219. p. 
 
 191.3. 
 Bennett t'. Lockwood, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 223. 
 
 p. 1221. 
 Bennett r. Matthews, 40 How. I'r (N. Y.) 
 
 42S. pp. 110, 117, 123. 
 Bennett r. O'Brien, 37 III. 2.50. pp. 1322, 1324. 
 Bennett i-. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 577. p. 
 
 1312. 
 Ben nett r. .State, 3 Ind. 167. p. 1982. 
 Bennett f. SUitc, 1 Humph. (Teun.) 399. 
 
 p. 1992. 
 Bennett c. .«Jtato, Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.) 133. 
 
 p. 20. 
 Bennett v. Watson, 3 Manlo & S. 1. p, 164. 
 Benolst f. Miirrin, 4S Mo. 48, p. I.W.), 
 Bensley r. Atwdl, 12 Cal. 231. 11. S74. 
 Benson r. Clark. 1 Cow. (N. V.) 2.W. p. 1915. 
 Benson r. Fish, 6. Mi-. HI. p|.. 19441.945. 
 Benson r. McCoy, 3f. Ala. 716. p. 1701. 
 Bent r. I'lilllirick, Hi Kan. 191. p. 2027. 
 Benll.y c. Kleming, I Com. 11.479. p. 1983. 
 Ilenlle'vr. Klckabaugli.<i2 I'a. SI. 281. p. 1413. 
 ItontleV r. Sill. 3.5 III. 414. i>. Umi.'). 
 Bentley v. Smith. 3 Smltii (K. B.), 17. p. 2013. 
 Bentoti t>. Central U. Co., 42 Iowa, 192. p. 
 
 12:J9. 
 Benton v. Chicago &c. R. Co.,. 55 lown, 496. 
 
 p. 1487. 
 Beutou i: Lindell, 10 Mo. .557. p. 2055.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXV 
 
 Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328. pp. 18, 115, 67C, 
 
 1948. 
 Benton t' Sntton, 1 Bos. & P. 24. p. 1142. 
 Benton r. Thornhill, 7 Taunt. 149. p. 1442. 
 BiMluillard r. IJartlett, 19 Kan. 382. p. 1021. 
 Bcnloll r. Berdell, 80 111. fi04. p. 448. 
 Bltk c. Chicago &c. U. Co., 50 Wis. 419. p. 
 
 1G48. 
 Bergh's Case, 16 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (N. s.) 26C. 
 
 pp. 145, 172. 
 BcrkL'v V. Judd, 22 Minn. 287. pp. 299, 344. 
 Berkley r. Kolics, i:i Mo. App. 502. )). 2108. 
 Berksliire Wcjokai Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 417. p. 1095. 
 Bernliard v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 40 
 
 Iowa, 442. 1). 16«2. 
 Bernhardt r. Bensselaer &c. 11. Co., 32 Barb. 
 
 (N. Y.) 166. p 1211. 
 Bernstein v. Humes, 78 Ala. 134. p. 802. 
 Berrv r. Billings, 47 Me. 328. p. 1684. 
 Berry r. Cooi)er, 28 Ga. 543. pp. 1321, 1344, 
 
 1345, 1347. 
 Berrv r. Da Caste, L. B. 1 C. P. 331 ; s. c. 35 L. 
 
 J. (0. 1'.) 191. p. 1477. 
 Berry r. De Witt, 27 Fed. Rep. 723. p. 2051. 
 lierry v. Drvdcn 7 Mo. 324. pp. 807. 1617. 
 Berry r. Hardinan, 12 Ahi. 604. p. 1758. 
 Berry r. .Jourdan, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 67. pp. 
 
 3.53,355. 
 Berry v. Kenncv, 5 B. Monr. (Kt.) 122. p. 6. 
 Berry v. 8inger,"l0 Ark. 484. j). 2122. 
 Berrv i\ State, 10 Ga. 511. pp. 728, 739,747, 
 
 752, 1509, 16:;7, 1902, 1905, 1906, 2049. 
 Berrv r. .^tale, 8 Tex. App. 51.5. p. 1680. 
 Berrvhill v. Kirchner, 96 Pa. St. 489. p. 779. 
 Berscli v. State, 13 Ind. 434. pp. 409, 1945, 
 
 1956, 1974. 
 Bersclie r. Globe Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 31 
 
 Mo. ,546. pp. 978, 979, 989. 
 Bertody r. Ison, 69 Ga. 317. pp. 215, 239. 
 Bertraud ■.,•. Morrison, Breese (III.), 175. p. 
 
 2009. 
 Bertrand v. Tavlor, 32 Ark. 470. pp. 218, 219. 
 Besford v. Saunders, 2 II. Bl. 116. p. 966. 
 Besleirel v. New York &c. R. Co., 14 Abb. Pr. 
 
 (N. s.) 29. p. 122.5. 
 Bessich v. Coggill, Palmer (K. B.),559. p. 
 
 889. 
 Bcsson V. Southard, 10 N. Y. 236. pp. 1179, 
 
 1198. 
 Best c. Allen, 30 111. 34. p. 1495. 
 Bethel v. Bethel, 92 Ind. 318. p. 1621. 
 Bethel's Case, 1 Salk. 533. p. 152. 
 Belts f. Francis, 30 N. .J. B. 1.52. p. 1002. 
 Belts V. Jack.son,6 Wend. (X. Y.) 173. p. 
 
 1,585. 
 r>etts r. State, 66 Ga. 508. p. 258. 
 Hevan r. Cullen, 7 Pa. St. 281. pp. 1130, 1131. 
 Bevan r. Ilavden, 13 la. 122. p. 1705. 
 Bevan r. Lewis, 3 Eng. Ch. 377. p. 878. 
 J?evan r. Waters, 1 Mood. & M. 235. p. 275. 
 Beverly r. Burke, 9 Ga. 440. pp. 1047, 1632 
 Bevin v. Powell, 83 Mo. 365; s. c. 11 Mo. App. 
 
 216. 1). 2055. 
 Blagi r. Howes, 66 Cal. 469. pp. 2084, 2099. 
 Biard r. Trimble, Cooke (Tenu.),289. p. 1671. 
 Bilib r. Reid, 3 Ala. 88. p. 128. 
 Bihl.ins r. Noxon, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 207. p. 
 
 1611. 
 
 Bickford v. Dane, 58 N. H. 185. p. 902. 
 liekford 
 p. 1021. 
 
 Bickford v. Meuier, 36 Hun 
 
 p. 902. 
 (N. Y.), 
 
 446. 
 
 Bickliani v. Smith, 62 Pa. St. 45. p. 560. 
 Bickley v. Com., 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 572. 
 
 p. lt!4. 
 Bidault r. Wales, 19 Mo. 36; s. c. 20 Mo. 5.50. 
 
 p. 1416. 
 Bierbach r. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 
 
 208. p. 1769. 
 
 Bigclow V. Reed, 51 Me. 325. p. 1210. 
 Bigelow V. Rutland, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 24';. 
 
 pp. 1209, 1224. 
 Bigelow r. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425. p. 54. 
 Riggers r. Pace, 5 Ga. 171. p. 1599. 
 Biggs V. Barry, 2 Curt. C. C. (U. S.) 259. 
 
 pp. 1971,1989. 
 Biggs l: Lloyd (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 831. pp. 
 
 2,3. 
 Biggs i\ Mcllvain's E.xecutrix, 3 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 (Ky.)360. p.2i:il. 
 Biggs, Ex parte, 64 N. C. 202. pp. 145, 146, 151, 
 
 1.59, 161. 
 Bigler r. Pinkncy, SOX. Y. 636. p. 2016. 
 Biglow V. Stearnes, 19 Johns. (X. Y.) 39. p. 
 
 160. 
 Bilanski v. State, 3 Minn. 427. pp. 1903, 1906. 
 Bill)erry v. :M(>bley, 21 Ala. 277. p. 316. 
 Billjrougli r. Metropolis Ins. Co., 5 l>uer (N. 
 
 Y.),587. p. 978. 
 Biles r. Holmes, 11 Ired.L. (X. C.) 16. p. 1207. 
 Bill V. Norwich, 39 Conn. 222. p. 1249. 
 Bill V. People, 14 111. 432. p. 728. 
 Bill V. State, 29 Ala. 34. pp. 17, 19, 129. 
 Billings r. Billings, 2 Cal. 107. p. 1438. 
 P.illinirs V. McCov, 5 Neb. 187. p. 1716. 
 Billini,'-s r. Stale," 107 Ind. 54. p. 2051. 
 P.illingslev r. Bunce, 28 Mo. 547. p. 1436. 
 I'.illis V. State, 2 McCord (S. C), 12. pp. 56, 
 
 118. 
 Bills r. Ottumwa, 35 la. 107. p. 1738. 
 Bills V. Stanton, 63 111. 51. p. 2053. 
 Bills?'. State, 59 Ind. 15. p. 164. 
 Bills i: Vose, 27 X. 11. 215. pp. 217. 218. 
 Biulield r. State, 19 X. W. Rep. 607; s. c. 15 
 
 Neb. 484. p. 1861. 
 Bingham v. Foster, 37 la. 339. p. 1994. 
 Bingham r. Guthrie, 19 Pa. St. 418. p. 192 
 Bingham r. .Supervisors, 8 Minn. 441. pp. 
 
 194, 195, 198, 324. 
 Bingham, In re, 32 Yt. 329. p. 137. 
 Binns r. State, 46 Ind. 311. pi). 1790. 1847. 
 Biuns r. State, 66 Ind. 426. pp. 1569, 1571, 1860, 
 
 1861, 1863. 
 Birch V. Benton, 26 Mo. 153. pp. 807, 1617. 
 Birchard v. Booth, 4 ^Vis. 67. pp. 1965, 1966, 
 
 19(i7. 
 Bird r. Appleton, 1 East, 111. pp. 2009, 2013. 
 Bird V. Great Xorthern R. Co., 28 L. J. 
 
 (Kxch.)3. p. 1237. 
 Bird V. Higginson, 2 Ad. & El. 160. p. 217. 
 Bird V. Lanius, 7 Ind. 615. p. 2124. 
 Bird V. State, 14 Ga. 43. pp. 20, 27. 
 Bird r. State, 50 Ga. .5S.5. p. 542. 
 Bird r. State, 107 lud. 154. pp. 1757, 1803, 
 
 1804. 
 lUrdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220. p. 1035. 
 Blrdsongr. State, 47 Ala. 68. pp. 51, 115. 
 Birge r. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507. p. 1232. 
 Blrkbeck r. Tucker, 2 Hall (X. V.I, 121. p. 615. 
 Bischof r. Cotfelt, 6 Ind. 23. p. 1747. 
 Bischoffsheim v. Brown, 29 Fed. Rep. 34L 
 
 I)p. 591, 5'.^2. 
 Bishop r. Bishop, 13 Ala. 47.5. p. 869. 
 Bishop r. Oliambre, Mood, .t M. 116. p. 1031. 
 Bishop r. Georgia, 9 Ga. 121. p. 1984. 
 Bishop V. Mugler, 33 Kan. 145. pp. 1996, 1999, 
 
 2000. 
 l?ishop r. O'Connell, 56 Mo. 158. p. 1440. 
 Bishop V. Ransom, 39 Mo. 417. pp. 2051.2056. 
 Bishop c. Redmond, S3 Ind, 157. i>. 2039. 
 Bishop r. Shillito, 2 Barn. & Aid. 329u. pp. 
 
 908, 909. 
 Bishop c. Spining, 38 Ind. 143. pp. 505, 508, 
 
 509, 1780. 
 Bishoi) V. State, 9 Ga. 121. pp. 70, 103. 
 Bishop V. State, 9 Ga. 260. p. 398. 
 Bishop r. State, 43 Te.\. 390. pp. 1635, 1674, 
 
 1690, 1743, 1746.
 
 X\.\\ 1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Bishop r. Williams, IS III. mi. y. S<;9. 
 Bliiliop of l)urliain v. Itcaumoiit, 1 Cnmp. 
 
 207. p. 474. 
 Bishop of Mcath r. jrarquls of Winchester, 
 
 SlMiig. N. C. 1S>. 1). -I'M. 
 Blssfll r. Drak.-. I'.i Johns. (X. Y.) 66. p. «U». 
 BKhsoM f. Flr.-t Nat. Jlauk, G'J I'a. St. 415. 
 
 p. 11)-::?. 
 Bissoll c. Ilopliins.aCovv. (N. Y.) lOfi. p. 1442. 
 Blssrll r. Price, Iti 111. 408. pp. )Sti7, Vili'X 
 Blr-sill r. l{v;m, 23111. fiDC. pp. M, S3. 
 lUssell r. siaiT, 32 Mleli. 2W. p. 407. 
 15l.--ill, Matur of, 40 Ml>s. 63. (i. 152. 
 Hissot f. btate, 53 IikI. 40^. pp. UM, 1008. 
 Blvins r. Mate, 11 .\ik. 4:)j. pp. 106, IS'JO. 
 Blxbo r. State, t! Oh. eti. ii. 40. 
 BI.\1)V r. Car-kacldon, 70 la. 7-V.. p. 1708. 
 Blxbv r. Carskaddou (la.), 2'J N. W. Kcp. 626. 
 
 1). 23(!. 
 Blatehfordr. r)o(1.2r.arn. & Aid. 179. pp. 
 
 1172, IL^O, lisj. lis.t. 
 Black f. CoorKh, 3 l.iit. (Kv.) 226. p. 265. 
 Black r. Dajr^.v. 1:5 IikI- :W3. p. 2100. 
 Black r. tioixlrlch Transportatlou Co., 55 
 
 Wis. 310. pp. 1344, 1360. 
 Black r. Jones, GE.xch. 213; s.c. 2 L.J. Exch. 
 
 152. p. 1740. 
 Black f. Rogers, 7"> Mo. 441. p. 102. 
 Black V. State, 1 Tex. App. 369. pp. 1S47, 1861, 
 
 18»M. 
 Black v. State, 18 Tex. App. 124. pp. l&Vt, 1880. 
 Black 1. State, 42 Tex. 377. pp. 72.76. 
 IMack V. Stale, 9 Tex. App. Sli. i>. m. 
 Blackhurn v. 15call,28 Md. 208. p. .'■)82. 
 Blackliurn r. Crowder, 110 Intl. 127. p. 2101. 
 I'.laikliurn f. IIa\>,4<'olilw.(Tenn.)227. p. 42. 
 Blackliurn v. State, 71 Ala. 310; «. c. 46 Aiu. 
 
 l{eii. 323. pp. 540, 541, 1S05. 
 Blackliurn r. Mate, 44 Tex. 457. p. 1606. 
 Blaiketer r. llou.se, 67 Ind. 414. pp. 1694, 
 
 1011. 
 Blacklnjrton v. .Johnson, 126 ^Ma.'ss. 21. p. as3. 
 Blackledge v. Plue, 28 Ind. 466. pp. 214, 221, 
 
 222. 
 Blackinau v. "Welsh, 44 Mo. 41. p. 1042. 
 Blackwellr. Hamilton, 47 Ala. 472. p. 336. 
 Blackwell v. State, 67 (ja. 76; s. c. 44 Am. 
 
 Uep. 717. p. 267. 
 Blade r. Xoland, 12 "Wend. (N. Y.) 173. p. 
 
 620. 
 Blair V. Lvnch (X. Y.), 11 Xorth East. Rep. 
 
 947 ; 8. c. :« llun. 663. p. 863. 
 Blair r. Pelliam, IH .Mass. 420. p. 661. 
 Blake r. Blossom, 15 .Me 304. p 1012. 
 Blake r. Davis, 20 Oh. 231. p. 200l». 
 Blake v. Irish, 21 Me. 450. p. 1758. 
 Blake f. Lane, 5 Jones E(j. (N. C.) 412. p. 
 
 1061. 
 Blnke v. I-anvon, 6 T R. 221. p. «)1. 
 Blake r. .Midland R. Co., 21 L. J. (t^. B.) 2,37. 
 
 pp. 1473, l.WH. 
 Blake f. MUlspaugh, 1 Johns. (X. Y.) 316. 
 
 p. r,S. 
 Bluker. Powell, 26 Kan. 320. pp. 3<i7, 372, 
 
 376,718. 
 Blake r. Sawn In, 10 Allen (Mas-s.), 340. p. 
 
 1709. 
 Blake r. St. Lonis, 40 Mo. 569. p. 1246. 
 P.lake f. Tucker, 12 V(. 39. p. 1072. 
 Itlake r. White. 13 X. II. 272 p. :M6. 
 Bl.'ikelv r. I'.eniiecke, .50 Mn. 193. ).. 8-25. 
 Bl.ikeiiian r. Itlakem.in, 31 Miun. 390. p. 
 
 Blakev V. Porter, 1 Tannt. .384. p. .580. 
 Blakevr. Saunders, Mo. 742. j>. 1611. 
 Blalock V. Phillip-.. 3-* »;a 216. p. 1020. 
 Blanc r. Kluinpkc.20 Cal. IVl. p. 1378. 
 Blanchard r. Brown, 1 Wallace Jr. (U. S.) 
 309;. p. 38. 
 
 Blanchard v. I'ratt, 37 111. 243. p. 1773. 
 Bland c. (I'Hagan.t^ N. (".471. j). 2129. 
 lUand r. State, 4 Tex. Ai>p. 15. p. 1S17. 
 Bland Ingr. .Sargent, 30 S. H. 239. p. 1088. 
 Blaney r. Fludley. 2 Blaekf. (Ind.) 338. p. 
 
 2111. 
 Blaneyr. Pclton (VI.), 13 Atl. Rep. 564. 
 
 925. 
 Blatchlcy r. Coles, 6 Colo. s»2. p. 2ia5. 
 Bleecker r. Carroll, 2 Abb. Pr. (X. V.) 82. p. 
 
 ir,ti. 
 Blemer r. Peojde. 76 111. 265. p. 21 
 lUenkinsop t. Clavton, 1 J. B. Moure, S28. p. 
 
 014. 
 Blesch r. Chicago &c. K. Co., 48 Wie. 168. p. 
 
 2o:i-t 
 Blew f. Hoover, 30 Ind. 4.50. p. 2042. 
 Blewett r. Ualn.'ird, 1 Stra. 70. p. 8«>. 
 lilight r. Fisher. Pel. C, C. 41. pp. 144. 188. 
 Blight r. Schenck. 10 Pa. St. 28!). p. 874. 
 JSIlss I-. Bralnard. 4-.' X. H. 255. p. 1C,8. 
 Blizzard r. Apjikgate, 77 lud. 516. i)p. 316, 
 
 319, 726. 
 Blizzard r. Blizzard, 48 Ind. 540. p. 2114. 
 Blizzard r. Phebus. 35 Ind. 284. p. 2107. 
 P.loch r. l'rlce,2l Mo. App. 14. p. 344. 
 Block V. Uoruian, 51 Mo. 31. p. 967. 
 P.lock r. State, loo Ind. 3.")7. p. 103. 
 Blocker r. State. Tex. App. 270. p. 1832. 
 Blodgett r. Farmer, 4 1 X. 11. 4(t3. i.. 344. 
 Blood V. Tvuesborough, 103 Ma.sb. 5o9. p. 
 
 1200. 
 Blood r. Whitman, 3 Plnnev (Wis.),. 54; s. e. 
 
 3 {'hand. (Wis. - 54. p. 2007. 
 Bloodirood V. Bruen, 8 X. Y. :J62. p. 967. 
 Bloodworth v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 614. p. 
 
 110. 
 Bloomlngton r. Read,2 Bradw. (111.) 542. p. 
 
 1247. 
 Blossom V. Barrett, 37 X. V. 434. p. 49.3. 
 Blossom r. Dodd, 43 \. Y. 264. p. i;i65. 
 Blount r. /Ink, 55 Mo. 455. p. 2121. 
 Bhinmntle r. Fltcliburg K. Co., 127 Mass. 822; 
 
 ft. c. 20 Alli. I,. J. iVI. p. 11.5.5. 
 Blunt r. IJltle, 3 .Mason (U. S.), 112. pp. 
 
 1195, 1107, 1108. 
 Blunt r. Sl.Mte, Tex. App. 234. p. 376. 
 Blvr. Haverhill. 110 Mass. .520. p. 1209. 
 P.lvdenburg r. .lohnson, 9.\bb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. 
 
 V.) 4.V.I. p. 2075. 
 Blv.lenburgr. Welsh, Bald. (U. S.) 331. p. 
 
 1410. 
 Blvih V. Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Exch. 
 
 784. pp. 1207, 12.')2. 
 Boar r. MeUormlck, 1 Scrg. & R. (Pa.) 160. 
 
 p. 018. 
 Board \c. r. Eperson, 50 Ind. 27.5. p. 2042. 
 Board of Com. v. Montgomery, 109 Ind. 69. 
 
 p. 2108. 
 Boardman r. Beckwilh, 18 la. 292. p. 2073. 
 Boanlman r. Klbbe, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 545. 
 
 p. 324. 
 Boardman v. Xcw Hampshire *c. Ins. Co., 20 
 
 N. II. .551. p. 074. 
 Boardman r. NVeslchesler Fire Ins. Co., 54 
 
 Wis. 3(H. pii. 67:!. f.o.'.. 
 Boardman c. U oo.l. 3 VI. 570. i)p. 67. 82. 
 lioardman r. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120. pp. 
 
 22.S, 471, 406, 498. 
 Boatmen's savings Bank f. Overall, 16 Mo. 
 
 Apj). 510. pp. 1445, 1027. 
 Borldb- c. State, .5-2 .Ma. 305. p. 1646. 
 Iloddlnglon r. .Schleneker.4 Barn. * Ad. 7.52. 
 
 p. 044. 
 Bodge I-. FoHs, 30 X. H. 406. p. 110. 
 Boihvell c. Swan, 3 Pick. (Moss.) .376. pp. 
 
 146r,, 1467. 
 Bnette r. Landa, 22 Tex. IM. p. 1986. 
 Bogart f. Brown, 5 Pick. (Mass.) \K p. 616.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXVU 
 
 Bogenschutz v. Smith (Ky.), 1 S. W. Rep. 578. 
 
 p. 1239. 
 Boggs V. State, io Ala. 30. p. 51. 
 Boggs V. State, 8 Iml. 463. p. 5C1. 
 BogKS r. Thoinpson, 13 Xeb. 403. p. 385. 
 Bogle V. Kreitzer, 46 Pa. St. 465. pp. 456, 
 
 1668. 
 Bohanan v. Hans, 26 Tex. 450. p. .563. 
 Bohanaa r. State, 15 Nel). 212. ]). 20j6. 
 Bolianan r. Slate, IS Xelj. .57. p. 73. 
 Boies V. Hartford &c. II. Co., 37 Conn. 272. 
 
 p. 1321. 
 Bolan r. Peeplcs.l Brev. (S. C.) 109. p. 1750. 
 Boland r. Gillett, 44 Wis. 329. i). 2067. 
 Bolaud V. Greenville &c. R. Co., 12 Rich. L. 
 
 368. p. 118. 
 Boland v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. 484. 
 
 pp. 1232, lo'.ib, l.i99. 
 Bolcliow V. Sevmour, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 107. p. 
 
 8o9 
 Bold't V. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739. pp. 1469, 1470, 
 
 1490. 
 Boldt v. State (Wis.), 35 X. AV. Rep. 935. 
 
 p. 57. 
 Bolen ('. State, 26 Oh. St. 371. p. .528. 
 Boles V. State, 24 Miss. 445. p. 129. 
 Boles r. State, 13 Siued. & M. (Miss.) 398. 
 
 pp. 81,82, 129. 
 Boles r. State, 18 Tex. App. 422. p. 1564. 
 Boiling V. Mavor, 3 Rand. ( Va. ) .577. pp. 2008. 
 Bqlling v. Petersburgli, 3 Rand. (Va.) 563. 
 
 p. JOU. 
 Bolhnan, Ex parte, 4 Cranch (U. S.), 75. p. 
 
 178. 
 Bolton V. Corporation of Liverpool, 3 Sim. 
 
 467. p. 27i;. 
 Bomar v. Maxwell, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 621. 
 
 !>. rioi. 
 
 Bomgardner v. Andrews, .55 la. 638. p. 505. 
 Bonaparte v. Camden &c. R. Co., Baldw. 
 
 vl'. >.)220. )). 1578. 
 Bond c. Clark, 35 Vt. 577. I). 927. 
 Bond v. Kpley, 4S la. 600. pp. 2074, 2080, 2100. 
 Bond r. Frost, 8 La. Ann. 297. p. 1366. 
 Bond r. Hall, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 14. p. 1668. 
 Bond f. Pacheco, 30 Cal. 533. i). 2057. 
 Bond c. Pcopl •, ,;9 111. 26. pp. 1646, 1647. 
 ISond V. Wabash &c. R. Co., 67 la. 712. p. 2082. 
 Bond r. Warren, 8 Jones L. (X. C.) 191. 
 
 p. 1642. 
 Bone r. McGinlev, 7 How. (Miss.) 671. p. 5. 
 lionesteel r. Lynde, 8 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 226. 
 
 I.. 278. 
 Bonlield r. Smith, 2 Mood. & Rob. 519. p. 217. 
 Bunliaiii V. Iowa &c. Ins. Co., 25 la. 328. 
 
 p. 2038. 
 Bonham v. Mills. .39 Oh. St. 534. p. 2. 
 Boniiell r Clianiberlin, 26 Conn. 487. p. 957. 
 Bonnell r. Delaware &c. R. Co., 30 X. J. Law, 
 
 189. p. 1303. 
 Bonnell c. ./aeohs, 36 Wis. 59. p. 713. 
 Bonney v. Morrill, .'>2 Me. 2.52. p. 827. 
 Bonney c. Morrill, 57 Me. 374. p. 192. 
 Booby r. State, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 111. pp.120, 
 
 1914, 1919,1992. 
 Booker r. State, 76 Ala. 22. pp. 1710, 1798, 
 
 1799, 1800. 
 Booker f. State, 4 Tex. App. 564. pp.433, 
 
 435. 
 Boon r. State, 1 Ga. 618. pp . 42, 46, 67, 68, 69, 
 
 72, 97. 
 Boon V. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675. pp. 455, 
 
 458. 
 Boone v. Pnrtiell, 28 Md. 607. p. 585. 
 Boone r. Kidgway, 29 N. I. Eij. 543. j). 583. 
 Booraem c. Wlicider, 12 N't. 311. p. 188. 
 Boorman r. Atlantic &.C. R. Co., 17 Hun (X. 
 
 Y.), 555. )). 182. 
 Booth V. Com., 16 Gratt. (Va.) 519. p. 11. 
 
 Booth r. Hall, 6 Md. 1. p. 324. 
 Booth r. Hvnes, 54 111. 363. p. 17.50. 
 Booth V. Millns, 15 Mees. & W. 669. p. 215. 
 Boots r. Canine. 94 Ind. 408. p. 1674. 
 Boots V. Griffith, 97 Ind. 241. p. 2027. 
 Borden v. Fitch, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 121. p. 160. 
 Borden v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 471. l>. 1067. 
 Boren v. State (Tex.), 4 S. W. Rep. 463. p. 
 
 48. 
 Borgraefe v. Supreme Lodge, 22 Mo. App. 
 
 127. p. 1627. 
 Borkheim v. Insurance Co. , 38 Cal. 623. p. 
 
 199. 
 Borland r. Barrett, 76 Va. 128. pp. 1022, 1978. 
 Borrekins v. Bevin, 3 Uawle (Pa.), 2:5. )). 925. 
 Borrowscale v. Bosworth, 98 Mass. 34. p. 
 
 2060. 
 Borst r. IJoecker, 6 Johns. 332. p. 49. 
 Bosborough v. State, 8 Crim. Law Mag. 751; 
 
 s. c. 21 Tex. App. 672. p. 427. 
 Bosley v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 3 GiU & J. 
 
 (Md.) 473 n. p. 1983. 
 Bosley V. Farquar, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 61. pp. 
 
 1910, 1911. 
 Bosse r. Thomas. 3 Mo. App. 472. p. 2003. 
 Bostick V. State, 11 Tex. App. 126. p. 308. 
 Bostock V. State, 61 Ga. 635. p. 676. 
 Boston V. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315. p. 55. 
 Boston r. Biunev, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 1. p. 89L 
 Boston v. Bobbins, 116 Mass. 313. p. 1934. 
 Boston r. Tileslon, 11 Mass. 468. p. 5.5. 
 Boston R. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), 83. 
 
 pp. 890, 1966, 1982. 
 Boston &c. R. Co. v. Ripley, 13 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 421. p. 1003. 
 Boston Mill Corp. v. Bulfinch, 6 Mass. 299. 
 
 p. 1044. 
 Bostwick V. MahafFy, 48 Mich. 342. p. 1011. 
 Boswell's Case,20 Graft. (Va.)860. p. 1879. 
 Bosworth V. Barker, (i5 Ind. .595. ji. 1726. 
 Bosworth r. Swansey, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 363. 
 
 pp. 1210, 1224. 
 Boisford r. Yates, 25 Ark. 282. p. 127. 
 Bottenberg r. Nixon, 97 Iml. 106. p. .563. 
 Bottorff c. Shellon, 79 Ind. 98. p)i. 1726, 1728. 
 Bottum V. Moore, 13 Daly (X. Y.), 464. p. 
 
 1125. 
 Boucher v. Xew Haven, 40 Conn. 456. p. 
 
 1249. 
 Boucicault V. Fox, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 87. p. 
 
 1585. 
 Bouldin v. State, 8 Tex. App. 624. p. 1560. 
 Bourke v. James, 4 Mich. 336. jj. 1148. 
 Bourne v. Seymour, 16 Com. Bench, 336. 
 
 p. 917. 
 Bourreseau i: Detroit Evening .Journal Co. 
 
 (Mich.), 6 West. Rep. 151. )). 307. 
 Bowan r. Chicago \c. li. Co., 85 Mo. 533. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Bowden v. State, 2 Tex. App. 56. \\ 1744. 
 Bowditch V. Boston, 101 V. S. 16. p. 1605. 
 Bowditch V. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 136. pp. 819, 
 
 1507. 
 Bowen v. Lazalere, 44 Mo. 383. pp. 1598, 1600. 
 Bowen V. Xew York &c. R. Co., 18 X. Y. 
 
 408. p. 1236. 
 Bowen v. Pollard, 71 Ind. 177. p. 1709. 
 Bowen v. Spears, 20 Ind. 146. pp. 219,221, 
 
 222. 
 Bowen r. State, 108 Ind. 411. p. 2088. 
 Bowen r. State. 3 Tex. App. 617. p. 1990. 
 Bowens r. Benson, .57 Mo. 26. p. 1056. 
 Bower r. Larl, 18 Mich. 378. p. 1670. 
 Bowers r. .lewell, 2 N. H. 543. p. 1031. 
 Bowers r. Mavo, 32 Minn. 241. p. 376. 
 Bowers c. Ross, 55 Miss. 213. p. 20<!4. 
 Bowers c. State, 29 Oh. .St. 542. pp. 300, 301. 
 Bowers r. Thomas, 62 Wis. 480. pp. 1426, 
 
 1427, 1662, 1664.
 
 XXWlll 
 
 TABLE OV CASES. 
 
 Bowon- Savlnijs' IJank r. Hichnrds, 3 linn 
 
 (N. v.), 330 ; «. 0. G Thoiiip. & C. (X. Y.) r.'.t. 
 
 p. 145 
 Bowie V. Bralio, 3 Huor (N. Y.), 35, pp. 1041, 
 
 liM4. 
 Bowlor V. State, U Miss. .^71. pp. 1833, 1842, 
 
 184:;. 
 Bowl.T r. ^Vaslllnc•ton, fii Mo, 302, ji, 1!>60. 
 llowlini^ £•, I'unniKiuwcaltli, 7!> Ky. ()04. 
 
 p. 4I-.4. 
 BowlluK I'. Krujr, .v. Mo. 44f>. p. 1747. 
 BuWMiai) f. Chicago &c. U. Co.,85 Mo. 533. 
 
 p. ]:<<i7. 
 Bowman r. State, 41 Tex. 417. pp. 30, CO, 116. 
 Bowman f. Welliir, :!'.• 111. 41(!. |.. I'.ll. 
 Bowman r. \Vooil.-i, 1 Ci. Greeno (Iowa), 441. 
 
 pp. 78:!, 784. 
 Bowman, In re, 7 Mo. .\pp. .^63. pp. 1'23. 124, 
 Bowno r, A\ Itt, 111 Wcml. (X, Y.) 47."), p. 48. 
 Boxley r. Carney, 14 Iml. 17. i>. ."itil. 
 Boyco r. .Vn.ler.-ion.2 I'et. (C. S ) 150. i>. 1:U2. 
 Bovce r. California A:e. Stage Co., 25 Cal. 
 
 460. pp. icoe, im:i, ItWl?. 
 Bovcc I-. \.nko. 17 S. C. 481, p. 218. 
 Bovce r, t<mitll, H! Mo. 317. p. iOtS. 
 Boyd r. .\n.l.rson, lui In<l. 217. p. 2058. 
 BoVfl I-. Banli.'J.") Iow;i, 2.">.'>. p. 338. 
 Bovtl r. Blai.sdell, 15 Ind, 73. p. 2141. 
 Bovd r. Brotliersou, 10 Wend. (X. Y.) 93. 
 
 p". 818. 
 Bovd r. llurlbut, 41 Mo. 204, p. 966, 
 Boyd r. Mclvor, 11 Ala. 822. i)p. 1408, 1637. 
 Bovd r. -Mexico SoiUliern Bank, 67 -Mo. 537. 
 
 pp. 1132,1133. 
 Bovd r. Sanfonl, 14 Kan. 280. p. 2097. 
 Boyd V. fitate, 17 tia. I'.M. pp. 111. 58.5, 
 Bo'vden r. Moore, 5 Ma.ss. 365. )). 17.t4, 
 BoVdston V. Giltacr, 3 Ore, 113. pp. 1656, 
 
 1833. 
 Bover r. Rllcv, 41 Iowa, 14, p. 903, 
 Boyintrton i-,'state,2 Tort. (.Ma.) 100, p. 9. 
 Bo'vkin r. I'crrv, 4 Joues L, (X. U,) 325. 
 
 p", icits, 
 Bovlan r. Meeker, 23 X. J. L, 274, p. 1008. 
 Bovle r. People, 4 Colo. 176. p. .58. 
 BoVnton r. iIolme.-»,:iS 111, 59. p. 1750, 
 Bovntou r, Trumlnill, 45 X. H. 408, pp. 1963, 
 
 l!Wi5. 
 Bovnton r. Vezle, 24 Me. 286. p. 915, 
 Bracegirdlc i: Bailev, 1 Fost. & Fin, 536, 
 
 p. 384. 
 Braekett v. Morse. 23 Vt. 354. p. 892. 
 Bradliurv v. Cony, 62 Me. 223. pp. 1922, 
 
 l'.>2:i, lit69. 
 Brafll.urv v. Falmonth, 18 Me. 181. p. 1249. 
 Bradliiirv v. Idalio &c. Co., 10 Pac. llep. 620. 
 
 ).. 2036' 
 Bradee r. Brownlleld, 9 Watt» (Pa.), 124. 
 
 ].|'.4<;7.47l, 472. 
 Bradford r. I'earson, 12 Mo. 71. pp. 1673, 
 
 1671, K.79. 
 Bradford r. School Tp., 107 Ind, 280. p, 2082, 
 Bradford r. Sonlli Carolina U. Co., t Uich. 
 
 L, (.>. (.',) pp. 201, 840. 
 Bradfr>rd r. State, 15 Ind, 347. pp. 4S, 73, 12'3, 
 
 VJM, I IKK). 
 Bradlev c. Andre.M.H, 30 Ala. 80. p. 2119. 
 Bradley r. P.radley, 45 Ind. 67, pp. 26, 1912, 
 
 2li2;i, •2034, 2041. 
 Braillev r. (Jamp, Klrhy (Conn,), 77. pp. 
 
 Hi'.k;. iio;j. 
 Bradley f. Clark, 1 Cush, (Mass.) 293, pp. 
 
 215, 241. 
 Bradleyr. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 33.'.. p. 
 
 Hi". 
 
 Bradley r. Oljear, 10 X. II. 477. p. .103. 
 Bradley r. State, i'.l Ind. 4'.>2. pp Ivj',, 1827, 
 Brn<llev I-. We«t, 60 .Mo. .•>'.». p. 1708. 
 Bradley, E.\ i>arte, 48 Ind. 54<J. p. 2o82. 
 
 Bradley, Kx parte, 7 Wall, (I'. S.) 376, pp. 
 
 1.511, 1.5'.t. 
 llradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 liuss. & Mvl, 358. 
 
 I.. 277. 
 Brailsliaw r. Coml.s, lf>2 III. 429. p, 32:5, 
 Itradshaw r. Ihil>l>ard, 6 III. :i'.lo. ]ip. 5S, 113. 
 Brad>liaw I-, M:ivlleld,24 Te\ 481, p. 1667. 
 Brad.shaw r. Stale, lit .Neb. (>44. p. 2078. 
 Bradshaw r. State, 22 X, W, Bep. 361, pp, 
 
 709. 745, 746. 
 Bradshaw r, Yates, 67 Mo. 221. p. 1410. 
 Hradstreet v. Iluutlngtou, 5 Pet, (U, S.) 402. 
 
 p. 1044. 
 Bra.lstreut, Ex parte, 4 Pet. (IT. S.) 102. p. 
 ' 2132. 
 Bradt r. Uomniel. 26 Minn. 605. p. 1984. 
 Bradwav v. Waddell, 1(5 Ind. 170, pp.1726, 
 
 1728, lt30. 
 Brady r, American I*rlnt Works, 119 Mass. 
 
 98. J). 1934. 
 Brady i: Com,, 11 Bush (Kv,), 282. pii. 1871, 
 
 187'2 
 Brady v. Felsll, 54 Cal. 181. p. 20.57. 
 Brady v. Steamboat Highland Marv, 17 Mo. 
 
 461, p. 12'.i'.i. 
 Bragg r. Town of Brailford, 33 Vt, 3.5. p, 892. 
 Brainard /■. Stiipliin, C. Vt. '.i. p. 1072, 
 Brake r. Slate, 4 Itaxt. (Tenn.) 361. ii 1923. 
 Brakelield r. State, 1 Sueed (Tenn,), 215. p. 
 
 73, 
 Brakcn r. Martin, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 55. ji. 1044. 
 Brakken r. .Minneapolis Ac. 11. Co., 29 .Minn. 
 
 41. jip. 670, (»). 
 Bramin c. Bingham, 26 X'. Y. 4&3. p. 340. 
 Bramlette r. Stale, 21 Tex. App. 611. pp. 
 
 1680, 1817. 
 Bramwell v. Lucas, 2 Barn. & Cress, 745, p. 
 
 272. 
 Branbnrry v. Cocktleld, 2 McMuU, L, 274. 
 
 p. 1190. 
 Branch r. Dawson (Minn.), 30 X^ W. Rep. 
 
 545. p. 95. 
 (Sranch r. Doane, 17 Conn. 403. p. 1750. 
 Itranch c. Palmer, (« (;a. 211. y. tM3. 
 liranch /■. Stale, 41 Tex. 622. i<. 1.5;!7. 
 Kranch r. Walker, '.t2 N. ('. 69. p. 102. 
 Branch Bank r. Moseley. lit Ala. '222. p. 2119. 
 Brandin c. Grannis, 1 Conn, 402u. pp. 1902, 
 
 llHMi. 
 Brandon r. People, 42 X, Y. 265, pp. 413, 
 
 524, .526, .529, .5:!o, 534, 5:i5. 
 Brandreth's Case, 32 How, St, Tr. 7.5.5. pp, 
 
 45, 87, 88, 03, 105. 
 Brandt I-. Klein, 17 John.s. (X, Y,) 335, p. 
 
 275. 
 Brandt v. (3gden, 1 .Johns, (X, Y,) 1.56, p. 
 
 1(114. 
 Branford r. Freeman, 1 Kng. Law & Eq. 444. 
 
 p. 21.5. 
 Branger r. Bntlrick. 28 Wis. 450, p. 2f)64. 
 Branham c. Brown, 1 Itailey (S, C), 262. 
 
 p. 1.588, 
 Brann r. Camiibell, 86 Ind. 510. pp. *67, 
 
 468. 
 Br.innock c. Bouldin,5 Ired, L. (X. C; 61. 
 
 p. :{51. 
 Brarinon r. May, 42 Iml. 02. Pp. 2039, 2063. 
 Branson r. Canrthcrs, 49 Cal. 374. pp, 570, 
 
 707. 
 Branson r. Turner. 77 Mo. 489. p. 1129. 
 Braiistetter r. Diirnnigh, 81 Ind. .527. j). 1756. 
 Ilrantlev r. Carter, 2<; ^Ilss 2.S2 p. 1747. 
 Itranlley r. W.-st, 27 Ala. 542 j). 860. 
 Brashears r. Stale, 5S Md. r<i\.\. p. 1H08. 
 Bratton r. Brvan, 1 .\. K. .Marsh, (Ky.) 212. 
 
 p. 118. 
 Bravo r. Slate, 20 Tex. App. 188. p. 1746. 
 Brnv r. Iladwen, 5 Maiile & S. 68. p. 944. 
 Brav r. State, 41 Tex. 660. pp. 107, 1835.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 Brardon v. Goalman, 1 Monr. (Ky.) 115. 
 
 p. "307. 
 Bravton v. Dexter, 12 Atl. Rep. 132. p. 2060. 
 Brayton v. Freese, 1 lud. 121. p. lOfiO. 
 Brazier v. State, 44 Ala. 387. pp. 4,94. 
 Brazleton v. State, 11 Ueportcr, 291. p. 58. 
 Breading v. Dubarry, 14 Serg. &. 11. 27. 
 
 p. 1131. 
 Breclieisen i\ Coffev, 15 Mo. App. 80. p. 825. 
 Breck v. Blanctiard', 27 X. H. 100. p. 1985. 
 Breck r. Cole, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 79. p. 1068. 
 Breckenkainp v. liees,3 Mo. App. 585. pp. 
 
 793, 8UK. 
 Breeding r. .State, 11 Tex. 257. p. 11. 
 Breedlove v. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319. pp. 311, 
 
 1719. 
 Breese v. State, 12 Oh. St. 146. pp. 1669, 1679. 
 Breeze v. Doyle, 19Cal. 101. p. 2015. 
 Brehm v. Great Wej^tern R. Co., 34 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.) 256. pp. 1207, 1236, 1237, 1238. 
 Breniian v. Cilv of St. Louis (Mo.), 2 S. AV. 
 
 Rep. 481. p. 747. 
 Breunan r. security Life Ins. Co., 4 Daly 
 
 (N. Y.), 296. pp. 222, 224, 235. 
 Brennau v. State, 33 Tex. 286. pp. 9, 121, 
 
 1995. 
 Breniian v. Tracv, 2 Mo. App. 540. pp. 1180, 
 
 1186. 
 Brennan r. Wallace, 25 Cal. 108. p. 1015. 
 Brenner r. llerr, 8 Pa. St. 106. p. 955. 
 Brentlinger v. Hutchinson, 1 "Watts (Pa.), 
 
 46. p. 1063. 
 Brenzer v. Wightman, 7 Watts & S. (P.a.) 264. 
 
 pp. 942, 943. 
 Bressler r. People, 117 111. 422; s. c. 8 Crlm. 
 
 L. ]Mag. 466. pp. 438, 441, 1765, 1801, 1865, 
 
 1869, 1870. 
 Bret V. J. S., Cro. Eliz. 755. p. 889. 
 Brewer r. Craig, 18 N. J. L. 214. p. 891. 
 Brewer v. Crosby, 11 Gray (Mass.), 29. p. 
 
 396. 
 Brewer r. Jacobs, 22 Fed. Rep. 217. pp. 118, 
 
 2071. 
 Brewer v. Opie, 1 Call (Va.), 212. p. 2017. 
 Brewer v. ^alt Assn., 47 Mich. 526. p. 912. 
 Brewster v. Doaue, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 537. p. 
 
 642. 
 Brewster r. Thompson, 1 X. J. L. 32. p. 1982, 
 
 1985. 
 Briant v. Fowler, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 562. p. 
 
 1929. 
 Briant r. Russell, 2 X. J. L. 107. p. 5. 
 Bricker r. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 83 Mo. 391. 
 
 1>. 2002. 
 Brieklev v. Weghorn, 71 Ind. 497. pp.2014, 
 
 2113. 
 Bridge r. Eggleston, 14 Mass. 245. p. 1982. 
 Bridge r. Grand Junction R. Co., 3 Mee. & 
 
 W. 246. p. 1221. 
 I'.ridu-.' i: Wellington, 1 Mass. 219. p. 328. 
 Bridger c. Ashville &c. U. Co. (S. C), 3 S. 
 
 E. Uei>. 860. )). 1234. 
 Bridgers r. Uridwrs, 69 X. 0.451. p. 551. 
 Bridges r. Xorth London R. Co.,L. R. 7 H. 
 
 L.21:!. pi). 1208, 1212, 1216. 
 Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. Rep. 19. i>. 188. 
 Bridges v. Smyth, 8 Bing. 29; s. c. 1 Moore & 
 
 S. 93. ]). 796. 
 Bridgetou i\ Jones, 34 Mo. 472. pp. 967, 
 
 969. 
 Brig Cadmus r. Matthews, 2 Paine C. C. 229. 
 
 p. 821. 
 Brig Collenberg, 1 Black (U. S.), 170. p. 
 
 1:542. 
 Briggs V. A Light Boat, 7 Allen (Mass.), 287. 
 
 p. 910. 
 Briggs V. Byrd, 12 Ircd. L. (X. C.) 377. p. 119. 
 Briggs r. Georgia, 15 Vt. t!l. p. 117. 
 Briggs c. Hall, 4 Leigh (Va.),484. p. 1003. 
 
 Briggs V. Matsell, 2 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 156. p. 
 
 186. 
 Briggs r. Morgan, 3 Phillimore, 325; s. c.l 
 
 Eng. Ecc. 490; 2 Hagg. Con. 324. pp. 646, 
 
 648. 
 Briggs V. Oliver, 4 Hnrl. A C. 403; s. c. 35 L. 
 
 J. (Exch.) 163;14L. T. (N. S.) 412;14 Week. 
 
 Rep. 6.08. I). 1222. 
 Briggs r. Parkman, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 2.^8. pp. 
 
 1442, 1443. 
 Brljiga V. Vanderbilt, 16 Barb. (X. Y.) 222. p. 
 
 1610. 
 Brigg.s r. Wheeler, 16 Hun (X. Y.),583. pp. 
 
 43;i, 435. 
 Bright V. Wilson, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 123. pp. 
 
 2095, 2097. 
 Brill V. Flagler, 23 Wend. (X. Y.) 354. p. 
 
 627. 
 Brill V. State, 1 Tex. App. 572. pp. 113. 119, 
 
 123. 
 Brinklev v. Brinkley, 47 X. Y. 40. p. 151. 
 Brinklev r. State, 54 Ga. 371. pp. 30, 31. 
 Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296. pp. 123, 124. 
 Brinkceter v. State, 14 Tex. App. 67. pp. 1538, 
 
 1889. 
 Brlntall v. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 32 Vt. 665. 
 
 p. 1334. 
 Brlsbau r. Boyd, 4 Paige (X. Y.) 17. p. HOC. 
 Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107. pp. 40, 1978, 
 
 1979. 
 Bristol V. Spragne, S Wend. (X. Y'.) 423. pp. 
 
 1103, 1104. 
 Briston v. Wright, Doug. (Mich.) 665. p. 
 
 1615. 
 Bristow's Case, 15 Graft. (Va.) 634. pp. Ill, 
 
 122, 123. 
 Brittain v. ^Ulen, 2 Dev. L. (X. C.) 120. pp. 
 
 56, 57. 
 Britton V.Atlantic &c. R. Co., 43 Am. Rep. 
 
 749. p. 1293. 
 Britton v. Cunningham, 107 Mass. 347. p. 
 
 1210. 
 Britton v. Fox, 39 Ind. .369. p. 1997. 
 Britton r. Turner, 6 X. H. 481 ; s. c. 26 Am. 
 
 Dec. 713. p. 893. 
 Broad v. Ham, 5 Bing. (X. C.) 722. pp. 1164, 
 
 1199. 
 r.roadwell v. Swigcrt, 7 B. 3Ion. (Ky.) 39. 
 
 p. 1223. 
 Brock V. Gale, 14 Fla. .523. p. 1154. 
 Brockbank v. Whitehaven &c. R. Co., 7 Hurl. 
 
 & X. 834. p. 1235. 
 Brockett v. Xew Jersey Steamboat Co., 13 
 
 Fed. Rep . 156. p. 583. 
 Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div. 692. pp. 1386, 
 
 1394, 1395. 
 Broniage r. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cres. 247. 
 
 pp. 795, 1457, 1460, 1462. 
 Bron.son v. Green, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 238. p. 2097. 
 Bronson v. Kensey, 3 McLean (U. S.), 180. 
 
 p. 593. 
 Bronson v. Metcalf, 1 Disney (Oh.), 21. p. 
 
 1944, 19.55. 
 Bronson r. People, 32 Mich. 34. pp. 110,113. 
 Hronson v. Southbury, 37 Conn. 199. pp. 
 
 1209, 1232. 
 Bronson v. Tuthill, 1 Abb. Dec. (X. Y.) 206. 
 
 p. 621. 
 Brook V. Montague. Cro. Jac. 90. p. 795. 
 Brookband r. State, 55 Ind. 169. pp. 489, 490, 
 
 2129. 
 Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill (Md.),16. p. 
 
 227. 
 Brooker i\ Weber, 41 Ind. 436. pp. 2030, 2032. 
 Brooklyn v. Patchin, 8 Wend. (X. Y.) 47. pp. 
 
 69S, (i99. 
 Brooks V. Allen, 62 Ind. 405. p. 1036. 
 Brooks c. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) W. pp« 
 
 219, 228, 229.
 
 xl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Rrooka v. nrnvn, 35 111. 3M. p. 50. 
 
 Hrooks f. Hntfnlo Ac. 11. Co., 25 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 »•*<). ]>. ItVH. 
 Hrooks r. Elgin, 6 GUI (Md.), 254. 1)11.034, 
 
 lt.V>. 
 IJrooks f. Fnrwcll, 4 Fed. Roil 16t>. p. 188. 
 Brooks r. Missouri, 124 V. >. 3iM; ». c. 8 S. C. 
 
 Hon. 443. p. 2(»7S. 
 Rrooks f. Mitoholl.OMeos. & W. l.V p. 038. 
 Hrooks f. Morjcan, .') Ircd. (X. C".) 481. p. l.V.i. 
 Hrooks r. IVrrv,23 Ark. .iJ. p. 70."). 
 Hrooks ,-. Powers, l.-> .Mass. 244. p. 1442. 
 Hrooks r. Hojul, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 380. pp. 
 
 88'.i. 8'.t8, SifX 
 Hrooks i: Somervillo, 106 Mass. 271. pit. 1247, 
 
 l»»o, i(!o:{. 
 Hrooks c. standard Flrolns. Co., 11 -Mo. App. 
 
 ;i.V). p. 828. 
 Brooks f. Warwick, 2 SUirk. 389. pp. 1169, 
 
 1181. 
 Rrooks r. AVlnicr. 20 Mo. .'103. p. 1440. 
 Hrooinlleld v. Suiilh. 1 Mees. & W. 542. p. 
 
 131!1. 
 Rrottiorton r. .Tones. Hill & Dcnlo Supp. {X'. 
 
 V.) 171. p. li'.(ii). 
 Hromvor r. Hill. 1 .''andf. S. C. (X. Y.) 630. p. 
 
 1(H>8. 
 
 Hrow r. State, 103 Tnd. 133. p. 754. 
 Hroward c. Do^K'^tt, 2 Fla. 49. p. 8.'J6. 
 Hnnvn r. Ail.iiiis Kxpress Co., 15 W. Va. 812. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1:14."), 1:547, 1348, 1350 
 Hrown I-. Atililsoii &c. li. Co., 1 Pac. Rep. 
 
 WIS. p. 12:!'.l 
 Hrown c. Atchlsou &c. R. Co., 31 Kau. 1. p. 
 
 KV21. 
 Hrown v. Autrcy (Ga.), 3 S. E. Rep. 669. p. 
 
 111. 
 Hrown r. Hccknall, 5 Jones Eq. (X\ C.) 423. 
 
 p. 1im;i 
 Hrown v. Howen, 30 X. Y. 520. p. 1750. 
 15rown f. Hrown, 1 Uang. Ecc. 523; s.c. 3 
 
 Kiijr. Fee. 22'.l. i>. i;4(>, C48. 
 Hrown c. Hrown, 8 Mote. CMass.) 573. pp. 
 
 834, M-.i. 
 Hrown r. Hurrus, 8 Mo. 26. pp. 312, 313, 318, 
 
 -.iSA. 718. 
 Hrown r. Central Pac. U. Co., 12 Pac. Rep. 
 
 512. p. 20:54. 
 Hrown r. Clienowortli, 51 Tcx. 469. p. .3. 
 Hrown r. Clarke, 4 How. (C. S.) 4. p. 213:5. 
 Hrown I-. Cockerell, :53 Ala. 3S. p. 1670. 
 Jirown r. Coin., 2 Luifjli (Va.), 769. pp. 69, 
 
 74. 
 Hrown. r. Com., 11 Leigh (Va.). 711. p. 7. 
 Hrown r. Com., 73 Pa. St. 322. p. 1.5. 
 Hrown c. ConKdon,.'»0 Conn. 302. p. 1979. 
 I'.rown r. Connrlly, 5 Hlackf. (lud.) 390. pp. 
 
 llT'.i, ll.s:;. 
 ISrowii ;•. Covenant Mut. Life Tub. Co., 86 
 
 .Mo. 51. |i. \iyi\x. 
 Hrown r. Ka-tcrn R. Co., 11 Cush. (Mas.s.) 
 
 97. PI'. lO'.il, lO'.t.-., VMV,. 
 Hrown r. KIIkoII. 2 .M.l. 7.'). pp. 1109, 1(>46. 
 Hrown f. Fsinonde, Irish Rep., 4 Kri. 630. 
 
 p. 'X,. 
 Hrown v. European Ac. R. Co., 58 Me. 384. 
 
 pp. 1226, 12:52, 1603, 1604, 1605. 
 Hrown r. Kvans, 18 F.-d. Rep. .56. p. 2068. 
 P.rown r. FIteli. :53 N. J. I-. 41s. p. 833. 
 Hrown r. (Jay. 3 Me. 126. p. 1090. 
 Hrown r. (JennnK. 1 W<'nd.(X. V.) 115. p. 141. 
 Hrown !•. (irlimiiH, 11 oii. .^t. :52'.t. p. 2:50. 
 Hrown I- Hannil.al Ae. R. Co., GG Mo. 688. 
 
 pp. 1484, 1770, 1772. 
 Hrown r. Hntlon.9 Ired. ^X.C.)319. p. 825. 
 Hrown f. Home .^nvhiKs Hank, 5 Mo. App. 1. 
 
 Hrown r. Hnjcer, 21 How. (U. S.) 305. p. 827. 
 Brown v. Hughes, 1 Foot. A Fin. 299. p. 635. 
 
 Hrown r. Isboll, 11 Ala. 1009. p. 1669. 
 I5rown i-. Jones. 46 Harli. (X. Y.) 400. p. 363. 
 Hrown r. Kellar, 40 III. 81. p. 146. 
 Brown r. Kirk, 2(i .Mo. App. .524. p. 871. 
 Brown r. Klrkpalrlck, 5 S. C. 267. pp. 218, 
 
 Brown r. Lacrosse G«8 Co., 21 WU. 61. 
 
 PI'. 117, 120. 
 Brown V. Leulirs. 1 Bradw. (111.) 74. p. 450. 
 Brown r. Lvnn. :!1 I'a. .St. 510. p. 1:50.5. 
 Brown v. McCounel, 1 Bibb (Kv.), 265. 
 
 p. 1910. 
 Hrown r. McCorralck, 23 Mo. App, 181. 
 
 p 10.')1. 
 Brown 1-. Mc(;raw, 14 Pet. (F. .«.)479. p.aw. 
 Brown V. .Mel.elsli, 71 la. 381 ; a. c. 32 X. W. 
 
 Kep. 38.'>. I'. 2IMI8. 
 Brown r. Milwaukee &C. R. Co., 22 Minn. 105. 
 
 p. 1226. 
 Brown r. Missouri Ac R. Co., 13 .Mo. App. 
 
 462. p. 810. 
 Hrown r. Missouri Ac. R. Co., 6t Mo. 630, 
 
 p. 1298. 
 Hrown V. Mooers,6 Grav (Mass.), 451. p. 471, 
 Brown f. Muuclc Xat^ Hank, Ho lud. 323. 
 
 p. 21118. 
 Hrown v. Murray. Hy. A >r. 254 p. 246. 
 Hrown r. Xew York Ac. R. Co., 32 X. J. 597. 
 
 p. 497. 
 Hrown r. Pavson. 6 X. H. 443. p. 272. 
 15rowu r. People, 9 111. 4:59 n. 1700. 
 Hrown f. People, 8 Hun (X. Y.), 662 p. 
 
 413. 
 Brown r. Perkins, 1 Allen (Mass.), 89. pp. 
 
 326. 425, ,566. 14S(». 
 Brown I-. Ralston, 4 Rand. (Va.) .516. p. 2008, 
 
 2(K(',». 
 
 Brown i\ Heed. 79 Pa. St. 370 ;«. c. 21 Am. 
 
 Kep. 75. p. 12.50. 
 Brown r. Richardson, 20 X. Y. 474. p. 553. 
 Brown c. Ulley, 22 111. 4.'). p. 1442. 
 Brown V Rose, .').'> la. 7:54. p. 211.54. 
 Brown r. State, 52 Ala. ;545. p. 11:5. 
 Brown f. State, 23 Ga. 439. pp. 117, .^57, 977, 
 
 l'.>84. 
 Brown v. State, 58 Ga. 212. ])p. 541, .542. 
 Brown V. State, (K) (in. 210. pp. 540, 729, 747, 
 
 1806. 
 Brown r. State, 16 Ind. 496. p. .5. 
 Brown i\ Stale, 6 Blaekf. (Ind.) .561. p. 5. 
 Brown c. State, 24 Ind. Il:l. )•. 4X5. 
 Brown (• State, 71 Ind. 470. p. 297. 
 Brown r. State, 7ii Ind. 577. pp. 70, 74, 115. 
 Brown r. State, :i2 Miss. 4:5:1. p. 17.'<5. 
 Brown r. State, :>1 .Miss. 424; a. c. 10 Cent. L. 
 
 .1. :576. pi>. 115 116. 
 Brown r. State, tW .Miss. 447. p. 122. 
 Brown c. state, 2 Tex. App. 115. p. 1765. 
 Brown c. .state, 3 Te.\. App 296. pp. 263, 
 
 2.55. 
 Hrown r. Stale, 6 Tex. App. 286. p. 1679. 
 Brown r. State, 2;5 Tex. li«5. pp. 1(^55, 1855, 
 
 Brown v. Stale, .38 Tex. 482. pp. 1903, 1905. 
 Brown 1: Swlnefonl, 44 Wis. 1h-2. pp. 244, 
 
 6.V5, 714. 728, 7:5H, 712. 717, 7.V2, 762. 
 Hrown r. Thorndlke, l.'i Pick. (Mass.) 388. 
 
 p. 1008. 
 Hrown r. Waha«h Ac. R. Co., 18 Mo. App. 
 
 .568. pp. U.V), 1:168. 
 Brown .f. Warner, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 39. 
 
 p. km;. 
 Hrown V. Waterman, 10 Cush. (Masu.) 117. 
 
 p. 1321. 
 Brown 1: Welghtman (.Mich.), 20 X. W. Rep. 
 
 9H. p. .561. 
 Brown r. Wheeler, 18 Conn. IW. p. .58. 
 Brown v. Wlllev, 42 Pa. St. 205. I'p. 1077. 
 Hrowu'H Case, 9 Leigh ( Vn.i. 6.14 ).. :i49.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xli 
 
 Brown's Lessee v. Galloway, Pet. C. C. (U 
 
 S.) 294. p. 572. 
 Browne v. Fire Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 133. p. 1708 
 Brownell v. Flagler, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 282. p 
 
 1223. 
 Brownell r. McEwen, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 367 
 
 pp. 1983, 1985. 
 Brownell v. Pacific R. Co., 47 Mo. 240. p 
 
 2(»02. 
 Brownfield v. Brownfleld, 43 111. 147. p 
 
 167(1. 
 Brownfleld r. Brownfield. 12 Pa. St. 136. p 
 
 l(t84. 
 Browning v. ITlght, 78 Ind. 277. p. 1709. 
 Browning r. State, 30 Miss. 657. p. 1840. 
 Browning v. State, 33 Miss. 48. p. 1857. 
 Browning v. state, 1 Tex. App. 96. p. 1744. 
 Browning r. \Vall)urn, 45 Mo. 477. p. 1611. 
 Brownlee v. Hare, 64 Ind. 311. pp. 2:59, 2112. 
 Brownlee v. Hewitt, 1 Mo. App. 360. p. 735. 
 Bruas's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 294. p. 882. 
 Brubaker f. Olieson, 36 Pa. St. 519. pp. 851, 
 
 852, 855. 
 Bruce v. Barnes, 20 Ala. 219. p. 239. 
 Bruce v. Sims, 34 Mo. 246. pp. 1608, 1661. 
 Bruce v. State, 87 Ind. 450. p. 2142. 
 Bruce v. Ulerv, 79 Mo. 322. pp. 1489, 1494. 
 Bruce i'. AVe^itcott, 3 Barb. (X. Y.) 374. p. 
 
 1034, 
 Brucli V. Carter, 32 N. J. L. 554. p. 1645. 
 Brucker r. State, 16 Wis. 333. p. 1904. 
 Brun V. Duinav, 2 Mo. 102. p. 20.50. 
 Bruner r. State, 58 Ind. 159. p. 1574. 
 Bruner v. Marcuui, 50 Mo. 405. pp. 2, 3. 
 Brun skill v. Giles, 9 Bing. 13. pp. 110, 1975. 
 Brusberg r. Milwaukee &C. R. Co., 55 Wis. 
 
 106. p. 1668. 
 Brush V. Keeler, 34 Conn. 499. p. 1749. 
 Bryan v. Cliicago &c. R. Co., 63 la. 464. p. 
 
 1666. 
 Brvau r. Courscy, 3 Md. 61. p. 324. 
 Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How. (U. S.) 334. p. 
 
 819 
 Bryan v. Harrison, 76 N. C. 360. p. 42. 
 BrVan v. Slate, 4 Iowa, 349. p. 4. 
 Bryan r. United States, 1 Black (U. S.), 140. 
 
 p. 1671. 
 Brvan v. Walton, 20 Ga. 480. p. 310. 
 Bryant v. Biddeford, 39 Me. 193. p. 1247. 
 Bryant r. Crosby, 40 Me. 9. p. 1705. 
 Bryan t v. Kelton, 1 Te.x. 415. pp. 1441, 1445. 
 Bryant r. Moore, 26 Me. 84. p. 1(j25. 
 Bryant v. Peters, 3 Ala. 170. p. t49. 
 Bryant r. State, 16 Tex. App. 144. p. ]a')5. 
 Bryant v. State, 18 Tex. App. 107. p. 1679. 
 Bryne r. Hoodie. 2 Hurl. & C. 722; s. c. 33 L. 
 
 J. (Exch.) 13. ]). 1222. 
 Bryorly i: Clark, 48 Tex. 345. p. 2064. 
 Bubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. St. 83. p. 394. 
 Buchanan v. Reynolds, 4 W. Va. 681. p. 1983. 
 Bucher r. .Jarratt, 3 Bos. & Pul. 143. p. 608. 
 Buclinian r. Siati', 59 I ml. 1. jip. 164, 176. 
 Buck r. Mallory, 24 Miss. 170. pp. 128. 
 Buckingham c. Smith. 23 Conn. 453. p. 967. 
 Buckland r. Adams Expres.s Co., 97 Mass. 
 
 125. p. 13(S. 
 Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396. p. 193. 
 Buckley v. Artcher,"21 Barb. (X. Y.) 585. p. 
 
 1412. 
 Buckley r. Garrett, 47 Pa. St. 205. p. 984. 
 Buckley v. (iuildliauk, Cro. .Jac. 678. p. 886. 
 Buckley v. Knai)]), 48 Mo. 152. pp. 560, 762, 
 
 1291. 
 Buckley v. Railroad Co., IS Mich. 121. p. 1374. 
 Buckley v. State, <i2 .Miss. 705. pji. 1801, 1803. 
 Bucklin v. State, 20 Oh. 18. p. 476. 
 Buckniiuster >•. Perry, 4 Mass. 593. p. 228. 
 Bncknal v. Rolston, Prec. in Chan. 285. 
 
 p. 1440. 
 
 Budd V. Brooke, 3 Gill (Md.), 198. p. 875. 
 Budd r. Falrnianer, 5 Carr. & P. 78. p. 927. 
 Budd V. Hiler, 27 N. J. L. 43. p. 890. 
 Budd V. Hoffheimer, 52 Mo. 297. p. 1667. 
 Buddicum v. Kirk, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 293. 
 
 p. 568. 
 Buddy V. Wabash &c. R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 
 
 206. pp. 1322, 1345. 
 Budlong V. Xostrand, 24 Barb. (X. Y.) 25. 
 
 ]j. 433. 
 Buel V. People, 78 X. Y. 492. p. 17.58. 
 Buesching r. St. Louis tias Light Co., 73 Mo. 
 
 219; s. c. 6 Mo. App. 85; 6 Cent. L. J. 458. 
 
 pp. 1222,1223,1226,1261. 
 Buessnieyer v. Stuckenburg, 33 Mo. 546. 
 
 p. 560. 
 Buettingcr r. Hurley, 34 Kan. 585. p. 205L 
 Bute r. Turner, 6 Taunt. 338. pp. 1411, 1417. 
 Buffington r. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 246. 
 
 p 1607. 
 Buffington r. Cook, 35 Ala. 312. p. 1637. 
 Buford v. :McGetchie, 60 Iowa, 298. p. HO. 
 Buford V. State, 44 Tex. 525. p. 1.560. 
 Buhol r. Boudousquie, 8 Mart. (n. S.) (La.) 
 
 425. p. 13. 
 Buie V. Caryer, 75 N. C. .559 p. 462. 
 Buie v. State, 1 Tex. App. 455. pp. 118, 120. 
 Bulen V. Granger, 58 Mich. 274 ; s. f. 29 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 718. pp. 1622, 1676, 1945. 
 Bulkeley v. Keteltas, 6 X. Y. 387. pp. 1180, 
 
 1188. 
 Bulkeley v. Smith, 2 Dner (X\ Y'.), 271. 
 
 pp. 1181, 1198. 
 Bull i-. Com., 14 Gratt. (Va.) 613. pp. 557, 
 
 1983. 
 Bull V. Loyeland, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 9. pp. 265, 
 
 Bull's Case, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 613. p. 19&5. 
 Bullard V. Boston &c. Co. (X. H.),5 Atl. Rep. 
 
 16. p. 747. 
 Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 X. Y. 230. p. 357. 
 Bullard V. Randall, 1 Gray (Mass.), 605. 
 
 p. 1022. 
 Bullard r. Spoor, 2 Cow. (X. Y.) 430. p. 82. 
 Bullard V. State, 38 Tex. 504. pp. 6, 85. 
 Bullard r. Stone, 67 Cal. 477. p. 1708. 
 Bullard J-. Wil.-ion,5 Mart. (x. s.) (La.) 196; 
 
 s. c. 3 Cond. .505. p. (j42. 
 Bulliner r. Peoi)le, 95 111. 394. pp. 258, 729, 
 
 747, 766, ISO), 1925,2078. 
 Bullis r. Drake (Xeb.), 29 X. AV. Rep. 292. 
 
 pp. 709, 744, 74.5. 
 Bullitt V. Musu'iaye. 3 (ull (:\rd.),31. p. le46. 
 Bullnor v. I'eoide. 95 111. 394. p. 754. 
 Bullock r. Coon. 9 Cow. (X. Y.) 30. p. 330. 
 Bulloch V. Smith, 15 (ia. 395. pp. 728, 739,747. 
 Bulloch r. State, 10 (;a. 47. p. 1634. 
 Bullock v. Xarrott, 49 111. 65. p. 861. 
 Bullock r. Xeal, 42 Ark. 278. pp. 2o6, 2144. 
 Bullock V. Wilson, 2 Port. (Ala.) 436. p. 1.382. 
 Bunibury ;■. Bumbury, 2 Beavan, 173. p. 276. 
 Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo. 266. p. 834. 
 Bunch V. Hurst, 3 Des. Eq. (S. C.) 273. p. 
 
 622. 
 Bunch v. State, 14 Ark. .544. p. 1.50. 
 Bundy v. Hyde, 50 X. H. 116. pp. 305, 322, 
 
 .561,"5(>3. 
 Bunker I'. Shed, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 1.50. p. r,42. 
 Bunn r. Croul, 10 Johns. (X. Y".) 239. pp. 
 
 1723, 1915. 
 Bunn V. Hoyt, 3 Johns. (X. Y'.) 2.55. pp. 1912, 
 
 1996. 
 Bunny i\ Poyntz, 4 Barn. & Ad. .5(>8. p. 915. 
 Buntain i\ IJaily, 27 111. 409. p. 560. 
 Buntiu r. Rose, 16 lud. 209. pp. 2025, 2032, 
 
 2040. 
 Burchard r. P>ooth, 4 Wis. 67. p. 762. 
 Bunkhalter r. Coward, 16 S. C. 435. pp. 
 
 44, 218, 219, 220, 242.
 
 xlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Burden f. People, 26 Mich. 162. pp. 50, Ml 
 Biirdlck r. Hunt. 43 Ind. 3^-2. y. 438. 
 r.unlliu' f. (Jrand IxxIk*'. 37 .\ln. 47S. p. 57. 
 Burdltt r. Swonsou. 17 Tox. 4S'.». p. 1394. 
 Bunlsal r. Diivk-.-*, 58 Mo. 138. p. 204it. 
 Burdus r. Sliorler, Baruos' Notes, 222. p. 
 
 17y. 
 Burfev i-. St.ito. 3 Tex. .\pp. 519. pp. 20, 124. 
 Burgert r. ISorchert, 59 .>!.>. SO. i>. 1440. 
 Burnfs V. I^uiglev, C Scott (N. U.),518. p. 
 
 li>84. 
 Burgos r. Wlckhain, 10 Jur. (x. 8.) 92. p. 994. 
 BurgeBd f. Buuuctt, 20 Week. Hop. 720. p. 
 
 63:1. 
 Burgess r. Lijuglev, 5 Mau. & Gr. 722. i>p. 
 
 im>, 19<57. 
 Burgett r. Hurgott. 43 Ind. 7S. pp. 119t!, 16'.»4. 
 Burtfott f. Teal. '.H liul. 2r>0. !>. 2012. 
 Burgliaus v. Calhouu, t> Watts (Pa.), 210. 
 
 p. '.'t!5. 
 Burhani v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 56 Mo. 330. 
 
 l>p. 12.i.i, 130«). 
 Burliauis t: Sandford, 19 Wcud. (N. Y.) 417. 
 
 p. li;»7. 
 Burk i: Andls, 98 Ind. 70. p. 257. 
 Burk f. Clark, 8 Fla. 9. p. 108. 
 Burk f. Com., 5 J. J. Marsh. (Kv.) C75. p. 
 
 I'.tas. 
 Burk V. Lewi.*, 6 Madd. 29. p. 279. 
 Burk r. State, 27 Ind. 430. i). 74. 
 Burk c. State, 2 Har. .S: J. (Md.) 426. p. 26. 
 Burk r. Adams, 80 .Mo. 504. p. 873. 
 Burke r. Broadway &c. K. Co., 49 Barb. (X. 
 
 Y.) 529. 1). 1232. 
 Burke v. Broadway &c. R. Co., 34 How. Pr. 
 
 iN. Y.) 239. p. 12-25. 
 Burke t\ Lee, 76 Va. 386. pp. 825, 828, 1597. 
 Burke f. Maxwell, 81 Pa. St. 139. p. 1646. 
 Burke r. Southea.stern U. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 
 
 Ulv. 1. i>. 1374. 
 Burke r. State, 72 Ind. 392. p. 2077. 
 Burke r. State, 15 Tex. Ai>p. I."*, p. 1737. 
 Burke r. Webb, 2 N. Y. Week. Dig. 679. p. 
 
 1723. 
 Burkhaltor v. Edwards, 16 Ga. .503. p. 446. 
 Burkhanl i-. State, 18 Tex. App. 599. pp. 
 
 1679, 1680, 1684. 
 Burkhart r. State, 18 Tex. App. 599. p. 798. 
 Burle.wn r. Burlesou, 2-* Tex. 383. p. 2028. 
 Burling r. Patterson, 9l'arr. & P. 570. p. 362. 
 
 ;urllngan)c v. Hurl 
 142. pp. lls-2, 11«7 
 
 Burllngamc v. Kurllugame, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 ■"•(&. 
 
 Burllngauie v. Burllngamc, 18 Wis. 285. p. 
 
 13. 
 Burliniiame r. Central &c. R. Co., 23 Fed. 
 
 Uep. 7116. p. 20(M. 
 Burhngame c. Corwee, 12 All. Rep. 234 ;». C. 
 
 5 .New Eng. Ui-p. 664. pp. 2094, 2096. 
 Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Dob.son, 17 Neb. 450. 
 
 p. 21IHI. 
 
 Burlington &c. R. Co. r. Sater, 1 la. 421. p. 
 
 1.588. 
 Burlington &c. R. Co. v. Schluatz, 14 Neb. 
 
 421. l'. 1608. 
 Bnrlock r. SInipe, 17 Pac. Rep. 19. p. 2084. 
 Barn r. Phelp-., 1 Stark. 94. j). 1003. 
 Burnell >: .\.w York &c. R. Co., 45 X. Y. 181. 
 
 pp. 1321, i:W5. 
 Burnett c. Phalon,2I IIow. Pr. (X. Y.) lOO. 
 
 1>. 2.S0. 
 Burney r. Hall. 24 Ga. 50.5. p. 3.'>6. 
 Burni-y r. .siatc, 21 Tex. .\pp. .572. p. 18iH). 
 Burnham v. ilattleld,5 lilackf. (lud.) 21. p. 
 
 4:w. 
 Burnham v. Morrlssev, 11 Gray (MasH.), 226. 
 
 pp. I.VJ, KUV 
 Burnham r. Smith. 11 Wis. 258. p. 100. 
 Burnlev i-. Rlre, 21 Tex. 171. p. 2W7. 
 Burus r. Barenlleld, 84 Ind. 43. pp. 406, 408. 
 
 Hums f. Burns, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 295. p. 
 
 ltH)8. 
 
 Burns v. Elba, 32 Wis. 605. ji. 1247. 
 
 Burns r. North Chicago &c. Co.. 60 Wis. .541. 
 
 pp. 1704, 211.37. 
 Burns r. Paine. 8 Tox. 150. pp. 1906,198.1. 
 Hums i: Sutherland, 7 Pa St. 103. p. 1698. 
 liurns r. Wilson. 1 Mo. Anp. 179. i). 1723. 
 Uurntr.tger r. McDonalu, 31 lud. 277. p. 
 
 2108. 
 lUiron r. Konman, 1 Kxrh. 760. p. 25. 
 Burr r. ralmor, 23 \ I. 244. p. 2<i91. 
 Hurr c. Todd,41 I'.i. SI. 212. pp. 870, 1414. 
 ISurr r. Williams, Jn Ark. 172. p. 8;». 
 Iturr Trial of, ciY-./ pp. 21. 27. 61, ti;i, 67, 68, 69, 
 
 72, 73, 7."). 76, 21."), 261, 265, 2Jil, lOoO. 
 Burrell r. Nlcliolson, 1 .Mood. A Rob. 3f»4. p. 
 
 217. 
 Burrell r. State, 18 Tex. 713. pp. W, 115, 471, 
 
 1575, 1855. 
 Biirriss c. Hlalr, 61 Mo. 133. p. 82.5. 
 Burrill r. Phillips, 1 tJall. (U. S.) 360. pp. 
 
 14."), I'.hh;. 
 Burrill r. Waterlown Kank, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 1115. p. Ii;i3. 
 Burrow r. l.angl.'V, in Md. 248. p. 8-21. 
 lUirrough r. .Marliii, 2 (amp. 112. p. :i54. 
 Kurrough,-< r. Hunt, 13 linl. 178.- p. 219. 
 Burrow r. Kagland, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 484. 
 
 p. 1,589. 
 Burrows r. Eric R. Co., 63 X. Y. 556. p. 
 
 1236. 
 Burrows v. Gallup, 32 Conu. 493. p. 1110. 
 Burrows v. Stebblus, 26 Vt. 659. pp. 907, 
 
 1446. 
 Burrows v. I'nwiu, 3 Car. & P. 310. pp. 
 
 l.-ilMi, 1951. 
 Burrows i\ Whltakor. 71 N. Y. 291. p. 912. 
 iSurson I-. Huntington. 21 Mlrh. 41.5. )>. Iti63. 
 Burson c. Mahonoy, 6 Haxt. (Tenn.) 304. 
 
 jip. 705, 706. 
 Burt c. Gwinn, 4 Ilarr. & J. (Md.) 507. p. 
 
 1W2. 
 Burt r. Cassetv, 12 .Ma. 734. p. 873. 
 Burt r. Merchants' Ins. Co., 115 .Mass. 1. pp. 
 
 2114,211.5. 
 Burt I-. I'anjaud. 9l> U. S. 180; s. c. 18 .Viu. L. 
 
 Reg. 660. jip. lol, 115. 
 Burt c. .'^latc, 2 ! « »li. Si. 394. p. 3.><2. 
 Hurt r. Wigglosworth. 117 Mass. 302. p. 2<A. 
 Hurtlno /•. Stale, 18 (;a. 534. p. 1913. 
 Burtuelt, .Matterof, 8 Daly (N. Y.),363. p. 
 
 602. 
 Burton i: Drlggs, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 115. p. 623. 
 Burton i: Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 151. p. 1404. 
 Burton r. (;rav, 10 Lea (Tonn.) .580. p. 2065. 
 Burton i: Grllllths, 11 .Mees. & W. 817. p. 
 
 1141. 
 Burton r. .Merrick, 21, Ark. Xu. p. 1747. 
 Burton r. riummer, 2 Ad. \K1. 341;«. c. 4 
 
 Nov. iV: Man. 31.'). iip. :}54, 360. 
 Burton I-. Wilkes, 66 N. C. 604. pp. 1938, 
 
 193.1. 1917. r.i.vi. 
 Busboe i: Finn, 1 Oh. St. 409. p. 886. 
 Bush r. Brown. 4.i 1ml. .')73. p. 1006. 
 Bush f. Biickmgliam, 2 Vontr. 8:1. n. 885. 
 Bush ('. Durham. 15 I ml. '2.')2. p. 1742. 
 Bush I'. Geneva, 3 Tliomp. ."t ('. 4ii9. p. 1249. 
 Bush r. .lack-on. 24 Ala. 273. p. :m. 
 Bush f. .lohnston, 23 Pa. ."^t. 209. p. 1225. 
 Bush r. Kontuckv, 107 V. S. 110. i). 8. 
 Bush c. Miller, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 481. p. 1321. 
 Bush f. .Sialon. 4 Ind. .')2-». )>. 576. 
 Bushe r. Bavon-. 10 Mo. .\pp. 579. p. 20.5.5. 
 Bu.shoe i: Wright. 1 IMnn. (Wl».) 101. p. 1920. 
 Busholl r. .starling, 3 Keb. 322. p. 160. 
 Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 13.5. pp. 1181, 1605, 
 
 1507. 1512. 
 Buslck r. State. 19 Ohio, 193. p. 121.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xliii 
 
 Buswcll V. Ptoby, 3 X. 11. 467. p. 927. 
 ISutclier r. Andrews, Carthew, 44C. p. 889. 
 HutclnT r. Coats, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 340. p. 168. 
 IJutcluT V. London &c. R. Co., 16 C. li. 13. 
 
 ]). 1151. 
 Butcher r. Vaca Val. R. Co., 67 Cal. 518; s. c. 
 
 8 Pac. Rep. 174. p. 1312. 
 r.iitler V. Doniian, 68 Mo. 29S. p. 1028. 
 P.utler V. I$ensoii, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 526. p. 365. 
 Butler V. Butler, 3 Day (Conn.), 214. p. 328. 
 Butler V. Cams, 37 Wis. 61. p. '662. 
 Butler V. Cbic.at,'(> &e. R. Co., 71 la. 206; s. c. 
 
 32 N. W. Kei>. 262. p. 2036. 
 Butler v. Ileanc, 2 Camp. 415. p. 1364. 
 Butler V. Hopper, 1 Wash. 0. C. (U. S.) 499. 
 
 p. 2010. 
 Butler V. Kelsey, 15 Johns. (X. Y.) 177. 
 
 p. 1197. 
 Butler V. Knip:ht, L. R. 2 Exch. 109. p. 192. 
 I'.utler V. Lawsou, 72 Mo. 227. p. 2056. 
 Butler r. Bee, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 383; s. c. 
 
 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 75. p. 643. 
 Butler V. People, 2 Col. T. 295. pp. 145, 146, 
 
 147, 150. 
 Butler r. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 93. 
 
 Pl>. 500, 501,. 502. 
 r'.utler r. State, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 511. p. 825. 
 Ituller r. State, 97 Ind. 378. p. 63. 
 I'.uller r. State, 3 Tex. App. 48. p. 1635. 
 I'.utkr r. Truslo\v,55Barb. (N.Y.)293. p. 484. 
 liutler r. Vassault, 40 Cal. 74. p. 2097. 
 Butler riiiversitv r. Conrad, 94 Ind. 353. 
 
 pp. 20S2, 2102. 
 Butt r. Tut li ill, 10 la. 583. pp. 1984, 1994. 
 Butterlield r. Forrester, 11 East, 60; s. c. 
 
 2 Thorn p. Xej;. 1104. pp. 1210, 1227. 
 Butterlield v. Gilchrist (Midi.), 5 West. Rep. 
 
 744. p. 307. 
 Buttertield r. Klaber, .52 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 255. 1). 1390. 
 Butterworth v. Pecare, 8 Bosw. (X. Y.) 671. 
 
 !>. 326. 
 Butterworth v. Stags, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) Cas. 
 
 2'.il. II. 147. 
 Button r. Dnwnham, Cro. Eliz. 643. p. 886. 
 Button i\ Hudson River R. Co., 18 X. Y. 248. 
 
 I). 1225. 
 Buttrani r. Jackson, 32 Ga. 409. p. 1632. 
 Butts V. Bilke, 4 Price, 240. p. 2008. 
 Ituxton r. Edwards, 134 Mass. 567. p. 1096. 
 Buzzell V. Laconia Man. Co., 48 Me. 113. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Buzzell /•. Snell, 25 X. H. 474. pp. 215, 218, 
 
 219,222.224,241. 
 Byars ;-. Mt. Vernon, 77 IH. 467. pp. 119, 120. 
 Bylngtou c. McCadden,34 la. 216. p. 1669. 
 Byles r. Colier, 5t Mich. 1. i). 912. 
 Byne, Ex [larte, 1 Ves. & B. 316. p. 188. 
 Bvnuin V. Bvnuni, 11 Ired, L. (N. C.) 632. 
 
 p. 1698. 
 Bvraui r. Galbraith, 75 Ind. 134. pp. 2034, 
 
 2037, 2(13'. I, 2043. 
 Bvrd r. ( liase, 10 Ark. 602. p. 891. 
 Byrd r. state, 1 How. (Miss.) 163. pp. 4, 8. 
 Bvrkct r. Monohon, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 83. pp. 
 
 1463, Ut'A. 
 Byrne v. Byrne, 3 Tex. 336. p. 833. 
 Bvriie V. .Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 29 3Iinu. 
 
 200. p. 20.iO. 
 Byrne i\ Xew York &c. R. Co., 10 N. E. Rep 
 
 539; s. c. 36 Hun (N. Y.), 647; 83 X. Y. 620. 
 
 p 1230. 
 
 C. 
 
 Cabiness v. Martin, 3 Dev. L. (X. C.) 454. p. 
 1199. 
 
 Cnblncs f. Martin, 4 Dev. L. (X. C.) 106. p. 
 423. 
 
 Cable V. State, 8 Blackt- 'Tid.) 531. p. 95. 
 Cabot r. Windsor, 1 Allen (Mass.), 546. p. 
 
 917. 
 Cabrera^ Ex. parte, 1 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 232. p. 178. 
 Cade V. Hatcher, 72 Ga. 359. p. 321. 
 Cadogan v. Keunett, Cowp. 435. pp. 1440, 
 
 1442, 1443. 
 Cadwaller v. Grand Trunk Co., 9 Lower 
 
 Canada Rep. 169. pp. 1151, 1154. 
 Cady V. Xorton, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 236. p. 329. 
 Cahill r. Kalamazoo Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Dougl. 
 
 (Mich.) 124. p. 1585. 
 Cahill f. London &c. R. Co., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 
 
 154; .9. c. 7 Jur. (N. S.) 1164. p. 1155. 
 Cahoon v. Marshall, 25 Cal. 197. p. 917. 
 Cahoon v. Ring, 1 Cliff. (C. C.) 592. p. 827. 
 Cain V. Cain, IB. Mon. (Ky.) 213. pp.119, 
 
 1182, 1992. 
 Cain V. Goda, 84 Ind. 209. p. 2090. 
 Cain V. Guthrie, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 409. p. 
 
 1129. 
 Cain V. Ingham, 7 Cow. X. Y. 478. pp. 53, 
 
 117, 123. 
 Cairnes r. Bleecker, 12 Johns. (X. Y.) 200. p. 
 
 1131. 
 Calder v. Moran, 49 Mich. 14. p. 1011. 
 Calder &c. Co. v. Pilling, 14 Mees. & W. 76. 
 
 p. 1283. 
 Caldwell v. Caldwell, Smith (X. IL), 239. p. 
 
 119. 
 Caldwell r. Dickson, 26 Mo. 60. p. 827. 
 Caldwell r. Greeley, 5 Xev. 258. p. 2099. 
 Caldwell v. Henrv, 76 Mo. 254. p. 1430. 
 Caldwell v. Irvine. 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 108. 
 
 p. 109. 
 Caldwell v. McWilliams, 55 Ga. 99. p. 194. 
 Caldwell r. Xew Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 
 
 X. Y. 282. pp. 310, 1237. 1346. 
 Caldwell v. Run3-an, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 184. 
 
 p. 1343. 
 Caldwell v. State, 34 Ga. 10. p. 41. 
 Caldwell r. Stale, 12 Tex. App. 3.58. p. 110. 
 Caldwell v. State, 41 Tex. 86. pp. 51, 66, 103. 
 Caldwell v. Stei)hens, 57 Mo. 589. p. 1647. 
 Caldwell Co. v. Crockett (Tex.), 4 S. W. Rep. 
 
 607. p. 4. 
 Calhoun v. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 477. p. 
 
 122. 
 Calhoun c. Williams, 32 Gralt. (Va.) 19. p. 48. 
 Calkins r. State, 18 Ohio St. 336. p. 788. 
 Calkins i: State, 21 Wis. 501. p. 2060. 
 Callahan r. Bean, 9 Allen (Mass.), 401. pp. 
 
 1224, 1232. 
 Callahan r. Caffarata, 39 Mo. 136. pp. 1189, 
 
 1194. 1195, 1200, 1480. 
 Callahan i: Mvers, 89 111. 566. p. 910. 
 Callahan i-. Warne, 40 Mo. 132. pp. 1217, 1226, 
 
 1598. 
 Callaway Co. Court v. Craig, 9 Mo. 846. p. 
 
 967. 
 Callender's Case, Whart. St. Tr. 688. pp. 67, 
 
 721. 
 Callis V. Tolson, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 80. p. 561. 
 Calllson r. Smith, 20 Kan. 28. pp. 375, 381, 
 
 386. 
 Callowav V. Varner, cited in Jacques r. 
 
 Hortoh, 76 Ala. 244. p. 356. 
 Calthorp r. Xewton, Cro. Jac. 647. p. 20. 
 Calvert c. Fitzgerald, Litt. Sel. Cas. (Kv.) 
 
 3S8. p. 361. 
 Calvert v. State, 91 Ind. 473. pp. 2o77, 2142. 
 Calye's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 63. p. 1155. 
 Caiiibridire Sav. Inst. v. Littlctield, 6 Cash. 
 
 (Mass.) 213. p. 966. 
 Camden r. Dorenius, 3 How. (U. S.) 515. pp. 
 
 560,561,942,2115. 
 Camden &c. It. Co. v. Bauldauf, 16 Pa. St. 67. 
 
 pp. 1321, 1345, 1348, 1365.
 
 xliv 
 
 TAIJI.K OF (ASKS. 
 
 Canidi'ii A(\ R. Co. ,-. Ilclknap, 21 \\\-tu\. 
 
 vN. V.I a54. i>. 1740. 
 Canu-ntn c, lUarkinan, 30 >rich. Iii8. p. X>1. 
 CniiuTon I-. .Mouigomerv, 13 Scrg. & It cTii. ) 
 
 12-<. |.. a;*, 
 rnimnm r. Watson. 40 Ml.<s. IDI. p. 1748. 
 (amp r. Brown, 48 ln«l. 575. pp. 21t<, 21'.t, '2ti. 
 Camp c. n<.-<lan,43 Mo. 5'.)1. pp. lUW, liDI'J. 
 tamp r. riiilllps, 42 (;a. •->><■".•. p. 1(!74. 
 (.'aiiipau r. Dowev,'.) Mit'li. ;?81. p. 385. 
 Camplii'll r. Allen, <U .Mo. 5S1. p. lOtW. 
 fainpboll r. IJccketl. 8 Oli. .St. 210. pp. 1722, 
 
 1723. 
 CampboU f. Cainiiboll, Co Barb. (X. Y.) 044. 
 
 p. Itoo. 
 Campbell i: Campbell, m Wis. 90. p. 1703. 
 Campbell r. Com., 84 Pa. St. 187. p. 126. 
 Campbell v. Couover, 26 111. 64. pp. 2071, 
 
 2073. 
 Campbell i-. Dntrli, .'^fi Inil. ,'>04. p. 2o39. 
 Campbell v. Fiankem, •;.") Intl. 591. p. 2030. 
 Campbell i-. Hunt, 104 lud. 210. pp. 2059, 
 
 210^.'. 
 Campbell r. .lobnson, 3 Del. Ch. 94. p. 182. 
 Campbell f. Jones, 41 Cal. 515. p. 2062. 
 Campbell r. Kearney, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 87. 
 
 p. 1209. 
 Campbell v. Klncai<i,3 T. B. :Mon. (Ky.) 560. 
 
 p. i;.4. 
 Campbell r. >filler, 1 Mart. (La.) (N. S.)614. 
 
 p. 1984. 
 Campbell r. Xew England Lite Ins. Co., 98 
 
 Mass. 381 ; g. <: 1 Big. L. Ins. Gas. 229. 
 
 pp. 991.1411.1417. 
 Campbell v. O'Brien, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 204. 
 
 p. ir.H. 
 Campbell v. O'XcUl, 64 Pa. St. 290. p. 803. 
 Campbell v. Peuusvlvauia 11. Co. (Pa.), 2 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 480. p. 1239; 
 Campbell I'. People, 109 111. riGo. pp. 1691, 1688, 
 
 17'.H,. 
 
 Campbell i: Uenwick, 2 Bradf. (X. Y.) 80. 
 
 p. 8'M. 
 Campbell r. Roberts, 66 lia. 733. p. 629. 
 Campbell v. Russell, 1:59 Mas.s. 278. p. 340. 
 Campbell r. Skldmore. 1 Tex. 475. ]>. 1995. 
 Campbell r. State, 23 Ala. 44. pp. 264,444,804, 
 
 1506. 
 Campbell v. .State, 29 Ala. 46. p. 1970. 
 Campbell I'. State, 3S Ark. 498. )>. 20'.t8. 
 Campbell r. State, 48 (ia. 353. pp. 11, 15, 83. 
 Campbell r. State, 3 Tex. App. 3:5. p. 1744. 
 Campbell r. State, 42 Tev. .591. p. 313. 
 Campbell v. Strong, Hemp. C. C. (C. S.) 265. 
 
 p. 124. 
 Campbgll v. Thrclkeld, 2 Dana (Kv.), 425. p. 
 
 1198. 
 Campbell v. Webster, 2 Man. G. & Sc. 253. 
 
 p. 947. 
 Campbell v. Wilson, 3 Rast, 294. p. 101.3. 
 (;anal Co. r. Bonham, 9 Watt.-i & S. (Pa.) 27 
 
 p. 1087. 
 Canceml r. People. H X. Y. 128; «. f. 7 -Vbb. 
 
 Pr. (N. Y. 271. pp. 4. 5, 6, 75, 88. 
 Candler I-. Ilaiiimniid, 29 (Ja. 493. p. 20i>9. 
 Camller r. Haiiimoiid. 2:! <ia. 493. pp. 108, 
 
 2iKi3, 2075. 
 Canlleld r. Xortln-rn R. Co., 18 Barb. ( X. Y.; 
 
 rm. p. 1367. 
 
 Cannon c. Alsbiirj-, 1 A. K. .Marsh. (Kv.) 
 
 76. pp. 1977. 
 Cannon i: Bullock, 26 (la. 431. p. 1977. 
 Cniiiion f. Peebles, 4 Ircd. L. (N. V.) 204. p. 
 
 1440. 
 Cannt.n r. State, 57 Miss. 147. p. 121. 
 Cannon r. Stnte, 3 Tex. 31. pp. 1990, 1902. 
 Cannon c. State, 5 Tex. .\pp. :M. p. 127. 
 Cannon. In re, 47 Mich. 1^1. p. 188. 
 Cautwell r. State, 18 i)h. st. 477. p. 19o3. 
 
 Capo (ilrardeau \o. Co. r. Brulhl, 51 Mo. 
 
 141. p. 81U. 
 Capebarl r. Stewart, '.>o X. ('. 101. p. 27. 
 I (ai'erlon c. Nickel, 4 W. Va. 137. p. 35. 
 
 Capital Bank r. Armstrong, (12 Mo. 60. pp. 
 I lo3t, 1037, UWI7, KU.l. 
 
 I Capital .Ve. Bank i. Hentv,5 C. P. Dlv. 514. 
 p. 14.13. 
 C.irbrev r. Willis, 7 Alien , Mass.), 364. pp. 
 I 104.), 11, W. 
 I Cardwell r. Strotlier, Lilt. Sel. Cas. 429;». c. 
 
 12 .\m. Dee. 32ii. p. 889. 
 ! Careaga r. Feriiald, i>i; Cal. ;i.M. p. 2084. 
 Carew c. Howard,! Root (Conn.), 323. pp. 
 
 112, 119. 
 Carey i: Chicago \c. R. Co., 61 Wis. 71. p. 
 
 1717. 
 Carev r. McDougald, 7 (Ja. 84. p. 1023. 
 Carev v. HIcbmond. 92 Ind. 2.')9. p. 372. 
 Carlss r. Taiter.sall, 2 Man. & ii. 890. p. 1031. 
 Carl r. Knott, It; la. 379. p. ^5^. 
 Carland j-. Cunningbam, 37 Pa. St. 228. p. 
 
 607. 
 Carleton v. People, 10 Mleli. 2:>0. pp. 816, 
 
 1507. 
 Carlin v. Chicago \c. ii. Co., 37 Iowa, 316. 
 
 pp. 1224, 12:1,-). 
 Carlisle i: Hill, I'J Ala. 3;iS. pp. 1669, 1076, 
 
 1681. 
 Carlisle r. Sheldon, 3S Vt. 419. pp. 1.12.), 1928, 
 
 1932, 1978. 
 Carlioii 1-. Baldwin, 22 Tex. 724. pp. 1439, 
 
 1444. 
 Carllon r. Badi. 22 \. II. .Vi9. p. 1377. 
 Carman r. Newi'll, 1 Denio (X. V.), 2."i p. 53. 
 Carmarthen c. Kvans, lo .Mi-es.A W. 274. pp. 
 
 95, 96. 
 Carmichael, In re, 36 .Via. 514. p. 375. 
 Carnal r. Peoide, 1 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 272. 
 
 pp. 87, J8, 96, lIKl. 
 Caring c. Lilclilleld, 2 Mich. .340. |). 762. 
 Games c. Pratt. 15 .Vbb. Pr. (N. s.) 3:17 ;«. c. 
 
 36 \. Y. Sui.er. ;5til. p. 3lti. 
 Carpenter r. .Vmbro-^an, 2o 111. 170. p. 334. 
 Carpenter r. Bennelt. 4 Kla. 2S4. p. ■V>4. 
 Carpenter r. Blake. 2 Laiis. (.\. Y.; 2n<J. pp. 
 
 504,505, 51.'). 
 Carpenter r. Blake, 10 IIuu (X. Y.), 053. p. 
 
 449. 
 Carpenter r. Dame, lolnd. 125. p. 128. 
 Carpenter r. Kastern Transportation Co., 71 
 
 X. V. 547. i>. 514. 
 Carpenter r. (ialloway, 7:t Iml. 418. p. 2o41. 
 Carpenti-r r. (;rjiliain.'42 Mich. 191. p. 912. 
 Carpenter r. (iwynn, :J5 Barb. (X. Y.) 395. p. 
 
 1012. 
 Carpenter r. Miles, 17 B. Mon. (Ky. )602. p. 
 
 951. 
 Carpenter f. Xlxon, 5 Hill (X. Y.),26o. pp. 
 
 4.59, .526. 
 Carpenter r. Peojile, 64 N. Y. 48.3. i). 31. 
 (Carpenter v. I'eople, 8 Barb. (X. \.) 693. p. 
 
 816. 
 Carpenter r. Pierce, 13 X. H. 403. p. 17.52. 
 Carpenter estate, 4 How. (MIsu.) 1(>3, 106. 
 
 p. 4. 
 Carpenter f. llz, 4 (Jralt. ( Va. 1 270. p. .552. 
 "Carpenter r. SI 111 well 11 N. Y. 61. p. 17o,5. 
 Carpentler r. Tbiirslon, 24 Cal. 26S. p. 827. 
 Carpiie r. London »Ve. R. Co., 5 g. B. (49. pp. 
 
 1236, 12:17. 
 Carr r. ("rain. 7 Ark. 241. p. 1.585. 
 Carr c. Ivlw.irdr., 1 Mo. 1:17. p. 2o55. 
 Cam-. Moore, 41 \. H. i:il. )>. :197. 
 Carr v. siaie,5 '\'i'\. App. 1.5:1. p. 1744. 
 Carr r. Stale. 41 Tev. .54.1. p. 1732. 
 Carr r. Tbotnas, :U Ind. 29-2. n. 2108. 
 Carrlco r. .Motiee, 1 Dana (Ky.), 6. pp.289, 
 294, 1506.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlv 
 
 Carrlco v. Meldrum, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 224. p. 119.5. 
 Carrier ^•. Dorrancc, 19 S. C. .W. p. 1329. 
 Carrifcan v. Ina. Co., 122 Mass. 298. p. 981. 
 Carrinffton v. Brunts, 1 McLean (U. S), 174. 
 
 p. 106(1. 
 Carriugton v. Ilaucock, 23 Mo. App. 299. p. 
 
 2064. 
 Carrington v. Hutson, 28 Hun (N. Y), 371. 
 
 p. 183. 
 Carrington ?•. Parilic Mail S. S. Co., 1 Cal. 
 
 475. pp. 1747, 1756. 
 Carroll v. Beuicia, 40 Cal. 390. p. 560. 
 Carroll v. IJohan, 43 Wi.s. 218. p. 2037. 
 Carroll r. Bowler, 40 Ark. 168. p. 2110. 
 Carroll v. Gillion, 33 Ga. 530. p. 1045. 
 Carroll r. Hangartner, 66 Wis. 511. p. 2100. 
 Carroll r. Minnesota &C. K. Co., 13 Minn. 
 
 93(1. p. 1235. 
 Carroll r. .More, ,30 AVi."?. 574. p. 2100. 
 Carroll r. Paul, 16 Mo. 226. p. 1618. 
 Carroll r. Paul, 19 Mo. 102. pp. 325, 1708. 
 Carroll r. Boherts, 23 Ga. 492. p. 1634. 
 Carroll r. Sanders, 38 Ark. 216. p. 2128. 
 Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28. p. 1548. 
 Carroll v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 315. p. 
 
 116. 
 Carroll r. State, 5 Neb. 31. pp. 77, 78, 676. 
 Carroll v. Upton. 3 N. Y. 272. p. 942. 
 Carroll, Will of, 50 Wis. 437. p. 2026. 
 Carson r. Cross, 14 la. 463. p. 2097. 
 Carson r. Cumniings, 69 Mo. 325. p. 1607. 
 Carson r. Henderson, 34 Kan. 406. i). 2093. 
 Carson v. State, 50 Ala. J34. pp. 69, 70, 1733. 
 Carson v. Watson, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 88. p. 1938. 
 Carter v. Baker, 1 Sawyer (U. S.), 512. p. 
 
 17S0. 
 Carter r. Bennett, 4 Fla. 284. pp. 561, 1698. 
 Carter i\ Bennett, 6 Fla. 214. pp. 289, 1506. 
 Carter v. Carter, 101 Ind. 451. p|). 738, 770. 
 Carter r. Connell, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 392. p. 338. 
 Carter v. Ford Plate Glass Co., 85 Ind. 180. 
 
 1>I). 1906, 1974. 
 Carter v. Holman, 60 Mo. 498. p. 2109. 
 Carter r. Jones, 1 Mood. & Rob. 281 ; s. c. 6 
 
 Carr. & P. 64. i)p. 217, 219. 
 Carter r. State, 56 Ga. 463. pp. 31, 103, 576, 
 
 l'.»05. 
 Carter v. Prior, 8 Mo. App. 577. p. 2094. 
 Carter r. State, 2 Ind. 617. pp. 727, 733, 783, 
 
 1515, 1520. 
 Carter r State, 8 Tex. App. 372. p. 115. 
 Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. II. 105. p. 342. 
 Carter v. Toussalnt, 5 Barn. & Aid. 255. p. 
 
 914. 
 Carter r. Whallev, 1 Barn. & Aid. 11. p. 1100. 
 Carthage f. I'.uckher,8 Bradw. (111.) l.")2. p. .3. 
 Carthage Turiip. Co. r. Andrews, 102 lud. 
 
 138. i)|). 497, 1482. 
 Cartright r. Clopton, 25 Ga. 85. p. 244. 
 Cartwright r. State, 16 Tex. App. 483; s. c. 49 
 
 Am. Pep. 826. p. 795. 
 Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230. p. 132. 
 Caruthers v. Crockett, 7 Bea (Tenu.), 91. p. 
 
 2065. 
 Carver r. Carver, 44 Ind. 265. p. 2123. 
 Carver r. Carver, 97 Ind. 497. pp. 1619, 1647. 
 Carver v. Compton, 51 Ind. 451. jip. 2057, 
 
 2101. 
 Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 1. pp. 1703, 
 
 2114. 
 Carv r. SUcox, 5 Ind. 370. p. 1997. 
 Casat r. State, 40 Ark. 511. p. 119. 
 Caseo Bank r. Keene, .53 Me. 103. p. 1758. 
 Case r. Hannahs, 2 Kan. 490. ]). 1.585. 
 Case r. Illinois &e. 11. Co., 38 la. 581. p. PJ69. 
 Case r. Weber, 2 Ind. 108. p. 1642. 
 Cases of the County Judges, 3 Hughes (U. 
 
 S.),576. p. 8. 
 
 Casevr. New York &c. R. Co., 6 Abb. X. C. 
 
 (N.'Y.) 104. p. 1232. 
 Casev V. State, 37 Ark. 67. p. 75. 
 Casey v. State, 20 Neb. 138. p. 2002. 
 Casey v. State, 8 Crim. L. Mag. 597. pp. 1860, 
 
 1864. 
 Casev V. State, 25 Tex. .380. p. 150. 
 CaskV V. Haviland, 13 Ala. 314. p. 1702. 
 Cason V. Tate, 8 Mo. 45. p. 2060. 
 Caspar v. O'Brien, 15 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.; (X. S.) 
 
 402. p. 339. 
 Caspari r. First German Church, 12 Mo. App. 
 
 293. p. 1410. 
 Cass V. Boston &c. R. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 448. p. 1321. 
 Cassaday v. Magher, 85 Ind. 228. p. 1756. 
 Cassard v. Hinnian, 6 Duer (X. Y.), 695. p. 
 
 603. 
 Cassedv v. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391. p. 1247. 
 Cassldy r. Conwav, 25 Pa. St. 240. p. 1079. 
 Castauedo r. State, 7 Tex. App. .582. p. 30. 
 Caster v. Thoniason, 19 Ala. 721. p. 949. 
 Castle V. Bullard, 23 How. (U. S.) 172. pp. 
 
 1.585, 1698, 1706, 1756. 
 Castle V. Candee, 16 Conn. 224. p. 938. 
 Castle r. State, 75 Ind. 147. p. 1852. 
 Castleman v. Sherry, 42 Tex. 59. p. 1784. 
 Castor V. Bavingtoii, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 505. 
 
 p. 392. 
 Castro V. Gill, 5 Cal. 40. p. 1982. 
 Caswell V. Hill, 47 X. II. 407. p. 1007. 
 Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. St. 186. 
 
 p. 1223. 
 Cathell V. Goodwin, 1 Ilarr. & G. (Md.) 470. 
 
 p. 947. 
 Catlen v. Guntcr, 11 X. Y. 368. p. 885. 
 Catlin V. Valentine, 9 Paige (X. Y.), 575. 
 
 p. 1405. 
 Cato V. State, 9 Fla. 163. pp. 108, 1698. 
 Cattell r. Dispatch Pub. Co., 88 Mo. 356; s. c. 
 
 15 Mo. Ai)p. 587. p. 2080. 
 Catterlin r. City of Frankfort, 87 Ind. 46. 
 
 pp. 1913, 19S1. 
 Catton r. Simjison, 8 Ad. A El. 136. p. 1032. 
 Candler v. Petit, 2 Hall (X. V.), 315. p. 1198. 
 Caughev v. Smith, 47 X. Y. 244. i). 891. 
 Cavan v. Els worth, 45 Ga. 283. p. 312. 
 Cavanah v. State, 56 Miss. 299. pp. 21, 25, 750, 
 
 784. 
 Cave V. Mountain, 1 Man. & G. 260; s. c. 1 
 
 Scott (X. R.) 132. p. 1142. 
 Cave V. State, 41 Tex. 182. p. 1&55. 
 Caw V. People, 3 Xeb. 357. p)). 1672, 1746, 
 
 1902, 1906, 1913. 
 Cavkcndoll, Ex parte, 6 Cow. (X. Y.) 53. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Cay wood r. Timmons, 31 Kan. 394. p. 912. 
 Cazeuove r. British Ins. Co., 3 Big. Ins. Cas. 
 
 202. p. 1417. 
 Cecil r. Beaver, 28 la. 242. p. 873. 
 Cecil Bank c. Barrv, 20 Md. 287. pp. 819, 1.507. 
 Celton V. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 67 Pa. St. 211. 
 
 p. 1321. 
 Center r. Spring, 2 la. 393. pp. 1161, 1163, 1167, 
 
 1170, 1171, 1181, 1196. 
 Center Turnpike Co. r. Smith, 12 Vt. 212. 
 
 p. 890. 
 Central &c. Corp. v. Lowell, 15 Grav (Mass.), 
 
 106. p. 325. 
 Central &c. R. Co. r. Craig, .59 Ga. 185. p. 2056. 
 Central &c. R. Co. r. Twentv-lhird Street R. 
 
 Co., .53 How. Pr. 4.5. ).. 182. 
 Central Bank r. Allen, 16 Me. 41. p. 610. 
 Central Bank v. St. John, 17 Wis. 157. pp. 
 
 219, 713. 
 Central Bank r. Tjivlor, 2 Cranch C. 0. (U. 
 
 S.) 427. p. 592. 
 Central Branch &c. R. Co. f. Andrews, 30 
 
 luiu. 590. pp. 373, 374.
 
 Xl\ 1 
 
 TABLi: or CASES. 
 
 Central Rrldgc Corp. r. nutU-r, 2 Grav 
 
 (Mass.\l;w. p. 131".i. 
 Central Nat. IJaiik c. Arthur, 2 Sweeny (N. 
 
 Y. . m. p. isi. 
 Central Nat. JJauk r. Wlilto, 37 N. Y. Supor. 
 
 2H7. i>. l5'2. 
 Central U. Co. r. Dixon. 42 On. .■?27. p. 123i. 
 Central U. Co. r. Ilmc-s, 111 iJa. 203. p. 1670. 
 Central 1£. Co. r. Mllcliell.W lia. 173. pp. 59, 
 
 775. 
 Central K. Co. r. Moire, 24 X. J. L. 824. p. 
 
 1566. 
 Central U. Co. r. SanKcr, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 231. 
 
 p. 16t!2. 
 Central Cnion Tel. Co. r. State, 110 In.l. 20<!. 
 
 p. 2112. 
 Cenlralla r. Krousc. tVt 111. 10. p. 1246. 
 Cliadlioiirn c. Franklin, 5 Urav (Mass.), 312. 
 
 pp. 310, 19S2, l<tS5. 
 Chaffee r. lulled States, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 51G. 
 
 p. aw. 
 
 Chanin r. Lynch, 11 Va. L. J. 508. pp. 14C0, 
 
 14)11. 
 Chalmers r. Shackell, 6 Car. it 1'. 475. pp. 
 
 \Ul'>, 14G0. 
 Chalmers r. Whittemore, 22 Minn. 305. pp. 
 
 1020, l'.^-'2. 
 Chamber r. Hiitc.her, 82 Ind. 50S. p. 2039. 
 Chamberlain r. Knliel(1.43 N. II. 35(i. p. 1377. 
 ChamlH-rlaiu f. Fuller, 50 Vt. 247. p. 1120. 
 Cliaiubcrlaiu r. Ma.stersou, 20 Ala. 37G. 
 
 p. i;mo. 
 Chamberlain i-. Porter, Minn.2(M). i>p. 1483, 
 
 1G08. 
 Chamberlain r. WlUson, 12 Vt. 401. pp.261, 
 
 2X3. 
 Chamberlain, Ex parte, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 49. 
 
 1>. 150. 
 Chamberlin r. P.rown, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 120. 
 
 p. 688. 
 Chamberlin r. MrCartv, 63 111. 262. p. 2066. 
 Chambi-rliii v. Milwaukee &c. K. Co., 7 Wis. 
 
 425. p. 1225. 
 Chamberlin v. Smith, 1 Mo. 482. p. 1600. 
 Chambers r. Greenwood, 68 X. C 274. pp. 
 
 768. 775. 770. 
 Chambers r. Hill. 34 Mich. 523. pp. 348, 3.50. 
 Chamber.'* r. Ma.-nn, 5 < '. 15. (N. 8.) 59. p. 192. 
 Chambers r. McGlvcron, 33 .Mo. 202. ji. 1600. 
 Chambers r. P.-opb-, U>:> 111. 415. p. 1801. 
 Chainliers r. ltubcv,47 .Mo. 00. j). OtMi. 
 Chambers r. SlK.rl, 70 .Mo. 204. p. 1028. 
 Chance r. Ilini-, (! ( onn. 231. p. 328. 
 Chaneu i: Dwlianapolls &c. R. Co., 32 Ind. 
 
 472. )ip. 451. ]'.Mil. 
 Chandelor r. I.opu.-, Cro. .I.ir. 4. i>. 926. 
 Chandler r. Alli.-oii, lo .Mich. 4C.0. p. 388. 
 Chandler r. IJarker, 2 Ilarr. (Del.) 387. pi>. 
 
 VMH, lOfiC. 
 Chandler r. IJarrctt. 21 La. Ann. .58. p. 1780. 
 Chandler r. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2. ]>. 1754. 
 Chandler r. Garr, s Mo. 4.'H. i). 1613. 
 Chandler r. Horn. .2. Mood. \Kob. 423. p. 257. 
 Chaniiler r. Keubotl. 83 111. 130. p. 63. 
 Chandler r. Thompbon, 30 Fed. Uep. 38. p. 
 
 2092. 
 Chandler r. Von noeder,24 How. (U. S.) 227. 
 
 |.p. 2»8, 1.506. 
 Chaney r. .state, 31 Ala. 342. p. 17. 
 Chapin r. flapp, 2*.) Ind. 614. p. 2033. 
 Chaplnr. Lapliam,20l'|ek. (Ma-<s.)467. p. 364. 
 Chapin I-. I'otlcr. I Hill. (N. V.) 3«'.6. ji. S.'.4. 
 Chaplin V. llonvr^. 1 Kasl, 102. pp. 912013. 
 (;hapllne f. KobfrtMon. 44 Ark. 2<r2. pp. 2, 3. 
 Chapman r. Callahan, 6<'> Mo. 'i'.r>. p. 1)>07. 
 Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 111. 517. pp. 1105, 
 
 ll'''.t. \H)1, 16.V1. 
 Cbapman r. ChlcuKO Ac. R. Co., 26 Wis. 295. 
 pp. 1404, 1722. 
 
 Chapman r. Cofttes, 26 Iowa, 288. p. 325. 
 Chapman r. Coflln,14 Grav (Mass.), 454. p. 
 
 306. 
 Chapman r. Colbv . 47 Mleh. 46. p. 1058. 
 Chapman r. I'oolev, 12 Rich. L. (S. C.) 654. 
 
 pp. 471.671. 
 fhapman c. Dodd, 10 Minn. 350. p. 1485. 
 Capman r. Krie I!. Co., M N. Y. 579 p. 1758. 
 Chapman r. Kean<-, 3 Ad. & Kl. 193; «. c. 4 
 
 N.v. .t M. 607. p. 044. 
 Chapman r. .Maeutcliln, 1 Craw. * Dl.\. 
 
 (Irish) Clr. ]1\. p. 20. 
 Chapman r. .McCormlck, 66 .V. Y. 470. pp. 
 
 1703. 1717,1710. 
 Chapman t: Murcli, 10 Johns. (X. Y.) 290. p. 
 
 026. 
 Cha|>nian r. Welles, Klrbv (Conn.), 132. p. 
 
 11*. 177. 
 Chappel r. Spencer. 23 Harb. (N. Y.) 584. p. 
 
 1032. 
 Cha|ipell r. Allen, 38 Mo. 213. p)). 1638, 1C83, 
 
 16,S5. 
 Chappel! r. Stale. 71 Ma. 322. pp. 540,545,546. 
 Charles r. Malolt, 6.-. liul. 1S4. p. 20C4. 
 Charles r. Mllb-r, 3t; .Ma. 141. !>. 324. 
 Charles r. Patch , 87 Mo. 4,'iO. jip. 1.598. 1600. 
 Charleston Ins. Co. v. Corner. 2 Gill i.Md.), 
 
 411. pp. ,S10, 094. 
 Charlotte r. (^houteau, 33 Mo. 194; «. c. 25 Mo. 
 
 4(k5. j.p. 810. 1507. 
 Charnock'sCasc.3Salk.81; «. <•. Holt, 133; 12 
 
 How. St. Tr. 137S. p. 41. 
 Chartered \ .Merc.iiilllc Hank of India r. 
 
 Dickson, L. It. 3 P. C. .574. p. 1144. 
 Chase r. Kvov, ."iS Cal. 34S. p. 200!t. 
 Chase r. Ilorton. 143 Mass. 118. ].. 1(VJ7. 
 Chase r. .Jennliips. 3S .Me. 44. p. 54. 
 Chaser. People, 40 111. 352. pp. 11,117,120. 
 
 122, 188:1. 
 Chase r. Ualston, 30 Pa. St. 5.39. pp. 1444, 
 
 1446. 1447. 
 Chase r. Slate. 46 Miss. 683. P. 81. 
 Chase, Trial of, cited pp. 67. 1505. 1514. 
 Chalaui|ua Co. IJank r. White, 23 N. Y. 847. 
 
 JI. 2(18(1. 
 Chatham Uank r. Retts, 9 llosw. (N. Y.) 652. 
 
 ji. 88.5. 
 Cheatham v. Riddle. 12 Tex. 112. j). 1767. 
 Cheek v. Aurora. 92 Ind. 107. p. 1 7.56. 
 Cheek r. Slate. .35 Ind. 492. p. 1940. 
 Cheesebrough f. Parker, 25 Kan. .VJe. p. 
 
 2IK'.2. 
 Chelton »•. State. 45 Md. .56.5. pp. 412. X\\. 
 Chemical Nat. Hank r. Kohner, .58 IInw. Pr. 
 (N. V.)2G7;». .-. 8 Daly (N. V.), 5.lo. p. 
 1023. 
 Cheiiervr. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 224. p. I4A9. 
 Chenevr. Arnold, 18 Uarb. (X. Y.)43J. p. 
 
 324. ■ 
 Chenev r. Holgate. Tlravt. (Vt.) 171. pp. 
 
 1064, '1965. 10»m;, l'.H?7, J9«7.' 
 Cherrv r. Sla<le. 3 Miirph. (X. C.) 82. p. 1081. 
 CherrV r. Stale, 6 Fla., 670. y. 171. 
 Cherrv r. Sween\, 1 Craneii t. I'. (U.S.), 
 
 .53(1. ■ pp. 1010. lok'.. 
 Chesapeake tVc. Can.'il Co. c. Knapp.O Pet. 
 
 M'. S. ).'.41. p. 1644. 
 Chesapeake .tc. R. Co. r. Patton, 9 W. Vn. 
 
 61H. pp. 124.125. 
 Chesapeake Rank r. Swatii, 29 Md. 483. p. 
 
 821. 
 Chesapeake Clnh r. Stale. tKJ Md. 446. p. 
 
 262. 
 Cheslevr. Chcslcy, 37 X. II. 2-»!». pp. 215,217, 
 
 218, 2"lO, 'i^•<. 
 Chess f. ChesH.l Penn. 41. p. 479. 
 Chester f. Kakerslleld Town Hall Assn., 64 
 
 Cal. 42. I.. r.-M. 
 Chester V. Rgwcr, 65 Cal. 46. i>. 256.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 Chester r. State, 1 Tex. App. 702. p. laW. 
 Chevarrio r. State, 17 Te.\. App. ,300. ].. 1744. 
 Chew V. Morton, 10 Watts (Pa.), 321. p. 1080. 
 Chews V. Driver, 1 N. J. L. ICO. j). 1991. 
 Cliiai)ella I-. lirown, 14 La. Ann. 18'J. p. 358. 
 Chicago r. r.ixin, 84 111. 82. p. 1240. 
 Chicago r. Crooker, 2 Bradw. (111.) 279. pp. 
 
 124(5, 1249. 
 Chicago r. Dermody, 61 111. 431. pp. 1924, 
 
 1925. 
 Chicago r Fowler, fiO 111. 322. p. 1249. 
 Chicago I-. Gavin, 1 1'.radw. (111.) 302. p. 1247. 
 Chicago r. Hesing, 83 111. 104. p. 1747. 
 Chicago r. Ji>lin.-::on, 53 111. 91. p. 1247. 
 Chicago r. Langlass, t;6 111. ;561. p. 1249. 
 Chicago V. IMajor, 18 111. 349. p. 1'224. 
 Chicago V. McCartv, 75 111. (•>02. i). 1249. 
 Chicago r. McCJivin, 78 111. 347. pp. 721, 1246. 
 Chicago V. Murpliv, 84 111. 224. p. 1249. 
 Chicago (-.Rogers; 61 111. 188. p. 1997. 
 Chicago r. Starr's Administrator, 42 111. 174. 
 
 Pl>. 1233, 1234. 
 Chicago &c. K. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017. 
 
 Iip. 1322. 1344, 1345, 1347, 1365. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 344. pp. 
 
 64, 1(12, 3.53. 
 Chicago &c. K. Co. v. Austin, 69 111. 429. p. 
 
 1305. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Avery, 109 111. 314. pp. 
 
 KWT, 1706. 
 Chicago tVcc. R. Co. v. Becker, 76 111. 25; s. c. 
 
 84 111.483. pp. 1232, 1234. 
 Chicago &c. It. Co. v. Bell, 70111. 102. p. 1299. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bert, 69 111. 3SS. p. 1774. 
 Chicago &c. li. Co. v. Blake, 116 111. 168. p. 
 
 1.500. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bonilleld, 104 111. 223. 
 
 p. 1207. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. i'. Bragonier, 13 Bradw. 
 
 (111.) 467. ])p. 758, 781. 
 Chic'ago &c. R. Co. v. Buttolf, 66 111. 347. pp. 
 
 64, 102. 
 Chicago &o R. Co. V. Coss, 73 111. 394. p. 1235. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Danierell, 81 111. 450; s. 
 
 c. 3 Cent. L. J. 768. p. 1230. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Dewey, 26 111. 25.5. p. 
 
 1235. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Dickinson, 74 111. 249. 
 
 p]>. 1332, 1334. 
 Chicago &c. It. Co. v. Dimick, 96 111. 42. pp. 
 
 2(1(13, 2071. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Dooling, 95 111. 202. p. 
 
 17.50. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Elmore, 07 111. 177. pp. 
 
 12,53, 1300. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 111. 364. p. 
 
 1284. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co r. George, 19 111. 510. pp. 
 
 12m;, l(i7(i. 
 Chicago itc. R. Co. r. Gregory, 58 111. 272. 
 
 pp, 1224. 1673. 
 Chicago &c. It. Co. V. Gretzner, 46 111. 76. 
 
 pp. 1299, 13(10. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Grillin, 68 111. 499. p. 
 
 16,53. 
 Chicago &C. R. Co. v. Ilalc, S3 111. 361. p. 
 
 1497. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Hatch, 79 111. 138. p. 
 
 1300. 
 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ilazzard, 26 111. 378. 
 
 pp. 1224, 1284. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. IIutchinHOu (111.), 11 
 
 N. East. Rep. a5,5. 1)].. 1230, 1231. 
 Chicago &c. it. Co. v. Ingersoll, 65 111. 399. 
 
 p. 642. 
 Chicairo &c,. R. Co. v. Jacob.s, 63 111. 178. pp. 
 
 129:1, 130(1. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Lambert, 10 Xorth East 
 
 Rep. 219 ; s. c. 119 111. 256. p. 496. 
 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lee, 68 111. 578 p 
 
 1300. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. r. Lewis, 109 111. 121. pp 
 
 1619, 1621, 1622, 1672, 1673, 1674. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. LiddeU, 69 111. 639. p 
 
 359. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Marseilles, 107 111. 313 
 
 p. 2061. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. McKean, 40 111. 218. p 
 
 1300. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. McLallen, 84 111. 109, 
 
 Ijp. 821, 1146. 
 Chicago &c. It. Co. v. McMahon, 1(j3 111. 485, 
 
 p. 618. 
 Cliicago &C. R. Co. v. Michie, 83 111. 427. p 
 
 1298. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Moranda, 108 111. 577. 
 
 p. 1240. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Morrissey, 18 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 47. p. 1482. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003. pp 
 
 1322, 1345, 1347. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Murray, 71 lU. 601. p 
 
 1232. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Northern Line Packet 
 
 Co., 70 111. 217. pp. 1332, 1362. 
 Chicago &.C. R. Co. v. Ostrauder, 15 X. E 
 
 Rep. 227. pp. 2041, 2043. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. Parks, IS 111. 464. p 
 
 1292. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. r. Payne, 49 111.499. p 
 
 1682. 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. r. Pennell, 110 111. 437, 
 
 pp. 1310,1311. 
 Chicago Ac. 11. Co. v. Pondrom, 51 111. 333 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 111. 510, 
 
 pp. 1229, 1295, 1298. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. Rung, 104 111, 641 
 
 )). 1750. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. Scales, 90 111. 5s9. p 
 
 1295. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. .Scott, 42 111. 132. p 
 
 1374. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Stumps, 69 111. 409. p 
 
 1232. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Sykes, 96 111.162. p 
 
 1482. 
 Cniicago Ac. R. Co. v. Townsdin, 36 Kan. 78 
 
 s. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 889. p. 2037. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Triplett, 38 111. 4S2. p 
 
 1300. 
 Chicago &i'. R. Co. v. Utlev, 38 111. 410. pp 
 
 KW.1, 1(178. 
 Chicago Ac. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 IE 
 
 510. p. 1:500. 
 Chicago Ac. It. Co. v. Young, 62 111. 238. p 
 
 1211. 
 Chicago Packing Ac. Co. v. Tilton, 86 111. 547 
 
 pp. 821,822, 1147. 
 Child V. Morlev, 8 T. R. 013. p. ,>*98. 
 Childers v. Deau, 4 Rand. (Va.) 406. p 
 
 886. 
 Childress v. Ford, 10 Smed. A M. (Miss.) 25 
 
 p. 121. 
 Childs r. State, 76 Ala. 93. pp. 1768, 1769, 
 
 1770, 1771. 
 Chiles c. Smith, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 460. p 
 
 2080. 
 
 Chiles V. Wallace, 83 Mo. 8.5. pp. l.'>94, 1667, 
 Chiivinan r. Tucker, 38 Wis. 43. p. 1662. 
 (.'hiiniendale r. Masson, 4 Camp. 174. ]>. 380, 
 Chirac i\ Iteinecker. 2 I'et. (U. '*^.) 613. p 
 
 1669. 
 Chltty r. Selwvn, 2 Atk. 359. p. 1143. 
 Choate r. Crowniushield, 3 Clitf. (U. S.) 184. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1.345. 
 Choate r. Ilathawav, 73 111. 518. p. 2053. 
 Choen v. State, 85 lud. 209. pp. 2108, 2109.
 
 xlviii 
 
 TABLE UF CASES. 
 
 Choice r. State, 31 Gn. 424. pp. 341. 498, 1635, 
 
 1T*|. 
 Cholston f. Cholston, 31 C,a. fi-25. p. 1917. 
 Choiuiuotto f. Bariida, -28 Mo. 491. pp. 1642, 
 
 1)'>4(;. 
 Cliouteau r. Jnplterlron Works. 83 Mo. 73. 
 
 1.. HtU. 
 Clioiitiau r. I'iorro, Mo. .3. p. T>1. 
 Chouti-ati r. UUv. 1 Minn. l'.>2. p. in«">i>. 
 Choiitonii r. .'^oarcv, 8 .Mo. 733. pp. 328, 804. 
 Clioiiliaux f. I.cacb, 18 Pa. bt. 224. pp. 865, 
 
 l.Vi^i, 1315. 
 Chc.wu f. rarrott, 14 C. 1\. (n. 8.) 74. p. 192. 
 Chrlfit r. State, 21 Ala. 37. p. 128. 
 Christie r. (;ripgs,2 Camp. 79; s. c. Tbonip. 
 
 Carr. raj.s. IM. pp. 12;!(i. 12;J7, 1285, 1293. 
 Christie r. State, 44 1 n<l. 4il8. p. 5o. 
 Chrlbtlne r. W liltehill, 10 Serg. & 11. (Pa.) 
 
 212. !>. 19to. 
 Chrlstv r. .M ver.s, 21 Mo. 112. pp. 1980, 2121. 
 Chrlsiv f. Snillli,801n(l. .'■73. p. 2(i71. 
 Chiilil)' r. Klannagau, 6 Carr. & P. 431. pp. 
 
 14f.3. 1404, 14t;8. 
 Chnl'l) r. Westlev, 6 Carr. A P. 436. p. 1468. 
 Chureh f. Cliureh, cited Sir T. liaym. 260. 
 
 p. 889. 
 Chureh r. (ioodln. 22 Kan. 527. p. 2069. 
 Chiirelilll r. ClMirehlll, 12 Vt. 061. p. 53. 
 Churehill r. Lee. 77 N. C. 341. i>p. 219,236. 
 Churohwell r. Kogers, llardlu (Ky.), 182. 
 
 p. 214. 
 Chute r. State, 19 Minn. 271. pp. 363, 679. 
 Clcelv r. State, 13 Siiie.l. & M. (Miss.) 202. 
 
 pp.'lSS;?. 1S42, 18^13, 1857. 
 Clllev r. IJartlett, 19 N. II. 312. pp. 1921, 1923. 
 Cincinnati r. Walls, 1 Ohio St. 222. i.. 891. 
 Cineiniiatl ite. U. Co. r. Cliironi, 113 Imi. 
 
 4011 ; 8. c. 15 X. E. Uep. 524. ]<. 2i«8. 
 Clnelnnatl \c. R. Co. c. Eaton, 1)4 Ind. 474; 
 
 ». r. 48 Am. Pep. 179. p. 14&5. 
 Clnelnnatl \e. U. Co. r. .Marcus, 38 111. 219. 
 
 pj.. ll.'il. 11.54. 
 Clnelnnatl .V<-. U. Co. r. Pontius, 19 Oh. St. 
 
 22!. p. 1.374. 
 Cincinnati Jfcc. R. Co. r. Spanler, 85 lud. 171. 
 
 p. 1482. 
 Clrcf. Klghtor, 11 La. Ann. 140. pp. 1983, 
 
 19ai. 
 Citizens' Bank r. Adams, 91 Ind. 280. p. ,^76. 
 Citizens' Pank r. Strauss, 20 La. Ann. 736. 
 
 pp. 11,85, 12'.i. 
 Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 41 Pa. St. 387. 
 
 p. 997. 
 Cltv f. Habcock, 3 WaU. (U. S.) 240. p. 2050. 
 CltvlSank f. Kent, 57 <;a. 285. pp.211, 254, 
 
 .3^2, 1727, 1702, 1776, lKt7. 
 Cltv Pauk f. McChcauey, 20 N. Y. 240. p. 
 
 Ji<i.5. 
 CItyPankf. Perkins, 29 X. Y. 5.54. p. 1023. 
 Cltv Pnuk of New II:ivou f. Perkins, 4 IJosw. 
 
 (.V. V.) 4211. ji. liiit. 
 Cltv Council f. Haywood, 2 Nott & McC. 
 
 (S. C. ) 3ii."<. p. ."^28. 
 Cltv of Atchison v. Bvrncs, 22 Kan. 05. p. 
 
 *2<t51. 
 City of Columbus r. Dabn, 30 Ind. .TKi. p. 
 
 3»5. 
 Cltv of Indianapolis r. Murphy, 91 Ind. 382. 
 
 p'. lliv. 
 City of Mattoon I-. Fallln, 113 111. 249. pp. 
 
 1214, 162.-.. 
 Cltyof Norwich, The, 4 Ben. (U. S.) 271. pp. 
 
 1*14.1.300. 
 Cltv of .St. Louis r. Kruln, 9Mo. App. 690. 
 
 p'. 747. 
 Cltv of .St. Lonls r. St. Louis U. Co., 14 Mo. 
 
 Api'.221. I.. H-21. 
 Cltv of St Loul8 r. Wcbcr, 44 Mo. 647. p. ' 
 
 K21. i 
 
 12. P. 46 
 (N. v.). 
 
 Clatlln f. Bacre, 28 Uun (X. V.}, 2i>4. pp. 
 
 214,210. 
 Clailin V. Meyer, 75 N. Y.260; t. c. 11 JoneB 
 
 & Sp. 1. pp. 121, 13:«'., 1337, l:«7, lOol. 
 Clallln f. Ros>enlper>.'. 42 M... 439. p. 1440. 
 Claggetf. Force, 1 l»ana i Ky. >, 429. p. 106. 
 Clair V. People, 8 Cniu. L.' Mag. 184. pp. 
 
 1867, 1870, 187-J. 
 Clantoii f. Stale, 13 Tex. App..l39. p. 66. 
 Clanton r. Stale, 2ii Tex. App. 016. ji. 1745. 
 Clapp r. Broniagbau, 9 Cow. (X. Y.) 530. p. 
 
 1037. 
 Clapp r. Clapj., 137 Mass. 183. p. 1962. 
 Clapp r. Minneapolis \c. H. Co., 86 Minn. 6; 
 
 a. r. 2'.iX. \\ . K. p. ;!4o. p. 1711. 
 Clapp I-. Tirr.ll, 2ti Pick. 247. V. 1447. 
 Claiip r. W11-...I1, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 280. p. 486. 
 Clardl r. Callcunt, 24 Tex. 170. p. 343. 
 Clare v. People, 9 Colo. 122. pp. 1807, 1870. 
 Clareinoiitf. Carlton, 2 X. 11.369. p. 1078. 
 Clark r. Allen, 11 It. I. 439; s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 
 
 4%. p. 9111. 
 Clark V. Barnwell. 12 How. (I'. S.) 272. pp. 
 
 1321, 1322, 1345, 1:U0, 1348. 1349, 1356. 
 Clark V. liiKlnw, 10 Me. 246. ]>. 338. 
 Clark r. lioiicl, 29 ln<i. 5.S5. p. 47o. 
 Clark r. Carter, 12 (i:i. .5o0. pp. 1983,1984. 
 Clark r. Chambers, 3 t^ B. Div. 327; i. c.l 
 
 Cent. L. .J. 11 ; 17 .\lb. L. .J. 50.5. p. 1210. 
 Clark V. Child. 60 Cal. b". p. 1750. 
 Clarke. Clark, t;5 N. C. t;55. ii. 417. 
 Clark V. Collins, 15 N. .1. L. 473. pp. 124,128. 
 Clark r. Conwav, 23 Mo. 4;i8. pp. 60o, 603. 
 Clark r. Corintli, 41 M. 449. p. 1249. 
 Clark r. Crane, 57 Cal. 629. pj.. 2085, 2086. 
 Clark r. Davis, 7 Tex. 5.50. p. 128. 
 Clark )■. Field, 42 Mich. 342. lip. 318, 342. 
 Clark r. Fitch, 2 Wend. ( N. V.^ 401. p. I49I. 
 Clark r. Fletcher, 1 Alien (Mass.), 53. p. 
 
 625. 
 Clark V. Fletcher, 96 Pa. St. 416. p. 1103. 
 Clark r. llammerle, 27 Mo. 55. pp. 1088, 1689, 
 
 1093. 
 Clark V. nannibal Ac. R. Co., 36 ,Mo. 202. pp. 
 
 1598, 1C(H), 1021, 1024. 1008. 
 Clark f. Houghton, 12 (Jray (Mass.), 38. p. 
 
 628. 
 Clark r. Ins. Co., 40 X. II. 3.33. p. 978. 
 Clark f. Lamb, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 415. p. 2003. 
 Clark r. Lowell, 1 .Mien (Mass.>, 18o. p. 739. 
 Clark r. .Mav, 2 tirav ( Mass.), 440. p. 100. 
 Clark r. .McKlvv, 11 Cal. ]rA. p. 1750. 
 Clark r. Missouri Ac. R. Co., 36 Kan. 850; «. 
 
 C. 11 I'.ic. Rep. 1311. p. 2027. 
 Clark r. Mix, 15 Conn. 1.5:{. p. 628. 
 Clarke. Molvneux.Ji; Week. K'ep. 104. p. 1480. 
 Clark I-. Muiivaii,22 Pick. 410. p. 108<>. 
 Clark 1-. Xew York, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 838. 
 
 p. 1737. 
 Clark v. Pageter, 45 111. 241. p. 1750. 
 Clark r. P.-ople, Breese (III.), 206. p. 150. 
 Clark r. Ralls, 71 la. 189; t. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 
 
 327. p. 2028. 
 Clark V. R.indall, 9 Wis. 13.'.. p. 192. 
 Clark r. Read, 5 X. .1. L. 4S0. p. l'.»8a. 
 Clark r. Ree^e. :Vi Cal. S'X pp. 2X2. 5'29. 
 Clark r. Reinigcr.Oi; la. .507. p. 377. 
 Clark f. Rii-s.1.3 Walls fPa. .21. p. 11.39. 
 Clark f. SIgoiirncv, 17 Conn. 511. p. 9t'>5. 
 Clark r. Spence, l(i Watts (Pa.),;«5. pp. 1.321, 
 
 i;tW, 1345. 
 Clark r. St. Louis Ac. R. Co., 64 Mo. 440. 
 
 11. 1:M3. 
 Cliirk r. State, 78 Ala. 474. pp. 632, 633. 
 Clark f. Stat<', 4 Ind. 1.50. p. :WL 
 Clark f. Slate, Wl Iii-I. .514. p. .52.5. 
 Clark r. Stale, 12<»hlo, 48.3. p. 1780. 
 Clark r. Slate, b Tex. App. ;!.50. pp. 1880. 1884.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlix 
 
 Clark r. Steamboat Mound Cltv, 9 Mo. 146. 
 
 J). 1584. 
 Clark r. Stronsp, 11 Xev. 76. p. 20f>9. 
 Clark V. Torritory, 1 Wash. (Terr.j 61. p. 118. 
 Clark V. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 40 N. H. 
 
 333. p. 974. 
 Clark V. Van Vranken, 20 Barb. (X. Y.), 278. 
 
 pp. ye, 118. 
 
 Crar 
 
 Clark V. Vorce, 15 AVend. (X. Y.) 193. p. 580. 
 Clark V. Vorce, 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 232. p. 
 
 1671. 
 Clark V. "Whittaker, 18 Conn. 543. pp. 1943, 
 
 1945, la-ie. 
 Clark Xat. Rank r. Bank, 57 X. Y. 126; s. c. 
 
 52 Barb. (X. Y.) 503. p. 102.J. 
 Clarke v. Arden, 16 C. B. 227; s. c. 1 Jur. 
 
 (N. S.) 710; 24 L. J. (C. P.) 162. p. 1748. 
 Clarke v. Dntcher, 9 Cow. (X. Y.) 674. pp. 
 
 9(W, 1671,1747. 
 Clarke v. Goode, 6 J. J. Matsh. (Ky.), 637. 
 
 pp. 86, 93. 
 Clarke i-. Kitchen, 52 Mo. 316. p. 1683. 
 Clarke v. Kownslar, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 617. p. 
 
 1669. 
 Clarke v. Marriott, 9 Gill (Md.), 331. pp. 
 
 822, 1507. 
 Clarke v. Kochester &c. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570. 
 
 p. 1343. 
 Clarke v. State, 35 Ga. 75. p. 1890. 
 Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. L. (X. C.) 78. pp. 460, 
 
 498, 499. 
 Clason V. Bird, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 370. p. 1586. 
 Claussen v. I. a Franz, 1 la. 226. p. 32. 
 Clay V. Xotrebe, 11 Ark. 654. p. 2122. 
 Clay V. Kobinson, 7 W. Va. 350. pp. 239, 476. 
 Clav r. Willan, 1 n. Bl. 298. pp. 1337, 1361. 
 Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. 1). 439. p. 1210. 
 Clayes v. Ferris, 10 Vt. 112. pp. .308, 309, 718. 
 Clayton v. Chicago &c. K. Co., 67 la. 238. p. 
 
 673. 
 Clayton v. School Dlst, 20 Kan. 256. p. 2101. 
 ClaVtor t'. Anthony, 6 Band. (Va.)285. pp. 
 
 289, 305, 1506. 
 Cluau'e f. llvden, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 73. p. 56. 
 Clealand r. Walker, 11 Ala. 1059. p. 1733. 
 Cleave v. Jones, 7 E.vch. 421. pp. 296, 1599, 
 
 1739. 
 Clegg v. Waterbury, 88 Ind. 21. p. 2027. 
 Clem V. State, 33 Ind. 418. pp. 73, 124. 
 Clem V. State, 42 Ind. 422. pp. 1515, 1656, 
 
 1682, 1808, 1852. 
 Clemcnce v. Auburn, 66 X. T. 334. p. 1586. 
 Clemence v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 366. 
 
 p. 1221. 
 Clement v. McConnell, 14 111. 154. p. 1125. 
 Clement i: Spear, 56 Vt. 401. p. 1921. 
 Clement, The, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 363. pp.499, 
 
 .500, .501. 
 
 Clements v. Benjamin, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 299. 
 
 1>. 1.585. 
 Clements v. Maloney, 55 Mo. 352. pp.1468, 
 
 1469, 1490, 1609, 1615. 
 Clerks' Savings Bank v. Thomas, 2 Mo. 
 
 A PI). 367. p. 2080. 
 Cleveland v. Sims, 60 Tex. 1.53; s. c. 6 S. W. 
 
 Hep. 634. p. 2093. 
 Cleveland v. Spier, 16 C. B. (n. s.) 399. p. 
 
 1210. 
 Cleveland v. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279. p. 1249. 
 Cleveland tVc. R. fo. v. Crawford, 24 Oh. St. 
 
 631. p. 1304. 
 Cleveland &g. R. Co, v. Curran, 19 Oh. St. 
 
 1. v\K 129S, 1374. 
 Cleveland &c. R. Co. r. Elliot, 28 Oh. St. 340. 
 
 p. 1230. 
 Cleveland &c. R. Co. r. X^ewcll, 104 Ind. 264; 
 
 «. c. 3 X. Fast. Hep. 836. pp. 1751, 2U41. 
 Cleveland Ac. R. Co. v. Perkins, 17 Mich. 
 
 296. p. ii2. 
 
 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Stanley, 7 Oh. St. 155. 
 
 p. 38. 
 Cleveland Paper Co. i-. Banks, 15 Xeb. 20; 
 
 s. r. IG X. \V. Rep. 8:J3. pp. 745, 747, 20J1. 
 Clews V. Bank, 106 X. Y. 398; s. c. 11 X. East. 
 
 Rep. 814. p. 251. 
 Clifford V. Drake, 14 Bradw. (111.) 75; s. c. 
 
 110 111.135. ]). 360. 
 Clifford r. Hunter, 3 Car. & P. 16; s. c. Mood. 
 
 & M. 103. p. 384. 
 Clifford V. Parker. 2 Man. & G. 910. p. 1031. 
 Clifton V. State, 53 Ga. 241. p. 129. 
 Chfton V. United States, 4 How. (U. S.) 212. 
 
 p. 2003. 
 Cline V. Brav, 1 Ore. 89. p. 1985. 
 Clingan v. Miicheltree, 31 Pa. St. 25. p. 1008. 
 Clintock V. Emick (Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep. 903. 
 
 p. 925. 
 Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 AVall. (U. S.) 434. 
 
 pp. 14, 112. 
 Clinton r. McKenzie, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 36. 
 
 pp. 309, 383. 
 Clinton v. Rowland, 24 Barb. (X. Y.) 634. 
 
 p. 585. 
 Clinton v. State, 13 Oh. St. 27. pp. 409, 414. 
 Clinton Xat. Bank v. Graves, 48 la. 229. 
 
 p. 2073. 
 Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 114. 
 
 pp. 305, 547. 
 ^lo 
 
 4a 
 
 Cloonr. Gerry, 13 Grav (Mass.), 201. pp.1171, 
 
 11:2, 1180. 
 Clore's Case. 8 Graft. (Va.)606. pp. 65, 69,72. 
 Close V. Samm, 27 la. 503. pp. 679, 680, 681, 
 
 687. 
 ClotworthT r. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 80 Mo. 220. 
 
 pp. 1297, '1483. 
 Clough V. Patrick, 37 Vt. 421. p. 340. 
 Clough V. State, 7 Xeb. 320. pp. Ill, 113, 114, 
 
 119, 120, 311, 385, 1709, 1714, 1999. 
 Cloves V. Thaver, 3 Hill (X. Y.), 564. p. 282. 
 Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263. pp. 73, 1950. 
 Cluggage r. Duncan, 1 berg. &R. (Pa.)lll, 
 
 p. 1064. 
 Cluggage V. Swan, 4 Binn. (Pa.) 150. pp. 
 
 19(56, 1983. 
 Clum V. Smith, 5 Hill (X. Y), 560. p. 1985. 
 Cluskey v. St. Eouis, 50 Mo. 89. pp. 1715, 
 
 1724. 
 Clyde V. Rogers, 24 Hun (X. Y.), 145. pp. 
 
 605, 606. 
 Clymer v. Dawkings, 3 How. (U. S.) 674. pp. 
 
 1706, 1708, 1739. 
 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones (111.), 6 West. 
 
 Rep. uol. ji. 1653. 
 Coale V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 60 Mo. 230. p. 
 
 1311. 
 Coates V. Hopkins, 34 Mo. 135. p. 376. 
 Coates r. Railroad Co., (il Mo. 38. p. 1311. 
 Coates V. Sangstou, 5 Md. 121. pp. 1124, 1693, 
 
 1698. 
 Cobb V. Fogalman, 1 Ired. L. (X. C.) 440. pp. 
 
 1668, 1674. 
 Cobb r. Griffith &c. Co., 12 Mo. App. 130. p. 
 
 315. 
 Cobb V. Griffith &c. Co., 87 Mo. 90. pp. 819, 
 
 820. 
 Cobb V. Krutz, 40 Ind. 323. pp. .577, 2051. 
 Cobb V. Page, 17 Pa. St. 469. p. 880. 
 Cobb r. Standish, 94 Me. 198. )>. 12o9. 
 Cobb V. State, 27 Ga. 648. jip. 314, 749. 
 Cobb r. State, 3 S. E. Kep. 628. i>. 2076. 
 Cobb r. Wallace, 5 Coldw. iTenu.) 539. PD, 
 
 8t;i,1126. *^*^ 
 
 Cobbeit 1-. Hudson, 1 El. & Bl. 11 ; s. c. 17 Jar. 
 
 488. pp. 257, T9(). 
 Col)l»ett V. Hudson, 15 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 988; 
 
 s. <•. 14 Jur. 982. ji. 796. 
 Cobbetl, In re, 17 Q. 15. 187. p. 152. 
 Coble 1-. State, 31 Oh. St. 100. p. 459.
 
 TAiu.i: OF casp:s. 
 
 CoblelRh I-. Ptorcc,32 Vt.788. pp. 10B8, 1069. 
 Cobiira t: llollle, 3 Mel. (Muss.) \ii. p. 
 
 Coliuni r. Mnrrav, 2 Mo. 2.%. pp. 21,W, 2131. 
 Cobiirn r. <>.lell,»> N. II. .Mo. j.p. 2t;i. 28;t. 
 C'oiluto Hank r. IJcrrv, 52 Me. 2y3. p. S25. 
 Coolutlio ItHiik t'. Ujk3kcU, 51 X. il. IW. pp. 
 
 1(^2. UirX 
 Cochlin r. Peoplo.03 111. 410; s. c. 10 Uc- 
 
 portcr, 422. pp. 19«5, ^I'S. 
 Coi'linowor v. Cocliuower, 27 lud. 253. p. 
 
 2m:. 
 
 Coclirnu r. Dlnsmoic, 49 N. Y. 249. pp. IWS, 
 
 135y. 
 Cochran r. Dodd, 16 Ind. 476. p. 2107. 
 Cochran r. Mate, tVl (ia. 731. p. 114. 
 Cochran r. State, 7 Humph. (Teun.) 544. p. 
 
 liHPT. 
 
 Cochran v. Street, 1 Wash. (Va.) 79. pp. 
 
 WSA, 1'."*;. 
 Cochran .-. Toher, 14 Minn. 3S5. pp. 1118, 
 
 1124, 1174, 12l>>. 
 Cochrane v. Halsev, 2a Minn. 52. p. 2072. 
 Cock f. State, 8 Tex. .\p|'. av.t. p. 116. 
 Cockburu r. A.shlaud Lumber Co., 54 Wis. 
 
 619. p. hViS. 
 Cocker v. Franklin Ac. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 
 
 53". pp. 1122, 1124. 1125. 
 Cockle V. Flack, 93 U. 8. .344. p . S85. 
 Cockrell v. McQuinu, 4 T. B. Mon. (K}'.) 63. 
 
 p. 1082. 
 Cockshott r. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763. p. 889. 
 Codding V. Wood, 112 Fa. St. 371. pp. 852, 
 
 854. 
 Codv V. Hou^h, 20 111. 43. p. 614. 
 CodV V. .'^tate, 3 ]k)W. (.Ml(<8.) 27. p. 121. 
 Coffee r. Groover, 2ii Fla. W. p. 199S. 
 Cotfeen v. .McCord, &5 Ind. Mi. p. 2042. 
 Coffelt V. State, 19 Tex. App. 436. p. 1777. 
 Coffett V. Wise, 62 Ind. 451. p. 1006. 
 Conin ». Anderson, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 395. p. 
 
 489. 
 Collin r. Cltv Council, 26 la. 535. p. 20.'>4. 
 Collin V. (■(>illn,4 Mas.~. 2. pj). 1.50."), 1515. 
 Collin V. Gephart, lo la. 2.56. pji. I'.i4», 194.5. 
 Collin V. Vincent, 12 Cash. ^.Maso.; 98. p. 
 
 3.53. 
 CoK'an r. Ebden, 1 Burr. 3S:}. jip. 1986, 1987, 
 
 l;l8".t, 2001. 
 Cogburn f. Spence. 15 .\la. .549. p. 9<')6. 
 CoKswell V. State, 49 Ga. 103. pi>. 1976, 1977, 
 
 1988. 
 Cohea r. State, il Tex. App. 153. p. 308. 
 Cohen r. Dupout, 1 .'iandf. S. C. (>'. Y.) 260. 
 
 p. loai. 
 Cohen V. Kvler, 27 Mo. 122. p. 891. 
 Cohen V. Jjobert, 2 Strobh, L. (S. C.) 410. 
 
 p. P.<23. 
 Cohen V. Slate, .50 Ala. 108. pp. 1740, 1839. 
 Cohen V. Slate, II T.\. Al>p. 337. p. 1.56(». 
 Cohen V. Trowliridu'e, 6 K;in. 3.><.5. p. 2130. 
 Cohen, Matter «>f , fi ( al. 494. p. 1.52. 
 Cohn, Kx parte, .5.5 fal. I'.i3. p. 1.52, 
 Cohol V. .\llen. 37 la. 449. p. 2093. 
 Cohron r. .stale, 20 «,a. 7.53. pp. 118, 1912, 1934. 
 Colt <•. Planer, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) (X. Y.) 140. 
 
 p. 891. 
 Colt r. Waples, 1 Minn. 134. p. 17.50. 
 Coker r. HirRe, 10 Ga .336. ]>. 1391. 
 Coker r. Haves 16 Kla. .3«V8. ).p. \W\. 1984. 
 Coker v. Stale, 20 Ark. .53. pp. I'.KW, 1'.k)7, 1982. 
 Coker f. Slate, 7 Tex. Apj.. 8;i. p. 30. 
 Colby f. Heaver Dam, 31 \ViH, 28.5. p. 1249. 
 Colcheeter r. Hrrx.ke, 7 Q. H. 337. p. 1221. 
 Colo r. Itovd, 47 .Mich. W. p. 2037. 
 Colo r. Crawford. iV> Tex. 124. |>. 20'27. 
 Colo v. CurtlH, 16 .Minn. 182. pp. 116.{, 1186, 
 
 ll-ff. 
 Colo 1-. Daviee, 1 Ld. Uaym. 724. p. 1440. 
 
 Colo V. DrIskell, 1 RIackf. (Ind.) 16. p. 2106. 
 Cole V. Cioodwin, 19 Wentl. (\. V.) 251. p. 1365. 
 Colo V. llebb, 7 Gill & J. (.Md.) 20. pp. 1507, 
 
 15116. 
 Cole V. 1IIII.'<, 44 X. II. 227. p. 1029. 
 CkIo r. .leshup, 10 X. V. IW. p. tU2. 
 Colo V. Perrv, 6 Cow. (X. Y.) 5S4. p. Jll. 
 Colo V. Spann, 13 Ala. 637. li. 1733. 
 Colo f. Swan, 4 ij. tireeno (la.), 32, i>p. 106, 
 
 1917, 1918, pi'.il. • 
 
 Cole r. While, 26 Wend. (X. Y.) 511. p. 1441. 
 Colee I-. Stale, 75 Iiid. .511. iip. 2107, 212:1. 
 Coleman c. ( Ii-mmiiis, 23 (al. 245. p. 822. 
 Coleman r. Dobbins, 8 Intl. 1.56. p. 561. 
 Coleman c. (aiuiore, 49 Cal. 340. p. 2o87. 
 Coil-man r. Ilagermnn, MS., died 6 Cow. 
 
 (X. V.) .564. p. 6'J. 
 Coleman c. Moodv, 4 Hen. & M. (Va.") 1. pp. 
 
 696, l'.»28, l'.i3il, I'.iTii. I'.i75, 2062. 
 Coleman i: People, 65 X. Y. 81. p. 298. 
 Coleman r. l{oberl-i, 1 Mo. y7. p. 888. 
 Coleman v. Soiitlicasteru K. Co., 4 Hurl. A 
 
 Colt. 699. p. 1232. 
 Coleman r. Stale, 59 Ala. 52. pp. 1820, 1861, 
 
 1862, 1864, 18«!5. 
 Coleman r. SI ale, 28 Oa. 23. p. 1984. 
 Coleman c. Sta(e, .5'i .Mi>s. 484. ]>. 66. 
 Coleman c. Wolcott, 4 Day (Coun.) 388. p. 
 
 291. 
 Colgan r. Ayniar, Labor Supp. (N. Y.) 27. p. 
 
 854. 
 Cr.Ilajran v. I?nriis, 57 Mo. 449. p. 1009. 
 Colletl v. Smilh, 143 Mass. 473. p. 1112. 
 Collier c. Idlev. 1 Hradf. (X. Y. j 9.5. p. 1.589. 
 Collier V. Xokes, 2 Car. ,t Kir. 1012. p. 636. 
 Collier r. Simpson, 6 Car. & P. 73. pp.QlS, 
 
 782, 7S;l. 
 Collier c. Stale. 20 Ark. 36. pp. 119, 120, 1982. 
 Collier f. Swinnev, 13 Mo. 478. p. 1.5'.t3. 
 Colling r. Stale, 21) Tex. .\pp.400. p. 1784. 
 Collins f. Albany Ac. U. Co., 12 Barb. (X. 
 
 V.)492. p. 1223. 
 Collin.s r. Hardlni,'. 65 Mo. 496. pp. 1980, 2128. 
 Collins r. Benburv, 5 Ired. (X. C.) 118. p. 
 
 8i5u 
 Collins r. Bennett, 46 X. Y. 490. pp. 1318, 
 
 1322, 13-25. 
 Collins v. Boston Ac. U. Co., lo Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) .VMi. |>. IKVi. 
 Collins V. Hrush, 9 Wend. (X. Y.) 198. p. 
 
 1411. 
 Collins r. Cave, 9 .Inr. (N. s.) 297; s. c. 4 
 
 Hurl. &X.22.5. p. :«1. 
 Collins V. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, .324. p. 
 
 Collins r. Evans, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 804. p. 
 
 14P.I. 
 Collins V. Frost, .54 Ind. 242. p. 19.37. 
 Collins t'. .Mack, 31 Ark. 6S.5. p. i:U. 
 C«dllns r. Magli<e, 32 Ind. 268. p. -2069. 
 Collins f. I'eople, 48 111. 14.5. j.. ,.5. 
 Collins r. State, 5 Tex. App. 38. p. 1.5»K). 
 Collins f. Slate, 6 Tex. App. 7'2. ii. -JO-.tS. 
 Collins V. Stephenson, 8 Grav (>las».), 438. 
 
 p. *.»7. 
 Collins Man. Co. v. Marcv, 25 Conn. 242. p. 
 
 1109. 
 Collver r. Pennsylvania U. Co. (X. J.), 6 
 
 All. Hep- 137. (i. l-r.'.i. 
 Color.'Klo SprlngH v. Ilewilt, 3 Colo. 275. p. 
 
 KW. 
 Cobiuitt V. Thomas, 8 Oa. 2.58. p. 1713. 
 C<dt r. Kves, 12 Conn. 243. i>p. 13, 43. 
 Colt r. People, 1 Park. Cr. R. (X. Y.; 611. pp. 
 
 17, 26. 
 Colt V. Sixth Ave. U. Co., 43 N. Y. 671. p. 
 
 1608. 
 Colton V. Cleveland Ar. U. Co., 67 Pa. .St. 2n. 
 
 pp. 1345, l:(47, 1348, 1356, 1359.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 li 
 
 Colloii V. James. 1 T?arn. & A'il. 12S. p. 1171. 
 Columbia V. Harrison, 2 Treadw. (S. C.) 213. 
 
 p. ShS. 
 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. (N. 
 
 S.)2.'). p. 805. 
 Columl)ia Inn. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. (U. 
 
 .S.) 507. pp. 974,982. 
 Columbus V. Dahn, 80 Ind. 330. p. 528. 
 Coluinbua v. Goulchins, 7 Ga. 139. pp. 5r^, 
 
 124. 
 Columbus &c. R. Co. v. Powell, 40 Ind. 37. 
 
 p. 2034. 
 Colviu V. I'.urnet, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 620. p. 
 
 1625. 
 Colwell V. Brower, 75 111. 517. pp. 216, 231. 
 Com. V. Addis, 1 Bro. (Penn.) 285. p. 45. 
 Com. V. Anlhcs, 5 Gray (Mass.), 185. pp. 
 
 1450, 1508, 1516. 
 Com. V. .\u.stln, 7 Gray (Mass.), 51. pp. 
 
 727, 728, 733. 
 Com. V. Kannon,97 Mass. 214. p. 171. 
 Com. V. Barney, 10 Gush. (Mass.) 480. p. 
 
 1087. 
 Com. V. Biirrv, 9 Allen (Mass.), 276. pp. 
 
 1630, 1636. 1768. 
 Com. V. Bean, 111 Mass. 438. p. 418. 
 Com. v. Billinj^s, 97 Mass. 407. p. 4.')0. 
 Com. V. Bonner, 97 Mass. .587. p. 525. 
 Com. V. Boston &c. K. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 25. pp. 56, 57. 
 Com. V. Bosworth, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 397. p. 
 
 467. 
 Com. r. Braynard, Thacli. Cr. Cas. 146. pp. 
 
 181.277,2S4. 
 Com. V. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.), 419. p. 
 
 351. 
 Com. V. Brown. 121 Mass. 69. pp. 647, 783. 
 Com. ('. Bruce, 79 Fvv. .560. p. 1088. 
 Com. v. Burcher, 2 Bob. (Va.)-826. p. 48. 
 Com. r. Burroughs (Mass.), 13 North East 
 
 Kep. 884. p. 51). 
 Com. V. Buzzell, 6 Pick. 153. p. 105. 
 Com. r. Cain, 14 Gray (Mass.), 7. p. 416. 
 Com. I'. Campbell, 7 Allen (Mass.), 543. p. 
 
 297. 
 Com. r. Carey,2 Brcwst. (Pa.)404. p. 1833. 
 Com. r. Carson, 3 Phila. 219. p. 23. 
 Com. v. Carter, 2 Va. fas. 319. p. 48. 
 Com. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 107Mass. 
 
 216. p. 43. 
 Com. i\ Chauncey, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 90. p. 19. 
 Com. V. Choate, 105 ISIass. 451. p. 299. 
 Com. I'. Cliurchill, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 538. p. 
 
 4.V). 
 Com. r. Cobb, 14 Grav (Mass.), 257. p. 1816. 
 Com. r. Cook, 6 Serg.\t K. (Pa.) .577. p. 1905. 
 Com. r. Costlev, US Mass. 1. pp. 1709, 1808, 
 
 1819, 1821,2114, 2115. 
 Come. Crans. 3Pa. L. .1. 449 ; .s. c. 2 Clarke 
 
 (Pa. L. .J.), 180. pp. 171. 172. 
 Com. V. Cullins, 1 Mass. 116. p. 1,566. 
 Com. c. Culver, 12ii Mass. 464. p. 297. 
 Com. r. Cumiinirliani, 11)4 .Mass. 545. p. 1073. 
 Com. r. Cunningham, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 695. p. 
 
 48. 
 Com. r. Dailey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 80. p. 6. 
 Com. r. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408. p]>. 143. 
 
 148. 
 Com. V. Davis, 11 Grav (Mass.). 4. p. 845. 
 Coin. v. l)earl)orn, 109 Mass. 368. p. 304. 
 Com. r. Deskins, 4 Leigh (Va.), 6a5. j). 187. 
 Com. r. Donovan, 13 Allen (Mass.), 571. ii. 
 
 111.5. 
 Com. V. Dorsev, 103 Mass. 412. pj). 8, 42. 
 Com. V. Doriis", los Mass. 488. p. 1911. 
 Com. V. Drew, 4 Mass. 391. pp. 189(J, 1982. 
 Com. r. Kddy, 7 Gray (Mass.), ,5*5. p. 1878. 
 Com. V. Eastman, "l Cush. (Mass.) 189. w. 
 
 303. 
 
 Com. r. Kalon, 8 Phila. 428. p. 26. 
 
 Com. V. Edgerly, 10 Allen (Mass.), 184. pp. 
 
 .300, 1943. 
 Com. r. Emmons, 98 >Iass. 6. p. 814. 
 Com. V. Kerrigan, 4« I'a. St. 386. pp. 290. 302. 
 Com. r. Fisher, 15 Phila. (Pa.) .387. p. 1798. 
 Com. r. Fitzgerald, 2 Allen (Mass.), 297. p. 
 
 4J5. 
 Com. V. Fitzpatrick, 3 Clark (Penn.\ .520. p. 
 
 98 
 Coni. V. Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 415. 
 
 pp. 72, 119. 123. 
 Com. V. Kord, 130 Mass. 64; «. c. 39 Am. Rep. 
 
 426. pp. 3.53, .360. 361, 365, 449. 
 Cora. V. Fox, 7 Gray (Mass.), 585. pp.364, 
 
 1574. 
 Com. V. Franklin. 133 Mass. .569. p. 1379. 
 Com. V. Frazier, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 490. p. 92. 
 Com. V. Gallagher, 126 Mass. 54. pp. 396, 400, 
 
 473. 
 Com. V. Galligan, 113 Mass. 202. p. 1784. 
 Com. 1-. Gee. 6 Cush. (Mass.) 174. pp. 87, 
 
 103. 
 Com. V. Green, 17 Mass. 515. pp. 2060, 2061. 
 Com. V. Green. 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289. p. 19. 
 (!om. V. Greenlaw. 119 Mass. 2i»8. p. 21.36. 
 Com. V. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272. p. 608. 
 Com. V. Gross, 1 .Vshm. (Pa.) 281. pp. 65, 114. 
 Com. r. IIailstock,2 Gratt. (Va.) .564. p. 72. 
 Com. V. Haines, 15 Phila. 363. p. 19&5. 
 Com. f. Halev, 13 AUeu (Mass.), 587. pp. 
 
 363. .366. 
 
 Com. V. Hammond, 2 Maine, 33. p. 879. 
 Com. V. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411. pp. 787, 788, 
 
 1808. 
 Com. V. Harmau, 4 Pa. St. 269. pp. 1816, 1836, 
 
 1860, 18(;i, 1863, 1875, 1876. 
 Com. i\ Harris, 101 Mass. 29. p. 1388. 
 Com. r. ilartzell, 40 Pa. St. 462. ]>. 90. 
 Com. V. Haskell, 2 Brewst. (Pa.; 491. pp. 
 
 215, 226. 
 Com. V. Hawkins, 3 Grav (Mass.), 463. pp. 
 
 437, 439. 
 Com. V. IlelmondoUer, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 536. 
 
 p. 48. 
 Com. r. Hill, 4 .Mien (Mas.s.), 591. p. 60. 
 Com. V. Hill, 14 Mass. 2ii7. p. .332. 
 Comer r. llimes, -lO Ind. 482. p. 2037. 
 Com. r. Horton. 2 (iray (Mass.). 354. p. ,300. 
 Com V. Howe. 13 Gray (Mass.), 26. p. 287. 
 Com. i\ Hudson, 11 ("irav (Mass.), 64. p. 443. 
 Com. r. Hughes, 5 Kand". (Va.) 655. p. 74. 
 Com. c. Hughes, 11 I'liila. 430. \t. 124. 
 Com. i: Hunt, 4 Gray (.Mass.), 421. p. 414. 
 Com. r. Hussey, 13 Mass. 221. pp. .52. 119. 
 Com. r. Ingraham, 7 Grav (Mass.), 46. pp. 
 
 468,472. ■ ^^ 
 
 Com. V. James. 99 ^lass. 438. pp. 41. 204. 
 Com. V. Jeffs, 131 Mass. 5. pp. 3t>3, 365, 366. 
 Com. V. Jenkins, 10 Gray (Mass.), 489. p. 
 
 484. ^ 
 
 Com. t>. Jenkins, Thach. Crlm. Cas. 118. p. 
 
 1952. ^ 
 
 Com. V. Joliffe, 7 Watts (Pa.), 585. pp. 45, 68. 
 Com. r. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 p. 111.5. 
 Com. v. Jones, 1 l>eigh (Va.),598. p. 123. 
 Com. V. Kautfuian, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 534. p. 
 
 19.'2. 
 Com. V. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.), 49(5. pp. 67. 
 
 75, 88. 67.^J. 
 Com. V. Knapp. 10 Pick. (.Mass.) 477. pp. 
 
 1.505. l.">06, l.-)U7. 
 Com. fT Kiieeland, 20 Pick. 206. p. 1694. 
 Com. r. Landis, 12 Phila. (Pa.) .576. ji. 1924. 
 Com. f. Laniian, 13 .\lleu (.Mass.) 563. pp. 
 
 364, .523. ^*^ 
 Com. r. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249. p. 71. 
 t;om. r. Leonard, 4 .\. East. Kep. 96; »■. <•. 140 
 
 Mass. 473. p. 1848.
 
 TA15LE OF CASES. 
 
 Com. r. Lofiher. 17 Scrg. & U. (Pa.) 155. pp. 
 
 (il. fi3. 05, «7, ".'>. 
 Com. i\ hfvv, •> Wheel. Or. C'a. i-ie. p. 878. 
 (.oiii. r. Lliiptinl, 6 Serg. & It. (I'a.) 305. p. 
 
 :U). 
 Com. r. Livermore, 4 Grav (Mass.), 18. pp-. 
 
 5ti. M. 
 Com. r. Lvnos (Ma.-'s.^ :? New Eng. Ilep. 
 
 Sit ; *. ,-. u-i Mii.-i.s. r.77. p. •i'.ia. 
 Com. r. Marrow,;! lJn'\v>l. (i'a.) 40'2; «. c. 
 
 glib itoiH. Com. V. .Marra, 8 Pbila. (I'a.) 
 
 44U. pp. 4.'). 87,8.1, 114, l'.i"t7. 
 Com. 1-. Mc-Affc, li»S .Ma>s. 4.58. p. 1574. 
 Com. r. .McAllister, 2 Watts (Fa.), UK), p. 
 
 11(17. 
 Com. I-. McC;ml, 1 Va. Cas. 271. pp. rJ07, 
 
 I'.tOS. 
 Cm. r. MoDowell, Sfi Pa. .'^t. 377. p. 803. 
 Com. r. MeKlhaiiv, 111 Mass. 431*. pp. 88, 
 
 imo, 20<;i. •2o7'.>. 
 
 Com. r. MclJortv, 114 Mass. 209. p. 1892. 
 Com. V. McKif, 1 (iray (Mass. i, (>1. p. 1848. 
 Com. V. Merriam, 14' Pick. (Mass.) 618. p. 
 
 3in». 
 Com. f. Messliiger, 1 IMnu. (Pa.) 273. p. 
 
 tWJ. 
 Com. r. :\niUT, 4 Plilla. 210. p. 19. 
 Com. r. Mooiu'v, 110 Mass. 90. p. 431. 
 Com. V. Moore, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 194. p. 449. 
 Com. c. Moore, 143 Mass. 136; s. c. 9 North 
 
 East. Rep. S81. p. .V.i. 
 Com. r. .Mor>:aii, 1(17 Mass. 199. p. 525. 
 Compton c. (■iis>a<la, 54 Ga. 74. p. 1634. 
 Com. r. Mullen, 97 Mass. .54.). ]>. 531. 
 Com. c. Miilliiis. 2 Allen (Mass. ), 295. p. 519. 
 Com. r. .Miirphv, 10 Grav (Mass.), 1. pp. 
 
 722, 727. 728. 
 Com. f. Newton, 1 Grant Cas. 458. pp. 151. 
 
 171, 172. 18;"). 
 Com. I.. Nii-liols, 114 Mass. 28.5. pp. 299, 524. 
 Com. V O'Neil, fi (Jrav (.Mass.), 343. p. 58. 
 Com. r. Parker, 2 Pick". (Mass.) 549. p. 19. 
 Com. V. Pease, 137 Mass. .57(;. pp. 1801, 1802. 
 Com. r. Phelps, 11 (irav (.Mass.), 73. p. 336. 
 Com. r. Pii-.r, 120 Mass". 18.5. p. 91. 
 Com. V. Pollard, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 22.'5. p. 
 
 1.5.58. 
 Com. r. I'orter, 4 Grav (Mass.), 423. p. 104. 
 Com. V. Porter, 10 Mete. (.Mass.) 263. pp. 725, 
 
 726, 1.5(1.5, 1520. 
 Com. r. Powers, lOi) Mass. .353. p. 204. 
 Com. I-. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462. p. 28:?. 
 Com. r. Price, 10 Gray (Mass.), 472. pp. 288, 
 
 209, 527. 
 Com. r. Oaks, 113 Mass. 8. p. 1.388. 
 Com. r. Kieil, l(;rav,472. p. 55. 
 Com. V. Kei<l, 8 Ptilla. (Pa. ) 3S.5. ]). 71. 
 Com. r. lieid, 1 Leg. Gaz. Hep. (Pa.) 182. pp. 
 
 3;{0, 646. 
 Com. V. Uevnolds, 122 Mass. 4.54. pp. 624, 
 
 528. 
 Com. V. Uevnolds, 14 Gray (Mass.), 87. p. 
 
 18.5. 
 Com. r. Hlcketson, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 412. p. 
 
 310. 
 Com. r. Higgs, 14 Gray (Mass.), 377. p. 845. 
 Com. r. K<ililiison. 1 (Jrav, 555. p. 204. 
 Com. V. Uol.v, 12 Pl(;k. (ilass.) 496. pp. 1921, 
 
 1926, I'.CIO, i9S2. 
 Com. r. Itogers, 7 Mctc. (Mass.) 500. pp. 88, 
 
 Ki, 312, 17H0. 
 Com. r. Kock, 10 Gray (Ma88.),4. bj). 1508, 
 
 1516, 
 Com. r. Uvnn, 5 Mass. 90. p. 55, 
 < 
 Co 
 
 110. 
 
 Com. V. Scolt, 123 Mass. 2.39. pp. 710, 745. 787, 
 788. 791. 793. 
 
 Oom. r. Uvnn, 5 Mass. 90. p. ^5. 
 
 r;om. V. Jacket I, 22 Pick, f Mass.) 394. p. 376. 
 
 L'om. V. .^allager, 3 Clark (Pciin.), li7. p. 
 
 Com. r. .Scott, 123 Maes. 418. p. 2060. 
 
 l'om. V. .'^elfrldge, Morr. A Thomp. Caa. 
 
 .SelfDef. 2. p|.. 1.V19, KW. 
 Com. V. Miaw, 7 .\m. Law Iteg. 2S9. p. 5. 
 Com. f. t^haw, 4 ( ush. «..Mass. 6W. p. 282. 
 Com. t'. h>heplierd, 1 Alleu (Mass.), 576. 
 
 p. 3a3. 
 Com. r. ."^heplierd. 6 Hinn. (Pa.) 282. p. 585. 
 Com. r. ."^lierr\ , \\ hart, on Mom. 481. p. 65. 
 Com. r. Shields, 2 Hush (Kv.), 81. pp. 1904, 
 
 1907, 1981. 
 Com. V. Skeggs, 3 Hush (Ky.), 19. pp. 1983, 
 
 1984. 
 Com. f. Smith, 6 Cush. SO. p. 1.388. 
 Com. r. smith, 2 Grav (.Mass.). 516. p. 264. 
 Com. f. Sniilli, 1(12 Mass. 144. p. 1.5.36 
 Com. f. .'^nelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 321. 
 
 p. 1720. 
 Com. r. .stt-nrns, 10 Mote. 2.57. p. 299. 
 Com. r. .stelililii>,8Grav (Mass. ;, 492. j). 1.535. 
 Com. V. .'^tepli.ii, 4 Leigh (N'a.), 679. p. 124. 
 Com. r. Stochr. ln'.i Mass. 3t>5. p. 304. 
 Com. r. Sldw.U, 9 Mite. (Mass. ). 572. p. 111. 
 Com. r. stuai-i, 2 Va. Cas. 329. p. 144. 
 Com. V. ."^turtivant, 117 Mass. 139. p. 784. 
 Com. f. Thompson, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 216. pp. 
 
 49, 117. 
 Com. r. Thrasher, 11 (irav (Mass.), 55. pp. 
 
 58, 73, !Kt, 103. 3(1(1. 
 Com. r. Thurston, 7 J. .L Marsh. (Kv.) 62. 
 
 p. 265. 
 C^om. V. Tuckerman, lo Gray (Mass.), 198. 
 
 p. 297. 
 Com. I'. Tuev, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 1. pp. 1666, 
 
 18.53. 
 Com. r. Tnrner, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 19. p. 304. 
 Com. f. Tuttle, 12 Cush. (.Mass.) 402. p. 1816. 
 Com. r. Twitchell, 1 IJrewst. (I'a.) 551. pp. 
 
 27, 4.5,91, (H7. 
 Com. c. Twomhlv, 10 Pick. (.Mass.) 480n. pp. 
 
 65, 85. 
 Com. V. Walden, 3 Cush. (.Mass.) 558. p. 
 
 1.537. 
 Con), r. Walsh, 124 Mass. 32. pp. 30. 42. 
 Com. V. Warrin, 143 Muss. .5(18. p. 111,5. 
 Com. V. Wehsler, 5Ciish. (Mass.) ■2!t5 pp. 62, 
 (>4,t;.5, 67, 72. K-i, 515, 675, 1788, 1793,1800, 
 1808, IS20, 1821, 1822, 1847, 1860, 1861, 1863, 
 18(i5, 18(i9, 1886. 
 Com. r. Welsh, 4 Gray (M.'iss.).6S3. p. 444. 
 Com. <-. Wevmouth, 2 .Mien (.Masn.i, 144. p. 
 
 2075. 
 C'om. f. Wilson, 1 (Jray (Mass.), 3,37. pp. 
 
 484, 738. 
 Com. V. WInnemore, 1 Rrewst. 3.56; «. c. 2 
 
 Hrewst. 37.S. pp. 10. 11, K\. 
 Com.ti. Worcester, 3 Tick. (Mas8.)462. p. 69. 
 Com. r. Woreeslir, 144 .Mass. .5><. p. 789. 
 Com. r.Wiirmh'y,8(;rall. (Va.) 712. p. 1918. 
 Com. I'. Wright. 1 Cush. (.^lass.) 46. pp. 
 
 VMA, \'.*W. 
 Com. I-. York, 9 Meic, (Mass.) 93. p. 1817. 
 Com. /Immcrinan, 1 ('ranch C. C. (U. 8.) 47. 
 
 pp. 721,72.5. 1916, 
 Comhs V. Slanghler, Hard. (Ky.) 62. p. 86. 
 Comhs r. Smith. 7.s .Mn, 32. p.'l(t,5Vt. 
 Comhs r. Winehesl.r, 39 N. 11. 13. p. 397. 
 Comfort r. i;i-.nl.cls. 11 fa, St. 13. p, St6«l. 
 Comforl r. Spragiie.itl .Minn. 4<K5 p. 1024 
 Commander r. Slate 
 
 6:1, 69. 
 Cominurclal Hank r. 
 
 .324. 
 Commercial Itank i 
 
 (.\. '\ 94. II. :<28. 
 Commercial Itank v. 
 
 1025. 
 Commercial Itank e. 
 
 2(i:t. p)>. .5(;'.i, .57(1. <u:!. 
 
 6(1 Ala. 1. pp. 35, 61, 
 
 Clark, 28 Vt, .325. p. 
 
 HughCM, 17 Wcud. 
 
 ,Iones, 18 Tex. 812. p. 
 
 Union Hank, 11 N'. Y.
 
 TAl'.LE OF CASES. 
 
 liii 
 
 Commissioners v. Bacon, 9G Ind. 31. pp. 
 
 12«i», 12T2. 
 Comniissioners r. Clark, 94 U. S. 278. p. 160-2. 
 Cominissioncra v. Craft, (j Kan. 145. p. 37.5. 
 ConiuiiSiiioners v. Kniiuereou, 95 Inii. 573. 
 
 p. l-.'sO. 
 Commissioners v. Lcmly, 85 X. C. 341. p. 
 
 5U1. 
 Commissioners of iscaufort v. Dancan, 1 
 
 Jones L. (N. C.) 234. p. 16*58. 
 Common Council of Alexandria v. Brock- 
 
 ett, -2 Crancli C. C. 13. p. 1147. 
 Compton r. Candless, 3 Camp. 19. p. 1244. 
 Company of Carpenters v. Hayward, Dougl. 
 
 (Midi.) .360. p. 288. 
 Compton V. Lepras, 24 La. Ann. 259. p. 30. 
 Compt.tn V. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130. p. 188. 
 Coinstock V. Davis, 51 .Mo. 569. p. 1584. 
 Comstock r. iladlynie Ecc. Soc.,8 Conn. 254. 
 
 pp. 214, 218, 22.S. 
 Comstock V. Savajre, 27 Conn. 284. p. 959. 
 Comstock V. Smith, 7 Johns. (X. Y.) 87. 
 
 p. 900. 
 Comstock V. State. 14 Neb. 205. p. 775. 
 Conard v. I'aciiic Ins. Co., B Pet. (U. S.) 262. 
 
 p. 2114. 
 ConastcT v. State, 12 Lea f Tenn.), 436. p. 73. 
 Couaw ay v. Slielton, 3 Ind. 334. p. 1646. 
 Concord" Kailroad i'. Greely, 17 N. H. 47. 
 
 p. 1107. 
 Condit r. Baldwin, 21 X. Y. 219. pp. 886, 887. 
 Cone V. State, 13 Te.x. App. 483. pp. 1-60, 
 
 1861. 
 Congar v. Chamljerlain, 14 Wis. 258. p. 927. 
 Conkev v. Xortliern Bank, 6 Wis. 447. p. 95. 
 Conklinr. Hill, 2 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 6. p. J964. 
 Conklin v. Hinds, 16 Minn. 4.=i7. pp. 2070, 2073. 
 Conklin v. Keokuk (Iowa), 35X. W. Rep. 444. 
 
 p. 56. 
 Conlin v. San Francisco &c. R. Co.,SGCal. 
 
 406. p. 1669. 
 Conn V. Ferree, 60 Mo. 17. p. 1590. 
 Conn V. State, 11 Tex. App. 391. p. 762. 
 Conn. Mat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 IIL 516. 
 
 p. 521. 
 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 
 
 457. p. 9'.a. 
 Counaghan v. People, 88 111. 460. pp. 1828. 
 
 1832. 
 Connecticut &c. R. Co. i-. Baxter, 32 Vt. 805. 
 
 p. 863. 
 Connehan v. Ford, 9 Wis. 240. p. 1014. 
 Conner v. Belden, 8 Dalv (X. Y.),257. p. 195. 
 Conner I'. lioutli, 7 How. (>nss.) 176. j). 847. 
 Conner v. Stanley, 67 Cal. 315. p. 339. 
 Connor v. State, 25 Ga. 515. pp. 23, 331. 
 Conner v. State, 17 Tex. App. 1. pp. 1708, 
 
 18,55. 
 Connett v. Chicago, 114 111. 233. p. 193. 
 Connolly v. Boston, 117 Mass. 64. p. 1210. 
 Connor v. Giles, 7i) Me. 132. p. 1604. 
 Connor i'. Marion, 112 Ind. 517 ;«. c. 14 X. E. 
 
 Hep. 488. p. 20.52. 
 Connor v. Slate, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 137. p. 1671. 
 Connor v. Winton, 8 Ind. 316. p. 1983. 
 Connors t'. People. 50 N. Y. 240. pp. 524,526, 
 
 .5-.'9. 531. • 
 
 Conover r. Mlddlelown, 42 X. J. L. 382. p. 
 
 1208. 
 Conrad v. Griffey, 16 How. (U. S.) 38. pp. 
 
 432. 489. ' 
 
 Coniadt v. Clauve, 93 Ind. 476. p. 1709. 
 Conrov /•. Twentv-tlilrd Street R. Co., .52 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 39. p. 1209. 
 Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35. i). 
 
 1211. 
 Conse<ina r. Willinir.s, Pet. C. C. (U. S.1 
 
 225. ).|i. SIO, 1,5(17, 1644. 
 Coustautiue 1-. Foster, 57 111. 36. p. 2077. 
 
 Conoway v. We.iver, 1 Ind. 263. p. 2111. 
 Continental Impiovcment Co. v. Stead, 95 
 
 r. S. 161. p. 1304. 
 Continental Insurance Co. v. Ilorton, 28 
 
 Mich. 173. p. 342. 
 Coutinenial Life Ins. r. Volger, 89 Ind. 572; 
 
 s. c. 46 Am. Hep. 185. p. 991. 
 Converse c. Warren, 4 la. 1.58. p. 845. 
 Conway v. Callahan, 121 Mass. 165. p. 2136. 
 Conwav v. Clinton, 1 Utah T. 215. pp. 47, 
 
 69,75, 76, 115, 262,344. 
 Conwell V. Pninplirev, 9 Ind. 135. p. 838. 
 Conyars v. Field, 61 Ga. 258. p. 398. 
 Conver r. Bovd, 55 Ind. 166. p. 693. 
 Cook V. Barkiey, 2 X. J. L. 16i). p. 1467. 
 Cook r. Bradlev, 7 Conn. 57; s. c. IS Am. 
 
 Dec. 79. pp. 889, 897. 
 Cook V. Brown (Mich.), 29 X. W. Rep. 4^ p. 
 
 1708. 
 Cook V. Castner, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 266. pp. 
 
 119,1982. 
 Cook V. Corn, 1 Tenn. (Overt.) 349. p. 274. 
 Cookf. Duvall,9 c;ill(Md.),400 p. 1705. 
 Cook r. Fincli, 19 Minn. 407. p. 2099. 
 Cook V. Fire Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 369. p. 869. 
 Cook V. Green, 6 X. J. L. (1 Halst.) 109. pp. 
 
 1722, 1916. 
 Cook V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 63 Mo. 397. pp. 
 
 12J9, 15il8. 
 Cook V. Harrington, St. Louis Ct. of App. 
 
 Xo. 4007. p. .571. 
 Cook V. Hunt, 24 111. 536. p. 476. 
 Cook V. Martin, 29 Conn. 63. pp. 966, 967. 
 Cook V. McChristian, 4 Cal. 23. p. 1015. 
 Cook r. Mix, 11 Conn. 4.32. pp. 294, 328, 804. 
 Cook V. -Aloselev, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 27S. p. 926. 
 Cook V. Xethercote, 6 Carr. & P. 741. p. 257. 
 Cook V. Hitter, 4 E. D. Smith (X. Y.), 254. p. 
 
 728. 
 Cook V. State, 11 Ga. 53. p. 1849. 
 Cook c. State, 14 Tex. App. 96. p. 18.55. 
 Cook V. State, 22 Tex. App. 511. p. 1746. 
 Cook f. Syplier, 3 la. 484. pp. 1981, 1994. 
 Cook V. Walker, 3') Ga. 519. p. 1197. 
 Cook V. Walters, 4 la. 72. pp. 1006, 1910. 
 Cook's Case, 13 IIow. St. Tr. 318; s. c. Skin. 
 
 82. pp. 45, ,52, 68, 88, 102, 105. 
 Cook's Lessee v. Carroll, 6 Md. 104. p. 827. 
 Cooker. Curtis, 6 Harr. & J. (Md.) 93. p. 
 
 483. 
 Cooke V. Forbes, L. R. 5 Eq. 166. p. 1400. 
 Cooker. Lalauce &c. Co., 29 Hun (X. Y.). 
 
 641. p. 657. 
 Cooker, folate Xat. Bank, 52 X. Y. 96. p. 
 
 1023. 
 Cool i\ Roche, 15 Xeb. 24; s. c. 17 X. W. Rep. 
 
 119. p. 385. 
 Cool V. Snover, 38 Mich. 562. p. 359. 
 Coolbroth r. Purinton, 29 Me. 469. p. 846. 
 Cooley c. State, 38 Tex. 636. pp. 87, 88, 89, 93. 
 Coombs r. Hibberd, 43 Cal. 453. p. 2ii64. 
 Coombs r. Pariiigton, 42 .Me. 332. p. 1223. 
 Coon r. Knapp, 8 N. Y. 4ii2. p. 842. 
 Coon r. State, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 246. p. 
 
 349. 
 Cooney r. Burt, 123 Mass. 579. p. 2137. 
 Cooney v. Furlong, 66 Cal. 520. pp. 2062, 2036. 
 Coons V. Chambers, 1 Abb. App. Dec. (X. Y.) 
 
 439. p. 875. 
 Coo|>er c. Barton, 3 Comp. 5n. p. 1328. 
 Coojier r. Central R. Co., 44 Iowa, 134. pp. 
 
 12.54, 1786. 
 Cooper r. Curtis, ,30 Me. 488. p. 1023. 
 Cooper r. Johnson, 81 Mo. 483. pp. 1202, 
 
 1480, 1(>84. 
 Cooper V. Martin, 4 East, 76. p. 895. 
 Cooper c. Pittsburg ^:c. R. Co., 24 W. Va. 
 
 37. pp. 12>;i. 
 Cooper V. Slate, 59 Miss. 19. p. 66.
 
 liv 
 
 TAIU.K OF CASKS. 
 
 Cooper f. State, 59 Miss. 2B7. p. »".l. 
 Coopir f. State, 1(5 Ohio St. :i-2S. y\<. 74, Ti",. 76. 
 foopiT c. Slate. It; Tf\. Apii. :i41. p. lV>.'i. 
 CoopiT I-. Wuklev, Mood. & Mulk. 248. pp. 
 
 21S. -Jill. 
 Cooper i: ^Valdron, 50 Me. 80. pp. 1603, 1005, 
 
 li;-.'.'.. 
 Coopor. Ill re, 32 Vt. 253. pp. 182, 13S, 141, 
 
 15'i, IJX 1.57. 
 Cope f. Thames Dock Co., 2 Car. & K. 757. 
 
 1.. KW. 
 Copolnnd v. Copelaiul. 28 Me. 525. p. 1748. 
 Copi-laiid r. UaU, 21 Me. 93. pp. 852, 854, 855, 
 
 85ti. 
 Copeland v. Xt>w EiiRland Ins. Co., 22 Pick. 
 
 (Slass.) i;W. p. I(i22. 
 Copeland r. Wadlelgh, 7 Me. 141. pp. 1748, 
 
 174V». 
 Copeland r. Watt.*, 1 Stark. 95. pp. 275, 277. 
 Copenhaven t- State, 14 On. 22. pp. 46, 97. 
 Copp I-. Iphain, 3 N. H. l.V.i. p. 2(«. 
 Corliitt j-.CorlM'tt,3 (amp. 3K. p. 242. 
 Corl.ctl r. Gibson, 16 IJlatchf. (U. S.) 334. p. 
 
 Pi'.". 
 Corlictt r. .Jol),5 Nev. 201. p. 2099. 
 lorhett f. Swift, 6 Xcv. 194. p. 2ii62. 
 Corliv r. Hutler, 55 .Mo. 3'.i8. )>. l<'.i;9. 
 Corhv r. Tavlor,35 Mo. 447. p. l.">94. 
 Cordellr. IJrldge, 9 Allen (Mass.), 3.55. p. 
 
 892. 
 Cordell r. New York &c. R. Co., 19 Alb. L. J. 
 
 l.U. p. 1230. 
 Cordova r. State, 6 Tc.v. App. 207. pp. 19, 
 
 22. 
 Coriiinar. Exeter. 13 Me. 328. p. 344. 
 Corlev r. McKcag, 9 Mo. Ai.)). .38. p. 793. 
 Cornt-liti.x c. Applelon, 22 \Vis. G.35. p. 1227. 
 Cornelius r. IJoucher, 1 HI. 12. p. 108. 
 Cornelius r. Gibcrson, 25 \. .1. I,. 1. p. 1042. 
 Cornelius v. Mollov, 7 Pa. St. 293. p. 1419. 
 Cornelius f. State, 12 Ark. 782. pp. 85, 1982, 
 
 unio. 
 Cornelius r. Van Slyck, 21 Wend. (X. Y.) 
 
 70. 1). 141)9. 
 Cornell r. I5arnes,26 Wis. 47.3. pp. 397, 563. 
 Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 104. i>. 449. 
 Corning v. Troy Iron Factory, 44 X. Y. 577. 
 
 p. ItMW. 
 Cornish v. Graff, 36 Hun (X. Y.), 160. pp. 
 
 17-22, 1723. 
 Cornl-sJi f. Territory (Wvo.), 3 Pac. Uep. 
 
 793. pp. im-1, 18.i4. 
 Corninan v. K:i>l<'rn Counties 11. ("o., 4 LIurl. 
 
 * N. 7S1. pp. 12111. Vrin. 
 Corpf r. OviTlon, 10 lUng. 252. p. 895. 
 Cortland t'ountv r. Ilerlilnier County, 44 
 
 X. V. 22. pp. 344. 345. 
 Corwin r. Wallacr. 17 la. .378. p. 892. 
 C'orv r. SII(t)X, 6 Ind. .5K7. p. 705. 
 Corv V. SlW-ox, 6 Ind. .39. p. 7h7. 
 Corvell r. Cain. 16 <-al. 567. p. 1141. 
 CorVfll V. Hannibal Ac. U. Co., 82 Mo. 441. 
 
 p.' 1308. 
 Cf.rvcil r. Stone, 62 Ind. 307. pp. 126, 129, 
 
 17i>9. 2089. 
 Cn-groye f. Ogden, 49 X. Y. 22.5. p. 1233. 
 Co^sart r. Stati-. 14 Ark. .5:{8. p. 160. 
 Costello f. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 622. p. 1207. 
 Costello r. Svra<-u»e &c. II. Co., <i5 Barb. {X. 
 
 Y.)H2. p. 1232. 
 Cooler »•. .Merest, 3 Ilrod. A Hlng. 272. pp. 
 
 J921. 19,55. 
 Costlgan f. Cuvb-r, 21 X. Y. 134. ]>, 90, 
 CoHllv r. Stair, 19 Ga. 614. pp. Hy. 122, 124. 
 Cothran r. Fors\ lb, <;m Ga. 560. pp. 2r.>, 312. 
 Cotbran v. Slate, ».» Miss. .541. pp. 15.58. 16«W, 
 
 ItJSI. 
 Colbren f. Connaughton, 24 Wis. 134. p. 
 
 20(H. 
 
 Coltb- V. Cottle, 6 .Me. 140. pp. 1921, 1929, 
 
 i'.i;4. 
 
 Cotton f. Iluldi'kopcr, 2 Pa. 149. p. 1197. 
 Cotton r. Uulb'dgi',33 Ala. lU. p. 704. 
 Cotton r. .^tato, 31 Miss. .5o4 ; ». c. Ilorr. & 
 
 Tbomp. Cas. Self Uef. 310. pp. 175, 1539, 
 
 1.510. 
 Cotton r. Stat.', 32 Tex. 626. pp. 76. 116, 1555, 
 
 1.567, 1.569, 1.57I. 1575, 1888, 1891. 
 Cotton r. Wo.mI, S C. H. (.n. b.) 563; S. 0. 1 
 
 Tbomp. X.-g. 3t;4. i>. 1220. 
 Cottri-ll i: Xlxon, Ur.i Inil. 379. p. 2010. 
 CottrlU I-. CranuT, .59 Wis. 2:11. p. 2037. 
 Coizbausen r. Simon, 47 Wis. lO^l. p. 2030. 
 Cou<b r. Briles, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Kv.) 257. 
 
 I.. 891. 
 Couch r. Charlotte Ac. R. Co., 22 S. C. 557. 
 
 p. 310. 
 Coudv r. St. Louis Ac. R. Co., 85 Mo. 79. pp. 
 
 8ii.'i(;i9. 
 
 Cougblin r. People, 18 111. 266. pp. 1668.1671. 
 Coulter I-. American Ac. Co., 56 X. Y. 585. 
 
 pp. 443, 446. 
 Coulter r. Weed Sewing Machine Co., 3 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.). 115. pp. 2. 3. 
 Count Conigsmark's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 12. 
 
 PI". 44. 11(5. 
 Counts I-. State, 19 Tex. App. 450. pp. 1855, 
 
 18.i(i. 
 County Court r. (;rlswold, 58 Mo. 175. p. 
 
 1107." 
 Coursen r. Ely, 37 HI. 340. p. 1314. 
 Coursln c. Pi'nusvlvaula Ins. Co., 46 Pa. St. 
 
 323. p. 984. 
 Courtney r. Baker, 3 Denio (X. Y.), 27. pp. 
 
 169, is:i, 184. 
 Courtov r. Dozier, 20 Ga. 369. p. 1016. 
 Courtwrlgbt r. Strickler, 37 la. :«2. p. 67. 
 Coveney i-. Tannabill 1 llill (X. Y.),33. pp. 
 
 272, 275. 
 Coyey i: Hannibal Ac. R. Co., 86 Mo. 636. p. 
 
 810. 
 Covilland r. Tanner, 7 Cal. 38. p. ,5.59. 
 Cowall r. Altebul. 40 Ark. 172. p. 206. 
 Cowglll i: Wooden, 2 IJlackf. (Ind.) 332. p. 
 
 29. 
 Cowles r. Bacon, 21 Conn. 451. p. lfi<59. 
 Cowlesr. Chicago Ac. K. Co., 32 la. 515. pp. 
 
 l'.H4, 1'.I93. 
 Cowles r. Hayes, 71 X. C. 23ti. pp. 358, 
 
 I9.')n. 
 Cowles V. State, .50 Ala. iM. p. :J62. 
 Cowley r. People, 83 N. V. 4m; g. c. 38 Am. 
 
 Kep.'464. p. 507. 
 Cowlin r. Cook, Latch. 151. p. 11.39. 
 Cowper's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 1108. "p. 46. 
 Cowperthwaite r. .Jones, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 66. 
 
 pp. i;h;3. 19<l5. • 
 Cox r. Baker. 113 Ind. 62; t. c. 14 X. E. Rep. 
 
 740. 1.. ^071. 
 Cox i: l-ieedlev. .13 Pa. St. 124. p. 827. 
 Cox V. IIaine-«."2 X. .1. L. b87. p. 19. 
 Cox r. Ilutelilns, 21 Ind. 219. p. 2101. 
 Cox r. Lee, L. It. 4 Exeh. 284. p. 14.53. 
 Cox r. Moss, ,53 Mo. 432. p. 2<M9. 
 Cox r. People, lO'.t 111. 4.57. p. 1675. 
 Cox v. People. 19 Hun (X. ^.),4:«); «. c. 80 N. 
 
 Y. .5(K). pii. 15, 32, 78. HI, 20<;2. 
 Cox V. Halellir.'. 105 Ind. :{74. p. 2089. 
 Cox V. Slate, 7 Tex. App. I. p. 1903. 
 Cox V. Sloul, 85 Ind. 422. p. 56:1. 
 Cox v. SIralssi-r, 62 III. H.S6. p. 1940. 
 Cox r. Tvler. 6 Xeb. 297. p. 20<iO. 
 Cox r. \anderkleed,21 Ind. 164. p. 1479. 
 Cox f. Viekers. ;C) Ind. 27. ji. 219. 
 Cox r. We.-ieiiester Turnpike Road, 33 Barb. 
 
 (N. Y. 1 411. p. 12<)!l. 
 Cox r. Wlrrall. (To. .lac. 193. p. 1191. 
 Cox V. Wolcolt, 27 Pa. St, 154. p. HHW.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Iv 
 
 •Coxe V. England. fi5 Pa. St. 212. p. 628. 
 Coyle r. Gorman, 1 Pliila. (Pa.) 326. p. 1971. 
 Cozzeiis V. Gilli-sjiie, i Mo. 82. p. 560. 
 Cozzen.s v. Hifc'gin» 1 Abb. App. Dec. (X. Y.) 
 
 451. p. 661. 
 Crabtree v. Clark, 20 Mc. 337. p. 1029. 
 Crabtrec v. Haf,aubough, 25 111. 233. pp. 
 
 455, 1776, 1914, 1915. 
 Cral)lree v. llorton, 4 Munf. (Va.) 59. p. 
 
 IIM. 
 Crabtree v. Kile, 21 111. 180. p. 1498. 
 Cralilree r. State, 3 Sneed (Tenu.), 302. pp. 
 
 HW4, 1965, V.m, 1992. 
 Craft V. Com., 24 Gratt. (Ta.) 602. pp. 16, 18, 
 
 48. 
 Craft r. Com. 80 Ky. 349. ]>. 4G4. 
 Crahau v. Balmcr's E.xr., 7 JVlo. App. 585. p. 
 
 758. 
 Craig V. Andrews,'7 Iowa, 17. pp. 881, 882. 
 Craig r. Elliott, 4 Ribb. 272. p. 113. 
 Craig r. Fenn, Car. & M. 43. p. 5(}. 
 Craig V. Grant, 6 Mich. 447. p. 443. 
 Craig r. Mayor of Allegheny, 53 Pa. St. 477. 
 
 p. 1107. 
 Craig V. Xoblesville &c. R. Co., 98 Ind. 109. 
 
 p. 498. 
 Craig, r. Mississippi Mills, 12 5Io. Ajip. 585. 
 
 p. 2064. 
 Craig V. Rohrer, 63 111. 32.5. pp. 419, 432. 
 Craig V. Scdalia, 63 Mo. 417. p. 1247. 
 Craig V. Ward, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 197. p. 
 
 1442. 
 Craige r. Sprague, 12 AVend. (N. Y.) 41. p. 
 
 351. 
 Craighead v. Peterson, 72 X. Y. 279; s. c. 28 
 
 Am. Rep. 150. p. 346. 
 Craighead r. Wells, 21 Mo. 404. p. 1668. 
 Crail V. Crail, 6 Pa. St. 480. ]). 1698. 
 Craln v. Cohvell, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 384. p. 948. 
 Crain v. llilligross, 21 liul. 210. i). 1588. 
 Crain v. Wright, .Sfi Hun (N. Y.), 74. p. 872. 
 Cramer r. Hurliiigton, 42 la. ;515. ji. .55. 
 Cran v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569. p. 
 
 586. 
 Cranburue's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 222. p. 
 
 60. 
 Crauch v. White, 1 Bing. (New Cas.) 414. p. 
 
 1339. 
 Crandall r. People, 2 Lans. (X. Y.) 212. pp. 
 
 747, 755. 
 Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. (X. Y.) 309. p. 
 
 787. 
 Crane v. Dygert, 4 Wend. (X. Y.)675. pp. 
 
 32, 34. 
 Crane v. Morris, 6 Pet. (F. S.) 598. p. 1585. 
 Crane r. Reeder, 25 Mich. 304. p. 2032. 
 Crane v. Sayre, 6 X. J. L. 110. p. 1906. 
 Crane r. Timberlake, 81 Mo. 431. i). 1440. 
 Crane, Ex i)arte,5 Pet. (U. S.) 190. j). 214. 
 C'ranmorr. Crawlev, 1 X. J. L. 43. i). 29. 
 Cravens v. Wilson, "48 Te.\. 324. p. 1672. 
 Crawford r. lierrv, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 63. i). 
 
 9ii4. 
 Crawford v. Bertliof, 1 X. J. Eq. 4.58. p. 424. 
 Crawford v. Branch Bank, 7 Ala. 205. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Crawford v. Martin, 19 Ind. 370. p. 2101. 
 Crawford v. Powell, 10! Ind. 421. ]<. 2052. 
 Crawford v. State, 12 (;a. 142. )>p. ;!14, 16.33. 
 Crawford v. State, 15 Tex. .\pii. 501. p. 761. 
 Crawford r. State, 21 Tex. Ai>p. 454. p. 16U6. 
 Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. (Teuu.) 111. p. 
 
 1992. 
 Creamer v. Bates, 49 Mo. 525. p. 892. 
 Creamer v. Perrv, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 332. i>. 
 
 949. 
 Creamer r. Pirp, 91 Ind. 366. p. 213S. 
 Creary c. Com., 29 l"a. St. 323. )>. 1902. 
 Creed" v. Fisher, 9 E.xch. 472. pp. 37, U77. 
 
 Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Oh. St. 1. p. 
 
 1446. 
 Creed v. People, 81 111. 568. pp. 1795, 1800, 
 
 1801. 
 Creek t-. State, 24 Ind. 151. pp. 1906, 1931. 
 Creelman f. Marks, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 281. p. 
 
 1617. 
 Creevv v. Carr, 7 Car. & P. 64. p. 384. 
 Cregier v. Bunton, 2 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 487. 
 
 p. 42. 
 Cremer v. Portland, 36 "SVis. 92. pp. 1209, 
 
 1247. 
 Crenshaw v. Jackson, 6 Ga. 509. p. 570. 
 Crerar v. Sodo, Mood. & M. 85. p. 219. 
 Creryv. Pollard, 14 Allen (Mass.), 284. p. 
 
 639. 
 Crews V. People, 120 III. 117; 11 X. East Rep. 
 
 404. p. 1846. 
 Crews V. Ross, 44 Ind. 81. p. 2102. 
 Crisman v. McDonald, 28 Ark. 9. p. 1708. 
 Crissev r. HestonviUe &c. R. Co., 75 Pa. St. 
 
 73. "pp. 1207, 1212. 
 Crist V. Erie R. Co., 1 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 
 
 435. p. 1210. 
 Crist V. State, 21 Tex. App. 361. p. 1743. 
 Criswell v. Altemus, 7 Watts (Pa.), 581. p. 
 
 1043. 
 Crocker v. Hoffman, 48 Ind. 207. pp. 1910, 
 
 1911. 
 Crocker v. Xew Loudon &c. R. Co., 24 Conn. 
 
 249. p. 1292. 
 Crockett v. State, 52 Wis. 211 ; s. c. 12 Cent. 
 
 L. J. 479. p. 1903. 
 Crockett v. Young, 1 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 241. 
 
 p. 1023. 
 Crofoot V. Bennett, 2 X. Y. 2.58. p. 912. 
 Croft v. State, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 317. p. 1669. 
 Crole v. Thomas, 17 Mo. 329. p. 1681. 
 Cronin v. Delavan, .50 AVis. 375. p. 1676. 
 Crook V. Williams, 8 Pa. St. 345. p. 1417. 
 Crooker v. Appleton, 25 Me. 131. p. 1025. 
 Crookshank v. Kellogg, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 256, 
 
 p. 1»U7. 
 Cropp v. Hambleton, Cro. Eliz. 48. p. 1128. 
 Cropsey v. Averill, 8 Xeb. 157. pp. 428, 
 
 436. 
 Cropsey r. Wiggenhorn, 3 Xeb. 108. p. 2051. 
 Crosbv" V. Boston, 118 Mass. 71. pp. 1247, 
 
 1249.' 
 Crosby v. Hungerford, 59 la. 712. p. 2028. 
 Crosby's Case, 3 Wils. 188. pp. 132, 152. 
 Cr<jss"f. Barnett, 65 Wi.s. 431. p. 1010. 
 Cross V. Eglin, 2 Barn. t"c Ad. 106. p. 917. 
 Cross 1-. Garrett, 35 Iowa, 480. p. 776. 
 Cross r. Hall 4 .>Id. 426. p. 1750. 
 Cross V Moullon, 15 Johns. (X. Y.) 470. p. 
 
 85. 
 Cross V. Pearson, 17 Ind. 612. pp. 240, 1742. 
 Cross V. State, 68 Ala. 476. pp. 754, 755, 762. 
 Cross r. State, 78 Ala. 430. p. 3. 
 Cross r. State, 11 Tex. A))p. 84. p. 727. 
 Crossman r. Ililltown Turnpike Co., 3 Grant 
 
 Cas. (Pa.) 225. p. 849. 
 Croswell I-. Craue,7 Barb. (X. Y.) 191. p. 
 
 891. • 
 Crotty r. Wyatt, 3 Brawdw. (111.) 388. pp. 
 
 202," 1996. 
 Crouch /•. (ireat Xorthern R. Co., 11 Ex. 742; 
 
 s. c. :U Eng. I,. >\: Kq. .573. ]>. 1156. 
 Croucli V. Martin, 3 lUackl. (Ind.) 2,56. p. 
 
 2001. 
 Crouch r. Miller, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 586. p. 
 
 893. 
 Crounse r. Filch, 6 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (X. Y.) 
 
 18.5. p. 41<i. 
 Crow r. Bovd, 17 Ala. 51. p. 890. 
 Crow r. Marshall, 15 Mo. 499. p. 316. 
 Crow r. State. 14 Tex. 12. p. 1.50. 
 Crowe c. People, 92 111. 231. p. 1213.
 
 Ivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Crowd! V. Western U. V.ank, 3 Oh. 409. pp. 
 
 Crov <'\oulsvnie&.. U. Co., 97 Ind. 126. 
 
 pp. iOSli, 21U4. „- ,„. 
 
 Crov ,-. State. 32 Iiul. 3S4. PP. HS, 120. 
 Crozier r. Gauo. 1 Hi>'l' (I^>-^'.2f ; P; ^O^l- 
 Cruce v. Stale, 59 Ga. !?3 pp. -i'. *»• ^^l-. ,90 
 Crugcr V. Hudson &c. K. Co., 12 N. \. UO- 
 
 Cr'uiksha.k .. Co^^gswell. 26 111. 366. p. 1060. 
 CruU r. Keener. 18 HI. b.^. p. ll'60- 
 Crunie r. Wilson. 104 In-i. 5^3. p. 2051 
 Cnunley ,-. Adkins 12 Id f^. V-19U 
 Crumley r. Hickman, 92 Ind. 38!>. pp. 2107, 
 
 Ci^umi."i-"Lambert. L. R. 3 Eq. 409. pp. 1383, 
 
 ijqi 
 
 Crump r. Thomas, 85 X. C..272. p. 2. 
 Crumi) r. United States Mining Co., 7 Gratt. 
 
 CrSefr. Williams, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 345. 
 
 Cr^iitchlicld v. Richmond &c. R. Co.,76N. C. 
 320. pp. 1635, 1636, 176S. 
 
 Cullacott V. Mining Co., 6 Pac. Rep. ill. P- 
 
 cX>n V. Soars. 112 Mass. 299^ P- 892 
 Oulyer r. Parish, 21 Conn. 40^. V-f\ 
 Cumberland &c. R. Co. v. btate, 45 Md. -.1. 
 
 Ctunireriand &c. R. Co. v. State. 37 Md. 156. 1 
 
 CumSmd Coal &c. Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 
 
 Cumin^';-''^od, 44 HI. «6. PP. 13^ 1323^ 
 Cummerford v. McAvoy, 15 111. 311. pp. 
 
 cSh?.Shand5Hurl&X^95 P.822. 
 Cumuiings v. Crawford, b8 111. 3li. PP- i-'^i, 
 
 Cuinmings v. Chandler, 26 Me. 453. pp. 1672, 
 
 Cuntmingsr. Denny,4Mo. App.602. p^2112. 
 Cunimings r. (ianu. 52 Pa. St. 481- P- 53- 
 Cu.nmings v. (i.H, « Ala .%2. p. 649. 
 Cummiugs r. Henry, 10 Ind. 109. p. 849 
 Cun.mingsi;. No.v^'^.J^' ^•^^«^''•'f; .Yl,?^^' 
 Cummings v. Parks, 2 i^\\}^\ iy ''V 1588 
 
 Cummings v. 1'«.vl'-r, 24 Minn 429. V'^^f- 
 Cummings v. Wyman, 10 Mass. 464. P- 10^/ 
 Cummins v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 67 N. "i. 
 
 Cummi'ns^Crawford 88 111. 312 p 1542. 
 Cummins v. Presley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 31.-). p. 
 
 Cummins v. Seymour. 79 Ind. 491 ; s. c. 41 Am. 
 Cum;;s;^n.!''Slr,l wend. (N.y.) 457. 
 
 Cuneo\-.Bessonl.63Ind.524 p. 1780 
 Cunnlugliam v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. o.53. pp. 
 
 Cunnlngt>ai" v. Cambridge Savings Hank. 
 cSS:^;tf^.Kr.^orn,HWend.(N.V.) 
 Cunningham r. Gallagher. 61 Wis. 170. pp. 
 Cnmlngham r. Iludson River P.ank, 21 
 
 c..)i;;;i^iia;n^.:'KmjJii^}.-.6.^i6i5. 
 
 Cunningham v. Pulton. 6 la. St. .«... p. 
 
 Cunningham v. Stf^SV-^Tef" ^P,'^" i^p 
 Cunningham v. Mate. 1. re.\. App. »». P 
 
 1(580. 
 
 P- 
 
 P- 
 
 Cunningham r. State. 20 Tex. App. 162. 
 
 Cuniiingham v. Wells, 16 Mo. App. 78. 
 
 •'144 
 Curd v. Lackland. 49 Mo. 4,54. p. H-17. 
 Curl r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 63 Iowa, 41 <. 
 
 1''90. 
 Curl r. Watson, 25 Iowa,35. p. 324. 
 Cuik'y V. com.: 84 Pa St. 151 pp. 30 70. 75. 
 Cnrran r. Connery, 5 limn. (Pa.) 4s8. pp. 
 
 ciirran r. Warren &c. Man. Co., 36 N. Y. 153. 
 
 Cumin's Ca's'e." 7 Gratt. ( Va.) 619. P. 123. 
 Currier r. Hank of Louisville, 6 Cold, (lenn.) 
 
 Currier"..Towe. 32 Mo. 203 pp. l«Of. i|;61- 
 Currier r. Lowell, 16 l^k. (Mass.) 1.0. p. 
 
 Curry r. Com. Ins. Co., 10 Pjck. (Mass.) 535. 
 
 Currv^r^'Currv, 114 Pa. St. 367. p. PH. 
 Currv r. Porter, 125 Mass. 94. p. 1.41. 
 (.'urrV. r. State.a Neb. 545. p. (. • 
 Currv i- State. -^ Nel). 412. p. l.<»9. 
 Curtis V. Detroit &c. R. Co.. 27 Wis. 160. p. 
 
 CurUs V. Mundv. 3Met. (Mass.) 405. p. 1093. 
 Curtis r. Kay, 37'Barb. (N. Y.) 69. p. 449 
 Curtis V. Railroa.l Co., 18 N. ^ . 53o. P- jf 3. 
 Curtis r. Railroa.l Co 20 Mich. 28. p. 342 
 Curtis r. Rochester Sec H- f'o., l'^^- ^-534. 
 
 s. c. Thoinp. Carr. Pass 188. P- 12.5,. 
 Curtis r.Spittv, 3 l{arn.& Aid. lfe;2. V-^^^- 
 Curtis V. St. Paul &c. R. Co.. 20 Minn. 2h. p. 
 
 Curl?; .-. State. 36 Ark. 284. pp. 727. 728, 733. 
 
 Curtis r. Treat, 21 Me. 525. P- 891. 
 
 Curtis V. Wheeler. 1 Mood. & M. 493. pp. 
 
 Curtis: e'x parte. 3 Minn 274. pp. 144 146. 
 Curzon v. Edmondson, 6 Mees. & ^\ . 2.io. p. 
 
 ensiling V. P.abcock,38 Me. 452^^ P- 1060. 
 Cushman v. Klannagan, 50 Tex. 389. p. i. 
 Cusiek V. N'c rwieh, 40 Tonn. 375. p. 1249. 
 Custiss V. Georgetown Tp. Co.,2Cranch C 
 
 Cuihrdl rlVMln.reiSi Ind. 375. p. 584. 
 Culler .•. Callison. 72 HI. 116. P- 1"J'- „g. 
 Cutler V. cutler. 43 Vt. 660. pp. 1983, 1987. 
 Cutler r. Dixon. 4 Coke, 14b; s.c. Dyer, 2SB. 
 
 CuileVV. Estate of Thomas, 24 Vt. 647. p. 
 
 ciiuer V. Hurlbut. 29 Wis 162. P; 1586. 
 Cutler r. Smith. .57 HI 256 p. m5. 
 Cutler r Stale, 42 Ind. 244. p. 168. 
 Cutsinger r^ebeker. 58 Ind. 401. p. 2076. 
 Cutter f. Pool. 54 How. Pr. (N.\.) 311. P- 
 
 Cuy'ler v. Sandford, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 225. p. 
 
 Cz^ecii V. General Steam Nav. Co.. L. R. 3 C. 
 P. 14. pp. 1326. 1327. 
 
 D. M. Force Mfg. Co. v. Horton, 74 111. 310. 
 
 I>i'cosfa r. .Jones. Cowp. 729. P- 319. 
 
 Da Lee f. Rlaekburn, 11 Kan. 190. pp. 386, 
 
 Dald r. Wilwankee City R. Co., 27 N. W. 
 
 D^dmafr.'nammel,45 Wis. 466. pp. 217, 
 
 Daflev r. Gaines, 1 Dana (Ky.), 529. pp 
 63, 2095.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Dailev V. Green, 15 Pa. St. 118. p. 631. 
 Dailev v. (i rimes. 27 Md. 440. p. 309. 
 Dailev r. State, 28 Ind. 283. p. 489. 
 Dailv'f. State, 10 Ind. 536. u. 1520. 
 Dakin, Matter of, 4 Hill (X.Y.), 42. p. 14fi. 
 Dakota Ter. r. People, 1 Dak. 470. p. 1953. 
 Dalln- V. Snuffer, 57 Mo. 296. p. 1053. 
 DaleV. Golds, 5 Barb. (X. Y.) 490. p. 943. 
 Dale r. Hall, 1 \Vils. 2S1. pp. 1322, 1346. 
 Dale V. Radcliffe, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 333. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Dalrymple v. Hanson, 1 Cal. 125. pp. 1586, 
 
 1605. 
 Dalrvmple v. AVilliams, 63 X. Y'. 361. pp. 
 
 1986,2064. 
 Dalton V. Bank of St. Louis, 54 Mo. 106. p. 
 
 10.53. 
 Dalton V. Bethlehem, 20 N. H. 506. p. 1794. 
 Dalton V. Landahn, 30 Mich. 349. p. 891. 
 Dameron r. ."State, 8 Mo. 494. p. 1562. 
 Damon c. Brvant, 2 Pick. 411. p. 377. 
 Damon r. Osljorn, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 476. p. 909. 
 Damon v. Sciluate, 119 Mass. 66. p. 1209. 
 Damont r. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 9 La. 
 
 Ann 441. p. 1236. 
 Damon v. Lyons, 44 Iowa, 276. p. 1266. 
 Dan V. Brown, 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 483. p. 1009. 
 Dana I'. Tucker, 4 .Johns. (X. Y.) 487. pp. 
 
 1964, 1966, 1967, 1982, 1984. 
 Dance V. McBride. 43 la. 624. pp. 396, 401, 
 
 402, 453. 
 Dane v. Treat, 35 Me. 19S. p. 307. 
 Danforth v. Evans, 16 Vt. 538. p. 881. 
 Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 614. p. 1509. 
 Daniel v. Foster, 49 Ga. 303. p. 2067. 
 Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697. pp. 110, 1917. 
 Daniel v. Guv, 23 Ark. 50. pp. 119, 120. 
 Daniel v. Johnson, 29 Ga. 207. p. 1670. 
 Daniel v. Metropolitan Ac. K. Co.. L. R. 5 
 
 H. L. 45. p. I2I5. 
 Daniels v. Davidson, 16 Ves. 1249; s. c. 17 
 
 Ves. 433. p. 1052. 
 Daniels t\ Hudson River Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 416. pp. 974, 976, 977, 978. 
 Daniels v. McGinnls, 97 Ind. 549. p. 2005. 
 Daniels v. People, 21 111. 439. p. 1013. 
 Daniels v. Shields, 3S 111. 197. pp. 20.50, 2051. 
 Danielson i'. Dyckman, 26 Mich. 169. p. 1741. 
 Danks r. Rodeheaver, 26 \V. Va. 274. pp. 
 
 2051, 2127,2128. 
 Danlev v. Edwards, 1 Ark. 437. p. 1669. 
 Dansbv v. State, 34 Tex. 392. p. 1917. 
 Danseyr. liichardsou, 3 El. & Bl. 144; s. c. 
 
 25 Ens. L. & Eq. 76. p. 1340. 
 Danville Bank v. Waddill, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 433. 
 
 pp. 1983. 1985. 
 Danville &c. R. Co. v. Stewart, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 
 
 119. p. 1473. 
 Darbv v. Ouseley, 36 Eng. Law and Eq. 518. 
 
 pp. 247, 250. 
 Darbv r. Ouselev, 1 Hurl. & X. I ; s. c. 2 Jur. 
 
 (X. s. ) 497 ; 25 L. J. Exch. 227. p. 635. 
 Dare v. Gearv, Anib. 375. p. 841. 
 Dare v. Ogdcn, 1 X. J. L. 91. pp. 1985, 1986. 
 Dargan v. Waddill, 9 Ired. L. (X. C.) 244. 
 
 p. 1394. 
 Dailend i\ Rosencrans, 56 Iowa, 122. p. 310. 
 Darling f. Dodge. .36 Me. 370. pp. 835,1685. 
 Darling v. WrsI, 51 la. 259. p. 2040. 
 Darling v. Williams, 35 Oh. St. 61. p. 1548. 
 Darnell v. iState, 15 Tex. App. 70. pp. 1679, 
 
 2(191. 
 Darrah v. Steamboat Lightfoot, 17 Mo. 276. 
 
 p. 2130. 
 Darrancc v. Preston, 18 la. 396. pp. 1919, 2100. 
 Dascomb r. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 27 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.)221. pp. 1207, 1211. 
 Dasslerr. Wisley, 32 Mo. 498. pp. 806, 1506, 
 
 1667. 
 
 Dauchy v. Goodrich, 20 Vt. 127. p. 1069. 
 Dauutley r. Hyde, 6 Jur. 133. p. 1722. 
 Dave V. State, 22 Ala. 23. p. 453. 
 Davenport v. Commonwealth, 1 Leigh (Va.), 
 
 585. p. 725. 
 Davenport v. Cummings, 15 la. 219. pp. 1956, 
 
 1957, 1994. 
 Davenport v. Harris, 27 Ga. 68. p. 585. 
 Davenport v. Ogg, 15 Kan. 363. p. 257. 
 Davenport Gas Co. v. Davenport, 13 la. 229. 
 
 pp. 55, 126. 
 Daves, Matter of, 81 N. C. 72. pp. 151. 
 David r. Mason, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 156. p. 214. 
 Davidson v. Graham, 2 Oh. St. 131. pp. 1326, 
 
 1345, 1347, i:548, 13.50, 1352, 1374. 
 Davidson v. Henop, 1 Cranch C. C. 280. p. 
 
 219. 
 Davidson v. Isham, 9 X. J. Eq. ISO. pp. 1384, 
 
 ISSO, 1405. 
 Davidson v. Overhulser, 3 la. 196. p. 310. 
 Davidson v. Lallande, 12 La. Ann. 826. pp. 
 
 358, 383. 
 Davidson v. Peck, 4 Mo. 438. p. 560. 
 Davidson v. People, 90 IlL 221. pp. 11, 122, 
 
 Davidson v. Manlove, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 346. 
 
 p. 1923. 
 Davidson v. Stanley, 3 Scott X. R. 49; s. c. 2 
 
 Man. & Gr. 721. p. 1643. 
 Davie v. Terrill, 63 Tex. 105. p. 335. 
 Davies v. Evans, 6 Carr. & P. 619. p. 223. 
 Davies I'. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. 546; s. c. 6 
 
 Jur. 954; 12 L. J. (Exch.) 10; 2 Thomp. 
 
 Neg. 1105. pp. 1023, 1210, 1221, 1229. 1305. 
 Daviess v. Arbuckle, 1 Dana (Ky.), 525. pp. 
 
 215, 217, 240. 
 Daviess Co. Sav. Ass. v. Sailor, 63 Mo. 24; 
 
 s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 488. p. 1023. 
 Davis V. Allen, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 466. pp. 57, 
 
 119. 
 Davis V. Amev, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 412. p. 968. 
 Davis V. Brown, 67 Mo. 313. i). 1747. 
 Davis V Byrd, 94 Ind. 525. p. 257. 
 Davis I'. Capper, 10 Barn. & Cr. 28; s. c. 5 
 
 Man. & Ry. 53. p. 1142. 
 Davis V. Charles River &c. R. Co., 11 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 506. p. 1011. 
 Davis V. Davis, 7 Harr. & J. (.Md.) 30. pp. 
 
 1507, 1596. 
 Davis c. Detroit &c. R. Co., 20 Mich. 105. p. 
 
 1226. 
 Davis V. Elliott, 15 Gray (Mass.), 90. p. 1698. 
 Davis i\ Kairclough, 63* Mo. 61. ]>. 1668. 
 Davis V. Field, .56 Vt. 426. pp. 353. 360, 362. 
 Davis r. Fish, 1 G. Greene (Iowa), 406. pp. 
 
 1914, 1997. 
 Davis r. Foster, 68 Ind. 238. p. 1726. 
 Davis r. Franke, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 425. pp. 
 
 435, 476, 478. 
 Davis r. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716. p. 1365. 
 Davis V. Guarnieri, 15 X. East. Rep. 350. p. 
 
 2049. 
 Davis V. Hardy, 6 Barn. & Crcs. 225. p. 
 
 1584. 
 Davis V. Hardy, 76 Ind. 272. pp. 415, 431, 
 
 1642, 1783, 178.i. 
 Davis V. Hill, 75 X. C. 224. pp. 736, 737, 739. 
 Davis V. Hunter, 7 Ala. 135. p. 62. 
 Davis c. Kenaga, 51 111. 170. pp. 1125,1131. 
 Davis r. Keves, 112 Mass. 436. p. 567. 
 Davis V. Lowman, 9 Ga. 54. p. 1919. 
 Davis r. Mason, 4 I'ick. (Mass ) 156. p. 22L 
 Davis i\ Melvin, 1 Ind. 136. p. 329. 
 Davis V. Michigan &c. K. Co., 22 111. 278. p. 
 
 1151. 
 Davis r. Miller, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 1. p. 1597. 
 Davis v. .^loore, 13 .Me. 424. p. 909. 
 Davis ('. Xeligh, 7 Xeb. 84. p. 385. 
 Davis c. Pattou, 19 Md. 128. p. 725.
 
 1 \' i i i 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Davis r. People, 19 111. 74. pp. 11, 118, V21, 
 
 1<):!0. 
 Davis r. PoopK', SS 111. :V)0. pp. 1.5:5!), 1,"U1. 
 l)avi> r. IVopli', lU 111. Sti. p. ItvtO. 
 l>a\ is r. I'eveler, C>o Mo. IS'J. pp. 31(!, 1102, 
 
 1711. 
 Davis r. President &.c. of Menasha, 21 AVIs. 
 
 4!tl. p. 2060. 
 Davis V. Reamer, 105 Iiul. 318. p. 2030. 
 Davis V. Itoby, &i Me. 430. pp. 306, 308. 
 Davi-s V. Kussell, 5 Hing. 354. p. 1175 
 1 ).a\ is V. Sawyer, 133 Ma.*s. 289. pp. 1384, I30C. 
 |)a\ is V. Scripps, 2 Mo. 187. p. 2053. 
 Da\ is r. Stale, 33 Ga. 08. p. 747. 
 Davis r. Slate. 38 Md. 15. p. 460. 
 Davis c. Mate, .35 Ind. 496; s. c. Am. Kep. 
 
 760. P11. 408, 5(12, ,503, 508, 500, 517, 519, 520, 
 
 1780, 1007, 1931,1981. 
 Davis r. State, 15 Oh. 72. pp. 1903, 1904. 
 Davis V. State, 25 Oh. St. 360. p. 19. 
 Davis V. State, 2 Tex. App. 58S. p. 46.5. 
 Davis V. State, 3 Tex. App. 91. p. 100,5. 
 Davis V. State, 9 Tex. App. 6:54. pp. 6, 85. 
 Davis r. State, 13 Tex. Ai)p. 11. p. 1537. 
 Davis V. State, 14 Tex. App. 645. pp.1679, 
 
 1706, 1707. 
 Davis r. State, 19 Tex. App. 202. p. 1756. 
 Davis V. State, 43 Tex. IsO. p. 198.5. 
 Davis r. Stewart, 8 Fed. Kep. 803; s. c. 3 
 
 McCrary (U. S.), 174. p. 1416. 
 Davis r. Town of Farmingham, 42 Wis. 425. 
 
 pp. 2025, 2028, 2030, 2036, 2037. 
 Davis V. Wabash &c. K. Co., 89 Mo. 340; 
 
 s. c. 1 S. AV. Hep. 327 ; 13 Mo. App. 449. pp. 
 
 1318, 1322, 11545, 1347, 11549, 1357. 
 Davis V. Wilson, 65 111. 527. p. 204. 
 Davis r. Zumwalt, 1 App. Civ. C. C. .507. p. 
 
 2076. 
 Davison v. Jersey Com))any Associates, 71 
 
 N. V. 333. p. 2. 
 Davison v. People, 90 111. 221. p. 124. 
 Davison's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 129. pp. 
 
 134, 152. 
 Dawes v. Cope, 4 Binn. 258. p. 1444. 
 Dawson i: Coffman, 28 Ind. 220. p. 2091. 
 Dawson v. Horan,51 Barb. (N. Y.) 540. p. 4. 
 Dawson v. Lambert, 8 Gill (Md.), 216. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Dawson v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 7 Hurl. & 
 
 N. 10:57. p. 1237 
 Dawson v. Bailwav Co., 76 Mo. 514. p. 1368. 
 Dawson v. Shillock, 20 Minn. 180. p. 2083. 
 Dawson v. St. Louis &c. K. Co., 76 Mo. 514. 
 
 p. 1150. 
 Dawson v. State, 29 Ark. 116. p. 18. 
 Dawson V. State, 62 Miss. 241. pp. 17S7, 1790. 
 Dav V. Com., 3 Gratt. (Va.) 6:50. p. 48. 
 Day r. Crawford, 13 Ga. .508. pp. 1771, 1773. 
 Day r. Henry, 104 Ind. 324. p. 20:58. 
 Dav V. Moore, 13 Grav (Mass.), .522. p. 309. 
 Day V. Owens, 5 Midi. .520. p. 1283. 
 Day V. Uidlev, 16 Vt. 48. pp. 1:521, 1332-, 1345. 
 Dav V. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448. p. 1011. 
 Day f. Savadge, Hob. 85. p. 55. 
 Day V. Sharp, 4 Whart. (Pa.) :539. p. .5.50. 
 Davr. Stale. 21 Tex. A|ip. 213. p. 1744. 
 Dav V. State, 63 (Ja. 667. p. 660. 
 Dav r. Slate, 13 Mo. 422. )). 448. 
 Dav r. Stickucv, 14 Allen (Mass.), 2,55. p. 
 
 :;d7. 
 Dav r. Woodworth, 13 How. (U. S.) 363. p. 
 
 •-'14. 
 Davharsh v. Knos, 5 \. Y. .581. pp. 110, 111. 
 I);i'vli.n r. Monroe, 47 Mieh. 105. ]>. 1050. 
 Davton r. Matr, 10 Oh. St 584. p. 26. 
 D.iicon c. Shreve,22\. .J. L 176. ]). 1914. 
 Deakers r. Temple, 41 Pa. St. 2:54. p. 14.50. 
 Dean c. ("orbetl. 51 N. Y. Super. (10 J. & S.) 
 
 103. pp. 368, 1625. 
 
 Dean r. Erskine, 18 X. H. 81. p. 827. 
 Dean r. Sweeney, 51 Tex. 242. p. 3. 
 Dean i-. Toppiu,"l30 Mass. 517. p. 958. 
 Dean of St. Asaph, Case of, cUed. p. 1521. 
 Doane c. Aveling, 1 Rob. Kcc. 279. pp. 646, 
 
 651. 
 Dearmond i\ Dcarmond, 10 Ind. 191. p. 53. 
 Deaver v. Riee,2 Ired. L. (X. C.) 260. p. 622. 
 De Bardelabeu v. State, 50 Ala. 179. p. 124. 
 De Benedetti i: Maudlin, 1 Hilt (N. Y.), 213. 
 
 p. 1225. 
 De 15ernard V r. Harding, 8 Exch. 822. p. 901. 
 De Bow r. People, 1 Denio (X. Y.), 9. p. 819. 
 Debuvs V. MoUere, 2 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 625. 
 
 p. 20. 
 Decker v. Brvant, 7 Barb. (X. Y.) 18:5. p. 585. 
 Decker r. House, 30 Kan. 614 p. 2050. 
 Decker v. Matthews, 12 X. Y. 313. pp. 1740, 
 
 1956. 
 Dedric r. Hopsen, 62 Iowa, 562. p. 264. 
 Deere r. Plant, 42 Mo. 60. p. 1600. 
 Deerly i". Duchess of Mazarine, 1 Salk. 116; 
 
 s. c. 2 Salk. 646; 1 Ld. Raym. 147. p. 1747. 
 De Foe ;•. People, 22 Mich. 224. i)p. 545, 1806. 
 Deford v. Rcvnolds, 36 Pa. St. 325. pp. 1098, 
 
 1102. 
 De Forrest v. Strong, 8 Conn. 513. p. 886. 
 De France v. De France, 34 Pa. St. 385. pp. 
 
 305, 803. 
 Defrese v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 53. p. 303. 
 Deggs V. State, 7 Tex. App. 359. pp. 17%, 
 
 1707. 
 Degraff v. Ilovev, 16 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 120. 
 
 p: 641. 
 Degraffenreid v. Thomas, 14 Ala. 681. pp. 
 
 203, 1506. 
 De Graw v. Prior, 60 Mo. 56. p. 1042. 
 Deickman r. McCormick, 24 Mo. 596. p. 1611. 
 Deigr. INIorehead (Ind.), UXorth. East. Kep. 
 
 458; s. c. 110 Ind. 451. p. 81. 
 Dejarnette v. Com., 11 Rejjorter, 6.53; s. c. 75 
 
 Va. 867. pp. 64, 73, 74, 725. 
 De La Mar r. Ilurd. 4 Colo. 422. p. 2130. 
 Delamater v. People, 5 Laus. (X. Y.) 632. p. 
 
 524. 
 Delaney v. Xoble, 3 X. J. Eq. 441. p. 424. 
 Delanev v. Regulators, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 403. 
 
 p. 160: 
 Delano r. Goodwin, 48 X. H. 203. p. 1007. 
 Delany I". Robinson, 2 AVhart. (Pa.) 503. p. 
 
 962. 
 Delaplane v. Crenshaw, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 457. 
 
 pp. 721, 725. 
 Delaware Ins. Co. v. Winter, 38 Pa. St. 187. 
 
 p. 905. 
 De Leon v. White, 9 Tex. 598. p. 1438. 
 Delooherv r. State, 27 Ind. .'^21. p. .523. 
 1)0 Lome' r. Pease, 19 Ga. 220. pp.312, 313. 
 Deliihi r. Lowerv, 74 Ind. .520; s. c. 39 Am. 
 
 Kep. 08. i)p. 561, 2115, 2116. 
 Del Valle v. Str. Richmond, 27 La. Ann. 90. 
 
 p. 11.54. 
 Delvee r. Boardman, 20 la. 446. j). 20.54. 
 Demaree r. Stale, 45 Ind. 200. ji. 50. 
 Demarest v. llardham, 34 X. J. Kcj. 409. p. 
 
 1403. 
 Dement, Ex parte, 53 Ala. 389. p. 176. 
 De Medina v. Owen, 3 Car. & K. 626. p. 639. 
 Demerritt r. Randall, 116 Mass. .331. p. 379, 
 Deming c. Hurlburl, 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 45. p. 
 
 117. 
 Deming v. Foster, 42 X. H. 165. pp. 851, 852, 
 
 >.)27. 
 Dempsev i: Mayor &c., 10 Daly (X. Y.), 417. 
 
 p|.. 21126, 2027.' 
 Demiisev r. State, 3 Tex. App. 429. pp.727, 
 
 720, 785. 
 Den r. .McAllister, 7 X. .1. L. 46. p. 1082. 
 Den 1-. Woodward, 4 X. J. L. 122. p. 700.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lix 
 
 Den Blaker's Executrix v. New Jersey &c. 
 
 R. Co., 7 Rep. 6-JG. p. ]'230. 
 Den d. Hopper v. Demarest, 21 X. J. L. 526. 
 
 p. 215. 
 Denison v. Wertz, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 372. 
 
 p. 826. 
 Denman v. Baldwin, 3 N. J. L. 045. p. 5. 
 Denn v. Clark, 1 X. J. L. 446. p. 53. 
 Denn v. Evaul, 1 X. J. L. 283. pp. 25, 34. 
 Denn v. Pissant, 1 X. J. L. 220. p. 82. 
 Dennerline r. Gable, 73 Ina. 210. p. 2110. 
 Denney v. Booker, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 427. pp. 
 
 215, 220. 
 Denning V. State, 22 Ark. 131. p. 171. 
 Dennis v. Alexander, 3 Pa. St. 60. p. 912. 
 Dennis v. Crooks, 23 Mo. App. 532. p. 854. 
 Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 390, 
 
 pp. 13S5, 1390. 
 Dennis v. Huvck,48 Mich. 620; s. c. 42 Am 
 
 Rep. 479. p." 1329. 
 Dennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142. p. 2079. 
 Dennison r. Collins,! Cow. (X'. Y.) 111. p 
 
 1931. 
 Dennison v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 37 Mich 
 
 285. pp. 2059, 2066. 
 Dennison v. Phoenix Co., 52 Iowa, 457. p 
 
 981. 
 Dennison r. Powers, 35 Vt. 39. p. 1917. 
 Denny r. Hutcheson, 1 Bibb (Ky.),576. p 
 
 109. 
 Denny v. Wickliffe, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 224. p 
 
 2097. 
 Dennv v. "Williams, 5 Allen (Mass.), 1. pp 
 
 919,1600,1603,1606. 
 Denslow i'. Fowler, 2 Cow. (X. Y.) 592. p 
 
 589. 
 Densmore v. State, 67 Ind. 306. pp. 1837, 
 
 1844. 
 Dent V. Hancock, 5 Gill (Md.), 127. p. 725. 
 Dent V. Hertford, 2 Salk. 645. pp. 112, 113. 
 Dent V. King, 1 Ga. 200. p. 1915. 
 Dent V. Miles, 4 Mo. 419. p. 1618. 
 Denton i*. Bate, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 279. p. 
 
 497. 
 Denton r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 52 la. 161. pp. 
 
 1356, 1359, 1360. 
 Denton V. Lewis, 15 la. 301. pp. 1964, 1965. 
 Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 296. p. 
 
 147. 
 Denver r. Capelli, 3 Col. 235. pp. 2130, 2131. 
 Denver &c. R. Co. v. Olsen, 4 Col. 239. p. 816. 
 De Paus v. Kaiser (Ga.), 3 S. E. Rep. 25. p. 
 
 2076. 
 Depi)e V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 38 la. 592. p. 
 
 1964. 
 Depevster v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Caines 
 
 (N."Y.),85. p. 17.00. 
 De Priest v. State, 68 Ind. 569. p. 1913. 
 Deputy V. Betts, 4 liarr. (Del.) 3.52. p. 1060. 
 Derl)v r. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119. p. 197. 
 DeUidder v. McKnight, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 294. 
 
 pp 852, 912. 
 Derosia c. Winona &c. R. Co., 18 Minn. 133. 
 
 pp. 1124, 12.53,1374. 
 Dea Art t'. Leggett, 5 Duer (X. Y.), 156. p. 
 
 1639. 
 De Schawnberg v. Buchanan, 5 Carr. & P. 
 
 343. p. 927. 
 Desclie i\ Gi'es, .56 Md. 135. p. 3. 
 DeSobry v. DeLaistre, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 192. 
 
 p. 819. 
 Des Rochers, Ex parte,! McAIl. (U. S.) 08. 
 
 p. 178. 
 Dessaunier v. Murphy, 33 Mo. 191. p. 1054. 
 Detroit &c. R. Co. v. Barton, 61 Ind. 293. p. 
 
 203(). 
 Detroit &c. R. Co. i\ Van Steinbersr, 17 Mich. 
 
 99. pp. 376, 388, 1208, 1212, 1219, 1224. 
 Deupree v. Deupree, 49 Ga. 325. p. 1633. 
 
 Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 3 Paige (X. Y.), 
 
 554. pp . 646, 648, 650. 
 Dever v. Aikin, 40 Ga. 423. p. 1750. 
 Devereux v. Barclay, 5 Barn. & Aid. 702. p. 
 
 1157. 
 Devereux v. Burgovne, 5 Ired. Eq. (X. C.) 
 
 351. p. 1061. 
 Devizes v. Clark, 3 Ad. & El. 506. pp. 1505, 
 
 1507, 1515. 
 Devlin V. Wabash &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 545. p. 
 
 1315. 
 Devlin, Ex parte, 5 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 287. p. 
 
 152. 
 Devollv. Brownell, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 448. p. 
 
 265. 
 Devries v. Havgood, 63 X. C. 53. p. 728. 
 Devries v. Phillips, 63 X. C. 53. pp. 775, 779. 
 Dew V. McDivitt, 17 Am. L. Reg. 623; s. c. 
 
 31 Ohio St. 139. pp. 60, 98, 102, 126. 
 Dewar v. Purdav, 4 X. & M. 633 ; s. c. 3 Ad. 
 
 & El. 166 ; 1 H. & W. 227. p. 1584. 
 Dewart v. Clement, 48 Pa. St. 413. p. 1418. 
 Dewdney v. Palmer, 4 Mees. & W. 664. p. 
 
 327. 
 Dewees v. Hudgeons, 1 Tex. 192. p. 1698. 
 Dewev v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307. p. 1246. 
 De Witt V. Denms, 30 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 131. 
 
 p. 161. 
 De Witt V. Pierson, 112 Mas.s. 8. p. 1003. 
 Dewitt V. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298. pp. 609, 613, 
 
 628. 
 De Wolf V. Rabaud, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 476. p. 
 
 1585. 
 Dexter v. Syracuse &c. R. Co., 42 X. T. 326. 
 
 p. 1154. 
 Dey r. Dunham, 2 Johns. (X. Y'.) 182. p. 
 
 1093. 
 Deyo V. Xew York &c. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 9. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Dias V. Merle, 1 Paige (X"". Y.), 494. p. 634. 
 Dias V. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 20. p. 1902. 
 Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217. pp. 1151, 1154, 
 
 11.55. 
 Dibble V. Rogers, 13 Wend. (X. Y.) 536. p. 
 
 lOSO. 
 Dicas V. Lawson. 1 Cromp. M. & R. 934. p. 
 
 169. 
 Dick V. Phillips, 41 Hun (X. Y.), 603. p. 602. 
 Dickens v. Xew York &c. R. Co., I Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. (N. Y.) 504. p. 1212. 
 Dickens v. State, 30 Ga. 383. p. 1509. 
 Dickens v. Williams, 2 B. Mour. (Ky.) 374. 
 
 p. 926. 
 Dickenson v. Breeden, 25 111. 186. p. 622. 
 Dickenson v. Cook, 17 Johns. (X. Y.) 332. p. 
 
 1442. 
 Dickenson i\ Dickenson, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 321. 
 
 p. 1102. 
 Dickenson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 546. p. 518. 
 Dickenson v. Lott, 29 Tex. 173. p. 966. 
 Dickenson v. Lovell, 35 X. H. 9. p. 809. 
 Dickenson v. Maynard, 20 La. Ann. 66. p. 
 
 1197. 
 Dickenson v. Shee, 4 Esp. 67. p. 391. 
 Dickenson's Case, 3 Harr.. (Del.) 517. p. 188 
 Dickerson i;. Burke, 25 Ga. 225. pp. 728 
 
 747. 
 Dickerson v. Dickerson, 50 Mich. 37. pp 
 
 2031,2038. 
 Dickerson v. Johnson, 24 Ark. 251. pp. 166S 
 
 1674. 
 Dickerson f. Seelye, 12 Barb. (X. Y.)99. p 
 
 1367. 
 Dickey f. Johnson, 13 Ired. (X. C.) 150. p 
 
 158.5. 
 Dickev r. Maine Tel. Co., 46 Me. 483. p 
 
 1224. 
 Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177. pp. 560, 561.
 
 Ix 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Dickev r. Tennison, 27 Mo. 3T3. p. 1107. 
 Dickiiis i\ Beale, 10 How. (U. S.) 572. p 
 
 942. 
 Dickinson r. Valpv, 10 Barn. & Cres. 128. p 
 
 IKX). 
 Dickinson. In re, 58 IIow. Pr. (X. Y.)260. p 
 
 2t)5. 
 Dickson v. Rose, 87 Tnd. 103. p. 2126. 
 Dickson i: 81iarrctio, 7 La. Ann 54. p. 461 
 Diefenback r. Stark, 50 ^Vis. 462. p. 852. 
 Digard r. Micnaud. 2 Hob. (La.) 3S7. p. 1084 
 Dikenian r. l'arrish,6 Pa. St. 211. p. 1047. 
 Dill r. Lawrence, 10 N. East. Rep. 573; s. c 
 
 109Ind. 564. j.. IHSI. 
 Dill r. OTerrcll, (!it Ind. .500. p. 1474. 
 Dillard r. Parker, 25 Ark. 503. p. 2122. 
 Dille r. Lovels, 37 Oh. St. 415. p. 218. 
 Dille r. State, 34 Ohio St. 617. pp. 705, 707, 
 
 708, 709. 
 Dillin V. People, 8 Mich. 357. pp. 316, 582. 
 Dillon r. Ander.son, 43 N. Y. 231. p. 346. 
 Dillon i: Bell, 9 Ind. 320. p. 433. 
 Dillon V. C'ockroft, 90 X. Y. 649. p. 200. 
 Dillon V. McRae, 40 Ga. 107. p. 1713. 
 Dills V. State, 59 Ind. 15. p. 176. 
 Dilworth v. Com., 12 Gratt. (Va.) 689. pp. 
 
 85, 120, 2062. 
 Diniick v. Downs, 82 111. 570. pp. 308, 449, 
 
 450. 
 Ditcham v. Chivis, 4 Bin.c. 706. p. 1611. 
 Ditmars v. Com., 47 Pa. St. 335. ]t. 1646. 
 Dittman r. Repp, 50 Md. 516. p. l:;87. 
 Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 la. 565. p. 55. 
 Divenv r. Elmira. 51 N. Y. 507. j). 55. 
 Diversv V. Will, 2 111 216. p. .328. 
 Dix V. Akers, 30 Ind. 431. p. 2089. 
 Dixon V. Duke, 85 Ind. 434. pp. 825, 2007, 
 
 2008,2010,2011. 
 Dixon r. Graham, 16 la. 310. p. 2075. 
 Dixon V. Haley, 16 111. 145. p. 891. 
 Dixon V. Richard, 3 How. (Miss.) 771. p. 5. 
 Dixon V. State, 3 la. 41. p. 1534. 
 Dixon r. State, 13 Fla. 636. pp. 1726, 1727, 
 
 1730,1731,173.5. 
 Dixon V. State, 2 Tex. App. 530. pp. 81, 91, 
 
 92. 
 Dixon V. Vale, 1 Car. & P. 278. p. 283. 
 Dixon V. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ad. 313. p. 915. 
 Doak V. Snapp, 1 Coldw. (Teuu.) 180. p. 
 
 Doati V. State, 26 Tnd. 40.5. p. 1181. 
 
 Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65. pp. 889, 898. 
 
 Doane v. Eddy, 16 Wend. (X. Y.) 523. p. 
 
 1441. 
 Doane t). Glenn, 21 Wall. (IT. S.) 33. p. 568. 
 Doane v. Lockwood, 15 111. 490. p. 1621. 
 Dobbins r. Oswalt, 20 Ark. 619. p. 705. 
 Dobbs r. State, 55 Ga. 272. p. 163. 
 Dobree v. Eastwood, 3 Car. & P. 250. p. 944. 
 Dobson V. Blackmore, 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 991. 
 
 p. 1404. 
 Dobson V. Finley, 8 Jones L. (X. C.) 495. p. 
 
 848. 
 Docks V. Stone, 13 Minn. 434. p. 415. 
 Dodd V. .Moore, 91 Ind. .522. p. 1803. 
 Dodd I'. Moore. 92 Ind. 397. p. 489. 
 Dodge V. Dunham, 41 Ind. 187. i>. 308. 
 Dodge V. (iavlord, 53 Ind. 365. p. 1647. 
 Dodge V. Israel, 4 Wash. C C. (U S.) 323. p. 
 
 630. 
 Dodge V. .Janvrin, 59 X. IT. 16. p. 866. 
 I>odge V. Prople, 4 Neb. 220. p. M. 
 Dodge f. Pope, 93 lud. 480. pp. 2048,2052, 
 
 207 1. 
 Dodge V. Rogers, 9 Minn. 22.3. p. 1706. 
 Dodson V. Weutworlh, 4 .Man. it G. 1080. p. 
 
 1020. 
 Doe c. Benjamin, 9 Ad. & El. 664. p. 1663. 
 Due :;. Braynu, 5 Com. Buucb, 655. p. 215. 
 
 Doe r. D.ivies, 10 Q. B. 314. p. 1739. 
 
 Doe r. Earl of Egremont, 2 Moody & Rob. 386, 
 
 p. 277. 
 Doe c. Gooch, 3 Barn. & Aid. 664. p. 886. 
 Doe r. Jauncey, 8 Carr & P. 99. p. 272. 
 Doe r. Makepeace, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 575. p. 
 
 2117. 
 Doe V. Paine. 4 Hawks (X. C), 64. p. 1746. 
 Doe V. Perkins, 3 T. R. 739. p. 2003. 
 Doe V. Rliodes, U Mees. & W. 600. p. 1135. 
 Doe V. Snowd jn, 2 W. Bl. 1224. p. 1135. 
 Doe V Spence, 6 East, 120. p. 1135. 
 Doer. Turford, 3 Barn. & Ad. 898. p. 642. 
 Doe i: Ulph, 66 Eng. C. L. 208; s. c. 13 Q. B. 
 
 204. p. 1124. 
 Doe r. Watkins, 7 East, 551. p. 1135. 
 Doe d. Bather v. Brayne, 5 Com. Bench, 
 
 655. p. 242. 
 Doe d. Courtail v. Thomas, 9 Barn. & Cress. 
 
 288. p. 27S. 
 
 1. Lewis v. 
 242. 
 
 Doe d. 
 
 Lewis, 1 Carr. & K. 122. p. 
 
 Doe d. Pill V. Wilson, 1 Mood. & Rob. .323. p. 
 
 242. 
 Doe d. Tucker v. Tucker, Mood. & M. 536. p. 
 
 242. 
 Doe d. Warren r. Bray, Mood. & M. 166. p. 
 
 242. 
 Doe d. Welsh v. Langfield, 16 Mees. & W. 
 
 497. p. 1333. . 
 Doe d. Wollaston i'. Barnes, 1 Mood. & Rob. 
 
 386. p. 242. 
 Doebling v. Loos, 45 Mo. 1.50. p. 1669. 
 Doering v. Stale, 49 Ind. .56. p. 1646. 
 Doggett V. Jordan, 2 Fla. .541. pp. 876, 1726. 
 Doggett V. Richmond &c. R. Co., 78 X. C. 305. 
 
 p. 1221. 
 Doggett V. Sims, 4 S. E. Rep. 909. p. 2067. 
 Doherlv v. Lincoln, 114 Mass. 362. pp. 2136, 
 
 2137, 2141. 
 Dohertv v. Waltham, 4 Gray (Mass.), 596. 
 
 p. 124S. 
 Dolan i: .Etna Ins. Co., 22 Hun (X. Y.), 396. 
 
 p. 1947. 
 Dolan V. People, 64 X. Y. 485. pp. 30, 31, 32.. 
 Dolan r. State, 40 Ark. 454. p. 73. 
 Dole c. Er.skine, 37 N. II. 317. p. 123. 
 Dole f. Tliurlow, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 157. pp. 
 
 828, 1739. 
 Doles V. State, 97 Ind. 5.55. pp. 1918, 1981. 
 Doll c. stale, 15 Nortli East. Hep. 293. p. 78. 
 Doll, Ex parte, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 595. pp. 139, 
 
 171. 
 DoUner v. Williams, 29 Ga. 743. p. 1670. 
 Dolloff V. Stimi)son, 33 Me. 546. pp. 113, 2062. 
 Dolz c. Morris, 10 Hun (X. Y.),201. p. 500. 
 Dominguez »". Mascotti (Cal.), 15 Pac. Rep. 
 
 773. p. 2084. 
 Donahoe r. state, 12 Tex. App. 297. p. 311. 
 Donahoe v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 83 Mo. 543. 
 
 PI). 1257, 12.58, 12.59. 
 Donahue v. Windsor County &c. Ins. Co., 56 
 
 Vt. .ni. 1). 982. 
 Donaldson y. Boston, 16 Gray (Mass.), 508. 
 
 p. 1249. 
 Donaldson v. Means, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 109. p. 
 
 948. 
 Donaldson t-. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 21 Minn. 
 
 293. pp. 1226, 1235. 
 
 Donaldson r. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 18 la. 
 
 280. p. 1229. 
 Doni-lson v. Taylor, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 390. pp. 
 
 294, 583. 
 
 Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490. p. 321. 
 Donnelly f. Stale, 26 .N. J. L. 602. ].. 1841. 
 Donner V. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40. pp. 1963, 1967, 
 
 1995. 
 Donohoo r. State, .36 Ala. 281. p. 1669. 
 Donohue v. People, 56 X. Y. 208. p. 525.
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 Donston t'. state, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 275. p. I 
 
 Doolev V. State, 28 Ind. 2.'59. pp. 1964, 1965. 
 Doolittle r. State, 9:', Ind. 272. p 110. 
 Doolv V. Jlnnings, 6 Mo. 61. p. 1600. 
 Dooman i\ Mitchell, 26 Ga. 472. p. 1670. 
 Doon V. Donaher, 113 Mass. 151. p. 616. 
 Doorman r. Jenkins, 2 Ad. &E1. 261. pp. 1242, 
 
 1245, 1246. 
 Dorau v. Shaw, 3 T. B. Men. (Ky.) 415. pp. 
 
 1984, 1991. 
 Dore V. Billings, 26 Me. 56. p. 960. 
 Uorgan v. State, 72 Ala. 17.3. pp. 4.3, 1770. 
 Dorlaud v. Cunningliam, 66 Cal. 484. p. 2064. 
 Dorlon v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 604. p. 
 
 124S. 
 Dorniandyt'. State Bank, 3 Bradw. (111.) 236. 
 
 p. 294. 
 Dorrr. Fenno, 12Pick. (Mass.) 521. pp. 1753, 
 
 1964, 1965, 1966, 19S3, 1989. 
 Dorr V. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 11 N. Y. 
 
 485. pp. 1348, 1349. 
 Dorr V. Swartwout, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 179. 
 
 p. 966. 
 Dorr V. Tremont Bank, 120 Mass. 3.59. p. 218. 
 Dorr V. Tremont Bank, 128 Mass. 849. p. 326. 
 Dorr, Ex parte, 3 How. (U. S.) 104. p. 178. 
 Dorsev v. Construction Co., 42 Wis. 583. 
 
 p. 2025. 
 Dorsey v. Eagle. 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 321. p. 821. 
 DorseV v. Phillips &c. Co., 42 Wis. 583. 
 
 p. 1210. 
 Doss V. Birks, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 431. p. 
 
 329. 
 Doss V. Com., 1 Gratt. (Va.) 5.57. p. 234. 
 Doss V. Missouri &c. K. Co., 59 Mo. 27. pp. 
 
 1229, 1297. 
 Dosscttr. Miller, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 72. p. 489. 
 Doster v. Brown, 2.S Ga. 24. p. 728. 
 DosttT V. Sterling, .53 Kau. 381. pp. 2079, 
 
 2101,2102. 
 Dotson 1-. State, 62 Ala. 141. p. 32. 
 Dotty V. Strong, Burnett (Wis.), 158. p. 
 
 1K69. 
 Doty ('. Steinberg, 25 Mo. App. 328. p. 1477. 
 Doty r. Wilson, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 378. pp. 
 
 889, 900. 
 Doub V. Barnes, 1 Md. Ch. 27. p. 194. 
 Doud V. Guthrie, 13 Bradw. (111.) 653. p. 
 
 668. 
 Dougan tJ. Champlain Transp. Co., 6 Lans. 
 
 (X. Y.) 430. p. 1223. 
 Dougherty r. Chicago &c. Co., 86 111. 467. p. 
 
 1236. 
 I)<iugherty v. Matthews, 35 Mo. 520. p. 1607. 
 Douglas r. Corbett, 6 El. & Bl. 511. pp. 1166, 
 
 1172,1176. 
 Douglas V. Hill, 29 Kan. 527. p. 703. 
 Douglas V. Orr, 58 Mo. 573. p. 2111. 
 Douglas V. Tansey, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 352. p. 
 
 449. 
 Douglass V. Blankenship, 50 Ind. 160. p. 
 
 2090. 
 Douglass V. Flynn, 43 Ark. 398. p. 20.55. 
 Douglass c. McAllister, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 
 
 298. p. 1739. 
 Douglass V. Kogers, 4 Wis. 304. p. 324. 
 Douglass r. State, 72 Ind. 385. pp 2107, 2123. 
 Douglass r. State, 4 Wis. 387. p. 1381. 
 Douglass r. Tousey, 2 Weud. (X. Y.) 352. 
 
 PI). 1910, 1912. 
 Douglass V. Trask, 77 Me. 35. p. 1781. 
 Douglass V. Whittemore, 32 Vt. 685. p. 1382. 
 Doulon V. Clinton, 33 Iowa, 397. p. 1249. . 
 Dounce i\ Dow, 64 N. Y. 411. p. 1739. 
 Dovalina v. State, 14 Tex. App. 312. p. 1855. 
 Dovey r. Hobson, 2 Marsh. 154; s. c. 6 Taunt. 
 
 460. p 110. 
 Dowd V. Chicopee, 116 Mass. 93. p. 1247. 
 
 Dowd V. Guthrie, 13 Bradw. (111.) 653. p. 
 
 1969. 
 Dowd V. Winters, 20 Mo. 361. p. 1592. 
 Dowda v. State, 74 Ga. 12. p. 714. 
 Dowdell r. Wilco.\, 64 Iowa, 721. pp. 708, 
 
 737, 743, 744, 769. 
 Dowds r. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 727. p. 115. 
 Dowell V. Gen. Steam Nav. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 
 
 195. pp. 1223, 12.55. 
 Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23. p. 2062. 
 Dowling V. State, 5 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 664. 
 
 pp. 4, 42, 43. 
 Downer r. Baxter, 30 Vt. 467. pp. 1902, 1906, 
 
 1977, 1985, 1990. 
 Downer f. Church, 21 AV. Va. 24. pp.1913, 
 
 1975. 
 Downer v. Rowell, 24 Vt. 343. p. 361. 
 Downey v. Day, 4 Ind. .531. pp. 221, 2109. 
 Downiug V. Bain, 24 Ga. 372. p. 827. 
 Downing r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 43 la. 99. 
 
 pp. 1278, 1308. 
 Downing v. Garner, 1 Mo. 751. p. 2060. 
 Downs V. Downs, 17 Ind. 95. p. 2112. 
 Downs V. New York &c. R. Co., 47 N. y. 83. 
 
 p. 1233. 
 Dows V. Rush, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 157. pp, 
 
 1698, 1737. 
 Dowzelot V. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 76. pp. 794, 
 
 1096, 1097, 1724. 
 Dox V. Dey, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) a58. p. 1476. 
 Doyal t'. State, 70 Ga. 134. p. 56. 
 Dovle r. Falconer, L. R. 1 P. C. 328. p. 142. 
 DoVle V. Kiser, 6 Ind. 242. p. 1151. 
 Dozier v. Jerman, 30 Mo. 216. pp. 309, 560, 
 
 718. 
 Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex. 351. p. 128. 
 Drake v. Chicago &c. R. Co. (la.), 29 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 804. p. 1666. 
 Drake v. Curtis, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 395. p. 1671. 
 Drake i-. Farmers' Uuion Ins. Co., 3 Grant 
 
 Cas. (Pa ) 325. p. 983. 
 Drake v. Newton, 23 N. J. L. 111. p. 1927. 
 Drake v. Palmer, 4 Cal. 11. p. 1473. 
 Drake v. State, 51 Ala. 30. pp. 87, 89, 90. 
 Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413. p. 663. 
 Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. 649. pp. 16, 17, 
 
 89, 93. 
 Draper r. Ironton, 42 Wis. 696; s. c. 5 Re- 
 porter, 223. p. 1247. 
 Draper v. Jones, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 269. pp. 
 
 908, 909, 910. 
 Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197. p. 1050. 
 Drefahl v. Tuttle, 42 la. 177. p. 2054. 
 Dressier r. Davis, 7 Wis. 527. p. 1225. 
 Dressier, Ex parte, 67 Cal. 257. p. 165. 
 Dreux v. Domec, 18 Cal. 83. p. 563. 
 Drew r. Ked Line Transit Co., 3 Mo. App. 
 
 495. pp. 1318, 1343. 
 Drew V. Sixth Avenue R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49. p. 
 
 1233. . 
 Drew v. Towle, 30 N. H. .531. p. 825. 
 Dreyer v. State, 10 Tex. App. 631. p. 1855. 
 Drevfuss r. Thompkius, 64 Cal. 448. p. 1671. 
 Driggs V. Burton, 44 Vt. 124. p. 1180. 
 Driggs V. Smith, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 447. p. 
 
 365. 
 Drinkout v. Eagle Machine AVorks, 90 Ind. 
 
 423. p. 2110. 
 Driscoll V. Newark &c. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 367. 
 
 p. 1316. . 
 Driscoll r. New York, 11 Hun (N. Y.), 101. p. 
 
 12(19. 
 Driscoll V. Troughton, 34 N. W. Rep. 497. p. 
 
 1627. 
 Driskell v. Parish, 10 Law Reporter, 395. pp. 
 
 91, 92,99, 104. 
 Driskill r. State. 45 Ala. 21. p. 16. 
 Driskill r. State, 7 lud. 338. pp. 65, 66. 
 Dritt V. Dodds, 35 Ind. 63. pp. 2108. 2110.
 
 Ixii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Druidingi'. Lyon, 7 Mo. Aiip. 109. p. 2112. 
 Driunnioud v. Leslie, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 453. 
 
 l>p. 1911, li>66, v.m. 
 Drury c. Urury, -J Eden, 39; s. c. Wllmot's 
 
 Opinions, 226'n. p. 895. 
 Drury c. White, 10 Mo. XH. pp. 1669, 1693. 
 Duljlin *c. R. Co. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 
 
 U.V). ))p. 1207. 1220. 
 Du ISnitz r. .Jo^:^up,54 Pal. US. p. 2099. 
 Duichcr c. !*late. ISOliio, ;i08. p. 1.563. 
 Duckett r. Crider, 11 B. Mou. (Ky.) 195. p. 
 
 17.50. 
 Duddiug V. Hill, 15 111. 6L p. 891. 
 Dudley r. Sumner, 5 Masis. 438. p. 17.54. 
 Dutlv'c. Thompson 4 E. D. Smith, 178. pp. 
 
 11.5"l, 11.52. 
 Dnff r. Rudd, 3 Brod. & Bing. 177. p. 11.57. 
 Duffee r. Mason, 8 Cow. (V. Y.) 25. p. 926. 
 Duffv V. People, 26 N. Y. 588. pp. 1508, 1519. 
 Duffv i\ People, 6 Hill (X. Y.), 75. p. 5. 
 Dufiuir 1-. Central Pac. K. Co., 67 Cal. 320. 
 
 p. 1(175. 
 Dugau V. Mahoney, 11 Allen (Mass.), 572. p. 
 
 362. 
 Dugan r. Coolidge, 3 Allen (Mass.), 555. p. 
 
 1112. 
 Dugle v. State, KjO Ind. 2.59. p. 70. 
 Duhon V. Landry, 15 La Ann. 591. pp. 1983, 
 
 1984. 
 Dake v. Given, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 478. p. 184. 
 Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshav, L. R. 1 C. P. 
 
 699 ; s. c. 35 L. J. C. P. 342. p. 295. 
 Duke of Newcastle v. Broxtowe, 4 Barn. & 
 
 Ad. 273; s. c. 1 Nov. & M. 598. p. 1748. 
 Duke of Richmond v. Wise, 1 Veutr. 125. 
 
 pp. 1926, 1931. 
 Dula V. Cowles, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 519. p. 
 
 I(i68. 
 Dula v. Cowles, 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 290. p. 
 
 lOiil. 
 Dulanev v. Rogers, 64 Mo. 201. p. 925. 
 Dulany'v. Elford,22 S. C. 304. p. 877. 
 DuDauransr. First Division St. Paul &c. R. 
 
 Co., 15 Minn. 51. pp. 1291, 1292, 1485. 
 Dullr. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.),91. p. 43. 
 Dumas v. Hauler, 30 Ala. 75. )). 609. 
 Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600. pp. 51, 103, 123, 
 
 124. 
 Dumev v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323. p. 1594. 
 Dumsford v. Curlewis, 1 Fost. & Fin. 702. 
 
 p. 295. 
 Dun i: Crozier, 17 Ga. 70. p. 2099. 
 Dunl)ar v. Briggs, 18 Neh. 94. p. 930. 
 Dunbar v. Hollinshead, 10 Wis. 505. pp. 
 
 2072, 2098, 2099. 
 Dunl.ar v. Parks, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 217. p. 68. 
 Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 28. 
 
 p. 889. 
 Dunbar r. Williams, 10 Johns. (X. Y.) 249. 
 
 rii>. 889, 898. 
 Dunbier v. Dav,12 Xeb. 590; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 
 772. pp. 133.^, 1340. 
 Duncan v. Stalcup, 1 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.)440. 
 
 p. 147.5. 
 Duncombc v. Daniell, 8 Carr. & P. 222. pp. 
 
 247. 248. 1762. 
 Diingan v. Miller, .37 N. J. Law, 182. p. 188. 
 Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 245. p. 151. 
 Dunlap i: International Steamboat Co., 98 
 
 Mass. 371. p. 1151. 
 Dunlavev r. Watson, 38 la. 398. p. 1994. 
 Durilop 'i: Peter, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 403. 
 
 pp. 215,227. 
 Dnnloi> r. Wright, 1 Pcake N. P. 123. p. 927. 
 Dunn r. (irand Trunk R. Co., .58 .Me. 189; s. 
 
 r. 10 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 615. pp. 1283, 
 
 1284. 
 Dunn i: Hall, 8 Blackf. rind.) 32. pp. 1964, 
 
 J965, 1906, 1967, 1984, 1990 
 
 Dunn V. Hannibal Ac. R. Co., 68 Mo. 270. 
 
 p. 1372. 
 Dunn r. Hubble, 81 Ind. 489. i>. 2137. 
 Dunn V. People, 29 X. Y. 623. p. 308. 
 Dunn V. Petiplc, 1m9 111. 635. pp. 1690, 1702, 
 
 1820, 1821. 1822, 1828, 1832, 1883. 
 Dunn r. Rothernell, 112 Pa. St. 272. pp. 825, 
 
 828, 1005. 
 Dunn V. State, 7 Tex. App. 600. p. 60. 
 Dunn V. State, 15 Tex. App. 560. pp. 465, 1777, 
 
 Dunn, In re, 9 ISIo. App. 255. p. 182. 
 Duiuiawav r. State, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 206. 
 
 pp. 1983, 19'.)2. 
 Duiiseth V. Wade, 3 111. 285. pp. 1156, 1322, 
 
 1346, 1365. 
 Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380. p. 1734. 
 Dupree v. State, 17 Tex. App. 591. p. ia55. 
 Dupont V. Starring, 42 Mich. 492. pp. 2032, 
 
 2036. 
 Durant v. Ashmore, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 184. 
 
 pp. 84, 10(»9. 
 Durant v. Banta, 27 X. J. L. 625. p. 884. 
 Durant v. Palmer, 29 X. J. L. 544. pp. 1209, 
 
 1225. 
 Durant I'. People, 13 Mich. 351. pp. 540, 545, 
 
 180t). 
 Durden v. State, 32 Ala. 579. p. 184. 
 Durell V. Mosher, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 445. pp. 
 
 68, 74. 
 Duren v. Getchell, 55 Me. 241. p. 1412. 
 Durfce V. Abbott, 50 Mich. 479. pp. 2025, 
 
 20:'.2. 
 Durfee r. Eveland, 8 Barb. (X. Y.) 46. pp. 
 
 195fi, 1957. 
 Durfee v. Moran, .57 :Mo. 37. p. 1712. 
 Durnford v. Clark, 1 Mart. (La.) 202. p. 
 
 383. 
 Durnford v. ^lessiter, 5 Maule & S. 446. p. 
 
 900. 
 
 Durr V. State, .53 Miss. 425. p. 1907. 
 Durrah v. State, 44 .Miss. 789. i)p. 18, 22. 
 Durrah r. Stillwcll, 59 Ind. 1.39. p. 1468. 
 Durvee v. Denuison, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 248. 
 
 p. 948. 
 Dusenbury v. Hoyt, 53 X. Y. 521. p. 966. 
 Dushon V. Merchants' Ins. Co., 11 Mete. 
 
 (Mass.) 199. p. 484. 
 Dutton V. Tracy, 4 Conn. 93. p. 124. 
 Duwar V. Speiice, 2 AVhart. (U. S.) 211. p. 
 
 19. 
 Dwver v. Bassett, 63 Tex. 275. pp. 1706, 1767. 
 Dwver v. Dunbar, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 318. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Dyas V. Hanson, 14 jNIo. App. 363. p. 936. 
 Dyer v. Dver, 87 Ind. 1. p. 1698. 
 Dyer v. Jones, 8 Vt. 205. p. 892. 
 Dver V. Morris, 4 Mo. 214. p. 259. 
 Dyer r. Talcotl, 10 111. 306. pp. 1224, 1314. 
 Dver V. Tavlor (Ark.),7S. W. Rep. 258. p. 
 
 2032. 
 Dvgert V. Remerschnlder, 32 X. Y. 629. p, 
 
 1446. 
 Dyson v. State, 26 Miss. 362. p. 108. 
 
 Eagle Bank v. Chapin, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 180. 
 
 p. 610. 
 Eagleton v. Kingston, 8 Ves. 464. p. 878. 
 Eakin r. Morris Canal Co., 24 N. J. L. 538. 
 
 p. 1928. 
 Eakman v. Sheaffer, 48 Pa. St. 176. p. 113. 
 Eaines r. Blackhart, 12 111. 195. p. 1646. 
 Eanu's v. Eamcs, 41 X. 11. 177. p. 347. 
 Eames v. .Morgan, ;i7 111. 2(K). pp. 1421, 1422, 
 
 1423. 
 Earbec v. Craig, 1 Ala. 607. p. 827. 
 Earl V, Dresser, 30 lud. 11. p. 2141.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 Earle v. Earle, 20 N. J. Law, 348. p. 874. 
 Earle v. Thomas, 14 Tex. 583. pp. J448, 1672, 
 
 16'.)8. 
 Earles v. Gilham, U Pac. Rep. 586. p. 2099. 
 Earll V. People, 73 111. 333. pp. 1778, 1833, 
 
 184-2, 1843. 
 Earll r. People, 99 111. 123. pp. 737, 739, 745. 
 Early v. Garrett, 2 Barn. & Cres. 928. p. 1419. 
 Early v. State, 1 Tex. App. 248. p. 190:!. 
 Earnest v. Express Co., 1 Woods (U. S.), 
 
 573. p. 136U. 
 Easeley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 267. pp. 1617, 1618. 
 Easoii I'. Chapman, 21 111. 33. p. 456. 
 Eason V. Gestler, 31 la. 475. p. 2054. 
 Eason v. Miller, IS S. C. 381. p. 2074. 
 Ea>on V Mate, BBaxter (Teon.),466. pp. 
 
 75, 74, 75, 76. 
 Ea^t V. Chapman, Mood. & M. 47; s. c. 2 Car. 
 
 & P. 570. pp. 2SS, 1467. 
 East Kingston r. Towie, 48 X. H. 57. p. 298. 
 East Line &c. R. Co. f. Brinl^er (Tex.), 3 S. 
 
 W. Rep 99. !■. 59. 
 East River Bankr. Kennedy, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 
 
 543. p. 854. 
 East Saginaw City R. Co. v. Bohn, 27 Mich. 
 
 503. pp. 1231, 1234. 
 East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Gurlev,"76 Tenn. 46. 
 
 p. 767. 
 East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Hackney, 1 
 
 Head (Tenn.), 169. p. 2065. 
 Easterling v. State, 30 Ala. 46. p. 1642. 
 Eastes r. Daubenspeck, 4 Ind. 617. p. 2130. 
 Eastland v. Fogo, 58 Wis. 274. p. 1013. 
 Eastman v. Coos Bank, 1 N. H. 2^. p. 1023. 
 Eastman v. Haward, 30 Me. 58. p. 891. 
 Eastman v. Wight, 4 Oh. St. 156. pp. 113, 
 
 117. 
 Easton v. State, 39 Ala. 552. pp. 148, 150. 
 Eastwood V. People, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 25. 
 
 pp. 676,693, 1903, 1907. 
 Eaton V. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 134. p. 2069. 
 Eaton V. Com., 6 Binn. (Pa.) 447. p. 19- 
 Eaton V. Jacobs, .56 Me. 445. p. 1048. 
 Eaton V. Smith, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 150. pp. 838, 
 
 844. 
 Eberhardt v. Sanger, 51 Wis. 72. pp. 2030, 
 
 2038. 
 Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598. p. 125. 
 Eberle v. St. Louis Public Schools, II Mo. 
 
 247. p. 55. 
 Eby V. Eby, 5 Pa. St. 435. p. 361. 
 Eckel r. Walker, 48 la. 150. pp. 2076, 2100. 
 Ecker v. McAlister, 45 Md. 291. i)p. 436, 440. 
 Eckert v. State, 9 Tex. 105. p. 18,56. 
 Eckles V. Bates, 26 Ala. 655. p. 497. 
 Eddebuttel v. Durrell, 55 Cal. 277. p. 2089. 
 Eddowes v. Hopkins, 1 Dougl. 361. p. 2003. 
 Eddy V. Caldwell, 7 Minn. 225. p. 2098. 
 Eddy V. Chase, 140 Mass. 471. p. 825. 
 Eddy V. Gray, 4 Allen (Mas.s.), 43.5. p. 425. 
 Eddy t;. Wilson,! G. Greene (la.), 259. p. 
 
 1586. 
 Edelen v. Edelen, 6 Md. 288. p. 227. 
 Edelen v. Gough, 8 Gill, 87. p. 89. 
 Edelen v. Thompson, 2 Har. & G. (Md.) 3J. 
 
 p. 1999. 
 Edeliii V. Sanders, 8 Md. 118. p. 1669. 
 Edelinan v. Yeakel, 27 Pa. St. 26. p. 837. 
 Eden r. Lingenfelter, 39 Ind. 19. p. 1950. 
 Edgar v Snate, 43 Ala. 45. p. 1733. 
 Edgell r. Francis. 1 Man. & G. 222. p. 1477. 
 Edgell V. Hart. 9 N. Y. 213. p. 1436. 
 Edgerly r. Emerson, 23 N. H. 555; s. c. 55 
 
 Am. bee. 207. ]). 2049. 
 Edgerton r. New York &c. R. Co., 35 Barb. 
 
 (N. Y.)389. p. 1237. 
 Edgerton r. New York &c. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 
 
 227. p. 1284. 
 Edgerton v. Weaver, 105 111. 43. pp. 880, 881. 
 
 Edmiston v. Garrison, 18 Wis. 594. pp. 
 
 19b3, 2097. 
 Edmiston v. Schwartz, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 135. p. 1941. 
 Edmonds v. Rowe, Ryl. & M. 77. p. 330. 
 Edmonds r. State, 34 Ark. 720. p. 2090. 
 Edmondson r. Kite, 43 Mo. 176. p. 891. 
 Edmondson i\ Machell, 2 T. R. 4. p. 1748. 
 Edmondson v. State, 7 Tex. App. 116. p. 313. 
 Edmonson v. State. 43 Tex. 230. p. 164. 
 Edmohstone v. Hart.shorn, 19 N. Y. 9. p. 
 
 571. 
 Edmundson v. Thompson, 31 L. J. (Exch.) 
 
 207 ; s. c. 8 Jur. (N. s. ) 235. p. 1100. 
 Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89. p. 1906. 
 Edson V. Central R. Co., 40 Iowa, 48. p. 1309. 
 Edson V. Fuller, 22 N. H. 183. p. 966. 
 Edwards v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 3 Gill (Md.), 
 
 176. p. 982. 
 Edwards v. Carv, 60 Mo. 572. p. 17.56. 
 Edwards v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 76 Mo. 399, 
 
 p. 1307. 
 Edwards r. Currier, 43 Me. 474. p. 344. 
 Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 281. pp, 
 
 889, 897. 
 Edwards v. Farrar, 2 La. Ann. 307. pp. II, 
 
 64, 85. 
 Edwards v. Goldsmith, 10 Pa. St. 43. p. 841. 
 Edwards r. Harben, 2 T. R. 587. p. 1440. 
 Edwards r. James, 13 Tex. 52. p. 2071. 
 Edwards v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 44 Mo. 
 
 119. p. 1308. 
 Edwards v. Lewis, 16 Ala. 813. p. 239. 
 Edwards r. Marcy,2 Allen (Mass.), 486. pp. 
 
 924, 925, 926, 928. 
 Edwards v. Matthews, 16 L. J. Exch. 291. p. 
 
 215. 
 Edwaids V. Noyes, 65 N. Y. 125. p. 622. 
 Edwards v. Smith, 63 Mo. 119. pp. 825, 834, 
 
 837. 
 Edwards v. State, 22 Ark. 253. p. 725. 
 Edwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428. p. 118. 
 Edwards v. State, 47 Miss. 583. p. 1700. 
 Edwards v. State, 5 Tex. App. 593. pp. 1695, 
 
 1696. 
 Edwards r. Thomas, 66 Mo. 483. p. 950. 
 Edwards, Ex parte, 11 Fla. 174. p. 132. 
 Egau r. Larkin, Arm. M. & O. (Irish. Exch.) 
 
 403. p. 292. 
 Egbert v. McMichael, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 45. p. 
 
 966. 
 Egljert V. Peters. 29 N. W. Rep. 134; s. c. 35 
 
 Minn. 312. p. 1622. 
 Eggers I'. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461. p. 1780. 
 Eggler V. People, 56 N. Y. 642. p. 1758. 
 Eggleston c. Castle, 42 Ind. 531. p. 1756. 
 Kggleston v. Smiley, 13 Johns. (N. Y'.).13. 
 
 pp. .54, 118, 119, 123. 
 Eggspieller v. Knockles, 58;iowa, 649. p. 310. 
 Egleslon i\ Knickerbocker, 6 Barb. (>. Y.) 
 
 45b. p. 842. 
 p:hle r. Judson, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 97. pp, 
 
 889, 900. 
 Ehrgott V. Mayor, 96 Ind. 264; s. c. 48 Am. 
 
 Rep. 622. p. 1485. 
 Ehrisman r. Roberts, 68 Pa. St. 308. p. 1438. 
 Eich ('. Taylor, 26 Minn. 378. pp. 1906, 1920. 
 Eicke V. Xbkes, 1 Mood. & JI. 303. p. 275. 
 Eicks V. Copeland, 53 Tex. 584. p. 1451. 
 Eiland v. Radford, 7 Ala. 724. p. 869. 
 Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322. pp. 1698, 1733, 
 
 1734. 
 Eisemann v. Swan, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 668. p. 
 
 2007. 
 Eiscnhart v. Slaymaker, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 1.03. p. 610. 
 Ela V. Cockshott, 119 Mass. 416. p. 1714. 
 Elain V. State, 16 Tex. App. 34. pp. 1743, 
 
 1746.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 EUlor V. Frcvort, IS Xev. 27S. p. 2099. 
 ElikT r. Sliinv, li' Nov. 7S. j). im9. 
 Klilred r. Ocoiitc Co., :'.:i UU. 1S3. p. 1734. 
 Eldredge c. Folwell, 3 Blackf. (lud.) '208. p. 
 
 liHiO. 
 
 Eldridire v. Ilawlev, 1 15 INIass. 410. p. 814. 
 Eldridire r. Rowe,"7 111. 91 ; s. c. 43 .\iu. Dec. 
 
 41. p. 893. 
 Elford r. Teed. 1 Manic & S. 28. p. 9.39. 
 Eljree Cotton Cases, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 180. 
 
 p. 910. 
 Ek'in r. Kenwick, 8fi 111. 4P8. p. 1209. 
 Eli/.abcth Ac. It. Co. v. Wcdger (Ky.),13 
 
 Am. L. IWg. (N. S.) 45. p. 1343. 
 Elkhart r. letter, m Ind. 130. pp. 407, 518. 
 Elkhart Jlutual Aid Assn. r. Haughlou, 103 
 
 Ind. 28(5. pp. 991, 2110. 
 Elkins V. Boston &c. K. Co., 23 X. H. 275. p. 
 
 1283. 
 Elkins r. Enipiro Transportation Co., 81 Pa. 
 
 St. 315. p. 1360. 
 Elkins v. Slate, 1 Tex. App. .539. p. 31. 
 Elkison r. Deliesseline, 2 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 
 
 56. p. 17S. 
 EUedge v. Todd, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 43. pp. 
 
 1964, 1966, 1992. 
 Ellerbe, In re, 4 McCrary (U. S.), 449. p. 171. 
 Eliieolt r. rearl,lMcLean (C. S.), 200; s. c. 10 
 
 I'et. ( U. S.) 412. pp. 484, 487, 489. 
 Ellicott r. Peterson, 4 Md. 476. p. 1646. 
 Elliot r. Aiken, 45 N. II. 35. p. 1003. 
 Elliott r. Abbot, 12 N. H. 549. p. 1023. 
 Elliott V. Hamilton &c. Ins. Co., 13 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 139. pp. 974, 976. 
 Elliott i: Mills, 10 Ind. 368. pp. 1983, 1990. 
 Elliott r. l'ier.sol, 1 Pet. (U. S.),328. )>. .560. 
 Elliott r. Kevnolds, 16 Pac. Kep. 698; s. c. 38 
 
 Kan. 274. j). 2031. 
 Elliott /•. Russell, 92 Ind. 526. pp. 50S, 584, 
 
 1711. 2090. 
 Elliott r. Slate, 73 Ind. 11. pp. 63, 1981. 
 Elliott r. Sioeks, 67 Ala. 336. p. 1740. 
 Elliott V. Woodward, 18 Ind. 1&3. p. 2091. 
 Elliotson r. Feetham, 2 Bing. X. C. 134. pp. 
 
 1383, 1391. 
 Ellis V. Carey, 30 Ala. 725. p. 1382. 
 Ellis V. Central &c. K. Co., 5 Nev. 255. p. 
 
 2099. 
 Ellis r. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 230. p. 126. 
 Ellis V. .Jameson, 17 Me. 235. p. 1752. 
 Ellis V. Lindlev, ;« Iowa, 461. ]>. 1468. 
 Ellis r. McPike, 50 Mo. 574. )). 1685. 
 Ellis r. Miller, 9 Ind. 210. p. 561. 
 Ellis r. Ohio L. Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Oh. St. 
 
 628. p. 1586. 
 Ellis V. Ponton, 32 Tex. 434. p. 1913. 
 Ellis r. Thompson, 3 Mees. & W. 445. pp. 
 
 1122, 1124. 
 Ells V. Slate, 20 Ga. 438. p. 1633. 
 Kllsasserv. Hunter, 26 Cal. 279. p.20S6. 
 Ellsworth V. Central K. Co., 34 N.J. L. 93. 
 
 p. 1971. 
 Elmakerr. Buckley, 16 Serg. & H. 72. pp. 
 
 m>, 392. 
 Klniore i: Grymcs, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 469. p. 
 
 15n5. 
 I':i Paso V. Causey, 1 Bradw. (III.) .531. p. 1247. 
 Elsey V. Metcalf, 1 Dcnio (X. Y.),323. p. 
 
 875. 
 Elwell V. Chambcrlin,31 N. Y. 611. pp.214, 
 
 2-.'l,222, 235, 243, 247. 
 Klwell r. .Martin. 32 Vt. 217. p. 895. 
 Elwood V. Bullock, 6 Ad. & El. (N. 8.) 383. 
 
 p. J2a3. 
 Elwood v. Dcifendorf, 5 Barb. (X. Y.) 398. 
 
 p. .561. 
 Pllwood V. Xew York &c. K. Co., 4 Hun (X. 
 
 Y. ), 808. )). 1235. 
 Elworthy v. Bird, 13 Price, 222. p. 1584. 
 
 Ely r. Ely, 6 Gray (Mass.), 4,59. pp. 1030, 
 
 1033. 
 Ely r. Porter, 58 Mo. 158. pp. 1609, 1614. 
 I<:iv V. Tallman, 14 Wis. 28. !>. 1670. 
 Ely r. Tesch, 17 Wis. 202. p. 1769. 
 Emanuel v. Cock, 6 Dana (Ky.), 214. p. 1747. 
 Embry v. Deyinney, 8 Dana (Ky.), 203. p. 
 
 2096. 
 Emeric r. Aharado, 64 Cal. 531. pp. 2015, 
 
 2085. 
 Emerlch v. Sloan, 18 la. 139. pp. 26, 83. 
 Emerick r. Harris, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 416. p. 4. 
 Emerson v. Coggswell, 16 .Me. 77. p. 1749. 
 Emersciu r. Hogg, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 1. pp. 
 
 830, 1703, 1739. 
 Emerson r. Joy, 34 Me. 347. p. 15S6. 
 Emerson v. Sturgeon, 18 Mo. 170. pp. 1598, 
 
 1600. 
 Emery v. Chcslev, 18 X. H. 198. p. 1016. 
 Emery v. Emery, .54 la. 106. ]). 2081. 
 Emery c. Esles. 31 Me. 15.5. i>. 1912. 
 Emery v. Owings, 6 GUI (Md.), 191. pp. 822. 
 
 825. 
 Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172. pp. 261, 268, 
 
 272, 
 Emmons v. Bishop, 14 111. 152. pp. 2066, 2080, 
 
 2102. 
 Emiioriat'. Schmidling,33 Kan. 488. pp. 1271, 
 
 1277. 
 Engard r. Frazior, 7 Ind. 1.54. p. 2126. 
 Engle r. Campbell. 42 Mich. .565. p. 854. 
 Eiiiile r. Jones, 51 Mo. 316. p. 14<U. 
 Eni,'leman r. State, 2 Ind. 92. pp. 1895, 1897. 
 English r. I.ane, I Porter (Ala.), 328. p. 869. 
 Ennis v. Williams, 30 Ga. 691. p. 1101. 
 Enos r. Sun Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 621. ]). 985. 
 Ensii^n v. Harney, 15 Xeb. 330; s. c. 43 Am. 
 
 Hep. 344. p. 1927. 
 Ensminger r. Mclntire, 23 Cal. 593. pp. 1586, 
 
 161)5. 
 Epes' Case, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 676. pp. 74, 1909. 
 Epiierson r. Stale, 22 Te.\. App, 69t. ]i. 1.506. 
 Epi)S c. State, 19 (ia. 102. i>p. SC, 124. 1912. 
 Epps r. State, 1U2 Ind. 539. pp. 773, 1568, 
 
 1751, 1780. 
 E(iuator Co. v. Hall, 106 U. S. 86. p. 2066. 
 Erben r. I.orrillard, 19 X. Y. 302. j). .586. 
 Erfool r. Consalus, 47 Mo. 2(i9. p. 1613. 
 Erie r. Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384. p. 1225. 
 Erie Preserying Co. v. Miller, 52 Conn. 444. 
 
 ]>]t. .353, 356. 
 Erickson r. Smith, 2 Abb. Ai)p. Dec. (X. Y.) 
 
 65. p. 518. 
 Erisman r. Walters, 26 Pa. St. 467. p. 919. 
 Errissman r Krrissnian, 25 111. 136. p. 253. 
 Ernst V. Hudson Kiyer li. Co., 35 N. Y. 9. p. 
 
 1255. 
 Erwin i-. Bulla, 29 Ind. 95. p. 1914. 
 Erwin r. Ingram, 24 X. J. I,. 519. p. 893. 
 Erwin v. Slate, 29 Oh. St. 186. pp. 115, 116. 
 Erwin v. Yoorhecs, 26 Barb. (X. Y.) 127. p. 
 
 1109. 
 Eschbaek r. Hurit, 47 Md. 61. p. .5.55. 
 Esmond v. People, 18 Bradw. (111.) 114. p. 
 
 198. 
 Espy V. Fenton, 5 Ore. 423. p. 891. 
 Essex r. McPherson, 6t HI. 349. pp. 120, 121. 
 Estabrook, Ex parte, 2 Lowell (U. S.), 547. 
 
 p. 1023. 
 Estalian v. Card, 15 B. Mou. (Ky.) 103. p. 
 
 1455. 
 Estate of Ayelinc, .53 Cal. 2.59. p. 2a56. 
 Estate of Young, 39 Mich. 429. p. 854. 
 Eslcji r. Burke, 19 Ind. 87. p. 2058. 
 Estep I'. Estcp,2:nnd. 114. p. 891. s 
 Estrp r. Slate. 9 T(!.\. App. 3r>6. j). 253. 
 E>tci) r. Waterous.ir. Ind. 140. ])|>. 118,120. 
 Esle c. Wilshire, 44 uh. SI. 636. )>. 527. 
 Eotes V. Boothe, 20 Ark. 523. p. 853.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 Estes V. Fry, 22 Mo. App. 80. pp. 1449, 1451. 
 Estes V. Richardson, 6 Nev. 128. pp. "5, 
 
 95. 
 Etheridge v. State, 8 Tex. App. 133. pp. 49, 
 
 50, H5, 103. 
 Etting V. Bank of United States, 1] Wheat. 
 
 (U. S.) 59. pp. 838.830, 1(570, 1747. 
 Etting r. Commercial Bank, 7 Kob. (La.) 459. 
 
 p. 1022. 
 Etting V. Schuylkill Bank, 2 Pa. St. 355. ' p. 
 
 942. 
 Eudaly v. Eudaly, 37 Tnd. 440. p. 2029. 
 Evans v. Boiling, 5 Ala. 550. p. G49. 
 Evan.s v. Carey, 29 Ala. 99. p. 964. 
 Evans v. Christopherson, 24 Minn. 330. p. 
 
 2093. 
 Evans v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 6 R. I. 
 
 47. p. 1751. 
 Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 356. p. 
 
 2114. 
 Evans v. Edmunds, 11 C. B. 777. p. 1419. 
 Evans v. Foreman. 60 Mo. 449. pp. 1024, 1031, 
 
 1032. 
 Evans v. Foss, 49 N. H. 490. pp. 1906, 1910. 
 Evans v. Hardeman, 15 Tex. 480. pp. 1122, 
 
 1123. : 
 Evans v. Harris, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 416. p. 909. 
 Evans V. Lohr, 3 111. 511. pp. 2048, 20.51. 
 Evans v. Mengel, 1 Pa. St. (iS. p. 1668. 
 Evans V. Rees, 12 Ad. & El. 55. pp. 164, 179. 
 Evans v. Rudv, 34 Ark. 387. p. 13G9. 
 Evans v. Smith, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 363. p. 
 , 450. 
 
 \ Evans v. Slate, 7 Ind. 271. pp. 1902, 1905. 
 \ Evans v. State, 67 Ind 68. p. 2089. 
 \ Evans v. State, 44 Miss. 762; s. c. Horr. & 
 ; Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. 329. pp. 1542, 1548, 
 , 1747. 
 
 Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App. 513. p. 85. 
 , Evans v. State, 13 Tex. App. 225. p. 1680. 
 Evans V. Walton, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; s. c. 36 L. 
 
 J. (C. P.) 307. p. 891. 
 Evansville v. Decker, 84 Ind. 325; s. c. 43 Am. 
 
 Rep. 86. p. 1265. 
 Evansville v. Martin, 103 Ind. 206. p. 2073. 
 Evansville v. Wilter, 86 Ind. 414. p. 729. 
 - Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Barbee, 74 Ind. 169. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 560. 
 
 pp. 679, 690, 691. 
 Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Dexter, 24 Ind. 411. 
 
 p. 1224. 
 Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102. 
 
 p. 1224. 
 Evansville &c. E. Co. v. Wolf, 59 Ind. 89. pp. 
 
 1232, 1642. 
 Evarts v. State, 48 Ind. 422. p. 21. 
 Everet, Matter of, 10 Daly (N. Y.), 99. p. 
 
 601. 
 Everett v. Lusk, 19 Kan. 195. p. 1090. 
 Everett v. United Slates, 6 Porter (Ala.), 166. 
 
 p. 1022. 
 Everett v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Iowa, 243. 
 
 p. 317. 
 Evcrhart t'. Hickman, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 341. p. 
 
 106. 
 Evorliart v. Hollingsworth, 19 Ind. 138. i). 
 
 2137. 
 Evcrhart v. Terre Haute &c. R. Co., 73 Ind. 
 
 292 ; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. .567. p. 1312. 
 
 Everson v. Seller, 105 Ind. 266. p. 1709. 
 Tverts r. Ad;i 
 889, 898, 899. 
 
 Everts r. Adams, 12 Johns. (N, 
 
 p. 1709. 
 Y.) 352. 
 
 pp. 
 
 Every v. Smith, IS Ind. 461. p. 561. 
 
 Ewaldt V. Farlow, 62 la. 212. i)p. 2071, 2080. 
 
 Ewart V. Cochrane, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 925. p. 
 
 11,58. 
 Ewart r. Street, 2 Bailey (S. C), 157. pp. 
 
 1322, 1346. 
 
 Ewen r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613. p. 
 
 1232. 
 Ewing V. Bailev, 5 111. 420. p. 2080. 
 Ewing V. Burnet, 11 Pet. (U. s.) 41. p. 1047. 
 Ewing I'. Ewing, 4 Ind. 4(i8. p. 2107. 
 Ewing V. Gray, 12 Ind. 64. p. 1438. 
 Ewing V. McConnell, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 188. pp. 2093, 2096. 
 Ewing r. Peck, 26 Ala. 413. p. 962. 
 Ewing I'. Price, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 521. pp. 
 
 2095 2098. 
 Ewing V. Runkle, 20 111. 448. p. 1668. 
 Ewing V. Sanford, 21 Ala. 157. p. 1733. 
 Exchange Bank v. Tiddy, 67 X. C. 169. p. 
 
 1978. 
 Exchange Xat. Bank v. Allen, 68 Mo. 474. p. 
 
 2052. 
 Express Co. v. Kountz, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 342. 
 
 p. 1698. 
 Everman v. Mt. Sinai Cemetery Asso., 61 
 
 Mo. 489. pp. 893, 1368. 
 Everman i\ Second National Bank, 13 Mo. 
 
 App. 289; s. c. 84 jNIo. 408. p. 1092. 
 Eyser v. Weissgerber, 2 la. 463. pp. 825, 861, 
 
 1681, 1683, 1741. 
 
 F. V. D., 4 Swab. & Tr. 86. pp. 646, 649. 
 Fiicey V. Hurdom, 3 Barn. & Cres. 213. p. 
 
 1145. 
 Fagan v. Williamson, 8 Jones L. (X. C.) 433. 
 
 p. 1750. 
 Fagin v. Connoly, 25 Mo. 94. pp. 834, 835. 
 Fahey v. Harvard, 62 111. 28. p. 1249. 
 Fahnestock i\ State, 23 Ind. 231. pp. 65, 73, 
 
 75, 1569, 1571. 
 Faiar r. State, 3 How. (Miss.) 422. p. 2097. 
 Fain v. Cornett, 25 Ga. 184. p. 1753. 
 Fain r. Goodwin, 35 Ark. 109. pp. 1967, 1984, 
 
 1985, 1995. 
 Fairbanks v. Hughson, f 8 Cal. 314. p. 294. 
 Fairljanks I'. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86. p. 1221, 
 Fairlianks v. Woodhouse, 6 Cal. 433. pp. 
 
 810, 1.5U7. 
 Faircbild v. Bascoinb, 35 Vt. 398. pp. 502, 
 
 503, .506. 
 Faircbild v. Bell, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 129; s. c. 27 
 
 Am. Dec. 702. pp. 896, 900. 
 Faircbild v. California Stage Co., 13 Cal. 
 
 599. pp. 1236, 1237. 
 Faircbild r. Case, 24 Wend. (X. Y.) 381. p. 
 
 554. 
 Faircbild r. Xortheast Mut. Life Ass., 51 Vt. 
 
 613. p. 991. 
 Faircbild v. Snvder, 43 la. 23. p. 1930. 
 Fairfax v. New" York &c R. Co., 67 X. Y. 
 
 11; s. 0. 5 Jones & Sp. 516. pp. 1321,1345. 
 Fairfax v. Xew York &c. R. Co., 73 X. Y. 
 
 167. lip. 1321, 134.5. 
 Fairman v. Oakford, 5 Hurl. & N. 633. p. 
 
 1 137. 
 Faitli V. Atlanta (Ga.), 4 South East. Rep. 3. 
 
 p. .55. 
 Faldo r. GrilHn, 1 Fost. & Fin. 147. pp. 1096, 
 
 1097. 
 Fallon r. Central Park R. Co., 64 X. Y. 13. 
 
 p. 1232. 
 Falls Wire Man. Co. r. Broderick, 12 Mo. 
 
 App. 378. pp. 825, 831. 
 Falmouth v. Kol)erts, 9 Mees. & W. 469; s. c. 
 
 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 633. pp. 112, 113. 
 Famulener v. Anderson, 15 Oh. St. 473. p. 
 
 50. 
 Fansbaw v. Tracv, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 490. p. 136. 
 Fareira v. Gal)ell, 89 Pa. St. 89. p. 882. 
 Farwcll r. Warren, 51 111. 468. p. 1495. 
 Farisli v. Reigle, 11 Graft. (Va.)697. pp. 1236, 
 
 1237. 
 
 5a
 
 Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Farlev r. Bndd, 14 la. -2?^. p. 1748. 
 Fark'v r. Kller, 40 Ind. 3UK p. 2039. 
 FarUV r. Pottes, 5 Mo. App. 2C'2. p. 855. 
 Farlfv r. Uauck, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 554. pp. 
 
 14(13, ITtJl. 
 Fanner c. Darliug, 4 Burr. 1971. pp. IICI, 
 
 li;i7. 
 Farmer v. State, 21 Tex. App. 424. p. 1671. 
 Farmers' Bauk v. Bavliss, 41 Mo. 275. p. 
 
 2(164. 
 Farmer's Bank r. Butchers' Bank, 16 X. Y. 
 
 125 -.s.c.i Duer (N. Y.), 219; 14 N. Y. 633; 28 
 
 X. Y. i.'S. p. 1023. 
 Farmers' Bank r. Cowan, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 
 
 CN. Y.) 88. p. 582. 
 Farmer's Bank v. Lonergan, 21 Mo. 46. p. 
 
 607. 
 Farmer's Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 115. ]). 101. 
 Farmer's Bank v. Sprigg, 11 Md. 389. p. 
 
 324. 
 Farmer's Bank t\ Trov City Bank, 1 Dougl. 
 
 (Mich.) 457. pp. 1022,1021 
 Farmers &c. Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 16 Wend. 
 
 (N. Y.) 481. p. 974. 
 Farmers' &c. Bank v. Boraef, 1 Kawle (Pa.), 
 
 152. p. 642. 
 Farmers &c. Bank v. Champlaln Co., 23 
 
 Vt. 186. p. &14. 
 Farmers' &c. Bank v. Whlnfield, 24 AVend. 
 
 (X. Y.) 420. pp. .567, 1936, 1942, 1944. 
 Farmers' &c. Bank r. Young, 36 Iowa, 44. 
 
 pp. 423, 516. 
 Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bair, 87 Pa. 
 
 St. 124. pp. 309, 321, 323, 718. 
 Farnham v. Camden &c. K. Co., 55 Pa. St. 53. 
 
 pp. 1318, 1322, 1344, 1345, 1.347, 1356, 1359. 
 Farnsworth v. Coots, 46 Mich. 177. p. 2027. 
 Farnum v. Farnum, 13 Gray (Mass.), 508. 
 
 p. 416. 
 Farquliar v. Dallas, 20 Tex. 200. p. 1698. 
 Farquhar v. Touey, 5 Ilumuh. (Tenn.) 502. 
 
 p. 1647. 
 Farcmharson v. Johnson, 35 Ark. 536. p. 
 
 2128. 
 Farr e-. Newman, 4 T. R. 621. p. 200". 
 Farrah r. Keat, 6 Dowl. 470. p. 169. 
 Farrar v. Delllinne, 1 Car. & K. 580. p. 1098. 
 Farrar v. (iilmau, 19 Me. 440. p. 1023. 
 Farrar r. lleinrich, 86 Mo. 521. p. 10.55. 
 Farrar v. State, 2 oh. St. 64. pp. 1925, 1990. 
 Farrar v. United States, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 459. 
 
 p. 10.59. 
 Farrell r. Brennan, 32 Mo. 328. p. 214. 
 Farrell r. Ilennesy, 21 Wis. (532. p. 1987. 
 Farrington v. Caswell, 15 Jolins. (X. Y.) 430. 
 
 p. 1412. 
 Farrington's Case, Sir T. Jones 222. p. 38. 
 Farrisv. Cass Ave. &c. R. Co.,8 Mo. App. 588; 
 
 s. c. 80 Mo. :V25. p. 1487. 
 Farwell v. Tillson, 76 Me. 227. p. 860. 
 Fash V. Byrnes, 14 Abb. Pr. (X*. Y.) 12. p. 
 
 1!)20. 
 Fasslnow v. State, 89 Ind. 235. p. 18.52. 
 Fathcree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss. .585. p. 829. 
 Faulk i: State, .52 Ala. 41(i. p. 18.50. 
 Faulkner r. South PacilJc Railroad, 61 Mo. 
 
 311. p. 1123. 
 Faulkner v. State, 15 Tex. App. 115. p. 1855. 
 Favors v. Stale, 20 Tex. App. 156. p. 1.564. 
 Fawcett v. Cash. 5 Barn. & Ad. 904. p. 1 136. 
 Fawcett, In re, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 217. p. ll."». 
 Fay V. Lovejov, 20 Wis. 407. p. 886. 
 Fav I'. Whitman, loo Mass. 76. p. 1381. 
 Felix V. Slate, 18 Ala. 720. ii. 1799. 
 Felkner v. Scarlet, 29 Ind. 154. )>. 1491. 
 Fellenzcr v. Van Valzah, 05 Ind. 128. p. 2113. 
 Fellows V. Prentiss, 3 Denio (X. Y.), 612. p. 
 
 852. 
 
 Fellows t'. Wise, 55 Mo. 413. p. 1669. 
 Fellows' Case, 5 Me. 333. pp. 19, 68, 69, 119, 
 
 1933. 
 •Feney v. Mazclin, 87 Ind. 226. p. 2058. 
 Fenn r. Blanchard, 2 Y'eales (Pa.), 543. pp. 
 
 2004, 2008. 
 Fenner v. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 44 X. Y. 505. p. 
 
 S.374. 
 Kent r. Toledo &e. R. Co., IThomp. Xeg. 136; 
 
 s. e, ,59 111. 349. j.. 1(;22. 
 Fenlon v. Hiissoll, 6 Mo. 143. p. 2060. 
 Fenwick i: Boll, 1 Car. & K. 312. p. 502. 
 Fenwick v. Parker, 3 Code Rep. 2.54. p. 100. 
 Fenwick r. Reed, 1 Meriv. 114. p. 279. 
 Fergason r. (;ill)ert, 16 Oh. St. 88. p. 1447. 
 Ferguson v. Clitford, 37 N. If. 8(!. p. 819. 
 Ferguson r. Davis Countv, 57 Iowa, 609. pp. 
 
 1272, 1273, 1280. 
 Ferguson v. Khrenberg, 39 Ark. 420. p. 2088. 
 Ferguson r. Ferguson, 27 Tex. 339. p. 829. 
 Ferguson v. Fox, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 83. p. 1682. 
 Ferguson v. Ilirsch, 64 Ind. 337. p. 319. 
 Ferguson r. Miles, 3 Gilm. (111.) 358. p. 
 
 611. 
 Ferguson r. Rutherford, 7 Xev. 385. pp. 
 
 376, 385, 387, 392. 
 Ferguson r. State, 49 Ind. 33. p. 765. 
 Feriter v. State, 33 Ind. 283. pp. 561, 1726. 
 Fernandez?:. Sacramento &c. R. Co.,52Cal. 
 
 45; 4 Cent. L. J. 82. pp. 1208, 1209, 1212, 
 
 1219, 1221, 1227, 1640. 
 Fernandez, In re, 6 Hurl. & X. 717 ;s. c. 10 
 
 C. B. (N. S.) 3; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 321. p. 13(5. 
 Fero V. Uusco, 4 X. Y. 162. pp. 1463, 1466, 
 
 1470. 
 Ferrell v. Adlcr, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 77. p. 
 
 2065. 
 Ferren v. Old Colony R. Co. (Mass.), 6 
 
 Northeast. Hep. (iOS. p. 1240. 
 Ferridav v. Selser, 4 How. (Miss.) 506. pp. 
 
 .59, 1 15" 
 Ferrill v. Com., 1 Duv. (Ky.) 154. p. 1566. 
 Ferris v. Cass Ave. R. C'o., 80 -Mo. 325; s. c. 
 
 S Mo. App. 588. pp. 1257, 1260. 
 Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 590. p. 1078. 
 Ferris v. McClure, 40 111. 99. p. 210.5. 
 Ferris I'. People, 35 N. Y. 125; s. c. 31 How. 
 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 140; 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; 1 Abb. 
 
 Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y'.) 193. pp. 15, 29, :V2. 
 Person r. Wilcox, 19 Minn. 449. pp. 200, 
 
 1741. 
 Fcssenden v. Sager, 53 Me. 531. pp. 1924, 
 
 1975, 2062. 
 Festerman v. Parker, 10 Ired. L. 474. pp. 
 
 851, 852. 
 Festner v. Omaha &c. R. Co., 17 Neb. 280. 
 
 pp. 728, 747, 748, 756. 
 Fetters r. Muncie Xat. Bank, 34 Ind. 261. 
 
 p. 219. 
 Pick V. Cliicago &c. R. Co., 68 AVis. 439. p. 
 
 2036. 
 Fick r. Mulholland, 48 Wis. 413. p. 2034. 
 Fiedler r. Doriii, ,50 N. Y. 437. p. 344. 
 Field c. Beaumont, 1 Swanst. 209. p. 275. 
 Field V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 71 111. 4,58. p. 
 
 1364. 
 Field V. Davis, 27 Kan. 400. p. 376. 
 Field V. Dealley, 10 B. Mon. 4. pp. 1754, 
 
 17.-..5. 
 Field r. Field, 77 X. Y. 294. p. 1627. 
 Field V. Ins. (.'o., 3 Md. 245. p. 993. 
 Fi.'ld r. Ireland, 21 Ala. 240. j). 1016. 
 Field r. TliDmiison, 119 M.-is.^. 151. p. .365. 
 Field V. Zamansky, 9 Bradw. (111.) 479. pp. 
 
 (;oM, 610. 
 Fiel.l, K\ i)arte, 1 Cal. 187. p. 151. 
 Fields r. (Jlbbs, 1 Pet. C. 0. (U. S.) 155. p. 
 
 10.50. 
 Fields V. Ilunter, 8 Mo. 128. p. 560.
 
 • TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixvii 
 
 Fields V. State, 52 Ala. 348. p. 19. 
 
 Fields V. State, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 5-2. p. 1G97. 
 
 Fields V. Wabash &c. R. Co., 80 Mo. 203. p. 
 
 1647. 
 Field's Estate, 2 Rawle (Pa.), 351. p. 966. 
 Fife r. Com., 29 Pa. St. 429. p. 1839. 
 Filori'.New York&c. R. Co., 49 N. V. 42; s. c. 
 
 59 X. Y. 356. pp. 507, 516, 1229, 1295. 
 Filmore v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2 Wyo. 94. p. 
 
 576. 
 Finch V. Bergins, 89 Ind. 360. pp. 1642, 1646, 
 
 1783, 1785, 1803. 
 Finch V. Green, 16 Minn. 355. pp. 2038, 2094. 
 Finch V. Kikeman, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 301. pp. 
 
 593, 594. 
 Finch V. State, 81 Ala. 41. p. 811. 
 Findlevr. Pruitt, 9Port. (Ala.) 195. p. 566. 
 Fine r." Ropers, 15 Mo. 31.i. p. 2052. 
 Fine v. St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo. 166. 
 
 p. 55. 
 Fine v. St. Louis Public Schools, 39 Mo. 59. 
 
 pp. 1642, 1688. 
 Fink V. Bruihl, 47 Mo. 173. p. 1.588. 
 Fink V. Hall, 8 Johns. (X. Y.) 437. pp. 1902, 
 
 1904. 
 Finlay v. Stewart, 56 Pa. St. 183. p. .309. 
 Finley v. Hayden, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 330. 
 
 pp. "118, 123". 
 Finley v. "Woodruff, 8 Ark. 328. p. 219. 
 ) Finley v. Nancy Tyler, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 \ 402. p. 2095. 
 
 \ Finn v. State, 5 Ind. 400. p. 129. 
 \ Finney v. Allen, 7 Mo. 416. p. 17.50. 
 iFinney r. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 12 
 \ Abb. Pr. (N. s.) (N. Y.) 1. p. 516. 
 !Finney v. State , 9 Mo. 634. p. 2055. 
 g^inucaner. Small, 1 Esp. 315. p. 1335. 
 F|irst Baptist Church v. Schenectady &c. R. 
 
 Co., 5 Barb. (N. Y'.) 79. p. 1399. 
 First IJaptist Church v. Utica &c. R. Co., 6 
 
 IJarb. (N. Y.) 313. p. 1399. 
 First Congregational Church v. Muscatine, 
 
 2 Iowa, 69. p. 150. 
 First Xat. Bank v. Colton, 61 Ind. 153. p. 
 
 20.58. 
 First Xat. Bankt'. Currie,44 Mo. 91. p. 1685. 
 First Xational Bank v. Dana, 79 X. Y'. 108. 
 
 p. 839. 
 First Xational Bank r. Decatur, -50 111.321. 
 
 p. 608. 
 First Xational Bank v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178. 
 
 pp. 1032, 1033. 
 First Xat. Bank v. Graham, 85 Pa. St. 91. p. 
 
 1322. 
 First National Bank v. Murdough, 40 la. 26. 
 
 pp. 2075, 2100. 
 Firi^t Nat. Itank v. Peck, 8 Kan. 600. pp. 
 
 2024, 2032, 2038. 
 Fischer r. .Max, 49 Mo. 404. pp. 1609, 1616. 
 Fish ('. Cantrell, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 578. pp. 
 
 1983, 1985, 1992. 
 Fish V. Chester, 8 Gray (Mass.), 506. p. 344. 
 Fish V. Chicago &c. R.Co., 38 X. W. Rep. 132. 
 
 p. 2043. 
 Fish V. Dodge, 4 Denio (X. Y.), 311. pp. 512, 
 
 1383 
 Fish V. Smith, 12 Ind. 563. p. 1915. 
 Fish ('. Travers, 3 Carr. & P. 578. p. 221. 
 Fishel V. Lockard, 32 Ga. 632. p. 1771. 
 Fisher r. Clement, 10 Barn. & Cres . 472. pp. 
 
 1456, 1457. 
 Fisher v. Ewing, 30 Ind. 130. p. 2107. 
 Fisher r. Filbert, 6 Pa. St. 61. pp. 1698, 16M. 
 Fislier v. Forrester, 33 Pa. St. 501. p. 1746. 
 Fisher r. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341. p. 1479. 
 Fisher v. Larick, 7 Serg. & R. 991. p. 1698. 
 Fisher I'. Lewis, 69 Mo. 629. p. 1445. 
 Fisher v. People, 23 111. 283. pp. 1520. 1524, 
 
 2043. 
 
 Fisher r. Philadelphia, 4 Brcwst. (Pa.) 395. 
 
 p. 49. 
 Fisher v. Samuda, 1 Camp. 190. p. 628. 
 Fisher c. State, 77 Ind. 42. p. 1694. 
 Fisher i: Steyens. Hi 111. .397. pp. 1019, 1024. 
 Fisk V. Henarie, 14 Ore. 29; s. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 
 
 760. p. 2063. 
 Fitch V. Peckam, 16 Vt. 150. pp. 888, 894. 
 Fitch r. Railroad Co.. 45 Mo. 322. p. 1311. 
 Fitch r. Woodruff Iron Works, 29 Conn. 82. 
 
 p. 1058. 
 Fitter v. Probasco, 2 Browne (Pa.), 137. pp. 
 
 140, 160. 
 Fitzgerald v. Barker, 85 Mo. 13. p. 200. 
 Fitzgerald v. Beebe, 7 Ark. 305; s. c. 46 Am. 
 
 Dec. 285. p. 891. 
 Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28. pp. 467, 1698, 
 
 1918. 
 Fitzgerald v. Jerolaman, 10 Ind. 338. p. 
 
 1709. 
 Fitzgerald v. Hayward, 50 Mo. 516. p. 1689. 
 Fitzgerald v. McCarty, 55 la. 702. p. 1666. 
 Fitzgerald I'. People. 1 Colo. 56. p. 124. 
 Fitzgerald v. State, 12 Ga. 213. p. 1633. 
 Fitzgerald v. State, 20 Tex. App. 294. p. 1564. 
 Fitzharris' Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 436. p. 44. 
 Fitzpatrick i-. Harris, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.)561. 
 
 pp. 119, 120. 
 Fitzpatrick r. Papa, 89 Ind. 17. pp. 563, 2043. 
 Flack V. Xeill, 22 Tex. 253. p. 1419. 
 Flagg r. Worcester, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 69. pp. 
 
 ,57, 1266. 
 Flanders v. Colby, 28 X. H. 34. pp. 1645, 1959. 
 Flanders v. Cottrell, 36 Wis. 564. p. 1HH4. 
 Flanders i'. Dayis, 19 X. H. 139. ]i. 1957. 
 Flanegan v. State, 64 Ga. 53. pp. 1913, 1924, 
 Flannagan v. Wilmington, 4 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 548. p. 1607. 
 Flatter v. McDermitt, 25 Ind. 326. p. 1974. 
 Fleckenstein v. Dry Dock &c. Co., 11 X. 
 
 East. Hep. 950. p." 1626. 
 Fleckner r. U. S. Bank, 8 Wlieat. (U.S.) 
 
 338. pp. 1022. 1023. 
 Fleeson v. Sayage S. M. Co., 3 Xev. 15. pp. 
 
 56, 116,2099. 
 Fleet v. Hoelenkenip, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 219. 
 
 p. 310. 
 Fleetwood v. Com., 80 Ky. 1. p. 1.550. 
 Fleetwood v. Dorsey Machine Co., 95 Ind. 
 
 491. iJ. 2028. 
 Fleischfresser v. Schmidt, 41 Wis. 223. p. 
 
 1090. 
 Fleming r. Hayne, 1 Stark. 370. p. 966. 
 Fleming v. Liillman, 11 Mo. App. 104. p. 966. 
 Fleming v. State. 11 Ind. 234. p. 59. 
 Flenimingr. xMulligan, 2 McCord (S. C), 17.3. 
 
 p. 886. 
 Flamming v. Western Pacific R. Co., 49 CaL 
 
 2.53. pp. 1207, 1223, 1226. 
 Flemmiugtont?. Smithers, 2 Car. & P. 292. p. 
 
 891. 
 Fletcher v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 484. 
 
 pp. 1228, 1230, 1604. 
 Fletcher v. Boston & Maine R. R., 1 Allen 
 
 (Mass.), 9. p. 416. 
 Fletcher v. Crosbie, 2 Mood. & Rob. 417. p. 
 
 380. 
 Fleshcr v. Hale, 22 W. Va. 45. pp. 2062, 2093. 
 Fletcher v. luirram, 46 Wis. 191. i). 910. 
 Fletcher r. Stale, 6 Humph. (Toun.) 249. 
 
 pp. 86, 104, 1992. 
 Fletcher v. State. 49 Ind. 124; s. c. 19 Am. 
 
 Rep. 673. PI). 372, .524, .525, 526, .532, 761. 
 Flinn v. Hcadlam, 9 Barn. & Cres. 693. p. 
 
 974. 
 Flinn v. Pliila. &c. R. Co., I Houst. (Del.) 
 
 469. p. 1298. 
 Flint r. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 186. pp. 
 
 729, 747, 755.
 
 Ixviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES.' 
 
 Flint r. Hill, 11 East, 181. p. GDS. 
 Flint r. Knssi'll, 5 Dill. (I'. S.) l.M. p. 1394. 
 Flood r. Mitcliell, U8 .\. Y. bol. \^. 36.5. 
 Flori r. St. Louis, 3 Mo. Aj.p. 231. i>. 1600. 
 Flournoy v. Andrews, 5 Mo. 513. pp. 1673, 
 
 1674. 
 Flower r. Allen. .5 Cow. 6.54. p. 899. 
 Flower V. Downs, 6 La. Ann. 539. p. 358. 
 Flowers r. Helm, 29 Mo. .{24. p. 17.51. 
 Flower v. Livingston, 12 Mart. (La.) 681. p. 
 
 20. 
 Flovd r. Bovard, 6 AValts & S. (Pa.) 75. pp. 
 
 3t>6, 392. 
 Flovd r. State, 7 Tex. 215. pp. 150, 268, 284. 
 Flovd r. Taylor, 12 Ired. L. (N. C.) 47. p. 
 
 872. 
 Flover r. Edwards, Cowp. 112. p. 886. 
 Flvnlr. IJodenhamer, 80 N. C. 205. pp. 294, 
 
 1780. 
 Fog^ertr. Blackweller, 4 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 
 238. p. 926. 
 Folev r. Mason, 6 Md. 37. p. 821. 
 Folger V. Chase, 18 Pick. (Mas.s.) 63. p. 1022. 
 Fotkes v. Cliadd, 3 Doug. 157. p. .520. 
 FoUandsbee v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311. p. 
 
 315. 
 Folsom ?•. A])ple Elver Log Driving Co., 41 
 
 Wis. 602. pp. ,356, .365. 
 Folsom r. Apple River Log Driving Co., 47 
 
 AVis. 602. ]). 3.53. 
 Folsom r. IJrawu, 25 N. H. 114. pp. 397, 1982, 
 
 1983, 1985. 
 Folsom r. Carii, 6 Minn. 420. p. 891. 
 Folsom r. Manchester, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 334. 
 
 p. 1982. 
 Folsom V. Plumer, 43 X. H. 469. pp. 851, 852. 
 Fonville r. Slate, 17 Tex. Ai)p. 369. p. 1744. 
 Foot V. ^Morgan, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 654. p. 29. 
 Footf. Sabin, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 155. pp. 1585, 
 
 1586. 
 Foot V. Wiswall, 14 Johns. (X. Y.) .304, p. 
 
 1207. 
 Foote r. LaA^Tence, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 483. p. 6. 
 Foote r. Silsby, 1 Blatch. (U. S.) 445. pp. 
 
 1.585,1751. 
 Forljes r. Howard, 4 R. I. 364. pp. 1964, 1967. 
 Forbes V. Ins. Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 470.- p. 
 
 977. 
 Forljes r. Waller, 25 N. Y'. 430. pp. .344, 345. 
 Forbes r. AVillard, 37 How. Pr. (X. Y'.) 193. 
 
 p. 151. 
 Forbing v. Weber, 99 Ind. 588. pp. 561, 564, 
 
 575. 
 Ford V. Ford, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 92. p. 456. 
 Ford V. Ford, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 89. pp. 381, 
 
 1670. 
 Ford v. Ilennessv, 70 Mo. 580. p. 1410. 
 Ford V. Holmes," 61 Ga. 419. pp. 1929, 2067, 
 
 2099. 
 Ford V. Lacev, 30 L. J. (Exch.) 351. p. 1698. 
 Ford v. McClung, 5 W. \n. 158. p. 954. 
 Ford r. Xiles, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 300. p. 307. 
 Ford V. Stale, 71 Ala. 385. p. 348. 
 Ford r. Slate, 12 Md. 514. p. 1983. 
 Ford V. I'matilla Countv (Ore.), 16 Pac. Rep. 
 
 33. pp. .5.5, 112. 
 Ford r. Whitinarsh, Hurl. & W. 63. p. 1100. 
 Ford V. Williams, 13 N. Y. .577. p. 194. 
 Fore V. Williams, 35 Miss. 533. p. 1748. 
 Forester v. (iuard, 1 HI. 44. p. 1984. 
 Foreman v. Com. (Ky.),6 S. AV. Rep. 579. 
 
 )>]). 22, 23. 
 Forrest v. Forrest, 6 Ducr (X. Y'.), 102. pp. 
 
 .571, ((.39. 
 Forrest r. ILanson, 1 ('ranch C. C. (L'. S.) 
 
 63. p. 1720. 
 Forrest v. Kissam, 7 Hill (X. Y'.), 465. i>. 
 
 669. 
 Forrest v. State, 3 Tex. App. 232. p. 1744. 
 
 Forshee r. Abrams, 2 Iowa, 571. pp. 1468, 
 
 1968, 1994. 
 Forster v. Jurdismi, 11 Last, 104. p. 948. 
 Forsvth V. Col bran, 61 (ia. 278. p. 739. 
 Forsvth V. Dooliltle, 110 V. S. 73; s. c. 7 Sup. 
 
 Ct.'Rep. 408. pp. 511, 17.S2. 
 Forsvthe v. Ganson, 5 Wend. (X. Y'.) 558. p. 
 
 .582. 
 Forsvth V. ^Mathews, 14 Pa. St. 100. pp. 1438, 
 
 1446, 1448, 1450. 
 Forsyth v. Van AVinkle, 9 Fed. Rep. 247. p. 
 
 2059. 
 Fors vtho V. State, 6 Oh. 19. p. 13. 
 Fort'r. Collius, 21 Wend. (X. Y'.) 109. p, 
 
 1.585. 
 Fort r. Whipple, 11 Hun (X. Y'.), 586. p. 1210. 
 Fort Scott Coal &c. Co. r. Sweenev, 15 Kan. 
 
 244. p. 1603. 
 Fort Wavne r. De Witt, 47 Ind. 391. pp. 
 
 1247, 1-248, 1249. 
 Fort Wavne iVc. R. Co. r. Reverie, 110 In(L 
 
 100. p. 2038. 
 Fort Wortli &c. R. Co. v. Hogsett. 67 Tex. 
 
 685. p. 1757. 
 Fortenl)erry r. State, 55 Miss. 403. pp. 65, 
 
 83. 
 Forward v. Pitfard, 1 T. R.27. pp. 1344, 1346. 
 Foshav V. Ferguson, 2 Denlo (N. Y'.), 617. 
 
 pp. 1163, 1197, 1199 
 Foss V. Foss, 58 X. H. 283. p. 1014. 
 Foster V. Rerg, 104 Pa. St. 324. p. 839. 
 Foster r. Rerkev, 8 Minn. 351. p. 1438. 
 Foster v. Brooks. 6 Ga. 287. p. 1920. 
 Foster v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 84 111. 164. p. 
 
 17.50. 
 Fosters. Estate of Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176. p. 
 
 927. 
 Foster v. Foster, 77 AIo. 227. p. 1626. 
 Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89. p. 276. 
 Foster r. Hawden, 2 Lev. 205. p. 1964. 
 Foster r. Kirbv, 31 Mo. 496. p. 4. 
 Foster r. McDivit, 5 Watts & S. .3.59. p. 1065. 
 Foster V. McDonald, 12 Ileisk. (Tenn.) 619. 
 
 p. 168. 
 Foster v. McO'Blenis, 18 Mo. 88. pp. 1943, 
 
 1944, 1954. 19.55, 19.56, 1957, 19.58. 
 Foster r. Xewbrough, 66 Barb. (X. Y'.) 645. 
 
 p. 311. 
 Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266. pp. 283, 404. 
 Foster?'. People, 50 N. Y. .598. p. 1703. 
 Foster r. Pierce, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 437. pp. 
 
 283, 527. 
 Foster r. Pointer, 9 Car. & P. 718. p. 613. 
 P'oster V. Speed, 32 La. .\nn. 34. p. 30. 
 Foster r. State, 1 Tex. Apji. 363. p. 1744. 
 Foster r State, 8 Tex. App. 249. pp. 82, 727. 
 Foster t' Steele, 5 Scott, 28. p. 1613. 
 Foster r. Wallace, 2 Mo. 231. p. 1441. 
 Foster r. Woodlln, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) 339. 
 
 pp. 1436, 1441. 
 Foster's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. 8.) (X. Y.) 
 
 372 n. |>. 129. 
 Foster's Will, In re, U Mich. 21. p. 1940. 
 Fountain c. West, 23 Iowa, 10. pp. 91,92, 
 
 214, 1468. 
 Fourth National Bank i\ Hencheu, 52 Mo. 
 
 207. )«. 808. 
 Fourth Nat. Bank c. OIncy, 29 X. W. Rep. 
 
 513. p. 1(!22. 
 Foust r. Com., 33 Pa. St. 338. p. 30. 
 P^outs r. State, 7 (Jbio St. 471. pp. 69, 75. 
 Fouty r. Morrison, 73 Ind. 3:13. p. 2112. 
 Fowkes V. Manchester, etc. Ass. Soc, 3 Best 
 
 .V S. <)]7 ; 8. c 2 J{ig. Ins. Cas. 631. p. 1417. 
 FowIe i: Alexandria, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 322. 
 
 p. 1622. 
 FowIe c. Blgelow, 10 Mass. .379. pp. 825, 851. 
 Fowlc V. Stevenson, 1 Johns. Cas. 110. p. 
 
 1131.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 Fowler v. Brantley, U Pet. (U. S.) 31S. p. 950. 
 Fowler v. Colton, Burnett (Wis.), 175; s. c. 1 
 
 Finney (Wis.), 331. pp- 1%4. '2095. 
 Fowler v. Coster, Mood. & M. 241. p. 239. 
 Fowler v. Ins. Co., 7 Wend. (X. Y.) 270. p. 
 
 2065. 
 Fowler v. 3Iiddlesex, 6 Allen (Mass.), 92. 
 
 p. 110. 
 Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165. p. 819. 
 Fowler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 39. p. 1670. 
 Fowler v. State, 85 Ind. 538. pp. 1515, 1520, 
 
 1525. 
 Fowler t'. State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 573. p. 43. 
 Fox r. Com., 1 S. W. Kep. 396. p. 449. 
 Fowler r. Young, 19 Kan. 150. pp. 2050, 2073. 
 .Fox V. Drake, « Cow. (N. Y.) 191. p. 899. 
 Fox v. Glastenburj-, 29 Conn. 204. pp. 1224, 
 
 1227, 12-28. 
 Fox V. Hazelton, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 275. pp. 
 
 112, 1976, 2062. 
 Fox V. Meacham, 6 Neb. 530. p. 2071. 
 Fox I'. Ohio, 5 How. (U. S.) 410, 4:i4. p. 1578. 
 Fox V. Reed, 3 Grant (Pa.), 81. p. lOfiO. 
 Fox v. Smith, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 23. p. 1996. 
 Fox r. Vanderbeck, 5 Cow. (X. Y.) 515. p. 
 
 1617. 
 Fox v. Webster, 46 Mo. 181. p. 1416. 
 Fox r. Wunderlich, 64 la. 187. p. 1983. 
 Fox V. Young, 22 Mo. App. 386. p. 2087. 
 Fov r. Harder, 3 Keble, 805 . p. 1964. 
 Fraedricli 1-. Fliette, 64 Wis. 184; s. c. 25 X. 
 
 W. Rep. 28. p. 674. 
 Fralich «. People, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 48. pp. 
 
 524, 529. 
 Fralick v. Presley, 29 Ala. 4.57. p. 383. 
 Frame'v. Badger, 79 111. 441. pp. 1637, 1643. 
 France v. Lucy, Ry. & M. 341. p. 612. 
 Francia v. De Mattos, Barnes' Xotes, 223. 
 
 p. 179. 
 Francis I'. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 25 la. 60. p. 
 
 1374. 
 Francis v. Somerville Mat. Ins. Co., 25 X. J. 
 
 L. 78. p. 979. 
 Francklin's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 625. pp. 
 
 1505, 1512, 1521. 
 Frank v. Grimes, 105 Ind. 347. p. 2030. 
 Frank i-. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8. p. 2089. 
 Frank r. Manny, 2 Daly (X. Y.),92. p. 612. 
 Frank r. State, 39 Miss. 705. p. 121. 
 Frankenberg v. First Xat. Bank, 33 Mich. 46. 
 
 p. 2038. 
 Frankford &c. Turnpike Co. v. Philadelphia 
 
 &c. R. Co., 54 Pa. St. 345. p. 1210. 
 Franklin «;. Fisk, 13 Allen (Mass.), 211. p. 
 
 126R. 
 Franklin v. McCorkle, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 190. 
 
 p. 2. 
 Franklin v. Xational Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 491. p. 
 
 325. 
 Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14. p. 1906. 
 Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. p. 721. 
 Franklin v. State, 2 Tex. App. 8. pp. 119, 
 
 120. 
 Franklin Bank v. Steward, 37 Me. 519. p. 
 
 1022. 
 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 43 Pa. 
 
 St. 350. pp. 98:5, 984, 986, 987. 
 Franklin Ins. Co. v. Coates, 14 Md. 285. p. 
 
 974. 
 Franklin Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ice Co., 36 
 
 Md. 102. ]).980. 
 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 
 
 116 ; s. c. 1:5 .\.m. Rep. 313. v. 991. 
 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Seflon, 53 Ind. 
 
 380. p. 991. 
 Franz r. Ililterbrand, 45 Mo. 121. p. 1494. 
 Fratt r. Clark. 12 Cal. 89. j). 890. 
 Frav r. Blackburn, H Best & S. 576. p. 160. 
 Fray t\ Voules, 1 El. & El. 839. p. 192. 
 
 Frazer r. Boss, 66 Ind. 1. pp. 2042, 2044. 
 Frazer v. Howe, 106 III. 563. p. 1213. 
 Frazier v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206. pp. 42, 
 
 715. 
 Frazer v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 49. p. 2099. 
 Frazier v. state, 23 Oh. St. 551. pp. 74, 7 7. 
 Frear v. Hardenburg, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 275. 
 
 p. 889. 
 Freeh v. Phila. &c. R. Co., 39 Md. 574. p. 
 
 1225. 
 Frederick v. Campbell, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 293. p. 838. 
 Frederick r. Kinzer, 17 Xeb. 366. p. 1661. 
 Frederickton Boom Co. v. McPherson, 2 
 
 Hannav (X. B.), 8. p. 60. 
 Free r. Buckingham, 69 X. H. 219. p. 403. 
 Freel r. State. 21 Ark. 212. p. 18. 
 Freeman v. Baker, 2 Xev. & Man. 44G. p. 
 
 926. 
 Freeman v. Bowman, 25 Ind. 236. p. 2101. 
 Freeman r. Camden, 7 ^lo. 298. p. 1618. 
 Freeman v. Brenhara, 17 B. Mon. 603. pp. 
 
 2134, 2136, 2137. 
 Freeman v. Lawrence, 11 Jones & Sp. (43 X. 
 
 Y. Sup.) 2Sf<. pp. 500, 501. 
 Freeman c. People, 4 Denio (X. Y.),l. pp. 
 
 38,67,95,98, 103, 11.5. 
 Freeman v. Ifankins, 21 Me. 446 p. 1750. 
 Freeman v. Kosher, 13 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 780. 
 
 p. 796. 
 Freeman v. Wilkerson, 50 Mo. 544. p. 1712. 
 Freeman v. State, 11 Tex. Ai)p. 92. p. 465. 
 Freeze r. De I'uv, 57 Ind. 188. p. 1709. 
 Freltag c. Burk;45 Ind. 38. p, 2089. 
 Freligh v. Ames, 31 Mo. 253. p. 705. 
 French i\ Marstin,24 X. H. 440. p. 344. 
 French t\ Morrill, 6 X. II. 46.5. p. 487. 
 French v. Smith, 4 Vt. 363. pp. 117, 1585. 
 French v. Stanley, 21 Me. 512. p. 1747. 
 French v. State, 12 Ind. 670. pp. 1790, 1793, 
 
 1847. 
 French v. State, 81 Ind. 151. p. 2113. 
 French v. Taunton Branch Ry., 116 Mass. 
 
 537. p. 1303. 
 Freshour v. Logansport &c. R. Co., 104 Ind. 
 
 463. p. 2104. 
 Freto V. Brown, 4 Mass. 675. p. 894. 
 Friar v. State, 3 How. (Miss.) 222. p. 1984. ' 
 Frick r. Algeier, 87 Ind. 255. p. 955. 
 Frick v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 542. p. 1305. 
 Friend v. Friend, 64 Md. 321. pp. 825, 1077. 
 Friend i-. Hamill, 34 Md. 298. p. 15. 
 Friend's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 1. pp. 177,484. 
 Frier v. Jackson, 8 Johns. (X. Y.) 396. p. 
 
 5.59. 
 Fricry v. People, 2 Keyes (X. Y.), 424; s. c. 2 
 
 Abb. App. Dec. (X. Y.) 215; 54 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 319. pp. 15, 29, 32,115. 
 Fries v. Brugler, 12 X. J. L. 79. p. 261. 
 Fries' Case, Whart. St. Tr. 610,614. p. 67. 
 Frink r. Potter, 17 111. 406. p. 1286. 
 Frissell v. Relfe, 9 Mo. 859. p. 1197. 
 Front V. Williams, 29 Ind. 18. p. 67. 
 Frost V. Frost, 33 Vt. 639. p. 1003. 
 Frost V. Martin, 29 X. H. 307. p. 956. 
 Frost V. McCarger, 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 617. " p. 
 
 471. 
 Frost V. Prvor, 7 Mo. 314. p. 560. 
 Froude v. Froude, 3 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 79. 
 
 p. 106. 
 Fruberger r. Perkins, 66 Ind. 19. p. 1979. 
 Fruin v. Crystal Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 397. pp. 825, 
 
 837. 
 Fry V. Bank, 11 111. 373. p. 449. 
 Fry r. Bennett, 3 Bosw. (X. Y.) 200:s. c. 28 
 
 X. Y. 324. pp. 208, 214, 218, 220, 375, 739, 741, 
 
 743. 
 Frv ('. Franklin Ins. Co., 40 Oh. St. 108. p. 
 
 831.
 
 Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Frv V. Hardy, Sir T. Joues, 83. pp. 19G4, 
 
 1967. 
 Frv V. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397. p. 1U4. 
 FrVe f. State, 7 Tex. App. 94. p. 21. 
 Fudge V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 31 Kan. 146. 
 
 I). -2075. 
 Fugate V. Carter, 6 Mo. 267. pp. 801, 1506, 
 
 1667. 
 Fugate V. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441. p. 1050. 
 Fugitt V. Nixon, 44 Mo. 295. p. 936. 
 Fulclierr. State, 41 Tex. 233. p. 1695. 
 Fulkerson v. Houts, 55 Mo. 301. p. 2137. 
 Fuller V. Bean, 34 X. H. 299. pp. 907, 908, 
 
 910. 
 Fuller V. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120. p. 857. 
 Fuller V. Coates, 18 Oil. St. 383. p. 1705. 
 Fuller i\ Cliicago Ac. R. Co., 31 la. 211. pp. 
 
 1964, 1968, 1993. 
 Fuller r. Harris, 29 Fed. Rep. 814. p. 2096. 
 Fuller V. Hovt, 14 Tex. 49. pp. 607, 608. 
 Fuller r. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 63. p. 26. 
 Fuller V. State, 19 Tex. App. 380. pp. 1777, 
 
 1778. 
 Fuller V. Wilson, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 403. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Fuller's Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 517. pp. 1504, 
 
 1521; 
 Fulmer v. Seitz, 68 Pa. St. 237. p. 1031. 
 Fulton V. Ceutral Bank, 92 Pa. St. 112. p. 
 
 1623. 
 Fulton V. Hanna, 40 Cal. 278. p. 2085. 
 Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 483. pp. 383, 387. 
 Fulwciler r. St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479. p. 55. 
 Fuhvider r. Ingols, 81 Ind. 414. pp. 508, 1803. 
 Funk r. Ely, 45 Pa. St. 444. pp. 38. 54. 
 Funk r. Kincade, 5 Md. 405. i)p. 549, 550. 
 Funk r. Slaats, 24 111. 633. p. 1440. 
 Funkhouser v. Malleu, 62 Mo. 555. p. 2055. 
 Funkliouser v. Pogue, 13 Ark. 295. p. 81. 
 Funkliouser v. Wagner, 62 111. 59. p. 1322. 
 Funston v. Chicago &c. 11. Co., 61 la. 458. 
 
 pp. 1300, 1303. 
 Furbush r. Goodwin, 25 X. H. 426. p. 567. 
 Furlong r. (iarrett, 44 Wis. 111. p. 2030. 
 Furlong r. Howard, 2 Sell. & Lef. 115. p. 279. 
 Furlnnan v. Mavorof Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263. 
 
 p. 1650. 
 Furinan r. Apiilegate, 23 N. J. L. 28. p. 90. 
 Furinan r. I'eay,2 Bail. (S. C.) 394. p. 364. 
 Furinan r. Union Pae. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 579; 
 
 s. c. 9 tent. Reii. 2!?5. p. 1330. 
 Furnissf.Hone,8 Wend. (X.Y.)256. p. 910. 
 Furniss v. IMereditli, 43 Miss. 1302. p. 128. 
 Furstr. Second Avenue K. Co., 72 X. Y. 542. 
 
 p. 587. 
 Furv r. State, 8 Tex. App. 471. p. 1S17. 
 Fyrfe V. Beers, 18 Iowa, 4. p. 1015. 
 
 Gabel v. Weisensce, 49 Tex. 131. p. 343. 
 Galdich v. People, 40 Mich. 292. p. 1895. 
 Gadsden r. Woodward (N. Y. Ct. of App.), 8 
 
 X. Last. Itcli. 6.'-)3. p. 265. 
 Gaff r. Hutchinson, 38 Ind. 341. p. 2137. 
 Gaff r. .'Stern, 12 Mo. App. 115. p. 1449. 
 Gaffney r. Peoi)U', .50 N. V. 416. p)). 436, 715. 
 Gage 1-. Parker, 25 Barb. 141. p. 140'.). 
 Gage V. Smith, 27 Conn. 70. ]>. 1046. 
 (iage V. Wilson, 17 Me. .378. jip. 1915, 1916. 
 Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228. pp. 1207, 1316. 
 Gahagan r. Boston &c. R. Co., I Allen 
 
 fMass.), J8'7- t>- l-''''i- 
 Gaillard r. Smart, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 385. pp. 
 
 19, 1119 
 Gair.as v. Buford, 1 Dana (Kv.), 481 p. 
 
 17F'= 
 
 Gaiuas V. Com., 50 I'a. St. 319. pp. 3:)9, 416 
 
 Gaines v. Saunders, 87 Mo. 557. pp. 1049, 
 
 1050. 
 Gaines v. Summers, 39 Ark. 482. p. 2128. 
 Gaines v. Union &c. Co., 28 Oh. St. 418. p. 
 
 1374. 
 Gainey v. People, 97 111. 270. p. 1918. 
 Gains v. Gains, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 190. p. 
 
 10(18. 
 Gainsford v. Grammar, 2 Campb. 9. p. 273. 
 Gaither r. Martin, 3 Md. 162. p. 1646. 
 Galbraith r. State, 41 Tex, 567. p. 1763. 
 Galbreath v. Eichelberger, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 
 
 515. p. 264. 
 Gale V. Belknap Ins. Co., 41 N. H. 170. p. 
 
 344. 
 Gale V. Xew Y'ork &c. R. Co., 13 Hun (X. Y'.),. 
 
 1. p. 1976. 
 Gale r. New Y^ork &c. R. Co.,53 How, Pr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 385. pp. 1985, 1990. 
 Gale V. Parks, 58 Ind. 115. p. 2112. 
 Gale V. People, 26 Mich. 1.50. i)p. 534, .545. 
 Gale V. Rector, 5 IJradw. (111.) 481. p. 783. 
 Gale i\ Shillock (Dakota), 29 X. W. Rep. 66L 
 
 Galena &c. R. Co. v. Fay, 16 111. 558. pp. 1224, 
 
 1284, 1286, 1314. 
 Galena A:c. R. Co. v. Haslam, 73 HI. 494. pp. 
 
 64, 102, 697. 
 Galena &c. R. Co. r. Jacobs, 20 111. 478. pp. 
 
 1224, 1314, 1668, 1679. 
 Galena &c. R. Co. v. Welch, 24 111. 32. p. 
 
 1313. 
 Galena &c. R. Co. v. Y'arwood, 15 111. 568; s. 
 
 c. 17 111. 509. pp. 1237, 1286, 1287. 
 Galesburg r. Highley, 61 111. 287. p. 1249. 
 Gallagher i\ Baton Rouge Hebrew Congre- 
 gation, 34 La. Ann. 526. \). 2. 
 Gallagher r. Goldtrank, 63 Tex. 473. p. 3. 
 Gallagher r. People, 120 111. 179; s. c. 11 N. 
 
 East. Rep. 355. p. 1538. 
 Gallagher v. State, 3 Minn. 270; s. c. Hor. & 
 
 Thomp. Cas. 8elf-I)ef. 720. p. 1542. 
 Gallagher r. Williamson, 23 Cal. 331. p. 272. 
 Gallinger r. Lake Shore Traffic Co. (Wis.), 
 
 30 X. W. Hep. 790. p. 747. 
 Galloway r. State, 25 Ga. 596. p. 125. 
 Gallowav c. State, 29 Ind. 4. p. 1567. 
 Gallowav r. State, 41 Tex. 289. p. 1896. 
 Galloway c. Week, .54 Wis. 608. p. 912. 
 (ialpin r. Wilson, 40 la. 90. p. 1751. 
 (ialvin r. State, 56 Ind. 51. p. 2112. 
 Galvinr. State, 64 Ind. 96. p. 2089. 
 Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 283. p. 
 
 1992. 
 Games r. Stiles, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 322. p. 1644. 
 (iammon v. Abrams, .53 Wis. 323. p. 1648. 
 (iainsby r. Columbia, .58 X. H. 60. p. 1918. 
 Gamwell r. Merchants &c. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 167. p. 978. 
 Gandolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114. pp. 477, 
 
 1,506, 19.52. 
 Gano r. Ilarmison, 44 Wis. 323. p. 2072. 
 (Jano r. Wells, 36 Kan. 688. p. 2067. 
 Ganson v. Madigan, 75 Wis. 144. pp. 839, 
 
 1072. 
 Garard r. Iladden, 67 Pa. St. 82; s. c. 6 Am. 
 
 Rep. 412. p. 12.50. 
 Garber r. State, iU Ind. 219. pp. 1756, 1776. 
 Garcelon r. Hampden F. Ins. Co., 50 Me. 580. 
 
 l)p. 976,977. 
 Garcia r. State, 12 Tex. App. 335. p. 49. 
 Garcia v. State, 15 Tex. App. 120. p. 1855. 
 Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 209. p. 189B. 
 Garden v. Creswell, 2 Mecs. & W. 319. p. 
 
 1H8. 
 Gardener r. Collector, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 499. 
 
 pp. 818,819. 
 G.irdenhire i-. State, 6 Tex. App. 147. pp. 17, 
 
 61, 111.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 •Garrtiner v. People, 6 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 
 
 157. pp. 31, 3-2, 114, 663. 
 Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 153. p. 1013. 
 Gardner v. Boot her, 31 Ala. 187. p. 1446. 
 Gardner v. Clark, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 538. p. 
 
 1750. 
 Gardner v. Clark, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 538. p. 
 
 83f>. 
 Gardner v. Kimball, 58 N. H. 202. p. 1943, 
 Gardner v. Lainbach, 47 Ga. 133. p. 16.33. 
 Gardner v. Lanning, 2 N. J. L. 651. p. 57. 
 Gardner v. Miller, 21 Ark. 398. p. 2053. 
 Gardner v. People, 4 111. 84. pp. 69, 74. 
 Gardners. People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 155. 
 
 p. 647. 
 Gardners. Picket, 19 Wend. 186. pp.1645, 
 
 16.58. 
 Gardner v. Piscataquis Mut. F. Ins. Co., 38 
 
 Me. 439 p. 979. 
 Gardners. State, 11 Tex. App. 265. p. 1746. 
 .Gardner v. Towsev, 3 Littell (Kv.),423. p. 
 ' 1096. 
 Gardner r. Turner, 9 Johns. CN. Y.) 260. p 
 
 33. 
 Gardner r. Walsh, 5 El. & Bl. 32. p. 1032. 
 Garfield v. Kirk, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 464. p. 
 
 397. 
 Garfield v. Knight's Ferry Water Co., 14 Cal. 
 
 35. p. 771. 
 Garfield v. State, 74 Ind. 60. pp. 1642, 1783, 
 
 1785, 1827 
 Garibaldi v. Carroll, 33 Ark. .ISS. p. 2135. 
 Garland i\ Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185. p. 1479. 
 Garland, Ex parte, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 378. p. 
 
 148. 
 Garlick v. Bowers, 66 Cal. 122 p. 1705. 
 Garner v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.),213. p. 643. 
 Garner ». State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 160. p. 86. 
 Garnet v. State, 1 Tex. App. 605. p. i560. 
 Garnett v. Kirksnian, 33 Miss. 389. p. 2066. 
 Garnett v. Woodcock, 6 Maule & S. 44; s c. 
 
 1 Stark. 475. p. 940. 
 Garrr. Haskett, 86 Ind. 373. p. 1157. 
 Garr v. Selden, 4 N.|Y. 91. p. 795. 
 Garrard v. Willet, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 628. 
 
 p. 1198. 
 Garrellst'. Alexander, 4 Esp. 37. p. 878. 
 Garrett v. Chambliss, 24 Tex. 618. p. 1670. 
 Garrett v. Garrett, 27 Ala. 678. p. 1689. 
 Garrett v. HoUowav, 24 Ala. 376. j). 1669. 
 Garrett v. Jackson, "20 Pa. St, 331. p. 1013. 
 Garrett v. State, 76 Ala. 18. p. 65. 
 Garrotty v. Brazell, 34 la. 100. pp. 1984, 1986. 
 
 1994. 
 Garrison v. Pearce, 3 E. D, Sinith (N. Y.;, 
 
 2.55. p. 1195. 
 Garrison v. Portland, 2 Ore. 123. pp. 55,81- 
 
 90. 
 Garrison r. State, 110 Ind. 145. p. 2113, 
 Garrison v. Wilcoxson, 11 Ga. 154. p. 703. 
 Garthwaite v. Tatuni, 21 Ark. .336. pp. 60, 70. 
 Gartou v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 508. p. 
 
 1506. 
 Gartside v. Orphans' Benefit Ins. Co. ,"62 Mo. 
 
 322. pp. 993, 994. 
 Garver v. Dauljenspeck. 22 Ind. 238. p. 2052. 
 Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; s. e. 50 Mo. 
 
 206. p. 1410. 
 Gary v. James, 4 Desan. (S. C.) 185. p. 899. 
 Garza v. State, 3 Tex. App. 286. p. 93. 
 Gas Co. V. Wheeling, 8 W, Va. 323. pp. 
 
 1681,1682,1708. 
 (Jatos r. Labeaume, 19 Mo. 17. pp. 1410, 1437. 
 Gates V. Lounsbury, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 427. 
 
 p. 344. 
 Gates V. Madison County M. Ins. Co., 2 N. Y. 
 
 43. pp. 974, 975. 
 Gates V. McDaniel, 4 Stow. & P. (Ala.) 69. p. 
 
 152 
 
 Gates V. People, 6 Bradw. (111.) 383, p. 145. 
 Gates r. People, 14 111. 433; s. c. 2 Am. L. 
 
 Keg. 671. pp. 66, 485,487. 
 Gates V. Winter, 3 T. K. 306. p. 612. 
 Gatlifl= V. Bourne, 2 Moo. & Rob. 100. p. 25. 
 Galling r. Newell, 9 Ind. 572. p. 1129. 
 Gatzweiler v. Morgan, 51 Mo. 47, p. 912. 
 Gauldin v. Crawford, 30 Ga. 674. p. 20S3. 
 Gaunt V. F^ynney, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 8. pp. 
 
 1391 1393 1399. 
 Gavan v. Ellsworth, 45 Ga. 283. p. 312. 
 Gavet V. Manchester &c. R. Co., 16 Gray 
 
 (Mass.),. 501. pp. 1229, 1236. 
 Gavett V. Manchester &c. R. Co., IG Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 501, p. 1603. 
 Gavigan v. Scott, 51 Mich. 373. p. 775. 
 Gawtrv r. Doane, 51 N. Y 84. p. 581. 
 Gay V. Ardrv, 14 La. 288. p. 49. 
 Gay V. Balfou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403. p. 895. 
 Gay V. State, 2 Tex. App. 128. p. 1784. 
 Gay V. Winter, 34 Cal. 153. pp. 1223, 1225. 
 Gayette v. Bethuue, 14 Mass. f>a. p. 1044. 
 GaVnor v. Old Colonv &c. R. Co., 100 Mass. 
 
 208. pp. 1208, 1209, 1211, 1212, 1224. 
 Gazette Printing Co. v. Moras, 60 Ind, 154. 
 
 p, 2112. 
 Gazzam v. Povntz,4 Ala. 374. p. 1436. 
 Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & W. 95. pp. 214, 
 
 21.5. 
 Gearhart v. Jordan. 11 Pa. St. 325. p. 85. 
 Geary v. People, 22 Mich. 220. pp. 402, 443. 
 Geary I'. Simmons, 39 Cal. 224. ]). 1605. 
 Geery v. Hopkins, 2 Ld. Raym. 851. p. 177. 
 Geill V. Jeremy, Mood. & M. 61. p. 943. 
 Gellatly v. Lowery, 6 Bosw. (X. Y.) 113. p. 
 
 571. 
 Gelpke v. Pike, 33 Mo. 163. p. 1669. 
 Gelston v, Marshall, 6 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 39a. 
 
 p. 599. 
 Gelyin v. Kansas City R. Co., 21 Mo, App. 
 
 273. p. 1020. 
 Center V. Morrison, 31 Barb. (N Y.) 155, p 
 
 875. 
 Gentry Co v Black, 32 Mo. 542. p. 1594. 
 George v. Joy, 19 N. H. 544. p. 357. 
 George v. Norris, 23 Ark. 121. p. 349. 
 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 300, pp. 
 
 311,469, 718 
 George v. Stubbs, 20 3Ie. 250. p. 908. 
 George v. Surrey, 1 Mood. & Malk. 516. p. 
 
 878. 
 George v. Taylor, 55 Tex. 97. p. 2076. 
 George v. Thomas, 16 Texas, 74. p. 1080. 
 Georgia v. Bailford, 3Dall. (U. S.) 1. p. 1508. 
 Georgia r. llepfood, 45 Iowa, 48. p. 146S. 
 Georgia Railroad r. Hart, 60 Ga. 550. pp. 54, 
 
 117. 
 Gerard v. Penswick, 1 Swanst. 533. p. 634. 
 Gere r. Murray, 6 Minn. 305. pp. 1437, 1446. 
 Gerhardt r. Swaty, 57 Wis. 24. p. 2032. 
 German Bank v. Dunn, 62 Mo. 79. p. 1025. 
 German Ins. Co. v. Smelker, 38 Kan. 285 p. 
 
 2037. 
 German Theological School v. Dubuque, 64 
 
 la. 736. pp. 661,1266. 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Davenport (Pa.'>, 9 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 517. p. 956. 
 Germania Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Oh. St. 33. 
 
 p. 999 
 Gerrish v. Mace, 9, Gray (Mass.), 235. p. 
 
 1407. 
 Gertv r. Fitchburg &c. R. Co., 137 Mass. 77. 
 
 pp: 472, 473. 
 Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 471. p. 1780. 
 Gettwerth v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 29 La. Ann. 
 
 30. p. 30. 
 Getty V. Shearer, 20 Pa. St. 12. p. 1031. 
 Ghcnn v. Proviucetown, 105 Mass. 313. p. 
 
 1247.
 
 Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Gholstou V. Gholston, :U Ga. 625. p. 1949. 
 Gibbous y. People, -21 111. 518. p. 19U4. 
 Gibbons v. Wiscousiu &c. R. Co., 62 Wis. 546. 
 
 pp. 16(58 1676. 
 Hbl 
 
 Gibbons r. Wisconsin &c. R. Co., 66 Wis. 161 ; 
 
 S. c. 28 X. W. Rep. 170. p. 1312. 
 Gibbs V. Dewev, 5 Cow. (X. Y.) 503. p, 1922. 
 Glbbs I' Lindsiev,13 Vt. 208. p. 493. 
 Gibbs V. State, s'Heisk. (Tenn.) 72. p. 48. 
 Giblin r. McMul'.en, L. R. 2 r. C. 317. pp. 
 
 1001, 1605. 
 Gibson i'. American &c. Life Ins. Co., 37 X. 
 
 Y. .580. p. 9'tO. 
 Gibson r. Green, 22 Ind. 422, p. 561. 
 Gibson v Hatchett, 24 Ala. 201. p. 583. 
 Gibson v. Hill, 21 Tex. 225. p. 1441. 
 Gibson v. Manlv, 15 111. 140. \^^. 2079, 2080. 
 Gibson r. State, 9 Ind. 264. p. 2094. 
 Gibson r. .state, 16 Fla. 291, 300. p. 4. 
 Gibson c. Stearns, 3 X. H. 185. p. 886. 
 Gibson v. Tong, 29 3Io. 133. p. 1070. 
 Gibson i: Williams, 39 Ga. 660. p. 1977. 
 • Gibson r. Wvandotte, 20 Kan. 156. p. 55, 
 Gifford c. Clark, 70 Me. 94. p)). 1978, 19S1. 
 Gifford V. Peoule, 87 111. 210. p. 533. 
 Gilbart v. Dale, 5 Ad. & El. 543. pp. 1332, 
 
 1333. 
 Gilbert v. Cherry, 57 Ga. 128. p. 581. 
 Gilbert v. Henck, 6 Casey (Pa.), 205. p, 
 
 1251. 
 Gilberts, Xortii American Fire Ins. Co., 23 
 
 Wend. (X, Y.) 43. p. 876. 
 Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio (X. Y'.),41. p. 
 
 795. 
 Gilbert v. Rider, Kirby (Conn.), ISO. pp. 
 
 118, 120. 
 Gilbert v. Schwenck, 14 Mees. &. W. 488. 
 
 p. 891. 
 Gilbert v. Thompson, 14 Minn. 544. p. 560. 
 ' Gilbert v. Woodbury, 22 Me. 246. p. 1670. 
 Gilchrist v. Brande, 58 Wis. 184. pp. 1101, 
 
 1102. 
 Gilchrist v. Donnell, 53 Mo. 591. p. 1661. 
 Gilchrist v. McGee, 9 Yerger (Tenn.), 455. 
 
 p. 1080. 
 Gilchrist v. Rogers, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 483. 
 
 p. 1668. 
 Gildersleevc v. London, 73 X. Y. 609. p. 
 
 639. 
 Gile V. People, 1 Colo. 60. p. 1726. 
 Giles V. State, 6 Ga. 276. VP. 1835, 2007. 
 Gilhooly v. Washington, 4 X. Y. 217. p. 
 
 1003. 
 Gill V. Cald\vell, 1 111. (Breese) 28. p. 329. 
 Gill V. Clark, 54 Mo. 415. pp. 1590, 1712. 
 Gill V. Cubit, 3 Barn. & Cres. 466; s. c. 10 
 
 Eng. C. L. 154. p. 950. 
 Gill V. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Men. (Ky.) 177. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Gill V. McXamee, 42 X. Y. 44. p. 561. 
 Gill i: People, 5 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 308. 
 
 p. .529. 
 Gill i: Rochester, 37 Hun (X. Y'.). 108. p. 
 
 1488. 
 Gill r. Rogers, 37 Tex. 628. p. 2076. 
 Gilleland c. Slate, 44 Te.K. 3.50. pp. 1903, 1990. 
 Gillespie v. Gillespie, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 89. p. 
 
 1755. 
 Gillespie V. Xewberg, 54 X. Y', 408. pp. 1209, 
 
 1225. 
 Glllosple V. Smith, 29 111. 473. p. 560. 
 Gillespie v. State, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 507. p. 
 
 122. 
 Glllctt V. Camp, 27 Mo. .541. pp. 888, 894. 
 Gillctt V. .Miller, 108 Ind. 75. p. 2102. 
 Gillette v. Morrison, 7 Neb. 395. p. 312. 
 Gillett V. Wlmer, 23 Mo. 77. p. 1770. 
 Gilliam r. Ball, 49 .Mo. 249. pp. 1037, 1768. 
 Gilliam 1-. Brown, 43 Miss. 641. pp 81. 85. 
 
 I Gilliam r. McJankin, 2 So. Car. 442. p 152. 
 Gillis V. Hall, 2 lirewst. (Pa.j 342. p. 871. 
 Gill man v. Connor, 3 Jebb. & Symes, 210. p 
 
 1142. 
 Gilly V- State, 15 Tex. App. 287. pp. 1696. 
 Gilnian v. Dcerfleld, 15 Gray (Mass), 577. 
 
 p. 1209. 
 Gilman v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 21 Mich. 
 
 372. p. 2059. ■ 
 Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 X. H. 108 pp. 1929. 
 
 1930. 
 Gilmer v. Higley, HO U. S. 47. v. .391. 
 Gilmore v. American Central Ins. Co., 67 
 
 Cal. 336. p. 196. 
 Gilinore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 120; s. c. 
 
 22 Am. Dec. 410. p. 890. 
 Gilmore r. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 104 Pa, St 
 
 275. p. 581. 
 Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182. pp. 118, 120, 
 
 Gilp'atrick ?•. Biddcford, 51 Me. 182. pp. 
 
 1019, 1021. 
 Gilpins v. Consequa, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 184 ; s. c. i'et. C. C. 85. p\). 307, 308. 
 Gilstrap v. Felts, 50 :Mo. 428. p. 2049. 
 Ginder v. Farnum, 10 Pa. St. 98. p. 1413. 
 Ginnon r. Xew Y'ork &c. R. Co., 3 Robt. (N. 
 
 Y.) 26. p. 1236. 
 Girard v. Gettig, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 234. pp. 1584, 
 
 1586. 
 Girardey v. Bessnian, 62 Ga. 654. p. 2067. 
 (iirault i: Adams, til Md. 1. i>. 313. 
 Gist V. Iliggins, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 303. p. 2106. 
 (iist c. Loring, 60 Mo. 487. p. 1608. 
 Givens v. Brisco, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 532. 
 
 p. 194. 
 Givius r. Bradley, 3 Bibb (Ky.) , 195. p. 2146. 
 Givins v. Van "Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149. p. 
 
 2139. 
 Glacius V. Black, 30 X. Y. 145. p. 893. 
 Gladden v. state, 12 Fla. 562. pp. 1539, 1548. 
 Gladden v. State, 13 Fla. 623. pi). 13, 21. 
 Gladmou v. Railroad Co., 15 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 401. p. 1646. 
 Gladwell v. Turner, 39 L. J. Exch. 31 ;s. c. 
 
 L. R. 5 Exch. 59. p. 944. 
 Glantz r. South Bend, 106 Ind. 305. pp. 
 
 2024, 2052. 
 Glascock c. Manor, 4 Tex. 7. p. 2097. 
 Glascock i: State, 10 Mo. 508. p. 1114. 
 Glasgow V. Copeland, 8 Mo. 268. p. 1600. 
 Glasgow v. Hobbs, .52 Ind 239. p)). 1715, 2028. 
 Glasgow r. Lindell, ,50 Mo. 60. p. 1047. 
 Glasgow r. Xicholson,25 Mo. 29. p. 907. 
 Glass V. Gel vin, 80 i^Io. 297. pp. 90s, 920, 1661. 
 Glasscock V. Gla.sscock, 66 Mo. 627. p. 1138. 
 Glass Co. V. Walcott, 2 Allen (Mass.), 227. 
 
 p. 890. 
 Gla/e r. Whitlcv,5 Ore. 164. pp. 469, 470. 
 Gleason r. Bremen, .50 Me. 222. p. 1224. 
 Gleason v. Drew, 9 Mo. 79. p. 1443. 
 Gleason v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 32 Wis. 85. 
 
 p. 1154. 
 Glenn v. Charlotte &c. R. C.,63 X. C. 510. p. 
 
 802. 
 Glenn v. Clore, 42 Ind. 60. pp. 459, 570. 
 Glenn v. Gleason, 61 la. 28. pp. 385, 388, 390, 
 
 637, 638. 
 Glenn r. Glcnn,4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 488. p. 918. 
 Glenn r. Lelinen, 54 Mo. 45. p. 1669. 
 Glidden /•. Towle, 31 N. II. 147. p. 1945. 
 Glidewell r. Daggy, 21 Ind. 95. p. 2101. 
 Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 50. 
 
 p. 91(9. 
 Globe National Bank v. Ingalls, 130 Mass. 
 
 8. p. 912. 
 Globe Works v. Wriglit, 106 Mass. 207. p. 974. 
 Glory V. State, 13 Ark. 230. pp. :{51, 181L 
 Glover 1-. Duhle, 19 Mo. 300. p. 1642.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 Glover v. Holbrook, 5 Allen (Mass.), 155. p. 
 
 1751. 
 Glover v. Woolsev, Dudley (Ga.) , 85. pp. 58, 
 
 118,120. 
 Grable v. Margrave, 3 Scam. (III.) 372. p. 
 
 1491. 
 Goben i\ Goldsberry, 72 Ind. 44. p. 199. 
 Godbold V. Blair, 27 Ala. 592. p. 1733. 
 Goddard v. Foster, 17 WaU. (U. S.) 123. pp. 
 
 825, 860, 1507. 
 Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172. p. 273. 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk K. Co., 57 Me. 
 
 202; s. c. 2 Am. Kep. 39. pp. 1290, 1203. 
 Goddard v. Williamsou, 72 Mo. 13: p. 96S. 
 Godefroy v, Dalton, 6 Bing. 460. pp. 1242, 
 
 1243, 1244. 
 Godfrey v. Turnbull, 1 Esp. 371. p. 1101. 
 George^ v. Huffschuidt, 44 Mo. 179. p. 1669. 
 Goettiug V. Biehler, 33 Hun (Jn. Y.),500. p. 
 
 2016. 
 Gold V. Bissell, 1 Wend. (X. Y.) 210. p. 
 
 1016. 
 Gold Mining Co. v. Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 640. 
 
 p. 71. 
 Golden v. Romer, 20 Hun (N. Y.), 43S. p. 
 
 1321. 
 Golden v. State, 18 Tex. App. 637. p. 1575. 
 Golden Fleece &c. Co. v. Cable &c. Co., 15 
 
 Nev. 450. p. 2099. 
 Golden Terry 3Iining Co. v. Smith, 2 Dak. 
 
 377. p. 2099. 
 Goldev V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 
 
 242. "pp. 1348, 1349. 
 Goldins I'. Crowle, Saver, 1. pp. 1161, 1182. 
 Goldiiig V. Petit, 27 La. Ann. 86. p. 7. 
 Goldman r. Wolff, 6 Mo. App. 491. p. 740. 
 Goldsberry v. Stuteville, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 345. 
 
 pp. 214, 215, 221, 240. 
 Goldsby v. Robertson, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 247. 
 
 pp. 2010, 2124. 
 Goldsmitli r. Solomons, 2 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 
 
 296. p. 1915. 
 Gomer v. Chaffee, 5 Colo. 383. p. 2076. 
 Gonsolis V. (iearheart, 31 Mo. 585. p. 1708. 
 Gonzales r. Gobliner, 68 Cal. 151. p. 1704. 
 Gonzales r. New York &c. R. Co., 50 How. 
 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 126. p. 1235. 
 Gonzales v. State, 12 Tex. App. 657. p. 
 
 1855. 
 Gonzales v. State, 18 Tex. App. 449. p. 1898. 
 Good V. Mylin, 13 Pa. St. 53S. pp. 729, 733. 
 Goodall V. Tricky, 33 Mo. 340. p. 1670. 
 Goodall V. State,"l Ore. 334. p. 1539. 
 Goode V. Linecum, 1 How. (Miss.) 281. pp. 
 
 1948, 1956. 
 Goode r. State, 2 Tex. App. 520. pp. 1744, 
 
 1902, 1903. 
 Goode r. State, 16 Tex. App. 411. p. 817. 
 Goodenow v. Snyder, 3 Greene (la.), 599. p. 
 
 890. 
 Goodfellow V. IMeegan, 32 Mo. 280. p. 1321. 
 Goodhaudi'. Benton, 6 Gill & J. (Md.)4Sl. p. 
 
 419. 
 Goodhue v. People, 94 111. 37. p. 17. 
 Goodin, Ex parte, 67Mo. 637. p. 152. 
 Goodlittle d. Revett v. Braham, 4 T. R. 498. 
 
 p. 242. 
 Goodman v. Cotherington, Sid. 235. p. 1910. 
 Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870. p. 950. 
 Goodman v. Kennedy, 10 Neb. 270. pp. 307, 
 
 426. 
 Goodman v. Losev, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 526. 
 
 p. 106G. 
 Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. (U. S.) 343. 
 
 pp. 950, 1669. 
 Goodno V. Oshkosh, 28 Wis. 300. pp. 1249, 
 
 14H3. 
 Goodnough v. Oshkosh, 24 Wis. 549; s. c. 
 
 Goodno 17. Oshkosh, 28 Wis. 300. p. 1249. 
 
 Goodnow V. Hill, 15 Mass. 589. p. 316. 
 Goodpastor r. Voris, 8 Iowa, 335. p. 214. 
 Goodrich r. Burdick. 26 Mich. :V.\ p. 82. 
 Goodrich v. Davis, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 473. p. 
 
 1459. 
 Goodrich v. Downs, 6 Hill (N. Y), 438. pp. 
 
 1436, 1439. 
 Goodridge v. Dustin, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 363. p. 
 
 lOSO. 
 Goodtitle v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497. pp. 215, 
 
 217. 
 Goodtitle v. Thrustout. 2 Stra. 1023. p. 29. 
 Goodwin v. Appleton, 22 Me. 453. p. 1911. 
 Goodwin v. Blackley, 4 Ind. 438. jjp. 69, 70, 
 
 76. 
 Goodwin v. Cloudman, 43 Me. 577. p. 113. 
 Goodwin v. Phillips, Lofft. 71. p. 1966. 
 Goodwin ?•. Smith, 72 Ind. 113. pp. 215, 238. 
 Goodwin i'. State, 3 Crim. L. Mag. 44. p. 
 
 1879. 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550. pp. 505, 508, 
 
 509, 1688, 1705, 1709, 1756, 1780, 1782. 
 Goodwine v. Crane, 41 Ind. 335. p. 2113. 
 Goodwyu V. Cheveley, 4 Hurl. & N. 631. pp. 
 
 1120, 1138. 
 Goodwyu V. High tower, 30 Ga. 249. p. 2099. 
 Googins i\ Gilmore, 47 Me. 9. p. 1443. 
 Gordon v. Bowers, 16 Pa. St. 226. p. 805. 
 Gordon v. Inghram, 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 152. 
 
 p. 1060. 
 Gordon v. People, 33 N. Y. 501. pp. 65, 1797. 
 Gordon v. Pitt, 3 la. 385. pp. 2048, 2058. 
 Gordon v. State, 48 N. J. L. 611. p. 155S. 
 Gore V. Brazier, 3 Mass. 523. p. 1003. 
 Gore V. Summersoll, 5 Monr. (Ky.) 513. p. 
 
 899 
 Gorham v. Carroll, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 221. p. 265. 
 GorlKim V. Gale, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 739. p. 192. 
 Gorham r. Thompson, Peake N. P. 42. pp. 
 
 1101, 1105. 
 Gorham v. Upham, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 9. 
 
 p. 1173. 
 Gorman v. Dierkes, 37 Mo. 576. p. 1614. 
 Gormlev v. Laramore, 40 Ga. 253. pp. 110, 
 
 lis. 
 Gortons. Erie&c.R. Co.,45N. Y. 660. p. 1230. 
 Gorton r. Hadsell, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 508. pp. 
 
 289, 1739. 
 Goslin V. Corry, 7 Man. & G. 347. p. 1663. 
 Goss I'. Turner, 21 Vt. 440. pp. 215, 228, 303 
 Gott ('. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45. p. 1365. 
 Gottlieb V. Hartman, 3 Col. 53. p. 505. 
 Goudy i'. Duncombe, 1 Exch. 430. p. 1140. 
 Gough V. Farr, 1 Younge & J. 477. p. 1477. 
 Gough V. Staats, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 549. p. 
 
 936. 
 Gould V. Day, 94 U. S. 405. p. 583. 
 Gould t\ Moore, 40 N. Y. Super. (8 Jones & 
 
 S.) 387. pp. 728, 747,755. 
 Gould r. AVard, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 104. p. 1443. 
 Gourley v. Allen, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 644. p. 899. 
 Gover h. Dill, 3 la. 337. p. 1670. 
 Goyne v. Howell, Minor (Ala.), 62. p. 128. 
 Grabbenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236. p. 
 
 1003. 
 Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505. p. 1365. 
 Gracia y. State, 5 Tex. App. 337. p. 50. 
 Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 699. p. 
 
 1059. 
 Graddy v. Hightower, 1 Ga. 253. p. 2075. 
 Gradle v. Hoffman, 105 111. 147. p. 73. 
 Gradle v. Kern, 109 111. 5.58. p. 1251. 
 Grady i'. Early, 18 Cal. 108. p. 81. 
 Grady r. Hammond, 21 Ala. 428. p. 239. 
 Grady v. American &c. Ins. Co., 60 Mo. 116. 
 
 1). 1598. 
 Grady v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 289. pp. 1096, 
 
 1098. 
 Gradv c. State, 4 la. 461. p. 1994.
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Graoter v. State. 105 Iiui. 272. pp- 1751, 1812. 
 Graff c. Pittsburgh &c. K. Co., 31 Pa. St. 489. 
 
 p. 294. 
 Gragg i: VTagncr, 77 X. O. 246. pp. 779, 780. 
 Graliani r. Audt-rsoii, 12 111. 514. p. 560. 
 Graham i-. Jiradlev, 5 lluiuph. (Teun.) 476. 
 
 p. 1750. 
 Graham i: Davis, 4 Oh. St. 302. pp. 307, 1322, 
 
 1344, 1345, 1347. 1349, 1352.1374. 
 Graham r. Dvster, 2 Stark. 21. p. 635. 
 Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. 112. pp. 222, 
 
 223. 
 Graham v. Ilolligcr, 46 Pa. St. 55. p. 1414. 
 Graham v. Hope, Peake X. P. 154. pp. 1101, 
 
 1105. 
 Graham r. Houston, i De.v. L. (N. C.) 236. 
 
 p. 17.50. 
 Graham v. Hunt, S B. Men. fKy.) 7. p. 966. 
 Graham r. Nowlin, 54 lud. 389. p. 1708. 
 Graham r. Okiis, 1 Post. & Fiu. 262. p. 612. 
 Graham r. Pacific K. Co., 66 Mo. 536. pp. 
 
 129S, 1487. 
 Graham v. Smith, 25 Pa. St. 323. p. 1446. 
 Graham v. State, 66 Ind. 386. p. 2052. 
 Graham r. Trimmer, G Kan. 231. ]>. 47. 
 Graham v. Van Dicman's Land Co., 11 Ex. 
 
 101:s. c. 30 Eug. L. & Eq. 574. p. 1134. 
 Graham, In re, 8 JJen. (U. S.^ 419. p. 261. 
 Grahme's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 673. p. 41. 
 Grainger v. State, 5 Yerg. (Teun.) 459. p. 
 
 1548. 
 Grammar v. Borgam, 27 Iowa, 369. p. 931. 
 Grand Jurv v. Public Press, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 313. p. 172. 
 Grand Lodge v. Knox, 27 Mo. 317. p. 1684. 
 Grand ltai)ids &c. R. Co. v. Boyd, 65 Ind. 
 
 526. ]). 1293. 
 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Horn, 41 Ind. 
 
 479. p. 1501. 
 Grand Rapids &c. R. Co. v. Jones, 81 Ind. 
 
 .523. p. 1308. 
 Grand IJapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 
 
 Mich. 308. p. 128. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Latham, 63 Mo. 177. 
 
 p. 1704. 
 Granger v. State, 11 Tex. App. 454. pp. 
 
 1796, 1797. 
 Grannis v. Brandon, 5 Day (Conn.), 260. p. 
 
 1922. 
 Grant v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 29 
 
 Wis. 125. ]). 1734. 
 Grant v. Cropsey, 8 Neb. 205. p. 1022. 
 Grant v. Howard Ins. Co., 5 Hill (N. Y.). p. 
 
 978. 
 Grant v. Merchants &c. Bank, 35 Mich. 515. 
 
 p. 912. 
 Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644. pp. 1167, 1170, 
 
 1180, 1182, 1188. 
 Grant v. Newton, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 95. 
 
 pp. 1151. 1152. 
 Grant v. Reese, 82 N. C. 72. p. 2. 
 Grant v. Sbclton, 3 B. Mon. (Kv.) 420. p. 
 
 2071. 
 Grantr. State, 45 Ga. 477. p. 16,34. 
 (irant V. Slate, 3 Te.\. App. 1. p. 111. 
 Grant v. Westfall, 57 Ind. 121. pp. 2089, 
 
 2090. 
 Grantham v. Canaan, 38 N. H. 208. pp. 961, 
 
 'Mi-2. 
 Grattan v. Mctroi>olitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N. 
 
 Y. 274. p. 039. 
 Gratz V. Beuner, 13Serg. & R. (Pa.) 110. p. 
 
 57. 
 Grave v. Brlen, 1 Md. 438. p. 821. 
 Graves v. Al.sap, 1 Ariz. Ter. 274. p. 194. 
 (iravfs r. (irave!?,45 N. H. 323. p. 314. 
 (irav<\s r. Key, 3 Barn. & Ad. 313. p. 842. 
 Gr;ive." r. Li'ikc Sliore iV:c. R. Co., 137 Mass. 
 
 33. p. 1361. 
 
 Graves v. Monet, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 45. 
 
 pp. 145, 1906. 
 Graves c. Seoville, 17 Neb. 593. p. 2052. 
 Graves v. Sliattuck, 35 N. H. 257. pp. 1246, 
 
 1378. 
 Graves v. Short, M. 1598; Cro. Eliz. 616. p. 
 
 1936. 
 Graves v. State, 63 (^a. 710. p. 1952. 
 Gravest'. State, 12 Wis. .591. p. 1896. 
 (iraves^'. Gans, 25 Wis. 41. p. 1916. 
 Grav c. Berry, 9 N. II. 473. p. 1080. 
 Gray r. Hurk", 19 Tex. 228. p. 775. 
 Gray r. Coan, 4S la. 424. pp. 2074, 2080, 2100. 
 Gray v. Cooper, 65 N. C. 183. pp. 423, 424. 
 Grav V. Grav, 3 Litt. (Kv.) 465. p. 585. 
 (iray r. Ilornheck, 31 Mo. 400. p. 864. 
 Gray r. Mol)Q(' Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387. pp. 
 
 1321, 1.345, ]3.")6, 1300. 
 Gray i\ Missouri River Packet Co., 64 Mo. 47; 
 
 s. "<;. Thomi). Carr. Pass. 43. p. 1299. 
 Grav V. People, 26 111. 3. pp. 70, 75. 
 Gray v. Pullen, 5 Best & S. 970. p. 1218. 
 Gray r. Reg., 11 CI. & Fiu. 427. p. 37. 
 Gray v. State, 55 Ala. 86. pp. 18, 35. 
 Gray v. Stivers, 38 Ind. 197. p. 1726. 
 Grayson r. Com., 6 Gratt. (Va.) 712. p. 2047. 
 Grayville v. Whitakcr, 85 111. 4.39. p. 1247. 
 Great Northern R. Co. v. Harrison, 23 L. J. 
 
 (Exch.) 308; s. c. 12 C. B. 576; 26 Eng. Law- 
 it Eq. 443. p. 1298. 
 Great Northern R. Co. t'. Shepherd, 8 Exch. 
 
 30; s. c. 7 Eng. Ry.Cas. 310. p. 1155. 
 Great Western R. Co. v. Braid, 1 Moo. P. C. 
 
 C. 101 ; s. c. 9 .Jur. (N. S.) 339; 11 Week. Rep. 
 
 444. pp. 1236, 1237, 1698. 
 Great Western Turnpike Co. v. Loomis, 32 
 
 N. Y. 127. pp. 262, 264, 403,409, .531. 
 Greeley r. Mausur, (>4 Me. 211. pp. 1984, 1993. 
 Greely v. McNabb, 13 Mo. 597. p. 1669. 
 Green v. Akers, 55 Ga. 159. p. 346. 
 Green r. Bliss, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 429. p. 
 
 1985. 
 Green v. Chelsea, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 7L p. 
 
 1012. 
 Green v. Cochran, 43 la. 545. pp. 1189, 1198, 
 
 1775. 
 Green v. Cornell, 1 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 14. 
 
 p. 783. 
 Green v. Dauby, 12 Vt. 338. p. 1247. 
 Green v. Dinglev, 24 ."Me. 131. p. 1749. 
 Green v. Drinker, 7 AVatts & S. (Pa.) 440. p. 
 
 1052. 
 Greeu v. Erie R. Co., 11 Hun (N. Y.), 333. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Green r. Gallagher, 35 Mo. 226. p. 560. 
 Green v. (iould, 3 Allen (Mass.), 465. p. 462. 
 Greenr. Haiues, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.)251. pp. 1122, 
 
 1123. 
 Green v. Hallenbeck, 24 Hun (N. Y.), 116. 
 
 I). 1250. 
 Green c. Hamilton, 16 Md. 317. p. 1474. 
 Green r. Hill, 2 Tex. 465. p. 817. 
 Green v. Hill, 4 Tex. 405. p. 68. 
 Greeu r. Humphrey, .50 Pa. St. 212. p. 915. 
 Green v. Slate, 08 Ala. 539. p. 1535. 
 Green v. Stale, 17 Kla. 669. pp. 17, 110, 135, 
 
 107. 
 Green v. State, 43 Ga. 368. pp. 16.35, 1701. 
 Greeu v. State, .59 Md. 123; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 
 
 542. p. 11. 
 Green r. Telfair, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 11. p. 1455. 
 Greenbaum v. lillii.tt, 00 Mo. 25. p. 889. 
 Greentield v. Moore, 113 Ind. 597. p. 2038. 
 (ireenlield r. People, ai N. V. 75. p. 17.58. 
 Greenlielcl r. People, 74 N. Y. 277. pp. 69, 
 
 71, 77, 78, 120, 41S, .l;i3. 
 Greenle.uf r. Kdes, 2 .Minn. 261. pp. 1437,1446. 
 Greenleaf v. llliuuis iVc. K. Co., 29 Barb. 14. 
 
 I>. 1002.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 Greenleaf r. Egan, 30 Minn. 316. p. 3. 
 Greenlee r. McDowell, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 
 
 485. p. 192. 
 Greeuley v. State, 60 Ind. 141. pp. 65, 66, 
 
 1780. 
 Greenman v. O'Connor, 25 Mich. 30. p. 576. 
 Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 Myl, & K. 98. p. 
 
 276. 
 Greenup v. Crooks, 50 Ind. 410. pp. 2076, 
 
 2140. 
 Greenup v. Stoker, 8 111. 202. pp. 123, 1750. 
 Greenwade v. Mills, 31 Miss. 464. p. 1197. 
 Greenwalt v. Tucker, 10 Fed. Rep. 884. pp. 
 
 2075, 2097. 
 Greenwell v. Greenwell, 2S Kan. 678. p. 902. 
 Greenwood v. Callahjin, 111 Mass. 298. p. 
 
 1210. 
 Greenwood v. Harris, 8 Mo. App. 603. p. 811. 
 Greer v. Higgins, 20 Kan. 420. p. 428. 
 Greer v. Norvill, 3Hill (S. C), 262. pp. 11, 
 
 86, 129, 130. 
 Greer v. Nourse, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 527. 
 
 p. 233. 
 Greer v. Parker, 85 Mo. 107. p. 1661. 
 Greer v. State, 53 Ind. 420. pp. 345, 513, 
 
 529, 1642, 1803. 
 Greer v. State, 14 Tex. App. 179. p. 112. 
 Greff V. Blake, 16 la. 222. pp. 1945, 1956. 
 Gregg V. Forsyth, 24 How. (U. S.) 179. p 
 
 819 
 Gregg V. McDaniel, 4 Harr. (Del.) 367. p 
 
 1929. 
 Gregg V. Sayre, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 244. p. 2114. 
 Gregg V. State. 3 W. Va. 705. p. 257. 
 Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray (Mass.), 242. p 
 
 1210. 
 Gregory v. Ford, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 473. p 
 
 1706. 
 Gregory v. Lincoln, 13 Neb. 352. pp. 2, 3. 
 Gregory v. Perkins, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 50. pp 
 
 1436, 1441. 
 Gregory v. Underbill, 6Lea (Tenn.), 207. p 
 
 825. 
 Gregory v. Walker, 38 Ala. 26. p. 874. 
 Gregorys. "Wells, Smith (N. H.), 399n. p 
 
 119. 
 Greschia v. People, 53 111. 298. pp. 1.544, 
 
 1548, 1574. 
 Greta v. State, 9 Tex. App. 429. p. 1695. 
 Greton r. Smith, 33 N. Y. 245. p. 1003. 
 Gridley r. Boggs, 62 Cal. 191. p. ,522. 
 Griffee r. State, 65 Tenn. (1 Lea) 41. p. 1907. 
 Griffeth v. Hanks, 46 Tex. 217. pp. 1427, 1428. 
 Griffin r. JIarquardt, 21 N. Y. 121. p. 345. 
 Griffin r. New Y'ork, 9 N. Y. 456; s. c. Sel- 
 
 den's Notes, 223. p. 1249. 
 Griffin v. Potter, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 209. pp. 
 
 888, 895. 
 Griffin v. Sheffield, 88 Miss. 3,59. p. 629. 
 Griffin v. Stadler, 35 Tex. 695. p. 94. 
 Griffin r. State, 15 Ga. 476. p. 67. 
 Griffin v. Williamstown, 6 W. Va. 312. p. 
 
 1246. 
 Gritlth V. Dayies, 5 Barn. & Ad. 502. p. 273. 
 Griffith V. Ditteuderffer, 50 Md. 466. pp. 385, 
 
 388 
 Griffith V. Eby, 12 Mo. 517. p. 1414. 
 Griffith V. McCuUum, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 561. 
 
 p. 1378. 
 Griffith V. Parton, 59 la. 31. p. 1748. 
 Grithth V. Sitgreayes, 90 Pa. St. 161. p. 1005. 
 Griffiths V. Chichester, 14 Eug. L. & Eq. 372 n. 
 
 p. 960. 
 Griffiths V. Ivery, 11 Ad. & El. 322. p. 1940. 
 Griffiths r. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290. p. 1WJ3. 
 Griffiths V. Lee, 1 Car. & P. 110. pp. 1332, 
 
 1333, 1334. 
 Griggs r. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81. pp. 
 
 1209, 1210, 1315. 
 
 Griggs V. Houston , 104 U. S. 553. p. 1605. 
 Grigsby v. Fullerton, 57 Mo. 309. pp. 1669, 
 
 1672." 
 Grig.iby v. Chappell, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 446. 
 
 p. 1207. 
 Grimbaldeston v. Anderson, cited 3 PhiUl- 
 
 niore, 155; s. c. 1 Eng. Ecc. 385. p. 646. 
 Grimes v. Bush, 16 Ark. 647. p. 1067. 
 Grimes v. Fall, 15 Cal. 63. p. 607. 
 Grimes v. Martin, 10 la. 347. pp. 257, 1705. 
 Grimes v. State, 63 Ala. 166. p. 1768. 
 Grimm v. Gamache, 25 Mo. 41. p. 560. 
 Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 529. pp. 1964, 
 
 1966. 
 Grinnell v. Stewart, 62 Barb. (N. Y".) 544. 
 
 p. 1195. 
 Gripton v. Thompson, 32 Kan. 367. pp. 1494, 
 
 2036. 
 Grissom v. State, 4 Tex. App. 374. pp. 70, 
 
 77, 111. 116, 129. 
 Griswold r. American Central Insurance 
 
 Co., 1 Mo. App. 97; s. c. 70 Mo. 654. p. 
 
 978. 
 Griswold r. Bolev, 1 Mont. 545. pp. 2085,2099. 
 Groat v. Gile, 51 N. Y'. 431. p. 912. 
 Groenwelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 144; s. c. 1 Ld. 
 
 Raym. 454. p. 150. 
 Grogan r. Adams Express Co. (Pa.), 5 Cent. 
 
 Rep. 298. pp. 1321. 1344, 1345, 1361. 
 Groh V. Bassett, 7 Minn. 325. p. 2072. 
 Groll V. Tower, 85 Mo. 249. pp. 1598, 1619. 
 Groom V. State (Tex.) , 3 S. W. Rep. 668. p. 48. 
 Gropp V. People, 67 111. 154. pp. 21, 83, 87. 
 Groscop I'. Ranier, 111 Ind. 361. p. 2035. 
 Gross t'. State, 2 Ind. 329. p. 65. 
 Grosse v. State, 11 Tex. App. 364. pp. 729, 
 
 747, 753. 
 Groye v. Brien, 1 Md. 439. p. 1646. 
 Groye v. City of Kansas, 75 Mo. 672. p. 1949. 
 Groyer v. Siins, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 498. p. 1670. 
 Growcock r. Hall, 82 Ind. 202. p. 2039. 
 Grube V. Nichols, 36 111. 92. pp. 1638, 1685. 
 Grubler v. Ryus, 23 Kan. 195. p. 2051. 
 Gruen v. Ban'iberger, 25 Mo. App. 89. p. 2052. 
 Guard v. Risk, 11 Ind. 156. pp. 1477, 1964. 
 Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 
 
 111. 35 ; s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 180. p. 991. 
 Gudgell V. Mead, 8 Mo. 53. p. 1,591. 
 Guengerich r. Smith, 36 Iowa, .587. p. 1479. 
 Guenther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439. p. 888. 
 Guetig V. State, 66 Ind. 94: s. c. .'52 Am. Rep. 
 
 99. pp. 73, 75, 77, 508, 509, 1782, 1848, 1879, 
 
 ISSl, 1886. 
 Guffee V. State, 8 Tex. App. 187. p. 1695. 
 Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 129. pp. 
 
 888, S94. 
 Guillaume v. Hamburg &c. Packet Co., 42 
 
 N. Y. 212. p. 1157. 
 Guitterniann v. Liyerpool &c. Steamship Co., 
 
 83 N. Y. 358. pp. 498, 499, 502, 503, 507, 509. 
 Gulf &c. R. Co. V. Leyy, 59 Tex. 542; s. c. 46 
 
 Am. Rep. 269. p. 315. 
 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. V. Redeker (Tex.), 
 
 2 S. ^\\ Rep. 527. p. 1239. 
 Guuu r. Gudehus, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 447. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Gunn r. Howell, 35 Ala. 144. p. 1670. 
 Gunn r. Scoyil, 4 Day (Conn.), 228. p. 891. 
 Gunter r. Astor, 4 J."B. Moore, 12. p. 891. 
 Gunter r. Geary, 2 Cal. 462. p. 1378. 
 Gunter v. GranUeville Man. Co.. 15. S. C. 443. 
 
 p. 37. 
 Gunter r.Patton, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 2.=>7. p. 48. 
 Gunter v. Watson, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 455. 
 
 p. 334. 
 Gurney r. Eyans, 27 L. J. Exch. 166. p. 1097. 
 Gullerson r. Morse. 58 N. H. 165. p. 403. 
 Guy V. Mead, 22 N. Y. 162. pp. 362, 365. 
 Guykowsky v. People, 2 111. 476. pp. 117, 122.
 
 ]xxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 H. 
 
 H. r. C, 1 Swab. & Tr. 605. pp. 640, 649. 
 
 H. v. U., 3 Swab & Tr. 517, 5M; s. c. 33 L. J. 
 
 (P. M. & A.) 159; 34 L. J. (P. M. & A.) 12. 
 
 pp. 64 (i, 650. 
 Haas V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 Wis. 44. pp. 
 
 •2036, 2037. 
 Habcrsliam v. "Wetter, 59 Ga. 11, p. 2063. 
 Jiackeiiev, Matter of, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 54; s. f.'24 X. Y. 74. p. 1.53. 
 Hacker v. Urowii, 81 Mo. 6S. p. 1626. 
 Hackett V. Snielsley, 77 111. 109. p. 1489. 
 Hackford r. Xew York Ac. R. Co.,6Lans. 
 
 (N. Y.) 381 ; s. c. 43 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 222. 
 
 p. 1225. 
 Hackley r. Hastie, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 252. pp. 
 
 1955, 1958, I'.mo. 
 Hackley r. jNIuskegon Cir. Judge, 58 Mich. 
 
 4.'i4. p. 2061. 
 Haddock v. Bury, MS. cited 7 East, 236, 
 
 n. a. p. 948. 
 Haddrick v. Heslop, 12 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 267. 
 
 p. 1164. 
 Haderlein v. St. Louis K. Co., 3 Mo. App. 601. 
 
 p. 769. 
 Hadjo V. Goodeu, 13 Ala. 718. pp. 454, 455, 
 
 469. 
 Hadley v. Baxendale, 6 Exch. 341; s. c. 18 
 
 Jur. 358; 23 L. J. (Exch.) 179. pp. 1473, 
 
 155S. 
 Hadlev V. Cliuton County Importing Co., 13 
 
 Oil. St. 502. p. 1419. 
 Hadlev v. Hadlev , 82 Ind. 75. p. 2029. 
 Hadley v. Haywood, 121 Mass. 236. pp. 1998 , 
 
 2002. 
 Hagan v. Alston, 9 Ala. 627. p. 150. 
 Hageman v. Morelaud , :« Mo. 86. p. 1593. 
 Hager r. Hager. 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 92. pp. 
 
 1912, 1913. 
 Hagerty t'. Scott, 10 Tex. .525. p. 1670. 
 Hague V. State, 34 Mies. (:16. p. 1890. 
 Ilalin V. Fredericks, 30 Mich. 223. p. 912. 
 Halin I'. Miller, 60 la. 96. p. 1975. 
 Haigh V. Belcher, 7 Car. & P. 389. p. 407. 
 Haight V. Holley, 3 AVend. (N. Y.) 258. p. 19. 
 Haight v. Lucia, 36 "Wis. 355. p. 139. 
 Haight V. Turner, 21 Conn. 593. pp. 1983, 
 
 1984. 
 Hailes v. Marks, 30 L. J. Exch. 389; s. c. 7 
 
 Hurl. & N. 56. pp. 1172, 1179. 
 Hailes v. State, 15 Tex. App. 94. p. 1534. 
 Haines r. Com., lOuPa. St. 317. p. 46. 
 Haines r. Haines, 35 Mich. 138. p. 151. 
 Haines v. Kent, 11 Ind. 126. pp. 214, 220, 221. 
 Haines v. Peoi)le, 97 111. 161. p. 150. 
 Haines v. Stouffer, 10 Pa. St. 363. p. 1668. 
 Haines v. Stouffer, 33 Pa. St. 541. p. 966. 
 Haines v. Territory (Wyo.), 13 Pac. Rep. 8. 
 
 p. 1801. 
 Haines v. Welch, 14 Ore. 319. p. 1109. 
 Hair v. Little, 28 Ala. 236. pp. 1651, 1679. 
 Hairo V. Wilson, 9 Barn. & Ores. 634. p. 1456. 
 Hairgrovei'. Millington,8 Kan. 480. pp.1941, 
 
 1942, 1962, 2023, 2027,2028. 
 Haish r. Mundav, 12 Bradw. (111.) 539. p. 334. 
 Haish v. Pavsoii, 107 111. 36.5. pp. .505, .510. 
 Halbert r. Halbert, 21 Mo. 277. pp. 851, 1001. 
 Haldane v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2489. pp. 6.54, 6.5S. 
 Ilaldeman v. Railroad Co., 50 Pa. St. 425. 
 
 p. 1107. 
 Hale V. Cove, Strange, 642. p. 1964. 
 Hale V. Rich, 48 Vl. 217. pp. 778, 1047. 
 Hale V. Sittingbourne &c. R. Co., 6 HurL & 
 
 X. 488; «. c. 30 L. J. (Exch.; 81. p. 1218. 
 Hale V. Taylor, 45 X. H. 40.5. pp. 344, 346. 
 Hale Man. Co. v. American Saw Co., 43 
 
 Mich. 2.50. p. 105>!. 
 Hales V. Owen, 2 Salk. 625. p. 2080. 
 
 Haley v. Case, 142 Mass. 316 ; «. c.l X. E. 
 
 Rep. 877. p. 1241. 
 Haley v. Railroad Co., 69 Mo. 614. p. 1311. 
 Haley r. State. 63 Ala. 83. pp. 421, 454, 470. 
 Halfertv r. Wabash &c. R. Co., 82 Mo. 90. 
 
 pp. 1307, 1494. 
 Halifax's Case, Bull. (N. P.) 7th ed. 298. p. 
 
 1331. 
 Hall V. Biever, I la. 113. p. 1060. 
 Hall V. Burgess, o Barn. & Cres. 3S2. p. 1003. 
 Hall r. Cheney, 36 X. H. 26. pp. 1322, 1343. 
 Hall V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 65 la. 2.58. p. 2. 
 Hall V. Coin. (Pa.), 12 All. Rep. 163; s. c. 11 
 
 Cent. Rep. 183. pp. 63, 78. 
 Hall r. Costello, 48 X. H. 176. p. 820. 
 Hall v. Cunningham, 1 Munf. (Va.)330. p. 
 
 918. 
 Hall V. Dewev, 10 Vt. .593. p. 1044. 
 Hall r. Durha'm, 10 X. East. Rop. .581. p. 1619. 
 Hall r. Flockton, 16 Ad. & El. (N. 8.) 1039. 
 
 p. 955. 
 Hall V. Fond du Lao, 42 Wis. 274. p. 1249. 
 Hal. i\ Fuller, 5 Barn. & Cres. 750. p. 1034. 
 Hall V. Gale, 20 Wi.<. 292. p. 1473. 
 Hall V. Hawkins, 5 llumpb. (Tenn.) 357. pp. 
 
 1195, 1 107. 
 Hall r. Henline, 9 Ind. 256. p. 1674. 
 Hall V. Lowell, 10 Gush. 260. p. 1247. 
 Hall r. lAIcLeod, 2 Mete. (Kv.) 98. p. 1012. 
 Hall V. Xees, 27 111. 411. p. 2063. 
 Hall V. Parsons, 17 Vt. 271. p. 1446. 
 Hall V. Patterson, 51 Pa. St. 289. p. 316. 
 Hall V. Platimer, 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500; 
 
 s. c. 5 Daly (X. Y.), 534. p. 145. 
 Hall r. Rav, 18 X. H. 126. p. 364. 
 Hall V. Rehfro, 3 Met. (Ky.) 51. pp. 806, 1343. 
 
 1667,1771,1772. 
 Hall V. Robinson, 25 la. 91. pp. 1984, 1993. 
 Hall V. Rupley, 10 Pa. St. 231. pp. 1947, 
 
 1948. 
 Hall V. Southmayd, 15 Barb. 32. p. 891. 
 Hall V. State, 40 Ala. 698. pp. 22, 35, 302, 
 
 1800. 
 Hall V. State, .51 Ala. 9. pp. 17, 19, 69, 129. 
 Hall v. State , 8 Ind. 439. pp. 1710, 1715 , 1750, 
 
 1896, 1897. 
 Hall V. suvdam, 6 Barb. (X. Y.) 84. pp. 1197, 
 
 1198, 1199. 
 Hall V. Tittabawassee Boom Co., 51 Mich. 
 
 377. p. 1148. 
 Hall V. Weare, 92 U. S. 728. p. 214. 
 Hall V. Weir, 1 Allen (Mass.), 261. p. 1698. 
 Hall r. Wheeler, 13 Ind. 371. p. 1446. 
 Hall i: Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559. pp. 705, 708, 713, 
 
 743, 761. 
 Halleck r. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574. p. 890. 
 Hallettv. Jenks, I Gaines' Gas. (X. Y.) 43. p. 
 
 2007. 
 Halliburton v. Johnson, 30 Ark. 723. p. 
 
 2093. 
 Ilalliday v. Briggs (Xeb.), 18 N. W. Rep. 55. 
 
 p. 925. 
 Hallidav v. Jones. .59 Mo. 482. p. 1598. 
 Halliday v. Sterling, 62 Mo. 321. pp. 1168, 
 
 1171. 
 Halligan v. Wade, 21 111. 470. pp. 1003, 1005. 
 Ilallock i\ Franklin, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 558. 
 
 pii. 112, 1975, 1976. 
 Halpin r. Third Avenue R. Co., 8 Jones & S. 
 
 (X. V.) 17.5. p. 207. 
 Halsey v. Sinsebaugh, 15 X. Y. 485. pp. 355, 
 
 361, 365. 
 Ham V. Goodrich, 37 X. II. 185. p. 1496. 
 Ham V. Losher, 24 Up. Can. Q. B. r)33n. 
 
 ].. 114. 
 Ham r. State, 4 Tex. App. 645. pp. 253, 1817. 
 Hamaker v. Eberly, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 506. p. 
 
 1139. 
 Ilainbleton v. Dempsey, 20 Oh. 231. p. 2009.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 Hamblett v. Hamblett, 6 N. H. 333. p. 5S5. 
 Hambley v. Trott, Cowp. 373. p. 890. 
 Hanier v. Hathawaj-, 33 Cal. 117. p. 1494. 
 Hamilton v. Bishop, 2-2 Iowa, 211. ]). 1425. 
 Haniiltou v. Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.), 475. 
 
 p. 1210. 
 Hamilton v. Burch, 28 Ind. 233. pp. 2141, 
 
 2146. 
 Hamilton v. Conyers, 25 Ga. 158. pp. 2067, 
 
 2U99. 
 Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 348. p. 1003. 
 Hamilton v. Des Moines Valley R. Co. , 36 la. 
 
 31. pp. 1964, 1965. 
 Hamilton r. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116. p. 1460. 
 Hamilton v. Glenn, 1 Pa. St. 340. pp. 1938, 
 
 1962. 
 Hamilton v. Marks, 63 Mo. 178. p. 9.i0. 
 Hamilton v. Pease, 38 Coun. 115. pp. 1913, 
 
 1921, 1922, 1923. 
 Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173. pp. 283, 
 371, 402, 409, 412, 452, 456, 457, 458, 575, 732, 
 1505, 1506, 1508, 1511, 1517. 1691, 1770, 1816. 
 Hamilton v. Rice, 15 Tex. 382. p. 3b3. 
 Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch (U. S.), 309. 
 
 pp. !440, 1669. 
 Hamilton r. Shoaff, 90 Ind. 63. p. 2038. 
 Hamilton v. State, 11 Oh. 436. p. 1566. 
 Hamilton v. State, 2 Tex. App. 194. pp. 1560. 
 Hamilton v. Taylor, Littell's Sel. Cas. (Ky.) 
 
 444. p. 294. 
 Hamlyn v. Nesbit, 37 Ind. 284. p. 219. 
 Hamm v. Romine, 98 Ind. 77. pp. 21,37, 2138. 
 Hammon v. Sexton, 69 Ind. 37. pp. 2110, 2112. 
 Hammat i-. Russ, 16 Me. 171. p. 1670. 
 Hammersley i-. Brown, 2 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 
 
 423. p. 649. 
 Hammett v. Yea, 1 Bos. & Pul. 144. p. 886. 
 Hammon v. Hopping, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 503. 
 
 p. 608. 
 Hammond v. Mukwa, 40 Wis. 35. p. 1247. 
 Hammond v. Stewart, 1 Strange, 510. p. 179. 
 Hampton r. Dean, 4 Tex. 455. p. 1672. 
 Hampton i'. Speckenagle, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 212. p. 1941. 
 Hampton v. State, 1 Tex. App. 652. p. 1835. 
 Hampton v. State, 45 Tex. 1,54. p. 4.37. 
 Hamrich v. Combs, 14 Neb. 381. p. 191. 
 Hamrick v. Danville &c. Co., 32 Ind. 347. 
 
 p. 561. 
 Hancock v. Bliss, 7 AVend. (N. Y.), 267. p. 965. 
 Hancock v. Horau, 15 Tex. 507. p. 1672. 
 Hancock v. Whybark, 66 Mo. 672. p. 871. 
 Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 
 
 Mich. 41. pp. 325, 326. 
 Hanford v. Artcher, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 272. pp. 
 
 1440, 1441. 
 Handler r. Leigh, 8 Tex. 129. pp. 1964.1966. 
 Haudliiief. State, 6Tex. App. 347. pp. 22,125. 
 Handly v. Call, 30 Me. 9. pp. 69, 1934. 
 Hanegar i\ Spangler, 29 Ga. 217. p. 188. 
 Hanev V Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156. p. 860. 
 Haney v. Caldwell, 43 Ark. 184. p. 1690. 
 Handy v. Sta^.e, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 42. p. 879. 
 Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 334. p. 1690. 
 Hanger r. Imboden, 12 Mo. 83. ii. 1937. 
 Hanks v. Neal, 44 Miss. 213. p. 1747. 
 Hanks v. State, 21 Tex. 526. pp. 103, 120. 
 Hanlon v. Ingram, 3 la. 81. p. 1210. 
 Hanlyn v. Nesbit, 37 Ind. 284. )). 239. 
 Hanna v. People, 86 111. 243. p. 23. 
 Hanna r. Phillips, 1 Grant Uas. (Pa.) 253. 
 
 pp. 849, 1412. 
 Hann;i v. Renfro, 33 Miss. 126. p. 1747. 
 Hannah v. McKellop, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 342. 
 
 p. 474. 
 Hannah v. State, 75 Tenn. (II Lea) 201. pp. 
 
 722, 1.520. 
 Hannah v. State, 1 Tex. App. 579. p. 1896. 
 Hannahau v. People, 91 111. 142. p. 1647. 
 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Fox (Kan.), 3 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 330. p. 1239. 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 590. pp. 
 
 1261, 1483. 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467. 
 
 p. 20.55. 
 Hannibal &c R. Co. v. Martin, 111 111. 225. 
 
 pp. J -288, 1483. 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 37 Mo. 338. 
 
 pu. 560, 572. 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 262. ]!. 1152. 
 Hannum v. Belchertowu, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 311. pp. 1753, 1794, 19S3. 
 Hauoff V. State, 37 Oh. St. 178; s. c. 41 Am. 
 
 Rep. 496. pp. 282, 527, 530, S'.O. 
 Hansen v. Erickson, 28 111. 257. p. 1774. 
 Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614. \>. 909. 
 Hanson v. Presbyterian Church, 11 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 441. p. 424. " 
 Happel V. Brethauer, 70 111. 166. p. 819. 
 Harbor v. Morgan, 4 Ind. 158. p. 1674. 
 Harbour v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 152. p. 1903. 
 Hardenburgh v. Crarv, 15 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 307. pp. 107, 111, 119," 123, 127. 
 Hardin v. Branner, 25 la. 364. pp. 2033, 
 
 2036. 
 Hardin v. Helton, 50 Ind. 319. p. 1726. 
 Hardin t>. Kritsinger, 17 Johns. (X. Y.) 293. 
 
 p. 609. 
 Hardin v. State, 4 Tex. App. 355. pp. 93, 
 
 565, 1811. 
 Harding v. Colburn, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 333. p. 
 
 1072. 
 Harding v. Whitney, 40 Ind. 379. pp. 124, 
 
 1990. 
 Haidly v. State, 7 Mo. 607. p. 1951. 
 Hardihan v. Bellhouse, 9 Mees. & W. 596. p. 
 
 955. 
 Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227. p. 342. 
 Hardy v. Norton, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 527. p. 
 
 1940. 
 Hardy v. Simpson, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 132. 
 
 pp. 1407, 1408, 1409, 1410. 
 Hardy v. Skinner, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 191. p. 
 
 1410. 
 Hardy r. Sprowle, 32 Me. 310. pp. 53, 117. 
 Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607. ]>. 150(5. 
 Hardy, Ex parte (Ala.), 3 Cent. L. J. 50. pp. 
 
 132. 153. 
 Hardy's Case, 24 How. St. Tr. 414. pp. 363, 
 
 1905, 1909. 
 Hare v. Henty, 30 L. J. (C. P.) 302; s. c. 10 
 
 Com. Bench (N. s.),65. p. 944. 
 Hare r. Sproul, 2 How. (Miss.) 722. p. 2097. 
 Hare v. Siate, 4 How. (Miss.) 187. pp. 387, 
 
 1904, 1921,1981. 
 Harebottle r. Placock, Cro. Jac. 21. p. 1926. 
 Harford v. Gardner, 2 Leon. 30. p. 889. 
 Haring v. New York &c. R. Co., 13 Barb. (N, 
 
 Y. ) 9. p. 1230. 
 Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372. 
 
 p. 937. 
 Harkins v. State, 6 Tex. App. 452. p. 81. 
 Harlan v. Railroad Co., 65 Mo. 26. p. 1305. 
 Harlan r. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 480; 
 
 s. c. 2 Thomp. Neg. 439. p. 1235. 
 Harmon v. Shotwell, 49 Mo. 423. p. 1707. 
 Harmon v. Thornton, 3 111. 351. p. .560. 
 Harner'8 Ai)peal, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 473. p. 
 
 2057. 
 Harness v. State, 57 Ind. 1. pp. 372, 552. 
 Harnett r. Harnett, 59 la. 401. jip. 2068, 2093. 
 Harnev f. Owen, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 337. pp. 
 
 S8S, 895. 
 Harper v. Burrow, 6 Ired. L. (N. C.) 30. p. 
 
 265. 
 Harper V. Calhoun, 7 How. (Miss.) 203. p. 
 
 1023.
 
 Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Harper t'. Farmers' &c. Bank, 7 Watts & S. 
 
 (Pa.) 204. p. 1941. 
 Harper v. Harper, 57 Ind. .547. p. 37'2. 
 Harper v. Keen, 11 Serg. & K. (Pa.) '280. pp. 
 
 69, 71, 838. 
 Harper v. Lamping, 3.3 Cal. (Ul. p. 392. 
 Harperi'. Lexington &c. R.Co., 2Daua(Kv.), 
 
 227. p. 697. 
 Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365. p. 1248. 
 Harper v. Minor, 27 Cal. 108. p. 2094. 
 Harper v. State, 101 lud. 109. pp. 1776, 2092. 
 Harper r. Smith, 1 Cranch 0. 0. (U. S.) 495. 
 
 p. 1669. 
 Harriman v. Boston, 114 Mass. 241. p. 1249. 
 Harrimau v. Queen Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 71. pp. 
 
 •2030, '2042. 
 Harrimau v. Wilkins, '20 Me. 93. p. 1939. 
 Harring r. Allen, '25 Mich. 505. pp. 1009. 
 Harrington v. Latta, 36 N. W. Rep. 364. p. 
 
 2050. 
 Harrington v. Lincoln, 3 Gray (Mass.), 133. 
 
 p. 449. 
 Harringtons. Lincoln, 4 Gray (Mass.), 563. 
 
 p. 472. 
 Harrington v. Snyder, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 380. 
 
 p. 1328. 
 Harrington v. State, 76 Ind. 112. p. 1977. 
 Harris v. Bishop of Lincoln, 2 P. Wms. 137. 
 
 p. 841. 
 Harris v. Butterly, Cowp. 483. 1584. 
 Harris v. Central R. Co. (Ga.),3N. East. Rep. 
 
 355. p. 378. 
 Harris v. Davis, 1 Chit. 6-25n. p. 2003. 
 Harris v. Doe, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 369. pp. 825, 
 
 827, 1750. 
 Harris v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 37 Mo. 308. 
 
 p. 1607. 
 Harris v. Lee, 80 Mo. 420. p. 1708. 
 Harris v. Miner, '28 111. 135. p. 1669. 
 Harris v. North Ind. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 232. p. 
 
 1343. 
 Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264. pp. 1319, 
 
 1337, 1361. 
 Harris v. Panama R. Co., 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 312. 
 
 p. 566. 
 Harris v. Ray, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 628. p. 2071. 
 Harris v. Robinson, 4 How. (U. S.) 336. p. 
 
 942. 
 Harris v. Rosenberg, 43 Conn. 227. p. 336. 
 Harris v. Shaffer, 92 N. C. 30. p. 2. 
 Harris v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 23 Mo. App. 
 
 328. p. 2087. 
 Harris v. State, 30 Ind. 131. p. 471. 
 Harris v. State, 6 Tex. App. 97. pp. 17, 30. 
 Harris v. State, 13 Tex. App. .309. p. 1855. 
 Harris v. State, 44 Tex. 146. p. 313. 
 Harris r. Tippett, 2 Camp. 637. pp. 396,416. 
 Harris v. Wall, 7 How. (U. S.) 693. p. 572. 
 Harris v. Wilson, 7 Wend. (X. Y.) 57. pp. 
 
 414, 547, 804. 
 Harris v. Woody,' 9 Mo. 11.3. pp. 1507,1597, 
 
 16'20, 1621, 16'24. 
 Harrisburg Bank v. Foster, 8 Watts (Pa.), 
 
 304. p. 59. 
 Harrison v. Brooks, 20 Ga. 537. p. 1394. 
 Harrison v. Cachelin, 27 Mo. 26. pp. 1668, 
 
 1669, 167'2. 
 Harrison v. Davies, 23 La. Ann. 216. p. 968. 
 Harrison v. Hance, 37 Mo. 185. pp. 1506, 
 
 1951. 
 Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore P. C. 96. pp. 
 
 646, 649, 650. 
 Harrison v. Lockwood , 14 Nev. 263. p. 2099. 
 Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 527. 
 
 pp. 353, 361. 
 Harrison v. Park, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 170, 
 
 pp. 703, 725. 
 Harrison v. Price, 22 Ind. 165. pp. 1920. 
 
 1974, 2141. 
 
 Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 580. p. 392. 
 Harrison r. Rowan, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 32. 
 
 pp. 19-26, 1972. 
 Harrison v. Sparrow, 3 Curt. Ecc. 1 ; s. c 7 
 
 Eng. Ecc. 3.57. pp. 646. 650. 
 Harrison v. Spring Valley Ilvdraulic Gold 
 
 Co., 65 Cal. 376. pp. 1683, 1751. 
 Harrison v. St. Mark's Church, 12 Phila, 
 
 (Pa.) 259. p. 1383. 
 Harrison v. State, 35 Ark. 458. pp. 146, 151. 
 Harrison v. State, 3 Tex. App. 558. pp. 16, 
 
 20. 
 Harrison v. State, 6 Tex. App. 42. p. 1855. 
 Harrison v. State, 8 Tex. App. 183. pp. 1873, 
 
 1874. 
 Harrison v. State, 9 Tex. App. 407. p. 1873. 
 Harrison v. State, 16 Tex. App. 325. p. 389. 
 Harrison v. State, 17 Tex. App. 442. p. 1779. 
 Harrison v. Young, 9 Ga. 3.59. pp. 1711, 1762. 
 Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn. 202. ]). 422. 
 Harrison's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 861. pp. 
 
 472, 484. 
 Harriss v. Guin, 10 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 563. 
 
 p. 1060. 
 Hart V. Boiler, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 162. pp. 
 
 955 958. 
 Hart'i'. Bray, 50 Ala. 446. p. 1689. 
 Hart V. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 226. p. 
 
 r249. 
 Hart V. Girard, 56 Pa. St. 23. pp. 1019, 1746. 
 Hart V. Heilner, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 407. pp. 
 
 293, 805. 
 Hart V. Hud.son, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 294. p. 952. 
 Hart V. Kimball, 72 Cal. 283 ;s. c. 13 Pac. Rep. 
 
 852. p. 2085. 
 Hart V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331. 
 
 p. 1360. 
 Hart V. Rector, 7 Mo. 531. p. 1592. 
 Hart V. Red Cedar, 63 Wis. 634. p. 2043. 
 Hart V. State, 57 Ind. 102. pp. 74, 1566, 1697. 
 Hart V. State, 14 Xeb. 572. p. 707. 
 Hart V. State, 21 Tex. App. 16.3. p. 1756. 
 Hart V. Tallmadge, 3 Day (S. C), 381. p. 35. 
 Hart V. Wall, 2 C. P. Div. 146. p. 1453. 
 Hart Mfg. Co. v. Mann's Boudoir Car Co. 
 
 (Mich.), 32 N. W. Rep. 820. p. 2030. 
 Ilarter r. Seaman, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 27. pp. 
 
 1910, 1911. 
 Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 615 ; s. c. 
 
 2 Thomp. Neg. 221. pp. 1'231, 1232, 1605. 
 Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. p. 1803. 
 Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 JNIass. 93. p. 1022. 
 Hartford Bank v. Hart. 3 Day (Conn.), 491. 
 
 pp. 53, 82. 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 
 
 502. p. 805. 
 Hartley v. Chidester, 36 Kan. 363; s. c. 13 Pac. 
 
 Rep. "578. p. 2046. 
 Hartley v. Cummins, 5 C. B. 248. p. 891. 
 Hartshorn v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 52 Iowa, 
 
 613. p. 1500. 
 Hartshorn v. Gelston, 3 Caines (N. Y.),84. 
 
 p. 7. 
 Hartnett v. Garvev, 66 N. Y. 641. p. 507. 
 Hartz v. Com., 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 359. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Hartzell v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 462. pp. 42, 92. 
 Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319. p. 878. 
 Harvey v. Ellithorpe, '26 111, 418. pp. 221, 
 
 222. 
 Harvey v. Hewitt, 8 Dowl. P. C. 598. pp. 1966, 
 
 1067. 
 Harvey v. Huston, 94 Ind. 527. pp. .563, 2090. 
 Harvey v. Jones, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 157. pp. 
 
 1964, 1992. 
 Harvey v. Mitchell, 2 Mood. & R. 366. p. 
 
 615. 
 Harvey v. Osborne, 55 Ind. .535. pp. 322, 577.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Harvev v. Rickctt, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 87. p. 
 
 ]9(i4." 
 Haivey v. Rose, 26 Ark. 3. p. 1369. 
 Harvey v. bkipwith, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 405. p. 
 
 ]'i70. 
 Harvev v. Smith, 55 111. 2-25. p. 1036. 
 H;.rveV v. State, 40 Ind. 516. pp. 357, 568, 
 
 T2', 732, 786. 1520, 1694. 
 Harvev v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147. p. 1410. 
 Harvey v. Terre Haute &c. R. Co., 74 Mo. 
 
 538. p. 1361. 
 Harvey v. Tvler, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 328. pp. 
 
 1708, 1740, 1956. 
 Haselmton v. Gill, 3 T. R. 620. p. 1440. 
 Haseltine v. Ausherman, 87 Mo. 410. p. 
 
 1412. 
 Haseltine v. Simpson, 61 Wis. 427. p. 2101. 
 Haskell v. Beckec, 3 Me. 92. p. 1990. 
 Haskell V. Champion, 30 Mo. 136. pp. 1031, 
 
 1032. 
 Haskett v. State, 51 Ind. 176. p. 14.5. 
 Haskiiigs v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 58 Mo. 302. 
 
 pp. 1669, 1671. 
 Haslack v. Mavers, 26 X. J. L. 284. p. 893. 
 Hassa r. Junger, 15 Wis. 598. \>. 1229. 
 Hasselback v. Sinton, 11 Ind. 545. pp. 2108, 
 
 2111. 
 Hasselmeyer v. State, 1 Tex. App. 690. p. 
 
 no. 
 
 Hassfeldt v. Dill, 28 Minn. 469. p. 1413. 
 Hassler v. Schumacher, 10 Wis. 419. p. 777. 
 Hastiuffs V. Bangor House Proprietors, IS 
 
 Me. 437. p. 1754. 
 Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 214. 
 
 p. 925. 
 Hastings r. Lusk, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 410. p. 
 
 795. 
 Hastings v. Palmer, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 225. 
 
 p. 307. 
 Hastings r. Pepper, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 41. pp. 
 
 1322, 1343, 1365, 1366, 1367. 
 Hastings &c. R. Co. v. Ingalls, 15 Neb. 123. 
 
 p. 2091. 
 Hatch V. Bayley, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 27. pp. 
 
 90S, 920. 
 Hatch V. Fowler, 28 Mich. 205. p. 912. 
 Hatch V. Mann, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 262. pp. 
 
 1902, 1904. 
 Hatch V. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124. p. 910. 
 Hatch r. Potter, 2 Gilm. (111.) 725. p. 372. 
 Hatch V. Spearin, 11 Me. 354. p. 1698. 
 Hatch V. State, S Tex. App. 416. pp. 747, 750, 
 
 752, 758, 760. 
 Hatch ell v. Odom, 2 Dev. & Batt. (X. C.) 
 
 302. p. 1585. 
 Hatcher v. Fowler, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 337. p. 108. 
 Hatcher v. Moore, 51 Mo. 115. p. 2052. 
 Hatcher v. State, 18 Ga. 460. p. 748. 
 Hatlield v. Cheanev, 76 111. 488. p. 1947. 
 Hatfield v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 61 la. 440. 
 
 pp. 1261, 1802. 
 Hatfield v. St. Paul &c. R. Co. (Minn.), 22 X. 
 
 W. Hep. 176; s. c. ,32 Minn. 130. j). 6.56. 
 Hatrtel,.; v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., IS Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. R. Cas. 292. p. 654. 
 Hathaway v. Brown, 18 Minn. 414. p. 344. 
 Hathaway u. Crocker, 7 Mete. 262, p. 375. 
 Hathaway v. Crosby, 17 Me. 448. pp. 1748, 
 
 1749. 
 Hathaway v. Helmer, 25 Barb. (X". Y.) 29. 
 
 pp. 59,112. 
 Hathaway a. Hemingway, 20 Conn. 195. 
 
 p. 307. 
 Hathaway v. Xational Life Insurance Co., 
 
 48Vt. 336. pp. 505, 515. 
 Hathaway v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 46 Ind. 25. 
 
 p. 1224. 
 Hathorn v. King. 8 Mass. 371. p. 497. 
 Hathorn v. Stinson, 10 Me. 224. p. 1670. 
 
 Hatton V. Robinson, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 416. p. 
 
 272. 
 Hauii V. Wilson. 28 Ind. 296. pp. 1983, 1984, 
 
 1990. 
 Haupt V. Pohlman, 16 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 301. p. 
 
 1693. 
 Hauser v. Com., 5 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 668. 
 
 p. 68. 
 Haussknecht v. Clayi^ool, 1 Black (U. S.), 
 
 431. p. 554. 
 Havemeyer i'. Ingersoll, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 
 
 301. p. 580. 
 Haven r. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130. p. 820. 
 Havis V. Tavlor, 13 Ala. 324. p. 566. 
 Hawes r. Gu8tin,2 Allen (Mass.), 402. pp.55,' 
 
 316, 385. 
 Hawkes v. Kennebeck, 7 Mass. 461. p. 55. 
 Hawkes v. Salter, 4Bing. 715; s. c. 1 Moore & 
 
 P. 750. p. 944. 
 Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. 290. p. 889. 
 Hawkes v. Smith, i Car. & M. 72. pp. 1321, 
 
 1345. 
 Hawkins v. Andrews, 39 Ga. 118. p. 119. 
 Hawkins v. Carbines, 3 Hurl. & N. 914. p. 
 
 11.58. 
 Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill (X. Y.),586. pp. 
 
 1157, 1330. 
 Hawkins v. New Orleans PrintingCo., 29 La. 
 
 Ann. 134. pp. 1922, 1923, 1924. 
 Hawkins v. Xye, 59 Tex. 98. p. 1080. 
 Hawkins v. Pleasants, 71 N. C. 325. p. 416. 
 Hawkins i\ State, 9 Ala. 137. p. 40. 
 Hawkins r. State, 13 Ga. 322. p. 41. 
 Hawks V. Baker, 6 Me. 72. p. 329. 
 Hawks V. Crofton, 2 Burr. 700. p. 2011. 
 Hawley i\ Chicago &c. R. Co., 71 la. 717: s. c. 
 
 29 N. W. Rep. 787. p. 1632. 
 Hawthorn v. State, 58 Miss. 778. p. 1791. 
 Hav V. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159. p. 1316. 
 Hay V. Ousterout, 3 Oh. 384. p. 2003. 
 Havcroft V. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 2 Hun (N. 
 
 Y".),489. p. 1209. 
 Haycroft v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 64 N. Y. 
 
 636. pp. 1209, 1218. 
 Hayden v. Johnson, 59 Ga. 105. p. 2062. 
 Hayden r. Long, S Ore. 244. p. 127. 
 Havden v. Madison, 7 Me. 78. p. 892. 
 Hayden v. Suiithville Man. Co., 29 Conn. 548. 
 
 p. 1210. 
 Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42 ; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 
 
 1. p. 1750. 
 Havden r. Woods, 16 Neb. 306. p. 2058. 
 Haves v. Acre, Com. & M. 19. p. 891. 
 Hayes v. Caldwell, 10 111. 333. p. 261. 
 Haves v. Cheatham, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 2. pp. 
 
 485, 489. 
 Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121. p. 150, 
 Haves v. Reg., 10 Irish L. 53. p. 35. 
 Haves v. State, 68 Ga. 35. pp. 205, 1650, 1653, 
 
 1658. 
 Hayes r. Thompson, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) (ST. 
 
 S.)220. pp. 118, 123. 
 Hayes v. Warren, 2 Strange, 933. p. 889. 
 Haymondu. Saucer,84 Ind. 3. pp. 1492, 1776. 
 Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & P. 599. p. 944. 
 Haynes r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 
 
 18. p. 2092. 
 Haynes v. Crutchfield, 7 Ala. 189. p. 85. 
 Haynes v. Hunsicker, 26 Pa. St. 58. p. 80.5. 
 Haynes v. Ledyard, 33 Mich. 319. pp. 376, 
 
 385, 388. 
 Haynes v. State, 2 Tex. App. 84. p. 1744. 
 Havnes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38. p. 1911. 
 HaVnie r. Baylor, 18 Tex. 498. p. 1109. 
 Hays r. Bell, 16 :Mo. 496. pp. 1598, 1600. 
 Hays r. Ford, 55 Ind. 52. p. 136. 
 Hays V. Gallagher, 72 Pa. St. 136. pp. 1222, 
 
 1225. 
 Hays I'. Hayman, 20 La. Ann. 336. p. 1195.
 
 Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Havs V. Havs, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 419. pp. 
 
 n22, 1124. 
 Havs r. Keuuedv, 41 Pa. St. 378. pp. 1318, 
 
 13'22, 134f;, 1347, ii^r,, 1S58. 
 Havs V. McKoe,2 Hlackf. (Ind.) 11. p. 2107. 
 Havsr. Richardson, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 366. p. 
 
 205. 
 Ha.\ ward v. Bath, 38 X. H. 1S2. p. 344. 
 Havward v. Kuapp, 22 Minn. 5. pp. 695, 
 
 ifXi'.l. 
 
 Ilayward r. LeBaron, 4 Fla. 404. p. 886. 
 Havward r. I^eoiiard, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 181; s. 
 
 c. 19 Am. Dec. 2(;8. p. 892. 
 Havward r. Peoi.le, 90 111. 492. p. 532. 
 Hayward i-. Callioun, 2 Oh. St. 164. p. 05. 
 Havwood r. Harman, 17 111. 477. \<. 1141. 
 Hazard i-. Chicago &c. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S.) 
 
 503. p. 1284. 
 Hazard Powder Co. r. Viergutz, 6 Kan. 471. 
 
 pp. 2034, 2036, 2041, 2124. 
 Hazi'ltine r. Stinipson, Wis. 61 427. p. 2097. 
 Hazeltou v. Case, 46 AVis. 392. p. 1380. 
 Hazzard v. Citizens' Bank, 72 Ind. 130. p. 
 
 1647. 
 Heacock v. Hosmer, 109 111. 245. p. 2. 
 Heacock v. Lubukee, 108 III. 641. i)p. 2, 3. 
 Heacock v. State, 13 Tex. App. 97. p. 59. 
 Head r. Langworthy, 15 la. 235. pp. 1727, 
 
 1728, 1948. 
 Head v. Sleeper, 20 Me. 314. p. 1604. 
 Head v. State, 44 Mis.s. 731. pp. 81, 1747. 
 Headen v. Womack, 88 N. C. 468. p. 1061. 
 Headrick v. AVisehart, 57 Ind. 129. p. 2066. 
 Heady v. Fishburn, 3 Neb. 263. p. 2097. 
 IleadV r. Vevay Turnp. Co., 52 Ind. 117. pp. 
 
 679,"681. 
 Ileaffer r. Xew Era Life Ins. Co., 101 Pa. St. 
 
 178. p. 624. 
 Heagv r. State, 85 Ind. 260. pp. 721, 1520. 
 Ileald V. Thing, 45 Me. 392. pp. 495, 497, 
 
 498. 
 Heard v. Pierce, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 338. pp. 
 
 i;57, 142, 171, 187. 
 Heard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 1. p. 1962. 
 TIr;irn v. Greenslnirgh, 51 Ind. 119. p. 55. 
 lii'arn v. Kiehl, 3S Pa. St. 147. p. 955. 
 Ilearn v. Tenuant, 14 Ves. 136. p. 167. 
 Hearue v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 
 
 482. p. 1223. 
 Hcarsav v. Pruyn, 7 Johns. (X. Y.) 179. p. 
 
 1625. 
 Ilcarsomr. Grandine,87 111. 115. p. 2069. 
 Heartt v. Rhodes, 66 111. 351. p. 1647. 
 Ueaston v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 
 
 275. p. 128. 
 Heath v. Biddle, 9 Pa. St. 273. pp. 1065, 1066. 
 Heath v. Com., 1 Rob. (Va.) 735. p. 123. 
 Heath v. Conwav, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 398. pp. 
 
 1965, 1966, 1983, 1984, 2096. 
 Heath V. Cook, 7 Allen (Mass.), 59. p. 886. 
 Heath v. Randall, 4 Cush. (Ma.ss.), 195. p. 
 
 916. 
 Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 4.57. p. ,368. 
 Heberd v. Wines, 105 Ind. 237. p. 2102. 
 Heckelman r. Rup)), Sa Ind. 286. p. 2014. 
 Uecker v. noi)kius, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301, 
 
 n. pp. 218, 220. 
 Hecker v. Sterling, 36 Pa. St. 423. p. 1089. 
 Hector r. Knox, 63 Tex. 61i5. ])p. 1015, 1016. 
 Hedges i\ Hudson River &c. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 
 
 223. p. 1143. 
 Hedges V. Williams, 33 Hun (X. Y.), 546. p. 
 
 .'570. 
 Ilecrdt V. Wetmore, 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 697. p. 
 
 181. 
 Ileirncr v. ^fov.st, 40'Oh. St. 112. p. 20.'j8. 
 lletfner v. Wenrich, .32 I'a. St. 423. p. 1031. 
 Helfron r. (iallnpe, r,n Mc. 563. pp. 1921, 
 1923, 1939, 1943, 1954, 1969. 
 
 Heffron v. State, 8 Fla. 73. pp. 215, 234. 
 Hefner v. Palmer, 67 111. 161. pp. 1099, 1100. 
 Hege V. Xewson, 96 Ind. 426. p. 1715. 
 Hegeman r. We.-^lern R. Corp., 13 N. Y. 9; 
 
 s. c. Tliomi). Carr. Pass. 16(). p. 1238. 
 Ileil r. (ilandinir, 42 Pa. St. 493. p. 1223. 
 Ileilner r. liattin. 27 Pa. St. 517. p. 324. 
 Heihnan r. Shanklin, 6l) Ind. 424. p. 218. 
 Heimann r. Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Wis. 
 
 .'■)62. p. 11.50. 
 Heine v. Morrison, 13 Mo. App. 577. p. 2089. 
 Heinicke r. (;rillith,29 Kan. 516. j). 14.57. 
 Ileinleu ?•. Heilhron, 71 Cal. 557. \<. 2(IS5. 
 Ileirn v. IsrcCaughan, .32 Miss. 17. p. 1647. 
 Heise's Case, 44 -Md. 456. p. 313. 
 Hei.ser i'. Van Dyke, 27 la. 359. pp. 1906, 
 
 1910. 
 Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.). 407. p. 
 
 1209. 
 Ilelbrion v. State, 2 Tex.. App. 637. p. 1744. 
 Ileldt r. State, 30 X. W. Rep. 626; s. c. 20 
 
 Xeb. 492. pp. 775, 1S4.'5. 
 Heller v. English, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 486. 
 
 p. 1997. 
 Hellmau r. Holladav, Woolw. .365. p. 1151. 
 Helm V. Cantrell, 59'lll. 525. p. 348. 
 Helm V. Coffey, 80 Ky. 176. p. 2053. 
 Uelmholz v. Everiugham, 24 Wis. 266. p. 
 
 090 
 
 Helnis r. Chadbourne, 48 Wis. 690. p. 2098. 
 Helms r. Howard, 2 llarr. & McH. (Md.) 76. 
 
 p. 1046. 
 Ilelser v. McGrath, 52 Pa. St. 531. p. 387. 
 Hemiug v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 35 Mo. 408. 
 
 p. 4. 
 Hemingway r. Garth, 51 Ala. 530. p. 444. 
 Hem me v. School Dist., 30 Kan. 377. p. 
 
 2075. 
 Ilemmer v. Wolfcr, 11 N. East. Rep. 88.5. p. 
 
 1741. 
 Hempstead v. Stone, 2 Mo. 65. p. 2055. 
 Henck v. Todhunter, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 275. 
 
 p. 796. 
 Hendel r. Berks &c. Tp. Road, 16 Serg. &R. 
 
 (Pa.) 92. pp. 1938, 1942. 
 Henderson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 48 Iowa, 
 
 220. p. 1309. 
 Henderson v. Aliens, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 235. 
 
 p. 2009. 
 Henderson f. Dickey, 76 Ind. 264. pp.2008, 
 
 2014. 
 Henderson v. Fox, 5 Ind. 489. p. 1157. 
 Henderson v. Henderson, 55 Mo. 534. p. 
 
 2055. 
 Henderson v. Hydraulic Works, 9 Phlla. 
 
 (Pa.) 100. pp. 386, 387. 
 Henderson v. Jones, 10 Serg. & R. 322. pp. 
 
 482, 485, 487. 
 Henderson v. Mabey, 13 Ala. 715. p. 1408. 
 Henderson v. Mears, 1 Fost. & Fin. 636. 
 
 •p. 1(104. 
 Henderson v. Mcrritt, 38 Ga. 232. p. 324. 
 llender.sou v. Slate, 70 Ala. 29. )>. 434. 
 Henderson r. Slate, 1 Tex. Apj). 432. pp. 
 
 414,437, 1777. 
 Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc. ) 
 
 470. j>. 13(;5. 
 llendrick v. Com., 5 Leigh (Va.), 707. pp. 
 
 89, 100. 
 Ilendriekson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379. pp. 
 
 1479, 1964, 1968, 1993. 
 Ilendriekson v. Walker, 32 Mich. 68. p. 2052. 
 liendrix v. Heinian, 90 hid. il9. p. 2110. 
 Henley v. .\rbuckle, 13 Mo. 209. p. 2003. 
 JlenleV v. Mavor, 6 Ping. 100. p. 201)3. 
 Henlow v. Leonard, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 200. p. 
 
 1917. 
 llennan r. Lester, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 776; s c 
 9 Jur. (X. 8.) 601. p. 1749.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 Hennies v. Vogel, 87 111. 242. pp. 248, 728, 
 
 747, 753. 
 Henric v. State, 41 Tex. 573. p. 124. 
 Henrv v. Hassett, 'h Mo. 90. p. 1061. 
 Henrv v. Cuvillier, 3 3Iart. (La.) (N. S.) 524. 
 
 p. 120 
 Henrv v. Davis, 7 W. Val 715. pp. 1664, 1682. 
 Henrv v. Jones, 1 Idaho T. 38. p. 1670. 
 HenrV v. Lee, 18 Eng. C. L. 273 (2 Chit. Rep. 
 
 124)'. p 353. 
 Henry v. Ricketts, 1 Crunch 0. C. (U. S.) 545. 
 
 p. 1973. 
 Henry v. Sioux Citv &c. R. Co. (Iowa), 30 
 
 N. VV^ Rep. 630. p^ 747. 
 Henrv v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 183. 
 
 p. 1221. 
 Henry v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 76 Mo. 288. p. 
 
 1222. 
 Henry v. State, 33 Ala. 389. p. 22. 
 Henrv v. State, 77 Ala. 75. p. 114. 
 Henrv v. State, 33 (ia. 441. p. 103. 
 Henry v. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 270. p, 
 
 129. 
 Henry v. State, 9 Tex. App. 359. p. 1746. 
 Henrv County Turnpiice Co. t'. .Jaclvson, 86 
 
 Ind". Ill ; s. c. 44 Am. Kep. 274. p. 1278. 
 Henschen v. <>'Bannon, 56 Mo. 289. pp 
 
 16!52, 1686, 1756. 
 Hensgen v. Donnelly, 24 Mo. App. 398. p 
 
 1673. 
 Henshaw v. Robins. 9 Mete. (Mass.) 83. p 
 
 925. 
 Hensley v. Peck, 13 Mo. 587. p. 1588. 
 Henson r. King,3 Jones L. (N. C.) 419. p 
 
 927. 
 Henson v. Veach, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 370. p 
 
 1467. 
 Heuwood V. Cheeseman, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 500. p. 891. 
 Herbert v. Butler, 97 U. S. 319. pp. 1605, 1625. 
 Herbert v. Ford, 33 Me. 90. p. 855. 
 Herl)ert v. Ilenrick, 16 Ala. 581. p. 1044. 
 Herbert v. Huie, 1 Ala. IS. p. 1698. 
 Herbert v. Shaw, 11 Mod. 118. p. 1976. 
 Herdic v. Bigler, 47 Pa. St. 60. p. 1668. 
 Herman t>. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 182. p. 1031. 
 He^ndon v. Bradshaw, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 45. p. 
 
 Herndon r. Bryant, 39 Miss. 336. p. 1668. 
 Herndon i'. Given.s, 16 Ala. 26L p. 329. 
 Herndon r. Givens, 19 Ala. 313. p. 966. 
 Hernsheim v. Babcock (Tex.), 2 S. W. Rep. 
 
 880. p. 343. 
 Herpel v. Malone, 56 iNIich. 199. p. 1077. 
 Herrick v. Smitli, 13 Hun (N. Y.), 446. p. 486. 
 Herrick v. Swomlcy, 66 Md. 439. pp. 385, 388. 
 Herriman r. Shoman, 24 Kan. 387; s. c. 36 
 
 Am. Rep 261. p. 191. 
 Herring v. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 10 Ired. 
 
 (N. C.) 402. p. 1235. 
 Herrington v. Bradford, Walker (Miss.), 
 
 520. p. 829. 
 Herrman v. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 162. p. S81. 
 Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847. pp. 55, 
 
 125. 
 Heskew v. State, 17 Tex. App. 161. p. 37. 
 He.9lop V. Chapman, 23 L. J. (Q. B.) 49. p. 
 
 1165. 
 Hess V. Frankenfleld, 106 Pa. St. 440. p. 956. 
 Hess V. AVileox, 58 Iowa, 380. p. 311. 
 Hess V. Young, 59 Ind. 379. p. 1431. 
 Hesse v. Missouri Ac Ins. Co., 21 Mo. 93. 
 
 pp. 1.589, 1,590. 
 Hessing v. McCloskey, 37 111. 341. p. 1669. 
 Hessong v. Presslev,'86 Ind. 555. p. 2010. 
 Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. St. 139. pp. 414, 487. 
 Hester v. State, 17 (ia. 146. pp. 1983, 1986. 
 Hewettr. Buck, 17 Me. 147. p. 559. 
 Hewett V. Cobb, 40 Miss. 61. p. 128. 
 
 Hewitt V. Flint &c. R. Co. (Mich.), 11 W. Rep. 
 
 148. p. 1724. 
 Hewitt V. Jones, 72 HI. 218. p. 1750. 
 Hewitt V. Pioneer Press Co., 23 Minn. 178. 
 
 p. 1979. 
 Hewitt V. ^Veek, 51 Wis. .368. p. 201. 
 Hewlett V. Brown, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 655. p. 
 
 185. 
 Hewson v. Tootle, 72 Mo. 632. pp. .1410, 
 
 1437. 
 Hey V. Com., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 946. pp. 253, 
 
 257. 
 Heyl V. State (Ind.), 10 N^orth East. Rep. 916; 
 
 s. c. 109 Ind. 589. pp. 81, 765, 772. 
 Hevwood r. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428; s. c. 
 
 43 L. J. (Q. B.) 145. p. 945. 
 Hevwood V. Reed, 4 Gray (Mass.), 574. pp. 
 
 471.473. 
 Hiljbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54. p. 570. 
 Hibbard v. Russell, 16 N. H. 410. p. 346. 
 Hibblewhite v. McMorine,5 Mees. & W. 462. 
 
 p. 882. 
 Hibler v. McCartney, 31 Ala. 501. pp. 1669, 
 
 lii81. 
 Hiljler v. Servoss, 6 Mo. 24. p. 1617. 
 Hickevv. Boston &c. R. Co., 14 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 429. pp. 1224, 1235. 
 
 Hickey v. Ryan, 15 Mo. 63. pp. 801, 1506. 
 Hickey, Ex parte, 4Sm. & M. (Mis^.) 751. p. 
 
 biO. 
 Hickok V. Farmers' &c. Bank, 35 Vt. 476. p. 
 
 1022. 
 Hickox V. Xaugatuck R. Co., 31 Conn. 281. p. 
 
 1151. 
 Hicks V. Bailey. 16 Tex. 229. p. 1670. 
 Hicks V. Buriiaus, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 243. p. 
 
 900. 
 Hicks r. Chaffee, 13 Hun (X. Y.), 293. p. 1246. 
 Hicks r. Davis, 4 Oal. 67. p. 1040. 
 Hicks v. Klli.s. (iS Mo. 176. j). 1980. 
 Hicks V. Faulkner, 51 L. J. (Q. B.) 268. pp. 
 
 1167, 1168, 1169. 
 Hicks v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 68 Mo. 330. p. 
 
 1290. 
 Hicks V. Pacific R. R., 65 Mo. 34 ; s. c. 64 Mo. 
 
 430. pp. 1225, 1257. 
 
 Hicks V. State, 5 Tex App. 488. p. 24. 
 Hicks V. Stone, 13 Minn. 434. p. 431. 
 Jligliee V. Moore, 66 Ind. 263. p. 2110. 
 Higdon V. Higdon, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 48. 
 
 pp. 215. 228, 230. 
 Higgiusr. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. 482 
 
 p. 1285 
 Higgins r. Lee, 16 111. 495. pp. 2048,2051. 
 Iliggins V. McCrea,116 U. S. 671. pp. 823, 
 
 825 
 Iligginson v. Fabre, 3 Desau. 88. p. 899. 
 Higg.^^ !• Mavnard, 12 Jur. (N. S.)705;s c. 
 
 1 flarr. & Ruth. 581. p. 1222. 
 High V. Johnson, 28 Wis. 72. pp. 1910, 1912. 
 Higliam^r. Gault, 15 Hun (X. Y.), 383. p. 
 
 399. ^ 
 
 Hight r. Langdon, 53 Ind. 81. p. 21. 
 High tower v. Hawthorn, 1 Hempst. (V. S.) 
 
 42. p. 796. 
 Higley r. Lannt, 3 Mich. 612. p. 1060. 
 IlillH.^^h V. Hilbish, 71 Ind. 30. p. 904. 
 Ilildeburu v. Curreu, 65 Pa. St. 59. p. 414. 
 Hildreth v. Trov, 101 X. Y. 234; s. c. 54 Am. 
 
 Rep. 6S6. J). 128. 
 Ilill r. Alexander, 77 Mo. 296. p. 2052. 
 Hill r. Cantield, 56 Pa. St. 458. p. 1670. 
 Hill r. Covell, 1 X. Y. 522. pp. 2007, 2008, 
 
 2009. 
 Hill r. Crandall, 52 111. 70. p. 141. 
 Hill r. Doaver, 7 Mo. 57. p. 2065.' 
 Hill i: Gittings, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 112. p. 
 
 .561. ^ 
 
 Hill V. Grange, Plowd. 173. p. 1128. 
 
 6a
 
 Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hill V. Gnst, 45 Ind. 45. p. 437. 
 
 Hill r. Hobart, 16 Me. 164. pp. Ill", 1122. 
 
 Hill V. Hollo«-ay, r)2 la. 676. p. 2119. 
 
 Hill V. Mason, 7 Joues L. (N. C.) 551. p. 
 
 10S4. 
 Hill V. New Haven, :17 Vt. 501. p. 1225. 
 Hill V. Nichols. .50 .Ma. 3:56. p. 1761. 
 Hill V. Palm, 38 Mo. 22. pp. 1180, 1194, 1195, 
 
 1198. 
 Hill V. People, 16 Mich. 351. pp. 5, 6, 121. 
 Hill i: Perrv, 82 Ind. 28. pp. 214, 215, 238. 
 Hill V. Portland &c. R. Cfo., 55 Me. 439. pp. 
 
 505, 514. 
 Hill V. Kucker, 14 Ark. 706. p. 1585. 
 Hill V. State, 64 Ga. 454. pp. 1509, 1913, 1984, 
 
 1998. 
 Hill V. State, 22 Tex. App. 579. p. 1746. 
 Hill r. .^tate, 17 Wis. 67.5. p. 353. 
 Hill V. .state, 2 Yery. (Tenn.) 246. p. 40. 
 Hill I'. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 329. pp. 571, 1321, 
 
 1.345. 
 Hill r. Sutton, 8 Mo. App. 353. p. 811. 
 Hill V. Tissier, 15 Mo. App. 299. p. 1092. 
 Hill V. Ward, 7 111. 2S5. )). 1G69. 
 Hill V. Weisler,49 Cal. 146. p. 2087. 
 Hill V. Wilkins, 4 Mo. App. 86. p. 2065. 
 Hill r. Yates, 8 Taunt. 182. pp. 1172, 1173. 
 Hill V. Yates, 2 J. P.. Moore, 80. p. 1181. 
 Hill, Ex parte, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 355. p. 1906. 
 Hill's Case, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 595. pp. 1579, 
 
 1891. 
 Hiller v. Sharon Springs, 28 Han (N. Y.}, 
 
 344. p. 653. 
 Hilllard v. Beattie, 59 N. H. 462. p. 317. 
 Hllliard v. Wilmington &c. R. Co.,6 Jones 
 
 L. (N. C.) 343. p. 1374. 
 Hilton V. Fairclough, 2 Camp. 633. p. 943. 
 Hilton V. Southwick, 17 Me. 303. pp. 1923, 
 
 1929. 
 Hinchcliff's Case, 1 Lewin C. C. 161. p. 1627. 
 Hincklev v. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89. p. 1210. 
 Hinde v". Longworth, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 99. 
 
 pp. 560, 1445, 1446. 
 Hindle v. Birch, 8 Taunt. 26. p. 1989. 
 Hinds V. Gage, 56 Cal. 487. p. 2084. 
 Hiner v. Peoyile, 34 111. 297. pp. 1090, 1091. 
 Hines V. Driver, 100 Ind. 315. p. 2064. 
 Hines v. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 597. pp. 
 
 85, 1903, 1907, 2094, 2101. 
 Hines v. State, 3 Tex. App. 483. pp. 727. 785. 
 Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 3.55. p. 1470. 
 Hinkle v. Margerum, 50 Ind. 240. pp. 2071, 
 
 2076, 2110. 
 Hinkson v. Morrison, 47 la. 167. p. 576. 
 Hinson c. Slate, 7 Mo. 244. p. 1562. 
 Hint on V. Heather, 14 Mees. & W. 131. pp. 
 
 1166. 1172, 1180. 
 Hintoii V. Cream City R. Co., 65 Wis. 335. 
 
 pp. 1761, 1802. 
 Hinton v. Nelms, 13 Ala. 222. p. 1733. 
 Hintrager r. Suml)argo, ,54 la. 604. p. 2100. 
 Hirshiiorg v. Strauss, 64 Cal. 272. p. 1676. 
 Hirslilield v. Smith, Harr. & Ruth. 284. p. 
 
 941. 
 Hirshman v. People, 101 111. 568. p. 1801. 
 Hirsch v. State, 8 Baxt. fTenn.) 89. )>. 268. 
 Hirst, In re, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 216. p. 148. 
 Hise V. Fincher, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 139. p. 
 
 loos. 
 Hitchcock V. Burgett, 38 Mich. .501. p. 498. 
 Hitchins v. Eardlev, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 
 
 248: s. c. 40 I J. .1. (i'rol). & Mat.) 70. j). 290. 
 Hitchlftr V. Voelker, 8 Mo. Apj). 492. p. 811. 
 Hite r. Blandford, 45 111. 9. p. 1670. 
 Hite V. Hunton, 20 Mo. 286. p. 1618. 
 Hitson V. Forrest. 12 Tex. 320. p. 1198. 
 Hitt r. Allen, 13 111 .592. p. 1125. 
 Hix ?•. Dnirv. 5 Pick. fMa-^s.) 297. pp. 1921, 
 
 1945, 1946, i955, 1991, 2021. 
 
 Hoag V. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; 
 
 s. c. 4 W. N. Cas. 552; 6 Cent. L. J. 95. p. 
 
 1221. 
 Hoasrland v. Moore, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 167. p. 
 
 1477. 
 Hoaijland v. State, 17 Ind. 488. p. 523. 
 Hoar r. Wood, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 193. p. 795. 
 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 208. pp. 
 
 512, 516. 
 Iloare v. Broom, Cro. Eliz. 369. p. 31. 
 Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 624. 
 
 p. 1507. 
 Holjl)s V. Eastern R. Co., 66 Me. 572. p. 1687. 
 IIol)l)s V. Outlaw, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 174. p. 
 
 1750. 
 llobbs V. State, 7 Tex. App. 117. pp. 1732, 
 
 1744, 1745. 
 Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 272. pp. 1914, 1915, 
 
 1922. 
 Hobson V. Emanuel, 8 Porter (Ala.), 442. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Hocum V. Weithcrick, 22 Minn. 152. pp. 
 
 1225, 1254, 1705. 
 Hodge V. State, 85 Ind. 561. pp. 1694, 1698. 
 Hod.gon V. Latham, 33 111. .346. p. 963. 
 lloilgen V. Commissioners, 10 Kan. 638. p. 
 
 2130. 
 Tlodges V. Cooper, 43 N. Y'. 216. p. 1705. 
 Hodges V. Strong, 10 Vt. 247. p. 827 . 
 Hodgkins v. Hook, 23 Cal. 584. p. 1446. 
 Hodg.son r. Scarlett, 1 Barn. & Aid. 232; s. c. 
 
 1 Holt N. I'. 621. ]). 795. 
 Hoe r. .Sanburn, 21 N. Y. 5,52. p. 1419. 
 Hoeflinger v. Stafiord, 38 Wis. 391. pp. 1586, 
 
 1608. 
 Iloffljauer r. Railway Co., 52 Iowa, 342. p. 
 
 1290. 
 Hoffman v. Danner, 14 Pa. St. 25. p. 1085. 
 Hoffman v. State, 65 Wis. 46; s. c. 26 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 110. p. 774. 
 Hogan V. Crearan, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 138. p. 418. 
 Ilogan V. llendrv, IS Md. 128. p. 725. 
 Hogan V. State, 36 \Vis. 226. p. 119. 
 Ilogell V. Lindell, 10 Mo. 483. p. 1729. 
 Hogg v. People, 15 Bradw. (HI.) 288; s. c. 19 
 
 Cent. L. J. 476. p. I.i36. 
 IIoLTcr ('. State, 7 Ind. 551. p. 1720. * 
 
 Hogg c. Wilkins, 1 Grant (Pa.V 67. p. 1417. 
 Hoggctt V. Oxley, 2 Mood. & Rob. 251. p. 
 
 217. 
 Hogsett V. State, 40 Miss. 522. pp. 1647, 1784. 
 Hogshead v. State, 6 Hamph. (Tenn.) 59. 
 
 pp. 113, 1932. 
 Iloitt V. Ilolcomb, 32 N. H. 186. p. 1746. 
 Hoke V. Fleming, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 263. pp. 
 
 489, 490. 
 Holbeit V. State, 9 Tex. App. 219. p. 462. 
 Holbrook v. Baker, 6 Me. 309. p. 1443. 
 Holbrook v. Coolev, 25 Minn. 275. p. 169. 
 Holbrook V. Holbrook, 30 Vt. 433. p. 441. 
 Holbrook V. McBride, 4 Gray (Mass.), 215. 
 
 1). 308. 
 Holbrook t'. Utica &c. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 236; 
 
 s. <•. 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 113. pp. 1225, 1235, 
 
 1236, 1237. 
 Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 169. 
 
 p. 11.56. 
 Ilolcomb V. Cornish, 8 Conn. 375. pp. 141, 
 
 148. 
 Ilolcomb V. Ilolcomb, 28 Conn. 177. p. 804. 
 Holcroft r. Barber, 1 Car. & K. 4. p. 1137. 
 Ilohlane v. Biilterworth, 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 1. 
 
 1)1). 1105, 1747, 1751. 
 Holder r. SouIbv.SC. B. (N. .S.) 2.54. p. 1340. 
 Holder r. State, 5 (ia. 441. pp. 1509, 16.58. 
 Ifoldridge r. Cubbeire, 71 (ia. 2.54. i). 1708. 
 Ilolcsapiilc r. Kawbush, 51 Ind. 494. ]>. 2051. 
 llolker r. I'arker, 7 Cranch (U. S.),436. pp. 
 
 191, 192, 193.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83; s. c. 25 Am. 
 
 Rep. 595. p. 4S0. 
 Holland v. Fisher, O. Bridg. 181. p. 2008. 
 Holland v. Fox, 3 El. & Bl. ;t77. p. H57. 
 Holland v. Palmer, 1 Bos. & Pul. 95. p. 1068. 
 Hollenbeck v. Marshalltown, 62 la. 21. pp. 
 
 50, 2043. 
 Hollenbeck v. Ptowley, 8 Allen (Mass.), 473. 
 
 p. 601. 
 Holley V. Winooski Turnpike Co., 1 Aik. 
 
 (Vt.) 74. p. 1247. 
 Holley V. Young, 68 Me. 215. 614. 
 Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450. p. 
 
 1008. 
 Hollingsworth v. Duane, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 353. 
 
 pp. 49, 117. 
 Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. La. (U. 8.) 
 
 77. p. 132. 
 Hollis 1-. .State, 8 Tex. App. 620. p. 116. 
 HoUis V. Swift, 74 Ga. 595. p. 885. 
 Hollister v. Loud, 2 Mich. 312. ]). 1446. 
 Hollistert). Nowlen, 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 234. p. 
 
 1305. 
 Ilollowayr. Griffith, 32 Iowa, 409. p. 1491. 
 llulloway V. State, 53 Ind. 544. p. 124. 
 llollv 1-. Brown, 14 Conn. 256. p. 1750. 
 Hohnan v. Chicago &c. K. Co., 62 Mo. 562. 
 
 pp.1222, 1223. 
 Hohnan v. Crane, 17 Ala. 570. pp. 825, 827, 
 
 8'' 8 
 Hohnan v. King, 7 Met. (Mass.) 384. p. 820. 
 Hoi man v. Mayer, 34 Tex. 668. p. 152. 
 lldhnan v. State, 13 Ark. 105. p. 645. 
 lluhuead v. Corcoran, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 119. p. 1982. 
 Holmes v. Baddeley, 1 Phil. Ch. 476. p. 276. 
 Holmes v. Blogg, S Taunt. 508; s. c. 2 J. B. 
 
 Moore, 552. p. 895. 
 Holmes v. Clark, 10 la. 423. p. 1429. 
 Holmes v. Doane, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 135. p. 
 
 1755. 
 Holmes v. Gayle, 1 Ala. 517. p. 361. 
 Holmes v. Hamburg, 47 Iowa, 348. p. 1247. 
 Holmes v. McKiuney, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 5. 
 
 pp. 2095, 2096. 
 Holmes v. Kogers, 13 Cal. 191. p. 192. 
 Ilohnes v. State, 23 Ala. 17. p. 1849. 
 Ihihiies V. State, 9 Tex. App. 314. p. 18.37. 
 lldhnesT. state, 20 Tex. App. 509. p. 1763. 
 Holmes ». Stateler, 17 111. 453. p. 450. 
 Holmes, Ex parte, 21 Neb. 324 ;s. c. 32 N. W. 
 
 Ilep. 71. pp. 2075, 2078. 
 Holt V. Bacon, 25 Miss. 567. p. 1023. 
 Holt V. Meirs, 9 Car. & P. 191. p. 613. 
 Holt V. Penobscot, 56 :\Ie. 15. p. 1249. 
 Holt V. People, 13 Mich. 224. pp. 73, 98, 
 
 126. 
 Holt V. Simmons, 14 Mo. App. 450. p. 2108. 
 Holt V. State, 9 Tex. App. 571. pp. 116, 130. 
 Holton V. Greenwell,4 Dana (Ky.), 633. p. 
 
 2060. 
 Holton V, Kemp, 81 Mo. 661. p. 1030. 
 Holyoke v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 
 
 541. pp 1481, 1483. 
 Homans v Corning, 60 N. H. 418. pp. 344, 
 
 345, 421. 
 Homans v. Lambard, 21 Me. 308. p. 860. 
 Home Ins. Co. r. Favorite, 46 111. 263. p. 986. 
 Homer v. Engelhardt, i 17 Mass. 539. p. 1459. 
 Homer V. Taunton, 5 Hurl. & N. 661. ]>. 1507. 
 Homes v. Crane, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 607, n. 1. 
 
 p. 1442. 
 Honegsberger v. Second Ave. R. Co., 1 Keyes 
 (N. Y.),570; s. c. U How. Pr. (X. Y.) 195; 
 2 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y'.) 378; 1 Daly 
 (N. Y.),89. pp. 1232, 1233. 
 Honev v. Honev, 18 Mo. 466. p. 2072. 
 Honstine v. O'Donnell, 5 Hun (N. Y ),472. 
 p. 436. 
 
 Hood t\ Fahnestock, I Pa. St. 470. p. 1052. 
 Hook V. Craghead, 35 Mo 380. p. 1750. 
 Hook V. Page, 1 Overton (Tcnn.), 250. p. 69. 
 Hooker i\ Eagle Bank, 30 N. Y. 83. p. 609. 
 Hooker V. State, 4 Ohio, *t8. pp. 88, 89. 
 Hooksett r. Amoskeag Man. Co., 44 X. H. 
 
 105. p. 1758. 
 Hooper v. Edwards, IS Ala. 280. p. 849. 
 Hooper V. Moore, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 428. p. 
 
 432. 
 Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L. (N. C.) 130. pp. 
 
 SI 9, 820. 
 Hoojier r. Rathbone, Taney (U. S.), 519. pp. 
 
 1,322, 1345. 
 Hoot V. Spade, 20 Ind. 326. p. 106. 
 Hoover «. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79. p. 1020. 
 Hopkins v. Coburn, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 292. p. 
 
 188. 
 Hopkins v. Preston, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 64. p. 106. 
 Hopkins v. Robinson, 3 Watts (Pa.), 205. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Hopkins V. St. Lawrence R. Co., 36 X. H. 9. 
 
 p. 1486. 
 Hopkins r. Stanley, 43 Ind. 553. pp. 2029, 
 
 2041. 
 Hopkins v. Ware, L. R. 4 Exch. 268. p. 944. 
 Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64. p. 1360. 
 Ilopkinson v. Leeds, 78 Pa. St. 396. p. 1623. 
 Hopkuison V. People, 18 111.264; s. c. Horr. 
 & Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. SO. pp. 1542, 1646, 
 1681. 
 Hopkinson v. Steel, 12 Vt. .582. pp. 308, 321, 
 
 323, 1943, 1958. 
 Hoppe V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 01 Wis. 357. 
 
 p. 2037. 
 Hopper V. Mooie, 42 la. 563. p. 2028. 
 Hopps V. People, 31 111. 385. p. 1883. 
 Hopson V. Brunwankel,24 Tex. 607. p. 862. 
 Hopt r. People, 104 U. S. 631. pp. 1726, 1733. 
 Hopt V. People, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 614; s. c. 21 
 
 Am. L. Rev. 459. pp. 316, 614, 747, 786. 
 Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430; s. c. 7 U. S Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 614. pp. 758, 1762. 
 Horacek r. Keebler, 5 Xeb. 356. p. 2051. 
 Horback r. Miller, 4 Xeb. 43. p. 2051. 
 Horback v. State, 43 Tex. 242. pp. 89, 93. 
 Hord V. Taubman, 79 JIo. 101. ji. 1032. 
 Horlor v. Carpenter, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 1. n. 
 1698. '^ 
 
 Horn V. Amicable &c. Co., 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 81 ; 
 
 s. c. 3 Big. Ins. Cas. 712. p. 1408. 
 Horn V. Baker. 9 East, 21.5. p. 1443. 
 Horn V. Eberhart, 1 .' Ind. 118. p. 2043. 
 Home V. Puckett, 12 Tex. 201. p. 869. 
 Home V. State, 37 Ga. 80. p. 41. 
 Home V. Williams, 12 Ind. 325. p. 511. 
 Hbrne v. Williams, 23 Ind. 37. p. 2091. 
 Home Tooke's Case (Anno, 1798), 25 How. 
 
 St. Tr. 1. p)). 45, 68. 
 Horner v. Hower, 49 Pa. St. 475. p. 956. 
 Horner v. Xicholson, 56 Mo. 222. nu. 1316 
 1483. ' 
 
 Hornsberger v. State, 19 Tex. App. 335. p. 
 1778. ^ 
 
 Horner v. Wood, 16 Barb. 386. pp. 1671, 1746. 
 1750. ' 
 
 Horr V. People, 95 111. 169. p. 145. 
 Hortou V. Horton. 2 Cow. (X. Y'.) 589. p. 
 191(1. ^ 
 
 Horton v. Moot, 60 Barb. (X. Y.) 27. p. 886. 
 Hortou V. Parsons, (X. Y'. Sup. Ct.), 24 
 
 Week. Dig. •.'34. p. 7S8. 
 Hortou V. '1 owns. 6 Leigh (Va.), 47. p. 1025. 
 Horton V. \\ illuims,21 Minu. 187. pii. 1706. 
 
 17(17, 1714, 1726. 
 Horton v. Wil.son, 25 Ind. 316. pp. 2091, 2107. 
 Ho.sford V. Stone. 6 .\eb. 381. p. 2051. 
 Hoskius V. Hatterback, 14 la. 314. p. 2075.
 
 Ixxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hospes r. Alder, 6 East, 16, n. p. 948. 
 Hotchkiss V. Gennania Fire Ins. Co., 5 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.), 90 pp. 437, 48.5, 4".)U. 
 Hotteudtein v. Lerch, 104 Pa. .'^t. 454. p. 1052. 
 Hotz c. Hotz, 2 .Vsh. (Penu.) 245. p. 92. 
 Houdlette r. Tallniau, 14 Ale. 403. pp. 907, 
 
 908. 
 Hough r. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 10. pp. 
 
 972, 982. 
 Hough r. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213. p. 1254. 
 Hoiiichtaling v. IJall, 19 >lo. 84. p. 1600. 
 Houghlalingr.Osborn, 15 Johns. (X. Y.) 119. 
 
 p. 1997. 
 Houghton r. First Nat. Bank, 26 Wis. 663. 
 
 pp. 1022, 1023. 
 Houghton V. Houghton, 37 Me. 72. p. 854. 
 Houghton V. Jonefi, 1 AVall. (U. S.) 702. pp. 
 
 3.S4, 392. 
 Houghton i: Manufacturers &C. Ins. Co., 8 
 
 Meto. (Mass.) 114. p. 976. 
 House r. Fulton, 29 AYis. 296. p. 1219. 
 House c. Metcalf. 27 Conn. 631. ii. 1383. 
 House V. State, 16 Tex. App. 31. p. 1763. 
 House r. State, 19 Tex. App. 227. pp. 755, 
 
 1697, 17^9. 
 House V. Wright, 22 Ind. 383. p. 2101. 
 Houser v. State, 93 Ind. 228. pp 631, 633. 
 Houser v. Tulley, 62 Pa. St. 96; s. c. 1 Am. 
 
 Rep. ,390. p. 1339. 
 Houstine v. O'Donnell, 5 Hun, 472. p. 357. 
 Houston V. Bruner, 39 Ind. 376. p. 2082. 
 Houston V. Clark, 50 N. H. 479. p. 1007. 
 Houston V. Potts, 65 X. C. 41. p. 1923. 
 Houston V. Sneed, 15 Texas, 307. p. 1080. 
 Houston V. Terrell (Tex.), 7 S. W. Rep. 670. 
 
 p. 102. 
 Houston V. Woodward, 17 N. J. L. 344. p. 
 
 697. 
 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Gilmore, 62 Tex. 391. 
 
 p. 1672. 
 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 576, 
 
 pp. 1285, 1297. 
 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Randall, 50 Tex. 255. 
 
 pp. 1253, 12,54, 1261. 
 Housworth v. Bloomhuff, 54 Ind. 487. p. 
 
 2124. 
 Hovey v. Grant, 52 X. H. 569. p, 303. 
 THoyey i: Lane, 52 Ind. 49. p. 584. 
 Hovey v. Thompson, 37 111. 538. p. 1937. 
 How J-. Hall, 14 East. 274. p. 608. 
 How V. Taylor, .52 Mo. 592. p. 923. 
 Howard v. Brown, 21 Me. 385. p. 1749. 
 Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10. pp. 803, 
 
 807,811. 
 Howard v. Chamberlin, 68 Ga. 684. p. 421. 
 How.ard /•. City Fire Ins. Co., 4 Denio (N. Y'.), 
 
 502. p. .3!)6. 
 Howard v. Cobb, 3 Day (Conn.), 310. p. 
 
 I9a5. 
 
 Howard v. Kislinc, 15 Ind. 83. p. 215. 
 Howard v. Marshall, 48 Tex. 471. p. 817. 
 Howard v. McCall, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 212. p. 
 
 i9a5. 
 
 Howard r. Miner, 20 Me. 325. p. 1745. 
 Howard v. State, 18 Tex. App. 318. p. 1560. 
 Howard v. M'inters, 3 Xey. .5.39. p. 2099. 
 Howard r. Wissman, 18 How. (U. S.) 231. pp. 
 
 1342, 1367. 
 Howard Ins. Co. v. Cormick, 24 111.455. p. 
 
 1815. 
 Howcott r. Kill)Ourn, 44 Ark. 213. p. 2088. 
 Howe V. (-'lanccv, 53 Me. 130. p. 890. 
 Howe V. llunliugton, 15 Me. 350. p. 1122. 
 Howe V. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538. p. 1446. 
 Howe v. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99. p. 1219. 
 Howe V. Plainfield, 41 X. II. 135. p. 1249. 
 Howe V. Russell, 41 Me. 446. p. 891. 
 Howe Machine Co. r. Clarke, 15 Kan. 492. p. 
 
 433. 
 
 Howe Machine Co. v. Rosine, 87 111. 105. p. 
 
 315. 
 Howell r. Commonwealth, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 664. 
 
 p. 703. 
 Howell V. Edmond, 47 111. 79. p. 560. 
 Howell 1'. Hartford Ins. Co., 6 Biss. (U. S.) 
 
 1()3. p. 1940. 
 Howell r. Howell, 59 Ga. 145. pp. 95, 99. 
 Howell I'. Huvck, 2 Abb. App. Dec. (X. Y.) 
 
 423. p. (!U9. 
 Howell V. Leayitt, 90 X. Y. 238. p. 20.59. 
 Howell V. Rol)ertS()n, 6 N. .J. L. 142. p. 20. 
 Howell V. State, 5 (Ja. 48. p. 1542. 
 Howell V. State, 16 Tex. Api). 93. p. 1777 
 Howenstein v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 55 
 
 Mo. 33. pp. 1.S07, 1308. 
 Ilowerlon v. Holt, 23 Tex, 52. pp. 1444, 
 
 1448. 
 Howerton v. State, Meigs (Tenn.), 262. 
 
 p. 121. 
 Howie V. Lea, 75 X. C. 326. p. .363. 
 Howland v. (iifford, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43, n. 
 
 p. 27, 111, 119,1976. 
 Howland c. Jenks, 7 Wis. 57. p. 420. 
 Howland r. Marine Co., 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 ■ S.) 474. p. 1211. 
 Howland v. Reeycs, 25 Mo. A.pp. 458. pp. 
 
 2092, 2093, 2094. 
 Howland v. Sheriff, 5 Sandf. (X. Y'.) 219. p. 
 
 353. 
 Rowland v. Willetts, 9 X. Y'. 170. pp. 1942, 
 
 1958, 196-.>. 
 Howie V. Dunn,l Leigh (Va.), 455. p. 1906. 
 Howley v. Whipple, 48 X. H. 487. pp. 641, 
 
 642. 
 Howth V. Franklin, 21 Tex. 798. p. 1340. 
 Hoxle V. Green, 37 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 97. pp. 
 
 219, 221,222. 
 Hoxie V. Home Ins. Co., 33 Conn. 471. pp. 
 
 728, 739, 740, 747, 753, 7.55. 
 Hoy V. Morris, 13 Gray (Mass.), 519. pp. 272, 
 
 273. 
 Iloye V. State, 39 Ga. 718. p. 1984. 
 lloVt V. American Exch. Bank, 1 Duer 
 
 (X. Y.),652. pp. 596,60.5. 
 Ilovt V. City of Hudson, 27 Wis. 656. p. 1266. 
 llovl V. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105. pp. 1225, 1227. 
 Hoyt V. .Jackson, 3 Dem. (N. Y'.) 390. pp. 
 
 590, 625, 626, 634. 
 Ilovt V. .letfers, 30 Mich. 194. p. 1316. 
 Hubbard v. I!elden,27 Vt. 645. p. 892. 
 Hubbard r. Briggs, 31 X. Y. 518. p. 428.' 
 Hubbard v. Concord, 35 X. H. 52. pp. 1249. 
 
 1377. 
 IIul)bard v. Gale, 105 Mass. 511. p. 82. 
 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 7 Ore. 42. p. 2,57. 
 Hubbard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7. pp. 59, 116. 
 Hul)bell V. Bowe, 17 Jones & Sp. (40 N. Y. 
 
 Siip.'r.) 131. p. 322. 
 Iluhbsv. Bancroft, 4 Ind. 388. p. 1438. 
 Ilubhv c. Slate, 8 Tex. Ai)p. 597. p. 3.56. 
 Ilubb'v V. Stokes. 22 Tex. 217. p. 17.54. 
 Ilublcy V. White, 2 Yeatos (I'a.), 133. p. 25. 
 1 lubner v. Feige, 90 111. 208. p. 1213, 1750. 
 llubotter v. State, 32 Tex. 479. pp. 81. 89, 91. 
 Huckabee v. May, 14 Ala. 263. p. 966. 
 Huckins v. People's &c., Ins. (Jo., 31 X. II. 
 
 238. 1). 361. 
 Iluckraan v. Fernle, 3 Mees. & W. 505. pp. 
 
 214,217, 218, 1417. 
 ThirkshDld r. St. [>ouls, &c. R. Co. (Mo.),2S. 
 
 W i;.|). 794. I). 747. 
 IhKlilerson v. Prizer, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 65. p. 
 
 1&8. 
 HudoLson v. State, 94 Ind. 426. pp. 1515, 
 
 1.525. 
 Hudgcns r. State, 2 Ga. 173. pp. 42, 67, 63, 
 
 74. 124. 
 Huduutt I'. Comstock, .50 Mich. 596. p. 359.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 Hudson V. Allison. 54 Ind. 215. p. 193. 
 Hudson V. liaxendale, 2 Hurl. & N. 575. p. 
 
 1342. 
 Hudson V. St. Louis &c. R. Co. , 53 Mo. 525. 
 
 p. U'.tS. 
 Hudson V. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 317. p. 
 
 101. 
 Hudson V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 525. 
 
 pp. 802, 1308, 1498. 
 Hudson V. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 408. pp. 
 
 1914, 1992. 
 Huds-on V. Wier, 29 Ala. 294. p. 810. 
 Hudson r. Wetherington, 75 N. C. 3. pp. 
 
 215, 221, 222. 
 Hudspeth v. Herston, 64 Ind. 133. pp. 53, 
 
 121. 
 Huebner v. RooseTelt, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 111. 
 
 p. 437. 
 Huelsenkamp v. Citizen's R. Co., 37 Mo. 537. 
 
 pp. 1255, 1282, 1296. 
 Hueske v. Broussard, 55 Tex. 201. p. 867. 
 Huey V. Huey, 65 Mo. 689. p. 873. 
 Huff V. Bennett, 6 X. Y. 337. p. 353. 
 Huff V. Cole, 45 Ind. 300. p. 1620. 
 Huff V. Cox, 2 Ala. 310. p. 1638. 
 Huff V. Gilbert, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 19. p. 2117. 
 Huff V. Nims, 11 Xeb. 364. p. 879. 
 Huff V. State, 29 Ga. 424. p. 324. 
 Huff r. Walkins, 15 S. C. 82. p. 37. 
 Huffell I' Armitstead, 7Car. &P. 56. p. 1135. 
 Huffman v. Acklev, 34 Mo. 277. p. 1668. 
 Huffman v. Cauble, 66 Ind. 591. p. 319. 
 Huffman v. Hulbert, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 375. 
 
 p. 952. 
 Hughes V. Biddulph, 4 Russ. 190. p. 276. 
 Hughes V. Ellison, 5 Mo. 110. p. 1600. 
 Hughes V. Listner, 23 Ind. 396. p. 1983. 
 Hughes V. M'Gee, 1 A. Iv. Marsh. (Ky.)29. 
 
 p. 2064. 
 Hughes V. Monty, 24 la. 499. p. 1647. 
 Hughes V. People, 116 111. 330; s. c. 6 X. East. 
 
 Rep. 55. pp. 124, 2096. 
 Hughes V. Pipkin, 4 Phill. L. (X. C.) 4. p. 
 
 1137. 
 Hughes V. State, 75 Ala. 31. pp. 1638, 1653, 
 
 1798. 
 Hughes V. Westmoreland Coal Co., 104 Pa. 
 
 St. 207. pp. 385, 388, 1623. 
 Hughes V- Winona &c. R. Co., 27 Minn. 139. 
 
 p. 1261. 
 Hughey v. State, 47 Ala. 97; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. 589, note. p. 1542. 
 Huguenin r. Raylev, 6 Taunt. 186; 2 Big. Ins. 
 
 Cas. 208. pp. 975, 1417. 
 Hulett V. Hulett, 37 Vt. 581. p. 344. 
 Hull V. Albro, 2 Disney (Ohio), 147. pp. 117, 
 
 118, 123. 
 Hull V. Alexander, 26 la. 569. pp. 356, 718. 
 Hull t'. City of Kan.sas, 54 Mo. 600. p. 1280. 
 Hull V. Cooper, 14 East, 479. pp. 974, 1143. 
 Hull V. Louth, 109 Ind. 315. pp. 2110, 2143. 
 Hull r. Lyon, 27 >Io. 570. p. 295. 
 Hull r. Richmond, 2 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 337. 
 
 p. 1247. 
 Hull r. State, 93 Ind. 128. p. 390. 
 Humbert v. Eckerr, 7 Mo. 259. p. 2064. 
 Hume V. Xe\v York, 47 X. Y. 639. pp. 1246, 
 
 1247, 1249. 
 Hummel's Case, 9 Watts (Pa.),416. p. 151. 
 Humphrey v. State, 21 Tex. App. 666. p. 
 
 760. 
 flunii)hrey. Ex parte, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 283. 
 
 p. 166. 
 Humphreys v. Collier, 2 111. 48. p. 1669. 
 Humphreys r. Reed, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 435. Y>p. 
 
 1322, 1346, 1347. 1358. 
 Humphreys v. Spear, 15 111. 275. p. 642. 
 Humuhrevs v. State, 18 Tex. App. 302. pp. 
 
 1790, 1791. 
 
 Humphreys v. Walton, 2 Bush (Ky.). 580. 
 
 pp. 2053, 2071. 
 Humphries c. Dawson, 38 Ala. 199. p. 631. 
 Humphries v. .Johnson, 20 Ind. 190. p. 1780. 
 Humpliries v. McCravy, 5 Ark. 61. p. 1937. 
 Humphries t\ Parker, 52 Me. 502. pp.1161, 
 
 1168, 1171, 1181,1189, 1193, 1702, 1704. 
 Hundhausen v Ins. Co., 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 702. p. 151. 
 Huugate V. Hamond, Cro. Eliz. 188. p. 113. 
 Hungerford v. Burr, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 527. p. 233. 
 Huuuicut r. State, 18 Tex. App. 500. pp. 
 
 1777, 1796, 1797. 
 Hunt V. Adams, 6 Mass. 519. p. 1032. 
 Hunt r. Bate, Dyer, 272. p. 889. 
 Hunt V. Elliott, 80 Ind. 245; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 
 
 794. p. 2110. 
 Hunt V. Fish, 4 Barb. (X. Y.) 324. p. 640. 
 Hunt V. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54. p. 1453. 
 Hunt V. Lo\yell Gaslight Co., 8 Allen!(Mass.), 
 
 169. pp. 502, 503, 504, 509. 
 Hunt V. Maybee, 7 X. Y. 266. pp. 942, 1740, 
 
 1956. 
 Hunt ('. Mayo, 27 La. Ann. 197. p. 33. 
 Hunt r. McFarland, 38 Pa. St. 69. p. 1088. 
 Hunt V. Owings, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 20. p. 
 
 2096. 
 Hunt V. Pownall, 9 Vt. 411. p. 1280. 
 Hunt r. Salem, 121 Mass;. 294. p. 1210. 
 Hunt V. Scobie, 6 I'.. Monr. (Ky.) 469. p. 26. 
 Hunt V. State, 49 Ga. 255. pp. 705, 708. 
 Hunt V. State, 9 Tex. App. 156. pp. 255, 1855, 
 
 1859. 
 Hunt V. State, 7 Tex. App. 212. pp. 18.55, 1859. 
 Hunt V. Stewart, 7 Ala. 525. p. 158. 
 Hunt V. Swain, 1 Lev. 165; s. c. Sir T. Raym. 
 
 227 ; 1 Sid. 248. p. 889. 
 Hunt V. The Cleyeland, 6 McLean (U. S.), 76. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1345, 1346, I35H. 
 Hunter v. Allen, 35 Barb. (X. Y.) 42. p. 657. 
 Hunter v. Caldwell, 10 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 69. 
 
 p. 1243. 
 Hunter v. Chrismann, 70 Ind. 439. p. 2059. 
 Hunter i>. Cleyeland, 1 Brey. 1(57. p. 188. 
 Hunter v. Com., 79 Pa. St. 503. p. 523. 
 Hunter v. Corbett, 7 Up. Can. Q. B. 75. p. 
 
 1443. 
 Hunter v. Hatfleld, 68 Ind. 416. p. 1492. 
 Hunter v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 96. p. 89. 
 Hunter v. State, 43 Ga. 484. pp. 1784, 1924, 
 
 1977. 
 Hunter r. State, 101 Ind. 406. p. 2142. 
 Hunter v. State, 102 Ind. 428. p. 2142. 
 Hunter v. State, 8 Tex. App. 76. pp. 1964. 
 
 1965, 1967, 1995. 
 Hunter v. AVatson, 12 Cal. 363. p. 273. 
 Huntington v. Blaisdell, 2 X. H. 318. p. 1016. 
 Huntington v. Breen, 77 Ind. 29. p. 1278. 
 Huntington r. Conkey, 33 Barb. (X. Y.) 218. 
 
 pp. 214, 217, 218, 22i; 222, 225. 
 Huntington v. Drake, 24 Ind. 347. p. 2101. 
 Huntington v. Shultz, Harp. (S. C.) 453. p. 
 
 1016. 
 Huntress v. Epsom, 15 Fed. Rep. 732. p. 697. 
 Hunisman v. X^^ichols, 116 Mass. 521. pp. 
 
 309, 718. 
 Huntzinger v. Roberts, 44 Pa. St. 204. p. 
 
 1438. 
 Hnppert v. Weisgerber, 25 Mo. App. 95. p. 
 
 2087. 
 Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17. pp. 1942, 1948. 
 Hurlev r. Tavlor. 7s Mo. 238. p. 1445. 
 Hurd r. Marple, 10 ISradw. (III.) 418. p. 201. 
 'Hurd V. :\riller, 2 Hilt. (X. Y.) 540. p. 891. 
 Hurd i\ Shaw. 20 111. 356. i)p. 1172, 1197. 
 Hurd V. Swan. 4 Denio (X. Y.), 7.5. p. 184. 
 Hurley i'. .Alorgan, 1 Dev. & Bat. 425. p. 837. 
 Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17. pp. 81, 129.
 
 Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Hurst r. 'Rnrnside, 12 Ore. 520. p. 713. 
 Hnrst V. Kailroad Co., 49 la. 76. \u 505. 
 llussoy V. Alli'ii, .5'.t Mf. 2(!9. pp. 113, 1976. 
 Hufisev V. Saragosssa, 3 Woods (U, S.),380. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1341. 1342, 1345. 
 Hussou V. Fox, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 464. p. 
 
 603. 
 Husiton V. Mitchell, 14 Serg. &. R. (Pa.) 307. 
 
 p. 191. 
 Hutchings v. "Western R. Co., 25 Ga. 61. 
 
 pp. 1151, 1154, 1155. 
 llutcliins V. Hudson, S Humph. (Tenn.)426. 
 
 p. 1101. 
 HutcliiiLson r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 Wis. 
 
 541. p. 1270. 
 Huuhiuson v. Consumers' Coal Co., 36 N. 
 
 J. L. 24. pp. 1924. 1985. 1990. 
 Hutchinson v. Decatur, 3 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 8.) 291. p. 1944. 
 Hutchinson v. Lord. 1 Wis. 287. pp. 1437, 
 
 1444. 
 Hutchinson i\ National Assurance Soc, 3 
 
 Big. Ins. Cas. 444. p. 1417. 
 Hutchins v. Maslerson, 46 Tex. 551. p. 
 
 1672. 
 Hutchinson v. Patricli, 3 Mo. 65. p. 1618. 
 Hutchinson v. Saudt, 4 Kawle (Pa.), 234. 
 
 p. 1983. 
 Hutcliinson v. State, 19 Neb. 262. p. 64. 
 Hutchin^^on v. Bowker, 5 Mees. & W. 535. 
 
 pp. 834, 837. 
 Huth V. Carondelet &c. Co.. 56 Mo. 202. p. 
 
 868. 
 Hutton V. Hun. Cro. Eliz. 849. p. 125. 
 Huttou V. .Schumaker, 21 Cal. 453. p. 1141. 
 Hutton V. "VVetherald, 5 Harr. (Del.) 38. p. 
 
 890. 
 Hutts V. Hutts, 62 Ind. 215. pp. 455, 480, 
 
 552. 
 Hutts V. State, 7 Tex. App. 44. p. 1815. 
 Hvatt V. Clements, 65 Ind. 12. pp. 215, 2034. 
 Hvde V. .Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538. p. 1235. 
 Hvde V. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443. p. 1225. 
 Hvde V. (State, 16 Tex. 445. p. 65. 
 Hyde r. Stone, 20 How. (T. S.) 170. p. 947. 
 Hyde Park v. Cornell, 4 Bradw. (111.) 602. 
 
 p. 2053. 
 Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. St. 332. 
 
 p. 1141.- 
 Hyland v. Milner, 99 Ind. 308. pp. 369, 382, 
 
 430. 
 Hvman v. Wheeler, 29 Fed. Rep. 347. p. 
 
 1775. 
 Hynds r. Hayes, 25 Ind. 31. p. 1647. 
 HyiJfner v. Walsh. 3 G. Greene (la.), 509. 
 
 p. 1670. 
 
 I. 
 
 laslgi V. Brown, 1 Curt. C. C. (U. S.) 401. pp. 
 
 593, .i94, 595. 
 Ihl c. Foriv-second Street R. Co., 47 N. Y. 
 
 317. pp. 1231, 14,s8. 
 Ikerd r. Beavers, 106 Ind. 483. pp. 202G, 
 
 2070. 
 Illinois &c. U. Co. r. Able, 59 111. 131. i)p. 
 
 VMH, 1967. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Baches, 55 111. 388. pp. 
 
 I:i00, 1304, 1488. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. V. Cassell, 17 111. 389. pp. 
 
 825,861. 
 lUinois &c. R. Co. v. Chambers, 71 HI. 520. 
 
 p. 1295. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Cobb, 72 111. 148. p. 
 
 1 i6'.i. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Coiielaud, 24 111. 332. p. 
 
 1151. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. r. Frankcnl)urg, .54 111. 88. 
 
 l>p 1362, 1364, 1365. 
 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 111. .'i69. p. 
 
 1299. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 111. 500. p. 
 
 1.'99. 
 
 Illinois Ac. R. Co. v. Hall, 72 111. 222. p. 1235. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Hammer, 85 111. 526. p. 
 
 1726. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Hetherington, 83 III. 
 
 510. p. 1235. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Maffit, 67 111. 431. p. 
 
 1683. 
 Illinois &C.R. Co.r. Middlesworth,46 111. 494. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Patterson, 93 111. 290. p. 
 
 2066. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Slatton, 54 111. 139. pp. 
 
 1236. 1295. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Sutton, 42 111. 438. p. 
 
 497. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Sutton, 53 111. 397. p. 
 
 1284. 
 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Whitmore, 43 111. 420. 
 
 p. 1146. 
 Imlur r. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119. p. 1266. 
 Improvement Co. r. Munson, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 442. pp. 1605, 1625. 
 Inchbald r. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 388. 
 " pp. 1383, 1388. 
 Incledon v. Berry, 1 Camp. 203. pj). 1167, 
 
 1172. 
 Independence v. Jeckel, 38 Iowa, 427. p. 
 
 1247. 
 Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Foster, 107 Ind. 432; «. 
 
 c. 8 X. East. Rep. 264. p. 1311. 
 Indiana A:c. R. Co. r. McBroom, 103 Ind. 310. 
 
 pp. 2059, 2079. 
 Indiana &c. R. Co. v. Quick, 109 Ind. 295. p. 
 
 2112. 
 Indiana Car Co. r. Parker, 100 Ind. 181. pp. 
 
 1477, 1482. 
 Indiana Manf. Co. v. Millican, 87 Ind.87. p. 
 
 1709. 
 Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224. p. 1482. 
 Indianapolis r. La\yyer, 38 Ind. 348. pp. 
 
 2030, 2031. 
 Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196. pp. 1268, 
 
 1272, 1482, 1483, 1675, 1973. 
 Indianapolis Ac. K. Co. v. Beaver, 41 Ind. 
 
 49.3. p)). 1284, 129M. 
 Iiidianai)olis &c. R. Co.». Bonnell, 42 Ind. 
 
 539. p. 1308, 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 582. 
 
 pp. 1703, 1711,2009,2010, 2014, 20.52. 
 Indianaiiolis iVc. R. Co. v. Christian, 93 Ind. 
 
 360. pp. 2108, 2109. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Cobb, 68 111. 64. p. 
 
 149.->. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. f.Horst, 93 U. S. 291. 
 
 PI). 592, 1298, 1705, 1708. 
 In<lianai)olis &c. R. li. Co. v. Irish, 26 Ind. 
 
 26S. p. 1308. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Kecly's Admr., 23 
 
 Ind. 133. p. 1224. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Klbby, 28 Ind. 479. 
 
 p 1308. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. McCaffrey, 62 Ind. 
 
 552. J. p. 2034, 2036, 2039, 20(«. 
 Indianapolis &c. R. Co. «. Miller, 71 111.464. 
 
 p. 779. 
 In(liaiiai>olis &c. R. Co. v. Morganstern, 106 
 
 111.216. ],. 1240. 
 Indianaiiolis &c. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 29 
 
 Ind. 8J. p. 1235. 
 Iiidianiiulis Ac. R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 150. 
 
 Pli. KiiMi, 2036, 204.3. 
 Indianapolis Ac. R. Co. v. Wjatt, 16 Ind. 
 
 2(14. p. 21 OS. 
 Ingalls r. lUlls, 9 Mote. (:\ra88.) 1. p. 1285. 
 Iiigalls V. Stale, 48 Wis. 647. p. 282.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 Ingersoll v. Truebodv, 40 Cal. 603. p. 1920. 
 Ingersoll, In re, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 216. pp. 1-15, 
 
 146. 
 Ingle V. Mndd, 86 Mo. 216. pp. 916, 1496. 
 Ingle V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 574. pp. 147, 
 
 150. 
 Ingram v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 3 Brev. 
 
 (S. C.)522. p. 1748. 
 Ingram v. State, 62 Miss. 142. pp. 1691, 1791. 
 Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67. pp. 375, 480. 
 Inman r. State, 72 Ga. 269. pp. 776, 777. 
 lumau V. AVestern Fire Ins. Co., 12 Wend. 
 
 (N. Y.) 452. p. 982. 
 Insurance Co. v. Cheever, 36 Ohio St. 201; s. 
 
 c. 38 Am. Rep. 573. p. 781. 
 Insurance Co. v. Foley, 105 U. S. 350. p. 992. 
 Insurance Co. v. Lyons, 38 Texas, 258. pp. 
 
 973, 1027. 
 Insurance Co. v. Palmer, SI 111. 88. p. 2080. 
 Insurance Co. i-. Rubin, 79 111. 402. p. 315. 
 Insurance Co. v. Weide, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 677. 
 
 pp. 3.54, 362. 
 Insurance Cor. Weides, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 375. 
 
 pp. ,354. 362. 
 International &c. R. Co. v. Blanton, 63 Tex. 
 
 109. p. .359. 
 International &c. R. Co. f. Ormond, 64 Tex. 
 
 487. p. 1284. 
 International &c R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 67 Tex. 
 
 24; s. c. 2 S. W. Rep. 515. p. Ii512. 
 International &c. R. Co. v. Underwood, 64 
 
 Tex. 464. p. 653. 
 International Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 57 Mo. 
 
 289. p. 1613. 
 Invincible, The, 1 Lowell (U. S.), 225. p. 
 
 1367. 
 Inwood V. Steamboat Fleetwood, 19 Mo. 529. 
 
 p. 1683. 
 Inyo Mining Co. v. Pheby, 49 N. Y. Super. 
 
 392. p. 600. 
 Ipswich V. Essex, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 519. p. 113. 
 Ireland r. Emmerson, 93 Ind. 1. p. 1698. 
 Ireland v. Stiff, 1 Fost. & Fin. 340. p. 636. 
 Ireland, Ex parte, 34 Tex. 344. p. 137. 
 Irish r. AVright, 8 Rob. (La.) 428. p. 1990. 
 Iron Mountain Bank v. Murdock, 62 Mo. 70. 
 
 pp. 1025, 1034, 1661, 1662. 
 Irvine v. Cook, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 239. p. 
 
 1944. 
 Irvine v. Kean, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 292. pp. 
 
 70, 76. 
 Irvine v. Lumbermen's Bank, 2 Watts & S. 
 
 (l'a.)190. p. 74. 
 Irvine v. State, 20 Tex. App. 12. p. 1689. 
 Irving V. Taggart, 1 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 360. p. 
 
 158H. 
 Irvinson v. Van Riper, 34 Ind. 148. p. 561. 
 Irwin V. Bell, 1 Tenn. 485. p. 893. 
 Irwin V. Dixon, 9 How. (U. S.) 10. p. 1012. 
 Irwin t>. Jones, 1 How. (Miss.) 497. p. 128. 
 Irwin I'. Smith, 72 Ind. 482. p. 2098. 
 Irwin V. Sprigg, 6 Gill (Md.), 200. p. 1225. 
 Irwin V. M'ickersham, 25 Pa. St. 316. p. 803. 
 Isaac V. Clarke, 2 Gill (Md.), 1. p. 58. 
 Isaac v. State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 458. p. 85. 
 Isaacs V. Brand, 2 Stark. 167. p. 1181. 
 Isaacs V. Wilkey, 12 Vt. 677. p. 1072. 
 Isal)el V. Railroad Co., 60 Mo. 475. p. 1305. 
 Isbell V. New York &c. R. Co., 27 Conn. 393. 
 
 p. 12.55. 
 Isbell V. New Y'ork &c. K. Co., 25 Conn. 556. 
 
 p. 336. 
 Iseloy V. Lovejoy, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 462. pp. 
 
 1617, 1618. 
 Ishiim V. State, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 111. p. 125. 
 Islay V. Stewart, 4Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 160. p. 
 
 Isler *'. Dewey, 71 X. C. 14. pp. 469, 470, 489. 
 Isler V. Dewey, 75 X. C. 466. p. 460. 
 
 I Isley's Case, 1 Leon. ISO. p. 797. 
 Israel v. Brooks, 23 lU. 575. pp. 1161, 1167, 
 
 1170, 1172, 1186, 1197. 
 Iselt r. Hoge, 2 Watts (Pa.) , 128. p. 1251. 
 Ivei son V. State, 52 Ala. 170. p. 115. 
 Ives v. Leonard, 50 Mich. 183. p. 294. 
 Ivev V. Owens, 28 Ala. 642. p. 1.702. 
 Ivey r. State, 12 Ala. 276. p. 1535. 
 Ivevr. Phifer. 11 Ala 535. p. 1733. 
 Ivey V. State, 23 Ga. 576. p. 1771. 
 Ivey r. State, 43 Tex. 425. p. 1763. 
 Ivory V. Delore, 26 Mo. 505. p. 1591. 
 
 Jack V. Naber, 15 la. 450. p. 1994. 
 Jack V. State, 20 Tex. App. 656. p. 1697. 
 Jack V. State, 26 Tex. 1. pp. 1906, 1974, 1975, 
 
 1995. 
 Jackman v. Bowker, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 235. 
 
 pp. 1747, 1756. 
 Jackman r. State, 71 Ind. 149. p. 1784. 
 Jacks V. Adair, 33 Ark. 161 . p. 2080. 
 Jacks V. Stimpsou, 13 111. 701. pp. 1172, 1186, 
 
 1197. 
 Jackson r. Benson, o4 la. 654. p. 340. 
 Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 124. 
 
 p. 1130. 
 Jackson v. Burke, 1 Dill. C.C. (U. S.) 311. p. 
 
 968. 
 Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. (N. Y'.) 622. pp. 
 
 559, 560. 
 Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. (N. Y"".) 539. 
 
 p. 1130. 
 Jackson, V. Catlin, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 248. p. 
 
 876. 
 Jackson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 36 la. 451. p. 
 
 1300. 
 Jackson V. Cole, 16 Johns. (N.Y'.)257. p. 1090. 
 Jackson r. Com., 23 Gratt. (Va.) 919. pp. 69, 
 
 70, 71, 74, 75. 
 Jackson v. Dean, 1 Dongl. (Mich.) 519. pp. 
 
 1438, 1441. 
 Jackson v. Dickenson, 15 Johns. (X. Y'.) 309. 
 
 p. 1986. 
 Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209. p. 1003. 
 Jackson v. Ellis, 13 Johns. (X. Y.)118. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. (X. Y'.) 214. p. 468. 
 Jackson v. Evans, 73 N. C. 128. p. 424. 
 Jackson r. Feather R. W. Co., 14 Cal. 19. p. 
 
 392. 
 Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 337. p. 
 
 272. 
 Jackson v. Frier, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 192. pp. 
 
 620, 621. 
 Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. (N. Y'.) 99. p. 
 
 294. 
 Jackson v. Hardin, 83 Mo. 175. pp. 551, 1605, 
 
 1607. 
 Jackson v. Hawks, 2 Wend. (X. Y.) 619. p. 
 
 1997. 
 Jackson v. Heskete, 2 Stark. N. P. 618. pp. 
 
 216, 217, 219. 
 Jackson r. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 47 Ind. 
 
 4.54. p. 1224. 
 Jackson v. Jackson, 32 Ga. 325. pp. 1914, 
 
 1975. 
 Jackson v. Jackson, 40 Ga. 150. pp. 1931, 
 
 1932. 
 Jackson v. Jackson, 5 Cow. (X. Y'.) 173. p. 
 
 1977. 
 Jackson v. Jones, 3 Cow. (X. Y'.) 17. p. 589. 
 Jackson v. Joy, 9 Johns. (X. Y.) 102. p. 1044. 
 Jackson v. Lewis, 13 Johns. (X. Y'.) 505. p. 
 
 449. 
 Jackson v. Litch, 62 Pa. St. 451. pp. 385, 1623, 
 Jackson v. Mann, 2 Caines (X. Y'.), Rep. 92. 
 
 p. 170.
 
 Ixxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Jackson v. McVey, IS Johns. (N. Y.) C30. p. 
 
 27J. 
 Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 355. p. 
 
 1(144. 
 Jackson v. Ogden, 7 Johns. (X. Y.) 23S. p. 
 
 1(180. 
 Jackson i'.* Osborne, "2 Wond. (X. Y.) 555. 
 
 pi). 413, 4.^9. 
 Jacksou r. Parkhurst, 4 'SVend. (X. Y.) 369. 
 
 !>. .-SSI. 
 Jackson r. People, 18 111. S70. pp. 1567,1571, 
 
 157-2, 17SC, ISi^S. 
 Jackson i: Pbipps, 12 Johns. (X. Y.) 418. 
 
 pp. 872, 873. 
 Jackson v. PIttsford, 8 Blackl. (Ind.) 194. 
 
 pp. 89. 219. 
 Jacl<son V. Post, 15 Wend. (X. Y.) 588. p. 
 
 144,i. 
 Jackson v. Second Ave. R. Co., 47 X. Y. 274. 
 
 p. 1238. 
 Jacksou V. Sharp, 9 Johns. (X. Y.) 1(;3. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Jacksou V. Sharpe, 29 Ind. 167. p. 448. 
 Jacksou r. Smith, 21 Wis. 26. p. 1920. 
 Jacksou V. Sou,2Caines(X. Y.),178. pp.392, 
 
 393. 
 Jackson w. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 422. 
 
 p. 12.54. 
 Jackson r. State, 33 Ark. 180. p. 2098. 
 Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 2(!. p. (15. 
 Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 18. p. CO. 
 Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471. p. 371. 
 Jackson v. State, 51 Ga. 402. p. 85. 
 Jackson v. State, Ilorr. & Thoinp. Cas. Sclf- 
 
 Dcf. 476. pp. 1539, 1542, 1648. 
 Jackson V. State,6 Klackf. (Ind.) 461. p. 5. 
 Jacksou r. State, 14 Ind. 327. p. 2,57. 
 Jackson V. State, 4 Te.K. App. 292. pp. 17, 22. 
 Jack~on v. State, 15 Tex. App. 84. p. 169.5. 
 Jacksou r. State, 18 Tex. App. 586. pp. 737, 
 
 745, 1679, 1680. 
 Jacksou V. State, 20 Tex. App. 190. p. 1575. 
 Jackson v. State, 25 Tex. (Supp.) 229. p. 
 
 1744. 
 Ja(!kson v. Stephens, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 495. 
 
 11. 1044. 
 Jacksou V. Stetson, 15 Mass. 48. pp. 1463, 
 
 147(1. 
 Jackson V. Thomas, 16 Johns. (X. Y.) 293. 
 
 11. 1044. 
 Jackson v. Town, 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 599. p. 
 
 1445. 
 Jackson V. Varrick, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 238. p. 
 
 391. 
 Jackson V. Waters, 12 Johns. (X. Y"".) 365. p. 
 
 1(141. 
 Jackson V. AA'heat, 18 Johns. (X. Y.) 40. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Jackson v. Williams, 2 T. R. 281. pp. 1584, 
 
 1983, 19S5. 
 Jackson's Case, 25 Flow. St. Tr. 804. p. 88. 
 Jacob r. Ursullne Xuus, 2 Mart. (La.) 269; 
 
 8. f. 5 Am. Dec. 7:!0. p. 899. 
 Jacol.sf. Doolv, 1 Idaho, 36. p. 1984. 
 Jacobs V. KiKard, 25 Pa. Si. 45. p. 1065. 
 Jacobs V. PhlUips, 8 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 158. p. 
 
 Jjicolis V. State, 9 Tex. Anp. 278. pp. 60,70. 
 Jacobson V. LeGrauge, 3 .Johns. (N. Y.) 199. 
 
 Ti. 895». 
 Jacobson v. Metzger, 35 Mich. 103. pp. 376, 
 
 389. 
 Jacobus r. St. Panl &c. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125; 
 
 8. r. 1 Cent. L. .J. 37.5. p. 1298. 
 Jac.pics V. Collins, 2 Ulatchf. (U. S.) 23. pp. 
 
 .592, .593. 
 Ja<(,iics ,: Weeks, 7 Watts (Pa.), 261. pp. 
 
 87(1, 1052. 
 Jalle V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118. p. 1226. 
 
 James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 221. p. 1,578. 
 .lauies r. Cowing, 82 X. Y. 449. p. 2016. 
 James v. Langdon, 7 B. Mon. 193. pp. 1764, 
 
 1755. 
 James J'. Mickcv, 26 S. C. 270; s. c. 2 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 130. p. 1770. 
 James v. 0'Dri.>coll, 2 Bay (S. C), 101; s. c. 1 
 
 Am. Dec. 632. p. 899. 
 James v. Phel|>s, 11 Ad. & El. 483. p. 118L 
 James v. Smith, 2 So. Car. 183. p. 152. 
 James v. State, .53 Ala. :)S0. pp. 81, 111. 
 James c. Slate, 45 Miss. 572. pp. 1821, 1860, 
 
 1861, 1864, 1997. 
 James v. State, .55 Miss. ,57. pp. 1910, 1997. 
 Jameson r. Androscoggin R. Co., .52 Me'. 412. 
 
 pp. 110,113. 
 Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore, 148. pp. 
 
 499, 512. 
 Jameson r. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 224. p. 939. 
 .lane r. Com., 2 Melc (Ky.) 90. p. 1824. 
 Janrin r. Scammon, 29 N. II. 280. p. 261. 
 Janseu r. AU^hison, 16 Kan. 358. p. 1249. 
 Jausen v. Acker, 23 Wend. (X. Y.) 480. p. 
 
 1585. 
 Jarnagln v. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 529. pp. 
 
 234, 1904. 
 •Taniagin >: State, 6 Tex. App. 465. p. 1564. 
 .Jacques r. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va ) 88. p. 53. 
 .J.acqucsr. Com., 10 (;raU. (Va.) 090. p. 54. 
 Jaccjues V. Hortou, 76 Ala. 239. pp. 353, 356, 
 
 365. 
 Jaciuithr. nndson,5 Mich. 123. p. 876. 
 Jarrell v. State, 58 Ind. 293. pp. 1828, 1863, 
 
 1911. 
 .Tarrelt v. Arnold, 30 Ga. 323. p. 16;?3. 
 .Jarrettv. Jarrett. 11 W. Va. 584. p. 1780. 
 Jaspers v. Lane, 17 -Minn. 296. p. 2027. 
 Jarvist'. Strong, 8 Ind. 284. pp. 2112, 2113. 
 Jaynes, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 638. p. 590. 
 .Jeitersou v. State, 52 Miss. 767. pp. 22, 85. 
 Jefferson City v. Opel, 67 Mo. 394. pp. 1980, 
 
 2121, 2128. 
 Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla. 980. p. 56. 
 Jefferson Couuiv r. Savory, 2 G. Greene 
 
 (la.), 238. p. 84.5. 
 Jefferson I{. Co. i'. Cleveland, 2 Bush (Ky.), 
 
 468. p. 1374. 
 Jeffersonville &c,. R. Co. v. Bowen, 40 Ind. 
 
 545. pp. 679, 691, 1233. 
 Jetrersonville «&c. R. Co. r. Cox, 37 Ind. 352. 
 
 p. 1742. 
 Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 
 
 228. pp. 1224, 12;6. 
 Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 
 
 5(i8. p. 1485. 
 Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 3. 
 
 pji. 1292, 1293. 
 Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Swift, 26 Ind. 
 
 4.59. p. 1668. 
 Jefford r. Ringgold, 6 Ala. 544. p. 614. 
 .IclTorils r. Crmnp, cited, p. 1340. 
 .JclFrics r. Ranilall, 14 Mass. 20,5. pp. 120, 121, 
 .Icniison v. Dcaring, 41 Ala. 2815. p. 1670. 
 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumu. (U. S.) 221. p. 
 
 12S3. 
 Jencks r. Smith, 1 N. Y. 90. pp. 1737, 1740. 
 Jeudwine r. Sljide, 1 Ksp. ,572. p. 927. 
 .Jenkins r. Corwin, .55 Ind. 21. p. 2102. 
 Jenkins v. Davies, 10 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 314. p. 
 
 291. 
 Jenkins v. Little IMlaml R. Co., 2 Disney 
 
 (Oh.), 49. Tip. 1208. 1212. 
 .Jenkins r. Xorlli Carolina Ore Dressing 
 
 Co., 65 N. C. .5(;;5. pp. 728, 740. 
 Jenkins r. State, 82 y\la. 86; a. c. 2 South. 
 
 I!<M>- !•''"• J'l'- bi'i2, 1731, 1890. 
 Jenkln-i v. Slate, 1 Tex. App. 346. pp.1664, 
 
 1695, 1763.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 Jenkins v. State, 2 Tex. App. 346. p. 1564. 
 Jenkins v. State, 41 Tex. VIS. pp. 1903, 
 
 197.i. 
 Jenkins v. Tobin, 31 Ark. 307. pp. 1637, 
 
 1638. 
 Jenks V. Knott's Co., 58 la. 549. p. 551. 
 Jenks V. State, 39 Ind. 1. p. 2142. 
 Jenness v. Berry, 17 N. H. 549. p. 865. 
 Jennie f. Delesdcrnier, 20 Me. 183. p. 192. 
 Jennings v. Durliam, 101 Ind. 391. p. 2026. 
 Jennings v. Prentice, 39 Micti. 421. pp. 263, 
 
 559. 
 Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358. p. 795. 
 Jennings r. Slierwood, 8 Conn. 122. p. 839. 
 Jesse i\ State, 20 Ga. 156. pj). 43, 82, 312. 
 Jessup V. Eldridge, 1 N. J. L. 401. pp. 1940, 
 
 1954. 
 Jessup V. Gragg, 12 Ga. 261. p. 1632. 
 Jeter v. Heard, 12 La. Ann. 3. pp. 1983, 
 
 1984. 
 Jewell V. Blanford, 7 Dana (Ky.), 473. p. 
 
 2063. 
 Jewell V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 54 AVis. 610. 
 
 p. 2030. 
 JeweU V. Com., 22 Pa. St. 94. pp. 30, 45, 
 
 82. 
 Jewell V. Parr, 13 C. B. 909. pp. 1601, 1602, 
 
 1605. 
 Jewell V. Schroeppel, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 564. 
 
 p. 892. 
 Jewsbury v. Sperry, 85 III. .56. p. 1920. 
 Jezeph V. Ingram, 8 Taunt. S38. p. 1443. 
 Jilz, Ex parte, 64 Mo. 205. pp. 154, 253, 
 
 2.54. 
 Jim V. State, 4 Humpli. (Tenn.) 289. p. 
 
 19(;8. 
 
 Jocli c. Dankivardt, 85 111. 381. p. 1211. 
 John V. State, 16 Fla. 554. pp. 81, 129. 
 John V. State, 16 Ga. 200. pp. 72, 463. 
 Johns V. Com. (Ky.), 3 S. AV. Rep. 369. p. 23. 
 John e. Hodges, 60 Md. 215; s. c. 45 Am. 
 
 Rep. 722. p. 118. 
 Johns V. Davidson, 16 Pa. St. 512. p. 1089. 
 Johns V. People, 25 Mich. 500. p. 89. 
 Johns V. State, 104 Ind. .i,i7. p. 2110. 
 Johnson v. Addleman, 35 111. 268. p. 560. 
 Johnson r. Americas, 46 Ga. 80. p. 55. 
 Johnson v. Beasley, 65 Mo. 25. p. 137. 
 Johnson v. Blackman, 11 Conn. 342. p. 
 
 17.50, 
 Johnson v. Blenkensopp, 5 Jur. 870. p. 
 
 1136. 
 Johnson V. Boston Tow-boat Co., 135 Mass. 
 
 209. ]). 1240. 
 Johnson v. Brailsford, 2 Nott & McC. (S. 
 
 C.) 282. p. 1008. 
 Johnson r. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71. p. 1470. 
 Johnson v. Canal &c. R. Co., 27 La. Ann. 53. 
 
 p. 1223. 
 Johnson v. Central &c. R. Co., 56 Vt. 707. 
 
 p. 516. 
 Johnson v. Chambers, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 
 287. p. 1195. 
 Johnson v. ("lark, 6 Ark. 321. p. 869. 
 Johnson r. Cole, 2 X. J. L. 266. p. 20. 
 Johnson v. Coles, 21 Minn. 108. p. 364. 
 Johnson r. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 
 
 598. p. 132. 
 Johnson v. Continental Ins. Co., 39 Mich. 
 
 33. p. 2033. 
 Johnson v. Davenport, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 393. pp. 1982, n)S6. 
 Johnson v. Donaldson, 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 287. !>. 265. 
 Johnson r. Grcini, 17 Nev. 417. pp. 697, 1928. 
 Johnson v. Glover. 10 North E. Rep. (111.) 
 
 214; s. c. 121 111. 283. p. 3.39. 
 Johnson r. Haverhill, 35 K. H. 52. pp.1246, 
 
 1247, 1377,2021,2027. 
 
 Johnson v. Hodges, 65 Mo. 589. p. 2144. 
 Johnson v. Howe, 7 111. 342. p. 1997. 
 Johnson v. Hubbard, 22 Kan. 277. p. 1966. 
 Johnson r. Hudson &c. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65; 
 
 s. c. 6 Duer (X. Y.), 633; 5 Duer (X. Y.), 21. 
 
 pp. 1209, 1211, 1223, 1225, 1255. 
 Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kan. 277. pp. 1966, 
 
 1984, 1995, 2027. 
 Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28. p. 1210. 
 Johnson v. Josephs, 75 Me. 544. pp. 214, 215, 
 
 218, 221. 
 Johnson v. Kinsey. 7 Ga. 428. pp. 1658, 1701. 
 Johnson v. Lyon, 14 la. 434. p. 2075. 
 Johnson v. Martin, 25 Ga. 269. p. 237. 
 Johnson v. Mason, 27 Mo. 511. p. 310. 
 Johnson v. Maxwell, 87 N. C. 18. pp. 214, 
 
 219. 
 Johnson v. McAllister, 30 Mo. 327. p. 1440, 
 
 1437. 
 Johnson v. McCulloch, 89 Ind. 270. pp . 2082, 
 
 2130. 
 Johnson v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 568. pp. 1271, 
 
 1274. 
 Jolinson V. Moss, 45 Cal. 515. p. 1607. 
 Johnson v. Moulton, 2 111. 532. p. 1214. 
 Johnson v. Myers, 9 X. East. Rep. 55. p. 
 
 1627. 
 Johnson v. Patterson, 2 Hawks (X. C), 183. 
 
 p. 489. 
 Johnson v. Paul, 23 Minn. 46. p. 2075. 
 Johnson v. Perry, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 569. p. 
 
 1964. 
 Johnson v. Preston, 9 Neb. 474. p. 1090. 
 Johnson v. Railway Co., 25 W. Va. 570. p. 
 
 12,54. 
 Johnson v. Revnolds, 3 Kan. 257. p. 1341. 
 Johnson r. Richardson, 17 111. .302. p. 1340. 
 Johnson v. Richardson, 52 Tex. 481. p. 54. 
 Johnson v. Root, 2 Cliff. C. C. (U. S.) 108. 
 
 pp. 1974, 1980, 1981. 
 Jolinson V. San Francisco Superior Court, 
 
 63 Cal. 578. p. 167. 
 Johnson v. Sims, 50 Ga. 119. p. 1634. 
 Johnson,;-. State, 17 Ala. 618. p. 302. 
 Johnson r. State, 47 Ala. 9. p. 129. 
 Johnson r. State, 73 Ala. 523. p. 1535. 
 Johnson v. State, 43 Ark. 391. pp. 2068, 2128. 
 Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55. p. 254. 
 Johnson v. state, 26 Ga. 611. p. 1670. 
 Johnson r. State, 3i) (ia. 426. p. 1634. 
 Johnson v. State. 48 Ga. 116. p. 459. 
 Johnson r. State, 5S Ga. 491. p. 81. 
 Johnson r. State, 59 Ga. 142. pp. 727, 730. 
 Johnson r. State, 2 Ind. 652. p. 253. 
 Johnson V. State, 21 Ind. 329. p. 467. 
 Johnson v. State, 4 G. Greene (la.), 65. p. 
 
 464. 
 Johnson v. State, 63 Miss. 313. p. 791. 
 Johnson v. State, 7 Mo. 183. p. 1550. 
 Johnson v. State, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 47. p. 72. 
 Johnson t'. State, 64 Tenn. 450. p. 1904. 
 Johnson v. State, 10 Tex. App. 571. nn. 
 
 1878,1880. 
 Johnson v. State, 12 Tex. App. 38.5. p. 1896. 
 Johnson ;•. State, 18 Tex. App. 3S5. iip. 1679. 
 
 1696, 1868. 
 Johnson r. State, 21 Tex. App. 368. p. 1790. 
 Johnson v. State, 27 Tex. 758. pp. 116, 1674, 
 
 1753, 1974, 1975, 1985, 1995. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 4 Tex. App. 268. pp. 17. 
 24. 1 «- i^t- , 
 
 Johnson V. State, 10 Tex. App. 571. pp. 253, 
 
 2.55. 
 Johnson t'. Stone, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 419, 
 
 pp. 1151, 11.52. 
 Johnson v. Terrv, 35 Ark. 220. p. 2145. 
 Jahnson v. Totten, 3 Cal. 343. p. 1101. 
 Johnson V. Weed, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 310. v. 
 
 959.
 
 xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Johnson r. AVhltman Agr. Co., 20 Mo. App. 
 
 100. p. 1129. 
 Johnson V. AVideman, Dudley (S. C), 70. p. 
 
 214. 
 Jolmson V. AViley, 74 lud. 233. pp. 574, 2112, 
 
 21i:{. 
 Johnson t'. Wilson, 1 Plnney ("Wis.), 66. p. 
 
 2065. 
 Johnson r. AVrlght, 19 Ga. 509. p. 324. 
 Johnson v. AVright, 48 iiii. 648. n. 1633. 
 Johnston v. Cirarleston, 3 So. Car. 232. p. 
 
 1246. 
 Johnston v. Crawlev, 22 Ga. 348. p. 1600. 
 Johnston r. Jones, 1 Black (U. S.),209. pp. 
 
 37."), 408, 1740, lH.ie. 
 Johnston v. Mason, 27 Mo. 511. p. 312. 
 Johnston v. Sutton, 1 T. R. 544. pp. 1161, 
 
 1162, 1163, 1167, 1170, 1181, 1191. 
 Johr V. People, 26 Mich. 427. p. 122. 
 Joice V. Alexander, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 528. pp.46. 93,97.100. 
 Joiner v. Tan Alstyue, 30 N. W. Rep. 944; 
 
 «. c. 20 Neb. 578. p- 2051. 
 Jolland V. Stainbridire, 3 Ve8. 478. p. 1093. 
 Jolleyr. Tavlor, 1 (ami). 143. pp. 608, 609. 
 Joliffe V. Hile, 1 Call (Va.), 301. p. 918. 
 Jones r. Adams. 17 Kev. 84. p. 2087. 
 Jones V. Andover, 10 Allen (Mass.), 18. p. 
 
 1210. 
 Jones V. Angell, 95 lud. 376. pp. 563, 1750. 
 Jones V. Baird, 76 Ind. 164. p. 2(i08. 
 Jones i: Brownlicld, 2 Pa. St. 55. p. 1007. 
 Jones V. Buffum, 50 111. 277. p. 1741. 
 Jones V. Butterworth, 3 N. J. L. 345. p. 
 
 96. 
 Jones V. Cox, 7 INfo. 173. p. 1618. 
 Jones V. Evans, 28 AVis. 168. p. 2100. 
 Jones V. Foster, 67 AVis. 296; s. c. 30 N. AV. 
 
 Rep. 697. p. 2033. 
 Jones V. Gaither, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 106. 
 
 p. 2095. 
 Jones V. GwTun. 10 Mod. 214. p. 1161. 
 Jones V. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 14. pp. 1426, 
 
 1694, 1698. 
 Jones V. Hook, 47 Mo. 329. pp. 912,914. 
 Jones V. Holland, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 377. p 
 
 344. 
 Jones r. Inness. 32 Kan. 177. p. 191. 
 Jones V. Johns, 3 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 426 
 
 p. 3.')8. 
 Jones V. Johnson, 3 A\"atts & S. (Pa.) 276 
 
 pp. 9.')5, 9.')8. 
 Jones V. Jones, 71 111. 562. p. 1708. 
 Jones 1'. Jones, 91 Ind. 72. pp. 2071, 2076. 
 Jones V. Jones, 57 .AIo. 138. pp. 1642, 1688, 
 Jones V. Jones, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 491, p 
 
 1016. 
 Jones V. Jones, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 448. p 
 
 1016. 
 Jones V. Kea, 4 Dev. (N. C.) .301. p. 829. 
 Jones V. Kimbro,6 Humph. (Tenn.) 319. pp 
 
 195, 200. 
 Jones V. Londemian, 39 Mo. 288. p. 1607. 
 Jones V. M'Williams, 6 Munf. (Va.) 501. p 
 
 2017. 
 Jones r. Michigan &c. R. Co., 59 Mich. 437 
 
 s. e. 26 N. ^V. Rep. 662. p. 1312. 
 Jones r. Mills, 10 Com. Bench (N. S.) 788; s, 
 
 r. al I.. J. V. P. 66. )). ii;». 
 Jones r. Parker. 20 N. H., 31. p. 612. 
 Jones V. J'ashbv,29 N. AV. Rep. 374. p. 1622 
 Jones r. Peoi>le, 6 Colo. 4.52. ]). 78. 
 Jones r. I'eople, 2 Colo. 351. pp. 78, 117, 125 
 
 443, 445, 1772. 
 Jones v. Porter, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) i:!2. p 
 
 1044. 
 Jones r. Pullen, 66 Ala. 306. ]). 802. 
 Jones V. Railro.-id Co., 79 .Mo. '.)•.'. p. 925. 
 Jones V. Smitli,64 N. Y. 180. p. 312. 
 
 Jones f. State, 1 Ga. 610. p. 42. 
 
 Jones r. Sprague, 3 111. 55. p. 2130. 
 
 Jones r. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 475. pp. 65, 
 
 91, 103, 1902, 1904. 
 Jones v. State, 65 Ga. 506. pp. 727, 732, 1637, 
 
 1640, 1668, 1728, 17.")6. 
 Jones V. State, 3 Blackf. (lud.) 37. pp. 15, 
 
 32, 33, 104. 
 Jones r. State, 59 Ind. 229. p. 1.566. 
 Jones r. State, 57 Miss. 684. ji. 66. 
 Jones v. State, 20 Ohio, 34. i). 1698. 
 .Jones V. State, 3 Tex. App. 150. p. 2.53. 
 Jones V. State, 3 Tex. App. 228. p. 1537. 
 Jones r. State, 3 Tex. App. 575. p. 20. 
 Jones V. State, 7 Tex. Ap]).838. p. 1560. 
 Jones V. State. 8 Tex. App. 648. p. 103. 
 Jones V. State, 10 Tex. App. 532. j). 1564. 
 Jones V. State, 13 Tex. 168. pp. 1635, 1670, 
 
 1903, 1929, 1931. 
 Jones V. State, 13 Tex. App. 11. pp. 1878, 
 
 1880,1889. 
 Jones V. State, 14 Tex. App. 85. p. 1763. 
 Jones r. State, 18 Tex. App. 485. p. 1538. 
 Jones r. State (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1851), 8 West. 
 
 L. J. 508. p. .32. 
 Jones r. Talbot, 4 IMo. 279. pp. 1682, 1710. 
 Jones V. Trustees, 1 Ind. 109. p. 572. 
 Jones V. Tucker, 41 X. H. .546. p. 294. 
 Jones r. A'ail, 30 X. J L. 135. p. 1914. 
 Jones V. A'an Patten, 3 Ind. 107. p. 1710. 
 Jones V. Vanzandt, 2 McLean (U. S.), 611 
 
 p. 89. 
 Jones V. AVilliamson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 371 
 
 |). 192. 
 Jones V. AVilson, 3 Johns. (N. T.) 434. p. 898 
 Jones r. AVood, 16 Pa. St. 25. p. 1668. 
 Jordaine r. Lashbrooke, 7 T. R. 601. p. 464, 
 Jordan r. Bowden, 46 N. Y. Super. 355. p 
 
 653. 
 Jordan r. Fall River R. Co., 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 69. pp. 1151, 11.52. 
 Jordan v. Meredith. 1 Binu. (Pa.) 27. p. 113. 
 Jordan r. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457. p. 299. 
 Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 54."). j). 126. 
 .Jordan v. State, 14 Tex. 436. p. 152. 
 .Jordan v. State, 5 Tex. App. 422. p. 1744. 
 Joseph V. Com. (Ky.), 1 S. A\'. Rep. 4. p. 
 
 430. 
 Joseph 7-. Mather, 110 Ind. 114. p. 2138. 
 Josephine v. State. 39 Miss. 613. p. in4. 
 Josev ?•. \\ ilmington &c. R. Co., 12 Rich. L. 
 
 134" p. 118. 
 Joslin c. Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co., 55 
 
 Mich. 323. p. 316. 
 Jov V. Adams, 26 .Ale. .330. p. 961. 
 •lov r. Slate, 14 Ind. 139. p. 27. 
 Juvee r. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 273. pp. 1964, 
 
 i',«;,"), I'.Kw;, 1092. 
 Judah c. Trustees, 23 Ind. 272. pp. 215, 221, 
 
 2 '^2. 
 Ju(lJ!re r. Leclalre, 31 Mo. 127. p. 852. 
 Judge of Probate v. Green, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 
 14(). 11.265. 
 Judge of Probate v. Stone, 44 N. H. 593. pp. 
 
 21'.t, 243, .581. 
 .Judge r. Moore, 9 Fla. 269. p. 1669. 
 .Judson t\ Kslava, Minor (Ala.), 3. p. 9. 
 .ludson r. Reardon. 16 AHnn. 431. j). 1741. 
 Judson, Ex parte, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 89. p. 
 
 ]t;6. 
 Judson, In re, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 148. p. 186. 
 Judv V. Gerard, 4 McLean (U. S.), 360. p. 
 
 886 
 Jumpertz v. People, 21 111. 411. pp. 1903, 
 
 19()C,, J008. 
 Juneau Bank r. McSpcdou, 5 Blss. 64 p. 
 
 188. 
 Justice r. Kirlin, 17 Ind. .o88. p. 833 
 Justices V. GrilHn &c. Co., 15 Ga. 39, p. 1750.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCl 
 
 K. 
 
 Kabe v. Eagle, 2f> "SVis. 108. p. 2064. 
 
 £ahii V. Central Smelting Co., 2 Utah, 370. p. 
 
 877. 
 Kahn's Case, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 147; a. c. 19 
 
 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 475. p. 153 
 Kaime v. Omro,4!t "Wis. 371. pp. 713, 714. 
 Kaim v. State, 16 Tex. App. 282. p. 268. 
 Kalamazoo Noveltv Mfg. Co.t;. McAllister, 36 
 
 Mich. 327. pp. W38, 1944. 
 Kalckhoff v. Zoehrlant, 43 Wis. 373. p. 2028. 
 Kaler v. Builders' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 120 
 
 Mass. 33.5. pp. 416, 417. 
 Kalk t: Fielding, 50 Wis. 339. pp. 376, 377. 
 Kalle I', People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 591. p. 
 
 311. 
 Kallman v. United States Express Co., 3 Kan. 
 
 205. p. 1364. 
 Kane v. Com., 89 Pa. St. 522; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 
 
 787. pp. 1512, 1521, 1530. 
 Kanna v. Koster, 15 Week. Dig. (N. Y.) 119. 
 
 p. 1559. 
 Kanouse v. Kanouse, 36 111. 4.39. p. 331. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Allen, 28 Kan. 285. p. 
 
 673. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Brady, 17 Kan. 380. p. 
 
 1226. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kan. 83. p. 
 
 1488. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Lane, 33 Kan. 704. p. 
 
 1300. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37; s. c. 
 
 9 Kan. 620 pp. 560, 503, 1225, 2034, 2035, 
 
 2041. 
 Kansas &c. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 8 Kfin. 623. 
 
 p. 2038. 
 Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 
 
 645. pp. 1344, 1360. 1373, 1497. 
 Karle r. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 55 Mo. 476. 
 
 pp. 1218, 13U7, 1756. 
 Karr r. Parks, 40 Cal. 188. pp. 1233, 1234. 
 Karriger v. Greb, 42 Mo. 44. p. 1670. 
 Kassebaum v. State, 45 Ind. 277. p. .50. 
 Kauffman r. Babcock, 2 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 
 
 878 ; s. c. 66 Tex. 241. p. 343. 
 Kauflfman v. Griesemer, 20 Pa. St. 467. p. 
 
 1698. 
 Kauffman v. Harrington, 23 Mo. App. 573. 
 
 p. 2051. 
 Kaufman r. State, 49 Ind. 248. pp. 1790, 1847. 
 Kavauaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis. 618. p. 
 
 1235. 
 Kay r. XoU, 20 Xeb. 380 ; s. c. 30 N. W. Rep. 
 
 269. pp. 1771,2041. 
 Kay r. Pennsylvania R. Co., 65 Pa. St. 269. 
 
 p. 1234. 
 Kealing v. Van Sickle, 74 Ind. 529. p. 2010. 
 Kearnev v. Gough, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 457. pp. 
 
 227, 233. 
 kearney v. Holmes, 6 La. Ann. 373. p. 1197. 
 Kearnev v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 
 
 411 ; s. c. L. R. 6 Q. B. 759; 2 Thomp. Neg. 
 
 1220. p. 1222. 
 Kearney v. New York, 92 X. Y. 617. pp. 620, 
 
 621,622. 
 Kearney, Ex parte. 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 38. pp. 
 
 150, 152, 154. 
 Kearney's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 459. p. 
 
 138. 
 Ke.-irns v. Snowden, 104 Mass. 63, n. p. 1210. 
 Keating v Irish, Lutw. 227. p. 1128. 
 Keating r. State, 44 Ind. 449. p. 2110. 
 Keator r. Peojjle, 32 Mich. 484. pp. 452, 456. 
 Kee i: State, 28 Ark. 155. ji. 19.50. 
 Kcech V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 17 Md. 32. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Keeler v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523. 
 
 p. 974. 
 
 Keely v. State, 14 Ind. 36. p. 1566. 
 Keen v. Preston, 24 Ind. 395. p. 916. 
 Keeuan v. Com., 44 Pa. St. 55. p. 1571. 
 Keenan v. State, 8 Wis. 132. pp. 125, 1903, 
 
 1907,1908. 
 Keener v. Kauffman, 16 Md. 296. p. 1046. 
 Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194. pp. 119, 120, 1509. 
 Keerl v. Bridgers, 10 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 612. 
 
 p. 958. 
 Keiser r. Lines, 57 Ind. 431. p. 63. 
 Keiser v. State, 83 Ind. 234. pp. 1520, 1525, 
 
 1526. 
 Keith V. Herschberg Optical Co., 48 Ark. 138. 
 
 p. 2122. 
 Keith V. Lathrop, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 454. p. 
 
 515. 
 Keith i\ New Haven &c. R. Co., 140 Mass. 175. 
 
 p. 814. 
 Keith V. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435. p. 257. 
 Keith r. WombeU, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 217. p. 265. 
 Keithley v. Keithley, 85 Mo. 217. p. 1712. 
 Kelbourni'. Bradley, 3 Day (Conn.), 356; s. c, 
 
 3 Am. Dec. 237. p. 889. 
 Kelham r. The Kensington, 24 La. Ann. 100. 
 
 pp. 1346, 1356, 1359. 
 Kell V. Brillinger, 84 Pa. St. 276. p. 35. 
 Kellar v. Roberts, Bright (Pa.), 109. p. 264. 
 Keller r. Xew York &c. R. Co., 24 How. Pr. 
 
 (X. Y.)172. p. 1212. 
 Keller v. Strasburger, 90 X*. Y. 379. p. 1559. 
 Kelley v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 138. 
 
 pp. 1305, 1307. 
 Kelley v. People, .55 N. Y. 565; s. c. 14 Am. 
 
 Rep. 342. pp. 47, 48, 1811. 
 Kelley v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 140. pp. 1305. 
 
 1307. 
 Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339. p. 796. 
 Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 76. p. 1764. 
 Kelley v. State, 53 Ind. 312. p. 1574. 
 Kelley v. State, 18 Tex. App. 262. p. 1762. 
 Kelley v. United States Express Co., 45 Mo. 
 
 428. p. 1770. 
 Kelley v. Weber, 9 Abb. N. C. (X*. Y.) 62. p. 
 
 630. 
 Kellogg V. Adams, 51 Wis. 141. p. 1003. 
 Kellogg r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 26 Wis. 223: 
 
 s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 69. p. 1485. 
 Kellogg V. French, 15 Gray (Mass.), 354. p. 
 
 Kellogg r. Nelson, 5 Wis. 125. p. 375. 
 Kellogg r. Steiner, 29 Wis. 626. p. 1662. 
 Kellogg V. Wilder, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 455. 
 
 p. 1931. 
 Kelly V. Beauchamp, 59 Mo. 178. pp. 1493. 
 
 1494. 
 Kelly V. Brooks, 25 Ala. 523. p. 383. 
 Kelly r. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 70 Mo. 604. p. 
 
 1599. 
 Kelly V. Jackson, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 622. pp. 1708, 
 
 1709, iS92. 
 Kelly f.Mack, 49 Cal. 523. p. 2089. 
 Kelly V. Sheehy, 8 Daly (N. Y.),29. p. 1983. 
 Kelly V State, 3 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 518. 
 
 p. 23. 
 Kelly V. Troy Ins. Co., 3 Wis, 254. p. 250. 
 Kelly r. Wright, 65 Wis. 236. p. 191. 
 Kelsear. Haines, 41 X'. H. 246. pp. 346,912. 
 Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708. p. 1247. 
 KelsoV. Townsend, 13 Tex. 140. p. 1668. 
 Kelton r. Bevius, Cooke (Tenn.), 90. pp. 
 
 1161,1176,1181,1197. 
 Kemmerer v. Edelmau, 23 Pa. St. 143. p. 
 
 1380. 
 Kemp r. Dcrrett, 3 Camp. 510. p. 1135. 
 Kemp 1-. Kennedy, 5 Crauch (U. S.), 185. p. 
 
 136. 
 Kemp r. Phillips, 55 Vt. 69. p. 1245. 
 Kemp V. State. 13 Tox. App. 561. pp. 1545, 
 
 1546, 1557, 1571, 1573,1891.
 
 XCll 
 
 TAHLE OF CASES. 
 
 Kemp V. State, 38 Tex. 111. p. 312. 
 Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Hush (Ky.), 87. p. 
 
 55. 
 Kempinger v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 3 Mo. 
 
 App. 5S1. i>. l'2;?-2. 
 Kenan r. ilollowav, 16 Ala. 53. p. 1702. 
 Kendall r. Albla (Iowa), 34 N. W. Kep. 833. 
 
 pp. 5.'>, 5(5. 
 Kendall v. IJrownson. 47 X. H. ISfi. p. 322. 
 Kendall r. May, 10 Allen (Mass.l, M. p. 293. 
 Kendel v. Judah, 63 Ind. 291. p. 2140. 
 Kendrick V. Cisco, "7 Teun. (3 Lea) 248. p. 
 
 1703. 
 Kendrick V. Com.,7S Va. 490. pp. 264 26S. 
 Keudrick v. State, 55 Miss. 436. p. 1">42. 
 Kennard v. Hurtou. 25 Me. 39. p. 1224. 
 Kenneda v. State, 16 Tex. App. 2.5S. pp. 1695, 
 
 1A">5. 
 Kennedy v. Bohannon, 11 B. Mon. (Kj-.) IIS. 
 
 Pl>. 1096, ia)7, 109S. 
 ICennedy v. Com., 14 Bush (Ky.), 340. pp. 19, 
 
 110,117,119. 
 Kennedy v. Dale, 4 "SVatts & S. (Pa.) 176. p. 
 
 92. 
 Kennedy v. Gibbs, 15 111. 406. p. 1125. 
 Kennedy V. Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503. p. 
 
 343. 
 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 2 Ala. 571. p. S69. 
 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 18 N. J. L. 450. pp. 
 
 1964, 1967. 
 Kennedy v. Moore. 17 S. C. 464. p. 218. 
 Kennedy v. North Mo. 11. Co., 36 Mo. 351. j). 
 
 1677. 
 Kennedy v. People, 40 111. 488. pp. 1815, 1833, 
 
 1834, 1843. 
 Kennedy v. Prueltt, 24 Mo. App. 414. p. 1059. 
 Kennedy v. State, 19 Tex. App. 620. pp. 65, 
 
 321. 
 Kennev v Altvater, 77 Pa. St. 34. p. 1101. 
 Kenney v. Kailroad Co., 70 Mo. 244. p. 1311. 
 Kennon v. State, 7 Tex. App. 326. p. 127. 
 Kenrick v. Heppard, 23 Ohio St. 333. pp. 118, 
 
 120. 
 Kent V. Charlesto\yn, 2 Gray (Mass.), 281. p. 
 
 113. 
 Kent V. Elstob, 3 East, 18. p. 1223. 
 Kent r. IIarcourt,33 Barb. (N. Y.) 491. p. 1625. 
 Kent V. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591. pp. 310, .516. 
 Kent r. Masson, 1 Bradw. (III.) 466. p. 365. 
 Kent r. Miltenberger, 13 Mo. App. 503. pp. 
 
 882, 883. 
 Kent V. Tyson, 20 N. H. 121. pp. 1698, 1913, 
 
 1956. 
 Kenworthy ?;. Ironton, 41 Wis. 655. p. 1270 
 Kenworthy r. Williams, 5 Ind. 375. i)p. 1726, 
 
 1727. 
 Kenyon v. New York &c. R. Co., 5 llun (X. 
 
 Y.),479. p. 1235. 
 Kenyon v. Sutherland, 8 111. 99. p. 746. 
 Keokl' V. Main, .52 X. Y. Sui)er. 160. p. 105. 
 Keokuk &c. Packet Co. v. True, 83 111. 609. p. 
 
 1286. 
 Keongh v. McXitt, 6 Minn. 513. p. 098. 
 Kepperly r. Kanisden, S3 111. 3M. p. 1224. 
 Kerby t'. Com., 7 Leigh (Va.). 747. !>. 4S. 
 Keruf. Soiiih St. Louis ."Slut. In.^. Co.. 40 Mo. 
 
 19. p. 979. 
 Kernodle v. Cason, 25 Ind. :'62. p. I'O. 
 Kerner r. Peligo. 25 Kan. C25. jip. 2U00, 2073. 
 Kerr c. Day. 14 Pa. St. 112. p. lo.-i2. 
 Kerr r. Korgiic, 54 111. .182. i-. 1232. 
 Kerr I', (iilniore. 6 Watts (Pa.). 4"l. p. 870. 
 Kerr r. Mc(;uire. 28 N. Y. 416. p. Oil. 
 Kerr v. Wlllan, 2 Stark. 53. j). 1364. 
 Kerr r. Workman, Add. (I'a.) 270. p. 1167. 
 Kerr.ilns v. I'cople, 60 X. Y. 221. ]>]). 345, ,52>'. 
 Kerrigan, Matter of, 33 N. J. L. 314. pp. 137, 
 
 13S, l:!9, 140. 
 Kcrschbaugher v. Slusser, 12 Iud.4,53. j). 106. 
 
 Kerwin.Ex parte. S Cow. (X. T.) 118. p. 1033. 
 lve>lcr r. MyiTs, 41 Ind. 543. pp. 2107. 2111, 
 
 2117,2121,212.;. 
 Ketchani c. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. T.) 144. pp. 
 
 llol, 1103,1104. 
 Kctchum V. K\i)ress Co., 52 Mo. 390. p. 1318. 
 Kettle V. Ilaryev, 21 Vt. 301. p. 892. 
 Key V. lIolenian,2 Bay (S. C.),315. p. 1980. 
 Key V. Lynn, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 338. p. 361. 
 Keys i: (;rant, 118 I'. .^."25. p. 1075. 
 KeVser v. Kvans, 30 Pa. St. 507. p. 1046. 
 Kibler v. Mcllwain, 16 S. C. 551. pp. 383, 
 
 384. 
 Kidd V. Com., 16 Pa. St. 426. p. 961. 
 Kidd r. Cromwell, 17 Ala. 648. pp. 825, 827. 
 Kidd r. Kawliiison, 2 Bos. &. P. 59. pp. 
 
 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443. 
 Kiddell v. Buruard, 9 Mees. & W. 668. p. 
 
 929. 
 Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen (Mass.), 393. p. 
 
 IISI. 
 Kidwelly r. Brand, Plowd. 71. p. 1126. 
 Kiernan r. Abbott, 1 llun (X. Y.). 109: s. c. 
 
 3 Thomi). & ('. (X. Y.) 755. pp. 266, 267. 
 Kiernau v. Kocheleau, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 148. 
 
 p. 1671. 
 Kiler r. Kimball, 10 Cal. 267. p. 560. 
 Kilcfore r. Jordan, 17 Tex. 341. p. 1995. 
 Kilgore V. State, 74 Ala. 1. p. 1797. 
 Killen v. Sistrunk, 7 Ga. 283. pp. 1945, 1954, 
 
 19,55. 
 Killian v. Eigenman, 57 Ind. 480. pp. 1646, 
 
 2027, 2029. 
 Killij) V. Empire Mill Co., 2 Nev. 34. pp. 
 
 20S4, 2085. 
 Killman i\ State, 2 Te.x. App. 222. p. 1744. 
 Kilnioie v. Abdoolah, 27 L. J. (E.xch.) 307. 
 
 pp. 1473, 15,59. 
 Kilpatrick v. People, 5 Denio (X. Y.),277. 
 ' p. 1537. 
 
 Kilpatrick v. State. 13 Pa. .St. 198. p. 1890. 
 Kinihall r. Bates, .50 Me. 308. p. 1169. 
 Kiuiliall V. Bath, 38 Me: 219. p. 1473. 
 Kinil)all v. Cleveland, 4 Mich. 606. pp. 1022, 
 
 1023. 
 Kiml)all v. Davis, 19 AVend. (X. Y.) 437; a. c. 
 
 25 Wend. (X. Y.) 259. p. .569. 
 Kimball v. Estate of Baxter, 27 Vt. 623. p. 
 
 966. 
 Kimball r. Tenner, 12 N. H. 248. p. 1447. 
 Kimball v. Loomis, 62 Ind. 201. pp. 2112, 
 
 2123. 
 Kimball V. Morris, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 573. p. 
 
 159. 
 Kimball i'. Parmerlee, 29 Minn. 302. pp. 
 
 2072, 2073. 
 Kimball v. Rutland &c. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247. 
 
 p. 1343. 
 Kiinliall V. Thompson, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 441. 
 
 ]>. 204. 
 Kimball Ac. Man. Co. v. Vronlan,35 Mich. 
 
 310. p. 325. 
 Kimble r. Adair, 2 Blatchf. (Ind.) 320. p. 221. 
 Kimliru r. Hamilton, 28 Tex. .500. p. 1637. 
 Kimbniugh r. Stale, 62 Al;i. 248. p. 84. 
 Klncaid r. Xicely, 90 Ind. 403. p. 1621. 
 Kincaid v. Rogers, 3 Suced (Tenu.), 1. ji. 
 
 184. 
 Kinc.'innon i\ Carroll, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) II 
 
 p. 847. 
 Klne r. Beaumont, 7 .1. B. Moore, 112. p. 611. 
 King V. Atkins, 33 La. Ann. 1057. p. 383. 
 King V. Bailey, 8 Mo. 332. pp. 1440, 1441. 
 King V. Bunlett. 12 West Va. 088. j)p. 2, 3. 
 Kingr. Butler, 15 .Johns. (X. Y.) 281. ii. 899. 
 King V. Chicago &c. li. Co., 98 HI. 376. i). 
 
 201. 
 King'v. Ilckla Fire Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 514. p. 
 
 986.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XClll 
 
 King V. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 la. 458. p. 
 
 673. 
 King V. Kearsev, 2 Ind. 402. p. 4.51. 
 King r. King, 3"? Ga. 205. pp. 1633, 1681. 
 King V. King, 4!t Ga. 622. p. 1984. 
 King v. Little Rock. 26 Ark. 479. p. 2053. 
 King V. Ohio &c. 11. Co., 7 Biss. (U. S.) 529. 
 
 p. 145. 
 King V. Phillips, 8 Bosw. (X. Y.) 603. p. 1416. 
 King r. Shepherd, 3 Story (U. S.),349. pp. 
 
 1321, 1345. 
 King V. State, 21 Ga. 220. p. 103. 
 King V. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 730. pp. 33, 73, 
 
 99, 100. 
 King V. State, 9 Tex. App. 515. pp. 1S78, 
 
 1880. 
 King V. State, 13 Tex. App. 277. pp. 1695, 
 
 lti96. 
 King V. Williams, 21 N. W. Rep. (la.) 502. p. 
 
 10U6. 
 King V. Woodbridge, 34 Vt. 565. p. 343. 
 King's Proctor i\ Daims, 3 Hagg. 218. p. 829. 
 Kingen v. State, 46 Ind. 132. pp. 118, 120, 
 
 122. 
 Kingsbury v. Buchanan, 11 la. 388. p. 854. 
 Kingeley v. Wallis, 14 Mc. 57. ]i. 1122. 
 Kinloch's Case, Foster, 16. p. 1905. 
 Kinnaiuan v. Kiunamau, 71 Ind. 417. pp. 
 
 740, 744. 
 Kinney v. Central R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 513. p. 
 
 1298. 
 Kinney v. "Williams, 1 Col. 191. p. 1646. 
 Kinuicutt v. Stockwell, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 73. 
 
 p. 119. 
 Kinsell v. Daggett, 11 Me. 309. p. 1044. 
 Kinsman v. Dullman, 5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 382. 
 
 p. 1074. 
 Xinzey v. King, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 76. p. 184. 
 Kip, Matter of, 1 I'aige (N. Y.), 601. p. 265. 
 Kipp V. Wiles, 3 Sandf. (S. C.) (N. Y.) 585. 
 
 p. 1122. 
 Kirby v. Bruns, 45 Mo. 234. p. 1.591. 
 Kirk V. Bhirton, 9 Mees. & W. 284. p. 1074. 
 Kirk V. Folsom, 23 La. Ann. 584. pp. 1322, 
 
 1346, 1357. 
 Kirk V. State, 14 Oh. 511. p. 1723. 
 Kirk V. Wolff Man. Co.. US 111. 567; s. c. 6 
 
 West. Rep. 500. pp. 1653, 1686. 
 Kirkman v. Handy, II Humph. (Tenn.) 406. 
 
 p. 1394. 
 Kirkpatrick v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 86 Mo. 
 
 341. pi). 923, 1369, 1495. 
 Kirksey v. Cole, 47 Ark. 504. p. 2111. 
 Kirkwood's Case.l Lewin C. C. 103. p. 299. 
 Kirland v. State, 43 Ind. 146; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 
 
 386. p. 1756. 
 Kirschbon v. Bousel (Wis), 29 N. W. Rep. 
 
 S07;s. c. 67 Wis. 178. p. 311. 
 Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140. p. 285. 
 Kirwin v. People, 96 111. 206. p. 8. 
 Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400. p. 1800. 
 Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau &c. R. Co., 59 Mo. 
 
 514. p. 1708. 
 Kitchens v. State, 41 Ga. 217. p. 1635. 
 Kittt'ri'. People, 25 111. 42. p. 127. 
 Kiltredge v. Elliott, 16 N. H. 77. i>. 1944. 
 Kittredge v. Proprietors, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 246. p. 1051. 
 Kittredge v. Russell, 114 Mass. 67. p. 348. 
 Kitzinger v. Sanborn, 70 111. 146. p. 1498. 
 Kizer v. State, 12 Lea (Teuu.),564. pp. 707, 
 
 708. 
 Klein v. Franklin Ins. Co., 13 Pa. St. 247. p. 
 
 983. 
 Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 433. pp. 
 
 409, 618, 619. 
 Kleinback r. State, 2 Spccrs L. (S. C.) 418. 
 
 pp. 43, 84, 89, 92. 
 Kleinmau v. Boernstein, 32 Mo. 314. p. 946. 
 
 Kleinschmidt v. McAndrews, 117 L'. S. 282 
 
 pp. 2104. 2127. 
 Kline r. Baker, 99 Mass. 253. pp. 819, 1507. 
 Kline v. Cent. Pac. H. Co., 37 Cal. 400. p. 
 
 1290. 
 Klingensmith v. Klingensmith's Ex., 31 Pa. 
 
 St. 460. p. 1020. 
 Klinger r. State, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 2,57. p. 83. 
 Klipuer v. Coffev, 44 Md. 117. p. 1210. 
 Klock V. State, 60 Wis. 574. pp. 321, 322, 323, 
 
 334. 
 Klosterman v. Germanla Life Ins. Co., 6 jNIo. 
 
 App. 582. p. 740. 
 Klutts V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 642. 
 
 p. 1256. 
 Knapp V. Schneider, 24 Wis. 70. pp. 383, 420. 
 Kneeland v. State, 62 Ga. 395. p. 268. 
 Knickerbocker v. People, 43 X. Y. 177. pp. 
 
 1892, 1896. 
 Knight f. Campbell, 62 Barb. (N". Y.) 16. p. 4. 
 Knight r. Clements, 45 Ala. 89. pp. 1669, 1733. 
 Knight V. Clements, 8 Ad. & El. 215. p. 1031. 
 Knight V. Cunnington, 6 Hun (X. Y.), 100. 
 
 jip. 375, 385. 
 Knight V. Egerton, 7 Exch. 407. pp. 1472, 
 
 1473, 1559. 
 Knigbt V. Forward, 63 Barb. (X. Y.) 311. p. 
 
 397. 
 Knight V. Freeport, 13 Mass. 213. pp. 1921, 
 
 1923, 1927. 
 Knight c. Goodyear &c. Co., 38 Conn. 438. 
 
 pp. 1400, 1401. 
 Knight r. House, 29 Md. 194. p. 456. 
 Knight V. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432. p. 1068. 
 Knight ?i. Killebrew, 86 X. C^ 400. p. 2129. 
 Knight V. Low, 15 Ind. 374. p. 797. 
 Knight;-. Xew England ^VorstedCo., 2 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 272. p. 1007. 
 Knight V. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 
 
 462. p. 1223. 
 Knight V. State, 70 Ind. 375. pp. 525, 787. 
 Knight V. A'ardemaim, 25 .\la. 262. p. 1642. 
 Knode v. Williamson, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 586. p. 
 
 454. 
 Knoll ». Mayer, 13 Bradw. (111.) 203 p. 1381. 
 Kuoop t'. Nelson Distilling Co., 26 Mo. App. 
 
 303. pp. 1440, 1446. 
 Knott V. People, 83 111. 583. p. 145. 
 Knowles V. People, 15 Mich. 409. pp. 761, 775, 
 
 1772. 
 Knowles V. Rexroth, 67 Ind. 59. p. 107. 
 Knowlton v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 59 Wis. 
 
 278. p. 2042. 
 Knox V. Easton, 38 Ala. 345. p. 1669. 
 Knox V. Rives, 14 Ala. 249. p. 1156. 
 Knox V. Summers, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 496. p. 
 
 1059. 
 Knox V. Trofalet, 94 Ind. 346. p. 2014. 
 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Dobson, 15 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.), 410. p. 20(!6. 
 Knyaston v. Shrewsbury, Andrews, 85. pp. 
 
 112, 125. 
 Koch c. State, 32 Ohio St. 3.52. p. 92. 
 Koecker r. Koecker, 7 Phila. 364. p. 179. 
 Koehler r. Wilson, 40 la. 183. p. 1698. 
 Koelges v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 57 X. Y. 
 
 638. pp. 745, 747. 755, 756. 
 Koenig v. Bauer, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 304. pp. 113, 
 
 120. 
 Koenig v. Globe Mutual Life Ins Co., 10 Hun 
 
 (N. v.), 558. p. 509. 
 Koerner, v. State, 98 Ind. 8. pp. 1569, 1632, 
 
 1616, 1647, 168S, 1709, 1785. 1868, 1877. 
 Koester v. Ottumwa, 34 la. 41. p. 1929. 
 Koger V. Havs, 57 Mo. 329. p. 1,594. 
 Kohler V. Wells, 60 Cal. 606. p. 309. 
 Kohn V. Lucas, 17 -Mo. Ai)p.29. p. 2108. 
 Koon ('. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 106. p. 201. 
 Kouutz V. Kennedy, 63 Pa. St. 187. p. 1031.
 
 XCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Krack r. Wolf. 39 Ind. 88. pp. 1738, 1743. 
 Krninph v. Hatz, 52 Pa. St. 525. pp. 1131, 
 
 1251. 
 Kraiis f. Burlington Ac. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 33S. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 liranz r. Thiohen, 15 Bradw. (111.) 482. pp. 
 
 1675, 1681, l(i!H1. 
 Krebs v. O'Gradv, 23 Ala. 732. p. 1019. 
 Krelis V. State, S'Tox. A])!). 1. j). 115. 
 Krech v. Pacific liailroad, 64 Mo. 172. p. 
 
 1668. 
 Kreitline v. Franz, lOR Ind. 359. p. 2102. 
 Kicniling v. Lallman, K; Xeb. 280. p. 43. 
 Krider v. Laffcrty, 1 AVliart. (Pa.) 303. p. 
 
 1052. 
 Krieg v. "Well.s. 1 E. D. Smith, 76. p. 1232. 
 Krov V. Chicago &c. K. Co.,32 la. 3.57. p. 
 
 12(53. 
 Krug r. Davis, 101 Ind. 75. p. 2008. 
 Kruidcuicr v. Shields, 70 la. 428; s. c. 30 N. 
 
 W. Hup. 681. p. 1945. 
 Krutz V. Craig, .53 Ind. .561. p. 2076. 
 Kuhlman r. Medliuka, 29 Tex. 385. pp.331, 
 
 2007. 
 Kuhn.-i V. Gates, 92 Ind. C6. p. 2012. 
 Kuhtraan v. Browu, 4 Kich. L. (S. C.) 479. p. 
 
 821. 
 Kun's Executor v. Young, 34 Pa.. St. 60. p. 
 
 857. 
 Kuvkendall v. McDonald, 15 Mo. 41(!. pp. 
 
 1440, 1449. 
 Kyle V. Hostick, 10 Ala. .591. p. 5r.;t. 
 Kyle V. Miller, lOS Ind. 90. p. 1108. 
 
 L. V. n.,4 Sw.ah. & Tr. 1I.'>. pp. 646, 619, 651. 
 Labar v. Koplin, 4 X. Y. 546. p. 16ft5. 
 Laberr. Cooper, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 565. pp. 
 
 1670, 1708. 
 Labron v. Woran. 1 Hill (X. Y'.),91. p. 582. 
 Lacey v. Mitchell, 23 Ind. 67. pp. 1164, 
 
 1172. 
 Lacey v. State, 58 Ala. 385. p. 127. 
 Lack V. Seward, 4 ( 'ar. & P. 106. p. 1223. 
 Lackawanna &c. 11. Co. v. Doak, 52 Pa. St. 
 
 379. p. 1210. 
 Lacker v. United States, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 
 
 339. p. 2003. 
 Laconv. Iliggins, 3 Stark. 178; s. c. D. & 11. 
 
 178. p. 246. 
 Ladd V. Hildcbrant, 27 Wis. 135. p. 2061. 
 Ladd r. Moore, 3 Sandf. (S. C.) (N. Y.) 589. 
 
 p. 1132. 
 Ladd V. WUson, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 5. p, 
 
 1982. 
 Lady Herbert r. Shaw, 11 Mod. 118. p. 112. 
 Lady Joy's Case, cited 1 Ld. Raym. 148. p. 
 
 1936. 
 LaFarge v. LaFarge Ins. Co., 14 How. Pr. 
 
 (X. Y.) 26. p. 182. 
 Lafayette r. Larson, 73 Ind. .367. p. 1272. 
 Lafavette &c. K. Co. v. Huffman, 28 Ind. 289. 
 
 p. 1233. 
 Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. Xew Albany &c. R. 
 
 Co., 13 Ind. 90. p. 120. 
 Lafayette Bank v. State Bank, 4 McLean 
 
 (U.S.) 208. pp. 1022, 1023. 
 Lafavette I'lank lioinl Co. t\ Xew Albany &c. 
 
 R. "Co., 13 Ind. 90. p. 1992. 
 Lafever v. Stone, 55 la. 49. pp. 2088, 2101. 
 Lafolletc r. Thompson, 83 .Mo. 199. ]). 211.3. 
 La Fontaine r. Underwriters, 83 N. C. 132. 
 
 pp. 132, 139, 171. 266, 268, 285, 286. 
 La Force r. Park, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 223. J). 891. 
 La Fronibois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 589. 
 
 pp. 2008, 2009. 
 Laggins v. State, 12 Tex. App. 65. p. 130. 
 
 Laicher v. New Orleans &c. II. Co., 28 La» 
 
 Ann. 320. pp. 1223, 1235. 
 Laidlow r. Organ, 2 Wheat. (U. S.) 178. p. 
 
 1U4. 
 Laing r. Colder, 8 Pa. St. 234. p. 1236. 
 Laird v. Iven^i, 45 Tex. 622. p. 1102. 
 Lake v. Bender, 18 Xev. 361. ]>. 2082. 
 I.ako c. Johnnveako.9 Kan. 511. p. 1751. 
 Lake c. Milliken. 02 Me. 240. p. 1221. 
 Lake v. People, 1 I'ark. Cr. (X. Y.)495. p. 
 
 17S0. 
 Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v. Acres, 108 Ind. .548; 
 
 s. e. 9 X. E. Roil. 4.53. p. 2089. 
 Lake Erie &c. R. Co. r. Fix. 88 Ind. 381 : s. c. 
 
 45 Am. Ken. 461. i)p. 1295, 1312, 1477. 1479. 
 Lake Erie kc. \l. Co. v. Parker, '.)4 lud. 91. 
 
 pp. 563, .577, 17(i5. 
 Lake shore &e. U. Co. r. Fltzpatrick, 31 Oh. 
 
 St. 479. 1). 1210. 
 Lake Shore &c. IJ. Co. i-. Hart, 87 111. 529. p. 
 
 1235. 
 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. i-. Miller, 25 Mich. 
 
 274. ]). 12 ill. 
 Lake Shore Ac. R. Co. r. O'Conner, 115 111. 
 
 2.-).5. p. I J 13. 
 Lake *liore &c. R. Co. v, Sunderland, 2 
 
 r.radw. (111.) 31)7. p. 1230. 
 Lakey r. llurnhy, 9 Ind. .536. p. .561. 
 Lainance r. Bvhies, 17 Xev. 197. pp. 2087, 
 
 2'r.i9. 
 Lamb r. Brolaski, 38 AIo. .53. p. 892. 
 Lamb r. Camden &c. R. Co., 46 X. Y. 271. pp. 
 
 1318, 1:522, 1:541. 1346, 1:547, 134S. 
 Lamb r. First Presb. Soc. 20 la. 127. p. 2036. 
 Lamb r. Lmuc, 4 Oh. St. 167. p. 4. 
 Lamb v. Old Colony B. Co., 140 Mass. 79. p. 
 
 210'.*. 
 Lamb V. State, :^6 Wis. 424. pp. 94, 105. 
 Lamb v. Western U. Corp., 7 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 98. pp. 1:533, 1336. 
 Lambert r. Ghiselin, 9 How. (U. S.) 552. p. 
 
 942. 
 Lambert v. McFarland, 7 Xev. 159. p. 2028. 
 Lambert r.Saulord, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 137. p. 
 
 194. 
 Lambertson v. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 200. p. 25. 
 Lam me v. Gregg, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 444. pp. 926, 
 
 927. 
 Lammers r. White Sewing Machine Co., 23 
 
 .Mo. App. 471. p. 1033. 
 LWmoureaux v. Crosby, 2 Paige (X. Y.), 422. 
 
 p. 147. 
 Lampe v. Kennedv, 60 Wis. 110. p. 1766. 
 Lamphier v. State", 70 Ind. 317. p. 121. 
 Lamprey v. Munch, 21 Minn. 379. p. 389. 
 Lanagin f Xo\vland,44 Ark. 84. j). 2010. 
 Lancaster t'. Collins, 115 U. S. 222. p. 214. 
 Lance v. Bonnell, 105 I'a. St. 46. p. 2076. 
 Lando v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 33 Wis. 640. p. 
 
 1308. 
 Lander r. State, 12 Tex. 462; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 Thoinp. ('as. Self-Def. 366. p. 1542. 
 Laudis r. Ilamillon, 77 Mo. 5.54. p. 1605. 
 Landis v. Laudis, 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 249. p. 
 
 1009. 
 Landsbergcr v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 450. i)p. 272, 
 
 392. 
 Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107 Mass. 104. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Lane v. Ballcv, 47 Barb. (X. Y.) 395. p. 1773. 
 Lane v. Com., .59 Pa. St. 371. pp. 1.5.57, 1861. 
 leaner. Crockett, 7 Price, .566. p. 2063. 
 Lane v. Croinbie, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 177. pp. 
 
 1224, 1754. 
 Lane v. Goodwin, 47 Me. .59.3. p. 117. 
 Lane v. Scovllle, 16 Kan. 402. pp. 113, 121. 
 Lane I'. Salter, 4 Rob. (N. V.) 239. p. 1222. 
 Lane v. Slate, 16 Tex. App. l73. p. 1.538.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xcr 
 
 Lane V. Stebbins, 9 Paige (X. Y.), 622. p. 
 
 58;t. 
 Laufear r. Sumner, 17 Mass. 109. p. 1131. 
 Lang r. State, 1 S. W. Rep. 319. p. 1694. 
 Langdale v. ■I'rimmer, 15 East, 291. p. 944. 
 Langdon v. Goole 3 Lev. 21. p. 847. 
 Langford r. Green, 52 Ala. lO.S. p. S91. 
 Langley v. Borrv, 14 X. H. 82. p. 1447. 
 Langley v. Warner, 3 N. Y. 327. pp. 2007, 
 
 2008, 2000. 
 Langwonby v. Myers, 4 la. 18. pp. 1948, 
 
 19.3(). 
 
 Lanier r. Driver, 24 Ala. 149. p. 649. 
 Lanigan v. Xcw York &c. Co., 71 X. Y. 30. p. 
 
 1642. 
 Launen v. Albany Gasligbt Co., 44 X. Y. 4.i9. 
 
 p. 1300. 
 Lanning v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 68 Iowa, 502; 
 
 S. c. 27 X. W. Rep. 478. p. 1312. 
 Lansdale r. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 148. pp. 1945, 1954. 
 Lansing v. Johnson, 18 X'eb. 175. p. 1496. 
 Lansing v. Russell, 13 Barb. (X. Y.) 510. p. 
 
 1645. 
 Lapeer Ins. Co. r. Dovle, 30 Mich. 159. pp. 
 
 825, 845. 
 Lapevre v. Paul, 47 Mo. .586. p. 1051. 
 Large v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 696. pp. 816, 817. 
 Larilliau r. Lane, 8 Ark. 372. p. 6. 
 Larimer r. Kollv, 13 Kan. 78. p. 1930. 
 Larkin i-. l?uck,"n Oh. St.56S. p. 893. ' 
 Larkiii v. Taylor, 5 Kan. 433. p. 1224. 
 Larkins r. Tartar, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 681. pp. 
 
 l-.t8S,1992. 
 Larmun v. lluey, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 436. p. 
 
 310. 
 Larned v. Buffington, 3 Mass. 546. pp. 1466, 
 
 1467. 
 Larned v. Griffin, 12 Fed. Rep. 590. p. 188. 
 La Rose r. Logansport Xat. Bank, 102 Ind. 
 
 322. p. 2138. 
 Larrabee v. Selbv, 52 Cal. 506. p. 1.50. 
 Larrabee v. Sewall, 66 Me. 376. p. 1209. 
 Lary r. Cleveland &c. R. Co., 78 Ind. 323; 
 
 s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 572. p. 1312. 
 Lassell, Ex parte, 8 Cow. (X. Y.) 119. p. 199. 
 Laselle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33. pp. 1627, 1726. 
 Lassiter v. Jackmon, 88 Ind. 118. p. 2036. 
 Lassiter v. State, 67 Ga. 739. p. 257. 
 Lathrop V. Sharon, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 172. p 
 
 17.52. 
 Latham v. Selkirk, 11 Tex. 314. pp. 215, 217 
 
 239. 
 Latimer 1'. Batson, 4 Barn. & Cres. 652. pp 
 
 1441, 1443. 
 Latshaw v. Territory of Oregon, 1 Ore. 140, 
 
 p. 1669. 
 Laughlin v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 28 Wis. 204, 
 
 p. 1363. 
 Laughlin v. Clawson, 27 Pa. St. 328.' p. 1176 
 Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156. p. 1235. 
 Laughlin ?•. State, 19 Oh. St. 99. p. 258. 
 Laurel v. Bank, 25 Minn. 48. p. 2092. 
 Lawrcns, The Bark, 1 Abb. Adm. 508. pp. 
 
 132, 136. 
 Lavin v. People, 69 111. 303. p, 58. 
 Law V. Cross, 1 Black (U. S.), 533. pp. 835, 
 
 1709. 
 La^v V. Fairfield, 46 Vt. 425. p. 431. 
 Law V. Jackson, 8 Cow. (X. Y.) 746. pp. 2130, 
 
 2131. 
 Law V. Long, 41 Ind. 586. p. 1130. 
 Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen (Mass.), 22. p. 2021. 
 Lawler I'. Linden, 1-. R. 10 ('. L. 188. p. 1136. 
 Lawler v. Mcl'heeters, 73 Ind. 577. p. 1730. 
 Lawler v. Northampton Gas. Co., 2 Allen 
 
 (Mass.), 307. p. 1232. 
 Lawless r. Connecticut &c. R. Co., 136 Mass. 
 
 1. p. 1241. 
 
 Lawless v. Reese, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 486. p. 1943. 
 Lawrence i\ Barker, 5 Wend. (X. Y.) 305. 
 
 pp. 361, 1663. 
 Lawrence v. Beaabien, 2 Bailey (S. C), 623. 
 
 pp. 2007, 2015. 
 Lawrence v. Boswell, Saver, 100. p. 1984. 
 Lawrence v. Clark, 14 Mees. & W. 249. p. 613. 
 Lawrence v. Collier, 1 Cal. 37. p. 123. 
 Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. (X. Y.) 443. 
 
 I). 1003. 
 Lawrence v. Fulton, 19 Cal. 690. p. 1141. 
 Lawrence v. Housatonic R. Co., 29 Conn. 390. 
 
 p. 1256. 
 Lawrence v. Lanning, 4 Ind. 191. p. 414. 
 Lawrence v. Ocean Ins. Co., 11 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 245, note a. pp. 344, 589. 
 Lawrence v. Shreve, 26 Mo. 492. p. 1583. 
 Lawrence v. State, 20 Tex. App. 536. pp. 
 
 1506, 1705. 
 Lawrence w. Stiles, 16 Bradw. (111.) 489. pp. 
 
 35,-<, 642. 
 Lawrence v. Van Home, 1 Caines (X. Y.), 
 
 27(>. p. 634. 
 Laws V. Rand, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 76 ; s. c. 3 Com. 
 
 Bench (N. s.), 442. p. 944. 
 Lawson v. Bachmau, 81 X. Y. 616. p. 609. 
 Lawson v. Glass, 6 Colo. 134. pp. 321, 355. 
 Lawson v. State, 32 Ark. 220. pp. 351,4.52. 
 Lawton v. Sager, 11 Barb. (X. Y.) 349. p. 
 
 876. 
 Lawyer v. Loomis, 1 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 
 
 3!>3. p. 344. 
 Lawyer v. Smith, 8 Mich. 411. p. 1009. 
 Lave'r's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 135. pp. 45, 
 
 68, 88, 93, 105. 
 Layton v. Riney, 33 Mo. 87. p. 1593. 
 Lea V. Henderson, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 146. pp, 
 
 265, 287. 
 Lea V. Henry, 56 la. 662. p. 831. 
 Leach v. People, 53 111. 311. pp. 69, 72. 
 Leach V. Wilbur, 9 Allen (Mass.), 212. p. 
 
 1917. 
 Leach 6 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279; s. c. 3 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 539. pp. 1708, 1884. 
 Leadbeter v. Roth, 25 111. 587. p. 1003. 
 Leaf r. Butt, 1 Car & M. 451. p. 613. 
 Leahy v. Dun lap, 6 Colo. 552. pp. 2, 3. 
 Leaptrot v. Robertson, 44 Ga. 46. p. 1713. 
 Learned r. Hall, 133 Mass. 417. pp. 737, 775. 
 Learyr. Boston &c. R. Co., 139 Mass. 580; s. 
 
 c. 2 N. E. Rep. 115. p. 1241. 
 Leary v. IMever, 78 Ind. 393. p. 629. 
 Leas V. Cool, 68 Ind. 166. p. 1911. 
 Leas V. W^alls, 101 Pa. St. 57; s. c. 47 Am. 
 
 Rep. 699. p. 1250. 
 Leavenworth &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 17 Pac. 
 
 Kep. 391. p. 2040. 
 Leavenworth &c. R. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426. 
 
 1). 2033. 
 Leavitt v. Stansell, 44 Mich. 424. pp. 389, 416. 
 Le Barrou v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365. pp. 646, 
 
 65 1 . 
 Le r.eau v. People, 34 X. Y. 223. pp. 403, 409, 
 
 53 1 . 
 Lecraw v. Boston, 17 How. (U. S.) 426. p. 
 
 812. 
 Ledbetter v. State, 21 Tex. Anp. 344. p. 1637. 
 Ledford v. Ledford, 95 Ind. 283. p. 375. 
 Ledley j. State, 4 Ind. .580. p. 1742. 
 Leduke v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 4 Mo. App. 
 
 485. p. 1230. 
 Lee V. Angas, L. R. 2 Eq. 59. p. 180. 
 Lee V. Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378; s. c. 55 Am. 
 
 Deo. 110. p. 892. 
 Lee r. Campbell, 4 Port. (Ala.) 198. pp. 
 
 2008, 2009, 2013. 
 Lee V. Chadsev, 2 Keves, 546. pp. 414, 432. 
 Lee i\ Clute, 19 Xev. 151. p. 1964. 
 Lee V. David, 11 Mo. 114. pp. 1598, 1621.
 
 XCVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES- 
 
 Lee V. Pnnlap, 55 >ro. 454. p. S02. 
 
 Lee c. Grand Trunk R. Co., 36 Upper Can. 
 
 (Q. It.) 350. p. 1155. 
 Lee r. Hamilton, 12 Tex. 413. p. 1672. 
 Leer. Ins. Co.,3Grav (Mass.),6S3. p. 977. 
 Lee V. Lee, 71 X. C. 139. ]>. 27. 
 Leer. Leo, 6 Gill & .1. (Mil.) 316. p. 899. 
 Lee r. JMcLeod, 15 Nev. 15S. pp. 1920, 1976, 
 
 2062. 
 Leer. Mound Station, 118111.306. p. 1749. 
 Leer. jMusriceridu-ejS Taunt. ?,{>. p. SS9. 
 Leer. reUr,(U;ill&.I. (.M(l.)447. p. 90. 
 Lee V. Slalo, 45 Miss. Ii4. p. 74. 
 L,ee r. State, 21 Oli. t^t. 151. p. 630. 
 Lee V. State, 14 Tex. App. 2(>6. p. 1S5.5. 
 Lee r. State, 21 Tex. Ai.p. 244. p. 1.548. 
 Lee V. Stowe, 57 Tex. 444. pp. .5(i9, 570. 
 Lee r. Tebo Ac K. Co.. 53 Mo. 178. p. 1499. 
 Lee r. Troy &c. Gaslight Co., 98 N. Y. 115. 
 
 pp. 1640, 1642. 
 Leegee r. Thomas, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 11. 
 
 p. 1059. 
 Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387. p. 2n.'?6. 
 Leet V. "Wilson, 24 Cal. 398. j). 50,5. 
 Leetchr. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Daly (N. 
 
 Y.)518. ]). 331. 
 Leete r. Pilgrim Cong. Church, St. Louis Ct. 
 
 of Apjieals (unreported), p. 1388. 
 Lefever r. Johnson, 79 Ind. 554. p. 319. 
 Leffel v.- Letfel, :)r, Ind. 76. )). 20;{3. 
 Leftwich r. Day, 32 Minn. 512. pp. 2000, 
 
 2011. 
 Leftwich r. Lecann, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 187. p. 
 
 211!l. 
 
 Legg V. Drate, 1 Oh. St. 286. pp. 383, 783, 
 
 Leggett V. Blount, Taylor (X. C.) 123. p. 
 
 1181. 
 Leggett r. State, 21 Tex. App. 382. p. 1079. 
 Lehigh CoaKtc. Co. v. Nortliampton County, 
 
 S Watts & S. (Pa.) 334. p. 1087. 
 Lehman r. P.rooklyn, 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 234. pp. 
 
 1233, 1602. 
 Lehman v. State, 18 Tex. App. 174. pp. 1865, 
 
 1892, 1894, 1895, 
 Lehman v. Strassbnrgcr, 2 Woods (U. S.),554. 
 
 p. 882. 
 Leiber v. Weidcn, 17 Neb. 584. p. 1006. 
 Leicester v. Pittsford, 6 Vt. 245. p. 1247. 
 Leigh V. People, 113 lU. 372. pp. 1846, 1849, 
 
 1870. 
 Leigiiton v. Sargent, 31 X. H. 120. pp. 1929, 
 
 1982, 1985. 
 Leimerv. Pac. R. Co., 26 Mo. 26. p. 1593. 
 Leister v. Smith, 2 Root (Conn.), 24. p. 1466. 
 Leith v. Poi.e, 2 W. BI. 1327. p. 1477. 
 Leland i: K;mtli, 47 Mich. .508. p. 410. 
 Lemarr. AVilliams, 32 JSliss. 341. p. 1647. 
 Lc.Merchand's Case, Leaclie's Cr. Cas. 336, n. 
 
 p. 609. 
 Le Mere r. McTTale. 30 Minn. 410. p. 176. 
 Lenike r. Chicago &c. K. Co., 39 Wis. 449. pp. 
 
 2036. 2030. 
 Lemmonr. Moore, 97 Ind. 1.5. p. 2041. 
 Lemon r. Chanslor, 68 Mo. 342. pp. 1285, 1286, 
 
 1299, 1483. 
 Lemon r. Phoenix Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294. p. 
 
 991. 
 Lemon r. State, 4 W. Va. 755. p. 476. 
 Lemprevr. Munch, 21 Minn. 379. i). 370. 
 Lenox v. Knox &c. R. Co., 62 Me. 322. p. 
 
 2092. 
 Lenox v. Pike, 2 Ark. 14. pp. 210(5, 2122. 
 Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 241. p. 
 
 449. 
 Leonard v. Baker, 1 Maule & .S. 251. p. 1443. 
 Leonard v. Leonard, 2 Allen (Mass.), 543. p. 
 
 11.58. 
 Leonard r. Scbuler, .34 Mo. 475. p. 2092. 
 
 Leonard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 417. p. 1566. 
 Leonard v. State, 20 Tex. App. 442. p. 77*. 
 Leonard r. Territory, 7 I'ac. Ro)). 872; s. c. 
 
 2 Wash. Tcr. 381. "pp. 1825, 1870, 1871. 
 Leonard c. Warrine, 20 Wis. 41. {t. 2130. 
 Leonard v. \\liile, 5 Allen (Mass.), 177. p. 
 
 324. 
 Leonori v. Bishop, 4 Duer (X. Y.), 420. pp. 
 
 470, 488. 
 Le Uov r. Beard, 8 How. (U. S.) 451. p. 1444. 
 Lc Roy V. Market F. Ins. Co., 39 X. Y. 90. p. 
 
 975. 
 Le Rov r. Park F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 56. pi). 
 
 976, 9"78. 
 Le Roy r. Rassette, 32 Cal. 171. p. 2086. 
 I>e Sage r. Coussniaker, 1 Esp. 187. ji. 899. 
 Lesem v. Harriford, 44 .Mo. 323. p. 1440. 
 Leslie r. Merrick, 9'.) Ind. 180. p. 20:i'.(. 
 Lessee of Pennr. Messenger, 1 Veates (Pa.), 
 
 2. p. 1.52. 
 Lesser v. Banks, 46 Ark. 482. pp. 2104, 2120, 
 
 2)45. 
 Lester v. Goode, 2 Murph. (X. C.) 37. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Lester r. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 60 Mo. 265. 
 
 1). 1669. 
 Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 1.58. p. 1225. 
 Lester v. Stanley, 3 Day (Conn.), 287. p. 
 
 1910. 
 Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 433. pp. 9, 51, 
 
 103, 105, 116. 
 Lctcliford r. Golden Eagle, 17 La. Ann. 9. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1346, 1358. 
 Lctton V. Graves, 26 Mo. 251. p. .5.59. 
 Letton r. Young, 2 Mete. (Ky.).5.59. p. 1772. 
 Leveu v. Smith, 1 Denio (X. Y.),571. p. 1671. 
 Leverett r. State, 3 Tex. App. 213. pp. 1964, 
 
 1965, 1967. 
 Levers r. Buskirk, 4 Pa. St. 309. p. 1699. 
 Leverich v. Frank, 6 Ore. 212. pp. 449, 450. 
 Levering r. Union &c. Co., 42 Mo. 88. pp. 
 
 1318, 1322,1347, 1348, 1349, 1350. 
 Levi V. Milne, 4 Bing. 195. p. 1517. 
 Levin r. Russell, 42 N. Y. 251. p. 583. 
 Leviston r. Junction R. Co., 7 Ind. 597. pp. 
 
 825, 827. 
 Levitzkv v. Canning, 33 Cal. 299. p. 1003. 
 Levy r."P>rannan, 3vt Cal. 485. ]). 19(>3. 
 Levv V. Brown, .56 Miss. 83. pp. 191. 192. 
 Levy V. Milne. 12 Moore, 418; s. c. i Bing. 195. 
 
 pp. 1473, 1,5.59. 
 Levv r. Gadsbv, 3 Cranch (U.S.), 180. pp. 
 
 82.5, 886. 
 Levy r. Peters, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 125. p. 948. 
 Lewis V. Armstrong, 64 Ga. 645. p. 807. 
 Lewis V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 38 Md. 588. p. 
 
 1235. 
 Lewis V. Chapman, 16 X. Y. 369. pp. 1456, 
 
 14.57. 
 Lewis r. Christie, 99 Ind. 377. p. 1783. 
 Lewis r. Denton, 13 la. 441. p. 1.588. 
 Lewis r. Ilartlev, 7 Car. A: P. 405. p. 658. 
 Lewis r. Klotz (La.), 1 South. Rep. .539. p. 3. 
 Lewis r. Lewis, 8 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 530. p. 
 
 898 
 Lewi's V. Marshall, 7 Jfan. &~G. 729. p. 304. 
 Lewis V. McDaniel, 82 Mo. 577. pp. 1468, 
 
 1469. 
 Lewis r. McJIullln, 5 W. Va. .582. p. 1983. 
 Lewis V. Moses, 6 Coldw. (Tcnn.) 193. pp. 
 
 1983, VMK. 
 Lewis r. .Moxcv, 9 :Nro. App. .597. p. 20.55. 
 Lewis r. Xiles", 1 Root (Conn.), 346 p. 1466. 
 Lewis r. Xuckolls, 2(; :\I(). -MS. p. 1060. 
 Lewis r. Parker, 4 Ad. .t Li. 838. p. 217. 
 Lewis r. People, 44 III. 542. ).. 1904. 
 Lewis r. Pnill, 48 Vt. 3.58. p. 1000. 
 Lewis r. Sai)lo. 1 Mood. & Malk. 39. p. 878. 
 Lewis r. Schweuu, 15 Mo. App. 342. p. 2080.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCVll 
 
 Lewis V. State, 35 Ala. 380. p. 421. 
 
 Lewis V. State, 51 Ala. 1. 18. 
 
 Lewis V. State, 33 Ga. 132. p. 1750. 
 
 Lewis V. State, 9 Smed. & 31. (Miss.) 115. 
 
 pp. 65, 82, 85. 
 Lewis V. State, 3 Head (Tenn.), 127. p. 85. 
 Lewis V. State, 18 Tex. App. 116. pp. 1695, 
 
 1713, 1746, 1756. 
 Lewis r. Wake County, 74 N. C. 194. p. 171. 
 Lexington &c. Ins. Co, v. Paver, 16 Oh. 324. 
 
 p. 214. 
 Leyner v. State, 8 Ind. 491. p. 2107. 
 Licett V. Stale, 23 Ga. 57. p. 125. 
 Lichteiiheiu v. Boston &c. R. Co., 11 Cnsh. 
 
 (Mass.) 70. pp. 1321. 1366. 
 Liddy v. St. Louis &c. K. Co., 40 Mo. 511. 
 
 pp. 1.S06. 1773. 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 291. 
 
 j). 2061. 
 Light r. Kennard, 11 Neb. 130. pp. 2051, 2052. 
 Lightfoot V. People, 16 Mich. 507. pp. 436, 
 
 440. 
 Lightlv V. Clauston, 1 Taunt. 112. p. 892. 
 Lilleyv. Elwin, 11 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 742. p. 
 
 1136. 
 Lillev V. Havs, 5 Ad. & El. 548. p. 1018. 
 Liliis" V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 464. p. 
 
 1668. 
 Lilly V. Griffin, 71 Ga. 535. p. 1951. 
 Lilly V. State, 20 Tex. App. 11. p. 1544. 
 Lin V. Terre Haute &c. R. Co., 10 Mo. App. 
 
 125. pp. 1363, 1364. 
 Lincoln v. Gillilan, 19 Neb. 119. pp. 1269, 
 
 1280. 
 Lincoln r. Iron Co., 103 U. S. 412. p. 2005. 
 Lincoln r. Stowell, 73 111. 246. p. 21. 
 Lincoln r. Walker, IS Neb. 244. pp. 1271, 
 
 1274, 1278, 1280, 1483. 
 Lindauer v. Teeter, 41 N. J. L. 256. pp. 19S3, 
 
 1985. 
 Lindenan r. Desborough, 8 Barn. & Cres. 
 
 586. p. 975. 
 Lindholm r. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245. p. 1249. 
 Lindley r. Kindall, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 189. p. 32. 
 Lindo, Ex parte, 1 Cranch C. C. 445. p. 261. 
 Lindsay v. Dayis, 30 Mo. 406. pp. 926, 929. 
 Lindsay v. Janson, 4 Hurl. & N. 699. p. 995. 
 Lindsay v. Larned, 17 Mass. 190. p. 1161, 
 
 1704. 
 Lindsay V. Lindsay, 11 Tt. 621. p. 1597. 
 Liudsey v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 3 R. 1. 157. 
 
 pp. 974, 976. 
 Lindsley v. European Petroleum Co., 3 Lans. 
 
 (N. Yi) 176. p. 214. 
 Lindsley v. People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 233. 
 
 p. 90. 
 Lime v. Taylor, 3 Post. & Fin. 731. p. 6.58. 
 Lingham r. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324. p. 912. 
 Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay (S. C), 1. pp. 132, 
 
 141. 
 Links V. State, 13 Lea (Tenn.), 701. p. 1711. 
 Linn v. Le Compte. 47 Tex. 440. p. 2076. 
 Linn v. Wright, 18 Tex. 317. pp. U36, 1439, 
 
 1698. 
 Liuscv V. Ramsey, 22 Ga. 627. p. 717. 
 Linsley v. Loyely,26 Vt. 123. pp. 383, 387. 
 Liuvilfe r. Early wine, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 469. p. 
 
 1670. ' 
 
 Linyille v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203. p. 1681. 
 Lionberger v. Pohlmau, 16 Mo. App. 392. p. 
 
 1627. 
 Lipe V. Eisenlerd, 32 N. Y. 228. pp. 413, 459. 
 Lisle V. state, 6 Mo. 426 p. 112. 
 Listv. Koriepeter, 26 Ind. 27. pp. 221, 222. 
 Listen-. Boker, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 439. ji. 261. 
 Lister i\ Perryman, L. R. 4 H. L. 521 ; s. c. 39 
 
 L. J. Exch.'l77. pp. 1172, 1176, 1177. 
 Listen V. Central &c. R. Co., 70 la. 714; s. c. 
 
 29 N. W. Rep. 445. pp. 575, 2043. 
 
 Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195. p. 
 
 1415. 
 Llthgow V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297. pp. 64, 69, 
 
 73, 115. 
 Lltlethale v. Dix, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 364. p. 
 
 1484. 
 Little V. Blrdwell, 21 Tex. 597. p. 1995. 
 Little V. Boston &c. R. Co., 66 Me. 239. pp. 
 
 1321, 1345. 
 Little V. Clarke, 36 Pa. St. 114. p. 1101. 
 Little r. Com., 25 Gratt. (Va.) 921. p. 74. 
 Little v. Dawson, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 111. p. 899. 
 Little V. Jacks, 67 Cal. 165. pp. 2085, 2086. 
 Little V. McGuire, 43 la. 450. p. 1765. 
 Little r. Vance, 14 Ind. 22. p. 1060. 
 Little r. Woodworth, 8 Neb. 283. p. 928. 
 Littlefleld r. Beamis, 5 Rob. (La.) 145. p. 
 
 19.56. 
 Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415. 
 
 p. 1225. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Atkins, 46 Ark. 430. 
 
 p. 1297. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Cavenesse (Ark.), 
 
 2 S. W. Rep. 505. p. 747. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Corcoran, 40 Ark. 
 
 375. pp. 1347, 1356. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Finlev, 37 Ark. 562. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 208. 
 
 lip. 1347, ia56. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Payne, 33 Ark. 816. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 523. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1345, 1347, 1355, 1356. 
 Little Schuylkill Nay. Co. v. Richard, 57 Pa. 
 
 St. 142. pp. 1938, 19.56, 1962. 
 Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y'.) 4L 
 
 p. 218. 
 Littleton v. Clayton, 77 Ala. 571. p. 612. 
 Littleton v. Richardson, 32 N. H. 59. p. 1221. 
 Litton V. Graves, 26 Mo. 250. p. .560. 
 Livermore r. Campbell, 52 Cal. 75. p. 2057. 
 Liverraore r. St. John, 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 12. 
 
 pp. 600, 638. 
 Liversidge v. Broadbeut, 4 Hurl. & N. 602. 
 
 p. 1018. 
 Livineood v. Livingood, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 268. 
 
 p. 2117. 
 Livingston v. Ackeston, 5 Cow. (N. Y'.) 531. 
 
 pp. 888. 895. 
 Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (La.) 656. 
 
 p. 114. 
 Livingston r. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Cranch 
 
 (U. S.), 280. pp. 819, 1507. 
 Livinsston v. Mavor of New York, 8 Wend. 
 
 (N."Y.) 85. p. lo~S. 
 Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 469. ]). 1578. 
 Livingston v. Rogers, 1 Caines (N. Y'), 583. 
 
 ]i. 900. 
 Livingston v. Smith, 1 Johns. (N. Y".) 141. 
 
 p. 7. 
 Livingstone v. Com., 14 Gratt. (Va.)592. pp. 
 
 498, 505. 
 Lloyd r. Brmck, 35 Tex. 1. p. 2049. 
 Llovd V. Hough, 1 How. (U. S.) 160. p. 891. 
 Lloyd V. Jones, 7 Best & S. 475. p. 1644. 
 LloVd V. McClure,2 G. Greene (la.), 139. pp. 
 
 1983, 1994. 
 Llovd V. Nourse, 2 Rawle (Pa.), 49. p. 70. 
 Llovd r. Scott, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 205. p. 886. 
 Llovd r. Thompson, 5 Bradw. (111.) 90. p. 385. 
 Lobdell v. New Bedford, 1 Mass. 1,53. p. 1249. 
 Locke V. First Division &c. R. Co., 15 Minn. 
 
 350. p. 1305. 
 Locke v. Merchants' Nat. Bank. 66 Ind. 353. 
 
 p. 2010. 
 Locke r. Palmer, 26 Ala. 312. p. 869. 
 Locke r. Railway Co., 46 la. 109. p. 661.
 
 XCVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Locke V. Rowcll, 47 N. H. 46. p. 1015. 
 Locke V. Sioux &c. R. Co., 46 la. 109. p. 1211. 
 Lockctt v. State, 63 Ala. 5. p. 283. 
 Lockluirt V. State, 92 Ind. 452. p. .319. 
 Lock wood i'. Bull, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 322. pp. 
 
 1;!21, 1329. 
 Lockwood V. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361. pp. 
 
 819, 938. 
 Lockwood V. Ins. Co., 47 Conn. 553. . p. 983. 
 Lockwood V. State, 1 Ind. 161. pp. 150, 171, 
 
 173. 
 Lockwood V. Thome. 11 N. T. 170. p. 11,33. 
 Loetlier r. Keokuk Packet Co., 7 Mo. App. 
 
 185. p. 101. 
 LoeflFener v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598. p. 74. 
 Loenier v. Haug, 20 Mo. App. 163. p. 968. 
 Loew V. State. 60 "Wis. 559. pp. 1748, 1999. 
 Loewe v. Keismau, 8 Bradw. (111.) 525. p. 
 
 p. 294. 
 Loewer v. Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431. pp. 1269, 
 
 1276, 1278, 1281 , 1483. 
 Loaran v. Mesurier, 6 Moore P. C. 116. p. 910. 
 Logan V. Mathews, 6 Pa.. St. 417. pp. 1322, 
 
 1325. 
 Logan V. Monroe, 20 Me. 259. p. 775. 
 Logan V. Quigley (Penn.), 11 Atl. Rep. 92. 
 
 p. 1052. 
 Logaii r. State, 50 Miss. 269. pp. 18, 69, 70, 76. 
 Logan V. State, 53 Miss. 431. p. 22. 
 Logan V. State, 17 Tex. App. 50. p. 1756. 
 Logansport r. McMillen, 49 Ind. 493. p. 1501. 
 Loggins V. State, 12 Tex. App. 65. p. 116. 
 Lohmau v. People, 1 Comst. (N. Y.) 379. p. 
 
 262. 
 Lombard v. Chicago, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 460. p. 
 
 1246. 
 London v. Coleman. 59 Ga. 653. p. 20,58. 
 London Savings' Fund Soc. v. Ilagerstown 
 
 Savings' Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498. p. 1019. 
 Long V. Duncan, 10 Kan. 294. p. 2034. 
 Long Z-. Higginbolham, 5ii Mo. 245. p. 1050. 
 Longr. Hughes, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 387. pp. 2071, 
 
 2080. 
 Long V. Lewis, 16 Ga. 154. pp. 1586, 1605. 
 Long v. Morrison, -14 Ind. 595. pp. 411, 1235. 
 Long V. Rodgers, 19 Ala. 321. pp. 827, 1733. 
 Long V. State, 12 Ga. 294. pp. 203, 209, 703, 
 
 736, 737, 1669, 1713. 
 Longr. State, .56 Ind. 133. p. 2141. 
 Long V. State, .56 Ind. 182. p. 787. 
 Long r. State, 95 Ind. 481. pp. 338, 1711, 1950, 
 
 1974, 1985. 
 Long v. State, 11 Tex. App. 381. pp. 1763, 
 
 1796, 1797. 
 Longcojie v. Brace, 44 Tex. 434. p. 2001. 
 Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 151. 
 
 p. 1139. 
 Loomis V. Eagle &c. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 396. p. 991. 
 Loomis V. Jewett, 35 Hun (N. Y'.),313. p. 
 
 1111. 
 Loonev v. Bush, Minor (Ala.), 413. p. 2119. 
 Loop V. Gould, 17 Hun (N. Y.), 535. p. 167. 
 Looper V. I'.ell, 1 Head (Tenn.), 373. p. 108. 
 Lopez V. State, 34 Tex. 133. p. 465. 
 Lorainer. Cartwright, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 151. p. 1131. 
 Lord V. Brown, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 345, pp. 57, 
 
 99. 100. 
 Lord V. French, 61 Me. 420. p. 890. 
 Lord Behuore v. Anderson, 4 Bro. C. C. 90. 
 
 p. 646. 
 Lord (irey's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 128, S. C, 
 
 Skin. 82. p. 4,5. 
 Lord Fitzwater, Case of, 805. p. 1964. 
 Lord Peter v. Heneage, 12 Mod. 520. p. 
 
 1936. 
 Lord Stafford's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 1294. 
 
 p. 399. 
 
 Lord Walsingham v. Goodricke, 3 Hare, 122, 
 
 p. 276. 
 Lore V. State, 4 Ala. 173. p. 82. 
 Loring v. Bacon, 4 >Iass. 575. pp. 889, 899. 
 Lorrimer v. Bank of Illinois, 1 la. 223. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Lott V. Macon, 2 Strobh. L. (N. C.) 178. p. 
 
 1945. 
 Lott V. State, 9 Tex. App. 206. p. 1537. 
 Lott i: State, 18 Tex. App. 627. p. 727. 
 Lottman r. Barnott, 62 :Mo. J65. p. 1316. 
 Lotz V. P.riggs, 50 Ind. 346. pp. 1937, 1939, 
 
 1946, 1950. 
 London Savinsrs Fund Soc. v. Ilagerstown 
 
 Savings Bk., 36 Pa. St. 498. p. 1024. 
 Louisiana Plank Road Co. v. Mitchell, 20 
 
 Mo. 432 1). 1593. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Boland, 70 Ind. 595. 
 
 p. 199. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v, Brownlee, 14 Bush 
 
 (Ky.), 590. p. 13(!4. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409. 
 
 pp. 496, 497, 498. 506, 508, 509. 516, 519, 520, 
 
 563, 582, 584, 655, 1256, 1477, 1482, 1484, lii75. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Fox, 11 Bush (Ky.), 
 
 506. p. 1287. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Harrigan, 94 Ind. 245. 
 
 ]). 1756. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 372. 
 
 pp., 1293, 1295, 1757. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Mahony, 7 Bush 
 
 (Kv.\235. p. 2088. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403. 
 
 p. 2088. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. McKenna, 13 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.) , 280. pp. 825, 838. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Murphy, 9 Bush 
 
 (Kv.),522. pp. 1207, 1225. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Porter, 97 Ind. 267. 
 
 1). 2110. 
 Loui-sville &c. R. Co. v. Shanklin, 98 Ind. 573. 
 
 p. 1756. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Sickings, 5 Bush 
 
 (Kv.),l. p. 1235. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Thompson, 107 Ind. 
 
 442. pp. 2042, 2084. 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 554; 
 
 s. c. 115 Ind. 570. pp. 2038, 2043. 
 Louisville .Vc. R. Co. v. Worley, 107 Ind. 320. 
 
 J])). 2027, 2(129. 
 Louisville iVc. Works v. Commonwealth, 8 
 
 Bush (Ky.). ISl. p. 2068. 
 Louisville Rock Line Co. v. Kerr, 78 Ky. 12. 
 
 p. 21169. 
 Louthain v. ^filler, 85 Ind. 161. p. 2039. 
 Louw V. Davis, 13 Johns. (N. Y'.) 227. p. 19. 
 Love V. Carpenter, 30 Ind. 284. p. 2052. 
 Love V. DicUcrson, 85 X. C. 5. p. 218. 
 Love V. Hall, 76 ln<l. 326. p. 3. 
 Love V. :Moo<ly, 68 \. C. 200. pp. 1978, 1979. 
 Love V. State, 62 Tenn. (6 Baxt.) 154. p. 
 
 1907. 
 Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U. S. 430. pp. 1099, 
 
 1103, 1104. 
 Lovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. .545. p. 507. 
 Lovell V. Briggs, 2 X. H. 218. p. 351. 
 Lovell V. Davis, 101 IT. S. 541. p. 576. 
 Lovett V. Salem &c. R. Co., 9 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 557. p. 1233. 
 Lovett r. State, 60 Ga. 257. pp. 72, 123. 
 Low V. (ietiv, 18 111. 493. p. 1664. 
 Low r. Mitciiell, 18 Me. 372. p. 527. 
 Lowber v. Le Roy, 2 Saudf. (S. C.) 202. p. 
 
 838. 
 Lowe V. Foulke, 103 111. 58. pp. 2060, 2066. 
 Lowe V. McCorkle, 8 West. L. J. 64. p. 113. 
 Lowe V. Sinklear, 27 Mo. 310. )). 892. 
 Lowell V. Ins. Co., 8 Cush. (Mass.) 127. p. 
 
 977.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCIX 
 
 Lowenburg v. People, 5 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 414. 
 
 pp. 65, 73. 
 Lowney v. New Brunswick R. Co., 78 Me. 479 ; 
 
 s. c. 7 Atl. Hep. 381. p. 1311. 
 Lowney v. Perham, 20 Me. 235. p. 265. 
 Lowery v. Carver, 104 Ind. 447. p. 2112. 
 Lowrie v. France, 7 Xeb. 192. p. 2088. 
 Lowery v. State, 72 Ga. 649. p. 1777. 
 Lowry v. Orr, 6 111. 70. p. 1214. 
 Lovd V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 53 Mo. 509. pp. 
 
 6o3, 728, 747,-749, 1229, 1477. 
 Loyd V. Lee, 1 Strange, 94. p. 889. 
 Lovd V. State, 19 Tex. App. 32. p. 1744. 
 Loza V. State, 1 Tex. App. 488. p. 1696. 
 Lubbering v. Kehlbrecher, 22 Mo. 586. p. 
 
 1030. 
 Lubbock V. Inglis, 1 Stark. 104. p. 1330. 
 Lucas i\ Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436. j). 1705. 
 Lucas V. Cannon, 13 Bush (ivy.), '350. p. 1984. 
 Lucas V. Cole, 57 31o. 145. p. 877. 
 Lucas V. Daniels, 34 Ala. 188. p. 1051. 
 Lucas V. Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9. p. 434. 
 Lucas I'. Growning, 7 Taunt. 164. p. 835. 
 Lucas V. Johnson, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 244. p. 
 
 1047. 
 Lucas V. Mariene, 40 Ind. 289. p. 1910. 
 Lucas V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co. 33 Wis. 50. 
 
 p. 1283. 
 Lucas V. New Bedford &c. R. Co., 6 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 64. pp. 1224. 1236. 
 Lucas v. Nichols, 7 Jones L. (N. C.)32. p. 1456. 
 Lucas V. San Francisco, 28 Cal. 596. p. 2015. 
 Lucas V. Snyder, 2 G. Greene (Iowa), 499. 
 
 p. 825. 
 Luck V. State, 96 Ind. 16. p. 1981. 
 Luckett V. Townsend, 3 Tex. 119. p. 869. 
 Luckhart v. Ogdeu, 30 Cal. 547. p. 825, 828, 
 
 831, 1119,1122. 
 Ludden v. demons, 16 Neb. 506. p. 1650. 
 Ludlow V. Knox, 7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (N. S.) 
 
 411 (X. Y. Court of Appeals, 1869.). p. 151. 
 Ludwig V. Sager, 84 III. 90. p. 1653. 
 Lnera v. State, 12 Tex. App. 2.57. p. 1889. 
 Lufkins v. Collins (Idaho), 10 Pac. Rep. 300. 
 
 p. 2027. 
 Lumbert v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, 104. p. 1662. 
 Lumbkin v. Slate, 12 Tex. App. 341. p. 1889. 
 Luiiik-y ('. Caswell, 47 la. 159. p. 1263. 
 Lumpkin r. State, 68 Ala. 56. p. 464. 
 Lund V. Tyngsboro, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 563. p. 
 
 1721. 
 Lundie v. Roberts, 7 East, 231. p. 948. 
 Lung V. Deal, 16 Ind. 349. p. 1726. 
 Luningi'. State, 1 Cliand. (Wis.) 178. p. 783. 
 Lunt V. Whitaker, 10 Me. 310. p. 1442. 
 Lunt V. Wormell, 19 Me. 100. pp. 218, 221. 
 Lush V. Druse, 4 Wend. (X. Y.j 313. p. 1476. 
 Luster v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 169. p. 
 
 1913. 
 Luther v. Skeen. 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 356. p. 
 
 450. 
 Latterell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 282. pp. 483, 484. 
 Luttrell V. JMaysville &c. R. Co., 18 B. Mon. 
 
 (Ky.) 291. pp. 1014, 1974. 
 Luxford V. Large, 5 Car. & P. 421. p. 1223. 
 Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward, 90 111. 545. 
 
 pp. 6y, 71. 
 Lyles V. Lyles, 1 Hill Ch. (S. C.) 76. p. 489. 
 Lyles V. Lyles, 2 Xott & McC. (N. C.) 531. 
 
 p. 829. 
 Lyles V. State, 41 Tex. 172. pp. 49, 51. 
 Lyman v. Bauk of U. S., 12 How. (U. S.) 225. 
 
 p. 958. 
 Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. St. 488. pp. 
 
 456, 476. 
 Lyman v. Redman, 23 Me. 286. p. 1758. 
 Lyman v. State, 45 Ala. 72. p. 51. 
 Lyman v. State, 69 Ga. 405. pp. 258, 259, 1976. 
 Lynch y. Com., 77 Pa. St. 205. p. 1878. 
 
 Lynch t\ Metropolitan Ac. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 
 
 77 ; s. c. 43 Am. Hep. 141. p. 1293. 
 Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; s. c. 4 Per. & 
 
 Dav. 672. p. 1231. 
 Lynch v. Peabody, 137 Mass. 92. p. 779. 
 Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass. 53. pp. 1232, 1233, 
 
 1234. 
 Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541. pp. 317, 705, 722, 
 
 726, 727, 732, 1520. 
 Lynn v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 167. p. 
 
 1307. 
 Lyon V. Barrows, 13 Iowa, 428. p. 630. 
 Lyon V. Commercial Ins. Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 
 
 267. p. 20. 
 Lyon V. Daniels, 14 Pa. St. 197. p. 1586. 
 Lyon v. Fox, 2 Browne (Pa.), 67. pp.1161, 
 
 1198. 
 Lvon V. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1. p. 1101. 
 Lyon V. Lyon, 21 Conn. 18, 185, 196. p. 132. 
 Lyon I'. Siblev, 32 Me. 577. p. 1586. 
 Lyons V. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387. p. 1210. 
 Lvons V. Lawrence, 12 Bradw. (111.) 531. pp. 
 
 618, 1927, liimi. 
 Lyons y. Rosenthal, 11 Hun (N. Y.),46. p. 
 
 1222. 
 Lytton V. Baird, 95 Ind. 349. p. 1756. 
 
 M. 
 
 M. V. B., 3 Swab. & Tr. 550. pp. 646, 649, 651. 
 M. V. H., 3 Swab. & Tr. 517. pp. 649, 651. 
 M'Aleece,In re, 7 Ir. C. L. 146. p. 136. 
 M'Clintock v. Emick (Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep. 
 
 906. p. 925. 
 M'Xaughton's Case, 10 CI. & Fin. 200. pp. 
 
 49i», 502. 
 M'Causlandt'. Causlaud, 1 Y''eates (Pa.), 372. 
 
 p. 1980. 
 Mass V. White, 37 Mich. 126. p. 854. 
 Mabbett r. White, 12 X. Y. 442. p. 560. 
 Macclestield v. Pedley, 4 IJarn. & Ad. 403. pp. 
 
 1505, 1507, 1515. 
 MacFarland v. Bellows, 49 Mo. 311. p. 
 
 1508. 
 MacKinley v. McGregor, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 370. 
 
 )). 386. 
 Macbeath v. Haldiman, 1 T. R. 172. pp. 831, 
 
 832, 835. 
 Macdonald v. Evans. IC. B. 930; s. c. 21 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 141 ; 16 Jur. 103. p. 635. 
 Mace V. State, 9 Tex. App. 110. p. 1746. 
 Mack v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 35 Hun 
 
 (X. Y.),75. p. 980. 
 Mack V. Salem, 6 Ore. 275. p. 1248. 
 Mackay v. Commercial Bauk, L. R. 5 P. C. 
 
 394; s. c. 43 L. J. (P. C.) 31. p. 1022. 
 Mackay i: Hhinelauder, 1 Johns. Cas. (X. Y.) 
 
 408. p. 074. 
 Mackey v. Adair. 99 Pa. St. 143. p. 191. 
 Mackey i-. Ford, 5 Hurl. & X. 792. p. 795. 
 Mackev v. Xuw York &c. R. Co., 27 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.) 528. p. 1226. 
 Mackey v. People, 2 Colo. 13. pp. 20, 1682. 
 Mackinson v. Glegg, 95 Ind. 373. p. 2051. 
 Maclin v. Bloom, 54 Miss. 365. p. 1912. 
 Macklin v. Waterhouse, 5 Bing. 212. p. 1364. 
 Macklot V. Dubreuil, 9 Mo. 477. p. 1042. 
 Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 215. p. 745. 
 Maclin v. Insurance Co., 33 La. Ann. 801. 
 
 p. 640. 
 Maclin v. Wilson, 21 Ala. 670. p. 184. 
 Macomber i'. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 183. p. 
 
 910. 
 Macomber v. Taunton, 100 Mass. 255. p. 
 
 1379. 
 Macro w v. Great Western B. Co., L. B. 6 
 
 Q. 15. 612. pp. 11.52, 1154. 
 Macullar v. Wall, 6 Gray (Mass.), 507. p. 
 
 307.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Madan v. Covert 13 Joue8 & Sp. (X. Y.) 
 M^c^^::.^^K-52la.692. pp. 30., 441. 
 
 Mnddc 1 V. Tucker, 4tt Me. 367. p. 10. .. 
 
 Madsdeu V. Phoenix Fire ins. Co., 1 b. C. 
 
 M^iu^ka^fT.>omas.6Kan.l^.PP.5^^g. 
 Maffelt I'. Toukius, b N. J. 1- -£-»• PI"- "^ ' 
 MSef t'. Carmack, 13 111. 289. pp. 1131, 1132, 
 Magee v. Harrington, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 
 MSee^-.H'oliand. 27 N. J. L. 86. pp. 891, 
 Ts/^-ee V Magee, 37 ^liss. 138. p. 1043. 
 
 mScs^s J:'liate,2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 309. p. 
 
 mShcss v. Stewart. 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 309 
 
 Maguiac V. Thompson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 348. p. 
 
 Mig'niu t'. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168. PP- 1321. 
 
 Mlgomn V. Muldrow, 12 Mo. 512 p. 890. 
 Matuinr.State,10Oh. 232 P- "ll: „„, .,„ 
 Maher v. Allanlic &c. 11. Co., bi Mo. 267. PP 
 mSI- "central Park R. Co., 67 X.Y. 52. 
 
 MaiiS: People 10 Mich 212 V- 1554. 
 Maher v. Slate, 1 Port. 2fao. P- 2( . 
 
 Major r. Pulliam, 3 Daua (Ivy.), 583. pp. H ' . 
 
 Mlior .. spies. 6^ar^(XY.^577.p^340. 
 
 Maior v. State, 4 bneeu ^ivj-;, " • f 
 Saiorsr. State 29 Ark. 12 p 448. ^^^^ 
 
 £a"rMc\^S.^3^^nd. 273. Iv ni5. 
 MS-ok..TowerGrovell. C0..57M0.17. 
 Mlmi't'r. Mallet, 1 Root (Conn.). 501 p.328. 
 
 Mi^ii^iioufh^t^^^I-;/t.t6 P.380. 
 
 ^aione v. Murphy 2 Kan. 2 0. P- 1197. 
 Malone v. State, 6 ca. 408. p. u*- 
 
 Malone r. State,. 49 Ga. 210 P; 30- 
 
 Maloy f. New York &C. U. Oo.,56iJaru. i,i.^. 
 
 Mai;^y'- -SUUe'^ex. 599 ^PP; ^.2076 
 
 Mals6n V. Fry, 1 \\ "i^^ / l-^lit-^-^^jj^-y j 473. 
 Maltbv V. Harwood, 12 Barb. (N. i-) *'^- 
 
 mJuIu? ': ilUelds, 2 Met. (Ky.) 653 p. 816. 
 Manchester v. Dodbridge, 3 Ind. 300. p. 
 
 Manchester r. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118. p. 
 
 Mandeville r. Heynolds.CS N Y 528^^ P- 191. 
 IMandigo r. Mandigo. 2b Micl 34J. P- l.*i- 
 Mauer estate. 8 Tex. App..ibl. p.^l• 
 Manga.n r. Urook lyn &c K. Co., 38 X. 1. 400. 
 
 M!;i:h:;imeiTil'^^ii.^^iMo.App.297. p. 
 
 K&vr^Si!!;^^r8rp|il|io94. 
 
 Manke v. People, 17 Han V \.). 410. p. 78- 
 Manly r. Hubbard. 9 Ind. 230. •'';'•,„ j^^g^ 
 Maun i: Uirchard, 40 \ t. .526. 'l ■ 1*^— ''**"• 
 Mann r. Clifton, 3 IJlackf. Und.) 304. p. 2097. 
 Mann v. Faiilee, 44 Vt 6i3. p. 1". 
 Mann i-. Glover, 14 ^. J. L- -«0J- PP- '*• °^' 
 
 Malint-'Scke,12N H.246. p.890 
 Mauning j;. Bresnahan (Jlich.), 30 is. \m. 
 
 Kep. 189. p. 747. o.„ t? pr. on N W. 
 
 Manning r. Burlington &c. 1^- Co-- -» ^. >V. 
 
 Kep. 163; S. <•• 64 Iowa, 240 p. .6. 
 Manning r. Cuumugham, 21 Neb. 288. p. 
 
 Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399. pp.563. 
 
 Manning v. Wells. 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746. 
 
 M!^i^Ieid^cti\;li.4C^sii^(Ma;B;)213. p. 
 
 Manslield v. Wheeler, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 79. 
 
 Mansiiii^d &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519. 
 
 Mlnu'/hicturers Bank v. Scofleld. 39 Vt. 590. 
 
 Manulacturing Co. v. Thomas (Iowa), 5 N. 
 
 M:^\,'[^f;>'Hrig^s?l|vtV7^^,^p.l66. 
 Manwell r. Turner 2.5 Kan. 42 p. -101. 
 
 K^^:^^i^c?VG^"y(^la^.).395. p. 
 
 Ml^blehead M. F. Ins. Co, v. Underwood. 2 
 MSiS^'s?n^Sll'K^^.-5M. p.2087. 
 M rch" .^llabough, 103 Pa- ^ 33,-> p^ 871. 
 March v. Uarrell. 1 Jones L. (N. C.) iiJ. P- 
 
 Mlrch V. Ludlum. 2 Sandi. Ch. (N. Y.) 35. p. 
 Man-h v. Portsmouth &c. U. Co., 19 N. H. 
 M^h':-.^ate.44Tex.C4. pp. 1912, 1918, 
 Miay'"'shultB.29 N.Y.346. pp. 355. 365, 
 
 Manulstv State, 26 ind 101 p. 561. 
 Marcy v. Barnes, 10 Gray (.Mass.;. loi- i 
 661.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CI 
 
 Marcy v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 11 La. Xm\. 749. 
 
 p.'.ti»3. 
 Mart'tzek v. Cauldwell,2 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 407; 
 
 s. c. 5 Kobt. 6ij0. p. 63. 
 Margrave v. Ausmuss, 51 Mo. 561. p. 5fi0. 
 Mariam v. Dougherty, 46 (Jal. 26. p. 2057. . 
 Manner v. Dver. 2 Me. 165. p. 132. 
 Mariner v. Pettibone, 14 Wis. Hi.a. p. 1637. 
 Mariner v. Saunders, 5 Gilm. (111.) 113. p. 611. 
 Marion v. State, 20 N. \V. Rep. 290. pp. 
 
 ISTD, 1871. 
 Marion v. State (Neb.), 29 X. ^Y. Eep. 911. 
 
 PI). 370, 450. 
 Markel v. Moudy, 13 Neb. 323. pp. 373, 430. 
 Mark v. State, lo Tex. App. 3:U. p. 1744. 
 Markes v. Hilsendegeu, 46 Mich. 336. p. 
 
 407. 
 Markham v. Lee, cited 1 Leon. 8S. p. 29. 
 Markle v. Haltield, 2 Jolins. (N. V-) 458. 
 
 pp. 1132, 1133. 
 Marks v. King, 64 N. Y. 628. p. 5S3. 
 Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55. p. 464. 
 Marmaduke, Ex parte, 91 Mo. 228. pp. 164, 
 
 177, 178, 179. 
 Marnoch v. State, 7 Tex. App. 269. p. 1903. 
 Marr f. Marr,2 Head (Tenn.), 303. p. 1008. 
 Marscimetz v. Wright, 50 Wis. 175. p. 1664. 
 Marsh v. Elsworth, 36 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 532; 
 
 s. c. 1 Sweeny (NT. Y.), 152. p. 795. 
 Marsh v. Horne, 5 Barn. & Cress. 322. pp. 
 
 1319, 1337. 
 Marsh v. Mitchell, 25 Wis. 706. p. 1090. 
 Marsh i>. Richards, 29 Mo. 105. p. 892. 
 Marsh r. State, 30 Miss. 627. pp. 81, 82. 
 Marshall r. American Express Co., 7 Wis. 1. 
 
 pp. 214, 215, 713. 
 Marshall r. Russard, Gilm. (Va.) 9. p. 1161. 
 Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414; s. c-. 58 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 231; 16 Hua(N.Y.), 606. 
 
 pp. 307, 300. 
 Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 111. p. 
 
 1749. 
 Marsliall v. Gougler, 10 Scrg. &R. (Pa.) 1G4. 
 
 p. 1031. 
 Marsliall v. Krugg, 2 A. & K. Marsh. (Ky.) 36. 
 
 p. 106. 
 Marshall v. Haney, 4 Md. 498. p. 1670. 
 Marshall v. Jones, U Me. 54. p. 893. 
 Marshall v. Maddock, Litt. Sel. Cas. (Ky.) 
 
 1(16. p. 1198. 
 Marshall v. Morris, 16 Ga. 368. p. 1634. 
 Marshall v. Nagel, 1 Rail. (S. C.) 308. p. 194. 
 Marsliall V. bchricker, 63 Mo. 308. pp. 808, 
 
 1239. 
 Mar.shall v. Shatter, 32 Cal. 176. p. 389. 
 Marshall?;. State, 107 Ind. 173. p. 2112. 
 Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273. pp. 316, 
 
 458. 
 Marshall v. Wolfe, 11 Mo. 608. pp. 1584, 1585. 
 Marshall &c. Co. v. Kirtley, 8 Colo. 108. p. 
 
 2130. 
 Marston v. Roe, 8 Ad. & El. 14. p. 647. 
 Martin v. Anderson, 21 Ga. 301. p. 272. 
 Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67. p. 2052. 
 Martin v. Central Iowa R. Co., 59 la. 411. p. 
 
 2040. 
 Martin v. Com., 2 Leigh (Va.), 745. p. 1909. 
 Martini). Cope, 28 N. Y. 181. pp. 1684,1685. 
 Martin r. Elden, ;52 Oh. St. 282. i)p.36S, 382. 
 Martin v. Khrenfels, 24 111. 187. p. 1984. 
 Martin v. Faruham, 25 N. H. 195. p. 397. 
 Martin v. Good, 14 Md. 398. p. 3.53. 
 Martin v. Great Northern R. Co., 16 C. B. 179. 
 
 p. 1698. 
 Martin v. Henley, 13 Mo. 312. p. 1584. 
 Martin v. Matlield, 49 Cal. 42. p. 2081. 
 Martin v. Miller, 3 Md. 135. p. 1616. 
 Martin r. Morelock, 32 111. 487. pp. 1912, 1921, 
 
 1923, 1996. 
 
 Martin v. Nutkin, 2 P. Wms. 266. p. 1399. 
 JIarliu V. Orndorff, 22 lovva, 504. p. 758. 
 Martin v. People, 54 111. 225. pp. 1912, 1913. 
 Martin v. Ramsey, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 260. 
 
 p. 188. 
 :Martin v. Reg., 12 Irish L. 399. p. 55. 
 Martin v. Rushton, 42 Ala. 289. p. 2019. 
 Martin v. Smvlee, 55 Mo. 577. p. 1708. 
 Martin v. State, 25 Ga. 494. pp. 63, 1919. 
 Martini'. State, 16 Oh. 364. p. 65. 
 Martin v. State, 9 Tex. App . 293. p. 1918. 
 Martin v. Tapley, 119 Mass. 116. p. 796. 
 Martin i\ Tidwell, 36 Ga. 332. pp. 1020, 1976, 
 
 1977, 2062. 
 IMartiu v. Travers, 12 Cal. 243. pp. 559, 560. 
 Martini'. Weblj, 5 Ark. 72. p. 1585. 
 Maniu V. Wiiglit, 13 Wend. (N. V.) 460; s. c. 
 
 28 Am. Dec. 4t)S. p. 9t)0. 
 Martin, Ex parte, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 456. p. 
 
 150. 
 
 Martineau v. Steele, 14 Wis. 273. pp. 828. 
 
 852. 
 Martinez r. State, 16 Tex. App. 122. p. 1707. 
 Martyn v. Gray, 14 C. B. (N. s.) 824. p. 1100. 
 Martz t7. Martz, 25Gratt. (Va.) 361. pp. 551, 
 
 552. 
 Marvin v. Raygan, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 132. p. 
 
 631. 
 Marvine v. Hvmers, 12 N. Y. 223. p. 888. 
 Marx V. fechvvartz (Ore.), 12 Pac. Rep. 253. 
 
 p. 1661. 
 Marye v. Strouse, 5 Fed. Rep. 494. p. 2098. 
 Mascheck v. St. Louis R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 
 
 600 p. 1232. 
 Maslin v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 14 W. Va. 
 
 180. p. 1372. 
 Mason v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Mo. App. 
 
 275. p. 950. 
 Mason v. Bair, 33 111. 194. pp. 2105, 2106. 
 Mason V. Croom, 24 Ga. 211. pp. 215, 224. 
 Mason v. Ditchbourne, 1 Mood. & Rob. 462, n. 
 
 p. 380. 
 Mason v. Lewis, 1 G. Greene (Iowa), 494. 
 
 p. 1603. 
 Mason v. Poulson, 43 Md. 162. p. 1708. 
 Mason v. Russell, 1 Tex. 721. pp. 1972, 1983, 
 
 1985, 1995. 
 Mason v. State, 15 Tex. App. 534. p. 64. 
 Mason v. Slate, 42 Ala. 532. pi). 299, 3U4. 
 Mason c. Thompson, 9 Pick. 2o0; s. c. 20 Am. 
 
 Dec. 471. p. 1340. 
 Mason v. Wlutbeck Co., 35 Wis. 134. p. 1734. 
 Mason, In re, 8 Mich. 70. p. 177. 
 Massengale i<. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 
 
 Mo. App. 257. p. 1150. 
 Massey v. Hackett, 12 La. Ann. 54. p. 358. 
 Massony. Bovet, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 69. p. 1132. 
 Mastea v. Devo, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 424. pp. 
 
 1172,1181, 1182,1187. 
 Master r. Miller, 4 T. R. 320. p. 1031. 
 Masters r. .Madison Co. Alut. Ins. Co., II 
 
 Burb. (N. Y.)625. pp. 974, 977. 
 Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293. pp. 1481, 
 
 1672. 
 Masterson v. Cheek, 23 111. 73. p. 87:!. 
 Masterson v. LeClaire, 4 Minn. 163. p. 193. 
 Masterson v. West End Narrow Gauge R. 
 
 Co., 5 Mo. App. 64. p. 1092. 
 Mastin i\ Bran ham, 86 Mo. 643. p. 966. 
 Mastin v. Paciiic R. Co., 83 Mo. 634. p. 863. 
 Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221. pp. 1586, 1605. 
 Mather v. Parsons, 32 Hun(N. Y.),339. p. 
 
 640. 
 Matheson v. Stewart, 2 How. (U. S.) 263. p. 
 
 2003. 
 Mathews v. Mass. Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes (U. 
 
 !S.),396. p. 1023. 
 Mathis V. Buford, 17 Tex. 152. p. 321. 
 Mathis V. State, 18 Ga. 343. p. 1980.
 
 cu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Matilda v. Mason, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 343. 
 
 p. 99. 
 Matuey v. Gragg Bros. Grain Co., 19 Mo. 
 
 App. 107. p. 1473. 
 Matron V. BucIj, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 499. p. 1466. 
 Maton V. People, 15 111. 536. pp. 37, 40. 
 Matteson v. Noyes, 25 111. 591. p. 641. 
 Matthews v. Coulter, 9 Mo. 705. p. 1030. 
 Matthews v. Hamilton, 2i 111. 470. p. 1675. 
 Matthews v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 
 
 50 Mo. 149. p. 1600. 
 Matthews r. Story, 54 Ind. 417. p. 1646. 
 Matthews i\ Itice, 31 N. Y. 457. pp. 1414, 1438. 
 Matthews v. State, 6 Tex. Ap\^. 23. p. 24. 
 Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N. Y. 568. p. 188. 
 Matthews v. ^Yard, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443. 
 
 p. 1046. 
 Matthewson v. Burr, 6 Neb. 312. p. 452. 
 Mattocks V. Lyman, 16 Vt. 113. pp. 361, 362. 
 Mattocks V. Wheaton, 10 Vt. 498. p. 184. 
 Mauerman v. Siemens, 71 Mo. 101. p. 1212. 
 Maugham v. Hubbard, 8 Barn. & Cres. 14. 
 
 p. 362. 
 Maulsby, Ex parte, 13 Md. 625. pp. 171. 173. 
 
 174, 187. 
 Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 174. p. 274. 
 Maurer v. People, 43 N. Y. 1. p. 1916. 
 Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233. pp. 581, 585. 
 Mauro v. Piatt, 62 111. 450. p. 1784. 
 Maverick v. Salinas, 15 Tex. 57. p. 1412. 
 Mawson v. Hartsink, 4 Esp. 102. p. 456. 
 Maxwell v. Boyne, 36 Ind. 120. pp. 2032, 2040. 
 Maxwell v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 
 
 pp. 567, 1261, 14S3, 1646, 1686. 
 Maxwell v. Kennedy, 10 La. Ann. 798. p. 629. 
 Maxwell v. Planter's Bank, 10 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 507. p. 1023. 
 Maxwell i-. Kives, 11 Nev. 213. p. 151, 281. 
 Maxwell v. Wilkinson, 113 U. S. 656. p. 355. 
 May V. Burk, 80 Mo. 67.i. p. 861. 
 May V. Elam, 27 Iowa, 365. p. 126. 
 May V. Gwynne, 4 Barn. & Aid. 301. p. 589. 
 May V. Hoover (Ind.), 14 North East. Rep. 
 
 472. p. 95. 
 May V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 3 AVis. 219. 
 
 p. 4. 
 May V. Pavey, 63 Ind. 4. p. 2112. 
 May V. People, 8 Colo. 224. iip. 1548, 1555, 
 
 1557, 1562, 1568, 1569, 1571, 1573, 1574, 1576, 
 
 1808. 
 May V. People, 60 111. 120. pp. 1828, 1832. 
 May V. Shumway, 16 Gray (Mass.), 86. p. 188. 
 May V. State, 22 Tex. App. 595. p. 1679. 
 May, In re, 1 Fed. Rep. 737. p. 1923. 
 May bee v. Fisk, 42 Barb. (X. Y.) 327. p. 1645. 
 Maybee v. Sniffen, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 1. 
 
 p. 641. 
 Mayer v. People, 80 X. Y. 364. p. 385: 
 Mayeys v. Parish, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 38. p. 
 
 1669. 
 Mayfleld v. Cotton, 37 Tex. 229. pp. 727, 733. 
 Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328. p. 1316. 
 Mavnard V Fellows, 43 N. H. 255. p. 1957. 
 Mayuard v. Head, 1 S. E. Rep. 273. p. 2099. 
 Mavnard v. Johnson, 4 Ala. 116. j). 1733. 
 Maynard v. Shorb, 85 Ind. 501. p. 312. 
 Mayo r. Archer, 1 Strange, 531. p. 2012. 
 Mayo I'. Preston, 131 Mass. 304. p. 1336. 
 Mayor v. Humphries, 1 Carr. & P. 251. p. 
 
 1610. 
 Mayor v. Pentz, 24 AVend. (X. Y.) 668. p. 
 
 612. 
 Mayor &c. of York v. Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302. 
 
 p. 158. 
 Mavor of Devises v. Clark, 3 Ad. & El. 506. 
 
 p. 2021. 
 Mavijr of Dartmouth v. Iloldsworth, 10 Sim. 
 
 476. p. 276. 
 Mays V. Foster, 26 Kan. 518. p. 2038. 
 
 Maze V. Miller, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 328. p. 955. 
 McAdory v. State. 62 Ala. 154. pp. 747, 755. 
 ^McAfee v. Ryan, 11 Mo. 364. p. 1626. 
 McAfee V. State, 17 Tex. App. 131. pp. 1796, 
 
 1797. 
 INIcAffee V. State, 31 Ga. 411. p. 422. 
 McAllilley t'. Horton, 75 Ala. 491. p. 2019. 
 JIcAllister r. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 
 
 Ky. 531. pp. 2048, 2050, 2086. 
 McAllister r. Engle, 52 Mich. 56. p. 1741. 
 McAllister v. Sibley, 25 Me. 474. pp. 1465, 
 
 1780, 1920, 1977. 
 .AIc.Mlister v. State, 17 Ala. 434. pp. 81, 1780. 
 McAllister v. Williams, 1 Tenn. (Overt.) 107. 
 
 p. 328. 
 McAlpine v. Reichneker, 27 Kan. 257. p. 
 
 1090. 
 SIcAlpine v. State, 47 Ala. 78. p. 1849. 
 lAIcArthur v. Henry, 35 Tex. 804. p. 1080. 
 McArthurr. Soule, 5Hun (N. Y.),63. p. 572. 
 .AIcAvoy V. Long, 13 111. 147. p. 837. 
 McBain r. Smith, 13 Ga. 315. p. 1669. 
 McBeatht). Wabash &c. R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 
 
 445. pp. 1343, 1368. 
 McBrayer v. Hill, 4 Ired. L. (N. C.) 136. p. 
 
 1456. 
 McBride v. Thompson, 8 Ala. 650. p. 1758. 
 McBride v. Wallace (Mich.), 29 N. W.Rep. 
 
 75. p. 323, 
 McCabe v. Brayton, 38 N. Y. 196. pp. 397, 
 
 583. 
 jNIcCabe v. Hammond, 34 Wis. 590. p. 1249. 
 McCabe v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 301. p. 2049. 
 McCall V. Butterworth, 8 la. 329. p. 184. 
 McCall V. Davis, 56 Pa. St. 431. p. 1413. 
 McCall V. Seevers, 5 Ind. 187. pp. 1747, 1750. 
 McCall V. State, 14 Tex. App. 363. pp. 1745, 
 
 1788. 
 McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 669. p. 1730. 
 McCamant v. Busch, 33 Mo. 544. p. 1670. 
 McCampl)elU\ State, 9 Tex. App. 124. p. 49. 
 McCaudless v. State, 21 Tex. App. 411. p. 
 
 1889. 
 McCann r. Beere, 1 Hogan, 129. p. 279. 
 McCann v. People, 88 111. 103. p. 1904. 
 McCann v. State, 9 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 465. 
 
 pp. 190t, 1907,1921, 1981. 
 McCarragher v. Gaskell, 42 Hun (N. Y.), 451. 
 
 p. 1211. 
 McCarrow v. Cassiday, 18 Ark. 34. p. 869. 
 McCarthy v. Missouri R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 
 
 3S5. p." 3. 
 McCarthy v. Railway Co. (Mo.), 4 S. W. Rep. 
 
 516. pi>. 62, 126. 
 McCarthy v. State, 56 Ind. 203. p. 1515. 
 McCartny v. Territory, 1 Neb. 121. pp. 566, 
 
 567. 
 McCarty v. Kitchen, 59 Ind. 505. pp. 1196, 
 
 1920. 
 McCarty v. McCarty, 4 Rich. L. (N. C.) 594. 
 
 l)p. 1930, 1975. 
 McCarlv v. State, 26 Miss. 299. pp. 17,81, 111. 
 McOarty v. Waterman, 96 Ind. 694. pp. 684, 
 
 1756. 
 Mc( !arver v. Pipen, 12 Ileisk. (Tenn.) 057. p. 
 
 1922. 
 McCaslandv. Kimberlin,100Ind. 121. p. 1775. 
 McCaulay v. Palmer, 40 Hun (N. Y.),38. p. 
 
 167. 
 McCauley v. Murdock, 97 Ind. 229. p. 2101. 
 Mc(Jausland v. McCauslaud, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 
 
 372. i)p. 62, 72, 120. 
 McCausland v. Ralston, 12 Nev. 195. p. 364. 
 McClain v. Esham. 17 B. Mon. (Kv.) 156. p. 
 
 1669. 
 McClane v. Riddle, 19 Ala. 180. p. 649. 
 M<',('laren v. Indianapolis &c. 11. Co.. 34 Ind. 
 
 319. p. 2035. 
 McClarv r. State, 75 Ind. 260. pp. 1918, 1983,
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cm 
 
 pp. 
 
 McClay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa, 66. pp. 340, 893. 
 McClay v. State, 1 Ind. 385. p. 17J6. 
 McClean r. Hertzog, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 154. 
 
 p. 609. 
 McClellau v. Bond, 92 Ind. 424. pp. 563, 574, 
 
 2115. 
 McClenaghau v. Brock, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 17. 
 
 p. 1621. 
 McClelland v. Lindsay, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 
 
 360. p. 552. 
 McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879. p. 2048. 
 McClintock iJ. Curd, 32 Mo. 41L pp. 214, 227, 
 
 1670. 
 McCloskev v. People, 5 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 
 
 308. p. 32. 
 McClung V. Kelly, 21 la. 508. pp. 910, 912. 
 McUlung V. Ross, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 124. p. 
 
 1044. 
 McClung's Executors v. Spottswood, 19 Ala. 
 
 165. p. 1019. 
 McCluuy V. Lockhart, 1 Bailev (S. C), 117. 
 
 p. 1980. 
 McClure v. McClure, 74 Ind. 108. p. 2039. 
 McClure v. Red Wing, 28Miuu. 186. p. 1241. 
 McClure v. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 206. pp. 
 
 122, 125. 
 McCIurkin v. Ewing, 42 111. 283. pp. 2050, 
 
 2051. 
 McCollough, Ex parte, 35 Cal. 97. p. 152. 
 McCollum V. Seward, 62 N'. Y. 317. p. 503. 
 McCoraas v. Haas, 93 Iiid. 276. p. 2042. 
 McComas V. Haas, 107 Ind. 512. p. 2038. 
 McComas r. State, 11 Mo. 116. p. 2064. 
 McCombs V. Chandler, 5 Harr. (Del.) 423. 
 
 p. 2096. 
 McConnell v. Kibbe, 33 111. 175. p. 1750 
 McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430, 
 
 218, 223. 
 McConnell v. Linton, 4 Watts (Pa.), 357. 
 
 p. 1999. 
 McConnell v. State (Tex.), 3 8. W. Rep. 699. 
 
 pp. 768, 772. 
 McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 340. p. 113. 
 McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 40. pp. 1905, 1911, 
 
 1997. 
 McCormick v. Brookfleld, 4 X. J. L. 69. pp. 
 
 5,46, 97. 
 McCormick v. Dunville, 36 Iowa, 645. p. 931. 
 McCormick v. Elston, 16 111. 205. p. 1125. 
 McCormick v. Irwin, 35 Pa. St. 111. p. 1941. 
 McCormick v. Joseph, 77 Ala. 236. p. 345. 
 McCormick v. l^ougliran, 16 Neb. 87. p. 568. 
 McCormick r. Mliler, 12 Minn. 443. p. 2050. 
 McCormick v. Mulvihill, 1 Hilt. (X. Y.) 131. 
 
 p. 353. 
 McCormick i\ Pennsylvania &c. R. Co., 49 X. 
 
 Y. 3U3. p. 1494. 
 McCormick v. Sisson, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 715. 
 
 pp. 1181,1198. 
 McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 
 
 192. p. 136. 
 McCourt V. People, 64 X. Y. 583. p. 1535. 
 McCoy V. Huffman, 8 Cow. (X'^. Y.) 84. p. 
 
 895. 
 McCoy V. Lassiter, 95 X. C. 88. p. 869. 
 McCov V. Phillips, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 463. p. 309. 
 McCoy V. Rives, 1 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 592. 
 
 p. 2001. 
 McCoy V. State, 22 Ark. 308. p. 109. 
 McCov r. State, 15 Ga. 205. p. 1670. 
 McCoy V. State, 44 Tex. 616. p. 1896. 
 McCrarv r. Crandall, 1 la. 117. p. 1773. 
 McCray"«-. Stewart, 16 Ind. 377. p. 1982. 
 McCreciie v. Senior, 4 Paige (X. Y.), 378. p. 
 
 151. 
 McCullev r. State, 62 Ind. 463. pp. 1562, 1756. 
 McCullough V. Rice, 59 Ind. 580. p. 1196. 
 McCullough V. State, 5 b. W. Rep. 175; s. c. 
 
 23 Tex. App. 620. u. 1846. 
 
 McCnlly v. Barr, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 445. p. 
 
 1938. 
 McCullv V. Clarke. 40 Pa. St. 399. pp. 1210, 
 
 1-'18, 1223. 
 McCuue V. Com., 2 Rob. (Ta.) 777. pp. 71, 74. 
 McCurrv v. Hooper, 12 Ala. 823. p. 551. 
 McCutchen r. McCutchen, 9 Port. (Ala.) 650. 
 
 pp. 456, 476, 827. 
 McDaniel r. Crosbv, 19 Ark 533. p. 227. 
 McDaniel v. State, "53 Ga. 253. p. 444 
 McDaniel v. Stale, S Smed. & M. (Miss.) 401. 
 
 p. 1671. 
 McDaniels v. McDailieIs,40 Tt. 363. pp. 1921, 
 
 1923, 1976. 
 McDaniel:^ v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 317. pp. 1321, 
 
 1338, 1340. 
 McDermott v. Highbv. 23 Cal. 489. p. 2044. 
 McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. St. 31. pp. 20, 
 
 38, 95. 
 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187. p. 1709. 
 McDonald v. Beall, 55 Ga. 288. pp. 119, 120, 
 
 1646. 
 McDonald v. Bellamy, 18 Ga. 411. p. 1670. 
 McDonald v. Carson,' 95 X. C. 378. p. 612. 
 McDonald v. Cooper &c. Co., 32 Kan. 61. pp. 
 
 2056, 2073. 
 McDonald v. Elfes, 61 Ind. 279. p. 2112. 
 McDonald v. Hodge, 5 Havw. (Tenn.) 85. p. 
 
 1956. 
 McDonald v. Matney, 82 Mo. .358. p. 876. 
 McDonald v. McDonald, 55 Mich. 155. p. 421. 
 McDonald v. Mulhollan, 5 Watts (Pa.), 173. 
 
 p. 1065. 
 McDonald v. Xorth, 47 Barb. (X. Y'.) 530. p. 
 
 561. 
 McDonald v. Rooke, 2 Bing. (X^ C.) 219. p. 
 
 1169'. 
 JIcDonald v. Shaw, 1 X'. J. L. 6. p. 30. 
 McDonald r. State, 63 Ind. 544. p. 1526. 
 Mcliouel V. State, 90 Ind. 320. pp. 480, 647, 
 
 1482, 1709. 
 McDonough v. Virginia City, 6 Xev. 93. p. 
 
 1246. 
 McDowell V. Crawford, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 377. 
 
 p. 310. 
 McDuflie V. Clark, 39 Hun (X. Y'.),166. p. 
 
 1073. 
 Mclilfatrick, v. Cofforth, 29 Ind. 37. i>. 2141. 
 McElfresh v. Guard, 32 Ind. 4U8. p. 2iiH. 
 McElhinuey v. Kraus, 10 Mo. App. 218. p. 
 
 1050. 
 McElven v. State, 30 Ga. 869. pp. 1845, 1984. 
 McEutee v. Xew Jersey Steamboat Co., 45 
 
 X. Y. 34. pp. 11.56, 1157". 
 McEwen v. Ins. Co., 5 Hill (X. Y".), 101. p. 
 
 977. 
 McFadden v. Com., 23 Pa. St. 12. pp. 51, 86, 
 
 91. 
 
 McFadden v. Mitchell, 61 Cal. 148. pp. 385, 
 
 389. 
 McFadden r. Wallace, 38 Cal. 51. p. 64. 
 McFarland v. Bellows, 49 Mo. 311. pp. 584, 
 
 1598. 
 McFarland v. Carver, 34 Mo. 195. pp. 1423, 
 
 1424. 
 McFarlin v. State, 41 Tex. 23. pp. 398, 430. 
 McGar r. Drake (Tenn.), 5 Reptr. 347. p. 878. 
 McGarry v. Loomis, 63 X. Y. Iu4. p. 1233. 
 McGarry v. People, 2 Lans. (X'. Y.) 227. p, 
 
 524. 
 McGavock v. Brown, 4 Humpli. (Tenn.) 251. 
 
 p. 2094. 
 McGee v. Robbins, 58 Ind. 463. pp. 577, 2051, 
 
 2090. 
 McGehee v. State, 4 Tex. App. 94. p. 183. 
 McGinitv v. Xew Y'ork, 5 Duer (X. Y'.),674. 
 
 p. 124S: 
 McGinnis r. State. 24 Ind. 500. pp. 609. 660. 
 McGinty i'. Keokuk, 66 la. 727. p. 1277.
 
 CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 McGovern v. New York &c. K. Co., 67 X. 
 
 Y. 417. pp. 1232, 1303. 
 McGowau V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 61 Mo. 528. 
 
 p. 1239. 
 McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184. pp. 
 
 47,67,69, 70, 115. 
 McGowen v. Campbell, 28 Kan. 25. p. 203. 
 McGrath v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. 
 
 (N. y.) 144; s. c. 19 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 2n. 
 
 pp. 1208, 1212. 
 McGrath v. New York &c. R. Co.,1 Thomp. 
 
 & C. 243. p. 1251. 
 McGregg V. State, 4 Blackf. (lud.) 101. pp. 
 
 73, 74, 
 McGregor v. Armill, 2 Iowa, 30. p. 1671. 
 McGregor r. Gardner, 16 la. 53t?. p. 2075. 
 McGrew v. Foster, 66 Mo. 30 p. 2144. 
 McGrew v. State, 10 Tex. App. 539. pp. 1796, 
 
 1797. 
 McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436. p. 1221. 
 McGuffle V. State, 17 Ga. 497. pp. 26, 27, 46, 
 
 70, 97, 121. 
 McGulre v. People, 44 Mich. 280; s. c. 6 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 669. p. 1834. 
 McGuire v. People, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 148. 
 
 p. 20. 
 McGuire v. State, 37 Miss. 369. pp. 57, 85. 
 McGuire v. State, 37 Miss. 703. p. 1815. 
 McGuire v. State, 10 Tex. App. 125. p. 1917. 
 McHenry v. Marr, 39 Md. 522. p. 725. 
 McHeury v. Railroad Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 448. 
 
 p. 1108. 
 McHugh V. State. 38 Oh. St. 153. p. 73. 
 Mcllvaine v. State, 80 Ind. 69. p. 2029. 
 Mcllvaine v. Wilkins, 12 N. H. 374. pp. 1914, 
 
 1921, 1923. 
 Mclutire v. Hussey, 57 Me. 493. pp. 1921, 
 
 1923. 
 Mclutyre v. Kline, 30 Miss. 361. p. 1669. 
 Mclutire v. Mclntire, 80 Mo. 470. p. 2055, 
 Mclutyre v. New York &c. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 
 
 287. p. 1488. 
 Mclutyre v. People, 38 111. 514. p. 1904. 
 Mclntyre v. Thompson, 14 Bradvy. (111.) 554. 
 
 p. 372. 
 Mcintosh V. Smith, 2 La. Ann. 757. pp. 1671, 
 
 1905. 
 Mclver v. Humble, 16 East, 169. p. 1097. 
 McKain v. Love, 2 Hill (S. C), 506. p. 1919. 
 McKay V. Evans, 48 Mich. 597. p. 1741. 
 McKay V. Leonard, 17 la. 569. p. 1750. 
 McKean v. Wagenblast, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 
 
 462. pp. 839, 850. 
 McKee V. Bidwell, 74 Pa. St. 218. p. 1210. 
 McKee V. Calvert, SO 3Io. 348. pp. 2002, 2128. 
 McKee v. McDonald, 17 Ind. 518. p. 2101. 
 McKee V. People, 36 N. Y. 113. p. 1645. 
 McKeen v. Gammon, 33 Me. 187. p. 200. 
 McKellip v. Mcllhenuy, 4 Watts (Pa.), 317. 
 
 p. 608. 
 
 McKenua v. People, 81 N, Y. 360. p. 1639. 
 McKenua r. State, 61 Miss. 589. p. 1848. 
 M'Kenzie v. Milligau, 1 Bay (S. C), 248. 
 
 p. 221. 
 McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334. pp. 1571, 1913, 
 
 1913, 1982. 
 McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. 294. pp. 827, 
 
 855. 
 McKeon v. Citizen's R. Co., 43 Mo. 79. p. 
 
 1291. 
 McKeon v. Lane, 1 Hall (N. Y.), 319. p. 184. 
 McKeon v. See. 4 Rob. (N. Y.) 449. p. 1390. 
 McKeown v. Harvey, 40 Mich. 226. p. 323. 
 McKinley v. O'Ke.son. 5 Pa. St. 3()9. p. 900. 
 McKinley v. Smith, Hard. (Ky.) 167. jv 117. 
 McKinley V. Wilmington Star Mining Co., 7 
 
 Bradw. (111.) 386. \>. 196. 
 McKinney v. Hartman, 4 Iowa, 154. p. 806. 
 McKinney v. Jones, 55 Wis. 39. p. 310. 
 
 McKinney v. Neil. 1 McLean (U. S.), 540.- 
 
 pp. 1236, 1237, 1285. 
 McKinney v. People, 7 111. 540. pp. 329, 
 
 1902, 1,903, 1907. 
 McKinney v. Shaw &c. Co., 51 Ind. 219. pp. 
 
 577, 2051. 
 McKinney v. Simpson, 51 Iowa, 662. pp. 119, 
 
 120. 
 McKinney v. Snyder, 78 Pa. St. 497. pp. 
 
 1681, 1705. 
 McKinney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 626. p. 
 
 115. 
 McKinney v. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 420. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 McKiusey v. Bowman, 58 Ind. 88. p. 2112. 
 McKleroy v State, 77 Ala. 95. p. 1815, 1820, 
 
 1863. 
 McKnabb v. Thomas, 18 Ga. 495. p. 74S. 
 McKuight f. Kutclitf, 44 Pa. St. 156. p. 1671. 
 McKown V. Craig, 39 Mo. 1,56. p. 1600. 
 McKown V. Furgason, 47 Iowa, 636. p. 1429. 
 McKown V. Hunter, 30 N. Y. 625. pp. 344, 
 
 345. 
 McLain v. Dibble, 13 Bush (Ky.), 297. p. 2088. 
 McLain v. State, 18 Nob. 159. p. 1796. 
 McLain v. State, 24 N. W. Rep. 720. pp. 710, 
 
 745, 776. 
 McLain v. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 241. p. 
 
 1907. 
 McLain v. Van Zandt, 7 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 
 
 347. p. 1208, 1233. 
 McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U. 
 
 S.) 170. p. 1644. 
 McLane v. Lafayette, Bank, 3 McLean (U. 
 
 S.),589. p. 952. 
 McLaren v. Birdsong, 24 Ga. 265. p. 64. 
 McLaren v. Hall, 26 la. 303. p. 1670. 
 McLaughlin v. Corrv, 77 Pa. St. 109. p. 1249. 
 McLaughlin v. Upton, 2 N. Y. 27. p. 2076. 
 McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277. p. 1237. 
 McLean v. Burbank 12 Minn. 530. p. 2027. 
 McLean v. Clark, 47 Ga. 25. pp. 1669, 1771. 
 McLean i: Clark, 48 Ga. 66. p. 1761. 
 McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672. p. 253. 
 McLean v. State, 18 Ga. 508. p. 1899. 
 McLean v. State, 8 Mo. 153. p. 1907. 
 McLees i: Felt, 11 Ind. 218. pp. 215, 230. 
 McLeland v. State, 25 Ga. 477. p. 1633. 
 McLellan v. Crolton, 6 Me. 307. pp. 118, 123, 
 McLellau V. Cumberland Bank, 24 Me. 566. 
 
 p. 1197. 
 McLendon v. Frost, 57 Ga. 449. p. 740. 
 McLeod r. Humeston &c. R. Co., 71 la. 138; 
 
 s. c. 32 N. W. Rep. 246. p. 1945. 
 McLeran v. McNamara, 55 Cal. 508, pp. 193, 
 
 196. 
 INIcLimans v. Lancaster, 63 Wis. 596. p. 2041. 
 McLure v. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96. p. 874. 
 MCxMahon v. New York, 33 N. Y. 642. p. 1233, 
 McMahon v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 39 Md 
 
 438. pp. 1231, 1235. 
 McMahon v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216. pp 
 
 1714, 1741. 
 McManuis i'. Lee, 43 Mo. 208. p. 1480. 
 McMasters v. West Chester &c. Co., 25 Wend 
 
 (N. Y.) 379. p. 2021. 
 McMath V. State, 55 Ga. 304. p. 727. 
 JNIcMaugli V. Milwaukee, 32 Wis. 200. p. 1247, 
 McMe(;tien v. iMcMechen, 17 W. Va. 684. j)p 
 
 499, .506. 
 Mc.Meen v. State, 9 Atl. Rep. 878; s. c. 114 Pa, 
 
 St. 300. p. 1S39. 
 Mc^Iichen v. Amos, 4 Rand. (Va.) 134. p 
 
 2018. 
 McMicken v. Brown, 6 Mart. (n. s.) (La.) 86, 
 
 p. 1663. 
 McMicken v. Perin, 20 How. (U. S.) 1.33. p 
 
 1.50. 
 McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 178. p. 796,
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cv 
 
 McMillan v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 46 la. 231. 
 
 p. 1232. 
 McMillan v. State, 7 Tex. App. 142. pp.89, 
 
 1885. 
 McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 306. pp. 210, 1636, 
 
 imo, 1768. 
 McMorris v. Herndon, 2 Bail. (S. C.) Law, 
 
 56 ; s. c. 21 Am. Dec. 515. p. 889. 
 McMullan v. MacKenzie. 2 G. Greene (la.), 
 
 368. p. 876. 
 McMulleu r. State, 53 Ala. 531. p. 1535. 
 McXair v. Hunt, 5 Mo. 300. p. 10i4. 
 McNair v. Piatt, 46 III. 211. p. 1678. 
 McXair v. Schwartz, 16 111. 24. p. 891. 
 McXair v. State, 14 Tex. App. 83. p. 1895. 
 McX'^amara v. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207; s. c. 
 
 61 Am. Rep. 722. p. 1485. 
 McXamara r. Dratt, 40 la. 413. p. 1979. 
 McNamarar. Minnesota &c. R. Co., 12 Minn. 
 
 388. p. 2047. 
 McXamara v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 50 
 
 Cal. 581. p. 1210. 
 McXeese v. Herring, 8 Tex. 151. p. 1198. 
 McNeil V. Farneman, 37 Ind. 2(i3. p. 2076. 
 McNeil V. Holbrook, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 84. p. 
 
 1669. 
 McNeil's Case, 6 Mass. 245. p. 188. 
 McNeill t'. Arnold. 22 Ark. 477. p. 1679. 
 McNeill r. Massey, 3 Hawks (N. C.),91. pp. 
 
 1698, 1701. 
 McXichol r. Pacific Express Co., 12 Mo. App. 
 
 401. pp. 834, 835, 850, 1368. 
 McPheeters v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 45 Mo. 
 
 22. p. 1299. 
 McPherson v. Featherstone, 37 Wis. 632. p. 
 
 1010. 
 McPherson v. State, 23 Ga. 478. pp. 1509, 
 
 1.539. 
 McQueen r. State, 82 Ind. 74. p. 1800. 
 McQuesney v. Heister, 33 Pa. St. 435. p. 961. 
 McQuilken r. Central Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 
 
 7. V'l>- l'^25, 1226. 
 McQnillen v. State, 8 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 587. 
 
 p. 1909. 
 McKae r. Lawrence, 75 N. C. 289. p. 236. 
 McRaer. Lillv,l Ired. L. (X. C.) 118. p. 1641. 
 McRevnold.s v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 106 
 
 III. 152. p. 238. 
 Mci^hane v. Braender, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 294. pp. 221, 222. 
 McVickar v. Greenleaf, 4 Rob. CN. Y.) 657. 
 
 p. 580. 
 McWilliams v. Bannister, 42 Wis. 301. p. 
 
 2083. 
 Meacham v. Moore, 59 Miss. 561. p. 312. 
 Meacham r. Pell, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 65. p. 36.5. 
 Mead v. Boxborough, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 362. 
 
 pp. 1747, 1756. 
 Mead v. McGraw, 19 Oh. St. 55. pp. 353, 
 
 1772. 
 Mead i\ Northwestern Ins. Co., 7 N. Y'. 530. 
 
 p. 980. 
 Meade v. Smith, 16 Conn. 346. p. 1985. 
 Meade's Case, Lewin C. C. 184. p. 1.539. 
 Meadow Val. &c. Co. v. Dodds, 6 Nev. 261. 
 
 p. 2099. 
 Meagoe v. Simmons, 3 Car. & P. 75. p. 246. 
 Means r. Means, 7 Rich. L. (S. C.) 533. p. 
 
 1940. 
 Means v. Moore, 3 McCord (S. C), 282. p. 
 
 1008. 
 Mears v. Griffin, 2 Scott (N. R.), 15; s. c. 1 
 
 Man. & G. 796. pp. 1473, 1559. 
 Meaux i: Meaux, 81 Ky. 475. p. 2088. 
 Meaux v. Whitehall, 8 Bradw. (111.) 173. pp. 
 
 63, 64, 116. 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Rawls, 7 Ga. 191. p. 446. 
 Mechanics' &c. Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 
 
 (N. Y.) 115. pp. 96, 125. 
 
 Mechanics' Savings Institution v. Potthoff, 
 
 9 Mo. App. 574. p. 811. 
 Mechelke v. Bremar, 59 Wis. 57; s. c. 17 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 682. p. 316. 
 Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 110. p. 
 
 895. 
 Medcalf v. Hall, Triu. Term, 22 Geo. 3, 
 
 B. R. 3; Doug. 113. p. 941. 
 Medler v. State, 26 Ind. 171. pp. 1973, 1974. 
 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235. p. 1031. 
 Meek v. Keen, 47 Ind. 77. p. 577. 
 Meeker v. Fountain Co., 53 Ind. 31. p. 2108. 
 Meeker v. Potter, 5 X. J. L. 586. p. 58. 
 Meekinsr. Smith, 1 H. Bl, 636. p. 188. 
 Meeks v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 52 Cal. 602. 
 
 p. 1233. 
 Meeks v. State, 57 Ga. 329. p. 119. 
 Mehan v. Syracuse &c. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 585. 
 
 p. 1211. 
 Mehesv v. Kahu, 50 N. Y. Super. 209. p. 598. 
 Mchncrt v. Thieme, 15 Kan. 369. p. 2101. 
 Meier r. Pennsvlvania R. Co., 64 Pa. St. 225. 
 
 pp. 1236, 1237, "1285, 1287. 
 Melhuish v. Collier, 19 L. J. Q. B. 493. p. 
 
 444. 
 Melledge t\ Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 158. p. 1672. 
 Mellish V. Arnold, Bunbury, 51. pp. 1964, 
 
 1967. 
 Mellish V. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416. pp. 934, 935, 
 
 936, 1144. 
 Melody v. Chandler, 12 Me. 282. p. 1443. 
 Melsou V. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682; s. c. 36 Am. 
 
 Rep. 128. pp. 54, 95. 
 Melvin v. Easley, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 386. pp. 
 
 741, 782. 
 Melvin i\ Proprietors &c., 16 Pick. (Mass.) 
 -161. p. 10.53. 
 Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Chastine,54 Miss. 503. 
 
 p. 1607. 
 Memphis &c. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 467. 
 
 pp. 1207, 1481. 
 Meach v. Bolbach, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 68. pp. 
 
 1914, 1922. 1923. 
 Mendiola v. State, 18 Tex. App. 462. pp. 1743, 
 
 1746, 1878. 
 Meuk V. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Pac. Rep. 
 
 837. p. 2099. 
 Meranda r. Spurlin, 100 Ind. 380. p. 2051. 
 Mercer v. State, 17 Ga, 146. p. 123. 
 Mercer v. State, 17 Tex. App. 452. pp. 465, 
 
 791, 1779. 
 Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 447. pp. 
 
 214, 218, 220, 223, 225, 243. 
 Mercer Academy v. Rusk, 8 W. Va. 373. 
 
 pp. 1747, 1748. 
 Mercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. 211. p. 
 
 1575. 
 Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412. p. 265. 
 Merchants' Bank v. Rudolf, 5 X"eb. 527. p. 
 
 1022. 
 Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U. 
 
 S.) 604. pp. 1022, 1023, 1605. 
 Merchants' Dispatch Co. v. Coruforth, 3 Col. 
 
 280. p. 1364. 
 Merchants' Dispatch Co. v. Theilbar, 86 111. 
 
 71. p. 1364 
 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Chauviu, 8 Rob. (La.) 
 
 49. p. 1023. 
 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Hauck, 83 Mo. 20. 
 
 pp. 1689, 1708. 
 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 
 
 Cliff. (U.S.) 201. p. 591. 
 Mercier v. Mercier, 43 Ga. 323. p. 1600. 
 Meredith v. Com., 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 49. p. 
 
 1539. 
 Meredith v. Crawford, 34 Ind. 399. pp. 1726, 
 
 1727. 
 Meredith v. State, 40 Tex. 483. p. 313.
 
 CVl 
 
 TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 Mersrcnthelm r. State (Ind.), 8 N. East. Kcp. 
 
 5t>S; s. 0. 107 Ind. 507. 1>1). 317, 551. 
 Moikle r. State, 37 Ala. 13;). p. 784. 
 Moik' r. Hascall, l(i Mo. 40t;. jip. l(;07, 1C08. 
 MorUizzi r. Gleeson, .V." Md. '214. p. 2(14. 
 Meiriiiold v. AVestou, i!8 lud. 71. p. 2113. 
 ilerriain r. Cunulugham, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 40. p. 214. 
 Merriam r. Hartford &c. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354. 
 
 p. 475. 
 Mornam r MitchcU, 13 Me. 43*1. p. 1195. 
 Merrick v. Slate, 6^^ Ind. 327. p. 21. 
 Alerrill v. ISerksliire, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 269. 
 
 pp. 113, 2.-'.i,;583, l'.t7ti. 
 Merrill i: George, 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 331. 
 
 p. 188. 
 Merrill v. Grinuell, 30 N. Y. 594. pp. 1151, 
 
 1152. 
 Merrill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 234. pp. 1224, 
 
 124(1, 1247. 
 Merrill i: Hilliard, .TO X. H. 481. p. 1049. 
 Merrill i\ Ithaca &c. li. Co., 16 Wend. 587. 
 
 PI). (542, 892. 
 Merrill v. Narv, 10 AUen (Mass.), 416. pp. 
 
 150(i, 1733, 1951. 
 Merrill v. Perkins, 59 X. H. 343. p. 403. 
 Merrill v. Hailway Co., 16 Wend. 586. p. 363. 
 Merrill v. St. Louis, 83 Mo. 244; s. c. affirmed, 
 
 12 Mo. App. 466. p. 2. 
 Merrinian v. Brii; Mav Queen, 1 Newb. (U. 
 
 S.) 4(>4. pp. 1322, 1343, 1347. 
 Merriman v. Cuuuingliam, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 40. p. 241. 
 Merritt v. Given, 34 Mo. 98. p. 1646. 
 Merril t v. Merritt, 20 111. 65. pp. 1653, 1690. 
 Merritt v. AVilcox, 52 Cal. 238. p. 199. 
 Mersev Docks' Trustees v. Gibbs. L. R. 1 H. 
 
 L. 93". p. 1248. 
 Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14. pp. 524, 526. 
 Mertens v. Kiclmann, 79 Mo. 412. pp. 1055, 
 
 1056. 
 Merz V. Missouri &c. R. Co., 14 Mo. App. 4,59. 
 
 p. 821. 
 Meshke v. Van Doren, 16 Wis. 319. p. 1734. 
 Metcalf V. Fouts, 27 111. 110. pp. 1741, 20.53. 
 Metcalfe v. Deaue, Cro. Eliz. 189. pp. 1914, 
 
 1986. 
 Metropolitan Bank v. Hale, 28 Hun (X. Y.), 
 
 341. p. 324. 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson, L. R. 3 App. 
 Cas. 193 ; s. c. 47 L. J. C. P. 306 ; 37 L. T. 679. 
 pp. 1215, 1216, 1602. 
 Metz V. Eddy, 21 Mo. 13. p. 1618. 
 Metzgcr v. S"tate, 18 Fla. 481. p. 95. 
 Metzer v. State, 39 Ind. .596. p. 372. 
 Meyer v. Cullen, 54 N.'"Y. 392. p. 312. 
 Meyer v. Foster. 16 Wis. 294. pp. 1902, 1904. 
 Mever v. Paciflc R. Co., 40 Mo. 15.5. pp. 1279, 
 
 1296, 1598, 1600. 
 INIever v. Peck, 28 X. Y. 590. p. 1367. 
 Mever v. State, 19 Ark. 156. pp. 69, 75, 119, 
 
 122, 123. 
 Meyers v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 59 Mo. 223. p. 
 
 1708. 
 Meyers v. State, 20 Ind. 511. p. 129. 
 MeVers v. State, 33 Tex. 535; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 I'homp. Cas. Self-Def. 432. p. 1542. 
 Movers v. Union Trust Co., 82 Mo. 237. p. 
 
 8il. 
 Mev.senburg v. Engclke, 18 Mo. App. 346. 
 
 pp. 1180, 1182. 
 Miami &c. K. Co. v. Bailev, 37 Oh. St. 104. p. 
 
 654. 
 Miami Vallcv Furniture Co v. Wesler, 47 
 
 Ind. 6.5. J>."124. 
 Michael r. St. Louis :\Iutual Fire Ins. Co., 17 
 
 Mo. App. 23. J.. 825. 
 Michaels v. Xew York &c. R. Co.. 30 X. Y. 
 564. pp. 1318, 1347. 
 
 Michan v. "Wvatt, 21 Ala. 813. p. 649. 
 Michel V. Wa're, 3 Xeh. 229. p. ,560. 
 Michell r. Williams, 11 Mees. & W. 205. p, 
 
 1181. 
 INIicliigan Air Line Rv. i: Barnes, 44 Mich. 
 
 223. ]). 699. 
 Michigan &c. R. Co. r. Barnes, 40 Mich. 383. 
 
 !>. 56. 
 Michigan &c. R. Co. v. Campaw, 34 Mich. 468. 
 
 p. 12,{5. 
 Michigan &c. R. Co. r. Carrow, 73 111. 348. p. 
 
 1155. 
 Michigan &c. R. Co. v. Lantz, 29 Ind. 528. p. 
 
 1224. 
 IMiehigan &c. R. Co. v. Oehm, 56 HI. 293. p. 
 
 1155. 
 Micliigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. (U, S.) 544. 
 
 pp. 1669, 1672. 
 Michigan Paneling &c. Co. v. Parsell, 38 
 
 Mich. 475. pp. 2031, 2038. 
 Mickle r. State, 27 Ala. 20. p. 1859. 
 Middlebrooks v. Middlebrooks, 57 Ga. 193. 
 
 I). 2099. 
 Middlel)rook v. State, 43 Conn. 257. pp. 132, 
 
 133, 136, 148. 
 Middletonr. Ivansas City &c. R. Co., 62 Mo. 
 
 579. pp. 1017, 1024. 
 Middleton v. Quigley, 12 X. J. L. 352. p. 200L 
 Middletown v. Amos, 7 Vt. 166. p. 55. 
 Midland li. Co. v. Bromley, 17 C. B. 372; s. c. 
 
 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 235. pp. 1332, 1333, 1334. 
 Milllin V. Bingham, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 294. p. 328. 
 Mikell V. State, 62 Ga. 368. p. 110. 
 Milburn v. Kansas City &C. R. Co., 86 Mo. 104. 
 
 p. 1226. 
 Milburn v. Waugli, 11 IMo. 369. p. 1441. 
 Mildrone's Case\ 1 Leach C. C. 459. p. 330. 
 Miles r. Buchanan, 36 Ind. 491. pi). 2108, 2112. 
 Miles V. Douglas, 34 Conn. 393. )). 1670. 
 Miles V. Goodwin, 35 111. 53. p. 1060. 
 Miles V. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385. \). 1130. 
 Miles V. Pulver, 3 Demo (N. Y.-), 84. p. 34. 
 UUes V. Roberts, 34 X, H. 245. ji. 348. 
 Miles V. Rose, Hemp. C. C. (U. S.) 37. p. 106. 
 Miles V. Sackett, 30 Hun (X. Y.), 68. pp. 396, 
 
 400. 
 Miles V. State, 18 Tex. App. 156. p. 1680. 
 Miles V. Stevens, 3 Pa. St. 21. p. 570. 
 Miles V. United States, 102 U. S. 304, p. 1815. 
 Miles V. Williams, 8 Q. B, 147. p. 796. 
 Millar v. Cuddv, 43 Mich. 273. p. 1947. 
 Millard v. Lvons, 25 Wis. 516. p. 17,30. 
 Millard i\ Porter, 18 Ind, .502. p. 1647. 
 .Miller v. Alliaugh, 24 la. 128. pp. 2075,2093. 
 Miller r. Ballhassar, 78111. 302. pp.1664, 167,5. 
 Jliller I'. Barber (N. Y. Cl. of App.), 4 Cent. 
 
 I^aw Journ. 177. j). 315. 
 Miles I'. Buchanan, 36 Ind. 490. p. 2107. 
 Miller v. Burkey,3 Casev (Pa.), 317. p. I25I. 
 Miller V. Brvan, 3 la. .58." p. 1698. 
 Miller v. Diivton, 57 la. 424. p. 1808. 
 Miller V. Drake, 62 Mo. 544. p. 1708. 
 Miller V. Dunlap,22 Mo. App. 97. p. 828. 
 Miller y. Garrett, 3.5 Ala. 96. p. 1733. 
 Miller V. Gilleland, 19 Pa, St, 119. pp. 1031, 
 
 1032. 
 Miller v. Goodwin, 70 111. 659. p. 819. 
 Miller v. Gorman, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 112. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Miller V. Green, 110 Tnd. .569, p, 2112. 
 Miller v. Ilacklev, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 375. p. 
 
 948 
 Miller v. Hampton, 37 Ala. 342. pp. 1726, 
 
 1949. 
 Miller V. Hartford Ins. Co. (Iowa), 29 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 411 : s. r. 70 la. 704. p. 313. 
 IMillerr. Ileinrick, 4 Camp. 155. p. 820. 
 Miller v. Hower, 2 Havvle, .53. p. 2014. 
 M lller V. Jauuett, 63 Tex. 82. p. 368.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 evil 
 
 Miller v. Kirby, 74 Ind. 242. p. Ifi47. 
 Miller V. Lancaster, 4 Me. 159. p. 965. 
 Miller v. Lebanon Lodge, 88 Ind. 286. p. 
 
 3090. 
 Miller r. Lullinau, SI Mo. 311. pp. 873, 874. 
 Miller v. Marks, 20 Mo. App. 369. p. 1071. 
 Miller v. Mavbon, 6 la. 456. pp. 1906, 1911. 
 Miller v. McCullough, 104 Pa. St. 624. p. 
 
 1086. 
 Miller v. Morgan, 143 Mass. 25; s. c. 3 N. Eng. 
 
 Rep. 119. p. 2004. 
 Miller v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 
 
 216. p. 977. 
 Miller v. Pancoast, 29 N. J. L. 250. p. 1442. 
 Miller v. People, 39 111. 464. pp. 1564, 1776, 
 
 1828, 1832. 
 Miller v. Read, 27 Pa. St. 244. p. 1031. 
 Miller v. Russell, 1 Bay (S. C), 309. p. 994. 
 Miller v. Sliackleford, 4 Dana, 264. pp. 827, 
 
 2010, 2011. 
 Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass. 470. pp. 373, 375. 
 Miller v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 5 Mo. App. 473. 
 
 pp. 1964, 1985. 
 MiUer v. State, 15 Fla. 577. pp. 540, 541, 1805, 
 
 1S06. 
 Miller v. State, 4 Tex. App. 251. p. 465. 
 Miller v. State, 18 Tex. App. 34. p. 1896. 
 Miller v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 502. p. 1438. 
 Miller v. Talcolt, 46 Barb. (X. Y.) 168. p. 967. 
 Miller r. Tillman, 61 Mo. 316. p. 1708. 
 Miller r. Voss, 49 Ind. 307. p. 2028. 
 Miller v. White River School Tp., 101 Ind. 
 
 303. p. 2030. 
 Miller v. Wild Cat Gravel Rd. Co., 52 Ind. 
 
 51. p. 56. 
 Miller V. Wilson, 24 Pa. St. 114. p. 111. 
 Millerd i: Thorn, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 376; 
 
 s. c. 56 N. Y'. 402. pp. 214, 216. 
 Milliken v. Barr, 7 I'a. St. 23. pp. 608, 610. 
 Milliken v. Ross, 9 Fed. Hep. 855; s. c. 4 Wood 
 
 C. 0. (U. S.) 69. p. 2065. 
 Milliken v. Tufts, 31 Me. 497. p. 1749. 
 Millington, In re, 24 Kan. 214. pp. 132, 134. 
 Mills 1-. Barber, 1 Mees. & W. 425; s. c. Tyr. 
 
 & G. 835. p. 217. 
 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y". 489. p. 1266. 
 Mills V. Siramouds, 10 Ind. 464. p. 2117. 
 Mills V. State, 52 Ind. 187. p. 2082. 
 Mills r. Thompson, 72 Mo. 367. p 1440. 
 Mills V. Wvnuui, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 207. p. 897. 
 Milne r. Ilenrv, 40 Pa. St. 352. i>. 1406. 
 Milluer v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197 ; s. c. 31 Am. Rep. 
 
 121. pp. 1642, 1784, 1803. 
 Milner r. Wilson, 45 Ala. 478. p. 1734. 
 Milo c. Gardner, 41 Me. 549. pp. 145, 1906. 
 Milwaukee &c. R. Co. v. Hunter, 11 Wis. 160. 
 
 p. 1225. 
 Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 3; s. c. 7 Cranch (U. S.), 290. pp. 46, 49, 
 
 64, 97. 
 Mimms v. State, 16 Oh. St. 221. pp. 115, 116, 
 
 Minis V. Lockett, 23 Ga. 237. p. 1067. 
 
 Minis r. Mitchell, 1 Tex. 443. pp. 1356, 1359. 
 
 Minchin v. Clement, 6 Barn & Aid. 252. p. 
 
 15S4. 
 Miner r. Brown, 20 Conn. 519. p. 43. 
 Miner v. Pliillips, 42 111. 123. p. 344. 
 Miner v. Vedder (Mich.), 33 N. W. Rep. 47. 
 
 p. 2030. 
 Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 452. pp. 112, 1770, 
 .1773, 1821,1828,1833. 
 Minklaer v. Rockfeller, 6 Cow. (N. Y'.) 276. 
 
 p. 899. 
 Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Montague, 59 
 
 Iowa, 448. p. 1131. 
 Minnitt v. Whitney, 16 Vin. Abr. 244, pi. 12. 
 
 p. HOI. 
 Miuns V. Smith, 1 Fost. & Fin. 318. p. 636. 
 
 Minor r. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 46. 
 
 p. 1130. 
 Mirick r. Hemphill, Hempst. (U. S.) 179. 
 
 pp. 1750, 1753, 1983. 
 Mississippi &c. Boom Co. v. Prince, 34 Minn, 
 
 71. p. 1497. 
 Mississippi &c. R. Co. ■;;. Kennedy, 41 Miss. 
 
 671. pp. 1154, 1155. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Goodrich, 38 Ivan. 224 ; 
 
 s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 439. p. 2061. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Haines, 10 Kan. 439. 
 
 p. 373. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Holley, 30 Kan. 465. 
 
 p. 2031. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Manson, 31 Kan. 339. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Munkers. 11 Kan. 223. 
 
 pp. 58, 121. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Stevens, 35 Kan. 625. 
 
 p. 1307. 
 Missouri Coal & OH Co. i\ Hannibal «&c. R. 
 
 Co., 35 Mo. 84. pp. 806, 1.506. 
 Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 111. 44. 
 
 pp. 1673, 1674. 
 Mitchell V. Allison, 29 Ind. 43. p. 1756. 
 Mitchell V. Carter, 14 Hun (N. Y'.),448. pp. 
 
 1944, 1949. 
 Mitchell V. Coglazier, 106 Ind. 464. p. 2008. 
 Mitchell V. Com., 75 Va. 856. p. 412. 
 Mitchell V. Denbo, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 259. pp. 
 
 31, 33. 
 Mitchell V. Ehle, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 59.5. p. 
 
 1963. 
 Mitchell V. Harcourt, 62 la. 349. p. 551. 
 Mitchell V. Harmony, 13 How. (U. S.) 115. 
 
 p. 1644. 
 Mitchell V. Home Ins. Co., 32 la. 422. p. 971. 
 Mitchell V Huron Circuit Judge, 53 Mich. 
 
 541 ; s. c. sub nam. Mitchell v. Wixon, 19 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 176. p. 188. 
 Mitchell V. Insurance Co., 51 Pa. St. 403. 
 
 p. 977. 
 Mitchell V. Jenkins, 5 Barn. & Ad. 588. pp. 
 
 1168, 1171, 1195. 
 RlitcheU v. Likens, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 258. pp. 
 
 31, 33. 
 Mitchell V. Mayor of Rome, 49 Ga. 19. p. 
 
 1633. 
 Mitchell V. Milhoan, 11 Kan. 617. p. 2073. 
 Mitchell V. Mitchell, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 388. 
 
 p. 1670. 
 Mitchell V. Napier, 22 Tex. 120. p. 886. 
 Mitchell 17. New York &c. R. Co., 2 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.), 535; s. c. 5 N. Y'. S. C. (T. & C.) L p. 
 
 1230. 
 Mitchell V. Hvan, 3 Oh. St. 377. p. 873. 
 Mitchell V. Sellman, 5 Md. 377. p. 566. 
 Mitchell V. State, 58 Ala. 417. p. 18. 
 Mitchell V. State, 22 Ga. 211. pp. 103, 123. 
 Jlitchell V. State, 43 Tex. 512. pp. 35, 85, 89. 
 
 93. 
 Mitchell V. United States Express Co., 46 la. 
 
 214. pp. 1322, 1346, 1347. 
 Mitchell V. Western &c. R. Co., 30 Ga. 22. p. 
 
 1669. 
 Mitcliell V. Williams, 11 Mees. & W. 205. 
 
 p. 1173. 
 Mitchell V Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75. p. 1758. 
 Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 249. pp. 
 
 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 280, 286, 328, 590. 
 Mitchum V. State, 11 Ga. 615. pp. 123, 438, 
 
 728, 729, 739, 747, 757, 773. 
 Mix v. Madison Ins. Co., 11 Ind. 117. p. 884. 
 Mixer v. Cook, 31 Me. 340. p. 910. 
 Mize V. State, 30 Ark. 661. p. 1549. 
 Moberly r. Leophart,51 Ala. 587; s. c. 47 Ala. 
 
 257. ]). 6,3]. 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15. 
 
 p. 1473.
 
 CVlll 
 
 TAIil.K OF CASKS. 
 
 Mobile Ac. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 4S6. 
 
 p. 1345. 
 Mobile &c. K. Co. i: Jarboe, 41 Ala. G44. p. 
 
 1345. 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. ISO. 
 
 p. 1W2. 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672. p. 
 
 lois. 
 Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Yeatcs, 67 Ala. 164. p. 
 
 Mobl'cv V. Ilamit, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 590. 
 
 p. 4.i6. 
 Mockabec r. Com., 78 Kv. 380. p. l.i.W. 
 Moffat V. Conkliu, 35 Mo. 453. pp. 1646, 1647, 
 
 Uiiil, 1662. 
 Mollil v. Rosters, 15 la 433. p. 1994. 
 Motlitt V, Cressler, 8 la. 122. pp. 1669, 1671. 
 Moliawk Rank v. Atwater, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 
 
 60. p. 5S3. 
 Mohawk Hank v. Rroderick, 13 Wend. (X. 
 
 Y.) 137. p. 936. 
 3Iohlcr. The, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 230. pp. 1322. 
 
 134.^), 1356. 
 Mohuev r. Evans, 51 Pa. St. 84. p. 1646. 
 Moll ('."Bewckler, 28 Wis. 611. p. 2064. 
 Moloney r. Dows, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 247. p. 26S. 
 Molton V. Mason, 21 Mich. 364. pp. 616, 617. 
 Moncricf v. State, .59 Ga. 570. i)p. 117, 124. 
 Monday v. State, 32 Ga. 672. jip. 65, 103. 
 Monies V. Lvnn, 119 Mass. 273. p. 1247. 
 Jlonke r. Butler, 1 Rolle, 83. p. 1331. 
 Mononsrahela Water Co. v. Stewartson, 96 
 
 I'a. St. 436. pp. 385, 433. 
 Monroe r. Adams Exp. Co., 65 lud. 60. p. 
 
 2039 
 Monroe v. Brigham, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 368. p. 
 
 118. 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 86; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 Tliomp. Cas. SelC-Def. 442. pp. 16.58, 1982. 
 Monroe r. State, 23 Tex. 10. pp. 63, 71, 117. 
 Montag r. Linn, 23 111. 5.51. p. 827. 
 Montague v. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 767. pp. 
 
 45, 49,64,65,81,126. 
 3Iontaguc v. Perkins, 22 L. J. (C. P.) 1S7. 
 
 p. 1144. 
 Montague v. State, 17 Fla. 662. p. 73. 
 Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J, Marsh. 
 
 (Kv.) 132. PI). 1214, 1.505, 1510. 
 Montfort v. Rowland, 38 N. J. Eq. 181. pp. 
 
 581,583. 
 Montgomery v. Blair, 2 :Nfo. 190. p. 20.50. 
 Montgomery v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 103. 
 
 pp. 1271,1280. 
 Montgomery v. Ellis, 6 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 326. 
 
 p. 109. 
 Montgomery v. Evans, 8 Ga. 178. p. 1669. 
 Montgomery f. Hamilton, 43Ind. 451. p. 2112. 
 Montgomerv v. Railroad Co., (Mo.), 2 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 409. "p. 126. 
 Montgomerv v. Scott, 34 Wis. 338. p. 516. 
 Mont-tomerv v. State, 3 Kan. 263. p. 125. 
 MonlKoinerv v. State, 11 Oh. St. 424. pp. 1505, 
 
 1.508, 1517, "1520. 
 Montgomery v. State, 13 Tex. App. 669. p. 
 
 1S.55. 
 Montgomery r. Swindler, 32 Ohio St. 224. 
 
 pp. 214,216,219. 
 Montgomery v. Townsend (Ala.), 2 South. 
 
 Rep. 155. p. 820. 
 Montgomery &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 51 Ala. 396. 
 
 p. 1322. 
 Montmorency &c. R. Co. v. Rock, 41 Ind. 263. 
 
 p. 1501. 
 Montmorency &c. R. Co. v. Stockton, 43 Ind. 
 
 328. p. 1.501. 
 Moody V. Dcutsch, 85 Mo. 237. pp. 1171, 
 
 1182, 1598. 
 Moody t'. Keener, 7 Port. (Ala.) 218. p. 333. 
 Moody V. Payne, 3 .Johns. Ch. 2'J4. p. 649. 
 
 Moodv v. i*omeroy, 4 Dcnlo (X. Y.), 115. 
 
 pp. 1915, 1723. 
 Moody V. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490 ; s. c. 28 
 
 Am. Dec. 317. pp. 324, ;W3, 387, 301,393, 498. 
 Moon r. Heller, 25 Kan. 140. p. 1451. 
 Moonev r. Olseu, 22 Kan. 69. p. 2037. 
 Moore r. Bank, 13 Pet. (V. S.) 302. i>. 560. 
 Moore r. Barnell, 17 Ind. 349. p. 2016. 
 Moore V. Biekhain, 4 llinn. (I'a ) 1. p. 1032. 
 Moore v. Camplieli, 10 Kxch. 323. p. 918. 
 Moore V. Cass, 10 Kan. 288. pp. 11, 121. 
 Moore V. Central R. Co., 24 N. J. L. 268. p. 
 
 1225. 
 Moore V. Clerk, 6 Lift. (Kv.) 104. p. 144. 
 :\roore r. Collishaw, 10 Pa. St. 225. p. 1043. 
 .Moore v. Ediiiislon, 70 X. C. 471. pp. 1978, 
 
 1979. 
 Moore V. Fitchburg II. Co., 4 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 465. p. 1200. 
 Moore v. Gwvnn, 5 Ircd. L. (X. C.) 187. p. 
 
 819. 
 Moore r. Harvev, 50 Vt. 297. p. 891. 
 ^loore c. Hutcliinson, 69 Mo. 429. p. 1032. 
 Moore r. Leseur, 18 Ala. 606. p. 827. 
 Moore r, McDonald, r.i Atl. Rep. 117. 
 
 p. 1409. 
 Moore r. Miller, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 279. p. 825. 
 Moore i: Mobile, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 284. p. 1246. 
 Moore v. Moore, 67 Tex. 293; s. c. 3 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 284. p. 2001. 
 Moore ^•. Morgue, Cowp. 479. p. 1246. 
 Moore f. Peiper, 51 Mo. 157. pp. 810, 811. 
 Moore V. Peojil"', 108 111. 484. p. 40S. 
 ^looro r. Philadelphia Bank, 5 Serg. & R. 
 
 (I'a.) 41. 1)11.123,2093. 
 Moore v. Phillips, 8 Porter (Ala.), 467. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Moore r. Ross, 11 X. H. .547. p. 1698. 
 Moore v. Sanborin, 42 .Mo. 490. pp. 1197, 1756. 
 Moore V. Seaton, 31 liul. 11. p. 205i) 
 .Moore V. Shreveport, 3 La. Ann. 645. p. 1225. 
 Moore V. State, 20 Tex. App. 275. pp. 1564^ 
 
 1708. 
 Moore v. State, 21 Te.v. App. 666. p. 758. 
 Moore V. State, (Tex.), 2 S. W. Rep. 887. p. 
 
 747. 
 Moore V. Stone, 50 Ga. 157. p. 1633. 
 Moore v. Ulm, 34 Ga. 365. p. 2067. 
 Moore V. Watts (Ala.), 2 South. Uep. 278. p. 
 
 1647. 
 :\Ioore V. Wingatc, 53 Mo. 398. p. 1712. 
 Moore's Exr. v. Jlills, 69 Tex. 109 ; s. c. 58. W. 
 
 Rep. 675. p. 2007. 
 :Mooring i: State, 42 Tex. 83. p. 1744. 
 Morav. McCredy, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 669. p. 
 
 590. 
 Morals v. State, 1 Tex. App. 494. pp. 711, 716, 
 Moran r. Com., Leigh (Va.), 651. pp. 71, 74. 
 Moran v. .lanuarv, 52 .Mo. .523. p. 2072. 
 .Moree, .Mailer of, 64 X. ('. 308. p. 14.5. 
 Morehead r. Adams, 18 Neb. 569. p. 2144. 
 Morehead v. Jones, 2 B. Mou. (Ky.) 210. pp. 
 
 1465, 1467. 
 Morehouse r. Heath, 99 Ind. .509. ]). 775. 
 Morehouse r. Mathews, 2 X. Y. 514. p. 338. 
 Morel ('. .Missl.ssippi Ins. Co., 4 liush (Ky-)> 
 
 .535. p. 1235. 
 Morel t: Slate, 80 Ind. 278. p. 1576. 
 Moresl r. Swift, 15 Nev. 216. p. 1771. 
 .Morford v. reek. 46 Conn. 380. p. 564. 
 Morford c. Woodworth, 7 Ind. 83. p. 1750. 
 .Morgan c. Browne, 71 Pa. ."^t. 130. ]>. .5.52. 
 Morgan r. P.rvdges, 2 .'>tark. 314. p. 383. 
 .Morgan c. ('o"m., 14 Busli(Ky.), 106. p. 126. 
 .Morgan r. Couclinian, 14 C. ii. 100, s. c. 23 L. 
 
 .J. (('. P.) Mi. p. 1608. 
 Morgan r. D;ivl<lson, 1 Stark. 144. p. 940. 
 Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469. pp. 1494, 1603, 
 
 1627, 16S4.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CIX 
 
 ISIorgan v. Frees, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 352. p. 
 
 39ii. 
 IVIorgan v. Frees, 1 Am. L. Rej?. 92. p. 396. 
 Morgan v. Houston, 6 Yerg. (Teun.) 3U. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Morgan v. Jones, 24 Ga. 115. p. 611 
 Morgan v. Mori,'au, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 291. 
 
 pp. 169, 183, 184. 
 Morgan v. Nashville &c. R. Co., 58 Tenn. 379. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Morgan v. Ross, 74 Mo. 318. p. 1491. 
 3Iorgau v. Ryerson, 20 111. 343. p. 1214. 
 ISlorgan v. Shaw, 4 Madd. 57. p. 277. 
 Morgan «J. State, 31 lud. 193. p. 73. 
 Morgan v. Stevenson, 6 Ind. 169. p. 73. 
 Morgan v. Taylor, 32 Texas, 364. p. 923. 
 Morning Star r. State, 59 Ala. 30. p. 312. 
 Morrell v. Frith, 3 Mees. & W. 402. pp. 826, 
 
 835, 964. 
 Morrill v. Wallace, 9 X. H. 111. p. 926. 
 Morris v. Barnes, 35 Mo. 412. p. b88. 
 Morris v. Beach, 2 Jolins. (X. Y.) 294. p. 188. 
 Morris v. Bowman. 12 Gray (Mass.), 467. p. 
 
 1709. 
 Morris v. Brower, 1 Anth. (X^ Y.) 368. p. 1394. 
 Morris v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 45 la. 29. pp. 
 
 1306, 1481. 
 Morris v. Corson, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 281. pp. 
 
 1172, 1183, 1198. 
 IMorris v. Creel, 1 Va. Cas. 333. p. 170. 
 Morris r. Howe, 36 la. 49U. pp. 1994, 1995. 
 Morris r. Lachman, 68 Cal. 109. pp. 1632, 
 
 1637, 1653. 
 Morris v. Phelps, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 38. p. 1223. 
 Morris r. Piatt, 32 Conn. 75. pp. 1670, 1679. 
 Morris r. state, 25 Ala. 57. p. 1733. 
 Morris v. State, 27 Ala. 57. p. 1734. 
 Morris v. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 37. p. 2082 
 Morris i: State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 607. p. 89. 
 Morris r. State, 101 Ind. 561. p. 1784. 
 Morris r. Stern, 80 Ind. 227. p. 2112. 
 Morris v. Varner, 32 Ala. 499. p. 874. 
 Morris r. Vivian, 10 Mees. & W. 137. pp. 
 
 1926, 192S. 
 Morris' Case, 4 How. St. Tr. 12.55. p. 87. 
 Morris &c. R. Co. v. Ayres, 29 N. J. L. 393. 
 
 pp. 1147,1374. 
 Morrison v. Chapin, 97 Mass. 72. p. 354. 
 Morrison v. Clark, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 213. p. 
 
 1S19. 
 Morrison v. Cummings, 26 Vt. 3.54. p. 892. 
 Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. p. 1221. 
 Morrison v. Erie R. Co., 56 N. Y. 302. p. 
 
 1236. 
 Morrison r. Lehew, 17 Mo. App. 633. p. 2121. 
 Morrison v. Lenuard, 3 Car. & P. 127. p. 
 
 332. 
 Morrison v. Loveioy, 6 Minn. 319. pp. 90, 
 
 98, 101. 
 Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me. 550. pp. 132, 
 
 136. 160, 
 Morrison v. McKinnou, 12 Fla. ,552. pp. 53, 
 
 114, 123. 
 Morrison i'. Moreland, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 61. p. 1945. 
 Morrison v. Myers, II Iowa, 538. pp. 436, 
 
 7.58. 
 Morrison v. Phillips &c. Co., 44 AVis. 405. p. 
 
 1364. 
 Morrison v. State, 76 Ind. 335. pp. 448, 524, 
 
 525, 526. 769, 787, 1683. 
 Morrison r. Sturges, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 177. 
 
 pp. 596, 603. 
 Morrlssey v. Schindler, IS Neb. 673. p. 2005. 
 Morrow r. Com. 21 Kan. 484. pp. 1906, 1910, 
 
 2026, 2040. 
 Morrow v. Com., 48 Pa. St. 305. p. 610. 
 Morrow v. Saunders, 1 Brod. & Bing. 318. p. 
 
 589 
 
 Morrow v. State, 48 Ind. 432. pp. 525, 2110, 
 
 2lla. 
 Morse v. Erie &c. R. Co., 65 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 490. p. 1230. 
 Morse r. Goddard, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 177. 
 
 p. 1003. 
 Morse V. Mason, 103 Mass. 560. p. 1007. 
 Morse v. Morse, 25 Ind. 156. pp. 2024, 2038. 
 Morse V. Pitman (N. H.), 4 Atl. Rep. 880. 
 
 p. 929. 
 Morse v. Potter, 4 Grav (Mass.), 292. p. 309. 
 Morse v. Shaw, 124 Mass. 59. p. 1415. 
 Morse v. AYevmouth, 28 Vt. 824. p. 827. 
 Morss V. Palmer, 15 Pa. St. 51. pp. 476, 477, 
 
 479. 
 Morton v. Frankfort, 55 Me. 46. pp. 1603 
 
 16U5. 
 Morton v. Lawson, 1 B. Mon. (Kv.) 46. pp. 
 
 1747, 1760. 
 Morton r. Smith, 48 Wis. 265. p. 701. 
 Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468. pp. 76, 115, 116. 
 Morton v. State, I Lea (65 Tenn.), 498. p. 
 
 1919. 
 Mose V. State, 36 Ala. 211. pp. 1020, 1860, 
 
 1861, 1863, 1865. 
 Mosely r. Caldwell, 59 Teun. 208. p. 966. 
 Moser «. Krelgh, 49 111. 84. p. 560. 
 Moses V. Arnold, 43 la. 187. p. 890. 
 Moses V. Boston &c. R. Co., 32 N. H. 523. p. 
 
 1374. 
 Moses V. Gatewood, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 234. 
 
 p. 220 
 Moses V. State, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 456; s. c. 
 
 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 232. pp. 70, 74, 75. 
 Moses V. Steven.s, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 332. p. 895. 
 Mosey V. Troy, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 581. p. 1249. 
 Mosher v. Lawrence, 4 Denio (N, Y.), 421. 
 
 p. 1663. 
 Mosher V. Lawrence, Thomp. Carr. Pass. 554, 
 
 n. 7. p. 1606. 
 Mosier r. State, 14 Ind. 261. p. 846. 
 Mosley V. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 
 
 142. p. 468. 
 Mosley v. Walker, 7 Barn. & Cres. 53. pp. 
 
 1505," 1507, 1515. 
 Mosoati V. Lawson, 1 Mood. & Rob. 454. 
 
 p. 796. 
 Moss V. Priest, 19 Abb. Pr. (X'. Y.) 314. pp. 
 
 2026, 2028, 2035. 
 Moss V. Witness Printing Co., 64 Ind. 125. 
 
 p. 1647. 
 .Mostvn V. Fabrigas, Cowp. 164. p. 820. 
 Motley r. Head, 43 Vt. 636. p. 564. 
 Mott V. Consumers' Ice Co., 52 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 244. p. 182. 
 Mott V. Consumers Ice Co., 2 Abb. N. Cas. 
 
 (X. Y.) 143. pp. 596, .597. 
 Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Deuio (X. Y.),483. p. 
 
 1020. 
 Moughon V. State, 59 Ga. 308. pp. 72, 123, 
 
 1984. 
 Moule V. Brown, 4 Bing. N. C, 266. p. 944. 
 Moulton V. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36. p. 192. 
 Moultou V. McOweu, 103 Mass. 687. p. 892. 
 Moulton V. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 31 Minu. 85. 
 
 PI). 1344, 1360. 
 Mounseu i\ AVest, 1 Leon. 88. pp. 29, 53. 
 Mount I'. Derick, 5 Hill (X. Y.), 455. p. 1156. 
 Mount V. Larkins, 8 Bing. 122. pp. 1143, 
 
 1144. 
 Mount Desert v. Cranberry Isles, 46 Me. 411. 
 
 pp. 117,118, 120. 
 Mount Vernon v. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 586. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Mountfort r. Hall, 1 Mass. 443. p. 42. 
 Mower r. Watson, 11 Vt. 636. p. 795. 
 Mowrev c. Central Park R. Co., 51 X. Y. 667. 
 
 p 1232. 
 Mowiv r. Hill, 11 Wis. 146. p. 2083.
 
 ex 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Mowrv i\ ?lo{mcr, 3 S. C. iol. p. 825. 
 Mowrv V. Smith, '.i Alien (.Mass.) 07. p. 425. 
 Mowrv r. Starbuck, i Ci\\. 271. \i. !'.>. 
 Mown- V. Wood, 12 AVis. 4l;i. pp. 8.V2, 105S. 
 Miukl"r. SiK'kennorc, 1 Nov. & P. 32; s. c. 
 
 5 Ad. \- Kl. 730. pp. 87S, 870. 
 Mud. lie c. StruiU-, ii Car. vt I'. 380. p. 13G6. 
 Miiollor r. Kcbham, 1)4 111. 142. p. 87. 
 Miiiliiian t'. D'Kguiiio, 2 H. lil. 565. pp.035, 
 
 1 1.'2. 
 Miiiiliead v. Evans, 6 Exch. 447, 449. pp. 5, 
 
 0, 85. 
 Mulcahv V. Keg., Irish Rep. 1 C. L. 12; s. c. 
 
 atlinncd in L. K. 3 Jl. L. 306. p. 11. 
 Mulcairns v. Janesvillc (Wis.), 29 N. W. 
 
 Keii.5(io. pp. 710, 745. 
 Muldowuev r. Illinois &c. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 
 
 61.t; s. c-."36 Iowa, 462; 32 Iowa, 176. pp. 
 
 514, 1224, 1254, 1263. 
 Muldowuey v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 32 la;. 178. 
 
 p 1600. 
 Muldrow v. Caldwell, 14 Mo. 523. p. 1670. 
 Muldiow V. Uobinsou, 58 Mo. 332. p. 1092. 
 Mulford r. Grittin, 1 Fost. & Fin, 145. pp. 
 
 1096, 1097. 
 Mulhado v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 30 N. Y. 
 
 370. p. 653. 
 Mulliall V. Neville. 8 Exch. 390. p. 1250. 
 Mullee, In re, 7 JJIatchf. (U. S.) 24. p. 116. 
 Mullen V. Morris, 2 I'a. St. 85. p. 1937. . 
 Mullen r. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. p. 1222. 
 Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 198. p. 1626. 
 MuUer v. St. Louis Hospital Assn., 5 Mo. 
 
 Ap|). 390; s. c. 73 Mo. 243. p. 403. 
 Muller V. State, 11 Lea (Tcnn.), IS. p. 272. 
 Mullick V. Radakissen, 9 Moore 1'. C. 46. 
 
 ]'!'. 934, 1144. 
 Mullitran v. Cole, L. R. 10 Q. B. ."549. p. 1453. 
 Muilii;au v. Curtis, 100 Mass. 512. pp. 1232, 
 
 1234'; 
 Mulligan v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 181. 
 
 !>. 1365. 
 Mullin's Appeal (Pa.), 5 Atl. Rep. 738. pp. 
 
 20, 24. 
 Mullmix r. People, 76 111. 211. pp. 1520,1524. 
 Mullins i: Cattrell, 41 Miss. 291. p. 1980. 
 Miillins V. People, 110 111. 42. pp. 1768, 1788, 
 
 17'.*:., 1S46, 1870. 
 Mulli>ek V. Lawrence, 5 City Hall Rec. 
 
 (N. Y.) 84. p)). 1964, 1966. 
 Mulrooney v. State, 26 Ohio St. 327. p. 1.563. 
 Muinford v. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 475. pp. 
 
 SSO, 898. 
 Muinford t'. Oxford &c. R. Co., 1 HurL & N. 
 
 34. p. 1404. 
 Mundc 1-. Lambie, 125 Mass. 367. p. 1943. 
 Mnnden v. State, 37 Tex. 3.i3. p. 1835. 
 Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290. p. 1008. 
 MundV V. Whittemore, 15 Neb. 647. p. 
 
 1006^ 
 Hunger v. Tonawanda &c. R. Co., 4 N. Y. 349. 
 
 p. 1223. 
 Munkers r. Watson, 9 Kan. 668. p. 2000. 
 Munlv V. State, 7 IMackf. (Ind.) .593. p. 89. 
 Munn r. Mavor of Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. St. 364. 
 
 p. I.i86. 
 
 Munns r. Bnpont, 2 Browne (Pa.), Apx. 42; 
 
 s. r. 3 Wa ■ ~ "" ■■ " 
 
 11 KO, 1201. 
 
 3. r. 3 Wash. C. C. 31. pp. 1161 
 
 .), Ap> 
 , 1163, 
 
 1181, 
 
 Monroe ^•. Brighani, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 368. p. 
 
 111. 
 Monroe v. Gates, 42 Me. 178. p. 1112. 
 Munshowcr r. Patton,10 Serg. &ll. (Pa.) 334. 
 
 pp. 20, 1014. 
 Munson V. Ma-itlngs, 12 Vt. 346. p. 482. 
 Murrh V. Coneord H. Co., 29 N. H. 9. p. 
 
 12H?,. 
 
 Murchison i;. Marsh, 2 Kerr (X. B.), 608. p. 
 29. 
 
 Mnrchlson v. IVIcLcod, 2 Jones L. (N. C.) 
 
 p. 607. 
 MurdocK v. Sumner, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 156. p. 
 
 230. p. 607. 
 1982. ' 
 
 I^Inre r. Kaye, 4 Taunt. 84. p. 1183. 
 Murphy v. Bedford, 18 Mo. App. 279. p. 
 
 S.-)l. 
 Muiphv r. Chieairo Ac. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 661; 
 
 .S-. <•. ;ls Iowa, r.;o. p. 1235. 
 Murjihv i: Deane, 101 Mass. 456. pp. 1223, 
 
 1224.' 
 Mnr))hyi». Indianapolis, 83 Ind. 76. p. 1278. 
 Murjihy v. Kipp, 1 iJuer (N. Y.), 6.59. )). 7. 
 Murphy v. I'eople, 37 111. 447. pp. II, 1669, 
 
 1890. 
 Murphy v. Price, 48 Mo. 247. p. 1613. 
 Morphvr. Redler, 16 La. Ann. 1. p. 1197. 
 Murphy v. St. Louis Type Foundry, 29 Mo. 
 
 .\pp.541. i>. 794. 
 .Muri)hv c. State, 37 Ala 142. pp. 84, 112. 
 -Murphv r. Stale, 3S Ark. 514. p. 2097. 
 Murphy v. Stale, 6 lud. 490. pp. 727, 733, 
 
 1520. 
 Murphy v. State, 15 Neb. 383. p. 78. 
 Murphv V. State, 17 Tex. App. 645. p. 1855. 
 Murphv V. Staton,3 Munf. (Va.) 239. pp. 
 
 1322, 1344. 
 Murphv r. Tillv, 11 Ind. 511. pp. 20:W, 2107. 
 Murrav v. Abbot. 61 Wis. 198. p. 2030. 
 MurraV V. Bethune, 1 AYend. (N. Y.) 191. 
 
 I). 346. 
 Murray r. Com , 79 Pa. St. 311. pp. 1682, 
 
 1683. 
 Murrav v. Cnnningliam, 10 Neb. 167. p. 359. 
 Murray v. Elston, 23 N. J. Eq. 212. pi). 180, 
 
 182. 
 Murrav v. Harding, 2 Wm. Bl. 859. p. 886. 
 Murrav r. Long, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 140. pp. 
 
 11S2,"1187, 1105, 1198. 
 ^lurray v. Phillips. 59 Ind. .56. pp. 563, 2039, 
 
 2042. 
 Murray v. Riggs, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 571. p. 
 
 1436. 
 Murray v. Spencer, 88 N. C. 357. p. 1083. 
 Murrav v. State, 26 Ind. 141. p. 1738. 
 Murrav v. State, 1 Tex. Anp. 415. p. 1635. 
 Murrav v. State (Tex.), 3 S. W. Hep. 114; s. C. 
 
 1 S. \y. Rei). 522. pp. 16, 10, 20, 84. 
 Murrell v. Whiting, 32 ^Vla. 55. pp. 1122, 
 
 1125. 
 Muschamp v. Lancaster, 8 Mces. & W. 421. 
 
 p. 1362. 
 .Muser v. Holland, 17 Blatchf. 412. p. 1361. 
 .Musi(; r. Atlantic A:c. R. Co., 57 Mo. 134. p. 
 
 1668. 
 Mu.sick V. Peoiile, 40 111. 268. pp. .58, .59. 
 Musselnian r. Pratt, 41 Ind. 126. pp. 706,707, 
 
 1671, 1750, 1076, 2000. 
 Mu.^ser r. .Mavnard, .59 la. 11. p. 1748. 
 Mutual &c. liis. Co. V. Gannon, 48 Ind. 264. 
 
 p. 2040. 
 Mutual Insurance Co. v. Deale, 18 Md. 27. 
 
 p. 074. 
 Mvatls i: Bell, 41 Ala. 222. p. 1731. 
 .MVer r. Cluunbers, 6S .Mo. 626. p. 1609. 
 Mvers r. Coin., 70 Pa. St. 308. pp. 75, 77. 
 .Mvers V. Dixon, 45 llow. Pr. (N. Y.) 48. p. 
 
 "1200. 
 
 .Mvers v. Girard Ins. Co., 26 Pa. St. 192. p. 
 
 i.-)8<i. 
 
 .Myers V. James. 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301. p. 
 
 1.52. 
 Mvers V. Malcolm, 20 111. 621. p. 901. 
 Mvers r. Stale, 7 Tex. App. 640. pp. 60, 116. 
 Mvers v. Welles, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 463. p. 9.52. 
 .Mvlock r. Saladin, 1 W. HI. 4S0. pp. 59. 72. 
 .Mvnalt V. Hubbs. 6 Ilelsk. (Tcnn.) 320. p. 
 
 1027. 
 Myrlck r. Hicks, 15 Ga. 1.55. p. 1748.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXI 
 
 N. 
 
 Xadenbouch v. Sharer, 4 AV. Va. 203. p. 123. 
 Kat'ee V. lugersoll, 7 Pa. St. 185. pp. 1076, 
 
 1085. 
 XajjTle V. Allegheny &c. R. Co.,6W. N. C. 
 
 olU; s. c 8 Cent. L. J. 307. p. 1233. 
 Xaglt^ V. Homer. 8 Cal. 3o:i. p. S71. 
 Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. St. 185. pp. 1076, 
 
 KIS5. 
 Nailoi- V. Williams, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 107. p. 
 
 576. 
 Xall V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 59 Mo. 113. p. 
 
 1638. 
 Xance r. Alexander, 48 Ind. 516. p. 891. 
 Xapper r. Young, 12 la, 450. p. 1637. 
 Xash V. Drisco, ol Me. 417 p. 825. 
 Xash V. State, 2 Tex. App. 362. p. 124. 
 Xashville v. Shepherd, 3 Baxt. (Tenu.) 373. 
 
 p. 8. 
 Nashville &c. R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 
 
 (Tenn.) 367. p 1229. 
 Xashville &c. R. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.), 351. p. 2. 
 Xason V. United States, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 53. 
 
 p. 1649. 
 Xational Bank v. Ingalls, 126 Mass. 209. p. 
 
 912. 
 Xational Bank r. Isham, 48 Vt. 590. pp. 338, 
 
 340. 
 Xational Bank v. 'Williams, 46 Mo. 17. p. 
 
 2080. 
 Xational Benefit Assn i\ Grauman, 107 Ind. 
 
 288 -,8.0.1 X. East. Rep. 233. p. 1709. 
 Xauer ». Thomas, 13 Allen (Mass.), 572. p. 
 
 797. 
 Xaugatnck R. Co. v. "VVaterbury Button Co., 
 
 24 Conn. 4GS. p. 1586. 
 Xaunian i-. Overle^ (Mo.), 3 S. AV. Rep. 380. 
 
 p. 925. 
 Xave V. Flack, 90 Ind. 205. pp. 1278, 1295, 
 
 1312, 1674, 1757. 
 X'ave V. Tucker, 70 Ind. 15. pp. 506, 508, 509. 
 Xave's Admr. r. Williams, 22 Ind. 368. p. 
 
 804. 
 Xavlor V. Semmes, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 273. p. 
 
 265. 
 Xazro V. Fuller, 24 Wend. (X. Y.) 374. p. 
 
 1034. 
 Xeal V. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370. p. 8. 
 Xoal V. Jovner, 89 X. C. 287. p. 1549. 
 •Xeal V. State, 64 Ga. 272. p. 1908. 
 Xeal V. Cunningham, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 76. p. 261. 
 X'^eally v. Greenough, 25 X. H. 325. p. 608. 
 Xoaly V. Brown, 6 111. 10. p. 1669. 
 Xeanow v. Uttech, 46 Wis. 5S1. p. 1210. 
 Xearlioff v. Addlemau, 31 -Pa. St. 279. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Xeave v. Amtz (Wis.), 14 X. W. Rep, 41. p. 
 
 925. 
 X'ed V. State, 7 Porter (Ala.), 187. p. 71. 
 Ned V. State, 33 Miss. 365. pp. 1913, 1921, 
 
 1981. 
 Xeece r. Halev, 23 111. 416. p. 1442. 
 Xeedham r. People, 98 111. 279. p. 1564. 
 Xeedham i-. San Francisco &c. R. Co., 37 Cal. 
 
 400. p. 1223. 
 Neel V. State, 9 Ark. 259. pp. 144, 150. 
 Xeely v. People, 13 111. 685. pp. 70, 74. 
 Xeclv's Case, 13 111 68.5. p. 69. 
 Netf V. Cincinnati, 32 Oh. St. 215. p. 238. 
 XetF r. Horner, 63 Pa. St. 327. p. 1U31. 
 Xetf ('. Reed, 98 Ind. 341. p. 2051. 
 Xegley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158; s. c. 45 Am. 
 
 Hep. 715. pp. 14.54, 1460, 1461. 
 Negro Jerrv r. Townshend, 9 Md. 145. pp. 
 
 503, 1780, 1938, 1942. 
 NelUig V. Cole, 13 Neb. 39. p. 703. 
 
 Neier r. Missouri &c. R. Co., 12 Mo. App. 26. 
 
 p. 821. 
 Neil V. Abel, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 185» pp. 1943, 
 
 1949, 1962. 
 Neil i\ Tarin, 9 Tex. 256. p. 324. 
 Xeil V. Thorn, 88 X. \. 270. pp. 177, 385. 
 Xeilou r. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 599. 
 
 pp. 1028, 125i, 1260, 1261, 1485. 
 Xeilson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 58 Wis. 517. 
 
 pp. 682, 688. 
 Xeilson v. Harford, 8 Mees. & W. 823. pp. 
 
 826, 837, 844. 
 Xelms V. State, 58 Miss. 362. p. 1787 
 Xelms r. State, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 590. 
 
 pp. 71, 72. 1917, P.)18, 1991. 
 Xels V. State, 2 Tex. 2S0. pp. 127, 1505. 
 Nelson v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 68 3Io. 593. pp. 
 
 1229, 1297, 1305. 
 Xelsou v. Cook, 19 111. 440. p. 192. 
 Xelson V. Dodge, 116 Mass. 3ti7. p. 1721. 
 Nelson v. Ewell, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 271. p. 
 
 184. 
 Nelson v. Matthews, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 164. 
 
 p. 918. 
 Nelson v. State, 57 Miss. 286. p. 48. 
 Xelson V. State, 57 Mo. 286. p. 48. 
 Nelson v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 237. pp. 253, 
 
 254, 257. 
 Nelson v. State, 32 Tex. 71. /pp. 1903, 1906. 
 Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455. pp. 1642, 1784, 
 
 1803. 
 Nelson v. Woodruif, 1 Black (U. S.), 156. pp. 
 
 1342, 1367. 
 Neptune, The, 6 Blatchf. 194. pp. 1346, 1346, 
 
 ia5fi, 1358. 
 X'esbett V. Brown, 30 Ark. 585. p. 212S. 
 Nesbit V. Dallam, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 492. p. 
 
 329. 
 Nesbit V. Hines, 17 Kan. 316. pp. 2047, 2051, 
 
 2073. 
 Nesmith v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 8 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y-.)423. p. 7 
 Nesmith r. Clinton Fire Ins. Co., 8 Abb. Pr. 
 
 (X. Y.) 141. pp. 1914,1922, 1923, 1981. 
 Nettles r. South Carolina R. Co., 7 Rich. L. 
 
 (S. C.) 190. 11. 1322. 
 Neuman v. Third Avenue E. Co., 50 N. Y. 
 
 Super. 412. pp. 6.53, 655. 
 Nevins v. Bank of Lansiugburg, 10 Mich. 547. 
 
 p. 942. 
 Xevins v. De Grand, 15 Mass. 436. p. 1031. 
 Xevins v. Peoria, 41 111. .502. p. 1267. 
 Xevison r. Whitlev, Cro. Car. 501. p. 885. 
 Xew V. Fisher, 11 Dalv (X. Y.) 309. p. 282. 
 Xew r. Walker, 108 Ind. 365. j). 2042. 
 New Albanv &c. R. Co. v. Campbell, 12 Ind. 
 
 55. p. 1374. 
 New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Pace, 13 Ind. 411. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 New Albany &c. R. Co. v. Wilson, 16 Ind. 
 
 402. p. 21U. 
 New Brunswick Co. v. Tiers, 24 N. J. L. 697. 
 
 p. 1671. 
 New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 111. 221. 
 
 p. 978. 
 New England Iron Co. v. New Y'ork Loan 
 
 Co., 55 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 351. pp. 600, 603. 
 New .Jersey Express Co. v Nichols, 32 X. J. 
 
 L. 166; s. c. 33 N. J. L. 434. pp. 1225. 1226. 
 New Jersey Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 94 U. S. 
 
 610 p. ;646. 
 New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 
 
 (U.S.) 387. p. 150. 
 New Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Albritton,38Miss. 
 
 242. 15. 1237. 
 New Orleans &c. R. Co. i-. Bailev, 40 Miss. 
 
 391. p. 1486. 
 New Orle:ins &c. R. Co. v. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 
 ' 17. p. 48.
 
 0X11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 New Orleans &c. R. Co. r. Mitchell, 52 Miss. 
 
 SOS. p. 1230. 
 Xew Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 40 Miss. 
 
 39. p. 1154. 
 New Orleans INIntnal Ins. Co. r. Xew Orleans 
 
 itc. K. Co., 20 La. Ann. :iO-'. p. 1350. 
 New Yorii r. Mason, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 
 
 142. p. 110. 
 Sew York v. Price, 5 Sandf. (X. Y.) 542. p. 
 
 ICTl. 
 New York &c. Co. v. Mever, 51 Ala. 325. p. 
 
 19.59. 
 New York &c. Ins. Co. v. Stnrges, 2 Cow. 
 
 (N. Y.) 664. p. S86. 
 New York Ac. K. Co. v. Doan, 105 lud. 92. 
 
 pp. 204S, 2051, 2068. 
 New York &c. R. Co. r. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24; 
 
 s. c. 9 Cent. L. J. 432. pp. 11.52, 1154. 
 New York &c. R. Co. r. Sabine, 26 Pa. St. 
 
 242. p. 1087. 
 New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Waldeu, 12 Johns. 
 
 (N. Y.)513. p. 1658. 
 New York Firemen's Co. i' Lawrence, 14 
 
 Jolins. (N. Y.) 46. p. 344. 
 New York Fireman's lus. Co. v. Ely, 2 Cow. 
 
 (N. Y.) 678. p. 886. 
 Newberry r. Furuival, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 139. p." 416. 
 Newberry v. Lee, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 526. pp. 
 
 195, 1663. 
 Newburger r. Campljell, 9Daly (N. Y.), 102; 
 
 s. c. 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 313. p. 20S. 
 Newburger v. Howard, 6 Phila. 174. p. 1360. 
 Newby r. Sharp, 8 Cli. Div. 39. p. 1003. 
 Newby v. Yestal, 6 Ind. 412. pp. 891, 1620. 
 NewbV r. Warren, 24 lud. 161. p. 1742. 
 Newby r. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739. pp. 889, 898. 
 Newcomb i: Griswold, 24 N. Y. 298. pp. 
 
 403,413. 436,459,526,619. 
 Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383. p. 282. 
 Newell r. Ayer, 32 Me. 334. p. 1973. 
 Newell i-. Downs, 8 Black. (lud.) 523. pp. 
 
 1171,1195. 
 Newell r. Homer. 120 Mass. 277. p. 444. 
 Newell V. Houlton, 20 Minn. 19. p. 2044. 
 Newell V. How, 31 Minn. 235. pp. 1455, 1456. 
 Newell r. Newell, 9 Paige (N.Y.),25. pp. 
 
 646, 650. 
 Newlicld v. Coppermau, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y'.) 
 
 CN. S.) 360. p. 795. 
 Newkirk r. State, 27 lud. 1. pp. 1506, 1950. 
 
 1951,1952. 
 Newlove v. Woodward, 9 Neb. 502. p. 2055. 
 Newman v. Dodson, 61 Tex. 94. p. 1480. 
 Newman v. Hazelrigg, 96 Ind. 73. pp. 1642, 
 
 1783. 
 Newman v. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 630. p. 
 
 524. 
 Newman v. State, 26 Ga. 637. p. 1639. 
 Ncwmarch v. Clay, 14 East. 239. p. 1584. 
 Newmarket Man. Co. r. Pendergast, 24 
 
 N.1I.54. p. 1051. 
 Newton r. Allis, 16 Wis. 197. p. 807. 
 Newton v. Askew, 6 Hare, 310. p. 188. 
 Newton t'. Harris, 2 Seld. (X. i.) 345. pp. 
 
 396, 397. 
 Newton v. Jackson, 23 Ala. 335. pp. 469. 483. 
 Newton r. Locklin, 77 111. 103. pp. 141, 160. 
 Newton v. Pope, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 109. p. 1328. 
 Newton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 245. p. 1744. 
 Ncy V. Rothe, 61 Tex. 374. pp. 214, 241. 
 Ncj'land r. State, 13 Tex. App. 536. j). 1680. 
 Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 111. 
 
 644; s. c. 11 Ins. L. J. 614. }>. 982. 
 Nias i\ Northern & Eastern R. Co., 2 Keen, 
 
 76. p. 276. 
 Nichol V. Lytle, 4 Yerger (Teun.), 456. p. 
 
 lO.-jO. 
 Nicholas v. Stale, 6 Mo. 6. p. 1670. 
 
 Nicholls V. Foster, 89 111. 386. p. 1984. 
 Nichols V. Alsop, 10 Conn. 263. p. 1977. 
 Nichols t". Bronson, 2 Day (Conn.), 211. p. 
 
 1920. 
 Nichols r. Frothingham, 45 Me. 22(t p. 847. 
 Nichols V. Earkin, 79 Mo. 264. p. 1607. 
 Nichols r. Nichols, 136 Mass. 256. p. 1934. 
 Nichols r. Rubelman, 13 Mo. App. 615. p. 
 
 1449. 
 Nichols V. Shearon, 49 Ark. 75; s. c, 4 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 167. p. 2071. 
 Nichols V. Sixth Avenue R. Co., 38 N. Y. 131. 
 
 p. 1212. 
 Nichols V. State, 65 Ind. 512. pp. 1937, 1950, 
 
 2039. 
 Nichols V. Stewart. 20 Ala. 358. pp. 481, 484. 
 Nichols V. Suucook Man. Co., 24 N. H. 437. 
 
 p. 1985. 
 N-ichols V. Webb, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 326. pp. 
 
 354, 642. 
 Nicholson v. Coghill, 4 Barn. & Cres. 21. p. 
 
 1197. 
 Nicholson r. Com., 96 Pa. St. 503. p. 1-528. 
 Nicholson r. Desobry, 14 La. Ann. 81. p. 383. 
 Xicoles V. Calyert, 96 Ind. 316. j). 1756. 
 Nicoll r. Greaves, 17 Com. Bench (N. S.) 27; 
 
 s. c. 33 L. J. ((;. P.) 255. p. 1136. 
 Nightingale v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 2 Sawy. 
 
 (U. S.) 338. p. 192. 
 Nimmo v. Kuvkcndall, 85 111. 576. p. 2053. 
 Niinsr. Bigelow, 44 N. H. 376. pp. 1912, 1918. 
 Nininger r. Knox, 8 Minn. 140. p. 1911. 
 Ninnon v. State, 17 Tex. App. 650. p. 1797. 
 Nixon V. Brown, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 157. p. 
 
 1647. 
 Nixon r. Downey. 49 la. 166. p. 2063. 
 Nixon r. Vanhis"e, 2 South. (N. J.) 491 ; s. C. 
 
 8 Am. Dec. 618. p. 889. 
 Noaker r. Morev, 30 Ind" 103. p. 2034. 
 Noble V. Epperlv,6 Ind. 468. p. 1998. 
 Noble V. McCliritock, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 38. 
 
 p. 729. 
 Noble r. National Discount Co., 5 Hurl. & 
 
 N. 22.5. p. 1018. 
 Noble V. People, 1 111. 29. p. 67. 
 Noble r. Richmond, 7 Reporter, 478. p. 1249. 
 Noble V. Smith, 5 .lohns. 357. p. 178. 
 Noble's Case, 15 How. St. Tr. 731. p. 41. 
 Noblesville &c. R. Co. v. Ganse, 76 lud. 142; 
 
 s. c. 40 Am. Rep. 224. p. 1293. 
 Noe I'. State, 92 Ind. 92. p. 73. 
 Noe V. State, 4 How. (Miss.) 330. p. 71. 
 Nofsiuger v. Reynolds, 52 lud. 218. p. 2090. 
 Nofsinger v. Ring, 4 Mo App. 570. p. 1018. 
 Nolan V. Shickle, 3 Mo. App. 30o. p. 1604. 
 Nolan V. State, 19 Oh. 131. p. 465. 
 Nolan v. \08berg, 3 Bradw. (III.) 596. p. 
 
 1944. 
 Nolaud V. McCracken, 1 Dev. & Batt. (X. C, 
 
 594. p. 1636. 
 Nolen V. State, 2 Head (Tcnn.), 520. pp. 
 
 82, 85, 1919. 
 Nolen r. State, 9 Tex. App. 419. pp. 10, 49. 
 Noles r. State, 20 Ala. 31. p. 1548. 
 Nolton r. Moses, 3 Barb. (X. Y.) 31. p. 1645. 
 Nomacjue v. People, 1 111. 109. p. 122. 
 Xorberg's Case, 4 Mass. 81. p. 331. 
 Norburv i'. Kennedy, 3 Crawf. & Dix (Irish) 
 
 Cir. 124. p. 35. 
 Norcross i\ Norcross, 53 Me. 163. p. 1340. 
 Norcum v. Gatv, 19 Mo. 65. p. 1130. 
 Norden r. Jones, 33 Wis. 600. p. 891. 
 Nordham v. Btough, .50 Ind. 280. p. 2100. 
 Nordinanser r. Hitchcock, 40 Mo. 178. pp. 
 
 15S6, 1588. 
 Nordvke &c. Co. v. Van Sant. 99 Ind. 188. 
 
 I»p."l621, 16J2. 
 Norlleet r. State, 4 Suced (Tenn.), 340. pp 
 
 69, 71, 77, 114.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXlll 
 
 Norfolk V. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 300. pp. 283, 
 
 524. 
 Norman v. Beaumont, 'Willes, 4S4. p. 32. 
 Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. (X. Y.) 136. pp. 
 
 512, 1703. 
 Normaque v. People, Breese (111.), 145. p. 
 
 1996. 
 Norris i\ Cargill, 57 Wis. 251. p. 420. 
 Norris v. Casel, 90 lud. 143. p. 1756. 
 Norris V. Cook, 1 Curt. C. C. (U. S.)464. p. 
 
 1720. 
 Norris v. Ha8ler,23 Fed. Rep. 581. p. 168. 
 Norris v. Morrill, 40 X. H. 395. p. 344. 
 Norris v. School District Xo. 1, 12 Me. 293; 
 
 s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 182. p. 892. 
 Norris r. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 333. pp. 
 
 1983, 1984. 
 North V. State, 12 Tex. App. 111. p. 1695. 
 North British &c. Ins. Co. v. Steiger, 13 
 
 Bradw. (111.) 482. p. 978. 
 North Missouri It. Co. v. Stephens, 36 Mo. 
 
 150. p. 196. 
 North Pennsylvania R. Co. r. Heilenian, 49 
 
 Pa. St. 60. p. 1230. 
 North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Mahoney, 57 
 
 Pa St. 187. p. 1233. 
 North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314. p. 
 
 516. 
 Northcutt r. Buckles, 60 Ind. .577. p. 2077. 
 Northern Central K. Co. r. Gies, 31 Md. 357. 
 
 pp. 1224, 1227. 
 Northern Central R. Co. v. Price, 29 Md. 420. 
 
 pp. 1229, 1304. 
 Northern Line Packet Co. v. Biuuinger, 70 
 
 111. 576. p. 1298. 
 Northern Pacitic R. Co. i\ Paine, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 323. pp. 197, 1671. 
 Northington v. State, 78 Tenn. (14 Lea) 424. 
 
 pp. 728, 747, 771, 782. 
 Northwestern &c. Co. v. Blankenship, 94 
 
 Ind. 535. p. 2039. 
 Northwestern &c. Ins. Co. v. Ilazelett, 105 
 
 Ind. 212. p. 2090. 
 Northwestern &c. Ins. Co. v. Heimann, 93 
 
 Ind. 24. pp. 2038, 2110. 
 Northwestern &c. Ins. Co. v. Muskegon 
 
 Bank, 122 U. S. 501. pp. 991, 992. 
 Norton v. Hevward, 20 Me. 359. p. 615. 
 Norton v. Ittner, 56 Mo. 351. pp. 1208, 1210, 
 
 1212, 1218, 1226. 
 Norton v. Kearney, 10 Wis. 443. p. 1411. 
 Norton v. Lexington &c. Ins. Co., 16 111. 236. 
 
 p. 99G. 
 Norton v. McLearv, 8 Oh. St. 205. p. 4. 
 Norton v. Reeds, 6 Mo. 64. p. 1600. 
 Norton v. Seton, 3 PhiUimore, 147. pp. 646, 
 
 649. 
 [Nourse v. Prime, 7 Johns. Ch. (X. Y.) 77. 
 
 p. 886. 
 ' Nourse v. State, 2 Tex. App. 588. p. 465. 
 '.Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 23. p. 4. 
 [Nowlan f. Ablett, 2 Cromp. Mees. & R. 54; 
 . s. c. 5 Tyrwh. 709. p. 1136. 
 iNovea t\ Byxbce, 45 Conn. 382. p. 137. 
 Noyes v. Hemphill, 58 X. H. 536. p. 1007. 
 Noyes v. Rock wood, 56 Vt. 647. p. 1597. 
 Noyes v. Shepherd, 30 Me. 173. pp. 1750, 
 
 1755. 
 Noyes ». Stillman, 24 Conn. 15. p. 1110. 
 Nugent V. Smith, 1 C. P. Div. 423. p. J344. 
 Nugent V. Trepaguier, 2 Martin (La.), 205. 
 
 pj). 60, 87. 
 Nugent, Ex parte, 4 Clark (Pa. L. J.), 106. 
 
 p. 152. 
 Nute r. Nute, 41 N. H. 60. p. 441. 
 Nuzum V State, 88 lud. 599. p. 1.526. 
 Nye V. Lewis, 65 Ind. 326. p]). 2139, 2141. 
 Nye V. Old Colony R. Co., 124 Mass. 241. p. 
 
 2137. 
 
 Oakland R. Co. v. Fielding, 48 Pa. St. 320. 
 
 pp. 1209, 1232. 
 Gates r. Brown, 59 Ga. 711. p. 1984. 
 Gates' Case, 10 How. St. Tr. 1082. pp. 52, 86. 
 Gatfleld v. Waring, 14 Johns. (N. Y ) 188. p. 
 
 900. 
 O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195. pp. 1925, 
 
 1926. 
 Obear v. Railroad Co., 13 Mo. App. 84. p. 
 
 2121. 
 Ober V. Carson, 62 Mo. 209. p. 912. 
 Obcr V. Gray, 68 Ga. 182. pp. 1907, 1917, 1963. 
 Oberfelder v. Kavanaugh (Neb.), 32 N. AY. 
 
 Rep. 296; s. c. 21 Xeb. 483. pp. 313, 399. 
 Oberman v. Coble, 13 Ired. L. (X. C.) I. p. 
 
 551. 
 Obermier v. Core, 25 Ark. 562. p. 20.53. 
 O'Bliuskie v. Judge &c., 34 Mich. 62. p. 2070. 
 Obouchon v. Boon, 10 Mo. 442. p. 1600. 
 O'Brian v. Com., 9 Bush (Kv.), 333. p. 114. 
 O' Brian v. McGlyuchy, 68 Me. 5.52. pp. 12, 35. 
 O'Brien v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 6 Jones 
 
 & Sp. (X^ Y.) 482. pp. 1943, 1945, 1955. 
 O'Brien r. People, 36 X. Y. 276;s. c. 48 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.) 274. pp. 64, 65, 74, 98. 
 O'Brien r. Phila. &c. R. Co., 3 Phila. (Pa.) 
 
 76. p. 1223. 
 O'Brien v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 459. p. 
 
 1131. 
 O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 667. p. 1576. 
 O'Brien f. Vulcan Iron Works, 7 Mo. App. 
 
 257. pp. 81, 129. 
 O'Bvrne v. State, 29 Ga. 36. p. 38. 
 O'Callaghan v. Booth, 6 Cal. 63. p. 1047. 
 Ocean Wave, The, 3 Biss. (U. S.) 317. pp. 
 
 1322, 1345, 1359. 
 Ocheltree v. Carl, 23 la. 394. pp. 1671, 1672, 
 
 1746. 
 O'Coigly's Case, 26 How. St. Tr. 1191, 1231. 
 
 PI), 45, 68, 88. 
 O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Irish L. 179. p. 
 
 95. 
 O'Connor r. Corbitt, 3 Cal. 370. p. 891. 
 O'Connor v. Gutlirie, 11 la. 80. p. 1915. 
 O'Connor v. Koch, 66 Mo. 253. pp. 2055, 
 
 2056. 
 O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215. pp. 27, 53, 73, 
 
 89, 106, 108. 
 Odd Fellows' Hall v. Messer, 24 Pa. St. 507. 
 
 p. 1947. 
 O'Dea V. State, 16 X^^eb. 242. p. 1576. 
 O'Dell V. Coppie, 5 Hei.sk. (Tenn.) 88.- p. 
 
 264. 
 Odell r. Reynolds, 40 Mich. 21. p. 2. 
 Odell V. Sargent, 3 Kan. 80. pp. 2073, 2083. 
 Odiorne v. Bacon, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 185. p. 
 
 J739. 
 Odle V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 159. p. 1927. 
 Odom V. Gill, 59 Ga. 180. p. 20. 
 O' Donald v. Constant, 81 lud. 212. p. 2110. 
 O'Donnell v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 8 Cent. L. 
 
 J. 414. p. 1235. 
 O'Donnell v. Segar, 25 Mich. 367. p. 553. 
 O'Donnell's Case, referred to 18 Am. L. Rev. 
 
 97. p. 539. 
 O'Donohue v. Hendrix, 13 Neb. 255. p. 
 
 2055. 
 O'Driscoll V. M'Burney, 2 Nott. &M. (S. C.) 
 
 54. p. 1198. 
 Oestrich v. Gilbert, 9 Hun (X. Y.), 242. p. 
 
 192. 
 Offlt V. Vlck, Walker (Miss.), 99. pp. 1906, 
 
 1914. 
 O'Flahertv v. Union R. Co., 45 Mo. 70. pp. 
 
 1232, 12.^4. 
 OIlov c. Hicks, Cro. Jac. 263. p. 875. 
 Ogden V. Parks, 16 Johns. N. Y. 180. p. 100. 
 
 8a
 
 CXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ogg V. Shehan, 17 Neb. 323; s. c. 22 X. W. 
 
 Kep. 55(5. p. 2036. 
 Ogle V. Dill, til Iiul. 43S. p. -2041. 
 Ogle V. t?tate, 33 Miss. 383. pp. 75, 116. 
 Oglotreo V. State, 2S Ala. 693. pp. 1534, 
 
 1687. 
 O'Hagan v. Dillon, 76 N. Y. 170. pp. 336, 
 
 337. 
 O'Hara r. Richardson, 44 Pa. St. 385. pp. 
 
 1049, 1938, 1947, 19H-.>. 
 Oliio&c. H. Co. r. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; s. c. 
 
 38 Am. Rep. 134. p. 1477. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 321. 
 
 l>p. 1284, 1289. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 321. p. 
 
 12S9. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Dunbar, 20 111. 623. p. 
 
 1343. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Hemberger, 43 Ind. 462. 
 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Kuhn, 5 S. W. Rep. 419. p. 
 
 2087. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Schicbe, 44 111. 460. p. 
 
 1236. . 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Selby, 47 Ind. 471. pp. 
 
 1298, 2043. 
 Ohio &c. R. Co. V. Stratton, 78 111. 88. p. 
 
 1295. 
 Ohlsen r. Manderfeld, 28 Minn. 390. p. 1052. 
 Oil Co. V. Van Etton , 107 U. S. 325. p. 1133. 
 O'Kecfe V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 32 la. 467. p. 
 
 1305. 
 Okeson r. Patterson, 29 Pa. St. 22. p. 1013. 
 01dersha\T r. Knovvles, 101 111. 117. p. 391. 
 Oldfield r. Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310;s. c. 
 
 3 E. D. Smith, 103. pp. 1233, 1234. 
 Oldham r. Hill, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 300. p. 5. 
 Olds V. Moderwell, 87 Ind. 582. p. 2042. 
 Olendorf i\ Cook, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 37. p. 864. 
 Oleson 17. Meader, 40 la. 662. pp. 1976,2062. 
 Olive V. Guin, 2 Siderfln , 145. p. 1936. 
 Olive V. State, II Neb. 1. pp. 75, 76, 379, 580, 
 
 1777. 
 Olive V. City of Kansas, 69 Mo. 80. pp. 1268, 
 
 1280. 
 Oliver v. Eaton, 7 Mich. 108. pp. 1410, 1437, 
 
 1438, 1443. 
 Oliver v. Gray, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.) 204. p. 
 
 965. 
 Oliver v. La Valle, 30 Wis. 592. pp. 1221, 
 
 1485. 
 Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132. pp. 375, 480. 
 Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; s. c. Ilorr. & 
 
 Thomp. Cas. Self -Def. 725. pp. 1533, 1534, 
 
 1539, 1548. 
 Oliver v. State, 39 Miss. 526. p. 1668. 
 Oliver V. Williams, 25 Ga. 217. p. 1045. 
 Ollam V. Shaw, 27 Ind. 388. pp. 1715, 2028. 
 Olnistead r. Gere, 100 Pa. St. 127. p. 522. 
 Olmstead v. Kevs, 85 N. Y. 593. p. 991. 
 Olmstead v. Miller, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 506. p. 
 
 1617. 
 Olney v. Hatcliff, 37 Hun (N. Y.), 286. p. 
 
 604. 
 Olney r. Mvers, 3111. 311. pp. 888, 895. 
 Olney v. VVickes, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 122. p. 
 
 899. 
 Omaha v. Kane, 15 Neb. 657. p. 56. 
 Omaha r. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; s. c. 16 Am. 
 
 L. Rej). 3.56. p. 55. 
 Omaha &c. R. Co. v. Walker (Neb.), 23 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 348; s. c. 17 Neb. 432. p. 689. 
 O'.Mara v. Com., 75 Pa. St. 424. pp. 72, 75. 
 O'Mara v. Hudson &c. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445. 
 
 p. 1-232. 
 O'Mealyr. State, 1 Tex. App. 180. pp.118. 
 
 1'22. 
 Onirod v. Hath, 14 Mees. &-W. 664. p. 927. 
 O'Neal V State, 47 Ga. 229. p. 54. 
 
 O'Neal r. Walton, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 234. pp, 
 
 354, 3.55, 361. 
 O'Xeallt'. Calhoun, 67 111. 219. p. 1939. 
 O'Neil t'. Capelle. .ill Mo. 296. p. 16t-T). 
 O'Neil V. Lake Sujierior Iron Co. (Mich.), 35 
 
 N. W. Rep. 162. p. 82, 
 O'Neil V. State. 48 Ga. 66. pp. 1761, 1849. 
 O'Neill V. James, 43 N. Y 84. pp. 1626, 
 
 1739. 
 Onev i\ Clendonnin, 28 W. Va. 34. p. 2055. 
 Opdvke V. Marl)le,44 Barb. (N. Y\) 64, pp. 
 
 182, 183, 596, ■i97, .599, 604. 
 Opdvke V. Stephens, 28 N. J. L. 83. pp. 1077, 
 
 1078. 
 Op<ivkc V. Weed, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 223 n. 
 
 pp". 218,220. 
 Opotlile-Yoholo r. Mitchell, 2 Stew. & Port. 
 
 (Ala.) 125. p. 38. 
 Oppenheimer v. United States Express 
 
 Co., 69 111. 62. pp. 1360,1364. 
 Oram v. Bishop, 7 ilalst. (N. J.) L. 153. pp. 
 
 145, 1906. 
 Orange Co. Bank r. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 85. p. 1151. 
 Orcutt V. Carpenter, 1 Tyler (Vt.), 250. pp. 
 
 47, lis, 1920. 
 Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill (Md.), 350. p. 947. 
 Oregon &.c. I{. Co. r. Oregon Steam Nav. 
 
 Co., 3 Ore. 178. p. 1983. 
 O'RelUv r. Hendricks, 2 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 
 
 208. p. 1671. 
 Organ v. State, 26 Miss. 83. pp. 1921, 1981. 
 Orme v. Pratt, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 124. 
 
 pp. 118, 123. 
 Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. 443. p. 1626. 
 Ormod v. Huth, 14 Mees. & W. 651. p. 1419. 
 Ormychund c. Barker, 1 Atk. 21; s.c. Willes,, 
 
 543. p. 330. 
 O'liourk V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 530. 
 . p. 1369. 
 
 Orr V. State, 15 Ark. 540. p. 339. 
 Orr V. Worden, 10 Ind. 553 p. 2108. 
 Orrok r. Com. Ins. Co., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 457. 
 
 pp. 113, 1976. 
 Ortman v. Dixon, 9 Cal. 33. p. 159. 
 Ortman v. Union Pac. R. Co., 32 Kan. 419. p. 
 
 1969. 
 Orton V. Tilden, 110 Ind. 131. p. 2138. 
 Ortweia v. Com., 76 Pa. St. 414. pp. 75, 77. 
 Ortwein v. State, 76 Pa. St. 414. p. 1878. 
 Osl)orne I'. Governors of Guy's Hospital, 2 
 
 Stra. 728. p. 899. 
 Osborne v. Hamilton, 29 Kan. 1. p. 2073. 
 Osborne v. London Dock Co., 10 E.xch. 
 
 (H. &G.)701. ]). 2S6. 
 Osl)orne v. O'Reilly, 34 N. J, Eq. 60. pp. 424, 
 
 425. 
 Osl)orne v. Peoi)lc, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 583. 
 
 p. 304. 
 Osceola Tribe i: Rost, 15 Md. 295. p. 822. 
 Osgood V. Devrey, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 240. p. 
 
 891. 
 Osgood V. Lewis, 2 Harr. & G. (Md.) 495. 
 
 pp. 925, 926, 927. 
 Osgood i: Manhattan Co., 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 612. 
 
 p. 557. 
 Osgood 1-. McConnell, 32 111. 74. p. 1998. 
 Osgood r. State, 63 (ia. 791. p. 118. 
 O'Shields r. State, 55 Ga. 696. pp. 123,1720, 
 
 1748. 
 Osiander v. Com., 3 Leigh (Va.), 780, pp. 
 
 67, 69, 74. 
 Ossipe Man. Co. v. Canney, 54 N. H. 295. 
 
 p. 91. 
 Ostcrtag r. Pacific R. Co., 64 Mo. 421. pp. 
 
 1229, 12a5, 12.57, 12.59. 
 O'Sullivan r Roberts, 39 N. Y. 360. p. .586. 
 Oswald I'. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 20 Minn. 6k 
 
 p. 1922.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXV 
 
 Oswego V. Oswego Canal Co., 6 N. Y. 257. 
 
 p. 101-2. 
 Otis V. Raymond, 3 Conn. 413. p. 1419. 
 O'Toole's Estate, 1 Tuck. (N. Y.) (S-irr.) 39. 
 
 p. 182. 
 Ott i: Oyer, 106 Pa. St. 6. pp. 1698, 1767, 1769, 
 
 1958, 1962. 
 Ott r. Soulard, 9 Mo. 681. p. 1082. 
 Ottawa &c. R. Co. v. McMath, 91 111. 104. p. 
 
 2087. 
 Otter Creek Coal Co. v. Rainy 34 lud. 329, 
 
 p. 2035. 
 Otterbackr. Brown, 2 MacArth. (D. C.) 541. 
 
 p. 1637. 
 OUinger v. Ottinger, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 142. 
 
 p. 1942. 
 Otto V. Dnrege, 14 Wis. 574. p. 886. p. 
 Ougier v. Jenninsrs, 1 Camp. 505. p. 1143. 
 Oulton V. IMorse, 2 Kerr (N. B.), 77. p. 29. 
 Ousley V. Hardin, 23 111. 404. p. 1495. 
 Outlaw (-. Hurdle, IJones (N. C.),450. pp. 
 
 463, 1937, 1939. 
 Outwater v. Dodge, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 87. p. 
 
 909. 
 Over V. Scliiffling, 102 Ind. 191. p. 563. 
 Overall v. Overall, Lit. Sel. Cas. 513. p. 1008. 
 Overbee v. Com., 1 Va. 7-56. p. 1907. 
 Overcash v. Kitchie, 89 N. C, 384. p. 766. 
 Overfleld v. Christie, 7 S. & E. (Pa.) 173. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Overton v. Tracy, 14 Serg. & R. 324. pp. 569, 
 
 839. 
 Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark. 147. p. 1031. 
 Overton v. Overton, 18 B. Mou. 61. p. 1114. 
 Owen V. Hudson River Co., 35 N. Y. 516. p. 
 
 1226. 
 Owen V. Jordan, 27 xila. 608. p. 2019. 
 Owen V. O'Reillv, 20 Mo. 603. p. 312. 
 Owen V. Owen, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 261. p. 646. 
 Owen V. Phillips, 73 lud. 287. 
 Owen V. Warburton, 1 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.) 
 
 326. pp. 1966, 1984. 
 Owens r. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 58Mo. 386. pp. 
 
 1207, 1223, 1307, 1670, 1708. 
 Owens V. Rector, 44 Mo. 389. p. 1414. 
 Owens w. State, 19Tex.App. 242. p. 1538. 
 Owens V. White, 28 Ala. 413. p. 493. 
 Owens Co. v. Pierce, 5 Mo. App. 576. p. 
 
 793. 
 Owings V. Hull,- 9 Pet. (U. S.) 608. p. 1131. 
 Owings V. Low, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 134. p. 
 
 274. 
 Owings r. Shannon, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 
 
 188. p. 361. 
 Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 51 Ala. 172. p. 
 
 346. 
 Oxley V. Storer, 54 111. 159. p. 1667. 
 Ozier v. Hinsburgh, 44 Vt. 220. p. 1249. 
 
 Pacific, The, 1 Xewb. (IT. S . ) 9. p. 488. 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Chrvstal, 25 Mo. 544. p. 1499. 
 Packard v. Smith, 9 Wis. 184. p. 2057. 
 Packard r. United States, 1 G. Greene (la.), 
 
 225. p. 1994. 
 Packer v. Cockayne, 3 G, Greene (la.). 111. 
 
 p. 1670. 
 Packer v. Gonsalus, 1 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 526. 
 
 p. 485. 
 Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall. (U. S) 528. 
 
 pp. 574, 1298. 
 Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 590. 
 
 p. 1074. 
 Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 11 Pick. 
 
 (Mass.) 227 p. 993. 
 Paddock V. Wells. 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 331. 
 
 p. 53. 
 
 Padgett V. Lawrence, 10 Paige (N. Y.),170. 
 
 p. 1073. 
 Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & E. 380. p. 
 
 795. 
 Paducah &c. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush (Kv.), 
 
 41. pp. 1225, r2:>2. 
 Page V. Carter, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 192. pp. 215, 
 
 223. 
 Page V. Com., 27 Gratt. (Va.) 954. p. 70. 
 Page V. Contoocook &c. K. Co., 21 X. 11.438. 
 
 pp. 56, 117. 
 Page V. Gushing, 38 Me. 523. pp. 1162. 1171, 
 
 1173. 
 Page V. Danvers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 326. p. 110. 
 Page V. Kankey, 6 Mo. 433. p. 383. 
 Page V. Marsh, 36 N. H. 305. p. 888. 
 Page V. Osgood, 2 Gray (Mass.), 260. pp. 
 
 218, 241. 
 Page r. Parker, 40 X. H. 47. pp. 315, 351, 
 Paget V. I'erchard, 1 Esp. 205. p. 1440. 
 I'aige V. O'Neal, 12 Cal. 483. p. 95. 
 Page V. Wheeler, 5 N. H. 91. pp. 1945, 1954, 
 
 1955. 
 Pahlman v. King, 49 111. 266. p. 1750. 
 Pain V. Rochester, Cro. Eliz. 871. p. 1191 
 Paine v. Edscll, 19 Pa. St. 178. p. 1031. 
 Paine v. Hutchins, 49 Vt. 314. p. 1045. 
 Paine v. Lake Erie &c. R. Co., 31 Ind. 283. 
 
 p. 2029. 
 Paine V. Riugold, 43 Mich. 341. p. 845. 
 Paine v. Tilden, 20 Vt. .5.54. pp. 469, 471, 476. 
 Palatka &c. R. Co. v. State (Fla.), 3 S. Rep. 
 
 158. p. 2071. 
 Fallen r. Glidden, 68 Me. 559. p. 1704. 
 Palmer?;. Kennedy, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 498. 
 
 p. 2057. 
 Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 161. pp. 953, 
 
 1143. 
 Palmer v. People, 4 Xeb. 68. pp. 71, 78, 115. 
 I'almer v. Pinkham, 33 Me. 35. p. 344 
 Palmer v. Portsmouth, 43 X. H. 265. pp. 
 
 r.'OO, 1246. 
 Palmer v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 217. pp. 1311, 
 
 1708. 
 Palmer v. Rowan (Neb.), 32 N. W. Rep. 210. 
 
 p. 188. 
 Palmer v. State, 42 Oh. St. 596. p, 76. 
 Palmer v. Utah &c. R. Co. (Idaho), 13 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 425. p. 747. 
 Palmer v. Vandenburg, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 281. 
 
 p. 899. 
 Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248. pp. 1924, 1930, 
 
 1933, 1945. 
 Pangborn v. Continental Ins. Co. (Michi- 
 gan), 29 N. W. Rep. 475. p. 608. 
 Pangburn v. Bull, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 345. pp. 
 
 1168, 1170, 1172, 1173, 1181, 1184, 1193, 1198. 
 Pannel v. Com., 86 Pa. St. 260. p. 1780. 
 I'annel c. state, 29 Ga. 681. pp. 85, 129. 
 Panton v. Williams, 2 Ad. & FA. (n. s.) 169; 
 
 s. c. 1 Gale & Dav. 504. pp. 1172, 1173, 1176, 
 
 1181, 1189,1192. 
 Pa,i)ineau r. Belgurde, 81 111. 61. pp. 1964, 
 
 1967. 
 Para more v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 63. pp. 1029. 
 
 103' I, j920. 
 Parch man v. State, 2 Tex. App. 228. p. 70. 
 Pardee v. Drew, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 459. pp. 
 
 1154, 1155. 
 Parham v. Harney, 6 Smed. & M. (Pa.) 55. 
 
 pp. 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968. 
 Paris v. .State, 36 Ala. 232. p. 18. 
 Parish i\ Gates, 29 Ala. 254. p. 869. 
 Park V. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 347. pp. 1209, 1224, 
 
 1226. 
 Park r. Piedmont &c. Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 510. 
 
 p. 1454 
 Park r. Wooten, 35 Ala. 242. p. 1098. 
 Parker j;. Adams, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 415. p. 1224.
 
 CXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Parker v. Barker, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 423. pp. 
 
 144-2, 1447. 
 Parker c. Browning, S Paige fX. Y.), 388. p. 
 
 ur>. 
 Parker v. Crane, 6 Wend. (X. Y.) 647. p. 
 
 900. 
 Parker r. Donaldson, 6 AVatts & S. (Pa.) 
 
 13'2. pp. HiSS, 1701. 
 Parker v. Dubuque &c. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 400. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Parker r. Dudlev, US Mass. 602. p. 425. 
 Parker v. Easlow, 102 111. 272. p. 653. 
 Parker v. Fe^gu^^, 52 111. 419. p. 1679. 
 Parker t'. Gordon, 7 East, 385. p. 939. 
 Parker v. Hardy, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 246. p. 
 
 20St4. 
 Parker v. Ilawlev, 4 Colo. 336. p. 969. 
 Parker v. Ilotchkiss, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S.)200. 
 
 p. 18S. 
 Parker r. Ibbetsou,4 C. B. (N. S.) 345. pp. 
 
 821,825,828, 1137. 
 Parker v. Jenkins, 3 Busti (Ky.), 587. p. 
 
 1472. 
 Parker v. Marquis, 64 Mo, 38. p. 1661. 
 Parker v. Palmer, 4 Barn. & Aid. 387. p. 
 
 1144. 
 Parker v. Potts, 3 Dow. (Pari. Rep.) 23. p. 
 
 994. 
 Parker r. Proprietors &c., 3 Mete. (Mass.) 
 
 91. p. 1051. 
 Parker v. Smith, 4 Cal. 105. p. 581. 
 Parker r. 8mitii, 17 Mass. 413. p. 10S6. 
 Parker v. Southeastern R. Co., 2 C. P. Div. 
 
 416. p. 13(55. 
 Parker v. State, 34 Ga. 262. pp. 58, 62, 1633. 
 Parker V. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 292. p. 576. 
 Parker v. State, 55 Miss. 444. pp. 113, 121, 
 
 2062. 
 Parker v. State, 18 Ohio St. 88. p. 1903. 
 Parker v. State, 18 Tex. App. 72. pp. 1549, 
 
 1709. 
 Parker v. Union Ins. Co., 15 La. Ann. 688. 
 
 p. 993. 
 Parker v. Union Woolen AVorks, 42 Conn. 
 
 399. pp. 1400, 1401. 
 Parker v. Waugh, 34 Mo. 340. p. 2056. 
 Parkhill v. Brighton, 61 la. 103. p. 1277. 
 Parkhill v. Imlay, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 431. pp. 
 
 1131,1134. 
 Parkhurst v. Lawtou, 3 Madd. 121. p. 277. 
 Parkin v. Caruthers, 3 Esp. 248. p. 1101. 
 Parkin v. Moon, 7 Carr. & P. 408. p. 369. 
 Parkins v. Cobbet, 1 Car. & P. 282. p. 622. 
 Parkins v. Dunham, 3 Strobh. Law (S. 0.) 
 
 224. p. 1062. 
 Parkinson v. Parker, 48 Iowa, 667. p. 123. 
 Parks V. Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198. pp. 
 
 682, 684. 
 Parks V. Hill, 45 Ind. 172. p. 2090. 
 Parks V. State, 4 Oli. St.. 234. pp. 113, 2062. 
 Parks V. Turner, 12 How. (U. S.) 39. p. 2005. 
 Parkyn's Case, 13 ilow. St Tr. 7.5. p. 88. 
 Parley v. State, 57 Ind. 331. p. 533. 
 Parmalee v. Kisher, 22 111. 212. p. 1154. 
 Parmele v. Guthery, 2 Root (Conn.), 185. p. 
 
 113. 
 Parmlee v. Sloan, 37 Ind. 469. pp. 1910, 1911. 
 Parmiter v. Coupland, 6 Mees. & W. 105. p. 
 
 14.53. 
 Parr v. Seams, Barnes' Notes, 438. pp. 1964, 
 
 1966. 
 Parr v. Van Ilorne, 40 111. 122. p. 2069. 
 Parris v. State, 2 G. Greene (la.), 449. p. 
 
 1727. 
 Parrott v. Anderson, 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 371. 
 
 p. 960. 
 Parrott v. Thatcher, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 426. pp. 
 
 1989,2021. 
 Parry v. May, 1 Mood. & R. 279. jip. 65, 616. 
 
 Parsons z!. Brown, 15 Barb. (X. Y.) 590. p. 
 
 1698. 
 Parsons v. Harijer, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 64. p. 111. 
 Parsons v. Hulf, 38 Me. 137. pp. 321, 1908. 
 Parsons v. State, 22 Ala. .50. pp. 81, 82. 
 I'artridge v. Forsythe, 29 Ala. 200. p. 1733. 
 Partridge v. Gilbert. 3 Duer (N. Y.), 184. p. 
 
 2026. 
 Partridge v. Patterson, 6 la. 514. p. 845. 
 I'asauka v. Daus, 31 Tex. 72. p. 15. 
 I'asclial V. Ciishmau, 26 Tex. 74. p. 2007. 
 I'asolial V. Davis, 3 Ga. 2.)6. pp. 1669, 1677. 
 Paslevi- English, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 236. p. 1597. 
 Pasoilr V. Lineborger, 90 X. C, 159. p. 2. 
 Passmore \Villiamson's Case, 26 Pa. St. 9, 
 
 18. pp. 132, 136. 
 Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Southgate,5 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 617. p. 572. 
 Patchin v. Sands, 10 Wend. (X. Y.) 570. p. 7. 
 Patchin v. Trustees, 2 Wend. (X. Y.) 377. 
 
 p. 6i)8. 
 Pate V. People, 8 111. 661. pp. 1815, 1903, 
 
 1905. 
 Patent Type Foundry Company v. Lloyd, 29 
 
 L. J. (Exch.) 207.' p. 657. 
 Pater, In re, 5 Best & S. 299; s. c. 10 Jur. 
 
 (N. S.) 972. p. 136. 
 Patman v. State. 61 Ga. 379. p. 398. 
 Patrick v. Hallett, 3 Johns. Cas. (X. Y.) 76. 
 
 pp. 993, 994. 
 Patrick V. Leach (Xeb.), I X. W. Rep. 853. 
 
 p. 925. 
 Patrick v. Pote, 117 INIass. 297. p. 1210. 
 Patricks. Roach, 27 Tex. 579. p. 1047. 
 Patten V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 32 Wis. 524. p. 
 
 1221. 
 Patten v. Goldsborough, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 47. p. 1086. 
 Patten r. Gurnev, 17 Mass. 182. p. 351. 
 Patterson v. Ball, 19 Wis. 243. p. 1734. 
 Patterson v. Beecher 6 J. B. Moore, 319. 
 
 p. 947. 
 Patterson v. Burlington &c. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 
 
 279. p. 1224. 
 Patterson v. Clyde, 67 Pa. St. 500. pp. 1322, 
 
 1345, 1347, 1355, 13.56, 1359. 
 Patterson v. Colebrook, 29 X. H. 94. p. 1645. 
 Patterson v. Edwards, 7 111. 720. p. 1469. 
 Patterson v. Ely, 19 Cal. 35. p. 199. 
 Patterson w. Mickey, 32 (ia. 156. p. 1009. , 
 Patterson v. Jack, .59 111. 633. pp. 2073,2091. 
 Patterson v. McClanahan, 13 Mo. 507. p . 
 
 1751. 
 Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 379. p. 899. 
 Patterson v. People, 46 Barb. (X. Y.) 625. 
 
 (). ,524. 
 Patterson v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 76 Pa. 
 
 St. 389. p. 1211. 
 Patterson v. State, 7 Ark. 59. p. 108. 
 Patterson v. State, 70 Ind. 341. pp. 118, 120. 
 Patterson ?'. "Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748. 
 
 pp. 1209, 1212. 
 Patterson's Case, 6 Mass. 486. p. 19. 
 Pattison v. AVilson, 22 Ind. 358. p. 2101. 
 Patton V. Ash, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 116. p. 92. 
 Patton V. Gregory, 21 Tex. 513. p. 1671. 
 Patton V. Hamilton, 12 lud. 256 pp. 215, 235, 
 
 385. 
 Patton V. Ilughesdale Man. Co., 11 R. 1. 188. 
 
 pp. 696, 1976. 
 Patton V. Philadelphia, 1 La. Ann. 98. p. 
 
 5C>6. 
 Paty V. The Queen, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105. p. 1.52. 
 Paul V. Joel, 3 Hurl. & X. 455. j). 945. 
 Paulette v. Brown, 40 Mo. .52. ]). 1770. 
 Paulitsch r. Railroad Co., 60 (X. Y.) Super. 
 
 (J. *S.) 2H. p. 119. 
 Pauska r. Duus, 31 Tex. 72. p. 125,
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXVll 
 
 Pavey v. American Ins. Co., 56 Wis. 221. p. 
 
 ■202S. 
 Pavey v. Burch, 3 Mo. 447. p. 585. 
 Pavey v. Wintrode, 87 Ind. 379. p. 574. 
 Pawling?;. United States, 4 Cranch (U. S.), 
 
 219. p. 1603. 
 Paxson V. BaileT,17 Ga. 640. p. 1046. 
 Pavne v. Hodge, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 612. p. 350. 
 Payne v. Com., 1 Mete. (Ky.) 370. pp. 1850, 
 
 1854. 
 Payne v. Com. Bank, 6 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 24. 
 
 p. 1023. 
 Payne v. Farmers' Bank, 29 Conn. 415. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Payne v. Ibbotson, 27 L. J. Exch. 341. p. 
 
 636. 
 Pavne v. McLean, 1 Up. Can. K. B. (O. S.) 
 
 444. p. 35. 
 Pavne V. State, 60 Ala. SO. pp. 433, 440, 441, 
 
 l"542. 
 Payne v. Stanton, 59 Mo. 159. p. 1445. 
 Payne v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 375. pp. 
 
 69, 70, 71 74. 
 Payne v. State, 21 Tex. App. 184. pp. 1637, 
 
 1898. 
 Pea V. Pea, 35 Ind. 3S7. p. 2029. 
 Peacham r. Carter, 21 Vt. 515. pp. 1921, 1945. 
 Pearce v. Brower, 72 Ga. 243. pp. 1461, 1462. 
 Pearce v. Hooper, 3 Taunt. 60. p. 628. 
 Pearce v. Young, ^Valk. (Miss.) 259. p. 1060. 
 Pearse r. Rogers, 2 Fos. & F. 137. pp. 51, 95. 
 PearsoU v. Cliapin, 44 Pa. St. 9. p. 890. 
 Pearson v. Coles, 1 Mood. & Rob. 206. p. 
 
 217. 
 Pearson v. Duane, 4 "Wall. (U. S.) 605; s.c. 
 
 Thomp. Carr. Pass. 17. p. 1294. 
 Pearson v. South, 61 Iowa, 232. p. 315. 
 Pearson v. Wightman, 1 Mills Const. Rep. 
 
 336. p. 118. 
 Pease v. State, 63 Ga. 631. p. .540. 
 Peck V. Bacon, 18 Conn. 377. p. 1416. 
 Peck V. Boyes, 7 Scott X. R. 441. p. 1181. 
 Peck V. Brewer, 48 111. 54. pp. 1984, 1990. 
 Peck V. Chouteau, 3 S. W. Rep. 577; s. c. 91 
 
 Mo. 138. pp. 560, 563. 
 Peck V. Crouse, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 15L p. 
 
 1441. 
 Peck V. Hiler, 24 ■ Barb. (X. Y.) 178. p. 
 
 1003. 
 Peck V. N. Y". &c. Steamship Co., 5 Bosw. 
 
 (X. Y.)226. pp. 967, 968. 
 Peck V. Peck, 21 Law Times (N. S.) 670; s. c. 
 
 18 Week. Rep. 295. p. 632. 
 Peck V. Ritchie, 66 IMo. 114. p. 1646. 
 Peck V. Yorks, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 131. p. 413. 
 Pederson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 485. p. 1680. 
 Peebles ('. Horton,54X. C. 374. p. 775. 
 Peed i\ Brenneman, 89 Ind. 2.52. p. 237. 
 Pegram v. Isabell, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 387. p. 
 
 2013. 
 Peiffer v. Com., 15 Pa. St. 468. p. 1905. 
 Pekin v. Winkel, 77 111. 56. pp. 1965, 1967, 
 
 1968. 
 Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa, 1. p. 496. 
 Pelham r. Page 6 Ark. 535. pp. 1927, 1930, 
 
 1931, 1932, 1933. 1980, l'.iS8. 
 Pellersells v. Allen, 56 la. 717; s. c. 10 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 261. p. 385. 
 Peltz V. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171. p. 2055. 
 Pemberton v. Johnson, 113 Ind. 538; s. c. 15 
 
 X. E. Rep. SOi. p. 2095. 
 Pembroke Iron Co. v. Parsons, 5 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 589. p. 917. 
 Pence v. Garrison, 93 Ind. 345. pp. 2026, 
 
 2070. 
 Pence v. State, 110 Ind. 95. p. 2142. 
 Pender r. People, 18 Hun (X^. Y.), 560. p. 78. 
 Pendergrass v. Cross, 15 Pac. Rep. 63. p. 
 
 2099. 
 
 Pendergrastr. Gullatt, lOGa. 218. p. 1669. 
 Pendleton i\ Bank of Kentuckv, 1 T. B. 
 
 Monr. (Ky.) 171. pp. 1022, 1023. 
 Pendleton V. Dvett, 4 Cow. (X. Y'.)581;s. c. 
 
 8 Cow. (N. Y'.") 727. p. 1003. 
 Pendleton Street R. Co. v. Stallman, 22 Oh. 
 
 St. 1. p. 1705. 
 Pendrill v. Second "Ave. R. Co., 2 Jones & 
 
 Sp. (X. Y.)481. p. 1232. 
 Penfleld v. Carpender, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 350. 
 
 p. 1944. 
 Penhyrn Slate Co. v. Meyer, 8 Daly (X. Y.), 
 
 61. p]). 214, 222, 223, 242. 
 Peninsula Bank v. Hanmer, 14 Mich. 208. p. 
 
 1022. 
 Peninsular R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18. p. 
 
 56. 
 Penn. &c. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 134 Mass. 56. 
 
 p. 974. 
 Penn. Hall, In re, 5 Pa. St. 204. p. 43. 
 Penn. Mutual Aid Society v. Corley (Pa.), 
 
 11 Ins. Law Journal, 493. p. 565. 
 Pennell v. Percival, 13 Pa. St. 197. p. 129. 
 Peunewill v. CuUen, 5 Harr. (Del.) 238. p. 
 
 1108. 
 Pennimau v. Jones, 59 X. H. 119. p. 281. 
 Peunock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 1. pp. 
 
 1698, 1703,1739. 
 Pendril v. Second Avenue R. Co., 43 How. 
 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 399. p. 1209. 
 Penns' Lessee v. Ingraham, 2 "Wash. C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 487. p. 572. 
 Pennsylvania r. Bell, Add. (Pa.) 156. pp. 
 
 732, 1505, 1508, 1511. 
 Pennsylvania v. McFall, Add. (Pa.) 255. p. 
 
 1890. 
 Pennsvlvania v. Ravenel, 21 How. (U. S.) 
 
 103. "p. 1014. 
 Pennsvlvania Canal Co. r. Pentley, 66 Pa. 
 
 St. 30. pp. 1208, 1212, 1225. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. 
 
 (Md.) 249. p. 1025. 
 Pennsvlvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203, 
 
 p. 1295. 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Smith, 98 Ind. 42. p, 
 
 2039. 
 Pennsvlvania Co. v. Stoelke, 104 111. 201. p, 
 
 1213." 
 Pennsvlvania Co. v. Weddle, 100 Ind. 189. 
 
 |). ll"'79. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Billings, 94 Pa. St. 
 
 40. pp. 1107, 1108. 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. Conlan, 101 111.93. 
 
 pp. 1207, 1208. 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. Frana, 112 111. 405. 
 
 pp. 820, 1230. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 
 
 315. p. 1298. 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372. 
 
 p. 1232. 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. McCloskey, 23 Pa. St. 
 
 526. "p. 1295. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McTighe, 46 Pa. St. 
 
 316. p. 1225. 
 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. Miller, 87 Pa. St. 395. 
 
 p. 1321. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60. 
 
 pp. 1304, 1472. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. St. 
 
 365 p. 12!tO. 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. Weber, 76 Pa. St. 157; 
 
 s. c. 72 Pa. St. 27. p. 1225. 
 Penny r. Brink, 75 X. C. 68. p. 168. 
 Penry v. Richards, 52 Cal. 496. p. 1090. 
 Pensenneau r. Pensenneau, 22 Mo. 27. p. 
 
 1607. 
 People V. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 398. pp. 
 
 32. 66. 
 People V. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61. p. 469.
 
 CXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 People V. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345. p. 1726. 
 People V. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645. p. 208/. 
 PeoTJle V. Ah You, 47 Cal. 121. p. 89. 
 Peopler. Albany, 6 Wend. (N. J .)-548. p. 107. 
 People V. Albright, 23 How. Pr. (N. 1.) 300. 
 
 People 'v. Allen, 43 N. Y. 28. pp. 63, 66, 67. 
 People V. Aniauacus, 50 Cal. 233. p. 472. 
 People r. Ames, 39 Cal. 403. p. 464. 
 People V. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65. pp. 727, 732. 
 People V. Anderson, 14 Johns. (N. i.) 294. 
 
 pJople V. Anthony, m Cal. 400. pp. 1864, 1868. 
 
 People V. Apple, 7 Cal. 289. p. 560. 
 
 People V. Arceo, 32 Cal. 40. pp. 49, 82, 89, 
 
 People V. Arnold, 40 INlich. 710. pp. 283, 403, 
 
 410, 540, 545, 18o5, ISOB, 1808. 
 People r. Ashe, 44 Cal. 288. pp. 1821, lb22. 
 People r. Atchinson, 7 How. Pr. (N. 1.) 241. 
 
 p 45 
 People V. Atherton, 51 Cal. 495. p. 126. 
 People V. Augsbiiry 97 N. Y. 501. p. 506 
 People r. Backus, 5 Cal. 275. pp. 99, 1907. 
 People V. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340. p. 34o. 
 People V. Barker, 60 Mich. 277; s. c. 27 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 539. p. 272. ^ n /xr v n 
 
 People V. Barker, 2 Wheeler Cr. C. (N. Y.) 
 
 19. pp. 1965, 1966. „^„ _„. 
 
 People V. Barnhart, 59 Cal. 402. pp. 748, 766. 
 People V. Beck, 58 Cal. 212. p. 526. 
 People V. Bcckwith(X. Y.), 15 ^orthEa8t. 
 
 Rep. 53. p. 79. 
 People V. Beelcr, 6 Cal. 246. p. 1'26. 
 People V. Bell, 53 Cal. 119. pp. 416, 419. 
 People V. Benson, 52 Cal. 380. p. 39/. 
 People V. Blakeley, 4 Park. Cr. R. (N. 1.) 
 
 People r. Bodine, 1 Denio (X. Y'.),306. pp. 
 
 59. 69, 96, 97, 98, 103, 115, 125, 127. 
 People V. Boggs, 20 Cal. 432. p. 1912. 
 People V Bollinger (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 799. 
 
 P- 465. „,„ 
 
 People V. Bonds, 1 Nev. 33. p. 210. 
 People V. Bonnev, 19. Cal. 42b. pp. 6/3, 676, 
 
 677, 1906,1907,1969. 
 People V. Boscovitch, 20 Cal. 436. p. 257. 
 People V. Bourke, 66 Cal. 455. pp. 1731, 
 
 2109 
 People V. Bradner, 107 N. Y. 1; s. c. 13 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 87. p. 2077. „ ,^^ _^ . 
 
 People V. Bragle, 10 Abb. New Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 300 ; s. c. 26 Hun (N. Y.), 378. p. 315. 
 People V. Brannigau, 21 Cal. 340. p. 1982. 
 People v. Brannon,47 Cal. 96. p. 182o. 
 People V. Brennan, 44 Barb. (N. \.) 344. p. 
 
 137 
 People V. Brotherton, 43 Cal. 530. pp. 70, 
 
 126. 
 People V. Brown, 48 Cal. 253. p. 75. 
 
 People V. Brown, 53 Mich. 531. pp. 510, 511. 
 People V. Brown, 72 (N. \.) o71. pp. 282, 
 409, 527, 533, 534, 535. nn .. qq 
 
 People r. Brown (Cal.), 14 Pac. Rep. 90. p.99. 
 People V. Buckley, 49 Cal. 241. p. 95. _,_, 
 People r. Buddenseck (N. Y.), 9 North East. 
 
 People**: Bus^CCal.), 10 Pac. Rep. 169; s. c. 
 
 71 Cal. 602. pp. 676, 677. _ „ 
 
 People i: Bush. 68 Cal. 623; s. c. 10 Pac. Rep. 
 
 People^r. Bush, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 553. p. 
 
 People V. Cadd.U Reporter, 200; s. c. 60 Cal. 
 
 People^;, cltvin. 60 Mich. 113; s. c. 26 N. W. 
 
 People^t'. Campbell, 8 111. 466. p. 819. 
 People V. Carey, 17 Abb. L. J. 432. p. 524. 
 
 People V. Carnal, 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 256. 
 
 People V.' Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238; s. c. 86 
 
 North East. Rep. 584. pp. 63, 78^ 
 People V. Carr (Mich.), 31 N. W. Rep. 591. 
 
 People 'v. Carrillo, 70 Cal. 643; s. c. 11 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 840. pp. 1819, 185S. 
 People V. Carroll, 3 Park. Cr. (N. 1.) -3. p. 
 
 People V. Casey, 65 Cal. 260. pp. 1632, 1767. 
 People V. Casey, 72 X. Y. 393. p. 396. 
 People V. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115. P ■ '8. 
 People V. Cassel, 5 Hill (N. 1.), 164. pp. 152, 
 
 155 
 People V. Cassiano, 30 Hun (N. Y.),3S8. p. 
 
 PeoiJle V. Choong Foon Ark, 61 Cal. 528. 
 
 PtfoiK. Christie, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 256; s. 
 
 c. 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 579. PP- 63, 6/, 104. 
 People V. Church, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 262. p. 145. 
 People V. Clark, 8 N. East. Rep. 38. pp. 5^0, 
 
 People V. Clark, 10 Mich. 317. p. 1565. 
 I'eople r. Clark, 23 Hun (NY.), 374. p. 5 
 People r. Cloonau, 50 Cal. 449. pp. 464, 465. 
 I'eople V. Clough, .59 Cal. 428. p. 39. ^ 
 People V. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548 p /o. 
 People V. Cogdell, 1 Hill (X . "i •), 94. p. 1566. 
 People r. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508. p. o69 
 People V. Colson, 49 Cal. 679. p. 126. 
 People V. Colt. 3 HiU (N. Y.), 432. pp. 21, 25, 
 
 People V. Comstock, 55 Mich. 405. p. 43 
 People V. Connors, 50 N. \. 240. pp.531, 
 
 Peop'le V. Conrov, 33 Hun (N. Y.),119; s. C. 
 
 20 Week. Dig. 242, p. 1639. 
 People r. Cornetti, 92 K. 1.85. V-'\ 
 People V. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166. pp. o2, 99, 353. 
 Peoples. Cottle, 6 Cal. 227. pp. /O '5. 
 People V. Court, 83 N. 1 . 436 p. 4a| 
 Peo ilev. Courtney. 28 Hun (N. Y.), 589. p. 465. 
 People V. Coyodo,40 Cal 586. pp. 1'- ^d. 
 People I'. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288. pp. 530, 534, 
 
 People V. Crawford, 48 -Mich. 500. P- fee. 
 People V. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191. pp. 1801, 1819, 
 1857, 1858, 1860. ^ , ^ /xr v ^ 
 
 People V. crosswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 pSle?^cae?:\b^^-Y. 234; s. c. 6 North 
 
 East. Rep. 384. p. 78. . 
 
 People V. Cunningham, 1 Demo (N. \.), 524. 
 
 Peopled. Cummings, 3 Park. Cr. R. (N. T.) 
 
 343 pp. 20, 25, 27, 110. ^, . 
 
 People i Cox, 21 Huu (N. Y.),47. pp. 414, 
 
 People V. Damon , 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 351. pp. 
 
 People v. Dane, 59 Mich. 550. p. 754. 
 
 ?3e:::SSfS:Vs^:«.o.64caL 
 
 peopled mvai^Wend.-(N.Y.) 309. pp. 
 People '/•' Devine, 44 Cal. 452. pp. 414, 433, 
 
 Peo'p'le ^'.'Devine , 46 Cal. 46. p. 21. 
 
 People V. Dcwick, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 230. 
 
 IC Q7 QS 
 
 Peoi'.le V. Do' Witt, 68 Cal. 584. p. 1548. 
 People V. Dewey (Idaho), 6 Pac. Rep. loa 
 
 pi'tf'r.' Dick, 32 Cal. 213. pp. I860. 1861, 
 
 1864. 1865. 
 People V. Dick, 37 Cal. 2,7. p. 95.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 People i\ Doe, 1 Mich. 451. pp. 95, 114. 
 People r. Doesburg, 17 Mich. 135. p. 2001. 
 People V. DolMii , 61 X. Y. 485. p. 32. 
 People V. Douohue,59 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 417. 
 
 p. 151. 
 People V. Douglass, 4 Cow. (N. Y'.) 26. pp. 
 
 1903. 1906, 1931. 
 People r Dowling, 84 X. Y'. 479. p. i566. 
 People V. Dovell,iS Cal. So. pp. 484, 1647. 
 People r. Durfee (3iich.),29 N. W. Rep. 109. 
 
 pp. 560, 2109. 
 People r. Dwindle 29 Cal. 632. p. 151. 
 People V. Dvle, 21 X. Y. 478. p. 180S. 
 People V. Eastwood, 14 X. Y. 562. p. 341. 
 People V. Euoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 163. p. 
 
 1572. 
 People V. Edwards, 41 Cal. 640. p. 70. 
 People V. Elliott (N. Y.), 12 X. E. Hep. 602. 
 
 p. 813. 
 People V. Elster (Cal.), 3 West Coast Rep. 
 
 33. p. 532. 
 People V. Fancher, 2 Hun (X. Y'.l, 226. p. 
 
 152. 
 People V. Fancher, 4 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 
 
 467. pp. K2, 136, 171, 187. 
 People V. Farrell, 31 Cal. 577. pp. .528. 787. 
 People V. Felliuger, 24 How. Pr. (X. Y'.) 341. 
 
 p. 1563. 
 People V. Ferguson, 34 Cal. 309. pp. 2130, 
 - 2131. 
 
 People V. Fernandez. .35 X. Y. 49. p. 663. 
 People i: Ferris, 56 Cal. 442. p. 1731. 
 People V. Finley, 38 Mich. 482. pp. 1838,1848. 
 People V. Finnegan, 1 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 147. 
 
 pp. 481, 485. 
 People V. Fisher, 51 Cal. 319. p. 2087. 
 People V. Forsvthe, 65 Cal. 102. p. 1899. 
 People V. Freeman, 4 Den. (N. Y'.) 9. pp. 88, 
 
 96. 
 People V. Freshauer, 55 Cal. 575. p. 283. 
 People V. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135. p. 2060. 
 People r. Frost, 5 Park. Cr. (X. Y'.) 53. pp. 
 
 1919, 1990. 
 People V. Fuller, 2 Park. Cr. R. (X. Y'.) 16. 
 
 pp. 33. 74, 100. 
 People V. Furtado, 57 Cal. 346. pp. 396, 400, 
 
 414. 
 People V. Gaffney, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) (X. 
 
 Y^) 36. pp. 1506,' 1924, 1952, 1973. 
 People V. Gar Sov, 57 Cal. 102 ; s. c. 23 ^Ub. L. 
 
 J. 418. pp. 63, 105. 
 People V. Gardner, 2 Johns. (X. Y'.) 477. p. 
 
 1566. 
 People V. Garv, 105 111. 264. p. 2069. 
 People V. Gatewood, 20 Cal. 146. p. 116. 
 People V. Gaunt, 23 Cal. 1.56. p. 116. 
 People r. Gay, 7 X. Y. 378. pp. 413, 459, 467, 
 
 471, 473, 488, 535. 
 People V. Gehr, 8 Cal. 3.59. pp. 70, 75, 76. 
 People V. Genet, 19 Hun (X. Y'.), 92; s. c. 83 
 
 X. Y'. 438. pp. 393, 409. 
 People V. Genung, 11 AYend. 19. p. 400. 
 People V. Getty, 49 Cal. 584. p. 2099. 
 People V. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557. )). 528. 
 People V. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32. p. 559. 
 People V. Gonzales, 35 X. Y. 49. p. 647. 
 People V. Graham, 21 Cal. 261. pp. 59, 334. 
 People V. Gray, 66 Cal. 271. pp. 1708, 1763. 
 People r. Gray, 5 Wend. (X. Y'.) 289. pp. 
 
 1693, 1703. 
 People V. Green, 53 Cal. 60. p. 678. 
 People V. Guidice, 73 Cal. 226: s. c. 15 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 44. pp. 1543, 1546, 1547, 1549. 1830. 
 People V. Hainblin, 68 Cal. 101. p. 532. 
 People V. Hamilton, 62 Cal. 377. p. 99. 
 People V. Hardin, 37 Cal. 2.58. p. 95. 
 People V. Harris, 61 Cal. 136. p. 39. 
 People V. Hartung, 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y') 256. 
 
 pp. 786, 1506, 1917,' 1952, 1985, 1989. 
 
 People V. Hatch, 36 111. 14. p. 2080. 
 
 People V. Hayes, Edm. Sel. Cas. (X. Y'.) 582. 
 
 p. 70. 
 People V. Healey, 48 Barb. (X. Y'.) 564. p. 
 
 151. 
 
 People V. Henderson, 28 Cal. 466. p. 126. 
 People V. Heneck, 13 Johns. (X. Y"".) 82. 
 
 264. 
 
 P- 
 
 People r. Henries, 1 Park. Cr. (N. T.) 579. 
 
 p. 45. 
 People V. Herbert, 61 Cal. 454. p. 1671. 
 People V. Herrick, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 82. p. 
 
 526 
 People V. Hettick, 1 Wheeler Cr. C. (N. Y'.) 
 
 399. p. 67. 
 People r. Holbrook, 13 Johns. (X. Y''.) 90. 
 
 pp. 608, 609. 
 People r. Honeyman, 3 Denlo (X. T.),121. 
 
 pp. 67. 71,83,88,96, 93. 
 People V. Hope, 62 Cal. 291. p. 693. 
 People V. Hosmer, 1 Wend. (X. Y'.) 297. p. 
 
 1983. 
 People r. Hovev. 29 Hun (X. T.), 383. p. 409. 
 People V. Howard, 16 Pac, Rep. 694. p. 
 
 2093. 
 People I'. Howell, 4 Johns. (X. T.) 296. p. 41. 
 People V. Hovt, 3 Utah, 396. p. 105. 
 People V. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257. p. 1995. 
 People t'. Hulse, 3 HUl (X. Y.),300. pp.477. 
 
 481. 485, 488. 
 People ('. Hunt, 59 Cal. 430. p. 1990. 
 People i: Hurley, 8 Cal 390. p. 1714. 
 People r. Hurlev,60 Cal. 74. p. 1894. 
 People V. Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384. pp. 444. 
 People V. Jenks, 24 Cal. 11. p. 89. 
 People V. Jewett, 3 Wend. (X. Y'.) 314. p. 31. 
 People V. Jewett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 386. p. 
 
 118. 
 People V. Johnson, 2 Wheeler Cr. C. (X. Y'.) 
 
 361. pp. 67, 73, 74. 
 People r. Johnston, 46 Cal. 78. pp. 70, 74, 75. 
 People V. Jones, 31 Cal. 573. p. 787. 
 People V. Jones, Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 112. 
 
 p. 65. 
 People V. Jones, 24 Mich. 215. pp. 19, 21, 
 
 545, 1671, 1806. 
 People V. Jones, 11 Pac. Rep, 501. p. 1970. 
 People V. Justices. 74 X. Y. 406. p. 5. 
 People 1'. Justices of Chenango, 2 Gaines' 
 
 Cas. rX. Y'.) 319. pp. 2060, 2061, 2073. 
 People V. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581. pp. 705, 706, 
 
 708. 
 People V. Keller, 28 Cal. 423. p. 1896. 
 People r. KelleV, 47 Cal. 125. p. 528. 
 People V. Kellev, 35 Hun (N. Y.),295. pp. 
 
 1639, 1758, 1787. 
 People V. Kellv, 46 Cal. 357. pp. 1905, 1911. 
 People V. Kelly. 24 N. Y. 74. pp. 148, 149, 151, 
 
 158,171,173,174,187,271. 
 People V. Kelly, 94 N. Y. 527. pp. 705, 707, 
 
 1916. 
 People v. Kennedy, 2 Park. Cr. R. (X. Y.) 
 
 312. p. 4. 
 People V. Kerrick, 52 Cal. 446. p. 1858. 
 People V. Kerrigan (Cal.), 14 Pac. Rep. 849. 
 
 p. 208. 
 People V. Keyser, 53 Cal. 183. p. 2087. 
 People V. King, 27 Cal. 507. pp. 69, 73, 75. 
 People V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1; s. c. 8 Crim. L. 
 
 Mag. 640. p. 1801. 
 People V. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267. pp. 1918, 
 
 1934. 
 People V. Knickerbocker, 1 Park. Cr. (X. T). 
 
 302. pp. 6:5, 115 
 People V. Kohle, 4 Cai. 199. p. 89. 
 People 17. Kunz (Cal.), 14 Pac. Rep. 836. p. 
 
 813 
 People V. Labadie (Mich.), 33 X. W. Rep. 806. 
 
 p. 15.
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 People V. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358; s. c. 1 Park. Cr. 
 
 (X. Y.) 495. ])p. 496, 504, 512, 513. 
 People V. Lane, 6 Abb. Pr. (n. S.) 105. 
 
 p. 4. 
 People V. Langton, 67 Cal. 427. pp. 1S8G, 
 
 lt<SS. 
 People V. Lamed, 7 X. Y. 445. pp. 94, 129, 
 
 662. 
 People V. Lee, 5 Cnl. 353. p. 59. 
 People V. Leo, 49 Cal. 37. p. 164. 
 People V. Lee Ah Chuck, 66 Cal. 662. p. 
 
 368. 
 People V. Lee Ah Yute, 60 Cal. 95, p. 748. 
 People V. Lohinan, 2 Barb. (X. Y.) 450. p. 
 
 63. 
 People V. Lohman, 2T5arb. (X. Y.) 216; s. c. 
 
 1 N. Y.280. pp. 96, 1751. 
 People r.Loucks, 28 Cal. 68. p. 2069. 
 People r. Loughliu, 3l'tah, 133. p. 40. 
 People r. Lowrcv, 70 Cal. 193; s. c. 11 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 605. p. 1970. 
 People V. Mahoney. IS Cal. 180. p. 63. 
 People V. Majors, 65 Cal. 138. p. (iii. 
 People V. Mallou, S Laus. (X. Y.) 224. pp. 
 
 69, 73, 75. 
 People V. Manning, 48 Cal. 335. pp. 409, 412, 
 
 561,564. 
 People V. Marble, 38 Mich. 309. p. 2077. 
 People V. Marion, 29 Mich. 32. p. 2032. 
 People V. Jlartin, 6 Cal. 477. p. 2099. 
 People r. Matlu-r, 4 AVeud. (X. Y. ^ 229. pp. 
 68, 69, 75, 88, 96, 98, 112, 261, 286, 313, 334,393, 
 456. 
 People V. Matteson, 2 Cow. (X. Y.) 433. p. 
 
 294. 
 People v. McCalla, 8 Cal. 301. p. 41. 
 People V. McCalluni, 103 N. Y. 587. p. 1893. 
 People V. McCann, 16 X. Y. 58. p. 1848. 
 People V. McCann, 3 Parker Cr. K. (X. Y.) 
 
 272. p. 20. 
 People V. McCarty, 48 Cal. 557. p. 90. 
 People V. McCaulev, 1 Cal. 379. p. 74. 
 People V. McCollister, 1 Wheeler C. C. (X. 
 
 Y.)391. p. 58. 
 People V. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 216. 
 
 p. 658. 
 People V. McDowell, 64 Cal. 467. p. 1708. 
 People V McFadden, 65 Cal. 445. pp. 1552, 
 
 1647. 
 People V. McGarren, 17 TVend (X. Y.) 460. 
 
 p. 409. 
 People V. McGee, 1 Denio (X. Y.) i9. p 
 
 832. 
 People r. McGeery, 6 Park. Cr. R. (X. Y.) 
 
 653. p. 35. 
 People t'. JIcGulre, 43 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 67. 
 
 p. 7. 
 People V. McGungill, 41 Cal. 429. pp. 95, 116, 
 
 524, 527,531. 
 People V. McKay, 18 Johns. (X. Y.) 212. pp. 
 
 18, 19, 87. 
 Peni>lc V. McKellcr, 53 Cal. 65. pp. 416, 419. 
 People V. McLean, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 381. 
 
 People r. McLeod, 1 Hill (X. y.),377; «. c. 
 • Horr. & Thomp. Case Self-Def. 784. p. 
 
 1539. 
 People V. McMahon, 2 Park. Cr. CN. Y.) 
 
 663. pp. 67, 581. 
 People V. Melvane, 39 Cal. 614. pp. 464, 465. 
 People r. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Cr. C. (X. Y.) 
 
 26.0. p. 67. 
 People V. Milgate, 5 Cal. 127. p. 1848. 
 People V. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. 6.) 
 
 (X. Y ) 207. p|>. 175. 1903, 1969. 
 People V. Moore, 52 Mich. 563. p. 1626. 
 People V. Moore, 15 AVend, (X. Y.) 419. pp. 
 
 :'.92. ;!93, 4.><5. 
 People V. Morrlgau, 29 Mich 5. pp. 371, 642. 
 
 People V. Morrisser, 1 Buff. (X. Y.) Sup. 295.. 
 
 p. I'.i76. 
 People r. Morrow, 60 Cal. 146. p. 1801. 
 Peoi>le r. Mnlkev, 65 Cal. 501. p. 1666. 
 I'eopio V. Muller, 32 Hun (N. Y.), 209. p. 66 
 People i\ iSIuiin, 65 Cal. 211. p. 1SS8. 
 I'eoiilor. jMuriiliY, 45Cal. 137. pp. 74, 126. 
 I'eople V. 31urpiiy, 1 Daly (X.V.),462. p. 
 
 161. 
 People V. Murrav, 52 Mich. 288. p. 2037. 
 People V. Xaughton,7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (N. S.) 
 
 421. p. 171. 
 People V. Noill, 74111. 68. p. 14.'). 
 People V. Xevins.l Hill (X. Y.),154. p. 148. 
 People V. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 602. jip. 261, 531. 
 I'eople r. O'Laughliu, 3 Utah, 133. pp. 74, 
 
 253 259 
 People r.' O'Xeal, 67 Cal. 378. pp. 1752,1801. 
 People V. O'Xeil, 61 Cal. 4:^.5. p. 39. 
 People V. Otto, 101 X. Y. 690; s. c. 5 Xorth 
 
 East. Uep. 788. p. 78. 
 People V. Oyer and Terminer, 83 X. Y. 436. 
 
 pp. 73, 392, .393, 403. 
 People V. Padillia, 42 Cal. 536. pp. 1819, 1820, 
 
 1857, 1858. 
 People V. Page, 1 Idaho, 114. p. 1948. 
 People V. Parish, 4 Denio (X. Y.), 153. p, 
 
 351. 
 People V. Parton, 49 Cal. 632. pp. 313, 442. 
 Peoi)le V. Perrv, 65 Cal. 568. pp. 1631, 1632, 
 
 1719. 
 People V. Petmecky, 99 X. Y. 415. pp. 1801, 
 
 1802. 
 People V. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326. pp. 1819, 1858, 
 
 1867. 
 People V. Plummer, 9 Cal 298. p. 123. 
 People V. Price, 67 Cal. 350. p. 1714. 
 I'eople V. Quick, 92 111. .580. p. 191. 
 I'eople r. Ransom, 7 Wend. (X. Y.) 417. pp. 
 
 Ill, 19U3, 1934. 
 People V. Rathbnn, 21 "Wend. (N. Y.) 509. 
 
 pp. 98, 125, 1615. 
 People V. Reagle, 60 Barb. (X. Y.) 257. p. 
 
 1905. 
 People V. Real, 42 X. Y. 270. p. 534. 
 People V. Rector, 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 569 pp. 
 
 261, 310, 4.56, 467, 468,602, 603, 1572. 
 People t'. Reinhart, 39 Cal. 449. pp 526, 626,, 
 
 529. 
 People V. Renfrew, 41 Cal. 37. p. 95. 
 People V. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347. pp. 62, 63, 104. 
 l'eoi)le r. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128. pp. 66, 70, 
 
 73, 89, 95, 96, 106. 
 People V. Rlghetti, 66 Cal. 185. p. 1771. 
 People V. Rllev, 66 Cal. 107. p. 1671. 
 People V. Roberts. 6 Cal. 214. pp. 87, 1669. 
 People V. Robert.son,67 Cal. 646. p. 1.545. 
 People V. Robinson, 2 Park. Cr. (X. Y.; 235. 
 
 p. 20. 
 People V. Robinson, 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 649. 
 
 p. 1780. 
 People V. Robinson, 66 Cal. 136. p. 1.560. 
 People V. Rodngo, 69 Cal. 601 ; s. c. & Grim. 
 
 Law Mag. 503. pp. 412, 454, 1848. 
 People r. Rodrigues, 10 Cal. 50. pp. 35, 87. 
 People v. Rogers. 13 Abb. Pr. (N. B.) {S. Y.) 
 
 370. pp.32, 94. 
 Peoiilev. Ro9evear,.56Mich. 168. p. 48. 
 People V. Russell, 46 Cal. 121. pp. 90, 370, 
 
 ,531. 
 People V. Ryan, 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 47 p. 65. 
 People V. Ryland, 28 Hun ^N, Y.), 668, p. 
 
 465. 
 People V. SaflFord, 5 Denio (X Y".;, 112. p. 
 
 443. 
 Peoples. Sam Lung (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep 673. 
 
 p. 2.53. 
 People V. Sameels, 66 Cal. 99. pp 1732, 1799..
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXl 
 
 47, 
 
 People r. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17. p. 65. 
 People V. Sandford, -13 Cal. 29. pp. 113, 118. 
 People V. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309. p. 344. 
 People V. Scales, 4 111. 351. p. 122. 
 People V. Scoggins, 3" Cal. 676. p. 90. 
 People V. Scolt. M JMicli. 154. pp. 48, 113. 
 People V. Shafer, 1 Utah Ter. 260. pp. 
 
 1905, 1907. 
 
 People i: Sheldon, 68 Cal. 434. p. 1675. 
 People V. Schuler, 28 Cal. 490. p. 1860. 
 People V. Sing Lum, 61 Cal 538. p. 2077. 
 People V. Smallmau, 55 Cal. 185. p. 433. 
 People V. Sprague, 53 Cal. 491. pp. 1770, 1771, 
 
 1985, 2099. 
 People V. St. Clair Cir. Judge, 37 Mich. 131. 
 
 p. 2065. 
 Peoples. Steubenvoll, 8 Crim. L. JJag. 265; 
 
 s. c. 28 N. W. Uep 883. pp. 1816, 1830, 1997. 
 People V. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140. pp. 65, 115, 
 
 126. 
 People V. Strong, 30 Cal. 151. pp. 1709, 1860, 
 
 1861,1862,1864, 1865. 
 People V. Swift, 66 Cal. 348. p. 1680. 
 People V. Stoncifer, 6 Cal. 405. pp. 47, 113, 
 
 115. 
 People V. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 71. 
 
 pp. 46, 69, 71, 73, 87, 96, 126, 302. 
 People V. Stuari, 4 Cal. 225. p. 21. 
 People V. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263. pp. 132, 
 
 151,153. 
 People V. Symonds, 22 Cal. 348. p. 71. 
 People I'. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257. pp. 65, 66. 
 People V. Tavl<ir, 59 Cal. 640. p. 1694. 
 People V. Taing, 53 Cal. 602; s. c. 8 Kep. 618. 
 
 p. 1542. 
 People i>. Thompson, 34 Cal. 671. 
 People r. Thompson, 41 N. Y. 1. 
 People V. Thurston, 2 Park. Cr. 
 
 p. 508, 1780. 
 People V. Tomlinson, 63 Cal. 344. 
 People r. Trim, 37 Cal. 276. p]). 1722, 1723. 
 People V. Turcott, 65 Cal. 126. pp. 1671, 
 
 1756. 
 People V. Turner, 1 Cal. 152. pp. 151, 159. 
 People V. Turner, 39 Cal. 370. p. 1982. 
 People V. Turner, 65 Cal. 540. p. 1708. 
 People V. Tweed, 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 286. 
 
 pp. 25, 29, 30, 31, 34, 99. 
 People V. Tyler, 85 Cal. 553. p. 456. 
 People V. Tvler, 36 Cal. 522. pp. 198, 627 
 People V. Vail, 2 Cow. N. Y.) 623. p. 589. 
 People V. Van Alstyue, MS., cited in 6 Cow. 
 
 (N. Y.) 565. p. 68. 
 People V. Vance, 21 Cal. 400. p. 21. 
 People V. Vane, 12 AVend. (N. Y.) 78. pp. 
 
 466. 468, 485. 
 People V. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560. pp. 1631, 1632, 
 
 1641. 
 People V. Verniilyea, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 108. pp. 
 
 66, 68, 70, 94, 102, 125, 129. 
 People V. Voll, 43 Cal. 166. p. 113. 
 People V. Thompson, 28 Cal. 214. p. 2105. 
 People V. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314. pp. 532, 540, 
 
 545. 
 People V. Walsh, 44 Cal. 440; s. c. 1 Green 
 
 Cr. L. 487. p. 95. 
 People v. Wassow, 65 Cal. 538. p. 402. 
 People V. Webb (Cal.), 11 Pac. Kep. 609; s. c. 
 
 70 Cal. 120. p. 416. 
 People r. Webster, 14 How. Pr. (N". Y.) 242; 
 
 s. c. 3 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 503. p. 141. 
 People V. Weil, 40 Cal. 268. pp. 76, 116. 
 People 1-. Welch, 49 Cal. 174. pp. 24, 35,52, 
 
 75, 1630, 1647, 1648. 
 People V. West, 73 Cal. 345. p. 1921. 
 Peojjle V. Wheeler, 65 Cal. 77. pp. 1671, 1694, 
 
 1801. 
 Peojile V. Wheeler, 60 Cal. 680; s. c. 44 Am. 
 
 Rep. 70. pp. 783, 784, 786. 
 
 p. 48. 
 p. 715. 
 (X. Y.) 49. 
 
 p. 1690. 
 
 People V. White, 53 Vllch. 537. pp. 320, 410, 
 
 771. 
 People V. Wiley, 3 Fill (X. Y".), 194. p. 1751. 
 People V. AVillett, 36 Hun (X. Y.),500. pp.78, 
 
 1543, 1887. 
 People V. Williams, 6 Cal. 206. p. 61. 
 People V. Williams, 17 Cal. 142. )). 73. 
 People V. Wliliams, 18 Cal. 187. p. 580. 
 People V. Williams, 24.Cal. 31. pp. 1924, 1953, 
 
 1980. 
 People V. Williams, 43 Cal. 344. p. 21. 
 People r. Williams, 24 Mich. 156. p 19. 
 People V. Wilson, 64 111. 195. pp. 132, 133. 
 People V. Wilson, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 368. p. 
 
 146. 
 People V. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506. pp. 715, 776. 
 People V. Wilson, 3 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 199. pp. 
 
 65, 85, 812. 
 People V. Wilson, 8 Abb. Pr. (X. Y'.) 137; *. c. 
 
 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 619. pp. 1945, 1976, 1988, 
 
 1989. 
 People V. Winters, 49 Cal. 383. p. 333. 
 People V. Wong Ah Bang (Cal.), 3 West 
 
 Coast Rep. 58. p. 831. 
 People V. Wood, 3 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 681. p. 
 
 299. 
 People V. Woods, 29 Cal. 135. p. 76. 
 People V. Young, 65 Cal. 225. p. 1762. 
 People ex rel. v. County Judge, 27 Cal. 151. 
 
 p. 152. 
 People ex rel. v. Jacobs, 66 N. Y'. 8. p. 
 
 152. 
 People ex rel. v. Sheriff, 7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 96. p. 152. 
 Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 111. 317. pp, 816, 1507. 
 Peoria &c. R. Co. v. Mclntire, 39 111. 299. p. 
 
 1308. 
 Peppers v. Railroad Co., 67 Mo. 716. p. 1311. 
 PercifuU v. Piatt, 36 Ark. 461. p. 2055. 
 Percy, Matter ot, 2 Daly (X. Y.),530. pp. 
 
 148, 152. 
 Perdue v. Burnett, Minor (Ala.), 138. p. 128. 
 Peri V. People, 65 111. 17. p. 19. 
 Perigo V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 52 Iowa, 277. 
 
 pp. 1254, 1263. 
 Ferine v. Van Xote, 4 X. J. L. 146. p. 1969. 
 Perkins v. Bradley, 24 Vt. 66. p. 1024. 
 Perkins i». Dacon^i 12 Mich. 81. p. 909. 
 Perkins v. Eastern &c. R. Co., 29 Me. 307. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325. pp. 145, «*, 
 
 218, 219, 764, 1906. 
 Perkins v. Fayette, 68 Me. 152. p. 1247. 
 Perkins v. Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435. p. 120l»- 
 Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153. |>. 273. 
 Perkins v. Hart, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 237. r 
 
 1133. 
 Perkins v. Knight, 2 N. H. 474.. p. 1921. 
 Perkins v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 55 Mo. 201 
 
 pp. 1290,1291,1486. 
 Perkins v. Perkins, 39 X. H. 163. p. 228. 
 Perkins v. State, 4 Ind. 221. p. 489. 
 PerkiQS v. Towle, 59 X. H. 583. p. 403. . 
 Perkins, Ex parte, 18 Cal. 60. p. 152. 
 Perley v. Littie, 3 Me. 97. p. 1586. 
 Perrins v. Marine &c. Soc, 2 El. & El. 317; 
 
 s. c. 2 Big. Ips. Cas. 561. p. 1417. 
 . Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539. pp. 1930, 1984, 
 
 1994. 
 Perry v. Banks, 14 Ga. 699. p. 1634. 
 Perry t'. City of Worcester 6 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 544. p. 1273. 
 Perry r. Cottingham, 63 la. 41. p. 1945. 
 Perry v. John, 79 Pa. St 412. p. 1247. 
 Perry v. Mitchell, 5 Benio (X. Y.), 337. p. 163. 
 Perry v. Xewton, 5 Ad. & El. 514 p. 1940. 
 Perry v. State, 41 Tex. 483. p. 1896. 
 Perry v. State, 9 Wis. 19. p. 30. 
 Perry, In re, 30 AVis. 268. p. 152.
 
 CXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 rersall v. McCartney, 28 Ala. 110. p. 239. 
 Persse v. Persse, 5 H. L. Cas. 671. p. 188. 
 Perth Anibov Man. Co. v. Condit, 21 N. J. L. 
 
 659. p. 8-25. 
 Peru V. French, 55 111. -517. p. 1249. 
 Potor V. Steel, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 250. p. 895, 
 Peter r. Thickstuu,51 Mich. 590. p. 1133. 
 Petcrkin v. Inloes, 4 Md. 175. p. 1078. 
 Peterson;-. Gresham,25 Ark. 380. |i. 2093. 
 Peterson r. Ilaugen, 34 la. 395. p. 1960. 
 Peterson r Laik,24 Mo. 641. p. 1130. 
 Peters v. Lane, 55 Ind. 391. p. 2041. 
 Peters v. New Orleans &c. E. Co., 50 Ala. 
 
 528. p. l:,82. 
 Peterson v. Roach, 32 Ohio St. 374. p. 878. 
 Peterson r. State, 45 Wis. 5.35. p. 16. 
 Peterson v. United States, 2 \Yash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 36. pp. 2010, 2013. 
 Petries' Case, cited, 4 T. R. 756. p. 280. 
 Petrikin v. Collier, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 392. 
 
 p 630. 
 Petteer. Tenn. Manufacturing Co., 1 Sneed 
 
 (Tenu.), 386. p. 893. 
 Pettesv. Biilgham, 10 N. H. 514. p. 2011. 
 Pettibonev. Deriuger, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 215. pp. 307,572. 
 Pettiljone v. Maclem, 45 Mich. 381. p. 2038. 
 Pettiljone v. Phelps, 13 Conn. 445. pp. 1913, 
 
 197.M977. 
 Pettiugillr. Porter, 8 Allen (Mass.), 1. pp. 
 
 1158, 1159. 
 Pettis v. Warren, Kirbv (Conn.), 426. p. 68. 
 Peyton V. Rose, 41 Mo. 257. pp. 5.59,5(50. 
 Pfeffele v. Second avenue K. Co., 34 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.),497. pp.1717. 1718. 
 Pfomer v. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 558. 
 
 p. 1539. 
 Pfund V. Herlinger, 10 Phila. 13. p. 1003. 
 Phares v. Barber, 61 111. 272. pp. 321, 341, 372 
 
 439. 
 Pharr V. State, 10 Tex. App. 485. p. 18.55. 
 Phelau V. Moss, 67 Pa. St. 59; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 
 
 402. p. 1250. 
 Phelps V. Hall, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 401. pp. 58, 
 
 129. 
 Phelps V. Hartwell, 1 Mass. 71. p. 228. 
 Plielps V. Hunt, 43 Conn. 194. p. ,381. 
 Ptielpsr. Maver. 15 How. (U. S.) 160. pp. 
 
 2126,2127,2134. 
 Phelpsv. Loudon &c. R. Co., 19 C. P.. (N. s.) 
 
 321 ; s. c. 11 Jur. (N. S.) 652. p. 1151. 
 Phelps V. People, 6 Hun (N. Y.) 401; s. c. 72 
 
 N. Y. 334. p. 78. 
 Phelps V. People, 55 111. 334. p. 1697. 
 Phelps V. Piatt, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 557. p. 
 
 602. 
 Phelps V. Sheldon, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 50; s. c. 
 
 23 Am. Dec. 659. p. 892. 
 Phenix v. Baldwin, 14 Wend. (N. Y'.) 62.. p. 
 
 569. 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Anderson, 91 Pa. 
 
 St. 351 ; s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 787. p. 1286. 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. r. Derby, 14 How. 
 
 (U.S.) 468. PI). 1290, 1298. 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Harper, 29 Md. 
 
 3.30. p. 1670. 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co.r. Larkln,47 Md. 1,50. 
 
 p. 1747. 
 Ptiiladeliihla &c. R. Co. v. Long, 75 Pa. St. 
 
 257. p. 1234. 
 Philadelplila &c. R. Co. v. Philadelphia &c. 
 
 Tow Boat Co., 23 How. (U. S.) 209. p. 
 
 1210 
 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Quiglcv,21 How. 
 
 (U.S.) -202. p. 1486. 
 Philadelphia&c. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. St. 
 
 300. pp. 1-209, 1211, 1232, 1-235. 
 Philadeli)hia&c. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 
 
 (U. S.^448. pp. 384,392. 
 
 Philibert v. Burch, 4 Mo. App. 47C. pp. 839, 
 
 867. 
 Phillips V. Beene, 16 Ala. 720. p. 1733. 
 Phillips r. Blstoh, 2 Barn. & Cres. 511. pp. 
 
 912, 914. 
 Phillii)8 V. Brigham, 26 Ga. 617. pp. 1599, 
 
 1600. 
 
 Phillips V. Cassady, 36 La. Ann. 2,S8. p. 
 
 1587. 
 Phillips V. Com., 19 Gratt. 485. pp. 1904, 1907, 
 
 1981. 
 Phillips r. Dickerson, 85 111. 11. p. 1221. 
 Phillips V. Fowler, Comvns, .525; s. c. 
 
 Barnes Notes. 441. pp. 1964, 1966. 
 Phillip V. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256. p. 893. 
 Phillips V. Hill, 3 Tex. 397. p. 2001. 
 Phillips r. Hovle, 4 Gray (Mass.), 468. pp. 
 
 425, 1491. 
 Phillips V. Irving, 7 Man. & G. 325. p. 1144. 
 Phillipps i\ Kinglield, 19 Me. 375. p. 457. 
 Phillips V. INlahan, 52 Mo. 197. p. 968. 
 Phillips V. McGuire, 73 Ga. 517. p. 9,56. 
 Philips V. Middlesex, 1 Esp. 355. p. 384. 
 Phillips V. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633. pp. 
 
 1748, 1756. 
 Phillips V. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 356. p. 
 
 304. 
 Phillips V. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220. 
 
 p. 982. 
 Phillips V. Rensselaer &c. R. Co.,49N. Y^ 
 
 177. p. 1295. 
 Philips V. Sackford Cro. Eliz. 455. p. 1138. 
 Phillips v. Smith, 110 Mass. 61. pp. 793, 
 
 794. 
 Phillips V. Smoot, 15 Mo. 598. p. 1708. 
 Phillips V. Soule, 6 Allen (Mass.), 150. pp. 
 
 2105,2136. 
 Phillips V. Star, 26 Iowa, 349. pp. 500, 501. 
 Phillips V. State, 29 Ga. 105. pp. 23, 5.5. 
 Phillips r. State, 6 Tex. App. 44. p. 88. 
 Phillips V. State, 17 Tex. App, 169. p. 1779. 
 Phillips V. State, 19 Tex. App. 1,58. p, 1745. 
 Phillips. V. Welch, 11 Nev. 187. p. 1.50. 
 Phillips f. Welch, 12 Nev. 171. p. 152. 
 Phillips V. Wisconsin State Ag. Soc, 60 Wis. 
 
 401. p. 1751. 
 Phillips, Kx parte, 10 Exch. 731; s. c. 1 Jur. 
 
 (N. S.) 143: 24 L. .1, Exch. 79. pp. 118, 122. 
 Phillipsburgh Bank v. Fulmer, 31 N. J. L. 
 
 53. p. 1929. 
 Philpot V. Tavlor, 75 111. 309. p. 721. 
 Phillpottr. Kellev, 3 Ad. & El. 106. p 1329. 
 Phipps V. Mansfield, 62 Ga. 209. p. 55. 
 Phcenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich, 501, pp. 
 
 729, 936. 
 Phosnix Ins. Co. v. Frissell, 142 Mass. 513. p. 
 
 1-246. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v La Poiute, 118 111. 384. pp. 
 
 1750, 1768. 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mundav, 5 Coldw.(Tenn.) 
 
 547. p. 983. 
 Phronix Ins. Co, v. Sholes, 20 Wis. 35. p. 
 
 397. 
 Pha'nix Ins. Co, v. Tucker, 92 HI. 64. p. 981. 
 Phcenix Ins. Co. r. Underwood, 12 Heisk. 
 
 (Tenn.)424. p. 1938. 
 Phienix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Raddln, 120 
 
 U. S. 1S3. pp. 21C9, 2110,2114. 
 Phoenix AVater Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 48L 
 
 p. -2044. 
 Phvsico- Medical College v. Wilkinson, 89 
 
 liul. 23. p. 2102. 
 Piatt r. Head, 35 Ivan. 282. p. 705. 
 Piatt (-. People, 29 111. .54. p. 1670. 
 Pick V. Rubi(;ou &t: Co., 27 A\is. 433. p. 673. 
 Pickens r. Hobbs, 42 Ind. 270. i>. 118. 
 Pickorell r. Carson, 8 Iowa, 544. )). 827. 
 Picket V. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 22 Ark. 346. 
 
 p. I9i.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxxm 
 
 Picket V. Rlchet, 2 Bibb (Ky.). 1"9- PP- 
 
 2011,2095. 
 Pickett V. AVallace, 54 Cal. 148. p. 2085. 
 Pico V. Steveus, 18 Cal. 376. p. 143S. 
 Piercer. Busti,3]?ibb (Kv.),317. p. 117. 
 Pierce v. Delameter, 1 X. Y. 17. p. 208. 
 Pierce v. Lyman, 28 Ark. 550. p. 218. 
 Pierce v. Negro John, 6 Md. 28. p. 1670. 
 Pierce v. Pierce, 25 Barb. (X. Y.) 243. p. 891. 
 Pierce v. Randolph, i2 Tex. 290. p. 849. 
 Pierce r. Rehfuss, 35 Mich. 53. p. 1653. 
 Pierce v. State, 67 Ind. 354. p. 21. 
 Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536. pp. 65, 81, 82, 
 
 103, 1508, 1517. 
 Pierce v. State, 17 Tex. App. 232. pp. }550, 
 
 1575. 
 Pierce r. State, 21 Tex. App. 540. p. 1680. 
 Pierce v. State, 53 Ga. 365. pp. 1771, 1773. 
 Pierce v. Stevens, 30 Me. 184. p. 1443. 
 Pierce v. Tate, 27 Miss. 283. p. 128. 
 Pierce v. Thompson, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 193. p. 
 
 1171. 
 Pierce v. Wood, 23 N. H. 519. p. 307. 
 Pierce v. AVoodward, 6 Pick. 206. pp. 1989, 
 
 2021. 
 Pierce, In re, 44 Wis. 411. pp. 151, 172. 
 Piersol v. Neill, 63 Pa. St. 420. p. 1620. 
 Plerson v. People, 18 Hun (X. Y.),239. p. 32. 
 Plerson r. People, 79 N. Y. 424. p. 90. 
 Plerson v. State, 12 Ala. 149. p. 1517. 
 Piersoii v. State, 11 Ind. 341. p. 59. 
 Plerson r. State, 18 Tex. App. 524. pp. 11, 
 
 755, 757, 767,768,774. 
 Piere v. Martin, 14 La. 64. p. 1975. 
 Pike V. Bright, 21 Ala. 332. p. 890. 
 Pike r. Dvke, 2 Me. 213. p. 1090. 
 Pike V. Emerson, 5 N. H. 393. pp. 193, 196. 
 Pike County v. GriiBu &c. Plank Road Co., 
 
 15 Ga. 39. p. 64. 
 Pilkington v. Scott, 15 Mees. & W. 657. p. 891. 
 Pines V. State, 21 Ga. 227. p. 103. 
 Pingrv ('. Washburn, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 264; s. c. 15 
 
 Am. Dec. 676. p. 308. 
 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557. p. 1340. 
 Pinuell V. Stringer, 59 Ind. 555. p. 1621. 
 Plnuev V. First Division &c. R. Co., 19 Minn. 
 
 251. ■ p. 1124. 
 Pinschower v. Hanks, 18 X'ev. 29. p. 2093. 
 Piper V. Lodge, 16 Serg. & R. 214. pp. 54, 59. 
 Piper V. Manny, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 282. p. 
 
 1340. 
 Piper V. Pearson, 2 Gray (Mass.), 120. p. 
 
 160. 
 Piper V. White, 56 Pa. St. 90. p. 316. 
 Pitchers v. Barrows, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 361. p. 
 
 1104. 
 Pitt V. Davidson, 37 Barb. (X. Y.) 97. pp. 
 
 148, 152. 
 Pitt V. Shen, 4 Barn. & Aid. 206. p. 1143. 
 Pitt V. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060. p. 1244. 
 Pitts' Adm'r. v. Pitts, 21 Ind. 314. p. 904. 
 Pitts V. State, 43 Miss. 472. p. 1780. 
 Pitts r. Whitman, 2 Story C. C. (U. S.) 609. 
 
 pp. 1707. 1739. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151. 
 
 p. 2007. 
 Pittsburgh O. & St. L. Rv. Co. v. Adams 
 
 (Ind.), 5 X. E. Rep. 187. p. 1239. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 
 
 329. pp. 440, 1211,1235. 
 Pittsfleld r. Barnstead, 40 X. H. 477. p. 110. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Barrett, 36 Oh. St. 
 
 448. p. 1374. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 74 Pa. St. 
 
 421. pp. 12:!2, 12,33. 129S. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Evans, 53 Pa. St. 250. 
 
 p. 1207. 
 Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Eby, 55 Ind. 567. p. 
 
 1308. 
 
 Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Ehrhart, 36 Ind. 118. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 Pittsburgh r. Greer, 22 Pa. St. 54. r 1229. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Hixon, 110 Ind. 225. 
 
 p. 2041. 
 Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Krouse, 30 Oh. St. 
 
 222. p. 1682. 
 Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 82 Ind. 482. 
 
 p. 1300. 
 Pittsburg &c. R. Co., v. McClurg, 56 Pa. St. 
 
 294. p. 1235. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Pearson, 72 Pa. St. 
 
 169. p. 1235. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Porter, 32 Oh. St. 
 
 328. pp. 1927, 1930, 1932, 1974, 1978. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186. 
 
 pp. 2007. 2010.2024. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. r. Thompson, 56 HI. 
 
 138. pp. 1236, 1237. 
 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Vining's Admr. 27 
 
 Ind. 513. pp. 1224.1233, 1234. 
 Pittsburg &c. P. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 
 
 462. pi). 1286, 2040. 
 Pitzer V. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 80 Ind. 569. 
 
 p. 2008. 
 Planch V. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14. p. 901. 
 Plant I'. Fleming, 20 Cal. 92. p. 1588. 
 Planters' Bank v. Richardson, 15 Ga. 277. p. 
 
 1747. 
 Planters' Bank v. Walker, 7 Ala. 926. p. 649. 
 Plaster v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 35 Iowa, 449. 
 
 p. 1224. 
 Platner v. Platner, 78 X. Y. 90. pp. 336, 583. 
 Piatt V. Hibbard, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 501. pp. 
 
 1321. 1336, 1337. 
 Piatt V. Piatt , 58 X. Y. 646. p. 616. 
 Platter v. Commissioners &c. , 103 Ind. 360. 
 
 p. 2026. 
 Pleak V. Chambers, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 565. p. 
 
 1706. 
 Pleasaut v . State, 13 Ark. 360. pp. 1508, 2097. 
 Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624. pp. 257, 450. 
 Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 116. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403. pp. 1966, 
 
 1982, 1984,1989. 
 Plimpton V. Winslow, 9 Fed. Rep. 365. p. 188. 
 Plumb V. Cattaraugus &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 
 
 392. p 972. 
 Plume f Plume, 7 Ves. 258. p. 899. 
 Plume V Seward, 4 Cal. 94. p. 1141. 
 Plummer i\ Ossipee, 59 X. H. 55. p. 403. 
 Plummer i\ People, 74 111. 361. pp. 50, 71. 
 Plummer r. Webb, 4 Mason (U.S.), 380. p. 
 
 891. 
 Plunkettw. Appleton,9 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 
 
 1.59; s. c. 51 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 469. pp. 1914. 
 
 1915. 
 Poage V. Bell, 3 Rand. 586. p. 827. 
 Pocket ('. State, 5 Tex. App. 5.52. p. 22. 
 Poeppers i\ Missouri &c. R. Co.. 67 Mo. 715; 
 
 s. c. 7 Cent. L. J. 252. p. 1221. 
 Poertner v. Poertner, 66 AYis. 644. p. 1761. 
 Pogue i\ Jovner, 7 Ark. 462. p. 214, 
 Pogue V. State, 13 Mo. 414. p. 2052. 
 Pogue V. State, 12 Tex. App. 283. p. 18.55. 
 Poignard v. Smith, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 172. p. 
 
 1044. 
 Poindexter v. Davis, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 481. p. 
 
 287. 
 Pointer v. Thompson, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 532. 
 
 p. 108. 
 Polack V. McGrath, 32 Cal. 15. p. 1141. 
 Polaski V. Ward, 2 Rich. L, (S. C.) 119. p. 
 
 1906. 
 Pole V. Rogers, 2 Mood. & Rob. 287. p. 217. 
 Pohlemus v. Helmau, 50 Cal. 438. p. 1995, 
 Polhill V. Walter, 3 Barn. & Ad. 114. p. 
 
 1419.
 
 CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Police Jury i-. Manning, 1(5 La. Ann. 182. p. 
 
 687. 
 Poliu v. State, 16 X. W. Rep. 891 ; s. c. 14 Neb. 
 
 540. pp. 773, 777, 18-24. 
 Polii r. State, 45 Aik. 165. p. 75. 
 Polk r. State, 19 lud. 170. p. 1848. 
 Pollardi;. D\visht,4 Cranch (U. S.),421. p. 
 
 1051). 
 Pollard V. Teel, 3 Ired. L. (X. C.) 470. p. 
 
 11)70. 
 Pollard r. AVvbourne, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 725. pp. 
 
 640, 648, 65)". 
 Pollen V. Le Ror, 30 X. Y. 550. p. 1685. 
 PoUv V. McCall", 37 Ala. 20. p. 1733. 
 Ponieroy v. Bailey, 43 X. H. 118. p. 1446. 
 PomeroV v- Insurance Co., 2 Caines (X. Y.), 
 
 260. p. 2094. 
 Pomerov v. Stephens, 11 Met. (Mass.) 244. 
 
 p. 1093. 
 Poniroy v. Parmlee, la. 140. p. 1670. 
 Pond V. Wyman, 15 Mo. 175. pp. 1682, 
 
 1708. 
 Ponton V. Ballard, 24 Tex. 619. p. 1094. 
 Pontius V. People, 82 X. Y 340. p. 583. 
 Pool V. Chicago &c. It. Co., 56 Wis. 227. p. 
 
 1295. 
 Pool V. Dlcas, 1 Bing. X. C. 649. p. 642. 
 Pool V. Higginsou, S Daly (X. Y.), 113. p. 
 
 1387. 
 Pool v. Pool, 35 Ala. 12. p. 1670. 
 Poolr. Whitcombe, 3 Fost. & Fin. 70; s. c. 6 
 
 L. T. (N. S.) 783. pp. 1473, 15.59. 
 Poole V. Chicago &c. K. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 844; 
 s. c. 11 Reporter, 828; 12 Cent. L. J. 492. p. 
 1920. 
 Poole V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 2 McCrary (U. 
 
 S.)251. pp. 1913, 1920. 
 Poole V. Fleeger, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 185. p. 2133. 
 Poole V. Huskinson, 11 Mees. & W. 827. p. 
 
 1012. 
 Poole V. Xorth Carolina &c. R. Co., 18 Jones 
 
 L. (X. C.) 340. p. 1235. 
 Poole V. People, 80 X. Y. 648. p. 1862. 
 Poole V. Perrett, 1 Speara (S. C), 128. p. 
 
 261. 
 Pooler V. Curtlss, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 228. 
 
 pp. 408, 413. 
 Pooley V. ■\Vhethan, 15 Ch. Dlv. 435 ;s. c. 50 
 
 L. J. (Chan.) 236. p. 136. 
 Pope V. Latham, 1 Ark. 66. p. 219. 
 Popet'. Kislev, 23 Jlo. 185. p. I(i96. 
 Pope t: State, 36 Miss. 121. pp. 1917, 1921, 
 
 1930, 1933, 1981. 
 Pope r. Thompson, 66 Mo. 661. p. 2144. 
 Poppell V. State, 71 Ga. 276. p. 1805. 
 Porter v. Greenough, Smith (X. H.), 238 n. 
 
 p. 119. 
 Porter v. Havens, 37 Barb. (X. Y.) 343. p. 
 
 881. 
 Porter v. Knight, 63 la. 365. p. 1666. 
 Porter v. Mount, 45 Barb. (X. Y.) 422. pp. 
 
 1937, 1962. 
 Porter v. I'atterson, 15 Pa. St. 229. p. 1131. 
 Porter v. I'latt, 57 Vt. 533. p. 809. 
 Porter v. Ravworth, 13 East, 417. p. 948. 
 Porter r. State, 65 Ala. 107. p. 1797. 
 Porter r. State, 2 Ind. 435. )>i). 257, 448, 1906. 
 Porter r. State, 1 Tex. App. 474. p. 1714. 
 Porter v. Throop, 47 Midi. 313. p. 71.5. 
 Porter v. Waltz, 108 Ind. 40; s. c. 6 W. Rep. 
 
 329. pp. 1751, 2038. 
 Porter v. Woods, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 56;"s. c. 
 
 39 Am. Dec. I.i3. p. 893. 
 Portis V. State, 27 Ark. 360. p 1974. 
 Portland &<;. F rrv Co. v. Pratt, 2 Allen ^X. 
 
 B.),17. p. 56. 
 Post V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 14 Xcb. 112. p 
 
 1283. 
 Post V. Garrow, 18 Xcb. 682. p. 1498. 
 
 T»ost V. Gazlay, 1 Cln. Sup. Ct. (Oh.) 105. pp. 
 
 1938.1942. 
 Post V. state. 10 Tex. App. 579. pp. 75. 1873. 
 I'ost V. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667. pp. Sit, 
 
 819 
 I'otier r. Barclav. 15 Ala. 439. p. 607. 
 I'otsdainer v. Slate, 17 Fla. 895. p. 124. 
 I'ott V. Eyton, 3 C. B . 32. p. 1100. 
 I'ottle V. McWhorter, 13111. 454. pp. 2050, 
 
 2051. 
 Totter V. Chicago R. Co., 46 la. 399. p. 1239. 
 I'olter V. Clueago &c. R. Co., 22 Wis. 615 ; s. c. 
 
 21 Wis. 372. ]). 1225. 
 Potter V. Hopkins, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 417. p. 
 
 1748. 
 Potter V. Mcl'herson, 61 Mo. 240. p. 1708. 
 I'otter V. Parsons, 14 Iowa, 286. p. 192. 
 Potter V. Potter, 41 111. SO. p. 1750. 
 Potter V. Scale, 8 Cal. 217. pp. 1116, 1163, 
 
 1167,1170, 1171,1181. 
 Potter r. Stiles, 32 Ind. 318. p. 2107. 
 Potter V. Wooster, 10 Iowa, S34. pp. 806, 
 
 1620. 
 Potts V. Davenport, 79 111. 455. p. 101,5. 
 Potts V. House, 6 Ga. 325. pp. 1658, 1748, 
 
 1754. 1755, 1780. 
 Poucher v. Livingston, 2 AVend. (X. Y.) 296. 
 
 p. 7. 
 PouUain v. Poullaiu, 4 S. E. Rep. 81. p. 
 
 2097. 
 Powell V. Bradlee, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 220. pp. 
 
 821, 1G68. 
 Powell r. Camp, 60 Mo. 669. p. 1708. 
 Powell ('. Ford, 2 Stark. 164. p. 878. 
 Powell V. llaU'v, 28 Tex. 52. p. 113. 
 Powell r. Howard, 109 Mass. 192. p. 892. 
 PowelU'. Howell, -21 Ga. 214. p. 20(i7. 
 Powell V. Jones, 12 Ohio, 35. p. 1586. 
 Powell r. Messer, IS Tex. 401. p. 1689. 
 Powell V. Missouri &c. R. Co., 76 Mo. 80. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Powell V. Myers, 26 Wend. (X. Y.) 591. p. 
 
 1157. 
 Powell V. People, 5 Hun (X. Y.), 69. p. 34. 
 Powell V. Railroad Co., 68 X. C. 895. p. 
 
 763. 
 Powell V. State, 13 Tex. 244. pp. 2.53, 2.55. 
 Powell r'. Stale, 15 Tex. App. 441. pp. 465, 
 
 1777, 1779. 
 Powell r. I'owell, 23 Mo. App. 365. p. 808, 
 Power v. Barham, 4 Ad. & El. 573. pp.926, 
 
 927. 
 Power V. Savannah &c. R. Co., 58 Ga. 471. p. 
 
 2067. 
 Powers V. Browder, 13 Mo. 155. p. 1614. 
 Powers v. Evans, 72 Ind 23. p. 2113. 
 Powers V. Mitchi'U, 77 Me. 361. p, 737. 
 Powers V, Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227. pp.81, 
 
 95, 99. 
 Powers V. Russell, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 69. p 
 
 1319. 
 Powers V. State, 87 Ind. 145. pp. 1524. 1572 
 
 1694, 1697, 169,S, 2108, 2110, 2143. 
 Poyer t-. Xew York Central A:e. R. Co., 7 Abb, 
 
 Xew Cas. (N. Y.). 371, p. 3. 
 Piairie State &c. Co. v. Dolg, 7 111. 52. p 
 
 1642. 
 Prall v. IIinchman,6 Ducr (X. Y.),35I. p 
 
 547, 
 Prall V. Peet, 3 La. 274. p. 20. 
 Pralus V. Pacillc &c. Co., 85 Cal. 3.5. p. 2015 
 Prather v. Rambo, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 189. p 
 
 .561. 
 Prallier v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495. pp. 834, 836 
 
 838, 843. 
 Pratt V. Chase, 40 Me. 269. np. 912, 915. 
 Pratt r. (iardiier, 2 Tush. (Mass.) 68. p. 160. 
 Pratt r (irappe, 12 La. 451. i>p. 15, 32. 
 Pratt V. Hackell, 6 Johns (N. Y.) 13. p, 831
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXV 
 
 Pratt V. Hull, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 334. p. 15S5. 
 Pratt V. Kellev, 24 Kau. 111. p. 20.5], 
 Pratt V. Page, 32 Vt. 13. pp. 1009, 1101. 
 Pratt t;. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Miuu. 41. p. 
 
 1456. 
 Pratt V. Rogers, 5 Mo. 53. p. 2055. 
 Pratt V. State, 56 Ind. 179. pp. 1642, 1784, 
 
 1803, 1906, 1930. 
 Pratt's Case, 21 Jac. 1. p. 1954. 
 Pratte r. Coffman, 33 Mo. 71. p. 1982. 
 Pratte v. Judge, 12 Mo. 194. p. 2065. 
 Pratte, Matter of, 12 Mo. 194. p. 1749. 
 Pray v. Garcelon, 17 Me. 145. p. 1604. 
 Pray r. Pierce, 7 Mass. 3S3. p. 1044. 
 Prentiss v. Blake, 34 Vt. 460. p. 1072. 
 Prentiss v. Danaher, 20 Mis. 311. p. 2072. 
 Prentiss v. Roberts, 49 Me 127. p. 468. 
 Prentiss v. Sinclair, 5 Vt. 149. p. 1101. 
 Presbury v. Com., 9 Dana (Ky.), 203. pp. 
 
 117, 123. ^ 
 
 Prescott V. Johnson, 8 Fla. 391. p. 17.50. 
 Prescott r. Trustees, 19 111. 324. p. 819. 
 Prescott V. Ward, 10 Allen (Mass.), 203. p. 
 
 403. 
 Prescott V. Wright, 4 Gray (Mass.), 461. p. 
 
 1414. 
 Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 217. p. 936. 
 Presnall v. Herbert, 34 la. 539. p. 2054. 
 Presser v. State, 77 Ind. 274. p. 467. 
 Pressley v. State, 19 Ga. 192. p. 16, 
 Preston v. Culbertson, 58 Cal. 198. pp 690, 
 
 692. 
 Preston v. Hill, 50 Cal. 43. pp. 191, 192. 
 Preston y. Simons, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 262. p. 
 
 1060. 
 Preston v. State, 8 Tex. App. 30. p. 108. 
 Preston v. Walker, 26 Iowa, 205. p. 214. 
 Prestwitch v. Poley, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 806. p. 
 
 192. 
 Preswood v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 468. p. 
 
 115. 
 Price V. Com., 77 Va. .393. pp. 567, 787. 
 Price V. Earl of Torrington 1 Sm. L. Cas. 
 
 390. p. 642. 
 Price V. Evans, 4 B. Mon. (Kv.) 388. p. 1750. 
 Price V. Johnson Co., 15 Mo. 433. p. 17.i8. 
 Price r. Lambert, 3 N. J. L. 401. p. 1917. 
 Price V. Mazange, 31 Ala. 701. p. 827. 
 Price V. Mcllvain, 2 Tredw. Const. (S. C.) 
 
 503. p. 1989. 
 Price 1!. Railroad Co., 34 111. 17. pp. 1004, 
 
 1005, 1298. 
 Price V. Ship Uriel, 10 La. Ann. 413. pp. 
 
 1322, 1346, 1357. 
 Price V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 72 Mo. 414. p. 
 
 1229. 
 Price V. St. Louis Life Insurance Co., 3 Mo. 
 
 App. 262. p. 889. 
 Price V. State, 18 Tex. App. 474. p. 1704. 
 Price V. Warren, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 385. pp. 
 
 1982, 1984, 1985. 
 Price, Matter of, 4 East, 587. p. 178. 
 Prichard v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa, 120. p. 1425. 
 Prickett v. Badger, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 428. p. 
 
 901. o H f 
 
 Priddy v. Dodd, 4 Ind. 84. pp. 317, 561. 
 Prideaux v. Criddlc, L. R. 4 Q. B. 455; s. c. 38 
 
 L.J. (Q. B.) 232; 10 Best. & Sm. 515. p. 
 
 944. 
 Prideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513. pp. 
 
 1225. 1227, 1247, 1248. 
 Pridgen r. State, 31 Tex. 420. p. 1542. 
 Priest r. (Jrotou, 103 Mass 540. p. 326. 
 Priest V. Way, 87 Mo. 16. p. 794. 
 Prim V State, 36 Ala. 244. p. 1538. 
 Primm v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205 p. 850. 
 Primm v. Raboteau, 56 Mo. 407 p. 560. 
 Prince v. Clarke, S Eug C. L. 54. p. 1131. 
 
 Prince v. Samo, 7 Ad. & El. 627. p. 639. 
 Prince v. State, 3 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 253. 
 
 p. 29. 
 Princeton Turnp. Co. v. Gulick, 16 X. J. L. 
 
 161. p 17.=>0. 
 Prindeville r. People, 42 111. 221. p. 1715. 
 Pringle v. Huse, 1 Cow. (X. Y.) 432. pp. 32, 
 
 66, 102. 
 Pringle v. Philips, 5 Sandf. S. C. (X. Y.) 157. 
 
 p. 950. 
 Printz V. Cheeney, 11 Iowa, 469. p. 265. 
 Prior r. Powers, 1 Keble, 811, pi. 87. pp. 
 
 1963, 1966. 
 Pritchard v. Comer, 71 Ga. 18. jd. 9,56. 
 Pritchard v. Heunessy, 1 Gray (Mass.), 294. 
 
 p. 1911. 
 Probst V. Braeunlich, 24 W. Va. 356. p. 1985. 
 Proctor r. I)e Camp, 83 Ind. 559. p. 770. 
 Proctor r. Jennings, 6 Xev. 83. p. 1221. 
 Proctor V. Lewi.stown, 25 111. 1.53. p. 1013. 
 Proctor V. Wilcox, 4 S. W. Rep, 375; s. c. 68 
 
 Tex. 219. p. 2099. 
 Propeller XIagara r. Cordes, 21 How. (U. S.) 
 
 726. pp. 1322, 1345. 
 Proprietors v. Wentworth, 36 Me. 339. p. 
 
 194. 
 Prosser r. Henderson, 11 Ala. 484. p. 704. 
 Prov. Inst. V. Burnham, 128 Mass. 458. p. 
 
 50. 
 Providence Life lus. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 
 
 236. p. 991. 
 Providence &c. Co. v. Martin, 32 Md. 310. p. 
 
 585. 
 Provines v. Heaston, 67 Ind. 482. pp. 1726, 
 
 1728. 
 Provis r. Reed, 3 Moore A- P. 4. pp. 474, 475. 
 Prowattain r. Tindall, 80 Pa. St. 295. p. 1802. 
 Pruitt i\ Brockman, 46 Ind. 56. p. 430. 
 Pruitc V. Cox, 21 Ind. 15. pp. 467, 468. 
 Pruitt r. Miller, 3 Ind. 16. p. 469. 
 Pruner v. Pendleton, 75 Va. 516. p. 1394. 
 Prussel V. Knowles, 4 How. (Miss.) 90. p. 
 
 1986. 
 Prvme v. Titmarsh, 10 Mee. & W. 605. p. 
 
 113. 
 Pryor, Matter of, 18 Kan. 72. pp. 146, 150. 
 Pugh V. Reat, 107 III. 440. pp. 2080, 2083. 
 Pulaski V. Ward, 2 Rich. L. (X. C.) 119. pp. 
 
 1974, 1980. 
 PuUen r. Glidden, 68 Me. 559. p. 2129. 
 Pullen V. Hutchinson, 25 Me. 249. p. 1029. 
 Pulling r. Supervisors, 3 Wis. 337. p. 1060. 
 Pullman &c. R. Co. i\ Barker, 4 Colo. 344 ; «. 
 
 c. 34 Am. Rep. 89. p. 1485. 
 Pulsford r. Richards, 22 L. J. (Ch.) 559; s. e. 
 
 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 387. p. 1068. 
 Purcell r. MacXamara, 9 East, 361. pp. 1167, 
 
 1172,1616. 
 Purdy r. People, 4 Hill (X. Y.), 384. p. 819. 
 Puriiiton r. Humjihreys, 6 Me. 379. pp. 1925, 
 
 1926, 1930, 1973. 
 Purnell v. Gabdv, 46 Tex. 198. p. 57a 
 Purnell v. Purnell, 89 X. C. 42. p. 257. 
 Purple V. Horton, 13 Wend. (X. Y.) 11. p. 57. 
 Purvear v. Com. (Va.), 1 South East. Rep. 
 
 513. p. 22. 
 Putnam v. Bowker, 11 Cnsh. (Mass.) 542. p. 
 
 1043. 
 Putnam v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 22 Mo. App. 
 
 589. p. 2087. 
 Pylus V. Mitford, 2 Leon. 77. p. 1120. 
 Pynohonr. Day, 118 111. 9. pp. 634, 635. 
 
 Quackenbush v. Ehle, 5 Barb. (X. Y.) 472. 
 
 p. 899. 
 Quaifc V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 48 Wis, 531; 
 
 s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 821. pp. 497, 1289.
 
 CXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Queen r. Hepburn, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 290. p. 
 
 87. 
 Queen v. Mutters, 3-1 L. J. (Mag. Cases) 22. 
 
 p. 1316. 
 Queen's Case, The, 2 Brod. & Bing. 2S4. pp. 
 
 ■264, 319, 330, 399, 432, 436, 637, 639. 
 Queener v. Morrow, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 124. 
 
 p. 489. 
 Quesenberry v. State, 3 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 
 
 3i»-i. pp. 51, 71. 
 Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 17S. 
 
 p. 918. 
 Quick V. Brenner, 101 Ind. 230. p. 2052. 
 Quick V. Turner, 26 Mo. App. 29. p. 869. 
 Quill V. Gullivan, 108 Ind. 235. p. 2052. 
 Quimby v. Vermont Central R. Co., 23 Vt. 387. 
 
 pp. S21, 1147. 
 Quincy &c. B. Co. v. Ridge, 57 Mo. 601. pp. 
 
 1499, 1501. 
 Quill ebaugli Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87. 
 
 pp.54, 118,120. 
 Qulnebaug Bank v. Tarbox, 20 Conn. 510. 
 
 pp. 30, 48. 
 Quinu V. Biggins, 63 Wis. 664. p. 509. 
 Quinu V. Halljurt, 52 Vt. 353. p. 117. 
 Qulim V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 51 111. 495, p. 
 
 1235. 
 Qulnn V. State, 14 Ind. 589. p. 1905. 
 Quirk V. Holt, 99 Mass. 164. p. 1209. 
 
 R. 
 
 Racer v. Baker, 113 Ind. 177; s. c. 11 W. Rep. 
 
 816. p. 2050. 
 Baco V. Green, 50 Tex. 483. p. 817. 
 Rader v. Barr, 7 Ind. 194. pp. 2112, 2113. 
 Radley v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 9 Exch. 
 
 71; s. c. 1 Anp. Cas. 754; L. R. 10 Exch. 100; 
 
 43 L. J. (Exch.) 73; 33 L. J. (N. S.) 209; 2 
 
 Thomp. Neg. 1108. pp. 1221, 1229. 
 Rafe V. State, 20 Ga. 64. pp. 15, 30, 32, 43, 69. 
 Rafferty v. Williams, 50 N. Y. Super. 66. p. 
 
 598. 
 Ragan v. Galther, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 472. 
 
 pp. 801, 1647. 
 Baglaud v. \VllIs, 6 Leigh (Va.), 1. pp. 1906, 
 
 1910. 
 
 Railroad v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70. p. 
 
 1087. 
 Railroad v. Konk, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 575. p. 
 
 1665. 
 Railroad Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 344. p. 360. 
 Railroad Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 457, p. 1372. 
 Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147. pp. 
 
 1229, 1236, 1287. 
 Railroad Co. v. Black, 58 111. 34. p. 1501. 
 Railroad Co. v. Burns, 60 111. 284. p. 1123. 
 Railroad Co. v. Burrows, 55 Mich. 6. p. 1123. 
 Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 36 Oh. St. 647. pp. 
 
 1371,1374. 
 Railroad Co. v. Carpenter, 14 111. 190. p. 
 
 1501. . 
 Railroad Co. v. Curran, 19 Oh. St. 1. pp. 
 - 1344, 1374. 
 Railroad Co. v. Foreman, 24 West Va. 662. 
 
 p. 2. 
 Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 401. p. 1231. 
 Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; s. c. 
 
 1 Thoni]). Neg. 444; 6 Cent. L. J. 132. pp. 
 
 1230, 1604. 
 Railroad Co. v. Linn, 15 Xeb. 234. p. 1.503. 
 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 3.57. pp. 1298, 1345, 1348, 1349, 1352. 
 Railroad Co. v. Martin (Tenn.), 2 S. W. Rep. 
 
 381. i).4. 
 Railroad Co. v. McDonald. 18 111. 172. p. 1369. 
 Railroad Co. i?. Morris (Tex.), 3 S. W, Rep. 
 
 457. p. 3. 
 
 Railroad Co. i\ Norton, 24 Pa. St. 465. pp. 
 
 1223, 1224. 
 Railroad Co. v. Patnam, 118 U. S. 545; s. c. 7 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. p. 1645. 
 Railroad Co. r. Pollard, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 341. 
 
 pp. 1236, 1238. 
 Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 176. 
 
 pp. 1349, 1356, 1359. 
 Railroad Co. v. Smith, 21 WaU. (U. S.) 256. 
 
 p. 574. 
 Railroad Co. v. Stanley, 7 Oh. St. 155. p. 95. 
 Railway Co. i-. Stevens, 95 V. S. 655. p. 1298. 
 Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 657. 
 
 pp. 1208, 1212, 1219, 1231. 
 Railroad Co. v. Taylor, 35 L. J. (C. P.) 210. 
 
 p. 1123. 
 Railroad Co. v. Troesch, 68 111. 545. p. 1607. 
 Railroad Co. v. AVinslow, 66 111. 219. p. 315. 
 Railsback v. Greve, 58 Ind. 72. pp. 2112,2113. 
 Railton v. Matthews, 10 CI. & Fin. 934. p. 1419. 
 Railway Co. v. Warner, mem. in 62 N. Y. 651. 
 
 p. 486. 
 Railway Co. v. M'hilton, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 270. 
 
 p. 1708. 
 Rainforth v. State, 61 111. 365. p. 1939. 
 Rains v. Hood, 23 Tex.. 556. p. 2065. 
 Rainwater v. Elmore, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 363. 
 
 p. 254. 
 Raleigh v. Kane, 2 Jones L. (N. C.) 288. p. 
 
 159. 
 Ralston V. Groff, 55 Pa. St. 276. p. 1646. 
 Raniage v. Peterman. 25 Pa. St. 349. p. 1083. 
 Ramadge v. Ryan, 9 Bing. 333. p. 123. 
 Ramirez v. Murrev, 5 Cal. 222. p. 891. 
 Ramos V. Bringidr, 2 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 192. 
 
 p. 20. 
 Ramsay v. Warner, 97 Mass. 8. p. 968. 
 Rand v. Nesmith, 61 Me. 111. p. 890. 
 Randall V.Baltimore &c. R. Co., 109 U. S. 
 
 478. pp. 1075. 1605, 1625. 
 Randall v. Barker, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 69. p. 
 
 1441. 
 Randall v. Bayon, 4 Mart. (N. s.) (La.) 132. 
 
 p. 197.5. 
 Randall v. Collins, 58 Tex. 231. p. 2065. 
 Randall v. Cook, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 56. p. 
 
 1441. 
 Randall v. Grover, 1 N. J. L. 151. p. 1982. 
 Randebaugh v. Shelley, 6 Oh. St. 307. p. 
 
 230. 
 Raudidge v. Lyman, 124 Mass. 361. p. 966. 
 Randolph v. Keiler, 21 Mo. 557. p. 1614. 
 Randolph Bank v. Armstrong, 11 Iowa, 515. 
 
 pp. 215, 233. 
 Randolph Iron Co. v. Elliott, 37 N. J. L. 184. 
 
 p. 890. 
 Rangel r. State (Tex.), 3 S. W. Rep. 788; s. c. 
 
 22 Tex. App. 642. pp. 321, 322. 
 Rank c. Shewey, 4 Watts s.Va.), 218. p. 54. 
 Rankin v. Crow, 19 111. 626. p. 628. 
 Rankin v. Goddard, 4 Allen (N. B.), 155. p. 
 
 25. 
 Rankin v. Lawton, 17 Mo. App. 574. p. 2055. 
 Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts (Pa.), 372. p. 
 
 870. 
 Rankin v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378. p. 1410. 
 Rankin v. Tavlor, 49 111. 451. p. 1750. 
 Rann v. Home Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 387. p. 98C. 
 Ranney v. Bader, 48 Mo. .539. p. 2003. 
 Ranney v. Barlow, 112 U. S. 207. p. 1638. 
 Ranney v. Higby, 5 Wis. 62. pp. 831, 852. 
 Ransom v. City of New York, 20 How. (U. S.) 
 
 581. p. 1060. 
 Ransom v. New York Ac. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 415. 
 
 p. 1481. 
 Ransom v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 415 p. 
 
 1483. 
 Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351. pp. 215, 
 220, 721, 727.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXVll 
 
 Rapho V. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404. p. 1246. 
 Hasich V. Bissell, 5-2 Mich. 45.5. pp. ]638, 1671. 
 Kasli V. State. 61 Al.t. 89. pp. 18, 87, 126. 
 Kathbun v. Ross, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 127. p. 
 
 450. 
 Ratlitf r. Hnntlv, 5 Ired. L. (?f. C.) 545. pp. 
 
 2!«,204, 049. lo()6. 
 Ratteree v. Nelson, 10 Ga. 439. p. 1632. 
 Kauch V. Lord, 31 Pa. St. 352. pp. 1232, 
 
 1377. 
 Raulston v. Jackson, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 129. 
 
 )). 1199. 
 Ravenga v. Mackintosh, 2 Barn. & Ores. 693. 
 
 p. 1197. 
 RawHugs V. Chandler, 9 Exch. 687. p. 636. 
 Rawlins v. Desbrough, 2 Mood. &R. 328. pp. 
 
 1410,1417. 
 Rawson V. Curtiss, 19 III. 456. pp. 1939, 1942, 
 
 1943. 
 Rawson r. Knight, 73 Me. .343. p. 614. 
 Rawson V. Penns3lvania R. Co., 48 X. Y. 212. 
 
 p. 1365. 
 Rav V. Bell, 24 111. 444. p. 4il. 
 Ray r. McCary, 26 Miss. 404. p. 2066. 
 Ray V. State, 50 Ala. 104. pp. 1775, 1825, 1839. 
 Ray V. State, 15 Ga. 223. pp. 67, 117, 123, 124. 
 Rav c. State, 2 Kan. 40.i. \^. 71. 
 Rav r. State, 4 Tex. App. 450. pp. 81, 82, 91, 
 
 93, 110, 111. 
 Rav V- State, 13 Tex. App. .51. p. 1855. 
 Rav r. Thompson, 26 Mo. App. 451. p. 20S8. 
 Ray r. Wooters, 19 111. 82. p. 1726. 
 Ravburn v. Mason Lumber Co., 57 Mich. 273. 
 
 p. 629. 
 Ravmond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 524. p. 
 
 1-246. 
 Raviuond v. Nye, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 151. p. 
 
 1753. 
 Ravmond r. Thexton, 17 Pac. Rep. 258. p. 
 
 2099. 
 Rnynor v. Norton, 31 Mich. 210. p. .366. 
 Raysdou r. Trumljo 52 Mo. 35. p. 1685. 
 Rea V. Missouri, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 532. p. 
 
 394. 
 Read V. Cambridge, 124 Mass. 567. p. 1914. 
 Read f. Com., 22 Gratt. (Va.) 924. pp.567, 
 
 1985. 
 Read v. French, 28 N. Y. 293. p. 192. 
 Read r. Goodyear, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 350. 
 
 p. 1044. 
 Read v. Moore, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 337. p. 614. 
 Read r. Morse, 34 Wis. 315. pp. 1210, 1668. 
 Read r. Railway Co., 60 Mo. 199. p. 1318. 
 Read v. Si^aulding, 30 N. Y. 630. pp. 1318, 
 
 1344, 1347. 
 Read v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 60 Mo. 199. pp. 
 
 1123, 1347, 1349. 
 Read v. State, 2 Ind. 438. p. 739. 
 Reader v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. (X. Y.) 
 
 500. p. 1445. 
 Reading's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 264. p. 36, 
 Reagan v. Grim, 13 5Pu. St. 508. p. 340. 
 Real ('.People, 42 N. Y. 270. pp. 338, 402, 404. 
 Ream v. Hamilton, 15 Mo. App. 577. p. 883. 
 Reamer v. Downer, 23 Wend. (X. Y.) 626. p. 
 
 943. 
 Reason v. Bridges, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 478. pp. .16, 97, 104. 
 Rebecca Lea v. State (Miss.), 1 So. Rep. 244; 
 
 s. c. 64 Mis. 294. p. 460. 
 Records v. Melson, 1 Houst. (Del.) 139. p. 
 
 239. 
 Rector v. Hudson, 20 Tex. 234. pp. 29, 110. 
 Rector v. Pierce, 3 Thomp. & Cook (N. Y.), 
 
 416. p. 1209. 
 Redden v. Barker, 4 Harr. (Del.) 179. p. 891. 
 Redden v. Spruance, 4 Harr. (Del.) 217. pp. 
 
 361, 642. 
 Rftddiu V. Gates. Cited, p. 661. 
 
 Reddington v. Gilman, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 235. 
 
 p. 582. 
 Reddle v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 401. p. 124. 
 Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107 Ind. 485; s. C. 5 
 
 West. Rep. 619. pp. 2007, 2038, 2039. 
 Redman v. Gulnac, 5 Cal. 148. pp. 1722, 1723. 
 Redmond v. Railroad Co. ,76 Mo. 550. p. 1311. 
 Redmond i\ Royal Ins. Co., 7 Phila. (Pa.) 
 
 167. p. 1930. 
 Redus V. Wofford, 4 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 579, 
 
 592. p. 4. 
 Reed v, Deerfleld, 8 Allen (Mass.), 522. pp. 
 
 1209, 1603. 
 Reed v. Greathouse, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 558. 
 
 p. 1669. 
 Reed v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen (Mass.), 534. p. 
 
 1625. 
 Reed r. Jones, 15 Wis. 40. p. 358. 
 Reed v. Miller, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 142. pp. 2086, 
 
 2096. 
 Reed v. Northfleld, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94. p. 
 
 1249. 
 Reed v. Proprietors &c., 8 How. (U. S.) 274. 
 
 pp. 10.52, 1053, 1076, 1079. 
 Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. St. 239. p. 962. 
 lieed V. ispaulding, 42 N. H. 114. pp. 484, 486, 
 
 487. 
 Reed v. State, 15 Oh. 217. p. 21. 
 Reed v. State, 1 Tex. App. 1. p. 110. 
 Reed v. State, 9 Tex. App. 317. p. 1680, 
 Reed v. Taylor, 4 Taunt. 616. p. 1181, 
 Reed v. Thayer, 9 Ind. 157. p. 1998. 
 Reed v. Upton, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 522. p. 916. 
 Reed v. Vaughn, 10 Mo. 447. p. l.!6. 
 Rees i: Warwick, 2 Barn. & Aid. 113. p. 835. 
 Reed v. ^\'ilkinson, MS., cited Whart. Dig. 
 
 87. p. 948. 
 Reese v. Beck, 24 Ala. 651. pp. 163S, 1685, 
 
 1686. 
 Reese v. Mahouy, 21 Cal. 305. p. 199. 
 Reese v. Rigbv, 4 Barn. & Aid. 202. p. 1243 
 Reese i\ Walters, 3 Mees. & W. 527. p. 294, 
 Reeve r. Dennett, 141 Mass. 207. p. 368. 
 Reeve v. Underbill, 1 Mood. & Rob. 440. p. 
 
 217. 
 Reeves v. Larkin, 19 jMo. 192. p. 1618. 
 Reeves v. Moody, 15 Rich. L. (S. C.) 312. p. 
 
 1986. 
 Reeves v. Plough, 41 Ind. 204. pp. 1912, 2089, 
 
 2090. 
 Reeves v. Reeves, 54 111. 332. p. 2130. 
 Reeves v. state, 23 Ind. 441. p. 1477. 
 Reford v. Cramer, 30 X. J. L. 250. p. 1438. 
 Reg. V. Aylmer. 1 Crawf. & D. 116. p. 464. 
 Reg. V. Bailev, 2 Cox C. C. 311. p. 302. 
 Reg. V. Ballivos, 1 P. AVill. 212. p. 1911. 
 Reg. V. Bavnton, 17 How. St. Tr. .589. p. 645. 
 Reg. V. Beard, 8 Carr. & P. 142. p. 539. 
 Reg. V. Benjamin, 4 Up. Can. C. P. 179. p. 
 
 45. 
 Reg. V. Bleasdale. 2 Carr. & K. 765. p. 304. 
 Reg. V. Boucher, 8 Carr. & P. 141. p. 539. 
 Reg. V. Brown, L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 70. p. 
 
 456 
 Reg. V. Brownlow, 11 Ad. & El. 119. p. 1121 
 Reg. V. Conrahy, 1 Craw. & Dix (Irish) Cir. 
 
 56. p. 31. 
 Reg. V. Colton, 12 Cox C. C. 400. p. 301. 
 Reg. V. Coulter, 13 Up. Can. (C. P.) 299. p. 
 
 114. 
 Reg. V. Courvoisier, 9 Carr. & P. 362. p. 785. 
 Reg. V. Crouch, 1 Cox C. C. 94. p. 783. 
 Reg. ('. Ciowhurst. 1 Carr. & K. 370. p. 1896. 
 Reg. V. Davis, 4 Xew Sess. Cas. 611 ; s. c. 5 
 
 CoxC. C. 237. p. 1115. 
 Reg. V. Delme, 10 Mod. 198. p. 23. 
 Reg. V. Doran, Lewin C. C. 27. p. 330. 
 Reg. V. Dossett, 2 Carr. & K. 306. p. 302. 
 I Reg. V. Dougall, 18 Low. Can. Jur. 85. p. 45,
 
 CXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Reg. r. Dowlih,, h (.ox C. C. 509. pp, 16, 99. 
 Reg. V. Duncoiiibe, b Car. & P. 369. p. 632. 
 Reg. v. Exall, 4 Fost. & F. 92-2. p. 1S96. 
 Reg. r. Fellows, 19 Up. Cau. Q. B. 48. p. 45. 
 Reg. V. Fitzpatrick, Crawf. & D. (Irish) 513. 
 
 pp. 31, 101. 
 Reg. V. Foster, Dearsley C. C. 456. p. 299. 
 Reg. V. Frances, 4 Cox "Cr. Cas. 57. pp. 499, 
 
 .500,50 , 1780. 
 Reg. V. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129. pp. 44. 45, 87. 
 Keg. V. Garbett, 2 Car. & Ker. 474. ]). 287. 
 Reg. V. Garner, 2 Car. & K. 920. p. 289. 
 Keg. V. Garner, 3 F. & F. 681. p. 301. 
 Keg. ;'. Geach, 9 Car. &P. 499. p. 45. 
 Reg. V. Gray, 4 Fost. & F. 1102. p. 302. 
 Reg. V. Gray, 6 Irish C. L. 259. pp. 37, 125. 
 Reg. r. Gray, 11 CI. & Fin. 427. p. 36. 
 Reg. r. Guttridge, 9 Car. & P. 471. p. 332. 
 Reg. V. Hlcklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. p. 661. 
 Reg. r. Hill, 5 Cox C. C. 259. p. 293. 
 Reg. V. Hill, 2 Den. C. C. 259; s. c. 5 Cox C. C. 
 
 470. p. 804. 
 Reg. V. Hughes, 1 C. & K. 235. p. 95. 
 Reg. r. Hughes, 2 Craw. & Dix Cir. 396. pp. 
 
 87, 88, 102. 
 Reg. V. Hunt, 2 Cox C. C. 261. pp. 645, 648. 
 Reg. V. Key, 3 Car. & K. 371 ; s. c. 15 Jur. 1065. 
 
 p. 86. 
 Reg. V. Key, Temple & Mew 623. p. 3S. 
 Reg. V. Lacev, 3 Cox C. C. 517. pp. 101, 102. 
 Reg. V. Lang'ton, 2 Q. B. Div. 296. p. 359. 
 Reg. V. Lef roy, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134 ; s. c. 4 Moak. 
 
 250. pp. 137, 140. 
 Reg. V. Magill, Ir. Clrc. Cas. 418. pp. 464, 466. 
 Ri'g. V. Malings, 8 Car. & P. 242. pp. 538, 541. 
 Reg. V. Martin, L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 378. p. 
 
 677. 
 Reg. V. McCartie, 11 Ir. C. L. (N. S.). 188. p. 
 
 45. 
 Reg. V. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927. p. 658. 
 Reg. V. Mears, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 581. pp. 351, 
 
 1811. 
 Reg. V. Megson, 9 Car. & P. 420. p. 332. 
 Reg. V. Mellor, Dears. & Bell C. C. 468; s. c. 
 
 4 Jur. (N. s.) 214; 7 Cox C. C. 454 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 (M. C.)121. pp. 121,122. 
 Reg. V. Mitchell, 3 Cox C. C. 1. p. 31. 
 Reg. V. Murphy, 8 Car. & P. 297. p. 394. 
 Reg. V. Neale, 9 Car. & P. 431. p. 1536. 
 Reg. V. Newton, 3 Car. & K. 85; s. c. 13 Q. B. 
 
 716; 3 Cox C. C. 489; 13 Jur. 606; 18 L. J. 
 
 (M. C.)200, p. 1925. 
 Reg. V. Nicholson, 8 Dowl. P. C. 422; s. c. 4 
 
 Jur. 558. p. 58. 
 Reg. V. Nisbett, 6 Cox C. C. 320. p. 299. 
 Reg. r. O'Connell, 11 CI. & Fin. 155; s. c. 1 
 
 Cox C. C. 384. p. 31. 
 Reg. ('. Patteson, 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 129. p. 45. 
 Reg. V. Pilkington, 5 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 662. 
 
 p. 1137. 
 Reg. V. Proud, Leigh & Cave C. C. 97. p. 302. 
 Reg. V. Richardson, 2 Fost. & F. 343. p. 30.5. 
 Reg. V. Robinson, 12 Ad. & Kl. 672. p. 1121. 
 Reg. V. Roder, 12 Cox C. C. 630. p. 302. 
 Reg. V. Roebuck, Dearsley & B. C. C. 24. p. 
 
 303. 
 Reg. V. Rowton, 2 Benn. & H. Cr. Cas. 333. 
 
 p. 476. 
 Reg. V. Salt, 3 Fost. & F. 834. p. 299. 
 Reg. V. Slowrnan, 1 Dowl. 618. p. 169. 
 Keg. V. Smith, 8 Carr. & P. 160. p. 1543. 
 Keg. V. Southey, 1 Fost. & F. 864. p. 1780. 
 Reg. I'. Sterne, citetl, p. 1819. 
 Reg. V. Stewart, 1 (Jox C. C. 174. pp. 58, 99. 
 Reg. V. Sullivan, 1 Per. & Dav. 96; s. c. 8 Ad. 
 
 &K1. 831. pp. 86, 1976. 
 Reg. V. Taylor, 13 Cox C. C. 77. pp. 783. 784. 
 Reg. V, Vincent, 9 Carr. & P. 91 and 275. p. 
 
 1-536. 
 
 Reg. V. "Walkin, 8 Carr. & P. 243. p. 538. 
 
 Reg. V. Wardle, Car. & M. 647. p. 86. 
 
 Reg. V. Weeks, Leigh & Cave C. C. 18. p. 299. 
 
 Reg. V. White, 4 Fost. & F. 383, n. p. 1816. 
 
 Keg. t\ Worseham, 1 Ld. Raym. 705. p. 658. 
 
 Keg. V. Wrightson, 2 Salk. 698. p. 134. 
 
 Reg. V. Wycherley, 8 Carr. & P. 262. pp. 646, 
 
 647, 648. 
 Regicide's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 978; s. c. Sir 
 
 J. Kelyng, 9. p. 60. 
 Reich t). Rebellion &c. Co., 3 Utah, 245. p. 
 
 2015. 
 Reich V. State, 63 Ga. 616. p. 540. 
 Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 
 
 518. pp. 214, 215. 
 Reichwald v. Gaylord, 75 111. 503. pp. 2050, 
 
 2051, 20.)3. 
 Reid V. Colcork, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 604. 
 
 p. 618. 
 Reid V. Griffith, 63 Mo. 545. p. 2055. 
 Reid ('. Pcidmont &c. Ins. Co., 58 Mo. 421. 
 
 pp. 990, 16.38, 1671. 
 Reiger v. Davis, 67 N. C. 185. p. 1652. 
 Relnhard ». New York, 2 Daly (N. Y.),243. 
 
 p. 1249. 
 Reinhart v. Miller, 22 Ga. 403. p. 1634. 
 Reinhold v. Alberti, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 469. p. 193. 
 Reins v. People, 30 ill. 256. pp. 1548, 1903, 
 
 1906, 1918, 1991. 
 Relssner v. Oxley, 80 Ind. 580. p. 838. 
 Reiterbaugh v. Ludwick, 31 Pa. St. 131. p. 
 
 870. 
 Reith r. Lullman, 11 Mo. App. 254. p. 966. 
 Rembert v. Brown, 14 Ala. 36. p. 343. 
 Remington v. Cougdon, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 210. 
 
 p. 795. 
 Remy v. Municipality No. 2, 12 La. Ann. 500. 
 
 pp. 682, 687. 
 Renner?-. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 
 
 581. pp. 620, 621,622. 
 Reunick v. Walthall, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 23. 
 
 p. 118. 
 Reno f. Robertson, 48 Ind. 106. p. 2093. 
 Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reed. 5 Cow. 
 
 (N. Y.) 587. pp. 889, 898. 
 Renwick v. La Grange Bank, 29 Ga. 200. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Reops V. Barker, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 238. p. 
 
 1998. 
 Requa V. Rochester, 45 X. Y. 129. p. 1249. 
 Respass r. Young, 11 Ga. 114. p. 1002. 
 Kespublica v. Duaue, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 347. 
 
 p. 189. 
 Kespublica v. Me.sca, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 73. p. 7. 
 Respublica r. Richards, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 480. 
 
 p. 56. 
 Rewey v. Riley, 17 Week. Dig. 573. p. 1559. 
 Rex V. Adams, Jebb C. C. 135. p. 37. 
 Rex V. Almon, Wilmot, 243. pp. 139, 171. 
 Rex v. Atkinson, 5 T. R. 437, n. pp. 2049, 2079. 
 Rex V. Atwood, 2 Leach C. C. 521. pp. 464, 
 
 1506. 
 Rex V. Balls, 1 Moody C. C. 470; s. c. 7 Carr. & 
 
 P. 429. p. 300. 
 Rex V. Barrett, Jebb C. C. 103. p. 86. 
 Rex V. Birt, 5 Carr. & 1'. 1.54. p. 1.537. 
 Rex r. Brooke, 2 Stark. 472. p. 383. 
 Rex V. Burl)age, 3 Burr. 1440. pp. 177, 178. 
 Rex I'. Burdetl, 12 Mod. Ill ;s. c.l Ld. Raym. 
 
 148. pp. 1808. 1926,1936. 
 Rex V. Burridge, 1 Str. 693; s. c. 2 Ld. Raym. 
 
 125. V. 34. 
 Rex V. Clarke, 2 Starkie, 241. pp. 471, 472. 
 Rex V. Clewes, 4 Carr. & P. 221. p. 302. 
 Rex V. Colley, 1 Mood. & M. 329. p. 2.57. 
 Rex V. Coombs, Comb. .57. p. 1331. 
 Rex V. Crump, 1 Carr. & P. 6.58. p. 1697. 
 Rex V. Davison, 4 Barn. & Aid. 329. pp. 136, 
 143.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 Rex r. Dean and Chapter, 1 Stra. 536 ; s. c. 8 
 
 Mod. 27. p. 150. 
 Rex v. Delany, Jebb C. C. 106. p. 86. 
 Rex V. Delaval, cited p. 1966. 
 Hex V. Derby, 3 Mod. 139. p. 135. 
 Rex r. Despard, 2 Man. & Ryl. 406. pp. 34, 
 
 86, 95. 
 Rex V. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687. p. 1S3. 
 Rex V. Dolby, 1 Dow. & Ry. 145; s. c. 2 Barn. 
 
 & Cres. 104. pp. 23, 27. 
 Rex V. Dunconibe, 12 Mod. 224. p. 38. 
 Rex V. Dunston, Rv. & M. 109. p 1558. 
 Rex V. Kdamnds, 4 Barn. & Aid. 471. pp. 24, 
 
 34, 35, 67, 68, 95, 96, 102, 125. 
 Rex r. Edwards, Russ. & Ry. 223; s. c. 4 
 
 Taunt. 309 ; 3 Camp. 207. p. 86. 
 Rex V. Elkins, 4 Burr. 2130. p. 2080. 
 Rex V. Francis, Cases Temp. Hardw. (Lee) 
 
 114. p. 1120. 
 Rex r. Geering, 18 L. J. (Mag. Cas.) 215. p. 
 
 301. 
 Rex V. Giles, 8 Price, 383. p. 2009. 
 Rex V. Gilham, 1 Esp. 285; s. c. 6 T. R. 265. 
 
 p. 330. 
 Rex V. Greenacre, 8 Carr. & P. a5. p. 1848. 
 Rex v. Hall, 3 Starkie, 67. p. 1566. 
 Rex V. Hanly, 1 Craw. & Dix (Irish) Cir. 188, 
 
 71. p. 60. 
 Rex V. Haworth, 4 Car. & P. 254. p. 609. 
 Rex V. Haves, 2 Ed. Raym. 1518. p. 2013. 
 Rex V. Hemp, 5 Carr. & P. 468. p. 449. 
 Rex V. Hill, 1 Car. & P. 667. p. 25. 
 Rex V. Holt, 5 T. 11. 438. pp. 2049, 2079. 
 Rex V. Hucks, 1 Stark. N. P. 523. pp. 296, 
 
 845. 
 Rex r. Huggins, 2 Ld. Rarm. 1574. pp. 2008, 
 
 2009, 2013. 
 Rex V. Hunt, 4 Barn. & Aid. 430. pp. 25, 35, 
 
 122. 
 Rex v. Inhabitants &c., 8 East, 77. p. 526. 
 Rex V. Johnson, 2 Stra. 1000. pii. 29, 34. 
 Rex V. Jones, 2 Camp. 131 p. 464. 
 Rex r. Kenihvorth, 7 Ad. & El. (X. S.) 642. 
 
 p. 294. 
 Rex V. Kinloch, 1 Wils. 157; s. c. Fost. Cr. L. 
 
 16. p. 86. 
 Rex r. Kinnear, 2 Barn. & Aid. 462. pp. 
 
 1902, 1906. 
 Rex V. Klrwan, cited Finlav's Irish Dig. p. 
 
 347. pp. 46, ■97, 102. 
 Rex V. Langley, 2 Salk,697 ; s. c. 2 Ld. Raym. 
 
 1029. p. 140. 
 Rex V. Layer, Fort. 396. p. 177. 
 Rex V. Lord Fitzwater, 2 Lev. 140. p. 1964. 
 Rex V. Lord Ossulston, 2 Strange, 1107 (s. c. 
 
 sub nom. King t?. Pierson, Andrews, 310). 
 
 p. 134. 
 Rex V. Lord Preston, 1 Salk. 278. p. 17J. 
 Rex V. Martin, 6 C. & P. 562. p. 449. 
 Rex r. Mayor of .Oxford, 3 Nev. & M. 877. 
 
 p. 2061. 
 Rex. V. McGowan, ciferZ, 11 Ir. C. L. (n. s.) 
 
 188. p. 45. 
 Rex V. Messenger, Kelvng, 78. p. 2008. 
 Rex V. Mogg, 4 Carr. &" P. 364. p. 302. 
 Rex r. Morris, 2 Burr. 1189, p. 2049. 
 Rex r. Noakes, 5 Carr. & P. 326. pp. 464, 466, 
 
 1553. 
 Rex V. Offord, 5 Carr. & P. 163. p. 1780. 
 Rex V. Okey, 1 Levinz, 61 ; s. c. Sid. 72; Sir J. 
 
 Kelvng, 13; 1 Keble, 244. p. 38. 
 Rex V. Oldroyd, 1 Russ. & Ry. C. C. 88. p. 
 
 439. 
 Rex V. Owens, 10 How. St. Tr. App. 194. p. 
 
 1521. 
 Rex V. Owens, 15 How. St. Tr. 1203. p. 1505. 
 Rex r. Parker, 3 Dougl. 242. p. 486. 
 Rex r. Parrv, 7 Car. & P. 838. p. 90. 
 Rex V. Parry, 8 Car. & P. 836. p. 44. 
 
 Rex r. Percival,l Sid. 243. p. 52. 
 Rex I'. Perkins, Holt, 403. p. 68. 
 Rex V. Perry, 5 Term Rep. 453. p. 25. 
 Rex V. Phelau, 1 Craw. & Dix, 189. p. 37. 
 l{e.x V. Phillips, 3 Camp. 73. p. 646. 
 Rex V. Pierce, 2 Shower, 327. p. 1396. 
 Rex V. Pitcher, 1 Carr. & P. 85. p. 262. 
 Rex V. Ramsden, 2 Carr. & P. 603. pp. 362, 
 
 363. 
 Rex V. Ratcllffe, 1 "W. Bl. 3; s. c. 18 How. St. 
 
 Tr. 429. p. 38. 
 Rex V. Redman, 1 Keny, 384. p. 667. 
 Rex V. Roddam, Cowp. 672. p. 178. 
 Rex r. Hudge, 2 Peake N. P. Cas. 232. p. 449. 
 Rex c. Russell, 1 Mood. C. C. 3.56. p. 646. 
 Rex r. Scalbert, 2 Leach C. C. 7uO. p. 86. 
 Rex V. Searle, 1 Mood. & Rob. 75. p. 503. 
 Hex r. Sheehan, Jebb Cr. Cas. 54. p. 464. 
 Rex V. Shelley, 3 T. R. 142. p. 658. 
 Rex r. Shepherd, 1 Leach C. C. 119. p. 29. 
 Rex v. Shipley, 3 T. R. 428, n. p. 1513. 
 Rex r. Smith, 2 Shower, 288. p. 23. 
 Rex V. St. Andrew, 8 Barn. & Cres. 679. p. 
 
 1137. 
 Rex V. Stone, 6 Term Rep. 527. pp. 88, 1904. 
 Rex 1-. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cres. 417 ; s. c. 15 
 
 Eng. C. L. 252. pp. 48, 117, 122, 1976. 
 Rex V. Tipping, 1 Car. & P. 668. p. 25. 
 Rex V. Tremaine, 7 Dowl. & Ry. 684 ; s. c. 16 
 
 Eng. C. L. 318; s. c. sub nom. Rex r. Tre- 
 
 mearne,5 Barn. & Cress. 254; 11 Eng. C. L. 
 
 218. p. 32. 
 Rex V. Undertakers &c.,2 T. R. 662. p. 1584. 
 Rex r. Voke, Russ. & Ry. 53). p. 301. 
 Rex v. Warrington, 1 Salk. 152. p. 23. 
 Rex V. ^Vatson, 2 Stark. 149. pp. 407, 416, 430. 
 Rex V. AVhelan, 1 Craw. & Dix, 189. p. 37. 
 Rex V. White, 1 Burr. 338. p. 1.584. 
 Rex r. Wliittaker, Cowp. 752. p. 12. 
 Rex V. Wiukworlb, 4 Carr. & P. 444. p. 303. 
 Rex r. Wilke.s, 4 Burr. 2527. pp. 1.505, 1.521. 
 Rex V. Withers, 3 T. R. 428. pp. 1505, 1522. 
 Rex V. Wood, 5 Jur. 225. p. 480. 
 Rex V. Woodcock, 2 Leach Cr. C. 563. p. 296. 
 Rex V. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661. pp. 1505, 1512, 
 
 1513,1.521,2013. 
 Rex r. Woolf . 1 Chit. R. 401. pp. 1902. 1906. 
 Rex V. Worcester, Skin. 101. p. 96. 
 Rex V. Worfleld, 5 T. R. 508. p. 1137. 
 Rex V. Wright, 1 Russ. & R. 456. pp. 512, 
 
 1780. 
 Reynolds v. Champlain Trans. Co., 9 How. 
 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 7. pp. 1991, 1992. 
 Reynolds v. Copeland, 71 Ind. 422. p. 1006. 
 Reynolds v. Cox, 11 Ind. 262. p. 1646. 
 Reynolds v. Dechaums,24 Tex. 174. pp. 849, 
 
 1418. 
 Reynolds v. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146. p. 1224. 
 Reynolds v. Kennedy, 1 Wils. 232. pp. 1181, 
 
 1184. 
 Reynolds t'. Loundsburv, 6 Hill (X. Y.),534. 
 
 pp. 328, 804. 
 Reynolds v. Magness, 2 Ired. L. (N". C.) 26. 
 
 p. 1747. 
 Reynolds r. New York &c. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 
 
 248; s. c. 2 N. Y. S. 0. (T. & C.) 644. pp. 
 
 1230, 1232. 
 Reynolds v. Richards, 14 Pa. St. 205. p. 850. 
 Reynolds r. Robinson, 64 X. Y. 589. p. 503. 
 Reynolds v. State, 1 Ga. 222. pp. 46, 67, 69. 
 Reynolds v. State, 8 Tex. 412. pp. 1680, 
 
 1695. 
 Reynolds v. Tompkins, 23 W. Va. 229. pp- 
 
 1983, 1985. 
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145. pp. 
 
 14, 72, 75, 77, 98, 99, 126. 
 Reynolds v. West, 1 Cal. 323. p. 1084. 
 Rhea r. Riner. 21 111. 526. pp. 854, 912. 
 Rheiuhart v. State, 14 Kan. 322. pp. 307, 718. 
 
 9a
 
 cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Rhctt r. Poe, 2 How. (U. S.) 457. pp. 942, 
 
 Rhines r. Baird, 41 Pa. St. 256. p. 1094. 
 Rhoades !•. Selin, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 715. 
 
 p. 275. 
 Rhoads v. Jones, 02 Ind. 328. p. 576. 
 Rhodes v. Chessou, Busbee (N. C), 336. p. 
 
 852. 
 Rhodes V. Com., 48 Pa. St. 396. pp. 1557, 
 
 1851. 
 Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. St. 274. p. 1384. 
 Rhodes r. Otis. 3:5 Ala. 578. p. 1382. 
 I Rhodes r. Slate, 17 Tex. App. 579. p. 1679. 
 I Rice V. Bancroft, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 469. p. 
 
 1977. 
 Ricer. Codman, 1 Allen (Mass.), 377. p. 925. 
 Ricer. DesMoines, 40 Iowa, 641. pp. 1249, 
 
 1268, 1269, 1270, 1483. 
 Rice V. Kvausville, 108 Ind. 7. pp. 2007, 2038. 
 Rice V. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470. ]). 1247. 
 Rice V. Olin, 79 Pa. St. 391. pp. 1682, 1683. 
 Rice V. Rico, 6 Ind. 100. pp. 1670, 2030. 
 Rice V. State, 7 Ind. 332. p. 73. 
 Rice V. State, 3 Kan. 157. ]>. 1576. 
 Rice V. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenu.) 432. pp. 67, 69, 
 
 76, 121. 
 Rice V. State, 3 Tex. App. 451. pp. 1635, 1636, 
 
 1768. 
 Rice V. ^A^esson, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 400. p. 939. 
 Richr. Campbell, 1 W.oods (U. S.),509. p. 14. 
 Rich V. Jackwav, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 357. p. 346. 
 Rich V. Lambert, 12 How. (U. S.) 347. pp. 
 
 1322, 134.5. 
 Rich V. Plaver, 3 Show. 261. pp. 23, 96. 
 Rich V. Slate, 1 Tex. App. 206. ii. 128. 
 Richard v. Van Meter, 3 Cranch C. 0. (U. S.) 
 
 214. p. 144. 
 Richards v. Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 690. p. 7. 
 Richards v. El well, 48 Pa. St. 361. p. 1041. 
 Richards v. Goddard, L. R. 17 Eq. 238. p. 168. 
 Richards v. Nixon, 20 Pa. St. 19. pp. 217, 
 
 221,222. 
 Richards V. Richards, 37 Pa. St. 228. p. 607. 
 Richards v. Kuckolls, 19 la. 555. p. 2092. 
 Richards t;. M'estcott, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 589. 
 
 pp. 1155, 1612. 
 Richardson v. Backus, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 59. 
 
 p. 2(196. 
 Richardson v. Brown, 8 Moore, 338; s. c. 1 
 
 Bing. 344. p. 927. 
 Richardson v. City of Boston, 24 How. (U. S.) 
 
 188. p. 1644. 
 Richardson v. Golden, 3 Wash. (U. S.) 109. 
 
 p. 347. 
 Richardson v. Jones, 1 Nev. 405. p. 1930. 
 Richardson v. Lessee &c., 4 Binn. (Pa.) 198. 
 
 pp. 309, 718. 
 Richardson «;. Mellish, 3 Bing. 334; s. c. 7 
 
 Barn. &C. 819. p. 2003. 
 Richardson r. Bobbins, 124 Mass. 105. p. 628. 
 Richardson v. Snider, 72 Ind. 425; s. c. 37 Am. 
 
 Rep. 168. p. 1097. 
 Richardson r. St. Joseph's IronCo.,5Blackf. 
 
 (Ind.) 146. p. 2111. 
 Richey v. Burnes, 83 Mo. 362. pp. 916, 1599. 
 Richey v. Hinde, 6 Ohio, 371. p. 891. 
 Richey v. McBean, 17 111. 63. pp. 1163, 1172. 
 Richey v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 7 Mo. App. 150. 
 
 p. 64. 
 Richman v. State, 2 G. Greene (Iowa), 532. 
 
 p. 284. 
 Richmond v. Atkinson, 58 Mich. 413. v.. 667, 
 
 675. 
 Richmond 17. Bronson, 5 Denio .'i> V.), 55. 
 
 p. 1476. 
 Richmond v. Dayton, 10 Johnv. (N. Y.) 393. 
 
 pp. 135, 140, 141. 
 Richmond v. Richmond, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 
 343. i>. 469. 
 
 Richmond v. Roberts, 98 111. 472. pp. 64, 102. 
 Richmond t). Sacramento Valley R. Co., 18 
 
 Vti\. 351. p. 1255. 
 Richmond v. Wardlaw, 36 Mo. 313. p. 2049. 
 Richmond &c. Co. v. Farquar, 8 Blackf. 
 
 (Ind.) 89. p. 827. 
 Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Starks. 4 Mason (U. 
 
 S.),296. p. 1130. 
 Richter v. Koster, 45 Ind. 440. p. 2082. 
 Rickabus v. Golt, 51 Mich. 227. p. 739. 
 Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275. p. 1918. 
 Ricketts i;. Harvey, 106 Ind. 564. pp. 1705, 
 
 1750. 
 Ricketts V. Pendleton, 14 Md. 321. pp. 876, 
 
 942. 
 Ricketts v. Richardson, 85 Ind. ,508. p. 2110. 
 Rickov r. Zeppenfeldt, 64 Mo. 277. p. 1708. 
 Rickford r. Uidge, 2 Camp. 537. p. 944. 
 Ricks r. State, 19 Tex. Ap"p. 308. p. 764. 
 Kiddle v. Core, 21 W. Va. 530. p. 2051. 
 Riddle i\ Varnum, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 283. pp. 
 
 908, 909. 
 Riddlesburg&c. Co. v. Rogers, 65 Pa. St. 416. 
 
 pp. 1938, 195.S. 
 Ridenhauer r. State, 75 Ga. 382. p. 1509. 
 Rider r. People, 110 111. 13. pp. ISOI, 1802. 
 Kidgew.-^V i'. Hollidav, 59 Mo. 144. p. 1055. 
 Kidgwayr. Dey, 13 Pa. St. 208. p. 948 
 Ridgway v. Ewbank, 2 Mood. & R. 217. pp. 
 
 218,219. 
 Ridgway r. Morris -n, 28 Ind. 201. p. 199. 
 llidlev y. Buchanan, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 555. 
 
 p. 807. 
 Ridley r. Gvdc, 1 Mood. & Rob. 197. p. 635. 
 Riest v. Goshen, 42 Ind. 339. p. 1224. 
 Rigby V. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 240. pp. 1209, 1210, 
 
 1221. 
 Rigg V. Cook, 9 111. 336. p. 1996. 
 Riffgins V. Brown, 12 Ga. 272. pp. 1714, 1905, 
 
 1957, 2067. 
 Riggs r. S.avage, 9 111. 129. p. 
 Riggs V. Tavloe, 9 AVheat. (tJ. S. tai. p. 620. 
 Riggs V. State, 26 Miss. 51. p. 19b4. 
 Right v. Darbv, 1 T. R. 159. p. 113r. 
 Riley V. Bussell, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 29* ». 50. 
 Riley V. Carter, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) i'X p. 
 
 1588. 
 Riley v. Dickens, 19 111. 29. p. 845. 
 Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217. pp. 1321 ^323, 
 
 1345. 
 Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496. p. 827. 
 Riley v. State, 9 Humph. (Ten-. 46. p. 
 
 1981. 
 Riley v. State, 20 Tex. App. 100. ?. 1855. 
 Riley v. Watson, 18 Ind. 291. jip . . 26, 1727. 
 Riley v. West Virginia &c. R. Co, 27 W. Va. 
 
 150. pp.1254, 1261,1262,1487. 
 Rindskoff v. Curran, 34 la. 326. p. 1669. 
 Kinehart v. Bowen, 44 Ind. ^53. p. 2139. 
 Riney v. Vanlandingham, 9 Mo. 816. pp. 481, 
 
 1197. 
 Ring V. Cohoes, 7 Reporter, 725 ; s. c. 19 ^ilb. 
 
 L. J. 472. p. 1247. 
 Ring v. State, 42 Tex. 282. p. 1575. 
 Ring r. Wheeler, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 725. p. 795.. 
 Ringgold V. Haven, 1 Cal. 108. pp. 1590, 1605. 
 Ringle v. First Mat. Bank, 107 Ind. 426. p. 
 
 2051. 
 RIngo V. Field, 6 Ark. 43. p. 1.5S5. 
 Ripley I'. uEtna Ins. Co., 30 X. Y. 136. p. 982. 
 Ilv'cy V. Coolidgc, Minor (Ala.), 11. pp. 
 
 117, 125, 126. 
 Ripon r. Bittel, 30 Wis. 619. p. 783. 
 Ripon r. Davies, 2 Nev. & I\r. 310. p. 273. 
 Ripp, In re, 29 N. W. Hep. 517. i>p. 1622,1638. 
 Rippey v. Friede, 26 Mo. 523. p. IGOO. 
 Rippy V. State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 217. p. 1548. 
 Rising Sun &c. Co. v. Conway, 7 Ind. 187.. 
 
 pp. 1726, 1727.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 Ritchey v. Davis, 11 la. 124. pp. 1170. 1171, 
 
 1197. 
 Ritchie r. Holbroolje, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 458. 
 
 pp. 1921, 1923, 1924, 1991. 
 Rives r. McLosky, 5 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 330. 
 
 p. 1733. 
 Rives V. Parmlev, IS Ala. 261. p. 949. 
 Roach V. Huliiitjs, Ki Pet. (V. S.) 319. p. 1669. 
 Roach V. (State, 41 Tex. 262. p. 312. 
 Roach V. Slate, 4 Tex. App. 46. pp. 465, 1779. 
 Roan V. Rohrer, 72 111. 582. p. 2080. 
 Robb r. Hackley, 23 Wend. (M. Y.) 50. pp. 
 
 484, 486, 487, 490. 
 Robb V. McDonald, 22 Iowa, 330. p. 152. 
 Robb V. Ross Co. Bank, 41 Darb. (X. Y.) 586. 
 
 p. 1023. 
 Robb V. Starkey, 2 Car. & K. 143. p. 615. 
 Robbius 1-. Alton Marine &c. Ins. Co., 12 Mo. 
 
 380. p. 1600. 
 Robbinsu. Dillaye,33Barb. (N. Y.) 77. pp. 
 
 885, 886. 
 Robbins v. Fowler, 2 Ark. 133. p. 1669. 
 Robbins v. Gortiam, 25 N. V. 588. p. 184. 
 Robbins V. Parker, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 117. p. 
 
 1443. 
 Robbins v. State, S Oh. St. 131. pp. 1508, 1520, 
 
 155K, 1851. 
 Robbins v. State, 49 Ala. 394. p. 111. 
 Robbins t'. "Windover, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 11. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Roberts v. Rradshaw, 1 Stark. 28. p. 611. 
 Roberts v. Corbin, 28 la. 355. p. 2042. 
 Roberts v. Fallis, 1 Cow. (X. Y.) 238. p. 1964. 
 Roberts r. Graham, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 578. pp. 
 
 161.16, 1663. 
 Roberts v. Jenkins, 21 N. H. 116. p. 929. 
 Roberts v. Johnson, 37 X^. Y. Super. 157. p. 
 
 582. 
 Roberts r. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613 ; s. c. 5 Jones 
 
 & Sp. 157. p. 1237. 
 Roberts v. Manslield, 32 Ga. 228. p. 1632. 
 Roberts v. Mason, 10 Oh. St. 277. pp. 1479, 
 
 1486. 
 Roberts v. Mazeppa MiU Co., 30 Minn. 413. 
 
 )). 1124. 
 Roberts v. McGrath, 38 Wis. 52. p. 1663. 
 Roberts v. Nelson, 22 Mo. App. 28. p. 191. 
 Roberts z'. Ogdensburgh &c. R. Co.,29 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.), 1.54. pp. 653, 655. 
 Roberts v. Riley, 15 La. Ann. 103. pp. 1322, 
 
 1345. 
 Roberts v. Roberts, 85 X. C. 9. pp. 372, 423, 
 
 551. 
 Robertson v. Spring, 16 La. Ann. 252. p. 1197. 
 Roberts r Swift, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 209. p. 899. 
 Roberts v. Swearengen, Hard. (Ky.) 121. p. 
 
 i09. 
 Roberts v. Thompson, 28 111. 79. p. 1060. 
 Roberts v. Trauwick, 13 Ala. 68. p. 1589. 
 Roberts v. Trenayue, C ro. Jac. 507. p. 886. 
 Roberts v. Wood, 38 Wis. 60. p. 1663. 
 Robertson v. Caw, 3 IJarb. 410. p. 482. 
 Robertson v. Garshwiler, 81 Ind. 463. p. 
 
 2058. 
 Roberts v, Hughes, 7 Mees. & W. 399. pp. 
 
 1986, 19.-'8. 
 Robertson v. State, 43 Ala. 325. p. 18. 
 Robertson v. state, 9 Tex. App. 20.i. p. 1835. 
 Robeson r. Whitesides, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 320. p. 870. 
 Robidoux V. Cassilegi, 10 Mo. App. 516. p. 
 
 1051. 
 Robinson v. Adkins, 19 Ga.398. pp. 721, 722. 
 Robinson v. Anderson, 106 Ind. 1.52. p. 2138. 
 Robinson v. Bealle, 20 Ga. 275. p. 341. 
 Robinson v. Benson, 19 Xev. 331 ; s. c. lOPac. 
 
 Rep. 441. pp. 2084, 20a5, 2099. 
 Robinson r. Brock, 1 Hen. &M. (Va.) 213. p. 
 
 2013. 
 
 Robinson v. Campbell, 8 Mo. 365. p. 1056. 
 Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213. p. 1231. 
 Robinson v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co.,1 Rob. 
 
 (X. Y.) 14. 1). 1476. 
 Robinson v. Cushman, 2 Denio (X. Y.), 149. 
 
 Ijp. 888, S94. 
 Robinson r. Ferry, 11 Conn. 460. pp. 289, 
 
 293, 547,564, ].")06, 1507. 
 Robinson r. Fitchburg &c. R. Co., 7 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 92. p. 1224. 
 Robinson r. Gould, 26 la. 89. p. 873. 
 Robinson r, lladlev, 14 Ind. 417. p. 2091. 
 Robinson v. Hawkesford, 9 Ad. & El. i .n. s.) 
 
 52. p. 944. 
 Robinson v. Hitchcock, S Met. (Mass.) 64. 
 
 pp. 214, 218, 219, 221, 223, 24.3. 
 Robinson v. Hood, 67 Mo. 660. p. 2128. 
 Robinson i\ Johnson, 61 Ind. 535. p. 2141. 
 Robinson v. I\[urphv, 69 Ala. 543. p. 191. 
 Robinson v. Xeal, 2"T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 212. p. 
 
 261. ' 
 
 Robinson v. Xew York &c. R. Co., 65 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.)146. p. 1225. 
 Robinson v. Randall, 82 111. 515. i)p. 63, 115, 
 
 116. 
 Robinson v. Raynor, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 131 : s. c. 
 
 28 X. Y. 497. p. 899. 
 Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 230. p. 1607. 
 Robinson v. Robards, 15 Mo. 459. pp. 1436, 
 
 1440, 1447. 
 Robinson v. State, 33 Ark. 180. pp. 85, 2098. 
 Robinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835. pp. 453, 455. 
 Robinson v. State, 84 Ind. 452. p. 15J5. 
 Robinson v. State, 2 Tex. App. 390. p. 1560. 
 Robinson r. State, 1 Lea (i'enn.), 673. p. 
 
 555. 
 Robinson v. State, 34 Tex. 1.52. p. 1744. 
 Robinson v. Stewart, 10 X. Y. 190. p. 1446. 
 Robinson v. Suter, 15 Mo. App. 599. p. 2103. 
 Robinson v. Uhl, 6 Xeb. 328. p. 920. 
 Robinson v. Walton, 58 Mo. 38. p. 1017. 
 Robinson v. West Pa. R. Co., 72 Pa. St. 316. 
 
 p. 1107. 
 Robinson v. AVestern Pacific R. Co., 48 CaL 
 
 409. pp. 1223, 1225. 
 Robinson v. White, 42 Me. 209. p. 1081. 
 Robinson, Ex parte, 19 Wall. (U'. S.) 505. 
 
 pp. 133,146,148,150. 
 Ro lies V. State, 5 Tex. App. 346. pp. 48, 82. 
 Robson 0. Calze,Dougl. 216. p. 1068. 
 Robson V. Xortheastern R. Co., 40 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 50 ; s. c. 2 Q. B. Div. 85. p. 1216. 
 Rocheblare v. Potter, 1 Mo. .561. p. 1440. 
 Rochereau i\ Bark Hausa, 14 La. Ann. 431. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1343. 
 Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 
 
 254. p. 272. 
 Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Roches- 
 ter, 3 X. Y. 463. pi>. 1268, 1273. 
 Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61 111. 155. p. 1249. 
 RoCKford t'. Russell, 9 Bradw. (111.) 229. p. 
 
 661. 
 Rockford &c. R. Co. v. Byam, 80 111. 528. p. 
 
 1230. '■ 
 
 Rockford Ins. Co. r. Xelson, 75 111. 548. p. 21. 
 Roddy r. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490. p. 527. 
 Rodgers v. Central Pac. R. Co. (Cal.), 8 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 377. p. 1239. 
 Roe r. Taylor, 45 111. 4S5. pp. 827, 829, 1690 
 Roeder r. Studt, 12 Mo. App. 566. pp. 709, 
 
 737,744,1971. ff > 
 
 Roolker, In re, 1 Sprague (U. S.), 276. pp. 
 
 166,169,176. ^ o ^ 11 
 
 Roemmich v. Wamsganz, 8 Mo. App. 576. 
 
 pp. 2093, 2094. 
 Rogers 17. Ackerman, 22 Barb. (X. Y.) 134. 
 
 p. 927. 
 Rogers ?'. Carcv, 47 Mo. 232. p. 872. 
 Rogers v. Colt,"21 X. J. L. 704. p. 825.
 
 CXXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Kogers v. Diamoud, 13 Ark. 474. pp. 219, 
 
 Rogers v. Hocnig. 4G Wis. 361. pp. 2056, 2064. 
 Kogers r. Lamh, 3 IJlackf. (Ind.) 155. p. 52. 
 Rogers r. Maddeu, 2 Bailev (S. C), 321. pp. 
 
 1044, 1586. 
 Rogers r. 3[cCune, 19 Mo. 557. pp. 1669, 1708. 
 Kogers v. Moons 10 Conn. 13. pp. 471, 475. 
 Kogers v.Moulthrop, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 274. 
 
 p. 1720. 
 Rogers v. Ostroni, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 523. p. 
 
 1003. 
 Rogers v. Rogers (Ga.), 3 S. East.vRep. 451. 
 
 pp. 204S, 2055. 
 Rogers v. Rogers, 46 Iiul. 1. p. 2089. 
 Kogers V. Rogers, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 131. pp. 
 
 71,96. 
 Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 333. p. 1235. 
 Rogers v. Smith, 1 Ad. & El. 772. p. 18. 
 Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543. p. 26. 
 Rogers r. State, 99 Ind. 218. \). 2044. 
 Rogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713. pp. 947, 948. 
 Rosrers r. The Marshal, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 645. 
 
 pp. 1740, 1956. 
 Rogers r. Weir, 34 N. Y. 463. p. 1156. 
 Rogers v. West, 9 Ind. 400. p. 1476. 
 Roggencamp r. Dobbs, 15 Neb. 620. p. 207B. 
 Rolirer v. Brockhage, 15 Mo. App. 16. jjp. 
 
 204S, 2080, 2081, 2088. 
 Rohrer v. Morningstar, 18 Oh. St. 579. p. 328. 
 Rolf V. Polland, 16 Keb. 21; s. c. 19 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 615. p. 218. 
 Rolfe V. Rumford, 66 ]Me. 564. pp. 728, 747. 
 Roll V. Indianapolis, 52 Ind. 547. p. 1264. 
 Roiland v. Com., 82 Pa. St. 306. pp. 19, 20, 30, 
 
 .32. 
 Roller V. Bachman, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 154. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Roller V. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485. p . 1^2. 
 Rollings V. Gate, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 97. p. 1681. 
 Rollins V. Ames, 2 N. H. 349. pp. 47, 1976. 
 Rollins V. Chalmers, 51 Vt. 592. p. 1491. 
 Rollins V. State, 62 Ind. 40. pp. 1694, 1800. 
 Roloson V. Herr, 14 Ind. 5.39. p. 2141. 
 Romaiuey v. State, 7 Ind. 63. pp. 67, 119, 123, 
 
 124. 
 Roman r. State, 41 Wis. 312. p. 1930. 
 Komeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 449. p. 151. 
 Kondcau v. New Orleans ImiJ. Co., 15 La. 
 
 Ann. 160. p)). 26, 68, 69. 
 Rood V. Priestlv, 58 Wis. 255. p. 914. 
 Kooh V. Brewster, 36 N. \V. Rep. 649. p. 2075. 
 Rooks V. State, 65 Ga 330. p. 257. 
 Rooney r. Grant. 40 Ga. 191. pi). 2087, 2088. 
 Roop v. Brubacker, 1 Rawle (Pa.), 304. p. 
 
 1988. 
 Root V. Brewster, 36 N. W. Rep. 649. p. 2097. 
 Root V. Curtis, 38 111. 192. p. 1750. 
 Root V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 29 la. 102. p. 2054. 
 Root V. King, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 613. p. 1466. 
 Root v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 68. pp. 
 
 1997, 1990. 
 Roquest v. Boutin, 14 La. Ann. 44. p. 582. 
 Rose V. Blakemore, Ry. & M. 383. p. 287. 
 Rose V. Davis, 4 Cow. "(N. Y.) 17. p. 1931. 
 Rose V. Des xMoines Aalley R. Co., 39 la. 246. 
 
 p. 1298. 
 Rose V. First Nat. Bank, 91 Mo. 399. pp. 879, 
 
 880. 
 Rose V. Lewis, 10 Mich. 483. p. 609. 
 Koser. Northeastern K. Co., 2 Exch. Div. 
 
 248; s. c. 46 L. J. (Exch.) 374. p. 1216. 
 Rose V. Spies, 44 Mo. 20. pp. 1642, l(i88. 
 Rose v.M- Charles, 49 Mo. .509. p. 55. 
 Rose V. State, 19 Tex. App. 470. p. 1537. 
 Roseboro v. Thompson, 1 App. C. Ci\\, § 
 
 19. p. 2071. 
 Roseborough r. State, 43 Tex. 570. pp. 113, 
 
 118, 120. 
 
 Rosecrans v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 83 Mo. 678. 
 
 pp. 811, 1626, 1627. 
 Rosenberg v. DesMoines, 41 Iowa 417. pp. 
 
 1268, 1270. 
 Rosenblatt v. Haberman, 8 Mo. App. 486. p. 
 
 937. 
 Rosenheim v. American Ins. Co., 33 Mo. 230. 
 
 p. 560. 
 Rosenthal v. Middlebrook, 63 Tex. 334. pp. 
 
 339 349. 
 Ross'i'. Ackcrman, 46 N. Y. 210. p. 413. 
 Ross V. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294. p. 1384. 
 Ross V. Bruce, 1 Day (Conn.), 100. p. 609. 
 Ross V. Citizens Ins. Co., 7 Mo. App. 575. p. 
 
 811. 
 Ross V. Crutsinger, 7 Mo. 245. pp. 1441, 1447. 
 Ross V. Gill, 1 Wash. (Va.) 87. j). 1.584. 
 Ross V. Gould, 5 Me. 210. pp. 216, 219. 
 Ross V. Head, 51 Ga. 605. p. 209. 
 Ross V. Johnson, 5 Burr. 2825. p. 13.30. 
 Ross V. Misner, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 3(i2. p. 2111. 
 Ross V. Missouri &c. R. Co., 4 Mo. App. 583. 
 
 p. 1155. 
 Ross r. Neal, 7 B. Monr. (Ky.) 408. p. 6. 
 Koss V. Ross, 21 Ala. 322. p. 1698. 
 Ross V. State, 59 Ga. 248 pp. 540, .541, 1805. 
 Ross V. Slate, 9 Tex. App. 275. p. 1S55. 
 Ross V. State, 16 Tex. App. 554. i). 1896. 
 Ross V. State, 29 Tex. 499. p. 1635. 
 Ross f. Turner, 5 Yerger (Tenn.), 338. p. 
 
 1080. 
 Ross r. United States, 12 Ct. of CI. 565. p. 
 
 2024. 
 Rosser v. Barnes, 16 Ind. 502. pp. 2030, 2031, 
 
 2033. 
 Rosser v. McColley, 9 Ind. 587. pp. 317, 705, 
 
 707, 1997. 
 Roth V. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 548. p. 
 
 1143. 
 Rotli V. Colvin, 32 Vt. 125. pp. 950, 951. 
 Koth V. Miller, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 100. p. 
 
 825. 
 Rothe V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 21 Wis. 256. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Rothrock r. Gallagher, 91 Pa. St. 108. p. 357. 
 Rothschild r. Slate, 7 Tex. App. 519. pp. 66, 
 
 74,75,77,116. 
 Roulo r. Valcour, 58 N. H. 347. p. 820. 
 Round V. State, 14 Ind. 493. pp. 2107, 2108. 
 Rounds V. McCorraick, 11 Bradw. (lU.) 220. 
 
 11. 338. 
 Rourke v. Bulleus, 8 Gray (Mass.), 349. p. 
 
 1604. 
 Rouse V. Lewis, 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 
 
 121. p. 1669. 
 Rouse V. Whited, 25 N. Y. 170. p. 639. 
 Roush V. Layton, 51 Ind. 106. pp. 2074, 2101. 
 Rousseau v. Corey, 62 Ind. 250. pp. 2050, 
 
 2052. 
 Roussln V. St. Louis &c. Ins. Co., 15 Mo. 
 
 244. p. 560. 
 Routsong V. Pacific R. Co., 45 Mo. 236. p. 
 
 1698. 
 Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129. pp. 1903, 1907. 
 Rowbotham v. Pearce, 5 Iloust. (Del.) 135. 
 
 p. 1003. 
 Rowe r. Brenlon, 3 Man. & Ry. 133. p. 309. 
 Rowe V. Canney, 1.39 Mass. 41. pp. 1976, 1985. 
 Rowe V. Haines, 15 Ind. 445. p. 561. 
 Rowe V. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291. pp. 1247, 
 
 1249. 
 Rowe V. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 491. p. 
 
 1930. 
 Rowe V. Tipper, 13 Com. Bench, 249. i)|). 
 
 943, 944. 
 Rowe, Ex parte, 7 Cal, 181; s. c. T C'al. 177. 
 
 1>1.. 1.52, 17.5. 
 Rowell r. Fuller's Estate, 5 X. Eng. Rep. 217. 
 
 p. 1645.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXlll 
 
 Rowell i: Williams, 29 Iowa, 210. p. 1249. 
 Rowland v. Berries, 1 Carr. & Kir. 46. p. 217. 
 Rowland V. Rowland. 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 61. 
 
 p. 1670. 
 Rowland v. State. 14 Ind. 575. p. 1990. 
 Rowlands v. !?aniuels, 11 Ad. & El. (N. S.)40, 
 
 note. p. 1167. 
 Rowley V. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N. T. 550. p. 
 
 972. 
 Rowley v. Insurance Co., 36 N. T. 550. p. 977. 
 Rowley «. Ins. Co., 3 Keys (N. Y.),557. p. 
 
 977. 
 Rowlev V. Rav, 139 Mass. 241. p. 2002. 
 Rov r. Targee, 7 Wend. (X. Y.) 359. p. 552. 
 Royal r. Smitli, 40 Iowa, 615. p. 1491. 
 Rovce V. Guggenlieim, 106 Mass. 201. p. 1003. 
 Rover V. Fleming, 58 Mo. 338. p. 1668. 
 Rover t\ Schultz Belting Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 
 
 281. p. 1605. 
 Rozar v. Burns. 13 Ga. 34. p. 1698. 
 Rozell V. Anderson, 91 Ind. 591. p. 1264. 
 Ruble V. McDonald, 7 la. 90. pp. 1964, 1966, 
 
 v:m, 1994. 
 Ruclier r. Beatv, 3 Ind. 70. p. 451 . 
 Ruclier v. Edding, 7 Mo. 115. pp. 309, 312, 
 
 718, 1624. 
 Rackersville Bank v. Hemphill, 7 Ga. 396. 
 
 pp. 1943, 1945. 
 Ruckman v. Cowvell, 1 X. Y. 505. p. 136. 
 Rudd V. Davis, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 287. p. 1585. 
 Rudd i: Davis, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 529. p. 1605. 
 Ruddell V. Tyner, 87 Ind. 529. p. 2061. 
 Rudolph V. Ilandwerlen, 92 Ind. 34. pp. 710, 
 
 737, 744, 745, 759. 
 Rudolphy v. Fuchs, 44 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 155. 
 
 p. 1219. 
 Rudsill r. Slingerland, ISMinn. 380. p. 449. 
 Ruff V. Rader. 2 Mont. 211. pp. 70, 75. 
 Ruff r. Ruff, 85 Ind. 431. p. 1621. 
 Rugg V. Minett, 11 East, 209. p. 910. 
 Rugg r. Spencer, 59 Barb. 383. p. 137. 
 Ruggles V. Coffin, 70 Me. 468. p. 311. 
 Ruloff V. People, 45 X. Y. 213 ; s. c. 11 Abb 
 
 Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 245. p. 661. 
 RundeU v. Butler, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 119. p 
 
 560. 
 Runnells v. State, 28 Ark. 121. p. 2098. 
 Runey v. Shoenberger, 2 Watts (Pa.), 23. p 
 
 1014. 
 Ruuvan v. Caldwell, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 134 
 
 P."l3-n. 
 Ranyan r. Price, 15 Oh. St. 1. p. 428. 
 Runvon ?\ Clark, 4 Jones L. (X. C.) 52. !> 
 
 959. 
 Runyon r. Groshon, 12 X. J. Eq. 86. p. 1442 
 Runyon v. State, 57 Ind. 84. p. 1545. 
 Rusch V. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. p. 1224. 
 Rush r. French, 1 Ariz. 99. pp. 385, 386, 389, 
 
 559, 561, 562. .56.i, 573, 574. 
 Rush V. Peddigo, 63 Ind. 479. pp. 1911, 1912, 
 
 2034. 
 Rushin v. Shields. 11 Ga. 636. p. 1632. 
 Rushmore v. Hall, 12 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 420. 
 
 p. 1671. 
 Rushton V. Martin, 43 Ala. 555. p. 2019. 
 Russel V. Union Ins. Co., 1 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)440. p. 1977. 
 Russell V. Ashlev, Hemp. (U. S.) 549. p. .572. 
 Russell V. Artiiur. 17 S. C. 477. pp. 825, 831. 
 Russell V. Barcroft, 1 Mo. 662. p. 159S. 
 Russell V. Branliam, 8 Blackf. (Ind.j 277. p. 
 
 21 1.^. 
 Russell V. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 143. pp. 471, 
 
 472. 
 Russell V. Columbia, 74 Mo. 487. p. 1280. 
 Hu.ssell r. Crutienden, 53 Conn. 564. p. 407. 
 Russell r. Dver, 40 X. H 173. )). 1108. 
 Russell ?•. Gibbs, 5 Cow. 39. p. 1139. 
 Russell V. Hamilton, 3 111. 56. p. 55. 
 
 Russell V. Hudson &c. R. Co., 17 X. Y. 134. 
 
 pp. 361, 365. 
 Russell r. Peo]ile, 44 111. 508. pp. 1903, 1907. 
 Russell V. Place, 94 U. S. 606. p. 1074. 
 Russell V. Quinn, 114 Mass. 103. pp. 113, 
 
 2062. 
 Russell V. Rider, 6 Car. & P. 416. p. 632. 
 Russell V. St. Nicholas &c. Co., 51 X. Y. 643. 
 
 p. 403. 
 Russell V. State, 53 Miss. 365. pp. 21, 65, 83, 
 
 1930, 19S2. 
 Russell V. State, 13 Xeb. 68. p. 2051. 
 Russell V. State Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 585. p. 1150. 
 Russell r. Tilotson, 140 Mass. 201; s. c. 4 X. 
 
 E. Rep. 231. p. 1241. 
 Rust r. Eckler, 41 X. Y. 488. p. 569. 
 Rust I'. Shacklef ord, 47 Ga. 538. p. 53. 
 Ruston's Case. Leach C. C. 458. p. 332. 
 Rutherford t\ Com., 13 Bush (Ky.),608. pp. 
 
 126, 287. 
 Rutherford v. Geddes, 4 WaU. (U. S.) 224. 
 
 p. 572. 
 Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N. Y. 368; s. c. 5 
 
 Hun (X. Y.).31. ]». 141. 
 Rvall V. Rowles, 1 Atk. 165; s. c. 1 Ves. 359. 
 
 p. 1440. 
 Rvan V. Conch, 66 Ala. 244. pp. 253, 256. 
 Rvan r. Dunlap, 17 111. 40. p. 1023. 
 Rvan V. Gross (Md.), 12 Atl. Rep. 115. p. 
 
 1415. 
 Rv:m V. Harrow, 27 la. 494. p. 1929. 
 Rvan V. Hudson &c. R. Co., 1 Jones & Sp. 
 
 "(X. Y.) 137. p. 1225. 
 Rvan V. Kelly, 9 Mo. App. 591. p. 1985. 
 Rvan t: Lvnch, 68 111. 160. p. 819. 
 Rvan V. Marsh, 2 Xott & M. (S. C.) 156. p. 
 
 891. 
 Rvan V. People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 188. pp. 
 
 "402, 409, 583. 
 Ryder v. People, 38 Mich. 269. p. 95. 
 Rvder V. Womb well, L. R. 4 E.xch. 32; s. c. 
 
 38 L. J. Exch. 8. pp. 1599, 1602, 1605. 
 Ryerson v. Abiugton, 102 Mass. 526. p. 1210. 
 
 S. 1'. E.. 3 Swab. & Tr. 240. pp. 646, 649. 651. 
 Sacia r. O'Connor, 58 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 430. 
 
 p. 2059. 
 Sackett v. Loomis, 4 Gray (Mass.), 148. p. 
 
 939. 
 Sackett r. Spencer, 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 180. p. 
 
 358. 
 Sacramento &c. Mining Co. v. Showers, 6 
 
 Nev. 291. pp. 1927, 1932. 
 Saddler v. Heulock. 4 El. & Bl. 570. p. 1218. 
 Saddler v. Rav, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 523. p. 188. 
 Saddler v. State, 12 Tex. App. 194. p. 1564. 
 Saddler v. State, 20 Tex. App. 195. p. 1707. 
 Sadler v. Sadler, 16 Ark. 628. p. 1690. 
 Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. St. 391. 
 
 pp. 1321, 1338. 
 Safford v. Grout, 120 Mass. 20. p. 1415. 
 Safret I'. Hartman, 5 Jones L. (X. C.) 185. 
 
 pp. 1081, 1082. 
 Sage V. Brown, 34 Ind. 464. pp. 1911, 2035, 
 
 2040. 
 Sage V. Valentine, 23 Minn. 102. p. 1068. 
 Sager v. Portsmouth &c. R. Co.. 31 Me. 228. 
 
 p. 1348. 
 Sager r. State, 11 Tex. App. 110. pp. 372, 
 
 400 435. 
 Sailer v. Barnousky, 60 AVis. 169. p. 1703. 
 Sailor v. Hertzog, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 259. p. 
 
 10.r2. 
 Sainthill v. Bound, 4 Esp. 74. p. 635. 
 Salander v. Lockwood, 66 Ind. 285. pp. 2035, 
 
 20.36. 
 Salisbury v. Peniofe, 44 Mo. 554. p. 936.
 
 CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 525. p. 1445. 
 Salmon v. AVard, 2 Carr. & P. 211. p. 927. 
 Salmon Falls Man. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 
 
 (U.S.) 446. p. 8-i;5. 
 Salmons v. Uouudtree, 24 Ala. 45S. pp. 1750, 
 
 1758. 
 Saltmarsh r. Bower, 22 Ala. 221. p. 1093. 
 Salter v. Utica &c. li. Co., 88 N. Y. 42. p. 
 
 1304. 
 Saltonstall v. Stockton, 1 Taney's Dec. 11. 
 
 p. 1211. 
 Sam r. State, 13 Sni. & M. (Miss.) 189. pp. 
 
 64,09,70,71,74,75,76, 121. 
 Sam r. State, 1 Swan (Tenn.), 61. pp. 1907, 
 
 1919. 
 Sam, Ex parte, 51 Ala. 34. pp. 132, 153. 
 Samis v. Clark, 13 HI. 454. p. 1125. 
 Sample v. Kobb, 16 Pa. St. 305. p. 1066. 
 Sampson v. SchafCer, 3 Cal. 107. pp. 115, 
 
 891. 
 Samschen v. State, 8 Tex. App. 45. p. 24. 
 Samuel, The, 1 AVheat. (U. ti.) 15. p. 671. 
 Samuels v. Griffith, 13 la. 103. pp. 312, 436, 
 
 758. 
 Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 68. p. 20. 
 San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69. p. 825. 
 San Francisco v. Clark, 1 Cal. 386. p. 1376. 
 Sanchez v. McJIahon, 35 Cal. 218. p. 2099. 
 Sanchez v. People, 22 X. Y. 147. pp. 98, 125. 
 Sanchez f. People, 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 635. 
 
 p. 74. 
 Sanderlin v. Sanderlin, 24 Ga. 583. p. 334. 
 Sanders v. Lov, 45 lud. 229. p. 2101. 
 Sanders v. Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. 419. pp. 132, 
 
 158. 
 Sanders v. State, 2 la. 230. pp. 1910, 1911. 
 Sanders v. State, 17 Tex. App. 222. pp. 1735, 
 
 1744. 
 Sanders v. State, 41 Tex. 307. p. 1695. 
 Sanders r. AVeelburg, 107 liid. 266. p. 2038. 
 Sanderson v. Bowen, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 
 
 675. pp. 1937, 1947, 1962. 
 Sanderson r. Nashua, 44 N. H. 492. p. 1969. 
 Sanderson v. Ileinstadler,31 Mo. 483. p. 942. 
 Sanderson's Case, 3 Cranch C. C. 638. p. 261. 
 Saudford v. State, 11 Ark. 238. p. 108. 
 Sands v. Com., 21 Gratt. ( Va.) 871. p. 20. 
 Sandusky &c. R. Co. v. Sloan, 27 Oh. St. 342. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 Sandwell r. Sandwell, Comb. 445 ; s. c. Holt, 
 
 295. p. 354. 
 Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. (X. Y.) 381. p. 
 
 188 
 Sanford v. Gaddis, 15 411. 228. p. 1469. 
 Sanford v. Sandford, 40 Hun (X. Y.), 540. 
 
 p. 167. 
 Sanger v. Seymour, 42 Hun (X. Y'.), 641. pp. 
 
 596, 598. 
 Santissima Trinidad, The, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 
 
 383. p. 177L 
 Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 67 ;s. c.30 X. W. Rep. 
 
 226. pp. 90. 74^1. 
 Sarah r. State. 28 Ga. 576. pp. 6, 2096. 
 SargeanttJ. Clark, 108 Pa. St. 558. p. 192. 
 Sargeant v. Kellogg, 10 111. 273. p. 560. 
 Sargeant v. Solberg, 22 Wis. 132. p. 1072. 
 Sargent v. Koberls, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 337. pp. 
 
 1914,1915. 
 Sargent t'. State, 11 Oh. 472. pp. 1903, 1911, 
 
 19'.I6. 
 Sartor v. McJunkin, 8 Rich. L. (S. C.) 451. p. 
 
 1910. 
 Sartor v. Sartor, 30 :Miss. 760. p. 827. 
 Sartonous v. State, 24 Miss. 602. pp. 258, 
 
 1896. 
 Sartwell v. Wilcox, 20 Pa. St. 117. p. 1668. 
 Sassecn v. Clark, 31 Ga. 242. p. 1156. 
 Saunders v. Baxter, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 369. 
 
 p. 728. 
 
 Saunders r. Fuller, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 518. 
 
 pp. 1983, 1984. 
 Saunders' Appeal, .54 Conn. 108. p. 1762. 
 Sauudersou v. Lace, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 231. p. 
 
 1637. 
 Saunderson's Case, 3 Crancli C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 638. p. 284. 
 Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 90S. p. 41. 
 Savage v. Tuller, Brayt. (Vt.) 223. p. 1537. 
 Savannah v. Haucock, 91 Mo. 54. )>. 1107. 
 Savery v. Busick, 11 la. 487. p. 1748. 
 bavil V. Roberts, 1 Salk. 14 ; s. c. I Ld. Raym. 
 
 374. p. 1167. 
 Saville r. Robertson, 4 T. R. 720. p. 878. 
 Savings Bank v. Getchell, 55 X. H. 281. p. 
 
 902. 
 Savings Bank v. Shakman, 30 Wis. 333. p. 
 
 713. 
 Sawdon's Case, 2 Lewin C. C. 117. pp. 44, 51. 
 Sawyer V. Fitts, 4 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 365. p. 
 
 2001. 
 Sawyer v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 37 Mo. 240. 
 
 pp. 1237, 1688, 1964, 1966, 1984. 
 Sawver v. Hopkins, 22 Me. 276. p. 218. 
 Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 Vt. 172. p. 1020. 
 Sawyer v. Merrill, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 478. p. 
 
 1711. 
 Sawyer v. Ore, 140 Mass. 234. p. 336. 
 Sawver r. Sargent, 65 Cal. 259. p. 2081. 
 Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 470. pp. 1255, 1489, 
 
 1690. 
 Sawyer V. Spofford, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 598. p. 
 
 916. 
 Sawver v. Taggart, 14 Bush (Kv.), 729. p, 
 
 882. 
 Sawver, In re, 14 Xat. Bank. Reg. 241. p. 
 
 10(58. 
 Saxon V. Boyce, 1 Bailev (S. C), 66. p. 56L 
 Saxton V. Bacon, 31 \t. 540. p. 1221. 
 Sayer v. Kitchen, 1 Esp. 210. p. 625. 
 Sayres v. Scudder, 2 X. J. L. 53. p. 19. 
 Scaggs V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 10 Md. 268. 
 
 p. 325. 
 Scales V. Anderson. 26 Miss. 94. p. 891. 
 Scales r..Shacklefor(l, 64 (ia. 170. p. 566. 
 Scanlan v. Ayres, 73 Ind. 211. p. 2137. 
 Scarborough v. Stale, 46 Ga. 26. p. 1647. 
 Scarman v. Castell, 1 Esp. 270. pp. 897, 899. 
 Scattergood v. Wood, 79 X. Y. 263. p. 566. 
 Schafer v. State, 7 Tex. App. 239. p. 66. 
 Schanler v. Porter, 7 la. 482. pp. 1964, 1968, 
 
 1994. 
 Schappner r. Second Ave. R. Co., 55 Barb. 
 
 497. pp. 1937, 1944, 1946, 1962. 
 Scharff v. Klein, 29 iMo. App. 549. p. 1673. 
 Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429. pp. 426, 427. 
 Schalz V. Pfeil, .56 Wis. 429. p. 2027. 
 Scheibel v. Fairbain, 1 Bos. & Pul. 388. p, 
 
 1141. 
 Scheible r. Law, 65 Ind. 332. p. 20.36. 
 Schell r. Xat. Hank, 14 Minn. 47. p. 560. 
 Schellito r. Sampson, 61 la. 40. p. 551. 
 Schmidt v. Chicago Ac. R. Co., 83 111. 405. 
 
 pp. 1247, 1249. ' 
 
 Schenck r. Butsh, 32 Ind. 338. p. 1187. 
 Scheuckv. Grillin, 38 X. J. L. 463. pp. 408, 
 
 460. 
 Schenck v. Mercer County M. F. Ins. Co., 24 
 
 X. J. L. 447. p. 974. 
 Schenck v. Steven.^^on, 2X. J. L. 387. p. 1982. 
 Schenectady &c. R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 X. Y, 
 
 102. p. 1625. 
 Schettler r. .Jones, 20 Wis. 412. p. 3.58. 
 Schilling r. Aberuathy, 112 Pa. St. 437. p. 
 
 l-Ml. 
 Schilling V. Durst, 42 Pa. St. 126. p. 957. 
 Schindler v. Houston, 1 Deuio (N. Y.), 51. p. 
 
 910. 
 
 Schiudlbr v. State, 15 Tex. App. 394. !>. 1895.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXV 
 
 Schindler v. State, 17 Tex. App. 408. p. 1S55. 
 Schlesinger r. Texas &c. R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 
 
 471 ; s. c. 87 Mo. 146. pp. 1017, 10-27. 
 Schmidt V. Blood, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 2(58. p. 
 
 1335. 
 Schmidt V. Chicago &c. E. Co., 83 111. 405. p. 
 
 42. 
 Schmidt v. Ins. Co., 41 111. 295. p. 978. 
 Schmidt v. New Yor.k &c. R. Co., 1 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 529. p. 1781. 
 Schmidt v. Smitli, 57 Mo. 135. p. 889. 
 Schmidt «•. Union Ins. Co., 1 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 63. p. 716. 
 Schmitt V. Schmitt, 32 Minn. 130. p. 2082. 
 Schmitz V. Lauferty, 29 Ind. 400. p. 2001. 
 Schmitz r. Rose, 6 Mo. App. 587. p)). 121, 123. 
 Schneck v. Mercer County M. F. lus. Co., 24 
 
 N.J. Law, 447. p. 978. 
 Schneer*;. Lemp,17 Mo. 142. pp. 1637, 1642, 
 
 1683. 
 Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Oh. St. 98. p. 1489. 
 Schnier v. People, 23 111. 17; s. c. Ilorr. & 
 
 Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. 285. pp. 331, 332, 
 
 1520. 
 Schoeder v. Railway Co., 47 la. 375. p. 654. 
 Schoelller v. State, 3 Wis. 823. pp. 67, 69, 73, 
 
 98, 115. 
 Schffilkopf V. Leonard, 8 Colo. 159. p. 1017. 
 Schoflelder v. Ferrers, 47 Pa. St. 194. pp. 
 
 1171,1195. 
 School Dist. No. 1 V. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507. 
 
 p. 1915. 
 School District v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330. p. 
 
 838. 
 School Trustees v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513. 
 
 p. 893. 
 School-town of Rochester v. Shaw, 100 
 
 Ind. 268. p. 759. 
 Schooling V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 518. 
 
 p. 1626. 
 Schools r. Woodburn-Sarven Wheel Co., 56 
 
 Mo. 174. p. 1315. 
 Schooner Emma Johnson, 1 Sprague (U. S.) 
 
 527.- pp. 1322, 1346, 1356. 
 Schoonover r. Reed, 65 Ind. 313. p. 2141. 
 Schoregge v. Gordon, 29 Minn. 367. p. 192. 
 Schraeder v. Ehiers, 31 N. J. L. 146. p. 140. 
 Schreiberr. Butler. 84 Ind. 576. p. 2110. 
 Schrubbe v. Council, 69 Miss. 476; s. c. 34 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 503. p. 2031. 
 Schuchardt v. Aliens, 1 AVall. (U. S.) 359. pp. 
 
 347,1605. 
 Schuerman v. Missouri R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 
 
 565. p. 1225. 
 SchutBin v State, 20 Ohio St. 233. pp. 91, 94. 
 Schulter v. Bockwinkle, 19 Mo. 648. pp. 
 
 1593, 1594. 
 Schulter r. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 
 
 237. p. 983. 
 Schultzi\ Astley, 2 Bing. New Cas. 544. p. 
 
 1033. 
 Sch ultz V. Cremer, 59 la. 182. p. 2029. 
 Schultz V. State, 20 Tex. App. 316. pp. 1817, 
 
 1896. 
 Schumackerz?. State, 5W^is. 324. pp. 49, 90, 
 
 92, 122. 
 Schuster v. W"ina:ert, .30 Kan. 529. p. 377. 
 Schute r. Robins, Mood. & Malk. 133. p. 936. 
 Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Farr, 4 Watts &S. (Pa.) 
 
 362. p. 38. 
 Schuylkill &c. R. Co. v. McCreary, 58 Pa. St. 
 
 304. p. 1941. 
 Schwab V. Union Line, 13 Mo. App. 159. p. 
 
 1123. 
 Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 21 
 
 Miun. 215. p. 1646. 
 Schwartz v. Kuhn, 10 Me. 274. p. 1044. 
 Schwartz r. Herrenkind, 26 111. 208. pp.848, 
 
 849, 1038. 
 
 Schwarzbach v. Ohio Valley Protective 
 
 Union, 25 W. Va. 622. p. 992. 
 Schweickhardt v. St. Louis, 2 Mo. App. 571. 
 
 p. 1248. 
 .•Schweitzer v. Connor, 57 Wis. 177. p. 1648. 
 •Schwcnk r. Umsted, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 351. 
 
 pp. 38, 95. 
 Schwingcr !•. Raymond (N. Y.), 11 N. East. 
 
 Rep. 952; s. e. 35 Hun (N. Y.), 666. p. 1708. 
 Schwinger r. State, 105 N. Y. 648; s. c. 11 N. 
 
 East. Hep. 952. p. 1738. 
 Scofleld r. Walrath, 35 Minn. 356. p. 554. 
 Scotland County r. Hill, 112 U. S. 183. p. 556. 
 Scott t'. Buchanan, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468. 
 
 p. 1130. 
 Scott V. Coxe, 20 Ala. 294. pp. 289, 292, 1.506. 
 Scott r. Dublin &c. R. Co., 11 Ir. Rep. C. L. 
 
 (N. S.) 377. p. 1229. 
 Scott r. Elmendorf, 12 Johns. (N. Y'.) 315. p. 
 
 193. 
 Scott V. Firth, 4 Fo.st. & Fin. 349. p. 1404. 
 Scott r. Henry, 13 Ark. 119. p. 869. 
 Scott V. Hull, 8 Conn. 296. pp. 214, 221. 
 Scott V. Hunter, 46 Pa. St. 192. p. 1221. 
 Scott V. Jones, 4 Taunt. 865. p. 608. 
 Scott f. King, 7 Minn. 494. p. 197. 
 Scott V. Lillord, 9 East, 347; s. c. 1 Camp. 246. 
 
 p. 944. 
 Scott r. Lloyd, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 418. p. 1708. 
 Scott i\ London &c. Docks Co., 3 Hurl. & 
 
 Colt. 596. p. 1326. 
 Scott V. London &c. Dock Co., 10 Jur. (N. s.-) 
 
 1108. p. 1222. 
 Scott r. Moore, 41 Vt. 205. pp. 113, 127. 
 Scott V. Nelson, 1 Esp. N. P. 95. p. 889. 
 Scott V. Peutz, 5 Sandf. S. C. (N. Y.) 572. p. 
 
 875. 
 Scott V. Scott, 82 Kv. 328. pp. 2075, 2100. 
 Scott V. Sheakly, 3 Walts (Pa.), 50. pp. 1073, 
 
 1672. 
 Scott V. Simons, 54 N. H. 428. p. 1003. 
 Scott V. Simpson, 1 Sandl. (N. Y.) 601. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Scott V. Smith, 70 Ind. 299. p. 1979. 
 Scott V. Stark, 4 Taunt. 865. p. 609. 
 Scott V. State, 37 Ala. 117. p. 1734. 
 Scott r. State, 64 Ind. 400. pp. 435, 1646. 
 Scott I'. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 232. pp. 1985, 
 
 1986, 1992. 
 Scott V. State, 71 Tenn. (7 Lea) 232. p. 766. 
 Scott V. State, 19 Tex. App. 325. pp. 1865, 
 
 1867. 
 Scott V. Winship, 20 Ga. 429. pp. 1633, 1634. 
 Scott f. Woodward, 2 McCord (S. C.)., 161. p. 
 
 310. 
 Scotten r. Divilbiss, 60 Ind. 37. p. 2108. 
 Scotten V. Longfellow, 40 Ind. 23. p. 1196. 
 Scotten V. Sutter, 37 Mich. 526. p. 912. 
 Scovell r. Kingsley, 7 Conn . 284. pp. 293, 555. 
 Scranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68. pp. 73, 1130. 
 Scripp.s r. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371. pp. 91, 247, 
 
 248, 249, 2.50, 556, 557. 
 Scruggs V. Brackiu, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 528. p. 
 
 1585. 
 Sea Ins. Co. v. Stebbius, 8 Paige (N. Y'.), 565. 
 
 p. 145. 
 Seabrook v. Hecker,2 Robt. (N. Y'.) 29L pp. 
 
 1209, 1211. 
 Seabury r. Field, 1 McAll. (U. S.) 60. p. 1698. 
 Seacord v. Burling, 1 How. Pr. (N. Y'.) 175. 
 
 p. US. 
 Seal V. State, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 286. p. 
 
 113. 
 Seal r. State, 28 Tex. 491. pp. 811, 1671. 
 Sealy r. State, 1 Ga. 213. pp. 45, 46. 
 Seaman v. Duryea, 11 N. Y. 324; s. c. 10 Barb. 
 
 (N. Y.)523. pp. 137, 138. 
 Seaman r. New York, 3 Dalj- (N. Y.), 147. p. 
 
 1249.
 
 CXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Searcv v. State, 1 Tex. App. 440. pp. 1560, 
 
 163.x 
 Seare r. Prentice, 8 East, 348. p. 1750. 
 Searl r. People, 13 III. 597. p. 1562. 
 Scaver r. Kobiiison.S Duer (N. Y.), 622. p. 
 
 18S. 
 Seavy r. Dearborn, 19 X. II. 351. pp. 55, 219. 
 Seaward r. Malotte, 15 Cal. 304. p. 827. 
 SeawcU v. Colm, 2 Nev. 308. p. 324. 
 Second Ward Uank r. Upman, 14 AVis. 596. 
 
 p. 2064. 
 Second Ward Savings Bank v. Shakman, 30 
 
 Wis. 333. p. 224. 
 Secor V. Pestana, 37 111. 525. p, 1669. 
 Secor V. Toledo &c R. Co., 7 Biss. (U. S.) 513. 
 
 p. 145. 
 Seeley v. Ensrel, 17 Barb. (X. Y.) 530. p. 328. 
 Seeley v. New York &c. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 719; 
 
 s. c. 7 N. East. Rep. 734. p. 1311. 
 Sehorn t'. AVilliams, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 575. 
 
 pp. 58, 99. 
 Seibel v. Sienion, 72 Ato. 526. p. 1494. 
 Seibel v. Vaughan, 69 111. 257. p. 205.3. 
 Seibert r. Price, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 438. p. 
 
 1937. 
 Seifrath v. State, 35 Ark. 412. p. 2048. 
 Seigel V. Eison, 41 Cal. 109. p. 1226. 
 Seigerson r. Pomeroy, 13 Mo. 620. p. 1020. 
 Seigel V. Louderbaugh, 5 Pa. St. 490. p. 1698. 
 Seixas V. Woods, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 48. p. 926. 
 Selby V. Hutchinson, 9 111 319. p. 1060. 
 Selinr. Snyder, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 319. p. 
 
 1682. 
 ' Selkirk & Cobb, 13 Gray, 313. p. 581. 
 Sellar v. Clelland, 2 Colo. 532. pp. 1431, 1432, 
 
 1433, 1434, 1435. 
 Sellars r. Johnson, 65 X. C. 104. p. 825. 
 Selleck v. Sugar Hollow Tp. Co., 13 Conn. 
 
 453. pp. 113, 1976. 
 Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430. pp. 348. 415, 
 
 431,432,433. 
 Sellers v. Jones, 22 Pa. St. 423. p. 957. 
 Sellers v. People, 4 111. 412. p. 121. 
 Sellers v. Sellers (N. C), 3 South East. Rep. 
 
 917. p. 49. 
 Sellers v. State, 52 Ala. 368. p. 94. 
 Sells V. Hoare, 7 J. B. Moore, 36; s. c. Bred. 
 
 & Bing. 2o2. pp. 329, 330. 
 Senecal V. Richelieu Co., 15 Lower Canada 
 
 Jur. 1. p. 1151. 
 Senter v. Carr, 15 N. H. 351. p. 1772. 
 Serio v. State, 22 Tex. App. 633; s. c. 3 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 784. p. 1668. 
 Scrle vi Norton, 2 Mood. & Rob. 401. p. 944. 
 Sertel v. Graeter, 112 Ind. 117; s. c. 11 West. 
 
 Rep. 234. p. 20S9. 
 Sessengut r. Posey, 47 Ind. 408. p. 2113. 
 Sessions r. Newjiort, 23 Vt. 9. pp. 982, 1247. 
 Seven Bishops, Trial of, 12 How. St. Tr. 429. 
 
 )). 1931. 
 Severance v. Carr, 43 N. H. 65. p. 322. 
 Seward i\ Jackson, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 406. pp. 
 
 1439, 1445, 2007, 2009, 2013. 
 Scwell V. Com., 3 Kv. Law Rep. 86. p. 708. 
 Sewell r. Eaton, 6 Wis. 490. p. 910. 
 Sewall r. Gliddon, 1 Ala. 52. pp. 2008, 2014. 
 Sewall r. Henry, 9 Ala. 24. p. 839. 
 Sexton V. Brock, 15 Ark. 34,5. p. 2122. 
 Sexton r. Ins. Co.,9Barb. (N. Y.) 191. p. 977. 
 Sexton V. Lelievrre, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) II. pp. 
 
 1921, 1929. 1930, 1974. 
 Sexton V. Montgomery County M. Ins. Co., 9 
 
 Barb. (N. V.) 191. jJp. 974,975. 
 Sexton V. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 242. p. 
 
 1445. 
 Seymour v. Cowing, 1 Keyes (N. Y.), 532. p. 
 
 1740. 
 Seymour v. Deyo, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 289. pp. 
 
 119, 123. 
 
 178. p. 504. 
 (N. Y.) SO. p. 
 
 Seymour v. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178. 
 Seymour v. Marvin, 11 Barb. (N. 
 
 8S6. 
 Seymour V. Parnell (Fla.), 2 South Rep. 312. 
 
 p. 108. 
 Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N. Y, 567. pp. 344, 345. 
 Shackieford v. Bailey, 36 111. 387. pp. 1049, 
 
 2066. 
 Shackieford v. State, 2 Tex. App. 385. p. 
 
 31. 
 Shadwell v. Hutchinson, M. & M. 350. p. 
 
 1404. 
 Shafer v. Ferguson, 103 Ind. 90. p. .563. 
 Shafer v. Smith, 63 Ind. 226. p. 2044. 
 Shafor v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374. p. 1726. 
 Shaffer v. Ryan, 84 Ind. 140. p. 2039. 
 Shaffer v. Weech, 34 Kan. 598. p. 1090. 
 Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa. St. 60. pp. 1557, 1851. 
 Shafto V. Shafto, 28 N. J. Eq. 34. pp. 646, 
 
 6-18. 
 Shain v. Markham, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 580. 
 
 p. 106. 
 Shakleton v. Sun Fire Office, 55 Mich. 290. 
 
 p. 981. 
 Shakspearer. Markham, 10 Hun (N. Y.),322; 
 
 s. c. 72 N. Y. 400. p. 899. 
 Shamburg r. Ruggles, 83 Pa. St. 148. p. 1098. 
 Sharaokin &c. R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St. 
 
 475. p. 1087. 
 Shane v. Clarke, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 101. 
 
 p. 117. 
 Shank v. Case, 1 Ind. 170. pp. 14&3, 1464. 
 Shank v. Fleming, 9 Ind. 189. pp. 215, 221, 
 
 222. 
 Sh'jink's Case, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 38. 
 
 p. 177. 
 Shanley v. Wells, 71 111. 80. p. 1577. 
 Shannon v. Austin, 67 Mo. 485. p. 967. 
 Shannon v. State, 18 Wis. 604. p. 1.51. 
 Shai)ley v. White, 6 N. H. 172. p. 1915. 
 Sharon r. Davidson, 4 Nev. 416. p. 1046. 
 Sharp V. Burns, 35 Ala. 653. p. 1702. 
 Sharp V. Flinn, 27 Ind. 98. p. 561. 
 Sharp i\ Hendrickson, 2 N. J. L. 686. p. 19. 
 Sharp V. Ponce, 74 Me. 470. p. 975. 
 Sharp r. State, 6 Tex. App. 650. pp. 17. 115. 
 Sharp V. State, 15 Tex. App. 171. ]). 1564. 
 Sharpe v. Brice, 2 W. Bl. 942. p. 1477. 
 Sharpe r. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557. pp. 1168,. 
 
 1170, 1180, 1182. 
 Sharpe v. State, 48 Ga. 16. p. 1672. 
 Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 315. pp. 
 
 1268, 1269, 1274. 
 Shattuck V. Allen, 4 Gray (Mass.), 540. p. 
 
 1459. 
 Shattuck V. Myers, 13 Ind. 146. p. 411. 
 Shattuck V. State, 11 Ind. 473. p. 438. 
 Shattuck V. State, 51 Miss. 50. pp. 132, 150, 
 
 1.52. 
 Shaughnessy v. Railway Co., 7 Mo. App. 591. 
 
 p. 2108. 
 Shaul V. Brown, 28 la. 38. pp. 1199, 1200, 
 
 1201. 
 Shaw V. Berry, 31 ]SIe. 478. p. 1340. 
 Shawr. Barnhart, 17 Ind. 183. p. 219. 
 Shaw V. Brown, 13 la. 508. p. 1670. 
 Shaw V. Burney, 86 N. ('. 331. p. 2010. 
 Shaw V. Collin, 58 Me. 254. pp. 890, 895. 
 Shaw v. risk, 21 Wis. 368. p. 1992. 
 Shaw r. Gardner, 12 Gray (Mass.), 488. pp. 
 
 1321, 1345, 1357. 
 Shaw V. McCombs, 2 Bay (8. C), 232. p. 1997. 
 Shaw r. Saum, 9 Ind. 517. p. 17.56. 
 Shaw V. State, 27 Tex. 750. p. 121. 
 Sl)aw«'. Stone, 1 Cash. (Mass.) 228. p. 638. 
 Shaw V. Van Rensselaer, 60 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 143. p. 6.55. 
 Shaw V. AVallace, 2 Stew. & P. (^Vla.) 193. p. 
 
 1749.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXYll 
 
 Shaw r. York &c. R. Co., 6 Rail. Cas. 87 ; s. c. 
 
 lo Ad. & El. (N. S.) 347. p. 1095. 
 Shaw, Ex parte, 61 Cal. 58. p. 165. 
 Shea r. Lawreuce, 1 Allen (Mass.), 167. pp. 
 
 119, 1923. 
 ShcalT r. Grav, -2 Teates (Pa.), 273. pp. 1921, 
 
 1023, 1943, 1947, r.i54. 
 Shealv r. Edwards, 75 Ala. 412. p. 1651. 
 Shear v. Vau Dyke, 10 Hun (N. Y.), 528. p. 
 
 350. 
 Shearer v. Bovd, 10 A'a. 279. p. 239. 
 Sheehy v. Burger, 62 N. Y. 558. p. 1209. 
 Sheel V. Appleton, 49 Wis. 128. pp. 1280, 
 
 1483. 
 Shelf V. Hunting-ton. 16 VT. Ya. 307. p. 1254. 
 Sheffield r. 3Iullin, 28 Minn 251. p. 2075. 
 Sheffield v. t^vracuse &c. K. Co., 21 Barb. (X. 
 
 Y.) 339. p. "1223. 
 Shehan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217. p. 2038. 
 Sheldon v. Connecticut M. F. Ins. Co., 25 
 
 Conn. 207. p. 972. 
 Sheldon v. Hudson River R. Co., 29 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.) 22C.. p. 1605. 
 Sheldon v. Perkins, 37 Yt. 550. pp. 1983,1985. 
 Sheldon r. South School District, 24 Conn. 
 
 88. p. 1750. 
 Sheldon V. Wood, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 267. p. 
 
 51)9 
 Sheiton v. Braithwaite, 7 Mees. & "SY. 436 
 
 p. 943 
 Sheiton v. Durham, 6 Mo. 434. pp. 560, 
 
 2096. 
 Sheiton r. Franklin, 6S 111. 333. n. 912. 
 Shepard r. (iiddinss, 22 Conn. 282. p. 616. 
 Shepard v. Merrill, 13 Johns. (^. Y.) 475. p. 
 
 1467. 
 Shepard v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 629; «. 
 
 c. 55 Am. Rep. 390. pp. 653, 654. 
 Shepard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209. p. 1494. 
 Shepherd v. I'.avior, 5 X. .J. L. 827. p. 1907. 
 Shepherd v. Cassidav, 20 Tex. 24. p. 1015. 
 Shepherd v. Dean, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 174. 
 
 p. 171. 
 Sheplierd v. Hamilton County, 8 Heisk. 
 
 (Tenn.) 380. p. 33'.t. 
 Shepherd v. Kaiu, 5 Barn. & Aid. 240. p. 925. 
 Shepherd r. Parker, 36 X. Y. 517. p. 264. 
 Shepherd r. Thompson, 4 X. H. 213. p. 1943. 
 Shepherd r. Trigg, 7 Mo. 151. p. 1441. 
 Shepherd v. Union M. F. Ins. Co., 38 X. H. 
 
 232. p. 978. 
 Shepherd v. AYhite, 11 Tex. 346. p. 825. 
 Shepherd r. AYillis, 19 Oh. 142. p. 343. 
 Shepherd, In re, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 225. p. 
 
 181. 
 Sheple V. Page, 12 Yt. 519. p. 351. 
 Sheplev r. Cowan, 52 Mo. .559. p. 1055. 
 Sheppard v. Cook, 2 Hayw. (X. C.) 238. p. 
 Sheppard v. Lark, 2 Bailev (S. C), .576. p 
 
 1966. 
 Sheppard v. Sheppard, 10 X. J. L. 250. p 
 
 2097. 
 Sheppard v. Wilson, 6 How. (U. S.) 260. pp 
 
 2133, 2134. 
 Shorer r. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 134. mi 
 
 942, 948. 
 Sheridan v. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 36 X. Y. 39 
 
 p. 1232. 
 Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 Ind. 184. pp. 577, 1293 
 Sherman r. Champlain Transp. Co., 31 Vt, 
 
 162. p. 1753. 
 Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283. p. 1646. 
 Sherman r. Shaw, 9 Xev. 148. p. 20;'9. 
 Sherwood v. Collier, 3 Dev. L. (X. C.) 380. 
 
 p. 959. 
 Sherwood v. Railroad Co., 21 Minn. 127. p. 
 
 342. 
 Sherwood r. Ruggles, 2 Sandf. S. C. (X. Y.) 
 
 55. p. 994. 
 
 Sherwood r. State, 42 Tex. 498. p. 312. 
 Sherwood r. Titman, 55 Pa. St. 77. p. 566. 
 Shields v. Cunningham, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 86. 
 
 p. 2107. 
 Shields r. Guffev, 9 la. 322. pp. 324, 1942, 
 
 1943, 1948, 1956. 
 Shields v. Xiagara Sav. Bank, 3 Hun (X. Y.), 
 
 477 ; s. c. 5 Th. & C. (X. Y.) 585. p. 27. 
 Shields v. State, 45 Conii. 266. p. 20.)7. 
 Shields v. St;ite, 95 Ind. 2'M). pp. 63, 70, 1981. 
 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U. S.) 253. p. 
 
 1059. 
 Shiells V. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158. p. 1246. 
 Shiels r. Stark, 14 Ga. 429. pp. 1634, 1701. 
 Shilcock V. Passman, 7 Car. & P. 289. p. 
 
 1243. 
 Shillito V. Reineking, 30 Hun (X. Y.), 345. p. 
 
 884. 
 Shimer v. Butler UniversitT, 87 Ind. 21S. 
 
 pp. 574, 2113. 
 Shipman r. State. 38 Ind. 549. p. 2094. 
 Shippen's Lessee v. ^Yells, 2 Yeatesi (Pa.), 
 
 260. p. 181. 
 Shipton V. Cassou, 5 Bam. & Cres. 378. p. 
 
 892. 
 Shipton V. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El. 314. p. 805. 
 Shirley I'. Yail, 38 How. Pr. (X. Y.j 406. pp. 
 
 1603, 1605. 
 Shirts V. Irons, 47 Ind. 445. p. 2066. 
 Shisler v. Keavv, 75 Pa. St. 79. p. 193. 
 Shobe V. Bell, 1 Rand. (Ya.) 39. pp. 119,1965, 
 
 1985. 
 Shock V. McChesney, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 507. p. 
 
 1172. 
 Shockey v. Mills, 71 Ind. 2S8. pp. 344, 966, 
 
 969. 
 Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 X. Y. 176. p. 967. 
 Shoemaker r. Railroad Co., 30 Kan. 359; s. c. 
 
 2 Pac. Rep. 517. p. 2037. 
 Shoemaker r. State, 12 Ohio, 43. p. 125. 
 Shoflfner r. State. 93 Ind. .")l'.i. pp. 2U51, 20S8. 
 Sholly r. Diller, 2 Rawle (Pii.), 177. pp. 1937, 
 
 1938, 1942. 
 Shomo V. Zeigler, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 611. pp. 
 
 1937, 1941, 19.5(3. 
 Shook V. Blount, 67 Ala. 301. p. 831. 
 Shook r. Pate, 50 Ala. 91. p. 662. 
 Shorl5 v. Kinzie, 100 Ind. 429. pp. 779, 1783. 
 Shore v. Bedford, 5 Man. & G. 271. p. 273. 
 Shores r. Casswell, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 413. p. 
 
 194. 
 Short r. State, 4 Harr. (Del.) .568. p. 261. 
 Short r. West, 30 Ind. 367. pp. 1907, 1946. 
 Short r. Woodward, 13 Gray (Mass.), 86. pp. 
 
 8.52, 974. 
 Shorter v. People, 2 X. Y. 197. pp. 1539, 1752. 
 Shctwell V. Maurice, 1 N. J. L. (Coxe) 224. 
 
 p. 274. , 
 
 Shoulty V. Miller, 1 Ind. 544. p. 1465. 
 Shover r. Jones, 32 Ind. 141. p. 2086. 
 Showalter v. State, 84 Ind. 563. ]). 787. 
 Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. St. 175. p. 870. 
 Shreve v. Dulaney, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 499. p. 613. 
 Shrewsbury v. Keeling, 11 Ad. & EI. (N, S.) 
 
 834. p. 294. 
 Shrewsbury v. Kynaston, 7 Brown Pari. Cas. 
 
 396. ]). 2014. 
 Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W. Ya. 115. p. 
 
 2051. 
 Shriver r. Sioux City &c. R. Co., 24 Minn. 
 
 506. pp. 1322, 1343, 1363. 
 Shubert r. State, 16 Tex. App. 645. p. 15.38. 
 Shucraft v. Dayid.sou, 19 Ind. 98. p. 2059. 
 Shultz V State, 5 Tex. App 390. pp. 323, 333. 
 Shuman i'. Gavin, 15 Ind. 93. p. 2059. 
 Shupe V. Galbraith, 32 Pa. St. 10. p. 880. 
 Shurtleff v. AYillard, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 202. p. 
 
 915. .
 
 CXXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Shustcr r. Com.. 38 Pa. St. 206. p. 37. 
 Bliusier V. Stout, 30 Kan. 529. p. 37o. 
 Sbutte V. Thompson, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 151. [i. 
 
 5GS. 
 Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 X. H. .'>53. p. 1340. 
 Sibley v. Smith, 4(5 Ark. 275; s, c. 55 Am. Rep. 
 
 5S4. p. 054. 
 Sibly r. Hood, 3 Mo. 290. p. 1441. 
 Sickles r. Tattison, 14 Weud. (X. Y.) 257; s. 
 
 c. 25 Am . Dee. 527. p. S'Jo. 
 Sidener v. I.s.sox, 22 lud. 201. p. 324. 
 Sideways r. D\»vu, 2 Stark. 40. j). (>35. 
 Sidgreavesr. :ftlvalt, 22 Ala. t)17. p. 'J^iS. 
 Sie'iert v. Leoiiard,21 Miuu. 442. pp. 1G40, 
 
 1CS2. 
 Sill r. Keese, 47 Cal. 294. pp. 200, 583. 
 Sillivautr. Keardoii.S Ark. 141. pp. 219,223. 
 Sills V. r.rowu, 9 Car. & 1\ (iOl. pp. 501, 502. 
 Silsbv r. Foote, 14 How. (X. Y.) 218; s. c. 1 
 
 Hhrtch. 444. p. SI',. 
 Silshe V. Lucas, 53 111. 479. p. 2066. 
 Siltz V. Hawkeve lus. Co., 71 Iowa, 710; s. c. 
 
 29 X. ^V. Kep! 605 p. 1668. 
 Silverthorn v. Fowle, 4 Joues L. (X. C.) 362. 
 
 p. 1241. 
 Silvis V. Ely, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 42L pp. 56, 
 
 129. 
 Simmons v. Chicago &c. K. Co., 110 111. 340. 
 
 pp. 1213, 1605. 
 Simmons v. Com., 5 Binn. (Pa.) 617. p. 1566. 
 Simmons v. Haas, 56 Md. 153. p. 640. 
 Simmons v. Mitchell, 6 App. Cas. 156. p. 
 
 1456. 
 Simmons v. Morse, 6 Jones L. (X. C.) 6. pp. 
 
 1456, 1457. 
 Simmons v. XewBedford &c. Steamboat Co., 
 
 97 Mass. 361. p. 1207. 
 Simmons v. State, 73 Ga. 609. p. 114. 
 Simmons v. Slate, 61 Miss. 243. p. 1787. 
 Simmons V. Swift, 5 Barn. & Ores. 857. pp. 
 
 910, 915. 
 Simmons v. Wilmot, 3 Esp. 91. pp. 897, 899. 
 Simms V. fe'larke, 11 HI. 137. pp. 1132, 1133. 
 Simms v. State, 8 Tex. App. 230. pp. 72, 123. 
 Simon f. Home Ins. Co., 58 Mich. 278. p. 378. 
 Simpkins v. Smith, 94 Ind. 470. p. 1750. 
 Simpson v. Alexander, 35 Kan. 227. p. 1494. 
 Simijson v. Blunt, 42 Mo. 544. p. 2049. 
 Simpson v. City of Keokuk, 34 Iowa, 568. p. 
 
 1268. 
 Simpson v. Dall, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 460. p. 620. 
 Simpson v. Gregg, 5 Xeb. 237. p. 20.52. 
 Simpsou V. Hargitson, 35 Leg. Obs. 172. p. 
 
 834. 
 Simpson v. Kent, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 30. pp. 1919, 
 
 1922, 1923. 
 Simpson v. McKay, 12 Ired L. (X. C.) 144. p. 
 
 869. 
 Simp^nt'. Pittman,13 0hio,.365. pp. 119. 120. 
 Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. St. 186. p. 1031. 
 Sims v. Bovnton, 32 Ala. 3.52. \). 8:'>0. 
 Sims V. Mead, 29 Kan. 124. p. 2036. 
 Sinisv. Templeman, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 1(;3. p. 1945. 
 Simson v. London &c. Omnibus Co., L. R. 8 
 
 C. P. 390; s. c. 42 L. J. (C. P.; 112; 21 Week. 
 
 Rep. 595. p. 1237. 
 Sinard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 353. pp. 
 
 1750.1751. 
 Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. & Cres. 92. p. 
 
 8;-.2. 
 
 Sinclair i'. Rou'»h, 14 Ind. 450. p. 19*3. 
 Sinclair r. Talmadge, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 602. 
 
 ]>. 893. 
 Sindram v. People, 88 X. Y. 196. p. 1758. 
 Sines v. Sui)erinlendeuts of Poor, 55 Mich. 
 
 383. l>. 854. 
 Singer Mfg. Co. r. Sammons, 49 AVis. ;516. 
 
 pp. 2030, 2038. 
 
 Singleton v. Bovle, 4 Xeb. 414. p. 2051. 
 Singleton v. Hil'liard, 1 Strobh. L. (S. C.)203. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1345, 1347. 
 Singleton r. Millett, 1 Xott & McC. (S. C.) 
 
 355. i))). 214, 2.'1. 
 Singleton v. I'acilic Railroad, 41 Mo. 465. p. 
 
 Iii07. 
 Singleton v. AVhiteside,5 Yerger (Tenn.), 18. 
 
 p. 1080. 
 Sioux City &c. R. Co. r. Brown, 13 Xeb. 317. 
 
 1). 1698. 
 Sioux Citv .<tc. R. Co. r. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 
 
 578. i)|). ,5t;9, 653, 1667, 1698. 
 Sisk r. Slate, 9 Tex. Anp. 246. pp. 1837, 1848. 
 Sissou V. Barrett, 2 X." Y. 406. pp. 2008, 2009, 
 
 2015. 
 Sisson V. Conger, 1 Thomp. & C. (X. Y.) 564. 
 
 pp. 338, 443, 446. 
 Sitterlee r. State, 13 Tex. App. 587. p. 1896. 
 Sittig i\ Burkestack, 28 Md. 1.58. ]). 1710. 
 Six Hundred and Thirty Quarter Casks, 14 
 
 Blatchf. (U. S.) 517. p. 1344. 
 Skagg V. Slate (Ind.). 6 West. Rep. 261; s. c. 
 
 108 Ind. 53. pp. 321, 332, 2101. 
 Skally V. Shute, 132 Mass. 367. p. 1003. 
 Skelleru v. May, 6 Cranch (U. S.), 267. p. 136. 
 Skeen r. Johnson, 55 Mo. 24. p. 900. 
 Skidmorc ■/■. Bricker, 77 Ind. 165. \). 1196. 
 Skillen r. Jones, 44 Ind. 136. p. 2044. 
 Skinner r. London &c. R. Co., 5 Exch. 786; 
 
 s. c. 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 360 ; 15 Jur. 299. p. 
 
 1237. 
 Skinner r. Skinner, 77 Mo. 148. p. 64.3. 
 Skinner v. State, 53 Miss. 399. pp. 74, 84. 
 Skipper V. State, 59 Ga. 65. pp. 446, 1771, 
 
 1773, 1774. 
 Sladden v. Sergeant, 1 Fost. & Fin. 322. p. 
 
 636. 
 Slagel V. Murdock, 65 Mo. 522. p. 2055. 
 Slater r. Manes, .54 Ga. 671. p. 2067. 
 Slater v. Rawson, 1 Met. (Mass.) 450. p. 1086. 
 Slater v. Sherman, 5 Bush (Ky.), 206. p. 2088. 
 Stater i\ Wood, 9 Bosw. (X. Y.) 15. pp. 
 
 1536, 1537. 
 Slaughter r. Ilailcv, 21 Tex. .537. p. 15SS. 
 Slaughter r. state, 24 Tex. 410. pp. 1904, 1918. 
 Slauson v. Euglehart, 34 Barb. (X. Y.) 198. 
 
 p. 219. 
 Slauter v. Whitelock, 12 Ind. 338. p. 329. 
 Sledge V. Clo|)ton, 6 Ala. 589. p. 869. 
 Sledge V. Scott, 56 Ala. 202. p. 346. 
 Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4 Denio (X. 
 
 Y.),431. 1). 450. 
 Slevin r. Reppv, 46 Mo. 606. p. 1613. 
 Slipher v. Fisher, 11 Ohio, 299. p. 1586. 
 Sloan V. Edwards, 61 Md. 90. pp. 419, 431. 
 Sloan V. Harrison, 1 X. J. L. 123. p. 1921. 
 Sloan V. Xew York C. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 125. p. 
 
 437. 
 Sloan V. Petric, 15 111. 425. pp. 1461, 1463, 
 
 1465. 
 Sloan V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 58 Mo. 220. p. 
 
 889. 
 Sloane v. Sloane, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 341. p. 2091. 
 Smallcy v. Ilendricksou, 29 X. J. L. 371. p. 
 
 852. 
 Smart v. Raynor, 6 Carr. & P. 721. p. 224. 
 Sinathers v. State, 46 Ind. 447. p. 1646. 
 Smclliurst, Matter of, 2 Sandf. (X. Y.) 724. 
 
 PI) 148, 1.52. 
 Smiley f. Burpee, 5 Allen (Mass.), 568. p. 
 
 776. 
 Smith r. Acker, 23 Wend. (X. Y.) 653. pp. 
 
 1438,1441. 
 Smith V. .Etna Life Ins. Co., 49 N. Y. 211 ; «. 
 
 c. 3 Big. Ins. Cas. 708. p. 1417. 
 Smith V. Allen, 16 Ind. 316. j.. ,561. 
 Smith r. Arsenal I'.auk, 104 Pa. St. 518. j)p. 
 
 551,1647,2130.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 Smith V. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 25 Oh. St. 91, 
 
 102. p. 4. 
 Smith V. Battens, 1 Mood. & Rob. 341. p. 
 
 875. 
 Smith V. Beck, 25 Pa. St. 106. p. 10(55. 
 Smith v. Bossard, 2 McCord Ch. (S. C.) 409. 
 
 p. 192. 
 Smith V. Boston &c. R.R., 120 Mass. 490. p. 
 
 1210. 
 Smith V. Boston &c. R. Co., 44 N. H. 325. p. 
 
 11.55. 
 Smitii V. Bouvier, 70 Pa. St. 325. p. 882. 
 Smith V. Bradv, 17 X. Y. 173. p. 893. 
 Smith v. Brown, 8 Kan. 608. pp. 89, 94. 
 Smith V. Brown, 3 Tex. 360. p. 147. 
 Smith V. Burtis,9 Johns. (X. Y.) 174. p. 1044. 
 Smitli V. Carr, 16 Conn. 450. pp. 1671, 1746, 
 
 1747, 1756, 1758. 
 Smith V. Carrin^ton, 4 Cranch (U.S.), 62. 
 
 pp. 1044, 1703, 1739. 
 Smith V. Cheetham, 3 Caines (X. Y.), 57. 
 
 pp. 1964, 19G6. 
 Smith V. City of Stockton, 73 Cal. 204; s. c. 14 
 
 Pac. Rep. 675. p. 2099. 
 Smith r. Clark, 31 Barb. (X. Y.) 140. p. 1008. 
 Smith V. Clark, 58 Mo. 145. p. 1245. 
 Smith V. Clark, 3T>ans. (X. Y.) 208. p. 1209, 
 Smith V. Clarke, 12 Yes. 477. i>. 1418. 
 Smith V. Clayton, 29 M. J. L. 357. pp. 83, 129, 
 
 827. 
 Smith V. Com., 6 Gratt. (Va.) 698. pp. 74, 77. 
 Smith v. Com., 7 Gratt. (Ya.) 593. pp. 74, 77. 
 Smith i\ Com., 100 Pa. St. 324. p. 46. 
 Smith V. Coopers, 9 Iowa, 379. p. 214. 
 Smith V. Crichtou, 33 Md. 103. p. 1725. 
 Smith t'. Crocker, 5 Mass. 538. p. 1033. 
 Smith r. Culbertson, 9 Rich. L. (X. C.) 106. 
 
 p. 1983. 
 Smith V. Cushing, 18 AYis. 295. pp. 2097, 2098. 
 Smith V. Davidson, 45 lud. .396. p. 2130. 
 Smith i\ Denman, 48 Ind. 65. p. 904. 
 Smith V. Deuuie,6 Pick. (Mass.) 266. pp. 908, 
 
 910. 
 Smith V. Dolbv, 4 Harr. (Del.) 350. p. 1008. 
 Smith r. Dukes, 5 Minn. 373. pi). 1646, 1755. 
 Smith V. Eames, 4 111. 76. ])p. 69, 72, 1990. 
 Smith v: Earle, 118 Mass. n-6i. p. 118. 
 Smith r. Eastman, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 355. p. 
 
 966. 
 Smith V. Easton, 54 Md. 138. p. 641. 
 Smith r. Evans, 6 Biun. (Pa.) 109. p. 918. 
 Smith V. Faulkuer, 12 Gray, 251. pp. 825, 
 
 860. 
 Smith i\ First Congregational Meeting 
 
 House, 8 Pick. (:Ma.ss.) 178. p. 892. 
 Smith V. Floyd, 8 Bajrb. (X. Y.) 5. pp. 67, 98, 
 
 103. 
 Smiley v. Gamblll, 2 Head (Tenn.), 164. p. 
 
 1008. 
 Smith V. Graves, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 16. p. 1914. 
 Smith r. Griffith, 3 Hill (X. Y.), 333. p. 569. 
 Smith r. Grimes, 43 la. 356. p. 1775. 
 Smith r. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 83 Mo. 683. p. 
 
 1621. 
 Smith V. Harrow. 3 Bibb (Ky.),446. p. 1910. 
 Smith V. Hickenbottom, 57 Iowa, 733. pp. 
 
 501, 502. 
 Smith V. Holcombe, 99 Mass. 553. p. 1948. 
 Smith V. HoUis, 46 Ark. 16. pp. 2053, 2(j55. 
 Smith V. Hutchinson, 83 Mo. 683. pp. 1598, 
 
 1621. 
 Smith V. Ins. Co., 24 Pa. St. 320. p. 977. 
 Smith V. Janes, 20 Wend. (X. Y.) 192; s. c. 
 
 32 Am. Dec. 527. p. 937. 
 Smith V. Kyler, 75 Ind. 575. p. 2110. 
 Smith V. Lane, 12 Serg. & R. 84. p. 642. 
 Smith V. Lisher, 23 Ind. .500. p. 2123. 
 Smith V. Little, 67 Ind. 549. p. 2071. 
 .Smith V Lovejoy, 62 Ga. 372. p. 1924. 
 
 Smith r. Lynes, 4 X. Y. 44. p. 910. 
 Smith r. Marvin, 27 X*. Y. 137. p. 886. 
 Smith r. Mayer, 3 Colo. 209. p. 1496. 
 Smith V. McDonald, 50 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 519. 
 
 p. 182. 
 Smith V. McMillen, 19 Ind. 391. p. 1949. 
 Smith V. Mechanic's &c. Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 
 
 399. p. 978. 
 Smith V. Meldren, 107 Pa. St. 348. p. 2004. 
 Smith V. Miller, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 617. p. 926. 
 Smith V. Morgan, 38 Me. 468. p. 481. 
 Smith V. Morrison, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 81. 
 
 pp. 725, 2096. 
 Smith V. Morrison, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 430. p. 141. 
 Smith V. Mullett, 2 Camp. 208. p. 943. 
 Smith V. New Haven &c. R. Co., 12 Allen 
 
 (Mass.). 531. p. 1343. 
 Smith V. Newland, 40 111. 100. pp. 2105, 2106. 
 Smith r. Xew YorJi &c. R. Co., 4 Abb. App. 
 
 Dec. (N. Y.) 202. p. 628. 
 Smith r. New York &c.R. Co., 6 Duer (N. Y.), 
 
 25. p. 1207. 
 Smith V. Xew York &c. R. Co., 24 X. Y. 222; 
 
 s. c. 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 132. p. 1298. 
 Smith V. Xew York &c. R. Co. , 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 225 ; s. c. 41 X. Y. 620. p. 1363. 
 Smith i\ O'Connor, 48 Pa. St. 218. p. 1232. 
 Smith r. fJverbv, 50 Ga. 241. p. 1681. 
 Smith V. Parker. 41 Me. 452. p. 1446. 
 Smith I'. Peninsular Car-works (Mich.), 27 
 
 N. W. Rep. 662. p. 1239. 
 Smith r. People, 25 111. 21. pp. 1.565, 1577. 
 Smith V. People, 103 111. 82. p. 1892. 
 Smith V. I'owers, 15 N^. H. 456. p. 1990. 
 Smith V. Putney, 18 Me. 87. p. 2021. 
 Smith V. Railroad Co., 37 Mo. 287. p. 1311. 
 Smith r. Raymond, 1 Day (Conn.), 189. p. 
 
 2001. 
 Smith z). RockwcU, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 482. p. 
 
 1(139. 
 Smith V. Euss, 17 "VYis. 227. p. 1381. 
 Smith V. Sasser, 5 Jones L. (X. C.) 388. p. 
 
 1(568. 
 Smith V. School District, 40 Mich. 143. p. 122. 
 Smith r. Shakleford, 1 Xott & McC. (S. C.) 
 
 36. p. 119S. 
 Smith V. Sliattuck, 12 Ore. 362. p. 626. 
 Smith r. Shepard,! Dev. L. (X. C.) 46L p. 
 
 1749. 
 Smith V. Shepherd, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 147. p. 
 
 1003. 
 Smith V. St. Joseph, 54 Mo. 456. p. 1235. 
 Smith V. Smith, 15 Ind. 315. p. 2110. 
 Smith V. Smith, 8 Ired. (X'. C.) 29. p. 1585. 
 Smith r. Smith, 43 X. H. 536. p. 890. 
 Smith r. Smith, 61 Wis. 665. pp. 2075, 2100. 
 Smith V. Smith, .50 N. H. 212. pp. 1983, 1990. 
 Smith r. St. Paul City R. Co., 32 Minn. 1. 
 
 pp. 673, 694. 
 Smith r. State, 55 Ala. 1. pp. 25, 51,66,81,85, 
 
 91. 
 Smith V. State, 79 Ala. 21. p. 532. 
 Smith r. State, 63 Ga. 1(>9. j). 1904. 
 Smith V. State, 64 Ga. 439. pp. 2077, 207S. 
 Smith V. State, 4 G. Greene (Iowa), 189. p. 92. 
 Smith r. State, 64 Md. 25; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 
 
 752, p. 264. 
 Smith r. State, 55 Miss. 513. pp. 65, 85, 129. 
 Smith r. State, 57 Miss. 882. p. 40. 
 Smith i\ State, 58 Miss. 867. p. 1791 
 Smith V. State, 75 X. C. 306. p. 7.53. 
 Smith r. State, 4 Xeb. 277. p. 35, 
 Smith V. State, 5 Xeb. ISl. pp. 77, 78, 414. 
 Smith r. State, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 428, pp, 254, 
 
 257, 258, 
 Smith r. State, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 386. p. 44, 
 Smith V. State, 8 Tex. App. 141. p. 1679, 
 Smith V. State, 9 Tex. App. l.iO. p. 1S3.5. 
 Smith r. Slate, 13 Tex. App. 507, p. 1779.
 
 cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Smith V. State, 15 Tex. App. 139. pp. 1679, 
 
 Suiilh V. State, 15 Tex. App. 33S. p. 1549. 
 Smith V. State, 19 Tex. App. 96. pp. 1639, 
 
 1«!I6, 1878, ISSO. 
 Smith V. State, 21 Tex. App. 278. p. 727. 
 Smith r. State, 42 Tex. 444. pp. GG8, 676. 
 Smith V. State, 43 Tex. 103. p. 1642. 
 Smitli V. State (Tex.;, 5 S. AV. Kep. 219. p. 
 
 813. 
 Smith V. State Ins. Co., 58 la. 478. p. 312. 
 Smith V. Stewart, 6 Jolins. (N. Y.) 46; s. c. 5 
 
 Am. Dec. 186. p. 891. 
 Smith r. Stickncy, 17 JJarb. 4S9. p. 484. 
 Smith V. Surridjfe, 4 Esp. 25. p. 1143. 
 Smitli V. Thompson, 1 Cow. (K. Y.) 221. p. 
 
 1906. 
 Smith V. Thompson, 8 C. B. 44. p. 986. 
 Smith V. Vniou K. Co., 61 Mo. 591. p. 1227. 
 Smith V. "Wagaman, 58 la. 11. \>. 2097. 
 Smith V. AVageuseller, 21 Pa. St. 491. p. 60. 
 Smith V. AVard, 2 Koot (Conn.), 302. p. 121. 
 Smith V. AVarden, 8(3 Mo. 382. pp. 1315, 1483. 
 Smith V. AVare, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 257. p. 8S9. 
 Smith r. AVarren, 60 Tex. 462. ]>. 2124. 
 Smith V. AVhite, 5 Dana (Ky.), 376. p. 561. 
 Smith V. AVhitnian,G Allen (Mass.), 562. pp. 
 
 316,585. 
 Smith V. AVilliams, 11 Kan. 104. p. 2097. 
 Smith V. AVilliamson, 1 1 N. J. L. 313. p. 1903. 
 Smith V. AVilliugham, 44 Ga. 200. pp. 1978, 
 
 1979. 
 Smith V. AVilson, 3 Barn. & Ad. 728. p. 842. 
 Smith V. AVise, 58 111. 143. p. 1005. 
 Smith V. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575. p. 343. 
 Smith t'. A'arvaii, 69 Ind. 445; s. c. 35 Am. 
 
 Rep. 232. pp. 409, 411. 
 Smith V. Zent, 59 Ind. 362. p. 1196. 
 Smith V. Zent, 77 Ind. 474. p. 2044. 
 Smith, Ex parte, 53 Cal. 204. p. 152. 
 Smith, Ex parte, 28 Ind. 47. pp. 132, 135, 147. 
 Smith, Ex parte, 94 U. S. 485. pp. 136, 147. 
 Smith's Appeal, 52 Mich. 415. p. 1671. 
 Smoot V. AVetumpka, 24 Ala. 112. p. 1225. 
 SmuU V. Jones, 6 AVatts & S. (I'a.) 122. p. 57. 
 Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 404. pp. 1726, 1728. 
 SmyrI V. Kiolon, 2 Bailey (S. C), 421. pp. 
 
 1322, 1346. 
 Smyth V. Craig, 3 AVatts & Serg. (Pa.) 18. ]>. 
 
 8.54. 
 Snedeker v. AVarring, 12 N. T. 170. p. 344. 
 Sneed v. OsboTu, 25 Cal. 627. p. 563. 
 Snell V. Ilarri-son, S3 Mo. 651. p. 1712. 
 Snell V. Trustees &c., 58 111. 290. p. 2053. 
 Snellingr. Darrell, 17 Ga. 141. p. 2067. 
 Snider r. Adams Kxp. Co., 63 Mo. 376. p. 
 
 Snider v. Myers, 3 AV. Va. 195. p. 2097. 
 Snodgras.s v. Hunt, 15 lud. 274. pp. 42, 2091. 
 Snook V. Southwood, Kyan & Moo. 429. p. 
 
 25. 
 Snow V. Allen, Stark. 502. p. 1197. 
 Snow V. Crowe, 2 Utah, 172. p. 2099. 
 Snow V. Batchelder, 8 Cush. (Maes.) 51.3. p. 
 
 237. 
 Snow V. Grace, 29 Ark. 131. p. 452. 
 Snow V. Paine, 111 Mass. 520. ii. 528. 
 Snowr. Penobscot Iliver Ice Co., 77 Me. .55. 
 
 p. 1704. 
 Snowdeu v. State, 7 Baxter (Tenn.), 482. p. 
 
 86. 
 Snowdcn r. Craig, 20 la. 477. p. 2068. 
 Snyder w. Hanni)jal&c. K. Co., 60 Mo. 413. 
 
 p. 808. 
 Snvder v. Iowa Citv, 40 la. 646. p. 176. 
 Snyder ». Kurtz, 61 Iowa, 593. p. 849. 
 Snyder v. Leibengood, 4 Pa. St. 30,5. p. 880. 
 Snvder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 295. p. 
 
 332. 
 
 Snyder v. Raah, 40 Mo. 166. p. 185. 
 Snyder v. Railway Co., 11 W. A'a. 14. p. 1254. 
 Snyder v. Snyder, 50 Ind. 492. p. 324. 
 Snyder r. United Slates, 112 U. S. 216. pp. 
 
 2003, 2005. 
 Suyder v. A'an Natha, 7 N. J. L. 25. p. 700. 
 Snyder v. AVitt, 15 Pa. St. 59. n. 1669. 
 Sodusky r. Me(;ee, 5 .1. J. Afarsli. (Ky.) 621. 
 
 pp. 42, 214, 219, 240, 264, 282, 703, 710. 
 Sohn V. Canibern, 106 Ind. 302. p. 2042. 
 Solin r. Marion &c. B. Co., 73 Ind. 77. pp. 
 
 2139, 2140. 
 Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48. pp. 68. 97, 
 
 110,125,1574, 1765,1801. 
 Solarte 4'. Melville, 7 Barn. & Cres. 431. pp. 
 
 886, 1643, 16.58. 
 Solarte v. Palmer, 5 Moore & P. 475. p. 945. 
 Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393. p. 1068. 
 Solomon U. Co. v. Jones, 34 Kan. 443; s. c. 8 
 
 Pac. Rep. 731. p. 2038. 
 Soltan r. De Held, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133. pp. 
 
 1383, 1398. 
 Somer.s v. Balabrega, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 164. p. 
 
 192. 
 Somerville v. Donaldson, 26 Minn. 75. p. 
 
 2102. 
 Sommer V. AA'ilt, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 19. p. 
 
 1197. 
 Soper V. Medberry, 24 Kan. 128. p. 2073. 
 Sopris V. Truax. 1 Col. 91. p. 1637. 
 Soria r. State, 2 Tex. App. 297. ]>. 1903. 
 Sorrelle v. Craig, 'J Ala. 534. pp. 449,454, 455, 
 
 456. 
 Souder v. Lippincott, 48 :N. J. L. 437. p. 610. 
 Soulden v. A'an liensselaer, 9 AVend. (N. Y.) 
 
 297. p. 966. 
 Soule V. Barlow, 49 A"t. 329. p. 1045. 
 South V. Thomas, 7 T. B. Mon. (Kv.) 60. p. 
 
 2095. 
 South &c. R. Co. V. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606. pp. 
 
 1:521, 1345, 1347, 1361. 
 South &c. R. Co. V. AYood, 71 Ala. 215 ; s. c. 46 
 
 Am. Rep. 309; 66 Ala. l67; 41 Am. Rep. 749. 
 
 l)p. 1331, 1332, 1334, 1335. 
 South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260. p. 
 
 818. 
 South Park Commissioners v. Trustees, 107 
 
 111. 489. p. 238. 
 South Bend v. Hardy, 98 Ind. 577. pp. 261, 
 
 264, 282, 409, 420, 1278. 
 Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 254. 
 
 pp. 261, 282. 
 Souther r. State, 18 Tex. App. 352. p. 1703. 
 Southern Express Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19. 
 
 pp. 1321, 1363. 
 Southern Express Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822. 
 
 pp. l:!44, 13o0. 
 Southern Ins. & Trust Co. v. Lewis, 42 Ga. 
 
 588. pp. 1633, 1681. 
 Southern Life Ins. Co. v. AA'ilkinson, 53 Ga. 
 
 5.35. p. 1633. 
 Southey v. Nash, 7 Carr. & P. 632. p. 254. 
 Southwark Ins. Co. v. Knight, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 
 
 327. p. 570. 
 Southwestern Freight Co. v. Stanard, 44 
 
 yio. 71. p. 912. 
 St uthwick V. McGovern, 28 Iowa, 533. p. 
 
 1103. 
 Souverwelnv. Jones, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 335. 
 
 1). 725. 
 Spain V. State, 59 Miss. 19. p. 66. 
 Spain r. State, 64 Tenn. 514. )). 1904. 
 Sjialding v. Taylor, 1 Mo. App. 34. pp. 825, 
 
 828. 
 Spanaglo v. Bellinger. 38 Oal. 278. p. 2075. 
 Spangler r. Brown, 26 Oh. St. 389. p. 2053. 
 Spangler v. Jacob, 14 111. 297. J). 819. 
 Spann v. Baltzell. 1 Kla, 302. p. 642. 
 Si)auu V. Clark, 47 Ga. 369. p. 2076.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxli 
 
 Sparbawk v. Union Passenger R. Co., 54 Pa. 
 
 St. 401. p. 1399. 
 Sparks r. Com., 3 Bush (Ky.), 113. p. 1573. 
 Sparks r. Heritage, 45 lud. 66. p. 2089. 
 Sparks f. Slate, 59 Ala. 82. pp. 89,91, 2J1, 319. 
 Sparrow r. Turner, 2 Wils. 3ii6. p. 25. 
 Sparrowhawkr. Sparrowliawk, 6 X. Y.'Week. 
 
 Dig. 281 ; s. c. 11 Hun (N. Y.), 528. p. 561. 
 Spauldiug r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 33 "Wis. 589. 
 
 pp. 1210, 1668. 
 Spauldiug V. Hollenbeck, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 80. 
 
 p. 883. 
 Sp'aulding r. Hollenbeck, 35 N. Y*. 204. p. 583.' 
 Spauldiug V. Hood 8 Cush. (Mass.) 602. pp. 
 
 218, 2J1. 
 Spauldiug r. People, 10 Paige (>r. Y'.),284; s. 
 
 c. 7 Hill (X. Y" ), 301 ; 4 How. Pr. (X. Y'.) 21. 
 
 pp. 132, 134, 151. 
 Spear r. Richardson, 37 X. H. 24. p. 498. 
 Spear I'. Spencer, 1 G. Greene (Iowa), 534. 
 
 pp. 60, 102. 
 Spears v. Clark, 6 Blackf. and.") 167. p. 2117. 
 Spears v. Forrests, 15 Vt. 435. p. 450. 
 Spears '.'. Ledergerber, 56 Mo. 465. p. 191. 
 Spears v. Mt. Ayr, 66 la. 721. p. 2068. 
 Specht V. Howard, 16 Wall. 564. p. 316. 
 Speck V. Kiggin, 40 Mo. 405. p. 1093. 
 Speed V. Herrin, 4 Mo. 356. p. 1600. 
 Speerr. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. St. 376. p. 
 
 819. 
 Speiden v. State. 3 Tex. App. 156. p. 94. 
 Spence v. Hoinian, 30 Ga. 646. p. 2ii83. 
 Speuce V. Oustott, 3 Tex. 147. p. 1747. 
 Spence r. Spence, 4 "Watts (Pa.), 165. pp. 
 
 1938, 1942, 1962. 
 Spence v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 539. p. 73. 
 Spence r. Stuart, 3 East, 89. p. 188. 
 Spenceley v. De AVillott, 3 Smith (K. B.;,322. 
 
 p. 1923. 
 Spenceley v. De "Willott, 2 Lewin C. R. 155 u. ; 
 
 s. c. 7 East, 110. pp. 407, 414, 416, 430. 
 Spencer v. De France, 3 G. Greene (la.), 216. 
 
 pp. 89,111. 
 Spencer v. Illinois Central R. Co., 29 Iowa, 
 
 55. pp. 1254, 1303. 
 Spencer r. Long, 39 Cal. 700. p. 2099. 
 Spencer v. McMa.-^ters, 16 HI. 405. p. 1470. 
 Spencer v. Milwaukee &c. It. Co., 17 Wis. 487. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Spencer r. St. Paul &C.-R. Co., 22 Minn. 30. 
 
 p. 559. 
 Spencer v. Thistle. 11 Xeb. 228. p. 2087. 
 Spencer v. Trafford, 42 Md. 1. pp. S05, 1914. 
 Spencer 1-. Utica &c. R. Co., 5 Barb. (X. Y'.) 
 
 337. p. 1225. 
 Spencer, In re, 4 McArthur (D. C.),433. p. 
 
 163. 
 Speugler v. Davy, 15 Gratt. ("\'a.) 381. p. 
 
 1199. 
 Speusley v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 62 "Wis. 443. 
 
 p. 1781. 
 Sperry v. Dickinson, 82 Ind. 132. p. 2058. 
 Sperry v. Miller, 16 X. Y. 407. p. 961. 
 Sperry v. Moore, 42 Mich. 353. p. 368. 
 Sperry v. Wilcox, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 279. p. 
 
 1319. 
 Spies V. People, 122 III. 1 ; s. c. 12 -X. East. 
 
 Rep. 865. pp. 63, 124, 130. 
 SpinuertJ. New York &c. R. Co., 67 X. Y. 153. 
 
 p. 1309. 
 Spittorf r. State (Ind.), 8 North East. Rep. 
 
 911. p. 52. 
 Spivey v. State, 26 Ala. 90. p. 1535. 
 Spofford r. Harlow, 3 Allen (Mass.), 176. 
 
 pp. 1209, 1210. 
 Spoflford V. AVeston, 29 Me. 140. p. 1093. 
 Spoford's Case, Clayton, 78. p. 85. 
 Spong r. Lesher, 1 Yeates (Pa. ) , 326. p. 85. 
 Spooiiemore v. Cables, 66 Mo. 579. p. 1008. 
 
 Spooner, Ex parte, 3 X. Y. Citv Hall Rec. 
 
 109. p. 172. 
 Spoor V. Spooner, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 281. p. 
 
 1989. 
 Spottiswood r. "Weir, 66 Cal. 529; s. c. 6 Pac 
 
 Hep. 381. p. 2084. 
 Spradliiig v. Conway, 51 Mo. 51. p. 1074. 
 Sprague v. Cadwell, 12 Barb. (X. Y.) 518. p. 
 
 433. 
 Sprague v. Craig, 51 111. 289. p. 721. 
 Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Evans, 15 Md. 54. 
 
 pp. 354, 984, 1058. 
 Springdale Cemetery Assn. v. Smith, 24 111. 
 
 480. p. 1757, 1815. 
 Springer r. Bowdoiuham, 7 Me. 442. pp.1249, 
 
 1748, 1749. 
 Springer r. State, 34 Ga 379. p. 1927. 
 Siiringlield v. Dovle, 76 111. 202. p. 1249. 
 Springfleld v. LeClaire, 49 111. 476. p. 1247. 
 Springfield v. Sleeper, 115 Mass. 587. p. 204. 
 Siiringtieldi7. "Worcester, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 52. 
 
 p. 796. 
 Springiield &c. R. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258. 
 
 p. 238. 
 Sprouce v. Com., 2 Ya.. Cas. 375. pp. 69, 101, 
 
 115. 
 Spyer v. The Mary Belle Roberts, 2 Sawy. 
 
 (U. S.) 1. pp. 1322,1345,1346,1356. 
 Si>urck r. Crook, 19 111. 415. p. 1988. 
 Spurr r. ghelburne, 131 Mass. 429. p. 2021. 
 Scpiire r. Central Park &c. R. Co., 4 Jones & 
 
 Sp. (X. Y.) 436. p)). 1225, 1232. 
 Squire V New York &c. R. Co., 98 Mass. 239. 
 
 p. I.i60. 
 Squires v. Anderson. 54 Mo. J93. p. 831. 
 St. Anthony Falls W. P. Co. v. Eastman,20 
 
 .Minn. 277. p. 91. 
 Slaak r. Sigelkow, 12 "Wis. 234. p. 1072. 
 Staat r. l':vans, 3J 111. 455. p. 890. 
 Staats V. Burke, 16 Ind. 44§. p. 1646. 
 Slaats, Ex parte, 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 76. p. 146. 
 Stack r. Portsmouth, 52 >. H. 224. p. 1247. 
 Stackhouse r. O'Hara, 14 Pa. St. 88. p. 191. 
 Stackus r. Xew York Central i&c. R. Co., 79 
 
 N. Y. 464. p. 1211. 
 Stacy r. Cobbs, 36 111. 349. p. 1637. 
 Staff, In re, 63 Wis. 285; s. c. 53 Am. Rep. 285. 
 
 p. 2. 
 Stafford v. Bacon, 1 Hill (X. Y'.), 532. p. 1703. 
 Stafford v. Fargo, 35 111. 481. \). 385. 
 Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591. p. 1983. 
 Stagner v. State, 9 Tex. App. 440. pp. 82, 101, 
 
 103. ■ ff , , 
 
 Stahl r. Berger, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 170. p. 
 1033. '• ' f 
 
 Staiuinger v. Andrews, 4 Xev. 59. p. 1141. 
 Staley r. Barhite, 2 Caines (X. Y'.i, 221. p. 
 
 1904. ^ 
 
 Stall r. Catskill Bank. 18 "Wend. (X. Y'.) 466. 
 
 p. 328. 
 Stalls V. State, 28 Ala. 25. p. 91. 
 Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450. p. 471. 
 Stamper v. Hayes, 25 Ga. 546. p. 1600. 
 Stamper v. Johnson, 3 Tex. 1. p. 869. 
 Stampofski iJ. Steffens, 79 111. 303. pp. 1969. 
 
 1976. ^ '■ 
 
 Staubro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. (X. Y'.) 270. d 
 
 409. ' ■ 
 
 Stancell v. Kenan, 33 Ga. 56. p. 1902. 
 Standard Oil Co. v. Van Etten, 107 U. S. 325 
 
 p. 437. 
 Stanford v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45. p. 1622. 
 Standcu r. Standen, 2 Ves. Jun. 589. p. 841 
 Stanley r. Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala. 652. pn. 
 
 942,943,949,1060. ^^ 
 
 Stanley v. Bunce, 27 Mo. 269. p. 1436. 
 Stanley r. Sutherland, 54 Ind. 339. pp. 563. 
 
 17.30. ' ' 
 
 Stanley r. Sutherland, 55 Ind. 339. p. 1984.
 
 cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Stansbnry v. Marks, 2 Hall. (Pa.) 313. pp. 
 
 143, liK). 
 Stanton I'. Bannister, 2 Vt. 464. p. 1715. 
 Stantou County v. Caulield, 10 Neb. 390. p. 
 
 2051. 
 Stanton v. Delaware Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Sandf. 
 
 (N.Y.)6H2. i).5sn). 
 Stanton v. State, 13 Ark. 317. pp. 19S2, 19S4. 
 Stape r. People, Si N. Y. 390. p. 4S1. 
 Staples r. Parker, 41 P.arb. (X.Y.)648. p. 194. 
 Slaplctou's Case, 8 IIow. St. Tr. .503. p. 45. 
 Starin r. Kcllv, S8 N. Y. 318. ]i. 345. 
 Stark r. P.arrett, 15 Cal. 361. p. 827. 
 Stark r. Lancaster, .^17 X. H. 88. pp. 1221,1247. 
 Stark r. State, 6;5 Ind. 285. p. 1.566. 
 Starks ?-. People, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 106. pp. 
 
 396, 397,471,479, 488. 
 Staruer r. State, 61 Ind. 360. pp. 2050, 2052. 
 Starrett v. Biirkhalter, 86 Ind. 439. p. 1709. 
 Startup V. McDonald, 6 Man. & G. 593. pp. 
 
 1126, 1127. 
 State V. Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185. pp. 1539, 1541. 
 State V. Abrams, 11 Ore. 169. pp. .529, 710, 745. 
 State V. Adair, 66 N. C. 298. pp. 85, 91. 
 State V. Areola, 11 la. 246. pii. 1945, 1994. 
 State V. Achey, 64 Ind. 69. pp. 1569, 1571, 
 
 1888. 
 State V. Adams, 20 Kas. 311. p. 677. 
 State V. Adams, 76 Mo. 605. p. 2065. 
 State V. Adaui>. 84 Mo. 310; s. c. 12 Mo. App. 
 
 436. p)). 21149, 2iC)U. 
 State V. All Cliuev, 14 Ncv. 79. pp. 267, 659. 
 State V. Ah Lee, 8 Ore . 214. pp. 678, 1841. 
 Stale V. Ah Tong, 7 Nev. 148. p. 210. 
 State V. Alderson,10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 523. p. 19. 
 State V. Alfred, 31 Conn. 40. p. 307. 
 State r. Alexander, 66Me. 131. pp. 1563,1569. 
 State r. Alexander, 66 IMo. 148. pp. 1886, 1984. 
 State V. Allen, 1 Ala. 444. p. 31. 
 State V. Allen, 46 Conn. 531 ; s. c. 10 Reporter, 
 
 107. pp. 76, 114. 
 State V. Allen, 47 Conn. 121. p. 27. 
 State?-. Allen, 22 Mo. 318. p. 1171. 
 State r. Anderson, 8 Crim. Law Mag. 519; s. c. 
 
 89 Mo. 312. p. 527. 
 State V. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65. pp. 721, 727. 
 Stater. Anderson, 30 La. Ann., Pt. 1, 557. 
 
 p. 830. 
 State V. Anderson, 1 Nev. 266. p. 1924. 
 State V. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265. pp. 87, 89, 106, 
 
 113. 
 State V. Anderson, 10 Ore. 448. pp. 505, 710, 
 
 745. 
 State V. Anderson, 86 Mo. 309. p. 1851. 
 State v. Anderson, 2 Bailey (S. C), 565. p. 
 
 1903. 
 State V. Andrew, Phil. L. (N. C.) 205. p. 296. 
 State V. Angel, 7 Ired. L. (N. C.) 27. p. 1630. 
 States. Ankrlm, Tappan (Ohio), 80. p. 100. 
 State r. AntboMv, 7 Ired.L. (N. C.) 234. p. 54. 
 State V. Antonio, 4 Hawks (N. C), 200. p. 7. 
 State V. Arata, 32 La. Ann. 193. p. 33. 
 State V. Archer, 48 Iowa, 310. pp. 167, 170. 
 State r. Arden, 1 Bay (S. C), 487. p. 648. 
 State V. Arnold, 12 Iowa, 479. pp. 33, 64, 102. 
 State V. Arrington, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 571. p. 
 
 1911. 
 State v. Arthur, 23 la. 430. p. 1669. 
 State V. Arthur, 39 la. 631. p. 21. 
 State V. Arthur, 2 Dev. (X. 0.) 217. pp. 37, 45, 
 
 129. 
 State r. Aver, 23 X. II. 301. pp. 71, 123,124, 
 
 1914, 1980, ]9a') 1990. 
 State V. Askins, 33 La. Ann. 1253. p. 2. 
 State V. P.abb, 76 Mo. .504. j). 1073. 
 State V. Babcock, 1 Conn. 401. pp. 117, 1903, 
 
 1906. 
 State V. Baber, 74 ^fo. 292. p. 73. 
 State V. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 586. pp. 744, 749. 
 
 State V. Ballev, 54 la. 414. p. 287. 
 state V. BaileV, 2 X. J. L. 415. p. 264. 
 Stale V. Bailev, 4 La. Ann. 376. p. 1780. 
 Slate f. Bailey, 57 Mo. 131. pp. 1669, 1671, 
 
 1677. 
 State r. Baker, 63 N. C. 276. p. 1973. 
 State V. Balch, 31 Kjui., 465; s. c. 2 Pac. Rep. 
 
 609. p. 789. 
 Staler. Baldwin, 1 Const. Rep. (S. C.) 296. 
 
 pp. 47, 102. 
 State r. V.aldwin, 2 ITill (S! C), 379. p. 30. 
 J^tate v. Baldwin, 80 N. C. 390. p. 54. 
 Slate r. lialdwin, 1 Dev. & Batt. (N. C.) 197. 
 
 p. 1384. 
 State r. I?aldev, 17 la. 39. p. 1929. 
 State r. Ballerie, 11 La. Ann. 81. p. 1524. 
 State V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 24 Md. 84. p. 
 
 1231. 
 State r. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 367. 
 
 p. 1577. 
 State r. Bancroft, 22 Kan. 170. p. 124. 
 State r. Banks (Me.), 3 New Eng. Rep. 240. 
 
 pp. 787,788. 
 State V. Banks, 73 Mo. 592; s. c. 10 Mo. App. 
 
 111. pp. 528, 771, 1694. 
 State V. Barham, 82 Mo. 67. p. 763. 
 State r. Barnes, 34 La. Ann. 395. p. 79. 
 State r. Barrontine, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 
 
 553. p. 45. 
 State V. Bartlctt, 55 Me. 200. pp. 787, 788, 
 State V. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224. p. 1893. 
 State r. Bartlctt, 47 Me. 3(^8. p. 1781. 
 Stale V. Barton, 19 IMo. 227. p)). 1903, 1906. 
 State r. Barton, 8 Mo. App. 15; s. c. 71 Mo. 
 
 288. pp. 75, 78. 
 State V. Bassernian, 54 Conn. 88. p. 2002. 
 Stale V. Baumbagcr, 28 Minn. 229. p. 1566. 
 State r. Beal, 67 Ind. 345. p. .526. 
 State V. Beasley, o2 La. Ann. 1162. p. 110. 
 State V. Beatly, 4 La. Ann. 1226. p. 1990. 
 State V. Beauchamp, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299. p. 
 
 91. 
 Stale V. Belcher, 13 So. Car. 4.59. pp. Ill, 129. 
 Slate V. Bell, 70 Mo. 633. p. 1903. 
 State V. Beneko, 9 Iowa, 203. p. 4. 
 State V. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154. p. 1544. 
 State V. Benjamin, 7 La. Ann. 47. p. 167. 
 Stale V. Bennett, 14 La. Ann. 651. pp. 17, 64, 
 
 102. 
 Stale r. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 196. pp. 
 
 25, 45,46, 73, 82, 84, 98, 113, 125, 127, 129. 
 State r. Berlin, 24 La. Ann. 46. pp. 676, 1970. 
 Stale V. Bilausky, 3 ^linn. 246. pp. 282. 
 State r. Bill, 15 La. Ann. 114. pp. 64, 102. 
 State V. Bixley, 39 la. 465. ]>. 2077. 
 State V. Blackwell, 10 So. Car. 35. p. 134. 
 State V. Blan, 69 Mo. 317. p. 2048. 
 State r. Bland, 97 N. C. 438. pp. 1.551, 1552. 
 State r. Blocker, 14 Ala. 450. p. 171. 
 State r. Blue, 84 X. C. 807. p. 1.5.33. 
 Staler. Blunt (Mo.), 4 S. AV. Rep. 394. p. 
 
 1836. 
 State r. Boatwright, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 407. 
 
 ].. 91. 
 State V. Bohan, 19 Kan. 28. pp. 33, 1539, 1541, 
 
 1.548, 1765, 1769. 
 State i: Bone, 7 Jones. X,. (N. C.) 121. pp. 
 
 45, 74. 
 State V. Boon, 80 N. C. 461; s. c. 82 N. C. 637. 
 
 pp. 110,111. 119. 
 State c. Borowskv, 11 Nev. 119. p. 6. 
 State r. Bowden, 71 Me. 89. p. 113. 
 State r. Bowers, 17 Iowa, 46. p. 92. 
 State r. Bowman, 78 N. C. .509, pp. 601, 502. 
 State r. Bradley, 6 La. Ann. 560. pp. 1943, 
 
 1957, 1982. 
 State r. Bradv, S7 Mo. 142. p. 394. 
 State r. Braisford, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 1. p. 732. 
 State V. Branuon, 45 Mo. 329. pp. 1903, 1906.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 State V. TJraustetter, 65 Mo. 149. pp. 1964, 
 
 1965, 19t>i. 
 State V. Braswell, S2 X. C. 693. p. 741. 
 State V. Brazil, 2 Ga. Dec. 107. p. 1914. 
 State r. Breaux. 32 La. Ann. 222. pp. 81, 129., 
 State V. Breeden, 5S Mo. 507. pp. 448, 1642. 
 State r. Brette, 6 La. Auu. 652. pp. 70, 1909, 
 
 1978, 1984. 
 State r. Bridges, 29 Kan. 138. pp. 1822, 1828. 
 State t'. Bridgmau, 49 Vt. 202. p. 299. 
 State V. Brooks, 9 Ala. 9. p. 31 . 
 State V. Brook.*, 92 Mo. 542. pp. 1900, 2067. 
 State V. Brooks (Mo.), 5 S. AV. Rep. 258. p. 
 
 124. 
 State V. Brooks, 30 X. J. L. 356. pp. 17, 18. 
 State c. Brookshire, 2 Ala. 203. p. 258. 
 State V. Brown, 12 Minn. 538. p. 1890. 
 State V. Brown, 15 Kan. 400. ]). 116. 
 State V. Brown, 22 Kan. 222. p. 1917. 
 State r. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 505. p. ii9. 
 State V. Brown, 12 Minn. 538. pp. 20, 94, 111. 
 State r. Brown, 61 .Alo. 367. p. 1545. 
 State f. Brown, 71 JIo. 454. pp. 77, 78. 
 State V. Brown, 67 N. C". 435. p. 1642. 
 t*tate r. Brown, 3 Sirob. L. (S. C.) 508. p. 84. 
 State r. Brownilold, 15 Mo. App. 5H3. p. 787. 
 State V. Bruce, 48 la. 533. p. 1878. 
 State V. Bruin, 34 Mo. 537. pp. 1892, 1895. 
 State V. tiraintrton, 22 La. Ann. 9. p. 125. 
 State r. Bucklev, 40 ( oun. 247. p. 1527. 
 State r. Buckner. 25 Mo. 167. pp. 16, 17, 26. 
 State r. Bulla (Mo.).6 West.Eep. 440. p. 526. 
 State r. Ballard, 16 X. H. 139. p. 1929. 
 State r. Bullock, 63 X. C. 570. pp. 21, 126. 
 State r. Bulluck, 91 X. C. 614. p. 1542. 
 State r. Buntrer, 14 La. Ann. 461. pp. 17, 66, 
 
 74,75, 76, 116, 118. 
 State V. Burgwvn, 87 X. C. 572. pp. 294, 296. 
 State r. Burke, 30 Iowa, 332. p. 1.544. 
 State i\ Burnett, 81 Mo. 119. p. 2048. 
 State r. liurns, 3.j Kan. .390. ii. 1576. 
 State V. Burns, 33 Mo. 48 !. p. 1909. 
 State r;. Burns, 85 Mo. 47: s. c. 16 Mo. App. 
 
 State V. Butler. 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) S3, p. 184. 
 State r. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 297. pi>. 1563, 1575, 
 
 1832, 1892, 1897. 
 State V. Brvan, 40 la. 379. p. 87. 
 State c. Bryan, 34 Kan. 64. p. 1576. 
 State r. Brvant, 55 Mo. 75. p. 1548. 
 State r. Brvant (Mo.), 6 S. AV. Bep. 102. p. 78. 
 State r. Ca'in, 2 Jones L. (X. C.) 20i. p. 1670. 
 State V. Cain, 20 AV. Va. 710. pp. 1548, 1570, 
 
 1891, 1942. 
 State r. Caldwell, 3 La. Ann. 435. p. 1983. 
 State r. Calvert, 32 La. Ann. 224. p. 127. 
 State r. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172. pp. 
 
 29 89. 
 Statle v. Cardoza, 11 So. Car. 195. pp. 37, 355, 
 
 364. 
 State V. Carland, 90 X'. C. 668. pp. 49, 1848. 
 State V. Carlisle, 57 AIo. 102. p. 17S6. 
 State V. Carman, 63 la. 130; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 
 
 741. p. 2. 
 State r. Carr, 43 Iowa, 420. p. 1564. 
 State r. Carrick, 6 Xev. 120. ]>. 76. 
 Slate r. Carrigues, 1 Hayw. (X. C.) 241. p. 
 
 1905. 
 State r. Carson, 50 Ala. 134. !>. 75. 
 State V. Carstaphen, 2 Hayd. (X. C.) 238. p. 
 
 1990. 
 State V. Cartright, 20 AV. Va. 43. p. 1985. 
 State V. Catlin, 3 Vt. 530. p. 1717. 
 State r. Caullield, 23 La. Ann. 148. pp. 116, 
 
 1918, 1927, 1930, 1978. 
 Slate V. Cavanaugli, 76 Mo. 54. p. 20. 
 State r Caveness, 78 X. C. 484. pp. 710, 739, 
 
 746, 763. 
 State V. Cazeau, 8 La. Ann. 109. p. 37. 
 
 735, 
 
 pp. 
 
 State )•. Certain Intoxicating Liquors &c. 
 
 (Me.), 12 Atl. Rep. 794. p. 2059. 
 State V. Chadbourne, 74 Me. 506. p. 44 
 State r. Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129; s. c. 1 S. 
 
 AV. Rep. 145. ]). 531. 
 State r. Chandler, 36 La. Ann. 177. p. 2049. 
 state V. Chajnnan, 6 Xev. 320. p. 95. 
 State V. Chatham X'at. Bank, 80 Me. 626. p. 
 
 126. 
 State V. Cheek, 13 Ired. L. (X". C.) 114. p. 
 
 364. 
 State V. Cherry. 63 X. C. 493. pp. 469, 479. 
 State V. Chevallier, 36 La. Ann. 81. pp. 1763, 
 
 1764. 
 State V. Christian, 66 Mo. 143. p. 1574. 
 State V. Christian, 30 La. Arm. 367. pp. 84, 
 
 128. 
 State V. Clark, 16 Ind. 97. p. 448. 
 State r. Clark, 32 La. Ann. 559. p. 65. 
 State r. Clark, 18 Mo. App. 531. p. 1536. 
 State V. Clark, 42 At. 629. pp. 67, 77. 
 State r. Clark, 29 X. J. L. 96. p. 1537. 
 State V. Clarkson, 3 Ala. 378. p. 31. 
 State 1-. Claudius, 1 Mo. App. 551. pp. 
 
 763. 
 State V. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298. pp. 787. 788. 
 State V. Clements, 32 3Ie. 279. p. 1542. 
 State V. demons, 51 la. 274; s. c. 1 X. AV. 
 
 Rep. 546. p. 1800. 
 State V. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 
 
 506. pi». 448, .524. 526, 531. 
 State V. Clvburn, 16 S. C. 37.5. p. 311. 
 State V. Cbckman,2 AVinst. (X. C.) 95. 
 
 74, 115. 
 State r. Cohn, 9 X"ev. 179. pp. 524, 525. 
 State V. Cole, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 626. 
 State V. Cole, 94 X. C. 959. p. 294. 
 State r. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691. 
 
 310,312. 
 State r. Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237. 
 
 101,111, 114. 
 State i: Coleman, 20 S. C. 441. pp. 72, 73. 82. 
 state r. Collins, 32 la. 36. pp. 438, 1548. 
 State V. Collins, 33 Kan. 77. pp. 375, 398. 
 State v. Collins, 70 X. C. 241. pp. 74, 705, 706, 
 
 711,712. 
 State r. Collins. 15 S. C. 373; s. c. 40Am. 
 
 Kep. 697. pp. 3.54, 363. 
 State V. Cohvell, 3 R. I. 132. p. 361. 
 State r. Comstock, 20 Kan. 650. pp. 70S, 744, 
 
 749. 
 State V. Conlev 39 Me. 78. p. 40. 
 State r. Conwav, IS Mo. 321. p. 1566. 
 State f. Cook, 20 La. Ann. 145. p. 16. 
 State V. Cook, 84 Mo. 40. p. 1801. 
 State V. Cooper, 71 Mo. 436. p. 471. 
 State v. Cooper, 22 X. J. L. 52. p. 646. 
 State i\ Cooper, 83 X. C. 671. p. 48. 
 State c. Copp , 1 5 X. H. 212. pj). 142, 148. 
 State r. Core, 70 AIo. 491. pp. 75, 78. 
 State r. Coulter, Wright (Ohio), 421. p. 143. 
 State (.'. Coupenhaver, 30Mo. 430. p. 1982. 
 Stale i: Courtney, 28 La. Ann. 794. pp. 48, 
 
 1 12. 
 State r. Cox, 8 Ark. 436. pp. 4, 6. 
 State V. Cox, 67 AIo. 352. p. 531. 
 State i: Crank, 75 Mo. 406. pp. 1892, 1895. 
 State V. Crank, 2 BaUev (S. C.), 66. p. 84. 
 State r. Craton, 6 Ired. L. (X. C.) 164. pp. 
 
 45, 602. 
 State r. Crawford, 34 AIo. 200. pp. 1S25, 
 
 1846 
 State r. Creasman, 10 Ired. L. (X. C.) 395. 
 
 pp. 91 , 99. 
 Stater. Crosby, Harper Const. Rep. (S. C.) 
 
 90. J). 20. 
 State V. Crosby, 4 La. Ann. 434. p. 1909. 
 State i: Croteau. 2:i Vt. 15. p. 1521. 
 State '•. Crowner, 56 Alo. 149. p. 1562. 
 
 pp. 
 
 p. 19. 
 71, 73, 
 pp. 21, 90,
 
 cxliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State V. Cncucl, 31 X. J. L. -240. pp. lOOS, 1912, 
 
 iy-J:5, 1924, 1973, 1974, 1981, 19>l(). 
 State V. Culler, 82310. 623. p. 77. 
 State r. Cummings, 72 N. C. 409. p. 85. 
 State V. Cunimiugs, o La. Auu. 330. pp. 91, 93. 
 Stater. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594. pp. 1569, 1786, 
 
 1886. 
 Stater. Curtis, 5 Ilumph. (Tenn.) 601. p. 86. 
 State V. Cushing, 29 jNlo. 215. p. 1772. 
 State V. Dale, 8 Ore. 229. p. 27. 
 State v. Dancy, 78 X. C. 437. p. 1642. 
 State V. Danforth, 48 La. 43 ; s. c. 30 Am. Hep. 
 
 387. p. 652. 
 State V. Daniels, 44 X'^. H. 383. pp. 1976, 2062. 
 State V. l)a Hocha, 20 La. Ann. 356. pp. 30, 
 
 31. 
 Stale i: Daubert, 42 Mo. 242. p. 315. 
 Slate r. Davidson, 67 X. C. 119. p. 530. 
 State V. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311. pp. 87, 115. 
 State V. Davis, 29 Mo. 391. p. 75. 
 State V. Davis, 14 Xev. 439. pp. 63, 64, 69, 87, 
 
 102. 
 Stale V. Davis, 80 X'. C. 412. pp. 85, 87, 91, 119, 
 
 125. 
 State r. Dean, 49 la. 74. p. 1566. 
 State V. Dean, 40 Mo. 464. pp. 1032, 1033. 
 Slate r. Decklolts, 19 Ln. 447. pp. 1544, 1890. 
 Slate r. Deo, 14 Minn. 35. p. 398. 
 State V. Dcgonia, 69 Mo. 486. pp. 35, 88, 737, 
 
 740, 1913, 1926. 
 State V. Delong, 12 Iowa, 453. pp. 1!^07, 1948. 
 State V. Deniouchet (La.), 3 S. AV. Kep. 565. 
 
 pp. 5, 39. 
 Stater. Dennin, 32 Tt. 158. p. 490. 
 Stale r. De Kance, 34 La. Ann. 186. p. 73. 
 State r. Desmond, 5 La. Ann. 399. pp. 1902, 
 
 1909. 
 State r. Dcsmouchet, 32 La. Ann. 1241. pp. 
 
 26, 72. 
 Stater. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93. pp. 332, 475,485. 
 Slate r. Dibble, 6 Mo. App. 584. p. 731. 
 State r. Diclj, 2 Winst. (X. C.) 45. p. 763. 
 State r. Dickson, 6 Xan. 211. pp. 81, 1567, 
 
 1568. 
 State V. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438. pp. 740,1569, 
 
 1886. 
 State r. Dictz, 67 la. 220. p. 1777. 
 State r. Dill, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 414. p. 184. 
 State V. Dineen, 10 Minn. 408. pp. 1818, 1825. 
 State r. Diskm, 35 La. Ann. 46. p. 72. 
 State r. Dixon, 75 X. C. 275. p. 1630. 
 State r. Doan,2 Root (Conn.), 451. p. 48. 
 State r. Dodson, 16 S. C. 453. pp. 82, 126, 741. 
 State r. D'Oencii, 31 Mo. 453. p. 1436. 
 State r. Dolling. 37 "Wis. 396. pp. 1903, 1907, 
 
 1908,1991. 
 Stater. Donnegan, 74 Mo. 67. p. 1567. 
 State r. Donnellv, 2 Dutch. (X. J.) 463. p. 
 
 705. 
 State V. Donncly, 9 Mo. App. 519. pp. 825, 
 
 1440. 
 State r. Donovan, 10 Xev. 36. p. 1747. 
 State r. Doon, K. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 1. pp. 
 
 1982, 1984. 
 State V. Doty, 32 N. J. L. 403. pp. 132, 145, 
 
 1923. 
 State V. Doughcrtv, 70 la. 439; s. c. 30 N. W. 
 
 Kep. 685. J). 2075. 
 State r. Dougherty, 1 West. L. J. 271. p. 
 
 1903. 
 Stat e r. Douglass, 7 la. 413. p. 1994. 
 State r. Douglass, 28 I-a. Ann. 425. p. 127. 
 State r. Douglass, 81 Mo. 231. p. 531. 
 State r. Douglass. 63 X. C. 500. p. 110. 
 Stale r. Dove, 10 Ired. L. (X. C) 469. pp. 74, 
 
 95, 98. 
 Stale r. Downer, 21 Wis. 274. p. 1758. 
 State r. Downs, 3 S. W. Kep. 219; s. c. 91 Mo. 
 
 19. pp. 399, 4:iO. 
 
 State r. Dozier, 2 Speers L. (S. C.) 211. pp, 
 
 IS, 19. 
 State r. Draper, 48 Mo. 56. p. 234. 
 State r. Drawdv, 14 Kich. L. (.S. C.) 87. pp. 
 
 1508, 1519, 179.5. 
 State r. Dubord, 2 La. Ann. 732. p. 17. 
 State r. Duestoe, 1 Bay (S. C), 377. pj). 1980, 
 
 1981. 
 State r. DutTv, 15 Iowa, 425. pp. 284, 286. 
 Male V. Dugav, 35 La. Ann. 327. p. 73. 
 State r. Dunijihey, 4 Minn. 438. pp. 91,123, 
 
 124, 1980. 1990. 
 State r. Dunn, IS Mo. 419. pp. 1554, 1571, 
 
 1846. 
 Stale r. Durham, 72 X. C. 447. p. 1973. 
 Stale r. Durien, 29 Kan. 688. ]). 40. 
 State V. Dwire, 25 Mo. 5.53. p. 1770. 
 Slate r. Earlc, 24 La. Ann. 38. )i. 41. 
 State V. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586. p. 1548. 
 State r. Eller, 85 X. C. 585. pp. 61, 294, 296, 
 
 .529. 
 State r. Eldridge, 65 Mo. .584. p. 1980. 
 State V. Ellick, Winst. L. (N. C.) 50. p. 1848. 
 State r. Ellington, 7 Ired. L. (X. C.) 61. pp. 
 
 74,98, 127. 
 State V. Elliott, 45 la. 486; s. c. 2 Am. Crim. 
 
 Kep. 322. pp. 115. -.91). 
 State r. Elliott, 90 Mo. 350; s. c. 2 S. W. Rep. 
 
 411. p. 1801. 
 Stale r. p:ilis, 3 Conn. 186. p. 1566. 
 Slate r. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207. pp. 1554, 1555. 
 Slate r. Elsham, 70 la. 531; s. c. 31 X. W. 
 
 Kep. 66. pp. 1838, 1839, 1877. 
 State r. Emerich, 13 Mo. App. 492. p. 646. 
 Slate V. Emory, 12 Mo. App. 593; s. c. 79 Mo. 
 
 461. p. 740. 
 Slate r. Engles, 13 Oh. 490. pp. 1903, 1911. 
 Stale V. Enoch, 69 Ind. 314. p. 266. 
 State V. Estes, 70 Mo. 428. p. 766. 
 Slate V. Erb, 9 Mo. Ajip. 588. pp. 731, 732. 
 Slate V. Evans, 21 La. Ann. 321, pp. 1902, 
 
 1909. 
 State V. Everage, 33 La. Ann. 120. pp. 5, 39. 
 Slater. Excelsior Distilling Co., 20 Mo. App. 
 
 21. p. 1449. 
 Slate V. Ezell, 41 Tex. 35. p. 425. 
 Stale •('. Fagin, 28 La. Ann. 887. p. 152. 
 Stale r. Farmers" Branch, 36 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 332. p. 1023. 
 Stale r. Farrow, 74 Mo. 531. p. 74. 
 State r. Fay, 43 Iowa, 651. p. 627. 
 State r. Feirrav, 22 La. Ann. 423. pp. 17, 31. 
 State r. Feller, 25 Iowa, 67. l)p. .500,501, 1880. 
 State r. Feller, 32 Ja. 53. pp. 184(i, 1878, 1883. 
 State r. Fenlason, 78 Me. 495. )). 1738. 
 State r. Ferguson, 2 Hill (S. C), 629. p. 1545. 
 State r. First Xal. Bank, 4 Xev. 3,58. p. 2084. 
 Stale r. Fisher, 2 Xott & McCord (S. C.),26i. 
 
 pi). 16, 118. 
 State r. Fitzsimmons, 30 Mo. 236. p. 258. 
 Stale r. Florez, 5 La. Ann. 429. pp. 91, 92. 
 Slate r. Flower, Walker (Miss.), 318. pp. 73, 
 
 74, 99, 100. 
 Stale r. Flovd, 15 IMo. 349. pp. 1681, 1708. 
 Stale r. Five, 26 Me. 312. p. 1319. 
 State r. Foley, 12 Mo. Api). 431. p. 761. 
 Stale r. Folke,2 La. Ann. 744. p. 20. 
 Slate V. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443. pp. 40, 1520, 
 
 1,522. 
 Slate r. Forshner, 43 X. H. 89. p. 11. 
 State r. Forsyth (Mo.), 1 S. W. Rep. 834. p. 
 
 747. 
 State r. Forsythe (Mo.), 6 West. Rep. 438. 
 
 1). 737. 
 State r. Foster, 61 Mo. 549. p. 1891. 
 State r. Foster, 23 X. II. 348. p. 283. 
 Slate r. Fox, Ga. Dec. pt. 1, p. 36. pp. 1906, 
 
 1981. 
 State v. Fox, X. J. L. 244. p. 128.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 State V. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566. pp. 102, 307. 
 State V, Fox, 29 X. J. L. 566. p. 68. 
 State V. France, 76 Mo. 681. pp. 48, 1573. 
 State V. Frank, 23 La. Ann. 213. pp. 1902, 
 
 1907, 1909. 
 State V. Freeman, 5 Conn. 348. p. 1984. 
 State V, Fruze, 28 La. Ann. 657. pp. 1913, 
 
 1920. 
 State V. Fry, 07 la. 478. pp. 1793, 1794. 
 State r. Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. 427. p. 7 
 State V. Fuller, 39 Vt. 74 p. 88. 
 State V. Funck, 17 Iowa, 365. pp. 119, I'JO. 
 State V. Gainer, 2 Ilavw. (N. C.) 140. p. 38. 
 State V. Gaitliur, 77 Mo. 304. p. 2128. 
 State r. Gallowaj-, 5 Coldw. (Tenu. ) 326. pp. 
 
 132,1.50,151. 
 State V. Garrand, 5 Ore. 216. p. 1915. 
 State I'. Garrett, Busbue CX- C.),357. pp. 530, 
 
 659. 
 State V. Gartrell, 14 Ind. 280. p. 1562. 
 State i\ Gates, 9 La. Ann. 94. p. 127. 
 Slate V. Gay, 25 La. Ann. 197. p. 33. 
 State V. Gav, 25 La. Ann. 472. pp. 41, 49. 
 State V. Gedicke, 43 X. J. L. 86. p. 497. 
 State V. Gee, 85 Mo. C47. pp. 1543, 1548, 1567, 
 
 1568, 1569, 1.571, 1.'574, 1770, 1773, 1832, 1990. 
 State V. George, 8 Ired. (X. C.) 324; s. c. 49 
 
 Am. Dec. 392. pp. 489, 2049. 
 State V. George, 8 Itob. (La.) 535. pp. 69, 70, 
 
 73. 
 State V. Gibson, 21 Ark. 140. p. 109. 
 State V. Gi2;her, 23 la. 318. p. 524. 
 State r. Giles, 10 Wis. 101. p. 150. 
 State V. Gill, 14 So. Car. 410. p. 115. 
 State V. Gillick, 7 la. 287. p. 1890. 
 State r. Gillick, 10 la. 98. pp. 70, 1002, 1953. 
 State r. Gilman, 70 Me. 329. p. 2078. 
 State V. Given, 32 La. Ann. 782. p. 111. 
 State V. Glass, 5 Ore. 73. pp. 1860, 1861, 1863, 
 
 1864, 1865, 1869. 
 State V. Glass, 60AVis. 218. p. 528. 
 State V. Goff, Wright (Ohio), 78. p. 143. 
 State V. Godfrey, Brayt. (Vt.) 170. pp. 67, 
 
 100. 
 State V. Golden, 49 la. 49. p. 1898. 
 State V. Grace, 18 Minn. 398. p. 164. 
 State V. Graham, 74 X. C. 616. pp. 647, 660. 
 State V. Graham, 17 X. W. Rep. 192. p. 787. 
 State V. Grant, 79 Mo. 113. p. 526. 
 State V. Graynor (Mo.), 6 West. Rep. 207. p. 
 
 527. 
 State V. Grebe, 17 Kan. 459. p. 1810. 
 State V. Green, 20 Iowa, 424. n. 94. 
 State r. Green, 33 La. Ann. 1408. p. 41. 
 State r. Green, 66 Mo. 640. p. 1550. 
 State V. Greenwade, 72 Mo. 298. p. 75. 
 State V. Gregory, 33 La. Ann. 737. pp. 259, 
 
 Sta'te V. Griffin, 87 Mo. 608. pp. 767, 769, 1548. 
 State V. Groning, 33 Kan. 22. \^:>. 1887, 1897. 
 State V. Groome, 10 la. 308. pp. 113, 117. 
 State r. Guidry, 28 La. Ann. 630. pp. 15, 16, 
 
 32, 70, 63. 
 State V. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 539. p. 17. 
 State V. Gurnee, 14 Kan. 111. p. G09. 
 State V. Gut, 13 Minn. 341. ]>. 31. 
 . State V. Guttiores, 15 La. Ann. 190. p. 4. 
 State V. Guy, 69 Mo. 430. p. 769. 
 State V. Hall, 20 Mo. App. 397. p. 283. 
 State V. Hall, 39 Me. 107. p. 1670. 
 State V. Hall, 26 W. Va. 236. pp. 2056, 2061. 
 State r. Hamilton, 57 la. 698; s. c. 11 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 5. pp. 1793, 1847, 1853. 
 State V. Hamilton, 27 La. Ann. 400. pp. 103, 
 
 115. 
 State V. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520. pp. 234, 448, 
 
 767. 
 State V. Hannibal, 37 La. Ann. 619. pp. 1520, 
 
 1523. 
 
 State V. Hardie. 47 la. 648. p; 1574. 
 
 State V. Hardin, 46 la. 623. pp. 23, 24, 1793, 
 
 1794, 1847. 
 State V. Harding, 46 la. 623. p. 1800. 
 State V. Harding, 2 Bay (S. C), 267. p. 1980. 
 State V. Harkin, 7 Xev. 377. pp. 210, 1649. 
 State V. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446. pp. 1903, 1906. 
 State r. Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 16 W. 
 
 Va. 864. p. 1.32. 
 State V. Harrington, 12 Xev. 125. pp. 527, 
 
 528, 1647. 
 State V. Harris, 30 La. Ann. 90. pp. 20, 111, 
 
 119,120. 
 State V. Harris, 11 la. 414. p. 1891. 
 State V. Harris, 59 Mo. 553. pp. 1569, 1668, 
 
 1708. 
 State V. Harris, 12 Xev. 414. p. 1906. 
 State V. Harris, 7 X. J. L. 361. p. 128. 
 State V. Harris, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 190; s. c. 
 
 Horr. & Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. 276. pp. 
 
 1,539, 1540. 
 State V. Harrison, 5 Jones L. (X. C.) 1-15. p. 
 
 1668. 
 State V. Hartmann, 46 Wis. 248. p. 1953. 
 State r. Hartneit, 75 Mo. 251. p. 408. 
 State V. Hascall, 6 X. H. 352. pp. 30, 34, 110, 
 
 1921,1923,1954, 1976,1990. 
 State V. Hatfleld, 72 Mo. 518. p. 325. 
 State V. Hawkins, 8 Porter (Ala.), 461. p. 
 
 1697. 
 State V. Havden, 51 Vt. 296. p. 123. 
 State V. Hayden, 45 la. 11. pp. 4.38, 1822, 1846, 
 
 1869, 1870. 
 State V. Haves, 78 Mo. 309. p. 1576. 
 State V. Haves, 59 X. H. 450. p. 1007. 
 State V. Hays, 23 Mo. 287. pp. 88, 89, 1786, 
 
 1891. 
 State V. Heaton, 77 X. C. 505. p. 48. 
 State V. Heaton, 23 W. Va. 776. p. 1567. 
 Slate 1-. Hecox, 83 Mo. 531. p. 1.563. 
 State v. Helvenstou, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 48. 
 
 p. 145. 
 State V. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 564. pp. 487, 
 
 1577. 
 State V. Henrick, 62 la. 40. p. 1793. 
 State V. Henry. 24 Kan. 460. p. 1898. 
 State V. Henrv, 15 La. Ann. 297. p. 17. 
 Slate V. llenson, 81 Mo. 384. p. 325. 
 State V. Hernandes, 4 La. Ann. 379. p. 16. 
 State V. Herudou, 1 Murph. (X. C.) 269. p. 
 
 184. 
 State V. Hessians, 50 la. 135. p. 1898. 
 State V. Hester, 2 Jones L. (X^. C.) 83. p. 
 
 1978. 
 State V. Hickman, 75 Mo. 416. p. 763. 
 State V. Hill, 65 Mo. 85. pp. 1567, 1786, 1887, 
 
 1897. 
 State V. Ilinkle, 6Iowa, 380. p. 74. 
 State V. Hodge, 50 X. H. 510. p. 1893. 
 State V. Holding, 1 xMcCord (S. C.), 379. pp. 
 
 145, 146. 
 State V. Hollescheit, ef Mo. 302. pp. 1786, 
 
 1891. 
 State V. Holme, 54 Mo. 153. pp. 1554, 1573, 
 
 1848, 1891. 
 State V. Holt, 90 X. C. 749 ; s. c. 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 544. p. 2. 
 State V. Honig. 78 Mo. 249. p. 717. 
 State V. Hopkins, 1 Bay (S. C.), 372. pp. 117 
 
 122. 
 State V. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425. pp. 769, 1506, 
 
 1918, 1952. 
 state V. Horn, 9 Kan. 119. pp. 1548, 1984, 1994. 
 State V. Horner, 86 Mo. 71. p. 2005. 
 State V. Horner, 16 Mo. App. 191. p. 159. 
 Stale V. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554. pp. 1902, 
 
 1905, 1909, 1911. 
 State V. Hosmer, 85 Mo. 553. p. 1455. 
 State V. Howard, 63 lud. 502. p. 100. 
 
 10a
 
 cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State V. Howard, 14 Kan. 173. p. 154S. 
 State r. Howard, 17 N. H. 171. pp. 68, 69, 73, 
 
 82, 119, 1-23. 
 State V. Howard, 32 Tt. 380. p. 465. 
 State r. Howell, 3 La. Ann. 50. p. 16. 
 State V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518. pp. 42, 43, 71, 74, 
 
 100, 116. 
 State V. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135. p. 1668. 
 State V. Hulf, 11 Jsev. 17. pp. 524, 527, 534, 
 
 535. 
 State V. Hugel, 27 La. Ann. 375. p. 71. 
 State V. Hughes, ?5 Kan. 632 ; s. c. 12 Pac. 
 
 Kep. 28. p. 2075. 
 State V. Hughes, 72 N. C. 25. p. 1384, 1394, 
 
 1397. 
 State V. Hull, 26 la. 292. p. 438. 
 State V. Hunt, 4 La. "Ann. 438. pp. 1909, 1978. 
 State V. Hunt, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) L. 322. p. 161. 
 State V. Hutintj-, 21 Mo. 464. p. 1879. 
 State r. Huxford, 47 la. 18. p. 1576. 
 State V. Hvmer, 15 Nev. 49. p. 584. 
 State V. Igo, 21 Mo. 451). pp. 1903, 1906. 
 State r. Irwin, SO Mo. 249. p. 1758. 
 State V. Ivey, 41 Tex. 38. pp. 91, 92, 94. 
 State r. Jackson, 12 La. Ann. 679. p. 16. 
 State V. Jackson, 37 La. Ann. 768. p. 76. 
 State V. Jackson, 39 Mo. 420. p. 1576. 
 State V. Jacobs, 5 Jones L. (N. C.) 260. pp. 
 
 658, 6.59. 
 State V. Jaynes, 78 X. C. 504. p. 1533. 
 State V. Jeiikins, 32 Kan. 477. p. 31. 
 State V. Jennings, 18 Mo. 435. pp. 1550, 1571. 
 State V. Jennings, 81 Mo. 1S5. pp. 325, 763. 
 State V. Jennings. 15 Kich. L. (S. C.) 176. p. 
 
 48. 
 State V. Johnagen, 53 Iowa, 250. p. 813. 
 State V. Johnson, lOi Ind. 247. p. 1574. 
 State r. Johnson, 30 La. Ann., Pt. II., 904. 
 
 pp. 1520, 1523, 1908. 
 State r. Jolmson, 33 La. Ann. 889. p. 73. 
 State V. Jolinson, Walker (Miss.) , .392. p. 74. 
 State V. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121. [jp. 7t4, 749. 
 State V. Johnson, 33 X. H. 441. p. 303. 
 State V. Johnson, 1 N. J. L. 219. p. 30. 
 State V. Johnson, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 266. 
 
 pp. 1848, 1890. 
 State V. Johnson, 75 N. C. 174. p. 1542. 
 State 17. Johnson, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.) 354. p. 
 
 763. 
 State V. Johnson, 2 Bay (S. C), 385. pp. 132, 
 
 141. 
 State V.Jones, 5 Ala. 666. p. 108. 
 State V. Jones, 64 la. 350. pp. 1756, 1879. 
 State V. Jones, 20 Mo. 58. p. 1.554. 
 State V. Jones, 53 Mo. 488. j). 1553. 
 State V. Jones, 61 Mo. 232. pp. 20, 125, 1694, 
 
 1726. 
 State V. Jones, 64 Mo. 391. pp. 54, 442. 
 State V. Jones, 78 Mo. 283. pp. 1548, 1549, 1567, 
 
 1570, 1573, 1799, 1804, 1836, 1848, 1891. 
 State V. Jones, 86 1Mb. 627. p. 1836. 
 State t». Jones, 7 Nev. 408. pp. 1930, 1931, 
 
 1978. 
 State V. Jones (Xev.), 11 Pac. Rep. 317; s. c. 
 
 19 Xev. 365. pp. 1819, 1857, 1858, 1860. 
 State V. Jones, 77 N. C. 520. pp. 775, 1542, 
 
 1766, 1767. 
 State V. Jones, 80 N. C. 415. p. 82. 
 State V. Judge, 11 La. Ann. 79. pp. 29, 1903. 
 State V. Judges, 32 La. Ann. 1256. p. 151. 
 State V. Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71. pp. 1520, 
 
 1523. 
 
 State V. K , 4 X. H. .562. p. 283. 
 
 State V Kane, 32 La. Ann. 999. pp. 17, 27. 
 State V. Kaufman, 51 Iowa, 578; s. c. 9 Cent. 
 
 L. J. 313. p. 6. 
 State V. Kearlcv, 26 Kan. 77. pp. 1815, 1824. 
 State V. Keatley, 21 Mo. App. 484. p. 2130. 
 Stale V. Keene, 50 Mo. 307. p. 1542. 
 
 State i: KeUcrman, 14 Kan. 135. pp. 466, 1777, 
 
 1778,2097. 
 State V. Kelley, 57 la. 646. pp. 1895, 1898. 
 State V. Kellv, 73 Mo. 608 ; s. c. 9 Mo. App. 612. 
 
 pp. 1892, 1893, 1897. 
 State V. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 571. pp. 1543, 1544. 
 State V. Kennedy, 8 Rob. (La.) 590. pp. 65, 
 
 118, 120, 121. 
 State r. Kennedy, 88 Mo. 341. p. 1895. 
 State r. KenncdV, 7 Nev. 374. pp. 1646, 1647. 
 State V. Ketclie)', 70 X. C. 621. p. 112. 
 State V. Kilgore, 93 X^. C. 533. p. 78. 
 State r. Kimball, 50 Me. 409. pp. 1506, 1951. 
 State V. King, 28 La. Ann. 425. p. 127. 
 State V. King, 44 Mo. 238. p. 1708. 
 State V. King (Xeb.), 37 X. W. Bep. 310. p. 
 
 2060. 
 State V. Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238. pp. 69, 124. 
 State V. Kinlev, 43 la. 294. p. 437. 
 State V. Kinney, 81 Mo. 101. pp. 810, 811. 
 State i\ Kirkuatrick, 63 la. 556. p. 1577. 
 State V. Kline, 54 la. 183; s. c. 6 N. W. Rep. 
 
 184. pp. 1793, 1794, 1847. 
 
 State i\ Klinger, 43 Mo. 127. p. 1879. 
 State V. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224. pp. 16, 20. 
 State V. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148. p. 300. 
 State V. Knight, 43 Me. 11. pp. 47, 95, 1890. 
 State V. Knight, 46 Mo. 83. pp. 2003, 2076. 
 State V. Knight, 61 Mo. 373. p. 34. 
 State r. Koerner, 51 Mo. 174. p. 2049. 
 State r. Krlng, 64 Mo. 591. p. 747. 
 State V. Kring, 74 Mo. 612. pp. 395, 728, 740, 
 
 747. 
 State V. Krum, 32 Kan. 372. p. 396. 
 State V. Lamltert. 93 X. C. 618. p. 119 
 State V. Lamon, 3 Hawks (X. C.), 175. pp. 
 
 26, 27. 
 State V. Lane, 64 Mo. 320. p. 1891. 
 State V. Lane, 1 Ired. L. (X. C.) 113. p. 1545. 
 State r. Lang, 63 Me. 215. p. .530. 
 State V. Lanier, 79 X. C. 622. p. 450. 
 State V. Lantz, 23 Kan. 728. pp. 1917, 1943, 
 
 1944, 1946. 
 State V. Larkin, U Xev. 314. p. 126. 
 State V. Lartigue, 29 La. Ann. 642. pp. 74, 
 
 116. 
 State V. Laurie, 1 Mo. App. 371. p. 1449. 
 State V. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 514. pp. 
 
 100, 101. 
 State V. Lawhorn. 88 X. C. 634. p. 530. 
 State V. Lawlor, 28 Mian. 216. pp. 662, 813, 
 
 1777. 
 State V, Lawrence, 38 Iowa, 51. pp. 74, 75. 
 State V. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574. pii. 787, 788. 
 State ». Laxton, 78 X. C. 564. pp. 203, 318, 
 
 320, 488, 1642. 
 State V. Lee, 22 IMinn. 407. pp. 476, 477. 
 State V. Lee, 66 Mo. 165. pp. 728, 740, 747, 761. 
 State V. Leeper, 78 Mo. 470. p. 1576. 
 State V. Lefaivre, 53 ]Mo. 470. pp. 825. 828. 
 State V. Leicham, 41 Wis. 581. ]). 1.566. 
 State V. Leiclit, 17 la. 28. pp. 60, 64, 102. 
 State V. Leonard, 6 La. Ann. 420. p. 1542. 
 State V. Leiiage, 57 X. H. 245. pp. 297, 298, 
 
 301. 
 Rtate V. Levy, 5 La. Ann. 64. p. 1987. 
 State V. Lewis, 48 la. 579. p. 1576. 
 State V. Lewis, 28 La. Ann. 81. pp. 82, 83, 129. 
 State V. Lewis, 6 Mo. App. 58t. )). 747. 
 State V. Linney, 52 ^lo. 40. p. 1546. 
 State V. Ligon, 7 J'ort. ( Ala.) 167. p. 47. 
 State V. Lopez, 15 Xev. 407. !>. 696. 
 State V. Loi)her, 35 La. Ann. 975. p. 117. 
 State V. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348. pp. 172, 173, 
 
 185, 186, 187, 285. 
 
 State V. Lovenstein, 9 La. Ann. 313. pp. 20, 
 
 129. 
 State V. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412. p. 101. 
 State V. Lull, 37 Mo. 246. pp. 321, 353
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 state r. Lurch. 12 Ore. 99. pp. 531, 532. 
 
 State V. Lvnott, 5 R. I. 295. p. 1642. 
 
 State r. Lvtle, 5 Ired. L. (N. C.) 58. pp. 25, 
 
 1906. 
 State r. Madoil, 12 Fla. 151. pp. 67, 118, 119, 
 
 123, 190(i, 190S. 
 State ('. Maguire, 69 Mo. 197. pp. 1545,1801. 
 State V. Malm, 25 Kan. 186. pp. 1879, 1881. 
 State r. .Alahon, 3 Harr. (Del.) 568. p. 1016. 
 State r. Maine, 27 Conn. 281. p. 1530. 
 State r. Maine &c. R. Co., 76 Mc. 357. p. 1475. 
 State r. Mallon, 75 Mo. 355. pp. 765, 766, 1712. 
 State V. Malov, 44 la. 113. p. 157.5. 
 Stater. Manchester &c. R. Co.,52N. H. 529. 
 
 pp. 1208, 1212, 1221. 
 State V. Mann, 83 Mo. 590. p. 101. 
 State r. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 47o. p. 6. 
 State V. Marshall, 8 Ala. 302. pp. 49, 51. 81, 82 
 
 129. 
 State V. Marshall, 36 Mo. 400. pp. 20, 124, 261 
 
 315, 2055, 2056. 
 State V. Martin, 8 Mo. 102. p. 1616. 
 State V. Martin. 74 Mo. 547. p. 787. 
 State r. Martin, 2 Ired. L. (X. C.) 101. p 
 
 1809. 
 State r. Marvin, 12 Iowa. 499. pp. 1562, 1577 
 State r. Marvin, 35 K. H. 22. p. 300. 
 State r. Massev, 2 Hill (S. C), 379. p. 30. 
 State r. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55. pp. 1.505, 1694, 
 State r. Matthews, 80 N. C. 417. p. 103. 
 State V. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450. pp. 132, 148 
 
 149. 
 State V. Maxwell, 42 Iowa, 210. pp. 1536 
 
 1860. 
 State I'. Mav, 4 Dev. L. (X. C.) 330. p. 316. 
 State V. Mc.Vfee. 64 N. C. 339. p. 105. 
 State V. McAllister, 24 Me. 139. p. 761. 
 State V. McCall, 4 Ala. 643. pp. 537, 538. 
 State r. INIcCartev, 17 Minn. 76. pp. 21, 27. 
 St ite V. McClear" 11 Xov. 39. pp. 4, 42, 51, 70. 
 State V. McCool, 34 Kan. 613. pp. 767, 778. 
 State V. McCoy, 34 Mo. 431. pp. 1879, 1884. 
 State V. McCrea (La.), 3 S. Rep. 380. p. 2050. 
 State V McCurrv, 63 X. C. 33. pp. 35, 1670. 
 State r. McDevitt, 69 la. 549; s. c. 29 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 4.59. p. 1772. 
 State V. McDonald, 65 Me. 466. pp. 437, 439. 
 State V. McDonald. 8 Ore. 113. pp. 117, 119. 
 State V. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456. pp. 119, 
 
 121,124. 
 State V. McDonnell. 32 Vt. 491. p. 1890. 
 State V. McDuffle, .52 Ala. 4. ]>. 138. 
 State r. .McElmurray, 3 Strobh. (S. C.) 33. 
 
 pp. 25^1, r.)0:!. 
 State r. McGee, 36 La. Ann. 206. pp. 317, 
 
 2049. 
 State V. McGinnis, 76 Mo. 326. p. 1801. 
 State V. MeOraw, 74 Mo. .573. p. 531. 
 State V. McGrew, 13 Rich. L. (S. C.) 316. p. 
 
 40. 
 State V. McJunkin, 7 S. C. 21. p. 31. 
 State V. McKee, If^g Ind. 498. p. 2108. 
 State V. ATcLaughlin, 44 la. 82. pp. 559, 1994. 
 State V. McLaughlin, 27 INIo. 111. p. 2097. 
 State r. McLaughlin, 76 i\Io. 320. p. 531. 
 State V. JIcLeau, 11 La. Ann. 546. p. 40. 
 Stater. McLean, 21 La. Ann. 546. pp. 118, 
 
 120. 
 State V. McLendon, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 195. p. 18. 
 State iJ. McLeod, 1 Hawks (X. C), 344. u. 
 
 1985. 
 State V. McXinch, 90 X. C. 695. p. 1549. 
 State V. McXinch, 12 So. Car. 89. ]>. 46. 
 State V. :McQuaige, 5 S. C. 429. jip. 34, 116. 
 State V. Meaker, 54 Vt. 112. p. 73. 
 State V. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257. i)p 71, 75. 
 State V. Meller, 75 X". C. 74. p. 1520. 
 State !'..Melwin, U La. Ann. 535 p. 66. 
 State V. Merrill, 2 Dev. L. (X. C.) 269. p. 1890. 
 
 State r. Meshek, 61 la. 316. p. 1569. 
 
 State V. Mewherter, 46 la. 88. pp. 1878, 1883. 
 
 State V. Mever, 58 Vt. 457 ; s. c. 3 Atl. Rep. 
 
 195. pp. 13, 1831,1850. 
 State V. Meyers, 68 Mo. 266. p. 5. 
 State V. Middleton, 5 Port. (Ala.) 484. p. 
 
 47. 
 State V. Millain, 3 Nev. 409. p. 125. 
 State V. Miller, 53 la. 209. pp. 356, 524, 1528, 
 
 1776. 
 State V. Miller, 29 Kan. 43. p. 76. 
 State V. Miller, 26 La. Ann. 579. pp. 15, 32. 
 State V. Miller, 36 La. Ann. 158. p. 2049. 
 State V. Miller, 67 Mo. 604. pp. 325, 1708. 
 State v. Miller, 75 X. C. 73. p. 712. 
 State V. Miller, 1 Dev. & B. (X. C.) 500. pp. 
 
 1906, 1978. 
 State V. Millican, 15 La. Ann. 557. pp. 234, 
 
 1984. 
 State V. Mills, 91 X. C. 581. p. 10. 
 State V. Minis, 26 Minn. 183. pp. 96, 1984. 
 State V. Mix, 15 Mo. 153. pp. 315, 1770, 1903, 
 
 1905, 1906. 
 State r. Modecai, 68 X. C. 207. p. 647. 
 State V. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920. p. 296. 
 State V. Monaquo, T. U. P. Charlt. (Ga.) 22. 
 
 p. 41. 
 Slate V. Moncla (La.), 2 South. Rep. 814. pp. 
 
 24, 81. 
 State r. Monk, 3 Ala. 415. pp. 23, 124. 
 State r. Montgomery, 56 la. 198. p. 1576. 
 State V. Morea, 2 Ala. 275. pp. 74, 85, 87. 
 Sttite r. Morgan, 20 La. Ann. 442. pp. 30, 31. 
 State i'. Moore, 28 Oh. St. 195. p. 95. 
 State r. Moore, 28 Oh. St. 595. p. 88. 
 State r. Morphy, 33 la. 270; s. c. Xi Am. Rep. 
 
 125. pp. 1484, 1548. 
 State V. Morrill, 16 Ark, 384. pp. 132, 133. 
 State t'. Morris, 3 Hawks (X. C), 388. pp. 
 
 1698, 1701. 
 State r. Moslev, 31 Kan. 355. pp. 787, 788. 
 State V. Mott, 4 Jones L. (X. C.) 419. p. 150. 
 State V. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 570. p. 65. 
 State V. Jlurphy, 6 Ala. 846. p. 1833. 
 State V. Myers, 44 Iowa. 580. i>. 15L 
 State V. Xadal (Iowa), 29 X. W. Rep.-451, p. 
 
 1666. 
 State V. Xadal, 8 Crim. Law. Mag. 730. p. 
 
 1694. 
 State u. Xash,7Ia. 3.50. p. 1824. 
 State V. Xash, 10 la. 81. p. 524. 
 State r. Xash, 8 Ired. L. (X. C.) 35. p. 25. 
 State V. ^auert, 6 Mo. App. 596. p. 314. 
 State V. Xeagle, 65 Me. 468. p. 30. 
 state V. Xeeley, 20 la. 108. pp. 1544, 1548. 
 State V. Xegro Peter, Ga. Dec.,pt. 1, p. 46. p. 
 
 1981. 
 State t»; Xelson, 58 la. 208. pp. 62, 476. 
 State V. Xelson, 11 Xev. 334. pp. 1819, 1857, 
 
 1858, 1860. 
 State V. Xerbovig, 33 Minn. 480. p. 35. 
 state V. Xeuner, 49 Conn. 232. p. 39. 
 State V. Xewhouse, 29 La. Ann. 821. p. 31. 
 State V. Xichols, 29 Minn. 357. p. 284. 
 State I'. Xixon, 32 Kan. 213. p. 1882. 
 State V. Xorris, 59 X. H. 636. p. 1553. 
 State V. Xorthrup, 48 la. 583. pp. 1793, 1800, 
 
 1847. 
 State V. Xorwood, 12 Md. 177. p. 324. 
 State V. Xowell, 58 X. H. 314. p. 268. 
 State V. Xueslein, 25 Mo. 111. p. 1555. 
 State V. Ober, 52 X. H. 459; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 
 
 88. pp. 524. 527, 529. 
 State r. O'Brien, 7 R. T. 331. pp. 783, 1906. 
 State r. O'Connor, 65 Mo. 374. p. 578. 
 State V. O'Gradv, 3 Woods (U. S.;, 496. p. 39. 
 State i\ Oriniston, 66 la. 1.52. ]>. 1776. 
 State r. O'Xeal, 7 Ired. (X. C.) L. 25L pp. 
 
 741, 1698.
 
 cxlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State r. O'Xealc, 4 Ired. L. (X. C.) 88. p. 450. 
 State V. Orr, (14 Mo. 339. ji. lGr):i. 
 State V. Oscar, 7 .loues L. (X. C.) 303. p. 18-25. 
 State V. Ostrander, 18 la. 437. pp. 74, 81, S3, 
 
 438,1831. 
 State r. Ott, 49 Mo. 326. p. 1707. 
 State V. Overton, 24 X. J. L. 435. p. 1147. 
 State i\ Owen, Phlll. L. 4-25. p. 35. 
 State V. Owens, 79 Mo. (!I9. p. 1836. 
 State V. Vngv, 21 Mo. 257. pp. 705, 706, 708. 
 State r. I'agels, 92 Mo. 300; s. c. 10 West. Rep. 
 
 288. p. 1886. 
 State V. Pasols (Mo.), 4 S. W. Rep. 931. p. 49. 
 State V. rainier, S8 Mo. 568. p. 16:i4. 
 State t'. rainier (Mo.), 5 West. liep. 387. p. 
 
 526. 
 State V. Parish, 79 N. C. 610. p. 484. 
 State V. Parker, 77 Teuu. (13 Lea) 221. p. 
 
 16()8. 
 State V. Parks, 21 La. Ann. 251. pp. 118, 120. 
 State r. Parks, 3 Ired. L, (X. C.) 29G. p. 450. 
 State V. Parsons, 7 Xcv. 57. pp. 1909, 1981, 1982. 
 State V. Parllow, 90 Mo. 608. pp. 1703, 1709. 
 State V. Parraut, 16 Miuu. 178. pp. 1903, 1905, 
 
 1932. 
 State V. Pate, Bush. (N. C.) 244. pp. 43, 107. 
 State V. Patrick, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 443. pp. 
 
 87, 118, 120. 
 State r. Patterson, 88 ISFo. 88. p. 531. 
 State V. Patterson, 74 N. C. 157. pp. 416, 417. 
 State V. J'atterson, 2 Ired. (X. C.) 346. pp. 
 
 282, 416, 417, 530. 
 State r. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308. pp. 1914, 1915. 
 State V. Pavton (Mo.), 2 S. AV. Rep. 394; s. c. 
 
 90 31o. 220. p. 1836. 
 State V. Peace, 1 Jones L. (X. C.) 251. p. 
 
 1670. 
 State V. Peak, 85 Mo, 190. pp. 568, 1545, 1574, 
 
 1786, 2048. 
 State V. Pender^ass, 2 Dev. & Bat. L. (N. 
 
 C.) 365. p. 1552. 
 State V. Perkins, 66 N. C. 126. p. 91. 
 State V. Perry, Busbee (X. C), 330. pp. 20, 
 
 22, 53, 1902. 
 State r. Pete, 39 La. Ann. 1095. p. 2049. 
 State V. Peterson (Kan.), 16 Pac. Rep. 263. 
 
 p. 124. 
 State V. Petrie, 25 La. Ann. 386. p. 30. 
 State V. Pettv, 21 Kan. 54. pp. 485, 487, 489. 
 State V. Pfeiferlc, 36 Kan. 90. p. 630. 
 State V. I'liair, 48 Vt. 366. p. 67. 
 State V. J'liares, 24 W. Va. 657. pp. 2051, 
 
 20.55, 2128. 
 State V Pliifer, 90 X. O. 721. p. 1.533. 
 State V. Phillips, 2 Ala. 297. p. 19. 
 State V. Phillips, 28 La. Ann. 387. p. 127. 
 State V. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475. pp. 21, 760. 
 State V. Phillips, 70 N. C. 462. p. 420. 
 State V. Phinney, 42 Me. 384. pp. 1698, 1702. 
 State V. IMcrce, 7 Ala. 728. p. 1537. 
 State V. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231. i^p. 91, 92. 
 State V. J'icrce, 65 la. 89. pp. 1821, 1828; 1832. 
 State V. IMerce, 8 Nev. 291. i>. 717. 
 State V. I'ike, 65 Me. HI. p. J984. 
 State V. Pike, 20 N. H. 344. pp. 119, 123, 126, 
 
 1938. 
 State r. Pike, 49 X. IL 406. pp. 42, 91. 
 States. I'ike (Sup. Ct. N. H.), 11 Am. L. 
 
 Reg. 233. p. 72. 
 State V. Pitts, 11 la. .343. p. 1720. 
 State V. IMlts. 58 Wo. .556. pp. 34, 84. 
 State V. I'lunkett, 64 Me. 534. p. 304. 
 State V. Pollard, 14 Mo. App. 583. pp. 737, 
 739. 
 
 State V. Poison, 29 la. 133. p. 559. 
 
 State V. Ponyicr, 6 Ciim. L. Map. 851. p. 
 1575. 
 
 State V. Pcpulns, 12 La. Ann. 710. pp. 1905, 
 1909. 
 
 State V. Porter, 34 la. 131, p. 1842. 
 
 State t'. Porter, 26 Mo. 201. i)p. 310, 312. 
 
 State V. Porter, 75 M<i. 171. p. .531. 
 
 State V. Potter, 18 Conn. 166. pp. 46, 47, 73,89, 
 
 105, 128. 
 Stale V. Potter, 13 Kan. 414. p. 1548. 
 State V. Potter, 15 Kan. 302. p. 1726. 
 State V. Powers, 10 Ore. 145; s. c. 45 Am. 
 
 Kop. 138. p. 119. 
 State V. Prater, 26 S. C. 198; s. c. 2 8. E. Rep. 
 
 108. pp. 58, 82, 1717. 
 State V. I'rescotl, 7 X. H. 287. pp. 1907, 1908, 
 
 1931,1982. 
 State V. I'rescott, 33 X. IL 212. p. 298. 
 State V. Pre-ston, 77 Mo. 294. p. 788. 
 State V. I'restoii, 34 AX' is. ()75. p. 1537. 
 State V. Price, 3 Mo. App. 586. ]). 17. 
 State V. Price, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 351. p. 90. 
 State V. Primrose, 3 Ala. 546. p. 9. 
 Stale V. Pritcliard, 15 Xev. 74; s. c, 10 Re- 
 porter, 273. pp. 66, 89, 92, 129. 
 Stale V. Push, 23 La. Ann. 14. p. 49. 
 State r. Putnam, 1 X. J. L. 260. i». 128. 
 State V. Quarrel, 2 Bay (S. C), 150. pp. 117. 
 
 120. 
 State V. Ragland, 75 X. C. 12. p. 48. 
 State V. Railroad, .58 X. H. 410. p. 403. 
 State V. Railroad Co., 24 AV. Va. 785. p. 1577. 
 State V. Kash, 12 Ired. L. (X. (J.) 382. pp. 
 
 1669, 1070. 
 State r. Rawls, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 33L 
 
 pp. 355,361.362. 
 Stale v. Uavinond, 11 Xev. 98. pp. .33, 73, 95, 
 
 115,116, 129. 
 State V. Red, 53 la. 67; s. c. 4 X. AV. Rep. 831. 
 
 pp. 524, 1793, 1847. 
 State V. Rcddick, 7 Kan. 152. p. 1882. 
 State V. Reed, 62 la. 40.; s. c. 17 X. AV. Rep. 
 
 150. pp. 1793, 1847. 
 State V. Reed, 62 INIe. 129. pp. 1709, 1830. 
 State V. Reed, 71 Mo. 200. pp. 730, 732. 
 State V. Reed, 47 X. H. 466. jip. 40, 42. 
 State r. Reeves, 11 La. Ann. 685. pp. 17, 26, 
 
 65, 85. 
 State V. Reid, 28 La. Ann. 387. p. 127. 
 State V. Kenton, 15 X. 11. 174. p. 297. 
 State r. Rcvells, 35 La. Ann. 342. p. 72. 
 State V. Revells, 31 La. Ann. 387. p. 15. 
 State f. Ithodes, 1 llousi. (Del.) Crim. Cas. 
 
 476. p. 3.53. 
 State V. Rice, 56 la. 431. pp. 1514, 1.538. 
 State r. Richart, 57 la. 245. p. 1898. 
 State r. I.'icks, 32 La. Ann. 1098. pp. 74, 75. 
 State i-. Rider (Mo.), 6 AVest. Rep. 458. p. 
 
 526. 
 State V. Ridley, 48 la. 370. p. 2032. 
 State V. Rigg, 10 Xev. 284. pp. 1 10, 127. 
 Stale r. L'ing, 29 Minn. 78. jip. 49,-65. 
 State r. KMplev, 31 Me. 386. pp. 351, 181L 
 State r. Kivers, 68 la. 616. p. 1898. 
 State r. Roark, 23 Kan. 147. p. 763. 
 Stale r. Hobli, 90 ]Mo. 31. ii. 797. 
 Slate r. Robl)in8, 65 Mo. 443. p. 1892. 
 State V. Roberts, 81 X. C. (.06. p. 416. 
 State r. Roberts. 15 Ore. 187. p. 1789. 
 State?'. Robertson (S. C), 1 S. K. Rep. 443. 
 
 ).. 747. 
 Stale r. Robinson, 20 AV. A'a. 713. pp. 1879, 
 ]9a5, 2078. 
 j State V. Hobinson, 36 La. Ann. 873. p. 108. 
 State r. Hobinson, 39 Me. 150. p. 1670. 
 State V. KoliiiKson, 49 ]Mc. 285. ]). 2059. 
 State V. Robourn, 14 Ind. 300. p. 1742. 
 Slate V. Hockatellow, 6 X. J. L. 332. p. 128. 
 Stale V. Roderigas, 7 Xev. 328. pp. 89, 94, 125, 
 State V. Roe, 12 Vt. 9.3. pp. 469, 471, 492. 
 Slate V. RoUlus, 77 Me. 380. pp. 408, 1653, 
 
 17.51. 
 State V. Rollins, 22 X. II. 528. p. 107
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 State V. Rombaner, 44 Mo. 490. p. 2076. 
 State V. Rorabaeher, 19 la. 154. pp. 1853, 
 
 1854. 
 State V. Rose, 33 La. Ann. 932. pp. 310, 311. 
 State V. Rose, 32 Mo. ;346. p. 1671. 
 State V. Rosenfleld, 35 Mo. 472. p. 1440. 
 State V. Ross, 30 La. Ann. 1154. p. 129. 
 State V. Ross, 29 Mo. 32. p. 1670. 
 State V. Rounds, 76 Me. 123. pp. 1830, 1840. 
 State V. Rousseau, 28 La. Ann. 579. pp. 49,82. 
 State V. Rugan, 68 Mo. 214. p. 531. 
 State V. Ruhlniau, 111 Ind. 17; «. c. 11 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 793. p. 174S. 
 State V. Russell, 33 La. Ann. 135. p. 1777. 
 State r. Rvan, 13 Minn. 370. pp. 42, 43. 
 State V. Sales, 2 Xev. 268. p. 1922. 
 State V. Salge, 1 Nev. 4.55. p. 48. 
 State V. Salge, 2 Nev. 321. p. 257. 
 State V. Saliba, 18 La. Ann. 35. p. 1520. 
 State V. Sanders, 68 Mo. 202 p. 695. 
 State V. Sanders. 84 N. C. 728. p. 294. 
 State V. Sargent, 32 Me. 431. p. 425. 
 State V. Sarton, 2 Strobh. L. (.S. 0.) 60. p. 
 
 783. 
 State V. Sater, 8 Iowa, 420. p. 74. 
 State V. Saunders (Ore.), 12 Pac. Rep. 441. p. 
 
 126, 
 State V. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300. pp. 531. 533. 
 State V. Sauvinet, 24 La. Ann. llii. p. 160. 
 State V. Sayers, 53 Mo. .585. p. 383. 
 State V. Schlagel, 19 Iowa, 169. pp. 465, 1709. 
 State V. Schnapijer, 22 La. Ann. 43. p. 63. 
 State V. Schneider, 35 Mo. 533. p. 315. 
 State V. Schorn, 12 Mo. App. 590. p. 740. 
 State V. Schwin, 65 AVis. 207. p. 1013. 
 State V. Scott, 11 La. Ann. 421. p. 1524. 
 State V. Scjtt, 12 La. Ann. 386. pp. 1524, 
 
 1698. 
 State V. Scott, 45 Mo. 302. pp. 879, 880, 1940. 
 State V. Scott, 2 Uev. & Batt. (N. C.) 35. p. 
 
 169S. 
 State V. Scott, 64 N. C. 5S6. p. 1697. 
 State V. Scott, 80 N C. 365. p. 318. 
 State V. Seaborn, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 305. p. 32. 
 State V. Seav, 64 Mo. 89. p. 1067. 
 State V. Sha'ffer, 59 la. 290. p. 1898. 
 State V. Sharp, cited, 6 X. J. L. 332. p. 128. 
 State V. Shaw, 5 La. Ann. 342.' p. 125. 
 State V. Sbaw,3 Ired. L. (N. C.) 632. pp. 45, 
 
 53, 125. 
 State V. Shay, 30 La. Ann. 114. pp. 16, 113, 
 
 State V. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404. p. 60. 
 
 State V. Shehane, 25 Mo. 565. p. 19S0. 
 
 State r. ShPlledv, 8 la. 477. pp. 60, 81, 91, 
 
 119, 120, 129, 1545, 1549, 1555, 1565, 1567, 15^8, 
 
 1570, 1571, 1572, 1574, 1766, 1774, 1782, 1811, 
 
 1860, 1861, 1863,1887,1891. 
 State V. Sherbourne, Dudley (Ga.), 28. p. 
 
 1907. 
 State V. Shermer, 55 Mo. 83. pp. 1535, 1566, 
 
 1696. 
 State V. Shields, 33 La. Ann. 991. p. 66. 
 State V. Shields, 13 Mo. 236. p. 448. 
 State V. Shoultz, 2.") Mo. 128. p. 1541. 
 State V. Shuftlin, 20 ( )hio St. 233. p. 89. 
 State V. Sidney, 74 Mo. 390. p]). 1895, 1897. 
 State V. Simmons, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 309. p. 
 
 19. 
 State v. Simmons, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 21. p. 
 
 1652. 
 State r. Simons, 4 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 266. pp. 
 
 351,1811. 
 State V. Sims, 2 Bailev (S. C), 29. pp. 84, 102. 
 State V Sizemore, 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 206. p. 
 
 1555. 
 State V. Skmner, 34 Kan. 256. p. 44. 
 State V. Slack, 1 Bailer (S. C), 330. p. 111. 
 State V. Sloan, 55 la. 217. p. 1853. 
 
 State V. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604 ; », c. Horr. & 
 
 Thomp. Gas. Self-Def. 516. pp. 1542, 1548. 
 State r. Smalls, 11 S. C. 263. p. 466. 
 State V. Smallwood, 78 X. C. 560. p. 1985. 
 State r. Smallwood, 75 N. C. 104. pp. 1636, 
 
 1760, 1809. 
 State V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376. pp. 736, 1637, 
 
 1656. 
 State V. Smith, 20 Minn. 376. p. 92. 
 State V. Smith, 31 Mo. 556. p. 1440. 
 State V. Smith, 21 Mo. App. 595. p. 1836. 
 State V. Smith , 32 Me. 369. p. 646. 
 State V. Smith, 2 Ired. L. 402. pp. 37, 40. 
 State V. Smith, 75 N. C. 306. pp. 728, 747. 
 State V. Smith, 34 N. W. Rep. 597. p. 1569. 
 State v. Smith (la.), 6 N. W. Rep. 153; s. c. 23 
 
 Alb. L. J. 43; s. c. 54 la. 104. p. 652. 
 State i;. Smith, 6 R. I. 33. pp. 1506, 1916, 1951, 
 
 1952. 
 State V. Snow, 18 Me. 346. pp. 732, 1506, 1520. 
 State i\ Snyder, 14 Ind. 429. p. 1553. 
 State V. Snyder, 20 Kan. 306. p. 1918. 
 State V. Soper, 16 Me. 293. p. 40. 
 State V. Sopher (Iowa), 30 N. W. Rep. 917. p. 
 
 78. 
 State 1'. Sparrow, 3 Murph. (N. C.) 487. pp. 
 
 257, 1926, 1927, 1930. 
 State V. Speight. 69 N. C. 72. p. 450. 
 State V. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 197. pp. 68, 74, 
 
 102. 
 State V. Spaulding, 24 Kan. I. pp. 73, 78. 
 State V. Squaires, 2 Nev. 226. pp. 19, 32, 95. 
 State V. St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 501. p. 2054. 
 State V. St. Loui3 Brokerage Co., 85 Mo. 411. 
 
 pp. 1671, 1703. 
 State t'. Stalcup, 2 Ired. L. (X. C) 50. p. 
 
 1552. 
 State V. Staley, 14 Minn. 105. pp. 554, 1741. 
 State V. Stalmaker, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 1. p. 45. 
 State V. Staples, 47 X. II. 113. p. 262. 
 State V. Stark, 10 Mo. App. 591. p. 740. 
 State V. Stark, 72 Mo. 37. pp. 768, 797, 1917. 
 State I'. Starr, 38 Mo. 270. pp. 1545, 15i8, 1891. 
 State V. Start, 7 Iowa, 499. pp. 135, 147. 
 State V. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463. p. 464. 
 State I'. Stedman, 7 Port. (Ala.) 495. p. 19. 
 State V. Steelev, 65 Mo. 218. p. 88. 
 State V. Stephens, 11 So. Gar. 319. pp. 85, 110. 
 State V. Stephens, 13 S. C. 285. pp. 2(i, 46. 
 State V. Steptoe, 1 Mo. App. 19. p. 2003. 
 State V. Sterrett, 71 la. 386. p. 1801. 
 State V. Stephens, 103 Ind. 55. p. 1479. 
 State V. Stewart, .52 la. 284; s. c. 3 N. W. Rep. 
 
 99. pp. 1846, 1853. 
 State V. Stewart, 8'i N. C. 563. p. 5. 
 State V. Stewart, 11 Ore. 52. pp. 421, 435. 
 State V. Stickley, 41 la. 232. pp. 496, 1880, 
 
 1886. 
 State V. Stokely, 16 Minn. 282. pp. 19, 1984, 
 
 1985. 
 State V. Stone, 68 Mo. 101. p. 1535. 
 State r. Stonum, 62 Mo. 596. pp. 1505, 1694. 
 State V. Stouderman, 6 La. Ann. 280. p. 1669. 
 State ('. Stoughton, 51 Vt. 362; s. c. 8 Re- 
 porter, 762. p. 40. 
 State V. Stout, 31 Mo. 406. p. 1772. 
 State V. Strauder, 11 W. Va. 745. pp. 119, 123. 
 State V. Straw, 33 Me. 554. p. 1698. 
 State V. Stubblefleld, 32 Mo. 564. p. 1553. 
 State V. Summers, 4 La. Aon. 26. pp. 1917. 
 
 1918. 
 State V. Sutfln, 22 W. Va. 771. p. 2056. 
 State V. Sutton, 99 Ind. 300. p. 1803. 
 State V. Swain, 68 Mo. 605. p. 1836. 
 State V. Swartz, 9 Ind. 221. p. 2113. 
 State V. Swavze, 30 La. Ann. 1323. p. 395. 
 State V. Sweeney, 68 Mo. 96. p. 2108. 
 State v. Sykes, 79 N. C. 618. p. 1643. 
 State V. Talbott, 73 Mo. S47. pp. 1786, 189L
 
 cl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State V. Tnllv, 23 La. Ann. 677. p. 1524. 
 State V. Taster, 31 Mo. 445. i>. 1436. 
 State V. Talro, 50 Vt. 488. i). 07. 
 State r. Tavlor, 26 la. 273. p. 1S98. 
 Stale V. Tavlor, 20 Kan. tU3. p. 1944. 
 State V. Ta'zwi'll, 3ii l,a. Aim. 8S4. p. 49. 
 State V. TestiTiuan, OS Mo. 4u6. p. 531. 
 State r. Thomas, 47 Couu. 456. pp. 1521, 1527. 
 State V. Thomas, 32 La. Ann. 349. pp. Ill, 
 
 39.5 
 State V. Thomas, 35 La. Ann. 24. p. 119. 
 State V. Thomas, 19 Jliim. 4S4. p. 52. 
 Mate t>. Thomas, 78 Mo. 336. pp. 1557, 1567, 
 
 l.i09, 1571, 1574, 1773, 1886. 
 State V. Thomas, 3 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 269. p. 
 
 481. 
 State r. Thomas, 11 Lea (Tenn.),113. p. 184. 
 State t'. Thomas (1ml.), 10 West. Rep. 808. 
 
 p. 448. 
 State V. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188. pp. 1543, 
 
 1548, 1S44. 
 State V. Thompson, 21 "W. Va. 746. pp. 1770, 
 
 1773. 
 State v. Thome, 81 N. C. 555. p. 50. 
 Stale V. Thurmond, 37 Tex. 340. p. 150. 
 State V. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502. pp. 210, 436, 
 
 440. 
 State V. Tllghman, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) 513. 
 
 pp. 1906, lii78, 1979. 
 Stater. Tilton, 6:> la. 118. p. 1898. 
 ^tate V. Tindall, 10 Kich. L. (S. C.) 212. pp. 
 
 1945, 195.=), 1983. 
 State V. Tipton, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 166. pp. 132, 
 
 150. 
 State V. Tobv, 31 La. Ann. 736. p. 17. 
 folate V. Toui, 8 Oregon, 177. pp. 126, 127. 
 State V. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 613. pp. 1937, 
 
 1940, 1948. 
 State V. Touchet, 33 La. Ann. 1154. p. 3. 
 State V. Towle, 42 X. H. 540. pp. 141, 150, 152. 
 State V. Towle, 13 U. I. 6B1. p. ."iSB. 
 State t^. Town, Wright (Oh.), 75. p. 1925. 
 State V. True, 20 Mo. Api). 176. p. 1448. 
 Stale V. Trumball, 4 N. J. L. 139. pp. 166, 167, 
 
 168. 
 State V. Tucker, 10 La. Ann. 501. pp. 1908, 
 
 1909, 1978. 
 State V. TuUer, 34 Conn. 280. pp. 113, 114, 
 
 2062. 
 State V. Turner, 6 La. Ann. 309. pp. 119, 123. 
 State V. Turner, 25 La. Ann. 573. pp. 17, 111, 
 
 1906, 1975. 
 State V. Turner, 76 Mo. 350. p. 531. 
 State V. Turner, Wright (Ohio), 29. p. 18.50. 
 State V. Turner, 6 Kaxt. (Teun.) 201. p. I'.t72. 
 State V. Turpiu, 77 N. C. 473. pp. 1539, l.Ml. 
 State V. Tint, 63 Mo. 598. i). Ibm. 
 State V. T\\ iH\ ,2 Hawks (N. ('.), 449. p. 466. 
 State V. Underwood, 37 Mo. 226. p. 157<;. 
 State V. L'nderwood, 57 Mo. 40. pp. 1818, 1891, 
 
 1984, 1990. 
 State V. Underwood, 75 jMo. 230. pp. 325, 763. 
 State V. Underwood, 2 Overtou (Tenn.), 92. 
 
 p. 69. 
 State V. Underwood. 6 Ired. L. (X. C.) 96. p. 
 
 110. 
 State V. Upham, 38 Me. 261. p. 761. 
 State V. Upton, 20 Mo. 397. p. 1930. 
 State V. Vance, 31 La. Ann. 398. p. 31. 
 State V. Van Matre, 49 Mo. 268. pp. 5, 6. 
 State V. Vann, 82 X. C. 631. pp. Sr,, 296. 
 Statev. Vaneant, SO Mo. 67. i>p. 1545, 1.548, 
 
 1549, 1.560, 1.568, 1571, 17(i5, 17f6, 1799, 1820, 
 
 1S21, 1822, 1.832, 1860, 1861, 1803. 
 Stater. Van Waggoner (La.), 3 South. Rep. 
 
 119. p. 82. 
 Stale V. Vegas, 19 La. Ann. 10.5. p. 19. 
 6tate t'. Verry (Kan.), 13 Pac. Rep. 838. p. 
 
 726. 
 
 State V. Vestal, 82 X'. C. 563. p. 85. 
 
 State r. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 570. pp. 484, 1793, 
 
 1794, 1817. 
 State V. Vinson, 37 La. Ann. 792. pp. 1520, 
 
 1523. 
 State v. Vogcl, 22 Wis. 471. pp. 49, 122. 
 l^tate V. Volmor, 6 Kan. 371. p. 1709. 
 State V. Wall, 15 Mo. 208. p. J980. 
 Stater. Wall.li Vcrg. (Tenn.) 349. p. 47. 
 Stale i\ Wallace, 3 Ired. L. (N. C.) 195. pp. 
 
 2007, 2013. 
 Stale v. \Vallac>\ 9 X. H. 515. p. 300. 
 Slate ('. W;illahan,Tai)pau(Oh.),52. p. 1903. 
 State r. Wallham, 48 Mo. 55. pp. 214, 234. 
 Stale /•. Walton, 74 Mo. 270. pp. .53, 73, 78. 
 Slate V. Ward, 49 Conn. 429. p. 467. 
 State V. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673. pp. 18, 64, 71, 
 
 102. 
 Stale V. Ward, 2 Hawks (X. C.) , 443. p. lU. 
 State V. Ward, 39 Vt. 2'25. pp. 65, 81. 
 State V. Ware, 62 Mo. 597. p. 156(i. 
 State V. W:u-ner. 13 Lea (Tenn. ), 52. p. 268. 
 State V. WiiH, 51 la. 587. pp. 1902, 1903, 1917. 
 State V. Waters, 1 Mo. App. 7 ; s. c. 62 Mo. 196. 
 
 p. 16. 
 State V. Waterman, 1 Xev. 552. p. 1794. 
 State V. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47. p. 302. . 
 Stale V. Watkins, 3 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 441. 
 
 p. 86. 
 State V. Watson, 63 Me. 128. p. 530. 
 State r. Watts, 10 Ired. L. (X. C.) 369. p. 
 
 2009. 
 State V. Weber, 22 Mo. 321. p. 331. 
 State V. Webster, 13 X. II. 491. p. 70. 
 State V. Wells, 46 la. 662. p. .^.i. 
 State V. Wells, 28 Kan. 321. p. 123. 
 State V. Wcntworth, 65 Me. 234. p. 524. 
 St.ate V. Wentworth, 37 X. H. 197. p. 304. 
 State v. West, 69 Mo. 401. pp. 51, 61, 63, 65, 
 
 66, 1786, 1930. 
 State r. White, 11. M. Charlt.- (Ga.) 136. p. 
 
 132. 
 State V. Whiie, 19 Kan. 415; *. c. 27 Am. Rep. 
 
 140. p. 5J4. 
 State V. \Vhite, 7 La. Ann. 531. p. 17. 
 Slate V. White, 33 La. Ann. 1218. j). 2. 
 State V. While, 35 La. Ann. 96. p. 111. 
 State V. W Mite, 76 Mo. 98. p. 1.576. 
 State V. White, 68 X. C. 158. j). 118. 
 Stale V. Whitman, 14 Rich. L. (S. O.) 113. p. 
 
 81. 
 Staler. Wieners, 66 Mo. 14; s. c. 4 Mo. App. 
 
 492. p. 662. 
 State r. Wiley, 88 X. C. 691. p. 48. 
 Stale r. Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 454. pp. 15, 
 
 2(1,:!.', (iS, 74, 85. 
 Stater. Williams, 30 Me. 484. pp. .55, 82. 
 Sl;ite r. \\illiains, 77 Mo. 310. p. 2048. 
 Stale c. Williams, 2 Jones L. (X. C.) 194. p. 
 
 1896. 
 State. V. Williams, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 188. pp. 
 
 18, 19. 
 Stat e V. Williams, 65 X''. C. .53. p. 728. 
 Stater. Williams, 3 Speers(S. C), 26. p. 134. 
 State r. Williams, 2 Ulll (S. C), 38L pp. 47, 
 
 86, 110. 
 State V. Williamson, 42 Conn. 261. pp. 464, 
 
 1777, 1778, l'.iii2. 
 Slate r. W illiamson, 68 la. .3.52. p. 1891. 
 Slate I'. \\'lllingliam, 33 La. Ann. 537. pp. 
 
 397,402, 18611, 1863. 
 Stale r. Willis, 03 X. O. 26. p. ]8i8. 
 State r. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126. pp. 67, 71, 73. 
 Stale r. Wilson, 4 la. 4U7. pp. .^is, 103. 
 State V. Wilson, 30 I,a. Ann. 804. p. 108. 
 Slater. Wilson, di Mo. 134. p. 7.3. 
 State r. Wil.son,48 X. II. 398. pp. 8, 42, 29. 
 State r. Wincroft, 70 N. O. 38. pp. 48, 98. 
 State r. Wiugo, 89 lud. 206. p. 1566
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cli 
 
 State V. TVingo, 66 Mo. ISl. pp. 1569, 1886. 
 State v. Wisdom, 84 Mo. 177. pP- 136U, 1575, 
 
 1676, 1801, 18S6. 
 Btate V. Wise, 7 Rich. L. 412. pp. 37, 40. 
 State r. AVitham, 72 Me. 531. pp. 300, 425,521, 
 
 525, 527. 
 State V. Witt, 8 Pac. Rep. 769. p. 1S52. 
 State V. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272. p. 464 
 State V. Wolff, 15 Mo. 168. p. 315. 
 State V. Wood, 46 la. 116. p. 1566. 
 State V. Wood, 53 X. II. 484. p. 580. 
 State V. Woodliu, 5 Ired. (X. C.) 199. p. 150. 
 State V. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89. p. 652. 
 Stale T. Woodson, 41 la. 425. p. 1919. 
 State r. Woolery, 39 Mo. 525. p. 1060. 
 State i\ Worthihgliam, 23 Minn. .528. p. 107. 
 State V. Wright, 53 Me. 328. p. 11. 
 State r. AVright , 75 N . C. 439. p. 432. 
 State V. Yancey, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 3nfi. p. 41. 
 State V. Zeibert, 40 la. 173. pp. 1890, 1891. 
 State r. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220. pp. 99, 164, 254, 
 
 15.04. 
 
 State r. Zorn, 71 Mo. 415. p. 1801. 
 
 State r. Zumbun.son, 86 Mo. Ill ;s.c. 7 Mo. 
 
 App. 526. pii. 740, 742, 8ll9. 
 State Bank v. Fox, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 431. p. 
 
 1023. 
 State Bank v. Haves, 3 Ind. 400. p. 1647. 
 State Bank v. Hubbard, 8 Ark. 183. p. 1669. 
 State Bank v. Littlejohn, 1 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 
 
 563. p. se,.T. 
 State Bank r. Williams, 6 Ark. 156. p. 1669. 
 State Bank v. AVilson, 1 Dev. (N. C.) 484. p. 
 
 1(122. 
 Staudenmier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 566. p. 
 
 784. 
 Staunton v. Paton, 1 Carr. & Kir. 148. p. 217. 
 Staunton v. State, 13 Ark. 31;». ji. 1990. 
 Staup V. Com., 74 Pa. St. 458. pp. 69, 76, 77. 
 Bt. Clair r. Piatt, AVright (Ohio), 532. p. 144. 
 Steagald r. Slate, 22 Tex. App. 464; s. c. 3 S. 
 
 AV. Rep. 771. p. 1757. 
 Steagall v. McKellar, 20 Tex. 265. pp. 1122, 
 
 1123. 
 Steamboat Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. 69. pp. 
 
 432, 436. 
 Steamboat Emilv v. Carnev, 5 Kan. 645. p. 
 
 1359. 
 Steamboat v. Hopkins, 30 Miss. 703. p. 821. 
 Steamboat r. Matthews, 28 Mo. 248. p. 1626. 
 Steamlioat New World v. King, 16 How. (U. 
 
 8.) 469. pp. 129S, 1299. 
 Steiniiboat Sultana v. Chapman, 5 AA'is. 454. 
 
 p. 821. 
 Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Yt. 624. p. 890. 
 Stebbius v. Eddv, 4 Masou (U. S.), 414. p. 
 
 918 
 Steck V. Maher, 26 Ark. 536. p. 2055. 
 Steed V. Cruise, 70 Ga. 168. p. 182. 
 Steel r. Malonv, 1 Minn. 347. pp. 110, 118, 120. 
 Steel r. State (Ala.), 3 South. Rep. 547. p. 82. 
 Steel r. Thatcher, 1 Ware (V. S. ', 91. p. 891. 
 Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 3Iass. 59. pp. 1210. 
 Steele v. Logan, 3 A. K. Mar.sh. (Ky.) 394. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Steele v. Townsend, .37 Ala. 247. pp. 1322, 
 
 1343, 1344, 1345, 1348, 1350, 13.i2. 
 Steer r. Little, 44 N. H. 613. p. 322. 
 Steer.s r. Liverpool Steamship Co., 57N. Y. 1. 
 
 pp. 1321,1345,1365. 
 Steffv V. Carpenter, 37 Pa. St. 41. pp. 1013, 
 
 1048. 
 Steinberg r. Meanv, 53 Cal. 425. p. 370. 
 Ste inert. Matter of, 24 Hun (X. Y.),246. p. 
 
 146. 
 Steinkeller «. Newton, 9 Carr. & P. 313. pp. 
 
 3,54, 62:>. 
 Steinwetz v. AVingate, 42 Ind. 574. p. 1647. 
 Stell V. Glass, 1 Ga. 475. p. 1658. 
 
 Stephens v. Brown, 12 Bradw. (111.) 619. p. 
 
 575. 
 Stephens?-. Citv of Macon, 83 Mo. 345. pp. 
 
 1226, 1275, 1276. 1279, 1376. 
 Stepliens r. Dewing, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 112. p. 1044. 
 Stephens v. Hume, 25 Mo. 349. p. 1591. 
 Stei>hens r. People, 38 Mich. 739. pp. 75, 76, 
 
 78, 101, 126. 
 Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549; s. c. 4 Park. 
 
 Cr. (N. Y.) 396. pp. 166, 177, 362, 434, 436, 
 
 439, 1903, 1905, 1906. 
 Stephens r. Sherrod, 6 Tex. 294. p. 869. 
 Stephens v. State, 20 Tex. App. 255. pp. 755, 
 
 756. 
 Stephens r. Thornton, 26 111. 323. p. 960. 
 Stephenson v. Clark, 20 A't. 624. p. 1446. 
 Stephenson v. Slate, 40 Ga. 291. pp. 1633, 
 
 1651. 
 Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 3.58; s. c. 11 N. 
 
 Last. Rep. 361. pp. 1709. 1726. 
 Stephenson r. Stale (Ind.), 4 North East. 
 
 Rep. 361). p. 65. 
 Stepheu.son v. Stiles, 3 N*. J. L. 43. p. 96. 
 Stephenson v. AValker, 4 Esp. 50. pp. 474, 
 
 475. 
 Sleptoe V. Flood, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 323. pp. 
 
 1984, 1985. 
 Steptoe V. Harvev, 7 Leigh (Va.), 501. p. 220. 
 Sterling r. State.'l5 Tex. App. 249. p. 1695. 
 Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 111. 250. p. 
 
 94. 
 Stern v. Henley, 63 Mo. 262. p. 1440. 
 Stern Auction Co. v. Mason, 16 Mo. App. 473. 
 
 p. 1447. 
 Stetter v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 49 Wis. 613. p. 
 
 1664. 
 
 Steudle v. Rentchler, 64 111. 161. p. 1750. 
 Stevens f. Boxlord, 10 Allen (Mass.), 25. p. 
 
 1209. 
 Stevens V.Brown, 12 Bradw. (111.) 619. p. 
 
 385. 
 Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266. p. 1197. 
 Stevens v. Hill, 10 Mees. & W. 30. p. 145. 
 Stevens r. Hollister, 18 A't. 294. p. 827. 
 Stevens v. Irwin, 12 Cal. 306. p. 456. 
 Stevens i\ Xevitt, 15 Ind. 224. p. 2036. 
 Stevens r. N. AV. Stage Co., 1 Idaho (N. S.l, 
 
 604. pp. 2072, 2085, 2099. 
 Stevens v. People, 67 111. 588. p. 1576. 
 Stevens v. Stale, 19 Xeb. 6.50. p. 1564. 
 Stevens v. AA'arreu, 101 Mass. 5H4. p. 991. 
 Stevens v. AA'elib, 7 Carr. & P. 60. p. 247. 
 Stevenson v. Stale, 17 Tex. App. 619. j). 1575. 
 Steves V. Oswego &c. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 422. p. 
 
 1605. 
 Stevick V. Com., 78 Pa. St. 460. p. 523. 
 Steward r. Lombe, 1 Brod. & B. .506. p. 1443. 
 Steward c. Strippleman, 16 Tex. 17.3. p. 1439. 
 Steward r. Thomas, 35 Mo. 202. p. 1441. 
 Stewart r. Allen, 45 AVis. 15S. p. 139. 
 Stfewart V. Brooklyn &c. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588 ; 
 
 s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 185. p. 1293. 
 Stewart c. Burlington &c. R. Co., 11 la. 62. 
 
 pp. 1943, 1945, 1984, 1994. 
 Stewart r. Eden,2Caines (N.Y'.),150. p. 889. 
 Stewart v. English, 6 Ind. 176. pp. 1411, 1438. 
 Stewart r. Ewbauk, 3 Iowa, 191. pp. 113, 119, 
 
 120, 121, 123. 
 Stewart v. Fitch, 31 X'. J. L. 17. p. 891. 
 Stewart i: Kirk, 69 111. 509. p. 551. 
 Stewart r. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51. p. 1479. 
 Stewart r. Xelson, 76 AIo. 522. p. 1440. 
 Stewart v. Peoide, 23 Mich 63. pp. 491, 492. 
 Stewart v. Randolph, 2 Cin. Supp. 132. p. 
 
 1906. 
 Stewart t'. Rankin, 39 Ind. 161. pp. 2107,2123, 
 
 2124. 
 Stewart r. Reckless, 24 X. .1. L. 427. p. 966. 
 Stewart v. Ripon, 38 AVis. 584. p. 1485,
 
 clii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Stewart v. Shaw, 55 ISIich. 613. p. 200. 
 Stewart r. Small, o :Mo. 525. p. 1975. 
 Stewart v. SouneboiD, 98 U. S. 187. pp. 1167, 
 
 1195. 
 Stewart v. State, 63 Ala. 109. p. 2129. 
 Stewart r. State, 78 Ala. 43(5. p. 345. 
 Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720. pp. 17, 22, 67, 
 
 99, 115,129. 
 Stewart v. State, 58 Ga. 577. pp. 41, 123. 
 Stewart 1^. Stale, 1 Oh. ftt. 66. pp. 81, 1672, 
 
 1746. 
 Stewart v. State, 15 Oh. St. 155. p. 114. 
 Stewart v. State, 19 Oh. 312. p. 341. 
 Stickney v. Stiekney, 21 N. H. 61. p. 1.588. 
 Stieknev, Ex parte, 40 Ala. 167. pp. 152, 159. 
 Stier V. Oskaloosa, 41 la. 353. p. 1209. 
 Stiles V. Estate of Botkin, 30 la. 60. p. 2071. 
 Stiles V. Geesey, 71 Pa. St. 439. pp. 1223, 1224, 
 
 1229. 
 Stiles V. Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443. p. 1446. 
 StilU'. Huidekopers, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 3S5. 
 
 p. 617. 
 Stilling V. Thorp, 54 Wi^. 628. p. 782. 
 Stillson V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 67 Mo. 671. 
 
 p. 1235. 
 Stlmpsnn r. West Chester R. Co., 3 How. 
 
 (U. S.) 553. p. 2114. 
 Stineman v. Beath, 36 la. 73. pp. 2075, 2093, 
 
 2100. 
 Stinhouse v. State, 47 Ind. 17. pp. 385, 390. 
 Stites V. McKibben, 2 Oh. St. 588. pp. 1938, 
 
 1942. 
 Stitz V. State, 4 N. East. Rep. 145 ; s. c. 104 
 
 Ind. 359. p. ]a52. 
 Stix V. Pump, 37 Ga. 332. p. 1005. 
 St. John V. Bumpstead, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 100. 
 
 p. 827. 
 St. John V. Homans, 8 Mo. 382. p. 937. 
 St. John t'. New York, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 315. 
 
 p. 1378. 
 St. John's Lodge v, Callender, 4 Ired. L. 
 
 (X. C.) 342. p. 1589. 
 St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 9 Atl. Rep. 571; 
 
 S. c. 59 Vt. 300. p. 1.507. 
 St. Joseph E. Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Kan. 188. p. 
 
 1209. 
 St. Louis V. Mever, 13 Mo. App. 367 ; s. c. 87 
 
 Mo. 276. p. 1U77. 
 St. Louis &c. Co. V. Vickers, 122 U. S. 360. p. 
 
 16^5. 
 St. Louis V. State, 8 Neb. 405. p . 65. 
 St. Louis &c. U. Co. V. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 521. 
 
 pp. 1297, 1483. 
 St. Louis &c. K. Co.r. Casner, 72111. 384. p. 87. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Dalby, 19 111. 353. p. 
 
 1292. 
 St. Louis &c. E. Co. V. Edwards, 26 Kan. 74. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 8t. Louis &c. E. Co; v. [Godby, 45 Ark. 485. 
 
 p. 2121. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Holman, 45 Ark. 102. 
 
 pp. 2134,2137. 
 St. Louis &(■. K. Co. V. Lux, 63 111. 523. p. 115. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Mauly, 58 III. 300. pp. 
 
 1299, 1300. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Myrtle, 51 Ind. 566. pp. 
 
 740, 1972. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Rapp, 39 Ark. 558. pp. 
 
 2135, 2]. ",7. 
 St. Lonis&c. R. Co. v. Shoemaker, 38 Kan. 
 
 723; s. c. 17 I'ac. Rep. 384. )). 2037. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Silver, 56 Mo. 265. p. 
 
 3S3. 
 St. Louis &c. E. Co. V. Valirins, 56 Ind. 611. 
 
 p. 1284. 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. AVeaver (Kan.), 11 
 
 Pac. Hep. 408. p. 1239. 
 St. I>oui8 Agricultui-al &c. Association r. 
 
 Eelnecke, 21 Mo. App. 478. p. 1050, 
 
 St. Louis Brewery Co. v. Bodeman, 12 Mo 
 
 App. 573. p. 1971. 
 St. Louis Collin Co. v. Rubelman, 15 Mo. 
 
 App. 280. p. 1449. 
 St. Louis Floating Dock Ins Co. v. Soulard, 
 
 8 y\o. 665. p. 1585. 
 St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 Mo. 278. p. 082. 
 St. Louis National Stock Yards r. Wiggins 
 
 Ferry Co., 1U2 111. 514. pp. 808, 860. 
 St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 9 Mo. 
 
 421. p. ]023. 
 St. Louis Public Schools v. Risley, 40 Mo. 357. 
 
 p. 560. 
 St. Martin v. Desnoyer, 1 Minn. 156. pp. 
 
 1964, 1066, 1983, 1990. 
 Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron Works, 
 
 102 Mass. 80. p. 607. 
 Stockdale ?•. Hansard, 9 Ad. &E.1;«. c. 4 Jar. 
 
 70;subnom. Reg. v. Gossett, 3 Per. & D. 
 
 340; sub nom. Reg. v. Evans, 8 Dowl. P. C. 
 
 451 ; sub nom. Sherltf of Middlesex, H Ad. 
 
 & K. 273. p. 152. 
 Stockdale's Case, cited, p. 1.522. 
 Stocken v. Collhi, 7 Mees. & W. 515. p. 943. 
 Stockett r. Ellicott, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 123. 
 
 pp. 886, 887. 
 Stockett V. Watklns, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 326; a. 
 
 c. 20 Am. Dec. 428. p. 801. 
 Stocking V. State, 7. Ind. 326. p. 732. 
 Stocklev V. Hornidge, 8 Car. & P. 11. pp. 
 
 1168, 1170. 
 Stockton V. Frey, 4 Gill (Md.), 407. p. 227, 
 
 12.36, 1237. 
 StockwcU V. Railroad Co., 43 la. 470. pp. 
 
 694, 1920. 
 Stockwell V. State, 101 Ind. 1. p. 2061. 
 Stoddard v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 65 Mo. 514. 
 
 pj). 1208, 1212. 
 Stoddert v. Manning, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 147. 
 
 p. 561. 
 Stokeley v. Com. 71 Va. Cas. 330. pp. 144, 150. 
 Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa. St. 315. p. 191. 
 Stoker v. Kendall, Busb. L. (S. C.) 242. p. 
 
 1137. 
 Stokes V. Arey, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 66. p. 
 
 1749. 
 Stokes V. Burrell, 3 Grant Cases (Pa.), 241. 
 
 pp. 861, 1608. 
 Stokes V. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20. p. 898. 
 Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164. pp. 42, 43, 78, 
 
 402, 1639. 
 Stokes r. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 181 ; s. c. 
 
 Thomp. Carr. Pass., p. 183. pp. 1236, 1237, 
 
 1285. 
 Stokes V. State, 18 Ga. 17. p. 456. 
 Stokes V. Staie, 5 l?axt. (Tenn.) 619; «. c. 2 
 
 Tex. Law Journ. 243. pp. 660, 1060. 
 Stokes V. Stickney, Ob N. Y. 320. p. 265. 
 Stokes, In re, 5 So. Car. 71. p. 152. 
 Stolp V. Blair, 68 111. 541. pp. 481, 485, 487. 
 Stone V. Bird, 16 Kan. 488. p. 1907. 
 Stone I'. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 82. pp. 
 
 1200, 1621. 
 Stone r. Clark, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 378. p. 1086. 
 Stone t". Crocker, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 81. pp. 
 
 1161, 1162, 1164, 1168, 1172, IISO, 1182, 1186, 1197. 
 Stone V. Danbury, 46 N. H. 139. p. 1413. 
 Stone V. Great Western Oil Co., 41 111. 85. p. 
 
 560. 
 Stone V. Grubbam, 1 RoUe Rep. 3, pi. 5. p. 
 
 875. 
 Stone V. Grnbham, 2 Bnlst. 225. p. 1440. 
 Stone V. Hawkeye &c. Ins. Co., 68 la. 737. 
 
 p. 2063. 
 Stone r. Miller, 16 Pa. St. 450. pp. 955, 958. 
 Stone V. I'coplc, 3 Hi. 326. pp. 85. 110. 
 Stone V. Powell, 5 Mo. 435. p. 1617. 
 Sione V. Sanborn, 104 Mass. 319. pp. 639, 
 640.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cliii 
 
 Stone V. Segur, 11 Allen (Mass.\ 56S. p. 43. 
 Stone r. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 58. pp. 
 
 1907, 1930, 19S2, 1990. 
 Stone V. State (Tex.), 2 S. W. Rep. 585. p. 
 
 747. 
 Stone V. Stevens, 12 Conn. 219. pp. 1195, 1198. 
 Stone V. Swift, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 389. p. 1197. 
 Stone r. Taylor, 63 Ga. 309. p. 2099. 
 Stoueman v. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 58 Mo. 503. 
 
 p. 1223. 
 Stoueman v. Cora., 25 Gratt. (Va.) 887. pp. 
 
 567, 1548. 
 Stones r. Menliem, 2 Exch. 383. p. 667. 
 Stoney v. Winterlialter (Pa.), 11 Atl. Rep. 
 
 611. pp. 2048, 2051. 
 Stonewall Man. Co. v. Peek, 63 Miss. 342. p. 
 
 lo74. 
 Storev r. P.reunan, 15 X. Y. 524. p. 1669. 
 StoreV r. Peo|ile, 79 111. 45. p. 172. 
 Storni r. United States, 9t U. S. 76. pp. 369, 
 
 403, 408. 
 Story V. Stale, 99 Ind. 413. p. 1756. 
 Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558. p. 
 
 375. 
 Stoulf er V. Latshaw, 2 Watts (Pa.), 165. p. 
 
 1598. 
 Stout V. Duncan, 87 Ind. Sf-S. p. 2102. 
 Stout r. Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232. pp. 82, 116. 
 Stout V. McAdams, 3 111. 67. p. 1669. 
 Stout r. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 132. pp. 
 
 67, 73, 98. 
 Stout r. State, 90 Ind. 1. pp. 75, 78, 1812, 1828, 
 
 1860, 1861, 1863. 
 Stoui r. State, 93 Ind. 150. p. 1037. 
 Stout V. State, 96 Ind. 407. pp. 727, 730, 1520, 
 
 1756. 
 Stovall V. Fowler, 72 Ala. 77. p. 1740. 
 Stover V. Bluehill, 51 Me. 439. p. 1256. 
 Stover r. People, 56 N. Y. 315. pp. 524, 787, 
 
 1S08, 1887. 
 Stowe V. Havwood, 7 Allen (Mass.), 118. pp. 
 
 891,892. 
 Stowe V. Querner, L. R. 5 Exch. 155; s. c. 39 
 
 L. J. (Exch.) 60. pp. 289, 292, 293. 
 Stowe V. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207. p. 192. 
 Stowell V. Goodenow, 31 Me. 538. p. 1698. 
 Stoyell V. Cole, 19 Cal. 602. p. 2062. 
 St. Paul V. Kuby, 8 Minn. 1.54. pp. 1233, 1485. 
 St. Paul Ins. Co. r. Allis,24 Minn. 75. p. 2053. 
 Strader v. Golf, 6 W. Va. 257. p. 2097. 
 Strader v. Snyder, 67 111. 404. p. 360. 
 Straker v. Graliam, 4 Mees. & \V. 721; s. c. 7 
 
 Dowl. P. C. 223. pp. 1960. 1984. 
 Strange v. Barrow, 65 Ga. 23. p. 629. 
 Stranger r. Searle, 1 Esp. 14. p. 879. 
 Stratford r. Hogau, 2 Ball & B. 164. p. 279. 
 Stratford c. Sandford, 9 Conn. 294. p. 324. 
 Straton r. Rantall, 2 T. R. 366. p. 842. 
 Stratton c. Paul, 10 la. 139. pp. 1727, 1730. 
 Strattou V. Kennards, 74 Ind. 302. p. 2110. 
 Stratton v. People, 5 Colo. 276. p. 65. 
 Stratton r. state, 45 Ind. 468. pp. 4,50, 4.51,471. 
 Strauder v. State, 100 U. S. 303; s. c. 10 Cent. 
 
 L. J. 255. p. 8. 
 Straus V. Beard.sley, 79 X. C. 59. p. 551. 
 Straus r. Minzesheimer, 78 111. 492. pp. 912, 
 
 1646,1671. 
 Straus V. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 190. p. 1297. 
 Straus V. Kansas City &o. R. Co., 86 Mo. 421. 
 
 p. 809. 
 Strauss V. Kranert, 56 111. 254. pp. 1425, 1426 . 
 Strecker v. Conn, 90 Ind. 469. pp. 1099. 1103, 
 
 1104,1105,2039. 
 Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450. p. 870. 
 Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 226. p. 1410. 
 Street r. Lynch , 38 Ga. 631. pp. 1698, 1702. 
 Streeter v. Streeter, 43 111. 155. p. 825. 
 Streett v. Launier, 34 Mo. 469. p. 1210. 
 Strickland v. Strickland, 8 C. B. 724. p. 802. 
 
 Stringer v. Young, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 320. pp. 
 
 566, 567. 
 Stroh r. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490. p. 42. 
 Strong V. Kean, 13 Irish L. 93. p. 124. 
 Strong V. Saunders, 15 Mich. 339. p. 854. 
 Strong V. Strong, 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 
 
 233. pp. 597, 603. 
 Stropes V. Board &c., 72 Ind. 42. pp. 2008, 
 
 2052. 
 Strout r. Gooch, 8 Me. 127. p. 1016. 
 Strudwick v. Brodnax, 83 X. C. 401. p. 591. 
 Sitryker w. Turubull, 3 Caines (N. Y.), 103. 
 
 p. 7. 
 Stuart V. Allen, 45 Wis. 158. pp. 138, 171, 186. 
 Stuart V. Bigler, 98 Pa. St. 80. p. 1321. 
 Stuart V. Fitch, 3 Vroom (X. J.), 17. p. 891. 
 Stuart r. Haven, 17 Xeb. 211. p. 6,53. 
 Stuart r. People, Breeze (111.), 395. p. 150. 
 Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. (X. Y.) 376. p. 
 
 1605. '■ 
 
 Slubber v. Wall, 1 Craw. & Dix. (Irish Cir.) 
 
 54. p. 29. 
 Stuckey v. State, 7 Tex. App. 174. p. 1874. 
 Stuckslager v. McKee, 40 la. 212. vv. 2075. 
 
 2093. 
 Studdard r. Linville, 3 Hawks (N. C), 474. 
 
 p. 1457. 
 Studley v. Hall, 22 Me. 198. pp. 70, 1927, 1933. 
 Stumm r. Hunimell, 39 la. 478. ]). 59. 
 Stump V. Estill, Peck. (Tenn.) 175. p. 893. 
 Siupetski V. Transatlantic Fire Ins. Co., 43 
 
 Mich. 373. p. 9S1. 
 Sturdivant v. Davis, 9 Ircd. L. (X. C.) 365. 
 
 p. 1436. 
 Sturdivant r. Watkins, 47 Mo. 177. p. 1980. 
 Sturgeon r. Gray. 96 Ind. 166. p. 2142. 
 Stingeon River Boom Co. v. Xester, 55 Mich. 
 
 113. p. 1149. 
 Sturges V. Bridgman, 11 Ch. Div. 852; s. c. 28 
 
 Week. Rep. 2o0. p. 1392. 
 Sturges V. Bank of Circleville, 11 Oh. St. 153. 
 
 p. J023. 
 Sturgia v. Bobbins, 62 Me. 289. p. 403. 
 Sturm V. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 
 
 87. p. 569. 
 Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. (X. Y.) 337. 
 
 pp. 1407, 1440. 
 Sturtevant v. Wallack, 141 Mass. 119. p. 814. 
 Stutsman v. Barringer, 16 Ind. 363. p. 1906. 
 St. V'rain r. Columbia Bottom Levee Co., 56 
 
 Mo. 590. p. 1598. 
 Style V. Smith, cited 2 Leon. 111. p. 889. 
 Styles V. Alien, 5 Allen (Mass.), 320. p. 6.32. 
 Suggs r. Anderson, 12 Ga. 461. pp. 2097. 
 Suit c. Bonnell, 33 Wis. ISO. p. 397. 
 Sullivan V. Honacker, 6 Fla. 372. p. 827. 
 Sullivan y. Phila. &c. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 234. 
 
 pp. 1207, 1236, 1237, 1238. 
 Sullivan v. State, 66 Ala. 48. pp. 729. 747, 755. 
 
 762. 
 Sullivan v. State, 52 Ind. 309. p. 1821 
 Sullivan v. State, 46 X. J. L. 446 p. 705. 
 Sullivan v. State, 47 X. J. L. 151. p. 705, 
 Sullivan v. State, 18 Tex. App. 623. p. 1896. 
 Sullivan v. Wallace, 73 Cal. 307; s. c 14 Pac. 
 
 Kep. 789. pp. 2084,2099. 
 Sultzner v. State, 43 Ala. 24. p. 1014. 
 Summers v. Greathouse, 87 Ind. 205. pn. 
 
 2032, 2033, 2035. 
 Summers, Ex parte, 5 Ired. (X. C.) 149. p. 150. 
 SumuicrviUe v. Horton, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) ."41. 
 
 p. 1443. 
 Sumner v. Blair, 9 Kan. 521. p. 375. 
 Sumner v. Chandler, 92 X. C. 634. p. 2129. 
 Sumner r. Crawford, 45 X. II. 416. p. :;97. 
 Sumner r. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 579. p. 1866. 
 Sumner r. Sumner, 7 Harr. & J. (Md.) 388.- 
 
 ]). 1003. 
 Sumrall r. State, 29 Miss. 202. p. 30.
 
 oliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Supervisors v Ilceuan, 2 Minn. 330. pp. 816, 
 
 S19. 
 Supervisors of \Vavne Co. v. Kennicott, 103 
 
 r. S. 544. p. 3. 
 Supreme Lodge r. Johnson, 78 lud. 110. p. 
 
 2139. 
 Susquehanna &c. R. Co. v. Quick, 61 Pa. St. 
 
 328. pp. 323, 630. 
 Sutherland v. Ilarkins, 5G Ind. 343. p. 1742. 
 Sutlierland v. Veuani. 32 Ind. 483. p. 561. 
 Sutlitt V. Gilbert, 8 Oh. 405. pp. 1910, 1911, 
 
 1912. 
 Sutlle V. Batie, 1 la. 141. pp. 26, 83. 
 Sutton V. Ballon, 46 Iowa, 519. p. 922. 
 Sutton V. Floyd, 7 H. Mon. (Kj-.) 3. p. 1670. 
 Sutton V. Fox, 55 Wis. 531; s. c. 42 Am. Hep. 
 
 744. p. 49. 
 Sutton r. Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493. p. 1172. 
 Sutton V. Madre, 2 Jones L. (N. C.) 320. pp. 
 
 1668, 1674. 
 Sutton V. Mandeville, 1 Cranch C. C. 187. pp. 
 
 215, 223. 
 Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis. 269. p. 2. 
 Sutton V. People, 119 111. 250. p. 375. 
 Sutton V. Slate, 41 Tex. 513. p. 107. 
 Sutton V. Wanwatosa, 29 Wis. 21. p. 1210. 
 Suttrell V. Dry, 1 Murph. (N. C.) 94. p. 1982. 
 Suvdam v. Grand Street &c. R. Co., 41 Barb. 
 
 (X. Y.) 375. p. 1225. 
 Suydani r. Pitcher, 4 Cal. 280. p. 1060. 
 Swaggerty iJ. Caton, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 199. 
 
 p. 1721. 
 Swails r. Butch r, 2 Ind. 84. pp. 1463, 1464. 
 Swain v. Ettling, 32 Pa. St. 486. i). 880. 
 Swallow V. State, 22 Ala. 20. p. 1698. 
 Swan V. Middlesex, 101 Mass. 173. p. 375. 
 Swan r. Tappan, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 104. pp. 
 
 1459, 1460, 1462. 
 Swan and Jeffrey's Case, Foster Cr. L. 104. 
 
 p. 41. 
 Swank v. Nichols, 24 Ind. 199. p. 1668. 
 Swank v. Swank, 85 Mo. 198. p. 2136. 
 Swann v. Rary, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 298. p. 109. 
 Swansen v. Swansen, 12 Neb. 210. p. 2054. 
 Swarnes v. Sittou, 5S 111. 155. pp. 120, 121. 
 Swartout v. Michigan &c. R. Co., 24 Mich. 
 
 389. p. 1726. 
 Swarlz )•. Chickering, 58 Md. 291. pp. 354, 
 
 424, 425. 
 Swayne v. Waldo, 33 N. W. Rep. 78. p. 1627. 
 Swearingen v. Leach, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 287. 
 
 pp. 548, 549. 
 Sweat r. Rogers, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 117. pp. 
 
 315, 381. 
 Sweazy v. Nettles, 2 Mo. 6. p. 1611. 
 Sweeney v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 10 Allen 
 
 (Mass.), 368. p. 1312. 
 Sweeney r. State, 35 Ark. 586. pp. 1508, 1517, 
 
 1890. 
 Sweet V. Gloversville, 12 Hun (X. Y.), 302. 
 
 p. 1248. 
 Sweet V. Sherman, 21 Vt. 24. pp. 469, 471, 
 
 476. 
 Sweet V. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465. p. 344. 
 Swete V. Fairlie, 6 Car. & P. 1. p. 1417. 
 Swett v. Colgate, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196. p. 
 
 926. 
 Swett V. Shumway, 102 Mass. 365. p. 443. 
 Swisher v. Swisher, Wright (Oh.), 755. p, 
 
 630. 
 Swift V. Fitzhugh, Port. (Ala.) 39. p. 1408. 
 Swift V. Ilarriinan, 30 Vt. 607. p. 892. 
 Swift r. Ji-wsburv, L. R. 9 (,». B. 301. p. 1022. 
 Swift r. Mass. Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 186; 3 
 
 Big. Ins. ('as. 392. i)p. 1410, 1417. 
 Switt V. Mnlkfv, 14 Ore. 59; s. c. 12 Pac. Rep. 
 
 76. 1). 2027. 
 Swift V. Newburv, 36 Vt. 355. p. 1209. 
 Swift r. Plessuer, 3'J Mich. 178. p. 2038. 
 
 Swift V. Tvson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1. p. 950. 
 
 Swift r. Whitncv, 20 111. 144. p. 560. 
 
 Swift V. Winterbotham, L. R. 8 Q. B. 244. p, 
 
 1022. 
 Swigar v. People, 109 111. 272. p. 1686. 
 Swigart r. Slate, 67 Ind. 287; s. c. 21 Alb. L. 
 
 J. 278 p. 63. 
 Swindler r. IlilHard, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 286. 
 
 pp. 1319, 1321, 1.344, 1345, 1347, 1348, 1352. 
 Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl. & N. 890. p. 
 
 192. 
 Swinfen r. Swinfen, 18 C. B. 485. p. 192. 
 Swinnerton r. Columbian Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 
 
 174. p. 996. 
 Swinnerton v. Stafford, 3 Taunt. 232. p. 
 
 2065. 
 Swires v. Parsons, 5 AVatts &S. (Pa.) 357. p. 
 
 888 
 Swiss V. Stockstill, 30 Ohio St. 418. p. 126. 
 Switland v. Holgate, 8 Watts (Pa.), 385. p. 
 
 1668. 
 Swofford v. State, 3 Tex. App. 76. pp. 17, 30. 
 Sv.'ope V. Shafer (Ky.), 4 S. W. Rep. 300. p. 
 
 l(i8K. 
 Sword V. Keith, 31 Mich. 248. p. 1758. 
 Svods V. Hav, 4 T. R. 260, p. 1330. 
 Sykes v. Dixon, 9 Ad. & El. 693. p. 891. 
 Sykcs V, Dunbar, 1 Cam)). 202, note. p. 1172. 
 Sylvester f. Rawlston. 31 Barb.,(N. Y.) 286. 
 
 p. 891. 
 Sylvester v. State. 71 Ala. 18. pp. 1552, 1890. 
 Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201. p. 48. 
 Svmmes r. Brown, 13 Ind. 318. pp. 827. 838. 
 Symonds v. Pain, 6 Hurl. & N. 709. p. 1094. 
 Sj'inons V. Clark, Barnes, 457 (1790). p. 699. 
 
 T. V. D., L. R. 1 Prob. & Dlv. 127. pp. 646, 
 
 649, 651. 
 T. V. M., L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 31. p. 646. 
 T. V. N., L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 31. p. 650. 
 Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322. p. 1479. 
 Tabor v. Stanniels. 2 Cal. 240. p. 547. 
 Taft r. Fiske, 140 Mass. 250; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 
 
 459. p. 794. 
 Taft r. Hoppin, Anth. N. P. 255. p. 188. 
 Taft V. Wildnian. 15 Ohio, 123. p. 1698. 
 Taggart v. McKinncv, 85 Ind. 392. p. 1698. 
 Tait V. Sherman, 10 la. 60. p. 892. 
 Talbert v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.. 80 Ind. 
 
 434. p. 2052. 
 Talbot V. Cains, 5 Mete. (Mass.) .520. p. 351. 
 Talbot V. Cusack, 17 Ir. L. (N. S.) 216. p. 353. 
 Talbot V. Mearns,21 Mo. 427. p. 1681. 
 Talbott V. McGee, 4 T. B. Mou. (Ky.) 377. 
 
 l)p. 193, 196. 
 Talcott r. Commercial Ins. Co., 2 Johns. 
 
 (X. V.)]24. p. 993. 
 Tallis r. T.allls, 1 El. & Bl. 391; s. c. 22 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 185; 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 151. pp.849, 
 
 1149. 
 Talmadgc i\ Davenport, 31 N. J. L. 561. pp. 
 
 1713, 1714. 
 Talmadgc v. Northrop, I Root (Conn.), 454. 
 
 11. 118. 
 Tallman v. Woodworth, 2 Johns. 385. pp. 
 
 29, 112. 
 Tallon V. Grand Portage Copper Mining Co., 
 
 ,5.i Mich. 147. pp. 811, 854. 
 Tancey v. Kemp, 4 llarr. & J. (Md.) 348. p. 
 
 265. 
 Tansill v. Brlnkman, 16 Mo. App. .S57. p. 842. 
 Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Minn. 458. p. 1007. 
 Tarbcll i: Central Pacilic R. Co., 34 Cal. 616. 
 
 p. 1294. 
 Tarbox c. Eastern Steamboat Co.,. 50 Me. 345. 
 
 PI). 1319, 1321, 1322, 1345, 1367. 
 Tarbox v. Golziau, 20 Minn. 139. p. 2034.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clv 
 
 Tardos r. Ship Toulon, 14 La. Ann. 429. pp. 
 
 1322, 1343. 
 Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. & Cres. 360. p. 
 
 909. 
 Tarpenning v. Cannon, 28 Kan. 665. p. 1090. 
 Tasker v. Cilley, 59 X. H. 575. p. 1077. 
 Tarver v. State, 43 Tex. 564. p. 313. 
 Tatum V. Mohr, 21 Ark. 349. p. 1780. 
 Tatum V. Preston, 53 Miss. 654. pp. 91, 92. 
 Tatuni V. Young, 1 Porter (Ala.), 298. p. 12S. 
 Taussig V. Rairroad Co., 8 Mo. App. 578. p. 
 
 2112. 
 Taussig V. Sliields, 26 Mo. App. 318. p. 794. 
 Tavloe V. Riggs, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 591. p. 294. 
 TaVloe V. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 13. p. 
 
 870. 
 Taylor v. Allen, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 294. p. 952. 
 Taylor v. Ashton, 11 Mees. & W. 401 ; s. c. 12 
 
 L. .J. Exch. 363. p. 1643. 
 Tavlor V. Atchison, 54 111. 196. p. 1663. 
 TaVlor V. Betsford, 13 Johns. (X. Y.) 487. 
 
 pp. 1723, 1915. 
 Taylor v. Burk, 91 Ind. 252. pp. 239, 2029. 
 Taylor v. California Stage Co., 6 Cal. 229. p. 
 
 1920. 
 Taylor v. Carew Manf. Co., 140 Mass. 150; s. 
 
 c. 3N. E. Rep. 21. p. 1241. 
 Tavlor v. Church, 8 X. Y. 452. p. 1479. 
 Tavlor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123. p. 2026. 
 Tavlor V. Cook, 14 la. 501. p. 1748. 
 Tavlor r. Everett, 2 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 23. pp. 
 
 1917, 1918, 1924, 1983, 1985. 
 Tavlor v. Fletcher, 15 Ind. SO. pp. 2107, 2108: 
 Taylor v. Genail, 10 Uo. App. 250. p. 2068. 
 Tavlor V. Giger, 1 Hardin (Kv.),586. p. 1083. 
 Tavlor r Grand Trunk II. Co., 48 X. H. 304. 
 
 pp. 12S5, 1286, 1287. 
 Taylor v. Greely, 3 Me. 204. pp. 119, 120, 124, 
 
 1990. 
 Tavlor V. Hords, 1 Burr. 60. p. 1043. 
 Tavlor c. Mclrwin, 94 111. 488. p. 2f)l. 
 Tavlor v. McXutt, 58 Tex. 71. p. 839. 
 Tavlor v. Middleton, 67 Cal. 656. p. 1062. 
 Tavlor v. Parker, 18 Minn. 79. p. 2099. 
 Taylor v. People, 12 Hun (X. Y. ), 212. p. 524. 
 Tavlor v. Shemwell, 4B. Mon. (Ky.) 575. pp. 
 
 310, 311,718. 
 Tavlor v. Smith, 16 Ga. 7. pp. 476, 478. 
 Tavlor v. State, 16 Ga. 7. p. 456. 
 Tavlor v. State, 3 Tex. App. 169. pp. 89, 93. 
 Taylor v. State, 17 Tex. App. 46. p. 1680. 
 Tayon r. Ladew, 33 Mo. 205. p. 1070. 
 Teague r. Irwin, 127 Mass. 217. p. 975. 
 Teal v. State, 22 Ga. 75. p. 1548. 
 Teall v. Barton, 40 Barb. (X. Y.) 137. p. 338. 
 Tebbetts r. Estes, 53 Me. 566. p. 1077. 
 Tebo V. Baker, 16 Hun (X. Y.), 182; s. c. 19 
 
 Alb. L. .J. ex. Y.) 39S. p. 167. 
 Tedrowe' v. Esher, 56 Ind. 443. p. 551. 
 Teese r. Huntingdon, 23 How. (U. S.) 2. pp. 
 
 319, 448, 4.50. 
 Tegler r. Shipman, 33 Iowa, 194. p. 922. 
 Temple v. Com., 75 Va. 892. pp. 268, 284. 
 Temple V. Pullen, 8 Exch. 389. p. 12.50. 
 Temple 1-. Sumner, Smith (X". H.),226. pp. 
 
 99, 119,121. 
 Templcton v. People, 3 Hun (X'. Y'.), 3.57. p. 
 
 1780. 
 Templeton v. State, 5 Tex. App. 399. p. 
 
 1925. 
 Templeton v. Wolf, 19 Mo. 101. p. 1588. 
 Tomplin v. Rothweiler, .56 la. 259. p. 629. 
 Tom pi in r. Snvder, 6 Xeb. 491. j). 2U60. 
 Tenlirook v. Brown, 17 Ind. 410. p. 1727. 
 Tennant v. Bell, 9 Ad. & El. (N. s.) 684. p. 
 
 1121. 
 Tennant v. Hamilton, 7 CI. & Fin. 122. p. 
 
 407. 
 Tenuey v. Butler, 32 Me. 2G9. p. 1GU8. 
 
 Tennev v. Evans, 13 N. H. 462. pp. 117, 124, 
 
 199(1. 
 Tennev v. Foot, 4 Bradw. (111.) 594; s. c. 95 
 
 111. 99. p. 882. 
 Tenney's Case, 23 X. H. 162. p. 132. 
 Tenpeiiuinff i\ Gallup, 8 la. 75. j). 2058. 
 Terhune r.lDever, 36 Ga. 648. p. 1750. 
 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Bissell, 108 Ind. 
 
 113. p. 2138. 
 Terre Haute Ac. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; 
 
 s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 169. p. 1485. 
 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Clark, 73 Ind. 168. 
 
 p. 2039. 
 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 
 
 19. p. 1293. 
 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 
 
 496. p. 576. 
 Terrell v. Com., 13 Bush (Ky.), 246. p. 126. 
 Terrell v. Frazier, 79 Ind. 473. p. 2042. 
 Territory v. Baker (X. Mex.),13 Pac. Rep. 
 
 31. p. 117. 
 Territory v. Bannigan, 1 Dak. Ter. 152. p. 
 
 1825. 
 Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.), 396. pp. 
 
 26, 94. 
 Territory v. Harding (Mont.), 12. Pac. Rep. 
 
 750. p. 49. 
 Territory v. Hart (Mont.), 14 Pac. Rep. 768. 
 
 p. 49. 
 Territory v. Kennedy, 3 Mont. 520. p. 121. 
 Territory i-. Lopez (Xew Xex.),2 Pac. Rep. 
 
 364. p. 1825. 
 Territory r. Tavlor, 1 Dak. 479. p. 1985. 
 Terry r. Shively, 64 Ind. 106. pp. 853, 1660. 
 Terry v. Wheeler, 25 X. Y. 520. p. 910. 
 Teter v. Hinders, 19 Ind. 93. p. 2058. 
 Tetlow V. Savournln, 15 Phil. (Pa.) 170. p. 
 
 280. 
 Texas &c. R. Co. r. Chapman, 57 Texas, 78. 
 
 11.1302. 
 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 62 Tex. 515. p. 
 
 1678. 
 Tliacher v. Jones, 31 Me. 528. p. 1755. 
 Thacher v. Phinney, 7 Allen (Mass.), 146. pp. 
 
 345, 528. 
 Thames &c. Co. v. Beville, 100 Ind. 309. pp. 
 
 2004,2113,2114. 
 Tharp v. Witham,65 Iowa, .566. pp. 2, 3. 
 Thatcher r. Olmstead, 110 111. 26. p. 390. 
 Thatcher v. State, 48 Ark. 60. p. 2110. 
 Thatcher v. Great Western R. Co. 4 Upper 
 
 Canada C. P. 543. p. 1207. 
 Thaver r. Boston, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 511. pp. 
 
 1019, 1021. 
 Thayer v. Burger, 100 Ind. 262. p. 2005. 
 Thaver r. Commonwealth, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 
 
 9. " p. 141. 
 Thaver r. Davis, 38 Vt. 163. p. 310. 
 Thaver v. Felt, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 3.54. p. 2080. 
 Thaver v. Societv &c.. 30 Pa. St. 60. p. 2007. 
 Thayer v. State, 52 Miss. 85. ]>. 1919. 
 Thayer v. Stevens 44 X. H. 484. p. 1752. 
 Thayer V. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111. pp. 299, 
 
 300. 
 Thayer v. Van Vleet, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) HI. 
 
 pp. 1915, 1916, 1962. 
 Theel V. Com. (Pa.), 12 Atl. Rep. 148. p. 1531. 
 Thelusson v. Coppinger, 3 Esp. 283. p. 178. 
 Theobald v. Hare, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 43. p. 
 
 2095. 
 Third Xat. Bank v. Hall, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 479. p. 489. • 
 Thoin r. Bigland, 8 Exch. 725. p. 1419. 
 Thomas r. Babb, 45 Mo. 3S4. p. 1045. 
 Thomas r. Chapman, 45 Barb. (X. Y.) 98. pp. 
 
 1917, 1924. 
 Thomas v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 479. p. 1908. 
 Thomas v. David, 7 Carr. .i P. 350. pp. 257, 
 
 418.
 
 clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Thomas v. De" Oraffenreid, 3 Nott & M. (S. 
 
 C.) 143. p. lins. 
 Thomas v. Dunawav, 30 111. 373. pp. 1461, 
 
 14t)6. 
 Thomas v. Freleigh, 9 ^Xo. App. 151. p. 1416. 
 Thomas I'. Godfiey, 3 (.iill & J. (Md.) 143. p. 
 
 1077. 
 Thomas v. Jones, SSGratt. (Va.) 383. p. 19S5. 
 Thomas r. People. 311 :siich. 309. p. 13. 
 Thomas t'. People, (i7 N. Y. 218. pp. 78,126. 
 Thomas v. Perrv, 4 Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 49. p. 
 
 918. 
 Thomas r. Kevnolds, 29 Kan. 304. p. 2036. 
 Thomas r. Sta'te, 27 Ga. 287. pp 81, 2.')7. 
 Thomas r. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 20. p. 33. 
 Thomas v. State, 13 Tex. App. 493. p. 18.i5. 
 Thomas r. State, 14 Tex. App. 200. p. 1889. 
 Thomas v. State, 14 Tex. App. 260. pp. 1537, 
 
 1538 
 Thomas v. State, 16 Tex. App. 535. p. 1890. 
 Thomas r. State, 17T''X. Aj.p. 437. p. 1744. 
 Thomas r. State, 36 Tex. 31(i. pp. (iO, 75, 76. 
 Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 65.- pp. 17e0, 1884. 
 Thomas r. State, 43 Tex. 6.5S. p. 1895. 
 Thomas r. Tanner, 6 T. B.Mon. (Ky.) 61. p. 
 
 1747. 
 Thomas r. Thomas, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 178. 
 
 pp. 801,825, 1.^)06. 
 Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671. p. 8)1. 
 Thomas r. AVesteni Union Tel. Co., 100 Mass. 
 
 156. p. 1222. 
 Thomas, In re, 1 Dill. (U. S.) 420. p. 168. 
 Thomason v. Odum, 31 Ala. 108. pp. 293, 
 
 1506. 
 Thompson v. Armstronaf, 5 Ala. 383. p. 1670. 
 Thompson v. Blauchard,4 2^. Y.303. pp. 443, 
 
 1441, 1445. 
 Thompson v. Botts, 8 Mo. 710. p. 1646. 
 Thompson v. Campbell, Hempst. (U. S.) 8. 
 
 p. 15S5. 
 Thompson r. Chicago &c. R. Co., 22 Mo. App. 
 
 321. p. 1160. 
 Thomi>son v. ChicJago &c. R. Co., 14 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 564. p. 1240. 
 Thompson r. Com., 8 Gratt. 637. pp. 118, 
 
 1926, 1930, 1964, 1965. 
 Thompson v. Dulf, 119 111. 226. pp. 1674, 
 
 1708. 
 Thompson v. Eagleton, 33 Ind. .300. p. 2141. 
 Thompson v. Erie Ry. Co., 9 Abb. Pr. (n. S.) 
 
 (N. Y.)212. pp.605, 606. 
 Thompson t>. Farr, 1 Spears (S. C), 93. ii. 
 
 2009. 
 Tliompson v. First Nat. Bank, 111 U. S. 529. 
 
 p. 1099. 
 Thompson v. Fisher, 13 Pa. St. 310. p. 1131. 
 Thompson r. Force, 65 111. 370. p. 16.53. 
 Thompson v. Gibson, 8 Mees. & W. 281. p. 
 
 1120. 
 Thompson r. Jones, 4 Wis. 106. p. 1072. 
 Thompson r. Keokuk, 61 Iowa, 187. p. 1503. 
 Thompson v. Lyle, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 166. p. 
 
 1.36. 
 Thompson v. Lynch, 43 Cal. 482. pp. 2062, 
 
 2064,2086. 
 Thompson v. Mallet, 1 Bay (S. C), 94. p. 
 
 1969. 
 Thompson v. Mills, 39 Ind. .528. p. 219. 
 Tiiomi)Son v. Modes, 46 Mi<;h. 42. p. 373. 
 Thompson c. Myrick, 24 Minn. 4. p. 20.50. 
 Thompsons. North Missouri R. Co., 50 3Io. 
 
 190. |). 1225. 
 Thompson v. Paige, 10 Cal. 78. pp. 117, 118. 
 Thompson r. People, 24 111. 60. p. 70. 
 Thompson r. People, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 467. 
 
 p. 103. 
 Tliompson v. Pershing, 86 Ind. 304. )). 193. 
 Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich. 172. i)p. 
 
 388, 827. 
 
 Thompson v. Shannon, 9 Tex. 536. pp. 1669, 
 
 1670, 1672. 
 Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323. pw. 1919, 
 
 1974, 1981. 
 Thompson v. State, 24 Ga. 297. p. 74. 
 Thompson r. State, 15 Ind. 473. p. 433. 
 Tliompson r. State, 19 Tex. App. .593. p. 70. 
 Tliompson v. State, 43 Tex. 268. pp. 728, 747, 
 
 752, 1896. 
 Tliompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402. pp. 487, 
 
 497. 
 Tliomiison v. Updegraff, 3 W. Va. 629. p. 69. 
 ThomiLson v. AVliite, 18 Ind. 373. p. 2108. 
 Thomiison's Case, 122 Mass. 428. p. 188. 
 Tliompsou's Case, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 641. p. 
 
 19S5. 
 Thomson v. Brothers, 5 La. 277. p. 566. 
 Tliorn V. Bell, Lalor Supp. (N. Y.) 430. p. 
 
 1026. 
 Thornlnirg v. Cole, 27 Kan. 490. p. 1997. 
 Thornlmrgli /•. Hand, 7 Cal .5.54. p. 372. 
 Thoniburgh r. Mastiu, 93 N.C. 258. pp. 802, 
 
 lo(;i. 
 Thome r. Deas,4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84. p. 889. 
 Thome r. Fuller, Cro. Jac. 397. p. 1139. 
 Thornton v. Davis, 4 Cranch C. C. 500. p. 
 
 144. 
 Thornton v. Gibson, 14 Cal. 395. p. 1600. 
 Tliornlon v. Hook, 36 Cal. 223. p. 392. 
 Thornton v. Jett. 1 Wash. (Va.) 138. p. 1584. 
 Thornton v. Lane, 11 (Ja. 4.59. ]))). 16;V1, 1760. 
 Thornton v. Slate, 20 Tex. App. 519. p. 
 
 1795. 
 Tliornton v Thompson, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 121* 
 
 p. 927. 
 Tliornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 183. p. 
 
 947. 
 Thorp V. Craig, 10 la. 461. p. 1620. 
 Thorp V. (ioewev, 85 111. 612. p. 1653. 
 Thrall v. Lincoln, 28 Vt. ,3.56. p. 123. 
 Thrall v. Smiley, 9 Cal. 529. pp. Ill, 1924, 
 
 1945. 
 Thrift r. Redman, 13 la. 25. p. 1914. 
 Thrings r. Central Park R. Co., 7 Robt. 616. 
 
 pp. 1207, 1223. 
 Thurber r. Harlem &c. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 331. 
 
 pp. 1211, 1232. 
 Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N. Y. 281. pp. 344, 
 
 528, 8S6. 
 Thurston v. Kcnnett, 22 N. H. 151. pp. 217, 
 
 218,219,231. 
 Thurston v. M'Kown, 6 Mass. 428. p. 939. 
 Thurston v. Slate, 18 Tex. 27. p. 1784. 
 Tliwing r. Dennie, Quiucy (Mass.), 338. p. 
 
 142. 
 Tibbelts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201. p. 363. 
 Tibbv r. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 80 Mo. 292. 
 
 p. 1296. 
 Tibeau v. Tibeau, 22 Mo. 77. p. 214. 
 Tidd r. Smith, 3 N. H. 178. p. 11U8. 
 Tidewater Canal Co. v. j\rcher, 9 Gill & J. 
 
 (Md.)479. pp. 118, 119, 123. 
 Tierney r. Spiva, 76 Mo. 279. p. 311. 
 Tiernan r. Trewick, 2 Utah, 393. p. 1914. 
 Tiftt V. Harton. 4 Denio (N. Y.). 171. p. 1440. 
 'lift r. Towns, 63 Ga. 267. p. 1951. 
 Tilford r. Ramsey, 37 Mo. 563. ]i. 1074. 
 Tilgliman r. Fislier, 9 Watts (Pa.), 441. p. 
 
 622. 
 Tiller v. Abernathv, 37 Mo. 196. p. 1015. 
 Tillev i: .^ladisou lilver R. Co., 24 X. Y. 471. 
 
 p. 1488. 
 Tilley r. Movers, 43 Pa. St. 404. p. 108i. 
 Tillinghast.Exparte, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 108. p. 
 
 148. 
 Tillion V. State, 5 Neb. 3.51. p. 126. 
 Tillman i: Allies, 5 Smcdes & M. (Miss.) 378. 
 
 Tlliiiiau V. Stringer, 26 Ga. 171. p. 1749.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clvii 
 
 Tllton V. Am. Bible Society, 60 N. H. 377. p. 
 
 403. 
 Tilton r. Kimball, 52 Me. 500. p. 113. 
 Tilton Safe Co. v. Tisdale, 48 Vt. 83. p. 
 
 11-29. 
 Tilton V. United States Life Ins. Co., 8 Daly 
 
 (N. Y.),84. p. 192. 
 Timbrook v. State, 18 Tex. App. 1. p. 1737. 
 Timon v. Claflfey, 45 Barb. (X. Y.) 438. p. 
 
 1008. 
 Tinckler v. Prentice. 4 Taunt. 549. p. 1128. 
 Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167. p. 941. 
 Tiudall r. State, 71 Ind. 314. p. 2088. 
 Tingley r. Providence, 9 R. I. 388. pp. 696, 
 
 1976. 
 Tinkham r. Thomas, 2 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 
 
 236. p. 1916. 
 Tinklepaugh v. Rounds, 24 Minn. 298. p. 4.32 
 Tiunev v. New Jersey &c. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 
 
 (N. S.) (X. Y.) 1. p. 17SIJ. 
 Tinsley r. Carey, 26 Tex. 350. p. 321. 
 Tipping r. St. Helen's Smelting Co., 4 Best& 
 
 S. 60S ; s. c. 11 H. L. Cas. 642. p. 1388. 
 Tipton r. Triplett, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 570. pp. 
 
 221, 222, l(i67. 
 Tisdale r. State, 17 Tex. App. 444. p. 1779. 
 Tison V. Yawn, 15 Ga. 491. pp. 1586, 1598, 1599, 
 
 1605. 
 Titford V. Knott, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 211. 
 
 p. 879. 
 Titus r. Ash, 24 N. H. 319. p. 456. 
 Tobie r. Commissioners &c., 20 Kan. 14. p. 
 
 2036. 
 Tobin r. Bass, 85 Mo. 654. p. 873. 
 Tobin t'. Gregg, 34 Pa. St. 446. p. 854. 
 Tobin V. Jenkins, 20 Ark. 151. pp. 215, 227. 
 Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331. p. 775. 
 Todd r. Boone Co., 8 Mo. 432. pp. 1600, 1971. 
 Todd V. Brenner, 30 la. 439. p. 1979. 
 'lodd V. Teuton, 66 Ind. 25. p. 2124. 
 Todd r. Grav, 16 S. C. 635. p. 53. 
 Todd r. Kerrich, 8 Exch. 151. pp. 1136, 1137. 
 Toddr. Old Colony R. Co., 3 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 18; s. c. 7 Allen (Mass.), 207. pp. 1235, 1298, 
 
 1603, 1605. 
 Todd i: Philhower, 24 N. J. L. 797. p. 1085. 
 Todd r. Todd, 3 Hun (N. Y'.), 298. p. 1739. 
 Todd r. Trov, 61 X. Y. 506. pp. 1248, 1249. 
 Tolandr. Sprague, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 300. p. 
 
 1133. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Dl. 19 ; s. c. 
 
 5 Am. Rep. 71. p. 516. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 111. 80. pp. 
 
 12,30, 1237, 12«?8, 1610. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Bevin, 26 Ind. 443. p. 
 
 1224 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Bray, .57 111. 515. p. 1309. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Brooks. 81 111. 245. p. 
 
 1298. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Conroy, 68 111. 560. p. 
 
 1287. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Craft, 62 Ind. 395. p. 
 
 2039. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Daniels, 21 Ind. 256. pp. 
 
 1726 1727. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Dunlap,47 Mich. 456. 
 
 pp. 682, 688, 698. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Gilvin, 81 111. 513. p. 
 
 922. 
 Tofedo &c. R. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185. 
 
 p. 551. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Grable, 88 111. 441. p. 
 
 1232. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Hammond, 33 Ind. 379. 
 
 |) 1154. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Ingraham, 77 lU. 300. 
 
 pp. 1675, 1757. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Jones, 76 111. 316. p. 
 
 1300. 
 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Maine, 67 lU. 299. p. 
 
 13l»;. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Miller, 76 111. 278. p. 
 
 1232. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Milligan, 52 Ind. 505. p. 
 
 2012. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Pindar, 53 111. 447. p. 
 
 1221. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Riley, 47 111. 514, p. 
 
 1300. 
 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Shuckman, 50 Ind. 42. 
 
 p. 1682. 
 Tollett r. State, 44 Tex. 95. p. 1855. 
 Tolman v. Johnstone, 2 Post. & Fin. 66. p. 
 
 418. 
 Tolman v. Phelps, 12 Wash. L. Rep. 587. p. 
 
 1186. 
 Tomer v. Densmore, 8 Xeb. 384. pp. 113,2097. 
 Tomlin v. Cox, 19 X. J. L. 76. p. 1923. 
 Tomlin v. Hilvard, 43 III. 300. pp. 339, 340. 
 Tomlinson v. Crooke, E. 10 Jac. 1. p. 1936. 
 Tomlinson v. Wallace, 16 Wis. 224. pp. 1698, 
 
 1740. 
 Tomlinson Carriage Co. v. Kinsella, 31 Conn. 
 
 2G9. p. 938. 
 Tompson i\ Mussey, 3 Me. 305. p. 1197. 
 Tonawanda R. Co. r. Munger, 5 Denio (X. 
 
 Y.),266. p. 1206. 
 Toney v. Tonev, 73 Ind. 34. p. 2101. 
 Tooei V. Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 714. p. 85. 
 Toogood i\ Spyring,4 Tyrwh. 582. pp.1459, 
 
 1462. 
 Toohey v. Sarvis, 78 Ind. 474. p. 1946. 
 Tool r. Com., 11 Leigh ( Va. ), 714. p. 1909. 
 Tooley r. Bacon, 70 X. Y'. 34. p. 561. 
 Toomey v. London &c. R. Co., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 
 
 146. pp. 1601, 1605. 
 Toouey V. State, 8 Tex. App. 452. pp. 115, 
 
 116. 
 Topeka v. Tuttle, 5 Kan. 311. pp. 2023, 2027. 
 Topham r. McGregor, 1 Carr. & K. 320. p. 
 
 360. 
 Toppan V. Jenness, 21 X. H. 232. p. 219. 
 Torbert v. Hayden, 11 Iowa, 435. p. 1443. 
 Torkelson v. Jorgenson (Minn.), 10 X. W. 
 
 Rep. 416. p. 925. 
 Torpey v. WiUiams, 3 Daly (X. Y\),I62. p. 
 
 1151. 
 Torrv r. Holmes, 10 Conn. 499. p. 1977. 
 Toulman v Swain, 47 Mich. 82. pp. 810, 20.30, 
 
 2038. 
 Tourtellot r. Rosebrook, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 
 
 460. p. 1319. 
 Tower v. Hewitt, 11 Johns. (X. Y.) 134. p. 
 
 1975. 
 Tower r. Moore, 52 Mo. 118. pp. 2, 3. 
 Towle V. Blake, 48 X. H. 2. p. 497. 
 Towae v. Campbell, 3 Com. Bench, 921. p. 
 
 1135. 
 Townly's Case, Foster, C. L. 7. p. 93. 
 Towns V. O'Brien, 2 Ala. 381. p. 569. 
 Towusend r. Chapin, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 328. 
 
 Iip. 1726, 1727. 
 Towusend v. Chas. H. Heer Dry Goods Co., 
 
 85 .Mo. 503. p. 946. 
 Townsend v. Des Moines, 42 Iowa, 657. p. 
 
 1249. 
 Townsend v. Doe, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 328. p. 
 
 1720. 
 Townsend v. Jeffries, 17 Ala. 276. p. 109. 
 Townsend v. Lorani Bank, 2 Oh. St. 345. p. 
 
 943. 
 Townsend v. Xorthwestern Ins. Co., IS X. 
 
 Y. 168. p. 978. 
 Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 151. pp. 
 
 732, 1515, 1517, 1520. 
 Townshi)) r. Keller, 100 Pa. St. 105; s. c. 43 
 
 Am. Rep. 42. p. iva. 
 Tracev v. Altmever, 46 X. Y. 598. p. 2075.
 
 clviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Pracv r. Swartout, 10 Pet. (U. S.) SO. p. 
 
 lt>44. 
 Tracv v. Whipple, 8 Jolius. (N. Y.) 379. p. 
 
 1016. 
 Tralton v. Pitts, 73 Mc. 408. pp. 1970, 1985. 
 Trail v. Somerville, '22 Mo. App. 1. p. -2. 
 Train r. Collins, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 145. p. 1977. 
 Train r. Holland Purchase Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 
 
 .598. p. I(i2(i. 
 Transportation Co. v. Downer. 11 Wall. (U. 
 
 S.) 129. p|.. 1328 1356, 1359. 
 Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U. S. 297. 
 
 pp. 502, 503, 513. 
 Trasher v. Everhart. 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 234. 
 
 p. S~yt 
 Travis v. Com., 106 Pa. St. ,597. p. 71. 
 Travnor v. Johnson, 1 Head (Tenn.), 51. pp. 
 
 10o7, 1069. 
 Treadwav v. .State, 1 Tex. App. 668. pp. 312, 
 
 313, 437." 
 Treadwell v. Goodwin, 6 Hosw. (N. Y.) 180. 
 
 p. 313. 
 Treadwell r. Wells, 4 Cal. 260. pp. 358, 1102. 
 Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 5.V2. p. 1670. 
 Trembly r. State, 20 Kan. 116. pp. 20, 21. 
 Trenor'r. Central Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 222. 
 
 pp. 64, 116. 
 Trentman v. Eldridge, 98 Ind. 525. pp. 2015, 
 
 2016,2017. 
 Trentman v. Wiley, 85 Ind. 33. pp. 1730, 
 
 2038. 
 Tre.sca r. Maddox, 11 La. Ann. 206. p. 1515. 
 Trew V. Kailwav I'assenger Assurance Co., 
 
 6 Hurl. & N. 838. p. 991. 
 Trice v. Hannibal &c. K. R. Co., 35 Mo. 416. 
 
 pp. 705,706. 
 Trice r. State, 17 Tex. App. 43. p. 1538. 
 Trichet v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 14 Gray 
 
 (Mass.), 456. p. 639. 
 Trihav r. IJrooklvn Lead Min. Co. (Utah), 
 
 11 Pac. Rep. 612." p. 1239. 
 Trigg V. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245. p. 1034. 
 Trimble r. Foster, 87 Mo. 49. p. 702. 
 Trimble v. State, 2 G. Greene (la-), 404. pp. 
 
 74, 75. 
 Trimble v. Thorne, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 151. p. 
 
 948. 
 Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65 ; s. c. 22 Alb. 
 
 L. J. 409; 10 Cent. L. J. 149. pp. 49, 51. 
 Tripp r. Commissioners, 2 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 556. pp. 696, 1928, 1930, 1932, 1970, 1974, 
 
 1978. 
 Tritlipo V. Lacv. .55 Ind. 287. p. 2039. 
 Tritz V. City of" Kansas, 84 Mo. 632. pp. 1268, 
 
 1269,1271,1277, 1279, 1280. 
 Trohan v. McManus, 2 La. 209. p. 1990. 
 Trott V. West, Meigs (Tenn.), 163. p. 2065. 
 Trotter v. Curtis, 19 Johns. (X. Y.) 161. p. 
 
 886. 
 Trotter v. Latson, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 261. 
 
 pp. 182, 278. 
 Troxdale r.. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 411. 
 
 pp. 70, 121. 
 True r. Plumley, 36 Me. 466. p. 1997. 
 Trueblood v. State, 1 Tex. App. 650. pp. 113, 
 
 118, 122. 
 Trneman v. Fenton, Cowp. .544. p. 889. 
 Truesdale r. Ford, 37 111. 210. p. 1046. 
 Truitt r. Trultt, :!7 Ind. .514. pp. 2028, 2059. 
 Trullinger v. Webb, 3 Ind. 19s. pp. 63, .54, 99, 
 
 100. 
 Trussell v. Scarlet, 18 Fed. Rep. 214. p. 
 
 627. 
 Trustees v. Bledsoe, 5 Ind. 133. p. 364. 
 Trustees t'. I'.rookhn Fire Ins. Co., 23 How. 
 
 Pr. 448. pp. .551,076. 
 Trustees v. Hill, 12 la. 462. p. 1670. 
 Trustees v. Kirk, 68 N. Y. 459. p. 1626. 
 Trustees v. Reynolds, 61 Ind. 104. i». 2101. 
 
 Tryon v. Oxley, 3 G. Greene (la.), 289. p. 
 
 167(1. 
 Tticliin's Case, cited p. 1521. 
 Tucker ?•. Cracklin, 2 Stark. 385. pp. 1321, 
 
 1332, 1345. 
 Tucker r. Ely, 37 Hun (X. Y.), 565. p. 1559. 
 'Pucker r. Hamlin, 60 Tex. 171. p. 315. 
 Tucker r. Hennikor, 41 N. H. 317. pp. 728, 
 
 729, 739, 747, 7.50, 773. 
 Tucker V. Morclaud, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 72. p. 
 
 1130. 
 Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ad. & El. 40. p. 1404. 
 Tucker r. I'acific K. Co., ,50 Mo. 385. p. 1123. 
 Tucker r. State, 72 Ind. 242. p. 1006. . 
 Tucker v. South Kingston, 5 R. 1. 558. pp. 
 
 1921,1983. 
 Tucker r. Welsh, 17 Mas.s. 160. p. 328. 
 Tucker r. White, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 97; S.c. 
 
 28 How. Pr. tX. Y.) 78. p. 2075. 
 Tucker c. Wilamouicz, 8 Ark. 157. p. 885. 
 Tutf V. Warman, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573. pp. 1221, 
 
 1229. 
 Tufts V. Newton, 119 Mass. 476. p. 2136. 
 Tufts r. Seabury, II Pick. (Mass.) 142. p. 
 
 17.54. 
 Tuggle V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 62 Mo. 427. p. 
 
 1372. 
 Tull r. Anderson, 15 Nev. 42. p. 2099. 
 Tuller r. Talbot, 23 111. 358. pp. 721, 1284, 
 
 1285, 1286, 1483. 
 TuUidge r. Wade, 3 Wils. 18. pp. 585, 1477. 
 Tullis r. Brawley, 2 ^Minn. 277. p. 2048. 
 Tully 1-. Fitchburg R. Co., 134 Mass. 499. p. 
 
 815. 
 Tully V. Harlow, 35 Cal. 303. p. 1438. 
 Tunhell v. Watson, 2 Munf. (Va.) 283. p. 
 
 2013. 
 Turbeville r. State. 40 Ala. 715. pp. 1734, 1820. 
 Turnbull v. Citizens' Bank, 16 Fed. Rep. 145. 
 
 pp. 1321, 1345. 
 Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 McCord (S. C), 131. p. 
 
 1.5Sfi. 
 Turnbull v. Schroeder, 29 Minn. 49. p. 1090. 
 Turner r. Ambler, 10 Ad. & El. (N. S.)252. 
 
 pp. 1164, 1172. 
 Turner v. Austin. 16 Mass. 181. p. 397. 
 Turner v. Baker, 42 Mo. 13. p. I(i69. 
 Turner r. Baker. 64 Mo. 219. pp. 794, 1042. 
 Turner v. Booker, 2 Dana (Kv.), 335. p. 2069. 
 Turner v. Burrows, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 627. p. 
 
 199. 
 
 Turner v. Cariienter, 83 IMo. 333. p. 873. 
 Turner v. Chillicotlie &c. R. Co., 51 Mo. 501. 
 
 I). 1609. 
 Turner r. Com.. 86 Pa. St. 54. p. 1797. 
 Turner r. Dartmouth, 13 Allen (Mass.), 291. 
 
 p. 1266. 
 Turner v. Foxall, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 324. 
 
 p. 1720. 
 Turner c. TIahn. 1 Colo. 23. pp. 117, 120. 
 Turner r. Hall, 60 Mo. 271. i)p. 1049, 1050. 
 Turner ?•. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 78 Mo 
 
 .578. p. 1.3(17. 
 Turner r. Kelly, 9 Ta. 322. p. 1956. 
 Turner v. Mas.!)n. 14 Mees. & W. 116. p. 1137 
 Turner v. Rawson, 5 (ia. 399. p. 2099. 
 Turner v. Ross, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 16. p 
 
 2065. 
 Turner v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 119. p 
 
 125. 
 Turner v. State, 68 Tenn. (4 Lea) 206. pp, 
 
 708, 737, 743, 744. 765, 18.59, 1874. 
 Turner r. Stale, 11 Tex. App. .587. p. 1560. 
 Turner v. Tuolumne Co., 25 Cal. 397. pp 
 
 1964, liHJC, 1967, 1995. 
 Turner v. Turner, 15 Jur. 218. p. 1.58. 
 Turner r. Strange, .56 Tex. 142. p. 343. 
 Turner r. Walker, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 377. pp 
 
 1195, 1197, 1198.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clix 
 
 Turner v. Yates, 16 How. (U. S.) 14. pr). 622, 
 
 827, 839, 2126. 
 Turnev v. t^tute, 8 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 104. 
 
 pp. 322, 334. 
 Turnev v. State , 9 Tex. App. 193. p. 430. 
 Turuev r. Wilson, 7 Verg. (Tenn.) 340. pp. 
 
 l;521,"]322, 1345, 1356, 1357. 
 Turnipseed r. Cuuniugliam, 16 Ala. 501. p. 
 
 809. 
 Turnpike Co. r. Loomis, 32 X. Y. 127. p. 396. 
 Turns v. Com., 6 Mete. (Mass.) 224, 235. p. 4. 
 Turpin v. State cMd.), 2 Crini. L. Mag. 532. 
 
 pp. 37, 91. 
 Turquand v. Guardians, 8 Dowl. P. C. 201. 
 
 p. 667. 
 Tuskaloosa Co. r. Logan, 50 Ala. H03. p. 2119. 
 Tutt r. Cloney, 62 Mo. 116. p. 1598. 
 Tutt 1-. Price, 7 Mo. App. 194. p. 1074. 
 Tuttle r. Brown, 4 Gray (Mass.), 457. p. 927. 
 Tuitlc v. Robinson, 33 X. H. 104. i>. 365. 
 Tut' lee. State, 6 Tex. App. 556. pp. 30, 50, 
 
 115,116,1930. 
 Tweed's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (N. s.) 371. 
 
 p. 85. 
 Tweedy v. Briggs, 31 Tex. 74. p. 118, 120. 
 Tweedv v. Brusli, Kirby (Conn.), 13. p. 
 TweedV v. State, 5 la. 433; s. c. Horr. & 
 
 Thomp. Cas. Self-Def. 905. p. 1848. 
 Twentyman v. Barnes, 2 De Gex & Sm. 225. 
 
 p. 657. 
 Twiford v. Warenp, Finch, 311. p. 918. 
 Twigg V. Potts, 1 Cromp. Mees. & R. 89. p. 
 
 1748. 
 Twogood V. HoTt, 42 Mich. 609. p. 1090. 
 Twomblv V. Monroe, 136 Mass. 464. pp. 1456, 
 
 1457, 1458. 
 Twvman v. Knowles, 13 C. B. 222. pp. 1473, 
 
 1.559. 
 Twvne's Case, 1 Sm. L. Cas. 1. p. 1442. 
 Tyler v. Hammerslev. 44 Conn. 393. p. 150. 
 Tyler v. Marcelin, 8 La Ann. 312. p. 629. 
 Tyndal'.s Case, Cro. Car. 291. p. 86. 
 Tyra v. Com.. 2 Mete. (Kv.) 1. pp. 6, 1534. 
 Tyre v. Morris, 5 Harr. (Del.) 3. p. 244. 
 Tyree v. Parham, 66 Ala. 424. p. 1731. 
 Tvson V. Reynolds, 52 la. 431. p. 817. 
 Tyson v. Richard, 3 Harr. & J. (Md.) 109. pp. 
 
 1507, 1596. 
 Tyson v. Tyson, 92 N. C. 288. p. 929. 
 
 U. 
 
 U. V. J., L. K. 1 Prob. & Div. 460. pp. 646, 
 
 649. 
 Udderzook v. Com., 76 Pa. St. 340. p. 661. 
 Uhl r. Com., 6 Gratt. ( Va.) 606. p. 4.56. 
 Uhl V. Harvey, 78 Ind. 26. pp. 1099, 1103. 
 Uland I'. Carter, 34 Ind. 344. p. 2141. 
 Ulmer v. Hills, 8 Me. 326. p. 1442. 
 Uhner f. Lelaud, 1 Me. 135. p. 1181. 
 Uliuer V. Leland,l Greenl. (Me.) 136. p. 1199. 
 Ulrich V. People, 39 INlich. 245. i>p. 73,78,378. 
 Umangst v. Kraemer, 8 Watts & S. 391. p. 
 
 585. 
 Um|)hrey v. State, 63 Ind. 223. p. 1566. 
 Underwood v. Eastman, 18 N. H. 582. p. 966. 
 Underwood r. Linton, .54 lud. 4li8. p. 563. 
 Underwood v. Parrott, 2 Tex. 168. ]>. 642. 
 Underwood r. State, 72 Ala. 220. p. 1894. 
 Unger I'. Fortv- second St. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 
 
 497 ; s. c. 1 Thomp. Neg. (1st ed.) 392. p. 
 
 1625. 
 Unger v. State, 42 Miss. 642. p. 1892. 
 Union Bank v. Ezell, 10 Hum))h. (Tenn.) 385. 
 
 p. 937. 
 Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 99. pp. 
 
 192, 193, 196. 
 Union Bank v. Grnnshaw, 15 La. 321. p. 947. 
 Union Bank v. Heyward, 15 S. C. 296. p. 825. 
 
 Union Bank ^j. Magmder, 7 Peters (U. S.), 
 
 287. p. 949. 
 Union Bank v. Smizer, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 501. 
 
 pp. 956, 959. 
 Union Bank v. Torrey, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 269. 
 
 p. 569. 
 Union Central Life Ins. Co. r. Cheever, .36 
 
 Oh. St. 201 ; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 573. pp. 728, 
 
 747, 753, 781, 785. 
 Union County r. Smith, 34 Ark. 6S4. p. 205.5. 
 Union Express Co. v. Graham, 26 Oh. St. 695. 
 
 pp. 1322, 1344, 1345, 1347, 1374. 
 Union Gold M. Co. v. Kockv Mountain Xat. 
 - Bank, 2 Colo. 565. pp. 74, '99. 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Groom, 1 Bush (Ky.), 2S9. 
 
 p. 2053. 
 Union Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 2 Dill. (U. S.) 14. 
 
 pp. 1356, 1359. 
 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 100 
 
 Ind. 63. pp. 192, 14S2, 1642, 1674, 1709, 1756. 
 Union Nat. Bank v. Balderwick, 45 111. 375. 
 
 pp. 1132, 1133. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Fray, 35 Kan. 700. p. 
 
 2041. 
 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hand, 7 Kan. 380. p. 
 
 1610. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Jones, 9 Colo. 379; s. 
 
 c. 12 Pac. Rep. 516. p. 1312. 
 Union &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 80 Ind. 458. p. 
 
 317. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 167. 
 
 p. 1255. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Shannon, 38 Kan. 476; 
 
 s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 836. p. 2040. 
 Union Savings Assn. v. Clayton, 6 Mo. App. 
 
 587. p. 747. 
 Union Trust Co. v. Cuppv,26 Kan. 762. p. 
 
 1313. 
 Union TYater Co. v. Crary, 25 Cal. 504. p. 
 
 309. 
 Uuis V. Charlton, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 484. p. 324. 
 United Society t\ Wmkley, 7 Gra3- (Mass.), 
 
 460. p. 9114. 
 United States v. Alden, Sprague (U. S.), 95. 
 
 p. 1171. 
 United States v. Anthony, U Blatchf. (U. 
 
 S.) 200. p. 1530. 
 United States v. Attaching Creditors, 2 Brev. 
 
 (S. C.) 8.5. p. 2013. 
 United States v. Babcock, 3 DilL (U. S.) 566. 
 
 p. 181. 
 United States v. Baker, 3 Bened. (U. S.) 63. 
 
 pp. 119, 120. 
 United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 
 
 (U. S.) 377. p. 1705. 
 United States v. Barefleld, 23 Fed. Rep. 136. 
 
 p. 179. 
 United States v. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240. pp. 
 
 732, 1505, 1510, 1517. 
 United States v. Benner, Baldw. (U. S.) 234. 
 
 p. 1016. 
 United States r. Benson, 31 Fed. Rep. 896. 
 
 p. 14. 
 United States v. Black, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.; 195. p. 37. 
 United States v. Black, 12 Nat. Bk. Reg. 340. 
 
 p. 523. 
 United States v. Blodgett, 35 Ga. .336. p. 101. 
 United States v. Borger (U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. 
 
 N. Y.), 7 Fed. Rep. 193. pp. 58, 63. 
 United States v. Boyden, 1 Lowell (U. S.), 
 
 266. p. 1976 
 United States v. Breitling, 20 How. (U. S.) 
 
 2.52. pp. 1669, 2135. 
 United States v. Burnham, 1 Mason (U. S.), 
 
 57. p. 1644. 
 United States v. Bnrr, 1 Burr Tr. 245. p. 284. 
 United States c Butler, 1 Hughes (U. S.), 
 
 457. pp. 46,88.
 
 clx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 United Statesr. Byrne (U. S.Cir. S. D. X. Y.), 
 
 7 Fed. Hep. 455. " u. li'J, 
 United States v. Caldwell, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 334. 
 
 p. itH. 
 
 United States r. Cullender, AVhart. St. Tr. 
 
 68S. pp. 1()'2, 103. 
 United States v. Carlton, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 400. 
 
 pp. 801, 1506. 
 United States v. Carnot, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)409. p. 7. 
 United Slates v. Carrigo, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.),49. p. 36. 
 United States r. Caton, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 150. p. 171. 
 United States v. Chaflfee, 2 Bond (U. S.), 147. 
 
 p. 1023. 
 United States v. City Bank, 21 How. (U. S.) 
 
 356. p. 1022. 
 United States v. Clarke, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)152. p. 1946. 
 United States r. Collier, AVliart. on Iloni. 
 
 Api). 4811. p. 41. 
 United States v. Collins, 1 Woods (U.S.), 
 
 409. pp. 14, IS. 
 United status r. Columbus, 5 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U.S.) 304. pp. 721,725. 
 United States v. Coolidge, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 364. 
 
 l)p. 143, I'.H), 330. 
 United stali-s v. Cooper, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 341. 
 
 pp. u;i;, is9. 
 United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. Rep. 
 
 198. J). 30. 
 United States v. Coppersmith, 2 Flip. (U. S.) 
 
 546. p. 44. 
 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason (U. S.), 
 
 91. pp. 65, 83, lUO. 
 United States *-. Cottingham, 2 Blatchf. (U. 
 
 S.)470. pp. 36,39. 
 United States v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 729. p. 264. 
 United States v. Crandell, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.J 683. p. 777. 
 United States r. Dashicl, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 182. 
 
 pp. 1665,2063. 
 United States v. Daubner, 17 Fed. Rep. 793. 
 
 p. 44. 
 United States v. De Vanghan, 3 Cranch C. 
 
 C. (U.S.) 84. ])p. 67, 1923. 
 United States v. Devaughn, 3 Cranch C. C. 
 
 501. p. 284. 
 United States v. Devlin, 6 Blatchf. 71 ; s. c. 7 
 
 Int. Rev. Rec. 94. p. 39. 
 United States v. Dickinson, 2 McLean 
 
 (U.S.), 325. p. 264. 
 United Statesr. Doebler, 1 Baldw. (CJ. S.) 
 
 519. p. 300. 
 United States v. Douglas, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 207. p. 45. 
 United States v. Dow, Taney Dec. 34. p. 
 
 14. 
 United States v. Duff (U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. X. 
 
 Y.j, Fed. Rep. 45. pp. 58, 62, 71, 105, 612, 
 
 613. 
 United States v. Eighteen Barrels of High 
 
 Wines. 8 Blatch. (('. S.) 475. p. 421. 
 United States r. Emerson, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 
 d'. S.) 188. p. 143. 
 United States v. Fenwick, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 
 ([■. S.)675. p. 1.575. 
 United Slates r. Foulke, 6 McLean (U. S.), 
 
 439. pp. 1842. 1843. 
 United States v. Fourteen Packages, GIlp. 
 
 ( U. S. ) 2.35. pp. 68, 1644, 1698. 
 United States v. Fries, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 515. 
 
 PI). 14,20, 117. 
 United States v. Fries, AYhart. St. Tr. 610. 
 
 p. 102. 
 United States v. Gamble, 10 Mo. 4.57. pp. 
 
 1980, 2121. 
 
 United States v. Gardner, 1 AYoods (U. S.), 
 
 514. p. 14. 
 United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 19. 
 
 pp. 40, 331, 332, 551, 1715, 1913, 1924, 1937, 
 
 1979. 
 United States r. Gillies, 1 Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 1.59; s. f. 3 Wheeler C. C. (N. Y.) 308. p. 
 
 1979. 
 United States r. Greathouse, 4 Sawv. (U. S.) 
 
 4.57 ; .s. c. 2 Abb. (U. S.) 3(>4. p. 1.529. 
 United States v. Green, 3 Mason (U. S.),482. 
 
 p. 148. 
 United States r. Guiteau, 3 Crim. L. Mag. 
 
 347; s. ('. II) Fed. Re)). 161. i). 1879. 
 T'niled Slates r. Hand, 3 Phila. 403. p. 36. 
 United Statesr. llanway,2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 
 
 139. pp. 58, 62, 67, 75. 
 United States r. Haskell, 4 Wash. C. C. (Va.j 
 
 412 n. p. 40. 
 United States r. Hawthorn, 1 Dill. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 422. p. 523. 
 United States v. IIill,l Brock. (U. S.) 156. p. 
 
 171. 
 United States v. Hodge, 6 How. (U. S.) 279. 
 
 p. 2068. 
 United States r. Holmes, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 98. 
 
 p. 484. 
 United States r. Horn, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 105. 
 
 p. 1953. 
 United States v. Hunter, 15 Fed. Rep. 712. 
 
 p. 180. 
 United States v. Hulton, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 2G8. 
 
 PI). .592, 593, 594. 
 United States v. Insurgents, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 
 
 335. pp. 14, 20. 
 United states v. Jackalow, 1 Black (U. S.), 
 
 484 p. 1090. 
 United States v. Jackson, 29 Fed. Rep. .503; 
 
 s. c. 9 Crim. Law Mag. 325. pp. 1824, 1829, 
 
 1833, 1860, 1861. 
 United Stales r. Johns, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 412. 
 
 P)). 36, 40. 
 United States v. Johnson, 1 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 371. p. 99. 
 United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Rep. 682. 
 
 pp. 1829. 18:53. 
 United States v. Keller, 19 Fed. Rep. 633. 
 
 p. 1833. 
 United States v. Kelly, 4 AVash. C. C. 528. 
 
 p. 40. 
 United States v. Krouse, 2 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U.S.) 2.52. p. 37. 
 United States r. Lee, 4 Mackey (D. C.),489; 
 
 s. c. .54 Am. Rep. 293. p. 11. 
 United States r. Loughery, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 267. pp. 27, 87. 
 United Slates v. Lynn, 2 Cranch C. C. 309. 
 
 p. 261. 
 United States r. !>rarchant, 4 Mason (U. S.) 
 
 158; s. c. 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 482. pp. 20, 37, 
 
 40, 45. 
 United State.s r. McCarthv, 18 Fed. Rep. 87; 
 
 s. c. 21 Ulatchf. (U. S.) 469. pp. 262, 268. 
 United States r. INlcGlue, 1 Curtis C. C 1. 
 
 pp. 498,, 502, .503, 1780. 
 United st;ites v. McHcury, 6 Blatchf . (U. S.) 
 
 503. pj). 74. 99. 
 United Slates v. McKee, 3 Cent. L. J. 258. 
 
 p. 1924. 
 United States v. McMahon, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U.S.) ,573. pp. 7,65. 
 United States r. Mcl'herson, 1 Cranch C. 0. 
 
 (F. S.)5I7. p. 36. 
 United Slates r. Miles, 2 Ctah, 19; s. c. 103 
 
 V. S. 304. p. .57. 
 United States v. Miller, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 247. J). 284. 
 United States v. Mingo, 2 Curt. C.C.I, p. 
 
 7n.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxi 
 
 United States v. Montgomers", 2 Dall. (U. S.) 
 
 335. p. 170. 
 United States v. Moore, 3 Cranch (U. S.J, 159. 
 
 p. 178. 
 United States v. Moore, Wall. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 23. p. 166. 
 United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 23. pp. So, 725, 1508. 
 United .States v. Moses, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 170. p. 26]. 
 United States v. Nardello, 4 Mackev (D. C), 
 
 503. p. 9. 
 United States v. Xeverson, 1 Mackey (D. C), 
 
 152. pp. 130, 1777. 
 United States I'. Noelke, 17 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 554; s. c. 1 Fed. Rep. 426; 9 Reporter, 505. 
 
 pp. 58, 62, 63. 
 United States v. Pacific Express Co., 15 Fed. 
 
 Kep. 867. pp. 1321, 1345. 
 United States v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 123 
 
 U. S. 113 ; s. c.S Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. p. 1644. 
 United Slates V. Porter, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 345. 
 
 p. 90. 
 United States v. Randall, 1 Deadv (U. S.), 524. 
 
 p. 37. 
 United States v. Randall, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 412. p. 85. 
 United States v. Reed, 2 Blatch. (U. S.) 435. 
 
 pp. 20, 39. 
 United States i>. Reid, 12 How. (U. S.) 361. 
 
 p. 1924. 
 United Stalest?. Reynolds, 1 Utah, 319. pp. 
 
 71, 101. 
 United Stales v. Riley, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 204. 
 
 pp.721,V22. 
 United States v. Rindskopf , 105 U. S. 418. p. 
 
 2114. 
 United Stales v. Rose, 6 Fed. Rep. 136. p. 24. 
 United Slates v. Ross, 1 GaU. (U. S.) 625. p. 
 
 1565. 
 United Stales v. Salentlne, 8 Biss. C. C. 
 
 (U.S.) 404. p. 1974. 
 United States v. Sanders, Hempst. (U. S.) 
 
 483. p. 1558. 
 United States v. Scholfleld, 1 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.)130. p. 169. 
 United Slates v. Searcy, 26 Fed. Rep. 435. 
 
 p. 1840. 
 United Stales v. Shackleford, IS How. 
 
 (U. S.) 588. pp. 39, 45. 
 United Slates v. Shaw, 1 Cliflf. (U. S.) 317. 
 
 p. 1507. 
 United States r. .Shar]i, 1 Pet. C. C. (U.S.) 
 
 lis. p. 41. 
 United States v. Simmons, 14 Blatch. C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 473. pp.2073, 2U79. 
 United .states v. Small, 2 Curt. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 241. pp. 1553, 1562. 
 United States v. Smith, 1 Sawyer (U. S.), 
 
 277. pp. 113, 121. 
 United States v. Smithers, 2 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 38. p. 36. 
 United States v. Strother, 3 Cranch C. C. 
 
 432. )). 261. 
 United Slates v. Tallman, 10 Blatchf. C. C. 
 
 21. pp. 14, 39. 
 United States v. Taylor, 3 McCrarv (U. S.) 
 
 500. p. 1531. 
 United States v. Tenney (Ariz.), 8 Crim. L. 
 
 Mag. 486. 1). 175(i. 
 United States r. Three Railroad Cars, 1 Abb. 
 
 (U.S.) 196. p. 1537. 
 United Stales v. Toms, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 607. p. 36. 
 United Slates Trust Co. v. Harris, 2 Bosw. 
 
 (N. Y.)75. p. 2036. 
 United Stales v. Upham,2 Mont. 170. p. 121. 
 United States v. Van Sickle, 2 McLean 
 
 (U. S.),219. D. 456. 
 
 United Stales v. Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. 582. p. 
 
 594. 
 United States v. Ware, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)477. p. 65. 
 United Slates v. Walkins, 3 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S. ) 443. pp. 26, 46, 60, 67, 82, 86, 97, 98, 725. 
 United States r. AVhile, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 116. pp. 37, 1720. 
 United States v. Wiggins, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 334. 
 
 p. 1892. 
 United Slates v. AVilson, 6 McLean (U. S.), 
 
 604. p. 14. 
 United States v. Wilson, Baldw. (U. S.) 78. 
 
 pp. 40, 45, 60, 65, 67, 75, 732, 1530, 1553. 
 United Stalest'. AViltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 515; s. c. Horr. & Thomp. Cas. Self- 
 
 Def. 35. p. 1539. 
 United Slates v. Winchester, 2 McLean (U. 
 
 S.),135. p. 607. 
 United Stales v. Wood (Dak.), 33 N. W. Rep. 
 
 59. p. 411. 
 United Stales v. Wright, 16 Fed. Rep. 112. 
 
 pp. 1824, 1869. 
 United Stales f. Wright, 1 McLean (U.S.), 
 
 509. pp. 1671, 1746. 
 United States r. Yates, 6 How. (U.S.) 605. 
 
 p. 1059. 
 United States v. Youngs, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 264. 
 
 pp. 593, 594. 
 United States Express Co. f. Backman, 28 
 
 Oh. St. 144. pp. 1321, 1344, 1345, 1347, 1360, 
 
 1374. 
 Unruh v. State, 105 Ind. 118. pp. 1783, 1803. 
 Updegrove v. Zimmerman, 13 I'enu. (X. J.) 
 
 619. p. 1470. 
 Upson r. Raiford, 29 Ala. 188. p. 140S. 
 Upstone f. People, lo9 111. 170. p. 1678. 
 Upton V. Slate, 5 Iowa, 465. p. 464. 
 Upton f. Towuend, 17 C. B. 30; s. c. 33 Eng. 
 
 L. & Eq. 212. pp. 1003, 1004. 
 Urbanck v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Wis. 59. 
 
 pp. 2035, 2041. 
 Urie r. Johnston, 3 Pa. (Penr. & W.) 213. 
 
 pp. 888, 895. 
 Urkett V. Coryell, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 61. p. 
 
 1668. 
 Urquhart f. Powell, 59 Ga. 721. p. 118. 
 Usher v. Hiatt, 18 Kan. 19.5. p. 2037. 
 Utica Ins. Co. v. Badger, 3 Wend. CN. Y'.) 
 
 102. p. 878. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vaden v. Ellis, IS Ark. 355. p. 109. 
 
 Vail V. Jacob, 7 ^Mo. App. 571. p. 823 
 
 Vail V. Stone, 13 Iowa, 284. p. 197. 
 
 Vale V. Bliss, 50 Barb. (X. Y.) 358. p. 1209. 
 
 Valentine r. Hickle, 39 Ohio St. 23. p. 878. 
 
 Valentine r. Stewart, 15 Cal. 396. p. 2099. 
 
 Valiente v. Bryan, 66 How. Pr. (X. Y'.J 302. 
 
 p. 1975. 
 Valton V. National &c. Life Insurance So- 
 ciety, 23 Barb. (X. Y.) 10. p. 989. 
 Van Alstyne r. Commercial Bank, 4 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. (X. Y.) 449. p. 620. 
 Van Ankiu v. Westfall, 14 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 
 233. p. 1467. 
 Vanauken t'. Beemer, 4 X. J. L. 364. p. 29. 
 Van Blarcom v. Frike, 29 N. J. L. 516. p- 
 
 1379. 
 Van Blaricum v. State, 16 111. 364. pp. 82, 129. 
 Van Buren v. Wells, 19 AVend. (X. Y.) 202. 
 
 p. 316. 
 Van Buskirk v. Dausrherlv, 44 la. 42. p. 1929. 
 Van Buskirk v. Levy, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 183. p. 
 
 951. 
 Vance r. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 162. p. 31. 
 Vance v. Harlett, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 191. pp. 117, 
 
 11a
 
 clxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Vance v. Phillips, 6 Hill (N. Y.),433. p. 1441. 
 Vance v. Schuyler. 6 111. 160. p. 2066. 
 Vance r. Vance, 2 Mete. (Ky.)581. pp.231, 
 
 467, 471. 
 Van Cleave v. Beam, 2 Dana (Ky.), 165. pp. 
 
 215, 228,230. 
 Vanderford r. Foster, 65 Cal. 49. p. 1605. 
 Vanderplank v. 31iller, 1 Mood. &M. 169. p. 
 
 1223. 
 Vanderwerker v. People, 5 "Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 530. p. 21. 
 Vaudike v. Townsend, 6 Week. Notes Cas. 
 
 (Pa.) 55. p. 309. 
 Van Diemen's Land Bank r. Victoria Bank, 
 
 40 L.J. (C. P.)28. p. 1144. 
 Vandoren v. Kimes, 29 Ind. 582. p. 2134. 
 Van Doren v. Walker, 2 Caines (X. Y.),373. 
 
 p. 1902. 
 Vanduzor v. Linderman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 106. p. 1161. 
 Van Eman v. Stanchfleld, 8 Minn. 518. pp. 
 
 825, 826. 
 Van Hoesen v. Cameron (Mich.), 20 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 609. pp. 929, 930. 
 Van Horn v. Redmou, 67 la. 689. p. 2068. 
 Van Hook v. Walton, 28 Tex. 59. pp. 874, 
 
 1093. 
 Van Hook, Ex parte, 3 N. Y. City Hall Eec. 
 
 64. p. 172. 
 Van Lien v. Scoville Man. Co., 4 Daly, 554 
 
 p. 1207. 
 Vanmeter v. Kitzmeller, 5 W. Va. 381. p. 
 
 1914. 
 Vanness v. Bradley, 29 Ind. 388. p. 2141. 
 Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 137. p. 
 
 1644. 
 Vannov v. Duprez, 72 Ind. 26. p. 2052. 
 Vannoy r. Giveus, 23 N. J. L. 201. p. 53. 
 ' Vanover v. Turner, 41 Ga. 577. pp. 2067, 2099. 
 Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308. pp. 
 
 1267, 1268, 1273. 
 Vansickle v. Brown, 68 Mo. 627. pp. 528, 
 
 1168. 
 Van Vacter V. McKillip,7 Blackf. (Ind.) 578. 
 
 p. 73. 
 Van Valkenburg v, Rogers, IS Mich. 180. p. 
 
 831. 
 Vanvaukenberg v. Vanvaukenberg, 90 Ind, 
 
 433. p. 508. 
 Van Vetchen v. Griffiths, 4 Abb. App. (N. Y'.) 
 
 487. p. 1705. 
 Vanrexen v. Rose, 7 Ind. 222. p. 1748. 
 Van Voorhees v. Leonard, 1 Thomp. & C. 
 
 tX. Y.) 148. p. 1195. 
 Vanwey v. State, 41 Tex. 639. p. 728. 
 Van Winkle r. South Carolina R. Co., 38 Ga. 
 
 32. pp. 1321, 1345. 
 Van ^^■vck v. Mcintosh, 14 N. Y. 439. p. 1940. 
 Van Za'ndt V. Mutual IJenefit Ins. Co.,55N. 
 
 Y. 169; s. c. 14 Am. Rep. 215. p. 509. 
 Van Zant v. Jones, 3 Dana (Ky.), 405. p. 221. 
 Varick v. Jackson, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 166; s. c. 
 
 19 Am. Due. 571. p. 383. 
 Varner v. Core, 20 W. Va. 472. pp. 2096, 2097. 
 Vastbinder r. Metcalt, 3 Ala. 100. p. 361. 
 Vasie v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11. pp. 1964, 1966, 
 
 1964. 
 Vater v. Lewis, 36 Ind. 288. pp. 1911, 2034, 
 
 2035. 
 Vaughan v. Six Hundred and Three Casks, 
 
 7 Ben. (U.S.) 51)6. p. 1344. 
 Vaughan v. Webster, 5 Harr. (Del.) 256. p, 
 
 1329. 
 Vaughan v. Westover, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 
 
 316. p. 397. 
 Vaughn v. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 758. p. 
 
 1535. 
 Vaughn v. Dotson, 3 Swan (Tenn.), 348. pp. 
 
 1921, 1929, 1930, 1974. 
 
 Vaughn r. Fuller, 2 Strange, 1246. p. 948. 
 Vauglin V. Paine, 3 N. J. L. 728. p. 264. 
 Vauglin V. Porter, 16 Vt. 266. p. 1716. 
 Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600. p. 4. 
 Vaughn v. State, 17 Tex. App. 562. pp. 1744, 
 
 1855. 
 Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 415. p. 1092. 
 Vaughn v. AVestover, 2 Hun (K. Y. 43. p. 402. 
 Vaulx V. Campbell, 8 Mo. 224. pp. 1669, 1750- 
 Veal V. Brown, 2 X. J. L. 72. p. 19. 
 Veatch v. Stale, 56 Ind. 584. p. 1642. 
 Veatch V. State, 60 Ind. 291. p. 2082. 
 Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126. p. 1146. 
 Veeder v. Baker, 83 N. Y. 156. p. 265. 
 Vegeant v. Scully, 20 Bradw. (111.) 437. p. 
 
 12,2. 
 Veiths V. Hagge, 8 Iowa, 163. p. 218, 219. 
 Velott V. Lewis, 102 1'a. St. 326. p. 357. 
 Venable v. McDonald, 4 Dana (Ky.), 336. p. 
 
 827. 
 Venine v. Archibald, 3 Colo. 163. p. 2. 
 Venuall v. Garner, 1 Cromp. & M. 21. p. 1223. 
 Vennum v. Harwood, 6 111. 659. pp. 120, 121. 
 Vent V. Osgood, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 672. p. 895. 
 Vermilyea, Ex parte, 6 Cow. (N. Y^. 555. pp. 
 
 66, 68, 70, 96, 98, 125. 
 Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. St. 208. pp. 1321, 
 
 1330, 1345, 1348. 
 Vernon v. Haukey, 2 T. R. 113. p. 2082. 
 Vernon v. Keys, i2 East, 632. p. 926. 
 Vernon v. Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 183. pp. 1103, 1104. 
 Vernon v. Manners, 3 Dyer, 319. a. (13). 
 
 p. 29. 
 Vernon Co. v. Stewart, 64 Mo. 408. p. 967. 
 Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts (Pa.), 385. pp. 839, 
 
 841. 
 Verplanck v. Sterry, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 558. 
 
 p. 1445. 
 Verzan v. McGregor, 23 Cal. 339. p. 627. 
 Vessey v. Pike, 3 Car. & P. 512. p. 1467. 
 Vest V. Cooper, 68 X. C. 131. p. 1978. 
 Vezain v. People, 40 111. 397. p. 106. 
 Vicars v. Laugham, Hob. 235. pp. 86, 125. 
 Vicary v. Farthing, M. 1695. Cro. Eliz. 411. 
 
 pp. 1936, 1952. 
 Vicksburg v. Hennessey, 54 Miss. 391. pp. 
 
 1224, 1246. 
 Vidal V. Thompson, 11 Mart. (La.) 23. p. 110. 
 Viele V. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa, 9. pp. 
 
 214, 219, 221, 224. 
 Vlerling r. Stifel Brewing Co., 15 Mo. App. 
 
 125. p. 2048. 
 Vifquain v. Finch, 15 Neb. 505. p. 220. 
 Vigus V. O'Bauuon, 6 West. Rep. 219; s. c. 118 
 
 111. 334. p. 1678. 
 Vilas V. Burton, 12 Vt. 56. pp. 150, 152. 
 VUhac V. Biven, 28 Cal. 409. p. 2099. 
 Vinal V. Core, 18 W. Va. 1. pp. 1194, 1197, 
 
 1198, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203. 
 Viucennes University v. Embree, 7 Blackf. 
 
 (Ind.) 461. p. 2117. 
 Vincent tJ. Hurt, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 381. p. 
 
 825. 
 Vincent t'. Watson, 1 Rich. 194. p. 188. 
 Vincett r. Cook, 4 Hun (X. Y.), 318. p. 1222. 
 Vinegard r. Matnev, 68 Mo. 105. p. 2051. 
 Vinton v. Baldwin," 95 Ind. 433. p. 2010. 
 Vinton r. Middlesex R. Co., 11 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 304; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 6. p. 1294. 
 Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287. p. 1940. 
 Vinton v. Schwab, 32 Vt. 612. pp. 1208, 1212, 
 
 1.599. 
 Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452. p. 626. 
 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 ; s. c. sub nom. 
 
 Re Com. Virginia, 12 Cent. L.J. 229. p. 8. 
 Vitrifled Wheel & Emery Co. v. Edwards, 
 
 135 Mass. 591. p. 2. 
 Volmer v. Stagerman, 25 Minn. 234. p. 2050.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxiii 
 
 Votaw V. Dlehl,62 la. 676. p. 551. 
 
 Von Latham v. Libby, 38 Barb. N. Y. 339. 
 
 pp. 1171,1173. 
 Voorhis v. Langsdbrf , 31 Mo. 451. p. U36. 
 Voorman v. Voight, 46 Cal. 397. p . 563. 
 Vorisr. Smith, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 135. p. 
 
 1941. 
 Vose V. Ins. Co., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 42. p. 977. 
 Vose V. Reed, 1 Woods (U. S.) 647. p. 13S. 
 Voss V. Eller, 109 Ind. '260. P- 2102. 
 Voss V. Prier, 71 Ind. 128. p. 1642. 
 Voullaire v. Voullaire, 45 Mo. 602. p. 2061. 
 Vuyton V. Brenell, 1 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 467. p. 219. 
 Vyyyan v. Vyvyan, 30 Beav. 65. p. 122. 
 
 W. 
 
 "W. V. H., 2 Swab. & Tr. 240. pp. 646, 651. 
 Wabash &c. Canal v. Mayer, 10 Ind. 400. p. 
 
 1224. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481. p. 1208. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Savage, 110 Ind. 156. p. 
 
 2037. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Tretts, 96 Ind. 450. p. 
 
 2028. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Williamson, 104 Ind. 
 
 154. p. 1619. 
 Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290; s. c. 50 Am. 
 
 Rep. 94'. pp. 375, 479. 16S8, 1708. 
 Waddell v. Magee, 53 Miss. 687. p. 128. 
 Waddingham r. Gamble, 4 Mo. 465. ]). 1669. 
 Wade V. De Wilt, 20 Tex. 398. pp. 727, 783, 
 
 Wade V. Halligan, 16 111. 512. p. 1005. 
 Wade V. Guppius^er, 60 Ind. 376. p. 2110. 
 Wade V. Hardy, 75 Mo. 394. p. 1661. 
 Wade V. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34. p. 1481. 
 Wade V. Ordway, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 229. p. 
 
 1983. 
 Wade V. Scott, 7 Mo. 509. p. 214. 
 Wade V. State, 65 Ga. 756. pp. 259, 730. 
 Wade V. State, 12 Ga. 25. p. 117. 
 Wade V. State, 12 Tex. App. 358. p. 130. 
 Wade V. State, 71 Ind. 535. pp. 1688, 1709. 
 Wade V. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578. p. 464. 
 Wade V. Walden, 23 111. 425. pp. 1161, 1170, 
 
 1173, 1197. 
 Wadhams v. Gav, 73 111. 415. p. 191. 
 Wadleigh v. .JanVrin, 41 N. H. 512. p. 344. 
 WaiHe V. Dillenbock, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 123. 
 
 pp. 1473, 1559. 
 Wafford v. State, 44 Tex. 439. p. 453. 
 Wager v. Stickle, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 407. p. 199. 
 Wagner v. Egleston, 4'.t Mich. 218. p. 861. 
 Wagner v. People, 30 Mich. 384. pp. 425, 426. 
 AVait V. Agricultural Ins. Co., 13 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.),371. p. 1211. 
 Wait r. Day, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 439. p. 1446. 
 Wait V. Maxwell, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 217. p. 
 
 1977. 
 Wait V. Pomerov, 20 Mich. 425. p. 1663. 
 Waite r. Northeastern R. Co., El. Bl. & El. 
 
 719; s. c. Exchequer Chamber, El. Bl. & El. 
 
 728. p. 1231. 
 Wakefield w. Ross, 5 Mason (U. S.), 16. p. 
 
 294. 
 Wakefield v. Smithwick, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 
 
 327. p. 1668. 
 Wakefield v. State, 41 Tex. 556. pp. 1903, 
 
 1906, 1975. 
 Wakeman v. Dailey, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 498. p. 
 
 1406. 
 Wakeman v. Sprague, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 720. p. 
 
 Waland v. Elkins, 1 Stark. 272. p. 1612. 
 Walbridge v. State, 13 K. W. Rep. 209. p. 
 1869. 
 
 Walcott V. Kimball, 13 Allen (Mass.), 460. 
 
 pp. 793, 794. 
 Walcott V. Yeager, 11 Ind. 84. p. 561. 
 Walden v. Bouhen, 55 Mo. 405. p. 191. 
 Waldheim v. Sichel, 1 Hilton (M. Y.), 45. p. 
 
 1173. 
 Waldhier v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 71 Mo. 514. 
 
 pp. 1607, 1609, 1610. 
 Waldhier v.. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 38. 
 
 p. 1475. 
 Waldron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414. p. 909. 
 AVales v. Miner, 89 Ind. 118. p. 1491. 
 Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456. p. 1381. 
 Walker t'. Armstrong, 2 Kan. 198. p. 560. 
 Walker v. Bank of Washington, 3 How. (U. 
 
 S.)62. p. 825. 
 Walker v. Boston &c. R. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 1. p. 110. 
 Walker r. Butler, 6 El. & Bl. 506; s. c. 37 Eng. 
 
 L. & Eq. 13. p. 968. 
 Walker v. Collier, 37 111. 362. pp. 94, 106, 
 
 328. 
 Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray (Mass.), 506. pp. 
 
 8il0, 895. 
 Walker v. Dunspaugh, 20 X. Y. 170. p. 321. 
 Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194. p. 1662. 
 Walker v. Erie R . Co., 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 260. 
 
 p. 1237. 
 Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237. pp. 310, 505. 
 Walker i'. Granite Bank, 19 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 111. pp. 603, 604. 
 Walker v. Green, 3 3Ie. 215. pp. 119, 120. 
 Walker I'. Herron, 22 Texas, 55. p. 1225. 
 AValker v. Hunter, 17 Ga. 364. pp. 1927, 1945, 
 
 1974. 
 Walker v. Kennison, 34 X. H. 257. pp. 81, 
 
 84, 1983. 
 Walker v, Moores, 122 Mass. 501. p. 2137. 
 Walker v. Orange, 16 Gray (Mass.), 193. p. 
 
 892. 
 Walker v. Rostron,9Mee8. & W. 411. p. 1018. 
 Walker v. Sawver. 13 X. H. 191. p. 2021. 
 Walker v. State, 35 Ark. 3S6. p. 2144. 
 Walker v. State, 102 Ind. 502. pp. 71, 1756, 
 
 1884. 
 Walker v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 1. pp. 451, 
 
 728, 747, 761. 
 Walker v. State, 2 Tex. App. 326. p. 1784. 
 Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 246. p. 660. 
 Walker r. State, 6 Tex. App. 576. p. 17. 
 Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 366. p. 1924. 
 Walker v. State, 42 Tex. 360. pp. 1647, 1767, 
 
 1790, 1873. 
 Walker v. Swiggart, 21 Ark. 404. p. 2053. 
 Walker v. Walker, 11 Ga. 206. pp. 1321, 1927, 
 
 1974. 
 Walker v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242. pp. 307, 309, 
 
 312, 314. 
 Walker v. AVildman, 6 Madd. 37. p. 276. 
 Walker r. Westlield. 39 Vt. 246. p. 1225. 
 Walkup V. Pratt, 5 Harr. & J. (Md.) 51. p. 
 
 .566. 
 Wallace v. Auer, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 356. pp. 
 
 1383, 1389. 
 Wallace v. Breeds, 13 East, 522. p. 900. 
 AVallace v. Columbia, 48 Mo. 436. pp. 27, 123. 
 AVallace V. Duffield,2 Serg. &R. (Pa.) 521. p. 
 
 1044. 
 AVallace v. Fairman, 4 AVatts (Pa.), 379. p. 
 
 958. 
 Wallace v. New A'ork, 2 Hilt (X. Y.), 440: s. 
 
 c. 18 How. Pr. 169. ]). 124r). 
 AA'allace v. State, 9 Tex. App. 299. pp. 1832, 
 
 1855. 
 AVall V. Fife, 37 Pa. St. 394. p. 878. 
 AVall V. Goodenough, 16 111. 416. p. 1646. 
 AVall v. Livezav, 6 ("olo. 465. p. 1483. 
 AVall r. State, 80 Ind. 146. p. 2101. 
 AVallace v. State, 20 Tex. App. 360. p. 1680.
 
 clxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \rallace v. Tannton Street Rv. Co., 119 Mass. 
 
 91. pp. 375, 401. 
 Wallace v. Wren, 32 111. 14S. pp. 930, 1498. 
 Waller v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 83 Mo. 60S. 
 
 pp. 1229, 1297. 
 Waller r. Morgan, IS B. Mon. (Ky.) 137. p. 
 
 215. 
 Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 32.5. pp. (i5, S3, 129. 
 Waller r. Von Pliul. U Mo. SI. p. 1413. 
 Wallinj; r. State, 7 Tox. App. 625. p. 253. 
 Wallingrford r. Duulop, 14 Pa. St. 31. pp. 
 
 1640, 2011, 2013. 
 Wallis c. Alpine, 1 Camp. 204, note. p. 1172. 
 Wallis r. Murray, 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 399. p. 589. 
 M'allis V. Randall, 81 N. Y. 164. p. 566. 
 Wallis r. AVallis, Winst. L. (N. 0.) 78. p. 
 
 1137. 
 Wallop, Ex parte, 3 Bro. C. C. 90. p. fU7. 
 Walls V. Gates. 4 Mo. Apj). 1. pp. 1129, 2109. 
 Walls, Ex parte. 73 Ind. 95. pp. 2008, 2052. 
 Walpole V. Alexander, 3 Doug. 45. p. 188. 
 Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 88. pp. 2051, 208", 
 
 2093. 
 Walsh V. ]Morse, SO Mo. .568. p. 925. 
 Walsh V. People, SS N. Y. 458. p. 714. 
 Walsh V. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 334. pp. 654, 
 
 655. 
 Walsh V. Str. H. M. Wright, 1 Newb Adm. 
 
 494. p. 1154 
 Walsh v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Rob (N. Y.) 
 
 646; s. c. 17 Abb. I'r. (X. Y.) 3.56. p. 7. 
 Walsh V. Trevanion, 15 Sim. 578. p. 277. 
 Walsh V. Washington Marine Ins. Co., 32 
 
 X. Y. 427. pp. 513, 993, 994. 
 AValsoniJ. Moore, 1 Car. & K. 626. p. 639. 
 Walstou V. Com., 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 15. p. 43. 
 Walter v. Alexander, 2 Gill (Md.), 204. p. 
 
 1670. 
 Walter v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 36. 
 
 p]). 1254, 1296. 
 Walter v. Gernant, 13 Pa. St. 515. p. 1417. 
 Walters. People, 32 N. Y'. 147; s. c. 6 Park. 
 
 Cr. (X.Y.)15; 18 Abb. Pr. 147. pp. 42, 64, 65. 
 Walters v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 la. 71. p. 
 
 1646. 
 Walters v. Junkins, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 415. 
 
 p. 1911. 
 Waltheim v. Artz, 70 Iowa, 609. pp. 420, 859. 
 Walthman v. Weaver, 11 Price, 257 n. p. 
 
 1466. 
 Walton V. Augusta Canal Co., 54 Ga. 245. p. 
 
 117. 
 Walton V. United States, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 
 
 651. p. 2133. 
 AValtzv. Robertson, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 499. p. 
 
 1947. 
 Walworth v. Seaver, 30 Vt. 728. p. 1093. 
 Wannack v. Mayor of Macon, 53 Ga. 162. 
 
 pp. 1633, 1637. 
 Wanser v. Atkinson, 43 N. J. L, 571. p. 2. 
 Ward V. Bateman, 34 Ind. 110. pp. 2110, 2113. 
 Ward V. Busack, 46 Wis. 407. pp. 2028, 2031, 
 
 2032. 
 AVard V. Carlton, 26 Ark. 662. p. 2055. 
 Ward V. Clark, 6 Wis. 509. p. 2057. 
 Wara V. Gibljs, 37 Mi.ss. 560. p. 1748. 
 Ward V. Herrin, 4 Jones L. (X. C.) 23. p. 
 
 1698. 
 Ward V. Jefferson, 24 Wis. 342. pp. 1246, 
 
 1249. 
 Ward V. Lattimer, 2 Tex. 245. p. 836. 
 Ward V. Eewis, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 518. p. 876. 
 AV ard v: Railroad Co., 19 S. C. .521. p. 114. 
 Ward V. Shaw, 15 Vt. 115. p. 2C5. 
 Ward V. State, 10 Tex. Ai>p. 293. p. 18,55. 
 Ward V. State, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 253. pp. 
 
 85, 86. 
 Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120. pp. 171, 1S7, 261, 
 
 266, 267, 286. 
 
 Ward V. States Blackf. (Ind.) 101. p. 1983. 
 Ward V. State, 19 Tex. App. 664. p. 73. 
 Ward V. Steamboat. 7 Mo. .582. p. 1615. 
 Wai'd i\ The Law Property Assurance and 
 
 Trust Society, 37 Eng. Law and Eq. 47. 
 
 p. 9S3. 
 Ward V. Ward, 41 Iowa, 687. p. 1479. 
 AVard r. Washington Ins. Co., o Bosw. (N. 
 
 Y.) 229. 1). .oCfi. 
 Warden v. lluirhes,^ Wend. (N. Y.) 418. p. 
 
 17.55, 
 Warder v. Bowen (Minn.), 17 N. ^y. Rep. 
 
 943. )i. 025. 
 Warden v. Green, 6 Watts (Pa.), 424. p. 
 
 l:«>7, 
 AVarden r. Reser, 58 Kan. 86. pp. 2034, 2043. 
 ^\arden v. ^Vardou. 22 Vt. 563. pp. 1943, 1957, 
 
 11158. 
 AVardlow v. South Carolina R. Co., 11 Rich. 
 
 L. (S. C.) 337. 1). 1360. 
 Wardwell v. llaight, 2 Barb. (N. Y'.) 549. pp. 
 
 iUl.i, 1104. 
 Ware i\ Gay, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 106. pp. 1236, 
 
 12,i7, 161>, " 
 Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42. pp. 81, 84, 228, 414, 
 
 484,1114, 104."), 1685, 
 Wareham i-. Sellers;9 Gill & J. (Md.) 98. p. 
 
 829. 
 Warfleld ivLiudell, 30 Mo. 272; s. c. 38 Mo. 
 
 51)1. 1). 1051. 
 Warlick v. Peterson, 58 Mo. 408. p. 669. 
 Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 179. p. 652. 
 Warnrock v. State, 56 Ga. 503. pp. 727, 
 
 1651. 
 Warner v. Dunnavan, 23 111. 380. p. 1702. 
 Warner v. Myrick, 10 Minn. 94. p. 877. 
 Warner v. New York &c. R. Co., 52 X. Y. 437. 
 
 p. 1912. 
 Warner v. Xew Y'ork &c. R. Co,, 44 N, Y. 465; 
 
 s. c. 45 Barb. (X. Y.) 299, pp, 1225, 1997. 
 Warner r. Xortou, 20 How. (U. S.) 448. p. 
 
 1450. 
 Warner v. Robinson, 1 Root (Conn.), 194. 
 
 pp. 1963, 196S. 
 Warner v. Haines, 6 Carr. & P. 666. pp. 221, 
 
 222. 
 Warner v. Thompson, 35 Kan. 27. p. 825. 
 Warnick v. Grosholz, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 236. 
 
 pp. 851, 852. 
 Warrell v. Parmlee, 1 N. Y'. 519. p. 577. 
 AVarren v. Buckminster, 24 N. H. 336, p. 909. 
 Warren v. Childs, 11 Mass. 222. p, 1044, 
 Warren v. Com,, 37 Pa. St. 45. pp. 42. 46. 
 Warren v. Dickson, 27 111, 115, p, 1815. 
 Warren v. Glvnu, 37 X, H . 340, p, 1060. 
 "Warren v. Joiies, 51 Me. 140. p. 825. 
 Warren v. Kaufman, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 259. p. 
 
 1222. 
 Warren v. State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 150. pp. 
 
 732, 1606, 1515, 1520. 
 AVarren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619. pp. 1903, 
 
 1965. 
 Warren v. Wallis, 42 Tex. 472. p. 729. 
 Warrington v. Earlv, 2 El. it Bl. 763. p. 1032. 
 Washburn v. Cuddiby, 8 Gray (Mass.). 431. 
 
 p. 783. 
 Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Minn. 361. p. 1044. 
 Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story (U. S.), 122. p. 
 
 830. 
 Washburn v. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 59 Wis. 
 
 364. pj). 682, 687. 
 AVashburn v. Nashville &c. R. Co.. 3 Head 
 
 (Tenn.), 638. )). 1298. 
 Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372. p. .540. 
 AVashburton v. i;rouch, 108 Ind. 83. p. 2102. 
 AVashington v. Burnett, 4 W, Va, 85. p, 963, 
 Washington v. State, 63 Ala, 135 ; «. c. 36 Am, 
 
 Uep, 8, pp, 1.508, 1518, 1533, 1,534, 
 Washington v. State, 8 Tex. App. 377. p. 18.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxv 
 
 Washington Ice Co. v. Lay, 103 Ind. 48. p. 
 
 2108. 
 Washington Ice Co. v. Webster, 68 Me. 449. 
 
 p. 218. 
 Washington &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchants' &c. 
 
 Ins. Co., 5 Oh. St. 450. p. 1747. 
 Washington Mat. Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Mary's 
 
 Seminary, 52 Mo. 480. p. 1647. 
 Washington Savings Bank v. Ecky, 51 Mo. 
 
 272. p. 1034. 
 Washington &c. Tel. Co. v. Hobson, 15 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.)122. pp. 2126, 2132. 
 Wason V. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525. p. 825. 
 Wasson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 474. pp. 89, 93. 
 Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93. pp. 118, 
 
 122. 
 Watchman, The, 1 Ware (U. S.), 232. p. 328. 
 Water Imp. Co. v. Gildersleeve (N. M.), 16 
 
 Pac. Rep. 278. pp. 2048, 2064. 
 Waterford &c. Twp. v. People, 9 Barb. (X. 
 
 Y.)161. p. 45. 
 Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430; s. c. 8 Reporter, 
 
 560. pp. 68, 74. 
 Waterman v. Buckland, 1 Mo. App. 45. p. 
 
 882. 
 Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261. p. 1085. 
 Waters v. Gilbert, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 29. p. 
 
 559. 
 Waters v. McClellan, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 208. p. 
 
 1440. 
 Waters v. Wing, 59 Pa. St. 211. p. 1225. 
 Watertown Bank & Loan Co. v. Mix, 51 N. Y. 
 
 55S. pp. 1723, 1914, litl5. 
 Watford V. Forester, 66 Ga. 738. p. 829. 
 Watkinson v. Laughton, S Johns. (X. Y.) 213. 
 
 p. 1476. 
 Watkins v. Birch, 4 Taunt. 823. p. 1443. 
 Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. fU. S.) 25. p. 
 
 819. 
 Watkins v. State, 37 Ark. 370. p. 206. 
 AVatkins v. State, 60 Ga. 601. p. 85. 
 AVatkins v. Towers, 2 T. R. 275. p. 1584. 
 Watkins v. Tru.^tees, 41 Mo. 303. p. 898. 
 Watkins v. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57. pp. 344, 
 
 345. 
 Watkins v. Weaver, 10 Johns. 107. pp. 29, 
 
 112. 
 Watkins, Ex parte, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 193. pp. 
 
 136, 157. 
 Watrous v. Kearnev. 79 X. Y. 496. p. 151. 
 Watson V. Bennett," 12 Barb. (X. Y.) 196. p. 
 
 1023. 
 Watson V. Blaine, 12 Serg. & E. (Pa.) 131. 
 
 pp. 838, 839. 
 Watson V. Brainard, 33 Vt. 88. p. 891. 
 Watson V. Citizens' Bank, 5 S. C. 159. pp. 
 
 145, 146. 
 Watson V. Clark, 1 Dow. (Pari. Rep.) 336. p. 
 
 993. 
 Watson V. Davis, 7 Jones L. (X. C), 178. pp. 
 
 1938 1939. 
 Watson V. Gilday, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 337. p. 
 
 1064. 
 Watson V. Hoosac Tunnel Line Co., 13 Mo. 
 
 App. 263. pp. 1017, 1018. 
 Watson r. McCharen, 19 Wend. (X. Y'.)557. 
 
 p. 560. 
 Watson V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., 57 AVis. 
 
 332. p. 2043. 
 Watson V. Musick, 3 Mo. 29. p. 1681. 
 Watson V. Xelson, Matter of, 69 X. Y. 536. 
 
 pp. 137, 133. 
 Watson V. State, 63 Ind. 548. pp. 81, 82, 
 
 129. 
 Watson V. State, 9 Tex. App. 237. p. 465. 
 AVatson V. State, 13 Tex. App. 76. p. 1534. 
 AA"at.<on V. Stever, 25 Mich. 386. p. 891. 
 AVatson v. Tarpley, IS How. (U. S.) 517. pp. 
 
 942, 946. 
 
 Watson V. Tripp, 11 R. I. 98; s. c. 15 Am. L. 
 
 Reg. 282. p. 55. 
 AA'atson v. Turner, Bull. X. P. 147. p. 889. 
 AVatson V. Twombly, 60 X. H. 491. pp. 396, 
 
 397, 402, 409. 
 AVatson v. AValker, 23 X. H. 471. pp. 365. 
 
 1939, 1956. 
 AA'atson v. Walker, 33 X. H. 131. pp. 84, 1246. 
 AVatson V. AVhitnev,23 Cal. 375. p. 100. 
 AVatson v. AA'illianis, 36 Miss. 331. pp. 132, 
 
 150. 
 AA'atson V. AVilson, 36 Miss. .331. p. ].37. 
 Watson V. AA'oolvertou. 41 111. 241. p. 1750. 
 AVatterson v. Moore, 23 AV. \'a. 403. pp. 
 
 2064, 20(35. 
 AA'atts V. Green, 30 Ind. 98. p. 561. 
 AVatts V. Holland, 56 Tex. 54. p. 254. 
 AVatts V. Ruth, 30 Ohio St. 32. pp. 118, 121. 
 AVaugh I'. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235. p. 1099. 
 AVauRh r. Fielding, 48 X. Y. 681. p. 346. 
 AVaughop V. AVeeks, 22 111. 350. p. 328. 
 AVausaw Boom Co. v. Plumer, 49 AVis. 118. 
 
 p. 2043. 
 AVay V. Arnold, 18 Ga. 181. p. 1947. 
 AVay V. Butterworth, 106 Mass. 75. p. 1109. 
 AVay V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 35 la. 485. p. 
 
 KiOO. 
 AA'ay v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 341. pp. 
 
 1224, 1263. 
 Way r. Sperry, 6 Cush. (Alass.) 238. p. 966. 
 AVayman v. Southard, 10 AVheat. (U. S.) 1. 
 
 p. 8S3. 
 AA'ayne Countv v. Delaware &c. R. Co., 15 
 
 Pa. St. 351. p. 1087. 
 AVayne &c. Co. v. Berry, 5 Ind. 286. p. 1670. 
 AVeatherly i\ Higgins, 6 Ind. 73. .p. 2027. 
 AVeaver v. Crocker, 49 111. 461. p. 608. 
 AVeaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584. pp. 705, 
 
 707, 710, 711. 
 AVebb V. Hill, 3 Carr. & P. 485. p. 1197. 
 Webb V. Page, 1 Car. & K. 23. p. 176. 
 AVebb V. Richardson, 42 A't. 465. p. 1U43. 
 AVebb V. Robinson, 14 Ga. 216. p. 1669. 
 AVebb V. State, 29 Oh. St. 351. pp. 34, 307, 471, 
 
 472, 473. 
 AA^ebb v. State, 5 Tex. App. 596. pp. 1878, 
 
 1884, 1930. 
 AVebb V. State, 9 Tex. App. 491. pp. 225,1788, 
 
 1789, 1880, 1884. 
 AVebb V. State, 9 Tex. App. 490. p. 255. 
 AVebber v. Hankey, 4 Mich. 198. p. 457. 
 AVeber v. Armstrong, 70 Mo. 217. pp. 1410, 
 
 1437. 
 Weber v. Illing, 66 AA'is. 79. p. 1074. 
 AVebster v. Clark, 30 X. H. 245. p. 365. 
 AVeljster College i'. Tyler, 35 Mo. 268. p. 1668. 
 AVebster v. Lee, 5 Mass. 335. p. 383. 
 AVeddeuburu's Case, Fost. Cr. L. 23. p. 86. 
 AVeed v. Armstrong, 6 McLean (U. S.) 44. 
 
 p. 572. 
 Weed V. Panama R. Co., 17 X.Y. 362. p. 
 
 1290. 
 Weed V. Saratoga &c. R. Co., 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 
 
 5.34. pp. 1151, 11.52. 1606. 
 Weeks v. Loighton, 5 X. H. 343. p. 895. 
 Weeks i'. Medler, 20 Kan. 57. p. 6U. 
 ^Veeks V. State, 3 S. E. Rep. 323. p. 2096. 
 AVeeton r. Hodd, 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 278. p. 950. 
 AVehrkamp v. Willett, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 
 
 (X.Y.) 548. pp. 319,449. 
 AVeick V. Lander, 75 HI. 93. p.. 1232. 
 AVeide v. David.^ou, 15 Minn. 330. p. 560. 
 AVeiderkind v. Tuolumne Water Co., 65 Cal. 
 
 431. p. 1IJ39. 
 AA^eidler v. Farmers' Bank, 11 Serg. & R. 
 
 (Pa.) 134. pp. 554, 555. 
 AVoidmau v. Kohr, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 17. p. 
 
 219. 
 AVeidncr v. Conner, 9 Pa. St. 78. p. 630.
 
 clxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Wegel, Snccesslon of, 18 La. Ann. 49. p. 328. 
 Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black (U. S.), 
 
 39. pp. 1246, 1249. 
 Weil V. Schwartz, 21 Mo. App. 372. p. 834. 
 Wetland v. Wevhiud, 64 Mo. 168. p. 1668. 
 Weir V. Burlington &c. K. Co., 19 Neb. 212. 
 
 p. 2090. 
 Weir V. Weir, 3 13. Mon. (Kv.) 645. p. 900. 
 Weir Plough Co. v. Wolnislev, 110 lud. 243. 
 
 p. 2112. 
 Weis V. Madison, 75 lud. 241; s. c. 39 Am. 
 
 Uep. 135. p. 1265. 
 Weisenberg r. Appleton, 26 Wis. 56. p, 1209. 
 Wei.^s V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 Pa. St. 387. 
 
 p. 1225. 
 Weisse v. Citv, 10 La. Ann. 46. p. 193. 
 Welch r. Ins." Co., 23 W. Va. 289. pp. 1941, 
 
 1942. 
 Welch r. Welch, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 133. p. 
 
 1910. 
 Welch V. Wesson, 6 Grav (Mass.), 505; s. c. 2 
 
 Thomp. Keg. 1077. p. "1210. 
 Welcome r. Batchelder, 23 Me. 85. p. 281. 
 Weld V. Came, 98 Mass. 152. p. 912. 
 Welden v. Buck, Anthou. (X. Y.) 15. p. 328. 
 Weldon V. Burch, 12 111. 374. p. 268. 
 Weldon Hotel Co. v. Seymour, 54 Vt. 582. p. 
 
 201. 
 Wellborn v. Spears, 32 Miss. 138. pp. 108, 
 
 174S, 1750. 
 Welling V. Judge, 40 Barb. (X. Y.) 193. p. 
 
 1209. 
 Wells V. American Express Co., 49 Wis. 224. 
 
 p. 195. 
 Wells r. Fairbanks, 5 Tex. 585. p. 335. 
 Wells V. Gatv, 8 Mo. 681. pp. 1584, 1565 
 Wells r. Halpiu, 59 Mo. 92. p. 1668. 
 Wells V. Kelsev, 37 N. Y. 143. p. 397. 
 AVells V. Preston, 3 Neb. 444. p. 2u51. 
 AVells V. Railroad Co., 56 la. 620. pp. 2119, 
 
 2120. 
 Wells V. Sharp, 57 Mo. 56. pp. 1609, 1614. 
 Wells V. State, 11 Neb. 409. p. 1983. 
 AVells V. Wells, 33 N. J. Eq. 4. p. 176. 
 Wells V. Zallee, 59 Mo. 509. p. 1474. 
 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Preston, 3 Xeb. 444. 
 
 p. 2071. 
 Welmau, Matter of, 20 Vt. 653. p. 819. 
 Welsh V. P.arrett, 15 Mass. 380. p. 642. 
 Welsh V. Dusar, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 329. p. 825. 
 Welsh V. Railroad Co.. 10 Oh. St. 65. pp. 
 
 1344, 1374. 
 Welstead v. Le^T. 1 Mood. & Rob. 138. p. 
 
 810. 
 Wendell v. Moulton, 26 X. H. 41. p. 1671. 
 Wendell v. Troy, 39 Barb. (X. Y.) 335. p. 
 
 1246. 
 Wenman v. Ash, 22 L. J. C. P. 190. p. 1461. 
 Weuuall V. Adney, 3 Bos. & P. 247. pp. 889, 
 
 899. 
 Wenrick v. Hall, 11 Scrg. & R. (Pa.) 153. p. 
 
 92. 
 Wentworth v. Eastern R. Co., 3 Xew Eng. 
 
 Rep. 355 ; s. c. 143 Mass. 248. p. 337. 
 Wentworth v. Farmington, 51 N. H. 128. p. 
 
 110. 
 AVerner v. Citizens' R. Co., 81 Mo. 368; s. c. 
 
 11 Mo. App. 601. pp. 1305, 1306. 
 Werner v. Kdmiston, 24 Kan. 147. p. 2083. 
 Werner v. State, 44 Ark. 127. pp. 113, 2048, 
 
 2055. 
 Wertheim v. Continental &c. Co., 21 Blatchf. 
 
 246. p. 182. 
 Wertheinier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 17 
 Blatchf. (U. S.) 421. pp. 1322, 1345, 1346, 
 13.56, 1359. 
 Wertz V. May, 21 Pa. St. 274. pp. 471, 1699. 
 Weslev V. State, 37 Miss. 327. pp. 1548, 1747, 
 1905,"19U6. 
 
 Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen 
 
 (Mass.), 95. p. 1384. 
 West V. Anderson, 9 Conn. 107. p. 1748. 
 West V. Baxeudale, 9 Com. Bench, 141. p. 
 
 1172. 
 West V. Cavino, 74 Ind. 265. pp. 2038, 2041. 
 West r. Ilendrix, 28 Ala. 226. p. 869. 
 West V. Lynch, 7 Daly (X. Y.), 247. pp. 409, 
 
 459. 
 West V. State, 4 S. E. Rep. 325. p. 124. 
 West V. State, 7 Tex. App. 150. p. 94. 
 West V. State, 1 AVis. 209. pp. 166, 167. 
 West V. State, 8 Tex. App. 199. p. 69. 
 AVest V. AA'hite, 56 Mich. 126. pp. 1011, 1012. 
 AA'est Chester &c. R. Co r. McElwee, 67 Pa. 
 
 St. 311. pp. 1209, 1211, 1218. 
 AVest Chester Gas Co. v. County of Chester, 
 
 30 Pa. St. 232. p. 1087. 
 AVest Mahouey Tp. v. Watson, 112 Pa. St. 
 
 574 ; s. c. 3 Atl. Rep. 866. p. 1222. 
 AVest Mahouey T)). Co. v. Watson, 9 AtL 
 
 Rep. 430. |i. 1222. 
 AA'est St. Louis Sav. Bank v. Shawnee Co. 
 
 Bank, 95 U. S. 557; s. c. 5 Rep. .33; 2 Cent. 
 
 L. J. 46 ; 16 Alb. L. J. 473. p. 1023. 
 AVester v. Cedar Rapids &c. R. Co., 27 111 
 
 315. p. 2054. 
 AVestern &c. R. Co. r. Johnson, 59 Ga. 626. 
 
 pp. 1229, 2076. 
 Western Baukof Scotland r. Needell, 1 Fost. 
 
 & Fin. 461. p. 1096. 
 Western Building Assn. v. Fitzmaurice, 7 
 
 Mo. App. 2S3. p. 1032. 
 AA^estern Historical Co. v. Schmidt, 56 AA'is. 
 
 681. p. 664. 
 AVe.stern Alassachusetts Ins. Co. v. Duffey, 2 
 
 Kan. 348. p. 1008. 
 AVesteru Stage Co. v. Walker, 2 la. 503. p. 
 
 1408. 
 AA'estern Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 
 
 Ind. 429 ; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 744. p. 955. 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Trissal, 98 Ind. 
 
 566. pp. 2016, 2126, 2130. 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Young, 93 Ind. 
 
 lis. p. 1756. 
 AVestfall v. Hudson River F. Ins. Co., 12 
 
 N. \. 289. p. 980. 
 AVestmoreland v. State. 45 Ga. 225. pp. 1907, 
 
 1913, 1930, 1981. 
 AVeston v. Com., Ill Pa. St. 251. p. 77. 
 AVeston v. Dobiniet, Cro. Jac. 432. p. 795. 
 AVeston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1. p. 2089. 
 AVeston &c. R. Co. r. Cox, 32 Mo. 456. p. 560. 
 AVellierall v. Harris, 51 Mo. 65. pp. 2051, 
 
 2052. 
 Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal. 106. p. 392. 
 AVethey V. Andrews, 3 Hill (N. Y.),682. p. 
 
 939. 
 AA'eybright v. Fleming, 40 Oh. St. 52. p. 2091. 
 Whaleii r. Centenary, 62 Mo. 326. p, 1239. 
 Whaleyr. Gleason, 40 Ind. 405. pp. 2076, 2086, 
 W haley v. I'eak, 49 Mo. 80. p. 899. 
 AVharton'3 Case, A'elverton, 24. p. 86. 
 AVhartonr. Fitzgerald, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 603. 
 
 p. 891. 
 AA heatou v. Railroad Co., 36 Cal. 591. p. 
 
 1483. 
 AVheeldcn v. AVilson, 44 IMe. 11. p. 344. 
 AVheeler v. Nesbit, 24 How. (U. S.) 545. p. 
 
 1195. 
 AVheeler v. Robb, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 330. p. 
 
 1468. 
 AVheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383. pp. 812, 
 
 839, 1.5%. 
 AA'heeler v. State, 42 Ga. 306. p. 15. 
 AVIieeler v. State, 42 Md. 570. p. 725. 
 AVheelerr. Train, 3 Pick. 2.55. j). 1442. 
 AVheeler v. AVestport, 30 AVis. 392. pp. 1246, 
 
 1247.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxvii 
 
 Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 El. & Bl. 231. pp. 
 
 1601, 1605. 
 Whelan v. Reg., 28 Up. Can. Q. B. 2. pp. 88, 
 
 11.5, 116, 122. 
 Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89. p. 1974. 
 Whelstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. St. 6.5. p. 1381. 
 Whipple V. Blackiugton, 97 Mass. 476. p. 
 
 968. 
 Whipple V. Walpole, 10 X. H 130. p. 342 . 
 Whipple V. Whitniai), 13 R. I. .512. p. 192. 
 W^hlrleyi'. Whiteman, 1 Head (Teun.), 610. 
 
 p. 1229. 
 Whitaker v. McCluug, 14 Minn. 170. p. 2102. 
 Whitcher t'. Peachaiii, 52 Vt. 242. p. 694. 
 Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118. pp. 132, 
 
 137, 139, 171. 
 Whitcomb v. Barre, 37 Vt. 148. p. 1235. 
 Whitcomb v. Fairlee, 45 Vt. 671. pp. 1681, 
 
 1687. 
 Whitcomb v. Hovt, 20 Pa. St. 443. p. 1066. 
 Whitcomb I'. Wiiliams, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 228. 
 
 p. 2137. 
 White V. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155. pp. 341, 343, 
 
 513,515,1780. 
 White V. Beem, 80 Ind. 239. p. 17.56. 
 White V. Bisbing, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 400. p. 
 
 1941. 
 White V. Brooks, 43 X. H. 402. p. S90. 
 W^hite f. Brown, 1 Wall. -Juu. 217. p. 1014. 
 While V. Burnlev, 20 How. (U. S.) 235. p. 
 
 1079. 
 White V. Caldwell, 17 Mo. App. 691. pn. 2048, 
 
 2049. 
 White V. Carroll, 42 X. Y. 161. p. 1461. 
 White r. Casten, 1 Jones L. (X. C.) 197. p. 
 
 1008. 
 White V. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 491. p. 
 
 1376. 
 White V. Cohen, 1 Drewrr, 312. p. 1385. 
 White V. Com., 6 Biuu. (Pa.) 179. p. 19. 
 White V. Crutcher, 1 Bush (Ky.), 472. pp. 
 
 2071, 2080. 
 White V. Dingley, 4 Mass. 435. p. 1161. 
 White V. Harlow, 5 Gray (Mass.) , 563. p. 324. 
 White V. Goodrich Transp. Co., 46 Wis. 493. 
 
 p. 1364. 
 White V. Graves, 68 Mo. 219. p. 1708. 
 White V. Hass, 32 Ala. 430. p. 1642. 
 White V. Hermann, 51 111. 243. p. 1078. 
 AVhite V. Leightou, 15 Neb. 426. p. 1027. 
 White v. Martin, 3 111. 69. p. 1911. 
 White V. Milwaukee &c. E. Co., 61 Wis. 536. 
 
 p. 654. 
 White r. Moses, 11 Cal. 68. p. 75. 
 White V. Parker, 8 Barb. (X. Y'.) 48. p. 842. 
 AVhite V. People, 90 111. 117. pp. 705, 707, 726. 
 White V. Perkins, 16 Ind. 35S. p. 2064. 
 White r. Prigmore, 28 Ark. 450. p. 2128. 
 White V. Smith, 54 Iowa, 233. p. 1429. 
 White V. State, 16 Tex. 206. pp. 19, 65. 
 White V. State, 18 Tex. App. 57. pp. 356, 
 
 1695, 1855. 
 White V. State, 19 Tex. App. 343^ pp. 1873, 
 
 18(4. 
 White V. State, 21 Tex. App. 3,39. p. 1647. 
 While ■y. State, 23 Tex. App. 1.54. p. 1851. 
 White V. State, 52 Miss. 216. pp. 11, 65, 71, S2, 
 
 83 
 White V. State, 63 Ind. 595. pp. 345, .528, 529. 
 AVhite V. Stillman, 25 X. Y'. 541. p. 885. 
 AVhite V. Stoner, 18 Mo. App. 540. p. 643. 
 AVhite r. Tucker, 9 Iowa, 100. p. 358. 
 AVhite V. Tucker, 16 Oh. St. 468. p. 344. 
 AVhite V. AValker, 31 111. 422. p. 10,58. 
 AVhite V. AVallen, 17 Ga. 106. p. 2097. 
 AVhite V. White, 5Rawle (Pa.), 61. p. 1983. 
 AVhite V. AVhite, 6 Xev. 20. p. 2099. 
 AVhite r. AA'iunisiraniet, 7 Cash. (Mass.) 153. 
 
 p. 1343. 
 
 White V. AVright, 16 Mo. App. 551. p. 1061. 
 AVhitefleld v. Aland, 2 Carr. & K. 1015. p. 
 
 354. 
 Whitefleld v. Hurst, 9 Ired. L. (N. 0.) 175. p. 
 
 1589. 
 Whiteford v. Burckmeyer, 1 Gill (Md.^, 127. 
 
 p. 349. 
 Whiteford r. Munroe, 17 Md. 135. pp. 827, 1670. 
 AVhitehead v. Keys, 3 Allen (Mass.), 495; s. 
 
 c. 1 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 471. pp. 1016, 1942. 
 Whitehead r. Scott, 1 Mood. & R. 2. p. 60S. 
 AVhitehead v. AVells, 29 Ark. 99. pp. 9, 118. 
 AVhitehouse v. Frost, 12 East, 614. p. 909. 
 AVhitehurst v. Davis, 2 Hayw. (N. C.) 113. , 
 
 p. 5. 
 AVhitemore v. Haroldson, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 313. 
 
 p. 2065. 
 AA'hiteside v. Adams, 26 Ind. 250. pp. 2107, 
 
 2108. 
 AVhiteside r. Jackson, 1 Wend. (N. Y'.) 418. 
 
 AVhitesides v. Russell, 8 AA'atts & S. (Pa.) 44. 
 
 pp. 1321, 1345, 1347, 2013, 2014, 2017. 
 AVhitewater R. Co. v. Bridgette, 94 Ind. 216. 
 
 p. 1308. 
 AA'hitewater A'alley Canal Co. v. Dow, 1 Ind. 
 
 141. p. 329. 
 AA'hitewater A"alley R. Co. v. McClure, 29 
 
 Ind. 536. p. 1501. 
 AVhitfleldr. AVestbrook, 40 Miss. 311. p. 1682. 
 AVhitford v. County of Clark, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 306; s. c. 13 Fed. Rep. 837. pp. 571, 572. 
 AA'hitlev v. State, 38 Ga. 50. pp. 84, 1632. 
 AA'hitman v. Freese, 23 Me. 185. p. 340. 
 AVhitmore v. Ball, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 35. p. 1993. 
 AVhitmore v. Str. Caroline, 20 Mo. 513. p. 
 
 1151. 
 AVhitner v. Hamlin, 12 Fla. 21. pp. 60, 122, 
 
 1669. 
 AA^hitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 110. p. 
 
 967. 
 Whitney v. Cumberland, 64 INIe. 541. p. 1209. 
 AVhituey v. Karner, 44 AVis. 563. p. 2072. 
 AVhitney v. Peckham, 15 Mass. 243. p. 1171. 
 AVhitney i\ Snvder, 2 Lans. 447. p. 1663. 
 Whitney v. State, 8 Mo. 165. pp. 1903, 1906. 
 AVhitney v. Swett, 22 X. H. 10. p. 853. 
 AVhitney v. AVhltman, 5 Mass. 405. pp. 1944, 
 
 1955. 
 AA'hitney, In re, 14 Nat. Bank Reg. 1. p. 
 
 1068. 
 AVhittaker v. Morris, Esp. Dig. 58. p. 948. 
 AVhittaker v. Pullen, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 466. 
 
 p. 1670. 
 Whitten v. State, 36 Ind. 196. p. 133. 
 AVhittlesey v. Kellogg, 28 Mo. 404. p. 827. 
 AVhitwell v. A'incent, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 449. 
 
 p. 916. 
 Whitworth r. Erie R. Co., 87 N. Y. 413. pp. 
 
 1318, 1346. 1347, 1356. 1359. 
 AA'hltwortn v. Sour, 57 Ind. 107. p. 2141. 
 AVhizenant r. State, 71 Ala. 383. p. 345. 
 AVichita &c. R. Co. r. Fechheimer, 36 Kan. 
 
 45; s. c. 12 Pac. Rep. 362. p. 2027. 
 AVicker r. Dresser, 13 How. Pr. (X. Y'.) 331. 
 
 pp. 132, 171. 
 Wickersham r. People, 2 111. 128. pp. 118, 
 
 123. 
 AA'ickes v. Clutterbuck, 2 Bing. 483; 8. c. 10 
 
 Moore, 63. ]■.. 174>. 
 AVidder r. Buttalo &.c. R. Co., 24 Up. Can. Q. 
 
 B. 534. p. 114. 
 AA'idner v. State, 28 Ind. 394. pp. 1726, 1727. 
 Wieland v. AVhite, 109 Mass. 392. p. 192. ' 
 AViggen v. Plummer, 13 X. H. 251. p. 121. 
 AViggiu V. Coffin, 3 Story (U. S.), 1. p. 
 
 1197. 
 AViggins V. Burkhem, 10 AVall. (U. S.) 129. 
 
 p. 1133.
 
 clxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 "Wiggins V. Downer, 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 65. 
 
 pp. 173-2, 1918, lliyi. 
 "Wiggins V. Holley, 11 Ind. 2. p. 1048. 
 "Wii^ginsr. State, 1 Lea (Tenn.), 738. p. 41. 
 Wiggins f. Wiffglus, 6 N. H. 298. p. 891. 
 Wigglesworth V. Atkins, 5 Cueh. (Mass.) 212. 
 
 p. 241. 
 "Wiglitman v. Overhiser, S Daly (N. Y.), 282. 
 
 p. 365. 
 AVigle V. AVlgle, 6 Watts (Pa.), 522. p. 829. 
 AVilliorn V. Odell, 29 111. 456. p. 1469. 
 AVilbur V. Flood, 16 Mich. 40. pp. 371, 405. 
 "Wilbur V. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600. pp. 1473, 
 
 1475. 
 "Wilcox V. School Dist., 20 N. H. 303. p. 110. 
 "Wilcoxeu V. Bowles, 1 La. Ann. 230. p. 838. 
 Wild r. Bank of Passamoquoddy, 3 Mason 
 
 (U. S.), 505. pp. 10-22, 10-23. 
 Wild's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 214. p. 1543. 
 Wild V. Gibson. 1 H. L. Cas. 605. p. 1419. 
 Wilde V. Trainer, 59 Pa. St. 439. p. 803. 
 Wilder v. Peabody, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 376. pp. 
 
 348, 417, 440, 467. 
 Wilder v. Sprague, 50 Me. 354. pp. 1122, 1124, 
 
 1131. 
 Wilder v. State, 29 Ark. -294. p. 1908. 
 AVilder v. State, 25 Ohio St. 555. pp. 119, 120. 
 Wilder V. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 19-2. pp. 1012, 
 
 1013. 
 AVilder v. ATheeldon, 56 A^t. 344. p. I.i97. 
 AVilds V. Bogan, 57 Ind. 453. pp. 194S, 1955. 
 AA'ilds v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 X. Y. 430; 
 
 s. c. 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 503. pp. 1-2-23, 1224, 
 
 1585, 1605. 
 Wildy V. Bonnev, 35 Miss. 77. p. 2066. 
 AViles V. Suvdam, 64 N. Y. 173. p. 265. 
 AViley v. Keokuk, 6 Kan. 94. pp. 115,116,1489 
 AA'iley v. Paver, 61 Ind. 457. p. 2036. 
 AViley v. State, 1 Swan (Tenn.), '25H. p. 1905, 
 AViley V. AVllson, 77 Ind. .596. p. 1130. 
 AVilhelm v. People, 72 111. 468. pp. 15, 32. 
 AVilhoit V. Hancock, 5 Bush (Ky.), 567. p 
 
 1491, 
 Wilkes V. Jacks, Peake N. P. Cas. 203. p 
 
 948. 
 AVilkie v. Bolster, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.),327 
 
 p. 1236. 
 Wilkins v. Anderson, 11 Pa. St. 399. pp. 704 
 
 709. 
 Wilkins v. Jadl8,2 Barn. & Adolph. 188. pp 
 
 939 940. 
 AVilk'ins v. Maddrey, 67 Ga. 766. p. 1945. 
 AVilkins v. Malone, It Ind. 153. p. 268. 
 AA'ilkinson v. Griswold, 12 Snied. & M. 
 
 (Miss.) 669. p. 1747. 
 AVilkinson v. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386. p. 912. 
 AA'ilkinson v. Jett, 7 Leigh (Va.), 115. p. 
 
 667. 
 AVilkinson v. Parne, 4 T. R. 468. p. 1747. 
 AVilkinson v. Searcy, 76 Ala. 176. p. 1650. 
 AVillard r. Bridge, 4 Barb. (X. Y.) 361. pp. 
 
 1321,1330. 
 Willard v. Germer, 1 Sandf. S. C. (N. Y.) 50. 
 
 p. 958. 
 AA^illard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt. 393. pp. 450, 
 
 451. 
 AVillard v. Newbury, 22 Vt. 468. p. 1247. 
 AA'illard v. Pinard, 44 Vt. 34. p. 12-23. 
 Willard r. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith (X. Y.), 
 
 148. p. 1340. 
 AVillard v. Stevens, 24 X. H. 271. p. 2021. 
 Willard v. Sumner, 7 iAIo. Ap]). 577. p. 828. 
 Willcuts V. Xorlhwcstcru Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
 
 81 Ind. 300. p. 1621. 
 WJlles V. Farley, 3 Carr. & P. 395. p. 351. 
 Willey J'. Belfast, 61 Me. 569. pp. 1221, 1247, 
 
 1965, 1967. 
 Willey V. Portsmouth, 35 X. H. 303. p. 334. 
 "Wllley V. State, 46 Ind. 363. p. 1574. 
 
 Willey V. State, 52 Ind. 421. p. 251. 
 AVilliams v. Allen, 40 Ind. 295. p. 219. 
 Williams v. Bentley, 29 Pa. St. 2'22. p. 1415. 
 AVilliams v. Benton, 12 La. Ann. 91. p. 607. 
 AA'llliams v. Bridge, 14 La. Ann. 721. p. 1086. 
 AVilliams v. Brobst, 10 AVatts (Pa.), 111. p. 
 
 948. 
 AA'illiams v. Brown, 28 Oh. St. 547. pp. 495, 
 
 505, 506. 
 Williams v. Brvant, 4 Ala. 44. pp. 1617, 1618. 
 AVilliams v. Cannon, 9 Ala. 348. p. 1642. 
 AA'illiams v. Central R. Co., 3 S. E. Rep. t8. 
 
 p. 2099. 
 AVilliams v. Circuit Ct., 5 Mo. 248. pp. 2049, 
 
 2076. 
 Williams v. Com., 82 Kv. 640. pp. 707, 708. 
 AVilliams v. Com., 91 Pa. St. 493. p. 26. 
 AVilliams v. Currie, 1 C. B. 841. p. 1477. 
 AVilliams v. Davis, 1 Penn. (X. J.) 177. p. 879. 
 AA'illiams v. Delafleld, 2 Caiues (X. Y.), 329. 
 
 p. 974. 
 Williams v. DeAVitt, 12 Ind. 309. p. 308. 
 AA'illiams v. Donaldson, 8 Iowa, 108. p. 931. 
 Williams v. East India Co., 3 East, 192. p. 
 
 1331. 
 Williams r. Eikenberrv, 22 Xeb. 210; s. c. 34 
 
 X. AV. Rep. 373. p. 2U37. 
 AVilliams v. Finch, 2 Barb. (X. Y.) 208. p. 
 
 888. 
 AVilliams v. Oilman, 71 Me. 21. p. 425. 
 AVilliams v. Godfrey, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 299. 
 
 p. 10-2, 
 Williams v. Gray, 39 Mo. 201. pp. 908, 920. 
 Williams v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 271. pp. 
 
 50, 582. 
 Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 79. p. 1209. 
 AVilliams v. Great Western R. Co., 3 Hurl. & 
 
 X. 869; s. C. -28 L. J. (Exch.) 2. pp. 118, 122. 
 Williams v. Griffiths, 5 Mees. & AV. 300. p. 
 
 968. 
 Williams v. Hartshorn, 30 Ala. 211. pp. 1407, 
 
 1408. 
 AVilliams v. Hays, 20 N. Y. 58. p. 310. 
 AVilliams v. Herschman, 5 Xev. 263. p. 2099. 
 AVilliams v. Hollis, 19 Ga. 313. p. 891. 
 AVilliams v. Hutchinson, 3 X. Y. 312. pp. 888, 
 
 894. 
 Williams v. Jarrot, 6 111. 120. p. 323. 
 AVilliams v. Keats, 2 Stark. '290. p. 1097. 
 Williams v. Miller, 10 Iowa, 344. p. 106. 
 AVilliams v. Xolan, 54 Tex. 708. p. 19'2. 
 AVilliams v. Xorris, 2 Litt. 157. p. 109. 
 AVilliams v. 0'Keefe,9 Bosw. (X. Y.) 536. p. 
 
 1209. 
 AVilliams v. Poppleton, 3 Ore. 139. p. 113. 
 AVilliams v. Port, 9 Ind. 551. p. 1585. 
 AA'illiams r. Porter, 51 Mo. 441. p. 893. 
 AVilliams v. Rcvnolds, 10 Md. 57. pp. 884,885. 
 AVilliams v. Rice, 13 Xev. 235. p. 2099. 
 AVilliams v. Smith, 6 Cow. (X. Y.) 1H6. p. 56. 
 AVilliams v. Smith, 2 Barn. & Aid. 496. i).943. 
 AVilliams v. Spaulding, 29 Me. 112. p. 1090. 
 AVilliams V. State (Ala.), 1 South. Rep. 179. 
 
 p. 111. 
 AAMlliams V. State, 45 Ala. 57. p. 1905. 
 Williams v. State, 52 Ala. 412. pp. 1800, 1820, 
 
 1S39, 1819. 
 AVilliams r. State, 3 Ga. 453. pp. 58, 62,65, 
 
 89,91, 103. 
 AVilliams t'. State, 60 Ga. 367. p. 99. 
 AVilliams v. State, 10 Ind. 503. pp. 1515, 1520. 
 AVilliams v. State, 16 Ind. 461. p. 609. 
 AA'illiams v. State, 45 Ind. 299. p. .50. 
 AVilliams I. State, 32 Miss. 389. pp. 65, 85, 
 
 1-29, 1700. 
 AVilliams v. State, 37 Miss. 407. p. 118. 
 AVilliams v. State, 6 Xeb. 336. pp. 1548. 1891, 
 
 2002. 
 Williams v. State, 12 Oh. St. 622. p. 6.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxix 
 
 "Williams v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 376. pp. 
 
 154S, 1668. 
 Williams v. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 5S5. p. 
 
 300. 
 Williams v. State, 2 Tex. App. 271. p. 1539. 
 Williams v. State, 4 Tex. App. 255. p. 2093. 
 Williams v. State, 7 Tex. App. 163. p. 18S4. 
 Williams v. State, 14 Tex. App. 102. p. 1695. 
 Williams v. State, 44 Tex, 34. pp. 8, 30, 51, 
 
 103. 
 Williams v. Thames &c. Co., 105 Ind. 420. p. 
 . 21 n2. 
 Williams r. Thomas, 78 N. C. 47. p. 1937. 
 Williams v. Tiedemann, 6 Mo. App. 269. p. 
 
 882. 
 Williams r. Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339. p. 1197. 
 Williams v. Waters, 36 Ga. 454. p. 825. 
 Williams v. AVillis, 7 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 90. p. 
 
 2007. 
 Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220. p. 844. 
 Williamson v. Carroll, 16 X. Y. 217. p. 330. 
 Williamson V. Com., 4 Gratt. (Va.) 547. p. 
 
 351. 
 Williamson v. Fischer, 50 Mo. 198. p. 1598. 
 Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. St. 402. p. 
 
 &38. 
 Williamson 17. McGinnis, 11 B. Monr. (Ky.) 
 
 74. p. 1474. 
 Williamson v. Reddish, 45 la. 550. pp. 1929, 
 
 1933. 
 Williamson v. Wachenheim, 62 la. 196. p. 
 
 2059. 
 Williamson r Yingling,80 Ind. 379. pp.2027, 
 
 2041. 
 Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. St. 9; s. c. 27 Pa 
 
 St. 18. pp. 152, 154. 
 Williamson - Stewart Paper Co. v. Bosby 
 
 shell, 14 Mo. App. 534. pp. 192, 193. 
 Willings V. Swasey, 1 Browne (Pa.), 123. pp 
 
 1911, 1913, 1983. 
 Willis V. Ba-ilev, 19 Johns. (X. Y.) 268. p. 689. 
 Willis V. Bullitt. 22 Tex. 3.30. p. 1670. 
 Willis V. Forrest, 2 Duer (X. Y.), 310. p. 246 
 Willis V. Lowry (Tex.), 2 S. W. Rep. 449. p 
 
 747. 
 Willis V. -McXeill, 57 Tex. 465. pp. 738, 739, 
 
 762. 
 Willis V. People, 32 X. Y. 715. p. 715. 
 Willis V. State, 12 Ga. 444. pp. 62, 63. 
 Willis V. State, 9 Tex. App. 297. pp. 60, 70. 
 Willis V. Whitsitt, 4 S. W. Rep. 253. p. 1626. 
 Willis r. Willis, 18 Ga. 13. p. 1681. 
 Williston V. Morse, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 17. pp. 
 
 1077, 1083. 
 Wills V. Fo wkes, 5 Bing. X. C 4.55. p. 968. 
 Wills V. Xoyes, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 324. p. 1197. 
 Wills V. Ru ssell, 100 U. S. 621. p. 384. 
 Wills V. State, 69 Ind. 286. p. 48. 
 Willson r. Whitefield, 38 Ga 269. p. 827. 
 Wilmarth v. Mouutford, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 82. p. 1199. 
 Wilmerdiugs v. Fowler, 14 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 
 (N. S.)249. p. 146. 
 Wilmont r. Miserole, 40 X"'. Y. Sup. (8 Jones 
 
 & Sp.) 322. p. 580. 
 Wilson V. Abrahams, 1 Hill (X. Y.), 207. pp. 
 
 1902, 1926, 1929. 
 Wilson V. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44. pp. 1964, 
 
 1966, 1967. 
 Wilson V. Board of Education, 63 Mo. 137. 
 
 pp. 850. 1621. 
 Wilson V. Carson, 12 Md. 54. p. 819. 
 Wilson V. Cochran, 31 Tex. 677. p. 817. 
 Wilson V. Codman, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 193. p. 
 
 1615. 
 Wilson V. Coles, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 402. p. 
 
 2111. 
 Wilson V. Conway F. Ins. Co., 4 R. I. 143. p. 
 976. 
 
 Wilson V. Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. (Col.), 2 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1. p. 1239. 
 Wilson V. Forsyth, 24 BarD. (X. Y.) 106. p. 
 
 1443. 
 Wilson V. Fuller, 9 Kan. 176. p. 560. 
 AVilson V. Grand Trunk B. Co., 56 Me. 6a 
 
 p. 1154. 
 Wilson V. Hamilton, 4 Oh. St. 722. p. 1374. 
 Wilson V. Hanson, 20 X. H. 375. p. 957. 
 AVilson V. Hoare, 10 Ad. & El. 236. p. 1147. 
 Wilson V. Hudson, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 398. p. 
 
 1080. 
 AVilson V. Inloes, 6 Gill (Md.), 121. p. 1078. 
 AVilson 1-. Irish, 62 Iowa, 260. p. 812. 
 AA'ilson V. Jennings, 3 Oh. St. 528. p. 194. 
 AA'ilson V. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 60 Mo. 184, 
 
 p. 1708. 
 Wilson V. Kestler, 34 Kan. 61. p. 2051. 
 Wilson V. Mavor of Xew York, 1 Denio (X. 
 
 Y.),595. p"l266. 
 Wilson i\ Xatious, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 211. pp. 
 
 1463, 1470, 1708. 
 AA'ilson r. Pearson, 20 III. 81. p. 1439. 
 Wilson r. People, 94 111. 299. pp. 95. 115. 
 AVilson V. People, 39 X. Y. 459. p. 1566. 
 AVilson V. People, 1 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 256. p. 
 
 1952. 
 AVilson V. People, 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 619. pp. 
 
 1506, 1991. 
 Wilson V. Russell, 136 Mass. 211. p. 915. 
 Wilson r. Shoenberger, 31 Pa. St. 295. pp. 
 
 869, S70. 
 AVilson V. Smith, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 379. p. 1003. 
 AVilson r. Southern Pac. R. Co., 62 Cal. 164. 
 
 pp. 1321,1359. 
 Wilson V. State, 31 Ala, 371. p. 81. 
 Wilson v. State, 94 111. 299. p. 75. 
 Wilson V. State, 16 Ind. 392. p. 411. 
 AVilson v. State, 57 Ind. 71. p. 167. 
 AA'ilsou I'. State, 20 Oh. 26. p. 2002. 
 AVilson r. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 206. p. 1927. 
 AA'ilson V. State, 14 Tex. App. 5'.'4. p. 1560. 
 AA'ilson V. State, 18 Tex. App. 270. p. 1697. 
 AVilson r. State, 35 Tex. 365. p. 9. 
 AVilson V. State, 3 AVis. 798. p. 456. 
 AA'ilson V. State Bank, 3 La. Ann. 196. p. 34. 
 AA'ilson V. Steamboat Tuscarora, 25 Pa. St. 
 
 317. p. 803. 
 Wilson r. Trafalgar &c. Co., 93 Ind. 287. pp. 
 
 127, 1276, 1278, 1281, 1483, 1698, 2110. 
 Wilson v. Truelock, 19 Ind. 389. p. 2107. 
 AA'ilson i\ A'ance, 55 Ind. 394. pp. 2071, 2076. 
 Wilson v. AA'adleigh, 36 Me. 496. p. 194. 
 AVilson r. AVagar, 26 Mich. 452. pp. 368, 385, 
 
 386 425. 
 Wilson v. Watertown,3Hun (X.Y'.),50S. p. 
 
 1248. 
 AVilson V. AA'atterson, 4 Pa. St. 214. p. 1065. 
 AA'ilson V. Wheeling, 19 AV. A'a. 323. p. 1481. 
 AVilson f. AA'illiams, 52 Miss. 487. p. 1681. 
 Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984 ; s. e. 9 Jur. 393; 14 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 105,201. pp. 132, 143, 152. 
 Wilt V. Vickers, 8 AVatts (Pa.), 227. pp. 516, 
 
 891. 
 Wilton V. Middlesex R. Co., 107 Mass. 108; s. 
 
 c. 125 Mass. 130. p. 1298. 
 Wimberly, Ex parte, 57 Miss. 437. p. 152. 
 AA'inans v. Sierra Lumber Co., 66 Cal. 61. p. 
 
 1750. 
 Winch V. AA'inchester, 1 A'es. & B. 375. p. 918' 
 AA'inchell v. Hicks, 18 X. Y. 558. pp. 1626, 
 
 1737, 1739. 
 AVinchesterr. Bennett, 54 Pa. St. 510. p. 803. 
 AVinchester v. Cox, 3 Iowa, 575. p. 1060. 
 AVindham v. State, 19 Tex. App. 413. pp. 
 
 1896, 1897. 
 Wing V. Burgis, 13 Me. 111. p. 1085. 
 AVing V. Grav, 36 A't. 261. p. 1245. 
 Wing V. Mill', 1 Barn. & Aid. 101. p. 899.
 
 clxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Winkleraan v. People, 50 111. 449. p. 145. 
 Winkler v. Railroad Co., 21 Mo. App. 109. p. 
 
 342. 
 Winkler r. State, 32 Ark. 539. pp. 727, 728, 
 
 733. 
 "Winlock V. Hardy, 4 Litt. (Kx.) 272. p. 554. 
 Winn V. Lowell. 1 Allen (Mass.), 177. p. 1246. 
 "Winn V. Madden, 8 Mo. App. 2G1. p. 1440. 
 Winn v. State, 15 Tex. App. 169. pp. 1777, 
 
 1779. 
 Wiune v. McDonald, 39 N. Y. 233. p. 1645. 
 Winnesbeik Ins. Co. v. Sclmeller, 60 111. 465. 
 
 l>p. 62, 63, 126. 
 Winsett r. 8tate, ,57 Ind. 26. p. 21. 
 AVinship V. Bank of U. f«., 5 Pet. (U. S.) 561. 
 
 p. 1024. 
 Wmship V. Buzzard, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 103. 
 
 p. 855. 
 Winship V. Enfield, 42 N. H. 74. pp. 1246, 
 
 1280, 1379. 
 Wiuship r. Neale, 10 Gray (Mass.), 382. p. 
 
 375. 
 Wiuship r. Waterman, 56 Vt. 181. p. 1157. 
 Winslow V. Bailev, 16 Me. 319. p. 548. 
 Wiuslowr. Campbell, 46 Vt. 746. pp. 1921, 
 
 1944, 1945. 
 Winslow r. Draper, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 170. p. 
 
 1911. 
 Winslow V. Morrill, 68 Me. 362. p. 1969. 
 Winslow V. Railroad Co., 42 Vt. 700. p. 1374. 
 AVinsor v. Savage, 8 T. R. 290. p. 898. 
 "NVinstour. Miller, 12 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 550. 
 
 p. 15S5. 
 Winston r. Wales, 13 Mo. 569. p. 1600. 
 Winston, Ex parte, 7 Nev. 71. p. 152. 
 Winter v. Norton, 1 Ore. 42. p. 1001. 
 AVinter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524. p. 1377. 
 Winters v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 39 Mo. 468. 
 
 pp. 1236, 1296, 1483, 1669, 1677. 
 AVintz V. Morrison, 17 Tex. 372. p. 1648. 
 AVircbach v. First Nat. Bank, 12 Reporter, 
 
 571. p. 98. 
 AA'ise V. Bosley, 32 la. 34. pp. 1919, 1923. 
 AA'ise V. Joplin R. Co., 85 Mo. 178. pp. 1310, 
 
 1311. 
 Wise V. Wismer, 23 Mo. 237. pp. 1410, 1437. 
 Wiser V Chelsev, 53 Mo. 547. p. 1341. 
 AA'ishmier v. State, 110 Ind. 523. p. 2138. 
 AA'iswell V. First Congregational Church, 14 
 
 Oh. St. 31. p. 1588. 
 Witham v. Derbv, 1 Wils. 48. p. 2009. 
 AAltherlee v. Oce"an Ins. Co., 24 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 67. p. 204. 
 Witherlv v. Regent's Canal Co., 12 C. B. (N. 
 
 S.) 2; s. C.6 L. T. (N. S.) 255; 3 Fost. & Fin. 
 
 61. p. 1223. 
 Withers v. Drew, Cro. Eliz. 676. p. 1127. 
 AA'ithers v. Fisous, 40 Ind. 131. p. 1983. 
 AA'ithers v. North Kent R. Co., 27 L. J. 
 
 (Exch.) 417; subnom. Kent v. Great North- 
 ern R. Co., 1 Fost. & Fin. 165. p. 1237. 
 Witherspoon v. AAitherspoon, 2 McCord (S. 
 
 C.),520. p. 829. 
 AA'itkouskv v. AA'a§son, 71 N. C. 451. pp. 288, 
 
 1603, 1604. 
 AA'itt V. State, 9 Mo. 671. p. 1535. 
 AVlttcnbrock v. Belmer, .57 Cal. 12. p. 2085. 
 AA'itter v. Latham, 12 Conn. 392. ]>. 294. 
 AVitter v. Lvon, 34 AA"is. 564. ]i. 151. 
 AVol.iiru r. lllenshaw, 101 Mass. 193 p. 272. 
 AVolcott V. Hall, 6 Mass. 514. p. 1466. 
 AVolf r. American Express Co., 43 Mo. 422. 
 
 pp. 1318, 1369, 1370. 
 AVolf r. Tel. Co., 62 Pa. St. S3, p. 1150. 
 AVolf V. Trinkle, 103 Ind. 35.5. p. 1478. 
 AVolf V. AVasher, 32 Kan. 533. )'. 1621. 
 AVolf r. AVlllits, 35 la. 95. p. 1765. 
 AVolfe V. Goulard, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 336. 
 
 p. 268. 
 
 Wolfe V. Kable, 107 111. 165. p. 2058. 
 
 AVolfe r. Martin, 1 How. (Miss.) 30. pp. 6, 
 
 12S. • 
 AVolfe V. Parham, 18 Ala. 442. p. 1058. 
 AVolfe r. Pugh, 101 Ind. 293. p. .584. 
 AVoltfe V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 34 Minn. 215 
 
 s. c. 25 N. AV. Rep. 63. p. 1312. 
 Wolff e V. Mlunis, 74 Ala. 3S6. pp. 741, 762. 
 AVollastou V. Barnes, 1 Mood. & Rob. 386 
 
 p. 242. 
 AVollev, In re, 11 Bush (Ky.), 95. pp. 145, 146 
 
 147. ■ 
 Wombough V. Cooper, 4 Thomp. & C. 586 
 
 p. 1603. 
 AVood V. Aldrich, 25 AVis. 695. pp. 1724, 1949 
 AVood V. Barker, 49 Mich. 295. p. 1780. 
 AVood V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 196 
 
 p. 1022. 
 AVoodv. Coggeshall, 2Metc. (Mass.) 89. p 
 
 891. 
 Wood V. Cooper, 1 Carr. & K. 645. p. 354. 
 AVood v. Crocker, 18 AVls. 345. p. 1374. 
 AVood r. Figard, 28 Pa. St. 403. p. 1699. 
 AVood V. Hopkins, 3 N. J. 507. p. 194. 
 AVood r. Mackinson, 2 Mood & Rob. 273. p. 
 
 Wood V. Mann, 2 Sunm. (U. S.) 316. p. 649. 
 AVood V. Matthews, 73 Mo. 477. p. 869. 
 AVood r. Neale, 5 Gray (Mass.), 538. p. 188. 
 AVood V. Nortman, 85 Mo. 298. i). 1588. 
 AVood V. Southwick, 97 Mass. 354. p. 2002. 
 AVood V. State, 34 Ark. 341. pp. 1907, 1930. 
 AVood V. State, 92 Ind. 269. p. 382. 
 AVood v. State, 16 Tex. App. 574. p. 1538. 
 AVood V. Steele, 6 AVall. (U. S.) 80. pp. 1029, 
 
 1031. 
 Wood V. Stewart, 7 A"t. 149. p. 1943. 
 Wood V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 58 Mo. 109. p. 
 
 1308. 
 AVood V. Stoddard, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 194. p. 
 
 55 
 Wood v. Weir, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.):544. pp. 1195, 
 
 1197. 
 AVood r. Willard, 36 A't. 82. pp. 778, 1947. 
 AVood V. AVood, 52 N. H. 422. p. 54. 
 AVood V. AVvlds, 11 Ark. 754. p. 1750. 
 AVoodard v'. State, 9 Tex. App. 412. p. 129. 
 AVoodbridge v. Raymond, Kirby (Conn.), 280. 
 
 pp. 58, 117. 
 AVoodburn r. Cogdal, 39 Mo. 222. p. 560. 
 AVoodbury v. Fr^nk, 14 111. 279. pp. 1331, 1332, 
 
 1334. 
 AA'oodburv v. Earned, 5 Minn. 339. p. lti~. 
 AVoodburV r. Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.) 467. pp. 
 
 498, 499,"500, 512, 519, 1780. 
 Woodbury v. Taylor, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 504. 
 
 pp. 802, "961, 962: 
 AVoodlill V. Patton, 76 Ind. 575. p. 2010. 
 AVoodling V. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268. 
 
 p. 14,58. 
 AVoodman v. Chesley, 39 Me. 45. p. 825. 
 AVoodman v. Dutton, 49 la. 398. pp. 2093, 
 
 2100. 
 Woodruff V. Richardson, 20 Conn. 238. pp. 
 
 1113, 1977. 
 AVoods r. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 50 Mo. 
 
 112. pp. 1600. 1021. 
 AVoods V. P.oston, 121 Mass. 337. p. 1209. 
 Woods r. Figaniere, 25 How. Pr. (N. 1.) 522. 
 
 pp. 000, 605: 
 AVoods r. Rowan, 5 Johns. (N. \.) 13. p. 29. 
 AVoods V. State, 43 Miss. 364. pp. 1907, 1982. 
 AVoodsides v. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 665. pp 
 
 18, 30. 
 AVoodward r. Rlanchard, 16 111. 424. p. 1049, 
 AVoodward v. Booth, 7 Barn. & Cres. 301. p. 
 
 1612. 
 AVoodward r. Dean, 113 Mass. 297. p. 119. 
 AVoodward v. Horst, 10 la. 120. p. 2082.
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxxi 
 
 Woodward v. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 381. p. 214. 
 Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453. pp. 124, 
 
 1934. 
 Woodward v. McReynolds, 1 Chandl. (Wis.) 
 
 244. p. 1586. 
 Woodward v. Trask Fish Co., 38 Kan. 284; 
 
 s. c. 16 Pac. Rep. 456. p. 2073. 
 Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns. 
 
 (N. Y.)391. pp. 1032, 1034. 
 Woolen V. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502. pp. 1642, 
 
 1784, 1803, 2029. 
 Woolen V. Wire (Ind.), 11 North East. Rep. 
 
 236. p. 102. 
 Woolen V. Wishmier, 70 Ind. 108. pp. 2036, 
 
 2112, 2113. 
 Woolery v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 107 Ind. 
 
 381. p. 1751. 
 Wooley V. Constant, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 54. p. 
 
 1033. 
 Wooley V. Fry, 30 111. 158. pp. 1250, 1448. 
 Woolf V. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 373. p. 1223. 
 Woolfolk V. Wright, 28 Ark. 1. p. 2122. 
 Woolley, lu re, 11 Bush (Ky.), 95. pp.133, 
 
 145, 146, 147. 
 Woolmer v. Caston, Cro. Jac. 113. p. 2013. 
 Woolnoth V. Meadows, 5 East, 463. p. 1456. 
 Woolsey V. White, 7 Bradw. (111.) 277. p. 
 
 1914. 
 Wooster v. Proprietor Canal Bridge, 16 
 
 Pick. (Mass.) 547. p. 1483. 
 Wooten V. Barton, 1 Mood. & Rob. 518. p. 
 
 217. 
 Worcester V. Marchant, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 510. 
 
 p. 894. 
 Worcester Medical Institution v. Harding, 
 
 11 Cush. (Mass.) 285. p. 832. 
 Word r. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh (Va.), 743. 
 
 pp. 704, 735. 
 Wordell v. Smith, 1 Camp. 332. p. 1440. 
 Worford v. IsbeU, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 247. pp. 
 
 1977, 2011. 
 Work V. State, 2 Oh. St. 296. p. 4. 
 Works V. Stephens, 76 Ind. 181. pp. 1642, 
 
 1784, 1803. 
 Worlcy V. Moore, 97 Ind. 15. pp. 738, 2041. 
 Worlev V. Watson, 22 Mo. App. 546. p. 1440. 
 Wormley's Case, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 658. pp. 70, 
 
 85. 
 Wormouth v. Cramer, 3 Wend. (X. Y.) 399. 
 
 p. 1467. 
 Worrall v. Rhoads, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 427. p. 
 
 1013. 
 Worsely v. De Mattos, 1 Burr. 467. pp. 1407, 
 
 1440. 
 Worsham v. Goar, 4 Port. (Ala.) 441. pp. 
 
 239, 240. 
 Worster v. Forty-second St. R. Co., 50 N. Y'. 
 
 203. p. 1222. 
 Worth r. McConnell (Mich.), 4 N. W. Rep. 
 
 198. p. 927. 
 Worthiugton v. Mason, 101 U. S. 149. p. 2109. 
 Worthmgton v. Welch, 27 Ark. 464. p. 2055. 
 Wragg V. Penn. Township, 94 111. 11. p. 
 
 1014. 
 Wriifht V. Abbott, 85 Ind. 154. pp. 215, 224. 
 Wright V. Adams, 12 Mo. App. 376. p. 2065. 
 Wright V. Boiling, 27 Ala. 259. p. 362. 
 AVright V. Burchlield, 3 Oh. 54. p. 1906. 
 Wright V. Cabot, 89 X. Y. 57. p. 569. 
 Wright V. Carpenter, 49 Cal. 607. pp. 679,681. 
 Wright V. Clark, 50 Vt. 130. p. 1953. 
 Wriglit V. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Johns. (X. 
 
 Y.) 211. p. 7. 
 Wright V. Com. (Ky.), 2 S. W. Rep. 905. p. 
 
 1809. 
 Wright V. Com., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 141. pp. 66, 
 
 69, 75. 
 Wright V. Compton, 53 Ind. 310. pp. 1316, 
 1482. 
 
 Wright V. De Klyne, 1 Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 199. 
 
 p. 485. 
 Wright V. Tatham, 7 Ad. & El. 313. p. 296. 
 Wright V. Fort Howard, 60 Wis. 119. pp. 
 
 1648, 1676. 
 Wright V. Gully, 28 Ind. 475. p. 2110. 
 Wright V. Haddock, 7 Dana (Ky.). 254. p. 
 
 2069. ^ J " *» 
 
 Wright V. Hardv, 22 Wis. 348. p. 504. 
 Wright V. Illinois &c. Tel. Co., 20 la. 195. 
 
 pp. 1945, 1964, 1968, 1983, 1984, 1993, 1994. 
 Wright v. Jacobs, 61 Mo. 19. p. 1473. 
 Wright V. Lattin, 38 111. 293. p. 1005. 
 Wright V. Maiden &c. R. Co., 4 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 283. pp. 1232, 1605. 
 Wright V. Mayer, Ves. 280. p. 279. 
 Wright V. McCormick, 67 Mo. 426. p. 1440. 
 Wright V. People, 112 111. 540. p. 284. 
 Wright V. Phillips, 2 G. Greene (la.), 191, p. 
 
 1998. 
 Wright V.Pindar, Stvle, 34, p. 1622. 
 Wright V. Rogers, 2 N. J. L. 547. p. 1954. 
 Wright V. Salisbury, 46 Mo. 26. p. 1074. 
 Wright 17. Saunders, 58 Barb. (X. Y'.) 214: 
 
 s. c. 3 Keyes (X. Y.), 323. p. 1209. 
 Wright «;. Shawcross, 2 Barn. & Aid. 501 n. 
 
 p. 944. 
 Wright V. State, 35 Ark. 640. pp. 349, 1908. 
 Wright V. State, 18 Ga. 383. p. 69. 
 Wright V. State, 30 Ga. 325. p. 1537. 
 Wright V. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 358. p. 
 
 1562. 
 Wright V. State, 5 Y'erg. (Tenn.) 154. p. 1566. 
 Wright t). State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 194. p. 
 
 74. 
 Wright V. State, 12 Tex, App. 163. p. 50. 
 Wright V. State, 18 Tex. App. 358. p. 1855. 
 Wright V. State, 43 Tex. 170. p. 465. 
 Wright V. Stuart, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 120. p. 
 
 21. 
 Wright V. Wright. 5 Ind. 389. p. 1008. 
 Wright, Ex parte, 65 Ind. 504. pp. 148, 149. 
 Wrockledge v. State, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 167. 
 
 p. 108. 
 Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. 460. pp. 403, 409, 
 
 530. 
 AVustum V. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 138. p. 981. 
 Wyandotte r. Gibson, 25 Kan. 236. pp. 
 
 2027,2031,2033. 
 Wyandotte v. White, 13 Kan. 191. p. 2038. 
 Wyandotte &c. R. Co. v. Waldo, 70 Mo. 629. 
 ■ p. 1499. 
 AVyatt V. Citizens' R. Co., 55 Mo. 485. pp. 
 
 1208, 1212, 1229. 
 Wyatt V. Hertford, 3 East, 147. p. 842. 
 AVvatt V. Magee, 3 Ala. 94. pp. 150, 649. 
 AVvatt V. Xoble, 8 Blackf. (lud.) 507. p. 89. 
 Wvatt V. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 257. p. 1905. 
 Wyatt V. Steele, 20 Ala. 639. p. 830. 
 AVybourn v. Wybourn, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 725; s. c. 
 
 3 Eng. Ecc. 308. ]). 650. 
 Wyckoff r. Ferry Co., 52 X. Y'. 32. p. 1369. 
 AA^yers r. State (T'ex.),2 S. AA'. Rep.722. p. 27. 
 AVyley v. Stanford, 22 Ga. 385. p. 1634. 
 AVylie v. Smithermans, 8 Ired. L. (X. C.) 236. 
 
 p. 1475. 
 AA'yman v. Adams, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 210. p. 
 
 938. 
 Wyman v. Gould, 47 Me. 159. p. 349. 
 Wynehamer v. People, 13 X. Y. 378, p. 4. 
 AA'ynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. 217. pp. 716, 717. 
 AA'yune r. Glidewell, 17 Ind. 446. p. 1438. 
 Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East, 515. p. 966. 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yancv v. Downer, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 8. p. 1920. 
 Y'auez V. State, 6 Tex. App. 429. pp. 49, 118, 
 120.
 
 clxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Yankee v. Thompson, 51 Mo. 234. p. 1591. 
 Yarnall v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 581 
 
 p. 1305. 
 Yater v. Mullen, 23 Ind. 562. p. 1477. 
 Yates V. Alden, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 172. pp 
 
 1414, 1415. 
 Yates V. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 395. p 
 
 154. 
 Yates V. People, 38 111. 527. p. 1969. 
 Yates V. People, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 337. p 
 
 154. 
 Yates V. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446. p. 925. 
 Yates, Ex parte, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 317. p. 154 
 Yeats V. Ballentiue, 56 Mo. 530. pp. 892, 893 
 Yeldoll V. Shinholster, 15 Ga. 189. p. 1721. 
 Yelm Jim v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 76. p 
 
 27. 
 Yerkes v. Soloman, 11 Hun (N. Y.), 471. p 
 
 346. 
 Yingling v. Hesson, 16 Md. 112. pp. 215, 239, 
 Yoe V. People, 49 111. 410. pp. 728, 747, 784 
 
 786, 1694. 
 Yoemans v. Yoemans, 3 S. E. Rep. 354. p 
 
 2107. 
 Yonge V. Kinney, 28 Ga. 111. pp. 1236, 1237. 
 Youge V. Paciflc Mail S. S. Co., 1 Cal. 353. p 
 
 1754. 
 York V. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 107. p. 1348. 
 York V. Chilton, 4 La. Ann. 377. p. 1195. 
 Yorkr. Pease, 2 Gray (Mass.), 282. p. 308. 
 York V. State, 17 Tex. App. 441. p. 1895. 
 York Co. V. Central R. Co., 3 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 113. p. 568. 
 Yosti V. Laughran, 49 Mo. .594. p. 1410. 
 Youmans v. Carney, 62 Wis. 580. p. 389. 
 Young V. Black, 7 Cranch (U. S.),568. p. 
 
 1622. 
 Young V. Bridges, 34 La. Ann. 333. p. 62. 
 Young V. Cannon, 2 Utah, 560. p. 151. 
 Young V. Clegg, 93 Ind. 371. p. 1756. 
 Young V. Fewson, 8 Carr. & P. 55. p. 1612. 
 Young V. Gregory, 3 Call (Va.), 446. p. 1198. 
 Young V. Grote, 4 Bing. 253. pp. 1034, 1036. 
 Young V. Highland, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 16. pp. 
 
 214,218,221. 
 Young V. Hill, 67 N. Y. 167. p. 880. 
 Young «. King, 33 Ark. 745. p. 2051. 
 Young V. Marine Ins. Co., 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.)452. pp. 54, 7L 
 
 Young V. Rosenbaum, 39 Cal. 646. p. 2099. 
 Young V. Slaughterford, 11 Mod. 228. p. 52. 
 Young V. State, 23 Ohio St. 577. p. 84. 
 Young V. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 200. p. 
 
 1554. 
 Young V. Thompson, 14 111. 380. p. 819. 
 Young V. Tibbitts, 32 Wis. 79. p. 1102. 
 Young, Estate of, 39 Mich. 429. p. 854. 
 Younge v. Booe, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.) 347. pp. 
 
 1440, 1441, 1443. 
 Youngs V. Youngs, 5 Redf. (N. Y. Surr.) 505. 
 
 p. 284. 
 Younger v. Welch, 22 Tex. 417. p. 865. 
 Youse V. Norcoms, 12 Mo. 549. p. 1130. 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322. pp. 1698, 
 
 1703.. 
 Zaleski v. Clark, 45 Conn. 401. pp. 2046, 
 
 2047. 
 Zehuer v. Aultman, 74 Ind. 24. p. 2110. 
 Zehuer v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290. pp. 219, 
 
 1711. 
 Zeigler v. Zeigler, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 286. p. 
 
 19S8. 
 Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. (U. S.) 289. p. 2114. 
 Zellweger v. Caffee, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 100. p. 
 
 509. 
 Zemp V. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 9 Rich. L. 
 
 (S. C.) 84. pp. 1207. 1237, 1238. 
 Zenger, Case of, cited p. 1512. 
 Zickefoose v. Kuykendall, 12 W. Va. 23. pp. 
 
 118, 123. 
 Ziegler v. Maddox, 26 Mo. 575. pp. 1436, 
 
 1440. 
 Zimmerman v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 71 Mo. 
 
 476. pp. 1226, 1305. 
 Zimmerman v. Lamb, 7 Minn. 421. p. 197. 
 Zimmerman v, Marchland, 23 Ind. 474. pp. 
 
 528, 2059. 
 Zimmerman v. State, 56 Md. 536. p. 78. 
 Zollar V. Janvrin, 47 N. H. 324. p. 1101. 
 Zolllcoffer V. State, 16 Tex. App. 312. pp, 
 
 1777, 1778, 1779. 
 Zollicoffer v. Turney, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 297. 
 
 p. 265. 
 Zouch V. Clay, 1 Vent. 185. p. 1031. 
 Zuber v. Geigar, 2 Yeates (Pa.), 523. p. 1965.
 
 I
 
 THE LAW OF TRIALS. 
 
 TITLE I. 
 IMPAXELIXG THE JURY. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Chapter til. 
 Chapter IV, 
 
 Of Juries and the Qualification of Jurors. 
 Of Selecting, Drawing and Summoning the 
 
 Panel; and herein of Special Venires 
 
 and Talesmen. 
 Of Challenges. 
 
 Of the Details of Practice in Challenging 
 AND Impaneling. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OF JURIES AND THE QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS. 
 Section' 
 
 1. Preliminary. 
 
 2. "Waiviug a Jury. 
 
 3. Regularly the Jury must consist of TTvelve Men. 
 
 4. What if it consists of more than Twelve. 
 
 5. What if the Record is Contradictory as to the Number of Jurors. 
 
 6. Waiver of Right to Jury of Twelve Men. 
 
 7. Special or Struck Juries. 
 
 8. Juries de Mediatate Lingua?. 
 
 9. Juries of Mixed Races. 
 
 10. Qualiflcatious for Jury Duty. 
 
 11. Exemptions from Jury Duty. 
 
 § 1. Preliminary. — Counsel at the outset are confronted with 
 the task of getting- an impartial jury. It will, therefore, be use- 
 
 (1)
 
 i:\JPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [I Thomp. Tr 
 
 ful to give a sketch of the various steps that usually take place 
 in the organization of a trial jury, — dwelling especially upon the 
 subjects of challenges and objections and the time and manner 
 of makinii' the same. 
 
 § 2. Waiving- a Jury. — It may be premised that the right of 
 trial by jury may be waived in civil cases/ but, according to the 
 better opinion, not in criminal cases,^ though there is some opin- 
 ion to the contrary.^ A statute authorizing such a w^aiver in 
 criminal cases has been held nof unconstitutional.^ This may 
 be done, under various constitutions, statutes and judicial hold- 
 ings, by not demanding a jury;^ by making no objection^ or 
 consenting" to an order of reference; by failing to advance the 
 jury fee prescribed by statute ; ^ by consent entered of rec- 
 
 1 Harris v. Shaffer, 92 N. C. 30; 
 Eailroad Co. v. Foreman, 24 West Va. 
 662; Chapline v. Robertson, 44 Ark. 
 202; Heacock v. Hosmer, 109 111. 245; 
 Vitrified Wlieel & Emery Co. v. Ed- 
 wards, 135 Mass. 591; Pasour v. Liue- 
 berger,90 N. C. 159; Franklin v. Mc- 
 Corkle, llLea (Tenu.), 190; Lealiy v. 
 Duulap, 6 Colo. 552; Heacock u. Lnb- 
 ukee, 108 HI. 641; Wanser v. Atkin- 
 son, 43 N. J. L. 571 ; Crump v. Tliomas, 
 85 N. C. 272 ; Tliarp v. Witham, 65 la. 
 566; Gregorys. Lincoln, 13 Neb. 352; 
 Bamberger v. Terry, 103 U. S. 40; 
 Grant v. Reese, 82 N. C. 72; Coulter v. 
 AVeed Serving Machine Co., 3 Lea 
 (Tenn.), 115; Davison v. Jersey Com- 
 pany Associates, 71 N. Y. 333; Baird 
 V. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 382; King v. Bur- 
 dett, 12 West Va. 688; Cushman'^. 
 Flanagan, 50 Tex. 389; Sutton v. Mc- 
 Connell, 46 Wis. 269; Merrill v. St. 
 Louis, 83 Mo. 244; s. c, aff'd, 12 Mo. 
 App. 466; Trail v. Somerville, 22 Mo. 
 App. 1 ; Bruner v. Marcnm, 50 Mo. 405; 
 Tower v. Moore, 52 Mo. 118; Brown v. 
 Home Savings Bank, 5 Mo. App. 1. 
 
 2 State V, Carman, 63 la. 130; s. c, 
 50 Am, Rep. 741 (Seevers, J., dis- 
 
 senting) ; State V. Stewart, 89 N. C. 
 563; State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749; s. c, 
 47 Am. Rep. 544. 
 
 3 State V. White, 33 La. Ann. 1218; 
 State V. Askins, Id. 1253. 
 
 * Re Staff, 63 Wis. 285; s. c, 53 
 Am. Rep. 285. 
 
 5 Heacock V. Hosmer, 109 111. 245; 
 Mich. Const., art. 6, §' 27. See Odell v. 
 Reynolds, 40 Mich. 21 ; Cushman v. 
 Flanagan, 50 Tex. 389; Wanser v. At- 
 kinson, 43 N. J. L. 571. When the de- 
 mand is in time: Gallagher v. Baton 
 Rouge Hebrew Congregation, 34 La. 
 Ann. 526; Hall v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 
 65 la. 258; Vitrified Wheel & Emery 
 Co. V, Edwards, 135 Mass. 591; Bon- 
 ham V. IVIills, 39 Oh. St. 534. When 
 failing to demand, under a rule of 
 court, not a waiver: Biggs v. Lloyd 
 (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 831. 
 
 6 Baird v. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 382. 
 
 7 Grant v. Reese, 82 N. C. 72; Har- 
 ris V. Shaffer, 92 N. C. 30. 
 
 8 Venine v. Archiljald, 3 Colo. 163. 
 But payment of the jury fee at the 
 time the demand for a jury is made is 
 not necessary to make the demand 
 valid. Odeil v. Reynolds, 40 Mich. 21.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. I.] JURIES AND QUALIFICATION OF JURORS. 3 
 
 ord ;^ by ;i stipulation in writing signed b}' the parties and filed with 
 the clerk that the case shall be tried by the court ; ^ by failing to 
 appear at the trial; ^ by not filing a notice under a statute of a 
 desire for a jury trial; * by waiving a jury orally in open court; ^ 
 by demanding a jurj'' without specifying the issues to be tried by 
 the jury, where there are issues triable by the court; ^ by failing 
 to take an appeal from the decision of a board of supervisors to 
 the circuit court. ^ The prevailing opinion seems to be that a 
 waiver of a jury at one terra, will not estop the party from 
 claiming it at a subsequent lerni,^ or after a neiu (rial has been 
 granted; ^ though there are holdings, influenced by statute, to 
 the effect that a Avaiver once made is a waiver for all subsequent 
 trials.^'' It has been held that, although in a case regularly tria- 
 ble by jury the parties waive a jury, the court is not bound by 
 the waiver, but may refuse to perform the office of a jury, with- 
 out assigning any reason therefor.^^ 
 
 Althoiigh the statute requires that the 
 fee be deposited on the first day of the 
 term (Rev. Stat. Tex., art. 30(JG), a de- 
 posit on the second day will be suffi- 
 cient, no prejudice appearing, the 
 statute being directoi'y as to time. 
 Gallagher v. Goldfrauk, G3 Tex. 473. 
 
 1 West. Va. Act of 1872, chap. 47, 
 § 35; Md. Const., art. 4, §4; Desche v. 
 Gies, 56 Md= 135 (holding that the 
 record must show the consent.) A re- 
 cital in the record that " neither party 
 requires a jury, and the court is sub- 
 stituted in lieu of a jury to try the 
 case," — satisfies such a statute. King 
 V, Burdett, 12 W, Va. GS8 ; Tower v. 
 Moore, 52 Mo. 118 ; Bruner v. Marcum, 
 50 Mo. 405. "Claim" of jury of 
 twelve men under New York LaAvs of 
 1869, chap. 410: Foyer v. New York 
 Central, etc., R. Co=, 7 Abb. New Case, 
 (N. Y.) 371. A record entry, " Neither 
 party requiring a jury," — imports a 
 waiver of the right. Chapline v. Rob- 
 ertson, 44 Ark. 202. 
 
 2 Bamberger v. Terry, 103 U. S. 40. 
 
 Compare Supervisors of Wayne Co. v. 
 Kennicott, Id. 554. 
 
 3 2 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1876, § 340; 
 Love V. Hall, 76 Ind. 326; Leahy v. 
 Dunlap, 6 Colo. 552. 
 
 * Bailey v. Joy, 132 Mass. 356. 
 
 ^ Gregory v. Lincoln, 13 Neb. 352. 
 
 6 Greenleaf v. Egan, 30 Minn. 316. 
 
 ' Tharp v. Witham, 65 la. 566. 
 
 8 Cross V. State, 78 Ala. 430 ; Dean 
 V. Sweeney, 51 Tex. 242; Brown v. 
 Chenoworth, Id. 469. 
 
 9 State V. Touchet, 33 La. Ann. 
 1154; Carthage v. Buckner, 8 Bradw. 
 (111.) 152. 
 
 JO Coulter V. Weed Sewing Machine 
 Co., 3 Lea (Tenn.), 115; Nashville &c. 
 R. Co. V. roster, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 351; 
 Heacockv. Lubukee, 108 111. 641 (Scott, 
 J., dissenting). 
 
 " McCarthy v. Missouri R. Co., 15 
 Mo. App. 385. As to the right to trial 
 by jury, and its waiver, see Biggs v. 
 Lloyd (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 831, and 
 note; Lewis v. Klotz (La.), 1 South. 
 Rep. 539 ; Railroad Co. v. Morris
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 3. Regularly the Jury must Consist of Twelve Men. — 
 
 According to the common law, a legal petit jury consists of nei- 
 ther more nor less than twelve men/ and the ancient law was so 
 precise that if the trial were by a jury consisting of more or less 
 than twelve men it was a mistrial.'^ In criminal trials this is 
 undoubtedly the law in this countiy at the present time. The 
 constitution of the United States, and it is believed the constitu- 
 tions of all the States, contain, with some variation of words, 
 the declaration that the right of trial by jury shall remain invio- 
 late. The constitutional juiy thus guaranteed is a common-law 
 jury of twelve men.^ In the face of this constitutional guaranty 
 an act of the legislature providing for the trial of common-law 
 cases before a jury of less than twelve men is void.* Moreover 
 
 (Tex.), 3 S. W. Rep. 457; Eailroad Co, 
 V. Martin (Tenu.), 2 S. W. Eep. 381; 
 Caldwell Co. v. Crocket (Tex.), 4 S. 
 W. Eep. e07. 
 
 1 Hale, P. C. 161; Bac. Abr. Juries 
 A. ; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 505. 
 
 2 Trials per Pais (anuo 1725) 79. 
 
 3 Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128, 
 135; May v. Milwauliee, etc., E. Co., 3 
 Wis. 219; State v. Cox, 8 Ark. 43(5; 
 Work V. State, 2 Oh. St. 29G ; Brazier 
 V. State, 44 Ala. 387, 392; Turns v. 
 Com., G Mete. (Mass.) 224,235; Lamb 
 V. Lane, 4 Oh. St. 1G7; People v. 
 Kennedy, 2 Park Cr. E. (X. Y.) 312 ; 
 Byrd v. State, 1 How. (Miss.) 1<;3, 
 177; Carpenter v. State, 4 How. 
 (Miss.) 1G3, IGG; Eedus v. Wofford, 4 
 Smed. & M. (Miss.), 579, 692; State v. 
 McClear, 11 Nev. 39; Smith v. Atlan- 
 tic, etc., E. Co., 25 Oh. St. 91, 102; 
 Gibson v. State, IG Fla. 291, 300; Wyne- 
 hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 427; 
 Cruger v. Hudson, etc., E. Co., 12 X. 
 Y. 190, 198; People v. Lane, G Abb. Pr. 
 (x. s.) 105, 115. 
 
 4 Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo. GOO; 
 Work V. State, 2 Oh. St. 29G ; Byrd v. 
 State, 1 How. (Miss.) 177; Dowling 
 V. State, 5 Sm. & M. (Miss.) GG4; Nor- 
 
 val V. Eice, 2 Wis. 23; May v. Mil- 
 waukee, etc., E. Co., 3 Wis. 219; Foster 
 V. Kirby, 31 Mo. 49G ; Allen v. State* 
 51 Ga. 2G4; Henning v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 35 Mo. 408. But as justices of 
 the peace do not form any part of the 
 ordinary judicial machinery of the 
 common law, it is held that such con- 
 stitutional provisions do not inhibit 
 the legislature from authorizing a jury 
 of less than twelve in justices' courts, 
 especially since tlie riglit to a jury of 
 twelve men is secured in the unlimited 
 right of appeal to a superior court of 
 record. Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binu. 
 (Pa.) 41G; Work v. State, 2 Oh. St. 
 29G ; Bryan v. State, 4 Iowa, 349 ; State 
 V. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; Norton v. Mc- 
 Leary, 8 Oh. St, 205; Dawson r. Ho- 
 ran, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 549; Knight v. 
 Campbell, G2 Barb. (N. Y.) IG (over- 
 ruling Baxter v. Putney, 37 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 140) ; People v. Lane, G Abb. 
 Pr. (x. s.) 105; Ward v. People, 30 
 Mich. IIG; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. 
 Ann. 190. The statutes generally pro- 
 vide that a justice's jui'y shall consist 
 of six men, unless the parties agree 
 upon a less number. So, also, in 
 cases in courts which exercise their
 
 Tit. I, Ch. I.] JURIES AND QUALIFICATION OF JURORS. 5 
 
 the rule in civil as well as in criminal cases is that the record 
 must shoiu that the case was tried by a jury of twelve men (ex- 
 cept by consent of the parties), or the verdict will be a nullity, 
 and the judgment entered thereon will be reversed and a new 
 trial irranted.^ 
 
 § 4. What if it Consists of 3Iore than Twelve. — The same 
 consequences will follow where the record shows that the verdict 
 was rendered by a jury of thirteen except by consent of parties. ^ 
 This rule has not been accepted in America in civil cases without 
 some qualification. In one case, an action of assumpsit, it was 
 held that the verdict by a jury of thirteen was good.^ The 
 Court of Appeals of Kentucky have adopted what seems to be a 
 just and reasonable qualification of the rule, by holding that the 
 objection that the verdict was rendered by a jury of thirteen 
 will be waived unless made in the trial court on a motion for a 
 new trial, and that it cannot be raised for the first time on ap- 
 
 fiinctions without the tvicl of a jury by 
 the ancient common hiw, a trial, even 
 in a criminal case by a jury of less 
 than twelve, will be legal. Duffy v. 
 People, G Hill (X. Y.), 75; People r. 
 Justices, 74 X. Y. 400; People v. Clark, 
 23 Hun (X. Y.), 374. The constitu- 
 tions of many of the States moreover, 
 provide that in criminal cases trial 
 before courts not of record or before 
 inferior courts, the number of the 
 jury may be less than twelve as pre- 
 scribed by law. Colo. Const., 1875; 
 art. 2, § 23; Ga. Const., ISOS; art. 
 5, § 4, sub sec. 5; Iowa Const., 1857, 
 art. 1, § 9; Amend, to Fla. Const., 
 18r,8, art. 6, § 12, ratified 1875; Mich. 
 Const., 1850, art. 6, § 28; Mo, Const., 
 1875, art. 2, § 28; Neb. Const., 18(50- 
 <'7, art. 1, § 5 (Const. 1875, art. 1, 
 § 0) ; S. C. Const., 1805, art. 9, § 7. 
 The La. Act of 1880, Nos. 35 and 35, 
 providing for trial of certain crim- 
 inal cases by a jury of five is valid. 
 State V. Everage, 33 La. Ann. 120; 
 
 State V. Dcmouchet (La.), 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 505. 
 
 > Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; 
 s. c, 7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 271; Brown v. 
 State, Blackf . (Ind.) 501 ; Jackson v. 
 State, Blackf. (Ind.) 401; Maduska 
 V. Thomas, (; Kan. 153; Brown v. State, 
 10 Ind. 490; Allen v. State, 54 Ind. 
 401; Hill V. People, 10 Mich. 351; Com. 
 V. Shaw, 7 Am. Law. Reg. 289; Dixon 
 V. Ricliard, 3 How. (Miss.) 771; Ayres 
 V. Barr, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 280; 
 Oldham v. Hill, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.), 
 300; Bone v. McGinley, 7 How. 
 (Miss.) 071; Briant V. Russell, 2 N. 
 J. L. 107; Denman v. Baldwin, 3 N. J. 
 L. 945; State v. Van Matre, 49 Mo. 
 208: State v. Myers, 08 Mo. 200. 
 
 2 Wolfe V. Martin, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 30; McCormick v. Brookfield, 4 N. J. 
 L. 09 ; Whitehurst v. Davis, 2 Hayw. 
 (X. C.) 113; Parke, B., in Muirhead v. 
 Evans, Exch. 447, 449, 
 
 3 Tillman v. Allies, 5 Smede.» & M. 
 (Miss.) 373.
 
 6 IMPANELING- THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 peal^ Moreover, it is a rule, applicable alike in civil and crimi- 
 nal cases, that, if a jury of more than twelve men has been 
 impaneled and the last juror sworn can be pointed out during 
 the trial, he may be dismissed from the panel and the trial may 
 proceed.^ 
 
 § 5. What if the Record is contradictory as to Xumber of 
 Jurors. — "Where the entries of the record are contradictory as 
 to the number of jurors who sat at the trial, so much of the 
 record as states that the jury consisted of twelve men will be re- 
 garded as stating the truth, and the contrary statement will be 
 rejected as a clerical error, — the legal presumption being that 
 the portion of the record is true which answers the requirements 
 of the law, unless the contrary be made to appear by the bill of 
 exceptions.'^ 
 
 § 6. Waiver of right to Jury of Twelve Men. — While in 
 cases of felony the constitutional right to be tried by a jury of 
 twelve men cannot be waived by the accused,* in cases of misde- 
 meanor^ the rule is different, especially where the punishment is 
 a pecuniary fine merely. 
 
 § 7. Special or Strucls Juries. — This jury differs from the 
 common jury in respect of the fact that it is not impaneled in 
 the ordinary manner. It is ordinarily formed by each party 
 striking a designated number from a list of names, the remaining 
 composing the juiy which is to try the cause. No general direc- 
 
 1 Eoss V. Neal, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) ■* Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; 
 408; Berry v. Kemiey, 5 B. Mou. (Ky.) State v. Mansflekl, 41 Mo. 470; Wil- 
 122. lu a criminal case a legal ver- liams ?;. State, 12 Ohio St. 622; Allen v. 
 diet cannot be rendered by a jury of State, 54 Ind. 461; Hill v. People, 16 
 more than - twelve men (Bullard v. Mich. 351. But see State v. Kaufman, 
 State, 38 Tex. 504), and as hereafter 51 Iowa, 578; s. c. 9 Cent. L. J. 313. 
 seen this defect in cases of felony can- s Com. v. Dailey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 
 not be waived. Posi, § 6. 80; States. Borowsl^y, 11 Nev. 119; 
 
 2 Muirhead v. Evans, 6 Exch. 447; State v. Cox, 8 Arls. 436, 447; Sarah v, 
 Bullard v. State, 38 Tex. 504; Davis State, 28 Ga. 576; State v. Van Matre, 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 631. 49 Mo. 268; Tyra v. Com., 2 Mete. 
 
 3 Larillian v. Lane, 8 Arlv. 372; (Ky.) 1. 
 Eoote V. Lawrence, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 483.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. I.] JURIES AND QUALIFICATION OF JURORS. 7 
 
 tion concerning the impaneling of a fc-pecial jury can be given in 
 a brief compass.^ In America the subject is generally one of 
 statutory regulation, the policy of the statutes being, like that of 
 the rule of the common law, to allow either party the privilege 
 of such a jury in cases of exceptional difficulty or importance. ^ 
 Under some systems, special juries are composed of persons, 
 otherwise qualitied for jury duty, who are possessed of certain 
 special qualifications demanded by the peculiarities of the case 
 on trial. ^ Under some systems, challenges for cause are allowed 
 before the striking begins.* 
 
 § 8. Juries tie Mediatate Linguas. — This kind of jury was 
 allowed to an alien. Its distinctive feature was that half of its 
 members were composed of citizens or denizens, and the other 
 half of foreigners. It was used in England under various stat- 
 utes until recently abolished.* The riiilit to this kind of jury 
 was recognized in a few early cases in this country.'^ denied in 
 others,^ and is generally abolished by statute,^ though in one 
 State it may still be directed by the court. ^ 
 
 1 See Thomp. & Mer. Jur., §§12, 
 13, 14. 
 
 2 Patchiu V. Sands, 10 Wend. (X. 
 Y.) 570; People v. McGuire, 43 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 67. As to what are such 
 causes and how the fact is to be 
 brought to the attention of the court, 
 see Poucher v. Livingstone, 2 Wend. 
 (X. Y.) 296; Anon., 1 Jolins. (X. Y.) 
 314; Wright v. Colurabiau Ins. Co., 2 
 Jolius. (X. Y.) 211; Murpliy v. Kipp, 
 1 Duer (N. Y.), 659; Livingston v. 
 Smith, 1 Jolms. (X. Y.) 141; Walsh v. 
 Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 2 Hob. (X. Y.) 
 646; s. c. 17 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 350; 
 Nesmith v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 8 Abb. 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 423; Strylier v. Turnbull, 
 3Caiues (X. Y.), 103; Hartshorn v. 
 Gelstcn, 3 Caines (X. Y.), 84; People 
 V. MoGuire, 43 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 67. 
 
 ^ Golding V. Petit, 27 L:i. Ann. 
 86. 
 
 ^ K. S. Mo. 1879, § 2802; K. S. Del. 
 
 1874, chap. 109, § 18; 2 Ind. Rev. 
 Stat. 1876, p. 159, § 1, note. 
 
 5 By tlie Stat. 33 Vict.-, chap. 14, 
 § 5. See Thomp. & Mer. Jur., § 10, 
 and authorities cited. 
 
 6 Ilespublica v. Mesca, 1 Dall. (IT. 
 S.) 73; Peoples. McLean, 2 Johns. (N. 
 Y.)381; United States v. Carnot, 2 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 409; Ricliards v. 
 Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 690; Brown v. 
 Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 711. 
 
 ' State V. Antonio, 4 HawivS (X. 
 C), 200; United States v. McMahon, 4 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 573; Stale v. 
 Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. 427. 
 
 8 X. Y. Code. Rem. Jus., § 1190; 
 Code Ala. 1876, § 4886; R. C. Md. 1878, 
 art. 62, § 17; R. S. HI. 1880, ch. 38, 
 § 429; Gen. Laws Colo. 1877, § 818; R. 
 S. Mo. 1879, § 1892; Comp. L. Mich. 
 1871, § 6012; 1 Brigiit. Purd. Dig., p. 
 837, § 71; lb., p. 385, § 45. 
 
 9 G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 571, § 6.
 
 8 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 9. Juries of 3Iixed Races. — While persons of the negro 
 race can not demand as a right/ even under the fourteenth 
 amendment of the constitution of the United States and the Civil 
 Eights Law, 2 that juries to try causes to which they are parties 
 shall be composed in part of persons of their own race ; yet a 
 State law ^ which confines eligibility to jury duty to loJiite male 
 persons, etc., is obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment to the 
 Federal constitution, as denying to colored persons the equal 
 protection of the laws, and hence void.* 
 
 § lO. Qualifications for Jury Duty. — Counsel cannot pro- 
 ceed with the work of impaneling a jury without having in mind 
 the qualifications of jurors prescribed by the common law, by 
 constitutional provisions, or liy statute. The common-law quali- 
 fications may generally be disregarded,^ and constitutional pro- 
 visions prescribe the qualifications of jurors in three States only, 
 80 far as the writer has observed.^ It is generally the subject of 
 legislation, and the power to prescribe qualifications other than 
 those of the common law, by abolishing the freehold qualifica- 
 tion," or the property qualification,*^ is fully established.^ But 
 
 1 Nashville v. Shepherd, 3 Baxt. also, Cases of the Comity Judges, 3 
 (Tenn.) 373. See, also, Vv^illiams v. Hughes (U. S.), 57(3, Where a State 
 State, 44 Tex. 34. constitution limited the right of 
 
 2 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; suffrage to the white race, and a 
 s. c. sub nom. Be Com. Virginia, 12 statute conlined the selection of jurors 
 Cent. L. J. 229; Bush u. Kentucky, 107 to electors, t\\Q adoption of the Fif- 
 U. S. 110. teenth Amendment operated to enlarge 
 
 3 Laws West Va. 1872-3, p. 102. the list of electors and to qualify 
 Several State statutes confine the colored citizens for jury service, 
 selection of jurors to white persons Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370. 
 
 and are to that extent invalid. K. S. ^ These ordinarily touch the ques- 
 
 W. Va. 1879, ch. 109, § 1; G. S. Ky, tion of citizensiiip or freehold. Thomp. 
 
 1879, p. 571, § 2; G. S. Neb. 1873, p. & Mer. Jur., §§ 16, 21. 
 G42, § Go7; Gen. Laws Ore. 1S72, 6 Const. Tia. 1808, art. VII, § 12; 
 
 § 918. See, also, Rev. Code Md. 1878, Const. Ga. 18(38, art. V, § 13, subsec. 
 
 p. 558, §§ 1 and 2. Others provide 2; Const. N. H. 1792, part I, art. 21. 
 against disqualification on account of ' Kirwin v. People, 96 111. 206. 
 
 color. Stat, Tenn. 1871, § 4002rt; R. » Com. v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; 
 
 S. La. 1876, § 2125. State v. Wilson, 48 N. II. 398. 
 
 4 Strauder v. State, 100 U. S. 303, ^ See also Byrd v. State, 1 How, 
 307; s. c. 10 Cent. L. .J. 225.. See, (Miss.) I63j 176. So, tlie legislature
 
 Tit. I, Ch. I.] JURIES AXD QUALIFICATIOX OF JURORS. 
 
 9 
 
 where the constitution prescribes the qualification, it is not com- 
 petent for the legishiture to resirict it, — as if the constitution 
 makes all qualified voters qualified jurors, and the legislature 
 attempts to restrict the qualification to householders or free- 
 holders.^ By some State constitutions religious or political tests 
 are forbidden.^ Others provide more generally that " the civil 
 rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen, shall in no way be 
 diminished or enlarged on account of his religious principles," ^ 
 and by others particular disqualifications are provided for.^ The 
 statutes generally disqualify those convicted of scandalous crime 
 or guilty of gross immorality.^ Alienage is a ground of dis- 
 qualification at common law, except in the case of mixed juries,^ 
 already considered ; ^ and many statutes provide that jurors shall 
 be citizens of the United States,^ •' residents " of the district,^ 
 qualified voters,^** of fair character, approved integrity, sound judg- 
 
 may define the mode of ascertain- 
 ing sucli qualifications. Whitehead v. 
 Wells, 29 Ark. 99. 
 
 1 Maloy V. State, 33 Tex. 599; Wil- 
 son v. State, 35 Tex. 3(55; Brennan v. 
 State, 33 Tex. 2G6. But, contra, see 
 Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432. 
 
 2 Const. Tenn. 1870, art. 1, § G; 
 Const. AV. Va. 1872, art. Ill, § 11. 
 
 3 Const. Ala. 1819, art. I, § 4; 
 Const. Ala. 18G5, art. I, § 4; Const. 
 Ala. 1875, art. I, § 4; Const. Ark. 
 1864, art. II, § 4; Cal. Const. 1879, 
 art. IV, § 9; Const. la. 1857, art. I, 
 § 4; Const. la. 1846, art. I, § 4; Const. 
 Ky. 1799, § 4; Const. Ky. 1850, art. 
 XIII, § 6; Const. Kans. 1857, art. XV, 
 Bill of Rights, § 4; Const. Tenn. 1870, 
 art. I, § 6. 
 
 4 Const. Ala. 1819, art. VI, § 5; 
 Const. Tex. 1876, art. XVI, § 2; Cal. 
 Const. 1879, art. XX, § 11. 
 
 « Code Va. 1873, p. 1059, § 4; R. S. 
 W. Va. 1879, ch. 109, § 8; R. S. So. 
 Car. 1873, p. 520, § 9. See, also, R. S. 
 Wis. 1878, § 2525; Gen. Laws Ore. 
 1872, Civil Code, § 918; Cal. Code. Civ. 
 
 Proc, § 199; Code Ala. 1876, § 4733; 
 Comp. Laws Utah, 1876, § 1073; R. S. 
 Tex. 1879, § 3010; Comp. L. Nev. 1873, 
 § 1051; G. S. Neb. 1873, p. 642, § 657; 
 Comp. L. Ariz., ch. 47, § 10; Gen. 
 Laws Colo. 1877, § 1460; R. C. Miss. 
 1880, § 1661; R. S. Me. 1871, ch. 106, 
 §2. 
 
 « Post, § 54. 
 
 ' Ante, § 8; Co. Litt. 156?;; Judson 
 V. Eslava, Minor (Ala.), 3; State v. 
 Primrose, 3 Ala. 646; Boyingtou v. 
 State, 2 Port. (Ala.) 100. 
 
 » Cal. Code, Civ. Proc, § 198; R. S. 
 Wis. 1878, § 2524; Comp. L. Arizona, 
 ch. 47, § 10; Gen. Laws Colo. 1877, 
 § 1460; Gen. Laws New Mexico, 1880, 
 p. 366; N. Y. Code Rem. Jus., § 1027; 
 Gen. Laws Ore. 1872, Civil Code, 
 § 918; G. S. R. I., p. 36, § 1 ; Comp. L. 
 Utah, 1876, § 1073. 
 
 9 Rev. St. U. S., § 872; construed 
 in United States v. Nardello, 4 Mackey 
 (D. C), 503. 
 
 ^0 R. S. Tex. 1879, art. 310; Miller's 
 R. C. Iowa, 1880, ch. 10, § 227; Comp. 
 L. Nev. 1873, § 1051; Code Va.
 
 10 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ment, well informed and the like ; ^ and neither mentally nor bodily 
 disabled, 2 and not more than sixty, -^ or seventy,^ years of age. 
 Freehold,^ household ^ and property^ qualifications are retained in 
 some States. Educational qualifications are rarely prescribed,^ 
 though in one State inability to read or ivrile is made a ground 
 of challenge,^ and in others inability to understand the language 
 in which the proceedings are conducted disqualifies.^^ It should 
 
 1873, p. 1058, § 1; Comp. L. Kan. 
 1870, § 29G4; Bush Diji. Tla., ch. 
 104, § 1; K. S. DfL 1874, cli. 109, 
 § 1; Ark. Dig., 1874, § 3654; Comp. L. 
 Arizona, cli. 47, § 10; E. S. Wis. 1878, 
 §2524; Corap. L. Mich. 1871, § 5978; 
 H. S. La. 187G, § 2125; G. S. Mass. 
 18C0, cli. 132, § 1; K. S. Me. 1871, cli. 
 lOG, § 2; Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 198; 
 G. S. E. L 1872, p. 430, § 1 ; E. S. So. 
 Car. 1873, p. 519, §§ 3, G; 2 Eev. Incl. 
 187G, p. 31. 
 
 1 N. y. Code Eem. Jus., § 1027; 
 Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 198; E. S. 111. 
 1880, ell. 78, § 2; Supp. to Ga. Code, 
 1873, § 654; Bush Dig. Pla., ch. 104, 
 § 3; G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 573, § 4; Comp. 
 L. Mich. 1871, § 5978; Code Ala. 1876, 
 § 4733; E. S. Wis. 1878, § 2530; Ark. 
 Dig. 1874, § 3669; Comp. L. Kan. 1879, 
 § 2964; G. S. Neb. 1873, p. 642, § 657; 
 G. S. E. I. 1872, p. 432, § 14; E. C. 
 Miss. 1880, § 1681; G. S. Ky. 1879: p. 
 571, § 2; E. S. So. Car. 1873, p. 519, §§ 
 3, 6; Stat. Tenn. 1871, § 3990. It Avas 
 held not erroneous to allow a juror to 
 sit in a case, although " he did not 
 read the newspapers and could not 
 tell what age he was," where the 
 statute required simply that jurors 
 should lie " solier, intelligent and 
 judicious persons." Com. v. "\Vinne- 
 niore, 1 Brewst. 356; s. c. 2 Brewst. 
 378. 
 
 2 N. y. Code Eem. Jus., § 1027; E. 
 S. 111. 1880, ch. 78, § 2 ; Comp. L. Jlich. 
 1871, § 5978; Comp. L. Arizona, ch. 
 47, § 10; Code Ga. 1873, §§ 3930, 3996; 
 
 Comp. L. Kan. 1879, § 2964; G. S 
 Neb. 1873, p. 642, § 657; Comp L. 
 Utah, 1876, § 1073; Gen. Laws Ore. 
 1872, Civil Code, § 918; E. S. Tex 
 
 1879, art. 3010. 
 
 '•^ N. y. Code Eem. Jus., § 1027; 
 Code Va. 1873, p. 1058, § 1; E. S. W. 
 Va. 1879, ch. 109, § 1; Code Ga., §§ 
 3930, 3906; Comp. L. Arizona, ch. 47, 
 § 10; E.G. Miss. 1880, § 1G61; E. S. 111. 
 
 1880, ch. 78, § 2. 
 
 * E. S'. Me. 1871, ch. 106, § 2. In 
 New Jersey, sixty-tive years is the 
 limit. Eev. N. J. 1877, p. 532, § 6. 
 
 fi N. y. Code Eem. Jus., § 1027; B. 
 S. Tex. 1879, § 3010; Stat. Tenn. 1871, 
 § 4002; Gen. Laws New Mexico, 1880, 
 p. 366; 2 Eev. Ind. 1876, p. 31; Code 
 Ala. 1876, § 4732. A tenant by the 
 curtesy initiate is a freeholder. State 
 i\ Mills, 91 N. C. 581. 
 
 c E. 8. Tex. 1879, § 3010; Gen. Laws 
 New Mexico, 1880, p. 366; Stat. Tenn. 
 1871, § 4002; G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 571, 
 § 2; 2 Eev. Ind. 1876, p. 31; Code Ala. 
 1876, § 4732. 
 
 ' N. y. Code Eenie Jus., § 1027; 
 Comp, Laws Utah, 1876, § 1073, 
 Comp. L. Kan. 1879, § 2964; Cal. Code 
 Civ. Proc, § 198; G. S. E. I. 1872, p. 
 36, § 1; E. S. Del. 1874, ch. 109, § 2; 
 Code Ga. 1873, § 3907; Battle's Eev. 
 N. C, p. 194, § 229rt. 
 
 ** Comp. Laws Utah, 1876, p. 55, 
 
 8 Texas Code Grim, Proc, art, 
 636, sulisec. 14, See Nolen v. State, 9 
 Tex. App. 419o See;)0*•^ § 56. 
 
 J" Cal. Code. Civ. Proc, § 198; R,
 
 Tit. I, Ch. I.] JURIES AND QUALIFICATION OF JURORS. 
 
 11 
 
 be borne in mind that inability to read and write was no dis- 
 qimlitication at common law, since in ancient times very few 
 persons possessed this qualification.^ 
 
 § 11. Exemption from Jury Duty. — The right of exemptior. 
 from jury duty need not l)e much considered; 2 because, unless 
 the statute creating the exemption is couched in such terms as 
 to create a disqualification, it will be a personal privilege merely 
 which may be waived, provided the person is not otherwise sub- 
 ject to challenge.^ INlany of the statutes enact in terms that 
 the exemption by thcni created sliall not ))e considered as a 
 ground of challenge ; ^ and others are framed in such terms as to 
 carry the same imi)lication.^ 
 
 S. 111. 1880, ch. 78. § 2; Comp. L. Mich. 
 1871, § 51178. Scej)os<, § 55. 
 
 1 See Com. v. Vv'inueniore, 1 Brewst. 
 (Pa.) 356,380; s. c. 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 378; White v. State, 52 Miss. 21G, 224; 
 American Ins. Co. v. Mahone, 56 Miss. 
 180; Citizens Bank v. Strauss, 26 La. 
 Ann. 736; State v. Lewis, 28 La. Ann. 
 84; Campbell v. State, 48 Ga. 353. 
 
 2 The subject is discussed in 
 Thomp, & r,Ier. Jur., §§ 34-40, inclu- 
 sive. 
 
 3 Mulcahy v. Reg., Irish Rep. 1 C. 
 L. 12 ; s. c. affirmed in L. R. 3 II. L. 
 306; State v. Forslnier, 43 X. H. 81); 
 State v^ Wright, 53 Me. 328; Moore v. 
 Cass, 10 Kan. 288; Davis v. People, 19 
 111. 74 •, Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; 
 Chasr V. People, 40 111. 352; Davidson 
 V. P^^oj'.e, 90 111. 221; EdAvards v. 
 Farm, 2 La. Ann. 307; Breeding v. 
 
 State, 11 Tex. 257; Greer v. Norvill. 3 
 Hill (S. C), 262; Booth v. Com., 16 
 Gratt. (Va.) 519; United States v. 
 Lee, 4 Mackey (D. C), 489; s. c. 54 
 Am. Rep. 293. 
 
 ■» Cal. Penal Code, § 1075; Comp. L. 
 Ariz., ch. 11, § 321; Stat, at L. Minn. 
 1S73, p. 1056, § 23S; Bullitt's Ky. 
 Code (Cr.), p. 42, § 211; R. S. La. 
 1876, § 2131; Ark. Dig. Stat. 1874, § 
 1914; Miller R. C. Iowa, 1880, § 2777; 
 R. S. 111. 1880, ch. 78, § 14; Comp. L. 
 Nev. 1873, § 1965; Gen. Laws Ore. 
 1872 (Civil Code), § 186; Laws Utah, 
 1878 (Code Cr. Proc), § 243. 
 
 5 Bush Dig. Fla., ch. 104, §2; R. 
 S. Del. 1874,, ch. 109 § 1; Supp.to Ga. 
 Code of 1873, §§ 415, 416, 417. That 
 it is not a ground of challenge, see 
 Green v. State, 59 Md. 123; s. c. 43 
 Am. Rep. 542.
 
 12 IMPANELING THE JURY. [L ThOLUp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF SELECTING, DRAWING AND SUMMONING THE PANEL; AND 
 HEREIN OF SPECIAL VENIRES AND TALESMEN. 
 
 Section. 
 
 13. Selecting the Jury List. 
 
 U. [Coiltiuuecl.] In the Federal aud Territorial Courts. 
 
 15. Drawing the Panel. 
 
 IG. Publication of the Panel. 
 
 17. Service of it upon the Accused. 
 
 18. [Continued.] Nature and Extent of this Right. 
 
 19. Summoning the Jurors. 
 
 20. Special Venire in Default of Jurors. 
 
 21. Special Venire in Capital Cases. 
 
 22. Venire, by whom Executed aud Returned. 
 
 23. Of Talesmen. 
 
 24. [Continued.] Under what Circumstances Summoned. 
 
 25. [Continued.] Contlicting Rulings on this Subject. 
 
 26. [Continued.] Further of this Subject. 
 
 27. [Continued.] By Whom and How Summoned. 
 
 § 13. Selecting the Jury List. — At common law no such 
 thing was known as the preparation of a list of persons who were 
 liable to be summoned to serve as jurors at a succeeding term of 
 court ; but the uncontroUed discretion was vested in the sheriff, 
 in tlie coroner, or in officials called elisors, of summoning such 
 " good and lawful men " as they might choose under the com- 
 mand of the writ of venire facias.^ This led to enormous abuses, 
 chiefly in the packing of juries and the blackmailing of citizens ; ^ 
 to remedy which, American statutes have generally provided, 
 with more or less particularity, for the preparation, a given 
 time before the commencement of any term of court, or at other 
 stated periods, of a list of persons, within the county or other 
 jurisdiction, froni whom jurors are to be summoned. The prep- 
 aration of this list is generally, though not always,* confided 
 
 1 See Thomp. & Mer. Jur., § 44. R. S. La. 1870, § 2127; Rev. N. J. 1877,. 
 
 2 Rex V. Whittalcer, Cowp. 752. p. 532, § 7. 
 
 3 Code Ala, 187G, §§ 4732, 4733;
 
 Tit. I, Ch. II.] SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 
 
 13 
 
 to officials other than the sheriff, such as the judges of general 
 elections, or the county canvassers of the votes polled at general 
 elections ; ^ the trustees of the township or the councilmeu of 
 wards ; ^ other town officers; ^ special boards,^ county courts,^ or 
 jury commissioners." Penalties are frequently imposed upon 
 the designated officers for the non-performance of this duty,^ 
 though in respect of the manner of performing it the statutes 
 ^re sometimes, though not always,^ regarded as directory.^ 
 
 § l-t. [Continued.] In the Federal and Territorial Courts. — 
 
 In the Federal courts the practice is now chietly reguhited by a 
 recent statute,^" which commits this duty to the clerk of the 
 court, and to a juiy commissioner appointed by the judge, who 
 shall be a well known member of the principal political party 
 within the district opposed to that to which the clerk belongs. 
 Practitioners in those courts should direct their attention to this 
 statute, at the same time bearing in mind that, under section 
 800, of the Eevised Statutes of tlie United States, those courts 
 
 1 R. C. Iowa 1880, § 234, et seq. 
 
 2 K. S. Ohio 1880, § olG4. 
 
 3 G. S. Mass. 1860, chap. 132, § 6, 
 ^tseq.; N. Y. Code Rem. Just., § 1035, 
 etseq.; Comp. L. Kan. 1879, § 2G93; R. 
 S. Wis. 1878, §'2520: R. S. Mich. 1871, 
 § 5977; G. S. Vt. App. 1870, p. 117, § 
 89; R. S. Me. 1871, ch. lOG, § 1; G. S. 
 X. H., ch. 194, §§ 1 and 2; G. S. Conn. 
 1875, ch. X, § 1 ; G. S. R. I. 1872, p. 
 432, § 14. 
 
 ■* Gen. Laws Colo. 1877, § 14G2; Cal. 
 Code Civ. Proc, § 204; Bush Dis. 
 Fla., ch. 104, § 3; Battle's Rev. X^. C, 
 p= 194, § 229a; R. S. 111. 1889, ch. 78, 
 §1; R. S. Wis. 1880, § 1681; Stat. 
 Minn, at L. 1873, p. 221, § 23, etseq.; 
 R, C. Miss, 1880, § 1681; G. S. Neb. 
 1863, p. 042, § 658; Code Ala. 1876, § 
 4733; Comp. L. Ariz,, ch. 47, § 13; 
 €omp. L. Nev. 1873, § 1052; 2 Ind. 
 Rev, 1876, p, 29, § 1 ; Code Ga. 1873, § 
 .3907; R. S. So. Car. 1873, p. 518, § U 
 
 Comp. L. Utah, 1876, p, 55; R, S, La, 
 1876, § 2127; Gen, Laws Xew Mexico, 
 1880, ch, 68, § 1 : 1 Bright. Purd. Dig., 
 829, § 2, 
 
 5 R, C. Del., ch. 109, § 2: Code A"a, 
 1873, p. 1059, § 3; R, S. Mo, 1879, § 
 2784; Stat, Tenn, 1871, § 3981; R, S. 
 W. Va. 1879, ch. 109, § 7; Gen. Laws 
 Ore. 1872, Civil Code, § 921; R. C. 
 M<1. 1>!78, art. 62, § 2. 
 
 6 G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 573, § 4; R. S. 
 Tex. 1879, art. 3030, 
 
 J Comp, L. Kan. 1879, § 2693. 
 
 « Gladden v. State, 13 Fla. 623; 
 Buhol V. Boudousquie, 8 Mart. (x. s.) 
 (La.) 425, 
 
 9 Forsythe v. State, 6 Oh, 19: Bur- 
 lingame v. Burliugame, 18 Wis. 285; 
 Colt V. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Thomas 
 V. People, 39 Mich. 309, 
 
 1" Act Cong, June 30, 1879; Laws U, 
 S, 1879 (Sess. I.), chap. 52; 21 U. S, 
 Stat, at Large, 143,
 
 14 IMPANELING THE JURY [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 ma}', by rule or order, conform the designation and impaneling^ 
 of jm'ies, in substance, to the hiws and usages relating to jurors 
 in the State courts.^ In the territories, the selection and sum- 
 moning of jurors is governed by territorial statutes, ^ or, in the 
 absence of statutory regulation, by the usages and holdings of 
 the common law, — in accordance with which an open venire 
 facias is directed to the marshal, who summons such good and 
 lawful men as he will."^ 
 
 § 15. Drawing the Panel. — From the general list thus 
 selected of persons eligible or liable to serve as jurors at the suc- 
 ceeding term of court, the list of names actually to be summoned, 
 called either the array or the panels is drawn by lot from a box 
 or wheel, at a time and at a place, either in open court or other- 
 wise, upon public notice, by the designated official or officials, 
 and sometimes in the presence of other designated officials, in a 
 designated manner, — all the conditions and details of the pro- 
 ceeding being generally prescribed by statute.* Although, as in 
 the case of the general list,^ penalties are frequently prescribed 
 
 1 See Alston v. Manning, Chase's Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Beuuer v. Porter, 
 Dec. 460. For the mode of selection 9 How. 235; Clinton v. Euglebrecht, 
 before the passage of the act of 1879, 13 Wall. 434. 
 
 see United States v. Collins, 1 Woods ^ Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 
 
 (U. S.), 499, 503; United States v. 186. The acts of Congress which 
 
 Tallman, 10 Blatchf. C. C. 21; United regulate the procuring of juries for 
 
 States V. Gardner, 1 Woods (U. S.), Federal courts are not applicable to 
 
 514, 519; United States v. Wilson, 6 the territories. Clinton v. Engle- 
 
 McLean (U. S.), 604; Eich v. Camp- brecht, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 434. See also 
 
 bell, 1 Woods (U. S.), 509; United Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 
 
 States V. Dow, Taney Dec. 34; United 145, 154; American Ins. Co. u. Canter, 
 
 States V. Insurgents, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 1 Pet. (U.S.) 511; Benner u. Porter, 9 
 
 335, 341; United States v. Fries, 3 How. (U.S.) 235. 
 
 Dall. (U. S.) 515. The Federal courts * See N. Y. Code Rem. Jus., § 1042 
 
 have the power," and it is their duty, et seq.; Rev. N. -J. 1877, p. 533, § 13; 
 
 to enforce other well founded objec- G. S. Mass. 18(;n, p. G80, § 10 et seq.; 
 
 tions than those available in the State Gen. Stat. N. H., chap. 194, § 10; G. 
 
 courts. United States ?;. Benson, 31 S. Conn. 1875, tit. 19, chap. 10, § G; 
 
 Fed. Rep. 896. G. S. Vt. 1862, chap. 37, §5; R. S. 
 
 2 Per Mr. Chief Justice Waite in . Me. 1871, chap. 106, § 9; Gen. Stat. 
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. R. I. 1872, p. 432, § 15. 
 
 145, 154, citing American Ins. Co. v. ^ Ante, § 13.
 
 Tit. I, Cll. II.] SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 
 
 15 
 
 for failing to make a drawing,^ 3'et a literal eomplianee with the 
 terms of the statute is not necessary to the validity of the panel. ^ 
 On the contrary, the statutes are generally regarded as direc- 
 tory,^ the object being to secure a proper apportionment of jury 
 duty among those liable to perform such dut\', as well as to se- 
 cure impartial juries; ^ and the usual presumption of right action 
 on the part of the otfieiais charged with this duty is generally 
 sufficient to cure irregularities in its performance,^ though obvi- 
 ously a general disregard of the essential provisions of the stat- 
 ute mav have the effect of vitiating the arrav.'' 
 
 § IG. Publication of the Panel.— The pane, thus drawn is, 
 under some statutory regulations, subject to public inspection; ^ 
 under others, any person may have a copy of it by applying to 
 the clerk or sheriff and pacing the fee allowed by law.^ 
 
 § 17. Service of it upon the Accused. — By statute in some 
 jurisdictions persons held to answer for capital,'' or other serious 
 
 1 G. S. Mass. 18G0, chap. 132, § 37; 
 G. S. Vt., p. 332, § 9; Code Va. 1873, 
 p. 10C2, § 22; G. S. N. IL, chap. 194, § 
 17; Bush Dig. Fla., chap. 10-1, § 29; E. 
 S. W. Va. 1879, chap. 109, § 2(J ; Miller's 
 R. C. Iowa, 1880, § 243; R. S. Del. 
 1874, chap. 109, § 23; R. S. Me. 1871, 
 chap. 106, § IG; Code Ala. 187(5, § 4762. 
 
 - See, in addition to the cases pre- 
 viously cited, Ferris v. People, 35 N. 
 Y. 125; s. c. 31 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 140; 
 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; 1 Abb. Pr. (n. 
 s.) 193; State r. Guidry, 28 La. Ann. 
 630; Pratt v. Grappe, 12 La. 451; 
 State v. Miller, 20 La. Ann. 579 ; Mapes 
 V. People, 69 111. 523; Wilhelm' ?;. 
 People, 72 111. 468; Prieri v. People, 2 
 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 230, 231 (fail- 
 ure to give notice of the drawing) ; 
 Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298 (infor- 
 mality in the certificate of the draw- 
 ing). 
 
 3 United States v. Collins, 1 Woods 
 (Uc S.), 499, 504. 
 
 * Rafe r. State, 20 Ga. 64. Cora- 
 pare State V. Revells, 31 La. Ann. 387. 
 See, also, State v. Williams, 3 Stew. 
 (Ala.) 454. 
 
 ^ Wheeler v. State, 42 Ga. 306; 
 Brown v. Cora., 73 Pa. St. 322; Pa- 
 sauka v. Daus, 31 Tex. 72. 
 
 « Cox V. People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 
 430; s. c. aff'd. 80 X. Y. 500; 19 Hun, 
 439. See also Jones v. State, 3 
 Blackf. (Ind.) 37; Campbell v. State, 
 48 Ga. 353; People v. Labadie (Mich.), 
 33 N. W. Rep. 806. 
 
 ' R. S. La. 1876, § 2127. In Nevada 
 by any officer or attorney of the court, 
 Conip. L. Xev. 1873, § 1054. 
 
 = X. Y. Code Rem. Jus., § 1049. 
 See, also, Cal. Code Civ. Pro6., § 221; 
 Comp. L. Mich. 1871, § 5992; Corap. 
 L. Kan. 1879, § 2978; Comp. L. Ariz., 
 chap. 47, § 27. 
 
 9 Stat. 7 Will. III., chap. 3, § 7 (trea- 
 son and misprision of treason) ; Stat. 
 7 Anne, chap. 21, § 11. See Code Ala,
 
 16 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY 
 
 [1 Tbomp. Tr., 
 
 offenses, are entitled to a copy of the panel a designated num- 
 ber of days before their trial. These statutes vary in their 
 terms, some providing for the service of the copy of the panel 
 or array assembled to serve generally for the term, and others 
 for a copy of the special panel assembled to serve in the partic- 
 ular case. Some of them provide for the service of the list of 
 those who have been actually summoned ; ^ others for the serv- 
 ice of a list of those who have been drawn. Under the former 
 it is not sufficient to serve a list of those who have been drawn 
 merely;^ nor under the latter will the statutory right be ac- 
 corded by the service of a long list of persons, most of whom, 
 to the knowledge of the officer, have been excused.^ No such 
 privilege existed at common law; it can only be claimed where 
 there is a statute granting it, and in cases within such statute.^ 
 The statutes are generally drawn upon the conception of extend- 
 ing a privilege to the accused, which he may waive by not de- 
 manding it,^ though the right is a valuable one, of which he can 
 not be deprived against his consent."^ 
 
 1876, § 4782; G. S. N. H. 18G7, chap. 
 243, § 1; R. C. MiSS. 1880, § 3057; R. S. 
 Ohio, 1880, §§ 7271, 7273. 
 
 1 R. S. Mo. 1879, §§ li)00, 1904. See, 
 also, R. S. Me. 1871, chap. 134, § 14; 
 R. S. La. 1876, § 992; R. S. 1879, chap. 
 55, § 1. It is clear that the prisoner 
 can have no right to a list of the 
 jurors in an}- other case than that pro- 
 vided by statute. Reg. v. Dowling, 3 
 Cox C. C. 509 ; Driskill v. State, 45 Ala. 
 21. Compare R. S. 111., chap. 38, § 
 421; R. S. Ohio 1880, § 7273; Rev. 
 Code Miss. 1880, § 3057; Rev. Stat. 
 West Va. 1879, chap. 55, § 1; Gen. 
 Stat. N. H. 1867, ch. 243, § 1; Stat. 
 Tenn. 1871, §§ 5212, 5251. 
 
 - Pasch. Dig. Tex. Stat., art. 3022: 
 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 611; Mur- 
 ray ?;. State (Tex.), 3 S. W. Rep. 104. 
 
 3 Harrison v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 558; Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. 649. 
 
 * State V. Howell, 3 La. Ann. 50, 52. 
 Compare State v. Guidry, 2S La. Ann. 
 631. 
 
 5 Reg. V. DoTvling, 3 Cox C. C. 509; 
 Driskill v. State, 45 Ala. 21. 
 
 6 State V. Kliuger, 46 Mo. 224, 227; 
 State V. Fisher, 2 Nott & McCord (S. 
 C), 261, 264; State v. Cook, 20 La. 
 Ann. 145; State r. Jackson, 12 La. Ann. 
 679; State v. Hernandes, 4 La. Ann. 
 379; Peterson v. State, 45 "Wis. 535; 
 Craft V. Com., 24 Gratt. (Va.) 602, 
 609; State v. Waters, 1 Mo. App. 7; s. 
 c. 62 Mo. 196. For stronger reasons, 
 by going to trial without objection, he 
 waives any informality or inaccuracy in 
 the list known to him to exist. State 
 V. Shay, 30 La. Aun. 114; Bell r. State, 
 59 Ala. 55; Pressley v. State, 19 Ga. 
 192. 
 
 ^ State V. Buckuer, 25 Mo. 167.
 
 Tit. 1, Ch. 11. J SELECTING, DUAWIXG, ETC., THE PANEL. 17 
 
 § 18. [Continued,] Xature and Extent of this Rigrht. — 
 
 From this it follows that the prisoner, on the one hand, can re- 
 quire nothing more than the statute grants to him. lie cannot, 
 for instance, rec^uire that the list shall be read to him, if he is 
 unable to read ; nor that the trial shall be delayed in order that he 
 may have, for the prescribed period of time, a list of the talesmen 
 who may have been summoned to supply deficiencies in the reg- 
 ular panel. ^ He cannot, on the other hand, comi)lain that more 
 has been dene for him than the statute accords, — as that the list 
 was served upon him a /o;<ve7' period before the trial than therein 
 prescribed; ^ or that there is a defect in the regular list of ju- 
 rors summoned for the term (furnished to him as a matter of 
 grace, merely), he being entitled onl}' to a list of those summoned 
 for his trial. ■"* Nor can he insist that all named in the list shall 
 attend,* nor that talesmen shall not })e called to su])i)ly the 
 place of absentees; ^ nor, in the ease of uninipoitant errors in the 
 list, that the trial shall be delayed until he shall have been sup- 
 plied, for the statutory length of time, with a })erfected list ; ^ 
 nor (in the absence of prejudice), that the Christian names are 
 not given in full. l)ut only by initials ; ^ nor that the nanie of a 
 toivihs/tip from which a jurcr is drawn has been abbreviated, 
 provided it is intelligible; ^ nor that the caption contains uei- 
 
 1 Gardeuhirc v. State, 6 Tex. App. 
 147; Harris v. State, C Tex. App. 1)7; 
 Johnsou V. State, 4 Tex. App. 208; 
 Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. 649 ; Sliarp 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 650; State v. 
 Buckuer, 25 Mo. 1<;7, 171; Green v. 
 State, 17 Fla. 669; State v. Price, 3 
 Mo. App. 586; State v. Keeves, 11 La. 
 Aim. 685; State v. Bunger, 14 La. .\un. 
 401; State r. Bennett, 14 La. Ann. 051; 
 State V. Henry, 15 La. Ann. 297; State 
 V. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 539; Colt v. 
 People, 1 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) R. Oil. 
 But, see, People v. Coyodo, 40 Cal. 
 586. 
 
 2 State V. Toby, 31 La. Ann. 730. 
 s Chaney v. State, 31 Ala. 342. 
 
 ♦ Jackijon v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 
 292, 298; Walki'r r. State, Tex. 
 App. 576. 
 
 5 Stewart v. Stale, 13 Ark. 720, 735; 
 Bates V. State, 19 Tex, 122; State w- 
 White, 7 La. Ann. 531 , State v. Ben- 
 nett, 14 La. Ann. 051;* State v. Ferx'ay, 
 22 La. Ann, 423 
 
 6 Goodhue v. People. 94 111. 37; 
 States. Turner, 25 La. Ann. 573; Mc- 
 Carty v. State, 26 Miss. 299; States. 
 Kane, 32 La. Ann. 999 ; State v. Dubord, 
 2 La. Ann. 732; Swofford f. State, 3 
 Tex. App. 76. In Alabama such de- 
 fects are cured by statute. Hall v. 
 State, 51 Ala. 9. 
 
 ' Aikin v. State, 35 Ala. 399 ; Bill v. 
 State, 29 Ahi. 34. 
 
 * State V. Brooks, 30 N. J. L. 356.
 
 18 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr.» 
 
 ther the name of the county, the court, nor the case.^ In 
 short, technical objections to the caption of the hst are not fa- 
 vored.^ The sheriff's return on the venire may be amended after 
 a motion to quash, so as to show a due service of a coj^y of it; 
 and the record need not affirmatively show the fact, in order to 
 sustain a conviction on error or appeal.^ 
 
 i 
 
 § 19. Summoning the Jurors. — Under the common hiw and 
 early English statutes the writ of venire facias, under which the 
 sheriff, at his ow^n discretion, selected and summoned the panel, 
 assumed great importance, and technical accuracy was required in 
 respect of it.^ But, since in nearly all the American States,^ the 
 drawing of the panel precedes the issuing of the process, by 
 whatever name called J by virtue of which the jurors are sum- 
 
 1 Ibid. 
 
 2 State ■?;. Ward, 14 La. Anu. 673; 
 Aikin v. State, 35 Ala. 399. 
 
 3 Gray v. State, 55 Ala. 86; Wash- 
 ington V. State, 8 Tex. App. 377. In 
 Woodsides v. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 
 665, it was held that the return of the 
 sherifE that he had served the prisoner 
 with a correct list of the jury could 
 not be collaterally questioned. 
 
 1 Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328, 34-4; 
 Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212; Dawson v. 
 State, 29 Ark. IIG; Durrah u. State, 
 44 Miss. 789; Logan v. State, 50 Miss. 
 269; Lewis u. State, 51 Ala. 1; Mitchell 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 417; Paris v. State, 
 36 Ala. 232; Rash v. State, 61 Ala. 89. 
 As to the comjnUatiou of the time dur- 
 ing which the accused is entitled to 
 have the list before the trial, see 1 East 
 P. C. 112; State v. McLendon, 1 Stew. 
 (Ala.) 195; Robertson v. State, 43 Ala. 
 325; Craft v. Com., 24 Gratt. (Va.) 
 602. 
 
 5 See Rogers v. Smith, 1 Ad. & El. 
 772, and many cases there cited. Peo- 
 ple V. McKay, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 212, 
 217; State v. Dozier, 2 Speers L (S. 
 
 C.) 211; State v. Williams, 1 Rich. L. 
 (S. C.) 188; 2 Hale P. C. 260; 2 Hawk. 
 P. C, chap. 41, § 1. 
 
 « The States of Maine, New Hamp- 
 shire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Penn- 
 sylvania and West Virginia seem to 
 form exceptions: in these a writ of 
 venire facias issues before each draw- 
 ing, and this is the only i^rocess. R. 
 S. Me., chap. 106, §9; G. S.N. H. 1867, 
 § 7; G. S. Vt. 1863, ch. 37, § 2; G. S. 
 Mass. 1860, p. 681, § 10; 1 Bright. 
 Purd. Pa. Dig. 833, § 34; 2 R. S. Va., 
 chap. 106, § 11. In Connecticut a "war- 
 rant" is issued to th(i town constable 
 directing the drawing. G. S. Coun= 
 1875, p. 433, § 6. 
 
 ' R. C. Miss. 1880, § 1692; R. S. 
 Ohio, 1880, § 5167; R. C. Md. 1878, p. 
 560, § 3; Comp. L. Nev. 1873, § 1054; 
 Bush Dig. Fla., chap. 104, § 6; R. S. 
 Wis. 1878, § 2535: G. L. Colo. 1877, 
 § 1471; R. S. La. 1876, § 2127; Code 
 Va. 1873, p. 1060, § 7; G. S. Neb. 1873, 
 p. 643, § 660; Code Ala. 1876, § 4744; 
 Battle Rev. N. C, p. 196, § 2291; Code 
 Ga. 1873, § 3931; Miller's R. C Iowa, 
 1880, § 241; R. S. 111. 1880, chap. 78,
 
 Tit. I, Cll. II. J SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 
 
 19 
 
 moned, irregularities in this process,^ or 'in the mode of its 
 execution- or return' lose their importance; nor, in general, is 
 
 § 10; R. S. Mo. 1879, §278(;; 2Iik1. Rev. 
 187(;, p. 30, § 2; N. Y. Code Rem. Jus.» 
 ^ 1047; Comp. L. Ariz. 1877, § 2418; 
 G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 574, § (i; Ark. Dij:. 
 Stat. 1874, § 3677; Geu. Laws Oreti. 
 1872, Civ. Code, § 980; Comp. L. Jlich. 
 1871, § 5991; Comp. L. Kan. 1879, 
 § 2970; Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 225; 
 Rev. N. J. 1877, p. 533, § 13; R. S. Del. 
 1874, chap. 109, § 8; Stat. Tenn. 1871, 
 § 3991. Ill Texas this list must be 
 under the seal of tlie court. R. S. 
 Tex. 1879, § 304(J. 
 
 1 Peri V. People, ('.5 III. 17; State v. 
 Cole, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) (;2(;; White v. 
 State, 16 Tex, 206; Murray v. State 
 (Tex.), 3 S. AV. Rep. 104; s. c. 1 S. 
 W. Rep. 522. White v. Com., G 
 Binn. (Pa.) 179; State v. Pliillips, 2 
 .Ahi. 297; Louw v. Davis, 13 Johns, 
 (N. Y.) 227. Compare State v. Sted- 
 man, 7 Port. (Ala.) 495; State v. Cole, 
 
 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 627; Bartow v. 
 Murry, 2 N. J. L. 97, Kirkpatrick, C. 
 J. diss., (overruling also the opinion 
 of the latter in Sayres v. Scudder, and 
 Veal V. Brown, Ibid. pp. 53, 72) ; Sharp 
 V. Hendrickson, 2 N. J. L. 686; Cox v. 
 Haines, Ibid. 687; State v. Alderson, 
 
 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 523; Bill v. State, 29 
 Ala. 34; Hallu. State, 51 Ala, 9; Fields 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 348; Aikin v. State, 35 
 Ala. 399; State v. Simmons, 6 Jones 
 L. (N. C.) 309; Cordova v. State, 6 Tex. 
 App, 207, 222; Haiglit v. Ilolley, 3 
 Wend, (N. Y.) 258, 262. Contra, a few 
 old cases which blindly adhere to the 
 ancient strictness : People v. McKay, 
 18 Jolins. (N. Y.) 212, 217; State v. 
 Dozier, 2 Speers L. (S. C.) 211; State 
 V. Williams, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 188. 
 
 2 People V. Williams, 24 Mich. 156, 
 i61. See, also, Kemiedy v. Com., 14 
 Bush (Ky.),340. 
 
 3 People V. Jones, 24 Mich. 215; 
 State V. Stokely, 16 ^liun. 282; Maples' 
 W.Park, 17 Conn, 338; Fellow'?^ Case, 
 5 Me, 333 ; Davis v. State, 25 Oh. St. 
 369; Anon., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 196. Al- 
 though a return Is necessary for the 
 purpose of identifying the juror's 
 drawn, with those present in court or 
 failing to attend (People v. Jones, 24 
 Mich. 215), yet even the omission of a 
 return does not vitiate the array (Rol- 
 land V. Com., 82 Pa. St. 306, 322), or 
 prevent a juror from taking his seat 
 upon sliowing that he was in fact 
 summoned. Patterson's Case, ('> Mass. 
 48(;. A neglect to sign the return will 
 not vitiate the array, but the court 
 may order it to be indorsed on the 
 writ and signed. Duwar v. Spence, 2 
 AVhart. (U. S.) 211; Com. v. Miller, 4 
 Phila. 210; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. 
 (Pa.) 289, 291; Com. v. Chauncey, 2 
 Ashm. (Pa.) 90; Com. v. Parker, 2 
 Pick. (Mass.) 549. If it omit to name 
 the day of summoning, the jurors 
 being in attendance, may testify that 
 they have ))eeu duly summoned and 
 thereafter be sworn. Anon., I Pick. 
 (Mass.) 196. Where the issue of the 
 venire precedes the drawing, it has 
 been held unnecessary to recite in the 
 return that the panel was drawn ac- 
 cording to law, for this will be pre- 
 sumed. Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 289. Contra, Eaton v. Com., G Binn. 
 (Pa.) 447. The statutory provision as 
 to the time within which the return 
 shall be made has been regarded as 
 directory, so that it is made In time to 
 afford an opportunity for Inspecting 
 the panel. Mowry v. Starbuck, 4 Cal. 
 274; State v. Squaires, 2 Kev. 226. 
 Contra, State v. Vegas, 19 La. Ann. 
 105. Net error to permit sheriff to
 
 20 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 it necessary that it issue at all; ^ since, if the designated jurors 
 assemble, it is wholly immaterial how they were brought in. 
 The number to be summoned, when not fixed by statute, ^ rests 
 in the discretion of the court ;^ and, where fixed by statute, a 
 want of literal compliance with its terms' will not vitiate the 
 array.* Parties cannot insist upon the attendance atone time of 
 the full panel, so that enough attend for the selection of a jury 
 in the particular case.^ 
 
 amend return: MuiTay v. State (Tex.), 
 3 S. W. Rep. 104; s. c. 1 S. W. liep. 
 522; Mulliu's Appeal (Pa.) 5 Atl. Rep. 
 738. 
 
 1 Bird V. State, 14 Ga. 43. To the 
 same effect see State r. Crosby, Harper 
 Const. Rep. (S. C.) 90; Malier v. State, 
 
 1 Port. 2(15; Johnson v. Cole, 2 N. J. L. 
 266; (contra, Howell v. Robertson, 6 
 N. J. L. 142); State v. Williams, 3 
 Stew. (Ala.) 454; Lyon v. Commercial 
 Ins. Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 267; State v. 
 Folke, 2 La. Ann. 744 ;Trembly v. State, 
 20 Kan. 116, 120; State v. Harris, 30 
 La. Ann. 90; McDermott u. Hoffman, 
 70 Pa. St. 31 ; State v. Perry, Bnsbee 
 (N. C.) 330; Bennetts. State, Mart. & 
 Yerg. (Tcnn.) 133; Macliey u. People, 
 
 2 Colo, 13, 17; United States v. Reed, 
 2 Blatch. (U. S.) 435, 452i Samuels v. 
 State, 3 Mo. 68; State v. Marshall, 36 
 Mo. 406; State ?;. Jones, 61 Mo. 232; 
 People V. McCann, 3 Parker, Cr. R. 
 (N. Y.) 272; People v. Cummings, 3 
 Park.- Cr. R. (N. Y.) 343; People v. 
 Robinson, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 235, 
 (overruling McGuire v. People, 2 Park. 
 Cr. R. (N. Y.) 148); State v. Cava- 
 naugh, 76 Mo. 54. 
 
 2 It was limited by Stat. Will. II., 
 chap. 38, 225, but tliis was held not to 
 apply to crown cases. 
 
 3 United States v. Insurgents, 2 
 Dall. (U. S.) 335. See, also. United 
 States V. Fries, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 515. 
 
 * Anderson v. State, 5 Ark. 444, 453; 
 
 Ramos V. Bringier, 2 Mart. (x. s.) La. 
 192; Debuys^;. Mollere, 2 Mart. (x. s.) 
 La. 625; Prall v. Peet, 3 La. 274, 280. 
 But contra see Harrison v. State, 3 
 Tex. App. 558; Burfey v. State, 3 Tex. 
 App. 519; Jones v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 575; Calthorp v. Newton, Cro. Jac^ 
 647. In Louisiana it is provided by 
 statute that it shall not be deemed a 
 good cause of challenge to the array, 
 that the uum1)er of jurors actually 
 drawn at any time is not the exact 
 number required by law. R. S. La. 
 1876, § 2130. 
 
 6 Odom V. Gill, 59 Ga. 180; State v. 
 Loveustein, 9 La. Ann. 313; Rolland v. 
 Com., 82 Pa. St. 306, 321; Sands v. 
 Com., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 871; State v. 
 Brown, 12 Minn. 538; State v. Ste- 
 phens, 13 So. Car. 285 ; State v. Klinger, 
 46 Mo. 224. But see Flower v. Living- 
 ston, 12 Mart. (La.) 681. In Anon., 1 
 Bro. (Penn.) 200. it is stated that "all 
 the persons who may be indicted will 
 be entitled to their challenges out of 
 the whole panel; if one single juror 
 neglects to attend, in consequence of 
 being illegally summoned, the right of 
 challenge is infringed." This, how- 
 ever, is now contradicted by the set- 
 tled rule that the right of challenge is 
 a right to reject, and not a right to 
 select. United States v. Marchant, 4 
 Mason, (U. S.) 158; s. c. 12 Wheat.' 
 (U. S.) 482. Persons jointly indicted, 
 who elect to be jointly tried, cannot
 
 Tit. I, Cll. II.] SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 21 
 
 § 20. Special Venire in Default of Jurors. — If the regular 
 panel is not drawn, or i.s quashed or exhausted, the business of 
 the court is not therefore to stop, but the court may, under most 
 statutory systems, award a special venire facias, returnable forth- 
 with, under which a sufficient number of jurors are summoned 
 to proceed with the public business.^ A new jury may, it has 
 been held, be thus impaneled while the regular jury is out delib- 
 erating ui)()n a verdict,^ or for the immediate retrial of a criminal 
 case where a jury have failed to agree. ^ As in the case of the 
 regular venire,^ irregularities in the special venire,^ or in its exe- 
 cution,® are in general disregarded; though matters of substance 
 are insisted upon, — as, where the statute prescribes that the 
 jurors be drawn by the clerk and this is omitted, a venire is is- 
 sue<l directino; the sheriff to summon a certain number.^ 
 
 § 21 Special Venire in Capital Cases. — In many of the 
 States the issuing of a special venire in capital cases is provided 
 for by statute. This is in the nature of a j^^'iviler/e to the accused, 
 and under some statutes the venire is issued only upon the de- 
 mand of the accused. This right cannot be demanded where, 
 from some cause, the offense has ceased to be capital.® It is 
 ivaived by going to trial without objection, with a jury selected 
 
 demand a more numerous panel than derwerker v. People, .3 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 ■Roukl be awarded in the case of a 530. 
 
 single defendant. State v. Phillips, ■• See preceding section. 
 
 24 Mo. 475. 5 state v. Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237; 
 
 1 Russel V. State, 53 Miss. 3';7; People u. Jones, 24 Mich. 215. 
 Trembly v. State, 20 Kan. IKi; People « state v. Arthur, 39 la 031 (sum- 
 V. Stuart, 4 Cal. 225; People v. Vance, moniug ** from the body of the coun- 
 21 Cal. 400; People v. Williams, 43 ty"); Cavanah v. State, 5(5 Miss. 299 
 Cal. 344 ; People V. Divine, 4(5 Cal. 4(!; (summoning from the assessment 
 People V. Davis, 47 Cal. 93. What is roll). See, also, People v. Colt, 3 Hill 
 "an entire absence of the regular (N. Y.) 432. 
 
 panel," so as to authorize a special ' Gladden v. State, 13 Fla. 623; 
 
 venire: State ?7. McCartey, 17 Minn. 70; Gropp v. People, 67 111. 154; Lincoln 
 
 Blemer v. People, 76 111. 265; Reed v. v. Stowell, 73 111. 246; Rockford Ins. 
 
 State, 15 Oh. 217. Co. v. Nelson, 75 111. 548; Wright w. 
 
 2 Evartsu. State, 48 Ind. 422; Win- Stuart, 5 Blackf. (lud.) 120; Hight w. 
 sett V. State, 57 lud. 26; ^lerrick u. Langdon, 53 Ind. 81. 
 
 State, 63 Ind. 327. « State v. Bullock, 63 N. C. 570. 
 
 3 Pierce v. State, 67 Ind. 354; Van-
 
 22 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 from the regular panel. ^ It is proper that the accused should 
 be present when the names of the jurors who are thus to be sum- 
 moned are drawn, where the statute provides for a drawing, ^ 
 though it has been held that he cannot demand this as a right, -^ 
 Although the statute provides that the clerk of the court shall 
 make the drawing, this, it has been held, may be done by a 
 deputy sheriff in open court.* As in the case of the regular 
 panel, ^ the disqualification of one or more jurors is no ground 
 for quashing the venire, but is a ground of individual challenge 
 merely.^ While the accused cannot insist that all persons named 
 in the special venire shall be brought iu,^ yet the neglect to sum- 
 mon a large number of them ought, it should seem, to vitiate the 
 panel ; '^ since in this way the sheriff might omit to summon per- 
 sons supposed to be favorable to the accused, while summoning 
 others unfavorable to him.^ 
 
 § 22. Venire, by Whom Executed and Returned. — As the 
 
 summoning officer at common law possessed the entire power of 
 selecting the venire-men who were to be brought in, the impar- 
 tiality of this ofiicer was a matter of great importance, and his 
 disqualification constituted in general the only ground for chal- 
 lenging the array. ^'^ Under American statutes, where the panel 
 is selected and drawn and a list of the names to be summoned is 
 furnished to the officer, it can be of little importance whether he 
 is the proper officer, or whether he is for any reason disqualified, 
 where he summons all the persons named in the list.^^ But a 
 
 1 Jefferson v. State, 52 Miss. 7G7; 'i Logan v. State, 53 Miss. 431.- 
 State V. Perry, Busbee (N. C), 830. ^ In a case of murder it is not error 
 
 2 Henry v. State, 33 x\la. 389; Hall for the court to refuse to cause a 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 698. venire to be summoned from another 
 
 s Pocket V. State, 5 Tex. App. 552; coiui^/ because of prejudice against the 
 
 Cordova v. State, G Tex. App. 207 ; accused, until an effort has been made- 
 
 Haudline v. State, 6 Tex. App. 347, to obtain a jury, free from exception, 
 
 358. from the venire already summoned. 
 
 4 Pocket V. State, 5 Tex. App. 552. Puryear v. Com. (Va.), 1 South East. 
 
 5 Post, § 31. Rep. 513. 
 
 « Durrah v. State, 44 Miss. 789. ^^ Post, § 32." 
 
 "^ Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720, 735; " See Forniau v Com. (Ky.), G. S. W. 
 
 Bates V. State, 19 Tex. 122: Jackson v. Rep. 579. 
 State, 4 Tex. App. 292, 298.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. 11. ] SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 
 
 23 
 
 fraudulent omixsion to summon a portion of those whose names 
 are on the list may create a necessity for the issuing of a special 
 venire, or for tlie summoning of talesmen, which may throw 
 into the hands of the otficer the })ower of selecting, or otherwise 
 prejudice the accused. In such a case, it is still a matter of 
 moment, as it was at common law, that the summoning officer 
 be the lawful officer, and not for any reason disqualified for the 
 performance of the duty. We accordingly find a good many 
 modern holdings which still emphasize the importance of the 
 venire facias, or other process by which jurors are brought in, 
 being executed by the proper officer ; though some of them pro- 
 ceed in deference to the ancient rule of the common law after 
 the reason of it has ceased, and do not put their conclusions upon 
 the correct ground. By that law, when the sheriff was for any 
 reason incompetent, the corontr acted in his place; ^ thouo-h the 
 coroner could not act where the sheriff was merely sick ^ or dead.^ 
 His absolute disqualification was necessary to qualify the coroner.* 
 In case of the gross ignorance of the sheriff, it has been held 
 that the court may direct his deputy to summon tales jurors ; ^ 
 and, where the sheriff can act, the deputy usually can.^ If there 
 be two slierifs and one a party, the other may act.^ Statutes 
 are found authorizing the court, when the sheriff or his deputies 
 are disqualified, to direct the coroner or any disinterested person 
 to summon the jurors,^ and this may be shown by affidavit 
 
 1 Cc. Litt. 158a; Res v. Smith, 2 
 Shower, 288 ; Res v. Dolby, 1 Dow. & 
 Ry. 145; s. c. 2 Baru & Cress. 104. 
 
 2 State V. Mouk, 3 Ala. 415. 
 
 3 Res V. Warrington, 1 Salk:. 152. 
 * Reg V. Delme, 10 Mod. 108. 
 
 5 Kelly V. State, 3 Siued. &. M. 
 (Miss.) 518. 
 
 '^ Cora. V. Carson, 3 Phila. 21D, 223; 
 Conner ^•. State, 25 Ga. 515. 
 
 ^ Res V. Warrington, 1 Salk. 152; 
 Rich V. Player, 2 Shower, 286. 
 
 8 Crim. Code Ky., § 103; Johns v. 
 Com. (Ky.),3 S. W. Rep. 369; Forraau 
 V. Com. (Ky.),6 S. W. Rep. 579. 
 Phillips v. State, 20 Ga. 105; Ilauna 
 
 V. People, 8G 111. 243; Stale v. Hardin, 
 46 Iowa, 623. A Statute providing 
 that " if the case requires it," the 
 court may appoint two citizens for 
 the summons of jurors, wi»s liberally 
 interpreted. '• If from any cause," 
 said the court, " bias or partiality, 
 sickness, absence, death, removal or 
 resignation from office, refusal to 
 obey the order to summon si)ecial 
 jurors, or if for any other sufllcient 
 cause the court determine tliat the 
 circumstances of the case require it, 
 they may appoint two citizens to per- 
 form the duty mentioned in the act." 
 Com. V, Carson, 3 Phila. 219.
 
 24 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 merely.^ Where the sheriff and the coroner were both incom- 
 petent, under the English practice, the court might, on applica- 
 tion, appoint officers called elisors to perform the duty ;2 but this 
 practice seems not to have gained a footing in this country.^ 
 
 § 23. Of Talesmen. — Where the requisite number of venire- 
 men did not attend, or the i)anel became reduced by claims of 
 exemption or by challenges, or where otherwise an emergency 
 arose for the summoning of additional jurors, the practice sprang 
 up and was sanctioned by early statutes,* of summoning tales- 
 men,^ or bystanders. In this country the power of summoning 
 such persons seems to be regarded as possessed by courts of 
 record, where not prohibited by statute.® The abuses which may 
 spring from the exercise of such a power are too obvious to be 
 pointed out ; and we accordingly find that statutes exist prohib- 
 iting the summoning of talesmen from the bystanders.^ There 
 seems to be a disposition on the part of the courts to retain this 
 power, evidently regarding it as advantageous to the dispatch of 
 the public business.** Accordingly, it has been held unaffected 
 in the Federal courts by the recent act of Congress ^ already 
 
 1 Harrimau v. State, 2 G. Greeiu-, § 30; R. S. Ohio, 1880, § 5173; Miller's 
 271 ; State v. Hardin, 46 Iowa, «23. R. C. la. 1880, § 2775. As to penalty 
 Compare People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174. for seeking jury service, see ante, 
 
 2 Co. Litt. 158a; Rex. v. Edmunds, § 84, subsec. 2. Construction of a stat- 
 4 Barn & Aid. 471, 480. ute prohibiting tales jurors from being 
 
 3 Statutory provisions against/ra?((i summoned from persons found in tlie 
 in procuring jurors: Thoinp, & iler. court-house or yard if procurable 
 Jur,, § 84. Punishment by fine of elsewhere: Balder v. State, 4 Tex. 
 non-attending jurors: /6td., § 83. App. 223; Matthew's v. State, 6 Tex, 
 
 * St. Hen. VIII., c. 6; 4 & 5 PhiL & App. 23; Johnson v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 
 M., c. 7. 2G8. See also Frye v. State, 7 Tex. 
 
 ^ Tales decirc%iinstantibus,—V[iAt I?,, App. 94; HicliS v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 
 such of those standing around as were 488; Samschen v. State, 8 Tex. App. 45. 
 
 probi et legates homines. s Matthews v. State, sttpra; Frye v. 
 
 6 R. S. 111. 1880, cliap. 78, § 13; Statt-, supra; State v. Moncla(La.),2 
 
 Comp. L. Kan. 1879, § 2991 -, 2 Ind. Rev. South Rep= 814 ; Mullin's Appeal (Pa.), 
 
 1876, p. 392, § 80, 5 Atl. Rep. 738. 
 
 ^ Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 227 ; Comp. » Ante, § 14; United States v. Rose, 
 
 L. Nev. 1873, § 1222; Comp. L. Utah, 6 Fed. Rep. 136. The power is given 
 
 1876, § 1385; Comp. L. Ariz., chap: 4 7, by § 804, Rev. Stat. U. S.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. II. J SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL 25 
 
 referred to. Unless otherwise provided by statute, it exists in 
 the case of special Juries, as well as in that of common juries.^ 
 
 § 24. [Coutinued.] Under what Circumstances Sum- 
 moned. — The true theory of summoning talesmen is that such 
 persons are to be summoned only where it is necessary to supple- 
 ment or JiJl up a jury which remains incomplete after the ex- 
 haustion of the regular panel by excuses, challenges or otherwise. 
 They ought not to be summoned on the one hand, until the regu- 
 lar panel has been exhausted, ^ though the court may summon 
 them without awaiting the return of attachments issued to brin^ 
 m members of the regular panel. ^ And where separate panels 
 are summoned and in attendance for separate weeks of the term, 
 It is better, and hence proper, where the first panel is exhausted 
 without procuring a jury, to resort to the panel for the second 
 week, rather than summon talesmen.* So, where the sheriff is 
 ordered by the court to summon duly qualified jurors " from the 
 county at large," he complies with the first order by summoning 
 them from the first names remaining on the jury list of the 
 county.^ Nor is it improper, although not authorized by statute, 
 for the court to direct such additional jurors to be drawn by the 
 clerk in the usual way.*^ 
 
 §25. [Continued.] Conflicting Rulings on this Subject. — 
 
 It is to be regretted, however, that no general rule on this sub^ 
 
 » Rex V Hunt, 4 Barn. & Aid. 430; pare State v Bentou, 2 Dev. & B. 196, 
 
 Snook v. Soutlnvood, Ryau & Moo. States Nash, 8 Ired. L, (N. C.) 35; 
 
 429: Gatliff v. Bourne, 2 Moo & Rob. State v- Lytic, 5 Ired. L. (X C.) .58 
 
 100; Atty. Gen. v. Parsons, 2 Mee. & Compare Bayoujon v. Criswell, 5 Mar- 
 
 W. 23; Rex V. Hill, 1 Car. & P. (MM ■ tin (x. s.) (La.) 2;i2. 
 Res V. Tipping, 1 Car. & P. 6G8 ; Buron =, Barthet .. Estebene , 5 La. Ann, 
 
 V. Deuman, 1 Exch. 769; People v. 315. 
 
 Tweed, 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 286; *" Lambertson w. People, 5 Park. C 
 
 Anou.,2Dall. (U. S.) 382; Ranking. «. (X. Y) 200. See also Smith v 
 
 Goddard, 4 Allen (N. B.) 155; Atlee v state, 55 Ala. 1. 
 
 Shaw,4 Yeates (Pa.), 236; Rex a;. Perry, . people v. Colt, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 432. 
 
 5 Term Rep= 453; Sparrow v. Turner, gee, also, Cavauah v. State, 56 Miss. 
 
 2 Wils, 366: Denu v. Evaul, 1 N. J. L. ^O'J. 
 
 283; Hubley v. White, 2 Yeates (Pa.) '^'l people v. Cumraings, 3 Park. C 
 
 133. 
 
 2 Barker v. Bell, 49 Ala. 281, Com- 
 
 R. (X. Y.) 343, 354.
 
 26 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 ject, applicable in all jurisdictions, can he stated. It has been 
 held, on the one hand, in a court of the United States, that it is 
 ground of new trial to order a tales where there is no deficiency 
 of regular jurors. ^ On the other hand, a territorial court has 
 held that whether a proper emergency exists for summoning 
 talesmen is for the court to decide according to the nature and 
 amount of the business pending.'^ Coming to the State courts, 
 we find the same difference of opinion. It has been denied by 
 some,^ and allowed by others,* that talesmen may be summoned 
 to supply a total default of regular jurors. On the one hand, 
 it has been ruled that, where the regular panel is absent in the 
 jury room making up their verdict in a case, the court can- 
 not call another cause for trial and proceed to impanel a jury 
 composed entirely of bystanders. ° On the other hand, if a j^or- 
 tion only of the regular jurors are so absent, talesmen may be 
 summoned to form a jury for the remainder of the panel. ^ If 
 but a single -member of the regular panel remains, talesmen may 
 be summoned to form a jury with him alone ; ^ and if he be 
 challenged off, a jury may nevertheless be formed entirely from 
 the talesmen.** 
 
 § 2G. [Continued.] Further of this Subject. — The num- 
 ber of talesmen to be summoned to supply a deficiency is gener- 
 ally regarded as a matter resting in the sound discretion of the 
 trial court : ^ and the court may even direct the sheriff, in antici- 
 
 1 United States I'. "Watkius, 3 Crauch ^ Kogers v. State, 33 La. Ann. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 508. 543. 
 
 2 Territory t;. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.), '^Bradley v. Bradley, 45 Ind. 67; 
 396 Rondeau v. New Orleans Imp. Co., 15 
 
 3 Rogers V. State, 33 Ind. 543; La. Ann. 160. 
 
 Williams v. Com., Dl Pa. St. 493. ^ Fuller v. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 •» Suttle V. Batie, 1 la, 141; Hunt v. 63; Emericli v. Sloan, 18 Iowa, 13'.). ' 
 Scobie, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 469. In Lou- ^ Fuller v. State, supra. 
 
 isiana it is ruled that there can be no » People v. Colt, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 432; 
 
 objection to summoning talesmen McGuffee u. State, 17 Ga. 497; State W: 
 
 TVhere the regular panel lias been ex- Lamon, 3 Hawks (N. C), 175; State v. 
 
 hausted without procuring a single Buckner, 25 Mc. 167, 171; Burk v. 
 
 juror. State v. Reeves, 11 La. Ann. State, 2 Har, & J. (Md.) 426; Daytonv. 
 
 G86; State w. Desmoucliet, 32 La. Ann. State, 11) Ohio St. 584; Colt v. Peopie, 
 
 1241. 1 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y,^ 611; Com.©.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. II.] SELECTING, DRAWING, ETC., THE PANEL. 
 
 27 
 
 pution of emergency, to bring in a sufficient number of qutilitied 
 persons to act as talesmen whenever a dclieiency may occur ; ^ and 
 these are not summoned for aparticuhir case, but for the business 
 of the courtgenerally.2 While talesmcnare ordinarily summoned 
 for a particular case,'^ yet if they sit in a su})sequent case, it is 
 an irregularity which is tcaivedhy not objecting before verdict."* 
 
 § 27. [Continued.] By whom and liow Summoned. — By 
 
 the common law, the selection of talesmen was contided entirely 
 to the discretion of the sheriff as was the selection of reo-ular 
 jurors; and this is still the law where not changed by statute ;5 
 though an order of court controlling his discretion in this matter 
 is no ground for now trial unless prejudice appears.'' There- 
 fore, the sheriff and his deputies who perform this duty ought to 
 bQ properly qualified; and where there is a statute prescribing the 
 oatJi which they shall take,Uhe omission to administer it will be 
 error for which a conviction will beset aside. ^ Talesmen should 
 possess the qualiticat ions of regular jurors, which will be presumed 
 until the contrary is shown ; '^ and while the summoning'- officer 
 nust, of course, judge of their qualitications in the tirst instance, 
 jet he ought not to interrogaie them as to their opinions or bias.^" 
 
 Ilaton, 8 Phila. 428; Com. r. Twitcn- 
 ell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 551. 
 
 1 Bac. Abr., Juries D, 337; State v. 
 Lamon, 3 Hawks (X. C), 175; United 
 States V. Loughery, 13 Blatch. (U. S.) 
 207; State r. Kane, 32 La. Ann. 999, 
 State V. Allen, 47 Conn. 121. The 
 sheriff, orcoroner, Avhen discharging 
 tlie duties of that ollicer, may of his 
 own motion specially request the atten- 
 dance of persons to serve as talesmen 
 if necessary. Rex v. Dolby, 2 Barn, & 
 Cress. 104. The statutes of a large 
 number of the States now provide that 
 talesmen may be taken from the by- 
 standers or from the l)ody of the county. 
 
 ^ Birdv. State, 14 Ga. 43. See also 
 State V. Dale, 8 Ore. 22'J; United 
 States V. Lougliery, 13 Blatch. (U S). 
 2(j7; O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215 
 
 ^ Wallace v. Columbia, 48 Me 436; 
 Sliields V. Niagara Sav. Bank, 3 II un 
 (X. Y,), 477; s c. 5 Th. & C. (N. Y.) 
 585- 
 
 * Rowland v. Giflford, 1 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 42, note; Wallace r. Colum- 
 bia, 48 Me. 436 
 
 ^5 People ?7. Cummiugs, 3 Park. C. 
 II (X. Y.) 343, 353 
 
 « Capehart v. Stewart, 90 N. C. 101 
 
 ^ Rev. St. Tex. art. 3056. 
 
 8 Wyers v, State (Tex.) 2 S. W. 
 Rep. 722 
 
 9 Yelm Jim v. Territory, 1 Wash 
 Terr. 76; O'Connor v State, 9 Fla. 
 215; Lee v. Lee, 71 N. C. 139; Mc- 
 Guffle V. State, 17 Ga. 497. 
 
 1" :. Burr's Triai, p 421; State v. 
 McCartey, 17 Minn. 76; Joy v State, 
 14 ImL 139
 
 28 ' IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 ThoUip. Tl.. 
 
 CHAPTER TIL 
 
 OF CHALLENGES 
 
 Article I. — Challenges to the Array. 
 Article II. - — ^Peremptory Challenges. 
 Article III. — Challenges for General Disqualification, 
 Article IV. — Challenges for Disqualification in Respect of the 
 Particular Case. 
 Subdivision 1. — Challenges Grounded on Consanguinity, Affin- 
 ity, Interest, Affection. 
 Subdivision 2. — Challenges Grounded on Bias, Prejudice, 
 Scruple, Opinion. 
 
 Article I. — Challenges to the Array. 
 
 Section 
 
 3L Of the Various kinds of Cliallenges. 
 
 32. Partiality of tlie Sumraouiug Ofiicer. 
 
 33. Irregularities or Frauds iu Selecting the Genera] List. 
 
 34. Irregularities iu Drawing the Panel. 
 
 35. Objection to the Officer who Conducts the Drawing, 
 
 36. In the Case of Special or Struck Juries. 
 
 37. Time of Conducting the Drawing. 
 
 38. Irregularities in Summoning the Panel. 
 
 39 Resummoning Members of Quashed Panel. 
 
 40 Kinds of Challenges to the Polls. 
 
 § 31. Of the Various kinds of Challenges. — ^ There are two 
 general divisions of challenges: 1. Challenges to the arraij . 
 2. Challenges to the polls. In the broadest sense, challenges to 
 the array are grounded upon some objection which, if well taken, 
 vitiates the whole panel or venire^ and requires its discharge •, 
 while challenges to the polls are grounded upon objections to par- 
 ticular jurors. As the entire ofEce of selecting the panel was, at 
 common law, committed to the sheriff or other summoning offi- 
 cer, the usual ground of challenging the array under that system
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES TO THE ARRAY 
 
 29 
 
 related to the partiality, '* unindifferency,"' as it was called, or 
 other disqualitication of this officer. This ground of challenging 
 the array still subsists in some American jurisdictions; hut the 
 more important and frequent ground is a non-compliance with the 
 law in some substantial particular in the selection of the general 
 jury list or in the drawing of the panel therefrom. 
 
 § 32. Partiality of the Suimuoniug Officer. — The })artiality 
 of the summoning officer, grounded upon his sustaining such re- 
 lations to a })arty as subjected him to the intluence of the latter,^ 
 or ui)on his being related to the adverse party by consanguinity 
 or affinity, 2 at least within the ninth degree^^ or himself the ad- 
 verse party to the suit,^ or interested therein,* or the prosecu- 
 tor in a criminal case,*"' or the advocate of the opposing party 
 is, at conunon law, a good ground of quashing the array* ^ 
 though the mere fact that he has expressed an opinion adverse to 
 the case of the challenging party, will not be.** Attempts by a 
 
 1 Bac. Al>r. Juries E.; Co. Litt. 
 l.jiia; Trials per Pais (ed. of ITi!."*;, p. 
 123. 
 
 2 Co. Litt. \o^ia•, Bac. Abr. Juries, E. 
 
 2 3 Bla. Com. 3i;3; Vernon v. Man- 
 ners, 3 Dyer, 319. a. (13); Ouiton v. 
 Morse, 2 Kerr (X. B.), 77; Vanaukea 
 r. Beemer, 4 N. J. L. 3G4; Kector «. 
 Hudson, 20 Tex. 234; Munshower r. 
 Patton, 10 Serj;. &K. (Pa.) 334: Moun- 
 seu f. West, 1 Leon. 8t>; Markliani r. 
 Lee, cited Ibid. See also Foot v. 
 Morgan, 1 Hill (X. Y.), 054. But not 
 that he was a sou of the prosecuting 
 attorney (State v. Cameron, 2 Chand. 
 (Wis.) 172), or married to the sister 
 of one who was surety for costs and 
 who had supported the plaintiff's ac- 
 tion with his money (Murchison v. 
 Marsh, 2 Kerr, N. B. 608), or cousin 
 of the lessor of the plaintiff in eject- 
 raeat, the lessor not being a party in 
 interest' Anon., 3 Dyer, 300. b. (35) ; 
 Goodtitle v. Thrustout, 2 Stra. 1023. 
 
 < Cowgill V. Wooden, 2 Blackf. 
 
 (Ind.) 332; Cranmer r. Crawley, 1 N. 
 J. L. 43; Woods r. Kowan, 5 Johns. 
 (X. Y.) 133; Munsiiower i;. Patton, 10 
 Seri;. & li. (Pa.) 334. But see State v. 
 Judge, 11 La. Ann. 79; Prince u. State, 
 3 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 253. 
 
 5 People V. Tweed, 50 How. Pr. (X. 
 Y.) 2.s(). See also liex v. Johnson, 
 2 Stra. 1000. 
 
 « Kex V. Shepherd, I Leach, C. C. 
 11 'J. 
 
 ' Co. Litt. 15(1. b. : Baylis r. Lucas, 
 Cowp. 112; Watkins v. Weaver, 10 
 Joims. (X. Y.) 107; Tallraan v. Wood- 
 worth, 2 Johns. (X. 1'.) 385; Stubber 
 V. Wall, 1 Craw. & Dix (Irish) Cir. 
 54; Chapman v. Macutchin, 1 Craw. & 
 Dix (Irish) Cir. 121. 
 
 <* Friery f. People, 2 Keyes (X. Y.), 
 424; s. c. 2 Abb. App., Dec. (X. Y.) 
 215; 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 319; Ferris v. 
 People, 35 X. Y. 125; s. c. 31 How. Pr. 
 (X. Y.) 140; 48 Barb. (X. Y.) 17; 1 
 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (N^. Y.) 193. In Texas 
 the only ground of challenging tlie
 
 30 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 party to influence the summoning ofiicer in the performance of 
 his duties will have this effect, without discriminating nicely as to 
 whether prejudice has resulted or not ; ^ though where the party 
 is a corporation, the mere fact of giving to the sheriff at his re- 
 quest information as to who the stockholders are, so that he may 
 avoid summoning them, will not have this effect.^ 
 
 § 33. Irregularities or Frauds in Selecting- the General 
 List. — As already seen, statutes which prescribe the manner of 
 selecting, by county, town, or other officers, the general list of 
 persons liable to jury duty from which the panel is drawn, are 
 generally treated as directory merely.^ It is hence a general 
 rule that irregularities in the discharge of this duty constitute no 
 ground for challengino: an arrav.* If the jurors who have been 
 selected and drawn arc individually qualified, that is generally 
 deemed suflicient,^ and objections to particular jurors are made 
 by challenge to the polls. It has been so held in case of a delay 
 
 array in criminal cases is tliat " the 
 otticer summoning the jury lias acted 
 corruptly, aucl has willfully summoned 
 persons upon the jury kuown to ha 
 prejudiced against the defendant, and 
 with a view to cause him to be con- 
 victed." Pasc. Dig., art. 3034; E. S. 
 Tex. 1879 (Code Cr. Proc), art. 024. 
 See Tuttle v. State, 6 Tex. App. 550 ; 
 Coker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 83; Cast- 
 ancdo v. State, 7 Tex. App. 582. See 
 also Harris v. State, fi Tex. App. 97 ; 
 Swofford V. State, 3 Tex. App. 88; 
 Williams v. State, 44 Tex. 34; Bowman 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 417. 
 
 1 McDonald v. Shaw, 1 N. J. L. C 
 See also State v. Johnson, 1 N. J. L. 
 219. 
 
 - Quinebaug Bank v. Tarl3.ox, 20 
 Conn. 510. 
 
 3 Ante, § 13. 
 
 ■» People V. Tweed, 50 Hew. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 280; Maffett v. Tonkins, (; N.J. 
 L. 228; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485; 
 Foust V. Com., 33 Pa. St. 338; 
 
 Jewell V. Com., 22 Pa. St. 94; Com. v. 
 Walsh, 124 Mass. 32; Woodsides v. 
 State, 2 How. (Miss.) 655; Malone v. 
 State, 49 Ga. 210; Brinkley v. State, 
 54Ga. 371; Foster v. Speed, 32 La. 
 Ann. 34; Sumrall v. State, 29 Miss. 
 202; State v. Neagle, (35 Me. 408. But 
 see Compton v. Legras, 24 La. Ann. 
 259. Irregularities in tilling the jury 
 wheel in Pennsylvania; Com. v. Lip- 
 pard, Serg. & R. (Pa.) 395; in the 
 custody of the wheel: Curlcy u.Com., 
 84 Pa. St. 151; Rollaud v. Com., 82 Pa. 
 St. 300. 
 
 * State V. Massey, and State v. 
 Baldwin, 2 Hill (S. C), 379; Rafe r. 
 State, 20 Ga. 80; Perry v. State, 9 
 Wis. 19: Gettwerth v. Teutonia Ins. 
 Co., 29 La. Ann. 30; State y. Petrie, 
 25 La. Ann. 380; Com. v. Walsh, 124 
 Mass. 32; State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 
 352. Conti'a, that a selection under 
 the provisions of a repealed law is 
 void: State v. Da Rocha, 20 La. Ann. 
 350; State v. Morgan, 20 La. Ann. 442,
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CH.\LLENGES TO THE ARRAY. 31 
 
 in returning the list to the clerk of the court,' and of informali- 
 ties of the certificate of selection ; - though a total failure to re- 
 cord the list, so as to allow the public inspection of it, has been 
 held a ground of such challenge,"^ and so has a total departure 
 from the provisions of the law.^ That the selection was not 
 made by the officer appointed by the statute,^ or that it was 
 made by an officer who had never qualified,'' or by persons to 
 Mhom the proper officers assumed to delegate their functions/ 
 will sup})ort such a challenge; but the objection that it was 
 made by an officer whose term had expired, will not, since he 
 was still an officer defacto^ and the court will not, on such chal- 
 lenge, try the title to ti public office.^ That a great dispropor- 
 tion exists between the number of persons of different religious 
 beliefs on the panel,^ or that, a ricJt man being defendant, there 
 are many poor men on the })ancl,'° are not, /;er .se, grounds of 
 such challenge. Decisions arc found to the effect that a list^ 
 valid on its face, is conclusive upon a prisoner as to its regularity : " 
 and a monstrous political case resulted in establishing the doc- 
 trine in England that it will be noground of challenge to the array 
 that the list is incomplete through frcntd .^'^ But it is confidently 
 believed that the doctrine in this country is otherwise.'^ 
 
 1 State V. Gut, 13 Minn. 341. La. Ann. 423. So, under the old law, 
 
 - Carter u. State, 5<! Ga. 403; Brink- it was no ground of challense that the 
 
 ley V. State, 54 Ga. 371. See also Gar- array was made by a person two days 
 
 diner v. People, a Park. C. R. (X. Y.) after he had received his discharge as 
 
 157, 198; State ^•. Clarkson, o Ala. 378. sheriff. Hoare v. Broom, Cro. Eliz. 
 
 ^ Mitchell V. Likens, 3 Blackf. 3(;!). But compare Anou., Dyer, 177. 
 
 (Ind.) 2.J8; Mitchell v. Denbo, //.. 2.5;». b. pi. (34). 
 
 ^ State V. Da Kocha, 20 La. Ann. 35(; ; » Reg. v. Mitchel, 3 Cox, C. C. 1 . 
 
 State ij. Morgan, 20 La. Ann. 442. As i" Ibid., p. 30, per Lefroy, B. 
 
 a failure to select from the assessment '' Gardiner v. People, fi Park. C. R. 
 
 roll. State v. Jenkins, 32 Kan. 477. (N. Y.) 157, 108; State v. Allen, 1 Ala. 
 
 5 Elkins V. The State, 1 Tex. App. 442; State v. Clarkson, 3 Ala. 378: 
 539. See also Shackleford v. The State v. Brooks, 9 Ala. 9. 
 
 State, 2 Tex. App. 385. 12 ijeg, v. O'Connell, 11 CI. & Fin. 
 
 6 State V. Vance, 31 La. Ann. 39s. 155; s. c. 1 Cox, C. C. 394, See also 
 ' StateD.Newhouse,29La.Ann.821. Reg. v. Fitzpatrick, Craw. & Dix 
 8 State V. McJunkin, 7 S. C. 21; (Irish), 513; Reg. t?. Conrahy, 1 Craw. 
 
 Vance v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 1(52; Car- & Dix (Irish) Cir. 50. Compare Peo- 
 peuter v. People, r.4 N. Y. 483; Dolan pie v. Jewett, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 314, 320. 
 V. People, lb. 485; State v. Ferray, 22 i3 People v. Tweed, 50 How. Pr. (N.
 
 32 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 34. Irregularities in Drawing the Panel. — In like man- 
 ner, statutory provisions respecting the drawing of the panel are 
 generally regarded as directory mercl}'/ so that irregularities 
 therein, unless plainly operating to the prejudice of the challeng- 
 ing party, form no ground for challenging the array. ^ Cases 
 are found, however, Avhere a palpable disregard of the statutory 
 provisions have been held sufficient ground for such challenge.*^ 
 Thus, if the clerk put upon the panel the names of persons, at 
 their own request, who have not been regularly drawn, the pres- 
 ence of these interlopers, called non-jurors, they not being sub- 
 ject to challenge personally, vitiates the whole panel.'* Stat- 
 utes are found which enact that only a material departure 
 from the forms prescribed for the drawing, or the intentional 
 omission of the sheriff to summon one or more of the jurors 
 
 Y.) 204; People v. Dolan, CA N. Y. 485; 
 Maffett V. Tonkius, (i N. J. L. 228. 
 
 ' Ante, § 15. 
 
 2 Rafev. State, 20 Ga. G4; State v. 
 Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 454; Friery 
 V. People, 2 Abb. App. (N. Y.) Dec. 
 215; s. c. 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 424; 54 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 319; Ferris v. People, 
 35 N. Y. 125; s. c. 31 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 140; 48 Barb. (N.Y.) 17; 1 Abb. Pr. (x. 
 s.) (N. Y.) 193; State v. Guidry, 28 La. 
 Ann. 630; Pratt v. Grappe, 12 La. 451; 
 State V. Miller, 2G La. Ann. 579; Mapes 
 V. People, 09 111. 523; Wilhelm v. Peo- 
 ple, 72 111. 468; Dotson v. The State, 
 62 Ala. 141. See also Crane v. Dy- 
 gert, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 675; Rolland v. 
 Cora., 82 Pa. St. 306, 321. Contra, 
 Jones V. State (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1851), 8 
 West. L. J. 508 ; Lindley v. Kindall, 4 
 Blackf. (Ind.) 189; Friery r. People, 
 Abb. App. (N. Y.) Dec. 215; s. c. 2 
 Keyes (N. Y.), 424; 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 319; Gardiner v. People, Park. C. R. 
 (N. Y.) 155; People v. Rogers, 13 Abb. 
 Pr. (n. s.) (N. Y.) 370; State v. 
 Squaires, 2 Nev. 227; People v. Ah 
 Chung, 54 Cal. 398; Piersou v. People, 
 
 18 Hun (N.Y.), 239; Cox v. People, 
 
 19 Hun (N. Y.), 430; Dolan v. People, 
 24 N. Y. 485; Claussen v. La Franz, 1 
 Iowa, 226, 241; State v. Seaborn, 4 
 Dev. L. (N. C.) 305. 
 
 3 .Jones V. State, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 37; Anon., 1 Bi'own (Penn.), 121 ; Baker 
 V. Steamer Milwaukee, 14 Iowa, 214; 
 Priugle V. Huse, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 432; 
 McCloskey v. The People, 5 Park. C. 
 R. (N. Y.) 308. Such persons are 
 termed non-jurors; they are mere in- 
 terlopers,, and not being subject to 
 challenge personally, their presence 
 vitiates the Avhole panel. Norman v. 
 Beaumont, Willes, 484; Abbott, C. J., 
 in Rex v. Tremaine, 7 Dowl. & Ry. 
 684, 687; s. c. 16 Eng. C. L. 318; s. c. 
 
 ,sub nom. Res v. Tremearne, 5 Barn. & 
 Cress. 254; 11 Eng. C. L. 218. 
 
 4 McCloskey v. People, 5 Park. C. 
 R. (X. Y.) 308; Norman r. Beaumont, 
 Willes, 484; Rex v. Tremaine, 7 Dowl. 
 & Ry. 684, 687; s. c. 16 Eng. C. L. 318; 
 s. c. sub nom. Rex v. Tremearne, 5 
 Barn. & Cress. 254; 11 Eng. C. L. 
 218.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES TO THE ARRAY. 33 
 
 drawn, .<liull afford ground of challenge ; i and still other statutes 
 in various terms, uphold the conclusion that irregularities or infor- 
 malities in the discharge of this duty will not ^afford ground for 
 challenging the array. ^ 
 
 § 35. Objections to the Officer who Conducts the Draw- 
 ingr. — Although the officer who conducts the drawing is re<rarded 
 for many purposes as the substitute of the sheriff at co'inmon 
 law,3 yet he has not the same power which was possessed by that 
 officer corruptly to influence the selection of the jury; and there- 
 fore challenges to the array, grounded on an objection that the 
 drawing was conducted by a different officer from the one ap- 
 pointed by law, have not the same force as such a challcno-e 
 under the old system. Plainly, it will be no objection that the 
 drawing took place by a deputy of the statutory officer, if the 
 latter was duly appointed; ' nor that an officer other than the 
 statutory officers attended and participated in it,^ nor that one 
 of the statutory officers was temporarily absent, provided no 
 names were drawn during his absence." Objections to the ;;ar- 
 hahly of the officer conducting the drawing, such as prevailed on 
 a challenge to the array at common law, have been abroo-ated by 
 statute in some of the States ; ' and in one State there Tre hold- 
 ings to the effect that the fact that the officer who served the jury 
 process, or drew and arrayed the panel, was the atlorney of the 
 
 ^Cal. Penal Code, § 1059; Comp. 730; Laws N. Y. igsi, chap 449 
 
 c^C'c ''p' '' ''t" '"^" '''"'' ''"'' ^' ''-' '^^•-^- c-1^' ^'--- 1^'---. -'t. 62^: 
 
 Code Cr. Proc, § 227; Miller, R. C. 3 Gardner r. Turner, 9 Johns (N 
 
 Iowa, 1880, §§ 27G4, 4400; Stat, at Y.) 360; Jones v. State, 3 Blackf' 
 
 Large Minn 1873, p. 1054, §221; Ark. (Ind.) 37; Mitchell ..Likens, M. 258;' 
 
 Dig. Stat. 1874. § 1902; Bullett's Ky. Mitchell v. Denbo, Id '>5<) 
 
 Codes (Crira.), p. 40, § 199. The « State v. Gav, 25 La" Ann 47'>- 
 
 grounds of challenge stated in such People v. Fuller, "2 Park C IJ rx y"^' 
 
 statutes are exclusive. State r. Ar- ](;. 
 
 nold, 12 Iowa, 479; State v. Raymond, 'a Hunt v. Mavo, 27 La. Ann. 197- 
 
 2 f; ^f 'o ^^^^'^ ^- ^ohan, 19 Kan. 28. 
 ro 1 \] ''''' P- ^'' § ^' ^'''- ' S*^t^ «• ^'-^^ta, 32 La. Ann. 103. 
 
 Code M,ss. 1880, § 1.94. See Hare v. r j,. y. Code Rem. Jus., ,.§ 1177, 
 
 S ate, 4_Ho>v. TMiss.) 189; Thomas v. 1178. See also Comp. L. Mich. 1871 
 
 &-ite, o Id. 20; King v. State, 5 Id. §§ G013, G014.
 
 34 iMPANELiNa THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 party, did not disqualify him for the diity.^ But in another 
 State it is enacted that a person interested in a suit cannot par- 
 ticijjate in tlie drawing of the panel by which it is to be tried ; ^ 
 and in still another State such a challenge has been upheld on 
 the ground that the jury commissioner who assisted in the draw- 
 ing was ix first cousin to the challenging party. '^ 
 
 § 36. Ill the Case of Special or Struck Jviries. — It seems 
 that " unindifferency " in the officer by whom a special or struck 
 jury has been nominated is no ground for challenging the array,* 
 though fraud in the preparation of the list from which such a 
 jury is struck will be.^ 
 
 § 37. Time of Conducting the Drawing. — Statutory pro- 
 visions prescribing the time of conducting the drawing are gen- 
 erally treated as directory,^ and it has been held no ground of 
 challenging the array that the drawing took place a greaterlengih. 
 of time ^ prior to the session of the court than that prescribed ; 
 but otherwise where it took place within a shorter period of 
 time,^ the object of the statute being to aiford parties an oppor- 
 tunity for the inspection of the list.^ 
 
 § 38. Irregularities in Summoning the Panel. — From what 
 has preceded, ^"^ the conclusion follows that irregularities in the 
 
 1 Miles V. Pulver, 3 Deu. (N. Y.) jury, that it was returned by the sher- 
 84; Wakeman v. Sprague, 7 Cow. (N. iff's deputy, who had not taken the 
 Y.) 720. oath of office. Denn v. Evall, 1 N. J. 
 
 2 2 Ind. Stat. 1876, p. 29, § 1. L. 283. In New York it has been held 
 
 3 State V. McQuaige, 5 So. Car. 429. that the statutory mode of obtaining 
 * Eex V. Edmunds, 4 Barn. & Aid. a special jury must be strictly pur- 
 
 471. See also Rex 'y. Despard, 2 Man. sued. People v. Tweed, 50 How. Pr. 
 
 & Eyl. 40Gr Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. (N. Y.) 2(J2, 2G3. 
 
 351; Rex v. Johnson, 2 Str. 1000; Rex ^ Wilson v. State Bank, 3 La. Ann. 
 
 V. Burridge, 1 Str. 593; s. c. 2 Ld. 196, 198; State v. Pitts, 58 Mo. 556; 
 
 Raym. 125. See Thomp. & Mer. Jur., State v. Knight, 61 Mo. 373. 
 
 § 144, subsec. 2. ' Crane v. Dygert, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 5 Maffett V. Tonkins, 6 N. J. L. 224. 675. But see State v. Hascall, 6 N. 
 
 In New Jersey, where the sheriff exer- H. 352, 360. 
 
 cises powers in respect of juries analo- * Powell v. People, 5 Hun (N. Y.), 
 
 gous to those possessed at common 69. 
 
 law, it has been held a good ground ^ Ante, § 16. 
 
 for challenging the array of a special ^'^ Ante, § 19.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES TO THE ARRAY. 35 
 
 procedure by Avliich tlie panel, selected and drawn, are brought 
 into court, afford no ground for challenging the array; ^ and ob- 
 jections to particular persons summoned are not properly taken 
 by challenge to the array, but by challenge to ihe polls? 
 
 § 39. Resummoning 3Iembers of Quashed Panel. — The 
 
 inutility of challenging the array on the ground of irregularities 
 merely, is illustrated by a class of cases which hold that, where 
 such a challenge is sustained and a special venire facias issues 
 for Avant of jurors, the sheriff may resummon the members of 
 the quashed panel, ^ unless it has been quashed by reason of 
 fraud.* 
 
 § 40. Kinds of Challenges to the Polls. — It will serve no 
 use to refer to the confusing divisions and subdivisions of chal- 
 lenges to the polls at common law.^ All such challenges fall 
 into two classes: 1. Peremptory challenges, — that is, chal- 
 lenges for which no reason need be o-iven. 2. Challenffes for 
 disqualitication, — that is, challenges for which a legal reason 
 must be given. The latter obviously again fall into two subdi- 
 visions: 1. Challenges grounded upon general disqualification. 
 2. Challenges grounded upon disqualification in respect of 
 the particular case. By a common-law classification, challenges 
 
 1 Hartt7. Tallmadge, 3 Day (S. C), <;0 Ala. 1; Baker v. Harris, 1 Winst. 
 381; Rex v. Eclmuiuls, 4 Barn. & Aid. (N. C.) 277. 
 
 471, 489. See also Rex f. Himt, 4 ^ Caperton r. Nickel, 4 W. Va. 137; 
 
 Bam. & Aid. 430; People v. McGeery, State v. Degonia, 09 Mo. 485; State v. 
 
 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) G53., As a niisde- Owen, Phill. L. 425; State u. McCurry, 
 
 scription in the ventre /acias by which GS N. C. 33; Smith v. State, 4 Neb. 
 
 the act is called "civil" instead of 277. But see Combs v. Slaughter, 
 
 "criminal:" State v. Nerbovig, 33 Hard, (Ky.) C2. It has been held that, 
 
 Minn. 480. Compare under the stat- upon process directed to the coi'oner, 
 
 nte of California: People v. Coyodo, that officer can suramon-the same panel. 
 
 40 Cal. 580; People v. Welch, 49 Payne v. McLean, 1 Up. Can. K. B. 
 
 Cal. 174; People v. Rodriguez, 10 Cal. (o. s.) 444. Compare Norbury u. Ken- 
 
 50. nedy, 3 Crawf. & Dix (Ir.), Cir. 
 
 2 Mitchell V. State, 43 Tex. 517; 124. 
 
 Gray v. State, 55 Ala. 86; Hall v. State, ^ Kell v. Brilliuger, 84 Pa. St. 276. 
 
 40 Ala. 698. See also Hayes v. Reg., = See Thorap. & Mer. Jur., §§ 152, 
 
 10 Ii'ish L. 53; Commander v. State, 153.
 
 30 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 for cause "were divided into challenges for jr;7'inc2paZ cause^ 
 and challenges to the favor. The chief importance of this dis- 
 tinction lay in the fact that the former were tried by the couri, 
 .whose decision was revieivahle on error, while the latter were 
 tried by triors^ whose decision was conclusive} With the aboli- 
 tion of triors, the distinction has become unimportant,, though 
 still to some extent kept up. 
 
 Article II. — Peremptory Challenges. 
 Section' 
 
 42. In what Cases Allowed. 
 
 43. Nature of this Right. 
 
 44. Number of such Challenges. 
 
 45. Number in Cases of Persons Jointly Indicted. 
 
 4G. [Continued.] In Case of Several Parties Plaintiffs or Defendants In 
 a Civil Action. 
 
 47. Power of Legislature to Increase or Diminish Number. 
 
 48. Canons of Construction Touching the Number of Challenges. 
 tO. Eight of Prosecution to Stand Jurors Aside. 
 
 § 42. Ill what Cases Allowed. — According to early writers, 
 peremptory challenges were allowed in capital felonies only, in 
 favorem vitae? This statement was not far out of the way, in 
 early times; since all felonies, though strictly punishable hj for- 
 feiture, were generally also punished by death? But, as non- 
 capital felonies were created and multiplied, the statements of 
 these writers became misleading, and they in fact misled manj 
 American courts into the conclusion that the right of peremptory 
 challenge existed only in the case of capital felonies.'^ It was 
 
 1 Pos^, § 89. W. 2 ; Finch Law, Bk. 4, c. 36, p. 
 
 2 Co. Litt. 15(5. b.; 2 Hawk. P. C. 414. 
 
 570, B. 2, c. 43, § 5; 2 Hale P. C. 2G7; ^ 4 Bla. Com. 98. 
 
 4 Bl. Com. 353; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 535; * See United States v. Hand, 3 
 
 Trials per Pais (1725), 455; Bac. Abr. Phila. 403; United States v. Cotting- 
 
 Juries E. 2; 7Md., 9; Doctor & Stu- ham, 2 Blatch. (U. S.) 470; United 
 
 dent, 29. See comments upon the States v. Carrigo, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 foregoing by Lord Chief Baron Pollock S.) 49; United States v. McPherson, 1 
 
 in Reg. ». Gray, 11 CI. & Fin. 427, 479; Cranch C.C. (U.S.) 517; United 
 
 Reading's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 264. States v. Toms, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 See also Com. Dig. Challenge, c. 1; 607; United States v. Smithers, 2 
 
 Ihid., Indictment M. ; Ihid.^ Justices Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 38; United States
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 37 
 
 long tlie practice in England, though not in" Ireland,^ to admit 
 this right in trials for felonies which were not capital; but tinally 
 it was settled in 1843 by the House of Lords, in a ease arising 
 in Ireland, that it was a right incidental to all felonies, whether 
 capital or not, both in England and in Ireland.- Such challenges 
 are now aUowed by statute in all American jurisdictions in all 
 cases of felony, whether capital or not; and in most American 
 jurisdictions in cases of misdemeanor, and in some in civil cases.^ 
 
 § 43. Nature of this Right. — It is a fundamental principle 
 that the right of peremptory chaUenge is a right to reject and not 
 a right to select.^ Therefore, a party cannot, in general, com- 
 plain that the court has excused jurors without cause,^ or sus- 
 tained untenable challenges of the other party, thus driving the 
 objecting party to exhaust his peremptory challenges upon othei' 
 members of the panel, or upon s[)ecial venire-men or talesmen. 
 The practice of allowing the crown to stand jurors aside^ was 
 supported by the same conception, — the idea being that, so long 
 as the prisoner enjoyed the full number of peremptory challenges 
 allowed him by law, he was not prejudiced. This w'as illusory; 
 since the sheriff had the power of arraying the panel in such 
 order as suited his discretion, so that, by placing at its head 
 
 ». Johns, 4: DaU. (U. S.) 412; United Fisher, 9 Exch. 472. The plaintiff in 
 States V. Black, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) a civil action cannot peremptorily 
 195 ; United States v. Krouse, 2 Cranch challenge a juror drawn to fill the place 
 C. C. (U. S.) 252; United States v. of one removed for cause. Huff v. 
 White, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 73; Walkius, 15 S. C. 82; Guntery. Granite- 
 United States V. Randall, 1 Deady (U. ville Man. Co., Id. 443. 
 S.), 524; Shuster v. Com., 38 Pa. St. •* United States v. Marchant, 4 Ma- 
 20G. son (U. S.), 158; .s. c. 12 Wheat. (U. 
 
 1 Rex V. Phelan, and Rex v. Whelan, S.) 480; State v. Wise, 7 Rich. L, 412; 
 1 Craw. & Dix C. C. 189, and note; State v. Cazeau, 8 La. Ann. 109; State 
 Eex V. Adams, Jebb C. C. 135, and u. Cardoza, 11 So. Car. 195, 249; Maton 
 other unreported cases cited in G Irish v. People, 15 111. 53(5, 539; Cruce v. 
 C. L. 281, 288. State, 59 Ga. 83, 90; State v. Smith, 2 
 
 2 Gray v. Reg., 11 CI. & Fin. 427; Ired. L. 402; State v. Arthur, 2 Dev. 
 reversing Reg. v. Gray, Ir. C. L. 482. 217; Turpin v. State (Sup. Ct. Md., 
 
 3 In recent times they have been Oct. 1880), 2 Crim. L. Mag. 532; Hes- 
 allowed in cases of misdemeanor and kew v. State, 17 Tex. App. IGl. 
 
 in civil cases in England, though as a ^ Ante, § 10; post,'^ 102. 
 
 matter of (/race merely. Creed v. ^ Post, § 49.
 
 38 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 thirty-five persons publicly known to be obnoxious to the accused 
 he could drive him to exhaust his peremptory challenges against 
 these, after which he would be completely at the mercy of the 
 crown. Moreover, this right of peremptory challenge is confined 
 to the tnain issue,^ and does not extend to the trial of collateral 
 issues, such as the issue of identity,'^ or insanity;^ though, where 
 it exists in civil cases by statute, the defendant may exercise it 
 upon jurors impaneled to execute a writ of inquiry.^ Finally, 
 this right does not exist in the case of special or str'uck juries, for 
 the right of striking takes the place of it.^ 
 
 § 44. Number of such Challenges. — At common law, the 
 number of such challenges allowed to the accused was thirty-five, 
 that is, one short of three complete juries.^ If he challenged a 
 greater number than that allow^ed, the barbarism of that law 
 pronounced death in cases of treason, and, in case of felony or 
 petit treason, subjected him to peine forte et dure, that is, press- 
 ing to death, '^ though sometimes he was mercifully hanged.^ In 
 
 1 2 Hale, P. C. 267; Bac. Abr. Juries 
 E. 9; Foster Cr. L. 42; 4 Bl. Cora. 
 353, 396; Co. Litt. 156. b. ; Rex v. Eat- 
 cliffe, 1 W. Bl. 3, 6; s. c. 18 How. St. 
 Tr. 429 ; Eex v. Okey, 1 Leviuz, 61 : s. c. 
 Sid. 72; Sir J. Kelyug, 13; 1 Keble, 
 244 ; Reg. v. Key, Temple & Mew, 623. 
 
 - Res V. Oakey, 1 Levinz, 61; s. c. 
 Sid. 72; Sir J. Kelyug, 13; 1 Keble, 244 
 (case of Regicides) . See also Res v. 
 Ratcliffe, 1 W. Bl. 3; s. c. IS How. St. 
 Tr. 429. 
 
 ^ Freeman I?. People, 4 Deuio(N. Y.), 
 1, 22. 
 
 4 Opothle-Yoholo v. Mitchell, 2 
 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 125. 
 
 5 Schweuk v. Umsted, 6 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 351; Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Farr, 
 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 362; Blauchard v. 
 Brown, 1 Wallace Jr. (U. S.), 309; 
 State v. Moore, 28 Ohio St. 595; 
 O'Byrne v. State, 29 Ga. 36; Cleveland, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Stanley, 7 Ohio St. 155. 
 But see McDermottu. Hoffman, 7(1 Pa. 
 
 St. 31. And where less than twelve 
 of the special jurors appeared, and 
 the jury was completed by talesmen, 
 peremptory challenges were allowed. 
 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Stanley, supra. 
 For this reason a struck jury was . 
 never granted at common law for the 
 trial at bar of a capital case (Far- 
 riugton's Case, Sir T. Jones, 222), 
 since this would deprive the prisoner 
 of his challenges. Res v. Duucombe, 
 12 Mod. 224. 
 
 6 Co. Litt. 156. b; 2 Hawk. P. C, 
 chap. 43, § 7 ; 2 Hale P. C. 268 ; Trials 
 per Pais (1725), 455. 
 
 " 2 Hale P. C. 268. 
 
 8 Kel. 36. It is inconceivable that 
 this should have been regarded as a 
 matter of importance, since the court 
 clearly had the right to proceed in 
 disregard of such escessive challeng- 
 ing. State V. Gainer, 2 Hayw. (N. 
 C.) 140; Funk v. Ely, 45 Pa. St. 444.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
 
 39 
 
 criminal cases the number allowed to the State and to the 
 accused is regulated by statute in every American jurisdic- 
 tion/ and can seldom be the subject of doubt except in the 
 case of two or more persons jointly indicted. In civil cases 
 the number Is variously fixed at (wo,^ three, '^ four^ and 
 
 1 Code Ala. 187G, §§ 4879, 4880; 
 Ark. Dig. 1874, §§ li)12, 1913; Cal. 
 Peual Code, § 1070; People v. Clough, 
 59 Cal. 428; People v. Harris, Gl 
 Cal. 13(i; People v. O'Neil, 61 Cal, 
 435; Laws Colo. 1877, § 873; G. S. 
 Coun. 1875, p. 538, § 6; State v. 
 Neuner, 49 Conn. 232; Sess, Laws 
 Conu. 1879, p. 303; Laws Del. 1874, 
 chap. 133, § 10; Bush's Dig. Fla., p. 
 444, § 34; Code Ga. 1873, § 4643; R. 
 S. 111. 1880, chap. 38, § 432; 2 Ind. 
 Rev. 1876, p. 893, §§ 81 and 82; Mil- 
 ler's R. C. Iowa, 1880, § 4413; Comp. 
 L. Kau. 1879, §§ 4690 and 4691 ; Bul- 
 litt's Cr. Code, p. 41, §§ 203, 204; R. 
 S. La. 1876, §§ 997, 998; La. Act of 
 1880, No. 35; State v. Everage, 33 La. 
 Ann. 120; State v. Deraouchet (La.), 3 
 S. W. Rep. 565; R. S. Me. 1871, chap. 
 134, § 12; R. C. Md. 1878, p. 563, § 18; 
 G. S. Mass. 1860, chap. 172, § 4; Acts 
 of 1875, chap. 167, § 1; R. C. Miss. 
 1880, § 3076; R. S. Mo. 1879, §§ 1900, 
 1902; Comp. L. Mich. 1871, § 7951; 
 Stat, at Large, Minn. 1873, p. 1055; 
 § 231; G. S. Neb., p. 826, § 467; Comp. 
 L. Nev. 1873, § 1960; Gen. Stat. N. H. 
 1867, p. 493, §§ 8 and 9; Rev. N. J. 
 1877, p. 280, § 71; p. 530, § 40; p. 531, 
 § 41; Rev. Stat. N. Y. (6th ed.), p. 
 1029, § 9 ef seq.; N. Y. Code Cr. Proc. 
 (chap. 442, Laws of 1881), § 370; Bat- 
 tle's Rev. N. C, p. 338, § 77; R. S. 
 Ohio, 1880, §§ 7272, 7274, 7277; Gen. 
 Laws Ore. 1872 (Cr. Code), § 155; 1 
 Bright. Purd. (Pa.) Dig. §§ 39 and 40; 
 Gen. Stat. R. I. 1872, p. 434, § 34; R. 
 S. So. Car. 1873, p. ?47, § 2; Stat. 
 Tenn. 1871, §§ 4013, 4014; R. S. Tex. 
 1879 (Code Cr. Proc), arts. 635 and 
 
 652; R. L. Vt. 1880, §§ 1653, 1654; 
 Code Va. 1873, p. 1246, §§ 7 and 9; 
 Rev. Stat. W. Va. 1879, chap. 65, §§ 3 
 and 4; R. S. Wis. 1878, § 4690. Federal 
 Courts: Rev. Stat. U. S., § 819. Con- 
 strued in United States v. Copper- 
 smith, 4 Fed. Rep. 198. Cases 
 removed from State courts are gov- 
 erned by the Federal, and not by the 
 State statute. State v. O'Grady, 3 
 Woods (U. S.),496. Construction of 
 former Federal statutes: Thomp. & 
 Mer. Jur., § 164; United States v. 
 Shackleford, 18 How. (U. S.) 588; 
 United States r. Reed, 2 Blatclif. (U. 
 S.) 435; United States v. Cottingham, 
 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 470; United States v. 
 Tallmau, 10 Blatclif . (U. S.) 21; United 
 States V. Devlin, 6 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 71; s. c. 7 Int. Rev. Rec. 94. 
 
 2 R. S. Me. 1871, chap. 82, § 66; 
 Comp. L. Mich. 1871, § 6027; Supp. to 
 G. S. Mass., Acts of 1862, chap. 84, 
 § 1; G. S. Vt. App, 1870, p. 1031, No. 
 39; R. S. So. Car. 1873, p. 523, § 26; 
 Gen. Stat. N. H.,chap. 212, § 10; R. 
 S, Ohio, 1880, § 5177; N. Y. Code Rem. 
 Jus., § 1176; Stat. Tenn. 1871, § 4012; 
 G. S. Conu. 1875, title 19, chap. 10, 
 § 16. 
 
 3 Rev. N. J. 1877, p. 530, § 40; R. 
 S. 111. 1880, chap. 110, § 49; Laws 
 Minn. 1878, chap. 21, § 1; Comp. L. 
 Kan. 1879, § 3799; R. S. Wis. 1878, 
 § 2851 ; Bush Dig. Fla., chap. 104, § 33; 
 Gen. Laws Ore. 1872 (Civil Code), 
 § 187; R. S. Del. 1874, chap. 109, § 19; 
 Ark. Dig., Stat. 1874, § 3702; R. S. 
 Laws New Mexico, 1880, chap. G8, 
 § 18; Comp. L. Utah', 1876, § 1771. 
 
 * Code Ala. 1876, § 3016; Cal. Code
 
 40 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 Jive^ and in one jurisdiction at one-fourth of the jurors sum- 
 moned.^ 
 
 § 45. Number in Cases of Persons Jointly Indicted. — 
 
 Though formerly doubted,-^ it is now generally settled^ that, 
 where several persons are jointly indicted, they must join in their 
 challeno-es, and cannot claim for each the number accorded 
 by the common law or by statute, except in cases where the stat- 
 ute accords them this right, which it does in some jurisdictions,^ 
 either in express terms or by reasonable interpretation.^ Many 
 statutes, on the other hand, expressly require that defendants 
 jointly indicted shall join in their challenges; ^ and it would 
 
 Civ. Proc, § 601; Rev. Stat. W. Va., 
 chap. lO'J, § 23; Civil Code Prac. La., 
 art. 512; Battle's Rev. N. C, p. 8G1, 
 § 229t(; 1 Bright. Purd. (Penu.) Dig., p. 
 837, § 72; R. C. Miss. 1880, § 1708; 
 Comp. L. Nev. 1873, § 1224; Colo. 
 Civil Code, § IGl. 
 
 1 Miller's R. C. Iowa, 1880, § 2771. 
 
 2 G. S. Ky. 1879, p. 572, § 12. 
 
 3 2 Hale, P. C. 2G3; 1 Cliitty C. L. 
 535. 
 
 < United States v. Marchant, 4 Ma- 
 sou (U. S.) 158; s. c. affirmed, 12 
 Wheat. (U. S.) 480; United States v. 
 Wilson, Baldw. C. C. (U. S.) 81; 
 Hawkins v. State, 9 Ala. 137; Bixbe v. 
 State, (J Oh. 86 ; State v. Wise, 7 Rich. 
 L. (S. C.) 412; Hillw. State, 2 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 24G; Matou u. People, 15 111. 
 53C; State v. McGrew, 13 Rich. L. (S 
 C.) 31G; United States v. Gibert, 2 
 Sumn. 19; United States v. Kelly, 4 
 Wash. C. C. 528; State v. Soper, 16 
 Me. 293; State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78; 
 State V. Smith, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 402; 
 State V. Stoughton, 51 Vt. 362; s. c. 
 8 Reporter, 762; People v. Loughlin, 
 3 Utah, 133. 
 
 5 R. S. Oh. 1880, § 7281; G. S. Neb. 
 1873, p. 827, § 470; 1 Bright. Purd. Pa. 
 Dig., p. 384, § 43; Battle's Rev. N. C, 
 
 p. 338, § 77; R. S. Wis. 1878, § 4689- 
 In Texas persons jointly indicted are 
 entitled to challenge separately, but not 
 to the same number as is allowed to a 
 single defendaut. R. S. Tex. 1879 
 (Code Crim. Proc), Art. 635, 652. 
 
 ^ United States v. Marchant, 4 Ma- 
 son (U. S.), 158; s.c. 12 Wheat. (U. 
 S.) 480; United States v. Johns, 4 
 Dall. (U. S.) 412; Hill v. State, 2 
 Yerg. (Tenn.) 246; Hawkins v. State, 
 9 Ala. 137 ; Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 
 107; United States v. Haskell, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. (Va.) 412, n; Bixbe v. State, 6 
 Oh. 86; Maton v. People, 15 111. 536; 
 State V. McLean, 11 La. Ann. 54G; 
 State V. Reed, 47 N. H. 466; Cruce v. 
 State, 59 Ga. 83; State v. Stoughtou, 
 51 Vt. 3i;2; s. c. 8 Reporter, 762; 
 Smith V. State, 57 Miss. 822; State v. 
 Durien, 29 Kan. 688. Compare State 
 V. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443. 
 
 7 Rev. Stat. U. S., § 819; R. S. Mo. 
 1879, § 1902; Comp. L. Nev. 1873, 
 § 1944; R. C. Miss. 1880, § 3070; Stat, 
 at Large, Minn. 1863, p. 1054, § 219; 
 Gen. Laws Ore. 1872 (Cr. Code), 
 § 154; Code Va. 1873, p. 1247, § 14; Bul- 
 litt's Ky. Cr. Code, p. 40, § 198; Cal. 
 Penal Code, § 1056; Ark. Dig. Stat. 
 1874, § 1920: R. S. Del. 1874, cliap. 133,
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. .41 
 
 seem tluit, where the question i.s not governed by statute, if, in 
 the judgment of the court, good cause exists for trying the de- 
 fendants severally, the court may order a severance, although 
 they may prefer to be tried jointly.^ By some statutes the right 
 of election is given them, either to be tried separately or jointly. - 
 Although the defendants, so jointly indicted, may severally be 
 permitted the statutory number of challenges, this does not in- 
 crease the number allowed to the State beyond the number 
 allowed to it in the case of a single defendant.^ The prosecu- 
 tion cannot complain of this, since it is a matter of its own 
 choice to proceed against the defendants jointly, when it might 
 have proceeded against them severally.^ It should be addotl that 
 whatever view is taken of this question, it has been usual, and it 
 is hence proper, to allow them to elect to be tried jointly and 
 hence to join in their challenges, or to be tried separately.^ 
 
 § 46. [Continued.] In Case of Several Parties Plaintiffs or 
 Defendants in a Civil Action. — Where several persons are 
 joined as plaintiffs or defendants in a civil action, the general 
 
 §16; Laws Utah, 1878 (Code Cr. which may be exercised by each of the 
 
 Proc), § 225; Rev. Stat. W. Va. 1879, joiut defendauts. li. S. Tex. 1879 
 
 chap. 55, §8: Corap. L. Ariz., p. 1077, (Code Cr. Proc), arts. G35, G52. So 
 
 chap. 11, § 300. in Louisiana: La. Acts 1878, No. 24; 
 
 1 Stewart v. State, 58 Ga. 577. See State r. Green, 33 La. Ann. U08. 
 Cruce V. State, .VJ Ga. 83, SS. In tlie * Wiggins u. State, 1 Lea (Tenu.), 
 earlier case of Hawkins v. State, 13 738. 
 
 Ga. 322, it was lield that, where the ^ i chitty Cr. L. 535; Charnock's 
 
 evidence was of such a nature that the Case, 3 Salk, 81; s. c. Holt, 133; 12 
 
 acquittal of one would be the acquittal How'. St. Tr. 1378; Swan and Jeffrey's 
 
 of both, they might be required to Case, Foster Cr. L. 104, 106; Grahme's 
 
 join in their challenges. Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 673; State v. 
 
 2 People V. :McCalla, 8 Cal. 301; Monaquo, T. U. P. Cliarlt. (Ga.) 22; 
 Caldwell i'. State, 34 Ga. 10; Horno People r. McCalla, 8 Cal. 301 ; State v. 
 V. State, .37 Ga. 80; R. S. Oh. 1880, Yancey, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 306; Com. v. 
 § 7271; Rev. Stat. W. Va. 1879, chap. .Tames, 99 Mass. 438; United States v. 
 55, § 8. Collyer, Wliart. on llom. App. 489. 
 
 3 Mahan V. State, 10 Oh. 232; Sav- In one okl case It was held that they 
 age V. State, 18 Fla. 909; State v. could not insist on separate trials. 
 Earle, 24 La. Ann. 38; State u. Gay, Noble's Case, 15 How. St. Tr. 731, 746. 
 25 La. Ann. 472. The statute of Compare People v. Howell, 4 .Johns. 
 Texas allows the State o«e-half the (X. Y.) 296, and United States i'. Sharp, 
 number of peremptory challenges 1 Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 118.
 
 42 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 rule, arising upon the express terms or the reasonable interpre- 
 tation of statutes, is, that the number of peremptory challenges 
 is restricted to each aggregate party considered as a unit, — that 
 is to say, all the j^arties plaintiff or defendant must join in their 
 challenges.^ But in one jurisdiction, this rule is restricted, in 
 the case of defendants, to instances where they plead jointly ^"^ 
 and where they plead separately by different counsel, they are 
 allowed to challenge separately, on the theory that, if the right 
 of challenge could not be exercised without agreement among 
 the parties on either side, it might be lost altogether.^ But this 
 conception would seem not to apply to parties plaintiff, since 
 they generally join as such by their voluntary action. 
 
 § 47. Power of Legislature to Increase or Diminish Num- 
 ber. — Statutes increasing or diminishing the number of chal- 
 lenges allowed by the common law, do not infringe the provision 
 of American constitutions that " the right of trial by jury shall 
 remain inviolate;" * and there is much authority for the conclu- 
 sion that this may be done by a statute enacted after the com- 
 
 1 Schmidt v. Chicago &c. R. Co., before it cau be made, "unless the 
 
 83 111. 405. To the same effect, see, court otherwise order or direct." 
 
 Snodgrass v. Huut, 15 lud. 274; So- §1224. See also Comp. L. Utah, 1876, 
 
 dousky V. McGee, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) § 1387. 
 
 267, 2G9; Stone v. Segur, 11 Allen 2 gtroh i7. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490. 
 
 (Mass.), 5GS; Bryan v. Harrison, 76 ^ g^^ Frazer v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 
 
 N. C. 360; State v. Reed, 47 N. H. 466; 206. 
 
 Blackburn r. Hays, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) * AYalter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147, 
 
 227. The statutes of the United States 159. See also Jones v. State, 1 Ga. 
 
 and of many of the States expressly 610; Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 618; Com. v. 
 
 require the parties plaintiff or defend- Walsh, 124 Mass. 32; State r. Wilson, 
 
 ant in a civil case to join in making 48 N. H. 398; State ?;. Pike, 49 N. H. 
 
 their peremptory challenges. Rev. 406; Com. v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; 
 
 Stat. U. S., § 819; Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879, Hartzell v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 462; War- 
 
 § 2795; Gen. Laws Ore. 1872 (Civil ren i'. Com., 37 Pa. St. 45; Mountfort 
 
 Code), § 187; Miller's Rev. Code Iowa, v. Hall, 1 Mass. 443; Hudgins v. State, 
 
 1880, §§ 2763, 4399; Stat, at Large, 2 Ga. 173; State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 
 
 Minn. 1873, p. 812, § 153; Gen. Laws 39, 49; Cregier u. Buuton, 2 Strob. 
 
 NewMexico, 1880, chap. 68, § 19. The L. (S. C.) 487; Dowliug v. State, 5 
 
 Compiled Laws of Nevada provide Sra. & M. (Miss.) 664; State u. Ryan, 
 
 that the several persons plaintiffs or 13 Minn. 370; Stokes v. People, 53 N. 
 
 defendants must join in a challenge Y. 164; State ?'. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518.
 
 Tit. 1, Cb. III.] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
 
 43 
 
 mission of the offense for which the prisoner is brought to trial, 
 without infringing his constitutional rights.^ 
 
 § 4S. Canons of Construction touching tlie Xumber of 
 Challenges. — Construing these statutes, it is a settled principle, 
 in determining the number of peremptory challenges to which 
 the parties are entitled, to consider the extent of the punishment 
 to which the prisoner may be subjected, and not the punishment 
 which actually ivas assessed,"^ and to disregard the fact that the 
 offense charged against him is one for which the court may im- 
 pose a shorter term of imprisonment,^ unless the prosecuting at- 
 torney announces that he will ask merely for a conviction for a 
 loiver grade of the crime.* In determining whether the action is 
 a civil or criminal action within the meaning of such statutes, 
 regard is generally had to its /or»i. If it proceeds by indict- 
 ment or information for a public offense, it is a criminal action; 
 if in any other mode, it is a civil action.*^ This is not, however, 
 an unvarying test; for we find that it has been held that a bas- 
 tardy proceeding, prosecuted l)y the State by information, is a 
 civil suit; ^ and so is a coftiplaint under a statute for a, forcible 
 entry and detainer,"' and an action prosecuted for the violation 
 of a municipal ordinance ii'i selling intoxicating liquors ; ^ while 
 another court has taken the view that a proceeding in rem by 
 the State against certain intoxicating liquors 'kept and sold con- 
 trary to law, to procure their forfeiture under a statute, is crim- 
 inal in its nature.* The offense of jyrosecnting false claims 
 
 1 State V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518; Wal- 
 ston V. Com., 1(5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 15; 
 State V. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370. Compare 
 Dowling V. State, 5 Sraed. & M. 
 (Miss.) 6(54; Rafe v. State, 20 Ga. GO; 
 Jesse V. State, 20 Ga. 156; Beers v. 
 Beers, 4 Conu. 535, 539; Colt v. Eves, 
 12 Conu. 243; Re Peuu. Hall, 5 Pa. St. 
 204, 208; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 
 164. 
 
 2 Fowler v. State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 573. 
 
 3 Dull V. People, 4 Deuio (N. Y.) , 91. 
 
 * People V. Comstock, 55 Mich. 405. 
 
 5 See State v. Pate, Bush. (N. C.) 
 244. 
 
 6 Ibid ; Dorgan v. State, 72 Ala. 
 173: Kremliug v. Lallmau, 16 Neb. 
 280. 
 
 7 Quinebaug Bank v. Tarbox, 20 
 Conn. 510; Miuer v. Brown, 20 Conu. 
 519. 
 
 8 Kleinback v. State, 2 Speers L. 
 (S. C.) 418. 
 
 9 Com. V. Certain Intoxicating 
 Liquors, 107 Mass. 216.
 
 44 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ao"ainst the government/ or of counterfeiting,'^ is not 2i felony, 
 within the meaning of § 819 of Rev. Stat. U. S., and therefore 
 the accused is not entitled to more than tliree peremptory chal- 
 lensres. The fact that the indictment contains two counts, stating 
 ^ similar offenses separately, does not increase the number of the 
 defendant's peremptory challenges.^ 
 
 § 49. Rigbt of Prosecution to stand Jurors aside. — Orig- 
 inally the crown had an unlimited right of peremptory challenge.* 
 This was remedied by statute o3 Edw. I., Stat. 4, called the " Or- 
 dinance for Inquests," which restricted the right of the crown to 
 challenges for cause shown. ^ It applied to all causes, civil and 
 criminal; and, as it was found in practice to put the crown at a 
 disadvantage, it was evaded by thetiction of allowing the crown's 
 counsel to direct successive jurors to stand aside, w'ithout showing 
 any cause against them„ until the whole panel had been gone 
 over; after which, in case of a deficiency, the crown was obliged 
 to show cause in respect of such members.^ As the court had 
 
 1 United States u. Daubncr, 17 Fed. 
 Rep. 793. 
 
 2 United States v. Coppersmitli, 2 
 Flip. (U. S.) 546. In a case of murder 
 in Maine, the State is entitled to five: 
 State V. Chadboui-ue, 74 Me. 506. No 
 right to challenge talesmen supplied in 
 place of jurors challenged, under Gen. 
 St. S. C. 523: Burckhalter v. Coward, 
 16 S. C. 435. 
 
 3' Smith V. State, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 
 386; State 17. Skinner, 34 Kan. 256. 
 
 4 1 Chitty Cr. L. 533. 
 
 5 The following is the text of the 
 statute: " Of inqiiests to be taken be- 
 fore any of the justices, and wherein 
 our lord the King is party, howsoever 
 it be, it is agreed and ordained by the 
 King and all his council, that from 
 henceforth, notv.ithstanding it be al- 
 leged, by them that sue for the King, 
 that the jurors of those inquests, or 
 some of them, be not indifferent for 
 the King, yet such inquests shall not 
 
 remain untaken for that cause ; but if 
 they that sue for the King will chal- 
 lenge any of those jui-ors, they shall 
 assign of their challenge a cause cer- 
 tain, and the truth of the same claal- 
 leuge sliall be inquired of according to 
 the custom of the court." This statute 
 was te-enacted in 6 Geo. IV., c. 50, 
 § 29. See Reg. v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 
 137. It was ruled in a nisi prius case 
 sliortly after the passage of this last 
 act, that the crown must show cause 
 upon making the cliallenge. See Saw- 
 don's Case, 2 Lewin C. C. 117. Such, 
 however, is not the law. The later 
 statute made no change in the rule. 
 Mansell v. Reg., 8 El. & Bl. 54; Rex v. 
 Parry, 8 Car. & P. 836. 
 
 6 Staunford P. C. 162, b. ; 2 Hawk. 
 P. C, chup. 43, § 3; 2 Hale P. C. 271; 
 1 Chitty Cr. L. 534; Bac. Abr. Juries 
 E. 10; 4 Bl. Com. 353; Fitzliarris' 
 Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 436 ; Count Con- 
 igsmark's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 12:
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
 
 45 
 
 the power of directing the sheriff to suininon any number of 
 jurors in its discretion, this power of standing them aside phiced 
 the prisoner, where the court was disposed to side with the crown, 
 at an enormous disadvantaji^e. Nevertheless, the iiractice, thouo-h 
 often and ably challenged, has apparently stood in Eno-land to 
 the present time;^ was adopted in this countr}^ together with 
 the ancient statute of Edward on which it was founded, ^ and has 
 
 Stapletou's Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 503; 
 Lord Grey\s Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 128; 
 s.c. Skill. 82; Cook's Case, 13 How. St. 
 Tr. 318; Cowper's Case, 13 How. St. 
 Tr. 1108; Layer's Case, 16 How. St. 
 Tr. 13.j; Brandreth's Case, 32 How. 
 St. Tr. 755, 772; Reg. v. Geach, 9 Car. 
 & P. 4'J9 ; Reg. v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 
 129; Mansell r. Keg., 8 EL &. Bl. 54; 
 Reg. V. Dougall, 18 Low. Can. Jur. Ho. 
 The panel liaving been gone over and 
 a jury not procured, the proper prac- 
 tice was to call over the whole of the 
 panel in the same order as before, 
 omitting tliose who had previously 
 been challenged by the prisoner, and, 
 as each juror appeared, for the prose- 
 cuting counsel to state the crown's 
 cause of challenge. If this challenge 
 was not allowed, and the juror re- 
 mained unchallenged by the accused, 
 he was sworn. Reg. v. Geach, 9 Car. 
 & P. 499. The panel might be gone 
 over a second time and the same 
 jurors stood aside a second time, if 
 certain members of the panel, absent 
 when their names were first called, 
 returned in season for the second call- 
 ing. Cook's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 
 311, 317; Mansell v. Reg., 8 EI. & Bl. 
 54. In cases of misdemeanor this right 
 of standing jurors aside was exercised 
 by thii private proseaitor. Reg. v. Mc- 
 Gowen, cited in Reg. v. McCartie, 11 
 Ir. C. L. (N. s.) 188. By the Canada 
 statute (Can. Stat, 37 Vict., chap. 38, 
 § 11) this right cannot be exercised by 
 
 a private prosecutor in a criminal 
 prosecution for libel. See Reg. v. 
 Patteson, 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 129. 
 
 1 Home Tooke's Case (Anno 1794), 
 
 25 How. St. Tr. 1, 25; O'Coigly's Case, 
 
 26 How. St. Tr, 1191, 1231; Mansell v. 
 Reg., 8 El. & Bl. 54, 72; s. c. Deers & 
 B. 375, See also Reg. v. Benjamin, 
 4 Up. Can. C. P. 179; Reg. v. Fellows, 
 19 Up. Can. Q. B. 48. 
 
 - Com. V. Addis, 1 Bro. (Penn.) 285, 
 and cases cited in note; State v. Bar- 
 rontine, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 553; 
 United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 
 (U. S.) 480; United States v. Wilson, 
 Bald. C. C. (U. S.) 78, 82; Cora. v. 
 Marrow, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 402; s. c. sub 
 mm. Com. v. Marra, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 
 440; Jewell v. Com., 22 Pa. St. 94; 
 Cora. V. Jolliffe, 7 Watts (Pa.), 585; 
 State V. Arthur, 2 Dev. (N, C) 217; 
 State V. Cratou, 6 Ired. L. (N, C.) 164; 
 State V. Benton, 2 Dev, & Bat, (N, C.) 
 196; State v. Stalraaker, 2 Brevard, 
 (S. C.) 1; Sealy v. State, 1 Ga. 213; 
 United States v. Douglass, 2 Blatch. 
 (U. S.) 207; Cora. v. Twitchell, 1 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 551; Waterford &c. 
 Tp. V. People, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 161; 
 People V. Atchinson, 7 How. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 241; People v. Henries, 1 Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 579; State v. Shaw, 3 Ired. L. 
 (N. C.) 532: State v. Bone, 7 Jones, L. 
 (N. C.) 121. But see Montague v. 
 Cora., 10 Graft. (Va.) 767: United States 
 V. Shackleford, 18 How, (U. S.) 588.
 
 46 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 been retained in some States even after the passage of statutes 
 giving peremptory challenges to the prosecution/ though in such 
 cases its retention cannot be defended upon principle.^ 
 
 Article III. — Challenges tor General Disqualification. 
 
 Section 
 
 52. Of Challenges for Cause. 
 
 53. Lack of the Statutory Qualificatious. 
 
 54. Alienage. 
 
 55. Ignorance of the English Language. 
 
 56. Inability to Read and Write. 
 
 57. Party to Another Suit at Same Term. 
 
 58. Prior Service as a Juror within a Stated Period. 
 
 § 52. Of Challenges for Cause. — These were divided in the 
 old law into two classes: 1. Principal Challenges. 2. Chal- 
 lenges to the favor. The former were tried by the court ;^ the 
 latter by persons sworn specially to try them, called triors.* The 
 former class seems to have included all causes of challeno;e which 
 were such as matter of law, and which, upon being shown, could 
 accordingly be allowed by the court ; the latter appears to have 
 included the almost infinite mass of grounds of challenge of a 
 nature so dubious as not to fall within the former class. The 
 second ground seems to have included everything that might give 
 rise to a suspicion of partiality springing out of the relations of 
 the parties to the venire-man and the circumstances of the par- 
 
 1 Warren v. Com., 37 Pa. St. 45; Y.) 71, 109; State v. Potter, 18 Conn- 
 
 Haines v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 317; Smith 166, 171. 
 
 V. Com., Id. 324; State v. McNinch, 12 * Rex v. Kirwan, cited in Finlay's 
 
 So. Car. 89; State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & I^isli ^^S-^ P- 347; People v. Dewick, 
 
 B. (N. C.) 200; State v. Stephens, 13 ^ Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 230; Mima Queen 
 
 'So Car '>85 ^- Hepburn, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 3; 
 
 2 Sealy v. State, 1 Ga. 213; Reynolds 
 V. State, 1 Ga. 222 ; United States v. 
 
 United States v. Watkins, 3 Cranch 
 (U. S.), 443; Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 618; 
 Copenhaven v. State, 14 Ga. 22; Mc- 
 
 Butler, 1 Hughes (U. S.), 457. The Cxuffie t^. State, 17 G«. 497; McCormick 
 
 latter case was tried before Chief ^_ Brookfield, 4 N. J. L. 69; Joice v. 
 
 Justice Waite in the United States Alexander, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 528; 
 
 Circuit Court for the District of South Reason v. Bridges, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 Carolina, April, 1877. S.) 478; McCormick v. Brooktield, 4: 
 
 3 People V. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. (N. N. J. L. 69, 72.
 
 Tit. 1, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOK CAUSE. 
 
 47 
 
 ticuliir case.^ AVith the general abolition of the practice of 
 swearing triors to determine challenges to the favor ,2 the dis- 
 tinction between these two kinds of challenges has so far disap- 
 peared in this country that it may now be disregarded ; ^ and 
 these hitter are in turn divided into challenges for " implied 
 bias "' and challenges for " actual bias.'' ^ 
 
 § 53. Lack of the Statutory Qualifications. — First, then, 
 as to challenges for general disqualification; and of these a 
 numerous class is grounded upon a lack of the statutory qualifi- 
 cations for jury duty. Here it may be premised that in general 
 it must ajipear that the juror is qualified at the time of service^ 
 and not merely that he was qualified when the jury list was pre- 
 pared.^ Such challenges have been made, and allowed or denied, 
 under various statutes, according to the facts of the case on the 
 ground of non-residence;^ not a voter ^ though if he has qualified 
 
 1 Co. Litt. 157a. 
 
 - The practice of ascertaining the 
 qualifications of jurors by triors seems 
 to have been abolislietl in some States 
 at an early date. State v. Bahhvin, 1 
 Const. Kep. (S, C.) 29G; McGowan u. 
 State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184; State v. 
 Wall. 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 349; Rollins v. 
 Ames, 2 N. H. 350; State v. "Potter, 18 
 Conn. IGO, 171; State v. Knight, 43 
 Me. 11. 
 
 3 The distinction is retained in sev- 
 eral jurisdictions, by statutes (cited 
 in the next note), drawn upon the 
 model of the statute of New York, 
 under the name of "General Causes 
 of Challenge and Particular Causes of 
 Challenge." 
 
 •* New Y'"ork Code Crira. Proc. 1881, 
 §§ 374-378; Ark. Dig. 1874, §§ 1907- 
 1911; Cal. Penal Code, §§ 1071-1074; 
 Bullitt's Ky. Cr. Code, p. 41, §j 20(5- 
 210; Gen. Laws Ore. 1872 (Civil 
 Code), §§ 181-185; Stat, at Large, 
 Minn. 1873, p. 1055, §§ 233-237; Sess. 
 Laws, Mmn. 1878, chap. 24; Comp. L. 
 
 Nev. 1873, §§ 1961-19(34; Comp. L. Ariz. 
 1877, chap. 11, §§ 317-320; Sess. Laws, 
 Utah, 1878 (Code Cr. Proc), §§ 239- 
 242. This system is found in the Iowa 
 Kevision of 18(10 (§§ 47(58-4771), but 
 not in the later codes of 1873 and 1880. 
 
 5 2 Hawk. P. C, c. 43, § 13; Kelley 
 V. People, 55 N. Y. 5G5; Armsby v. 
 People, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y".) 157; 
 State V. Williams, 2 Hill (S. C), 381; 
 Orcuttt'. Carpenter, 1 Tyler (Vt.), 250; 
 Conway v. Clinton, 1 Utah, 215. But 
 see State v. Middletou, 5 Port. (Ala.) 
 484, 48G; State v. Ligon, 7 Port. (Ala.) 
 1G7. Compare People v. Shafer, 1 
 Utah, 2G0. 
 
 o This happens where the venire- 
 man, having been a resident, has left 
 the county with the purpose of not re- 
 turning; but otherwise where he has 
 left it for a tempoi-ary purpose, in- 
 tending to return (People v. Stoucifer, 
 G Cal. 405, 410) ; or where, after re- 
 moval, he has acquired a new resi- 
 dence outside the county. Graham v. 
 Trimmer, G Kan. 231. Residence foi
 
 48 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY, 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 he need not be registered ; ^ not a freeholder, which means a 
 freeliolder of the county wherein the issue is tried, ^ though it 
 will be sufficient if he has an equitable interest in land,^ as where 
 he holds it by an ordinary title bond; "* not a householder, which 
 term does not refer to the holding of a house, ^ but is used to 
 designate the head or master of a family;^ not a taxpayer, 
 which means one who has not been assessed for taxes, and not 
 one who possesses taxable property not listed.^ 
 
 two months, animo manendi, sufficient: 
 State V. France, 70 Mo. 681. Where 
 an unorganized county is attached to an 
 organized county for judicial purposes, 
 a resident of the former is qualified 
 in respect of the latter. Groom v. 
 State (Tex.)~, 3 S. W. Rep. GG8. 
 
 i Craft u. Com., 24 Graft. G02; State 
 V. Courtney, 28 La. Ann. 789; State v. 
 Salge, 1 Nev. 455. The constitution- 
 ality of a statute prescribing this 
 qualification has been denied. Gibbs 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenu) 72 ; Gunter 
 V. Pattou, 2 Heisk. (Tenu.) 257. Under 
 the Micliigau statute imalien is quali- 
 fied, if a voter. People Vi Scott, 5() 
 Mich. 154; Peoples. Rosevear, Id. 158. 
 
 2 2 Hawk. P. C, c. 43, § 13; Day v. 
 Com., 3 Graft. 630; Wills v. State, 69 
 Ind. 286. See also State v. Cooper, 
 83 N. C. 671; 21 Vin. Abr. 250, § 21. 
 But contra, see New Orleans &c. R. 
 Co. V. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 17. A stat- 
 utory requirement of freeliold qualifi- 
 cation for talesmen will not by impli- 
 cation be extended to members of the 
 regular panel. State v. Wincroft, 76 
 N. C. 38- See also State v. Wiley, 88 
 N. C. 691. In Texas a juror is dis- 
 qualified who is not a freeholder in tlie 
 State or a householder in the county. 
 Rev. St. Tex., art. 3009; Boren v. 
 State (Tex.), 4 S. W. Rep. 463, 466. 
 
 3 Com. V. Helmondoller, 4 Graft. 
 (Va.) 536; State?;. Raglaud, 75 N. C. 
 12; Com. -v. Carter, 2 Va. Cas. 319. 
 
 ^ Hawkins, ubi supra; New Orleans 
 &c. R. Co. V. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 17. 
 See also Com. v. Burcher, 2 Rob. 
 (Va.) 826; Kerby v. Com., 7 Leigh 
 (Va.), 747; Com. v. Cunningham, 6 
 Graft. (Va.) 695. But one who has 
 sold all the land owned by him when 
 his name was put upon the list of 
 jurors, and has taken a mortgage 
 thereof to secure payment of the pur- 
 chase money, is no longer a competent 
 juror. Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565; 
 2 Th. & C. (N. Y.) 157. 
 
 •'' Nelson v. State, 57 Miss. 286 ; State 
 V. Wincroft, 76 N. C. 38. One court 
 has lield that one who " rents a room 
 and boards " is a householder within 
 such a statute (Robles v. Stjate, 5 
 Tex. App. 347) ; but this is an obvious 
 judicial aberration. 
 
 6 Bowne v. Witt, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 475; Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201 
 (house in wife's name). Compare 
 Calhoun v. Williams, 32 Graft. (Va.) 
 19; Bradford v. State, 15 Ind. 347; 
 Thomp. Homest. & Ex., § 65. 
 
 " People V. Thompson, 34 Cal. 671. 
 Compare State v. Doan, 2 Root (Conn.) , 
 451; State v. Heaton, 77 N. C. 505 
 (taxes assessed but collector enjoined) ; 
 State V. Wincroft, 76 N. C. 38 (con- 
 clusiveness of finding of trial court on 
 the question) : State v. Jennings, 15 
 Rich. L. (S. C.) 176 (excludes those 
 who pay po?/ taxes only). In North 
 Carolina tales jurors and nieml)eri^ 't the
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 49 
 
 § 54. Alienagre. — 'JMiis has always been held good ground of 
 challenge, though the objection is ivaived if not taken before the 
 juror is sworn. ^ 
 
 § 55. Ignorance of the English Language. — Unquestion- 
 ably the court has power to discharge a vcnire-nian Avho is igno- 
 rant of the English language, ^ although such a disqualitication is 
 not mentioned in the statute; ' and the better opinion is that this 
 is a ground of challenge,* though one court has held the contrary.*^ 
 
 original pauel must have paid tlicir 
 taxes for tlie preceding year; otlierwise 
 as to special veuire-nieu. State v. Car- 
 laud, 'JO X. C. COS. That is, for tlie 
 year p!vtLHllii<r tlie time wheu he was 
 placed on tla- jury list, though uot for 
 the year precediui: the trial: Sellers 
 V. Selless (N. C), .i South East. Kep. 
 017. 
 
 > Ilolliu^sworth v. Duaue, 4 Dall. 
 (U. S.) 3.53; Rex v. Suttou, 8 Barn. & 
 Cress. 417: s. c. 1.5 En^. L. & Eq. 2.52; 
 Com, r. Thompson, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 21.5; 
 Borst r. Beecker, C. .Johns. 332. It has 
 l)een held tlnit the objection may be 
 made even after verdict, if the fact 
 was not discovered until then: (Schu- 
 macker v. State, .5 \Vis. 324; State v. 
 Vogel, 22 Wis. 471); but we shall 
 hereafter see (post, § IIG), that the 
 weiL'ht of authority is greatly the 
 other way. It is stated in one case to 
 have been decided tliat alienage was 
 not a good cause of challenge, (Mima 
 Queen r. Hej.burn, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 S.) 3) : but it seems from a conflicting 
 report of the same case on appeal 
 that the question was one of non- 
 residence merely, and besides tlie 
 objection was not taken until after 
 the juror had been sworn. S. c. 7 
 (•ranch (U. S.), 290, 297. The ol)jec- 
 tion, though taken at the proper time, 
 has been held unavailing where the 
 accused went to trial loithoxit exhaust- 
 
 ing his peremptory challenges. Terri- 
 tory r. Hart (Mont.), 14 Pac. Kep. 
 7<i8, 774. Under some systems one 
 who has declared his intention of be- 
 coming a citizen under the Act of 
 Congress, is competent. State v. 
 Pagels (Mo.), 4 S. W. Kep. 931; Kev. 
 St. Mont., § 780; Territory v. Hard- 
 ing (Mont,), 12 Pac. Rep. 750. 
 
 - State V. Ring, 29 Minn. 78; Atlas 
 Mining Co. v. Jolinstou, 23 Mich. 3f; ; 
 State V. Rousseau, 28 La. Ann. 579; 
 People r. Arceo, 32 Cal. 40; State v. 
 Marsliall, 8 Ala. 302; Montague v. 
 Com., 10 Graft. (Va.) 707, 772. 
 
 ■^ Sutton V. Fox, 55 AYis. 531; s. c. 
 42 Am. Rep. 744. 
 
 * Lyles V. State, 41 Tex. 172; Vanez 
 V. State, (5 Tex. App. 429; Etheridge 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 133; McCampljell 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 124; Nolen v. 
 State, 9 Tex. App. 419. The same view 
 was taken at nisi prius in Fisher v. 
 Philadelphia, 4 Brewst. (Pa.) 395, and 
 by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 
 State V. Push, 23 La. Ann. 14 (disre- 
 garding Gay V. Ardry, 14 La. 288); 
 State V. Gay, 25 La. Ann. 472; State v. 
 Tazwell, 30 La. Ann. 884. 
 
 •'- Trinidad v. Simpson (Colo.) 22 
 Alb. L. J. 409; s. c. 10 Cent. L. J. 149; 
 5 Colo. ('>-,. This last decision had 
 reference to trials in a portion of the 
 State of Colorado in which nearly all 
 the inhabitants spoke and understood
 
 50 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 56, Inability to Read and Write. — This, though not a 
 disqualification at common hiw/ is made such by statute in one 
 State,- and perhaps in others. Although such a statute excepts 
 cases where the requisite number who can read and write are not 
 to be found in the county, the judge has no right to dispense 
 with the statutory qualification because the county is sparsely 
 populated.^ 
 
 § 57. Party to another Suit at same Term. — It has been 
 made a statutory cause of challenge that a juror has a suit pend- 
 ing for trial at the term of court for which he has been sum- 
 moned as a juror.* 
 
 § 58. Prior Service as a Juror within a Stated Period. — 
 
 Prior service as a juror within a stated period is made by some 
 statutes, levelled against a well known class of persons called 
 " professional jurors," a ground of challenge.^ 
 
 only the Spanish langnage. It pro- 
 ceeded upon the impracticability of 
 administering justice without the aid 
 of the inhabitants of those counties; 
 suggested that the proceedings could 
 be made known to the jurors by 
 means of interpreters; and held that 
 the statute of the State which pro- 
 vided that judicial proceedings must 
 be conducted In the English language 
 (Civil Code Colo., § 405), would be 
 satisfied by a record in that language. 
 
 1 Ante, § 10. 
 
 2 The Texas statute has been con- 
 strued to mean inability to read and 
 write the English language. AVright 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 163. 
 
 3 Garcia v. State, 12 Tex. App. 335. 
 
 4 Riley u. Bussell, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 294; Plummer v. People, 74 111. 3G1. 
 
 ■"' Brooks V. Bruyn, 35 111. 392; Bis- 
 sell V. Ryan, 23 111. 56(j; Barker v. 
 Hine, 54 Ind. 542; Christie v. State, 
 44 Ind. 408; Kassebaum v. State, 45 
 Ind. 277; Demaree v. State, 45 Ind. 
 299; Williams v. State, 45 Ind. 299. 
 For the construction of such statutes, 
 see Burden v. Peoplej 26 Mich. 162; 
 Gracia v. State, 5 Tex. App. 337; Tut- 
 tle V. State, G Tex. App. 556; Myers v. 
 State, 7 Tex. App. 640; Etheridge v. 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 133; State v. 
 Thorne, 81 N. C. 555. See Prov. Inst. 
 V. Burnham, 128 Mass. 458; Famul- 
 ener v. Anderson, 15 Oh. St. 473. 
 That such a statute applies to one 
 who had been summoned as a talesman 
 in a street-opening case: William& 
 V. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 271.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 51 
 
 Akticle lY. — Challenges fok Disqualificatiox in Respect of the 
 Pakticular Case. 
 
 Subdivision I. — Challenges Groimded on Consanguinity , Affinity, 
 Interest, Affection. 
 
 Section 
 
 5a Grounds of Principal Cliallenge at Common Law. 
 60. ^Member of the Grand Jury. 
 6L Consanguinity and Artinity. 
 
 62. [Continued.] Wliether the Party so Related to the Venire-man must be 
 
 a Party to the Kecord. 
 
 63. Members of rul)lic Corporations. 
 
 64. Members of I'rivate Corporations and Soeieties. 
 
 65. Interest in the Suit. 
 
 66. Membership in Associations for the Suppression of Crime. 
 
 67. Business Relations. 
 
 GS. Prior Sei'vice in the Same or a Similar Case. 
 
 § 59. Grounds of Principal Challenge at Common Law. — 
 
 These .statutory groinuls of cliiillenge arc not, in the view of 
 some courts, exclusive of others which existed at common law.^ 
 Indeed, it has been held not within the power of the legislature, 
 under a constitution preserving the right of trial by jury, to de- 
 prive an accused person of the right of challenge for actual biaSy 
 which was a challenge to the favor at common law.- It is 
 
 ^ Birdsong v. State, 47 Ala. 68; every one whom the judge desired to 
 Smith 17. State, 55 Ala. 1 (overruling convict, and also that he "would as 
 Boggs jj. State, 45 Ala. 30; Lyman u. lief swear on a spelling hookas a 
 State, 45 Ala. 72, and restoring State bible, because he was a Tom Paine 
 V. Marshall, 8 Ala. 302); Chouteau v. man." McFadden v. Com., 23 Pa. St. 
 Pierre, 9 Mo. 3; State v. West, 69 Mo. 12, 17. At nisi prius, however, it was 
 401; Lyles v. State, 41 Tex. 172; ruled by Coleridge, , J., to be no ground 
 Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 433; for a challenge, that the juror had 
 "Williams v. State, 44 Tex. 34; Cald- sat on several cases during the 
 well V. State, 41 Tex. Sij ; Trinidad v. assize, and in no instance had con- 
 Simpson (Sup. Ct. Col.), 22 Alb. L. sentcd to a verdict for the croAvn. 
 J. 409; s. c. 10 Cent. L.J. 149; Quesen- Sawdon's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 117. 
 berry v. State, 3 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) Nor that, in a pi-evious case, the juror 
 308; Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600. had shown some dissatisfaction with 
 Thus, it has been held a good ground the law as laid down by the judge in 
 of challenge that a juror had grossly favor of the challenging party. Pearse 
 misbehaved on a former occasion, by v. Rogers, 2 Fos. & Fin. 137. 
 declaring that he had tried to acquit - State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 89.
 
 52 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 important, then, to bear in mind what were the grounds of chal- 
 lenge for principal cause at common law. These, according to 
 Chief Baron Gilbert, were as follows: "All causes of objection 
 from partiality or incaj^acity, consanguinity and affinity, are con- 
 tained in the writ; if the juror be under the power of either 
 party, as if counsel, serjeant of the rf)bes, or tenant, these are 
 expressly within the intent of the writ ; so that, if he has de- 
 clared his opinion touching the matter, or has been chosen arbitra- 
 tor b}" one side, or done any act by which such an opinion might be 
 conceived, as if he has eaten and drank at the expense of either 
 party after he is returned. All incapable persons, as infants, 
 idiots and people of non-sane memory, are likewise excluded." i 
 
 § 60. Member of the Grand Jury. — To these may be 
 added another which has come down to the present day, namely, 
 that the person challenged was a member of the grand jury which 
 returned the indictment;^ but the mere fact that he was the 
 bailiff Viho attended upon the grand jury which returned the in- 
 dictment is not a disqualification, unless it appears that he knew 
 something of their proceedings touching the particular case.^ 
 
 The statutory causes of challenge for feiture which would eusue from the 
 
 "implied bias" are held to be ex- conviction: had declared an opinion 
 
 elusive of all others under this head, beforehand of the defendant's guilt, 
 
 People V. Cotta, 49 Cal. 1G6; People v. or had " given his dogs the names of 
 
 Welch, 49 Cal. 174, 178. See also the King's witnesses." 2 Hav^k. P. C, 
 
 State V. Thomas, 19 Minn. 484. But chap. 43, § 27, et seq. 
 
 the definition of "actual bias" is - So enacted by Stat. 25 Edw. III., 
 
 sufficiently broad to embrace the e. 3. See Gates' Case, 10 How. St. Tr. 
 
 most important objections formerly 1082; Cook's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 
 
 taken to the favor. 311, 339; Eex v. Percival, 1 Sid. 243; 
 
 1 Gilb. Hist. C. P. 95. Other old Young w. Slaughterford, 11 Mod. 228; 
 
 authorities, show that all of the fore- Com. v. Hussey, 13 Mass. 221. In an 
 
 going viere principal grounds of dial- action for malicious prosecution, for 
 
 lenge. Co. Litt. 157. a; Bac. Abr. causing the plaintiff to be indicted, he 
 
 Juries E. 5; Trials per Pais (ijth may challenge any of the jurors who 
 
 ed.), 137, et seq. Serjeant Hawkins were on the grand jury that found the 
 
 enumerates still others as allowed in indictment. Rogers r. Lamb, 3 Blackf. 
 
 criminal cases, namely, that the per- 155. 
 
 sou challenged had been a member ^ Spittorff v. State (Ind.), 8 North 
 
 of the grand jury that returned the East. Rep. 911. 
 indictment; had a claim to the for-
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 53 
 
 § Gl. Consanguinity and Affinity. — This is reckoned ac- 
 cording to the rule of the civil law,^ as dif<tingui:^hed from that 
 of the canon laio, Avhieh latter was the English law of descent. ^ 
 In so reckoning, we reckon from one of the persons up to the 
 common ancestor and then down to the other. "^ Thus, under 
 this rule//-s^ cousins are related to each other in the fourth de- 
 gree.* Afmity is the relationship which springs from the mar- 
 riage tic, and which subsists between one marital partner and 
 the blood relatives of the other,^ The rule will be best illus- 
 trated by the statement that the blood relatives of the wife stand 
 in the same degree of affinity to the husband as they stand in 
 consanguinity to her. It is important to bear in mind that, in 
 theory of law, if one of the parties to the marriage which created 
 the affinity be dead, the affinity still subsists if there be issue 
 living;^ otherwise the tie is broken and the disqualification re- 
 moved.^ This consanguinity or affinity between ii party and a 
 juror disqualified the latter at common law, when it existed within 
 the ninth degree.^ 
 
 1 4 Kent Com. 412, 413. 
 
 ~ 4 Kent Com. 374. 
 
 3 Ibid. See an instructive note by 
 the reporter to Hardy v. Sprowle, 32 
 Me. 310. 
 
 ■4 For illustrations of the rule in its 
 application to challenges, see Hardy v. 
 Sprowie, 32 Me. 310; Hudspeth v. 
 Herston, 04 Ind. 133; Rust v. Shackle- 
 ford, 47 Ga. 538; Morrison v. McKin- 
 non, 12 Fla. 552; Hartford Bank v. 
 Hart, 3 Day (Conn.) , 491 ; Churchill v. 
 Churchill, 12 Vt. GGl; State ?;. Perry, I 
 Busb. (X. C.) 330; Trullinger v. ^yebb, 
 3 Ind. l!)8; Denn v. Clark, 1 X. J. L. 
 440; O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215. 
 That the father of the venire-man is 
 second cousin to the defendant's 
 mother disqualifies under Mo. R. S., 
 § 1894: State v. Walton, 74 :\ro. 270. 
 
 '= See the definition of Chancellor 
 Walworth in Paddock v. Wells, 2 
 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 331, 333; also Dailey 
 V. Gaines, 1 Dana (Ky.), 529. 
 
 <5 Co. Litt. 150a; Ibid. 157a,- Pad- 
 dock V. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. (X. Y.) 
 331; Mounson v. West, 1 Leon. 88; 
 .Taques v. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 090; 
 Dearmond v. Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191. 
 
 7 Cain V. Ingham, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 
 478; Carman v. Xewell, 1 Den. (X. Y.) 
 25; Vannoy v. Givens, 23 N. J. L. 201; 
 State V. Shaw, 3 Ired. L. (X. C.) 532. 
 
 8 3 Bl. Comm. 303; 1 Chitty Cr. L. 
 541; Tidd's Pr. 853. Lord Coke 
 stated tlie rule to be that if a juror be 
 of kin to either party in any degree, 
 however remote, he is disqualified to 
 serve. Co. Litt. 157a. But this, if 
 ever the common law, is certainly not 
 such at the present day. Xo disquali- 
 fication that venire-man is husband of 
 third cousin of defendant. Todd v. 
 Gray, 10 S. C. 035. Xor that uncle of 
 party married aunt of venire-man, and 
 that two uncles of venire-man married 
 aunts of the party, — all the marriages 
 being dissolved by death, and no issue
 
 54 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 62. [Continued.] Whether the Party so related to the 
 Venire-man must be a Party to the Recoi-d. — The general 
 rule is that, in order that a juror shall be disqualified for this 
 cause, he must stand so related to a party to the suit. It is or- 
 dinarily not enough that he is so related to one of the counsel,^ 
 or to a brother,"^ or sister,^ or nepheio^ of the party. So, it has 
 been held not a ground of such challenge that a juror was mar- 
 ried to the widow of the prosecutor's uncle, ^ or that he was the 
 father-in-law of the prosecuting attorney," or a half-uncle of the 
 plaintiff's imfe? But it has been h(;ld not necessary that the 
 party who stands in this relationship to the challenged juror 
 should be the beneficial party in the full sense ; and accordingly 
 the rule applies so as to sustain the challenge where an adminis- 
 trator is the part}' related to the juror. ^ On the other hand, the 
 reason of the rule excludes the juror where he is related to one 
 who is a beneficial party, though not a party to the record, — as 
 where a corporation is a party and the juror is related to a mem- 
 ber or shai-eholder.^ Other cases extend the rule still further, — 
 holding that a juror is excluded, in a prosecution for arson, who 
 is related to the person whose house is alleged to have been 
 burned; ^^ or who, in the case of a slave indicted for robbery, is 
 related to the owner of the slave; " or who, in the case of a jail- 
 keeper indicted for a negligent escape, is related to the prisoners 
 who escaped. ^2 But, in an action by a municipal corporation to 
 
 liviiii^. Bigelow v. Spragiie, 140 Mass. « State v. Joues, 64 Mo. 301. 
 
 425. ■^ Eggleston v. Smiley, 13 Johus. 
 
 1 Funk V. Ely, 45 Pa. St. 444; Wood (N. Y.^ 133. 
 
 V. Wood, 52 N. H. 422; Piper v. » Trullinger v. Webb, 3 Ind. 198. 
 
 Lodge, Ifi Serg. & R. 214. Aliter, ^ Co. Litt. 157a; Quiuebaugh Bauk 
 
 where the coimsel have a lieu for u. Leavens, 20 Conu. 87; Georgia Rail- 
 
 their fees upon the proceeds of the road v. Hart, GO Ga. 550; Youug v. 
 
 suit. Melsoii V. Dicksou, 63 Ga. G85; Marine Ins. Co., 1 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 s. c. 36 Am. Rep. 128. S.) 452. 
 
 ^ Johnson v. Richardson, 52 Tex. ^ Jaques r. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 481. 690. 
 
 =* Chase ?-. Jennings, 38 Me. 44. " State v. Anthony, 7 Ired. L. (X. 
 
 * Rank ?'. Shewey, 4 Watts (Pa.), C.) 234. 
 
 218. i2 ^xate v. Baldwin, 80 N. C. 390. 
 
 5 Oueal V. State, 47 Ga. 229. But, in an action against a sheriff for
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III. J CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 55 
 
 ret'ovor over against a wrong-doer the damages which it had been 
 compelled to j)ay through his negligence, the husband of the 
 ])laintiff in the original action is not comi)etent hy reason of 
 affinity.^ 
 
 § G3. Members of Public Corporutioiis. — The rule of 
 the coninion law, established by Lord ^lanstield,'-' and gen- 
 erally followed in this country,'^ where not changed by 
 statute, as it frequently has been,^ excludes from the jury 
 
 the act of his deputy, a release of the 
 (.k'lmty itiulered the deputy's father 
 conipeteut as a juror. Seavy r. Dear- 
 born, 1!»N. H. 3.31. 
 
 ' Faith V. Atlanta (Ga.), 4 Soutli 
 East. Kep. 3. 
 
 2 Hesketh v. Braddoclv, 3Burr. 1847. 
 See also Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85. 
 Compare Martiu v. Kes;., 12 Irish L. 399. 
 
 3 Wood V. Stoddard, 2 Johus. (X. 
 Y.) 194; Garrison v. Portland, 2 Ore. 
 123: Boston r. Tlleston, 11 Mass. 4()8; 
 Hawkes w. Kenuebeck, 7 Mass. 4(.!1; 
 Watson r. Tripp, 11 K. I. 98; s. c. 15 
 Am. L. Reg. 282; Alexandria r. Brock- 
 et!, 1 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 605; 
 Diveuy v. Elmira, 51 X. Y. 507; Hawes 
 V. Gustiu,2 Allen (Mass.), 402; State v. 
 Williams, 30 Me. 484; Dively v. Cedar 
 Falls, 21 Iowa, 505; Cramer t'. Burling- 
 ton, 42 Iowa, 31,5; Kendall v. Albia 
 (Iowa), 34 N. W. Rep. 833; Ford r. 
 Umatilla County (Ore.), 1(3 Pac. Rep. 
 33; Davenport Gas Company I'. Daven- 
 port, 13 Iowa, 229; Gibson v. Wyan- 
 dotte, 20 Kan. 15(>; Eberle r. St. Louis 
 Public Schools, II Mo. 247; Fine v. 
 St. Louis Public Schools, 30 Mo. 106; 
 Columbus V. Goetchius, 7 Ga. 139; 
 Russell r. Hamilton, 3 111. 5G: Bailey v. 
 Trumbull, 31 Conn. oSl; Hearn v. 
 Greensburgh. 51 Ind. 119; .Johnson r. 
 Americus, 46 Ga. 80; Rose v. St. 
 Charles, 49 Mo. 509: Fuhveilei r. St. 
 Louis, 61 Mo. 479. But contra, see 
 
 Middletowu v. Ames, 7 A't. 166; Omaha 
 V. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; s. c. 16 Am. 
 L. Reg. 356; Kemper v. Louisville, 
 14 Bush (Ky.), 87. Member of city 
 council disqualifled, if city a party. 
 Boston V. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315. 
 Cases not vnthin the rule: Pliillips v. 
 State, 29 Ga. 105; Phipps v. Manstield, 
 G2 Ga. 209. Holder of municipal bonds, 
 incompetent where municipality is a 
 party: Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 
 Fla. 980. 
 
 * New York Code Rem. Just., § 1179 ; 
 1 Briglit. Purd. (Penu.) Dig., p. 837, 
 §73; G. S. Mass. 1860, chap. 132, §30; 
 Gen. Stat. R. I. Is72, p. 434, § 32; 
 Bush's Dig. Fla., chap. 104, § 25; R. 
 S. So. Car. 1873, p. 53, § 27; Comp. 
 L. Mich. 1871, § 6015; R. S. Me. 1871, 
 chap. 82, § 76; Rev. N. J. 1877, p. 530, 
 § 39; Comp. L. Mich. 1871, §§ 460, 
 3329; R. S. 111. 1880, cliap. 24, § 174; 
 lb., chap. 139, § 47; //;.,chap. 34, §32; 
 R. S. La. 1876, § 2134; Supp. to Ga. 
 Code of 1873, § 409; R. S. W. Va. 
 1879, chap. 33, § 63 ; R. S. Wis. 1878, 
 § 2850; Stat, at Large, Minn. 1873, p. 
 217, § 5; G. S. Neb. 1873, p. 232, § 5; 
 R. S. Mo. 1879, § 2801; Comp. L. Kan. 
 1879, § 1391. Such statutes have been 
 held not unconstitutional as invading 
 the riglit of trial by an impartial jury. 
 Com. V. Reed, 1 Gray, 472. See also 
 Com. V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Cora. 
 V. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; State v. Wells, 46
 
 56 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 the inhabitants of a town or city which is a party to the ac- 
 tion.^ 
 
 § 64. Members of Private Corporations and Societies. — 
 
 The same rule cxchides from the jury box a member of a pri- 
 vate corporation which is a party to a suit, or immediately inter- 
 ested in the question to be tried. ^ Thus, in an action betAveen 
 the trustees of two religious societies, involving the right of pos- 
 session of lands, the members of each society are, by reason of 
 interest, incompetent as jurors.'^ But the rule does not dis- 
 qualify a juror who has been active in forming a company, but 
 who has never been a shareholder in it.^ And it is no objection 
 that the juror is an officer or stockholder in another corporation, 
 organized for a similar purpose to that of the corporation which 
 is a party to the suit.^ Nor, according to the better opinion, 
 does the fact that the venire-man and the opposite party to the 
 suit are members in the snYne benevolent organization, such as the 
 
 loAva, 662. Construction of such stat- 
 utes: Baltimore &c. R. Co. U.Pitts- 
 burgh &c. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 812; 
 Doyal V. State, 70 Ga. 134. Oue who 
 would find for the city if the evidence 
 was equally balanced is disquaiihed. 
 Omaha v. Kane, 15 Neb. 657. 
 
 ^ A city defendant has no right of 
 challenge on the ground that, tliough 
 a resident, the venire-man is not a tax- 
 payer. Hollenbeck v. Marshalltown, 
 62 Iowa, 21. Nor on the ground that 
 he is a tax-payer. Conkliu v. Keokuk 
 (Iowa), 35 N. W. Rep. 444. But it is 
 a good ground of challenge by the 
 party adverse to tlie city. Kendall v. 
 Albia (Iowa), 34 N. W. Rep. 833; and 
 see note to same. 
 
 2 Respublica v. Richards, 1 Yeates 
 (Pa.), 480; Silvis v. Ely, 3 Watts & S. 
 (P^.) 421; rieesou v. Savage S. M. 
 Co., 3 Nev. 157.' Compare Williams v. 
 Smith, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 166; Peninsular 
 R. Co. V. Howard, 20 Mich. 18; Page 
 
 V. Contocook Valley R. Co , 21 N. H. 
 438. So, of a juror who has given his 
 note to a railway company to aid m 
 building its road: Michigan &c. R. 
 Co. V. Barnes, 40 Mich. 383. 
 
 3 Cleage v. Hyden, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 73. 
 
 * Portland &c. Ferry Co. v. Pra,tt, 
 2 Allen (N. B.) , 17. Compare Williams 
 V. Smith, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 166; Com. v. 
 Boston &c. R. Co., '3 Cush. (Mass.) 
 25. 
 
 5 Craig V. Feun, Car. & M. 43; Mil- 
 ler V. Wild Cat Gravel Rd. Co., 52 Ind. 
 51. No objection that a party and a 
 juror are both stockholders hi the same 
 corporation, it not being interested in 
 the suit: Brittain v. Allen, 2 Dev. L. 
 (N. C.) 120. On a trial of an indict- 
 ment for passing counterfeit money, it ' 
 is no objection that a juror is a direc- 
 tor in the bank whose money was 
 counterfeited: Billis v. State, 2 Mc- 
 Cord (S. C), 12.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 57 
 
 Masonic Fra(ei')iit)/, disqnaWfy.^ Nor, iu an action by a grand 
 lodge of this order, are members of subordinate lodges di:^quali- 
 fied by reason of interest in the suit.- So, a cJiurcJi member is 
 not incompetent as a juror in a case to which a church of his de- 
 nomination is a pai'ty.-^ But if the church is such an important 
 one that its tenets arc above the law of the land, and if belief iu 
 those tenets renders it unconscientious for him to enforce the 
 human as against the divine law, the venire-man will be disqual- 
 ified, — especially in a case where the venire-man is a member of 
 the Mormon churc/t^ and the accused is on trial for bigamy, and 
 the divine law, as gracioush^ revealed to the saints of that church, 
 commands ijolygamy, while the human law is so wicked as to 
 condemn it.* On the trial of a criminal action for unlawfully 
 selling intoxicating li([uors, members of a social club, apparently 
 organized for the purpose of getting litpior for their own use, — 
 are not, for that reason, subject to challenge by the defendant.^ 
 
 § 03. Interest in the Suit. — Any direct or contingent inter- 
 est in the result of the suit about to be tried, disqualitics the 
 venire-man. Thus, if he is interested in a similar ^mt , or in one 
 depending on the event of the particular suit,'' or if he is under 
 indictment for an offense similar to that charged against the 
 prisoner," this will disqualify him; but the fact that the plaint- 
 iff has had a suit against the challenged venire-man, similar to 
 the one about to be tried, will at most support a challenge to the 
 favor.^ So, if the venire-man is an executor, though not a party, 
 and the recovery will benefit the estate ; ^ or, if he is bound as a 
 
 1 Purple y. Horton, 13 Wend. ^N. 345; Davis y. Allen, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 
 Y.) 11, 23. Confm. Brittaiu w. Allen, 4(16; Flagg v. Worcester, 8 Cush. 
 2Dev. L. (N. C.) 120. (Mass.) 69; Gardner v. Launing, 2 N. 
 
 2 Burdine v. Grand Lodge, 37 Ala. j. l. G51. But see Com. v. Boston 
 478. &c. R. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 25. 
 
 3 Barton v. Erickson. U Neb. 1G4. 7 McGuire v. State, 37 Miss. 3G9. 
 ■* United States v. Miles, 2 Utah, s Austin v. Cox, 60 Ga. .520. 
 
 19; s. c. 103 U. S. 30i. 9 Smull v. .Tones, (; Watts & S. 
 
 5 Boldtu. State (AVis.), 35 N. W. (Pa.) 122. Compare Gratz u. Benner, 
 Rep. 935. 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 110, a decision 
 
 6 Courtwright u. Strickler, 37 Iowa, ^hich it is difficult to understand. 
 382; Lord v. Brown, 5 Den. (N. Y.) For a further illustration of disquali-
 
 :58 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY, 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 surety for the costs of the suit/ or for the apj)earance of the 
 accused.^ Moreover, if the venire-man once hiid a direct in- 
 terest in the pending suit, he is disqualified since the fact of his 
 ceasiuo- to have such an interest would not purge him of the bias 
 which he thereby acquired,'^ though this objection would not be 
 good after verdict.* 
 
 § 66. Meuibership in Associations for the Suppression of 
 Crime. — The decisions on this branch of the inquiry are not in 
 a satisfactory state. AVe shall see hereafter that prejudice against 
 the particular crime with which the accused stands charged does 
 not disqualify a venire-man.^ Upon analogous grounds, some 
 courts have reached the conclusion that membership in a society 
 organized for the prosecution of crimes of the nature of the one 
 with which the accused is charged, does not disqualify,*^ unless 
 
 lication of au administrator by reason 
 of contingent interest in tlie event of 
 tlie suit, see Meeker v. Potter, 5 N. J. 
 L. 586. A juror lias been permitted to 
 release his interest in lands claimed 
 in ejectment, in order that he might 
 sit upon the trial. Isaac v. Clarke, 2 
 Gill. (Md.) 1. 
 
 1 Glover v. Woolsey, Dudley (Ga.), 
 85. 
 
 2 State r. Prater (S. C), 2 South 
 East. Pep. 108; Brazleton v. State, 11 
 Reporter, 291; People v. McCollister, 
 1 Wheeler C. C. (N. Y.) 391; Anderson 
 V. State, 03 Ga. 675. This objection 
 was held to be good as against the 
 son-in-lavj and brother -in-law of the 
 surety (Sehorn i\ Williams, 6 Jones 
 L. (N. C.) 575; Woodbridge v. Ray- 
 mond, Kirby (Conn.), 279), l)ut de- 
 nied as against tenant. Brown v. 
 Wheeler, 18 Conn. 199. 
 
 » Phelps V. Hall, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 401. 
 
 * Bradshaw v. Hubbard, 6 111. 390, 
 394. 
 
 ^ United States v. Hanway, 2 Wall. 
 Jr. 139; Williams v. State, 3 Ga. 
 453; Parker v. State, 34 Ga. 262; 
 
 United States v. Noelke, 17 Blatch. 
 (U. S.) 554 ; s. c. 1 Fed. Rep. 426 ; 9 Re- 
 porter, 505; United States v. Borger(U. 
 S. Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y., May, 1881), 7 
 Fed. Rep. 193; United States r. Duff 
 (same court, Jan., 1881), 6 Fed. Rep. 
 45, 48. 
 
 6 State V. Wilson, 4 la. 407; Boyle 
 V. People, 4 Colo. 176; Com. v. Liver- 
 more, 4 Gray (Mass.), 18; Com. v. 
 O'Neil, 6 Gray (Mass.), 343; Musick 
 V. People, 40 111. 268. Compare Mis- 
 souri &c. R. Co. V. Munkers, 11 Kan. 
 223; Reg. v. Nicholson, 8 Dowl. P. C. 
 422; s, c. 4 Jur. 558; United States v. 
 Borger, 7 Fed. Rep. 193; s. c. 12 Re- 
 porter, 134. The refusal of the judge 
 to ask venire-men whether they be- 
 long to any association formed for the 
 purpose of enforcing the law under 
 which the defendant is indicted, has 
 been held no ground of exception, if 
 the defendant's counsel disclaims any 
 knowledge or suspicion of such con- 
 nection and assigns no ground for 
 making the request. Com. ». Thrasher, 
 1 1 Gray, 55 ; Reg. v. Stewart, 1 Cox C. C. 
 174. Contra, l^ixyinv. People, 69 111. 303.
 
 Tit. I, Cll. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 59 
 
 the relation of the veniie-iuaii to the society is such as to render 
 him liable to contribute towards the expenses of the prosecution.^ 
 But he is disqualified if he has participated in the prosecution of 
 the accused i)crson, or belongs to a committee the members of 
 which have agreed to indemnify each otiicr against any action 
 which the accused might prosecute against anj^of them for false 
 imprisonment.'- 
 
 § C7. Business Relations. — That the venire-man is the 2n- 
 ferior ov dependent in business rehitions of the opposite party to 
 the suit, will generally disipuilify. Thus, if he is his surety, and 
 the rendition of u judgment against him will diminish the prob- 
 ability of his being exonerated;^ or if he is his ^e;<a?<^,* although 
 distress for rent may have been abolished ; ^ or is his derk,^ or 
 other employe,'' or even his partner in business.^ But the mere 
 fact that an innkeeper is a party and the venire-man is his 
 guest does not disqualify the latter ;^ and while, as elsewhere 
 seen,^'^ a sliareJiolder in a corporation is disqualified from serving 
 
 1 Some cases make no mention of 
 this distinction. Musick v. People, 40 
 111. 2t)8. Compare Mjiock v. Saladiue, 
 1 W. Bl. 480; People v. Lee, 5 Cal. 
 353; People v. Graham, 21 Cal. 2G1. 
 
 2 Fleming v. State, 11 lud. 234; 
 Pierson v. State, 11 Ind. 341. Contra, 
 that subscribers to a general fitml to se- 
 cure counsel for the prosecution of 
 the defendant are not disqualilied : 
 Heacock v. State, 13 Tex. App. ;t7. 
 That members of the ^' Law and Or- 
 der League," who contribute to its 
 funds are not disqualiried on trial 
 of a complaint for selling intoxicating 
 liquors: Com. v. Burroughs (Mass.), 
 13 North East. Rep. 884. AUter, if the 
 League had initiated or was conduct- 
 ing the particular prosecution. Ibid.; 
 Com. V. Moore, 143 Mass. 136; s. c. 9 
 North East. Eep. 884. 
 
 3 FerridaytJ. Selser, 4 How. (Miss.) 
 506, 
 
 * Co. Litt, ir.7. a.; Bac. Abr. Juries 
 E. 343; Anon., 2 Dyer, 170. a. pi. (27) ; 
 Pipher V. Lodge, 16 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 214; Harrisburg Bank v. Foster, 8 
 "Watts (Pa.), 304. But that the oppo- 
 site party to the suit is a tenant to the 
 juror is ground of challenge to the 
 favor only. People v. Bodine, 1 Deuio 
 (N. Y.), 306. . 
 
 ^ Hathaway r. Helnier, 25 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 20. 
 
 ** Hub))ard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7. 
 
 ' Central R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 
 173. See Co. Litt. 157. b. ; Gilb. Hist, 
 C. P. 95; 3 Bl. Com. 363; Bac. Abr. 
 Juries E. : 2 Tidd Pr. 853. But not if 
 he was merely in his employ a year 
 Ijefore. East Line &c. R. Co. v. 
 Briuker (Tex.), 3 S. W. Rep. 99. 
 
 ** Stumm V. Hummell, 39 la. 478. 
 
 ^ Cummiugs v. Gauu, 52 Pa. St. 484. 
 
 1 Ante, § 64.
 
 60 IMPANELING THK JUKY, [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 as a juror where the corporation is a party, yet this does not ex- 
 tend so far as to exclude from such service an employe of a 
 shareltoldtr } 
 
 § 68. Prior Service in tlie Same or a Similar Case. — It is 
 
 a ground of challenge that the venire-man has sat as a juror upon 
 a former trial of the same action.'^ But the fact of having sat at 
 the same term upon the trial of an action brought by the same 
 plaintiff against other defendants and having returned a verdict 
 for tlie plaintiff, does not disqualify,'^ unless the cause involves 
 the same questions, determinable on the same evidence as the one 
 about to be tried.* One court holds,^ and others deny^ that the 
 fact of the juror having sat on a former trial of the same action, 
 which resulted in a mistrial, will operate to exclude him, where 
 not discovered until after he has been impaneled and sworn. 
 Nor does this rule extend so far as to disqualify venire-men who 
 have sat on the trial of other defendants jointly indicted with 
 the defendant in the particular case, btit who had severed for 
 the purposes of their trial.' Nor is a venire-man, who has sat 
 on a jury which has found the defendant guilty ujjon one indict- 
 ment, thereby disqualified from sitting upon his trial under 
 another indictment at the same term, although for a similar 
 offense.^ 
 
 ' Eredericktou Boom Co. v. Mc- Ark. 336. But see Sheppard v. Cook, 
 
 Phersou, 2 Hauuay (N. B.), 8. 2 Hayw. (N. C.) 238. 
 
 2 Co. Litt. 157. b. ; Argent v. Dar- ^ Weeks v. Medler, 20 Kan. 57. 
 rell, 2 Salk. 648. For the construction « Whitner v. Hamlin, 12 Fla. 18; 
 of statutes asserting this disqualifica- Atkinson v. Allen, 12 Vt. 619. 
 
 tion, see Dunn v. State, 7 Tex. App. ' Regicide's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 
 
 600; Jacobs v. State, 9 Tex. App. 278; 978 (Resolution 7) ; s. c. Sir J. Kelyng, 
 
 Willis ij. State, 9 Tex. App. 297; State 9. S,ee also Cranburne's Trial, 13 
 
 V. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404; State v. How. St. Tr. 222, 235; Thomas v. 
 
 Leicht, 17 Iowa, 28. State, 36 Tex. 315; Bowman v. State, 
 
 3 Dewu. McDivitt, 31 Oh. St. 139; 41 Tex. 417; United States v. Wilson, 
 s. c. 17 Am. L. Reg. 621; Algier v. Baldwin, C. C. 84; Rex v. Hanly, 1 
 Steamer Maria, 14 Cal. 167; Nugent v. Craw. & Dix Cir. (Irish), 188, note. 
 Trepagnier, 2 Martin (La.), 205; « United States v. Watkins, 3 
 Smith V. Wagenseller, 21 Pa. St. 491. Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 578; Com. v. Hill,. 
 
 * Spear v. Spencer, 1 G. Greene 4 Allen (Mass.), 591. 
 (Iowa), 534; Garthwaite v. Tatum, 21
 
 Tit. I, Ch. ]II.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 61 
 
 Subdivision 2. — Challenges Grounded on Bias, Prejudice, Scru- 
 ple, Opinion. 
 Section 
 
 71. Grounds of Chalieu2:e tin.- sanu- for the State as for the Accused. 
 
 72. Bias, Prejudice, Opinion. 
 
 73. Kinds of Bias and Prejudice that do not Excuse. 
 
 74. Conscientious Scruples against Capital Punishment. 
 
 75. Conscientious Scruples against Capital Punishment on Circumstantial 
 
 Evidence. 
 711. Opinions Touchinic the Merits of the Particular Case. 
 
 77. Nature of the Opinion which Disqualifies. 
 
 78. [Continued.] Must be of a Fixed and Positive Cliaracter. 
 7'J. Opinions Avliich do not Disqualify. 
 
 80. Opinions winch will Require P>vidence to Kemove them. 
 
 81. Newspaper Reports of Former Trial. 
 
 82. Statutes Kemovini: Common-Law Di^squaliticatiou. 
 
 83. Declaration of Venire-Man tliat lie can Render an Impartial Verdict. 
 
 § 71. Grounds of Challenge the same for the State as for 
 the Accused. — Here it .should be observed that, in respect of 
 the grounds of challeuge, though not always in respect of the 
 mimber of the challenges, the rights of the State and the accused 
 are precisely the same. The bias, i)rejudice or opinion which 
 will disqualify the venire-man when entertained against the case 
 of the accused, will e(]ually disqualify him when entertained 
 against the case of the prosecution.^ Indeed, it has been held, 
 under a statute which is little less than declaratory of the gen- 
 erally accepted ride, that a juror cannot be interrogated as to 
 ivhich side his opinion favors or disfavors, and accordingly that 
 it is not necessary, in order to reverse a judgment for overruling 
 a challenge to a juror entertaining a disqualifying opinion, to show 
 that the opinion was unfavorable to the com})l:iining party'.^ 
 But the better opinion would seem to be that the party complain- 
 ing of the disallowance of his challenge ought to show that the 
 juror was prejudiced ciriainM him, and therefore that he tvaives 
 his ground of comi)laint by not interrogating the juror as to the 
 directiofio^ his opinion.^ 
 
 1 state r. West, G9 Mo. 401,403; 2 people v. Williams, C Cal. 20d. 
 
 Com. V. Lesher, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. 
 155; Commander v. State, 60 Ala. 1 ; 1 3 3^^^^ ^ Efler, 85 N. C. 585. 
 
 Burr. Tr. 495; Piersou v. State, 18 
 Tex. App. 524.
 
 62 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 72. Bias, Prejudice, Opinion. — Some useless casuistry 
 has been expended upon a supposed distinction between preju- 
 dice and bias, resulting in the conclusion that, while prejudice is 
 a prejudgment of the particular case, bias is a predisposition or 
 leaning, from some other cause, toward one side or the other of 
 it.^ As the usual mental conception vrhich is conveyed by the 
 word prejudice is a condition of the mind, founded in opinion, 
 which has resulted in bias more or less complicated with ill feel- 
 ing^ and as plain men on a jury panel will not ordinarily taka 
 any essential distinction between the two expressions, — it must 
 follow that refinements upon this subject can serve no useful 
 purpose in the administration of justice. 
 
 § 73. Kinds of Bias and Prejudice that do not excuse. — A 
 
 general prejudice against crime, •^ or prejudice against the partic- 
 ular crime with which the accused stands charged,^ or against the 
 criminal business for which he is prosecuted;^ or against the 
 particular unlawful act for the alleged doing of which the action 
 is brought, it being a civil action ;^ or against the class of actions 
 to which his suit belongs; ^ or even a prejudice against the de- 
 fendant himself, arising solely from the fact of his being engaged 
 in a criminal or unlawful business, and therefore tantamount ta 
 
 1 Thomp. & Mer. Jur., § 191. Com- ^ United States v. Noelke, 17 Blatchf . 
 pare the following cases: Com. v. (U. S.) 554. 
 
 Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 297; Win- ^ Davis v. Hunter, 7 Ala. 135. In 
 
 nesheik Ins. Co. v. Schueller, 60 111. an action for the killing of sheep by 
 
 473; People ■;;. Keyes, 5 Cal. 847, 349; clogs, a juror Avho said that he had 
 
 Willis V. State, 12 Ga. 444, 448; Mc- such a bias or prejudice about the 
 
 Causland v. McCauslaud, 1 Yeates matter of dogs killing sheep as would 
 
 (Pa.), 372, 378; Willis v. State, 12 Ga. interfei-e with his impartial judgment 
 
 444, 448, per Nisbet, J. in the case, was held to have been 
 
 2 State V. Burns, 85 Mo. 47; s. c. properly excused, upon a challenge 
 aff' d, 16 Mo. App 555. for cause. Anson v. Dwight, 18 Iowa, 
 
 3 United States v. Hanway, 2 Wall. 241. 
 
 Jr. (U. S.) 139; Williams v. State, 3 " That is, against slander suits, 
 
 Ga. 453; Parker v. State, 34 Ga. 262; Young v. Bridges, 34 La. Ann. sm. 
 
 United States v. Noelke, 17 Blatch. Or against personal damage suits. 
 
 (U.S.) 554; s. c. 1 Fed. Eep. 426; 9 McCarthy v. Railway Co. (Mo.), 4 S.W 
 
 Reporter, 505; State v. Nelson, 58 Iowa, Rep. 516. 
 208.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 63 
 
 a prejudice against the business merely; ^ or a prejudice against 
 the kind of defense whieh he sets up, e. g., insaniti/ ; - or an unfav- 
 orable opini(»n of his natio)ialit//,'^ov of his cJiarader, derived from 
 general reputation,* — Avill not excuse the venire-man, provided 
 he is able, for the time being, to lay aside his unfavorable opinion 
 and give the accused a fair trial according to the evidence.^ So, 
 on a trial for nmrdcr, the result of an anarchical conspiracy, a 
 prejudice against socialists, communists and anarcltists is not of 
 itself a disciualitication.^ On the other hand, a })elief that the 
 accused is innocent, although the law })resumcs him to be such; ^ 
 
 1 Uuited States v. Borger, 7 Fed. 
 Rep. rJ3; Uuited States v. Duff, C Fed. 
 Rep. 45, 48. The fact that the veuire- 
 iiiau is prejudiced agaiust the business 
 of the challeugiug party but uot against 
 him, is uot a siillicieut grountl of ciial- 
 lenge for priucipal cause. Maretzek 
 V. Cauldwell, 2 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) 407; 
 s. c. 5 Pvobt. fiiiO; Uuited States v. 
 Noelke, 17 Blatclif. (U. S.)*554; Elliott 
 V. State, 73 lud. 10. Though it has 
 beeu held that a mau who iu order to 
 suppress liquor -selling, would stop 
 short of mob violence ouly, ought to lie 
 excused. Albrecht v. Wallcer, 73 111. 
 69. See also Wiuueshcik Jus. Co. v. 
 Schueller.t;0 111. 4i;.-.: Swigart v. State, 
 67 lud. 287; s. c. 21 Alb. L. J. 278; 
 Reiser v. Liues, 57 Iiid. 431. Compare 
 Elliott V. State, 73 lud. 10. In a simi- 
 lar case a juror is properly rejected 
 whose prejudice against the defend- 
 ant's business is such that he cannot 
 give the testimony of a person engaged 
 iu the same business as the defendant 
 the same weight whicii he could the 
 testimony of other persons. Robiuson 
 V. Randall, 82 111. 515. Contra, Shields 
 V. State, 95 lud. 299. AUte.r, where the 
 business is perse unlawful. This dis- 
 tiuctiou was overlooked iu Meaux v. 
 Whitehall, 8 Bradw. (111.) 173. One 
 who believes that only an immoral mau 
 would sell liquor is iucompeteut on the 
 
 trial of au application for a license. 
 Chaudler v. Ruebett, 83 lud. 139. 
 
 2 People V. Carpenter, 38 Hun (N. 
 Y.), 490; s. c. 102 N. Y. 238; Hall t>. 
 Com. (Pa.), 12Atl. Rep. 163; s. c. 11 
 Ceut. Rep. 183; Butler v. State, 97 
 lud. 378: provided the prejudice is uot 
 uureasonable. Ibid. 
 
 s Balbo V. People, 19 Huu (N. Y.), 
 424; s. c. affirmed, 80 N. Y. 484. Com- 
 pare People ». Christie, 2 Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 579; s. c. 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 256; People v. Keyes, 5 Cal. 347; Peo- 
 ple V. Gar Soy (Sup. Ct. Cal., Dec. 
 1880). 23 Alb. L. J. 418. 
 
 ■» People V. Lohman, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 450; People v. Knickerbocker, 1 Park. 
 Cr. (N. Y.) 302; People v. Allen, 43 N. 
 Y. 28; Anderson v. State, 14 Ga. 710; 
 Willis V. State, 12 Ga. 444; State v. 
 Schnapper, 22 La. Ann. 43; People v. 
 :Mahouey, 18 Cal. 180; State v. Davis, 
 14 Nev. 439, 450; Monroe v. State, 23 
 Tex. 210. 
 
 ^ See preceding cases, and also 
 Martin v. State, 25 Ga. 494. 
 
 6 The Anarchists' Case (Spies v. 
 People), 122 111. 1; s. c. 12 North East. 
 Rep. 865. 
 
 ^ 1 Burr. Tr. 425, per Marshall, C. 
 J.; State v. West, 69 Mo. 401, 403, per 
 Henry, J, See also Com. v. Lesher, 
 17 Serg. &R. (Pa.) 155; Commander 
 V. State, 60 Ala. 1.
 
 64 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 an expressed wish or desire that he may prevail ; ^ an expressed 
 opinion by one who has signed a petition for his pardon, that he 
 has been already sufficiently punished ; ^ a feeling of unwilling- 
 ness on the part of the venire-man to t,rust himself as a juror on 
 the trial ; ^ a preference in case the evidence is evenly balanced,^ 
 such as would incline the mind of the juror to lean one way 
 or the other,^ — have generally, though not always, been held 
 ofood o;rounds of clialleno;e. It is not oround of rejecting a 
 venire-man that he has an unfriehdly feeling towards one of the 
 attorneys of the challenging party ."^ 
 
 § 74. Couscientioiis Scruples against Capital Punishment. — 
 
 It is now settled that these are good grounds of challenge in a 
 
 1 Mason v. State, 15 Tex. App. oSi; 
 Pike County v. GrifBu &c. Plank Road 
 Co., 15 Ga. 39. 
 
 - Asbury Ins. Co. v. Warren, 66 Me. 
 523. 
 
 3 Com. V. Webster, 5 Cash. (Mass.) 
 295, 298; Montague v. Com., 10 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 767, overruling upon this point 
 Lithgow V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297; Mc- 
 Laren V. Birdsong, 24 Ga. 265; Ed- 
 wards V. Parrar, 2 La. Ann. 307; De- 
 jaruette v. Com. (Va.), 11 Reporter, 
 653; O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276; 
 s. c. in court below, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 274; Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147; s. 
 c. 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 15; 18 Abb. Pr. 
 147. See the dissenting opinion of 
 Brockenbrough, J., in Lithgow v. 
 Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297. 
 
 •* Mima Queeu r. Hepburn. 7 Cranch 
 (U. S.), 290; Meaux v. Whitehall, 8 
 Bradw. (111.) 173. Accordingly, it lias 
 been held that venire-men may be in- 
 terrogated as to which way they woiild 
 be inclined to decide the case, if, upon 
 liearing the testimony, tliey sliould 
 find it evenly balanced. Cliicago &c. 
 R. Co. r. Adler, 56 111. 345; Chicago 
 &c. R. Co. V. Buttoff, 66 111. 347 ; Ga- 
 
 lena &c. R. Co. V. Haslan, 73 III. 494; 
 Richmond r. Roberts, 98 111. 472. Tills 
 seems to be an exception to the gen- 
 eral rule that hypothetical questions 
 are not to be put to the venire-man on 
 his -voir dire with a view of testing his 
 competency. See State v. Arnold, 12 
 Iowa, 479; State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439.; 
 State V. Leicht, 17 Iowa, 28 ; State v. 
 Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673; State v. Ben- 
 nett, 14 La. Ann. 651; State v. Bill, 15 
 La. Ann. 114. But in one jurisdiction 
 such a disposition does not disqualify, 
 provided the venire -man states that if 
 the evidence were against the party 
 toward whom he would be inclined if 
 it were equally balanced, he would do 
 his duty as a juror under the instruc- 
 tions of the court. McFadden r. Wal- 
 lace, 38 Cal. 51: Trenor v. Central 
 Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 222. 
 
 5 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 
 111. 345, witli whicli compare Richmond 
 V. Roberts, 98 111. 472. See also Curry 
 V. State, 4 Neb. 545; Sam v. State, 13 
 Sm. &M. (Miss.) 189, 193; Richey y. 
 Missouri &c. R. Co., 17 Mo. App. 581. 
 
 6 Hutchinson v. State, 19 Neb. 262.
 
 Tit. I, CI). III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 65 
 
 capital case,^ without reference to the grouiuls upon which such 
 scruples arise ; ^ though some courts have held such venire-men 
 competent where they were confident of their ability to do jus- 
 tice between the State and the accused, notwithstanding such 
 scruples,'^ but this seems to be an unsound view.^ This rule of 
 
 » L'uited States r. Coruell, 2 JIusou 
 (U. S.), 91, 104; Uuited States v. 
 Ware, 2 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 477; 
 O'Brien v. The People, 3f> N. Y. 270; 
 s.c. 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 274; Loweu- 
 Ijurg V. The People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 414, 425; Uuited States v. Wilsou, 
 Baldwin, C. C. (U. S.) 83; Clore's 
 Case, 8 Gratt. (Va.) flOG; Lewis v. 
 State,9Smod. & M. (Miss.) 115; Will- 
 iams V. State, 32 Miss. 381); State v. 
 Kennedy, 8 Rob. (La.) 590; Cora. v. 
 Tworably, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 480, note; 
 Burrell v. State, IS Tex. 713; Hvde v. 
 State, 113 Tex. 445; White v. State, 1(5 
 Tex. 207; Kennedy r. State, 19 Tex. 
 App. 618; Jackson r. State, 74 Ala. 2*;; 
 Garrett r. State, 7G Ala. 18; Moutairue 
 r. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 7(>7; People 
 V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; Waller v. 
 State, 40 Ala. 325; People ». Tanner, 
 
 2 Cal. 257; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 
 53(!, 556; State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225; 
 Etheridge r. State, 8 Tex. App. 133; 
 Com. V. Sherry, Whart. on Hom. 481; 
 Martin v. State, 16 Ohio, 364; Hay- 
 wood i?. Calhoun, 2 Ohio St. 164; St. 
 Louis V. Sttvte, 8 Neb. 405; Williams 
 t\ State, 3 Ga. 453; Russell v. State, 
 53 Miss. 367; White v. State, 52 Miss. 
 216; Portenberry v. State, 55 Miss. 
 403; Jones v. State, 2 Blackf. (lud.) 
 475; Gross v. State, 2 Ind. 329; Dris- 
 kill r. State, 7 Ind. 338; Fahuestock 
 V. State, 23 Ind. 231; Greeuley v. 
 State, 60 Ind. 141; Stepheuson v. 
 State (Ind.), 4 North East. Rep. 360; 
 Mondays. State, 32 Ga. 672; State v. 
 West, 69 Mo. 401 ; People v. Wilson, 
 
 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 199; State r. Mul- 
 
 len, 14 La. Ann. 570; State v. Reeves, 
 11 La. Ann. ('>So; State v. Clark, 32 
 La. Ann. 559; Metzger v. State, ISFla. 
 481; States. Hing, 16 Nev. 307; Peo- 
 ple ?7. Damon, 13 AA'end. (N. Y.) 351. 
 Contra, Com. v. Gross, 1 Ashra. (Pa.) 
 281, 287 (overruled by Com. v. Lesher, 
 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 155). In United 
 States V. McMahon, 4 Crauch C. C. 
 (U. S.) 573, the question was sub- 
 mitted to triors. Compare People v. 
 Ryan, 2 Wheel. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 47; 
 People V. Jones, Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. 
 Y.) 112. It was so established by 
 statute in New York as early as 1801, 
 in respect of Quakers. 2 Rev. Stat. 
 N. Y. 734, § 12. 
 
 - Walter r. People, 32 N. Y. 147, 161 ; 
 O'Brieu V. People, 36 N. Y. 276, 278; 
 Gordon v. People, 33 N. Y. 501; Peo- 
 ple V. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140, 143, per 
 Murray, C. J. See also Com. v. Web- 
 ster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295,298; Atkins 
 V. State, 16 Ark. 568. It is no evi- 
 dence of the existence of the consci- 
 entious scruples in question that a 
 juror, when interrogated upon the 
 subject, simply says that he " would 
 not like for a man to be hung." Smith 
 V. State, 55 Miss. 410. 
 
 3 Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389; 
 People V. AVilson, 3 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 199; Stratton v. People, ' 5 Colo. 
 
 27(;. 
 
 * Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325. A 
 juror wlio stated upon the voir dire 
 tliat he did not think he could do the 
 prisoner justice, Avas held incompe- 
 tent, although he subsequently stated 
 that he could come to the trial with an
 
 66 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 exclusion applies, although the offense is one for which capital 
 punishment may be given, although a lower degree of punish- 
 ment may be assessed ^ by the jury.^ 
 
 § 75. Conscientious Scruples against Capital Punishment 
 on Circumstantial Evidence. — For the same reason the venire- 
 man w^ill be excused where he declares that his conscientious 
 scruples against capital punishment are limited to cases in which 
 circumstantial evidence is relied upon for a conviction, '^ since 
 the law recognizes such evidence as of equal value with other 
 evidence,* although the particular case depends on direct testi- 
 mony.^ But it has been held that some j^rejudice against con- 
 victing on circumstantial evidence is not sufficient ground of 
 challenge for cause. ^ 
 
 § 76. Opinions Touching the 3Ierits of the Particular 
 Case. — This is by far the most frequent ground of challenge in 
 criminal cases. The American law in respect of it is in such a state 
 of confusion that no success can be hoped for in reconcding con- 
 flicting 0})inions, or even in arraying the decisions in logical 
 order. ^ A disqualifying opinion is at common law a principal 
 cause of challenge, as distinguished from a cause of challenge to 
 the favor ; ^ though under that system a challenge to the favor may 
 
 unbiased aud uuprejudiced miud. Reg. (J71; State u. Bunger, 11 La. Ann. 
 
 Wright V. Com., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 941. 607; State v. Pritcliard, 15 Nev. 74. 
 
 ^ People V. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257. See * Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 1 ; People 
 
 also Caldwell v. State, 41 Tex. 87; v. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 398; State v. 
 
 State V. Melvin, 11 La. Ann. 535; Dris- West, m Mo. 401; Gates v. People, 14 
 
 kill V. State, 7 lud. 338; Greeuley v. 111. 433; Jones v. State, 57 Miss. (385; 
 
 State, CO lud. 141; People v. Majors, State v. Buuger, 11 La. Ann. 607. 
 G5 Cal. 138. 5 Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484. 
 
 2 Spain V. State, 59 Miss. 19; « State v. Shields, 33 La. Ami. 991. 
 Cooper y. State, Id. 267. ' See the observations of Clark, J., 
 
 3 Schafer V. State, 7 Tex. App. 239; in Rothschild v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 Clanton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 139; 519, 542; also People v. Reynolds, 16 
 Jones w. State, 57 Miss. 684; State v. Cal. 128. 
 
 Pritchard, 15 Nev. 74; Smith v. State, ^ Pringle v. Huse, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 55 Ala. 1; Peoples. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 432; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cow. (N. 
 
 398; State v. West, 69 Mo, 401; Gates Y.) 555; People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 
 
 V. People, 14 111. 433; s. c. 2 Am. L. (N. Y.) 108; People v. Allen, 43 N. Y
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 67 
 
 be taken on this ground and .submitted to triors,^ whose decision in 
 favor of competency will be conclusive, notwithstanding the court 
 might have ruled otherwise on a challenge for principal cause. ^ At 
 common law, it was necessary not merely that the venire-man 
 should have formed^ but also that he should have expressed a 
 disqualifying opinion, in order to support a challenge for prin- 
 cipal cause, -^ — the reason being that one Avho has expressed an 
 opinion is likely to be restrained by his own pride from recant- 
 ing it. But numerous American holdings make the existence 
 of such an opinion, admitted by the venire-man on his voir dire, 
 a sood cause of challensfe.^ 
 
 28; Rice v. The State, 1 Yerg. (Teuu.) 
 432; McGowau v. The State, 9 Yerg. 
 (Teuu.) 184; Com. v. Lesher, 17 Serg. 
 & R. (Pa.) 15(5. 
 
 1 Freeman v. People, 4 Deu. (N. Y.) 
 9, 35; People v. Houeymau, 3 Deu. (N. 
 Y.) 121; Smith v. Floyd, 18 Barb. (N. 
 Y.) 522; People -y. McMahou, 2 Park. 
 Cr. (N. Y.).0(J3; Audersou v. State, 14 
 Ga. 709; Ray v. State, 15 Ga. 223; 
 Stout V. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 132; Schoeffler V. State, 3 Wis. 823. 
 
 '' People V. Alleu, 43 N. Y. 28. 
 
 3 1 Burr. Tr. 44, per Marshall, C. .J. ; 
 State V. Godfrey, Brayt. (Vt.) 170; 
 United States v. Watkius, 3 Crauch C. 
 C. (U. S.) 505; Uuited States v. 
 Devaughau, 3 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 
 84; State v. Madoil, 12 Fla. 151; 
 Boardmau v. Wood, 3 Vt. 570; State v. 
 Clark, 42 Vt. (329; State v. Pliair, 48 
 Vt. 3(;(J; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483; 
 Noble V. People, 1 111. 29; Hudgius v. 
 State, 2 Ga. 173; Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 
 619; Reynolds v. State, 1 Ga. 228; 
 Baker y. State, 15 Ga. 498; Griffin v. 
 State, 15 Ga. 47G. Oue of the grounds 
 alleged against Mr. Justice Chase on 
 the trial of his impeachment was that, 
 in the trial of Calleuder's Case, he had 
 coupled these two elements together, 
 though he had put the question iu the 
 
 disjunctive on the previous trial of 
 Fries' Case (Cliase Tr. 117; Fries' 
 Case, Whart. St. Tr. 610, 614; Cal- 
 ender's Case, Wliart. St. Tr. 688, 
 G9<)) ; and the invective launched 
 agaiust the traverser by John Ran- 
 dolpli ou this grouud showed that 
 distinguished mau to be a better 
 orator than lawyer ; for it was only the 
 expression of a disqualifying opinion 
 at common law that afforded ground 
 of challenge. Hawk. P. C, chap. 43, 
 § 28; Rex v. Edmunds, 4 Barn. & Aid. 
 471, 492. 
 
 ^ Osiauder v. Com., 3 Leigh (Va.), 
 780; Arraistead's Case, 11 Leigh 
 (Va.), 657; State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 
 126; United States v. Hamvay (Walsh's 
 Case), 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 139; 
 United States v. Wilsou, Bald. C. C. 
 84 ; People v. Christie, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 579; s. c. 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 256; 
 Com. V. Kuapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 496, 
 498 ; Com. V. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 295, 298 ; People v. Hettick, 1 Wheeler 
 Cr. C. (N. Y.) 399; People v. Melvin,2 
 AVlieeler Cr. C. (N. Y.) 265; People v. 
 Johnson, 2 Wheeler Cr. C. (N. Y.) 
 361, 367; Eomaine v. State, 7 Ind. 63; 
 Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720; Maize 
 V. Sewell, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 447; Front 
 V. Williams, 29 Ind. 18.
 
 68 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 77. Nature of the Opinion which Disqualifies. — By the 
 
 common law the fact that a venire-man had declared his opinion 
 that the accused was guilty, that he would be hanged, and the 
 like, was good cause of challenge,^ unless it should appear that the 
 declaration was made from his own knowledge of the cause, and 
 not out of any ill-will to the party. ^ This exception carries us 
 back to the early days of jury trial, when jurors were summoned 
 devicineto, because they had knowledge of the controversy to be 
 tried, and therefore sat in the character of witnesses as well as 
 in that of triors. It is unsuited to modern conceptions, and, 
 though approved in England as late as 1821,^ and in a few instances 
 in this country,* it is not in general the law with us ; but here 
 the question usuallj' is whether, from any cause, the juror has 
 such a bias of mind as may disqualify him from deciding impar- 
 tially.^ In some States the fact that the venire-man has been 
 summoned as a witness, is a o;ood cause of challenge." 
 
 1 2 Hawk. P. C, chap. 43, § 28: 
 Cook's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 333; 
 Barbot's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 1233; 
 Layer's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 137; 
 O'Coigly'sCase, 2G How. St. Tr. 1227; 
 Home Tooke's Case, 25 How. St. Tr. 
 17. 
 
 2 2 Hawk. P. C, chap. 43, § 2^. See 
 also Brooke's Abr., Challenge, pi. 90, 
 citing 21 Hen. VII. 29; Bac. Abr., 
 Juries, E. 5; Eex v. Edmunds, 4 Barn. 
 & Aid. 471, 490. See also Brook's 
 Abr., Challenge, 55, and Fitzherbert's 
 Abr., Challenge, 22, citing the charge 
 of Babington to the triors in the Year 
 Book, 7 Hen. VI. fol. 25; Trials per 
 Pais (1725), 189. 
 
 3 By Lord Tenterden in Rex v. Ed- 
 munds, supra. 
 
 < State V. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 19C, 
 198; State v. Pox, 29 N. J. L. 506; 
 Pettis V. Warren, Kirby, 426. See also 
 State V. Howard, 17 N. H. 171, 192. 
 
 s Trial of Aaron Burr, vol. I, p. 
 414, opinion of Marshall, C. .T. ; Blake 
 'J. Millspaugh, 1 Johns. (N. Y) 316; 
 
 Durell V. Mosher, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 445; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 555; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 229, 241; People v. Van Al- 
 styne, MS., cited in 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 565; People r. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 108; 
 Solander v. People, 2 Col. 48,59; Boon 
 V. Georgia, 1 Ga. 618, 622;^ State v. 
 Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 454; Wa- 
 ters V. State, 51 Md. 430; Hudgins v. 
 State, 2 Ga. 173. If a juror has A,7ioioZ- 
 edge of the facts in controversy, he 
 should be sworn and examined as a 
 witness, so that he may be cross- 
 examined, and so that his testimony 
 shall not be given for the first time in 
 the jury room out of the presence of 
 the parties. Rex v. Perkins, Holt, 403; 
 Hauser v. Com., 5 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 
 668; Dunbar r. Parks, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 
 217; Green r. Hill, 4 Tex. 465; United 
 States r. Fourteen Packages, Gilp. (U. 
 S.) 236; Fellows' Case, 5 Me. 333; 
 Rondeau v. New Orleans &c. Co., 15 La. 
 160. 
 
 « Com. V. Joliffe, 7 Watts (Pa.),
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 69 
 
 § 78, [Contiimed.] 3Iiist be of a Fixed and Positive Char- 
 acter. — Expressed in the vaiying terms of judicial opinions, 
 the opinion concerning the merits of the case on trial which dis- 
 qualifies the venire-man must be a j^.x-ecZ, settled, absolute, i^ositive^ 
 decided, subst ant ialf deliberate ov unconditional opinion/ no mat- 
 ter from \\\\)xt source derived.'-^ But the source is so far material 
 
 585; Atkins I'. State, 60 Ala. 45; Com- 
 mander V. State, 60 Ala. 1 ; State v. 
 Underwood, 2 Overton (Tenn.), 92; 
 Hook V. Page, 1 Overton (Tenn.), 250. 
 But see FelloTVs's Case, 5 Me. 333; 
 Handly v. Call, 30 Me. 9; Bell v. State, 
 44 Ala. 393; Rondeau v. New Orleans 
 Co., 15 La. IGO. Whei-ethis is so, the 
 juror does not render himself compe- 
 tent by disclaimino; all kuowledire of 
 the case. "West v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 119. Nor is the error of putting him 
 on the juiy cured by omitting to call 
 him as a witness. Atkins v. State, 
 60 Ala. 45. But it has been held no 
 cause of challenge that the venire-man 
 was examined as a witness on a former 
 trial of the same cause before arbitra- 
 tors. Harper v. Keen, 11 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 280. Nor that, in a criminal 
 case, he had been called on a former 
 trial as a witness for the State to tes- 
 tify against the general character of 
 the prisoner. Fellows's Case, 5 Me. 
 333. 
 
 1 Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 823; 
 People V. King, 27 Cal. 507; Jackson 
 V. State, 77 Ala. 18; People v. Bodine, 
 1 Den. (N. Y.) 308; State v. Howard, 
 17 N. H. 192; Staup v. Com.. 74 Pa. 
 St. 458; Rafe v. State, 20 Ga. 60; 
 Osiander v. Com., 3 Leigh (Va.), 780; 
 Arraistead v. Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 
 657; Lithgow v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297; 
 Sprouce v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 375; Jack- 
 son V. Com., 23 Graft. (Va.) 919; 
 Thompson v. Updegraff, 3 W. Va. 629; 
 Brown v. Com., 2 Leigh (Va.), 769; 
 State V. George, 8 Rob. (La.) 535; 
 
 State V. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 505 ; Wright 
 V. State, 18 Ga. 383; People v. Stout, 
 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 71, 117. See also 
 State V. Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238. 
 Judges frequently tise the term 
 •' opinion " as synonymous with 
 " tixed opinion." See Reynolds v. 
 State, 1 Ga. 222, with which decision 
 compare Hndgins v. State, 2 Ga. 173, 
 180; Maddox v. State, 32 Ga. 581. 
 
 '^ Boon V. State, 1 Ga. 631; Logan 
 V. State, 50 Miss. 269, 275; Lycoming 
 Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward, 90 111. 545; 
 Leach v. People, 53 111. 311; Smith v. 
 Fames, 4 111. 76; Carson v. State, 50 
 Ala. 134; Hall v. State, 61 Ala. 9; 
 State V. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 450; Payne 
 V. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 375; Rice 
 V. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 432; Mc- 
 Gowan v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184; 
 Coleman v. Hagerman, MS., cited in 6 
 Cow. (N. Y.) 564; People v. Mather, 4 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 229, 244; Greenfield v. 
 People, 74N. Y.277; Norfleet v. State, 
 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 340; Sam v. State, 
 
 31 Miss. 480; Goodwin v. Blachley, 4 
 lud. 438; Meyer v. State, 19 Ark. 156; 
 Fonts V. State, 7 Ohio St. 471 ; Armi- 
 stead V. Com., 11 Leigh (Va.), 657; 
 Staup V. Com., 74 Pa. St. 458; People 
 V. Mallon, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 224; Lith- 
 gow V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297; Sprouce 
 V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 375; Conway v. 
 Clinton, 1 Utah, 215; Wright v. Com., 
 
 32 Gratt. (Va.) 941; Jackson v. Com., 
 23 Gratt. (Va.) 919; Gardner v. Peo- 
 ple, 4 111. 84; Neely's Case, 13 111. 685. 
 But see Clore's Case, 8 Gratt. (Va.) 
 607; Trial of Aaron Burr, p. 370;
 
 70 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 that disqualifying opinions which have been derived from an 
 auihentiG source,^ as from hearing the evidence tijjon a former 
 (rial of the same case,^ or from conversations ivith witnesses^ or 
 
 Moses V. State, 10 Humph. (Teun.) 
 4oG; s. c. 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 232; 
 McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 184; Payne v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 375; Balbo v. People, 80 N. Y. 484, 
 492, 493, per Andrews, J. ; State v. 
 McClear, 11 Nev. 39, G7; Logan v. 
 State, 50 Miss. 2G9, 275; State v. 
 Brette, C La. Ann. 652; Gray v. People, 
 26 111. 344; ArmisteaO v. Com., 11 
 Leigh (Va.),G57; Maddox v. State, 32 
 Ga. 581; Neely v. People, 13 111. 685; 
 People V. Cottle, 6 Cal. 227; People v. 
 Edwards, 41 Cal. 640; People v. Rey- 
 nolds, 16 Cal. 128, 133; People v. 
 Brotherton, 43 Cal. 530; s. c. 1 Green's 
 Cr. L. 739; People v. Gehr, 8 Cal. 359; 
 Ruff V. Rader, 2 Mont. 211. The 
 juror's statement that the opinion is 
 "unqualified" receives weighty con- 
 sideration. State r. Gillicli, 10 Iowa, 
 98. The source of the opinion is ma- 
 terial only as throwing doul^t upon its 
 disqualifying character, where doubts 
 arise on that question. "Wormeley v. 
 Com., 10 Graft. (Va.) 658, 687. The 
 numerous cases which hold that opin- 
 ions based upon rumor merely do not 
 disqualify, are reconcilable with the 
 foregoing only upon the ground that 
 such opinions are not, from their na- 
 ture, of that tixed character which will 
 not yield to evidence. Alfred r. State, 
 3 Swan (Tenn.), 581. See also 
 Major V. State, 4 Sneed (Ky.), 597; 
 People V. Hayes, Edm. Sel. Cas. (X. 
 Y.) 582; Carson v. State, 50 Ala. 134; 
 Curley v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 151. In the 
 view of these cases " belief " is syn- 
 onymous with a "tixed opinion." 
 But see Neely v. People, 13 111. 685; 
 Bales V. State, 63 Ala. 30, 36. In the 
 California Penal Code " belief " is 
 
 used as synonymous with " unquali- 
 fied opinion." Cal. Penal Code, § 1074, 
 subsec. 8. 
 
 1 Troxdale v. State, 9 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 411. 
 
 2 Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 555; People V. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) 121; Grissom t\ State, 4 Tex. 
 App. 374; Jacol)s v. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 278; Willis v. State, /d. 297; Jackson 
 V. Com., 23 Graft. (Va.) 919; Apper- 
 son V. Logwood, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 262; Lloyd v. Nourse, 2 Rawle (Pa.), 
 49; Garthwaite 17. Tatum, 21 Ark. 336; 
 Irvine v. Kean, 14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 292; State v. McClear, 11 Nev. 39, 67; 
 McGuffie V. State, 17 Ga. 497; State v. 
 AVebster, 13 N. H. 491; Studley v. 
 Hall, 22 Me. 198; Sara v. State, 13 
 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 189. One who 
 has formed an opinion from reading 
 the evidence on the trial of an accom- 
 plice is so disqualified. Brown v. State, 
 70 lud. 576. Contra, that the mere fact 
 of having heard such evidence does 
 not disqualify. Thompson r. State, 19 
 Tex. App. 593. 
 
 3 People V. Johnson, 46 Cal. 78; 
 Logan V. State, 50 Miss. 275; State v. 
 George, 8 Rob. (La.) 535, 537; Good- 
 win I'. Blachley, 4 Ind. 438; Dugle 
 V. State, 100 Ind. 259 (by statute); 
 Bishop V. State, 9 Ga. 121. But see 
 State V. Guidry, 28 La. Ann. 630. The 
 mere circumstance that a juror has 
 listened to the testimony, or has con- 
 versed with witnesses in ^ case, is not 
 a cause of challenge, if he has formed 
 no opinion based upon such testimony 
 or conversation. Page v. Com., 27 
 Graft, (Va.) 954; Thomson v. People, 
 24 111. 60; Parchmau v. State, 2 Tex. 
 App. 228; Shields v. State, 8 Tex.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 71 
 
 with a jx(r(^,^ or with one who heard the witnesses testify on a 
 former trial or examination.^ will be a grood ground of challenge. 
 Within this rule, a mere impression, not amounting to a fixed or 
 settled o})ini()n,"^ will not disqualify; though if, on examination, 
 what -the juror calls an impression appears to be a fixed opinion, 
 the challenge will be sustained.* Conversely, what the juror 
 calls an opiuion may turn out on examination to be a slight im- 
 pression which will yield to evidence, in which case the chal- 
 lenge will be overruled.'^ It is but another expression of the same 
 idea that an in<lpji)iite opinion does not disqualify.® In short, 
 the rule cannot be better stated than in the language of Chief 
 Justice Shaw in the celebrated trial of Professor "Webster for 
 the murder of Dr. Parkman: "■ The o})inion or judgment," said 
 he, '' must be something more than a vague impression, formed 
 from casual observation with others, or from reading imperfect, 
 abbreviated newspaper reports. It nuist be such an opinion 
 upon the merits of the question as would })e likely to bias or 
 pervert a candid judgment \.\\)o\\ a full hearing of the evidence. 
 If one has formed what in some sense might be called an opin- 
 
 App. 427; Harper v. Kean, 11 Sersi. & 
 R. (Pa.) •2sO: Kay r. State, 2 Kau. 
 405; Lycoming lus. Co. v. Ward, 90 
 111. 545; State v. Aver, 23 N. H. 301; 
 Com. V. Reid, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 3^15; 
 Uuited States v. Duff (U. S. Cir. Ct. 
 S. D. New York, Jan. 1881, Benedict, 
 D. J.), 6 Fed. Rep. 45; McCune v. 
 Com., 2 Rob. (Va.) 777; JSIouroe v. 
 State, 23 Tex. 10. Compare IMoran u. 
 Com., 9 Leigh (Va.), r.51. Such con- 
 versations as to incidental or collat- 
 eral matters do not disqualify. Walker 
 V. State, 102 lud. 502. 
 
 1 Rogers v. Rogers, 14 Wend. (X. 
 Y.) 131: Young v. Marine Ins. Co., 1 
 Cranch C. \ (U. S.) 452. 
 
 2 Nelms V. State, 13 Smed. & M. 
 (Miss.) 500, 504; Quesenberry v. 
 State, 3 Stew. &Port. (Ala.), 308; Sam 
 V. State, 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) ISO: 
 Nedv. State, 7 Porter (Ala.), 187. But 
 
 see Jackson v. Com., 23 Gratt. (Va.) 
 919. 
 
 * People r. Honeyman, 3 Denio (N- 
 Y.), 121; People v. Symonds, 22 Cal. 
 348; Gold Mining Co. v. Nat. Bank, 90 
 U. S. 040; Noe v. State, 4 How- 
 (Miss.) 330; White v. State, 52 Miss- 
 21G; State v. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673; 
 State V. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. G91; 
 State V. Ilugel, 27 La. Ann. 375; State 
 V. Medlicott, 9 Kau. 257; Travis v. 
 Com., lOi) Pa. St. 597. 
 
 * Greentield v. The People, 74 N. Y. 
 277, 2.S3. 
 
 5 Payne v. The State, 3 Humph. 
 (Teun.) 375; State v. Wilson, 38 
 Conn. 120, 138; Norfleet r. The State, 
 4 Sneed (Tenn.), 340, 343; Palmer v. 
 The People, 4 Neb. 68, 75; Com. v. 
 Leuox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249; United 
 States r. Reynolds, 1 Utah, 319. 
 
 « State w. Hoyt, 47 Conu. 518.
 
 72 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ion, but which yet fell far short of exciting any bias or preju- 
 dice, he might conscientiously discharge his duty as a juror." ^ 
 
 § 79. Opinions which do not Disqualify. — Lord Mansfield's 
 standard that " a juror should be as ivhite as jyaper,'' ^ jias long 
 since been discarded as impracticable,-^ and that of Chief Justice 
 Marshall, laid down in the trial of Aaron Burr, has been generally 
 substituted in its place. " Were it possible," said he, " to obtain 
 a jury without any prepossessions whatever, respecting the guilt 
 or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely desirable to 
 obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps impossible, and therefore 
 will not be required. The opinion which has been avowed by 
 the court is, that light impressions which may fairly be supposed 
 to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave 
 the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, consti- 
 tute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong 
 and deep impressions which will close the mind against the testi- 
 mony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will 
 combat that testimony, and resist its force, do constitute a suffi- 
 cient objection to him." * Improper expressions of opinion, 
 shown to have been made in a spirit of levity, have been often 
 overlooked;^ but if the venire-man has talked about the case and 
 
 1 Com. V. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 295, 297. See also State v. Pike (Sup. 
 Ct. N. H.),llAm. L. Reg. 233, aud 
 particularly the opinion of Lomax, J., 
 in Clore's Case, 8 Gratt. (Va.) GOG, G17. 
 
 2 Mylock V. Saladiu, 1 W. Bl. 480, 
 481. 
 
 ^ McCausland v. McCausland, 1 
 Yeates (Pa.), 372, 378; O'Mara v. Com., 
 75 Pa. St. 424,428; Reynolds v. United 
 States, 98 U. S. 145, 156. 
 
 * Trial of Aaron Burr, vol. 1, p. 
 41G. See also Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 
 618,625; Nelms v. State, 13 Smed. & 
 M. (Miss.) 500, 504; Smithy. Eames, 
 4 111. 7G; Leach v. People, 53 111. 311; 
 Black V. State, 42 Tex. 377; Stater. 
 Desmouchet, 32 La. Ann. 1241. 
 
 3 John V. State, 16 Ga. 200; Mou- 
 ghon V. State, 59 Ga. 308; Com. v. 
 Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 415, 421; 
 Lovett r. State, 60 Ga. 257; Simms v. 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 230; Com. v. Hail- 
 stock, 2 Gratt. (Va.)564; State ?;.Dis- 
 kin,35La. Ann. 46 ; Johnson v. State, 11 
 Lea (Teun.) , 47. Compare State ^.'.Rev- 
 ells, 35 La. Ann. 342 ; State v. Coleman, 
 20 S. C. 441. It was so held in the 
 case of one of the venire-men sum- 
 moned on the trial of Aarou Burr, 
 who on his voir dire, admitted as fol- 
 lows: "I met an intimate friend to 
 whom I observed that I had come to 
 town with a hope of being placed on 
 this jury, and if I were, I would hang 
 Colonel Burr at once without further
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 73 
 
 has strong opinions, he should bo rejected,^ Accordingly it is 
 no longer a ground of disqutdilictition that the juror has heard 
 much about the case, provided he has formed no opinion thereon ; ^ 
 nor that what he has heard has impressed itself upon his mind 
 as a fact, provided the impression is such as will readily yield to 
 the evidence presented in the case.'^ Of this character are many 
 opinions formed from reading newspapers * and from other 
 sources of so unsubstantial a character that a contradiction from 
 the same source would be as readily accepted as true,^ — but, as 
 
 inquiry. 1 Burr. Tr. 423., Contra, 
 Braketield v. State, 1 Sueed (Teuu.), 
 21."). Compare State v. Colemau, 20 S. 
 C. 441. 
 
 1 Ward V. State, 19 Tex. App. Mi. 
 
 2 State V, Howard, 17 N. II. 171; 
 State V. Potter, 18 Couu. IGG; Com. v. 
 Thrasher, 11 Gray (Mass.), .57. 
 
 3 Scrautou v. Stewart, 52 lud. (!S ; 
 McGresrg v. State, i Bhickf. (lud.) 
 101 ; Vau Yacter v. McKillip, 7 Blackf. 
 (lud.) 578; Morirau v. Steveusou, (> 
 lud. 109; Rice v. State, 7 lud. 332; 
 Lithiiow V. Coui., 2 Va. Cas. 297, 31-3; 
 Ulrich V. People, 39 Mich. 245; State 
 P. George, 8 Rob. (La.) 535; State v. 
 Colemau, 27 La. Auu. 691,692; State 
 V. De Ranee, 34 La. Anu. 186; State v. 
 Dugay, 35 La. Auu. 327; State v. Wal- 
 tou, 74 Mo. 270; State v. Bahar, Id. 
 292. Compare State v. .Johnsou, 33 La. 
 Aun. 889; Guetig v. State, G(; lud. 94; 
 Noe V. State, 92 Ind. 92; Conaster v. 
 State, 12 Lea (Teuu.), 436. A juror 
 whose frame of miud is such that he 
 is iu doubt as to Avhether the opiuiou 
 he has formed would readily yield to 
 the evidence ought to be excluded. 
 Dejaruette v. Com., 11 Reporter, (;53; 
 s. c. 75 Va. 867. Compare Stout v. 
 People, 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 71, 111. 
 
 * State V. Meyer, 58 Vt. 457 ; Speuce 
 V. State, 15 Lea (Teuu.), 539; Bohauau 
 V. State, 18 Neb. 57; State v. Wilsou, 
 85 Mo. 1.30: Dolan v. State, 40 Ark 
 
 454; Allison u. Com., 99 Pa. St. 17; 
 Gradle v. Hoffman, 105 111. 147; State 
 V. Meaker, 54 Yt. 112; State v. Hoyt, 
 47 Coun. 518; People v. Oyer & Ter- 
 miner Court, 83 N. Y. 436. Contra, iu 
 McIIugh V. State, 38 Oh. St. 153, it is 
 held that oue who has formed and 
 expressed an ojuniou of guilt, from 
 newspaper accounts, iu a capital case, 
 is disqualitied. 
 
 5 People V. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 71; Peoi)le v. .Johnson, 2 Wheeler 
 Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 361, 369; Loweuberg 
 V. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 414, 423; 
 Easou V. State, 6 Baxter (Teuu.), 466, 
 477; State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166; 
 State V. Wilsou, 38 Couu. 126; O'Con- 
 nor u. State, 9 Fla. 215; Montague v. 
 State, 17 Fla. 662; Bradford v. State, 
 15 lud. 347; State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & 
 B. (N. C.) 196; Morgan v. State, 31 
 lud. 193; Clem v. State, 33 lud. 418; 
 Cluck V. State, 40 lud. 2»;3; Scrautou 
 V. Stewart, 52 Ind. GS; Pahnestock v. 
 State, 23 Ind. 231; Meyer v. State, 
 19 Ark. 156; State v. Spaulding, 24 
 Kan. 1; People v. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 
 128; Shoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 823; 
 People V. Mallon, 3 Laus. (N. Y.) 224; 
 Lithgow V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297; Holt 
 V. People, 13 Mich. 224 ; King v. State, 
 5 How. (Miss.) 730; State v. Flower, 
 Walker (Miss.), 318; State v. Ray- 
 mond, 11 Nev. 98; People v. King, 27 
 Cal. 507; People v. Williams, 17 Cal.
 
 74 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thonip. Tr., 
 
 all opinions, founded on the belief of facts derived from the 
 testimony of others, are of this character, it is obvious that we 
 get no safe rule from the use of this expression. Such opinions 
 may involve the rankest prejudice. Great care should therefore 
 be exercised in interrogating the venire-man who entertains 
 them, as to the strength of his belief in them.^ Such opinions 
 are frequently disregarded in the venire-man, on the ground of 
 their being hypothetical opinions merely."^ 
 
 142; State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275; 
 Hudgins v. State, 2 Ga. 133; State v. 
 Cockinau, 2 Wiust. (N. C.) 95; State 
 V. Ellington, 7 Ired. L. (N. C.) 61; 
 Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430; s. c. 8 
 Eeporter, 560; Little v. Com., 25 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 921; United States v. McHeury, 
 6 Blatchf. (U. S.) 503; Brown v. Com., 
 2 Leigh (Va.), 769; McCune v. Com., 
 2 Eol). (Va.) 771; Irvine v. Lumber- 
 men's Bank, 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 190; 
 Wright V. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 194; Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St. 328; 
 Erazier v. State, 23 Ohio St. 551; 
 State V. Dove, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 469; 
 Hart V. State, 57 Ind. 102; State v. 
 Bone, 7 Jones L. (N. C.) 121; State v. 
 Collins, 70 N. C. 241; Sanchez v. Peo- 
 ple, 4 Park. Cr.'(N. Y.) 535; Union 
 Gold M. Co. V. Rocky Mountain Nat. 
 Bank, 2 Colo. 565; State x>. Johnson, 
 Walker (Miss.), 392; Sam ??. State, 13 
 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 189 ; Lee v. State, 
 45 Miss. 114; State v. Bunger, 14 La. 
 Ann. 461; State v. Lartigue, 29 La. 
 Ann. 642; State x. Hinkle, 6 lov^a, 
 380; State v. Sater, 8 Iowa, 420; State 
 V. Lawrence, 38 Iowa, 51; McGregg v. 
 State, 4 Blackf . (Ind.) 101 ; Plummer v. 
 People, 74 111. 361 ; Thompson v. State, 
 24 Ga. 297; People v. McCauley, 1 Cal. 
 379; Skinner v. State, 53 Miss. 399; 
 State V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518. Within 
 this category are impressions formed 
 from vague and floatiug rumors, of 
 whose authenticity the venire-man 
 
 has no just grounds of 'belief. Payne 
 V. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 375; 
 People V. O'Loughlin, 3 Utah, 133. 
 It is obvious that this rule must be 
 guardedly applied. Eason v. State, 6 
 Baxt. (Tenn.) 466, 477. 
 
 1 Trimble v. State, 2 G. Greene 
 (la.), 404; Armistead v. Com., 11 
 Leigh (Va.), 657; People v. Johnston, 
 46 Cal. 78 ; Gardner v. People, 4 111. 
 83; Rothschild v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 519; Moses v. State, 10 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 456; Neely «. People, 13 111. 
 685; Brown v. State, 70 Ind. 577; 
 State V. Ricks, 32 La. Ann. 1098. 
 But see Epes' Case, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 
 676; Smith v. Com., 6 Gratt. (Va.) 
 696; Smith v. Com., 7 Gratt. (Va.) 
 593; Dejarnette v. Com., 75 Va. 867. 
 
 2 Durell V. Mosher, 8 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 445. See also Com. v. Hughes, 5 
 Rand. (Va.) 655; State v. Farrow, 74 
 Mo. 531 ; People v. Johnson, 2 Wheeler 
 Cr. Cas. 361, 369; People v. Fuller, 2 
 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 16; Mann v. Glover, 
 14 N. J. L. 195; State v. Spencer, 21 N. 
 J. L. 197; Burk v. State, 27 Ind. 430; 
 State V. Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 454; 
 Osianderv. Com., 3 Leigh (Va.), 780; 
 State V. Flower, Walker (Miss.), 318; 
 People V. Murphy, 45 Cal. 137; Jack- 
 sou V. Com., 23 Gratt. (Va.) 919; 
 Moran v. Com., 9 Leigh (Va.),651; 
 Loeffener v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598; 
 State V. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435 ; State 
 V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518; Jackson v.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 
 
 75 
 
 § 80. Opinions which will require Evidence to Remove 
 
 them. — Opinions -wliich will require evidence to remove them dis- 
 qualify the juror in the oi)ini()n of many courts.^ Other courts, 
 following the lead of Chief Justice Marshall in Burr's case, lay 
 this test aside, reasoning that " the fact that it would take evi- 
 dence to remove an opinion would appear to be only the natural 
 adjunct of every opinion formed upon rumor." ^ But not only 
 the opinion of Chief tJustice Marshall,-^ })ut all other judicial 
 opinion, so far as known, is to the effect that, if the venire-num 
 has acquired that fixed and jmsitive opinion which disqualifies 
 him — if, in other words, he has made up his judgment in the 
 case — the law will not trust him to change that opinion or that 
 judgment after hearing the evidence.* A venire-man entertain- 
 
 Com., 23 Gratt. (Va.) iati, tiL'S; 
 "Wright r. Com., 32 Gratt. (Va.) !i41, 
 943; Balding v. State (Tex.), 9 S. W. 
 Eep. 579. 
 
 1 Uuited States v. Wilson, Baldwin 
 (U. S.), 85; People r. Mather, 4 
 Wend. (X. Y.) 229; Easou v. The 
 State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 4CG, 47G; Com. 
 V. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 49(i; Cotton 
 V. State, 31 Miss. 504; White i-. Moses, 
 11 Cal. G8; Fahnestock v. State, 23 
 Ind. 231; Armistead v. Com., 11 Leigh 
 (Va.), 657; People v. Mallou, 3 Lans. 
 (N. Y.), 224; Stephens «. People, 38 
 Mich. 739; People v. Cottle, 6 Cal. 
 227; Peoples. Gehr, 8 Cal. 359; Con- 
 way I'. Clinton, 1 Utah, 215; Roth- 
 schild V. State, 7 Tex. App. 519; 
 Uuited States v. Hanwav, 2 AVall. Jr. 
 (U. S.) 139; Rufe v. Rader, 2 Mont. 
 211; Moses v. State, 10 Hnmph. 
 (Tenn.) 45G; Sam v. State, 13 Smed. & 
 M. (Miss.) 189 ; Alfred v. State, 37 Miss. 
 296; State r. Buuger, 11 La. Ann. 607; 
 Collins V. People, 48 111. 145; Gray v. 
 People, 26 111. 344; Caucemi v. Peo- 
 ple, 16 K. Y. 501; Olive v. State, 11 
 Neb. 1; Polk r. State, 45 Ark. 1G5 
 (overruling Casey v. State, 37 Ark. 
 G7). 
 
 2 Per Lewis, P. J., in State v. Bar- 
 ton, 8 Mo. App. 15, 17; s. c. 71 Mo. 
 288. See also State v. Core, 70 Mo. 
 491; State v. Greeuwade, 72 Mo. 298; 
 State V. Davis, 29 Mo. 397; State ?j. 
 Carson, 50 Ala. 134; Bales t. State, 63 
 Ala. 30; Reynolds v. L'nited States, 98 
 U. S. 145; Curley v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 
 151 (the juror Lorah) ; Ortweiu v. 
 Com., 76 Pa. St. 414; Estes v. Rich- 
 ardson, 6 Nev. 128; People v. King, 27 
 Cal. 507; Wilson v. State, 94 111. 299; 
 Ogle r. State, 33 Miss. 383; Thomas v. 
 State, 36 Tex. 310; Post v. State, 10 
 Tex. App. 579; O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 
 St. 424; Myers v. Com., 79 Pa. St. 308; 
 State V. Lawrence, 38 Iowa, 51; State 
 V. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257; Guetig v. 
 State, 66 Ind. 94; People r. Brown, 48 
 Cal. 253; People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174; 
 Stout V. State, 90 Ind. 1. 
 
 ^ 1 Burr Tr. 41G. 
 
 4 Com. V. Lesher, 17 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) ],-;5, 156; United States v. Wil- 
 son, Bald. C. C. (U. S.) 84; Rothschild 
 ■c. State, 7 Tex. App. 619; People v. 
 Johnson, 46 Cal. 78; State v. Ricks, 
 32 La. Ann. 109^; Burr's Trial, vol. I, 
 p. 416. See also Fonts r. State, 7 Ohio 
 St. 471 ; Trimble v. State, 2 G. Greene
 
 76 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ing such an opinion is not to be put upon the jury in the confi- 
 dence that he can render an impartial verdict; since, under 
 such circumstances, his effort to justify such a confidence might 
 incline him too far in the opposite direction.^ Therefore, if he 
 has an opinion whicli it would require strong evidence to change, 
 it is an abuse of discretion to admit him, although he may testify 
 that he believes he can render an impartial verdict.^ If his 
 opinion of guilt is so strong that he can only admit the j^ossibilily 
 of innocence, he must be rejected.^ An iritimate friend of the 
 deceased, who has expressed the opinion that the defendant is 
 guilty of his murder, is incompetent, although he states on his 
 voir dire that he can give the accused a fair trial.* 
 
 § 81. Newspaper Reports of Former Trial. — Again, one 
 court has taken the view that opinion derived from reading news- 
 
 (la.), 40-t; Staixp v. Com., 74 Pa. St. 
 458; People v. Gehr, 8 Cal. 359; Baker 
 V. Harris, 1 Wiust. (N. C.) 277; Cou- 
 way V. Cliutou, 1 Utah, 215; Cottou v. 
 State, 32 Tex. 614; Black v. State, 42 
 Tex. 377; GoocIt^'Iu v. Blachley, 4 lud. 
 438; Irvine v. Keau, 14 Serg. & E. 
 (Pa.) 292; Sam v. State, 13 Smed. & 
 M. (Miss.) 189, 194; Alfred v. State, 
 37 Miss. 296 ; Logan v. State, 50 Miss. 
 275; State v. Bunger, 11 La. Ann. 607; 
 Eason v. State, 6 Baxter (Teun.), 466, 
 476; Peoples. Weil, 40 Cal. 268; Ste- 
 phens V. People, 38 Mich. 739; State v. 
 Miller, 29 Kan. 43; State v. Carrick, 6 
 Nev. 120. The mind of the court must 
 be satisfied that the challenged juror 
 is free from bias and prejudice and not 
 merely that of the juror himself. 
 Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468 ; Cooper v. 
 State, 16 Ohio St. 328, 332; Peoples. 
 Woods, 29 Cal. 135. But see Thomas 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 315. It seems that 
 the fact that the venire-man has 
 formed an unqualified opinion does not 
 noAV disqualify in California. People 
 V. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548. 
 
 1 Rice V. State, 1 Yerg. (Teun.) 432, 
 
 434; State v. Allen, 46 Conn. 531, 549. 
 The penetrating mind of Aaron Burr, 
 ■ftheu oif trial for treason against the 
 United States, appreciated the force of 
 this last proposition, as Avill be seen 
 from the following extract from the 
 report of his trial: "Mr. Bott (a 
 juror) : ' I have gone as far as to de- 
 clare that Col. Burr ought to be 
 hanged.' Mr. Burr: <Do you think 
 that such declarations would now in- 
 fluence your judgment? Would not 
 the evidence alter your opinion? ' 
 Mr. Bott: 'Human nature is very 
 frail. I know that the evidence 
 ought, but it might or might not influ- 
 ence me. I have expressed myself in 
 this manner, perhaps, within a fort- 
 night ; and I do not consider myself a 
 proper juryman.' Mr. Burr:'* * * 
 I will take Mr. Bott under the belief 
 that he will do me justice.' " 1 Burr's 
 Trial, 426. 
 
 2 Palmer v. State, 42 Ohio St. 596 
 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 
 3 Olive u. State, 11 Neb. 1. 
 
 * State V. Jackson, 37 La. Ann. 768,
 
 Tit. I, Ch. III.] CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE. 77 
 
 paper reports of a former trial may or may not disqualify, ac- 
 cording to the fullness of the re})orts, the attention with which 
 they have been read, and other circumstances. Accordingly, we 
 find that such opinions have operated to disqualify^ or not," ac- 
 cording to the circumstances, and the extent to which the par- 
 ticular courts were disposed to relax the strict rule. FolloAving 
 back and forth the oscillations of the pendulum, we find that one 
 court has hit upon the conce})tion that the inquiry is to be ad- 
 dressed to the present condition of the mind of the venire-man, 
 and that a disqualifying opinion, formerly entertained, which has 
 changed and passed away, furnishes no ground of exclusion.-^ 
 Another court has taken the view that, after a venire-man has 
 expressed a positive opinion, he ought not to be heard on his 
 voir dire to say that he t/ie)i had no opinion.* 
 
 §82. Statutes removinj? Common-law Disqualification. — 
 
 The advance in the popular intelligence and the wide dissemina- 
 tion of a knowledge of current events through the medium of 
 the press, have rendered it impracticable to secure a jury of in- 
 telligent men for the trial of causes which have excited much 
 public attention, and have resulted in the necessity of trying such 
 causes before juries composed of the more ignorant portion of 
 the community. To remedy this evil, statutes have recently been 
 passed in several States, removing the common-law ground of 
 
 1 Staupv. Com., 74 Pa. St. 458. Com- 2 Grissom v. State, 4 Tex. App. 374. 
 
 pare with this case Myers v. Com., 79 See also Smith v. Com., 6 Gratt. 
 
 Pa. St. 308. See al^o State u. Clark, (Va.) G!;i7; Smith v. Cora., 7 Gratt. 
 
 42Vt. 029; GreentieUlr. People, 74 N. (Va.) 593; State v. Brown, 71 Mo. 
 
 Y. 277 (compare Balbo v. People, 19 454; Reynolds r. United States, 98 U. 
 
 Hun (X. Y.), 424; s. c. 80 N. Y. 484); S. 145: Ortweiu r. Com., 76 Pa. St. 
 
 Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 31; Smith v. 414; Weston v. Com., Ill Pa. St. 251 
 
 State, 5 Neb. 181; Guetig v. State, 06 (newspaper account of trial of one 
 
 Ind. 94; State v. Culler, 82 Mo. jointly indicted with defendaut) . 
 623. In Ohio a juror is rendered in- ■'' Rothschild v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 competent by statute who forms an 544; Grissom i\ State, 8 Tex. App. 386, 
 
 opinion from reading reports of the 3!»(;. 
 
 testimony of witnesses as to the facts * Norfleet v. State, 4 Sueed (Tenu.), 
 
 of the case. Laws 1872, p. 11. This 340, 345. 
 includes newspaper reports. Fraziei" v. 
 State, 23 Ohio St. 551.
 
 78 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 challenge explained in the preceding sections, provided the venire- 
 man shall declare on oath that he verily believes that he can 
 render an impartial verdict according to the evidence, and that 
 his previously formed opinion or impression will not bias or in- 
 fluence his verdict.^ Such statutes have been held not unconsti- 
 tutional as invading the right of trial by jury.^ 
 
 § 83. Declaration of Venire-man that he can render an 
 Impartial Verdict. — It has come to this, under many recent 
 statutes and holdings, especially in cases where the opinion was 
 formed from newspaper reports, that it is not error to seat the ve- 
 nire-man, where he declares on oath that, notwithstanding his pre- 
 vious opinion, he believes that he can render an impartial verdict 
 on the evidence, — a statement w^hich the natural pride of many 
 men would lead them to make.^ But if he hesitates in saying 
 
 1 Laws of New York 1872, chap. 
 475, p. 1133; Laws of Michigan 1873, 
 act 117, p. 1G2; Laws Colo. 1877, § 872; 
 111. Stat. 1885, p. 1422. The Michigan 
 statute has been interpreted as declara- 
 tory of tlie previously existing law in 
 that State. Stevens v. People, 38 Mich. 
 739; Ulrich v. People, 39 Mich. 245. 
 See also Palmer v. People, 4 Neb. (J8, 
 75, construing a similar statute in that 
 State. For the construction of the 
 New Yorii statute see Thomas v. Peo- 
 ple, 67 N. Y. 218; Abbott v. People, 86 
 N. Y. 4(;0; People v. Otto, 101 N. Y. 
 690; 8. c. 5 North East. Rep. 788; Peo- 
 ple V. Crowley, 102 N. Y''. 234; s. c. 6 
 North East. Eep. 384; People v. Car- 
 penter, 102 N. Y. 238; s. c. 6 North 
 East. Rep. 584; People v. Biiddenseick 
 (N. Y.), 9 North East. Rep. 44; Balbo 
 V. People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 421; s. c. 80 
 N. Y. 484; Phelps v. People, 6 Hiin (N. 
 Y.), 401; s. c. 72 N. Y. 334; Cox v. 
 People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 430; s. c. af- 
 firmed, 80 N. Y. 500; Manke v. People, 
 
 17 Hun (N. Y.), 410; Pender v. People, 
 
 18 Hun (N. Y.), 560; Greenfield v. Peo- 
 
 I^le, 13 Hun (N. Y.), 242; s. c. reversed, 
 74 N. Y. 227. Cases construing the 
 Nebraska statute : Carroll v. State, 5 
 Neb. 32; Smith v. State, 5 Neb. 181. 
 
 - Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 
 173; Jones v. People, 2 Colo. 351; 
 Cooper V. State, 16 Oh. St. 328. 
 
 3 People V. Willett, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 
 500; People v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115 
 (under N. Y. Cod(!, § 376) ; Jones v. 
 People, 6 Colo. 452 (under a statute) ; 
 State V. Kilgore, 93 N. C. 533; State v. 
 George, 37 La. Ann. 786 ; Allison v. 
 Com., 99 Pa. St. 17 (Mercur, J., dis- 
 senting) ; State v. Spaulding, 24 Kan. 
 1; State v. Core, 70 Mo. 491; Zimmer- 
 man V. State, 56 Md. 536; Stout v. 
 State,90Iud. 1; People v. Cornetti, 92 
 N. Y. 85; Murphy v. State, 15 Neb. 
 383; Doll v. State (Ohio), 15 North 
 East. Rep. 293; State v. Sopher 
 (Iowa), 30 N. W. Rep. 917; State v. 
 Bryant (Mo.), 6 S. W. Rep. 102; State 
 V. Walton, 74 Mo. 270; State v. Bar- 
 ton, 71 Mo. 288; State v. Brow]K 71 
 Mo. .454; Hall v. Com. (Pa.), 12 Atl. 
 Rep. 163; s. c. 11 Centr. Rep. 183.
 
 Tit. 1, Ch. 111.] CHALLENGES FOK CAUSE. 
 
 79 
 
 whether his previously formed opinion would influence his ver- 
 dict, he should be rejected. 
 
 Aud the judge may still, iu his dis- 
 cretion, reject him. State v. Barues, 
 34: La. Auu. 395 (Bermudez, C. J., 
 and Levy, J., disseutiug). The fact 
 that a large number of venire men 
 were called before the juiy was finally 
 
 obtained, does not show that the jury 
 was prejudiced against the accused, 
 or unfavorable to him, or moved by 
 improper motives. People v. Beck- 
 with (N. Y.), 15 North East. Rep. 53.
 
 80 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF THE DETAILS OF PRACTICE IX CHALLEXGING AXD IMPAXELING. 
 
 Article I. — Challenging, Impaneling, Swearing. 
 Article II. — Objections and the Waiver and Review of the 
 Same. 
 
 Article I. — Challenging, Impaneling, Swearing. 
 
 Section 
 
 88. Discretion of tlie Court in Respect of Iinpaueling tlie Jury. 
 
 81). [Coutiuued.] Illustratious. 
 
 90. Power of Court to Discharge Jurors after they have been Sworn. 
 
 91. Time and Order of Challenging. 
 
 92. [Continued.] Right to hold Peremptory Challenges in Reserve. 
 
 93. Retraction of Challenge or of Acceptance. 
 
 94. Order of Cliallenging as between the Parties. 
 
 95. Mode of Imjianeling 
 
 96. Impaneling by Lot. 
 
 97. Challenging the Polls of a Special Jury. 
 
 98. Ground of Challenge must be Specifically Stated. 
 
 99. Triors of Challenges. 
 
 100. The Court as a Substitute for Triors. 
 
 101. Examination of tlie Venire -man on the Voir Dire. 
 
 102. What Questions may be put to the Venire-man. 
 
 103. [Continued.] Questions Touching Religious or Political OpinionSj 
 
 Affiliations, etc. 
 
 104. Swearing Singly or in a Body. 
 
 105. Time of Swearing. 
 
 106. Reswearing the Jury. 
 
 107. Swearing for the Term. 
 
 108. Form of the Oath. ' 
 
 109. [Continued.] In Particular Cases. 
 
 § 88. Discretion of the Court in respect of Impaneling the 
 Jury. — In the superintendence of the process of impaneling the 
 jury, a large discretion is necessarily contided to the judge, which 
 discretion will not be revised on error or appeal, unless it appears
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMFANELING. 
 
 81 
 
 to have beon grossly abused or exercised contrary to law.^ The 
 exercise of this discretion is generally uphold, in excusina juror, 
 on grounds personal to him,-' or because he is manifestly dis- 
 
 1 Head v. State, 4+ Miss. 731, 750. 
 See also Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 
 (i41; McCarty i\ State, 2() Miss. 30-2; 
 Marsh r. State, 30 Miss. n27; State 
 i\ Marshall, s Ala. 302; Smith v. State, 
 55 Ala. 1, 10; McAllister r. State, 17 
 Ala. 434; Johusou v. State, 58 Ga. 491 ; 
 Thomas v. State, 27 Ga. 287 ; Powers 
 r. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227; Grady v. 
 Early, 18 Cal. 108; Garrisou v. Port- 
 laud, 2 Ore. 123; State r. Shelledy, 
 8 Iowa, 477; Chase r. State, 4G Miss. 
 (183; State v. Ostrauder, 18 Iowa, 435; 
 Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 53ij; Ilubotter 
 V. State, 32 Tex. 479 ; Kay v. State, 4 
 Tex. App. 450; Gardeuhire v. State, 
 Tex. App. 147; Dixou v. State, 2 Tex. 
 App. 530; Harkius r. State, Tex. 
 App. 452; Walker r. Keiinisou, 34 N. 
 H. 257; Wilsou r. State, 31 Ala. 371; 
 Funkhouser v. Pogue, 13 Ark. 2'.t5; 
 Heyl V. State (lud.), 10 North East. 
 Hep. 91fi; s. c. 109 lud. 58'J; Deig v. 
 Morehead (lud.), 11 Id. 458; s. c. 110 
 lud. 451. Eveu where a statute makes 
 it "the imperative duty of the court, 
 before admiuisteriug to the juror the 
 oath, to ascertain tliatlie is possessed 
 of the qualiticatious required by law," 
 it is uot necessary that it should ap- 
 pear, on appeal or error, that the 
 judge plied him with questions; but 
 if he was satisfied from his personal 
 knowledge of the man, his answers to 
 otlier questions, or his reputation for 
 integrity and intelligence, or other- 
 wise, that he was qualitied, it will be 
 sutticient, and his judgment will uot 
 l)e reviewed. .Tames v. State," 53 Ala. 
 380. 
 
 2 Ante, § 11; State v. Moncla (La.), 
 2 South. Rep. 814; Ray v. The State, 4 
 Tex. Ai^p. 450; Com. v. Livermore, 
 
 4 Gray (Mass.), 18; Atlas Mining Co. 
 V. .Johnston, 23 Mich. 37; Ware v. 
 Ware, 8 Me. 42; Hurley r. State, 2!) 
 Ark. 17, 22; State v. Ward, 3'J Vt. 
 225; Maner w. State, 8 Tex. App. Stil; 
 O'Brien v. Vulcau Iron Works, 7 Mo. 
 App. 257; Watson v. State, fiS Ind. 
 548; State v. Dickson, (i Kan. 20!); 
 Dodge V. People, 4 Neb. 220; Ander- 
 son V. Wasatch &c. R. Co., 2 Utah, 
 518. But contra^ see Montague v. 
 Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 7(:7; Boles v. 
 State, 13 Sraed. & M. (Miss.) 398; 
 Parsous v. State, 22 Ala. 50. The ac- 
 tion of the court iu excusiug jurors 
 will be regarded as proper, although 
 uo cause appears of record. State v. 
 Whitniau, 14 Rich. L. (S. C.) 113; 
 State r. Breaux, 32 La. Ann. 222. It 
 was so held where it appeared from 
 the record tiiat the juror was excused 
 '' to relieve him from embarrassment." 
 Johu V. State, Ifi Fla. 554. But see 
 Montague v. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 
 7(17. A sheriff has no power to excuse 
 jurors. But an appellate court will 
 not infer that a sheriff who has ex- 
 cused a portion of the panel did so 
 from improper motives, nor that such 
 action prejudiced any party. Ayers v. 
 Metcalf, 30 111. 307. The power of the 
 court to excuse a juror for satisfac- 
 tory reasons, is not impaired by a 
 statutory provision to tlie efifect that 
 " the tirst twelve persons who shall 
 appear, as their names are draAvn and 
 called, and sliall be approved as in- 
 different between parties, shall be 
 sworn, and shall be the jury to try 
 the cause." Atlas &c. Co. v. John- 
 ston, 23 Mich. 37. A struck juror may 
 be excused for a sufficient reason. 
 Stewart v. S' 1 Ob. St. CO. But
 
 82 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 qualified by reason of physical or mental infirmities,^ — as where 
 he is deaf^ intoxicated '^ or ill^^ or because of serious illness in his 
 family.^ So, the court may, ex mero motu^ examine venire-men 
 for grounds of partiality and direct them to stand aside ^ although 
 not challenged by either party ,^ and although not subject to chal- 
 lenge ; ' though in some jurisdictions venire-men thus stood aside 
 are not excused, but may be called and tried upon challenges, if 
 the regular panel is exhausted without securing a jury ; ^ and the 
 court has authority, either to examine the venire-man or any 
 other witnesses, to ascertain such matters of fact as will enable 
 it to exercise this power discreetly.^ It may exercise this power 
 where the venire-man is ignorant of the Enijlish lansuage,^" unless 
 
 where jurors are suramoued upou a 
 special venire, it has beeu held that uo 
 veuire-man can be excused until his 
 name is regularly called in court. 
 Foster v. State, 8 Tex. App. 248; 
 Robles V. State, 5 Tex. App. 346. Ex- 
 cusing talesmen who reside moi-e than 
 two miles from the court-house under 
 a recent Ala. statute. Steel v. State 
 (Ala.), 3 South. Rep. 547. 
 
 1 Mansellw. Reg., 8 El. & Bl. 54, 80. 
 
 2 Atlas Mining Co. v. Johnston, 23 
 Mich. 36; Jesse v. State, 20 Ga. 156. 
 
 3 Bullard v. Spoor, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 430; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536, 555; 
 Noleu 17. State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 520. 
 
 * Jewell V. Com., 22 Pa. St. 94; 
 Ray ^. State, 4 Tex. App. 450; Hub- 
 bard V. Gale, 105 Mass. 511. 
 
 5 Parsons v. State, 22 Ala. 50, 53. 
 It has, however, been held that the 
 juror should be excused only in those 
 cases of such a serious character as 
 to demand his personal attention, and 
 that the decision of the court upon 
 this point may be reviewed. Boles v. 
 State, 13 Smed. & M. 398; Parsons v. 
 State, supra. 
 
 <■' Atlas Mining Co. v. Johnston, 23 
 Mich. 36; Lore v. State, 4 Ala. 173; 
 Pierce o. State, 13 N. H. 536; State v. 
 
 Jones, 80 N. C. 415; State v. Prater 
 (S. C), 2 S. E. Rep. 108; State v. 
 Dodsou, 16 S. C. 459; State ». Cole- 
 man, 20 S. C. 448 ; White v. State, 52 
 Miss. 216; Stagner v. State, 9 Tex. 
 App. 440, 455; Lewis v. State, 9 Smed. 
 & M. (Miss.) 115; Marsh v. State, 30 
 Miss. 627 ; State v. Van Waggoner 
 (La.), 3 South. Rep. 119. Contra, Van 
 Blaricum v. State, 16 111. 364; Deun 
 V. Pissant, 1 N. J. L. 220. 
 
 ' Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day, 491 ; 
 Goodrich v. Burdick, 26 Mich. 39; 
 State V. Lewis, 28 La. Ann. 84; State 
 V. Williams, 30 Me. 484; Watson v. 
 State, 63 Ind. 548 ; Stout !0. Hyatt, 13 
 Kan. 232; Atchison &c. R. Co. v. 
 Franklin, 23 Kan. 75. 
 
 * Boardman v. Wood, 3 Vt. 570, 
 577; United States v. Watkins, 3 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 578; State t). How- 
 ard, 17 N. H. 171, 180. See in this con- 
 nection ante, § 49. 
 
 9 State V. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. (N. 
 C.) 196, 221 ; White v. State, 52 Miss. 
 217; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536. 
 
 '0 Atlas Mining Co. v. Johnston, 23 
 Mich. 36; O'Neil y. Lake Superior Iron 
 Co. (Mich.), 35 N. W. Rep. 162; State 
 V. Rosseau, 28 La. Ann. 579 ; People v. 
 Arceo, 32 Cal. 40; State v. Marshall, 8
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 83 
 
 in the particular jurisdiction this constitutes no disqualification : ^ 
 and, in capital cases, -where the venire-man discloses a tixetl 
 opinion against capital })unishnient ; - and, according to a case 
 applicable to a period in our political history through which we 
 have hai)pily passed, where the venire-man entertains a present 
 and unrelenting hostility against the government of the United 
 States.^ Caution should obviously be observed in the exercise 
 of this discretion; since, at least under some systems, by excus- 
 ing or discharging a great number of the regular panel, the court 
 and the parties may be driven to tilling it up by sunnnoning 
 talesmen from that well-known disreputable class of court idlers 
 called " professional jurors."'^ A remedy for excusing an un- 
 reasonable number of venire-men, thereby reducing the panel 
 below the number recpiin-d to make a jur\-,has been conceded in 
 one jurisdiction to exist in the form of a challenge to the array 
 of those remaining; ^ though the right to make this challenge is 
 waived by objecting in another form, and if the jury are sworn 
 without a challenge to the array, it seems that it becomes a legal 
 jury, although the objection, taken in another form, was erro- 
 neously overruled.^ The failure of the court to exercise this dis- 
 
 Ala. 301.'; State v. Guidry, 28 La. Auu. 
 630. lu Ciinipbell v. State, 48 Ga. 353, 
 it was held that the court had no riiiht 
 to purtie the panel of jurors, returned 
 for service durin<j; tiie term, of .such 
 jurors as could neither write the Eng- 
 lish language nor read the Constitution 
 ofHhe United States, and of the State 
 of Georgia. It was held that a chal- 
 lenge to the array after .such purging 
 ought to have been sustained. Wheth- 
 er this decision can be supported is 
 doubtful. It is certainly true that the 
 grounds upon which these jurors were 
 excused do not constitute a cause of 
 challenge. White v. State, 52 Miss. 
 216, 224; American Ins. Co. v. Mahoue, 
 56 Miss. 180; Citizens' Bank v. Strauss, 
 26 La. Ann. 736 ; State v. Lewis, 28 La. 
 Ann. 84; Cora. v. Winneraore, 1 Brewst. 
 (Pa.) 35G; s. c. 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 378. 
 
 But it has been held that althougii a 
 challenge is allowed upon this ground, 
 a new trial will not be granted, unless 
 it appears that the defendant has suf- 
 fered in consequence of such ruling. 
 Citizens' Bank v. Strauss, supra. 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 10, 55. 
 
 2 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason 
 (U. S.), 91; Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 
 325; Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367; 
 White V. State, 52 Miss. 216; Forten- 
 berry v. State, 55 Miss. 403. 
 
 ^ Klinger v. State, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 
 257. 
 
 * State V. Ostrauder, 18 Iowa, 485, 
 44<J ; Bissell v. Ryan, 23 111. 566 ; People 
 V. Honeyman, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 121. 
 
 5 Smith V. Clayton, 29 N.-J. L. 358. 
 
 6 Smith V. Clayton, 29 N. J. L. 358; 
 Gropp V. People, 67 111. 154; Emerick 
 V. Sloan, 18 Iowa, 140; Suttle v. Batie.
 
 84 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl"., 
 
 cretion of standing jurors aside of its own motion, for a cause of 
 challenge known to the court and to the parties, cannot, of 
 course, be assigned for error; since the objection is waived by 
 failino; to challeng-e.^ Moreover, statutes prescribinsi: the formal 
 details of impaneling are frequently regarded as directory, and 
 hence as yielding to this judicial discretion, w^here no prejudice 
 appears.'^ 
 
 § 89. [Continued.] Illustrations. — It is within the discretion 
 of the court to direct the names of twelve of the regular panel in 
 attendance to be omitted in impaneling a jury for a given cause, — 
 as, for example, where such jurors are deliberating in the jury 
 room,^ or have recently rendered a verdict in another case.^ In 
 the absence of statutory provisions, according to one view, after 
 the jurors are returned into court, all subsequent proceedings in 
 the process of impaneling the jury are left to the discretion of the 
 court.^ The court may, accordingly, in its discretion, when a 
 case comes on for trial, })reak up and re-arrange the panels, if 
 more than one is in attendance.^ Within the scope of this dis- 
 cretion are such questions as the order in which the name of 
 the jurors shall be called.^ But the court cannot, of course, 
 depart from the essential requirements of the law. Thus, 
 where jurors have been summoned upon a special venire for the 
 trial of a capital case, the court cannot take a portion of them 
 for the trial of another case;^ and a trial justice has no right, 
 
 1 Iowa, Ul. A challenge to the array -^ State v. Pitts, 58 Mo. 556; Kim- 
 may be waived after it has been taken, brough v. State, 62 Ala. 248. 
 by the challenging party consenting to * Alexander v. Oslikosh, 33 Wis. 
 the removal of the objectionable per- 277. 
 
 sons from the panel. "Whitley v. State, ^ Walker v. Kenuison, 34 N. H. 257. 
 
 38 Ga. 50. 6 Watson v. Walker, 33 N. H. 131, 
 
 1 State V. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. (N. 144; Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42; Duraut 
 C.) VM; Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142; v. Ashmore, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 184. 
 Bellows V. Weeks, 41 Vt. 590; Young "^ State v. Sims, 2 Bailey (S. C), 
 V. State, 23 Ohio St. 577; Skinner r. 20; State v. Crank, 2 Bailey (S. C), 66; 
 State, 53 Miss. 399 ; State v. Christian, Kleiuback v. State, 2 Speers L. (S 
 30 La. Ann. 367. C.) 418; State ?;. Brown, 3 Strob. L. 
 
 2 Murray V. State (Tex.), 3 S. W. (S. C.) 508. 
 
 Kep= 104. ^ Bates v. Bates, 19 Tex. 124.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 85 
 
 of his own motion, without ;iny exception being taken by eithe 
 party, to quash a panel and issue a new venire.^ 
 
 § 90. Power of Court to Discharge Jurors after they have 
 been Sworn. — Ahhouixh there are some lioKlinirs to the con- 
 trary,- the sound and prevailing opinion is that the court is not 
 bound to suffer the cause to proceed after discovering a fact go- 
 ing to the disqualiticatiou of a juror, in consequence of which any 
 verdict which may be rendered may be set aside. ^ The obnox- 
 ious juror may be excluded,^ although sworn, at any time before 
 evidence has been introduced.' So, the court niav discharge a 
 
 1 Cross V. Moultou, l.l Johus. (N. 
 Y.) 470. 
 
 - See State v. Williams, 3 Stew. 
 (Ala.) 454; Ward v. State, 1 Humph. 
 (Temi.) 253; Sm-.hr. State, 55 Ala. 1, 
 7; State v. ilorea, 2 Ala. 275; Gear- 
 hart r. Jordan, 11 Pa. St. 325; State v. 
 Stepheux, 11 So. Car. 31!); United 
 States V. Randall, 2 Crauch C. C. (U. 
 S.) 412. 
 
 3 Mitchell u. State, 43 Tex. 512, 
 51(5; Wormeley's Case, lOGratt. (Va.) 
 t>58; Muirhead v. Evans, (5 Exch. 447. 
 In this last case, it was discovered, 
 during the examination of the tirst 
 witness, that thei'e were thirteen 
 jurors in the box. It was impossible 
 to ascertain which juror was last 
 sworn. Twelve of this jury were aft- 
 erwards re-sworn, and the trial of the 
 case proceeded. This practice was 
 held to be correct. See upon this 
 point Davis v. State, 9 Tex. App. G34 : 
 Bullard v. State, 38 Tex. .504. 
 
 * State V. Reeves, U La. Ann. 
 685; Robinson v. State, 33 Ark. 180; 
 State V. Vestal, 82 N. C. 5(J3; State v. 
 Vaun, 82 N. C. 631 ; Nolen v. State, 2 
 Head (Tenn.), 520: Hines v. State, 8 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 597; State v. C«ra- 
 mings, 72 N. C. 469; Pannell v. State, 
 29 Ga. 681; Isaac v. State, 2 Head 
 (Tenn.), 458: Lewis v. State, 3 Head 
 
 (Tenn.), 127. The court may, in its 
 discretion, givu the prosecution in a 
 criminal case the privilege to re-ex- 
 amine a juror after his acceptance by 
 the State's attorney, but before his 
 acceptance by the defendant. The 
 allowance of a challenge for cause 
 shown upon the re-examination con- 
 stitutes no error. Belt v. People, 97 
 111. 4(;i. 
 
 ■' Spoford's Case, Clayton, 78; Peo- 
 ple w. Damon, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 351; 
 Lewis V. State, 9 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 
 115; McGuire v. State, 37 Miss. 369; 
 Tooel V. Cora., 11 Leigh (Va.), 714; 
 Spong V. Lesher, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 326; 
 Smith V. State, 55 Miss. 513; State v. 
 Adair, m N. C. 298; Com. v. Twora- 
 bly, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 480, note; State 
 V. Davis, 80 N. C. 412; Haynes v. 
 Crutchtield, 7 Ala. 189; Edwards v. 
 Farrar, 2 La. Ann. 307; Tweed's Case, 
 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) (n. s.) 371, note; 
 People V. Wilson, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 199; United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 23; Gilliam v. Brown, 43 
 Miss. 641 ; Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 
 389; Cornelius v. State, 12 Ark. 782; 
 Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App, 513; Stone 
 V. People, 3 111. 326; Jefferson v. State, 
 52 Miss. 767; Jackson v. State, 5i Ga. 
 402; Dilworth v. Com. 12 Gratt. r^a.) 
 689, 705; Watkins v. State, 6a G»,
 
 86 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 juror who has been sworn, if it appear that he will be physically 
 unable to sit throuo;h the trial. ^ The discharge or excusino: of a 
 juror after the jury has been sworn and charged with the 
 prisoner, will not operate to discharge him, but will operate as a 
 mistrial merely. A new jury may be called. The eleven who 
 remain may,^ except where the rule has been changed by statute,'^ 
 be put upon the prisoner again, and he may be allowed to exer- 
 cise upon them his right of challenge anew. 
 
 § 91. Time and Order of Challenging. — There can be no 
 challenge, either to the array or to the polls, until a panel suf- 
 ficiently numerous to compose a full jury appears.^ By the 
 common law, all challenges must be made before the juror is 
 sworn ; ^ but statutes exist in several American jurisdictions which 
 
 601. It has been held by one coiu't 
 that the sufflciency of the reasons for 
 such an exclusion will be examined on 
 appeal, and unless they are found to 
 be sound, the judgment will be re- 
 versed. Black V. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 328. 
 
 1 Fletcher v. State, 6 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 24!» ; Silsby v. Foote, 14 How. 
 (N. Y.) 218: s. c. 1 Blatch. 444. 
 
 2 Rex V. Edwards, Russ. & Ry. 223; 
 s.c. 4 Taunt. 309; 3 Camp. 207; Rex 
 V. Scalbert, 2 Leach C. C. 700; Greer 
 V. Norvill, 3 Hill (S. C), 2(32, 263. 
 Upon the discharge of a jury after be- 
 ing charged with the prisoner, see 
 notes to Eex v. Scalbert, supra, and to 
 Rex V. Edwards, 3 Camp. 207; Rex v. 
 Kinlock, 1 Wils. 157; s. c. Fost. Cr. 
 L. 16; Wedderburn's Case, Fost. Cr. 
 L. 23; Rex v. Delany, .Jebb C. C. 106; 
 Rex V. Barrett, Jebb C. C. 103. 
 
 3 See Garner v. State, 5 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 160; States. Curtis, 5 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 601; Snowden r. State, 7 
 Baxter (Tenii.), 482. 
 
 4 Clark V. Goode, 6 J. J. Marsh. 
 (Ky.) 637, 638. 
 
 ^ Wharton's Case, Yelvertou, 24; 
 
 Vicars v. Langham, Hob. 235; Blew- 
 ett V. Bainard, 1 Stra. 70; Tyndal's 
 Case, Cro. Car. 291. However, the 
 juror might be withdrawn by consent 
 of the adverse party. Gates' Case, 10 
 How. St. Tr. 1082. A juror may be 
 cliallenged for a cause happening since 
 he was sworn. Co. Litt. 158. a. ; Vi- 
 cai's V. Langham, Hob. 235; United 
 States V. Watkins, 3 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 S.) 441. Not so the panel; for as 
 stated by Hol)art, " no ill affection of 
 the sheriff, arising since the jury 
 sworn can make the jury suspect- 
 ed, that was impaneled before." 
 Vicars v. Langham, Hob. 235. This 
 is the practice in England at the pres- 
 ent time. Reg. v. Sullivan, 1 Per. & 
 Dav. 96; s. c. 8 Ad. & El. 831; Reg. v. 
 Wardle, Car. & M. 647; Rex v. Des- 
 pard, 2 Man. & Ry. 406, 409; Reg. v. 
 Key, 3 Car. & K. 371; s.c. 15 Jur. 
 1065. The same rule prevails in some 
 American jurisdictions. United States 
 V. Watkins, 3 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 443;.Epps v. State, 19 Ga. 102; State 
 V. Williams, 2 Hill (S. C), 381; Ward 
 V. State, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 254: Mc- 
 Faddeu v. Com., 23 Pa. St. 12, 17;
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 87 
 
 authorize the court, for reasons satisfactory to itself, to hear any 
 objection to a juror, even after he is sworn, before the jury is 
 completed. 1 The challenge to the array and the challenge to 
 the polls are taken separately. The challenge to the array al- 
 ways precedes challenges to the polls. If challenges to the polls 
 are made without challenging the array, the right to challeno'e 
 the array is waived. ^ So, the challenge for principal cause pre- 
 cedes the challenge to the favor.-^ 
 
 Queeu r. Hepburn, 7 Crauch (U. S.), 
 2'JO; State r. Auderson, 4 Nev. 2<55; 
 Rash V. State, 61 Ala. 89; State v. 
 Morea, 2 Ala. 275; State v. Patrick, 3 
 Joues L. (N. C.) 4i3; Nugeut v. Tre- 
 paguier, 2 ]Martiu (La.), 205; Com. v. 
 Gee, (] Cush. (Mass.) 174. Under this 
 practice the rule is that challenges 
 must be made as the jurors come to 
 the booli, before they are Sivoru. The 
 moment the oath is beguu it is too 
 late; and the oath is begun by the 
 juror taking the book, havinir been di- 
 rected by the officer of the court to do 
 so. Reg. V. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 
 137. See also Braudreth's Case, 32 
 How. St. Tr. 755, 777: Morris' Case, 
 4 How. St. Tr. 1255; State v. Davis, 
 80 N. C. 412; Com. v. Marrow, 3 
 Brewst. 402. This differs from the 
 Irish practice. By that practice it has 
 been generally held that the oath is 
 not commenced until after the clerk 
 of the Crown has said: '-Juror, look 
 upon the prisoner : prisoner, look upon 
 the juror." Reg. v. Hughes, 2 Craw. 
 & Dix, Cir. 39(J. Likewise, if the 
 juror is to affirm, after he has been 
 called to his feet to take the atBrma- 
 tiou, it is too late to challenge him. 
 Com. r. Marrow, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 402 : 
 s. c. sitb nom. Com. v. Marra, 8 Phila. 
 (Pa.) 440. In Drake v. Stixte, 51 Ala. 
 30, the juror had been accepted, and, 
 as he rose from his seat in the box to 
 be sworn, the defendant challenged 
 
 him peremptorily. It was held that 
 the challenge was not taken too late. 
 The point, however, that the swearing 
 liad beguu was not raised. 
 
 1 Stat, at Large, Minn. LS73, p. 
 1055, § 229; Gen. Laws Ore. 1872, 
 Civ. Code, § 188; Comp. L. Nev. 1873, 
 § 195S; Ark. Dig. Stat. 1874, § 1905; 
 Miller's R. C. la. 1880, § 2769; Bul- 
 litt's Cr. Code Ky., p. 41, § 202; Cal, 
 Penal Code, § 10(i8. See People v. 
 Rodriguez, 10 Cal. 50. Or before evi- 
 dence is introduced to the jury, 
 Comp. L. Kan. I,s79, § 4698; Code Ga. 
 1873, § 4681 ;*R. S. Mo. 1879, § 1898. 
 See also G. S. Mass., ch. 132, § 31 ; R. 
 S. Me. 1871, ch. 82, § 77; Laws N. Y. 
 1881, ch. 44-2, § 371; Code Ya. 1873, p. 
 1062, § 20; Rev. Stat. W. Va. 1879, ch. 
 109. § 24: Gen. Stat. R. I. 1872, p. 424, 
 § 33. 
 
 2 Cooley V. State, 38 Tex. 636, 638; 
 People r. Rol)erts, 6 Cal. 214; People 
 V. McKay, 18 Juhns. (N. Y.) 218; 
 Gropp V. People, 67 111; 154; St. Louis 
 &c. R. Co. V. Casner, 72 111. 384; Muel- 
 lerr. Rebhau,94 111. 142; United States 
 V. Loughery, 13 Blatch. (U. S.) 267; 
 State V. Bryan, 40 Iowa, 379; State v. 
 Davis, 41 Iowa, 311; State t;. Davis, 
 14 Xev. 439, 448. A challenge to the 
 I>olls cannot be taken upon grounds 
 which would have supported a chal- 
 lenge to the array. Co. Lift. 157. b. 
 
 3 Carnal v. People, 1 Park. Or. 
 (N. Y.) 272; Stout v. People, 4 Park.
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr. 
 
 § 92, [Continued.] Right to Hold Peremptory Challenges 
 in Reserve. — By the common law, a party is not compelled 
 to make his peremptory challenges before his challenges for 
 cause; but, after making his challenges for cause, he may hold 
 his peremptory challenges in reserve up to the time of swearing 
 the jury, to be used in excluding from the panel such jurors as, 
 though challenged for cause, have been accepted, or such as for 
 other reasons he may wish to exclude.^ This is a very important 
 
 Cr. 71; Canceini v. People, IG N. 
 Y. 501; People v. Freeman, i Deu. 
 (N. Y.) 9; People v. Honeyman, 3 Den. 
 (N. Y.) 121; People v. Mather, 4 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 2-i!i. It is laid down in 
 books of the common law that if a 
 party has more than one cause of 
 challenge, he must take them all at 
 once. Co. Litt. 158. a.; Bac. Abr. 
 Juries E. 11; Trials per Pais (1725), 
 p. 149; 1 Chatty Cr. L. 545. The 
 meaning of this rule seems to be that 
 a party must prefer all of his chal- 
 lenges, which are of the same nature 
 and triable l)y the same forum, i.e., by 
 the court, or by triors, at ouce. Mann 
 V. Glover, 14 N. J. L. 195, 202; Carnal 
 V. People, 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 272. 
 
 1 4 Bl. Com. 353; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 545; 
 Co. Litt. 158. a ; Reg. v. Hughes, 2 Craw. 
 & Dix Irish Cir. 39G ; Whelan v. Reg., 28 
 Up. Can. Q. B. 2; Hooker v. State, 4 
 Ohio, 348; State v. Fuller, 39 Vt. 74; 
 Barber v. State, 13 Fla. G75; s. c. 1 
 Green Cr. L. Rep. 723; Cooley v. State, 
 38 Tex. G38; United States v. Butler, 1 
 Hughes (U. S.), 457. See Parkyu's 
 Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 75; Cook's Case, 
 13 How. St. Tr. 313; Layer's Case, 10 
 How. St, Tr. 137; Barbot's Case, 18 
 How. St. Tr. 1233; O'Coigly's Case, 26 
 How. St. Tr. 1227; Jackson's Case, 25 
 How. St. Tr. 804; Rex v. Stone, 6 
 Term Rep. 527. In Braudreth's Case, 
 32 How. St. Tr. 773 (anno 1817), this 
 principle was challenged by the i-ittor- 
 
 uey-geuei'al, but on grounds obviously 
 untenable, as shown by the last pre- 
 ceding cases. lu Massachusetts it 
 was established by judicial decision 
 that the right of peremptory chal- 
 lenge, if exercised at all, must be ex- 
 ercised in the first instance, before 
 the juror is interrogated as to his bias 
 or opinions. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. 
 (Mass.) 500; Com. v. AYebster, 5 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 295 (overruling upon this- 
 point. Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 
 49(;); Com. v. McElhaney, 111 Mass. 
 439. But this rule has been repealed 
 and the common-law rule restored in 
 that State by statute. LaviS of Mass 
 1873, chap. 317, § 1. It Avas formerly 
 held in ^Missouri that the trial court 
 might compel both parties in a cap- 
 ital case to make, at the same time 
 and ouce for all, the peremptory chal- 
 lenges allowed to each by law, each be 
 iug ignorant of the challenges made 
 by the other. State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 
 287. But now by statute (R. S. Mo. 
 1879, § 1905.), the prosecution is re- 
 quired to announce its challenges be- 
 fore the defendant can be required to 
 make his. State v. Steeley, 65 ]Mo. 
 218; State v. Degonia, 69 :Mo. 4S5. 
 Calling over the names of those re- 
 maining unchallenged has been held 
 to give the accused sufficient informa- 
 tion as to whom the prosecution has 
 challenged. Phillips v. State, 6 Tex. 
 App. 44.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 8R 
 
 right ; ;>ince the fact of having unsucces^sfully challenged a 
 venire-man for cause may have excited ill feelino; in his breast 
 against the challenging party, and it may be desirable to ex- 
 clude him from the jury by a peremptory challenge. Accord- 
 ing to the American })ractice, and contrary to that in England, 
 the swearing of the jury is generally deferred until a full jury 
 has been procured. The jurors, as fast as they are accepted, 
 are directed to take their places in the box. It often happens 
 that much time is consumed in impaneling a jury, and that, 
 during this time, a party may discover some reason for 
 challenging peremptorily a juror who has been accepted. In 
 many American jurisdictions it is held that he has no such 
 right, but that all right of challenge is at an end as soon as the 
 juror has taken his seat ;^ though the court may still, in the exer- 
 cise of a fZ;'.s"c7v^^'ou, for cause shown, re^uoye the juror from the 
 panel.-' Other American authorities hold that the right of per- 
 emptory challenge should be kept open to the latest possible 
 period, that is, until the actual swearing of the jury.^ 
 
 1 State V. Potter, 18 Couu. Mti: Ilor- 
 bach V. State, 43 Tex. 242 (overruliusi 
 ou this point Coolev v. State, 38 Tex. 
 t;3(>; Hiibotter i\ State, 32 Tex. 479); 
 Cora. V. :Marrow, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 402, 
 412; Sparks v. State, 59 Ala. 82; State 
 V. Caraerou, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172; 
 Com. V. Kosrers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 500; 
 State 17. Hays, 23 Mo. 287; McMillau 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 142; Smith u. 
 Browu, 8 Kau. G09; State v. Audersou, 
 4 Xev. 2i!5; State v. Roderigas, 7 Nev. 
 328; State v. Schuffliu, 20 Ohio St. 
 233; Mitchell v. State, 43 Tex. 512; 
 Wassou V. State, 3 Tex. App. 474; 
 Taylor u. State, 3 Tex. App. 1G9; Ba- 
 ker V. State, 3 Tex. App. 525; Drake 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. (349. 
 
 2 State V. Potter, 18 Couu. 1(50; 
 Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242; Mit- 
 chell V. State, 43 Tex. 512; McMillau v. 
 State, 7 Tex. App. 142; Baker v. State, 
 3 Tex. App. 525; Sparks v. State, .59 
 
 Ala. 82: Drake v. State, .".Tex. App. (;49. 
 For a modified rule see Speuceru. De- 
 Frauce, 3 G. Greeue (la.), 21(j. 
 
 3 Hooker v. State, 4 Ohio, 348, 350; 
 Beaucharap v. State, 6 Blackf, (lud.) 
 299, 308; Muuly v. State, 7 Blackf. 
 (lud.) 593; Morris v. State, 7 Blackf. 
 (lud.) (507; Wyatt v. Noble, 8 Blackf. 
 (lud.) 507; People v. Reynolds, 16 
 Cal. 128; People v. Ah You, 47 Cal. 
 121; Edelen v. Gough, 8 Gill, 87; Will- 
 iams u. State, 3 Ga. 453, 459; Drake 
 V. State, 51 Ala. 30, aud Bell v. State, 
 cited Ibid., p. 31; Kleiuback v. State, 
 2 Speers (S. C), 418; Heudrick v. 
 Com., 5 Leigh (Va.), 707; Jacksou 'j. 
 Pittsford, 8 Blackf. (lud.) 194; Huu- 
 ter 17. Parsous, 22 Mich. Oi!; Johns v. 
 People, 25 Mich. 500; O'Connor v. 
 State, 9 Fla. 215; State v. Pritchard, 
 15 Nev. 74; s. c. 10 Reporter, 273; 
 Jones V. Vanzandt, 2 McLean (U. S.), 
 611; People V. Kohle, 4 Cal. 199; Peo-
 
 90 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 93. Retraction of Challenge or of Acceptance. — In 
 
 strict law a party cannot, after having once taken a peremptory 
 challenge, retract it and accept the juror, so that it shall not be 
 counted against him in reducing the number of peremptory chal- 
 lenges which he is allowed.^ But this matter in modern practice 
 j'ields to the discretion of the court ; ^ and where the panel has 
 been gone over without procuring a jury, the prisoner has been 
 allowed to retract one of his challenges, in order that the chal- 
 lenged venire-man might be available to complete the jury."^ A 
 challenge to the array may be waived after allowance, by the 
 challenging part}-, and he will be bound by such waiver, although 
 the case for trial be a capital one.* But a prisoner having chal- 
 lenged a juror peremptorily^, cannot subsequently withdraw the 
 challenge and insist that he shall sit upon the jury, or substitute 
 a challenge for cause, so that the peremptory challenge shall not 
 be counted in reducing his number ; although the grounds on 
 which he seeks to challenge for cause may have come to his 
 knowledge after the peremptory challenge had been taken.® 
 When a venire-man has been challenged for favor and excluded, 
 the challenging party cannot change his ground and say that he 
 ought not to have been discharged ; nor can he thereafter insist 
 upon examining him on oath, to make it appear that he is really 
 
 l)\e V. Jeuks, 24 Cal. 11; People v. Mc- 
 Cartj, 48 Cal. 557; Liudsley v. People, 
 (> Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 233; Drake v. 
 State, 51 Ala. 30. It is a necessary 
 corollary of this rule tliat the court 
 has a diacretiou to deuy the right of 
 peremptory clialleuge after the juror 
 has taken his seat, but before the 
 panel is sworn. Schumacher v. State, 
 5 Wis. 324. Under certain statutory 
 systems the proper practice is for the 
 clerk to draw twelve names from the 
 box: for the court to permit the de- 
 fendant separately to examine each ju- 
 ror whose name Is so drawn, and ex- 
 haust his challenges for cause before 
 challenging any one of the twelve per- 
 
 emptorily. People V. Scoggins, 37 
 Cal. 67(); People v. Russell, 4(5 Cal. 
 121. See also Com. v. Hartzell, 40 Pa. 
 St. 462: Lee v. Peter, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 447. 
 
 1 2 Dyer, 198 b. pi. 51. 
 
 2 Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319; 
 Santry v. State (Wis.), 30 N. W. Rep. 
 22(!. 
 
 3 United States v. Porter, 2 Dall. 
 (U. S.) 345. See also Garrison v. 
 Portland, 2 Ore. 123. 
 
 4 Piersou v. People, 79 N. Y. 424. 
 
 ^ State V. Price, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 
 351; State v. Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237; 
 Rex V. Parry, 7 Car. & P. 838 ; Furmau 
 V. Applegate, 23 N. J. L. 28.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 91 
 
 iudifferont and therefore competent.^ In general, it has been ob- 
 served, i)ermis.sion to withdraw a challenge ought to be given 
 cautiously; otherwise the right to reject may be converted into 
 a right to select, which is contrary to its meaning and purpose.^ 
 It ought not to be permitted where it will operate as a fraud on 
 the other party, who has exhausted his peremptory challenges.'^ 
 On the other hand, it is held that a party may, for a pro^x-r rea- 
 son, retract his acceptance of a juror, and challenge him for 
 cause; * at least, it is within the discretion of the court to allow 
 the party to challenge members of the panel after he has once 
 passed them.' But if a known objection to a juror be improp- 
 erl}' or capriciously kept back, the court may, in its discretion, 
 refuse this right, on the ground that the right of challenge has 
 been waived.® 
 
 § 94. Order of Challenj^iiijf as between the Parties. — This, 
 in like manner, seems to be committed to the discretion of the 
 court, which discretion will not be reviewed,' uidess it plainly a})- 
 pears that it has been abused to the prejudice of the jiarty com- 
 plaining.^ In the absence of a contrary statute, the court may 
 
 1 State 1-. Creasmau, lo Ired. L. (N. 
 C.) 3[t5. 
 
 2 Ante, § 43. 
 
 ^ Com. V. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 5:.i. 
 
 * :McFadcleu r. Com., 23 Pa. St. 12, 
 17; Smith v. State, 55 Ala. 1 (over- 
 ruliug Stalls v. State, 28 Ala. 25) ; 
 Sparks v. State, 59 Ala. 82; State v. 
 Adair, GO N. C. 298; State v. Perkins, 
 G(J N, C. 120; State v. Davis, 80 N. C. 
 412; Scripps v. Eeilly, 38 Midi. 10. 
 
 ^ Foimtaiu v. AVest, 2'i Rnva, 10; 
 Com. V. Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Hu- 
 botter V. State, 32 Tex. 479; Williams 
 V. State, 3 Ga. 453, 459. 
 
 6 McFaddeu v. Cora., 22 Pa. St. 12, 
 17, per Black, C. J. See also tlie 
 other authorities cited supra. 
 
 ' Com, V. Piper, 120 Mass. 185: Ta- 
 tura V. Preston, 53 Miss. G54; State v. 
 
 Pike, 49 N. H. 400; Ossipe Man. Co. v. 
 Cauney, 54 N. H. 295; St. Anthony 
 Falls W. P. Co. V, Eastman, 20 INIinu. 
 277; Turpin v. State (Sup. Ct. Md., 
 Oct. 1880), 2 Crim. L. Mag. 532. 
 
 8 State V. Ivey, 41 Tex. 38; Dixon 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 530; Eay v. State, 
 
 4 Tex. App. 450; State v. Cummings, 
 
 5 La. Ann. 330; Stater. Florez, 5 La. 
 Ann. 429; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 
 480: State r. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231 ; State 
 V. Boatwright, 10 Kich. L. (S.C.) 407; 
 Schufflin V. State, 20 Ohio St. 233; 
 State V. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438; Dris- 
 kell V. Parish, 10 Law Reporter, 395; 
 Jones V. State, 2 Blackf. (lud.) 475, 
 478; Williams v. State, 3 Ga. 453, 459; 
 Beachamp v. State, G Blackf. (Ind.) 
 299. However, it has l)eeu considered 
 that a departure from a well estab- 
 lished practice might afford good cause
 
 92 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr.^ 
 
 require the parties to take their peremptory challenges one at a 
 time and alternately.^ In such a case^ according to some hold- 
 ings, a failure of a party to challenge when his turn conies, is a 
 waiver of his right of challenge at that time, in such a sense that 
 it counts against him in reducing the number of peremptory chal- 
 lenges allowed him, as though he had actually made it.^ But 
 the waiver of the first challenge is not to be construed as a waiver 
 of subsequent challenges.^ Nor can the court fix up a rule or 
 method of challenging which may operate to deprive the prisoper 
 of his number of peremptory challenges without his consent. 
 Thus, the court cannot, by arranging that the State shall chal- 
 lenge one and the prisoner thereafter two, make the prisoner's 
 right of challenging contingent upon the State challenging in the 
 first instance.* 
 
 for granting a new trial. State v. 
 Florez, 5 La. Ann. 429. For illustra- 
 tions of this, see State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 
 231; Dixon u. State, 2 Tex. App. 529; 
 State V. l\y, 41 Tex. 35. It has been 
 held no abuse of discretion for the 
 judge to compel either party, upon 
 the full panel of twelve being pre- 
 sented to him, to strilie off, then, once 
 for all, every one to Avhora he has ob- 
 jection, granting him only the oppor- 
 tunity of objecting to new venire-men 
 as fast as they shall be introduced to 
 supply the places of those challenged 
 off by himself or hy his adversary. 
 Tatum V. Preston, 53 Miss. 654; Hotz 
 V. Hotz, 2 Ash. (Penu.) 245. 
 
 1 Driskell v. Parish, 10 Law Re- 
 porter, 395. 
 
 2 Patton V. Ash, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 IIG; Com. v. Frazier, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 ' 490; Wenrick v. Hall, 11 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 153; Fountain v. West, 23 Iowa, 
 9. But see Schumacker v. State, 5 
 Wis. 324; Hartzell v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 
 462; Kleinback V. State, 2 Speers (S. 
 C.),418; Koch v. State, 32 Ohio St. 
 352; State u. Pritchard, 15 Nev. 74. 
 
 3 Kennedy v. Dale, 4 Watts & S. 
 
 (Pa.) 176; Fountain v. West, 23 Iowa, 
 9. 
 
 * Smith V. State, 4 G. Green (Iowa), 
 189. See also State v. Pritchard 15 
 Nev. 74. Under a statute requiring 
 that the State shall first exhaust its 
 peremptory challenges or waive the 
 same, and the defendant afterwards 
 (Iowa Rev. 1860, § 4780) , the court can- 
 not arrange an alternative order of 
 challenging. State v. Bowers, 17 
 Iowa, 46. On the other hand, under a 
 statute prescribing that "all chal- 
 lenges to an individual juror shall be 
 taken first by the defendant, and then 
 l)y the State, and each party shall ex- 
 haust all his challenges before the 
 other begins" (G, S. Minn., chap. 
 lOi;, § 32), it has been held erroneous 
 to compel the defendant to exhaust all 
 of his challenges to each and all of the 
 persons upon the panel before the 
 State began. The meaning of the stat- 
 ute was that the defendant should first 
 exhaust all of his challenges to a sin- 
 gle juror, who was then to be turned 
 over to the State, if remaining upon 
 the panel. State v. Smith, 20 Minn. 
 376.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 93 
 
 § 95. Mode of Impaneling. — At common law, for the pur- 
 pose of ascertaining whether a full panel was present and of aid- 
 ing the accused in making his challenges, the court, upon the 
 request of the accused, would order the whole panel to be called 
 over once in his hearing.^ It is scarcely necessary to say that, 
 under American constitutions, the prisoner is entitled to the as- 
 sistance of counsel in making his challenijes. In one American 
 case, a nisi prius judge was found so ignorant as to deny this 
 right, but his decision was reversed on a})i)eal."^ The right of 
 counsel would obviously be abridged by rulings which would 
 unnecessarily hamper them in discharging their duties toward 
 their client. While a nisi j)rins court has held that counsel will 
 not be i)ermitted to argue before triors the question of the com- 
 petency of a juror ui)on a challenge to the favor, ^ another has 
 gone so far the other way as to hold that, where there are two 
 counsel the hasty acceptance of a juror by one without consulta- 
 tation with the other, will not conclude the rights of the client, 
 but if the acce]>tance be at once withdrawn, a peremptory chal- 
 lenge ought to be allowed.^ At common law, jurors were sei)a- 
 rately accepted and sworn. The venire-man was presented to the 
 accused or to his counsel, that a view of his person might be had. 
 The otficer of the court then looked first to the counsel of the 
 prisoner, to know whether he wished to challenge him. He next 
 turned to the counsel of the crown, to know whether the crown 
 desired to offer a challenge; if neither made any objection, the 
 oath was administered.^ It seems that this rule of practice is 
 
 1 Townly's Case, Foster C. L. 7; 
 Layer's Case, K! How. St. Tr. 132. 
 
 2 State V. Cummiuiis, 5 La. Auu. 
 330, 332. 
 
 ' .Joice V. Alexaudor, 1 Crauch C. 
 C. (U. S.) 528. 
 
 * Clarke v. Goode, J. .T. Marsh. 
 (Ky.) G37, 038. 
 
 5 Braudreth's Case, 32 How. St. Tr. 
 755, 771; Layer's Case, 16 How. St. 
 Tr. 135. This has been held to be the 
 proper practice under statutes in 
 Texas (Pasch. Dig. Tex. Stat., jj 2034; 
 
 Tex. Code Cr. Proc, § 550; Horbach 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 242, 200, overruling 
 Cooley V. State, 38 Tex. 033, 030. The 
 case of Horbach v. State, supra, is re- 
 garded as settling the practice in 
 Texas. Mitchells. State, 43 Tex. 512; 
 Wasson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 474; 
 Taylor V. State, 3 Tex. App. 100, 190; 
 Baker v. State, 3 Tex. App. 525; Har- 
 din V. State, 4 Tex. App. 355; Drake 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 040 ; Ray v. State, 
 4 Tex. App. 450; Garza v. State, 3 
 Tex. App. 280. See in this connection
 
 94 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 one of those which yield to judicial discretion; though we find 
 that it has been held that, although the practice has been to call 
 a certain number of jurors at a time, for the purpose of putting 
 them upon the parties, the court may call a greater or a less 
 number and require the parties to pass upon them.^ 
 
 § 96. Impaneling by Lot. — Under some statutory systems,, 
 each jury is selected by lot from the whole number summoned. 
 The names of the venire-men are written upon slips of paper, 
 which, after being folded, are placed in a box. When the case 
 is called, the twelve whose names are first drawn from the box, 
 if present, and not challenged or excused, are sworn. This 
 statutory form must be followed,^ although slight and imma. 
 terial departures will be tolerated.^ A juror who does not appear 
 when drawn, may be refused his seat, although he appears and 
 answers before the drawing is completed.^ If, in compliance 
 with the statute, his name is returned to the box, neither party 
 can demand that he shall take his place upon the jur}^^ Unless 
 there be a statute requiring the selection of jurors by lot, a 
 party cannot demand this mode of impaneling.® For stronger 
 reasons, if, w^ithout a statutory authorization, the clerk takes it 
 upon himself to adopt a fortuitous mode of selection, a party 
 cannot object that a more fortuitous mode of selection might have 
 been adopted.^ 
 
 Speideu v. State, 3 Tex. App. 15f); accepted in panels of /ojo', after twelve 
 
 West u. State, 7 Tex. App. 150; State are in the box. Sterling Bridge Co. 
 
 V. Ivey, 41 Tex. 35; Griffin v. Stadler, v. Pearl, 80 111. 250, 254. 
 
 35 Tex. 695). And so in other States i Walker v. Collier, 37 111. 302; 
 
 (Smith V. Brown, 8 Kan. 608 ; State v. Sellers v. State, 52 Ala. 368. 
 
 Roderigas, 7 Nev. 328; Schufflin v. 2 grazier v. State, 44 Ala. 387. 
 
 State, 20 Ohio St. 233; State u. Brown, » People v. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. (n. 
 
 12 Minn. 538); though it has been s.) (N. Y.) 370. 
 
 disapproved iu Wisconsin, on the * People v. Vcrmilyca, 7 Cow. 
 
 ground that it would unnecessarily (N. Y.) 361). 
 
 hamper the prisoner's right of per- ^ People v. Larned, 7 N. Y. 445. 
 
 emptory challenge, by depriving him Territory v. Doty, 1 Piuney 
 
 of adequate opportunity for corapari- (Wis.), 396; State v. Green, 20 Iowa, 
 
 son and choice. Lamb v. State, 36 424. 
 
 Wis. 424. One State is found which ' Benoway v. Conyue, 3 Chaud. 
 
 requires jurors to be passed upon and (Wis.) 214.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLEXGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 95 
 
 § 97. Challenging the Polls of a Special Jnry. — In !>ome 
 States, challenges may be made to the polls of a panel, arrayed 
 for the purpose of striking a special jury, before the formality 
 of striking begins, on the theory that the parties have a right to 
 a panel of tAventy-four impartial men from which to strike such 
 as they Avill exchide.^ This seems to be the safer and better 
 practice; since the right of peremptory chaUenge does not exist 
 in the case of a s})ecial or struck jury, the striking being substi- 
 tuted for this kind of challenge.'^ There seems to be no reason, 
 in the nature of things, why the right of striking should displace 
 the right of challcn2in»T for cause. 
 
 § 98. Ground of Challenge must be specifically stated. — 
 
 Much particularity is recjuired in setting out the grounds of chal- 
 lenge.^ A challenge to the array must be i)i ivriting,^ but chal- 
 lenges to the i)olls are taken orally. The grounds of all challenges 
 must be specifically stated. To say, " I challenge the array," 
 " I challenge for principal cause," or " I challenge to the favor," 
 is in general not sufficient ; ^ though in one jurisdiction the prac- 
 
 1 Melson v. Dicksou, 03 Ga. 082. 
 To test their competeucy, the jurors 
 may be examiuecl upon the voir dire 
 before the strikiuii begins. Howell v. 
 Howell, 59 Ga. 145. 
 
 2 See liex v. Despard, 2 Man. & Hy. 
 40(j, 410; s. c. sub nom. But see Bar- 
 rett V. Long, 8 Irish L. 331 ; s. c. 7 Irish 
 L. 439; O'Counell v. Manstield, 9 Irish 
 L. 179; Mayu. Hoover (Ind.), 14 North 
 East. Rep. 472; Branch v. Dawsou 
 (Minn.), 30 N. W. Rep. 545; Railroad 
 Co. 17. Stanley, 7 Oh. St. 155; State v. 
 Moore, 28 Oh. St. 195; Thomp. & Mer. 
 Jur.. § 280; ante, § 7. Compare Schweuk 
 V. Umstead, 6 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 351 ; 
 McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. St. 31. 
 
 ^ Rex V. Edmunds, 4 Barn. & Aid. 
 471; Carmarthen «. Evans, 10 Mee. >i 
 W. 274; Brown v. Esmonde, Irish Rep. 
 4 Eq. 630; Reg. v. Hughes, 1 C. & K. 
 235; Pearse v. Rogers, 2 Fos. & F. 137. 
 
 * People V. Doe, 1 Mich. 453; Ryder 
 V. People, 38 Mich. 209. 
 
 * Manu V. Glover, 14 X. J. L. 195, 
 203. See to this effect: People v. 
 lieynolds, 10 Cal. 128; Freeman v. Peo- 
 ple, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 9; People v. Ren- 
 frow, 41 Cal. 37; People v. Walsh, 44 
 Cal. 440; s. c. 1 Green Cr. L. 487; 
 State V. Knight, 43 Me. 11; Powers v. 
 Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227; State v. 
 Squaires, 2 Nev. 220; Paige v. O'Neal, 
 12 Cal. 483; Estes v. Richardson, 
 Nev. 128; State v. Chapman, Nev. 
 320; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; 
 People V. McGuugill, 41 Cal. 429; Peo- 
 ple V. Hardin, 37 Cal. 258; People v. 
 Dick, 37 Cal. 277; People v. Buckley, 
 49 Cal. 241; Wilson v. People, 94 111. 
 299; Cable v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 531; Conkey v. Northern Bank, G Wis. 
 447; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 453; State 
 V. Dove, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 4G9.
 
 96 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 tice of making the last kind of challenge by simply saying, " I 
 challenge to the favor," has grown up and has finally been held 
 sufficient.^ In challenges to the polls, there is authority to the 
 effect that such general statements of the grounds of challenge 
 as that the venire-man " does not stand indifferent between the 
 parties," or "entertains and has manifested a strong bias and 
 prejudice against the defendant,"^ or "is a neighbor to the 
 plaintiff," ^ or, " I challenge the juror for implied bias," * — are 
 not sufficient. The challenge should state facts which, if true, 
 show a disqualification.^ In auc'^nt times the steps upon a chal- 
 leno-e of a venire-man advanced with the regularity of pleadino;s, 
 demurrers and counter-pleadings ; ^ but this strictness has been 
 o-enerallv relaxed in American courts. 
 
 § 99. Triors of Challenges. — The common-law practice of 
 appointing triors to try challenges to the favor, ^ still prevails in 
 some American jurisdictions. In some of these jurisdictions, the 
 determination of the facts, under a challenge for actual bias, as 
 contradistinguished from imjoUed bias, is assigned to triors ; ^ 
 
 1 See People v. Freeman, 4 Deu. then v. Evaus, 10 Mee. & W. 274. See 
 (N. y.) i); People v. Lohman, 2 Barb. also Clark v. Vau Vraukeu, 20 Barb. 
 (N. y.) 216; s. c. 1 N. y. 280; People (N. y.) 278, where it was said that a 
 V. Houeymau, 3 Den. (N. y.) 121; Peo- challenge for principal caupe was in 
 pie V. Bodine, 1 Den. (N. y.) 281; the nature of a pleading which must 
 Rogers v. Rogers, 14 Wend. (N. y.) be answered by denial or demurrer; 
 131; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. also People v. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. 
 Y.) 229; Mechanics' &c. Bank v. Smith, (N. y.) 71, 109; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 
 19 Johns. (N. y.) 115; Carnal v. Peo- Cow. (N. y.) 555. 
 
 pie, 1 Park. Cr. (N. y.) 272. ' Challenges to the anmj and for 
 
 2 Mann v. Glover, 14 N. J. L. 195. principal cause to the polls, were tri- 
 
 3 Jones V. Butterworth, 3 N. J. L. able by the court. Ante, §§ 40, 52. 
 345. ^ Comp. L. Nev. 1873, § 1968; 2 
 
 4 People V. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128. Stat, at Large, Minn. 1873, p. 1055, 
 '" So a challenge for consanguinity § 234; Gen. Laws Ore. 1872 (Civil 
 
 or affinity must state Aoto and to ?o/iow Code), § 168. See also Sess. Laws, 
 
 the venire-man is related. Stephenson Utah, 1878, § 246. Where, by consent 
 
 V. Stiles, 3 N. J. L. 43. of the parties, the court is substituted 
 
 *5 Rex V. Edmunds, 4 Barn. & Aid. for triors upon a challenge for actual 
 
 471, 474; AUeway v. Rowdeu, 2 Show. bias, its decision will be liual. State 
 
 422; Rex v. Worcester, Skin. 101; r. Mims, 26 Minn. 183. 
 Rich V. Player, 2 Show. 261; Carniar-
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IxMPANELING. 97 
 
 but, under the statutory systems prevailing in most American 
 jurisdictions, botli of these forms of challenge are tried by the 
 court. ^ Under the old practice the court in the first instance ap- 
 pointed two unexceptionable persons to act as triors.^ When 
 one juror had been procured, he, with the two triors who had 
 passed upon his qualifications, or with any other two unexcep- 
 tionable persons selected by the court, passed upon the qualifica- 
 tions of the next venire-man called.^ When two jurors had 
 been procured, they ordinaril}' acted as triors for the remaining 
 ten.* The triors were sworn thus: " You shall well and truly 
 try whether A. [the venire-man] stands indifferent between the 
 parties to this issue." ^ As the court is the trior of challenges 
 for principal cause, it is obvious, on principle, that the court 
 must decide all questions of fact which arise on tlic trial of such 
 a challenge. But there is questiona])le authority to the effect 
 that in such cases disputed questions of facts are submitted to 
 triors.*' The relation of the court and triors is analogous to that 
 of court and jury. The court, upon a challenge to the favor, de- 
 cides what evidence is admissilile for the consideration of the 
 triors; but its sutiiciency or insufficiency as establishing the chal- 
 
 1 New York Code Crim. Proc. (Laws lenge. Thus, in one case, five acted 
 
 1881, chap. 4-12), § SKi; Ark. Dig. as triors (Joice v. Alexander, 1 
 
 Stat. 1874, § 1910; Bullitt's Ky. Cr. Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 528); and in 
 
 Code, p. 41, § 209. See also Comp. L. another, eiglit. Reason v. Bridges, Id. 
 
 Ariz. 1877, chap. 11, § 319. 478. But this practice has been 
 
 2 Two officers of the court might be strongly condemned. McCormick v. 
 
 appointed. Rex v. Kirwan, cited in Brookfield, 4 N. J. L. 09, 72. 
 Finlay's Irish Dis.,p. 347. * Anou., 1 Salk. 152. In People v. 
 
 » People V. Dewick, 2 Park. Cr. Bodiue, Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 36, 
 
 (N. Y.) 230. 38, the following form was used: 
 
 * Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 2 Crancn " You shall well and truly try whether 
 
 C. C. (U. S.) 3; United States v. Wat- A. [the venire-man] stands indifferent 
 
 kins, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 443; Boon tJ. between the people of New York and 
 
 State, 1 Ga. 618; Copenhavenc. State, Mary Bodine, the prisoner at the bar, 
 
 15 Ga. 22; McGuffie v. State, 17 Ga. and a true verdict render according to 
 
 497; McCormick v. Brookfield, 4 N. J. the evidence." 
 
 L. 69. There are cases, however, in ^ People v. Dewick, 2 Parker Cr. (N. 
 
 which all the jurors, sworn up to the Y.) 230. See also Solauder v. People, 
 
 time of a juror being challenged to the 2 Colo. 48, 58. 
 favor, have acted as triors of the chal-
 
 98 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 lenge, is for their determination alone. ^ Tlie triors decide ac- 
 cording to their "discretion and conscience," ^ and their decis- 
 ion is conchisive,^ even where a principal cause of challenge is 
 submitted to them (the parties not objecting), which might have 
 been decided by the court. If the triors disagree, what takes 
 place is analogous to a mistrial; there must be a neiu trial of the 
 challenges before new triors, — the court appointing for that pur- 
 pose the third or fourth jurors, if so many have been impaneled, 
 or two unexceptionable bystanders.* 
 
 § 100. The Court as a Substitute for Triors. — In most 
 American jurisdictions the practice of appointing triors has been 
 discontinued, and the court acts as the trior of all challenges. 
 Moreover, where parties have the right to demand triors, if 
 neither party makes such a demand, and the evidence is sub- 
 mitted to the judge, they cannot afterwards object to his compe- 
 tency to decide the issue. ^ In such cases, the determination by the 
 court of the questions of fact submitted to it is equally final with 
 that of triors; it cannot be excepted to or reviewed upon error. '^ 
 
 1 Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. 
 Y.), 9, 35; People v. Houeyman, 3 
 Denio (N. Y.), 121; Smith w, Floyd, 18 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 522. 
 
 2 Co. Litt. 156a. 
 
 3 People V. Dewick, 2 Parker Cr. 
 (N .Y.) 130; State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & 
 B. (N. C.) 1!)G; State v. Ellington, 7 
 Ired. L. (N. C.) Gl; State v. Dove, 10 
 Ired. L. (N. C.) 469. Ex parte Ver- 
 milyea, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 559 ; Freeman 
 V. People, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 33 ; Schoeffler 
 ij. State, 3 Wis. 828. 
 
 •i People V. Dewick, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 230. See also People v. Bodine, 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. 38, 39. In the view of 
 other conrts, where the triors cannot 
 agree, the challenge is not made ont, 
 and the venire-man must be sworn as 
 a juror. United States v. AVotkhis, 3 
 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 443, 579; Com. 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 3 Clark (Penn.), 520. 
 
 This is in conformity with the princi- 
 ple that a venire-man is presumed to 
 be qualified and Impartial until the 
 contrary is shown, and that the bur- 
 den of proving the challenge rests up- 
 on the party making it. Eeynolds v. 
 United States, 98 U. S. 145, 157; Holt 
 V. People, 13 Mich. 224. 
 
 5 Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 555; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 229, 240; People v. Rathbun, 
 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 509; O'Brien v. Peo- 
 ple, 36 N. Y. 276 ; Stout v. People, 4 
 Parker Cr. (N. Y.) 132; People v. Doe, 
 1 Mich. 451 ; Wirebach v. First Nat. 
 Bank, 12 Reporter, 571. 
 
 8 Stout V. People, 4 Parker Cr, (N. 
 Y.) 132; Sanchez v. The People, 22 N. 
 Y. 147; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio (N. 
 Y.), 281, 309; State v. Wincroft, 76 Nc 
 C. 38; Dew v. McDivitt, 17 Am. L. 
 Reg. 623; s. c. 31 Ohio St. 139; Morri-
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 99 
 
 It has been held ^ and denied ^ that, where the judge acts as 
 the ^trior, his rejection of testimony offered in support of the 
 charge is immaterial, and not subject to review. Where he 
 thus acts, it is immaterial u})on v^hat form of challenge venire- 
 men are set aside, provided they are incompetent. A judgment 
 will not be reversed because a challenge, good for the favor, 
 was sustained in form for principal cause. ^ 
 
 § 101. Examination of the Venire-man on the Voir Dire. — 
 
 Venire-men are examined one by one, and not by squads or 
 platoons.* A challenge assigning some specific ground of dis- 
 qualification, which ground is denied by the opposite party, must 
 precede any examination of the venire-man; for, until this is 
 made there is no issue for the decision of the triors or the court.* 
 As a general rule, a party has no right to examine the venire- 
 man by way of Jkhing for some ground of challenge ;^ but this 
 rule should be accepted with caution.^ In some States, amotion 
 or request of a party that the venire-man be put to answer is 
 understood to be in itself a challenge.^ Within reasonable 
 limits, each party has a right to put pertinent questions to show, 
 not only that there exist proper grounds for a challenge for 
 cause, but to elicit facts to enable him to decide whether or not 
 
 son V. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319; People u. son, 1 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 371; 
 
 Tweed, 11 Hun (N. Y.), li)5; United Matilda v. :Mason, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 States V. McHenry, G Blatchf. (U. S.) S.) 343; Lord v. Brown, 5 Den. (N. 
 
 503; Union Gold I^I. Co. v. Rocky Y.) 345; Trulliuger v. Webb, 3 Ind. 
 
 Mountain Nat. Bank, 2 Colo. 5G5; 198; Powers v. Presgrove, 38 Miss. 
 
 Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720. 227; Eeg. v. Stewart, 1 Cox C. C. 174; 
 
 1 Costigau V. Cuyler, 21 N. Y. 134. Com. i;. Thrasher, 11 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 2 Sehorn v. Williams, 6 Jones, L. 55; State v. Flower, Walker (Miss.), 
 (N. C.)575; People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 319; King u. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 
 16G. 730; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; 
 
 3 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. and note by the reporter. Ibid, 223. 
 
 S. 145. 6 Reg. V. Dowling, 3 Cox C. C. 509; 
 
 * 1 Chit. Cr. L, 547; Arch. Cr. PI. & Bales v. State, G3 Ala. 30, 38. 
 
 Pr. 1G2; Williams V. State, GO Ga. 3(i7, ' People v. Brown (Cal.), 14 Pac. 
 
 372; Driskell t?. Parish, 10 Law Re- Rep. 90; People v. Hamilton, C2 Cal. 
 
 porter, 395. 377. 
 
 M ChittyC.L. 546; State v.Creas- » Howell v. Howell, 59 Ga. 145; 
 
 man, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 395, per Temple r. Sumner, Smith (N. H.), 22G, 
 
 Ruffiu, C. J.; United States v. John- 234; People v. Backus, 5 Cal. 275, 277.
 
 100 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tv., 
 
 he will exercise his right of peremptory challenge. ^ There is 
 much authority for the conclusion that the trial judge has a, dis- 
 cretion, either to examine the juror without putting him upon 
 oath, and to reject him if he finds him disqualified, although no 
 challenge has been made,^ or to allow either party to interrogate 
 him without first interposing a challenge ; and this seems to be 
 the general practice of the courts.^ The challenge may be tried 
 by the examination of the venire-man himself on the voir dire, 
 or by the testimony of witnesses, or both.* It is a general rule 
 that the challenged venire-man may ])e sworn as a witness to 
 state or explain any facts which do not impeach his character or 
 his motives ; ^ but the parties may waive the administration of 
 the oath, and if a party permits him to be examined without 
 oath, making no objection thereto, his consent will be implied.*' 
 Upon this examination, the venire-man, like any other witness 
 in a judicial investigation, answers under the risk of an indict- 
 ment for perjury;^ and he therefore may, as other witnesses 
 may, correct any error in his previous statements on a re-exam- 
 ination.^ As already seen,^ the grounds of a challenge must or- 
 dinarily be stated when the challenge is made. If the challenged 
 
 1 Watson V. Whitney, 23 Cal. 375; C. C. (U. S.) 528, a hasty nisi prius de- 
 State V. Godfrey, Brayt. (Vt.) 170. cisiou. In Connecticut, the practice 
 
 2 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason has been to examine the challenged 
 (U. S), 91. venire-man without putting him under 
 
 3 State V. LaiTtenschlager, 22 Minn, oath, though it has been said that the 
 514; Carnal v. People, 1 Park. Cr. (N. court may, in its discretion, cause him 
 Y.) 272, 282. to be sworn upon request, and that 
 
 * In an early case in Ohio, the rule this will be done in cases of very 
 
 was laid down that the party chal- grave importance. State v. Hoyt, 47 
 
 lenging a venire-man "on suspicion Conn. 518. 
 
 of bias or partiality " miglit examine ^ Lord v. Brown, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 
 
 him, or call witnesses, but that he 345, 348 ; Carnal v. People, 1 Pari:. Cr. 
 
 could not do both. State v. Ankrira, (N. Y.) 272, 282; TruUinger v. Webb, 
 
 Tappan (Ohio), 80. But this concep- 3 lud. 198. But see State v. Flower, 
 
 tion was plainly erroneous, and is uni- Walker (Miss.), 318; King «. State, 5 
 
 versally discarded. How. (Miss.) 730. 
 
 5 1 Chitty Cr. L. 550; Ogden v. Parks, ' State v. Howard, 63 Ind. 502. 
 
 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 180; Penwick v. s jjeudrick y. Com., 12 Leigh (Va.), 
 
 Parker, 3 Code' Rep. 254; People v. 708. 
 
 Fuller, 2 Parker Cr. (N. Y.) 16. Cora- ^ A7Ue, § 101. 
 pare Joice v. Alexander, 1 Crauch
 
 Tit. I, Cll. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 101 
 
 venire-man admits the truth of the grounds, he will not be ex- 
 amined on his voir dire, but the court will determine their 
 sufficiency as matter of law.^ So, whenever a good cause of 
 challenge is interposed by one party and admitted by the other, 
 there is nothing to try, and the venire-man must stand aside. - 
 The court may conduct the examination for its own information,^ 
 though this cannot be done so as to deprive a party of his right 
 to re-examination.* The court may exercise a sound legal dis- 
 cretion in respect of the pertinency of the questions put and the 
 limits to which the examination shall be extended. The ques- 
 tions must be pertinent and of a nature to show that the venire- 
 man is not sufficiently free from bias to sit as an impartial 
 juror .^ 
 
 § 102. What Questions may be put to a Venire-man. — 
 
 Questions tending to degrade the venire-man,*^ or to show him 
 guilty of crime, ^ cannot be put. Anciently in England a venire- 
 
 1 Morrisou v. Lovejoy, (J Miuu. 310. 
 
 2 State V. Lautenschlager, 22 Miuu. 
 514. 
 
 3 State V. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412. 
 
 ♦ Stephens v. People, 38 Mich. 739. 
 Au exception taken to the refusal of 
 the court to permit a certain question 
 to be put to a venire-man on the voir 
 dire, may be waived by counsel omit- 
 ting again to insist upon the exception 
 when the court propounds a substi- 
 tute. Loeffler v. Keokuk Packet Co., 
 7 Mo. App. 185. 
 
 5 State V. Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237; 
 Reg. V. Lacey, 3 Cox C. C. 517. See 
 as to the mode of conducting such an 
 examination, tlie judicious observa- 
 tions of Winkler, J., in Stager v. 
 State, 9 Tex. App. 440. 
 
 6 Anon., 1 Salk. 153; Farmers' Bank 
 V. Sraith,19 Johns. (N. Y.) 115; Hudson 
 V. State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 317; State v. 
 ]Mann, 83 Mo. 590. Though, if the juror 
 chooses to answer sucli questions, it 
 is only a waiver of his privilege of re- 
 
 fusal, and gives the prisoner no right 
 to complain. Spruce v. Com., 2 Va. 
 Cas. 375. It has even been held that a 
 juror cannot be asked whether he has 
 subscribed money towards carrying on 
 the prosecution in a criminal case. 
 Reg. V. Fitzpatrick, Crawf. & D. 
 (Irish) 513. Contra, that he may be 
 asked whether he belongs to an asso- 
 ciation for the prosecution of crime. 
 State V. Mann, 83 Mo. 590. See 
 ante, § 66. 
 
 " As, for instance, -whether he had 
 aided or abetted the late rebellion 
 against the United States. Burt v. 
 Panjaud, 99 U. S. 180. And so, a juror 
 might refuse to take the test oath pre- 
 scribed by § 821 of the Revised Stat- 
 utes of the United States, designed to 
 purge the panel of such jiirors as had 
 voluntarily engaged in the late rebel- 
 lion. Atwood V. Weems, 99 U. S. 183. 
 Compare United States v. Blodcett, 
 35 Ga. 336 ; United States v. Reynolds, 
 1 Utah, 319.
 
 102 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 man could not be asked whether he had expressed a belief that 
 the accused was guilty, would be hanged, or the like; since to 
 prejudge a man of a heinous matter was scandalous, and such a 
 question tended to degrade the venire-man . ^ This rule , which was 
 more tender to the feelino;s of the venire-man than to the rights of 
 the accused, has been unwisely adopted to some extent in this coun- 
 try ; '^ but, as it was founded on a principle of the common law 
 which has not been generally admitted with us, namely, that the 
 expression of an opinion unaccompanied with personal ill-will is 
 no ground of challenge,^ it has not generally been followed in this 
 country.* In civil cases venire-men may be questioned on their 
 oath as to whether or not they have formed or expressed an 
 opinion in reference to the case,^ or whether they have " made 
 up their minds" about the case.^ Hypothetical questions, that 
 is, questions as to what the juror would or would not decide in a 
 supposed state of the evidence, — are not allowed.^ The court 
 may restrict the form of the questions, so that they shall not be 
 
 1 Cook's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 334; 
 Rex V. Edmunds, 4 Barn. «& Aid. 471, 
 492; Ees v. Kerwan, cited in Finlay's 
 Irish Dig., p. 347; Reg. v. Hughes, 
 2 Craw. & Dis, Irish Cir. 306. 
 
 2 State V. Baldwin, 1 Const. Rep. 
 (S. C.) 289, 293; State v. Sims, 2 
 Bailey (S. C), 29; State v. Spencer, 
 21 N. J. L. 197; State v. Fox, 25 N. J. 
 L. 566. 
 
 3 Ante, §77; 2 Hawk. P. C, chap. 
 43, § 28. 
 
 ■* People V. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 108, 125; United States v. Fries, 
 Whart. St. Tr. 610, 614; United States 
 V. Callender, Whart. St. Tr. 688, 696 ; 
 1 Burr's Tr. 426, et passim. In a 
 modern English case, the venire-man 
 was tlius questioned by counsel for the 
 accused witliout opposition. Reg. v. 
 Lacey, 3 Cox, C. C. 517. 
 
 ^ Spear v. Spencer, 1 G. Greene 
 (la.), 535. See also Dcav v. McDivitt, 
 31 Ohio St. 139; s. c. 17 Am. L. Reg. 
 621; Williams v. Godfrey, 1 Heisk. 
 
 (Tenn.) 299. Compare, as to the an- 
 cient, restricted and obsolete prac- 
 tice. Anon., 1 Salk. 153; Pringle v. 
 Huse, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 432. 
 
 « Houston V. Terrell (Tex.), 7 S. 
 W. Rep. 670. 
 
 7 Woolen V. Wire (Ind.), 11 North 
 East. Rep. 236; State v. Arnold, 12 
 Iowa, 479; State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 
 439; State v. Leicht, 17 Iowa, 28: 
 State V. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673; State 
 V. Bennett, 14 La. Ann. 651; State v. 
 Bell, 15 La. Ann. 114. But see Chi- 
 cago &c. R. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. 344 ; 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Buttolf, 66 111. 
 347; Galena &c. R. Co. r>. Haslam, 73 
 111,494; Riclimond tJ. Roberts, 98 111. 
 472. In these cases it was held tliat 
 the representative of the railroad com- 
 pany had a right to ask jurors this 
 question: " If upon hearing the testi- 
 mony, they should find it evenly bal- 
 anced, which Tvay they would be 
 inclined to decide the case?"
 
 Tit. 1, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND LMPANELING. 
 
 103 
 
 unnecessarily ji^'o/Za; or minute in their details.^ Where the stat- 
 ute prescribes the questions which shall be put, it rests in 
 the discretion of the court to allow otlier questions to be pro- 
 pounded or to allow other evidence to be adduced ; though au- 
 thority is not quite harmonious on this point.- But it should be 
 remembered in this connection that, according to the prevailing 
 view, the causes of challenge })rescribcd ])y statutes are not exclu- 
 sive of others.^ Where a venire-man is challenged on the ground 
 of bias, prejudice- or opinion, a very wide range of inquiry is 
 permissible, for the purpose of ascertaining the real extent to 
 which his mind is affected for or against either party. Circum- 
 stances may be gone into, including those which relate to a period 
 subsequent to his coming to court; * but irrelevant questions, — 
 as whether the venire-man believes in a future state of rewards 
 and punishments,^ or whether he has formed or expressed an 
 
 1 Thus, it is sufficient, on a trial 
 for murder, to ask the venire-man 
 whether he has formed or expressed 
 the opinion that the prisoner is truilty, 
 without extending it to the different 
 grades of homicide. State v. Mat- 
 thews, 80 N. C. 417. See also Burr's 
 Tr. 418; United States v. Callender, 
 Whart. St. Tr. 688. 
 
 2 Com. V. Gee, 6 Cash. (Mass.) 174, 
 177, 1'tej' Dewey, J. ; Com. v. Thi-asher, 
 11 Gray (Mass.), 55, oG; Pierce v. 
 State, 13 N. H. 536; Jones v. State, 2 
 Blackf . (Ind.) 475, 478. Contra, Will- 
 iams V. State, 3 Ga. 453, where Lump- 
 kin, J., delivering the opinion of the 
 court, held it to be improper to ask 
 any other questions of a juror than 
 those authorized by statute, with a 
 view to ascertaining' whether he is 
 objectionable for favor. See also 
 King r. State, 21 Ga. 220; Pines v. 
 State, 21 Ga. 227; Monday r. State, 32 
 Ga. 672; Bishop v. State, 9 Ga. 121; 
 Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600. Compare 
 State V. Wilson, 7 Iowa, 407. The 
 statutory form of questions may be 
 
 varied, in order to make their import 
 clear to the juror. Mitchell v. State, 
 22 Ga. 211; Henry v. State, 33 Ga. 
 441; Carte v. State, 56 Ga. 463. 
 
 3 Block r. State, 100 Ind. 357; Lester 
 r. State, 2 Tex. App. 433; Williams v. 
 State, 44 Tex. 34; Caldwell v. State, 
 41 Tex. 86; Etheridge r. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 133. Compare Jones v. State, 8 
 Tex. App. 648 ; Hanks v. State, 21 Tex. 
 526. A statute which prescribes that 
 ou giving an affirmative answer to a 
 prescribed question, the venire-man 
 " shall be discharged," is mandatory, 
 and no further examination or ex- 
 planation is permissible. Staguer v. 
 State, 9 Tex. App. 440. 
 
 4 See, for statements and illustra- 
 tions of this doctrine People v. Bodine, 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. 36, 77; s. c. 1 Denio 
 (N. Y.), 281; People v. Houeyman, 3 
 Denio (N. Y.), 121, 124; Freeman v. 
 People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 9, 35; Smith v. 
 Floyd, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 522; Thomp- 
 son V. People, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 467. 
 
 5 State V. Hamilton, 27 La. Ann. 45a.
 
 104 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr. » 
 
 opinion as to the credibility of a particular witness/ are not al- 
 lowed. 
 
 § 103. [Continued.] Questions touching" Religious or Po- 
 litical Opinions, Affiliations, etc. — Questions touching the 
 scruples of the venire-man, whether religious or otherwise, if 
 the answers would probably disclose facts affecting his impar- 
 tiality as a juror, ought to be put.^ So, on the trial of certain 
 foreigiipn^^ it was held proper to ask the venire-man, suspected 
 of belono-ino; to the so-called Know-Nothinq organization, 
 whether he had taken an oath or obligation of such a character 
 as caused a prejudice in his mind against foreigners; ^ and, on 
 the trial of persons engaged in a riot between foreign Roman 
 Catholics and native Americans, it was held that a venire-man 
 could not refuse, on the ground that it would disgrace him, to 
 answer whether he had any bias against Roman Catholics, or 
 whether he belonged to the order of United Americans.^ On 
 the other hand, it has been held that, on a trial for participat 
 ing in the destruction of a convent by mob violence (many of- 
 the witnesses being Roman Catholics), a venire-man could not 
 be asked whether he entertained the opinion that a Roman Cath- 
 olic was not to be believed on oath; whether the destruction 
 of the building under certain circumstances constituted a crime ; 
 
 1 Com, I?. Porter, 4 Gray (Mass.), 423. -niiether he was not a Methodist, and 
 
 Where the issue to be tried, under an whether the Methodists liad religious 
 
 indictment for murder, arose on a scruples touching the legality of slav- 
 
 special plea of former acquittal, it ery. But this, like many other cases 
 
 was held that the venire-man could m those reports, is of slight authority, 
 not be asked whether he had formed ^ People v. Keyes, 5 Cal. 347. 
 
 or expressed an opinion as to the * Peoples. Christie, 2 Abb. Pr, (N.. 
 
 guilt or innocence of the accused as Y.) 251]; s. c. 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 charged in the indictment. Jose- 579. But it has been held that a ve- 
 
 phiue V. State, 39 Miss. 613. nire-man iu a prosecution for counter- 
 
 2 Jones V. State, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) feitiug, cannot be asked whether he 
 
 475, 478. See also Driskell v. Parish, has not taken an oath to acquit all 
 
 10 Law Reporter, 395. Contra, Keason persons of counterfeiting, and that 
 
 V. Bridges, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) he may properly decline to answer. 
 
 477, where on the trial of a petition Fletcher v. State, 6 Humph. (Teun.) 
 
 for freedom, the court refused to al- 249. 
 low a juror to be examined as to
 
 Tit. I, Cll. IV.] CHALLEXGIXCr AND IMPANELING. 105 
 
 or whether such ;iu offeuse ought to be punished by hiw, or in 
 the same measure prescribed by hiw for other offenses of the 
 same kiud.^ So, on the trial of one charo-ed with beino" ens^aijed in 
 an illegal calh'ng, a venire-man cannot be asked whether he would 
 give less credit to the testimony of one proved to be engaged 
 in such calling than to that of other persons.'^ But it has been 
 held proper, on the trial of m white man for the murder of a 
 negro, to ask venire-men whether they could, upon the same 
 evidence, return the same verdict against a icliite tiian for kill- 
 ing a negro as for killing another white man."^ In California, 
 upon the trial of a Clnnaman for a criminal offense, the following 
 questions may be put to a venire-man: "Other things being^ 
 equal, would you take the word of a Chinaman as soon as 
 you would that of a white man?" "If the defendant, a 
 Chinaman, should be sworn as a witness in his own behalf, 
 would you give his testimony the s.ime credit that you would 
 give to the story told by a white person under the same circum- 
 stances ? " ^ 
 
 § 104. Swearing Singly or in a Body. — Some writers cast 
 doubt upon the question,^ 3'ct the common-law practice clearly 
 was to swear each juror as soon as he was accepted.^ By the 
 American practice, the jurors are not generally sworn until a full 
 jury is completed, and then they are sworn in a body.^ But this 
 practice is so far flexible that, unless a different rule is pre- 
 scribed by statute, each juror may be sworn as he is accepted, or 
 
 1 Com. V. Buzzell, (J Pick. (Mass.) 143, 150, 152; Joy on Confessions and 
 
 153. Challenges, 220; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 54, 77; 
 
 - United States v. Duff, 6 Fed. Rep. Count Conigsmark's Case, 9 How. St. 
 
 45,48. But see a««e, § 73. Tr, 12; Cook's Case, 13 How. St. 
 
 » Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432. Tr. 318; Layer's Case, 16 How. St. 
 
 See also State v. McAfee, C4 N. C. 33'J. Tr. 135, and especially the remarks of 
 
 Pobjgamist not disqnalifled under Act Mr. Justice Abbot in Braudretli's Case, 
 
 of Cong, of March 22, 1882: People v. 32 How. St. Tr. G94; State v. Potter, 
 
 Hoyt, 3 Utah, 396. 18 Conn. lOG, 17(3, per Williams, C. J. ; 
 
 * People V. Gar Soy, 57 Cal. 102; Lamb v. State, 86 Wis. 424, 428, per 
 s. c 28 Alb. L. J. 418. Ryan, C. J. 
 
 5 1 Chit. Cr. L. 551 ; 2 Hale P. C. 293. ' Ante, § 92. 
 
 * Trials per Pais (ed. 1725), pp.
 
 106 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 the administration of the oath may be delayed until the jury is 
 completed.^ But, since in either case the parties must exercise 
 their right of i^eremptory challenge before the jurors are sworn, 
 it has been considered the better practice in criminal cases to 
 have the jury full before any of them are sworn, so as to give 
 the parties the benefit of their peremptory challenges down to 
 the latest possible point of time.- 
 
 § 105. Time of Swearing, — In a civil case, the jury cannot 
 be properly sworn until a plea has been filed and an issue joined 
 thereon,^ nor before the suit has been called for trial; * nor in a 
 criminal case, before the accused has pleaded to the indictment.^ 
 And if the whole or a portion of them have been sworn before 
 his arraignment, he may ask that they be resworn, though he 
 waives the irregularity by not preferring the request.^ 
 
 § 106. Reswearing the Jury. — Where, upon the trial of two 
 persons jointly indicted, there is a severance after the jury and 
 witnesses have been sworn, both the jury and the witnesses must 
 be sworn again. ^ The better opinion,^ though denied by one 
 court,^ is that, if the issue is changed by an amendment of the 
 pleadings during tlie progress of the trial, a failure to reswear 
 the jury will not be error, at least unless the complaining party 
 
 1 People V. Reynolds, 16 Cal. 128; Rose, Hemp. C. C. (U. S.) 37; Balti- 
 O'Counor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 226. more &c. R. Co. v. Christie, 5 W. 
 
 2 State V. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265; Va. 325; Brown v. Warner, 2 J. J. 
 O'Connorv. State, 9 Fla. 215. Unless Marsh. (Ky.) 39. 
 
 prescribed l)y statnte, there is no rule ^ Marshall v. Krngg, 2 A. K. Marsh. 
 
 of pi'actice reqiiiring/o»r jurors to be (Ky.) 36. 
 
 called at a time, for the purpose of ^ Vezaiu v. People, 40 111. 397. 
 
 being sworn. According to that opin- ^ Ihid. 
 
 ion, a greater or less number may be ^ Babcock v. People, 15 Hun (N.Y.), 
 
 called at any one time, and the parties 347. 
 
 may be required to pass upon them. ^ Williams v. Miller, 10 Iowa, 344 
 
 Walker v. Collier, 37 111. 362. (overruling Cole v. Swan, 4 G. Greene, 
 
 3 Everhart v. Hickman, 4 Bibb 32); Arnold v. Arnold, 20 Iowa, 273; 
 (Ky.), 341; Clagget v. Force, 1 Dana Hinkle ??. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355- 
 (Ky.), 429; Shaiu v. Markham, 4 J. J. ^ Kerschbaugher v. Slusser, 12 Ind. 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 580; Hopkins r. Pres- 453; Hoot w. Spade, 20 Ind. 326. 
 
 ton, 2 A. K. Marsh, (Ky.) 64; Miles v.
 
 Tit. I, Cll. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 107 
 
 requests that this be done, which request is refused. But if the 
 anicndnuMit does not change the issues, it is not necessary to re- 
 swear the jury.^ 
 
 § 107. Swearing for the Term. — There is some loose opin- 
 ion to the effect that, where all the jurors selected and drawn are 
 sworn at the coniinencenient of the term, to try the several is- 
 sues upon which they may sit as jurors during the term, this 
 will be sufficient,'' at least unless the complaining party insisted 
 upon having the jury which was impaneled sworn in the particu- 
 lar case."^ But this is clearly contrary to the course of the com- 
 mon law; and the better opinion is that, where a different 
 practice is not prescribed by statute, it lacks the necessary 
 solemnity, and each jury should be sworn to try the issues in 
 each particular case.* 
 
 § 108. Form of the Oath. — AVhere the form of the oath is 
 prescribed by statute, none other can be administered. The oath 
 used at connnon law, as well as that prescribed by statute in 
 criminal cases, is essentially different from that used in civil 
 cases, and the better opinion therefore is that it is erior in a 
 criminal case to use that prescribed for civil cases,^ though an 
 objection for such an irregularity will not })e available if taken 
 
 ^ Kuowles V. Rexroth, 07 lud. 59; 
 Merrill v. St. Louis, 83 Mo. 244; s. c. 
 aflfd, 12 Mo. App. 400. 
 
 - People V. Albauj, G Weud. (X. 
 Y.) 548. 
 
 ^ Hardeuburgli v. Crary, 15 How. 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 307. 
 
 * Barney v. People, 22 111. KJO. This 
 too much resembles the practice of 
 the economical deacon who blessed 
 the pork barrel instead of asking a 
 blessing at each meal. 
 
 5 State V. Rullius, 22 N. H. 528; 
 Sutton V. State, 41 Tex. 513; Bray v. 
 State, 41 Tex. 5G0. Where two oaths 
 are prescribed by statute, one to be 
 administered to jurors on the trial of 
 
 "any civil action or proceeding," the 
 other in criminal trials, tlie former 
 oath must bo used in a bastardy pro- 
 ceeding. "The use of tiie latter is 
 contined exclusively to the trial of 
 cases wholly and essentially criminal 
 in their nature and character. The 
 former is applicable, not only to the 
 trial of civil actions, properly so called, 
 but to all sue h other actions and special 
 proceedings as, strictly speaking are 
 neither civil nor criminal actions, and 
 hence cannot properly be classified 
 under either head." State v. "Worth- 
 ingham, 23 Minn. 528, 537. See also 
 State V. Pate, Busb. 244.
 
 108 
 
 IMPANELIXG THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 after verdict} Therefore, although the oath which was admin- 
 istered may not have conformed to the statutory form, yet it will 
 be sufficient that the record states that the Jury were duly sworn, 
 and a party will not be permitted to contradict it.^ In civil 
 cases, the common-law form is: " You solemnly swear that you 
 shall well and truly try the issues joined between A. B., plaintiff, 
 and CD., defendant, and a true verdict give according to the 
 evidence." ^ Under many American State constitutions, as 
 hereafter seen, ^ J i«ror.s in criminal cases are judges of the law, as 
 well as of the fact. There is hence some opinion that it is neces- 
 sary in a criminal case to swear the jury a true verdict to render 
 according to the law and the evidence.^ But it should be said that 
 no authoritative common-law precedent sanctions such a form ;® and 
 as, in most of the American States, the jurors are bound to take 
 the law from the court, it is apprehended that in most such jurisdic- 
 tions, the common-law form need not be varied in this particular.' 
 
 1 State V. Robinson, 36 La. Ann. 
 873; Seymour v. Parnell (Fla.), 2 
 South. Eep. 312; State ■«. Wilson, 36 
 La. Ann. 864. See also Harriman 
 V. State, 2 G. Greene ■ (Iowa) , 285; 
 Wrockledge v. State, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 
 167; Candler v. Hammond, 23 Ga. 
 493; Looper u. Bell, 1 Head (Tenu.), 
 373. 
 
 2 Candler v. Hammond, 23 Ga. 493; 
 Cornelius v. Boucher, 1 111. 12; Ap- 
 plegate v. Boyles, 10 Ind. 435; Looper 
 V. Bell, 1 Head (Tenn.), 373. In any 
 case, if a party would object to the 
 form of the oath as actually adniinis- 
 terc<l, he must incorporate it into his 
 bill of exceptions, in order that a court 
 of error may see whether the form 
 used was proper or not. Bartlett v. 
 State, 28 Ohio St. 669, 672; Preston v. 
 State, 8 Tex. App.30; Dyson v. State, 
 26 Miss. 362; Barfield v. Inipson, 1 
 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 326; Cato v. State, 9 
 Fla. 163; Wellborn v. Spears, 32 Miss. 
 139. 
 
 ^ 3 Bl. Comm. 365. It is sufficient 
 
 if the jury are sworn "well and truly 
 to try, and the truth to speak upon the 
 issues joined." Burk v. Clark, 8 Fla. 
 9. Where a jury is sworn to try " the 
 issue " in a case presenting severa) 
 issues, the word "issue" will- be 
 taken collectively, all the issues being 
 considered as one. Hatcher v. Fow- 
 ler, 1 Bil)b (Ky.), 337; Bate v. Lewis, 
 1 J. J. M:irsh. (Ky.) 316; Pointer v. 
 Thompson, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 532. 
 But see Adams v. State, 11 Ark. 466. 
 The practitioner should be cautioned 
 that this form may be modified by 
 statute in his jurisdiction, and he 
 should look to that. 
 
 ^ Post, § 2140, et seq. 
 
 5 Patterson v. State, 7 Ark. 59; 
 Sandford v. State, 11 Ark. 328; Bell v. 
 State, 10 Ark. 536; Bivens v. State, 11 
 Ark. 455. 
 
 *^ See Trials per Pais (1725), pp. 
 192, 193. 
 
 7 O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215;. 
 State V. Jones, 5 Ala. 666.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 109 
 
 § 109. [Continued.] In Particular Cases. — On an inquiry 
 of damages, or, to use the ancient form of expression, a lurit of 
 inquiry, after a judgment by default, the jurors are sworn not 
 " to try the issues," but "to assess the phiintiff 's damages," 
 though an irreguhirity in this particuhir, will not reverse the 
 judgment.^ But where an issue has been joined, to swear a jury 
 to inquire of damages, will be reversible error; since, in such a 
 case, they are clearly not sworn to try the contested issues of 
 fact.'^ The practice of swearing the jury, as well to try the 
 i-sue of fact, as to inquire of the damages, on an issue of law 
 previously found for the plaintiff, o))tains only where the decis- 
 ion of the issue of law entitles the plaintiff to damages without 
 regard to the trial of the issue of fact.-^ In suits on penal 
 bonds, where breaches have been assigned, swearing the jury to 
 inquire into the truth of the breaches, is equivalent to swearing 
 them to try the issues.* And so, swearing them to try the 
 issues joined, is equivalent to swearing them to inquire into the 
 truth of the breaches; although strict practice would require 
 them to be sworn to inquire into the truth of the breaches and 
 to assess the damages as to the party in default, as well as to try 
 the issues and assess the damages as to the defendants Avho have 
 pleaded to the action.^ 
 
 Article II. — Objections and the Waiver and Review of the Same. 
 
 Section' 113. Time of takinj? Objections to Irregularities. 
 Hi. Waiver of Causes of Cliallenge. 
 
 115. Waiver of Exceptions for Disallowance of Challenges. 
 
 116. Objections to Incompetency after Verdict. 
 
 117. Evidence iu Support of sucli Objections. 
 
 118. Question, lio^v viewed on Error or Appeal. 
 
 119. What the Record must show. 
 
 120. No Vested Riirht in a particular Juror. 
 
 121. Juror no Vested Right to serve. 
 
 1 Colorado Springs v. Hewitt, 3 see Caldwell v. Irvine, 4 J. J. Marsh. 
 Colo. 275; Denny v. Hutclieson, 1 (Ky.) 108. 
 
 Bibb (Ky.),57G; Roberts v. Swearen- 3 Swann v. Rary, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 gen, Hard. (Ky.) 121. 298, 300; Vaden v. Ellis, 18 Ark. 
 
 2 W^illiaras v. Norris, 2 Litt. 157; 355. 
 
 Townsend V. Jeffries, 17 Ala. 270; * McCoy r. State, 22 Arlv. 308. 
 
 Adams v. State, G Ark. 497, 505. But ^ gtate r. Gibson, 21 Ark. 140.
 
 110 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 113. Time of taking Objections to Irregularities. — Irreg- 
 ularities in selecting the general jury list, in drawing the panel, 
 and in summoning those whose names have been drawn, as already 
 seen,' are properly objected to by a challenge to the array. Such 
 an objection ou^ht not to be listened to after trial begun, except 
 for cogent reasons and upon a clear showing that it could not 
 have been made sooner; though there is no doubt that the court 
 may entertain it in its discretion? As already seen,^ in many 
 jurisdictions the statutes governing these steps in the selection 
 of a jury, are regarded as directory merely. In these and in 
 other jurisdictions, the analogous doctrine exists that informali- 
 ties of this kind will not be permitted to vitiate a verdict, although 
 they did not sooner come to the knowledge of the complaining 
 party, unless positive injury is shown to have accrued therefrom.* 
 In like manner, a knovm or obvious irregularity in the pro- 
 
 1 Ante, § 31, et seq. 
 
 - Dovey v. Hobsou, 2 Marsh. 154; 
 s. c. 6 Taunt. 4G0; State v. Stephens, 
 11 So. Car. 319; Steele v. Malony, 1 
 Minn. 347. 
 
 3 Ante, §§ 33, 34. 
 
 4 Doolittle V. State, 93 Incl. 272; 
 Buford V. McGetchie, 60 Iowa, 298; 
 CaklwcU V. State, 12 Tex. App. 358; 
 Page V. Danvers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 326, 
 327. See also Reed v. State, 1 Tex. 
 App. 1 ; Mikell v. State, 62 Ga. 368. 
 The same rule was applied in the fol- 
 lowing cases where objection was 
 made, after verdict, to the legality of 
 the drawing. Ray v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 450; Amlierst v. Hadley, 1 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 38; State?;. Hascall, 6 N. H. 
 
 ■352; Bodge v. Foss, 39 N. H. 406; 
 Pittsfield V. Barnstead, 40 N. H. 477; 
 Wilcox V. School Dist., 26 N. H. 303; 
 Gormley v. Laramore, 40 Ga. 253; 
 Wentworth v. Farmington, 51 N. H. 
 128, 135; Hasselmeyer v. State, 1 Tex. 
 App. 690; State v. Williams, 2 Hill 
 (S. C), 381; State v, Douglass, 63 N. 
 C. 500; Anderson v. State, 5 Ark. 445; 
 Walker v. Boston &c. R. Co., 3 Cush. 
 
 (Mass.) 1, 19; State v. Beasley, 32 La. 
 Ann. 1162; New York v. Mason, 4 E. 
 D. Smith (N. Y.), 142; State v. Under- 
 wood, 6Ired. L. (N. C.) 96; State i?. 
 Courtney, 28 La. Ann. 794; State v. 
 Rigg, 10 Nev. 284; Com. v. Sallager, 3 
 Clark (Penn.), 127; People v. Cum- 
 mings, 3 Park. C. (N. Y.) 343. And 
 so with respect to objections affecting 
 the validity of tlie summons. Bennett 
 V. Matthews, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 428; 
 Vidal V. Thompson, 11 :\Iart. (La.) 23; 
 Kennedy v. Com., 14 Bush (Ky.), 340; 
 Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697; Stone v. 
 People, 3 111. 326; State v. Boon, 80 
 N. C. 461; Bronson v. People, 32 Mich. 
 34; Fowler v. Middlesex, 6 Allen 
 (Mass.), 92; Sohmder v. People, 2 
 Colo. 48; New York v. Mason, 4 E. D. 
 Smith (N. Y.), 142; Dayharsh v. Enos, 
 5 N. Y. 581; Green v. State, 17 Fla. 
 669; Brunskill v. Giles, 9 Bing. 13; 
 Rector v. Hudson, 20 Tex. 234; Jame- 
 son V. Androscoggin R. Co., 52 Me. 
 412. A statute of Louisiana requires 
 all objections to the manner of draw- 
 ing juries, or to any defect or irregu- 
 larity tUat can be pleaded against any 
 
 i
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLEXGIXa AND IMPANELING. 
 
 HI 
 
 cess of impaneling must be objected to at the time when it is 
 committed; it will be too late to make the objection for the 
 first time on a motion for new triaJ ^ or in arrest of judo-ment.^ 
 
 array or venire, to be urired on the lirst 
 day of the term; otherwise such ob- 
 jections are considered as waived. 
 State V. Thomas, 32 La. Ann. 3-1!); 
 State V. Given, 32 La. Ann. 782; State 
 V. Harris, 30 La. Ann. 90. A statute 
 of South Carolina provides that "no 
 irregularity in any writ of venire facias, 
 or in the drawings, summoning, re- 
 turning or impaui'ling of jurors, shall 
 be suUlcient to set aside the verdict, 
 unless the party making the objection 
 was injured by the irregularity, or 
 unless the objection was made before 
 the returning of the verdict." See 
 State r. Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237. 
 Similar statutes are found in other 
 States. See 1 Bright. Purd. (Penn.) 
 Dig., p. 838, § 82; Code Va. 1873, p. 
 1002, § 21; Rev. Stat. W. Va. 187!l, 
 chap. 109, § 25; R. S. Wis. 1878, 
 § 2881 ; Bush Dig, Fla., chap. 104, § 26; 
 G. S. Mass. 1860, chap. 131, § 32; R. 
 S. :Me. 1871, chap. 82, § 78. That the 
 name of the same juror appeared twice 
 upon the venire, without any collusion 
 or improper design, is no ground of 
 error. McCarty v. State, 2(5 :Miss. 302. 
 Xor is it that the name of one of the 
 jurors, -who sat upon the trial of the 
 case, was not upon the vcnjVe returned 
 by the sheriff, where it appears tiiat 
 he had been summoned at the com- 
 mencement of the term, and his name 
 entered on the minutes and tlrawn from 
 the box, like those of the other jurors. 
 Thrall v. Smiley, 9 Cal. 529. 
 
 1 Com. V. Stowell, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 
 572; Bristow's Case, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 
 634; Ilardenburgh v. Crary, 15 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 307; State v. Slack, 1 
 Bailey (S. C), 330; Clough v. State, 7 
 Neb. 320; Gardenhire v. State, 6 Tex. 
 
 App. 117, l.'.l; :Muuroe v. Brlgham, 19 
 Pick. (Muss.) 368; Boyd v. State, 17 
 Ga. 194; State v. Ward, 2 HaAvks (X. 
 C), 443; State v. Belcher, 13 So. Car, 
 459; Ray v. State, 4 Tex. App. 450; 
 State V. Boon, 80 N. C. 461 ; s. c. 82 N. 
 C. 637; Dayharsh v. Enos, 5 N. Y. 531 ; 
 State V. Turner, 25 La. Ann. 573 ; Par- 
 sons V. Harper, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 64; 
 Grant v. State, 3 Tex. App. 1 ; People 
 V. Ransom, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 417; Cole 
 V. Perry, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 584; Grant v. 
 State, 3 Tex. App. 1 ; State v. Brown, 
 12 Minn. 538; Williams «. State (Ala.), 
 1 South Rep. 179; Brown v. Autrey 
 (Ga.), 3 S. E. Rep. 669. It has been 
 so held in a case of a talesman, sum- 
 moned to complete a particular iianel, 
 being sworn for tiie term and allowed 
 to sit in otlier cases (Howlaud v. Gif- 
 f ord, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43, note) . Where 
 the judge, during the process of imi)an- 
 eliugthe jury, permits those who have 
 been selected to go at liberty and min- 
 gle with the crowd, during a delay in 
 the proceedings resulting from the 
 summoning of talesmen, it is the duty 
 of a party, having objections to such 
 action of the court, to make them 
 known at the time, or at least before 
 the selection of jurors from the tales- 
 men i)egins. Such o1)jections will not 
 avail, if held back until after the jury 
 are sworn. James v. State, 53 Ala. 
 380; Rol)bins v. State, 49 Ala. 394. 
 But see Grissom v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 374. Allowing the jurors impaneled, 
 but not sworn, to separate for the 
 night is not an irregularity in civil 
 cases. Miller r. Wilson, 24 Pa. St. 
 114; Spencer v. DeFrance, 3G. Greene 
 (Iowa), 216. 
 
 2 State i: White, 35 La. Ann. 96.
 
 112 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 114. Waiver of Causes of Challenge. — A party is entitled 
 to waive a cause of challenge which he may have against a juror, 
 and suffer the juror to sit in the case/ and the other party can 
 derive no advantage from such waiver.'-^ So, if one party waive 
 a cause which disqualifies the venire-man as against him, the 
 other party cannot malve the disqualification a ground of chal- 
 lenge.^ If both the prisoner and the State's counsel waive an 
 objection for bias, the judge cannot reject the venire-man^ sua 
 sponte.^ As already seen, the right to challenge the array is 
 ivaived by a challenge to the polls. ^ So, a right of challenge for 
 cause, or what is in substance the same, an exception to the over- 
 ruling of such a challenge, is waived by a peremptory challenge 
 of the same juror. ^ But, if a challenge to the array has been 
 once taken, an exception to the overruling of it i^not ivaived by 
 an effort to secure an impartial jury by challenges to the polls.' 
 A hiown cause of challenge is always waived by withholding it, 
 and raising it as an objection after verdict; since such a practice 
 is incompatible with the good faith and fair dealing which should 
 characterize the administration of justice.^ Therefore, in order 
 
 1 People V. Mather, 4 Weud. (N. 
 Y.) 229, 246. Compare the old cases 
 of Kuyaston v. Shrewsbury, Audrews, 
 85; Anon., Aiidersou, 272; Alleway w. 
 Rowden, 2 Show. 423. 
 
 2 Thus, if the State have a cause of 
 clialleuge, because the venire-mau has 
 a fixed opinion against capital or peni- 
 tentiary punishment, it is a matter of 
 choice with the prosecuting counsel 
 whether he Avill challenge for this 
 cause. Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142. 
 
 3 Such as consanguinity or affinity. 
 State V. Ketchey, 70 N. C. G21. 
 
 * Greer v. State, 14 Tex. App. 179. 
 
 ^ Ante, § 91; Co. Litt. 158. a.; 
 Watkins v. Weaver, 10 Johns. 107; 
 Tallmaa v. W^oodwortli, 2 Johns. 385. 
 After a failure to mal^e such a chal- 
 lenge at the proper time, any ol)jec- 
 tion to the legality of subsequent 
 proceedings must ])e addressed to the 
 discretion of the court; which will not 
 
 be exercised to the relief of the party 
 complaining, in the absence of evi- 
 dence showing some positive injury to 
 have been suffered. Barton v. Quinn, 
 Batty (Irish Rep.), 552. 
 
 6 Ford-y. Umatilla Co. (Ore.), IGPac. 
 Rep. 33 ; Minich v. State, 8 Colo. 440. 
 
 ' Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 
 434. An exception, formally taken to 
 the decision of the court in disallowing 
 challenge, is not Avaived by a negative 
 answer to the inquiry of the court, at 
 the conclusion of the impaneling, as 
 to whether the parties have any objec- 
 tion to the jurors as they stand. Hath- 
 away V. Ilelmer, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 29. 
 
 8 Dent V. Ilurtford, 2 Salk. 645; 
 Fox V. Ilazelton, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 275, 
 278, opinion by Shaw, C. J.; Hallock 
 ?;. Franklin, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 558; Lady 
 Herbert v. Shaw, 11 Mod. 118; Fal- 
 mouth V. Roberts, 9 Mee. & W. 469; 
 Carew v. Howard, 1 Root, 323; Lisle
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMTANELING. 
 
 113 
 
 to make an objection to a juror available after verdict, the ob- 
 jecting party must prove that it was unknown to him, and that 
 it would not have been disclosed to him by a proper inquiry be- 
 fore the jury was sworn. ^ For the pur{)()ses of this rule, tlie 
 knoivledge of the attorney is the knowledge of his client.'- Hence, 
 
 V. State, 6 Mo. 42f.: Bell r. Howard, 4 
 Litt. 117; Craig r. Elliott, 4 Bibb, 272 ; 
 Jordan ?'. Meredith, 1 Binii. (Pa.) 27; 
 McCorkler. Biims, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 340; 
 Bellows V. Gallup, Kirby (Conn.), 106; 
 "Williams v. Foppletou, 3 Ore. 139; 
 Tomer v. Densmore, 8 Neb. 384; Sel- 
 leck V. Sugar Hollow Tp. Co., 13 Conn. 
 453; Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 581 ; 
 Brown V. State, 52 Ala. 345; People v. 
 Stonecifer, (> Cal. 405; People r. Sand- 
 ford, 43 Cal. 29; Eakman r. Sheaffer, 
 48 Pa. St. 17(;; Parmele v. Gutliery, 2 
 Root (Conn.), 185; Woodruffs. Rich- 
 ardson, 20 Conu. 238 ; Lane v. Scoville, 
 16 Kan. 402; State v. Shay, 30 La. An. 
 114; Hussey v. Allen, 59 Me. 269; 
 DollofE V. Stimpson, 33 Me. 546; Wer- 
 ner V. State, 44 Ark. 122; State v. An- 
 derson, 4 Nev. 265; Lowe v. MeCorkle, 
 8 West. L. J. 64; United States v. 
 Smith, 1 SaAvyer (U. S.), 277; Bron- 
 son V. People, 32 Mich. 34; People v. 
 Scott, 56 Mich. 154; State t'. Benton, 
 2 Dev. & Bat. (X. C.) 196; State v. 
 Groome, 10 la. 808. If any objection 
 exists to the competency of a trior, it 
 should be made at the time of his ap- 
 pointment, when, if overruled, an ex- 
 ception may be reserved. It cannot 
 for the first time be made upon a mo- 
 tion for a new trial. People v. Voll, 
 43 Cal. 166. This rule is also applica- 
 ble to objections affecting the impar- 
 tiality of referees. Ipswich v. Essex, 
 10 Pick. (Mass.) 519; Merrill v. Berk- 
 shire, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 269. 
 
 1 Seal V. State, 13 Sraed. & M. 
 (Miss.) 286; Roseborough v. State, 43 
 Tex. 570; Brill v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 572; Maniou v. Flyun, 39 Conu. 330; 
 
 Bradshaw v. Hubbard, 6 111. 390: 
 Jameson v. Androscoggin R. Co., 52 
 Me. 412; Tilton v. Kimball, 52 Me. 
 500; Goodwin v. Cloudman, 43 Me. 
 577; PowelH'. Haley, 28Tex. 52; Fal- 
 mouth V. Roberts, 9 Mee. & W. 469; s. 
 c. 1 Dowl. (x. s.) G33; Stewarts. Ew- 
 bank, 3 Iowa, 191. Knowledge that a 
 juror is a man of intemperate habits 
 does not include knowledge of the 
 fact that he is subject to dclirinm 
 tremens. Hogshead v. State, 6 Humph. 
 (Teuu.) 59 ; Dent v. Hertford, 2 Salk. 
 645. Judgment was arrested, where 
 it appeared that a juror who had 
 been challenged and withdrawn was 
 brought in on a tales, and sat upon 
 the trial of the cause. II ungate v. 
 Ilamond, Cro. Eliz. 188. But see Koe- 
 uigr. Bauer, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 304. 
 
 2 Russell V. Quiun, 114 Mass. 103; 
 Kent V. Charlestowu, 2 Gray (Mass.), 
 281; Orroku. Com. Ins. Co., 21 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 456, 471; Parks v. State, 4 
 Ohio St. 234; Eastman v. Wight, 4 
 Ohio St. 156, 160; State v. TuUer, 34 
 Conn. 294; Falmouth v. Roberts, 9 
 Mee. & W, 469; Clough v. State, 7 
 Neb. 324; Anderson v. State, 14 Ga. 
 709; Parker v. State, 55 Miss. 414; 
 Jameson v. Androscoggin R. Co., 52 
 Me. 412; Goodwin v. Cloudman, 43 
 Me. 577; State v. Bowden, 71 Me, 89; 
 Powell V. Haley, 28 Tex. 52; Pryme v. 
 Titchraarsh, 10 Mee. & W. 605; True- 
 blood V. State, 1 Tex. App. 650; Scott 
 V. Moore, 41 Vt. 205. In one case, the 
 knowledge of the attorney's clerk 
 seems to have been imputed to the 
 client. Falmouth v. Roberts, 9 Mee. 
 & W. 469 ; s. c. 1 Dowl. (x. s 63 
 
 8
 
 114 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr 
 
 an affidavit in support of a motion for a new trial upon the 
 ground of the disqualification of a juror, should unequivocally 
 allege that the moving party and his attorneys were themselves 
 ignorant of the matter affecting the juror's competency, so that 
 the olijection could not be seasonably made.^ After a party has 
 announced that he has no challenges to make, he cannot resume 
 the right of challenge merely because the other party has exer- 
 cised the right; ^ though the court may, in its discretion, allow 
 him to do so. For counsel to sit in silence when the court is 
 embarrassed in the process of impaneling a jury, declining to 
 take action upon the suggestions of the court, and answering 
 that they have nothing to say, and then raising the proper ob- 
 jection in case the verdict goes against them, — is a trifling with 
 the court and with the administration of justice, which will not 
 be tolerated on the trial of the gravest offenses.^ After a juror 
 is once sivorn, objections to his competency which might have 
 been taken by challenge are addressed to the discretion of the 
 court.* 
 
 1 Achey v. State, 64 Ind. 5G; Kooby 
 V. State, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) Ill; State v. 
 Tuller, 34 Couu. 280; Clough v. State, 
 7 Neb. 324; Morrison v. McKinuou, 12 
 Fla. 552. A new trial will not be 
 granted upon tlie sole affidavit of a 
 stranger to the case, wlio deposes 
 to a positive expi'ession of opinion 
 against tlie defendant by one of the 
 jurors, previous to the trial; and 
 further, t-hat he did not inform the at- 
 torneys of the defendant of this fact 
 until the trial was concluded. ISfon 
 constat, but that the defendant and his 
 attorneys were also aware of the 
 juror's prejudice, Achey v. State, (54 
 Ind. 5G. 
 
 2 Ward V. Railway Co., 19 S. C. 
 521. 
 
 3 Norfleetv. State, 4 Sueed (Tenn.), 
 340, 343. See also Com. v. Gross, 1 
 Ashmead (Pa.), 281, 286; State v. 
 Coleman, 8 So. Car. 237 ; Com. v. Mar- 
 row, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 402; Gardiner r. 
 
 People, 6 Parlv. Cr. (N. Y.) 155; Ma- 
 loue V. State, 8 Ga. 408; Ham v. 
 Lasher, 24 Up. Can, Q, B. 533, note; 
 Widder v. Buffalo &c. R. Co., 24 Up. 
 Can, Q. B. 534; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 
 451 ; Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Martin 
 (La.), 656; Stewart r. State, 15 Ohio 
 St. 155. See also State v. Allen, 4G 
 Conn. 531 ; s. c. 10 Reporter, 107 ; Reg. 
 V. Coulter, 13 Up. Can. (C. P.) 299. 
 The result would have been otherwise, 
 if the prisoner had made no objection 
 to proceeding with the jury as con- 
 stituted. In such a case the court 
 cannot, witliout the consent of the 
 prisoner, and of its own will, rcith- 
 drato a juror. Such action operates 
 as a discharffe of the jury, and an 
 acquittal. O'Brian v. Com., 9 Busli 
 (Ky.), 333. Compare Cochran v. 
 State, 62 Ga. 731 ; Cox v. People, 19 
 Hun (N. Y.), 430; s. c. 80 N. Y. 500. 
 
 •1 Henry v. State, 77 Ahi. 75. See 
 also Simmons v. State, 73 Ga. 609.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING 
 
 115 
 
 § 115. AVaiver of Exceptions for Disallontiiue of Chal- 
 lenge. — The sound and prevailing view is that a i)aity cannot, 
 on error or appeal, complain of a ruling of the trial court in 
 overruling his challeuge for cause, if it api)ear that, when the 
 jury had been completed, his peremptory challenges ivere not 
 exhausted; since he might have excluded the obnoxious juror by 
 a i)ereinptory challenge, and therefore the error is to be deemed 
 an error without injury. ^ For the same reason, if the court 
 erroneously overrules a challenge for cause, and thereafter the 
 challenging party excludes the obnoxious juror by a peremptory 
 challenge, he cannot assign the ruling of the court for error ^ 
 unless it appear that, before the jury was sworn his quiver of 
 peremptory challenges was exhausted ; ^ in which case there is 
 
 1 State V. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 48(;; 
 State V. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311 ; Barnes v. 
 Newton, id Iowa, 5(!7; St. Louis &c. 
 R. Co. V. Lux, (13 III. 523; Tuttle v. 
 State, () Tex. App. o5(i; Sharp v. State, 
 (j Tex. App. G50; McKinuey v. State, 8 
 Tex. App. Oi'O; Toouey v. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 452; Krebs v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 1 ; Palmer v. People, 4 Neb. G8 ; State 
 V. Gill, 14 So. Car. 410; Preswood v. 
 State, 3 Heisk. (Tenu.) 468. There is 
 some slight and ill-considered author- 
 ity to the effect that uo oblisatiou 
 rests upon a party to make use of his 
 peremptoi-y challenges, for the pur- 
 pose of excluding a juror, unsuccess- 
 fully challenged for cause, but that he 
 has a right to accede to the decision 
 of the court ujion such a challenge, 
 ■which, if erroneous, must be corrected 
 by awarding him a new trial. People 
 V. Bodine, Edra. Sel. Cas. (X. Y.) 36, 
 78; s. c. 1 Den. (N. Y.) 281; Freeman 
 V. People, 4 Den, (X. Y.) 9, 31 ; Brown 
 V. State, 57 Miss. 424; s. c. 10 Cent. L. 
 J. 376; People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 140; 
 Sampson v. Schaffer, 3 Cal. 107. 
 
 - Schoeffler v. State, 8 Wis. 823, 
 836; Burt i'. Panjaud, 99 U. S. 180; s. c. 
 18 Am. L. Reg. 660; Freeman v. People, 
 
 4 Denio (X. Y.), 9; Stewart v. State, 
 13 Ark. 720; Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 
 328; Friery v. People, 2 Abb. App. (X. 
 Y.) Dec.215;s.c. 2Keyes (X. Y.),424; 
 54 Barb. 319; Ferriday v. Selser, 4 
 How. (Miss.) 506; People v. Kuicker- 
 ))ocker, 1 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 302; 
 Whelan v. Reg., 28 Up. Can. Q. B. 2, 
 108; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; 
 State V. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311; Morton 
 V. State, 1 Kan. 4G8; Wiley v. Keokuk, 
 6 Kan. 95; People v. Stonecifer, 6 Cal. 
 405; Robinson v. Kaiidull, 82 III. 522; 
 AVilsou V. People, 94 111. 299; Carter/. 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 372; Conway v. 
 Clinton, 1 Utah, 215; Krebs v. State, 8 
 Tex. App. 1 ; Brown v. State, 57 Miss. 
 424 ; State v. Cockman, 2 Winst. (X. C.) 
 95; Minims v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221; 
 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 ; State 
 V. Hamilton, 27 La. Ann. 400; Bejarauo 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 265. Contra, 
 Lithgow V. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 297; 
 Sprouce v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 375; 
 Dowds V. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 727; 
 Birdsong v. State, 47 Ala. 68; Iverson 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 170, 174; Brown v. 
 State, 70 Ind. 576. 
 
 * McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 184; Barrel! v. State, 18 Tex. 713;
 
 116 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURt 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 room for the inference that the erroneous ruHng of the court 
 may have resulted in leaving upon the panel oilier obnoxious 
 jurors whom the party might, but for the ruling, have excluded 
 by peremptory challenge. Some courts, therefore, hold that it 
 is enough, in such a juncture, to show that his peremptory chal- 
 lenges were exhausted before the jury was sworn.^ But others 
 take what seems to be the better view, that it nuist also appear, 
 not only that his peremptory challenges were exhausted, but 
 that some objectionable person took his place on the jury, who 
 otherwise would have been excluded by a peremptory challenge.^ 
 
 § IIG. [Continued.] Objections to Incompetency after 
 Verdict. — Although there is considerable American authority, 
 following in the wake of a leading case in Maryland, in favor of 
 
 Johusou V. State, 27 Tex. 7G4; Bow- 
 man V. State, 41 Tex. 417; Lester v. 
 State, 2 Tex. App. 43L>, 443; Carroll v. 
 State, 3 Humph. (Teim.) 315; Robin- 
 son V. Randall, 82 111. 521; People v. 
 Gaunt, 23 Cal. 156 ; People v. Gate- 
 wood, 20 Cal. 146; Wiley v. Keokuk, 6 
 Kan. 04 ; Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468 ; 
 People V. McGungill, 41 Cal. 429; 
 Stout V. Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232 ; State v. 
 McQuaige, 5 So. Car. 421); Tuttle v. 
 State, G Tex. App. 556; Ogle v. State, 
 33 Miss. 383; Brown v. State, 57 Miss. 
 424; Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221; 
 Erwiu V. State, 2U Ohio St. 186; State 
 V. Buuger, 14 La. Ann. 461; State v. 
 Caulfield, 23 La. Ann, 148; State v. 
 Lartigue, 29 La. Ann. 642, 646 ; State 
 V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518. 
 
 1 People V. Weil, 40 Cal. 268; 
 Treuor v. Central Pacific R. Co., 50 
 Cal. 222, 226; Hubbard v. Rutledge, 
 57 Miss. 7; State v. Brown, 15 Kan. 
 400. 
 
 - Fleeson v. Savage, S. M. Co., 3 
 Nev. 157, 163; State v. Raymond, 11 
 Nev. 98 ; Rothschild v. State, 7 Tex. 
 App. 519; Grissoniw. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 ;586; Hollis v. State, 8 Tex. App. 620; 
 Cock r. State, 8 Tex. App. 659; Tooney 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 452; Cotton v. 
 State, 32 Tex. 614; Myers v. State, 7 
 Tex. App. 641; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. 
 App. 571; Loggins v. State, 12 Tex. 
 App. 65; Balding v. State (Tex.), 4 S. 
 W. Rep. 579; Meaux v. Wiiitehall, 8 
 Bradw. (HI.) 173. luWhelanv. Reg., 
 28 Up. Can. Q. B. 2, the Canadian 
 courts, certain judges dissenting, held 
 that, even under the circumstances 
 stated in the text, a prejudice to the 
 cliallenging party would not be pre- 
 sumed. In considering this case, it is 
 to be remembered that the prisoner 
 was a member of the Fenian organiza- 
 tion so obnoxious to the Canadian 
 people; that the crime for which he 
 was tried was the assassination of the 
 Hon. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, a mcAi- 
 ber of the Canadian Parliament; and 
 that he had been fairly convicted upon 
 the evidence, as he himself admitted 
 at the close of tlie trial. See 28 Up. , 
 Can, (Q. B.) p. 141. It is not, there- 
 fore, surprising tliat tlie majority iu 
 both the appellate courts were in- 
 clined to find from the record that the 
 prisoner had suffered in no respect 
 from the error of the court in disallow- 
 ing a legal cause of challenge.
 
 Tit. I, Cb. IV.] CHALLENGING AND BIPANELING. 
 
 117 
 
 the rule that the discovery that a disquahfied person sat on the jury 
 gives to the unsuccessful party the same right of new trial, as the 
 right which he would have had to challenge the juror, if the discov- 
 ery had been made before the jury were sworn, on the ground that 
 such a person is no juror at all, — a non-jui-or, — and that the 
 presence of a, non-juror vitiates the whole panel; ^ yet the mass 
 of American authority, grounded upon considerations of conven- 
 ience and public policy, is opposed to this strict rule. It has 
 been repeatedly held that a cause of challenge not discovered 
 until after verdict, wdiether the case be civil or criminal, — as 
 that some of the jurors Avere aJieiis; - or not of the jury list as se- 
 
 1 Shaue v. Clarke, 3 Har. & McH. 
 (Md.) 101, 103. It was so held where 
 oue of the jurors was an alien. Quinn 
 V. Halbert, 52 Vt. 353; Guykowski v. 
 People, 2 111. 476 (overruled in Chase 
 V. People, 40 111. 352, 358) ; was lack- 
 ing in statutory qualifications. Briggs 
 V. Georgia, 15 Vt. 61; State v. Bab- 
 cock, 1 Conn. 401; jMann v. Fairlee, 44 
 Vt. 673; Eastman v. 'Wright, 4 Ohio 
 St. 156; State v. Groome, 10 Iowa, 
 315; was connected with one of the 
 parties by relationship within the de- 
 gree constituting a cause of challenge. 
 Hardy v. Sproule, 32 Me. 310; Lane v. 
 Goodwin, 47 Me. 593; Brown r. State, 
 28 Ga. 439; Georgia R. Co. v. Hart, 60 
 Ga. 550; Woodbridge v. Raymond, 
 Kirby (Conn.) , 280 ; had expressed his 
 opinion upon the issue to be tried, or 
 upon the guilt of the defendant in a 
 criminal case. ^McKinley v. Smith, 
 Hard. (Ky.) 167; United States v. 
 Fries, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 515; Stste v. 
 Hopkins, 1 Bay (S. C), 372; Tenney v. 
 Evans, 13 N. H. 462; IMonroev. State, 5 
 Ga 85; Wader. State, 12Ga. 25; Rayr. 
 State, 15 Ga. 223; IVIoncrief v. State, 59 
 Ga. 470; Pierce r.Bush, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 
 347; French r. Smith, 4 Vt. 363; Vance 
 
 V Haslett, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 191 ; Herndon 
 
 V Bradshaw^ 4 Bibb (Ky.), 45; Tweedy 
 
 r. Brush, Kirby (Conn.), 13; Demingv. 
 Hurlburt, 2D. Chip. (Vt.) 45; or was 
 interested in the event of the suit. 
 Page V. Coutoocook &e. R. Co., 21 N. 
 H. 438. But an objection to a juror, 
 which is not good as a principal cause 
 of challenge, is no ground for setting 
 aside the verdict. Chapman r. "Welles, 
 Kirby (Conn.), 132; Walton v. Au- 
 gusta Canal Co., 54 Ga. 245. But see 
 Cain V. Ingham, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 478. 
 
 2 Rex V. Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cress. 
 417; s. c. 15 Eng. C. L. 252; Holliugs- 
 worth V. Duane, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 353; 
 State V. Quarrel, 2 Bay (S.C), 150; 
 Com. V. Thompson, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 215; 
 Brown v. Lacrosse Gas Co., 21 Wis. 
 51; Presbury v. Com., 9 Dana (Ky.), 
 203; State v. Lopher, 35 La. Ann. 975; 
 Turner V. Hahu, I Colo. 23; Jones t. 
 People, 2 Colo. 351 ; Chase v. People, 
 40 111. 352; Bennett v.. Matthews, 40 
 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 428; Ripley v. Cool- 
 Idge, Minor (Ala.), 11; State v. Mc- 
 Donald, 8 Ore. 113; Kennedy ■y. Com., 
 14 Bush (Ky.), 340; Majors. Pnlliam, 
 3 Dana (Ky.), 583; Mt. Desert v. 
 Cranberry Isles, 46 Me. 411; Hull v. 
 Albro, 2 Disney (Ohio), 147; Thomp- 
 son r. Paige, IG Cal. 78; Territory w. 
 Baker (N. Mex.), 13 Pac. Rep. 31.
 
 118 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 lecled by the county authorities ; ^ or non-residents, or not citi- 
 zens of the county or State ; '^ or not possessed of the statutory 
 qualifications,^ as for instance less than twenty-one ^ or more 
 than sixty ,^ years of age ; or related to the opposite party 
 within the disqualifying degrees : ^ or interested in the event 
 of the suit ; ^ or shown to have expressed disqualifijing ojnn- 
 
 1 Gormley v. Laramore, 40 Ga. 253 ; 
 Edwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428; Ur- 
 quhart w. Powell, 59 Ga, 721; Osgood 
 V. State, G3 Ga. 701. 
 
 2 Koseborovigh v. State, 43 Tex. 
 570; O'Mealy v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 180; Clarke v. Territory, 1 Wash, 
 (Terr.) 82; State v. KcuDcdy, 8 Rob, 
 (La.) 590; Costly v. State, 19 Ga. 614; 
 Zickefoose v. Kuykeudall, 12 W. Va. 
 23; Major v. Pulliam, 3 Dana (Ky,), 
 583; Mt, Desert r. Cranberry Isles, 46 
 Me. 411; Hull v. Albro, 2 Disney, 147; 
 Thompson v. Paige, 16 Cal. 78. 
 
 3 Ex parte Phillips, 10 Exch. 731; 
 s. c. 1 Jur. (x. s.) 143; 24 L. J. Exch. 
 79; State v. Patrick, 3 Jones L. (N. 
 C.) 443; State v. AVhite, 68 N, C. 158; 
 Tweedy v. Bi-iggs, 31 Tex. 74 ; Thomp- 
 son r. Com., 8 Gratt. (Va.) 637; Gil- 
 berts. Rider, Kirby (Conn.), 180, 184; 
 Orciitt V. Carpenter, 1 Tyler (Vt.), 
 250; People v. Jewett, 6 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 386; Finley v. Haydeu, 3 A. K. 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 330; Bratton v. Bryan, 
 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 212; Rennick ■y. 
 Walthall, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 23; 
 State V. Fisher, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 
 261; People i'.. Sandford, 43 Cal. 29; 
 s. c. 1 Green C. L. 682; Steele v. 
 Malony, 1 Minn. 347; Clark v. Van 
 Vrancken, 20 Barb. (X. Y.) 278; Estep 
 V. Waterous, 45 Ind. 140; Croy v. 
 State, 32 Ind. 384: Pickens v. Ilobbs, 
 42 Ind. 270; State r. McLean, 21 La. 
 Ann. 546; Gillooley r. State, 58 Ind. 
 182; Kingen v. State, 46 Ind. 132; 
 Whitehead v. Wells, 29 Ark. 99; Watts 
 V. Ruth, 30 Ohio St. 32; State v. Biin- 
 ger, 14 La. Ann. 461; State v. Parks, 
 
 21 La. Ann. 251; Keurick v. Reppard, 
 23 Ohio St. 333; State v. Madoil, 12 
 Fla. 151; Mansfield &c. R. Co. v. 
 Clark, 23 Mich. 519; Patterson v. 
 State, 70 Ind. 341; Buie v. State, 1 
 Tex. App. 453; Yanez v. State, 6 Tex. 
 App. 429. 
 
 * Trueblood v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 650; AVassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93; 
 Brewer v. Jacobs, 22 Fed. Rep. 217; 
 John V. Hodges, 60 Md. 215; s. c. 45 
 Am. Rep. 722. 
 
 5 Williams v. State, 37 Miss. 407; 
 Monroe v. Brigham, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 
 368; Davis r. People, 19 111. 74; Sea- 
 cord V. Burling, 1 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 175; Cohron v. State, 20 Ga. 753. 
 
 *> Quinebaug Bank v. Leavans, 20 
 Conn. 87; Eggleston v. Smiley, 17 
 Johns. (X. Y.) 133; Hayes v. Thomp- 
 son, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) (x. s.) 220; 
 McLellan v. Crofton, Me. 307; Tide- 
 Avater Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill & J. 
 (Md.) 479; Orme v. Pratt, 4 Cranch 
 C. C. (U. S.) 124; Smith v. Earle, 118 
 Mass. 531; Baker v. State, 4. Tex. 
 App; 223 Wickersham v. People, 2 111. 
 12s. 
 
 ' Williams v. Great W. R. Co., 3 
 Hurl. & N. 869 ; s. c. 28 L. J. (Exch.) 
 2; (compare Bailey v, Macaulay, 13 Q. 
 B. 815) ; Glover v. Woolsey, Dudley 
 (Ga.), 85; Josey v. Wilmington &c. 
 R. Co., 12 Ricii. L. 134; Boland v. 
 Greenville &c. R. Co., 12 Rich. L. 
 368; Magness v. Stewart, 2 Coldw. 
 309; Pearson v. Wightmau, 1 Mills 
 Const. Rep. 336; Billis v. State, 2 Mc- 
 Cord (S. C.) , 12. But see Talmadge v. 
 Northrop, 1 Root (Couu.), 454.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 119 
 
 ions as to the subject matter of the trial; ^ or otherwise subject 
 to challenge; 2 is not, per se, a ground of new trial, though 
 it may be such in the discretion of the court. ^ In the ex- 
 
 1 Taylor v. Greely, 3 Me. 204; 
 Briggs V. Byrd, 12 Ired. L. (X. C.) 
 377; Byars v. Mt. Veruou, 77 111. 4G7; 
 Kennedy v. Com., 14 Bush (Ky.), 340; 
 Romaiue v. State, 7 Ind. G3; Keener v. 
 State, 18 Ga. 194; Alexanders. Dunn, 
 5 Ind. 122; Fitzpatrick v. Harris, KJ B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 5G1; Tidewater Canal Co. 
 V. Archer, 9 Gill & J, (Md.) 479; Simp- 
 sou v. Pittmau, 13 Ohio, 365; Com. v. 
 Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 415; 
 Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 3G ; Meyer v. 
 State, 19 Ark. 156 ; Daniel r. Guy, 23 
 Ark. 50; State v. Howard, 17 N. H. 171, 
 198; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; 
 State V. Strauder, 11 AV. Ya. 745; 
 Brill V. State, 1 Tex. App. 572 ; Clough 
 V. State, 7 Neb. 324; Stater. Funck, 17 
 Iowa, 3G5; McKinney v. Simpson, 51 
 Iowa, 6G2 ; McDonald v. Beall, 65 Ga. 
 288; Stewart v. Ewbank, 3 Iowa, 191; 
 Gregorys. Wells, Smith (X. H.), 239, 
 n; Porter v. Greenough, Smith (N. 
 H.), 238, u; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 
 Smith (N. H.), 239. Unless he im- 
 posed himself iipon the jury by con- 
 cealment or prevarication. Casat v. 
 State, 40 Ark. 511. 
 
 2 States. Davis, SON. C. 412; Am- 
 herst r. Hadley, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 38: 
 Wilder v. State, 25 Ohio St. 555; Ho- 
 gan V. State, 36 Wis. 226; Meeks v. 
 State, 57 Ga, 329 ; Walker v. Green, 3 
 Me. 215; Howland v. Gifford, 1 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 43, note; Fellows' Case, 5 
 Me. 383; Cook v. Castner, 9 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 2GG; Bloodworth v. State, 6 
 Baxt. (Tenn.) G14; Shobe v. Bell, 1 
 Eand. (Va.) 39; Hardenburgh v. Crary, 
 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 307, 309; State v. 
 Harris, 30 La. Ann. 90; United States 
 V. Baker, 3 Beued. (U. S.) G8; State 
 V. Powers, 10 Ore. 145; s. c. 45 Am. 
 
 Rep. 138; Paulitsch v. Railroad Co., 
 50 X. Y. Super. (J. & S.) 241; State v. 
 Thomas, 35 La. Ann. 24. 
 
 2 Woodward v. Dean, 113 Mass. 
 297, 298. See also Kimiicutt v. 
 Stockwell, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 73; Davis 
 V. Alleu, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 4GG; Eg- 
 gleston V. Smiley, 17 Johns. (X. Y.) 
 133; Meyer V. State, 19 Ark. 15G; State 
 V. McDonald, 8 Ore. 113; Seymour v. 
 Deyo, 5 Cow. (X. Y.) 289; State i?. 
 Davis, 80 N. C. 412, 414; State v. Boon, 
 80 X. C. 4G1 ; Clough v. State, 7 Neb. 
 351 ; Shea v. Lawrence, 1 Allen 
 (Mass.), 1G7; State r. Madoil, 12 Fla. 
 151; State v. Howard, 17 N. H. 171; 
 Cain v.. Cain, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 213; 
 Templet?. Sumner, Smith (N. H.), 226; 
 State V. Pike, 20 N. H. 344 ; State v. 
 Lambert, 93 N. C. 618. On a motion 
 in arrest of judgment, or for a new 
 trial, it is plain that a party cannot be 
 heard to allege partiality on the part of 
 certain jurors, which, if existing at all, 
 was in favor of the party complaining. 
 Carew v. Howard, 1 Root (Conn.), 
 323. In an early criminal case in 
 Massachusetts, the court granted a 
 new trial where it appeared after ver- 
 dict that two of the trial jurors had 
 been members of the grand jury 
 which found the indictment. Com. v. 
 Hussey, 13 Mass. 221. See also 
 Hawkins v. Andrews, 39 Ga. 118. But 
 in other cases this reason has been 
 held to be insufllcieut. State v. Tur- 
 ner, 6 La. Ann. 309; Beck v. State, 20 
 Ohio St. 228; Franklin v. State, 2 Tex- 
 App. 8; State v. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 
 456. It has been considered that a 
 new trial should be awarded, where 
 one of tlie jurors previous to the trial 
 had made a trifling loager upon the
 
 120 
 
 IMPANELI>rG THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ercise of such a discretion, an essential inquiry will be whether 
 the objecting party exercised reasonable diligence in ascer- 
 taining the qualilications of the obnoxious juror. ^ Was he 
 questioned on the voir dire as to the cause of challenge now al- 
 leged? If not, there has been a lack of diligence on the part of 
 the complaining party ,"^ which amounts to a waiver of the cause 
 
 result. Essex v. McPherson, 6i 111. 
 31:9. But see McCauslaud v. Mc- 
 Causlaud, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 372; Booby 
 V. Suute, 4 Yerg. (Tenu.) 111. It is 
 evideut that an objection made to a 
 juror during the course of the trial is 
 entitled to greater consideration than 
 if postponed until after verdict. Dil- 
 worth-y. Com., 12 Gratt. (Va.) GS9; 
 Henry v. Cuvillier, 3 Mart. (La.) (x. 
 s.) 524. 
 
 1 RoseboroughtJ. State, 43 Tex. 570; 
 Quinebaug Bank v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 
 87; Brown v. Lacrosse Gas Co., 21 
 Wis. 51; Steele v. Malony, 1 Mimi. 
 341; Mt. Desert v. Cranberry Isles, 4(5 
 Me. 411; Patterson v. State, 70 Iiul. 
 341; Veununi v. Harwood, 6 111. (J5'J; 
 Swarnes V. Sitton, 58 111. lo.j; Walker 
 V. Green, 3 Me. 215; Glover v. Wool- 
 sey, Dudley (Ga.), 85; Fitzpatrick v. 
 Harris, IG B. Mon. (Ky.) 5G1; Frank- 
 lin V. State, 2 Tex. App. 8 ; McDonald 
 V. Beall, 55 Ga. 288 ; Koenig v. Bauer, 
 1 Brewst, (Pa.) 304. In one case the 
 court awarded a new trial, where a 
 juror appeared to have been strongly 
 biased against the defendant, because 
 the facts of the case did not show 
 "gross" negligence on the part of 
 the defendant in not ascertaining this 
 cause of objection to the juror before 
 trial. Hanks v. State, 21 Tex. 526. 
 In Lafayette &c. R. Co. v. New Al- 
 bany &c. R. Co., 13 Ind. DO, the 
 motion for a new trial was founded 
 upon the incapacity of a juror to un- 
 derstand the English language. This 
 the court granted, the juror's ignor- 
 
 ance being unknown to the party 
 against whom the verdict was ren- 
 dered, until after the trial. " The 
 party," said Perkins, J., " might well 
 presume that the officer had called a 
 juror competent in this particular." 
 But see Yanez v. State, 6 Tex, App. 
 429; State v. Harris, 30 La. Ann. 90-, 
 United States v. Baker, 3 Bened. (U. 
 S.) G8. 
 
 - Jeffries v. Randall, 14 Mass. 205; 
 State V. Patrick, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 
 443; Tweedy v. Briggs, 31 Tex. 74; 
 State V. Quarrel, 2 Bay (S. C), 150; 
 Gilbert v. Rider, Kirby (Conn.), 180, 
 184; Taylor v. Greely, 3 Me. 204; 
 Turner v. Hahn, 1 Colo. 43; Chase v. 
 People, 40 111. 352 ; Estep v. Watrous, 
 45 lud. 140; Alexander v. Dunn, 5 Ind. 
 122; Croyv. State, 32 Ind. 384; Kin- 
 gen V. State, 4G Ind. 132; Gillooley r. 
 State, 58 Ind. 182; State v. McLean, 21 
 La. Ann. 54G; State v. Parks, 21 La. 
 Ann. 251; State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 
 (La.) 5'.)0; Simpson v. Pitman, 13 
 Ohio, 3G5; Watts v. Ruth, 30 Ohio St. 
 32; Beck v. State, 20 Ohio St. 228; 
 Wilder v. State, 25 Ohio St. 555; Ken- 
 rick V. Reppard, 23 Ohio St. 333 ; Byars 
 V. Mt. Vernon, 77 111. 4G7; Keener v. 
 State, 18 Ga. 194; Collier v. State, 20 
 Ark. 3G; Daniel v. Guy, 23 Ark. 50; 
 State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; Buie v. 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 453; Yanez v. State, 
 G Tex. App. 429; Clough v. State, 7 
 Neb. 324; State v. Funck, 17 Iowa, 3G5; 
 McKinney v. Simpson, 51 Iowa, GG2; 
 Stewart v. Ewbank, 3 Iowa, 191. 
 Whether the juror was thus examined
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 121 
 
 of challenge. ^Moreover, it should appear by affidavit that 
 both the prisoner and his counsel had no knowledge of the dis- 
 
 upou tlie voir dire, is a matter to be 
 sliowu by the record, TheaniUavit of 
 the party iiioviug for the uew trial is 
 not siitiicient to establish this fact. 
 Ste'R'art r. Ewbauk, 3 Iowa, I'J L ; State 
 V. Slielledy, 8 Iowa, 447; Shaw v. 
 State, 27 Tex. 750. If the juror an- 
 swers untruthfully, for the purpose of 
 avoiding a challenge, it is generally 
 proper for the court to grant a new 
 trial, upon the discovery of the decep- 
 tion after verdict. Sellers v. People, 
 4 111. 412; Howerton v. State, IMeigs 
 (Tenu.),2()2; Veuuum r. Ilarwood, 
 111. 659 ; Essex v. McPhersou, G4 111. 
 349; Jeffries r. Randall, 14 Mass. 
 205; Cody v. State, 3 How. (Miss.) 27; 
 Troxdale v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 411; Sam v. State, 31 Miss. 480; 
 Busick V. State, 19 Ohio, 198; Rice v. 
 State, 16 Ind. 298; State v. Kennedy, 8 
 Rob. (La.) 590; Smith r. "Ward, 2 Root 
 (Conn.), 302; Lane v. Scoville, 16 
 Kan. 402; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 
 477; Lamphier v. State, 70 Ind. 317; 
 Watts V. Ruth, 30 Ohio St. 32; Bales 
 V. State, 63 Ala. 30; Cannon v. State, 
 57 Miss. 147; McGufRer. State, 17 Ga. 
 497; Childress r. Ford, lOSmed. & M. 
 (Miss.) 25. Mr. Justice Crorapton was 
 of opinion that, even if a prisoner had 
 been purposely misled as to a cause 
 of challenge, this would not vitiate the 
 verdict in point of law, " though it 
 would be matter for the consideration 
 of a court in a civil case, in exercising 
 their discretion as to granting a new 
 trial under all the circiuiistances of 
 the case, or for the advisers of the 
 Crown in the exercise of the preroga- 
 tive of mercy." Reg. v. Mellor, Dears. 
 &Bell C. C. 468, 509; s. c. 4 Jur. (n. 
 s.) 214; 7 Cox C. C. 454; 27 L. J. (M. 
 C.) 121. See also Temple v. Sumner, 
 
 Smith (N. H.), 226; Schmidt v. Rose, 
 6 Mo. App. 587, 588; State v. McDon- 
 ald, 9 W. Va. 456 ; Brenuau v. State, 
 33 Tex. 266; Frank v. State, 39 INIiss. 
 705. But if, at the time of the ex- 
 amination, one of the parties or his 
 counsel is aware that the juror has 
 testified falsely, and makes no objec- 
 tion to the juror until after verdict, 
 this circumstance cannot be relied 
 upon as ground for a new trial. Parker 
 V. State, 55 Miss. 414. Jurors are not 
 required to know or to surmise that 
 something more is intended than is 
 fairly expressed by the terms of the 
 questions put to them. Missouri &c. 
 R. Co. V. Munkers, 11 Kan. 223; Moore 
 V. Cass, 10 Kan. 288; United States v. 
 Smith, 1 Sawyer (U. S.), 277, 282; 
 Swarnes v. Sittou, 58 111. 155. It 
 seems to make no diffci'ence whether 
 the answers of the juror are made to 
 questions by the court, or by the 
 party subsequently alleging their 
 falsity. Hudspeth v. Herston, 64 Ind. 
 133; Wiggin v. Plummer, 31 N. H. 
 251. It has been held that, if it ap- 
 pear after verdict that a juror testi- 
 Hed falsely upon the voir dire, he does 
 not restore his competency by making 
 an affidavit tliat he was really impar- 
 tial in the case, and that he unr,;:- 
 tingly testified to the contrary of th3 
 facts. Territory v. Kennedy, 3 ilont. 
 520 ; United States v. Upham, 2 Mont. 
 170; Hudspeth v. Herston, 64 Ind. 133. 
 But the soundness of this view may be 
 doul)ted. The Supreme Court of 
 Michigan has taken the view that the 
 conception of vxiiver embodied in the 
 above text is applicable only in civil 
 cases, and has no application in cn'm- 
 inal cases, where every step against the 
 accused is taken in invitum. Hill v.
 
 122 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [L Thorap. Tr., 
 
 qualifying fact when the juror was accepted.^ In Enghmcl, and in 
 many American jurisdictions, a paramount inquiry upon such an 
 objection is, whether it has resulted in an unjust verdict; if not, 
 the objecting party has sustained no injury, and a new trial will 
 not be granted in order that public and private time may be 
 consumed, and the dangers of other irregularities incurred, when 
 the same result must, on a just view^of the evidence, be reached.^ 
 
 People, 16 Mich. 351, 357; Johr v. 
 People, 26 Mich. 427. See also 
 Smith V. School District, 40 Mich. 143. 
 The Supreme court of Wisconsin, on 
 the other haud, has regarded this 
 theory of waiver to be applicable iu all 
 criminal cases not capital. State v. 
 Vogel, 22 Wis. 471; Schumacker v. 
 State, 5 Wis. 324. The Illinois court 
 tooli this view iu two early cases. See 
 Nomaque v. People, 1 111. 109 ; Guy- 
 kowski V. People, 2 111. 476. But it 
 was later abandoned. See People v. 
 Scates, 4 111. 351, 353; Chase v. Peo- 
 ple, 40 111. 352. There seems to be 
 no sound view for such a distinc- 
 tion in capital cases, since here the 
 temptation to perjury is even greater 
 than in non-capital felonies. ' See for 
 example. State v. Hopkins, 1 Bay (S. 
 C), 372. In such a case, a judge has 
 " no right to be tender and humane at 
 the expense of the law." Crowder, 
 J., in Reg. v. Mellor, Dears. & Bell C. 
 C. 468, 517. Most courts seem to ap- 
 ply the principle of the text alike in all 
 causes, civil and criminal, non-capital 
 and capital. Ex parte Phillips, 10 
 Exch. 731, 732; Amherst v. Hadley, 1 
 Pick. (Mass.) 38, 40; Wassum tj. Fee- 
 ney, 121 Mass. 93; Davis v. People, 19 
 111. 74; Chase v. The People, 40 111. 
 352; Gillooley v. State, 68 lud 182; 
 Kingen v. State, 40 Ind. 132; Costly v. 
 State, 19 6a. 614; Davison v. People, 
 90 111. 221. The argument, frequently 
 raised, that the party cannot waive 
 what lie does not know (Vy\-yan v. 
 
 Vyvyan, 30 Beav. 65, 74, per Lord 
 Romilly, M. R. ; Bristow's case, 15 
 Gratt. (Va.) 648), is more specious 
 than sound; since it is met by another 
 I^rinciple, which is, tliat negligent ig- 
 norance operates against a party the 
 same as actual knowledge ; and there- 
 fore he ought not to be permitted to de- 
 stroy a verdict by urging a ground of 
 challenge which, but for his negli- 
 gence, he might have discovered and 
 urged at the proper time. Note the 
 language of Lord Tenterden in Rex v. 
 Sutton, 8 Barn. & Cres. 417, 419. See 
 also \yhelan v. Reg., 28 Tp. Can. Q. B. 
 2, 63, 177, 178; Reg. v. Mellor, Dears. 
 & Belie. C. 468, 617, per Willes, J.; 
 Ibid., p. 523, per Byles, J. 
 
 1 Brown r. State, 60 Miss. 447. The 
 mere fact, in a criminal case, that the 
 prisoner had no knowledge of the 
 grounds of challenge so as to inter- 
 pose it at the proper time, counts for 
 little ; since, as well suggested by Cat- 
 ron, J., how can tlie court know this 
 after verdict except by the affidavits of 
 a convicted felon — proof always to be 
 had when necessary? McClurei'. State, 
 1 Yerg. (Teun.) 206, 219. See also 
 Gillespie I). State, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 507; 
 Calhoun v. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 477; Meyer V. State, 19 Ark. 156. 
 
 2 Rex V. Huut, 4 Barn. & Aid. 430, 
 432; Williams v. Great Western R. 
 Co., 3 Hiirl. & N. 869, 870; s. c. 28 L. 
 J. (Exch.) 2; Trueblood v. State, 1 
 Tex. App. r,50; O'Mealy v. State, 1 
 Tex. App. 180; "Whituer v. Hamlin, 12
 
 Tit. ] , Cll. I^^] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 123 
 
 Unless there is plain evidence of injustice done to the party com- 
 plainMig, the verdict should be allowed to stand. ^ 
 
 §117. Evidence in Support of such Objections. — Such 
 objections, then, are to be received with great caution, as tend- 
 ing to perjury and to the defrauding of i)ublic justice; ^ other- 
 wise, as soon as a verdict is rendered, another trial, to wit, that 
 of the jurors, will begin. ^ It follows that the evidence in sup- 
 })ort of such objections will be closely scrutinized, and if con- 
 Jiictinj, the decision of the trial court, refusing a new trial, will 
 
 Fla. 2] •, Fiuley v. Hayden, 3 A. K. 
 JMarsh. (Ky.) 330; Beuuett v. Mat- 
 thews, 40 How. Pr. (N, Y.) 428; 
 Zickefoose v. Knykeudall, 12 "W. Va. 
 23; State v. Madoil, 12 Fla. IT)!; Hull 
 V. Albro, 2 Disuey (Ohio), 147; Ko- 
 maiue %, State, 7 lud. 63; Egglestou v. 
 Smiley^ 17 Johus. (N. Y.) 133; Caiu v. 
 Ingham, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 478; Hayes v. 
 Thompson, 15 Al)b. Pr. (N. Y.) (x. s.) 
 220; Ftate v. Turuer, 6 La. Auu. 309; 
 McLe^ lau v. Croftou, 6 Me. 307 ; Tide- 
 water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill & J. 
 (Md.;^ 479; Com. v. Flanagan, 7 Watts 
 & S. (Pa.) 415; State v. Howard, 17 
 N. H 171, 198; State v. Stnuider, 11 
 W. ^ A. 71:5; Brill v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 572; Orrae v. Pratt, 4 Cranch C. 
 C. (T. S.) 121; Maguess v. State, 2 
 Coldw. (Teun.) 309; Hardeuburgh r. 
 Cravy, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 307, 309; 
 Bri^tow's Case, 15 Gratt. (Va.) G18; 
 Coin. V. Jones, 1 Leigh (Va.), 598; 
 Cu'-rau's Case, 7 Gratt. (Va.) G19; 
 Gn-euup v. Stoker, 8 111.202; Seymour 
 V. Deyo, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 289; Heath v. 
 Com., 1 Eol). (Va.) 735; "Wickersham 
 V. People, 2 111, 129; Presbury v. Com., 
 9 Dana (Ky.), 203. 
 
 ^ Kamadge v. Ryan, 9 Biug. 333; 
 Davison v. People, 90 111. 221; State 
 V. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296; Mitchum r. 
 State, 11 Ga. 015; Anderson v. State, 
 14 Ga. 709; Eay r. State, 15 Ga. 223; 
 
 M^ercer 1), State, 17 Ga. 146; Curran's 
 Case, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 619; Ash v. State, 
 56 Ga. 683; Moughou v. State, 59 Ga. 
 308; Lovettr. State, 60 Ga. 257; Mor- 
 rison V. McKiuuon, 12 Fla. 652; Re 
 Bowman, 7 Mo. App. 668 ; Schmidt v. 
 Rose, 6 Mo. App. 587, 588; Meyer v. 
 State, 19 Ark. 156; Lawrence v. Col- 
 lier, 1 Cal. 37; People v. Plummer, 9 
 Cal. 298; State v. Shay, 30 La. Ann. 
 114; "Wallace v. Columbia, 48 Me. 436; 
 SteAvart v. State, 68 Ga. 577; Simms v. 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 230; Thrall v. Lin- 
 coln, 28 Vt. 356 ; Parkinson v. Parker, 
 48 Iowa, 667; Xadenbousch v. Sharer, 
 4 W. Va. 203; O'Shields v. State, 55 
 Ga. 696; Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211; 
 Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296 ; State v. 
 Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438; Stewart v. 
 Ewbauk, 3 Iowa, 191 ; State v. Pike, 20 
 ,N. II. 344; State v. Ayer, 23 N. H. 
 301; Dole v. Erskine, 37 N. H. 317; 
 Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600. Thus, 
 where the juror has expressed the 
 opinion that the defendant killed the 
 deceased, and this indisputably ap- 
 pears, but self-defense was set up as a 
 justification, no injury was shown. 
 State V. Wells, 28 Kan. 321. 
 
 2 PerTilghman, C. J., in Moore v. 
 Philadelphia Bank, 5 Serg. & K. (Pa.) 
 41, 42. 
 
 3 Per Rogers, J., in Com, r. Flana- 
 gan, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 415, 422.
 
 124 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 not be disturbed on appeal.^ If such an objection assails the 
 impartiality of a juror, it is due to him and to justice that he be 
 furnished ^ith the charge, and that his affidavit be taken, deny- 
 ing it if he can ; ^ and althouo-h such affidavit be not taken, a new 
 trial will not necessarily follow, if the affidavit in support of the 
 objection conflicts with his testimony on the voir dire^ since it 
 will still be merely the case of oath against oath.^ 
 
 § 118. Question how viewed on Error or Appeal. — Here, 
 as in all other cases where the rulings of the trial court are ques- 
 tioned on error or appeal, those rulings are presumed to be cor- 
 rect until the contrary is sliow^i ; ^ it will, therefore, be presumed, 
 until the contrary appears by the record, that the jurors who 
 
 1 Miami Valley riirniture Co. v. 
 Wesler, 47 lud. (>5; Clem v. State, 33 
 lud. 418; Harding v. Whituey, 40 
 Ind. 879; Holloway ^7. State, 53 lud. 
 554; Romaiue v. State, 7 lud. 63; 
 State t\ Bancroft, 22 Kan. 170; Epps 
 V. State, 19 Ga. 102, 122; Costly v. 
 State, 19 Ga. 614; The Auarcliists' 
 Case, Spies v. People, 122 111. 1; s. c. 
 12 North East. Rep. 867, 992, 993; 
 Hughes V. People, 116 111. 331, 337; s. 
 c. 6 North East. Rep. 55; State v. 
 Brooks (Mo.), 5 S. W. Rep. 258, 271. 
 
 2 Anderson v. State, 14 Ga. 709 ; Tay- 
 lor v. Greely, 3 Me. 204; States. Kings- 
 bury, 58 Me. 238; Nash v. State, 2 Tex. 
 App. 362 ; Davison v. People, 90 111. 
 221; Columbus v. Goetchius, 7 Ga. 
 139; Re Bowman, 7 Mo. App. 568; 
 State V. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456, 466; 
 Tenney v. Evans, 13 N. H. 462; Wood- 
 ward V. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453; Ray v. 
 State, 15 Ga. 223; Moucrief v. State, 
 59Ga. 470; Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 
 296; State ?;. Dumphey, 4 Miun. 439; 
 State V. Ayer, 23 N. H. 301. Contra, 
 Vance v. Haslett, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 191. 
 
 ^ Nash V. State, 2 Tex. App, 362; 
 State V. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456; 
 Hudgins t'. State, 61 Ga. is2; AVest t;. 
 State (Ga.), 4 S. E. Rep. 325; Dumas 
 
 V. State, 63 Ga. 601 ; Com. v. Hughes, 
 
 11 Phila. 430. But see Reddle v. State, 
 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 401; Henries. State, 
 41 Tex. 573; Fitzgerald v. People, 1 
 Colo. 56. In the Anarchists^ Case it is 
 said by the Supreme Court of Illinois : 
 " It is a dangerous practice to allow 
 verdicts to be set aside upon ex jparZe 
 affidavits as to what jurors are claimed 
 to have said before they were sum- 
 moned to act as jurymen. The par- 
 ties making such affidavits submit to 
 no cross-examination, and the correct- 
 ness of their statement is subject to no 
 test whatever." Spies v. People (111.), 
 
 12 North East. Rep. 867, 992, 993; s. 
 c. 122 111. 1; reaffirmed by the Su- 
 preme Court of Kansas in State v. Pe- 
 terson (Kan.), 16 Pac. Rep. 263. 
 
 4 Mansell v. Reg., 8 El. & Bl. 54; 
 s. c. Dears. «& B. 375; Strong v. Kean, 
 
 13 Irish L. 93; De Bardelabenu. State, 
 50 Ala. 179; State v. Monk, 3 Ala. 415,. 
 417; Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v, Pattou, 
 9 W. Va. 648; Campbell v. Strong, 
 Hemp. C. C. (U. S.) 265; Dutton v. 
 Tracy, 4 Conn. 93, 94; Clark v. Col- 
 lins, 15 N. J. L. 473; State v. Marshall, 
 36 Mo. 400; Potsdamcr v. State, 17 
 Fla, 895; Com. v. Stephen, 4 Leigh 
 (Va.), 679; Burfey v. State, 3 Tex.
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 125 
 
 tried the case, were possessed of the qualifications required by 
 l:nv,^ The disallowance of a statutory or principal cause of 
 challenire is ground of a venire de novo, as contradistiniruished 
 from a new trial ; it is a denial of a legal right, and not the er- 
 roneous exercise of a discretion ; it is therefore subject to re- 
 view by writ of error, or upon a statutory appeal in the nature 
 of a writ of error ; ^ and so (under the old system) the refusal 
 to appoint triors,^ the rejection of competent evidence,* the ad- 
 mission of incompetent evidence,^ or a misdirection to the triors 
 in point of law,*' might be corrected, on error or statutory appeal, 
 l)y a bill of exceptions in the usual way. In the view of some 
 courts, where the trial of challenges is devolved by statute upon 
 the court, unless the statute so provides, the decision of the 
 court upon a challenge ^o the favor cannot be reviewed;^ but 
 other courts take the view that au appellate court ought to re- 
 view the action of the trial court on all questions touching the 
 
 App. 519; Pauska v. Daus, 31 Tex. 
 72; State r. Jones, f.I Mo. 232; Mont- 
 gomery V. State, 3 Kan. 2()o; Green 
 V. State, 17Fla. 6G9, GTU; Haudliue u. 
 State, 6 Tex. App. 3^7. 
 
 1 Mansell v. Reg., supra; Chesa- 
 peake &c. R. Co. V. Pattou, 9 W. Va. 
 Gt8; Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43; 
 Ishamv. State, 1 Sueed (Tenu.), HI; 
 Turner v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 119; McClurer. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 215, pe?" Catron, J. ; Keenau v. State, 8 
 Wis. 132; State v. Roderigas, 7 Nev. 
 328. The bill of exceptions must con- 
 tain a statement of the facts upon 
 Tvhich the challenge disallowed is 
 based; otherwise it cannot be con- 
 sidered by au appellate court. State 
 v.. Shaw, 5 La. Ann. 342; State v. 
 Bruington, 22 La. Ann. 9; Ripley v. 
 Coolidge, Minor (Ala.), 11. This state- 
 ment must be ill itself sufficient to 
 support a challenge. State v. Millain, 
 3 Kev. 409. 
 
 2 Rex V. Edmunds, 4 Barn. & Aid. 
 i"^!, 473; Vicars v Laugham, Hob. 
 
 235; Knyastou v. Shrewsbury, An- 
 drews, 85, 89; Hesketh v. Braddock, 
 3 Burr. 1847; Reg. v. Gray, 6 Irish C. 
 L. 259, 2(;7; Huttonv. Hun, Cro. Eliz. 
 849; Ex parte Yermilyea, 6 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 555; People V. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 
 (X. Y.) 108; Mann v. Glover, 14 N. J. 
 L. 205; State v. Shaw, 3 Ired. L. (N. 
 C.) 532; State v. Davis, 80 N. C. 412, 
 414. 
 
 3 People V. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 509; People v. Bodlne, 1 Den. 
 (N. Y.) 281, 308; Baker t;. Harris, 1 
 Winst. (N, C.) 277. 
 
 ■* Meclianics' Bank v. Smith, 19 
 Johns. (N". Y.) 115. 
 
 ^ Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147, 
 151. 
 
 6 State V. Benton, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. 
 C.) 196, 222; People v. Bodine, 1 
 Denio (N".' Y.),281, 308. 
 
 T Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48, 62; 
 Jones r. People, 2 Colo. 351, Licett v. 
 State, 23 Ga. 57; Galloway w. State, 
 25 Ga. 596 ; Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 
 598.
 
 126 
 
 IMPANELING THE JURY. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr. 
 
 competency of jurors.^ A statute which grants an exception 
 where the court disallows a challenge, does not authorize it 
 where the challenge is alloiued ; since the right of challenge, as 
 already seen,^ is the right to reject, and not the right to select, 
 and neither party has the right to have a particular juror sit 
 on the trial of the case.'^ As the question of the competency of 
 a juror is a mixed question oflaio and fact, ^ and as the reviewing 
 court has not the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the 
 venire-man who is challenged, or of the witnesses whose testi- 
 mony is weighed, it will defer to the decision of the trial court 
 and will exercise its power of setting aside that decision with 
 caution and hesitancy.^ In order to have the erroneous disal- 
 lowance of a challenge reviewed on error or appeal, the record 
 must not only distinctly set out the grounds of the challenge,' 
 
 1 Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Schiieller, 
 GO III. -K;."); Montague v. Com., 10 
 Gratt. 7i!7; Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 
 224; Stevens V. People, 38 Mich. 739; 
 State V. Pike, 49 N. II. 399, 407. The 
 statute of Kentucky ijrovides that all 
 challenges are tried by the court, and 
 that its decision in no case is subject 
 to exceptions. Bullitt's Ky. Cr. Code, 
 §212; Terrell V. Com., 13 Bush, 246; 
 Rutherford v. Com., 13 Bush (Ky.), 
 608; Morgan V. Com., 14 Bush (Ky.), 
 lOG. A late statute of New York con- 
 tains a similar provision, but allows 
 an exception to the determination of 
 the challenge and a review by writ of 
 error or certiorari. Laws N. Y. 1873, 
 ch. 427; Thomas v. People, G7 N. Y. 
 218, 222, opinion by Earl, J. See also 
 Greenfield v. People, 74 N. Y. 277. 
 
 2 Ante, § 43. 
 
 3 People V. Murphy, 45 Cal. 137, 
 overruling People v. Stewart, 7 Cul. 
 140. See also State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 
 314; Peoples. Brothertou, 43 Cal. 530; 
 People w. Colson, 49 Cal. G79; People 
 V. Atherton, 51 Cal. 495. 
 
 * McCarthy v. Railway Co. (Mo.), 4 
 
 S. W. Rep. 51 G. See also State?;, 
 Chatliam Nat. Bank, 80 Mo. G26 ; Mont- 
 gomery V. Railroad Co. (Mo.), 2 S. W. 
 Kep, 409. 
 
 5 People V. Stout, 4 Parker, Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 71, 124, opinion by E. Darwin 
 Smith, J. See also Thomas v. People, 
 67N. Y. 218, 222, per Earl, J.; The 
 State f. Tom, 8 Oregon, 177; Jordan 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 545; Bradford v. State, 
 15 Ind. 347; March w. Portsmouth &c. 
 R. Co., 19 N. H. 372; People v. Hen- 
 derson, 28 Cal. 4GG; Campbell v. Cora.,. 
 84 Pa. St. 187; May v. Elam, 27 Iowa, 
 3G5; Davenport Gas Co. r, Davenport,. 
 13 Iowa, 229 ; Coryell v. Stone, G2 Ind. 
 307; State V.Saunders (Ore.), 12 Pac. 
 Rep. 441; Reynolds v. United States, 
 98 U. S. 145. See also Trenor v. Cen- 
 tral Pacific R. Co., 50 Cal. 222; Swiss 
 V. Stockstill, 30 Ohio St. 418; Dew ??. 
 McDivitt, 31 Ohio St. 139; s.c. 17 Am., 
 L. Reg. G23; State v. Dodson, IG S. C. 
 453. Contra, Montague v. Com., 10 
 Gratt. (Va.) 7'<w. 
 
 6 Ripley v. Coolidge, ]\Iinor (Ala.), 
 11 ; Rash v. State, 01 Ala. 89 ; Pillion v. 
 State, 5 Xeb. 351 ; State v. Bullock, 63
 
 Tit. I, Ch. IV. 1 CHALLENGING AND niPANELING. 
 
 127 
 
 but also the testimony "whicli ^vas adduced for and against 
 it.i 
 
 § 119. What the Record must show. — Here, as in other 
 cases of appellate procedure, and especially in criminal cases, 
 much attention nmst be given to the question, what errors or 
 irregularities must be affirnuitively exhibited by the record, in 
 order to be available for reversing the judgment. A general 
 statement of principle would be, that those steps in the procedure 
 which are matters of vital or constitutional right to the accused 
 in a criminal case, must affirmatively appear by the record, 
 though not necessarily in the form of specific recitals; and that, 
 in respect of matters of minor ini})ortance, the presumption 
 spoken of in the last section will su})})ort the judgment. In gen- 
 real, it nmst affirmatively appear from the record, that the jury 
 were sicorn ; ^ though, in those jurisdictions where the jury is not 
 
 N. C. 570; State v. Ellington, 7 Ircd. 
 L. (N. C.) 61; People v. Bodine, 1 
 Den. (N. Y.) 281, 308; Baker r. Harris, 
 1 Wiust. N. C. 277; State v. Benton, 2 
 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) IDG, 217. 
 
 i State V. Tom, 8 Ore. 177; Ilaydcu 
 V. Long, 8 Ore. 2U; State v. Rigg, 10 
 Nev. 28i. 
 
 * Kitter v. Teople, 25 111. 42; Nels 
 V. State, 2 Tex. 280 ; Cannon v. State, 
 5 Tex. App. 34; Keunon v. State, 7 
 Tex. App. 326; State v. Gates, 9 La. 
 Ann. 94; State v. Donglass, 28 La, 
 Ann. 425; State v. King, 28 La. Ann. 
 425; State v. Phillips, 28 La. Ann. 387; 
 Botsford V. Yates, 25 Ark. 282; Lacey 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 385; Baird v. State, 
 38 Tex. 500 ; State v. Calvert, 32 La. 
 Ann. 224; State f. Keid, 28 La. Ann. 
 387. It is doubtless true that it 
 seldom happens, as a matter of fact, 
 that a jury is not sworn, although the 
 record omits to state the swearing. 
 An attempt was lately made in a 
 Louisiana case to break in upon the 
 well estal)lished iHile that the record 
 must show the fact of swearing. Al- 
 
 thougli unsuccessful, the result was a 
 divided court. Ludeling, C. J., ouo 
 of the dissenting judges, held that, 
 upon the principle that courts gener- 
 ally will not listen to objections to the 
 qualifications of jux'oi'S unless taken 
 at the proper time, before trial, a 
 prisoner sliould be presumed to have 
 waived sucli an informality if it actu- 
 ally occurred. But, said he: "It is 
 morally certain that the jury is sworn 
 in all cases. Tliis results from the 
 manner in which tlie jurors are se- 
 lected and sworn in courts, and I can- 
 not perceive how it is possible to fail 
 to swear a jury in any case." State 
 V. Kcid, 28 La. Ann. 387, 388. See 
 also Ilardenburgh v. Crary, 15 How. 
 Pr. 307, wliere a verdict rendered hj a 
 jury, one of the twelve being unsworn, 
 was upheld. Before a new trial will 
 be granted in such a case, it must be 
 demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
 court, that tlie party com{)laiuing and 
 his attorneys were ignorant of the fact, 
 until after verdict, tliat the juror was 
 unswcrn. Scott v. Jloore, 41 Vt. 205-
 
 128 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 sworn in each case, but the entire panel is sworn at the begin- 
 ning of the term once for all, this recital is regarded as no essen- 
 tial part of the history of the case.^ But it is sufficient that this 
 appear by a fair interpretation of the record, although the fact 
 be not expressly stated.^ According to one conception, where 
 some of the jurors affirm, the record ought to show that they 
 were conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath;^ but this 
 conclusion is doubtful,^ and by an English statute,^ it is unneces- 
 sary. 
 
 § 120, No Vested Right in a Particular Juror. — As already 
 pointed out,*^ the right to reject is not a right to select. No party 
 can acquire a vested right to have a particular member of the 
 panel sit upon the trial of his cause until he has been accepted 
 and sAvorn.^ It is enough that it appear that his cause has been 
 tried by an impartial jury. It is no ground of exception that, 
 against his objection, a juror was rejected by the court upon in- 
 sufficient grounds, unless, through rejecting qualified persons, the 
 necessity of accepting others not qualilied has been purposely 
 created.^ Thus, in the process of impaneling, no party is en- 
 titled, as of right, to have the Jirst juror sit who has the statu- 
 
 1 Wacklell v. Magee, 53 Miss. GS7 ^ State ?;. Putnam, IN. J. L. 2G0; 
 (probably overruling Wolfe v. Martin, State v. Sharp, cited by Kinsey, C. J., 
 I How. (Miss.) 30; Beall «. Campbell, in State v. RockafelloAV, 6 N. J. L. 
 1 How. (Miss.) 24; Irwin v. Jones, 1 332, 341. See also State v. Eox, 9 N. 
 How. (Miss.) 407) ; Clark v. Davis, 7 J. L. 244; State V.Harris, 7 N. J. L. 
 Tex. 6.36; Drake v. Brauder, 8 Tex. 3(;i. 
 
 351; Pierce v. Tate, 27 Miss. 283; Fur- " Clark v. Collins, 15 N. J. L. 473. 
 
 niss V. Mereditli, 43 Miss. 302; Ilewett ^ (5 mij 7 Vict., chap. 85, § 2. 
 
 V. Cobb, 40 Miss. CI. But see Buck v. e ^„/(,^ § 43, 
 
 Mallory, 24 Miss. 170. See also Goyne ' Mansell v. Keg., 8 El. & Bl. 54, 79. 
 
 V. HoAvell, Minor (Ala.), G2; Perdue v. ^ Tatum v. Young, 1 Poi'ter (Ala.), 
 
 Burnett, Minor (Ala.), 138. 298; Bibb i-. Eeid, 3 Ala. 88; People 
 
 2 Christ V. State, 21 Ala. 37. Por v. Arceo, 32 Cal. 40; Grand Eapids 
 example, see State v. Christian, 30 La, Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308; 
 Ann. 3G7. Por cases where the record Carpenter v. Dame, 10 Ind. 125; Heas- 
 •was held, on an interpretation, not to ton v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 
 show the fact, see Bass v. State, 6 275, 279. Contra, Hildreth v. Troy, 
 Baxter (Tenn.), 679, 58fi; State v. 101 N. Y. 234; s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 
 Potter, 18 Conn, 16G, 175; Richi?. State, 68G. 
 
 1 Tex. App. 20G.
 
 Tit. I. Ch. IV.] CHALLENGING AND IMPANELING. 
 
 129 
 
 tory qualifications ; ^ though there are authorities to the contrary, 
 chiefly based on exaggerated views of the rights of the accused 
 in criminal trials.^ But this is on principle quite untenable ; since, 
 if the prisoner has been tried by an impartial jury, it would be 
 nonsense to grant a new trial or a venire de novo upon this ground, 
 in order that he might be again tried by another impartial jury.-^ 
 A consequence of this rule is, that when the name of a juror is 
 drawn and called in court, the accused in a criminal case cannot 
 demand that the juror shall be called at the door of the court 
 house, or that an attachment shall issue to bring him in, or that 
 an officer shall be dispatched for him ; * though, if ti juror ab- 
 sent himself after he has been sworn, the court may either com- 
 pel his attendance or dismiss the jury and impanel another.^ 
 Finally, it is a rule of paramount importance that errors com- 
 
 1 People V. Arceo, 32 Cal. 40, 44 ; 
 State V, Pritchard, 15 Nev. 74; State v. 
 Arthur, 2 Dev. (N. C.) 217; State v. 
 Beutou, 2 Dt'v, & B. (N. C.) 196, 222; 
 Smith V. ChiTtou, 2'.) N. ,T. L. 357; 
 Phelps r. Hall, 2 Tyler (Vt.), 401; 
 Johu V. State, 16 Fla. 554; State v. 
 Marshall, 8 Ala. 302; Watson r. State, 
 C3Iiicl.548; Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 
 17, 22; State v. Loveusteiu, 9 La. Aun. 
 313; State v. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; 
 Foster's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (N. 
 y.) 372, n. ; Silvis v. Ely, 3 Watts & S. 
 (Pa.) 420; Citizens' Bank t\ Strauss, 
 26 La. Aun. 736; State v. Lewis, 28 
 La. Ann. 84; Clifton v. State, 53 Ga. 
 241; Paunell v. State, 29 Ga. 681; 
 Henry r. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 270; 
 State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; O'Brien 
 r. Vulcan Iron Works, 7 Mo. App. 
 257. 
 
 2 Boles V. State, 13 Sraed. & M. 
 (Miss.) 3!»S; Williams w. State, 32 Miss. 
 390; Smith r. State, 55]\Iiss. 410; Finn 
 V. State, 5 lud. 400; Meyers v. State, 
 20 Ind. 511. (But see Coryell v. Stone, 
 62 Ind. 307.) Van Blaricura v. Peo- 
 ple, 16 111. 364; Greer v. Norvill, 3 
 
 Hill (S. C), 262. See also remarks of 
 Lord Tenterden, ante, § 250. 
 
 2 Henry v. State, 4 Humph. (Teun.) 
 270; Grissonw. State, 8 Tex. App. 386, 
 398; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; 
 Woodard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 412. 
 But, in the view of some courts, this 
 rule docs not permit the trial judge to 
 exclude competent jurors arbitrarily 
 and unreasonably; but an abuse of 
 discretion in this regard may be 
 ground of new trial. 
 
 * United States v. Byrne (U. S. 
 Cir. Ct. S. D. X. y., May, 1881), 7 Fed. 
 Rep. 435; AValler v. State, 40 Ala. 325; 
 Bill V. State, 29 Ala. 34; Stewart v. 
 State, 13 Ark. 721, 737; Hall v. State, 
 51 Ala. 9; People ^7. Larned, 7 IST. Y. 
 445; People?;. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. (N. 
 y.) 369, 382; Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 
 9 ; State V. Lovensteiu, 9 La. Aun. 313; 
 Foster's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (n. 
 s.) 372, 11. ; Boles v. State, 24 Miss. 
 445; State v. Breaux, 32 La. Ann. 222; 
 State V. Belcher, 13 So. Car. 459. But 
 see Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9; State 
 V. Ross, 30 La. Ann. 1154. 
 
 5 Peuuell V. Percival, 13 Pa. St. 197.
 
 130 IMPANELING THE JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 mitted in overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of re- 
 versal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced up- 
 on the challenging party after he had exhausted his peremptory 
 challenges ; ^ if his peremptory challenges remained unexhausted, 
 so that he might have excluded the objectionable juror by that 
 means, he has no ground of complaint.^ 
 
 § 121. Juror no Vested Right to Serve. — A single decision 
 is found upholding the idea that a citizen has a vested right to 
 serve as a juror when drawn ; ^ but the idea is too fantastic for 
 serious discussion. 
 
 1 The Anarchists' Case (Spies v. ^ United States v. Neverson, 1 
 
 People) (111.), 12 North East. Rep. Mackey (D. C), 152. 
 867, 989; s. c. 122 111. 1; Holt v. State, ^ Qj-ger v. Norvill, 3 Hill (S. C), 
 
 9 Tex. App. 571; Laggins v. State, 12 262. 
 Tex. App. 65. But see Wade v. State, 
 12 Tex. App. 358.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IM FACIE CURIiE. 131 
 
 TITLE II. 
 
 CO:^TEOL AXD REGULATIO]S' OF THE TKIAL. 
 
 Chapter V. — Of the Preservation of Order and the Pun- 
 ishment OF Contempts. 
 
 Chapter VI. — Of Compulsory Process against Witnesses. 
 
 Chapter VII. — Enforcing the Stipulations and Adjiissions 
 of Counsel. 
 
 Chapter VIII. — Of Other Subjects of Judicial Conduct 
 AND Control. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 OF THE PRESERVATION OF ORDER AND THE PUNISHMENT OF CON- 
 
 TEIVIPTS. 
 Section 
 
 124. Extent of the Power to Punish Contempts. 
 
 125. Power of Legishiture to Limit this Power of Courts. 
 
 126. Statutory Affirmations of this Power. 
 
 127. Immaterial that the Offense is Indictable. 
 
 128. What are Superior Courts of Record. 
 
 129. Power of Inferior Courts to Punish Contempts. 
 
 130. [Continued.] Power of Referees, Court Commissioners, Notaries. 
 
 131. [Continued.] Power of .Justices of the Peace. 
 
 132. Power of all Courts to Protect their Proceedings from Interruption. 
 
 133. Of Direct Contempts or Contempts in Facie Curiae. 
 
 134r. Matters whicli have been lield not Contempts in Facie Curice. 
 135. What Acts are Punishable as Constructive Contempts. 
 13G. Contempts by Attorneys of the Court. 
 
 137. [Continued.] Punishment — Disbarment, Suspension. 
 
 138. Procedui-e in Cases of Contempts in Facie Curiae. 
 
 139. [Continued.] Procedure in Cases of Indirect or Constructive Contempts. 
 
 140. Remedies of the Person Committed for Contempt. 
 
 141. Remedy by Habeas Corpus, in case of a Want of Jurisdiction.
 
 132 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 Sectiox 
 
 142. [Continued.] Power of one Court to Judge of the Jurisdiction of an- 
 other Court. 
 
 14:3. [Continued.] Power to re-judge the Question of Jurisdiction but not 
 the Judgment. 
 
 144. [Continued.] Statutory Expressions in Various States. 
 
 145. [Continued.] Extensions of the Use of this Writ by Appellate Courts, 
 
 146. [Continued.] Pernicious Consequences of Such Extensions. 
 
 147. Injunction, Proliibition, Mandamus. 
 
 148. Action for False Imprisonment. 
 
 149. Executive Pardon. 
 
 150. Application to the Judge who has Imposed the Punishment. 
 
 § 124. Extent of the Power to Punish Contempts. — It is 
 
 necessary to the due exercise of the functions of a judicial court 
 that the judge should possess the power to preserve order while 
 conducting judicial proceedings, to enforce obedience tOjthe lawful 
 orders and process of the court, and consequently to punish disobe- 
 dience of the same. It is therefore a general principle of the com- 
 mon-law, subject to statutory limitations in this country: (1) that 
 every superior court of record has the inherent power to jDunish 
 contempts committed in its presence and against its authority ; ( 2 ) 
 that every such court is the exclusive judge of such contempts.^ 
 
 1 Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984; s. c. 185, 190; Johnson ■;;. Commonwealth, 
 
 9 Jur. 393, 14 L. J. Q. B, 105, 201; 1 Bibb (Ky.), 598; Morrison «. McDon- 
 
 Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 174; State aid, 21 Me. 550; Passmore William- 
 
 V. Gallaway, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 32(;; son's Case, 26 Pa. St. 9, 18; Ex parte 
 
 Re Andrews, 4 C. B. 226; Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; State v. Tipton, 1 
 
 Hardy (Ala.), 13 Cent. L. J. 50; Re Blackf. (Ind.) 166; State v. Doty, 32 
 
 Cooper, 32 Vt. 253 ; People v. Sturt- N. J. L. 403 ; The Bark Laurens, 1 
 
 evant, 9 N. Y. 263; Ex parte Adams, Abb. Adm. 508, 513; Watson?;. AVill- 
 
 25 Miss. 883; Ex. parte Sam, 51 Ala. iams, 36 Miss. 331; Hollingsworth v. 
 
 34; Re Millington, 24 Kan. 214; Duane, Wall. La. (U. S) 77; State v. 
 
 Crosby's Case, 3 Wils. 188; Wicker u. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; Lining v. 
 
 Dresser, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 331; Bentham, 2 Bay (S. C), 1, 7; States. 
 
 AVhitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118, 120, .Johnson, 7d, 385; People v. Fancher, 
 
 .per Gray, C. J.; Cartwright's Case, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 467; Sanders v. 
 
 114 Mass. 230; State v. Matthews, 37 Metcalf, 1 Tenn. Ch. 419, 428; People 
 
 N. H. 450; Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Me. ■?;. Wilson, 64 111. 195; Middlebrook r. 
 
 165, 172; Tenney's Case, 23 N. H. 162; State, 43 Conn. 257, 268; Shattuck v. 
 
 Spalding v. People, 7 Hill (N. Y.), State, 51 Miss. 50; La Fontaine v 
 
 301 (affirming s. c. 10 Paige (N. Y.), Southern Underwriters, 83 N. C. 132; 
 
 284) ; State v. AVhite, R. M. Charlt. State v. Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 16 
 
 (Ga.) 136; Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn, 18, W. Va. 864, 876.
 
 Tit. II, Cll. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURIAE. 133 
 
 The result of this doctrine is that superior courts of record are 
 not bound to certify upon their record the facts of which a con- 
 tempt consists, but that every other court or judge, where the 
 vahdity of a commitment for contempt by such a court is drawn 
 in question, is bound to presume that the facts were sufficient to 
 warrant it. 
 
 § 125. Power of Legislature to limit this Power of 
 Courts. — This- power being inherent in courts of justice, and 
 necessary to enable them to preserve their dignity and enforce 
 their process, and so to attain the ends of their creation, the 
 power of the legislature to regulate the same, except where such 
 power is conferred by the constitution, may well be doubted.^ 
 If the court is created by the constitution, it is clear, upon prin- 
 ciple, that the legislature has no such power, unless such power 
 is conferred upon it by the constitution; and it has been so 
 held.2 
 
 § 126. Statutory Affirmations of this Power. — Statutory 
 affirmations of this power exist in several States. Where 
 the power is conferred in general terms by an affirmative 
 statute upon a superior court of record, it is regarded as 
 being merely declaratory of the common law,^ not as creating 
 a power, but simply as re-affirming a pre-existing power; and it 
 leaves the court to follow the principles of the common law in 
 determining what constitutes a contempt.* Accordingly, a stat- 
 ute conferring this power upon superior courts of record, in gen- 
 eral terms, is held to embrace both direct and constructive con- 
 tempts, because both of these were contempts at common law.^ 
 Even a statute requiring a judge issuing a writ of habeas corpus 
 
 1 See Arnold v. Com., 80 Ky. 300; might impose reasonable checks upon 
 s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 480 ; Ex parte Robin- the mere arbitrary exercise of a discre- 
 son, 19 AVall. (U.S.) 510; Re Wolley, tion in this regard. Re Wolley, 11 
 11 Bush (Ky.), 95, 111. Bush (Ky.), 95, 111. 
 
 2 State ?;. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384. The 3 Middlebroo4i v. State, 43 Conn. 
 Kentucky court, while asserting this 257, 267. 
 
 principle in general terms, was dis- ^ People v. W^ilson, 64 111. 195. 
 
 posed to consider that the legislature ^ whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196, 212.
 
 134 CONTEOL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 to remand a j3risoner, if it appear that he is detained in custody 
 for a contempt specially and plainly charged in the commitment, 
 by some court having authority to commit for the contempt 
 charged, has been supposed not to work a substantial alteration 
 of the rule of the common law on the subject.^ A statute which 
 merely purports to limit the power, in this regard, 6f judges in 
 vacation and at chambers, does not, of course, operate to curtail 
 the power possessed by the courts.'^ 
 
 § 127. Immaterial that tlie Offense is Indictable. — The 
 
 power of the courts in this regard, being founded in the princi- 
 ple of self-preservation, it does not at all go to deprive them of 
 it, that the law has provided some other mode for punishing the 
 offender; it is quite immaterial that the offense is indictable.^ 
 Courts are not obliged to trust the preservation of their dignity 
 and authority to such weak agencies as information, indictment, 
 and trial by jury, it may be before some other tribunal, where 
 the success of the prosecution and the conviction of the offender 
 may depend upon the zeal of a prosecuting witness, of the 
 State's attorney, or upon circumstances purely accidental. Be- 
 sides, the exigencies may not admit of so tardy a remedy. In 
 cases of inferior courts, such as justices of the peace, even the 
 remedy by indictment may not exist, unless the words are such 
 that they would be indictable when spoken of a private person ; * 
 
 ^ Davison's Case, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. an ass and a coxcomb for making such 
 Y.) 129, 138. But a reading of tlie a warrant, and lie l^nows no more tlian 
 Euglisli decisions will show that this a slickhill," was held naught, on de- 
 supposition is erroneous. murrer, tliough it was a breach of 
 
 2 Ke Millington, 24 Kan. 214. good manners, and might afford 
 
 8 Rex .V. Lord Ossulston, 2 Strange, ground for binding the party over for 
 
 1107 (s. c. sub nom. King r. Pierson, good behavior. " Et pei' Holt, C. J.: 
 
 Andrews, 310) ; Spauldingt'. People, 7 ' To say a justice is a fool, or an ass. 
 
 Hill (N. Y.), 301, 302; State ?'. Will- or a coxcomb, or a blockhead, or a 
 
 iams, 3 Speers (S. C), 2G; Contra, buffle-head, is not indictable.'' " Reg. 
 
 State V. Blackwell, 10 So, Car. 35, 38. v. Wrightsou, 2 Salk. 698. But in a 
 
 * Thus, in an old case, an indict- rambling report in the Modern Re- 
 
 ment for saying of Sir Rowland Gwyn, ports, the court is said to have sus- 
 
 who was a justice of the peace, in a tained au indictment for speaking 
 
 discourse concerning a warrant made scandalous words of Sir J. K., a jus- 
 
 by him, " Sir Rowland Gwyn is a fool, tice of the peace, namely: " Sir J. K.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURIiE. 135 
 
 but they might afford ground for binding the party over to keep 
 the peace. 1 To this ruling an exception has been admitted by 
 some courts, in the case of proceedings to disbar atlorneys for 
 professional misconduct; so that, where a special proceeding 
 was provided hy statute by which the accused was allowed the 
 advantage of certain formalities, he could not be proceeded 
 against and disbarred b}' the court in the exercise of its common- 
 law powers. 2 
 
 § 128. "What arc Superior Courts of Record. — AVhat are 
 superior courts of record, within the meaning of this rule, is an 
 important subject of inquiry. It must be stated in the outset, 
 that it is not at all necessary to the inherent power of the court 
 to fine and imprison for contempt that it should be what is termed 
 a court of general jurisdiction. In the largest sense, there are 
 no such courts, because there are no courts in P^ngland or Amer- 
 ica which exercise at once all the judicial power of the State, 
 both original and appellate, legal and equital)le, civil and crim- 
 inal. The two houses of Parliament, for instance, have always 
 been regarded, whenever their authority in this regard has been 
 called in question in the judicial courts, as very high courts. 
 The House of Lords, indeed, is the highest court of api^ellate 
 jurisdiction in Great Britain, and it possesses a certain original 
 jurisdiction, chiefly criminal, in respect of its own members, but 
 it is in no sense a court of general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
 its power, when sitting as a legislative body, to punish contempts 
 of its authority is of so high a nature that it cannot 
 even be inquired into by the judicial courts. The former 
 Court of Chancery in England had no common-law jurisdiction, 
 
 is a buffle-headed fellow and doth not for which au hulictmeut would lie; 
 understand law; he is not lit to talk and of that opinion was the whole 
 law with me; I have baffled him, and court, and gave judgment accord- 
 he hath not done my client justice." ingly." Rex v. Derby, 3 ]Mod. lo'J. 
 The counsel for the crown urged that ' Richmond v. Dayton, 10 Johns. 
 '' this was a scandal upon the govern- (N. Y.) 3'J3. 
 
 ment; since it was as much as to say - State v. Start, 7 Iowa, 499; Ex 
 
 that the king hath appointed an ignor- parte Smith, 28 lud. 47. 
 ant man to be a justice of the peace,
 
 136 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 and hence was not, properly speaking, a court of general juris- 
 diction ; but its power to punish contempts of its authority was 
 not only never questioned, but in the earliest times this was the 
 only way in which it enforced its orders and decrees. ^ The Court 
 of Common Pleas in England had no criminal jurisdiction, but 
 its inherent power in this regard was never questioned. So the 
 Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut has no criminal jurisdic- 
 tion, but its power in this regard, Avhen questioned, was dis- 
 tinctly affirmed. 2 The courts of the United States possess both 
 common-law and equity powers, and their common-law jurisdic- 
 tion extends to cases both civil and criminal. But in respect of 
 parties to actions, those courts are not courts of general juris- 
 diction.'^ Their jurisdiction is limited by the citizenship of the 
 parties, except in cases relating to the federal revenue and ni 
 some other cases. But their power to punish contempts of their 
 authority is unquestioned, and, when acting within the scojje of 
 their apparent jurisdiction, their judgments in this regard cannot 
 be questioned in other courts.^ Passing to other courts, we find 
 that the English connnon-law judges holding courts of nisiprius,^ 
 courts of Oyer and Terminer in England ^ and in New York ^ 
 and the Municipal Court of Bangor, Maine, existing in 1833,* 
 
 1 3 Bl. Com. 287. other State, and brought before the 
 
 2 Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. court whose authority he has con- 
 257 2(57. temned, there to be dealt with for 
 
 3 Ex parte Smith, 94 U. S. 485. such contempt. Faushawe v. Tracy, 
 Compare Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 4 Biss. (U. S.) 490. But some of the 
 (U. S.) 193, 207; McCormick v. Sul- federal judges deny this power. Com- 
 livant, 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 192; Kemp pare Pooley v. Wliethan, 15 Ch. Div. 
 V. Kennedy, 5 Cranch (U. S.), 185; 435; s. c. 50 L. J. (Chan.) 236. 
 Skelleru v. May, 6 Cranch (U. S.), ^ Rex v, Davison, 4 Barn. & Aid, 
 267; Ruclvman v. Cowvell, 1 N. Y. 505; 329, 
 
 Thompsons. Lyie, 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) « Re M'Aleece, 7 Ir. C. L. 146. 
 
 166; Reed?). Vaughn, 10 Mo. 447; Hays Compare Re Pater, 5 Best & S. 299; 
 
 V. Ford, 55 Ind. 52. s. c. 10 Jur. (x. s.) 972; Re Fernandez, 
 
 ♦ Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. St. 9; 6 Hurl. & N. 717; s. c. 10 C. B. (n. s.) 
 
 The Bark Laureus, 1 Abb. Adm. 508, 3; 30 L. J. (C. P.) 321. 
 
 513. It has even been held that a con- ^ People v. Faucher, 4 Thomp. & a 
 
 temnor of one of the Circuit Courts of (N. Y.) 4(57. 
 
 the United States may be arrested in « Morrison v. Macdonald, 21 MCc 
 
 another federal district, even in an- 651, 556.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IN FACIE CURI.E. 137 
 
 were all ranked as superior courts of record, within the rule 
 which clothes such courts with this power. So, the Court of 
 Probate in Mississippi,^ and the Surrogates' Court in New york,^ 
 possess the power to compel defaulting executors, administratovs 
 and guardians to pay over inongy or deliver property, where 
 payment or delivery is w'ithin their power. ^ 
 
 § 129. Power of Inferior Courts to Punish for Contempt. — 
 
 It maj^ be stated as a general rule of the connnon law, that infe- 
 rior courts not of record, inferior legislative bodies such as those 
 of the British colonies and dependencies, and the legislative 
 councils of municipal corporations,* have no power to fine and 
 imprison for contempt, except in so far as such power has been 
 expressly conferred by statute.^ Much difference of opinion has 
 existed as to what tribunals and officers are to be deemed inferior 
 courts not of record, W'ithin the meaning of this rule. But it has 
 been held that judges of courts performing ex officio acts out of 
 court in vacation,'' or at chambers,^ have no power to fine or im- 
 
 * Watson w. Wilson, 3(5 Miss. 331. proceedings, regarded, in certain 
 
 But not in Vermont . Ee Bingham, 32 cases, as superior courts of record 
 
 Vt. 329. (Johnson v. Beasley, 65 Mo. 250), yet 
 
 2 Seaman v. Duryea, 11 N. Y. 324 it is believed that it is not the uuder- 
 
 t-ming s. c. 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 523) ; standing of the profession in that 
 
 Matter of Watson v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. State that the above statute extends to 
 
 536. the courts of probate. 
 
 3 In Missouri, there is a general * Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118. 
 
 statutory provision to the effect that ^ j^^ Kerrigan, 33 N. J. L. 314; 
 
 "when a judgment requires the per- Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412, 414; 
 
 formance of any other act than the Reg. v. Lefroy, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; s. c. 
 
 payment of money, a certified copy of 4 Moak, 250; Noyes v. Byxbee, 45 
 
 the judgment may be served upon the Conn. 382 ; Heard v. Pierce, 8 Cush. 
 
 party against whom it is given, and (Mass.) 338. 
 
 his obedience thereto required. If he ^ Ex parte Ireland, 34 Tex. 344. 
 
 neglect or refuse, he may be punished ' People v. Breuuan, 44 Barb. (N. 
 
 by the court, as for a contempt, by Y.) 344. The N. Y. Code Civil Proc, 
 
 flue or imprisonment, or both, and, if § 302, gives to the judge who issues 
 
 necessary, by sequestration of proper- the order in a proceeding supplement- 
 
 ty." Rev. Stat., § 3728. Although ary to execution, the power to punish 
 
 courts of probate in Missouri are now, as for contempt, and such power is 
 
 in respect of the presumptions in sup- possessed by the county judge in that 
 
 port of their jurisdiction in collateral State. Rugg v. Spencer, 59 Barb. (N.
 
 138 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 prison for contempt; though judges of the Circuit Court of the 
 United States, in cases in equity, possess power so to punish in 
 vacation, because a court of equity has no terms, but is deemed 
 to be always open.^ By analogy to the well-known rule that in 
 suinmojy proceedings contrary to the course of the common law, 
 nothing is presumed in favor of the jurisdiction even of a supe- 
 rior court of record, it his been laid down that no power resides 
 in judicial officers when exercising a summary jurisdiction, to 
 punish for contempts, unless this power is expressly conferred 
 by statute.- In this category have been placed justices of the 
 peace, recorders of municipal corporations, and the like officers 
 who exercise summary jurisdiction expressly conferred by stat- 
 ute for the trial of certain petty offenses.^ But there is a dif- 
 ference of opinion as to the powers of justices of the peace in 
 this regard, as we shall hereafter see. County courts possess 
 varying jurisdiction in different States ; and no general rule can 
 be stated with regard to the power of such courts to punish for 
 contempts. Undoubtedly, they have such power in Vermont.* 
 But it would seem they do not possess it in Alabama; ^ and, un- 
 questionably, they do not in Missouri, where the county court is 
 merely an administrative board, possessing, except in a few pro- 
 visional cases, no judicial powers. There seems to have been a 
 difference of opinion in New York, as to whether surrogates 
 possess this power; but it seems that, by force of statute, they 
 possess it to a limited extent, and may use it to compel the pay- 
 ment of money into their hands by defaulting executors, admin- 
 istrators and guardians. '^ 
 
 Y.) 383, 398. But the possessiou of ^ Matter of Kerrigan, supra. 
 this special statutory power on the * lu that State it is held that jus- 
 part of the judge, does not operate as tices of the peace have such power, 
 an implied denial of it on the part of witliout the aid of any statute. Ee 
 the court. Kearney's Case, 13 Abb. Cooper, 32 Vt. 253. 
 (N. Y.) Pr. 459. •'5 State v. McDuffie, 52 Ala. 4. 
 
 1 Vose V. Reed, 1 Woods (U. S.), « Seaman v. Duryea, 11 N. Y. 324 
 
 647, 652. (affirming s. c. 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 523) ; 
 
 - Matter of Kerrigan, 33 N. ,T. L. Matter of Watson v. Nelson, 69 N. Y, 
 
 344, 348, 350; Stuart r. Allen, 45 Wis. 536. 
 158, 160, per Orton, J.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CUKI.E. 139 
 
 § 130. [Continued.] Power of Referees, Court Commis- 
 sioners, Xotaries. — It is said, in North Carolina, tliat a referee 
 sitting to try tlie issues of a cause Mhich has been referred to 
 him, has the same power to enforce obedience to his rulinos 
 which the court would have if the trial were before the court ; 
 but this is by virtue of the express provisions of a statute.^ 
 Where the referee is not to try the issues, but merely to collect 
 evidence, in other words, where the officer, although called a 
 referee, discharges merely the functions of an examiner in chan- 
 cery, he has no power to punish a recusant witness for contemjDt, 
 but must refer the matter to the court. '^ Court commissioners 
 in "Wisconsin have no such power, except in so far as it is con- 
 ferred by statute.'^ According to the usual practice in chancer}^ 
 an attachment against a Avitness for a contempt in a proceeding 
 before a master, requires an application to the court. ^ A like 
 l^ractice is prescribed by act of Congress in the case of commis- 
 sioners to take depositions to be used abroad, and in case of re<iis- 
 ters in bankruptcy.^ Neither have commissioners of Circuit 
 Courts of the United States power to commit for contempt, and 
 the power of Congress to clothe them with this power has been 
 doubted.^ So, it has been well laid down that a party seeking to 
 justify the commitment of a witness by a notary public, must 
 put his finger upon some statute directly authorizino- it." "We 
 shall see in the next section, that justices of the peace do not 
 possess this power at common law. For stronger reasons, then, 
 it has been denied to the police justices of municipal corpora- 
 tions.^ 
 
 § 131. [Continued.] Power of Justices of the Peace. — 
 
 The power of justices of the peace at common law, to fine and 
 
 1 X. C. Code Civ. Pro., § 24G. Am. ed.) 117S, 1198; 78th Eq. Rule of 
 
 - La Fontaine r. Southern Under- U. S. Courts, 17 Peters, Ixxiv. 
 writers, 83 N. C. 132, 137. 5 ^ev. Stat. U. S., §§ 4071, 4073, 
 
 3 Haight V. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355; 4999, 5002, 5005, 5006. 
 Stewart v. Allen, 45 Wis. 158, 160, per ^ Ex parte Doll, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 595. 
 
 Orton, J. 7 Ex parte Mallinkrodt, 20 Mo. 
 
 * Gray, C. J.., in Whitcomb's Case, 493. 
 120 Mass. 118, 120. See Rex r. Almou, s T^iatter of Kerrigan, 30 X. J. L. 
 
 Wiimot, 243, 2GU; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. (4th 344, 34(J-348.
 
 140 CONTROL AND KEGULATIOX OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tv.y 
 
 imprison for contempt, is 'involved in much doubt. I have not 
 met with any authoritative adjudication in England which holds 
 that they possess such power; and as late as 1822 the power was 
 questioned in the King's Bench, and the court avoided express- 
 ing any opinion upon it. If they ever possessed this power at 
 all, beyond question it was limited to the punishment of con- 
 tempts committed i)i facie citrice; ^ although a court of record 
 possessed at common law the power to punish constructive con- 
 tempts, that is, contempts committed out of court. ^ But a jus- 
 tice of tlie peace may, for this kind of contemi:)t, compel the 
 contemnor to find sureties to keep the peace, and commit him in 
 default thereof ;^ but if he merely imprisons him for contempt, he 
 will be liable to him for damages for false imprisonment.* Dicta 
 may possibly be found in the old English books of reports which 
 give color to the idea that justices of the peace have power to 
 punish direct contempts;^ and some of the authoritative text- 
 writers seem to have supposed that this is the law.^ But it has 
 been pointed out by a learned judge in New Jersey, in by far the 
 ablest discussion of this branch of the subject which has ap- 
 peared in any American book of reports, that these assumptions 
 are entirely destitute of the force of authority, and may be ex- 
 jolained, for the most part, by the indefinite use of the word 
 " commit," not discriminating between its use in the sense of 
 committing in default of sureties of the peace or of bail, to an- 
 swer before a criminal tribunal on an indictment, and the power 
 to commit by way of punishment.^ He pointed out that origin- 
 ally the powers of a justice of the peace were ministerial only,^ 
 consisting chiefly in preserving the peace, receiving complaints, 
 issuing warrants for the arrest of accused persons, examining wit- 
 nesses of the informant, and binding over or bailing or commit- 
 
 1 Res;. V. Lefroy, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; = Rex. v. Laugley, 2 Salk. (197; s. c. 
 Richmoutl v. Dayton, 10 Johus. (N. 2 Ld. Rayin. 1029. 
 
 y.) 393; Fitlcrv. Probasco, 2 Browue e 2 Ha^vk. P. C, book 2, ch. IC, 
 
 (Pa.), 137. § 3; 2 Hale P. C. 122. 
 
 2 Post, § 135. ' Matter of Kerrigan, 33 N. J. L. 
 
 3 Richmoud v. Dayton, 10 Johns. (N. 344, 349. 
 
 Y.) 393. 8 See, as to this, Schraedcr v. Eh- 
 
 * Fitler v. Probasco, supra. lers, 31 N. .1. L. 14(1.
 
 Tit. 11, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IN FACIE CURIAE. 141 
 
 ting the accused.^ Several American courts, however, have 
 conceded to justices of the peace the power to punish contempts 
 of their authority, committed in their immediate presence while 
 in the discharge of their judicial functions, independently of any 
 express grant of such power by statute. ^ This might be held in 
 New England consistently Avith sound principles, upon an excep- 
 tional view tliere taken of the character of courts held by jus- 
 tices of the peace, that such courts arc courts of record; ^ or at 
 least, in certain cases, judges of record.* In New York this 
 power is conferred by statute upon justices of the peace in cei- 
 tain defined cases, and prohibited in all others;^ so that, in that 
 State, a justice of the peace has no ])ower to adjudge a ])erson 
 guilty of contempt, and to })unish him thei'cfor, except in the 
 cases prescribed.^ In Illinois, the power is now limited by stat- 
 ute to the imposition of a fine of $-'), and to imprisonment until 
 the same is paid;" but there can be no imprisonment in the first 
 instance.^ 
 
 § 132. Power of all Courts to Protect their Proceedings 
 from Interruption. — It riiust not be sui)))osed from the foref''oin<»" 
 that the common law has been so jealous of liberty as to deprive 
 inferior judicatories and deliberative bodies of the power to pre- 
 serve their deliberations from interruption and disorder, and 
 from making or ordering the arrest of disturbers, for this pur- 
 pose. Accordingly, under any view taken of the power of a 
 justice of the peace to fine and imprison for contempt, he un- 
 
 1 See 3 Bl. Com. 354, note. Mete. (Mass.) 9. Compare Smith v. 
 
 2 Richmoud v. Dajtou, 10 Johns. Morrison, 22 Piek. (Mass.) 430. 
 
 (N. Y.) 303; Lining r.Beutliam, 2 Bay & Rev. Stat. N. Y. 748, § 44; Id. 
 
 (S. C), 1, 8 (anno 179(;) ; State v. John- (4th ed.) 931, § 51. 
 
 son, 2 Bay (S. C), 385; Hill u. Crau- « Rutlierford t;. Holmes, 06 N. Y. 
 
 dall, 52 m. 70,73; Re Cooper, 32 Vt. 3G8; (aflirming s. c. 5 Hun (N. Y.), 
 
 253, 257; State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 31); ]\Iallory v. Benjamin, 9 How. Pr. 
 
 5*f- (N. Y.) 419; People v. Webster, 14 
 
 3 Holcomb i\ Cornish, 8 Conn. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 242; s. c. 3 Park. Cr, 
 375, 380. That this is not the view in (X. Y.) 503. 
 
 New York, see Brown v. Genung, I - 111. Act. July 1st, 1872, § 123. 
 
 Wend. (N.Y.) 115. s Newton v. Lockliu, 77 111. 103, 
 
 "• Thayer v. Commonwealth, 12 IOC
 
 142 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 doubtedly possesses the pov\^er, during the trial of a cause before 
 him, to order the removal of a disorderly by-stander from his 
 court room. Such a power lies at the very foundation of the 
 administration of justice, and his order, in the exercise of it, will 
 justify a sheriff or constable in an action of false imprisonment ; 
 and, not being an order of record, may be proved by parol.* 
 So, one of the houses of the legislative assembly of a British 
 colony, while possessing no power to imprison for contempt by 
 way of punishment, nevertheless possesses the inherent power 
 to arrest and remove a disorderly member. This power is nec- 
 essary for self-preservation. It is warranted by the legal maxim 
 quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et illud, sine quo 
 res ipsa e.sse non potest.^ In like manner, a grand jury, while 
 possessing no inherent power to punish contempts of its author- 
 ity, is held to possess, by necessary implication, the power to 
 order a contumacious witness or a disturber of its deliberations 
 into the custody of its officer, for the purpose of being brought 
 before the court, there to be dealt with as to the court shall 
 seem proper.^ 
 
 § 133. Of Direct Contempts or Contempts in Facie 
 Curiae. — Having thus stated by way of premise the general 
 scope of the power which judicial courts possess of punishing 
 contempts and protecting their proceedings from disorderly in- 
 terruption, we shall now proceed to speak of those contempts 
 which most usually arise in the conduct of trials. And first of 
 direct contempts, or contempts in the face of the court itself. 
 "What will amount to such a contempt will, of course depend 
 largely upon the personal temperament and the views of decorum 
 of the judge who presides. The following acts have been held 
 to constitute such contempt: Tearing up papers of the oppo- 
 site counsel ; ^ for a person conducting his own defense on a 
 trial under an indictment for a blasphemous libel to say to the 
 
 1 State V. Copp, 15 N. II 212. s Heard v. Pierce, S Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 2 Doyle V. Falconer, L. K., 1 P. C. 338. 
 
 328,310. 4 Thwiugv, Denuie,Quiucy(Mass.), 
 
 338.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACJK CURIAE. 143 
 
 judge; " My Lord, if you have your dungeon read}- I will give 
 you the key." ^ To say on such a trial, " The deist is infamous 
 because he cannot believe that some traditions handed down 
 among the Jews and Christians are a divine revelation, and not 
 only superior to the several and respective revelations possessed 
 by the Turks, the Brahmins, the Hindoos, and many others, but 
 the only genuine and authentic revelation in existence. Now, it 
 so happens that a deist considers all as a collection of ancient 
 tracts, to contain sentiments, stories and references totally de- 
 rogatory to the honor of a God, destructive to pure principles of 
 morality, and opposed to the best interests of society: " ^ for the 
 defendant on such ati'ial to say, " All bishops are generally scep- 
 tics;"' ^ to call another person a liar in the presence of the court 
 and in the hearing of its officers; ^ to protest against the judg- 
 ment of the court in an insulting manner, thougli with language 
 not necessarily insulting; ^ for a i)arty against whom the judge 
 had decided a cause to say to him when about to take his seat on 
 the bench, "I do not si)eak to any one who acted so corruptly 
 and cowardly as to attack my character when I was absent and 
 so entirely defenseless; " ^ to perform militia evolutions, with 
 music and firing near the court. house while the court is in ses- 
 sion ; ^ for a Jew to refuse to be sworn on Saturday ; ^ for one 
 not a Quaker to refuse to be sworn on the grounds of conscien- 
 tious scruples, the liberty of affirming being at the time confined 
 to Quakers.^ 
 
 1 For this coutempt the defeudaut States (admitting that anywhere the 
 
 was fined £200. Eex v. Davisson, i laws are in such a barbarous state as 
 
 Barn. & Aid. 329. to admit of such a prosecution), with 
 
 - For these expressions the learned the slightest prospect of success, 
 
 judge fined the defendant £40. Ibid. * United States v. Emerson, 4 
 
 ^ This so horrified the learned judge Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 188. 
 
 that he imposed an additional £40. It ^ Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984. 
 
 is not supposed that any American ^ Com. v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408. 
 
 court will follow this infamous prece- ' State i'. Coulter, Wright (Ohio), 
 
 dent. The trial of a person for a 421; State r. Goff, /rf. 78. 
 
 blasphemous libel, consisting in the ^ Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 
 
 expression of candid opinions upon 213. 
 
 matters of religious belief, could not * U. S. v. Coolidge, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 
 
 take place anywhere in the United 304.
 
 144 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TKIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 § 134. [Continued.] Matters wliicli Lave been held not 
 Contempts in Facie Curiae. — On the contrary, the following 
 cases have been held not to amount to contempts in the face of the 
 court itself, so as to subject the person or persons guilty of them 
 to immediate fine or committment: To make an affray at a 
 tavern near the court house, where the judge was stopping, of 
 which the roiters were advised, during a night of the term, the 
 court being then in recess; ^ to serve a party or witness attend- 
 ing court, with a summons, in violation of privilege;^ for the 
 clerk of a court to send up an imperfect record to an appellate 
 court — this not being a contempt of the appellate court, though 
 jDOssibly a contempt of the court below ; ^ to read an aflidavit 
 charging the judge with prejudice, on a motion for a change of 
 venue; * for counsel to use hasty expressions under excitement, 
 where no disrespect w'as intended ; ^ for a justice to offer a pro- 
 test to the county court, against their proceedings in making 
 certain appropriations, and to complain of their acting illegally 
 and oppressively ; * for an attorney to post up, with his name 
 signed thereto, at the ofiice of A. B., the judge, a paper reading: 
 "A. B. is a damned base and corrupt man" — the court not 
 being in session, and it not appearing that the language had 
 reference to any ofiicial act of the judge. ^ 
 
 § 135. [Continued.] What Acts are Punishable as Con- 
 structive Contempts. — Many acts intimately connected with 
 the conduct of trials, though not regarded as direct contempts, 
 are punishable as constructive contempts. Within this category 
 falls every species of interference with the process or authority 
 of the court, direct or indirect, committed out of the presence 
 of the court itself, such as removing the subject of the contro- 
 versy beyond the jurisdiction of the court ; ^ taking papers from 
 
 1 Com. V. Stuart, 2 Va. Cas. 329. ' Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 259. 
 
 - Blight V. Fisher, Pet. C. C. 41. * So held concerning the removal 
 
 •^ Moore v. Clerk, 6 Litt. (Ky.) 104. of a slave pending the trial of a suit for 
 
 * Ex parte Curtis, 3 Minn. 274. his freedom. Eichard v. Van Meter, 
 
 5 St. Clair V. Piatt, Wright (Ohio), 3 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 214; Thornton 
 
 532. V. Davis, 4 Id. 500. 
 « Stokeley v. Cora., 1 Va. Cas. 330.
 
 Tit. II, Cb. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURI^ 
 
 145 
 
 the files of the court iind refusing to return them ; ^ for a juror 
 to separate himself from his associates and mingle with the com- 
 munity at large, or to hold communications with persons other 
 than ofiicers of the court ; ^ holding improper communications 
 with jurors;^ writing an insulting letter to a grand juror; ^ 
 spiriting away witnesses ; ^ procuring an insolvent person to jus- 
 tify as bail ; ^ becoming surety in a bail bond under a fictitious 
 name; ^ interfering with property in custodia ler/is, as property 
 in the possession of a receiver,^ or an assignee in bankruptcy; ^ 
 or property held under mesne process,^" such as a writ of replevin ;" 
 but not under final process, such as a writ of fieri facias .^"^ 
 
 § 136. Contempts by Attorneys of the Court. — There is no 
 doubt of the power at common law of those superior courts of 
 record which are commonly termed convis, oi general jurisdiction, 
 to disbar, suspend, or otherwise punish attorney's of their bar 
 for contempts. ^-^ This is nothing more than a branch of that in- 
 
 1 Baker r. Wilford, Kirby (Couii.), 
 23o. 
 
 2 State V. Helveustou, R. M. Charlt. 
 (Ga.) 48. See also Milo v. Gardiner, 
 •tl Me. 549; Perkins v. Ermil, 2 Kan. 
 32.5; Burrill v. Phillips, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 
 3G0; Alexander v. Dunn, 5 Ind. 122, 
 125; Graves v. Monet, 7 Sinedes & M. 
 (Miss.) 45; Oram v. Bishop, 7 Halst. 
 (N. J.) L. 153. 
 
 3 State V. Doty, 32 N. J. L. 403. 
 
 * Berg's Case, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 206. The contemner was excused 
 under the circumstances and in view 
 of his official position. 
 
 5 Haskett r. State, 51 Ind. 176, 180. 
 The coutemuor was likewise excused 
 under the circumstances in this case. 
 
 « Hall V. Platimer, 49 How. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 500; s. c. 5 Daly (N. Y.), 534. 
 
 ' Re Pawcett, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 217. 
 
 8 Secor V. Toledo &c. R. R. Co., 7 
 Biss. (U. S.) 513; King v. Ohio &c. R. 
 R. Co., Id. 529; Gates v. People, 6 
 Bradw. (111.) 383, 386, per Pillsbury, 
 
 P. J. Compare Albany City Bank v. 
 Scliermeriiorn, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 372; 
 Bowery Savings Bank v. Richards, 3 
 Hun (N. Y.), 336; s. c. 6 Thomp. & C. 
 (N. Y.) 59; Parker v. Browning, 8 
 Paige (N. Y.), 388, 390; Sea Ins. Co, v. 
 Stebbins, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 565. 
 
 9 Gates V. People, 6 Bradw. (111.) 
 383. 
 
 JO People r. Church, 2 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 262. 
 
 " Knott V. People, 83 111. 583; Peo- 
 ple V. Neill, 74 111. 68. Compare Horr 
 V. People, 95 111. 169, 172. 
 
 12 Gates V. People, 6 Bradw. (III.) 
 383, 388. 
 
 13 State V. Holding, 1 McCord (S. 
 C), 379, where many precedents are 
 cited; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202; 
 Matter of Moree, 7cZ. 398; Re AVolley, 
 11 Bush (Ky.),95; Watson v. Citizens' 
 Bank, 5 S. C. 159; Stevens v. Hill, 10 
 Mees. & W. 30; Butler v. People, 2 Col. 
 T. 295; Winkleman v. People, 50 111. 
 449; Re Ingersoll, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 216. 
 
 10
 
 146 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [i Thoilip. Tl% 
 
 herent jDower which, as ah'eady seen, superior courts of record 
 possess, of preserving their dignity and enforcing obedience to 
 their process by summary proceedings for contempt.^ Thus, 
 there seems never to have been any question that, where an at- 
 torney receives money for his client, upon an employment as an 
 attorney, whether any suit or legal proceedings may have been 
 instituted by him for his client or not, an attachment will lie to 
 compel its payment.^ This power has been exercised in a case 
 where, after a temporary restraining order had been made in a 
 suit in equity to wind up a banking corporation, certain attorneys 
 advised the officers and stockholders to file a petition in bank- 
 ruptcy for the corporation, with the view of removing its prop- 
 erty beyond the jurisdiction of the State court; ^ where an 
 attorney imposed upon the court by suing out an attachment for a 
 witness before a subpoena had been issued ; ^ or presented straw 
 bail to the court; ^ or charged the judge with prejudice, in amo- 
 tion for a new trial ; ^ or where an attorney presented to the 
 court scandalous matter reflecting on an opinion of the court, in 
 a petition for a rehearing; ^ or attempted to suborn a witness; ^ 
 or used sneering, insulting and disrespectful language in a writ- 
 ten communication to the judge respecting his ruling upon a mat- 
 ter still pending ; ^ or jirocured money for his client by practicing 
 fraud upon the court ;^'' or, being the editor of a newspaper, pub- 
 lished therein a libel upon the judges of the court; ^^ or brought 
 
 1 See Ex parte Eobinson, 19 Wall. Contra, where the motion Is for a 
 (U. S.) 505. change of venue. Ex parte Curtis, 3 
 
 2 Wilmerdings v. Fowler, 14 Abb. Minn. 274. As to the limit of the 
 Pr. (N. Y.) (x. s.) 249 (N. Y. Ct. of privilege of an attorney in criticising 
 App.) ; People v. Wilson, 5 Johns. (N. the rulings of the court, see Matter of 
 Y.) 3G8; Ex parte Staats, 4 Cow. (N. Pryor, 18 Kan. 72; Re Wolley, 11 
 Y.) 7(3; Matter of Dakin, 4 Hill (N. Bush (Ky.), 95. 
 
 Y.),42; Matter of Steinert, 24 Hun ' Ee Wolley, 11 Bush (Ky.), 95. 
 
 (N. Y.), 240. The punishment here was a fine. 
 
 3 Watson V. Citizens' Savings * State v. Holding, 1 McCord (S. C), 
 Bank, 5 S. C. 159. 379. 
 
 4 Butler V. People, 2 Col. T. 295. ^ Matter of Pryor, 18 Kan. 72. 
 
 See also Brown v. Kellar, 40 111.81. ^^ Wilmerdings v. Fowler, 14 Abb^. 
 
 5 Re Ingersoll, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 21G. Pr. (N. Y.) (n. s.) 249. 
 
 6 Harrison v. State, 35 Ark. 458. ^i Es parte Biggs, G4 N. C. 202.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURI.E. 147 
 
 an action in the name of another without his privity or consent ; ^ 
 or commenced a suit against a lunatic or habitual drunkard with- 
 out permission, after notice of the inquisition declaring his 
 incompetency ; ^ or brought a fictitious case for the purpose of ob- 
 taining the opinion of the court on the matters presented by it ;^ 
 or appeared for a defendant and confessed judgment without au- 
 thority.* On the contrary, it has been held not a contempt for 
 an attorney to advise his client, who was indicted for assault and 
 battery, and bound by a recognizance to answer the charge, that 
 if he could not procure a continuance on affidavit, he could escape 
 and forfeit his recoo-nizance, which would work a continuance, 
 for a trifling expense.^ 
 
 § 137. [Continued.] Punishment — Disbarment, Suspen- 
 sion. — The subject of disciplinary action against attorneys is, 
 to a considerable extent, regulated by statute, and it has been 
 generally held that, where it has been made the subject of statu- 
 tory regulation, a court cannot proceed to disbar or suspend an 
 attorney by the ordinary process of contempt, under its common- 
 law powers, but that the proceedings must be in conformity with 
 the statute ; ^ that unquestionably, unless the statute contains a 
 positive negation of this power the court may proceed summa- 
 rily, in virtue of its common-law powers, to fine and imprison an 
 attorney, just as it may so proceed against any other contemnor.'" 
 A fine so levied upon an attorney may be either enforced by ex- 
 ecution, or by a capias jjro fine;^ or the attorney may be sus- 
 pended from practice until he purge his contempt by paying the 
 fine which has been assessed against him.^ Such an order of sus- 
 pension imposed by a court in virtue of its common-law powers, 
 affects only the status of the attorney in that particular court; it 
 will not prevent his being enrolled as a counselor in another, 
 
 1 Butterworth v. Stagg, 2 Johus. •' Ingle r. State, 8 Blackf . (Iiid.^574. 
 
 (N. Y.) Case, 291, e State v. Start, 7 Iowa 490; Ex 
 
 * L'Amoureaus v. Crosby, 2 Paige parte Smith, 28 Iiul. 47. 
 
 (N. Y.), 422. ' Ex parte Smith, supra. 
 
 3 Smith V. Brown, 3 Tex. 360. s j^^ Wolley, 11 Bush (Ky.), 95. 
 
 < Denton v. Noyes, G Johus. (X. Y.) "^ Butler v. People, 2 Col. T. 295, 
 
 296- 297,
 
 148 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Tholllp. Tl'., 
 
 even a higher court, of the same sovereign ; ^ and it will cease 
 with the abolition of the court by which he is thus disbarred. ^ 
 
 § 138. Procedure in Cases of Contempt in Facie Curiae. — 
 
 Incases of contempt, as in other cases, the one object of process 
 is to bring the accused person into court; ^ and the only object 
 of an affidavit in such a case is to inform the court that a con- 
 tempt has been committed.* When, therefore, the contempt is 
 committed in the face of the court itself, no affidavit,^ order to 
 show cause,^ attachment,^ or interrogatories,^ are necessary; but 
 the court takes judicial notice of the contempt,^ and proceeds im- 
 mediately, without formality, to pass sentence upon the offender. ^° 
 The court may, however, in its discretion, require the contemnor 
 to answer interrogatoi'ies ; ^^ and, while the offending party may 
 
 1 Ex parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. (U. 
 S.) 108, where an attorney who had 
 been stricken from the roll of attor- 
 neys of the United States District 
 Court for tlie Northern District of New 
 York Avas, nevertheless, enrolled in 
 the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, Chief Justice Marshall saying: 
 *' The court finds that he comes Avith- 
 in the rules established by this court. 
 The circumstances of his having been 
 stricken off the roll of counsel of the 
 District Court of the United States for 
 the Northern District of New York, by 
 the order of the judge of the court, 
 for contempt, is one which the court 
 do not mean to say was not done for 
 suflacient cause, or tliat it is not one 
 of a serious character ; but this court 
 does not consider itself authorized to 
 puuiih him for a contempt which may 
 have been committed in that court." 
 As to disbarment of attorneys in 
 United States courts, see Ex parte 
 Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 378; Ex parte 
 Robinson, 19 Id. 505. 
 
 2 Ee Hirst, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 21C, 
 218. 
 
 3 Com. V. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408. 
 
 4 Matter of Smethurst, 2 Sandf . (N. 
 Y.) 724. 
 
 5 Matter of Smethurst, supra; Peo- 
 ple V. Kelly, sux>ra. 
 
 ^ Matter of Smethurst, supra. 
 
 ' United States v. Green, 3 Mason 
 (U. S.),482; Commonwealth v. Dan- 
 dridge, 2 A^a. Cas. 408; State v. 
 Mathews, 37 N. H. 450, 453. 
 
 s Matter of Percy, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 
 530. Compare Pitt v. Davidson, 37 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 97; People v. Nevins, 1 
 Hill (N. Y.), 154; Commonwealth v. 
 Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408. 
 
 9 People V. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 75. 
 
 10 4 Bl. Com. 286; 1 Tidd Pr. 479; 
 2 Bac. Abr. (Bouv. ed.) G33; Eastou 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 552; Commonwealth 
 V. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408 ; State v. 
 Mathews, 37 N. H. 450, 453; Stater. 
 Copp, 15 N. H. 212; Middlebrook v. 
 State, 43 Conn. 257; People v. Kelley, 
 24 N. Y. 75; Ex parte Wright, G5 Ind. 
 504. Compare Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 
 Conn. 375. 
 
 11 U. S. V. Green, 3 Mason (U. S.), 
 482.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IN FACIE CURI.E. 149 
 
 be ordered into custody although no warrant or written order is 
 made out/ yet some record of the offense and the order for its 
 punishment shouhl be immediatety made,^ and in this record the 
 matter of the contempt shouki be stated. "^ AVhen, therefore, a 
 witness refused to answer certain questions before a grand jury, 
 and his refusal was reported to the court in the presence of the 
 witness, who did not deny, but justified the same, and reiterated 
 his refusal, it was held that this was a contempt in the immedi- 
 ate face and presence of the court, and that no affidavit or fur- 
 ther evidence of it was necessary to a commitment.^ 
 
 §139. [Continued.] Procedure in Cases of Indirect or Con- 
 structive Contempts. — The subject of procedure in cases of 
 indirect or constructive contem}its, that is, contempts committed 
 out of the immediate presence of the court while conducting its 
 proceedings and not so near thereto as to interrupt such pro- 
 ceedings, is an extensive one, and would of itself form a long 
 chapter. It is not so intimately connected with the conduct of 
 a trial as to require treatment here. It has been carefully 
 treated by the present writer in an article in the Criminal 
 Laio Magazine,^ and also by Mr. Rapalje in his work on con- 
 tempts. 
 
 § 140. Remedies of the Person Committed for Contempt. — 
 
 The rule of the common law, above stated,^ that every superior 
 court of record is the exclusive judge of contempts committed 
 against its dignity and authority, has necessarily its counterpart 
 in another rule of the common law, which is, that the judgment 
 of every superior court of record (and this principle includes the 
 legislative bodies of sovereign States), in a proceeding for con- 
 tempt is final, and not subject to review by any superior authority 
 
 1 State V. Mathews, 37 N. H. 450, •< People v. Kelley, 24 N. Y. 75. 
 453. 5 5 crira. L. Mag. 483, 521. 
 
 2 Ibid. 6 j^nte, § 125. 
 ' Ex parte Wright, G5 Ind. 504,
 
 150 
 
 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 by writ of error, ^ appeal, ^ certiorari,^ or otherwise ; nor subject to 
 be relieved against in any manner, unless such judgment is abso- 
 kitely void for want of jurisdiction, in which case relief is usually 
 had by habeas corpus, as hereafter stated. In some American juris- 
 dictions, however, under the operation of constitutional or statu- 
 tory provisions, and perhaps in one or two cases, of judicial 
 decisions, contrary to the general course of authority, writs of 
 error,* lie in such cases; and in cases where the proceeding is in 
 the nature of execution of judgments, orders or decrees in civil 
 cases, such as orders upon trustees or executors to pay over money, 
 
 1 Rex V. Dean and Chapter, 1 Str. 
 53fi; s. c. 8 Mod, 27, perFortescue, J.; 
 Groenwelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk, 144; s. 
 c, 1 Ld, Raym. 454, per Lord Hale, C, 
 J,; Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 
 393, 409; State v. Tipton, 1 Blackf, 
 (Ind.) 1^6; Lockwood v. State, 1 Ind. 
 ir,l ; Watson 11. "Williams, 3G Miss. 331; 
 State V. Galloway, 5 Coldw. (Tenu,) 
 32(3,331; Sliattnck v. State, 51 Miss, 
 50; Phillips v. Welch, 11 Kev, 187; Ex 
 parte Kearney, 7 Wheat, (U, S.) 38; 
 New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 
 Wall. (U, S.) 387; Hayes », Fischer, 
 102 IT, S. 121; Bntler v. People, 2 Col. 
 T, 295; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall, (U, 
 S.) 37G; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 505; Hagan v. Alston, 9 Ala, 
 627; Ex parte Martin, 5 Yerg, (Tenn.) 
 45G ; Re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253 ; Ex parte 
 Summers, 5 Ired. (N. C.) 149 ; Cossart 
 V. State, 14 Ark. 538 ; Bunch v. State, 
 Id. 544. Compare Neel v. State, 9 
 Ark. 259, 
 
 2 Ex parte Summers, 5 Ired. (N. C.) 
 149; State v. Woodfin, Id. 199; State 
 V. Tipton, 1 Blackf, (Ind.) ir.G; Lock- 
 wood V. State, 1 Ind. IGl; Watson v. 
 Williams, 36 Miss, 381; State v. Gallo- 
 way, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 32G, 331 ; Sliat- 
 tnck V. State, 61 Miss, 50; Phillips v. 
 Welch, 11 Nev. 187; Ex parte Kearney, 
 7 Wheat. (U, S.) 38; New Orleans v. 
 
 Steamship Co., 20 Wall, (U, S.) 387; 
 Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121; First 
 Congregational Church v. Muscatine, 
 2 Iowa, 69; Ex parte Martin, 5 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 456; Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 
 215; Casey V, State, 25 Tex, 380, 385; 
 Crow«. State, 14 Tex. 12, 14; State v. 
 Giles, 10 Wis, 101 ; Kernodle v. Cason, 
 25 Ind. 362 ; Larrabee v. Selby, 52 Cal. 
 506, 508 ; State v. Mott, 4 Jones L, (N. 
 C.)449; State 17. Thurmond, 37 Tex. 
 340; Vilas v. Burton, 27 Vt. 56; Mc- 
 Micken v. Perin, 20 How, (U, S.) 133; 
 Eastou V. State, 39 Ala, 651 ; Wyatt v. 
 Magee, 3 Ala. 94, 97; Cossart v. State, 
 14 Ark. 638; Bunch v. State, Id. 544; 
 State V. Towle, 42 N. H. 640, 646; 
 Clark V. People, Breese (111.), 266. 
 
 3 State V. Tipton, I Blackf, (Ind.) 
 166; Lockwood v. State, 1 Ind, 161, 
 The T'rit of certiorari is used to bring 
 up contempt proceedings In several 
 States; but the inquiry extends no 
 further than the jurisdiction of the 
 court below. 
 
 * Matter of Pryor, 18 Kan. 72; 
 Haines v. People, 97 111. 161 ; Baltimore 
 &c. R. Co. V. Wheeling, 13 Gratt (Va.), 
 40, 57; Stuart V. People, Breese (111.), 
 395; Stokelcy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. 
 Cas, 330; Ingle v. State, 8 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 574 (in case of an attorney fined 
 for contempt) .
 
 Tit. II, Cll. v.] CONTEMPTS IN FACIE CURI.E. 
 
 151 
 
 the rule is varied in some jurisdictions by local statutes, perhaps 
 by judicial decisions,^ so that au appeal lies.^ lu some jur- 
 isdictions the certiorari is also used by the highest appellate 
 court, in virtue of a superintending jurisdiction, to bring up such 
 judgments for re-examination.'^ In most of these jurisdictions 
 the -writ of certiorari is limited to the office Avhich it performed 
 at common law, that is, it reaches only proceedings ^vhich are 
 absolutely void for want of jurisdiction,* and in such cases the 
 judgment of the superintending court in general is that the con- 
 viction be quashed. In others, it has substantially the scope of 
 a writ of error ; ^ and in still others it performs the office of an 
 appeal and secures a re-examination of the merits.*^ 
 
 § 141. Remedy by Habeas Corpus in Case of a Want of Ju- 
 risdiction. — An order committing ii, person for such a contempt 
 is in the nature of a judgment. The person so committed is 
 
 1 See the subject considered more 
 at large in au article l)y the present 
 writer. 5 Crim. L. Mag. O-t.s, et 
 seq. 
 
 2 Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 4+;); 
 McCredie v. Senior, 4 Paige (X. Y.), 
 378; Spaulding v. People, 10 Id. 28-1; 
 .s. c. on appeal, 7 Hill (X. Y.), 302, and 
 4 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 21 ; People ». Sturt- 
 evant, 9 N. Y. 2(;3; Ballston Spa Bank 
 f. IMarine Banli, 18 AVis. 4'JO; Shannon 
 V. State, 18 Wis. G04; People v. Healey, 
 48 Barb. (X. Y.) 5G4; Forbes v. Wil- 
 lard, 37 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 193; Ludlow 
 V. Knox, 7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) (x. s.) 411 
 (X'. Y. Court of Appeals, 18G9) ; Brink- 
 ley V. Briukley, 47 X^. Y. 40; Haines v. 
 Haines, 35 Mich. 138; Matter of Daves, 
 81 X. C. 72; Ke Pierce, 44 "Wis. 411, 
 422; Watrous v. Kearney, 79 X". Y. 
 40(;; Witter r. Lyon, 34 Wis. 5(;4; 
 Huudhausen v. Ins. Co., 5 Heisk. 
 (Tenn.) 702. 
 
 ^ Pennsylvcmia: Huminel's Case, 9 
 Watts, 416; Com. v. Newton, 1 Grant 
 
 Cas. 458. Louisiana: State v. The 
 Judges, 32 La. Ann. 549; State v. The 
 Judges, 32 La. Ann. 1256. Arkansas: 
 Harrison v. State, 35 Ark. 458. loica: 
 Code of 1873, § 3499; State v. Myers, 
 44 Iowa, 580; Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 
 245. California: People v. Turner, 1 
 Cal. 152, 15G; Ex parte Field, 7d. 187. 
 New York: People v. Donoliue, 59 How. 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 417; People v. Kelly, 24 
 N. Y. 74. North Carolina: Ex parte 
 Biggs, 64 N. C. 202. 
 
 * Louisiana: State v. Judges, 32 
 La. Ann. 1256. California: People u. 
 Dwindle, 29 Cal. 632. Nevada: Max- 
 well V. Rives, 11 Nev. 213. Utah: 
 Young V. Cannon, 2 Utah, 560, 593. 
 
 ^ North Carolina: Ex parte Biggs, 
 64 X. C. 202. Pennsylvania: Com. v. 
 Newton, 1 Grant Cas. 453. Neio York: 
 People V. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74. Arkan- 
 sas: Harrison v. State, 35 Ark. 458, 
 4G1. 
 
 •i Iowa: Code of 1873, § 3222; State 
 V. Myers, 44 Iowa, 580, 584.
 
 152 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 committed in execution,^ tmd if the court have jurisdiction so to 
 commit him, and if the contempt be plainly charged in the war- 
 rant of commitment, he Avill no more be relieved on habeas coi- 
 jms than he would be if he were committed in execution of a 
 judgment founded upon a verdict in an ordinary criminal prose- 
 cution.'^ It will appear from the general current of the decisions 
 which declare this rule, that the inquiry upon habeas corpus is 
 ordinarily limited to the question whether the court which made 
 the order of commitment had jurisdiction in the premises.^ If 
 
 1 De Grey C. J., in Crosby's Case, 3 
 Wils. 188. 
 
 2 British: Paty r. The Queen, 2 Ld. 
 Raym. 1105; Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 
 Ad. &E. 1; s. c. 4 Jur. 70; sub nom. 
 Reg. V. Gossett, 3 Per. & D. 34:9; suh 
 nom. Reg. v. Evans, 8 Dowl. P. C. 
 451 ; suh nom. Re Sheriff of Middle- 
 sex, 11 Ad. & E. 273; Re Wilson, 7 Q. 
 B. 984; s. c. 9 Jur. 393; 14 L. J. Q. B. 
 105; Re Cobbett, 17 Q. B. 187; Re An- 
 drews, 14 C. B. 22(j; Betliel's Case, 1 
 Salk. 533. United States: Ex parte 
 Kearney, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 845. Ala- 
 bama: Gates V. McDaniel, 4 Stew. & 
 P. (Ala.) 69; Ex parte Sticliney, 40 
 Ala. 1G7. California: Matter of Co- 
 hen, 5 Cal. 494; Ex parte Perkins, 18 
 Cal. GO; IContra, Ex parte Rowe, 7 
 Cal. 181; s. c. 7 Cal. 177, per Buruett, 
 J.] ; People, ex rel. County Judge, 27 
 Cal. 151; Ex parte MeCullough, 35 
 Cal. 97; Ex parte Smith, 53 Cal. 204; 
 Ex parte Cohn, 55 Cal. 193. Joioa: 
 Robb V. McDonald, 22 Iowa, 330. 
 Louisiana: State, ex rel., v. Fagin, 28 
 La. Ann. 887. Massachusetts: Burn- 
 ham V. Morrissey, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 22G, 240. Michigan: Matter of Bis- 
 sell, 40 Mich. G3. Mississippi: Ex 
 parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883; Shattuck 
 V. State, 51 Miss. 50; Ex parte Wim- 
 berly, 57 Miss. 437. Missouri: Ex 
 parte Goodin, G7 jVIo. G37. Nevada: 
 
 Ex parte "Winston, 7 Nev. 71 ; Phillips 
 V. Welch, 12 Nev. 171. New Hamp- 
 shire: State V. Towle, 42 N. H. 540. 
 New York: People, ex rel., v. Jacobs, 
 66 N. Y. 8 ; Kearney's Case, 13 Abb. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 459; Davison's Case, 13 
 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 129; Kahn's Case, 11 
 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 147; s. c. 19 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 475; People v. Cassel, 5 Hill 
 (N. Y.), 1G4; People, ex rel., v. Sheriff, 
 7 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 96; Matter of 
 Percy, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 530; Pitt v. 
 Davidson, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 97; People 
 V. Fancher, 2 Hun (N. Y.), 226; Ex 
 parte Devlin, 5 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 287; 
 Matter of Smethurst, 2 Sandf . (N. Y.) 
 724 ; Myers v. James, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 301; Matter of Hackeney, 21 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 54; s. c. in Ct. of App., 24 
 N. Y. 74. Pennsylvania: Williamson's 
 Case, 26 Pa. St. 9; s, c. 27 Pa. St. 18; 
 Lessee of Penn v. Messenger, 1 Yeates 
 (Pa.), 2; Expra-te Nugent, 4 Clark (Pa. 
 L. J.) , 106. Soxith Carolina: Re Stokes, 
 5 So. Car. 71; Gilliam r. McJuukin, 2 
 So. Car. 442; James v. Smith, 2 So. 
 Car. 183. Tennessee: State v. Gallo- 
 way, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 326. Texas: 
 Holman v. Mayer, 34 Tex. 668; Jordan 
 V. State, 14 Tex. 436. Vermont: Vilas 
 V. Burton, 27 Vt. Gl. Wisconsin: Re 
 Perry, 30 Wis. 268. 
 
 ^ See Ex parte Adams, 25 MisSc 
 883.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURI.E. I53 
 
 jurisdiction appear, the rule expressed in a former section,^ tlat 
 every superior court of record and every legislative bodj^ of a 
 sovereign State is the exclusive judge of contempts committed in 
 its presence or against its process or authority, forbids all inter- 
 ference on the part of other tribunals hy means of the writ of 
 habeas corpus, or otherwise, except in plain cases of excess of 
 jurisdiction. 2 Great ditEculty attends the aj)plication of this rule, 
 and this difficulty is not sufficiently discussed and explained in 
 the judgment of the courts. 
 
 § 142. [Continued.] Power of one Court to judge of tlie 
 Jurisdiction of another Court. — The question concerns the 
 power of one court to judge of the jurisdiction of another court. 
 This power will be freely exercised where the court which issues 
 the habeas corpus is a court having a})pellate or superintending 
 jurisdiction over the court which made the commitment; and 
 this consideration will explain the fact that many such courts, 
 while professing to limit their inquiry to the jurisdiction of the 
 inferior court, push such inquiry much further than one court 
 would go in inquiring concerning the jurisdiction of a co-ordinate 
 court. Where the commitment is made by a court superior in 
 rank or dignity to, or having appellate or superintending juris- 
 isdiction over, the court which issues the habeas corpus, it would 
 be highly indecent for the inferior court to assume the right to 
 judge of the jurisdiction of the superior court ; and yet the doc- 
 trine of many of the courts, broadly stated and applied, would 
 lead to this result. Thus, it is said in Missouri that the Supreme 
 Court has no more power in the use of the writ of habeas corpus 
 than any other court — even the county court, which has power 
 to issue the writ — has.^ 
 
 § 143. [Continued.] Power to Rejudgre the Question of 
 Jurisdiction, but not tlie Judgment. — Concerning this power 
 
 * Ante, § 125; 5 Crim. L. Mag. 151. vant, 9 N. Y. 203; Ex parte Adams, 
 
 2 Ex parte Hardy, 13 Cent. L. J. 50 supra; Ex parte Sam, 51 Ala. 84. 
 
 (Supreme Court of Ala. 1881); Ke * See Ex parte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205, 216,, 
 
 Cooper, 32 Vt. 253; People v. Sturte- per Henry, J.
 
 154 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Tboilip. Tl'., 
 
 of one court to judge of the jurisdiction of another court, if we 
 take the English and American decisions togetlier we shall be 
 able to extract from them no uniform rule. The English courts 
 of judicature, in proceedings by habeas corpus, and in actions 
 for malicious j^rosecutions, have generally agreed, in respect of 
 commitments made by authority of the houses of Parliament, 
 that the judicial courts have no power to judge of the juris- 
 diction of Parliament; or, to use the expression in which the 
 judicial courts couch this rule, they have no conusance of 
 the lex 2>nrliamenti , and no power to judge of the privileges of 
 either house of Parliament.^ It may also be said with con- 
 fidence that the English courts, in dealing by habeas corpus 
 with commitments for contempts by other courts of co-ordi- 
 nate dignity, have generally refused to judge of the jurisdic- 
 tion of such other courts. To this extent they have pushed the 
 doctrine that each superior court of record is the exclusive judge 
 of its own contempts. This limitation upon the use of the writ 
 of habeas coryus has been expressed by some of the most author- 
 itative American courts. ^ In a case which was greatly agitated 
 in the State of New York, where a judge of the Supreme Court 
 of that State, in vacation, on habeas corpus, had discharged a 
 prisoner committed by the chancellor on a conviction for a con- 
 tempt, and such person was again arrested and committed 
 for the same cause, the second commitment was held legal. It 
 was held that a person who had been regularly committed by the 
 chancellor for a contempt, and who afterwards had been im- 
 properly set at large, might be recommitted by an order of the 
 court reciting the original writ of attachment.^ The sound rule 
 
 J 5 Crim. L. Mag. 152, 153. lookiDg the fact that Yates v. People, 
 
 2 See Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 337, had been over- 
 (U. S.) 315; AVilliamson's Case, 27 Pa. ruled, following the supposed author- 
 St. 18. ity of that case, laid down the doctrine 
 
 3 Yates V. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N. that where a person, althougli held in 
 Y.) 395 (overruling Yates v. People, 6 execution under the judgment of a 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 337; re-affirming Ex court having jurisdiction of the sub- 
 parte Yates, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 317). In ject-matter of the crime for which he 
 the case of Ex parte Jilz, CA Mo. 205, had been tried, is discharged on /wfieas 
 the Supreme Court of Missouri, over- corpus by another court or judicial
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURIAE. 
 
 155 
 
 was thus expressed in u case in the former Supreme Court of 
 Isew York: " If there has been error the remedy is by certiorari 
 or writ of error. When the return states the imprisonment to be 
 by virtue of legal process, the officer may inquire whether, in 
 truth, there be any process, and whether it a})pearsupon its face 
 to be valid, and he may also inquire Avhether any cause has arisen 
 since the execution for putting an end to the imprisonment — as 
 a pardon, reversal of the judgment, pa^^ment of the fine, and the 
 like. But he cannot re judge the judgment of the committing 
 court or magistrate.^ 
 
 § 144. [Continued. J Statutory Expressions in Various 
 States. — In conformity with this rule, it is in several States 
 provided by statute that a prisoner shall not be discharged on 
 /tabeas corims where he is held in custody for any contempts 
 specially or plainly charged in the commitment, by some court 
 or body politic having authority to commit for a contempt so 
 charged.''' In some of the States the statutory expression is 
 
 officei" havius power to issue the writ, 
 sucli discliarge conclusively entitles 
 the prisoner to his liberty, and he can- 
 not thereafter be recommitted upon 
 ti- same judgment, nor can the pro- 
 priety of the discharge on habeas 
 corpus be reviewed by another judicial 
 tribunal. This aljsurd and anarchical 
 decision, which vested even in the 
 county courts of Missouri the power 
 of opening the penitentiary of the 
 State and discharging. therefrom men 
 who were held in execution of judg- 
 ments which had been aflirmed by the 
 Supreme Court of the State, called 
 forth an act of the legislature, pro- 
 viding that whenever, on habeas corpus, 
 it should appear that the prisoner was 
 held in execution under a sentence for 
 a crime, which sentence was erroneous 
 as to time or place of imprisonment, 
 the court hearing the habeas corpris 
 should correct the sentence. 1 Rev. 
 Stat, of Mo., § 199(3. This act of tlie 
 
 legislature was as nonsensical as the 
 decision which produced it. It gives 
 to courts of any grade above justices of 
 the peace the power on habeas corpus io 
 revise and correct the judgments or 
 sentences of courts of co-oixlinate or 
 even superior jurisdiction. 
 
 1 People V. Cassels, 5 Hill (X. Y.), 
 ir,4, Kw. 
 
 2 Comp. L. Kan. 1879, § 4211; Eev. 
 Stat. lud. 1881, § 1119; Comp. L. Mich. 
 1871, § 7014; 2 Minn. Stat, at L. 1873 
 p. 931, § 3<i; Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879^ 
 §§ 2G48, 2G50; Comp. L. Nev. 1873, § 367; 
 X. Y. Code of Crim. Proc, § 2032 
 (•'Criminal Contempt"); Batt. Rev. 
 (X. C.) 1873, p. 403, § 24; Gen. Laws 
 Ore. 1872, § GU; Rev. Stat. Wis. 1878, 
 § 3427. This does not include an gr- 
 der of commitment as for contempt 
 iipon proceedings to enforce the rem- 
 edy of a party. Comp. L. Kan. 1S79, 
 § 4211; Rev. Stat. Ind. 1881, § 1119.
 
 15G CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 somewhat different, thus: That the legality or justice of any or- 
 der, judgment, decree or process of any court legally constituted, 
 or the justice or j^ropriety of any commitment for contempt made 
 by a court, officer or body according to law, and charged in such 
 commitment, will not be incjuired into.^ In Massachusetts and 
 Maine it is also provided that the Supreme Judicial Court shall 
 have no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the pur- 
 pose of taking bail of any person committed for causes men- 
 tioned in the constitution by the governor and council. Senate or 
 House of Eepresentatives.^ In Minnesota, " persons committed 
 or detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any 
 competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue 
 of an execution issued upon such judgment or decree," are not 
 entitled to prosecute writs of habeas corpus; but " no order of 
 commitment for any alleged contempt, or upon proceedings as 
 for contempt to enforce the rights or remedies of any j^arty, 
 shall be deemed a judgment or decree within the meaning of this 
 section; nor shall any attachment, order or process issued upon 
 such order be deemed an execution within the meaning of this 
 section."^ In Vermont, by statute, the writ of habeas corpus 
 is made to extend to commitments for contempt.* If it appear 
 on the hearing upon such writ that such disobedience or contempt 
 was committed through ignorance, mistake or misapprehension, 
 or by acting in good faith under the advice of counsel, and that 
 relief may be granted Avithout impairing the rights of the parties 
 concerned, or the due administration of the law, the Supreme 
 Court may discharge such person from such imprisonment or 
 confinement upon such terms as it thinks fit.^ Where a party in 
 a proceeding before a justice of the peace assailed the justice's 
 decision with sneers, sarcasm and irony, and was fined for con- 
 tempt in the sum of $10, and committed to jail for the non-pay- 
 
 1 Code of Ala. 187(5, § 4691; Fla. s 2 Minn. Stat, at L. 1873, p. 929^ 
 Dig., 1881, p. 504, § 8 ; Comp. L. Midi. § 22. Compare N. Y. Code Civ. Proe , 
 1871, § 7015; Gen. L. Ore. 1872, § (513; § 2032. 
 
 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc, § 2034. ^ Kev. Laws of Vt. 1880, § 1371, 
 
 2 Pub. Stat. Mass. 1882, p. 10(19, s u,, § 1372. 
 § 28; Eev. Stat. Me. 1871, p. 748, § 33.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURI^. 15/ 
 
 ment of the fine, the Supreme Court refused to relieve liim ou 
 habeas corjms under this statute.^ 
 
 § 145. [Contimiecl.] Extension of the Use of this Writ by 
 Appellate Courts. — The general habit of appelhite courts of 
 scrutinizing closely the records of inferior courts to discover er- 
 i'ors or irregularities, has led them insensibly to pass beyond the 
 bounds which have been set by sound principle to the use of the 
 Vii'it of Itabeas corpus, and, instead of limiting their inquir}^ to 
 the mere question of general jurisdiction, they have extended it 
 so as to inquire whether the sentence pronounced was legal. 
 They have indeed said again and again that they would not dis- 
 charge a prisoner for what is termed irregularity of procedure. 
 They need not have said this, because this is the correct rule upon 
 which courts proceed upon writ of error. But they have said 
 that there is a distinction between irregularity and illegality, and 
 that if the sentence was illegal — that is, such a sentence as the 
 courtin the particular case had no power to pronounce — they 
 would discharge the prisoner on habeas corpus.'^ In other words, 
 they have passed beyond the idea of the former school of jurists 
 as to the limits which are set by sound principle to the iuquiiy 
 into the jurisdiction of other courts. It was enough for the old 
 judges to see that a court had what was termed general jurisdic- 
 tion of the subject matter of the proceeding which resulted in 
 the commitment, as well as jurisdiction of the person of the 
 prisoner; ^ but the modern idea is that it must not only appear 
 that the court making the commitment had general jurisdiction 
 of the subject matter — that is, general power to commit for 
 contempt, and also jurisdiction over the person of the prisoner — 
 but it must also appear that the court had power to render the 
 particular judgment or to order the particular commitment.* 
 Accordingly, they will inquire Mhether the contempt charged in 
 
 1 Re Cooper, 32 Vt. 258. 3 Ex parte "Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 - The -nriter refers to an article in 193, 203. 
 the Criminal Law Magazine for a dis- ^ See this subject discussed in 5 
 
 cussion of these distinctions. 4 Crim. Crim. L. Mag. 162. 
 X Mag. 805
 
 ir)8 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 the commitment was a contempt in point of law ; holding, in tlie 
 expressive hinguage of Denio, J., that " where the act is neces- 
 sarily justifiable, it would be preposterous to hold it a cause of 
 imprisonment." ^ It is very plain that this view results substan- 
 tially in converting the writ of habeas corpus, when used by ap- 
 pellate or superintending courts, into a writ of error. 
 
 § 146. [Continued.] — Pernicious Consequences of such 
 Extensions. — It will not escape the attention of the judicious 
 reader that this extension of the original doctrine must bear per- 
 nicious fruits, because the appellate courts which make this use 
 of the writ of habeas corpus do not profess to use the writ as a 
 means of exercising appellate jurisdiction.^ They do not pro- 
 fess to exercise a larger jurisdiction in the use of the writ than 
 any other court or judicial officer, even the lowest, which is 
 clothed by law with power to issue it, might exercise ; and it will 
 result from this that if, in a given case, the Court of Appeals of 
 New York can say that an act charged in a commitment as a 
 contempt of court is rightful and innocent, and that the commit- 
 ment is accordingly preposterous, any justice of the Supreme 
 Court of New York, revising a commitment of any other court 
 for contempt, can say the same thing; that a county court in 
 Missouri, composed of men unlearned in the law, can say it; and 
 that the writ of habeas corpus, instead of being a writ of liberty ^ 
 becomes a writ of anarchy. 
 
 § 147. Injunction, Prohibition, Mandamus. — It is scarcely 
 necessary to suggest that the execution of a judgment imposed 
 for a contempt will not be enjoined in equity; ^ for, although 
 courts of equity constantly, by orders in personam, exercise the 
 jurisdiction of restraining the execution of judgments at laAV, yet 
 they do this on the ground that, but for the existence of such a 
 jurisdiction parties would frequently find themselves remediless; 
 and this jurisdiction has never, except in one or two rare cases,* 
 
 1 People V. Kelley, 24 N. Y. 74, 77. ' Sanders v. Metcalf, 1 Tenu. Ch. 
 
 2 The Supreme Court of the United 419, 428, per Cooper, C. 
 
 States is an exception to this state- * Mayor &c. of Yorl<». Pilkington, 2 
 
 meut, 18 Fed. Rep. 69. Atk. 302 ; Turner v. Turner, 15 Jur. 218.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. v.] CONTEMPTS IX FACIE CURI.E. 159 
 
 been exercised to restrain criminal proceedings. ^ The same may 
 be said of the writ of prohibition. This writ, as is well known, 
 is a superintending writ, used by the former Court of King's 
 Bench, and now by the Queen's Bench Division of the High 
 Court of Justice in England, and by certain courts in the United 
 States, upon whom the jurisdiction to use it is specially con- 
 ferred by constitutional ordinance or by statute, to restrain in- 
 ferior courts from doing injurious acts in excess of their juris- 
 diction. Like the writ of 7ncnidanms it is never issued in a case 
 where the party has any other plain remedy. As the writ of 
 habeas corpus in the cases we are considering affords a plain 
 remedy, the writ of prohibition Avill not ordinarily issue to re- 
 strain a court from proceeding against a party for a contempt. - 
 So of the writ of mandamus. While this writ has been some- 
 times awarded to compel inferior tri})unals to reinstate attorneys 
 who have been expelled from the ])ar without notice or an op- 
 portunity of being heard, ^ yet it has been well laid down that it 
 is not an a[)propriate remedy for one who has been fined or im- 
 prisoned for contempt ; and o})inion is divided upon the question 
 whether it will lie to compel a court to proceed against a party 
 for contempt.* 
 
 § 148. Action for False Imprisonment. — A remedy which 
 has been frequently resorted to in cases of unlawful imprison- 
 ment for contempt is an action for false imprisonment, either 
 
 ^ See an article ou this subject, by ceeding is by certiorari m tlie nature 
 
 the present writer in tiie American of a writ of error. Ex parte Bisgs, 
 
 Law Berieio for July-Aug. 1884. 18 G-t X. C. 202. As to the writ of ceiTi- 
 
 Am. L. Rev. 599. orari in the nature of a writ of error, 
 
 2 See Ex parte Sticl^ney, 40 Ala. under the North Carolina practice, see 
 160' l''*j- Brooks V. Morgan, 5 Ired. (N. C.) 
 
 3 Ex parte Bradly, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 481 ; Raleigh v. Kane, 2 Jones L. (N. 
 ^^'^- C.) 288. That mandamus Avill lie, see 
 
 * People V. Turner, 1 Cal. 153, 155. Ortnian v. Dixon, 9 Cal. 33; Kimball v. 
 
 In North Carolina, it has been held Morris, 2 Mete. Qrass.) 573. Contra, 
 
 thiitmandamus is not the proper pro- State ex rel, v. Horner, 16 Mo. App! 
 
 ceeding to restore an attorney who has 191. Compare Ex parte Chamberlain, 
 
 been disbarred by the superior court 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 49. 
 for contempt; that the proper pro-
 
 160 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 against the ministerial officer executing the process of commit- 
 ment, or the judicial officer who awarded the process, or both. 
 The grounds which are necessary to support such an action are 
 pretty well understood. An officer can justify under legal pro- 
 cess, unless upon its face it is void for want of jurisdiction.^ 
 Such an action will not lie against the judge of a superior court 
 of record, although he may have acted without jurisdiction and 
 from express malice, if it appear that the act was done colore 
 officii. He is under an absolute privilege in respect of his ju- 
 dicial acts. The rule which clothes him with this immunity is 
 one of public policy, which has always been held to be necessary 
 to preserve the independence of the judiciary.^ The same im- 
 munity does not extend to courts of inferior jurisdiction, such 
 as justices of the peace and the like. They are liable in such 
 cases whenever they act in excess of their jurisdiction ; and in 
 their cases the single inquiry is whether the commitment was 
 within or without the jurisdiction of the judicial officer against 
 whom the action is brought.^ 
 
 § 149. Executive Pardon. — If these remedies fail, the party 
 fined or imprisoned has still a right to resort to the executive for 
 pardon. There is little doubt that an order inflicting punish- 
 ment for a criminal contempt comes within the scope of the par- 
 doning power of the executive.* It has even been held that 
 where the imprisonment is imposed to compel the pa^^ment of a 
 fine assessed for the violation of an injunction, and after a length 
 of time it appears that payment of the fine has become impos- 
 
 1 Anderson v. Dnnn, 6 Wheat. (U. 388; Ackerly v. Parkinson, 3 Maule & 
 S.) 204. S. 425, 428; Borden v. Fitch, 5 Jolms. 
 
 2 Bradley v. Tislier, 13 Wall. (U. (N. Y.) 121; Biglow v. Stearnes, 19 
 S.) 335; Fray v. Blackburn, 3 Best & Johns. (N. Y.) 39; Allen v. Gray, 11 
 S. 57G. See Morrison v. Macdonald, Conn. 95; Clark v. May, 2 Gray 
 21 Me. 550; Pratt •». Gardner, 2 Gush. (Mass.), 440; Bushell v. Starling, 3 
 (Mass.) G8; Cooley on Torts, 409. Keb. 322. 
 
 3 Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray (Mass.), * Ex parte Hickey, 4 Sm. & M. 
 120; Newton v. Locklin, 77 111. 103; (Miss.) 751; State v. Sauvinet, 24 La. 
 Fitler v. Probasco, 2 Browne (Pa.) ,137. Ann. 1 19 ; 4 0pp. Atty . -Gen. 458 : 3 Id. 
 Compare Beaurain v. Scott, 3 Camp. GG2.
 
 Tit. II, Cll. v.] COXTEMPTS IN FACIE CURI^. IGl 
 
 sible, the president has power to pardon the contemnor and re- 
 lease him from imprisonment.^ 
 
 § 150. Application to the Judge who has Imposed the Piin- 
 ishmeut. — Where the contempt is merely a criminal contempt, 
 and no civil right is involved in the punishment of the accused, 
 if all these remedies fail, there still remains one which, though 
 not agreeable to the pride of the contemnor, is seldom ineffective, 
 and that is a submission and an application for forgiveness to 
 the judge of the court whose process has been disobeyed or 
 whose authority or dignity has been offended. Nothing can be 
 more distasteful to a right-minded judge or hurtfid to his feel- 
 ings, than the necessity of being compelled to impose a punish- 
 ment upon a party for an offense which, though an offense against 
 the State and against the administration of justice, is, neverthe- 
 less, in a greater or less degree, a personal affront to himself. 
 Experience shows that in such cases judges are generally eager 
 to grant pardon upon the apoh)gy and submission of the offender, 
 and that they very often accompany tlic remission of the line or 
 the discharge of the order of imprisonment with complimentary 
 allusions to the person committed. ^ 
 
 1 Ke MuUee, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 24. 202; De Witt v. Dennis, 30 How. Pr. 
 
 2 State V. Hunt, 4 Strobli. (S. C.) (N. Y.) 131 ; People v. Murpliy, 1 Daly 
 L. 322, 340; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C. (N. Y.), 462. 
 
 11
 
 162 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 CHAP TEE VT. 
 
 OF COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 
 
 Section 
 
 155. Scope of this Chapter. 
 
 156. Power of Court to compel Attendance of Witnesses. 
 
 157. Of Subpoenas. 
 
 158. Particularity in this Writ. 
 
 159. Eight to this Process. 
 
 160. Of Letters Rogatory 
 
 161. Of Attachments for Witnesses. 
 
 " 162. Whether Attachment a Matter of Discretion. 
 
 163. [Continued.] Personal Service of Subpoena necessary. 
 
 164. What will excuse Non-Attendance. 
 
 165. When Attachment issues in First Instance. 
 
 166. Service and Return of Attachment. 
 
 167. Hearing the Excuse — Purging the Contempt. 
 
 168. Punishment of the Recusant Witness. 
 
 169. Power to Award Compensation to Party injured by Recusancy of Witness. 
 
 170. Relief by Habeas Corpus. 
 
 171. Compelling the Testimony of Experts. 
 
 172. When the Witness is privileged to depart. 
 
 173. Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum. 
 
 174. Proceedings to Obtain this Writ. 
 
 175. Subpoena Duces Tecum. 
 
 176. [Continued.] May be used for obtaining a Discovery. 
 
 177. [Continued.] Witness, when privileged against the Writ. 
 
 178. Action against Witnesses for Non-Attendance. 
 
 179. Striking out the Answer of a Defendant who fails to appear. 
 
 180. Interfering with Witnesses. 
 
 181. Refusing to appear before Commissioners, Examiners, Notaries. 
 
 182. Refusing to attend or testify before Municipal Boards, Committees, etc. 
 
 183. Refusing to give Deposition to be used in foreign Court. 
 
 184. Power to compel Answer before Grand Jury. 
 
 185. Protection of Witness against Arrest and Service of Process. 
 
 186. Privilege of Member of Congress. 
 
 187. Refusing to be Sworn on the Ground of Conscientious Scruples. 
 
 § 155. Scope of this Chapter. — It is not designed to dis- 
 cuss in this chapter the subject of the privilege of witnesses ex- 
 cept so far as it arises incidentally ; ^ but chiefly to give a sketch 
 
 1 Seeposf, Ch. XII.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 163 
 
 of the mode of compelling the attendance of witnesses and the 
 production of books and papers. 
 
 § 156. Power of Court to compel Attendance of Witnesses. 
 
 " Every coui't,"' says Dr. Greenleaf, "having power definitely 
 to hear and determine any suit, has, by the common law, in- 
 herent power to call for all proofs of the facts in controversy, 
 and, to that end, to summon and compel the attendance of wit- 
 nesses before it." ^ 
 
 § 157. Of Subpoenas. — The first process for bringing a wit- 
 ness into court is a subpceua. This is a judicial writ, directed 
 to the witness, commanding him to appear at the court on a day 
 named, there to give evidence and the truth to say in a cause 
 therein pending, m lierein A. B. is plaintiff and C. D. is defend- 
 ant (or otherwise describing the parties), and not depart thence 
 without leave of the court, under a certain penalty therein 
 named. 
 
 § 158. Particularity in this Writ. — As this writ is the foun- 
 dation of any future compulsory process against the witness, 
 particularity is required in its terms. A subpoena issuing in a 
 criminal case out of a court of the United States must cpmmand 
 the witness to attend from day to day, and not to depart with- 
 out leave of the court ; otherwise it will not support a proceed- 
 ing against the witness for contempt, in case he attends on the 
 day named and afterward departs without leave. ^ "Where sub- 
 pcEuas for witnesses against whom a contempt is charged, are 
 issued in blank as to the names of the parties to the case, such 
 subpoenas are not valid process on which to predicate a rule for 
 contempt, in hiring a person to intimidate such witnesses. "^ 
 
 § 159. Right to this Process. — The granting of this process 
 is matter of right, where it appears that the attendance of the 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 309. It Wiis Perry v. Mitchell, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 
 
 ruled iu New York that a surrogate 537. 
 
 had no power to issue an attach- ^ jjegpeticer, 4McArthur (D.C.),433. 
 
 ment to briug in a witness to testify, ^ Dobbs v. State, 55 Ga. 272.
 
 164 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 ThoUip. Tr., 
 
 witness cannot otherwise be procured, and the granting or refus- 
 ing of it is not within the discretion of the judge or clerk. ^ In 
 criminal cases, by the terms of American constitutions, the ac- 
 cused is entitled to have com'pulsory process for obtaining wit- 
 nesses in his favor. ^ The accused may, therefore, demand that 
 his witnesses shall be compelled to enter into a recognizance for. 
 their appearance at the trial, ^ and the court may compel a wit- 
 ness in such a case to enter into a recognizance to appear at a 
 future day; but, according to one view, cannot require him to 
 find suriLies for his appearance.* It is usual, upon preliminary 
 examinations in criminal cases, where the accused is held to bail 
 or committed, to require the witnesses thus to enter into a recog- 
 nizance, and, according to early conceptions, to commit them 
 upon their refusal to do so.^ But one American court has de- 
 clared that it is unjust, oppressive and against common right to 
 commit a Avitness to jail in default of sureties, without some proof 
 of his intent not to appear at the trial. But where such inten- 
 tion appears, the commitment is not prohibited by the fourteenth 
 amendment to the constitution of the United States, nor by the 
 constitution of the State. ^ In another State, by statute, the 
 witness in a criminal case, if unable to procure sureties, may be 
 discharged from commitment and his deposition taken ;^ and the 
 power to require undertakings from such witnesses is limited in 
 the same jurisdiction to those who have been examined before a 
 
 1 Edmonson v. State, 43 Tex. 230. moned as such upon an Indictment for 
 
 2 Const. U. S., 6th Amendment; lud. a felony, to enter into a recognizance 
 Const. 1851, art. 1, §13; Const. Cal. to appear as a witness and give evi- 
 1879, art. 1, § 13; Const. Colo., § IG; dence upon the trial of such indict- 
 Conn. Const. 1818, art. 1, §9; Const. 111. ment, cannot be regarded as a 
 1870, art. II, § 9; Kans. Const. Bill of contempt, where there is no statute 
 Eights, § 10; Md. Const. Bill of Eights, authorizing the court to require such 
 art. 21; Mich. Const., art. G, §28; N. security. Bickley v. Com., 2 J. J. 
 Y. Const. 181:7, art. I, § 6 ; Ohio Const. Marsh. (Ky.) 572, 574. 
 
 art. VIII, § 11; Tex. Const., art. 1, § & 1 Greenl. Ev., § 318; Bennett r. 
 
 10. See Buchraan v. State, 59 Ind. 1; Watson, 3 Maul. & S. 1; Evans ■?;. Rees, 
 
 Bills V. State, Id. 15; Ex parte Marma- 12 Ad. & El. 55. 
 
 duke, 91 Mo. 228. 6 state v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398. 
 
 3 State V. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220. ' People v. Lee, 49 Cal. 37c 
 
 * The refusal of a Avitnoss, sum-
 
 Tit. 11, Cll. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 165 
 
 committing magistrate. ^ Moreover, the constitution of that 
 State provides that witnesses shall not be " unreasonably de- 
 tained;" under which it is held that if a witness is detained for 
 ninety days, after several continuances not satisfactorily ex- 
 plained, he is entitled to be- discharged on habeas corpus.'^ 
 
 § 160. Of Letters Rogatory. — The etymology of the word 
 subpoena implies tliat it is issued frpm a tribunal having the 
 power to command and to enforce obedience to its command by 
 the imposition of a penalty. It, therefore, cannot properly issue 
 to a person who, under the law, is privileged from arrest iu case 
 of his refusal to obey it. In such a case, it is indecent to issue 
 such a writ, but it is ?;ometimes the practice to issue, instead of 
 it, what is called a letter rogatory. It seems that where the at- 
 tendance of a member of a legislative body,, then in session, is 
 desired before a court of judicature, the proper practice is to 
 issue a letter rogatory to the speaker of the body, requesting the 
 attendance of the member named aa a witness, and not to issue 
 a.subpoena in the first instance.^ Letters rogatory are also issued 
 
 1 Ex parte Shaw, Gl Cal. 58. 
 
 2 Ex parte Dressier, (J7 Cal. 257. 
 
 3 Iu a case iu 1800, iu the Circuit 
 Court of the United States for the 
 District of Penusylvauia, before Mr. 
 Justice Chase, of the Supreme Court 
 of the United States, and Mr. Dis- 
 trict Judge Peters, the defendant, be- 
 ing indicted for a libel on the President, 
 applied to the court for a letter to be 
 addressed by them to several members 
 of Congress (Congress being iu ses- 
 sion), requesting their attendance as 
 witnesses on his behalf. In support 
 of the application, a variety of similar 
 cases arising under the government of 
 Pennsylvania were referred to. Mr. 
 Justice Chase, who appears to have 
 been a person of liasty, arbitrary and 
 unjudicial temperament, is reported to 
 have said : " The constitution gives to 
 every man charged with an ofCeuse the 
 
 benefit of compulsory process to se- 
 cure the attendance of his witnesses. 
 I do not know of any privilege to ex- 
 empt members of Congress from the 
 service or obligations of a subpcena. 
 In such cases I will uot sign any letter 
 of the kind proposed. If, upon serv- 
 ice of a subponna, the members of Con- 
 gress do not attend, a different ques- 
 tion may arise; and it will then be 
 time enough to decide whether au at- 
 tachment ought or ought not to issue. 
 It is not a necessary consequence of 
 non-attendance after the service of a 
 subpcena that an attachment shall issue. 
 A satisfactory reason may appear to 
 the court to justify or excuse it." 
 Mr. District Judge Peters, on the con- 
 trary, is reported to have said: "I 
 know the practice in Pennsylvania to 
 be :is it has been stated ; for I have re- 
 ceived such letters from the Supreme
 
 166 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TliOmp. Tl'., 
 
 to foreign judicatories, whose assistance is desired in obtaining 
 the depositions of witnesses residing abroad.^ 
 
 § 161. Of Attachments for Witnesses. — Where a witness 
 has been duly subpoenaed and fails to attend, the usual course is 
 for the court, on the application of the party whose witness he 
 is, to issue an attachment for him, under w^hich he is arrested by 
 the court's officer and brought before the court and there com- 
 pelled to give his evidence, with or without the imposition of 
 punishment, according to the excuse which he may have to offer.^ 
 In ordinary cases the purpose of the attachment is satisfied when 
 the presence of the witness is secured ; but where contumacious 
 neglect or disobedience of the court's process appears, a pecuni- 
 ary fine, generally small, is also imposed; and where the contu- 
 macy is aggravated, as in the case of the witness concealing 
 himself or keeping out of the way of the court's officer to avoid 
 giving his testimony in the particular case, a substantial punish- 
 ment by fine or imprisonment, within the limits allowed by law 
 may be inflicted. 
 
 § 163. Whether Attachment a Matter of Discretion. — Ac- 
 cording to certain conceptions the refusing of an attachment for 
 an absent witness is a matter of discretion, which will not be 
 reviewed on error or appeal, in the absence of an appearance of 
 
 Court while I was speaker of the letters rogatory. Fronde v. Fronde, 
 
 House of Kepreseutatives requesting 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 79. 
 that members might be permitted to ^ gee Buruham v. Morrissey, 14 
 
 attend as witnesses. In the present Gray (Mass.), 226; Ex parte Hvun- 
 
 case I should have no objection to ac- phrey, 2 Blatehf . (U. S.) 228 ; Ex parte 
 
 quiesce in the defendant's application, Judsou, 3 Blatehf . (U. S.) 89; United 
 
 with the concurrence of the presiding States v. Moore, Wall. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 judge." But, in accordance with the 23; Ex parte Beebees, 2 Wall. Jr. (U. 
 
 opinion of the presiding judge, the S.) 127; Ee Eoelker, 1 Sprague (U. 
 
 motion was refused. United States v. S.), 27G; West v. State, 1 Wis. 209; 
 
 Cooper, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 341. Bleecker v. Carroll, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 320, where the prac- 82 ; State v. Trumbull, 4 N. J. L. 139 ; 
 
 tice is described and a form given ; also Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 637, 
 
 1 Eol. Abr. 530, pi. 15. A statutory 549. 
 commission, if sufficient, is preferred to
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] CONTEMPTS IN FACIE CUKI^. 167 
 
 abuse. ^ But another and better view is that, if the witness has 
 been regularly served with subpcena, the party requiring his at- 
 tendance may claim an attachment as a matter of right. ^ 
 
 §163. [Coutiimed.] Personal Service of Subpoena neces- 
 sary. — In order to entitle a party to an attachment against a de- 
 faulting witness, it is necessary for him to show that the subi^oena 
 was duly served, "^ — it being a general rule that before a person can 
 be brought into contempt for disobeying an order of court, he must 
 be personally served with the order,* unless he was present in 
 court when the order was made, or knowing that the order was 
 about to be made, left the court in order to avoid being present 
 when it was made and in order to prevent its service upon him." 
 If, however, the return of the sheriff shows that the witness wil- 
 fully refused to permit the sheriff to serve the ^ib})cenau[)onliim, 
 this will be sufficient ground for the attachment.'' It is said that, in 
 order to punish a witness for contempt in not attending in obedience 
 to a subpoena, two things are necessary: 1. That the process of 
 subpoena, be strictly and legally served. 2. That the disobedience 
 is of such a nature as to indicate a design to contemn the process 
 and authority of the court. Ui)on the first point, where it did 
 not appear from the return of the subpoena, where it was deliv- 
 ered to the witness, it was held that it was not a suflicient basis 
 
 1 West t'. State, 1 AVis. 209; State to authorize au attachment in case it 
 V. Archer, 48 Iowa, 310. Thus, where is disobeyed. Loop v. Gould, 17 Hun 
 an attachment against an absent fe- (N, Y.), 535; Tebo v. Baljer, 16 Hun 
 male witness was refused on account (N. Y.), 182; s. c. 19 Alb. L. J. (N. Y.) 
 of her condition, and the accused 398. 
 
 failed to apply for a continuance, it ^ McCaulay v. Palmer, 40 Hun (N. 
 
 was held that relief could not be Y.),3S; Sauford v. Sanford, Id. 540; 
 
 granted on appeal. State r. Benjamin, Bate Ref. Co. ■?;. Gilett, 24 Fed. Rep. 
 
 7 La. Ann. 47. 697; Joliuson ?;. San Francisco Supe- 
 
 2 Green f. State, 17 Fla. 669. rior Court, 63 Cal. 578. 
 
 3 State V. Trumbull, 4 N. J. L, 139; « Hearn v. Tennant, 14 Ves. 136. 
 United States v. Caldwell, 2 Dall. (U. « Wilson v. State, 57 Ind. 71. More- 
 S.) 334. It has been held, in the case over, all tlie papers on which the 
 of an order for the examination of a attachment is awarded ought to be 
 party under a statute (X. Y. Code Civ. filed in court. United States v. Cald- 
 Proc, § 873) service of order upon the well, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 334. . 
 
 atiorneij of the party is not suflicient
 
 168 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TKIAL. [1 ThoiUp. Tr., 
 
 • 
 
 to punish the witness for the contempt, since it might have been 
 delivered to him at a place where he was not bound to yield it 
 obedience. It might have been out of the jurisdiction of the 
 court or out of the limits of the State. Upon the second head, 
 it was said; " It is the contempt which is punishable in this sum- 
 mary way. In the present instance there is not the slightest 
 appearance of any intention to disregard the process or authority. 
 of the court. The defendant had yielded obedience, and when 
 he left the place it seems to have been under a well-founded 
 impression that his presence would not at the time be required. 
 Besides, he was in another State and attending to necessary 
 business of deep importance to himself. The court therefore 
 see no grounds for an attachment." ^ 
 
 § 164. What will excuse non-attendance. — The serious ill- 
 ness of the witness,^ or of his wife,^ will generally be a sufficient 
 excuse for his failure to attend. So, where there is a statute 
 requiring the party desiring the attendance of the witness to 
 tender to him his legal fees^ he cannot be punished for refusing 
 to obey the subpoena, if the 'same are not tendered, or the tender 
 waived.* For the witness is not bound to testify until his fees 
 are tendered ; ^ and if he attends for one party and testifies and 
 then departs, without notice that he will be required to remain 
 for cross-examination, the cross-examining party must tender 
 his fees in order to secure his return for that purpose.^ By an 
 
 estate V. Trumbull, 4: N. J. L. Greenl. Ev., § 319; Gardens. Creswell, 
 
 139. 2 Mees. & W. 319. 
 
 2 Cutler V. State, 42 Lid. 244. « Atwood v. Scott, 99 Mass. 177; 
 Where it appeared that the -witnesses Bliss v. Brainard, 42 N. H. 255. Con- 
 thus brought in had been so much in- tra, in the federal courts, at least so 
 disposed as to be incapable of attend- far as mileage money is concerned : 
 ing, they were discharged, and the Norris v. Hasler, 23 Fed. Rep. 581. 
 costs of tlie attachment directed to ^ Richards v. Goddard, L. R. 17 Eq. 
 abide the event of the suit. Butcher 238. Where a party is summoned as a 
 V. Coats, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 340. witness, under a statute, by theoppo- 
 
 3 Foster v. McDonald, 12 Heisk. site party, it has been held that he is 
 (Tenn.) 619. entitled to witness fees. Penny v. 
 
 * Re Thomas, 1 Dill. (IT. S.) 420; 1 Brink, 75 N. C. 68.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. J ()9 
 
 early English statute/ the witness was entitled to his " reason- 
 able chariies," " accorclin«; to his countenance or callino;: " but 
 in the United States, the fees and mileage of witnesses are, it is 
 believed, universally fixed by statute;^ but there is so little 
 uniformity in the practice touching this subject that it cannot 
 properly be discussed here.^ Nor will the court compel the 
 attendance of an interpreter, or of an expert, who has neglected 
 to obey a subpa?na, unless in case of necessity.* If the witness 
 against whom an attachment is issued, arrives in court before it 
 has been served and makes a reasonable excuse, the court will 
 countermand the attachment on payment of the costs of it.^ 
 Moreover, an attachment will not be granted where it appears that 
 the testimony of the witness could not be 'material to the issues.^ 
 So, where a public officer is served with a subpoena duces tecum, 
 requiring him to bring certain public documents which may be 
 proved by copies, an attachment will not be granted because of 
 his refusal to obey; ^ otherwise if he refuses to furnish copies.^ 
 Where the witness had reasonable grounds to suppose that he 
 would not be wanted at the trial,'' or was excused by the attorney 
 of the party who summoned liim,^° attachments were refused. 
 An attachment will not be issued where it would be oppressive, 
 ox dangerous to the health of the witness, or where any strong 
 reason relating to the business or family of the witness exists, 
 against his compulsory absence from home ; but the court will 
 either postpone the cause or have his deposition taken. ^^ 
 
 § 165. When Attachment Issues in First Instance. — It is 
 
 not usual to grant an attachment against a witness in the first 
 
 1 Stat. 5 Eliz., chap. 9. Pr. (x. s.) (N. Y.) 291. Compare 
 
 2 See Holbrook v, Cooley, 25 Minu. Courtney v. Baker, 3 Denio (X. Y.), 
 275. 27, 30, 31, and cases cited. 
 
 *See 1 Greeul. Ev., § 310, and cita- ' Corbett v. Gibson, 16 Blatch. (U. 
 
 tions. S.) 334. 
 
 * Re Roelker, 1 Sprague (U. S.), ^ Delaney v. Regulators, 1 Yeates 
 
 276 ; pos?, § 171. (Pa.), 403. 
 
 5 United States v. Scliolfield, 1 » Reg. v. Slowman, 1 Dowl. 618. 
 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 130. lo Farrah v. Keat, 6 Dowl. 470. 
 
 fi Dicas V. Lawson, 1 Cromp. M. & " Ex parte Beebces, 2 Wall. Jr. (U. 
 
 R. 934; Morgan v. Morgan ^G Abb. S.) 127.
 
 170 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 instance, unless some willful disobedience to the authority of the 
 court is made to appear. The usual practice is to grant only a 
 rule to show cause. ^ But where a witness is regularly served 
 with subpoena and money tendered him for his expenses, which 
 he does not object to for its insufficiency, but positively refuses 
 to attend, it is a palpable case of contempt, and the court will 
 award an attachment in the first instance. " The sum of money 
 tendered may or may not have been adequate ; but as the witness 
 did not object to it at the time, it is to be considered sufficient." ^ 
 
 § 166. Service and Return of Attachment. — The attach- 
 ment must be served by the proper executive order of the 
 court, — in the courts of the United States, by the marshal of 
 the United States, although the witness reside in a distant county 
 of the State ; it being process regularly issued for the adminis- 
 tration of justice.^ It has been held, under statutes, that it is 
 unnecessary that an attachment for a defaulting witness should 
 be issued and executed at the same term. It may be issued at 
 the close of the term, returnable to the succeeding term, and 
 may be executed by the sheriff in vacalion, who may discharge 
 him upon his giving bail in the amount required by statute; and, 
 after such an attachment, the cause may be continued.^ 
 
 § 167. Hearing the Excuse — Purging the Contempt. — 
 
 When the witness is brought in by the officer, in execution of 
 the attachment, the court will, of course, hear his excuse, if 
 any he have to offer, and if it is a valid one, will discharge him 
 from the arrest and hear his testimony. " He is called upon to 
 purge himself oi the alleged contempt, which, if he does to the 
 satisfaction of the court, he is dismissed without more; but if 
 he fail to purge himself, the court adjudges him guilty of con- 
 tempt, and imposes the costs of the attachment, and such addi- 
 tional Jine as, in their discretion, the case seems to demand ; 
 
 1 Jackson w. Mann, 2 Calues (N.Y.), Cas. (N. Y.) 109; s. c. Coleman's 
 Rep. 92; Morris v. Creel, 1 Va. Cas. Cases (N. Y.), 119. 
 
 .333. » U. S. V. Montgomery, 2 Dail. (U. 
 
 2 Andrews v. Andrews, 2 Johns S.) 335. 
 
 * State V. Archer, 43 Iowa, 310.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 171 
 
 and, in default of payment, he ma}' be committed io jail to com- 
 pel execution of the sentence."' ^ 
 
 § 168. Punisliment of the Recusant Witness. — As a gen- 
 eral rule, the refusal of a witness to attend, to submit himself 
 to an examination, or to answer particular questions before a 
 subordinate officer of a court of record, appointed, or having 
 authority to take the deposition of the witness, or to conduct his 
 examination, is a contempt of the court, and not of the officer. ^ 
 In like manner, the refusal of a witness to submit to an examin- 
 ation, or to answer particular questions^ before a grand jury ^ is 
 a contempt of the court by which the grand jury is impaneled.^ 
 The grand jury is merely an appendage of the court, of which 
 the judge is the head or controlling power .^ It is only through 
 the subpoena of the court that witnesses can be brought before 
 them, who do not choose to attend voluntarily ; and they must 
 invoke the powers of the court, when necessary, to compel the 
 
 1 Com. V. Newton, 1 Grant's Cas. 
 (Pa.) 453, 45G. This case discusses at 
 length the power of the courts to pun- 
 ish contempts under the Pennsylvania 
 statute of June IGth, 1836 (Purd. Dig. 
 158). 
 
 2 La Fontaine v. Southern Under- 
 writers, 83 N. C. 132, 137; Stuart v. 
 Allen, 45 Wis. 158, KJl, per Ortou, J.; 
 Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118, 121, 
 per Gray, C. J. ; Rex v. Almon, Wil- 
 mot, 243, 2G9; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. (4th Am. 
 ed.) 1178, 1198; 78th Eq. Rule of U. 
 S. Courts, 17 Pet. Isxiv.; Rev. Stat. 
 U. S., §§ 4071, 4072, 4073, 4999, 5002, 
 5005, 500(5 ; Ex parte Doll, 7 Phil. (Pa.) 
 595; Matter of Allen, 13 Blatchf. (U. 
 S.) 271. Compare Shepherd v. Dean, 
 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 174; Wicker v. 
 Dresser, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 331; 
 Com. V. Newton, 1 Grant (Pa.) Cas. 
 453. 
 
 3 United States v. Caton, 1 Cranch 
 C. C. (U. S.) 150. Where the writ 
 Issues from a federal court, refusal to 
 
 obey it is an offense against the United 
 States. Re Ellerbe, 4 McCrary (U. 
 S.), 449. 
 
 4 People V. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; 
 Heard v. Pierce, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 338; 
 People V. Fancher, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. 
 Y.) 4G7, 470; Commonwealth v. Ban- 
 uon, 97 Mass. 214; Rex v. Lord Pres- 
 ton, 1 Salk. 278; Ex parte Maulsby, 13 
 Md. G25; Lockwood v. State, 1 lud. 
 IGl; Ward t?. State, 2 Mo. 120. Contra, 
 in Alabama, where the proceeding 
 must be by indictment. State v. 
 Blocker, 14 Ala. 450. 
 
 5 United States v. Hill, 1 Brock. (U. 
 S.) 15G; Denning u. State, 22 Ark. 131, 
 132; Ch-erry v. State, G Fla. G79, G85: 
 People V. Naughtou, 7 Al)b. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) (N. s.) 421, 423; Heard ??. Pierce, 
 8 Cush. (Mass.) 338, 339; Commou- 
 wealth V. Bannon, 97 Mass. 214, 219; 
 Lewis V. Wake County, 74 N. C. 194, 
 198; Commonwealth v. Crans, 3 Pa. 
 L. J. 449, 450; s. c. 2 Clarke (Pa. L. 
 J.), 1^0.
 
 172 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRL4L. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 attendance of witnesses, and to protect themselves from insult 
 or interference,^ Under the limitations imposed upon the pro- 
 cess of contempt by statute in Pennsylvania, a sentence disbar- 
 ring 071 attorney for default as a witness is merely void. " This 
 legislation," said Woodward, J., " would be a vain array of 
 words, if a gentleman of the bar who happened to be in techni- 
 cal contempt as a tardy witness, might, instead of being fined, 
 be stripped of his profession. As well might the occupation of 
 another witness be taken away from him for disobedience to a 
 subpoena, and his family beggared. Before such things can be 
 done, the acts of assembly restricting punishments for con- 
 tempt must be repealed and forgotten." ^ 
 
 § 169. Power to Award Compensation to Party injured by 
 Recusancy of Witness. — The power of courts to award in- 
 demnity to an injured party, in a summary proceeding as for a 
 contempt, is said, in Wisconsin, to rest entirely upon the statute.-^ 
 This may be true, but it is beyond question that it was the prac- 
 tice of the court of chancery in England, independently of stat- 
 ute, to fine contemnors in the amount which the opposite party 
 and been damaged by their contempt.^ Following this view, 
 however, the Wisconsin court, having held in a previous case 
 that the "loss or injury" for which the court may award 
 compensation to the injured party in a proceeding for contempt, 
 under the statutes of that State,^ is a pecuniary loss or injury, 
 for which the party injured might recover damages by an 
 action,^ — with this ruling as the basis of its reasoning, pro- 
 ceed upon the consideration that, while the statute of that 
 State ' o;ives or recoo;nizes a rio-ht of action by the ag^ofrieved 
 party against one duly subpoenaed and under obligation to attend 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Crans, 3 Pa. L. ^ Com. v. Newton, 1 Grant's Cas. 
 
 J. 453; s. c. 2 Clarke (Pa. L. J.), 184; (Pa.) 453, 457. 
 
 Ex parte Van Hook, 3 N. Y. City Hall 3 stately. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 366. 
 
 Eec. 64: Ex parte Spooner, 5 Id. 109; * 3 Bla. Com. 344. 
 
 Bergh'sCase, IG Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) (n. s r.s. 1878, §§ 3490, 3491: R. S. 
 
 s.) 266. Compare Storey v. People, 79 1858, eh. 149, §§ 21, 23. 
 
 HI. 45; Grand Jury v. Public Press, 4 <* Ee Pierce, 44 AVis. 411. 
 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 313. ^ R. S. Wis. 1878, § 4063.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 173 
 
 as a witness, who fails to attend without reasonable excuse, to 
 recover damages caused by such failure ; yet no right of action 
 exists against a witness for the mere refusal to answer proper 
 questions, at least without allegation and proof of some special 
 loss or injury. The conclusion of the court, therefore, is that, 
 in a proceeding against a witness for contempt in refusing to an- 
 swer proper questions propounded to him, it is not competent 
 for the court to impose a tine upon him for an i)idemniJication 
 of the party by whom he was subpoenaed.^ Speaking for the 
 court, Lyon, J., says: *' Neither the statute nor any adjudged 
 case that has come to our notice recoo-nizcs such rio^ht of action 
 against a witness for refusing to answer proper questions. It 
 may be, however, that in special cases such an action can be 
 maintained on common-law principles. But it seems to us it can 
 only be maintained (if at all) for some special damage resulting 
 from the unlawful refusal of the witness to testify. For exam- 
 ple, such refusal might compel a party to take a continuance one 
 term. The continuance costs would probably be the measure of 
 damages. If such an action can be maintained in any case, we 
 think the recovery will be limited to the actual, direct tangible 
 damages ; and that the mere refusal to testify, unaccompanied by 
 such damages, is not a ground of action. And we think also that 
 no recovery can be bad in such an action, based upon the possi- 
 bility or probability that, had the witness testified fully, the 
 judgment would have been more favorable to the aggrieved party 
 than it was. Such damaofcs are altoo;ethcr too uncertain and con- 
 jectural to furnish a ground of action." '^ 
 
 § 170. Relief by Habeas Corpus. — If the commitment of 
 the witness is illegal, he is entitled to be discharged by habeas 
 corpus.^ At the same time, the sentence of commitment will 
 not — at least at common law — be reviewed on error or ap- 
 peal.* But, on well settled principles touching the office of the 
 
 » State V. Lousdale, 48 Wis. 348, C41,app.; People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 
 
 367. ' 74. 
 
 2 Ibid. 367. 4 Lockwood v. State, 1 Ind. 161. 
 
 ^ Ex parte Maulsby, 13 Md. G25, Otherwise uuder statutes. Ante, § 140.
 
 174 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 writ of habeas corpus, he cannot be discharged because of any 
 mere error or irregularity in the commitment, or in the steps 
 which have led up to it ; he can only be discharged for what is 
 termed illegality — that is, because the sentence was one which 
 could not be legally imposed.^ Upon this subject — the differ- 
 ence between irregularity and illegality in respect of the remedy 
 by habeas corpus, — there is much contrariety of judicial opinion. 
 It would appear, on the whole, that courts of co-ordinate jurisdic- 
 tion will not assume the right, on habeas corpus, to judge of 
 each other's jurisdiction and of the legality of each other's com- 
 mitments for contempt; while it cannot escape attention that 
 appellate or superintending courts are more and more in the 
 habit of doing so.^ It is apprehended that the generally pre- 
 vailing view is that a person committed contempt for refusing to 
 produce certain papers in his possession before a grand jury, in 
 compliance with an order of the court in the nature of subpoena 
 duces tecum is in law committed in execution of a criminal judg- 
 ment, and cannot be enlarged by another tribunal or judge on 
 habeas corpus, upon any view of errors in the judgment of com- 
 mitment, as that the witness was privileged by his position of 
 attorney from producing the documents called for; they being 
 the documents of his client, or for any other error which ma}'' 
 have led to the judgment of committal, or for any excess in the 
 fine or imprisonment imposed.^ On the other hand, there is au- 
 thority in support of the view that if the refusal of the wit- 
 ness to answer the question is altogether innocent and Justifiable, 
 or only an assertion of a constitutional right, such as the right of 
 not giving evidence against himself, a commitment for contempt 
 is illegal in such a sense that the error may be reached by certi- 
 orari, if not examinable upon the return to a habeas corpus.^ 
 Where an event occurs which renders it impossible for the wit- 
 ness, or other contemnor, to perform the thing required of him, 
 for refusing to perform which he is imprisoned, he will be en- 
 titled to be relieved from imprisonment by habeas corpus; other- 
 
 1 Ante, § 140 et seq. s Ex parte Maulsby,13 Md. App. 625. 
 
 2 Ante, § 145. ^ people v. Kelly,' 24 N. Y. 74.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 175 
 
 wise he might be doomed to perpetual imprisonment. ^ Thus, 
 where a witness is imprisoned for refusing to answer questions 
 in a pending cause, he will be released on habeas corpus upon the 
 abatement of such suit? 
 
 § 171. Compelling' the Testimony of Experts. — This sub- 
 ject is also in much confusion. Statutes exist fixing the fees 
 of experts at larger sums than those of ordinary witnesses. 
 Judicial opinion is much at variance on the question whether an 
 expert may be compelled to testify without the payment of the 
 statutory fees, or even as to whether a witness can be com- 
 pelled to give his opinion at all. According to one view, the 
 witness meets the requirements of a subpoena if he appears in 
 court wdien required to testify and gives imp)romptu answers to 
 such questions as are then put to him. He cannot be required, 
 by virtue of the subpoena, to examine the case, to use his skill 
 and knowledge, to form an opinion, or to attend, hear and con- 
 sider the testimony given, so as to be qualified to give an opinion 
 on a question of science arising upon such testimony, — from 
 which the conclusion follows that a professional witness called 
 as an expert may properly be paid for his time, services and 
 expenses, and that the amount which is paid to him cannot, in 
 the absence of anything showing bad faith on his part and on the 
 part of the party calling him, affect the regularity of the trial, 
 though it may affect his credit wnth the jury. It was also reas- 
 oned that it is not improper for the State's attorney, in a crim- 
 inal case, to procure the attendance of skilled witnesses for a 
 special compensation, and that the fact that an expert attended 
 and testified at his instance, under an agreement for compensa- 
 tion, which was unknown to the defendant until after the wit- 
 ness' testimony had closed, did not affect the regularity of the 
 verdict.^ Opinion has so far varied that in one jurisdiction it 
 has been held that an expert may refuse to give his opinion 
 on matters of science or skill until the statutory fees are 
 
 ^ Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 175. 3 People v. ^Aloiitsomery, 13 Abb, 
 
 2 Had. Pr. (X. s.) (N. Y.) 207.
 
 176 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 paid ;^ and another court has gone so far as to hold that he may re- 
 fuse to give his opinion at all ; ^ while still another court has held that 
 such a refusal is a contempt.^ It has been reasoned in an English 
 case that there is a distinction between a witness to the facts and 
 a witness selected by a party to give his opinion as an expert ; 
 that the former is bound, as a matter of public duty, to testify 
 to facts within his knowledge, while the latter is under no such 
 obligation to testify as to his opinion on matters of skill or 
 science ; and accordingly that the party who selects him must pay 
 for his time before he will be compelled to testify.* If a profes- 
 sional man is called as an ordinary ► witness to testify to facts 
 within his knowledge, he will not be entitled to the extra com- 
 pensation allowed by a statute in the case of experts ; ^ and it has 
 been held that physicians called to give their opinions on facts 
 observed by them while treating a person professionally, are not 
 within the meaning of a statute empowering the court in its dis- 
 cretion to give extra compensation to expert witnesses.^ 
 
 § 172. When the Witness is privileged to depart. — By the 
 
 usual terms of a subpoena, the witness is required to attend de 
 die in diem^ and not to depart without leave of the court. But 
 it is usual, and hence not blameable, for him to depart as soon 
 as his examination has been completed and he is notified by the 
 party calling him that his attendance will not be further required, 
 unless he receives contrary notice from the opposite party or 
 from the court. It has even been held that the party calling the 
 witness may allow him to depart after cross-examination, and 
 that the opposite party cannot demand that he be detained to 
 testify regarding new matter, or that he be required to produce 
 documents to be used by the latter in support of his case; and 
 this for the reason that if he desires him for this purpose, he 
 should subpoena him as his own witness.^ In another case, the 
 
 1 Biicliman v. State, 5!) lud. 1 ; Dills * Webb v. Page, 1 Car. & K. 23. 
 V. State, Id. 15. ^ Suyder v. Iowa City, 40 la. G4G. 
 
 2 Ex parte Roelker, 1 Sprague (U. " Le Mere v. McHale, 30 Miun. 
 S.), 027. 410. 
 
 3 Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389. ' Wells v. Wells, 33 N. J. Eq, 4.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 177 
 
 court refused to allow the defendant to prove his case by cross- 
 examination of the plaintiffs witness, thus enforcing what we 
 shall hereafter find to be the general rule in several American 
 jurisdictions ; ^ whereupon the defendant said that he would call 
 the witness as his own at the proper time, and the plaintiff re- 
 plied that he had no objection to the witness remaining. Next 
 day, when the defendant desked to call the witness, he could not 
 be found. It appearing that the defendant had not subpoenaed 
 him, or tendered him the statutory fee for the second day, it was 
 held that he could not have an attachment for him.^ But there 
 is another conception, which is that, when a witness has been 
 subpoeuaed and called to testify, he is presumed to be present 
 until the conclusion of the trial, and that if he has left the court 
 after the close of his examination, and is thereafter wanted by 
 the opposite party, the court may, in its discretion, suspend the 
 trial until he can be brought in.^ On a similar view, it has been 
 held that, after the announcement of the counsel on each side in 
 a criminal case that the testimony is closed, it is within the dis- 
 cretion of the presiding judge to issue attachments to compel the 
 attendance of an absent witness.* 
 
 § 173. Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum. — Where the wit- 
 ness is in custody or in the military or naval service, it has been 
 usual to compel his attendance by a w^rit of habeas corpus ad tes- 
 tificandum, directed to his prison-keeper if in confinement,^ or 
 to his superior officer if in the military or naval service. This 
 writ is a very ancient one, and appears to have been granted at the 
 discretion of the courts of common law. It is said to have been 
 employed to bring witnesses before the court when in custody 
 awaitiuo; trial, and also when under2:oino^ sentence.® The writ 
 
 1 Post, chap. XVII. 250, per Sherwood, J. See Adam's 
 
 2 Beaulieu ??. Parsons, 2 Minn. 37. Case, 3 Keb. 51; Kes v. Burbage, 3 
 
 3 Neil V. Thorn, 88 N. Y. 270. Burr. 1440; Rex v. Layer, Fort. 396; 
 * Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. Geery u. Hopkins, 2 Ld. Raym. 851; 
 
 549. Friend's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 1; 2 
 
 5 Chapman i\ Welles, Kirby (Conn.) , Tidd Prac. (9th ed.) 809 ; Shank's Case, 
 
 133,137. 15 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) (N. Y.) 38; Re 
 
 « Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228, Mason, 8 Mich. 7 
 
 12
 
 178 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 has issued in civil cases from the federal courts, and seemingly 
 without regard to the question whether the witness was in Fed- 
 eral or in State custody.^ Its use is recognized by several 
 American statutes."'^ The Missouri statute empowers the judge 
 of any court of record to issue the writ to bring up persons de- 
 tained for any cause, " except a sentence for felony." It was 
 held, where the writ was demanded on behalf of a prisoner on 
 trial for felony, that this exception did not infringe his consti- 
 tutional right to have process to compel the attendance of wit- 
 nesses in his behalf, and that obedience to the writ, when di- 
 rected to the warden of the penitentiary of the State to bring up 
 a prisoner there confined under sentence for a felony, could not 
 be enforced by a criminal court. ^ 
 
 § 174. Proceeding to Obtain this Writ. — According to an 
 early English case, in order to lay the proper foundation for the 
 writ of habeas corpus ad testificandiun, it is necessary to show by 
 affidavit that the persons whom it is desired to bring up as wit- 
 nesses have been served with subpoenas, and that they are not 
 willing to attend. " Without such an affidavit," said Lord Mans- 
 field, "the writ ought not to go. They can never be brought up 
 as prisoners against their consent."* According to Dr. Green- 
 
 1 Ex parte Barnes, 1 Sprague (U. up a prisoner who was confined in 
 S.), 133; Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wasli. jail for the non-payment of a fine ira- 
 C. C. (U. S.) 2'62 ; Ex parte des Eoch- posed on him as a part of a judg- 
 ers, 1 McAIl. (U.S.) 68; Ex parte ment of the court upon an indictment 
 Dorr, 3 How. (U. S.) 104; Ex parte for assault, in order that lie might 
 Bollman, i Cranch (U. S.), 75; Elki- give evidence before an election corn- 
 son V. Beliesseline, 2 Wheel. Crim. mittee of the House of Commons, on 
 Cas. 5C) ; United States v Moore, 3 an affidavit of service of a rule to 
 Cranch (U. S.), 159. show cause upon the under sheriff, 
 
 2 Crim. Code Ind., §§ 245, 240; 2 the solicitor of the treasury, the 
 Rev. Laws Ohio 1880, § 7290; Stat. Me. prisoner, and the person at whose in- 
 1883, p. 805, § 37; Stat. Mass. 1882, p. stance he was in execution, and, no 
 1070, § 29; Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879, § 4031. cause having been shown. Matter of 
 
 » Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228 Price, 4 East, 587. See also Rex v. 
 
 (Sherwood, J., dissenting). Burbage, 3 Burr. 1440; Thelusson v. 
 
 * Rex V. Roddam, Cowp. 672. The Coppiuger, 3Esp. 283; Noble v. Smith, 
 
 King's Bench, in 1804 granted a ha- 5 Johns. 357. It was at one time a 
 
 beas corpus ad testificandum to bring doubtful point whether a habeas cor-
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI. 1 coMPUi.soRY process against witnesses. 179 
 
 leaf, " the application in civil cases, is made upon affidavit, stat_ 
 ing the nature of the suit, and the materiality of the testimony, 
 as the party is advised and verily believes, together with the 
 fact and general circumstances of restraint, which call for the 
 issuing of the writ ; and, if he is not actually a prisoner, it 
 should state his willingness to attend. In criminal cases, no 
 affidavit is deemed necessary on the part of the prosecuting at- 
 torney. The writ is left with the sheriff, if the witness is in 
 custody; but if he is in the military or naval service, it is left 
 with the officer in immediate command, to be served, obeyed and 
 returned like any other writ of habeas corpus.^ This writ will 
 not be issued in any case to bring out of the penitentiary a wit- 
 ness who, by reason of his conviction for a felony is incompetent 
 to testify.^ Nor will it be issued in such a case where the com- 
 petency of the witness is substantially in doubt ; ^ nor will its 
 execution be enforced when impi'ovideutli/ granted.^ 
 
 pus ad testificandum could be granted 
 in the Common Pleas, to bring up a 
 prisoner charged in execution in the 
 Fleet, in order that he might testify 
 in a pending cause. The doubt turned 
 upon whether the writ of habeas cor- 
 pus would be a good defense to an ac- 
 tion for an escape against the warden of 
 the Fleet. Burdus v. Shorter, Barnes' 
 Notes, 222. The court refused the writ 
 in Francia v. De Mattos, Id. 223. The 
 court declared it to be a very doubtful 
 point and did not grant the writ ; but 
 the deposition of the prisoner taken 
 in chancery was read by consent. 
 
 1 1 Greeul. Ev., § 312. See Evans 
 V. Rees, 12 Ad. & El. 55; Hammond v. 
 Stewart, 1 Strange, 510. 
 
 - Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228, 
 23(J. 
 
 ^ United States v. Barefield, 23 Fed. 
 Rep. 136. 
 
 * Accordingly, where, in a trial of 
 an issue m a divorce case, the re- 
 spondent, the father, had been served 
 With a habeas corpus ad tesUficandum, 
 
 directing him to produce the two 
 daughters of the parties who were at 
 school in Boston, and he made re- 
 turn that the children had been sent 
 to the school more than six months be- 
 fore, and that the libellant. the mother, 
 had visited them there and had free 
 access to them, — it was held that, as 
 the libellant knew of the whereabouts 
 of the children and could have taken 
 their depositions under a commission, 
 she had been guilty of laches in not 
 doing so, and could not obtain a con- 
 tinuance of the cause because of their 
 absence; that the writ of habeas cor- 
 pus ad testificandum had been improvi- 
 dently issued, and could not, there- 
 fore, be enforced ; that the witnesses, 
 not having been sent away by the fa- 
 ther to avoid service of the subpoena, 
 and being at the time of the applica- 
 tion, and for several months before, 
 in another State, could not be brought 
 in under this writ without their con- 
 sent. Koecker v. Koecker, 7 Phila. 
 364, before Paxson, J.
 
 180 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 175. Subpoena Duces Tecum, — The ordinary process for 
 compelling the production of books and papers which are neces- 
 sary to be used in evidence upon a trial or other judicial examin- 
 ation, is a subpoena duces tecum. This is usually the ordinary 
 subpoena with an additional clause to the following effect: " And 
 also, that you diligently and carefully search for, examine, and 
 inquire after, and bring with you and produce at the time, and 
 place aforesaid, a bill of exchange, dated," etc. [here describing 
 with precision the papers and documents to be produced], " to- 
 gether with all copies, drafts and vouchers, relating to said doc- 
 uments, and all other documents, letters, and papers, writings 
 whatsoever, that can or may afford any information or evidence 
 in said cause ; then and there to testify and show all and singu- 
 larly those things which you (or either of you) know or the said 
 documents, letters or instruments in writing do import, of and 
 concerning the said cause now depending. And this you (or any 
 of you) shall in no wise omit," etc.^ It has been held that unless 
 the subpoena contain the words " to testify," it will not support 
 further compulsory process against the witness ; since the power 
 of the court to compel the witness to attend at all, is based upon 
 the assumption that his testimony is material to a case in court. ^ 
 Particularity is required in describing the documents which the 
 witness is required to produce. Thus, a subpoena to produce all 
 the dispatches received at a certain telegraph office between the 
 6th and 20th days of the month, is too general.'^ So, it has been 
 held that a subpoena requiring a solicitor to produce all his books, 
 papers, etc., relating to all dealings between him and a party to 
 the suit during a term of thirty-three years, is too vague.* But 
 '' the papers are required to be stated or specified only with 
 that degree of certainty which is practicable, considering all the 
 circumstances of the case, so that the witness may know what is 
 wanted of him, and may have the papers at the trial so that they 
 can be used, if the court shall then determine them to be com- 
 
 » Araey v. Long, 9 East, 473; 3 Chit. ^ United States v. Hunter, 15 Fed. 
 
 Geu., Prac. 830, note; 1 Greeul. Ev., Rep. 712. 
 § 309. 4 Lee v. Angas, L. R. 2 Eq. 59. 
 
 ^ Murray v. Elstou, 2i5 X. J. Kq. 212.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 181 
 
 petent and relevant evidence." ^ There is, of course, some limit 
 to the tiling which the witness can be compelled under such a 
 writ to produce. It has been held in a patent case that he could 
 not be thus compelled to bring before the court the patterns of a 
 stove? It was held in an early case in Pennsjdvania that a 
 subpoena duces tecum would not lie to compel a party, residing at 
 a great distance from court, to produce in court certain news- 
 papers containing advertisements of the sale of unseated lands 
 for taxes ; the court reasoning that if the party applying for the 
 process desired the benefit of the newspapers, it behooved him to 
 produce them or get them the best way he could. ^ Moreover, if 
 books or papers are brought into court under a subpoena duces te- 
 cum, a party who withdraios them from the court and restores 
 them to their original custody, is guilty of a contempt of court 
 and may be punished for so doing.* A witness will not be pun- 
 ished for contempt for failing to produce books and papers in a 
 case pending before a referee, where it appears from his afiidavit 
 that he has not had reasonable time within which to procure and 
 produce them.^ On the other hand, it has been held that a pub- 
 lic ofiicer, — the surveyor-general of the State, — is guilty of 
 contempt if he refuses to furnish copies of official records in obe- 
 dience to a subpoena duces tecum, though applied to for this pur- 
 pose after office hours.^ 
 
 § 176. [Continued.] May be used for obtaining a Dis- 
 covery. — The use of the subpxjena duces tecum is regulated to 
 such an extent by local statutes that it would be unsafe to at- 
 tempt any extended exposition of the practice under it in this 
 country, without a very minute examination. One idea concern- 
 ing it seems to be that it is not to be used as a means of obtain- 
 ing a discovery of evidence in the possession of the opposite 
 
 1 United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. * Com. v. Brayuard, Thach. Cr. 
 (U. S.) 5G6, 568, per Dillon, J. Cas. 146, 155. 
 
 2 Re Shepherd, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) ^ Heerdt v. Wetmore, 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 
 225. 697. 
 
 ' Shippen's Lesee v. Wells, 2 ^ Delaney v. Regulators, 1 Yeates 
 
 Yeates (Pa.), 2G0. (Pa.), 403.
 
 182 
 
 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 party .^ But this cannot be stated with much confidence, especially 
 in view of recent statutes rendering parties competent as wit- 
 nesses ; for we find that it has been ruled that a subpoena duces 
 tecum must in all cases be issued for the purpose of obtaining 
 profert of books and papers; and that, upon taking conditionally 
 the testimony of a witness, whether a party to the action or not, 
 he may be required, by such a subpoena, to produce any books or 
 papers specified in the writ, and, for disobedience, is guilty of 
 contempt and also liable in damages to any party aggrieved 
 thereby.^ It is held that it may issue to compel the president 
 and secretary of a corporation to produce books and papers of 
 the corporation in a suit in equity to which the corporation is 
 not a party.^ 
 
 1 Smith V. McDonald, 50 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 519; Campbell v. Johnsou, 3 
 Del. Ch. 94. 
 
 2 Central Nat. Bank v. Arthur, 2 
 Sweeny (N. Y.), 194; Trotter v. Lat- 
 son, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 261. Mott v. 
 Consumers Ice Co., 52 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 244; Murray v. Elston, 23 N. 
 J. Eq. 212. As to the proper proceed- 
 ing where the witness appears but 
 neglects to produce the books or pa- 
 pers, see O'Toole's Estate, 1 Tuck. 
 (N. Y.) (Surr.) 39. Where, in an ac- 
 tion for ejectment against a gi'antee, 
 his loarrantor, though not nominally 
 a party, employed counsel to defend 
 the case, and placed in his hands a 
 deed to be used in the litigation, it 
 was held that the paper was legally in 
 the custody of the warrantor and must 
 be produced under such a subpoena. 
 Steed V. Cruise, 70 Ga. 168. It is no 
 answer to such a writ that the books 
 and {)apers are private property of the 
 witness, nor is it necessary that the 
 subpoena should declare them material 
 to the investigation. Re Dunn, 9 Mo. 
 App. 255. 
 
 3 Wertheim v. Continental &c. Co., 
 21 Blatchf. ^U. S.) 246. Contra, Boor- 
 
 man V. Atlantic &c. R. Co., 17 Hun 
 (N. Y.), 555; Central Nat. Bank v. 
 AVhite, 37 N. Y. Super. 297. In the 
 view of other courts, the statute af- 
 fords ample means of compelling a 
 corporation to produce its books 
 under a subpoena duces tecum in like 
 manner as in the case of a natural 
 person. N. Y. Code Civ. Proc, § 
 8G8; Central &c. R. Co. v. Twenty- 
 third Street R. Co., 53 How. Pr. 45. 
 On the] contrary, it has been laid 
 down in New York that, even in case 
 of an action in which a corporation is 
 a party, the production of its books 
 cannot be enforced by subpoena duces 
 tecum, served on its officers; it can 
 only be effected by way of discovery un- 
 der the provisions of the statutes. (2 
 Rev. Stats. New York, 199; Wait's 
 New York Code of Procedure, 1871, 
 §388 Throop's Code, 1877, §803; La 
 Farge v. La Farge Ins. Co., 14 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 26;Opdyke v. Marble, 44 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 64) ; and the exercise of this 
 power is left to the discretion of the 
 court. As to the books of a corpora- 
 tion, not a party to the action, no such 
 power of enforcing an examination or 
 production of them on a trial between
 
 Tit. II, Cb, VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 183 
 
 § 177. [Continued.] Witness wlien privileged against the 
 Writ. — The command of a subpoena duces tecum is sometimes 
 met by the claim of absolute privilege; and where the chiim is 
 well founded, the person to whom the subpoena is directed will 
 be justified in disobeying it, and if he is thereafter committed 
 for the supposed contempt, he will be entitled to be discharged 
 by habeas coipus. Thus, it has been held that an attachment 
 will not be awarded against an attorney for refusing to obey a 
 subpoena duces tecum, to appear before a grand jur}^ with vouch- 
 ers which have been intrusted to him b}^ his client in confidence, 
 which vouchers contain evidence of a forgery committed by his 
 client.^ In such circumstances, it is the duty of the attorney, 
 immediatel}'' on receiving the subpoena, to deliver up the papers 
 to his client. 2 This subject is merely suggested here, and is dis- 
 cussed hereafter.^ 
 
 § 178. Actions against Witnesses for Non-attendance. — 
 
 Statutes exist imposing penalties upon witnesses for non-attend- 
 ance, to be recovered by the parties on whose behalf they have 
 been subpoenaed. It has been held that, in order to recover the 
 penalty denounced by such a statute, it must be shown that the 
 witness was a material witness, and tiiat damages resulted from 
 his non-attendance.* Under some systems, the party summon- 
 ing the witness also ma}' have an action for damages against the 
 
 other parties is afforded ; nor can its tlie defendant had left an infant with 
 
 agents or officers, in their individual such hospital, the result of an illicit 
 
 capacity, be compelled to discover or sexual intercourse with a third per- 
 
 produce the books of a corporation son, was denied. Morgan v. Morgan, 
 
 over which they have not an absolute siqyra. Whether these decisions are 
 
 control and right of disposition at law in that State at the pi'esent time, 
 
 their own will and discretion. Mor- the writer does not undertake to 
 
 gan V. Morgan, 16 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) say. 
 
 '291, 295. See Opdyke v. Marble, su- ^ Rex v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1G87. 
 
 pra. Accordingly, a motion for an at- ^ Ibid. 
 
 tachment against the chief officers of ^ Post, Ch. XII. 
 
 a. foundling hospital, to compel them * Carrington v. Hutson, 28 Hun 
 
 to produce upon the hearing, before a (N. Y.), 371. See also Courtney v. 
 
 referee, of an action for divorce, the Baker, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 27. This is 
 
 books of the hospital, for the purpose required by the Texas statute. Mc- 
 
 of disclosing the supposed fact that Gehee v. State, 4 Tex. App. 94.
 
 184 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 witness ; ^ but here it must likewise appear that his testimony 
 was material and necessary to prove the case of the party re- 
 quiring his attendance.^ But in order to sustain such an action, 
 it is necessary to prove that the fees of the witnesss for travel 
 and attendance were duly paid or tendered according to the re- 
 quirements of the statute ; it is not sufficient to prove a loaiver 
 on the part of the witness of his right to such fees.-^ Under 
 some systems the penalty does not go to the injured party, but 
 is in the nature of a fine imposed on the witness by way of pun- 
 ishment.* Under the Tennessee statute, the penalty can only be 
 recovered in the name, and to the use of the State,^ In order 
 to recover such a penalty there must have been a substantial 
 compliance with the statute in the matter of summoning the 
 witness.^ Such a statute has been regarded as penal and to be 
 strictly pursued, for which reason a judgment nisi for any sum, — - 
 even a less sum, — than therein prescribed, has been held a nul- 
 lity.^ Under some systems, defaulting witnesses are liable to 
 summary proceedings for punishment.^ 
 
 § 179. Striking out the Answer of a Defendant who fails 
 to appear. — Under some statutes, if the defendant, duly sum- 
 
 1 McCall V. Butterworth, 8 la. 329; * Maclin v. Wilson, 21 Ala. 670, 
 Hurd V. Swan, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 75. ^ Nelson v. Ewell, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 
 
 2 It Is an answer, as well to a com- 271. As to forfeitures against wit- 
 mon-law action against a witness, as nesses who have been put under re- 
 to a proceeding to punish him for con- cognizance, see State v. Herudon, 1 
 tempt for neglecting to attend in Murph. (N. C.) 2G9. See, as to stat- 
 obedience to a subpoena served upon ute forfeitures against witnesses, 
 him, that he knows nothing material State v. Thomas, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 113 
 to the issue; or, if it were a suhpcena Duke v. Given, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 478 
 duces tecum, that he has not any docu- State v. Butler, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 83 
 ment such as he is called upon to pro- State v. Dill, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 414 
 duce, material and necessary as evi- Kincaid v. Rogers, 3 Sneed (Tenn ) 
 dence tending to prove the case of the 1 ; Mattocks v. "Wheatou, 10 Vt. 493 
 party requiring his attendance. Mor- Kiuzey v. King, G Ired. (N. C.) 70. 
 gan V. Morgan, k; Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (N. « Durden v. State, 32 Ala. 579. See 
 Y.) 291. Compare Courtney v. Baker, also Mattocks v. Wheaton, 10 Vt. 493. 
 3 Denio (N. Y.), 27, 30, 31, and cases ' State v. Dill, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 
 cited. 414. 
 
 3 McKeon t?. Lane, 1 Hall (N. Y.), « bobbins v. Gorham, 25 N. Y. 
 319. 588.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST "VVIT^ESSEt.v. 185 
 
 moned as a witness, fails to appear and testify, the court may 
 strike out his answer and give judgment for the plaintiff.^ 
 
 § ISO. Interfering witli Witnesses. — Tampering with wit- 
 nesses, attempting to bribe them, or to dissuade them from at- 
 tending and testifying, is not only a contempt of court, but a 
 misdemeanor at common law and punishable by indictment. ^ 
 
 § 181. Refusing to Appear before Commissioners, Exam- 
 iners, Notaries. — The process for compelling the attendance of 
 witnesses and their answers to questions, before examiners, 
 notaries, commissioners or other officers, is too wide a question 
 for general discussion in a work of this kind. Nothing can be 
 done beyond suggesting certain lines of inquiry. In the first 
 place, it should be observed that the subject is very much con- 
 trolled by local statutes. For instance, we find that it has been 
 laid down in Pennsylvania that a failure on the part of the wit- 
 ness to appear before an examiner in obedience to a subpoena is 
 not a contempt of the court in which the proceeding is pending, 
 in which his testimony was to be used, but a contempt of the 
 process of the law, for which the examiner is entrusted by the 
 law with power to punish liim.^ On the other hand, it is held in 
 Wisconsin, as a rule under the statute of that State,* as well as 
 at common law, that the circuit court of any county may punish 
 as for a criminal contempt a person who, subpoenaed to testify 
 in an action pending in such court, before a court commissioner 
 in another county, disobeys the summons or refuse to be sworn 
 or to answer.^ It has been laid down that the same rules must 
 be applied in determining the propriety of compelling a witness 
 to answer a particular question, on his examination de bene esse 
 before a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States, 
 under section thirty of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which govern 
 the court in the examination of a witness on a trial before a 
 
 1 Snyder V. Raab, 40 Mo. 166; Hew- ^ Corn. v. Newton, 1 Grant's Cas. 
 
 lett V. Brown, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 655. (Pa.) 453. 
 
 ' Com. V. Reynolds, 14 Gray ^ R. S. Wis., § 3477. 
 
 (Mass.) , 87. 5 state v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 365
 
 186 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 court; and accordingly, that an attachment will not be granted 
 against a witness for contempt in refusing to answer questions 
 before such a commissioner on the taking of a deposition de bene 
 esse, unless the materiality of the evidence sought to be elicited 
 is shown. In so holding Mr. District Judge Betts said : " I see no 
 reason why any more stringent obligation should be imposed upon a 
 witness in these outside examinations than is enforced in court. 
 Before the court w^ill adjudge a witness to be in contempt, or com- 
 mit him therefor, it will require more than proof of the fact that 
 he declines to respond to a question. It will inquire whether the 
 question is relevant and material to the case on hearing,^ and also 
 whether the witness is exempt from answering it. No contu- 
 macy can be imputed to him until these points are determined." ^ 
 
 § 183. Refusing to attend or testify before Municipal 
 Boards, Committees, etc. — A statute of A^-^isconsin,^ empowers 
 courts of record to punish for conteinjjt witnesses who refuse to 
 attend and give evidence before municipal boards, committees, 
 etc.^ A similar statute formerly existed in New York City,^ un- 
 der which it has been held that an attachment ^\'\\\ not be granted 
 against a witness subpcenaed to attend and testify before a com- 
 mittee of the New York Common Council, unless it satisfacto- 
 rily appears to the judge to whom the application is made: (1) 
 That the w^itness refused to obey a subpoena issued by the clerk; 
 or (2) that, on appearing, he refused to be sworn as a witness; 
 or (3) that, after being sworn, he refused to answer some question 
 which, in the opinion of the judge, was a question proper to be 
 put. Therefore, wdiere the witness attended pursuant to the 
 subpoena and submitted to be sworn, and then stated that he de- 
 clined generally to answer any questions, and none were put to 
 him by the committee, an attachment was refused.® 
 
 1 Citing Greenl. Ev., § 319. N. Y. 1855, p. 24, chap. 20 (local to the 
 
 2 Ke Judson, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 148. city of New York) ; repealed by the 
 
 3 R. S. Wis. § 4066. N. Y. Laws of 1860, chap. 39; IE. S. 
 * See State v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. N. Y. 1882, p. 921. 
 
 348, 363; and compare Stuart v. Allen, « Biggs v. Matsell, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 45AVis. 158. Y.) 156. 
 
 5 N. Y. Act of Feb. 8th, 1855; Laws
 
 Tit. TI, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY process against witnesses. 187 
 
 § 183. Refusing to give Deposition to be used in Foreign 
 Court. — Construing a statute, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
 say; "The law which compels the citizens of this State to 
 give testimony in such cases is founded in comity^ and such tes- 
 timony is, so to speak, extra-judicial as to our courts. A wit- 
 ness who unhiwfully refuses to testify in a foreign cause, 
 although he violates a penal law and is liable to be punished 
 therefor, commits no contempt of any court of this State." ^ 
 
 § 184. Power to Compel answer before Grand. Jury. — As 
 
 already suggested,^ courts of criminal jurisdiction, which have 
 power to impanel grand juries, have inherent power to com- 
 pel witnesses summoned to appear before such grand juries, 
 to answer proper questions propounded to them by such bodies.^ 
 A grand jury falls within the designation of '' persons appointed 
 under the authority of the court, to take depositions or testi- 
 mony," within the meaning of a statute empowering courts to 
 compel the attendance of witnesses in such cases.* \^'here a 
 witness is committed for contempt in refusing to produce cer- 
 tain papers before a grand jury, in obedience to an order of the 
 court in the nature of a subpoena duces tecum ^ the commitment 
 reciting that he shall remain in custody till " purged of contempt 
 by appearing before the grand jury and furnishing to them the 
 paper or papers required by them," — he is entitled to his dis- 
 charge upon habeas corpus, from such commitment, upon the 
 discharge of the grand jury ; for this circumstance renders obe- 
 dience to the subpoena duces tecum impossible ; and if he were 
 not entitled to his discharge upon the happening of this event, 
 he would be doomed to perpetual imprisonment.^ 
 
 1 State V. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, grand jury to cowceaZAiiwse//, in order 
 365. to prevent the service of the process, 
 
 2 Ante, § 1G8. has been held, under a statute, not a 
 ^ People V. Fancher, 4 Thomp. & C. contempt such as could be punished 
 
 (N. Y.) 467,470; People v. Kelly, 24 in a summary manner. Com. v. Des- 
 
 N. Y. 74; Heard v. Pierce, 8 Cush. kins, 4 Leigh (Va.), 685. But this 
 
 (Mass.) 338. So by statute in Mis- would seem to be a contempt of court 
 
 soui'i: Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120. upon common-law principles. 
 
 MYard?;. State, swpm. For a vrit- ^ e^ parte Maulsby, 13 Md. 625, 
 
 ness summoned to attend before a 641, App.
 
 188 
 
 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 185. Protection of Witnesses against Arrest and Service of 
 Process. — Moreover, it is to be observed tliat the court has pow- 
 er, at common law, to protect witnesses and parties from arrest on 
 civil process during their attendance, and for a reasonable time 
 ingoing and returning, — eundo^ morando, et redeundo;^ and 
 this whether they attend under the compulsion of a subpcena or 
 voluntarily, or whether or not they have obtained a writ of pro- 
 tection. ^ According to early conceptions, the privilege extended 
 only to exemption from arrest, but not to the mere service of a 
 summons, — a distinction not of much importance at a time 
 when civil actions were ordinarily commenced by the issuing of a 
 capias;^ but later views incline to extend it to immunity from 
 the service of all process.* 
 
 § 186. Privilege of Member of Congress. — The constitu- 
 tion of the United States declares that ' ' the senators and repre- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 316; Palmer v. 
 Rowan (Neb.), 32 N. W. Rep. 210 
 (where numerous authorities are col- 
 lected by Maxwell, C. J.) ; Thompson's 
 Case, 122 Mass. 428. See also Lar- 
 ned V. Griffin, 12 Fed. Rep. 590 
 Ex parte Levy, 28 Eed. Rep. 651 
 Atchison v. Morris, 11 Fed. Rep. 582 
 Plimpton V. Wiuslow, 9 Fed. Rep. 365 
 Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. Rep. 19 
 Brooks V. FarTvell, 4 Fed. Rep. 166 
 Parker v. Hotchkiss, 1 Wall. Jr. 269. 
 
 2 Walpole V. Alexander, 3 Doug. 
 45; Meekius v. Smith, 1 H. B. L. 686; 
 Arding v. Flower, 8 Term R. 534; 
 Spence v. Stuart, 3 East, 89; Ex parte 
 Byne, 1 Ves. & B. 316; Persse v. 
 Persse, 5 H. L. Gas. 671; McNeil's 
 Case, 6 Mass. 245; Wood v. Neale, 5 
 Gray (Mass.), 538; May v. Shumway, 
 16 Gray (Mass.), 86; Gray, J., in 
 Thompson's Case, supra. 
 
 3 Blight V. Fisher, Pet. C. C. 41; 
 Hunter v. Cleveland, 1 Brev. 167; Taft 
 V. Hoppin, Anth. N. P. 255; Booraem 
 V.Wheeler, 12 Vt. 311. 
 
 * Mitchell V. Huron Circuit .Tudge, 
 53 Mich. 541 ; s. c. sub nom. Mitchell v. 
 
 Wixon, 19 N. W. Rep. 176; Compton v. 
 Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130. See, as to 
 the nature and extent of the immunity 
 and the reasons which support it. 
 Morris v. Beach, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 294; 
 Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 381; 
 Hopkins V. Coburn, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 292; Seaver v. Robinson, 3 Duer (N. 
 Y.), 622; Merrill v. George, 23 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 331; Matthews v. Tufts, 
 87 N. Y. 568, 570; Huddeson v. Prizer, 
 9 Phila. (Pa.) 65; Dungan v. Miller, 
 37 N. J. Law, 182 ; Vincent v. Watson, 
 1 Rich. 194; Saddler v. Ray, 5 Rich. L, 
 (S. C.) 523; Martin v. Ramsey, 7 
 Humph. (Tenu.) 260; Dickenson's 
 Case, 3 Har. (Del.) 517; Hanegar v. 
 Spangler, 29 Ga. 217; May v. Shum- 
 way, 16 Gray (Mass.), 86 ; Thompson's 
 Case, 122 Mass. 428 ; Ballinger v. El- 
 liott, 72 N. C. 596 ; Parker v. Hotch- 
 kiss, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 269 ; Juneau 
 Bank v. McSpedou, 5Biss. 64; Arding 
 V. Flower, 8 Term R. 534; Newton v. 
 Askew, 6 Hare, 310; Persse v. Persse, 
 5 H. L. Cas. 671. See also In re Can- 
 non, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N. W. Rep. 280.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VI.] COMPULSORY PROCESS AGAINST WITNESSES. 189 
 
 sentatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony and breach of 
 the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at 
 the sessions of their respective houses, and in going to or return- 
 ing from the same." ^ It has been said: " There is no ambiguity in 
 these expressions; they convey precise and definite ideas. The 
 privilege secured to the members of both houses is freedom from 
 arrest. It cannot be asserted that the service of a subpcena is an 
 arrest. It is a mere notice to the party to appear and give testi- 
 mony. But it is certain that, unless a court can constitutionally 
 enforce the attendance of a witness under a subpoena, it will be 
 of little avail to issue that process to a reluctant witness. And 
 this necessarily leads to the inquiry whether an attachment can 
 issue against a senator or representative in Congress, neglecting 
 or refusing to attend in consequence of a subpoena properly 
 served? On the most mature reflection, I am of opinion that 
 the court may either grant or refuse such compulsory process, 
 according to existing circumstances. That the service of an at- 
 tachment for a contempt includes an arrest there can be little 
 doubt ; and it cannot be said that such contempt is either treason, 
 felony or breach of the peace. But the })rivilege is confined to 
 the periods of the members' attendance at the sessions of their 
 respective houses, going to or returning from the same. If a 
 member should neglect his duty by not attending the session of 
 Congress, or should desert it without leave, he is no more en- 
 titled to the privilege in such circumstances from arrest than a 
 mere private citizen. The court, however, will not presume a 
 dereliction of duty unless it is established by satisfactory proof ; 
 they will construe the privilege liberally, and by no means weigh 
 the absence of the member in scales too nice. Should it appear 
 to them that he is on his return to Congress, they will at once 
 refuse the attachment." ^ 
 
 § 187. Refusing to be sworn on the Ground of Conscien- 
 tious Scruples. — A Jew refusmg to be sworn on Saturday, was 
 
 1 Const. U. S., art. 1, § 6. pare U. S. v. Cooper, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 
 
 2 Respublica v. Duaue, 4 Yeates 341. 
 (Pa.), 347, 348, per Yeates, J. Com-
 
 190 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp, Tr., 
 
 fined ten pounds for contempt, but, the defendant afterwards 
 waiving the benefit of his testimony, he was discharged from the 
 fine.^ One who, not being a Quaker, was called as a witness and 
 refused to be sworn, on the ground of conscientious scruples, but 
 offered to a-fflrm, was committed for contempt, — the liberty to 
 afiirm being strictly confined to Quakers by the laws and practice 
 of Massachusetts then existing.^ 
 
 1 Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 2 u. S. v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 
 
 313. 364, before Mr. Justice Story.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 191 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ENFORCING THE STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF COUNSEL. 
 
 Section 
 
 190. Extent of Authority of Attorney in Management of Cause. 
 
 191. [Continued.] What he may do. 
 
 192. [Continued.] What he may not do. 
 
 193. Binding Nature of his Stipulations. 
 
 191. Setting aside and relieving against such Stipulations. 
 
 195. [Illustration.] Agreement that several Causes shall abide the Event of 
 
 One. 
 
 196. [Further Illustrations.] That the opposite Party may take Judgment. 
 
 197. [Further Illustrations.] Admissions in the Pleadings. 
 
 198. Admissions and Agreements of State's Attorney. 
 
 199. Stipulation cannot confer Jurisdiction. 
 
 200. Verbal Stipulations, how far Binding. 
 
 201. Solemnity and Formality required in Admissions of Counsel. 
 • 202. Interpretation of Various Stipulations and Agreements. 
 
 § 190. Extent of Authority of Attorney in Management of 
 Cause. — "While a geueral retainer to collect a debt or to conduct 
 a cause does not, except under extraordinary circumstances, en- 
 able the attorney to bind his client by a compromise entered in- 
 to with the opposite party, ^ yet he has general power to make 
 
 1 Jones V. Inness, 32 Kan. 177; Kel- Rep, 2G1 ; Levy v. Brown, 5G Miss. 83; 
 \y V. Wright, 65 Wis. 236; Roberts?;. Picket v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 32 
 Nelson, 22 Mo. App. 28; Walden v. Ark. 346; Maudeville v. Reynolds, 68 
 Boulten, 55 Mo. 405; Spears v. Leder- N, Y, 528; Wadhams^J, Gay, 73111, 415; 
 gerber, 56 Mo. 465; Ambrose v. Mc- People d. Quick, 92 111, 580; Holker v. 
 Donald, 53 Cal, 28; Preston 17, Hill, Parker, 7 Cranch (U, S.), 436, The 
 50 Cal, 43; Township v. Keller, 100 Pa, English courts, after some vacillation, 
 St. 105; s. c. 43 Am. Rep. 42; Hus- seem to have settled upon the view 
 ton v. Mitchell, 14 Serg. «& R. (Pa.) 307; that the attorney has power, by virtue 
 Stackhouse v. O'Hara, 14 Pa. St. 88; of his retainer, to compromise the ac- 
 Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa. St. 315; tiou in which he is retained, provided 
 Mackey v. Adair, 99 Pa. St. 143; Ham- he acts bonafida and reasonably, and 
 rich V. Combs, 14 Neb. 381; Robinson does not violate the positive instruc- 
 ts. Murphy, 69 Ala, 543; Herriman v. tious of his client, and that the com- 
 Shomau, 24 Kan, 387; s, c, 36 Am. promise will bind the client even if he
 
 192 
 
 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr.. 
 
 such engagements and stipulation in or out of court as lie may 
 deem proper in the conduct of the litigation/ and where they are 
 entered into without fraud or collusion, they will bind his client.'' 
 In short, according to Dr. Greenleaf, " the effect of a retainer 
 to prosecute or defend a suit, is to confer upon the attorney 
 all the powers exercised by the forms and usages of the court 
 in which the suit is pending." ^ 
 
 § 191. [Continued.] What lie may do. — He may agree to 
 submit the matter in controversy to arbitration ; ^ or not to take 
 
 does violate instructions, unless the 
 violation is known to the adverse par- 
 ty, — the reason being that the attor- 
 ney, within tlie scope of his retainer, 
 is the general agent of his client. 
 Swinfen v. Swinfen, 18 C. B. 485; 
 Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl. & N. 
 890; Chambers v. Mason, 5 C. B. (n. 
 s.) 59; Chown v. Parrott, 14 C. B. (n. 
 s.) 74 ; Prestwitch v. Poley, 18 C. B. 
 (N. s.) 80G; Fray v. Voules, 1 El. & El. 
 839; Butler v. Knight, L. E. 2 Exch. 
 109. A few American courts have fol- 
 lowed the same rule. Wieland v. 
 White, 109 Mass. 392; Potter v. Par- 
 sons, 14 Iowa, 286; Holmes v. Kogers, 
 13 Cal. 191 (overruled it seems, by 
 Preston v. Hill, 50 Cal. 43 and Am- 
 brose V. McDonald, 53 Cal. 28). 
 And American courts generally show 
 a leaning in favor of such com- 
 promises, when fairly made, and up- 
 hold them if they seem advantageous 
 to the party complaining. Holker v. 
 Parker, 7 Crauch (U. S.), 436, 452; 
 Whipple V. Whitman, 13 R. I. 512. 
 See also Rollers. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 
 485; Potter v. Parsons, 14 la. 286; 
 Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Pet. 
 (U. S.) 99; Black v. Rogers, 75 Mo. 
 441; Williams v. Nolan, 58 Tex. 708; 
 Bonny v. Morrill, 57 Me. 374 ; Jones v. 
 Williamson, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 371; 
 Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Buchanan, 100 Ind. 63; Albee v. Hay- 
 den, 25 Minn. 267. Nor has he gener- 
 ally authority to release a sux'ety. 
 Stowe V. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207. 
 
 1 Greenlee v. McDowell, 4 Ired. Eg. 
 (N. C.) 485; Branch v. Walker, 92 N. 
 C. 89; Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 
 36; Williamson-Stewart Paper Co. v. 
 Bosbyshell, 14 Mo. App. 534, 538; 
 Levy V. Brown, 56 Miss. 83; Annelly v, 
 Saussure, 12 S. C. 488; Read v. 
 French, 28 N. Y. 293; Nightingale v. 
 Oregon &c. R. Co., 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 
 338. See also Schoregge v. Gordon, 
 29 Minn. 367; Clark v. Randall, 9 Wis. 
 135; Nelson v. Cook, 19 111. 440; Gor- 
 ham V. Gale, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 739 ; Union 
 Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 99; 
 Newberry v. Lee, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 526; 
 Oestrich v. Gilbert, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 
 242; Jennie v. Delesdernier, 20 Me. 
 183; Week's Att., §218; Whart. Ag., 
 § 585 et seq. He cannot stipulate that 
 a sheriff shall conduct a business on 
 which he has levied. Alexander v. 
 Denaveaux, 53 Cal. 663; s. c. 59 CaL 
 476. 
 
 2 Beck V. Bellamy, 93 N. C. 129. 
 
 3 2 Greenl. Ev., § 141; Smith v. 
 Bossard, 2 McCord Ch. (S. C.) 409. 
 
 4 Sargeant v. Clark, 108 Pa. St. 688; 
 Bingham v. Guthrie, 19 Pa. St. 418; 
 Tilton V. United States Life Ins. Co., 
 8 Daly (N. Y.), 84; Somers v. Bala-
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 193 
 
 an appeal or ivrit of error; ^ or may agree that the opposite party 
 may take judgment,^ and this, too, although he may know that 
 his client has a good defense to the action.^ So, where he rep- 
 resents the plaintiff, he may, without the consent of his client, 
 dismiss the action,* or restore it after a dismissal or nolle pros., ^ 
 or bring a new action;^ and he may take an appeal, and, ac- 
 cording to one opinion, bind his client by a recognizance in the 
 name of the latter for the prosecution of it.^ So, he may have 
 printed, at the charge of his client, such briefs or arguments as 
 he may judge advisable for the more convenient presentation of 
 the cause in an appellate court. ^ In all these cases if, in the 
 absence of collusion with the opposite party, he acts contrary to 
 the express directions of his client, or to his injury, the client 
 must look to the attorney, and not to the opposite party, for re- 
 dress. 
 
 §192. [Continued] AVhat he may not do. — But there is 
 even here a line which he cannot overstep. He cannot, by virtue 
 of his general authority, accept service for his client of the orig- 
 inal process by which the action is begun; ^ nor, under the old 
 law excluding interested witnesses, could he release a claim of his 
 client against a witness, in order to render the latter competent 
 
 brega, 1 Dall. (U. S.) IGl; Holker v. attorney has taken place in the mean- 
 Parker, 7 Crauch (U. S.), 436; Buck- time. Barlow v. Steel, 65 Mo. 611, 
 land V. Conway, 16 Mass. 396. Com- 618. 
 pare Conuett v. Chicago, 114 111. 233. * McLeran v. McNamara, 55 Cal. 
 
 1 Shisler v. Keavy, 75 Pa. St. 79. 508; Gaillard v. Smart, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 2 Hudson V. Allison, 54 lud. 215. 385. 
 
 Compare Pike v. Emerson, 5 N. H. ^ Reinhold v. Alberti, 1 Binu. (Pa.) 
 
 393; Talbott v. McGee, 4 T. B. Mon. 469. 
 
 (Ky.) 377; Union Bank v. Geary, 5 6 Scott r. Elraendorf, 12 Johns. (N. 
 
 Pet. (U. S.) 99. Y.) 31.-). 
 
 3 Thompson •;;. Pershing, 86 Ind. ' Adams v. Robinson, 1 Pick. 
 304, 310. So, an attorney has author- (Mass.) 462. 
 
 ity, in virtue of his general retainer, ^ Williamson-Stewart Paper Co. v. 
 
 to bind his client by a stipulation to Bosbyshell, 14 Mo. App. 534; Weisse 
 
 take a judgment on a verdict ah'cady v. City, IC La. Ann. 46. 
 
 rendered, and such a stipulation does ^ Bayley v. Buckland, 1 Esch. 1 ; 
 
 not lose its force by the lapse of over Mastei'son v. Le Claire, 4 Minn. 163; 
 
 ten years before judgment is entered, Anderson v. Hall, 87 N. C. 381. 
 
 if no revocation of the authority of the 
 
 13
 
 194 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 to testify;^ nor release siireties; ^ nor execute a replevin bond for 
 his client; '^ nor enter a retraxit ; * nor, according to one doubtful 
 opinion, stipulate loJiat laio shall govern the case, — as that a 
 particular statute was or was not duly enacted ; ^ nor assign the 
 judgment when recovered ; ^ nor release or postpone the lien 
 thereof ; ^ nor act for the legal representatives of his deceased 
 client.^ 
 
 § 193. Binding Nature of his Stipulations. — Such being 
 the extensive nature of his powers in the conduct of the litiga- 
 tion, it follows that his stipulations, made in open court with the 
 opposite counsel, have in general the force of contracts, the per- 
 formance of which the court will enforce.^ Some decisions add, 
 as a condition of the binding character of a stipulation, that it be 
 also entered of record.^^ But, on principle, it would seem suffi- 
 cient, to give the stipulation or promise, made in facie curiae, the 
 binding nature of a contract, that the other party has acted upon 
 it. This conclusion is supported upon the familiar principle of 
 an estoppel in pais, which is that when a party, by his declaration 
 or conduct, has induced another to act in a particular manner 
 
 1 Shores v. Casswell, 13 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 413. See also Marshall v. 
 Nagel, 1 Bail. (S. C.) 308. 
 
 2 Giveus V. Briscoe, 3 J. J. Marsh. 
 (Ky.) 532. 
 
 3 Proprietors v. Wentworth, 3G Me. 
 339. But aliter as to an indemnifying 
 bond to a sheriff, in the name of his 
 principal. Ford i-. Williams, 13 N. Y. 
 577. 
 
 ^ Lambert v. Sanford, 2 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 137. 
 
 5 Graves v. Alsap, 1 Ariz. Ter. 274. 
 
 6 Wilson V. Wadleigh, 36 Me. 496. 
 
 7 Wilson V. Jennings, 3 Oh. St. 528. 
 See also Doub v. Barnes, 1 Md. Ch. 
 27. 
 
 8 Campbell v. Kincaid, 3 T. B- 
 Mon. (Kj'.) 560; Wood v. Hopkins, 3 
 N. J. 507. 
 
 9 Banks v. American Tract Society, 
 4 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 438; Staples v. 
 
 Parker, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 648. It is 
 said to have always been the practice 
 in New York "to hold the parties 
 strictly to their engagements made 
 during the trial and in the face of the 
 court, relating to the conduct of the 
 suit, and its proceedings." Staples v. 
 Parker, supra. 
 
 io Caldwell v. Mc Williams, 65 Ga. 
 99. Under the statute of Minnesota, 
 whicli declares that the authority of 
 an attorney to bind his client shall ex- 
 tend to " any of the proceedings in an 
 action or special proceeding, duly 
 made, or entered upon the minutes of 
 the court," it has been held that a 
 stipulation touching the conduct of a 
 cause, so made and entered, is in the 
 nature of a contract, which the court 
 cannot set aside at the instance of one 
 of the parties. Bingham v. Super- 
 visors, 6 Minn. 13"
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 195 
 
 which he would not otherwise have done, such party will not 
 afterwards be permitted to set up a claim inconsistent with such 
 declaration and conduct, if such claim will work an injury to the 
 other party or to those claiming under him.^ Sometimes the 
 qualification is added that the agreement he fair and reasonable. 
 Thus, it is said in Tennessee by the court, speaking through 
 Reese, J. : " The power of the court, as well as the duty, to en- 
 force fair and reasonable agreements relatino- to the conduct and 
 dispatch of business before it, is necessarily incident to the 
 nature of its position and required to insure the orderly and 
 faithful determination of causes. It is a power which this court 
 has repeatedly exercised upon deliberation and examination of 
 authorities, and very recently in a highly important case." "^ 
 
 § 194. Setting aside and relieving against such Stipula- 
 tions. — Such being the nature of the stipulations of counsel 
 made in court touching the cause of the trial, it follows that they 
 will not be set aside upon any lower grounds than those which 
 would warrant the rescission of a contract, ■ — namely, fraud, collu- 
 sion, accident, surprise, or some ground of the same nature.^ 
 The court will not relieve parties from the effects of a stipulation 
 made under a full understandino; of the facts existing at the time.* 
 The mere fact that a party, by such a stipulation, has waived de- 
 fenses which he might otherwise urge, is no sufficient ground for 
 setting it aside. ^ But, by analogy to the relief of parties from 
 contracts entered into under a mutual mistake of fact ^ it is clear 
 that a court will relieve a party against a stipulation made under 
 such a mistake.^ It has been held that an order settins: aside a 
 stipulation of counsel touching the conduct of a case, is appeal- 
 able.'' But this, under most systems, would obviously depend 
 
 1 Banks v. American Tract Society, ^ Bingham v. Supervisors, supra. 
 
 4 Saudf. Ch. (X. Y.) 438, 4(;7. 6 W'ells v. American Express Co., 
 
 2 Jones V. Kimbro, 6 Humph. 49 Wis. 224. In this case the mistake 
 (Tenu.) 319. does not appear to have been mutual 
 
 3 Bingham v. Supervisors, 6 Minn. and yet the stipulation was set aside. 
 136; Keogh v. Main, 52 N. Y. Super. ' Bingham v. Supervisors, 6 Miim. 
 100. 13(3. 
 
 * Conner v. Belden, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 
 257.
 
 196 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 upon the nature of the order ; it would not be appealable unless 
 it were in the nature of a final judgment dispositive of a sub- 
 stantial right. 
 
 § 195. [Illustration.] Agreement that Several Causes shall 
 ABIDE the Event of one. — Where several cases are pending in court, 
 depending upon the same facts or questions of law, it is compe- 
 tent for the attorneys, in virtue of their general retainers, to stipulate 
 that only one shall be tried and that the others shall abide the result of 
 that one.i Such a stipulation is not merely an independent executory 
 agreement, but it operates presently to affect the status of the case itself, 
 and invests the plaintiff with rights in respect to its conduct, which he 
 otherwise would not have had, and of which neither the opposite party 
 nor the court can lawfully divest him. When, therefore, one suit was 
 selected from among a number which were founded upon the same 
 cause of action, and a stipulation made that all the causes then pending 
 on appeal from a justice should abide the final determination of this 
 case, — the defendant thereafter had no right to dismiss his appeal in 
 the case in which the stipulation was entered of record. ^ 
 
 § 19G. [Further Illustrations.] That the Opposite Partt 
 MAY take Judgment. — The foregoing principle no doubt extends so 
 as to give binding force to a stipulation that one of the parties to the 
 suit may take judgment, since it is competent for counsel to make such 
 an agreement."^ Under a statute providing that parties may agree to a 
 judgment by loriting filed in open court, it is held that an agreement be- 
 tween the parties to an action, stipulating the terms upon which a de- 
 cree shall be entered, when filed in open court, becomes a part of the 
 record, and is in effect an answer or pleading, and, unless for good cause 
 shown, should be so regarded by the court, and cannot hence be stricken 
 from the files or withdrawn upon the motion of the parties ; and accord- 
 
 1 North Missouri R. Co. v. Ste- 377 ; Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. (U. 
 
 phens, 36 Mo. 150. As to the effect of 8.) 99; 2 Greeul. Ev. §14:1. It has 
 
 a stipulation tliat one cause shall been lield that a party who obtains a 
 
 abide the result of another, see Gil- juiipnent in violation of his written 
 
 more v. American Central Ins. Co., 07 stipulation on file, dismissing the ac- 
 
 Cal. 366. tion, — may be restrained or enjoined 
 
 ^ McKinley v. "Wilmington Star from enforcing it by the court in which 
 
 Mining Co., 7 Bradw. (111.) 386. it was obtained. McLeran v. McNa- 
 
 3 Pike ri. Emerson, 5 N. H. 393; mara, 55 Cal. 508. 
 Talbott V. McGee, i T. B. Mou. (Ky.)
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 197 
 
 ingly, that a subsequent pleading, filed by one of the parties, inconsist- 
 ent therewith, should be stricken from the files. ^ 
 
 § 197. [Further Illustrations.] Admissions in the Pleadings. — 
 The pleadings are drawn by the attornej's of the parties, except in 
 those few cases where parties are foolish enough to endeavor to act as 
 their own attorneys ; and no better illustration of the principle under 
 discussion could be furnished than is found in the binding nature of 
 the admissions in the pleadings. Such admissions are evidentiary in 
 their character, are an absolute estoppel upon the party making them, 
 unless he seasonably withdraws them by amendment, and obviates the 
 necessity of the other part3' proving the facts thus admitted. Much 
 could be written upon this subject. There are implied admissions as 
 well as express admissions. It has been held that, where an answer 
 sets up several distinct defenses,. a denial in one is qualified by an ad- 
 mission in another, — which is merely an apj^lication of the rule that a 
 party's pleading, like any other written instrument, is to be construed 
 as a whole, and in case of any incongruities or contradictions, is to be 
 taken most strongly against the pleader. If, therefore, a party in one 
 count of an answer denies a fact alleged in the petition or complaint, 
 and in another count admits it, the admission, and not the denial, will 
 be taken to be true. It will estop him, and the plaintiff will not be 
 bound to prove the fact thus admitted. For instance, where the action 
 was replevin for unlawfully taking the plaintiff 's goods, and the 
 answer contained two defenses: (1) a general denial of the allegations 
 of the complaint, and (2) a justification of the taking under a levy 
 upon execution, — it was held that the answer admitted the taking for 
 the purposes of the trial, and that to that extent the second defense 
 vacated the first. ^ In another case, the same court, applying the same 
 principle, held that a general denial in one count of the answer was in- 
 consistent with special matter alleged in another count, and was to be 
 construed as modified b}^ the latter.^ This principle has been applied 
 by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case originating in the 
 Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, — the 
 court holding that the admission of the plaintiff 's title contained in an 
 equitable defense set up in the third count of the answer, overrode and 
 controlled a denial of the plaintiff's title in the first count, and was 
 conclusive upon the question of title. ^ 
 
 1 Vail V. Stone, 13 Iowa, 2S4. * Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Paine, 
 
 2 Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119. 7 Sup. Ct. Kep. 323, 325. 
 
 3 Scott V. Kiug, 7 Miuu. 494. See 
 aisoZiraraermau v. Lamb, 7 Minn. 421.
 
 198 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 198. Admissions and Agreements of State's Attorney. — 
 
 Admissions made by the State's attorney of facts for the pur- 
 pose of the trial are to be considered, for all the purposes to 
 which they are relevant, in precisely the same light as if they had 
 been proved by testimony instead of admitted. ^ Where the 
 State's attorney is not in a condition to go to trial or to demand 
 the forfeiture of a recognizance, he may lawfully agree in con- 
 sideration of a consent to th.e forfeiture , that it shall be set aside 
 on the appearance of the defendant at the next term.^ 
 
 § 199. Stipulation cannot confer Jurisdiction. — An ex- 
 ception to the rule touching the binding force of stipulations of 
 counsel as to the conduct of a cause is founded in the principle 
 that consent cannot confer jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
 a litigation: a stipulation giving the court jurisdiction which it 
 does not possess is invalid.^ 
 
 § 200. Verbal Stipulations, How far Binding". — Subject to 
 the statute of frauds, verbal promises, whether made in or out 
 of court, if acted upon by the other party, are binding as con- 
 tracts, at least by way of estoppel, on a principle already sug- 
 gested.* Acting upon this principle, one court has ruled that 
 although there may be a rule of court intended to prevent dis- 
 putes and uncertainties, requiring stipulations of counsel touching 
 the conduct of causes to be put in writing, yet where such an 
 agreement has been orally made between counsel, and the sub- 
 stance of it is admitted, the court will not allow one of the coun- 
 sel to disregard it, after it has been acted upon by the other. 
 *« We think it well established by the authorities," said Paine, J., 
 " that, although the rule requires stipulations to be in writing in 
 order to be binding, yet it was not designed to allow a party who 
 had entered into a verbal stipulation, upon which his adversary 
 had relied and acted, to obtain an unjust advantage, and destroy 
 
 1 People V. Tyler, 3*5 Cal. 522, 531. ^ Bingham v. Supervisors, 6 Minn. 
 
 2 Esmond?;. People, ISBradw. (111.) 13G, U7. 
 
 114. ■» Ante, § 193.
 
 Tit. II, Cb. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 199 
 
 the other's rights by disregarding it himself.^ Another court 
 has ruled, proceeding upon the necessity of avoiding disputes 
 between counsel, that verbal stipulations with reference to pro- 
 ceedings pending an action cannot be regarded, except so far as 
 they are admitted by the parties against whom they are sought 
 to be enforced. 2 For stronger reasons, a verbal stipulation not 
 entered of record will not be enforced after a Ions: and un- 
 explained delay, as for instance, a stipulation that a default may 
 be set aside wiiere a delay of seven years has intervened before 
 making the application to the court to enforce the same.^ Stat- 
 utes exist in some States like the following: " An attorney and 
 counsellor has authority to bind his client in any of the steps of 
 an action or proceeding, by his agreement filed with the clerk or 
 entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise."* 
 Such statutes are regarded as in the nature of a statute of frauds.^ 
 Under them an attorney cannot bind his client, by a verbal stip- 
 ulation, made during the progress of a trial and not entered on 
 the minutes, to waive the rights of his client under an issue made 
 by the pleadings, — as, for instance, that the judgment of the 
 plaintiff, if he recover, shall be for payment in gold coin; ^ or 
 even extending the time for filing a bill of exceptions.^ 
 
 § 201. Solemnity and Formality Required in Admissions of 
 Counsel. — In order that admissions of counsel of facts may take 
 the place of evidence in a civil trial, such admissions " must be 
 distinct and formal, or such as are termed solemn admissions, 
 made for the express purpose of alleviating the stringency of 
 some rule of practice, or of dispensing with the formal proof of 
 
 1 Buruham v. Smith, 11 "Wis. 258. ^ Borkheim v. Insurance Co., 38 
 Tlie court cite Gaillard v. Stuart, <! Cow. Cal. (J23, (_;28. 
 
 (N. y.)3S5; Ex parte Lassell, 8 Cow. ^ Merritt v. Wilcox, 52 Cal. 238. 
 
 (N. Y.) 119; Montgomery u. Ellis, 6 Under a substantially similar statute 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 32(J; Wager v. the same rule exists in Indiana. 
 
 Stickle, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 407; Turner Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Boland, 70 
 
 17. Burrows, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 627. Ind. 595. 
 
 2 Patterson v. Ely, 19 Cal. 35; ' Goben v. Goldsb^rry, 72 Ind. 44 
 Reese v. Mahony, 21 Cal. 305, 308. (distinguishing Ridgway v. Morrison, 
 
 ' Reese v. Muhony, supra. 28 Ind. 201). 
 
 < Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 283.
 
 200 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tl*., 
 
 some fact at the trial." ^ The remark's of counsel during the 
 progress of a trial are not to be regarded as adirissions by which 
 the rights of the client are to be determined. ^ It has even been 
 held that counsel who, when evidence is offered, make declara- 
 tions that it is offered iov delimited jnirpose only, are not estopped, 
 after it is received, from drawing from it deductions other than 
 those contained in the offer, unless injustice will be done to the 
 opposite party by permitting such new deductions. Coun- 
 sel, it is reasoned, have no power to limit the effect of evidence, 
 but its effect is regulated by the court in its charge to the jury. 
 The statement by counsel of the purpose for which evidence is 
 offered is only a reason given wdiy the evidence should be re- 
 ceived.^ But i\\Q failure to object to evidence in the course of the 
 trial will, in many cases, have the effect of an admission of cer- 
 tain facts which flow as a natural consequence from acts done or 
 evidence admitted. Thus, in a suit upon notes where certain 
 notes are offered in evidence without objection, this, it has been 
 held, is equivalent to a tacit admission that they were the notes 
 in suit. "If they were not," said the court, " by timely ob- 
 jection, by pointing out any substantial difference between the 
 notes sued on and those offered, he (defendant) could very 
 easily have prevented their introduction in evidence." * 
 
 § 202. Interpretation of Various Stipulations and Agree- 
 ments. — A stipulation which on its face purports to be '•'•^statement 
 of the facts in this action " does not, unless its terms so import, pre- 
 clude the parties from introducing other evidence on the trial. ^ 
 
 An agreement to supply lost papers or dismiss cause at the next term, 
 is construed to mean at that period of the term when the cause is 
 
 reached for trial on the docket in regnlar course of business.^ 
 
 An agreement to submit a case on briefs to be decided in vacation, the 
 order and decree to be entered as of that or the next term, is con- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 180; Ferson v. ^ Sill v. Reese, 47 Cal. 294. 
 Wilcox, 19 Miun. 449, 451. See also ^ Fitzgerald ??. Barker, 85 Mo. 13, 20. 
 Geu. Stat. Minu., chap. 88, § 8. s Dillou v. Cockcroft, 90 N. Y. 049. 
 
 2 McKeeu v. Gammon, 33 Me. 187. ^ Jones v. Kimbrough, 3 Humph, 
 See for illustration, Stewart v. Shaw, (Tenu.) 319. 
 
 55 Mich. G13.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VII.] STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS. 201 
 
 strued as a submission of the whole controversy, and not as merely 
 
 the submission of a motion to disallow an injunction.^ Where 
 
 the parties, upon the evidence as it stands at a given stage of the trial, 
 stipulate that the jury may he discharged and the cause submitted to 
 the court alone, if one of them is thereafter, against the objection of 
 the other, permitted to introduce further evidence, and if the cause is 
 decided by the court with reference to such further evidence, without 
 any waiver by the other party of his right to a jury trial thereupon, 
 it will be error.- Where the defendant moved for a continu- 
 ance to enable him to discredit the testimony of the plaintiff, in case 
 she should be called as a witness in her own behalf ; and thereupon her 
 counsel, in order to avoid a continuance, announced that she should 
 not be called, whereupon the court said that, upon that agreement, the 
 continuance would be refused, — it was held that this circumstance 
 did not preclude the counsel of the defendant from commenting in his 
 
 argument upon the failure to call her as a witness.^ A stipulation 
 
 that a stenographer's notes of testimony taken on a trial of another 
 cause may be used as evidence, subject to objections for immateriality, 
 irrelevancy, or other matter of substance, is a waiver of the right to 
 object that the witnesses were incompetent, or that the parties or is- 
 sues were different than on the former trial. ^ An agreement 
 
 to amend the issue and try the case on the merits has the effect 
 merely of waiving exceptions to the matter of form, and does not, in 
 any other respect, affect the legal rights of the parties.^ A stipu- 
 lation that the jury, if the court be not in session when they agree upon 
 their verdict, may sign, seal and deliver it to the otficer in charge and 
 disperse, is equivalent to an agreement that the court may open the 
 sealed verdict in their absence, and, if necessary, reduce it to proper 
 form. It is also a waiver of the right to poll the jury if they should 
 be in court. ^ 
 
 1 Auderson v. White, 27 111. 57. '= Banghart v. Flummerfelt, 43 N. J. 
 
 2 Hewitt V. Week, 51 Wis. 368. L. 28. 
 
 3 Hurd V. Marple, 10 Bradw. (HI.) ^ Koon v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 
 418. 100. Whether a suit at law and one 
 
 * Weldon Hotel Co. v. Seymour, 54 in chancery are to be tried as one suit. 
 Vt. 582 King v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 98 111. 376
 
 202 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 ThOQip. Tl'., 
 
 CHAP TEE A^IL 
 
 OF OTHER SUBJECTS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND CONTROL. 
 
 Section 
 
 205. Establishing Rules of Practice. 
 
 20(;. Coutrolling tlie Intercourse between tlie Court and the Bar. 
 
 207. Protracting a Trial during a whole Night. 
 
 208. Allowing Members of the Family of the Prosecutrix to sit in court and 
 
 weep. 
 
 209. Allowing one not an Attorney to appear. 
 
 210. Consolidating several Actions for Purposes of Trial. 
 
 211. Calling an Attorney to Preside. 
 
 212. Retiring from the Bench without Suspension of Trial. 
 
 213. Change of Judges during the Trial. 
 
 214. Who to sign Bill of Exceptions in such a Case. 
 
 215. Objection that the Judge presided on a previous Trial of the same Action. 
 216= Exclusion of Spectators when not a Violation of Right of Public Trial. 
 
 217. When Improper to grant Leave of Absence to Counsel. 
 
 218. Prejudicing the Minds of the Jurors. 
 
 219. [Continued.] Remarks ludicatiug Opinion as to Facts. 
 
 220. Asking Pertinent Question of Counsel. 
 
 221. Conversing privately with Witnesses. 
 
 § 205. Establishing Rules of Practice. — While it is the un- 
 doubted province of judicial courts to establish reasonable rules 
 of practice, yet a rule of court which operates to deprive a party 
 of a legal right is void.^ So held of a rule which empowered the 
 court to disregard a motion to have the jury polled. 
 
 2 
 
 § 206. Controlling the Intercourse between the Court ana 
 the Bar. — It seems that the whole subject of the intercourse be- 
 tween the trial court and the bar is a matter committed to the 
 discretionary control of the trial court and the sense of propriety 
 of the members of the bar. " We presume not," said the Su- 
 preme Court of Georgia, " to prescribe the manner of inter- 
 course between the court and the bar. We leave that to the 
 
 1 Crotty V. Wyatt, 3 Bradw. (III.) 2 ji^^i^ 
 
 388.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VIII.] VAEIOUS INSTANCES. 203 
 
 good sense and high breeding which so generally characterize 
 both, except where we tind that it affects the rights of parties; 
 then it is within our corrective jurisdiction." ^ 
 
 §' 207. Protractiug" a Trial During a whole Night. — In 
 Kansas, where new trials are granted in cases appealed from 
 justices of the peace, it has been held that it is an unusual and un- 
 just proceeding and a great abuse of discretion for a justice of 
 the peace, without special circumstances existing therefor, to 
 proceed with the trial of an action during the whole night, 
 against the objection and protest of one of the parties litigant. 
 The court said: " Special circumstances might justify a court in 
 proceeding with a trial until after midnight; but the mere fact 
 that a criminal charge was pending against the defendant below, 
 to which he was required to answer on November 12th, 1881, be- 
 fore a justice in another township, was not a sufficient excuse 
 for keeping open the court all night, as the case might have been 
 adjourned, if it were deemed necessary, until after the conclu- 
 sion of the hearing of the criminal charge.^ 
 
 § 208. Allowing Members of the Family of the Prosecutrix 
 to sit in Court and weep. — During the trial of an indictment 
 for rape, certain members of the family of the prosecutrix sat 
 within the bar of the court and occasionally wept during the 
 argument of the prosecuting counsel, and withdrew when the 
 prisoner's counsel began to address the jury. It was held that 
 the failure of the judge to restrain such conduct was no ground 
 for new trial. ^ 
 
 § 209. Allowing one not an Attorney to Appear. — It haj 
 
 been ruled that, where the judge allows a person not a licensed 
 attorney and counsellor, to appear for and conduct the trial on 
 the part of one of the parties, notwithstanding the objection of 
 the other party, the judgment will be reversed on appeal; ^ but 
 this is a very doubtful holding. 
 
 • 
 
 1 Long V. State, 12 Ga. 295, 330. * Newburger v. Campbell, 9 Daly 
 
 2 McGoTreu v. Campbell, 28 Kau. (N. Y.), 102; s. c. 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 25, 30. 313. 
 
 3 State V. Laxtou, 78 N, C. 564, 570.
 
 204 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tl"., 
 
 § 210. Consolidatingseveral Actions for Purposes of Trial. — 
 
 It is within the discretion of the presiding judge to order several 
 actions founded on the same subject matter, brought by the same 
 party against several defendants, to be brought together, al- 
 though the defendants employ different counsel and the evidence 
 in the several causes is different.^ So, it is clearly within the 
 discretion of the presiding judge to hold })arties to an agreement 
 to try together several petitions against different owners of land 
 taken for the public use under a statute ; and it seems that the 
 court might so order without an agreement. ^ 
 
 § 211. Calling an Attorney to preside. — It has been held 
 manifest error for the trial judge, in a civil case, to call an at- 
 torney of the court to occupy the bench while the trial was pro- 
 ceeding. "Judicial functions," says Walker, J., speaking for 
 the court, " cannot be delegated to or exercised by an agent or 
 deputy. They must be performed by the persons who have 
 been designated by law for the purpose. The attorney occupy- 
 ing the bench was not connected with or a part of the judicial 
 department of the State, named in the third article of our con- 
 stitution; and persons not of that department are prohibited 
 from the exercise of such powers. The putting of the verdict in 
 form and discharging the jury for the term were both judicial 
 acts, and the first related to and affected the rights of appellants. 
 Even if a person not a- judge may, by consent of parties, act as 
 such, still it is clear that the presiding judge, of his own motion, 
 cannot substitute another to act for the court : and if it can be 
 done, it must be by consent of the parties appearing on the rec- 
 ord ; and such consent does not appear, and will not be implied. 
 It has been supposed by some that it would be error if the rec- 
 ord showed that any one but the judge acted even with consent; 
 but we refrain from deciding that question until it shall be pre- 
 sented." ^ 
 
 1 Springfield v. Sleeper, 115 Mass. v. James, 99 Mass. 438; Com. v. Pow- 
 
 587. See also Witherlee v. Ocean In- ers, 109 Mass. 353. 
 snrance Co., 24 Pick. (Mass.) 67; 2 Burt i;. WlggleSTVorth, 117 Mass. 
 
 Kimball v. Thompson, 4 Cush. 441; 302. 
 Com. V. Robinson, 1 Gray 555; Com. ^ Davis v. Wilson, 05 111. 527, 530.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VIII.] CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE. 205 
 
 § 212. Retiring from the Bench Without Suspending the 
 Trial. — In a capital case in Georgia it was said by tlie Supreme 
 Court, speaking through Bleckle}', J. : " When, during the trial 
 of a case, the judge leaves the bench and withdraws from the 
 bar, he should order a suspension of business until his return. 
 His immediate presence tends to preserve the legal solemnity and 
 security of the trial, and u}>holds the majesty of the law. Es- 
 pecially, while a witness for the State is under examination, 
 should the judge not retire beyond the bar, without directing the 
 examination to cease during his temporary absence, however 
 necessary or however brief his absence may be. The guilty and 
 the innocent are alike entitled to be tried according to law, in 
 the immediate presence of one of the State's judges." ^ 
 
 § 213. Change of Judges duringthe Trial. — Where the judge 
 who i^resides at the trial becomes sick, or is otherwise unable to 
 proceed, after the evidence is all in and the instructions have 
 been given to the jury, the trial, it has been held, should pro- 
 ceed under a special judge ^ before the same jury and without re- 
 hearing the testimony. Upon this question the Supreme Court 
 of Wisconsin, speaking through Mr. Justice Eakin, say: *' It is 
 submitted as matter for arrest that the jury were not discharired 
 upon the election of the special judge, and a new jury selected. 
 The jury had heard the evidence and instructions, and had dis- 
 persed to await the argument of counsel. There is no reason 
 why this should not be made under the presiding control of the 
 special judge. The instructions had not been excepted to, and if 
 it had been important to determine precisely what the evidence 
 had been, the special judge might in several ways sufBciently 
 have advised himself of it, to have enabled him to regulate the 
 discussion. Upon a difference among the attorneys as to testi- 
 mony during an argument, it is no uncommon practice to call a 
 witness, not for re-examination, but to state what he had testi- 
 fied. After the evidence has been admitted and the law settled, 
 the presidency of the judge is more for the purpose of preserv- 
 ing the order in the discussion, and in the future conduct of the 
 
 1 Hayes v. State, 58 Ga. 35, 49.
 
 206 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thomp. Tr.y 
 
 i 
 
 jury, than for anything else. It would be an unnecessary delay, 
 expense and vexation to clients in such cases, to impanel a new 
 jury and to recall witnesses. It is not demanded by the ordi- 
 nary requirements of justice." ^ 
 
 § 214. Who to sign Bill of Exceptions in such a Case. — A 
 
 controversy having arisen as to which judge should sign a bill of 
 exceptions in such a case, the court also said: " All matters of 
 exception occurring whilst the regular judge was presiding should 
 have been shown by the bill of exceptions, certified to be true un- 
 der his signature. As to those matters, the special judge had no 
 authority to sign a bill. If, however, the exceptions regarded 
 any matter which occurred before the special judge, or was first 
 brought to his notice, such as misconduct of the jury, newly dis- 
 covered evidence, etc., he should have signed the bill himself, al- 
 though he had vacated the bench. The object of the signature 
 is to give verity to the statement of occurrences complained of 
 as erroneous. As it is the duty of the presiding judge to con- 
 sider them, he can most properly certify them. In doing so, he 
 performs no judicial act, requiring him to have the present char- 
 acter and authority of a judge. He thereby orders nothing and 
 determines nothing, not already ruled. The certificate has refer- 
 ence to past transactions. The honorable special judge was mis- 
 taken in basing his opinion, as to his incompetency to sign the 
 bill of exceptions, upon the ground that he had vacated the 
 bench. He might sign it as to all matters occurring before 
 himself .2 As to matters arising before the regular judge, he was 
 the only person competent to certify them, except in certain con- 
 tingencies, when bystanders might do so." ^ Where there was 
 thus a change of judges during the trial, after the evidence had 
 been heard and the instructions given, the Supreme Court held 
 that it could not regard any proceedings as before it for review 
 which were not regularly certified in a bill of exceptions, signed by 
 the regular judge who presided when the proceedings were had.* 
 
 1 Bullock tJ. Neal, 42 Ark. 278. * Bulloch v. Neal, 42 Ark. supra. 
 
 2 Citiug Watkius v. State, 37 Ark. Compare Cowall v. Altchul, 40 Ark,. 
 370. 172. 
 
 3 Bulloch V. Neal, 42 Ark. 278.
 
 Tit II, Ch. VIII.] CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE. 207 
 
 § 215. Objection that the Judge presided on a previous 
 Trial of the same Action. — Generally speaking, it is no objec- 
 tion to the qualification of a judge that he presided upon a pre- 
 vious trial of the same cause, though of course a plain 
 manifestation of prejudice against either party on the previous 
 trial might, under statutory rules existing in various jurisdictions, 
 afford ground of a change of venue. In a cause of some celeb- 
 rity in New York, an action for libel against James Gordon Ben- 
 nett, the publisher of the New' York Herald, Chief Justice 
 Oakley, of the New York Superior Court, before whom the 
 cause had been previously tried, after consulting with his 
 brethren, when the cause had been reached in its order on the 
 calendar, declined to yield to the request of the plaintiff to have 
 it tried before another judge of the same court. It was held 
 that this was no ground of exception. Bosworth, J., in giving 
 the opinion of the same court, said : "We know of no recog- 
 nized principle which will justify a judge in holding a circuit 
 court, to direct a cause on the calendar, when reached and ready 
 to be tried, to be postponed and await its oi)portunity to betried 
 before another judge, merely because it had been previously 
 tried before himself. The considerations of inconvenience and 
 delay resulting from such a practice in the circuit courts, as 
 they are generally constituted, would not, it is true, exist to the 
 same extent with reference to a court organized as this court is. 
 But that view cannot affect the legal rights of the parties, nor the 
 legal duty of the presiding judge. The objection by either party 
 to retrying a cause before a judge before whom it has been once 
 tried would apply with nearly, if not quite as much force, to trj^- 
 ing it before either of the judges who sat at General Term and 
 heard the argument which resulted in granting a new trial. For 
 it is to be presumed that they severally examined the evidence, 
 and formed opinions of the merits according to such evidence, 
 especially in a case where, as in this one, a new trial was sought 
 as well on the ground of excessive damages as of erroneous de- 
 cisions of questions of law. Even if such a presumption should 
 not entirely and in all respects accord with the fact, yet it would 
 be true that the judae Avho examined and scrutinized the evi-
 
 208 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 dence most closely, and made himself most familiar with its de- 
 tails, would be mos,t obnoxious to such an objection; because 
 the inference would be just that he had more decided views with 
 respect to the whole merits, as developed by the evidence given 
 on the first trial, than one who had given less attention to the 
 evidence in all its particulars. It is no part of the province of 
 a judge to find the facts, and there is no reason to suppose that, 
 on a second trial, he will not apply any rules of law determined 
 by the court which granted a new trial, with as much firmness 
 and accuracy as if he were a stranger to the cause. Any judge 
 would willingly be relieved from trying a cause which he knew 
 either party was averse to trying before him. But although he 
 might be disposed to gratify any such prejudice of either party, 
 he is not at liberty to refuse to try a cause, wdien reached and 
 ready to be tried, for any reason which the law does not recog- 
 nize as sufficient. The ground of objection assigned will not 
 warrant us in granting a new trial, either because it was erro- 
 neous to overrule it, or because, in the proper exercise of judicial 
 discretion, it should have been sustained." ^ 
 
 § 216. Exclusion of Spectators when not a Violation of 
 Right of Public Trial. — During the progress of a trial for an 
 assault with intent to commit murder, the court made an order 
 directing that the lobby outside of the court-room should be 
 cleared of spectators, and that no person except officers of the 
 court, reporters of the public press, friends of the defendant, 
 and persons necessary for her to have on said trial, should be 
 allowed to remain ; but no order was made requiring the doors 
 to be closed, and the friends of defendant and reporters were 
 permitted to come and go at will. The order of the court was 
 made on behalf of the defendant, as well as to preserve order, 
 because the attendance and conduct of a large crowd in the court 
 room tended to excite the defendant. It was held that the de- 
 fendant's right to a public trial was not violated. ^ 
 
 1 Fry t». Bennett, 3 Bosw. (N.Y.) 200, N. Y. 324, 329. Compare Pierce v. 
 The point was af!irined on appeal and Delameter, 1 N. Y. 17. 
 the above reasouiug approved. 28 2 f>eople v. Kerrigan (Cal,), H Pac. 
 
 Rep. 849.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VIII.] CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE. 209 
 
 § 217. Wlieii improper to grant Leave of Absence to 
 Counsel. — In Georijia it seems there is a statute regulation 
 requiring counsel, under what circumstances the writer does not 
 know, to obtain leave of absence from the court. It has been laid 
 down in a case in that State that the grantino; of leave of absence 
 by court to counsel, unless for providential cause, is of doubtful 
 propriety when it affects the rights and interests of other parties, 
 and should be exercised at all times with caution and circum- 
 spection by the court. But where the court had granted the 
 claimant's counsel leave of absence, though the docket did not 
 show him to be of counsel (such, however, otherwise appearing 
 to be the fact), the Supreme Court would not control the discre- 
 tion of the trial court in continuing the case because of such 
 absence. i 
 
 § 218. Prejudicing- the Minds of the Jurors. — Undoubt- 
 edly, any remarks of the presiding judge made in the presence of 
 the jury, which have a tendency to prejudice their minds against 
 the unsuccessful party, will afford ground for a reversal of the 
 judgment. But it has been held that a mere complaint made by 
 the presiding judge, of the consumption of time by counsel, does 
 not fall within this category. Accordingly, it was no ground 
 for a new trial that counsel for the defendant requested, before 
 the concluding argument to the jury on their part was begun, 
 and whilst the argument for the State was in progress, that the}^ 
 be furnished with the authorities relied upon by the State, and 
 the court replied: "You shall be furnished with them before 
 your concluding counsel commences his argument, and they shall 
 be read too, if you desire to consume another hour of the time 
 of the court." ■^ 
 
 § 219. [Continued.] Remarks Indicating Opinion as to 
 Facts. — During the progress of a criminal trial, the clerk of 
 the justice of the peace who had taken down the testimony on 
 the preliminary examination, testifying as a witness, was asked 
 by the court: " Don't you ever make mistakes in taking down 
 
 1 Ross V. Head, 51 Ga. 005. 2 Long v. State, 12 G*. 295, 330. 
 
 1*
 
 210 CONTROL AND REGULATION OF TRIAL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 testimony in the justice's court? ' ' To which the witness replied : 
 " It may be possible, your honor, but we try not to." "Where- 
 upon the judge made the remark in the presence of the jury: 
 " Well, if you don't, you are the first justice of the peace I ever 
 heard of who does not make a mistake occasionally." It was 
 held that these remarks were in substance and effect an instruc- 
 tion to the jury upon questions of fact, and were in violation of 
 the constitutional rights of the accused. ^ It is immaterial that a 
 prejudicial remark of this kind is not embodied in the forma 
 instructions, since it would have substantially the same effect 
 upon the jury as if it were so given. ^ The same court in another 
 case, said: "Under our practice the judge should intimate no 
 opinion upon the facts. If he cannot do so directly, he cannot 
 indirectly ; if not explicitly, he cannot by innuendo ; and the effect 
 of such an opinion cannot be obviated by announcing in distinct 
 terms the jury's independency of hini in all matters of fact." ^ 
 The same court, straining this rule, reversed a judgment in a 
 criminal trial, because the trial court, in overruling an objection 
 to certain testimony, remarked in the presence of the jury, 
 " that there was as much testimony that defendant had kicked 
 the deceased upon the chest as upon the face ; ' ' although the 
 court subsequently cautioned the jury that he did not wish to be 
 understood as saying how much or how little testimony there was 
 on any particular point, that the whole matter was for them to 
 pass upon, and that they would observe for themselves what the 
 testimony was, — without, however, in terms retracting this 
 opinion formerly expressed.* Carrying out the same idea, the 
 Supreme Court of California, where the judge had expressed his 
 opinion as to the respectability of a witness under examination, 
 said: " We should not hesitate to reverse the judgment because 
 of it, if the same depended in any material degree upon the testi- 
 mony of the witness whose character and standing were thus 
 indorsed." ^ 
 
 1 state V. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502, 508. * State v. Harkin, 7 Nev. 381. 
 
 2 People V. Bonds, 1 Nev. 33, 3(j. ^ McMinn v. Wheelan, 27 Cal. 300, 
 
 3 State V. Ah Tong, 7 Nev. U8, 152. 319.
 
 Tit. II, Ch. VIII.] CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE. 211 
 
 § 220. Asking pertinent Question of Counsel. — The judge 
 may ask counsel a pertinent question during the examination of 
 an expert, even though the effect be to put the witness on his 
 guard by disclosing to him a fact which the counsel wished him 
 not to know.^ 
 
 § 221. Conversing privately with Witnesses. — The judge 
 should not converse privately, either in or out of court, with a 
 witness, to ascertain whether he has or has not knowledge of 
 particular facts; nor should he suggest to the witness, after his 
 examination, that there are facts other than those to which he 
 has testified, within his knowledge.^ But it is not ground for a 
 new trial that the judge conversed with a witness upon the stand, 
 after his examination was through, in an undertone.^ 
 
 i City Bank v. Kent, 57 Ga. 285. » City Bank v. Kent, 57 Ga. 285. 
 
 2 Sparks v. State, 59 Ala. 82, 87.
 
 212 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr. 
 
 TITLE III. 
 
 OPEISrmG THE CASE AND PKESENTING THE 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 Chapter IX. — Of the Right to Open and Close. 
 
 Chapter X. — Of the Opening Statement. 
 
 Chapter XI. — Excluding Witnesses from the Court Room. 
 
 Chapter XII. — Of the Privilege of Witnesses. 
 
 Chapter XIII. — Preliminary Questions of fact for the 
 Judge. 
 
 Chapter XIV. — Control of the Court over the Examin- 
 ation OF Witnesses. 
 
 Chapter XV. — Incidents of the Direct Examination. 
 
 Chapter XVI. — Of the Use by Witnesses of Memoranda 
 TO Refresh Recollection. 
 
 Chapter XVII. — Of the Cross-examination. 
 
 Chapter XVIII. — Of the Re-examination. 
 
 Chapter XIX. — Of Indirect Impeachment. 
 
 Chapter XX. — Of Direct Impeachment. 
 
 Chapter XXI. — Sustaining and Corroborating Witnesses. 
 
 Chapter XXII. — Of the Examination of Experts. 
 
 Chapter XXIII. — Of the Accused as Witnesses. 
 
 Chapter XXIV. — Of the Unsworn Statement op the Ac- 
 cused. 
 
 Chapter XXV. — Objections to Evidence and Exceptions 
 TO THE Rulings thereon. 
 
 Chapter XXVI. — Of the Production and Use of Books 
 AND Papers. 
 
 Chapter XXVII. — Of Natural Evidence.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. I,] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 213 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CTF THE RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 Article I. — In Ordixary Actions. 
 Article II. — In Special Proceedings. 
 Article III. — Certain Special Rules. 
 
 Article I. — In Ordinary Actions. 
 
 Section 
 
 225. Preliminary. 
 
 226. Importance of the Right. 
 
 227. Confusing Ideas upon the Subject. 
 
 228. The Plaintiff l)egins where he has anything to Prove. 
 
 229. What this Rule Decides. 
 
 230. In Actions for Unliquidated Damages. 
 
 231. In Actions on Contracts which Liquidate the Damages. 
 
 232. In Actions on Contracts which do not Liquidate the D inages. 
 
 233. Doctrine of this Article Restated. 
 
 § 225. Preliminary. — The right to open aud close is strictly 
 a branch of the discussion concernino; forensic aro-ument, and 
 hence belongs in the next succeeding article ; but as this right 
 must be settled at the outset, before the opening statement is 
 made or before any evidence is introduced, it is perhaps best to 
 consider it here. 
 
 § 226. Importance of the Right. — The right to open and 
 close the argument in a civil case has been deemed of such im- 
 portance that it has been the subject of a distinct treatise by a 
 distinguished law writer and judge. ^ It is the settled law in 
 
 '^ Best on the Right to Begin.
 
 214 
 
 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Tliomp. Tr.» 
 
 England/ and in most,^ though not all,^ American jurisdictions, 
 that a deprivation of this right is substantial error, whiph, if 
 saved and properly presented by a bill of exceptions, will 
 operate to reverse a judgment ; while in still others there is a 
 middle rule to the effect that it is a matter within the sound 
 discretion of the trial court, which discretion will not be 
 revised except in cases of manifest abuse.* A statute prescrib- 
 
 1 Huckman v. Fernie, 3 Mees. & W. 
 605; Mercer V. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (n. 
 8.) 447; Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & 
 W. 95; Ashby v. Bates, 15 Mees. & W. 
 589. 
 
 2 David V. Mason, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 
 156; Robinson v. Hitchcock, 8 Met. 
 (Mass.) 64; Merriam v. Cuuuingham, 
 11 Gush. (Mass.) 40, 44; Beuham v. 
 Eowe, 2 Cal. 387, 408; Singleton v. 
 Millett, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 355; 
 Johnson v. Wideman, Dudley (S. C.), 
 70; Huntington v. Conkey, 33 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 218; Ayrault v. Ghamberlain, 
 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 229 ; Hill v. Perry, 82 
 Ind. 28; Johnson v. Josephs, 75 Me. 
 544; Ney v. Rothe, 61 Tex. 374; Millerd 
 V. Thorn, 56 N. Y. 402; Glaflin v. Baere, 
 28 Hun (N. Y.), 204; Johnson v. Max- 
 well, 87 N. C. 18, 22; Peuhryn Slate 
 Go. V. Meyer, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 61; Mil- 
 lerd V. Thorn, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 376; 
 s. c. 56 N. Y. 402; Lindsley v. European 
 Petroleum Go., 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 176; 
 Elwell V. Ghamberlain, 31 N. Y. 611, 
 614; Ghurchwell v. Rogers, Hai'din 
 (Ky.), 182; Goldsberry v. Stuteville, 3 
 Bibb (Ky.), 345; Blackledge v. Pine, 
 28 Ind. 466; Young v. Highland, 9 
 Gratt. (Va.) 16; Haines v. Kent, 11 
 Ind. 126. 
 
 3 Montgomery v. Swindler, 32 Oh. 
 St. 224, 226; Gomstock v. Hadlyme 
 Ecc. Soc, 8 Gonn. 254; Scott v. Hull, 
 8 Gonn. 296; Lexington &c. Ins. Go. v. 
 ^ Paver, 16 Oh. 324, 330; State v. Wat- 
 ham, 48 Mo. 55; Wade v. Scott, 7 Mo. 
 509, 514; Sodousky v. McGee, 4 J. J. 
 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 267,275; Day v. Wood- 
 worth, 13 How. (U. S.) 363; Hall v. 
 Weare, 92 U. S. 728; Lancaster v. 
 Gollins, 115 U. S. 222. 
 
 * In Texas, a deprivation of this 
 right is error for which the judgment 
 will be reversed, unless it appear that 
 the party complaining has not been 
 injured thereby (Ney v. Rothe, 61 Tex. 
 374, 376), and in Iowa (what is sub- 
 stantially the same thing), "while the 
 right to review such a question is not 
 absolutely denied, yet there must be a 
 clear case of prejudice in order to 
 justify a reversal upon this ground." 
 Preston v. Walker, 26 Iowa, 205, 207; 
 Eouutain v. West, 23 Iowa, 9, 14 ; Good- 
 pastor V. Voris, 8 Iowa, 335; Smith v. 
 Goopers, 9 Iowa, 379; Woodward v. 
 Laverty, 14 Iowa, 381; Viele v. Ger- 
 raania Ins. Go., 26 Iowa, 9, 45. In 
 Wisconsin, this is a matter resting in 
 the sound discretion of the trial judge, 
 which discretion is subject to review 
 only in cases of outrage or abuse. 
 Marshall v. American Express Go., 7 
 Wis. 1, 19. A similar doctrine was 
 suggested in a case in New York (Fry 
 V. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324, 331) ; but, as 
 seen by cases cited in the preceding 
 note, the rule in that State is now the 
 same as in England. This doctrine 
 also prevails in Arkansas (Pogue v. 
 Joyner, 7 Ark. 462) and in Missouri. 
 Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 
 31 Mo. 518; Farrell v. Brennan, 32 Mo. 
 328; McCliutockv. Curd, 32 Mo. 411; 
 Wade V. Scott, 7 Mo. 509; Tibeau v.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN A^D CLOSE. 
 
 215 
 
 ing which party shall have this right has been held manda- 
 tory. ^ 
 
 § 227. Confusing Ideas upon the Subject. — Prior to the 
 time when the ques.tion became settled in England, as will 
 be hereafter stated, the English books were full of confusing 
 ideas upon this subject. These ideas were propagated in this 
 country, and they still disfigure our jurisprudence to a consider- 
 able extent. One of them was an attempt to formulate the rule 
 in the proposition that the party sustaining the burden of proof ,2 
 or, as it is sometimes stated, the burden of the issue, ^ or of the 
 issues,* or the affirmative of the issue or issues,* possesses the 
 
 Tibeau, 22 Mo. 77. This was at oue 
 time tlie rule iu England. Goodtitle v. 
 Brahara, 4 T. R. 497; Branford v 
 Freeman, 1 Eug. Law and Eq. 444 
 Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & W. 97 
 Booth V. Millus, 15 Mees. &W. 669, 
 Doe V. Brayue, 5 Com. Bench, 655; 
 Edwards v. Matthews, 16 L. J. Exch. 
 291. Iu New Hampshire, as late as 
 1850, it was regarded as an open ques- 
 tion whether it was a matter of right 
 or discretion' merely (Belknap v. Wen- 
 dell, 21 N. H. 175, 182) ; but, as above 
 seen, it is now regarded in that State 
 as a matter of right. 
 
 1 Heffron v. State, 8 Ela, 73. 
 
 2 Ransone v. Chi-istian, 56 Ga. 351; 
 Baker i'. Lyman, 53 Ga. 339; Com. v. 
 Haskell, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 491; Hudson 
 V. Wetheriugton, 79 N. C. 3; Bradley 
 V. Clark, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 293; Patton 
 V. Hamilton, 12 lud. 256; Shank v. 
 Fleming, 9 Lid. 189; Mason v. Croom, 
 24 Ga. 211; Higdon v. Higdon, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 48; Bertody v. Isou, 69 
 Ga. 317; .Judah v. Trustees, 23 Lid. 
 272; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. McWhin- 
 uey, 36 Ind. 436; Hyatt v. Clements, 
 65 Ind. 12 ; Hill v. Perry, 82 Ind. 28, 31 ; 
 Wright u. Abbott, 85 Ind. 154; Good- 
 win V. Smith, 72 Ind. 113; Johnson v. 
 Josephs, 75 Me. 544 i Tobiuv. Jenkins, 
 
 29 Ark .151, 153; Y iugling v. Hesson, 
 16 Md. 112, 121; Waller v. Morgan, 
 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 137, 144; 1 Greenl. 
 Ev., § 74 and note. 
 
 3 McLees v. Felt, 11 Ind. 218. 
 
 * Rev. Stat. Ind. (1881), § 536; 
 Iowa Rev. Stat. (1886), § 2780; Judah 
 V. Trustees, 23 Ind. 274, 283; dis- 
 tinguishing Howards. Kisling, 15 Ind. 
 83, and Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 492. 
 Compare McLees v. Felt, 11 lud. 218; 
 Ashing V. Miles, 16 Ind. 329. 
 
 * Goss V. Turner, 21 Vt. 440; Dun- 
 lop V. Peter, 1 Cranch C. C. 403; Beale 
 V. Newton, 1 Cranch C. C. 405; Yau 
 Cleave w. Beam, 2 Dana (Ky.), 155; 
 (compare Higdon v. Higdon, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 50) ; Randolph Bank v. 
 Armstrong, 11 Iowa, 515; Daviess v. 
 Arbuckle, 1 Dana (Ky.), 525; Golds- 
 berry u. Stuteville, 3 Bibb (Ky.), 346; 
 Latham V. Selkirk, 11 Tex. 314, 322; 
 Auld V. Hepburn, 1 Cranch C. C. 122. 
 Compare Sutton v. Mandeville, 1 
 Cranch C. C. 187; Buzzell v. Snell, 25 
 N. H. 474, 478; Chesley v. Chesley, 37 
 N. H. 229 ; Den d. Hopper v. Demar- 
 est, 21 N. J. L. 526, 530; Denney v. 
 Booker, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 427; Page v. 
 Carter, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 192; Mar- 
 shall V. Am. Express Co., 7 Wis. 1, 
 18; Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins.
 
 216 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 right to open and close the argument. In cases where the ques- 
 tion was free from difficulty, these propositions generally, though 
 not always, conducted the courts to the right results; but the 
 application of them has been attended with the difficulty which 
 always attends in practice the application of general rules : by 
 reason of their generality they have failed to supply a uniform 
 test by which to decide every question of this kind whenever it 
 arises — a thing which is extremely desirable when possible. 
 The rule that the right rests with the party sustaining the bur- 
 den of proof is not adequate, because in many cases the plaintiff 
 sustains the burden as to some slight or almost formal matter, 
 after which the burden shifts upon the defendant, and either re- 
 mains with him throughout the case, or else, as sometimes hap- 
 pens, shifts back again upon the plaintiff. In these cases, how 
 is the rule to l)e applied? The plaintiff sustains the burden at 
 the threshold ; he must go forward and produce some evidence, 
 albeit slight or formal, such as the introduction of a written in- 
 strument, or the proof of a signature, while the substantial con- 
 test in the case grows out of defensive matter pleaded by his 
 antagonist. The same may be said substantially as to the rule 
 that the right rests with the party having the burden of the issue, 
 which means the same thing as the burden of proof. Nor has 
 the statutory rule in Indiana and Iowa, that the right rests with 
 the party having the burden of the issues, supplied an unvarying 
 rule for the decision of the question ; since in many cases the 
 plaintiff will have the burden of a single issue, and the defend- 
 ant will have the burden of many others. The same may be 
 said concerning the rule that the right rests witli the i^arty having 
 the affirmative of the issues. Although it is conceded that the 
 question must be determined by the trial judge on an inspection 
 
 Co., 31 Mo. 518; Banning v. Banning, 402; Claflin v. Baera, 28 Ilun (N. Y.), 
 
 12 011. St. 437; Ross v. Gonld, 5 Me. 204; Colwell v. Brower, 75 111. 517, 
 
 210; Belknap v. Wendell, 21 N. H. 523. It has been said that the right 
 175; Curtis v. Wheeler, 1 Mood. & M. ' is governed by the same rule as that 
 
 493; Montgomery V. Swindler, 32 Oh. which governs the production oi testi- 
 
 St. 224; Jackson v. Heskete, 2 Stark. mony. Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325, 
 
 N. P. 518; Millerd v. Thorn, 56 N. Y. 330.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEX AND CLOSE. 217 
 
 of the pleadings/ yet is the question to be determined by the 
 form of the issues, as held in Texas, ^ or hj iho. substance of them 
 as held in New Hampshire, "^ Kentucky,^ and New York?^ Again, 
 suppose that the defendant in his plea or answer admits every- 
 thing which the plaintiff alleges as the ground of his right of 
 action, except the amount of his damages, these being unliqui- 
 dated, — as in actions for libel, where the fact of the publication 
 is admitted, — is the burden of proof, or the burden of the issue 
 or issues, or the affirmative of the issue or issues, to be held to 
 be on the plaintiff or on the defendant? The general terms in 
 which the rule has been variously formulated, as above given, do 
 not furnish a uniform test by which to determine these questions. 
 
 § 228. The Plaintiff Begins where he has Anything to 
 Prove. — The English decisions upon this subject being in a 
 state of confusion,^ a decision was rendered in the Queen's 
 Bench in the year 1845, which settled previous conflicts and es- 
 tablished a rule which furnishes an absolute test for the decision 
 of the question in all ordinary actions between plaintiff and de- 
 fendant. That rule is this: That where the plaintiff has any- 
 thing to prove, in order to got a verdict, whether in an action 
 ex contractu or ex delicto, and whether to establish his rio-ht of 
 action or to fix the amount of his damages, the right to begin 
 
 1 Dahlmau v. Hammel, 45 "Wis. & Rob. 281; s. c. G Carr. & P. CA; 
 466; Richards r. Xixon, 20 Pa. St. 19, Staunton v. Paton, 1 Carr. & Kir. 148; 
 23. Rowland v. Borues, 1 Carr. & Kir. 46; 
 
 2 Latham v. Selkirk, 11 Tex. 314, Bird v. Higginson, 2 Ad. & El. 160; 
 322. Huckman v. Fernie, 3 Mees. & W. 505; 
 
 » Chesley «. Chesley, 37 N. H. 229, Mills v. Barber, 1 Mees. & W. 425; 
 
 237. See also Bills v. Vose, 27 N. H. s. c. Tyr. & G. 835; LeAvis v. Parker, 4 
 
 215; Tlmrstou v. Kennett, 22 X. H. Ad. & El. 838; Bedell ». Russell, Ry. & 
 
 151. M. 293; Bonfleld v. Smith, 2 Mood. & 
 
 * Daviess v. Arbukle, 1 Dana (Ky.), Rob. 519; Pearson v. Coles, 1 Mood. & 
 
 525. Rob. 206 ; Pole v. Rogers, 2 Mood. & 
 
 5 Huntington v. Coukey, 33 Barb. Rob. 287; Reeve t. Underhill, 1 Mood. 
 
 (N. Y.) 218, 228. & Rob. 440; Wootton v. Barton, 1 
 
 " Curtis V. Wheeler, Mood. & M. Mood. & Rob. 518; Jackson v. Hesketh, 
 
 493; Hoggett v. Oxley, Mood. & Rob. 2 Stark. N. P. 518; Goodtitlp d. Revett 
 
 251; Burrell v. Nicholson, 1 Mood. & v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497. 
 Rob. 304 ; Carter v. .Jones, 1 Mood.
 
 218 
 
 OPENING THE CASE. 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 and reply belongs to him.^ This rule has been generally adopted 
 in this country, as the decisions hereafter cited will show. The 
 unvarying test furnished by this rule is to consider which party 
 would, in the state of the pleadings and of the record admissions, 
 get a verdict for substantial damages, if the cause were sub- 
 mitted to the jury without any evidence being offered by either. 
 If the plaintiff would succeed, then there is nothing for him to 
 prove at the outset, and the defendant begins and replies ; if the 
 defendant would succeed, then there is something for the plaint- 
 iff to prove at the outset, and the plaintiff begins and replies. ^ 
 
 § 229. What this Rule Decides. — The advantage of this 
 rule is that it defines the general propositions stated in the 
 preceding paragraph and tells us the precise meaning of 
 them. It tells us that the party sustaining the burden 
 of proof, or the burden of the issue or issues, or the af- 
 tirmative of the issue or issues, is in every case the plaintiff, 
 where he has anything, however slight, to prove, in order to get 
 a verdict for other than nominal damages; and that in every 
 other case it is the defendant. "^ It tells us that, although the 
 
 1 Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (n. 
 s.) 447; overruliug Cooper u. Wakley, 
 Mood. & Malk. 248. 
 
 2 Huckman v. Fernie, 2 Jur. 444; 
 Veiths V. Hagge, 8 la. 163 ; Robinson 
 V. Hitchcock, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 64 
 Perkins v. Errael, 2 Kan. 325, 330 
 Amos V. Hughes, 1 Mood. & R. 464 
 Ridgway v. Ewbauk, 3 Mood. & R 
 217; McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C 
 430; Boyce v. Lake, 17 S. C. 481 
 Kennedy v. Moore, 17 S. C. 4(i4 
 Burklialter v. Coward, 16 >S. C. 435 
 Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 5 S. C. 267 
 Pierce v. Lyman, 28 Ark. 550; Ber- 
 trand v. Taylor, 32 Id. 470; Camp v. 
 Brown, 48 Ind. 575 (with -which com- 
 pare Heilman v. Shanklin, (;01nd. 424; 
 Johnson?;. Josephs, 75 Me. 544; Rolf 
 v.Polland, 16 Nehr. 21 ; s. c. 11) N. W. 
 Rep. 615; Fry r. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; 
 
 s. c. affl'd 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 200: Little- 
 john V. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 41,45; Huntington t). Coukey, 33 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 218; Hecker v. Hopkins, 16 
 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301, n.; Opdyke v. 
 Weed, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 223, n.; 
 Love V. Dickerson, 85 N. C. 5; Dille 
 ?;. Lovell, 37 Oh. St. 415; Young w. 
 Highland, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 16. 
 
 3 Johnson v. Josephs, 75 Me. 544; 
 iSpaulding v. Hood, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 
 602; Thurston v. Kennett, 22 N. H. 
 151; Belknap v. Wendell, 21 N. H. 
 175; Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Me. 100; 
 Sawyer v. Hopkins, 22 Me. 276 ; Wash- 
 ington Ice Co. V. Webster, 68 Me. 449; 
 Page V. Osgood, 2 Gray (Mass.), 260; 
 Dorr V. Tremont National Bank, 128 
 Mass. 359 ; Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecc. 
 Soc, 8 Conn. 254, 261; Bills v. Vose, 
 27 N. H. 215; Chesley v. Chesley, 37
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 219 
 
 burden of proof may shift during the trial, yet the right to open 
 and close the argument does not shift with it, but that the right 
 remains with the party on whom it primarily rested. ^ It decides 
 that where there are several issues, and the plaintiff has anything 
 to prove under any one of them in the first instance, in order to 
 a recovery, the right to open and close is with him.^ It tells us 
 that in every case where the general issice, or a general or special 
 denial is pleaded, the right to open and close is with the plaintiff, 
 no matter what may be the nature of the controversy, or what 
 special defenses or counter-claims may be set up."^ 
 
 N. H. 229; Seavy v. Dearborn, 19 N. 
 H. 351 ; Fetters v. Mimcie National 
 Bank, 34 lud. 251; Baltimore &c. R. 
 Co. ^^ Mc^yhinney, 30 Intl. 436,444; 
 Hamlyn v. Xesbit, 37 lud. 284 ; Thomp- 
 son ■?;. Mills, 39 lud. 528; Williams??. 
 Allen, 40 Ind. 295; Camp v. Brown, 48 
 Ind. 575; Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 493, 
 509; Shaw v. Barnhart, 17 lud. 183; 
 Buzzell V. Snell, 25 N. H. 474, 478 ; 
 Hoxie V. Greene, 37 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 
 97; Carter ?;. Jones, G Carr. & P. G4; 
 s. c. 1 Mood & Rob. 281; Amos v. 
 Hughes, 1 Mood. & Rol). 404 ; Rogers 
 V. Diamond, 13 Ark. 474. Compare 
 Pope V. Latham, 1 Ark. 66; Piuley v. 
 Woodruff, 8 Ark. 328. 
 
 1 Brooks V. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 
 94, 100; Belknap v. Wendell, 21 N. H. 
 175; Judge of Probate v. Stone, 44 N. 
 H. 593, 602; Ross v. Gould, 5 Me. 204. 
 Compare Crerar v. Sodo, Mood. & M. 
 85; Weidman v. Kohr, 13 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 17, 24; Cothrau v. Forsyth, 68 
 Ga. 560. 
 
 2 Cent. Bank v. St. John. 17 Wis. 
 157; Davidson v. Henop, 1 Crauch C. 
 C. 280; Churchill v. Lee, 77 N. C. 341; 
 Jackson v, Pittsford, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 194; Jackson v. Hesketh, 2 Stark. N. 
 P. 518; Ridgway v Ewbank, 2 Mood. 
 & Rob. 217; Burckhalter v. Coward, 
 16 S. C, 435, 442; Jolmson v. Maxwell, 
 87 N. C. 18; Bertrand v Taylor, 32 
 
 Ark. 470; Zehner v. Kepler, 16 Ind 
 290; Bowen v. Spears, 20 Ind. 146; 
 Viele V. Germania Ins. Co., 26 la. 10, 
 45; Veiths v. Ilagge, 8 la. 163, 192; 
 Sillivant v. Reardon, 5 Ark. 141, 157; 
 Montgomery v. Swiudler, 32 Oh. St. 
 224; Slauson v. Englehart, 34 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 198; Buzzell v. Snell, 25 N. 
 H. 474. Compare Sodousky v. Mc- 
 Gee, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 267, 274. 
 where the subject is reasoned forcibly 
 and at length by Robertson, C. J., 
 taking some positions which are not 
 in conformity with the above rule. 
 As to the right of the court to sever 
 the issues, and give the opening and 
 closing to each party, see Central 
 Bank u. St. John, 17 Wis, 157; Vuy- 
 ton V. Brenell, 1 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 4G7. 
 
 3 Ayer v Austin, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 
 225; Toppan v. Jeuuess, 21 N. H. 232; 
 Jackson v. Pittsford, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 194; Burroughs?;. Hunt, 13 Ind. 178; 
 Cox V. Tickers, 35 lud. 27; Robinson 
 r. Hitchcock, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 64, 66; 
 Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325, 330; 
 Judge of Probate v. Stone, 44 N. H. 
 593, 602; Belknap v. Wendell, 21 N. 
 H. 175; Thurston v. Keunett, 22 N. H. 
 151; Buzzell v. Snell, 25 N. H. 478; 
 Brooks V. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 94, 
 100; Chesley??. Cliesley, 37 N. II 227, 
 237r So, where matter is affirmatively
 
 220 
 
 OPENING THE CASE. 
 
 [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 230. In Actions for Unliquidated Damages. — It decides 
 that, in all actions for unliquidated damages, except where the 
 defendant, by his plea or answer, admits not only the cause of 
 action, but also the amount of damages claimed, the right is 
 with the plaintiff; since he must introduce evidence showing the 
 extent of his injury, ^ — as where, in any action sounding in dam- 
 ages, the cause of action is admitted, and a plea of confession and 
 avoidance is filed, leaving the amount of damages claimed sub- 
 ject to affirmative proof .^ Thus, in actions for libel or slander, 
 where the defendant admits the writing or speaking and pleads 
 justification, or claims privilege and denies mahce, the right, ac- 
 cording to the modern doctrine, is with the plaintiff. The rea- 
 son is that the question of malice and of the extent of the 
 damages are both in issue, and that the plaintiff has therefore 
 something to prove in order to make out his case.^ For the 
 same reasons, in an action for assault and battery, where the plea 
 is son assault demense, followed by a replication de injuria, or. 
 
 pleaded which amounts merely to the 
 general issue. Denny v. Booker, 2 
 Bibb (Ky.), 427. Compare, contra, 
 the text, Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181. 
 
 1 Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (n. 
 s.) 447, 4G1; Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind. 
 493, 509; Haines v. Kent, 11 Ind. 126; 
 Young V. Highland, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 16; 
 Steptoe V. Harvey, 7 Leigh (Va.), 501, 
 544; Cunningham u. Gallagher, 61 Wis. 
 170; Opdyke v. Weed, 18 Abb, Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 223, n.; Hecker v. Hopkins, 16 
 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 301, n. 
 
 - Cunningham v. Gallagher, supra. 
 
 3 Vifquain v. Finch, 15 Neb. 505; 
 Burckhalter v. Coward, 16 S. C. 435, 
 443; Fry V. Bennett, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 
 200, 232; s. c. affirmed, 28 N. Y. 324. 
 The decision of Lord Tenterden, in 
 Cooper V. Wakley, Mood. & M. 248, 
 has been overruled in England, and 
 has not been the law in that country 
 since the decision of Mercer v. Whall, 
 5 Ad. & El. (x. s.) 447, 463, in which' 
 last case Lord Deumau said : " K ever 
 
 a decision was overruled on great de- 
 liberation, and by an undeviating 
 practice afterwards, it was that in 
 Cooper V. Wakley." The English 
 judges, soon after the accession of 
 Lord Denman to the office of chief jus- 
 tice of the Queen's Bench, met and 
 discussed this troublesome question, 
 and adopted the following rule : "In 
 actions for libel, slander and injuries 
 to the person, the plaintiff shall be- 
 gin, although the affirmative is on the 
 defendant." A sketch of this rule is 
 given by Lord Denman in his opinion 
 in Mercer v. Whall, svpra. Two 
 American decisions (Moses v. Gate- 
 wood, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 234, and Ran- 
 sone V. Christian, 56 Ga. 351) hold 
 that, in actions for libel or slander, 
 where the defendant pleads justifica- 
 tion, he assumes the affirmative, and 
 the right to begin and reply is with 
 him; but these decisions are contrary 
 to iiriuciple and entirely out of cur- 
 rent with modern authority.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 221 
 
 as we would say in modern procedure, where the answer is a 
 justification^ the plaintiff begins and replies; since he must first 
 go forward with his evidence. ^ So, in trespass de bonis asjior- 
 talis, where the defendant pleads the general issue and files " a 
 brief statement " justifying under his authority as an officer, the 
 right is with the plaintiflf.- 
 
 § 231. In Actions on Contracts which Liquidate the Dam- 
 ages. — On the other hand, where the action is upon a contract 
 which, by its terms, liquidates the damages — as upon a promis- 
 sory note,"^ bill of exchange,* bank check, ^ bill single," policy of 
 
 1 Young V. Highland, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 
 16; Johnson v. Josephs, 75 Me. 544. 
 Contra, and out of line with modern 
 authority, are tlie following old cases ; 
 M'Keuzie v. Milligau, 1 Bay (S. C), 
 248; Goldsberry v. Stuteville, 3 Bibb 
 (Ky.), 345; Downey v. Day, 4 Ind. 
 531. Compare Van Zant v. Jones, 3 
 Dana (Ky.), 465, where, in such a 
 state of pleading, the defendant of- 
 fered no substantial evidence of justi- 
 fication, and it was held that the court 
 might, in the exercise of a sound dis- 
 cretion, withhold from him the advan- 
 tage, which the court supposed the 
 form of the pleadings gave him, by 
 giving the right to open and close to 
 the plaintiff. 
 
 2 Luut V. Wormell, 19 Me. 100; 
 Ayer v. Austin, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 225, 
 overruling Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181. 
 It has been held in old cases, con- 
 trary to the general principle stated in 
 the text, that, in such an action, where 
 justification only is pleaded, the de- 
 fendant is entitled to open and close. 
 Kimble v. Adair, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 320; 
 Downey v. Day, 4 Ind. 531. So, it has 
 been held that, in an action of trespass 
 quare clausum, where the defendant 
 pleads freehold only, the right to be- 
 gin and reply is with him. Singleton 
 V. Millet, Nott & McC. (S. C.) 355; 
 
 Davis V. Mason, 4 Pick, (Mass.) 156. 
 And one English case holds that this is 
 so, although the declaration alleges 
 special damage. Fish v. Travers, 3 
 Carr. & P. 578. But these two classes 
 of decisions seem to be opposed to the 
 modern rule stated in the text; since 
 in either case, the damages being un- 
 liquidated and not admitted in the 
 state of the pleadings, the plaintiff has 
 something to prove in order to get a 
 verdict. See Haines v. Kent, 11 Ind. 
 126. 
 
 3 Kimble v. Adair, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 320; Bowen v. Spears, 20 Ind. 146; 
 Harvey v. Ellithorpe, 26 111. 418; Tip-, 
 ton r. Triplett, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 570; Ay- 
 rault V. Chamberlain, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 229; Huntington v. Conkey, 33 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 218; Hoxie v. Greene, 37 How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 97; McShane v. Braender, 
 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 294; Hudson v. 
 Weatherington, 79 N. C. 3; Blackledge 
 V. Piue, 28 Ind. 466; Judah v. Trustees, 
 23 Ind. 272 ; Shank v. Fleming, 9 lud. 
 189. 
 
 * Warner v. Haines, 6 Carr. & P. 
 666; List v. Kortepeter, 26 Ind. 27. 
 
 5 Elwell V. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y. 611. 
 
 6 Richards v. Nixon, 20 Pa. St. 19, 
 23; Scott V. Hull, 8 Conn. 296. Com- 
 pare Robinson v. Hitchcock, 8 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 64.
 
 222 
 
 OPENING THE CASE, 
 
 [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 life ^ or fire insurance,- or any other written instrument which 
 by its terms fixes the amount of the recovery,^ — and the de- 
 fendant admits the execution of the instrument, but sets up an 
 aflSrmative defense/ such as duress/ fraud/ want of jurisdiction/ 
 usury/ a discharge under an insolvent debtor's act ^ or in bank- 
 ruptcy/^ want of title in the plaintiff/^ tender /^ or other affirmative 
 matter of defense/^ or pleads a set-off or counter-claim/* — in all 
 such cases the plaintiff has nothing to prove in order to recover; 
 upon a default an inquiry of damages would be unnecessary; 
 and therefore the right to begin and reply is with the de- 
 fendant. 
 
 § 232. In Actions on Contracts whicli do not Liquidate the 
 Damages. — Outside of these lie a mass of cases, founded upon 
 contracts, express or implied, where the contract itself does not 
 liquidate the damages, and where, although the existence of the 
 contract is admitted in the pleadings, the damages claimed are 
 not admitted; or where defensive matter is set up, apparently in 
 
 1 Breunan v. Security Life Ins. Co., 
 4: Daly (N. Y.), 296. Compare, contra, 
 Ashby V. Bates, 15 Mees. & W. 589. 
 
 2 Viele V. Germauia Ins. Co., 2 
 Iowa, 10, 44. 
 
 3 Aurora v. Cobb, 21 lud. 492, 509. 
 * Auld V. Hepburn, 1 Crauch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 122. 
 
 ^ Hoxie V. Greene, 37 How. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 97. 
 
 « Elwell V. Chamberlin, 31 N. Y. 
 Gil; Brennan v. Security Life Ins. Co., 
 Daly (N. Y.), 29(5. 
 
 ' Tipton V. Triplett, 1 IMetc. (Ky.) 
 570; Hoxie v. Greene, 37 How. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 97; McShaue v. Braeuder, 6G How. 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 294 ; List v. Kortepeter, 26 
 Ind. 27. 
 
 8 Harvey v. Ellithorpe, 20 111. 418; 
 Ayrault v. Chamberlain, 33 Bai-b. (N. 
 Y.) 229; Huntintiton v. Conkey, 33 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 218; Elwell v. Chamber- 
 lin, 31 N. Y. Gil. 
 
 Warner v. Haines, 6 Carr. & P. 
 
 GGG. 
 
 '0 Kichard v. Nixon, 20 Pa. St. 19, 
 23. 
 
 " Hoxie V. Greene, 37 How. Pr. (N. 
 Y.) 97. Compare Hudson v. Weather- 
 ington, 79 N. C. 3, where it was held 
 that, upon an issue upon a want of 
 title in the plaintiff, the plaintiff must 
 go forward with the evidence, and 
 consequently has the right to begin 
 and reply. 
 
 12 Auld V. Hepl)urn, 1 Cranch C. C. 
 (U. S.) 122. Compare Buzzell v. Snell, 
 25 N. H. 474. 
 
 " Biackledge v. Pine, 28 Ind. 4G6; 
 Judah V. Trustee, 23 Ind. 272; Shank 
 V. Fleming, 9 Ind. 189. 
 
 " Bowen v. Spears, 20 Ind. 146; 
 Brown v. Kirkpatrick, 5 S. C. 2G7. 
 Compare Penhryn Slate Co. v. Meyer, 
 8 Daly (N. Y.),G1; Graham v. Gautier, 
 21 Tex. 112.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 223 
 
 avoidance, but which really amounts to a denial of the grounds 
 on which the right of recovery is predicated, — in all which cases 
 the right to begin and reply is with the plaintiff. Among these 
 may be mentioned actions of debt on penal bonds where the plea 
 is nil debit, performance, set-off, etc., — these pleas not dispens- 
 ing with the necessity of proving the breaches and the damages ; i 
 actions for goods sold, answer admitting sale and delivery, but 
 alleging that the goods were not equal to the quality agreed 
 upon, and claiming a recoupment; '^ actions for the value of a 
 physician's services and a plea in reconvention, admitting the 
 services, but alleging damages by reason of want of skill, etc. ; ^ 
 actions on promissory notes providing for reasonable attorney's 
 fees, defense of payment, set-off, etc., and an admission that a 
 certain sum would be a reasonable attorney's fee if the plaintiff 
 should recover the amount of the note, — the admission not 
 agreeing what would be a reasonable fee in case he should re- 
 cover a 2:)art only of the note ; * actions upon promises and pleas 
 or answers alleging that the promise was a different promise 
 from that sued on, since this leaves the burden upon the plaint- 
 iff of proving the promise which he has alleged; ^ covenant for 
 dismissing a servant, justification and replication cZe injuria, — 
 since the damages are unliquidated and must be proved by the 
 plaintiff;^ covenant broken, general issue, with notice (under 
 Massachusetts statute) of special defense of discharge under in- 
 solvent law, replication admitting discharge but denying its 
 validity;^ action upon a policy of life insurance — plea, 
 misrepresentation by the assured, replication de injuria, — the 
 plea being in substance a mere denial of the averment in the 
 declaration of the truth of the statement by which the assured 
 
 1 Sillivaut V. Reardon, 5 Ark. 141, s.) 447 (leading English case). The 
 157. following decisions are referred to as 
 
 2 Penhryu Slate Co. ». Meyer, 8 Daly contrary to the principle of this case, 
 (N. Y.), 61. and as having been wrongly decided. 
 
 * Graham v, Gautier, 21 Tex. 112. Page v. Carter, 8 B. Mou. (Ky.) 192-, 
 ^ Camp V. Brown, 48 Ind. 575. Sutton v. Mandeville, 1 Cranch C- C. 
 
 * Davies v. Evans, 6 Carr. & P. 619; (U. S.) 187. 
 
 McCouuell V. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430. * ' Robinson v. Hitchcock, 8 Mete. 
 
 6 Mercer v. Whall, 5 Ad. & El. (n. (Mass.) 64.
 
 224 orENiNQ THE CASE. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 had obtained the policy; ^ actions to foreclose mortgages, since 
 the plaintiff must prove the mortgage debt and all other facts 
 preliminary to his right of foreclosure ; ^ an action on bills of 
 exchange with a count on an account stated, plea of payment as 
 to the bills and non-assumpsit as to the account stated, — since 
 the plaintiff must give some evidence in order to a recovery upon 
 the account stated ; ^ assumpsit for the unworkman-like execu- 
 tion of a contract, plea that the work was properly done;* 
 action on an account, cause of action not admitted, defense of 
 payment ; ^ action upon a guaranty of payment of certain prom- 
 issory notes, answer denying any indebtedness and setting up 
 false and fraudulent representations, etc., — the reason being 
 that it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the original indebt- 
 edness evidenced by the notes; ^ action for goods sold, general 
 issue except as to a part of the sum demanded, as to a plea of 
 tender; ^ and many other similar cases which might be stated. 
 
 § 233, Doctrine of this Article Restated. — The doctrine of 
 this article cannot better be restated than in the language of 
 Judge E. Darwin Smith at the conclusion of a learned opinion in 
 the Supreme Court of New York: "1. The plaintiff , in all cases 
 where the damages are unliquidated, has the right to open the 
 case to the jury and of the reply. 2. Whenever the plaintiff has 
 anything to prove, on the question of damages or otherwise, he 
 has the right to begin. 3. In other cases where the damages are 
 liquidated or depend on mere calculation — as the casting of in- 
 terest — the party holding the affirmative of the issue has the 
 rifht to beffin. 4. The affirmative of the issue in such cases 
 means the affirmative in substance, and not inform, and upon the 
 whole record. 5. The denial of the right to begin, to the party 
 
 1 Ashby V. Bates, 15 Mees. & W. * Amos t?. Hughes, 1 Mood. & R. 464. 
 589. Compare Viele v. Germauia lus. ^ Wright v. Abbott, 85 Ind. 154. 
 Co., 26 Iowa, 10, 44; Breunan v. Se- See also Ashlug v. Miles, 16 lud. 329 
 curity Life lus. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y.), (action for use and occupation). 
 
 296. ^ Uahlman v. Hammel, 45 Wis. 466, 
 
 2 Mason v. Croora, 24 Ga 211. citing Second Ward Savings Bauli v. 
 
 3 Smart v. Rayuer, 6 Carr. & T. Shakman, 30 Wis. 333. 
 
 721. ' Biuzell V. Snell, 25 N, H. 474, 4"9.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 225 
 
 entitled to it and claiming it at the proper time, is error, for 
 which a new trial will be granted, unless the court can see clearly 
 that no injury or injustice resulted from the erroneous decision." ^ 
 The foundation of this doctrine is, as before stated, the leading 
 case of Mercer v. WhaU,"^ to which most, though not all, Ameri- 
 can courts have conformed. While, as already stated, the rule 
 of that case is sufficient for the decision of the question in every 
 ordinary case, yet it must not be supposed that it furnishes the 
 key to a decision of the question in every case. In a variety of 
 special proceedings the question which the juror asked of the 
 judge at the conclusion of his charge, " What does your honor 
 mean by the words plaintiff and defendant? " is constantly re- 
 curring. To this question, as well as to several other topics con- 
 nected with the subject, the next article will be devoted. 
 
 Article. II — In Special Proceedings. 
 
 Section 
 
 236. Purpose of this Article. 
 
 237. Tlie Govei-ning Priuciple Stated. 
 
 238. On au Issue of Sauity. 
 
 239. On Issues of Devisavit vel non. 
 
 (1.) Wliat Rule upon Principle. 
 
 (2.) Cases which Concede the Right to the Proponents. 
 
 240. In Actions of Replevin. 
 
 241. In Cases of Replevin of Cattle Distrained for Rent with Avowry of Rent 
 
 in Arrear. 
 
 242. In Cases of Interpleader. 
 
 243. In Ci'iminal Cases. 
 
 244. In Cases of Fraud. 
 
 245. [Continued.] Opposing Views. 
 
 246. In Proceedings on Reports of Commissioners, Auditors, Referees. 
 
 247. In Proceedings to Condemn Land and Assess Damages-. 
 
 248. Petitioner, Claimant, Administrator. 
 
 249. Miscellaneous Cases where the Right was held to be with the Plaintiff. 
 
 250. Miscellaneous Cases where the Right is with the Defendant. 
 
 § 236. Purpose of this Article. — From the former article 
 on this subject it would appear that there is no difficulty in de- 
 termining, on principle and authority, with which party the right 
 
 1 Huntington v. Conkey, 33 Barb. 2 5 Ad. & El. (n. s.) 447. 
 
 (N. Y.) 218, 228. 
 
 15
 
 226 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 to open and close the argument rests, in ordinary actions between 
 plaintiff and defendant. But, as was there suggested, in many 
 special proceedings the situation of the parties is such that it is 
 difficult to determine which is to be deemed to stand in the posi- 
 tion of plaintiff and which in that of defendant. In these cases 
 the courts have not been able to lay hold of and adhere to any 
 governing principle, and the result is a great confusion and con- 
 trariety of holding; so that on perhaps no point can a un-iform 
 rule of procedure, applicable in all American jurisdictions, be 
 said to exist. 
 
 § 237. The Governing Principle Stated. — Recollecting the 
 general principle, developed in the former article, that the right 
 to open and close is generally coincident with the initiatory bur- 
 den of proof, that is that it belongs to the one who, in order to 
 succeed in his action or defense, must go forward and prove 
 sometJiing in the event of no proof being offered by the oppos- 
 ing party, — we arrive at a governing principle, which should 
 furnish an adequate rule in every special proceedmg, namely, that 
 the right to open and close belongs to the party who seeks to alter 
 the existing state of things. 
 
 § 238. On an Issue of Sanity. — A simple illustration of 
 the ai)plication of this principle is found in cases where the issue 
 is whether a certain person is, or was at a certain time, sane or 
 insane. The general presumption is in favor of sanity; because, 
 according to human experience, men and women are commonly 
 sane. The party asserting the sanity of the person whose san- 
 ity is in question has therefore at the outset nothing to prove; 
 but the burden, and with it the right to open and close the con- 
 test, rests upon the person asserting the contrary. He is the one 
 who seeks to overthrow the general presumption, or to aher the 
 commonly existing state of things. Thus, on the hearing of a 
 commission of lunacy in Pennsylvania, the burden of proof, and 
 with it the right to open and close the argument, is with the 
 commonwealth.^ So, on an issue from an orphan's court, or 
 
 » Com. V. II;iskL-ll, '_> Brcwst. (Pa.) 491.
 
 Tit. ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEX AND CLOSE. 227 
 
 court of probate, to ascertain the sanity of a testator, the party 
 objecting to the probate of the will on the ground of the testa- 
 tor's insanity is the moving party, and the right is with him.^ 
 
 § 239. On Issues of Devisavit vel nou. — (1.) What rule 
 upon principle. — The principle already suggested ^ would, if 
 kept in view, furnish a uniform rule for determining with which 
 party the right lies, in cases of contested wills. That rule would 
 be that, when a will is first brought into court and exhibited for 
 probate, the right is with the proponent or party affirming the 
 will; and that, after the will has been admitted to probate in 
 common form, in any future proceeding to contest its validity, 
 whether in the same or in another tribunal, the right is with tho 
 contestant, called variously the plaintiff, the petitioner, the cave- 
 ator, or the objector. The reason is that the executor, or other 
 party who first presents the will in the probate court and seeks 
 to prove it and have it admitted to record, is the acting party; 
 he seeks to move the court ; he must bring forward some evi- 
 dence, or the court will not grant his motion. He must at least 
 produce a paper, testamentary in its character, and prove in a 
 formal way that it was executed by the person whose last Avill 
 and testament it purports to be. If, at this stage of the pro- 
 ceeding, he meets in court an objecting party, as he must pro- 
 duce some evidence in order to get what he seeks, he comes 
 within the rule above stated and more fully developed in the 
 former article, which gives the right to open and close to him.^ 
 On the other hand, if the will is admitted to probate on his mo- 
 tion, and the objecting party persists in his contest, either by an 
 appeal to a higher tribunal,** by an issue of devisavit vel non tria- 
 ble by a jury in a court of law, by a bill in chancery,^ or by 
 
 1 Dunlop V. Peter, 1 Cranch C. C. Edelen v. Edelen, 6 Md. 288 (follow ■ 
 
 (U. S.) 403. ing Brooke v. Townsheud, 7 Gill 
 
 ^ Ante, ^237. (Md.), 10. Distiugiiishiug Stockton 
 
 3 McClintock v. Curd, 32 Mo, v. Frey, 4 Gill (Md), 407. Compare 
 
 411. Kearuey v. Gough, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 
 * Rogers v. Diamond, 13 Ark. 475, 457). 
 480; McDaniel u Crosby, 19 Ark. 538; ^ Contrary to the doctrine of the 
 
 Tobiu V Jenkins, 29 Ark. 151, 153; text, it was early held in Kentucky
 
 228 OPENING THE CASE. [1 ThoiUp. Tl . , 
 
 some other mode of procedure, generally prescribed by statute, 
 he will become the moving party, the party who seeks to alter 
 the existing state of things. A presumption obtains that the de- 
 cision of the court of probate was right ; he must overthrow that 
 presumption by evidence ; and consequently the office of taking 
 the initiative in the production of evidence, and with it the right 
 to open and close the argument, rests with him. But, in the 
 various conclusions at which the courts have arrived, neither the 
 principle of the text, nor any other uniform principle, has been 
 adhered to. 
 
 (2.) Cases loliich Concede the Right to tJie Proponents. — 
 We gather from different jurisdictions a group of cases which, 
 without reference to the stage or form of the proceeding, con- 
 cede the right to the caveators, objectors or assailants of the will, 
 sometimes called petitioners, and even plaintiffs. Thus, it is 
 held in several of the New England States that, on an appeal 
 from a decree of the probate court establishing a will (the 
 ground of the contest in most cases relating to the sanity of the 
 testator), the burden of proof, and with it the right to open and 
 close, belongs to the executor, or to the party affirming the will.^ 
 These courts apply this rule without reference to the question 
 which party is the appellant, and without regard to ih.Q form of 
 the issues as made up; reasoning that, according to the sub- 
 stance of the issues, the party assailing the will takes the affirm- 
 ative. Whethef this is true, where the sole ground of the contest 
 is the alleged insanity of the testator, would seem to depend 
 upon the view which is taken of the nature of the proceed- 
 ing. If it is viewed as an original proceeding, instituted to set 
 
 that, in a statutory proceeding by a are also opposed to the conclusion of 
 
 bill to contest a will which has been the text. 
 
 admitted to probate in the county ' Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecc. Soc, 
 
 court, the burden of proof, and with 8 Conn 254; Buckrainster v. Terry, 4 
 
 it the right to open and close, belongs Mass. 593; Phelps v. Hartwell, 1 Mass. 
 
 to the proponents of the will, defend- 71; Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 ants in the proceeding. Vancleave v. 94; Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42, 53; Per- 
 
 Beam, 2 Dana (Ky.), 155; Higdon v, kins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163, l(i7; 
 
 Higdon, « J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 48. The Boardman v. Woodman^ 47 N. H. 120, 
 
 New England cases cited further on 132; Goss v. Turner, 21 Vt. 437, 440.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] KIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. • 229 
 
 aside the judgment of another tribunal, then the rule is contrary 
 to principle, for presumptively the judgment of the probate court 
 is right. But if it is viewed as a new trial in the same proceed- 
 ing, then the conclusion would be different. An appeal in cases 
 of this kind is not in the nature of a writ of error ; its purpose 
 is not to correct errors of law committed hy the original court 
 of probate ; but it merely secures to the appellant a new trial of 
 the same controversy in a higher tribunal, upon the same or 
 such other evidence as the parties may be able to produce. This 
 being the nature of the case, the proceedings in the original court 
 of probate may be disregarded ; they may be treated as having 
 been entirely vacated by the ai)peal ; they may stand as though 
 they had never taken place, — just as, in the case of appeals from 
 justices of the peace to courts of record, in most American juris- 
 dictions, in which cases the issues stand for trial exactly as they 
 stood in the court below ; and the party having the burden of proof, 
 and with it the right to open and close in that court, has it in the 
 appellate court. On this principle the New England rule may 
 be vindicated; for, as already pointed out, in every case where 
 a will is offered for probate in the tirst instance, the proponent 
 assumes the initiatory burden of proof. Viewing the trial of 
 such a contest, when appealed from the probate court, as merely 
 a new trial of the same case before a different tribunal , the New 
 England rule also conforms to another principle pointed out in a 
 preceding article, namely, that the right to open and close the 
 argument does not shift with the shifting of the burden of 
 proof. So that, although in the appellate court the objectors 
 may be required to go forward with the production of evidence, 
 the right to open and close the argument will remain with the 
 proponents.^ In Ohio, the contestants are at liberty to proceed 
 either according to the forms of a suit in chancery or by peti- 
 tion under the code of civil procedure ; but in either case it is 
 laid down that an issue must in some form be made up, " whether 
 the writing produced be the last will of the alleged testator or 
 not;" and in cither case, on the trial of such issue, the party or 
 
 ' Brooks V. Barrett. 7 Pick. (Mass.) 94.
 
 230 OPENING THE CASE. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 parties setting up tlie will liold the affirmative, and are entitled 
 to open and close ; ^ and this although the will, admitted to 
 probate and recorded, is prima facie evidence of its validity, 
 due execution and contents, so as to cast the burden of proof up- 
 on the contestant.^ The rule is the same in Kentucky, where 
 the proceeding is by a bill in chancery to set aside a will on the 
 ground of the insanity of the testator after it has been admitted 
 to probate in the county court. ^ 
 
 § 240. Ill Actions of Replevin. — Lord Tenterden said that, 
 in respect of this question, he could make no distinction between 
 replevin and other forms of action; the principles applicable to 
 all were the same. The consequence was that the plaintiff was 
 entitled to begin, as there was an affirmative issue upon him.* 
 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, following this principle, 
 held that, in replevin, where the plaintiffs alleged that the articles 
 replevied were their property, upon which issue was Joined, and 
 also that the articles were mortgaged to them, which allegation 
 was denied by the defendants, upon which denial issue was 
 joined, — the affirmative of both issues was with the plaintiffs, 
 and that they had the right to open and close. ^ But the Supreme 
 Court of Indiana has held that, where the answer sets up, in 
 avoidance, that the defendant is entitled to a lien upon the 
 goods for freight, wherefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to 
 the possession of them, and the reply is a denial of such new 
 matter, — the burden of the issue is upon the defendant, and he 
 is entitled to open and close. ^ The court, in so holding, recog- 
 nize as correct doctrine the dictum of Professor Greenleaf, that 
 whenever the plaintiff is obliged to produce any proof in order 
 to establish his right to recover, he is generally required to go 
 into his whole case and is entitled to reply." In Kentucky, 
 
 1 Brown W.Griffiths, 11 Ohio St. 329. ^ Curtis v. Wlieeler, 1 Mood. & M. 
 
 2 Banning v. Banning, 12 Ohio St. 493. 
 
 437. See also Randebaugh v. Shelley, * Belknap v. Wendell, 21 N. II. 175, 
 
 6 Ohio St. 307. 182. 
 
 3 Van Cleave v. Bean, 2 Dana (Ky.), ^ McLees v. Felt, 11 Ind. 218. 
 155; Iligdou V. Higdon, t) J. J. Marsh. ' 1 Greeul. Ev., § 74. 
 
 (Ky.) 48.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] EIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE- 231 
 
 where the answer admits that the possession of the cliattel is in 
 the pkiintiff, but denies that the chattel was taken from plaintiff's 
 possession as alleged in the petition, and then sets up that the de- 
 fendant is the owner of the chattel, — it has been held that the 
 right to open and close the argument to the jury is with the de- 
 fendant. The ruling is based upon the provision of the Ken- 
 tucky Code of Practice, § 347, that the party having the burden 
 of proof has the right to conclude the argument. "It is evi- 
 dent," said Simpson, C. J., " that, on this state of pleading, if 
 no evidence had been adduced by either party, the plaintiffs 
 would have been entitled to a judgment for the slave. Their 
 possession was prima facie evidence of title; and that being ad- 
 mitted by the defendant, it then devolved upon him to introduce 
 evidence to repel that presumption, and if he failed to do it, a 
 judgment should have been rendered against him. Consequently 
 the burden of proof was upon him, and he had a right to the 
 conclusion of the argument with the jury." ^ In Illinois it has 
 been ruled that, in replevin for goods levied upon by an officer, 
 under an execution, as belonging to the defendant in the execu- 
 tion, where the defendant pleads facts to estop the plaintiff in 
 replevin from claiming the property or denying that it belongs 
 to the defendant in execution, which facts are denied by the 
 plaintiff, the defendant has the right to open and close. '^ 
 These last decisions overlook the fact that the object of the 
 statutory action of replevin is not merely the recovery of the 
 possession of the chattel. The plaintiif seeks, in the event the 
 chattel is not restored to him prior to the trial under his delivery 
 order, or subsequently under execution issuing to enforce his 
 judgment, an alternative judgment for its value; and in either 
 event he also seeks a judgment for the damages which he has 
 sustained in consequence of its detention by the defendant. 
 Unless, therefore, the chattel has been restored to him prior to 
 the trial, and unless he also waives his right to a recovery of 
 damages for its detention, he must, if his action is brouirht in 
 the usual form, prove something in order to the full relief which 
 
 ^ Yauce r. Vauce, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 581. 2 Colwell v. Brower, 75 111. 517.
 
 232 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Tlioinp. Tr., 
 
 he seeks, notwithstanding the defendant may in his answer have 
 made the admissions above stated. In conformity with Lord 
 Tenterden's view, and with the settled rule as shown m the pre- 
 ceding article, the right to open and close would rest with him, 
 and not with the defendant. 
 
 § 241. In Cases of Replevin of Cattle Distrained for Rent 
 with Avowry of Rent in Arrear. — Unless repealed by recent 
 statutory enactments, an unjust rule of the common law still de- 
 faces the jurisprudence of two or three of the older American 
 States, by which a landlord, wliose tenant is in arrear for rent, 
 may go upon the land occupied by the tenant and drive awa}' 
 and impound any cattle which he may find there, whether be- 
 longing to the tenant or to any innocent third person, and hokl 
 them until the rent is paid, — thus making himself not only a 
 judge in his own cause, but, in a controversy between himself 
 and his tenant, rendering judgment in his own favor without no- 
 tice to the tenant, without the formality of a trial, and execut- 
 ing his judgment at the same instant, and equally without notice. 
 The remedy of the tenant, if the cattle were his, and if no rent 
 were arrear, or if the cattle were not on the freehold of the land- 
 lord at the time of the distress, was an action of replevin. In 
 this action the landlord filed a plea called an avowry, in which 
 he admitted the possession of the plaintiff, but set up that the 
 cattle were distrained when upon his (defendant's) freehold, 
 whereof the plaintiff was tenant, and that the plaintiff was in 
 arrear for the rent. To this the plaintiff Avould ordinarily re- 
 ply, either denying that he was in arrear for the rent, or alleg- 
 mg that the cattle, when distrained, were not upon the freehold 
 of the defendant, but on the freehold of some other person, nam- 
 ing him.^ There seems to be nothing to distinguish such a case 
 from any other action of replevin, in respect of the right to be- 
 gin and reply. The plaintiff would have something to prove, in 
 order to establish the value of the chattels, or the amount of 
 damage sustained by reason of their caption and detention, unless 
 
 1 See the uature of the actiou aud the form of the plea as stated in Chitty 
 PI. G18.
 
 Tit. HI, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEX AND CLOSE. 233 
 
 these allegations of his declaration, as well as that asserting his 
 original right of possession, wore admitted by the defendant's 
 plea, — which would vest the right to begin and reply in him.; 
 and it has been so held.^ Thus, in replevin for cattle alleged to 
 have been illegally taken and impounded by the defendant, the 
 defendant avowed the taking of the cattle upon a certain lot of 
 ground, alleging that the same was his soil and freehold. The 
 plaintiff replied that -the soil and freehold Avere in one T., and 
 tendered an issue thereon, which the defendant joined. It was 
 held that the plaintiff had the right to open and close. ^ 
 
 § 242. lu Cases of Interpleader. — In the case of a bill of 
 interpleader in equity, or of the corresponding proceeding under 
 codes of procedure, where a party has possession of a fund be- 
 longing to one or more of several parties who contend against 
 each other for the possession of it, and, to exonerate himself, 
 presents a bill or petition in court, praying that these rival 
 claimants may be required to interplea;d for the fund and that he 
 may pay it into court and be exonerated, — it is difficult to say 
 with which one of the rival claimants the right to beo-in and re- 
 ply rests, since all are equally plaintiffs and defendants; each is 
 an actor and each defends against the contention of the others. 
 It is supposed that such a case must yield to the sound discretion 
 of the court, and that this discretion would be best exercised by 
 giving each claimant a stated period in which to argue in support 
 of his own claim and against the evidence adduced in support of 
 the claim of his opponents. As all would be equally entitled to 
 a reply and as all could not have a reply without giving the last 
 word to some one of them, it would seem that none should be al- 
 lowed to make a second argument. A case which presented less 
 difficulty was a proceeding by garnishment, in which, under the 
 issue as made up, it was held that the interpleading claimants 
 had the affirmative and consequently the right to begin and reply. =^ 
 
 1 Kearney v. Gough, 5 Gill & J. 2 Thurston v. Kennett, 29 M". H. 
 
 (Md.) 457; Huugerford v. Burr, 4 151, 158 (following Belknap i'. Wen- 
 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 349. See also dell. 21 X. H. 175). 
 Greer v. Nourse, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. •'' Randolph Bank v, Armstrong, 11 
 
 S.) 527 la. 515,
 
 234 orExiNG THE CASE. [ITliomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 243. Ill Criminal Cases, — In criminal cases the defendant 
 is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty. The 
 burden rests upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
 every fact essential to a conviction. From this it necessarily 
 follows that, in all cases, the right to open and close is with the 
 prosecution, unless a different rule is declared by statute. This 
 is so, although the accused offers no evidence ; ^ nor does the fact 
 that the accused sets up the defense of insanity shift the right to 
 him. Where counsel are employed by private parties to assist 
 the prosecuting officer of the State in a criminal trial, it is within 
 the discretion of the court to allow such counsel to make the con- 
 cluding argument to the jury in the place of the prosecuting at- 
 torney, although the prosecution is for a felony^ which is capital.-^ 
 But a statute which changes this rule and gives the right of con- 
 cluding the argument in a particular event to the defendant, is 
 not directory but mandatory ; it clothes him with a substantial 
 right, which the court is not at liberty to disregard or abridge, 
 the denial of which will work a reversal of a conviction. It has 
 been so held in respect of a statute giving the defendant this right 
 in cases wherein he introduces no testimony.* 
 
 § 244. Ill Cases of Fraud. — A general presumption of right- 
 acting attends human conduct; and therefore fraud is never pre- 
 sumed, but must be affirmatively })roved as a fact ; and of course 
 the burden of proving it lies upon the party alleging it. It does 
 not follow from this that, where fraud is set up as a defense to 
 an action on a contract, this necessarily shifts the burden of 
 proof, and with it the right to open and close, to the defendant. 
 If the fraud which is thus pleaded is what the civilians call 
 dolus dans locum contradui, that is a fraud giving occasion to the 
 contract itself, the pleading of it may be regarded as no more 
 than a special denial of the facts on which the plaintiff predicates 
 his right of action; since it is not very material in principle 
 
 1 Doss V. Com., 1 Gratt. (Va.) Jarnagiu v. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenu.) 
 557; State v. Millicau, 15 La. Aim. 529. 
 
 557. 3 State v. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520. 
 
 2 State V. Waltham, 48 Mo. 55; * Heffrou ?;. State, 8 Fla. 73.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPKN AND CLOSE. 235- 
 
 whether the defendant merely denies the existence of the con- 
 tract, or affirmatively states certain specific facts which, if true, 
 show that the contract, though formally made, was void. There 
 is room, however, for the view that an answer setting up such a 
 defense should be regarded as setting up an extrinsic defense ; 
 since fraudulent representations or concealments, whereby a 
 party has been induced to enter into a contract, do not make the 
 contract void ah initio, that is to say, non-existent from its in- 
 ception, but merely give to the party thus induced to enter 
 into it the rijjht to disaffirm it within a reasonable time after 
 discovering the fraud. He may affirm or disaffirm, but he can- 
 not do both ; he cannot keep the benefits which he nuiy have 
 received under the contract from the other contracting party, 
 and at the same time disaffirm it so far as it imposes duties or 
 obligations upon him. His right, therefore, when sued upon 
 the contract, is at most a right of rescission, — that is, either a 
 right to have it then rescinded for the fraud, or a right to plead 
 and prove that, because of the fraud, he had, Avithin a reasonable 
 time after discovering the fraud, elected to rescind it. In this 
 view the defense of fraud, set up in an action upon the contract, 
 may w'ell be regarded as an extrinsic defense ; since it amounts 
 to something more than a mere denial or traverse of the allega- 
 tion of the existence of the contract. AVe find that courts have 
 taken both views of this question, some treating such an answer 
 as a special denial, and others treating it as the pleading of an 
 affirmative defense. Whichever view is taken, the opening and 
 closing is, on principle and authority,^ to be given to the defend- 
 ant in every case where the contract liquidates the damages. In 
 other cases, if the allegation of fraud is to be regarded as a 
 special denial, the right remains with the plaintiff; but if it is 
 to be regarded as the pleading of an extrinsic defense, the right 
 plainly rests with the defendant. 
 
 § 245. [Continued.] Opposing A^iews. — When, therefore, 
 the plaintiff sues to recover specific chattels and his right to re- 
 
 1 Elwell V. Chamberliu, 31 N. Y. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y.), 290. Compare 
 611; Breuuan v. Security Life lus. Patton v. Hamiltou, 12 Iiid. 25ij.
 
 236 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 cover is predicated on his establishing a bona fide ownership of the 
 property, he cannot, it has been held, be deprived of his right to 
 open and close, by reason of the fact that the defendant alleges 
 that his title is fraudulent and void, — the court regardinof this 
 as in the nature of a special denial. ^ In like manner, it has been 
 held that, in an action for the recovery of damages for the 
 wrongful seizure and conversion of goods to which the plaintiff 
 claims title, if the defendant answers, simply alleging fraud in 
 the assignment under which the plaintiff chums, the plaintiff, on 
 the trial, is entitled to 0})en and close; because the effect of the 
 answer is not to admit that the plaintiff ever had title to the 
 goods, but it is in effect only a special denial of the title alleged 
 in the petition. The court say: " Before the plaintiff would be 
 entitled to recover at all, he would have to show a title in him- 
 self; but the answer admits nothing but a fraudulent assignment, 
 which is not an admission of any title. This state of the plead- 
 ings, under the third clause of section 26(3 of the [Ohioj code, 
 gave the affirmative of the issue to the plaintiff." ^ On the con- 
 trary, and apparently on the view that the defense of fraud is 
 an affirmative defense, it was held, in an action to recover 
 the value of goods attached by a sheriff, where the defendant, 
 before the trial, filed a pleading in which he admitted the plaint- 
 iff 's possession and that he had the right of possession at the 
 time of the seizure, but alleged that his title w:is obtained by a 
 transfer from the attachment debtor in fraud of his creditors, — 
 that the burden, and with it the right to open and close, was with 
 the defendant. "^ So, in Georgia, it has been held that, where an 
 insolvent debtor, arrested and held in execution under a ca. sa., 
 institutes a proceeding in the inferior court to obtain the benefit 
 of the statute for the relief of insolvent debtors, and credi- 
 tors aj)pear and object on the ground of fraud, the burden of the 
 issue which is made up is on the objecting creditors, and the cor- 
 responding right to open and close rests with them. The reason 
 
 1 Churchill v. Lee, 77 N. C. 341. = Beatty v. Hatcher, 13 Oh. St. 115, 
 
 See also McRae v. Lawrence, 75 N. C. 119. 
 
 2S9; 1 Greeul. Ev., § 74, 3 Bixby v. Carskaddoa (la.), 29 N. 
 
 W. Rep. (J26,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX. ] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 
 
 237 
 
 for this liolding is that the debtor has no proof to make — noth- 
 ing to do but to take the oath and be discharged, for which 
 reason the creditor alleging the fraud assumes the substantial 
 burden of proof, and is the movant within the meaning of the 
 rule of court which governs the question.^ 
 
 § 246. In Proceedings on Reports of Commissioners, 
 Auditors, Referees. — In Indiana, on appeal from proceedings 
 before a board of commissioners in reference to the location of 
 a highway, Avhere the remonstrance is lor damages only, the re- 
 monstrant has the burden of proof, and is therefore entitled to 
 open and close. The reason seems to be that if there is no re- 
 monstrance, no proof will be required from the petitioners, but 
 the report of the viewers will be final. ^ Under the code of 
 Georgia, the report of an auditor is prima facie evidence, and 
 the burden is on the exceptor to show error in it and to make 
 good his exceptions. "When an order is made that the report be 
 filed and granting leave and time to except thereto, the report 
 becomes such evidence. The burden thus being on the excep- 
 tor, he is entitled to open and conclude, unless the other party 
 introduces no testimony, in which case the right of conclusion 
 shifts to the other party. To cross-examine a witness of the ob- 
 jector and to continue the cross-examination after a temporary 
 susj^ension of it by the court, is not an introduction of testimony 
 by the party so cross-examining, in such a sense as to give him 
 the right to the conclusion.^ In Massachusetts, where the re- 
 port of an auditor is in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant 
 files exceptions to it, the right to open and close, in the contest 
 raised by the exceptions, remains with the plaintiff, although the 
 report makes a prima facie case in his favor, — on the j^rinciple 
 alluded to in the former article, that where the rio;ht once at- 
 taches to a party, it does not shift with the shifting of the bur- 
 den of proof.* The same conclusion has been reached in New 
 
 ^ Johuson V. Martin, 25 Ga. 269, 3 Arthur v. Commissiouers, 67 Ga, 
 
 271. 221, 224. 
 
 2 Peed y. Brenneman, 89 lud. * Suow v. Batclielder, 8 Cush. 
 
 252. (Mass.) 513.
 
 238 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr.y 
 
 Hampshire, in a case which was referred to co'mmissioners under 
 a statute, who had reported in favor of the phiintiff, the defend- 
 ant electing to h ive the case' afterwards tried by a jury, and 
 filing, under the terms of the statute, a statement of the particu- 
 lars in which he expected to change the result of the report. The 
 court, on a consideration of the state of the case and the terms 
 of the statute, being of opinion that the issue was in substance 
 the general issue, in which case the opening and closing is al- 
 ways with the plaintiff, gave the right to him.^ 
 
 § 247. In Proceedings to Condemn Land and Assess Dam- 
 ages. — In a proceeding to condemn land for public uses and for 
 the assessment of the compensation to be made to the land- 
 owner, the petitioner holds the affirmative of the issue, and con- 
 sequently has the right to begin and reply, both in the introduction 
 of evidence and in the argument to the jury.^ The reason is 
 that the petitioner, the party seeking to condemn the land, is the 
 moving party. Under the constitution the land cannot be taken 
 without just compensation being made to the owner. The pro- 
 ceeding of the petitioner is therefore a proceeding to ascertain 
 what is just compensation, and, should no proof be offered under 
 this head, he would be defeated.^ 
 
 § 248. Petitioner, Claimant, Administrator. — The right is 
 with the applicant for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, under 
 a statute of Indiana, in a proceeding to try his right to such a 
 license ;^ with the claimant or creditor in case of a claim preferred 
 
 ^ Chesley v. Chesley, 10 N. H. the damage is the object of the inquiry, 
 
 327. and the burden of proof is upon him. 
 
 - South Park Commissioners v. Springfield &c. E. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Arli. 
 
 Trustees, 107 111. 489; McReynokls v. 258, 2(54 (citing Mansfield's Arkansas 
 
 Burlington &c. II. Co., 10(3 111. 152 ; Neff Dig., § 5131 ; Pierce on Railroads, 187 ; 
 
 V. Cincinnati, 32 Oh. St. 215. Mills on Eminent Domain, § 92). On 
 
 3 McReynokls v. Burlington &c. R. principle the burden in these cases 
 
 Co., lOGIU. 152. The contrary is held -vyould, however, seem to be upon the 
 
 in Arkansas, the court reasoning that petitioner, since the petitioner cannot 
 
 the land-owner is the real actor. No succeed without introducing evidence, 
 matter which party initiates the pro- * Hill v. Perry, 82 Ind. 28; Good— 
 
 ceeding, the court say, the extent of win v. Smith, 72 Ind. I13o"
 
 Tit. HI, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEX AND CLOSE. 239 
 
 against a decedent's estate which is contested;^ with the adminis-. 
 trator on the trial of exceptions filed to his linal settlement."' 
 
 § 249. Miscellaneous Cases where the Right was held to 
 be with the Plaintiff. — Passing from these we come to a num- 
 ber of miscellaneous cases, some of which appear to have been 
 decided according to principle and others not, which, within the 
 limits of this article, can only be referred to without explanation 
 or discussion. The right rests with the plaintiff in a proceeding 
 called " claim " under a statute of Georgia where land has been 
 levied upon r^ but in cases of " illegality," under another statute 
 of the same State, it is with the defendant.* It is with the plaint- 
 iff a proceeding under a statute of Texas to try the right of prop- 
 erty levied upon by execution,^ and in an action against an 
 administrator who pleads payment and plene administravit.^ 
 
 § 250. Miscellaneous Cases where the Right is with the De- 
 fendant. — In like manner the right has been held with the de- 
 fendant on a plea in abatement to an action on bills of exchano-e, 
 which sets up the non-joinder of a joint maker or promissor; ^ in 
 Alabama, where the defendant in a judgment applies for a. super- 
 sedeas under a statute, the proceeding being a substitute for the 
 common-law writ of audita querela; ^ in Delaware, on the trial of 
 a caveat filed against proceedings to locate vacant lands under a 
 private act of assembly; ^ and, as stated in the preceding para- 
 graph, on the trial of an affidavit of " illeoralitv " in Georgia. ^^ 
 
 121. 
 
 ' Yingling v. Essou, 1(5 Md. 112, though decided before the rule became 
 
 settled iu Eughiud, is in conformity 
 
 2 Taylor v. Burk. 91 Ind. 252; Hau- with correct principle. 
 
 lyn V. Nesbit, 37 Ind. 284: Brownlee v. ^ Persall v. McCartney, 28 Ala. 110 
 
 Hare, G-l Ind. 311. 125. Compare Worshara v. Goar, 4 
 
 3 Baker i;. Lyman, 53 Ga. 339. Port. (Ala.) 441 ; Shearer v. Boyd, 10 
 * Bertodi v. Ison, (39 Ga. 317. Ala. 279; Grady v. Hammond, 21 Ala. 
 5 Latliam v. Selkirk, 11 Tex. 314. 428; Edwards v. Lewis, 16 Ahi.. 813; 
 *= Clay V. Kobinson, 7 W. Va. Bruce v. Barnes, 20 Ala. 219. 
 
 ^°'^- ^ Eecords v. Melsou, 1 Houst. 
 
 ' Fowler V. Coster, Mood. &M. 241, (Del.) 139. 
 
 per Lord Tenterdeu, C. J. This case, " Bertodi v. Ison, C9 Ga. 317.
 
 240 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Tlioiiip. Tf., 
 
 Article III. — Certain Special Rules. 
 
 Section 
 
 253. Express Waiver of General Denial. 
 
 254. Failure of the Defendant to Offer Evidence. 
 
 255. Effect of Admitting Plaintiff's Cause of Action. 
 
 256. Admission of a Part of the Plaintiff's Cause of Action. 
 
 257. Eight to Begin Carries with It Right to Keply. 
 
 258. Refusal of Right to Open not Cured by Granting Right to Conclude. 
 
 259. The Right to Reply how Affected by Waiving the Right to Begin. 
 
 § 253. Express Waiver of General Denial. — As seen in the 
 former article, in a suit on a contract which liquidates the dam- 
 ao-es, if the defendant files no denial but sets up an affirmative 
 defense, the right to begin and reply is with him. It has been 
 held that this rule is capable of application in an action upon 
 such an instrument before a justice of the peace, where no 
 formal defensive pleading is required, but where, by the terms 
 of the statute, the case stands as though the defendant had 
 pleaded the general denial; in which case he may, by filing of 
 record an express waiver of the general denial, confine himself to 
 an affirmative defense and acquire the right to open and to close. ^ 
 
 § 254. Failure of the Defendant to Offer Evidence. — It 
 
 is scarcely necessary to say that the failure of the defendant to 
 offer evidence does not oust the plaintiff of his right to open and 
 close the argument, if he otherwise has it under the rules already 
 stated.^ And where the defendant files a plea setting up an 
 affirmative defense which would give him the right to begin and 
 reply if evidence were offered under it, he does not have the 
 rioht if he offers no evidence under it; for otherwise, by filing 
 a sham plea, a defendant might acquire a right which the law 
 does not intend to give him.^ 
 
 § 255. Effect of Admitting Plaintiff's Cause of Action. — 
 
 But in Massachusetts, where the courts have been driven for the 
 
 1 Cross V. Pearson, 17 Ind. 612. (Kj-)) 525; approving Sodousky v. Mc- 
 
 2 Worsham v. Goar, 4 Port. (Ala.) Gee, i J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 275, and 
 441. qualifying Goldsberry v. Stuteville, 3 
 
 3 Daviess v, Arbuckle, 1 Dana Bibb (Ky.), 346.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 241 
 
 sake of convenience to adopt a uniform rule/ giving the plaint- 
 iff the right to open and close in all cases, the fact that the de- 
 fendant admits the plaintiff's cause of action and that the only 
 issue for the jury is on the defendant's declaration in set-off, 
 does not shift the right to the defendant. ^ In New Hampshire, 
 it is held, on somewhat doubtful grounds, that, although the de- 
 fendant admits the plaintiff s claim, which he has formally de- 
 nied in his answer, yet as the admission is only in the nature of 
 evidence, it does not change the burden of proof, and does not 
 entitle the defendant to begin and reply. " The right," says 
 Bell, J., " depends on the form of the pleadings, and is deter- 
 mined by the fact that the affirmative of one of the issues is 
 upon the plaintiff ; and this is in no way affected by the cir- 
 cumstance that the plaintiff has greater or less facilities for 
 making the retjuired jn-oof . An}^ material fact may be proved 
 by the admissions of the adverse party ; and it does not change 
 the burden of proof upon the pleadings, that the defendant has 
 admitted the claim wdiich he formally denies by his plea. Nor 
 is it in any way material in what form the admission is made, 
 so long as he chooses to deny it upon the record, and join issue 
 upon it." ^ In Texas, where the-defendant files a written admis- 
 sion, in accordance Avith a rule of court numbered 31, that the 
 plaintiff has a good cause of action as set forth in his petition, 
 except so far as it may be defeated, in whole or in part, by the 
 facts constituting the defense which may be established on the 
 trial, he is entitled to open and close, both in adducing evidence 
 and in arguing the [case.* Under a rule of court, numbered 59, 
 which has, been in force for many years in South Carolina, the 
 defendant is likewise entitled to begin and reply, when he ad- 
 
 1 8 Cush. (Mass.) 603, note. which were decided under a rule of 
 
 2 Page V. Osgood, 2 Gray (Mass.), the Court of Corainou Pleas of that 
 260. Compare Bradley v. Clark, 1 State prior to the adoption of this uni- 
 Cush. (Mass.) 293; Wigglesworth v. form rule. 
 
 Atkins, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 212; Spauld- ^ Buzzell v. Snell, 25 N. H. 474, 
 
 ing V.Hood, 8 Cush. 602; Merrimau 479. 
 
 V. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40, 44,— * Ney v, Koth, 61 Tex. 374. 
 
 16
 
 242 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 mitsiipon the record the phiintiff s cause of action and takes up- 
 on himself the burden of proof .^ 
 
 § 256. Admission of a Part of the Plaintiff 's Cause of 
 Action. — It is scarcely necessary to say that the admission by 
 the defendant of a part only of the plaintiff 's case, or of a part 
 only of the evidentiary facts upon which the plaintiff relies for 
 a recovery, will not give the right to begin and reply to the de- 
 fendant. Thus, in ejectment where each party claimed as heir 
 at law, and the real question was as to the legitimacy of the de- 
 fendant, who was clearly heir if legitimate, he proposed to ad- 
 mit that, unless he was legitimate, the lessor of the plaintiff was 
 the heir at law. It was held that the admission did not give him 
 the right to begin. ^ So, in an action of ejectment, the lessor of 
 the plaintiff claimed as devisee under the will of J. S. At the 
 trial the defendant admitted the seizin of J. S., and the due ex- 
 ecution of that will, and that the plaintiff was pm?2a y^cie en- 
 titled under it, and proposed to set up a subsequent will, revok- 
 ing the first will. It was held, reversing the trial court, that the 
 plaintiff was entitled to begin. The reasoning of the learned 
 judges was, that the lessor of the plaintiff claimed as devisee un- 
 der the will, that is, under the will that was a good and valid 
 will at the time of the testator's death ; therefore the defendants 
 proposed to admit a part only of the plaintiff's case, and in 
 fact did set up a case which denied that the plaintiff was such 
 devisee.^ 
 
 1 Burckhalter v. Cowerd, 16 S. C. 386. The court also distinguish Doe 
 435, 441. d. Corbett v. Corbett, 3 Camp. 368. 
 
 2 Doe d. Warren v. Bray, Mood. & On the right of the devisee to begin. 
 M. 166. See also Goodlittle d. Revett v. Bra- 
 
 3 Doe d. Bather v. Brayne, 5 Com. ham, 4 T. R. 498; Doe d. Tucker t?. 
 Bench, 655, 670. The case was dis- Tucker, Mood & M. 536. Several 
 tinguished from cases where the other early cases were cited in the ar- 
 plaintiff claims as heir at law, and gument: Doe d. Warren v. Bray, 
 where tlie defendant admits the whole Mood. & M. 166; Doe d. Pill v. Wil- 
 title of the plaintiff, that is, tliat the son, 1 Mood. & Rob. 323; Doe d. 
 ancestor died seized and that the Lewis v. Lewis, 1 Carr. & K. 122. But, 
 plaintiff is his heir at law. Doe d. as several of these were nisi prius 
 Wollaston v. Barnes, 1 Mood. & Rob. cases, decided at a period ])efore the
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. IX.] RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. 243 
 
 § 257. Right to Begin Carries with It Right to Reply. — 
 
 The right to begin, based iipou this so-called primary burden of 
 proof, carries with it the right to reply. ^ 
 
 § 258. Refusal of Right to Open not Cured by Granting 
 Right to Conclude. — The refusal to the party having the bur- 
 den of proof, of the right to open his case to the jury, is an error 
 which is not cured by according to him the right to have the 
 concluding argument. In the opinion of the court so holding, 
 Daly, C. J., said: " The opening of the case to the jury by the 
 plaintiffs, and the laying before them of their evidence in the 
 first instance, and confining the defendant to evidence in the way 
 of reply, are a part of their legal right, of which they are de- 
 prived under exception ; and I fail to see how the error is cured by 
 allowing them afterwards what was their further rig-ht, the final 
 address to the jurv. Depriving a party of one part of his legal 
 rights is certainly not cured by allowing another part." And the 
 judgment was reversed for this error alone, although the case 
 had been already tried three times. ^ 
 
 § 259. The Right to Reply how Affected by Waiving the 
 Right to Begin. — Where the plaintiff waives the opening argu- 
 ment to the jury, it has been thought that, on strict grounds, this 
 might give the defendant the right to close; but it was said: 
 " If such a waiver should still leave the closino; argument to the 
 plaintiff, it certainly confined it to a strict reply to the defend- 
 ant's argument, excluding general discussion of the case. The 
 sole object of all argument is the elucidation of the truth, greatly 
 a.ided, in matter of fact, as well as in matters of law, by full and 
 fair forensic discussion. And this is always imperiled when 
 either party is able to present his views of the case to the jury 
 without opportunity of the other to comment on them. And if 
 
 rule had become settled in England in (Mass.) 64; Judge of Probate v. Stone, 
 the leading case of Mercer v. AVhall ii N. H. 593, <JOG; Elwell v. Chamber- 
 Co Ad. & El. (N. s.) 447), it is thought lin, 31 N. Y. 611, 612. 
 unnecessary to examine them in detail. 2 Penhryn Slate Co v. Meyer, 8 Daly 
 1 Robinson v. Hitchcocli, 8 Mete. (N. Y.), 61.
 
 244 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 the party entitled to the opening argument, relying on the 
 strength of his case without discussion, waive the right to open, 
 he waives the right to discuss the case generally, and should not 
 be permitted to do so out of his order, and after the mouth 
 of the other party is closed. His close, if permitted to close 
 the argument, would be limited to comment on the argument of 
 the other side. This is essential to the fairness and usefulness 
 of juridical discussion at the bar." ^ In a civil case, where the 
 court, after the close of the evidence, directed counsel for the 
 plaintiff to go on and state his points relied on for a recovery, 
 which counsel did, and the defendant's counsel then asked the 
 court to charge the jury, but the plaintiff's counsel insisted upon 
 his right to argue the case to the jury, which was denied him by 
 the court, — it was held that the ruling was erroneous. This 
 holding was predicated upon the view that the court, in directing 
 the plaintiff's counsel to state his points, meant to restrict him 
 in his opening to a naked statement of his points, to the exclusion 
 of argument in sujDport of them. The reviewing court did not 
 hold that, where the plaintiff has the privilege of argument and 
 declines it, he is entitled to make the closing argument, although 
 the defendant declines argument.^ In a civil case, after the tes- 
 timony is closed and the case is opened by the plaintiff's counsel, 
 if the defendant's counsel submits the cause to the jury without 
 argument on his part, the plaintiff is not entitled to make any 
 further argument to the jury.^ 
 
 1 Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 2 Cartright v. Clopton, 25 Ga. 85. 
 
 290, opinion by Ryan, C. J. ' Tyre v. Morris, 5 Harr. (Del.) 3.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. X.] THE OPENING STATE3IENT. 245 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 OF THE OPENING STATEMENT. 
 
 Section 
 
 260. Reading the Pleadings. 
 
 261. The Opening Statement. 
 
 262. AVhether Anticipate Defense of Opposing Party. 
 
 263. No Right to rehearse Facts which cannot be Proved. 
 
 264. Nor Irrelevant and Prejudicial Matters. 
 
 265. Instructing the Jury to Disregard such Statements. 
 
 266. Abuse of Discretion in this Regard Revisable on Appeal. 
 
 267. Rehearsal of Testimony not Allowed. 
 
 268. Exhibiting Diagrams. 
 
 269. Dismissing the Cause on the Plaintiff's Opening Statement. 
 
 270. Defendant's Opening Statement. 
 
 § 260. Reading the Pleadings. — The case is ordinarily 
 opened by reading the pleadings. This is usually done thus : The 
 counsel (or, if there be more than one, the junior counsel) 
 of either party, beginning with the party who sustains the bur- 
 den of proof, reads his own pleading to the jury. This for- 
 mality may be dispensed with in the discretion of the court. On 
 this subject it has been observed: "It was purely a matter of 
 discretion with the judge whether he would allow the pleadings 
 to be read. He might call upon the counsel to read them, or to 
 state their substance, if it was necessary to enable the court to 
 understand the issues which were raised and were to be tried. 
 The pleadings, which are presumed to be statements in leo-al form 
 of those facts which constitute the charge or defense of the 
 parties, are for the consideration of the court. When evidence 
 for the consideration of the jury is offered or given to sustain 
 or establish those facts, it becomes necessary for the court to 
 understand what issues are raised, and which are properly tria- 
 ble in the case. The facts stated in the pleadings, except so far 
 as admitted, could not be considered by the jury until proved
 
 246 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 by competent testimony." ^ It should be kept in mind that 
 matters concerning the pleadings are ordinarily addressed to the 
 judge, whose duty it is to slate the issues to the jury when he 
 comes to deliver to them his instructions; and that comments 
 on the pleadings to the jury are in general out of place, and 
 sometimes unprofessional. 
 
 § 261. The Opening Statement. — The counsel for the party 
 sustaining the burden of proof next makes a short address to the 
 jury, in which he states the nature of the issues to be tried and 
 what he expects to prove, in order to sustain the action (or de- 
 fense, as the case may be.) According to an approved writer, 
 " the opening address usually states first, the full extent of the 
 plaintiff's claims, and the circumstances under which they are 
 made, to show that they are just and reasonable; secondly, at 
 least an outline of the evidence by which those claims are to be 
 established ; thirdly, the legal grounds and authorities in favor 
 of the claim or of the proposed evidence." -^ 
 
 § 262. Whether anticipate Defense of Opposing Party. — 
 
 As to the foregoing there is no difference of opinion; but the 
 writer last quoted from adds: " Fourthly, an anticipation of the 
 expected defense, and a statement of the grounds on which it is 
 futile, either in law or justice, and reasons why it ought to 
 fail." 3 That such is the English practice is shown by other 
 authorities.^ In some American jurisdictions this rule is denied, 
 and it is laid down that each party should be confined to a legiti- 
 mate and proper opening of his own case, — the plaintiff 's coun- 
 sel to a statement of his cause of action, and the defendant's 
 counsel to a statement of his answer to the plaintiff's case and 
 the evidence he proposes to give to sustain it; and that it 
 is imiiroper for the counsel of the plaintiff in his opening to 
 
 1 Willis V. Forrest, 2 Duer (N. Y.), * Meagoe v. Simmons, 3 Car. & P. 
 310,317. 75; Brown v. Murray, Ry. & M. 254. 
 
 2 3 Chit. Pr. 880. See also Lacon v. Higgius, 3 Stark. 
 
 3 3 Chit. Prac. 880. 178; s. c. D. & R. 178.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. X.] THE OPENING STATEMENT. 247 
 
 state the case as made by the defendant in his answer, or the 
 evidence he expects to give in reply to the defense set up in the 
 answer.^ 
 
 § 263. No Right to Rehearse Facts which caniiot be 
 Proved. — Counsel has no right in his opening statement, to re- 
 hearse before the jury facts which he is not in a condition to 
 prove.'' It is the duty of the judge to see that this rule is not 
 overstepped, and therefore he has a right to ask the counsel if he 
 means to prove what he has stated.^ As was well said by Mr, 
 Justice Graves : " The decisions unite in substantially denying 
 the right to get before the jury a detail of the testimony ex- 
 pected to be offered, and especially any not positively entitled to 
 be introduced, and deny the right to use it as a cover for any 
 topics not fairly pertinent." ^ 
 
 § 264. Nor Irrelevant and Prejudicial Matters. — It is 
 
 equally the duty of the trial court to restrain every effort on the 
 part of counsel, in their statements to the jury, to introduce 
 matters which are foreign to ihe issues, 'and especiall}' matters 
 which have a tendency to excite the prejudice of the jury. It 
 was so held where it was charged, though not established, that 
 
 ^ Ayrault r. Chamberlain, 33 Barb, and not the case of the accused. 
 
 (N. Y.) 229, 234 ; Elwell v. Chamber- Held, that this ruling was sufficient 
 
 lin, 31 N. Y. 611, 614. Ayrault v. protection to the accused from being 
 
 Chamberlain was affirmed by the Court prejudiced by anything thus stated. 
 
 of Appeals, as stated in the opinion in Baker v. State (Wis.), 33 N. W. Hep. 
 
 Elwell r. Chamberliu, supra, but the 52; s. c. 69 Wis. 32. 
 derision affirming does not seem to ^ Stevens v. Webb, 7 Carr. & P. 60; 
 
 have been reported-. In a bastardy Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 Carr. & P. 
 
 proceeding the counsel for the prose- 222; Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371. 
 
 cution, in opening the case to the jury, He cbuld not, therefore, under the old 
 
 stated, in effect, that the accused lav^', give his client's account of the 
 
 would introduce testimony as to the transaction, where his client was not 
 
 character of the complainant, and as permitted to testify. Duncombe v. 
 
 to what he tried to prove on the Daniell, supra. 
 
 former trial. Upon objection to ^ Darby v. Ouseley, 36 Eng. Law. & 
 
 these remarks, the court promptly Eq. 518, 525, per Pollock, C. B. 
 ruled that he must confine himself to * Scripps v. Eeilly, 35 Mich. 371, 
 
 stating the case of the prosecution, 388.
 
 248 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 the plaintiff's counsel, in his openino; speech to the jury, had 
 stated that, on a former trial of the cause, the defendants had 
 suborned their little son, then a child of four years, to commit 
 perjury, and that one of the defendants had committed perjury 
 in his affidavit for a change of venue. ^ So, in an action for 
 libel it is held error to permit the plaintiff's counsel, in opening 
 his case to the jury, to read at length, against objection, otJier 
 publications by the defendant which are not relevant or admissi- 
 ble as evidence, and which, afterward on the trial are not offered 
 as evidence.^ 
 
 § 265. Instructing the Jury to disregard such Statements. — 
 
 Where counsel have overstepped the bounds of the preceding 
 rule, it is the plain duty of the judge, as was done by Lord Den- 
 man, C. J., in one case,^ to reprove the practice in the hearing 
 of the jury, and afterwards, in instructing the jury, to admonish 
 them to dismiss from their minds the statements thus made; 4 
 though where the privilege of advocacy in opening the case has 
 been greatly abused in this regard, such an instruction may not 
 
 1 Hennies ??. Vogel, 87 111. 242. disprove them, and in Tvhich the jury 
 
 2 Scripps V. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371. were addressed as to facts tending to 
 ^ Duucombe v. Daniell,8 Carr. & P. establish the innocence of the plaint- 
 
 222. Counsel in this case having re- iff, without some proof being given of 
 ferred in his opening to a document those facts by the counsel stating 
 which he did not expect to prove, Lord them; yet that has been done on the 
 Denman, by way of punishment, al- present occasion. I do not believe 
 lowed secondary evidence to be given that the statement here will make any 
 of its contents. difference in your opinion; for you 
 * In such a case Lord Denman, C. will no doubt regard (as you ought) 
 J., in his charge to the jury, rebuked the evidence only as to facts, and listen 
 the conduct of Mr. Attorney-General to counsel only for their observation 
 Campbell (Lord Denman's successor on the facts. Still, I think that the 
 asLordChief Justice), in his summing practice which has been adopted on 
 up, by saying: " With respect to the this occasion is not one encouraged, 
 manner in which the plaintiff's case and that counsel ought not to be in- 
 has been conducted, I must say that 1 structed to go into a particular detail 
 do not recollect any case in which a of circumstances, unless they aj-e pre- 
 statement was made of independent pared to give some evidence of the 
 facts not drawn from the libelous truth of those circumstances." Dun- 
 matters themselves, but tending to combe v. Daniell, 8 Carr. & P. 222, 227.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. X.] THE OPENING STATEMENT. 249 
 
 be siiiEcient to cure the irregularity, but it will be ground of 
 new trial. ^ 
 
 § 266. Abuse of Discretion in tliis Regard revisable on Ap- 
 peal. — No doubt, the limits of privilege allowed to counsel in 
 this regard are very much within the diacretionot the trial court, 
 but subject, as in other cases of the exercise of judicial discre- 
 tion, to be revised on appeal in case of manifest abuse. ^ In such 
 a case the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through Graves, 
 J., said: " There is no doubt of the right of this court to revise 
 in such a case as this. If the trial court may pursue any course 
 it pleases in relation to the opening statement, if it may act in- 
 dependently of all control, then the idea of a rule to be pre- 
 scribed by this court, under the constitution and legislative 
 enactment, for its guidance and government, is preposterous and 
 absurd. But the point is too plain for argument. This court 
 will not revise such matters unless there is plain evidence of ac- 
 tion amounting to what is called an abuse of discretion, and cal- 
 culated to injuriously affect the legal rights of a party; and 
 where such is the case, whether the result of accident, or inad- 
 vertence, or misconception, it will take cognizance. The error 
 in this case was not cured, and is one subject to review, and is 
 sufficient to require a reversal.^ 
 
 ^ Where counsel for the plaintiff, be brought into the same impartial 
 
 in his opening statement in a libel attitude by tlie court's admonition, 
 
 case, grossly abused the privilege of ■which they would have held if counsel 
 
 advocacy, by reading many irrelevant for tlie defendant in error had been 
 
 matters to the jury, prejudicial in properly confined in his opening state- 
 
 their nature, which were not even of- ment. The course of fair and settled 
 
 fered in evidence, the court held that practice was violated to the prejudice 
 
 error had been committed by the trial of plaintiff in error, and it is not a sat- 
 
 court in allowing him to pursue this isfactory answer to say that the court 
 
 course; and, although the court had went as far as "practicable afterwards to 
 
 not instructed tlie jury to disregard cure the miscliief, so long as an infer- 
 
 such matters, the reviewing court held ence remained that the remedy applied 
 
 that such an instruction, if made, by tlie court was not adequate." 
 
 would not have cured tlie error. " Be- Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371, 391. 
 cause," said Graves, J., ''it is quite ^ Ayrault v. Chamberlain, 33 Barb, 
 
 impossible to conclude that the jury (X. Y.) 229, 235. 
 
 had not been influenced too far by the ^ Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 37X, 
 
 erroneous rulings and proceedings, to 392.
 
 250 OPENING THE CASE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 267. Detailed Rehearsal of Testimony not allowed. — 
 
 In the case last cited, where this subject was much considered, 
 it was said by Mr. Justice Graves: "A brief summary or 
 outline of the substance of the evidence intended to be offered, 
 with requisite clear and concise explanations, are considered 
 proper. But a relation of expected oral testimony at length, or 
 a reading of expected documentary proofs at large, or any other 
 course fitted to mislead the triers, should not be tolerated. Of 
 course, there may be cases and instances where the statement of 
 the evidence itself, or a reading of a paper, may be convenient 
 and harmless. Such, however, must be exceptional, and not 
 within the spirit of the general requirement." ^ From this it 
 would necessarily follow that counsel is not confined, in the in- 
 troduction of evidence, to the statement which he makes in the 
 opening of his case; ^ since this would oblige him, at his peril, 
 to announce to the jury each item of evidence which he intended 
 to introduce, — a practice which would be a reversal of the rule 
 above declared.^ 
 
 § 268. Exhibiting- Diagrams. — In an action for damages for 
 a negligent injury, w^here the exact location of the injury is 
 material, it is the right of the counsel for either party to exhibit 
 to the jury, in his opening statement, a diagram showing the 
 place of the injury, the same being correctly drawn and admis- 
 sible in evidence, and in fact afterwards admitted; and a denial 
 of this right to counsel is error.* 
 
 1 Scripps V, Keilly, 35 Mich, 371, evidence. Darby v. Oiiseley, 36 Eng. 
 388. L. & Eq. 518, 525. Before tlie pas- 
 
 2 Kelly V. Troy lus. Co., 3 Wis. sage of this act, as stated by Pollock, 
 254. C. B., "you never could compel a de- 
 
 ^ It has been held, tn view of the feudant's counsel to say whether he 
 
 provision of the Englisli Common Law would call witnesses or not, until he 
 
 Procedure Act, which has been more had concluded his address to the 
 
 or less adopted in this country jxiry. That makes the defendant's 
 
 (Stat. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, sec. 18), counsel bind himself on the subject 
 
 that, where counsel announce their before the plaintiff concludes his 
 
 intention not to adduce evidence, they case." Ibid. 
 
 cannot alter their purpose at a subse- * Battisliill v. Humphrey (Mich.), 
 
 ■quent stage of the trial and introduce 31 N. W. Rep. 894.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. X.] THE OPENING STATEMENT. 251 
 
 § 269, Dismissing- the Cause on the Plaintiff's Opening 
 Statement. — In jurisdictions where tlie court has power to order 
 a nonsuit, it is the frequent practice of the judge, where the 
 plaintiff 's opening statement discloses no cause of action, without 
 waiting for the introduction of evidence, to direct a nonsuit at 
 once. The principles on w^hich he should proceed in so doing 
 are analogous to those relating to a demurrer to the evidence, or 
 to a motion for a nonsuit or for a peremptory instruction in behalf 
 of the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff 's case. All the 
 facts referred to in his opening, or offers of proof, should be 
 considered, including facts not stated in the complaint, as well as 
 those stated, unless objection to proof of such additional facts is 
 made on the specific ground that it is not admissible under the 
 pleadings.^ 
 
 §270. Defendant's Opening Statement. — Eegularly, the 
 defendant's opening statement is not made until the evidence for 
 the plaintiff has been hea/d and the plaintiff has rested. He 
 then introduces his case by an opening statement; and, in a 
 criminal case, where a statute prescribes that the defendant shall 
 be allowed to make his opening statement at this time, it is error 
 to require him to make it immediately after that of the prose- 
 cuting attorney, or not at all.^ 
 
 1 Clews V. Bauk (N. Y.), 11 N.East. dence in support of the prosecution. 
 Rep. 814; s. c. 105 N. Y. 398. 2. The defeudaut or his couusel may 
 
 2 Willey V. State, 52 lud. 421. This then state his defense and offer evi- 
 was held under a statute which pro- deuce in support thereof." lud. Acts 
 vided: " 1. The prosecuting attorney 1873, chap. 74, page 183; Buskirk Ind. 
 must state the case, and offer the evi- Prac. 403.
 
 252 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 EXCLUDING WITNESSES FROM THE COURT ROOM. 
 
 Section 
 
 275. The Practice Stated. 
 
 276. Discretionary witli Trial Court. 
 
 277. Doctrine that it is a Matter of Right. 
 
 278. What Witnesses Exempt Irom the Rule. 
 
 279. Parties in Interest cannot be so Excluded. 
 
 280. Nor the Agent of a Party, when. 
 
 281. Consequences of Violating the Rule 
 
 282. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 § 275. The Practice stated. — "In the trial of causes, both, 
 civil and criminal, it is a rule of practice, devised for the discov- 
 ery of truth and the detection and exposure of falsehood, and 
 well adapted to the ends designed, for the presiding judge, on the 
 motion of either party, to direct that the witnesses shall be exam- 
 ined out of the hearing of each other. Such an order, upon the 
 motion or suggestion of either party, it is said, is rarely with- 
 held. But, by the weight of authority, the party does not seem 
 entitled to it as a matter of right. ^ To effect this object, gen- 
 erally the respective parties are required to disclose the names 
 of the witnesses intended to be examined, and then the wit- 
 nesses are simply ordered to withdraw froni the court room and 
 directed not to return until called; or, as is sometimes the case, 
 they are placed under charge of an ofBcer of the court, to be 
 kept by him out of hearing, in the jury room or some other con- 
 venient place, and brought into court when and as they may be 
 severally needed for examination. If a witness, or the officer in 
 charge, willfully disobeys or violates such order, he is liable to 
 be punished for his contempt; and at one time, according to the 
 English practice, it was considered that the judge, m the exercise 
 of his discretion, might even exclude the testimony of such a 
 
 1 Citing 1 Greenl. Ev., § 432.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XI.] EXCLUDING WITNESSES. 253 
 
 witness. But now, it seems to be the practice to allow the wit- 
 ness to be examined, subject to observation as to his conduct in 
 disobeying the order." ^ 
 
 § 276. Discretionary with the Trial Court. — According to 
 a much prevailing view, whether the court will thus sequester 
 the witnesses, or, as it is sometimes called, "put them under the 
 rule," is a matter of sound judicial discretion, which discretion will 
 not be revised on error or appeal in the absence of an appear- 
 ance of abuse. 2 Upon this question the Supreme Court of 
 Alabama, speaking through Somerville, J., said: " The exam- 
 ination of witnesses in cases, civil or criminal, is in a great 
 measure, necessarily under the control of the presiding judge, and 
 subject to a just, wise and sound judicial discretion. If he deem 
 it necessary, in order to elicit the truth and promote justice, he 
 may, jDroprio mohi, or on the application of either party to 
 the suit or proceeding, order all the witnesses, except the one 
 under examination, to leave the court. This practice is thought 
 to be coeval with judicature, having long been administered in the 
 British Parliament, and the courts of both England and Scot- 
 land. When requested by counsel or parties, though not a mat- 
 ter of right, the order is rarely withheld."^ Accordingly, it 
 has been held not error, in the absence of a plain appearance of 
 abuse of discretion and prejudice, to admit, against the objection 
 of the defendant, the testimony of a witness for the State in a 
 criminal case, who had not been put under the rule.* In Georgia it 
 has been ruled that, where there is an order for the separation 
 
 * Hey V. Com., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 94G, Tex. App. 150; Ham v. State, 4 Tex. 
 
 948, opinion by Burks, J. App, 645; Estep v. State, 9 Tex. 
 
 2 EiTissman v. Errissman, 25 111. App. 360; Jolmson tj. State, 10 Tex. 
 
 136; McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; App. 671; People v. O'Lougliliu, 3 
 
 Johnson V. State, 2 Ind. 652; Benaway Utah, 133. Compare Tex. Code Cr. 
 
 V. Couyne,3 Chand. (Wis.) 214; Nel- Proc., art. 666; Brown v. State, 3 Tex. 
 
 son V. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 237. App. 295. 
 
 Powell V. State, 13 Tex. 244, 252; 3 Ryan u. Couch, 66 Ala. 244, 248; 
 
 Walling V. State, 7 Tex. App. 625; citing 2 Best Ev., § 636; 1 Greenl. Ev., 
 
 People V. Sam Lung (Cal.), 11 Pac. § 432. 
 
 ■Rep. 673; Avery v. State, 10 Tex. < ^very r. State, 10 Tex. App. 192, 
 
 App. 199, 213; Jones v. State, 3 213.
 
 25-4 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 of the witnesses, exceptions therefrom as to witnesses not parties 
 to the suit, are discretionary with the court, and in the particu- 
 lar case the discretion was not abused in refusing to make the ex- 
 ception requested.^ 
 
 § 277. Doctrine that it is a Matter of Right. — In an English 
 nisi prius case Mr. Baron Alderson said that it was " the right of 
 either party at any moment to require that the unexamined wit- 
 nesses shall leave the court." ^ But this was very different from 
 holding that a judgment would be reversed because the trial 
 court had refused to grant such an application. In 1881 the 
 Supreme Court of Texas, in a heated decision delivered by the 
 Commission of Appeals, a body organized to assist the Supreme 
 Court in clearing its docket, held that it is error in a civil case, 
 for which a judgment will be reversed, to refuse the application 
 of a party thus to exclude witnesses from the court room. The 
 reasoning of the learned commissioner appealed to general prin- 
 ciples of law, but he failed to cite any common-law authorities 
 which sustain the court in its conclusion. On the contrary, the 
 text writers cited by him do not sustain the conclusion of the 
 court. ^ The opinion is capable of being sustained on the ground 
 that, in the particular case, a suit to establish a nuncupative will 
 it was an abuse of discretion not to grant such rule, and upon no' 
 other. In Tennessee the rule is favored as a mode of eliciting 
 the truth, and may be demanded as a matter of right in all cases, 
 upon affidavit of facts showing its necessity.* In Georgia it has 
 been ruled that the defendant may demand the separation of the 
 witnesses.^ In New Jersey it is a strict rule of practice that the 
 prisoner's witnesses shall not be in the court room while the 
 State's witnesses are being examined.^ 
 
 § 278. What Witnesses exempt from the Rule.- — It has 
 
 been said that ordinarily witnesses who are summoned as experts, 
 
 1 City Bank v. Kent, 57 Ga. 285. (Tenn.) 363; Nelson v. State, 2 Swan 
 
 2 Southey v. Nash, 7 Carr. & P. (Tenn.), 237; Smith v. State, 4 Lea 
 632. (Tenn.), 428, 430. 
 
 8 Watts V. Holland, 50 Tex. 54. ^ Johnson v. State^ 14 Ga. 55. 
 
 * Kainwater v. Elmore, I Heisk. 6 State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220'
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XI.] EXCLUDING WITNESSES. 255 
 
 as well as attorneys in the case, and witnesses called to testify to 
 the character of another witness, are excepted from the rule and 
 permitted to remain in the court room while the rest of the wit- 
 nesses are sent out.^ Accordingly, where the court exempted 
 from the rule an attorney of the court, who was one of the pros- 
 ecuting counsel in the case, it was held that there was nothing 
 which could be assigned for error. ^ When medical experts are 
 called solely as such, the better practice is said to be to allow 
 them to remain in the court room and hear the testimony of all 
 the other witnesses, in order that, from the whole testimony, 
 they may be able to determine, from the evidence itself, the mat- 
 ter upon which their opinion is desired.^ It is submitted by the 
 writer, however, that this is not a sound reason for allowing ex- 
 pert witnesses to be exempt from the rule; since, as elsewhere 
 seen,'* the weight of opinion is that such witnesses do not deliver 
 their testimony from their own conclusions as to the evidence given 
 by the other witnesses, but upon questions propounded to them 
 by counsel, presenting hypothetical states of fact, which the jury 
 are or are not to find true, accordingly as they may view the evi- 
 dence. It is laid down in Texas that where expert witnesses have 
 been put under the rule, and have not been permitted to hear 
 the evidence of the other witnesses, a hypothetical case embrac- 
 ing the facts in evidence may, in all cases, be submitted to them 
 for their opinions.^ And finally, it is laid down that the court 
 does not abuse its discretion in the slightest by subjecting medi- 
 cal experts to the operation of the rule.^ The w^riter expresses 
 the view, with confidence, that it is the better exercise of discre- 
 tion to put such witnesses under the rule ; since, where they are 
 permitted to remain in court during the trial, they are apt to 
 form theories from the evidence toward which their testimony 
 will be directed, instead of its being directed in a colorless manner 
 
 1 Brown v. State, 3 Tex. App. * Post, ch. XXII. 
 
 295. 5 Webb v. State, 9 Tex. App. 4P0j 
 
 2 PoTvell V. State, 13 Tex. 244. Hunt v. State, 9 Tex. App. 156. 
 
 3 .Johnson v. State, 10 Tex. App. 6 Johnson v. State, 10 Tex. App. 
 571, 577. 571, 577.
 
 256 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 to the hypothetical states of fact which may be submitted to them 
 by counsel on either side. 
 
 § 279. Parties in Interest cannot be so excluded. — An order 
 excluding witnesses from the court room ought not to be extended 
 to parties in interest; since, although they are competent to tes- 
 tify as witnesses, it is their right to be present and to aid in or 
 observe the progress of the trial. ^ " It is obvious," said Somer- 
 ville, J., " that this rule of exclusion ought never to be applied 
 so as to debar a party to a suit from being present during the 
 progress of his cause. He has a right to be present, for the 
 purpose of aiding and instructing his counsel in prosecuting or 
 defendino- his suit. To order him from the court room while his 
 case is in process of judicial investigation would be violative of 
 the spirit, if not of the very letter of the Declaration of Rights, 
 which declares that ' no person shall be debarred from prose- 
 cuting or defending, before any tribunal in this State, by himself 
 or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.' " ^ 
 
 § 280. Nor the Agent of a Party, when. — The Supreme 
 Court of Alabama, while conceding that the exercise of this dis- 
 cretion is not revisable on error or appeal, nevertheless, in view 
 of the practical importance of the question, have deemed it 
 proper to indicate the correct rule of practice in cases of this 
 character, as follows : " Where a judge is satisfied, from the state- 
 ment of counsel in open court, or otherwise, that a witness in a 
 cause has acquired such an intimate knowledge of the facts, by 
 reason of having acted as the authorized agent of either of the 
 parties, that his services are required by counsel in the manage- 
 ment of the trial, he ought not, especially in the necessary ab- 
 sence of his principal, to be placed under the rule. * * * 
 To exclude such a one from the valuable privilege of consultation 
 with the attorney of his principal during the progress of the trial, 
 is not required by the reason of this rule of evidence. The 
 sounder and better practice is to permit him to remain in the 
 <30urt room." ^ 
 
 1 Chester v. Bower, 55 Cal. 46. ^ Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244^ 
 
 2 Ryan v. Couch, 6G Ala. 244, 248. 248.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XL] EXCLUDING WITNESSES. 
 
 257 
 
 §'281. Consequences of Violating- the Rule. — The better 
 opinion now is that the violation of the rule by a witness, 
 although it will subject him to punishment for contempt of court, 
 will not deprive the party, whose witness he is, of the benefit of 
 his testimony, where the party himself is without fault, and that 
 the court cannot lawfully refuse to permit the examination of 
 the witness ; ^ although it will be a matter for observation to the 
 jury upon his evidence. ^ After such an order has been made, it 
 is no cause for a new trial that a witness, who had not gone out, 
 but had remained and heard the other witnesses, was afterwards 
 allowed to be examined ; ^ but it will be a matter of discretion 
 with the trial court whether a new trial will be granted for such 
 a reason, and this discretion is not reviewable.* In Illinois it is 
 laid down that where a witness, after being put under the rule, 
 converses with other witnesses, after they have testified, and with 
 counsel calling him, in violation of the court's order, it is a mat- 
 
 1 2 Tayl. Ev. (5th Am. ed.) 744; 1 
 Bish. Crim. Proc, §§ 1191, 1192; Cob- 
 bett V. Hudson, 1 El. & Bl. 11; Cook v. 
 Xethercote, 6 Carr. & P. 741; Res v. 
 Coliey, 1 Mood. & M. 329; Thomas v. 
 David, 7 Carr. & P. 350; Chaudler v. 
 Horue, 2 Mood. & Rob. 423; Nelson v. 
 State, 2 Swan (Teun.), 237; Hey 
 V. Com , 32 Gratt. (Va ) 94^1; Burk v. 
 Audis, 98 Ind. 79; Davis v. Byrd, 94 
 Ind. 525 (overruling Jackson v. State, 
 14 Ind. 327) ; Davenport v. Ogg, 15 
 Kan. 363; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 
 €24; State v. Salge, 2 Nev. 321; Grimes 
 V. Martin, 10 la. 347; Bell v. State, 44 
 Ala. 393; Keith v. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435; 
 People V. Boscovitch, 20 Cal. 436; 
 Gregg V. State, 3 W. Va. 705; Smith v. 
 State, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 42.s; Keith v. 
 Wilson, 6 Mo. 435; Lassiter v. State, 
 67 Ga. 739; Rooks v. State, (55 Ga. 330 
 (citing Ga. Code, § 38(i3) ; Thomas v. 
 State, 27 Ga. 288; Hubbard v. Hub- 
 bard, 7 Ore. 42, 47. It was formerly 
 held in Indiana to be a matter of dis- 
 cretion for the court trying tlie cause, 
 
 whether the testimony of a witness 
 who liad willfully disobeyed the order 
 of the court to remain out of the court 
 room until called, should be rejected 
 for that reason, and that this discre- 
 tion would not be reviewed on appeal 
 unless it appeared tliat it had been 
 abused. Porter v. State, 2 Ind. 435; 
 Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327. But in 
 later cases the same court have 
 adopted this as the true rule : " Where 
 a party is without fault, and the wit- 
 ness disobeys an order directing a 
 separation of witnesses, the party 
 shall not be denied the right of hav- 
 ing the witness testify, but the con- 
 duct of tlie witness may go to the 
 jury upon the question of his credi- 
 bility." Davis V. Byrd^ 94 Ind. 525; 
 Burk V. Andis, 98 Ind. 59, 64. 
 
 2 Chandler v. Home, 2 Mood. & 
 Rob. 423. 
 
 3 State V. Sparrow, 3 Murph.(X. C.) 
 487. 
 
 ^ Purnell v. Purnell, 89 N. C. 42; 1 
 Greeul. Ev., §§ 431, 432, and notes. 
 
 1'
 
 258 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 ter of discretion with the court whether to allow him to testify 
 as a witness, and hence not error to permit him to testify. 
 Scholfield, J., said: " If witnesses, after an order of separation, 
 upon being spoken to by third parties in violation of the order 
 of court, would become thereby disqualified to testify, a wide 
 door would be open to unscrupulous friends of those charged 
 with crime to disqualify material prosecuting witnesses. There 
 might probably be such an interference with witnesses, in disre- 
 gard of the order of court, as would justify the court in setting 
 aside a verdict based upon their evidence, the defendant being 
 free of fault, and the facts beino; brought to his attention for 
 the first time after the examination of all the witnesses had con- 
 cluded." ' 
 
 §282. [Continued.] Illustrations. — In Tennessee, where, 
 as already seen, the rule is a matter of right when the demand 
 for it is supported by afiidavit, if it has been asked for by both 
 parties, and a witness is discovered who knows an important 
 fact, who has been in court and heard the testimony of other 
 witnesses, it will not be ground of refusing to allow him to tes- 
 tify that he was not under the rule with the other witnesses.'^ In 
 Georgia, although at the request of the defendant's counsel in a 
 criminal case, the witnesses had been sworn and put under the 
 rule, yet it was no ground for a new trial that a witness who re- 
 mained in the court room was allowed to testify merely as to the 
 correctness of a diagrcnn which he had made of the scene of the 
 homicide.^ In the same State it is held that, where objection is 
 made to the witness on this ground, if the witness testifies that 
 he heard none of the testimony nor the prisoner's statement, the 
 court may admit him to testify.'* It is further held in the same 
 State that the fact that a witness for the State, after being put 
 under the rule, and, after having testified, may have heard thi 
 
 1 Bullmeru. People, 95 111.394,399. 18 Oh. 99; State v. Fitzsimmous, 30 
 
 To the same doctrine see State v. Mo. 236. 
 
 Brookshire, 2 Ala. 203; Sidgreaves 2 gmith w. State, 4Lea (Tenu.), 428. 
 
 V. Myatt, 22 Ala. 617; Sartorious v. ^ Betts v. State, G6 Ga. 508. 
 
 State, 24 Miss. 602; Laughlin v. State, * Lyman v. State, (;9 Ga. 405.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XL] EXCLUDING WITNESSES. 259 
 
 prisoner's statement, would not disqualify him from being re- 
 introduced as a witness.^ The same court has alt^o held that 
 the fact that the bailiff in charge of the jury is a witness in a 
 criminal trial and is put under the rule, but nevertheless retires 
 with the jury (upon a call of nature) is no ground for a new 
 trial. ^ In Louisiana, it was held that the accused in a criminal 
 trial could not be deprived of the testimony of some of his wit- 
 nesses, who were not in court when the order was made, and 
 who only presented themselves the day after. The court had 
 no hesitation in saying that, when the witnesses made state- 
 ments under oath that they had held no communication with the 
 accused on the subject of the trial, they should have been per- 
 mitted to testify.^ In general, it may be stated that, where a 
 witness, who has been thus excluded, has inadvertently come in- 
 to court in vioUition of the order, the court should have no hes- 
 itancy in receiving his testimony.* 
 
 1 Lyman v. State, 69 Ga. 405. * People v. O'Loughlin, 3Utha, 133; 
 
 2 Wade V. State, 65 Ga. 756. Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214. See fur- 
 
 3 State V. Gregory, 33 La. Ann. 737, the r, Anon.,. 1 Hill (S. C), 251 ; State 
 742. V. McElmurray, 3 Strobh. (S. C.) 33.
 
 260 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tllomp. Tl', 
 
 CHAPTEK XII. 
 
 OF THE TRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Section 
 
 285. Preliminary. 
 
 286. Privilege against Self-Crimination. 
 
 287. Against Questions Tending to Degrade. 
 
 288. Against Questions Exposing to Penalty or Forfeiture. 
 
 289. Against Questions Forming Links in a Chain of Criminating Evidence. 
 
 290. Disclosing the Names of Accomplices. 
 
 ■ 291. [Continued.] Application of this Rule. 
 
 292. Compelling Witness to Exhibit his Body. 
 
 293. Effect of Statutes preventing Answer from being Used against Witness. 
 
 294. Illustration under Massachusetts Statute. 
 
 295. Effects of Promise not to Prosecute. 
 
 296. Privileged Communications between Attorney and Client 
 
 297. [Continued.] History of this Privilege. 
 
 298. [Continued.] Rule Limited where Question of Crime not Involved. 
 
 299. [Continued.] Confidential Communications. 
 
 300. [Continued.] Witness not Exclusive .Tudge of Privilege. 
 
 301. [Continued.] These Principles, how far changed by Statutes Compelling 
 
 Parties to Testify. 
 
 302. Attorney has no greater Privilege than Client. 
 
 303. Trade Secrets Privileged. 
 
 304. Refusing to Expose Defense. 
 
 305. Testimony of the Judge as to Former Trials. 
 
 306. Privilege must be Claimed by the Witness himself. 
 
 307. Privilege may be Waived, 
 
 308. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 309. Question Decided by Court, not by Witness. 
 
 310. Compulsory Answer not Evidence against Witness. 
 
 311. Whether Refusal to Answer is P^videuce against Witness. 
 
 312. Whether Court Bound to Instruct Witness. 
 
 § 385. Preliminary. — It is supposed in this chapter that the 
 witness is on the stand and undergoing examination, and that a 
 question is put to him in respect of which he interposes a claim 
 of privilege. It is not the design of this chapter to consider 
 the subject of privilege in its relation to the compulsory attend- 
 ance of witnesses, the service of subpoenas upon them under
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIL] THE PRIVILEGK OF WITNESSES. 261 
 
 circumstances which clothe them with a privilege;^ or (except 
 incidental!}' ) their privilege in respect of the production of books 
 and papers ; ^ or the right of an accused person, testifying as a wit- 
 ness for himself, to refrain from answering certain questions on 
 cross-edzambiation.^ These questions are elsewhere considered. 
 The privilege which it is the purpose of this chapter to discuss 
 relates to the claim which the witness may interpose against being 
 compelled to answer particular questions. 
 
 286. Privilege Against Self-Crimination. — It is a funda- 
 mental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, that a person, 
 summoned as a witness before any inquisitorial body, judicial or 
 legislative, is absolutely privileged from answering a question 
 put to him, if he will state upon his oath, in answer to such 
 question, that he refuses to answer the same, for the reason that 
 his answer thereto, if given, would subject him to an indictment 
 for a crime ; and that, if such an answer be not deemed sufficient 
 by the inquisitorial body, and the witness be imprisoned for con- 
 tempt for refusing further to answer, he will be entitled to his 
 discharge on habeas corpus.^ The rule, as stated by Chief Justice 
 Marshall in Burr's Trial,^ is this: "It is the province of the 
 court to judge whether any direct answer to the questions that 
 may be proposed will furnish evidence against the witness. If 
 such answer may disclose a fact which forms a necessary and 
 
 ^ Ante,ch.Yl. 128; Chamberlin v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 
 
 2 Post, ch. XXVI. 491; Robinson v. Neal, 2 T. B. Men. 
 
 3 Pust, ell. XXIII. (Ky.) 212; Neale v. Cunuiugliara, 1 
 * Emory's Case, 107 Mass. 172. Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 7G; Hayes v. 
 
 It Tvas so held in this case, where the Caldwell, 10 111. 333; United States v. 
 committing body was a legislative Moses, 1 Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 170; 
 body, — the Senate of the State of United States v. Lynn, 2 /fZ. 309; San- 
 Massachusetts. See also People v. derson's Case, 3 Id. 638; Ex parte 
 O'Brien, 66 Cal. 602; Taylor v. Mclr- Lindo, 1 Id. 445; United States v. 
 win, 94 111.488; Re Graham, 8 Ben. Strother, 3 Id. 432; Short t;. State, 4 
 (U. S.) 419; Lister u. Boker, 6 Blackf. Harr. (Del.) 568; State v. Marshall, 
 (Ind.) 439; Coburn v. Odell, 30 N. H. 36 Mo. 400; Fries v. Brugler, 12 N. J. 
 540; Janrin u. Scammon,29 N. H. 280; L. 79; Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 
 People V. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 229 ; (N. Y.) 254. 
 People V. Rector, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) ^ i jjyrr Trial, 245. 
 569; Poole v. Perrett, 1 Spears (S. C),
 
 262 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 essential link in the chain of testimony, which would be sufficient 
 to convict him of any crime, he is not bound to answer it so as 
 to furnish matter for that conviction. In such case, the witness 
 must himself judge what his answer will be ; and if he say on 
 his oath that he cannot answer without accusing himself, he will 
 not be compelled to answer." ^ Some of the constitutional pro- 
 visions extending this immunity to witnesses are construed to 
 apply only in cases where the person himself is prosecuted, and 
 not merely where he is called upon to testify in a criminal pro- 
 ceeding against another. This construction has been placed upon 
 the provision of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the 
 United States, that " no person shall be compelled in any crim- 
 inal action to be a witness against himself." ^ 
 
 . § 287. Against Questions whicb tend to Degrade. — The 
 
 rule is that a witness is not bound to answer a question the an- 
 swer to which will subject him to disgrace, unless the evidence 
 is material to the issue on trial, ^ or unless it tends to impeach his 
 credibility, under principles hereafter stated.^ In England the 
 rule is said to be that the asking of questions which tend to de- 
 grade the witness is regulated by the discretion of the trial court 
 in each particular case.^ It has been said by Mr. Justice Cooley : 
 *' When discreditable facts are aside from the issue, a witness 
 
 1 This rule was declared by the Su- testify to facts tending to prove the 
 
 preme Court of Missouri in 1829 to be guilt of the club, in a prosecution 
 
 the true rule of law. Ward v. State, against it by indictment for the illegal 
 
 2 Mo. 120, 123. See also South Bend sale of intoxicating liquors. Chesa- 
 
 V. Hardy, 98 Ind. 577, 583. peake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446. 
 
 2 United States v. McCarthy, 18 ^ Lohman v. People, 1 Comst. (N. 
 
 Fed. Eep. 87; s. c. 21 Blatchf. (U. S.) Y.) 379; Great Western Turnpike Co. 
 
 4G9. Under a statute of Maryland v. Loomis, 32 N. Y. 127; State v. 
 
 (Md. Acts of 1882, chap. 112), provid- Staples, 47 N. H. 113. The court 
 
 ing that, in case of the illegal sale of may, in its discretion, permit disparag- 
 
 liquor by any company or corporation, ing questions to be asked, but it is not 
 
 "each or any member of such com- error to exclude them even when they 
 
 pany, corporation, or association, are irrelevant. Conway v. Clinton, 
 
 shall be liable, and shall suffer impris- Utah T. 215, 220. 
 onmeut as prescribed by this act," — 4 post, ch. XVII, Art. III. 
 
 it is lu'ld that a member of an incor- ^ Rex v. Pitcher, 1 Carr. «& P. 85. 
 
 porated club cannot be compelled to
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 2G3 
 
 may sometimes refuse to impair his evidence by a disclosure ; 
 but when they are relevant, it is no excuse for his refusal to tes- 
 tify concerning them that they may exhibit him in a light that 
 is not creditable. His dishonesty or fraud, when not criminal, 
 may as properly be proved by him as by any other person."^ 
 " If the answer," says Mr. Commissioner Blaclv, " would tend 
 merely to degrade the character of the witness, and if it be rele- 
 vant and material to the issue, w^hether it will go to his credibility 
 or not, he may not decline to answer, and the party cannot ob- 
 ject. If, however, the answer to a question on cross-examination 
 would be collateral and irrelevant, and would merely disgrace 
 the witness, but would not affect his credibility, the witness may 
 decline to answer; the court should in all cases sustain any ob- 
 jection made by counsel, and the court may, without objection 
 made, interpose to protect the witness from the impertinence. ^ 
 If the cross-examination tends merely to disgrace the witness, 
 but relates to a collateral and independent fact, and goes clearly 
 to the credibility of the witness, whether in such case he has the 
 privilege to decline or not, the matter so far rests in the discre- 
 tion of the trial court that, in the absence of a claim of privilege, 
 if the question relate to a matter of recent date and would mate- 
 rially assist the jury or court in forming an opinion as to his 
 credibilit}', the court will usually require an answer, over the 
 objection of counsel, but may sustain an objection. When the 
 answer would tend to criminate the witness, but would be collat- 
 eral and irrelevant to the issue, and yet would affect his credibility, 
 if he do not claim his privilege, no distinction, so far as the dis- 
 cretion of the court and the right of the party to call for its 
 exercise by an objection are concerned, can be perceived between 
 such a case and one differing from it only in that the answer 
 would merely disgiace the witness. In short, where the question 
 relates to a particular act which is collateral and irrelevant to the 
 issue, it is proper for the party to object, and it is within the 
 srund discretion of the court, where the witness does not exercise 
 a privilege to decline, to permit an answer, if, by affecting the 
 
 ' Jenuiugs v. Prentice, 39 Mich. 421. - Citing 1 Greenl. Ev., § 458.
 
 264 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 credibility of the witness, it will subserve justice, or to sustain 
 the objection if such purpose will not be promoted by the answer ; 
 and if the answer would not affect the credibility of the witness, 
 the court should sustain the objection, and has no discretion to 
 admit the evidence/' ^ This immunity is not founded in consti- 
 tutions, hwtYesis on principles of the common law; therefore 
 it is competent for the legislature to pass an act under which 
 a witness may be compelled to answer questions which will in- 
 volve him in shame and reproach.^ Where the witness claims 
 his privilege on this ground, he should not be obliged to disclose 
 why he declines to answer the question ; because so to do would 
 of itself defeat his claim of privilege/^ 
 
 § 288. Against Questions Exposing to Penalty or Forfeit- 
 ure. — By the Code of Civil Procedure of Kew York,"* a wit- 
 ness shall not be required to give an answer which will tend to 
 
 » South Bend v. Harclie, 98 lud. 
 577, 583, 584. For cases illustrating 
 the rule, see Great Western Turnpike 
 Co. V. Loomis, 32 N. Y. 127; Shepherd 
 V. Parker, 36 N. Y. 517; Vaughn v. 
 Paine, 3 N. J. L. 728; Sodusky v. Mc- 
 Gee, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 621; Camp- 
 bell V. State, 23 Ala. 44; United States 
 V. Dickinson, 2 McLean (U. S.), 325; 
 People V. Heneck, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 82 ; Grannis v. Brandon, 5 Day (Conn.), 
 2C0; State v. Bailey, 2 N. J. L. 415; 
 United States v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. 
 (U.S.) 729; Galbreath v. Eichelber- 
 ger, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 515. 
 
 2 Kellar v. Roberts, Bright. (Pa.) 
 109. A wit ness cannot be compelled 
 to testify as to his opinions on matters 
 of religious faith. Dedric v. Hopsou, 
 62 la. 562; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 370; Com. 
 V. Smith, 2 Gray (Mass.), 516; Odell 
 B. Coppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88; Arnd 
 V. Amling, 53 Md. 192; The Queen's 
 Case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 284. And al- 
 though he may have testified as to 
 his belief in God, he does not there- 
 
 by xoaive his right to refuse to testify 
 as to his belief in a future life. 
 Dedric v. Hopson, supra. Where there 
 is a statute providing that no witness 
 who shall give evidence in a prosecu- 
 tion touching any unlawful gaming, 
 " shall be ever proceeded against for 
 any offense of unlawful gaming com- 
 mitted ])y him at the time and place 
 indicated in such prosecution," — a 
 witness cannot refuse to answer ques- 
 tions touching the unlawful gaming, 
 on the ground that his testimony 
 " might tend to disgrace him." Kend- 
 rick V. Com., 78 Va. 490. Against 
 objection, the court permitted a wit- 
 ness to be asked if he had ever 
 been confined in jail; and then in- 
 structed him that he need not answer, 
 and he did not answer. It was held 
 that this ruling presented no prejudi- 
 cial error. Smith v. State, 64 Md. 25;. 
 s. c. 54 Am. Rep. 752. 
 
 3 Mcrluzzi V. Gleeson, 59 Md. 214, 
 
 4 § S37.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 265 
 
 expose him to a penalty or forfeiture . ^ An action brought against 
 a party to recover a debt due by a manufacturing corporation, of 
 which the defendant was a ti-us(ee or director, seeking to make 
 him liable on the ground that he failed to make the annual re- 
 port required of him by the statute, is not one for a penalty 
 within the meaning of this statutory privilege. ^ Aside from 
 statutory provisions the rule is that the constitutional immunity 
 does not extend to the mere protection of property, but to 
 immunity from criminal prosecutions.^ Therefore, a liability 
 to a civil aclion or to a pecuniary loss is no ground of privi- 
 lege.* 
 
 § 289. Against Questions forming Links in a Chain of 
 criminating Evidence. — The better opinion is that it is not 
 necessary, in order to bring the witness within thejirivilege, that 
 the answer to the question might directly criminate him, but 
 that it is sufficient if the court can see that it would probably 
 form a link in a chain of criminatins; evidence against him.^ 
 
 1 See Merchants' Bauk v. Bliss, 35 
 N. Y. 412; Veeder v. Baker, 83 N. Y. 
 156; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 326; 
 Re Dickinson, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 260. And he Is not reqiiired to verify 
 a pleading where he Avould be pi'iv- 
 ileged from testifying as a witness on 
 this ground. Gadsden v. Woodward 
 (X. Y. Ct. of App.), 8 N. East. Rep. 
 653. 
 
 " Gadsden v. Woodward, supra. 
 Compare Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y- 
 173; Veeder v. Baker, 83 N. Y. 156, 
 160. 
 
 3 Devoll V. Brownell, 5 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 448; Keith v. Woombell, 8 Id. 
 217. 
 
 * Bull V. Loveland, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 
 9; Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 397; AVardv. Shaw, 15 Vt. 115; Har- 
 per V. Burrow, 6 Ired. L. (N. C.) 30; 
 Matter of Kip, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 601; 
 Lowney v. Perham, 20 Me. 235; Hays 
 
 V. Richardson, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 36G; 
 Cora. V. Thurston, 7 J. J. Marsh. 
 (Ky.) 62; Tancey v. Kemp, 4 Harr. & 
 J. (Md.) 348; Naylor v. Semmes, 4 
 Gill & J. (Md.) 273; Copp v. Upham, 
 3 N. H. 159; Alexander v. Knox, 7 Ala. 
 503; Judge of Probate v. Green, 1 
 How. (Miss.) 146; Zollicoffer v. Tur- 
 ney, 6 Yerg. (Teuu.) 297; Gorham v. 
 Carroll, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 221; Black v. 
 Coorgh, Id. 226. In an action under 
 a statute relating to copyright (Rev. 
 Stat. U. S., § 4965) to recover penal- 
 ties and for a forfeiture of certain 
 photographic plates, the defendant 
 cannot be compelled, under a subpoena 
 duces tecum, to produce his books of 
 account and plates to be used in evi- 
 dence for the plaintiff. Johnson v. 
 Donaldson, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 287. 
 
 5 1 Burr Trial, 245; Priutz v. 
 Cheeuey, 11 Iowa, 469; Lea v. Hen- 
 derson, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 146.
 
 266 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § ?90. Disclosing' the names of Accomplices. — But a wit- 
 ness is not protected from giving evidence, from the mere fact 
 that the evidence which he will be obliged to give in answer to 
 the questions propounded, may disclose the names of other wit- 
 nesses Avhose testimony may convict him of a pending criminal 
 charge, or may furnish the means of procuring other evidence 
 to convict him of such charge.^ Thus, a person may be com- 
 pelled to disclose to a grand jury the names of persons whom he 
 has seen betting at an unlawful game, although by so doing he 
 may disclose the names of witnesses who may be called to testif}' 
 that he himself also bet at the same game. ^ But it has been held 
 that a statute ^ which provides that any person concerned in a 
 trespass may be compelled to testify against any other person 
 therein concerned, is in direct contravention of the provision in 
 the constitution of that State that " no person in any criminal 
 prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself." ^ 
 
 § 291. [Continued.] Application of this Rule. — A grand jury 
 caused a subpcena to be issued for one Ward to appear before them and 
 testify generally, without specifying the particular matter or cause about 
 which he was to testify. Ward appeared and was sworn to give evidence 
 before the grand jur^^ He went before the grand jury to testify. The 
 first question asked by the foreman of the grand jury was this: "Do 
 you know of any person or persons having bet at a faro table in this 
 county within the last twelve months?" To which the witness an- 
 swered, " I do." The foreman then desired the witness to tell what 
 person or persons had so bet, other than himself, and not naming him- 
 self. The witness declined to answer, sa^'ing that he could not answer 
 without im[)hcating himself. He was then directed by the court to an- 
 swer, luit not to name himself as' a better. This he refused to do, 
 alleging that to answer would impHcate himself; whereupon the court 
 committed him to prison until he should consent to give the evidence 
 
 ^ LaFontahie v. Sontheru Under- McGirk, J. : followed and its reasouhig 
 
 writers, 83 N.C. 132, 141; W'ardv. State, approved in La Fontaine v. Southern 
 
 2 Mo. 120; Kiernan v. Abbott, 1 Hun Uudei" writers, 8S N. C. 132,141. 
 (N. y.), 109; .s. 6. 3 Thomp. & C. (N. » 2 Rev. Stat. Ind. 1876, chap. 403, 
 
 Y.) 7.-5. § 14. 
 
 - Ward V. State, supra, where the ^ State v. Enoch, 69 Ind. 314. 
 
 question was reasoui'd at length by
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 267 
 
 required, and until the furtlier order of the court. He sued out a writ 
 of error ; and on an application to the Supreme Court for a supersedeas, 
 this relief was refused. The court, applying the foregoing rule, held 
 that the answer to the question would not necessarily criminate the wit- 
 ness, and that the witness could not refuse to answer a question on the 
 ground that it might excite the vengeance of other malefactors against 
 
 him.i In an action to enjoin the defendant from surreptitiously 
 
 obtaining and communicating to another certain foreign news dis- 
 patches, sent by the Atlantic cable exclusively to the plaintiff the de- 
 fendant, after testifying that the foreign news which he so furnished 
 was obtained by him several times each day directly by cable from 
 London, and that the dispatches came to a baniiing house in New York, 
 from whom he received them, was asked, " What banking house was 
 that? " It was held that this question was proper and pertinent, since 
 the plaintiff had a right to contradict the statement and to test its accu- 
 racy in any legal manner ; and accordingly that the defendant was in 
 contempt for refusing to answer it.'- 
 
 §292. Compelling AVitness to Exhibit liis Body. — The 
 
 privilege of not giving solf-criminating evidence extends so far 
 that a witness oq trial for a crime will not be compelled to ex- 
 hibit to the JLuy a portion of his body, where this might disclose 
 a fact prejudicial to him. Accordingly, on the trial of an indict- 
 ment for murder where it became material to disclose the extent 
 of an amputation of one of the prisoner's legs, it was held error 
 to compel him to exhibit his leg to the jury.^ Contrary to this, 
 it was held on a criminal trial, where the identity of the accused 
 was in question, that no error was committed in compelling him 
 to exhibit his arm to the jury, which disclosed certain tattoo marks 
 tending to identify him as the person who committed the crime.* 
 
 § 293. Effect of Statutes Preventing- Answer from being 
 used against Witness. — As a general rule, a witness will 
 not be protected in refusing to give testimony on the ground 
 that the testimony, if given, ^vould furnish evidence on 
 
 1 Ward V. State, 2 Mo. 120. * State v. Ah Chuey, U Ncv. 79 
 
 2 Kieman u. Abbott, 3 Thomp. «Sb C. (Leonard, J., dissenting). Sue jiost, 
 fX. Y.) 755; s. c. 1 Huu (N. Y.), 109. chap. XXVII. 
 
 ■' Bluckwell V. State, G7 Ga. 76; s. c. 
 44 Am. Kep. 717
 
 2(58 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 which he might be convicted in a crmiinal prosecution, where 
 there is a statute which expressly provides that the testi- 
 mony so given shall not be used as evidence against the 
 witness in a criminal proceeding; ^ but there are holdings to the 
 contrary.^ But in order to have this effect, the protection of the 
 statute must be complete. A statute providing that testimony 
 which a witness may give upon an investigation shall not be 
 used against him, is ineffectual to deprive the witness of his con- 
 stitutional privilege of exemption from being compelled to 
 accuse himself, or to furnish evidence against himself, unless it 
 is so broad that it secures him from future liability and from 
 exposure to prejudice, in any criminal proceeding against him, 
 as fully and extensively as would be secured by availing himself 
 of the constitutional privilege.-^ So, if a prosecution for the 
 offense is barred by the statute of limitations^ the witness must 
 answer.* 
 
 § 294. [Continued.] Illustration under Massachusetts Statute. — 
 A statute of Massachusetts enacted as follows: "No person who is 
 called as a witness before the Joint Special Committee on the State 
 Police shall be excused from answering any question, or from the pro- 
 
 1 La Fontaine v. Southern Under- person is summoned before tlie grand 
 
 writers, 83 N. C. 132; United States v. jury, and is aslsed if lie knows of any 
 
 McCartliy, 18 Fed.Rep. 87; 21Blatciif. persons playing cards for a wager 
 
 (U. S.) 4(19; Keudrick v. Com., 78 Va. within the last six montlis, within the 
 
 490; Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App 282; county, and no objection is taken to 
 
 State V. Warner, 13 Lea (Teun.), 52; the form of the question, and he re- 
 
 Wilkins v. Maloue, 14 Ind. 153. Com- fuses to answer, upon the ground that 
 
 pare Temple v. Com., 75 Va. 892; if he make any disclosures upon the 
 
 Kneelaud v. State, (i2 Ga. 395. subject, he will be obliged, in crimi- 
 
 - State V. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314. uatiug others also to criminate him- 
 
 Thus, the statutes of Tennessee, ex- self, — he may be required by the 
 
 isting from an early day, give the court to answer, upon pain of im- 
 
 grand juries in cases of gambling, in- prisonmeut for contempt. Hirsch ?;. 
 
 quisitorial powers. Those statutes State, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 89. 
 
 also coutain a provision which forbids ^ Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172. 
 
 the indictment or prosecution of any ^ Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215; Wel- 
 
 witness for any offense as to which he don v. Burch, 12 111. 374; Moloney v. 
 
 has testified before the grand jury. Dows, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 247; Wolfe ». 
 
 Code of Tenn., § 5089. In view of Goulard, 15 Abb. Fr. (N. Y.) 336. 
 this provision, it is held tliac, where a
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 269 
 
 duction of any paper relating to any corrupt practice or improper 
 conduct of the State police, forming the subject of inquiry by such 
 committee, on the ground that the answer to such a question, or the 
 production of such paper, may tend to criminate himself, or to disgrace 
 him, or otherwise render him infamous, or on the ground of privilege; 
 but the testimony of any witness examined before said committee, upon 
 the subject aforesaid, or any statement made, or paper produced by 
 him upon such examination, shall not be used as evidence against such 
 witness, in anj' civil or criminal proceeding in any court of justice- 
 provided hoxoever, that no official paper or record produced by such 
 witness on such examination shall be held or taken to be included with- 
 in the privilege of said evidence, so to protect such witness in any civil 
 or criminal proceeding as aforesaid, and that nothing in this act shall 
 be construed to exempt an\' witness from prosecution and punishment 
 for perjury committed by him in testifying as aforesaid." i With this 
 statute in force, a person was summoned to appear as a witness before 
 a joint special committee of the Senate and House of Representatives 
 of the General Court of Massachusetts appointed "to inquire if the 
 State police is guilty of bribery and corruption," and, in obedience to 
 the summons, appeared before the commiteee at the State house when 
 interrogatories were propounded to him which he declined to answer. 
 These facts being reported to the Senate, that body ordered tlie sergeant- 
 at-arms to arrest the witness and bring him before the Senate to answer 
 for contempt in refusing to answer the interrogatories. The sergeant- 
 at-arms arrested him and brought him to the bar of the Senate, where- 
 upon the Senate passed the following order: "That the President pro- 
 pound to Henry Emery, now arraigned at the bar of the Senate, the 
 following questions: ' Are you ready and willing to answer before the 
 joint special committee appointed by this Senate and House of Repre- 
 sentatives of Massachusetts to ' inquire if the State police is guilty 
 of bribery and corruption,* the following questions namely: First, 
 whether, since the appointment of the State constabulary force, you 
 have ever been prosecuted for the sale or keeping for sale of intoxi- 
 cating liquors? Second, have 3'ou ever paid any money to any Slate 
 constable and do you know of any corrupt practices or improper con- 
 duct of the State police? If so, state fully what sums and to whom 
 you have thus paid money, and also what you know of such cor- 
 rupt practices and improper conduct.' " The President of the Senate 
 then and there propounded the questions ordered by the Senate to the 
 
 1 Mass. Stat, of 1871, chap. 91.
 
 270 EXAMINATIOX OF M'ITXESSE8. [1 Thom[). Tr., 
 
 petitioner, and he answered in writing as follows : " Intending no dis- 
 respect to«tlie honorable Senate, I answer, under the advice of counsel, 
 that I am ready and willing to answer the first question ; but I decline 
 to answer the second question, upon the ground, first, that the answer 
 thereto will accuse rae of an indictable offense ; second, that the answer 
 thereto will furnish evirlence agaiiist me by which I can l)e convicted of 
 such an offense." The Senate thereupon passed an order that, whereas 
 the witness, " in contempt of the authority of this Senate, did give an 
 unsatisfactory answer to the second question," he " be committed to 
 the custody of the sergeant-at-arms, to be by him confined in the jail of 
 the county of Suffolk for the space of twenty-five days, or until the 
 further order of the Senate, unless he shall sooner signify his willingness 
 to appear and purge himself of his contempt, and testify before the joint 
 special committee and this Senate, and satisfactorily answer the ques- 
 tions propounded to him by the joint special committee and this Senate, 
 and the President of the Senate is hereby authorized to issue his warrant 
 to commit said Henry Emery to the custody of the sergeant-at-arms, to 
 be imprisoned in the common jail of the county of Suffolk;" and 
 " whenever the said Henry Emery, under the foregoing order, shall in- 
 form the sergeant-at-arms that he is willing to testify before the said 
 joint special committee and this Senate, it shall be the duty of the 
 sergeant-at-arnis immediately to take the said Emery before the Senate 
 and hold him subject to its order." In conformity with this order, the 
 President of the Senate issued his warrant for the arrest of the witness ; 
 whereupon the witness sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme 
 Judicial Court. The sergeant-at-arms returned the warrant of com- 
 mitment as his justification for holding the petitioner restrained 
 of his liberty. The Supreme Judicial Court, after able argument 
 and full consideration, announced its decision which bore "the ap- 
 proval and unanimous concurrence of all the memliers of the court," 
 discharging the prisoner from custody. The court held that the 
 statute did not furnish the prisoner with an exemption from 
 criminal prosecution in case he should answer the question 
 propounded to him, as broad and effectual as the constitutional 
 provision that " no one shall be * * * compelled to accuse or 
 furnish evidence against himself," furnished him in the event of his 
 refusal to answer it. In giving the opinion of the court upon this point. 
 Wells, J., after discussing at length the constitutional provision, said: 
 " It follows from the considerations already named that, so far as this 
 statute requires a witness who may be called, to answer questions and
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF AVITXESSES. 271 
 
 produce papers which may tend to criminate himself, and attempts to 
 take from him the constitutional privilege in respect theret©, it must 
 be entirely ineffectual for that purpose, unless it also relieves him from 
 liabilities, for protection against which the privilege is secured to 
 him by the constitution. The statute does undertake to secure 
 him against certain of those liabilities, to wit, the use of any dis- 
 closures he may make as admissions of direct evidence against him in 
 any civil or criminal proceeding. In the case already referred to,i it was 
 held that such a provision by statute removed all the liability against 
 which the witness was secured by the constitutional exemption, and 
 that, being thus otherwise furnished with all the protection to which 
 the constitution entitled him, he had no further occasion and therefore 
 no riglit to set up the claim of privilege as a protection against that to 
 which he was not exposed. But this decision was made upon the 
 ground that the terms of the provision relied on in the con- 
 stitution of New York protected the witness only from being 
 compelled 'to be a witness against himself,' and did not 
 
 • protect him from the indirect and incidental consequences 
 of a disclosure which he might be called upon to make. The 
 terms of the provision in the constitution of Massachusetts require 
 a much broader interpretation, as has already been indicated ; and no 
 one can be required to forego an appeal to its protection, unless first 
 secured from future liability and exposure to be prejudiced in any 
 criminal proceeding against him, as fuU}^ and extensively as he would 
 be secured by availing himself of the privilege accorded by the consti- 
 tution. Under the interpretation already given, this cannot be accom- 
 plished so long as he remains ]ial)le to prosecution criminally for any 
 matters or causes in respect of which he shall be examined, or to which 
 his testimony shall relate. It is not done, in direct terras, by tlie stat- 
 ute in question ; it is not contended that the statute is capable of an 
 interpi-etation which will give it that effect ; and it is clear that it can not 
 and was not intended so to operate. Failing, then, to furnish to the 
 persons to be examined an exemption equivalent to that contained in 
 the constitution, or to remove the whole lialjility against which its 
 
 ^ privileges were intended to protect them, it fails to deprive them of 
 the right to appeal to the privilege therein secured to them. The re- 
 sult is, that, in appealing to his privilege as an exemption from lieing 
 exposed to answering inquiries put to him, the petitioner was in the 
 exercise of his constitutional right ; and his refusal to answer upon that 
 
 1 People V. Kelk-y, 24 N. Y. 74.
 
 272 EXAMINATION OF "WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 ground was not and could not be considered as disorderly conduct, or 
 a contempt of the authority of tlfe body before which he was called to 
 answer. There being no legal grounds to authorize the commitment 
 upon which he is held, he must be discharged therefrom. He is dis- 
 charged accordingly." ^ 
 
 § 295. Effect of Promise not to Prosecvite. — The priv- 
 ilege "which a "witness may have to refrain from answering a 
 particular question on the ground of self-crimination, is not re- 
 moved by the promise of the State's attorney not to prefer an 
 indictment against him.'^ 
 
 § 296. Privileged Commvinications between Attorney and 
 Client. — Professional communications between attorney and 
 client are regarded as confidential, and are protected on grounds 
 of public policy.^ But this is a privilege of the client; it maybe 
 "waived by him; if the client sees fit to be a witness, he makes 
 himself liable to full cross-examination in respect of communi- 
 cations made by himself to his counsel.^ Moreover, the rule 
 extends merely to communications which the attorney and 
 client have themselves seen fit to entrust only to each other ; if 
 they make the communication in the presence of a tJiird "person 
 the privilege is waived, and he may disclose it on the witness 
 stand. ^ Obviously, the rule does not extend to statements made 
 by the client to oilier persons, or to statements made by other 
 persons to the client, in the presence of the attorney.® It is said 
 
 1 Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 185- CO Mich. 277; s. c. 27 N. W. Eep. 539; 
 18(i. Mobile &c. R. Co. v. Yeates, G7 Ala. 
 
 2 Muller V. State, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 18. 1(J4. See also Martiu v. Anderson, 21 
 "5 Mobile &c. 11. Co. v. Yeates, G7 Ga. 301; Brown v. Payson, 6 N. H. 
 
 Ala. 1(;+; Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 443. See also Doe v. Jauncey, 8 Carr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 337. & P. 99; Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. 
 
 * "VVoburn v. Henshaw, 101 Mass. (Mass.) 57(!. 
 193; Laudsberger v. Gorham, 5 Cal. »> Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal. 
 
 450. 331, 334. See also Coveney v. Tanne- 
 
 -^ Jackson v. French, 3 "Wend. (N. hill, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 33; Rochester 
 
 Y.) 337; Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray City Bank u. Snydani, 5 How. Pr. 254; 
 
 (Mass ), 519; Hatton v. Robinson, 14 Bramwell v. Lncas, 2 Barn. & Cres. 
 
 Pick. (Mass.) 41(;; People v. Barker, 745.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIL] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 273 
 
 in Connecticut, by Sanford, J. : " No reason of necessity requires 
 that anjMvitness (save an interyretei') should ever be present at a 
 consultation between a client and his attorney ; and if the client 
 procures or submits to the presence of such a witness, he volun- 
 tarily confides his secrets, not to his attorney onl} , but. also to the 
 witness, in whose custody the law cannot protect them when the 
 interests of justice require that they should be disclosed." ^ In like 
 manner it is said by Merrick, J., in a Massachusetts case: " The 
 privilege of exemption from testifying to facts actually known 
 is extended only to an attorney or legal adviser Avho derives ,his 
 knowledge from a communication by the client who applies and 
 makes disclosures to him in his professional character, and to 
 those other persons whose intervention is strictly necessary to 
 enable the parties to communicate with each other." ^ The rule 
 is therefore carried to the extent of holding that a statement to 
 an attorney in the presence and at the instance of his client, by 
 a third party, is not privileged.^ Nor does the privilege extend 
 to any facts within the attorney's knowledge or to any informa- 
 tion acquired by him in any other way than through the channel 
 of a confidential communication from his client.* Paper's in- 
 trusted to an attorney in professional confidence are not neces- 
 sarily to be deemed confidential communications; and if he 
 asserts that he is ignorant of their contents, he may be ordered 
 to produce them for the inspection of the court, and if he 
 refuse to do so, he will be guilty of a contempt.^ 
 
 § 297. [Continued.] History of this Privilege. — In a very well 
 considered case before Daly, F. J., in the New York Court of Common 
 Pleas, the following sketch was given of the history of the privilege of 
 an attorney, in respect of producing documents belonging to his client, 
 
 1 Gocldard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. M. 310; Shore v. Bedford, 5 Man. & G. 
 172, 175. See also Gainsford v. Gram- 271; Griffith v. Davies, 5 Barn. & Ad. 
 mar, 2 Campb. 9; 2 Stark. Ev., § 239; 502. 
 
 1 Phil. Ev. 162. * Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 363, 
 
 2 Hoy V. Morris, 13 Gray (Mass.), 377. 
 
 519, 521. 5 Mitcliell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr, (N. 
 
 '^ Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153, 167. Y.) 249. 
 See also Ripon v. Davies, 2 Nev. & 
 
 18
 
 274 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 or making disclosures of matters communicaled by his client to him in 
 professional confidence : " Before the important change in the law re- 
 quiring a party to an action to be examined as a witness at the in- 
 stance of the adverse party, the general principle was recognized that 
 no one in a court of law could be compelled to give evidence against 
 himself. 1 This principle had its most extensive application where the 
 question put to the witness would or might have a tendency to expose 
 him to a criminal charge or penal liability, or to any kind of punish- 
 ment ; and so far as protecting a party from an inquiry that may have 
 such a tendency, this broad principle of the common law remains 
 untouched. In such a case, as the witness knows what the court does 
 not know, and which he could not communicate without becoming his 
 own accuser, he is permitted to judge for himself what the effect of 
 his answering the inquiry would be ; the power of the court being lim- 
 ited simply to determining whether the question is one that might admit 
 of an answer having such a tendency. ^ The shelter of the principle 
 extends also to everything confidentially communicated by the party to 
 his attorney ; and it is for the attorney, as it would be for the party, to 
 judge what would be the effect of the inquiry. Thus in Rex v. Dixon,^ 
 it was held that an attorney was justified in disobeying a subpoena duces 
 tecum, directing him to bring before a grand jury certain papers which 
 had been placed in his hands confidentially by his client, where the ob- 
 ject in requiring him to do so was to found a prosecution against his 
 client for forgery." ^ 
 
 § 298. [Continued.] Rule Limited where Question op Crime 
 NOT Involved. — "But the principle that a party could not be com- 
 pelled to give evidence against himself, was far more limited in its ap- 
 plication when no question of crime was involved, both in relation to 
 the obligations of the witness and the power of the court in determin- 
 ing whether he should be absolved from answering or not. The 
 principle of exemption was applied, in its broadest extent, to parties to 
 actions at law, who could not be compelled to give evidence ; and in 
 respect to the production of documentary testimony, as a party to 
 an action was not bound to give evidence, he could not be required to 
 
 1 Citing Cook v. Corn, 1 Tenn. tlieir principal. Shotwell v. Maurice, 
 (Overt.) 340. See also Owings v. 1 N. J. L. (Coxe), 224. 
 Low, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 134; Maiirau v. 2 Citiug 1 Burr Trial, 245. 
 
 Lanab, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 174. So bail s 3 Burr. 1G87. 
 
 were not compellable to testify agaiust ^Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 240, 257.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 275 
 
 produce papers to be used against him as evidence ; and if a paper had 
 been deposited by him with his attorney, the attorney's possession was 
 deemed the possession of the party, and the attorney could not be re- 
 quired to produce it, nor even any other person having the temporary 
 possession of it in right of the party. ^ If a document was in the 
 possession of a party to an action at law, or in the possession of his 
 attorney, all that could be done was to give him notice to produce it ; 
 and if he failed to do so, the other party was at liberty to give sec- 
 ondary evidence of its contents ; or if the production of the document 
 itself was essential, and he would not produce it, the court would, if 
 he was a defendant, strike out his answer, or, if a plaintiff, non-suit 
 him 2 — a practice introduced into courts of law from the court of 
 chancery. But the attorney might be called and was bound to answer 
 whether or not he had the paper in his possession, that the other party 
 might be enabled to give secondary evidence of its contents, which he 
 could not do until he had first shown that he was unable to produce it ; 
 and though the attorney could not be required to disclose the contents 
 of the paper, his examination might be carried at least so far as to 
 show, with reasonable certainty, that the document introduced was the 
 one respecting which the other party proposed to give evidence.^ The 
 protection of this rule was also applied, to a certain extent, in favor of 
 witnesses called on behalf of third persons. Neither they nor their 
 attorneys, if called as witnesses, could be required to produce docu- 
 ments to be used in evidence, if the production of the paper might 
 materially affect the rights or prejudice the interests of the persons to 
 whom it belonged, which was a question which the court would deter- 
 mine upon tlie inspection of the document." * 
 
 §299. [Continued.] Confidential Communications. — "The rule 
 was also well established, that neither a party nor his legal adviser 
 
 1 Citing Bank of Utica v. Hillard, 5 241, 245; Cow. & Hill's notes (SrdecL), 
 Cow. (N. Y.) 419. Part 2, note lo2. 
 
 2 Citing 3 Eev. Stat. N. Y. (5th ed.) * Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 293,294; 4 Cow. & Hill's notes (3rd Y.) 249, 259. Citiug Copeland v. 
 ed.) 648. Watts, 1 Stark. 95; Bull v. Loveland, 
 
 3 Citiug Bevan v. Waters, 1 Mood. 10 Pick. (Mass.) 9; Araey v. Long, 9 
 & M. 235; Eicke v. Nokcs, 7(^. 303; East, 473; Bateman v. Phillips, 4 
 Rhoades u. Selin, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. Taunt. 157; Field v. Beaumout, 1 
 S.) 715,718; Coveney i7. Tanuahill, 1 Snanst. 209; Cowan & Hill's Notes 
 Hill (N. Y.), 33; Jackson v. McVey, (3rd ed.), Part 2, uote 316; 1 Greeul. 
 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 330; Braudt v. Ev., § 246; Dunlap Pr. 607. 
 
 Kleiu, 17 Id. 335; 1 Greenl. Ev., §§
 
 276 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 would be compelled in a court of justice to disclose the confidential 
 communication which had passed between them in respect of the mat- 
 ter upon which the party had sought professional advice. The prin- 
 ciple, which appears to have been recognized as far back as the days of 
 Elizabeth,! was not confined to courts of law but was equally acted upon 
 by the court of chancery, where the aid of the court was sought to 
 compel a discovery of evidence. On an application for a discovery, a 
 court of equity would neither compel nor permit a solicitor to disclose 
 what his client had communicated to him in professional confidence, 
 nor compel the production of letters which had passed between them, 
 or through intermediate agents on the business, containing or asking 
 legal advice or opinions, nor cases prepared at the instance of the client 
 for the opinion of counsel.^ Both courts of law and of equity recog- 
 nized the necessity of a free and unrestricted intercourse between the 
 client and his professional adviser, which would not exist if what was 
 imparted to the former in professional confidence could be afterwards 
 used against him. Everything of this nature was regarded, therefore, 
 as inviolate, and neither the client to a certain extent, nor his profes- 
 sional adviser, would be required, either at law or in equity, to disclose 
 it. As this was a rule, however, susceptible of great abuse, it was 
 always kept within just and rational limits. As it has, in the language 
 of Chief Justice Shaw, -^ ' a tendency to prevent the full disclosure of 
 the truth, it is to be construed .strictly ; ' to which may be added the 
 very pertinent observation of Lord Langdale, M. R.,! upon what he 
 deemed a too extensive application of it : ' It seems strange to say that 
 justice can be promoted by concealing the truth, by suppressing the 
 knowledge of any fact or any statement of the parties which bears upon 
 the question to be decided. It is often easier to exclude evidence than 
 to determine what weight ought justly to be attributed to it when re- 
 ceived. A bad cause may suffer, and the evasion of justice may be 
 prevented by compelling a party to disclose a material fact ; but the 
 object is not to save the trouble or lessen the responsibilities of the 
 judge to protect a bad cause, or to facilitate the evasion of justice, 
 
 1 Citiug Gary, 127, 88, 89. 2 Beavau, 173; Greenough v. Gaskell, 
 
 2 Citiug Lord Walsiugham v. Good- 1 Myl. & K. 98; Holmes v. Baddeley, I 
 ricke, 3 Hare, 122; Mayor of Durt- Phil. Ch. 47G; Walker v. Wiklmau, G 
 month V. Holdsworth, 10 Sim. 476; Madd. 37, 48; Bank of Utica v. Mer- 
 Bolton V. Coi-poratiou of Liverpool, 3 serau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528; March 
 Id. 4(J7; Hughes v. Biddulph, 4 Euss. v. Ludliun, 3 Saudf. Ch. (N Y.) 35. 
 190; Kias ■??. Northern & Eastern R. 3 In Foster t7. Hall, 12 Tick. 89. 
 Co., 2 Keeu, 7fl; Bunbury v. Bunbury, * In Nias v. Railway Co., supra.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 277 
 
 but, if possible, to do justice, and for that purpose to get at the whole 
 truth ; and I confess I have yet to learn how tlie concealment of the 
 truth or hiding from the court that which is known to any of the par- 
 ties, and relates to the matter in question, can in any way promote 
 justice.' " ^ 
 
 § 300. [CoNTiNDED.l Witness NOT Exclusive Judge OF Privilege. — 
 " Whenever, in the practical application of these rules, the question of 
 privilege arose, it was not * * * the right of the witness to 
 judge, except where the matter might criminate him, whether the 
 matter inquired of was privileged or not. That was the province of the 
 court. If the production of a document was called for, and the witness 
 declined to produce it, upon the ground that the reading of it in ev- 
 idence would be prejudicial to his interests, or to the interests of the 
 party for whom the witness acted as attorney, the witness was re- 
 quired to submit the document to the inspection of the court, and if the 
 judge, after perusing it, differed from the witness, he would direct it to 
 be read ; ^ or if a witness swore that a question put to him could 
 not be answered without a disclosure of secrets communicated to him 
 by his client, it was for the court to determine, from the nature of the 
 inquiry, whether the principle of protection extended to it or not ; ^ and 
 if the court decided that it did not, the witness, should he refuse to 
 answer, would be guilty of a contempt, nor would the court even hear 
 counsel upon the plea of the witness' objection.^ 
 
 § 301. [Continued.] These Principles how far Changed by Stat- 
 utes Compelling Parties to Testify. — " Such was the state of the law 
 before the enactment of the provision compelling parties to actions to be 
 examined as witnesses at the instance of an adverse party. That pro- 
 vision has brought about a very material change. * * * The pro- 
 vision in question declares that a ' party to an action may be 
 examined as a witness, at the instance of the adverse party, and for 
 that purpose may be compelled to testify in the same man- 
 
 1 Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249, 57; Parkhurst v. Lawton, 3 Id. 121; 
 259, 2(i0. Beer v. Ward, Jacob, 77; Com. v. 
 
 2 Copeland v. Watts, 1 Stark. 95; Brayuard, Thach.Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 146. 
 Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 Russ. & Myl. * Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 358; Walsh v. Trevanion, 15 Sim. 249, 2(J0 (citing to the last proposition 
 578. Doe v. Earl of Egremout, 2 Moody & 
 
 "' Citing Morgan v. Shaw, 4 ]Madd. Eob. 38G).
 
 278 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 ner and subject to the same rules of examination as any other 
 witness.' This sweeps away the rule of the common law, that parties 
 to actions could not be compelled to give evidence against themselves ; 
 and every privilege, either of the party or of his attorney, that was 
 founded upon it, is gone. I suppose that the protection that was ex- 
 tended to the confidential communications between attorney and client 
 remains unaffected, as the reason upon which that rule was founded is 
 as applicable now as it was before ; but, with this exception, a party to 
 an action or his attorney is no longer privileged to withhold testi- 
 mony. A party to an action may now be compelled by a subpoena 
 duces tecmn, to produce papers and documents upon the trial, to be read 
 in evidence.^ The contrary was held by Justice Rosevelt in a previous 
 case ; ^ but the construction he put upon the statute was repudiated, 
 after a careful examination, by Justice "Wells ; and I entertain no doubt 
 but that the conclusion arrived at by the latter was the correct one. If 
 a party, then, may be compelled to produce documents, the attorney, 
 whose privilege can be no greater than his client, must be equally 
 bound. Li Doe dem. Courtail v. Thomas,"^ which was an action at law, 
 an attorney was called upon to produce a lease, who declared that he 
 had received it from his client in the character of his attorney, and that 
 he held it in that character ; but, it appearing that the client had 
 been ordered, by the court of chancery, to deposit the lease for the in- 
 spection of the plaintiff, in a suit brought by the plaintiff against the 
 client in the court of chancery, the court ordered the attorney to pro- 
 duce the lease ; and, when the case came up for review, Lord Tenterden 
 held that the client might have been subpojnaed upon the trial and com- 
 pelled to produce the lease, and that if he could be compelled to pro- 
 duce it, then the attorney, who stood in the same situation as his client, 
 was equally bound to do so. If this were not so, all that a party 
 would have to do, to evade the production of papers, would be to put 
 them into the custod}^ of his attorney. 'The production of 
 written, as well as oral testimony,' said Lord Ellenborough,* 'is 
 essential to the ver}' existence and constitution of a court of 
 common law, which receives and acts upon both descriptions of 
 evidence, and could not possibly proceed with due effect with- 
 out them ;' holding that the writ of subpama duces tecum was as 
 essential and of as compulsory obligation as the ordinary writ by which 
 
 1 Citing Bonesteel v. Lyude, 8 How. » 9 Barn. & Cress. 288. 
 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 22G. * In Amey v. Long, 1) East, 47 
 
 2 Trotter v. Latsou, 7 Id. 2(;i.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 279 
 
 a witness is commanded to appear and testify. Tlie object sought in 
 the examination of a witness is to obtain from him, not only the evi- 
 dence wliich he may give orally, but the written evidence which may 
 be in his possession or under his control. One is as much a part of 
 what he is called upon to furnish, and in respect to which he may be 
 examined, as the other. When the code, therefore, declares that a 
 party to an action may be compelled to testify in the same manner and 
 subject to the same rules of examination as other witnesses, it is ob- 
 vious that the meaning is that whatever may be required of other wit- 
 nesses may be required of him. If they must produce books and 
 papers, so must he ; and if he has placed them in the possession of his 
 attorne}', agent, or any other person, the one who has them in actual 
 custody may be compelled to bring them before the court, to be used 
 as evidence. In courts of equit}^ the principle of protection was never 
 extended to all papers belonging to the client which he may have put 
 into the hands of his solicitor. But the general rule was, tliat what- 
 ever the client was bound to produce for the benefit of a third person, 
 his solicitor, if the document or paper was in his possession, was also 
 bound to produce ; ^ and if tlie solicitor was not a party to tlie 
 suit, he might be compelled, by a subpcpua duces tecum to produce 
 it.'^ Indeed, the principle of protection, recognized in courts of equity, 
 does not appear to have extended, so far as the adjudged cases show, 
 beyond letters or other communications passing between a client and his 
 solicitor or their intermediate agents, or papers or documents prepared by 
 the sohcitor at the client's request, and in certain cases to the title deeds 
 of the client in the hands of his solicitor, ^ or to a general application 
 *upon a solicitor to produce his client's papers.^ The general rule of 
 courts of equity, that whenever the client may be called upon to pro- 
 duce jDapers, the attorney, if they are in his possession, may be required 
 to produce them, is the proper rule, now that parties to communications 
 are made witnesses. There may possibly be cases in which the deposit 
 of a document with an attorney, for advice and counsel, may bring it 
 within the rule of protection ; though I can conceive of none, if the 
 client would himself be bound, if he had it in his possession, to produce 
 it as a witness." ^ 
 
 1 Citing Furlong v. Howard, 2 Sch. & B. KU; jNIcCann v, Beere, 1 Hogan, 
 & Lef. 115; Fenwick v. Reed, 1 Meriv. 129. 
 
 114. * Citing Wright v. Mayer, C, Ves. 
 
 2 Citing Burk v. Lewis, G Madd. 280. 
 
 29. _ s Mitclieirs Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 249, 
 
 3 Citing Stratford v. Hogan, 2 Ball 2(34.
 
 280 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 § 302. [Continued.] Attorney has no Greater Privilege than 
 Client has. — " The exemption of an attorney was never regarded as 
 his personal privilege, but as existing purely for the protection of his 
 client ; ^ and, even though willing or desirous to do so, he would not be 
 allowed, unless by his client's consent, to reveal anything entrusted to 
 him in professional confidence. ^ He was, in this respect, in the lan- 
 guage of Chief Baron Gilbert ' considered as one and the same person 
 with his client ; ' ^ and if, by a change of the law, a party to an action 
 has no longer any privilege, it follows as a matter of course, that his 
 attorney would have none." ^ 
 
 § 303. Trade Secrets Privileged. — Although the rule does 
 not extend to the protection of property,^ yet in an action to re- 
 strain the use of the plaintiff's trade-mark ^ the plaintiff will 
 not be compelled to disclose the ingredients of which his goods 
 are made, merely because the defendant in his answer alleges 
 that they contain injurious materials.^ 
 
 § 304. Refusing to Expose Defense. — A person who has been 
 indicted, and also made a defendant in a civil action in respect 
 of the same matter, and who is brought out of jail on an or- 
 der of court to testify as a witness in the civil case, is not privi- 
 leged to refuse answering relevant questions which are put to 
 him, on the ground that his answers thereto will expose his de- 
 fense in the criminal case, and put him " in the hands of his ene- 
 mies," —that is, in the hands of the complainant in the civil 
 case and of the prosecuting attorney in the criminal case. He 
 can only escape answering the questions, by putting himself 
 upon his privilege, and claiming that the answers which he 
 would be bound to give would furnish evidence on which he 
 might be convicted of a crime. In so holding, the court said: 
 
 ' Bnller N. P. 284. (Pa.) 170. Compare Burnett v. Pha- 
 
 2 Petrie's Case, cited, 4 T. R. 756. Ion, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 100, — where 
 
 3 Gilbert Ev. 138. a similar question was allowed, but 
 
 4 Mitcliell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. only on the ground tliat the plaintiff 
 Y.) 249, 2()2, opinion by Daly, F. .J. in his examination in chief had opened 
 
 ^ Ante, § 288. the question, and thus had made it 
 
 ^ Tetlow V. Savouruin, 15 Phil, relevant on cross-examination.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PKIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 281 
 
 "It is true, that in the ordinary course of criminal proceedings, 
 the defendant is enabled to conceal the grounds of his defense 
 until the prosecution has made a prima facie case before the 
 jury ; but this is merely incident to the course of those pro- 
 ceedings, and not in any true sense a privilege. As a defendant 
 in the criminal action, he can stand upon the presumption of his 
 innocence, and is not bound to offer any defense until a case has 
 been proved against him ; but, as a party to a civil action, his 
 privilege is just the same, whether he has been indicted or not; 
 he can only refuse to answer when his answers would tend to 
 criminate or degrade him, and he must himself invoke his privi- 
 lege.^ This is the plain rule of the statute, and there is no pub- 
 lic policy superior to the rule. To conceal his defense until the 
 day of trial, is, no doubt, a valuable privilege to the criminal ; 
 for it will often deprive the State of all opportunity of exposing 
 its falsity ; but it is difficult to see how it is to benefit an inno- 
 cent defendant, who relies upon the truth for his vindication, 
 unless it is assumed that the State will suborn false witnesses for 
 the purpose of destroying him." ^ There is a statute in New 
 Hampshire providing that a party testifying as a witness shall 
 not be compelled to disclose his witnesses nor the manner of 
 proving his case.^ This does not excuse him from testifying as 
 to all he knows upon the issue. ^ 
 
 § 305. Testimony of the Judge as to Former Trials. — On 
 
 grounds of public policy, the judge of a court is excused from 
 testifying as to what witnesses have testified to on former trials 
 before him ; but it has been held that he may waive the privi- 
 lege and testify without furnishing just ground of exccDtion.® 
 
 § 306. Privilege must be claimed by Witness himself. — 
 
 The privilege in respect of self crimination or disgrace is per- 
 sonal to the ivitness, and cannot be claimed by the party whose 
 
 1 Corap. Laws Nev., § 1455. ■* Penniman v. Jones, 5!) N. II. 
 
 2 Maxwell v. Eives, 11 Nev. 213, 119. 
 
 220. 5 Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Me. 
 
 3 Geu. Laws N. H., chap. 228, § 1-t. 85.
 
 282 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 witness he is.^ " AY here the answer would thus tend to ex- 
 l^ose the witness to a criminal charge, if it be material and 
 relevant to the issue, the privilege belongs to the witness alone, 
 and must be claimed by him ; the objection cannot be inter- 
 i:)osed by a party, but the witness, advised of his privilege, 
 will be permitted to answer if he choose to do so." ^ The general 
 rule is that, where a question is put tending to criminate or 
 degrade the witness, the claim of privilege from answering it 
 must be made by the witness himself, and is not available when 
 made merely by the party whose witness the witness is. It is 
 merely a question between the witness and the court, with which 
 the party has nothing to do, and with Avhieh the counsel for a 
 party has no right to interfere.^ Thus, on a trial for murder, 
 the accused, testifying for himself, was asked on cross-examina- 
 tion, whether he had not been arrested for an assault with intent 
 to kill. The question was objected to, the objection was over- 
 ruled, and the accused answered without claiming his privilege. 
 It was held that the ruling was not erroneous.^ Where, upon 
 cross-examination, a witness refuses to answer a question which, 
 although upon collateral matter, is not otherwise objectionable, 
 but the answer to which may tend to criminate or degrade him, 
 the cross-examining party may further ask him his reason for 
 refusing to answer, and thus conti^el liira to claim his privilege, if 
 his refusal is based upon that ground.^ 
 
 § 307. Privilege may be Waived. — The refusal to answer 
 a question on the ground that the answer might subject the 
 witness to a criminal prosecution is a privilege which the wit- 
 ness is at libertv to waive. It therefore follows that a question 
 
 1 Ingalls V. State, 48 Wis. G47; s Cloves v. Thayer, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 
 
 Clark V. Reese, 35 Cal. 89; Com. v. 564; Southard r. Ke-xford, 6 Cow. (N. 
 
 Shaw, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 594; Soiulusky Y.) 2,54; Teople r. Brown, 72 N. Y. 
 
 V. McGee, 5 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 621; 571,573. 
 
 State v. Bilansky, 3 Minn, 246; New- * Hauoff v. State, 37 Oh. St. 178; 
 
 comb V. State, 37 Miss. 383; State v. s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 496. 
 Patterson, 2 Ired. (N. C.) 346. & Kew v. Fisher, II Daly (N. Y.), 
 
 - South Bend v. Hardie, 98 Ind. 577, 309. 
 583.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XII.] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 283 
 
 can never be objected to upon this ground, if it is otherwise 
 proper. The extent of the rule is that a witness can never be com- 
 pelled by compulsory process to answer such a question.^ Where 
 a co-defendant in a criminal case " turns State's evidence'^ and 
 attempts to convict others by i^roof which would also convict him- 
 self, he has no right to claim any privilege concerning any of the 
 facts bearing upon the issue. He has waived all privilege which 
 would permit him to hold anything.'^ Such a waiver covers 
 confidential commiDiications made to attorneys; since there is no 
 more reason for saving these than for saving the privilege of a 
 witness from criminating himself. Each may be waived, and 
 each is, by such criminating disclosures, conclusively waived. 
 Both client and attorney may be • compelled to disclose the 
 client's statements which are pertinent to the issue. ^ If a wit- 
 ness discloses a part of a criminal transaction, without claiming 
 his privilege, he must disclose the whole. He cannot, after vol- 
 untarily testifying in chief, decline cross-examination on the 
 ground that his answer may criminate or disgrace him.* So, if he 
 voluntarily states that he knows a fact, he may be compelled to 
 state how he knows it.^ 0\iq^\\\o volunteers his testi^nony in be- 
 half of the defendant in a criminal case, cannot refuse to submit 
 to a cross-examination on the ground that his answers will expose 
 him to a criminal charge growing out of the transaction concern- 
 ing whichhe has volunteered to testify.^ And it seems that a wit- 
 ness, by voluntarily answering as to a transaction, where his 
 answers tends to criminate him, waives the privilege of refusing 
 to answer which he misfht have had at the outset if he had seen 
 
 1 People V. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710. r. Gaylord, 28 Couu. 309; State v. Fos- 
 
 2 Hamiltoa v. People, 29 Mich. 173, ter, 23 N. H. 348; Coburn v. Odell, 30 
 184; Foster V. People, 18 Mich. 2(]G; N. H. 540; People v. Carroll, 3 Park. 
 Lockett V. State, G3 Ala. 5; Alderman Cr. (X. Y.) 73; Chamberlin v. Wilson, 
 t\ People, 4 Mich. 414; Com. v. Price, 12 Yt. 491; East v. Chapman, Mood. 
 10 Gray (Mass.), 472. & M. 47; s. c. 2 Car. & P. 570; Dixon 
 
 3 Aderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414; v. Yale, 1 Car. & P. 278. 
 Hamilton v. People, supra. ^ State v. K , 4 N. H. 562. 
 
 ■* People V. Freshauer, 55 Cal. 575; *^ State v. Hall, 20 Mo. App. 397, per 
 
 Com. V. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462; Fosters. Hall, J.; See Whart. Crim. Ev., § 470 
 
 Pierce, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 437; Norfolk and cases cited.
 
 284 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 fit to claim it/ But the fact that the witness testified before tlie 
 grand jury, and that it was on his testimony that the indictment 
 was found, docs not deprive him of his privilege of declining to 
 testify on the trial? 
 
 § 308. [Continued.] Illustrations. — Thus, a witness in a bastardy 
 case testified for the defendant that a person other than the defendant 
 had had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. He was required by 
 the court, on cross-examination, to state who that person was, and 
 thereupon he said that it was himself. It was held that this was no 
 error ; since, by appearing for the defendant to testify to such a fact, he 
 
 waived his privilege of not criminating himself.^ In a proceeding 
 
 to revoke letters of administration granted upon an estate on the ground 
 that the supposed decedent was alive, a witness swore that he himself 
 was the supposed decedent ; that he left the place in 1875 and did not 
 return until 1880 ; but he declined to disclose his whereabouts in the 
 meantime, on the ground of self-crimination, — adding that he had 
 neither been in prison nor under arrest. It was held, (1) that he had 
 not waived his privilege; but, (2) that he did not disclose a suflflcient 
 basis to enable him to claim it."* A physician testified without ob- 
 jection as to the condition of his patient, and then refused to give his 
 opinion as to the cause of the symptoms discovered, unless he should 
 receive an expert's fee. It was held that he must answer. ^ 
 
 § 309. Question decided by Court, not by Witness. — The 
 
 question of privilege must be decided by the judge, and not by 
 the witness.*^ Tlie rule under this head was tlius stated in a case 
 in Wisconsin by Dixon, C. J.: " Although the witness is the 
 judge of the effect of his answer, and is not bound to disclose any 
 facts or circumstances to show how the answer would affect him, 
 as that would defeat the rule and destroy the protection afforded 
 
 1 Youngs V. Youugs, 5 Reclf. (N. Y. 245; Uuited States v. Miller, 2 Crauch 
 Surr.) 505^ C. C. (U. S.) 247; United States v. 
 
 2 Temple -y. Com., 75 Va. 892, Devauglin, 2 Id. 501; Sanderson's 
 
 3 State t7. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357. Case, 3 Id. 638; State v. Duffy, 15 ' 
 
 4 Youngs V. Youngs, 5 Redf. (N. Y. Iowa, 425; Eichman v. State, 2 G. 
 Surr.) 505. Greene (Iowa), 532; Com. v. Bray- 
 
 5 Wright u. Teople, 112 111. 540. nard, Thach. Cr. (Mass.) 146; Floyd 
 
 6 United States v. Burr, 1 Burr Tr. v. State, 7 Tex. 215.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIL] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 285 
 
 by the law, yet the court is to determine, under all the circum- 
 stances of the case, whether such is the tendency of the question 
 put to him, and whether he shall be required to answer; as other- 
 wise it would be in the power of every witness to deprive parties 
 of the benefit of his testimony, by the merely colorable pretense 
 that his answers to questions would have a tendency to implicate 
 him in some crime or misdemeanor, or would expose him to a pen- 
 alty or forfeiture when it is clear * * * tlijit the questions 
 have no such tendency." ^ This was decided by Chief Justice 
 Marshall in Burr's trial, as shown by the quotation in a preced- 
 ing section ; and there is a general concurrence of autliority to the 
 same effect. " The court must," said Smith, C. «!., " in the first 
 instance, determine whether the question is such that it may be 
 reasonably inferred that the answer made is criminating ; and the 
 nature of the answer, as it is known to the witness alone, he alone 
 nuist decide. If the information sought may be self-accusing, 
 and the witness says it is, he need not answer." ^ In like man- 
 ner Prof . Greenleaf says: " Whether it [the answer] nuiy tend 
 to criminate or expose the witness, is a point which the court 
 will determine under all the circumstances of the case." ^ It is 
 accordingly said by Marcy, J., in a case in New York: " My 
 conclusion is that where the witness claims to be excused from 
 answering a question because the answer may disgrace him or 
 render him infamous, the court must see that the answer way, 
 without the intervention of other facts, fix on him moral turpi- 
 tude. Where he claims to be excused from answering because 
 his answer will have a tendency to implicate him in a crime or 
 misdemeanor, or will expose him to a i)enalty or forfeiture, then 
 the court are to determine whether the answer he may give to the 
 question can criminate him directh^ or indirectly, by furnishing 
 direct evidence of his guilt, or by establishing one of many facts 
 which, together, may constitute a chain of testimony sufficient 
 to warrant his conviction, but which one fact, of itself, could 
 
 1 Kirschnerv. State, 9 Wis. 140 (re- 2 LaFontaiue v. Southcru Uuder- 
 
 affirmed iu State v. Lousdale, 48 Wis. writers, 83 N. C. 132, 138. 
 348, 368, 3 1 Greeul. Ev., § 451.
 
 286 ' EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoinp. Tl'., 
 
 not produce such result."^ Considering these authorities, the 
 Supreme Court of North Carolina hold the rule to be: "That 
 to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, 
 the court must see from the circumstances of the case and the 
 nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that 
 there is no reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the wit- 
 ness from his being compelled to answer,"^ So, it has been 
 said in Iowa: "It is not left alone to the witness to determine 
 whether the answer would tend to criminate him. He is not 
 required to explain how he would be criminated ; for this would 
 or might annihilate the protection secured by the rule. But it 
 is for the court to determine whether the answer can criminate 
 him, directly or indirectly, by furnishing direct evidence of his 
 guilt, or by establishing one of m.any facts which, together, may 
 constitute a chain of testimony sufficient to warrant his conviction, 
 but one part of which, by itself, could not produce such result." ^ 
 li the production of a docur)ienthQ called for, and the witness de- 
 cline to produce it, upon the ground that the reading of it in evi- 
 dence would be prejudicial to his interests, or to the interests of a 
 person toward whom he stands in a confidential relation respect- 
 ing the instrument, the witness may be required to submit the 
 document to the inspection of the court. In so holding Daly, F. 
 J., said: " It was a contempt wilfully to deprive the court of the 
 means of determining whether the principle of protection extended 
 to the papers in his possession or not ; and it would not be the less 
 a case of contempt, even assuming that, by what was stated to the 
 court, a case of privilege was shown; for though the judge 
 should decide erroneously upon the question of privilege, the 
 order he makes is nevertheless to be obeyed. If it were other- 
 wise, it will always be in the power of a witness to withhold evi- 
 " dence wherever he thought fit to consider himself privileged."* 
 
 1 People V. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) ^ LaFontaine v. Southern Under- 
 
 254. See also Ward v. State, 2 Mo. -writers, 83 N. C. 132, 141. 
 123; 1 Whart, Crim. L., §807. See ^ gt^te v. Duffy, 15 la. 425, 427, 
 
 Osborne v. London Dock Co., 10 Exch. per Wright, J. 
 
 (H. &G.)701. 4 Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Tr. 
 
 (N.Y.) 249.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIL] THE PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES. 287 
 
 § 310. Compulsory answer not Evidence against Wit- 
 ness. — This question was considered in England by the judges, 
 when a majority were of opinion that, if a witness claims the 
 protection of the court on the ground that his answer W'Ould 
 tend to criminate himself, and there appears to be ground for be- 
 lieving that it would do so, he is not compellable to answer ; and, 
 if obliged to answer notwithstanding, what he says must be con- 
 sidered to have been obtained by compulsion, and cannot after- 
 wards be given in evidence against him. The judges also held 
 that it made no difference in the right of the witness to protec- 
 tion, that he had before answered in part; on the contrary, they 
 were of opinion that he was entitled to claim the privilege at any 
 stage of the inquiry, and that no answer forced from him by the 
 presiding judge after he had claimed such privilege could after- 
 wards be given in evidence against him.^ 
 
 § 311. Whether Refusal to Answer is Evidence against 
 Witness. — It has been held that the refusal of a party to a civil 
 suit, when testifying as a witness, to answer a material question 
 on the ground of self-crimination, is a circumstance which may 
 be considered against him in such civil suit.'^ The rule is other- 
 wise wdiere the witness is not a party .-^ But in a criminal case 
 where the accused, testifying as a witness, claims his privilege on 
 the ground of self-crimination, this cannot be shown as a circum- 
 stance against him on a subsequent trial for the same offense.* 
 
 § 312. Whether Court bound to Instruct the Witness. — 
 
 It has been held that the court is bound to instruct the witness 
 whether, as matter of law, his answer would tend to criminate him.^ 
 But, while this is proper, it would seem to be rather a matter of 
 discretion. It is not error to refuse to instruct a Avitness that, if 
 he would avail himself of his privilege, he must make the ob- 
 jection before answering anything upon the subject.^ 
 
 ^ Reg. V. Garbett, 2 Car. & Ker. 474. (Tenn.) 146. Compare Eutherford v. 
 
 - Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234. Com., 2 Mete. (Ky.) 387; Pointdexter 
 
 3 Rose V. Blakemore, Ry. & M. 383. v. Davis, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 481. 
 ^ State V. Bailey, 54 la. 414. « Com. v. Howe, 13 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 ^ Lea V. Henderson, 1 Coldw. 2G.
 
 288 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TilOmp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 
 
 Sectiox 
 
 318. Judge must Decide all Questions of Fact Preliminary to tlie Admission 
 
 or Exclusion of Evidence. 
 
 319. What if tlie Decision of the Preliminary Question would Decide the 
 
 Main Issue. 
 
 320. [Illustration.] Admissibility of Copy of Instrument Sued on, Existence 
 
 of Original in Dispute. 
 
 321. Error to Suljmit these Preliminary Questions of Fact to the Jury. 
 
 322. Judge must be Satistied by Competent Proof. 
 
 323. [Illustration.] Competency of Witnesses. 
 
 324. Competency of Documentary Evidence. 
 
 325. Witness' Inability to Attend so as to Admit his Deposition. 
 
 326. Privilege. 
 
 327. Dying Declarations. 
 
 328. Threats or Promises which will Exclude Confessions. 
 
 329. Evidence of Similar Acts. 
 
 330. Admissibility of Evidence of Other Criminal Acts. 
 
 331. [Continued.] Instances under this View of the Law. 
 
 332. [Continued.] Such Evidence Admissible to Show Guilty Purpose, 
 
 Plan, System, etc. 
 
 333. [Continued.] Instances in the Cases of Forgery and Uttering Forged 
 
 Paper. 
 
 334. [Coutiuued.] Instances in the Case of Sexual Crimes. 
 
 335. [Continued.] Other Instances where such Evidence has been Ad- 
 
 mitted. 
 
 336. Usage of Trade or Business. 
 
 337. Leading Questions. 
 
 338. Further Illustrations. 
 
 § 318. Judge must decide all Questions of Fact preliminary 
 to the Admission or Exclvision of Evidence. — " Whether there 
 be any evidence or not, is a question for the judge ; whether it 
 is sufficient evidence, is a question for the jury." ^ It is the ex- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. on Ev. §49; Buller, J., v. Von Roeder, 24 How. (U. S.) 
 in Cbmpanyof Carpenters?;. Hay ward, 227; Witkowsky v. Wassou, 71 N. C 
 Dougl. 360; Campbell, J., in Chandler 451.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 289 
 
 elusive province and duty of the court to decide upon the admis- 
 sibility of evidence, and it is none the less so where, in order to 
 make such determination, the court is obliged to examine and 
 pass upon que-tions of fact.^ In all cases, whether civil or crim- 
 inal, where objection is made to the competency of evidence 
 offered, and the question depends upon facts which may be proved 
 or disproved, it is the duty of the judge to hear all proper evi- 
 dence offered on either side touching the question of competency, 
 before letting the challenged evidence go to the jury; and it is 
 error to do other wise. ^ 
 
 § 319. What if the Decision of the Preliminary Question 
 would decide the Main Issue. — An exception, sometimes ad- 
 mitted to this rule is, that th§ judge is not bound to decide the 
 preliminary question of fact where the state of the case is such 
 that, for the judge to decide this question would be equivalent to 
 deciding the main issue. ^ Embarrassments surround the situa- 
 tion of the judge where the question is thus presented, as will be 
 seen by the observations of Lord Penzance in a case where he 
 took the course of admitting the evidence upon a prima facie 
 showing, although his conclusion did decide the main issue, — at 
 the same time cautioning the jury that his ruling was a prelimin- 
 ary ruling upon imperfect evidence, and was not in the least de- 
 gree to influence their verdict. The question at issue was 
 whether Murhall Daniels, through whom the defendants claimed, 
 was legitimate. The defendants, after producing 'prima facie 
 evidence of the legitimacy of Murhall Daniels, tendered his de- 
 clarations in evidence. The plaintiffs objected to the admissi- 
 
 1 Robinsou v. Ferry, 11 Conu. 4G0; uot that of the jury, to determiue as 
 
 Carter f. Bennett, 6Fla. 214; Scott i?. to the admissibility of testimony. 
 
 Coxe, 20 Ala. 294; Gorton v. Hadsell, Merrill r. Berkshire, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 9 Cush. (Mass.) 508; Claytor v. An- 2G9. 
 
 thony, 6 Rand. (Va.) 285; Carrico v. - Bartlett r. Smith, 11 Mees. & W. 
 
 McGee, 1 Dana (Ky.), 6. So, in Mas- 483. See also Reg. v. Garner, 2 Carr. 
 
 sachusetts, where a jury is impaneled & K. 920, and note, 
 
 by an officer, in pursuance of statutes ^ Stowe v. Queruer, L. R. 5 Exch. 
 
 respecting the laying out of ahigliway, 155; s. c. 39 L. J. (Exch.) GO. 
 it is tlie province of the officer, and 
 
 19
 
 290 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, . ThoQip. Tl'., 
 
 bility of these declarations, and tendered evidence on the voir 
 dire^ for the purpose of showing that the declarant was not a 
 member of the family. Lord Penzance, being of opinion that 
 the defendants had made out a prima facie case of the declar- 
 ant's legitimacy, admitted the evidence of the declarations, and 
 rejected the evidence on the voii' dire tendered by the plaintiffs. 
 His lordship gave an interesting opinion, pointing out the incon- 
 venience of hearing the whole of the evidence on both sides, 
 touching the question of legitimacy, before admitting the decla- 
 rations; and added, evidently with the view of admonishing the 
 jury, that his decision, based upon imperfect evidence, would not 
 have the slightest effect upon their verdict.^ In an action of 
 ejectment, where this question was reserved for the judgment of 
 the Court of Queen's Bench, it was similarly decided. The ulti- 
 mate question for the decision of the jury was whether Elizabeth 
 Stephens was legitimate. A certificate of the marriage of her 
 alleged father, J. D., to her mother was produced by a witness, 
 who said he received it from the said Elizabeth. The question 
 was then put, whether Elizabeth made at that time any statement 
 respecting her mother's marriage. The admissibility of this state- 
 ment, if any, depended, as in the previous case, upon the question 
 whether she was a member of the family, — that is the question 
 called for a declaration concerning pedigree. It was held, on the 
 authority of a leading case already cited, ^ that this question was 
 for the judge, and that it made no difference that the fact which 
 the judge was thus called upon to decide was identical with the issue 
 on which the opinion of the jury would be ultimately taken. 
 Lord Denman, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the court after 
 an advisement, said: " It was the duty of the judge to decide 
 whether it was proved to Jiim, and he decided that it was. There 
 are conditions precedent which are required to be fulfilled before 
 evidence is admissible for the jury. Thus, an oath, or its equiva- 
 lent, and competency, are conditions precedent to admitting viva 
 voce evidence; an apprehension of immediate death, to admitting 
 
 1 Hitchins v. Eardley, L. R. 2 Prob. « Bartlett v. Smith, 11 Mees. & W. 
 
 & Div. 2-18 ; s. c. 40 L. J. (Prob. & Mat.) 483. 
 70.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XIJI.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 291 
 
 evidence of dying declarations ; a search, to secondary evidence of 
 lost writings ; a stamp, to certain written instruments: and so is 
 consanguinity or affinity in the declarant, to declarations of 
 deceased relatives. The judge alone has to decide whether the 
 condition has been fullilled. If the proof is by witnesses, he 
 must decide on their credibility. If counter evidence is offered, 
 he must receive it before he decides; and he has no right to ask 
 the opinion of a jury on the fact as a condition precedent." ^ 
 
 § 320. [Illustration.] Admissibility of Copy of Instru- 
 ment sued on. Existence of Original in Dispute. — This ex- 
 ception to the rule is well illustrated by a case in the English Ex- 
 chequer, W'here the action was upon a policy of insurance and the 
 defendant had pleaded (inter alia) that the defendant did not 
 become an insurer as alleged, which, it is perceived, was equiva- 
 lent to a plea of non est factum in respect of the policy sued on. 
 The plaintiffs, pursuant to notice to produce, called on the de- 
 fendant to produce the original policy. He declined, and they, 
 thereupon, with the view of proving that it had been duly exe- 
 cuted, offered in evidence a document which purported to be a 
 copy of the policy which they had received from the defendant's 
 broker. To this the defendant objected, and requested the 
 judge to hear evidence to show that no original policy was, or 
 ever had been, in existence. The objection was overruled, and 
 the alleged copy was admitted. Later in the trial, the defend- 
 ant gave evidence tending to prove that in fact there had never 
 been any duly stamped policy, or indeed any policy at all exe- 
 cuted; and the judge left it to the jury to say whether there had 
 or had not been executed a duly stamped policy by the defend- 
 ant. The jury having found in the affirmative, it Avas held that 
 the question was rightly left to them, inasmuch as if the judge 
 had himself decided it, he would in fact have decided the main 
 issue between the parties. Baron Bramwell, in the course of his 
 opinion, said: " If the objection on the part of the defendant had 
 been that there was a policy, but that it was not stamped, it would, 
 
 1 Jenkius v. Davies, 10 Ad. & El. (x. s.) 314, 323.
 
 292 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [i TllOinp. Tl'., 
 
 perhaps, have been well founded. But here it was objected 
 that there was no policy executed at all, an objection which goes 
 to the entire ground of action, and one which, if it had prevailed, 
 might have left the jury nothing to decide. For, suppose the 
 judge had ruled that the copy was inadmissible on the ground that 
 there was no original ever in existence, the plaintiffs would in fact 
 have had no case left, and the judge would himself have decided 
 the whole of it. * * * Put an illustration analogous to the 
 present. Suppose an action to be brought for libel, and a copy 
 of a letter which is destroyed, but which contained the libel com- 
 plained of, is produced and tendered in evidence. Could the de- 
 fendant say ' stop ; I will show that no letter was in point of 
 fact ever written, and I call upon you, the judge, to hear evidence 
 upon this point, and if I satisfy you that no such letter ever ex- 
 isted, you ought not to admit the copy?' Surely not; for that 
 would be getting the judge to decide what is peculiarly within the 
 province of the jury. The distinction is really this: Where the 
 objection to the reading of a copy concedes that there was pri- 
 mary evidence of some sort in existence, but defective in some 
 collateral matter, as, for instance, where the objection is a pure 
 stamp objection, the judge must, before he admits the copy, hear 
 and determine whether the objection is well founded. But where 
 the objection goes to show that the very substratum and founda- 
 tion of the cause of action is wanting, the judge must not decide 
 upon the matter, but receive the copy, and leave the main ques- 
 tion to the jury."^ Barons Martin, Pigott and Cleasby concurred. 
 
 § 321. Error to submit these Preliniiuary Qviestions of Fact 
 to the Jury. — Although Prof. Greenleaf states that the judge 
 may, if he chooses, take the opinion of the jury upon these 
 preliminary questions of fact,^ and although this doctrine has 
 been admitted in a few cases, "^ yet the general conclusion is that 
 
 1 Stowe V. Queruor, L. R. 5 Exch. 294. lu Bai-tlett v. Hoyt, the prelira- 
 155, 158; s. c. 39 L. J. (Esch.) GO. iuary questiou whether a statement of 
 
 2 1 Greeul. Ev., § 49. a party offered in evidence was in- 
 
 3 Egan V. Larkiu, Arm. M. & O. tended as an admission of a fact, or 
 (Irish Exch.) 403; Bartlett v. Hoyt, 33 merely as an offer to compromise, was 
 N. H. 151, 1G5; Scott ^'. Coxe, 20 Ala. regarded as one which the court miglit,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTJoxs of fact fok the judge. 293 
 
 it is error to .submit such questions to the jury.^ If, upon such 
 examination of facts, the judge decides to admit the evidence, it 
 is for the jury to weigh and apply it ; but if the judge rejects it, 
 the jury has no right even to know that it was offered.''^ 
 
 § 322. Judge must be satisfied by Competent Proof . — In 
 
 determining any preliminary fact essential to the admissibility 
 of evidence, the rule is the same as to the weight of the testi- 
 mony, as in the case' of issues tried by juries: it is not sufficient 
 that there may be evidence tending to establish the particular 
 fact, but the judge must be satisfied of it by competent proof .^ 
 But it was early hekl in Pennsylvania that if, when a witness is 
 offered, it \s j)erfectly clear from the testimony given in relation 
 to him, that he is interested, the court may reject him as incom- 
 petent ; but if his interest be in the least degree doubtful, the 
 court should permit him to be sworn, instructing the jury, that 
 if, in their opinion, he is interested, they are to pay no regard 
 whatever to his testimony.* But this view seems to have been 
 grounded upon the disfavor with which the court, even at that 
 early day, viewed the rule of law which excluded witnesses on the 
 ground of interest, rather than upon a general principle applica- 
 ble to all cases. 
 
 §323. [Illustration.] Competency of Witnesses. — Whether 
 a witness is qualified to be sworn as such is always a question 
 for the court; but it is for the jury to determine whether they 
 will believe his evidence.^ Thus, whether a witness is incompe- 
 
 in its discretion, submit to the jiu-y, — liff v. Huntly, 5 Ired. L. (N. C.) 545; 
 
 the view being that there is a distiuc- Thoraasou v. Odnra, 31 Ala. 108; De- 
 
 tion between such a question and that graffeureid v. Thomas, 14 Ala. (181. 
 of the interest of a witness and other 2 Scovell v. Kingsley, 7 Conn. 284. 
 
 questions which illustrate the rule 3 Degraffenreid v. Thomas, 14 Ala. 
 
 we are considering; but the vieAV 681, fi87. 
 
 which the court there took is plainly 4 i^art v. Heilner, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 
 
 untenable. 407, 411. 
 
 1 Bartlett v. Smith, 11 Mees. & W. ^ Com. v. Lynes (Mass.), 3 New 
 
 483; Hart v. Heilner, 3 Rawle (Pa.), Eng. Rep. 89, 91 ; s. c. North E. Rep. 
 
 107, 411; Stowe V. Querner, L. R. 5 408; s. c. 142 Mass. 577; Reg. v. Hill, 
 
 Exch. 155; s. c. 39 L. J. (Exch.) 60; 5 Cox C. C. 259; Kendall ?;. May, 10 
 
 i:o':iy.sou v. Ferry, 11 Conn. 460; Rat- Allen (:Mass.), 64.
 
 294 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tl., 
 
 tent (where the old rule prevails) by reason of interest,'^ or by 
 reason of a want of religious belief; - or whether or not a witness 
 is an expert so as to render him competent to express an opinion 
 upon the question in issue, ^ — are questions for the judge. 
 
 § 324 Competency of Docunieiitary Evidence. — In like 
 manner, the judge must determine all questions of fact which 
 are necessary to the decision of the question whether writings 
 which are offered in evidence are admissible. Thus, in an action 
 of ejectment, the court must decide upon the competency of 
 title pa j)ers, and the right to use them ; and, as an incident to 
 this, under what title the party entered.* So, it is for the judge 
 to decide, where a document is offered in evidence and objected 
 to on the ground that it has not come from the proper custody^ 
 whether it has come from the proper custody or not; and an 
 appellate court will not interfere with his decision, unless it ap- 
 pears to be clearly wrong. ^ Upon like grounds, evidence of the 
 loss or destruction of an instrument upon which suit is brought, 
 is not to go to the jury, but is addressed to the court, for the 
 purpose of establishing the right of the party to introduce sec- 
 ondary evidence of the contents of the lost instrument, and it is 
 error to refer such a question to the jury.^ So, where a hill of 
 
 1 Cook V. Mix, 11 Couu. 432, Jacobs v. Phillips, 8 Ad. & El. (n. s.) 
 
 - Wakefield, v. Eoss, 5 Mason 158. See the opinion of the judges to 
 
 (U. S.), 16, 18; People v. Mattesou, 2 the Lords, given by Tindal, C. J., in 
 
 Cow. (N. Y.) 433, 572; Jackson v. the case of the Bishop of Meath v. 
 
 Gridley, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 99. Marquis of Winchester, 3 Bing. N. 
 
 3 State u. Cole, 94 N. C. 959; Flynt C. 183, 196, 198. Compare Reg. v. 
 V. Bodeuhamer, 80 N. C. 205. Com- Kenilworth, 7 Ad. & El. (x. s.) 642. 
 pare State v. Sanders, 84 N. C. 728; " Locwe v. Ilolsmaun, 8 Bradw. 
 State V. Efler, 85 N. C. 585; State v. (111.) 525; Dormandy v. State Bank, 3 
 Burgwyn, 87 N. C. 572; Fairbanks t'. Id. 236; Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Pet. 
 Hughson, 58 Cal. 314; Joues v. (U. S.} 591 ; Ratliff t7. Hinitly, 5Ired. L. 
 Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; Ives v. Leon- (N. C.) 545; Graff v. Pittsburgh &c. R. 
 ard, 50 Mich. 183. Co., 31 Pa. St. 489; Witter v. Latham, 
 
 4 Carrico v. McGee, 1 Dana (Ky.), 12 Conn. 392; Donelson v. Taylor, 8 
 6; Hamilton v. Taylor, Littell's Sel. Pick, (Mass.) 390. Contra, Coleman 
 Gas. (Ky.) 444. v. Wolcott, 4 Day (Conn.), 388. And 
 
 ^ Slirewsbury v. Keeling, 11 Ad. & this question is not afterwards to be 
 El. (n. s.) 884, 889; Reese r. "Walters, considered by tlie jury. Witter v 
 3 Mees. & W. 527, 531, per Parke, II. \ Latliam, supra.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 295 
 
 exchange, purporting to be a foreign bill and stamped accord- 
 ingly, was offered in evidence, and objected to, on the ground 
 that, although it purported to have been drawn abroad, it was in 
 fact an inland bill, drawn in London, and therefore required a 
 higher stani]), it was held that the judge ought to have received 
 the evidence in that stage of the case, and ought to have decided 
 upon the admissibility of the instrument, instead of receiving 
 the evidence afterwards, as a part of the defendant's case, and 
 submitting it to the jury ; and for this error a new trial was 
 ordered.^ Applying the same principle, it has been ruled that, 
 where the question is whether a check was post-dated, and this 
 question arises upon an objection to its admissibility in evidence, 
 it is for the judge to try and determine the question as a collat- 
 eral issue, and not for the jury.^ 
 
 § 325. Witness' Inability to Attend so as to Admit his Depo- 
 sition, — Where the deposition of a witness is made by a statute,^ 
 inadmissible in evidence, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction 
 of the judge that the deponent is unable, from permanent sickness 
 or other permanent infirmity, to attend the trial, — it is for the 
 judge to satisfy himself of the deponent's inability to attend, by 
 such evidence as he shall think fit; and although his decision is 
 subject to review, yet it will not be disturbed by a reviewing 
 court, unless it be shown that he has been misled by false evi- 
 dence, or that injustice has resulted from the course pursued at 
 the trial. ■* 
 
 § 326. Privileg-e. — Where the question is whether the evi- 
 dence of a witness is to be excluded on the ground of privileo-e, 
 as where the witness is an attorney and the evidence called for 
 
 is a confidential communication of his client, this, on like 
 
 grounds, is a question for the court, and not for the jury.^ So, 
 
 1 Bartlett v. Smith, 11 Mees. & W. ■• Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshay, L. 
 '*^-^- 1^- 1 C. P. C99; s. c. 35 L. J. cV P. 
 
 2 Dumsford v. Curlewis, 1 Post. & 342. 
 
 ^'"- '^2. 5 Hull V. Lyou, 27 Mo. 570, 576. 
 
 3 In this case, the Stat. 1 "\Vm. IV., 
 c. 22, § 10
 
 29G EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOtlip. Tl"., 
 
 whether an instrument of w^'iting, offered in evidence, is protected 
 on the ground of its being a privileged communication ,is a pre- 
 liminary question of fact to be decided by the judge, ^ though his 
 decision is subject to review in a court of error. ^ 
 
 § 327. Dying Declarations. — So, upon the question whether 
 a declaration by a deceased person is competent as a dying 
 declaration on the trial of an indictment for murder, it is the 
 duty of the court to hear evidence tendered by both parties as to 
 the circumstances under which the declaration was made, and 
 thereupon to determine whether evidence of it is admissible or 
 not.^ 
 
 § 328. Threats or Promises which will Exclude Confes- 
 sions. — What amounts to such threats or promises as will ex- 
 clude evidencQ of the confessions of the defendant in a criminal 
 case, is a question of law, which may be reviewed on exceptions 
 by an appellate court. ^ But, whether the evidence, if true, 
 proves these facts, and whether the witnesses giving the testi- 
 mony in regard to the facts are credible or not, and, in a case 
 presenting a conflict of testimony, which witnesses shall be be- 
 lieved by the court, are all questions of fact to be decided by 
 the trial court, the decision of which cannot be reviewed on 
 appeal.^ Where objection is made to the competency of evi- 
 dence offered to prove confessions made by the defendant in a 
 criminal case, upon the ground that such confessions were made 
 under the influence of fear produced by threats, and evidence is 
 offered to prove such threats, it is the duty of the court to hear 
 
 1 Cleave v. -Jones, 7 Esch. 421. not for the jury. Rex. v. Hucks, 
 
 2 Wri.<:;htv. T:itham,7 Ad. &E1. 313. 1 Stark, N. P. 523. In this view of 
 
 3 State y. Elliott, 45 la. 48G; s. c. the law the ruling of Lord Eyre, C. B., 
 2 Am. Crim. Rep. 322; State v. Mo- in Rex v. Woodcock (2 Leach Cr. C. 
 lisse, 36 La. Ann. 920. *' This point," 5G3) , was plainly erroneous. 
 
 said Lord Ellenborough "was con- ■* State u. Andrew, Phil. L. (N. C.) 
 
 sidered by the judgeshere, ona ques- 205; States. Burgwyn, 87 N. C. 572. 
 
 tion proposed to them by the judges ^ State v. Burgwyn, supra. To the 
 
 in Ireland, who entertained doubts same effect are State v. Vann, 82 N. 
 
 upon the subject, and tliis was their C. 631 ; and State v. Efler, 85 N. C. 
 
 unanimous opinion," — that is, that 585. ' 
 it was a fiuestion for the judge, and
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 297 
 
 such evidence, to determine therefrom the competency of the 
 evidence offered to prove the confession, and not to submit the 
 question to the jury.^ 
 
 § 329. Evidence of Similar Acts. — " Where evidence is of- 
 fered of acts done in phices other than the phice in dispute, it 
 is for the judge to decide, in the iirst instance, whether there 
 is such a unity of character in the different parts, as to render 
 evidence affecting a part not in dispute, admissible with ref- 
 erence to the part in dispute, and whether the acts relied on 
 amount to evidence of ownership." Accordingly, where the 
 question was, whether a slip of land between some old enclosures 
 and the highway, vested in the lord of the manor or in the owner 
 of the adjoining freehold, — it was held that evidence might be 
 received of acts of ownership by the lord of the manor on sim- 
 ilar slips of land not adjoining his own freehold, in various parts 
 of the manor. ^ 
 
 § 330. [Continued.] Admissibility of Evidence op other Crim- 
 inal Acts. — The general rule is that it is not competent, on a criminal 
 trial, to give evidence tending to show that the defendant has been 
 guilty of other acts of a criminal nature. ^ Upon the same view it has 
 been held that it is not competent to show that the defendant had a 
 tendency to commit the offense with which he was charged.'* A better 
 statement of the rule is that evidence of other criminal acts of the 
 prisoner cannot be given by the prosecution, unless such acts are so 
 connected by circumstances with the particular crime in issue, that 
 proof of one act, with its attending circumstances, has a tendency to 
 make it probable that the accused committed the crime with which he 
 stands charged.-'' It has been reasoned that such evidence should have 
 a peculiar and intimate, if not also an inseparable connection with and 
 tendency to explain and characterize the act in issue against the pris- 
 oner, and that it is only admissible on the question of intent. ^ The ob- 
 jection to such evidence was thus forcibly stated by Allen, J. : " The 
 
 1 Brown v. State, 71 lad. 470; Com. ^ State v. Reutou, 15 N. H. 174. 
 V. Culver, 12(3 Mass. 4(3 4. s state v. Lepasre, 57 N. H. 245. 
 
 2 Barrett y. Kemp, 7 Biug. 332, 33(3, " Co,ji_ u. Tuckerroan, 10 Gray 
 per Bosanquet, J. (Mass.), 198; State v. Lepage, 67 
 
 3 Com. V. Campbell, 7 Alleu N. II. 245, 302, 304, 
 (Mass.), 542.
 
 298 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tl'., 
 
 general rule is against receiving evidence of another offense, A per- 
 son cannot be convicted of one offense upon proof that he committed 
 another, however persuasive in a moral point of view such evidence 
 may be. It would be easier to believe a person guilty of one crime, 
 if it was known that he had committed another of a similar character, 
 or indeed, of any character; but the injustice of such a rule in courts 
 of justice is apparent. It would lead to convictions upon the particu- 
 lar charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, 
 and to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce conviction for 
 a single one." ^ So, in a leading case in New Hampshire it was said 
 by Smith, J. : " It is always competent for the government to intro- 
 duce evidence of any facts tending directly to show an evil intent, or 
 from which such evil intent may be justly and reasonably inferred ; but 
 all proof in relation to transactions not intimately and directly con- 
 nected with the particular case against the defendant, or with the evi- 
 dence, or in necessary explanation of the evidence introduced in 
 support of the charge contained in the indictment, is irrelevant and 
 inadmissible." ^ 
 
 § 331. [Continued.] Instances under this View of the Law. — 
 Thus, where the action was against the owner of a dog for damages in 
 consequence of the killing of plaintiff 's sheep by the dog, it was said in 
 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, by Perley, C. J. : " We are not 
 acquainted with any rule of evidence which will allow the character of 
 the dog, or the fact that he had killed or worried sheep before, to be 
 admitted as evidence that he did the damage complained of in this suit. 
 To she iv that he did this mischief, it is not competent to prove that 
 he had done similar mischief before, more than it would be to prove 
 that the defendant, sued for an assault and batter}^ had beaten other 
 men before, or the same man." ^ So, where the indictment was for 
 keeping a gaming house, and the allegation in the second count was 
 confined to a single day, it was held that the government could not, for 
 the purpose of charging the defendant on that count, prove that the 
 crime Avas committed on more than one day, although evidence cover- 
 ing a longer time would be admissible for the purpose of showing what 
 character the house had on the particular day when it was sought to 
 prove that the offense was committed.'* On the other hand, on the trial 
 
 1 Coleman v. People, 55 X. Y. 81, 90. ' East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 
 
 2 State V. Lepage, 57 X. H. 245 57, (!5. 
 
 302. < State v. Prescott, 33 N. H. 212
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 299 
 
 of an indictment for murder, proof of other crimes than tlmt alleged in 
 the indictment, but connected with it by unity of plot and design ana 
 influenced by a similar motive, has been held admissible. ^ So, evi- 
 'dence of the commission of a previous crime is admissible where it will 
 furnish a motive for the commission of the crime charged. As where 
 A. is indicted for the murder of B., and evidence is admitted to show 
 an adulterous intercourse between A. and the wife of B.^ 
 
 § 332. [Continued.] Such Evidence Admissible to show Guilty 
 PuKPOSE, Plan, System, etc. — Where evidence is admissible as bear- 
 ing upon the question of intent, it is not rendered inadmissible by the 
 fact that it tends to prove the commission of another distinct and sep- 
 arate offense.^ " The principle is, that all the evidence admitted must 
 be pertinent to the point in issue ; but if it be pertinent to this point, 
 and tends to prove the crime charged, it is not to be rejected, though 
 it also tends to prove the commission of other crimes, or to establish 
 collateral facts."* This rule applies where intent, system, or scienter 
 may be involved, as illustrated in successive cheats or forgeries, or 
 passing counterfeit monej' to different persons, and the like.^ " An- 
 other act of fraud is admissible to prove the fraud charged, whenever 
 there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme or plan of fraud, 
 committed in pursuance of a common purpose." ^ 
 
 § 333. [Continued.] Instances in the Case of Forgery and Ut- 
 tering Forged Paper. — Numerous instances of the application of this 
 principle could be cited where the trial was for forgery or the uttering 
 of forged paper. Proof of the commission of other forgeries, or the 
 having in possession other forged paper, is generally admissible in such 
 cases, as bearing upon the question of intent.^ Thus, where the in- 
 
 1 People V. Wood, 3 Park. Cr. (X. Crim. Ev. (8th ed.), § 31 et seq.; 1 
 Y.) 081. Greenl. Ev. (13th ed.), §§ 53, 451, 454; 
 
 2 Com. V. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 38(3. Whart. Crhn. Law (8th ed.), § 1733; 
 
 3 Reg. V. Weeks, Leigh & Cave C. Bish, Stat. Crime, § 082; 2 Bish. Mar. 
 C. 18, 21; Kirkwood's Case, 1 Lewiu & Div. (C.th ed.), § 025. 
 
 C. C. 103; Com. v. Steams, 10 Mete. ** Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457, 
 
 257; Mason v. Stale, 42 Ala. 532. 461; approved and applied in Berkey 
 
 ^ Com. V. Choate, 105 Mass. 451^ v. Judd, 22 Minu. 287, 298. 
 458. ' Reg. V. Foster, Dearsley C. C. 
 
 5 See State v. Bridgmau,49 Vt. 202; 456; Reg. v. Nisbett, 6 Cox C. C. 320: 
 
 Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. Ill; Reg, v. Salt, 3 Fost. & F. 834; Com. 
 
 Com. ■?;. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285; Whart. r. Price, 10 Gray, 473.
 
 300 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 dictmentwas for forging and uttering a note of the Kingdom of Poland, 
 on September 1st, 1835, evidence was received to show that the defend- 
 ant, on August 24th, 1835, agreed to forge a thousand Austrian notes, 
 and that in September, 1834, he had in his possession plates for printing 
 Polish notes different from that which was the subject of the indictment, 
 and had caused 500 notes to be printed from those plates. ^ So, where 
 the charge was that the defendant had in his possession a counterfeit bank 
 bill with intent to pass it, it was held tliat evidence was admissible to 
 show that he had passed a different kind of counterfeit money at vari- 
 ous times and places, and that he had made statements to a witness 
 which were tantamount to an admission that he was a dealer in counter- 
 feit money. 2 So, on the trial of an indictment for forging and deliver- 
 ing bank notes, after proof of the fact of forging a large quantity and 
 the delivery of one note had been given, it was held that parol evidence 
 of the contents of a letter from the defendant to an accomplice on the 
 subject of counterfeit notes, for which the accomplice could tiot account 
 and had not searched, but which he believed to be lost, might be ad- 
 mitted. ^ 
 
 § 334. [Continued. ] Instances in the Case of Sexual Crimes. — 
 Upon the same principle, on an indictment for adultery, evidence of 
 previous improper familiarities is competent."* But it is said that the 
 reception of such evidence is to be controlled largely by the judge who 
 tries the cause, and that it is to be submitted to the jury with proper 
 explanation of its purpose and effect.^ So, on an indictment for seduc- 
 tion, it is competent for the defendant to give evidence of previous 
 acts of carnal intercourse between the prosecutrix and himself, not for 
 the purpose of impeaching her character for chastity, but for the pur- 
 pose of showing that the criminal act charged was not committed under 
 a promise of marriage.^ So, on an indictment for rape, evidence that 
 the defendant had made previous attempts to have sexual intercourse 
 with the prosecutrix has been held admissible.^ But where the defend- 
 
 1 Rex V. Balls, 1 Moody C. C. 470; v. Thayer, 101 Mass. Ill; (overrulins 
 s. c. 7 Carr. & P. 429. Com. v. Hortou,2 Gray (Mass.), 354, 
 
 2 Cora. V. Edgerly, 10 Allen (Mas.s.) , aud Com. v. Thrasher,ll Gray (Mass.), 
 184, 186, 187. 450). 
 
 3 United States v. Doebler, 1 ^ State v. Withara, 72 Me. 531, 535. 
 Baldw. (U. S.) 519. « Bowers v. State, 29 Oh. St. 542. 
 
 4 State V. Wallace, 9 N. H. 515; ^ Williams v. State, 8 Humph. 
 State V. Marvin, 35 N. H- 22; Com. v. (Tenn.) 585; State v. Knapp, 45 N. II. 
 Merriam, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 518; Tliayer 148, 15(], 157.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 301 
 
 ant was charged in the indictment with the murder of a woman, pei'pe- 
 trated in attempting to commit rape upon her, and the evidence of 
 another woman was admitted, detailing the fact that, four years before, 
 the defendant had committed a rape upon the witness in Canada, giving 
 in full tlie circumstances of the outrage, — it was held that, for the ad- 
 mission of this evidence, a neu- trial must be had.i 
 
 § 335. [Continued.] Other Instances where such Evidence has 
 BEEN AD-AHTTED. — lu the leading case on this subject in New Hamp- 
 shire,- the court had the advantage of an exhaustive printed argument 
 by the attorney-general, Lewis W. Clark (with whom were W. W. 
 Flanders, solicitor, and C. P. Sanborn). In this argument the follow- 
 ing instances were given of cases where evidence of other criminal acts 
 has been admitted. They have been re-examined and verified by the 
 present writer: — On the trial of an indictment for shooting with intent 
 to kill, evidence that the defendant shot at the same person at another 
 time was held by all the judges admissible, for the purpose of showing 
 
 that the shooting charged was not accidental. ^ Where the charge 
 
 was against a wife for murdering her husband by poison, evidence that 
 three of her sons had been subsequently poisoned was received, as tend- 
 ing to show that the husband had died of poison, and that his death 
 
 was not accidental.^ Where the charge was against a mother for 
 
 murdering her child by poison, evidence was held admissible that two 
 other children of tlie mother and a lodger in the house had previously 
 died of the same poison.^ Where the charge was that the de- 
 fendant had murdered his mother by poison, and the defendant's wife 
 had lived in his family as a servant when his former wife died, evidence 
 was received to show that his first wife had died of poison, and also to 
 
 show the circumstances of her death. ^ Where the charge was 
 
 against a mother for murdering her infant by suffocating it in bed, evi- 
 dence was received to show the previous deaths of her other chil- 
 
 ^ State V. Lepage, 57 N. H. 245. the prosecutrix with other persons, 
 
 The Ohio statute with reference .to but he must attack her character, if 
 
 seduction (Oh. Act of April 4th, 1859, at all, by proof of her reputation. 
 
 S. & C. 452) extends its protection to Bowers v. State, 29 Oh. St. 542. 
 
 all females under the age of 18 years ^ state v. Lepage, 57 N. H. 245. 
 
 who are " of good repute for chas- ^ pex v. Voke, Russ. & Ey. 531. 
 
 tity ;" and therefore on the trial of an ^ Reg. v. Geering, IS L. J. (Mag. 
 
 iudictmeut under the statute, it is not Cas.) 215. 
 
 competent for the defendant to prove ^ Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox C. C. 400. 
 
 specific acts of carnal intercourse by ^ Reg. v. Garner, 3 F. & F. G81.
 
 302 EXAMINATIOX OF WITNESSES. [IThotlip. Tr., 
 
 dren at early ages.^ Where the indictment was for the murder of 
 
 H., evidence was received to show that H. had been employed by the 
 
 defendant to murder P."^ Where the charge was that the defendant 
 
 had murdered his wife, evidence was received to show that he had 
 lived in adulterous intercourse with another woman for some months 
 prior to his wife's death. ^ - - _ _ So, on a trial for murder, 
 evidence was received to show an adulterous intercourse between the 
 defendant and the wife of the deceased.^ _ - - _ On the charge 
 of administering sulphuric acid to eight horses with intent to kill 
 them, evidence that the defendant had administered the same chemical 
 
 at different times, was received to show his intent. ^ On a charge 
 
 of setting fire to a rick by firing a gun close to it, on the 29th of 
 March, evidence that the rick was also on fire on the 28th of March, 
 and that the prisoner was then close to it, having a gun in his hand, was 
 
 received to show that the fire of the 29th was not accidental.^ On the 
 
 charge of setting fire to the defendant's house with intent to defraud an 
 insurance company, evidence that the defendant had insured in other 
 offices two other houses in which he had lived, which other houses were 
 burned and that he received the insurance money from the other com- 
 panies, has been held relevant as tending to show that the fire in ques- 
 tion was intentional and not accidental.''' On an Indictment for arson, 
 
 evidence of two previous unsuccessful attempts to set fire to the same 
 premises was admitted to show that the last fire was not accidental, 
 although there was no evidence that the two former attempts were made 
 by the defendant.^ .Where the charge was embezzlement by the de- 
 fendant, as a clerk, who had made false entries in his book of the 
 amounts by him received, it was held that the book was evidence, and 
 that generally not only the false entries bearing directly upon the issue, 
 
 but also other similar false entries might be shown thereby.^ Where 
 
 the charge was that of embezzlement against a clerk who made out 
 
 weekly accounts of his payments, it was shown that on three occasions 
 
 within six months he had entered the payments correctly, but that in 
 
 . adding them up he had made the totals £2 greater than they were, 
 
 1 Rog. V. Roder, 12 Cox C. C. 630. « Rex v. Mogg, 4 Carr. & P. 364. 
 
 - Rex V. Clewes, 4 Carr. & P. 221. ^ Reg. v. Dossett, 2 Carr. & K. 
 
 3 State V. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47; 306. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; Hall ' Reg. v. Gray, 4 Post. & F. 1102. 
 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 698; People v. Stout, » jjeg. v. Bailey, 2 Cox C. C. 311. 
 
 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 71. » Reg. v. Proud, Leigh & Cave C. C- 
 
 4 Com..?;. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St, 386. 97, 101.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 303 
 
 and had taken credit for the larger amounts. These were the cases 
 on which the indictments were founded. Evidence was admitted that, 
 on several occasions befoi'e and afterwards, precisely similar errors had 
 been made and similar advantage talcen of them by him, as tending to 
 show that the errors which were the foundation of the indictment were in- 
 tentional and fraudulent, and not accidental.^ In another case, where 
 
 the charge was embezzlement, evidence of another act of embezzlement 
 by the defendant during the same week was held competent on the ques- 
 tion of intent.^ Where the defendants were indicted for obtaining 
 
 goods of certain persons by false pretenses, evidence of the purchase of 
 other goods from other persons by similar pretenses was held competent 
 
 on the question of criminal intent.-' So, where the indictment was 
 
 for obtaining money by false pretense, and the pretense charged was 
 that a chain which the defendant pledged to a pawn broker was silver, 
 evidence that the defendant, a few days afterwards , offered a similar 
 
 chain to another pawn broker, was held admissible.* Where, on 
 
 an indictment for robbery, evidence was adduced to the effect that the 
 prosecutor was induced, by defendant's advice, to give money to a mob 
 who had come to his house for the purpose of getting rid of them and 
 preventing mischief, it was competent to show that the same mob had 
 demanded money at other houses when some of the defendants were 
 present, — for the purpose of showing that the advice was fraudulent 
 
 and a mere mode of effecting the robber3\^ Where the defendant 
 
 was indicted for robbery and found guilty of larceny of the prose- 
 cutor's watch, upon evidence that he had oUtained it under the pre- 
 tense of a bet, evidence was held competent to show that the defendant 
 had attempted to practice the same artifice on other persons and on 
 
 other occasions.^ Where the question at issue was whether the 
 
 purchase of property from one person was fraudulent, evidence was 
 held admissible to show that the purchasers had fraudulently bought 
 other property of other persons.''' Where the charge was the steal- 
 ing of coal, it was held competent to prove that the defendant was the 
 
 i Reg. V. Richardsou, 2 Fost. & F. ^ Rex v. Wiukworth, -4 Carr. & P. 
 
 343. 444. 
 
 2 Com. V. Shepherd, 1 Allen « Defrese v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 (Mass.), 575, 581. 53, 62. 
 
 3 Cora. V. Eastman, 1 Cush. (Mass.) ^ Bradley v. Obear, 10 N. H. 477, 
 189, 216. 480; Hovey •;. Grant, 52 N. H. 569. 
 
 •* Reg. V. Roebuck, Dearsly & B. C. See also State v. Johnson, 33 N. H. 
 C. 24. 441, 456, 457.
 
 304 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 lessee of a coal mine, and that he had from the shaft of the leased mine 
 wrongfully cut into adjoining premises and taken coal, during a period 
 of more than four j-ears, from the coal fields of thirty or forty different 
 owners, — the evidence bearing upon the question of felonious in- 
 tent.^ So, on an indictment for burglary, it is competent to show 
 
 that the defendant entered the building with a felonious intent, by 
 
 proof of a felony committed by him in the adjoining building.^ 
 
 So, it was held competent on an indictment of two persons for bur- 
 glary, to show that they had committed other burglaries, for the 
 
 purpose of showing privity and community of design,^ So, on an 
 
 indictment for kidnaping a negro boy, evidence that the defendants 
 made a similar attempt to kidnap another boy on the day previous, was 
 
 held competent as bearing upon the question of intent.* So, on a 
 
 charge of keeping liquor for sale contrary to law, evidence that the de- 
 fendant had previousl3'^ sold other liquor, or kept other liquor for sale, 
 or was a liquor-dealer, has been held admissible on tlie question of in- 
 tent.-'' So, where the prisoner was indicted for placing obstruc- 
 tions upon a railroad track, it was held competent to prove that he had 
 placed other obstructions than those for which the indictment was 
 found, upon the same railroad track, the court reasoning that the acts 
 were so connected that they might be regarded as being the continua- 
 tion of the same transaction.^ 
 
 § 336. Usage of Trade or Business. — So, where the question 
 at issue is the practice or usage with reference to a particular 
 trade or business, it is for the judge to decide, as a preliminary 
 question, whether tlie evidence tendered upon the question is 
 evidence of the fact of a general usage or practice prevailing in 
 the particular trade or business, or merely the judgment or opin- 
 ion of the witness. If the latter, he must reject it, as that 
 furnishes no safe guide for interpretation.^ 
 
 1 Reg.-y.Bleasdale, 2 Carr. & K.7fi5. ^ State v. Plunkett, 64 Me. 534; 
 
 2 Osborne u. People, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Com. v. Stoehr, 109 Mass. 3G5; Com. 
 Y.) 583; Phillips v. People, 57 Barb. v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 368. 
 
 (N. Y.) 356. « State v. Wentworth, 37 N. II. 197. 
 
 3 Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 539. ^ Lewis v. Marshall, 7 Man. & G. 
 
 4 Com. V. Turner, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 729, 743. 
 19, 24, 25.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIII.] QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JUDGE. 305 
 
 § 337. Leading- Questions. — On the same principle the judge 
 must determine the facts which form the necessary premises for 
 a conchisiou whether or not leading questions ought to be allowed 
 to be put to a witness.^ 
 
 § 338. Further Illustrations. — On the same principle it is 
 for the judge, and not for the jury, to decide whether one person 
 sustains such a relation to another, that the declarations of the 
 former are admissible in evidence against the latter; ^ whether 
 evidence shall be heard to show that a debt, absolute on its face, 
 was merely intended by the parties as a mortgage ; ^ and whether 
 a combination has been established such as renders competent 
 unsworn declarations of a person, dumfervet opus, in furtherance 
 of the common design.* 
 
 1 Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 116, 120; 3 ^e France v. De France, 34 Pa. 
 
 post, § 357, et seq. St. 385. 
 
 - Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. ■* Claytor v. Anthony, 6 Rand. (Va.) 
 
 S.) 114, 140; Claytor v. Anthony, 6 285. 
 Rand. (Va.) 285. 
 
 20
 
 306 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 CONTROL OF THE COURT OVER THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Section 
 
 343. Extent of the Discretion of the Court. 
 
 344. Order of Proof. 
 
 345. Anticipating the Defense. 
 
 346. Allowing the Plaintiff to Introduce Evidence not in Rebuttal after the 
 
 Defendant has Rested. 
 
 347. Defendant's Right of Reply or Sur-rehuttal. 
 
 348. Reopening the Case to admit Additional Evidence. 
 
 349. Recalling Witnesses for further Examination. 
 
 350. Allowing Witnesses to Correct their Testimony. 
 
 351. Admitting Irrelevant Testimony upon a Promise of subsequently Show- 
 
 ing Relevancy. 
 
 352. Limiting Time — Stopping Repetitions and Irrelevant Examinations. 
 
 353. Limiting the Number of Witnesses. 
 
 354. Control as to the Mode of Examination. 
 
 355. Right of Judge to put Questions. 
 
 356. Indecent Questions. 
 
 357. Leading Questions. 
 
 358. [Continued.] What Questions are Leading and what not. 
 
 359. [Continued.] Where the Witness is manifestly Hostile. 
 
 360. [Continued.] Other Circumstances where Allowed. 
 3G1. Effect of Admissions upon offers of Evidence. 
 
 § 343. Extent of the Discretion of the Court. — It is best 
 to consider at the outset the extent of the discretionary power 
 which is possessed by the trial judge in the matter of the exam- 
 ination of the witnesses and the deraignment of the evidence. 
 As it may be necessary to appeal to this discretion to help the 
 party out of the consequences of omissions or mistakes, it is 
 necessary for counsel to have as clear a view as possible 
 of the extent to which the law requires them to proceed ac- 
 cording to strict rules, and the extent to which they may secure 
 a possible relaxation of such rules through an exercise of the 
 discretion of the court.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] .CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 307 
 
 § 344. Order of Proof. — Where the plaintiff sustains the 
 burden of proof, " the rule of practice in the introduction of tes- 
 timony is, that the plaintiff shall first bring forward all the testi- 
 mony that goes to establish his claim ; the defendant shall then 
 introduce his proof upon matters of defense and his testimony 
 rebuttin(]j the proof adduced by the plaintiff; then the plaintiff by 
 his proof rebutting that of the defendant. And after the plaint- 
 iff has introduced his proof establishing his case, and the testi- 
 mony of the defendant has been heard, the plaintiff is not entitled, 
 as a matter of right, to introduce additional proof in chief." ^ In 
 strict practice the party holding the affirmative of the issue, is 
 bound to give all his evidence in support of the issue, in the first 
 instance; he can only give such evidence in reply, as tends to an- 
 swer the new matter introduced by the adversary.^ But the or- 
 der in which testimony, competent and relevant to the issues, is 
 admitted, is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and 
 the exercise of this discretion is not assignable for error except in 
 cases of manifest abuse.'^ The reason and policy of this rule 
 were thus well stated by Poland, J. : " Although there are cer- 
 tain established rules, which have obtained in the process of try- 
 
 1 Walker v. Walker, li Ga. 2^2, don v. Goulman, 1 Monr. (Ky.) 115; 
 260. See also Macullar v. Wall, 6 State v. Alford, 31 Coun. 40; State u. 
 Gray (Mass.), 507; Hathaway v. Hem- Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566; Dane v. Treat, 35 
 ingway, 20 Conn. 195; Gilpins v. Me. 198; Pierce u. Wood, 23 N. H. 519. 
 Consequa, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 184; Especially where the case is tried before 
 s. c. Pet. C. C. 85; Pettibone v. Der- the court, without a jury. Goodman 
 ringer, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 215; v. Kennedy, 10 Neb. 271, 274. Walker 
 Braydon v. Goulman, 1 Monr. (Ky.) v. Walker, supra. It is said that: 
 115; Abb. Tr. Brief, 42. <' Only in an extreme case will it be 
 
 2 Graham v. Davis, 4 Oh. St. held that the manner or order of pre- 
 362, senting competent testimony violates 
 
 3 Graham V. Davis, supra; Blake v. a substantial right of either party." 
 Powell, 26 Kan. 320, 327; Rheinhart V. Blake v. Powell, SM/)ra, opinion by 
 State, 14 Kan. 322. Bourreseau v. Brewer, J. The remedy for an abuse 
 Detroit Evening Journal Co. (Mich.), 6 of such h, discretion is a, motion for a 
 West. Eep. 151; Buttertield v. Gil- new trial; and if reviewable at all on 
 Christ (Mich.), 5 West. Rep. 744; error, it is only when, taken in connec- 
 Hastings v. Palmer, 20 Wend. ("S". Y.) tion with all the evidence in the case, 
 225; Ford v. Niles, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 300; it is shown to have prevented the party 
 Marshall u. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414, 420; from having a fair trial. Webb v. 
 Agate V. Morrison, 84 N. Y. 672; Bray- State, 29 Oh. St. 351.
 
 308 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 ing causes before a jury, and in the order of introducing the evi- 
 dence of witnesses, yet these rules, for the most part, are but 
 rules of practice, and are considered as under the control of the 
 court, and subject to be varied, in the exercise of a sound judi- 
 cial discretion ; so that a departure from the ordinary rules, in 
 the course of a trial, or a refusal to grant such indulgence to a 
 party on request, cannot properly be made a ground of error. 
 Of this class are the rules as to the order of introducing the evi- 
 dence, and also as to the mode of examining witnesses. In- 
 deed, the constantly varying circumstances under which cases 
 arise, and the haste and confusion which must frequently be 
 expected in jury trials (without permitting the exercise of the 
 discretion of the court), would often lead to most unjust results 
 and disastrous consequences." ^ 
 
 § 345. Anticipating the Defense. — Thus, while the plaintiff 
 is not bound to anticipate the defense of his opponent, and to 
 introduce evidence in rebuttal of it,^ yet, where the materiality 
 of evidence in rebuttal is foreshadowed by the line of defense, it 
 is within the discretion of the trial court to admit it in advance of 
 the evidence which it is intended to rebut. ^ . It has been laid down 
 that it is not an objectionable practice to allow the plaintiff, after 
 submitting sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case within 
 his complaint, to rest and see what the defendant will make out by 
 way of affirmative proof, reserving the balance of his evidence for 
 purposes of rebuttal, — thereby not exhausting all his ammunition 
 at the first fire.* 
 
 1 Gossv. Turner, 21 Vt. 437, 439. Williams v. DeWitt, 12 lad. 309; 
 The learned judge cited Clayes v. Duun v. People, 29 N. Y. 523; Bancroft 
 Ferris, 10 Vt. 112; Hopkiuson v. Steel, v. Sheehan, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 550. 
 
 12 Vt. 582. See also Pingry v. Wash- ^ Dean v. Corbett, 51 N. Y. Super, 
 
 burn, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 204; s. c. 15 Am. (19 J. & S.) 103. And see Bedell v. 
 
 Dec. 676. See under Tex. Statute, Carll, 33N. Y. 581. But if the plaintiff 
 
 Bostick V. State, 11 Tex. App. 126; takes this course, he is not. In strict 
 
 Cohea v. State, Id. 153. right, entitled to give in rebuttal 
 
 2 Dodge V. Dunham, 41 Ind. 187, further evidence on the same point. 
 192; Bancroft v. Sheehan, 21 Hun (N. Holbrook v. McBride, 4 Gray (Mass.), 
 Y.), 550. 215; York v. Pease, 2 Id. 282; Gil- 
 
 3 Dimick v. Downs, 82 111. 570; pins v. Cousequa, 3 Wash. C. C. (Uc 
 York V. Pease, 2 Gray (Mass.), 282; S.) 184.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] CONTROL OVEK EXAMINATION. 309 
 
 § 346. Allowing Plaintiff to introduce Evidence not in 
 Rebuttal after Defendant has rested. — The admission or ex- 
 clusion of evidence not strictly in rebuttal is a matter resting in 
 the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which discretion 
 is not subject to review except in cases of gross abuse. ^ The 
 proper rule for the exercise of this discretion is, that material 
 testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaint- 
 iff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless 
 it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving 
 the defendant and affecting his case injuriously.^ On this subject, 
 the following observation has been made: " It is a settled rule 
 of practice that, whilst the plaintiff is entitled to rest, on making 
 out a prima facie case, and afterwards to adduce additional as 
 well as rebutting testimony, the defendant is in general required 
 to go through his proofs before resting. In ordinary cases, a 
 departure from this course is matter of indulgence and discretion 
 with the court, and a refusal to permit it is, therefore, no ground 
 of error. The rule supposes, however, that the case as first made 
 by the plaintiff shall be calculated to apprize the defendant of 
 the ground on which the right of recovery is finally to be sup- 
 ported. If a new case is made in the close, without any pre- 
 vious notice to the defendant, he should be allowed to go into 
 evidence in answer to it."^ But the plaintiff is not entitled to 
 this grace. The strict rule is that he must try his case out when 
 he commences.* He cannot in strictness (though he can in dis- 
 cretion) be allowed to prove again the facts which he proved, in 
 making out his prima facie case.^ The better view, however, is 
 
 1 Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance (S. C.) 36; Finlayv. Stewart, 56 Pa. St. 
 
 Co. t'. Bair, 87 Fa. St. 121; Vaudike u. 183; Dailey u. Grimes, 27 Md. 440; 
 
 Towuseud, 6 Week. Notes Cas. (Pa.) McCoy v. Phillips, 4 Kich. (S. C.) 463. 
 55; Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y, 414; ^ Richardson v. Lessee &c., 4 Binn. 
 
 s.c. 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 231; reversing (Pa.) 198; Pucker ?;. Eddiugs, 7 Mo. 
 
 s. c. 16 Hua (N. Y.), 606; Huntsman 115, 118; Dozier v. Jerman, 30 Mo. 
 
 V. Nichols, 116 Mass. 521; Dozier v. 216,220. 
 
 Jerman, 30 Mo, 216, 220; Walker v. ^ Clayes w. Ferris, 10 Vt. 112. 
 
 Walker, 14 Ga. 242; Gaines u. Com., 50 * Rowe v. Breuton, 3 Man. & Ry. 
 
 Pa. St. 319; Morse v. Potter, 4 Gray 133, 139. 
 
 (Mass.), 292; Day v. Moore, 13 Id. ^ xjuion Water Co. u. Crary, 25 Cal. 
 
 522; Ciiutou v. McKeuzie, 5 Strobh. 504; Kohler u. Wells, 60 Cal. €06.
 
 310 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 that where the plsdntifl ' s.jjrima facie case is vigorously assailed, 
 he should be allowed to introduce in rebuttal additional corrobo- 
 rating evidenced This discretion cannot be exercised so as to 
 abridge the plaintiff 's 7'ight of rebuttal, — which is, his right to 
 introduce evidence which tends to meet and overthrow the af- 
 firmative case set up by the defendant in his testimony.^ It is 
 no ground of exception to such evidence that, in addition to re- 
 butting the defendant's new matter, it also tends to corroborate 
 the case made by the plaintiff in chief; ^ nor that it may neces- 
 sitate allowing the defendant to give evidence in sur-rebuttal> 
 
 § 347. Defendant's Right of Reply or Sur-rebuttal. — 
 
 Moreover, this discretion cannot properly be exercised so as to 
 cut off the defendant's right of reply to any new matter which 
 the plaintiff may thus be allowed to introduce in rebuttal, pro- 
 vided the defendant has not had the opportunity of introducing 
 the same evidence in his case in chief ,^ — - and this, in the view of 
 one court, though his evidence in reply is merely cumulative.® 
 
 § 348. Reopening the Case to Admit Additional Evi- 
 dence. — So, it is within the discretion of the trial court, both 
 in civil and criminal trials, to reopen the case at the request of a 
 party, for the purpose of allowing him to introduce additional 
 evidence.^ The court may allow a party to introduce further evi- 
 
 1 Bryan u. Walton, 20 Ga. 480; Dav- enkerap, 13 B. Mon, (Ky.) 219; Lar- 
 idson u. Overhulser, 3 la. 196. man v. Huey, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 43(3; 
 
 2 Bancroft v. Sheehau, 21 Hun (N. McDowell v. Crawford, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 
 Y.),550. 377,408; Eggspieller v. Knockles, 58 
 
 8 Chadbourn v. Franklin, 5 Gray Iowa, G49; McKinney v. Jones, 55 
 
 (Mass.), 312. Wis. 39; State v. Coleman, 27 La. 
 
 * Abb. Tr. Brief, 43; citing Scott Ann. 691; Johnston v. Mason, 27 Mo, 
 
 V.Woodward, 2 McCord (S. C), 161. 511; States. Porter, 26 Mo. 201, 209; 
 
 5 Asay V. Hay, 89 Fa. St. 77; Kent Couch v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 22 S.C. 
 V.Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; (compare as to 557; States. Rose, 33 La. Ann, 932; 
 Vermont rule Thayer v. Davis, 38 Vt. Darlend v. Roseucrans, 56 Iowa, 122; 
 163). Williams v. Hayes, 20 N. Y. 58; Cald- 
 
 6 Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237. well v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 
 
 7 Cora. V. Ricketson, 5 Mete. N. Y. 282, 295; People v. Rector, 19 
 Mass.) 412, 428; Taylor v. Shemwell, Wend. (N. Y.) 569. 
 
 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 575; Fleet v. Hoel-
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIY.J CONTROL over examination. 311 
 
 dence after the testimony has closed on both sides, ^ after a de- 
 murrer to the evidence has been made,^ after the argument has 
 commenced,^ and even after the argument has closed.^ The 
 court may allow the prosecution in a criminal trial, to reopen its 
 case and introduce further evidence in chief, even after the ex- 
 amination of witnesses for the defense has commenced,* and 
 after the State has closed and the defendant has announced that 
 he will introduce no evidence ; ® though it has been elsewhere 
 said tl;iat this discretion should be exercised with the utmost cau- 
 tion.' This discretion will not be exercised where it would 
 work a fraud on the opposite party, or where the withholding of 
 the evidence was a manifest trick; ^ and if the introduction of 
 such additional evidence takes the adverse party by surprise, he 
 should be allowed time and opportunity, if desired, to meet it 
 with further evidence on his side.^ It is scarcely necessary to 
 add that it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
 refuse to open a case to admit further defenses after the trial, 
 where the defendant, knoiving of the existence of the defenses, 
 neglected to assert them in his pleading in the first instance, and 
 gives no satisfactory reason for the neglect. ^° But where 
 
 1 Taylor v. Shemwell, 4 B. Mon. lo Kirschbon r. Bousel (Wis.), 29 N. 
 (Ky.) 577; Hess v. Wilcox, 58 Iowa, W. Rep. 907; s. c. 67 Wis. 178. And 
 380. see Foster v. Newbrous;fh, 66 Barb. (N. 
 
 2 Tierney v. Spiva, 76 Mo. 279. Y.) 645, where it was held that it was 
 
 3 Buggies V. Coffin, 70 Me. 468 ; proper to refuse to allow the defendant, 
 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 299, after the plaintiff had closed in rebut- 
 310. tal, to offer witnesses to sustain his 
 
 * Breedlove v. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319. testimony on the defense and to con- 
 
 5 State V. Clyburn, 16 S. C. 375. tradict the plaintiff's evidence in re- 
 
 6 State V. Rose, 33 La. Ann. 932. buttal. In a case in Georgia it was 
 ^ CloBgh V. State, 7 Neb. 323, 341, said by Lumpkin, J.: "I must say that 
 
 342. See also Kalle v. People, 4 so much averse am I to withholding 
 
 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 591. This must testimony, that I can hardly conceive 
 
 be allowed under Tex. Code Crim., of a case so gross and palpable that 
 
 art. 661 (which is mandatory) , at any I should feel constrained to control 
 
 time before the conclusion of the ar- the discretion of the circuit judge 
 
 guments. Donahoe v. State, 12 Tex. from receiving at any time additional 
 
 App. 297. affirmatory, cumulative and corrobo- 
 
 8 Breedlove v. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319. rative evidence of facts previously 
 
 8 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (Va.) proved, or which tends to strengthen 
 
 299, 310. and add force or probability to such
 
 312 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 the plaintiff lias inadvertently omitted to introduce a formal 
 though necessary document, until after the close of his evidence, 
 it will be an abuse of discretion, for which the judgment will be 
 reversed, to refuse his application to be allowed to introduce it 
 then.^ So, where a material witness failed to arrive in time 
 through no fault of his own, it was held error to refuse to allow 
 him to testify, after the argument had commenced, but before the 
 case had been finally submitted to the jury.'-^ If, after the de- 
 fense is closed, the plaintiff introduces new evidence, the defend- 
 ant will have the right to explain.^ Thus, where, after the 
 plaintiff had rested, the defendants moved for a non-suit, on the 
 ground that there was already on the records of the court a judg- 
 ment against them, the plaintiff, it was held, must be allowed to 
 introduce a docket entry showing that it has been set aside.* If 
 the court exercises this discretion unsoundly ^^ — as by refusing 
 to let in evidence which has been omitted in its regular order by 
 an oversight, the judgment will be reversed.^ 
 
 § 349. Recalling Witnesses for Further Examination. — 
 
 So, it is within the discretion of the trial court to grant ^ or to 
 
 evidence. Walkers. Walker, 14 Ga. 8 Mo. 26; Gavan w. Elsworth, 45 Ga. 
 242,250. It has even been held no 283; Cothran u. Forsyth, (JS Ga. 560; 
 error, in a suit on a promissory note, De Lome v. Pease, 19 Ga. 220; Jesse 
 to admit evidence of a reasonable at- v. State, 20 Ga. 156, 164; Jones v. 
 toruey's fee (allowed by statute), after Smith, 64 N. Y. 180. See also Cur- 
 motions for new trial and in arrest ran v. Conuery, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 488. 
 have been overi'uled. Maynard v. By statute in Texas, " the court shall 
 Shorb, 85 Ind. 501. allow testimony to be introduced at 
 
 1 Meacham v. Moore, 59 Miss. 561. any time before argument of a cause 
 
 2 Smith V. State Ins. Co., 58 la. 478. is concluded, if it appear that it is 
 •^ Asay ■;;. Hay, 89 Pa. St. 77. necessary to a due administi-ation of 
 ^ Gillette v. Morrison, 7 Neb. 395. justice." Pasc. Dig. Tex. Stat., art. 
 fi Meyer v. Cullen, 54 N. Y. 392; 3046 ; see Sherwood v. State, 42 Tex. 
 
 Meacham v. Moore, 59 Miss. 561. 498. The construction of this statute 
 « Owen V. O'Reilly, 20 Mo. 603. is that the discretion thus confided to 
 ' State V. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691; the court is not subject to revision, 
 Johnston v. Mason, 27 Mo. 511. except in cases where it has been so 
 State V. Porter, 2G Mo. 201, 209; abused as to defeat the ends of jus- 
 Samuels V. Gritfith, 13 la. 103; Morn- tice (Kemp v. State, 38 Tex. Ill; 
 ingstar v. State, 59 Ala. 30; Rucker ?;. Roach v. State, 41 Tex. 262; Tread- 
 Eddings, 7 Mo. 115; Brown v. Burrus, way v. State, 1 Tex. App. 668); and
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 
 
 313 
 
 refuse^ an application to recall a witness, who has been examined 
 and dismissed from the stand, for further examination. A wit- 
 ness may be thus recalled after cross-examination, for further 
 examination in chief ,"^ or for further cross-examination.^ But 
 when permitted to be recalled, the court is entitled to exercise a 
 larffe discretion as to the manner in which, and the extent to 
 which the favor granted shall be made use of .^ 
 
 ' § 350. Allowing Witness to correct bis Testiniouy. — The 
 trial court will always allow a witness to explain an error, mis- 
 take or oversight in his testimony, when he requests the privilege 
 of doing so before leaving the stand. ^ But whether it will al- 
 low a witness to be recalled for the purpose of correcting his 
 testimony after he has left the stand, is a matter which rests in 
 the discretion of the court." This will alwaj^s be allowed unless 
 there is reason to believe that the witness desires to substitute an 
 untruthful statement for a truthful one, — especially in view of 
 
 that it would be difficult to conceive 
 of such a case, where the discretion 
 has been exercised by perraittiug the 
 re-examination. Treadway v. State, 
 1 Tex. App. 668. See also Harris v. 
 State, 44 Tex. 146 ; Meredith v. State, 40 
 Tex. 483. A witness thus recalled does 
 not necessarily become the witness of 
 the party recalling him. Treadway v. 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 6(;8, 670. Recalling 
 to lay foundation for impeachment: 
 Ibid. Recalling to restate testimony, 
 under Texas statute (Pasch. Dig. Tex. 
 Stat., art. 3080; Tex. Code. Cr. Proc, 
 art. 615) where jury disagree as to 
 the statements of the witnesses : Ed- 
 mondson v. State, 7 Tex. App. 116; 
 Campbell v. State, 42 Tex. 591; Tar- 
 ver V. State, 43 Tex. 564. 
 
 1 People V. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 229,249; Beaulieu v. Parsons, 2 Minn. 
 37; Treadwell v. Goodwin, 6 Bosw (N. 
 Y.) 180. It has been held that the fact 
 that, in a criminal trial after the prose- 
 
 cuting witness has left the stand, an- 
 other witness for the prosecution gives 
 a different account of the occurrence 
 from that given by the prosecutor, does 
 not give the defendant a right further to 
 cross-examine the prosecutor. People 
 V. Parton, 49 Cal. 632. It is scarcely 
 necessary to say that a witness cannot 
 thus be recalled without special leave of 
 the court, whether in a case at law or 
 inequity. Girault w. Adams, 61 Md. 
 1, 9; Heise's Case, 44 Md. 453. 
 
 2 Brown v. Burrus, 8 Mo. 26, 30. 
 
 3 Cummiugs v. Taylor, 24 Minn. 
 429. 
 
 ^ Ibid. Rule of court restricting 
 this discretion not valid: De Lome v. 
 Pease, 19 Ga. 220, 227. 
 
 '=> Oberf elder v. Kavanaugh (Neb.), 
 32 N. W. Rep. 296; s. c. 21 Neb. 
 483. 
 
 ^ Miller v. Hartford Ins. Co. 
 (Iowa), 29 N. W. Rep. 411; s. c. 70 
 la. 704.
 
 314 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the fact that the witness has delivered his testimony under the 
 risk of an indictment for perjury, and if he has testified errone- 
 ously he is under a moral, if not a legal obligation, of tendering 
 the proper correction.^ But amended swearing is a thing which 
 justice suspects and abhors ; and where a witness has demeaned 
 himself unfavorably on the stand, has been manifestly prejudiced 
 or uucandid, it will be no abuse of discretion to deny him the 
 privilege of returning to the stand for the alleged purpose of 
 correcting a statement, if there is reason to believe that the cor-, 
 rection will not be in furtherance of truth and justice. ^ It is 
 not error for the court to allow the testimony of witnesses, taken 
 down in writing, to be read over to them in the presence of the 
 jury, for the purpose of correcting errors which may have been 
 committed in writing it down. It is impossible that a party can 
 be injured by having the testimony twice impressed on the minds 
 of the jury, if it is taken down correctly; and it can do him 
 no injustice to have errors, if any, corrected.^ 
 
 § 351. Admitting- Irrelevant Testimony upon a promise of 
 subsequently showing Relevancy. — It is laid down by Professor 
 Greenleaf that it is not necessary that the relevancy of testimony 
 " should appear at the time when it is offered, it being the usual 
 course to receive, at any proper and convenient stage of the trial, 
 in the discretion of the judge, any evidence which the counsel 
 shows will be rendered material by other evidence which he un- 
 dertakes to produce. If it is not subsequently thus connected 
 
 1 Upon this point it was said by him the permission to make a correc- 
 
 Lumpkin, J.: "A witness, tlirougli tion would be to transfer the guilt from 
 
 forgetfulness or inadvertence, mis- his conscience to theirs." Walker 
 
 states a fact: upon reflection he dis- v. Walker, 14 Ga. 242, 251. 
 covers the mistake and i^eks to rec- ^ ^ witness who had just sworn 
 
 tify it. Would it not 'be monstrous that certain property was worth $2,- 
 
 to deny him the privilege? Is it not 000, was not allowed to be recalled 
 
 due to him, apart from any other con- for the purpose of proving that, at the 
 
 sideration? Should he fail to make same time referred to in his testi- 
 
 the explanation so soon as he detects mony, the property was worth but 
 
 the error, he would be guilty un- $300. State v. Nauert, 6 Mo. App. 596. 
 doubtedly of moral, if not of legal ^ Cobb v. State, 27 Ga. 648. See 
 
 perjury. And for the court to refuse also Crawford v. State, 12 Ga. 145.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 315 
 
 with the issue, it is laid out of the case.^ This is regarded by 
 many courts as merely a branch of the general rule already 
 treated of ,^ that the order of proof is a matter within the discre- 
 tion of the trial court. Thus, it has been held that a judgment 
 will not be reversed because the court admitted declarations of a 
 cons/jifra^or against his co-conspirator, before proof of the con- 
 nection of the latter with the conspiracy had been made, pro- 
 vided the proof was afterwards made. If the proof is not after- 
 wards made, the rule is to withdraw the testimony from the 
 jury.^ It is conceded, however, that the better rule is not to ad- 
 mit evidence of the declarations of a co-conspirator or accom- 
 plice, until A 2)rima fade case has been made, establishing the fact 
 of the conspiracy.^ And, in general, it is an objectionable prac- 
 tice, to admit evidence which may be prejudicial, with the 
 understanding that it may be excluded from the jury by an in- 
 struction, unless the party tendering it produces other evidence 
 which makes it competent,^ for which in some cases judgments 
 have been reversed.^ In a criminal case where this was done it 
 was said: "It must be apparent that such testimony, having 
 once gone to the jury, its impression would necessarily, to some 
 extent, remain in their minds, though they were ordered to 
 discard it ; and in a case of circumstantial evidence, it is next 
 to impossible to say how far that impression exercised its in- 
 fluence in supplying any defect which might have arisen, or in 
 solving any doubt in their minds on the general state of the evi- 
 dence. A prosecuting officer in behalf of the State, in his zeal 
 for a conviction, should never overlook the fact that the interests 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 51 a. Compare ^ insurance Co. v. Rubin, 79111. 402; 
 Follausbee V. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311; Howe Machine Co. v. RosinCj 87 111. 
 People V. Bragle, 10 Abb, New Cas. 105. Post, §§ 723, 2415. 
 
 (N. Y.) 300; s. c. 26 Hun (N. Y.), 378. « State v. Mis, 15 Mo. 153; State v. 
 
 2 Ante, § 344. Wolff, 15 Mo. KJS; State v. Schneider, 
 'Miller v. Barber, (N. Y. Ct. of 35 Mo. 536; State i). Marshall, 36 Mo. 
 
 App.) 4 Cent. Law. Journ. 177. See 400; State v. Danhart, 42 Mo. 242; 
 
 Page V. Parker, 40 N. H. 62; Sweat v. Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542; 
 
 Rogers, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 118; Page v. s. c. 46 Am. Rep. 269; Cobb?;. Grif- 
 
 Parker, 43 N. H. 363. fith &c. Co., 12 Mo. App. 130; Ruil- 
 
 ^ Sweat V. Rogers, supra; Pearson road Co. v. Wiuslow, 66 111. 219. 
 
 V. South, 61 Iowa, 232. Compare Tucker v. Hamlin,60 Tex. 171.
 
 316 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 of society and the vindication of the law require at his hands as 
 much the protection of the innocent as the conviction of the 
 guilty. Evidence of this character, in cases involving life, should 
 never be proposed by him, unless he is morally certain that he 
 can make good his promise of connecting the defendant with the 
 matter; there should be no room for doubt, where, as in this case, 
 he could have ascertained in advance the existence or non-exist- 
 ence of defendant's connection with the proposed evidence." ^ On 
 the other hand, there is considerable authority to the effect that 
 the admission of improper evidence, which is subsequently with- 
 drawn from the jury, presents no available error. ^ In any view, 
 counsel cannot claim the privilege of thus putting evidence before 
 laying the foundation, without stating in advance wJuit he ex- 
 pects to prove, and in such a case it will be no error to refuse it.^ 
 
 § 352. liimitiiig Time, Stopping Repetitions and Irrelevant 
 Examinations. — In like manner, the discvetion of the trial 
 court extends to the stopping of repetitions, to the placing of a 
 reasonable limit upon the time which shall be allowed for the 
 examination or cross-examination of a witness, and to prevent- 
 ing the consuming of the public time by an examination into 
 irrelevant matters. It is discretionary with the trial court to 
 allow a subject to be gone into again, in examining a witness, 
 after he has been fully examined upon it.^ So, it has been laid 
 
 1 Marshal v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273, Bnreu v. Wells, 19 Weud. (N. Y.) 202; 
 
 291. Abbey v. Kiugsland, 10 Ala. 355; s. c. 
 
 - Blizzard V. Applegate, 77 lud. 516; 44 Am. Dec. 491; Carries v. Pratt, 15 
 
 Hopt V. People, 7 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 337; s. c. 36 N. Y. 
 
 614; Specht v. Howard, 16 Wall. 564; Super. 361; s. c. affirmed, 59 N. Y. 
 
 Davis V. Peveler, 65 Mo. 189; State v. 405. 
 
 May, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 330; Goodnow ■* Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice & Coal 
 
 V. Hill, 125 Mass. 589; Smith v. Whit- Co., 53 Mich. 323; Crow v. Marshall, 
 
 mau, G Allen (Mass.), 562; Hawes v. 15 Mo. 499. Where a witness has 
 
 Gustiu, 2 Allen (Mass.), 125; Dillin already testified that he cannot swear 
 
 V. People, 8 Mich. 369. to a certain fact, e.g., that certain 
 
 3 Abb. Tr. Brief, 52; citing Mech- persons wei'e at a certain time in- 
 elke V. Bremar, 59 Wis. 57; s. c. 17 toxicated, — no error is committed in 
 N. W. Rep. 682; Piper v. White, 56 Pa. allowing the same question to be re- 
 st. 90; Hall v. Patterson, 51 Id. 289; peated in substance to the witness. 
 Bilberry v. Mobley, 21 Ala. 277; Van Aurora v. Hillman, 90 111. 62.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 317 
 
 down, generally, that where, in the progress of a trial, it appears 
 obvious that a party, either in the examination of his witnesses 
 or in his argument, is consuming time unnecessarily, the court 
 may, in its discretion, arrest the examination; and the exercise 
 of this discretion will not be reviewed unless its abuse mani- 
 festly appears.^ So, it is the obvious duty of the judge to 
 interpose of his own motion, when a useless and irrelevant exam- 
 ination of the witness is going on, and prevent a waste of time and 
 the distraction of the attention of the jury from the real issues. ^ 
 
 § 353. Limiting Xumber of Witnesses. — So, a reasonable 
 limitation of the number of witnesses who shall testify to a par- 
 ticular fact is Avithin the discretion of the trial court; and it has 
 been held that the limitation of the number to seven is not an 
 abuse of discretion in a criminal prosecution for a nuisance, 
 where the court gives notice in advance of the limitation.-^ So, 
 the court may limit the number of expert witnesses to be called 
 at the trial. ^ So, the court may make and enforce a rule limit- 
 ing the number of witnesses who shall be allowed to testify upon 
 the question of the credibility of the plaintiff .^ So, the court 
 may, in its discretion, notify the parties that not more than 
 eleven witnesses on each side will be heard upon the question of 
 the value of the property in controversy, and may enforce the 
 order.^ So, in an action against a railway comi)any to recover 
 damages for taking the plaintiff's land for the defendant's use, 
 it has been held no abuse of discretion for the court to limit the 
 number of witnesses who should be allowed to testify as to the 
 value of the land, to Jive J 
 
 1 It was so held where, in a civil 2 state v. McGee, 36 La. Auu. 20G, 
 
 action to recover a quantity of goods, 209. 
 
 the plaintiff, after having examined ^ Mergentheira u. State (lud.), 8 N. 
 
 sixteen witnesses in rebuttal, was or- East. Rep. 0G8; s. c. 107 Ind. 567. 
 
 dered by the court to stop; and the •« Hilliard v. Beattie, 59 N. H. 462. 
 
 defendant declining to argue, the court ^ B^ys v. Huut, 60 Iowa, 251. 
 
 restricted tlie plaintiff's counsel to ^ Union &c. K. Co. v. Moore 80 
 
 ninety minutes. Eosser v. McColly, Ind. 458. 
 
 9 Ind. 5S7. See also Priddy V. Dodd, ' Everett v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
 
 4 Ind. 84; Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 59 Iowa, 243 (Beck and Adams, JJ., 
 
 ^^^- dissenting).
 
 318 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 334. Control as to the Mode of Examination. — The 
 
 manner of examining a witness is largely within the discretion of 
 the court before whom the witness is produced, and that discre- 
 tion must be governed, in a great measure, by a knowledge of 
 the character of the witness, and from his demeanor during 
 his examination.^ While the regular practice is to allow the 
 examination to proceed by questions and answers, so that the 
 opposing counsel shall have fair opportunity for interposing 
 seasonable objections — yet it is within the discretion of the trial 
 court to allow a witness to give his testimony without being 
 questioned at all; and it is said that cases undoubtedly occur 
 which justify such an indulgence. ^ So, it is discretionary and 
 proper for the court to act as a moderator over the course of the 
 examination, and to interpose, when necessary, to prevent the 
 unreasonable interruption of a witness, or to allow the witness to 
 complete a statement or to give his version of a fact or circum- 
 stance.^ It is the obvious duty of the trial judge to see that all wit- 
 nesses are treated with respect, and that ar/ed and feeble witnesses 
 are treated with indulgence, especially when testifying under cir- 
 cumstances which necessarily call forth great emotion.* It has 
 been held that a witness cannot be required to put a question to a 
 person in court, for the purpose of eliciting information con- 
 cerning which the witness is interrogated, — as for instance, the 
 full name of a person of which the witness professes to be ig- 
 
 1 Brown V. Biirrus, 8 Mo. 2G, 30, enough to be heard, at the same time 
 per Scott, J. remarking to counsel that, " some al- 
 
 2 Clark V. Field, 42 Mich. 342, lowauce must be made for the woman, 
 344. as she is ovei'come with emotion." It 
 
 ^ State V. Scott, 80 N. C. 365. was held that the prisoner could not 
 
 4 Thus, on the trial of an indictment claim a new trial on the ground that 
 
 for rape, tlie mother of the prosecu- this remark miglit liave had an unfair 
 
 trix, while testifying before the jury, influence with the jury, nor was it ob- 
 
 held down her head seemingly much jectionable in view of the statute (N. 
 
 affected, and spoke in a low voice. C. C. C. P., § 237; same code 1883, 
 
 The prisoner's counsel thereupon re- §413), which forbids the judge in giv- 
 
 quested the court to instruct her to ing a charge to tlie jury '^ to give an 
 
 hold up laer head and speak louder. opinion whether a fact is fully or sut- 
 
 The court declined to compel the wit- flciently proved, such matter being the 
 
 ness to hold up her head, but said that true oflice and province of the jury.'* 
 
 she would be required to speak loud State v. Lastoa, 78 N. C. 5G4.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 319 
 
 norant.^ Where a witness states that he is not able to ansiver 
 a question, the discretion of the court is not abused in exclud- 
 ing it.^ 
 
 § 355. Right of a Judge to put Questions to a Witness. — 
 
 A judge presiding upon the trial of a cause is more than a mere 
 moderator between contending parties ; he is charged Avith the 
 grave duty of maintaining truth and preventing wrong, and, to 
 this end, has a large discretion, which, if exercised without 
 abuse, will not be error. He may in the exercise of this discre- 
 tion propound questions to witnesses with a view to elicit the 
 facts; ^ and if they be leading questions, it is not available 
 error. * It is said to be the duty of the judge, both in civil and 
 criminal cases, to give strict attention to the evidence, and to 
 propound to the witness sucli questions as he may deem neces- 
 sary to elicit any relevant or material evidence, without regard 
 to its effect upon the interests of either party. ^ But it is also 
 said that the questions which a judge or a juror may properly 
 put to a witness should be such as are suggested by the evidence 
 given on the trial. ^ To this end the judge may propound to un- 
 willing witnesses all such proper questions as may throw light 
 upon their statements, and especially upon the motives which 
 actuate them.^ 
 
 § 3.56. Indecent Questions. — The fact that evidence is in- 
 decent is no objection to its being received, where it is necessary 
 to justice.^ But it is proper for the trial court to refuse to per- 
 
 1 Wehrkamp v. Willet, 4 Abb. App. In this case the judge was upheld in 
 Dec. (X. Y.) 548. propouucling to the prosecutrix in an 
 
 2 Teese v. Ilutingdon, 23 How. hadictmeut for rape, who had been 
 (U. S.) 2. brought in by attachment, questions 
 
 3 Ferguson v. Hirsch, 54 Ind. 337; whicli elicited answers showing that 
 Blizzard v. Applegate, 77 Ind. 516; the mother of the defendant had given 
 Lefever v. Johnson, 79 Ind. 554. her a sura of money to induce her not 
 
 ^Huffman v. Cauble, 8G Ind. 591, to appear against the defendant. But 
 
 596. see the Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & B. 284. 
 ^ Sparks v. State, 59 Ala. 82. s jy^ Costa v. Jones, Cowp. 729. 
 
 •5 Ibid. 87. Compare Anon. v. Anon., 23 Beav. 273; 
 
 » Lockhart v. State, 92 Ind. 452. s. c. 22 Beav. 481.
 
 320 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thomp. Tr, 
 
 mit indecent questions to be put to children on the witness stand ; ^ 
 nor will the court commit error in refusing to compel a female 
 witness^ testifying upon an indelicate subject, to couch her answers 
 in indecent language, although, if so expressed, her answers would 
 be more direct, though not necessarily more intelligible.^ 
 
 1 People V. White, 53 Mich. 537, 540. 
 
 2 Thus, on tlie trial of au iudict- 
 meut for rape, the prosecutrix, while 
 iestifyiug as to the circuuistauces of 
 the crime, hesitated aud wept, where- 
 upon the court directed her to pro- 
 ceed, saying: " I will not require you 
 to use language that will shock your 
 modesty." The witness then said: 
 "He had his will with me." It was 
 held that there was no error in this ; 
 but the report showed that no objec- 
 tion was made by the prisoner's coun- 
 sel at the time. State v. Laxtou, 78 
 N. C. 5(54. A recent case in Indi- 
 ana strikingly illustrates the extent to 
 which the discretionary power of the 
 court in this regard extends in the ab- 
 sence of an appearance of prejudice in 
 the record. On the trial of an indict- 
 ment for an assault upon a deaf-mute, 
 with intent to commit rape, a question 
 was propounded through an interpre- 
 ter to the prosecuting witness which 
 shocked her modesty to such an ex- 
 tent that she fled precipitately into an 
 adjoining room. She Avas there fol- 
 lowed by another deaf aud dumb 
 woman, whom the court had ap- 
 pointed as an interpreter, witlioutauy 
 objection fi-om the court or on the 
 part of the prisoner. In the seclusion 
 of that room, the interpreting witness 
 succeeded in pacifying her aud in get- 
 ting her lo answer tlie question. In 
 about a minute they returned together 
 into the court, and there, in the pres- 
 ence of the court, the jury, the witness 
 and defendant, the interpreting wit- 
 ness, without having repeated the 
 
 question to the witness, communi- 
 cated the witness' answer thereto to 
 another interpreter, who was not deaf 
 aud dumb, wlio gave such answer 
 orally to the court aud jury. This pro- 
 ceeding was vigorously assailed on 
 appeal by the prisoner's counsel, as 
 beiug intolerable in a court of justice 
 aud a palpable violation of his consti- 
 tutioual right to be brought face to 
 face with a witness testifying against 
 him. The Supreme Court nevertheless 
 held that the proceeding was not fairly 
 open to any of the criticisms or objur- 
 gations of the prisoner's counsel. 
 Howk, C. J., said: " In some particu- 
 lars the case is an anomalous one ; for, 
 to the credit of human nature, it is not 
 often that a man is cliarged with an 
 attempt even to gratify his passions 
 upon the person of an unfortunate 
 woman, forcibly and against her will, 
 who is deprived of the sense of hear- 
 ing and the power of speech. When 
 the case occnrs, however, as it must 
 be sustained, in the nature of things, 
 by tlie woman's evidence in relation to 
 the offense charged, the proceedings to 
 obtain her evidence will also be anom- 
 alous to some extent. If it be conceded 
 that the proceedings of which appellant 
 complains were irregular or even er- 
 roneous, there is nothing in the record 
 to show that the appellant was in any 
 manner injured thereby. The record 
 fails to show what the question was 
 which shocked the modesty of the 
 prosecuting witness, or Avhat was her 
 answer thereto, which she communi- 
 cated to Miss Coons, the interpreting
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIV.] COXTROL OVER EXAMIXATION. 
 
 321 
 
 § 357. Leading- Questions. — As a general rule, a party will 
 not be allowed to put leading questions to his own witnesses,^ 
 though he will be allowed to put such questions to the witnesses 
 of his adversary on cross-examination? But this rule is one 
 which yields to the sound discretion of the trial court, "^ which 
 discretion will not be reviewed on error or appeal except in cases 
 of manifest abuse.* In some jurisdictions it is held that this 
 discretion is unlimited, and that the exercise of it is not subject 
 to revision, even upon a case reserved.^ In others, e.g.^ in New 
 Hampshire, the propriety of admitting or excluding a leading 
 question is deemed a matter most conveniently and satisfactorily 
 determined at the trial, upon personal examination of the wit- 
 ness, and in view of all the circumstances of the case. At the 
 
 deaf-mute, out of the presence of the 
 court aud jury. lu this state of the 
 record, we caunot say that the error 
 uuder consideration was raateiially, or 
 in any wise, injurious to the appel- 
 hxut." Skaggs v. State (Ind.), « 
 West. Rep. 261 ; s. c. 108 lud. 53. 
 
 » Klock V. State, 60 Wis. 574, 576. 
 It is said in Pennsylvania by Mr. Jus- 
 tice Paxou: '* Wiiile there are in- 
 stances in the books where judgments 
 have been reversed for the refusal to 
 allow leading questions where the par- 
 ty was entitled to them, I know of no 
 reversal in Pennsylvania for allowing 
 a leading question." Farmers' Mu- 
 tual Fire Ins. Co. i'. Bair, 87 Pa. St. 
 12i, 128. In Texas, the rule seems to 
 be that the action of the trial court in 
 a criminal case, in permitting a leading 
 question to be put by the State's at- 
 torney, may be assigned for error, aud 
 is ground of reversing a conviction. 
 Rangel v. State (Te.x.), 3 S. W. Rep. 
 788; s. c. 22 Tex. App. 642; Mathis v. 
 Buford, 17 Tex. 152; Tinsley v. Carey, 
 2G Tex. 350; Kennedy v. State, 19 Tex. 
 App. 620. Thus, on the trial of an in- 
 dictment for theft, uuder the Texas 
 statute, while a witness was testifying. 
 
 the district attorney handed him a 
 paper purporting to be a certificate of 
 the brand of the company whose steer 
 the defendant was charged with steal- 
 ing, a representation of the brand be- 
 ing therein contained. After the wit- 
 ness had examined it, the district 
 attorney, for the purpose of ideutifying 
 this braud with the one on the stolen 
 animal, asked the witness, '• Is this 
 the brand that was on the animal 
 killed? '■ It was held that the court 
 erred in overruling an objection to this 
 question on the ground that it was 
 leading. Rangel v. State (Tex.), 3 S. 
 W. Rep. 788; s. c. 22 Tex. App. 642. 
 
 2 Phares v. Barber, 61 111. 272. 
 Post, §443 etseq. 
 
 3 1 Greeul. Ev., § 435. 
 
 •» Cade V. Hatcher, 72 Ga. 359; 
 Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bair, 
 87 Pa. St. 124; Hopkinson v. Steel, 12 
 Vt. 582; Dounell v. Jones, 13 Ala. 490; 
 Walker v. Duuspaugh, 20 N. Y. 170; 
 Addison v. State, 48 Ala. 478; Lawson 
 V. Glass, 6 Colo. 134; 1 Greeul. Ev., 
 §435. 
 
 5 State V. Lull, 37 Me. 246; Parsous 
 V. Huff, 38 Me. 137; Moody v. Rowell, 
 17 Pick. (Mass.) 498. 
 
 21
 
 322 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr.» 
 
 same time it is held to be quite proper at anytime, and certainly 
 expedient in cases of doubt and difficulty, for the presiding judge 
 to reserve the question of discretion for the revision of the whole 
 court; but when it is not reserved, it will always be presumed 
 that the discretion has been properly exercised.^ 
 
 § 358. [Coiitiiiiied.] What Questions are Leading and 
 wliat not. — A leading question is one which may be answered 
 by Yes or No, or which suggests the desired answer. ^ It is a 
 question which puts the answer into the mouth of the witness.^ 
 All questions put to a witness, which assume the existence of 
 facts material to the issue which have not been proved, are said 
 to fall within the definition of leading questions.* But a ques- 
 tion which merely directs the attention of the witness to the fact 
 in controversy, about which his testimony is desired, is not 
 
 leading." 
 
 1 Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 116, 120; 
 Severance v. Can; 43 N. H. 65; Steer 
 V. Little, 44 N. H. 613; Kendall v. 
 Browusou, 47 N. H. 186. 
 
 2 1 Whart. Ev. (2d ed.), § 499; 
 Raugel V. State (Tex.), 3 S. W. Eep. 
 788: s, c. 22 Tex. App. 642. Accord- 
 ingly, it is not proper, on the direct 
 examination of a witness who does 
 not need the aid of a memorandum to 
 refresh his memory, to read to him par- 
 agraphs from an affidavit made by him 
 on a previous occasion, and to ask 
 him if tho.^e statements are true. 
 This is in effect putting in evidence 
 the affidavit of the witness and his 
 declarations made previous to the 
 trial, in place of his direct oral state- 
 ments to the ijury on his present 
 recollection of the facts. Hubbell v. 
 Bowe, 17 Jones & Sp. (40 N. Y. Super.) 
 131. 
 
 3 Harvey v. Osboru, 55 Ind. 535, 
 547. 
 
 4 Klock V. state, 60 Wis. 574, 576; 
 1 Greenl. Ev., § 434; 1 Stark. Ev. (9th 
 
 ed.) 197; Tiirney v. State, 8 Smed. & 
 M. (Miss.) 104. 
 
 ^ Thus, the following question has 
 been held not leading : " Do you know 
 anything of the money transactions 
 between the same parties? If so, 
 state their nature and the time, as 
 near as you may remember." Harvey 
 V. Osboru, 55 Ind. 535, 547. So, the 
 following question has been held not 
 leading: " State what you may know, 
 if anything, of the purchase of land, 
 by your brother William, from Harvey 
 or Harvey's wife, shares or shares of 
 the estate, when it was, and what land 
 it was, and what, if anything, did 
 Harvey ever say to you on the sub- 
 ject." Ibid. So, the following ques- 
 tion lias been held not leading: " State 
 what you may know, if anything, 
 about any indebtedness by Squire 
 Harvey, one of the defendants In the 
 case, to William Osboru, the otlier de- 
 fendant." Ibid. 548. So, of the fol- 
 lowing question: '^' In speaking of a 
 balance of his wiff in the homestead.
 
 Tit, III, Cb. XIV.] CONTKOL OVER EXAMINATION. 323 
 
 § 339. [Continued.] Whei-e the Witness is manifestly 
 Hostile to the Party calling him. — The discretion of the trial 
 court is well exercised in allowing leading questions to be put, 
 where it appears, from the previous answers or conduct of the 
 witness, that he is an unwilling ivitness,^ or manifestly hostile to 
 the party calling him.-' 
 
 § 360. [Continued.] Other Circumstances where al- 
 lowed. — An exception to the rule which disallows leading ques- 
 tions to one's own witness, is that such questions may be put 
 for the purpose of introducing matter or leading or directing the 
 attention of the witness to the subject upon which his testimony 
 is desired.^ So, a party may put leading questions to his own 
 witness where an omission in the testimony of the witness is evi- 
 dently caused by a failure of recollection, which a suggestion may 
 assist.'* So, it has been held that, where a witness is called 
 to contradict a former witness, who has stated that certain ex- 
 pressions were used, the proper practice is to ask whether such 
 expressions were used, without putting the question in the gen- 
 eral form of inquiring what was said.^ In general, it is not 
 within the inhibition of the rule against leading questions, to ask 
 a witness questions calling for an affirmative or negative answer, 
 which, from the nature of the case, could not well be put in any 
 other way. " Some discretion," says Campbell, C. J., " must 
 be used on the subject, and every nicety is not conducive to either 
 convenience or justice."^ According to a learned and accurate 
 
 was reference had to a share pur- - Williams v. Jarrot, (] 111. 120; 
 
 chased by William Osborn of the wife McBride v. Wallace (Mich.), 2'J N. AV. 
 
 of Harvey, as child aud heir at law of Rep. 75; Klock v. State, 60 Wis. 574, 
 
 James D. Osboru, or was it some 576. 
 
 other and different claim? " This ^ Williams v. Jarrot, 6 111. 120. 
 
 question naturally arose from the ^ Shultz v. State, 5 Tex. App. 390; 
 
 Avituess' answer.to a preceding ques- 1 Greeul. Ev., §§ 434, 435. 
 :ion,and was therefore held not lead- ^ Farmers' IMutual Fire Ins. Co. v. 
 
 mg. Ibid. Bair, 87 Pa. St. 124; explaining Sus- 
 
 1 Hopiiinson u. Steel, 12 Vt. 582; quehanna Coal Co. ?;. Quick, 61 Pa. St. 
 
 Bradshaw v. Combs, 102 111. 429; 328. 
 
 Baker?;. State (Wis.), 33 N. W. Rep. ^ jjcKeown v. Harvey, 40 Mich. 
 
 52 ; s. c. 69 Wis. 32. 226.
 
 324 
 
 EXA.MINATION OF WITXESSES. [1 TllOIlip. Tr., 
 
 writer, " the judge may, ia his discretion, allow leading ques- 
 tions to be put, on direct or re-direct examination, where the 
 witness is hostile or reluctant, or is in the interest of the other 
 party, or so youthful, ignorant, or intirm as to require the atten- 
 tion to be led ; or where his memory has been exhausted without 
 stating some particular, such as a name, which cannot be signifi- 
 cantly pointed out by a general inquiry." ^ 
 
 § 361. Effect of Admissions upon Offers of Evidence. — 
 
 On principles already stated,^ stipulations made between counsel 
 in court,^ dispensing with witnesses or with evidence, will be en- 
 forced by the court, at least when in writing,^ or when acted on 
 by one of the parties,^ or even where, though not in writing,^ it 
 would work a fraud to allow them to be disregarded.^ Nor will 
 such stipulations be set aside on the ground of mistake, where 
 the evidence touching the mistake is conflicting and doubtful; ** 
 
 1 Abb. Tr. Brief, 9(3 ; citing 14 Abb. 
 N, C. (N. Y.) 470, note; Moody v. 
 RoTvell, 17 Pick. 490, 498; Metropoli- 
 tan Bank v. Hale, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 341 ; 
 Cheney v. Arnold, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 434 (witness old and blind) ; Strat- 
 ford V. Sandford, 9 Conn. 274, 284; 
 Snyder v. Snyder, 50 lud. 492. 
 
 2 Ante, § 193. 
 
 3 Not enforced when made out of 
 and not entered of record, though 
 made pending the trial. Commercial 
 Bank v. Clark, 28 Vt. 325. 
 
 4 See, as to the necessity of stipu- 
 lations being in writing, ante, § 200; 
 also Huff V. State, 29 Ga. 424. 
 
 5 Johnson v. Wright, 19 Ga. 509. 
 
 6 Henderson v. Merritt, 38 Ga. 
 232. 
 
 ' Heilner v. Battin, 27 Pa. St. 517. 
 See as to various stipulations touch- 
 ing evidence, — their validity and in- 
 terpretation, — Sidener v. Essex, 22 
 Ind. 201; Shields v. Guffey, 9 Iowa, 
 322; Curl v. Watson, 25 Iowa, 35; 
 Bryan v. Coursey, 3 Md. (31 ; Booth v. 
 Hall, 6 Md. 1 (interpretation of 
 
 an agreement waiving errors in 
 pleading) ; Farmers' Bank v, Sprigg, 
 11 Md. 389 (effect of agreement 
 that judgment shall be entered for 
 the plaintiff, as evidence on a fu- 
 ture trial) ; State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 
 177 (waiving formality of pleading) ; 
 Boardniau v. Kibbe, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 
 545 (waiving proof of execution of 
 papers) ; White v. Harlow, 5 Gray 
 (Mass.), 563; Leonard v. White, 5 
 Allen (Mass.), 177 (agreement to de- 
 feud on a particular ground only) ; 
 Bingham v. Supervisors, 8 Minn. 441 
 (restricting the evidence to a particu- 
 lar question) ; Seawell v. Cohn, 2 Nev. 
 308 (to enter judgment and stay of 
 execution) ; Neil v. Tarin, 9 Tex. 256 
 (tiual determination of controversy) ; 
 Uuis V. Cliarlton, 12 Graft. (Va.) 484 
 (evidence taken in one of several cases 
 to be read in all) ; Douglass v. Rogers, 
 4 Wis. 304 (that certain depositions be 
 admitted, reserving objections to mat- 
 ters of substance only) . 
 
 8 Charles v. Miller, 36 Ala. 141 (affi- 
 davit against affidavit).
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XI v.] CONTROL OVER EXAMINATION. 325 
 
 or where entered into by one party under a mistaken belief touch- 
 ing a fact which did not change the legal rights of the parties; ^ 
 or because of newly discovered evidence? Agreements touching 
 instruments of evidence, when not otherwise confined in their 
 meaning, are applicable to any future trial of the cause. ^ A 
 frequent stipulation, entered into to avoid a continuance, relates 
 to what an absent witness would testify to, if present, . On plain 
 grounds, this does not preclude objections to the reading of any 
 portion of the admission, founded on reasons which would have 
 been good against the like testimony of the witness, if person- 
 ally present ; * nor prevent the State from showing that the 
 absent witness has made contradictory statements.^ There are 
 statutes which enable the State's attorney to avoid a continu- 
 ance by admitting that an absent witness of the accused would, 
 if present, swear to the facts which the accused, in his affidavit 
 for a continuance, states that he expects to prove by him ; in 
 which case the affidavit and the admission are read to the jury 
 in the place of the testimony of the absent witness. It is ob- 
 vious that the statements thus read to them will not have the 
 same realistic effect on their minds as would the testimony of the 
 witness delivered in their presence ; and on this ground doubts have 
 been felt as to whether such a statute does not violate the consti- 
 tutional rights of the accused.^ On a similar view, it has been 
 reasoned in civil cases, that the admission of a fact by the oppos- 
 ing counsel will not necessarily preclude the party from proving 
 it ; ^ since " it would be absurd to hold that any party by his bald 
 admissions on a trial, could shut out legal evidence.^ But this 
 reasoning seems to go too far. Carried to its logical extent, it 
 would destroy the conclusive effect of the admissions in the 
 
 J Chapman v. Coates, 2r, Iowa, 288. v. Hatfield, 72 Mo. 518; State v. Jen- 
 
 2 Fraukliu v. National Ins. Co., 4M nings, 81 Mo. 585; State v. Heuson, 81 
 Mo. 401. Mo. 384. 
 
 3 Central &c. Coi'p. v. Lowell, 15 '' State v. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230, 
 Gray (Mass.), IOC; Carroll v. Panl, 19 234. 
 
 Mo. 102. ' Hancock ^Mnt. Life Ins. Co. v. 
 
 •* Scaggs V. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 10 Moore, 34 Mich. 41, 
 Md. 268. 8 Kimball &c. Man, Co. v. Vroraan, 
 
 5 State V. Miller, fi7 Mo. G04; State 35 Mich. 310.
 
 326 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOUip. Tr., 
 
 pleadings. The better view is that a formal admission of a fact 
 precludes, in the discretion of the court, the offer of any further 
 evidence of such fact,^ unless the admission is not co-extensive 
 with the offer ; ^ though it will not be error to admit it.^ 
 
 1 Dorr V. Tremont Bank, 128 Mass, Groton, 103 Mass. 540; Brown v. Per- 
 349; Ainsworth v. Hutchius, 62 Vt. kins, 1 Alleu (Mass.), 89, 96. 
 
 554; Butterworth v. Pecare, 8 Bosw. ^ Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co, v. 
 
 (N. Y.) 671. Moore, 34 Midi. 41; Bannister v. Al- 
 
 2 Abb. Tr. Brief, 45; citing Priest u. derman, 111 Mass. 261.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cli. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 327 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 INCIDENTS OF THE DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
 
 Section 
 
 364. Examinatiou ou the voir dire. 
 
 365. Of the Oath or Affirmatiou. 
 
 366. Of Sworn luterpreters. 
 
 367. Examination of Deaf and Dumb Witnesses. 
 
 368. Introductory Statements. 
 
 369. Assuming Material Facts in Issue. 
 
 370. Detailing Collateral Facts to assist Recollection. 
 
 371. [Illustration.] Marking the Boundaries of Parishes in Loudon. 
 
 372. Evidence of Undisputed Date to fix Disputed Date. 
 
 373. Reason for Remembering. 
 
 374. Questions as -to Contemporaneous Circumstances. 
 
 375. Eight to Contradict a Fact from which a Witness infers another Fact. 
 
 376. Strength of Recollection — " Impressions " of the Witness. 
 
 377. Witness must state Facts, not Conclusions. 
 
 378. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. 
 
 379. Appearances. 
 
 380. Opinions as to Value. 
 
 381. Opinion of the Plaintiff as to his own Damages. 
 
 382. Questions Depending on the Experience of Witnesses. 
 
 383. Testimony as to Intent, Belief or Motive. 
 
 384. Rule where the Concuri-ence of Intent of two Parties is Material. 
 
 385. Fullness of Witness' Statements. 
 
 386. Sufficient that the Evidence tends to Prove. 
 
 387. Substance of Conversation or Admission. 
 
 388. Rule where the Wituess remembers a Part only of the Convei'sation. 
 
 389. Source of Information or Belief must be given. 
 
 390. Compound Questions when not Admissible. 
 
 391. Negative Testimony when too remote. 
 
 392. Putting the Testimouy of two Witnesses together. 
 
 393. Rule as to the Declarations of Conspirators. 
 
 § 364. Examination on the Voir Dire. — "Where the witness 
 is objected to on the ground of incompetency, what is called his 
 examination on the voir dire precedes, in strict j^ractice, his ex- 
 amination as a witness.^ But this strictness does not obtain in 
 
 ^ Dewdney v. Palmer, 4 Mees. & W. 664.
 
 328 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 modern practice; and, where the objection is grounded on inter- 
 est, it is now entirely a matter of discretion with the court 
 whether the preliminary oath as to interest, or the oath in 
 chief shall be admhiistered; and it has been said that the bet- 
 ter practice is to swear the witness in chief, and to bring out the 
 facts showing his interest, either by direct or by cross-exam- 
 ination.^ Under the former practice, the examination on the 
 voir dire related only to the question of the interest of the wit- 
 ness in the subject-matter of the suit; ^ but the term is now gen- 
 erally employed to designate the preliminary examination of the 
 witness touching any other ground of qualification as to which he 
 may be interrogated. "^ He is first sworn to make true answers 
 to such questions as shall be put to him touching his competency 
 as a witness. He is then examined in chief by the objecting 
 party, after which the party calling him has the right of cross- 
 examination.^ The question of his competency is decided by 
 the court, and not by the jury.^ Where, under the old system, 
 the witness was objected to on the ground of interest, two 
 methods of proving him incompetent were open to the ob- 
 jecting party: 1. By examining him on his voir dire. 2, 
 By the introduction of independent evidence. The resort to 
 one method was in general a waiver of the other.® The rule 
 that the contents of a written instrument cannot be proved by 
 parol where the instrument itself can be produced, does not ap- 
 
 1 Seeley u. Engel, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) Morningstar, 18 Oh. St 579; City 
 530. Council v. Haywood, 2 Nott & McC. 
 
 2 1 Greeul. Ev., § 424. (S. C.) 308. 
 
 3 Rapalje on Witnesses, § 232. <> Butler v. Butler, 3 Day (Conn.), 
 
 4 Beach v. Covillaud, 2 Cal. 237; 214; The Watchman, 1 Ware (U. S.), 
 Succession of AVeigel, 18 La. Aun. 49. 232; AVaughop v. Weeks, 22 III. 350; 
 
 ^ Ante, § 323, ct seq.; Reynolds v. Diversy v. Will, 28 111. 216; "Walker v. 
 
 Lounsbury, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 534; Chou- Collier, 37 111. 3G2; Weldea v. Buck, 
 
 teau V. Searcy, 8 Mo. 733; Cook t). Anthon. (N. Y.) 15; Mifflinv. Bingham, 
 
 Mix, 11 Coun. 432; Amory v. Fellows, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 294; Mallet v. Mallet, 1 
 
 5 Mass. 219, 229; Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Root (Conu.), 501; McAllister v. W^ill- 
 
 Id. ICO; Dole v. Thurlow, 12 Mete, iams, 1 Teun. (Overt.) 107, 119; 
 
 (Mass.) 157; Commercial Bank v. Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 219; 
 
 Hughes, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 94; Stall v. Chance v. Hine, G Conu, 231. 
 Catskill Bank, 18 Id. iCC; Rohrer u.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 329 
 
 ply to the examination of a witness on a voir dire; since the 
 examining party cannot be supposed to know beforehand what 
 the witness Avill state, or what papers affecting his competency 
 are in existence.^ 
 
 § 365. Of the Oath or AiHrniation. — It is the duty of the par- 
 ty caHing the witness to see that he is sworn ; '^ though if the 
 oath is inadvertently omitted, the objection will not be good after 
 verdict.^ The objection must be made as soon as it is discovered, 
 or it will be deemed waived.* The oath, as we have inherited it 
 from England, is generally administered by handing to the wit- 
 ness a copy of the New Testament^ on the external cover of which 
 is imprinted a cross. The clerk of the court, at the same time re- 
 taining hold of the book, recites an oath like the followins; : "You 
 do solemnly swear, on the holy Evangelists of Almighty God, 
 that the evidence you shall give in the cause now in hearing, 
 wherein A. B. is plaintiff and C. D. is defendant (or otherwise 
 describing the parties, or omitting the description altogether), 
 shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth : so 
 help you God." The witness nods assent and kisses the book. 
 In many American jurisdictions this form of administering the 
 oath is changed, and in its place is substituted an oath adminis- 
 tered by the upJifted ImndJ' The clerk of the court rises and 
 holds up his right hand, and so does the witness. The clerk then 
 recites an oath like the following: "You solemnly swear that 
 the evidence you shall give in the cause now in hearing shall be 
 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth ; so help you 
 God." The witness bows, or adds the words " I do." In the 
 case of nou-christiaus, the judge will substitute an oath which 
 conforms to the custom of the witness' country or to his religious 
 
 1 1 Greeul. Ev., §95; Hernclon v. (Mass.) 236; Sells ?;. Hoare, 7 J. B. 
 Giveus, 16 Ala. 261. Moore, 36: s. c. 3 Brod. & Bing. 232. 
 
 2 Rap. Wit., § 235; Davis v. Melviu, * Slauter v. Whitelock, 12 lud. 338. 
 1 lud. 130; White Water Valley Canal 5 xhat such au oath is good see 
 Co. w. Dow, Id.Ul; Hawlis V. Baker, Gill v. Cakhvell, 1 111. (Breese) 28; 
 6 Me. 72. Doss v. Birks, 11 Huiiiph. (Teun.) 431; 
 
 8 Nesbit V. Dallam, 7 Gill & J. McKiuuey v. People, 7 111. 540. 
 (Md.) 494; Cady v. Norton, 14 Pick.
 
 330 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl"., 
 
 belief or scruples ; ^ or where he is conscientiously opposed to tak- 
 insr an oath, he will allow the clerk to administer to him an affir- 
 mation,^ which may run thus: " You do solemnly, sincerely, and 
 truly declare and affirm," etc."^ Thus, Jews may be sworn on the 
 Pentateuch with covered head,* Gentoos, by touching the feet of 
 a Brahmin;^ Chinese, by the ceremony of killing a cock, or 
 breaking a saucer; ®a member of the Scottish Kirk, by holding up 
 the hand without kissing the book ; ^ a Methodist on the 
 Old Testament, if he prefers; ^ Quakers and others of like 
 scruples, by taking a solemn asseveration that their testimony 
 shall be true; ^ and in whatever way the oath is administered, if 
 the witness knowingly testifies falsely, he will be guilty of per- 
 jury. ^° The fact that the oath is more comprehensive than the 
 statute requires does not, of course, affect its validity. ^^ The 
 meaning of the clause in the oath, " to tell the whole truth," is 
 that the witness obligates himself to tell so much of the truth as 
 may be competent evidence and as may not criminate himself. ^"^ 
 An oath administered to the witness suffices for the whole trial. ^^ 
 Although the witness is sworn before arraignment in a criminal 
 case, but after the prisoner has announced his readiness to pro- 
 
 ^ By the principles of tlie commou ^ Ibid. 
 
 law, no particular form of oath is *> Ibid. 
 
 necessary, so that it binds his con- ' Miklrone's Case, 1 Leach C. C. 
 
 science. Atcheson v. Everitt, Cowp. 459. 
 
 389; Rex v. Gilham, 1 Esp. 285; s. c. « Edmonds v. Rowe, Ryl. & M. 
 
 6 T. R. 265 ; The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. 77. 
 
 & B. 284. ^ United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gal. 
 
 2 See United States v. Coolidge, (U. S.) 3(;4; Stat. 9 Geo. 4, ch. 32; 3& 
 2 Gall. (U. S.) 364; ante, § 188. If tlie 4 Will. 4, ch. 49; Id., ch. 82; Reg. v. 
 witness does not object to be sworn he Doran, Lewin C. C. 27; Stat. 1 & 2 
 cannot be allowed to affirm. Will- Vict., ch. 77; and many American 
 iamson v. Carroll, 16 N. Y. 217. statutes. 
 
 3 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc, § 847. Or, » Sells v. Iloare, 3 Brod. & B. 232. 
 " I solemnly promise and declare that See further 1 Greenl. Ev., § 371; Rap. 
 the evidence given by me to the court Wit., § 235, and cases cited. 
 
 shall be tlie truth, the whole truth, and " Ballance v. Underhill, 4 111. 453. 
 
 nothing but the truth." Stat. 32 & 33 '^ ijap. Wit., § 235, citing Com. v. 
 
 Vict. ch. 68, § 4. For an earlier form, Reld, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. (Pa.) 182. 
 see Stat. 17 & 18 Vict., cii. 125, § 20. ^^ Bullock «. Coon, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 4 Ormychund «. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 30. 
 40, 42;s. c. Wides, 543.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
 
 331 
 
 ceed with the trial, it is unnecessary to reswear him.^ AYhere 
 the witness is competent in chief he must be sworn generally, al- 
 though his examination is confined to a particular fact."^ 
 
 § 366. Of Sworn Interpreters. — Where the witness does 
 not understand the English language, the court may swear an in- 
 terpreter to translate his answers.'^ This is generally provided 
 for by statute; but where there is no statute, it will be pre- 
 sumed on appeal, in the absence of a contrary showing in the 
 record, that the parties agreed upon the appointment of an in- 
 terpreter.* " The interpreter," says Mr. Rapalje, " is sioorn 
 truly to interpret between the court, the jury and the witness; 
 the oath is then administered to the witness in English, and in- 
 terpreted to him by the sworn interpreter, as it is pronounced 
 by the clerk." ^ He should be instructed to interpret and report 
 every statement made by the witness. ^ He may, it has been 
 ruled, take advantao;e of the suo-crestions of others who are not 
 sworn, with regard to the proper interpretation of the testimony, 
 stating the result to the court as his own interpretation.^ Of 
 course, a party is not bound by the interpretation, but may show 
 that the interpreter has given an erroneous translation of a word 
 or phrase.^ 
 
 1 State V. Weber, 22 Mo. 3*1. ^ Leetchr. Atlantic Mutual lus. Co., 
 
 2 Jackson v. Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 4 Daly (N. Y.), 518. 
 
 (N. Y.) 3(i9. A civil action for dam- ^ Rap. Wit., § 230; Norberg'sCase, 
 
 ages will not lie against a witness who 4 Mass. 81. 
 
 swears falsely. Amey v. Long, 9 '' People u. Wong Ah Bang (Cal.), 3 
 
 East. 473; s. c. 6 Esp. UG; s. c. 1 West. Coast Kep. 58. 
 
 Camp. 16; Collins v. Cave, 9 Jur. (n. ' United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 
 
 s.) 297; s. c. 4 Hurl. & N. 225; 28 L. (U. S.) 19. Mr. Rapalje regards this 
 
 J. (Exch.) 204. as a dangerous doctrine. Rap. Wit., 
 
 3 See Norberg's Case, 4 Mass. 81; § 23G. 
 
 Amory u. Fellows, 5 Mass. 219, 22G; * Schuier v. People, 23 111.17. A 
 
 Rap. Wit., § 23G. Where the witness witness may translate to the jury 
 
 is at the moment physically incapable documents written by himself in a for- 
 
 of speaking aloud, his testimony may eign language, without being sworn 
 
 be reported by some suitable person as an interpreter. Kuhlman v. Med- 
 
 appoiuted by the court. Conner v. liuka, 29 Tex. 385. 
 State, 25 Ga. 515.
 
 332 
 
 EXAMINATIOX OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'. 
 
 § 367. Examination of Deaf and Dumb Witnesses. — A deaf 
 and dumb witness is examined by a sworn interpreter, upon prin- 
 ciples similar to those which govern the examination of witnesses 
 who cannot understand and speak the language in which the trial 
 is conducted. It has been held that such an interpreter need not 
 be an adept in the sign language used by deaf and dumb persons, 
 but that it is sufficient if he understands the lansuajje so as to be 
 able to interpret, as well the questions that might be propounded 
 to the deaf and dumb witness as the answers thereto.^ It should 
 be added that in this, as in other cases, where an interpreter is 
 employed, the accuracy of the interpretation may be impeached 
 and is ultimately to be determined by the jury.^ If he can write 
 sufficiently well, he may be required to give his testimony in that 
 way ; ^ but he may be allowed to communicate by signs, although 
 he can write imperfectly.^ 
 
 § 368. Introductory Statements.— It is usual at the outset 
 to ask a witness such questions concerning himself as are suffi- 
 
 1 Skaggs V. State (lud.), (i West 
 Rep. 2(31; s. c. 108 Iiid, 53. 
 
 2 Ibid. As to this general principle 
 see Wliart. Crim. Ev., §449; United 
 States V. Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 19; 
 Schnier v. People, 23 111. 17. As to 
 the competency of such witnesses, see 
 Rap. Wit., § 6; Ruston's Case, 1 Leach 
 C. C. 458; Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blaclif. 
 (Ind.) 295. 
 
 ^ Morrison v. Lennard, 3 Car. & P. 
 127. 
 
 •4 State V. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93; 
 Com. V. Hill, 14 Mass. 207; Snyder v. 
 Nations, supra. In a trial in Indiana 
 for assaulting a deaf and dumb woman 
 with intent to ravish her, an interpre- 
 ter was appointed to put the questions 
 to and interpret the answers of the 
 prosecuting witness. The court ap- 
 pointed another deaf and dumb woman 
 to assist in the interpretation. It was 
 held that there was no error in so do- 
 ing. Howk, C. J., said: "The object 
 
 of the examination of the prosecuting 
 witness was to get the facts of the 
 case within her personal knowledge, 
 before the court and jury; and the 
 court had the power undoubtedly to 
 appoint as many interpreters as to it 
 seemed 'necessary to the accomplish- 
 ment of that object. The manner in 
 which such an examination could be 
 coudncted was a matter to ])e regulated 
 and controlled by the trial court, in its 
 discretion, and will not be reviewed by 
 this court, in the absence of a showing 
 that appellant was in some way in- 
 jured thereby." Skaggs v. State 
 (Ind.), 6 West. Rep. 261; s. c. 108 
 Ind. 53. As to the admissibility of 
 declarations, communicated by signs, 
 of a deaf and dumb female, alleged to 
 have been ravished, see People v. Mc- 
 Gee, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 19, 24; Reg. v. 
 Guttridge, 9 Car. & P. 471; Reg. v. 
 Megson, Id. 420.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 333 
 
 cient to inform the jury who he is ; and the examination usually 
 begins by asking him his name. But this question may be put 
 to him by the clerk of the court at the time when he is called 
 and sworn, in which case it will not be a good assignment of 
 error that the name of the witness was not proved.^ So, a wit- 
 ness may be permitted to state that he is a public officer without 
 producing his commission.''^ A witness may be permitted to tell 
 in his oivn language what may be necessary to tell by way of 
 introduction., to make his narrative intelligible, provided his 
 statements are propi^-rly restricted, or he reaches the material 
 facts of his testimony, — that is, those portions that bear upon 
 the issues involved in the case about which he is called to 
 testify. 3 
 
 § 369. Assuming 3Iaterial Facts in Issue. — It is said by an 
 able judge: " The rules of law which govern in the examination 
 of witnesses as effectually prohibit counsel from assuming, in 
 their questions, any facts which are material to the point of the in- 
 quiry, but which are to be ultimately found by the jury, as other 
 rules of law forbid the presiding judge from assuming such facts 
 in his instructions to the jury. In the former case, the reason 
 of such rules does not rest merely upon the consideration that 
 such assumption of facts might mislead the witnesses, but upon 
 tke liability of such assumption or assertion of facts by counsel 
 becoming a substitute in the minds of the jurors for evidence, 
 and thus calculated to mislead them. In the latter case the 
 reason is the same, with the further reason that the assumption 
 by the court, in its instructions to the jury, of material facts to be 
 found by them, is regarded as an invasion by the court of the 
 peculiar province of the ]\\vy. The rules in the former case are 
 so rigidly maintained that they will not permit counsel, even 
 upon cross-examination and when leading questions may be put, 
 to assume any material facts in issue and wdiich are to be found 
 by the jury, or to assume that particular answers have been 
 
 1 People V. Winters, 49 Cal. 383. ^ Shultz v. State, 5 Tex. App. 390, 
 
 2 Moody V. Keener, 7 Port. (Ala.) 392. 
 
 •-'18.
 
 334 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr. 
 
 given contrary to the fact." ^ Such a practice has also been re- 
 garded as subject to the objection that it tends to lead the wit- 
 ness; and where it was resorted to by the State's counsel in a 
 criminal case, against the objection of the defendant, it was held 
 that the ruling might be assigned for error. ^ Accordingly, coun- 
 sel have no right to put a question to a witness which assumes 
 that the witness has said something which he denies having said.^ 
 But it is no objection to a question that it assumes facts which are 
 not disputed; * nor as hereafter seen, that the question is hypothet- 
 ically framed, when designed to elicit the opinion of an expert 
 witness.^ Nor is it always available error that introductory ques- 
 tions, designed to draw the mind of the witness to the scene or 
 fact of the controversy, are put in such a manner as to assume 
 the existence of a fact. Thus, in a criminal trial it was held that 
 a witness might bo asked whether "he had examined the place 
 designated by H. as the place where he was shot," — the object 
 being merely to introduce further questions.^ 
 
 § 370. Detailing Collateral Facts to Assist Recollection. — 
 
 The rule under this head is that it is not necessary that the wit- 
 ness should have a positive or full recollection of the facts to 
 which he testifies, or that he should speak with such certainty as 
 to exclude all doubt in his mind.^ " He may," says Willie, C. 
 J., " detail circumstances which satisfy his mind of the existence 
 of the fact, and they should go to the jury, so that they may 
 draw from them such conclusion as they may deem just and rea- 
 sonable. If the deduction drawn by the witness from these 
 circumstances is unwarrantable, then the evidence may be ex- 
 cluded; but if they may or may not, under the facts, warrant 
 
 ' Haish V. Mimday, 12 Bradw. court cite Tuniey v. State, 8 Smed. 
 
 (111.) 539, 545, opinion by McAllister, & M. (Miss.) 104, 120; Guuter v. Wat- 
 
 J. ; citing People v. Mather, 4 Wend. sou, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 455. 
 (N. Y.)229, 249; People V. Graham, 3 gauderlin ?;. Sanderlin, 24 Ga. 583. 
 
 21 Cal. 261; Carpenters. Ambrosau, * Willey w. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. 
 
 20 111. 170; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. 303. 
 Thompson, 10 Md. 70; 1 Greenl. Ev., ■' Ibid., post, ch. 22. 
 
 § 434. " Magee v. State, 32 Ala. 5 
 
 2 Klocku. State GO Wis. 574. The ' 1 Greeul. Ev., § 440.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 335 
 
 the conclusion derived from them by the witness, we think that 
 they should be allowed to go to the jury. "When resort is had to 
 circumstantial proof, ' any fact may be submitted to the jury, 
 provided it can be established by competent means, which 
 affords any fair presumption or inference as to the question in 
 dispute.' ^ The particular fact connected with an old transac- 
 tion as to which a witness' testimony is sought, may have faded 
 from his memory, but other and surrounding or collateral facts, 
 which are remembered, may be so intimately associated with the 
 fact inquired about, as to satisfy the witness that it did exist. 
 In such cases it is entirely proper that all these facts should 
 be laid before the jury, together with the deduction drawn 
 from them by the witness, and let them determine as to the suiE- 
 ciency of the circumstances to establish the main fact. It is 
 more a matter of the sufficiency than of the competency of the 
 evidence." ^ 
 
 § 371. [Illustration.] Marking the Boundaries op the Parishes 
 IN LoNT)ON. — A good illustration of the value of the principle above 
 stated, that the witness may be allowed to appeal to collateral facts in 
 order to assist his memory, is found in a custom which still prevails in 
 London, of perpetuating the memory of the corners of the different 
 parishes of the city. As stated to the writer by an English barrister, 
 the beadle of each parish goes around at stated periods with a number 
 of boys with hazel switches and marks the corners of the parish by 
 calling the attention of the lads to it ; and it was stated to the writer 
 by a gentleman who had long lived in London, that in one known in- 
 stance the point where several parishes " cornered " was immediately 
 under the seat of one of the judges of one of the judicial courts, and 
 that when the beadle and the boys came around to perform this cere- 
 mony, the judge would vacate his seat for the purpose. The custom 
 originated in the practice of taking one or more boys to the parish 
 corner and there flogging them soundly with hazel switches, which cir- 
 cumstance would ever afterwards fix the particular spot in their recollec- 
 tions, and in that way a perpetual memorial of the place was preserved 
 in the memories of living witnesses. 
 
 1 Citing Wells v. Fairbanks, 5 Tex. 2 Davie v. Terrill, 63 Tex. 105. 
 
 585.
 
 336 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 § 372. Evidence of Undisputed Date to fix a Disputed 
 Date. — It has been held within the discretion of the trial court to 
 admit evidence of a transaction having an undisputed date, for the 
 purpose of fixing in the mind of the witness a date whicja was in 
 dispute. Loomis, J,, said: " If the dates to be shown were ma- 
 terial and in dispute, they could be shown by the date of some 
 other date not in dispute, upon the same principle that ' the 
 qualities of an object in dis})ute may be shown by comparison 
 with the known qualities of some object not in dispute.' " ^ 
 
 § 373. Reason for Remembering-. — " A witness," says Mr. 
 Abbott, " may be asked why he is confident he is correct ; for a 
 reason for the positiveness of relevant knowledge is relevant." ^ 
 Evidence which will assist in showing which party speaks the 
 truth is relevant;^ therefore -a party may aid the memory of 
 his own witness by directing his mind to any circumstance which 
 will help him to recollect more clearly the fact sought to be 
 proved.* The rule that a witness may state collateral facts which 
 tixed the subject about which he is being interrogated in his rec- 
 ollection has been applied so as to allow a witness, testifying to 
 a material fact in the case, to state as a reason for his accurate 
 recollection that he had ^conversation about it with a third person 
 at a stated time; but the details of the conversation are not rele- 
 vant or admissible. Soinerville, J., speaking for the court, said: 
 " Itis always competent for a witness to state that he had a con- 
 versation with a third i)erson on a certain subject germane to the 
 issue in dispute, and at a time specified, as a reason for his ac- 
 curate recollection of the fact to which he has testified. The 
 rules of evidence are those of connnon sense and human ex- 
 perience; and both of these teach us that the retentiveness of a 
 witness' memory,^ as to a particular fact or incident, is greatly im- 
 
 1 Harris v. Rosenberg, 43 Conn. Rosenburg, 12 Mich. 241, 256. 
 
 227, 231 ; citing Isbell v. New York » Platner v. I'latner, 78 N. Y. 90. 
 
 &c. R. Co., 25 Conn. 550. * O'llagan v. Dillon, 7(1 X. Y. 170. 
 
 2 Abb. Pr. Brief, 99; citing Blacl<- Compare Sawyer r. Urr, 140 Mass. 234. 
 well V. Hamilton, 47 Ala. 472; Angell v.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 337 
 
 proved where, after seeing or hearing of it, he subsequently con- 
 verses about it.' 
 
 § 374. Questions as to Contemporaneous Circumstances. — 
 
 It has been held that a party ought to be allowed to put a ques- 
 tion to his own witness relating to a contemporaneous circum- 
 stance, for the purpose of bringing to his recollection the fact 
 desired to be brought out. It is said by the New York Court of 
 Appeals: "While a party cannot cross-examine his own wit- 
 nesses, and is in general bound by the answers made, it is not 
 objectionable, after the witness has given an ambiguous answer, 
 to inquire as to any circumstance or fact tending to enable him 
 to recollect the fact sought to be proved more clearly or cer- 
 tainly." 2 
 
 § 375. Right to Contradict a Fact from which a Witness 
 infers Another Fact. — In a recent case in Massachusetts it is 
 ruled that, wdiere a witness swears to a fact only as an inference 
 from the existence of another fact, the question whether the fact 
 from which the main fact is inferred is true, becomes material, 
 and may be contradicted by the witnesses of the opposite party. 
 Thus, in an action against a railway company for a negligent in- 
 jury received by the plaintiff, a passenger, in alighting at the de- 
 fendant's station in the night time, it became a material inquiry 
 whether the premises were lighted at the time. The defendant's 
 witnesses swore to the fact that they were lighted, but based 
 their statement solely upon the ground that it was the uniform 
 practice to light it. It was held competent for the plaintiff to 
 show in rebuttal that there was no such uniform practice.** 
 
 § 376. Strength of Recollection — "Impressions'* of the 
 Witness. — In general, it may be said that the impressions 
 of a witness are not evidence, unless it be made to a})pear 
 that what are called impressions are derived from recollection, 
 
 1 Adams v. Robiusou, 65 Ala. 587, ^ Wentworth v. Eastern R. Co., 3 
 591. New Eug. Rep. 355; s. c. 143 Mass. 
 
 2 O'Hagau v. Dillon, 76 N. Y. 170, 2i8- 
 173.
 
 338 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 and not from the information of others ;^ and not then when the 
 so-culled impressions are in substance the conclusions of the wit- 
 ness, under the rule hereafter stated.^ Thus, on the trial of an 
 issue of devisavit vel non, several witnesses were asked: " From 
 the acts and declarations of S. (the deceased) by you related 
 and testified, and as you observed, what impressions did it make 
 on your mind as to his mental condition ? " It was held that the 
 question called for nw opinion which the witnesses were not com- 
 petent to give.^ So, a witness called to authenticate a paper 
 cannot be asked whether, to the best of his impression, it is in 
 the handwriting of the party. ^ 
 
 § 377. Witness must state Facts, not Conclusions. — It is 
 
 for the Jury, and not for the witnesses, to draw inferences from 
 facts ; and therefore it is a general rule that witnesses who are 
 not testifying as experts are not permitted to state their opin- 
 ions, conclusions or deductions from facts, but they must be con- 
 fined to the communication of facts, simply.^ Again, it is for the 
 court, and not for the witnesses, to draw conclusions of law, and 
 
 1 Clark V. Bigelow, 16 Me. 24(5; be Dave Long at the time. I could 
 
 Boyd V. Bank, 25 Iowa, 255. Follow- not say for certain who it was now; 
 
 ing this principle, it has been held in the man was running fast," etc. It 
 
 one of the appellate courts of Illinois, was held after a conviction and on 
 
 that it is not competent to allow a appeal, that it was not an available 
 
 wiiness to answer, " My impression is error for the court to put the ques- 
 
 that they did; I could not swear pos- tion in a leading form, and that, for 
 
 itively." Rounds v. McCormick, 11 the purpose of testing the witness and 
 
 Bradw. (111.) 220. But in another ju- getting at the truth, the court had the 
 
 risdiction, on the trial of a felony, right to ask her what her impressions 
 
 which consisted of shooting and were at the time. Long y. State, 95 
 
 wounding, after the witness had tes- Ind. 481, 487. See 3 Abb. N. C. 235. 
 
 tified that she was at her mother's ^ Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 270. 
 
 gate near the scene of the injury, and ^ Sisson v. Conger, 1 Thomp. & 
 
 saw a pei'son run west just after the C. (N. Y.) 5G4. 
 
 shooting, l)ut that she could not say ^ Carter v. Connell, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 
 
 who it Avas, the court put to her this 392. 
 
 question: " At the time you saw that ^ jviorchouse v. Mathews, 2 N. Y. 
 
 person running, and not from what 514;Teall v. Barton, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 you heard, did you think it was Dave 137; National Bank v, Isham, 48 Vt. 
 
 Long (the defendant)?" To which 590. 
 the witness answered : " I took it to
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XY.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 339 
 
 it is therefore a general rule that witnesses must not be per- 
 mitted to state such conehisions.^ The dividing line between 
 matter which involves the opinion, deduction, or conclusion of the 
 witness, and the recital of a state of the facts, will often be 
 difficult to be drawn; but several illustrations may be given 
 of the rule. Where a witness ended his answer to a question by 
 saying that he considered that certain property belonged to the 
 plaintiff, it was held that this part of his answer should be ex- 
 cluded, it being the statement of a conclusion of law.^ A ques- 
 tion which embraces the whole merits of the controversy is or- 
 dinarily subject to the objection that it calls for a conclusion 
 on the part of the witness, although it may not be so in particu- 
 lar cases. ^ Where, on a criminal trial, a witness persisted in 
 stating, against the objection of the defendent's counsel, his 
 suspicions and conclusions as to the defendant's guilt, and the 
 court failed to confine his examination to statements of fact, a 
 conviction was reversed.* So, a witness, in an action against a 
 guarantor of a promissory note, in proving the defendant's in- 
 dorsements, of which there are two, — one above and one be- 
 low a written guaranty, — should not be allowed to testify that 
 " the second signature was put on to guarantee the payment of 
 the paper." * So, in a summary proceeding by motion against 
 a tax collector and his sureties for failing to pay over public 
 moneys, it has been held error to allow the chairman of the coun- 
 ty court, as a witness, to state orally the result of his statement 
 of the collector's account, without producing the papers on which 
 it is based.'' 
 
 § 378. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. — Applying this rule, 
 it has been held inadmissible, in an action by a bank on a promissory 
 note, the entire consideration of which had failed, to ask the president 
 
 * Toralin v. Hilyard, 43 111. 300. * Harrison v. State, 16 Tex. App, 
 
 - Ro.seuthal v. Mitkllebrook, (J3Tex. 325, 329. 
 334. 5 Johnson v. Glover, 10 North E. 
 
 3 Caspar v. O'Brien, 15 Abb. Pr. (x. Rep. (111.) 214; s. c. 121 111. 283. 
 8.) (N. Y.) 402; Conner u. Stanley, 67 ^ Shepherd v. Hamilton Couuty, 8 
 
 Cal. 315. Compare Orr v. State, 15 Heisk. (Tenn.) 380. 
 Ark. 540.
 
 340 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 of the bank whether the bank discounted and received the note in the 
 ordinary course of business and in good faith.^ So, the following ques- 
 tion has been held improper, as eaUing for a conclusion of law : " Was 
 the judgment obtained for the purchase-money of the land in contro- 
 versy? " '^ So, it is improper to ask a witness what it would cost to do 
 certain work " according to the contract testified to by the plaintiff," 
 because it is for the court, and not for the witness to construe the con- 
 tract.^ So, it is improper to ask the witness what the defendant meant 
 by an expression which, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the 
 defendant had used,'* — the interpretation of verbal speech being for 
 the jury.^ So the question " was a certain deed delivered to take 
 effect?" — is inadmissible, as calling for a legal conclusion.'^ So, in 
 an action for damages for flowing land, a witness cannot be asked 
 whether the flowage injured the plaintiff.^ In like manner, it is not 
 competent for a witness to testify as to the knowledge of a person other 
 than himself. He may state declarations, acts or circumstances tend- 
 ing to show such knowledge, but beyond that his statement is merely 
 that of a conclusion, which is inadmissible. The following question 
 was, under this rule, properly rejected: " Did the plaintiff know you 
 had nothhig to do with the labor on the building after October last? " ^ 
 For a somewhat different reason, it is not competent to ask a witness 
 whether or not a certain instrument is a ivarranty deed. The reason is 
 that tlie contents of a writing cannot be proved by parol, unless the ab- 
 sence of the writing has been sufficiently accounted for. Where the 
 contents are shown, it is a question of law, for the court to decide, upon 
 which the opinion of a witness is incompetent.^ So, in an action on a 
 building contract, it has been held proper not to allow the architect, 
 testifying as a witness, to state whether certain extra work, which had 
 been ordered, was of such a character as to render it impossible for the 
 plaintiff to complete the building by the date named. ^° What the wit- 
 ness understands or thinks falls within the rule which prohibits witnesses 
 from stating their conclusions. Accordingly, the following testimony 
 was properly excluded from the jury: " Mj' understanding was, at the 
 
 1 National Bank v. Isham, 48 Vt. " Braman v. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 483. 
 590. See also Clougli v. Patricia, 37 ' Keagan v. Grim, 13 Pa. St. 508. 
 Vt. 421. 8 Major v. Spies, 6G Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 2 Tomlin v. Ililyard, 43 111. 300. 577. 
 
 3 McCUay v. lli'dgu, IS Iowa, G6. ^ Jackson v. Benson, 54 la. G54. 
 
 4 Whitman?;. Freese, 23 Me. 185. ^^ c.uupijL'll v. Kussell, 139 Mass. 
 5 Post, § 1115. 278.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 341 
 
 time, and still is, that the mortgage was given to release the securities 
 and secure the payment of the note. I think Barber (the payee) un- 
 derstood it in that way also." ^ But a witness may be asked whether 
 a person, e.g., the cashier of a bank, had authority to do a particular 
 act.2 And in an action for damages and for an injunction against 
 miners, who had cut away the dam above the plaintiff's mill, it has 
 bee-n held proper to ask a witness what effect did the running of the 
 slum, etc., by defendants and other miners above, have upon the plaint- 
 iff's race. 3 
 
 § 379. Appearances, — An exception to the foregoing rule is 
 that a witness may frequently state a conclusion of fact from 
 appearances. Thus, it has been held not error, in a trial for 
 murder, to allow witnesses for the State to testify that the pris- 
 oner " appeared to be drinking,'' * or was intoxicated at the time 
 of the alleged offense.^ So, witnesses other than experts may 
 give their opinions as to sanity or insanity, provided such opinions 
 be accompanied with statements of facts upon which they are 
 founded.^ So, it has been held proi)er to ask, " What did per- 
 sons in the crowd say, tending to show a common design and 
 feeling among several persons, to resist an officer in the execution 
 of his duty ? " ^ So, on a trial for murder occurring in an affray, 
 a witness, who was present, may be asked whether, when de- 
 ceased rushed upon defendant, there was time enough for the latter 
 to escape and get out of the way.^ But where the issue is 
 whether the deceased person was possessed of testamentary capa- 
 city, it will not be competent to ask a witness, " From what you 
 saw, what was his mental capacity? " — since this would devolve 
 upon him the office of court and jury, and require him to decide 
 the whole case.^ 
 
 § 380. Opinions as to Value. — An exception to the rule 
 which excludes the conclusions of witnesses is found in another 
 rule which admits their opinions as to value, provided y^founda- 
 
 1 Phares v. Barber, 61 111.272. 6 Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424. 
 
 2 KoI)inson v. Bealle, 20 Ga. 275. ' Maiu v. McCarty, 15 111. 441. 
 
 3 Bell V. Shutz, 18 Cal. 449. s Stewart v. State, 19 Oh. 312. 
 
 4 Choice V. State, 31 Ga. 424. » White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155. 
 ^■^ People V. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562.
 
 342 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tu., 
 
 Hon is first laid by showing that the witness is acquainted with 
 the value of the thing, the vahie of which is in dispute, and is 
 therefore competent to give an opinion upon that subject.^ 
 This rule is subject to the qualification that the opinions of wit- 
 nesses as to value are not binding upon the jury, but persuasive 
 merely. If they are of a different opinion, they may' find ac- 
 cording to their own opinion ; though a wide discrepancy between 
 their verdict and the opinions of the witnesses might be ground 
 of setting: the verdict aside. ^ Thus, where land is taken for the 
 building of a railroad, a witness acquainted with the land and its 
 value may state his opinion as to its value, immediately before 
 the taking and immediately after, and the amount of damage 
 done to the land by such taking.^ So, a witness acquainted with 
 the land and its value may state his opinion as to the amount of 
 damage done by hauling logs over it, in an action of trespass 
 quare clasum f regit .^ These decisions proceed upon the ground 
 that opinions of witnesses derived from observation are gener- 
 ally admissible in evidence when, from the nature of the subject 
 under investigation, no better evidence can be obtained.^ So, in 
 an action on a policy for fi7'e insurance , where it was necessary 
 to show the value of articles destroyed by the fire, it was held 
 that a daughter of the plaintiff who had bought many of the ar- 
 ticles insured, and who was present when others were bought, was 
 a competent witness to testify concerning their value.^ It is 
 competent for a witness to testify as to the actual cost of property 
 at a particular place, such evidence being relevant on the question 
 of value. ^ So, a witness may testify to a knowledge of the market 
 price of cattle at a particular time and place derived from the 
 newspapers.^ Obviously, a witness cannot be asked a question 
 which calls upon him, not to give his own opinion as to value, but 
 which requires him, from what he knows and from the testimony 
 
 1 Clark V. Field, 42 Mich. 342. 5 Hardy v. Merrill, m N. H. 227, 241. 
 
 2 Winkler v. Railroad Co., 21 Mo. ^ Coiitiuoutal liiburauceCo. v.Hov- 
 App. 109. ton, 28 Mich. 173. 
 
 3 Curtis V. R. R. Co., 20 Mimi. 28; ' AVhipple v. Walpole, 10 N. H. 130. 
 Sherwood V. R. R. Co., 21 Miuu. 127. ^ Cleveland &c. R. Co. i?. Perkins, 
 
 •* Carter v. Thurston, 58 N. H. 105, 17 Mich. 2yG. 
 108.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. Xy.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 343 
 
 of the witnesses which he has heard, to give his opinion as 
 to the amount of damages which ought to be awarded, — 
 since this devolves upon him the functions of th^ jury.^ 
 
 § 381. Opinion of the Plaintiff as to his own Damages. — 
 
 The rule of the preceding section does not extend so far as to 
 allow a plaintiff in an action, where the quantum of damages is 
 not determined by the value of real or personal property, to give 
 an opinion on the witness stand, as to the extent to which he 
 has been damaged.'^ Such evidence falls within the rule of a pre- 
 ceding section, 3 which excludes statements of witnesses which 
 involve conclusions merely, and especially conclusions which go 
 to the entire merits of the controversy.^ Thus, in an action for 
 maliciously suing out an attachment^ where injury to the plaint- 
 iff's credit is assigned as an element of damages, he will not be 
 permitted to testify what his credit was worth to him prior to 
 the doino; of the wrong. ^ 
 
 § 382. Questions depending on the Experience of Wit- 
 nesses. — Witnesses may properly testify in regard to matters 
 derived partly from their own experience in a particular business, 
 althouo;li their information comes through others in the course of 
 such business, — as, for instance, where the question concerns the 
 course of such business in a particular trade. ^ So, it has been 
 held competent to ask a witness who professes to know the num- 
 ber of slaves, mules, etc., employed on a plantation, how much 
 corn per month it would require to supply the wants of the 
 plantation.^ This opens up the question of expert testimony, 
 which is too extensive a subject for full treatment here.^ 
 
 1 "Shepherd v. Willis, 19 Oh. 142. The court cite Clarcli v. Calicoat, 24 
 
 Compare White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. Tex. 170, 173; Gabel v. Weiseusee, 49 
 
 155. Tex. 131, 142; Turner v. Strange, 56 
 
 ^ Kennedy V. Holladay, 25 Mo. App. Tex. 142; I Greeul. Ev., § 440. The 
 
 503,514; Smith v. Young, 2G Mo. App. same ruling was made at the same 
 
 575, 578. time in Herusheim v. Babcock (Tex.) 
 
 ^ Antp, § 377. 2 S. W. Rep. 880. 
 
 4 White V. Stoner, 18 Mo. App. 540, c Kj^g j, Woodbridge, 34 Vt. 565. 
 547; Belch v. Railroad Co., Id. 80. " Rembert v. Brown, 14 Ala. 36. 
 
 5 Kauffraan v. Babcock, 2 S. W. « As to the manner of examining, 
 Rep. (Tex.) 878; s. c. Wi Tex. 241. expert witnesses, see posf, chap. XXII.
 
 344 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 § 383. Testimony as to Intent, Belief or Motive. — It is a 
 
 general rule that the intent or purpose with which an act is done 
 is not material in civil cases, when the doing of the act is called 
 in question ; since parties are held to the natural and legal conse- 
 quences of their acts, and the law cannot investigate their psy- 
 chological conditions with accuracy.^ But where the intention 
 of a party becomes material, it may, of course be shown in evi- 
 dence. Before parties were made competent by statute to tes- 
 tify as witnesses, the intent of a party to a litigation, when 
 material, necessarily had to be proved by his acts or declarations, 
 or by surrounding circumstances. But since the passage of stat- 
 utes rendering parties competent to testify as witnesses, it is 
 settled by a preponderance of authority, that it is competent for a 
 party, testifying in his own behalf , to state his intent with regard 
 to the transaction in question, where such intent is material.^ 
 Thus, in a civil action for wantonly and maliciously destroying 
 property, the defendant may testify as to his motive, for the 
 purpose of disproving malice.^ So, it has been held, on the 
 
 1 Hale V. Taylor, 45 N. H. 405; 
 Gale V. Belknap lus. Co., 41 N. H. 
 170; Wadleigh v. Jauvriu, 41 N. H. 
 512; Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y_ 
 170; Farmers &c. Bank v. Cliamplaiu 
 Co., 23 Vt. 186; Hayward v. Bath, 38 
 N. H. 182. See also as bearing on this 
 subject. Gates v. Lounsbury, 20 Johns. 
 (N. Y.) 427; Lawrence v. Ocean Co., 
 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 241; N. Y. Fire- 
 men's Co. V. Lawrence, 14 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 4G; Palmer v. Piukham, 33 Me. 
 35. 
 
 2 Shockey v. Mills, 71 Ind. 288; 
 Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N. Y. 281; 
 Miner v. Phillips, 42 111. 123; Bloch v. 
 Price, 24 Mo. App. 14; Fish w. Chester, 
 8 Gray (Mass.), 50(;; Hulett v. Huiett, 
 37 Vt. 581, 58(1; Graves u. Graves, 45 
 N. H, 323; Homans v. Cornnig, GO N. H. 
 418; Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 4(55; 
 Hale V. Taylor,45 N. H. 405 ; Gale v. Bel- 
 knap Ins. Co., 4 IN. H. 170, 175; Norris 
 
 U.Morrill, 40 N. H. 395; Edwards ». 
 Currier, 43 Me. 474; Wlieelden v. 
 Wilson, 44 Me. 11; Coriuna v. Exeter, 
 13 Me. 328 ; French v. Marstin, 24 N. H. 
 440, 450; Conway v. Clinton, 1 Utah 
 T. 215, 221; McKown v. Hunter, 30 
 N. Y. 625; White v. Tucker, 16 Oh. St. 
 468; Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287, 
 297 (overruling dicaim in Hathaway u. 
 Brown, 18 Minn. 414; distinguishing 
 People V. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309) ; Wat- 
 kin V. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57; Seymour 
 V. Wilson, 14 N. Y. 567; Forbes v. 
 Waller, 25 N. Y. 430; Cortland 
 County V. Herkimer County, 44 N. Y. 
 22. See also as bearing on the ques- 
 tion, Jones V. Howland, 8 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 377; Blodgett v. Farmer, 41 
 N. H, 403; Fiedler v. Darin, 50 N. Y. 
 437 ; Lawyer v. Loomis, 1 Thoinp. & C. 
 (N. Y.) 393. 
 
 3 Conway v. Clinton, 1 Utah T. 215, 
 221.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 345 
 
 trial of an indictment for an assault and battery with intent to 
 commit a rape, that the accused might testify as to what his 
 intention was in the commission of the assault and battery.^ 
 So, on the trial of an indictment for larceny, it is competent 
 for the defendant to testify as to what his intention was at the 
 time the goods came into his possession.^ So, where the ques- 
 tion concerns the intent with which an assignment of property 
 has been made, it is competent for the assignor to testify what 
 his intentions were.'^ So, where the validity of a cZeecZ,* or of 
 an official act,^ is in question, it is competent for the grantor 
 to testify that he executed it in good faith. And in general, 
 it may be stated that, where the intent is an essential element 
 in the charge of crime, the prisoner has the right to testify as to 
 intent in doing the act.^ Nor is it necessary to the operation 
 of the rule that the witness should be a party to the action. 
 More broadly, the rule is, that where the motive of the witness, 
 in performing a particular act or making a particular declara- 
 tion, becomes a material issue in the case, or reflects import- 
 ant light upon such issue, he may himself be sworn in regard 
 io it, notwithstanding the difficulty of furnishing contradictory 
 evidence, and notwithstanding the diminished credit to which his 
 testimony may be entitled as coming from the mouth of an in- 
 terested party .^ Some courts, however, hold that, where a 
 party takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf in civil and 
 criminal cases, it is incompetent for him to testify as to an un- 
 communicated opinion, belief or motive on which he acted.** It 
 is clear that " a party cannot be allowed to testify to his undis- 
 
 1 Greer 17. State, 53 Ind. 420. Corning, 60 N. H. 418; McKown v. 
 
 2 White V. State, 53 Ind. 595. Hunter, 30 N. ¥.025; Starin v. Kelly, 
 
 3 Watkins v. Wallace, 19 Micli. 57, 88 N. Y. 318; Griffin v. Marquardt, 
 76. 21 N. Y. 121; Forbes v. AValler, 25 
 
 * Tliacher v. Pliiuuey, 7 Allen N. Y. 430; also. City of Columbus t;. 
 (Mass.), 146. , Dalin, 36 Ind. 330, where some au- 
 
 * CortlaudtCo. v. Herkimer Co., 44 thorities on this point were quoted, 
 N.Y. 22. but the point left undecided. 
 
 6 Kerrains v. People, 60 N. Y. 221; s Whizenant v. State, 71 Ala. 383; 
 
 People V. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340. Ford v. State, Id. 385; McCormick v. 
 
 ■f Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N. Y. 567; Joseph, 77 Ala. 236; Stewart v. State, 78 
 
 Kerrains v. People, supra; Homans v Ala. 436; Ball v. Farley, 1 South. Rep.
 
 346 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 dosed intent, in order to alter the effect of that which was matter 
 of contract, representation, or estoppel, on which the other party 
 had a right to rely." ^ 
 
 § 384. Rule where the Coucurreiiee of Intent of two Parties 
 is Material. — It is said that, where it is material to show the 
 concurrence of two parties in the same intent, evidence of the 
 intent of one party alone cannot prevail.^ But this will not nec- 
 essarily render it improper to prove the intent of each party. ^ 
 Thus, upon the question of the delivery and acceptance of chat- 
 tels under a contract of sale, the intent characterizes the act, and 
 the intention with which the act is done becomes material ; * and 
 therefore, under the above rule, each party may testify to his 
 intention in doino- what was done.^ This rule is not inconsistent 
 with another rule, which conclusively ascribes a certain intent to 
 a given act, which the law does in many cases, in which case the 
 party will be precluded from asserting, at least in civil cases, an 
 intent contrary to the act which he did." Where the concurring 
 intent of two parties must be shown, — as in an illegal agree- 
 ment, — the intent of each may be shown by independent evi- 
 dence, and evidence which shows the intent of one is not incorn- 
 petent because it does not also show the intent of the other. ^ 
 
 § 385. Fullness of Witness' Statement. — Either party is 
 entitled, if he insists upon it, to have the witnesses state fully all 
 
 (Ala.) 253, 259; s. c. 81 Ala. 288; Bal- (N. Y.), 158; Waiigh v. Fielding, 48 N. 
 
 lard V. Lockwood, I Daly (N. Y.), 158; Y. (i81. 
 
 Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 51 Ala. 2 Hale v. Taylor, 45 N. H. 405; 
 
 172; Baker v. Trotter, 73 Ala. 277, Murray v. Betliuue, 1 Weud. (N. Y.) 
 
 281; Sledge v. Scott, 5(; Ala. 202. 191; compare Rich v. Jackway, 18 
 
 lu Georgia the doctrine obtains that, Barb. (N. Y.) 357. 
 
 although the intention with which an ^ Hale v. Taylor, supra; Blake v. 
 
 actwas doueora contract made may be White, 13 N. 11. 272. 
 
 a material subject of inquiry, it is not •* Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246, 
 
 competent for a witness to testify as 253. 
 
 to what the iuteutiou was. Green v. ^ Hale v. Taylor, 45 N. II. 405. 
 
 Akers, 55 Ga. 159. •' 1 Smith L. C. 531. Compare Hib- 
 
 1 Abb. Tr. Brief, 93; citing Dillon bard v. llussell, 16 N. H. 410, 417. 
 V. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; Craighead ' Abb. Tr. Ev. 739 n. 5; Yerkes v, 
 
 V. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279; s. c. 28 Am. Salomau, 11 liuu (N. Y.), 47' 
 Hep. 150; Ballard v-. Lockwood 1 Daly
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XY.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 347 
 
 the details in respect of which he is interrogated. The court 
 cannot properly limit the direct examination to a general state- 
 ment, — such as, whether the witness has heard the testimony of 
 a preceding witness and concurs therein. ^ But the party calling 
 the witness is not obliged to enter into the details. He may ask 
 his witness a general question and elicit a general answer thereto, 
 and then leave his opponent to supply the details, if he shall de- 
 sire, by a cross-examination.- So, in a criminal trial, if there is 
 no objection, it is not an abuse of discretion for the judge to 
 allow a Avitness to answer the general question, whether the wit- 
 ness has seen the defendant play at a game charged in the indict- 
 ment at any time within twelve months, etc.^ It has been held 
 that a witness cannot be asked whether the facts stated in a par- 
 ticular paper are true: he should be interrogated as to those facts 
 particularly.* 
 
 § 386. Sufficient that the Evidence tends to Prove. — It is 
 
 sufficient, in order to make a question relevant, that the answer 
 which it seeks to elicit will tend in some sensible degree to prove 
 or disprove the fact in issue. It is not necessary that the 
 answer, if believed, should in itself afford complete proof. It 
 may be corroborative testimony merely, or a single link in a chain 
 of circumstances, or a single fad in a collection of facts, neither 
 of which is sufficient in itself, but all of which, when taken col- 
 lectively, may be of sufficient probative force to carry conviction, 
 to the minds of the jurors. If, therefore, the answer to a ques- 
 tion may tend to prove, or may form iiart of the proof of the 
 matters alleged, though not wholly sufficient to prove them, 
 the question may be asked. ^ In technical strictness the word 
 ^^ issue," when used with reference to pleadings, signifies the 
 disputed point or question.^ It is said that by the term " rele- 
 vancy," we do not mean that the evidence shall be addressed 
 
 1 Eames v. Eames, 41 N. H. 177. ^ Eichardsou v. Golden, 3 Wash 
 
 2 Ayrault v. Chamberlaiu, 33 Barb. (U. S.) 100. 
 
 (N. Y.) 229. 5 SchiR'hardt v. Aliens, 1 Wall. 
 
 * Orr V. State, 15 Ark. 540. (U. S.) 359. 
 
 <5 Steph. PI. 25.
 
 348 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tl"., 
 
 with, positive directness to the disputed point, but we mean evi- 
 dence which, according to the common course of events, " either 
 taken by itself or in connection with tlie testimony, proves, or 
 renders probable the past, present or future existence or non- 
 existence of the other. 1 "It is not necessary," continue the 
 Indiana court, "that the fact offered in evidence should bear 
 immediately and directly on the main issue; for, again to quote 
 from Stephen, 'facts which, though not in issue are so connected 
 with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction or 
 subject matter, are relevant to the fact with which they are so 
 connected.' "^ Dr. Wharton defines relevancy as being that 
 which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis. ^ 
 
 § 387. Substance of Conversation or Admission. — While a 
 witness testifying to declarations, conversations or admissions, 
 should give, if possible, the exact words used, yet a general answer 
 embodying the substance or purport of the declarations, conver- 
 sations or admissions, is not objectionable where that is all that 
 the witness can remember.* But it has been held that the rule is 
 not satisfied with a statement of anything else thtui the substance 
 of the language which was employed, and does not permit the 
 witness to state merely his conclusion from the testimony. 
 Thus, where, eight years after an alleged conversation, a witness 
 in a case in chancery testified concerning the party, "that he 
 fully admitted his liability on the note," — it was held that this 
 was a mere conclusion, and hence inadmissible.^ On the other 
 hand, it has been held that, where a witness is unable to state 
 what a conversation was, it is improper to refuse to allow him 
 to state the impression which the conversation made on his 
 mind.^ 
 
 1 Steph. Ev., art. 1; Bent. Ev. ^ Helm v. Cautroll, 59 111. 525, 531. 
 257, n; Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430, ^ AVilder v. Peabody, 21 Huu 
 488. (N. Y.) 37(;; ante, § 37(i. But see 
 
 2 Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430, 438; Miles v. Eoberts, 34 N. H. 245, which 
 citing Stephen's Ev., art. 3. supports the view that a witness may 
 
 3 1 Whart. Ev., § 20. state what he understood to be the <?/- 
 
 4 Chambers v. Hill, 34 Mich. 523; /eci of a conversation. 
 Kittredge v. Russell, 114 Mass. (!7.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 349 
 
 § 388. Rule where a Witness Remembers a Part only of 
 the Conversation. — The fact that the witness remembers only 
 a part of the conversation does not render the rest incompetent. 
 Although it is a rule of evidence that, where testimony of a con- 
 fession of the accused person is given the whole of what he said 
 must be detailed, and the State will not be allowed to extract a 
 part of it and detail that to the jury only ; ^ yet where there is 
 no attempt on the part of the State to violate this rule, the fact 
 that the State's witness is not able to remember all the conversa- 
 tion between himself and the prisoner, but details it so far as he 
 can remember it, does not aiford ground for striking out and ex- 
 cluding what he does remember and detail. ^ 
 
 § 389. Source of Information or Belief must be given. — 
 
 Where a question calls for the knowledge of the witness with 
 reference to a particular fact or transaction, and the- witness, 
 instead of answering the question directly, details that he found 
 out certain facts, his answer is correctly excluded, unless he gives 
 the source of his information.^ 
 
 § 390. Compound Qviestions when not Admissible. — Where 
 a compound question is propounded to a witness, part of which 
 is/admissible and part inadmissible, it is rightfully excluded as a 
 whole.* 
 
 § 391. Negative Testimony when too Remote. — A witness 
 cannot, on principle, be allowed to testify that he was not cog- 
 nizant of a fact, unless he lays n, foundation for so testifying, by 
 saying that he was in a position in which he would have been 
 cognizant of the fact if it had taken place. Thus, a witness hav- 
 ing testified to a material conversation in the family of a deceased 
 person, it was held not competent, for the pur})ose of contradict- 
 ing him, to call a neighbor to testify merely that he had never 
 
 1 1 Greeul. Ev., § 218 ; Coon v. State, s Rosenthal v. Mickllebrook, 63 Tex. 
 13 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 240, 250; 334, 336. 
 
 Brown's Case, 9 Leigh (Va.), 6;U. •* -Wy^an v. Gould, 47 Me. 159; 
 
 2 Wright V. State, 35 Ark. 640, George v. Norris, 23 Ark. 121; White- 
 654. ford v. Burckraeyer, 1 Gill (Md.), 127.
 
 350 EX>AMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOlUp. Tr., 
 
 heard such a conversatioii in the family. Such negative testi- 
 mony has no legal value. ^ 
 
 § 392. Putting the Testimony of two Witnesses together. — 
 
 There is authorit}^ for the conclusion that a fact may be proved 
 by putting the testimony of two witnesses together. Thus, if 
 one witness knew the fact at the time and told it to the other, 
 and then forgot it, but the other remembers it as the former 
 told it, and the former is able to testify that he told it correctly, 
 the latter may detail it to the jury as the former told it to him.^ 
 In like manner, where the plaintiff testified that he made entries 
 in accordance with statements made to him by other witnesses, 
 the latter testified that such statements were true, — the evi- 
 dence was held to be admissible.^ 
 
 § 393. Rule as to the Declarations of Conspirators. — It is 
 
 a well established rule that, where several persons are proved to 
 have combined together for the same illegal or fraudulent pur- 
 pose, any act done by one of the party in pursuance of the orig- 
 inal concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, 
 in contemplation of law, the act of the whole party. It follows 
 as a corollary from this rule, that any acts or verbal expressions, 
 being acts in themselves, or accompanying and explaining other 
 acts, in furtherance of the common design, and for this reason 
 part of the res gestoe, which are brought home to one conspira- 
 tor, are evidence against the other conspirators, provided it suffi- 
 ciently appear that they were made and used in furtherance of 
 the common purposes of the conspiracy. But, on obvious 
 grounds, before one party can be bound by the declarations of 
 
 1 Chambers v. Hill, 34 Mich. 523. the plaintiff. The i)laintiff was then 
 
 2 Thus, oil the trial of au action for called and allowed, against objectiou, 
 breach of a contract in reference to to state that the number of loads 
 gathering hay, the question in issue given him by the previous witness was 
 was the uuml)er of loads of hay which fourteen. It was held that the evi- 
 had been delivered at a particular deuce was adnussible. Shear v. Van 
 time. A witness stated that he could Dyke, 10 llun (N. Y.), 528. 
 
 not remember the number, but that he ^ Payne v. llodge, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 
 
 knew it at the time and then told it to 612.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XV.] INCIDENTS OF DIRECT EXAMINATION. 351 
 
 another party on the ground that the two are co-conspirators, the 
 fact of the conspiracy must be shown, and then the declarations 
 must appear to have been made in furtherance of the common 
 design. Reguhxrl}^ proof of the plot or combination must j9re- 
 cede the proof of the declarations : but this is a matter which 
 yields to the sound discretion of the trial court. In ordier to 
 make such evidence admissible, it must be shown that the con- 
 spiracy or combination was entered into before the declaration 
 was made, though the conduct, acts and declarations of the sep- 
 arate individuals, in the planning or the execution of the joint 
 scheme, may be shown as evidence of the common design. If 
 admissible, the acts and declarations must be those only which 
 were done and made during the pendency of the wrongful enter- 
 prise, shown to have been undertaken jointly and in furtherance 
 of its objects.^ The preliminary question of the existence of 
 such a common purpose must be passed on by the court, for the 
 purpose of deciding on the admissibility of the evidence of such 
 acts and declarations. The question of the probative value of the 
 acts and declarations is ultimately to be decided by the jury.^ 
 
 1 Page -y. Parker, 40 N. H. 47,62. See have been laid by evidence sufficient 
 
 also People v. Parish, 4 Denio (X. Y.), to establish the fact of the conspiracy 
 
 153; Williamson v. Com., 4 Graft. to the satisfaction of the court, or at 
 
 (Va.) 547; State u. Simons, 4 Strobh. least by evidence reasonably tending 
 
 L. (S. C.) 206; Reg. v. Mears, l.Eng. to establish it, before such declara- 
 
 L. & Eq. 581 ; State v. Ripley, 31 Me. tion's can be admitted. Sometimes, 
 
 386; Glory v. State, 13 Ark. 236; Ap- however, the court may, in its discre- 
 
 thorp u. Comstock, 2 Paige (N. Y.), tion, -an^er peculiar undi urgent circum- 
 
 482,488; Craige i?. Sprague, 12 Wend. stances, let such declarations go to 
 
 (N. Y.)41; Willes V. Farley, 3 Carr. the jury before sufficient proof is 
 
 & P. 395; Patten v. Gurney, 17 Mass. given of the conspiracy, the State un- 
 
 182; Lovell v. Briggs, 2 N. H. 218; dertaking to supply such proof after- 
 
 Sheple ■y.Page, 12 Vt. 519; Talbot v. wards. Lawson v. State, 32 Ark. 220; 
 
 Cains, 5 Met. (Mass.) 520; Brannock 1 Greeul. Ev., § 111. 
 . Bouldin, 5 Ir^d. L. (N. C.) 61. But, - Cora. v. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 as a general rule, a foundation must 419,432.
 
 352 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 OF THE USE BY WITNESSES OF MEMORANDA TO REFRESH RECOL- 
 LECTION. 
 
 Section 
 
 398. Statement of the General Rule by Prof. Greenleaf . 
 
 399. By Whom Made. 
 
 400. Time when Made. 
 
 401. How Made — May Consist of what. 
 
 (1.) Stenographic Writings. 
 
 (2.) Copies. 
 
 (3.) Previous Testimony, Deposition or Affidavit of the same Witness. 
 
 (4.) Books of Account, Bills of Particulars, etc. 
 
 (5.) Newspaper Report made by Witness. 
 
 402. How Used at the Trial. 
 
 (1.) Not Necessary that the Witness Should have an Independent 
 
 Recollection of the Fact. ♦ 
 (2.) Right of the Other Party to Inspect the Document. 
 (3.) Manner in which Memorandum Used by Witness. 
 (4.) Whether Memorandum can be Put in Evidence. 
 
 § 398. Statement of tlie General Rule by Prof. Green- 
 leaf. — Prof. Greenleaf s statement of the general rule has been 
 so often quoted with approval by the judicial courts, that the 
 writer takes the liberty of reproducing it here: " Though a wit- 
 ness can testify only to such facts as are within his own knowl- 
 edge and recollection, yet he is permitted to refresh and assist 
 his memory, by the use of a written instrument, memorandum, 
 or entry in a book, and maybe compelled to do so, if the writing 
 is present in court. It does not seem to be necessary that the 
 writing should have been made by the witness himself, nor that 
 it should be an original writing, provided, after inspecting it, he 
 can speak to the facts from his own recollection. So also where 
 the witness recollects that he saw the paper while the facts were 
 fresh in his memory, and remembers that he then knew that the 
 particulars therein mentioned were correctly stated. And it is 
 not necessary that the writing thus used to refresh the memory
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVI.] U«E OF MEMORANDA. 353 
 
 should itself be admissible in evidence ; for if inadmissible in 
 itself, as for want of a stamp, it may still be referred to by 
 the witness. But where the witness neither recollects the fact, 
 nor remembers to have recognized the written statement as true, 
 and the writing was not made by him, his testimony, so far as it 
 is founded upon the written paper, is but hearsay; and a witness 
 can no more be permitted to give evidence of his inference from 
 Avhat a third person has written, than from what a third person 
 has said." ^ The rule is applicable to criminal as well as to 
 civil cases. A witness called by the prosecution in a criminal 
 case to prove statements made by the defendant, may, while on 
 the stand, refresh his recollection by referring to a written mem- 
 orandum made by him at the time of making such statements or 
 soon after. 2 
 
 § 399. Bj' Whom Made. — In conformity with the above 
 text of Greenleaf , the prevailing, though not universal ^ view now 
 is, that it is not necessary that the memorandum which a witness 
 may use to refresh his recollection, should have been made by 
 the witness himself, i)rovided that, after reading it he can speak 
 to the facts from his recollection,* or can swear positively to 
 them from the memorandum,' and provided also it is used for the 
 sole purpose of refreshing his recollection, and not for the pur- 
 pose of acquiring original information.'^ It is, therefore, scarce- 
 
 » 1 Greenl Ev.,§ 43G. The follow- •* Berry v. Jourclau, 11 Eich. L. (S- 
 
 ing, among other authorities, are in C.) 67; Davis v. Field, 56 Vt. 42(;, 
 
 .substantial support of the text. Fol- 428; Com. v. Ford, 130 Mass. 64; Huff 
 
 som t>. Apple River Log Driving Co., v. Benuett, 6 N. Y. 337; Henry v. Lee, 
 
 47 "Wis. (;02 (where the text is quoted 18 Eng. C. L. 273 (2 Chit. Rep. 124) ; 1 
 
 with approval); Huff v. Benuett, 6 Whart. Ev., §516; State v. Lull, 37 
 
 X. Y. 337; Howlaud v. Sheriff, 5Saudf. Me. 246. 
 
 (X. Y.)21!); Harrison r. Middletou, 11 » Martin v. Good, 14 Md. 398; Cof- 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 527; Talbot t\ Cusack, 17 fin v. Vincent, 12 Ciish. (Mass.) 98; 
 
 Ir. L. (x.s.) 216; Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Hill w. State, 17 Wis. 675. Compare 
 
 Adler, 56 HI. 344; Mead v. McGraw, 19 McCormicku. Mulvihill, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 
 
 Oh. St. 55. 131. 
 
 2 Peoples. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166. e j^rie Preserving Co. v. Miller, 52 
 
 s See, for instance, Stater. Rhodes, Conn. 444; Jaques r. Horton, 76 Ala. 
 
 I Houst. (^Del.) Crim. Cas. 476, 480. 239, 243. 
 
 23
 
 354 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 \y necessary to say that, where a witness swears that he has a 
 complete recollection of the facts, it makes no difference that 
 the memoranda which he uses to refresh his memory are not his 
 own notes. ^ Thus, a sur2:;eon may use for this purpose the 7-ec- 
 ord of a hospital, although not made by him, provided he speaks 
 from his own recollection.^ 
 
 § 400. Time When Made. — Professor Greenleaf says: "It 
 is most frequently said that the writing must have been made at 
 the time of the fact in question, or recently afterwards. At the 
 farthest it ought to have been made before such a period of time 
 has elapsed as to render it probable that the memory of the wit- 
 ness might have become deficient. But the practice in this respect 
 is governed very much by the circumstances of the particular 
 case." ^ The memorandum must have been reduced to writing at, 
 or shortly after, the transaction, and while the transaction must 
 have been fresh in the memory of the witness. It must have been 
 " presently committed to writing," * " while the occurrences men- 
 tioned in it were recent and fresh in his recollection;" ^ " written 
 contemporaneously, with the transaction,"® "or contemporaneous- 
 ly or nearly so, with the facts deposed to." ^ Where the witness 
 uses a copy of his memorandum for the purpose of refreshing his 
 memory, it is immaterial when the copy was made, if it suiEc- 
 
 1 Camerou v. Blackman, 39 Mich. Chapiu, 97 Mass. 72, 77; Spriug Gar- 
 108. den lus. Co. v. Evans, 15 Md. 54; 
 
 2 State V. Collins, 15 S. C. 373; s. c. Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wlieat. (U. S.) 
 40 Am.Kep. 697. 326, 337; Ins. Co. v. Weide, 9 Wall. 
 
 3 1 Greenl. Ev., § 438. 667 and 14 Wall. 375; Chaffee v. U. S., 
 
 4 Lord Holt in Sandwell v. Sand- 18 Wall. 516. Instances: Two xveeks, 
 well, Comb. 445; s. c. Holt, 295. too long. O'Neale v. Walton, 1 Rich. L. 
 
 s Lord Ellenborongh in Burrough (S. C.) 234. So, under circumstances, 
 
 V. Martin, 2 Camp. 112. the next day. Ballard v. Ballard, 
 
 6 Tindal, C. J., in Steinkeller v. 5 Rich. L. 495. So, of sixteen months. 
 
 Newton, 9 Carr. & P. 313. Swartz v. Chickering, 58 Md. 291, 298. 
 
 ^ Wilde, C. J., in Whitfield «. Aland, So, of a memorandum made five moJiths 
 
 2 Carr. & K. 1015. To the same effect after the transaction at the request of 
 
 see Burton v. Plummer, 2 Ad. & El. a party. Spriug &c., Ins. Co. v. Evans, 
 
 341; s. c. 4 Nev. & Man. 315; Wood v. 75 Md. 54. 
 Cooper, 1 Carr. & K. 645; Morrison v.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVI.] USE OF MEMORANDA. 355 
 
 iently appear that it is a correct copy.^ It is said that in re- 
 spect of the time wheu a memorandum was made, much must be 
 left to the discretion of the trial court, who sees the witness and 
 hears him testify. Accordingly, where the witness said that he 
 made the memorandum within a month or so, but that he re- 
 membered it until he wrote it down, it was held that there was 
 no error in allowing him to use it to refresh his recollection. 
 The court said: " The witness having testified that he remem- 
 bered the items of labor when he wrote them down, the lapse of 
 time was not such, considering the nature of the account, as to 
 forbid the court, in the exercise of its discretion, allowing the 
 witness to use the account to refresh his memory." ^ "The 
 reasons," said Mr. Justice Gray, " for limiting the time within 
 which the memorandum must have been made are, to say the 
 least, quite as strong when the witness, after reading it, has no 
 recollection of the facts stated in it, but testifies to the truth of 
 those facts only because of his confidence that he must have 
 known them to be true when he signed the memorandum." ^ 
 
 § 401. How Made — May Consist of What. — ( 1 . ) 8teno- 
 grapliic Writings. — It seems to be no objection that the memo- 
 randum used by a witness to refresh his memory, if written by 
 himself, is in characters which he alone can read. This o})inion 
 was held in a case where the memorandum was written in pho- 
 nographic characters peculiar to the witness.* 
 
 (2.) Copies. — It is not necessary that the writing used for 
 this purpose should be an original writing, but a copy taken by 
 the witness may be used, provided that, after inspecting the 
 copy the witness can speak to the facts from his recollection.^ 
 " The rule is subject to the limitation, that the witness must be 
 
 1 Lawson v. Glass, C Colo. 134. McC. (S. C.) 331; O'Neale v. Walton, 
 
 2 Ibid. 1 Rich. L'. (S. C.) 234. 
 
 * Maxwell v. Wilkinson, 113 U. S. * gtate v. Cardoza, 11 S. C. 195,238. 
 
 6ofi, 658; citing Halsey u. Sinsebaugh, ^ Lawson v. Glass, 6 Colo. 134; 
 
 15 N. Y. 485; Marcly v. Shults, 29 Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238,244; 
 
 N.Y. 346,355; State ». Rawls, 2Nott & Berry v. Jourdan, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 67.
 
 356 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 able to testify that the original entry, when made, was a true 
 statement of the facts, and the copy must be verified."^ A 
 clerk may also use for this purpose copies of papers on file in his 
 office, which relate to the business which passes under his super- 
 vision. ^ 
 
 (3.) Previous Testimony^ Deposition or Affidavit of the Same 
 Witness. — There is a difference of o})inion whether the previous 
 deposition, testimony, or affidavit of a witness can be used by him 
 for the purpose of refreshing his memory. In one jurisdiction 
 the deposition of a witness, previously made by him, may be so 
 used,*^ and it is not error to allow a witness, on a criminal trial, 
 to refresh his memory by reference to the minutes of his testi- 
 mony given before the grand jury, although the minutes are not 
 in his handwriting.* In another jurisdiction, it is ruled that a 
 witness in a criminal trial may, for the purpose of refreshing his 
 memory as to certain dates, be permitted to read over the min- 
 utes of his testimony as given on the preliminary examination be- 
 fore a mao'istrate, where, after so refreshing his memory, he tes- 
 tifies from memory to the facts.^ These rulings conform to the 
 view above stated,^ that it is not necessary that the memorandum 
 should have been made by the witness himself. But, if they are 
 sound in principle, what becomes of the rule that the memoran- 
 dum should be made at, or near the time of the transaction to 
 which the testimony relates? It is believed that they are un- 
 sound in principle, and that the true view is that taken in Penn- 
 sylvania, that a party cannot refresh the memory of his own 
 witness by reading to him notes of testimony given by him in 
 
 1 Calloway v. Varner, cited in ney v. Ball, 24:Ga. 505; Beaubien v. 
 Jaques v. Ilorton, 76 Ala. 244. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 469. 
 
 2 Erie Preserving Co. v. Miller, 52 ^ State v. Miller, 53 la. 1.54. Corn- 
 Conn. 444, 446; s. c. 52 Am. Kep. G07. pare Com. w. Phelps, 11 Gray (Mass.), 
 Use of copy of defaced copy of defaced 73. 
 
 original permitted: Folsom v. Apple ^ White v. State, 18 Tex. App. 57, 
 
 Rivei &c. Co., 41 Wis. 602, 606. 62. See also. Hubby v. State, 8 Tex 
 
 3 Hull V. Alexander, 26 la. 569. App. 597. 
 
 See Atkin v. State, 16 Ark. 568; Bur- ^ Ante, § 399.
 
 Til. ill, Ch. XVI.] USE OF MEMORANDA. ' 357 
 
 a former proceeding, touching the same subject-matter;^ though 
 in that State the rule seems to be otherwise in a case of a witness, 
 who, since the former trial, has lost his health and memory.'' 
 But the mere fact that a witness fails to recollect what he had 
 previously sworn to, where he has not, by reason of old age or 
 otherwise, lost his memory, will not be sufficient to admit the 
 notes of a former trial. The court said : " He probably failed to 
 recollect what he had previously sworn to, but if this were enough 
 to admit the notes of the former trial, we might as well abandon 
 original testimony altogether, and supply it with previous notes 
 and depositions. It would certainly be an excellent way to 
 avoid the contradiction of a doubtful witness, for he could al- 
 ways be thus led to the exact words of his former evidence. As 
 we are not yet prepared for an advance of this kind, we must 
 accept the ruling of the court below as correct." "^ On the same 
 view it has been held that an affidavit, made by the witness 
 some three years after the occurrence of the transaction in ques- 
 tion, and shortly before the trial, at the request of the defend- 
 ant's counsel, could not be so used by the witness, since it 
 " would be calculated to stimulate his courage rather than his 
 veracity." The court said: " We think the practice of procur- 
 ing such papers, and then using them, ostensibly for the purpose 
 of refreshing the recollection of a witness who appears to be ad- 
 verse, but reallj^ to intimidate him, ought not to be encouraged 
 or sanctioned. The proper course is to examine the witness in 
 the usual way, and, if his testimony be in contradiction of writ- 
 ten statements previously made by him, to interrogate him re- 
 specting the latter, for the purpose of probing his recollection, 
 and of obtaining an explanation of his inconsistency." * But 
 where a witness is cross-examined as to his testimony in a previ- 
 ous deposition, there is no good reason wdiy he should not be al- 
 lowed to refresh his memory by looking at the deposition.^ 
 
 1 Velott V. Lewis, 102 Pa. St, 326. * Honstiue v. O'Donnell, 5 Hun, 
 
 See also Brown I'. State, 28 Ga. 199. 472; citiiii:; Bullard v. Tearsall, .53 
 
 2Rotlirock I'. Gallaher, 91 Pa. 108. N.Y. 230. Compare Harvey i'. State, 40 
 
 8 Velott V. Lewis, 102 Pa. St. 326, lud. 516. 
 333, opiuion by Gordon, J. ^ George v. .Joy, 19 N. H. 544.
 
 358 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 (4.) Books of Account^ Bills of Particulars, etc. — This 
 question must be kept distinct from the question under what cir- 
 cumstances books of account, shown to have been correctly kept, 
 are admissible as original evidence. On grounds already sug- 
 gested, books of account kept by the witness, or known by him 
 to be correct, may be used by him as memoranda for the purpose 
 of refreshing his recollection. ^ Thus, an invoice book, known by 
 the witness to be in the plaintiff 's handwriting, the witness hav- 
 ing been present when it was made, and it being correct so far 
 as the witness knows, has been held such a memorandum as the 
 witness might look to, for the purpose of refreshing his memory 
 as to the character of the goods mentioned therein and their 
 value. 2 So, where the question relates to the nature and value 
 of property sold at an administrator's sale, it is competent for a 
 witness to refresh his memory from an account of the sales kept 
 by himself, and also to read the terms of the sale as they were 
 read just before the sale commenced.^ So, where the question 
 was w^hether or not the defendant had deposited $1,000 with the 
 plaintiff 's bank on a given date and an offer was made to show 
 that he had deposited the amount in another bank on that date, 
 and that the entry had been made by the teller of such other bank 
 in the wrong pass-book, that is to say, in the pass-book which 
 contained the entries of the plaintiff 's bank, and the book-keeper 
 of such other bank was prepared to testify from an inspection of 
 his daily figuring book, made in course of business at the time, — 
 it was held that the testimony should have been received, whether 
 the books were admissible or not.* So, in a criminal trial the 
 prisoner was time-keeper, and the witness was pay-clerk, of a 
 colliery. The prisoner gave a time-list to a clerk, who entered 
 
 MVhite V. Tucker, 9 Iowa, 100; 42(1; Reed i'. Jones, 15 Wis. 40; Schet- 
 
 Flower V. Downs, 6 La. Ann. 539; tier ?;. Jones 20 Wis. 412. 
 Davidson v. Lallaude, 12 La. Ann. 820 ; 2 Miller v. Jannett, 63 Tex. 82. So 
 
 Sacliett V. Spencer, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) as to the invoices themselves, received 
 
 180; Columbia tJ. Harrison, 2 Treadw. with the goods by a /actor. Bartlett 
 
 (S. C.) 213; Treadwell V. Wells, 4 Cal. v. Hoyt, 33 N. H. 151. 
 260; Chiapella v. Brown, 14 La. Ann. ^ Cowles v. Hayes, 71 N. C. 230. 
 
 189; Mussey v. Hackett, 12 Id. 54; ^ Lawrence v. Stiles, 16 Bradw. 
 
 Jones V. Johns, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S) (111.) 489. 
 
 A
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVI.] USE OF MEMORAJfDA. 359 
 
 it in the time-book, and on pay-day the prisoner read from the 
 time-book the number of days each man had worked to the wit- 
 ness, who paid accordingly and who saw the entries of that time. 
 It was held that, for the purpose of proving these payments, the 
 witness might refresh his recollection by referring to the time- 
 book.^ For this pur})ose a witness may use a book kept by an- 
 other clerk, if, from his connection with the business, he knows 
 that the entries are correct, and testities therefrom according to 
 his own recollection.- So, a plaintiff testifying in his own be- 
 half, may refresh his recollection, where he kuDws the facts, by 
 reading from his bill of particulars, when that is a duplicate of 
 the account rendered on which he sues, even though it was kept 
 by his clerk from entries in his book, as to which the witness 
 cannot say, wdthout seeing them, wdiether or not he made them 
 himself ."^ So, in a suit to recover the pay for boarding a lot of 
 workmen, the plaintiff in his testimony referred to the bill of 
 particulars made out by another person under his direction, and 
 testified that he knew it to be correct. He testified from recol- 
 lection to the number of men boarded, the rate per week at which 
 they w'ere boarded, and the aggregate amount due therefor. It 
 was held that it was proper to allow him to refer to this account, 
 although he could not give the name of each man who boarded 
 with him.* And where a bill of particulars contains many items, 
 so that no person could be expected to remember them or to state 
 them in detail without the aid of some memorandum made by 
 himself or under his direction, it is discretionary to allow the 
 witness to take the bill of particulars for the purpose of answer- 
 ing the question whether or not it contains a correct list.^ It is 
 sometimes admissible to permit a witness to refresh his memory 
 by his books of account, although such books do not contain the 
 original entries. The fact, however, that books of original en- 
 tries have been lost or destroyed is ordinarily a suspicious cir- 
 cumstance proper to be considered by the jury.^ Where the 
 
 1 Reg. r. Laiigton, 2 Q. B. Div. 206. * Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Liddell, 69 
 
 2 Interuatioual &c. R. Co. v. Blan- 111. 639. 
 
 ton, 63 Tex. 109. ^ Cool v. Suover, 38 Mich. 562. 
 
 3 Iluduutt V. Comstocli, 50 Mich. ^ Murray v. Cuuuiugham, 10 Neb. 
 596,601. 167.
 
 360 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 question was whether a party was a resident of the State at a 
 partieuhir date, and a witness was testifying, who made the tax- 
 list, and who had signed and sworn to it, it was held that he 
 might use it as a memorandum to refresh his recollection.^ 
 Whether the writing be used merely as an instrument for restor- 
 ing the recollection of a fact, or be offered to be read as contain- 
 ing a true account of transactions entirely forgotten, it must, in 
 conformity with the general principles of evidence, be the best 
 evidence for the purpose that the case admits of.^ When, 
 therefore, the subject of the testimony is what took place at an 
 interview between a person and the reporter of a newspaper, the 
 reporter's notes of the interview, if in existence, would be the ' 
 proper memoranda to be used by the witness in refreshing his 
 recollection. But where the reporter testified that his notes of 
 such an interview had been destroyed, and that he had read the 
 published account of the interview printed from his minutes, had 
 compared it mentally with his minutes and had found it to be 
 correct, it was held that the printed article was the best evidence 
 that the case admitted of, and that it might be used by the re- . 
 porter, testifying as a witness, for the purpose of refreshing his 
 memory as to what took place at the interview.^ But where it is 
 sought to introduce the newspaper article itself as evidence, and 
 not to allow a witness to use it for the purpose of refreshing his 
 memory, the rule is said to be that it would be material to show, 
 as a foundation for the introduction of the article, that the orig- 
 inal manuscript from which it had been printed had been lost.* 
 
 (5.) JSTewspaper Report made by Witness. — A newspaper re- 
 porter, testifying as a witness, may be permitted, for this pur- 
 pose, to look at a newspaper report of the transaction made by 
 him at the time, although the absence of his written report, 
 
 1 Davis «. Field, 56 Vt, 426. Railroad Co. v. Addler, 56 111. 344; 
 
 2 1 Stark Ev. 178. Strader v. Snyder, 67 111. 404; Adams 
 
 3 Clifford V.Drake, 14 Bradw. (111.) v. Kelly, Ry. & M. 157; Burton v. 
 75; s. c. affirmed, 110 111. 135. See Plummer, 2 Ad. & EL 341. 
 
 also Toiiliara v. McGregor, 1 Carr, & * Clifford v. Drake, 14 Bradw. (III.) 
 
 K. 320; Com. v. Ford, 130 Mass. 64; 75.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVI.] USE OF MEMORANDA. 361 
 
 from which the newspaper report was printed, is not accounted 
 for.i 
 
 § 402. How Used at the Trial. — (1.) Not Necessary that the 
 Witness Should have an Independent Recollection of the Fact. — 
 The old idea seems to have been that the use of the memoran- 
 dum by the witness was permitted strictly for the purpose of re- 
 freshing his previous recollection of the fact — revivifying it, so 
 to speak, — and that it was for the witness then to testify, from 
 his recollection, so refreshed, what the fact was.^ But this idea 
 seems to be pretty much exploded. At least, in several modern 
 jurisdictions, it is held that all that is required is that the witness 
 be able to swear that the memorandum is correct, although he 
 may have forgotten the facts themselvo*?.^ "There seems," 
 said Howell, J., " to be two classes of cases on this subject: 1. 
 Where the witness, by referring to the memorandum, has his 
 memory quickened and refreshed thereby, so that he is enabled 
 to swear to an actual recollection. 2. "Where the witness, after 
 referring to the memorandum, undertakes to swear to the fact, 
 yet, not because he remembers it, but because of his confidence 
 in the correctness of the memorandum. In both cases the oath 
 of the witness is the primary, substantive evidence relied upon. 
 In the former, the oath being grounded upon actual recollection, 
 and in the latter on the faith imposed in the verity of the memo- 
 randum, in wdiich case, in order to judge of the credibility of 
 the oath and the reliance to be placed upon the testimony of the 
 
 1 Com. V. Ford, 130 Mass. G4; s. c. 3 Davis v. Field, 5G Vt. 426, 428; 
 39 Am. Rep. 42<J. Downer v. Rowell, 24 Vt. 343; Halsey 
 
 2 Redden v. Spriiance, 4 Harr. v. Siuesbaiigli, 15 N. Y. 485; Russell 
 (Del.) 217; Key u. Lynn, 4 Litt. (Ky.) v. Hudson &c., R. Co., 17 N. Y. 134: 
 338; Harrison v. Middletou, 11 Gratt. State v. Colwell, 3 R. I. 132; O'Neale 
 (Va.) 527; Holmes v. Gayle, 1 Ala. v. Walton, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 234; 
 517; Vastbinder v. Metcalf, 3 Ala. Mattocks ». Lyman, 16 Vt. 113; Eby w. 
 100; Bank v. Brown, Dudley (Ga.), 69; Eby, 5 Pa. St. 435; State v. Rawls, 2 
 Huckins v. People's &c., Ins. Co., 31 Nott & McCord (S. C), 331. Well 
 N. H. 238; Clark v. State, 4 Ind. 156; illustrated, in the case of an old and 
 Calvert v. Fitzgerald, Litt. Sel. Cas. feeble witness, by Cooper v. State, 59 
 (Ky.) 388; Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Miss. 267, 272. 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 301; Owings v. Shan- 
 non, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 188. '
 
 362 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tf., 
 
 witness, the memorandum must be original, and contemporary, 
 and produced in court." ^ The idea upon whicli many modern 
 decisions unite is that it is sufficient if the witness is able to 
 swear that he knows, from the memorandum, that certain facts 
 are true, although, independently of the memorandum, he may 
 have no present recollection of them.^ The same idea is some- 
 times expressed by saying that the witness may, from his memo- 
 randum, testify to his supposition and belief of the fact which is 
 stated in the memorandum. Thus, a witness has been allowed 
 to testify to his supposition and belief as to the time when a 
 transaction took place, although he had no recollection as to 
 the time independently of the entry in his cash book.^ So, a 
 notary's belief that protest and notice were given, based on his 
 entry in his books, his habit being to make such entries on the 
 happening of the event, is evidence, though he has no recollec- 
 tion of the fact independently of his books.* The same rule is 
 applied when a surveyor uses his field book to refresh his memory.^ 
 So, where a witness was shown a receipt given for the payment 
 of money signed by himself, he was permitted to say that he had 
 no doubt that he received the money, although he had no recol- 
 lection of it, and this was held sufiicient parol evidence of the 
 payment.^ So, in regard to an attesting witness, it is not gen- 
 erally necessary that he should be able to recollect the circum- 
 stances attending his attestation, or the fact that he saw the 
 maker of the instrument sign it. It is enough, lyrima facie, if 
 he answers to his signature, and testifies that it would not have 
 been affixed to the instrument but for the purpose of attesta- 
 tion.^ But where a witness, testifying to transactions relating 
 
 1 Davis V. Field, 56 Vt. 42ii, 42!). 375; Reynolds Steph. Ev.,art. 130; I 
 
 2 State V. Ravvls, 2 Nott & McC. Greenl. Ev., § 437. 
 
 (S. C.) 331; Dugau v. Mahoney, 11 3 Mattocks v. Lymau, 16 Vt. 113. 
 
 Alk'ii (,Mass.), 572; Cowles v. State, ^ Davis v. Field, 56 Vt. 426, 428, per 
 
 50 Ala. 454; Wright v. Bolliug, 27 Ala. Rovvell, J. 
 
 259; Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549. ^ i Whart. Ev., § 518. 
 
 See also Rex v. Ramsdeu, 2 Carr. & ^ Maugham v. Hubbard, 8 Baru. & 
 
 P. 603; Guy v. Meail, 22 N. Y. 462; Cres. 14. 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Wcide, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 677; ' Alvord v. Collins, 20 Pick. 418; 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Weules, 14 Wall. (U. S.) Burling v. Patterson, 9 Carr. & P. 570; 
 
 1 Whart. Ev., §739.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XVI.] USE OF MEMORANDA. 363 
 
 to the sale and delivery of goods which were the subject of a 
 book account, said, " I have no present recollection of the trans- 
 action, and can only speak now of the amount by what I swore on 
 a former trial of this action," — it was held that his testimony was 
 properly rejected ; ^ the court reasoning, according to the old 
 idea, that the witness must testify from his recollection as thus 
 refreshed. If a document, made by the witness and containing 
 an account of the transaction about which he is called upon to 
 testify, is handed to him to refresh his memory, and he does not 
 need it for that purpose, no error will be committed by allowing 
 him to take the document. To place in his hands the memo- 
 randum, under such circumstances, is regarded as the doing of 
 an idle thing, which does not prejudice the party against whom 
 lie testifies.'^ 
 
 (2.) Rigid of the other Painty to Inspect the Document. — 
 Where a paper is handed to a witness in order to refresh his 
 memory, the other party has a right to inspect it for the purpose 
 of cross-examination, and it is error to deny this right. '^ But he 
 has only the right to inspect such parts of it as the witness consults 
 to aid his memory, or as relate to the subject of his testimony.* 
 And this rule seems to apply only in cases where the memorandum 
 is used by the witness in court ; it has been held that the memo- 
 randum itself need not be produced in court, but that notes taken 
 from it may be used.* Accordingly, where the superintendent 
 and house surgeon of a hospital, after having refreshed their 
 memories by the records of the hospital, testified, from their own 
 recollection, as to certain facts therein contained as to the ad- 
 mission of a patient into the hospital, etc., it was held that the 
 court committed no error in receiving this testimony without the 
 production of the books in open court. ^ A witness, it seems, 
 
 ' Howie V. Rea, 75 N. C. 326. Barb. 201; Com. v. Jeffs, 131 Mass. 5; 
 
 2 Chute V. State, 19 Minn. 271. Com. v. Haley, 13 Allen (Mass.), 587. 
 
 ^ Cliute V. State, 19 Minn. 271; Rex ^ Com. v. Haley, supra. 
 
 w. Ramsdeu, 2 Carr. & P. 603; Hardy's ^ Hamilton v. Rice, 15 Tex. 382; 
 
 Case, 24 How. St. Tr. 824; Merrill v. ante, § 401, subsec. 2. 
 
 Ry. Co., 16. Wend. 586, 600; 1 Greenl. « State v. Collins, 15 S. C. 373; s. c. 
 
 Ev., § 466; Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 40 Am. Rep. 697.
 
 364 EXA3IINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp, Tr.» 
 
 may refresh his memory from memoranda made by him in books, 
 without being required to produce the books ; ^ at most, the pro- 
 duction of them, if he has not been summoned to produce them, 
 will be a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. ^ 
 
 (3.) Manner in Which Memorandum Used by Witness. — A 
 witness may be required, in the discretion of the trial court, to 
 look at a memorandum or papers, for the purpose of aiding his 
 recollection.^ The manner in which a witness shall be allowed 
 to refresh his recollection, by referring to a writing, must be left 
 to some extent to the discretion of the presiding judge ; a discre- 
 tion to be exercised with reference to the circumstances of the 
 case, and sometimes it is presumed, with reference to the conduct 
 and bearing of the witness upon the stand.* Thus, it is within 
 the discretion of the court to refuse to require the witness to 
 examine all the memoranda before giving his testimony, and then 
 to lay them aside and not to refer to them again while testifying, 
 especially where they consist of numerous large books. ^ If the 
 witness cannot read and write, but has nevertheless made his 
 mark to a certain memorandum produced to refresh his recollec- 
 tion, it may not be read to the witness in the presence of the 
 jury, but the witness may be permitted to withdraw, with one of 
 the counsel on each side, and the paper may there be read over 
 to him without comment, after which he may testify from his 
 recollection as thus refreshed.'' 
 
 (4. ) Whether the Memorandum can he put in Evidence. — Up- 
 on this point it is difficult to state a uniform or satisfactory rule. 
 
 1 Trustees v. Bledsoe, 5 Iiul. 133; ^ Chapin v. Laphara, 20 Pick. 
 State V. Cheek, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) lU. (Mass.) 4(j7. 
 
 This ruling will not apply to hooks of ■* Johnson v. Coles, 21 Minn. 108, 
 
 account, which, on proof of their hav- 111. 
 
 ing been correctly kept, become, in ^ ii)icl. It is proper to allow wit- 
 some jurisdictions, original evidence, nesses to refer to a book of original 
 See Furmau v. Peay, 2 Bail. (S. C.) entries made by himself for the pur- 
 394; State v. Cardoza, 11 S. C. 195, pose of fixing dates. McCausland v. 
 239; Bank v. Zorn, 14 S. C. 444. Ralston, 12 Nev. 195. 
 
 2 Com. V. Lannan, 13 Allen (Mass.), « Com. v. Fox, 7 Gray (Mass.), 
 563. Contra, that the books must be 585. 
 
 produced : Hall v. Ray, 18 N. H. 126.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XVI.] USE OF MEMORANDA. 365 
 
 One idea admits the memorandum in evidence in connection with 
 the testimonj^of the witness.^ But the general rule seems to be, 
 that the fact that the recollection of the witness has been refreshed 
 by the use of a memorandum, so that he is able to testify to the 
 fact, does not entitle either party to put the memorandum in 
 evidence.^ On the other hand, it is held that, " if the witness, 
 after examining the memorandum, cannot state the facts from 
 independent recollection, but can testify that he knew the con- 
 tents of the memorandum at or about the time it was made, and 
 knew them to be true, both the memorandum and the testimony 
 of the witness are admissible.'*^ Or, negatively, the memoran- 
 dum itself is not admissible in evidence, except in cases where 
 the witness, at the time of testifying, has no recollection of what 
 took place, further than that he accurately reduced the whole 
 transaction to writing.* In other words, the entries or memo- 
 randa of transactions made by a witness are admissible only when 
 the memory of the witness is at fault. If he can refresh his 
 memory by an inspection of the writing, and then testify from 
 personal recollection, the written data will be excluded from evi- 
 dence.^ When, therefore, a witness had testified from his own 
 recollection to certain transactions in which he took part, e.g., 
 interviews between himself and the defendant, it was error to 
 admit in evidence a written memorandum of such transactions 
 kept by him, the entries in which were made at the time of the 
 transactions, for the purpose of corroborating his testimony.^ 
 As already seen,' it is the right of the opposite party to inspect 
 
 1 Watson V. Walker, 23 N. H. 471; 485; Russell v. Hudson River Co., 17 
 Webster v. Clark, SON. H. 245; Tattle N. Y. 134; Guy v. Mead, 22 N. Y. 462; 
 V. Robinson, 83 N. H. 104. Marcly v. Shultz, 23 X. Y. 346; Brown 
 
 2 Com. V. Jeffs., 132 Mass. 5; Field v. Jones, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 400; Driggs 
 V.Thompson, 119 Mass. 151; Alcock v. Smitli, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 447; 
 V. Royal Exchange Ins. Co., 13 Ad. & Flood v. Mitchell, 68 N. Y. 507; Wiglit- 
 EI. (x. s.), 292; Com. v. Ford, 130 man v. Overhiser, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 282; 
 Mass. 64. Meacham v. Pell, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 65; 
 
 3 Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238, Butler v. Benson, 1 Id. 526. 
 
 243; Acklen V. Hickman, 63 Ala. 494. ^ ^yigi^ti^i-ii^ „_ Overliiser, supra. 
 
 •* Kent V. Masson, 1 Bradw. (111.) Compare Folsora v. Apple River &c. 
 
 466. Co., 41 Wis. 602, 607. 
 
 ^ Halsey v. Sinebaugh, 15 N. Y. ' Supra, subsec. 1.
 
 366 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr.y 
 
 the memorandum and to cross-examine the witness in reo-ard to 
 it; and it may be shown to the jury, not for the purpose of es- 
 tablishing the facts tlierein contained, but for the purpose of 
 showing that it would not properly refresh the memory of the 
 witness. But even in such a case, only those portions of the 
 memorandum Avhich relate to the cause on trial and the testimony 
 of the witnesss can be put in evidence." ^ It is scarcely neces- 
 sary to say that, where a witness uses a memorandum which it- 
 self is admissible in evidence, it is no objection that he reads 
 from it to the jury, instead of its being read to the jury by coun- 
 sel, according to the usual practice.'^ 
 
 1 Com. ?;. Jeffs, 132 Mass. 5. Opin- 2 jjaynor v, Norton, 31 Mich. 
 
 ion by Endicott, J. Citing Com. v. 210. 
 Haley, 13 Allen (Mass.), 587.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. ol)7 
 
 CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
 
 Article I. — In General. 
 
 Article II. — American Rule of Strict Cross-examination. 
 
 Article III. — Questions Affecting Credibility. 
 
 Article I. — In General. 
 Section 
 
 405. Object of Cross-examination. 
 
 406. Riyht to Cross-examine. 
 
 407. Leading Qnestions. 
 
 408. Sifting, Modifying and Extending the Direct Examination — Making it 
 
 More Explicit. 
 
 409. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 410. [Further Illustrations.] Circumstances Attending a Conspiracy. 
 
 411. [Further Illustrations.] Length and Circumstances of Possession, etc» 
 
 412. [Further Illustrations.] Right to the Whole of a Conversation. 
 
 413. [Further Illustrations.] Reasons for Opinion as to Value. 
 
 414. [Continued.] Instances Under the Last Rule. 
 
 415. Great Latitude Allo^ved. 
 
 416. Especially Where Fraud is Involved. 
 
 417. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 418. Control of the Limits of Cross-examination. 
 
 419. Court may Curtail Needless Repetitions. 
 
 420. Prescril)e what Counsel shall Examine and Cross-examine. 
 
 421. Prescribe Order in Case of Several Defendants having Separate De- 
 
 fenses. 
 
 422. Allow Re-cross-examination on the Same Subject. 
 
 423. Whether Admissibility of Matter on Cross-examination depends upon 
 
 its Admissibility on Direct Examination. 
 
 424. Cross-Examining an Adverse Witness whose Deposition has been 
 
 Taken. 
 
 425. Not Necessary to State what Facts the Question will Elicit. 
 
 § 405. Objects of Cross-examination. — All cross-examination 
 expends itself in three efforts: 1. To sift, explain or modify 
 what has been said on the direct examination. 2. (Under the 
 English rule in force in some American State courts) to develop
 
 368 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I TllOnil). Tl"., 
 
 new matter favorable to the cross-examining party. 3. To dis- 
 credit the witness. 
 
 § 406, Right to Cross-examine. — " The benefit of cross-ex- 
 amination, is an essential condition to the reception of direct 
 testimony ; " ^ that is to say, testimony is not admissible, if the 
 party against whom it is to be used, or those in privity with him, 
 have no opportunity of cross-examining the witness.^ The right 
 of cross-examination being a substantial and a very important 
 rin'ht, it is error to restrict it, so far as to prevent the cross-ex- 
 aminino- party from going fully into all matters connected ^itli 
 the examination in chief. " The importance of the right of full 
 cross-examination," says Scott, J., " can scarcely be overesti- 
 mated. As a test of the accuracy, truthfulness and credibility 
 of testimony, it is invaluable. It is the clear right of the cross- 
 examining party to elicit suppressed facts, which weaken or qualify 
 the case of the party examining in chief, or support the case of 
 the cross-examining party. ^ In any view, the right of cross-ex- 
 amination extends to all matters connected with the res gestoeA 
 A witness may be cross-examined as to his examination in chief 
 in all its bearings, and as to whatever goes to explain or modify 
 what he has stated in his examination in chief," und prejudice 
 will he j^resumed where this right is denied.^ K party, called by 
 his opponent as a witness, has a right to be cross-examined by 
 his own counsel. Accordingly, where the plaintiff had examined 
 the defendant as a witness, it was error to prevent the defend- 
 ant, on cross-examination, from answering questions rele- 
 vant to the matter of the examination in chief, and favorable 
 to his side of the case.^ It is error to refuse permission to cross- 
 examine a witness for the prosecution, in a criminal case, for the 
 purpose of .showing hostility.^ 
 
 1 Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457, '' Citing Whart. Ev., § 529. 
 
 471 '" Martin v. Elden, 32 Oh. St. 2<S2, 
 
 2 Sperry ?7. Moore, 42 Mieh. 353, 287; citing Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich. 
 301; Duller N. P. 231), 242; 1 Stark. Ev. 452. 
 
 61,02,409, 34; Best Ev. (Woods' ed.), « Reeve v. Dennett, 141 Ma.ss. 207. 
 
 § 496; 1 G.reeul. Ev., § 163; I Wlmrt. ' People v. Lee All Chuck, (,& Cal. 
 
 Ev.,§177. 662. 
 =» Citing Pow. Ev. 380.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 369 
 
 § 407. Leading Questions. — Leading questions may always 
 be put on cross-examination, "svhether the witness is a willing or 
 adverse one for the party calling him; ^ except where, under the 
 American rule of strict cross-examination, the cross-examining 
 party transcends the limits of the direct examination, and thereby 
 makes the mtness his own.^ 
 
 § 408. Sifting, 3Iodifying and Extending the Direct Exam- 
 ination — Making it more Explicit. — A primary object of cross- 
 examination is to enable the opposing party to sift the statements 
 made by the witness on his direct examination ; to sup})ly omis- 
 sions, to test the accuracy of his recollection, to develop facts 
 which diminish the probability of his statements, and to extend his 
 statements as to matters touched upon in his direct examination, so 
 as to make them more explicit and complete. Within reasonable 
 limits, a cross-examining party has a riglit to demand details and 
 particulars of the nuitters stated in general terms by the witnesis 
 on his direct examination, and it is error to deny tliis right. 
 The reason is that " cross-examination is important, not only as 
 a means of getting out, in full detail, all the facts within the range 
 of the subject matter of the direct examination, but it is also an 
 important means of testing the memory of a witness, as well as a 
 potent means of ascertaining the truth of his statements." ^ But 
 this right does not extend so far as to allow the cross-examining 
 party to put JisJiing questions, for the purpose of ascertaining 
 facts which may assist him in his prosecution or defense, such as 
 the names of other witnesses acquainted with the subject of the 
 inquiry. " Litigants," said Mr. Justice Cliffoni, " ought to pre- 
 pare their cases for trial before the jury is impaneled and sworn; 
 and, if they do not, they cannot complain if the court excludes 
 questions propounded merely to ascertain the names of persons 
 whom they desire to call as witnesses to disprove the case of the 
 opposite party." * 
 
 1 Parkiu v. Moou, 7 Carr. & P. 408, ^ stcrm v. United States, 94 U. S, 
 
 2 Post, § 433. 76, 81. 
 ^ Hylaud v. Milner, d'J Ind. 308, 310, 
 
 opiaiou cy Eiiiott, J. 
 
 24
 
 370 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 § 409. [Continued.] Illustrations. — Thus where a witness who was 
 an administrator testified to some facts touching his administration, it was 
 held that he might be interrogated /?<Z/^ in regard thereto, — meaning 
 so far as the matters souglit to be drawn out affected his credibility or 
 
 related to the issues.^ So, a defendant who becomes a witness in 
 
 his own behalf, and undertakes, on his direct examination, to state all 
 that transpired between two points of time, may be asked on cross-ex- 
 amination whether he has omitted anything pertinent to the case ; and his 
 attention may be directed to the precise point, by asking him if some 
 
 specified thing did not occur. ^ So, where the question in dispute 
 
 was as to the ececution of a woie, and the witness for the plaintiff had 
 testified as to such execution, it was held competent and proper to 
 cross-examine him (under the English rule)"* as to all the circumstances 
 connected with it, and, among others, as to the consideration of the 
 note.^ So, a witness having testified that he managed certain prop- 
 erty as the agent of the plaintiff, the witness' wife, — which property 
 had been attached, at the suit of one Newman, as the property of the 
 witness, — was asked on cross-examination: " What was the under- 
 standing between yourself and Newman, relative to attaching these cattle, 
 just previous to the commencement of the attachment suit?" It was 
 held that this question was proper on cross-examination, and that the 
 
 court erred in excluding it.^ So, where a witness, called by the 
 
 defendant in a criminal trial, is interrogated as to the conduct and 
 presence of the accused up to and at the tiyne of the alleged commission 
 of the crime, it is not improper to cross-examine him as to the conduct 
 and presence of the accused aftej- that date, without limiting the State's 
 
 counsel to the exact time mentioned in the examination in chief. ^ 
 
 So, on the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness on an indictment 
 for larceny, who claims to have been robbed of a large sum of money, 
 questions tending to elicit the fact that he was indebted considerably 
 and straightened at the time of the alleged larceny, and that his stock 
 of goods was small, and also tending to show that he had made state- 
 ments on the preliminary examination of the prisoners, which made out 
 his inventory to be very much larger than he knew it to be in fact, — 
 were held admissible, as bearing upon the probabilities, for the purpose 
 of testing his oharacter and credit. The court said: " The authorities 
 
 1 Barker v. Blount, (;3 Ga. 424. ^ Steinberg v. Meany, 53 Cal. 425. 
 
 2 People V. Russell, 4(; Cal. 121. 6 Mariou v. State (Neb.), 29 N. W. 
 
 3 Post, §430. Rep. 911. 
 * Lemprey v. Muuch, 21 Minu. 379.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 371 
 
 do not recognize such an inquiry as so connected with the merits as to 
 be open to impeachment, but it is within the range of a proper cross- 
 examination." 1 So, a witness who has testified as to character 
 
 may, of course, be cross-examined as to details, times and places. ^ 
 
 § 410. [Further Illustration,] Circumstances Attending a Con- 
 spiracy. — On the trial of an indictment for burning a barn to defraud 
 an insurance compan}'^, Henry Hamilton, a witness for the prosecution, 
 gave testimony respecting what took place at a certain party or dance 
 at Joseph Hamilton's house on the night of the fire. He was asked 
 whether the dance was not talked of some time before it was gotten up ; 
 but the court ruled this out", under objection of the defendant. An- 
 other witness for the prosecution, named Fuller, had given an account 
 of a plan proposed by the conspirators for burning the barn, which was 
 in substance that, in order to prevent any suspicion, a dance should be 
 gotten up at another person's house, and that, during the course of the 
 the evening, one of the Hamiltons should go out for a supply of cider 
 and take advantage of that opportunity to light a candle, which would 
 take some time to burn down to the straw, so that they would be away 
 at the party at the time the fire should break out, and thus escape sus- 
 picion. The Supreme Court held that the ruling of the court, in thus 
 curtailing the cross-examination of Hamilton was error. Campbell, J., 
 said: " If the party had been arranged and invitations given, earlier 
 than the alleged interview with Fuller, then his whole story would be 
 falsified. This was then a vital point in the case. It was veiy clearly 
 legitimate on cross-examination, upon the strictest 'rules. It referred 
 to the very dance concerning which the witness had been examined 
 in chief, and was offered as relevant to the subject as any of the other 
 circumstances on which he had been questioned." ^ 
 
 § 411. [Further Illustrations.] Length and Circumstances of 
 Possession, etc. — Applying the rule that the cross-examination may 
 properly be carried into all the surrounding circumstances, for the purpose 
 of testing fully the accuracy and credibility of the witness, it has been 
 held, in an action of replevin by A. against B., a sheriff, to recover pos- 
 session of goods levied upon by B. under process against C, where A., 
 in support of his title, offered a witness who testified that, on the day of 
 
 ^ People V. Morrigau, 29 Mich. 5. • Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471. 
 
 Compare Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. ^ Hamilton u. People, 29 Mich. 173^ 
 
 40. ISl
 
 372 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tr., 
 
 the levy he, the witness, was in possession of the goods as the agent or 
 servant of A., the court did not err in permitting the defendant to cross- 
 examine the witness as to the time during which he had been in posses- 
 sion, in whose employ he had been during such time, and the manner in 
 which he entered into the employ of the plaintiff.! - - - - So, in an 
 action of replevin, brought against an attaching creditor of the plaintiff's 
 vendor, the plaintiff having shown no title but possession merely, it was 
 held competent for the defendant to cross-examine as to the nature 
 and length of the possession, for the purpose of showing that it was 
 colorable and of testing the witness' means of knowledge. ^ 
 
 § 412 . [Further Illustrations. ] Right to the whole of a Con- 
 versation. — Where a conversation is called out by one party, it 
 is the right of the other party, upon cross-examination, to develop 
 the whole of the conversation, so far as it may bear upon the 
 issues or affect the credibility of the witness ; ^ and this rule ap- 
 plies equally, whether the conversation was brought out on direct 
 examination or on cross-examination; it may, therefore, apply 
 in respect of the re-examination.^ So, where a witness on his 
 direct examination testified that a witness for the opposite party 
 had, on another trial, testified to certain facts, it was proper, on 
 cross-examination, to ask the witness what oilier facts such other 
 witness testified to on such other trial .^ 
 
 § 413. [Further Illustration.] Reasons for Opinion as to 
 Value. — Where a witness has, on his examination in chief, 
 given his opinion as to value, he may be cross-examined in full 
 respecting his reasons for such opinion; and here the rule ap- 
 
 1 Blake V. Powell, 26 Kan. 320. Greeul. Ev., § 201; 2 Wlmrt. Ev., 
 
 2 Thoruburgh v. Hand, 7 Cal. 554. §§ 1108, 1109. 
 
 3 AdUisou V. State, 48 Ala. 478; ^ Carey r. Richmond, 92 lud. 259. 
 Phares V. Barber, 61111.272; Sager u. Compare Harper v. Harper, 57 Ind. 
 State, 11 Tex. App. 110; Metzer v. 547. But, it has been ruled that where 
 State, 39 lud. 596; Fletcher v. State, the party's own witness fix^t speaks of 
 49 lud. 124; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 673; the conversation, although on cross- 
 Harness V. State, 57 lud. 1. examinatiou, the party is not thereby 
 
 •* Roberts v. Roberts, 85 N. C. 9; entitled to make all that was said evi- 
 
 Mclntyrev. Thompson, 14 Bradw. (111.) deuce iu liis own behalf. Addison v. 
 
 .554; Hatch v. Potter, 2 Gilm. (111.) State, 48 Ala. 478. 
 725; Phares V. Barbour, 61 111. 271; 1
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATIOiSr. 373 
 
 plies that gi^eat latitude should be allowed in cross-examination,^ 
 the limits of which, where no rule of law is violated, are within 
 the discretion of the presiding judge. ^ A question is proper 
 which enables the jury to see upon ivhat basis the witness has 
 made his estimate of value, or which connects his general esti- 
 mates of value with the thing in respect of which the injury is 
 predicated.^ 
 
 § 414. Instances Under the Last Rule. — Where a witness testified 
 that a horse was worth $9,000, it was not error to ask him, on cross-ex- 
 amination, whether he would give $3,000 for the horse; and the witness 
 having testified that he had no money, it was not error to ask him 
 
 whether he would give his note for that price.* A witness, called to 
 
 testify as to the value of property, fixed it at $3,000. On his cross-ex- 
 amination, he was asked whether he had not, as an insurance agent, 
 offered and written a policy of insurance on the same property at a 
 valuation of $4,000. It was held error to reject this question. 
 It was admissible, upon the principle which permits statements made by 
 witnesses out of court, different from those which they have testified 
 to at the trial, to be shown. Lake, C. J., said: "The value 
 of the proposed testimony, as tending to discredit the witness, rests 
 upon the very reasonable presumption that he would not, in the 
 very important matter of taking an insurance risk, value the prop- 
 erty higher than what he really believed it to be worth." ^ 
 
 1 Mo. &c. R. Co. V. Haines, 10 Kan. have the right to give their opinion 
 439; Central Branch &c. R. Co. w. An- based upon actual sales known by 
 drews, 30 Kau. 590; Atcliisou &c, R. them to have been made; yet it would 
 Co. V. Blaclishire, 10 Kau. 477, 48G; be going too far to hold that the trial 
 Marliel u. Moudy, 13 Neb. 323, 327. court errs iu rejecting an offer to 
 
 2 Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass. 470. prove a mere proposition by the wit- 
 ' Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Blaclishire, ness to sell property similar to that 
 
 10 Kau. 477. Witnesses as to value can iu dispute, for the purpose of fixing its 
 
 base their opinions on actual sales of value. Thompson v. Moiles, 4(5 Mich, 
 
 which they have knowledge, but can- 42. The proposition is not well rea- 
 
 not, it has been ruled, be cross-exam- soned by the court, and the conclu- 
 
 ined as to what they have offered to sion is unsatisfactory. An offer to sell 
 
 sell similar property for. Thompson similar property at a different value 
 
 Wo Moiles, 46 Mich. 42. would be, iu some sense, equivalent to 
 
 4 Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass. 470. a statement made by the witness out 
 
 ^ Markel v. Moudy, 13 Neb. 323, of court contradicting a similar state- 
 
 327. It has been held that, while wit- ment made by him in court, aud such 
 
 mrsses, called to testify as to value, evidence is always admissible.
 
 374 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr. , 
 
 In a proceeding to condemn land for a railroad, the following ques- 
 tions and answers were given on cross-examination: " Q. Take 
 plaintiff's land just as it is, and suppose the railroad ran through 
 the valley without running through the land, what is the difference 
 of value, compared with the value as the road now is? A. I would 
 rather have the land without the road running through it, but don't 
 know what the effect on the general market would be." " Q. Have 
 you not a piece of land in the neighborhood of plaintiff which you are 
 offering to sell, and desirous to sell, through which the railroad runs? 
 A. Yes, I have." " Q. State whether or not these facts might not bias 
 3^our judgment as to value of Mr. Blackshire's land? A. I think not." 
 It was held that there was no error in permitting this latitude of cross- 
 examination. ^ In another like case, on a trial before a justice, 
 
 the plaintiff was examined as a witness in his own behalf. Upon his 
 examination in chief, he testified, among other things, that he was ac- 
 quainted with the value of property in his vicinity, in the neighborhood 
 of Lis lots, at the time the railway was constructed in the alley-way, and 
 it was his opinion that, immediately before the railroad was there con- 
 structed, his property was worth $10,000, and that, immediately after- 
 wards, it was worth only $6,000, and that the depression of the value by 
 reason of the construction of the railway was $4,000. Afterwards, 
 upon cross-examination, he was asked the following questions : " What 
 would be the value of a strip of ground fifteen feet wide, taken from 
 the south end of these lots (around the east end) out to Main street ; 
 beginning at Tenth street, take a strip fifteen feet wide off ; then again 
 from the south, north on the east side out to Main street?" " What, in 
 your opinion, would be the depreciation of the value of the remaining 
 property, as an entirety, by reason of the taking from them fifteen 
 feet off the south end of the lots, and fifteen feet off the side of the 
 property to Main street? " Upon objection of the plaintiff, these ques- 
 tions were excluded. The plaintiff having recovered a verdict and 
 judgment for $2,000 damages, the jury finding specially thiit the plaint- 
 iff's property without the alle3'-way was worth $5,000 and with the 
 alley $7,000, it was held on appeal that, under the circumstances of 
 the case, great latitudeshould have been allowed in the cross-examina- 
 tion of the witnessess, giving evidence merely as to their opinions in 
 respect of value and damages, and that tlie court below erred in re- 
 stricting the cross-examination of the plaintiff as a witness. ^ 
 
 1 Atchison &c. R. Co. u. Blackshire, 2 Ceiit. Braiicli &c, K. Co. v. An- 
 
 10 Kan. 477, 486. drews, 30 Kan. u'JO.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
 
 375 
 
 § 415. Great Latitude allowed. — The general rule, there- 
 fore, is that a, cross-examination should be permitted as to all 
 matters developed on the direct examination,^ and that great lat- 
 itude should be allowed in conducting the same,^ the extent and 
 limits of which, where no rule of law is violated, rest in the sound 
 dificretion of the trial court. ^ The rule, then, is that, for the 
 purpose of testing the accuracy of the recollection of the witness 
 or of affecting his credibility, the cross-examination may in gen- 
 eral be extended into all the circumstances surrounding or affect- 
 ing the transaction which he has detailed in his direct examination. 
 "A cross-examination," said Brewer, J., '• is not limited to the 
 very day and exact fact named in the direct examination. It 
 may extend to other matters which limit, qualify or explain the 
 
 1 Sinister ■;;. Stout, 30 Kau. 529; 
 Commissiouers v. Craft, G Kau, 145; 
 Suumer I'. Blair, 9 Kan. 521; Callisou 
 y. Smith, 20 Kau. 28; 1 Greeul. Ev., 
 § 4i5. 
 
 2 Atchisou &c. R. Co. v. Blackshire, 
 10 Kau. 477, 487; lugraiu r. State, 07 
 Ala. <;7, 71. See also Stoudeuuieier v. 
 ■Williamson, 29 Ala., 558; Re Carmi- 
 chael, 3() Ala. 514. On the trial of an 
 iudictment for murder, it has been said 
 that the broadest latitude should be 
 allowed the defendant in the cross- 
 examination of t^ucli of the State'' s loit- 
 nesses as were active partisans in the 
 difficulty which led to the killing, and 
 who are hostile in their feelings toward 
 the defendant; and, on the other iiaud, 
 that the examination of such wit- 
 nesses by the people should be cor- 
 
 .respondingly restricted. Sutton v. 
 People, 119 111. 250. 
 
 ^ Miller v. Smith, 112 Mass., 470, 
 476; Hathaway v. Crocker, 7 ]\Ietc. 
 2(;2, 2(i6; Com. v. Sacket, 22 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 394; Wiuship v. Neale, 10 
 Gray (Mass.), 382; Swan v. Middle- 
 sex, 101 Mass. 173; Johnston v. Jones, 
 1 Black (U. S.), 209, 226; Fry v. 
 Beuuett, 3 Bosw. (X. Y.) 200; Knight 
 
 V. Cuunington, 6 Hun (N. Y.), 100; 
 Wallace v. Taunton Street Ry. Co., 
 119 Mass. 91; Ledford v. Ledford, 95 
 Ind. 283; Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132; 
 AVachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290; 
 s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 94. The Supreme 
 Court of Kansas say: "Great lati- 
 tude is and should be allowed iu 
 the cross-examination of a witness as 
 to his interest in the suit, his friend- 
 ships or hostility towards the parties, 
 his motives and prejudices." State 
 V. Collins, 33 Kan. 77, 80. The Su- 
 preme Court of Wisconsin has said: 
 " On the cross-examiuation of a wit- 
 ness, anything which shows his friend- 
 ship or enmity to either of the parties 
 to the suit is commonly a proper sub- 
 ject of inquiry. So also is everything 
 which tends to show that,' in the cir- 
 cumstances iu which he is placed, he 
 has a strong temptation to swear 
 falsely. It is to be remembered that 
 the jury are the sole judges of the 
 credibility of the witness, and that 
 whatever tends to assist them, in the 
 judgment which they are to form up- 
 on this subject, ought not to be with- 
 held from them." Kellogg v. Nelson, 
 5 Wis. 125, 131.
 
 o76 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 facts stated in the direct examination, or modify the inferences 
 deducible therefrom, provided only that such matters are directly 
 connected with the facts testified to in chief." ^ But, while great 
 latitude is allowed to the cross-examining counsel in putting 
 questions having tendency to disclose the animus of the witness 
 toward the parties, yet it is plain that questions may be asked 
 under this head, which so far exceed the hounds of courtesy and 
 propriety, that it is no error to refuse to allow the witness to 
 answer them. It was so held, on the trial of a criminal prosecu- 
 tion for theft, where counsel for the defendant, on cross-examin- 
 ation of the jDrosecuting witness, asked, '"Don't you love the 
 defendant? " ^ 
 
 § 416. [Continued.] Especially where Fraud is involved. — 
 
 " Great latitude," said Marston, J., " has always been allowed 
 the cross-examination in this class of cases, especially where 
 one of the parties to the alleged fraudulent transaction is upon 
 the stand. In cases of fraud no definite fixed rule can be laid 
 down; as to do so would but, in many cases, be laying down rules 
 for the guidance of parties about to perpetrate frauds. Much 
 must be left to the discretion of the trial judge." ^ For obvious 
 reasons, where the question relates to the bona fides of a transfer 
 of a merchant's stock of goods, or whether a particular con- 
 veyance was concocted for the i)urpose of hindering, delaying 
 or defrauding the creditors of the vendor, the widest latitude, 
 in the cross-examination of ix party to the conveyance, should be 
 allowed.* It is pro[)er to extend the inquiry into all tlie circum- 
 stances of the transfer of the goods to the witness, which tend to 
 show its fraudulent character and purpose, and the fraudulent 
 nature of his possession of them.^ But, whilst this is so, it has 
 
 1 Blake v. Powell, 26 Kan., 320, 2 Bluut v. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 
 326. See to the same effect Coates v. 234. 
 
 Hopkins, 34 Mo. 135 Detroit &c. E. ^ jacobson v. Metzger, 35 Mich. 
 
 Co. u. VauSteiubur-j;, 17Mich. 99, 109; 103. So held in Anderson u. Walter, 
 
 Haynes v. Ledyard, 33 Mich. 319; 34 Mich. 113. 
 Fergnsou v. Rntlierford, 7 Nev. 385; * Kalk v. Fielding, 50 Wis. 339 
 
 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Blackshire, 10 ^ Bowers v. Mayo, 32 Mimi. 241. 
 
 Kan. 477; Field v. Uavis, 27 Kan. 400.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION, 377 
 
 been held, under the American rule,^ that a cross-examination con- 
 cerning otiier transfers not referred to in the examination in 
 chief, is not permissible, ^ — a conclusion which maybe regarded 
 as doubtful, since the question is largely one of intent.^ 
 
 § 417. [CoNTiNTJED.] Illustrations. — Thus, it appearing, from the 
 cross-examination of a mortgagee of a stock of merchandise, that he and 
 the mortgagor had an interview, shortly after the giving of the mort- 
 gage and before the attachment was levied, — it was held that the de- 
 fendant should have been allowed to ask further questions adapted to 
 elicit from the witness evidence as to whether, at such interview, the 
 mortgagor had informed the plaintiff that he was making large sales of 
 mortgaged goods and receiving large sums of money therefor, without 
 
 accounting to the plaintiff for the same.^ In another case, where the 
 
 question in issue was the bona fides of a sale of a stock of goods, it ap- 
 peared that the sale was made in haste, the vendor not taking an in- 
 voice or otherwise determining the amount of the goods, and leaving the 
 country immediately, with the cash portion of the purchase price. The 
 purchaser having testified, on direct examination, that the reason the 
 vendor gave for the hasty sale was that he was in a scrape with a girl 
 and was afraid of prosecution thereupon, a question was asked one of 
 the witnesses, on cross-examination, what kind of a trouble tlie vendor 
 said he was in with the girl, and one or two other questions were asked 
 tending in the same direction, all of which were ruled out by the court. 
 It was held that this was error. On cross-examination, the party deny- 
 ing the bona fides of the sale should have been allowed to inquire as to 
 all that the vendor said in reference to the scrape with the girl ; and 
 this for two reasons : ( 1) A full cross-examination might have disclosed 
 that the pretended reason was wholly fictitious, and so understood by the 
 purchasers ; or (2) it miglit have disclosed that he was seeking to evade 
 liability in a bastardy action, for the support of an illegitimate child, and 
 so informed the purchasers — in either of which cases the evidence would 
 have been material ; ^ since a conveyance made to avoid one's lialiility 
 for the support of a bastard child is a conveyance in fraud of creditors? 
 and void.^ 
 
 1 Post, § 432. 3 Schuster r. Wingert, 30 Kan. 
 
 2 Clark V. Reiniger, GG la. 507. 529. 
 
 ^ Ante, ^ i32, et seq. 6 ^s held iu Daiuou v. Bryant, 2 
 
 ^ Kalb V. Fielding, 50 Wis. 339. Pick. (Mass.) 411.
 
 378 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOIlip. Tr., 
 
 § 418. Control of the Limits of Cross-examination. — So, 
 
 the limit to Avhich a cross-examination shall be extended and the 
 mode in which it shall be conducted, are, as we shall still further 
 see, subject in a very large measure to the discretionary control 
 of the trial court. The propriety of allowing a question on 
 cross-examination, which misrecites the testimony of the witness, 
 and is calculated to lead him into error, is within the discretion of 
 the court. " On this point," say the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
 " we simply rule this : It is the duty of the court, both to protect 
 the witness under cross-examination from being unfairly dealt 
 with, and to allow a searchinoj and skillful test of his intelliireuce, 
 memory, accuracy, and veracity. As a general rule, it is better 
 that cross-examination should be too free than too much re- 
 stricted. This is a matter that necessarily belongs to and abides 
 in the discretion of the court. * * * There must be allowed 
 some degree of skill, if not sharpness, in conducting cross-ex- 
 aminations; because a witness, however fair and honest and 
 truthful, may not be careful enough; and it is to the interest of 
 justice to expose the blundering of a witness, as well as his will- 
 ful departures from veracity. A jury ought to be made to know 
 what character of mind they have before them on the witness 
 stand; whether they have a careful, cautious witness, or one 
 who is disposed to take things on trust. That is quite essential. 
 But the court is there watching the proceedings, and acquainted 
 with all the surroundings ; it is proper to leave such a question 
 to the discretion of the court." ^ 
 
 § 419. Court may curtail Needless Repetitions. — As a gen- 
 eral rule it is not error for the court to refuse to allow cross- 
 examining counsel to require the witness to rej^eat in detail what 
 he has fully staled on his direct examination.^ It was so held 
 where a conversation, partly in a foreign language, had been tes- 
 tified to and interpreted by the Avitncss on cross-examination.^ 
 How many times the same question shall be repeated on cross- 
 
 1 Harris v. Ceutnil K, Co (Ga.), 3 2Siniouv.HomeIns.Co.,58Mich,278. 
 
 S. Kast. Rep. 355. 3 Ulric v. People, 39 Mich. 245, 251.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XYII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 379 
 
 examination, and how far the witness shall be compelled to an- 
 swer, are obviously matters within the discretion oi the presiding 
 judge, and not the subject of exception. ^ But, as elsewhere 
 seen,' this rule cannot be aiplied so as to restrain the cross-ex- 
 amining party from calling out the details of matters which have 
 been stated by the witness, on his direct examination, in general 
 terms only. 
 
 § 420. Prescribe what Counsel shall Examine and Cross- 
 examine. — It is said by Lake, J., speaking for the Supreme 
 Court of Nebraska: "A court may doubtless make reasonable 
 rules for the reuulation and examination of witnesses, and qo so 
 far even as to require the attorney who begins either the exam- 
 ination in chief or the cross-examination, to complete it. To 
 this, however, there must necessarily be some exceptions, — as 
 where, during an examination, the attorney, from any cause, is 
 disabled to proceed; in such case it may, of course, be concluded 
 by another. But no rule can be upheld that arbitrarily dictates 
 which of several attorneys in a case — there beino- no disaa'ree- 
 ment between them — shall examine or cross-examine a witness, 
 or that requires the same attorney who took part in the examin- 
 ation in chief, to conduct the cross-examination. A rule of this 
 sort could serve no good purpose, and Avould unwarrantably in- 
 terfere with the constitutional right of a party to select his own 
 counsel to represent him in the several branches of the case. 
 One attorney may be employed with special reference to the ex- 
 amination or cross-examination of witnesses, or of a particular 
 witness, another to argue questions of law to the court, and still 
 another to su •. up the case to the jury, and to do this is a right 
 which no court can rightfully deny." " 
 
 1 Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. witnesses, an assistant counsel is not 
 331. prevented from oljjectiug to questions 
 
 2 Ante, §§ 40G, 408. put in cross-examination to a -Rituess, 
 
 3 Olive V. State, 11 Neb. 4, 2(;. who had been cross-examined in chief 
 Under Micliigan circuit court rule No. by his coadjutor on the same side. 
 63, providing that, on the trial of Baumeier v. Antiau (Mich.), 31 N. W. 
 issues of fact, one counsel only on each Eep. 888. 
 
 iSlde shall examine and cross-examine
 
 380 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOlllp. Tr., 
 
 § 421. Prescribe Order in Case of Several Defendants hav- 
 ing separate Defenses. — The order in which several defend- 
 ants, having separate defenses, shall cross-examine the plaintiff's 
 witnesses, present their defense, and make their argument, rests 
 in the sound discretion of the trial judge. ^ Although their de- 
 fenses may be separate, yet if their interests are identical, this 
 discretion will not be abused by confining the cross-examination 
 on behalf of all the defendants to one counsel, the same as though 
 their defense were joint. ^ 
 
 § 422. Allow Re-cross-examination on the Same Subject. — 
 
 To allow a witness to be recalled and cross-examined again on the 
 same subject is a matter purely discretionary with the trial court, 
 and is the subject of exception only when the discretion is 
 abused. "^ 
 
 § 423. Whether Admissibility of Matter on Cross-examina- 
 tion Depends upon its Admissibility on Direct Examination. — 
 
 Upon this subject, it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer: "Asa 
 rule, the admissibility of a cross-examination depends upon the 
 admissibility of the direct examination. If, upon any matter, the 
 testimony in chief is excluded, no cross-examination thereon is 
 allowed. The fact that testimony has been taken by deposi- 
 tion before the trial in no manner affects the question of the 
 competency of each and every part of it. Its competency is 
 determined in the same manner, and upon the same principles, 
 as though the witness was present on the stand and being inter- 
 rogated in person. A question which, if the witness were present, 
 counsel could not ask, cannot be asked in deposition ; and if 
 asked and answered, must be stricken therefrom." Accordingly, 
 where the answers to the direct interrogatories in a deposition 
 were excluded for want of sufficient identification in respect of 
 time and place, it was held that the party offering the deposition 
 could not read the answers given in response to the cross-inter- 
 
 J Fletcher v. C'rosbie, 2 IMood. & 174; Masou v. Ditcliboiiruc, 1 IMood. 
 Rob. 417. & Rob. 4G2 ji. 
 
 2 Cliippendale v. Massou, 4 Camp. ' Knight v. Cimningtonj 6 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.), 190.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 381 
 
 rogatories. ^ But it has been held that this rule cannot be made 
 to work, as it were, in a converse manner, so as, where the irrel- 
 evant evidence has been admitted on the direct examination, to 
 allow the opposite party to follow up and extend the irrelevant 
 inquiry on the cross-examination. In order that this restriction 
 shall work no hardship or inequality, it is ruled that, when this 
 privilege is denied to the cross-examining party, he may ask 
 the court to ride out the evidence already received in chief, so far 
 as it is irrelevant, and if the court should refuse to do this, it 
 would be ground for a new trial. The court, in thus holding 
 that the error of one party does not justify the continued propa- 
 gation of the error by the other, say: "The maxim ^ similia 
 similihus curantur ' has been applied to some extent in medicine^ 
 but the principle has never been applied to the cure of errors in 
 
 § 424. Cross-examining an Adverse Witness, whose Depo- 
 sition has been taken. — Statutes exist in many jurisdictions 
 enabling a party to compel the attendance of an adverse witness 
 whose deposition has been taken, and to cross-examine him in 
 respect of his testimony given in such deposition. It is a sound 
 conclusion, in the construction of these statutes, that a party who 
 thus subpcenas and cross-examines the adverse witness, does not 
 thereby make him his own witness.^ 
 
 1 Callison v. Smith, 20 Kau. 28, 37. and subjecting liim to the usual peu- 
 
 2 Phelps V. Huut, 43 Couu. 194, 200, alties agaiust -o-ituesses fcr failing to 
 opinion by Loomis, J. obey subpoenas. When such a witness 
 
 3 By § 3842 of the Code of Teuues- is brought into court under this sec- 
 see, edition of 1858, it was provided tion, or under § 3836, he continues to 
 that, " if the adverse party should de- be the witness of the party who took 
 sire to have any witness cross-exam- his deposition, and is subject to cross- 
 ined in open court Avhose deposition esamiuation as such. It is therefore 
 has been taken, he may compel the error for the trial court to rule that, 
 attendance of such witness, as in other by summoning his adversary's wit- 
 cases, unless the witness is exempted ness for cross-examination under this 
 by law from the usual penalties." statute, the party makes the witness 
 This, it is said, is merely an extension his own. Sweat v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 
 of the provisions of § 3830 of the same (Tenn.) 117, 122. In Ford v. Ford, 11 
 code, enabling the adverse party to Humph. (Teuu.) 89, a similar ruling 
 compel the attendance of such witness was made construing a similar statute.
 
 382 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 § 425. Not Necessary to State what Facts the Question will 
 Elicit. — "It is not necessary, on cross-examination, to state 
 what facts it is expected the answer will ellicit; on direct exam- 
 'inatiou this is essential, but not on the cross-examination.^ 
 The reason is, that the cross-examiner does not call the witness 
 for the purpose of proving anything ; the witness is called by 
 the adverse party, and the cross-examiner is seeking to extort 
 from him a qualification of his testimony in chief. He cannot 
 be presumed to know what the answers of the witness w'ill be to 
 questions propounded in a proper cross-examination, nor would he 
 be bound by such answers. *' The value of a cross-examination, 
 as a test of truth, would be lost in the case of a crafty and un- 
 reliable witness, if the examiner were bound to disclose in ad- 
 vance the purpose and intent of every question asked." ^ In 
 one jurisdiction there is a modified view that, even where 2i party 
 is under cross-examination, the court may exercise a sound dis- 
 cretiony in requiring counsel to make the relevancy of his ques- 
 tions apparent.^ 
 
 Article II. — American Rule of Strict Cross-Ex amination. 
 
 Sectiox 
 
 430. Euglish Kulc that the Witness may be Cross-examiued ou the Whole 
 
 Case. 
 
 431. Applications of this Rule. 
 
 432. American Kule of Strict Cross-examination. 
 
 433. Scope of the American Rule. 
 
 434. Defendant cannot Introduce his Defense by Cross-examination. 
 
 435. Confined to the Testimony in Chief of the Particular witness, or Ex- 
 
 tended to all the Plaintiff's Evidence. 
 430. Lil)erality in applying the Kule — Ho\y far Relaxed in Discretion. 
 
 437. [Illustnitiou.] Witness to prove Execution not Cross-examiued as to 
 
 Consideration. 
 
 438. [Coutiuued.J Witness to ]*rove Identity not Cross-examiued as to 
 
 Consideration. 
 
 439. [Continued.] Defendant's Title in Ejectment. 
 
 440. [Continued.] Fui-ther Illustrations of the Rule. 
 
 MIyland V. :Milucr, ;)!)Ind. 308, 310; 280. To the same effect see Burt w. 
 
 Wood V. State, 'J2 lud. 20'J; Harness State, 23 Uli. St. 3iU, 402. 
 V. State. .57 Ind. 1. » cjty Bank v. Keut, 57 Ga. 285. 
 
 2 Martin r. Eldeu, 32 Oh. St. 282,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 383 
 
 Sectiox 
 
 441. [Coutinued.] Illustrative Cases not within the Rule. 
 
 442. Effect of the Rule — When makes Adversary's Witness one's own. 
 
 443. Leading Questions Developing new Matter. 
 
 444. [Continued.] Reason of the Rule which admits Leading Questions. 
 
 445. [Continued.] Cross-examination of the Adverse Party. 
 
 446. Cross-examination in Criminal Cases. 
 
 § 430. English rule that the Witness may be Cross-exam- 
 ined on the whole case. — The English rule on cross-examination 
 is that, when a witness has been introduced, sworn and examined 
 as to any material point in the case, the other party may cross- 
 examine him as to the wdiole case, including any new matter of 
 defense; but the extent to which he may be allowed to press the 
 witness with leading questions will depend upon the circumstances 
 of the case, the demeanor of the witness, his apparent bias and 
 other considerations, and must, to a great extent, be left to the 
 sound discretion of the trial judge. ^ This rule is adopted by 
 several of the American State courts. ^ Its reason has been 
 thus stated: " The oath administered to a witness requires him 
 to speak the truth, the luJiole truth, and nothing but the truth; 
 and therefore when a witness is put upon the stand, he ought to 
 be allowed an opportunity for stating all the facts wiihin his 
 knowledge bearing upon the issues involved in the case, and 
 should not be confined to those facts only, about which the party 
 who offers him as a witness chooses to interrogate him. It is 
 
 » 2 Phil. Ev. 896-911; Morgan v. w. Kankey, 6 Mo. 433; Brown ?;. Burrus, 
 
 Brydges, 2 Stark. 314; Rex v. Brooke, 8 Mo. 26; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Sil- 
 
 Id. 472. ver, 56 Mo. 265; State v. Sayres, 58 
 
 - Massachusetts: Webster v. Lee, 5 Mo. 585. Wisconsin: Kuapp v. 
 
 Mass. 335; Merrill v. Berkshire, 11 Schneider, 24 Wis. 70. Louisiana: 
 
 Pick. (Mass.) 269, 274; Moody v. Durnford t?. Clark, 1 Mart. (La.) 202; 
 
 Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 4!IS; s. c. Davidson v. Lallande, 12 La. Ann. 826, 
 
 28 Am. Dec. 317: Blackington v. John- 828; Nicholson v. Desobry, 14 La. Ann. 
 
 son, 126 Mass. 21; Beal i;. Nichols, 2 81, 84; King v. Atkins, 33 La. Ann. 
 
 Gray (Mass.), 262. New York: Yiw'xq^ 1057,1064. South Carolina: Kihlevv. 
 
 y. Jackson, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 166; s. c. Mcllwain, 16 S. C. 551. It was as- 
 
 19 Am. Dec. 571; Fulton v. Stafford, 2 sumed that this was the rule in Cliuton 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 483. [But doubtful: v. JIcKenzie, 5 Strobh. L. 36, 41. 
 
 see next section.] Vermont: Liusley Alabama: Kelly i'. Brooks, 25 Ala. 523; 
 
 V. Lovely, 26 Vt. 123. Ohio: Legg v. Fralick v. Presley, 29 Ala. 457, 461. 
 Drake, 1 Oh. St. 286. Missouri: Page
 
 384 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TIlOlll}). Tr., 
 
 very true that the other party may put him ou the stand as his 
 witness and examine him as to any fa'^ts within his knowledge 
 which he may desire to bring before the court. But he is not 
 oblio-ed to do so; and it may, and often does happen, that the 
 other party would prefer to forego the opportunity of bringing 
 out such other facts, rather than adopt one of his adversary's 
 witnesses as his own. In such case the result would be that the 
 witness would have no opportunity of telling the whole truths as 
 he had been sworn to do."^ 
 
 § 431. Applications of tlie Rule. — Under the English rule, 
 where a witness has been called by one party, the other party 
 may cross-examine him, although no question ha.s been asked him 
 in chief .'-^ But if the plaintiff's counsel calls a witness by mis- 
 take, he cannot be cross-examined.^ And if a witness is called, 
 and has only answered an immaterial question, when his exam- 
 ination is stopped by the judge, the opposite party will have no 
 riiiht to cross-examine him.* And where a witness has said 
 nothing in chief, he cannot be cross-examined to discredit him.^ 
 
 § 432. American Rule of strict Cross-examination. — The 
 
 Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of some of 
 the American States have adopted the contrary rule, which is 
 sometimes called, by way of distinction, the American rule, and 
 sometimes the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 This rule is, that a party has no right to cross-examine except as 
 to facts and circumstances connected with the matter stated in 
 the direct examination of the witness, and that, if he wishes to 
 examine him as to other matters, he must do so by making him 
 his own witness, and by calling him as such in the subsequent 
 progress of the cause. ^ 
 
 ' Kiljlcr V. Mclhvaiii, 16 S. C. 550, •''' Bi'acegirdle v. Bailey, 1 Fost. & 
 
 557. Fill. 536. 
 
 2 Phillips V. Middlesex, 1 Esp. 355. •> rhiladclphia &c. R. Co. v. Stimp- 
 
 =» Clifford V. Hunter, 3 Car. & V. 16; son, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 448; Houghton v. 
 
 s. c. Mood. & M. 103; Wood u. Mack- Jojies, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 702; Wills v. 
 
 insou, 2 Mood. & Hob. 273. Kussell, 100 U. S. 621; 1 Green). Ev., 
 
 ■^ CreevytJ. Carr, 7 Car. & P. 64. § 445. This rule has been adopted :l-
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. Xyil,] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
 
 385 
 
 § 433. Scope of the American Rule. — According to a very 
 
 learned and accurate writer, " the limits of a strict cross-examina- 
 tion, within the meaning of this rule, include whatever tends to 
 qualify or explain his testimony, or rebut or modify any inference 
 resulting from it. " ^ In Pennsylvania it is said in a late case : " It 
 has been reiterated in this State that cross-examination must be 
 contined to matters which have been stated in examination in 
 chief, and to such questions as may tend to show bias and inter- 
 est in the witness ; that to permit a party to lead out new matter, 
 constituting his own case, under the guise of a cross-examina- 
 tion, is disorderly and often unfair to the opposite party; and 
 that these rules are established for the purpose of eliciting 
 truth and preserving the equality of rights of parties in trials 
 of causes." ^ In a case in Arizona, where this question was very 
 exhaustively and thoughtfully discussed by Dunne, C. J., the 
 following rules were laid down as applications of the Ameri- 
 can doctrine: "1. When an adverse witness has testified- to 
 any point material to the party calling him, he may then and 
 there be fully cross-examined and led by the adverse party, upon 
 all matters pertinent to the case of the party calling him, except 
 
 the following States: Pennsylvania: 
 Hughs V. Westmorehiud Coal Co., 104 
 Peiiu. St. 207, 213; Mouougahela 
 Water Co. v. Stewartson, 9(5 Pa. St. 
 436; Jackson v. Litch, G2 Pa. St. 451. 
 Maryland: Herrick v. Sworaley, 50 
 Md. 439, 455: Griffith v. Diffeuderffer, 
 50 Md. 4()r), 478. Indiana: Stiuhouse 
 V. State, 47 lud. 17 ; Aurora v. Cohl), 
 21 Ind. 493; Pattou v. Hamilton, 12 
 lud. 250. Illinois: Stafford v. Fargo, 
 35 HI. 481; Lloyd v. Thompson, 5 
 Bradw. (111.) 90, ijii; Stevens r. Brown, 
 12 Bradw. (111.) G19, (122; Bell v. 
 Prewitt, 02 111. 301. Iowa: Glenn v. 
 Gleason, 01 la. 28, 32; Pellersells v, 
 Allen, 56 la. 717; s. c. 10 N. \V. Rep. 
 201. Nebraska: Clough v. State, 7 
 Neb. 320, 341; Boggs v. Thompson, 13 
 Neb. 403; Davis r. Neligh, 7 Neb. 84; 
 Cod v. Eoclie, 15 Neb. 24; s. c. 17 
 
 N. W. Rep. 119. Neio York: Neil v. 
 Thorn, 88 N. Y. 270, 275; Hartness v. 
 Boyd, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 503. [lu Neil 
 V. Thorn, supra, it Is saM that the trial 
 court may, in its discretion, relax the 
 rule, so as to allow the cross-examin- 
 ing party to go beyond the limits of 
 the direct examiuatiou.] California: 
 McFaddeu v. Mitchell, 01 Cal. 148. 
 Nevada: Ferguson v. Rutherford, 
 7 Nev. 385, 390. Arizona: Rush v. 
 French, 1 Ariz. 99, 139. 
 
 1 Al)b. Tr. Brief, 40; citing Wilson 
 w. Wagar, 26 Mich. 452; Campau r. 
 Dewey, 9 Id. 381, 419; Haynes v. Led- 
 yard, 33 Id. 319; Ferguson v. Ruther- 
 ford, 7 Nev. 385; Baird r. Daly, 08 N. 
 Y. 547, 550; Mayer i'. People, 80 N. Y. 
 304, 378. 
 
 2 Hughes V. AVestmoreland Coal 
 Co., 104 Pa. St. 207, 2? 3. 
 
 25
 
 386 EXAMIXATIOiV OF AVITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl',, 
 
 exclusively new matter ; and nothing shall be deemed new mat- 
 ter except it be such as could not be given under a general de- 
 nial. 2. The fact that evidence, called forth by a legitimate 
 cross-examination, happens also to sustain a cross-action or coun- 
 ter-claim, affords no reason why it should be excluded. 3. The 
 party entitled to cross-examine may waive his right to do so 
 at the time, and recall the witness and cross-examine him after 
 he opens his case. 4. The court, in its discretion, may forbid 
 the cross-examining party putting leading questions, when objec- 
 tion is made that the w^itness is biased in favor of the party cross- 
 examining, and the court is satisfied that the objection is 
 good." ^ 
 
 § 434. Defendant cannot introdnce liis Defense by Cross- 
 examination. — Where this rule prevails a defendant cannot, by 
 cross-examining a witness for the plaintiff, except by consent of 
 parties and permission of the court, open up his own defense by 
 interrogating the witness as his own witness. ^ But he may 
 cross-examine as to all that constitutes the cause of action, 
 thouo;!! not with reo^ard to matters in confession and avoidance.^ 
 He may, according to principles already stated,* sift and probe 
 the direct examination to the fullest extent. As was well said 
 by Mr. Justice Christiancy: " All testimony elicited on cross- 
 examination, consisting, as it does, of facts which, relating to 
 the direct examination, may have been omitted or concealed in 
 that examination, or facts tending to contradict, explain or mod- 
 ify some inference which might otherwise be drawn from them, 
 must, in the nature of things, constitute a part of the evidence 
 given in chief, and both alike and taken together must therefore 
 be treated as evidence given on the part of the party calling the 
 
 ^ "Rush V. French, I Ariz. T. 99, 139. ^ Hendersou v. Hydraulic Worlvs, 9 
 
 2 D:i Lee ?;. Blackburn, n Kan. 190; Phila. (Pa.) 100. 
 
 Malone v. Do^lierty, 79 Pa. St. 4(i; ^ Ante, % 408. 
 
 Elmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & R. ^ Wilsons. Wager, 26 Mich. 452; 
 
 72; MacKiuley w. McGregor, 3 Whart. quoted with approval in Callison v 
 
 (Pa.) 370; Floyd v. Bovard, 6 Watts Smith, 20 Kan. 28, 37. 
 & S. (Pa.) 75.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 387 
 
 § 435. Coufinecl to the Testimony in Chief of the Particular 
 Witness, or Extended to all the Plaintiff's Evidence. — -In 
 
 jurisdictions \Yhere this rule prevails, a tendency is discovered to 
 relax its strictness, so far as to allow the defendant to cross- 
 examine the plaintiff's witnesses as to all the facts which have 
 been developed by the testimony given for the plaintiff, whether 
 delivered by the particular witness or by other witnesses. Thus, 
 in Pennsylvania, while it is conceded that " cross-examination, as 
 a general thing, is only regular when confined to the testimony 
 given by the witness in chief ,^ the modified vieiv has been laid 
 down, that it ought not to transcend the testimony in chief, taken 
 as a whole, or in other words, the case which the witnesses on 
 the other side are called to prove. If it is confined to narrower 
 limits, the plaintiff may distribute the case arbitrarily among the 
 witnesses, and, by restricting each to a particular line, prevent 
 the disclosure of truths which he desires to conceal." ^ The Su- 
 preme Court of Nevada have also laid down a modified rule, by 
 stating that the one invariable test by which to determine whether 
 the cross-examination can be permitted is, Does it concern new 
 matter of defense or not ? '^ 
 
 § 436. Liberality in Applying the Rule — How far Relaxed 
 in Discretion. — One court has gone so far as to hold, even in 
 civil cases, that when such cross-examination is carried to an 
 unreasonable length on new matters, whereby improper testimony 
 is obtained, it is error.* But another court has said: " The pur- 
 pose of the rule might often be defeated by a rigid enforcement 
 of the rules in all cases. In the order of examination of wit- 
 nesses and the introduction of testimony, much must be left to 
 the discretion of the court below. This court has rareh% if ever, 
 reversed for an error in permitting a violation of the rules relat- 
 
 i Helser r. McGratli,52Pa. St. 531. 483; Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 
 
 2 Heudersou v. H\-draulic Works, (Mass.) 490, 497; Beal r. Nichols, 2 
 
 9 Phila. (Pa.) 100, opinion by Hare, P. Gray (Mass.), 2G2; Liusley v. Lovely, 
 
 J. Such also is the rule of the com- 2ij \t. 123. 
 
 man law as practiced in New York, ^ Ferguson v. Rutherford, 17 Nev= 
 
 Massacliusetts and Vermont. Pulton 390. 
 
 Bank v. Stafford, 2 AVend. (N. Y.) ^ Bell v. Pruitt, G2 111. 362.
 
 3>8 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 ing to cross-examination, which does not result to the prejudice of 
 the part}'."^ In the opinion of another court we find the follow- 
 in<; hinfjuagfe : "As to wliat are and what are not circumstances 
 connected with the testimony in chi(>f , is sometimes very diffi- 
 cult of determination, owing to the remote connection between 
 the direct examination and the facts sought to be elicited by the 
 cross-examination ; and, unless a trial court should so far over- 
 step the bounds as to admit that in cross-examination which 
 clearly has no connection with the direct testimony, an appellate 
 court would not be justified in reversing a judgment for such 
 cause, especially where the cross-examination is upon facts com- 
 petent to be proved under the issues in case. In such questions, 
 very much must be left to the discretion of the trial court." ^ 
 Another court, in applying the rule, holds that it \snot necessary 
 that the jjr6'c«se subject should have been called to the attention 
 of the witness on the direct examination, but the cross-examina- 
 tion should be allowed to extend to any matter not foreign to the 
 subject of the direct examination, and tending to limit, explain 
 or modify the same.^ In another court, where the action was 
 upon a promissory note, and its genuineness was put in issue, a 
 witness who had testified in chief that he knew the defendant's 
 handwriting and that the note was in his handwriting, was asked, 
 on cross-examination, when he first saw the note. It was held, 
 applying the same liberal rule, that this question grew legiti- 
 mately out of the direct examination, since it had a tendency to 
 elicit from the witness what opportunities he had had of exam- 
 ining the signature.* For the same reason, it was permitted to 
 ask the witness on cross-examination, who showed him the note,® 
 So, another court has held that, on the cross-examination of a 
 witness Avho has given evidence making out a iwima facie case 
 
 1 Hughes tJ. Woslinort'landCoul Co., E. Co. v. Van Steiuberg, 17 Mich. 
 
 104 Pa, St. 207, 213. 'J'.). 
 
 "^ Glenn v. Gleuson, 01 la. 28, 32. '' Ilerrick r. Swoinlcy, ;16 Md. 439, 
 
 ^ Haynes v. Ledyard, 33 Mich. 319. 455. Compare Griffith v. Diffeuderf- 
 
 See as to the Miciiigau rule, Chandler fer, 50 Md. 400, 478. 
 
 ». Allison, 10 Mich. 400; Thompson v. ^ Herrick v. Swomley, supra. 
 
 Rioliards, 14 Mich. 172; Detroit &c.
 
 Tit. HI, Ch. XVri.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 389 
 
 for the plaintiff, it is competent to draw out any facts which 
 would tend to destroy the case thus made out.i 
 
 § 437. [Illustration.] Witness to prove Execution not Cross- 
 ExAMiNED A3 TO CONSIDERATION. — A frequBiit iiistancB, and one which 
 throws into contrast the English and American rule, is that, under 
 the English rule, a witness called by the plaintiff for the purpose of 
 proving the execution of the written contract which is the foundation of 
 the suit, may be cross-examined by the defendant as to its consideration, 
 and the defendant may contradict his statements concerning such con- 
 sideration.-^ But, under the American rule, a witness called by the 
 plaintiff for the purpose of proving the execution of the contract sued 
 on, cannot be cross-examined as to its consideration ; but if the defend- 
 ant would have his testimony en that point, lie must call him as his 
 own witness. 2 
 
 § 438. [Continued]. Witness to Prove Identity not Cross-ex- 
 amined AS to Consideration. — By parity of reasoning, under the 
 American rule, witnesses called to prove identity cannot be cross-exam- 
 ined as to consideration. Thus, in a contest between the mortgagee of 
 chattels and an alleged purchaser, the mortgagee called the mortgagor 
 as a witness and proved by him the single fact that the chattels were 
 the same which were described in the mortgage. The court then per- 
 mitted, against objection, a lengthy cross-examination of the witness, 
 in regard to the consideration of the mortgage and various other mat- 
 ters not touched upon in the examination in chief, and a verdict 
 resulted against the mortgagee. It was held that for this error the 
 judgment must be reversed. ■* 
 
 § 439. .[Continued.] Defendant's Title in Ejectment. — The 
 defendant's title in ejectment is not new matter, within the meaning of 
 this rule ; and therefore questions may be asked, on cross-examination 
 of the plaintiff's witness in ejectment, eliciting answers which set up the 
 defendant's title. ^ But in Illinois it is held that, where the plaintiff in 
 ejectment files an affidavit that he claims title through a common source 
 
 * .Tacobson v. Metzger, 35 Mich. Cal. U.S. Compare Leavitt v. Stan- 
 
 10.3. sell, U Mich. 424. 
 
 2 Lanipvey v. Munch, 21 Minn. 379. * Bell v. Pruitt, 02 111. 3()2. 
 
 ■^ Yomnan's v. Carney, (\2 Wis, 5 Marshall v. Shafter, 32 Cal. 176; 
 
 i>90, 582, McFaddeu c. Mitchell, Gl Kush r. French, 1 Ariz. T. 90, 130.
 
 390 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 with the defendant, and the defendant, or liis agent or attorne}', 
 denies under oath that he claims title through such source, or states 
 that he claims title through some other so urce, — the latter will not be 
 subject to a cross-examination as to his source of title. So held as to 
 the effect of a statute touching the action of ejectment.^ 
 
 § 440. [Continued.] Further Illustrations of the Rule. — An 
 illustration of the ridiculous consequences which flow from a strict 
 application of the American rule is found in a case in Indiana, where 
 the relatrix in a prosecution for bastardy having testified as a witness, 
 the defendant asked her what was tlie colo7' of the hair and eyes of the 
 child. It was held that this question was properly excluded, on the 
 ground that it was an attempt to introduce new defensive matter by 
 cross-examining a witness for the plaintiff, which was inadmissible. ^ 
 
 § 441. [Continued.] Illustrative Cases not within the Rule. — 
 On the trial of an indictment for seduction under a promise of mar- 
 riage, witnesses had testified, on behalf of the State, that the defendant 
 kept company with the female alleged to have been seduced, and that 
 they had walked and rode together a few times. It was held that these 
 witnesses might be asked, on cross-examination, vfheiher other onen had 
 not kept company with her in like manner. Tbe court said: " The fact 
 stated by the witnesses, in their direct examination, was introduced to cor- 
 roborate the testimony of the girl, and as tending to show that a prom- 
 ise of marriage had been made by the appellant. The object of the 
 cross-examination was to overthrow or weaken tlie effect of the evi- 
 dence. For that purpose it was proper, and the court erred in refusing 
 
 it." ^ Where, in an action against executors on certain promissory 
 
 notes purporting to be those of the testator, the plaintiff was allowed, 
 without objection, to testify that the testator had signed the notes, and 
 the notes were thereby admitted in evidence, making a prima facie case 
 for the plaintiff, it was held competent for the defendant to cross-ex- 
 amine the plaintiffs as to where, when, under what circumstances, and for 
 
 what consideration, the notes were signed.'* In a suit by a passenger 
 
 on a stage coach against the proi)rietors as common carriers, to recover 
 damages for personal injuries sustained by the upsetting of the coach, 
 the plaintiff, testifying as a witness, stated that he was received by the 
 
 1 Thatcher v. Olmstcad, 110 111. » Stiuhouse r. State, 47 Intl. 17. 
 26. * Gleuu V. Gleasou, 61 la. 28, 31. 
 
 2 Hull V. State, 93 lud. 128.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII. J THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 391 
 
 driver, as a passenger from Boulder to Helena, without charge, and that 
 one of the defendants had said, since the accident, that the driver had 
 orders to carry him without fare to Helena. On cross-examination, he 
 was asked whether his fare was not demanded before the accident at 
 Jefferson — a station between Boulder and Helena, — whether he had 
 not refused to pay it, or to leave the coach when required to do so. 
 These cross-questions were objected to, and the objection sustained by 
 the trial court. It was held that they related to the transaction in- 
 quired of in chief, and should have been allowed. ^ In a suit by a 
 
 commission merchant to recover of the person for whom he had made the 
 purchase, for loss on a resale, for want of putting up a further margin, 
 the defendant has the right, in Illinois, on cross-examination, to inquire 
 when, where, and in what manner the purchase was made for him, and 
 whether the plaintiff has settled the purchase, and if so, what was 
 paid to him, and the manner it was paid, — for the purpose of showing 
 whether the mode of dealing was fair and free from fraud and injustice 
 or wrong to him.- 
 
 § 442. Effect of the Rule — When makes Adversary's Wit- 
 ness One's Own. — The effect of the Amerieau rule is that, 
 where a party, on the cross-exuminutiou of a witness, draws out 
 new matter not inquired about in the examination in chief, he 
 makes the Avitness his own in respect of such new matter, and 
 gives the right to the party originally calling the witness, to cross- 
 examine him on such new matter.'^ 
 
 § 443. tieading Questions in Developing New Matter. — 
 
 Under the English rule, as applied in several American jurisdic- 
 tions,* the cross-examining counsel may put leading questions to 
 the witness, even while developing new matter not touched upon 
 in the examination in chief.® Other courts, which follow the so- 
 called American rule,'' have declared that, when the cross-exam- 
 iner proceeds to develop new matter, the witness becomes so far 
 
 1 Gihiier v. Higley, 110 U. S. 47 ^ Dickenson i\ Sliee,-t Esp.fil; Moody 
 
 2 Oklershaw v. Kuowles, 101 III. r. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 498; 
 117. s. c= 28 Am. Dec. 317; Beal v. Nichols, 
 
 ^ So held in Bassham v. State, 38 2 Gray (Mass.), 2G4; Jacksou v. Var- 
 
 Tex^ G22, aud cases iu the next sec- rick, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 238. 
 tiou « Ante, § 432. 
 
 * Ante, § 430,
 
 392 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 his 07vn witness^ that it is not proper for him to ask leading 
 questions in respect of such new matter.^ " A different rule," 
 says Finch, J., in giving the opinion of the Court of Appeals of 
 New York, " would enable a party to develop his defense 
 untrammelled by the rules which govern a direct examination, 
 and give him an advantage for which we can see no just reason. 
 As to the new matter the witness becomes his own, and in sub- 
 stance and effect the cross-examination ceases. That is properly 
 such only while it is directed to the evidence given in behalf of 
 the adversary. When it passes })eyond that, it becomes the 
 direct and affirmative evidence of the party, and should be sub- 
 jected to the appropriate restraints. There is no reason, in the 
 nature of the case, why a direct examination should be guarded 
 against the evil and danger resulting from leading questions, 
 which does not apply to an effort upon cross-examination to in- 
 troduce a new and affirmative defense."^ A modified view is 
 found in the decisions of several of the courts which follow the 
 American rule, which is to the effect that a leading question in 
 respect of new matter, though objectionable, may be allowed^ 
 or denied* in the discretion of the court. The courts which 
 adhere to this rule generally hold that a party cannot cross-ex- 
 amine his adversary's witness as to new matter, in order to 
 introduce his own case, untrammelled by the rules of direct 
 examination.^ In New York it was early laid down that the 
 
 1 Harrison V. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. son v. Son, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 178; 
 
 (U. S)5S0; Landsberger u. Gorliam, 5 People ^i. Moore, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 Cal, 451; Aitkenv. Moudenhall, 25Cal. 419, 
 
 213; Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal. 10(1; 2 people v. Oyer & Terminer, 83 
 
 Harper v. Lampins:;, 33 Cal. ()41, 047; N. Y. 438, 459; affirming s. c. 19 Hun 
 
 Ferguson v. liutherford, 7 Nev. 385, (N. Y.), 91 where the subject is fully 
 
 390. See also Houghton v. Jones, 1 and ably discussed by Brady, .J. 
 Wall. (U. S.) 705; Jaci<son v. Feather » Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 
 
 R. W. Co., 14 Cal. 19, 24; Thornton v. (U. S.) 5.S0. 
 
 Hook, 36 Cal. 223; Ellmaker v. Buck- * Ellniaker v. Buckley, IG Serg. & R. 
 
 ley, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 72, 77; Pliila- (Pa.) 72, 77. 
 
 delphia &c. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 ^ Castor v. Bavington, 2 AVatts & 
 
 Pet. (U. S.) 448; Castor v. Bavington, S. (Pa.) 505; Floyd v. Bovard, 6 Ibid. 
 
 2 Watts & S. (Pa.) 505; Floyd v. 75; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Stimp- 
 
 Bovard, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 75; Jack- son, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 448.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVll.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 393 
 
 cross-examination of a witness in such a manner as to call forth 
 new matter, made him the witness of the cross-examining party, ^ 
 and it was said that the court ought not, except in peculiar 
 cases, to permit a direct examination, meaning the examination 
 of the adversary's witness on new matter, to assume the form of 
 a cross-examination. 2 The conclusion seems to be that the ques- 
 tion rests largely in the discretion of the presiding judge. ^ 
 
 § 444. [CoNTixuED.] Reasons of the Rule Which Ad:mits Lead- 
 ing Questions. — In stating the reason of this rule in a leading case 
 in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Shaw said: " On the whole, the court 
 are of opinion that the weight of authority is in favor of the right to 
 put leading questions under the circumstances stated, and that this is 
 confirmed by practice and experience. It is most desirable that rules 
 of general practice, of so much importance and of such frequent re- 
 currence, should be as few, simple and practical as possible, and that 
 the distinctions should not be multiplied without good cause. It would 
 be often difficult, in long and complicated examinations, to decide 
 whether a question applies wholly to new matter, or to matter already 
 examined into in chief. The general rule, admitted on all hands, is 
 that, on a cross-examination, leading questions may be put; and the 
 court are of opinion that it would not be useful to engraft upon it a 
 distinction not in general necessary to attain tlie purposes of justice in 
 the investigation of the truth of facts ; that it would often be diffi- 
 cult of application, and that all the practical good expected from it 
 may be as effectually attained by the exercise of the discretionary 
 power of the court, where the circumstances are such as to require its 
 interposition." ^ After many years' experience of the workings of this 
 rule, the Massachusetts court say, in a more modern case: "Experi- 
 ence has shown that this rule is convenient and easy of application in 
 practice, and works no disadvantage to the party producing a witness. 
 On the other hand, a different rule, by making it necessary for the court, 
 during the examination of the witness, constantly to determine what 
 is or what is not new matter, upon which the opposite party has a right 
 
 1 Jacksou V. Son, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 3 people v. Genet, 19 Him (N. Y.), 
 178; People i\ Moore, 15 \yen(l. (N. 91, 100; s. c, s^ib nom. People v. Oyer 
 YO 419, 423. & Terminer, affirmed, 83 N, Y. 438. 
 
 2 People V Mather, 4 Wend. (N. ^ Moody v. Powell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 
 Y ) 229, 248. 490, 499; s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 317.
 
 394 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl"., 
 
 to put leading questions, leads to confusion and delay in tlie progress of 
 trials."! 
 
 § 445. [Continued.] Cross-examination of the Adverse 
 Party. — A greater latitude is allowed, under the Aiuoricaii rule, 
 in the cross-examination of a party who testifies in his own be- 
 half; but this matter rests very largely in the control of the trial 
 court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, which is not review- 
 able on error. 2 A statute of Pennsylvania, of which there are 
 no doubt counterparts in other States, is as follows : " A party 
 to the record of any civil proceeding in law or equity, or a per- 
 son for whose immediate benefit such proceeding is prosecuted or 
 defended, may be examined as if under cross-examination, at the 
 instance of the adverse party, or any of them, and for that pur- 
 pose, may be compelled, in the same manner, and subject to the 
 same rules of examination as any othtu- witness to testify; but 
 the party calling for such examination shall not be concluded 
 thereby, but may rebut it by counter testimony." ^ Under this 
 statute it is held that, Avhen a party is called as a witness by his 
 adversary, leading questions may be put to him, and there may 
 be drawn from him any facts or admissions which weaken his 
 case or strengthen his adversary's.* 
 
 § 44G. Cross-examination in Criminal Cases. — Where the 
 State introduces a witness and examines him, the defendant may, 
 under the English rule, cross-examine him as to all matters 
 involved in the case, no matter how fornud or unimportant the 
 examination in chief may have been.^ Indeed, the rules of evi- 
 dence are the same in civil and criminal cases; and in both 
 it is in the discretion of the judge, how far he will allow the 
 examination in chief of a witness to be by leading questions, or 
 to assume the form of a cross-examination." But in one juris- 
 
 ' Beal V. Nichols, 2 Gray (Mass.) ■» Ikibaker r. Taylor, 7(5 Pa. St. 
 
 264, oi)iiiiou by Biiiclow, J. 83. 
 
 2 ]{L'a V. Missouri, 17 Wall. (U. S.) •''' State r. Brady, 87 Mo. 142. 
 
 532, 542. « Keg. v. Murphy, 8 Car. & P. 
 
 3 l\-iiu. Act April ir.tli, 18(;'J; 1 297. 
 Bright. Purd. Dig. (524, pi. 17.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 395 
 
 diction a distinction is taken between the right of the State to 
 cross-examine witnesses for the accused, and the right of the ac- 
 cused to cross-examine witnesses for the State. The accused 
 .must be allowed to cross-examine tlie witnesses of the State as to 
 any fact tending to establish his defense, whether it be or be not 
 connected witli the facts testified to in his examination in chief. ^ 
 In a capital trial, where the defendant, upon cross-examination 
 of a witness for the State, by direct questions, disclosed for the 
 first time the commission of another crime by him than that for 
 which he was on trial, — it was held no ground for reversing the 
 judgment, that the State was afterwards permitted to prove, by 
 another witness, the same facts, in relation to a crime which had 
 already been brouoht out by such cross-examination. ^ 
 
 Article III. ■ — Ql'estigxs Affecting Credibility. 
 
 Section 
 
 450. Relatious between 'Witness and Parties — Facts Sliowiug Bias or Pre- 
 
 judice. 
 
 451. TVliether Details and Particulars of Ill-Tvill may be Shown. 
 
 452. Remoteness of 111 Feeling in Point of Time. 
 
 453. Attempts to Suborn other Witnesses. 
 
 454. Previous Offer of Prosecutor to Settle. 
 
 455. Other Illustrations of the foregoing Principles. 
 
 456. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. 
 
 457. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. 
 
 458. Questions affecting Cliaracter of "Witness. 
 
 459. [Continued.] Judicial Expressions on this Question. 
 
 460. [Continued.] Views of Dr. Greenleaf. 
 
 461. Cross-examination as to coUateral Matters affecting Credibility. 
 
 (1.) Viewtliat such Cross-examination is not Permissible. 
 
 462. Illustrations of the Eule last Stated. 
 
 463. [P^xception.] Where Counsel Promise to show Relevancy. 
 464c [Continued.] (2.) Sucli Inquiries Permissible in Discretion. 
 
 465. Illustrations of this Rule. 
 
 466. [Continued.] Contrary and confusing Views. 
 
 467. Arrested, Indicted, Convicted. 
 
 468. Questions creating Prejudice, but not affecting Credibility.. 
 
 1 State V. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. 2 g^ate v. Kriug, 74 Mo. 612, 
 
 1323, 1327: State v. Thomas^ 32 La. 631. 
 Ann. 34'J, 351.
 
 396 EXAMINATION OF AviTNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr. 
 
 Section 
 4(Ji). Cross-esaraiuation ou collateral [Matters for the Purpose of Contradic- 
 tion. 
 
 470. If AVituess Answers, Answer Conclusive. 
 
 471. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 472. [Continued.] Instances of Convictions Reversed for a Violation of this 
 
 Eule. 
 
 473. [Coutiniied.] What if Question Answered v^ithout Objection 
 474k Where the opposite Party is a Witness. 
 
 475. Right of Witness to Explain. 
 
 § 450. Relations Between Witness and Parties — Facts 
 Showing Bias or Prejudice — It is one of the objects of a cross- 
 examination to discover the motives, inclinations and prejudices of 
 the witness, for the purpose of reducing the effect which might 
 otherwise be given to his evidence.^ Accordingly, it has 
 been w^ell said that " it is always competent to show the relations 
 which exist between the witness and the party against, as well as 
 for whom he was called." ^ The general rule is that anything 
 tending to show bias or prejudice on the part of a witness may 
 be brought out on his cross-examination. The reason for the rule 
 is, that such matters affect the credit of the witness, and it is 
 therefore material to indulge in such an inquiry.^ For this pur- 
 pose it is competent to inquire of the witness concerning acts, 
 declarations and circumstances, showing the existence of hostile 
 feelings or j)fGJudice ; and the latitude of cross-examination is not 
 restricted by the fact that the witness is a party testifying in his 
 own behalf.* The slate of mind and feelings of a witness may 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev. (12th ed.), § 446. Harris v. Tippett, 2 Camp. 637; Atty.- 
 
 2 Starks V. People, 5 Denio(N. Y.), General v. Hitchcock, 11 Jur. 478; 
 106. See also Newton v. Harris, 2 Morgan v. Frees, 1 Am. L. Reg. 92; 
 Seld. (N. Y.) 345; Cameron v. Mont- Chapman v. Coffin, 14 Gray (Mass.), 
 gomcry, 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 128; How- 454; Davis v. Roby, 64 Me. 430; Cam- 
 ard V. City Fire Ins. Co., 4 Denio eron v. Montgomery, 13 Serg. & R. 
 (N. Y.), 502; Turnpike Co. v. Loomis, (Pa.) 128; Batdorff v. Bank, 61 Pa. St. 
 32 N. Y. 127; Madden u. Koester, 52 la. 183; 1 Whart. Ev., § 566; 1 Greeni. Ev. 
 693; People v. Furtado, 57 Cal. 346; (13th ed.), §§ 449, 455, 459, 461. 
 Dance v. McBride, 43 la. 624; Miles * Watson v. Twombly, 60 Ne H. 
 w. Sackett, 30 Ilun (N. Y),(i8; Com. u. 491; Brewer v. Crosby, 11 Gray 
 Gallagher, 12G Mass. 54. (Mass.), 29; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 
 
 3 State V: Krum, 32 Kan. 372, 373; 393, 398.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 397 
 
 materially affect his testimony, and the credit of a witness, upon 
 whose testimon}' in part the issue is to be determined, is not a 
 collateral and immaterial matter.^ " Otherwise, biased or de- 
 pendent witnesses, a parent, child, brother, sister or person with 
 strong motives for prejudice or partialit}', — might be put on the 
 stand by defendant, and, in the absence of any question by his 
 counsel on the subject, the State would be prevented from putting 
 the jury in possession of the fact of such relat ionship , which would 
 be entitled to lewitimate consideration, as affectino; the weio-ht and 
 credibility of the testimony." ^ So, for the purpose of affecting 
 the credibility of a witness, he may always be cross-examined as 
 to his interest in the event of the suit."^ It may, therefore, be 
 laid down, as a general rule, that any question is proper which 
 tends to show that the personal situation, or interest of the wit- 
 ness, may have influenced the testimony given by him on direct 
 examination.^ 
 
 § 451. Whether Details and Particulars of Witness's Ill- 
 will may be shown. — To this end, it has been held that it 
 is competent, on cross-examination, where the witness has ad- 
 mitted his ill-will toward a party, to go into the details and par- 
 ticulars of such ill-will, for the purpose of showing the extent 
 
 1 Watson V. Twombly, GO N. H. such party. No citation of authorities 
 
 491; Martin v. Taruham, 25 N. H. 195; is needed on a point so well settled." 
 
 Folsom t). Brawn, Id. 114; Combs v. People r. Benson, 52 Cal. 380. 
 AViuchester, 39 N. H. 13; Carr v. 3 Vaughan v. Westover, 4 Thoiup. 
 
 Moore, 41 N. H. 131; Sumner v. Craw- & C. (N. Y.) 310; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 
 
 ford, 45 N. H. 41(i; Collins u. Stephen- Slioles, 20 Wis. 35; Cornell v. Barnes, 
 
 sou, 8 Gray (Mass.), 488; Day -y. 26 Wis. 473; Suit «. Bounell, 33 Wis. 
 
 Stickney, 14 Allen (Mass.), 255. 180. See also Starks v. People, 5 
 
 ■■^ State V. Willingham, 33 La. Ann. Denio (N. Y.), lOG; Peoples. Cunuing- 
 
 537, opinion by Feuuer, J. On this ham, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 524; Newton v. 
 
 subject the Supreme Court of Cali- Harris, 6 N. Y. 345; Wells v. Kelsey, 
 
 fornia has said: "It is perfectly well 37 N. Y. 143, 146; McCabe v. Brayton, 
 
 settled that, on cross-examination, a 38 N. Y. 196; People v. Albright, 23 
 
 witness may be interrogated as to any How. Pr. (N. Y.) 306; Turner v. 
 
 circumstance which tends to Impeach Austin, 16 Mass. 181, 185; Garfield v. 
 
 his credibility, by showing that he is Kirk, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 464; Knight v. 
 
 biased against the party conducting Forward, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 311, 320. 
 the cross-examination, or that he has * Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Blackshire, 
 
 an interest in the result adverse to 10 Kan. 477, 487.
 
 398 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 of his bias and prejudice. Johnson, J., in giving the opinion of 
 the court, said: "The defendants were entitled to know the 
 character and extent of the feeling of enmity which the wit- 
 ness entertained toward them. The question of bias and preju- 
 dice, and how far her hostility towards the defendants may have 
 affected her testimony, are for the jury, and they cannot prop- 
 erly determine this until they learn the degree and intensity of 
 the hostile feeling." ^ In like manner, the Supreme Court of 
 Minnesota has said: " The object of this kind of testimony is to 
 show bias and prejudice on the part of the witness, for the pur- 
 pose of leading the jury to scrutinize and perhaps to discredit 
 the testimony. If testimony of this character is to be received, 
 it should be received in its most effective form, so that the pur- 
 poses for which it is introduced may be best accomplished. A 
 mere vague and general statement that hostile feeling existed 
 would possess little force. It certainly must be proper to ask 
 what the expression of hostility was, for the purpose of inform- 
 ing the jury of the extent and nature of the hostile feeling, so 
 that they may determine how much allowance is to be made for 
 it." ^ But, in the opinion of another court, the rule is that the 
 witness may be interrogated as to the state of his feelings to- 
 wards one of the parties, but that it is not competent to inquire 
 into the cause of such feelings. "^ On a somewhat similar view, 
 in a criminal trial, it has been held error to permit the State's 
 counsel, in cross-examining the defendant's witnesses, to inquire of 
 them as to the particulars of a difficulty which they have had 
 with the prosecutor, they having denied ill-feeling toward him.^ 
 
 § 452. Remoteness of Ill-Feelings in Point of Time. — 
 
 But the unkind feeling must be shown to exist when the evidence 
 is given. The witness may have been angry at the party years 
 
 1 State V. Collins, 3:3 K.iu. 77, 3 Conyars v. Field, 01 Ga. L'oS; 
 81. Bishop V. State, 1) Ga. 2(J0. 
 
 2 State V. Dee, U Miun. 35, 39. * Patmaii v. State, (!1 Ga. 379. It 
 See also Batdorf v. Bauk, (11 Pa. is respectfully submitted that the con- 
 st, 179, 183; Davis v. Roby, (!4: Me. ceptiou of this court is unsound, for 
 427, 430; McFarlin v. State, 41 Tex. the reasons given by the Kansas and 
 23. Minnesota courts, as above.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 399 
 
 before the trial, and the anger may have entirely disappeared. 
 Unless it is made to appear that the unkind feeling exists at the 
 trial, or that it has arisen so recently that it may be presumed to 
 have continued down to the trial, evidence to show it is inad- 
 missible. ^ 
 
 § 453. Attempts to Suborn other Witnesses. — For the pur- 
 pose of affecting the credibility of the witness by showing his 
 animus against the cross-examining party and the extent to which 
 he is willing to go in defeating the latter, it is competent to 
 ask the witness on cross-examination, with the requisite circum- 
 stances of time, place and person, whether he has not attempted 
 to suborn or get out of the way other witnesses subpoenaed on 
 behalf of the cross-examining party. ^ But, as was decided by 
 the judges in an answer to a question propounded by the Lords,^ 
 it is not competent to prove such attempts at subornation or tam- 
 pering with witnesses, without first laying a foundation therefor, 
 by interrogating the witness whom it is intended thus to accuse.* 
 
 § 454. Previous Offer of tlie Prosecutor to settle. — It has 
 
 been held that the prosecuting witness, in a criminal case, cannot 
 
 1 Higham v. Gault, 15 Hun (N. Y.), questious put to the witness would 
 
 383. not, if answered either way, elicit an- 
 
 - Tlie Queen's Case, 2 Brod. &Bing. swers tending to show this, they are 
 
 312; Morgan v. Frees, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) ' properly excluded. Oberf elder w. Kav- 
 
 352; State v. Downs (Mo.), 3 S. W. anaugh (Neb.), 32 N. W. Rep. 296; s.c. 
 
 Rep. 219; s. c. 91 Mo. 19. Compare 21 Neb. 483. On a criminal trial in 
 
 Oberf elder v. Kavanaugh (Neb.), 32 Missouri a witness for the State stated 
 
 N. W. Rep. 290; s. c. 21 Neb. 483. on his cross-examination that he did 
 
 3 Tlie Queen's Case, supra. not, at a designated time and place, 
 
 ■* So held in Bates v. Holladay, No. say to a relative of the defendant tliat 
 
 3804, St. Louis Court of Appeals, MS. he and another witness would leave, 
 
 In Lord Stafford's Case, 7 How. St. and not be Avitnesses against the de- 
 
 Tr. 1294, 1400, witnesses for the crown fendant, if tlie person addressed would 
 
 were allowed to testify to attempts at pay him $100. It was held that the 
 
 subornation, of which the prisinier defendant had the right to contradict 
 
 protested his innocence, without a this denial — to prove by the person 
 
 previous foundation being laid. But to whom this offer had been made that 
 
 this decision, although sometimes the witness had made it. The question 
 
 cited by American courts, should not was not collateral to the case on trial, 
 
 be regarded as of any authority upon State v. Downs (Mo.), 3 S. W. Rep. 
 
 the point. It was held that where the 219; s. c. 91 Mo. 19.
 
 400 EXAMINATIOX OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 be asked, on cross-examination, whether he had not frequently, 
 during the session of the court, offered to the prisoner that if the 
 prisoner would settle the subject matter of the indictment, he, 
 the prosecuting witness, would leave the court and not appear 
 against the prisoner. The reason was, that this testimony did 
 not tend to impair the credibility of the prosecuting witness.^ 
 
 § 455. Other Illustrations of the Foregoing Principles. — Ac- 
 cordingly, in an action brought by certain executors against a co-exec- 
 utor, to recover the vahie of a certain promissory note given by the 
 latter to ttie testator, a witness called by the plaintiffs, whose testimon}'- 
 tended to establish the defendant's liabihty, was asked, on cross-exam- 
 ination, whether it was not after a request to the executors to pa}' a sum 
 which they alleged she owed the estate, that she first gave the informa- 
 tion of the facts to which she had testified. It was held that the 
 referee erred in refusing to allow this question to be put.^ - - - - So, 
 it has been held within the discretion of the trial judge, to allow a 
 witness for the defendant in a criminal case to be asked, on cross- 
 examination, whether he has offered a certain person money to be a 
 surety on the defendant's appeal bond.^ - - - - On the cross-examina- 
 tion of the State's witness in a criminal case, he may be asked whether 
 he has not told the defendant that he had been his friend, but was 
 then his enem}^, and intended to have him prosecuted on the charge 
 for which he was then being tried. ■* - - - - Where a defendant was 
 on trial for a homicide committed while an attempt was being made to 
 expel him from premises claimed by the deceased, it was held that a 
 witness for the prosecution might properly be asked, on cross-examina- 
 tion, whether he, the witness, had agreed to be present and to aid the 
 deceased in the expulsion of the defendant. The court said: "The 
 defendant had a right to have that question answered, and to have the 
 jury give it such weight as they might think it entitled to. The ques- 
 tion whether the witness had a right to participate in the expulsion of 
 the defendant is quite immaterial, 'as the object of the question was to 
 draw out a statement which would enable the jury to determine what 
 relations, if any, the witnesses sustained toward the deceased and the 
 defendant respectively." ^ Where, in an action against a corpora- 
 
 > People V. Geuung, 11 Wend. 19. ' Sager v. State, 11 Tex. App. 
 
 2 Miles V. Sackett, 30 Hmi (N. Y.), 110. 
 
 68. 5 People v. Fartado, 57 Cal. 3i6, 
 
 3 Com. V. Gallagher, IL'G Mass. 54. opiuiou by Sharpsteiu, J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 401 
 
 tion, it appears that its president and treasurer are members of another 
 corporation, havinsj persons in its employ, and the plaintiff's counsel, in 
 examining a witness for the defendant, asks him if he is not an em- 
 ploye of the latter corporation, for the purpose of showing bias, no 
 exception lies to the exclusion of the evidence. Such evidence was 
 admissible only within the discretion of the judge, and it did not 
 appear that in excluding it, his discretion had been abused. ^ 
 
 § 456. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. — In a civil action 
 for damages for the seduction of the plaintiff's wife, a witness for 
 tlie plaintiff, Lohman, testified that he went to the phiintiff's house one 
 day to see the plaintiff; that the front door was opon ; that he went in 
 without rajiping, or ringing the bell, or otherwise announcing himself; 
 that he went to the door of the bed-room, which was shut, and, without 
 even rapping at the door or otherwise announcing himself, opened 
 it and saw the defendant standing in the room and Mrs. Dance 
 (the plaintiff's wife) on the bed with her person somewhat exposed. 
 In cross-examination, the defendant's counsel asked the witness what 
 he wanted to see Mr. Dance about, to which plaintiff' s counsel objected 
 and the court sustained the objection. It was held that this was error. 
 Adams, J., said: "This question, we think, should have been allowed. 
 If the object of the visit was really not to see Mr. Dance, but to pene- 
 trate to Mrs. Dance's bed-room, whether on a voyage of pleasure or 
 discovery, it was proper that the jury should know it. The evidence 
 tends to show that Lohman was an unsuccessful candidate for Mrs. 
 Dance's favor, and this fact also, as well as his familiarity or boldness 
 in the plaintiff's house, made him a worthy subject of cross-examination 
 within all reasonable latitude.'"^ In the same trial, the witness Loh- 
 man was aske<l, on cross-examination, whether he did not write to Mrs. 
 Dance (the plaintiff's wife) while she was in Michigan, in the fall of 1873. 
 The plaintiff's counsel objected to the question, and the court sustained 
 the objection. It was held that the court erred in this ruling. Adams, 
 J., said: "The bed-room occurrence was in the fall of 1872. If, the 
 next fall, he was writing her letters of either love or friendship, it would 
 tend to show that the interpretation put by him on the bed-room occur- 
 rence was not at that time such as to impair his admiration for her. 
 Again, it was proper to show, upon cross-examination of the witness, 
 whether Mrs. Dance answered his letters, that the jury might judge, in 
 
 ^ Wallace?'. Tauuton Street Ry. Co., - Dauce v. McBride, 43 Iowa, 624, 
 
 119 Mass, 91. 627. 
 
 26
 
 402 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoUip. Tr., 
 
 case she did not, whether he was testifying under bias or ill-feehng, 
 either towards her or towards the defendant, who is supposed to have 
 participated more largely in her favoritism. "^ 
 
 § 457. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. — Counsel for the 
 State, in a criminal prosecution, has the right, on the cross-examina- 
 tion of a witness for tlie defendant, to ask him what " the feelings are 
 between him and one of the State's witnesses, thougli nothing on this 
 point has been brought out in the examination in chief.'- - - - - On this 
 ground, on the trial of an indictment for murder^ it was held compe- 
 tent to ask a witness the following question: "I will ask you now, 
 Mr. Carroll, if, in Pike Payne's saloon in the town of Red Bluff, in the 
 presence of Mr. McGowan and Mr. Thatch, both witnesses in this case, 
 you did not make the remark that Wasson [the defendant] ought to 
 have been hung 'before he left Butte Creek?" 3 - - - - So, a witness may 
 be asked on cross-examination, whether he has not been active in pro- 
 curing testimony in the case, and if he denies this, he may be contra- 
 dicted. 4 _ . _ _ Whether the plaintiff (the witness) had not, prior to 
 the date of tlie act for which the action was brought, made a similar 
 charge against the defendant, may likewise be asked. ^ 
 
 § 458. Questions affecting Character of Witness. — It is 
 
 sometimes laid down without qualitication that, ou cross-examina- 
 tion, a witness may be compelled to answer any questions which 
 tend to test his credibility or to shake his credit by injuring his 
 character, however irrelevant to the facts in issue, or however 
 disgraceful the answer may be to himself, except where the answer 
 would expose him to a criminal charge.^ But the prevailing 
 opinion seems to be that, except in cases where the witness 
 is the prisoner on trial, the extent to which an inquiry vf'iW be 
 allowed in his past life, with the view of affecting his credibility, 
 rests in the discretion of the trial court. ^ 
 
 1 Dance v. McBride, 43 Iowa, (!24, <! MulloriJ. St. Louis Hospital Assn., 
 628. 5 Mo. App. 390; s. c. affirmed, 73 Mo. 
 
 2 State V. \VilIiuy;hani, 33 La. Ann. 243. 
 
 537. ' Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 270; Ryai\ 
 
 ^ People V. Wasson, Co Cal. 538. v. People, 19 Ilun (N. Y.), 188. Set 
 
 ■* Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173; also Maine v. People, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 
 
 182; Geary v. People, 22 Mich. 220. 113; Vaughn v. Westover, 2 Hun 
 
 5 Watsonw. Twombly, GON. H. 491. (N. Y.), 43; Stokes v. People, 53
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 403 
 
 § 459. [Contimied.] Judicial Expressions on this Ques- 
 tion. — Many expressions are found in the judicial opinions to 
 the effect that the trial courts should fix the limits of the cross- 
 examination of the witnesses, where the questions tend to de- 
 velop the real character of the witness, with great hesitation. 
 Thus, in a case in New York it is said by Peckham, J.: "I 
 wish to say that, in my opinion, as a general rule, evidence on 
 cross-examination, tending to impeach the credibility of a wit- 
 ness, shoidd be rejected with very great caution ; its exclusion 
 can rarely be proper." ^ So, in another case in the same court 
 is said by Allen, J. : "In the latitude of cross-examination, and 
 to enable the jury to it understand the character of the witness 
 they are called upon to believe, collateral evidence is allowed 
 from the witness himself, tending to discredit and disgrace the 
 witness under examination." ^ In a later case in the same court, 
 where the question was elaborately examined, it is said by 
 Grover, J. : " It is well settled that, for the purpose of impair- 
 ing the credit of a witness, by evidence introduced by the oppo- 
 site party, such evidence must go to his general character. * * * 
 It is held, for the purpose of discrediting his testimony, the 
 witness may be asked, upon cross-examination, as to specific 
 acts. This shows that, upon a cross-examination of a witness, 
 with a view of testing his credibility, inquiries are proper as to 
 facts not competent to be proved in any other way. * * * 
 In such examination the presumption is strong that the witness 
 will protect his credibility, as far, at least, as truth will warrant. 
 All experience shows this to be so. It would be productive of 
 
 N. Y. 164; Russell v. St. Nicholas 1(55: State i?. R. R., 58 N. 11.410,412 
 &c. Co., 51 N. Y. (343; Allen f. Bodiiie, Plummer v. Ossipee, 59 N. H. 55, 57 
 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 383; Storm -y. United Free v. Buckingham, 59 N. H. 219 
 States, 94 U. S. 7G, 85; Sturgisu. Rob- Merrill v. Perkins, 59 N. H. 343, 345 
 bins, 62 Me. 289, 293; Prescott v. Perking i?. Towle, 59 N. H. 583; Til- 
 Ward, 10 Allen (Mass.) , 203, 200 ; Wroe ton v. Am. Bible Society, 60 N. H. 377, 
 V. State, 20 Oh. St. 460; 1 Greenl. Ev., 384. 
 
 § 449; People v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710; i Le Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 
 
 Great Western &c. Co. v. Loomis, 32 N. 234. 
 
 Y. 127; Bank v. Sleramons, 34 Oh. St. 2 Newcorab v. Griswold, 24 N. Y, 
 
 142 ; People v. Court, 83 N. Y. 436, 298. 
 460; Gutterson v. Morse, 58 N. H.
 
 404 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 great injustice, often, if, where a witness is produced of wliom 
 the opposite party has before never heard, and who gives material 
 testimony, and from some source, or from the manner and ap- 
 pearance of the witness, such part}^ should learn that most of the 
 life of the witness had been spent in jails and other prisons for 
 crimes, — if this fact could not be proved by the witness him- 
 self, but could only be shown by records existing in distant coun- 
 ties, and perhaps States, which, for the purposes of the trial, 
 are wholly inaccessible. No danger to the party introducing 
 the witness can result from this class of inquiries, while their 
 exclusion might, in some cases, wholly defeat the ends of justice. 
 My conclusion is that a witness, upon cross-examination, may be 
 asked whether he has been in jail, the penitentiary, or State 
 prison, or any other place that would tend to impair his credibil- 
 ity, and how much of his life he has passed in such places."^ 
 In a civil case in Michigan, Campbell, J., in giving the opinion 
 of the court says: " It has always been found necessary to allow 
 the witnesses to be cross-examined, not only upon the facts in- 
 volved in the issue, but also upon such collateral matters as may 
 enable the jury to appreciate their fairness and reliability. To 
 this end a large latitude has been given, where circumstances 
 seemed to justify it, in allowing a full inquiry into the history 
 of witnesses, and into many other things tending to illustrate 
 their true character. This may be useful in enabling the court or 
 jury to comprehend just what sort of person they are called 
 upon to believe, and such a knowledge is often very desirable. 
 It may be quite as necessary, especially where strange or sus- 
 picious witnesses are brought forward, to enable counsel to ex- 
 tract from them the whole truth on the merits. It cannot be 
 doubted that a previous criminal experience will depreciate the 
 credit of a witness to a greater or less extent, in the judgment 
 of all persons, and there must be some means of reaching this 
 history. The rules of law do not allow specific acts of miscon- 
 duct, or specific facts of a disgraceful character to be proved 
 against a witness by others. * * * Unless the remedy is 
 
 1 Real V. reople, 42 N. Y. 270, 281.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XYIL] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 405 
 
 found in cross-examination, it is practically of no account. It 
 has always been held that, within reasonable limits, a witness 
 may, on cross-examination, be very thoroughly sifted upon his 
 character and antecedents. * * * Wq think a witness may 
 be asked concerning all antecedents, which are really signifi- 
 cant, and which will explain his credibility. * * * fjg must 
 be better acquainted than others with his own history, and is un- 
 der no temptation to make his own case worse than truth will 
 warrant. There can with him be no mistakes of identity. If 
 there are extenuating circumstances, no one else can so readily 
 recall them. We think the case comes within the well established 
 rules of cross-examination, and that the few authorities which 
 seem to doubt it have been misunderstood, or else have been 
 based upon a fallacious course of reasoning, which would, in 
 nine cases out of ten, prevent an honest witness from obtaining 
 better credit than an abandoned ruffian." ^ In a criminal case 
 subsequently before the same tribunal, the same learned justice 
 said: " The quality of such testimony can never be regarded as 
 entirely separated from the character which is indicated by their 
 crimes; and, if the position they occupy indicates moral turpi- 
 tude, there is a necessity for more thorough cross-examination, 
 and nothing ought to be shut out which can sensibly aid in ex- 
 plaining their credibility, unless there is some fixed rule of law 
 that excludes ic." ^ 
 
 § 460. [Continued.] Views of Dr. Greenleaf. — In his 
 
 work on Evidence, while recognizing the fact that the courts are 
 not in perfect harmony upon this subject. Dr. Greenleaf uses the 
 following language: " There is certainly great force in the argu- 
 ment that, where a man's liberty, or his life, depends upon the 
 testimony of another, it is of infinite importance that those who 
 are to decide upon that testimony should know, to the greatest 
 extent, how far the witness is to be trusted. They cannot look 
 into his breast to see what passes there, but must form Iheir 
 opinion on the collateral indications of his good faith and 
 
 1 ^Yilbur V. Flood, 16 Mich. 40, 2 Foster v. People, 18 Mich 266, 
 
 •i3. 271.
 
 406 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 sincerity. AVhatever, therefore, may materially assist them in 
 this inquiry is most essential to the investigation of truth; and 
 it cannot but be material for the jury to understand the charac- 
 ter of the witness whom they are called upon to believe, and to 
 know whether, although he has not been convicted of any crime, 
 he has not in some measure rendered himself less credible by his 
 disgraceful conduct. The weight of this argument seems to have 
 been felt by the judges in several cases in which questions tend- 
 ing to disgrace the witness have been permitted in cross-exam- 
 ination. * * * Nor does there seem to be any good reason 
 why a witness should be privileged from answering a question 
 touching his present situation, employment and associates, if they 
 are of his own choice; as, for example, in what house or family 
 he resides, what is his ordinary occupation, and whether he 
 is intimately acquainted and conversant with certain persons, and 
 the like; for, however these may disgrace him, his position is 
 one of his own selection. * * * Xhe State has a deep in- 
 terest in the inducements to reformation held out by the protect- 
 ing veil which is thus cast over the past offenses of the penitent; 
 but where the inquiry relates to transactions comparatively recent, 
 bearing directly upon the present character and moral principles 
 of the witness, and therefore essential to the due estimation of his 
 testimony by the jury, learned judges have of late been disposed 
 to allow it." 1 
 
 § 461. Cross-examination as to Collateral Matters affecting 
 Credibility. — (!•) View that such cross-examination is not 
 permissible. — Upon this subject there appear to be two views: 
 1. That a witness cannot be cross-examined at all, as to matters 
 which arc collateral to the issues on trial, and which do not con- 
 cern his relations or feelings toward the parties or toward the 
 action, for the purpose of affecting his credibility. 2. That such 
 inquiries may be permitted by the court in the exercise of a 
 sound discretion. There is also a third rule, upon wliich all 
 courts are agreed, which is, that a witness cannot be cross-exam ■ 
 
 1 Greeul. Ev. (14th ed.), §§ 455, 45(5, 459.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 407 
 
 ined as to independent collateral facts, for the mere purpose of 
 impeaching him by contradiction. ^ The English and some of 
 the American courts hold that evidence of particular collateral 
 facts cannot be adduced in any case, whether civil or criminal, 
 in order to discredit a Avitness.'^ 
 
 §462. [CoxTixuED.] Illustrations OF THE Rule LAST Stated. — On 
 the trial of an issue " whether (during a certain period) there arose from 
 the works of the defendants noisome, offensive, noxious or unwhole- 
 some smoke, and other vapors, to the nuisance of the plaintiff, where- 
 by the produce of his garden was deteriorated," evidence was adduced, 
 for the plaintiff, to show that the smoke and other vapors from the de- 
 fendants' Avorks bad injured the produce of other gardens in the neigh- 
 borhood ; and also, for the defendants, to show that their works did not 
 injure the produce of any other grounds, and one of the defendants' 
 witnesses, haAing, on his examination in chief, described several gar- 
 dens in the neighborhood of the Avorks as in the utmost health, was 
 asked, on cross-examination by the plaintiff's counsel, whether he knew 
 Glasgow Field (grounds in the neighborhood), and having answered that 
 ' he knew Glasgow Field, and never knew of any damage done there,' 
 he was asked whether he had known of any sum haA ing been paid by 
 the defendants to the proprietors of Glasgow Field for alleged damage 
 there, occasioned by their works. It was held that the question was in- 
 admissible, as leading to a new collateral inquiry, which, answered either 
 
 way, could not affect the issue, or test the credit of the witness.^ 
 
 In an action of trover for converting pension money collected by the 
 defendant for the plaintiff, it was held not error to refuse to allow a 
 witness for the plaintiff to be cross-examined as to whether he had 
 
 been arrested for conspiring to procure fraudulent pensions.* 
 
 •On the trial of an action on the warranty of a horse, the plaintiff can- 
 not be asked, on cross-examination, how many other purchases of horses 
 
 he had made and tried to set aside within the last twenty years. ^ 
 
 On the trial of a bastardy suit, the prosecutrix, after being com- 
 
 1 Post, § 409. 3 Teuuaut v. Hamiltou, 7 CI. & Fin. 
 
 2 Hex V. Watsou, 2 Stark. 149; 122; s. c. 1 Rob. .s21. 
 
 Spencoly v. DeWillott, 7 East, 108; ^ Marks v. Hilsendegeu, 41! Mich, 
 
 s. c. 3 Smitla, 289; Marks v. Hilseii- 336. See also Bissell v. Starr, 32 
 
 ck'gen, 40 M\c\\. 336; Bi.ssell v. Starr, Mich. 299. 
 
 32 Midi. 299; Teuuaut v. Hamilton, 7 ^ llussell v. Cruttendeu, 53 Conn. 
 
 CI. & Fiu. 122. 504.
 
 408 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr. ^ 
 
 pelled, on cross-examination, to give a detailed account of the time, 
 place and attending circumstances of the alleged illicit intercourse, was 
 asked where she went and dined that day, — the counsel proposing to 
 follow this up by showing that she had, on different occasions, made 
 different statements in this respect. The court, having sustained an 
 objection to the question, it was, on a|)peal, held no error, — the Su- 
 preme Court taking the view that the matters proposed to be drawn out 
 were collateral ; and also that, while it might have been proper to allow 
 questions as to her movements and conduct, yet her answers on such 
 collateral matters would be conclusive for the purpose of laying a 
 ground to impeach her.i 
 
 § 463. [Exception.] Where Counsel Promise to show Rel- 
 evancy. — Upon a principle already explained, ^ the judge may, 
 even under this strict rule, in his discretion, allow the defendant's 
 counsel to cross-examine as to facts which appear to be irrelevant, 
 if he undertakes that it shall be shown by other evidence that they 
 are relevant.^ 
 
 § 464. [Continued.] (2.) Such Inquiries Permissible in 
 Discretion. — The other and better view is, that it is within the 
 discretion of the presiding judge to determine whether, in view 
 of the evidence which has been introduced, and of the nature of 
 the testimony given by the witness in chief, it is fit and proper 
 that questions of the kind should be overruled, or to what extent 
 such a cross-examination should be allowed.* In one jurisdiction 
 this rule has been stated thus: "How far justice requires a 
 tribunal to go from the issue for the trial of collateral questions ; 
 how much time should be sjDent in the trial of such questions \ 
 what evidence may be excluded for its remoteness of time and 
 
 1 Moore v. People, 108 111. 484. 2 Ante, § 351. 
 
 But, imder the English rule, in a ^ Haigh v. Belcher, 7 Car. & P. 
 
 prosecution for rape, it was held error 389. 
 
 to refuse to allow defendant's coun- ^ Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 
 
 sel to ask the prosecuting witness on 7(3; Johnstons. Jones, 1 Black (U. S ), 
 
 cross-examination, what her object 209; State t;. Rollins, 77 Me. 380; Peo- 
 
 was in going to Scott's station, the pie v. Blakeley, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 place wliere the rape was alleged to 176; Pooler v. Curtiss, 3 Thomp. & C. 
 
 have been committed. State u. Hart- (N. Y.)'228; Scheuck v. Griffin, 38 N. 
 
 nett, 75 Mo. 251. J. L. 403, 471.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 409 
 
 place ; and what evidence is otherwise too trivial to justify a pro- 
 longation of the trial, — are often questions of fact to be deter- 
 mined at trial." ^ It follows, where this ride prevails, that the 
 decision of the judge, in the exercise of this discretion, is not 
 subject to revieio, except in cases of manifest injustice or abuse ; - 
 but in one jurisdiction, as hereafter seen,^ convictions have been 
 reversed for trivial violations of this rule. 
 
 § 465. [Continued.] Illustrations of this Rule. — Thus, it is 
 witWn the sound discretion of the trial court to permit a witness to be 
 cross-examined, for the purpose of affecting credibihty, as to his belief 
 in the existence of God and a state of future rewards and punishments ; * 
 or whether he has not committed a particular act of immorality or crim- 
 inality , the fact of which, if true, would injuriously affect his credit as a 
 witness,^ — as whether he has been indicted for assault and battery ; ^ or 
 whether he had deserted from the army, or had been charged with crime, 
 no attempt having been made to impeach him b}^ contradiction on these 
 collateral matters ; ''' or how many times he has been in prison ; ^ or 
 
 whether he has been arrested for vagrancy.^ The extent of this 
 
 discretion is also illustrated by a ruling that it is not error for which a 
 judgment Avill be reversed, that the presiding judge allowed counsel to 
 cross-examine a witness as to the contents of a paper which was inci- 
 dental and collateral to the issues, when the object of the cross-exam- 
 ination was to affect the credibility of the witness merel3\'*' In a 
 
 prosecution for larceny from a store, committed while the merchant's at- 
 tention was engaged by the defendant, he was tried as an accomplice, 
 
 1 Watson V. Twombly, 00 N. H.491 392; Smith v. Yaryan, (.9 lud. Uo; s. 
 493. c. 35 Am. Rep. 232. 
 
 2 GreatWest. Turup. Co. i?. Loomis « Ryan v. People, 19 Him (X. Y.), 
 .32 N. Y. 127; Le Beau v. People, 34 N.' 188; distiuguishiug People v. Brown, 
 Y. 223; West v. Lynch, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 72 N. Y. 571. See also People v. Genet, 
 247. 19 Hun (N. Y.), 92, 102. 
 
 ^ Post,^ 472. " Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 
 
 ^ Clinton v. State, 33 Oh. St. 27, 34 ; 183. 
 
 Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. 4(50; Stanbro * People v. Hovey, 29 Hun (X. Y.), 
 
 V. Hopkins, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 270; 383,390. 
 
 People V. McGarren, 17 Wend. (X. Y.) ® People v. Manning, 48 Cal. 335. 
 
 460; 2 Tayl. Ev., § 1258. But see post, § 467. 
 
 5 South Bend v. Hardie, 98 Ind. w Klein v. Russell, 19 AYall. (U. S.) 
 
 577, 583. Compare Bersch v. State, 433. 
 13 lud. 434; Wilson v State, 16 Ind.
 
 410 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 the merchant being the complaining witness ; and, having said tliat he 
 had once been a member of a banking firm, was asked on cross-exam- 
 ination the following question: " Did you not, while a member of that 
 firm, extract from an envelope securities which were left in your vault 
 for safe keeping, and use the proceeds for stock speculations in New 
 York?" It was held that, although the witness might refuse to crim- 
 inate himself, yet as this was a personal jnHvilege which he might waive, 
 
 the question should have been allowed. ^ So, in a civil action for 
 
 indecent assault upon a woman, it was held proper to cross-examine the 
 defendant, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, as to whether he 
 had ever been arrested on a criminal charge made by another woman, 
 and whether he had settled it b}^ the payment of money. Graves, J., 
 said: '-The jury were required to decide on the value of his testi- 
 mony tendered in his own behalf, and it was competent to call upon 
 him to inform them of such incidents of his life, not amounting to self- 
 crimination, as would assist them in placing an accurate estimate upon 
 his statements as a witness; and the questions objected to called for 
 
 nothing more." So, on the trial of a bastardy proceeding, the 
 
 court refused to allow the complaining witness to be asked, on cross- 
 examination, whether she had not, and whether her mother with her had 
 not, stated to various persons named, that the complainant was going to 
 get a prostitute, then in the House of Correction, out of it, and hire her 
 to swear a case against the respondent. Having refused this, the 
 court allowed the complainant's own counsel to ask her for her version 
 of this conversation. "These rulings," said Campbell, J., were er- 
 roneous and injurious to the respondent. Such questions were admissi- 
 ble on two grounds. They were directly important in bearing on the 
 character and veracity of the witness, and they bear also on her disposi- 
 tion to resort to criminal practices to injure him. And it is very clear 
 that it was improper to allow her to give her own version without cross- 
 examination, and shut out cross-examination." ^ The defendant 
 
 in a murder trial insisted that he was acting in self-defense. The only 
 witness who was present at the shooting was the wife of the deceased, 
 and her testimony was in direct opposition to that of the defendant. 
 On her cross-examination, the defense offered to prove by her that she 
 had previously been married to one man, from whom she had never 
 been divorced ; that she then lived with another, who, by reason of her 
 conduct, became jealous, and shot her, afterwards killing himself ; that 
 
 1 People V. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710. » People v. "White, 53 Mich. 537, 
 
 2 Lelaud v. Kauth, 47 Mich. 508. 539.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 411 
 
 she and the deceased lived together as man and wife until the pre- 
 vious fall, and that they were married by reason of the regulations 
 governing the military reservation on which they lived. This offer was 
 rejected. It was held that this was error; the rejected questions 
 were proper cross-examination, for the purpose of impeaching her 
 testimony'. ^ 
 
 § 466. [Continued.] Contrary and Confusing Views. — Contrary 
 and confusing views are sometimes met with upon this question. In one 
 jurisdiction it is not competent, on cross-examination, to ask the witness 
 whether he has not comimtted certain acts, although the commission 
 of such acts, if admitted, would have a tendency to discredit his testi- 
 mony, by showing that he is a man of bad character. He cannot, for 
 instance, be asked if he has not been concerned in a particular transac- 
 tion which involved an attempt to cheat and swindle."^ - - - - In another 
 State, in an action by a father for the seduction of his daughter, her 
 character for chastity being involved in the question, of damages, evi- 
 dence of her particular acts of sexual immorality has been held admissi- 
 ble ; and yet it has been held that in such a case the principal female 
 witness cannot, over objections by her counsel, be asked, on cross-ex- 
 amination, whether she had not been previousl3^ criminally intimate 
 with other men. The reasoning was, that in her character as witness 
 she stood as any other witness in the case,-* and that in that character 
 she could be impeached onl}- ' ' in the usual mode, through general ques- 
 tions.'^ - _ - . But the same court has held, in a later case, that, in an ac- 
 tion by a female for her own seduction, or in a case of bastardy, it is 
 competent to ask the prosecuting witness, on cross-examination, 
 whether she had sexual intercourse with any person other than the de- 
 fendant about the time the child was begotten, as this would be a proper 
 Cact to be considered in estimating the damages.^ . . . _ Another 
 court, which has vacillated with reference to the rule of the preceding 
 section, seems to have taken the view in one case that evidence that a 
 witness made statements in other cases, or generally, of his being 02^en 
 to bribery, does not come within any recognized rule of impeachment, 
 unless such facts have created for him a reputation for untruth, and then 
 
 1 United States v. Wood (Dak.), ^ Long v. Morrison, 14 lud. 595. 
 
 33 N. W. Rep. 59. Francis, J. dis- Compare Wilson v. State, 1(J lud 
 
 seuted. 392. 
 
 ^ Madden v. Koester, 52 la. G92. ^ Smith r. Yarvau, 69 lud. 445; s.c 
 
 3 Shattuck V. Myers, 13 Ind. 14(3. 35 Am. Eep. 232.
 
 412 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 itisonly the reputation which is admissible, and not its cause. 1 - - - - A 
 witness had testified, on her examination in chief, in a criminal case, as 
 to what took place at two interviews between her and the accused, and, 
 on cross-examination, stated that there had been several interviews be- 
 tween the two interviews which she had spoken of. It was held that 
 the witness would not be required to state generally what took place at 
 these interviews, but only so much, if anything, us bore upon the is- 
 sue.-^ - The defendant in a criminal prosecution proved, by two of 
 
 the State's witnesses, upon their cross-examination, that they had ex- 
 pressed to L. their willingness, for a bribe, to leave the State, so as not 
 to appear as witnesses against the prisoner. Upon a subseque^it exam- 
 ination of L., on behalf of the prisoner, touching his negotiations with 
 those witnesses in regard to the matter of the bribery, it was held that 
 the motive and purpose of L. in the transaction were not admissible. ^ 
 
 § 467. Arrested, Indicted, Convicted. — There is a confu- 
 sion in the authorities as to whether a witness may be asked, on 
 cross-examination whether he has been arrested, indicted or con- 
 victed upon a criminal charge. One of the difficulties grows out 
 of the question whether such a matter can be proved by secondary 
 evidence — even by the admission of the witness, who must of all 
 men be certain of the fact if it existed. The strain about sec- 
 ondary evidence in such a case is a mere quibble, totally desti- 
 tute of common sense. One court has held that a party seeking 
 to impeach a witness may, on cross-examination, ask him whether 
 he has been convicted of a felony, and if so, what sentence was 
 imposed upon him.* The same court has held tliat it is compe- 
 tent to ask a witness on cross-examination whether he has been 
 arrested for vagrancy, — the objection that the question calls for 
 secondary evidence not being tenable, since the fact of an arrest 
 does not necessarily imply any record showing it.^ Another 
 court has held that a witness cannot be asked on cross-examination 
 whether he has been indicted for a crime, — as, for instance, per- 
 jury. Assuming that the question whether a witness has been in 
 
 1 Haiuiltou 1). People, 2;> Mich. 175, ^ People v. Rodrigo, 6!J Cal. (!01; 
 183. s. c. S Crim. Law Mag. 503. 
 
 2 Mitchell \i. Com., 75 Va. 856. ^ People v. Manniug, 48 Cal. 335. 
 
 3 Cheltou V. Stale, 45 Mel. 505.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 413 
 
 dieted merely for a crime, instead of asking him whether he has 
 been convicted of a crime, is competent at all, it has been held in 
 some jurisdictions that such a fact cannot be proved by the ad- 
 mission of the witness upon cross-examination, but can only be 
 proved by the record, i In another case in the same State a pris- 
 oner, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, was asked on cross- 
 examination by the State's attorney: " How many times have 
 you been arrested?" This was objected to by the prisoner's 
 counsel as incompetent, irrelevant, tending to degrade the wit- 
 ness, etc. The objection was overruled and the prisoner's 
 counsel excepted. The witness answered: "Five times, I be- 
 lieve." It was held that the evidence was inadmissible as an 
 impeachment of the prisoner's character, either generally or in 
 respect of truth and veracity. ^ 
 
 § 468. Questions creating Prejudice, but not affecting Cred- 
 ibility. —Within the rule of the preceding text,'^ questions which 
 might excite prejudice against the witness, but the answers to 
 which would not properly affect his credibility, are not allowed 
 to be put on cross-examination. Thus, it has been held, but it 
 is conceived on a doubtful view of the proper application of this 
 principle, that, in an action to set aside a mortgage as usurious, 
 where a witness for the defendant, who had acted for him in the 
 negotiation of the mortgage, was questioned as to whether he 
 had not, on other loans of defendant to other parties, taken notes 
 from them in excess of legal interest paid to defendant, —the 
 question was inadmissible for the purpose of affecting the credit 
 of the witness.^ 
 
 § 469. Cross-examination on Collateral Matters for the 
 Purpose of Contradiction.— All courts agree that a witness can- 
 
 1 Peck r. Yorks, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 32 N. Y. 229, 238; and distinguish 
 131, 134; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 Brandon r. People, 42 N Y 265 
 
 2 Bro^yn v. People, 8 Hun (N. Y.), < pooler v. Curtiss, 3 Thomp. & C. 
 562. The court cite: Jackson t;. Os- (N. Y.) 228; denying the dictum of 
 born, 2 AVend. (N. Y.) 555; People v. Peckhani, J., in Ross v. Ackermau, 46 
 Oay, 7 N. Y. 378; Lipe v. Eisenlerd, N. Y. 210.
 
 414 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr. , 
 
 not be cross-examined as to any matters which are purely coL 
 hiteral to the issues on trial, with the view of impeaching him by 
 contradiction. 1 The rule is somewhat differently stated and 
 applied by different authorities. It is thus stated by Mr. 
 Starkie: " It is here to be observed, that a witness is not to be 
 cross-examined as to any distinct collateral fact, for the purpose 
 of afterwards impeaching his testimony by contradicting him." ^ 
 " The rule does not, of course, exclude the contradiction of a wit- 
 ness as to any facts immediately connected with the subject of 
 the inquiry, wliich in themselves would otherwise be legitimate 
 evidence in the cause." ^ It is thus stated by the late Judge 
 Taylor: " In accordance with this general principle, a witnesss 
 may be cross-examined as to a former statement made by him 
 relative to the subject matter of the cause, and inconsistent with 
 his present testimony." ^ Professor Greenleaf says: "It is a 
 well settled rule that a witness cannot be cross-examined as to any 
 fact which is coUateral and irrelevant to the issue, merely for 
 the purpose of contradicting him by other evidence, if he should 
 deny it, thereby to discredit his testimony." Mr. Starkie's 
 statement has been adopted by some courts ^ and criticised by 
 others.'' In Massachusetts it is said: " The rule which excludes 
 all evidence tendintj to contradict the statements of a witness as 
 to collateral matters does not apply to any facts immediately 
 and properly connected with the main subject of inquiry." ^ In 
 Indiana it is added: " These decisions, however, do not go to the 
 extent of limiting the right to cross-examine, for the purpose of 
 laying a foundation for an impeachment, to particular matters 
 
 1 Clinton u. State, 33 Oh. St. 27, - 1 Stark. Ev. 9th Ed. 200. 
 
 34; Speuceley v. De Willott, 2 Lewin ^ Id. 203. 
 
 C. R. 155, n.; s. c. 7 East. 110; Smith ^ Tayl. Ev. (8th ed.), § 1445. 
 
 V. State, 5 Neb. 183; Henderson v. * Lawrence f. Lanning, 4 Ind. I94; 
 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 432; People v. De- Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42. 
 vine, 44 Cal. 452, 458; People v. Eur- ^ Atty.-Gen. v. Hitchcock, 1 Esch. 
 
 tado, 57 Cal. 346; Hester w. Com., 85 91; Hildeburn v. Curren, 65 Pa. St. 
 
 Pa. St. 139, 157; Harris v. Wilson, 7 59. 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 57; Lee v. Chadsey, 2 ' Com. v. Hunt, 4 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 Keyes (N. Y.), 546; People v. Cox, 21 421. 
 Hun (N. Y.), 47.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XVII.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
 
 415 
 
 testified to by the witness on his direct examination: nor do they 
 limit the cross-examination to such matters as bear directly and 
 immediately upon the issue. The effect of proving contradictory 
 statements extends no further than the question of credibility. 
 Such evidence does not tend to establish the truth of the matters 
 embraced in the contradictory statements; it simply goes to the 
 credibility of the witness.^ This consideration in itself supplies 
 a strono; reason for alio wins; a liberal latitude in cross-examininof 
 for the purpose of laying the foundation for impeachment ; for 
 a witness who tells a falsehood concerning a matter incidentally 
 connected with the subject of the action, is as likely to testify 
 untruly as if the falsehood had directly affected the issue. It is 
 difficult to perceive why a material falsehood concerning a matter 
 collaterally related to the main issue, is not as effective against 
 the credibility of the witness, ms one immediately bearing upon 
 the question." ^ The rule was thus stated by Baron Alderson in 
 
 1 Citiug Davis v. Harclj-, 7<j lud. 
 272; Docks v. Stoue, 13 Miuu. 43^. 
 
 2 Seller v. Jeukius, 97 lud. 430, 
 435. The Supreme Court of ludiaua 
 seems to have settled upou the idea 
 that the rule does uot limit the cross- 
 examination to sucli matters as bear 
 directly and immediately upou the 
 issue, although they must be con- 
 nected with the subject matter of the 
 action. Tlie court say: ''We are not 
 to be understood as holding that mat- 
 ters foreign to the subject matter of 
 the action, or vxiioUy irrelevant to tlie 
 issue, can be used for the purpose of 
 impeachment; but we hold, with the 
 authorities cited, that where the mat- 
 ters properly come up on cross-ex- 
 amination, they may be made use of 
 for the purpose of impeachment, 
 though the specific matter was not ex- 
 plicitly developed in tlie direct exam- 
 iuatiou." The court then, after pro- 
 ceeding to give the definitions of 
 several text writers as to the meaniuj;^ 
 of the word " issue " aud the word 
 
 "relevant," proceed to say: "His 
 statements concerning the matter 
 which, as a witness, he declares to be 
 true, must be relevant to tlie issue, 
 even using that word iu its strict tech- 
 nical sense. If his statements out of 
 court are untrue, then they conduce to 
 the truth of a pertinent hypothesis, 
 namely, the hypotliesis that the ap- 
 pelhint's statemeuts tending to estab- 
 lish his charge were uot true; so that 
 even taking the word < issue ' in its 
 strict technical sense, evidence of 
 statements containing an account of 
 his cliarge against' the appellee are 
 relevant. That the statements given 
 out of court may tend to discredit the 
 statements made in court teuding to 
 prove the plea of justification, is evi- 
 dent when it is brought to miud that 
 if, out of court he made one cliarge, 
 and in court testified to the truth of a 
 different one, there would be a ma- 
 terial inconsistency in his testimony." 
 Seller v. Jenkins, supra, opinion by- 
 Elliott, J.
 
 416 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thonip. Tl'., 
 
 a leading case: "A witness may be asked any question which, 
 if answered, would qualify or contradict some previous part of 
 that witness' testimony, given at the trial of the issue ; and if 
 that question is so put to him and answered, the opposite party 
 may then contradict him, — and for this simple reason, that the 
 contradiction qualifies or contradicts the previous part of the 
 witness' testimony, and so removes it."^ 
 
 §470. [Continued."] If Witness Answers, Answer Conclu- 
 sive. — If he is so cross-examined, the cross-examining party 
 makes him his own witness in respect of such matters, and cannot 
 contradict the testimony which he gives. ^ The reason of the rule 
 has been variously stated. In one case it was said to be that the 
 time of the court is too limited to admit of collateral inquiries.^ 
 The more usual reason which the courts give is, that such a practice 
 would confuse the jury by an interminable multiplication of 
 issues.* But this rule never applies to testimony which is not 
 collateral, but which is material to the issue. When a party, 
 brino-sout evidence on cross-examination, which is material to the 
 issue, he is not necessarily bound by it, but may contradict it by 
 other w^itnesses.^ The reason is that a contrary rule would result 
 in making his opponent's witness bis own, by the mere fact of 
 cross-examining him, and would have the effect of depriving a 
 party of the advantage of a cross-examination, so necessary to 
 the sifting of the truth and the attainment of justice. 
 
 1 Atty.-Geu. v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 319, 327; State v. Pattersou, 74 N. C. 
 91, 102. 157; Harris v. Tippett, 2 Camp. 637; 
 
 2 Leavitt v. Stansell, 44 Mich. 424; Rex w. Watson, 2 Stark, llfi, 149; Rex 
 People V. McKeller, 53 Cal. (i5; People v. Kudge, Peake Add. Cas. 232 ; Madden 
 V. Bell, 53 Cal. 119; Newberry v. Furni- v. Koester, 52 Iowa, (593; Hawkins v. 
 val, 4G How. Pr. (N. Y.) 139; Crounse Pleasants, 71 N. C. 325; State v. Rob- 
 V. Pitch, 6 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) (N. Y.) 185; erts, 81 N. C. 606; State v. Patterson, 
 Kaler I'. Builders' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 346. 
 
 120Mass. 333, 336; Farnumu. Farnura, ^ Att'y-Geu. v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 
 
 13 Gray (Mass.), 508; Coin. v. Cain, 14 91. 
 
 Gray (Mass.), 7; Fletcher ??. Boston & •* Spcuceley r. l)c Willott, 7 East, 
 
 Maine R. R., 1 Allen (Mass.), 9; People 108. 
 
 V. Webb (Cal.), 11 Pac. Rep. 509; s. c. & jsjewberry v. Furnival, 46 How. 
 
 70 Cal. 120; Gaines v. Com., 50 Pa. St. Pr. (N. Y.) 139.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. Xyil.] THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 417 
 
 § 471. [Continued.] Illustrations. — Under this rule, where, upon 
 the trial of a proceeding in bastardy, the defendant asked the prosecu- 
 trix, on cross-examination, if she had ever had sexual intercourse with 
 A., to which she replied that she had not, — it was held that the ques- 
 tion was collateral and irrelevant, and the answer of the prosecutrix, 
 conclusive on the defendant, and that the court did not err in excluding 
 
 the testimon}' of A. in contradiction thereof. ^ So, where a witness on 
 
 his cross-examination was asked whether the prosecutor had not paid 
 him for coming from another State to be a witness, and he answered 
 that he had not, it was held incompetent for the defendant to introduce 
 
 witnesses to prove declarations that he had been so paid.^ In a 
 
 civil case, the defendant called George Morse, for the purpose of im- 
 peaching the plaintiff, Mr. Wilder, as a witness. Morse gave testimony 
 to the effect that the plaintiff's general reputation for truth and ver- 
 acity was bad. He was then asked by the defendant this question : 
 "Did Mr. Wilder state to you, in a certain conversation, that he re- 
 garded it as no wrong to swear falsely against such a man as Albert 
 Morse?" This was objected to, the objection overruled, and an ex- 
 ception taken. Tlie witness answered, " He did," though he could not 
 tell " how long ago it was." It was held that, to allow this question 
 was error, for which the judgment should be reversed.*^ In an ac- 
 tion on a policy of insurance against fire, the issues were whether an 
 addition to the building, in which was the property insured, materially 
 increased the risk, and whether the insurer assented to the addition be- 
 ing made. A witness for the defendant, who had the general manage- 
 ment of his business, was asked, on cross-examination, whether the 
 plaintiff did not, in an interview with him, show him a letter containing 
 this statement: "All my companies have paid, and I see no reason 
 v\'hy the others should not pay." The witness answered in the nega- 
 tive. It was held that this evidence was collateral and irrelevant to 
 the issues of the trial, that the witness could not be contradicted upon 
 this point, and that the admission of a letter written by an agent of 
 other insurance companies, containing such a clause, with evidence 
 that it was shown to the witness, gave the defendant good ground of 
 exception.'* A defendant charged with an indecent assault, hav- 
 ing been cross-examined as to alleged indecencies in respect of other 
 
 1 States. Patterson, 7i N. C. 157. 3 wilder r. Peabo:ly, 21 Huu (N. 
 
 2 Stater. Patterson, 2 Ived L. (X. Y.),:37i;. 
 
 C.) 346. See also Clark v. Clark, Go •« Kaler v. Bniklers Mutual Ins. Co., 
 N. C. 655. 120 Mass. 333. 
 
 27
 
 418 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tr.^ 
 
 persons, and having denied them, — evidence in disproof of these im- 
 putations on the one side, or in respect of them on the other, is properly- 
 rejected under the foregoing rule, as relating to collateral issues. , The 
 plaintiff is bound by the defendant's answers as to these collateral 
 
 matters.^ So, where the mother of the accused, on a criminal 
 
 trial, was called by the defense and gave evidence tending to show that 
 the accused was at home at the time a certain letter was delivered, and, 
 having stated on cross-examination that sbe did not know that the ac- 
 cused wrote a letter on the morning of the day the one in question was 
 delivered, she was subsequently asked on cross-examination whether 
 she did not tell certain persons named that the accused had written a 
 letter on the morning of that day, and she replied that she did not. 
 Subsequently these persons were called and allowed, against the ob- 
 jection of the accused, to testify that the mother had told them that the 
 accused had written a letter on the morning of that day. The mother 
 had made no reference to the writing of the letter in her direct exami- 
 nation. It was held that the prosecution, by attempting to prove by her 
 that the accused had written one on the day in question, had made her, 
 for that purpose, their own witness, and could not thereafter discredit 
 her testimony in regard to it, by showing contradictory statements 
 made to other persons when not under oath.'-^ 
 
 § 472. [Continued.] Instances of Convictions Reversed for a 
 VIOLATION of this Rule. — A witucss for the defendant, on a' criminal 
 trial, on cross-examination, stated that he lived in the City of San 
 Francisco ever since the year 1855, except that he had been out of 
 the city for the space of two years, working on a ranch in Marin 
 county. He also stated that he had testified in this cause, as a 
 witness for the prisoner, at a former trial. He was then asked 
 by the people's counsel, whether he had not testified at the former 
 trial that he had lived in Mai-in County four years, or that he had 
 been in that county six or seven years since the year 1855, and he 
 answered that he had not so testified. In rebuttal, the people, in order 
 to contradict the witness on this point, were permitted by the court, 
 
 1 Tolraan v. .Tohustone, 2 Fost. & 350. It is said in People v. Cox, supra, 
 
 Fin. m. that Greenfield v. People, 13 Hun (N. 
 
 ^ People V. Cox, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 47. Y.), 244, was not intended to be car- 
 Compare Honan v. Cregan, (5 Rob. (N. ried beyond the above authorities, 
 Y.) 188; Com. v. Bean, 111 Mass. some of which are therein cited. 
 438; Thomas v. David, 7 Carr. & P.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVII.J THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 419 
 
 against the objections of the prisoner, to read to the jury a portion of 
 the evidence given by the witness at the former trial, and by which it 
 was made to appear that he had, in point of fact, testified as claimed 
 by the counsel for the prosecution, and had stated at the former trial 
 that he had been absent from San Francisco and in Marin county 
 some sis or seven years since the year 1855. For this trivial departure 
 from the rules of evidence a conviction of felony was reversed and 
 
 the cause remanded for a new trial. ^ On a trial for murder the 
 
 defendant was examined as a witness in his own behalf, and, on his 
 cross-examination testified, that the deceased, on the occasion of the 
 quarrel which resulted in his death, called the defendant and his brother 
 " damned sons of bitches." The witness further testified: "That is 
 not the first time I ever heard him use that kind of language. Have 
 heard him use it frequently. I do not know as he was a practical 
 swearer." The prosecution called several witnesses in rebuttal, who 
 were permitted to testify, against the objection of the defendant, that 
 they were intimately acquainted with the deceased in his life time, and 
 that he was not a profane swearer, and that they never heard him use 
 profane language. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court ; 
 and, because the prosecution was allowed to go into this collateral and 
 irrelevant matter, which could not possibly affect the merits of the case 
 or prejudice the accused in any way, a conviction was reversed and a 
 new trial ordered.'^ Such decisions are a mere travesty upon the ad- 
 ministration of justice. 
 
 § 473. [Continued.] AVliat if Question answered without 
 Objection. — Although the witness may be asked such an irrele- 
 vant and collateral question and may answer it without objection, 
 evidence cannot be afterwards admitted to contradict his testi- 
 mony in respect of such collateral matter.'^ But the answers 
 are evidence in the case, and when they tend to affect the credi- 
 bility of a witness, are to be ^veighed and considered by the jury.* 
 
 § 474. Where the Opposite Party is a Witness. — It has been 
 suggested, on grounds that are obviously sound, that the fact 
 that the wdtuess is a party to the action, will justify the court, in 
 
 1 People ". McKeller, 53 Cal. 65. See also Goodhand v. Bentou, fi Gill 
 
 2 People V. Bell, 53 Cal. 119. & J. (Md.) 4S1. 
 
 3 Sloau V. Edwards, (11 IMd. 00, 105. ■» Craig v. Rohrer, G3 111. 325.
 
 420 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOIiip. Tr., 
 
 its discretion, in allowing even a broader range of cross-exami- 
 nation than would be allowed where the witness is not a party. ^ 
 But at the same time it is held that this is not the rigid of the 
 adverse party, but that the rules of cross-examination are the 
 same, whether the witness be a party or not.^ Thus, the plaintiff 
 having testified in his own behalf, in a suit against a city for 
 personal injury claimed to have been received from a defective 
 sidewalk, the defendant proposed, by cross-examining him, to 
 show that, three years before, he had combined with others to 
 defraud an insurance company which had taken a risk upon his 
 life. It was held that such cross-examination might, in the dis- 
 cretion of the trial court, be either refused or permitted without 
 error, the witness not claiming his privilege.^ Reasoning from 
 the same premises, it has been held that a defendant who offered 
 himself as a witness in his own behalf, might be asked whether 
 he had not disposed of his property so as to avoid the payment of 
 any recovery in the action then being tried; whether, since such 
 disposal, he had not been engaged in selling the same property ; 
 and whether he had not gone to New York to consult a spiritualist 
 in regard to the money which was the subject of the contro- 
 versy, — and his answers to these questions were held the proper 
 subjects of comment to the jury.* But this rule does not extend 
 so far as to render it proper to allow frivolous and immaterial 
 questions.^ 
 
 1 Norris v. Cargill, 57 Wis. 251, "Did you tell Mr. Beach or Mr. Hoy t 
 255; Kuapp v. Schuei'ler, 24 Wis. 70. (plaiutiff's attorneys), or either of 
 The suljject of the cross-exaraiuation them, how much Mr. Arts owed you 
 of accused persons, who offer them- wheu you brought this suit? " It was 
 selves as witnesses in criminal trials, held that these questions were prop- 
 is reserved for a future chapter. Fost, erly excluded. It was utterly imraa- 
 chap. 23. terial under whose advice or direction 
 
 2 Norris V. Cargill, swpra; Howland the suit was brought; nor could a 
 V. Jenks, 7 AVis, 57. communication of facts made to the 
 
 5 South Bend v. Hardy, 98 Ind. 577. plaintiffs counsel be introduced in ev- 
 
 4 State ex rel. v. Phillips, 70 N. C. idence. Walthelm v. Arts, 70 la. 609; 
 
 4G2. s. c. 31 N. W. Rep. 953. In Georgia a 
 
 ^ Thus, in a civil case in Iowa, the ruling of the trial court was sustained, 
 
 plaintiff was asived on cross-examiua- in suppressing a series of interrog- 
 
 tion: "Who told you to 1)i-iiig tliis atories sued out by the plaintiff, 
 
 r^uit against liim (defendant) V also, on tlie ground tliat one of the
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XVII.] THE CKOSS-EXAMIXATION. 421 
 
 § 475. Right of Witness to Explain. — A witness is entitled 
 to explain his declarations, introduced for the purpose of showing 
 an apparent hostility against the defendant.^ Where, on the 
 cross-examination of a witness, collateral facts are called out 
 from him tending to create a distrust in his integrity, fidelity or 
 truth, it is competent for the adverse party to ask, on re-exam- 
 ination an explanation^ which will tend to support his testimony, 
 although the circumstances thus proved are foreign to the main 
 issue, and would not have been permitted but for the previous 
 cross-examination/'' Thus, if he admits on cross-examination 
 that he has given contrary testimony, — as, for instance, before 
 a committing magistrate in the same case, — he may, on re- 
 examination, be permitted to state that such former testimony 
 was given in consequence of threats of personal violence by the 
 opposing witness.^ So, where a witness is interrogated, on 
 cross-examination, as to former inconsistent declarations, and 
 denies that he made them, he may state, in rebuttal, wJiat he did 
 saj/ on the particular occasion.* So, if the plaintiff's testimony 
 is assailed by that given for the defendant, setting up a new state 
 of facts, the plaintiff may explain away or modify the facts b}' 
 re-examination or by rebutting testimony. Thus, where a de- 
 fendant, on a trial for stabbing, gave in evidence a previous 
 
 cross-interrogatories had not heea fitlly on cross-examination, to conversations 
 
 answered. Tlie court said : ''Where a with the defendant, the defendant, 
 
 party to a cause makes himself a wit- called as a witness by the plaintiff, 
 
 ness in his own behalf, he should be may be examined on the subject of the 
 
 held to answer strictly and minutely same conversations. Homansr. Corn- 
 
 every interrogatory put to him of ing, (30 N. H. 418. See also Laws of 
 
 which he has knowledge, and if he New Hampshire, chap. 228, § 15. 
 
 neglects to answer, or answers eva- ^ State v. Stewart, 11 Ore. 52. As 
 
 sively, such testimony should be re- to the right of a witness to explain a 
 
 jected. Howai"di\ Chamberlin, 68 Ga. mistake made in his testimony on the 
 
 (i84, ()!)(). This was probably ruled in trial of another case between the same 
 
 conformity with some statutory re- parties, see McDonald v. McDonald, 
 
 quirement; the general rule would be 55 Mich. 155. 
 
 that the failure to answer the cross- - United States v. Eighteen Barrels 
 
 interrogatories fully would go merely of High Wines, 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 475, 
 
 to the credibility of the witness and be 478. 
 
 a subject of comment before the jury. ^ Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380. 
 
 Whei-e the plaintiff's witness testified, ^ Haley v. State, G3 Ala. 83.
 
 422 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl*., 
 
 difficulty or quarrel on the same day, to show a conspiracy to do 
 him bodily harm, it was competent for the State to prove other 
 incidents of such previous difficulty, in order that the jury might 
 better understand the real merits of the case.^ A witness having 
 testified to certain facts was asked on cross-examination if he had 
 not made a different statement to A., and he replied that he had 
 not. The adverse party afterwards called A. as a witness, who 
 testified that the former witness had made a different statement 
 to him. The former witne^ss was again recalled and stated what 
 he did say to A., and was going on to give the further conversa- 
 tion between him and A. upon the subject, when, on objection of 
 the adverse party, the court ruled it out. It was held that the 
 party calling the witness was entitled to have the whole conver- 
 sation detailed so far as it related to the same subject.^ 
 
 s McAffee v. State, 31 Ga. 411. « Harrison's Appeal, 48 Coim. 202.
 
 Tit. Ill, CI). XVIII.] THE HE-EXAMIXATION, 423 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 OF THE KE-EXAMIXATION. 
 Sectiox 
 
 480. Purpose of. 
 
 481. Developing New Matter brought out on Cross-examination. 
 
 482. Wlien not Permitted witliout Leave of Court. 
 
 483. Re-examiaation as to Incompetent and Irrelevant Matters. 
 
 484. Limits of Re-examination as to Former Statements. 
 
 485. [Continued.] An Illustration of the Rule. 
 
 480. Re-examination as to Reasons for Animosity towards Accused. 
 
 § 480. Purpose of. — After the witness has been cross-ex- 
 amined, he may often be re-examined by the party originally 
 calling him. The re-examination sustains, in respect of the 
 cross-examination, a relation similar to that which the cross-ex- 
 amination sustains to the direct examination. Its object is to 
 develop, explain, or modify any new matter which may have 
 been brought out on the cross-examination. 
 
 § 481. Developing Xew Matter brought out on Cross-ex- 
 amination. — The privilege which is extended to the cross-exam- 
 ining party, of developing and following into detail matter which 
 has been brought out on the direct examination, extends equally 
 to the other party, in respect of new matter which is brought out 
 on cross-examination. When, therefore, a witness has, on cross- 
 examination, detailed a part of a conversation, the other party 
 has a right, on re-examination, to have him state the whole of the 
 conversation, so far as it is material to the issues. ^ So, the re-ex- 
 amination of a witness should be permitted in respect of matters 
 drawn out on the cross-examination, or which furnish cir- 
 cumstances by which a material transaction is impressed on 
 the witness' mind.^ It is obviously competent for a party 
 
 1 Roberts v. Roberts, 85 N. C. '.). 2 Farmers &c. Bank v. Young, 36 
 
 See Cabiness v. Martin, 4 Dev. L. (N. la. 44. 
 C.) 106; Gray v. Cooper, 65 N. C. 183.
 
 424 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thoilip. Tr. , 
 
 to recall a witness, once sworn and examined in his behalf, for 
 re-examination in rehuttal^ without express leave of the court. ^ 
 Under the American rule,^ where the cross-examiner, in develop- 
 ing new matter, thereby makes the witness his own, it fol- 
 lows, in the view of some courts, that the party who orig- 
 inally called the witness may follow up the line of inquiry 
 thus touched upon, by a re-examination, which re-exam- 
 ination is in the nature of a cross-examination of the de- 
 fendant's witness.^ But this rule has no application where the 
 matter brought out is not new matter, but is merely matter 
 which was touched upon in the examination in chief. If this 
 matter was not competent, it does not afford a justification to 
 the party who originally stirred it, to go on and develop, in re- 
 examination, a greater mass of incompetent evidence of the same 
 character. Thus, on the examination of a witness for the plaint- 
 iff, certain evidence, touching transactions between the plaintiff 
 and his deceased partner, was ruled out under the defendant's 
 objection, the same being clearly incompetent under the statute. 
 On cross-examination, the defendant asked the witness a ques- 
 tion touching the evidence so ruled out, which the witness an- 
 swered. On re-direct examination, the witness was permitted by 
 the court, against the defendant's objection, to enter into a full 
 explanation of the matter. The Supreme Court held that this 
 was error.* 
 
 § 482. When not Permitted without leave of Court. — It is 
 
 an established rule, both of courts of law and of equity, founded, 
 it is believed, upon a sound policy, that a witness cannot, with- 
 out express leave of court, be re-examined as to matter upon 
 which he has already been examined in chief, unless it becomes 
 necessary or proper in view of his cross-examination.^ But 
 where a witness is recalled, and objection is made to his examina- 
 
 1 Osborue v. O'Reilly, 34 N. J. Eq. 1104; Osborne v. O'Rielly, 34 N. J. Eq. 
 60, 60. (;o, (i(!. See also Crawford v. Berthof, 
 
 2 Ante, § 432. 1 N. J. Eq. 458; Delaney v. Noble, 3N. 
 
 3 Gray V. Cooper, (55 N. C. 183. J. Eq. 441; Hanson v. Presbyterian 
 
 4 Jackson u. Evans, 73 N. C. 128. Cluirch, 11 N. J. Eq. 441; Svvartz v. 
 
 5 Whart. Ev., § 574; Dan. Cli. Pr. Chickerin<r, 58 Md.291, 2!)7.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XVIIL] THE RE-EXAMINATIOX. 425 
 
 tion, it will not be assignable for error that the court permitted 
 him to be examined, unless the ground of the objection was 
 stated. 1 Such testimony, in a chancery case, should be ex- 
 cluded on exception.^ But the passing of an order allowing the 
 re-examination of a witness in equity, is a matter resting in the 
 discretion of the court, which discretion is not subject to review 
 on appeal.^ 
 
 § 483. Re-exainiuatioii as to Incompetent and Irrelevant 
 Matters. — If one side introduces evidence irrelevant to the is- 
 sue, which is prejudicial and harmful to the other party, then, 
 although it come in without objection, the other party is entitled 
 to introduce evidence which will directly and strictly contradict 
 it. The government, in a criminal trial, waives the strict rule to 
 this extent, by its misstep of introducing illegal evidence; but the 
 respondent is not entitled to & further relaxation of the common 
 rule , because he could, by his objection, have excluded the illegal 
 or ir relevant evidence.* This is just and proper, to enable the 
 other party to explain away the prejudicial effect of the evidence, 
 which, in many cases cannot be cured by an instruction withdraw- 
 ing it from the attention of the jury. Thus, where, in a criminal 
 trial, the State's attorney was allowed by the court to ask the de- 
 fendant's witnesses wdiere they came from when they came to the 
 witness stand, to which they answered that they came from jail, — 
 it was held error not to allow them to state on what charofe they 
 were committed to jail, though they could not regularly be dis- 
 credited by such testimony.^ In one jurisdiction, wdiere the rule 
 prevails that a witness for the prosecution in a criminal trial is 
 as much the people's witness when under cross-examination as 
 when being examined in chief,'' the conclusion has been drawn 
 
 1 Osborne v. O'Reilly, 34 N. J. Eq. 9 Allen (Mass.), (',7; Parker v. Dudley, 
 60, m. 118 Mass. G02, (,i05; Phillips v. Hoyle, 
 
 2 Swartz t?. Chickering, 58 Md. 291, 4 Gray (Mass.), 568; Eddy v. Gray, 
 297. 4 Allen (Mass.), 435; Coin. v. Fitzser- 
 
 3 Swartz V. Chickering, 58Md. 291, aid, 2 Allen (Mass.), 297; Brown v. 
 297. Perkins, 1 Allen (Mass.), 89. 
 
 * State V. Witham, 72 Me. 531, 536; a stute v. Ezell,41 Tex. 35. 
 
 Stater. Sargent, 32 Me. 431; Williams ^ Wagner v. People, 30 Mich. 384; 
 
 V. Gilman. 71 Me. ?1: Mowry v. Smith, Wilson v. Wagar. 26 Mich- 45S, IcS
 
 426 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 that the mere fact that a witness has been permitted, on cross- 
 examination on a subject touched uponintlie direct examination, 
 to detail, without objection, evidence whicli is hearsay merely, 
 will not authorize the calling out of tJie rest of the story, against 
 objection, on the re-direct examination, on the claim that it is a 
 part of the same conversation.^ Elsewhere it is ruled, on a con- 
 ception analogous to the doctrine of estoppel, that it is not ground 
 of error that a witness, on his re-examination, is permitted to re- 
 peat incompetent evidence which has been brought out on the 
 cross-examination.^ 
 
 § 484. Limits of Re-examination as to former State- 
 ments. — Professor Greenleaf says: " After a witness has been 
 cross-examined respecting a former statement made by him, the 
 party who called him has a right to re-examine him to the same 
 matter. The counsel has a right, upon such re-examination, to 
 ask all questions which may be proper to draw forth an explana- 
 tion of the sense and meaning of the expressions used by the 
 witness on cross-examination, if they be in themselves doubtful, 
 and also of the motive by which the witness was induced to use 
 those expressions ; but he has no right to go further, and to in- 
 troduce matter new in itself, and not suited to the purpose of 
 exphiining either the expressions or motives of the witness." ^ 
 
 § 485. [Continued.] An Illustration of the Rule. — Upon the 
 trial of an indictment for arson a witness for the State, on his direct 
 examination, testified that, in a conversation with liira on a certain 
 occasion, the accused said to him, " I suppose you are going to send 
 me up on that buggy scrape." On his cross-examination the witness 
 explained that the words " buggy scrape " referred to a buggy which 
 one L. had caused the accused to be arrested for steahng a few days 
 before, and that the witness had been employed by L. to look it up 
 and had recovered it. On his re-direct examination, the witness was 
 permitted, against objection, to testify " what he knew and what he 
 did in regard to that buggy scrape," and to detail facts having a strong 
 tendency to show that the accused had stolen the buggy. It was held 
 
 MVagner ?7. People, 30 Mich. 384. 3 i Greenl, Ev., § iCT. So held in 
 
 2 Goodmau v. Keuuedy, 10 Neb. 270. Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429, 432.
 
 Tit. in, Ch. XVIII.] THE RE-EXAMINATION. 427 
 
 that this was new matter, not admissible within the foregoing: rule in 
 respect of re-direct examination, and that its admission was fatal 
 error. ' The decision is supportable on the ground that the evidence was 
 incompetent, since it was evidence of another and a distinct offense, of 
 a diferent character from the one on trial ; but the opinion, so far as it 
 holds that it is fatal error, in a criminal or in a civil trial, for the judge 
 to allow new matter to be gone into on re-direct examination, is mani- 
 festly unsound. Such a matter, by the best authority and reason, is 
 left to rest within the sound discretion of the trial judge. - 
 
 § 486. Re-examination Jis to Keasoiis of Aiiiinosity towards 
 Accused. — In Louisiana, it is held that, where a witness for the 
 State, on cross-examination, admits that his feelings to the ac- 
 cused are unfriendly, the counsel of the State cannot, on the re- 
 examination, ask the witness to state the reasons of his animosity. 
 The reason is that, to permit the State's witness thus to detail 
 the causes of his animosity towards the accused, is to suffer him 
 to testify to matters which are wholly irrelevant to the issues on 
 trial, and also to give him an opportunity of poisoning the minds 
 of the jury against the accused, by relating facts and circum- 
 stances, and making accusations, wholly disconnected with the 
 charge for which the accused is being tried, without an opportun- 
 ity of defense or reply being offered to the accused. Such an 
 irregularity has been held good ground for reversing a convic- 
 tion.^ The rule, heretofore explained, that such statements are 
 collateral to the inquiry, in the sense that the cross-examining 
 party, by interrogating the witness concerning them, makes the 
 witness his own witness, so that he is bound by his answers, 
 does not apply ; and it is error to reject the contradictory evi- 
 dence on this ground.* Thus, it is comi)eteut, for the purpose of 
 impeaching the credibility of a witness, to show that there has 
 been a quarrel between him and the party against whom he testi- 
 fies ; and it is not necessary that the cause of the quarrel should 
 be connected with the subject-matter of the suit on trial. 
 
 1 Schaser v. State, 3G AVis. 429. * Bosboroiigh v. State (Tex. Ct. of 
 
 2 Ante, §349. App.), 8 Crim. Law Mag. 751; s. c. 21 
 
 3 State V. Gregory, 33 La. Aim. 737. Tex. App. G72.
 
 428 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 Where the party against whom a witness testifies asks him, on 
 cross-examination, whether there has not been such a quarrel, he 
 does not thereby make the witness his own witness so as to preckicle 
 himself from contradicting him.^ The rule which thus requires 
 a foundation to be laid, applies equally to the case of oral state- 
 ments and to a previous deposition given by the witness.^ Ac- 
 cordingly, it has been held that, where the deposition of the wit- 
 ness has been read in evidence, and the opposing party produces 
 another and a conflicting deposition of the same witness, in an- 
 other action between the same parties, of a prior date, and offers 
 to introduce the same to impeach the witness, and the court of its 
 own motion excludes the testimony, it is not error. ^ It has even 
 been held that, where the deposition of a deceased witness had been 
 by consent read in evidence, another and conflicting deposition of 
 the same witness, at a prior trial, could not be read, in order to 
 impeach the witness, for the reason that the attention of the 
 witness had not been called to the conflict between the two dep- 
 ositions.* But this last holding does not seem to be supported 
 by reason ; since the prior deposition would certainly have some 
 tendency to impair the effect of the latter one, and since the 
 death of the witness has rendered it impossible to examine him 
 respecting the discrepancy between the two. 
 
 1 Beardsley v. Wiklraan, 41 Conu. ^ Greer u. Higgius, 20 Kan. 420, 424. 
 515. * Hubbard v. Briggs, 31 N. Y. 51P 
 
 2 Cropsey v. Averill, 8 Neb. 157. Runyau v. Price, 15 Oh. St. 1,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 429 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 OF INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 
 
 Section 
 
 489. P'our Modes of Impeachiuii the Credit of a Witness. 
 
 490. Riglit to Impeach l^y Proof of previous Coutradictory or hostile 
 
 Statements or Acts. 
 
 491. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 492. Previous Declarations of Witness not Evidence in Chief. 
 
 493. Rule does not Extend to contrary Expressions of Opinion. 
 
 494. Degree of Contradiction does not Determine Competency. 
 
 495. Not necessary that previous Declarations should have been Intention- 
 
 ally False. 
 
 496. Necessity of Laying Foundation. 
 
 497. When Foundation need not be laid. 
 
 498. What if no Objection is made. 
 
 499. Rule applies to Evidence of Previous Threats or Hostile Statements. 
 
 500. Rule Tvhere the Contradictory Declaration is in Writing. 
 
 501. [Continued.] Manner of Interrogating the Witness as to such Writing. 
 
 502. Particularity in laying the Foundation. 
 
 503. Contradictory Testimony given on a Former Occasion. 
 
 504. Former Testimony, how T*roved. 
 
 505. Proving the Contradictory Statements in other Cases. 
 50G. RuleTvhere the Witness admits such Statements. 
 
 507. What if Witness says he does not Remember. 
 
 508. Answer Categorically, and Explain on Re-examination. 
 
 509. Impeachment of Married Woman by Evidence of Conspiracy by Hus- 
 
 band, 
 
 510. Recalling Opponent's Witness to put Impeaching Questions,- 
 
 511. Impeachment of one's own Witness. 
 
 512. Exception where the Party is Surprised or Entrapped by the Witness. 
 
 513. Exception in the case of a Hostile Witness. 
 
 514. Assailing Credit of Witness called by both Parties. 
 
 515. Contradicting the Statements of one's own Witness. 
 
 § 489. Four Modes of Impeaching- the Credit of a Wit- 
 
 5JCSS. — There are but four modes of impeaching the credit of a 
 witness: 1. By cross-examination. 2. By proving previous con- 
 tradictory statements or acts. 3. By producing the record 
 of his conviction of some infamous crime. 4. By adducing gen-
 
 430 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 eral evidence tending to show that he is unworthy of belief on 
 his oath. ^ The Jirst has been ah'eady considered ; '-^ the second 
 will be considered in this, and the third and fourth, in the succeed- 
 ing chapter. 
 
 § 490. Right to Impeach hy Proof of Previous Contra- 
 dictory or Hostile Stateuients or Acts. — It is the absolute right 
 of a cross-examining party to lay a foundation for impeaching a 
 witness, by interrogating him as to whether or not he has made 
 contrary declarations on a former occasion, and the exclusion of 
 questions put for this purpose is error for which new trial will 
 be granted; ^ and where the proper foundation has been laid, as 
 hereafter explained, it is the right of the party seeking to im- 
 peach the witness, to introduce such impeaching evidence, and the 
 exclusion of it will be error. ^ The acts of the witness, relevant to 
 the subject of the action and inconsistent with his testimony, may 
 be shown as affecting his credibility.^ 
 
 § 491. [Continued.] Illustrations. — A witness testified in his 
 direct examination, that he had no ill feeling against the accused, when 
 he approached him, just before the difficulty which occasioned the in- 
 dictment. It was error to exclude his testimony, on cross-examina- 
 tion, regarding his declarations, made just before the difficulty, showing 
 
 a different state of feeling.^ A witness had testified, on his direct 
 
 examination, as to the unprojitableness of keeping a certain railroad 
 eating house. It was held competent to ask him, on his cross-examina- 
 tion, whether he had not published the following notice, and to offer the 
 notice in evidence: "For sale. Railroad Eating House, with furni- 
 ture and good will, on line of Union Pacific R. R. in Nebraska; regu- 
 lar eating house for all trains; large trains and large profits; terms, 
 part on cash and part on time. For particulars address," etc.^ 
 
 ^ Rexw. Watsou, 2 Stark. 116, 149: Rep. 4; State v. Downs (Mo.), 3 S. W. 
 
 Speucely v. DeWillott, 7 East, 108; s. c Rep. 219; s. c. 91 Mo. 19. 
 
 3 Smith, 289. fi Hyland v, Miluer, 99 Ind. 308; 
 
 2 Antr, chap. XVII. ante, §450. 
 
 ^ Pruitt V. Brockman, 46 Ind. SH; 6 McFarlin ?». Sttite, supra. 
 
 McFarlin V. State, 41 Tex. 23; Tiiruey ^Market v. Moudy, 13 Neb. 323, 
 
 V. State, 9 Tox. App. 193. 327. 
 
 * Joseph V. Com, (Ky.), ] S. W.
 
 Tit III, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 431 
 
 § 492. Previous Declarations not Evidence in Chief. 
 
 What a witness, who is not a party, states out of court, is not evi- 
 dence in chief, to prove the fact as stated by him ; but can only be 
 shown to discredit his testimony at the trial, when his testimony 
 is contradicted by such outside statements. i The effect of prov- 
 ing contradictory statements extends no further than the ques- 
 tion of credibility; it does not tend to establish the truth of the 
 matters embraced in the contradictory statements ; it simply goes 
 to the credibility of the witness. 2 
 
 § 493. Rule does not extend to Contrary Expressions of 
 Opinion. — The rule does not extend so far as to introduce pre- 
 vious expressions of opinion made by the witness. Thus, on the 
 trial of an indictment for a criminal offense, the defendant can- 
 not show that a witness, who has testified to circumstances tend- 
 ing to connect him with the_crime, had previously expressed the 
 opinion that he, the defendant, was innocent; since the expres- 
 sion of such an opinion would not tend to contradict the facts to 
 which the witness testified.^ So, where, in an action for dam- 
 ages for an assault and battery, a witness was asked, on cross- 
 examination, whether he had not gone to the plaintiff "s store some 
 time after the occurrence, and there stated to the plaintiff that 
 the assault upon him was a great outrage, and that he would be 
 foolish if he did not make the defendant smart for it; and the 
 plaintiff then, for the purpose of contradicting the witness, was 
 allowed to testify, against the objection of the defendant, that the 
 witness had come to his store a week after the occurrence, where, 
 after the plaintiff had explained the occurrence to the witness,' 
 the witness had said that it was a great outrage, and that the 
 plaintiff should make the defendant smart for it.* 
 
 § 494. Degree of Contradiction does not determine Com- 
 petency.— The Supreme Court of Indiana say: "There must be 
 
 1 Law ^'. Fairfield, 40 Vt. 425. 3 Com. v. Moonev, 110 Mass 99 
 
 ^ Seller ^.Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430,435; 4 gloau v. Edwards, 01 Md. 90, 
 
 Davis V. Hardy, 76 Ind. 272; Hicks v. 104. 
 Stoue, 13 Miuu. 434.
 
 432 EXAMixATiox OF wirxKssEs. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 contradiction between the statements alleged to have been made 
 out of court, and those made on the witness stand ; but the degree 
 of contradiction does not determine the competency of the im- 
 peaching testimony, however much that consideration may affect 
 its potency." ^ The Supreme Court of Minnesota expresses the 
 same conclusion thus: "The admissibility of the discrediting 
 testimony does not depend on the degree of variance between it 
 and the subsequent testimony. If it differs in any material par- 
 ticular, it is for the jury to determine what effect such difference 
 in statements shall have on the witness' credit." ^ 
 
 § 495. Not necessary that previous Declarations Intention- 
 ally False. — It is not necessary that the previous contradictory 
 statements should be intentionally false. Accordingly, it was 
 held error for the court to give the following cautionary instruc- 
 tion to the jury: " The court instructs for the plaintiff that, 
 before the jury can allow any contradiction of the testimony of 
 any of the witnesses to affect their credibility in this suit, the 
 jury must be satisfied, from the evidence, that such contradiction 
 is not only true, but is upon a matter material to the issue in this 
 case, and also that the testimony so contradicted was intention- 
 ally false." ^ 
 
 § 496. Necessity of Laying Foundation. — " The rule," said 
 Mr. Chief Justice Waite, " is that the contradictory declarations 
 of a witness, whether oral or in writing, made at another time, 
 cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching, until the witness 
 has been examined upon the subject, and his attention particu- 
 larly directed to the circumstances, in such a way as to give him 
 full opportunity for explanj^tion or exculpation, if he desires to 
 make it." ^ Stated in the more usual way, the witness'^must first 
 
 1 Seller v. Jenkins, i)7 Ind. 430, 439, 16 How. (U. S.) 38, 46; Seller v. Jenk- 
 opinion by Elliott, J. ins, 97 Ind. 430, 433; laeav. Chadsey, 2 
 
 2 Tmklepaugh v. Rounds, 24 Minn. Keyes (N.Y.), 543, 553; State w. Wright, 
 298. 75 N. C. 439; The Queen's Case, 2 
 
 3 Craig ?». Rohrer, G3 111. 325. Brod. & Bmg. 284, 313; Conrad v. 
 
 4 Steamboat Clias. Morgan, 115 Griffey, 16 How. (U. S.) 38; Hooper u. 
 U. S. 69. So held m Conrad y. Griffey, Moore, 3 Jones L. (N. C.) 428; Howe
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 
 
 433 
 
 be interrogated concerning the supposed contradictory state- 
 ments, together with the circumstances of time, place and person 
 involved in the supposed contradiction.^ 
 
 § 497. When Foundation need not be laid. — The rule 
 which requires the foundation thus to be laid does not apply where 
 the party himself is a witness; since his previous self-disserv- 
 ing declarations are always admissible against him ;2 but he may, 
 of course, always be asked whether he has npt made contrary 
 self-disserving statements respecting the matter in issue. ^ It is 
 scarcely necessary to add that the rule does not extend so far' as 
 to preclude the cross-examining party from contradicting the 
 witness as to any fact as to which he has testified in chief, 
 without thus interrogating him on cross-examination with the 
 view of lavino; a foundation. Thus, in an action for assault and 
 
 Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan. 492; 
 Payne v. State, GO Ala. 80, 89; see cases 
 in 2 Brick. Dig. 548, §§ 117, 118; 
 Sprague v. Cadwell, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 518: Booker V. State, 4 Tex. App. 5tj4; 
 Budloug V. Nostrand, 24 Barb. (N. 
 Y.) 25; Brig;2:s v. Wheeler, 16 Hun 
 (N. Y.), 583. In Massachusetts 
 and Maine the rule seems to be 
 that contradictory statements of the 
 witness are allowed, "nithoutauy pre- 
 vious iuterroiration of him about them. 
 Mauniug, ,J.,iu Payne v. State, CO Ala. 
 80, 89; Baker v. State (Wis.), 33 N. W. 
 Eep. 52; s. c. 69 Wis. 32. 
 
 1 People V. Devine, 44 Cal. 452, 
 Upon the cross-examination of a wit- 
 ness for the prosecution in a criminal 
 trial, an affidavit which had been made 
 by the witness was offered by the de- 
 fendant, for the purpose of impeaching 
 her testimony. It was held that the 
 circumstances under which the affida- 
 vit was made, and the conversation 
 had by the witness with the person at 
 whose instance it was made, were ad- 
 missible as parts of the transaction. 
 
 People V. Smallmau, 55 Cal. 185. It is 
 not necessary that the impeaching 
 testimony should be directed to the 
 contradiction of the testimony given by 
 the witness sought to be impeached on 
 his direct examination; it is compe- 
 tent when it contradicts statements 
 made by him to questions propounded 
 to him on his cross-examination. Sel- 
 ler V. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430, 437; 
 Greenfield v. People, 13 Hun (X. Y.), 
 242. In Seller v. Jenkins, the follow- 
 ing cases were cited by the court as 
 applications of this rule: Dillon v. 
 Bell, 9 Ind. 320; Brown r. State, 24 
 Ind. 113; Thompson v. State, 15 Ind. 
 473. 
 
 2 Collins V. Mack, 31 Ark. 685, 694. 
 
 ^ Thus, in an action to recover dam- 
 ages for injuries from falling into an 
 excavation, the plaintiff may be asked 
 whether he has not stated that he had 
 only been a little hurt, he having testi- 
 fied in chief that he had l)eeu severely 
 hurt. Monongahela Water Co. v. 
 Stewartsou, 96 Pa. St. 436. 
 
 28
 
 434 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tu.^ 
 
 battery, the defendant testified as a witness, on his direct exam- 
 ination, that he had no feelings of enmity against the phiintiff at 
 the time of the assault. It was held competent to prove, by 
 another witness, without laying a foundation on the cross-exam- 
 ination of the defendant, that the defendant had, prior to the 
 assault, made declarations showino; feelino-sof enmitv ajjainst the 
 plaintiff.^ But, as we shall hereafter see, where the question as 
 to hostile feelinofs has not been g-one into on direct examination, 
 there is a view that the foundation must be laid on cross-examin- 
 ation before evidence of declarations tending to show such feelings 
 can be introduced.'-^ 
 
 § 498. [Continued.] What if no Objection is made. — The 
 
 grounds on which the foregoing rule, which requires a founda- 
 tion to be laid by first interrogating the witness on cross-examina- 
 tion, is usually put, is that it is the right of the witness to have 
 the opportunity of explaining. If it is a pi'ivilege personal to 
 him, it would seem to follow that it can not be waived by the 
 party whose witness he is , without his consent ; but that if the 
 impeaching testimony is introduced without the foundation first 
 being laid, he has the rigid of subsequent explanation. ^ We 
 find, however, that it has been held competent for a cor- 
 oner's clerk to read, for the purpose of contradicting a wit- 
 ness in a criminal trial, his previous deposition, taken before 
 the coroner and subscribed and sworn to by him, without 
 askino; him on cross-examination concernino- the makino; of such 
 deposition, where no objection is made to the reading of it on 
 that score.* 
 
 § 499. Rule applies to Evidence of Previous Threats or 
 Hostile Statements. — According to some opinions, the rule 
 which thus requires a foundation to be laid, applies to evidence 
 of previous threats or hostile declarations, made by the witness 
 against the cross-examining party. Thus, in a criminal trial, the 
 defendant proposed to prove that, since the alleged assault, the 
 
 1 Lucas V. Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9, 14. ^ Stephens v- People. 19 N. Y. 
 
 2 Post, § 499. 549, 573. 
 
 3 Henderson v. State, 70 Ala. 29.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT I5IPEACHMENT. 435 
 
 prosecuting witness had threatened to poison him. But, as the 
 prosecuting witness, when on the stand, had not been interro- 
 gated as to whether he had made such threats, it was held that 
 evidence was properly excluded. ^ It is always competent for 
 the cross-examining party to put questions to the witness, tending 
 to show his bias, prejudice or ill-will against such party, and, if 
 the witness denies making such statements, to prove that he did 
 make them.^ It is said by the Supreme Court of California: 
 " No mode of ascertaining the state of feelings of the witness 
 exists, except that disclosed by the declarations or the acts of 
 the witness sought to be impeached by these declarations. The 
 same principle, which assures to him the privilege of explanation 
 when contradictory declarations are offered, applies to assure 
 him the rigid of explanation when declarations of hostility are 
 sought to be introduced. * * * Wg can see no distinction 
 between admitting declarations of hostility of the witness, by 
 the way of impairing the force of his testimony, and admitting 
 contradictory statements for the same purpose, so far as this 
 rule is concerned; for in either case, an opportunity should be 
 given the witness to explain what he said." ^ 
 
 § 500. Rule where the Contradictory Declaration is in Writ- 
 ing. — " If," said Mr. Chief Justice Waite, "• the contradictory 
 declaration is in writing, questions as to its contents, without the 
 production of the instrument itself, are ordinarily inadmissible, 
 and a cross-examination for the purpose of laying a foundation 
 for its use as impeachment, would not, except under special cir- 
 cumstances, be allowed, until the paper was produced and shown 
 to the witness while under examination. Circumstances nuiy 
 arise, however, which will excuse its production. All the law 
 requires is, that the memory of the witness shall be so re- 
 freshed by the necessary inquiries as to enable him to explain, if 
 
 1 Booker v. State, 4 Tex. App. 504. » Baker v. Joseph, 16 Cal. 173, 178, 
 Compare Briggs v. Wheeler, 16 Huu quoted and affirmed iu State v. Stew- 
 (N. Y.), 583; ante, §450. art, 11 Ore. 52. See Davis v. Frauke, 
 
 2 Scott V. State, 64 Ind. 400 ; Sager 33 Gratt. (Va.) 425 ; 1 Whart. Ev., § 566. 
 --.'. State, 11 Tex. App. 110; ante, §450.
 
 436 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiup. Tl'., 
 
 he can, and desires to do so. Whether this has been done is 
 for the court to determine before impeacliing evidence is ad- 
 mitted." ^ 
 
 § 501. [Continued.] Manner of Interrogating the Witness 
 as to sucli Writing. — When the depositions of a witness, on the 
 preliminary examination of the accused, are talcen down in writ- 
 ing, read over to the witness, assented to by him as correct, and 
 by him signed, — then, upon plain principles, where the witness 
 is asked whether he made the statement contained in the deposi- 
 tion, and answers in the negative, the deposition is admissible in 
 evidence for the purpose of impeachment.^ It has been held not 
 proper to cross-examine the witness, by first reading what pur- 
 ports to be his previous deposition, and then asking him whether 
 he had so testified. The correct rule is said to he^ first to prove 
 the deposition to be his, and tlien to read it as evidence, and to 
 cross-examine the witness as to any supposed discrepancies be- 
 tween his testimony in court and the deposition.^ An obvious 
 way of proving the deposition to be that of the witness Avould be 
 to put it into his hands and ask him whether it was his deposi- 
 tion. But, according to one view, it is not necessary to do this; 
 all that is required is to prove that he is the witness who was 
 sworn and examined by the commissioner taking the deposition 
 and whose answer the commissioner purports to give, without 
 submitting the deposition to him to be read, before he is asked 
 by counsel whether he has not made certain answers therein con- 
 tained, or before proving that the answers were read over to 
 him before he signed the deposition.* 
 
 1 The Charles Morgan, 115 U. S. self being presumptively the best evi- 
 
 69, 77. See also Morrison v. Myers, deuce of the fact. State v. Tickel, 13 
 
 11 la. 538; Samuels v. Griffith, 13 la. Nev. 502, 508. But there should be no 
 
 103; Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549; doubt about it. See the Queen's Case, 
 
 Honstine v. O'Donnell, 5 Hun (N. Y.), 2 Brod. & B. 287; Newcomb v. Gris- 
 
 472. It has been thought doubtful wold, 24 N. Y. 298; Lightfoot v. Peo- 
 
 Tvhether the cross-examining party pie, 16 Midi. 512; Gaffney v. People, 
 
 may riglitfully ask tlie witness as to the 50 N. Y. 4I(i. 
 
 coutciits of his former deiyosition, for ^ state v. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502, 508. 
 
 the purpose of laying a foundation for ^ Cropsey v. Averill,8 Neb. 151, 157. 
 
 his impeachment, tlie deposition it- ^ Ecker t?. McAlister, 45 Md. 291.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 437 
 
 § 502. Particularity in laying the Foundation. — The ques- 
 tion propounded to a witness on cross-examination, for the pur- 
 pose of hijing ground to impeach him by proof of contradictory 
 statements out of court, must clearly state the time icJien, the 
 place where and the person to lohom the statements were made.^ 
 General questions whether he has ever said this or that, whether 
 he has always told the same story, and the like, are not compe- 
 tent.^ Thus, the question whether a witness has not recently 
 made certain specified statements " to different parties in talk- 
 ing of the matter," is incompetent because not sufliciently defi- 
 nite." ^ So, a witness for the State in a criminal trial was 
 asked, on cross-examination: " Have you not said yourself, that 
 3'ou thought the defendant half crazy, and did not know what he 
 was doing at the time?" It was held that there was no error in 
 ruling out this question upon objection.* But it is not necessary 
 to put to the witness the precise question which it is intended to 
 put to the witness by whom he is to be impeached ; the form of 
 the question is in the discretion of the court. ^ 
 
 § 503. Contradictory Testimony given on a former Occa- 
 sion. — A witness may be impeached by showing that he testi- 
 fied differently at a former trial.^ But a witness cannot be im- 
 peached by showing that certain circumstances, to which he has 
 testified on the present trial, were omitted by him, when testify- 
 ing concerning the same occurrence on a former trial of the ac- 
 tion, unless at the former trial his attention was particularly called 
 to such circumstances.^ Notwithstanding the policy of the law en- 
 forces, in some of the States, by statutes, the secrecy of proceed- 
 ings before grand juries^ it has been held competent to ask witness 
 on cross-examination for the purpose of impeaching him by con- 
 
 1 Hill V. Gust, 45 Ind. 45, 51; DaLee 125; Hotchkiss v. Germauia Fire Ins. 
 V. Blackburn, 11 Kan. 190, Co., 5 Huu (N. Y.), 90, 94. 
 
 2 Heuderson ?;. State, 1 Tex. App. « State v. McDouald, G5 Me 4G(J; 
 432; Tredway v. State, 1 Tex. App. 608- Hampton v. State, 45 Tex. 154. 
 
 3 Standard Oil Co. v. Vau Etteu, ' Huebner v. Eoosevelt, 7 Daly 
 107 U. S. 325. (N. Y.), Ill ; Com. v Hawkins, 3 Gray 
 
 ■* State V. Kinley, 43 la. 294. (Mass.), 4(J3. 
 
 5 Sloan V. X. Y. C. R. Co., 45 N. Y.
 
 438 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. T:., 
 
 tradiction, whether he did not make contradictory statements be- 
 fore the grand jury.^ On tlie contrary, it is held in another juris- 
 diction that the minutes of the witness' testimony before the 
 grand jury, or the substance of his testimony taken before an 
 examining magistrate, are in no proper sense, the writing or the 
 act of the witness, and consequently that such writings are not 
 admissible in evidence, for the purpose of impeaching the witness 
 by contradicting him, even after a foundation has been laid by his 
 cross-examination.^ It has been ruled not competent to ask a 
 witness as to what he had sworn to on a former occasion, with a 
 view to impeach him, where his testimony on the former occa- 
 sion was not admissible in evidence.^ This holding was er- 
 roneously supposed to fall within the rule that a witness cannot be 
 examined upon coZ?a^era/ w«/^erswitha view to his impeachment.* 
 
 § 504. Former Testimony, how Proved. — Where the former 
 testimony is in the form of a deposition, subscribed and sworn 
 
 1 Bressler v. People (Ill.)> 8 Crim, 
 Law Mag. 466; s. c. 117 111. 422; Bur- 
 dik V. Hunt, 43 Ind. 382, 389. The 
 court say: 'It has beeu more than 
 once decided by this court that the 
 oath of grand jurors to keep their pro- 
 ceedings secret, does not prevent the 
 public or an individual, from proving 
 by one of the jurors, what passed be- 
 fore the grand jury." Burnham v. 
 Hatfield, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 21; Shat- 
 tuck V. State, 11 Ind. 473. The court 
 also hold that the statute of that State, 
 prescribing, as a part of the grand 
 juror's oath, " that you will not dis- 
 close any evidence given or proceed- 
 ings had before the grand jury" (2 
 Gav. & Ilyrd. Ind. Stat. 386, form 56) 
 was not intended to change the pre- 
 viously existing rule on this subject. 
 
 ^ State V. Hayden, 45 la. 11, 13. In 
 so holding Mr. Justice Rothrock, in 
 giving the opinion of the court, said : 
 "The witness is in no way connected 
 with the act of taking tliese minutes 
 of his testimony; tliey are not required 
 
 to be read over to him nor to be signed 
 by him. Unlike a deposition or affida- 
 vit, they do not purport to give state- 
 ments of fact in full, but are what the 
 law requires, — * mere minutes.' They 
 are often taken down by persons 
 wholly inexperienced in reducing the 
 language of others to writing. A long 
 experience upon the District Bench 
 has enabled the writer hereof to ob- 
 serve that the evidence taken before 
 grand juries is often of the most in- 
 definite and uncertain character, and 
 if used as the means of impeaching 
 witnesses, would lead to the grossest 
 Injustice to witnesses, and tend to 
 defeat a proper administration of jus- 
 tice." In State v. Hull, 26 la. 292 and 
 State V. Collins, 32 la. 36, the ques- 
 tion above decided had been left un- 
 determined. In State v. Ostrander, 18 
 la. 435, it is held that the minutes 
 taken before tlie grand jury are not 
 admissil)le as independent evidence. 
 
 3 Mltchum V. State, II Ga. 615, 616. 
 
 4 Ante, § 469.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 439 
 
 to by the witness, that is undoubtedly the best evidence.^ On the 
 trial of an indictment for murder, the dejyosition of a witness, 
 given before the coroner's jury, and certified and returned by 
 the coroner to the trial court, as required by statute, is admis- 
 sible in evidence, for the purpose of contradicting the statement 
 of a witness, made under oath, on the trial of the person accused 
 of having murdered the deceased. ^ The testimony of a witness 
 at a former trial may be also proved by any one who heard and 
 recollects it. The fact that there was a legally appointed sten- 
 ographer present at the former trial, who took notes of the testi- 
 mony, and who could give better evidence of it than a witness 
 who heard it could from his recollection, does not exclude the 
 testimony of such other witness. There is no rule of law which 
 makes a stenographer the only competent witness in such a case, 
 and the rule which requires the production of the best evidence 
 is not applicable. Walton, J., said: " Nothing more is intended 
 by that rule than that evidence which is merely substitutionary 
 in its nature shall not be received, so long as the original evidence 
 can be had. It does not allow secondary evidence to be substi- 
 tuted for that which is primary. It will not permit the contents 
 of a deed, or other written instrument, to be proved by parol, 
 when the instrument can be produced. It has nothing to do with 
 the choice of ivitnesses. It never excludes a witness upon the 
 ground that another is more credible or reliable."^ It is not 
 error to refuse to allow a transcribed phonograpJiic report of the 
 testimony of a witness, given on a former trial, to be read, for the 
 purpose of contradicting him, unless the legislature has declared 
 that - such report shall be evidence. The reason is that such 
 stenographic reports are not seen by the witness, and that they 
 may be fair and truthful reports of the testimony of the witness, 
 and may not. They are merely in the nature oi private meraor- 
 anda^ taken for the convenience of the parties, and are in no 
 sense a deposition^ unless made such by statute.* But the rule 
 
 • Compare «H<e, § 48G. Compare Com. v. Hawkius, 3 Gray 
 
 2 People V. Ueviiie,44: Cal. 452, 459; (IMass.), 463. 
 Rex V. Oldroyd, 1 Riiss. & Ry. C. C. 88 ; 3 state v. McDonald, 65 Me. 4G6. 
 
 Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549. < Phares v. Barber, 61 111. 272, 276.
 
 440 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 is different, where the testimony has been taken down by a com- 
 missioner and duly certified by him, although not read over by 
 the witness before signing.^ 
 
 § 505. Proving the Contradictory Statements in other 
 Cases. — In a casein Connecticut it is said by Pardee, J., in 
 giving the opinion of the court: " The party offering proof con- 
 cerning these variant statements, is not only permitted, but is 
 bound to give so much of the conversation, in connection with 
 which they are said to have been made, as will enable the triers 
 to know both their form and meaning." ^ The deposition of the 
 person with whom the alleged conversation took place is admis- 
 sible to impeach the witness, notwithstanding it was taken under 
 a commission, at the execution of which the witness sought to be 
 impeached was not examined.^ It is said to be a matter of dis- 
 cretion with the trial court, whether testimony contradicting the 
 statement which the plaintiff 's witness has made on cross-exami- 
 nation, will be brought in before the plaintiff rests, or called later, 
 after the plaintiff has rested.^ 
 
 § 506. Rule where the Witness admits such Statements. — 
 
 Where the witness admits the statement which he is alleged to 
 have made out of court, no other proof of his having made it is 
 allowable.^ 
 
 § 507. What if Witness says he does not Remember. — It is 
 
 competent to impeach a witness, in a criminal case, by proof of 
 contradictory statements, made by him on a previous examination 
 touching the same matter, although, when cross-examined as to 
 such statements for the purpose of laying a predicate for his 
 impeachment, he answers that he " does not remember " whether 
 he made the contradictory statements or not.^ A witness can- 
 
 1 Ecker v. McAllister, 45 Md. 291. ■■ Lishtfoot v. People, 16 Mich. 507, 
 
 2 Beardsley v. Wiklmau, 41 Coiui. 512; State v. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502, 508. 
 515. « Payne v. State, 60 Ala. 80, 86. It 
 
 3 Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Andrews, seems that the cases upon this point 
 39 Md. 329, 354. have not been uniform. It seems 
 
 ■* Wilder v. Peabody, 21 Hun (X. from statements made by Phillips in 
 Y.), 370, 378. his work on evidence (2 Phil. Ev. (5th
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 
 
 441 
 
 not, bj answering that he has no recollection of having made the 
 former statement imputed to him, defeat the right of the im- 
 peaching party to prove that he did make such statement. ^ For 
 like reasons, where the witness neither admits nor denies, on his 
 cross-examination, that he has made a certain declaration, or 
 given certain testimony, contrary to that which he has given on 
 the witness stand, tlie adverse party may, by subsequent testi- 
 mony, prove the fact.^ 
 
 § 508. Answer categorically and explain on Re-exaniina- 
 
 tion. — Where, on cross-examination, for the purpose of rebuttal 
 and discrediting a witness, he is asked if he did not give certain 
 different testimony on a former examination, he must answer 
 categorically. If he wishes to explain wliat he did say, or to 
 explain any other matter touching his former testimony, he may 
 be allowed to do so on re-direct examination. "^ 
 
 Am. ed.) 960), that on one occasion 
 Chief Justice Tindal said that he 
 had "never heard sucli evidence 
 admitted in contradiction except 
 wliere the witness liad expressly de- 
 nied the statement," and rejected the 
 evidence, and that Lord Abinger, C. B., 
 had expressed a similar opinion. But 
 Baron Parke in a case before him, held 
 that contradictory statements of the 
 witness could be introduced to im- 
 peach his evidence, although, in 
 order to lay a foundation for them and 
 to enable the witness to explain them 
 (and some believe for that purpose 
 only), "the witness must be asked 
 whether he ever said what is suggested 
 to him, with the name of the person 
 to whom or in whose presence he had 
 said it, or some other circumstance 
 sufficient to designate the particular 
 occasion. If the witness * * * ad- 
 mits the conversation imputed to him, 
 there is no necessity to give further 
 evidence of it; but, if he says he does 
 
 not recollect, that is not an admission 
 and you may give n\ evidence on the 
 other side to prove that the witness did 
 say what was imputed, always sup- 
 posing the statements to be relevant 
 to the matter in issue." In Alabama 
 Mr. Justice Manning said: " We agree 
 with Mr. Phillips that the ruling of 
 Baron Parke is the most sound and 
 fittest to be followed. If the rule were 
 otherwise, it might happen that, under 
 the pretense of not remembering, a 
 witness, who has made a false state- 
 ment, and knows it to be false, would 
 escape contradiction and exposure." 
 Payne v. State, GO Ala. 80, 89. See 
 also Holbrook v. Holbrook, 30 Vt. 
 433. 
 
 1 Ray V. Bell, 2-t 111. Ui, 451 ; Nute 
 V. Nute, 41 N. H. GO. 
 
 2 Bressler v. People (111.) , 8 Crim. 
 Law Mag. 4GG; s. c. 117 111. 422. 
 
 * Bressler v. People (111.), 8 Grim. 
 Law Mag. 4GG; s. c. 117 111. 422.
 
 442 EXAMiNATiox OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr. , 
 
 § 509. Impeachment of Married Woman by Evidence op Conspi- 
 racy BY Husband. — It has been held that, where a married woman 
 testifies as a witness for the prosecution in a criminal case, the defend- 
 ant cannot, for the purpose of affecting her credibility, introduce tes- 
 timony tending to prove a conspiracy on the part of her husband to 
 obtain his property by falsely prosecuting him. The court, speaking 
 through McKinstry, J., say: " There is nothing in the relation of hus- 
 band and wife from which it can be inferred that the latter is a party to 
 an offense committed by the former, or which directly tends to prove her 
 a party. Proof of the relationship alone would not make a case to go to 
 the jury against a wife, however strong the case against the husband. 
 The offer of defendant was properly rejected, there being no statement 
 therein of the existence of such evidence of complicity on the part of the 
 witness in the alleged conspiracy, as would have justified a court, if the 
 witness had been on trial for the crime, in submitting the question of 
 guilt to the jury." ^ The conclusion of the court is more than doubt- 
 ful. The question is entirely different from the question which would 
 be presented if the married woman were thus on trial for a conspiracy. 
 She would be surrounded with a presumption of innocence, and it 
 would, on the plainest principles, be necessary to make a case against 
 her by proof, not merely by such proof as might raise a remote infer- 
 ence as to her complicity, but by proof overthrowing the presumption 
 of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. But where a man is prose- 
 cuted for a crime — in the particular case, the crime of rape, — and a 
 married woman appears as a witness against him, the fact that her 
 husband has entered into a conspiracy to obtain his property by the co- 
 ercion of a criminal prosecution, may well be considered as affecting 
 the credibility of the wife ; since wives are known to be in constant as- 
 sociation with their husbands and under their influence and coercion. 
 Every intelligent juror would give weight to such evidence. 
 
 § 510. Recalling Opponent's Witness to put Impeaching" 
 Questions. — Where the defendant on a criminal trial recalled 
 a witness and put to him questions for the purpose of impeaching 
 him, it was held error to exclude the questions on the ground 
 that, by recalling the witness, the defendant had made him his 
 own witness.^ On this subject it is said by Prof. Greenleaf: 
 " Whether, when a party is once entitled to cross-examine a wit- 
 ness, this right continues through all the subsequent stages of 
 
 » People V. Parton, 49 Cal. G32, G37. 2 gtiite v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391, 396.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XIX.] IXDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 443 
 
 the cause, so that if the party should afterwards recall the same 
 witness, to prove a part of his own case, he may interrogate him 
 by leading questions, and treat him as the witness of the party 
 who first adduced him, is also a question upon which different 
 opinions have been held. Upon the general ground on which 
 this course of examination is permitted at all, namely, that every 
 witness is supposed to be inclined most favorably towards the 
 party calling him, there would seem to l)e no impropriety in 
 treating him, throughout the trial, as the witness of the party 
 who first caused him to be summoned and sworn." ^ 
 
 § 511. Impeachment of One's Own Witness. — The general 
 rule on this subject is, that a party cannot impeach a witness 
 whom he has called himself, either by proving that his character 
 for veracity is bad, or by proving that he has made declarations 
 out of court contradictory to those made by him on the witness 
 stand ;^ but it is always competent, for the purpose of affecting 
 the credibility of a witness, to show that he is more favorable to 
 the opposite party than to the jtarty calling him.^ Some of the 
 cases assert the hard ground that a party cannot be allowed to 
 discredit a witness called by him, in any degree, even when the 
 witness has, been also called by the opposite party , and the dis- 
 crediting testimony relates solely to facts drawn out by him.* 
 The reason of the rule is, that the party has given credit to the 
 witness by presenting him to the court, and that he ought not to 
 have the privilege of accepting the testimony if it be for him, 
 and rejecting it if it be against him.* Thus, a party calling a 
 witness cannot show, for the purpose of discrediting him, that he 
 has conspired to extort money from the parties in interest on the 
 side in behalf of which he has been called.** 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev,, § 447. 179; Swett v. Shumway, 102 Mass. 
 
 2 People V. Safford, 5 Deuio (N. 365, 309; Geary u. People, 22 Mich. 221. 
 Y.) 112; Thompsou v. Blauchard, 4 * Com. «. Hudson, 11 Gray (Mass.), 
 N= Y. 303, 311; Coulter v. American G4; Craig v. Grant, 6 Mich. 447. 
 
 &c, Co., 56 N. Y. 585, 589; Sissou v. ^ 1 Greenl. Ev., §442; Coulter v. 
 
 Conger, 1 Thomp. &C. (N.Y.) 5G4, 568. American &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 585, 589. 
 
 2 .Jones V. People, 2 Colo. 351, 358; ^ Sissou v. Conger, 1 Thomp. & C. 
 
 Batdorf v. Farmers' Bank, 61 Pa. St. (N. Y.) 5G4, 568.
 
 444 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 § 512. Exception where the Party is Surprised or Entrapped 
 by the Witness. — An exception to this rule has been admitted, 
 where the party calling the witness has been surprised by the tes- 
 timony of the witness on the stand, — as where the witness, after, 
 taking the stand, testifies differently from the statements which 
 he had made before the trial, concerning the facts, to the party call- 
 ing him as a witness. In such a case, on grounds of obvious jus- 
 tice, the party is not concluded by the treacherous conduct of his 
 witness, but is allowed to show contrary declarations made by the 
 witness. ^ The party may contradict his own witness by showing 
 that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent loith his 
 testimony/; but he cannot do this without first calling his atten- 
 tion to the circumstances and occasion of the supposed state- 
 ments ; they can under no circumstances be used as substan- 
 tive evidence to support the party's case.^ In Alabama a party 
 may ask his own witness w'hether he has not, on a former occa- 
 sion, made statements inconsistent with his testimony on the 
 trial. '^ But "it is not," said McCay, J., in Georgia, "sufiicient 
 that he shall have made contradictory statements ; such state- 
 ments must have deceived and led the complaining party to in- 
 troduce him, and thus unwittingly to have been damaged by 
 statements different from what he expected. Under such cir- 
 cumstances, the law permits a party to violate that salutary rule 
 which assumes that one who brings a witness before a court 
 has at least confidence in his truthfulness . " * The strict rule , 1 hat 
 a party who brings a witness into court to testify, even as to a 
 single point, vouches for his credibility, and cannot thereafter 
 discredit him, even though he is called by the other party to tes- 
 tify as to other matters, has in many cases worked such injustice 
 that it has been broken into in some jurisdictions by statute.^ 
 In one jurisdiction, under a statute,** even direct impeachment is 
 permitted under such circumstances.^ 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev. §444, note 1; Mel- 3 Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44, V6;. 
 
 huish V. Collier, 19 L. J. (Q. B.) 493; Hemius^way v. Garth, 51 Ala. 530. 
 People V.Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384; (lis- ^ McDauiel «. State, 53 Ga. 253. 
 
 tiuguishing Com. v. Welsh, 4 Gray ^ Mass. Stat. 1869, chap. 425. 
 
 (Mass.), 535. « Georgia Code, 1873, §3809. 
 
 2 Newell w. Homer,120 Mass. 277, 283. ^ Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 66.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XIX.] INDIRECT IMPEACHMENT. ' 445 
 
 § 513. Exception IN THE Case OF a Hostile Witness. — In Colo- 
 rado, an exception to the rule has been admitted, so as to allow the party 
 calling the witness to prove that he has previously made statements in- 
 consistent with his testimony on the witness stand, delivered at the in- 
 stance of the opposite 2^arty. In so holding, Mr. Chief Justice Hallett 
 said : " When applied to testimon}" called out hy the party who seeks 
 to discredit the witness, the reason is of great force ; but it has little ap- 
 plication to testimony drawn from the same witness by the opposite 
 party. B3' bringing a witness into court, the party vouches for his 
 general character for truth, and for the truth of his statements in re- 
 gard to the particular matter of which he inquires. Further than this, 
 neither the reason of the rule, nor the policy of the law can besafel}'' ex- 
 tended. Even as to the matter as to which the witness is interrogated, 
 if he declares against the party calling him, it is still open to proof by 
 the testimony of other witnesses. It is obvious that a party may be 
 willing to accept the testimony of a witness on one point, while he would 
 be utterly unwilling to accept his testimony upon another point ; and it 
 is equally plain that a witness may testify trul}' as to one fact, and un- 
 truly as to another. If, by calling a witness to prove a single fact, a 
 party shall be held to affirm his truthfulness absolutely and in all 
 things, the rule would appear to be a hard one. It is often necessary 
 for a party to call his adversary, or a witness who is hostile to him, 
 and who is a principal witness for his adversary, to prove a single fact. 
 And if in such case the witness is subsequently called by the opposite 
 party, justice requires that the party first calling him should be per- 
 mitted to show the interest or hostility of the witness, not for the pur- 
 pose of showing that the latter is unworthy of belief generally, but 
 that he is more favorable to one part}^ than to the otlier." ^ 
 
 § 514. Assailing Credit of Witness called by both Part- 
 ies. — When, therefore a witness had been called in a criminal 
 trial by both parties, it was held competent for the government 
 to ask him whether, in relation to the matters as to which he had 
 testified on behalf of the defendant, he had not given a different 
 account at another time and place. The evidence was regarded 
 as admissible, because it had a tendency to prove that the 
 witness was more favorable to the prisoner than to the govern- 
 ment. ^ 
 
 ^ Joues V. People, 2 Colo. 351,357. - Jones r. People, 5 Colo. 351, 355.
 
 446 . EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 515. Contradicting' the Statements of One's Own Witness. — 
 
 The rule does not extend so far that the party is estopped by the 
 statements of his witness. He is not conclusively bound by them. 
 While he may not impeach the character of his witness for 
 veracity, or interrogate him as to contradictory statements pre- 
 viously made by him, or interrogate him with a view to affect 
 his credibility merely, or introduce other evidence for that pur- 
 pose, — he may, nevertheless, contradict him as to a fact mate- 
 rial in the case, although the effect of such contradictory 
 evidence may be to discredit him ; but he cannot introduce such 
 evidence when it is only material in so far as it bears upon his 
 credibility. In other words, contradiction is allowed, though 
 impeachment, direct or indirect, is not.^ 
 
 1 Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63, 66; Coulter U.American &c. Co., 56 N. Y. 
 
 Mechanics' Bank v. Kawls, 7 Ga. 191, 585, 589; Sisson v. Conger, 1 Thomp. 
 
 198, 199; Burklialter v. Edwards, 16 & C. (N. Y.) 564, 568. 
 Ga. 593; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 442, 443;
 
 Titn III, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 447 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 OF DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 
 Section 
 620. Preliminary. 
 
 521. Error to Exclude Competent Impeaching Testimony. 
 
 522. Impeachment by Evidence of Bad Character. 
 
 523. By Evidence of Bad Cliaractcr for Veracity. 
 
 624. Specific Acts not Inquired into. 
 
 625. Character of Female Witness for Chastity. 
 520. Limitations as to Time and Place. 
 
 527. Extent of the Reputation. 
 
 528. Reputation Defined. 
 
 629. Mode of Examining the Impeaching "Witness. 
 
 530. [Continued.] Of Cross-examination. 
 
 531. What Interrogatories after Foundation laid. 
 
 532. Whether Impeaching Witness would Believe the Impeached Witness on 
 
 Oath. 
 
 533. Reason of the Rule which Admits this Question. 
 534:. Reason of the Opposing Rule. 
 
 635 Impeaching by Pi'oof of Conviction of a Felony or other Infamous 
 Crime. 
 
 536. By Evidence that the Witness is of a Defective Mind or Memory. 
 
 537. Inadmissible Modes of Impeaching. 
 
 § 520. Preliminary. — Having concluded the subject of in- 
 direct impeachment, that is, of impeachment by proof of contra- 
 dictory declarations or statements, let us next consider the modes 
 in which a witness may be subjected to what is termed direct 
 impeachment. We find that this maybe done in three ways: 
 1. By proof of bad character for veracity, or in some jurisdic- 
 tions, of general bad character. 2. By proof that the witness 
 has been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime. 3. By 
 proof that the witness is of defective memory, or is otherwise 
 mentally infirm, in such a sense as to disqualify him as a witness 
 or impair his credibility. It is said in Illinois by Mr. Justice 
 Craig, following a dictum of Starkie,^ that the general rule as 
 
 i 2 Stark. Ev. (9th ed.) 364. '
 
 448 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoinp. Tl*., 
 
 to the admissibility of evidence of the moral character and con- 
 duct of a person in society, confines such proof to three classes, 
 namely: 1. To afford a presumption that a particular party has, 
 or has not been guilty of a criminal act. 2. To affect the 
 damages in particular cases, where their amount depends upon 
 the character and conduct of any individual. 3. To impeach and 
 confirm the character of a witness. ^ With the last we have now 
 to deal. 
 
 § 521. Error to Exclude Competent Iinpeacliiiig Testi- 
 mony. — Where competent impeaching testimony is seasonably 
 offered, it is error to exclude it, for which error a judgment will 
 be reversed ; ^ though a neiu trial will not be granted merely be- 
 cause the unsuccessful party has discovered new or additional im- 
 peaching testimony.'^ 
 
 § 522. Impeachment by Evidence of bad Character. — In 
 
 some jurisdictions, for the purpose of impeaching a witness, it is 
 competent to prove, by testimony of other witnesses, that his 
 general character or reputation is bad, in the community where 
 he resides or has recently resided.* Where this doctrine pre- 
 vails, the inquiry extends to the general moral character of the 
 witness,^ and it is proper to interrogate the impeaching witness 
 thus: "Do you know the defendant's general character in the 
 neighborhood where he lives, for truth and veracity, honesty, 
 chastity and morality? " ^ 
 
 1 Berclell v. Berdell, 80 111. 604, 607. Teese v. Huutiugdou, 23 Hotv. (U. S.) 
 
 estate v. Thomas (lud.), 10 West. 2. By statute in Indiana, "In all 
 
 Rep. 808. questions affecting the credibility of a 
 
 ^ Porter t\ State, 2 Ind. 435; State witness, his general moral character 
 
 V. Clark, K! Ind. 97 ; Jackson v. Sharpe, may be given in evidence." Ind. Acts 
 
 29 Ind. 167. 1881, pages 157, 158; Crim. Code Ind., 
 
 ■* State V. Shields, 13 Mo. 236; Day § 230; Morrison v. Slate, 76 Ind. 335. 
 
 V. State, 13 Mo. 422; State v. Hamil- This rule has been introduced in yl?-- 
 
 ton, 55 Mo. 420; State r. Breeden, 58 kansas by statute. Gautt Ark. Stat., 
 
 Mo. 507; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. § 2524; Majors ■??. State, 29 Ark. 112. 
 380; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 506. Upon ^ gtate r. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507. 
 
 the question whether the inquiry ex- ^ State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380; s. c. 
 
 tends in ordinary cases to the char- 29 Am. Rep. 506. In California the 
 
 acter of the witness for morality, see statutory rule in civil cases is as fol- 
 
 the opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford in lows: "A witness maybe impeached
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 449 
 
 § 523. By Evidence of bad Character for Veracity. — In 
 
 other jurisdictions the inquiry is confined to the character of the 
 witness for veracity.^ 
 
 § 524. Specific Acts not Inquired into. — Under either rule, 
 the evidence is confined to the general character of the witness, 
 or to his general character for veracity. Particular acts cannot 
 be gone into ; since this would raise a multiplicity of issues 
 which the party callini^ the witness cannot be expected to be 
 prepared to meet, and which could serve no other purpose than 
 to distract the attention of the jury from the main issue. ^ Thus, 
 it is not competent to impeach a witness by proving that he 
 has lied on other occasions.^ But when sustaining testimony 
 as to general reputation is given by a witness, it seems to be 
 the rule that, on his cross-examination, with the view to lessen 
 the effect of his testimony, or to show a bias in favor of the party 
 who has called him, but not for the purpose of establishing the 
 particular facts, — the witness may be asked whether he has not 
 heard reports which tend to contradict the purport and effect of 
 his testimony.'* A person who states that he has no knowledge 
 of the general character of a witness, save only as connected 
 with "some alleged frauds," is not competent as an impeaching 
 witness.^ 
 
 bythe party against whom he is called, .Johns. (N. Y.) 505; Rex v. Hemp, 5 
 
 by contradictory evidence, or by evi- Carr. & P. 4G8. See also Harrington 
 
 dence that his general reputation for v. Lincoln, 3 Gray (Mass.), 133. Car- 
 
 truth, honesty or integrity \s bad, but penter v. Blake, 10 Hun (N. Y.),358; 
 
 not by evidence of particular wrong- Bakemau v. Rose, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 ful acts, except that it may be shown 110; Corning v. Corning, (J N. Y. 104; 
 
 bythe cross-examination of the wit- Fox v. Com. (Ky.), 1 S. W. Rep. 396; 
 
 ness, or the record of the judgment, Leverich v. Frank, 6 Ore. 212; 1 
 
 that he has been convicted of a fel- Greenl. Ev., § 4C1; Wehrkamp v. 
 
 ony." Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 2051. Willett, 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 
 
 1 Fry V. Bank, 11 HI. 373; Dimick 548. 
 
 V. Do^^Tis, 82 111. 570, 573; Rudsill v. 3 Com. v. Ford, 130 Mass. CA; s. c. 
 
 Slingerlaud, 18 Minn. 380. 39 Am. Rep. 426. 
 
 2 Douglas V. Taussey, 2 Wend. * Carpenter v. Blake, 10 Hun 
 (N. Y)352; Com. u. Moore, 3 Pick. (N.Y.), 358; Leonard z?. Allen, 11 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 194; Curtis v. Fay, 37 Barb. (Mass.) 241; Rex v. Martin, 6 C. & P. 
 (X. Y.) 69; Rex v. Rudge, 2 Peake 562. 
 
 N. P. Cas., 232; Jackson v. Lewis, 13 ^ Sorrelle v. Craig, 9 Ala. 535. 
 
 29
 
 450 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thom[). Tl'., 
 
 § 525. Character of Female Witness for Chastity. — An 
 
 exception to the rule which ignores evidence of immorality for 
 the purpose of impeachment, is made in cases where men are in- 
 dicted for sexual offenses against women. Thus, in cases of rape, 
 or assault with intent to commit rape, the inquiry as to the rep- 
 utation of the prosecutrix is not confined to veracity, but ex- 
 tends to her chastity.^ Yet the general holding of the courts 
 is that evidence of sexual prostitution is not admissible to im- 
 peach a witness, or to affect his or her credit in any other class 
 of cases,2 though there is some opinion to the contrary.^ 
 
 § 526. Limitations as to Time and Place. — The inquiry 
 must in general be restricted to the community in which the 
 witness resides or has recently resided.^ But this rule is not 
 imperative ; the inquiry may be extended to general reputation 
 at 'A former period and in another neigJiborltood, if it be not too 
 remote in point of time.^ The general effect of the decis- 
 ions is that the inquiry should relate to a period of time 
 
 1 Pleasants v. State, 15 Ark. ()52. 
 
 2 Diinick v. [Downs, 82 111. 570, 
 573; Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wencl. (N. 
 Y.) 14:8; Spears v. Forrests, 15 Vt. 
 435; Com. v. Churchill, 11 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 538; Evans v. Smith, 5 T. B. 
 Men. (Ky.) 3(;3. 
 
 3 It has been held that a witness 
 testifying in an action for slander, for 
 calling her a thief, could not be im- 
 peached by giving in evidence a letter 
 written by her to another person con- 
 taining lauguage which would indi- 
 cate that she was unchaste, and such a 
 letter was properly excluded. This 
 was ruled under a statute (Ore. Civ. 
 Code, § 830) which recites that "a 
 witness may be impeached by contra- 
 dictory evidence, or by evidence that 
 his general reputation for truth is 
 bad, or that his moral character is 
 such as to render him unworthy of 
 belief, but not by evidence of particu- 
 
 lar wrongful acts." Leverichv. Frank, 
 6 Ore. 212. But the conclusion of the 
 court was rested on the ground that 
 the effect of introducing the letter 
 would be to attempt to impeach the 
 character of the witness by evidence 
 of particular acts of immorality. 
 
 " Marion v. State (Neb.), 29 N. W. 
 Rep. 911. 
 
 5 Brown v. Leuhrs, 1 Bradw. (111.) 
 74; Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 
 (U. S.) 14; Holmes I?. Stateler, 17 111. 
 453; State v. Lanier, 79 N. C, 622; 
 Com. i;. Billings, 97 Mass. 407; Rath- 
 bun V. Ross, 4(i Barb. (N. Y.) 127; 
 Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4 Denio 
 (N. Y.),'431; 1 Greenl. Ev., §§141, 
 142. Compare Willard v. Goodenough, 
 30 Vt. 393; Luther v. Skeen, 8 Jones L. 
 (N. C), 350; State v. Speight, (;9 N. C. 
 72; State v. Parks, 3 Ircd. L. (N. C). 
 29(5; State v. 0'Neale,4 Ired. L. (N.C.) 
 88; Stratton v. State, 45 Ind. 408
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 451 
 
 near the time of the trial. Unless some little latitude is al- 
 lowed, it has been well said that it would be impossible to im- 
 peach the most corrupt, or to sustain the most truthful witness.^ 
 The obvious reason is that reputation is a thing of slow growth ; 
 it is not formed in a day, nor is it suddenly changed in a day. 
 Accordingly, it has been said that it is competent for the parties 
 to give evidence of the character of a witness within a reasonable 
 time before the trial. ^ Another court, relapsing into a poetical 
 vein, has suggested that the former character of the witness is 
 relevant only " as it blends with the continuous web of life and 
 tinges its present texture." ^ Again, it has been suggested that 
 the period of time to Avhich the inquiry may be extended is, to 
 some extent, at least, in the discretion of the trial court.* In a 
 case of bastardy, it was held incompetent to prove the character 
 of the prosecuti'ix for chastity at a period prior to the begetting 
 of the child. ^ In another case the same court held that the in- 
 quiry could not be extended back to a period of Jive years before 
 the time of the trial ;^ and where an attempt was made to im- 
 peach a witness by evidence of statements made out of court, 
 in conflict with his testimony on the trial, and evidence 
 had been given of the good character of the witness, — it 
 was held not error to admit testimony that his character was 
 also good tiuo years before, in a different neighborhood.'^ 
 Another court has ruled that evidence of bad reputation for 
 veracity, four years previous to the trial, may be admitted to 
 impeach a witness who has no lixed domicile, who has been out 
 of the State over a year of this time, and whose residence at the 
 place of such reputation was as long as at any other place. In 
 such a case it is not improper to allow a larger range of inquiry 
 than would be proper where there has been a more fixed domi- 
 
 1 Stratton v. State, 45 lud. 468, ^ Walkers v. State, 6 Blackf. 
 472. (lud.) 1. 
 
 2 Ibid. 473. Compare Aurora v. * Rucker v. Beaty, 3 Ind. 70. Cora- 
 Cobb, 21 Ind. 492, 510. pare King v. Kearsey, 2 lud. 402. 
 
 * Willard v. Goodeuough, 30 Vt. Chauce v. ludiauapolis &c. R. Co., 32 
 
 393. lud. 472. 
 
 •* Stratton v. State, 45 Ind. 468, ' Stratton v. State, 45 lud. 468. 
 
 473.
 
 452 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 cile.^ In another jurisdiction it has been held that evidence of 
 the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity at a different 
 pkice of residence, and at a period of time, tivo years^ and even 
 seven years,^ before the trial, is admissible for the purpose of 
 impeaching him.* In an important case in Michigan it was laid 
 down by Campbell, J., speaking for the court: " Where an im- 
 peached witness has changed his domicile, there appears to be 
 no objection to showing his reputation in both places, within a 
 reasonable limit of time. But, as the only object is to know 
 whether he is to be believed at the time when he testifies, a wit- 
 ness knowing his reputation tJien, should state that knowledge, 
 although he may also be authorized, in addition, to show what 
 his reputation had been elsewhere before.''' ^ 
 
 § 527. Extent of the Reputation. — It is not competent to 
 show what two or three persons only may say concerning the 
 witness sought to be impeached, but the inquiry should extend 
 to the general estimation in which he is held by his neighbors 
 iind acquaintances.^ But a witness is competent to speak of the 
 general character of another witness, without being able to say 
 that he knows what a majority of the neighbors of such other 
 
 1 Keator v. People, 32 Mich. 484. moteness, but is it not still light? The 
 ("Compare Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich, remoteness of time and place are also 
 173. circumstances and facts to "which, or- 
 
 2 Lawson v. State, 82 Ark. 220. dinarily, under proper instructions, 
 
 3 Snow V. Grace, 29 Ark. 131. the jury will give due weight. If this 
 
 4 In so holding it was reasoned by sort of testimony is to be admitted at 
 Williams, Sp. J. : '* That the repata- all, it would be difficult to draw the 
 tion a witness has for truth is a mere line and say when it — the evidence of 
 circumstance, which the rules of law reputation — ceases to be fact and be- 
 allow to be considered by the jury, to comes a question of law." At the 
 aid them in determining the degree of same time it is admitted that there are 
 credit to be given the witness, and is cases where the testimony would be 
 purely a question of fact. If so, does so remote as to time that the court, in 
 not reputation at some other time than the exercise of its discretion, might 
 that of testifying, and some other exclude it. 
 
 place than that of the then residence, ^ Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 
 
 equally tend to shed light upon the 188. 
 
 question of credit? The light may be ** Matthewson v. Burr, G Neb. 312. 
 dim and flickering on account of re-
 
 Tit. Iir, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 453 
 
 witness have said about him or thought of him. The reason is, 
 that " it may so happen that a man has a reputation, well estab- 
 lished, either good or bad, and yet a majority of his neighbors 
 may never have spoken upon the subject, or expressed 
 their thoughts in any manner Avhatever." Again, " there may 
 not have been a majority who have expressed an opinion to the 
 witness ; nor may he be able to say with positive knowledge what 
 the majority think ; nor may he have heard any one else say what 
 a majority said or thought; and yet he may himself be com- 
 petent to swear what his general reputation is. A person's posi- 
 tion in the community may be so obscure that very few of his 
 neighbors know anything of him. His general character may be 
 very circumscribed. To hold that he could not prove his general 
 character, except by witnesses who could swear as to what the 
 majority of his neighbors said and thought of him, would.be to 
 deprive him of the benefit of this species of testimony." i But 
 the production of one loitnexs only to prove the fact, would not 
 usually be satisfactory, although the law does not fix any re- 
 quired number. 2 
 
 § 528. Reputation Defined.— In a case in Iowa, several witnesses 
 were introduced for the purpose of impeaching another witness. The 
 court instructed the impeaching witness, before allowing them to 
 testify, that a man's reputation for truth and veracity is what the per- 
 sons who deal and associate with him say about him. The Supreme 
 Court did not approve this definition. Adams, J., said : "This defini- 
 tion, we think, is not broad enough. A man's reputation for veracity 
 IS what is said of him in the community in which he lives. Those who 
 deal and associate with him may say nothing about his veracitv, while 
 theremamder of the community may regard and speak of him as a no- 
 torious liar." 3 
 
 § 529. Mode of Examining Impeaching Witnesses. — It 
 
 is necessary here, as in many other cases, to lay a foundation 
 
 ' Dav-e V. State, 22 Ala. 23, 38; 3 Dance v. McBride, 43 la. 624 
 
 Eobinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835, 839. 629. 
 
 2 Wafford r . State, 44 Tex. 439.
 
 454 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 for the introduction of evidence of the reputation of the witness 
 sought to be impeached, before such evidence can be introduced. 
 Thus, it is necessary for the impeaching witness to show that he 
 has lived in the same comnmnity with, or knows the reputation 
 of the witness sought to be impeached, or of the party whose 
 character is in question; and until this is shown, it is not proper 
 to interrogate him on the subject.^ It is competent to ask the 
 impeaching witness what is the general rejnifation of the im- 
 peached witness for truth, instead of asking him what is the 
 general character of such witness for truth. " It is true," said 
 Mr. Justice Strong, " that in many cases it has been said that 
 the regular mode of cross-examining is to inquire whether the 
 witness knows the general character of the person whom it is in- 
 tended to impeach ; but in all such cases the word ' character ' is 
 used as synonymous with ' reputation.' What is wanted is the 
 common opinion, that in which there is general concurrence, — 
 in other words, general reputation or character attributed. That 
 is presumed to be indicative of actual character, and hence it is 
 regarded as of importance when the credibility of a witness is in 
 question."^ It is not enough that the impeaching witness pro- 
 fesses merely to state 7vhat he has heard others say ; for these 
 others may be but few. He must be able to state what is gen- 
 erally said of the person, by those among whom he dwells, or 
 with whom he is chiefly conversant; for it is this only that con- 
 stitutes his general reputation or character. Ordinarily , the wit- 
 ness ought himself to come from the neighborhood of the person 
 whose character is in question. If he is a stranger, sent thither 
 by the adverse party to learn his character, he will not be allowed 
 to testify as to the result of his inquiries."^ Where the im- 
 peaching witness was asked whether " he knew the general char- 
 acter of the defendant in his neighborhood, yrom rumor, '^ and 
 answered that he did, and that it was bad, it was held that the 
 question should not have been allowed. ^ 
 
 1 People V. Eodriijjo (Cal.), 8 Crim. ^ Sorrelle v. Craig, 9 Ala. 534, 539. 
 Law Mag. 503. reaffirmed iu Hadjo v. Goodeu, 13 Ala* 
 
 2 Knode v. Williamsou, 17 Wall. (U. 718, 721. 
 
 S.) 580, 588. ^ Haley v. State, 03 Ala. 83.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 455 
 
 § 530. [Continued.] Cross-examining him. — Where a witness had 
 testified as to the reputation of another for veracity, it was held 
 error to exclude, on cross-examination, the questions: " Wliat makes 
 reputation?'^ and " What is reputation?'' The testimony seems to 
 have been excluded under the idea that it called for a conclusion of law ; 
 but the court held that this could not be so, since, if reputation were a 
 conclusion of law, the witness ought not to have been called to prove 
 reputation at all. The court said: " The reputation of a party in his 
 neighborhood is not a conclusion of law, it is a fact ; but it is one about 
 which many honest and well meaning witnesses have mistaken or im- 
 perfect conceptions. * * * Itseemstous that, after the appellee's wit- 
 ness had testified in chief that he knew the general reputation of the 
 appellee in his neighborhood, the appellant had the right, clearly and 
 unquestionably^ to cross-examine him as to his means of knowledge, and, 
 to that end, to inquire of him what constituted reputation. In our 
 opinion the court erred in sustaining the appellee's objection to the 
 questions above set out, propounded by the appellant." ^ 
 
 § 531. AVhat Interrogatories after Foundation laid. — If a 
 
 witness testifies that lie knows the reputation, or reputation for 
 veracity, of the impeached witness in the neighborhood where he 
 lives, this may be followed up with the question whether that 
 reputation is good or bad ; and if the witness answers that it is 
 bad, by the question whether, from that reputation, the impeach- 
 ing witness would believe him under oath.^ The opposite party, 
 then, upon cross-examination, will have the opportunity of ascer- 
 taining the extent of the information of the witness and the 
 sources of his knowledge.^ The following form of qyestion is 
 sanctioned by the authority of Lord Ellenborough: " Have you 
 the means of knowing what the general character of the witness 
 
 i Hutts V. Hutts, G2 lud. 215, been ruled that, where a witness, 
 
 224. called to sustaiu an impeached witness, 
 
 2 Kobinson v. State, IG Fla. 835, states, on his direct examination, that 
 840. Compare Crabtree v. Hageu- he has heard the character of the wit- 
 baugh, 25 111. 233 ; Boon v. Weathered, ness spoken against, — it is admissible 
 23 Tex. 675; Sorrelle v. Craig, 9 Ala. for the party calling him to ask him to 
 534; Hadjor. Gooden, 13 Ala. 718, 721. give the names of the parties referred 
 See next section, to by him. Bakeman^7. Rose, 18 Wend. 
 
 3 Robinson v. State, sxipra. It has (N. Y.) 146.
 
 456 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOIlip. Tr., 
 
 is; and from such knowledge of his general character, would 
 you believe him on his oath? " ^ 
 
 § 532. Whether the 'impeaching Witness would believe 
 Impeached Witness on Oath. — Contrary to the erroneous text 
 of Greenleaf,'^ the English,^ and prevailing American rule is, 
 that it is competent to ask the impeaching witness whether, from 
 his knowledge of the reputation of the impeached witness, or his 
 knowledge of the reputation of the latter for veracity,* he would 
 believe him on oath.^ 
 
 § 533. Reason OF the Rule which admits this Question. — The ex- 
 istence of this rule is an undisputed branch of legal doctrine, and the 
 reasons upon which it is founded were thus stated at length in an opin- 
 ion of tlie Supreme Court of Michigan by Mr. Justice Campbell: 
 " The purpose of any inquiry into the character of a witness is to enable 
 the jury to determine whether he is to be believed on oath. Evidence 
 of his reputation would be irrelevant for any other purpose, and a rep- 
 utation which would not affect a witness so far as to touch his credibil- 
 ity under oath, could have no proper influence. The English text- 
 boolvs and authorities have always, and without exception, required the 
 testimony to be given directly on this issue. The questions put to the 
 impeaching and supporting witnesses relate, first, to their knowledge of 
 
 1 Mawson v. Hartsink, 4: Esp. 102; 
 recommeuded by Senator Tracy in 
 Bakeman v. Rose, 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 146, 151; and by Collier, C. J., in Sor- 
 relle v. Craig, 9 Ala. 534, 539. 
 
 2 1 Greenl. Ev. § 4(51. 
 
 3 1 Stark. Ev. 237 eJ seg; 2 Phill. 
 Ev. (Edward's Edition) 955, 958; Reg. 
 V. Brown, L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 70. 
 
 * According to the rule prevailing in 
 the particular jurisdiction. Ante §§ 
 522, 523. 
 
 fi Adams v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 70 
 N.Y. 1G6, 170; People W.Davis, 21 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 309; Hamilton v. People, 
 29 Mich. 173; Keator v. People, 32 
 Mich. 484; Uhl v. Com., 6 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 70G; People v. Mather, 4 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 229; People v. Rector, 
 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; People v. 
 Davis, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; Titus v. 
 Ash, 24 N. H. 319; Bogle v. Kreitzer, 
 46 Pa. St. 465; Lyman y. Philadelphia, 
 56 Pa. St. 488; Knight v. House, 29 
 Md. 194; Stevens v. Irwin, 12 Cal. 
 306; People v. Tyler, 35 Cal. 553; 
 Eason v. Chapman, 21 111. 33; Wilson 
 V. State, 3 Wis. 798; Stokes v. 
 State, 18 Ga. 17; Taylor u. State, 16 
 Ga. 7; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 92; M'Cutchen??. M'Cutchen, 
 9 Port. (Ala.) 650; Mobley v. Hamit, 
 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky. ) 590; United 
 States V. Van Sickle, 2 McLean (U. 
 S.), 219.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 457 
 
 the reijutation for truth and veracity of the assailed witness ; and, 
 second, whether, from that reputation, they would believe him under 
 oath. The only controversy has been whether or no the grounds of belief 
 must rest upon, and be confined to a knowledge of reputation for ver- 
 acity only. But as to that the authorities are harmonious. The reason 
 given is that, unless the impeaching witness is held to showing the ex- 
 tent to which an evil reputation has affected a person's credit, the jury 
 cannot accurately tell what the witness means to express by stating that 
 such reputation is good or bad, and can have no guide in weighing his 
 testimony. And since it has become settled that they are not bound to 
 disregard a witness entirely, even if he falsifies in some matters, it be- 
 comes still more important to know the extent to which the opinion in 
 his neighborhood has touched him. It has also been commonly observed 
 that impeaching questions as to character are often misunderstood, and 
 witnesses, in spite of caution, base their answer on bad character gen- 
 erally, which may or may not be of such a nature as to impair confidence 
 in testimony. "When the question of credit under oath is distinctly 
 presented, answers will be more cautious." i " The objection alleged 
 to such an answer by a witness," continued Campbell, J., " is that it 
 enables the witness to substitute his opinion for that of the jury ; but 
 this is a fallacious objection. The jury, if they do not act from per- 
 sonal knowledge, cannot understand the matter at all, without knowing 
 the witness' opinion, and the ground on which it is based. It is the 
 same sort of difficulty which arises in regard to insanity, to disposition 
 
 1 Hamilton i\ People, 29 Mich. 173, declared that the question was not 
 185,180. The learned judge criticised presented by the record for decision, 
 the dictum of Prof. Greenleaf (1 He also calls attention to the fact that 
 Greenl. Ev. § -liil) , to the effect that the the American editors of Phillipps and 
 American authorities on this subject Starkie do not appear to have dis- 
 disfavored the English rule; and covered auy such conflict, and do not 
 stated that, of the cases cited by the allude to it; whereas they do, as many 
 author in support of this doctrine, not decisions do, refer to the kind ofrepu- 
 one contained a decision upon the iaftow which should be shown, whether 
 question, and only one contained more for veracity merely or for other moral 
 than a passing dictum, not in auy qualities also. He also pointed out 
 way called for. The decision referred that in Webber v. Hauke, 4 Mich. 198, 
 to was Phillipps v. Kingfield, 19 Me. no question arose on the record except 
 375. The learned judge pointed out as to the species of reputation, and the 
 that the authorities referred to in that neighborhood and time of its exist- 
 case contained no such decision and ence, saying that what was said fur- 
 that the Maine court, after reasoning ther was not in the case, and could 
 out the matter somewhat carefully, not dispose of the matter.
 
 458 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 or temper, to distances and velocities, and many other subjects, where 
 a witness is only required to show his means of information, and then 
 state his conclusions or belief based on those means. If six witnesses 
 are merely allowed to state that a man's reputation is bad, and as many 
 say it is good, without being questioned further, the jury cannot be 
 said to know much about it. Nor would any cross-examination be 
 worth much, unless it aided them in finding out just how far each wit- 
 ness regarded it as tainted." ^ The learned judge concluded with this 
 statement: " Mr. Greenleaf himself intimates that it might be a proper 
 inquiry on cross-examination. We think the inquiry proper, when 
 properly confined and guarded, and not left to depend on any basis 
 but the reputation for truth and veracity. And we also think that the. 
 cross-examination of impeaching or sustaining testimony should be al- 
 lowed to be full and searching. " - 
 
 § 534. [Continued.] Reasons for the Opposing Rule. — In a 
 case in Texas where the subject is extensively examined, it was said by 
 Bell, J. : "Where the impeaching witness is asked, ' Whether or not 
 he could believe the other under oath,' he is more likely to give an an- 
 swer suggested by his personal knowledge, or prompted by his per- 
 sonal feelings, or his individual opinion, than he is when asked 
 whether or not he is acquainted with the general reputation of "the 
 impeached witness for truth, and whether it is good or bad. If the im- 
 peaching witness states that he is acquainted with the' general reputa- 
 tion of the former witness for truth in the community where he lives, 
 he may then be properly asked whether that general reputation is such 
 as to entitle the witness to credit on oath, or any other form of words 
 may be used which do not involve a violation of the cardinal prin- 
 ciples that the inquiry must be restricted to the general reputation of 
 the impeached witness for truth in the community where he lives, or is 
 best known ; and tliat the impeaching witness must speak from gen- 
 eral reputation or report, and not from his own private opinion. "^ 
 Following this ruling, it has been held proper, where an impeaching 
 witness has stated that he knows the witness' character for truth and 
 veracity in the neighborhood in which he has live d and that it is bad, 
 to exclude the further question, " from that repu tation would you be- 
 lieve him on oath?" ^ 
 
 1 TT;imiltoii v. People, 29 Mich. 173, ^ Boon v. Wethered, 23Tex. (;75, 686, 
 ISO. * Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 
 2 Ibid. 187, 188. • 274, 2',)3.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XX.] DIRECT IMPEACHMENT. 
 
 459 
 
 § 535. Impeachment by Proof of Conviction of Felony or 
 other Infamous Crime, — It is competent, for the purpose of 
 impeaching a witness, to put in evidence the record of a convic- 
 tion of feh)ny or other infamous crime. ^ But under this rule, 
 a witness cannot be impeached by })roving that he has been con- 
 victed of a simple misdemeanor, such as assault and battery ,2 or 
 the violation of a city ordinance. ^ For stronger reasons, the 
 record of a mere complaint or indictment, charging a crime, is not 
 admissible, for this does not impeach the Avitness; * since, " until 
 convicted, the law presumes the person indicted to be innocent 
 of the charge." ^ The record is the only competent evidence of 
 the fact of such a conviction; ^ though, as elsewhere seen,^ the 
 
 1 Carpenter v. Nixou, 5 Hill (X. Y.), 
 200 ; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N. Y. 
 300. 
 
 2 By statute in Indiana, a witness 
 might be impeached by proving by the 
 record that he had been convicted of 
 an infamous crime ; but it was held 
 that this cannot be done by show- 
 ing that, on an indictment for assault 
 and battery -with intent to commit a 
 rape, he had Ijeen convicted of a simple 
 assault and battery; since this was not 
 an infamous crime. Gleuu v. Clore, 
 42 lud. 00. As to what is an infamous 
 crime see Pruitt v. Miller, 3 Ind. 10. 
 
 ^ The Statute of Ohio provides that, 
 " No person shall be disqualified as a 
 witness in any criminal prosecution by 
 reason of his interest in the event of 
 the same, as a party or otherwise, or 
 by reason of his conviction of any 
 crime; but such interest or conviction 
 may be sliown for the purpose of af- 
 fecting his credibility." 66 Oh. Laws, 
 308; Rev. (1880), § 7284. It is held 
 that the conviction referred to in this 
 section, which may be shown for the 
 purpose of affecting the credibility of 
 the witness, is such, aud such only, as, 
 before the enactment of the section, 
 would have disqualified the person 
 
 from testifying as a witness. Con- 
 victions for violations of city ordi- 
 nances never disqualified a person from 
 testifying in auy cause; aud therefore 
 such convictions cannot be shown, 
 under this section, for the purpose of 
 affecting the credibility of the wit- 
 ness Coble V. State, 31 Oh. St. 100. 
 
 4 People V. Gay, 7 N. Y. 378; Lipe 
 V. Eisenlerd, 32 N. Y. 238; Jackson v. 
 Osljorn, 2 AVend. (N. Y.) 555; West v. 
 Lynch, 7 Daly (X. Y.), 245. 
 
 5 West V. Lynch, supra. Thus, it 
 has been held that the fact that the 
 witness has been indicted tor forgery or 
 perjury is inadmissible as affecting his 
 character without proof of conviction 
 under the indictments. Jackson v. 
 Osborne, supra. 
 
 ^ In Georgia, the rule of law con- 
 cerning secondary evidence has been 
 carried to the extent of holding that it 
 is not competent to show, on the 
 cross-examination of a witness, foi- 
 the purpose of impairing his testi- 
 mony, that he had, during the terra of 
 court then in session, pleaded guilty 
 to a criminal offense ; the record of the 
 plea of guilty was held the only proper 
 evidence. Johnson v. State, 48 Ga. 116. 
 
 ' Ante, § 404. 405, 407.
 
 460 EXAMINATION OF "WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 rules of practice in some jurisdictions allow such a question to 
 be put by the. witness on cross-exaDiination^ but he cannot be 
 contradicted by the record if he denies the fact. 
 
 § 536. By Evidence that the Witness is of Defective Mind 
 or Memory. — A person entirely without memory is incompetent 
 as a witness, and if his memory is naturally weak, or has been 
 impaired by disease or age, his testimony will naturally have less 
 weight with a jury than if his memory is sound and unimpaired. 
 It is therefore competent to give evidence that the memory of a 
 witness is weak, for the purpose of affecting his testimony. ^ It 
 is not necessary that such testimony should be given by an ex- 
 pert."^ 
 
 § 537. Inadmissible Modes of Impeaching. — It is not ad- 
 missible, for the purpose of impeaching a witness, to prove that 
 he is a chronic witness for particular cases. Thus, in a late crim- 
 inal case in Mississippi, in an indictment for gaming, the defendant 
 offered to. prove that a certain witness for the State had already 
 made, in the form of witness fees, about $20 that week, by testi- 
 fying for the State in several cases. It was held that the court 
 correctly excluded this evidence. " Such evidence," said Cooper, 
 C. J., " would not prove or tend to prove that he ought not to 
 be believed." ^ Nor can evidence be introduced to affect the 
 credibility of a witness, by showing that he testified on a former 
 trial and was not believed by the jury.^ 
 
 1 Isler V. Dewey, 75 N. C. 4G6. » Rebecca Lea v. State (Miss.), 1 
 
 2 Ibid.; Clary v. Clary, 2 Ired. L. So, Rep. 2U; s. c. CA Miss. 294. 
 
 (N. C.) 78; Bailey v. Pool, 13 Ired. L. -^ Scheuck v. Griffin, 38 N. J. L. 463, 
 
 (N. C.) 404. 471.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 461 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING WITNESSES. 
 
 Section 
 
 541. Right to Introduce Corroborating Testimony. 
 
 542. Witness' own Evidence as to Corroborating Facts. 
 
 543. Additional Evidence of tlie Facts Testified to by tlie Impeached Wit- 
 
 ness. 
 644. Where Witnesses are Assailed in Rebuttal. 
 
 545. In Cases where Testimony of a Single Witness is Insufficient. 
 
 546. CoiToboratiou of Accomplice Testimony. 
 
 547. [Continued.] Parties to an Incestuous IntercoursCo 
 
 548. [Continued.] By what Evidence Corroborated. 
 
 549. [Continued.] By Evidence of Previous Consistent Declarations. 
 
 550. [General Rule.] Supporting Testimony not Admissible in Chief. 
 
 551. Right to Sustain by Proof of Good Character. 
 
 552. View that any Species of Assault lets in Evidence of Good Character. 
 
 553. [Continued.] Reasons for the foregoing View. 
 
 554. Witness Impeached by Contradiction, sustained by Good Character. 
 
 555. [Continued.] A Contrary View. 
 
 556. Where the Witness has committed an Offense which affects his Char- 
 
 acter. 
 
 557. [Continued.] Contrary and Confusing Views. 
 
 558. [Continued.] AVhere Third Parties have Accused tlie Witness of Swear- 
 
 ing Falsely. 
 
 559. Exception in the Case of a Subscribing Witness who is Dead. 
 
 560. [Continued.] Illustration. 
 
 561. Exception where the Witness is a Stranger. 
 
 562. [Continued.] Sustaining a Deaf and Dumb Prosecutrix in an Indictment 
 
 for Assault with Intent to Ravisli. 
 
 563. Laying Foundation. 
 
 56*. Negative Evidence of Character. 
 
 565. [Continued.] Reasons and Illustrations. 
 
 566. Distance of Time and Place. 
 
 567. Riglit to Impeach an Impeaching Witness, 
 
 568. Cross-examination of Sustaining Witness. 
 
 569. Re-Examination. 
 
 570. [Georgia.] Wliat Sustaining Witness must Swear to. 
 
 571. [General Rule.] Declaration out of Court not Admissible to Sustain 
 
 Declaration in Court. 
 
 572. Old Rule that former Consistent Declarations may be Shown in Corrobo- 
 
 ration.
 
 462 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp, Tl'. , 
 
 Section 
 
 573. Witness Impeached by Previous Inconsistent Statements, not Sustained 
 
 by Evidence of Previous Consistent Statements. 
 
 574. Recognized Exceptions to the General Rule. 
 
 575. [Continued.] Change of Relation Necessary to Admit such Evidence. 
 57r.. [Another Exception.] Fabrication of Recent Date. 
 
 577. [Another Exception.] Statements made Immediately after the Occur- 
 
 rence. 
 
 578. [Continued.] Not Admissible when made Subsequent to the Inconsist- 
 
 ent Statements. 
 570. [Contra.] Impeached by Contradictory Statements, Confirmed by Con- 
 sistent Statements. 
 
 580. [Illustrations.] Where the Witness on a Previous Occasion testified 
 
 less positively. 
 
 581. Distinction between the Case where the Previous Inconsistent Declara- 
 
 tions are Established, and where they are Left in Dispute. 
 
 582. General Character not Supported by Previous Declarations. 
 
 § 541. Right to Introduce Corroborating Testimony. — 
 
 Where a witness is contradicted, the party calling him lias the 
 obvious right to introduce competent testimony corroborating 
 him, and no exception lies to the hearing of such testimony.^ 
 
 § 542. Witness' own Evidence as to Corroborating Facts. — 
 
 But a party cannot support his own positive testimony of facts, 
 stated upon his own knowledge, by testifying himself to other 
 consistent or corroborative facts, which arc immaterial in them- 
 selves, and which, like the facts sought to be corroborated, rest 
 entirely upon his own oath. " Such evidence," saidCooley,C. J., 
 " coming from other persons, might have had some such tend- 
 ency ; but when the question is whether one fact to which a wit- 
 ness testifies is correct, it can receive no support whatever from 
 his swearins: to another which, though consistent with the first, 
 must, like that, rest entirely upon his own statement." ^ » 
 
 § 543. Additional Evidence of the Facts testified to by the 
 Impeached Witness. — Where the character of a witness is im- 
 
 1 Green v. Gould, 3 Allen (Mass.), the purpose of con-oboratiug the state- 
 
 465. See also Holbert v. State, 9 Tex. ments of witnesses. Buie v. Carver, 
 
 App. 219. In an action to recover 75 N. C. 559. 
 
 real estate, it was held no error to al- 2 Anderson v. Russell, 34 Midi. 109, 
 
 low a deed for other lands tlian that in 111. 
 controversy to be put in evi(k'uce for
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROBORATING AND sustain;ng. 463 
 
 peached, it is competent for the party calling him to introduce 
 further testimony in support of the facts to which the discredited 
 witness has testilied. So held in a criminal trial, where one of 
 the State's witnesses was impeached by evidence of bad char- 
 acter, in which case it was held that the plaintiff had the right to 
 introduce another witness to the same fact, and that it was not a 
 good objection that the testimony of this witness was not in re- 
 buttal.^ In 1853 the practice was said to be in North Carolina, 
 and, as the Supreme Court thought, sustained by good sense, for 
 a party to offer as many witnesses as he might deem necessary 
 to establish his allegation. If the other party should choose, he 
 might rest the case upon it, or he might call witnesses in his 
 turn; and then the first party might call witnesses in reply, and 
 for the purpose of adding to the strength of the evidence upon 
 which he first rested his case. That is to say, the party sustain- 
 ing the burden of the proof might call as many witnesses as he 
 might think necessary to make out myri ma facie case, and then, 
 after hearing the opposing testimony, if he should think it neces- 
 sary, he might call other witnesses whose testimony would sim})ly 
 corroborate that of his first witnesses. In support of this view, 
 a remark attributed to Lord Kenyon was quoted that "it is not 
 worth while to jump until you get to the fence, " — " that is," 
 said Pearson, J., "there is no use of meeting objections until 
 they are presented, or in piling up proof until it is made neces- 
 sary by what is done on the other side." 2 Thus, on an issue of 
 devisavit vel non, the caveator produced and examined thirteen 
 witnesses, who testified to the disputed signature, after which the 
 proponent introduced six witnesses, who swore to the contrary. 
 It was held proper for the caveator then to call his other witnesses 
 in support of those who had first testified. ^ 
 
 § 544, Where Witnesses are Assailed in Rebuttal. — AVhere 
 the plaintiff, in rebuttal, introduces evidence in contradiction of 
 the witnesses of the defendant, which the defendant could not 
 
 1 John V. State, 16 Ga. 200. s Ibid. 
 
 2 Outlaw V. Hurdle, 1 Jones L. 
 (N. C.) 150.
 
 464 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 reasonably have anticipated, which evidence is offered for no other 
 purpose than to impeach their credibility, the defendant is entitled, 
 after the plaintiff has rested, to support their credibility by addi- 
 tional testimony.^ 
 
 § 545. In Cases where testimony of Single Witness is In- 
 sufBcient. — In certain cases the testimony of a single witness is 
 insufficient to establish the fact in issue, and therefore corrobo- 
 ration is necessary, and unless there be corroboration, the court 
 will direct a verdict against the party sustaining the burden of 
 proof .^ This happens in cases of treason, jjerjury, and in some 
 others, to enter upon which is not within the plan of this work. 
 
 § 546. Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony. — A slight 
 deviation may, however, be made for the purpose of merely 
 noticing a subject of great interest and of much conflict of opin- 
 ion, namely, the question of the necessity of corroboration in 
 the case of the testimony of accomplices. There is a coiifiict 
 of oinnion as to whether a conviction of crime can be had upon 
 the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The old En- 
 glish'^ and some of the American ^ opinion is to the effect that it 
 can be; but there are contrary holdings in England,'^ and the 
 later American holdings, founded largely upon statutes, are also 
 to the contrary.^ But where the modern and more humane rule 
 
 1 Wade V. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578. Eeg. v. Magill, Ir. Circ. Cas. 418. 
 
 2 Thus, iiiider the civil code of There is a luorft/zed titezo that the testi- 
 Louisiaiia, article 2257, the testimony mouy of accomplices is admissible 
 of a single witness is not sufficient to -without corroboration, where they 
 establish a contract guaranteeing the have been kept separate since their ar- 
 payments of the price of goods pur- rest, and have no opportunity to com- 
 chased for an amount exceeding $500. municate with each otlier. Reg. v. 
 Diclisou V. Sharretts, 7 La. Ann, 54. Aylmer, 1 Crawf. & D. 116. 
 
 3 Rex V. Atwood, 2 Leach C. C. 521 ; « Rap. Wit., § 22(i ; citing Marler v. 
 Jordaine v. Lashbrooke, 7 T. R. GOl, State, 67 Ala. 55; Lumpkin v. State, 
 609; Rex v. Jones, 2 Camp. 131; Rex 68 Ala. 56; People v. Ames, 39 Cal. 
 V. Sheehan, Jebb Cr. Cas. 54. 403; People v. Melvane, 39 Cal. 614; 
 
 4 State V. AVolcott, 21 Conn. 272; People v. Cloonan, 50 Cal. 449; John- 
 State V. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 468; son r. State, 4 Greeoie (la.), 65; Upton 
 State I'. Williamson, 42 Conn. 261. v. State, 5 Iowa, 4(;5; Bowling?). 
 
 6 Eex V. Noakes, 5 Carr. & P. 326; Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 604: Craft v.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 465 
 
 prevails, it is conceded that evidence necessary in order to cor- 
 roborate the testimony of an accomplice, so as to authorize a 
 conviction thereon, need not be of a conclusive character.^ A 
 statutory rule which requires the testimony of an accomplice to be 
 corroborated, does not apply to the testimony of a feigned ac- 
 complice ^^^ and, of course the same holding would apply in respect 
 of the same common-law rule, of which the statute is merely 
 declaratory. 
 
 § 547. [Continued.] Parties to an Incestuous Intercourse. — It 
 has been ruled that if the female, with whom an incestuous intercourse 
 is alleged to have been had, is shown to have knowingly, voluntarily 
 and with the same intent which actuated the accused, united with him 
 in the commission of the offense, she is an accomplice in the crime, and 
 her uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to support a conviction of 
 the accused. On the other hand, if the evidence shows that, in the 
 commission of the incestuous act, she was the victim of force, threats, 
 fraud or undue influence, so that she did not act voluntarily, and did 
 not join in the commission of the act with the same intent that actuated 
 the accused, then she is not an accomplice, and a conviction might stand 
 even upon her uncorroborated testimony.^ 
 
 § 548. [Continued.] By what Evidence Corroborated. — 
 
 But it is nevertheless a rule that it makes no difference as to the 
 number of accomplices who testify without confirmation, since 
 accomplices cannot corroborate each other. Although their testi- 
 
 Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 349; People v. 131, By § 1111 of the Califoruia Penal 
 
 Courtney, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 589; People Code, the evidence which is necessary 
 
 Kylaucl, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 568; Lopez v. to corroborate the testimony of an ac- 
 
 State, 34 Tex. 133; Wright v. State, 43 complice need not be evidence tending 
 
 Tex. 170; Nourse v. State, 2 Tex. App. to establish the precise facts testified 
 
 304; Davis t\ State, 2 Tex. App. 588; to by the accomplice, but it is sufficient 
 
 Eoach V. State, 4 Tex. App. 4G; Miller if it tends to connect the defendant 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 251 ; Powell v. with the commission of the offense. 
 
 State, 15 Tex. App. 441; Dunn v. State, People v. Cloonan, 50 Cal. 449. 
 15 Tex. App. 560; State v. Howard, 32 2 people ■;;. Bollinger (Cal.), 11 Pac. 
 
 Vt. 380; Wright v. State, 43 Tex. Rep. 799. 
 
 170. 3 Mercer v. State, 17 Tex. App. 452, 
 
 1 Best on Ev., § 171; People v. 465. See also Freeman v. State, 11 
 
 Melvane, 39 Cal. 614; State v. Schla- Tex. App. 92; Watson v. State, 9 Tex. 
 
 ge)., 19 la. 169; Nolan v. State, 19 Oh. App. 237; Whart. Crim. Ev., § 440. 
 
 30
 
 466 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 mony is given to the same fact, it must be corroborated by 
 evidence coming from an unpolluted source, before it will justify 
 conviction,^ But a writing delivered by one accomplice to an- 
 other, in furtherance of the scheme of crime concocted between 
 them, may be used as corroborating evidence.^ And where an 
 accomplice testified that he had paid a bribe to the defendant 
 (on trial for bribery) by giving to the defendant a check upon 
 a certain bank, payable to cash or bearer, which had afterwards 
 been returned by said bank to the witness, it was competent for 
 the State, in corroboration, to show, by the books and business 
 memoranda of the bank, a credit to the defendant for a like 
 amount, deposited by check two days after the alleged bribery.'^ 
 
 § 549. By Evidence of Previous Consistent Declarations. — 
 
 It has been reasoned that, where the witness is an accomplice, 
 this fact alone is an attack upon his credibility, and authorizes 
 the public prosecutor to prove that the witness, when first arrest- 
 ed, had given the same relation of the facts which he gave on 
 the witness stand.* So, it has been ruled that, where a witness 
 is called, who, in the commencement of his testimony, states 
 himself to be an accomplice of the accused, it is regular, before 
 the witness is attacked, to call on another witness to prove that 
 the first witness had related the facts disclosed in his evidence, 
 immediately after they happened.^ Though, it is conceded that, 
 after the evidence of the confessed accomplice had been freed 
 from suspicion, such confirmatory evidence would be useless, and 
 therefore inadmissible.^ These holdings are based on a view 
 which, as we shall hereafter see,^ had a better foothold in our 
 earlier, than in our later jurisprudence, and are therefore stated 
 by the writer with reserve. In Massachusetts, where, on the 
 more general question of sustaining impeached witnesses by evi- 
 
 1 Rex V. Noakes, 5 Carr. & P. 32(i; « State v. Twitty, 2 Hawks (N. C), 
 Reg. V. Magill, Ir. Circ. Cas. 418. 449. Such evideuce was to be consid- 
 
 2 State V. Kellerman, 14 Kan. 135, ered as given substantially in reply. 
 138. Id. 
 
 3 State V. Smalls, 11 S. C. 2(i3, 286. 6 jfji^^ 
 
 4 People V. Vane, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) ' Post, § 572. 
 78.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 467 
 
 dence of their previous consistent declarations, the holdings are 
 opposed to those in North Carolina, ^ the following ruling on this 
 question is found: — 
 
 The defendant in a criminal case, for the purpose of impeaching 
 the testimony of an accomplice, introduced a letter from him, admitting 
 that his testimony in regard to the transaction in controversy, given on 
 a former occasion, was false ; and the attorney for the commonwealth, 
 in order to show that the letter had been obtained unfairly, asked the 
 accomplice certain questions, in answer to which he testified that the 
 letter was part of a C3rrespondence which had been carried on in jail, 
 and stated the means by which the correspondence had been carried 
 on, the relative position of the several rooms, and the arrangement of 
 the prisoners therein. It was held that it was not competent to call 
 witnesses to i)rove that the position of the rooms and the arrangement 
 of the prisoners therein corresponded with the account given by the 
 accomplice, in order to support his general credit. The court could 
 not perceive how the circumstance that the witness told the truth about 
 these public and common objects, concerning which he knew the ])roof 
 was at hand, had any tendency to confirm the material parts of his 
 testimony, involving the guilt of the defendant.-^ 
 
 § 550. [General Rule.] Supporting- Testimony not Ad- 
 missible in Chief. — The general rule is that sustaining tes- 
 timony is not admissible until the credit of the witness is 
 in some way impeached, either upon cross-examination, or by 
 testimony of other witnesses, and that mere contradiction amono- 
 witnesses furnishes no basis for admitting such evidence.^ This 
 rule has its aptest illustration in cases where it is sought to sus- 
 tain the testimony of witnesses by evidence of their good charac- 
 ter; 4 but it equally applies where it is attempted to corroborate 
 
 1 Post. § 573. V. Cox, 21 lud. 15. This is the rule 
 
 - Com. v. Bosworth,22Pick.(Mass.) uucler the Kentucky Code, §§ ()f;i-663 
 
 397, 400. (Bullitt's Codes, 591-599), Vauce v. 
 
 3 Auuesleyu. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Vauce, 2 Mete. v. (Ky.) 581. 
 
 Tr. 1348; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 lud. ^ People v. Gay, 7 N. Y. 380; Wil- 
 
 28, 34; Johusou v. State, 21 lud. 329; der v. Peabody, 21 Hun (N. Y.), 376, 
 
 Presser v. State 77 Ind. 274; Brauu v. 379; State v. Ward, 49 Couu. 429, 442; 
 
 Campbell, 86 Ind. SK;.- Braddee v. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 Browufield,9 Watts (Pa.), 124; Pruitt 5C9.
 
 4G8 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 a witness by evidence of his having made lii'^vioiis statements^ 
 similar to those delivered on the witness-stand, under a rule 
 hereafter considered. The general rule, therefore, is that the 
 evidence which is usually heard to sustain a witness whose credi- 
 bility has been in some way impeached, other than by mere con- 
 tradiction of his testimony, cannot be given in chief. ^ Upon 
 this subject it has been well said: "If, in the multiplicity of 
 contradictions daily occurring, each witness was permitted to 
 bring other witnesses to sustain his general character, and they, 
 contradicting each other, should be permitted to bring others, — 
 the whole time of our courts would be taken up in hearing these 
 side questions, until the matters originally in litigation would be 
 almost lost sight of, to the great detriment of suitors." ^ 
 
 § 551. Right to Sustain by Proof of Good Character. — But 
 
 where the direct impeachment of a witness is attempted, it is 
 always competent for the party, whose witness he is, to call 
 other witnesses to prove that his character is good. ^ It has even 
 been held that this may be done where the impeaching witness 
 testifies that the character of the witness assailed is good, — the 
 view being that the mere fact that his character is questioned by 
 the opposite party, entitles the party, whose witness he is, to sus- 
 tain it.* Where the plaintiff introduv-ed evidence tending to 
 prove declarations of the defendant unfavorable to the charac- 
 ter of one of his own witnesses as to veracity, this was re- 
 garded as an impeachment of the witness' character, such as 
 authorized the defendant to testify that his character was good.^ 
 In an action on a policy of insurance, where the defendant's evi- 
 dence tended to show that the plaintiff burned his own building 
 and committed perjury in his proof of loss, it was held that evi- 
 dence of his good character was admissible.^ 
 
 1 Jackson v. Etz, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) People v. Rector, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 314,320; People v. Vance, 12 Wend. 5G9. 
 
 (N. Y.) 78, 79, per Savage, C. J. ^ Com. v. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.), 
 
 2 Pruittr. Cox, 21 Ind. 15, 16, opin- 40. 
 
 ion by Ilauna, J.; reaffirmed in Brauu ^ Prentiss v. Roberts, 49 Me. 127. 
 
 r. Campbell, 86 Ind. 51G. ^ j^j^^l^.y ^. Vermont Mutual Fire 
 
 ^ Clackuer v. State, 33 Ind. 412; Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 142.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 469 
 
 § 552. View that any Species of Assault lets in Evidence of 
 Good Character. — Some American courts hold that, whenever 
 the character of a witness for truth is attacked in any way^ it is 
 competent for the party calling him to give general evidence of 
 his good character for truth ; and that it is immaterial whether 
 his character is attacked by showing that he has given accounts 
 of the matter out of court different from that given by him in 
 court, or by cross-examination, or by general evidence of his 
 character for truth. ^ This latter rule has been applied where the 
 motives of the witness were assailed on a severe cross-examina- 
 tion; 2 where evidence had been admitted to contradict the wit- 
 ness on an immaterial j)oint;^ and even where an attempt was 
 made to discredit the witness by disproving material facts testi- 
 fied to by him.^ Where one party introduces evidence that the 
 witness of the other party has been suborned and paid for his 
 testimony, the party whose witness is thus assailed may, in re- 
 buttal, introduce testimony tending to show the good character of 
 the witness for veracity.^ Another American court holds 
 that, where a witness testifies to a material fact, and the op- 
 posite party calls a witness who contradicts the former witness 
 as to such fact, and thereupon the former witness is allowed to 
 be sustained by evidence of good character, the contradicting 
 witness may be so sustained.^ 
 
 § 553. [Continued.] Reasons for the Foregoing View. — In a 
 case in New York, Duer, J. , while conceding the rule in that State is not 
 as last above stated, said tliat, if the question were an open one, he 
 would not hesitate to hold that evidence of the good character of a 
 witness ought to be admitted, in every case in which the veracity of the 
 witness, and not merely the truth of his testimony, is denied by the 
 
 1 Paine v. Tilden, 20 Vt. 554; State peachment by evidence of previous in- 
 
 «. Roe, 12 Vt. 93; Sweet v. Sherman, consistent statements). 
 21 Vt. 24; Isler v. Dewey, 71 N. C. 14; 2 Richmond v. Richmond, 10 Yerg. 
 
 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 300, (Teun.) 343. 
 
 315. So held under statutes : Glaze v. 3 Newton v. Jackson, 23 Ala. 335. 
 
 Whitley, 5 Ore. 1(;4; Richmond v. * Davis v, State, 38 Md. 15. See 
 
 Richmond, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 343; also State u. Cherry, 63 N. C. 493. 
 Hadjo V. Goodeu, 13 Ala. 718 (im- = People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61, 64. 
 
 « Davis V. State, 38 Md. 15, 49.
 
 470 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 adverse party. He also said : " An attack upon the moral character of 
 a witness is permitted, because, when successful, it creates a probabil- 
 ity that he has sworn falsely in the testimony that he has given ; and it 
 cannot be denied that an opposite probability is created, when the 
 character of the witness, a man of integrity and truth, is fully estab- 
 lished. It therefore seems to me tliat the evidence is, in its nature, 
 corroborative, and as such, ought to be admitted in every case in which 
 intentional falsehood, no matter upon what ground, is imputed to a 
 witness. There is a fallacy in the assertion that, when the general 
 character of a witness has not been impeached by the adverse party, it 
 is admitted to be good. All that is admitted is, that his character can 
 not be shown to be positively bad ; but tliis is no i*eason for excluding 
 evidence to show that it is positively good. Nor is it difficult to see 
 that, in many cases, the exclusion of such evidence may be a source of 
 error and injustice. The relation given by a witness may be very im- 
 probable in itself, j^et perfectly true ; for experience attests the just- 
 ness of the observation that ' truth is not unfrequently stranger than 
 fiction.' But it is obvious that the improbability of the relation may 
 lead a jury to discredit a witness wlio, if it was clearly proved to them 
 that he was a man distinguished for his probity and strict adherence to 
 truth, they would not hesitate to believe. It is obvious that the prob- 
 ability that he has sworn truly, arising from the moral excellence of 
 his character, might very reasonably outweigh, in the minds of the jury, 
 the opposite probability, arising from the nature of the facts to which 
 he has testified. In judging of the credit to be given to the narrative, 
 where the facts are remarkable and unusual, we are all of us governed 
 by the knowledge we have, or the estimate we have formed, of the moral 
 character of the person from whom the narrative proceeds ; and it is 
 not easy to understand why the evidence that determines the judgment 
 of every reasoning person, in the ordinary transactions of life, should 
 be withheld from the consideration of a jury." ^ 
 
 § 554. Witness Impeached by Contradiction Sustained by 
 good Character. — Some Amoricun courts hold that witnesses, 
 who have been impeached by evidence of previous contradictory 
 statements made by them,^ may be sustained by evidence that they 
 are of good character for veracity.^ But where the impeaching 
 
 1 Leouoriv. Bishop, 4 Duer (X. Y.), 3 Clark v. Bond, 29 Ind. 555; Haley 
 420, 422. V, State, G3 Ala. 83; Isler v. Dewey, 71 
 
 2 Ante, § 490. N. C. 14 ; Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Ore.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 471 
 
 party has merely laid the foundation for introducing evidence of 
 the .su[)posed contradictory statements, but has not introduced 
 such evidence, the party calling the witness will have no right to 
 introduce evidence of good character to sustain him ; for until 
 he is impeached, such evidence is premature.^ 
 
 § 555. [Continued.] Contrary View. — Many other Ameri- 
 can courts hold that evidence of the good character of the wit- 
 ness for veracity is admissible only when his general character, 
 or his character for truth, has been assailed by direct evidence, 
 or by proof on cross-examination of extrinsic facts going to his 
 general character ; and that it cannot be received where the only 
 foundation is inconsistencies in the statements of the witness on 
 cross-examination, or between statements made by him on the wit- 
 ness stand and statements made by him out of court, or upon proof 
 being given by other witnesses of material facts irreconcilable 
 with the facts proved by the particular witness ; although the 
 necessary consequence of the proof of such facts may be to im- 
 jjute fraud or falsehood to the witness. ^ 
 
 164; Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713; (N. Y.),106. The statement to the con- 
 
 Paine v. Tildeu, 20 Vt. 554. Compare trary by Dr. Greenleaf (1 Greeul. Ev., 
 
 Harris v. State, 30 lud. 131; Stratton § 4G9) is iu the lauguage of a statement 
 
 V. State, 45 Incl. 4(38; State v. Eoe, 12 by Mr, Phillipps to which Mr. Phillipps 
 
 Vt. 93; Sweet v. Sherman, 21 Vt. cites no authority. Dr. Greenleaf cites 
 
 23. in support of liis statement the case 
 
 1 State V. Cooper, 71 Mo. 436, 442. of Res v. Clarke, 2 Starkie, 241. This 
 
 2 People r. Hulse, 3 Hill (N. Y.), does not bear out the doctrine. There 
 300; People v. Gay, 7 N. Y. 378; Rus- the prosecutrix in an indictment for 
 sell V. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 143; an assault with intent to commit rape, 
 Rogers v. Moore, 10 Conn. 13; Brown having admitted, on cross-examina- 
 u. Mooers, 6 Gray (Mass.), 451; Hey- tion, that she had been sent to the 
 wood V. Reed, 4 Gray (Mass.), 574; House of Correction upon charges of 
 AtAVOod V. Deai'born, 1 Allen (Mass.), liaving stolen money, and tliat she had 
 483; Boardman v. AYoodman, 47 N. H. been admitted into the Refuge for tlie 
 120; Braddee v. Browntield, 9 Destitute and had remained tliere 
 Watts (Pa.), 124; Wertz v. May, 21 nearly two years, — it was held com- 
 Pa. St. 274-, Webb v. State, 29 Oh. St. petent to show that her conduct, since 
 351 ; Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450, 456 ; being so admitted into tlie Refuge for 
 Vance v. Vance, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 571; tlie Destitute, had been good. The 
 Frost V. McCargar, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) ruling did not relate at all to previous 
 ■617; Chapman v. Cooley, 12 Rich. L. contradictory statements made by the 
 (S. C.) 654; Starks v. People, 5 Deuio prosecutrix.
 
 472 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 556. Whore the Witness has cominittecl an Offense 
 which affects his Character. — Where, on cross-exainination, 
 a witness admits, or where it is otherwise proved, that he has 
 been convicted of a crime, or has committed an offem^e which 
 affects his character, the person who calls him is permitted to 
 prove that his general character, since being convicted of the 
 offense, has been good.^ Where a witness is impeached by pro- 
 ducing the record of his conviction of a felony or infamous 
 crime, it is not a new thing to allow his character to be sustained 
 by witnesses who testify that his subsequent character has been 
 ffood. This was allowed bv Lord Holt on the trial of Henry 
 Harrison for murder, in 1(392. The record of the indictment 
 and conviction of a witness for extortion, was produced to im- 
 peach him. Afterwards another witness. Captain Cannon, was 
 called, who was asked by Lord Holt to tell the court of what 
 reputation the witness was at the present time; and Captain 
 Cannon said: " My lord, he is now of none of the clearest repu- 
 tation." 2 And so, where an attempt was made to show that a 
 certain witness had himseJf committed the crime of which the 
 defendant stood charged, and that he had by false testimony, by 
 his management of the case, and by improperly interfering with 
 defendant's witnesses, attempted to excidpate himself hy con- 
 victino; an innocent man, — it was held that evidence of his o-ood 
 character for veracity was admissible. The court reasoned: 
 
 1 Rex u. Clarke, 2 Stark. 241; Com. Liucolu, s^ipra, it was held that evi- 
 
 ??. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 541; Webb v. deuce iutroduced for the purpose of 
 
 State, 29 Oh. St. 351; Gertz w. Fitch- impeaching a witness to the effect that 
 
 burg &c. R. Co., 137 Mass. 77 (dis- he has been tried for a crime in an- 
 
 tinguishing Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 other State does not authorize the 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 503, 5(18.) See also Com. party calling the witness to sustain 
 
 V. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.), 46. In his testimony by evidence of his good 
 
 Russell V. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 143, character for truth and integrity. 
 
 154, the court referred to this prin- The question is not well reasoned, 
 
 ciple, with the observation that they and the conclusion seems to be wrong 
 
 did not ol)ject to it. It was also cited in principle; since such evidence may 
 
 with approval In Braddee v. Brown- fairly be supposed prejudicial to the 
 
 field, 9 Watts (Pa.), 94. It is compe- witness in the minds of the jui-y. 
 tent to give such evidence under the 2 Harrison's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 
 
 California statute. People ii. Aniana- 801, 802. 
 cus, 50 Cal. 233. In Harrington v.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROBORATIXG AND SUSTAINING. 473 
 
 " While it is true evidence cannot be given to prove an infamous 
 crime against a witness, of which he has not been convicted, for 
 the purpose of impeaching his credit, yet where the question as 
 to whether the witness is guilty of such a crime becomes the 
 legitimate subject of inquiry on the trial, we think his reputa- 
 tion for truth ma}^ be proved to rebut any imputation against 
 his credit which the evidence of guilt makes ag-ainst him." ^ 
 But in such a case, the character of the witness may not be sus- 
 tained by showing that he was in fact innocent^ for the record 
 of the conviction is conclusive.'^ 
 
 § 557. [Continued.] Contrary and Confusing Views. — It is to 
 be regretted that authority is not uniform on the question what species 
 of assaults upon the character of a witness will authorize evidence of 
 good character to sustain hira. In a criminal case in the Supreme 
 Court of New York, it was held that the fact that the witness admits, on 
 his cross-examination, that he has been prosecuted and bound over, on a 
 charge of perjury, will not authorize the party calling the witness to give 
 evidence of his general good character, — the court reasoning that a party 
 can only give such evidence when impeaching witnesses have been called 
 on the other side, and that, by impeaching witnesses is meant only such 
 witnesses as have spoken to general character for truth. ^ - - . . 
 The court went into a great deal of learning to reason itself into a 
 conclusion which is obviously unsound in principle. To call out, on 
 cross-examination of a witness, the fact that he has been prosecuted, 
 though unsuccessfully, for perjuiy, would ordinarily prejudice his 
 character and testimony in the minds of the jury, and clear!}' the 
 party calling him ought to be allowed thereafter to sustain his testi- 
 mony by evidence tending to show his good character. - - - - Evi- 
 dence tending to contradict a witness, and also to show that he has 
 conspired with the party calling him, to cheat and defraud the opposite 
 party, does not, it has been held on equally doubtful grounds, 
 authorize the party calling him to introduce evidence of his character 
 for honesty, integrity and moral worth, as well as for truth and 
 veracity 
 
 4 
 
 1 Webb V. State, 29 Oh. St. 351, 358. 308; s. c. affirmed, 7 N. Y. 378 (Rug- 
 
 2 Gertz V. Fitchburg &c. R. Co., gles, C. .J., and Willes, J., disseiitiug.) 
 137 Mass. 77; Com. v. Gallagher, 12G •* Hey wood v. Reed, i Gray (Mass.), 
 Mass. 54. 574. 
 
 s People V. Gay, 1 Park. Cr. (N. Y.)
 
 474 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 § 558. [Continued.] Where Third Parties have Accused the 
 Witness of Swearing Falsely. — Equally untenable seems another hold- 
 ing of the Supreme Court of New York. A witness' character for ver- 
 acity was attacked by asking him, on cross-examination, whether third 
 persons had not accused him of swearing falsely. He answered in the 
 affirmative. It was held that this did not operate to let in evidence 
 showing that his character for truth and integrity had always been 
 good.^ The court reasoned that because the impeaching evidence was 
 not competent, that is, because the question put on cross-examination 
 was not competent, — and ought not to have been put and answered, the 
 party whose witness he was, was thereby cut off from removing the dis- 
 paraging effect of the answer, — and this, although the question put on 
 cross-examination was objected to by the party calling the witness who 
 was thus assailed. 
 
 • § 559. Exception in the Case of a Subscribing- Witness who 
 is Dead. — An exception to this rule has been admitted by the 
 English judges, in the case where the subscribing witnesses to a 
 will, or one of them, is dead, and the will is impeached on the 
 ground of fraud, — in which case they have admitted evidence 
 to support the characters of such deceased subscribing witnesses.^ 
 In so holding LordKenyon said: " In the great case of Jolliffe's 
 Will, Lord Dudley and Ward, and other persons, were examined 
 as to the character of the person by whom the will was prepared ; 
 and the legality of admitting such evidence was not doubted.^ 
 But Lord Ellenborough justly held that the rule has no applica- 
 tion where the subscribing witness is not dead, and no shade is 
 cast upon bis character by the evidence.^ 
 
 § 560. [Continued.] Illustration. — The validity of a will was im- 
 peached on the ground of total incapability in the testatrix to make any 
 will at the time when it was supposed to have been made. The names 
 of three witnesses were regularly subscribed, as attesting its execution. 
 These were a Mr. Gale, an attorney by whom it was prepared ; one 
 Re3'nolds, liis cleric ; and one Cooperson. The two former witnesses 
 
 1 Hannah v. McKellop, 49 Barb. 3 Stephenson v. Walker, supra. 
 (N. Y.) 342. * Bishop of Durham v. Beaumont, 
 
 2 Stephenson v. Walker, 4 Esp. 50; 1 Camp. 207. 
 Provis V. Reeil, 3 Moore & P. 4.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 475 
 
 were dead. Evidence was given tending to show that, when the will 
 was signed, the testatrix was in a state of stupor, and that the pen was 
 guided in her hand, without her seeming to know what she did. Lord 
 Kenyon allowed several witnesses, particularly of the legal profession, 
 to be called and asked as to the general character of Gale and Reynolds, 
 and whether they were persons of good reputation and likely to be 
 
 guilty of such conduct as was imputed to them.^ In another such 
 
 case, imputations having been cast upon the character of the deceased 
 attorne3'by whom the will was prepared, and who was one of the attest- 
 ing witnesses, the evidence charging him with fraud in the execution 
 of the will, it was held that the devisee might call witnesses to show his 
 general good character. In so holding, Best, C. J., said: " Courts of 
 law lay down principles according to the necessity of the case before 
 them. Here, the character of the deceased attorney, when attacked, 
 could only be protected by calling witnesses to show that he was not 
 capable of the fraudulent conduct imputed to him," '^ 
 
 § 561. Exception "Where the Witness is a Stranger. — In Con- 
 necticut, while the general rule is conceded that a witness cannot be 
 supported by evidence of his general character for truth, until after a 
 general impeachment of it, — yet an exception to the rule has been 
 adopted in the case where the witness is in the situation of a stranger. 
 There, they allow him to be supported by evidence of his general good 
 character for veracity, although it has not been impeached. ^ But it is 
 held, in applying this exception, that evidence of his good character in 
 other respects than veracity, is not admissible for the purpose of sus- 
 taining him.* 
 
 §562. j Continued, 1 Sustaininga Deaf and Dumb Prosecu- 
 trix, — Where the prosecutrix, who w^as also the principal witness 
 fertile State, on the trial of an indictment for an assault with intent 
 to ravish her, was a deaf and dumb person, it was held that the 
 public prosecutor was entitled to support her testimony by evi- 
 dence that her general character for truth was good, althouo-h no 
 impeachment of her character had been attempted ; ^ for one who 
 
 1 Stephenson v. Walker, i Esp, 20 Coiiu, 354, oii4. Compare Eogers v. 
 5<J. Moore, 10 Coun. 12. 
 
 2 Provis V. Reed, 3 Moore & P. * Merriam v. Hartford &c. R. Co,, 
 4, 9. siipi-a. 
 
 8 Merriam v. Hartford &c. R, Co., '" State v. De Wolf, S Couu, 93, 100.
 
 476 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. fl Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 could neither hear nor speak might well be regarded as a stranger 
 in the community in which she lived. 
 
 § 563. Laying Foundation. — But here, as in the case of the 
 
 examination of impeaching witnesses, before the sustaining wit- 
 ness can properly testify, a foundation should be laid, by asking 
 him if he knows the general character of the witness who is 
 assailed (in those jurisdictions where the inquiry is as to general 
 character), or his general character for truth and veracity (in 
 those jurisdictions where the inquiry is thus limited), in the 
 community where he resides or has recently resided. Until this 
 is done, he cannot be heard ; ^ after it is done, he may be 
 allowed to say whether or not, from that reputation, he 
 would believe the impeached ivitness on oath ; ^ but without 
 this foundation, he cannot so testify.^ But where, without the 
 asking of this specific question, a witness, whose deposition was 
 taken, stated that the general character of the impeached witness 
 was good and that he was entitled to full credit on oath, this was 
 deemed sufficient.^ 
 
 § 564. Negative Evidence of Character. — Negative evidence 
 of character, by which is meant that the witness has long been 
 acquainted with the person whose character is in issue and has 
 never heard it questioned, — is competent, and it has been held 
 error to exclude it.^ The reason is that the fact that a person's 
 character is not questioned is, on grounds of common experience, 
 excellent evidence that he gives no occasion for censure, or, in 
 other words, that his character is good.^ 
 
 1 Cook V. Huut, 24 111. 536, 550; 18; Taylor u. Smith, 16 Ga. 7, 10; Peo- 
 Clay r. Kobinsou,? W. Va. 350, 363. pie v. Davis, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 309, 
 
 2 Clay V. Robinson, supra; ante, 315; Morss v. Palmer, 15 Fa. St. 51, 
 _ § 532. 57; Davis v. Prauke, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 3 Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. St. 4U. 
 
 488, 502; ante, § 529. " State v. Lee, supra, opinion by 
 
 •* McCutchen v. McCutcheu, 9 Port. Berry, J. A similar reason was given 
 
 (Ala.) 650; Paine w.Tilden, 20 Vt. 554; by Berkshire, J., in Lemons v. State, 
 
 Sweet V. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23. supra. See the following authorities, 
 
 5 State u. Lee, 22 Minn. 407; Lemony as showing the extent to which the 
 
 V. State, 4 W. Va. 755; State ?;, Nelson, old rule in this regard has been relax- 
 
 58 Iowa, 208; Bucklin v. State, 20 Oh. od: Reg. v. Rowton, 2 Beun. &. II. Cr.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 477 
 
 § 565. [Continued.] Reasons and Illustrations. — "A ver^- sen- 
 sible and commendable instance of the relaxation of the old and strict 
 rule, is the reception of negative evidence of good character, — as for 
 example, the testimony of a witness who swears that he has been ac- 
 quainted with the accused for a considerable time, under such circum- 
 stances that he would be more or less likely to hear what was said about 
 him, and has never heard any i-emark about his character ; the fact that 
 a person's character is not talked about at all being, on grounds of 
 common experience, excellent evidence that he gives no occasion 
 for censure, or, in other words, that his character is good." ^ In 
 like manner, it was ruled in Pennsylvania, that it is competent evi- 
 dence in support of character, that a witness, acquainted with the 
 witness assailed and living in his neighborhood, never heard his 
 character for truth spoken against or questioned. The court, speak- 
 ing through Rogers, J., said: "It is certainly some proof that a 
 person against whom the tongue of slander has never been heard 
 to wag, is not so destitute of truth and sincerity as that he ought not 
 to be believed on his oath. The evidence is not easily reconcilable 
 with the charge that he is totally unworthy of credit. The presumption is, 
 if the charge be true, it must have been heard by those who lived near, 
 and were in daily intercourse with him.^ In like manner, in a case in 
 New York, where the sustaining witness testified that he had never heard 
 the character of the impeached witness for truth and veracity spoken of, 
 but who also testified that he knew the witness and the persons with 
 whom he associated, — it was held that he might properly be asked whether 
 he would believe the impeached witness on oath. Nelson, C. J., said: 
 ' ' If such a question might not be permitted, the most respectable man 
 in the community might fail in being supported, if his character for 
 truth should happen to be attacked. Living all his life above suspicion, 
 his truth would rarely be the subject of remark. A neighbor might be 
 obliged to admit, as in this case, that he had never heard it spoken of, 
 
 Cas. 333 and note; Gaudolfo v. State, him uuworthy of credit on his oath, 
 11 Oh. St. 11-t; 1 Tayl. Ev. (8tli ed.), before he can give his own declaration 
 §350; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc, § 4S9. But that, from his cliaracter, he would not 
 under the provisions of the Georgia believe him under oath." Artope v. 
 Code (Ga. Code 1873, §§ 3873, 3874), it Goodall, 53 Ga. 318, 324. 
 is held that " if the sustaining witness ^ State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407, 409, 
 is not able to say that the general opinion by Berry, J. To the same doc- 
 character of the impeached witness is trine see Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio 
 not bad, he should at least be required St. 114, 117. 
 to state that it is not such as to render - Morss v. Palmer, 15 Pa. St., 51, 57,
 
 478 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 and yet undoubtedly be competent to sustain him." ^ The same view- 
 has been taken by the Supreme Court of Georgia, in an opinion in which 
 it is said : " Certainly, the sort of silent respect and consideration with 
 which one is treated and received by those who know him, is some in- 
 dex of what they think of him as a man of veracity. And, indeed, if 
 he is a person whom they think very highly of, that is about the only 
 index. The character for truth of such person is never discussed — 
 questioned — spoken of. To discuss, question, or even perhaps 
 to speak of one's reputation for truth, is to admit that two opinions 
 are possible on the point. Suppose the question were, what was the 
 character of Washington among his neighbors for truth, could the 
 answer be anything but this : ' I never heard it questioned — discuss- 
 ed — spoken of; and yet I know it to have been excellent.' " ^ It was 
 therefore held that the testimony of witnesses to the effect that they 
 were acquainted with the character of the impeached witness for truth 
 in their neighborhood, and that from their acquaintance, thence 
 derived, they would believe him on his oath, although they had never 
 heard his character spoken of, was proper to be considered by the jury.^ 
 So, in a civil case in Virginia, a witness was asked whether he knew the 
 general character of the plaintiff for truth and veracity. He replied 
 that he had known the plaintiff six or seven years, and knew his gen- 
 eral character for truth and veracity as we'll as any other man's char- 
 acter against whom he had never heard anything alleged, and that he 
 had never heard his character called in question. It was likewise held 
 that this was proper evidence to go to the jury. ^ 
 
 § 566. Distance of Time and Place. — It has been ruled that 
 evidence in support of the character of an assailed witness need 
 not be confined to the same neighborhood, or to the same time 
 spoken of by the assailing witness, but that the party attempting 
 to sustain the witness may prove his character for veracity years 
 previously, and in a different county, in which he has resided. 
 The reasons in support of this conclusion were thus stated by 
 Rogers, J.: "It is contended that the testimony in support of 
 character must take no wider range, but must be confined to the 
 
 1 People V. Davis, 21 Weud. (N. Y.) 3 ji)i^_ 
 
 309,315. * Davis v. Frauke, 33 Gratt. (Va.> 
 
 3 Taylor v. Smith, IG G:i. 7, 10, 414. 
 opinioa by Beuulug, J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 479 
 
 same neighborhood and the same time. It must be observed that 
 witnesses have rights, as well as parties. It is too often the case 
 that they are set up as marks to be shot at, and sometimes are 
 compelled to defend themselves against sudden ruthless assaults, 
 of which they had no previous notice. However, a correct and 
 proper rule has been adopted, that greater latitude is allowed in 
 support, than in attacking character.^ * * * j^ ^j-^^ party 
 making the assault is allowed to choose his own neighborhood and 
 
 CD O 
 
 his own time, it may be difficult, in many cases, to parry the attack. 
 It allows him an unjustifiable advantage, of which the witness, who 
 is most interested, would have great right to complain. The not 
 coming from what is termed his immediate neighborhood, may 
 lessen its weight, but certainly does not destroy the competency 
 of the evidence. The same may be said, with equal force, as to 
 time. It is sometimes convenient for a party to rid himself of a 
 troublesome witness, deposing to facts on which the cause turns; 
 it is sometimes easy to excite a prejudice against him, in the 
 town, village, or neighborhood where he resides. To confine 
 him, in vidication, to the same place where the atmosphere has 
 been polluted by sinister arts, no man's character would be safe." ^ 
 
 § 567. Right to Impeach an Impeaching Witness. — The 
 
 rule is that the general character, or general character for ver- 
 acity, of eve7'i/ loitness who testifies in a case, may be impeached 
 by the opposite party. It hence follows that a witness called to 
 impeach the character of another witness, may himself be im- 
 peached by the same method.^ It is said by the late Judge 
 Taylor, in speaking of a witness whose general character for ver- 
 acity has been impeached: "The party calling him may re- 
 establish his credit by attacking the general character of the 
 impeaching witnesses. How far this plan of recrimination may 
 be carried at common law is not yet determined, though in courts 
 of equity the practice is in conformity with the rule of the civil 
 law." * The rule of the civil law, here alluded to, permitted the 
 
 1 Citing Chess i'. Chess, 1 Peun. ^ starks v. People, 5 Deuio (N. Y.), 
 41. 10(1; State v. Cherry, 63 N. C. 493. 
 
 2 Morss V. Palmer, 15 Pa. St. 51, oC. * 2 Tayl. Ev. (8th ed.), § 1473.
 
 480 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoUip. Tr., 
 
 discreditmg witness himself to be discredited by other witnesses, 
 but allowed the recrimination to extend no further. 
 
 § 568, Cross-Examination of Sustaining Witness. — Where 
 
 a witness deposes to good character of an assailed witness, 
 he may be asked, on cross-examination, whether the impeached 
 witness has been reputed to have been arrested for felony, ^ 
 and whether he has not heard neighbors of such party testify, in 
 a previous action against the party, that his reputation was bad.^ 
 A prisoner on trial for highway robbery called a witness who de- 
 posed that he had known the prisoner for years, during which 
 time the prisoner had borne a good character. On cross-ex- 
 amination, it was proposed to ask the witness whether he had 
 not heard that the prisoner was suspected of having committed a 
 robbery, which had taken place in the neighborhood some years 
 before. This was objected to as raising a collateral issue, but 
 Mr. Baron Parke overruled the objection, saying: " The ques- 
 tion is not whether the prisoner was guilty of that robbery, but 
 whether he was suspected of having been implicated in it." ^ So, 
 in a prosecution for murder, a witness swore that he knew the 
 general character of the j^risoner for peace and quietude in the 
 neighborhood, and that it was good. On cross-examination, he 
 •was asked whether he had not heard that defendant had killed a 
 man in the State in Georgia. He was allowed, against objection, 
 to answer this question. It was held that in this the court com- 
 mitted no error. Stone, J., in giving the opinion of the court, 
 said: "In estimating character the shadings, as well as the 
 brio-hter hues, should be considered. They all go to make up 
 character — reputation — the estimation in which the person is 
 held. But it is only character, and not the particulars or details 
 of independent acts which can be inquired into." * 
 
 1 Wachstetterw. state, 99 Ind. 290; "distinguished" in the subsequent 
 
 s. c. 50 Ain. Rep. 94. The same court case of McDoiiel v. State, 90 lud. 320. 
 
 in a previous case held it iiicorapeteut Compare Hollaud v. IJarues, 53 Ala. 
 
 to ask a sustaining witness on cross- 83; s. c. 25 Am. Rep. 595. 
 examination if he had heard his neigh- ^ Hutts v. Ilutts, ()2 Ind. 240. 
 
 bors say that the slieriff had come to ^ Rex v. Wood, 5 Jur. 225; cited ir 
 
 arrest him for larceny. Oliver v. Best Ev., § 201. 
 Pate, 43 Ind. 132. But this case was * Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67, 72.'
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 481 
 
 § 569. Re-examination. — If sustaining witnesses admit, on 
 cross-examination, that tliere are reports in the neighborhood un- 
 favorable to the character of the witness assailed, it is competent, 
 on re-examination, to interrogate them concerning the nature of 
 those reports, e.r/., to ask them whether they are not in respect of 
 drinking and horse-trading. This is necessary, in order that the 
 jury may judge in what respect the reports affect the character of 
 the witness, and whether they are of such a nature as to impair 
 his credibility. 1 
 
 § 570. [Geokgia.] What Sustaining Witness must swear to. — 
 Under the Code of Georgia, to impeach a witness by proof of general 
 bad character, the impeaching witness should be first asked as to his 
 knowledge of the general character of the witness ; next, as to what that 
 character is ; and lastly, whether, from that character, he would believe 
 him on his oath.'^ By another section, " the witness may be sustained b}' 
 similar proof of character." -^ It would seem that these provisions are 
 merely declaratory of the common law. Construing them, the Supreme 
 Court of that State has said: " If the sustaining witness is not able to 
 say that the general character of the impeached witness is not bad, he 
 should, at least, be required to state that it is not such as to render 
 him unworthy of credit on his oath, before he can give his own declara- 
 tion, that, from this character, he would believe the other on his oath."^ 
 
 § 571. [General Rule.] Declaration out of Court not 
 admissible to Sustain Declaration in Court. — The general 
 rule is that the previous declaration of a witness out of court is 
 not admissible to sustain his evidence given in court. ^ Thus, it 
 has been ruled that a party who, in the progress of a trial, 
 makes use of a deposition, may not be allowed to strengthen it 
 by a so-called disclosure of the same witness, made at the time of 
 taking the poor debtor's oath, before two justices of the peace 
 and quorum.^ So, as a general rule, what a party swore to on a 
 
 1 Stape u P(!oplo, 85 N. Y. 390. (N. Y.) U7; Nichols v. Stewart, 20 
 
 2 Georgia Code 1873, § 3873. Ala. 358; Stolp t). Blair, 68 111, 541; 
 
 3 Ilnd , 5 3874. State v. Thomas, 3 Strobh. L. (S. C.) 
 
 4 Artopc V. Goodali, 53 Ga. 319, 269; Bailey v. State, 9 Tex. App. 98; 
 325. People v. Hulse, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 309 
 
 5 Riney v Vaiilandingham, 9 Mo. (Coweu, J., dissenting). 
 
 816; People v. Finnegau, 1 Park. Cr. « Smiths. Morgan, 38 Me. 468. 
 
 31
 
 482 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr. , 
 
 former occasion, cannot be given in evidence in his favor, though 
 it may be against him.^ Where a witness — a deaf-mute — was 
 discredited by evidence tending to sliow that slie had no knowl- 
 edge of a Supreme Being or of the obligations of an oatli, and 
 tlie party whose witness she was, tendered evidence to the effect 
 that she had related the same transaction to which she testified, in 
 a similar manner, to a friend of hers, — it was held that evi- 
 dence of these statements was rightly rejected, as being no more 
 than hearsay evidence; " and because, in the case of a witness 
 already laboring under suspicion, they are rarely calculated to 
 increase, in any degree, the confidence due to his testimony." ^ 
 It has been well said that: " To extend the doctrine to witnesses 
 who are not impeached, would result in making a witness' credi- 
 bility depend more upon the number of times he had repeated 
 the same story, than ui)on the truth of the story itself, and tend 
 to render the proceedings on each trial interminable." ^ 
 
 § 572. Old Rule that Former Consistent Declarations may be 
 SHOWN IN Corroboration. — It was early held in Pennsylvania that, 
 where a witness is impeached by evidence as to his character for 
 veracity, and is also contradicted, it is competent to give evidence of 
 what he swore to on a former trial, for the purpose of corroborating 
 his testimony.^ An early case in Maryland supported the same view. 
 The action was ejectment, and the question became material, whether 
 a certain child had been born alive or dead. The deposition of a doc- 
 tor of medicine was read, to the effect that he assisted at the accouch- 
 ment, and that the child was born alive. To overthrow this, testi- 
 mony was given to the effect that the deponent was not present at the 
 accouchment at all. The party offering the deposition then offered to 
 prove, for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the deponent, 
 that he had, two or three days after the birth of the child and before 
 the date of the deposition, declared tlie same facts to which he had de- 
 posed. It was held that this evidence should have been admitted, — 
 the court saying: " Where the credibility of the witness is attacked by 
 the opposite party, his prior declarations may be given in evidence to 
 
 1 Eobcrtson u. Caw, 3 Barb. (X. Y.) 3 Bailey v. State, 9 Tex, App. 98, 
 410. 100, opinion by Wliite, P. J. 
 
 2 Muusou V. Hastings, 12 Vt. ■* Henderson v. Jones, 10 Serg, & 
 346. R. (Pa.) 322.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 483 
 
 show bis consistency." 1 One decision is found which goes to the 
 wild length of holding that, where evidence is addnced which, contradicts 
 a witness upon an immaterial point, the party calling him may intro- 
 duce witnesses to sustain his general character, although the opposite 
 party disclaims any intention of discrediting him."^ These conceptions 
 take root in some early English authority, which will now be explained. 
 In an old case, William Maynard, a witness, was, as appeared by his 
 own evidence, guilty of a felony, to wit, robbery, together with others, 
 which robbery was the subject of the action, which was an action of 
 trespass. He had not been joined with the other defendants, in order 
 that he might be a witness for the plaintiff. He was allowed to testify, 
 and afterwards several witnesses were received and allowed to prove 
 that William Maynard did, at several times, discuss and declare the 
 same things, and to the like purpose, that he testified now ; and my 
 Lord Chief Baron said: " Though a hearsay ought not to be allowed 
 as direct evidence, yet it might be made so to this purpose, viz., to 
 prove that William Maynard was consistent to himself, whereby his 
 testimony was corroborated."^ Mr. Justice Builer, in his work 
 called Nisi Prius, citing the last named case, said: " But, though 
 hearsay be not allowed as direct evidence, yet it has been admitted 
 in corroboration of a witness' testimony, to show that he affirmed 
 the same thing before, on other occasions, and that he is still con- 
 sistent to himself,"^ — without offering any opinion as to the pro- 
 priety of the rule. In like manner, it was said bj' Mr. Serjeant Hawkins : 
 "What a witness hath been heard to say at another time may be given 
 in evidence, in order, either to invalidate or confirm the testimony which 
 he gives in court." ^ Chief Baron Gilbert, in his work on evidence, in 
 treating of hearsay evidence, says : " But although hearsay is not allowed 
 as direct evidence, yet it may, in corroboration of a witness' testimony, 
 to show that he affirmed the same thing on other occasions, and that the 
 witness is still consistent with himself ; for such evidence is only in 
 support of the witness that gives his testimony upon oath." ^ So, on 
 the trial of Sir John Friend for treason, Lord Chief Justice Holt 
 allowed Bertham, a witness, to testify that Captain Blair had told him, 
 for two years past, that Sir John Friend was to have a regiment of 
 horse which was to be raised and lie posted about the town, that Cap- 
 
 1 Cooke V. Curtis, 6 Harr. & J. 3 Lutterell v. Reynell, 1 Mod. 282. 
 (Md.3 93. 4 Bull. N. P. 29i b. 
 
 2 Newton v. Jackson, 23 Ala. s Hawk. P. C, bk., 2, ch. 4G, § 14. 
 335. 6 Gilb. Ev. 890.
 
 484 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 tain Blair was to be lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, and that the 
 witness was to be lieutenant to Captain Blair in his troop. Lord Holt 
 said: "That is not evidence against Sir John Friend. He [the wit- 
 ness] is only called to confirm the testimony of Captain Blair, — that 
 Blair spoke of it long before he gave his evidence, and so it is not 
 anew thing invented by him."i In another case, such confirmatory 
 evidence was offered and admitted in chief, which would not now be 
 alio wed. 2 For, notwithstanding these decisions and dicta, it is well 
 settled that such evidence is not receivable to confirm the testimony 
 of a witness, until it has been assailed by evidence of previous inconsist- 
 ent statements made by him ; since, to receive it would involve the 
 solecism of attempting to support testimony given upon oath, by state- 
 ments made not on oath, which are mere hearsay.^ 
 
 § 573. Witness Impeached by Previous Inconsistent State- 
 ments not Sustained by Previous Consistent Statements. — 
 
 By the weight of authority, where the testimony of a witness 
 is discredited by evidence that he has made statements out of 
 court inconsistent with his sworn testimony, it is not competent, 
 for the purpose of sustaining him, to prove that, at other 
 times, he has made, out of court, statements which are con- 
 sistent with his sworn testimony.^ A fortiori, such testimony is 
 not admissible, to confirm the testimony of another ivitness testi- 
 fying to the same fact.^ Thus, where the prisoner was on trial 
 for the crime of robbery committed upon the person of one 
 Terhune, it was held that the statements which Terhune had 
 made to a witness, immediately after the alleged robbery, con- 
 
 1 Friend's Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 10 Pet. (U. S.)412; Butler r. Truslow, 
 32, 33. 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 293; Reed v. Spauld- 
 
 2 Harrison's Case, 12 How. St. Tr; iug, 42 N. H. 114; Smith v. Stickuey, 
 861. ir Barb. (N. Y.) 481); Robb v. Hack- 
 
 3 Tliis was distinctly ruled iu Rex ley, 23 Weud. (N. Y.) 50; United States 
 V. Parker, 3 Dougl. 242, where the v. Holmes, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 98, 105; 
 doctrine of Lutterell t). Reyuell, sMp?'a, People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; Dushon 
 was declared not to Ije the law. v. Merchauts' lus. Co., 11 Mete. 
 
 4 Nichols V. Stewart, 20 Ala. 358; (Mass.) 199. So held iu Cora. v. Wii- 
 Com. w.Jenkius, 10 Gray (Mass.), 485, son, 1 Gray (Mass.), 337; Com v. 
 489; Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42; State v. Jenkins, 10 Gray (Mass.), 489. 
 Vincent, 24 la. 570, 575; Ellicott v. ^ State u. Parish, 79 N. C. 610. 
 Pearl, 1 McLean (U. S.), 20G; s. c. 
 
 I
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROIiOKATI^G AND SUSTAINING. 485 
 
 sistent with his statements made as a witness, were not admissi- 
 ble for the purpose of corroborating his statements as a witness.* 
 But in one jurisdiction, the case of a woman swearing to a rape 
 committed upon her ^ has been held to form no exception to 
 the foregoing rule. On the trial of an indictment for such 
 an offense, alleged to have been committed on board a vessel, 
 the prisoner attempted to discredit the testimony of the pros- 
 ecutrix,— 1. By showing, on her cross-examination, that her 
 story was improbable in itself. 2. By disproving some of the 
 facts to which she testitied. 3. By evidence that her conduct, 
 while on board the vessel and afterwards, was inconsistent 
 with the idea of the offense having been committed. 4. By 
 calling v/itnesses to show that the account which she had 
 given of the matter out of court, did not correspond with her 
 statements under oath. It was held, that this was not an attack 
 upon the complainant's general character, and therefore, that 
 evidence of her good character was not admissible in reply. 
 Cowen, J., dissented, holding that evidence of the complainant's 
 contradictory statements out of court affected her general char- 
 acter, and consequently that evidence of her good character be- 
 came admissible. 2 
 
 § 574. Recognized Exceptions to the Rule. — There are cer- 
 tain recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, as to which all 
 the authorities agree. Thus, where the witness is charged with 
 testifying under the influence of some motive prompting him 
 to make a false statement, it may be shown that he made 
 similar statements at a tim e when the imputed motive did not 
 exist, or when motives. of interest would have induced him to 
 make a different statement from that which he actually made. * 
 
 » People V. Fiuuegan, 1 Park. Cr. kiss v. Germania Eire Ins. Co , 5 Hun 
 
 ^^: ^-^ ^*^- (N. Y.), 90; State v. Petty, 21 Kan. 
 
 - Post, § 577. 54, 60. See also People v. Moore, 15 
 
 3 People V. Hulse, 3 Hill (N. Y.), Weud. (N. Y.) 419; State v. De Wolf, 
 
 8 Conn. 93; Wriglit v. DeKlyne, 1 Pet 
 C. C. (U. S.) 199; Henderson ??. Jones 
 10 Sersf. & R. (Pa.) 332; Packer v. 
 V. Cheatham, 6 Lea (Tenu.) , 2 ; Hotch- Gonsalus 1 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 526 ; People 
 
 ■» Gates V. People, 14 111. 433, 438; C. C. (U. S.) 199; Henderson ?7. Jones' 
 Stolpi;. Blair, 68 HI. 541, 544; Hayes 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 332; Packer v.
 
 486 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoUip. Tr., 
 
 Accordingly a confession by an accomijUce^ given before he had 
 received a promise of personal exemption if he would become a 
 State's witness, may well be received, as corroborating the tes- 
 timony^ given by him on the witness stand. ^ 
 
 § 575. [Continued.] Chanj^e of Relation Necessary to Ad- 
 mit such Evidence. — In such a case, denying the general right 
 to admit such evidence, it has been said: " To make the former 
 statements of the witness competent in his own favor, it should 
 ordinarily be made to appear that, at the time he made the state- 
 ments, he stood in some different relation to the cause or party 
 from what he now occupies, and that the change in his position 
 has been such that, though his present statement is in favor of 
 his interest, yet that the former one, at the time it was made, 
 must have been, or at least must have appeared to be, directly 
 against his interests. And any such statements by a witness, 
 made at any time, and offered as evidence in his own favor, 
 after he has been impeached, should be received with great 
 caution." '^ 
 
 §576, [Another Exception.] Fabrication of Recent Date. 
 
 So, in contradiction of evidence tending to show that the wit- 
 ness' account of the transaction was a fabrication of a recent 
 date, it may be shown that he gave a similar account, before 
 
 V. Vane, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 419 ; Clapp under the influence of some motive 
 V. Wilson, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 286. This prompting him to make a false or col- 
 rule was thus stated in an opinion ored statement, then, he may be al- 
 drawn up by Miller, .J., in the Court of lowed to show in reply, that he has 
 Appeals of New York, but not re- made similar declarations, at a time 
 ported, because not concurred in fully when the motive imputed to him did 
 by all the members of the court: "As not exist." Eailway Co. v. Warner 
 a general rule, such evidence is inad- (memorandum in G2 N. Y. 651) ; quoted 
 missible, as the witness cannot be and followed in Herrick v. Smith, 13 
 allowed to corroborate his statement Hun (N. Y.), 446, 448. 
 in court by what Avas said by him out ^ See the reasoning of Brousou, J., 
 of court. There ai'e, however, excep- in liobl) v. Hackley, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 tions to this rule. In case an attempt 50. 
 
 is made to discredit the witness on the '^ Reed v. Spaulding, 42 N. 11. 114, 
 
 ground that his testimony was given 123, opinion by Sargent, J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROBORATING AXD SUSTAINING. 487 
 
 its effect and operation could be foreseen.^ Thus, where it 
 was proved, with a view to discredit a witness, that he had given, 
 on other occasions, a week or ten days after the time of tlie trans- 
 action of which he testitied, a very different account from what 
 he had given on the stand, — it was hekl admissible to support 
 him, by showing that, immediately after the transaction, he had 
 given the same account which he had given upon the stand. ^ 
 
 § 577. [Another Exception,] Statements inade immedi- 
 ately after the Occurrence. — A moditied rule has been thus 
 laid down in a recent decision in Kansas: *'If a witness be im- 
 peached by proof of his having previously made statements out 
 of court, inconsistent with his testimony in court, he may then 
 be corroborated by evidence of other statements made by him 
 out of court, in harmony with his testimony, if made immedi- 
 ately after the occurrence of which he has testified took place, and 
 made before he has had any reason or ground for fabricating an 
 untrue or false statement; and such corroborating evidence is 
 not limited to those statements made by him before the time 
 when his statements, given in evidence to impeach him, were 
 made, but may be extended to other statements made by him after- 
 wards." ^ Thus, in an action by husband and wife for a personal 
 injury upon the wife. Lord Holt admitted evidence of what the 
 wife had said, immediately upon receiving the hurt, and before 
 she had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advan- 
 tage.* So, on a trial for rape, where the testimony of the 
 prosecutrix was impeached by })roof of inconsistent statements 
 made by her on the preliminary trial before a justice of the 
 peace, it was competent for the prosecution, in corroboration 
 to prove the declarations of such witness on the day following 
 
 1 Gates V. People, U 111. 433, 438, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 323. See also 
 
 per Treat, C. J.; Stolp v. Blair, G8 111. States. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559. 
 
 541, 544, per Sheldou, J.; State v. 2 preuch v. Merrill, 6 N. H. 465 
 
 Petty, 21 Kan. 54; Brousou, .T.jiu Robb (with which compare Spauldiug v. 
 
 V. Hackley, 23 Weud. (N. Y.) 50, 54; Reed, 42 N. II. 114.) 
 
 Eliicott V. Pearl, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 412, 3 state v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 
 
 439, per Story, J.; Hester t?. Com., 85 5G3. 
 
 Pa. St. 140, 158; Henderson t!. Jones, ■* Thompson r. Trevanion, Skin. 402.
 
 488 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr. 
 
 the commission of the crime. ^ The reader will here recall the 
 doctrine of immediate outcry applicable to such prosecutions. 
 "Upon accusations for rape, where the forbearance to mention 
 the circumstance within a reasoable time is in itself a reason 
 for imputing fabrication, unless repelled by other considera- 
 tions, the disclosure made of the fact, upon first opportunity 
 after its commission, and the apparent state of mind of the party 
 who has suffered the injury, are always regarded as very ma- 
 terial, and the evidence of them is constantly admitted without 
 objection."^ It has been held, on doubtful grounds, in a case 
 in admiralty, that the protest of the captain and crew of the 
 vessel, made the morning after the collision, may be considered 
 as evidence corroborative of the testimony of the witnesses in 
 court, when, as to all material facts, they correspond.^ 
 
 § 578. [Continued ] Not Admissible when made subse- 
 quently to the Inconsistent Statements. — It has been ruled 
 that, while evidence of previous inconsistent declarations may, 
 such a case, be admissible, when made prior to the date of the 
 inconsistent ones, yet the rule is otherwise where they are made 
 subsequently, — the reason, as stated by Mr. Justice Woodbury, 
 being, " that they must be made at least under circumstances 
 when no moral influences existed to color or misrepresent 
 them." " But," continued he, " when they are made subse- 
 quent to other statements of a different character, as here, it is 
 possible, if not probable, that the inducement to make them 
 is for the very purpose of counteracting those first uttered. This 
 impairs their force and credibility, when, if made before the 
 others, they might tend to sustain the subsequent evidence cor- 
 
 1 state V. Laxton, 78 N. C. 504, 570. ing a witness, his general character 
 
 2 Sir W. D. Evans in his notes to ranst have been assailed, either by im- 
 Pothier on Obligations, vol. 2, p. peaching witnesses or by proof of 
 251. extrinsic facts of a disparaging nature. 
 
 3 The Pacific, 1 Xewb. (U. S.) 9. Leonori v. Bishop, 4 Drue, (N. Y.), 
 The Nev^r York rule solmiis to be that, 420; People v. Hulse, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 
 in order to let in evidence of good 300; People v. Gay, 7 N. Y. 378; 
 cliaracter f or the purpose of sustain- Starks w. People, 5 Uenio (IS. Y.), lOG.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXI.] CORROBOKATIXG AND SUSTAINING. 489 
 
 responding with them." ^ The reason was thus stated by 
 McKinuey, J.: " To allow consistent statements, for the pur- 
 pose of giving support to the credit of the witness, made after 
 the contradictory representations by which it is sought to im- 
 peach him, would be to put it in the power of every unprincipled 
 witness to bolster his credit, and, perhaps, escape the just con- 
 sequences of his own falsehood and tergiversation." ^ 
 
 §579. [Contra.] Impeached by Contradictory Statements, 
 confirmed by Consistent Statements. — In the view of other 
 American courts, where a witness has been assailed by evidence of 
 having made previous statements, inconsistent with his testimony 
 on the stand, he may be confirmed by evidence of having made 
 previous statements consistent with such testimony.^ This rule 
 is differently stated in different jurisdictions. In one it is laid 
 down that when the credibility of a witness is attacked from the 
 nature of his evidence, from his situation, on the ground of bad 
 character, by proof of previous inconsistent statements, or by im- 
 putations directed against him on cross-exaonination, the party 
 who has introduced him may prove other consistent statements, 
 for the purpose of corroborating him.* In another, it is stated 
 in a much modified form, by saying that statements made by a 
 witness corroborating his evidence upon the trial, made soon 
 
 1 Conrad v. Griffey, 11 How. (U. S.) (N. C.) 263; State v. George, 8 Ired. L. 
 480, 491; Queener u. Morrow, 1 Coldw. (N. C.) 324; Johnson v. Patterson, 2 
 (Tenn.) 124, 135; State v. Petty, 21 Hawks (N. C), 183; March r. Harrell, 
 Kan. 54. See also Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 1 Jones L. (JST. C.) 329; Brookbank v. 
 Pet. (U. S.) 412,438, where it was held State, 55 lud. 169; Dailey v. State, 28 
 generally that such evidence was inad- lud. 285; Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blackf_ 
 missible; but the court found an addi- (Ind.) 395;^ Hayes v. Cheatham, 6 Lea 
 tional reason for supporting the de- (Tenn.), 2, 10; Third Nat. Bk. v. Hall, 
 cision of the trial court in excluding 1 Baxt. (Tenn.) 479; Perkins v. State, 
 it, in tlie fact that the conversations, 4 Ind. 222; Doddt'. Moore, 92 lud. 397; 
 testified toby tlie sustaining witnesses, Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 were subsequent to those testified to 395; Beaiichamp v. State, 6 Blacltf. 
 by the impeaching witnesses. Contra, (Ind.) 299; Dailey v. State, 28 Ind, 
 Brookbank v. State, 55 Ind. 169. 285; Dossettu. Miller, 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 
 
 2 Queener v. Morrow, 1 Coldw. 72; Lyles u. Lyles, 1 Hill Ch. (S. C) 76. 
 (Tenn.) 124, 135. * March u. Harrell, 1 Jones L.(N.C.) 
 
 3 Hoke V. Fleming, 10 Ired. L. 329; Isler v. Dewey, 71 N. C. 14.
 
 490 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 after the transaction to which it rehites, or when he was not 
 under the inliuence of any motive to rehite the transaction un- 
 truthfully, are competent, where it is shown that he had given a 
 different relation of the occurrence, or that he testified under the 
 influence of a motive calculated to induce him to testify falsely.^ 
 According to one vie w, evidence of such statements made, in har- 
 mony with the testimony given by the witness in court, is not 
 limited to such declarations as were made jjrioi' to the time when 
 his conflicting declarations, given in the impeaching evidence, 
 are claimed to have been made.^ 
 
 §580. [Illustration.] Where the Witness on a Previous Occasion 
 Testified less Positively. — A novelillustration of this principle is fur- 
 nished in a case in Vermont, where, on the trial of an indictment for crime, 
 the respondent, to weaken the force of the evidence of certain witnesses 
 as to his identity with the criminal, introduced evidence tending to show 
 that, at a preliminary examination of the respondent, they testified less 
 positively on that point; but it also appeared that the same witnesses, 
 directly after the commission of the offense, asserted positively the 
 identity of the respondent with the person whom they saw commit the 
 crime, and at the same time caused his arrest. It was held that such 
 statements and such action on the part of the witnesses, so near 
 the time of the commission of the offense, tended to corroborate their 
 testimony as to identity, and that the judge committed no error in 
 making this suggestion to the jury.^ 
 
 § 581. Distinction between the Case where the Previous 
 Inconsistent Declarations are established, and where they are 
 left in Dispute. — A distinction has been taken between a case 
 where the witness concedes, or where other testimony conclu- 
 sively establishes, the fact of his having made prior statements 
 inconsistent with his testimony on the witness stand, and the case 
 where the fact of his having made such prior statements is left 
 by the testimony in doubt or in dispute. In the former case, 
 the Supreme Court of Michigan concede that evidence of his 
 
 1 Hotchkiss V. Germjinia Fire Ins. 2 Rrookbank r. State, 55 Ind. 169 
 
 Co., 5 Hun (N. Y.), On, 95; Robb v. ^ State v. Deniiiii, a2 Vt. 158. 
 
 Hackley, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 50.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXL] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 491 
 
 prior consistent declarations would not be admissible in corrob- 
 oration, while in the latter case such evidence would be admis- 
 sible.^ Ill the opinion of the court, given by Mr. Justice Cooley, 
 the folio wino- lanojuao-e occurs: "If it were an established fact 
 that the witness had made the contradictory statements, we 
 should say that the supporting evidence here offered was not 
 admissible. If a witness has given different accounts of an affair 
 on several different occasions, the fact that he has repeated 
 one of these accounts oftener than the opposite one, can scarcely 
 be said to entitle it to any additional credence. A man untruth- 
 ful out of court is not likely to be truthful in court ; and where 
 the contradictory statements are proved, a jury is generally jus- 
 tified in rejecting the testimony of the witness altogether. But 
 in these cases, the evidence of contradictory statements is not 
 received until the witness has denied making them, so that an 
 issue is always made between the witness sought to be impeached 
 and the witness impeaching him. The jury, therefore, before 
 they can determine how much the contradictory statements ought 
 to shake the credit of the witness, are required first, to find, from 
 conflicting evidence, whether he made them or not; and the 
 question we now are to decide is whether, upon an issue of this 
 character, evidence like that received by the circuit judge was 
 admissible. The proper test for the admissibility of evidence 
 ought to be, we think, whether it has a tendency to effect belief 
 in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, who should receive 
 and weigh it with judicial fairness. Now, there. are many cases 
 in which, if evidence is given of statements made by a witness in 
 conflict with those he has sworn to, his previous statements 
 should not only be received in support of his credit, but would 
 tend very strongly in that direction. If, for instance, the wit- 
 ness is himself the prosecutor, and has already made sworn 
 complaint, there can be no doubt, we suppose, that the pendency 
 of this complaint, its contents, and the relation of the witness to 
 it, might be put in evidence, and that they would raise a strong 
 probability that the testimony to conflicting accounts as having 
 
 1 Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. G3 (Campbell, C. J., dissenting on both points).
 
 492 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 been given about the same time, was either mistaken or corrupt. 
 Suppose a man to be testifying in a case in which he had spent 
 a considerable period of time and a hirge sura of money in pur^ 
 suins an alleged criminal to conviction, and he is confronted 
 with evidence of his own conflicting statements; the rule would 
 be exceedingly unjust, as well as unphilosophical, which should 
 preclude his showing, at least by his own evidence, such circum- 
 stances of his connection with the case as would make the im- 
 peaching evidence appear to be at war with all the probabilities. 
 And other cases may readily be supposed in which, under the 
 peculiar circumstances, the fact that the witness has always pre- 
 viously given a consistent account of the transaction in question, 
 might well be accepted by the jury as almost conclusive that he 
 had not varied from it in the single instance testified to, for the 
 purposes of impeachment. It is impossible to lay down any 
 arbitrary rule which could be properly applied to every case in 
 which this question could arise ; but we think there are some 
 cases in which the peculiar circumstances would render this 
 species of evidence important and forcible. The tender age of 
 the principal witness might sometimes be an imjwrtant consid- 
 3ration, and the fact that the previous statemeut was put in 
 writing, — as it was in this instance, — at a time when it would 
 be reasonably free from suspicion, might very well be a con- 
 trolling circumstance. We think the circuit judge ought to be 
 allowed a reasonable discretion in such cases, and that, though 
 such evidence would not generally be received, yet that his dis- 
 cretion in receiving it ought not to be set aside, except in a clear 
 case of abuse." ^ 
 
 § 582. General Character not Supported by Previous Dec- 
 larations. — It has been ruled m Vermont that, where a witness 
 has been discredited by evidence of his having given a different 
 relation, even when this evidence appeared from his own cross- 
 examination, he might be sustained by evidence of general good 
 character.'^ But the same court holds that the converse of this 
 
 1 Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. G3, 2 gtate v. Eoe, 12 Vt. 110; ante,. 
 
 74. § 552.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XXL] CORROBORATING AND SUSTAINING. 493 
 
 proposition, that when his general character is impeached, he 
 may be sustained by proof of prior statements consistent with 
 his testimony, —is not the law.i Where a party testifies in his 
 oion behalf, evidence of previous inconsistent declarations are 
 admissible against him, without laying any foundation for the 
 introduction of the same by cross-examining him ; merely because 
 they are declarations against his interest, and such declarations 
 are always original evidence against a party.^ The mere fact 
 that evidence of such declarations has been given, does not, it 
 has been held, authorize the party to introduce witnesses in sup- 
 port of his general character.^ 
 
 1 Gibbs V. Linsley, 13 Vt. 208. 3 Owens v. White, 28 Ala. 413. 
 
 2 Blossom V. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434, 
 438.
 
 494 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thouip. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 OF THE EXAMINATION OF EXPEKTS. 
 
 Article I. — Direct Examination. 
 Article II. — Cross-Examination. 
 
 Article I. — Direct Examination. 
 
 Section 
 
 587. Expert Witnesses, how Examined. 
 
 588. Laying the Foundation. 
 
 589. Opinion based on the Personal knowledge of the Expert. 
 
 590. Medical Opinion based on Statements of Patient. 
 
 591. Medical Opinion upon Symptoms stated by Unsworn Persons. 
 
 592. Facts and Opinions Mingled. 
 
 593. Witness not to Decide Disputed Questions of Fact. 
 
 594. But Examined on Hypothetical Facts. 
 
 595. Not to give Opinions based upon Hearing the Evidence. 
 590. [Continued.] Observations on the above Rule. 
 
 597. [Continued.] Not to give Opinions upon Depositions Submitted to 
 
 them. 
 
 598. [Continued.] Farther Illustrations. 
 
 599. [Contra. When the Evidence may be Submitted to Experts. 
 
 600. [Continued.! In Actions for the Value of Services. 
 
 601. [Continued.] Other Instances where this has been done, 
 
 602. [Continued.] What if Expert has not heard all the Testimony. 
 603 [Continued.] Opinion founded on an Opinion. 
 
 604. Hypothetical Questions, how framed. 
 
 605. Must not embrace Matters within Ordinary Experience. 
 
 606. Must be based on Evidence. 
 
 607. Latitude in framing tliem. 
 
 608. No Objection that they Contain Errors. 
 
 609. Not Necessary to state Fact.s as Proved. 
 
 610. Need not Embody all the Facts. 
 
 611. [Continued.] Dicta upon this Subject. 
 
 612. Long Hypothetical Questions Objectionable, 
 
 613. [Continued.] Whether Witness concurs in the Testimony of Another 
 
 Expert. 
 
 614. [Continued.] Instances of Proper Hypothetical Questions.
 
 Tit. IIT, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 495 
 
 Section 
 
 615. Whether Expert can give Opinion upon tlie Whole Case. 
 
 616. [Continued.] Instances of Questions Bad because calling for a Decis- 
 
 ion of the Case. 
 
 617. What if the Answers go beyond the Question. 
 
 618. Keasons on Examiuation-iu-Chief. 
 
 619. Opinions founded upon BooliS. 
 
 620. Experiments in the Presence of the Jury. 
 
 621. Medical Opinions as to the Permanency of Physical Injury. 
 
 § 587. Espert Witnesses, how Examined. — Expert wit- 
 nesses are generally examined upon hypothetical questions^ as- 
 suming the existence of facts which there is substantial evidence 
 tending to prove. ^ They are sometimes allowed to give their 
 opinions upon evidence which they have heard detailed by wit- 
 nesses. ^ They often give their opinion based upon their own 
 knowledge of the facts of a particular case.^ Medical experts are 
 sometimes permitted to give an opinioE based upon facts com- 
 municated to them by their patient^ and by them communicated 
 to the jury.^ Experts are sometimes, though rarely, allowed to 
 make experiments in the presence of the jury.^ 
 
 § 588. Laying the Foundation. — A witness cannot be per- 
 mitted to give his opinion as an expert, until it appears, by a 
 preliminary examination, that he is a person of skill in the par- 
 ticular department of science or special matter in which his 
 opinion is desired. So, too, where he is called upon to testify 
 from his own knowledge, it must appear that he has trustworthy 
 information or knowledge of the facts involved, and upon which 
 his opinion is to be founded, before he can testify as an expert.^ 
 
 1 Post § 594. personal knowledge of the case in 
 
 ^ Post, § 599. whicli the services were claimed 
 
 3 Post. § 589. to have been rendered, or of the 
 
 * Post, § 590. amount and character of such serv- 
 
 ^ Post. § 620. ices, the party calling him had no 
 
 fi Heald r Thing, 45 Me. 392 Ac- right to ask him, e.^r. "from what you 
 
 cordingly, where it was not shown know of this case, what do you think 
 
 that an attorney at law called as a would be a fair amount for Todd's 
 
 witness on the question of the value services?" Williams v. Brown, 28 
 
 of another attorney's services had any Oli. St. 547.
 
 496 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoUip. Tr., 
 
 Questions which are directed to him for the purpose o± hiying this 
 foundation, present a preliminary question of fact for tlie decision 
 of tlie judo-e,^ In questioning a medical expert with this end ii? 
 view, it is obviously proper to ask him luhcu experience he has had 
 with the particular disease or physical injury which is the subject 
 of the investigation; and where he has beer afflicted with the dis- 
 ease himself, it has beer hek that he may> state that fact to the 
 jury ; since the fact would render it more probable thai he had 
 made the disease the subject of a special study and investigation. ^ 
 
 § 589. Opinions based on the Personal Knowledge of tlie 
 Expert — Expert witnesses are allowed to give opinions based 
 upon their personal knowledge.^ This is seen every day in our 
 trial courts in actions for damages for physical injuries, where 
 the physician who has attended upon the plaintiff is allowed to 
 o-ive his opinion as to the duration and probable extent of the 
 injuries complained of. The opinion of a physician, who has 
 personal knowledge of the conduct and habits of a person, is 
 competent evidence as to the .sfm^^y of such person; ^ so, in fact, 
 is the opinion of a non-expert On an issue of sanity, physicians 
 
 1 Ante, § 323. "ot a wholly unimportant fact. It 
 
 2 Thus, in a late case in Illinois, an tended to add strength to the witness' 
 expert witness, a physician of thirty testimony as an expert in being calcu- 
 years standing, introduced by the lated to excite in him a peculiar inter- 
 plaintiff in an action for physical in- est, and lead him to give special study 
 jury, was allowed to testify " I am to that sul)ject of injury. We see no 
 paralyzed on the left side, — my arm just ground of complaint on defend - 
 and leg. Have no pr;\ctical use of ant's part in not excluding this evi- 
 them, but I can move the leg along." dence." Chicago &c. R. Co. v. 
 The court refused the defendant's mo- Lambert (Sup. Ct. 111.), 10 North E. 
 tion to strike out this evidence. It Eep. 219; s. c. 119 111. 256. 
 
 was a controverted question whether ^ Pelamourges v. Clark, 9 Iowa 1 ; 
 
 or not the plaintiff was paralyzed in State u. Stickley, 41 Iowa, 232; 1 Redf. 
 
 her left leg and arm by the Injury Wills, 137; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. 
 
 which she had received. It was held Falvey, 104 lud. 409, 418; Burns v. 
 
 that no error was committed in the Barenfleld, 84 Ind. 4;5; Lawson Exp. & 
 
 ruling. Mr. Justice 8h(^]don, in giving Op. Ev. 144; Boardman v. Woodman, 
 
 the opinion of the court, said: "It Is 47 N. H. 120, 13.5. 
 true that the witness' paralysis was * People v. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358. 
 
 not within the issue ; and yet it was
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXir.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 497 
 
 may be asked whether, from the circumstances of the patient 
 and the symptoms which they observed, they are capable of 
 forming an opinion of the soundness of his mind; and if so, 
 whether they can thence conckide that his mind is sound or un- 
 sound; and in either case, they are properly required to state the 
 circumstances or symptoms from which they draw their con- 
 clusions, to the end that the jury may the better judge of the 
 value of the same.^ 
 
 § 590. Medical Opinion based on Statements of Patient. — 
 
 The opinion of a medical expert may rest in part on statements 
 made to him by his patient, and by him communicated to the 
 jury. Upon this subject the authorities are in harmony, though 
 there is some difference of opinion as to whether statements of 
 past symptoms may be taken into consideration/'' 
 
 § 591. Medical Opinion upon Symptoms stated by other Un- 
 sworn Persons, — On an issue of insanity a physician who has 
 visited the person wdiose sanity is in question, in consultation 
 with his attending physician, is not permitted to give in evidence 
 the declarations made to him at the time, either by the defendant's 
 wife, physician, or other attendant, as to his previous symptoms 
 or condition. Such statements are properly excluded as hear- 
 sa}'.^ Nor will such a witness be permitted to give his opinion of 
 the mental condition of the person in question, based upon the 
 representations thus made to him, in connection with the symp- 
 toms which he discovered by personal observation and examina- 
 tion. His opinion should be formed entirely from his own 
 observation and examination of his patient's symptoms and 
 
 1 Hathoni u. Kiua;, 8 Mass. 371. Bate, 1 Swan (Teuu.), 279; Illiuois 
 
 2 Louisville &c. K. Co. v. Falvey, &c. K. Co. v. Suttou, 42 HI. 438; State 
 104 lud. 409, 419; Cartilage Tump. Co. v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86; Eckles v. 
 V. Andrews, 102 lud. 138; Elkhart??. Bates, 26 Ala. (355; Quaife «. Chicago 
 Eitter, 66 lud. 136; Barber v. Merriani, &c. R. Co., 48 Wis. 513; s. c. 33 Am, 
 11 Allen (Mass.), 322; Thompson v. Kep. S21; Brown », N, Y, &c. R. Co., 
 Trevauion, Skinner, 402; Aveson v. 32 X, Y. 597; Towle v. Blake, 48 N, H. 
 Kinuaird, 6 East, 188; Bacon v. Charl- 2. 
 
 ten, 7 Cush. (Mass,) 581; Denton?;. ^ jjeald w. Thing, 45 Me. 392.
 
 498 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [ITliomp. Tr., 
 
 condition.^ The reason of the rule which excludes the declara- 
 tions as incompetent, excludes also an opinion, based in whole or 
 in part thereon.^ 
 
 § 592. Facts and Opinion Mingled. — On an issue of sanity 
 or insanity, a witness, who has had op})ortunities of knowing and 
 observing the person in question, may not only depose to the 
 facts which he knows, but he may also give his opinion or belief 
 as to his sanity or insanity.^ 
 
 § 593. Witness not to decide Disputed Questions of Fact, — 
 
 Expert witnesses cannot be called upon to decide disputed ques- 
 tions of fact, thereby assuming the office of the jury.* 
 
 § 594. But Examined on Hypothetical Facts. — The proper 
 mode of examination is upon facts hypothetically stated;^ or, as 
 it is sometimes said, upon a hypothethical case, stated to them 
 and so proved as to resemble, as near as may be, the case under 
 consideration ^ 
 
 § 595. Xot to give Opinions based vipon Hearing the Evi- 
 dence. — The general rule is that it is not the province of an 
 expert witness to draw inferences from the evidence of other wit- 
 nesses, unless the facts testified to are clear and uncontroverted, 
 or to take into consideration such facts a^ he can recollect as 
 having been testified to, and thus form an opinion ; but he should 
 
 1 Heald r. Thiug, 45 Me. 392. testimony of the witnesses and read it 
 
 2 Ibid. over to the experts, to enable them to 
 
 3 Chiry V. Chiry, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) express an opinion as to the sanity or 
 78; ante, § 589. insanity of the accnsed in a criminal 
 
 4 Hitchcock V. Bnrgett, 38 Midi. trial. Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424. 
 501; Craig u, Noblesville &c. K. Co., ^ Spear «. Richardson, 37 N. H. 24; 
 98 Ind. 109; Burns v. Barenfleld, 84 Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.), 
 Ind. 43; Livingston v. Com., 14 Graft. 4G7; United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 
 (Va.) 592; United States v. McGlue, 1 (U. S.) 1; Guitterraan v. Liverpool &c. 
 Curtis C. C. 1. To the like effect see Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358; Davis i'. 
 Ilcald I'. Thing, 45 Me. 392; 1 Greenl. State, 35 Ind. 490; Livingstone v. Com., 
 Ev., § 440; Kedf. Am. Cas. on Law of 14 Gratt. (Va.) 592. 
 
 Wills, 40; 1 Wliart. Ev., § 452. It is, « lioardmau v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 
 
 therefore, improper to take down the 120, 135.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMIXATIOX OF EXPERTS. 4dV 
 
 have full knowledge of the ascertained or supposed state of 
 facts, on which his opinion is desired.^ It is therefore improper, 
 in most cases, and therefore error, to submit to him the testi- 
 mony detailed by the witnesses in their hearing, and to ask him 
 his opinion thereon.^ 
 
 §596. [Continued.] Observations on the Above Rule. — In the 
 celebrated case of M'Naghten, the following question was put by the 
 lords to the judges: "Can a medical mau, conversant with the dis- 
 ease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but 
 who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the wit- 
 nesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the 
 time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the 
 prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act, that he was acting 
 contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any, and what delu- 
 sion at the time?" To this the judges, speaking through Tindal, C. J., 
 answered: " In answer thereto, we state to your lordships, that we 
 think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in 
 strictness, be asked his opinion in tlie terms above stated ; because each 
 of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts 
 deposed to, which is for the jury to decide, and the questions are not 
 mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence 
 is admissible. But, where the facts are admitted or not disputed, and 
 the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be con- 
 venient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though 
 the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." ^ This decision 
 in the highest judicial tribunal of Great Britain, is generally regarded 
 
 as having established the modern law upon the question. On a 
 
 trial for murder, subsequently occurring, evidence was called on the 
 prisoner's behalf, to prove his insanity. A physician, who had been 
 in court during the whole trial, was then called, on the part of the 
 prosecution, and asked whether, having heard the whole evidence, he 
 was of opinion that the prisoner, at the time he committed the alleo-ed 
 act, was of unsound mind. It was held, notwithstanding the opinion 
 of the judges in the case of McNaghten, that such a question ought not 
 
 1 Guittermau V.Liverpool &c. Steam- (U. S.) 3G3, 309; McMechen w. Mc- 
 ship qo.,83 N. Y. 358. Mecheu, 17 W. Va. 684, 694; Keg. v. 
 
 2 Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray P'rauces, 4 Cox Cr. Cas. 57. 
 (Mass.), 4i;7; Jamesou v. Driukald, 3 ji'Xaghteii's Case, 10 CI. & Fiu. 
 12 Moore, 148; The Clenieut, 2 Curt, 200, 211.
 
 500 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl*. 
 
 to be put, but that the proper mode of examination was to take par- 
 ticular facts, and, assuming them to be true, to ask the witness whether, 
 in his judgment, they were indicative of insanity on the part of the 
 
 prisoner at the time the alleged act was committed. ^ " This," 
 
 said Chief Justice Shaw, " would be especially irregular, where the evi- 
 dence is conflicting, because it puts it in the power of the expert to give 
 an opinion upon the credibility of the testimony and the truth of the 
 facts, which is purely a question for the jury ; and then, upon the value 
 and efficacy of the facts and circumstances, in his opinion thus proved, 
 upon the question of soundness of mind." - 
 
 § 597. [Continued.] Not to give Opinions upon Depositions Sub- 
 mitted TO Them. — Experts called in a case in admiralty cannot give 
 their opinions upon depositions submitted to them, but they must be 
 examined upon a hypothetical state of facts submitted to them by the 
 court, which facts the trier of the facts finds to be established by the 
 evidence."^ Upon the trial of an action brought to recover dam- 
 ages for the breach of a charter-party, the principal question was 
 whether or not the ship, which had been disabled by a storm while near 
 the port of Vera Cruz, could have put into any of the ports of the 
 Gulf of Mexico or the Southern Atlantic States. Upon the trial, 
 experts, called on behalf of the plaintiff, were asked, against the de- 
 fendant's objection and exception, the following question: "Under 
 the state of facts mentioned in that deposition, what ports could the 
 captain have made in the Gulf of Mexico?" They were also asked 
 other questions of a similar import. It was held error to admit these 
 questions, since they required each witness to determine for himself 
 what facts were proved Ijy the deposition, and thus to usurp the func- 
 tions of a jury.'' 
 
 § 598. [Continued.] Further Illustrations. — So, in a contest 
 touching the validity of a will, it is not admissible to ask a medical ex- 
 pert whether, after having heard the evidence, he is or is not of opinion 
 that the testator was of sound mind.^ . _ . _ Nor can he, in such a case be 
 
 1 Reg. V. Frances, 4 Cox Cr. Cas. 57. ^ Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray 
 
 2 Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.), 4(17; Butler f. St. Louis Life 
 (Mass.), 467, 471. lus. Co., 45 Iowa, 93. See further, 
 
 3 Tlie Clemeut, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 3(;3, Pliillips v. Star, 26 Iowa, 349; State 
 3G9. V. Felter, 25 Iowa, 07; 1 GreeuL Ev. 
 
 * Dolz V. Morris, 10 IIuu (N. Y.), § 440. See also Freeman r. Lawrence, 
 201. 11 Jones & Sp. (43 N. Y. Sup.,) 288.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 501 
 
 asked to give his conclusion, in view of tlie testimony, as lie has heard 
 
 it, in connection with his own personal knowledge of the testator, i 
 
 It was so held where a physician examined as an expert was asked a 
 question in these words: " Now, then, you will state to the jur^' if the 
 symptoms and indications testified to by the witnesses were proved, 
 and if the jury were satisfied of the truth of them, — I wish you to state 
 whether, in your opinion, having heard all the symptoms and indications, 
 Joseph Hickenbottom was of sound or unsound mind, and if unsound, 
 
 what is the nature and character of that unsoundness?" ^ So, 
 
 where on a trial for murder, a physician, who stated that he had heard 
 the statements of the witnesses as to the circumstances which immedi- 
 ately preceded the illness of the deceased, the appearance of the body 
 after death, the condition of the limbs, etc., and could therefrom 
 offer an opinion as to the cause of death, was permitted to testify 
 
 what, in his opinion, was the cause of the death, — this was error. ^ 
 
 So, in an action for damages growing out of a maritime collision, it was 
 held improper to ask a nautical expert whether he thought, having 
 heard the evidence in the case, that the conduct of the captain was cor- 
 rect or not.^ In an action against a common carrier by sea, to recover 
 
 damages for injury to the freight by a collision with a collier, after a 
 protest or statement as to the circumstances attending the injury and 
 the management of the vessel had been given in evidence, and after wit- 
 nesses had testified in reference thereto, there being a discrepancy 
 
 1 Thus, on a question respecting insane — based upon my own personal 
 
 insanity of a deceased person, an ex- knowledge." Tlie Court: "He is 
 
 pert witness had given his opinion giving you a hypothetical case." Q. 
 
 based on his personal observation and (to the same as before). " I want 
 
 treatment of the deceased. After- the opinion now with your own indi- 
 
 wards, in answer to certain questions vidual observation from what has 
 
 propounded to liira, he stated that he reached you in the testimony?" A. 
 
 had heard all the testimony that had " The testimony has not served to 
 
 been given iu the case. The plaintiff's induce me to change my opinion al- 
 
 counsel then propounded to him the ready expressed." It was held that 
 
 following questions: " Q. I will put the ruling of the court in allowing 
 
 this question. In view of the testi- these questions to be put, against ob- 
 
 mouy as you have heard it, and in jection, was prejudicial error. Butler 
 
 connection with your own knowledge v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 
 
 of the state of Mr. Butler at the time 93. 
 
 he was iu the asylum in 1847, in your ^ Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Iowa, 
 
 opinion, was he or not, at that thue, 733, 738. 
 
 insane?" A. " That opiuiou I have ^ state v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509. 
 
 already expressed — that he was not ^ Sills v. Brown, 9 Car. & P. GOl.
 
 502 EXAMIXATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoiUp. Tl'., 
 
 between the protest and some of the testimony, and the evidence cov- 
 ering a great variety of facts, a witness called as an expert by the 
 plaintiff, after having testified that he had heard the testimony read to 
 the jury on the previous da}^ and the protest, and had heard the testi- 
 mony of one or two of the witnesses and the circumstances as detailed 
 by them, — was asked, " under the circumstances detailed by these 
 witnesses and in the protest," and under certain circumstances which 
 were specified, " what, in your opinion, should have been done by the 
 persons in charge of the steamship?" It was held, applying the fore- 
 going principle, that the question was incompetent. ^ 
 
 § 599. [Contra.] When the Evidence may be Submitted 
 to Experts. — Contrary to the foregoing, there is considerable 
 judicial opinion, apparently following the lead of M' NagJiten's 
 Case'^ to the effect that the cases where the expert cannot be 
 asked to give his opinion upon the testimony as he has heard it 
 detailed by the witnesses, are those in which the facts are con- 
 troverted.^ Upon this subject it has been reasoned: " Where 
 the facts stated are not complicated, and the evidence is not 
 contradictory, and the terms of the question require the witness 
 to assume that the facts stated are true, he is not, [where he is 
 called upon to give an opinion upon the evidence which he has 
 heard,] required to draw a conclusion of fact." * 
 
 § 600. [Continued.] In Actions for the Value of Services. — In 
 an action for work and labor, after plaintiff had testified as to the char- 
 acter of the services rendered, he called a witness who was asked: 
 "What were his services, as he describes them, worth a month?" 
 This was objected to, upon the ground that it was not competent for 
 the witness to give an opinion based on the plaintiff's statement. The 
 objection was overruled. It w^as held that this was not error, since the 
 question did not call upon the witness to determine the truth of the 
 
 1 Guitterman U.Liverpool &c. Steam- (U. S.) 1; aud In Guittermau v. Liver- 
 ship Co., 83 N. Y. 358 (deuyiug Feu- pool &c. Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 358; 
 wick V. Bell, 1 Car. & K. 312, aud and in Davis v. State, 35 lud. 49G. 
 distinguishing Trausportatiou Line v. Compare Fairchild v, Bascomb, 35 Vt. 
 Hope, 95 U. S. 297). 398. 
 
 2 10 CI. & Fiu. 200, 211; ante, §59G. * Iluut v. Lowell Gaslight Co., 8 
 
 3 This seems to have beeu assumed Alleu (Mass.), 169, opiuiou by Chap- 
 in United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. mau,J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 503 
 
 plaintiff's evidence, but was siinpl}' asking him what were the serv- 
 ices worth, assuming that they were rendered as described, and leaving 
 
 the jury to determine that question. i A phj'sician who had testified 
 
 to his knowledge of cases of cancer and of the value of services in earing 
 for them, who also testified that he had heard the evidence of other 
 physicians who had treated and who described the cancer in question, 
 and had heard the testimony of the plaintiff's wife read, but who had 
 no personal knowledge of the case, was asked: " What would be the 
 value of the services rendered by her in nursing and dressing the can- 
 cer?" This was objected to, and the answer was received under excep- 
 tion. It was held that this mode of interrogation was erroneous ; since 
 the question called upon the witness to assume the correctness of, and 
 to draw inferences from the evidence of other witnesses, and that his 
 opinion should have been ol)tained by stating to him a hypothetical 
 
 case.'- But in such a case, a phj'sician who knows the value of 
 
 such services, and who is also acquainted with the particular case, may 
 give his opinion as to the value of the services sued for.^ 
 
 § 601. [Continued.] Other Instances where this has been 
 Done. — Cases are found where medical experts, who have heard the 
 evidence, have been allowed to give tlieir opinion based thereon. Thus, 
 in a criminal case where the prisoner's defense was insanity, a medical 
 man, who had sat through the trial, might, it was held by Park, J., be 
 
 asked whether the facts proved showed symptoms of insanity.'*^ An 
 
 expert who was present at the trial and who heard all the testimony of 
 the witnesses on the part of the defendant, in regard to the sanity of the 
 party, was asked: " Upon the hj'pothesis that the testimony given by the 
 witnesses in this case, etc., is all true, then what would be your opinion" 
 of the sanity of the party. It was held that this question was substantially 
 correct, as it was in effect putting a hypothetical state of case to the 
 
 witness, from which his opinion was to be given. ^ In an action 
 
 against a gaslight company, for a negligent injury caused by an escape 
 of gas from its main pipe into the public street, exceptions to the fo.l- 
 lowing question, put to three medical experts, were held not well taken: 
 " Having heard the evidence, and assuming the statements made by the 
 plaintiffs to be true, what, in your opinion, was their sichiess, and do 
 
 1 McColhim V. Seward, 62 N. Y. 317. •» Rex v. Searle, 1 Mood. & Eob. 75. 
 
 * Reynolds v. Robiusou, 64 N. Y. ^ Negro Jerry v. Towusheud, 9 
 
 589. Md. 145, 159. 
 3 Reynolds V. Robiusou, supra.
 
 504 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoniD. Tr., 
 
 you see any adequate cause for the same? " ^ So, where, in an 
 
 action for malpractice by a surgeon, an expert had heard the testi- 
 mony of a particular witness as to the manner in which the operation 
 had been performed, and was thereafter questioned as follows: " Sup- 
 pose his statement relative to the amputation and its subsequent treat- 
 ment to be trutliful, was, or was not, the amputation well performed? 
 Was the subsequent treatment of the patient proper or improper? 
 And, in your opinion, was, or was not, the death of the patient the re- 
 sult of any neglect or want of skill in the surgeon? " — it was held that 
 the court erred in rejecting these questions, though, as the testimony 
 of the witness had been put to the expert as a supposed case, the error 
 
 was without prejudice.'-^ So, it has been held, in an action for 
 
 work and labor, where the value of the services is in question, that it is 
 competent for a witness, who has heard tlie testimony of another wit- 
 ness as to the nature and extent of the services rendered, to give an opin- 
 ion as to their value. The court said: "The question directed the 
 attention of the witness to the testimony of a single witness upon a sin- 
 gle subject, and was not other in effect than it would have been, if the 
 counsel had recited the statement of services rendered by the party, 
 and, on that statement, asked an opinion of their value." This 
 was equivalent to a question, "assuming that the services rendered 
 were as described by the witness, what were they worth? " ^ 
 
 § 602. [Contiiiiied.] What if the expert has not heard 
 all the Testimony. — A medical expert called as a witness is not 
 qualified to express an opinion, based on previous testimony in 
 the case, where he has not heard all the testimony which may 
 have been material to the subject of the inquiry.* Thus, it is not 
 competent for a medical Avitness who has not heard all the testi- 
 mony, given in a case of murder, tending to show the mental 
 condition of the defendant, where the defense is insanity, to give 
 an opinion founded upon the portion heard by him, as to his 
 sanity.^ 
 
 § 003. [Continued.] Opinion founded on an Opinion. — 
 
 It has been said that an expert may give his opinion to the /ac(s 
 
 1 Hunt V. Lowt'U Gaslijjjlit Co., 8 ■* Carpenter v. Blake, 2 Laus. (N. 
 Allen (Mass.), I(i9. Y.) 20(5; People v. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358; 
 
 2 Wright V. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348. s. c. 1 Park, Cr. (N. Y.) 495. 
 ' Seymour v. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178. ^ People v. Lake, snpra.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 505 
 
 testified to by the witnesses, but not upon their — opinions, which 
 means that an expert's opinion cannot be founded upon an 
 opinion.^ 
 
 § 604. Hypothetical Questions, how Framed. — The rule, 
 then, is that the hypothetical questions must be based either 
 upon the hypothesis of the truth of all the evidence, or upon a 
 hypothesis specially framed, of certain facts assumed to be 
 pi'oved, for the purpose of the inquiry. Such questions leave it 
 for the jury to decide, in the first case, whether the evidence is 
 true or not, and in the second case, whether the particular facts 
 assumed are or are not proved. ^ It should exclude any opinion 
 of the witness as to the way in which disputed facts should be 
 found. "^ 
 
 § 605. [Continued.] Must not embrace Matters within 
 Ordinary Experience. — The hypothetical questions must not 
 embrace matters within the range of ordinary human experience; 
 because, as to such matters, the opinions of the twelve men in 
 the jury box are better, in the eye of the law, than those of the 
 experts.* 
 
 * 
 
 § 606. Must he Based on tlie Evidence. — Hypothetical 
 questions must present facts which the evidence tends to prove; 
 if the facts embraced in them are not proved or attempted to be 
 proved, they are to be excluded by the court upon objection.^ 
 There must be testimony tending to jyrove every supposed state 
 of fact embraced therein.^ The hypothesis must be clearly 
 stated, so that the jury may know with certainty upon precisely 
 
 1 Walker v. Fields, 28 Ga. 237. s state v. Anderson, 10 Ore 4i8, 
 
 2 Gottlieb?;. Hartmau, 3Col. 53, G3; 455; Williams v. Brown, 28 Oh. 8t. 
 adopting Carpenter u. Blake, 2 Laus. 547; Bomgardner v. Andrews, 55 la. 
 (N. Y.) 206. 638; Hurst v. Railway Co., 49 la. 76; 
 
 3 Livingstone v. Com., 14 Gratt. Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, 554; 
 (Va.) 592. Bishop v. Spiuiug, 38 Ind. 143; Haish 
 
 * State V. Anderson, 10 Ore. 448, v. Payson, 107 111. 365. 
 455; Hill v. Portland &c. R. Co., 55 ^ Hathaway v. National Life Insur- 
 
 Me, 439. auce Co., 48 Vt. 336.
 
 '506 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 what state of assumed facts the expert bases his opinion. ^ Mere 
 fanciful questions, where there is no evidence at all in support of 
 the facts assumed, or questions assuming facts which are 
 wholly irrelevant to the subject of the investigation, should be 
 excluded. 2 But where there is evidence, either directly proving 
 the facts assumed, or evidence from which such facts may be 
 inferred, the court cannot invade the province of the jury and 
 decide the facts. " It is," said Elliott, J., "only where there 
 is no evidence at all in support of the facts assumed, or 
 where the question is clearly irrelevant, or where it is merely 
 speculative , or where it is itnproperly framed , that the court may 
 interfere.-^ Within this rule, whether the facts are all proved, 
 upon which the hypothetical question is based, or to what ex- 
 tent they are proved, is a question, not for the court, but for the 
 jury.* In fine, there should be evidence in support of the hy- 
 pothesis, of such probative strength that, according to the prin- 
 ciples prevailing in the particular jurisdiction, the judge would 
 be warranted in submitting such facts to the jury for their find- 
 ing. In general, it is sufficient that there is substantial evidence 
 tending to establish the hypothesis; for the judge cannot say, 
 before the question reaches the jury, whether or not it has been 
 established.^ 
 
 § GOT, Latitude iu Framing them. — It was said in one case 
 that "some latitude must necessarily be given, in the examina- 
 tion of medical experts, and in the propounding of hypothetical 
 questions for their opinion, the better to enable the juiy to pass 
 upon the questions submitted to them. The opinion is the opin- 
 ion of the expert, and if the facts are found by the jury, as the 
 counsel, by his questions, assumes them to be, the opinion may 
 have some weight; otherwise, not. It is the privilege of the 
 counsel, in such cases, to assume, within the limits of the evi- 
 
 , 1 McMecheu v. McMecheu, 17 W. ^ Louisville &c. K. Co. v. Falvey, 
 
 Va. 684. 104 lud. 409, 420. 
 
 2 People V. Augsbury, 97 N. Y. 501. * Ibid.- 
 
 See also Fairchikl v. Bascomb, 35 Vt. ^ Nave u. Tucker, 70 lud. 15, 18. 
 
 398; Williams 17. Browu, 28 0h. St. 547.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 507 
 
 deuce, any state of facts which he claims the evidence justifies^ 
 and have the opinion of experts upon the facts thus assumed." ^ 
 
 § 608. Xo Objection that they contain Errors. — It i^ no ob- 
 jection to a hypothetical question that the state of facts which it 
 assumes is erroneous, if within the possible or probable range of 
 the evidence; since the judge cannot decide, as a preliminary 
 question on an objection to evidence, whether it is erroneous or 
 not, — the question being for the jury.^ 
 
 § 609. Not Necessary to State Facts as Proved. — It is gen- 
 erally said in the books that, in putting hypothetical questions 
 to an expert w^itness, counsel may assume the facts in accordance 
 with his theory of them; it is not essential that he state them to 
 the witness as they have actually been proved."^ In discussing 
 this question, it was said by Folger, J.: *'The claim is, that a 
 hypothetical question may not be put to an expert, unless it 
 states the facts as they exist. It is manifest, if this is the rule, 
 that, in a trial where there is a dispute as to the facts, which can 
 be settled only by the jury, there would be no room for a hypo- 
 thetical question. The very meaning of the word is that it sup- 
 poses, assumes something, for the time being. Each side, in an 
 issue of fact, has its theory of what is the true state of the facts, 
 and assumes that it can prove it to be so, to the satisfaction of 
 the jury; and, so assuming, shapes hypothetical questions to ex- 
 perts accordingly."^ 
 
 § 610. Xeed not embody all the Facts. — In general, it is 
 not necessary that hypothetical questions should embody all the 
 facts exhibited by the evidence; it is sufficient, on the contrary, 
 that they embody such a state of facts, fairly within the range 
 of the evidence, as the counsel propounding them deem to*have 
 
 1 Filer v. New York &c. R. Co., 49 Steamship Co., 83 N. Y. 3o8; Cowley 
 N. Y. 42, 46. r. People, Id. 4(34. 
 
 2 Hartuett v. Garvey, 6(3 N. Y. 641. * Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 4G4, 
 
 3 Lovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. 470; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 464. 
 545,560; Guittermau ?7. Liverpool &c.
 
 508 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl*., 
 
 been proved.^ But where the facts are not in dispute, it is proper 
 to require that the hypothetical question shall embrace them all, 
 and that the witness shall take them all into consideration, in 
 giving his answer.'^ Where, however, the evidence is conflicting^ 
 or the facts are in dispute, the party examining an expert wit- 
 ness is at liberty to frame a hypothetical state of facts, within 
 the limits of the evidence, according to Ids tJieory of what the 
 evidence tends to prove, or of what the finding of the jury should 
 be ; and it will be no objection that it is partial, and does not 
 cover all the evidence in the case, or all the ultimate facts which 
 there is evidence tending to prove. ^ 
 
 § 611. [Continued.] Dicta upon this Subject. — Thus, in a case 
 in Indiana,- it was said by Elliott, J.: "A doctrine which requires a 
 prosecutor to assume and embody in one question conflicting testimony, 
 cannot be defended on any ground consistent with sound reason. It 
 would operate unjustly in practice, because it would impose upon an 
 examining counsel the necessity of assuming as true that which he 
 denies intact, and thus the jury would be confused and perplexed by an 
 apparent admission of facts antagonistic to the theory of the prosecu- 
 tion. It would require tiie court, whenever an objection was interposed, 
 to determine what facts were proved, and what were not, and thus com- 
 pel an invasion of the province of the jury. It would produce endless 
 wrangling and confusion, darken and obscure the investigation of the 
 recondite subject of mental capacity, and place the falsest testimony 
 and the absurdest statements on an equality with the truest and most 
 reasonable. On the other hand, no harm can be done the accused by 
 holding that the examining counsel may assume such a case as the evi- 
 dence, in his judgment, makes out, and which keeps within the range of 
 the relevant testimony, because the prisoner's counsel may, on cross- 
 examination, add to the hypothetical case supposed by the prosecutor, 
 such facts as he deems the evidence to have established, or subtract 
 from it such facts as he supposes to have been disproved, or not to have 
 
 1 Goodwiu V. State, 96 Ind. 550, 554 v. State, 66 lud. 94; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 
 
 (denying People v. Thurston, 2 Park. 99; Nave v. Tucker, 70 lud. 15; Bishop' 
 
 Cr. (N. Y.) 49); Louisville &c. R. v. Spiuing, 38 Ind. 143; Davis v. State, 
 
 Co. V. Falvey, 104 Ind. 412; Elliott v. 35 Ind. 496; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 760. 
 Russell, 92 Ind. 526; Vauvalkeubt'rg 2 d^vIs u. State, 35 Ind. 496. 
 
 V. Vanvalkenborg, 90 lud. 433, 437; ^ Davis u. State, 35 lud. 496. 
 
 Fulwider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414; Guetig
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 509 
 
 been proved." ^ lu like manner it is said by Worden, C. J., in an 
 earlier case in the same State: " The party seeking an opinion in snch 
 case may, within reasonable limits, put his case hypothethically, as he 
 claims it to haA^e been proved, and take the opinion of the witness 
 thereon ; leaving the jury, of course, to determine whether the hypo- 
 thetical case put is the real one proved." - Upon the same subject the 
 Supreme Court of Wisconsin has said: " The rule in that respect must 
 be that, in propounding a h3'pothetical question to the expert, the party 
 may assume as proved, all facts which the evidence in the case tends to 
 prove, and the court ought not to reject the evidence, on the ground 
 that, in his opinion, such facts are not established by the preponder- 
 ance of evidence. What facts are proved in the case, when there is 
 evidence to prove them, is a question for the jury, and not for the 
 court. The party has the right to the opinion of the expert witness on 
 the facts wliich he claims to be the facts of the case, if there be evi- 
 dence in the case tending to establish such claimed facts, and the trial 
 judge ought not to reject the question because he may think such facts 
 are not sufflciently established." ^ In short, the rule seems to be that 
 a physician testifying as an expert cannot be permitted to decide upon 
 the credibility of witnesses, or to take into consideration facts known to 
 him and not communicated to the jury; but after having communi- 
 cated such facts in his testimony, he may take them into consideration 
 in forming his opinion.* 
 
 § 612. Long- Hypothetical Questions Objectionable. — The 
 
 giving of long hypothetical questions, which assume the existence 
 
 * Gooclwiu V. State, 9G lud. 550, 554. sel in such case to assume, within the 
 2 Bishop V. Spiuiug, 38 lud. 143. limits of the evidence, any state of 
 To the same effect see Guitterinau v. facts which he claims the evidence 
 Liverpool &c. Co., 83 N. Y. 358; justifies, aud have the opiuiou of ex- 
 Davis V. State, 35 lud. 496; s.c. 9 Am. perts upon the facts thus assumed." 
 Rep. 7(J0; Guetig v. State, 66 lud. 94; Lawsou Exp. & Op. Ev. 153. 
 Nave V. Tuclier, 70 lud. 15. It is said ^ Quiuu v. Biggius, G3 Wis. (364, 
 by a recent writer on this subject: 670. 
 
 " If framed ou the assumption of cer- * Koeuig v. Globe Mutual Life lus. 
 
 tain facts, counsel may assume the Co., 10 Hun (N. Y.), 558; Huut v. 
 
 facts in accordance with his theory of Lowell Gaslight Co., 8 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 them, it not being essential that he 169; Van Zaudt v. Mutual Benefit lus. 
 
 should state the facts as they actually Co., 55 N. Y. 169; s. c. 14 Am. Kep. 215; 
 
 exist." Rogers' Expert Test. 39. Bush r. Jackson, 24 Ala. 273; Bennett 
 
 Another recent writer thus states the v. Fail, 26 Ala. 605; Louisville &c. R. 
 
 rule: " It is the privilege of the couu- Co. v. Falvey, 104 lud. 409, 419.
 
 510 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'.,, 
 
 of a multitude of facts, is erroneousA The reason of this rule 
 is thus stated by Mr. Justice Campbell: " In most cases it asks 
 the witness to usurp the functions of the jury, and may often 
 lead them to disregard their own functions and accept conclu- 
 sions which they should form for themselves. But it may also 
 be observed that another result, even where the question involves 
 science, is nearly as dangerous. No opinion of a scientific ques- 
 tion can be of any service to a jury, either in giving them direct 
 knowledge, or in enabling them to compare opinions, unless they 
 know just what elements enter into the opinion. Human mem- 
 ory is not usually so tenacious that a question of such great 
 length, involving many distinct facts or elements, can be fully 
 remembered by the witness to whom it is propounded on the 
 stand; and it is practically unlikely, if not impossible, that when 
 he answers it, he answers it with a view of all these separate ele- 
 ments. He necessarily answers it by assuming for himself what 
 is material and what is immaterial, and if he were at the same 
 time to show what matters he has eliminated, there could be no 
 difficulty in ascertaining what is needed, and testing all witnesses 
 by the same standard. But where this process is repeated by 
 
 1 People V. Browu, 53 Mich. 531 ; immediate gains, his rescue from im- 
 Haish V. Paysou, V2 Bradw. (111.) 539, pending perils, the superior advan- 
 54:(); s, c. affirmed on this poiut, 107 tages which he thereby acquired over 
 111. 365, 371. This case furnishes a other persons with whom he had no 
 strikingly fantastic illustration of an connection; a victory, whose stnpen- 
 abuse of the rule in this regard. The dous results to the defendant, the ar- 
 so-called hypothetical question was gumeut traced down through the next 
 long enough to fill two and a half succeeding fourteen years of the un- 
 pages of a book of standard law re- certain future, showing that the de- 
 ports. It was, according to the de- fendant might realize, as a crowning 
 scriptiou of the appellate court, resnlt of the plaintiff's services, the 
 "replete with absolute assertions of great sum of $1,120,000, if he would 
 facts and even extended into the do- but attend to his business during that 
 main of pure speculation." It was time." And although it was put to 
 "a high-sounding prologue;" it six expert Zaio«/e/'S on a question of the 
 "abounded with strong adjectives," value of professional services, it was 
 and with "now and then a rhetorical drawn in si;ch a manner as obliged the 
 expletive," and " embodied a rather court to assume that even they would 
 vigorous argument to prove the mag- not be aljle to understand it, and it 
 uitude of the victory, which the plaint- was therefore held bad. 
 iffs had won for the defendant; his
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 511 
 
 different witnesses, they may not all act on the same basis, and 
 fonllicts of opinion will appear, which are more apparent than 
 real. In science, as everywhere else, all inquiries should be brief 
 and clear enough to leave out all rubbish and direct attention to 
 tangible results." ^ There is another, and, within certain limits, 
 an obviously sound view, which was thus expressed in a late 
 opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, given by Mr. 
 Justice Field: " The length of hypothetical statements presented 
 to a witness to ascertain his opinion upon any matter growing out 
 of the facts supposed, will necessarily depend upon the simple or 
 complicated character of the transactions recited, and the num- 
 ber of particulars which must be considered for the formation of 
 the opinion desired; and this subject, like the extent to which 
 the examination of a witness may be allowed, must, in a great 
 degree, be left to the discretion of the court." ^ 
 
 § 613. Whether Witness concurs in the Testimony of An- 
 other Expert. — An expert who has heard the testimony of an- 
 other expert, may not properly be asked whether he concurs 
 therein, and if not, wherein he differs from it. Such a mode of 
 eliciting the opinion of the witness may have the merit of being 
 expeditious, but it may be attended with unfairness toward the wit- 
 ness himself, as well as toward the opposite party. " Witnesses 
 called upon to testify professionally should be left free to give 
 their own individual opinion, ui)on the facts involved, uncon- 
 nected with, and untrammeled by the opinions of others who 
 may have been examined." ^ 
 
 § 614. [Continued.] Instances op Proper Hypothetical Ques- 
 tions. — In an action for damages against a druggist for selling opium 
 to the plaintiff 's wife, whereliy she became sick, emaciated, etc., the 
 following question was put to a doctor of medicine: " In your judg- 
 ment, speaking from your experience as a ph3'sician and surgeon, what 
 would tlie natural result of three of these bottles of opium, called laud- 
 
 ' People y. Brown, 53 Mich. 531, 535. 3 Home v. Williams, 12 lud. 325, 
 
 2 Forsythe v. Doolittle, 7 Sup. Ct. 329, opinion by Wordeu, J. 
 Rep. 408; s. r. 120 U. S. 73.
 
 512 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 anum, be upon Mrs. Hoard, as you know tlie Avoman, and her situation 
 and constitution, and all that? " It was held that the question was 
 clearly proper. The court, speaking through Foster, J., said: "If it 
 had been based upon the evidence which had then been given, there is 
 good ground for holding that it should have been excluded, because 
 the witness would have been called upon to determine as to the truth or 
 the falsity of all of the evidence, and he would have also to found his 
 conclusions as to the effect to be given to it, both of which belong ex- 
 clusively to the jury ; while, in the form in which the question M^as put, 
 if the jury found that the facts proved did not warrant any or all of the 
 assumptions of the hypothetical question, they would treat the answer 
 of the doctor as not relevant to the case. The true rule is to state a 
 hypothetical case to the witness." ^ The following form was ap- 
 proved in a case where it was deemed proper to take the opinions of 
 witnesses upon the evidence, as they had heard it: -^ " Suppose all the 
 facts stated, by the several witnesses to be true, was Mr. Wood- 
 bury laboring under an insane delusion, or was he of an unsound 
 mind?" ^ - - - - In another case the same court ruled that the proper 
 question to be put to a medical witness was this: " If the symptoms 
 and indications testified to by the other witnesses are proved, and if 
 the jury are satisfied of the truth of them, wliether in his opinion, 
 the party was insane, and what was the nature and character of the in- 
 sanity ; what state of mind did they indicate, and what he would expect 
 to be the conduct of such person in any supposed circumstances."'* 
 
 § 615. Whether Expert can give Opinion upon the whole 
 Case. — It has been ruled, and the decision followed, that, where 
 scientific men are called as witnesses, they are not entitled to give 
 their opinions as to the merits of the case, but only as to the 
 facts as proved at the trial. ^ This is undoubtedly the general 
 rule, as shown by the cases in the next section. It is equally 
 true that great difficulty must arise in applying it, where the is- 
 sue is whether a certain person was, at the doing of a certain 
 
 1 Hoard v. Pock, 5(3 Barb. (N. Y.) ^ Jameson v. Driukald, 12 Moore, 
 203, 210. 148; reople v. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358, i)er 
 
 2 Ante, § 5;»i). Haud, J. See also Kex v. AYrlglit, 
 
 3 Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray Russ. & Kir. 456; Norman v. Wells, 17 
 (Mass.), 4G7, 4G8. Wend. (N. Y.) 136, 161; Mayor v. 
 
 •» Com. V. Rogers, 7 Mete. (Mass.) Pentz, 24 Weud. (N. Y.) 668; Fish u. 
 500, 505. Dodd, 4 Deiiio (X. Y.), 311.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXlI, j THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 513 
 
 act, sane or insane,^ and it is believed that in most of these cases 
 the question is so framed — and unavoidably so — as to call for 
 the opinion of the expert upon the very fact in issue. What 
 else can he generally answer in such a case? Moreover, the 
 view, already shown,^ that, in certain cases, experts may be 
 permitted to give their opinions upon the evidence as they have 
 heard it detailed by the witnesses, would seem to carry with it 
 the conclusion that the opinions which they are to give are opin- 
 ions upon the main issue. Accordingly, we find that it has been 
 held not a good objection that the question goes to the whole 
 merits, and that the witness is required to give an opinion upon 
 the very question which the jury are to determine. It was so 
 held, where a person, skilled in the art of navigation, was asked 
 to ivhat the loss loas atlribuiahle.'^ But, in general, the hypo- 
 thetical questions may and must be so framed as to call for the 
 opinion of the witness upon an assumed state of facts, without 
 requiring him inform (though it ma}^ require him in substance) 
 to decide the whole controversy. Perhaps a good instance of 
 this is afforded by a ease where the action was against a carrier 
 by water, to recover damages for a loss of goods alleged to have 
 occurred through the negligence of the defendant's servants and 
 agents, while towing the plaintiff's barge from Jersey City to 
 New Haven, through Long Island Sound. It was held that no 
 error was committed by asking an expert: " AVith your experi- 
 ence, would it be safe or prudent for a tug boat on Chesapeake 
 Bay, or any other tide water, to take three boats abreast, with 
 a high wind ? " * 
 
 § 616. [Continued.] Instances of Questions Bad because call- 
 ing FOR A Decision of the Whole Case. — But, in an action to recover 
 damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff's 
 canal-boat, t\i\'o\xgh.t\iQ negligence of the defendant, it was held improper 
 to ask a witness for the defendant as follows : " Did Mr. Carpenter (the 
 plaintiff), in your opinion as a canal-boat man, in any way omit or neg- 
 
 ^ People V. Lake, supra. Compare * Walsh v. "Washington Marine 
 
 White V. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155. Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 427, 443. 
 
 2 Ante, § 599. * Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 
 
 U. S. 297. 
 33
 
 514 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 lect to do anything which he might have done to save his boat?" ^ 
 The court said: "An expert may be asked whether certain acts, which 
 are proven, are seamanlike and proper, under a given state of circum- 
 stances ; but he cannot be allowed to express an opinion as to what was, 
 
 or was not done as matter of fact." - So, in an action for damages 
 
 against a railioay company, grounded upon negligence, it is not compe- 
 tent for the defendant to aslc a witness, who is an experienced railroad 
 man, whether or not, in his opinion, certain signals " were reasonable or 
 unreasonable," " prudent or extraordinary ; " or whether or not simi- 
 lar signals are given by other railway corporations. Such questions 
 sought to obtain from the witness answers to questions which the jury 
 were to answer, where the facts were of a character equally within the 
 knowledge and comprehension of the jury as of the witnesses. They 
 asked for mere naked expressions of opinion as to the character and 
 
 quality of acts which were open to common observation.^ So, on 
 
 the trial of an action for damages resulting in death, the deposition of 
 a medical man was read, containing the following question and answer: 
 " Do you think that, with different, or in the exercise of greater care, 
 he would probably have recovered ? " Answer: " The treatment and 
 care of Laughlin were, in my opinion, prudent. I believe a change in 
 either would not have produced any different results." It was held 
 that this should have been excluded. The court said: " This question 
 and answer put the witness in the place of the jury, to determine the ul- 
 timate fact, and it was therefore error to admit them. The witness 
 might properly state what facts he knew respecting the treatment and 
 care, and then give his medical opinion upon such facts.; or he might 
 be asked his opinion upon an assumed state of facts, which the testi- 
 mony of the other witnesses tended to establish. But such a question, 
 as asked, was improper, because the witness might base his opinion 
 upon facts which he assumed, but which the jury might not find, or 
 which had no existence in the case. A medical man's opinion is very 
 competent when the facts upon which it is based are testified to b}^ him- 
 self, or by others ; but his opinion, without the facts, is not competent, 
 because he is not authorized to find or assume the facts at his pleasure ; 
 they are to be found by the jury, and if they do not exist as he as- 
 sumes them, his opinion may go for naught." ^ So, in an action 
 
 1 Carpenter v. Eastern Trausporta- ^ Hill v. Portland &c. R. Co., 55 Me, 
 tion Co., 71 N. Y. 574. 439. 
 
 2 Carpenter v. Eastern Transporta- ■* Muldowney v. IlUnois Cert. E, 
 tion Co., 71 N. Y. 574, 579. Co., 39 la. (JIG, (522.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 515 
 
 against a surgeon for the negligent and unskillful treatment of a dislo- 
 cated arm, the defendant claimed " consecutive luxation," or a dis- 
 placement after an actual reduction. It was held that it was not 
 competent to ask a surgical witness, " Do you believe, from what you 
 have heard of the testimony in this case, that this arm has been the, 
 subject of consecutive luxation?" — since this required the witness to 
 perform the function of the jury.^ A medical witness having tes- 
 tified to seeing the decedent, some two or three months before the mak- 
 ing of the will, which was challenged on the ground of a,ioant of testa- 
 mentary capacity, was asked: "From what you saw, what was his 
 mental capacity? " This question was understood as referring to his 
 mental capacity to make a will, and it was held incompetent, because 
 presenting to the witness a question of law, and not of medical science,- — 
 a conclusion which does not seem to be sound. 
 
 § 617. What if the Answers go beyond the Questions. — 
 
 It is no objectiou to the answers of the experts, that they include 
 considerations not referred to in the questions, as constituting 
 the basis of the opinions given, provided they are such as the 
 testimony tends to prove, and such as might properly have been 
 included in the questions.^ 
 
 § 618. Reasons on Examination-in-cliief. — An expert may 
 give the grounds and reasons of his opinion, on his examination- 
 in-chief, as well as the opinion itself; it is not necessary that he 
 should wait to have them drawn out on cross-examination.^ 
 
 §619. Opinions founded upon Books. — While medical 
 books, which are stated by medical witnesses to be works of 
 authority, cannot be put in evidence upon an issue upon which 
 they might speak, yet medical witnesses may be asked their 
 judgment, and the grounds of it, upon the question ; and it is no 
 objection to their answers that they are in some degree founded 
 upon these books, as apart of their general knowledge.^ 
 
 1 Carpeutev v. Blake, 2 Laus. (N. Y.) ^ Keith v. Lathrop, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 
 20(5. 454; Cora. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 
 2 White V. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155. (Mass.) 295, 301; Collier v. Simpson, 
 
 3 Hathaway v. National Life Ins. 5 Car. & P. 73. 
 
 Co., 48 Vt. 33G. 5 Collier v. Simpson, 5 Car. & P. 73.
 
 516 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOHip. Tr., 
 
 § 620. Experiments in the Presence of the Jury. — These 
 are generally discountenanced, owing to the liability which exists 
 of the jurors being imposed upon by skillful manipulation or 
 jugglery.^ On the other hand, experiments coming within the 
 range of ordinary knowledge or experience may well be per- 
 mitted, and circumstances can be imagined under which the 
 refusal to permit them would be error. Such a case arose in 
 Iowa. The action involved the genuineness of the signature to 
 a note. The clerk of the court was called by the defendant as 
 an expert. He testified that, in his opinion, certain signatures 
 were not made with the same ink. Being recalled by the plaintiff, 
 he stated that, since his examination by the defendant, he had 
 examined writings upon the court record made with the same 
 ink, which apparently differed in color. He accounted for this 
 difference by the fact that a blotting pad had been used in the 
 one case and not in the other. Being asked to point out the dif- 
 ference on the record, and illustrate the effect of the blotting 
 pad, an objection of the defendant thereto was sustained. This 
 "was held error.'- 
 
 § 621. Medical Opinion as to the Permanency of Physical 
 Injury. — In every action for damages for a physical injury, all 
 the damages accruing from the injury, past, present and pros- 
 pective, must be included in the one recovery.^ It is therefore 
 competent, in order to assist the jury in arriving at a conclusion 
 as to the character of an injury and the probability of its per- 
 manency, to take the opinion of medical experts on the subject.* 
 
 1 See post, ch. XXVII. Wilt v. Vickers, 8 Watts (Pa.), 227; 
 
 2 Fanners' &c. Bauk v. Young, 36 Kent v. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Johnson 
 Iowa, 45. V. Central &c. R. Co., 56 Vt. 707 
 
 3 Elkhart v. Ritter, 66 lud. 136 ; Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202 
 North Vernon u. Voegler, 103 lud. 314; Montgomery v. Scott, 34 Wis. 338 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 111 
 Ind. 409, 422. 19; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 71; Anthony v 
 
 4 Finney v. New Jersey Steamboat Smith, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 503; Louisville 
 Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (N. Y.) 1; &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, swpra. 
 
 Filer v. N. Y. &c. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42;
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXI^EKTS. 517 
 
 Article II. — Cross-Examination. 
 Sectiox 
 625. Incompleteness of Hypothesis of one Party remedied by Cross-Exam- 
 
 luation. 
 020. Facts and Eeasous on Cross-Exaraiuatiou. 
 
 627. Questions going beyond the Scope of the Evidence. 
 
 628. Scope allowed in Cross-Exaraining a Medical Expert. 
 
 629. [Illustration.] What a Doctor "would Think if he should Find a Man 
 
 Dead with Certain Appearances. 
 
 630. Cross-Examination of Medical Experts who have examined the Body of 
 
 the Plaintiff. 
 
 631. Irrelevant Facts admissible for the Purpose of Testing Knowledge of 
 
 Expert. 
 
 632. [Continued.] Illustration — Cross-Examination as to Age. 
 
 633. Reading Books of Science to Expert to test his Knowledge. 
 
 634. Questions affecting Credibility. 
 
 635. Instance of an Improper Cross-Exaraiuatiou under the Araerica« Rule. 
 
 § 625. Incompleteness of Hypothesis of one Party rem- 
 edied by Cross-examination. — When the witness has expressed 
 an opinion based upon facts assumed by the party whose witness 
 he is, the other party may cross-examine him, by taking his 
 opinion, based upon any other state of facts assumed by him to 
 have been proved by the evidence, provided that such hypotheti- 
 cal state of facts is within the scope of the evidence. Such a 
 cross-examination, to reach its true vahie, should develop fully 
 the reasons upon which the expert bases his oi)inion. The cross- 
 examining counsel should be allowed to call the attention of the 
 expert to any and every view of the facts which will tend to test 
 the correctness of his opinion. This right of cross-examination 
 has been justly characterized as of the utmost importance to the 
 defendant in a criminal trial, especially where the experts are in- 
 troduced and examined in rebuttal, so that the defendant cannot 
 introduce them as his own witnesses at that stage of the case, or 
 bring others to overcome their evidence.^ 
 
 § 626. Facts and Reasons on Cross-examination. — A fam- 
 iliar illustration of the rule that the expert is to give, on cross- 
 
 ' Davis V. State, 35 Iiid. 490.
 
 518 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 examination, the reasons for his opinion, is found in a proposi- 
 tion already stated/ tliat where a witness has given his opinion 
 as to value, he may be asked, even on his examination-in-chief, 
 the facts and reasons on which his oi)iuion is founded. ^ 
 
 § 62T. Questions going beyond the Scope of the Evi- 
 dence. — Such being the scope of the cross-examination, it is 
 obvious that it will not be a good objection to a question, that 
 it goes beyond the scope of evidence ; since questions propounded 
 for the purpose of eliciting the reasons upon which the expert 
 bases his opinion, or the extent of his knowledge, may often go 
 beyond the evidence. Thus, in an action for injuries causing 
 death, where the injury happened in a steamboat explosion and 
 the body was subsequently found in the water, it was held that 
 a medical witness, who had examined the body and testified that 
 death was caused by drowning, might properly be asked, '' What 
 would have been the indications if a person had been suffocated 
 first, and had afterwards fallen into the water?" — although 
 there was no evidence that this was the fact.^ 
 
 § 628. Scope allowed in cross-examining- a Medical Ex- 
 pert. — In a case in Indiana it is said by Elliott, J. : "In cross- 
 examining a medical expert, counsel have a right to assume the 
 facts as they believe them to exist, and to ask the expert's 
 opinion upon the facts thus assumed. An examination-in-chief 
 cannot be so conducted as to compel the cross-examining counsel 
 to merely follow the line of questions that are asked ; but when 
 a general subject is opened by an examination-in-chief, the cross- 
 examining counsel may go further into details,- and may put the 
 case before the expert witness in various phases. Each side las 
 a right to take the 0})inion of the witness upon his theory of the 
 facts established by the evidence. While it is true that a cross- 
 examination must be confined to the subject of the examination- 
 in-chief, it is not true that the cross-examining party is confined 
 
 1 Ante^ilS. 3 Ericksou v. Smith, 2 Abb. App. 
 
 2 Dickeiisou v. Fitcliburg, 13 Gray Dec. (N. Y.) G5. 
 (Mass.),54G.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXII.] THE EXAMINATIOX OF EXPERTS. 519 
 
 to any particular part of the subject. He has a right, iu such a 
 ease as this, to leave out of the hypothetical question facts as- 
 sumed by the counsel on the direct examination, if he deems 
 them not proved ; and he also has a right to add to the question 
 such facts as he thinks the evidence establishes." ^ 
 
 § G29. [Illustration.] What a Doctor would Think if he should 
 Find A Man Dead avith certain Appearances. — Where a medical ex- 
 pert testified, on a trial for manslaughter, which was committed by 
 striking the deceased upon the head with a stone, that the appearances 
 disclosed upon a jwst mortem examination of the head of the deceased, 
 as described by another witness, were those of apoplexy, — it was held 
 that he might be asked on cross-examination, what he would think to 
 be the cause of death, if he should find a man dead, and ajjost mortem 
 examination should disclose similar appearances to those described, 
 and it should be proved that he had been struck violently upon the 
 head wiih a stone. - 
 
 § 630. Cross-exaiuiuation of Medical Experts who have ex- 
 amined the Body of tlie Plaintiff . — In an action for personal 
 injuries, " where medical experts are ordered to examine a 
 plaintiff, and they are called and questioned by the defendant as 
 to the result of their examination, the plaintiff has a right to ask, 
 on cross-examination, how the examination was conducted, and 
 this necessarily includes the right to ask what questions were 
 propounded to the plaintiff. If it were otherwise, the plaintiff 
 could not get fully before the jury, the method of investigation 
 pursued by the medical experts ; and to deny this would be an 
 unjustifiable restriction of the important right of cross-examina- 
 tion." ^ Another reason adduced in support of the same view 
 is the rule that, where a party gives evidence of ajJcirt of a 
 transaction^ his adversary has a right io full details of the trans- 
 action.* 
 
 1 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, regarded as within the rule laid down 
 104: lud. 400, 421. See also Davis v. in Woodbury u. Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.), 
 State, 35 lud. 406; s. c. Am. Rep. 4(J7. 
 
 700; Rogers Exp. Test., 40. 3 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 
 
 2 Cora. V. Mullius,2 Allen (Mass.), 104 lud. 409, 417. 
 295. This mode of interrogation was •* Ibid.
 
 520 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOUip. Tl'., 
 
 § G31. Irrelevant Facts admissible for the purpose of test- 
 injf Kiiowleclj;e of Expert. — It is laid down by Mr. Justice 
 Stephen in his work on evidence that, " facts not otherwise rele- 
 vant, are deemed to be relevant, if they support, or are inconsis- 
 tent with the opinions of experts, when such opinions are 
 deemed to be rckn^ant.'' ^ The reason given for this rule is that 
 it is a proper rule to be resorted to, in order to test the capacity 
 of the witness, and to ascertain the reasonableness, or establish the 
 unreasonableness of his opinion.^ It is therefore admissible, on 
 the cross-examination of an expert witness, to state hypothet- 
 ical cases to him, and to ask his opinion thereon, for the pur- 
 pose of testing his knowledge and skill. -^ 
 
 § 632. [Continued.] Illustration — Cross-examination as to 
 Age. — In an action by a lady agaiusta raih-oad company for a physi- 
 cal injury, a witness for the defendant was asked, among other questions, 
 what the apparent age of the plaintiff was. To this he answered: " In 
 my opinion she was twenty-two or twenty-three, say twenty-four or 
 twenty-five; from twenty -three to twenty-five in appearance." On 
 cross-examination the plaintiff 's counsel pointed out a bystander and 
 asked the witness : "How old do you think he is." The witness an- 
 swered: " Well, I think he is about fifty-five." In giving evidence in 
 rebuttal the plaintiff called the bystander, wlio testified that his age 
 was forty-six. It was held, applying the above rule, tliat in allowing 
 this to be done the court committed no error. It was competent, for 
 the purpose of showing that the witness was not capable of judging of 
 the age of a person by his appearance. "* 
 
 § G33. Readiiit? Books of Science to Expert to test -his 
 Knowledge. — Where a physician testitied as to the symptoms 
 of a disease of which a person died whose life was insured, 
 and lU'onounced it deliinion tremens, induced by the use of intox- 
 icating liquors, it was held that paragraphs treating of that disease 
 
 » Steph. Ev., art. 50. 104 Ind. 400; Davis u. State, 35 lud. 
 
 2 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 49(i, 498; s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 7(50; Rog- 
 104 Intl. 409, 424; Folkes v. Chadd, 3 ers' Exp. Test. 50. 
 
 Doug. 157; Davis v. State, 35 lud. "» Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 
 
 496; s. c. 9 Ara. Rep. 700. 104 lud. 409, 423. 
 
 3 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey,
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXII.] THE EXAMINATION OF EXPERTS. 521 
 
 might be read to him, and that he might be asked, on cross-ex- 
 amination, whether he agreed with the authors, as one of the 
 means of testing his knowledge, and that this was in no just 
 sense reading books of science to the jury. At the same time 
 the court, speaking through Scott, J., said: "The rule an- 
 nounced may be liable to abuse. Great care should always be 
 taken by the court to confine such cross-examination within 
 reasonable limits, and to see that the quotations read to the wit- 
 ness are so fairly selected as to present the author's views on the 
 subject of thQ examination." ^ 
 
 § 634. Questions Affecting Credibility. — It is competent 
 to cross-examine an expert witness as to the fee which has been 
 paid him for attending at the trial in the character of an expert. 
 Nevertheless, as there is nothing discreditable to the party or the 
 witness, in the one paying and the other receiving a reasonable 
 fee, it is proper for the court, on request, or even without request, 
 to say so to the jury, in instructing them. ^ 
 
 § 635. Instance of an improper Cross-examination under the 
 Ajierican rule. — In a case in California, where the American rule of 
 strict cross-examination'^ obtains, an expert witness, called on behalf of the 
 plainti:ff, had testified that he had made a 2^ost mortem examination of 
 the body of George W. Gridley, and as to the condition of the brain, 
 pelvic viscera, and particularly the kidneys and bladder and the pros- 
 tate gland and urethra; that he had found nitrate of urea in crystals in 
 washing the membranes of the brain and crystals of urea in the arach- 
 noid sac, etc. ; that the kidneys were apparently in a normal state, 
 except that they were engorged with blood ; that the membranes 
 of the brain, the pia mater, the arachnoid and dura mater were 
 '•thickened, discolored, adherent, and matted together;" and that 
 the prostate gland was enlarged, thickened, and indurated, and 
 its walls pressed together. In his opinion, the deceased must 
 have been of unsound mind for five years prior to his death, 
 by reason of tlie facts that the condition of the prostate gland 
 had obstructed the elimination of urea, causing it to enter into 
 
 1 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, ^ Alford v. Vincent, 53 Mich. 555. 
 
 89 111. 516. 3 Ante, § 432 et seq.
 
 522 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOlUp. Tr., 
 
 the circulation and poisoning the branial membranes, and that the 
 patient had diod of uraomic convulsions, thus produced; that the 
 thickened condition of the brain coverings established insanity, and 
 that the thiclcening produced by the chronic uraematic poisoning must 
 have been gradual, continuing several j'cars. One B., called as an ex- 
 pert witness, b}' the defendant, after stating that he had been a prac- 
 ticing physician and surgeon since 1804 (about 17 j-ears), that he was 
 a graduate of certain medical schools, and that he had been superin- 
 tendent al)out two j^ears of an insane asylum in Lancashire, Elngland. 
 proceeded to testify, in effect, that he had never known crystals of urea to 
 be found in the brain or any of its surroundings; that> nitrate of urea 
 is [)erfectl3' soluble in water ; that uric and urea are specifically different. 
 He added, that taking the condition of the coverings of the brain and 
 the brain itself, and of the kidneys, the bladder, the prostate gland, 
 and the urethra, as descril)ed by M. and by Dr. C. [who bad assisted 
 atthe jw.si mortem examination], he could not understand how an}' such 
 condition of his brain, or of its membranes could be attributed to urae- 
 mic poisoning, without disease of the kidneys antedating it ; and de- 
 clared that disease or unsoundness of mind could not be predicated on 
 the condition of the coverings of the braia as described by M. and C. 
 On cross-examination of B. the plaintiff wished to put to him a h3'po- 
 thetical question, in all respects similar to such questions proi)Ounded 
 to the plaintiff 's witness on direct examination. It was held that, since 
 the testimony of B. on direct examination was confined to a contradic- 
 tion of the tlieor}' of M. as to the mental unsoundness of Gridle\' pro- 
 duced by slow uraemic poisoning, the question was not proper on cross- 
 examination ; as the answer of the witness thereto, if it sustained the 
 plaintiff's views, would have constituted part of her case, which should 
 have been made out before she rested. Nor was the question proper as 
 testing the capacity of B., as an expert; for if the answer of B. had 
 been the same as that given by the plaintiff's experts, it would have 
 strengtlienud the plaintiff's affirmative case ; if different, it would have 
 tended no more to prove the incompetency of B. than to prove the 
 
 incompetency of the plaintiff's experts.^ In another jurisdiction it 
 
 has l)ecn held that where a witness has testified, l)ut not as an exi)ert, 
 under the so-called American rule, it is not comi)etout to put to him 
 questions on cross-examination which would be only admissible in case 
 of an expert witness ; the cross-examining party must call him as his 
 Qwn ivitness.- 
 
 ' Gridley y. Boggs, G2 C:il. V.n. ^ Olmstoad v. Gere, 100 Pa. St 127.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIII.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 523 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 OF THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 
 Section 
 
 640. Competency. 
 
 641. lu the Case of Persons jointly Indicted. 
 
 642. Subject to the same Rules of Examination as other Witnesses. 
 
 643. And to the same Modes of Impeachment. 
 
 644. Whether taking the stand -n-aives Privilege against Self-Crimination. 
 
 645. Jury entitled to draw Inferences from Witness' Demeanor. 
 
 646. And the State's Counsel may Comment on the Same. 
 
 647. Testimony, Evidence against him on a Subsequent Trial. 
 
 648. May Testify as to his Intent or Motive. 
 
 649. View that he may be Cross-Examined as any other Witness. 
 
 650. [Continued.] Interrogated as to former Arrests and Convictions. 
 
 651. [Continued.] Illustrations of this View. 
 
 652. View that Cross-Examination is coufiued to Examination-in-Chief. 
 
 653. [Continued.] Previous Arrests, Convictions, etc., not Inquii-ed into. 
 
 654. Crimes not affecting Credibility. 
 
 655. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 § 640. Competency. — Defendants in criminal cases were in- 
 competent as witnesses at common law,^ but have been made 
 competent by enabling statutes in most American jurisdictions ; ^ 
 and, in other jurisdictions where legislation has not progressed 
 so far, statutes exist, as seen in the next chapter, allowino; the 
 accused to make an unsworn statement. The enabling!: leoishition 
 of the States did not em})()wer defendants in the Federal courts, 
 to testify in their own behalf; ^ though this defect has been 
 hitely remedied by Federal legislation.^ The effect of such en- 
 
 1 Deloohery v. State, 27 Ind. 521 2 See the statutes in Rap. Wit., chap, 
 (defendant in a proceeding for surety 258 et seq. See also as to such stat- 
 for the peace incompetent) ; United lUes and the extent to which tliey en- 
 States V. Black, 12 Nat. Bk. Reg. 340 able the prisoner to testify, Hoagland 
 (in a criminal proceeding under the v. State, 17 Ind. 488. 
 late Bankrupt Act) ; Stevick v. Com., 3 Uuitecl States v. Hawthorne, 1 
 78 Pa. St. 460 (where a count for Dill. C. C. (U. S.) 422. 
 felony was joined with one for misde- * 2 Rev. Stat. U. S., Sup. vol. 1, p. 
 raeauor) ; Hunter v. Com., 79 Pa. St. 312. 
 503 (same subject).
 
 524 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 ablino: statutes will be, unless their terms are restrained, to make 
 the accused in a criminal case competent, even under circum- 
 stances where another witness would not be competent. Thus, it 
 was held, construing the statute of New York, that a prisoner 
 was a competent witness in his own behalf, although he had been 
 sentenced upon a conviction for felony, and was unpardoned.^ 
 Where a prisoner, testifying in his own behalf, stated on cross- 
 examination, that he had been in the State prison and had served 
 out his term, it was held error for the court to instruct the jury 
 to disregard his testimony for that reason.'^ 
 
 § 641. In the Case of Persons jointly Indicted. — In the case 
 of persons jointly indicted, if there has been a severance, one de- 
 fendant may call his late co-defendant as his own witness, as a 
 matter of right, ^ and it has been held that he may do so, under such 
 a statute, where there has been no severance.* This is an excep- 
 tion to the rule of the common law^ that persons jointly indicted 
 are not competent witnesses for each other. 
 
 § 642. Subject to the same Rules of Examination as other 
 Witnesses. — It has been held in several jurisdictions that, where 
 the defendant in a criminal case offers himself as a witness in his 
 own behalf, he is subject to the same rules as to examination, 
 cross-examination and impeachment as other witnesses.^ Ac- 
 
 1 Delaraater v. People, 5 Lans. State u. Witham, 72 Me. 531 ; People u. 
 (N. Y.) 632; Newman v. People, 63 McGimgill, 41 Cal. 429; State v. Ober, 
 Barb. (N. Y.) G30. 52 N. H. 459; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. 88; 
 
 2 Newmau v. People, supra. Norfolk v. Gaylorcl, 28 Corm. 309; 
 
 3 State V. Nash, 10 la. 81. rietclier v. State, 49 Iiul. 124; s. c. 19 
 
 4 State u. Gigher, 23 la. 318. Am. Eep. 073; Merslion v. State, 51 
 
 5 Patterson v. People, 4G Barl). lud. 14; Morrison v. State, 76 Ind. 335; 
 (N. Y.) 625; Taylor y. People, 12 Hun State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380; s. c. 29 
 (N. Y.), 212. Am. Rep. 506; note to State v. White, 
 
 6 State V. Cohn,9 Nev. 179; State v. 19 Kan. 445; 27 Am. Rep. 140; Com. v. 
 Huff, 11 Nev. 17, 27; State v. Red, 53 Nicliols, 114 Mass. 285; Com. v. Rey- 
 la. 69; State v. Miller, 53 la. 209; nolds, 122 Mass. 454; State r. Went- 
 Braudon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265; Fra- wortii, 65 Me. 234; Connors v. Peoi)le, 
 lich V. People, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 48; 50 N. Y. 240; Stover v. People, 56 N. 
 McGarry v. People, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) Y. 315; 1 Grecnl. Ev. (13th ed.), § 4.-)l 
 227; People y. Carey, 17 AH). L. .J. 432; and cases in note; Wliart. Crini. Ev.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIII.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 
 
 525 
 
 cordiugly, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
 not only to allow State's counsel to cross-examine him, but also 
 to recall him after he has left the stand for the purpose oi further 
 cross-examination } His counsel may interrogate him, as in the 
 case of any other witness, and it is error for the judge to deny 
 this right and to direct the prisoner to make a general statement."^ 
 He has a right to explain any circumstance in evidence which 
 works to his prejudice, the same as a party testifying in a civil 
 case would have.-^ 
 
 § 643. And to the same Modes of Impeachment. — While 
 the general proposition is true that the moral character of the ac- 
 cused in a criminal case is not in issue, unless he chooses to brins: 
 it into question by first offering evidence in support of it,^ it has 
 become the rule in some jurisdictions that, if he avails himself 
 
 (8th ed.), §§ 470, 6G9 and notes; Peo- 
 ple V. Reiuhart, 39 Cal. 449 ; Com. v. 
 Bonner, 97 Mass. 587; Com. v. Morgan, 
 107 Mass. 199. In Maine the following 
 language was used by Peters, C. J., in 
 discussing this question: " When the 
 accused volunteers to testify in his 
 own behalf at all, upon the issue 
 whether the alleged crime has been 
 committed or not, he volunteers to 
 testify in full. His oath in such case 
 requires it. If he waives the consti- 
 tutional privilege at all, he waives it 
 all. He cannot retire under shelter 
 when danger comes. The door opened 
 by him Is shut against his retreat. 
 The object of all examinations is to 
 elicit the whole truth, and not a part 
 of it. Under our rule, the cross-ex- 
 amination of a witness is not confined 
 to the matters inquired of in chief. A 
 party testifying as his own witness 
 can be examined just as any other wit- 
 ness could be, in any respect material 
 and relevant to the issue. To some 
 extent more may be elicited from him 
 than from a common witness, because 
 
 his statements are admissions as well 
 as testimony. Any other construction 
 would render the statute a shield to 
 crime and criminals." State w.Witham, 
 72 Me. 531, 533. 
 
 1 State V. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179, 188. 
 
 2 Clark V. State, 50 lud. 514; Dou- 
 ohue V. People, 5(; N. Y. 208 (construc- 
 tion of a statute authorizing a convict 
 to be sworn, and making him " a com- 
 petent witness against any fellow- 
 prisoner, for any offense actually 
 committed while in prison)." 
 
 3 Thus, on the trial of an indictment 
 for murder, the State gave in evidence 
 the fact of a whispered conversation, 
 two days after the homicide, between 
 the defendant and the wife of the mur- 
 dei'ed man, she being jointly indicted 
 with him. It was held that he had a 
 right to testify as to what Avas said in 
 that conversation. Morrow v. State, 
 48 Ind. 432. 
 
 4 Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124; 
 Knight V. State, 70 Ind. 375; Morri- 
 son V. State, 76 Ind. 335, 337.
 
 526 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 of the privilege of testifying, he testifies under the same rules, 
 and may be impeached in the same manner, as other witnesses.^ 
 The fact of his having been previously convicted of crime, may 
 be proved for this purpose ; ^ though it has been held that this 
 fact cannot be drawn from him on cross-examination, since it is 
 provable by the record only,Hhat being the best evidence.^ The 
 State may afterwards examine witnesses to prove his general 
 bad character or reputation/ 
 
 § 644. Wlietlier taking the Stand waives Privilege against 
 Self -crimination. — It is a sound view, in the interpretation of 
 such statutes, that they do not, by enabling the prisoner to tes- 
 tify in his own behalf, place him in a worse j^osltion than that 
 which another witness would occupy. By electing to take the 
 stand, he does not waive his privilege against self-crimination, 
 so as to be obliged to answer a question, the answer to which 
 
 1 Mershon v. State, 51 lud. 14; 
 State V. Beal, 68 Ind. 345; Morrison v. 
 State, 76 Ind. 335; State v. Clinton, G7 
 Mo. 380; s. c. 29 Am. Rep. 506; Bran- 
 don V. People, 42 N. Y. 265; Connors 
 «. People, 50 N. Y. 240; Fletcher v. 
 State, 4!) Ind. 124; s. c. 19 Am. Rep. 
 673; Mershou v. State, 51 Ind. 14; 
 Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124. In Mis- 
 souri the law is in this sliape, that in a 
 criminal trial where the defendant of- 
 fers himself as a witness in his own be- 
 half, it is not error to allow the State, 
 over his objection, to examine witness- 
 es touching his general moral charac- 
 ter. He may be impeaclied as any other 
 witness, except that, on liis cross-ex- 
 amination, he can only be examined as 
 to matters in respect of which he has 
 testified on his examination-m-chief. 
 State V. Bulla (Mo.), 6 West. Rep. 440. 
 On the last point see State v. Palmer 
 (Mo ) , 5 West. Rep. 387 ; State v. Grant, 
 79 Mo. 113; State t\ Clinton, 67 Mo. 
 380. W^e understand tlie Missouri rule 
 to mean that, while such a witness 
 
 may be impeached by independent tes- 
 timony, yet it is not competent to lay 
 a foundation for impeachimg him by 
 asking questions on his cross-exam- 
 ination as t o his former antecedents 
 declarations, etc., as may be done in 
 the case of other witnesses. But he 
 may be impeached by disproving facts 
 stated by him, the same as any other 
 witness may. State v. Rider (Mo.), 6 
 West. Rep. 458, 461. 
 
 2 People V. Reinhart, 39 Cal. 449, 
 per Rhodes, J. 
 
 ^ People V. Reinhart, supra. 
 
 * Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N. Y. 
 298; People v. Herrick, 13 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 82; Rex v. Inhabitants &c., 8 East, 
 77; Carpenter v. Nixon, 5 Ilill (N. Y.), 
 260. 
 
 * State V. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380; State 
 V. Beaty, 25 Mo. App. 214; People v. 
 Beck, 58 Cal. 212. Under the Cali- 
 fornia statute, tlie iucpiiry extends to 
 his character for truth, honesty and 
 integrity. Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 2051 ; 
 Cal. Penal Code, § 1102.
 
 Tjt. Ill, Ch. XXIII.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 527 
 
 might furnish evidence which would subject him to, or which 
 could be used against him in, another criminal prosecution.^ 
 We find, however, that some courts have taken the view that the 
 defendant, by taking the stand as a witness in his own behalf, 
 waives the privilege which another witness would have in respect 
 of self-crimination.^ 
 
 § 645. Jury entitled to draw Inferences from Witness' De- 
 meanor. — If such a witness refuses to answer proper and com- 
 petent questions, the refusal is a circumstance from which the 
 jury are at liberty to draw inferences unfavorable to him.^ 
 
 § 646. And the State's Counsel may comment on the 
 same. — While the mere failure of the prisoner to take the witness 
 stand in his own behalf is not, under most statutes, the subject 
 of observation by the State's counsel in the presence of the 
 jury,* yet if he does exercise his privilege by taking the witness 
 stand, his testimony is the subject of fair comment, precisely 
 like the testimony of any other witness.^ This right of fair 
 comment extends to his conduct, demeanor and appearance while 
 so testifying.^ " The same rights exist in favor of the district 
 attorney, to comment upon his testimony, or his refusal to an- 
 swer any proper question, or to draw all proper inferences from 
 his failure to testify upon any material matter within his knowl- 
 edge, as with other witnesses." ^ 
 
 1 People V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571. » state v. AVitham, 72 Me. 534. So 
 
 2 Com. B, Lannau, 13 Allen (Mass.), in a civil case: Andrews v. Erye, 104 
 564; Cora. v. Price, 10 Gray (Mass.), Mass. 234; Whart. Ev., §§ 533, 
 472; State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459. 54G, 12G0; Hauof ?;. State, 37011. St. 
 Compare Foster v. Pierce, 11 Cash. 178. 
 
 (Mass.) 437; Low v. Mitcliell, 18 Me. * Post, § 1004. 
 
 372, 374; Roddy v. Finuegau, 43 Md. ^ State v. Anderson CNIo.), 8 Crim. 
 
 490; State v. Fay, 43 Iowa, 651. It has Law Mag. 519; s. c. 89 Mo. 312. 
 
 been held that, where a party in a civil ^ State v. Graynor (Mo.), 6 "West. 
 
 action testifies in his own behalf, he Rep. 207. 
 
 thereby waives the privilege of refusing ' State V.Harrington, 12 Xev. 125. 
 
 to answer pertinent questions on the See also People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522 ; 
 
 ground of self-crimination. Este v. People u. McGungill, 41 Cal. 429; State 
 
 Wilshire, 44 Oh. St. 636 (Owen, C. J. v. Huff, 11 Nev. 27. 
 
 dissenting).
 
 528 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 § 647. Testimony Evidence against liiiu on a Subsequent 
 Trial. — If the accused waives his privilege and takes tlie witness 
 stand in his own belialf, at any stage of the prosecution, he 
 waives it for every subsequent stage. Thus, if he gives testimony 
 on his preliminary examination, the same maybe put in evidence 
 asrainst him on the trial. ^ So, if he takes the stand as a witness 
 on his own behalf on one trial, what he so testifies may be put 
 in evidence against him on a subsequent trial. ^ These decisions 
 proceed upon the obvious principle that statements or admissions, 
 voluntarily made by a party, are always evidence against him. 
 
 § 648. May testify as to his Intent or Motive. — As already 
 seen,^ it is competent for a party testifying as a witness to state 
 what his intent was in doing a particular act, whenever the ques- 
 tion of intent is material to the issue.* This rule of evidence is 
 of great value to persons accused of crime who may elect to tes- 
 tify in their own behalf; since in most crimes and misdemeanors 
 intent is a necessary ingredient of the offense. Under this rule, 
 the accused, when so testifying, is competent to state what the 
 intent was, with which he did the act imputed to him as a crime.^ 
 He may explain what he mpant by words shown to have been 
 used by him.^ Where the charge is murder and the accused sets 
 up the so-called " plea of self-defense,'' he is entitled to testify 
 whether, at the moment when he committed the fatal act, he did 
 or did not really believe that he was in danger of death or great 
 bodily harm at the hands of the deceased.^ Where the charge 
 is assault and battery with intent to ravish, he may testify that the 
 
 1 People v. Kelley, 47 Cal. 125; state Mo. 627, 034; Thacher v. Phinney, 7 
 V. Glass, 50 Wis. 218. Compare Peo- Alleu (Mass.), 14G; Snow v. Paine, 114 
 pie V. Gibbous, 43 Cal. 557. Mass. 520. 
 
 2 Com. V. Reynolds, 122 Mass. 454. ^ Boleu v. State, 2(5 Oh. St. 371 ; 
 
 3 Ante, §383. Kerraius v. People, GO N. Y. 221; State 
 ■* Greer v. State, 53 Ind. 420 (over- v. Banks, 73 Mo. 592; s. c, reversed 
 
 ruling Zimraerraau v. Marchland, 23 ou another point, 10 Mo. App. Ill; 
 
 Ind. 474, and qualifying Columbus v. Babcock v. People, 15 Huu (N. Y.), 
 
 Dalin, 31] Ind. 330) ; Thurston v. Cor- 347. 
 
 nell, 38 N. Y. 281; White v. State, 53 « People v. Farrell, 31 Cal. 577. 
 
 Ind. 5:»5; Van Sickle v. Brown, G8 ^ State v. Harrington, 12 Nev. 126.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch, XXIII.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 529 
 
 assault was made with a different intent ; ^ and where the charge 
 is larceny, he may testify as to what his intention was in resi)ect 
 of the goods, at the time when they came into his possession. ^ 
 
 § 649. View that lie may be Cross-Examined as any other 
 Witness. — There is a difference of view as to the scope of cross- 
 examination, where the accused in a criminal case offers himself 
 as a witness. One view is that, unless the lan2:uao:e of. the statute 
 is restrained, it places him, in respect of his cross-examination, in 
 the same situation as that of any other witness.-* So, where a 
 party in a civil action becomes a witness in his own behalf, he 
 thereby subjects himself to all the rules regulating the direct and 
 cross-examination of other witnesses.* Accordino; to this view, 
 his cross-examination is subject to the same rules, and the same 
 questions may be put to him for the purpose of affecting his 
 credibility.^ Questions calling for facts in his history, which 
 would disgrace him or disparage his character, may be put to 
 him, where they might be put to any other witness.^ Under 
 this view, he may refuse to answer a question which would dis- 
 grace him, ^ under the same circumstances which would entitle 
 any other witness to exercise that privilege.^ But this is his 
 privilege an a loitnes'^, and not as a party .^ He therefore can- 
 not, through his counsel, object to a question put to him on the 
 witness stand, ui>on this ground ; but if he does not wish to an- 
 swer it, he must claim his privilege.^'' But this view is very much 
 discarded, 'AS we shall presently see, and some of the cases cited in 
 this section must be regarded as overruled in the same jurisdictions, 
 
 §650. [Continued.] Interrogated as to former Arrests 
 and Convictions. — Under this view, whether a witness, or de- 
 
 '1 Greer v. State, 53 lud. 420. •» Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89. 
 
 2 White V. State, 53 lud. 5!)5. '" Gill v. People, 5 Thorap. & C. 
 
 3 Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 240; (N. Y.) 308. 
 
 Fralich v. People, G5 Barb . (N. Y.) 48; 6 Braudou v. People, 42 N. Y. 265. 
 
 People V. Reiuhart, 39 Cal. 449; State ^ AntP., §287. 
 
 V. Abrams, 11 Ore. 1<;9, 173; State v. ^ People v. Reiuhart, 39 Cal. 449. 
 
 Ober, 52 N. H. 459; s. c. 13 Am. Rep. » Ante, §306. 
 
 88; State v. Efler, 85 N. C. 585. ^^ People v Reiuhart, supra. 
 
 34
 
 530 EXAMINATION OF AVITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 fenclant in a criminal trial testifying in his own behalf, may be 
 asked on cross-examination touching his commission of another 
 crime, for the purpose of affecting his credibility, is a matter 
 resting largely within the discretion of tlie trial court. " The 
 limits to which a witness may be cross-examined on matters not 
 relevant to the issue for the purpose of judgiug of his character 
 and credit from his ow'n voluntary admissions, rest in the sound 
 discretion of the court trying the cause. Such questions maybe 
 allowed where there is reason to believe it will tend to the ends 
 of justice ; but they ought to be excluded when a disparaging 
 course of examination seems unjust to the witness and uncalled 
 for by the circumstances of the case."^ 
 
 §651. [Continued.] Illustrations of this View. — Forinstance, 
 where the prosecution is for the unlaivful selling of intoxicating liquors, 
 he may be asked whether he has not recently been tried and convicted 
 
 several times for the unlawful seUing of such Hquors.'- So, it has 
 
 been held within the discretion of the trial court to allow a witness to 
 be asked, " Are you not now under indictment for murder in the second 
 
 degree in this court?" ^ So, where, on the trial of an indictment 
 
 for murder in the first degree, the accused took the stand as a witness 
 in his own behalf, it was held within the discretion of the trial court to 
 allow the State's counsel to ask him, on cross-examination, whether he 
 
 had not once before been arrested for an assault with intent to kill.^ 
 
 So, it was held that a prisoner, testifying in her own behalf, might prop- 
 erly be asked whether she had ever been arrested for theft, ^ the ques- 
 tion being one which the court, in the exercise of its discretion, might 
 
 1 Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. 400; offered in a case where the accused 
 
 Hanoff V. State, 37 Oh. St. 178, 181; testifies as a witness in his own be- 
 
 State V. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90; State v. half. State v. Watson, 65 Me. 74, 79. 
 
 Lawhoru, 88 N. C. 634; State v. Pat- And it is not admissible for the ac- 
 
 tersou, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 346; State v. cused to give evidence to contradict 
 
 Garrett, Busbee (N. C), 357. Com- it; it imports absolute verity. Ibid: 
 
 pare State v. Davidson, 67 N. C. 119; State v. Lang, 63 Me. 215. 
 People V. Clark (N. Y.), 8 N. East Rep. ^ state v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90. 
 
 38. By the statute of Maine the record ^ Wroe v. State, 20 Oh. St. 460. 
 
 of a previous conviction of a criiniual * Hanoff v. State, supra. Compare 
 
 offense is made competc'ut to affect the Lee v. State, 21 Oh. St. 151; People 
 
 credibility of a witness. Rev. Stat. v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288. 
 Me., chap. 82, § 94; State v. Wat.son, « Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y= 265-. 
 
 63 Me. 128. Such a record may be
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIII.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 531 
 
 allow in the case of another witness.^ . . . . AYhere a witness was on 
 trial for a felonious assault and elected to testify as a witness in his 
 own behalf, it was held that the people might ask him, on cross-exam- 
 ination, " How many times have you been arrested?" ^ 
 
 § 652. View that Cross-Extiniinatiou is Confined to Exaui- 
 ination-in-Chief . — The other, and more widely prevailing view 
 is that the cross-examination of the accused is confined to those 
 matters which were touched upon in his examination-in-cliief, 
 and that it cannot extend beyond this, although the questions 
 may pertain to the issues.^ If the trial court permit a more 
 extensive cross-examination, the constitutional privilege of not 
 being a witness against himself is violated.^ Irrespective of 
 the terms of the statute, or of the considerations touchino- 
 the privilege of the accused, this would be the view where 
 the American rule of strict cross-examination, already con- 
 sidered,^ prevails; ^ whereas in those jurisdictions where the 
 English rule prevails, the defendant, by taking the witness stand 
 in his own behalf, might subject himself to the hazards of a gen 
 eral cross-examination.^ In any view, the accused may be inter- 
 rogated as to any matter concerning which he has testified on his 
 direct examination.^ In one jurisdiction, which follows the so- 
 called American rule, the defendant in a criminal prosecution 
 testified that two of the prosecutino; witnesses had a o-ruda'e 
 against him. It was held inadmissible for his counsel to ask him 
 to state the grounds of the grudge, for the reason that such evi- 
 dence would introduce collateral issues.^ 
 
 1 LeBeau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223; ute the rule was otherwise. State??. 
 Great Western &c. E. Co. v. Loomis, Clinton, 07 Mo. 330; State v. Cox, 67 
 32 N. Y. 127; ante, § -liU. Mo. 392; State v. Eugaii, (38 Mo. 214; 
 
 2 Couuors V. People, 50 N. Y. 240. State v. Testermau, 68 Mo. 408. 
 
 3 State u. Charaberlaiu, 89Mo. 129; •* People v. O'Brien, m Cal. 602 
 s. c. 1 S. W. Rep. 145; State v. Mc- (McKee, J., dissenting). 
 
 Graw, 74 Mo. 573; State v. Turner, 76 ^ Ante, § 432. 
 
 Mo. 350; State v. McLaughlin, 76 Mo. « As in California: People v. Mc- 
 
 320; State v. Porter, 75 Mo. 171; State Guugill, 41 Cal. 429. 
 
 V. Douglass, 81 Mo. 231; State v. Pat- ' Cora. v. Mullen, 97 Mass. 545. 
 
 terson, 88 Mo. 88; State v. Lurch, 12 » People v. Russell, 46 Cal. 121. 
 
 Ore. 99; State u. Saumlers, 14 Ore. " Chelton r. State, 45 Md. 564. 
 
 300. Under a former IMissouri stat-
 
 532 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 § G53. [Coiitiimed.J Previous Arrests, Convictions, etc., 
 not inquired into. — As already seen, ^ it is a general rule api)li- 
 cable to the cross-examination of witnesses, that it is within the 
 discretion of the court to allow collateral facts affecting; the 
 credibility of the witness, to be inquired into, subject to another 
 rule, that his answers are conclusive and cannot be contradicted. 
 Under this view, as also seen, the witness may be questioned 
 concerning previous arrests and convictions for crime. But un- 
 der the view stated in the preceding section, where the accused, 
 on a criminal trial, avails himself of the privilege afforded by the 
 enabling statute, and takes the witness stand in his own behalf, 
 he cannot be interrogated as to previous arrests, convictions, or 
 other disparaging circumstances in his history. He cannot be 
 examined, against his objection, as to former indictments against 
 him for other offenses not pertaining to the issue to be tried. '^ 
 He cannot be required to answer such a question as, " Did you 
 not belong to Jesse James' gang?"^ He cannot be required to 
 answer questions, the answers to which would disgrace him and 
 disparage his character.^ He cannot be required to write his 
 own name, or that of another person, in the presence of 
 the jury, in order that they may compare it with the signa- 
 ture on a note, which he is charaedwith havino- uttered knowinoj 
 it to be forged — the reason being that such a course violates 
 the prisoner's right of not giving criminating evidence against 
 himself.^ He cannot be asked whether he has been con- 
 victed of crime, — the reason that, in a criminal cause, a wit- 
 ness cannot be impeached or sustained by proof of general 
 moral character,*' and, a fortiori^ by proof of an is olated 
 
 ^ Ante, §§ 404, 465. which we have been thus far happily 
 
 2 Smith V. State, 70 Aha. 21. delivered." 
 
 3 Clarke v. State, 78 Ala. 474. lu ■« Ilayward v. People, 90 111. 492;. 
 the opinion in this case the court Gifford v. I'eople, 87 111. 210; People 
 quote the following observation of v. Hambliu, C8 Cal. 101; People v. 
 Campbell, J., in People v. Thomas, 9 Elster (Cal.), 3 West Coast Rep. 33, 37. 
 Mich. 314: "But, perhaps, the worst ^ State v. Lurch, 12 Ore. 99. 
 
 thing would be the degradation of our ^ Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124c 
 
 criminal jurisprudence by converting This, though the rule in Indiana, is 
 
 it into an inquisitorial systc':ii, from not tlie universal rule. Ante, § 552.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIII. ] THE ACCUSED AS AVITNESSES. 533 
 
 act of good or bad conduct.^ He cannot be asked, on cross- 
 examination, whether he had killed a man in another State, or 
 how often he had been without a pistol, or whether he had not 
 been at target practice most of the time at a particular place, — 
 the reason being that, to compel a prisoner thus to testify as to 
 his whole life on the witness stand, would not merely discredit 
 hira as a witness, but would prejudice the jury against him and 
 against his defense in a particular case.-^ But his examination 
 should be limited to matters pertaining to the issue, in order to 
 prevent a conviction of one offense by proof that the accused 
 may have been guilty of another,^ To require the prisoner, as 
 the price of taking the witness stand in his own behalf, to run 
 the gauntlet of being interrogated as to every disparaging fact 
 connected with his past history, is deemed to deprive him in a 
 large measure of the privilege conferred by the enabling statute, 
 and also to violate his constitutional privilege against self-crimi- 
 nation. The reason given for the conclusion of the foreiroinsr 
 cases, by Chief Judge Church, of the Court of Appeals of New 
 York, has been frequently quoted with apjiroval by other courts: 
 " By taking the stand as a Avitness, while he may subject himself 
 to the rules applicable to other witnesses, he is not thereby 
 deprived of his rights as a party; and it follows that his counsel, 
 while he is in the witness box, has a right to speak for him, and 
 that an error committed by the court against him may inure to 
 his benefit as a party. Especially ought this protection to be 
 afforded to persons on trial for criminal offenses, wdio often, by 
 a species of moral compulsion, are forced upon the stand as wit- 
 nesses ; and being there, are obliged to run the gauntlet of their 
 whole lives on cross-examination, and every immorality, vice or 
 crime of which they may have been guilty or suspected of being 
 guilty, is brought out, ostensibly to affect credibility, but prac- 
 tically used to produce a conviction for the particular offense for 
 which the accused is being tried, upon evidence w^hich otherwise 
 w^ould be deemed insufficient. Such a result is manifestly un- 
 
 1 Parley ■«. state, 57 lud. 331. 3 People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571; 
 
 2 State V. Saumlers, U Ore. 300. Clarke v. State, 78 Ala. 474,481.
 
 534 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 just, and every protection should be afforded to guard against 
 it." 1 
 
 § 654. Crimes uot Affecting- Credibility. — For stronger 
 reasons, an accused person who takes the witness stand in his 
 own behalf, cannot be interrogated as to other offenses, or acts of 
 misconduct, which do not necessarily affect his credit or ve- 
 racity .^ In so holding, it was said by Mr. Chief Judge Church, 
 in giving the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals: "The 
 discretion which courts possess, to permit questions of particu- 
 lar acts to be put to witnesses for the purpose of impairing cred- 
 ibility, should be exercised with great caution, when an accused 
 person is a witness on his own trial. He goes upon the stand 
 under a cloud; he stands charged with a criminal offense, not 
 onh', but is under the strongest possible temptation to give evi- 
 dence favorable to himself. His evidence is therefore looked 
 upon with suspicion and distrust; and if, in addition to this, he 
 may be subjected to a cross-examination upon every incident of 
 his life, and every charge of vice or crime which may have been 
 made against him, and which have no bearing upon the charge for 
 which he is being tried, he may be so prejudiced in the minds of 
 the jury as frequently to induce them to convict, upon evidence 
 which otherwise would be deemed insufficient. It is not legiti- 
 mate to bolster up a weak case by probabilities based upon other 
 transactions. An accused person is required to meet the specific 
 charge made against him, and is not called upon to defend him- 
 self against every act of his life. * * * ]^^o r^le of law is 
 violated, in requiring that, to entitle questions' to be put to ac- 
 cused persons, which are irrelevant to the issue, and are calcu- 
 lated to prejudice him with the juiy, they should at least be of a 
 character, which clearly go to impeach his general moral charac- 
 ter, and his credibility as a witness. The old rule, not to allow 
 
 1 People V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 2 people v. Crapo, 7G N. Y. 288, 
 
 574 (distiuguishiug People v. Brau- 289,293; Peoples. Browu, 72 N. Y. 
 
 clou, 42 N. Y. 265; People v. Conuors, 571; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17, 20. See 
 
 50 N. Y. 240: People v. Real, 42 N. Y. 24 N. Y. 299; Gale v. People, 2G Mich. 
 
 270.) 159.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIll.] THE ACCUSED AS WITNESSES. 535 
 
 irrelevant questions to such persons, would be preferable, and 
 more in accordance with sound principles of justice ; but it is un- 
 necessary in this case to go bej^ond the requirement that the 
 answer must tend directly to impeach him." ^ In an earlier 
 case in the same State it was said, on obvious grounds, by Jewett, 
 J., that, " the single fact that he [the witness] had been com- 
 plained of and held for trial, for the commission of a crime, did 
 not affect his moral character." ^ 
 
 § 655. [Continued.] Illustrations. — Thus, it has been held that 
 a prisoner, on trial for burglary and larceny, who elects to take the 
 stand as a witness in his own behalf, cannot be asked, on cross-examina- 
 tion, whether he has been arrested on a charge of bigamy.'-^ On the 
 
 same principle, it has been held that, where the defendant, on trial for 
 murder, takes the witness stand, he cannot be cross-examined as to as- 
 saults QXi(\ batteries; since, while this might carry the inference that he 
 was a violent and dangerous man, it would not tend to prove that he 
 was a liar. Accordingly, the foUowing line of cross-examination of the 
 defendant in such a case, permitted by the court against the objection 
 of the defendant's counsel, was held prejudicial error: " Q. How many 
 times have 3'ou been arrested in Virginia City for unlawfully beating 
 men and women? A. Three times, I believe. Q. Were 30U convicted 
 each time? A. Yes, sir. Plead guilty twice and was tried two times. 
 Q. What was the name of that woman j'^ou were arrested for beating? 
 A. Katie Devine. Q. Was that one of the persons that you assaulted, and 
 was convicted of the offense? A. I believe it was. Q. Do you know 
 Mr. Robe}'? A. Yes, sir. Q. You were arrested and charged with 
 beating him and cutting off his beard? A. I was. Q. And convicted? 
 A. I was. Q. Were you arrested for striking a man with a monkey 
 wrench? A. No. Q. You threw it at him and was convicted of as- 
 sault and battery? A. I was." ^ For like reasons, it has been held er- 
 ror to allow the State to ask the prisoner, on the witness stand, '* How 
 many times have you been arrested?" *'' But the same court, in a 
 
 1 People V. Crapo, 70 N. Y. 288, the objectiou did not involve the 
 
 289,293; Folger and Earl, JJ., dis- point under consideration, 
 sented. The Chief Judge, iu his 2 people v. Gay, 7 N. Y. 378. 
 
 opinion, distinguishes People v. Bran- ^ People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288. 
 
 don, 42 N. Y. 2G5, and People v. Con- * State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17, 26. 
 
 nors, 50 N. Y. 2-tO, on the ground that « People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571.
 
 536 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tl., 
 
 later decision, has declared a rule whicli seems mucli better calculated 
 to subserve tlie rights of society and to develop the real object of a ju- 
 dicial inquiry, the ascertaining of the truth. It is, that it is within the 
 sound discretion of the trial court how far the examination of a prisoner, 
 who elects to talce the stand in his own behalf, may be carried with ref- 
 erence to his past history and mode oflife.^ 
 
 1 People V. Clark (N. Y. Ct. of App.), 8 N. East. Eep. 38.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIV.] UNSWORN statement of accused. 537 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIV. 
 
 OF THE UNSWOEN STATEMENT OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 Section 
 
 660. Right to make a Statemeut at Coraraou Law. 
 
 661. Unsettled State of the Law. 
 
 662. [Continued.] Prisoner's Counsel not allowed to make it. 
 
 663. Under American Statutes. 
 
 664. In the Nature of Evidence. 
 
 665. Rebutting such Statement. 
 
 666. Omission to make Statement. 
 
 667. Prisoner, how Assisted by his Counsel. 
 
 668. [Continued.] Observations on this Question. 
 
 669. Cross-Examination on the Statement. 
 
 670. Not Subject to Impeachment. . 
 
 § 660. Right to make a Statement at Common Law. — At 
 
 common law the defendant was often accorded the right to make 
 an unsworn statement to the jury in his own behalf, at least in 
 capital cases. The right has been more recently allowed in 
 England in cases not capital, the authorities in that country not 
 being united as to whether it may be exercised only in cases 
 where the defendant has not the aid of counsel.^ How far the 
 prisoner is allowed to make an unsworn statement of facts, 
 by the rules of procedure in American courts, in the absence of 
 a statute authorizing it, is perhaps a matter of doubt. In most 
 of the American constitutions there is a provision that " in all 
 criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to be heard by 
 himself and counsel, or either." ^ It has been supposed that 
 such a constitutional provision does not extend so far as to require 
 the court to allow the prisoner to make an unsworn statement 
 of the facts, beyond giving his explanation of the inculpatory 
 evidence wdiich has been adduced against him. He cannot, it 
 
 1 Whart. Crim. Ev.. § 427. And 2 Ala. Const. 1875., art. 1, § 7. 
 
 see the jaext section, infra.
 
 538 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl*., 
 
 has been ruled, make au unsworn statement in the nature of 
 substantive evidence.^ 
 
 § GG 1 . Unsettled state of the Law in England. — There has been, un- 
 less within a very recent period, no settled rule on this subject in England. 
 In one case where, at the close of the case of the prosecutor, counsel 
 for the prisoner proposed that the prisoner should make his own state- 
 ment before the counsel addressed the jiuy, Baron Gurney, having con- 
 ferred with Baron Alderson, said: " My brother Alderson informs me 
 that he allowed it to be done in the instance which has been referred 
 to, which was a very peculiar case ; and as it has been already per- 
 mitted before at these assizes, I will not refuse to allow it in this in- 
 stance ; but I think that it ought not to be drawn into a precedent." 
 The prisoner then read a written statement to the jury, which did not 
 aid him much, for the verdict was guilty. ^ In the " very peculiar 
 case" where Baron Alderson allowed such a statement to be made, 
 counsel for the prisoner, in commencing his address to the jury, ex- 
 pressed regret that, as the prisoner was defended by counsel, he could 
 not be allowed to make his own statement. Baron Alderson replied: 
 " I see no objection in this case to his doing so ; I have read the state- 
 ment he made before the magistrate. I think it is right that a person 
 should have an opportunity of stating such facts as he ma}^ think ma- 
 terial, and that his counsel should be allowed to comment on that 
 statement, as one of the circumstances of the case. On trials for high 
 treason, the prisoner is always allowed to make his own statement, after 
 his counsel has addressed the jury. It is true that the prisoner's 
 statement may often defeat the defense intended by his counsel ; but if 
 so, the ends of justice will be furthered. Besides, it is often the genu- 
 ine defense of the party, and not a mere imaginary case invented by the 
 ingenuity of counsel." The prisoner then made the same statement as 
 he had done before ; that the prosecutor had, in the first instance, 
 threatened to shoot him, and had snapped the gun at him. His counsel 
 then addressed the jury and commented on his statement, as according 
 with the evidence, and only supplying what was otherwise deficient in 
 it. The indictment was for maliciously wounding with intent to do 
 grievous bodily harm ; the verdict was guilty of an assault merely.-^ 
 Another English judge seems to have conceived the rule to be that if, 
 in a case of felony, the prisoner's counsel had addressed the jury, the 
 
 1 State V. McCall, 4 Ala. 043. ^ Rgg. v. Malings, 8 Carr. & P. 242. 
 
 2 Kfii. r. Walking, S Carr. & P. 243.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXIV.] UKSNVORN STATEMENT OF ACCUSED. 539 
 
 prisoner himself would not be allowed to address the jury also. Thus 
 where, in such a case, the prisoner's counsel had addressed the jiiry, at 
 the conclusion of his speech the prisoner wished to make a statement, 
 but Coleridge, J., said: " Prisoner, your counsel has spoken for you. 
 I cannot hear both." ^ 
 
 § 6G2. [CoxTiNUED.] Prisoner's Counsel not allowed to matte 
 IT. — But, while the prisoner would not be allowed to make a statement 
 where he had counsel who addressed the jury for him, the prisoner's 
 counsel was not allowed to detail the prisoner's account of the matter to 
 the jury for the prisoner. In a case of felony, the prisoner's counsel, 
 in addressing the jur}', was proceeding to tell them that he was in- 
 structed b}^ the prisoner that the oats, which were the subject of the 
 larceny charged in the indictment, had lieen delivered to the prisoner 
 by one Dunn, and that the prisoner was ignorant of their having been 
 stolen. But Coleridge, J., said: '' I cannot permit a prisoner's coun- 
 sel to tell the jury anything which he is not in a situation to prove. If 
 the prisoner does not employ counsel, he is at liberty to make a state- 
 ment for himself and tell his own story ; which is to have such weight 
 with the jury, as, all circumstances considered, it is entitled to; but if 
 he employs counsel, he must submit to the rules which have been es- 
 tablished with respect to the conducting of cases by counsel." In 
 summing up Coleridge, J., also, said : " The counsel for the prisoner 
 cannot be allowed to state the prisoner's story, unless he is able to 
 confirm it by evidence ; as the prosecutor and prisoner, if they employ 
 counsel, must be put in the same situation." ^ This question came 
 up in the trial of O'Doiinell, before Mr. Justice Denmaa, in 1883, 
 who refused to allow Mr. Russell, of counsel for the prisoner, to re- 
 hearse the statement of the circumstances of the homicide, as the 
 prisoner had stated them to him. The discussion of the subject led 
 to a correspondence between the Attorney-General and Lord Coleridge, 
 the Lord Chief Justice of England, which developed the fact that, on 
 November 26, 1881, all the judges of England liable to try prisoners, 
 had held a meeting in the room of the Queen's Bench Division, which 
 had resulted in passing the following resolution, with the concurrence 
 of all present except Hawkins and Stephen, JJ., who dissented, — 
 nineteen judges having concurred therein: " That, in the opinion of 
 the judges, it is contrary to the administration and practice of the 
 criminal law, as hitherto allowed, that counsel for prisoners should 
 
 1 Keg. V. Boucher, 8 Carr. & P. Ul. 2 ]jeg. r. Beard, 8 Carr. & V. 142.
 
 540 EXAMINATION" OF WITNESSES. [I Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 state to the jury, as alleged existing facts, matters which they have 
 been told in their instructions, on the authority of the prisoner, but 
 which they do not propose to prove in evidence. " i It thus appears that, 
 by relaxing the rigor of the old rule which denied a prisoner the bene- 
 fit of counsel except to argue questions of law to the court, the prisoner 
 was, in a very important respect, placed in a worse position than that in 
 which he stood before. 
 
 § 663. Under American Statutes. — Statutes exist in several 
 American jurisdictions, allowing the defendant, in a criminal trial, 
 to make an unsworn statement of facts to the jury ; though in 
 most States, enabling acts exist (considered in the preceding 
 chapter) under which the prisoner has the option of being sworn 
 as a witness in his own behalf.^ Such statutes, being just and 
 humane in purpose, slioukl receive a construction which will give 
 them full effect.^ 
 
 § 664. In tlie Nature of Evidence. — While there is judicial 
 opinion to the effect that such a statement, when the subject of 
 argument, should be dealt with as a statement, and not con- 
 founded with testimony,^ yet the general opinion is that it is in 
 the nature of evidence, and that the jury are to give it such 
 weight as they think it entitled to.^ They are to consider its 
 probability or improbability with reference to the situation of 
 the defendant, his demeanor in making the statement, its in- 
 trinsic character, its harmony with the other evidence in the case, 
 and the like circumstances.^ It is said that it is subject to the 
 
 1 See 18 Am. Law Rev. 97. Durant v. People, 13 Mich. 351; Annis 
 
 2 In People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314, u. People, 13 Mich. 511, 519. See also 
 it was decided that Statute 125 of Washburu v. People, 10 Mich. 372; 
 1861, enacted in that State, did not People r'. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314; Reich 
 extend so far as to allow a defendant v. State, 03 Ga. GIG; Pease v. State, G3 
 in a criminal case to be sworn in his Ga. G31. 
 
 owu behalf, but only allowed him to ® Blackburn v. State, 71 Ala. 319; 
 
 make an unsworn statement to the s. c. 4G Am. Rep. 323; Chappell v. 
 
 jury. State, 71 Ala. 322 ; People v. Arnold, 40 
 
 3 Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511, Mich. 710; Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 577; 
 519. ' Barberi?. State, 13 Fla. 675, 681; Bond 
 
 ■» Brown v. State, GO Ga. 210. v. State, 21 Fla. 738; Brown v. State, 
 
 s People V. Arnold, 40 Midi. 7in; 60 Ga. 210; Ross v. State, 59 Ga. 248,
 
 Tit III, Ch, XXIV.] UNSWORN statement of accused. 541 
 
 ordinary intrinsic tests of credibility governing the s^Yorn testi- 
 mony of witnesses, such as the character of the defendant, his 
 demeanor on the witness stand, his intelligence, the accuracy of 
 his memory, the inherent probability of his statement, its con- 
 sistency with itself and with the other circumstances of the case; 
 or the lack of these elements of veracity, together with many 
 other considerations liable to affect its credibility, or afford any 
 reasonable presumption of its probability or improbability.^ 
 Uppn this princi})le it is held error for the court to charge the 
 jury in respect of its probative value. '^ Being in the natm'e of 
 evidence and a subject for the consideration of the jury as such, 
 it is the privilege of the defendant's counsel to comment upon it 
 in argument^ and the denial of this privilege is error. ^ It may 
 be regarded as evidence against him, as well as evidence for him. 
 In other words, so far as it confesses or admits anything, it 
 stands on the same footing as any other confession or admission.^ 
 It is therefore generally,^ though not always,^ held error for the 
 court to instruct the jury that it is not to be considered as evi- 
 dence. 
 
 § 665. Rebutting^ such Statement. — After the prisoner has 
 made his statement, it is competent for the prosecution to give 
 evidence rebutting the facts therein stated. It was justly said 
 that, if the contrary view were to be taken of the statute, " the 
 legislation, which has proved in so high a degree beneficent and 
 just, might easily, in the case of the most dangerous offenders, 
 become a protection to crime, instead of the shield to innocence 
 it was designed to be." ^ 
 
 1 Blackburn v. State, 71 Ala. 319; ^ Barber v. State, 13 Fla. 675, G81; 
 s. c. 4G Am. Rep. 323. reaffirmed iu Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 
 
 2 Ibid. 577. 
 
 3 Beasley v. State, 71 Ala. 328. So 6 Ross v. State, 59 Ga. 248. As to 
 held iu Euglaud, uuder the comraou- the luauuer of instructing juries with 
 la;v practice of allowiui? the prisoner reference to the value of such state- 
 to make a statemeut. Reg. v. Malings, • ment, see post, §§ 2448-2450. 
 
 8 Carr. & P. 242. 7 Burden v. People, 26 Midi. 162, 
 
 * See reasouing iu Browu v. State, 166. 
 58 Ga. 212.
 
 542 EXAMINATIOX OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl"., 
 
 § 6G6. Omission to make Statement. — The omission of a 
 defendant to avail himself of the statutory privilege of making 
 a statement to the jury, is not matter which they are entitled to 
 consider, in determining the question of his guilt. It is, there- 
 fore, error for the court to instruct them, that they may take 
 that into consideration, and give it such weight as they may 
 think tit, with the other evidence.^ 
 
 § 667. Prisoner, how Assisted by his Counsel. — In deliver- 
 ing his unsworn statement, the accused is not examined as a 
 witness, and his counsel has no right to put questions to him; 
 though it is supposed that this might be allowed in the discretion 
 of the court; 2 and he may receive suggestions ivom. his coun- 
 sel, first submitted in loriting to the court, ^ provided they are 
 not leading in their form.^ 
 
 § 668. [Continued.] Observations on this Question. — In a case 
 arising under the Michigan statute, the question was presented whether 
 the prisoner was entitled to any aid from counsel in making his state- 
 ment. The case was an indictment for larceny, and one of the defend- 
 ants went iqjon the witness stand, and without being interrogated, 
 made a statement under the statute ; ^ but in such statement said 
 nothing upon the subject of his knowledge of the mare, which was 
 alleged to have been stolen, but did make a statement in reference to 
 other material points in the case. Whereupon the counsel for the de- 
 fendants proposed to call the attention of this defendant, while upon the 
 stand, to a subject which he had omitted in the following words: "I 
 call your attention to the subject of your knowledge of the stolen mare, 
 so that you may make a statement in reference to it or not;" which 
 proposition was made in writing and submitted to the court and to the 
 prosecuting attorney, without being made icnown to the defendant or to 
 any other person. The prosecuting attorney objected, on the ground 
 that the statement to be made by the defendant must be made without 
 interrogation by counsel, while he was upon the stand. The circuit 
 judge sustained the objection, and the defendant left the stand. But 
 he afterwards requested the court to let him make a further statement, 
 
 1 Bird V. State, 50 Ga. 585. » Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 611, 519. 
 
 2 Brown v. State, 58 Ga. 212; Aiiuis * People v. Morrigan, 2i) Midi. 5, 8. 
 j;. People, 13 Mich. 511. s Mich. Laws 18(il, p 1G8.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXIV.] UNSWORN STATEMENT OF ACCUSED. 543 
 
 which request was granted ; whereupon he went upon the stand and 
 stated as follows: "I know nothing about the stealing, and had 
 nothing to do with it." Upon these facts two questions were presented 
 to the Supreme Court for decision : ( 1 ) whether the court erred in the 
 ruling, and if so, then (2) whether the error was cured by the defend- 
 ant afterwards going upon the stand and making the statement he did. 
 It was held, on plausible grounds, that the trial court erred in the ruling, 
 and, on very doubtful grounds, that the error was not cured by 
 the prisoner afterwards going upon the stand and amending his state- 
 ment. Coolc}', J., in giving the opinion of tlie court, after recurring 
 to the reason and policy of the statute, as already stated, ^ and to 
 the propi-iety of giving it a just and humane construction, said: 
 *'The defendant, when he goes upon the stand, may fairly be sup- 
 posed to understand what facts, within his knowledge, will have 
 a bearing upon the case, and will tend to remove any suspicion 
 which the sworn evidence has cast upon him. There is no 
 propriety, therefore, in his cousel being allowed to question him as 
 a witness is questioned, and the statute which allows him to ' make a 
 statement ' evidently does not contemplate that his knowledge of the 
 case shall be drawn from him by questions in the usual form. But 
 to hold that, the moment the defendant is placed upon the stand, he 
 shall be debarred of all assistance from his counsel and left to go 
 through his statement as his fears or his embarrassment may enable 
 him, in the face of the consequences which may follow from imperfect 
 or unsatisfactory explanation, would, in our opinion, be to make what 
 the statute designed as an important privilege to tlie accused, a trap 
 into which none but the most cool and self-possessed could place himself 
 with much prospect of coming out unharmed. An innocent man 
 charged with a heinous offense, and against whom evidence of guilt has 
 been given, is much more likely to be overwhelmed by his situation and 
 embarrassed, when called upon for explanation, than the offender who is 
 hardened in guilt; and if he is unlearned, unaccustomed to speak in 
 public assemblies, or to put together his thoughts in consecutive order 
 anywhere, it will not be surprising if his explanation is incoherent, or 
 if it overlooks important circumstances. The weak in mind and body 
 are precisely the class most needing the protection of the statute, and 
 they are the very classes who, in most cases, would receive no benefit 
 from it, if the construction adopted by the circuit judge is correct. 
 The fact is illustrated in the case before us. The defendant went upon 
 
 1 Ante, §§ wa, ^■,^^^.
 
 544 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tboilip. Tr., 
 
 the stand and made a statement in reference to some material facts, but 
 left it witliout saying a word about the property he was accused of bav- 
 ins: stolen. This omission could not fail to have its effect ag^ainst him 
 in the minds of the jury ; and if, in fact, he was an innocent man, we can 
 only attribute the omission to some embarrassment springing from 
 the unaccustomed, and to him momentous, circumstances surround- 
 ing his attempt at explanation. The manner in whicli the counsel 
 sought to call his attention to the subject to which he should direct his 
 explanation was quite unobjectionable, and was well calculated to se- 
 cure to the defendant the benefits intended by the law, without endan- 
 gering public justice. The defendant, through embarrassment, defect 
 of memory, or other reason, having failed to make his explanation full, 
 the counsel proposed to call his attention to the topics he had omitted, 
 that he might make further explanation in regard to them if he saw fit. 
 This was not done, however, by the way of question addressed directly 
 to the defendant, but the proposition was delivered in writing to the 
 judge, that it might have his approval before the prisoner should be 
 informed what it was. Tliis precaution was eminently proper, and, if 
 adopted, as we think it should generally be, will prevent the privilege 
 being abused and being made a means by which counsel may indicate 
 to a prisoner what they desire to have him say. And the judge, 
 although allowed to pass upon the propositions and reject such as are 
 improper, should not be regarded as possessing unlimited j^ower to 
 reject at discretion, but as bound to allow all that are made in good 
 faith, and with a view only to call the attention of the defendant to the 
 subjects to which he should address himself. The error in this case was 
 not cured by the prisoner going upon the stand and making a further 
 statement. The last statement was as defective as the first, and could 
 scarcely have been made by any man in the form it was, unless he was 
 laboring under great embarrassment. The prisoner needed the aid 
 which counsel proposed to give, as much aid this time as he had needed 
 it before ; and the ruling which the court had made, and which was 
 sweeping in its extent, excluded all such aid." ^ 
 
 § 6G9 .Cross-Examiiiation on the Statement. — Under the 
 statute of Michigan allowing defendants to make such state- 
 ments,^ the defendant " may be cross-examined upon any sueh 
 
 1 Auuis V. People, 13 Mich. 511, 519, 2 Comp. Laws Mich. 1871, § 5967. 
 
 521.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXIV.] UNSWORN STATEMENT OF ACCUSED. 545 
 
 statement.'^ The statute does not state whether the statement 
 is to be under oath or not, but the rulings under it are that it is 
 made ivitliout oaiJi.^ But under the Alabama statute, it is held 
 that the defendants, thus making statements, not being witnesses, 
 and their statements not being strictly evidence, it results, that 
 they are not subject to examination or cross-examination as wit- 
 nesses are.^ Under the Michigan statute, the cross-examination 
 is not allowed to go beyond the statement, and to extend over the 
 entire issue, as it might if the defendant were a general wit- 
 ness ; neither will it be allowed to go into any of the collateral 
 inquiries whereby a witness' credit or memory is sometimes 
 tested.-^ 
 
 § 670. Not Subject to Impeacbment. — From the same 
 reasoning as to the effect of the Alabama statute, the conclusion 
 has been reached that while the statement may be subject to all 
 the tests for ascertaining truth which spring out of the proof in 
 the case, the con.sistenc3^ or probability, velnon, of the statements 
 
 1 Duraut u. People, 13 Mich. 351; 
 People V. Joues, 24 Mich. 215; De Foe 
 V. People, 22 Mich. 224; People v. Ar- 
 uold, 40 Mich 710. 
 
 2 Chappellv. State, 71 Ala 322, 327. 
 
 3 People V. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314, 
 321. The court add that: " While his 
 coustitutioual right of declining to an- 
 swer questions cannot be removed, 
 yet a refusal by a party to answer any 
 fair question, not going outside of 
 what he has offered to explain, would 
 have its proper weiglit with the jury." 
 Keaffirmed in Gale v. People, 2G Mich. 
 157, IGO. In the latter case Cooley, J., 
 in giving the opinion of the court, 
 after remarking on the beneficent pur- 
 pose of the statute, said: " Few men, 
 however innocent, could safely go up- 
 on the stand, to answer a criminal 
 charge, If they must, at their peril, be 
 prepared to give satisfactory answers 
 to questions regarding their whole 
 
 former life, or, if they decline to do 
 so, have their triers informed that the 
 information they decline to give, it was 
 proper for the prosecution to call out, 
 and tliat the refusal to respond to the 
 questions justly subjected them to un- 
 favorable inferences. Such would be 
 the practical result of a refusal to an- 
 swer an interrogatory which the court 
 had sustained after objection was 
 made. A review of tlie evidence in 
 this case suggests very forcibly that, 
 however full may be the explana- 
 tions, a list of questions which assume 
 the existence of damaging facts may 
 be put in such a manner and with such 
 persistency and show of proof, as to 
 impress a jury that there must be 
 something wrong, even though the 
 prisoner fully denies it, and there is no 
 other evidence." Gate v. People, 
 s^ipra.
 
 546 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip Tl'., 
 
 made, the defendant's manner in making them, the interest he 
 must feel in the result, — the defendant making such a statement 
 cannot be impeached as a witness, either by proof of bad charac- 
 ter, upon cross-examination, or by other proof of extrinsic facts 
 introduced for such purpose.^ 
 
 1 Chappell V. State, 71 Ala. 322, 327.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 547 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULINGS 
 
 THEREON. 
 
 Article I. — Tenders of Evidence. 
 
 Article II. — Objections to Evidence and Exceptions. 
 
 Article III. — Striking out and Withdrawing. 
 
 Article I. — Tenders of Evidence. 
 Section 
 
 675. Court Rules upon all Offers of Evidence. 
 
 676. Evidence to be admitted if Prima Facie Relevant. 
 
 677. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 678. Offer must show Materiality. 
 
 679. [Continued.] Counsel required to state the S^^bstance of the Offer. 
 
 680. [Continued.] Aliter on Cross-examination. 
 
 681. Tender of Witness Competent as to some Matters only. 
 
 682. When Witness presumed Material. 
 
 683. Questions must be Speciflc. 
 
 684. Question must be Relevant at the Time. 
 
 685. Counsel must have Witnesses ready to sustain Offer. 
 
 686. Must not repeat Offer after Adverse Ruling. 
 
 687. When Offer not majje in Hearing of Jury. 
 
 § 675. Court Rules upon All Offers of Evidence. — At the 
 
 outset it is to be observed that it is for the court to rule upon all 
 offers of evidence, and to decide, when necessary, all questions 
 of fact which are involved in the question whether the evidence 
 is admissible.^ 
 
 § G7G. Evidence to be admitted if Prima Facie Relevant. — 
 
 Where an instrument of evidence is offered, and its relevancy is 
 
 ^ Ante, chap. XIII.; Currier v. ris u. Wilson, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 57; Cli- 
 
 Bank of Louisville, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) quot's Champagne, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 114; 
 
 460; Tabor v. Stauniels, 2 Cal. 240; Prall v. Hiuchmau, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 
 
 Robinson v. Ferry, 11 Conn. 460; liar- 351.
 
 548 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomj). Tl\, 
 
 supported by other testimony, the judge will admit it, when suf- 
 ficient supporting evidence has been heard to warrant the jury in 
 inferring tlie existence of the fact upon which its relevancy de- 
 pends.^ This is not a negation, but is an affirmation of the prin- 
 ciple already discussed, that questions of fact involved in pre- 
 liminary offers of evidence are first to be decided by the judge. 
 Where proof of one fact is necessary to let in proof of another 
 fact, and there is evidence conducing to prove the preliminary 
 fact, the court should not, as a general rule, exclude the main 
 evidence from the jury.'-^ The rule under this head was thus 
 stated by Marshall, C. J., in the Kentucky Court of Appeals: 
 "If the fact on which the relevancy of the disputed evidence de- 
 pends be merely preliminary, and not otherwise essential than as 
 it may lay the foundation for receiving the evidence in question, 
 then it may, perhaps, in all cases, be proper to make the admis- 
 sibility of the disputed evidence depend upon the judge's opinion 
 as to the sufficiency of the proof to establish the preliminary 
 fact. But where the preliminary fact is otherwise material in 
 the cause, and essentially involved in the issue, the general prac- 
 tice is, to admit the evidence, if, in the opinion of the judge, 
 there be evidence conducing to prove the preliminary fact, and 
 from which a jury might rationally infer it. A contrary prac- 
 tice would, in many instances, as in this, take the whole case 
 from the jury, and subject it to the decision of the judge upon 
 the weight of the evidence, thus destroying the established dis- 
 tinction between their respective functions. When it is neces- 
 sary to prove a deed, the instrument is assumed to be read to the 
 jury, upon evidence conducing to prove its execution. Could a 
 judge afterwards exclude it on motion, on the ground that the 
 j)roof of its execution was not fully satisfactory to his mind? 
 Or could he have rejected it on this ground, even in the first in- 
 stance? The execution of the deed, being a material fact in the 
 the issue, the judge does not decide it peremptorily, though 
 it is in one aspect a preliminary fact; but, having decided that 
 there is evidence conducing to i)rovc it, he places the whole 
 
 1 Wiuslo-vv V. Bailey, K! Me. 311). ^ Sneariiiijeu v. Leach, 7 B. Mou. 
 
 (Ky.) 2S7.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 549 
 
 question before the jury. We are satisfied that, in this and 
 similar cases, where the relevancy of one fact depends upon 
 another material fact in the cause, the admissibility of the 
 evidence in support of the dependent or secondary fact, 
 depends not upon the absolute proof of the principal fact, 
 but upon tliere being such evidence as conduces to prove it, 
 and as would authorize the jury to find it." ^ This is agreeable 
 to the view taken by another court, that, where the preliminary 
 proof is clear and uncontradicted, the court will decide the ques- 
 tion of admissibility; but if it is doubtful, it will submit the 
 matter to the jury, and let them decide the doubt, when such 
 doubt depends upon a question of fact,- — that is, will admit the 
 evidence. But as already seen,^ the judge can never allow the 
 jury to say, in the first instance, whether an objection to evi- 
 dence shall be sustained. Thus, where a party offers to prove a 
 contract by parol evidence, and it is objected that the contract 
 was reduced to writing, and a witness is introduced to show that 
 there was a writing, he must state the contents of it to the courts 
 so that the court may judge whether it relates to the same con- 
 tract or to something else; and it is error to leave this fact to 
 the jury.^ While the authorities leave this question in a state of 
 embarrassment, 3'et in view of what has already been said,^ the 
 following propositions may be safely affirmed: 1. The judge will 
 never submit to the jury, in the first instance, whether an objec- 
 tion to testimony shall be sustained — to do this is error. 2. 
 Where the evidence fairly tends to support the preliminary 
 proposition of fact, the existence of which is necessary to the ad- 
 mission of the evidence, the judge will admit it, and let the jury 
 say what weight and effect they will give to it ; and it is error to 
 withhold it from them. 3. The decision of the judge in admit- 
 ting evidence, where it has been necessary to decide a preliminary 
 question of fact, will not be overthrown by a reviewing court, 
 where there is any substantial evidence to support his conclusion. 
 
 1 Swearingeu v. Leach, 7 B. Mon. * Eatlif v. Hurtley, olred. L. (N. C.) 
 (Ky.) 287. 545. 
 
 2 Fniik r. Kiocaid, 5 Md. 405. 5 ^^nf, ch. XIII. 
 
 3 Aide, j 318.
 
 550 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 §677. [Continued.] Illustrations. — This corresponds to 
 what has ah-eady been observed/ that, where the fact which the 
 judge must decide on a preliminary offer of evidence involves 
 the decision of the whole case^ the judge merely decides, and so 
 cautions the jury, that the fact has been 2}^^oved to him. Where 
 the fact involved in the preliminary offer decides the whole case, 
 and there is substantial evidence in support of it, it is error for 
 the judge to reject the evidence ; since this ruling, by withholding 
 the question from the ultimate decision of the jury, has the effect 
 of usurping their province. This is well illustrated by a case 
 where the defendant, in an action of trespass, justified under an 
 execution issued by a magistrate and assigned to such defendant. 
 The plaintiff objected to the admission of the execution in evi- 
 dence, and offered to prove that the plaintiff therein was dead 
 before it was issued. The court received evidence touching the 
 question of the death, and decided that the execution was not 
 admissible under the circumstances. It was held that this was 
 error, since it had the effect of withdrawing the question from 
 the jury.^ So, in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff claimed 
 under a conveyance from husband and wife, and insisted that the 
 defendants were the tenants of the wife, and therefore estopped 
 from disputing his title; but the tenancy was denied, and the 
 defendants offered to prove, by the former husband of the wife, 
 her alle2;cd former marriao-e, and the court admitted this evidence. 
 It was held: 1. That this evidence was admissible, if there was 
 no tenancy, and that, by admitting it without qualification, the 
 court decided that there was none, which the court had no 
 right to do, it being a question of fact for the jury, and there 
 being testimony to show that there was a tenancy. 2. That, 
 if the evidence rendered the question of tenancy or no tenancy 
 a doubtful one in the opinion of the court, the court might 
 have admitted it, instructing the jury that if they believed 
 there was a tenancy, then the testimony was not properly before 
 them.^ 
 
 1 Ante, § 31!). 3 j'lmk v. Kiucaid, 5 Md. 405. 
 
 2 Jiay V. Sharp, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 339.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 551 
 
 § 678. Offer uiust show Materiality'. — In order to put the 
 trial court in the wrong, on appeal or writ of error, for reject- 
 ing an offer of evidence on direct examination, the offer, as 
 stated in the bill of exceptions, must show the materiality of the 
 evidence which Avas tendered.^ Where the question does not 
 suggest the answer, counsel must, in general, disclose what it 
 will be, or what he expects it will be, or wliat he i^ro^joses to 
 prove? "Where there is in the bill of exceptions neither a form- 
 al offer of evidence, nor any statement of what the witness will 
 testify to, there is no available error. ^ Thus, it is said to be a 
 settled rule, where a conversation between persons is offered in 
 evidence, to require the party offering it to disclose Jiow it may 
 be material.* So, where a tender of evidence is made to 
 prove certain facts, some of which are admissible and others 
 inadmissible, the offer is properly rejected as a whole; the court 
 is not bound to separate it and admit such parts of it as are com- 
 petent, although it may do so in its discretion.^ Where a ivitness 
 which a party tenders is competent as to certain facts, but not as 
 a general witness, and he is objected to as incompetent, — the 
 party tendering him should state what he proposes to prove by 
 him, so that the court may know that it is proper; otherwise an 
 appellate court cannot say that there is any error in refusing to ' 
 allow him to testify ."^ In Virginia we find a quo.lifed statement 
 of the rule, which is, that where an objection is made to a ques- 
 tion, on the ground of irrelevancy , and sustained, it is necessary 
 for the party asking the question, in order to put the court in the 
 
 1 United states V. Gilbert, 2 Siimn. 448; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. God- 
 (U. S.) 20. Bauk of Pleasaut Hill r. dard, 25 lud. 185, 191; Shellito v. 
 Wills, 79 Mo. 275; Aull Saviuijs Bauk Sampson, 61 la. 40. Compare Jeuks v. 
 «. Anil, 80 Mo. 199; Jackson y. Hardin, Knott's Co., 58 la. 549; Votaw v. 
 83 Mo. 175, 187. Diehl, G2 la. G76, 680; Mitchell v. Har- 
 
 2 Jackson v. Hardin, supra; Brid- court. Id. 349, Martz v. Martz, 25 
 gers V. Bridgers, 69 N. C. 451; Gratt. (Va.) 361,367. 
 
 Straus V. Beardsley, 79 N. C. 59; 3 Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 395, 401, 
 
 Oberman v. Coble, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) ^ Trustees v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co 
 
 1; Roberts v. Roberts, 85 N. C. 9; 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 448. 
 Mergentheim v. State (Ind.), 8 N. s Smith v. Arsenal Bank, 104 Pa. 
 
 East. Rep. 568; s. c. 107 Ind. 567; St. 518. 
 Tedrowe v. Esher, 56 Ind. 443, c Stewart v. Kirk, 69 111. 509.
 
 552 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 wrong, to show upon the record what he expects to prove by the 
 witness.^ But in that State this rule has no application where 
 the objection is to the competency of a witness; since here it is a 
 question whether the witness shall be heard at all, though his 
 testimony be ever so relevant or important. ^ 
 
 § 679. [Continued.] Counsel required to State the Sub- 
 stance of the Offer. — The court may, in the exercise of a sound 
 discretion, require counsel to state the substance of evidence 
 which is tendered, so as to enable the court to judge of its mate- 
 riality and relevancy ; ^ and a reviewing court will not control 
 the trial court in the exercise of such a discretion.* If this is 
 not required, and the evidence is admitted generally, no error is 
 committed, provided the evidence was competent for any pur- 
 pose.^ " A party," says Parker, J., " having a witness on the 
 stand, may be called upon by his adversary to state what he pro- 
 poses to prove, and in that case he must state it. But he need 
 make no such statement, unless called upon to do so. It is 
 enough for him to proceed and put his questions to the witness 
 unless desired to state what he expects to prove."® 
 
 § C80. [Continued.] Aliter on Cross-examination. — It 
 
 should be added that the foregoing rule is not applicable on 
 cross-examination. Here the party is examining his adversary's 
 witness, and from the nature of the case cannot be expected to 
 know what the answers to his questions will be.^ It is errone- 
 ous to reject questions, propounded on cross-examination, which 
 relate to the subject of the cross-examination, even though it be 
 not apparent that the answers would have benefited the cross- 
 examining party, unless it affirmatively appear that he could not 
 have been injured by the rejection ; and it has been held that 
 
 1 Carpeuter v. Utz, 4 Gi-catt. (Va.) ■» Koy v. Targee, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 270. 359. 
 
 2 Martz V. Martz, 25 Gratt. (Va.) s McClelland v. Lindsay, 1 Watts 
 361, 307. & S. (Pa.) 3<;0. 
 
 3 Morgan v. Browne, 71 Pa. St. 130, 6 jjeal v. Finch, 11 N. Y. 128, 135. 
 130; McClelland v. Lindsay, 1 Watts ' Harness v. State, 57 Ind. 1; Hutts 
 & S. (Pa.) 360. V. Hutts, 62 Ind. 214, 225.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXV.] OB.JECTIOXS AND EXCEPTIONS. 553 
 
 this error is not cured by allowing the party to go fully into the 
 same matters with his own witnesses. He has a right to a full cross- 
 examination, and cannot, for that purpose, be compelled to make 
 the witness his own. " Cross-examination," said Christiancy, 
 C. J., "is the great test of the knowledge, as well as of the ver- 
 acity of witnesses. The right to pursue it may sometimes be 
 abused; and when it is sought to be abused, — as when counsel 
 insists upon going over the same ground again and again, or 
 when it is apparent that the Avitness has already fully answered 
 without any appearance of evasion, and it is evident the counsel 
 is merely pushing the witness for the sake of annoyance, or for 
 any illegitimate purpose, — it is competent for the court in its 
 discretion, to put an end to it " ^ 
 
 § 681. Tender of Witness Competent as to some Matters 
 only. — Where a party is colupctent as a witness for a limited 
 purpose, and tenders himself as a witness " generally in his own 
 behalf," it is error to exclude him without being sworn, unless 
 it distinctly appear that he does not wish to be sworn at all, un- 
 less allowed to give evidence at large. He should be sworn, and 
 the objection to his competency should be taken to any evidence 
 which he may offer as to which he is incompetent.- In other 
 words, wdiere a witness has been called to the stand, who is in- 
 competent to be sworn and to testify on some matters, but who 
 may not speak of other matters, it is not proper to object to his 
 competency generally and to exclude him. In such a case, it 
 will not be presumed that an improper question will be asked of 
 him. It is only by objecting to improper questions when asked, 
 that a party can exclude improper evidence,^ 
 
 § 682. When Witness presumed Material. — It has been 
 held that, where a bill of exceptions states that a witness was 
 asserted to be competent by the counsel tendering him, and was 
 rejected by the court, — a court of error will infer that the wit- 
 
 1 O'Dounell v. Segar, 25 Mich. 307, 2 Brown v. Richardson, 20 N. Y. 474 
 
 374. 3 i3eal v. Finch, 11 N. Y. 128, 134.
 
 554 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tbomp. Tl'., 
 
 ness was material to sustain the issue, without a direct statement 
 to that effect in the bill of exceptions.^ 
 
 § 683. Questions must be Specific. — Where questions are ^oo 
 general in their character, they may be properly rejected for that 
 reason alone. Thus, in an action against a sheriff for an escape, 
 it was held that a new trial would not be granted because the 
 judge refused to allow a question to be put in this form: *' By 
 what means and in what manner did the prisoner break jail?" 
 To entitle the party to enter upon such an inquiry he should 
 apprise the judge of his intention to show such a state of facts as 
 would excuse the sheriff.^ 
 
 § 684. Question must be Relevant at the Time. — In order 
 to put the court in error for rejecting a question, or a tender of 
 evidence, it must appear that it was relevant a^ tlie time when it 
 was offered^ unless the party offering it proposes to make it rele- 
 vant by the introduction of some other evidence distinctly 
 specified.^ It is not sufficient that it became relevant by some- 
 thing that transpired at a subsequent stage of the trial.* The 
 mere fact that such evidence may be a part of a chain of evi- 
 dence^ the other links of which the counsel tendering the evidence 
 intends to supply, is not of itself sufficient to put the court in 
 the wrong in rejecting it; since, as was well observed by Gib- 
 son, J., " if this were admitted, no court could, without error, 
 ever reject evidence for irrelevancy, — as there is no fact so 
 entirely irrelevant as to be incapable of being connected with 
 the question, however remotely, by the intervention of a chain 
 of possible circumstances. But the question is, how did the 
 matter stand as it was proposed to the court? If it was al- 
 together irrelevant, the court might reject it, although it might 
 not, perhaps, be error to admit it. If it would be relevant, when 
 
 1 Ilausskuecht v. Chiypool, 1 Black State v. Staley, 14 Miun. 105; Austin r. 
 (U. S.;, 431. Kobertsou, 25 Miim. 431. 
 
 2 Fairchild v. Case, 24 Weud. ^ Carpenter %\ Bennett, 4 Fla. 284, 
 (N. Y.) 381. 334; Winlock r. Hardy, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 
 
 3 McCurry u. Hooper, 12 Ala. 823; 272; Weidler v. Farmers' Bank, II 
 Scotield n. Walrath, 35 jNIinu. 35(;; Serg. & K. (Pa.) 134.
 
 Tit. IJI, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 555 
 
 taken iu connection with other facts, it ought to be proposed 
 in connection with those facts, and an offer to follow 
 the evidence proposed, with proof of those facts at the proper 
 times. But the court is not bound to spend its time in an 
 mquiry which, from the showing of the party, can produce no 
 results. Dislocated circumstances may doubtless be given in 
 evidence, particularly if there be no objection to the order of 
 time; but the proposal of the evidence must contain, in itself, 
 by reference to something that has preceded it, or that is to 
 follow, information of the manner in which the evidence is to be 
 legitimately operative." ^ Thus, where a witness for the plaint- 
 iff, in an action for slander, is unable to say whether the words 
 were spoken before or after the commencement of the suit, the 
 testimony is properly excluded, because the judge cannot see 
 whether or not it is relevant. 2 
 
 § 685. Counsel must Lave Witnesses ready to Sustain Offer. 
 
 It is not competent for counsel simply to make an offer of proof 
 which he has no witnesses to sustain, and insist upon the court 
 deciding the question which the offer raises; since that would be 
 invoking from the court a decision upon a mere moot question. 
 Nor is it competent for counsel to make an offer of proof, without 
 stating to the court that he can sustain it by competent wit- 
 nesses. ^ If no witnesses are tendered, it is not error for the 
 court to reject the offer for that reason; and it follows from this 
 that, in order to reverse a judgment because of the rejection of 
 a tender of competent evidence, it should appear that a witness 
 was offered to prove it.^ But it does not follow that it will be 
 presumed, on error, that the offer was a sham. "If," said Waite, 
 C. J., " the trial court has doubts about the good faith of an 
 offer of testimony, it can insist on the production of the wit- 
 ness, and upon some attempt to make the proof, before it rejects 
 the offer; but if it does reject it, and allows a bill of exceptions 
 which shows that the offer was actually made and refused, and 
 
 MVeidler v. Farmers' Bank, 11 ^ Eschbach t-. Hurtt, 47 Md. (11 
 
 Sero. & R (Pa ) 134, 139. 4 Kobinsou .. State, 1 Lea (Teun.), 
 
 Scovell r. Kingsley, 7 Conn. 2S4. (;73. ^'
 
 556 EXAMINATIOxN OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 there is nothing else in the record to indicate bad faith, an 
 appelhite court must assume that the proof could have been 
 made, and govern itself accordingly." ^ 
 
 § 686. Must not repeat Offers after Adverse Ruling. — 
 
 While counsel may offer evidence for the purpose of obtaining, 
 in case of doubt, a distinct ruling as to its admissibility, and 
 may vary the form of the offer or include other matters, in 
 order that the particular question desired may be distinctly 
 raised — yet where an adverse ruling has once been obtained, 
 other offers governed by such ruling must not be made.^ 
 
 § 687. When offers not made in Hearing of Jury. — In an 
 
 important case in Michigan it is said: " If counsel * * * 
 make the offers in the presence and hearing of the jury, and the 
 court permits, them to be made in this manner, the character of 
 the offers so made may be such, even although they were re- 
 jected below, as to require, on error, a reversal of the judg- 
 ment where the party making such rejected offers obtains a 
 verdictand judgment in the case. Everything having a tendency 
 to prejudice or influence a jury in their deliberations, which is not 
 le2;ally admissible in evidence on the trial of the cause, should be, 
 so far as possible, kept from coming to their knowledge during 
 the trial. An impression once made upon the mind of a juror, 
 no matter how, will have more or less influence upon him when 
 he retires to deliberate upon the verdict to be given, and no mat- 
 ter how honest and conscientious he may be, or how carefully he 
 may have been instructed by the court not to permit such incom- 
 petent matters to influence him, or have any bearing on the case, 
 it will be very difiicult, if not impossible, for him to separate the 
 competent from the incompetent, or to say to what extent his 
 ' impressions or convictions may be attributed to that which prop- 
 erly should not have been permitted to come to his knowledge. 
 But whatever the reason for the rule may be, all courts agree in 
 excluding incompetent testimony, and that an error in this re- 
 
 J Scotland County v. Hill, 112 U. S« - Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10. 
 
 183, 186.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 557 
 
 spect will be sufficient cause for reversal. This rule would be 
 but slight protection, if counsel or witnesses could be i^ermilted 
 to make a statement, but not under oath, of the incompetent 
 testimony, or counsel state the same fully to the jury, in their ar- 
 gument, or otherwise. The essence of the wrong consists in the 
 fact that such incompetent testimony is brought to the attention 
 of the jury, more than in the method adopted in communicating 
 1 he fact. No matter how the information is derived, the result 
 is the same. In this case, after counsel had obtained a clear and 
 distinct ruling of the court as to the inadmissibility of a certain 
 class of articles [newspaper articles], a large number of the 
 same class were offered, and in making each separate offer, coun- 
 sel stated the purport of the article, or read the headings. This 
 course Avas objected to, but permitted by the court, and the arti- 
 cles offered were all excluded, the objection as to their admissi- 
 bility having been sustained. We think the course adopted was 
 not correct, and that, although perhaps not fully covered by the 
 letter of the previous decision in this case, yet that it comes 
 clearly within the reason and the spirit of the rules there laid 
 down. Where the offer is likely to be of such a character that it 
 would have a tendencv to prejudice or influence the jury, the cor- 
 rect practice would be to present the article, if in writing, to the 
 court and counsel for examination, without stating either the 
 purport or substance of it. The cases are but few wdiere such 
 objectionable articles are likely to come up on the trial, and, 
 when such a case arises, the good sense of court and counsel will 
 not only see the necessity, but will readily discover and adopt the 
 means requisite to keep them from the reach of the jur3^" ^ 
 
 Article II. — Objections to Evidence and Exceptions. 
 
 Section 
 
 690. Necessity of Objecting aud Excepting. 
 
 691. Evidence having no Probative Value. 
 
 692. Waiver of Right to 01:)ject. 
 
 693. Specific Grounds of Objection must be pointed out. 
 
 694. Instances under the foregoing Rule. 
 
 ^ Scripps V. Eeilly, 38 Mich. 10, U.
 
 558 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 Section 
 
 695. [Continued.] Objections to Specific Portions of Testimony must state 
 
 clearly tlie Portions Objected to. 
 
 696. Exceptions to Testimony ea 3Iasse. 
 
 697. Effect of sustaining and overruling General and Specific Objections. 
 
 698. If Ground stated, it must be a Good one. 
 
 699. Right to rebut Irrelevant Evidence. 
 
 700. Time of Objecting and Excepting. 
 
 701. [Continued.] Objections to Depositions. 
 
 702. Error to admit Depositions de bene esse when Witness is present itt 
 
 Court, 
 
 703. What the Record must show. 
 
 704. [Continued.] Where the Objection was Sustained. 
 
 705. Whether necessary to repeat Objections. 
 
 706. Of AVaivers and Estoppels in Respect of Objections to Evidence. 
 
 707. Errors without Pi-ejudice. 
 
 708. When Error not Cured by Subsequent Evidence to the same Effect, 
 
 709. 01)jections must be Renewed in Motion for New Trial. 
 
 710. Court Excluding Illegal Evidence of its own Motion. 
 
 711. Prosecuting Attorneys not to Object in Doubtful Cases. 
 
 712. Arguing the Objection. 
 
 713. Effect of Examination of a Party before Trial. 
 
 § 690. Necessity of Objecting and Excepting. — The gen- 
 eral rule is that, in actions at laio, appellate tribunals review the 
 judgments of trial courts only in respect of errors of law ; such 
 cases are not re-examined upon the whole evidence, as is done in 
 cases in equity, admiralty and in actions for divorce. It 
 is therefore necessary, in order to save the rulings of the trial 
 courts for review in actions at law, to preserve a record of 
 such rulings, by excepting to them in the trial court when they 
 are made, by bringing to the attention of the court the distinct 
 ground of the exception, and by having the exception embodied 
 in a bill of exceptions, which, when signed and sealed by the 
 judge in conformity with law, becomes a part of the record 
 in the cause, which is brought to the appellate court by appeal or 
 writ of error. Unless objections are seasonably made upon 
 specific grounds, and exce})tions properly taken in the trial 
 courts, the rulings of such courts, in actions at law, cannot be re- 
 viewed in the appellate tribunals. If this were not the rule, the 
 spectacle would be presented of causes tried upon one theory in 
 the court of nisi jji'ius, and decided upon a different theory in the
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceitions. 559 
 
 court of appeal.^ The rule is, therefore, general in actions at 
 law, that no objection to a ruling made on the progress of the 
 trial is available upon error or appeal unless it was first made 
 and ruled upon in the court below. ^ Subject to the qualification 
 stated in the next following section, the rule applies with as 
 much force to the objections to eviden(3e as to objections to any 
 other ruling made in the progress of a trial. ^ The necessity of 
 making seasonable objections to incompetent testimony is just as 
 important in crhninal as in civil trials, and where the defendant 
 in such atrial fails to object to such testimony when it is offered, 
 he cannot raise the objection for the first time on appeal.* 
 
 § 691. Evidence having no Probative Value. — An exception 
 to the foregoing rule relates to cases where the evidence, which 
 is admitted without objection, is of such a character that the law 
 ascribes to it no probative value whatever. In such a case, — at 
 least according to one view, — if the jury return a verdict in 
 consequence of it in an action at law, the verdict will be set aside 
 as being unsupported by evidence; and, as already suggested, 
 in suits in equity and in other proceedings where the appellate 
 court tries the case anew, it will not be allowed to have any 
 weight in influencing the decree of the court, — especially if the 
 attention of the court is directed to its want of probative value. 
 Notwithstanding this, it is unsafe, whether in an action at law or 
 in equity, to allow such matters to be rehearsed as evidence 
 without objection. 
 
 § 692. Waiver of Right to Object. — A party who agrees 
 that his adversary may go into evidence which may be inadmis- 
 
 * To this general principle see Let- Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 ton ». Graves, 26 Mo. 251; Peyton i'. 622; Whiteside v. Jackson, 1 Wend. 
 
 Rose, 41 Mo. 257; Jennings ?;. Pren- (N. Y.) 418; Waters v. Gill)ert, 2 
 
 tlce, 39 Mich. 421, 423. Cash. (Mass.) 29; Covillaud v. Tanner, 
 
 ' Spencer v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 7 Cal. 38. 
 22 Minn. 30; Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 3 Hewett tj. Buck, 17 Me. 147. 
 
 T. 99, 102; Martin v. Travers, 12 Cal. ^ State v. McLaughlin, 44 la. 82; 
 
 243; People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32; Frier State v. Poison, 29 la. 133. 
 17. Jackson, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 496;
 
 560 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoillp. Tr 
 
 sible if objected to, cannot afterwards complain of the reception 
 of such evidence, or of the reception of otlier evidence of the 
 same character. The reason is, that modus et conventio vincunt 
 legem: having established a law of his own, he must be content 
 to abide by it. i 
 
 § 693 Specific Grroimcis of Objection must be pointed out. — 
 
 Where evidence is objected to at the trial, if the party would 
 save an exception to the ruling of the court if adverse to him, 
 such as will be available on ai)peal or error, he must frame 
 his objection so as to bring to the attention of the trial 
 court the specific ground upon which he predicates it, and 
 this must be stated in his bill of exceptions.^ He ivaives 
 
 1 Rundell v. Butler, 10 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 119. Compare Adams v. Farus- 
 worth, 15 Gray (Mass.), 423, 426. 
 
 2 Dozier v. Jerraau, 30 Mo. 216; 
 Lettou V. Gi'aves, 26 Mo. 250; Camden 
 V. De Doremus, 3 How. (U. S.) 515; 
 Bank of Missouri v. Mercliauts' Bauii, 
 10 Mo. 123, 128; Roussin v. St. Louis 
 i&c. Ins. Co., 15 Mo. 244; Weston &c. 
 R. Co. V. Cox, 32 Mo. 456; Buesse- 
 meyer v. Stuckenberg, 33 Mo. 546; 
 Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 37 Mo. 
 338; Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 257, 260. 
 See also Davidson v. Peck, 4 Mo. 438; 
 Cozzeus V. Gillispie, 4 Mo. 82; Peck v. 
 Chouteau (Mo.), 3 S. W. Rep. 577; 
 s. c. 91 Mo. 138; Shelton v. Durham, 
 76 Mo. 434; Primm v. Raboteau, 56 
 Mo. 407; Margrave v. Ausmuss, 51 Mo. 
 561, 506; Buckley v. Kuapp, 48 Mo. 
 152, 164; Woodburn v. Cogdal, 39 Mo. 
 222; St. Louis Public Schools v. Ris- 
 ley, 40 Mo. 357; Fields v. Hunter, 8 
 Mo. 128; Dickey v.Malechi, 6 Mo. 177, 
 186; Frost v. Pryor, 7 Mo. 314; Wat- 
 son V. McClaren, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 557; Baler v. Berberich, 85 Mo. 50; 
 5. c. affirmed, 13 Mo. App. 5S7; People 
 V. Apple, 7 Cal. 280,290; Kileru. Kim- 
 ball, 10 Cal. 267; Martin v. Travers, 12 
 
 Cal. 243; Baker v. Joseph, 16 Cal. 173, 
 180; Mabbett v. White, 12 N. Y. 442> 
 451; Kan. Pac. R. Co. v. Painter, 9 
 Kan. 620, 629; Wilson v. Fuller, Id. 
 176, 186; Walker W.Armstrong, 2 Kan. 
 198, 226; Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) 622, 639; Michel v. Ware, 3 
 Neb. 229,235; Johnson v. Adleman, 35 
 HI. 265; Carroll v. Benicia, 40 Cal. 
 390; Rosenheim v. American Ins. Co., 
 33 Mo. 230; Greene v. Gallagher, 35 
 Mo, 226; Clark v. Conway, 23 Mo. 438; 
 Grimm v. Gamache, 25 Mo. 41; 
 Stone V. Great Western Oil Co., 41 111. 
 85; Graham w. Anderson, 42 111. 514; 
 Howell V. Edmonds, 47 111. 79; Moser 
 V. Kreigh, 49 111. 84; Hanford v. Ob- 
 recht, 49 111. 146; Harmon v. Thorn- 
 ton, 3 III. 351; Gillespie v. Smith, 
 29 111. 473; Sargeaut v. Kellogg, 10 111. 
 273; Swift v. Whitney, 20 111. 144; 
 Buntain v. Baily, 27 111. 409; Weide v. 
 Davidson, 15 Minn. 330; Schcll y. Nat, 
 Bank, 14 Minn. 47; Gilbert v. Thomp- 
 son, 14 Minn. 544; Bickham v. Smith, 
 02 Pa. St. 45; Batdorflf v. Bank, 61 Pa. 
 St. 179; Moore v. Bank, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 
 302; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 
 328; Hinde v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 
 199; People v. Durfee (Mich.), 29
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXy.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 561 
 
 iall grounds not so specified. ^ The reason of the rule is 
 twofold: 1. To enable the trial judge to understand the 
 precise question upon which he has to rule,^ and to re- 
 lieve him from the burden of searching for objections which 
 counsel is unable to discover, or which he sees lit to con- 
 ceal/^ 2. To afford the opposite party an opportunity to 
 obviate it before the close of the trial, if well taken.* It 
 is, therefore, a part of the rule that the party objecting to 
 testimony will not be permitted to change his ground on appeal ; ® 
 otherwise the trial court might decide the objection on one ground, 
 and the appellate court on another.^ This would produce un- 
 certainties and injustice. Thus, it would be a monstrous rule 
 that would permit a defendant in an action of ejectment to object 
 to a deed, on which the plaintiff dei:»ended to make out his title, 
 
 N. W. Rep. 109; Delphi v. Lowery, 
 74 lud. 520; ForlMuu; r. Weber, 99 
 lud. 588; Carter v. Beuuett, 4 Fla. 
 284, 337; Camdeii v. Doremus, 3 
 How. (U. S.) 515; Elwood v. Dei- 
 feudorf, 5 Barb. (N, Y.) 398, 40G. 
 See also the following cases as 
 more or less illustratiug the rule: Ir- 
 viuson t' Van Riper, 34 lud. 148; Fer- 
 iteru. State, 33 lud. 283; Sutherlaud 
 V. Veuard, 32 lud. 483; Hamrick v. 
 Dauville &c. Co., 32 lud. 347; Watts v. 
 Greeu, 30 lud. 98; Sharp r. Fliuu, 27 
 Ind.98; Marcus v. State, 2G lud. 101; 
 Gibson v. Greeu, 22 lud. 422; Every 
 I). Smith, 18 lud. 4G1; Smith v. Alleu, 
 1(5 Ind. 316; Rowe v. Haines, 15 lud. 
 445; Boxley v. Carney, 14 lud. 17; 
 Wolcott V. Yeager, 11 lud. 84; Lackey 
 V. Heruby, 9 lud. 53(3; Mauly v. Hulj- 
 bard, 9 lud. 230; Ellis v. Miller, 9 lud. 
 210; Boggsv. State, 8 lud. 463; Cole- 
 man v. Dobbins, 8 lud. 156; Priddy 1'. 
 Dodd, 4 lud. 84; Prather v. Rambo, 1 
 Blackf. (Ind.) 189. 
 
 1 People V. Manning, 48 Cal. 335. 
 " All the equities," said Duuue, C. J., 
 ''and all the presumptions are, not 
 
 that the ruling is correct, but that evi- 
 dence offered ought to come in, unless 
 at the time it was offered good reason 
 is shown why it should be excluded. 
 'Competency is presumed uutil the 
 contrary is showu.' " Rush v. French, 
 1 Ariz. T. 99, 128; citing Hall v. Git- 
 tings, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 112, 120 and 
 the cases cited by Chase, C. J., at the 
 last page; Stoddert??. Manning, 2 Harr. 
 & J. (Md.) 147; Callis v. Tolsou, G 
 Gill & J. (Md.) 80, 91; Saxon u. Boyce, 
 1 Bailey (S. C), 6G; Smith v. White, 
 5 Dana (Ky.), 376, 382, 383. 
 
 2 Brown v. Weightman (Mich.), 29 
 N. W. Rep. 98; Dickey u. Malechi, 6 
 Mo. 177, 186. 
 
 3 Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 121. 
 
 4 Gill V. McNaraee, 42 N. Y. 44; 
 Sparrowhawk v. Sparrowhawk, 6 N. Y. 
 Week. Dig. 281; s. c. 11 Hun (N. Y.), 
 528; Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. T. 99, 
 125. 
 
 * Tooley v. Bacou, 70 N. Y. 34; 
 Briggs V. Wheeler, k; Hun (N. Y.), 
 583; McDonald v. North, 47 Barb. 
 (X. Y.) 530. 
 
 " Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177, 186. 
 
 36
 
 562 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thoi!l[). Tr., 
 
 on the ground that it was defectively acknowledged, and then to 
 renew his objection in the appellate court, on that ground that it 
 was a, forgery; or that he should object to it in the trial court on 
 the ground of irrelevancy, without stating any other ground, and 
 should then renew his objection in the appellate court on the 
 ground of a defective acknowledo-ment. Such a rule would level 
 the appellate courts to the position of trial courts, would overturn 
 all just conceptions of appellate jn-occdure in cases at law, and 
 would result in making the hearing of an appeal in such an action 
 a trial de novo, without the presence of witnesses or the means 
 of obviatinii; errors or omissions.^ 
 
 § 694. Instances under the foregoing Rule. — Under the forego- 
 ing rule, objections presented by the bill of exceptions in the following 
 form: "Counsel for the plaintiff objected, objection overruled and 
 plaintiff excepted," are too general in their terms to present any ques- 
 
 1 ''The object," said Duuue, C. J., 
 "of requiring tlie groimd of objection 
 to be stated, whicli may seem to be a 
 teclinicality, is really to avoid tecliui- 
 calities and prevent delay in tlie ad- 
 ministration of justice. When evi- 
 dence is offered to which there is some 
 objection, sulistautial justice requires 
 tliat the objection be specified, so that 
 the party offering the evidence can re- 
 move it, if possible, and let the case 
 be tried on its merits. If it is objected 
 that the question is leading, the form 
 maybe changed; if that the evidence 
 is irrelevant, that the relevancy may 
 be shown; if tliat it is incompetent, 
 the incompetency maybe removed; if 
 that it is innnaterial, its materiality 
 may be established; if to tlie order of 
 introduction, it may be withdrawn and 
 offered at another time; — and thus 
 appeals could often be saved, delays 
 avoided and substantial justice admin- 
 istered. Counsel are held to the 
 grounds of objection stated at the time 
 they call for the decision of tlie court 
 below; because tliey are supposed to 
 
 know the law of their case, and if they 
 do not offer objections they are sup- 
 posed to waive them, and evidence ad- 
 mitted without valid objection should 
 stand. Counsel must not be permitted 
 to wink at the introduction of evidence 
 to wliich they thiuk there is a valid 
 objection, hoping that it may benefit 
 them, and if it goes the other way, 
 move to exclude it; neither must they 
 be permitted to plead inattention as au 
 excuse. It is their business to be at- 
 tentive on the trial, and if they miss a 
 point by neglect, they must ose it. 
 Neither can we allow them lO strike 
 between wind and water on the trial, 
 and then go home to ilieir books and 
 study out their objections and urge 
 them here. They must stand or fail 
 upon the case they made below; for 
 this court is not a forum to discuss 
 new points of this character, but sim- 
 ply a court of review to determine 
 wliether the rulings of the court below 
 on the case, as presented, were correct 
 or not." Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. T. 
 
 9'J, 124:.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTioxs and exceptions. 
 
 563 
 
 tion for review on error or appeal.^ So, of objections on the ground 
 that the evidence is '• illegal and incompetent.'" '^ So, of an objection 
 that the evidence is ^'' incompetent,^^ without pointing out the ground 
 on which this claim is inade.^ So, of an objection that the evidence is 
 '■'■ incompetent and irrelevant.," ^ or '■'irrelevant, incompetent and m- 
 material," ^ or, ^'inadmissible."^ So, an objection that testimony 
 is " irrelevant," without specifying wherein, how or why it is ir- 
 relevant, will not be considered on appeal or error, if the testi- 
 mony could, under an}^ possible circumstances, have been relevant.'^ 
 So, where the objection is that the evidence is '■'incompetent" and 
 " illegal " it is the duty of the court to overrule it if the evidence is ad- 
 missible for any purpose.^ So, an objection that evidence is " irrele- 
 vant, incompetent and immatericd " is held to be merely a general 
 objection, and properly overruled if the evidence is admissible for any 
 purpose. 9 So, it has been held that an objection that evidence is " in- 
 competent," does not raise any issue as to whether the question is lead- 
 ing; the onh' way to raise such an issue is to object specifically that it 
 is leading. ^° So, objections that evidence is " irrelevant, immaterial or 
 improper" will not be sufficient to raise the question of the competency 
 of the witness, even where he is clearly incompetent by express statute. ^'^ 
 So, an objection to a deposition for substance will not enable the object- 
 ing party to claim its exclusion on the ground of incompetency, just as 
 the court commences to charge the jury. The reason is that if the ob- 
 jecting party had placed his objection on the ground of incompetency at 
 the time, the plaintiff might have availed himself of other testimony on 
 
 1 Peck V. Chouteau, 3 S. W. Rep. 
 577; s. c. 91 Mo. 138. 
 
 2 Clark V. Couway, 23 Mo. 438. 
 
 3 Joues V. Angell, 95 Intl. 370; Lake 
 Erie &c. R. Co. v. Parker, 94 Ind. 91; 
 McClellan r?. Bond, 92 lud. 424; Stan- 
 ley V. Sutherlaud, 54 lud. 339, 352; 
 Harvey v. Huston, 94 lud. 527; Fitz- 
 patrick v. Papa, 89 lud. 17; Cox v. 
 Stout, 85 lud. 422; Underwood v. 
 Liuton, 54 lud. 468 ; Murray v. Phillips, 
 59 lud. 5(5; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 
 lud. 399; Buudy v. Hyde, 50 N. H. 
 121. 
 
 * Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 
 104 lud. 409,415; Over r. Schiffliug 
 102 lud. 191; Shafer v. Ferguson, 103 
 
 lud. 90; Botteuberg u. Nixon, 97 lud. 
 lOti; Joues V. Angell, 95 Ind. 376; 
 Lake Erie &c. E. Co. v. Parker, 94 Ind. 
 91; Harvey v. Huston, 94 Ind. 527; 
 McClellan v. Bond, 92 lud. 424; Stan- 
 ley V. Sutherlaud, 54 Ind. 339. 
 
 5 Lake Erie &.c. R. Co. v. Parker, 94 
 Ind. 91, 94. 
 
 6 Leet V. Wilson, 24 Cal. 398, 402. 
 ^ Dreux v. Doniec, 18 Cal. 83. 
 
 ® Sueed)?. Osborn, 25 Cal. 627; Bo- 
 hanau v. Hans, 26 Tex. 450. 
 
 9 Voorman v. Voight, 46 Cal. 397. 
 
 1" Kan. Pac. R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 
 Kan. 620, 627. 
 
 ^1 Cornell v. Barnes, 2C Wis. 473^ 
 480.
 
 564 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 the particular points. • So, the general objection to the witness that he 
 is "• incompetent " will not be available on appeal, where it appears that 
 he was a competent witness as to certain facts, although he may have 
 been incompetent as to other facts. ^ It is well laid clown that, " there 
 is a wide distinction between imniaterial and incompetent evidence. It 
 may be material and tend to prove the issue, but incompetent for that 
 purpose under the rules of law. On the other hand, it may be compe- 
 tent evidence in a proper case, but immaterial to any issue before the 
 court. 3 
 
 § G95. [Continued.] Objections to Specific Portions of Testi- 
 mony MCST state clearly THE PORTIONS OBJECTED TO. — Where Certain 
 evidence is objected to, which is clearly admissible, if it is apart of one 
 entire conversation on which the plaintiff relies, but which is left in un- 
 certainty by reason of the indistinct recollection of the witness offered 
 to prove it, the court ought not to let it go to the jury to be consid- 
 ered by them, if they shall find it to have been an entire conversation 
 relied upon. In so holding it was said by Church, J., in giving the 
 opinion of the Connecticut court: "Although it is the privilege and 
 prerogative of the jury to determine all matters of fact which are in- 
 volved in the issue submitted to them, yet it is equally the exclusive 
 duty of the court to determine all matters of law, even if they involve 
 the necessity of deciding upon the truth of facts."* Upon the same 
 principle where, in two instances, after certain testimony had been of- 
 fered, the defendant objected to certain portions of it as matter which 
 the witness had testified to from hearsay, and not from his own knowl- 
 edge, and the court merely instructed the jury to reject all statements 
 not made hy the witnesses on their own knowledge ; and in one of the 
 instances the plaintiff particularly requested the court to instruct the 
 jury specifically as to what particular evidence was to be thus excluded, 
 but the court did not comply with the request, — it was held that this 
 was error." Loomis, J., in giving the opinion of the court said: "As 
 the matter of admitting or rejecting evidence is within the exclusive 
 province of the court, and not of the jury, it should not have been left 
 to them to say what evidence should be excluded ; and the party has a 
 right to know where he has taken his objection with particularity, pre- 
 cisely what evidence is received and what rejected.-'' 
 
 1 Motley V. Head, 43 Vt. 030. ■• Robiusou v. Ferry, 11 Coun. 4(50. 
 
 2 Forbingr. Weber, *i;) Ind. 5SS. •■* Morford v. Peek, 40 Couu. 380, 
 « Feople V, Manuiug,4.S Cal. 3r..l, 338. 382.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 565 
 
 § 696. Exceptions to Testimony en Masse. — An exception to testi- 
 mony en masse is unavailing, wLiere any of it is properly admitted. 
 Thus, if a party excepts to the entire testimony of a witness, without 
 specifying particular portions of it, and if any of it was properly ad- 
 mitted, the exception is unavailing. • 
 
 § G97. Effect of Sustaining and Overruling General and Specific 
 Objections. — In a case already much quoted from, in the opinion giv- 
 en by Dunne, C. J., the following judicious observations occur: 
 ."There are numerous authorities and adjudications in support of the 
 natural, common-sense proposition that a general objection raises no 
 issue, except it is as to whether the evidence would, under any 
 circumstances or for any purpose, be admitted ; and that a spe- 
 cific objection raises no other issue than the particular one 
 tendered. They are also in support of the proposition that if 
 a judge overrule a general objection, he must be sustained un- 
 less it clearly appears that, under no possible circumstances in the 
 case would the evidence come in ; and that if he sustain a general ob- 
 jection, he must be reversed if it is possible that, under any view of the 
 case, the evidence might be admitted ; that if he overrule a special ob- 
 jection, he must be sustained if the particular objection is bad, no mat- 
 ter how many other good objections might have been offered ; but if he 
 sustain a special objection, he must be reversed if the special objection 
 urged is not good, hotwithstanding that there may be other objections, 
 which, had they been urgi'd, would have sustained his rulings. The 
 policy of the law is evidently to admit evidence unless a good objection 
 to it i^ clearly shown." - 
 
 § 698. If Ground Stated, it must be a Good One. — Where the 
 objecting party states tlie ground of his objection, it is incumbent upon 
 him, if he would save an exception to the overruling of it, which will be 
 available on error or appeal, to state a valid ground. If he fails to do 
 this, his objection will not avail him, although he might have stated a 
 
 1 Beebe v. Bull, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) the grountl of the objectiou to be 
 504- ' specitied, he must call upon the ob- 
 
 2 Rush V. French, 1 Ariz. T. 99, 127. jector to state them at the trial and to 
 A loose view is found iu one case, have them incorporated in the bill of 
 that a general objection to evidence exceptions. Peno. Mutual Aid Society 
 will enable the objector to assign any v. Corley (Pa.), 11 Ins. Law Jouru. 
 cause for the objectiou which is valid. 41)3. 
 
 If the proponent of the evidence wishes
 
 566 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 valid ground.^ In other words, he cannot change his ground and ob- 
 ject to the evidence on one ground, in the trial court, and on another 
 in the appellate court. 
 
 § 699. Right to rebut Irrelevant Evidence. — Upon this sub- 
 ject there are tioo vieivs. One is that, where one party introduces 
 irrelevant evidence, the other is entitled to rebut it, and that the 
 party first entering ui)on such line of inquiry, is estopped to ob- 
 ject that the rebutting evidence is irrelevant.^ Thus, where the 
 plaintiff was interrogated on the witness stand by the defendant, 
 touching certain admissions made in the presence of certain per- 
 sons and at a certain time, and did not set up that what he said 
 was in reference and with a view to a compromise of the case, 
 but gave his version of the conversation, — it was held that the 
 defendant should be allowed to give his version of the same 
 transaction, either by himself or by other witnesses, and that his 
 version should not be ruled out on the ground of having been 
 made in view of a compromise. "^ So, where a defendant is im- 
 properly permitted to assail the cJiaracter of the plaintiff by evi- 
 dence, no error is committed by permitting the plaintiff to 
 countervail it, by evidence of good character.* This view is sup- 
 ported by the sensible and just consideration that evidence, 
 though immaterial, may be prejudicial ; and if prejudicial the 
 party against whom it is leveled ought to have the right to coun- 
 tervail its prejudicial effect. The other view is that the fact that 
 improper evidence has been used on one side, does not justify 
 the same kind of evidence, if objected to, being used on the 
 other side,^ — which seems to mean that it is within the power of 
 
 1 Harris v. Pautima Kaih-oad Co., 5 Compare People v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 
 Bosw. (N. Y.) 312. 47;); Wallis v. Kaudall, 81 N. Y. 1G4. 
 
 2 Havis V. Taylor, 13 Ala. 324; Hale ^ Scales v. Sliackleford, C4 Ga. 170. 
 y.Philbrick,47 la. 217; Pattou v. Phil- ^ Fiudlay v. Pruitt, 9 Port. (.Ua.) 
 adelphia, 1 La. Auu. 1)8; Scattergood 195. 
 
 t?. Wood, 79 N. Y. 2i;3; Brown u. Per- ^ Walkup v. Pratt, 5 Harr. & J. 
 
 kins, 1 Allen (Mass.), 89; Sherwood v. (Md.) 51; Mitchell v. Sellmau, 5 Md. 
 
 Titman, 55 Pa. St. 77; INIcCartuy v. 377; Stringer v. Youug, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 Territory, 1 Neb. 121; Thomson v. 320,337. In such a case it was saiil 
 
 BroLhers, 5 La. 277; Ward v. Wa.sh- by Chief Justice Mar.sliall: *' Whetlicr 
 
 iugtou Lis. Co., (i Bo.-^w. (X. Y.) 229. a case' may exist in which improper
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 567 
 
 the court to stop the progress of the irrelevant inquiry, and such 
 is the rule; ^ which power the court will exercise, to avoid the 
 consumption of public time and the diversion of the attention of 
 the jury from the real issues in the case.^ A further reason is, 
 that the plaintiff's consent to the admission of incompetent evi- 
 dence for the defendant, furnishes no reason why he should be 
 allowed to introduce other incomi)etent evidence, to which the 
 defendant objects.^ So, it has been ruled that incomi^etent testi- 
 mony cannot be admitted to rebut incompetent testimony which 
 has been offered by the other side.* On the other hand, it has 
 been ruled that the verdict will not be set aside because this isdone.^ 
 
 § 700. Time of Objecting' and Excepting-. — Moreover, it is 
 incumbent on the defendant in a criminal case, as it is on a party 
 in a civil case, if he would avail himself, on error or appeal, of 
 any irregularities committed on the trial of the case, to make his 
 objection and to save his exception at the time when the irregu- 
 larity was conmiitted.^ Objections to evidence cannot, as a gen- 
 eral rule, be made by a motion to instruct the jury to disregard 
 the i)articular evidence. It has been well said: "To allow a 
 party to permit, without objection, the admission of evidence, 
 and for the first time make his objection in instructions, Avould be 
 intolerable practice. If he had an opportunity to interpose an 
 objection, he cannot take the chances that the testimony will be 
 favorable to him, and, when it turns out otherwise, raise his 
 objection; but must be held to have ivaived it." ^ Such an 
 
 testimony may be calculated to make •'' "Wilkiusou v. Jett, 7 Lciiih (Va.), 
 such an impression upou the jury, that 115; IManuing v. Burlington &c. R. Co- 
 no instructions given by the judge can (la.), 20 N. W, Rep. 169; s. c. CA la. 
 efface it, and whether, in such a case, 240. 
 
 testimony, not otherwise admissible, * McCartny v. Territory, 1 Neb. 121. 
 
 maybe introduced, which is strictly ^ Furbush r. Goodwin, 25 N. H. 426. 
 
 and directly calculated to disprove it, '^ Bull v. Com., 14 Gratt. (Va.) 613; 
 
 are questions on wliich this court does Read ?;. Com., 22 Gratt. (Va.) 924; 
 
 not mean to indicate any opinion." Stonemanv. Com, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 887, 
 
 Stringer 17. Young, s?(y9ra. 905; Price u. Com., 77 Va. 393; Whart. 
 
 1 Farmers' &c. Bank v. Whiufield, Cr. PI. & Pr. (8th ed.) § 77. 
 
 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 420. 422. ^ Maxwell t;. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 
 
 2 Davis V. Keyes, 112 Mass. 436. 85 Mo. 95, 106.
 
 568 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 objection comes too late, when made for the first time in a 
 motion for a neio trial.^ If a party allows competent evidence 
 from an incompetent ivitness to go to the jury without objection, 
 he cannot afterwards complain of the finding of the jury thereon, 
 and make his objection for the first time on a motion for a new 
 trial. ^ It is not available, w^here such evidence has gone in 
 without objection, and the objection is made for the first time to 
 a substantial repetition of it.^ 
 
 § 701. [Continued.] Objections to Depositions. — Objec- 
 tions to depositions, which might have been obviated if made 
 when they were taken, come too late when made for the first 
 time at the trial, when it is proposed to read them. " In such 
 cases," said Mr. Justice Swayne, " the objection must be noted 
 when the deposition is taken, or be presented by a motion to 
 suppress before the trial is begun. The party taking the depo- 
 sition is entitled to have the question of its admissibility settled 
 in advance. Good faith and due diligence are required on both 
 sides. When such objections, under the circumstances of this 
 case, are withheld until the trial is in progress, they must be re- 
 garded as waived, and the deposition should be admitted in ev- 
 dence. This is demanded by the interests of justice. It is 
 necessary to prevent surprise and the sacrifice of subsequent 
 rights. It subjects the other party to no hardship. All that is 
 exacted of him is proper frankness. The settled rule of this 
 court is in accordance with these views." It was therefore held 
 that it was error to exclude the deposition under such circum- 
 stances.* More broadly, the rule is that no objection to a depo- 
 sition will be entertained when made at the trial, which could 
 have been remedied, if seasonably made by the taking of a new 
 
 1 State V. Peak, 85 'Slo. 190; Harvey ^ Doaue v. Glenn, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 
 V. State, 40 Ind. 51*;. 33, 35. See also York Co. v. Central 
 
 2 Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Stanford, R. Co. 3 Wall (U. S.) 113; Shutter. 
 12 Kan. 354:, 380. Thompson, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 151, IGO; 
 
 3 McCormick v. Laughrau, 1(3 Neb. Buddicum v. Kirk, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 
 87. 293.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 
 
 5G9 
 
 deposition.^ An objection to the form of a question in a de- 
 position debene esse, is waived, if not taken before the officer taking 
 
 1 Wright V. Cabot, 89 N. Y. 570; 
 Corainorcial Bank v. Uuiou Bank, 11 
 N. Y, 205; Sturm v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
 Co., 63 N. Y. 87; Zelhveirer v. Caffee, 
 
 5 Duer (N. Y.), 100; Union Bank v. 
 Torrey, 2 Abb. Tr. (N. Y.) 209; Sliel- 
 don V. Wood, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 207. In 
 conformity witli tlie alcove text the 
 general rule is tliat objections wliicli 
 go to the form and manner of taking 
 the deposition must be made and set- 
 tled prior to the trial. Crowell v. 
 AVesteru R. Bank, 3 Oh. 409; Akers 
 V. Demond, 103 Mass. 322; Kyle v. 
 Bostick, 10 Ala. 591 ; Towns v. O'Brien, 
 2 Ala. 381; Overtone. Tracy, 14 Serg. 
 
 6 R. 324; Lee v. Stowe, 57 Tex. 444, 
 451; Bartlett v. Hoyt, 33 N. H. 151. 
 Under § 390 of the Civil Code of Ne- 
 braska objections to depositions, ex- 
 cept on the grounds of incompetency 
 or irrelevancy, must be reduced to 
 writing and tiled before the commence- 
 ment of the trial or they will be disre- 
 garded. Sioux City &c. R. Co. v. 
 Finlay-son, 10 Neb. 579, 587. See also 
 Weeks on Depositions, § 404. " It 
 may be taken, as the rule, that, where 
 a party is deprived of the benefit of the 
 cross-examination of a witness, by the 
 act of the opposite party, or by the 
 refusal to testify, or other misconduct 
 of the witness, or by any means, other 
 than the act of God, the act of the 
 party himself, or some cause to which 
 he assented, that the testimony given 
 on the examination in chief may not 
 be read. People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508 ; 
 Smith V. Griffith, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 333; 
 Forrest v. Kissam, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 405. 
 And the rule may be applied to the 
 examination of a witness on commis- 
 sion, or conditionally out of court, 
 when, in such case, the party desiring 
 
 the benefit of a cross-examination has 
 not been present or represented at the 
 taking of the testimony, and had no 
 opiMjrtunity to push his cross-examin- 
 ation, or to know of the refusal of the 
 witness to testify, or of his neglect 
 to answer any question, or of other 
 like misconduct of the witness. Smith 
 V. Griffith, supra. But where the 
 party is present at the examination of 
 the witness, in person or by counsel, 
 and is there fully apprised of the facts 
 upon which he afterwards relies at the 
 trial to suppress the testimony, and 
 does not, at the examination or after- 
 wards before the trial, seek to avail 
 himself of them to that end, or to 
 procure for himself, before or at the 
 trial, the benefit of a full cross-exam- 
 ination, he may not, waiting until the 
 trial, then for the first time oliject to 
 the reading of the deposition, or move 
 to suppress it. He should take au 
 earlier opportunity for action, so that, 
 if successful, his opponent might move 
 for a commission to examine his wit- 
 ness anew out of court, or might ob- 
 tain a personal attendance at the trial." 
 Sturm V. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 03 
 N. Y. 77, 87, opinion by Folger, J. ; 
 citing Kimball v. Davis, 19 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 437; s. c, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 259; Zellweger v.Caffe, 5 Duer (X. Y.), 
 87, 100; Rust v. Eckler, 41 N. Y. 48s ; 
 Sheldon v. Wood, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 207. 
 Where no motion to suppress deposi- 
 tions has been made, they may be used 
 at the trial, although the personal 
 attendance of the witness can be se- 
 cured. Phenix v. Baldwin, 14 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 02. In such a case, the most 
 that can be said in favor of the motion 
 to suppress them is, that it addresses 
 itself to the discretion of the court
 
 570 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 the deposition.^ Thus, it has been held that the objection that a 
 question is leading in its form is an objection, not to the sub- 
 stance or relevancy of the evidence, but to the form and manner 
 of obtaining it, and should be made at the time the question is 
 propounded; but if not made then, or within proper time before 
 the cause is called for trial, it will be taken to have been Avaived.^ 
 Where a motion to suppress depositions is grounded upon the 
 objection that certain j^tordons of them are irrelevant, it will not be 
 sustained ; the remedy is a motion to strike out the irrelevant jjarts.^ 
 Coming down to a more specific point of time it is held in In- 
 diana that the swearing of the Jury is, for the purpose of this 
 rule, to be deemed the commencement of the trial. The court 
 say: " The rule provided by the statute is convenient, as well as 
 fair; for why impanel and swear a jury to try a cause, which 
 the parties may afterwards be prevented from trying by the 
 suppression of depositions after the jury are sworn?* It has been 
 ruled that it is irregular to arrest the reading of a deposition on 
 the ground that the witness testified that he was the agent of the 
 plaintiff, and that his authority was in writing and ought to have 
 been produced ; and that the better practice is for the reading 
 to proceed, and, upon proof that the testimony was illegal, to 
 move to withdraw it from the jury,^ — a conclusion which is 
 doubtful.*^ There is a difference of opinion upon the question 
 whether a party who offers a deposition in evidence, must read 
 the whole of if, or wlicther he is at liberty to read oidi/ such 
 2)arts as he may judge favorable to his case; allowing his 
 opponent to read the remainder as his own evidence, if he shall 
 see fit. The former view is taken in Pennsylvania^ and in 
 
 and cannot be claimed as a matter of ^ Commercial Bank v. Union Bank, 
 
 right. Hodges v. Williams, 33 Hun. 11 N. Y, 203, 210. 
 (N. Y.) 516 (decided under § 910 of the 4 Qleun v. Clore, 42 Ind. 60, 63. 
 
 New York Code of Civil Procedure). ^ Crenshaw ?;. Jackson, 6 Ga. 509. 
 
 1 Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54. s Post, §§ 717, 723. 
 
 sCrowell?;. Western R. Bk., 3 Oli. ^ Southwark Ins. Co. v. Knight, 6 
 
 409; quoted with approval in Lee v. Whart. (Pa.) 327. Compare Miles v. 
 
 Stowe, 57 Tex. 444, 451 ; Puruell v. Stevens, 3 Pa, St. 21. 
 Gahdy, 46 Tex. 198.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AXD EXCEPTIONS. 571 
 
 Missouri ; ^ while the latter rule has beeu favored in New 
 York.2 
 
 § 702. Error to admit Depositions de bene esse when wit- 
 ness is Present in Court. — Under section 8(55, Rev. St. U. S., 
 providing that " unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court 
 that the witness is then dead, or gone out of the United States, 
 or to a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place 
 where the court is sitting, or that, by reason of age, sickness, 
 bodily infirmity or imprisonment, he is unable to travel and ap- 
 pear at court, such deposition shall not be used in the cause," 
 the admission of the deposition, taken de bene esse, of a witness 
 who was shown to the court to be present in court, ready and 
 able to testifv if the case was called, before the readinor of the 
 deposition was begun, is error. -^ This is in conformity with 
 previous rulings of the same court. In one case it was said by 
 Marshall, C, J., that the deposition taken under the statute, de 
 bene esse, " can only be read wdien the witness himself is unat- 
 tainable."* In another case it was said, in reference to this 
 provision, that " the act declares expressly that, unless the same 
 (that is, the disability) shall be made to appear on the trial, such 
 deposition shall not be admitted or used in the cause. This in- 
 hibition does not extend to the deposition of a witness living a 
 greater distance from the place of trial than one hundred miles, 
 he being considered permanently beyond a compulsory attend- 
 ance. The deposition in such case may not always be absolute, 
 for the party against whom it is to be used may prove that the 
 witness has removed within the reach of a subpoena after the 
 deposition was taken; and, if that fact was known to the party, 
 he would be bound to procure his personal attendance. The 
 onus, however, of proving this would rest upon the party oppos- 
 
 Mlill V. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 329; N. Y. 9; Forrest v. Forrest,*; Diier 
 
 Cook V. Ilarrin-iton, St. Louis Court (N. Y.), 102, 
 
 of Appeals, No. 4007, not yet re- ^ Whitford v. Couuty of Clark, 7 
 
 ported. Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; reversiug s.c. 13 
 
 2 Gellatly v. Lowery, G Bosw. (X. Y.) Fed. Rep. 837. 
 
 113: Edmonstoue v. Hartshorn, 1'.) ^ The Samuel, 1 Wheat. (U, S.) 15.
 
 572 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 ino; the admission of the deposition in evidence.^ "It thus 
 appears," said Waite, C. J., commenting on the foregoing de- 
 cisions, " to have been established at a very early date that 
 depositions taken de bene esse could not be used in any case at 
 the trial, if the presence of the witness himself was actually 
 attainable, and the party offering the deposition knew it, or 
 ouoht to have known it. If the witness lives more than one 
 hundred miles from the place of trial, no subpoena need be issued 
 to secure his compulsory attendance. So, too, if he lived more 
 than one hundred miles away when his deposition was taken, it 
 will be presumed that he continued to live there at the time of 
 the trial, and no further proof on that subject need be furnished 
 by the party offering the deposition, unless this presumption 
 shall be overcome by proof from the other side. But if it be 
 overcome, and the party has knowledge of his power to get the 
 witness in time to enable him to secure attendance at the trial, 
 he must do so, and the depositions will be excluded." ^ 
 
 § 703. What the Record must Show. — Moreover, in order 
 to save for review the overruling of an objection to evidence, the 
 bill of exceptions must show that the objection was made at the 
 time when the evidence was offered;-^ otherwise the objection 
 will be presumed to have been waived. It must disclose what 
 the witness stated, and what the testimony was which was ob- 
 jected to, or a reviewing court will not interfere.* This question 
 
 1 Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Soxith- 1818) ; Russell v. Ashley, Hemp.(U. S.) 
 gate, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 617. See also 549; Weed v. Armstrong, 6 McLean 
 Harris v. Wall, 7 How. (U. S.) 61)3; (U. S.), 44. Where the question is 
 Rutherford v. Geddes, 4 Wall. (U. S.) whether a wituess whose deposition 
 224. de bene esse has been taken, is phy.^i- 
 
 2 Whitford v. County of Clark, 7 cally able to attend at the trial, the 
 . Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 307. The rulings testimony of a non-expert may be 
 
 in the circuit courts of the United heard as to the declarations of the 
 
 States seem to have been uniformly wituess touching his physical condi- 
 
 the same way. Lessee of Peuus v. tion. McArthur v. Soule, 5 Hun. 
 
 Ingraham, 2 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 487 (N. Y.) 63. 
 
 (decided in 1811); Lessee of Brown v. ^ Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 37 
 
 Galloway, Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 294 (de- Mo. 338, 841. 
 
 cided in 1816) ; Pettiboue v. Derringer, ■• Jones v. Trustees, 1 Ind. 109. 
 
 4 Wasli. C. C. (U. S.) 219 (decided in
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 573 
 
 was discussed with much particuhirity in what seems to have 
 been a well concided case in the Supreme Court of the territory of 
 Arizona, in an opinion given by Dunne, C. J. The court ruled: 
 "Where a party objecting is overruled, and he appeals, he must 
 show by the record: 1. "What the question was and what answer 
 was given to it, or what the evidence was which was introduced 
 against his objection. " This," said Dunne, C. J., " is im})ortant 
 because the evidence admitted may not injure him. The answer 
 may have been in his favor. It is not necessary that he should 
 show clearly that he was injured, because that would often be 
 impossible; but he must show that evidence was admitted against 
 his valid objection, which, it may be, has injured him; for the 
 <)})ject of granting a review by this court is not to determine the 
 abstract questions as to whether the judge below ruled correctly 
 or not, but to give relief in case a party may have been injured 
 by an erroneous ruling. 2, He must set out enough of the evi- 
 dence to illustrate the point of his objection, and to raise the 
 presumption that he may have been injured ; but where cri'or is 
 shown, injury will be presumed, unless the contrary clearly ap- 
 pears. 3. He must show what kind of an objection was made, 
 and, to avail him here, he must show that the objection, as made, 
 was good. Then it is for the other party to see that the state- 
 ment made contains a showing sufficient to sustain the admission 
 of the evidence as against the objection made. The amount of 
 showing the latter party must make, depends upon the nature of 
 the objection. If the party objecting interposes merely a general 
 objection, all that is necessary is to show enough to obviate the 
 general objection. If the objection is specific, all that is neces- 
 sary is to show enough to obviate the specific objection as made. 
 Beyond this we cannot in reason require him to go. He should 
 defend himself against the i)articular attack made; but we cannot 
 ask him to fortify himself against all possible attacks which 
 might have been made." ^ 
 
 §704. [Continued.] Where the Objection was sustained, — 
 
 " In the second case," said Dunne, C. J., " where the party ob- 
 
 1 Rush V. Frc-ueh, 1 Ariz. T. 'Ji), 121.
 
 574 EXAMINATION OF "WITNESSES. [1 Tboilip. Tr., 
 
 jecting was sustained, and the other side appeals and asks to 
 have the ruling dechired erroneous, the party appealing must see 
 that the record shows: 1. What question he asked, or what 
 evidence he sought to introduce. 2. Sufficient of the other evi- 
 dence to illustrate the admissibility of that offered. 3. That the 
 evidence so offered was excluded. 4. That there was reason- 
 able ground to presume that he may have been injured by such 
 exclusion. The other party must see that the record shows good 
 grounds for the exclusion." ^ To render an exception available 
 in the Suj^reme Court of the United States, it must affirmatively 
 appear that the ruling excepted to affected, or might have affected, 
 the decision of the case. If the exception is to the refusal of an 
 interrogatoiy, not objectionable in form, put to a witness on the 
 taking of his deposition, the record must show that the answer 
 related to a material matter involved; or, if no answer was given, 
 the record must show the offer of the party to prove by the wit- 
 ness particular facts, to which the interrogatory related, and that 
 such facts were material. ^ Where the incompetency of the evi- 
 dence results in consequence of some other evidence in the case, 
 then in order to have the question of its competency reviewed, 
 all the evidence must be preserved in the record; but in other 
 cases this is unnecessary.^ 
 
 § 705. Whether necessary to repeat Objections. — There is 
 authority to the effect that, where a specific objection has been 
 made and overruled, it is not necessary, in order to save the 
 rights of the party, to repeat his objections to subsequent ten- 
 ders of the same kind of evidence. Thus, it has been ruled that 
 where a certain question is objected to by counsel on the specific 
 ground that it is not proper on cross-examination, and a second 
 . question calling for the further elaboration of the subject-matter 
 of the first is objected to, although the specification that it was 
 not proper on cross-examination was not repeated, it may fairly 
 
 1 PiUsh U.French, 1 Ariz. T. 99, 122. s McClellan u. Bond, 92 lud. 424; 
 
 2 Railroad Co. v. Smith, 21 Wall. Johnson v. Wiley, 74 Ind 233; Shinier 
 (U. S.) 25(); Packet Co. -y. Clough, 20 v. Butler University, 87 Ind. 218; 
 Wall. (U. S.) 528. Tavey v. Wintrode, 87 lud. 379.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTioxs and exceptions. 575 
 
 be regarded as implied that it was intended to object to the 
 second question on the same ground which was taken to the first 
 question.^ 
 
 § 706. Of Waivers and Estoppels in Respect of Objections 
 to Evidence. — An error in admitting evidence is cured by tlie 
 act of the opposing party in putting witnesses on the stand to 
 })rove the facts sought to be proved by the evidence admitted ; 
 this upon the plain principle that a party cannot com})lain of 
 his own error? Where evidence offered by one party is rejected 
 by the court, and, after all the evidence is in, a written admis- 
 sion is filed by the other partv, concedino; the facts which the 
 party tendering the evidence offered to prove by it, and a correct 
 instruction is given by the court applicable to such facts, the 
 error in rejecting the evidence is cui-ed.^ The party who has 
 .questioned his own witness u})on a given subject, cannot object 
 to the cross-examination of the witness on the same subject, or 
 claim the exclusion of the answers of the witness contradictins" 
 his statements upon the examinafion-in-chief.^ The objection 
 that an answer is not responsive to the question put to the witness 
 is one which does not concern the other party, if the answer is 
 relevant to the issues. The party examining a witness may some- 
 times object to volunteered and irresponsive statements made by 
 a witness aside from his questions; but if he is willing to accept 
 the answer, and if it is one which he would have a right to elicit, 
 the opposite party cannot complain.'^ There are cases, however, 
 where the deposition of a witness is taken on settled interro<Ta- 
 tories, where an answer not called for may be objected to by 
 either party for stirprise; inasmuch as, if the questions had been 
 so put in writing as to call for it, other interrogatories might 
 have been framed accordingly, which might have led to explana- 
 
 1 Stephens v. Bro-nu, 12 Bnuhv. (Iowa), I'D N. W. Rep. 445; s. c. 70 la. 
 (111.) Cld. 714. 
 
 2 Gale V. Shillock (Dakota), 29 N. * Artz v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 44 la. 
 W. Rep. GCl. 284. 
 
 3 Listou V. Central Iowa R. Co. ^ Hamiltou v. Reople, 29 Mich. 17B, 
 
 184.
 
 576 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilll). Tr., 
 
 tion.^ A party is so far estopped hy his oion testimony, that the 
 court will not allow public time to })e consumed in disproving a 
 fact which the party himself has admitted when testifying as a 
 witness. 2 It has been held that, where a witness gives testimony 
 upon the plaintiff's direct examination, and in reference to a 
 matter about which no inquiry has been made by the defendant, 
 the plaintiff cannot be allowed to call witnesses to contradict 
 him.^ 
 
 § 707. Errors without Prejudice. — An error of the court 
 in excluding the evidence of a witness does not injure a party, if 
 the witness is afterwards permitted to testify fully in respect of 
 the matter excluded.* The admission of incompetent testimony will 
 not, in many cases, avail to work a reversal of a judgment, as, for 
 instance, where such testimony relates to a question which is not in 
 dispute, and consequently could have had no influence on the re- 
 sult, or where the finding must have been the same on the evi- 
 dence had the incompetent evidence been excluded.^ A party 
 cannot complain that the opposite party lioJds Jam to the e-ffect of 
 his own evidence. When, therefore, a party called out the fact 
 that a certain bond was in existence, he could not complain that 
 the other party produced the instrument to confirm the fact.^ 
 Where a question propounded by the prosecution in a criminal 
 case was subsequently witJidrawn, the refusal of the court to al- 
 low the answer to be recorded, was not such abuse of discretion 
 as to require a new trial. ^ The overruling of an objection to an 
 illegal question becomes harmless to the objecting party, where 
 the witness answers, either that he knows nothing about the mat- 
 ter, or where his answer is favorable to the objector.^ 
 
 1 Ibid.; Greeuman 17. O'Counor, 25 Citizens' Bank v. Adams, 91 Ind. 280, 
 Midi. 30. 288; Busli v. Seaton, 4 lud. 522; Man- 
 
 2 Hinksonu. Morrison, 47 la. 1(17. cliester v. Doddridge, 3 Ind 3G0; Park- 
 
 3 Trustees v. Brookl\-n Fire Ins. er ■??. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 292. 
 
 Co., 23 IIow. Pr. (N. Y.) 448. « Filiuore v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2 
 
 4 Branson v. Carutliers, 49 Cal. 374. Wyo. 94. 
 
 5 Forbing v. "VVel)er, 99 Ind. 588; ^ Carters. State, 5(5 Ga. 463. 
 Anfdencarap v. Sniilli, 90 Ind. 328; s bailor v. "Williams, 8 Wall. (U. 
 Terre Haute &c, R. Co. r. Pierce, 95 S.) 107; Lovell v. Davis, 101 U. S. 
 lud. 496; Rlioads v. Jones, 92 Ind. 328; 541.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 577 
 
 § 708. When error not Cured by Subsequent Evidence to 
 the same Effect. — The error of admitting incompetent evidence 
 is in most cases available error, although the evidence is merely 
 cumulative. Thus, where the unsworn declarations of a person are 
 admitted, this will be error, although the person is subsequently 
 called as a witness and testifies to the same facts; but whether the 
 error will be sufficiently prejudicial in its character to work a re- 
 versal, will depend ui)on the nature and surroundings of the case.^ 
 As a general rule the admission of im})roper evidence, over a 
 specific objection, will work a reversal, although the evidence was 
 merely cumulative.^ 
 
 § 709. Objections must be renewed in Motion for New Tri- 
 al. — In some jurisdictions the rule is that objections to evidence, 
 and other objections made at the trial nuist, in order to be available 
 on appeal or error, be renewed by the objector in his motion for 
 a new trial. ^ In Indiana, in order to present the question of the 
 rulings of the court in admitting or rejecting evidence for re-ex- 
 amination on a motion for new trial, the motion iwu^t point out 
 the evidence so admitted or excluded. A general complaint that 
 the court erred in admitting illegal, incompetent and irrelevant 
 evidence, or in refusing to admit legal, proper and relevant 
 evidence, does not direct the mind of the court to the errors 
 complained of, and such a motion is properly overruled for that 
 reason alone.* 
 
 § 710. Court excluding Illegal Evidence of its own Mo- 
 tion. — It is said in Georgia that, where evidence is admitted 
 
 1 In Audersou v. Rome &c. R. Co., 2 Osgood v. Manhattau Co., 3 Cow. 
 
 54 N. Y, 334, the declarations of a (X. Y.) C12. 
 
 person were put in evidence, and he 3 Lake Erie &c. R. Co. v, Parker 
 
 was afterwards called as a witness 94Iud. 91; McGee r. Robbius, 58 Ind. 
 
 and gave evidence to the same facts. 4(13; Cobb v. Krutz, 40 Ind. 323; 
 
 It was held that the error of allowing McKiuuey v. Shaw &c. Co., 51 Ind. 
 
 his unsworn declarations to be re- 219. 
 
 hearsed before the jury, was of a •» Harvey v. Osborn, 55 lud. 535, 
 
 character so prejudicial that it was 549; Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Heniberger, 
 
 not cured. Compare Warrell v. Farm- 43 lud. 462; Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 
 
 lee, IN. Y. 519. Ind. 184; Meek v. Keeue, 47 lud. 77,
 
 578 EXAMINATION OF AVITNESSES. [1 Th()m[l. Tl"., 
 
 without objection, if the court rule it out, it is error} Contrary 
 to this, it is held in J//s6'oin'«' that the rule that the court does noi 
 err in admitting evidence where the objection to it is not specific^ 
 does not apply in criminal cases, since it is the duty of the court 
 to see that innocent men are not convicted. It is accordingly laid 
 down in that state that, in criminal cases, the court should exclude 
 from the jury all improper evidence offered by the prosecution, 
 whether the objection be general or special.- The rule is be- 
 lieved to be a dangerous one, and calculated to increase miscar- 
 riages of criminal justice, already too numerous. It is believed 
 that such a burden ought not to be i)ut upon the trial court, 
 except where the evidence is of such a nature that its inadmis- 
 sibility and prejudicial character are entirely obvious. 
 
 § 711. Prosecuting Attorneys not to object in Doubtful 
 Cases. — The Supreme Court of California has offered these 
 sound observations for the guidance of judges and prosecuting 
 attorneys in criminal trials: "In consideration of the number 
 of appeals brought to the court in criminal cases, upon technical 
 points, having for the most part no necessary connection with 
 the merits, we feel warranted in making some suggestions, an 
 attention to which we are persuaded will lead to a more speedy 
 and satisfactory enforcement of criminal justice. In capital 
 cases almost every case is appealed. We do not complain of 
 this, even when the grounds of appeal do, not present a plausible 
 reason for the reversal of the judgment; since a natural sense of 
 responsibility in the counsel to whose hands the life of a fellow 
 being is confided, may well influence him to exhaust every re- 
 source to save his client from the last i)enalty of the law. But 
 still it is important that the laws should be enforced, so as to 
 render as certain as })ossible the conviction of those guilty of 
 their infraction. "With every disposition on the part of the 
 judges to do this, the effort frequently fails, because something 
 is done or omitted which contravenes some arbitrary ortechnical 
 
 1 Barker *;. Blount, 03 Ga. 423, 2 gtate v. O'Coiiuor, CS IMo. 374. 
 
 427.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OB.JECTioNS and exceptions. 579 
 
 right of the iDrisoner. Courts have no power in criminal casesto 
 affirm a judgment merely because the judges are persuaded that, 
 u})on the merits of the case, the judgment is right. If any error 
 intervenes in the proceeding, it is presumed to be injurious to 
 the prisoner, and generally he is entitled to a reversal of the 
 judgment; for it is his constitutional privilege to stand upon his 
 leijal rights and to be tried according to law. And vet it very 
 often happens that the matter of exception taken by him serves 
 no other purpose than to defeat justice. For example, a ques- 
 tion proper in itself is asked a witness, and the court refuses to 
 allow the answer; if answered, the reply would probably be 
 worth little or nothing to the defendant ; yet for this error we 
 would be bound to reverse a judgment which would have been 
 the same whether the questions were answered or not; for, 
 though we might surmise, we would not knoio the effect of the 
 denial of this legal right upon the jury, who are the sole judges 
 of the facts. And many other illustrations might be given. As 
 no man ought to be convicted unless on a full exposure of the 
 merits of the case if he is really guilty, it would seem that 
 little or nothing is gained by interposing technical objections 
 to keep a knowledge of the whole case on its legal merits 
 from the jury. Questions as to the admissibility of evi- 
 dence frequently arise, and in the hurry of a nisi prius trial, the 
 best judge may err, especially when suddenly called to pass upon 
 them without the aid of books or argument. These constitute 
 the usual grounds of reversal. Whenever there is any doubt of 
 the question, or rather whenever the evidence proposed by the 
 defense is not plainly inadmissible, it is better to let it go in; 
 since, in nine cases out of ten, a single equivocal fact, of doubt- 
 ful bearing upon the case, would have no effect upon the judg- 
 ment of the jurors, who are usually disposed to pass and do pass 
 ui)on the general merits. Not unfrequently the offer to make 
 the proof and the exclusion of it have about the same effect 
 on the minds of the jury — though it should not — as if the 
 proof were introduced. If the course here suggested were pur- 
 sued by the prosecuting attorneys, we are convinced that the 
 number of convictions would not be less than at present, while
 
 580 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TilOmp. Tl'., 
 
 the immbcr of appeals, or at least the number of those success- 
 fully prosecuted would be greatly diminished."^ 
 
 § 712. Arguing- the Objection. — The refusal of the trial 
 court to Jiear argument of counsel, as to the admissibility of evi- 
 dence, is not of itself error; '^ though cases might arise where it 
 would be such an abuse of discretion as would work a reversal 
 of the judgment. It is ruled that, when a tender of testimony is 
 made, the court may, in its discretion, hear the arguments for 
 and against its admission, openly in the presence of thejuri/, or 
 privately in the absence of the jury; and that, after the testi- 
 mony has been admitted, no exception lies, upon the ground that 
 such discussions toolv place in the hearing of the jury.^ 
 
 §713. Effect of Examination of a Party Before Trial. — The 
 New York Code of Civil Procedure, in force in 1876, provided that a 
 party to an action might be examined at the instance of the adverse 
 party under the same rules of examination as any other witness."* It 
 further provided that the examination might be liad before the trial. 
 Under these sections of the Code, it has been held that a party ma}' 
 be examined by his opponent before issue joined,^ and before complaint 
 served.^ These examinations are had for the purpose of preparing the 
 examining party's case for trial, and it is held that such an examination 
 precludes the further examination of the party at the trial on the same 
 subject matter, unless some reason or excuse is shown, such as the 
 omission by inadvertence to ask some questions or to prove some facts.''' 
 
 Article III. — Striking out and Withdrawing. 
 
 Section 
 
 715. Power to Strike Out. 
 
 716. Motion to Strike Out. 
 
 717. Striking Out wliore Offer to Conueet not Fullilled. 
 
 718. Motiou to Strikeout Answer. 
 
 1 People V. ^yilliaIns, 18 Cal. 1S7, •'^ McVickar v. Grceuleaf, 4 Rol). N. 
 193; repeated in People v. Devine, 44 Y. 057. 
 
 Cal. 452, 400. c navemeyer v. Ingersoll. 1:.' Al)l). 
 
 2 Olive V. State, 11 Neb. 3. Prac. N. S., 301. 
 
 3 State V. AVood, 53 N. II. 484. ' Wilniont v. Miserole, 40 N. Y. 
 ■• New York Code Civ. Proc, Sup. (8 .Tones & Sp.) 327. Compare 
 
 § 3i)0. Clark v. Vorce, 15 Wend. 193.
 
 Tit, III, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 581 
 
 Sectiox 
 71!). Motion to Strike Out all the Testimony of a Witness. 
 7:^0. Striking out Plaintiff's Evidence at the Close of his Case. 
 
 721. [Continued.] Right to Open and Close ou such a Motion. 
 
 722. Right to Withdraw Evidence, 
 
 723. Error of Admitting Incompetent Testimony Cured by Subsequently 
 
 Withdrawing it, 
 
 § 715. Power to Strikeout, — The court has, at any stage of 
 the trial, the discretioiiari/ power to exchule evidence iinpi-o[)erly 
 admitted, or admitted subject to exceptions. If its admissibility 
 depends upon outside or collateral facts, there can be no reason 
 why the court should nothear them without delay, ^ It is proper 
 to exercise this power where incompetent evidence is admitted 
 under a mistake of Jr/c(^ which mistake is shown by subsequent 
 evidence.^ This power may be excercised at any time before 
 the cause is finally submitted to the jury,^ 
 
 § 716. Motion to Strike out, — When testimony is admitted 
 without objection, and afterwards appears to be inadmissible, 
 the proper course is to ask the court to instruct the jury 
 to disregard it. It is too late to except to the admission of it, 
 and if the exception is overruled, to assign the ruling for error. ^ 
 But in such a case the mo' ion to strike out is not a matter of 
 right, but addresses itself to the discretion of the court. ^ It is 
 scarcely necessary to say that it will be error for the court to 
 take the inconsistent position of refusing to allow the objecting 
 party to offer contradictory evidence, and at the same time of re- 
 fusing to strike out the testimony, on the ground that it is irrele- 
 vant.^ If it is prejudicial, the objecting party has the right 
 either to have it stricken out, or to rebut it,^ so as to remove its 
 prejudicial effect from the minds of the jurors. Testimony 
 will not be stricken out on the ground that the question to which 
 
 1 Maurice v. Wordeu, 54 Md. 23.3, ^ Gilmore v. Pittsburg &c. R. Co., 
 251; Montfort v. Rowland, 38 N, J, 104 Pa. St. 275, 
 
 Eq. ISl; Parker v. Smith, 4 Cal. 105, ^ Qawtry v. Doaue, 51 X. Y. 84, 
 
 2 People V. McMahon, 2 Park, Cr. 00, 
 
 (N. Y.) 6r,3. « Gilbert v. Cherry, 57 Ga. 128. 
 
 3 Judge V. Stone, 44 N. H, 503; Sel- ' Ante, §483. 
 kirk V. Cobb, 13 Gray (Mass.), 313.
 
 582 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 it is a response was hading, if no objection on such ground was 
 made to the question, and if such a motion is sustained, the rul- 
 ing will be error, provided the testimony stricken out was rele- 
 vant and material to the issue. ^ Where a motion is made to 
 strike out testimony and the adverse party consents that the 
 motion may be sustained, after which the moving party changes 
 his mind and tvitJidraivs the motion, but the court nevertheless, 
 upon the request of the adverse party, strikes out the testi- 
 mony, — the party making the motion cannot complain of the 
 action of the court, and the original admission of the testimony 
 ceases to be available error. '^ 
 
 § 717. Striking out where Offer to Connect not Fulfilled. — 
 
 Where evidence is introduced, accompanied by the assurance of 
 counsel, that it will be followed up by proof of other facts, 
 material and competent, which will render its admission proper, 
 the judge properly admits it. But if this assurance is not ful- 
 filled, it will be the duty of the court, upon application of the 
 opposing counsel, to direct the jury not to regard it.^ But where 
 the judge admits evidence which is in the character of a link in 
 a chain of facts necessary to make out the case of the proponent, 
 the mere fact that the other links are not supplied will not sup- 
 port an exception to its admission; since if it were otherwise, it 
 would result in the principle that evidence is erroneously admitted 
 because ultimately insufficient.* 
 
 § 718. Motion to Strike out Answer. — It will often happen 
 that, although the question may be proper, the answer will be 
 improper, not being responsive to the question. In such a case, 
 objection to the answer must be taken by moving to strike it 
 out.® So, where a witness is asked a question, and, instead of 
 
 1 Williams v. Grand Rapids, 53 ♦ Labroii v. Worau, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 
 Mich. 271. 91. 
 
 2 Louisville «&c. R. Co. v. Falvey, ^ Farmers' Bank v. Cowau, 3 Abb. 
 104 Ind. 409. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 88, 90; Roquest v. 
 
 3 Blackburn V. Beall, 28 Md. 208; Boutin, 14 La. An. 44. Compare 
 Forsjthe v. Ganson, 5 AVcnd. (N. Y.) Reddiugtou v. Gilman, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 
 558; DillJu "y. I'eople, 8 Mich. 357. 235; Roberts v. Johnson, 37 N. Y.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 583 
 
 answering in a responsive manner, gives an expression of his 
 opinion, this may be properly stricken out on motion.^ But 
 where the question foreshadows the answer, and the question is 
 not objected to, any furthcrobjcction isivaived."^ Thereafter the 
 refusal of the court to strike out the evidence on motion, cannot 
 be assigned for error. ^ The reason is, that a party ought not to 
 1)6 allowed to sit by, during the reception of incompetent evi- 
 dence, without objecting thereto, taking his chances of any ad- 
 vantage to be derived therefrom, and afterwards, when he finds 
 such evidence prejudicial to him, to require the same to be 
 stricken out.* Whether, under such circumstances the court will 
 sustain a motion to strike out, becomes a matter of discretion.^ 
 Thus, it has been held that if a party, with full knowledge of the 
 incomjjetenvy of a ivifness, fails to o])jcct to him when he is 
 called, but allows him to be sworn and examined without objec- 
 tion, he thereby loses his right to object to his evidence ; yet the 
 court may, of its own motion, if it appears that the evidence is 
 opposed to the policy of the law and dangerous to the adminis- 
 tration of justice, suppress it.^ The party moving to strike out 
 the answer of a witness to a question nuist specifi/ Ins objections 
 to the answer, with as much particularity as is required in an ob- 
 jection to a queistion.^ 
 
 § 719. Motion to Strike out all the Testimony of a Wit- 
 ness. — Less harm is generally done by admitting incompetent 
 evidence, than by excluding evidence which is competent. 
 Where the judge remains in doubt, he should, therefore, incline 
 rather to admit than to reject the evidence which is challenged. 
 
 Super. 157; Gould v. Day, !I4 U. S. 405, Paige (N. Y.), 60; Greenl. Ev., § 421. 
 414; Gibson v. Hatchett, 24 Ala. 201; ^ Brockott v. New Jersey Steamboat 
 
 McCabe v. Braytou, 38 N. Y. 190; Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 15(;. 
 Spaiilding v. Ilallubeck, 35 N. Y. 204. * Leviu u. Russell, supra. 
 
 1 Ryau V. People, 19 Him (N. Y.), ^ poutlus v. People, 82 N. Y. 340, 
 188. 347; Marks v. King, 64 N. Y. 628; 
 
 2 Levin v. Russell, 42 N. Y. 251, 256; Plainer v. Plainer, 78 N. Y. 90; Mon- 
 Boone v. Ridgway, 29 N. J. Eq. 543; fort v. RoAvlaiid, 38 X. J. Eq. 181. 
 Douelson v. Taylor, 8 Pick. (Mass.) ^ Moufort v. Rowland, supra. 
 
 391; Mohawk Bank v. Atwater, 2 ' Sill r. Reese, 47 Cal. 294.
 
 584 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl*.^ 
 
 It is, therefore, a sound rule that a motion to strike out evidence 
 because it is irrelevant and immaterial, ought not to be granted, 
 unless the evidence is clearly of that character.^ Where com- 
 petent testimony has been given by a witness, a motion to strike 
 out all his testimony should be overruled, although some of it 
 may be incompetent. It is the duty of the party to select the 
 incompetent from the competent testimony, and to point out in 
 his motion the specific testimony objected to, as well as to indi- 
 cate the character of his objections.'^ "This," said Elliott, J., 
 " is not a mere arbitrary technical rule, but is founded on solid 
 principle and essential to the fair administration of justice. It 
 is in harmony with the well settled rule of practice, everywhere 
 obtaining, that the motion of the party must point out the spe- 
 cific testimony objected to, and indicate the character of the ob- 
 jections; and it is also in harmony with the familiar rule that, if 
 a demurrer is addressed to an entire pleading, it must be over- 
 ruled, although the pleading may be bad in form."^ A motion to 
 strike out all the testimony of a witness is properly overruled 
 where it appears that some of the testimony was dieted by the 
 questions of the party making the motion.* 
 
 § 720. Striking out Plaintiff's Evidence at the Close of his 
 Case. — In Missouri the court cannot, at the close of the plaint- 
 iff's case, strike out his testimony on the ground that it is insuf- 
 ficient to make out his case. If it is not suflJcient to make out 
 his case, the court may instruct the jury to find for the defend- 
 ant ; but if it tends in any degree to substantiate the allegations 
 of his petition, it must go to the jury, who are the exclusive 
 judges of its weight.^ 
 
 § 721. [Continued.] Right to Open and Close on such a Mo- 
 tion. — A rule of court providing that " on trials of fact the plaintiff 
 
 1 Chester v. Bakersfield Town Hull 52G; Cuthrcll v. Cuthrell, 101 led. 375- 
 Assn., 64: Cal. 42. Kefusing to strike State v. Hyiuer, 15 Nev. 49. 
 
 out impeaching evidence: lloyeyv.Li-dui;, ^ Louisville &c. E. Co. v. Falvey, 
 
 52lu(l. 49. ' 104 lud. 410, 41G. 
 
 2 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, * McCarty v. Waterman, 9G lad. 
 104 lud. 410, 41(;; Wolfe y. Pu<ili, 101 594. 
 
 lud. 293; Elliott r. Kussell, 92 lud. ^ McFarlaud r. BellowS; 49 Mo. 311.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 585 
 
 shall have the opening and conclusion," does not apply to a case where, 
 on a motion by the defendant for the exclusion of evidence, he offers 
 to introduce evidence exclusively for the court, for the purpose of en- 
 abling it to determine whether the evidence sought to be excluded is 
 such a privileged paper as should exclude it altogether from the con- 
 sideration of the jury.^ 
 
 § 722. Right to Withdraw Evidence. — A party having 
 once introduced evidence, cannot of right withdraw it, on find- 
 ing that it does not answer his purpose. " Before the evidence 
 is given, it is w^ithin the control of the party. Once given, it 
 belongs to the cause, and is the common property of all the 
 parties." ^ But where a party has tendered evidence, and it has 
 been admitted against the objection of the opponent, the court 
 may, in its discretion, allow him to withdraw it before 
 the case goes to the jury. It is proper in most cases for the 
 court to allow the party thus to correct the supposed error into 
 which he has fallen, and not to run the risk of its workiuo; a re- 
 versal of the judgment Avhich he may obtain.^ In most cases the 
 opposite party could not ground an exception upon the ruling of 
 the court in permitting the withdrawal of evidence under such 
 circumstances ; •* since it would not be prejudicial to him, — though 
 cases might occur where it would work injury and prejudice, as 
 shown in the next section. 
 
 § 723. Wliether Error of Admitting Incompetent Testi- 
 mony Cured by Witlidrawing it. — There are numerous hold- 
 ings to the effect that error in admitting incompetent testimony 
 is cured by subsequently withdrawing it from the consideration 
 of the jury, by directing them not to regard it; ^ and there is 
 
 1 Maurice y. Wordeu, oi Md. 233, * As was suggested in Booue v. 
 251. Puruell, supra. 
 
 2 Decker v. Bryant, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) ^ Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. 18 ; Cora. 
 183,189; Clintou u. Rowlaud, 24 Barb. v. Shepherd, Biuu. (Pa.) 282; Ura- 
 (N. Y.) 034. angst v. Kraemer, 8 Watts i& S. 391: 
 
 3 Providence &c. Co. v. Martin, 32 Minus v. State, 1(5 Oh. St. 221; Haiub- 
 Md. 310, 31(5; Booue 27. Puruell, 28 Md. lett v. Harablett, 6 N. H. 333; Pavey 
 t)07, G30; Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; v. Burch, 3 Mo. 447; Beck v. Cole, 16 
 Daveuport V. Harris, 27 Ga. G8; Gray AVis. 95; Hawes v. Gustiu, 2 Allen 
 V. Gray, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 4G5. (Mass.), 402; Smith v. Wliitraau, 6 Al- 
 len (Mass.), 562.
 
 586 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 equally good authority to the contrary. ^ But there is another 
 class of cases which hold that, where the evidence is of a charac- 
 ter clearly prejudicial to the opposing party, the prejudice may 
 not be cured by withdrawing it, but the improper admission of 
 it is ground of reversing the judgment. The same principle 
 nuist api)ly, where evidence which is illegally admitted is subse- 
 quently withdrawn by the act of the party. Whether the with- 
 drawing of it will cure the error of admitting it, will depend up- 
 on its character and prejudicial tendency. Prima facie, it will. 
 " The question," said Durfee, C. J., in discussing this point, 
 *' is, did the withdrawal take the testimony out of the case? If 
 it did, it is to be considered as 'if it had never been admitted. 
 We think the withdrawal, being by consent of court, is to be re- 
 garded as the act of the court, and that, in contemplation of 
 law, it purged the case absolutely of the testimony." The con- 
 clusion was that, while it would rest within the discretion of the 
 trial court to grant a new trial for the admission of illegal testi- 
 mony subsequently withdrawn by counsel, — yet a judgment 
 could not be reversed on exceptions for this reason. ^ The Court 
 of Ai)peals of New York took a different view of the question. 
 After repeated objections to illegal questions had been made and 
 overruled, and the answers of the witness had been given, the 
 party tendering the evidence proposed to have it stricken out. 
 The opposing party declined to accept this proposition, and 
 elected to retain his exception. The court made no ruling, and 
 gave no instruction to the jury on the subject. The former rul- 
 ings, the exceptions thereto, and the objectionable testimony, all 
 remained in the case. It was said by the reviewing court: 
 " The defendant's counsel had the legal right, after the evidence 
 had been admitted in spite of his repeated objections, to insist 
 upon his exception ; and it was not his duty to waive it, as he 
 would have done by accepting the proposal of the plaintiff's 
 counsel. So far as the jury might be influenced by the incom- 
 petent evidence, the mischief was already clone, and would not 
 
 1 Ante, §351; ErbcMi r. Lorrillard, 19 '^ State v. Towk-, 13 11. I. GUI. 
 
 N. Y. 302; O'Sullivau v. lloberts, 3'J 
 N. Y. 300.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cb. XXV.] OBJECTIONS and exceptions. 587 
 
 have been repaired by the agreement of counsel to strike it out. 
 The answer of the witness was strictly responsive to the question 
 objected to, and the plaintiff's counsel had no right to have it 
 stricken out. * * * The offer of the plaintiff's counsel, if 
 explicit, would not have caused the jury to overlook this evi- 
 dence when they came to consider the case, and it is impossible 
 to say that it did not have some influence upon them." The 
 court therefore held that the error of admitting incompetent 
 evidence is not cured hy the offer of the counsel tendering it to 
 have it stricken out.^ 
 
 1 Furst V. Second Avenue R. Co., 72 N. Y. 542.
 
 588 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 ON THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF BOOKS AND PAPEES. 
 
 Article I. — Discovery and Inspection. 
 
 Article II. — Notice to Produce and Secondary Evidence. 
 
 Article III. — Use of Books and Papers at the Trial. 
 
 Article I. — Discovery and Inspection. 
 
 Subdivision 1. — Under the Federal Statute. 
 
 Section 
 
 730. Subpoena Duces Tecum a Substitute for Other Methods. 
 
 731. Statutes Exteudiug to Courts of Law the Power to Compel Discovery. 
 
 732. Federal Statute does not Abolish Bills of Discovery. 
 
 733. Supersedes State Statutes. 
 
 73i. Enables Parties to Prepare for Trial. , 
 
 735. Enables the Defendant to draw his Answer. 
 
 736. Does not Subject Party to a Penalty. 
 
 737. Inflicts Non-suit or Default. 
 
 738. Production of Books and Papers by the United States. 
 
 739. What the Application must Show. 
 
 740. May be Made before Trial. 
 
 § 730. Subpoena Duces Tecum a Substitute for other 
 Methods. — As already sufficiently explained, a trial had accord- 
 ing to the ancient common law, proceeded on the conception that 
 it was a species of combat between two subjects, rather than an 
 inquisition by the sovereign, upon the complaint of one of them 
 against the other, for the purposes of justice. A party was, 
 therefore, entitled to all the advantage, in respect of disclos- 
 ing the truth, wdiich possession and secrecy could give him. He 
 could not testify for himself; he was not obliged to testify for 
 his adversary, nor to furnish evidence against himself. The 
 court of chancery broke into this barbarous rule by the intro-
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 589 
 
 tion of the bill of discovery; upoo the exhibition of which its 
 subpoena was issued, followed, if neeessaiy, by other compulsory 
 process, bringing the defendant into court, and searching his 
 conscience by means of interrogatories, Avhich he was compelled 
 to answer on oath. No such power existed in the courts of 
 law ; or, if it existed, it was but feebly exercised, and only 
 in a few special cases ;^ so that, for a great period, the 
 bill of discovery in equity, in aid of an action at law, was 
 the only means afforded by the remedial procedure in England, 
 by which a party could compel his adversary to make disclosures 
 of material facts which were locked up in his breast alone. 
 These facts might be matters within his exclusive knowledge, or 
 evidence of them might be furnished by means of books or pa- 
 pers which were in his exclusive possession. To compel him to 
 disclose the contents of such books or papers, where he was 
 privileged against making such disclosure, the common-law 
 courts early resorted to the writ of subpoena duces tecum, wdiich 
 has been defined to be " a process by which a court, at the in- 
 stance of a suitor, commands a person, who has in his possession 
 or control some document or paper that is pertinent to the 
 issues of the pending controversy, to produce it for use at the 
 
 1 The English courts of law have 
 sometimes exercised a power analo- 
 gous to that of chancery, of compel- 
 ling an absent party to produce docu- 
 ments for inspection (Morrow v. 
 Saunders, 1 Brod. &Bing. 318; Blakey 
 V. Porter, 1 Taunt. 384; Bateinau v. 
 Philip, 4 Taunt. 157), even before the 
 passage of the statute conferring such 
 power upon the courts of law. And 
 the same power was sparingly exer- 
 cised in New York, in cases at law, 
 prior to the Revised Statutes. Jack- 
 son V. Jones, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 17; Law- 
 rence V. .Ocean Ins. Co., 11 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 245, note a; People u. Vail, 2 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) G23. Cases where such re- 
 lief was refused : Deuslow v. Fowler, 
 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 592 ; Willis v. Bailey, 
 
 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 268; Mayu.Gwynne, 
 4 Barn. & Aid. 301. Discovery in 
 equity: Lane v. Stebbins, 9 Paige (N. 
 Y.) fi22. It was held that the Supreme 
 Court would order a defendant to 
 allow the plaintiff to take a copy of a 
 paper in his possession, on which the 
 suit was founded, though the plaintiff 
 once had a counterpart which was lost; 
 and that it was not necessary to show 
 that the paper was delivered to the de- 
 fendant to hold as trustee of the 
 plaintiff. It was said that the Su- 
 preme Court would grant this rule, as 
 to such a paper in all cases where 
 chancery would entertain a bill of 
 discovery. Wallis v. Murray, 4 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) 399.
 
 590 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 trial." ^ This writ extended no further than to compel the pro- 
 duction of books and papers, the existence and character of 
 which were already known to the party seeking to use them as 
 evidence; so that, as already seen,^ it Avas necessary that it 
 should describe the books or papers required to be produced, 
 with a considerable deo;ree of accuracy.'^ Beoinnins: Aviththe Ju- 
 diciary Act of 1781), as we shall presently see,^ statutes have 
 been passed in many American jurisdictions, extending to courts 
 of law the power which had been hitherto possessed by courts of 
 chancery, of compelling discovery by parties. These statutes 
 seem to have left the subpoena duces tecum untouched in its 
 former efficacy.^ This efficacy has been greatly enlarged by 
 other statutes enabling parties to testify as witnesses; so that 
 now a party can generally, by means of this writ, compel his ad- 
 versary to bring into court, for the purpose of being used as evi- 
 dence on a trial, any books or documents which contain matter 
 material to the issues, subject to \\h privilege, which has been al- 
 ready discussed.'' 
 
 § 731. Statutes Extending to Courts of Law the Power ta 
 compel Discovery. — In section 15 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
 the Congress of the United States seems to have enacted the first 
 statute extending to courts of law the power which courts of 
 chancery hitherto exclusively possessed, of compelling the oppo- 
 site party to produce books and papers for inspection before or 
 at the trial. Sixty-two years after its adoption in this country, 
 it was adopted and enacted in England.^ This statute is pre- 
 served in the Revised Statutes of the United States at section 
 724. It is as follows: '' In the trial of actions at law, the courts 
 
 ' KoUius, HuiToirate, in Iloyt v. therein named, between speciflfd 
 
 Jackson, 3 Dein. (N. Y.) at p. 31)0. dates. It must identify the particular 
 
 - Ante, § 175. message required. Ex parte Jaynes^ 
 
 ^ It has been lately held tiiat the 70 Cal. G38. 
 agent of a telegraph compcmu is not ■* Next section, 
 
 in contempt for refusing to obey such ^ Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 a writ, which commands him to search Y.) 249. 
 for and produce all messages from " Ante, chap. XII. 
 
 and to a large number of persons ' Stat. 14 & 15 Vict., 99, § 6.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PKODucTiox of books and papers. 591 
 
 of the United States may, ou motion and due notice thereof, 
 requh-e the parties to produce books or writings in their posses- 
 sion or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in 
 eases and under circumstances where they might be compelled 
 to produce the same by ordinary rules of proceeding in chan- 
 cery. If a plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the 
 court may. on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant 
 as in cases of non-suit; and if a defendant fails to comply with 
 such order, the court may, on motion, give judgment against 
 him by default." Statutes more or less similar have been enacted 
 in many of the States. Thus, section 9 of the Illinois Practice 
 Act,i provides that the several courts shall have power, in any 
 action, pending before them, u})on good and sufficient cause, 
 and upon reasonable notice thereof given, to require the parties, 
 or either of them, to produce books or writings, in their pos- 
 session or power, which contain evidence pertaining to the 
 issue. 2 A similar provision is found in the Revised Statutes of 
 New York ^ and also in the Code of Civil Procedure of that 
 State. * The federal statute al)Ove quoted does not a})ply to 
 proceedings in equity, those courts having ample power to compel 
 such discovery without statutory aid.^ The later Federal statute" 
 making parties to suits in equity, as well as in suits at laAV, com- 
 petent witnesses, seems to have largely dispensed with the aid of 
 this statute. A party may now examine his adversary, as he 
 might examine any other witness. Such an adversary may be 
 compelled, as a witness, by a subpoena duces tecum, to produce 
 books and papers in his possession, the same as any other wit- 
 ness.^ " He is," said Wallace, J., " bound to obey the writ and 
 be ready to produce papers in obedience to the summons. Like 
 any other w^itness, it is his duty to make reasonable search for 
 the papers and documents required, if they are in his possession; 
 
 1 Rev. Stat. 111. 1880, chap. 31. ure, § 854; preseut edition byThroop, 
 
 2 See also as to the North Carolina § 858. 
 
 Statute, Commissioners v. Lemly, 85 = Bischoffsheim v. Brown, 29 Fed. 
 
 N. C. 341; Strudwick v. Broduax, 83 Rep. 341, per W^allace, J.; infra, § 732. 
 N. C. 401. 6 supp. Rev. St. U. S. 312. 
 
 3 4 R. S. N. Y. 1878, P, 1G8, § 854. ' ]\k'rchauts' Nat. Bk. v. State Nat. 
 * New York Code of Civil I'roced- Bk., 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 201.
 
 592 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Tliomp. Tr,, 
 
 but, before he can be required to exhibit their contents, he is 
 entitled to appeal to the discretion of the court, if any sufficient 
 reason exists to protect him from disclosure." ^ 
 
 § 732. Federal Statute does not Abolish Bill3 of Discov- 
 ery. — It has been thought that this statute is not to be construed 
 as taking away any right to have relief by bill of discovery, 
 except in cases where the remedy therein provided for is given. 
 The bill of discovery covered many matters not therein provided 
 for, and is not abolished by its terms. The object of the statute 
 was to give a more summary remedy in certain cases, not to take 
 away any existing remedies.^ 
 
 § 733. Supersedes State Statutes. — As the matter of the 
 production of books and papers in the courts of the United 
 States is expressly regulated by the above statute, it is not a 
 matter as to which, under section 914 of the Revised Statutes of 
 the United States, the practice of State courts is adopted.^ 
 
 § 734. Enables Parties to Prepare for Trial. — Under this 
 statute, it has been held that the production of books and papers 
 can be compelled, for the purpose of enabling a party to prepare 
 for trial. It is not confined to the production of books and pa- 
 pers on the trial.* In this view it is only requisite that the cause 
 
 1 Bischoffsheim v. Brown, 29 Fed. is regulated by the statutes of the 
 Eep. 341, 343. United States; and that these statutes 
 
 2 United States v. Hutton, 10 Ben. make no provision for such an exam- 
 (U. S.) 2(j8, 278; Bischoffsheim v. ination. There is nothing in § 914 of 
 Brown, 29 Fed. Hep. 341. the Revised Statutes of the United 
 
 3 United States v. Hutton, 10 Ben. States, providing for conformity of the 
 (U. S.) 268. See also Beardsley v. practice of the Federal courts, insults 
 Littell, 14 Blatchf, (U. S.) 102. It at law, to that of the State courts, 
 was held in this latter case that a party which authorizes the adoption of the 
 has not the right to examine his ad- statute of a State court, providing for 
 versary out of court before trial, al- such an examination. Beardsley v. 
 though there is a statute of the par- Littell, 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 102. As to 
 ticular State in which the Federal court the effect of § 914, Rev. Stat. U. S., see 
 is held, which gives such a right. The Indianapolis &c. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 
 reason is that the whole subject of U. S. 291. 
 
 oral testimony, in actions at common •* Central Bank r. Taylor, 2 Cranch 
 
 law, in the courts of the United States C. C. (U. S.) 427; Jacques v. Collins,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 593 
 
 should be at issue, that the court should be satisfied that the 
 evidence sougiit for will be pertinent to the issue, and that the 
 circumstances are those in which a discovery would be decreed 
 in chancery ; ^ for the authority conferred by the statute can only 
 be exercised in cases where relief might have been had in chan- 
 cery, by a bill of discovery .- 
 
 § 735. Enables the Defendant to Draw his Answer. — A 
 
 bill of discovery would lie to obtain the production of books and 
 papers to enable the party to draw his pleading, and, by anal- 
 ogy, it has been held that he may, under the above statute, move 
 for the production of books and papers in the hands of the plaint- 
 iff, for a like purpose.^ It was ruled by Mr. Justice McLean 
 that a motion to produce a paper in the possession of the plaintiff, 
 which was necessary to enable the defendants to plead, may be 
 granted, in the discretion of the court, although no notice has 
 been given; but he conceded the rule to be, that, where the pos- 
 session of a paper is desired to be used in evidence, a notice is 
 necessary.* 
 
 § 736. Does not Subject Party to a Penalty. — A bill of dis- 
 covery would not be allowed in chancery, in any case where it 
 would subject the defendant to a penalty, unless the bill relin- 
 quished all claim to the penalty. As the Federal statute, above 
 quoted, merely transfers to the courts of law the power to com- 
 pel a discovery, possessed by the courts of chancery, it has been 
 held that the power would not be exercised in an action to recover 
 damages for the infringement of letters-jjatent , where the pro- 
 duction of the books sought for would furnish evidence which 
 would subject the defendant to a penalty under the act of Con- 
 
 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 23; United States v. ^ Jacques v. Collins, supra. 
 
 Youngs, 10 Ben. (U. S.) 204; United 2 Fiuch v. Rikeman, supra. 
 
 States V. Huttou, Id. 209; Finch v. ^ United States v. Huttou, 10 Ben. 
 
 Rikeman, Id. 301. It was, however, (U. S.) 268, 279. 
 
 held by Mr. Justice Curtis that the * Brouson v. Kensey, 3 McLean 
 
 production of papers could only be (U. S.), 180. The soundness of this 
 
 (ioyhiiqWqA at tlip trial. lasigi v. Brown, ruling may be doubted. 
 
 1 Curt. C. C. (U. S.) 401. 
 
 38
 
 594 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thouip. Tr., 
 
 gress/ and the plaintiff had not relinquished his claim to the 
 penalty.-^ 
 
 § 737. Inflicts Non-suit or Default. — The above statute has 
 so far altered the rule of the common law, as to intiict upon the 
 party the penalty of a non-suit or default, upon the non-produc- 
 tion of a paper in obedience to the court's order, instead of mere- 
 ly letting in the opposite party to parol proof .^ 
 
 § 738. Production of Books and papers by the United 
 States. — Although a bill of discovery will not lie against the 
 United States, yet it has been held that, under the above stat- 
 ute, the United States will be compelled to produce the official 
 weigher's returns of the weight of merchandise, on the motion 
 of a defendant sued for the balance of duties alleged to be due 
 thereon, the defense being that the dues were fully paid, and the 
 motion being supported by affidavit that an inspection of copies 
 of the returns is necessary to enable the defendant to prepare 
 for trial.* In such an action, where it appeared that the defend- 
 ants were clearly entitled to the production of the papers called 
 for, the court ought to stay the proceedings until their produc- 
 tion, and, in case of the refusal of the collector to exhibit them 
 within a reasonable time, to issue a mandamus for their produc- 
 tion.^ Where a bill was filed in the English court of chancery, 
 by the United States, for an account of certain property of the 
 so-called Confederate States, it was held by Lord Cairns, L. C, 
 that, although a bill for a discovery cannot be maintained against 
 a sovereign State, yet if a discovery becomes necessary to aid 
 the defendants, the court may stay the proceedings until means 
 of discovery should be furnished.® 
 
 1 5 U. S. Stat, at Large, 123. (U. S.) 2G8. In this case there was a 
 
 2 Fiach V. Rickraaii, 2 Blatchf. considerable discussion of the validity 
 (U. S.) 301. and effect of a regulation made by the 
 
 '■^ lasigi V. Brown, 1 Curt. C. C. (U. collector of customs under § 251 of 
 
 S.) 401. the Revised Statutes of the United 
 
 •* United States v. Youngs, 10 Ben. States, touching the inspection of 
 
 (U. S.) 2G-1; United States v. Mutton books and papers in the custom house. 
 10 Ben, (U. S.) 2G9. « United States v. Wagner, L. R. 2. 
 
 5 United States y. Ilutton, 10 Ben. Ch. 582, 595.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTiox of books and papers. 595 
 
 § 739. What the Application must Show. — " The applicant 
 must show that the paper exists, and is in the control of the 
 other party; that it is pertinent to the issue, and that the case is 
 such that a court of equity would compel its discovery." ^ 
 
 § 740. May be made before Trial. — Even under a holding 
 that the papers could only be produced for the purpose of being 
 used at the trial, it was ruled, on grounds of manifest conven- 
 ience, that the application for an order to produce them on 
 notice might be made before the trial. ^ In such a case, Mr. 
 Justice Curtis, at circuit, said: "If the notice is made before 
 the trial, the correct practice seems to be, after the moving party 
 has made a prima facie case, to enter an order nisi, leaving it 
 for the other party to show cause at the trial. He must then 
 come prepared to produce the paper, if he fails to show cause."* 
 
 Subdivision 2. — Under the Statutes of New York. 
 
 Section 
 743. Construction of the New York Statute. 
 744:. Does not Extend to Cases of Tort. 
 
 745. Nor to Matters which are Privileged. 
 
 746. Does not Require a Party to Disclose his own Evidence. 
 
 747. Nor extend to Discovery of Books of Corporations. 
 
 748. Enables the Plaintiff to Draw his Petition. 
 
 749. But not to Anticipate a Defense. 
 
 750. Nor to Discover the Names of Proper Parties Defendant. 
 
 751. Enables Defendant to Prepare his Answer. 
 
 752. An Illustration. 
 
 753. Fishing Explorations not Countenanced. 
 
 754. Inspection of Books of an Insolvent. 
 
 755. Proceeding by Petition and Order to show Cause. 
 
 756. Affidavit by whom made. 
 
 757. What the Petition must show. 
 
 758. Information and belief not enough. 
 
 759. Certainty Required in Description. 
 
 760. [Continued.] Illustration. 
 
 761. Explicit Denial ends the Application. 
 
 762. Vacating Duces Tecum on Application of Attorney. 
 
 763. Appeal from an Order Granting an Inspection. 
 
 764. Question for Decision on Appeal. 
 
 1 lasigi V. Brown, 1 Curt. C. C. (U. 2 lasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. C. C. 401. 
 
 S.) 401, 402. •■* Ibid.
 
 596 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 § 743. Construction of New York Statute. — The i)roceed- 
 ing for ii discovery, according to the chancery practice, was 
 superseded in New York by provisions of the Revised Statutes, 
 and these in turn were suiDplemented by a provision (§ 388) 
 of the Code of Civil Procedure.^ It has been hekl that the 
 provision of the code does not repeal those of the Revised 
 Statutes. Not being inconsistent with each other, they might 
 well stand together, either as directing the mode of mak- 
 ing the discovery, or as defining the powers of the courts in case 
 an order for a discovery should be disobeyed. ^ The discovery 
 therein provided for may be had as well afle)' issue Joined, as 
 before; but under either statute, the court must be satisfied that 
 the books or papers contain evidence relating to the merits of the 
 action.^ The court must be satisfied before granting the order, 
 that the discovery is pertinent or material to the claim or de- 
 fense of the party seeking the remedy.^ And where the plaint- 
 iff 's claim was proved prima facie, it was held (reversing the 
 trial court), that an order for the inspection of the defendant's 
 books, in order to get further proof, should not have been 
 made.^ 
 
 § 744. Does not extend to Cases of Tort. — The provisions 
 of the Revised Statutes have been held co-extensive only with 
 the principles of the former court of chancery, — from which 
 the conclusion has been reached that such an inspection cannot 
 be demanded in an action for libel.^ In an action for a personal 
 tort, brought by a physician, the plaintiff cannot be compelled 
 to make a discovery of his books and papers, for the purpose of 
 enabling the defendant to intercept and rebut his testimony as to 
 the damage sustained by him, by showing his gains from his 
 practice.^ 
 
 1 2 R. S. N. Y. (184()) 199. ^ Sanger v. Seymour, 42 Huu (N. 
 
 2 Hoyt V. American Exch. Bauk, 1 Y.) (Ul. 
 
 Duer (N. Y.),(i52; Morrison w. Stur- e Opilyke v. Marble, 18 Abb. Pr. 
 
 ges, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 177. (N. Y.) 2(i(]. 
 
 3 Morrison v. Sturges, snpra. ' Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co., 2 
 " 2 Wait Pr. 531, and cases citei,!. Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 143.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 597 
 
 § 7-45. Xor to 3Iatters which are Privileged. — A physician's 
 account books, containing information which would be privil- 
 eged as concerns his patients, are not subject to discovery 
 and exploration, in an action between the physician and a third 
 person.^ 
 
 § 746. Does not Require Party to Disclose his own Evi- 
 dence. — The provision of section 388 of the New York Code of 
 Procedure does not sanction an order requiring either party to 
 disclose the evidence which he intends to introduce against his 
 adversar}'.^ So, in another jurisdiction, it is held that it is an 
 abuse of the power of compelling the party to produce docu- 
 ments, to use it so as to compel the opposite party to discover 
 evidence which is material to his case, but not material to the 
 case of his opponent; " for the rule is that the defendant has the 
 right to enforce the production of such documents by the plaint- 
 iff, as relate to his defense, and does not extend to the enforce- 
 ment of the production of documents by means of which the 
 plaintiff's case is to be established." '^ 
 
 § 747. Nor extend to Discovery of Books of a Corporation. — It 
 has been held, but, it is believed, on grounds that are quite untenable, 
 that agents of a corporation will not be compelled to discover the 
 books of the corporation.'* It was also ruled that the fact that 
 the petition for the discovery alleged that the corjioration was fic- 
 titious, made no difference. ^ This would seem to be a political de- 
 cision, not entitled to much respect. It is plain that the discovery 
 of the books of a corporation cannot properly be had at all, except by 
 process directed against the agents of the corporation who have them 
 in their custody. The corporation, being itself an intangible body, 
 could not be imprisoned for contempt ; and although the process might 
 be in name directed against the corporation, it would be necessary to 
 serve it upon its agents, having control over the m atter of the produc- 
 tion of the books. 
 
 ' Mott V. Consumers' Ice Co., 2 3 Abrahams v. Swaun, 18 W. Va. 
 
 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 143. 274, 278. 
 
 2 Strong w. Strong, 1 Abb. Pr. (N.s.) * Opdyke v. Marble, 18 How. Pr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 233. (N. Y ) 266. 
 
 5 !hid.
 
 598 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thom}). Tr., 
 
 § 748. Enables Plaintiff to draw his Petition. — Where an 
 application for the exhibition of a writing is made before issue 
 joined, to enable the plaintiff to frame his complaint, it can only 
 be granted where the petition shows that the inspection is neces- 
 sary to enable the plaintiff to frame his complaint. Where the 
 petition contains enough matter to enable the plaintiff properly 
 to frame his complaint, the application will not be granted, 
 though it may appear that certain of the allegations cannot be 
 made upon knowledge, but can only be made upon information 
 and belief.^ The orantino; of such an order has been said to be a 
 matter resting very largely within the discretion of the court. 
 In dealing with such an application, it was said: " The power to 
 search through defendant's account books, in order to find iso- 
 lated entries not particularized, to enable the plaintiff to frame 
 a complaint, is open to great abuse, and should only be granted 
 where the purpose and necessity of such examination are appar- 
 ent. At a later stage of the proceedings, when the issues be- 
 tween plaintiff and defendants shall have been developed, other 
 appropriate measures can be taken by the plaintiff to obtain the 
 information now sought, if it be found to be then necessary." ^ 
 
 § 749. But not to Anticipate a Defense. — In New York it 
 is not usual to direct a discovery and inspection of books and 
 papers, in anticipation of a defense, and with a view of enabling 
 a party to prepare to meet it. The rule, as generally stated, is 
 that the papers to be inspected must relate to the maintenance 
 of the position taken by the applicant, and to that of the oppo- 
 site party. '^ Accordingly, where the })laintiff moved for an in- 
 spection of the defendant's books, in order to show the 
 non-payment of a debt, it was held that, as the defense of pay- 
 ment was an affirmative defense, in respect of which the burden 
 was on the defendant, the plaintiff was not entitled to an inspec- 
 tion of his books, in anticipation of his defense, and to meet it."* 
 
 1 Kafferty v. Williaius, '^0 N. Y, Y.), 641 ; citing Andrews u. Towuseud, 
 
 Super. (iO. 14 Week. Dig. (N. Y.) 243. 
 
 - Mohesy I'. Kaliii, :.i) .\. Y. Super. ■* C'lUter r. Pool, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 20'J. 311. 
 
 ^ Sanger v. Seymour, 42 Hun (X.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 599 
 
 § 750. Nor Discover the Names of Proper Parties Defend- 
 ant. — In a motion, under the provision of the Revised Statutes 
 of New York, for the discovery of the books, etc., of a printing 
 and publishing company called "The World Company," for the 
 purpose of enabling the plaintiff to prepare his complaint, with 
 the names of real defendants, to be inserted in the place of cer- 
 tain fictitious names contained in the summons, it was ruled that 
 the courts could not grant a discovery and inspection for such a 
 purpose, but only for the purpose of aiding the plaintiff in stat- 
 ing his cause of action.^ 
 
 § 751. Enables Defendant to Prepare his Answer. — An 
 
 order requiring the plaintiff to produce, or give copies of papers, 
 to enable the defendant to answer the complaint, will not be 
 made when it is manifest that the defendant has no defense 
 which he cannot set up in due legal form, without the aid of such 
 papers. 2 It is said: " Discovery may be ordered to assist a de- 
 fendant to facts without which he cannot frame an answer with 
 safety to his rights. But it is not intended to protect him from 
 answering untruthfully, or to inform him how fully he may have 
 furnished the plaintiff with the means of disproving the answer 
 which he may propose to interpose." ^ The defendant must show 
 Jiow or ivJiy it is necessary to have the discovery, in order to pre- 
 pare his answer. In other words, he must set forth the neces- 
 sary /rtc^*^ in his petition to show that such a discoveiy is nec- 
 essary.* It does not satisfy this rule that the defendant states, 
 in his petition, that he expects to be able to prove that a note and 
 acceptances, which are the foundation of the action, were 
 paid by the transfer of the property mentioned and described 
 in the pa})ers whereof a discovery is sought.^ 
 
 § 752. A\ Illustration. — Where an action was brought to recover 
 a balance of moneys, alleged to have been received by the defendant as 
 
 1 Opdyke v. Marble, 18 Abb. Pr. '' Gelstou v. Marshall, G How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 2(36. (X. Y.) 398. 
 
 2 Morav. McCredy, 2BOSW. (X. Y.) ^ Gelstou z). Marshall, 6 How. Pr. 
 li(jy. supiri. See also Stantou v. Delaware 
 
 3 Mora v.McCredy, 2Bosw. (N. Y.) Mut. lus. Co., 2 Saudf. (N. 1".) G62. 
 669.
 
 (JUO EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the plaintiff's agent, and the complaint was drawn upon the face of 
 certain accounts rendered by the defendant, it was held that he was 
 entitled to an order for the inspection of the same, and of the vouchers 
 filed by him in support thereof, to enable him to frame his answer. In 
 such a case the defendant should be allowed an inspection of his book 
 of accounts, as the plaintiff's agent, if necessary, to enable him to meet 
 the proofs of the account stated thereafter in the complaint, and 
 make a substantial allegation as to what the accounts all together showed. 
 The allegation in the complaint, that such books of account were falsely 
 and fraudulently made up by the defendant, was regarded as rendering 
 
 it more proper to grant an inspection.^ In another case, upon an 
 
 a[)i>lication by the defendant for the discovery of the contents of a letter 
 written to him by the plaintiff, and his answer thereto, written on the 
 same paper, which were in the plaintiff 's possession, where such petition 
 showed that they contained evidence that the plaintiff had no legal de- 
 mand against the defendant, the discovery was granted, the allegation 
 not being controverted by the plaintiff.'^ 
 
 § 753. Fishing- Explorations not Conntenanced. — The stat- 
 utes of New Tork, providing for this mode of discovery, do not 
 countenance fishing explorations, for the mere pui'pose of obtain- 
 ing evidence or witnesses. If, therefore, the order for a dis- 
 covery of books and papers does not show that the entries sought 
 for are evidence, but only that they contain information by wliich 
 evidence may be obtained, the order will not be granted.-^ An 
 inspection is denied of the documents of the adversary before 
 trial, where it is clear that they may be produced on an examina- 
 tion of the adverse party under a subpcena duces tecum, when 
 the only purpose is to prove circumstances as the foundation of 
 relevant inferences, rather than facts proximately probative of 
 an issue.* 
 
 § 754. Inspection of Books of an Insolvent. — It has been reasoned 
 in New York, construing a statute,^ that it is altogether foreign to the 
 
 1 InyoMiuiugCo. r. Pheby, 49 N. Y. "i New Euglaud Irou Co. v. New 
 Super. 392. York Loun Co., 53 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 2 Livermore v. St. Johu, 4 Rob. ;3r>l. 
 
 (N. Y.) 12. ^ § 21 of the General Assignment 
 
 3 Woods V. Figauiei-e, 25 How. Pr. Act of that State. 
 (N. Y.) 522.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 601 
 
 purposes of the legislature to compel the assignee to produce the assign- 
 or's books, in order to enable a creditor to extract evidence therefrom 
 that will aid him in a litigation, existing or contemplated, not relating 
 to the assigned estate. " An insolvent," said Van Hoesen, J., "is un- 
 der no greater obligation than a solvent person, to disclose to his ad- 
 versary the evidence on which he relies. It cannot add to the quantum 
 or value of the assigned estate to show from the assignor's books that 
 he intentionally misrepresented the weight of tlie hides on which he pro- 
 cured a loan from the petitioner ; nor ought the assignee to be com- 
 pelled to exhibit the evidence which he has to show that the petitioner 
 took usury from the assignor." ^ In another case where, shortly before 
 making an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, the assignor had 
 allowed a judgment by default to be entered against him, under which 
 his stock in trade had been levied upon and sold, and tlie circumstances 
 of the transaction tended to show that the claim sued on was fictitious, 
 and that it was concocted for the purpose of defrauding the actual cred- 
 itors of the assignor, — the court allowed the assignee to bring suit for 
 the recovery of the propert}', but refused to allow him to examine, under 
 the provisions of the above statute, the persons who were alleged to have 
 taken part in, or to have knowledge of, the fraudulent transaction- 
 Charles P. Daly, C. J., said: " The order allowing the assignee to sue 
 will be granted, and whatever examination of parties, or witnesses ma}^ be 
 necessary to sustain the action, must be had in that action. The exam- 
 ination allowed by the Assignment Act is to aid in the admin istratioyi of 
 the assignment. If it is necessary to perpetuate testimony, then it 
 should be made under the Revised Statutes, and subject to the restric- 
 tions and limitations which, by adjudged cases, is to be applied to such 
 proceedings. What is sought to be done in this application is to go 
 into the whole alleged cause of action, by the examination of witnesses 
 and the filing of their testimony, before any action is commenced. It 
 is only necessary to suggest the gross abuses that would arise should 
 such a proceeding as this be allowed. The examination as to the whole 
 subject of inquiry has nothing to guide it, and may be as extensive and 
 irrelevant as the person who obtains such an order wishes. It is im- 
 possible for the referee to determine in advance what may or what 
 m ay not be irrelevant, and the most unrestrained license of inquiry 
 would be the consequence. When an action is commenced, and an 
 issue or issues have been found, there is then a definite limit to the 
 
 ^ Matter of Everit, 10 Daly (X. Y.), 99.
 
 602 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl., 
 
 inquirj', and a means of determining what is, or is not relevant. If an 
 examination is necessary to enable the plaintiff to frame his complaint, 
 he must specifically show why a discovery is necessary for that purpose ; 
 or if a discovery is necessary to enable the plaintiff to give or procure 
 evidence, the necessity for it must be shown. All that was evidently 
 intended by the twenty-first section of the Assignment Act was, that 
 parties sliould have, in their assignment proceedings, the same power 
 as to compelling the production and examination of books and papers, 
 the discovery of evidence requisite to the complete administration of the 
 assigned estate by the court, or the perpetuation of testimony where 
 there is reason to apprehend that the party may lose it, — which, by va- 
 rious statutory provisions parties have in actions, with the additional 
 right of compelling answers that might criminate the witness, but for 
 the provision in the act and the right of the party to avail himself of 
 the testimony so taken in any action then pending or thereafter 
 brought." ^ 
 
 § 755. Proceeding by Petition and Order to Show Cause. — 
 
 Under the New York Code of Civil Procedure, the proceeding to 
 compel the inspection of the books of the adversary party, takes 
 place upon a verified petition, praying for the discovery or in- 
 spection sought, upon which the only order Avhich can be made 
 in the first instance is an order directing the relief prayed for, 
 or to show cause why it should not be had. A peremptory order 
 compelling the production of books and papers for examination, 
 cannot be granted e.x jjft?'<f^.'- 
 
 § 756. Affidavit by Whom Made. — The affidavit should be 
 made by the part ij himself ; if made by his attorney, some reason 
 should be shown for his making it.'^ "Where the State (or the 
 people of the Suite) are moving parties in the application, the 
 necessary facts must not only be stated, but the person from 
 whom the information is derived should Jdmself make the aflida- 
 vit or i)etition, and state the facts positively, or else state the 
 nature of the information which he has of the facts. ^ 
 
 » Matter of Burtm-tt, 8 Daly (N. " Thelps v. Piatt, J4 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 Y.)' 3(;3. ').->-. 
 
 2 i)ick y. Phillips, 41 Ilmi (N. Y.), 'People v. Kector, Abb. Pr. 
 
 on:;- (N. Y.) 177.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 603 
 
 § 757. What the Petition must Show. — The petition must 
 point to the places where the information sought for exists, or 
 describe the entries, other than by merely stating their supposed 
 effect as evidence. It must also show the expediency or neces- 
 sity of resorting to this mode of proof. If it is deficient in 
 these particulars, the inspection will be denied.^ It must state 
 definitely what it is that the petitioner seeks to discover, so that 
 the court may see that it is material to the case.'^ It must show 
 that entries, affecting or throwing some lio;ht on the matters in 
 controversy, exist, or, at least, enough to call upon the adverse 
 party to show whether they do or do not exist. It must show 
 that such entries are material, and it must state facts from 
 which the court can see that they are material, in addition to 
 stating other matters prescribed by court: rules regulating such 
 applications.^ The entries, of which a discovery is sought, 
 must be described with sufficient certainty, to ena})le the adverse 
 party to ascertain whether they exist and are in his possession.* 
 Such a petition will not be granted where it prays for a discov- 
 ery, generally, of all the books, papers, and correspondence of the 
 adverse party, containing entries made during a period of several 
 years, relating to purchases of a specified commodity.^ 
 
 § 758 Information and Belief not Enough. — It is not 
 
 enough that the party believes or is advised that a paper contains 
 material evidence. Facts must be shown to support such belief. 
 Nor is it enough that the paper may, or probably will, furnish 
 information to obtain evidence which may be material. The 
 paper itself, must contain the evidence, either by itself or in con- 
 nection with other evidence.^ An affidavit seeking such a dis- 
 covery and inspection, sworn to on information and belief, that 
 the books of a corporation will show the names of proper par- 
 
 J New England Iron Co. v. New ■* People v. Rector, supra. 
 
 York Loan Co., 55 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 351. ^ Cas.sard v. Hiuraan, supra. 
 
 2 People V. Rector, 6 Abb. Pr. ^ Morrison v. Sturges, 26 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 177; AValkeru. Granite Bank, (N. Y.) 177; Strong v. Strong, 1 Abb. 
 19 Abb. Pr. (N.Y.) 111. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 233; Husson v. Fox, 
 
 3 Cassard v. Hiumau, 6 Duer 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 404. 
 (N. Y.), 695.
 
 60'4 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 ties defendant against whom it is desirable to bring an action for 
 libel, has been denied.^ It must state this po,sz7iye??/, not on in- 
 formation or helief; and the absence of a party will not excuse 
 the want of such positive information, unless the affidavit sets 
 forth the sources and grounds of such information and belief .^ 
 In such a case it was said: " The uniform course of decision has 
 been against any attempt to use this power of the court for the 
 mere purpose of hunting for evidence, without some knowl- 
 edge on the part of the applicant as to what the entries are, and 
 in what paper or book it is contained. It is very evident, no 
 such knowledge exists in the present case, and the whole petition 
 rests upon the supposition that there must be some entries in the 
 defendant's books, and if the plaintiff can obtain an inspec- 
 tion, he can obtain some information beneficial to him in con- 
 ducting this prosecution. Such a rule, if carried out to this ex- 
 tent, would give to a party the privilege of always examining his 
 adversary's books, if he can swear that the litigation relates to 
 matters which ought to be entered in the books, and that he can 
 swear that he believes that he keeps correct ones."^ 
 
 § 759. Certainty required in Description. — Practical cer- 
 tainty is required in the description of the books and papers 
 which are to be produced, as in the case of a subpoena duces 
 tecum. ^ 
 
 § 760. [Continued.] Illustration. — An order req-uiring the pro- 
 duction of " books and papers, if any such there are, touching the bus- 
 iness relations of the defendants as between themselves and third 
 parties, which would refer to, or would cover or include, the purchase 
 of the said ice," — has been held too vague and indefinite to be en- 
 forced. ^ 
 
 § 761. Explicit Denial ends the Application. — An explicit 
 denial by the party that there are any such entries, books or 
 
 1 Opdyke r. Marble, 18 Abb. Pr. * Ante, §750; Olncy v. Hatcliff, 37 
 (N. Y.) 2(!(;; Walker v. Granite Bauk, Ilun (N. Y.), 28(1. 
 
 19 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 111. ^ Oluey v. Hatcliff, 37 IIuu (N. Y.), 
 
 2 Walker u. Granite P,ank, iiupra. 28(J. 
 
 3 Ibid., opiuiou by Ini^raham, P. J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 605 
 
 papers, under his control, ends the appHcation. He cannot, it 
 has been ruled, })e subjected to a fishing examination.^ 
 
 § 762. Vacatixg Duces Tecubi on Application of Attorney. — In 
 a case in New York, brought to recover moneys alleged to have been 
 taken from the plaintiffs' firm by the defendant, while employed by the 
 plaintiffs as a book-keeper or clerk, the defendant alleged that the 
 moneys were taken in pursuance of an arrangement with one Clyde, 
 who was then the senior partner of the plaintiffs' firm, by which the de- 
 fendant was to have one-fourth of the profits. The defendant sub- 
 poenaed one of the plaintiffs to produce the books of the firm. The 
 subpoena was thereafter set aside, on an application of the plaintiffs, 
 based upon an affidavit of one of their attorneys, stating that he be- 
 lieved that the subpoena was served with a view of annoying the plaint- 
 iffs, and that the books called for were from forty to fifty in number. 
 It was held that the court erred in granting the application to vacate 
 the subpoena ; that if the subpoena was too broad, the court should have 
 required the plaintiff to allow the defendant to inspect the books, or 
 should have compelled them to produce copies of such portions of the 
 books as were material to the issues. The court said: " The case to 
 be tried, in such a case, is stifled without a trial. The materiality of 
 evidence should be determined at the trial, where an exception is pos- 
 sible to a ruling of the judge before whom the trial is had. In this 
 case, if the books are material, there is no remedy.'"-^ 
 
 § 763. Appeal from an Order Granting an Inspection. — 
 
 In New York an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, at general 
 term, from an order made at special term, granting or denying 
 to a party leave to inspect and examine the books of the party 
 appealing. Such an order is regarded as disposing of a sub- 
 stantial right. "^ But the Court of Appeals of New York does not 
 revise such orders. That court has said : " Whether the subpoena 
 duces tecum should be set ix^xde, \s ws matter of discretion in the 
 cou'"t below ; and whether permission to inspect and copy plaint- 
 
 1 Hoyt V. American Exch. Bk., 1 ^ Clyde v. Rogers, 24 Huu (N. Y.), 
 
 Duer (N. Y.), 652. lu this case, the 145. 
 
 mode of making application for the ^ xhompsou v. Erie Ry. Co., 9 Abb. 
 
 discovery under the Revised Statutes Pr. (x. s.) (N. Y.) 212; Woods v. 
 
 and Code of Civil Procedure of New Figaiiiere, 25 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 522. 
 York, is stated.
 
 606 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 iff s books should be granted, was also matter of discretion. 
 These are matters of practice, with which we have no jurisdic- 
 tion to interfere. The appeal should therefore be dismissed with 
 costs." ^ 
 
 § 704. Question for Decision on Appeal. — On an appeal 
 from such an order, the question for decision is, whether suffi- 
 cient evidence appears to satisfy the court that the books called 
 for are material and necessary for the applicant, as claimed; and 
 it has been ruled that, where there is no denial of the facts 
 alleged, the applicant is entitled to the benefit of all intend- 
 ments and inferences which may be drawn from the allegations 
 made by him.-^ 
 
 Article II. — Notice to Produce and Secondary Evidence. 
 
 Subdivision 1. — JSfotice to Produce. 
 
 Section 
 
 770. Necessity of the Notice. 
 
 771. Notice not Complied with, lets iu Secondary Evidence. 
 
 772. Object of requiring Notice. 
 
 773. Exception where the Pleadings give Notice. 
 
 774. Dispensed with when Paper iu Court. 
 
 775. Notice to Produce a Notice not Necessary. 
 
 776. Not to Produce a Notice to au Indorser. 
 
 777. Exception in the Case of Recorded Deeds. 
 
 778. Exception where the Opposite Party has Obtained the Paper Surrepti- 
 
 tiously. 
 
 779. Whether Notice in Writing or by Parol. 
 
 780. Description of the Papers in the Notice. 
 
 781. Notice to Agent or Attorney. 
 
 782. Length of Time of Notice. 
 
 783. Instances where Length of Time was held Suflicient. 
 784r. Instances where Length of Time was held Insutticient. 
 
 785. Notice applies to any Subsequent Trial. 
 
 786. Evidence of the Possession of the Documents. 
 
 787. Evidence to Excuse their Production. 
 
 788. Where the Document is held by a Tliird Party. 
 
 1 Clyde V. Rogers, 87 N. Y. 625; s.c. - Tliompson v. Erie Ry. Co., 9 Abb. 
 
 in court below, 2-1 Hun (N. Y.), 145. Pr. (x. s.) (N. Y.) 212.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 607 
 
 Section 
 
 789. Party failiug to Produce cannot meet Secondary Proof Avith like Proof. 
 
 790. [Continued.] A Contrary View. 
 
 791. After Paper Produced, Secondary Evidence not Admissible. 
 
 792. What Secondary Evidence may be given. 
 
 793. Answer to Notice not Evidence. 
 
 79-1. Presumption of Contents in Case of Failure to Produce. 
 795. Evidence of Attempts to Destroy or Fabricate Evidence. 
 79G. Secondary Evidence as to Incidental and Collateral Papers. 
 
 § 770. Necessity of the Notice. — Where a written instrument 
 is in the posses.sion of the opposite party and is material to the 
 issues, secondary evidence of its contents is not in general ad- 
 missible, unless a seasonable notice to produce it upon the trial, 
 has been served upon such party or his counsel, and not complied 
 with.^ And it is error to allow a copy to be given in evidence, 
 without proof of a previous notice to produce the original.^ 
 Except as hereafter stated, preliminary notice to produce the 
 instrument, before resorting to inferior evidence of its contents, 
 is indispensable. " Inconvenience or absence from the State is 
 not an excuse for omitting this notice; the exception would be 
 where the party himself could not be found after diligent inquiry. 
 Then the law would treat the instrument as lost. Other excep- 
 tions are, where the action is brought for the instrument itself, 
 when proof of notice is not necessary. The action for the in- 
 strument is a demand for the production of it."^ Roundly 
 stated, the rule is that, in order to lay a foundation for secondary 
 evidence, it must be shown that the oricinal writingr is lost or tie- 
 stroked by time, mistake or accident, or is in the hands of the 
 adverse party, who has had due notice to produce it on the trial. ^ 
 The rule is the same in criminal as well as in civil cases. ^ A 
 
 1 Grimes v. Fall, 15 Cal. (33; Farm- - Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. St. 
 
 ers' &c. Bank v. Lonergan, 21 Mo. -t<J; 228. 
 
 Williams v. Benton, 12 La. Ann. 91; ^ Carland v. Cunningham, 37 Pa. 
 
 Anderson Bridge Co. v. Applegate, 13 St. 228, 232, opinion by Thompson, J. 
 
 Ind. 399; Potier v. Barclay, 15 Ala. •* Anderson Bridge Co. i?. Applegate, 
 
 439; United States v. Winchester, 2 13 Ind. 339. 
 
 McLean (U. S.), 135; Fuller v. Hoyt, » United States v. Winchester, 2 
 
 14 Tex. 49; Murchison v. McLeod, 2 McLean (U. S.), 135. 
 Jones L. (N. C.) 239.
 
 608 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 demand before suit brought for the delivery of the instrument, 
 does not take the phiee of a notice to produce it for evidential 
 purposes upon the trial. ^ 
 
 § 771. Notice not Complied with lets in Secondary Evi- 
 dence. — Conversely, if a seasonable notice to produce has been 
 given and disregarded, parol evidence of the contents of the 
 paper will be heard, or a copy of it will be admitted in evidence, 
 on proof that it is a copy.'^ Where one party gives to the other 
 notice to produce certain instruments of writing known to be in 
 his possession, and the party so notified fails to produce them, it 
 is competent to inquire, upon cross-examination of a witness for 
 such party, what are the contents of such instruments.^ 
 
 § 772. Object of requiring- Notice to Produce. — The object 
 of requiring notice to produce to be given, is to prevent the 
 party to whom the notice is directed from being taken by siirjjrise.^ 
 
 § 773. Exception where the Pleadings give Notice. — Ac- 
 cording to numerous holdings, notice to produce an original paper 
 is not required, where the form of the action, or the pleadings are 
 such as to give notice that its production will be necessary at the 
 trial, to contradict the evidence of the other party .^ Thus, where 
 the action is brought for fhe 2)Ofisession of the jiaper itself, ^•.9'-!i 
 
 1 Fuller V. Hoyt, U Tex. 49. It 2 McKellip v. Mcllheuuy, 4 Watts 
 
 has been held that a party may testify (Pa.), 317; Augur Steel &c. Co. v. 
 
 orally as to the amount clue him, from Whittier, 117 Mass. 451; Comraou- 
 
 a writteu account of a sale sliown him, wealth v. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 272. 
 
 made by the defendant as his factor, ^ Pangboru v. Continental Ins. Co. 
 
 without giving the plaintiff notice to (Michigan), 29 N. W. Rep. 475. 
 
 produce it, — the theory of the court •* Field v. Zamansky, 9 Bradw. 
 
 Ijeiug that, as the account of the sale (111.) 47; Milliken v. Barr, 7 Pa. St. 
 
 was made by a third party person, to 23. 
 
 wit.au auctioneer, it was not such an ^ Nealley v. Greenough, 25 N. H. 
 
 instrument as must be produced in 325; llammon v. Hopping, 13 Wend, 
 
 evidence. First National Bank w. De- (N. Y.) 503; How v. Hall, 14 East, 
 
 catur, 50 111. 321. Compare Weaver v. 274; Scott v. Jones, 4 Taunt. 865; 
 
 Crocker, 49 111. 401, where a somewhat Whitehead v. Scott, 1 Mood. &K. 2; 
 
 similar ruling was made. But the Buciier v. Jarratt. 3 Bos. & Pul. 143; 
 
 soundness of these holdings seems Jolley v. Taylor, 1 Camp. 143; People 
 
 doubtful. V. Holbrook, 13 Joims. (N. Y.) 90;
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 609 
 
 an action of trover, a notice to produce it is not necessary.^ So, 
 in assumpsit against a carrier for the non-delivery of written in- 
 struments, it is not necessary to prove a notice to the defendant 
 to produce them, before giving parol evidence of their contents. ^ 
 So, the defendants to an action are entitled, on the trial, without 
 notice, to the production of all papers which formed any part of 
 the contract sued on.'^ So, in an action for damages iov forging a 
 note, evidence that the note was in the hands of the defendant, 
 and that it was forged, is admissible, without producing the note, 
 or giving the defendant notice in the declaration to produce it.^ 
 So, on the trial of an indictment for the larceny of hank-notes 
 or other written instruments, where the stolen property is 
 alleged to be in the possession of the accused, parol evidence 
 may be given of their contents, without notice to the accused to 
 produce them; ^ though there is opinion to the contrary.^ But 
 in the last view, where notice has been given and refused, copies 
 may be given in evidence. It is no argument to say that, be- 
 cause the defendant was under bond to produce the originals, 
 and thus give evidence against himself, their contents cannot be 
 l^roved by copies.^ 
 
 Hardin v. Kritsineer, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 •iWd; Bissell v. Drake, 19 Jolnis. (N. 
 Y.) G6; McCleau v. Hertzog (J Serg. 
 & E. (Pa.) 154; Cora. v. Messiuger, 1 
 Biuu. (Pa.) 273; Lawson v. Bachmau, 
 81 N. Y. 616: Howell v. Huyck, 2 Abb. 
 App. Dee. (N. Y.) 423; Hooker v. 
 Eagle Bank, 30 N. Y. 83, 86. This 
 rule has been denied in Alabama, 
 where it has been held that secondary 
 evidence of tlie written demand and 
 notice, given by a landlord to his 
 tenant, which is made necessary by a 
 statute to enaljle the landlord to 
 maintain against the tenant an action 
 of unlawful detainer, cannot l)e shown 
 by secondary evidence in such an ac- 
 tion, without a notice to produce the 
 original. Dumas v. Hunter, 30 Ala. 
 75. 
 
 1 McCleau v. Hertzog, 6 Serg. & K. 
 
 (Pa.) 154; People v. Holbrook, 13 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 90. See also Ross v. 
 Bruce, 1 Day (Conn.), 100; Scott v. 
 Stark, 4 Taunt. 865; Rose v. Lewis, 10 
 Mich. 483. 
 
 2 JoUey V. Taylor, 1 Camp. 143, 
 per Lord Mansfield, C. J. 
 
 ■^ Dewitt V. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298, 
 301. 
 
 ^ Bruce v. Ross, 1 Day (Conn.), 
 100. 
 
 5 McGinuis v. State, 24 Ind. 500 
 (overruling Williams v. State, 16 Ind. 
 461); Com. v. Messinger, IBinn. (Pa.) 
 273; State v. Gurnee, 14 Kan. Ill, 
 120. 
 
 " Rex V. Ilaworth, 4 Car. & P. 
 254. 
 
 ' Le Merchand's Case, cited in 
 Leach's Cr. Cas. 336, n. See other 
 cases cited in tlie same note. 
 
 39
 
 610 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoni[). Tl',, 
 
 § 774. Dispensed with when Papers in Court. — Accord- 
 ing to one view, where the papers asked for are in court, in the 
 hands of the attorney of the opposite party, there is no neces- 
 sity for a previous notice. In such a case, it was said: "No 
 surprise or hardship could result from his being required to pro- 
 duce them on demand." ^ But, according to another view, 
 notice to produce is necessary, even though the paper is in court 
 at the trial. This is not required in order that, upon proof of 
 such notice, the party having the custody of the paper may be 
 compelled to furnish evidence against himself; but it is required 
 to lay the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence 
 of the contents of the paper. " This rule," it has been observed, 
 "is of immense importance to prevent surprise indeed, it has 
 been held that proof that the adverse party or his attorney, has 
 the instrument in court, does not make notice to produce it un- 
 necessary, for the object of the notice is not only to produce the 
 paper, but to give the party an opportunity to provide proper 
 testimony to support or impeach it." - But upon a motion or 
 rule, reciting matters appearing in the ^les of the court, they may 
 be produced without further formality.^ 
 
 § 775. Notice to produce a Notice not Necessary. — ; 
 
 "Every written notice," said Gibson, C, J., "is, for the best 
 of all reasons, to be proved by a duplicate original ; for if it were 
 otherwise, the notice to produce the original could be proved 
 only in the same way as the original notice itself, and thus a 
 fresh necessity would be constantly arising, ad infinitum^ to 
 prove notice of the preceding notice." ^ 
 
 § 776. Not to produce a Notice to an Indorser. — Perhaps 
 not for this reason, a written notice to an indorser of a promis- 
 sory note may be proved by parol, without giving notice to par- 
 ties to produce the writing ; ^ but more probably for the reason 
 
 1 Field V. Zaraausby, n Bradw. '' Eisenhart v. Slayinaker, 14 Sers;. 
 (111.) 479. & R. (Pa.) 153; reaffirmed in Morrow 
 
 2 Millikeu v. Barr, 7 Pa. St. 23, y. Com., 48 Pa. St. 305. 
 
 opinion l)y Burnside, ,J. '" Eaiile Bank v. Cliapiu, 3 Pick. 
 
 3 Souderv. Lippiucott,48N..T.L. 437. (Mass.) 180; Central Bank r. Allen,
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPF.RS. 611 
 
 that such a notice consists of a few simple facts, the nature of 
 which is well known. 
 
 § 777. Exceptions in the Case of Recorded Deeds. — An ex- 
 ception to the foregoing rule is admitted in the case of recorded 
 deeds. Here a certified copy from the record may be used, on 
 the proper preliminary proof being made, without notice to the 
 opposite party to produce it.^ There are holdings to the effect 
 that, if the deed has been recorded, a transcript from the record 
 may be introduced, provided the party make oath that the original 
 is not in his custody, and is beyond his control. ^ 
 
 § 77S. Exception where the Opposite Party has Obtained the 
 Paper Surreptitiously. — The affidavit of a party to a cause, 
 that an original paper, of which he has had the custody, has dis- 
 appeared without his consent, and has been seen in possession of 
 the counsel of the opposite party, has been held sufficient proof 
 to let in secondary evidence of its contents. '^ 
 
 § 779. Whether Notice in Writing or by Parol. — It has been 
 said tliat the general rule of practice, regarding a written notice 
 to produce papers, has reference only to the i^reliminar}^ prepa- 
 rations for the trial, and that the reason of the rule does not ap- 
 ply to a notice given in the presence and hearing of the court, 
 while the trial is in progress. It was therefore held that a verbal 
 notice, given at a previous meeting before a referee, was good.* 
 
 § 780. Description of the Papers in the Notice. — As in the 
 
 case of a subpoena duces tecum, ^ reasonable or practical certaintv 
 in the description of the pa})ers, the production of which is re- 
 quired, is generally insisted upon; since it would be unjust to let 
 
 16 Me. 41; Roberts v. Bradshaw, 1 358; Mariner v. Saunders, 5 Gilra. 
 
 Stark. 28; Kine u. Beaumout, 7 J. B. (III.) 113; Bowman v. Wettig, 39 111. 
 
 Moore, 112. 410, 422. In Missouri without the 
 
 1 Bowman v. Wettig, 39 111. 410. oath: Barton r. Murrain, 27 Mo. 235; 
 The proof which was held sutlicient in Avery v. Adams, 69 Mo. 003. 
 
 this case was, that the party had ^ ]\iorgan v. Jones, 24 Ga. 155. 
 
 searched for the deed unsuccessfully, * Kerr v. McGuire, 28 ^. Y. 446, 
 
 and could not produce it. ^ Ante, § 175. 
 
 2 Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gilm. (111.)
 
 612 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmj). Tl'., 
 
 in secondary evi^ience of a paper, upon a notice to produce which 
 failed to specify the character of the paper intended. It has 
 been held that a notice to produce " all letters, papers and doc- 
 uments, touching or concerning the bill of exchange mentioned 
 in the declaration in this cause, and the debt sought to be recov- 
 ered," — is too general.^ In general, where the notice is such 
 that the party to whom it is delivered could not mistake the pa- 
 per intended, it will be held sufficient.'^ It will be good, although 
 informal and «ua6*cw?"rt^e in certain particulars, — as, for instance, 
 as to the date of the paper, — if it fairly apprize the party what 
 paper is to be produced.^ Accordingly, a notice describing a 
 letter as inclosed in an envelope, has been held sufficient to call 
 for both the envelope and the inclosure.* In an action against a 
 person seeking to charge him as a partner, a notice to produce 
 "all papers pertaining to the partnership" calls for any (ieec^ 
 which the defendant may have making him a partner.^ 
 
 § 781. Notice to Agent or Attorney. — Notice need not, in 
 general, be given to the party himself ; notice to his agent or at- 
 torney is sufficient,® even in penal actions.^ 
 
 § 782. Length of Time of Notice. — " The length of time," 
 says Clopton, J., " for which notice should be given, depends 
 on the attendant circumstances, and the time required to ob- 
 tain the paper. The notice should be for a reasonable time — 
 sufficiently long to enable the party to procure and produce it 
 without undue inconvenience. If the paper is not in court, and 
 cannot be produced without delaying the trial, notice should be 
 o;iven prior to the trial ; but when the paper is in court, and in 
 the power of the party to i)roduce immediately, notice at the trial 
 is sufficient." ^ 
 
 1 Frauce v. Lucy, Ry. & M. 341. ' Gates v. Winter, 3 T. R 30G. 
 
 2 Graham/?. 01dis,lFost.& Fin. 2G2. » Littletons. Clayton, 77 Ala. 571, 
 
 3 Franliu. Manny, 2Daly (N. Y.),92. 574, 575. "Due notice," under tlie 
 * United States v. Duff, 6 Fed. Rep. North Carolina statute, means sufficient 
 
 45. time to enal)le the party to have the 
 
 •^ Jones r. Parker, 20 N. II., 31. document present when called for. 
 
 « Attorney-Gen. r. Le Merchant, 2 McDuuakU'. Carson, 95 N. C. 378. 
 
 T. R. 203 n.; ante, § l'.»0.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 613 
 
 § 783. Instances wheke Length of Time was held Sufficient. — 
 It is said by Russell : " In ^owu cases, service of notice on the attor- 
 ney, on the evening before the trial, is in general sufficient." i When, 
 therefore, notice to produce a letter was served upon the defendant's 
 attorney on the afternoon of the day before the trial, at twenty minutes 
 before five o'clock, and he had his office in the same town and near the 
 
 place of trial, it was held that the length of time was sufficient.- 
 
 A notice given on the 2)receding evening was held sufficient, where the 
 
 counting house of the party was very near the court house. ^ Where 
 
 both parties lived in London, a notice served on defendant's attorney 
 at seven o'clock on the evening of the day before the trial, was held not 
 
 too late. ^ Wliere one of the parties lived in the assize town, and 
 
 the plaintiff's attorney served the defendant's attorney in the assize 
 town, on the commission day, with notice to produce a paper, and paid 
 the expense of going to fetch it, and the defendant's attorney said that 
 that was of no use, as the paper was not in existence, — it was held that 
 the plaintiff might give secondary evidence of its contents, as the state- 
 ments of the defendant's attorney that it was not in existence obviated 
 any objection to the lateness of the service of the notice to produce. 
 
 § 784. Instances where Length of Time was held Insufficient. — 
 Unless under special circumstances, a notice to parties is insufficient 
 which barely allows time to procure them by telegraphic communication 
 with clients.^ Notice given to a party dnriug the trial is not suffi- 
 cient, unless it appear to the satisfaction of the court, that the paper is 
 in court at the time and in possession of the party, or, if elsewhere, that 
 
 it would be of easy access.'' Where the trial was at the Middlesex 
 
 sittings (in London), and the plaintiff resided in London, notice served 
 upon him at half past eight o'clock on the evening before the trial, was 
 too late.*^ So, where the notice was served on the plaintiff 's attor- 
 ney at a quarter before nine on the night before the trial, it was held that 
 it was too late.^ A notice to produce deeds was served on the de- 
 fendant's attorney in Essex on Saturday, the commission day of the 
 assizes being Monday. The attorney went to London and fetched 
 them. A notice was served on the commission day evening, to pro- 
 
 1 2 Russ. ou Crimes, 743. s Foster v. Pointer, 9 Car. & P. 718. 
 
 2 Uuited States v. Duff, 6 Fed. Rep. « Dewitt v. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298. 
 45. ' Atwell V. Miller, 6 Md. 11. 
 
 3 Shreve v. Dulauey, 1 Crancli C. C. « Lawrence v. Clark, U Mees. & W. 
 (U. S.) 499. 249. 
 
 * Leaf V. Butt, 1 Car. & M. 451. » Holt v. Meirs, 9 Car. & P. ]91.
 
 614 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [I Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 duce another deed. The attorney stated that he had been to town and 
 fetched the deeds, and that, if the plaintiff would pay the expense of 
 sending for this from town, where it was, it should be had. The plaint- 
 iff did not offer to pay such expense, and the trial was had on Thurs- 
 day. It was held by Lord Tenterden, C. J., that, under these circum- 
 stances, the plaintiff was not entitled to give secondaiy evidence of the 
 
 last mentioned deed.^ Where the notice was given the day previous 
 
 to the trial, to produce a paper which was eiglity miles distant, in the 
 trial of another person, the reviewing court refused to take judicial 
 notice of facts which would imply that the paper could not be obtained, 
 so as to exclude secondary evidence,- — in other words would not, 
 upon these facts, say that the trial court erred in admitting such evi- 
 dence. A notice given several days before the term at which the cause 
 was tried, was deemed j^^i ma facie sufficient, although the party refus- 
 ing the notice resided without the State, — the court reasoning that, if 
 he was willing to produce it, but unable to do so, because of the short- 
 ness of the notice, he should have applied for a continuance.^ 
 
 § 785. Notice applies to any Subsequent Trial. — Where a 
 paper is produced at one trial, it should remain on hie, unless 
 leave is granted to withdraw it for special reasons, so that it may 
 be used at another trial in case a new trial is awarded. " If a 
 party is notilied that a paper is wanted at one trial, it is, or 
 should be known by such party that, if there be a new trial, the 
 paper will be wanted again."* On this principle, as already 
 seen,^ an admission made at the first trial of a cause, if reduced 
 to writing, or incorporated into the record, will be binding upon 
 the party making it, at another trial, unless the trial judge, in 
 the exercise of his discretion, thinks proper to relieve him from 
 it; ^ and the power of the trial judge to grant this relief may be 
 doubted. Upon the same analogy, where notice is given to pro- 
 duce a paper at a trial, that is a sufficient notice to produce the 
 same paper at any subsequent trial of the same cause. ^ If given 
 before a justice of the peace, it is available on a trial in a higher 
 court, to which the cause has been appealed.^ 
 
 1 Curtis V. Spitty, 3 Burn. & Aid. 182. s Ante, § 193. 
 
 2 Cody V. Hough, 20 111. 43. « Holley v. Young, (!8 Me. 215. 
 
 3 Jefford V. Kiuggold, <i Ala. 544. '' liawson v. Kuight, 73 Me. 840. 
 
 ■» Riiwsou V. Kuight, 73 Me. 3i3. » Readt'. Moore, 19 Johns. (N.Y.)337.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXYL] PRODUCTION of books and papers. 615 
 
 § 786. Evidence of the Possession of the Documents. — The 
 
 party giving the notice is bound to prove the books or documents 
 to be in the hands of the opposite party, or under his power or 
 control, before secondary evidence of their contents will be re- 
 ceived. He must prove this by comj^etent evidence. He cannot 
 . prove it by the admissions of otJier persons^ whose admissions are 
 not binding upon the party. ^ But cogent evidence is not re- 
 quired. Where, after notice to produce, bare evidence is given 
 that the document is in the i)ossession of the ixartv receivino- the 
 notice, if it is not produced, secondary evidence of its contents 
 will be heard. '^ It is sufficient evidence to let in secondary proof 
 of the contents of a Avritten instrument, that it was last seen in 
 the possession of the party invited to produce it.^ Evidence 
 that the document is in the hands of the arjenl of the party notified 
 to produce it, — e.r/., where the defendant is a ship-owner, and 
 the document is in the hands of the captain, — is sufficient to let 
 in secondary evidence of its content, if it is not produced.* 
 
 § 787. Evidence to Excuse their Production. — The party 
 notified to produce the document, may produce evidence show- 
 ing that it is lawfully out of his j^osse^sion, whereupon the judge 
 will decide whether secondary evidence of its contents can be 
 admitted, — the question being exclusively within his cogni- 
 zance.^ 
 
 . § 788. [Continued.] Where the Document is lield by a 
 third party. — " In order to let in secondary evidence, the instru- 
 ment need not be in the actual possession of the party; it is 
 enough if it be in his power, which it would be if in the hands 
 of a party in whom it Avould be wrongful not to give up pos- 
 session to him. But he. must have such a right to it as would en- 
 title him, not merely to inspect, but to retain."^ It was 
 accordingly held that, where a document was in the hands of one 
 
 1 Birkbeck ?7. Tucker, 2 Hall (N.Y.), ^ Baldney v. Eltchie, 1 Stark. 333. 
 121. 5 Harvey v. Michell, 2 Mood. & R, 
 
 2 Robb V. Starkey, 2 Car. & K. 366; «?iie, § 318 e« sery. 
 
 JiS. 6 Parry v. May, 1 Mood. & K. 279, 
 
 3 Norton v. Ileyward. 20 Me. 359. 280, opiuiou by Littledale, ,J.
 
 616 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tu., 
 
 who occupied the position of a stake-holder between the party 
 invited to produce it and a third person, secondary evidence of 
 its contents would not be admitted.^ But where the writing is 
 in the possession of a third person, who resides out of the jurh- 
 diction of the court, and does not appear to be in the possession 
 of the opposite party, secondary evidence of it will be let in 
 without a notice to produce it.'^ 
 
 § 789. Party Failing to Produce, cannot meet Secondary 
 Proof with Like Proof. — The party who refuses to produce 
 documentary evidence, when required by an order of the court, 
 cannot, because of his contumacy, be allowed to meet secondary 
 proof of their contents with like proof ; he can only rebut such 
 secondary proof by producing the instruments themselves.-^ 
 
 § 790. [Continued.] A Contrary View. — The contrar}- has been 
 held in Michigan, and in a case where there was merely a notice to 
 produce but no order of court. Notice to produce a paper having 
 been given and not complied with, an alleged copy was offered in evi- 
 dence, and received against objection. Thereafter, the objecting party 
 offered to prove that this copy was not a copy of any paper which he 
 had ever assisted in making, or which had been in his possession. This 
 evidence vras ruled out, and it was hekl error. The court did not per- 
 ceive any sound reason why the document itself should be excluded, if 
 he had it, and said: " There is no authority for such exclusion, where 
 it relates to his own case, even where not produced when called for by 
 his adversary." The court also denied this doctrine of estoppel, as one 
 not calculated to promote justice, and observed further: " If such rule 
 could ever have been proper, there can be no reason for it now, when 
 parties are competent witnesses, and can be compelled, by suhpcena 
 duces tecu7n, to bring into court any paper in their hands, which their 
 adversaries have a right to inspect and prove." "* But it would never- 
 theless seem that where a party refuses, after proper notice, to produce 
 a paper, it would be a mere trifling with justice to allow him to introduce 
 it, after thus driving his adversary to experiment with secondary proof. 
 
 1 Parry v. May, I Mood. & K. 279, 18; Piatt v. Piatt, 58 N. Y. 646, 649, 
 opinion by Littledale, .1. Doon v. Doualier, 113 Mass. 151. 
 
 2 Shepard v. Giddiugs, 22 Couu. •* Molton v. Masou, 21 Mich. 364, 
 282. -^"O) opinion by Campbell, J. 
 
 3 Bogart V. Brown, 5 IMcli. (Mass.)
 
 Tit. Ill, ('h. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPEliS. ()17 
 
 § 791. After Papp:r produced, Secondary Evidence not Admissi- 
 ble. — After a paper is produced in compliance witli the notice, if the 
 producing party offers to verify it by his oath, the other party cannot 
 refuse to use it, and cannot be allowed to introduce a copy in the first 
 instance, on the allegation that the paper produced is not genuine ; 
 although he may show wherein it is erroneous or defective after he 
 once introduces it. " It seems to us," said Mr. Justice Miller, "that 
 the court was right in refusing to admit in the first instance what was 
 conceded to be a cop3% when that which was at least prima facie the 
 original was in court, to answer the notice of the party desiring to use 
 the copy. How far the plaintiff could have been permitted to show a 
 variance of the defendant's paper from the genuine, after it was once 
 introduced, we need not inquire. But a copy could not be introduced 
 until what seemed to be the original had been before the court and be- 
 come the subject of inspection by the jury." i The propriety of this 
 holding is very doubtful. Upon what principle does the mere produc- 
 tion of a paper, in response to a notice, authenticate it as the paper 
 called for in the notice ? Why should the fact that his adversary is 
 willing to verify the paper with his oath, make it incumbent on him to 
 accept that oath and make the paper his evidence, or be estopped from 
 proving the fact? Why should a party be required to put in evidence 
 a paper the authenticity of which he denies, merely because the other 
 party has seen fit to produce it in response to a notice, it may be to 
 produce something else? If be should put it in, as above suggested, 
 upon what principle could he thereafter deny its authenticity? The 
 true rule is that evidence of the contents of a writing which is merely suh- 
 stitutionary, cannot be given where the writing is in court or capable of 
 being produced ; but the rule can have no just application where the 
 identity of the writing which is in court, with the writing whose contents 
 it is sought to prove, is unsettled or in dispute. 
 
 § 792. What Secondary Evidence may be Given. — The re- 
 fusal of the party to produce the paper upon notice, does not 
 dispense with the best evidence of the contents of the paper, 
 which is attainable in the absence of the paper itself, nor does it 
 allow its substance to be made out by anything less than satisfac- 
 tory evidence of all that is essential. ^ 
 
 1 Stitt V. Huidekopers, 17 Wall. 2 Moltou v. Mason, 21 Mich. 364. 
 
 (U. S.) 385, 397.
 
 618 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 793. Answer to T^otice not Evidence. — Before the passage 
 of modern statutes a court of law did not have power to compel 
 the party to produce the paper. It was, therefore, not incum- 
 bent on him to produce it, or to give any reason why he would 
 not. It was held to follow from this, that any answer which 
 he might make to such a notice was irrelevant, and consequently 
 inadmissible as evidence.^ 
 
 § 794. Presumption of Contents in Case of Failure to Pro- 
 duce. — Where the party contumaciously fails to produce a doc- 
 ument after notice, — or, having the power to decline producing it, 
 elects to exercise this power, — everything touching the contents 
 of the document and its execution will be presumed against him, 
 which the case fairly admits of, under the operation of the 
 maxim contra spoliatorem omnia prcesumuntur ? This is a branch 
 of the doctrine of presumptions which it is not intended to go 
 into here . 
 
 § 795. Evidence of Attempts to Destroy or Fabricate Evi- 
 dence. — Evidence of attempts, by the opposite party or by one 
 authorized by him, to destroy, fabricate, or suppress evidence, 
 may be shown, — such acts being in the nature of an admission 
 that the party has no sufficient case unless aided by suppressing 
 or fabricatino; evidence.^ 
 
 § 796. Secondary Evidence as to Incidental and Collateral 
 Papers. — Where a paper relates to an incidental and collateral 
 matter, drawn out to test the temper and credibility of the wit- 
 ness, and in no wise affects the merits of the controversy between 
 the parties, the witness may, without error, be asked to state its 
 substance.^ Thus, it was held allowable to ask a witness of the 
 opponent, who had said that he had seen and copied a paper in 
 reference to the expenses of the suit, subscribed by various per- 
 
 1 Reid V. Colcork, 1 Nott & Mc. C. (111.) 531; Chicago City R. Co. v. Mc- 
 (S. C.) 604. Mahou, 103111. 485; ante, § 453. 
 
 2 See Bciijamiii r. KlUiiuer, SO Ky. •< Kleiu v. Russell, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 
 472. 433, 403. 
 
 ■' Lyons ?■. Lawrciici', 1:.' Hrachv.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 619 
 
 sons, what were the contents of the paper, — the purpose of the 
 question being to show that the witnesses of the opponent were 
 in a combination to defeat the phiintiff and to share the expenses 
 of the opponent. In such a case, it is not necessar}^ to lay a 
 foundation, by calling on the opponent to jiroduce the paper. ^ 
 On the other hand, it has been ruled that a party may object, 
 though his witness does not, to a question propounded to the wit- 
 ness on cross-examination, as to whether the latter had made cer- 
 tain statements in an affidavit not produced, — the reasoning 
 being that the affidavit was the best evidence. - 
 
 /Subdivision 2. — /Secondary Evidence of lost Instruments. 
 
 Section 
 
 799. Preliminary. 
 
 800. Secondary Evidence of Lost lustrumeuts. 
 
 801. Voluntary Destruction. 
 
 802. Foundation to let in Secondary Evidence. 
 
 803. Special Count not Necessary. 
 
 804. Question Decided by the Judge. 
 
 805. Under what Rules of Evidence. 
 
 806. His Decision not Reveviewable. 
 
 807. Person last known to have been in Possession must be Examined. 
 
 808. Certainty of Evidence to Prove Contents. 
 
 809. Stringency of the Rule, when Relaxed. 
 
 810. Lost Depositions. 
 
 § 799 Preliminary. — It is not within the plan of this work 
 to enter into a full investigation of the subject of lost documents, 
 of the methods of supplying them, and of secondary evidence of 
 their contents; but a slight digression will be made for the pur- 
 pose of suggesting some outline views on the subject, referring 
 the reader for fuller treatment to the standard works on evi- 
 dence. 
 
 § 800. Secondary Evidence of Lost Instruments. — A party 
 who intends to use a written instrument in evidence must pro- 
 duce the original, if in his possession ; but if it is in the possession 
 
 i Klein v. Russell, supra. 2 Xewcomb v. Griswold, 24 X. Y. 
 
 298, 301 (Smith, J., dissenting).
 
 620 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 of the other party, who refuses to produce it after notice, or if 
 the original is lost or destroyed, — secondary evidence, the same 
 beino- the best which the nature of the case allows, will be admit- 
 ted. The party in such a case may read a counterpart ; or if 
 there is no counterpart, an examined copy ; or if there is no such 
 copy, he may give parol evidence of its contents. Where a writ- 
 ing has been vohmtarily destroyed, for fraudulent purposes, or to 
 create an excuse for its non-production, secondary evidence of 
 its contents, by the party so destroying it, is not admissible. 
 But where the destruction or loss, although voluntary, happens 
 through mistake or accident, such evidence will be admitted.^ 
 
 § 801. Voluntary Destruction. — From the preceding, it 
 follows that, where the proof is that the party deliberately and 
 voluntarily burned the instrument sued on, and there is nothing 
 to account or afford any explanation of the act, consistent with 
 an honest or justifiable purpose, he will not be allowed to intro- 
 duce secondary evidence of its contents.^ 
 
 § 802. Foundation to let in Secondary Evidence. — A 
 
 party alleging the loss of a material paper must, in order to lay 
 a foundation for introducing secondary evidence of its contents, 
 show that he has, in good faith and to a reasonable degree, ex- 
 hausted all the sources of information and means of discovery 
 which the nature of the case would suggest, which are accessi- 
 ble to him. The person last known to have been in possession 
 of the paper must be examined to prove the loss ; if out of the 
 State, his deposition must be procured, or some good excuse 
 must be given for not procuring it.^ 
 
 1 Riggs V. Tayloe, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) ■'' Kearney v. New York, 92 N. Y. 
 483; Jackson v. Frier, 16 Johns. (N. G17; Simpson v. Dall, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 
 Y.) 192. That secondary evidence of 4(J0, 475. Wrongful detention in an- 
 the contents of written instruments is other State not sufficient to let in evi- 
 admissible, wherever it appears that deuce of contents of a negotiable 
 the original is destroyed or lost by ac- paper, under the New York Statute re- 
 cideut, without fault of the party, was lating to lost instruments : Van Al- 
 also ruled in Keuner v. Bank of Col- styne v. Commercial Bank, 4 Abb. Apj). 
 umbia, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 581. Dec. (N. Y.) 449. Contra, evidence 
 
 2 Blade v. Nolaud, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) that the possessor of the note is out 
 173. of the State lets in secondary evidence
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 621 
 
 § 803. Special Count not Necessary. — Contraiy to the 
 English practice, it seems to be the practice in this country, that 
 a special count in the declaration or complaint is not necessary, 
 in order to let in proof that the instrument sued on has been lost; 
 since this would shut the door against secondary evidence in all 
 cases where the instrument happens to become lost after the 
 declaration is tiled. ^ 
 
 § 804. Question decided by the Judge. — The evidence of 
 the loss of a written instrument, adduced to lay the foundation for 
 introduction of secondary evidence of its execution and contents, 
 is addressed solely to the judge, who is to determine it exclusive- 
 ly, without the intervention of the jury.'- 
 
 § 805. Under what Rules of Evidence. — Evidence ad- 
 duced upon this question is not governed by the ordinary rules 
 of evidence. Thus where, under the old law, a witness was in- 
 competent by reason of interest, he was not incompetent to speak 
 upon this preliminary question. For a like reason, a party was 
 not incompetent. "^ 
 
 § 806. His Decision not Reviewable. — Whether a founda- 
 tion has been laid, sufficient to let in secondary evidence of the 
 contents of an instrument alleged to be lost, is a preliminary 
 question of fact for the decision of the trial judge, the deter- 
 mination of which is not reviewable on error or appeal, unless 
 the evidence of loss was so clear and conclusive that it was 
 error of law to find against it.* 
 
 § 807. Person last known to have been in Possession must 
 be Examined. — The person last known to have been in posses- 
 sion of the paper must be examined as a witness to prove its 
 loss, even where he is out of the jurisdiction, — in which latter 
 
 of its contents: Bronsou v. Tuthill, 1 ^ Jackson r. Frier, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 20G. l'J2. 
 
 1 Reuner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 ■• Kearney v. New York. 92 N. Y. 
 Wlieat. (U. S.) 581, 597. 017, Gl'O; a«ie, §§ 318, 324. 
 
 2 .Tacksou V. Frier, 10 Johns. 
 (N. Y.) 192.
 
 622 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 case, his deposition must be procured if i^racticable, or some 
 good excuse given for not procuring it.^ 
 
 § 808. Certainty of Evidence to prove Contents. — Parol 
 
 evidence to prove the contents of a lost instrument should show 
 that it was duly executed as required by law, and should sub- 
 stantially disclose its contents. The testimony of a witness who 
 has simply heard it read, and who can give but a small portion 
 of its contents, is insufficient.^ In the case of a lost note, it is 
 not necessary that its contents should be proved by a notarial 
 copy. All that is required is that it should be proved by the 
 best evidence, which the party has it in his power to produce, 
 which must, at all events, be such as to leave no reasonable doubt 
 as to the substantial parts of the paper. ^ 
 
 § 80D. Stringency of the Rule, when Relaxed. — The strin- 
 gency of the rule requiring search for documents and proof 
 of their loss, before letting in secondary evidence of their con- 
 tents, is proportioned to their cJiaracter and value. Slight proof 
 of such loss is sufficient, where the documents, from their nature, 
 w^ould have only a transitory value, and where no reasons exist 
 for preserving them. Accordingly, it has been held that a dep- 
 osition will not be rejected because the witness speaks of papers 
 not produced, if it appear that they were received a long time 
 before the deposition was taken, and are such as would probably 
 not be preserved for so long, or are not in the power of the wit- 
 ness or the party.* It has been so held concerningjram27?/ letters 
 received by the witness in a foreign country.^ 
 
 1 Kearney v. New York, 92 N. Y. ^ ^n^, Ljfe lus. Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 
 617, 621; Deaver v. Eice, 2 Ired. L. Pa. St. 507, 513. The doctrine of this 
 (N. C.) 280; Dickinson v. Breedeu, 25 case qualities the following doubtful 
 111. 186; Bunch v. Hurst, 3 Des. Eq. text of Greenleaf: "If a witness, 
 ^S. C.) 273; Turner v. Yates, 16 How. being examined in a foreign country 
 (U.S.) 14; Parkins 11. Cobbet, 1 Car. upon interrogatories sent out with a 
 &P. 282. coraraissiou for tliat purpose, sliould, 
 
 2 Edwards v. Noyes, Qio N. Y. 125. in one of his answers, state the con- 
 
 3 Kenner v. Bank of Columbia, tents of a letter whicli is not produced, 
 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 581, 597. tliat part of the deposition will be 
 
 * Tilghman w. Fisher, 9 Watts (Pa.), suppressed, notwithstanding, lu- l)eing 
 441. out of the jurisdiction, there may be
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF books a\d papers. 623 
 
 § 810. Lost Depositions. — Applying the rule stated in the 
 last chapter, that objections must specifically state the ground of 
 objection relied on, we find that it was held that, where an or- 
 iginal deposition regularly taken, sealed up, transmitted, opened, 
 and filed in the case, was lost, and a copy, taken under the direc- 
 tion of the clerk of the court and sworn to as a true copy, was 
 offered in evidence in its place, an objection to the copy " on the 
 ground that it was not the original," — was too indefinite to let 
 in argument that the witness was alive, that the lost deposi- 
 tion could only be supplied by the same witness, and that sec- 
 ondary evidence was inadmissible to prove the contents of the 
 first deposition. 1 • 
 
 Article III. — Use of Books and Papers at the Trial. 
 
 Sectiox 
 815. Party not bouud to put iu Evidence all Papers produced on his Notice., 
 81G. But they may be put in Evidence by the Party Producing them. 
 
 817. [Continued.] Illustration. 
 
 818. Tender of Documentary Evidence, how made. 
 
 819. Reading the Paper. 
 
 820. Proof of Execution. 
 
 821. [Continued.] Illustrations. 
 
 822. [Continued.] ^Vhen Proof of Execution Dispensed "nith. 
 
 823. [Continued.] Admission of Document Carries with itProof of Signature 
 
 and Indorsement. 
 
 824. [Continued.] Objection for want of Proof by Subscribing 'Wituess. 
 
 825. [Continued.] Autlienticatiou of Documents in a Deposition. 
 
 826. [Continued.] Exhibits, where there are Different Sets of luterroo-a- 
 
 tories. 
 
 827. Right of Inspection. 
 
 828. [Continued.] Illustration. 
 
 829. [Continued.] WHiere Document is Produced on Notice. 
 
 no means of compelling liim to pro- We have no power to compel the wit- 
 duce tlie letter." 1 Greenl. Ev., § 88. ness to give any evidence at all, buc 
 This statement of Greeuleaf is based if he does give an answer, that an- 
 on the authority of an English nisi swer must be taken in relation to the 
 prius decision iu which Tiudal, C. J., rules of our law on the subject of evi- 
 said: "I think it would be a most deuce." Steinkeller v. Newton, 9 
 inconvenient and a most dangerous Carr. & P. 313. 
 
 rule to hold, that it should rest in the i Burton u. Driggs, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 option of the party examined, whether 125, 133. 
 he will produce the document or not.
 
 G24: EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thouip. Tl'., 
 
 Section 
 
 830. Eight to Seal up Pages which are not Pertiueut. 
 
 831. Cross-Examiiiing as to contents of Written Documents. 
 
 (1.) Document must be produced. 
 
 (2.) Aliter where the Witness is a Party. 
 
 (3.) When the Document itself Evidence. 
 
 (4.) Witness asked whether Kepresentation in Writing or Parol. 
 
 832. Cross-Examiniug Witness as to tlie Contents of Letter claimed to lia\'e 
 
 been written by him. 
 
 833. [Continued.] Illustration of a Violation of this Rule. 
 
 834. Use of Document for one Purpose does not make it Evidence for all 
 
 Purposes. 
 
 835. Whole of a Correspondence. 
 
 836. Assailing the Integrity of One's own Documentary Evidence. 
 
 837. Effect of putting in Evidence Affidavit of Opposing Party. 
 
 838. Telegraphic Dispatches. 
 
 839. Dispatch Received not Evidence of Dispatch Sent. 
 
 840. Book Entries on Proof that tliey were Truly made. 
 
 841. Use of the Instrument whicli is the Foundation of the Action. 
 
 842. Duplicate Evidence of Indebteduess. 
 
 843. Objections to Documentary Evidence must be Specific. 
 
 § 815. Party not Bound to pvit in Evidence all Papers Pro- 
 duced on his Notice. — A party is not bound to put in evidence 
 all the papers produced in response to his notice, — especialh' 
 where papers are produced not named therein. This is illus- 
 trated by a ruling in an action on a policy of insurance. The 
 plaintiffs, in order to prove the death of the insured, and a com- 
 pliance with the conditions of the policy as to proof of loss, 
 called upon the defendant company to produce " all proofs of 
 the death " of the insured. The defendant produced a package 
 containing those proofs, which the plaintiff had furnished it, and 
 also several other papers. It was held that the plaintiff was not 
 bound to offer any evidence beyond the papers thus produced, 
 but might select only those which he had furnished to the de- 
 fendant, and that it was error to reject those which he offered 
 because he did not offer all.^ 
 
 § 81G. But tbey May l>e i>ut in Evidence by the Party pro- 
 ducing them. — It was ruled by Lord Kenyon that, where a 
 notice has been given to produce books, if the party giving the 
 
 1 Heaffer v. New Era Life Ins. Co., 101 Pa. St. 178.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVL] USE of books and papers. 625 
 
 notice calls for them and exhibits them, this fact does not make 
 them evidence for the party whose books they are; but it is only 
 a matter of observation to the jury, in behalf of such party, that 
 the entries are in his favor ; ^ but if the party calling for them 
 thereafter declines to use them in evidence, they may be put in 
 evidence by the party producing them, provided they are mate- 
 rial and relevant to the issues,^ and this, although they were 
 called for under a misapprehension of their contents, provided 
 there is no doubt as to their identity. " A party cannot," 
 said Bigelow, J., " require his adversary to produce a document, 
 and, after inspecting it, insist on excluding it from the case 
 altogether. Such a course of proceeding would give one party 
 an unfair advantage over the other. He would gain the priv- 
 ilege of looking into the private documents of the other party, 
 without any corresponding obligation or risk on his own part. It 
 is, therefore, generally deemed a just and wise rule that, in such 
 cases, the paper called for and produced, after it has been seen 
 and examined by the party calling for it, becomes competent evi- 
 dence in the case for both parties.^ It is manifest that this rule 
 would be of little use, if the paper can be excluded on the allega- 
 tion that the party calling for it mistook the nature of its con- 
 tents. Generally, the party seeking for it acts on the supposition 
 that it contains matter favorable to his side of the case. He, 
 therefore, assumes the risk of making it evidence; and cannot be 
 heard to say, after he has ascertained its contents by inspection, 
 that he intended to call for a different paper, or, in other words, 
 that its contents were not such as he expected. If there is no 
 doubt as to the identity of the document, the party who pro- 
 duces it has the right to insist on its being read to the jury; and 
 the court cannot, in the exercise of their discretion, deny him 
 this privilege." * 
 
 §817. [Continued.] Illustration. — During the progress of a 
 cause before a surrogate in New York, contesting a will, a subpoena 
 
 1 Sayer v. Kitchen, 1 Esp. 210. 3 Citing 1 Greenl. Ev., § 5(13. 
 
 2 Hoyt V. Jackson, 3 Dem. (X. Y.) •* Clark r. Fletcher, 1 Allen (Mass.), 
 388. 53, 57. 
 
 40
 
 626 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSKS. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 duces tecum was issued at the request of the contestant, and was served 
 on Mr. ConkUng, former counsel of the contestant, requiring him to 
 produce certain papers therein described. In obedience to the sub- 
 poena, Mr. Conkling attended in court, and requested to be sworn as a 
 witness, and, on being sworn, produced to the surrogate the papers 
 described in the subpoena, and, taking the court's direction, delivered 
 them to the surrogate. Before resting his case, the contestant's coun- 
 sel moved that the papers deposited with the court by Mr. Conkling, 
 " be placed in the custody of counsel for contestant." The court said : 
 "For the present, I deny your motion." Thereupon Mr. Evarts, of 
 counsel for proponents, asked the court to put at their disposition, for 
 use as evidence in the cause, the papers produced under the subpoena 
 issued by the other side. This was resisted on the ground of privilege. 
 The court ruled, substantially, that the privilege was the privilege of 
 the party, and not the privilege of his attorney ; that the privilege had 
 not been waived by the act of Mr. Conkling in delivering the papers to 
 the surrogate ; that such of the papers, as had not been offered in evi- 
 dence by the contestant, remained subject to his control ; and directed 
 the official stenographer to return to Mr. Conkling such of the papers, 
 produced by him, as had not been offered in evidence. ^ 
 
 § 818. Tender of Documentary Evidence, how made. — It 
 
 has been ruled that, where documentary evidence is offered, each 
 piece should be presented by itself to the presiding judge; ex- 
 hibited, if desired, to the opposing counsel; identified by the 
 court stenographer with suitable marks; and, if objected to, its 
 genuineness established by the testimony. Where a bundle of 
 papers was offered in evidence, described as " invoices of goods, 
 notes and drafts paid," and an objection was raised to the recep- 
 tion of any bundles, it was held, on the most obvious grounds, 
 that it was rightly sustained.^ It is said to be ordinarily proper 
 for a trial court to permit documents to be offered in evidence 
 provisionally, and afterwards to instymct the jury as to their 
 effect.^ 
 
 § 819. Reading the Paper. — Where a written instrument is 
 offered in evidence, it is discretionary with the judge to read the 
 
 1 Hoyt V. Jackson, 3 Dem. (N. Y.) ^ Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452, 401. 
 
 388. ^ Smith v. Shattuck, 12 Ore. 3fi2.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI. ] USE OF books and papers. 
 
 627 
 
 paper himself, so as to keep its contents from the jury until it is 
 admitted, or to direct counsel to read it.^ 
 
 § 820. Proof of Execution. — Where the party offering a 
 written instrument, miike^i oat a prima facie case of its execution^ 
 the other party, it has been held, should not be allowed to intro- 
 duce counter evidence, before the instrument is read to the jury.^ 
 But this ruling does not seem to be sound. The established rule 
 seems to be tliat, when objection is made to the admissibility 
 of a paper offered in evidence, upon a ground which calls for the 
 testimony of witnesses, it is proper for the court, before permit- 
 ting the paper to be read to the jury, to allow the objecting party 
 to cross-examine the witness producing it, and to receive other 
 evidence upon the question, in order to decide whether or not it 
 is admissible.^ Documents cannot be authenticated by the testi- 
 
 1 Brill V. Flagler, 23 Weud. (N. Y.) 
 354. 
 
 2 Verzan v. McGregor, 23 Cal. 339. 
 
 3 Trussell v. Scarlet, 18 Ted. Rep. 
 21-i. lu a note to this case, by Dr. 
 AVharton, it is said that this view is 
 in harmouy with mauy ruliugs ou the 
 subject of admissibility. He said: 
 "When the adraissil)ility of either a 
 witness or a document is iu question, 
 the party opposing the admissibility 
 is entitled, as a preliminary test, to 
 cross-examine on this specific issue the 
 witnesses on whose testimony the 
 admissibility depends. No document 
 or witness, — such is the fundamental 
 principle, — is self-proving. "We must 
 fall back, as a basis logically neces- 
 sary in all cases, on parol proof; and 
 this proof only is effective when ex- 
 posed to the criticism of cross-exam- 
 ination. This is illustrated by the 
 old practice of examination on voir 
 dire. When a witness, in old times, 
 as to whose competency there was 
 any question, was called, he was 
 sworn, not 'to tell the truth, 
 the whole truth, and nothing but 
 
 the truth.' but 'true answers to 
 make to such questions as should be 
 put to him.' These questions re- 
 lated solely to his competency: and 
 the burden of this preliminary exam- 
 ination fell upon the party objecting 
 to competency. In fact, the old 
 practice was, that when there was an 
 objection to competency, for the ob- 
 jecting counsel to ask for the admin- 
 astering of the voir dire oath, which 
 was granted as a matter of course. 
 The objecting counsel then proceeded 
 to inquire as to the witness' interest 
 in the case, or other ground of incom- 
 petency; the party sustaining the 
 admissibility being then entitled to 
 examine in reply. The same distinc- 
 tion is taken with regard to the proof 
 of lost documents. A witness called 
 to prove the contents of a lost docu- 
 ment, after his examination, by the 
 party calling him on the subject of the 
 loss, and of his knowledge of the doc- 
 ument, is open to cross-examination 
 by the opposing counsel; and it is 
 not until the Avituess has been thus 
 fully probed, and his knowledge ou
 
 628 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 mony of witnesses as to their identity, unless the opposite party 
 has had an opportunity to inspect them and to cross-examine the 
 witnesses.^ 
 
 § 821. [Continued.] Illustrations. — While one of the plaintiff's 
 witnesses was on the stand, the defendants, during cross-examination, 
 undertook to prove by him the identity of certain documents, which 
 counsel for plaintiff was not allowed to see, but which were afterwards 
 read as having been proved. This was held erroneous. Campbell, J., 
 said : " There is no case where a witness proving an instrument should 
 not be subject to immediate cross-examination, which could never be 
 effective without the view of the document itself, not only to guard 
 against forgery or substitution, but also to inform parties what issues 
 were likely to arise concerning genuineness, or any other fact which is 
 material. Our rules in equity cases have done away with proof of in- 
 struments at the hearing, for the reason that there was always danger 
 of surprise and imposition. But there was never any practice which 
 deprived parties of the right to inspect and cross-examine in season." '^ 
 
 § 822. [Continued.] When Proof of Execution Dispensed 
 with. — Where a verbal contract refers to a written instrument, 
 not as a contract, but as containing some of the terms of the 
 verbal contract, it is not necessary, in order to admit the writing 
 in evidence, for the purpose of establishing the contract, to 
 prove its execution; it is enough that it is identified.^ So, one 
 writing may be so acknowledged by another, that proof of the 
 latter will carry with it the authentication of the former, render- 
 ing it unnecessary to do more than identify the former, in order 
 to its admission in evidence.* The production of a paper 
 under notice, by the opposite party, dispenses Avith the neces- 
 sity of proof of the fact which makes it operative, where it ap- 
 pears that the party producing it claims any benefit under it.^ 
 
 this specific issue drawn out, that tlie ^ De Witt v. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298, 
 
 document is received in evidence." 300. 
 
 (Citing Fisher v. Samuda, 1 Camp. ^ p)e^itti,, Prescott,51 Mich. 298, 300. 
 
 190, 193; Clark v. Ilougliton, 12 Gray ^ Smith v. New Yorli Central R. 
 
 (Mass.), 38; Richardsoii v. Robbius, Co., 4 Abb. App. Dec. (N.Y.) 262. 
 
 124 Mass. 105; Coxe v. England, 65 ^ Clarinet?. Mix, 15 Conn. 153. 
 
 Pa. St. 212; Rankin t;. Crow, 19 III. « Pearce v. Hooper, 3 Taunt. 60, 
 
 C26). opinion by Lord Mansfield, C. J.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF books and papers. 629 
 
 Thus, where a deed is produced by the opposite party on notice, 
 it has been held unnecessary to prove its delivery.^ Where the 
 instrument is the foundation of the action, and its genuineness is 
 not denied on oath, statutes exist in many jurisdictions, dispens- 
 ing with proof of its execution. ^ The statutes rehiting to reg- 
 istration do not contemphite the recording of the duplicate im- 
 pression of seal. It is, therefore, no objection to the admission 
 in evidence of the certified copy of a recorded deed, that a copy 
 of the impression of the official seal of the officer, who took the 
 acknowledgment of the grantor, does not appear on it, if it be 
 stated in the body of the certified act of acknowledgment, that 
 it w^as certified under such official seal.'^ 
 
 § 823. [Continued.] Admission of Document carries with 
 it Proof of Signature and Indorsement. — So, where written 
 instruments are received in evidence without objection, the sig- 
 natures of all persons who are properly parties thereto, are con- 
 sidered as admitted.* This is nothino-but a branch of the broader 
 rule that, w^here an instrument of writing is received in evidence 
 without objection, proof of its execution is waived.* Where an 
 instrument is offered in evidence and not objected to, any in- 
 dorsement upon it is considered as proved.^ 
 
 § 824 [Continued.] Objection for AVaut of Proof by Sub- 
 scribing Witnesses. — This objection must be made when the 
 paper is offered, or it will be deemed waived.' Where a party 
 calls his adversary, or permits him to be called, to prove the in- 
 strument, this dispenses with proof by the subscribing witness.^ 
 
 § 825. [Continued.] Authentication of Documents in a 
 Deposition. — Upon the taking of a deposition, documents which 
 are merely produced and identified before the commissioner and 
 
 1 Campbell v. Eoberts, 66 Ga. 733. ^ Tyler v. Marcelin, 8 La. Ann. 312- 
 
 2 Leary v. Meyer, 78 lud. 393; 6 Bell v. Keefe, 12 La. Ann. 340; 
 Strange v. Barrow, G5 Ga. 23; Temp- Maxwell v. Kennedy, 10 La. Ann. 798* 
 lin ■!;. Rothweiler, 56 la. 259. ' Rayburu v. Mason Lumber Co., 
 
 3 Griffin v. Sheffield, 38 Miss. 359. 57 Mich. 273. 
 * Maxwell v. Keuuedy, 10 La. Ann. ^ Hid. 
 
 798.
 
 630 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoHip. Tr., 
 
 returned by him as exhibits to his deposition, are not considered 
 as having been proved. Such identification is not enough to ad- 
 mit them as evidence at the trial, but their genuineness must be 
 established by witnesses who are subject to cross-examination.^ 
 The distinction between proving the authenticity of a document 
 and merely identifying it, is one which should be constantly 
 borne in mind. " If the proof of authenticity is to be by the 
 deposing witness, there must be opjjortiinity of cross-examination 
 on the point, and the document be submitted to the cross-exam- 
 ining counsel, and annexed to the deposition, unless a case 
 excusing this is shown, and a copy is supplied. If the paper is 
 merely to be identified, submission to adverse counsel is not 
 matter of right, and annexation to the deposition not essential." ^ 
 If the witness is to be examined as to the genuineness of an in- 
 strument, the original of it must, of course, be exhibited to the 
 witness and returned, attached to the interrogatories by the com- 
 missioner.^ This is a very important rule, in order to prevent 
 deception. Unless the paper be particularly described, identified 
 by the commissioner loith marks, and annexed to the deposition as 
 returned by him, the deposition, so far as it relates to the paper, 
 cannot be read in evidence.* A paper which is pinned to a depo- 
 sition, not referred to in it, and which contains no evidence that 
 it has been attached thereto by the officer taking the deposition, 
 is not suflSciently identified as an exhibit to be admitted in evi- 
 dence.^ But a deposition ought not to be suppressed, on the 
 ground that the witness referred to certain deeds which were not 
 set out as exhibits, when it appears that the deeds are not under 
 the control of the witness, are not the foundation of the action, 
 and that there is no dispute as to their contents." It has been 
 held no objection to a deposition that the bill of items of the 
 plaintiff's account annexed thereto, and sworn to by the depo- 
 
 1 Kelley v. Weber, it Abb. N. C. * Petrikiu v. Collier, 7 Watts & S. 
 (N. Y.) 62. (Pa.) 392; Dodge v. Israel, 4 Wash. 
 
 2 Note by Mr. Austin Abbott in 9 C. C. (U. S.) 323. See Swislier v. 
 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) at page 65; citing Swisher, Wright (Oh.), 755. 
 
 Weeks on Dep. 358-361. s Susquehanna &c. K. Co. v. Quick, 
 
 •i Weidner v. Conner, 9 Pa. St. 61 Pa. St. 328, 3;59. 
 7S. *' Lyon v. Barrows, 18 Iowa, 428.
 
 Tit. Ill, Cll. XXVI.] USE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 631 
 
 nent, is in the handwriting of the plaintiff's attorney; nor that 
 such bill is described in the deposition as " marked A," when it 
 is not so marked, — there being no other account annexed.^ It 
 seems that, where the instrument has been identified by the com- 
 missioner, by sufficient marks, it is not a fatal objection that it 
 was not 'physically attached to the deposition, provided it was 
 enclosed under seal, in the same package with the deposition, 
 and thus returned by the commissioner. ^ INIoreover, it has been 
 said that, where papers alleged to have been exhibited to the 
 witness at the giving of his deposition, are not sufficiently iden- 
 tified by the officer, they may be identified by parol evidence.^ 
 
 § 826. [Continued.] Exhibits, where there are Different 
 sets of Interrogatories. — Where there are different sets of in- 
 terrogatories, drawn for the purpose of taking the depositions of 
 different witnesses, it is not, in the nature of things, possible 
 that the same exhibit should accompany each. In such a case, 
 it has been held sufficient that it be attached to one set of the in- 
 terrogatories, and referred to by proper descriptions in the oth- 
 ers ; and it has been held that, if so referred to, and properly 
 indentified by the witness, and certified by the commissioner, 
 this will be sufficient.* 
 
 § 827. llig-ht of Inspection. — There is a confusion in the 
 judicial holdings as to whether the opposite party has the right 
 to inspect a document which is produced and proved, before it is 
 formally offered in evidence. According to one view, a party 
 has no right to the inspection of papers which are proved by a 
 witness on the stand, unless they are offered in evidence, — 
 although the act of producing the papers and proving them may 
 be a species of forensic thimble-rigging, devised to prejudice the 
 jury.^ Under this view, the mere fact that the signature to a 
 paper is verified by a witness in court, does not entitle the 
 
 1 Marviu v. Kaygaii, 12 Cush. ^ Moberly u. Leophart, 51 Ala. 587; 
 (Mass.) 132. s. c. on former appeal, where the same 
 
 2 Humphries r. Dawsou, 38 Ala. 199. point was considered , 47 Ala. 257. 
 
 3 Dailey v. Green, 15 Pa. St. 118, 127. ^ Houser v. State, 93 Ind. 228.
 
 632 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 opposite party to inspect the paper, or to cross-examine the 
 witness upon it, until the paper has been put in evidence; al- 
 though it is irregular for the counsel to ask a witness any ques- 
 tion concerning the document which he does not intend to offer 
 in evidence. 1 Nor are the English holdings quite uniform on 
 this question. It was ruled by Mr. Chief Justice Erie at niH 
 priuSf that the mere fact that counsel, in cross-examining a wit- 
 ness, puts a document into the witness' hand, and asks him 
 whether it is in his handwriting, does not entitle the opposite 
 counsel to see the document.^ On the contrary, it was ruled by 
 the Court of Common Pleas that when, on cross-examination of 
 a witness for the plaintiff, the defendant's counsel puts a docu- 
 ment into his hands, and proves out of his mouth that it is in 
 the plaintiff ^s lianchoriting , the plaintiff's counsel has a right to 
 see it at once, for the purpose of identifying it and re-examining 
 the witness upon it;^ and it was conceded by Mr. Chief Justice 
 Erie, in the case first cited, that the opposite counsel has the right 
 to inspect it before the cross-examining counsel proceeds to found 
 any question upon it.* But, where a witness, on cross-examina- 
 tion, proves the handwriting of the opposite party to a paper, the 
 counsel for the party has no right to see such paper, to enable 
 him to found an examination upon it, as to whether it was really 
 the writing of his client or not.^ The rule, as laid down by 
 Lord Demnan, C. J., is that if the cross-examining counsel puts 
 a paper into the witness' hand and questions him upon it, aud 
 anything comes of those questions^ the counsel for the opposite 
 party has the right to see the paper, and to re-examine the wit- 
 ness in respect of it; but if the cross-examination, founded on 
 the paper, entirely fails, and nothing comes of it, the opposite 
 counsel has no right to see the paper .^ Where a witness uses a 
 document for the purpose of ref resiling his "memory, it is the 
 
 ' Styles V. Allen, 5 Alleu (Mass.), ■* Cope v. Thames Dock Co., supra. 
 
 320. •'; lUissell V. Rider, Car. & P. 
 
 2 Cope V. Thames Dock Co., 2 Car. 41G. 
 
 & K, 7r)7. 6 Re<;. V. Duncombe, 8 Car. & P, 
 
 3 Peck V. Peck, 21 Law Times (x. SCO. 
 s.) 070 ; s. c. 18 Week. Pep. 2'.!.').
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI. J USE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 633 
 
 right of the opposing counsel to inspect the document ; but this 
 right may be limited to that 'portion of the document which has 
 been thus used by the witness. Thus, it was ruled by Yice- 
 Chancellor Malins, that on the cross-examination of a Avitness, the 
 cross-examining counsel is not entitled to inspect the whole of a 
 diary used by the witness to assist his memory, but only such 
 portions of it as refer to the subject-matter of the suit.^ 
 
 § 828. [Continued.] Illustration. — In a bastardy proceecling the 
 prosecuting attorney handed to the relatrix, who was testifying as a 
 witness, two letters, and asked her if she knew the handwriting. The 
 defendant's counsel objected to the question, and demanded an inspec- 
 tion of the letters. The court overruled the objection, and refused the 
 defendant an inspection of the letters at that time. The relatrix then 
 testified that the letters were written by the defendant. The prose- 
 cuting attorney then, in answer to a question by the court, stated that he 
 intended to offer the letters in evidence. They were then, by order of 
 the court, delivered to the defendant for inspection. Nevertheless, the 
 prosecuting attorney did not offer them in evidence. It was held that 
 in this there was no error sufficient to reverse a judgment. The court, 
 speaking through Hammond, J., said: "In the conduct of atrial, 
 there are many trifling occurrences, bearing favorably or unfavorably 
 upon the one or the other of the parties, which are difficult for the trial 
 court, and beyond the power of this court to correct. Fortunately, 
 however, for litigants, the ingenuity of counsel upon the one side, is 
 usually counterbalanced by the tact of counsel on the other, so that 
 the substantial rights of parties are generally preserved. It is only 
 where there has been manifest injustice occasioned by a proceeding, 
 in which the power of the trial court for correction has not been prop- 
 erly used, that this court may intervene by reversal." ^ 
 
 § 829. [Continued.] Where Document is Produced on 
 Notice. — A party who gives notice to produce a paper in evi- 
 dence, must be supposed to know its contents. If he does not, 
 he ought not to be permitted to speculate through the forms of 
 law, and obtain from his adversary the inspection of any paper 
 or document he may choose to demand. It has been reasoned that 
 
 ' Burgess r. Bennett, 20 Week. Eep. 2 Houser v. State, 93 Ind. 228, 230.. 
 
 720; ante, §402, subsec. 2.
 
 634 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 notice to produce a paper requires it to be produced in evidence, 
 and, when once called for and produced, it is in evidence, 
 as it could not be called for on an}^ other terms. ^ This is illus- 
 trated by a case where the defendants gave notice to the plaint- 
 iffs to produce a letter, on the trial, which, when it came on, 
 they refused to do, unless the defendants would engage to read 
 it in evidence. This they declined acceding to, without being 
 first permitted to inspect it, and, on this being denied, the trial 
 court ruled that the inspection could not be demanded, except on 
 the terms which the plaintiff v/ished to impose. It was held that 
 this rulino; was correct.^ Where a witness, in obedience to a 
 subpoena duces tecum, attends in court, and, after being sworn, 
 produces papers which he thereupon places in the custody of the 
 court, — either party thereafter has the same right, which he 
 had when the witness was present, to insist that the papers shall 
 be placed at his disposal for use as evidence in the cause. ^ 
 
 § 830. Right to Seal up Pages which are not Pertinent. — 
 
 It is said by Dr. Greenleaf: "Where books are to be produced, 
 the defendant will have leave to seal up and conceal all such parts 
 of them as, according to his affidavit, previously made and filed, 
 do not relate to the matters in question." ^ It is the uniform 
 practice of courts to permit a party producing his books to seal 
 up those pages which do not relate to the subject of the litiga- 
 tion.^ Upon a like princi{)le, it has been held proper for the 
 court to make an order placing the books which contain the ac- 
 counts which are pertinent to the issue, in the possession of the 
 clerk of the court, limiting the inspection to certain pages con- 
 taining the pertinent accounts, and giving the defendant liberty 
 to seal up the remaining parts; which order further recited that, 
 it ai)i)eari ng that the journal entries were so intermingled with 
 other matters as that inspection of them would expose such out- 
 
 1 Lawrence v. Van llorue, 1 Caines •• 3 Greenl. Ev., § 301. 
 
 (N. Y.), 27G, 285. ^ pjas v. Merle, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 
 
 2 Ibid. 494; Gerard v. I'enswick, 1 Swanst. 
 '■'' Iloyt V. Jackson, 3 Dem. (N. Y.) 533; Pyuclion v. Day, 118 111, 9, 15. 
 
 388.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 635 
 
 side matters, the defendant might present in court a verbatim 
 copy of all the journal entries relating to matters between the 
 parties, giving the page where entered, such copy to be verified 
 by affidavit and the certificate of the clerk of the court, upon an 
 actual examination and comparison, provided the plaintiff should 
 so require. It was held that this was proper. ^ 
 
 § 831. Cross-examining as to Contents of Written Docu- 
 ments. — ( 1- ) Document must be j^^'oduced. — As a general rule, 
 a witness cannot, upon cross-examination, even for the purpose 
 of discrediting him, be asked as to the contents of a written 
 paper which is neither produced, nor its absence accounted for.^ 
 Thus, a witness cannot be cross-examined as to what he swore to in 
 an affidavit, unless the affidavit is produced.^ It has been held that 
 a witness cannot be asked on cross-examination, he not having been 
 interrogated as to the point on direct examination, whether his 
 name was not written in the book of a certain association.* But 
 it has been held that a witness, on cross-examination, may admit 
 not having mentioned a fact on a former examination, although 
 that examination is in writing and not produced.^ So it has been 
 ruled that, in order to explain or contradict a statement made by 
 a party as to an alteration in a will under which he claims, the 
 probate of the will is not sufficient evidence, but the original 
 document itself should be put in the hands of the witness.^ 
 
 (2.) AUter where the Witiiess is a Party. — But the forego- 
 ing rule does not apply where the witness on cross-examination 
 is the opposite party to the action. Thus, a party may be cross- 
 
 1 Pyuchon v. Day, 118 111. 9. that stage of the cause. Sideways v. 
 
 2 MacdouuellT. Evans, 11 C. B. 930; Dyson, 2 Stark. 49; Graham v. Dyster, 
 s. c. 21 L. J. C. P. 141; s. c. 16 Jur. 2 Stark. 21. 
 
 103. It has been ruled at nisi prius, 3 Sainthill v. Bound, 4 Esp. 74. 
 
 that the defendant cannot, in the * Darby v. Ouseley, 1 Hurl. & X. 1; 
 
 course of the plaintiff's evidence, s. c. 2 Jur. (n. s.) 497; s. c. 25 L.J. 
 
 cross-examine tlie plaintiff's wit- Exch. 227. 
 
 nesses as to the contents of written ^ Eidley v. Gyde, 1 Mood. & Kob. 
 
 documents, although notice has been 197. 
 
 given to the pkiiutiff to produce them, ^ Brown v. Hughes, 1 Post. & Flu. 
 
 and he refuses to produce them at 299, per Channell, B.
 
 636 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thouip. Tr., 
 
 examined as to the contents of an affidavit which is not put in, ^ 
 or as to whether he has read a letter of a certain date, and in cer- 
 tain terms. ^ It was also ruled by the same learned judge ^ that 
 the rules of a society to which the defendant belonged, proved 
 by the cross-examination of one of the witnesses, are evidence 
 against him.* So, it has been ruled that a party to an action, 
 called as a witness in his own behalf, may be asked, on cross- 
 examination, as to the contents of a letter which he has written, 
 without producing the letter. 
 
 (.3.) When Ihe Doaiment itself Evidence. — When a book is 
 put into the hands of a witness to refresh his recollection^ and 
 questions are asked upon it on cross-examination, the book is 
 not thereby made evidence^ for the party producing it, though 
 it may be such for the cross-examining party.* Where a docu- 
 ment is put into the hands of a witness for the purpose of found- 
 ing the cross-examination upon it, it does not thereby become 
 evidence for the party whose witness it thus cross-examined.^ A 
 o-ood illustration of this is found in a case where the defendant's 
 counsel, on cross-examination of the plaintiff, read a letter from 
 him, which, in eifect, overthrew his case, and then submitted 
 that there was no evidence for the jury; but the court held that, 
 as this letter was the defendant' sand notthe plaintiff's evidence, 
 it could not be looked to as a part of the plaintiff 's case in de- 
 termining this question.^ 
 
 (4.) Witness asked ivhetlier Representation in Writing or 
 Parol. — In view of the foregoing rules, and in view of the 
 further rule that the contents of a writing which can be produced 
 are not provable by parol, when a witness is asked on cross-ex- 
 amination whether he has made representations of a particular 
 
 1 SlacUleu v. Sergeant, 1 Fost. & ^ Payne v. Ibbotsou, 27 L. J. Exch. 
 Fiu. 322, 341. See rui^e, § 402, subsec. 4. 
 
 2 Ireland V. Stiff, 1 Fost. & Fiu. 340. « Collier v. Nokes, 2 Car. & Kir, 
 
 3 Willes, .J. 1012. 
 
 * Minus V. Smith, 1 Fost. & Fiu. ' Rawlings v. Chandler, 9 Exch. 
 
 318. 687.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF books and papers. 637 
 
 Bature, if he answers in the affirmative, he should next be asked 
 whether he made the representation by parol or in writing.^ 
 
 § 832. Cross-examiniug Witness as to the Contents of Let- 
 ter claimed to have been written by him. — It is said by Prof. 
 Greenleaf : " The counsel will not be permitted to represent, in 
 the statement of a question, the contents of a letter, and to ask 
 the witness whether he wrote a letter to any person with such 
 contents, or contents to the like effect, without having first shown 
 to the witness the letter, and having asked him whether he wrote 
 that letter, and his admitting that he wrote it; for the contents 
 of every written paper, according to the ordinary and well es- 
 tablished rules of evidence, are to be proved by the paper itself, 
 and that alone, if in existence. But it is not required that the 
 wdiole paper be shown to the witness. Two or three lines only 
 of a letter may be exhibited to him, and he may be asked 
 whether he wrote the part exhibited. If he denies, or does not 
 admit, that he wrote that part, he cannot be examined as to the 
 contents of such letter, for the reason already given ; nor is the 
 opposite counsel entitled in that case to look at the paper. And 
 if he admits the letter to be his writino;, he cannot be asked 
 whether statements, such as counsel may suggest, are contained 
 in it ; but the whole letter must be read as the only competent 
 evidence of that fact." ^ 
 
 §833. [Continued.] Illustration of a Violation of this Rule. — 
 In a case in Iowa, in the course of the cross-examination of the plaintiff, 
 her attention was called to certain letters said to have been written and 
 signed by her. As to one of those letters she was asked: "Examine 
 that writing and signature, and see if it is j-our writing or not. " There- 
 upon her counsel requested " that the witness have the privilege of ex- 
 amining the contents of the letter, before being required to answer if 
 it was her signature." This request was refused, and the plaintiff ex- 
 cepted. The witness answered that she would not be positive that the 
 signatures to the letters were her signatures. She stated tliat she 
 
 ^ The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & Biug. approval in Gleuu v. Gleasou, Gl la. 
 ^4, 292. 28, 34. 
 
 « 1 Greeul. Ev. § 4(13; quoted with
 
 638 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 ThoUip. Tr.^ 
 
 thought at one time that the signature to one of the letters was her 
 signature. Thereupon counsel for defendant proceeded to read certain 
 clauses of the letters, and asked the witness if she had written them. 
 Questions like the following were put to her: " Did you, in the same 
 letter, say to him : ' Do not let them draw anything out of you that will 
 conflict with the statement I givej-ou ; ' ' No one to love them, no one 
 to caress them,' — Did you write that? " The counsel for the plaintiff 
 protested against this mode of examining the witness, for the reason 
 that the letters were the best evidence of their contents, and that the 
 witness should not be compelled to give her recollection of what she 
 had written when the letters which she had written were in court. The 
 court overruled the objection and permitted the counsel to proceed, and 
 the witness answered all the interrogatories to the effect that she did 
 not remember. It was held that in so ruling the court erred. The 
 coui'se of examination was a plain violation of the rules above drawn 
 from the text of Prof. Greenleaf. The course pursued tended to em- 
 barrass and confuse the witness and prejudice her in the minds of the 
 jury, and the error was not cured by the fact that the letters were 
 subsequently read in evidence.^ 
 
 § 834. Use of Document for one Purpose does not make it 
 Evidence for all Purposes. — The fact that a party uses a docu- 
 ment, e.^., an account book, for the purpose of fixing the date, 
 does not make it competent evidence against him for all pur- 
 poses.'^ 
 
 § 835. Whole of a Correspondence. — By analogy to a 
 rule already stated in respect of conversations, ^ if a portion of a 
 correspondence is given in evidence, the other party is entitk^d 
 to call for the remaining portion of it.* The rule appears to be 
 firmly settled, both as to a conversation or writing, that the in- 
 troduction of a part renders admissible so much of the remain- 
 der, as tends to explain or qualify what has been received, and 
 that is to be deemed a qualification which rebuts and destroys the 
 inference to be derived from, or the use to be made of the por- 
 
 1 Gleim V. Gleasou, Gl la. 28, 33. ^ j^iae^ § 412. 
 
 2 Abbott V. Pearson, 130 Mass. 191; ^ Livermore v. St. John, 4 Rob 
 Compare Shaw v. Stone, 1 Cush. (N. Y.) 12. 
 
 fMass.) 228.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF books and papers. 639 
 
 tion put in evidence.^ A party may give in evidence against 
 his adversary any letter of his, containing admissions material to 
 the issue, without putting in the whole of the correspondence be- 
 tween them. If the letter, which he puts in evidence, shows that 
 it is in reply to another letter^ he may doubtless put that letter in 
 evidence also, as tending to explain the former. ^ But he is not 
 bound to do so ; he may leave it to his adversary, on cross-ex- 
 amination or otherwise, to offer any competent evidence of the 
 rest of the correspondence which he desires.'^ In considering this 
 question it was said by Mr. Chief Justice Gray: " When a par- 
 ticular communication, which refers to a previous one, is not intro- 
 duced as containing the terms of a contract, we see no more reason 
 for obliging the party offering it to put in the previous communica- 
 tion also, when the communications are Avritten, than when they 
 are oral. In either case, whether the communications are by 
 successive letters or by distinct conversations, the party intro- 
 ducing the second in evidence may, if he pleases, introduce the 
 first also ; and if he does not, the other party may. The actual 
 custody of the papers does not affect the question which party 
 shall introduce them, but only the steps to be taken to compel 
 
 1 Grattau v. Metroplitau Life lus, 2 Trichet v. Harailtou lus. Co., 14 
 
 Co., 92 N. Y. 27i, 284; Gildersleeve v. Gray (Mass.), 456. 
 London, 73 N. Y. G09 (applying tlie 3 stone v. Sanborn, 104 Mass. 319, 
 
 rule in tlie construction of a pleading). 324; Barrymore v. Taylor, 1 Esp. 326; 
 
 Compare Rouse v. Whited, 25 N. Y. De Medina v. Owen, 3 Car. & K. 626. 
 
 170; The Queen's Case, 2 Brod. & Contrary to the above, Pollock, C. B., 
 
 Biug. 297, 298; Prince v. Samo, 7 Ad. ruled in AValson v. Moore, 1 Car. & K. 
 
 & El. 627. In Rouse v. Whited, supra, 626, that the party offering the reply In 
 
 the question, as it relates to conversa- evidence should put in both letters or 
 
 tions, is examined at length, and the neitlier; but this was supposed by Mr. 
 
 conclusion is reached that, where one Chief Justice Gray to be nothing more 
 
 party puts apart of a conversation in than an exercise of discretion as to the 
 
 evidence, this does not entitle the order of proof. Stone u. Sanborn, s»pto. 
 
 other party to demand the whole con- In Crery u. Pollard, 14 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 versadon, but only so ranch of it as is 284, the reply was held admissible, 
 
 relevant to the issues: approving Prince as evidence of notice to the party 
 
 V. Samo, supra, and denying on this to whom it was addressed, without 
 
 point the Queen's Case, supra. See producing the letter to which it was a 
 
 also Forrest u. Forrest, 6 Duer (N. Y.), reply. 
 126, 127.
 
 040 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 their production." ^ In another American jurisdiction an oppos- 
 ing view has been expressed, that the party seeking to avail him- 
 self of the letter of his adversary as evidence, is bound to call for 
 and put in evidence the letter to which it is a reply, as a part of 
 his own evidence, — the court saying: " However ingenious and 
 plausible the reason assigned in the English authorities, it seems 
 to us, the general principle adopted by the American authors on 
 evidence, that the whole admission must be taken together, gen- 
 erally requires the prior letter to be produced or accounted for, 
 before the answer can be properly admitted in evidence ; though 
 we do not decide it to be always the rule, and without exception;^ 
 for the character of the letter and the case may make the pro- 
 duction of the first unnecessary. The rule in chancery that a 
 party against whom an answer is produced may claim to have the 
 whole bill, as well as the answer, read as j^art of his adversary's 
 case, upon the same ground that where one proves answers in 
 conversation against a party, he may insist on having the ques- 
 tion to which he made the replies, put in evidence, is, we think, a 
 forcible illustration and correct applic;rtion of the principle." ^ 
 
 § 836. Assailing the Integrity of one's own Documentary 
 Evidence. — After introducing a document in evidence, without 
 any qualification, the party introducing it cannot be permitted to 
 impeach its integrity, or assail the correctness of its statements.^ 
 
 § 837. Effect of putting in Evidence Affidavit of Opposing 
 Party. — A party is not bound by all the statements contained 
 in the affidavit of his opponent, although he himself puts it 
 in evidence for a particular purpose; but he may contradict 
 that portion of it which works against him. Such would be the 
 rule if be were to put his opponent ui)on the stand; ho woukl not 
 be estopped by his testimony, but would be at liberty to show 
 the facts to be contrary thereto.^ But a party cannot get in his 
 
 1 Stone V. Siiiil)orn, KH Mass. 319, ■'' Macliu v. lusurauce Co., 33 La. 
 
 325. Ann. 801. 
 
 * Simmons v. Ilaas, 5G Md. 153, * Mather v. Parsons, 32 Hun (N. 
 
 1G2; citing 1 Greenl. Ev., §201, Y.), 331), 3-t4. Compare Hunt v. Fish, 
 
 note 1. -t Barl). (N. Y.) 324; ante, § 515.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVI.] USE OF BOOKS AND PAPERS. 641 
 
 own affidavit, by putting in evidence the affidavit of his oppo- 
 nent, in which his own affidavit is referred to and contradicted.^ 
 
 § 838. Telegraphic Dispatches. — The telegraphic message 
 which is sent and not the one which is received and transcribed 
 at the other end of the line, is the original. The latter is a copy, 
 and carries with it none of the qualities of primary evidence.'^ 
 Where it is material to prove the sending and delivery of a tele- 
 graphic message, the usual course is to show the delivery of the 
 original message at the office from which it was to be telegraphed, 
 and then to show that it was transmitted and delivered at the 
 place of its destination. But even where the original is pro- 
 duced, its authenticity must be established, either by proof of 
 the handwriting, or b}' other evidence of its genuineness. It has 
 been held that proof of the destruction of all the messages sent 
 from the sending office, on the day on which the particular mes- 
 sage was sent, is sufficient foundation to let in secondary evi- 
 dence of its contents. But this secondary evidence can only be 
 admitted, on proof that the copy offered is a correct transcript 
 of the message actually authorized by the party sought to be af- 
 fected by its contents.^ 
 
 § 839. Dispatch received not Evidence of Dispatch sent. — 
 
 The fact that a telegraphic dispatch was delivered to a man on a 
 certain day at a distant place, is not proved by producing what 
 purports to be a telegraphic reply signed by him, received at the 
 sending office, very soon after on the same day, and addressed to 
 the sender of the former dispatch; * for, although men, in the 
 ordinary affairs of life, constantly act upon such evidence, yet it 
 was said that the only way to prove such a message in a court of 
 law, is to summon both the intermediate agents or bearers of the 
 message, — that is, the agent of the telegraph company receiving 
 
 1 Degraft v. Hovey, 16 Abb Pr. (N. ness of au affidavit used iu judicial 
 
 Y.) 120 Iu tliis case it is erroneously proceedings, see Maybee v. Suiffen, 2 
 
 said that, after putting in liis oppo- E. D. Smitii (N. Y.), 1. 
 
 ueut's affidavit he could not contradict ^ Mattesou v. Noyes, 25111. 591. 
 
 if, having made it his own testimony. ^ gmith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138, 145. 
 
 See ante, § 515. As to tlie conclusive- ■• Howley v. Whipple, 48 N. H. 487. 
 
 41
 
 642 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 Thonip. Tl". , 
 
 and transmitting the message, and the agent at the end of the 
 transit, receiving and delivering it, — and by them proving its 
 transmission and delivery. Anything short of this wonld be to 
 rely npon hearsay evidence of the loosest character.^ 
 
 § 840. Book Entries on Proof that they were truly 
 made. — Upon a princii)le very closely allied to that which per- 
 mits the use by witnesses of memoranda to refresh their memo- 
 ries,^ is a principle which admits the contents of books of ac- 
 counts, upon proof that the books were truly kept and the en- 
 tries truly made, although the witness so deposing cannot testify, 
 by reason of the lapse of time, to the truth of the particular en- 
 tries. Originally, it seems, such entries were only admissible 
 after the death of the person whose books they were.-'^ Other 
 circumstances, such as insanity or absence beyond the jurisdic- 
 tion, have been regarded as tantamount to death. ^ In such cases 
 the books are admitted on proof of the handwriting of the part}^. 
 But where the party is alive, produced as a witness, and is not 
 able to recollect the fact recorded in the books, independently of 
 the entry, after referring to it, the principle has been extended 
 so as to admit the writing in evidence, upon preliminary proof of 
 the single additional fact that it was truly made.^ 
 
 § 841. Use of the Instrument which is the Foundation of 
 the Action. — While the defendant, in an action brought upon 
 a written instrument, is entitled to crave oyer of it under the com- 
 mon-law practice, or to an inspection of it under statutes, he 
 
 1 Howley w. Whipple, SMpj'rt. IG Weud. 587; Bank of Monroe v. 
 
 2 Ante, §31)8, et seq. Culver, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 532; Cole v. 
 
 3 Price V. Earl of Torrinston, 1 Sra. Jessnp, 10 N. Y. 9G; Bunker v. Shed, 
 L. Cas. (6 Am. ed.) 3'.i0; Doe ■». Tur- 8 Mete. (Mass.) 150; Farmers' &c. 
 ford, 3 Barn. & Ad. 898; Pool v. Di- Bank v. Boraef, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 152; 
 cas, 1 Bing. N. C. 049; Welsh v. Smith v. Lane, 12 Serg. & R. 84; Red- 
 Barrett, 15 Mass. 380; Brewster v. den r. Spruance, 4 Har. (Del.) 2(!5, 
 Doane, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 537; Nicholas 2G9; Bullard v. Wilson, 5 Mart. (x. s.) 
 V. Webb, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 32(1. (La.) 10(J; s. c. 3 Cond. 505; Spann t'. 
 
 4 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ingersoll, Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302, 321; Underwood 
 65 111. 3!)9. V. Parrott, 2 Tex. 1()8, 17G; Humphreys 
 
 5 1 Greenl. Ev., § 115, note 4, § 120, v. Spear, 15 111. 275; Lawrence v 
 note 2; Merrill v. Ithaca &c. R. Co., Stiles, IG Bradw. (III.) 489.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch.XXVI.] USE OF books and papers. 643 
 
 cannot claim tlie right to have it delivered to him for the pur- 
 pose of being annexed to a commission to take depositions, in 
 order that it may be inspected by his witnesses, Avho reside out 
 of the State. There is no precedent for thus placing the instru- 
 ment Avhich is the foundation of the action, and which belono-s 
 to the plaintiff, within the power of the defendant.^ Witnesses 
 may be examined on a commission as to an original j^aper, by 
 annexing a copy to the interrogatories, for the purpose of refer- 
 ence, description and identification, and by producing the orig- 
 inal on the examination of the witness for inspection and identi- 
 fication. It is not necessary that the original be annexed to 
 the interrogatories. "A party is never called upon to risk 
 the loss of valuable original papers, by annexing them to a com- 
 mission to be transmitted to a distant State or country for exe- 
 cution." 2 
 
 §842. Duplicate Evidence of Indebtedness. — It seems 
 that, where the evidence of an indebtedness is in duplicate, so 
 that an action can be supported upon either instrument, it is not 
 necessary to sue upon both, but an action upon one will be a bar 
 to an action upon the other; and hence that, in an action upon 
 one, it will not be necessary to introduce the other in evi- 
 dence.^ 
 
 § 843. Objections to Documentary Evidence must be Spe- 
 cific. — It is but a specification under the rule* already stated, to 
 say that, when a document is offered in evidence and objected 
 to, the objection must distinctly state the grounds on which the 
 objector chooses to stand. The reason is that the opposite party 
 may have opportunity of curing the defect, if there be one.® 
 
 1 Butler V. Lee, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) ^ See Skinuer v. Skiuuer, 77 Mo, 
 383; s. c. 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 75. U8, 155. 
 
 2 Commercial Bank v. Union Bank, * Ante, § 693. 
 
 11 N. Y. 203, 209. s Garner v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 
 
 213, 218.
 
 644 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [ 1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 OF NATURAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 Article I. — Inspection of Persons and Things in Court: Trial by 
 
 Inspection. 
 Article II. — View of Places and Things out op Court. 
 
 Article I. — Inspection of Persons and Things in Court: Trial by 
 
 Inspection. 
 Sectiox 
 
 850. lu AVhat Cases formerly Permitted. 
 
 851. lu What Cases still commouly Granted. 
 
 852. In Cases of Alleged Pregnancy. 
 
 853. Inspection of the Body in Proceedings for Divorce or Nullity of Marriage. 
 
 854. Order for such Inspection, how Enforced. 
 
 855. Mode of Inspection in such Cases. 
 
 85G. Inspection of the Child in Filiation Cases. 
 
 857. On a Question of Personal Identity. 
 
 858. Exhibiting Injured Parts of the Human Body to the Jury. 
 
 859. Compulsory Physical Examination of Plamtiff in Actions for Personal 
 
 Injuries. 
 
 860. Before Trial. 
 
 ' 861. Such Examination, how Conducted. 
 
 862. Compelling Plaintiff to perform Physical Acts before Jury. 
 
 863. Instance Avhere such Experiment was Properly Refused. 
 
 864. Experiments in Preparation for Trial or Hearing. 
 
 865. Compelling Inspection of Chattels. 
 
 866. Physical Examination of the Defendant in Criminal Trials. 
 
 867. Compulsory Experiments by the Prisoner, disclosing Guilt. 
 
 868. Obscene Photographs. 
 
 869. Photographic and Stereoscopic Views. 
 
 870. Plans and Diagrams. 
 
 871. Indicia of Crime — Blood-stained Clothing, Burglar's Tools, etc. 
 
 872. When Court will not assume Labor of Examining Natural Evidence. 
 
 § 850. In What Cases formerly Permitted. — Trial by in- 
 spection or examination was an ancient and well recognized mode 
 of determining collateral questions which arose in legal proceed-
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] NATURAL EVIDENCE. 645 
 
 ings, and was frequently resorted to for the purpose of deter- 
 mining the chief issue in an action at law , in which last case the 
 inspection was by the judge or judges, Avho thereupon proceeded 
 to give their judgment without the intervention of a jury. This 
 mode of trial seems to have been thus used where the question 
 of non-age was in dispute, as in the case of a suit to reverse a 
 fine for the non-age of the cognizor.^ It was also resorted to to 
 determine questions of personal identily, — as where it was 
 pleaded in abatement that the plaintiff was dead and that the 
 pretended phiintiff was simulating a deceased person ; ^ in cases 
 of idiocy, where the lord chancellor determined the question by 
 an inspection of the person of the alleged idiot ; ^ on an appeal 
 of mayhem, where the issue joined was mayhem or no mayhem, 
 in which case the decision was by the court on inspection; ^ in 
 
 actions of trespass for mayhem,^ or for an atrocious battery,^ 
 
 in which cases the judges would, upon an inspection, increase 
 the damages at their discretion, — a practice which has gone 
 wholly out of use in modem times, though it is common for 
 courts to require a remittitur of damages as a ground for refus- 
 ing a new trial. 
 
 § 851. Ill what Cases still Commonly Granted. — In mod- 
 ern procedure, this mode of trial is regularly resorted to in the 
 followino; cases: — 
 
 1. In criminal trials, where the defendant, a female, having 
 been tried and found guilty, pleads her pregnancy in stay of 
 execution.^ 
 
 1 3 Bla. Com. 332; 9 Co. Rep. 31. ch. 51, § 10; Bish. Crim. Proc, § 1823.; 
 
 2 3 Bla. Com. 332; 9 Co. Rep. 30. 1 Chit. Crlm. L. 759, 7(51; 3 lust. 17; 
 
 3 3 Bla. Com. 332; 9 Co. Rep. 31. 1 Hale P. C. 308; 2 Hale P. C. 407, 
 
 4 3 Bla. Com. 332; 2 Roll. Abr. 578. 418. In receut times this has been 
 It should be added that appeals of regarded, it Trould seem, grouud for 
 mayhem were abolished by statute, an application to the home secretary, 
 59 Geo, III., ch. 4(3. in England, for a respite of the sen- 
 
 5 3 Bla. Com. 332; 1 Sid. 108. teuce: Reg. v. Hunt, supra. The plea 
 ^ 3 Bhi, Com. 332; Hardr. 408. of pregnancy merely operates to delay 
 ^ Reg. V. Bayntou, 17 How. St. Tr. sentence; it is not a ground for a new 
 
 589, C3L Compare Reg. v. Hunt, 2 trial, since it does not touch the ques- 
 Cox C, C. 2(;l See 2 Hawk. P. C, tiou of guilt or innocence: Holman
 
 646 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOlUp. Tl'., 
 
 2. In cases in chancery, where an inspection became necessary 
 in order to determine whether an heir presumptive or a devisee 
 for life, in tail or in fee, should be admitted to the enjoyment of 
 an estate.^ 
 
 3. In proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, on the 
 ground of impotency or sexual incapacity.^ 
 
 4. In proceedings to lay out roads and to assess damages, 
 where land is taken for public uses ; in the former of which 
 cases a jury of view is ordered under statutory regulations, and 
 in the latter it is the common practice for the jurors or commis- 
 sioners to view the locus in quo.^ 
 
 5. In criminal or civil trials where, under statutory authority, 
 and sometimes without it, the court may order a view by the 
 jury, of the place where the alleged crime was committed, or the 
 features of which are involved in the controversy.* 
 
 6. In actions for personal injuries, where it becomes necessary 
 
 V. State, 13 Ark. 105, 111. As to the 
 meauiug of the term " quick with 
 child," "which commonly arises iu 
 such cases, see Bish. Stat. Crim. 
 § 45; Ees v. Phillips, 3 Camj). 73, 7G; 
 Cora. V. Reicl, 1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. Rep. 182; 
 Reg. V. Wycherley, 8 Carr. & P. 262; 
 State V.Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 57; Rex 
 V. Russell, 1 Mood. C. C. 356, 360; 
 State V. Smith, 32 Me. 369; State v. 
 Emerich, 13 Mo. App. 492. 
 
 1 1 Bla. Com. 456; Lord Belmore v. 
 Anderson, 4 Bro. C. C. 90; Ex parte 
 Aiscough,2P. Wms. 591. 
 
 2 2 Bish. Mar. & Div., § 590, et seq.; 
 Devenbagh v. Deveubagh, 5 Paige, 
 (N. Y.) 554, 557; Briggs v. Morgan, 3 
 Phillimore, 325; s. c. 1 Eng. Ecc. 
 408; 2 Hagg. Con. 324; Norton v. 
 Setou, 3 Phillimore, 147; Shafto v. 
 Shafto, 28 N. J. Eq. 34; Brown v. 
 Brown, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 523 ; s. c. 3 Eng. 
 Ecc. 229; Anon., Dean & S. 333; Ale- 
 son u. Alesou, 2 Lee, 576; Newell v. 
 Newell, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 25-, Anon., 35 
 
 Ala. 226; LeBarrou v. LeBarrou, 35 
 Vt. 365; Pollard v. Wybourne, 1 
 Hagg. Ecc. 725; Owen v. Owen, 4 
 Hagg. Ecc, 261; B. v. L., L. R. 1 
 Prob. & Div. 639; T. v. M., L. R. 1 
 Prob. & Div. 31; H. v. H., 3 Swab. & 
 Tr. 517, 592; s. c. 33 L. J. (P. M. & 
 A.) 159, and 34 L. J. (P. M. & A.) 12 
 Harrison v. Sparrow, 3 Curt. Ecc. 1. 
 s. c, 7 Eng. Ecc. 357; s. c, sub noni 
 Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore P. C 
 96; S. V. E., 3 Swab. & Tr. 240; M. v 
 B., 3 Swab. & Tr. 550; H. v. C, 1 
 Swab. & Tr. 605; E. v. D., 4 Swab. & 
 Tr. 86; T. v. D., L. R. 1 Prob. & DiVo 
 127; U. V. J., L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 
 460; L. V. H., 4 Swab. & Tr. 115, 118; 
 W. V. H., 2 Swab. &Tr. 240; Deane v. 
 Aveling, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279; Grimbalde- 
 ston V. Anderson, cited 3 Phillimore 
 155; s. c. 1 Eng. Ecc. 385. 
 
 3 See tlie next article iu this chap- 
 ter. 
 
 * See the next article iu this chap- 
 ter.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] NATURAL EVIDENCE. 647 
 
 to order an examination of the body of the person injured, for the 
 purpose of showing the extent of his injuries. ^ 
 
 7. In cases of disputed identity ^^ and in other cases hereinafter 
 exphdned. 
 
 8. In addition to tliis, it is the common practice in criminal 
 trials to produce, for the inspection of the jury, the iveajJOii with 
 wliich the crime was committed,^ any clothing or other articles 
 containing blood-stains, * or, in general, any material object, 
 capable of being produced in the court-room and exhibited to the 
 jury, the physical characteristics of which speak in evidence, in 
 connection with the oral evidence, concerning the alleged crime. ^ 
 
 § 852. In Cases of Alleged Pregnancy. — Where it became 
 necessary to have an inspection of the body in cases of alleged 
 pregnancy, this inspection, according to the ancient and familiar 
 practice, was made by a jnrj/ of matrons, under a writ denomi- 
 nated in the ancient law de ventre inspiciendo.^ This mode of 
 trying the fact has been condemned by modern medical authority,^ 
 on the most unanswerable grounds, supported by historical in- 
 stances.^ It is quite too plain for argument that, in many cases, 
 a jury of old women might not be able to distinguish a case of 
 pregnancy from a case of dropsy, and that their conclusions would 
 bear no comparison for accuracy or probability wnth the conclus- 
 ions of a commission of expert surgeons. Accordingly, we find 
 that modern statutes have, in some instances, substituted for this 
 inadequate and insufficient mode of trial, a trial by a jury, com- 
 posed, in whole or in part, of medical men.^ 
 
 1 Post, § S69,, et seq. Ex parte Aiscough, 2 P. Wms. 591; 
 
 2 Post, § 857. Ex parte Bellett, 1 Cox Chau. Cas. 297 ; 
 
 3 McDonel v. Stare, 90 lud. 327. Marston v. Eoe, 8 Ad. & El. U. 
 
 4 Com. V. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. ' Beck Med. Jnr. 203, 205, et seq.; 
 (Pa.) 501, 5G3. Taylor's Med. Jur. 154, ct seq. 
 
 ^ See, for instance, Com. r. Brown, * In Eeg. v. Wycherley, 8 Carr. & P. 
 
 121 Mass. 09; People v. Gonzales, 35 2G2, a jury of matrons had the good 
 
 X. Y. 49; Gardner v. People, 6 Park. sense to ask for the assistance of a 
 
 Cr. E. (N. Y.) 155; State v. Modecai, surgeon. 
 
 t;8N. C. 207; State v. Graliam, 74 N.C. » 2 Eev. Stat. N. Y., ch. G58; 1 Eev. 
 
 G46; post, § 870. Stat. Mo. 1879, § 1851. The mode of 
 
 6 1 Beck Med. Jur., ch. G ; Cro. Eliz. procedure in the case of a writ de ventre 
 
 6GG; Ex parte Wallop, 3 Bro. C C. 90; inspiciendo, executed by a jury of ma-
 
 648 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. [1 TllOlllp. Tl'., 
 
 § 853. Inspection of the Body in Proceeding' for Divorce or 
 Nullity of Marriage. — Inspections of this kind are always in- 
 delicate and distressing to the feelings of the parties, and are, 
 therefore, never ordered except when clearly necessary.^ Nev- 
 ertheless, it is settled that the courts are not at liberty to decline 
 to order such an inspection on the ground of indelicacy alone. 
 " Courts of law," said Sir William Scott, " are not invested with 
 the power of selection. They must take the law as it is imposed 
 on them. Courts of the highest jurisdiction must often go into 
 cases of the most odious nature, where the proceeding is only 
 for the punishment of the offender. Here the claim is for a 
 remedy, and the court cannot refuse to entertain it on any fas- 
 tidious notions of its own." ■^ But an order for an inspection 
 will never be granted unless the court is satisfied that the com- 
 plaint is preferred in good faith. '^ A court will be more reluctant 
 to order an inspection of the body of an old person than that of 
 a young person; and, for equally obvious reasons, it will be more 
 reluctant to grant an inspection of the body of a luife than that 
 of a husband; * though an inspection of the wife is sometimes 
 ordered where she herself is the complainant, since the impedi- 
 ment to the consummation of the marriage may exist in her, and 
 since the fact of her virginity may be of itself evidence of his in- 
 capacity.^ By the old law, an inspection would not be granted 
 in a divorce proceeding until after a triennial coJiahitation ; ^ 
 but this doctrine seems to have no place in modern divorce 
 law.^ It has been doubted, in England, whether a decree 
 of nullity would be granted in any case without a physical 
 
 trons, is decribed at length in the ^ Ibid. 
 
 modern case of Eeg. v. Wycheiiey, 8 ^ Ibid.; Shafto v. Shafto, 28 N. J. 
 
 Carr. & P. 2C,2, A. D. 1838. See also Eq. 34; Brown v. Brown, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 
 
 State V. Arden, 1 Bay (S. C), 487; 523; s. c. 3 Eug. Ecc. 229; Anon., Doau 
 
 Reg. V. Bayuton, 17 How St. Tr. 598, & S. 333. 
 
 G31. s 1 Coot. Ecc. Prac. 307; Pollard v. 
 
 1 2 Bishop :Mar. and l)iv., § 590; Wybouru, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 725; 2 Bishop 
 
 Devenbagh v. DevenlKigh, 5 Paige Mar. and Div., § 596. 
 (N. Y.), 554, 557. " Alesou v. Alesou^ 2 Lee, 576c 
 
 - Briggs V. Morgan, 3 Pliillimore, ' See 2 Bishop Mar. and Div . §585; 
 
 325, 328; s. c. 1 Eug. Ecc. 490; 2 Hagg. et seq. 
 Con. 324.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] NATURAL EVIDENCE. 64^ 
 
 examination of the defendant by scientific men; but the English 
 courts appear to have settled upon the doctrine that such 
 an inspection is not required in all cases; that the physical 
 incapacity of the defendant may be proved by any attainable 
 evidence ; and that all that is required is that such incapacity be 
 shown to exist, and that there is clearly no collusion between the 
 parties.^ In this country, the making of such an order has been 
 regarded as discretionary, and hence not revisable on appeal. ^ 
 While many decisions emphasize the uncertain results of such 
 inspections, even where the person inspected is the wife and the 
 object is to ascertain whether she is virgo intacta et apta viro,'"^ 
 and it has been held that a decree of nullity will never be granted 
 upon the evidence furnished by such an inspection alone,* — yet 
 it seems to have been the opinion at one time that a decree of 
 nullity would never be pronounced without such an inspection.^ 
 But this conclusion seems to have been abandoned ; ^ and the 
 contrary w^ould seem to be the better conclusion, as applicable 
 to such procedure in this country, where the parties themselves 
 are allo\ved to give evidence. 
 
 § 854. Order for such Inspection, how Enforced. — If a 
 
 party in such a proceeding refuses to undergo an inspection which 
 the court has ordered, he or she may be proceeded against for 
 
 1 Harrisons. Harrison, 4 Moore P. 926; McClane v. Kiddle, 19 Ala. 180: 
 C. 96, 103. Michan v. Wyatt, 21 Ala. 813; Lauier 
 
 2 Anon., 35 Ala. 226. This was a v. Driver, 24 Ala. 149. 
 
 rule of the English chancery practice, * S. v. E., 3 Swab. & Tr. 240, 243; 
 
 ■which has been adopted in some of M. «. H., 3 Swab. & Tr. 517, 520; M. 
 
 our American divorce proceedings by v. B., 3 Swab. & Tr. 550; H. v. C, 1 
 
 analogy. The Alabama court cite, in Swab. & Tr. 605; F. v. D., 4 Swab. & 
 
 support of this conclusion, the follow- Tr. 86; T. v. D., L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 
 
 ing: 2 Danl. Ch. Prac. 1136; Wood v. 127; U. v. J., L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 460; 
 
 Mann, 2 Surau- (U. S.) 316; Hammers- L. v. H., 4 Swab. & Tr. 115, 118. 
 
 leyu. Brown, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 428; ^ Norton v. Seton, 3 Phill. Ecc. 147, 
 
 Moody V. Payne, 3 Johns. Ch. 294; 160; s. c. 1 Eug. Ecc. 384. 
 
 Cummings v. Gill, G Ala. 562; Evans ^ h. v. C, 1 Swab. & Tr. 605. 
 
 V. Boiling, 5 Ala. 550; Bryant t), Peters, « F. v. D., 4 Swab. &. Tr. 86, 92. 
 
 3 Ala. 170; Wyatt v. Magee, 3 Ala. 94; This decision was afterwards reversed 
 
 Planters' &c. Bank v. Walker, 7 Ala. on appeal: 34 L. J. (P. & M.) 66.
 
 650 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 ThoUll). Tl'., 
 
 contempt, 1 and the court may enforce the order by attaching the 
 body of the contemning party. "^ In the case of the absence of 
 the defendant, the English Court of Divorce has sometimes taken 
 the course of suspending its decree of nullity, in order to give 
 the petitioner an opportunity of having the defendant inspected, 
 if he or she should afterwards be found within the jurisdiction.^ 
 In such a case, where the absent defendant was the wife, an order 
 of the court directed that her alimony pendente lite should be 
 withheld, incase she refused to appear and submit to an inspec- 
 tion; ^ and in another case it was suggested that the court might 
 suppress the defendant's testimony in case of her refusal.^ It 
 is scarcely necessary to add that the complaining party will not 
 be prevented from having a decree of divorce or nullity, through 
 the misconduct of the defendant in placing himself or herself 
 beyond the jurisdiction of the court so that an inspection cannot 
 be had, provided it clearly appear that there is no collusion.^ 
 
 § 855. Mode of Inspection in Such Cases. — Where, as in 
 
 some American jurisdictions, divorce cases have been committed 
 to courts of chancery, a reference has been ordered to a master, 
 directing him to conduct such an examination and report the 
 result thereof.^ An ex parte examination by the party's own 
 physician will not satisfy the demands of justice, but the defend- 
 ant will be required to submit to an inspection by one or more 
 respectable gentlemen of the medical profession, to be named 
 for that purpose by the comi)lainant with the sanction of the 
 court. ^ In another case a commissioner was appointed to take 
 proofs, to select disinterested physicians, and through them to 
 
 1 Harrison v. Sparrow, 3 Curt. Ecc. ^ Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 25. 
 1; s. c. 7 Eng. Ecc. 357; s. c. sub nom. * Anon., 35 Ala. 2-20, 228. 
 Harrison v. Harrison, 4 Moore P. C. ** Wybourn v. Wybourn, 1 Ilagg. 
 96, Ecc. 725, 729; s. c. 3 Eng. Ecc. 308. 
 
 2 B. V. L., L. R. 1 Prob. & Uiv. ' Devenbagh v. Devenbagh, 5 
 639. Paige (N. Y.), 554, 558. 
 
 3 T. V. N., L. E. 1 Prob. & Div. 31. « Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige, 25. 
 See also H. v. H., 3 Swab. & Tr. 517 See this case at length for the mode 
 and 592; s. c. 33 L. J. (P. M. & A.) of conducting such an examination. 
 159, and 34 L. J. (P. M. & A.) 12.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII. J INSPECTION. 651 
 
 make such an examination.^ In the English Ecclesiastical Court 
 the examination was conducted by medical inspectors, generally 
 two physicians and a surgeon, or two surgeons and a physician, 
 nominated by the complainant, with the privilege conceded to 
 the adverse party of naming one or more of them.^ They, of 
 course, take an oath, faithfully to perform the duty required of 
 them.^ They certify to the court the result of their examina- 
 tion.^ Their certificate merely states the result of their inspec- 
 tion, in conformity with the oath which they have taken, but 
 does not give the reasons for their conclusions.*'^ In this regard 
 it resembles a special verdict. In addition to requiring a written 
 certificate, delivered under the obligation of the oath which they 
 have taken, it is the constant practice of the English Ecclesias- 
 tical courts to examine them as witnesses, touching the result of 
 their inspection.^ 
 
 § 856. Inspection of the Child in Filiation Cases. — In the 
 
 trial of an action involving the question of the legitimacy of a 
 child, who was alleged to be of mixed African blood, it was held 
 proper to allow the child to be exhibited to the jury; since 
 " when the question is whether a certain object is hlack or white, 
 the best evidence of color would be the exhibition of the object 
 to the jury. The eyes of the members of the jury must be pre- 
 sumed to be as good as those of medical men. Why should a 
 jury be confined to hearing what other men think they have seen, 
 
 1 Le BaiTou v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. Prac. (4tli ed.) (522, 023. The form of 
 365, 372. the oath is given in 2 Bishop Mar. & 
 
 2 Coot. Ecc. Prac. 388. See also Div., § 598. 
 
 Dean v. Aveling, 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, •* Eor forms of such certificates, see 
 
 where the proceedings appear in full. L. v. H., 4 Swab. & Tr. 115; W. v. H., 
 
 In more recent times the practice has 2 Swab. & Tr. 240; S. v. E., 3 Swab. & 
 
 been to appoint but tiKO medical or Tr. 240. 
 
 surgical inspectors: S. v. E,, 3 Swab. ^ Pollard v. Wybouru, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 
 
 & Tr. 240; M. v. H., 3 Swab. & Tr. 517; 725, 727. 
 
 M, V. B., 3 Swab. & Tr. 550; F. v. D., « Deane v. Aveling, 1 Eob.Ecc. 279; 
 
 4 Swab. & Tr, 8(J; L. v. H., 4 Swab. & W. v. H., 2 Swab. & Tr. 240,242; S. v. 
 
 Tr. 115. E., 3 Swab. & Tr. 240; M. v. H., 3 
 
 3 2 Bishop Mar. & Div., § 598; Swab. & Tr. 517, 520; M. «. B., 3 Swab. 
 Coot. Ecc. Prac. 389 ; Browne Div. & Tr. 550, 553.
 
 652 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 and not be allowed to think for themselves?" ^ In a previous 
 case in the same State, it was held no ground of new trial that 
 the mother of the bastard ehild was put upon the stand having 
 the child in her arms, and that the solicitor called the attention 
 of the jury to the child's features, and afterwards commented up- 
 on its appearance in his address to the jury, — the defendant 
 having taken no objection. The court said that it had long been 
 the practice in that State, in bastardy cases, to exhibit the child 
 to the jury.^ In a similar case in another jurisdiction, it was 
 held not error to allow a bastard child about hvo years old to be 
 exhibited to the jury, for the purpose of enabling them to deter- 
 mine whether there was a family i^esemblance between the child 
 and the defendant.^ But in another case in the same court, it 
 was held error to allow a child three months old to be thus ex- 
 hibited.* The distinction drawn by the court between these two 
 cases w^as that, where a child has reached a considerable maturity, 
 family resemblances will appear; whereas all extremel}'' young 
 babies look substantially alike. ^ 
 
 § 857. On a Question of Personal Identity. — In an En- 
 glish revenue case a defendant, against whom an information had 
 been filed for importing prohibited goods, was, on his own appli- 
 cation, brought, on a particular day, by a habeas corpus ad testi- 
 ficandum.^ into court, in order that he might be present at the 
 trial, so as to avail himself of the only point of defense which he 
 made, which w^as that the person who had actually committed the 
 offense had personated him.® The report does not disclose why 
 this extraordinary step was necessary — why the defendant 
 
 1 Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 179. 2 state v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89. 
 
 The court quoted the followiug pas- ^ State v. Smith (la.), 6N. W. Rep. 
 
 sage from Horace: — 153; s. c. 22 Alb. L. J. 43; s. c. 54 la. 
 
 '' Aut agitur res in scenis, aut 104. 
 
 acta ref ertur : ■* State v. Danforth, 48 la. 43; .s. c. 
 
 •' Segnius Irritaut animos de- 30 Am. Rep. 387. 
 missa per aurcm, * Note bytheimnter: The judge who 
 
 "Quamquaisunt oculis subjectafidel- made this ruling must have been an 
 
 ibus, et quje old bacliclor. 
 " Ipse sibi tradit spectator. — Eor.ad *' Attorney-General v. Eadden, 1 
 
 Fisoncs. Price, 403.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] INSPECTION. 653 
 
 would not necessarily be present at the trial without being so 
 brought up ; and why a form of the habeas corpus implying that 
 he was brought up as a, witness, should have issued, when the law 
 rendered him incompetent to testify. The inference is that he 
 was brought up for the purpose of inspection merely. 
 
 § 858. Exhibiting Injured Parts of the Human Body to the 
 Jury. — On the trial of actions for damages for a personal inju- 
 ry, where there is a question as to the character and extent of 
 the injury, it is not error to allow the injured person to exhibit 
 the injured portion of his body to the jury,i unless this would 
 involve an indecent exposure of the person, which ought not to 
 be permitted in a judicial proceeding.'-^ The objection that such 
 an exhibition has a tendency unduly to excite the sympathies of 
 the jurors, is not tenable. 
 
 § 859. Compulsory Physical Examination of Plaintiff in Ac- 
 tions for Personal Injuries. — In modern trials of civil actions 
 for physical injuries, the question has frequently arisen whether 
 the court has power to order an inspection of the body of the 
 plaintiff or person injured, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
 nature and extent of the injuries. Some of the courts, car- 
 rying in their minds no higher conception of a judicial trial than 
 the conception that it is a combat, in which each of the gladia- 
 tors is permitted, within certain limits, to deceive and trick the 
 antagonist and the umpire, have denied the right of the de- 
 fendant to have an order for such inspection.^ Other courts, 
 taking the more enlightened view that the object of a judicial 
 
 1 Hiller v. Sharon Springs, 28 Hun point is slurred over without discus- 
 (N.Y.), 344; Mulhadov. Broolilyn City siou) ; Neuraau v. Third Avenue R. 
 R. Co., 30N. Y. 370; Jordan v. Bow- Co., 50 N. Y. Super. 412; Roberts w. 
 den, 46 N. Y. Super, 355; Earlier v. Ogdtjusburgh &c. R. Co., 29 Hun 
 Perry, 67 la, 146. (N. Y.), 154. In Texas it is ruled that 
 
 2 Post, § 861. the court will not compel a plaintiff, 
 
 3 Stuart V. Haven, 17 Neb. 211, 214; suing for personal injuries, to submit 
 Sioux City &c. R. Co. v. Finlayson, 16 his body to examination, unless it is 
 Neb. 578, 588; Loyd w. R. Co., 53 Mo. essential to the ends of justice. In- 
 515 (overruled it seems by Shephard ternational &c. R. Co. v. Underwood, 
 Uo Mo. Pac. R, Co., 85 Mo. 629) ; Parker 64 Tex. 464. 
 
 V Euslow, 102 111. 272, 279 (where the
 
 654 NATURAL EVIDENCE, [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 trial is to enable the State to establish and enforce justice be- 
 tween party and party, have held that it is within the power of 
 the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, in proper 
 cases, upon an application seasonably made, under proper safe- 
 guards designed to preserve the rights of both parties, to order 
 such an inspection, and to com})el the plaintiff or injured person 
 to submit to it.^ Another court has held that where the plaintiff 
 in such an action alleges that his injuries are of a permanent na- 
 ture, the defendant is entitled, as a matter of right, to have the 
 opinion of a surgeon, based upon a personal examination, unless 
 there is already an abundance of expert evidence, in which case 
 the court, in its discretion, may refuse to order an examination."^ 
 Another court has ruled that the trial court may require the 
 plaintiff in such an action to submit to a medical examination 
 and dismiss his action, if he refuses to comply with the order, ^ 
 This conclusion may be placed upon the higher ground that, 
 when a person appeals to the sovereign for justice, he impliedly 
 consents to the doing of justice to the other party, and impliedly 
 agrees in advance to make any disclosure which is necessary to 
 be made in order that justice may be done. The conception of 
 the nature and objects of a judicial trial which denies to the de- 
 fendant, under proper safeguards, the right of such an inspec- 
 tion, is not higher than that of the old law, which w^ould not 
 even compel a party to produce a deed or private paper, in a 
 civil case, where it was intended to be used in evidence against 
 him,* a rule which the court of chancery invaded to prevent fail- 
 ures of justice, and which has almost entirely disappeared from 
 modern civil jurisprudence.^ 
 
 1 White V. Milwaukee &c. R. Co., « Sibley u. Smith, 46 Ark. 275; s.c 
 
 61 Wis. 536; Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. 55 Am. Rep. 584. 
 
 Pr. 334; Shephard v. Mo. P. R. Co., 3 Miami &c. Co.w. Baily, 37 Oh. St. 
 
 S5 Mo. 629; s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 390; 104. 
 
 Schoeder v. Railway Co., 47 la. 375; ^ Haldane v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2489; 
 
 Miami &c. R. Co. v. Baily, 37 Oh. ante, § 730 et seq. 
 
 St. 104; Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Thul, ^ The power to compel a physical 
 
 29 Kau. 466. See Ilatheld v. St. Paul examiuation of the plaintiff, in an ac- 
 
 &c. R. Co., 18 Am. &Eng. R. R. Cas. tion for personal injuries, has been 
 
 292, where the authorities are collected likened to the power to compel the 
 
 in a note by the learned editor. opposite party to produce books and
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII. J INSPECTION. 655 
 
 § 860. Before Trial. — It has been held that the court has power, 
 under the New York statute, relating to the examination of parties be- 
 fore trial to compel the plaintiff, in an action for damages for a phy- 
 sical injury, to submit to a physical examination by medical experts, 
 where the defendant, in his application, makes the necessity of such ex- 
 amination appear,! otherwise not ; ^ but in later cases in the same State 
 this has been denied.-^ 
 
 § 861. Such Examination, liow Condiictecl. — It is needless 
 to add that such an exannnation Avill not be ordered in i/ie pres- 
 ence of the jury, where it would require an indecent exposure 
 of the person; ^ and that, while the court for obvious reasons 
 will not make an order for such an examination to be had ex 
 parle^ or by surgeons selected by one party alone, without an 
 opportunity for surgeons selected by the other party to be pres- 
 ent, — yet where the party has been examined ex parte without 
 an order of the court, there is no rule of evidence which will ex- 
 clude the testimony of the examining surgeons,^ provided their 
 testimony does not come within the rule which excludes confi- 
 dential communications between patient and physician. 
 
 § 862. Compelling Plaintiff to Perform Physical Acts before 
 Jury. — From analogy to some of the preceding holdings, it has 
 been concluded that the trial court has power, in a proper case 
 and under proper circumstances, to direct the plaintiff to do a 
 physical act in the presence of the jury, which will show the 
 character of his injuries ; and it has been supposed that there 
 may be circumstances where the defendant would have a rio-ht 
 to such an order. At the same time, it is said that, " from the 
 very nature of things, the propriety of such an order must usu- 
 ally rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and it would 
 
 papers. Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Pr. 154: disapproving Walsh r. Sayre, 52 
 (N. Y.) 334. How. Pr. (N. Y^ 334; and Sliaw v. 
 
 1 Shaw V. "Van Rensselaer, 60 How. Van Rensselaer, supra. 
 
 E»r<, (N. Y.) 143. * Brown v. Swiueford, 44 Wis. 282, 
 
 2 Ibid. 285. 
 
 8 Neuman v. Third Avenue R. Co., ^ Louisville &c. R. Co. n. Falvey,. 
 
 50N. Y. Super. 412; Roberts -y. Og- 104 Iiid. 409, 417. 
 deusburgh &c. R. Co., 21) Hun (N. Y.),
 
 656 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoni}). Tl'., 
 
 only be in the case of a plain abuse of such discretion " that an 
 appellate court would interfere. ^ 
 
 § 863. Instance where such an Experiment was Properly Re- 
 fused. — In an action against a railway company for damages it ap- 
 peared that tlie plaintiff, while leaving the defendant's cars, fell or was 
 thrown from the platform or steps of the car upon the ground, injuring 
 the sciatic or great nerve of the thigh. The plaintiff, as a witness in her 
 own behalf, testified that this had caused her great and constant pain, 
 had caused the thigh to shrink, had rendered her lame, and had 
 caused her to " limp " in walking. The counsel for the defendant 
 thereupon requested the court to order her to walk across the court 
 room in the presence of the jury, which the court declined to do. The 
 reviewing court saw, under the circumstances, no abuse of discretion in 
 refusing to comply with the request. " Such an act," said the court, 
 " would have furnished the jury little or no aid in determining the ex- 
 tent or the character of her injuries. The only fact it could, by any 
 possibility, have determined, was, whether or not she was lame, or 
 ' limped,' as she testified, in walking. But there was already ample and 
 uncontradicted evidence of this fact. Her own evidence on the point 
 was fully corroborated by that of three or four other witnesses, her 
 neighbors or members of her family, who had seen her almost daily 
 since the accident." ^ It may be doubted whether this was a sound 
 conclusion. The fact that there was considerable evidence, from the 
 plaintiff herself and her neighbors, to prove that she limped, does not 
 make it appear why the defendant was not entitled to an exhibition of 
 her manner of walking before the jury, for the purpose, if possible, of 
 showing the contrary, or at least of showing the extent to which she 
 limped. It is true that the experiment might, if fraudulently performed 
 by her, confirm her testimony and that of her witnesses on the point , 
 but this would seem to be no reason for refusing the experiment on the 
 application of the defendant. 
 
 § 8G4. Experiments in Preparation for Trial or Hearing. — A 
 suit was instituted to restrain proceedings at law, to recover for work 
 and labor in constructing a sewer, on the ground of fraud on the part 
 of the defendant in equity, in improperly obtaining possession of an 
 
 1 Ilatfleld V. St. Paul &c. R. Co. 2 Hatfield v. St. Paul &c,, R. Co, 
 
 (MiiinO, 22 N. W. Rep. 176; s. c. (Minn.), 22 N. W. Rep. 176: s. c. 33 
 33Miuu. 130. Miuu. 130.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] INSPECTION. 657 
 
 estimate in writing, and, by a chemical process, removing the figures 
 indicating the price. The document in question having been deposited 
 with the clerk of the records, in pursuance of an order of production, 
 the plaintiff moved for liberty to subject it to chewJcal tests, for the 
 purpose of the trial at law, upon an undertaking by the defendant to 
 produce it to be stamped at the trial at law. The vice-chancellor, upon 
 this undertaking being given, refused to make any order. i — - - In an 
 action against printers, for the infringement of a patent for making type 
 b}^ a certain combination of metals, an application, on the part of the 
 plaintiff, not merely for an inspection of the type used by the defendants' 
 type-founders, but also to be permitted to take specimens thereof for 
 the purpose of analysis, was refused ; it appearing that the defendants 
 had purchased their tj'pe, and the only ground laid for the application 
 being that, by the analysis it would appear that the composition was 
 similar to that of the plaintiff's type, and amounted to an infringement 
 of the patent. The question was decided under a statute,'- and the 
 judges seemed to be of opinion that circumstances might arise where the 
 power to order such an inspection would exist. ^ 
 
 § 865. Compelling Inspection of Chattels. — It has been 
 held that, where the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries, 
 has been injured by a machine, the court is without power to 
 compel the defendant to allow the plaintiff's attorney to inspect 
 it, in order to assist in the cross-examination of the plaintiff by 
 his attorney, the defendant having obtained an order for the 
 plaintiff's examination before the trial ;^aud that a justice of the 
 peace has no power, upon the trial of an action for the breach of 
 a warrant ij in the sale of a chattel, to compel a party to produce 
 the chattel in court for inspection, by means of a subpoena duces 
 tecum, or by any other means. ^ In an action for damages for 
 wrongfully and knowingly keeping n. fierce and miscliievous dog, 
 which bit and wounded the plaintiff, it was held that the dog 
 might be allowed to be brought into court, and he was brought 
 
 1 Twentymanu. Barnes, 2 DeGex& pany v. Lloyd, 29 L. J. (Exch.) 207. 
 Sm. 225. See also Holland v. Fox, 3 El. & Bl. 
 
 2 The Patent Law Amendment Act, 977, decided under the same statute. 
 1852, § 42; Stat. 15 & 16 Vict., chap. •* Cooke ??. Lalance &c. Co., 29 Hun 
 83, § 22. (X. Y.), 641. 
 
 3 The Patent Type-Foundry Com- ^ Huuteru. Allen, 35 Barb. (N.Y.) 42. 
 
 42
 
 658 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 into court by his keeper led by a chain, and, at the request of 
 some of the jurors, was released in their presence and examined 
 by tliem ; and they seemed to be of opinion that he was not of a 
 vicious disposition, and gave a verdict for the defendant.^ It 
 has been culed that if, in an action for trespass in seizing and 
 detaining a dog, the defendant refuses to produce the dog upon 
 notice, during the examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, he 
 will not be allowed to produce it afterwards, for the purpose of 
 invalidating the testimony of those witnesses as to the identity 
 of the dog.^ Tills is in conformity with a principle already ex- 
 plained, that a party who refuses to produce a document on 
 notice, will not be allowed afterwards to produce it, for the 
 purpose of rebutting secondary evidence which the party re- 
 quiring its production has been compelled to give of its contents.* 
 
 § 8G6. Physical Examination of the Defendant in Crim- 
 inal Trials. — There is a difference of opinion upon the question 
 whether the physical examination of the defendant in a criminal 
 trial will not be ordered against his consent. One view is that 
 this would violate a fundamental principle of Anglo-American 
 jurisprudence,* embodied in our American constitutions, that a 
 prisoner shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself .& 
 Thus, it has been ruled that the forcible examination, under an 
 order of the coroner, of a female prisoner, by physicians, for 
 the purpose of obtaining evidence that she had been pregnant 
 and had been delivered of a child within two or three weeks 
 previous, was a violation of such a constitutional provision.*' 
 We find, however, that authority on this question, has not 
 been uniform. Thus, on a criminal trial, the question of the 
 identity of the defendant being in issue, one of the w^itnesses 
 
 1 Line v. Taylor, 3 Fost. &. Fin. 731; 705; Eeg. v. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927; 
 trial before Erie, C. J., who said that Hex v. Shelley, 3 T. R. 142. Compare 
 he remembered a case la which Lord Haldane i\ Harvey, 4 Burr. 2489. 
 Campbell had permitted a similar in- * People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 
 spection. (N. Y.) 210; States. Jacobs, 5 Jones 
 
 2 Lewis V. Hartley, 7 Car. &. V. 405. L. (N. C.) 200; ante, § 292. 
 
 3 Aute, § 789. « People v. McCoy, 45 How. PJ- 
 ^ Reg. V. Worsenham, 1 Ld. Raym. (N. Y.) 21G.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] INSPECTION. 659 
 
 testified that he knew the defendant, and knew that he had tattoo 
 marks (a female head and bust) on his right fore-arm. The 
 court, thereupon, compelled the defendant, against his objec- 
 tion, to exhibit his arm, in such a manner as to show the 
 marks to the jury. It was held that this action of the court was 
 not a violation of the provision of the constitution of the State 
 that no person shall be compelled, " in any criminal case, to be 
 a witness against himself," — and further, that the action was 
 not erroneous or prejudicial to the defendant in a legal sense. 
 The court construed the constitutional provision as meaning that 
 no person shall be compelled to testify as a witness against 
 himself. "To use a common phrase," said Hawdey, J., " it 
 closes the mouth of the prisoner. A defendant in a criminal 
 case cannot be compelled to give evidence, under oath or afiirm- 
 ation, or make any statement, for the purpose of proving or 
 disproving any question at issue before any tribunal, court, 
 judge or magistrate. This is the shield under which he is pro- 
 tected by the strong arm of the law, and this protection was given, 
 not for the purpose of evading the truth, but for the reason that, in 
 the sound judgment of the men who framed the constitution, it 
 was thought that, owing to the weakness of human nature, and the 
 various motives that actuate mankind, a defendant accused of 
 crime might be tempted to give testimony against himself that 
 was not true." ^ So, evidence of the condition of the pris- 
 oner's hand, if material, may be rehearsed to the jury, although 
 the evidence was obtained by compelling her, against her will, to 
 unwrap and exhibit her hand at the coroner's inquest. ^ But with 
 singular absurdity, it was held, on trial of an indictment against 
 the defendant, as a free negro, for carrying weapons, that it was 
 erroneous to allow the State to offer the defendant to the 
 inspection of the jury, in order that they might see that he was 
 a mulatto within the prohibited degree. He w^as, it seems, to sit 
 during the trial, some where in the court room, where the jury 
 could not see him.^ 
 
 ^ State V. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 83. C.) 259. Upon obvious grounds, and 
 
 2 State V. Garrett, 71 N. C. 95. iu conformity witli the maxim nemo se 
 
 3 State V. Jacobs, 5 Joues L. (N. ipsum accusare tenetur, the defendant
 
 660 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tl*., 
 
 § 867. Compulsory Experiments BY THE Prisoner DISCLOSING Guilt. — 
 In another case a prisoner, indicted for the larceny of growing corn, 
 was compelled by the officer in charge, to put his shoe in a track 
 found in the field, for the purpose of comparison, and the result of 
 this comparison was detailed by the officer, as a witness on the trial. 
 It was held that in this there was no error. ^ But on a trial in Georgia, 
 it has been held that a witness should not be permitted to testif}' that he 
 forced the defendant to put his foot into a shoe track near the scene of 
 the burglary, and that the shoe fitted the track, — it being a violation 
 of the constitutional guarantee that " no person shall be compelled to 
 give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself." ^ So, 
 where, in a case of murder the prosecution proved that foot-jyrints were 
 found on the premises where the assassination had been perpetrated, 
 and also that the examining magistrate had compelled the accused to 
 make his foot-prints in an ash-heap, and that the foot-prints so made 
 corresponded with those found on the premises where the homicide was 
 committed, — it was held that the evidence was admissible, and that it 
 was no invasion of the constitutional guaranty that " one accused of 
 crime shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." ^ But 
 where a pan of soft mud was brought into the court room on the trial, 
 and the prisoner was asked, in the presence of the jury, to put his foot 
 into it, which he declined to do, the conviction was reversed, because 
 the court was satisfied that the jury were improperlj^ influenced by this 
 attempt to compel the prisoner to give evidence against himself.* 
 
 § 868. Obscene Photographs. — On the trial of an indictment 
 for selling an indecent and obscene photograph, it has been 
 held that the photograph itself is a proper instrument of evidence 
 for inspection by the jury. The court say: " As the statute has 
 given this general definition of the character of the acts consti- 
 tuting the offense, it must necessarily have been designed that 
 the drawing, picture, photograph or writing should be exhibited 
 
 in a criminal action cannot be com- may be given, — the defcndaut not being 
 
 pelled to produce or surrender a writ- expected to deliver it iu conformity 
 
 ing, or other iustrument of evidence, witli a uotice. Ihid.; ante, § 773. 
 to be used agaiust him. McGiunis v. ^ State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646, 
 
 State, 24 lud. 500. It is upon this 2 Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667. 
 
 ground that the courts have held, as ^ Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 246, 
 
 already seen, that on an indictment for 265. 
 
 the larceny of an instrumeut of writ- ^ Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 ing, parol evidence of its character 619; s. c. 2 Tex. Law Journ. 243.
 
 Tit. in, Ch. XXVII.] INSPECTION. 661 
 
 to and observed by the jury, for them to determine, as a matter 
 of fact, in the exercise of their good sense and judgment, whether 
 or not they were obscene and indecent." ^ 
 
 § 869. Photographic and Stereoscopic Views. — Next to the 
 inspection of the object itself, a photograph becomes its most ac- 
 curate and convenient representation ; and where an inspection 
 of the object is proper, but impracticable, a photograph of it 
 may be exhibited to the witnesses as an aid in identification,^ and 
 maybe admitted in evidence,^ and, in the discretion of the court, 
 examined by the jury through a stereoscope,^ or other magnifying 
 glass,^ and taken by them to their room.® Accordingly, in an 
 action for damages for an injury to real property, a photograph 
 of the premises taken at the time, is admissible, for the purpose 
 of showing the nature and extent of the injury.^ 
 
 § 870. Plans and Diagrams. — Plans and diagrams of prem- 
 ises, which are the scenes of transactions under investiofation, 
 may be referred to by witnesses and exhibited to a jury, for the 
 purpose of explaining their testimony and rendering it more intel- 
 ligible. " They are often formally admitted in evidence, and 
 
 1 People V. Muller, 32Huu (N. Y.), copies of a signature). Tlie correct- 
 
 209. This was considered tlie proper uess of tlie photograpli must be verified 
 
 course to be pursued in Reg. v. Hick- by tlie testimony of a witness, or it is 
 
 lin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360. inadmissible. Hollenbeck v. Rowley, 
 
 - Ruloff V. People, 45 N. Y. 213; s. 8 Allen (Mass.), 47 3. And whether it 
 
 c, more fully reported, 11 Abb. Pr. is sufficiently verified is a preliminary 
 
 (N. s.) (N. Y.) 245. question of fact, to be decided by the 
 
 3 /Z)id.; Locke v. Railway Co., 46 trial judge, whose decision thereon is 
 
 la. 109 (photographs of a railway not subject to exception. Blair v. 
 
 wreck); Reddiu r. Gates (ferrotype of Pelham, 118 Mass. 420; ante, chap, 
 
 the plaintiff's back, taken after a bat- XIII. Objection that the photograph 
 
 tery, showing his injuries); Blair u. exhibits only a partial view of the 
 
 Pelham, 118 Mass. 420 (photographs premises untenable. Locke v. Rail- 
 
 of place of injury on defective high- way Co., 4C la. 109, 112, 
 
 way) ; German Theological School v. * Rockford v. Russell, 9 Bradw. 
 
 Dubuque, 64 la. 736 (stereoscopic view (111-) '-29. 
 
 of premises injured by water) ; Udder- ^ Barker w. Perry, 67 Iowa, 146. 
 
 zook V. Com., 76 Pa. St. 340 (photo- ^ /^i^^. 
 
 graphs of the deceased, on a trial for ' Cozzens v. Higgins, 1 Abb. App. 
 
 murder) ; Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray Dec. (N. Y.) 451. 
 (Mass.), 161 (magnified photographic
 
 662 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 are proper for the consideration of the jury, so far as tliey are 
 shown to be correct, not as independent testimony, but in con- 
 nection with otlier evidence to enable the jury to understand and 
 apply such evidence." ^ In testifying as to a disputed boundary 
 line, a surve^'or may use a diagram to illustrate his evidence or 
 make it intelligible to the jury, although the diagram was not 
 made by himself, and is not shown to contain a perfectly accurate 
 description of the lines. Peters, C. J., in giving the opinion of 
 the court, said: " A witness may as well speak by a diagram or 
 linear description, when the thing may be so described, as by 
 words. It is a common and usual method of pointing out locali- 
 ties and lines. Even savages resort to it, in lieu of words, in de- 
 scribing the course of rivers, and the line of the seashores. It is 
 enough if it serves the purpose of the witness in the explanation 
 of the lines and localities he is seeking to exhibit." '^ 
 
 § 871. Indicia of Crime — Blood-Stained Clothing', Bur- 
 glar's Tools, etc. — As already stated, it is common, on criminal 
 trials, to submit to the inspection of the jury burglar's tools and 
 other indicia of crime, found in the possession of the prisoner, 
 in connection with evidence tending to show that they were used 
 in the commission of the crime. ^ It has been held not improper, 
 in a case of murder, to allow the State to exhibit to the jury the 
 bones of the vertebral column of the deceased, where it serves to 
 show to the jury the attitudes and relative positions of the parties 
 when the fatal shot was fired. The court said: " It was not an 
 unnecessary parade of the bones of the dead man to excite pre- 
 judice against his slayer, but was legitimate and proper evidence; 
 and a party cannot, upon the ground that it may harrow up feel- 
 ings of indignation against him in the breasts of the jury, have 
 competent evidence excluded from consideration." * So, on 
 such a trial the skull of the deceased may be produced in court 
 and exhibited to an expert surgeon, who may testify whether the 
 fractures therein could have been caused by blows from a gun, 
 
 1 State V. Lawlor, 28 Minu. 210, 218, 3 People v. Larued, 7 N. Y. 445. 
 and cases cited; ante, § 844. •» State v. Wieuers, G6 Mo. 14, 29; 
 
 2 Shook V. Pate, 50 Ala. 91, 92. affirraiug s. c. 4 Mo. App. 492.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] INSPECTION. 663 
 
 as testified to by other witnesses.^ So, the prosecuting attorney 
 may exhibit to the jury the articles of dothing found upon the 
 body of the deceased, as well as articles of personal property 
 found near the body.^ So, on the trial of an indictment for 
 homicide, the exhibition to the jury of blood-stained clotJiing, 
 worn by the deceased at the time of his arrest, shortly after the 
 commission of the crime, has tlie sanction of immemorial usage. ^ 
 *' In short," in the language of Starkie, " upon the trial of a 
 charge of homicide or burglary, all circumstances connected with 
 the state of the body found, or house pillaged, the tracing by 
 stains, marks or impressions, the finding of instruments of vio- 
 lence or property, either on the spot or elsewhere, — in short, all 
 visible vestigia are part of the transaction, are admitted in evi- 
 dence for the purpose of connecting the prisoner with the act. 
 Such facts and circumstances have not improperly been termed 
 inanimate ivitnesses.^'' * 
 
 § 872. Wlien Court will not assume Labor of examining^ 
 Natural Evidence. — Where a part}^ tenders material things in 
 evidence, there is authority to the effect that the court is not ob- 
 liged to assume the labor of examining them, without the assist- 
 ance of witnesses. Thus, the delendant agreed to buy from the 
 plaintiff a book which should correspond with a prospectus 
 which was exhibited to him. In an action for the price, the 
 plaintiff introduced the book in evidence, but put in no other 
 evidence tending to show that it complied with the prospectus. 
 It was held that the plaintiff had not proved his case ; that he 
 
 1 Gardiner v. Teople, (J Park. Cr. to crimiuate himself" (Ga. Code, § 
 (N. Y.) 157. 4998) does not extend so far as to 
 
 2 Ibid. prevent tlie clothing or other articles, 
 " People V. Fernandez, 35 N. Y. 49, taken from the person of the accused, 
 
 64. from being given in evidence or ex- 
 
 4 1 Stark. Ev. (9 Am. ed.) 66, hibited to the jui-y, where the same 
 
 quoted with approval in People v. Fer- tend to show his guilt. It means that, 
 
 nandez, 35 N. Y. 49, 64. The provis- when a person is sworn as a witness, he 
 
 ions of the constitution of Georgia shall not be compelled to testify to 
 
 that "no person sliall be compelled to facts that may tend to crimiuate him. 
 
 give testimony tending in any manner Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413, 415.
 
 664 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tl., 
 
 could not impose upon the court the obligation of examining the 
 book to see whether it corresponded to the prospectus. ^ 
 
 Article II. — View of TmNGS out of Court. 
 
 Section 
 
 875. In Real and Mixed Actions under the Common Law. 
 
 876. Under the Statute of Anne. 
 
 877. Under the Statute of Geo. II. 
 
 878. Under the Statute of Geo. IV. 
 
 879. In what Cases Granted under these Statutes. ^ 
 
 880. Old Practice in Conducting a View. 
 
 881. The Subject Regulated by Statute in America. 
 
 882. Provisions of American Statutes. 
 
 883. When Discretionary. 
 
 884. In Equity Cases. 
 
 885. In Criminal Cases. 
 
 886. View that the Prisoner must Accompany the Jury. 
 
 887. A Contrary View. 
 
 888. Irregular to send out Witnesses with Jury. 
 
 889. Theory that Impressions Acquired by the View are not Evidence. 
 
 890. Reasons Adduced in Support of this View. 
 
 891. Instructions held Erroneous under this View. 
 
 892. Instance under this Theory of a Proper Instruction to a Jury before 
 
 sending them out. 
 
 893. Contrary Opinion that Knowledge Acquired by the View is Evidence. 
 
 894. [Continued.] The same View taken by Chief Justice Shaw. 
 
 895. But Jurors not to Disregard other Evidence. 
 
 896. Illustration of this View. 
 
 897. When Jury decide upon their Personal Knowledge. 
 
 898. Not Error to Exclude Evidence of Pacts which the Jury have learned 
 
 from the View. 
 
 899. [Michigan.] Scope of the Powers of the Jury in Condemnation Pro- 
 
 ceedings. 
 
 900. Difficulty of Reviewing on Appeal the Finding of the Jury. 
 
 901. How Courts have Dealt with this Difficulty. 
 
 902. Observations on this Subject. 
 
 903. Report of Road Viewers not Evidence on Appeal. 
 
 904. Unauthorized Views. 
 
 905. Experiments before the Jury out of Court. 
 
 906. Misconduct in making a View. 
 
 907. [Continued.] Giving the Jury Refreshments. 
 
 908. View granted at what Stag<i of the Trial. 
 
 909. Rule for a View continues through Subsequent Trials. 
 
 910. Personal Notice in Condemnation Proceedings. 
 
 1 Western Historical Co. v. Schmidt, 56 Wis. 681.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 665 
 
 Section 
 
 911. Costs of the View. 
 
 912. Jury attended by the Proper Officer. 
 
 913. [Michigan.] Office of Judge or Court Commissioner when Attending. 
 
 914. Showers appointed under the old Practice. 
 
 915. Obstructing the ShoAvers in Punning Lines. 
 
 916. Competent to show change in Premises after the Fact in Controversy, 
 
 and before the View. 
 
 § 875. In Real aud Mixed Action.s under the Common-Law 
 Practice. — "In most real and mixed actions, in order to ascertain 
 the identity of land claimed with that in the tenant's possession, 
 the tenant is allowed, after the demandant has counted, to demand 
 a view of the land in question, or, if the subject of claim be rent, 
 or the like, a view of the land out of which it issues." ^ 
 
 § 876. Under the Statute of Anxe. — A statute passed in the reign 
 of Anne, " for the amendment of the law, and the better advancement 
 of justice," extended the view seemingl}^ to all civil actions, b\^ enact- 
 ing " that from and after the first day of Trinity Term, in any actions 
 brought in any of Her Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, 
 where it shall appear to the court in wliich such actions are depending, 
 that it will be proper and necessary that the jurors who are to try the 
 issues in any such action, should have the view of the messuages, lands, 
 or place in question, in order to their better understanding the evidence 
 that will be given upon the trials of such issues, — in every such case, 
 the respective courts, in which such actions shall be depending, may 
 order special writs of distringas, or habeas corpora to issue, by which 
 the sheriff, or such other officer to whom the said writs shall be directed, 
 shall be commanded to have six out of the twelve of the jurors named 
 in such writs, or some greater number of them, at the place in question, 
 some convenient time before the trial, who, then and there, shall have 
 
 1 Bouv. Law Diet. tit. Fie w; citing undenihillmhel. According to Viner's 
 
 Vin. Abr., View; Com. Dig., View; Abridgement, it was not demandable 
 
 Booth, 37; 2 Saund. ioh.;-! Reeve in such actions. Vin. Abr., Fieio, A. 2. 
 
 Hist. Eng. Law, 435. In Vin. Abr., There is a well condensed and well 
 
 tit. View, the old practice is set out at written article on this subject, in the 
 
 very considerable length; from which Central Law Journal for May 4, 1888, 
 
 It appears that a view could be had by J. C. Thomson, Esq., of St. Paul, to 
 
 only in real and mixed actions. It which the writer is indebted for cita- 
 
 was much questioned whether it was tions to many authoi'ities here ex- 
 
 demaudable in the action of dower amined.
 
 66& NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 the matte IS in question shown to them by two persons in the said writs 
 named, to be appointed by the court ; and the said sheriff, or other 
 officer who is to execute the said writs, shall, by a special return upon 
 the same, certify that the view hath been had according to the command 
 of the said writs." ^ 
 
 § 877. Under the Statute of Geo. II. — In the reign of George II. 
 a law was passed " for the better regulation of juries," which contains 
 the following proviso: "Provided always that, where a view shall be 
 allowed in any cause, that in such case six of the jurors named in said 
 panel, or more, who shall be mutually consented to by the parties or 
 their agents on both sides, or, if they cannot agree, shall be named by 
 the proper officers of the respective courts of King's Bench, Common 
 Pleas, Exchequer at Westminster, or Grand Session in Wales, and the 
 said Counties Palatine, for the causes in their respective courts, or, if 
 need be, by a judge of the respective courts where the cause is depend- 
 ing, or by the judge or judges before whom the cause shall be brought 
 on to trial respectively, — shall have the view, and shall be first sworn, or 
 such of them as appear, upon the jury to try the said cause, before any 
 drawing as aforesaid, and so many only shall be drawn to be added to 
 the viewers who appear, as shall, after all defaulters and challenges 
 allowed, make up the number of twelve to be sworn for the trial of such 
 cause." - 
 
 § 878. Under the Statute op Geo. IV. — In the time of George IV. 
 these statutes were re-enacted in a modified form, in the " act for con- 
 solidating and amending the laws relating to jurors and juries," where- 
 in it was provided " that, where in any case, either civil or criminal, or 
 on any penal statute, depending in any of the said courts of record at 
 Westminster, or in the Counties Palatine, or Great Sessions in Wales, it 
 shall appear to any of tlie respective courts, or to any judge thereof in 
 vacation, that it will be proper and necessary that some of the jurors 
 who are to try the issues in such case, should have the view of the place 
 in question, in order to their better understanding the evidence that 
 may be given upon the trial of such issues, in every sucli case such 
 court, or any judge thereof in vacation, may order a rule to be drawn up 
 containing tlie usual terms, and also requiring, if such court or judge 
 shall so thinl^rfit, the party applying for the view to deposit in the hands 
 of the under-sheriff a sum of money to be named in the rule, for pay- 
 
 1 Stat. 4 Anue, chap. IG, § 8. 2 gtat. 3 Geo. II , chap. 25, § U.
 
 Tit, III, Ch. XXYII.] VIEW. 667 
 
 ment of the expenses of the view, and commanding special writs of 
 venire facias, distringas and habeas corpora, to issue, by which the 
 sheriff or other minister to whom the said writ shall be directed, shall 
 be commanded to have six or more of the jurors named in such writs, 
 or in the panels thereto annexed (wlio shall be mutuallj'- consented to 
 by the parties, or, if they cannot agree, shall be nominated by the 
 sheriff or such other minister as aforesaid), at the place in question, 
 some convenient time before the trial, who then and there shall have the 
 place in question shown to them by two persons in the said writs named 
 to be appointed by the court or judge; and the said sheriff or other 
 minister, who is to execute any such writ, shall, by a special return 
 upon the same, certify that the view hath been had according to the 
 command of the same, and shall specify the names of the viewers. "^ 
 
 § 879. In what Cases granted under these Statutes. — Not- 
 withstanding the unrestrained terms of these statutes, the courts would 
 not, as a rule, order a view, except in actions of a local nature such as 
 trespass quare clausum f regit, nuisance, and the like. They would not 
 grant it in an action of assumpsit for work done by a carpenter or 
 bricklayer upon a house ; - for the judge had no power to make an 
 order for the plaintiff, or his witnesses, to enter the defendant's prem- 
 ises, in order to inspect the work done. 3 Prior to the last statute 
 above quoted, they would not grant it in a criminal prosecution, without 
 consent, and this was the practice before the statute of Anne.* 
 
 § 880. Old Practice in Conducting a View. — "Before we make 
 a rule for a view," said Ld. Holt, C. J., "the venire facias must be 
 returned, and then we make a rule that so many of the panel shall view 
 the premises." ^ A view was never granted without affidavit, except in 
 actions of tvaste;^ nor without hearing both parties and examining into 
 the propriety of it, unless the opposite party consented.' 
 
 § 881. The subject Regulated by Statute in America. — In 
 
 this country the subject is generally one of statutory regulation. 
 
 1 Stat. 6 Geo. IV., chap. 50, § 23. ^ Anou., 2 Salk. 665. See also 
 
 2 Stoues V. Meuhem, 2 Esch. 382. another case called Auon., on same 
 So held iu Richmoud v. Atkiusou, 58 page, also 1 Eeeve Hist. Eug. Law, 
 Mich. 413; post, § 883. 435, 
 
 3 Turquaud v. Guardians, 8 Dowl. 6 Com. Dig. Vieic, A. 
 P. C. 201. 7j^,jv?. 
 
 4 Ives V. Kedraan, 1 Keuy. 384.
 
 iSaS NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 It has been held not competent for the court to order a view, 
 against the objection of a party, except in cases where a view is 
 authorized by statute, the court proceeding upon the conception 
 that it is more in consonance with tlie theory and method of 
 judicial trials, that the jury should base their findings solely upon 
 sworn testimony taken in open court, or upon depositions taken 
 as provided by law. ^ 
 
 § 882. Provisions of American Statutes. — The provisions 
 of some of these statutes will next be considered. 
 
 (1.) California — [Civil Procedure]. — " When, in the opinion of 
 the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the property which 
 is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact 
 occurred, it may order them to be conducted, in a body, under the 
 chai'ge of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by some 
 person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
 thus absent, no person other than the person so appointed, shall speak 
 to them on any subject connected with the trial." ^ 
 
 (2.) California — [Criminal Procedure]. — "When, in the opinion 
 of the court, it is proper that the jury should view the place in which the 
 offense is charged to have been committed, or in which any other material 
 fact occurred, it may order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the 
 custody of the sheriff, to the place, which must be shown to them by a 
 person appointed by the court for that purpose ; and the sheriff must be 
 sworn to suffer no person to speak or communicate to the jury, nor to do 
 so himself, on any subject connected with the trial, and to return them 
 into court without unnecessary delay and at the specified time." ^ 
 
 (3.) Indiana. — " Whenever, in the opinion of the court, it is proper 
 for the jury to have a view of real or personal property which is the 
 subject of the litigation, or of the place in which any material fact 
 occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body, under the 
 charge of a sworn officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them 
 by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While tlie 
 jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person so appointed, 
 shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial." ^ 
 
 i-Doud V. Guthrie, 13 Bradw. (111.) ^ cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 610. 
 
 653; Smitli v. State, 42 Tex. Ui; 3 Cal Code Crira. Proc, § 1119. 
 
 Bosticlj V. State, 61 Ga. 635. * Rev. Stat. Ind. 1881, § 538,
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 669 
 
 (4.) Iowa — [Cwil Procedure]. — "Whenever, iu the opinion of 
 the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the real property 
 which is the subject of the controversy, or of the place in which any 
 material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body, 
 under the charge of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to 
 them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While 
 the jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person so appointed, 
 shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial." i 
 
 (5. ) Kansas — [Civil Procedure] . — " Whenever, in the opinion of 
 the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the property which 
 is the subject of the litigation, or of the place in which any material 
 fact occurred, it nbay order them to be conducted, in a body, under the 
 charge of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by some 
 person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
 thus absent, no person, other than the person so appointed, shall speak 
 to them on any subject connected with the trial." 2 
 
 (6.) Kansas — [Criminal Procedure]. — " Whenever, in the opin- 
 ion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the place in 
 which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted 
 in a body, under the charge of an officer, to the place, which shall be 
 shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. 
 While the jury are thus absent, no person other than the officer and a 
 person appointed to show them the place, shall speak to them on any 
 subject connected with the trial." ^ 
 
 (7.) Maine. — The statute of Maine merely provides: " In any jury 
 trial, the presiding justice may order a view by the jury." * And also: 
 "The court may order a view by any jury in a criminal case." ^ 
 
 (8.) Massachusetts. — " The jury in a case may, at the request of 
 either party, be taken to view the premises or place in question, or 
 any property, matter, or thing relating to the controversy between the 
 parties, when it appears to the court that such view is necessary to a 
 just decision: provided, the party making the motion advances a sum 
 sufficient to defray the expenses of the jury, and the officers who attend 
 
 1 Miller's Rev. Code la. 1886, 3 Dass. Comp. Laws Kan. 1885, p. 
 § 2790. 759, § 316. 
 
 2 Dass. Comp. Laws Kau. 1885, p. ■* Rev. Stat. Me. 1883, p. 705, § 82. 
 638, § 277. 5 75,-(^.^ p. 945^ § 93.
 
 670 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 them in taking the view ; which expenses shall be afterwards taxed like 
 other legal costs, if the part}- who advances them prevails in the suit." ^ 
 
 (9.) Michigan. — " When any court of record in which an issue of 
 fact is tried by a jury, shall deem it necessary that the jury view the 
 place or premises in question, or any property or thing relating to the 
 issue between the parties, such court may, on the application of either 
 party and the advancement of a sufficient sum to pay the expenses of" 
 tlie jury and officers attending them in taking such view, order such 
 view to be had, and direct the manner of effecting the same." ^ 
 
 (10.) Minnesota — [Civil Procedure]. — " Whenever, in the opin- 
 ion of the court, it is proper that the jury should have a view of real 
 projjerty which is the subject of the litigation, or of the place in which 
 any material fact occurred, it may order the jury to be conducted in a 
 body, in the custody of proper officers, to the place, which will be 
 shown to them by the judge, or by a person appointed by the court for 
 that purpose. While the jury are thus absent, no person, other than 
 the judge or person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject 
 connected with the trial." ^ 
 
 (11.) Nebraska — [Civil Procedure]. — "Whenever, in the opin- 
 ion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of property 
 which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any ma- 
 terial fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body, un- 
 der the charge of an officer, to the place, wliich shall be shown to them 
 by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the 
 jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person so appointed, 
 shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial." ** 
 
 (12.) Nebraska — [Criminal Procedure]. — "Whenever, in the 
 opinion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have a view of the place 
 in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted 
 in a body, under the charge of the sheriff, to the place, which shall be 
 -shown to them by some person appointed by the court. While the 
 "jury are tlius absent, no person other than the sheriff having them in 
 charge, and the person ai:)poiiited to show them the place, shall speak 
 with them on any subject connected with the trial." ^ 
 
 1 Pub. Stat. Mass. 1882, p. 999, § 43. - Gen. Stat. Neb. 1873, p. 573, § 284; 
 
 2 2 How. Mich. Stat. 1882, § 7G20. Id. 1887, p. 775, § 284. 
 
 3 Geu. Stat. Minn. 1881, p. 743, ^ /6id.,p.829, § 479; /d. 1887,p.952, 
 § 228. § 479.
 
 Tit. Ill, (^h. XXVII. ] VIEW. 671 
 
 (13.) New Hampshire. — "In the trial of actions involv-'ngj ques- 
 tions of right to real estate, or in which the examination of places or 
 objects may aid the jury in understanding the testimony, the court, on 
 motion of either party, may, in their discretion, direct a view of the 
 premises by the jurj^, under such rules as they may prescribe. ^ The 
 costs of such view shall be subject to such adjudication, as to the whole 
 or an}' part thereof, as the court may deem equitable." ^ 
 
 (14.) New Jersey. — "In action in the Supreme Court, or any cir- 
 cuit court or court of common pleas, where it shall be proper or neces- 
 sary that the jurors who are to tr}" the issue should view the messuages, 
 lands, or place in question, in order to their better understanding the 
 evidence that will be given on the trial, the court, or a judge thereof, 
 may order a special writ of venire facias to issue, by which the sheriff, 
 or other officers to whom the same shall be directed, shall be commanded 
 to have six or more of the first twelve of the jurors, named in the 
 panel to such writ annexed, at the place in question, at a day therein 
 named, prior to the first day of the court, who then and there shall 
 have the matters in question shown to them by two persons in the said 
 writ named, to be appointed by the court, or judge ; and the sheriff or 
 other officer who is to execute the said writ, shall, by a special retui-> 
 on the same, certify under his hand that the view hath been had ac 
 cording to the command of the said writ." ^ 
 
 (15.) Rhode Island. — "In all cases relating to the realty, eithei 
 party may have the jury to view the place in question, if tlie court 
 
 1 Gen. Laws N. H. 1S7S, chap. 537, of taking the view. Then follows the 
 § 17. following section, drawn more in cou- 
 
 2 Ibid., § IS. forraity with modem statutes: "The 
 
 3 Eev. Stat. N. J. 1877, p. 529, pi. court in which any cause, of a crimiu- 
 25. The next section provides for a al or civil nature, is pending, may, at 
 view by a struck jury, in -nliich case any time after the jury for the trial of 
 twelve jurors are to attend at the view, the same is drawn, or at anytime dur- 
 The next section provides that, al- ing the trial, order that the jury im- 
 though a view may have been ordered, paneled for the trial thereof, shall 
 the trial shall proceed if it is not taken, view any lands or place, if, in the 
 and that no objection shall be made by judgment of the court, such view Is 
 either side for want of a view. The necessary to enable the jury better 
 next section provides that the expense to understand tlie evidence given in 
 of the view shall be equally borne by the cause; and such view shall there- 
 both parties, and that no evidence upon be had in such manner as the 
 shallbe given on either side at the time court shall direct." Z6jd.,p. 530,pl, 29.
 
 '672 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 shall be of opinion that such view is necessary." ^ "To entitle himself 
 to such view, the party moving therefor shall advance such reasonable 
 sum of money to the sheriff, to defray the expenses of the jury on 
 such view, as the court shall order ; and the amount of such expenses 
 shall be taxed against the adverse party, if he who advanced the same 
 shall recover costs in the suit." ^ 
 
 (16.) South Carolina. — "The jury in any case may, at the request 
 of either party, be taken to view the place or premises in question, or 
 any property, matter or thing, relating to the controversy between the 
 parties, when it appears to the court that such view is necessary to a 
 just decision ; provided, the party making the motion advances a sum 
 sufficient to pay the actual expenses of the jury and the officers who at- 
 tend them in taking the view, which expenses shall be afterwards taxed 
 like other legal costs, if the party who advanced them prevails in the 
 suit. "3 
 
 (17.) Virginia and West Virginia — [Civil Cases]. — "The jury 
 may, in any case, at the request of either party, be taken to view the 
 premises or place in question, or any property, matter or thing, relating 
 to the controversy between the parties, when it shall appear to the court 
 that such view is necessary to a just decision ; provided the party mak- 
 ing the motion shall advance a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of 
 the jury and the officers who attend them in taking the view, which ex- 
 penses shall be afterwards taxed like other legal costs." * 
 
 (18.) Wisconsin. — " The jury ma}^ in any case, at the request of 
 either party, be taken to view the premises or place in question, or any 
 property, matter or thing, relating to the controversy between the par- 
 ties, when it shall appear to the court that such a view is necessary to 
 a just decision ; provided, the party making the motion shall advance a 
 sum sufficient to defray the expenses of the jury and the officers who 
 attend them in taking the view ; which expenses shall afterwards be 
 taxed like other legal costs, if the party who advanced them shall prevail 
 in the action." ^ 
 
 * Code Va. 1887, § 3167; Va. Code 
 1849, p. 629, § 10; 2 Rev. Stat. W. Va. 
 1879, chap. 109, § 36. 
 
 6 Kt'v. Stat. Wis. 1878, §2852; Eev. 
 Stat. Wis. 1858, cliap. 118, § 32. 
 
 1 Pub. 
 
 §1. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
 Stat. R. I. 1882, chap. 214, 
 
 ,§2. 
 
 3 Rev. 
 
 Stat. So. Car. 1873, p. 524, 
 
 §35. 

 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII. ] VIEW. 673 
 
 § 883. When Discretionary. — Under these statutes, it has 
 been frequently ruled that the granting or refusing a view is 
 purely a matter of discretion with the trial court, which discretion 
 is not reviewable on appeal except in cases of manifest abuse. ^ 
 Although a view is authorized by statute, the refusing of it will 
 not be ground of reversing a judgment, where it does not appear 
 that there was any difficulty in deciding the question upon the 
 whole evidence, or that there was any difficulty which might have 
 been removed by a view. A mere contradiction in the evidence, 
 without more, does not enable an app'ellate court to see that a 
 view was necessary. ^ In such a case it has been said: " It would 
 be an exceedingly difficult matter to show that the court had abused 
 its discretion in refusing to make an order of this kind. It appears 
 that, in this case, a map was used upon the trial [a proceeding to 
 condemn land] , showing the farm and the right of way through 
 it, and the witnesses described fully the situation of the premises, 
 and we suppose the court was correct in holding that a view of 
 the farm was not necessary to ena})le the jury to understand and 
 properly apply the evidence in this case, and reach a just deter- 
 mination of the rights of the parties." ^ In an action for 2V07'k 
 and labor done and materials furnished in repairing a house, a 
 view was requested and denied, and it was held that there was 
 nothing w^hich made it appear that the discretion of the trial 
 court was abused,* 
 
 § 884. In Equity Cases. — In equity cases the verdict of the 
 jury is advisory merely, and therefore a view of the locus in quo 
 by the jury is not as important as in cases where their decision, 
 
 1 Pick V. Rubicon &c. Co., 27 Wis. 2 Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Polly, 14 
 
 433, 446; Boardmau u. Westchester Gratt. (Va.) 447, 470. 
 
 Fire Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 364; Smith u. ^ Clayton v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 
 
 St. Paul City R. Co., 32 Minn. 1,7; swpj-a. Circumstances under which dis- 
 
 Clayton «. Chicago «fcc. R. Co., 67 la. cretionary to refuse a view under Kau- 
 
 238; King v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 34 sas statute in a proceeding to condemn 
 
 la. 458; Richmond v. Atkinson, 58 land for a railway : Kansas Central R. 
 
 Mich. 413; People v. Bouncy, 19 Cal. Co. v. Allen, 28 Kan. 285. 
 
 426; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. Polly, 14 * Riclimoud v. Atkinson, 58 Mich. 
 
 Gratt (Va.) 447, 470. 413; ««;e, § 879. 
 
 43
 
 674 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tr.j 
 
 subject to the power of the judge to set it aside for good cause, 
 is final. The difference between the relation of the judge to the 
 finding of the jury, in cases in equity and in cases at law, is this: 
 in cases in equity the judge, having heard the evidence, is at 
 liberty to adopt the verdict, if he thinks fit; in cases at law, he 
 is at liberty to set it aside, if he thinks fit. In either case, in 
 order to enable him to exercise this office discreetly and justly, 
 he ought to hear and see all the evidence which the jury hear and 
 see. If the jury make a view of the premises out of court, 
 the judge ought to make the same view. In point of 
 fact, however, he never accompanies them in making the or- 
 dinary statutory view, except under special statutory provis- 
 ions, such as the statute of Michigan relating to the condemnation 
 of land for public uses, hereafter considered. ^ Nevertheless, 
 we find that it has been held that where, in an equity case, the 
 jury view the premises, the judge should accompany them; since 
 he is not in a position to review and affirm or set aside their ver- 
 dict, unless he has the same means of information which they 
 had. In such a case the judge, finding himself in no position to 
 review the verdict intelligently, properly, it was held, granted a 
 new trial. ^ 
 
 § 885. In Criminal Cases. — It thus appears ^ that, in crimi- 
 nal cases, we have no warrant in the English practice for sending 
 the jury out to make a view, except where such a course is au- 
 thorized by statute. Before the enacting of any statute author- 
 izing a view in criminal cases, a view in such a case was reluc- 
 tantly granted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
 The case was a prosecution for murder, and a view of the house, 
 where the murder was alleged to have been committed, was at 
 first refused, although moved for by the prisoner and consented to 
 by the attorney-general, — the court saying: " We refused sucii 
 a request in another case, and it does not appear to us that a view 
 is necessary. It is attended with many inconveniences. We 
 
 1 Post, § 911. -* Ante, §879. 
 
 2 Fraedrich v. Fliette, G4 Wis. 184, 
 188; s. c. 25 N. AV. Kcp. 28.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 675 
 
 know not what the jury may hear, and what impressions may be 
 made upon them while they are talking the view. The ease 
 should be decided by the evidence given in court." Upon a 
 second trial of the same case, the jury themselves requested that 
 they might be permitted to see the place of the murder, and the 
 counsel on both sides expressed their desire that permission 
 should be gi-anted. The prisoner likewise gave his consent. 
 The court granted the request, but with hesitation, because they 
 said this course was without precedent, and if it should turn out 
 to be incorrect, they had doubts whether they could hold the 
 ^ prisoner to his consent. The court directed that no person should 
 go with the jury, except the officers having them in charge, and 
 that no person should speak to them, under penalty of a con- 
 tempt. Plans were exhibited and explained to the jury in court, 
 and they were permitted to take them with them.i This 
 doubt was relieved by a statute subsequently enacted, which 
 recited that "the court may order a view by a jury im- 
 paneled to try a criminal case."^ With this statute in force, 
 the court could, of course, have no doubt of its authority 
 to grant a view, if it deemed it expedient. Thus, in the cele- 
 brated trial of Prof. Webster for the murder of Dr. Parkman, 
 the attorney-general, after opening the case, suggested that it 
 would be desirable that the jury should be permitted to go to 
 the medical college, and take a view of the premises wdiere the 
 murder was alleged to have been committed. The court said, 
 referring to the above statute, that they had no doubt of their 
 authority to grant a view, if they deemed it expedient; and that 
 views had been granted of late in several capital cases in that 
 county. "And the court afterwards, on adjourning for the day, 
 directed that the jury should be permitted to take a view of the 
 medical college on the next morning, before the coming in of the 
 court, attended by two officers, and one counsel on each side." ^ 
 But in Texas, where there was no statute authorizing a view in 
 
 1 Com. ». Ivaapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) Geu. Stats. Mass. 1860, ch. 172, §9. 
 496, 515. See ante, § 882, subsec. 8. 
 
 2 R. S. Mass. 18i3, ch. 137, § 10; 3 Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 295, 298.
 
 676 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 TllOtlip. Tl"., 
 
 criminal cases, it was held that, for the court to permit a view, 
 was error for which a conviction would be reversed. The case in 
 which it was so held was a case of hog-stealing. There was a con- 
 troversy as to the identify of the animal alleged to have been stolen. 
 The jurors were permitted by t]\e court to leave the court room 
 during the trial, and to inspect the animal alleged to have been 
 stolen, with a view of thus solving, in connection with the evi- 
 dence detailed by the witnesses, the question of identity and 
 ownership. The court set aside the verdict and ordered a new 
 trial. ^ So, in Georgia, in a case of murder, the court asked the 
 defendant's counsel whether he objected to the jury making a 
 view of the premises, and received an answer that he did not, 
 and thereupon sent them out in charge of a bailiff to make such 
 a view. It was held that this was error such as required a reversal 
 of the conviction. The court said: "This extraordinary pro- 
 ceeding on the part of the court was error. The court had no 
 legal right to require the defendant's counsel to say whether he 
 objected to that extraordinary proceeding or not, especially in 
 the presence of the jury, and the fact that he did not object 
 under the circumstances did not legalize that extraordinary pro- 
 ceeding.' '^ 
 
 § 886. View that the Prisoner must Accompany the Jury. — 
 
 Where a view takes place under the authority of a statute, in a 
 criminal case, the prisoner must, according to several recent 
 holdings, accompany the jury; since it is reasoned that, for the 
 view to take place in his absence, is a violation of his constitu- 
 tional privilege of meeting the witnesses against him face to 
 face, — the conception being that no species of evidence can be 
 communicated to the jury in any way except in his presence.^ 
 
 1 Smith V. State, 42 Tex. iU. (Cal.), 10 Pac. Rep. 1G9; s. c. 71 Cal. 
 
 2 Bostock V. State, 61 Ga. 635, 639, 602 (overruling People v. Bonuey, 19 
 opiniou by Warner, C. J. ; a»<e, § 881. Cal. 426). Compare Eastwood v. 
 
 3 State y. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46; People, 3 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 25; 3 
 Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 32, 35 ; Benton v. Wliart. Cr, L. (7tli ed.), § 3160. 
 State, 30 Ark. 328, 348; People v. Bush
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVIL] VIEW. 677 
 
 Some of the cases ^ also take the view that this supposed consti- 
 tutional right of the prisoner cannot be icaived by him.^ 
 
 § 887. A Contrary View. — There is equally good authority 
 and reason in support of the contrary view. In Massachusetts 
 it was not supposed necessary in the cases of Knapp and 
 Webster,^ to send the prisoner with the jury when they made the 
 view. In England, it has been held, in the Court for Crown 
 Cases Reserved, that no irregularity is committed in a criminal 
 case, by allowing a jury to view the premises on which the 
 alleged criminal act was committed, even after the case has been 
 summed up and the jury have commenced their deliberations, 
 the prisoner not consenting, his counsel being absent at the 
 time, and neither the prisoner nor his counsel going with the 
 jury to make the inspection.* The statute of Kansas is similar to 
 that of Arkansas and California; but, nevertheless, the Supreme 
 Court of Kansas hold that it is not necessary for the prisoner to 
 accompany the jury in making the view ; and that his right so to 
 accompany them is a right which he may ivaive, and which he 
 does waive by not demanding the privilege.^ So, in Oregon, 
 
 1 Notably the case of People v. by the witnesses, and looked in the 
 Bush (Cal.), 10 Pac. Rep. 169; s. c. 71 same manner in which the witnesses 
 Cal. 602 (overruling People v. Bon- stated they had looked. It was ob- 
 ney, 19 Cal. 426). served that if these facts had been 
 
 2 This proposition is denied in a found by the court below, instead of 
 vigorous argument by Brewer, J., in being merely recited, a very serious 
 State V. Adams, 20 Kas. 311, 32-1. question would have arisen, upon 
 
 3 Ante, § 885. which it would have been necessary to 
 * Reg. V. Martin, L, R. 1 Cr. Cas. examine several authorities; but as 
 
 Ees. 378. In this case another very the facts were not found, the question 
 
 serious question was presented, was not presented to the reviewing 
 
 While the jurors were making the court for decision, 
 view, they asked the witnesses, who ^ State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311, 324. 
 
 had testified in coiirt, to point out the The reasoning of the court is not as 
 
 precise spot where they, the witnesses, clear as its conclusion. It introduces 
 
 had stood, and the place aud the posi- the fiction that, although the prisoner 
 
 tion in which the prisoners were does not accompany the jury in mak- 
 
 standing, when the witnesses saw the ing the view, he is, nevertheless, with 
 
 prisoners do the alleged criminal act; them, because they are in legal con- 
 
 and then the jurors placed themselves templation in the presence of the 
 
 In the same position as that occupied court. On this point. Brewer, J.,
 
 678 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 where, in a case of murder, a view was directed, and the order 
 omitted to provide for the presence of the defendant or his coun- 
 sel thereat, no application having been made therefor by them, 
 it was held no error, since the right to be present was one which 
 the accused might loaive, — the court saying: " We consider the 
 better doctrine to be, that the failure of the accused to be pres- 
 ent when the jury were making their view, is no ground of error. 
 We are unable to see what good his presence would do, as he 
 could neither ask nor answer an}^ question, nor in any way inter- 
 fere with the acts, observations, or conclusions of the jury. He 
 would only have been a mute spectator while there." ^ 
 
 § 888. Irregular to send out Witnesses with Jury. — For 
 
 the court to send a witness with the jury, on making the view, 
 with directions to show them the position where the witness 
 stood during the transaction in question, and where other persons 
 stood, is a violation of the provision of a statute against suf- 
 fering persons to communicate with the jury, for which a con- 
 viction will be reversed. 2 
 
 § 889. Theory that Impressions acquired by the View are 
 not Evidence. — The foregoing theory,^ that for tlie view to take 
 place without the presence of the accused is a violation of his 
 constitutional right to have all the evidence wliich tlie jury re- 
 ceive presented to them in his presence, is reduced to nonsense 
 by another class of holdings, one of them in the same court, to the 
 effect that the knowledge acquired by the jurors in making the 
 
 said: "In contemplation of law, the of the court. Though the defendant 
 
 place of trial is not changed. The may not go with them into their place 
 
 judge, the clerk, the officers, the of retirement, he is nevertheless jier- 
 
 records, the parties, and all that go to soually present during that portion, 
 
 make up the organization of the court, as well as the rest of the trial." This 
 
 remain in the court room. The jury reminds one of the fiction by which 
 
 retire to discharge one duty connected the Koman emperors, although sitting 
 
 with the trial, and yet, though absent at ease in their capital, personally 
 
 while discharging that duty, inasmuch commanded in ))attles fought in the 
 
 as it is done under the direction of the most distant parts of their empire, 
 court, and while in charge of an officer ^ State v. Ah Lee, 8 Ore. 214, 217. 
 
 appointed, by the coui't, they are, in ^ people v. Green, 53 CaL GO. 
 
 legal contemplation, in the presence ' Ante, § 886.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVll.] VIEW. 679 
 
 view is not evidence at all; that the view is not allowed for the pur- 
 pose of furnishing evidence upon which a verdict is to be founded, 
 but for the purpose of enabling the jury better to understand 
 and apply the evidence which is given in court; ^ that it is there- 
 fore error to instruct them that, in making it, they are to take 
 into consideration in any degree ^ the knowledge thus acquired; ^ 
 and that, "though a view has been had and the bill of exceptions 
 discloses nothing which took place at the view, it contains all the 
 evidence.^ 
 
 § 890. Reasons Adduced in Support op this View. — The reasons 
 adduced in the support of this view will appear from the following quo- 
 tations: " In authorizing a court to send the jurv to view the premises 
 in litigation, it was not the purpose of the statute to convert the jurors 
 into silent witnesses, acting on their own inspection of the land, but 
 only to enable them the more clearly to understand and apply the evi- 
 dence. If the rule were otherwise, the jury might base its verdict 
 wholly on its own inspection of the premises, regardless of an over- 
 whelming weight of evidence to the contrary, and the losing party would 
 be without remedy by a motion for a new trial. It would be impos- 
 sible to determine how much weight was due to the inspection by the 
 jury, as contrasted with the opposing evidence, or (treating the in- 
 spection as in the nature of evidence), whether it was sufficient to raise 
 a substantial conflict in the evidence. The cause would be determined, 
 not upon evidence given in court, to be discussed by counsel and con- 
 sidered by the court in deciding a motion for a new trial, but upon the 
 opinions of the jurors, founded on a personal inspection, the value or 
 the accuracy of which there would be no method of ascertaining. The 
 statute could not have been intended to produce such results as these, 
 
 in authorizing the jury to view the premises." ^ "The question 
 
 then arises as to the purpose and intent of this statute.*^ IL seems to 
 
 J Chute V. State, 19 Miun. 271, 281; 609; Heady v. Vay Tump. Co., 52 lud. 
 
 Brakkeu v. Miuueapolis &c. R. Co., 29 117, 124. 
 
 Minn. 41, 43. That this was tlie origi- ^ jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Bowen, 
 
 ual conception of the office of a view 40 Ind. 545 (overruling Evansville &c. 
 
 will appear from the English statutes R. Co. v. Cochran, 10 Ind. 500). 
 already quoted. Ante, §§ 876, 878. ^ Wright v. Carpenter, 49 Cal. 607, 
 
 2 Close V. Samra, 27 la. 503, 507, 609. 
 
 (Wright, J., dissenting). 6 j^ef erring to the Iowa statute, 
 
 3 Wright V. Carpenter, 49 Cal. 607, ante, § 882, subsec. 4.
 
 680 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 US that it was to enable the jury, by the view of the premises or place, 
 to better understand and comprehend the testimony of the witnesses re- 
 specting the same, and thereby the more intelligently to apply the tes- 
 timony to the issues on trial before them ; and not to make them silent 
 witnesses in the case, burdened with testimony unknown to both parties, 
 in respect to which no opportunity for examination or correction of 
 error, if any, could be afforded either party. If they are. thus per- 
 mitted to include their persoiial examination, how could a court ever 
 properly set aside their verdict as being against the evidence, or even 
 refuse to set it aside, without knowing the facts ascertained by such 
 personal examination by the jury? It is a general rule, certainly, if 
 not universal, that a jury must base their verdict upon the evidence 
 delivered to them in open court, that they may not take into consider- 
 ation facts known to them personally, but outside of the evidence pro- 
 duced before them in court. If a party would avail himself of the facts 
 known to a juror, he must have him sworn and examined as other wit- 
 nesses." 1 
 
 §891. Instructions held Erroneous under this View. — Under 
 this view it has been held error to instruct the jury that, in estimating 
 the damages, they are to use their own judgment, as well as the judg- 
 ment of the witnesses.- Under the same view it has been held error to 
 give the followhig instruction: "You must determine the question of 
 damages from the evidence before you, giving the same and each part 
 thereof, the weight you think it entitled to, and no more ; as a part of 
 the evidence in the case, such information as you derived from the view 
 of the premises through which the road is proposed, and on the line of 
 the said proposed road." The court quoted and approved the reason- 
 
 1 Close V. Samra, 27 la. 503, 507, the testimony,' then, it seems to me, 
 
 opinion by Cole, J. From the fore- they are possessed of facts unknown 
 
 going decision Wright, J., dissented. to the parties; and whether tlie im- 
 
 lu the course of his opinion, he said : pressions received and the applica- 
 
 " If the only object of the statute was tious of the testimony are true or 
 
 to enable thejury to better understand, false, can no more be discovered than 
 
 and the more intelligently to apply, If they have actually ' burdened ' them- 
 
 the testimony of the witnesses, then I selves with testimony.'''' Ibid. 511. 
 
 confess that I do not see why, upon The learned judge extended his ob- 
 
 this basis alone, they might not, in servations at considerable length upon 
 
 determining the ultimate facts, ' in- the question, with reference to the 
 
 elude ' or make use of, this ' personal particular case before the court, 
 
 examination.' If they are to use it to ^ Brakken v. Minneapolis &c. R, 
 
 enable them ' to iiuderstand and apply Co., 29 Minn. 41, 43.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 681 
 
 ing of the Iowa court in the ease next cited. ^ This view has been 
 pushed to the extreme of holding that an instruction which allows the 
 jur}' to base their verdict in any degree upon their personal examina- 
 tion of the preuiises, is error. It was so held of the following in- 
 struction : "You will determine from all the evidence in the case, 
 and all the facts and circumstances disclosed on the trial, including 
 3'our personal examination, whether the water was, by the act of the 
 defendant, backed up on the premises of the plaintiffs, to the damage 
 of their water power, as alleged." - 
 
 § 892. Instance, under this Theory, op a proper Instruction to a 
 Jury before sending them out. — On the third trial of an action for 
 the recovery of land in California, it became material to determine 
 whether the land was sicamp and overfloived land, such as passed under 
 the patent under which the plaintiff claimed. The court, upon ordering 
 a view, instructed the jury as follows: "The jury will go with the 
 sheriff, examine the land, examine the quality of the soil, of the growth 
 upon it; but you are not to have any conversation with each other, 
 or any body else, in relation to the quality of the land. Avoid form- 
 ing an opinion as to its quality until you have finally heard all the evi- 
 dence, and retired to your jury room to consider a verdict. " ItM-as 
 held that this instruction was not erroneous. It did not authorize the 
 jury to take into consideration, when they should retire into the jury 
 room, the result of their own examinations of the land, as independ- 
 ent evidence in the case.^ 
 
 § 893. Contrary Opinion that Knowledge Acquired by the 
 View is Evidence. — There is no sen.se in the conclusion that 
 the knowledge which the jurors acquire by the view is not evi- 
 dence in the case. The conception that what a body of jurors 
 see themselves, relevant to the issue to be decided by them, is 
 not evidence, but something to be considered by them in weigh- 
 ing oral evidence, is nonsense, "What they see is evidence in a 
 primary sense, and what is detailed to them concerning the 
 same subject matter by witnesses, is evidence in merely a second- 
 ary sense. An objective lesson always impresses itself more 
 
 1 Heady v. Vevay &c. Turup. Co., ^ Wright v. Carpenter, 50 Cal. 556; 
 52 Ind. 117, 12-1. s. c. ou former appeals, 49 Cal. 60a 
 
 2 Close V. Samm, 27 la. 503, 507 and 47 Cal. 43G. 
 (Wright, .J., dissenting).
 
 682 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tl*., 
 
 vividly upon the mind than an oral lesson. Such a conclusion is 
 tantamount to saying that they are to take the trouble of going 
 in a body to inspect land, or other material object, out of court, 
 and that when they come to make up their verdict they must 
 resolutely forget the impressions acquired from such inspection. 
 The conception that a body of freeholders, residing in the vicin- 
 ity, shall view the land in controversy, in a proceeding to expro- 
 priate it for public use, and then shall put out of sight, in making 
 their estimate of damages, their own knowledge of the value of 
 land in that vicinity, applied to the character of the particular land 
 as they have observed it, is also nonsense. Impressed with this 
 view, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin , speaking through Lyon, J. , 
 has said : " We understand that the object of a view is to acquaint 
 the jury with the physical situation, condition and surround- 
 ings of the thing viewed. What they see they know absolutely. 
 If a witness testified to anything which they know by the evi- 
 dence of their senses on the view is false, they are not bound to 
 believe, indeed cannot believe, the witness, — and they may dis- 
 reirard his testimony, although no other witness has testified on 
 the stand to the fact as the jury know it to be. For example, if 
 a witness testified that a certain farm is hilly and rugged, when 
 the view has disclosed to the jury, and to every juror alike, 
 that it is level and smooth, or if a witness testify that a given 
 buildino; was burned before the view, and the view discloses that 
 it bad not been burned, — no contrary testimony of witnesses on 
 the stand is required to authorize the jury to find the fact as it 
 is, in disregard of the testimony given in court." That court 
 accordingly has held that the knowledge which the jurors acquire in 
 making the view, is evidence to be considered by them in assessing 
 damages, in a proceeding for the condemnation of land for public 
 use ^ upon wdiich they may act to the exclusion of contradictory 
 evidence;^ and similar views prevail in other jurisdictions.^ 
 
 1 Washburn v. Milwaukee &c. R. Mich 456; post, § 899; Parks v. Bos- 
 Co., 59 Wis. 364, 868. ton, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198 (as seen in 
 
 2 Neilson v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 58 next section) ; Eemy v. Municipality 
 Wis. 517; post, § 598. No. 2 (still stronger view, as seen in 
 
 3 Toledo &c. E. Co. ■?-. Dunlap, 47 §897, pos^).
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 683 
 
 § 894. [Continued.] The same View taken by Chief Jus- 
 tice Shaw. — Opposed to the foregoing authorities^ is a well con- 
 sichn-cd case, in which the opinion was written by a judge no less 
 eminent than Chief Justice Shaw. The proceeding was instituted 
 for the purpose of assessing the damages sustained b}' a property 
 owner, by the act of the City of Boston in widening a street. 
 The judge instructed the jury^ "that the}^ having viewed the 
 land taken, and having heard the testimony of witnesses, and en- 
 lightened their consciences as fully as they could, must give a 
 verdict according to their own opinion and conviction; that if 
 any one of them knew any fact of his own knowledge, which 
 bore upon the case, he ought to disclose it, and testify to it in 
 court; that, in making up their verdict, they should take coun- 
 sel of their own experience and knowledge of like subjects, and 
 should consider, not only what the witnesses had testified, but 
 what they themselves had seen in the view Avhich they had taken ; 
 and that, if witnesses had sworn to matters of opinion, which 
 the jury, in the exercise of their good sense, did not believe to 
 be correct, they should disregard such testimony." The pro- 
 priety of this instruction was challenged. "It a[)pears to me," 
 said Shaw, C. J., " that the direction of the court in this respect 
 was singularly well guarded, and expressed with great accuracy 
 and strictly comformably to law. The cases cited tend to 
 show that, where a juror knows of a fact material to .the issue, 
 he must disclose and testify to it, in court; but in the case be- 
 fore us, the jurors were referred to their own experience and 
 knowledge of like subjects, especiallv that acquired by the view, 
 to test the accuracy of the witnesses in matter of opinion. Were 
 this a common-law action, therefore, I should feel strongly inclined 
 to the opinion that this instruction was strictly and legally cor- 
 rect; but what we think puts it beyond any exception here is, 
 that this was not an action, but an estimate of damages, in lay- 
 ing out a highway." The learned judge then referred to cer- 
 tain statutes, as showing that the practice had been for the jury 
 to go upon the land and there make the appraisement or estimate, 
 
 1 Those examined in § 889, et seq.
 
 684 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 and continued thus: " The locating committee, and the sheriff's 
 jury are to make an estimation upon view; and, speaking for 
 myself, I cannot percieve why they might not, in both cases, 
 have estimated the damages upon their own experience and judg- 
 ment, without any evidence aliunde, though they might be at 
 liberty to enlighten their own judgments by the aid of testimony. 
 And there seems to be no substantial difference established by 
 the mode of trial in this city. The whole city being within an easy 
 walk of the court, it wasmanifestly a wise and convenient provision 
 that, after having taken a view of the place, they should return 
 into court and have the cause there conducted before the judge, 
 and in conformity with the usual forms, rather than elsewhere 
 before the sheriff. But the object of inquiry is still the same ; 
 it is to estimate the plaintiff's damages, and upon view, if either 
 party desire it. The jury must, therefore, I think, exercise 
 their own knowledge and experience fully; and perhaps, in most 
 instances, with a competent and intelligcjnt jury, such judgment 
 could not be much aided by the estimates of others, though un- 
 der oath in the form of testimony. It may follow as a conse- 
 quence, as suggested by the learned counsel for the complainant, 
 that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to set aside a ver- 
 dict in such a case, on the ground of being contrary to the 
 weight of evidence given on the trial ; though probably the same 
 result might be obtained by proving, by other evidence, such an 
 excessive over or under-valuation as to show that the jury might 
 have been misled by error or prejudice."^ 
 
 § 895. But Jurors not to Disregard other Evidence. — But 
 
 the evidence which the jurors may acquire from making the view 
 is not to be elevated to the character of exclusive or predomi- 
 nating evidence. They are not to disregard other evidence in re- 
 gard to the character and value of the property; and an 
 instruction which conveys to them the impression that they may 
 do so, is erroneous. It was so held concerning instructions which 
 embraced the following sentences: "You are to determine it 
 [the compensation] from the whole evidence that has been given 
 
 1 Parks V. Boston, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 198, 199,209.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] viEAV. 685 
 
 you in the case — from your view — you to take the view you 
 make ; j'ou take your own knowledge, 3'our own judgment, your 
 own good sense." " If a witness, from his manner and appear- 
 ance upon the stand, from his want of knowkxlge of the subject- 
 matter, or from other causes apparent to you and your judgment — 
 his evidence docs not convince your mind that he is right, you 
 should disregard it, because it is not evidence in the case. On 
 the other hand, if, from his knowledge, from his experience, 
 from his appearance and manner, he does convince you, and your 
 judgment, your knowledge acquired by your view, your good 
 sense, together with all the evidence given in the cause — de- 
 termines in your mind that the damages are so nnich, that should 
 be 3^our verdict, — more or less." ^ The court held that these, 
 and other similar sentences in the charge, were of a character to 
 convey to the jurors the idea that they might assess the damages 
 according to the impressions which they had acquired from the 
 view, disregarding other evidence in the case. The court, con- 
 tinuing the language already quoted,'- said: " But if the fact of 
 which the jury may thus become cognizant is only one of many 
 elements which must be considered, to determine some other 
 fact which can only be satisfactorily determined by a resort to 
 l)rofessional or cx})ert testimony, the case is very different. 
 Such are these cases. The jury were to assess the value of the 
 land taken for the use of the railway company, and the damages 
 to the other adjacent lands of the respective owners resulting 
 from such taking. To do this intelligentl}', it became necessary 
 to determine the location, quality, and condition of the land, 
 the uses to which it was or might be applied, its market value, 
 the manner in which the taking of a part of the tract would affect 
 the residue, and perhaps other conditions affecting such value and 
 damages. Some of these conditions, and more especially the 
 value of the land, could not be definitely determined by the view 
 alone, and cannot properly be said to be within the common 
 knowledge of the jur\'. The opinions of witnesses acquainted 
 
 1 It should be observed iu passing, which accouuts for the defects of 
 that this Avas probably an oral charge, grammatical coustructiou. 
 takcu down by a court stenographer, 2 ^n^e^ § 393,
 
 686 . NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 with the values of such property, are essential to an intelligent 
 judgment. At the common law, a view might have been had in 
 a real action, and by statute in any action, to the end that the 
 jury might see the land, or thing claimed, to enable the jurors 
 better to understand the evidence on the trial. ^ We think such 
 is still the office of a view. Hence, whatever the jury in each of 
 these cases learned of the lands in question by the view, was 
 available to enable them to determine the weight of conflicting 
 testimony, respecting value and damage, but no farther. * * * 
 As to how far jurors may make up their verdict on their own 
 knowledge, independently of the testimony, or against the testi- 
 mony, the true rule is indicated by what has already been said 
 concerning the view. A jury is not bound to give, and cannot 
 give, any weight to testimony which, although undisputed by 
 witnesses, is contrary to what every person of ordinary intelli- 
 gence knows to be true. To illustrate, should a witness testify 
 that at Boston on a certain day the sun arose at midnight, or 
 that the Mississippi River empties into Lake Michigan, or that 
 white is black, the testimony would be rejected at once. So, 
 in matters of mere opinion, in cases where the testimony of ex- 
 perts is not required, if the jury know all the facts, they are not 
 necessarily controlled by the opinions of witnesses, if such opin- 
 ions have been received. In such cases, the jury are as compe- 
 tent as the witnesses to form an opinion, and the opinions of 
 witnesses, if objected to, are inadmissible. Bej^ond this the jury 
 cannot properly go. To allow jurors to make up their verdict 
 upon their individual knowledge of disputed facts material to the 
 case, not testified to on oath in court, or upon their private opin- 
 ions, would be most dangerous and unjust. It would deprive the 
 losing party of the right of cross-examination, and the benefit of 
 all the tests of credibility which the law affords. Besides, the 
 evidence of such knowledge, or of the grounds of such opinions, 
 could not be preserved in a bill of exceptions, or questioned on 
 appeal. It would make each juror the absolute judge of the ac- 
 curacy and value of his own knowledge or o})inions, and compel 
 an appellate court to affirm judgments on the facts, when all of 
 
 • Citing Jacol) L;nv Diet., tit. Vieio.
 
 Tit. in, Ch. XXVII.] v,E,v. gg^ 
 
 the evidence i, before it, a,„l there is none whatever to ...pport 
 
 e jndg„,ent. The conrt wonk, be obliged to presume th" th 
 JU.^ , or some juror, had, or at lea.rt thought he had, some per- 
 sonal knowledge of the facts outside the testimony, or oont.' :; 
 to It, vbK.h would sustain the judg„,ent. Such a ruling in a 
 case he procedure in which was governed by connnon-h.^rules 
 
 n oL of "d "",•:;"" " '"!"' ="'°^-« ^■''«'- '" "■'■'. if the testi- 
 mony of value and damages is contlictiug, the jury may resort to 
 
 the,r own general knowledge of the ele,„e„ts wi'ch^.ffec the 
 assessment m order to dccrn.ine the relative weight of co^! 
 fi.ct,ngtes,unony; but their assessment must be supported by 
 the testnnony, or it cannot stand." ' ' f "y 
 
 § 896. Illustration of rn.s V,ew. - Further to ilh,strate this view 
 Ljon J gave tbe following supposed case: "If no witness b 'd esu' 
 mated the compensation, to which a plaintiffl was entitled a lesttan 
 
 !l OOo" ,"°n f'"" *'•"'"•' "' ^""'"' ""■ '-^ '^- «^^»« or -0 e than 
 « ,000, should be set aside, because unsupported by ti,e evidence ••" 
 w uch naeans that an estimate of values made e..el„slvely upon , 'evi- 
 dence furiushed bv a view is to !» «„t o.i,i 
 stantial evidence. '"'" ''^ ""^"PP°rt«' by sub- 
 
 5 807 When Jury decide „„«„ their Personal K„owI- 
 
 edge.-In proceedmgs for the expropriation of land for public 
 
 uses, under the Ctvil Code of Louisia„a,3 the court, pusbin. 1 s 
 
 theory st.ll further, hold that the jurors are entitled o r y^u^oa 
 
 lie,r personal knowledge of the property i„ forndugtheh- co^ 
 
 us,on although they may be aided, especially if they re„ue t 
 
 ., by the op.ntons of witnesses. .^A jury," said the court, '• a e 
 
 n t,u,h experts; and we suggest that a personal exa.ninat .u> of 
 
 the premises by the jury in a body, after it is impaneled, should 
 
 be a featm-e oi every proceeding ,u„ler this article of the code.'- 
 
 J Washburn v. Milwaukee &c. E. 4 t?.™^ ,. ■ • ,- 
 
 Co 50 "Wis ^a± Qr- / • ^ i^emy v. Municipal ty 'No '> 12 
 
 .:^S:lZ27ll%^^^^^^^^ La Ann. 500, 503. a's to the .^t'urf 
 
 ^ Washburn .. Milwaukee &c. R. ^1^^7:1!::^^''' T '^^^"'^' 
 Co., 50 Wis. 3M, 370 f T "^ "• Manning, 1& 
 
 3 n- r^ , ^ La. Ann. 182. 
 
 Civ. Code La., art. 2608.
 
 688 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 § 898. Not Error to exclude Evidence of Facts which the 
 Jury have learned from the View. — On a similar theory, where 
 the jury have made a view of the premises, it has been held not 
 error to exclude testimony of witnesses, as to matters concerning 
 which they could form an opinion from the view as intelligently 
 as could the witnesses. " Opinions in such oases are entirely 
 outside the range of authorized expert testimony." ^ 
 
 § 899. [Michigan.] — Scope of the Powers of the Jury in Condem- 
 nation Proceedings. — It is said in Michigan that, in such cases, the 
 constitution as well as the principles of the common law, makes the 
 jurors judges of the laio and fact.^ ' " Their conclusions are not based en- 
 tirely on testimony. They are expected to use their own judgment 
 and knowledge, from a view of the premises, and their experience as 
 freeholders, quite as much as the testimony of witnesses to matter of 
 opinion. And while an appellate court is bound in such cases to set 
 aside proceedings which appear to be based on false principles, it can 
 not properly deal with rulings as if they were excepted to on a common- 
 law trial, or dispose of the controversy on a merely technical motion." ^ 
 
 § 900. Difficulty of Reviewing' on Appeal the Finding of the 
 Jury. — The absurd conclusion in which, as already seen,* sev- 
 eral of the courts have landed themselves, that what the jurors 
 see and know in consequence of making the view is to be shut 
 out from their minds as evidence — even if this were possible — 
 when they come to make up their verdict, has grown out of the 
 difficulty which appellate courts have had in dealing with such 
 verdicts when challenged as being unsupported by the evidence ; 
 and their conclusion has been that the knowledge which the 
 jurors acquired in making the view is nut evidence, because it 
 cannot be got into a bill of exceptions so as to be conveyed to 
 the minds of the appellate judges. They have been staggered 
 by the thought of the consequences which would ensue, in a cap- 
 
 1 Ante, § 893; Neilsou v. Chicago 3 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Duulap, 
 &c. 11. Co., 58 Wis. 517, 524. supra, opiuiou by Campbell, J. 
 
 2 Chambeiiin v. Browu, 2 Doug. ^ Ante, § 889. 
 (Mich.) 120; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. 
 
 Duiilap, 47 Mich. 45G, 406.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVri.] VIEW. 689 
 
 ital case, for instance, in dealing with a verdict thus challenged, 
 Avhere, in addition to the oral testimony of witnesses, the record 
 should disclose the fact that the jurors had made a view of the 
 scene of the supposed crime; but they have not stopped to re- 
 flect that, to hold that, because a species of evidence maybe pre- 
 sented to the jury which was not even presented to the trial 
 judge, and which, in the nature of things, could not be presented 
 to the appellate judges, therefore it is to be regarded as not 
 being evidence at all, and the jury are to be so instructed, — 
 proves altogether too nuich, even for an ordinary criminal case; 
 since, as already seen,^ it has been the immemorial practice in 
 criminal trials to exhibit to the jury burglars' tools, blood stained 
 clotliino;, and other indicia of crime. Althouo;h the knowledo;e 
 acquired by the jurors from such an inspection can never be ac- 
 curately conveyed to the minds of the appellate judges through a 
 bill of exceptions, would any court therefore fall into the wild 
 dream of holding that the jurors should be instructed to disregard 
 the evidence thus acquired? 
 
 § 901. How Courts have dealt with this Difficulty. — The dif- 
 ficulty of dealing with the verdicts of juries, when challenged on the 
 ground of being unsupported by evidence, where a view has been 
 had, is exhibited in several reported cases. It has been said in 
 Nebraska that, in a proceeding to condemn land for a railway, 
 where there has been a view, "it is difficult to review the judg- 
 ment as being against the weight of evidence, because all the 
 evidence before the court cannot, from the nature of the case, be 
 incorporated in the record; and in these cases there is no such 
 discrepancy between the evidence in the records and the verdicts, 
 as to justify the court in setting them aside, which the court 
 would not do, unless it was clear that the jury had erred." '^ In 
 California, in a contested election case, the evidence showed that 
 one Twist voted in precinct A., and the question was as to the 
 location of the boundary between that and another precinct, with 
 reference to Twist's residence. The trial court found that he 
 
 1 Ante, § 871. (Xeb.), 23 N. W. Rep. 34-8, 350; s. c. 
 
 ^ Omaha &c. R. Co. v. Walker 17 Xeb. 432, opiuioii by Maxwell, J. 
 
 44
 
 690 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 voted illegally, and, on appeal, the question was whether there 
 was evidence to support the finding. The record did not clearly 
 show the location of the boundary line between the precincts ; 
 but, as it appeared that the trial judge (who acted as trier of the 
 facts) visited, with the consent of the parties, the locality, it 
 was held that the finding should not be disturbed. The court 
 said: "As the case is presented in the transcript before us, we 
 cannot reverse the decision of the court below upon this question. 
 The record does not clearly show the relative positions of the 
 natural objects referred to in the testimony, so that we can in- 
 telligently determine where the line runs with reference to the 
 house of Twist, or with reference to his lands, or to his en- 
 closure, as the same existed when the line was established. 
 The judge below, with the consent of the parties, visited the 
 locality, and certainly had better opportunities for determin- 
 ing satisfactorily the question in dispute than have we." ^ 
 In Indiana it was originally held that, where the jury have made 
 a view, their finding in respect of value cannot be reviewed on 
 appeal; because, although the bill of exceptions recites that it 
 contains all the evidence, yet in point of fact it shows that it 
 does not; since it contains nothing relative to the examination of 
 the premises which was made by the jury, or in regard to the 
 information conveyed to their minds by such examination. 
 " Evidence," said Hanna, J., " is that which produces conviction 
 on the mind as to the existence of a fact. An ocular examina- 
 tion of the premises alleged to have been injured, might have 
 had that effect, as well as an oral detail of circumstances, as in 
 this instance." '"^ But in a subsequent case the court receded 
 from this view, and held that, although the jury have made a 
 view, yet a bill of exceptions which contains only the testimony 
 which was presented at the trial in open court, contains all the 
 evidence^ so that an appellate court has before it the same means 
 of revising the verdict as it would have if no view had taken 
 place, or as it would have if the appellate judges could have ac- 
 
 • 1 Preston v. Culbertson, 58 Cal. 198, 2 Evausville &c. K. Co. v. Cochran, 
 
 210. 10 Ind. 500.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 691 
 
 companicd the jury in making the view.^ The grounds which 
 induced the court to change its view, were thus pressed upon the 
 attention of the court by counsel, and thus rehearsed by the 
 court in its opinion: " It is urged that, to follow that case is to 
 say that in no case where a jury has had a view of the place in 
 which any material fact occurred, as contemplated by the stat- 
 ute,2 can the evidence be got into the record, as it would be im- 
 possible to put into the bill of exceptions the impressions made 
 upon the minds of the jury by such view ; and that in this way 
 all benefit of appeal to this court, so far as any question is con- 
 cerned which depends upon all the evidence being in the record, 
 would be wholly cut off. It is further contended that, whether 
 the jury shall have a view of the place, etc., is a matter entirely 
 within the discretion of the court, and that the court may thus, 
 in its discretion, deprive a party of the right to have questions 
 depending on the evidence reviewed in this court, even in cases 
 of the greatest moment. It is urged that, under the rule in that 
 case, a party might be convicted and sentenced to be hanged on 
 wholly insufficient evidence ; yet if the prosecutor has got an order 
 for the jury to view the place, and they have done so, it would 
 be impossible to get the judgment reversed, no matter how in- 
 sufficient the evidence might have been. These reasons have so 
 much force in them, that we feel compelled to overrule the case 
 of Evansville <&c. R. Co. v. CocJiran,'^ and other cases which 
 have followed it, and to hold that the bill of exceptions may 
 contain all the evidence, notwithstanding the jury may have 
 viewed the property which is the subject of the litigation, or the 
 place in which any material fact occurred, in accordance with the 
 sections of the codes above cited." * These holdings strikino-ly 
 illustrate the effect upon law which is produced by the effort of 
 trained minds to reduce its rules to scientific precision, — a thing 
 
 1 So held iu Jeffersonville &c. R. vision of the crimiual code, — Id. 202, 
 Co. V. Bowen, 40 lud. 545; overruling § 328. 
 
 Evansville &c. R. Co. v. Cochran, su- 3 \q i^itX. 5(50. 
 
 pra. ^ Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Bovreu, 
 
 2 Referring to 2 Gav. & Hord. Ind. 40 lud. 545, 548. 
 Stat. p. 427, § l(J4,andto the like pro-
 
 092 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 which, in the nature of things, is impossible. In the same juris- 
 diction (California), as above seen, a view furnishes evidence in a 
 criminal case, so that it is a fatal error for the accused not to be 
 present when it takes place ; ^ but it does not furnish evidence in a 
 civil case, even where the question is whether the land which the 
 jurors have inspected is dry land or swamp land ; ^ and it does 
 furnish evidence in an election case, so as to preclude an appel- 
 late court from sitting aside a verdict based on it.^ Again, in 
 order that it shall not be evidence, the jurors are to be com- 
 manded by an instruction from the bench to reverse the in- 
 voluntary mental processes by which conviction or belief is 
 attained. 
 
 § 902. Observations on this Subject. — This is emphatically 
 what Goethe called the " nonsense of reason." * The true 
 solution of this difficulty is that cases where there has been 
 a view stand, on appeal or error, on a special footing ; that, 
 although what the jurors have learned through the view is 
 evidence to be considered by them, — -yet, on grounds of public 
 policy, having reference to the known imperfections which at- 
 tend the conclusions of jurors, and even of judges in the haste of 
 nisi prius work, a reviewing court should set aside a verdict 
 based partly on a view, unless it is supported by substantial tes- 
 timony, delivered by sivorn rvitnesses. It is necessary to have at 
 least the testimony of one sworn witness, although ignorant, dis- 
 honest, partial to the party by whom he is brought into court, 
 or otherwise not deserving of credit, to support the verdict of 
 twelve persumably impartial men, not selected by either party, 
 
 1 A7ite, § 886. Or thus, accordiug to Bayard Tay- 
 
 2 A7ite, §§ 889, 890, 892. lor's trauslatiou : 
 
 3 Preston v. Culbertson, supra. "All rights aud laws are still trans- 
 
 4 " Laws, like inherited disease de- raitted, 
 
 scend, Like an eternal sickness of the race, — 
 
 And slyly wind their way from From generation unto generation 
 
 age to age, titted, 
 
 And glide almost unseen from place And shifted round from place to place. 
 
 to place; Reason becomes a sham, beneficence 
 
 Reason to nonsense grows, a bless- a worry." 
 
 ing to a worry." Goethe, Faust, Scene IV.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 693 
 
 who are sworn to decide according to the evidence, and who de- 
 liver a verdict based upon the evidence of their senses.^ 
 
 § 903. The Report of Road Viewers not Evidence on Appeal. — 
 Where, in a special proceeding to lay out a road and assess damages 
 against property holders whose property has been taken for the same, a 
 land-owner appeals to the circuit court, the reports of the " viewers and 
 reviewers " who acted in the proceeding below, are not evidence at all, 
 but the cause is to be tried de novo upon original evidence. 2 
 
 § 904. Unauthorized View.— Jurors must base their find- 
 ings upon evidence ackhiced in their hearing in court, or upon a 
 view authorized by the court. For a juror to go out of court, 
 of his own motion, and make an inspection of the premises or 
 thing in dispute, will be good ground of setting aside the verdict; 
 though, if the party entitled to complain have knowledoe of the 
 irregularity and remain silent, it will be deemed waiZd.^ But 
 it has been held that the bare fact of the jury having visited, 
 during the trial of an indictment for burglary, the premises where 
 It was alleged that the defendant had committed the crime, is 
 not a sufficient ground for discharging the jurv; some prejudice 
 to the prisoner must appear.^ Thus, where, in a capital case, 
 after the court had closed, and the jurors were, pursuant to leave 
 given by the court, walking out for exercise in charge of an 
 officer, several of them came accidentally upon the pla°e of the 
 homicide and inspected it, - it was held that this irregularity 
 was ground for setting aside a conviction, on the principle that, 
 after a cause is submitted to a jury, if they receive any kind of 
 evidence which can have the remotest kind" of bearing upon the 
 case, it will be fatal to their verdict.^ The fact thlit certain 
 jurors, in a civil case, while passing into court, stopped and ex- 
 amined the horse which was the subject of the injury sued for 
 in the presence of the plaintiff, who made no objection thereto,' 
 nor any objection to proceeding with the trial, afforded no ground 
 
 ' ^"^'' § ^^'^- " People V. Hope, fi2 Cal. 291. 
 
 Couyer v. Boyd, 55 Ind. im. 5 Eastwood v. People, 3 Park. C. R 
 
 •^ Starapofskiw. Steffens, 79 111. 303. (N. Y.) 25, 52.
 
 694 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 of new trial, — since any objection grounded on such an irregu- 
 larity was waived.^ 
 
 § 905. Experiments before Jury out of Court. — The 
 
 privilege of making experiments in the presence of the jury is 
 generally refused, on the ground that such experiments, in the 
 hands of skillful persons, are as likely to deceive as to enlighten 
 them.^ Thus, in an action brought to recover damages for per- 
 sonal injuries, alleged to have been caused by a collision between 
 two street railway cars of the defendant, on one of which the 
 plaintiff claimed to have been a passenger, it was held no error 
 for the trial court to refuse an application to allow the jury to 
 proceed to the car-house of the defendant and witness experi- 
 ments with those cars, as bearing upon the question of the na- 
 ture of the alleged collision. " The case was not within the pro- 
 visions of the statute allowing a view by the jury, and, if such 
 procedure were authorized or proper in any case, the question 
 would be one restins; in the discretion of the court." ^ In an ac- 
 tion to recover the value of lumber burned by a tire, alleged to 
 have been caused by a locomotive operated upon the defendant's 
 railroad, the jury, by consent of the parties and the sanction of 
 the court, were permitted to make an inspection of the railroad 
 and the locality of the tire. While making the inspection, ex- 
 periments were made in their presence by employes of the de- 
 fendant, for the purpose of showing that the defendant's en- 
 gines could be run over the section of the defendant's road 
 contiguous to the fire, without the use of steam, and consequently 
 without the emission of sparks. The trial court regarded this 
 experiment as an irregularity sufficient to require the verdict 
 (which was for the defendant) to be set aside; but the Supreme 
 Court took a different view, declined to say that it was not proper 
 and authorized by law, held that in the particular case it was not 
 prejudicial, and reversed the judgment of the trial court and re- 
 manded the cause for judgment on the verdict.* Most of the 
 
 1 Whitcher v. Peacham, 52 Vt. 3 Smith v. St Paul City R. Co., 32 
 242. Mimi. 1, 7. 
 
 2 Ante, § 620. ^ stockwell v. Railway Co., 43 la. 470.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 6115 
 
 analogies would sustain the conclusion of the trial court, and dis- 
 affirm that of the reviewing court in this case. Experiments 
 made by the jury in a criminal caae, outside of the court and in the 
 absence of the prisoner, may afford ground for setting aside their 
 verdict. It was so held where the counsel for a defendant in a 
 criminal case, in the course of his argument, told the jurors that 
 they had a right to try for themselves whether worn-out boots, 
 like those described by the witness for the State, would make 
 such (racks in the dust or sand as they described, and advised 
 the jurors to make the experiment. Several of them did accord- 
 ingly make the experiment, out of court, without the court's leave, 
 and in the absence of the defendant. A fine sense of technical- 
 ity held that, although the prisoner's counsel had led the jury 
 into this irregularity, it was ground of setting aside the verdict. ^ 
 
 §906. Misconduct in making- a View. — If the jury are 
 guilty of misconduct in making a view, the party claiming to be 
 injured by it must bring it to the attention of the trial court and 
 obtain a distinct ruling thereon, which he may embody in his 
 bill of exceptions, — otherwise it will not be the subject of re- 
 vision on appeal. 2 Upon principles more fully explained in a 
 subsequent part of this work,^ improper conwiunications loith the 
 jury while making the view, as where a person presumes to re- 
 hearse evidentiary matters in their hearing, will require the 
 granting of a new trial, unless it clearly appear that no prejudice 
 resulted ; since " the court is the place in which causes are to be 
 tried, and to suffer them to be tried elsewhere, destroys confi- 
 dence in the trial by jury, and brings the administration of 
 justice into contempt." ^ Thus, where, in a case of homicide, it 
 appeared that, when the jury arrived at the premises which they 
 were sent to inspect, they there found a person who had never 
 been sworn as a witness in the case, and who, in response to ques- 
 tions addressed to him by members of the jury, pointed out to 
 them all the special features of the premises, — for this irreo-u- 
 
 1 state V. Sanders, G8 Mo. 202. 3 p^g^^ §2553, et seq. 
 
 2 See Boardmau U.Westchester Fire * Hay ward v. Knapp, 22 Minn. 5. 
 Ins. Co., o-i Wis. 304, 3G7.
 
 696 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 larity a conviction was reversed, the court saying: "Whether 
 his answers were correct or incorrect cannot be known. They 
 may have been false and extremely prejudicial to the defendant, 
 but whether they were or not, makes no difference. It cannot 
 be denied that the jury received material and vitally important 
 evidence out of court from a witness who was not sworn, who 
 was not confronted with the defendant and as to whom there was 
 no opportunity of cross-examination." ^ 
 
 § 907. [Continued.] Giving the Jury Refreshments. — On prin- 
 ciples hereafter stated, ^ any tampering with the jury, by extending 
 undue favors to them in the way of food, drink and entertainment, while 
 making the view by or in the interest of the successful party, will de- 
 mand the setting aside of their verdict ; but this does not extend to 
 ordinary civilities, such as the act of the deputy sheriff in charge of 
 the jury in furnishing them with a pitcher of cider at tlie house of the 
 petitioner, upon their request for refreshments.-^ And where, in making 
 the view, tlie jurors, with the consent of the unsuccessful party, were 
 treated several times to liquid refreshments at the house of the success- 
 ful party, this was not deemed sufficient cause for setting aside the ver- 
 dict. It was not regarded as the result of a sinister motive, but as the 
 result of a motive of hospitality and kindness, for which the citizens of 
 Virginia were generally distinguished. Moreover, the consent of the 
 unsuccessful party cured the irregularity, under the principle omnis 
 concensus tollit erroremJ So, in Rhode Island, the consent of the un- 
 successful party to such an irregularity was held a ivaiver of an excep- 
 tion to it^ on the principle declared in another case,*^ "that where an 
 irregularity has been committed, the party who consents to a proceeding 
 which he might have prevented by resisting on that ground, ivaives 
 thereby all exceptions to such irregularity. Where the jury went eight 
 miles from the court house to view the locus in quo, the fact that the 
 bailiff, by order of the sheriff, procured and caused dinner to be served 
 at the house of the successful party, without his solicitation or the 
 solicitation of the jury, — there being no other convenient place to 
 procure it, the bailiff undertaking to pay for it, and no improper com- 
 
 1 State V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407, * Coleman v. Moody, 4 Hen. & M. 
 413. (Va.) 1, 16,21. 
 
 2 Post, §§ 2560, 2564, 2565. ^ Patton v. Hughesdale Man. Co., 
 
 3 Tripp V. Commissioners, 2 Allen 11 R. I. 188. 
 
 (Mass.), 556. " Tingley v. Providence, 9 P. I. 388.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVIL] VIEW. 697 
 
 munication having been had with the jurors, — furnished no cause for 
 setting aside their verdict.^ 
 
 § 90S. View granted at what Stage of the Trial. — Where 
 there is a statute authorizing a view, without prescribing at whut 
 stage of the trial it shall be made, this is committed to the sound 
 discretion of the court. 2 In Pennsylvania an application for a 
 view presented during the week in which the case is set for trial, 
 is not in time. Such an application will not be granted, where 
 it would delay the trial of the cause. ^ 
 
 § 909. Rule for a View continues through subsequent 
 Trials. —Under the New Jersey statute,^ where a rule for a view 
 V a jury is once entered, it continues in force until the cause is 
 tried, or the rule discharged.^ 
 
 § 910. Personal Xotice in Condemnation Proceedings. 
 
 It has been thought unnecessary to give the defendant personal 
 notice, in a proceeding to condemn land for a railway, of the 
 time and phice of the meeting of the jury, in the absence of any 
 statute requiring notice to be given in this manner.*' 
 
 § 911. Costs of the View. — Courts of law have the power 
 to allow reasonable expenses for surveys and views in proper 
 cases, and the ordinary fee-bill does not apply to the expenses of 
 such proceedings.^ In the Federal courts, under the provisions 
 of section 914 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the 
 rule prescribed by the statute of the State in which the court 
 sits, will be adopted as. determining the assessment of the costs 
 of a view, in civil suits other than in equity or admiralty.^ The 
 plaintiff in trespass quare clausum, who recovered less t\vdi\ forty 
 
 1 Johnson v. Greim, 17 Neb. 417. « Harper v. Lexington &c. R. Co., 2 
 
 2 Galena &c. R. Co. v. Haslam, 73 Dana (Ky.), 227. 
 
 lU- 494. 7 stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone 
 
 3 Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. St. Iron Works, 102 Mass. 80, 89 (hi which 
 
 71 
 
 case the sura of $4,800, was allowed 
 as t 
 
 8 
 
 L. 344. 345. 732. 
 
 ■* Ante, § 882, subsec. 14. as the expenses of the view) . 
 
 ■ Houston V. WoodAvard, 17 N. J. » Huntress v. Epsom, 15 Fed. Rep.
 
 '698 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 shillings, was not entitled to costs for increase, merely because a 
 view was granted before trial, though upon the application of the 
 defendant.^ 
 
 § 912. Attended by the proper Officer. — It should appear 
 that the jurors were attended by the proper ofScer.^ The sheriff 
 should accompany the jury, and keep them together in a body 
 while making the view. It is irregular to tell the jurors that 
 such of them may go and view the premises as choose to 
 do so.^ 
 
 §913. [Michigan.] — Office of Judge or Court Commissioner 
 WHEN Attending. — The Michigan statute allows the judge to "at- 
 tend said jury, to decide questions of law and administer oaths to wit- 
 nesses." But the same statute allows him to designate a circuit court 
 commissioner for the same purpose, and also allows the jury to proceed 
 without either. In view of these provisions, it is held that the func- 
 tions of the judge, when so attending the jury, are merely advisory. 
 The jury, being, as before seen,^ judges of both the law and the fact, 
 the judge, it seems, ought not, when attending them, to control their 
 conduct, to admit or exclude evidence, or to instruct them, as upon a 
 regular trial ; ^ though the fact of his having done so will not be ground 
 of setting aside their award, unless it appear that the complaining party 
 was prejudiced thereby.^ In such a proceeding under the Michigan 
 statute, the inquest may be conducted b}'^ the jury without legal assist- 
 ance, and a liberal practice in the admission or rejection of evidence is 
 alloivable; nor will the conclusions of the jury therein be disturbed, 
 except for rulings which were manifestly inaccurate and contrary to 
 substantial justice. The court say: " Wlien the law provided how the 
 tribunal should be constituted for these cases, and prescribed the method 
 to be observed, it obviously contemplated that the practice respecting 
 the admission of testimony should be as simple as a due regard to sub- 
 stantial justice would permit. It was not intended to leave the fate of 
 the determination had in view, to any fine-spun theories, or to the re- 
 finements which are not uncommon in trials at the circuit. They were 
 
 1 Flint V. Hill, 11 East,. 184. ^ Ante, § 899. 
 
 2 Patchiu V. Trustees, 2 Weud. ^ Toledo &c. K. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 
 (N. Y.) 377, 384. Mich. 45C, 466. 
 
 ^ Brooklyn v. Patcheu, 8 Wend. ^ Ji,i(j, 
 
 <N. Y.) 47, 84.
 
 Tit. Ill, Ch. XXVir.] VIEW. 699 
 
 not supposed to be necessary to the fundamental purpose or beneficial 
 working of inquests of this nature, and no provision was made for the 
 certain attendance of any one presumptivel}^ qualified to deal with them. 
 The statute plainly assumes that the jury may conduct the inquiry with- 
 out the aid of any legal expert, and under circumstances in which it 
 would be difficult, if not impracticable, to preserve technical or hair- 
 drawn questions in a shape to be reviewed. And were the niceties of 
 nisiprius to be insisted on, the proceeding would speedily break down 
 under the perplexities and embarrassments due to its own methods. 
 The conclusion to which these and other considerations lead is, that a 
 very large discretion in admitting and rejecting testimony, is left to the 
 ju7-y, or the attending officer, whenever there is one, and that, when the 
 case is brought here by ai)peal, the award cannot be disturbed on ac- 
 count of such decision, unless it is fairl}' evident, in view of the facts 
 and circumstances, that the ruling was not only inaccurate, but was a 
 cause of substantial injustice to the appellant in the matter of the re- 
 sult."! 
 
 § 914. Showers appointed under the Old Practice. — Per- 
 fions called showers were appointed under the old practice, whose 
 office it was to accompany the jury to the land to be viewed. ^ 
 Under the old New York practice, following the English, where 
 au application for a view was demanded by either party, show- 
 ers were appointed to show the premises, under the direction of 
 the sheriff, ^ and such also was the practice under theKew Jersey 
 statute.* The showers were at liberty to show marks, bounda- 
 ries, etc., to enlighten the viewers; and might say to them, 
 " these are the places which, on the trial, we shall adapt our evi- 
 dence to." ^ The practical directions given in Bagley's Practice 
 for the appointment of showers are, " that, if the opposite party 
 refuses to name a shower, the attorney on the other side is to 
 get an appointment from the master to name a shower ; that a 
 
 1 Michigan Air Line Ry. v. Barnes, gestive of a loet day for making tlie 
 
 44 Mich. 223, 226, opinion by Graves, view. 
 J. ' 3 Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. 
 
 2*806 the English statutes already (N. Y.) 47. 
 quoted, §§876, 878. These function- * See the statute, aJi^e, § 882, subsec. 
 
 aries were called in the old books 14; also next section, 
 "shewers"; but I use the modern ^ Symous v. Clark, Barnes, 457 
 
 spelling, though somewhat sug- (1790).
 
 700 NATURAL EVIDENCE. [1 ThoUip. Tl'., 
 
 memorandum of the rule, with the name and phice of abode of 
 the one shower, and of the shower nominated by the adverse 
 party, or by the master on his default, is to be taken to theoffice, 
 and tlie clerk Avill draw up the rule." ^ The practice was thus 
 stated by Archbold: '' Draw up a prcecipe ov memorandum of 
 the rule you want. Get from the opposite attorney a memor- 
 andum of the name and place of abode of his shower, and take it> 
 together with a similar memorandum of your own shower, and 
 also of the time and place of meeting, etc., to one of the mas- 
 ters, and draw up the rule." ^ 
 
 § 915. Obstructing the Showers in Running Lines. — In a 
 
 curious old case in New Jersey (anno l.S:2;^), a special rule for a 
 view for a particular line was made, supported ])y an affidavit that 
 the land-owner had obstructed a shower who had a heady been upon 
 it, in running a line. The court said: " Tiie party is entitled to 
 the special view. We can never suffer justice to be defeated by 
 the obstinacy of the party in preventing a line being run. In the 
 great patent line, to the running of which great opposition was 
 made, a rule of this kind was obtained by the late Mr. Stockton, 
 and the power of the county went with him. In the Cumberland 
 case, the agent of the plaintiff went to run the lines, and the per- 
 sons in possession cut his saddle to pieces : the court granted him 
 the power of the county and ordered the sheriff to accompany 
 him. There is no doul)t of the power of the court to grant the 
 rule, and w-e think it should be granted." ^ The " special rule " 
 established in New Jersey at an early day, seems to have author- 
 ized the sheriff to take the jury of view over any Jaiid which 
 might be deemed necessary, and to run the lines which bounded 
 the premises in dispute, upon whose land soever the same might 
 be ; but this rule was not granted, on the grounds of unfairness, 
 injustice and expense, unless there was reason to believe that 
 the viewers would be obstructed in the performance of their 
 duty.^ 
 
 1 j'.ai.'. Prac. 228. 3 Snyder v. \\\\\ Natta, 7N. J. L. 25, 
 
 2 Arch. Prac. 407, Gtli Eug. ed. "• Deu v. Woodward, 4 M. J. L. 122.
 
 Tit III. Ch. XXVII.] VIEW. 701 
 
 § 916. Competent to show Chang-e in Premises after the 
 Fact in Controversy, and hefore the View. — Where the jury is 
 permitted to view the locus in quo, evidence is competent, tend- 
 ing to show that, after the fact out of which the controversy 
 arose, and before the making of the view, the character of the 
 premises was materially changed.^ 
 
 » Mortou V. Smith, 48 Wis 2G5, 270.
 
 702 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tbomp. Tr., 
 
 TITLE IV. 
 
 AEGUMENT OF COUNSEL. 
 
 Chapter XXVIII. — Of the Right of Argument Generally. 
 Chapter XXIX. — Of the Right to Argue Questions op 
 
 Law to the Jury. 
 Chapter XXX. — Abuses of the Right of Argument. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 OF THE RIGHT OF ARGUMENT GENERALLr= 
 
 Section 
 
 920. Right of Parties to Arguineut by Counsel. 
 
 921. In Crimiual Cases. 
 
 922. Waiver of Riglit of Argumeut. 
 
 923. Limiting Time of Argumeut. 
 
 924. WliatLimitatious of Time liave been aplield. 
 
 925. What Limitations liave been held on Abuse of Discretion. 
 
 926. Question how Presented for Review . 
 
 927. Practice of Limiting the Time of the Advocates among the Ancients, 
 
 928. Limiting Number of CouuseL 
 
 929. Statutory Rules prohibiting such Limitations. 
 930= Order of making the Argument. 
 
 ' 931. The Approved Order Suggested. 
 
 932. Effect of Waiver of Opening Statement. 
 
 933. Scope of the Opening Statemento 
 
 934. What must be Stated in the Opening Argument, 
 
 935. Limits of the Concluding Argumeut. 
 
 . 936. Cutting off the Plaintiff's Right to Reply. 
 
 § 920. Right of Parties to Argument by Counsel. — It is 
 
 said that every party to a trial, civil or criminal, has the legal as
 
 Tit. IV, Cb. XX VI 1 1.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 703 
 
 well as the natural right to be heard in his own cause, by himself 
 or counsel, and that no rule of practice can deprive him of this 
 right, if, at the proper time and in the proper way, he offers to 
 exercise it.^ Another court has said that a party to a civil action 
 "has a right to be heard, not only in the testimony of his wit- 
 nesses, but also in the arguments of his counsel. It matters not 
 how weak and inconclusive his testimony maybe; if it is enouo-h 
 to present a disputed question of fact upon which he is entitled 
 to the verdict of the jury, he has a right to present, in the argu- 
 ments of his counsel, his view of the case. This is no matter of 
 dl'icrelion on the part of the court, but an absolute right of the 
 party." 2 But it is conceived that a distinction must be taken 
 between the right to appear and defend by counsel and the 
 right to be heard in argument by counsel. The right to ap- 
 pear and defend is undoubtedly an absolute right, existing in all 
 cases, civil and criminal, of which no court possesses the power 
 to deprive a party. But the right to be heard in argument in a 
 particular case, is plainly not a right of this absolute nature; it 
 does not exist at all unless there is something to argue which is 
 fairly debatable. The true office of counsel is that of aids or 
 helps to the court and jury in the administration of justice.^ 
 Clearly, it is within the power of the court, in a civil case, to 
 dispense with this aid or help, where it is not necessary. It is 
 not error to deny the right of argument in such a case, where the 
 evidence is all on one side and there is nothing to aro-ue : nor 
 will a judgment in such a case be reversed merely to allow a law- 
 yer to make a speech.* Nor is a judge, even in a criminal case, 
 bound to hear argument upon a question of law, in respect of 
 
 which his opinion is so fixed as to render discussion unavailino-.* 
 
 o 
 
 1 Sodousky v. McGee, 4 J. J. Marsh. 5 Howell v. Commonwealth, 5 Gratt. 
 (Ky.) 271; post, § 1010. (Va.) 664, 668. It has been held in 
 
 2 Douglas V. Hill, 29 Kan. 527. Georgia, in a criminal case, not error 
 'See Garrison v, "Wilcoxson, 11 but an j)T«?5fM?ar%, for the trial court 
 
 Ga. 154, 159, for an eloquent passage to refuse, under circumstances, to hear 
 
 on this subject by Xisbet, J. argument in favor of a motion to ar- 
 
 * Harrison v. Park, 1 J. J. Marsh, rest the judgment and to grant a 
 
 (Ky.) 170, 173; Xeidig v. Cole, 13 Xeb. new trial. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 295, 
 
 S9. 331.
 
 704 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 ThoiUp. Tl'., 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to say that the right of argument fnay be 
 waived in civil cases. ^ 
 
 § 921. In Criminal Cases. — In criminal cases the right of 
 accused persons to be defended by counsel is a right of a very 
 high nature, which is guaranteed by the constitution of the 
 United States^ and by the constitutions of most of the States. 
 Under these constitutional guaranties, it is the unquestioned right 
 of every person tried upon a charge of crime to be heard by the 
 court and jury, upon the whole case,^ through the lips of coun- 
 sel learned in the law. *' If," said Scott, J., "there be any 
 point involved in the issue before the jury, on which their minds 
 may be enlightened or theii consciences satisfied by argument, 
 the accused has an undoubted right to all the advantage that may 
 be derived from that source, and this right would be utterly 
 destroyed if it were allowed to the court to prohibit argument 
 merely because, ^7^ its ojnnion, the evidence is so clear that argu- 
 ment cannot vary it. Neither is this the only case in which an 
 argument before the jury might be of importance to the accused, 
 however direct and uncontradicted the evidence against him 
 might be."* 
 
 § 922. Waiver of Right of Argument. — Where, after the submis- 
 sion of a cause to the court without a jury, the court states to defend- 
 ant's counsel that plaintiff's counsel do not wish to argue the case, and 
 
 1 It has been held that, wheu coun- Ala. Ill, 115. Compare Prosser v. 
 
 sel decline to argue the case to the Henderson, 11 Ala. 484. Obviously 
 
 jux'y, after the evidence is closed on the refusal of the trial court to allow 
 
 both sides, this is a waiver of their counsel to address the jury cannot be 
 
 right of argument; and that, when the reviewed on error, unless the ruliug is 
 
 right is thus waived, it is not revived excepted to and preserved in a bill of 
 
 by allowing either party to read from exceptions. Wilkins v. Anderson, 11 
 
 a record book a piece of evidence Pa. St. 399. 
 
 which has, in the course of the trial, ^ u, g. Const. Amendments, art. 
 
 l)een properly read to the jury, al- VI. This amendment extends only to 
 
 though such second reading is per- the Federal tribunals, 
 mittedafterthe jury have been charged, ^ Word v. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 
 
 and have retired and returned into (Va.), 743, 759. 
 court and informed the court that they * Ibid. 
 
 cannot agree. Cotton v. Rutledge, 33
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.J KIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 705 
 
 asks the defendant's counsel whether they wish to make an argument, 
 and tlie}^ make no reply, and the court thereupon renders a decision 
 adverse to the defendant, — defendant's counsel cannot thereafter claim 
 the right of argument ; it has been waived.'^ 
 
 §923. Limiting? Time of Ai'gumeiit. — ^The rule, both in 
 civil "^ and in criminal ^ cases, is that the courts have power, in 
 the exercise of a sound discretion, to impose reasonable limitations 
 upon the time which is to be allowed to parties for argument by 
 counsel, which discretion will not be revised on error or appeal 
 except in cases of manifest abuse. On the one hand, a reason- 
 able exercise of this i)ower is upheld as being a])solutely necessary 
 to enable the courts to dispatch the public business; on the other 
 hand, a plain abuse of it, which has resulted in denying to an 
 accused person the constitutional right of defense by counsel, or 
 of unreasonably abridging this right, will afford ground for set- 
 ting aside the judgment in a criminal case and granting a new 
 trial.* Just observations have been made upon the impropriety, 
 even in civil cases, of curtailing the time of argument, where it 
 can be avoided without detriment to the public business ; pointing 
 out the difficulty of the court undertaking to prescribe in advance 
 the time which may be necessary for the proper presentation by 
 counsel of his client's cause, and dwelling u})on the fact that 
 such a restriction has a tendency to hamper the efforts of counsel 
 and to impair the public confidence in the administration of jus- 
 tice.^ While the rule which reposes this discretion in the trial 
 
 1 Piatt V. Head, 35 Kan. 282. v. Colhns, 70 N. C. 241 (Bynum, J., 
 
 2 Cory V. Silcox, 5 Ind. 370; Rosser dissenting) ; Dille v. State, 34 Ohio St. 
 V. McColly, 9 Ind. 587; Burson v. Ma- G17; People v. Kelly, 94 N. Y. 627; 
 honey, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) .S04, 307; Pre- State v. Donnelly, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 
 Ugh V. Ames, 31 Mo. 253; Dobbins v. 4(;3; Sullivan v. State, 46 N. J. L. 446; 
 Oswalt, 20 Ark. 619, 624; Musselman People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, 584; 
 V. Pratt, 44 Ind. 126; Trice v. Hannibal Sullivan v. State, 47 N. J. L. 151. 
 
 &c. R. R. Co., 35 Mo. 416. Contra, in ■» White v. People, 90 111. 117; Dille 
 
 Iowa, Hallv. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559,562. v. State, 34 Ohio St. 617; Hunt v. 
 
 3 Brooks V. Perry, 23 Ark. 32; State State, 49 Ga. 255; People v. Keenan, 
 V. Page, 21 Mo. 257 (Scott, J., dissent- 13 Cal. 581, 584. 
 
 ing) ; Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541 ; ^ Burson v. Mahouey, 6 Baxt. 
 
 "Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584; State (Teun.) 304, 307. 
 
 45
 
 706 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 courts extends even to capital cases ;^ yet it has been suggested 
 that if such a limitation is imposed at all in such cases, it 
 should be done only in very extraordinary and peculiar circum- 
 stances. ^ 
 
 § 924. What Limitations of Time Have Been Upheld. — Applying 
 these principles, it was held in Missouri, in a criminal prosecution for 
 cutting timber upon school lands, that no abuse of discretion appeared 
 in an order of the trial court limiting the time of argument allowed the 
 counsel for the defendant, to fifteen minutes. Cicero having been al- 
 lowed but half an hour to defend Caius Rabirius before the tribune of 
 the people on a charge of murder, the court concluded that " a quarter 
 of an hour allowed to a modern orator, in a petty case of cutting down 
 timber on school lands, cannot be considered an inhibition to be heard 
 
 in defense of his client." ^ In the same State, where the action 
 
 was for damages against a railway company for killing the plaintiff 's 
 hogs, and the defendant introduced no evidence, the Supreme Court 
 could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting coun- 
 sel on either side to ten minutes."* Where, in a civil action in Ten- 
 nessee, the trial court limited counsel to five minutes on each side, the 
 Supreme Court, after giving extended observations upon the impro- 
 priety of unnecessarily restricting the time for argument, said that, in 
 a case involving larger interests, they would have made it a ground 
 for reversing the judgment; but as it was, they allowed the judg- 
 ment to stand. 5 Complaint was made, in a civil case in Indiana, 
 
 that the trial court had limited the argument of counsel for the plaintiff 
 to ninetv minutes ; but it appearing that the defendant's counsel had 
 declined to make any argument, the Supreme Court held, on plain 
 
 1 State V. Collins, 70 N. C. 241; be reasonably continued. If a court 
 People V. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581. can limit the time of speaking to fif- 
 
 2 People i;.Keenau,s?«pm. See also teen minutes, it can take away tlie 
 Kizer v. State, 12 Lea (Tenn.) , 564. riglit of making a defense ; for I repeat 
 
 3 State V. Page, 21 Mo. 257, 259. It, that no counsel who had any regard 
 Scott, J., strongly dissented, taking for his reputation would attempt to 
 the ground that no limitation of time make a defense in fifteen minutes, in 
 should be attempted in advance, but a case in which it was really uecessaiy 
 that this control should be exercised to make one." 
 
 on the circumstances as they should "* Trice v. Hannibal &c. R. E. Co., 
 
 transpire. He said: " It is not for 35 Mo. 41(). 
 
 man in his weakness to declare, before ^ Burson v. Mahoney, 6 Baxt. 
 
 a defense is begun, how long it should (Tenn.) 304, 307.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 707 
 
 grounds, that there was no abuse of discretion.^ On less doubtful 
 
 grounds the same court upheld the limitation of an hour and a half to 
 the plaintiff and an hour to the defendant in a civil action for slan- 
 der. ^ - - - - In a criminal case in Ohio, where the subject was well 
 considered by the Su[)rerae Court, two days had been consumed in 
 taldng testimony in the trial court. The court bad adjourned over 
 Christmas day, and had also adjourned in order to allow one of the 
 jurors to attend the funeral of a relative. It was held that, in limiting 
 the time of argument to five hours on each side and in extending the 
 defendant's time twenty minutes without interruption, the trial court 
 did not abuse its discretion.^ Nor did the Supreme Court of Ne- 
 braska see an abuse of discretion, in a trial of murder, in limiting argu- 
 ment to two hours and a half on each side, and afterwards extending 
 the defendant's time to three hours.* On an appeal from a con- 
 viction under an indictment for an assault with intent to kill, the Court 
 of Appeals of New York went so far as to uphold a limitation of half an 
 hour to the defendant, it appearing that not many witnesses had been 
 sworn, that the questions of fact were not numerous, and that the evi- 
 dence on both sides had been submitted during the same day.^ 
 
 Reasoning upon such a case, it was conceded that a restriction to five 
 minutes, in a case of felony, was one which could rarely be sustained 
 while allowing the largest limits to the discretion of the trial court, if 
 
 the question were properly presented for review.^ In a capital case 
 
 where the prisoner was defended by three counsel, and the court limited 
 counsel to one hour and ten minutes on each side, the reviewing court 
 was unable to say, on a general exception merely, that the discretion 
 of the court had been abused, though it intimated an opinion that the 
 time had been unnecessarily restricted.'' 
 
 § 925. What Limitations Have Been Held an Abuse of Discre- 
 tion. — On the other hand, on the trial of an indictment for larceny, 
 where four witnesses had been examined in chief for the prosecution, 
 three for the defense and two for the prosecution in rebuttal, it was 
 held, on obvious grounds, an abuse of discretion to limit counsel on 
 
 either side to five minutes. ^ On the trial of an indictment for bui-- 
 
 glary and larceny, seven witnesses were examined for the State and 
 
 1 Rosser v. McColly, 9 lud. 587. ♦ Hart v. State, 14 Neb. 572. 
 
 2 Musselman v. Pratt, U Ind. 126. « People v. Kelly, 94 N. Y. 527. 
 
 8 Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584; 6 Williams «. Cora., 82 Ky. 640, 643. 
 
 approved in Dille v. State, 34 Ohio St. "> Kizer v. State, 12 Lea (Teuu.), 564. 
 
 617. 8 -White V. People, 90 111= 117.
 
 708 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 four for the defense. Half a day was occupied in taking the testimony. 
 It was entirely circumstantial, and there were serious conflicts in it. It 
 was held by a majority of the court, on appeal, that a limitation of 
 thirty minutes to the defendant's counsel was an abuse of discretion 
 
 for which there must be a new trial. ^ In Georgia, on the trial of 
 
 an indictment for an assault with intent to murder, where the evidence 
 was conflicting as to whether the stabbing was done in self-defense, the 
 Supreme Court held that, in limiting the defendant's counsel, against his 
 protest, to thirty minutes, the trial court committed "a grave error," 
 which was not cured by extending the time to forty minutes, which 
 error had resulted in denying the defendant the privilege and bene- 
 fit of counsel in his defense, as contemplated by the constitution. ^ 
 
 § 926. Question how Presented for Review. — Although it 
 has been held in California that this question may be presented for 
 review in an appellate court by affidavits,^ yet the better and pre- 
 vailing rule of practice is that the counsel complaining of the 
 limitation of time must promptly object to it, and save an ex- 
 ception^ which must be shown to the reviewing court by a bill of 
 exceptions. There is a further view that the mere fact that coun- 
 sel excepts to the order of the court, is not sufficient to brmg 
 the abuse of discretion by the court, if such it be, to the attention 
 of the reviewing court; but counsel must " ask for further time^ 
 or at least in some way inform the judge that, in his opinion, in- 
 justice will be done him by the restriction, and not content him- 
 self with a mere exception." * The fact, then, that a court limits 
 the time of argument to an extremely short period, will not 
 be ground of new trial where counsel make no claim at the time 
 that the period is too short. It was so held in a case of felony, 
 where the court limited each side to five minutes.^ 
 
 § 927. Practice of Limiting the Time of the Advocates Among 
 THE Ancients. — In a case in Missouri,'' where this question was un- 
 
 1 Dille V. State, 34 Ohio St. 617. 
 
 2 Hunt «. State, 49 Ga. 255. , 
 
 3 People V. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, 584. 
 See also Hall v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559, 
 561 ; Dbwdellw. Wilcox, 64 Iowa, 721, 
 724; Turner v. State, 68 Tenii. (4 Lea) 
 206; State I?. Comstock, 20 Kau. 650. 
 
 * Williams v. Cora., 82 Ky. 640; 
 Kizer v. State, 12 Lea (Teuu.), 564. 
 Compare Sewell v. Com., 3 Ky. Law 
 Rep. 86. 
 
 5 Williams v. Com., supra. 
 
 6 State V. Page, 21 Mo. 257, 259
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 709 
 
 der discussion, Ryland, J., thus stated the practice among the Greeks 
 and Romans, without stating from what historical sources he derived 
 his information: "This matter of limiting the time to be occupied in 
 the prosecution of causes before courts of justice is of very ancient 
 origin. It is found among the Greeks, and was carried thence to Rome. 
 Tlie Greeks had their instruments by which the}^ measured time in the 
 halls of judicature. The clepsydra was used. It was an instrument 
 by which they measured time by means of the flowing of water 
 through it ; and so frequent and common was the practice of limiting 
 the time to the speakers by water flowing through these instruments, 
 that the word "water" was used metaphorically for time. When a 
 speaker was allowed to speak so long, tliey said he was allowed so much 
 water. The Greeks had an officer in their courts of justice whose duty 
 it was to watch this measuring of time, and when a certain amount 
 was allotted to a speaker, if there were any documents to be read dur- 
 ing his speech, the time the reading of such documents consumed was 
 not to be estimated as any part of what had been allotted to him ; 
 therefore this oflicer, whose station was near the clepsydra, stopped the 
 water while the documents were being read. The orator did not waste 
 his water in reading documents. Pliny tells us that he was allowed ten 
 large amphorce of water once, and so important was the cause in which 
 he was engaged that the judges added four more to the amount. He 
 says he spoke five hours. He tells us likewise that he himself used to 
 allow the accused as much water as he wanted. The tribune of the peo- 
 ple, Titus Sabienus, only allowed half an hour to Cicero to speak in de- 
 fense of Caius Rabirius when he was prosecuted for murder. This, too, 
 on an appeal from the judgment of the Duumviri to the people. The 
 orator complained of being cramped by the narrow space of time ; for 
 though it would be nearly enough to make the defense for his client, it 
 would not be enough for preferring the complaints he had a right to 
 bring forward. ' I have spoken the time allowed me,' he said, when 
 about to conclude ; and in no part of the monument erected by his ge- 
 nius to its own immortality will you find a more polished or more brill- 
 iant gem than this half hour's work." 
 
 § 928. Liimiting Number of Counsel and Number of 
 Speeches.^ — The principle which vests in the trial courts the 
 
 1 As was done in Dille v. State, 34 Studt, 12 Mo. App. 566; Bradshaw v. 
 Ohio St. 617. See also Wilkiusy.Au- State, 22 N. W. Rep. 361; Bullis v. 
 derson, 11 Pa. St. 399; Roeder i\ Drake (Neb.), 29 N. W. Rep. 282;
 
 710 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 discretionary poicer of limiting the time of counsel, must also 
 operate to give them the like power to limit the nwnber of 
 counsel who may be heard in behalf of a single party. It has 
 been suggested that the constitutional right of being heard by 
 counsel is satisfied where the party is allowed the privilege of 
 being heard by one counsel, and that he cannot demand, as a 
 matter of right, that he be allowed to be heard by a greater 
 number.^ Where several persons voluntarily yo^7^ as parties, so 
 that they constitute, in contemplation of law, but a single party 
 to the litigation, they cannot of right claim to be heard by more 
 than one counsel, speaking for them collectively.^ But where 
 several persons are, against their wills, yo^»ef7 «*• defendants in 
 an action, whose interests are diverse and repugnant to each 
 other, and who have an interest in discharging upon each other 
 the burden which the plaintiff is endeavoring to cast upon them 
 all, — in such a case any one of such parties, where not represented 
 by counsel appearing for the others, may of right claim to be 
 heard in his sesparate behalf by at least one counsel. But, as 
 was said by Robertson, C. J., " wdiile the general right is ac- 
 knowledged, the courts should be careful lest it may be abused 
 and perverted to purposes of vexation, inconvenience and injus- 
 tice. Before a defendant can insist on such a right he should be 
 prepared to show very clearly that he is justly entitled to the 
 enjoyment of it. The bare fact that he has employed other 
 counsel than those who were employed by his co-defendants, 
 would not of itself entitle him to be heard, after two speeches had 
 been made by the defense. If the interests of the defendants 
 seem to be in unison, if the argument for one includes or bene- 
 fits the others, and if they all act in concert, the court might re- 
 fuse to permit more than two of the counsel to be heard, and 
 leave it to the defendants to make the selection." '^ It was ruled 
 
 Mulcairns v. Jauesville (Wis.). 29 N. " Sodousky?;. McGec, 4 J. J. Marsh. 
 
 W. Eep. 5()5; McLaiu v. State, 24 N. (Ky.) 2(17. 
 
 W. Kep. 720,724; Rudolph v. Laud- 2 m^^ 
 
 werlen, 92 Ind. 34, 35; State v. Au- 3 Sodousky u. McGee, 4 J. J. Marsh, 
 
 dersou, 10 Ore. 448, 457; Coramou- (Ky.) 2()7, 271, where the propriety of 
 
 wealth V. Scott, 123 Mass. 231); State the above conclusious is very forcibly 
 
 r. Abraius, 11 Ore. 1(59, 172; State v. argued by Hobertsou, C. J. 
 Cavem-ss, 78 N. C. 484, 489.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 711 
 
 by Mr. Justice Curtis, of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, at circuit, that in a capital case the ju) nor counsel has the 
 right to argue the law aud the facts, but that only one counsel 
 has the right to close. In the particular case, however, as all the 
 witnesses were government witnesses, and as none were called for 
 the defendant except those whom the government had declined, 
 to examine, two counsel were permitted to close in full on the 
 law and facts — not, however, making a precedent for cases in 
 which the prisoner's counsel should call witnesses not examined 
 by the grand jury and sworn on the part of the defendant. ^ A 
 statute of Texas provides that " in prosecutions for felony the 
 court shall never restrict the argument to a less number than 
 two on a side." ^ It is held that this statute applies only to cases 
 where the prisoner has more than one counsel, aud tliat it was 
 not intended to confer upon him the benefit of having two 
 speeches where he has but one counsel.^ 
 
 § 929. Statutory Rules Prohibiting such Limitations. — In North 
 Carolina, about the year 1874, a circuit judge, in a criminal case, re- 
 stricted the prisoner's counsel to an hour and a half in addressing the 
 jury, allowing two of his counsel to divide this time between them. To 
 this ruling exceptions were taken, aud, on an appeal from a convic- 
 tion, tlie Supreme Court, while expressing its disapprobation of the man- 
 ner in which the trial judge had exercised his discretion, nevertheless 
 held that it was a power vested in him, the exercise of which could not 
 be controlled b^- a reviewing court."* The decision of the Supreme 
 Court was unsound, in that it held that the discretion of the trial court 
 was absolute, and not subject to control by the appellate tribunal in a 
 case of manifest abuse. Thereupon the legislature passed the follow- 
 ing extraordinary statute: "Any counsel appearing in any civil or 
 criminal ease, in any of the courts of this State, shall be entitled to ad- 
 dress the court or the jury for such a space of time as, in his opinion, 
 
 * United States v. Mingo, 2 Curt. would be incumbent upon the counsel 
 
 C. C. 1. intending to make two speeclies to 
 
 2 Texas Code Crim. Pro., art. notify tlie court of sucli intent before 
 3051. tlie commencemeut of his argument, 
 
 3 Morals v. State, 1 Tex. App. 494, failing in which he would be deemed 
 499. It was also reasoned that, even to have waived the right. 
 
 on tihe contrary view of the statute, it ^ state v. Collins, 70 N. C. 241.
 
 712 ARGUMENT OF COUXSEL. [I Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 may be necessary for the proper development or presentation of his 
 case." It is to be noticed that the statute begins by vesting this right 
 in " any counsel appearing in any civil or criminal case." If, there- 
 fore, the whole bar appear, as they frequently do in the country 
 circuits in important cases, on the one side or the other, "aw?/" 
 (and consequently every) counsel so appearing may exercise the right 
 of addressing the court or jury as long as, in his discretion, it may be 
 necessary. The statute thus places it within the absolute power of a 
 combination of lawyers, by following each other and " speaking against 
 time," to protract trials until the term lapses by operation of law, to 
 produce mistrials, to prevent other causes from being heard, and to- 
 tally to obstruct and prevent the dispatch of the public business. That 
 discretionary control over the conduct of causes in the courts of nisi 
 prius which is absolutely essential to dispatch litigation and prevent de- 
 nials of justice, is taken away from the judge and vested, not in the bar 
 as an aggregate body, but in any particular lawyer or lawyers who may 
 presume to exercise it. " What we suppose is meant," said Reed, J., 
 commenting on this remarkable piece of legislation, " is that it is left 
 to the discretion of counsel instead of to the discretion of the presiding 
 judge, how they shall address themselves to the court and jury. It 
 must be left either to the judge or the counsel, and the legislature has 
 left it with the counsel. It may be that the confidence is not mis- 
 placed. But one instance is recorded i where any counsel has felt 
 himself at liberty to abuse his privilege to the obstruction of the due 
 administration of the law, and that was before many of the profession 
 had many of the advantages which they now possess, and, it may be, 
 before it was fully known that ' we cannot do evil that good may come 
 of it.' At any rate, the law is plain, and the experiment has to be made 
 whether it is prudent to entrust the discretion in the courts to the 
 counsel instead of to the judge.'' ^ Xhe court also ruled that, under a 
 proper interpretation of the statute, the trial court does not possess the 
 power to limit the number of counsel who shall speak ; in other words, 
 that the trial court cannot limit the time which the counsel for a party 
 shall employ in arguing his cause b^'^ limiting the number who shall 
 
 speak. 3 By statute, in Iowa, " the court may restrict the time of 
 
 an attorney in any argument to itself, but shall not do so in any case 
 before the jury." ^ With this statute in force, the judges in that State 
 
 ^ He referred to the iustaiice stated 2 gtate v. Miller, 75 N. C. 73, 75. 
 
 in the dissenting opinion iu State v. ^ Ihid. 
 
 Collins, 70 N. C. 241. * Miller Rev. Code la,, § 2783.
 
 Tit. IV, CIk XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 713 
 
 are often driven to the expedient of vacating the bench during an argu- 
 ment to a jury and engaging in the trial of another cause in another 
 room. That State, so far as the writer knows, is the only jurisdiction in 
 which this abominable practice has been sanctioned by an appellate tri- 
 bunal. " In this State," said Rothrock, J,, "a nisi prius judge is not 
 permitted to limit counsel in their argument to jurors ; and it often oc- 
 curs that, in order to dispose of the business of the court, and keep court 
 expenses within some limit, by consent of the parties and counsel, the 
 judge transacts other business during part of the time taken in argu- 
 ments to juries. Now, in such a case, counsel are bound to argue the 
 case made in the record. If not disposed to do so, it would be an un- 
 just rule that would require an opposing counsel to make objection 
 which is usually unavailing, and call upon the judge to return to the 
 court-room and correct tlie error." And the court hold that the fact 
 that such prejudicial remarks were made in argument, under such cir- 
 cumstances, may be shown by affidavit. ^ Where there is a statute 
 
 providing that the whole time occupied in the argument of a cause shall 
 not exceed two hours on either side, unless the court, for special reasons, 
 shall otherwise permit, it is not error for the court, against the objection 
 of a party, to limit his argument to a shorter time. The'statute is mere- 
 ly a limitation upon the power of the court to extend the time for argu- 
 ment unless for special reasons, and does not take away its discretion 
 of making a reasonable curtailment of the time.^ 
 
 § 930. Order of 3Iaking the Argument. — This has been al- 
 ready much considered in a former chapter," wherein it is seen 
 that, as a general rule, the order of argument is a matter of right 
 and follows the burden of proof. But there is an extensively 
 prevailing view that, "■ in the absence of any positive rules upon 
 the subject, the order of argument to the jury is matter of prac- 
 tice, within the control of the trial judge, and an appellate court 
 will not interfere, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, and 
 there is good ground for believing that the party complaining 
 has been injured by a wrong ruling as to such matters." * 
 
 1 Hall V. Wolff, Cl Iowa 559, 562. John, 17 Wis. 157; Savings Bank v, 
 
 2 Hurst t\ Burusicle, 12 Ore. 520, 526. Shakman, 30 Wis. 333; Bonnell v. 
 
 3 ^?t(e, chap. IX. Jacobs, 36 Wis. 59; Austin y. Austin? 
 
 4 Marshall v. American Express 45 Wis. 523; Kaime u. Omro, 49 Wis. 
 Co., 7 Wis. 1; Central Bank v. St. 371, 378; ante, § 226, n. 4.
 
 714 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 § 931. The Approved Order Suggested. — The old and ap- 
 proved practice is said to be, that each party shall open his case 
 to the jury just before introducing his evidence, and that, when 
 the evidence is all in, the defendant's counsel may sum up to the 
 jury, and plaintiff 's counsel may then close. ^ 
 
 § 932. Effect of Waiver of Opening Statement. — Where the 
 plaintiff 's counsel, after having waived his right to open his case 
 to the jury, is not confined by the trial court to a strict reply to 
 the arguments of the defendant's counsel, there is no ground of 
 reversal, if it does not appear that he was permitted to wander 
 from ilieisi^ues in the case.^ 
 
 § 933. Scope of the Opening Statement. — The scope of the 
 opening statement has been already considered ;^ but it may not be 
 amiss to notice two or three cases which have come to the attention 
 of the writer since those paragraphs were printed. It is, of course, 
 no objection in a criminal case that the State's attorney, in his 
 opening statement, sets out fully what he expects to prove against 
 the accused; but this is rather a benefit to him, since it notifies 
 him of the case which he must be prepared to meet.^ Where the 
 States' counsel, in opening the case to the jury exhibited to them 
 a photograph of the deceased, a young girl, the same having been 
 afterwards identified by a witness as a photograph of her, it was 
 held that no error was presented, such as could be reviewed by 
 an appellate court, and secondly, the court regarded it as not an 
 error such as would produce a reversal ; since if the jurors had 
 known the deceased, they would not for that reason have been 
 incompetent, and if the people's counsel had described her per- 
 sonal appearance in argument, that would not have been such an 
 abuse as would have required a new trial. ^ It cannot be as- 
 
 1 Kairae v. Omro, 49 Wis. 371. court had Avas that, under the Revised 
 
 2 Kaiine v. Omro, 49 Wis. 371 Statutes (2 R. S. N. Y., p. 73G, § 21), 
 (qualifying dicta in Brown v. Swine- the matter was not the subject of ex- 
 ford, 44 Wis. 282). ceptions, but addressed itself only to 
 
 3 Ante, § 201, et seq. the discretion of the trial court on a 
 * Dowda V. State, 74 Ga. 12. motion for new trial, or to the gover- 
 •^ Walsh V. People, 88 N. Y. 458, nor on appeal for executive clemency. 
 
 403. The principal difficulty which the On this point the court cite: People
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT or argument. 715 
 
 signed for error that the judge directed counsel not to spend time 
 on certain issues in their opening statement, where, though an 
 exception was taken to the ruling, no suggestion was made at 
 the time that anything had been omitted from the statement, and 
 no evidence was afterwards offered to establish the issues as to 
 which an opening statement had been excluded. ^ The interrup- 
 tion by opposing counsel of the opening statement to raise ques- 
 tions as to its competency, or the restriction of the opening by the 
 court, is unjustifiable, except in very clear cases of abuse; and 
 any question raised upon it should be disposed of summarily and 
 without argument.'- In discussing this question in the case first 
 cited, Cooley, C. J., said: "Since the decision in the case of 
 Scripps V. Reilhj,^ an impression seems to have prevailed with 
 some members of the })ar that the opening statement of counsel 
 might be challenged step by step, and questions of the relevancy 
 and materiality of evidence raised and considered, and even aro-ued 
 at length, on counsel stating what he proposed to prove. Under 
 this impression , the practice of interrupting counsel and demanding 
 the judgment of the court on the competency of what he proposed 
 to show, has in some cases been carried to extraordinary lengths, 
 and elaborate arguments have been indulged in over the question 
 whether counsel should be suffered to make certain statements 
 of proposed evidence to the jury. Any such practice is a great 
 abuse, and in a desperate criminal case, might be resorted to for 
 the purpose of defeating the ends of justice, by breaking the 
 force of a connected statement of the case to the jury, and by 
 prolonging the trial until the trouble and expense should dis- 
 hearten the authorities, and result in a relaxation of effort for 
 conviction. The cases must be rare in which counsel would be 
 justified in interrupting the opening of his antagonist to raise 
 questions of competency ; and when he does so, the questions 
 ought to be disposed of summarily and without argument." * 
 
 «. Thompson, 41 N. Y. 1 : Gaffney v. ^ People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506, 
 
 People, 50 N. Y. 41G; Willis v. People, 513; Porter v. Throop, 47 Mich. 313 
 32 N, Y. 715. 3 38 Mich. 10. 
 
 1 Frazier v. Jeunison, 42 Mich. ■• People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506 
 
 206. 513.
 
 716 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 934. What must be Stated in the Opening Argument. — 
 
 Bearing in mind, then, that the State has, in every case where a 
 different rule is not prescribed by statute, the right to make both 
 the opening and the concluding argument, it becomes an import- 
 ant inquiry how far the prosecution is required, in its opening 
 argument, to develop and present its case, in order not to take the 
 accused at a disadvantage. It is the constant effort of unfair 
 and disingenuous advocates, who represent the side of the issue 
 which has the right to open and close, to attempt, by waiving 
 the opening argument, to put the other party at the disadvantage 
 of making his argument without knowing the argument which he 
 will have to meet, the prosecuting counsel thus acquiring the ad- 
 vantage of delivering his entire argument in conclusion without 
 giving to the defending counsel any right of reply to the positions 
 which he may take. This practice ought never to be tolerated. 
 Where the prosecution waives the opening argument and throws 
 the burden of opening upon the defendant, the court should allow 
 the defendant to close ; for it is but just that the defendant 
 should have a right to reply to the positions taken by the prose- 
 cution, and a spirit of fair play would dictate that the party 
 which has the burden of opening should have the advantage of 
 closino". To obviate such an unfair method of argument, courts 
 have adopted the rule requiring the party possessing the right to 
 the opening and closing arguments to deliver to the court and to 
 the opposite counsel the points upon which he means to insist, ^ 
 and to confine his concluding argument to the points thus deliv- 
 ered.^ Under a statute^ giving the State's counsel the right to 
 make the concluding address to the jury in all cases, it has been 
 ruled that the presiding judge should require him in his opening 
 speech fairly to develop his case, and to present the law on which 
 he relies ; and that if he should fail to do this until his second 
 speech, the presiding judge, in his discretion, would be author- 
 ized to allow the defendant's counsel again to address the jury.* 
 
 1 Main v. Newson, 3 Jolius. (N. Y.) ^ Wynn v. Lee, supra. 
 
 542; Schmidt v. Uiiiou lus. Co., 1 3 Texas Code Crim..Pro., art 3050. 
 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 63; Wynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. ■» Morales r. State, 1 Tex. App. 4!U, 
 
 217. 500. This ruling was also made ^;^\h
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 717 
 
 In Missouri, a statute prescribing that " unless the case be sub- 
 mitted without argument, the counsel for the prosecution shall 
 make the opening argument, the counsel for defendant shall 
 follow, and the counsel for the prosecution shall conclude the 
 argument," ^ is held to be mandatory. The prosecuting attorney 
 must therefore make the opening argument, in which he must 
 apprise the accused of the theory of the prosecution and of the 
 positions w'hich it takes, in order that the accused may be able to 
 reply: and if the State's counsel refuses to make such an open- 
 ing argument, he cannot be permitted to argue at all.^ Where 
 the statute required the counsel for the people to open and close, 
 allowed two counsel to argue on each side, and gave the court a 
 discretionary power to change the order thus prescribed, ^ it was 
 held that the court committed no error in denying the concluding 
 argument to the defendant's counsel and in allowing the counsel 
 for the prosecution and the accused to follow each other alter- 
 nately, the prosecution opening and concluding.^ 
 
 § 935. Limits of the Coiicludiiij? Argument. — In order not 
 to be unfair to the accused, the concluding argument must, then, 
 be confined to the grounds stated and points of law announced 
 in the opening argument ;^ and if counsel, in opening, refers to 
 authorities merely, without reading them, he is understood to 
 waive the right of reading them ; and, unless they are referred to 
 by the opposing counsel in his argument, the opening counsel 
 cannot take them up again in his reply .^ But if the counsel for 
 the defendant, in his argument, comments upon a decision which 
 is handed to him by counsel for the plaintiff, this obviously will 
 give to the counsel for the plaintiff the right to comment upon 
 the decision in his reply.'' It thus appears that the concluding 
 argument sustains an analogy to evidence in rebuttal. Its proper 
 
 reference to another Texas statute ^ Xov. Stat. 18G1, chap. 472, §§ 355, 
 
 (a)ife, § 928), which allows two argu- 350. 357. 
 
 ments ou each side iu a criminal ■* State v. Pierce, 8 Nev. 291, 296. 
 
 trial. ' Wynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. 217. 
 
 ' Rev. Stat. Mo. 1879, § 1908. 6 Cutler v. Estate of Thomas, 24 
 
 2 State V. Houig, 78 Mo. 249, Vt. G47. 
 253. . • ■' Liusey i-. Ramsey, 22 Ga. G27, 637.
 
 718 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 limit is a reply to what has been brought out in the defendant's 
 argument. As the plaintiff (or, in a criminal case, the State) is 
 not allowed to establish its case in chief by evidence introduced 
 for the first time in rebuttal, so the plaintiff's counsel (or the 
 State's counsel) ought not to be allowed, in the concluding argu- 
 ment, to take new grounds, to state new points of law, or to 
 read new authorities in support of the positions which he has 
 assumed. But, as the court possesses the power, in the exercise 
 of a sound discretion^ of permitting evidence which should have 
 been offered in chief to be introduced in rebuttal, provided it has 
 been inadvertently overlooked or not availed of at the proper 
 time by reason of accidental circumstances,^ so it rests within 
 the sound discretion of the trial court to permit counsel, in their 
 concluding argument, to comment upon matters not referred to 
 by the opposite counsel, and to which the opposite counsel are 
 afforded no opportunity to reply, — which discretion will not be 
 reviewed by an appellate tribunal except in a clear case of 
 prejudice.'^ 
 
 § 936. Cutting off Plaintiff's Right to Reply. — In a civil 
 case in Michigan the somewhat novel question was discussed 
 whether the defendant can, by waiving argument after the open- 
 inof argument has been made, cut off the rioht of the plaintiff to 
 his concludino; argument. The conclusion was that the matter 
 addressed itself to the sound discretion oi the trial court ; but, at 
 the same time, it was pointed out that the defendant has not an 
 absolute right to produce such a result, and that it ought to be 
 prevented by the trial court. In the course of the o})inion of 
 the court, Campbell, J., said: "Usually the plaintiff's opening 
 must indicate what the defendants are expected to meet. They 
 
 1 Rucker v. Eddiiiiis, 7 ]Mo. 115; 310; Farmer.s' Mutual Fire lus. Co. v. 
 
 Brown ?;. Burruss, 8 Mo. 26; Curreu Bair, 87 Pa. St. 124; Huntsmau v. 
 
 V. Connery, 5 Biun. (Pa.) 488; Eich- Nichols, IK! Mas.s. 521; Taylor v. 
 
 ardson v. Lessee &c., 4 Biun. (Pa.) Shemwell, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 577; Clayes 
 
 198; Dozier v. Jerman, 30 Mo. 216, u. Ferris, 10 Vt. 112; a«/e, § 345, e« se^. 
 220; Blake t?. Powell, 26 Kau. 320,327; 2 Hull v. xVlexauder, 26 Iowa, 660. 
 
 Rheinhart v. State, 14 Kan. 322; Compare Bardeu ??. Briscoe, 36 Mich. 
 
 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 3*0n, 255, 258.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXVIII.] RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 719 
 
 have a right to know what arguments are to be alleged against 
 them, and this they can only learn from the opening, inasmuch 
 as they liave no reply. In most cases, if they do not think the 
 opening requires any arguments to fortify their case against it, 
 they may fairly let the case go to the jury as it stands, and no 
 reply is needed where there is. nothing to be replied to. But 
 while this is true in theory, it is also true that, when all the testi- 
 mony is in, the defendants know perfectly well, before the open- 
 ing, what the line of argument against them must be, and that 
 its effect upon the jury will depend more or less upon the skill 
 or force of opposing counsel in presenting the facts. As only 
 one counsel opens, and as, where there are more than one, the 
 ground is usually divided, and the junior commonly precedes, 
 the effect of cutting off a reply would be to prevent the whole 
 case from being thoroughly presented. We cannot think that 
 there is any absolute right in a defendant to produce such a re- 
 sult. Every court is bound in fairness to prevent such abuses. 
 But inasmuch as the propriety of interference must depend upon 
 circumstances, we think the matter comes within those discre- 
 tionary rules which must, unless in extreme cases, leave the trial 
 judge to determine the course of procedure." ^ 
 
 J Barclen v. Briscoe, 3G Mich. 255, 257.
 
 720 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 ThotUp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. . 
 
 OF THE RIGHT TO ARGUE QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE JURY. 
 
 Section 
 
 940. How far Juries are Judges of the Law. 
 
 941. la Civil Cases. 
 
 942. Jurisdictions in whicli Counsel not Permitted to argvie Questions of 
 
 Law to the Jury. 
 
 943. Contrai-y Doctriue that Counsel should be Permitted to argue Questions 
 
 of Law to the Jury. 
 
 944. Arguing against the Law as laid down by the Court.' 
 
 945. Right to read Books of the Law to the Jury. 
 
 946. Court may Curtail this Right within Reasonable Limits. 
 
 947. Counsel not Permitted to read Law Books upon Questions of Fact. 
 
 948. Reading a Former Decision of the Supreme Court in the Same Case. 
 
 949. Reading or Stating Good Law to the Jury. 
 
 950. Stating Bad Law to the Jury. 
 
 951. [Conclusion.] Discretion, Cautious, Instructions. 
 
 § 940. How far Juries are Judges of the Law. — The ques- 
 tion to be discussed in this chapter is involved in another ques- 
 tion upon which a great amount of usek^ss judicial casuistry has 
 been expended, — namely, in what sense and to what extent are 
 juries judges of the law ? The question assumes practical shape 
 only in so far as it affords the key to the answ^ers to the follow- 
 ing questions: 1. To what extent are counsel permitted to ar- 
 gue questions of law to the jury? 2. What instructions shall the 
 court give to the jury touching their authority as judges of the 
 law ? It is not proposed to consider this preliminary question 
 now ; it more properly belongs to the next title, where the whole 
 subject of the relative provinces of court and jury is considered. 
 
 § 941. In Civil Cases. — The question may be at once laid 
 out of view, so far as civil oases are concerned, by the statement 
 that in no such case, except according to some early conceptions 
 in actions for damages for slander or libel, :ire the jury in any 
 sense judges of the law. In such cases the jury must take
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 721 
 
 the Lnv from the court, and not from the counsel. The 
 hitter ought not to be allowed to argue questions of law to 
 the jury, or to read them in argument from books of the law.^ 
 It has been doubted by one court whether counsel might not 
 properly be permitted to read books of the law to the jury in 
 civil cases, for the purpose of illustration merely ; ^ but at a later 
 period the same court held, on fuller consideration, that even 
 such a practice is improper. '^ 
 
 § 942. Jiirisdictious in which Counsel are not Permitted to 
 argue Questions of Law to the Jury. — In the courts of the 
 United States,* and in the courts of most of the States, it is settled 
 that counsel cannot be permitted to argue to the jury questions 
 of law which have been decided by the court. ^ Juries have no 
 power to judge of the constitutionality of acts of the legislature, 
 and consequently counsel have no right to argue such questions 
 to them.^ 
 
 1 Delaplaue v. Crenshaw, 15 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 457,481; Philpot «. Taylor, 75 
 111. 309; Chicago ?;. McGiveu, 78 111. 
 347; Spragiie v. Craig, 61 111. 289; 
 Tiiller V. Talbot, 23 111. 357; Heagy v. 
 State ex rel., 85 lud. 2(10. See contra., 
 for a local and peculiar rule in 
 Georgia, Robinson v. Adliins, 19 Ga. 
 398; Eansoue v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351, 
 355. 
 
 2 Tuller V. Talbot, supra. 
 
 ^ Chicago V. McGiven, supra. 
 
 ■* Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 1 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 47; Uuited States 
 V. Columbus, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 
 304; United States v. Riley, 5 Blatchf. 
 (U. S.) 204, 207. 
 
 5 State V. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65, 70. 
 
 6 Franlilin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 
 246, 249; Callender's Case, Whart. St. 
 Tr. 688, 710; United States v. Riley, 
 5 Blatclif. (U. S.) 204, 207. Callender's 
 Case, supra, was a prosecution, by in- 
 dictment, for a seditious libel, in the 
 Circuit Court of the Uuited States for 
 
 the district of Virginia, in the year 
 1800. William Wirt, in addressing 
 the jury on behalf of the defendant, 
 undertook to argue to them the consti- 
 tutionality of an act of the legislature 
 of Virginia, but, after several rude in- 
 terruptions by the presiding judge 
 (the Hon. Samuel Chase), was obliged 
 to take his seat. Mr. Wirt's reason- 
 ing was summed up in his concluding 
 sentence : '' Since the jury have a right 
 to consider the law, and since the con- 
 stitution is the law, the conclusion is 
 certainly syllogistic that the jury have 
 the right to consider the constitution." 
 The conduct of Mr. Justice Chase on 
 this trial, and, among other things, 
 this particular ruling, was made one of 
 the grounds for his impeachment be- 
 fore the Senate of the United States. 
 The Supreme .Court of Indiana take 
 the same view of this question which 
 was taken by Mr. Wirt, holding that 
 as the constitution is a part of the law, 
 it follows as a necessary corollary of 
 
 46
 
 722 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 § 943. Contrary Doctrine that Counsel Should be Allowed 
 to Arg-iie the Law to the Jury. — As hereafter seen,^ the con- 
 trary view prevails in Massachusetts, Maine, Indiana, Illinois 
 and other States, that in criminal cases counsel have the right to 
 argue the law to the jury. In Georgia the right is extended even 
 to civil cases. But the origin of the doctrine in that State is 
 found in the peculiar provisions of the constitution of 1777 and 
 that of 1798, which need not be further considered. The Geor- 
 gia courts, under these provisions, uphold the right to argue the 
 law as well as the facts to the jury in civil cases, subject to the 
 corrective power of the court in charging the jury and in grant- 
 ing new trials.^ The Supreme Court of Tennessee in upholding 
 the right to argue the law to the jury in criminal cases, over- 
 ruled the decision of a very able criminal judge. ^ The court 
 place^d its conclusion upon a principle thus expressed in its opin- 
 ion by Turney, J. : "It is impossible to understand how counsel 
 can make out a case from facts, while he is forbidden to state and 
 argue the law applicable to the facts. It requires both facts and 
 law to make a prosecution or defense in either civil or criminal 
 proceedings. Without facts there is no law to operate. To 
 hold that the facts shall be argued, but the law shall not be pre- 
 sented with these facts, is to deny the benefit of counsel. The 
 value of facts depends upon the law, and that governs them. No 
 lawyer can discuss propositions, except in a combination of facts 
 and law."* The leading case in support of this doctrine is a 
 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts^ in which 
 the subject was discussed in an ample manner and with great 
 
 the rule, that the jury are the judges stead of arguing it to the jury. See 
 
 of the coustitution as well as of auy also ou this question, Coinmouwealth 
 
 other part of the law, aud consequeutly v. Murpliy, 10 Gray (Mass.), 1. 
 
 may deterraiue the constitutionality of * Post, §2140. 
 
 a statute. Lynch v. State, 9 lud. 541. ^ Kobiusou v. Adkius, 19 Ga. 398, 
 
 In United States v. Riley, 5 Blatchf. 401. But query? Post, p. 1509. 
 
 (U. S.) 204, 207, Mr. District Judge » Judge Horrigan, of the Criminal 
 
 Shipnian held that it was uot error, in Coui't of Shelby County. 
 
 a criminal trial, to require counsel to "^ Hannah v. State, 74 Tenu. (11 
 
 argue the question of the constitu- Lea) 201. 
 
 tionality of the law to the court, in- .
 
 Tit. rV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law tg the jury. 723 
 
 ability by counsel, and considered in an important opinion of 
 Chief Justice Shaw. The court upheld the right of counsel in 
 criminal cases, to argue the law as well as the facts to the jury, 
 both upon principle and in view of the practice which had long 
 existed in that conlmon wealth. The question was reasoned with 
 the massive force which distinguish the opinions of that eminent 
 judge upon important questions. The decision is perhaps the 
 leading American judgment upon the question in what sense juries 
 are to be deemed judges of the law. Omitting those portions 
 of the opinion which deal with that question, and referring to 
 those portions which deal with the immediate question of the 
 right of counsel to argue the law to the jury, one or two extracts 
 will be given: "In thus conducting a jury trial in a criminal 
 case, with a view to the return of a general verdict, it is obvious 
 that the whole matter, of law as well as of fact, must be stated 
 and explained to the jury, so that they may fully understand and 
 apply it to the facts; because, as we have seen, in the form of a 
 general verdict, they are to declare the law as well as the fact. 
 For this purpose it must be necessary, and in our State it is the 
 usual practice, for the parties respectively, by their counsel, to 
 state the law to the jury, in the presence and subject to the ulti- 
 mate direction of the judge, because, unless the jury understand 
 the rule of law, with its exceptions, limitations and qualifications, 
 they cannot know how to apply the evidence, and determine the 
 truth of the material facts necessary to bring the case of the ac- 
 cused within it. In thus presenting their respective views of the 
 law to the jury under the direction of the court, for the better 
 information of both the judge and jury, great latitude has been 
 allowed in the practice of this commonwealth, and counsel have 
 been permitted to state and enforce their views of the law, es- 
 pecially in capital cases, by definitions and cases from such works 
 of established authority as the court may approve. In this great 
 latitude has been allowed, in tenderness to the accused, and a 
 liberal confidence reposed in counsel called to defend the accused 
 in the hour of his trial. But such an address, whether it be upon 
 the matter of fact or matter of law, and whether in fact it be 
 directed to the court or jury, is, in legal effect and actual oper-
 
 724 ARGUMENT OF COUNSELe [1 Tliomp. Ti',, 
 
 ation, an address to both ; not because they have not several duties 
 to perform and distinct questions to pass ui)on, but because it is 
 one trial, carried on at once before court and jury, in which the 
 judge must have a clear comprehension of the evidence conducing 
 to the jiroof of facts, which may or may not reiider the accused 
 amenable to the law, in order that he may give such directions in 
 matter of law as the state of the evidence may require; and the 
 jury must have a clear comprehension of the rules of law, in order 
 to determine whether the facts proved bring the accused within 
 them ; and because the minds of both judge and jury, acting 
 within their respective departments, must result in that general 
 verdict of acquittal or conviction Avhich is the proper determi- 
 nation of the cause. Considering the latitude which has been 
 allowed in this commonwealth by a long course of p.actice, and 
 the difficulty of drawing an exact line of distinction between that 
 full statement and exposition of his views of the law, which coun- 
 sel may properly make in a general address to the court and 
 jury, upon the questions embraced in the issue and involved in 
 the general verdict, and the address to the jury separately upon 
 questions of law, we are of opinion that a l)arty may, by his 
 counsel, address the jury upon questions Of law, subject to the 
 superintendence and controlling power of the court to decide 
 questions of law, by directions to the jury, which it is their dut}-- 
 to follow. In ordinary cases such directions to the jury, upon 
 questions arising in the cause, are not given until the parties, by 
 their counsel, have submitted their respective views of the law 
 and facts in an argument to the court and jury. * * * As 
 the jury have a legitimate power to return a general verdict, and 
 in that case must pass upon the whole issue, this court are of 
 opinion that the defendant has a right by himself or his counsel, 
 to address the jury, under the general sui)erintcndence of the 
 court, upon all the material questions involved in the issue, and, 
 to this extent and in this connection, to address the jury upon 
 such questions of law as come within the issue to be tried. Such 
 address to the jur}', upon questions of law embraced in the 
 issue, by the defendant or his counsel, is warranted by the
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 725 
 
 long practice of the courts in this commonwealth in criminal 
 cases." ^ 
 
 § 944. Arguing- Against the Law as Laid Down by the 
 Court. — If the court is the official mouthpiece of the law, and 
 if the jury are bound to receive and administer the law as laid 
 down by the court, it follows as a conclusion that counsel have 
 not the right to argue to the jury the law contrary to the views 
 expressed by the court. But if the jury are the judges of the 
 law, and if the views of the court upon questions of law are 
 merely advisory to the jury, which they are at liberty in their 
 discretion to disregard, then it would seem to follow that counsel 
 should be allowed to argue the law to the jury fully and freely, 
 and in order to argue it fully and freely, to argue it, if necessary, 
 contrary to the declarations of the court. Upon this question 
 there is fortunately not very much controversy. It is held in 
 the FederaP and in most of the State jurisdictions^ that counsel 
 
 ^ Comraouwealth v. Porter, 10 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 2(i3, 283, 287. What the 
 court distinctly ruled was, that the 
 trial court erred in interruptiu!.^ coun- 
 sel, and in prohibiting counsel from 
 arguing to tlie jury, before tlie court 
 liad delivered its charge to them, 
 propositions of law which were op- 
 posed to views of the law entertained 
 by the court. This case is therefore a 
 distinct authority, opposed to the 
 cases cited in the preceding paragraph, 
 which hold that counsel ought not to 
 be allowed to controvert, in argument 
 to the jury, the views which the court 
 has expressed concerning the law. 
 
 - United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 23, 48 (fugitive slave 
 case — able opinion by Mr. .Justice 
 Curtis) ; Comraouwealtli v. Zimmer- 
 man, 1 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 47; 
 United States v. Columbus, 5 Cranch 
 C. C. (U. S.) 304. Compare United 
 States V. Watliius, 3 Cranch C. C. 
 (U. S.) 443. 
 
 3 Dejaruette ?;. Commonwealth, 75 
 
 Va. 867, 882; Davenport v. Common- 
 wealth, 1 Leigh (Va.), 58.5, 597; Del- 
 aplaue v. Crenshaw, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 
 457, 481; Smith v. Morrison, 3 A. K. 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 81; Harrison v. Park, 1 
 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 170, 173; Edwards 
 V. State, 22 Ark. 253. Baltimore &c. 
 R. Co. V. Boyd (Md.), 7 Centr. Rep. 
 435, 438. See also Bell v. State, 57 
 Md. 120; Sowerwein v. Jones, 7 Gill & 
 J. (Md.) 335. Thus, tlie court has an 
 undoubted right to state to the jury 
 the legal effect of evidence which has 
 been introduced and submitted to their 
 consideration. McHenry v. Marr, 39 
 Md. 522; Wlieeler v. State, 42 Md. 
 570; post, § 2244. If counsel do not 
 except to such statements, they become 
 the law of the case. Hogan v. Hendry, 
 18 Md. 128; Davis v. Patton, 19 Md. 
 128; Dent v. Hancock, 5 Gill (Md.), 
 127; and, being the law of tiie case, 
 counsel are not at liberty to argue 
 against them. Bell v. State, 57 Md. 
 109, 120; Sowerwein v. Jones, 7 Gill & 
 J. (Md.) 341.
 
 726 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 have no right to argue to the jury propositions of law contrary 
 to those which have been hiid down by the court. The courts 
 which so hold proceed upon the view that to permit this to be 
 done would be contrary to the respect which the court owes to 
 itself, and that it would be a perversion of the law to allow an 
 ap[)eal from the court to the jury for the purpose of correcting 
 the errors of law committed by the court, instead of correcting 
 them by an appeal to the proj^er appellate tribunal provided by 
 the constitution and the laws for that pur})Ose. On the contrary, 
 in the most important American judgment which is to be found 
 upon the question of the power of juries to judge of the law as 
 w^ell as of the facts, it was distinctly ruled, in an opinion given 
 by Chief Justice Shaw, that the trial court committed error ni 
 interrupting the argument of counsel to the jury, and in prevent- 
 ing counsel from expressing to the jury views of the law contrary 
 to those entertained by the court. ^ In Indiana, where counsel 
 have the right to argue law to the jury, where it is sought to put 
 the trial court in error, for the reason that the counsel for the 
 accused was prohibited from commenting on instructions which 
 the court had announced its purpose to give, under the provisions 
 of a statute, it must appear icliat the comments loere which the 
 counsel desired to make.'^ 
 
 § 945. Right to Read Books of the Law to the Jury. — If 
 
 the right exists to argue the law of the case to the jury, it must 
 follow that the right exists to read })()oks of the law to them, as 
 authority and for illustration, in like manner as counsel would 
 do in arguing the law to the court. This right has accordingly 
 been upheld in those jurisdictions where the right to argue the 
 
 1 Commonwealth w. Porter, 10 Mete. See ahso Lynch x\ State, 9 lud. o41; 
 
 (Mass.) 2(;3, 283, 287. It is not un- White u. People, 90 111. 117. In Kansas, 
 
 derstood that counsel in this case at- counsel may argue against the court's 
 
 tempted to argue to the jury against instructions, in crimiual prosecutions 
 
 &i\y previous ruling ot the judge. He for libel. State u. Verry (Kau.), 13 Pac. 
 
 argued against the views of the judge. Rep. 838. 
 
 and was Interrupted, and it was held ^ Blizzard v. Applcgate, 77 Ind. 527, 
 
 that tlie judge luul uo right to do this. 572.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 727 
 
 law to the jury exists/ — those courts holding that a substantial 
 denial or deprivation of it is error for which a new trial will be 
 granted.^ Another view remits the question, almost entirely to 
 the discretion of the trial court. '^ 
 
 § 946. Court May Curtail this Right Within Reasonable 
 Limits. — It seems to be everywhere agreed that the court may 
 curtail this right within reasonable limits.* Accordingly the 
 trial court is not,oblio;ed to allow the readins; of numerous au- 
 thorities to the jury, or the unnecessary consumption of public 
 time in discussing to the jury such authorities, especially where 
 the court is familiar with them, and is prepared in its charge to 
 announce to the jury the propositions of law which they contain, 
 so far as applicable to the case on trial. ^ The refusal of the 
 trial court to allow the counsel of the accused to read to the jury 
 the whole of the statute upon one section of which the prosecu- 
 tion is founded, presents no question for review, if it appear that 
 counsel was allowed to read those parts of the statute which, in 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray of the trial judge, and one which will 
 (Mass.), 51; Jones ?7. State, (35 Ga. 506; not be revised on appeal, unless that 
 Johnson v. State, 59 Ga. 142; Lynch v. discretion has been clearly abused to 
 State, 9 lud. 541; Harvey v. State, 40 the prejudice of the appellantc Smith 
 lud. 516; Stout v. State, 96 Ind. 407 «. State, 21 Tex, App. 278,307; Wade 
 (overruling Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617, v. De Witt, 20 Tex. 398; Dempsey v. 
 and it seems Murphy v. State, 6 lud. State, 3 Tex. App. 429; Hinest;. State, 
 490). A qualified rule exists in 3 Tex. App. 483; Foster v. State, 8 
 Georgia, applicable to civil cases, to Tex. App. 249; Cross u. State, 11 Tex. 
 the effect that counsel may argue to App. 84; Lott v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 the jury their view of the law, or what 627. As to books of science, see posi, 
 they expect the court to charge as the § 995. 
 
 law subject tc the correction of the •* Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray 
 
 court. Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. (Mass.), 51; Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 
 
 351, 355. 490; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 10 
 
 2 McMath V. State, 55 Ga. 304; 308; Gray (Mass.), 1; Mayfleld v. Cotton, 
 Warmock r. State, 56 Ga. 503. 37 Tex. 229,232; Curtis v. State, 36 
 
 3 Thus, in Texas the rule is now Ark. 284, 292; Winkler v. State, 32 
 established by repeated decisions that Ark. 539 ; People v. Anderson, 44 Cal. 
 the extent to which counsel may read 65, 70. 
 
 ioi\\e\\\vyivombooksofthelai,oandof ^ Mayfleld v. Cotton, 37 Tex. 229, 
 
 science, as a part of their argument, is 232, 
 
 a, matter left largely to the discretion
 
 728 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 his opinion, affected the construction of that section, and to 
 comment to the jury upon the whole statute.^ Nor does the 
 trial court commit any abuse of discretion in refusing to permit 
 counsel to read to the jury legal authorities which have no per- 
 tinency to the facts of the case on trial.^ In Massachusetts, 
 where the right to argue the law to the jury is upheld, it has 
 been held, that the refusal of the presiding judge to allow the 
 counsel of the accused to read to the jury an adjudication of the 
 highest court of another IState, holding that a statute similar to 
 the one upon which the prosecution was founded was contrary 
 to the constitution of that State, presented no ground of excep- 
 tion. "This," said Chief Justice Shaw, "was a purely local 
 decision, on a different constitution and different statute, and 
 all merely local, of no force here. Without laying down any 
 general rule respecting the reading of books on a trial, the court 
 are of opinion that this was rightfully rejected." ^ 
 
 § 947. Counsel not Permitted to Read Law Books upon 
 Questions of Fact. — Counsel have no right, in argument, to in- 
 troduce any evidentiary matters to the jury which have not been 
 regularly offered and admitted in evidence, in presenting the 
 evidence in support of the action of the defense.* The toleration 
 
 1 Comraouwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray 
 (Mass.), 51. 
 
 ^ Curtis V. State, 36 Ark. 284; 292; 
 Winkler v. State, 32 Ark. 539. 
 
 3 Commonwealth v. Murphy,' 10 
 Gray (Mass.), 1. 
 
 * State V. Lee, 06 Mo. 165; State v. 
 Kring, 64 Mo. 591; Yoe v. People, 49 
 111.410,412; Kennies r. Vogel (111.), 
 7 Cent. L. J. 18; s. c. 87 111. 242; State 
 V. Smith, 75 N. C. 306; Mitchum v. 
 State, 11 Ga. G15, 633; Tucker ?;. Ilen- 
 niker, 41 N. II. 317; Hatch v. State, 8 
 Tex. App. 41(!, 423; Brown v. Swine- 
 ford, 44 Wis. 282, 293; Berry v. State, 
 10 Ga. 511, 522; Thompson v. State, 43 
 Tex. 268, 274; Fe.stner w. Omalia &c. 
 R. R. Co., 17 Neb. 280; Rolfe v. Rum- 
 
 ford, 66 Me. 564; Union Central Life 
 Ins. Co. V. Cheever, 36 Ohio St. 201, 
 208; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 573; Walker v. 
 State, 6 Blackf. (lud.) 2; Hoxie v. 
 Home Ins. Co., 33 Conn. 471; Bulloch 
 V. Smith, 15 Ga. 395; Dickersou v. 
 Burke, 25 Ga. 225; Doster v. Brown, 
 25 Ga. 24; Cook v. Ritter, 4 E. D. 
 Smith (N. Y.), 254; Loyd v. Hannibal 
 &c. R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 509; Bankard v. 
 Baltimore &c. R. R. Co., 34 Md. 197; 
 Saunders v. Baxter, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 369; Bill v. People, 14 III. 432; Jenkins 
 V. North Carolina Ore Dressing Co., 
 65 N. C. 563; State v. Williams, 65 N. 
 C. 505; Devrles v. Haywood, 63 N. C. 
 53; Gould v. Moore, 40 N. Y. Super. 
 (8 Jones &, S.) 387, 395; Northingtou
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 729 
 
 of such conduct on the part of the prosecuting counsel in a crim- 
 inal trial has been justly regarded as a substantial invasion of the 
 right of trial by jury, which is guaranteed to accused persons by 
 American constitutions.^ Applying these principles, it is held, 
 even in those jurisdictions where counsel are permitted to argue 
 the law to the jury, that they cannot be allowed, under pretense 
 of reading legal authorities to the jury, to read passages from 
 such books which bear upon questions of fact which are before 
 the jury for consideration, thus introducing to the minds of the 
 jurors evidentiary matters which have not been regularly ad- 
 mitted by the presiding judge. '^ Thus, where the question of 
 fact for decision was whether a ih^aft was presented for payment 
 within a rea-sonable time, it was held error to allow counsel to 
 read to the jury and to comment upon cases found in the books 
 of reports upon this subject.-^ So, where the case was a civil 
 action against a municipal corporation, for negligence in allow- 
 ing an obstruction in its highway, whereby the plaintiff had been 
 injured, it was error to allow the plaintiff's counsel, against the 
 objection of the defendant, to read extracts from reported cases 
 in which larije damao;es had been held not excessive.^ 
 
 § 948. Reading a Former Decision of the Supreme Court 
 in the Same Case. — It has been held upon the clearest grounds, 
 that counsel have no right, in arguing the cause to the jury, to 
 read to them a previous decisjon of the Supreme Court in the same 
 case,^ — the conclusion being that the court may, in its discre- 
 tion, reserve the opinion of the Supreme Court for its own guid- 
 
 V. State, 78 Temi. (U Lea) 424; Flint 414; Baldwin's Appeal, 44 Couu. .37. 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 18(1; SuUi- Compare Warren v. Wallis, 42 Tex. 
 
 van V. State, 66 Ala. 48; Grosse v. 472. 
 
 State, 11 Tex. App. 364, 367; Brown v. ^ Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 
 
 State, 60 Ga. 210, 212; Buliner v. Peo- 501, 512. 
 
 pie, 95 111. 396. < Evansville v. Wilter, 86 Ind. 414. 
 
 1 Tnckeru. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317, s Good v. Mylin, 13 Pa. St. 538 
 324; Mitchnra ?;. State, 11 Ga. 615, 633.. (overruling Noble v. McClintock, 6 
 
 2 Dempsey v. State, 3 Tex. App. Watts & S. (Pa.) 58) : Dempsey u. State, 
 429; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 3 Tex. App. 429. Compare Warren u. 
 501, 512; Evansville v. Wilter, 86 Ind. Wallis, 42 Tex. 472.
 
 730 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoill}). Tl'., 
 
 ance in instructing the jury. But in a State where the right to 
 argue questions of hiw to the jury is uphekl, on the ground that 
 the jury are judges of the hiw as well as of the facts, it has been 
 held no ground for a new trial that the prosecuting attorney, in 
 a criminal case, in his closing argument to the jury, read to them 
 a previous decision of the Su})reme Court. ^ 
 
 § 949. Reading- or Stating Good Law to the Jury. — Under 
 any theory of this question, it is obvious that, if the court allow 
 counsel to argue the law to the jury, and to read to them from 
 books of the law, there will be no ground for a new trial if the 
 passages which the counsel read are good law, applicable to the 
 case before the jury, and contain no matter having a tendency to 
 prejudice their minds in the decision of the case. Thus, in a 
 criminal trial in Georgia, the counsel for the State read to the 
 jury from a book of the law the following passage: ^^ Alibi, as a 
 defense, involves the impossibility of the prisoner's presence at 
 the scene of the offense at the time of its commission; and the 
 range of the evidence, in respect to time and place, nmst be such 
 as to reasonably exclude the possibility of such presence." The 
 Supreme Court of Georgia had previously held that this was the 
 law, 2 and the trial court so charged the jury. It was held that 
 no ground was presented for a new trial. -^ 
 
 § 950. Stating Bad Law to the Jury. — On a criminal trial, 
 in a State where the instructions of the court precede the argu- 
 ment of counsel, where the court failed to instruct the jury upon 
 a material point, and the prosecuting attorney, in his closing 
 argument, took it upon himself to sui)ply the omission, and, in 
 so doing, stated the law in a manner prejudicial to the prisoner, 
 it was held that the judgment must be reversed.* So, where, in 
 his closing argument to the jury, the prosecuting attorney told 
 them that, where the charge was murder in the first dcirree, the 
 defense of insanity admitted that the charge was proved, and the 
 court refused, on tlie defendant's motion, to require him to with- 
 
 1 Stout V. state, Of) Iiid. 407. » .Toliuson v. State, TjO Ga. 142. 
 
 2 Wade V. State, <;5 Ga. rr.O, 7.59. ♦ State v. Keed, 71 Mo. 200.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 731 
 
 draw the remark, it was held that this was error for which the 
 judgment must be reversed.^ But it was not error to refuse a 
 new trial, in a criminal case, because the prosecuting attorney 
 stated to the jury, in argument, a proposition of law which, though 
 erroneous, could have no bearing upon the question of the guilt 
 or innocence of the accused, and hence no effect on their verdict. ^ 
 
 § 951. [Conclusiou.] Discretion, Cautions, Instructions. — 
 
 A just conclusion seems to be that, in those jurisdictions where 
 the practice of the English courts of law is followed, under 
 which counsel make their arguments to the jur}^ before the 
 charge of the court is given, counsel must be permitted, within 
 reasonable limits, to state and to argue their views and theories 
 of the law applicable to the case ; that in every such argument it 
 is necessary to the full presentation of the view upon which the 
 prosecution or the defense rests, that a state of the law applica- 
 ble to the facts should be assumed to exist, for which reason 
 counsel must be permitted, in the very nature of things, to ad- 
 dress the jury upon the whole case, both upon the law and the 
 facts. But while this is so, counsel ought not to be permitted 
 to argue to the jur}^ against ^propositions of law which have been 
 decided by the court in the particular case, thus presenting the 
 unseemly and indecent spectacle of an attempt to appeal from 
 the judge, who is learned in the law and who is the official mouth- 
 piece of the law, to the jury, who are unlearned in the law, and 
 who are not judges of the law except in the limited sense hereafter 
 stated.^ It seems reasonably to follow that, in order to allow the 
 proper freedom of argument, the court should not interrupt or 
 check counsel — especially the counsel for the prisoner — in 
 stating or enforcing propositions or conclusions of law which 
 may be contrary to the views of the court j unless the conduct 
 of counsel involves a flagrant and willful attempt to misstate the 
 essential law of the case and to mislead the minds of the jury in 
 respect of it, and unless counsel should deliberately assail or 
 impugn propositions of law which the court has already decided 
 
 » state V. Erb, 9 Mo. App. 588. 3 post, § 2132, et seg. 
 
 2 State V. Dibble, C. Mo. App. 584.
 
 732 ARGU3IENT OF COUNSEL. [I Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 in the case ; ^ but that the court should, iu ordinary cases, reserve 
 the correction of erroneous statements of the hiw made by coun- 
 sel to the jury, to be made in its general charge. In those juris- 
 dictions where the charge of the court precedes the argument of 
 counsel, the counsel should be confined, in their argument from 
 legal premises, to the propositions of law embodied in the court's 
 instructions, and the practice of reading books of the law to the 
 jury ought not to be tolerated, especially where the attempt in- 
 volves an effort to induce the jury to disregard the court's 
 instructions, or to take the law of the case from the books rather 
 than from the court.-' If, in reading from books of the law to 
 the jury, counsel read passages which are evidentiary in their 
 nature, the court should, so far as possible, correct the error and 
 remove the prejudice, by instructing the jury that such passages 
 are not to be regarded as evidence in the case.^ The court ought 
 further, in instructing the jury, to disabuse their minds of any 
 notion which they may have received from the argument of 
 counsel, that, in their olEce of judges of the law, they have a right 
 to set aside the law, or to refuse to apply the law as expounded 
 to them by the court. ^ Finally, it may be doubted whether 
 
 1 People V. Anclersou, 44 Cal. Go, from works of romance." Jones v. 
 70. State, 65 Ga. 506. 
 
 2 People V. Anderson, supra; State ■* On this point, the charge of Mr. 
 V. Reed, 71 Mo. 200; State v. Erb, 9 Jnstice Baldwin, in United States v. 
 Mo. App. 588. Wilson, Bald. (U. S.) 78, 108; that of 
 
 2 Harvey v. State, 40 lud. 515. Mr. Chief Justice Jay, in State of 
 
 Contrary to this view, it was held, in Georgia v. Braisford, 3 Dallas (U. S.), 
 
 a criminal trial in Georgia, where conn- 1,4; that of Mr. President Addison, 
 
 sel for the defendant had read to tlie in Pennsylvania v. Bell, Add. (Pa.) 
 
 jury in his argument, passages from 156, 160; that of Mr. Justice Story, in 
 
 Phillipps' Remarliuble Cases of Cir- United States u. Batti.><te, 2 Suran. 
 
 cumstautial Evidence, that if the (U. S.) 240, 243, may be referred to as 
 
 judge had reason to believe that the fair models of cautionary instructions, 
 
 jury were likely, from any cause, to be See also and compai'e Hamilton v. 
 
 misled thereby, it would have been his People, 29 Mich. 173,189; Warren v. 
 
 duty to state to them what evidence State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 150; Townsend 
 
 was to influence them in arriving at v. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 151; State v. 
 
 their verdict; but that it was error to Snow, 18 Me. 346, 348; Lynch v. State, 
 
 instruct them that they " must not l)e 9 Ind. 541 (where the court approved 
 
 influenced, guided by or accept as law tlie instructions given on this point in 
 
 iu this case, any imaginary cases taken Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, and
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXIX.] QUESTIONS of law to the jury. 733 
 
 there is any sounder view of the question of the right to argue 
 the law to the jury and to read to them passages from books of 
 the law, than that which commits the whole subject to the sound 
 discretion of the trial court, subject to the corrective power of 
 the appellate courts in cases of abuse. ^ 
 
 doubted whether the instructiou iu v. Cotton, 37 Tex. 229, 232; Common- 
 Carter V. State, 2 lud. 617, could be wealth v. Austin, 7 Gray (Mass.), 51; 
 sustained). Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490; Good v. 
 
 1 Curtis V. State, 36 Ark. 284, 292; Mylin, 13 Pa. St. 538. 
 Winkler i). State, 32 Ark. 539 ; Maytield
 
 734 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiup. Tl*. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXX. 
 
 ABUSES OF THE RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 
 
 Section 
 
 955. Duty of Judge to Prevent Abuses of the Right. 
 
 956. To Correct Misrepresentations of Counsel. 
 
 957. Duty of Counsel to Object to Improper Argument. 
 
 958. Duty of Presiding Judge to Rebuke Misconduct. 
 
 959. [Illustration.] Checking Appeals to the Sympathy of the Jurors. 
 
 960. What will Cure the Prejudice. 
 
 961. [Illustration.] Correcting the Prejudicial Remarks by an Instruction. 
 
 962. Question how Saved for Review. 
 
 963. Stating to the Jury Prejudicial Facts which are not in Evidence. 
 
 964. Limits within which the Rulings of the Trial Court will be Controlled. 
 
 965. Observations on the Limit allowed to Argument. 
 
 966. Instances of reversals under the Last Preceding Rule. 
 
 967. [Continued.] Doctrine as restated by the Supreme Court of Alabama. 
 
 968. [Continued.] Doctrine restated in Texas. 
 
 969. Commenting on Evidence which has been Excluded. 
 
 970. Commenting on the Defendant's Character, Evidence as to which has 
 
 been Excluded. 
 
 971. Comments not Supported by Evidence, on the Character and Credibility 
 
 of Witnesses. 
 
 972. Expressing Belief in Guilt or Innocence. 
 
 973. Alluding to former Trials of same Case. 
 
 974. Appealing to Local Prejudices. 
 
 975. Appealing to Religious Prejudices. 
 
 976. A Catalogue of Prejudicial Statements. 
 
 977. Referring to Recent Crimes, Lax Administration of Law, etc. 
 
 978. Indulgence Extended to Extravagant Declamation, Exaggeration, Er- 
 
 roneous Statements of the Evidence. 
 
 979. Illustrations. 
 
 980. And to the Use of Epithets. 
 
 981. Appeals to Sympathy — the Widow in Tears. 
 
 982. Tricks of Advocacy, Sidebar Remarks, etc. 
 
 983. Bad Logic and Bad Law. 
 
 984. Other Statements which have been Excused rather than Justified. 
 
 985. Transgressions in Criminal Cases wliich have been Overlooked. 
 
 986. Prejudice not Cured by similar Misconduct in the Opposing Counsel. 
 
 987. Illegitimate Argument first Introduced by Opposing Counsel. 
 
 988. Illustration. 
 
 989. Matters which have been held fair Subjects of Comment.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 735 
 
 Section 
 
 990. Reading Documentary Evidence to tlie Jury. 
 
 991. Reading fromtlie Notes of tlie Official Stenographer. 
 
 992. Use of Papers, Maps, Diagrams, etc., whicliare not in Evidence. 
 
 993. Referring to Failure of the Opposite Party in a Civil Case to Testify. 
 
 994. Reading Newspapers to the Jury. 
 
 995. Reading Books of Science to the Jury. 
 99i5. That such Books are not Evidence. 
 
 997. Instances Affirming and Disaffirming the foregoing Rule. 
 
 998. Whether such Books may be read for Purposes of Argument or Illus- 
 
 tration. 
 
 999. Instructing the Jury that such Books are not Evidence. 
 
 1000. Illustrations. 
 
 1001. Referring to the Failure of Prisoner to Testify in his own Behalf. 
 
 1002. Instances under the foregoing Rule. 
 
 1003. Comments by the Author on the foregoing Rule. 
 
 1004. Commenting on Failure to call Prisoner's Wife as a Witness. 
 
 1005. Prisoner's Counsel may Enlarge on the Prisoner's Right to be Silent. 
 1001). Illustration of the Foregoing. 
 
 1007. Commenting on the Difference between Original and Amended Pleadings. 
 
 1008. Suffering the Audience to App laud the State's Counsel. 
 
 1009. Civil Responsibility for Words Spoken in Forensic Debate. 
 
 1010. Who entitled to be heard as Counsel. 
 
 § 955. Duty of Judge to Prevent Abuses of this Right. — 
 
 The right of argument, as seen in a former chapter,^ is a vakiable 
 right, secured to every suitor by the principles of Anglo-Ameri- 
 can law, which are embodied in American constitutions. But 
 the right has its limits. The judge has power to see that it is 
 not abused, and may, to this end, exercise a reasonable control 
 over the course of the argument. ^ To this end it is his duty to 
 remain on the bench during the argument to the jury; and if he 
 vacate the bench, and, while he is absent, counsel, in arguing their 
 client's cause to the jury, overstep the limits of privilege accorded 
 to advocacy, to the manifest prejudice of the opposite party, a 
 new trial will be ordered by an appellate court, in the exercise of 
 a proper superintendence.-^ The presiding judge is not a mere 
 nose of wax; nor is he a mere umpire in a gladiatorial contest; 
 
 1 jK^e, ch. XXVIII. Iowa as already seen (an«e, § 829), a 
 
 2 Word V. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh statute prohibiting the curtailment of 
 (Va.), 743, 760. the firae of argument to the jury has 
 
 3 Browulee v. Hewitt, 1 ]Mo. App. enforced a change of rule in this re- 
 360; State v. Claudius, Id. 551. In spect. In Connecticut it has beeu
 
 736 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 nor is it merely his office to keep the peace in the court-room 
 while the advocates and the jurors try the case. He not only 
 checks abuses of the privilege of argument, but he decides, in cases 
 of dispute, what evidence has been admitted.^ In those jurisdic- 
 tions where the instructions precede the argument, it is his duty to 
 interpose and restrain counsel who is indulging in arguments and 
 illustrations before the jury, which are unwarranted by the instruc- 
 tions of the court, and which will, if unrestrained, be likely to mis- 
 lead the jury; and it has been well said that " no duty incumbent 
 upon the judge of a trial court is more imperative, nor more im- 
 portant to the fair and orderly administration of justice, than 
 that of interposing to restrain everything in the course of the 
 trial that tends to mislead the jury, and to divert their minds 
 from the strict line of inquiry with which they are charged." ^ 
 
 § 956. To Correct Misrepresentations of Counsel as to the 
 Facts. — It has been said in Georgia: " Itis certainly the business of 
 the court, when practicable, to correct the misrepresentations of the tes- 
 timony by counsel, particularly when that counsel is in conclusion. 
 And it is practicable, when the witness whose evidence is charged to be 
 misrepresented, is in court. He ought to be called to say what he did 
 testify. And it is practicable in cases in which, like this, the law requires 
 the testimony to be taken down, by reference to the brief. We differ 
 with the judge in his opinion that the brief of the testimony taken down, 
 incases of felony, is but a memorandum for his private use. It is taken 
 for the use of the reprieving and pardoning power, primarily no doubt ; 
 and we see no objection, where the witness is not at hand, to its be- 
 ing used to correct a misrepresentation on the argument. Its verity is 
 presumed, because it is taken under as serious sanctions as any act is 
 done by the court or its authority in tlie progress of the trial. It is 
 
 ruled that, while it is the duty of the maiued all the time where he could hear 
 
 judge, presiding at a crimiual trial, to what was said, the door beiug appar- 
 
 be present duriug the whole of the ar- eutly opeu, so that he could also see 
 
 guraent, so that he can see and hear all what was done. State v. Smith, 49 
 
 that is done and said, yet it has been Conn. 37fi, 383. 
 
 held not such au irregularity as would i Davis v. Ilill, 75 N. C. 224, 228; 
 
 require a uew trial, that, for a few mo- Long v. State, 12 Ga. 205, 330. 
 meuts during the argumeut of such a '^ Baltimore & Oh. li. Co. v. Boyd 
 
 case, he went into the retiring room (Md.), 10 Atl. Rep. 315; s. c. 7 Cent. 
 
 Immediately behind the bench, but re- Rep. 435.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 737 
 
 made the duty of the judge to take or cause it to be taken down, and in 
 the event of a conviction and sentence, it is required to be approved by 
 the court and recorded, and upon application for reprieve or pardon, a 
 certified copy of it must accompany the application." The court con- 
 cluded that the refusal of the trial court to have the testimony of a 
 particular witness set right, either by calling the witness again or by re- 
 ferring to the brief, though not error, was an irregularity.^ In another 
 case it is said : " The jury can consider the weight and effect of that ev- 
 idence only, which has been allowed by the court to go to them. In 
 cases where the court is not distinct in his recollection of the testi- 
 mony, he may, and it is generally advisable, to refer it to the jury for 
 their better recollection. If they have doubts as to the precise terms 
 of the testimony, the court will, at their suggestion, have the witness re- 
 called and re-examined on the doubtful point." ^ 
 
 § 957. Duty of Counsel to Object to Improper Argu- 
 ment. — In the discharge of this office, as of every other, the 
 })residing judge is entitled to reasonable aid from the counsel in 
 the case on trial, or from the parties themselves, where they ap- 
 })ear in proper person. Where counsel, in arguing to the jury, 
 exceed the limits allowed to advocacy, the way to correct the 
 prejudicial effect of the argument is either to object to it at the 
 time, to answer it by counter argument, or to ask suitable in- 
 structions to the jury with reference to it.^ After verdict it 
 comes too late ; ^ and whether the objection is saved for review 
 by affidavit, or by a recital in a bill of exceptions (according to 
 the practice in the particular jurisdiction ), it is equally necessary 
 that the record should show that the objection was made at the 
 time of the misconduct.'^ Where such an objection is thus sea- 
 
 1 Long V. State, 12 Ga. 295, 330, 3(!8; Learned v. Hall, supra; Dowdell 
 opinion by Nisbet, J. v. Wilcox, 64 Iowa, 721, 724; States. 
 
 2 Davis V. Hill, 75 N. C. 224, 228. Degonia, 69 Mo. 486; Barbour v. Mc- 
 
 3 Learned v. Hall, 133 Ma.'^.s. 417, Kee, 7 Mo. App. 587; State v. Forsythe 
 419; Turner v. State, 68Tenn. (4 Lea) (Mo.), 6 "West. Rep. 488. It is scarcely 
 L'06; Roeder v. Studt, 12 Mo. App. necessary to add that such objections 
 5116; Rudolphs. Laudwerleu, 92 Ind. Avill not be available when made for 
 ;'>4, 37; Earll v. People, 99 111. 123; the first time in an appellate court. 
 .Jackson v. State, 18 Tex. App. 586; State r. Pollard, 14 Mo. App. 583. 
 infra, § 961. ^ Dowdell v. Wilcox, siq)ra. 
 
 ■* Powers V. Mitchell, 77 Me 361,
 
 738 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoilip. Tr.y 
 
 sonably made, if counsel at once desist from the improper line 
 of argument, there is, as a general rule, no available error; nor 
 can error be predicated upon the silence of the court, where there 
 is no request for an admonition to the jiiry not to be intiuenced 
 by the statement.^ 
 
 1 Worleyw. Moore, 97 Ind. 15; re- 
 affirmed and applied in Carter v. Car- 
 ter, 101 lud. 451. To the foregoing 
 rule of procedure au exception must be 
 noted in Texas. Tlie rules prescribed 
 in tliat State for tlie goverument of 
 procedure in tlie District Court recite 
 that " counsel shall be required to 
 confine argument strictly to the evi- 
 dence and to the argument of opposing 
 counsel," and tliat "the court will 
 not be required to wait for objections 
 to be made when the rules as to argu- 
 ment are violated; but should they 
 not be noticed and corrected by the 
 court, opposing counsel may ask leave 
 of the court to rise and present his 
 point of objection." Tex. Rules, 39, 
 41. By another rule it is provided 
 that any supposed violation of the 
 rules, to the prejudice of a party, may 
 be saved by bill of exceptions, pre- 
 sented as ground for a new trial, and 
 assigned as error by the party who 
 may have conceived himself aggrieved 
 by such supposed violation. Id., Rule 
 121. " Under these rules," the Su- 
 preme Court of Texas say, "the duty 
 devolves affirmatively, first, upon the 
 counsel, to confine the argument 
 strictly to the evidence and to the ar- 
 gument of opposing counsel; second, 
 upon the court, upon its own mo- 
 tion, to confine counsel to this line 
 of argument. If botli the counsel 
 who is making the argumeut and 
 the court shall fail in the discharge 
 of this duty, then the rules give 
 to opposing counsel the privilege, 
 but do not make it his duty, to then 
 present his point of objection. This 
 
 discretion given to counsel, as to 
 whether he will make objection at the 
 time, was doubtless based upon the 
 well known embarrassments and often 
 prejudice which generally attend the 
 interruption of the argument of one 
 counsel by another; and was intended 
 to place that as a duty where it prop- 
 erly belongs — upon the presiding 
 judge. Whether counsel, under such 
 circumstances, remain silent or object, 
 may be alike prejudicial to his cause. 
 Silence maybe construed into acquies- 
 cence; objection may call forth a 
 damaging repartee." Willis v. Mc- 
 Neill, 57 Tex. 465, 474, 475. In an 
 important case in Georgia it was ruled, 
 according to the official syllabus, 
 drawn, it is understood, by the judge 
 who wrote the opinion, that for coun- 
 sel to attempt surreptitiously to get 
 before the jury facts, by way of sup- 
 position, which have not been proved, 
 is highly reprehensible; and that the 
 attempt should be instantly repressed 
 by the court, without waiting to be 
 called upon by the opposite party. 
 The statement, however, is to be re- 
 garded rather as a dictum of the judge 
 than as a decision of the court; since, 
 although the State's counsel was guilty 
 of the misconduct, the prisoner was 
 not for that rea>on allowed a new trial. 
 In glviug the opinion of the court on 
 this point, Lumpkin, J., said: "That 
 the practice complained of is highly 
 reprehensible, no one can doubt. It 
 ought in every instance to be promptly 
 repressed. For counsel to undertake 
 by a side wind to get that in as proof 
 which is merely conjecture, and thus
 
 Tit. iV^, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 739 
 
 § 958. Duty of Presiding- Judge to Rebuke tlie Miscon- 
 duct. — All courts agree that it is the duty of the presiding 
 judge, either of his own motion ^ or upon the request of the op- 
 posing party or his counsel,^ to interpose and check the party or 
 his counsel in an improper and prejudicial line of argument.^ It 
 is the duty of the trial judge thus to interpose for the purpose of 
 repressing needless scandal and gratuitous attacks upon private 
 character. This duty is a very plain one, and good care should 
 be taken to discharge it fully and faithfully.^ It is equally the 
 duty of the court, when thus appealed to, to prevent counsel in 
 argument from misstating the testimony of a witness ; but where, 
 in consequence of a disagreement as to his testimony, the witness 
 has been recalled and has restated it, and his restatement has 
 been written down, the judge may properly refuse to allow coun- 
 sel to argue to the jury that the witness, when thus recalled, 
 made a different statement from that read to the jury by the 
 court. ^ Here, as in other matters relating to the conduct of 
 trials, a very large discretion is conceded to the presiding judge.^ 
 
 to work a prejudice in the mind of the ^ jjoxie v. Home Ins. Co., 33 Conn, 
 
 jury, cannot l)e tolerated. Nor ought 471; Fry i\ Bennett, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 
 
 the presiding judge to wait until he is 200, 2i2. 
 
 called upon to Interpose. For it is ^ Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; 
 usually better to trust to the discrira- Bulloch «. Smith, 15 Ga. 395; Mitchum 
 inatiou of the jury as to what is and v. State, 11 Ga. 615; Dickerson v. 
 what is not in evidence, than for the Burke, 25 Ga. 225; Read v. State, 2 
 opposite counsel to move in the matter. Ind. 438; Forsyth v. Cothran, 61 Ga. 
 For what practitioner has not re- 278; Davis v. Hill, 75 N. C. 224; 
 gretted his untoward interference, State v. Caveness, 78 N. C. 484, 488 ; 
 when counsel, thus interrupted, re- Clark v. Lowell, 1 Allen (Mass.), 180. 
 sumes, ' Yes, gentlemen, I have It is said that '^ it is within the prov- 
 touched a tender spot; the galled jade iuce, and it is the duty of the court to 
 will wince. You see where the shoe disentangle the case from any mistakes 
 pinches.' " Berry v. State, 10 Ga. made by counsel in the statement of 
 511, 522. These observations were testimony, and for this purpose to re- 
 quoted, and the rule therein expressed state and comment upon the testi- 
 approved by the Supreme Court of mony," Read i\ State, 2 Ind. 438; 
 Texas, in Willis v. NcNeill, supra. citing Swan Prac. 910. 
 
 1 Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511; For- •» Rickabus v. Gott, 51 Mich. 227. 
 
 syth V. Cothran, 61 Ga. 278; Willis v. ^ Davis v. Hill, 75 N. C. 224. 
 
 McXeill, 57 Tex. 465, 474; Earll v. ^ j^ j^^s been held that where 
 
 People, 99 111. 123; Brown v. Swine- counsel properly interrupt the argu- 
 
 ford, 44 Wis. 282. raent of the opposing counsel to cor-
 
 740 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 It has been held that it is within the limits of this discretion for 
 the judo:e to determine whether he will stop counsel at the time, 
 or wait and correct the error in his charge to the jury; although 
 where the abuse of privilege by the counsel has been gross and 
 manifestly prejudicial, the failure of the trial court to stop him 
 then and there will afford just ground for a new Irial.^ Although 
 the court may not, in general, be bound thus to interfere unless 
 appealed to, yet, when appealed to, the duty to interfere in some 
 way is imperative, either by stopping counsel or by correcting 
 the abuse in the court's instructions; since, if this is not done, 
 the jury are, in effect, given to understand that the court is of 
 opinion that they are allowed to take into consideration the 
 erroneous or prejudicial statement thus made.^ On the other 
 hand, unless the trial judge, on being thus appealed to, fails or 
 refuses to interfere and to administer the proper rebuke or cor- 
 rection, no ground is afforded for a new trial ; ^ though it is not 
 error for the court to grant a new trial of its own motion be- 
 cause of such abuse, even though a seasonable objection may not 
 have been interposed by the opposing counsel. The granting of 
 a new trial for such a cause will be within the limits of the dis- 
 cretion of the trial court.* 
 
 rect an erroneous statement of fact, ^ Jenkinson v. North Carolina Ore 
 
 and a paper, not at hand, is needed to Dressing Co., 65 N. C. 563. 
 settle the point in dispute, the court is ^ Hoxie v. Home lus. Co., 33 Conn, 
 
 not bound to allow time to search for 471. 
 
 the disputed paper; and where coun- ^ states. Lee, 66 Mo. 165; State v. 
 
 sel having the floor exclaimed, upon Degouia, 69 Mo. 486; States. Schorn, 
 
 such an interruption (in a way too f re- 12 Mo. App. 590; States. Emory, 12 
 
 quently practiced), '• The shoe pinch- Mo. App. 593; s. c. affirmed, 79 Mo. 
 
 es!" and the interrupting counsel 461; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; 
 
 complained of this as improper, and State v. Zumbunsou, cited in 79 Mo. 
 
 subsequently showed, by producing 463; State ex rel. v. Stark, 10 Mo. 
 
 the lost paper, that the statement App. 5i»l; Goldman v. AVolff, 6 I\Io. 
 
 which gave occasion to the interrnp- App. 491; Klosterman v. Germauia 
 
 tion was in fact erroneous — it was Life Ins. Co., 6 Mo. App. 582; St. 
 
 held no ground of error that the court Louis &c. K. Co. «. Myrtle, 51 Ind. 
 
 answered, " Well, you have now stated 56(i, 576. Compare State v. Kring, 64 
 
 it in your way; he has passed from it. Mo. 591, 595. 
 
 let the argument go on." McLeudou * Kinuaman v. Kiunamau, 71 Ind. 
 
 V. Frost, 57 Ga. 449. 417, 420.
 
 Tit. IV, Cb. XXX. ] ABUSES OF UW.HT OF ARGUMENT. 741 
 
 § 959. [Illustration.] Checivin;. Appeals to the Syjipathies of 
 THE Jurors. — Where, in a case of arson, counsel for the prisoners, in 
 argument, pressed upon the jury the consideration that the conseqnence 
 of (heir verdict, if guilty, would be that the prisoners would be hanged, 
 and the court cliecked the counsel and admonished the jury that they had 
 nothing whatever to do with the conseqences of their verdict, but that 
 their sole duty was to determine whetlier the prisoners were guilty or not 
 guilty, —it was held that no error was committed. "This," said 
 the court, " is quite common in cases of this character, and we cannot say 
 that It IS improper." The court did not regard it as a deprivation of the 
 right of the jury to consider anything but the naked fact of the burniug.i 
 
 § 960. AVhat will Cure the Prejudice. — An objection by tbe 
 opposing counsel, promptly interposed, followed by a rebuke 
 from the bench and an admonition from the presiding judge to 
 the jury to disregard the prejudicial statements, is genemlly, 
 though not always, held sufficient to cure the prejudice.^ The 
 same result would, in most cases, follow a prompt and ample 
 apology by the offending counsel ; but it has been held in differ- 
 ent jurisdictions that such a prejudice is not cured by the churlish 
 form of apology which is involved in the expression that 
 counsel will " take it back.'"3 other courts have conceived that 
 the prejudice is sufficiently cured where the presiding judo-e waits 
 until he comes to charge the jury, and then admonishes Ihem to 
 disregard such considerations as those which have been improp- 
 erly pressed upon their minds by the counsel in the argument * 
 The rule that the effect of a prejudicial line of argument may be 
 cured m this way has been applied in a flagrant case, where the 
 argument was unprofessional and where the prejudice must have 
 been serious.^ Another court has gone so far as to suppose that 
 the practice of curing the prejudice by an admonition in the 
 charge of the judge is - perhaps the most proper way," «_a con- 
 
 ^^ > state V. Dodsoii, U So. Car. 453, 324; State v. O'Neal, 7 Ired. (N. C.) L. 
 
 \"^. ^ „■ „ -51; Melviuy. Easley, IJoiies (N. C), 
 
 - btate y. Braswell, 82 N. C. 693. L. 38(1 
 
 UH. Wnf^ " \r'"-""' ,''' ^''- '''' ' ^'^ '''''' '''^'''''' *« '« 'Stated in 
 
 148 ; Wolffe v. Mnuiis, 74 Ala. 38(;. the next section. 
 
 ooo ^n ';.^'""'"' i''""^'- ^''- ^^-^ ' «*^^^ "• O'^^-^-^l' - Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 200,210, 243; s. c. affirmed, 2S N. Y. 251.
 
 742 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 elusion from which the experience of most judges and practition- 
 ers will cause dissent. This conclusion has been denied in a case 
 in Wisconsin, where this subject is ably reasoned. The court, 
 speaking through Eyan, C. J., said: " Verdicts are too often 
 found ao-ainst evidence and without evidence, to warrant so great 
 a reliance on the discrimination of juries; and without notes of 
 the evidence, it will be often difficult for juries to discriminate 
 ao"ainst statements of facts within the evidence and outside of it. 
 It is sufficient that the extra-professional statements of counsel 
 may gravely prejudice the jury and affect the verdict." ^ On the 
 other hand, the fact that the trial judge neglected to rebuke the 
 impropriety will, in the view of many courts, be no ground of new 
 trial, if the case was otherwise well tried, and it appears that, 
 under the law and the evidence, no other result than a conviction 
 was possible without a misbehavior of the jury.^ 
 
 § 961. [Illustration.] Correcting the Prejudicial Remarks by 
 AN Instruction. — The view that the prejudicial remarks may be suf- 
 ficiently corrected by an admonition from the judge in his general in- 
 structions finds support in a celebrated case in New York, which was an 
 action for libel against James Gordon Bennett, the proprietor of the New 
 York Herald. Counsel for plaintiff, in his concluding argument to the 
 jury, among other things, said: " The Herald by-and-by began to find 
 that it could not live with6ut doing something to attract public atten- 
 tion ; and, about the days of Ellen Jevvett, it came out as one of the most 
 infamous sheets that ever existed since man was allowed by the Almighty 
 to handle a pen." The counsel for the defendant thereupon objected, 
 on the ground that no evidence had been given in relation to this mat- 
 ter. The court replied : " He is drawing upon his imagination." The 
 plaintiff's counsel then said: " My learned friend does not discriminate 
 as to what we are at liberty to take notice of. I should like to know if 
 we are bound to prove everything we talk about? Then I should be in 
 danger for saying that it is daylight now. I am speaking of the public 
 history of the time, as I would of the Mexican war, or the reign of Vic- 
 toria ; and if it became necessary to talk about it, it would be perfectly 
 ridiculous to prove the reign of James I. It is a thing received by all 
 
 1 Browu V. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 2 state v. Zumbimsoii, 7 ]\Io. App. 
 
 292. 52G; s. c. affirmed, St; Mo. 111.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 743 
 
 mankind, and that portion which comes within the range of the fact I 
 have a right to talk about. I suppose the gentleman knows that I have 
 aright to talk about Bennett still publishing the Herald,, without having 
 proved it by evidence ; or of other papers, such as the Courier or En- 
 quirer ox Evening Post. Now, Bennett comes up ; I do not ask j^ou to 
 notice a single fact in relation to that paper, otherwise than as a part of 
 the general history of the country ; and so far as I know, the court will 
 agree with me so far as this, that that which constitutes a part of the 
 public histor\^ of the country is what we are at liberty to take notice of." 
 The counsel for the defendant responded : " The learned counsel claims, 
 as matter of law, that, he has a right to refer to the articles in the 
 Herald as part of the history of the country. I desire the court to say 
 that it is not so." The court responded : "I will say to the jury what- 
 ever is proper to be said at the end of the matter." Counsel for the 
 defendant replied: " I except to the refusal of the court now to stop 
 the counsel." It did not appear that the plaintiff's counsel subsequently 
 made any remarks in which he should not have been permitted to indulge. 
 The court, in charging the jury, used the followinglanguage: " Taking 
 all these things into view, if you find for the plaintiff in this matter, you 
 will assess these damages, taking constantly into view the application of 
 this principle, and leaving out of view anything growing out of what has 
 been said as to the character of his newspaper, about which there is no 
 evidence before us any more than that the paper forms the libel, and 
 divesting yourselves of all feeling of that kind, then say, in the exercise 
 of a sound discretion, what damages ought to be assessed." It was 
 held that the above ruling presented no reason for granting a new trial.i 
 
 § 962, Question, How Saved for Review. — There is a con- 
 fusion, not very creditable to the courts, upon the question how 
 the error of allowing a prejudicial line of argument is to be 
 saved for review in an appellate tribunal. A class of decisions 
 is met with to the effect that the error may be — 
 
 (1.) 8hmvn by Affidavits submitted to the Court on Motion 
 for Neio Trial? — But the sound view is that, this being a matter 
 
 1 Fry V. Beuuett, 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 20G. In Iowa, where, as already seen, 
 200, 241, 242; s. c. affirmed, 28 N. Y. the judge is allowed by the rules of 
 324. procedure, to quit the beucli during 
 
 2 Hall y. "Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559, 5(51; the argument aud proceed with other 
 Dowdell V. Wilcox, 04 Iowa, 721, 724; busiuess of the term iu another room, 
 Turuer v. State, (J8 Teuu. (4 Lea) it becomes necessary to adopt the
 
 744 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [I TllOmp. Tr., 
 
 occurring in open court, in the presence of the presiding judge, his 
 attention should be called to it by a seasonable objectio^i, which, 
 if overruled, should be followed by an exception, which exception 
 should be noted and incorporated in the general bill of excep- 
 tions,^ — from which the conclusion follows that such an irregu- 
 larity cannot be presented for appellate review by affidavits. - 
 Where the practice of the particular jurisdiction allows the question 
 to be raised on motion for new trial by affidavits, and these affidavits 
 are conflicting, the appellate court will resolve the doubt in favor 
 of the ruling of the trial court ,^ It seems that the affidavits of 
 jurors, in oppostion to a motion for a new trial upon this ground, 
 in which the jurors attempt to show that the improper remarks 
 had no influence upon them in making up their verdict, are not 
 to be considered; since, though the jurors might conscientiously 
 believe this, few men are able to take exact cognizance of the 
 operations of their own minds and of the influences which bear 
 upon them, and they might be mistaken.^ 
 
 rule that the miscouduct may be 
 shown iu this way. In that State it 
 seems to be the practice to bring such 
 an objection to tlie attention of tlie 
 trial court by affidavit on a motion for 
 new trial, and to save it for review by 
 incorporating the affidavit into the bill 
 of exceptions — at least this is the in- 
 ference which the writer draws from 
 one case. Dowdell v. Wilcox, 64 Ipwa, 
 721, 724. In Tennessee, where such 
 misconduct was shown by affidavits 
 of members of the bar wljo were coun- 
 sel for the defendant, which affidavits 
 were embodied in the bill of exceptions 
 withoiit any comments by the presid- 
 ing judge, the statements contained in 
 them were taken to be true by the ap- 
 pellate court, on the ground that the 
 judge had made the affidavits a part of 
 the bill of exceptions without ques- 
 tioning iu any manner the correctness 
 of their statements. Turner v. State, 
 m Tenn. (4 Lea) 20(;. 
 
 1 Turner v. State, 68 Tenn. (4 Lea) 
 206; Roederw. Studt, 12 Mo. App. oCC; 
 Rudolph V. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34, 
 37. 
 
 2 So held in the cases cited in the 
 preceding note. It seems at one time 
 to have been the practice in Missouri 
 to raise this question by affidavits; 
 for in some cases the courts have re- 
 fused to reverse a judgment for this 
 cause because the affidavits were con- 
 flicting. State V. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 
 586; State v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121. 
 
 3 State V. Baber, supra; State v. 
 Johnson, supra; State v. Comstock, 
 20 Kan. 650. And if the portion of the 
 remarks which appear clearly to have 
 been made were not prejudicial, the 
 conviction will not he reversed. 
 
 * Kinuaman v. Kinnaman, 71 Ind. 
 417, 419. Especially the affidavits of 
 six jurors to this effect Avill not pre- 
 vail, since they are notable to answer 
 for the other six. lb.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 745 
 
 (2.) By Objections^ Exceptions and a Bill of Exceptions. — 
 The other and more correct view is that such an irregularity can 
 only be saved for appellate review by an objection seasonably 
 made, an exception properly taken if it is overruled, which ex- 
 ception is incorporated in a bill of exceptions, signed and sealed 
 by the presiding judge. ^ Confusing ideas are met with even in 
 this connection; for, while it is held in one jurisdiction that such 
 an irregularity cannot be made available on appeal unless pointed 
 out to the lower court and the ground of objection specifically 
 stated, 3^et another decision of the same tribunal is to the effect 
 that an exception taken at the time is not in all cases necessary; 
 since the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, see fit 
 to wait until its charge is given to the jury, to cure the prejudice ; 
 and that an exception to the refusal to grant a new trial upon 
 this ground sufficiently saves the question for review, where the 
 irregularity is shown to have been such as prevented a fair trial. - 
 The correct rule of procedure in such cases is believed to be that 
 laid down by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, speaking through 
 Reese, J., in the following language: " The Supreme Court, in 
 the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in cases of this kind, is 
 limited to the correction of the error of the District Court. 
 Before a case can be reversed and a new trial ordered, it must 
 appear that the court before whom the accused was tried erred, 
 and that such error was prejudicial to the party on trial. The 
 practice in this State is now settled in this respect, and before 
 this court can review questions of this -kind, the attention of the 
 trial court must be challenged by a proper objection to the lan- 
 guage and a ruling upon tlie objection. If the language is ap- 
 proved by the court, and the attorney is allawed to pursue the 
 objectionable line of argument, an exception to the decision can 
 
 1 Bradshaw v. State (Xeb.), 22 N. Andersou, 10 Ore. 448, 457; State v. 
 
 W. Rep. 3(;i; s. c. 17 Neb. 147 (distiu- Abrams, 11 Ore. 1()9, 172; Commou- 
 
 guishiugClevelaudPaperCo.v. Banks, wealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; Earll 
 15 Neb. 20; s. c. 16 N. W. Rep. 833) ; ' v. People, 99 111. 123; Jacksou v. State, 
 
 McLaiu V. State, 24 N. W. Rep. 720, 18 Tex. App. 58r>; Maclean v. Scripps, 
 
 724; Bullis v. Drake (Neb.), 29 N. W. 52 Mich. 215, 222. 
 Rep. 292; Miilcairns v. Jauesville - Rudolph v. Landwerleu, 92 Ind- 
 
 (Wis.), 29 N. W. Rep. 5G5; State v. 34,39.
 
 746 4RGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 be noted. By a bill of exceptions, showing the language used, 
 the objection, ruling of the court and exception to the ruling can 
 be presented to this court for decision. If the court sustains 
 the objection, and thus condemns the language, and requires the 
 attorney to desist and confine himself to the evidence in the case, 
 no injury is suffer<3d by the accused."^ This ruling has been 
 re-affirmed by the same court in a more recent case.^ It is 
 scarcely necessary to add that an exception of this nature, in 
 order to be available on error or appeal, should specify loliai was 
 said; otherwise tbe reviewing court cannot see whether any 
 2")rejudice resulted from the matter complained of.'' 
 
 § 963. Stating to the Jury Prejudicial Facts Which are not 
 in Evidence. — It is scarcely necessary to suggest that, in every 
 judicial trial, a party must present his evidence either by the tes- 
 timony of witnesses who are under oath, by the exhibition of 
 documents which are competent under the rules of evidence, or 
 by the exhibition of such material objects as are connected with 
 the res gestce and speak with reference to the issues on trial. He 
 cannot be permitted to present his evidence in the form of the 
 argument of his counsel to the jury, who is not sworn to speak 
 the truth as a witness in the particular case. All courts, there- 
 fore, unite upon the conclusion that where counsel, in their argu- 
 ment to the jury, make statements of prejudicial matters which 
 are not in evidence, it will afford ground for a new trial, unless 
 the error is cured before the cause is finally submitted to the 
 
 "1 Bradshaw ^;. State, supra. entirely out of the line with the au- 
 
 2 McLaiu t; State, (Neb.) 24 N. W. thorities, but cannot be defended upon 
 
 Eep. 720, 724. principle. If the only remedy for 
 
 ■' State V. Oaveuness, 78 N. C. 484. abuse of the privilege of argument lies 
 
 An old case In Illinois is to the effect in a request to the court to instruct 
 
 that the reo ding of au improper paper the jury to disregard the prejudicial 
 
 by counsel in argument cannot be as- statement, then disingenuous counsel 
 
 signed f'<r error, — the remedy of the will beat lil)erty to till the minds of 
 
 opposite party being to reciuest the the jurors with prejudicial matters, 
 
 court to instruct the jury that nothing and the other side will have no better 
 
 which b:is been so read is' evidence remedy than the meagre chance of the 
 
 before them. Kenyon v. Sutherland, effect being obliterated by au admoni- 
 
 8 111 yi). This decision is not only tion from the bench.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 747 
 
 jury, in the manner stated in the preceding paragraphs. ^ It is a 
 necessary part of this rule that the matters thus improperly 
 stated by counsel to the jury in argument should, in view of the 
 issues on trial, the status of the parties, their attitude toward 
 each other, and the like considerations, be, in their nature, of a 
 tendency to iwejudice the cause of the opposing party in the 
 minds of the jurors. Where such statements, though of matters 
 not in evidence and hence improperly made, are immaterial ov at 
 least not prejudicial, they will afford no ground for a new trial. ''^ 
 
 1 State V. Lee, 66 Mo. 165; State v. 
 Kriug, 64 Mo. 591 (modifying tlie re- 
 marks of tlie same court iu Loyd v. 
 Hanuibal &c. R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 509, 
 51-4) ; s. c. in intermediate appellate 
 court, 1 Mo. App. 438; Yoe v. People, 
 49 111. 410, 412; Kennies v. Yogel, 87 
 111. 242; s. c. 7 Cent. L. J. 18; State v. 
 Smith, 75 N. C. 307; Mitchura v. State, 
 II Ga. 615, 633; Tucker v. Henuiker, 
 41 K. H. 317, 324; Hatch v. State, 8 
 Tex. App. 416, 423; Brown v. Swine- 
 ford, 44 Wis. 282, 293; Berry v. State, 
 10 Ga. 511, 522; Tliompsou v. State, 43 
 Tex. 268, 274; Festuer v. Omaha &c. 
 R. R. Co., 17 Neb. 280; Cleveland Pa- 
 per Co. V. Banks, 15 Neb. 22; Rolfe v. 
 Ruraford, 66 Me. 564; Union Central 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Cheever, 36 Ohio St. 
 201, 208; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 573; Walker 
 V. State, 6 Blackf. (lud.) 2; Hoxie v. 
 Home Ins. Co., 33 Conn. 471; Bulloch 
 V. Smith, 15 Ga. 395; Dickersou v. 
 Burke, 25 Ga. 225; Gould v. Moore, 49 
 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (8 J. & S.) 387, 395; 
 Iveolges V. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 57 
 N. Y. 638; Craudall v. People, 2 Lans. 
 (N. Y.) 212; Northiugton v. State, 78 
 Tenu. (14 Lea) 424; Flint v. Common- 
 wealth, 81 Ky. 186; Sullivan v. State, 
 66 Ala. 48; McxVdory v. State, 62 Ala. 
 154; Grosse v. State, 11 Tex. App. 364, 
 377; Brown v. State, 60 Ga. 210, 212; 
 Bulliner v. People, 95 111. 396. Such 
 conduct has been deemed, iu a sense, 
 
 a deprivation of the riglit of trial l)y 
 jury. See Mitchum v. State, II Ga. 
 615, 633, where this view is enforced 
 at length iu glowing language by 
 Nisl)et, J. Also Tucker v. Henuiker, 
 41 N. H. 317, 324, where the language 
 of Nisbet, J., iu the preceding case, 
 is plagiarized, with some slight omis- 
 sions and rhetorical improvements. 
 Consult, on this su1)ject, the following 
 authorities : Hopt v. People, 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 614; Bullard v. Boston &c. Co. 
 (N. H.), 5 Atl. Rep. 16; People v. Carr 
 (Mich.), 31 N. W. Rep. 591; Gallinger 
 t>. Lake Shore Traffic Co. (Wis.), 30 
 N. W. Rep. 790; Heury v. Sioux City 
 & P.R. R. Co. (Iowa), Id. 630 and 
 note; Manning v. Bresnahau (Mich.), 
 Id. 189; Palmer v. Utah & N. R. R. Co. 
 (Idaho), 13 Pac. Rep. 425; Moore v. 
 State (Tex.), 2 S. W. Rep. 887; Ilucks- 
 hold i\ St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co. 
 (Mo.), Id. 794; Stone v. State (Tex.)^ 
 Id. 585; Little Rock &c. R. R. Co. v. 
 Cavenesse (Ark.) Id. 505 and note; 
 Brenuau v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 
 Id. 481; Willis v. Lowry (Tex.), 2 S. 
 W. Rep. 449; States. Forsythe (Mo.), 
 1 S. W. Rep. 834 ; s. c. 89 Mo. 667 ; State 
 V. Robertson (S. C), I S. E. Rep. 443. 
 2 City of St. Louis v. Fruin, 9 Mo. 
 App. 590; Uuiou Savings Assn. v. 
 Claytou, 6 ]\Io. App. 587; State v. 
 Lewis, 6 Mo. App. 584; Davis v. State, 
 33 Ga. 98. The following remarks of
 
 748 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOmp. Tl'.,- 
 
 The words spoken must have been of such a character as may 
 reasonably be supposed to have influenced the jury to the preju- 
 dice of the party complaining. ^ The rule has been held to have 
 no just application to erroneous statements of counsel in argument, 
 in respect of the testimony which has been heard on the trial,- 
 the reason of the rule apparently being that it is admissible for 
 counsel to state the evidence in the most favorable light for his 
 own client, and that deductions or inferences in respect of what 
 the evidence tends to prove are always a fair subject of comment 
 to the jury. Where there is a conflict of testimony, the counsel 
 will not be stopped by the court as misrepresenting the testi- 
 mony, merely because he assumes that the facts testified to by 
 his own witnesses were proved ; ^ and the view of the courts is 
 that it is so important that the just privilege of counsel in argu- 
 ment should not be unduly restrained, that it has been regarded 
 as not sufiicient ground for a new trial that counsel, in the clos- 
 ing address to the jury, rather overstates the facts which there is 
 some evidence tending to prove.* It is scarcely necessary to add 
 that the rule does not apply to statements made by an attorney 
 while testifying as a witness.^ An exception to the rule has also 
 been admitted where counsel have inadvertently omitted to intro- 
 duce in evidence a document essential to his client's cause, such 
 as an exemplification of the plaintiff's act of incorporation. 
 Here the question is governed by the rule that the order in which 
 
 Cassoday, J., iu a recent bastardy case into the bill of exceptions. Counsel 
 
 in Wisconsin, are quoted by the au- necessarily have a broad latitude." 
 
 thor with some reserve: " Of course, Baker v. State (Wis.), 33 N. W. Rep. 
 
 the remarks of counsel are to be re- 52, 55. 
 
 stricted to matters in the case on trial. i Festner v. Omaha &c. R. Co., 17 
 
 But this is not always conllned to Neb. 280. 
 
 such evidence as is pertinent to the 2 people v. Barnhart, 59 Cal. 402; 
 . issue on trial. Other evidence fre- People v. Lee Ah Yute, GO Cal, 95. 
 quently gets into a case by consent of Especially where, as in the latter case, 
 parties or without objection. So tlie court orders the improper re- 
 there may be, and frequently is, some marks to be stricken out. 
 fact or circumstances occurring iipon ^ Hatcher v. State, 18 Ga. 4G0. 
 the trial which is properly open to the •* McKnabb v. Thomas, 18 Ga. 495, 
 comment of counsel, and yet never be- 507. 
 
 comes a part of the record in the ap- •'' Baker v. Madison, G2 Wis. 137, 
 
 pellate court by being incorporated 14G.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES or right of argument. 749 
 
 the evidence is presented is within the discretion of the trial 
 judge, and that the mere fact that evidence is })resented out of 
 its order is not ground of new trial unless prejudice appears.' 
 
 § 964. Limits Within Which the Rulings of the Trial Court 
 Will be Controlled. — Recurring to what has already been said, 
 and especially to the view that the control of argument, like 
 other matters relating to the conduct of trials, must necessarily 
 be committed largely to the discretion of the trial court, the con- 
 clusion follows that it is onl}^ in cases where the court has refused 
 to exercise its powers, or where its discretion has been mani- 
 festh/ abused by permitting i)rejudicial matters to be rehearsed 
 to the jury in argument, that appellate courts will interfere. ^ 
 They will, as already seen, defer to the conclusion of the trial 
 court, whose presiding judge was in a much better position to 
 know whether prejudice really accrued to the unsuccessful part}' 
 than the appellate court is,'^ especially where the evidence as to 
 the nature of the remarks is conflicting.* And, on a similar prin- 
 ciple, they will not control the trial judge, who has heard the evi- 
 dence and tried the cause, in his decision upon the question how 
 far the remarks were warranted by the evidence, when it is 
 not made clearly to appear that they were unwarranted.^ 
 What abuses of the right of argument will warrant the inter- 
 ference of appellate courts, when thus clearly shown, will now 
 be stated. 
 
 1 Bauk of Charleston v. Emerich, 2 trial court its discretion, it should be 
 Sandf. (N. Y.) 718, Oakley, C. J., say- made to appear affirmatively, by iu- 
 iug: " It is surely not worth while to corporatiug the essential facts and 
 send this cause back for anotlier trial, circumstances showing it in the rec- 
 merely to have this document, upon ord. Baker r. State (Wis.), 33 N. W. 
 which no question arises, given in Rep. 52, 55; Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 
 evidence." Ante, § 344, et seq. 67; s. c. 30 N. W. Rep. 226. 
 
 2 It is said that, the trial judge ^ gee the remarks upon this point 
 being necessarily familiar with all the in Loyd v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 53 
 facts and circumstances, as well as Mo. 509, 514, and in Cavauali v. State, 
 the suades of the evidence, must nee- 56 Miss. 299, 309. 
 
 essarily have a broad discretion in ^ State v. Comstock, 20 Kan. 650; 
 
 such matters, and that error is not to State v. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 586; State 
 
 be presumed in such a case; but that v. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121. 
 if counsel abuse their privilege or the ^ Cobb v. State, 27 Ga. 649.
 
 750 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [I Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 965. Observations on the Limits Allowed to Argument. — On 
 this subject it was said by Fowler, J., in what lias come to be regarded 
 as a leading case: " The counsel represents and is a substitute for his 
 client ; whatever, therefore, the client may do in the management of his 
 cause may be done by his counsel. The largest and most liberal free- 
 dom of speech is allowed, and the law protects him in it. The right of 
 discussing the merits of the cause, both as to the law and the facts, is 
 unabridged. Tlie rangeof discussion is wide. He may be heard in ar- 
 gument upon every question of law. In his address to the jury it is 
 his privilege to descant upon the facts proved or admitted in the plead- 
 ings ; to arraign the conduct of the parties; to impugn, excuse, justify 
 or condemn motives, so far as they are developed in evidence, assail 
 the credibility of witnesses when it is impeached by direct evidence or 
 by the inconsistency or incoherence of their testimony, their manner of 
 testifying, their appearance upon the stand or by circumstances. His 
 illustrations may be as various as the resources of his genius ; his argu- 
 mentation as full and profound as learning can make it ; and he may, if 
 he will, give play to his wit, or wings to his imagination. To this free- 
 dom of speech, however, there are some limitations. His manner must 
 be decorous. All courts have power to protect themselves from con- 
 tempt, and indecency in words or sentences is contempt. This is a 
 matter of course in the courts of civilized communities, but not of form 
 merely. No court can command from an enlightened public that re- 
 spect necessary to an even administration of the law without maintain- 
 ing in its business proceedings that courtesy, dignity and purity which 
 characterize the intercourse of gentlemen in private life. So, too, what 
 a counsel does or says in the argument of a cause must be pertinent to 
 the matter on trial before the jury, and he takes the hazard of its not 
 being so. Now, statements of facts not proved and comments thereon 
 are outside of the cause. They stand legally irrelevant to the matter 
 in question, and are therefore not pertinent. If not pertinent, they are 
 
 not within the privilege of counsel." ^ In 1878 this question came 
 
 for the first time before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and it was 
 said by Chief Justice Ryan in delivering the opinion of the court, that 
 it was to the honor of the bar that this was the case. The counsel 
 who had transcended tlie bounds of professional propriety, by comment- 
 
 1 Tucker v. Hi-nniki'r, 41 N. II, 317, Texas in Hatch v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 323. This laugiiage was quoted with 41(i, 423. See also Cavanah v. State;, 
 approval by the Court of Appeals of 56 Miss. 2y'j, 309.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argu3ient. 751 
 
 ing upon a supposed state of facts not in evidence, was eminent at the 
 bar and of liigli character; and the observations of the court, wliile not 
 implying personal censure, give for this reason greater emphasis to the 
 rule which it laid down. The following view was delivered from the 
 bench, in respect of the limits of professional propriety in arguing facts 
 to juries : " The profession of the law is instituted for tiie administration 
 of justice. The duties of the bench and bar differ in kind, not in pur- 
 pose. The duty of both alike is to establish the truth and to apply the 
 law to it. It is essential to the proper administration of justice, frail 
 and uncertain at best, that all that can be said for each party, in the 
 determination of fact and law, should be heard. Forensic strife is but 
 the method, and a mighty one, to ascertain the truth and the law gov- 
 erning the truth. It is the duty of counsel to make the most of the 
 case which his client is able to give him ; but counsel is out of his duty 
 and the right, and outside of the principal object of his profession, 
 when he travels out of his client's case and assumes to supply its defi- 
 ciencies. Therefore, it is that the nice sense of the profession regards 
 with such distrust and aversion the testimony of a lawyer in favor of 
 his client. It is the duty and right of counsel to indulge in all fair ar- 
 gument in favor of the right of his client; but he is outside of his duty 
 and his right when he appeals to prejudice irrelevant to the case. Prop- 
 erly, prejudice has no more sanction at the bar than on the bench. 
 But an advocate may make himself the alter ego of his client, and in- 
 dulge in prejudice in his favor. He may even share his client's preju- 
 dices against his adversary, as far as they rest on the facts in his case. 
 But he has neither duty nor right to appeal to the prejudice, just or un- 
 just, against his adversary, and dehors the very case he is to try. The 
 very fullest freedom of speech, within the duty of his profession, should 
 be acconled to counsel ; but it is license, not freedom of speech, to 
 travel out of the record, basing his argument on facts not appearing, 
 and appealing to prejudices irrelevant to the case and outside of the 
 proof. It may sometimes be a very difficult and delicate duty to con- 
 fine counsel to a legitimate cour,se of argument. But, like other difli- 
 cult and delicate duties, it must be performed by those upon whom the 
 law imposes it. It is the duty of the circuit courts, in jury trials, to 
 interfere in all proper cases, of their own motion. This is due to truth 
 and justice. And if counsel persevere in arguing upon pertinent facts 
 not before the jury, or appealing to prejudices foreign to the case in 
 evidence, exception may be taken by the other side, wliich may be good
 
 752 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ground for a new trial, or for a reversal in this court." ^ - - - - In the 
 case just quoted from Georgia, Judge Lumpkin delivering the opinion 
 of the court, thus eloquently denounced the practice under considera- 
 tion: " Is it, I ask, worthy of the noblest of professions thus to sport 
 with the life, liberty and fortune of the citizen? A profession which is 
 the great repository of the first talents of the countr3% and to whose 
 standard the most gifted flock, as offering the highest inducement of 
 reputation, wealth, influence, authority and power which the commun- 
 ity can bestow? I would be the last man living to seek to abridge 
 freedom of speech, and no one witnesses with more unfeigned pride 
 and pleasure than myself the effusions of forensic eloquence dailj^ ex- 
 hibited in our courts of justice. For the display of intellectual power, 
 our bar speeches are equaled by few, surpassed by none. Wliy then 
 resort to such a subterfuge? Does not history, ancient and modern, 
 nature, 'art, science and philosophy, the moral, political, financial, com- 
 mercial and legal, — all open to counsel their rich and inexhaustible 
 treasures for illustration? Why, under the fullest inspirations of ex- 
 cited genius, they ma}' give vent to their glowing conceptions in thoughts 
 that breathe and words that burn. Nay, more, giving reins to their 
 imagination, they may permit the spirit of their heated enthusiasm to 
 swing and sweep beyond the flaming bounds of space and time — extra 
 flammantia moenia mundi. But let nothing tempt them to pervert the 
 testimony, or surreptitiously array before the jury facts which, whether 
 true or not, have not been proven."- After all this eloquence the court 
 refused to grant the prisoner a new trial. - - - - So, in a case in 
 Texas the practice was tluis denounced by Mr. Justice Moore : " Zeal in 
 behalf of their clients or desire for success should never induce counsel 
 in civil cases, much less those representing the State in criminal cases, to 
 permit themselves to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based 
 upon any other than tlie facts in the case and the conclusions legitimately 
 deducible from the law applicable to them." ^ 
 
 § 966. Instances OF Reversals Undcu the Last Preceding Rule. — 
 In his opening speech to the jurj', counsel for the plaintiff said " that 
 in the former trial of the case the defendants had suborned their little son 
 
 1 Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 2 gerry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 522. 
 
 293. This language was also quoted » Thompson v. State, 43 Tex. 268, 
 
 with approval by the Texas Court of 274. 
 Appeals iu Hutch v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 HE 41:1.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 753 
 
 to commit perjui\v, * * * and that the appellant had committed per- 
 jury in liis affidavit for a change of venue." ^ In a criminal prosecu- 
 tion for forgery, the State's counsel, in addressing the jury, was allowed 
 by the court, the defendant's counsel not objecting at the time, to use 
 the following language: " The defendant was such a scoundrel that he 
 was compelled to move his trial from Jones County to a county where 
 he was not known." And again: " The bold, brazen-faced rascal had 
 the impudence to write to me a note yesterday, begging me not to prose- 
 cute him, and threatening me that if I did he would get the legislature 
 
 to impeach me." On the trial of an action upon a policy of life 
 
 insurance, the counsel for the plaintiff read to the jur3' and commented 
 thereon, against the objection of the defendant, a pamphlet prepared by 
 the secretary of the defendant company for use among its agents, 
 
 which had been offered in evidence and, upon objection, withdrawn.^ 
 
 In a suit on a policy of insurance on a vessel, the plaintiff offered in ev- 
 idence a protest which had been filed bj' the master of the vessel, after 
 it had sustained injury at sea, with a consul of the United States. 
 The protest was excluded by the court on the objection of the defend- 
 ants. Nevertheless, in his closing argument to the jur}', the plaintiff's 
 counsel attempted to state some of its contents, and, on objection, was 
 allowed by tlie court to proceed, on the ground that such protests usu- 
 ally set forth the particulars of such a casualty, and that, under the cir- 
 cumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to any fair inference from the 
 general character of the paper and the refusal of the defendant to have 
 it read.^ On the trial of an indictment for larceny, the State's attor- 
 ney, against the objection of the defendant's counsel, stated, in his clos- 
 ing argument to the jury, that " he lieard, while out on the street in 
 New Braunfels, a citizen remark that it was a great shame that the de- 
 fendant sliould have taken the money of the old man Wucherer, near 
 
 seventy-one years old, and all the rnone}^ he had in the world." ^ The 
 
 defendant, on his trial for murder, identified three letters by a witness, 
 and then handed them to the judge to be marked and preserved until 
 
 1 Henuies v. Vogel, 7 Cent. L. J. 2 Smith v. State, 75 N. C. 30C,. 
 
 IS; s. c. 87 111. 242. It was said by » Union Central Ins. Co. u. Cheever, 
 
 Dickey, J., iu giving the opinion of the 30 Ohio St. 301, 208; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 
 
 court: "Were this true, it would iu 573. 
 
 f :vct be good cause for reversing the ^ Hoxie v. Home lus. Co., 33 Conn, 
 
 judgment. But, on an examination of 471. 
 
 the record, tlie i-ourt tiud that the ^ Grosse i?. State, 11 Tex. App. 304, 
 
 charge tliat sucli language had been 377. 
 used was not sustained." 
 
 48
 
 754 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiiip, Tr., 
 
 they should be used, but aftewards offered in evidence only two of them. 
 ]Severtheless, the State's attorney, in his closing argument, alluded to 
 
 the third letter, expressing curiosity as to what it contained. ^ 
 
 The State's counsel, in his argument to the jury was permitted, against 
 the objection of the accused, to detail at length the facts of a similar 
 
 case, which had been tried in another part of the State.- ^Yhere, in a 
 
 prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors to a person when in a state 
 of intoxication, the prosecuting attorney, in addressing the jury, 
 stated, among other remarks of doubtful propriety, that " he knew per- 
 sonally the saloon keeper in this case, and that he was guilty of this, 
 and, he was sure, of other crimes," — and the court failed, upon re- 
 quest to instruct the jury to disregyrd these remarks, and counsel 
 saved an exception. ^ In his argument in a case of larceny, the pros- 
 ecuting attorney asserted that " he knew that the defendant was the 
 man who took the money," and, notwithstanding a strong objection, 
 the court failed to caution the jury to disregard this statement, — and 
 
 an exception was saved. ^ In all the foregoing cases, with the 
 
 quahfications stated in the notes, it was held that the remarks 
 afforded ground for reversing the judgment and ordering a new 
 trial. 
 
 § 967. [Continued.] Doctrine as Restated by Supreme Court of 
 Alabama. — The Supreme Court of Alabama, to avoid misunderstand- 
 ing, have restated its views upon this question, thus: "There must 
 be objection in the court below, the objection overruled, and an excep- 
 tion reserved. The statement must be as of fact ; the fact stated must 
 be unsupi)orted by any evidence, must be pertinent to the issue, or its 
 natural tendency must be to influence the finding of the jury ; or the 
 case is not brought within the influence of this rule. To come within 
 the last clause above, namely, where the natural tendency is to influ- 
 ence the finding of the jury, the case must be clear and strong. We 
 would not embarrass free discussion, or regard the many hasty or ex- 
 aggerated statements counsel often make in tlie heat of debate, which 
 cannot, and are not expected to become factors in the formation of 
 their verdict. Such statements are usually valued at their true worth, 
 and have no tendency to mislead. It is only wlien the statement is of 
 
 1 Bullner v. People, 95 III. 394. The ception taken, it would not be ground 
 
 ruling here was that, although this for reversing the judgment, 
 conduct was irregular and should not ^ Cross v. State, G8 Ala. 476. 
 
 have been allowed, yet, as uo object- ^ Brow v. State, 103 Ind. 133. 
 
 ion was made at the time and uo ex- ■* People v. Dane, 59 Mich. 5.50.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 755 
 
 a substantive, outside fact — stated as a fact — and wliicli manifestly 
 bears on a material inquiry before the jurj'^, that the court can inter- 
 fere and arrest discussion." ^ 
 
 § 968. [Continued.] Doctrine Restated in Texas. — In a recent 
 criminal case in Texas the court, speaking through Willson, J., say: 
 "It has become quite common to except to the remarks of counsel for 
 the State in their address to the jury. We find such exceptions in the 
 majority of contested cases that come before us. If we had sustained 
 all these exceptions, the effect would have been to have virtually closed 
 the mouths of prosecuting attorneys. While argument should be re- 
 stricted legitimately, it should not be so unreasonably limited as to 
 render it ineffectual. The State has rights in this respect as well as 
 defendants. And in view of the frequency of exceptions of this char- 
 acter, we will take occasion here to say that, before we will reverse a 
 conviction because of remarks of prosecuting counsel, it must appear to 
 us: (1) that the remarks were improper; and (2) that they were of a 
 material character and such as, under the circumstances, were calcu- 
 lated to injuriously affect the defendant's rights." ^ 
 
 \ 
 
 § 969. Coiuinentiiig on Evidence which has been Ex- 
 cliided. — An aggravated foriii of the abuse of the privilege of 
 argument, which is inchided in the rule stated and illustrated in 
 the two preceding paragraphs, is presented where counsel, in 
 arguing to the jury, are guilty of the highly unprofessional con- 
 duct of stating or commenting upon evidence which has been 
 offered and excluded. This attempt to appeal from the judge to 
 the jury, as to what is admissible as evidence in the case, is not 
 only, within the limits stated in the preceding paragraphs, ground 
 for a new trial, ^ but the w^riter has no hesitation in saying that 
 the presiding judge would be justified in treating and punishing 
 it as contempt of court. Scarcely less unprofessional and per- 
 
 1 Cross V. State, 68 Ala. 476, 484. pare Koelges v. Guardian Life Ins. 
 
 2 Pierson v. State, 18 Tex. App. Co., 57 N. Y. G38; Craudall u. People, 
 524, 564; reaffirmed in House v. State, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 212; Flint v. Common- 
 19 Tex. App. 227. wealth, 81 Ky. 18(i; Sullivan v. State 
 
 * Hoxie V. Home Ins. Co., 33 Conn. 66 Ala. 48; McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 
 471 ; Gould v. Moore, 40 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 154; Stephens v. State, 20 Tex. App. 
 (8 J. & S.) 387, 395 (with which com- 255, 271).
 
 756 ARGU.MtNT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tlioiiip. Tr., 
 
 nicious is the practice of counsel of presuming to state in argu- 
 ment what they ivoidd have 'proved had they been permitted under 
 the rules of evidence.^ 
 
 § 970. Commenting on the Defendant's Character, Evidence as 
 TO WHICH HAS BEEN EXCLUDED. — Where, In a criminal trial, the charac- 
 ter of the defendant was not put in evidence, and the court had excluded 
 evidence tending to show that he had been at one time arrested for a 
 robbery, it was held an abuse of privilege for the State's counsel to 
 comment upon his general character ; and that, in view of these impro- 
 prieties, the court, in order to prevent as far as possible any prejudice 
 to the defendant by reason of them, should have given to the jury the 
 following special instruction, requested by the defendant : "You are 
 charged that the law presumes that the defendant has a good character, 
 and you cannot presume against it because the defendant failed to in- 
 troduce evidence of a good character, and every presumption in favor 
 of his innocence is indulged by the law," — and the appellate court, 
 being of opinion that the defendant had not had a perfectly fair trial, 
 the judgment was reversed.- 
 
 § 971. Coininents, not Supported by Evidence, on the Char- 
 ncter and Credibility of Witnesses. — It has been held error to 
 make statements and comments respecting the character and cred- 
 ibility of witnesses for which the evidence affords no basis or 
 justification. In so holding the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
 speaking through Nisbet, J., said: " I know of no rule of law 
 which authorizes the credibility of witnesses to be impeached or 
 fortified thus. The manner of attacking or defending the char- 
 acter of the witness is fixed by law, and fixed among other things 
 that he may not be subject to irregular and irresponsible assaults 
 upon his veracity and fairness. He, as well as parties and coun- 
 sel, has rights which it is the duty of the court to protect. It 
 were, cruel injustice to permit his character to be driven to and 
 fro like the shuttlecock by the outside statements of counsel. 
 Where shall the license stop? If allowed against the credibility 
 of a witness, then with equal reason they are to be allowed as 
 
 J Fcstner v. Omaha &c. K. Co., 17 2 sicphi'iis v. State, 20 Tex. App. 
 
 X:b. 280. 2.>j, 271.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 757 
 
 touching the merits of the issue. If crimination is granted, re- 
 crimination cannot be refused. If statements on one side are 
 permitted, counter-statements on the other cannot be denied. 
 If allowed to men of the highest honor, they cannot be denied 
 to those few to be found in all professions destitute of all hon- 
 orable principle. The concession, carried out in its legitimate 
 consequences, would convert the stern inflexible law and order 
 of a court of justice into confusion, uncertainty and injustice. 
 All these objections apply alike to criminal trials and civil 
 actions — to the prosecuting otBcer and to counsel." ^ 
 
 § 972. Expressing Belief in Guilt or Innocence. — "No lawj-er," 
 says Dr. Bishop, " ought to undertake to be a witness for his client, 
 except when he testifies under oath, and subjects himself to cross-exam- 
 ination, and speaks of what he personally knows. Therefore, the prac- 
 tice, which seems to be tolerated in many courts, of counsel for 
 defendants protesting in their address to the jury that they believe their 
 clients to be innocent, should be frowned down and put down, and never 
 be permitted to show itself more." ^ The Court of Appeals of Texas 
 quote this language with approval, and hold that it applies equally to 
 counsel for the prosecution. "They should not intrude «/<e«r belief 
 in the guilt of the accused, upon the jury." Where, however, such 
 remarks were objected to, and the trial judge promptly told the jury 
 that the remarks were beside the evidence, foreign to the issue in the 
 case, and that they were to pay no attention to them, the appellate 
 court thought it " not probable that th% jury would determine a case 
 upon the belief of counsel, and especially when instructed by the court 
 to disregard such remarks," and l^hey accordingly held them no ground 
 for a new trial. ^ 
 
 § 973. Allltung to Former Trials of the same Case. — A statute of 
 Texas enacts that " the effect of a new trial is to place the case in the 
 same position in which it was before the trial had taken place," and 
 that " the former conviction shall be regarded as no conviction of guilt, 
 nor shall it be alluded to in the argument. "^ A statute of Utah, regulat- 
 
 635 
 
 ^ Mitchum V. State, U Ga. CU, < Pasc. Dig. Tex. Stat., art. 3139; 
 
 Rev. Stat. Tex., Code Crira. Pro., art 
 783, For a similar statute, set 
 Dig. Tex. Stat., art. 321(j; Rev, 
 5'!3. Tex., Code. Crim. Pro., art. 876 
 
 Bish. Crira, Proc, § 311. 783. For a similar statute, see Paso. 
 
 3 Piersou u. State, 18 Tex. App. 524, Dig. Tex. Stat., art. 3216; Rev. Stat.
 
 758 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tiiomi). Tr., 
 
 ing proceedings in criminal cases, declares that the granting of a new 
 trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had," 
 and that " all the testimony must be produced anew, and the former 
 verdict cannot be used or referred to either in evidence or in argu- 
 ment." 1 These statutes express a general principle of procedure, which 
 obtains with equal force wliere there is no such statutory enactment. 
 Allusions, by counsel in argument, to the result of a former trial in the 
 same case, favorable to tlie party for whom he is contending, ^ whether 
 made directly or by the artifice of handing up to the court the opinion 
 of the appellate court reversing the former judgment, accompanied by 
 observations on the same in the hearing of the jury, ^ especially if ac- 
 companied with severe denunciation of the action of the appellate tri- 
 bunal,* will, generally, though not always,'^ afford ground for new trial. 
 It is an equal irregularity' to permit counsel, in arguing to the jury, to 
 read minutes of the evidence taken at a former trial between the part- 
 ies, which minutes have not been put in evidence at the present 
 trial, and chiefly for the reason stated in the preceding paragraph,*' that 
 counsel are not to be permitted, in arguing to the jury, to state evident- 
 ial matters which have not been regularly admitted in evidence in the 
 case." The statute of Utah, above quoted, does not extend so far as to 
 require the granting of a new trial, merely because the counsel for the 
 government, in his final argument to the jury, alluded to the fact that 
 the case had been many times before the tribunals. It was said: "If 
 allusion to previous trials, such as were here made, were to vitiate a 
 subsequent trial, a new element of uncertainty would be introduced 
 into the administration of justice in criminal cases." '^ 
 
 § 974. Appealing to Local Prejudices. — Appealing to local preju- 
 dices, — as, in an action brought by a citizen of the county in which the 
 trial was had, to which the venue had been changed, against a board of 
 school directors in another county, saving to the jury: "Stand by your 
 own citizen;" and also, against the objection of defendant's counsel 
 and the admonition of the court, telling the jury that "the school di- 
 
 1 Laws of Utah 1878, p. li'C, § P.17. ^ ChicaiiO &c. li. Vo. v. Braiionior, 
 
 2 Crahau v. Bahner's Exr., 7 Mo. i<upi-a. 
 
 App. 585. ^ Ante, § !>(33. 
 
 3 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bragouier, ' IMartin •;;. Orudorff, 22 Iowa, 504. 
 13 Bradw. (111.) 407. Compare Morrison v. Myers, 11 Iowa, 
 
 t Hatch V. State, 8 Tex. App. 416; 538; Samuels v. Gridlth, 13 Iowa, 103, 
 Moore v. State, 21 Tex. App. GG6; post, » Hopt v. Utali, 120 U. S. 431, 442, 
 
 § !J7(;. opinion l)y Field, J.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 759 
 
 rectors, people and citizens of Fulton county are trying to disgrace and 
 oppress a citizen of Marshall county," ^ — affords ground of new trial. 
 
 § 975. Appealing to Religious Prejudices. — Thus, in an action for 
 damages for an assault and battery, for the plaintiff's counsel to say, in 
 his closing argument: " It is in evidence that this defendant is a Cath- 
 olic priest, and all of his witnesses are members of his church, and it 
 is a strange coincidence that they track the evidence of defendant with 
 that minuteness and precision in the use of words and language that 
 cannot be accounted for except as shown by the evidence. They heard 
 the defendant, from the pulpit, detail his version of the case, and they 
 can come here and swear to his version of the case, and the defendant 
 can absolve them from the sin. If it is one of the doctrines of the 
 Catholic church that one of the members may swear falsely as a witness, 
 and the priest can forgive him his sin for such false swearing, so as to 
 absolve him from all moral guilt, it is the privilege and duty of the jury 
 to take this fact, in determining the credibility of such witnesses." 
 And, after protest, saying: " The defendant is here, and if it is not the 
 doctrine of the Catholic church, let him stand up and deny it, and that 
 shall be the end of it." It was held that a new trial must be had.- 
 
 § 976. A Catalogue of Prejudicial Statements. — The following 
 abuses of the right of argument have been held, under various circum- 
 stances, ground for reversing judgments and awarding new trials. For 
 counsel, in arguing for the State in a criminal trial, when his language 
 is excepted to, to retort, facing the jury, in the following strain : " Yes, 
 take 3^our bill ; and as often as this case is taken to the Court of Ap- 
 peals and there reversed on some foolishness or technicality, I will, as 
 often as I can get the case before twelve honest men, convict him again 
 and again." To repeat the language excepted to and to add: *' Take 
 bill and repeat them," and then to proceed to harangue the jury thus: 
 ' • I mean to deal with these fellows [meaning men who had been in- 
 dicted for complicity in land frauds], and commence with this one 
 [meaning the defendant Hatch] ; that when they know themselves to be 
 guilty, and wlien tliey, as has this defendant, been once convicted by 
 twelve honest men, and by a dodge and technicality have had the case 
 reversed, and now represented by an able counsel watching for an error, 
 I will teach them, — I will teach them to throw themselves on the mercy 
 
 1 Schooltowuof ]{ochester». Shaw, 2 Rudolph v. Lamlwerleu, 02 Ind. 
 
 lOOInd. 2G8. 34. 30.
 
 7G0 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 of the jury and the court, and not make defenses to cost the State 
 thousands. I demand of the jury, in the event you find the defendant 
 guilty, that he be punished by the maximum of years allowed by law. 
 He is defending and procuring the reversal of this case that, in the 
 progress of time, witnesses may be scattered, and that, too, when he 
 knows that he is guilty as hell itself. A taste should be put in his 
 mouth in the shape of ten 3^ears' punishment, and then the next land 
 thief who is tried will plead guilty and throw himself on the mercy of the 
 court and jur}-." ^ The following passage in the concluding argu- 
 ment of the State's attorney reversed a conviction under an indictment 
 for an assault with intent to commit rape: " Gentlemen of the jur}'^, a 
 good jury of your county convicted the defendant of tlie offense with 
 which he is now charged, upon a former and a previous indictment, and 
 his attorney appealed it to the Court of Appeals upon a trifling tech- 
 nicality in drawing the indictment; and that court reversed the case, 
 and, by taking advantage of this trifling technicality, without merit, he 
 has caused your county great expense, which comes out of the pocket 
 of every good taxpaj^er, yourselves among the rest ; and now, in view of 
 these facts, I ask you to give him such a term in the penitentiary that will 
 make up for this great expense he has caused upon a mere technicali- 
 t3^" In the course of its opinion, the court said: "In many decisions 
 this court has urged upon counsel, whose duty it is to prosecute the 
 pleas of the State, to refrain from injecting into the trial of cases of 
 this kind, any matter calculated to inflame the minds or excite the preju- 
 dices of the jury. If we could add anything to what has been said, or 
 could use any language calculated to reaeh the minds and consciences 
 of tliose to whom such admonitions are addressed, we would avail our- 
 selves of the present occasion to do so. As we cannot, we can only reverse 
 and remand the case, in the hope that the accused may secure a fair and 
 impartial trial, according to law, and according to those methods, alike 
 ancient and honorable, which still obtain in all enlightened courts. It is 
 
 so ordered." '^ For the State's counsel, in a criminal trial, to read, 
 
 against the protest of the accused, the proceedings which have taken place 
 on an application for a change of venue which has been granted." 3 . . . - 
 For the court to permit the State's counsel, against the objection of the 
 defendant and without hinderance or rebuke, to use the following lan- 
 guage in the closing aigument to the jury: " And that is the character 
 
 • Hatch V. State, 8 Tex. App.41fi. » State v. Phillips, 24 Mo, 475, 
 
 2 Huraphi'ey v. State, 21 Tex. App, 483. 
 <\GG, (i(;8, opluiou by Hum, J.
 
 Tit IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of eight of argument. 761 
 
 of the man, and that is the character of the place they were going into — 
 actually taking their lives in their hands — and there is no man on this 
 jury who would have more bravely faced what those two men faced. I 
 just ask you, however lion-hearted you may be, to put yourselves in 
 their places — walking in there into a saloon in that part of the city, in 
 the dead of night, face to face with two of the most terrible desperadoes 
 of the city, to arrest them for highway robbery." i The defendant 
 on trial was one of the two persons thus called " terrible despera- 
 does." For the State's counsel to indulge in gross denunciation, 
 
 diatribe and abuse against the defendant on trial ; as, in a prosecution 
 against a negro for larceny, to say in his closing argument, turning to- 
 ward defendant: " You black thief! You are a thief — as black as hell 
 itself." Then, turning to the jur}', to say : " Gentlemen, if you do not 
 convict this man you had better throw open the jail doors, tear down 
 our court-houses and burn up our law books ; because if you acquit 
 such men, and that is to be the law in Waller county, people will flock 
 to Waller county from north and south Texas to become thieves. All 
 good men in Waller county know that this man ought to be convicted, 
 and it is your duty to do so. I feel an interest in this case and want to 
 see this man convicted ;" — the court declining to take othernotice of this 
 language, upon objection, than to say to counsel for the defendant : "I 
 
 will give you a bill of exception." 2 For the defendant's counsel 
 
 in a civil case to slate, in his argument to the jury, the presiding judge 
 not being present, that plaintiff was only a cat's paw to lend the cloak 
 of respectability to the case, meaning that he was a cat's paw for one 
 
 of his own witnesses. ^ For the State's attorney, in a criminal trial, 
 
 tc allude to the failure of the defendant to introduce evidence to sustain 
 his character, no attempt to impeach his character as a witness having 
 
 been made.'* For the State's attorney, in a criminal trial, to comment 
 
 to the juiy upon the failure of the defendant to avail himself of the 
 privilege guaranteed to him by the statute of calling his wife as a witness 
 
 in his own behalf.^ For the counsel for a party in a civil action to 
 
 comment upon the fact that a witness of the opposing party had 
 claimed exemption from answering a question on the ground of privilege, 
 
 1 State V. Foley, 12 Mo. App. 431; 13t; State v. Uphara, 38 Me. 261. 
 following State v. Lee, 6(3 Mo. ICo. Compare Walker v. State, 6 Blackf. 
 
 2 Crawford u. State, 15 Tex. App. (lud.) 1; State y. McAllister, 24 Me. 
 501. 139; Ackley v. People, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 ■ 3 Hall „. Wolff, Gl Iowa, 559, 509. 
 
 5''1- ^ Knowle.s v. People, 15 Mich. 409,. 
 
 ^ Fletcher r. State, 49 lud. 124, 413.
 
 762 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 which claim had been allowed by the court as well founded.^ - . -. For 
 the prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial, to say: "'They have suf- 
 fered, and Conn is put to trial, and you are told that he is only a 
 hired man. They hope thus to clear this man, and then he is to 
 swear his confederate clear. I tell you this is the trick." For such 
 counsel to continue, after a request made by defendant's counsel to 
 the court to stop him from using such remarks, which the court re- 
 fused to do, to say to the jury: "Good men in this county, and best 
 citizens of Gonzalez county, desire ' je conviction of this man and his 
 partner ;" the court overruling this objection to this language with the 
 remark: "He speaks at his peril. I will sign your bill of excep- 
 tions." For the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil trial to eulogize 
 
 in extravagant language the chai-acter of his client, calling him a 
 " large-hearted, great-souled, confiding, trusting man," of which facts 
 there was no evidence, and then, upon objection, saying: " O, well, 
 I will take it back." 3. , _ . For the counsel for the plaintiff, in an 
 action for maliciously suing out an attachment, in his closing argu- 
 ment, to discuss tlie wealth of the defendants (plaintiffs in the 
 attachment suit), and to insist that the wealthier they were the 
 greater the amount of damages which should be assessed against 
 
 them.* For the counsel for the plaintiff, in an action against 
 
 an officer in a railway company, for a tort which might be the 
 subject of exemplary damages, to comment to the jury in the 
 concluding argument, upon the defendant's connection with the 
 railway compan}^ upon the wealth and power of the com- 
 pan)'-, and upon the defendant's ability, from these circumstances, 
 to pay any judgment wliich might be rendered against him, 
 although no evidence has l)een given of his pecuniary ability.^ - - . . 
 For counsel, in the closing address in a civil case, to read to 
 the jury prejudicial matter not contained in the record, the evidence 
 or the instructions given, "^ and to refer to or comment upon the in- 
 
 1 Carue r. Litchfield, 2 Mich. 3t0. dcfeudaut is admissil^le, as speaking 
 
 2 Couu r. State, 11 Tex. App. 391, upou liis al)ility to pay sucli damages. 
 390. Burchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. G7; Barnes 
 
 3 Wolffe V. Miuuis, 7-1 Ala. 38(5. v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240; Bucliley v. 
 Compare Sullivan v. State, (JG Ala. 48; Knapp, 48 Mo. 1(52; Trimble v. Foster, 
 Cross V. State, G8 Ala. 470. 87 Mo. 49. 
 
 4 Willisu. McNeill, 57 Tex. 4(55, 474. " Tlie courts of procedure in the 
 s Brown v. Swiueford, 44 Wis. 282, State where this ruling was ,made re.- 
 
 291. It seems that iu an action for a quires the court to instruct the jury iu 
 tort for whicli exeinplary damages may writing before counsel malie their ar- 
 be given, evidence of tlie wealth of the gumeut.
 
 Tit. IV, Cb. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 
 
 703 
 
 structions offered b}' the opposite party and refused.^ For the 
 
 State's counsel to abude to the fact that the judge did not direct an 
 acquittal, b^' saj'ing: " If the judge did bebeve that the defendant bad 
 made out a fair claim to the property, bis Honor wouki have directed 
 an acquittal without their leaving the box ; but as be did not so say, 
 the judge must not have believed that a fair claim of propert}' bad been 
 
 shown by the defendant." '^ Where the counsel for tlie State, in a 
 
 criminal trial has, under the provisions of a statute, admitted that an 
 absent witness for the defendant would, if present, testify to a given 
 state of facts, which admission is made in order to avoid a continuance, — 
 for bim, in his concluding argument, to say that the statement con- 
 tained in the admission '" was not the statement of sworn witnesses," 
 but a statement "deftly prepared by counsel for defendant; that it 
 was all a tissue of lies ; that it contained nothing but lies, except a 
 few immaterial things ; that the persons named bad never seen it, and 
 would not have so sworn if they bad been present ;" but that " the State 
 had proven her case b}' living witnesses, who bad flesh and bone and 
 blood, and bad proven this statement to be lies, and nothing but 
 lies." ^ In a criminal case the district attorney in his opening 
 
 1 State ex rel. v Claudius, 1 Mo. 
 App. 552. 
 
 2 State V. Cavenuess, 78 N. C. 484, 
 490. Corapar(4^tate v. Johnson, 1 Ired. 
 L. (N. C.) 354; Powell v. Railroad 
 Co., G8 N. C. 395; State v. Dick, 2 
 Winst. ex. C.) 45. 
 
 » State V. Barliam, 82 Mo. G7, 70. 
 See also State v. Roark, 23 Kau. 147; 
 State V. Hickman, 75 Mo. 41G. It 
 should be borne in mind that the Mis- 
 souri statute, under which the admis- 
 sion was made in order to avoid the 
 continuance, places the statement of 
 facts set forth in the affidavit for a 
 continuance on precisely the same 
 footing, to all Intents and purposes, 
 as though the absent witnesses had 
 been personally present and had so 
 testified. It is only upon this ground 
 that the validity of such a statute, 
 depriving, as it does, the defendant of 
 compulsory process for the attendance 
 of his witnesses, can be upheld. State 
 
 V. Underwood, 75 JIo. 234; State v. 
 Jennings, 81 Mo. 185. It should be 
 added that the decision of the Mis- 
 souri court was placed on the ground 
 that the prosecuting counsel was per- 
 mitted to argue to the jury, against 
 his own admission, that the witnesses 
 would not so testify if present. So 
 much of his argument as was to the 
 effect that, although they would so 
 testify, their testimony would be false, 
 was within the line of legitimate argu- 
 ment; since it is permissible for the 
 State's counsel so to argue iu the case 
 of any witness, nor would the court 
 grant a new trial because he may have 
 done so iu strong and extravagant 
 language. On the other hand, in an 
 early case iu Kansas, whei'e the record 
 showed that comments had been made 
 upon an affidavit made by the opposite 
 party to procui'e a continuance, but it 
 did not appear what comments were 
 made or under what circumstances,
 
 764 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 speech said to the jury: " Gentlemen of the jury, the witnesses for the 
 defense have sworn lies, and have come here for that purpose. I will 
 show it by the testimony. They know that they have sworn lies, and if 
 it was not so, they would not allow me to say it, but would make mince 
 meat out of me when I charge them with having done so." The Court 
 of Appeals, speaking through Hurt, J., said: " We deem it proper, — 
 yea, an imperative duty on our part, — to sternly and emphaticallj' 
 condemn such conduct. Such bullying and defiant conduct was highly 
 calculated to provoke the most serious results, and that, too, in the 
 very temple of justice ; a place in which the highest order and decorum 
 should be preserved. The district attorney was not content to brand 
 the witnesses as perjured liars, but calls the jury to witness that he 
 proves the charge. How? Because they will not resent the terrible in- 
 sult by at least an aggravated assault and battery — thus subjecting 
 themselves to fine and imprisonment. Such conduct should not be 
 tolerated for a moment, and if the court had knowingly permitted the 
 same, we would feel it our duty to reverse the judgment because of 
 this matter. However, the court's attention was not called to this 
 matter at the time, and when this was done, the court reproved the 
 attorney by stating that such remarks were highly improper. We 
 think from the circumstances and nature of the remarks that the 
 court should have gone further, by instructing the jury that the credi- 
 bility of the witnesses could not be tested in any such manner ; but as 
 this matter will not arise upon another trial, we deem it unnecessary 
 
 to determine whether or not it is reversible error." ^ In all the 
 
 foregoing cases, subject to the qualifications stated, it was held that 
 the limits of the privilege of advocacy had been exceeded, and new trials 
 were ordered. 
 
 § 977. Keferrixg to Recent Crimes, Lax Administration of Law, 
 ETC. — In his closing ai'gument in a prosecution for larceny, the prose- 
 cuting attorney referred to the riots at Cincinnati (then recent) and 
 
 the reviewing court declined to regard duty of the trial court to restrain 
 
 it as ground for a new trial. For counsel witliin proper limits; and, as 
 
 aught that appeared, the counsel for the record did not disclose the con- 
 
 the party mal<iug the alHdavit might trary, it was held that the proper dis- 
 
 have first commented upon it; nor did chargeof this duty would be presumed, 
 
 anything appear in the I'ecord to show Perliius v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325, 331. 
 that such comments were prejudicial ^ Kicks v. State, 1!) Tex. App. 308,- 
 
 to the party complaining. If they 319. 
 were so, it would have been the
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of kight of argument. 7G5 
 
 alleged, as a cause for the prevalence of mob violence, the lax adminis- 
 tration of criminal justice in that city. The appellant objected to this 
 line of argument, but the court overruled the objection. It was held 
 that this was not error. " The remarks alluded to above, had refer- 
 ence to an historical fact concerning which the jury were supposed to be 
 familiar, both in respect to its occurrence and the causes to which it was 
 attributed." As there was no allusion made to the defendant in tliat 
 connection, or to his being in any manner concerned in the riots, 
 the court could not say that the privilege of fair debate had been 
 
 transcended.! So, it has been held, in Missouri, that remarks 
 
 of the prosecuting attorney in his argument, in which he states, in 
 substance, that tliere is no security for the lives or property of 
 citizens, if juries fail to do their duty, while crime is so greatly on 
 the increase, contained nothing which could be deemed prejudicial to 
 the defendant. It was but a declaration of the duty of juries, every- 
 where recognized, and the statement of the fact that crime was on the 
 increase could certainly have been no inducement to the jury to con- 
 vict the defendant, if the evidence did not warrant his conviction. - 
 On the other hand, it has been held that, for the State's counsel, in a 
 criminal trial, to comment on the frequent occurrence of murder in the 
 community and the formation of vigilance committees and mobs, argu- 
 ing that the same are caused by the laxity of the administration of the 
 laws, and stating to the jury that they should make an example of the 
 defendant, the defendant's counsel objecting, and the court overruling 
 the objection and remarking, in the presence of the jury, that such 
 things were proper subjects of comment, has been held ground of new 
 trial. 3 The State's counsel, on the trial of an indictment for lar- 
 ceny, used language to the effect that there was a regular band of 
 thieves in tlie neighborhood where this crime was committed ; that the 
 defendant was one of them (naming a number of others whose names 
 were known to the jury as persons who had Ijeen recently convicted of 
 crimes), and that unless the jury should convict the defendant he 
 (counsel) would not blame the people for taking the law into their own 
 hands, the defendant's counsel remonstrating and the court declining to 
 interfere. This was held ground of reversal.'' In another case in the 
 same State, on the trial of an indictment for a felonious homicide, the 
 State's counsel, in his argument to the jnry, remarked that " if the juries 
 
 1 Heyl V, State, 109 lucl. 589, 594. ^ Turner w. State, C8 Tenu. (4 Lea) 
 
 2 State V. Mallon, 75 Mo. 355, 358. 20G. 
 
 3 Ferguson v. State, 49 lud. 33.
 
 7()6 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 do not punish crime, the people will rise up, and should vise up, and pun- 
 ish it." These remarks, the Supreme Court said, "• were very repre- 
 hensible, and the court ought to have rebuked hira in the presence of the 
 jury," but under the circumstances of the case it was not deemed a suf- 
 ficient ground for a new trial. ^ On the trial of an indictment for 
 
 murder in Illinois, where the record showed that counsel, both for the 
 defendants and the people, referred to the prevalence of crime and com- 
 mented upon it, but not in a manner which was regarded by the Supreme 
 Court as prejudicial to tlie defendants, this court, speaking through 
 Scolfield, J., among other things, said: "The trial judge should always 
 see that the line of argument is kept within reasonable bounds, and not 
 allow the defendant to be convicted or prejudiced on account of real or 
 imaginary crimes for which he is not upon trial. And, unless for a pal- 
 pable abuse of discretion in this regard, manifestly tending to an im- 
 proper conviction, there should be no reversal." ^ 
 
 § 978. Indulgence Extended to Extravagant Declamation, 
 Exaggeration, Erroneous Statements of the Evidence. — The 
 
 courts extend considerable indulgence to extravagant declama- 
 tion and exaggeration. They obviously will not reverse judo^ments 
 because counsel in argument have stated erroneous conclusions as 
 to what the evidence proves.^ The privilege of argument extends 
 to a statement of the testimony as the counsel understands it, 
 and therefore an erroneous statement of it, if not conceived in a 
 spirit of unfairness or fraud, will be no ground of awarding a 
 new trial.* 
 
 § 979. Illustrations. — So, where, in his argument on the trial of 
 an indictment for resisting an officer, the prosecuting attorney said : 
 " Malice may bud and bloom in a man's heart almost in a moment or 
 in a short time," the court saw notliing in this which could have oper- 
 ated to the injury of the defendant.^ So, an interruption by counsel, 
 
 of the opposing party in his argument, charging him with " dodging the 
 
 main issue," has been held to afford no ground for a new trial. "^ 
 
 So, where, in an action for damages against a railway company, the 
 
 ' Scott V. State, 71 Tt'iiu. (7 Lea) ^ Teople v. Barnhardt, 59 Cal. 402. 
 
 232. * State v. Estes, 70 Mo. 428. 
 
 2 Biilliuer V. Tcopk-, 95 111. 394, 405. « Overcash v. Kitchie, 89 N. C. 384, 
 
 3 State V. Mallou, 75 Mo. 355. 389.
 
 Tit. IV, Cll. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 767 
 
 couasel for the plaintiff, in discussing the question of punitive dam- 
 ages, said: "You can and 3'ou should, out of the abundance of this 
 compam', take enough to keep this woman and her children from want 
 all the daj^s of their lives ; " and the couit, upon objection, merely said : 
 " Let it pass," — no ground was perceived for a new trial. ^ - - - - A 
 statement by the prosecuting attorney that " the defendant has been 
 guilty of one penitentiary offense, and would be guilty of a greater 
 offense to cover the other up," — has been held not sufficient ground 
 of reversing a conviction on appeal, where it did not appear in what 
 connection the statement was made.^ It is the duty of a prose- 
 cuting attorney, if he thinks the evidence establishes the guilt of the 
 defendant, to demand his conviction ; and where, in a trial for murder, 
 the State's attorney demanded a conviction, " in the name of the State, 
 in the name of the law, justice and right, in the name of society, in the 
 name of the widow and children of the deceased," — the appellate court 
 saw nothing wrong in this. " If the defendant committed the murder, 
 he had acted against the peace and dignity of the State ; he had out- 
 raged law, justice, right and society ; he had clothed the wife in 
 widow's weeds, and had made fatherless the children of the deceased ; 
 and each and all of these consequences of his crime demanded his con- 
 viction and punishment." ^ 
 
 § 980. And to the Use of Epithets. — "• Epithets and invec- 
 tive in which counsel sometimes indulge are frequently matters 
 of taste, and cases sometimes occur in which severe animadver- 
 sion is deserved and merited. But, after all, it is for the court, 
 in the i^resence of which the trial is had, to determine whether 
 counsel transcends the limits of professional duty and propriety, 
 and that determination cannot, in any appellate tribunal, be as- 
 signed for error." ^ Thus, it has been held no ground of new 
 trial that the prosecuting attorney called him a murderer in his 
 argument to the jury, where the indictment was for murder and 
 the whole effort of the State was to prove him to be sueh.^ So, 
 where it appeared in evidence that, after the prisoner had com- 
 mitted the assault charged in the indictment, he had gone to the 
 
 1 East Tfuii. &c. R. Co. i'. Gur- ^ pie,.sou r. State, 18 Tex. App. 524, 
 lej', Til TenUc -K!, 5-t. 5(J4. 
 
 2 State 17. MoCool, 34 Kau. G13. •» State v. Hamilton, '>■) Mo. 520, 522; 
 
 5 State i;. Gritliu, «7 Mo. G08, 615.
 
 768 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 Indian Territory, the court refused to grant a new trial because 
 the prosecuting attorney, in his argument to the jury, said that 
 "the defendant had gone to the Indian Territory, where all 
 rascals go." ^ It is said, in a late case in Texas, that " to make 
 vituperation and abuse grounds for reversing the judgment, 
 it must appear that the remarks indulged in were grossly un- 
 warranted and improper; that they were of a material charac- 
 ter, and calculated injuriously to affect the defendant's rights." ^ 
 And, in general, comments on the argument delivered by op- 
 posing counsel ought not to be restrained, where they do not 
 amount to comments upon matters not in evidence.^ 
 
 § 981. Appeals to Sympathy — The Widow in Tears. — 
 
 So, it is said: "Great latitude is allowed in appealing to the 
 sympathy of the jury, in the arguments of counsel. That, and 
 the widow in tears, are a kind of stage performance which courts 
 cannot very well, perhaps ought not to attempt to control." 
 And, proceeding upon this view, no ground for a new trial was 
 perceived in the conduct of counsel, in a civil action, in appeal- 
 ing to the sympathies of the jury in behalf of his client because 
 she was a widow, and in denouncing the opposing parties as 
 leeches and oppressors of poor women and widows — the widow, 
 
 1 State V. Stark, 72 Mo. 37. said to the jury that, if the plaintiff's 
 
 2 McCoimell v. State (Tex.), 3 S. intestate were alive, there would be uo 
 \V. Rep. 61)9, 702, citing Piersou v. difliculty about it, and that he would 
 State, 18 Tex. App. 524. bcAvilling to leave it to him. In reply, 
 
 3 In Chambers v. Greenwood, G8 the plaintiff's counsel said: " Well, if 
 N. C. 274, the action was upon a note that is so, why do you object to my 
 payable to the plaintiff's intestate, ])roving what he said?" Thereupon 
 which note the defendant alleged was the defendant's counsel asked the 
 embraced in a settlement of accounts court to stop the plaintiff's counsel, 
 between him and the plaintiff's intes- because he was commenting upon evi- 
 tate, in his lifetime, and which, as he dence which had been ruled out. This 
 alleged, had thus been settled, but was the court declined to do, saying: " lie 
 not delivered up because mislaid. is not commenting on the testimony 
 The plaintiff liad offered to prove what Avhich w;vs ruled out, but he is com- 
 his intestate had said about the note, menting on your argument." It was 
 but this evidence was ruled out, on the held that, in thus refusing to stop 
 objection of defendant's counsel. In counsel, no ground was presented for 
 his argument the defendant's counsel a new trial.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 709 
 
 at tlie same time, facing the jury aud weeping, or pretending to 
 weep.^ Haranguing the jury on irrelevant matters not neces- 
 sarily prejudicial, such as the fact that the defendant had a 
 wo^/zer only fifteen miles away, that she had abandoned him, that 
 she was not at the trial to share his troubles, — has been held no 
 ground of new trial. ^ So, where, in response to an objection to 
 testimon}^ which the counsel was seeking to introduce, he said: 
 " I am careful not to get error into the case. If my client was 
 a rich man I should like to litigate this matter for the next 
 twenty-five years, and I think it would give me a good support; 
 but my client is poor, and we live in Minneapolis, aud every time 
 we come down here it costs him $100," — it was held there was 
 uo ground for a new trial. -^ 
 
 § 982. Tricks of Advocacy, Sidebar Remtirks, etc. — Nor 
 
 are mere tricks of advocacy, devised to arrest the attention of 
 the jury at certain points in the evidence, ground for anew trial.* 
 Thus, where a witness was being examined in a criminal ca.se, 
 and the prosecuting attorney, at a point in the evidence, remarked 
 to his associate, " Put that down," an objection to this language 
 was held frivolous.^ Nor will a judgment be reversed, even in a 
 capital case, because of indiscreet side remarks by the prosecut- 
 ing attorney, unless the court can see that a jury of ordinarily 
 intelligent men would be misled or prejudiced by them.® 
 
 § 983. Bad Logic and Bad Law. — Nor is it ground for a 
 new trial, in a criminal case, that the prosecuting counsel has 
 made an illogical argument, or has misstated the law in his ad- 
 dress to the jury.' If the error is of logic — if illogical conclu- 
 sions are drawn or illicit inferences are made — the courts cannot 
 correct them by directing counsel to reason logically. If, how- 
 ever, counsel state the law incorrectly in their address to the 
 
 1 Dowdell r. Wilcox, G4 Iowa, 721, •* Haderleiu v. St. Louis K. Co., 3 
 72i. Mo. App. 001. 
 
 2 State V. Griffin, 87 Mo. 608. s State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425, 433, 
 s Baiier v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137, « State v. Guy, G'J Mo. 430. 
 
 l-i7, ■ .Morrison v. State, 76 lud. 335. 
 
 4'.>
 
 770 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tl',, 
 
 jury, the adverse party can secure a correction. The correction 
 is not to be obtained by objecting to the statements of counsel 
 during the argument, but by asking the court to give the kiw to 
 the jury in its instructions.^ 
 
 § 084. Other Statements Which Have Been Excused Rather 
 than Justified. — Tlie alhision by counsel in argument to the 
 absence of the defendant from the trial of a civil case, has been 
 held a question of taste and propriety rather than misconduct^ 
 even where the plaintiff's counsel had charged him with fabri- 
 cating evidence and said: " He did not want to be here, and it 
 is well that he is not here, after making such an exhibition of 
 himself." ^ It is unquestionably a sound rule that historical 
 facts, of which courts take judicial notice, may be alluded to in 
 argument for the purposes of illustration, and this rule has been 
 extended, on doubtful grounds, so far as to justify a State's 
 counsel, in a criminal trial, in alluding to other' liistoi'ical cases^ 
 similar to the case at bar.^ Nor, in a capital case, where coun- 
 
 ' Proctor V. De Camp, 83 Ind. 559, 
 opiniou by Elliott, J. This rule would 
 not be applicable in Missouri, where 
 the charge of, the judge is delivered 
 before counsel make their argument. 
 Under the system In that State an un- 
 fair statement of law by counsel to the 
 jury ought to be corrected by the court 
 when the objection is made. 
 
 2 Carter v. Carter, 101 Ind. 450, 454. 
 
 3 Thus, on the trial of a statutory 
 felony, the State's attorney, in his 
 closing argument, on the question of 
 insanity, alluded to the facts of the 
 Lawless case and the Guiteau case, 
 and said that the case at bar did not 
 show one-half or even the hundredth 
 part of the eccentricities which those 
 cases showed; that Guiteau's whole 
 life was one of oddities and eccen- 
 tricities ; that experts were called from 
 the whole nation, but nevertheless he 
 was convicted by a jury, was allowed 
 
 his appeal, and was finally hanged; 
 that Tom Buford killed Judge Elliott 
 and never went to the asylum. When 
 the State's counsel commenced speak- 
 ing of these matters, the defendant's 
 counsel objected; but the court said 
 these matters were merely in the na- 
 ture of argument, and refused to stop 
 him, and the defendant saved an ex- 
 ception. The Supreme Court over- 
 ruled the exception, Freeman, J., in 
 giving its opinion, saying: "While it 
 was not pertinent to the issues in this 
 case to cite the facts, or supposed facts, 
 in the cases of Guiteau and Buford, 
 still such reference, byway of illustra- 
 tion, we do not think sufficient grouiid 
 of reversal of the verdict of a jury. 
 The true basis of the argument is 
 always the facts presented in the tes- 
 timony, but we cannot see that sui!i 
 allusions as are Here found could have 
 materially affected the conclusions of
 
 Tit. IV, Cb. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 771 
 
 sel for the defendant has allowed improper evidence to go to the 
 jury without o})jection, can a new trial be claimed on the ground 
 that the prosecuting attorney commented on such evidence in 
 his argument to the jury.^ Although, as elsewhere seen,-^ coun- 
 sel are not permitted in argument to refer to supposed facts not 
 in evidence, yet it has been held not clearly error to permit 
 counsel for the State, in a bastardy proceeding, to refer to the 
 resemblance between the child (presumably in the court-room) 
 and the respondent ; since this, if a fact, was a fact which the 
 jury could not well be prevented from noticing, and " some ex- 
 travagance in cases involving sensational elements" cannot Avell 
 be restrained.^ So, in the absence of specific objection, or of a 
 request for an instruction, the reading, by counsel for the de- 
 fendant, of the complaint in the case, verified by aflidavit. has 
 been held no ground for a new trial, the reading having appar- 
 ently been done for the purpose of showing what allegations were 
 not denied and hence admitted.* 
 
 § 985. [Illustrations.] Transgressions in Criminal Cases which 
 HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED. — In a case of larceny, counsel, in closing for 
 the defendant, by way of illustrating the value of certain testimony 
 given on behalf of the State to sustain the reputation of a witness, said, 
 in substance, that the witnesses did not profess to have any knowledge 
 of the reputation of the witness whose testimony they were called to 
 sustain, and that, from the same standpoint, he could personally sus- 
 tain the reputation of the defendant. These observations were made 
 the basis upon which the prosecutor said, in his argument, that he had 
 personal knowledge of the fact that the defendant was reputed to be a 
 hotel thief, and that he -had been published and portrayed in the Police 
 Gazette as such. The reviewing court censured this transgression of 
 
 the jury; besides, they are not withiu State, 78 Teuu. (14 Lea) 424, 428, 
 
 the principle established by our cases. 431. 
 
 They are not facts detailed by the ^ State v. Banks, 10 Mo. App. Ill, 
 
 attorney-general, not in proof in refer- 115. 
 
 ence to the prisoner or his conduct or ^ Ante, § 963. 
 
 relations, but only matters of current s People v. White, 53 Mich. 537, 
 
 history, used byway of enforcing an 539; ante, § 856. 
 
 argument. This objection is not suffi- •* Crartield r. Knight's Ferry AVater 
 
 cieut for reversal." Northiugton v. Co., 14 Cal. 35.
 
 772 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 the prosecuting attorney, but finding " a bare shadow" of excuse for 
 it, and the verdict being well sustained by the evidence, concluded not 
 
 to reverse the conviction. ^ On the trial of an Indictment of a 
 
 supervisor for unlawfully withholding a record from the proper custo- 
 dian, the State's attorney, in his closing remarks to the jury, charged 
 the defendant with stealing an affidavit made by him at a previous term 
 of court for a continuance, and reiterated the same after objection by 
 defendant and after being warned by the court that it was improper ; and 
 stated that the defense was all a sham, and that defendant had fled 
 from justice and never surrendered himself until he found a witness 
 was dead, and then hatched up his rotten defense. There was no evi- 
 dence upon which to base such remarks, and they were reiterated after 
 being informed by the court that they were improper. The reviewing 
 court characterized these arguments as clearl}' improper and a mani- 
 fest breach of both professional and official duty ; yet, under the cir- 
 cumstances, the court did not regard them as of so gross a character as 
 
 to warrant a reversal of the judgment.'- On a trial for murder the 
 
 prosecuting attorney, in addressing the jury, said: "The defendant in 
 this case has stooped so low as to drag before you, on the trial of this 
 cause, the infidelity of his dead wife, and publish her before the court- 
 house as a prostitute." The court could not deny that this remark was 
 
 " unfair," but refused a new trial. ^ On a recent prosecution in 
 
 Indiana for a murder by poison, one of the attorneys for the State, in 
 his closing argument, delivered to the jury, notwithstanding repeated 
 objections from the counsel of the accused, such paragraphs as the fol- 
 lowing: " Why, a man was hung at Ft. Wayne, in an adjoining county, 
 on circumstantial evidence not a hundredth part as strong as the evi- 
 dence in this case against Mrs. Epps." After an interruption and an 
 admonition from the court to confine himself to the case, he replied : 
 " I know what I am saying, and I do not want to be interrupted in my 
 argument. It throws me off my line of argument." Commenting on 
 certain evidence, he also delivered the following expressions, some of 
 which were grossly unwarranted by the evideuce: "This woman 
 [pointing to the accused] took poison from Clinton Orndorff in 
 Weaver's store and said: ' I know what it is ; I know it's poison ; I've 
 handled it before ; I have buried two husbands and children.'" The 
 evidence to which this referred was merely that the accused had given 
 
 1 Heyl V. State, 109 Intl. 590, .594. s McConnclI v. State (Tex.), 3S. W. 
 
 2 Baysinger v. rcople, 115 111. 420, Eep. G99. 
 42G.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT 773 
 
 the witness five cents to buy some arsenic to poison rats, and, on re- 
 ceiving it slie said she had handled it before. On being again inter- 
 rupted by counsel for the accused and admonished by the court, the 
 State's counsel kept on thus: "I don't mean tliat she [the accused] 
 said it all in Weaver's store ; I mean to say that she said in Weaver's 
 store that she knew it was poison and had handled it before, and that 
 it was a fact that she had buried two husbands and children ; but I dis- 
 claim any intention to say that she testified to [these facts] all in the 
 same connection in the store." Further on in his argument, he said: 
 " Oh, gentlemen of the jury, if 1 could tell you what that good old 
 man, Edward jMise [pointing to him], told me he knows about other 
 dark things concerning this case, it would clear away much of the mys- 
 tery about it, about which counsel for defendant talked so much." 
 Because the verdict was right on the merits, the reviewing court over- 
 looked these shameful abuses of the right of argument,^ for which the 
 
 counsel committing them ought to have been punished. Objection 
 
 was made in one case to the statement of the district attorney, in his 
 argument to the jury, that the plea of insanity in criminal cases is gen- 
 erally a " sham " and a " device " resorted to by defendants who have 
 no defense, — illustrating his remarks by a reference to the Guiteau 
 case. It was claimed that this was unwarranted and of a prejudicial 
 character ; but tiie court nevertheless affirmed the conviction and sen- 
 tence of death. '2 
 
 § 986. Prejudice not Cured by Similar Misconduct in the 
 Opposing Counsel. — Similar misconduct on the part of the op- 
 posing counsel does not justify such a course, although it may 
 justify the counsel in endeavoring to remove the prejudice which 
 nuiy have been produced by the misconduct of the opposite 
 counsel.'^ 
 
 §987. Illegitimate Argument first Introduced by Opposing 
 Counsel. — We have had occasion to examine a rule of evidence 
 under which a party who opens up, by his own witnesses, an im- 
 proper line of inquiry, cannot complain that the other party was 
 allowed to introduce evidence rebutting the same facts, or to 
 follow up the same inquiry.* Some courts admit a correspond- 
 
 1 Epps u. State, 102 Ind. 540, 550. 629; Tucker y. Ileuuiker, 41 N. H. 
 
 2 Poliu V. State, 14 Neb. 540, 548, 317, 322. 
 
 2 Mitchum V. S^ate, 11 Ga. 615, ■» Ante, §§ 423, i'>'.K), 70C.
 
 774 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tlioiup. Tr., 
 
 ing rule in respect of forensic argument ; so that, where the 
 counsel of the accused in a criminal trial enters upon a line of 
 argument outside the record, the accused cannot complain that 
 the State's attorney was allowed too free scope in reply uig to tJie 
 same} At least, where counsel on one side transcend their 
 jn'ivilege by alluding to impro})er matter, the counsel on the 
 other side may, without prejudicing their case, follow them, and 
 indulge in proper comments upon the same matter. ^ 
 
 § 988. Illustration. — This is well illustrated by a case of murder, 
 where counsel for the accused, among other irrelevant matters, ap- 
 pealed to the jur^'^ to look into the defendant's face, " for evidence of 
 courage and consequent incapacity to commit such a crime." "The 
 prosecuting attorney , " said the court, ' in a masterly manner, took up 
 the gauntlet thus thrown down, and ably, eloquently, and with telling 
 force, presented the State's side of the collateral issues thus forced up- 
 on the prosecution. We are not prepared to say that his remarks were 
 not entirely legitimate, independent of the provocation and invitation 
 thus given by the defense. If the defendant wishes to invoke the rule 
 of confinement to the record, they themselves must keep within the 
 record. When they voluntarily go outside, they at least invite, if tliey 
 do not render it necessary, that the prosecution should follow. Appel- 
 lant's counsel characterized the deed as a most dastardly and cowardly 
 murder, and requested tlie jury to look into defendant's face for evi- 
 dence of courage and incapacity to commit such a crime. Answering 
 this argument, the reply was: 'Whoever saw that face [pointing at 
 defendant] that could ever forget it? No, gentlemen, no. As the pis- 
 tol flashed, there was a circle of light in his front, and through it 
 gleamed the eyes of the assassin sitting tiiere [pointing at defendant] 
 in this court room.' This reply was called for, and was legitimate. 
 As stated above, if the remarks excepted to were not legitimate pri- 
 marily, they were most clearl}' so, and entirely within the bounds, as 
 answers to the above argument of defendant's counsel," "^ 
 
 § 089. 3Iatters Which have been Fair Subjects of Com- 
 ment. — The subornation of evidence by the o})posing i)arty, or 
 his fadure to j)roduce important evidence within his reach, is 
 
 ' I'iorsoii r. state, lM Tex. Ap|i. ].-., L'l; \. \X . Kcp. lU); I'.aUrr r. Slate 
 
 " IIoEfiuau r. State, (J.J Wis. ir. ; >•. c. J Piursou v. State, 21 Tex. xVpp, 1,:;,G0.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of akgu.ment. 775 
 
 always a fair subject of comment in argument to the jury,' — as 
 where the opposing party fails to call an important witness whom 
 he might have called,^ or to road the depositions of witnesses 
 which he has taken to be used in the casc,'^ or to introduce im- 
 portant papers in his possession.^ So, the apparent interest of 
 the witness is always the subject of fair comment in argument,^ 
 and in most jurisdictions may properly form the subject of cau- 
 tionary instructions to the jury. Contractual relationf^, sus- 
 tained by a witness to a party may, as already seen, be shown in 
 evidence, on cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting the 
 credibility of the witness in the opinion of the jury.^ Upon the 
 like principle, the fact of such relationship is the subject of fair 
 comment in argument. " Even though introduced by the party 
 thus commenting, it is legitimate to call attention to the bias, in 
 order to give more force to what the employe may swear against 
 his master, — just as a brother swearing against a party in that 
 relation to him mi<iht just as well be considered as entitled to 
 great credit, and when for him, to less. Not that either could 
 be impeached by the party calling him, but the fact of relation- 
 ship or obligation or service may be properly evoked by counsel, 
 with a view to strengthen or weaken the force of what is testi- 
 fied — the natural heiijhtening or softening^ the colors of the 
 story, without impeaching the integrity of the witness."^ So, 
 if the accused takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf his 
 testimony is the subject of fair comment by the State's attorney, 
 the same as the testimony of any other witness ; ^ though if he 
 
 1 See Kuowles v. People, 1,1 Mich, *> Ante, § 450. 
 
 412; Audersou v. Ku.ssell, 34 Mich. ' Central R. Co. w. Mitchell, (J3 Ga. 
 
 110; ante, §§ 453, 794, 7'J5. 173, 180. 
 
 2.-Gavigan v. Scott, 51 Mich. 373; » Held v. State, 20 Neb. 493,500. 
 
 State V. Joues, 77 N. C. 520; Gray t?. Compare Comstock v. State, 14 Neb. 
 
 Bark, 19 Tex. 228; Peebles v. Hortou, 205, ^vhere the accused having elected 
 
 54 N. C. 374. to take the yrituess stand and failed 
 
 3 Learned v. Hall, 133 Mass. 417. to controvert the testimony of the 
 
 •• Chambers v. Greenwood, 08 N. C. State's witnesses, it was reasoned 
 
 274; Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331; Lo- that this was tantamount to an ad- 
 
 gan V. Monroe, 20 Me. 25'.). See also mission that such testimony was true. 
 
 Devries v. Phillips, (i3 N. 0. 53. See ante, § G4(j. 
 
 '" Morehouse v. Heath, 99 lud 509, 518
 
 77(5 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOlllp. Tl"., 
 
 does not take the stand, the circunii^tance cannot be alluded to.^ 
 Where the prisoner had taken the stand as a witness, and, being 
 pressed Avith a particuLir question, had declined to aiisicer it on 
 the ground of privilege^ and the prosecuting attorney had aUuded 
 to the fact in argument, — it was observed that it would have been 
 more proper to have abstained from so doing, but that the remark 
 afforded no sufficient ground for disturbins»: the verdict.^ As the 
 argument of the opposing counsel is a fair subject of comment, 
 so may be his mode of framing the questions which he puts to 
 hisowm witnesses ; and accordingly it is not error to i^ermit coun- 
 sel to make comments on the cross-interrogatories proposed by 
 the adverse party to a witness w'ho testifies by deposition, 
 and to argue therefrom that the evidence of that party, as given 
 at the trial, was incorrect. " If," said Bigelow, J., " a witness 
 should be examined on the stand, the mode in which questions 
 were framed and put would certainly be open to observation. 
 The same rule is applicable wdiere the interrogatories are in writ- 
 ing." ^ Matters which form a part of the record are gen- 
 erally regarded as subjects of fair comment. Thus, it has 
 been held that a written motion for a continuance, being a part 
 of the record, may be commented upon by the opposite counsel 
 in their argument, without the formality of having it offered in 
 evidence.* So it is legitimate for counsel, in argument, in a 
 criminal trial, to allude to what has transpired in the case from 
 the time it was called, through its entire progress; and the con- 
 duct of the accused or his counsel in connection with his trial is 
 a proper subject of argument. Such mutters, it is reasoned, are 
 necessarily within the discretion of the trial court, which discre- 
 tion will not be controlled except in cases of flagrant abuse; it 
 must a[)pear that the accused has received some positive injury, 
 or been denied some material right. ^ So, it has been held that 
 the privilege of argument is not abused in a criminal case, by the 
 statement by the prosecuting counsel that " the defendant stood 
 
 1 Pnst, §§ 1001, 1002. •■' Smiley u. Burpco, 5 Allen (Mass ), 
 
 2 I'eople V. Wilsou, ."> Mich. oOC, 5(;8. 
 
 515. ■• Cross V, Garrett, 35 Iowa, 480 
 
 ^ Iiiiuau V. State, 72 Ga, 2G'J 274.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMEXT. 777 
 
 mute, and said nothing when accused of this crime by the pros- 
 ecuting witness in the presence of the officers of the hiw," — 
 this being a fact shown by evidence. ^ In a criminal trial, coun- 
 sel for the defendant objected to the solicitor-general stating, in 
 his concludino; aro-ument to the jury, that counsel for the defend- 
 ant had " dilly-dallied'" with (his case; that they had moved for 
 a continuance at the last term of the court upon the absence of a 
 witness [naming him] , and, at the present term upon the same 
 ground ; that the court had sent for the witness and had brought 
 him. into court, and yet counsel for the defendant had not intro- 
 duced him. It was held that these facts were subjects of fair 
 comment.^ In a case of murder, the prisoner had testified to 
 admissions which his wife had made to him respecting her char- 
 acter for chastity. The wife was offered as a witness to contra- 
 dict this, and, in arguing the question of her competency, the 
 State's attorney narrated the statements made by the husband 
 which he proposed to disprove by her, charging that they were 
 " false" and stated that he " denied them." It was said that 
 this was not outside the legitimate scope of argument.-^ 
 
 § 990. Reading Documentary Evidence to the Jury. — It 
 
 is scarcely necessary to say that counsel, in arguing to the jury, 
 are entitled to read to them any instrument which has been of- 
 fered and admitted, for the purpose of refreshing their minds in 
 respect to the same and of directing their attention to the view 
 entertained by counsel as to its bearings. Nor is it necessary 
 that the portion of the document which the counsel proposes to 
 read, was read to them when offered and admitted as evidence. 
 Accordingly, Avhere a paper is put in evidence by a party for a 
 peculiar purpose, and not read to the jury, but read to them in 
 part only, it is generally the right of the opposing party to have 
 the whole of it considered as evidence, and to read to them such 
 portions of it as he may desire.* 
 
 1 Leonard v. State, 20 Tex. App. •• Hassler v. Schumacher, 10 Wis. 
 442. 419; Uuited States v. Craudcll, 4 
 
 2 Inmau v. State, 72 Ga. 2G9. Crauch C. C. (U. S.) 683. See ante, §§ 
 
 3 Poliu V. State, 14 Neb. 540, 548. 412, 701,835.
 
 778 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiup. Tl"., 
 
 § 991. Reading from the Notes of the Official Stenog- 
 rapher. — It is not an irregularity for the State's counsel, in a 
 criminal trial, in reviewing the evidence in his argument to the 
 jury, to read from the notes of a stenographic reporter of the 
 court; since, his right to state the evidence being clear, it can 
 make no difference whether he states it from recollection, or reads 
 it from the reporter's abstract, provided he states it correctly. 
 " In most cases," said the court, " it is quite probable that a more 
 exact statement of what the testimony was, will be given from 
 the stenographer's report than from memory; but of the cor- 
 rectness of the statement, and what the testimony actually was, 
 the jury will ultimately determine. In either case, it devolves 
 on the court to see to it that the jury are not imposed upon by 
 any misstatement of the evidence given in the case." ^ 
 
 § 993. Use of Papers, Maps, Diagranis, etc., which are not 
 in Evidence. — It seems to be a sound conclusion that it is the 
 right of a party, in arguing to a jury, to use a map or plan which 
 is not strictly evidence in the case, for the purpose of illustrat- 
 ing his argument and explaining to the jury the position which 
 he assumes — just as the teacher makes use of the figures on a 
 blackboard for the purposes of illustration. ^ On the contrary, it 
 has been held that trial courts should not permit counsel, in ar- 
 guing a case to the jury, to induce the jurors to take down with 
 pencil and ])aper the counseVs calculation of amounts, nor should 
 the jurors be permitted to take such memoranda to the jury- 
 room, to be used in making up their verdict. " It may be," 
 
 1 State V. McCool, M Kau, 013, filG^ correctly, as near as he could see.'' 
 
 2 Thus, in a controversy between It was held proper for the court toal- 
 two coterminous owners as to a low the plaintiff to use this plan for 
 
 -boundary, a plan of two lots, the loca- the purpose of explaining to the jury 
 
 tion of the division line of which was what his claim was in relation to the 
 
 the subject of the controversy, was location of the lots, and where, ac- 
 
 raade by the plaintiff's attorney, he cording to his claim, the division line 
 
 not being a surveyor, and the plan liot was, the charge of the court having 
 
 having been made prior to the survey limited his use of it strictly to his 
 
 of tlie lauds. The plaintiff testilied, ])urpose. Hale v. Rich, 48 Vt. 217, 
 
 ■without contradiction, that the plan '12\. See also Woodv. Willard, 3G Vt, 
 
 was all rigiit ami located the land 82; mite, §870
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 779 
 
 say the court, " that a juror, if he desire it, may make, od his 
 own motion, memoranda of evidence, or even of the points of 
 argument of counsel, but it should only be done on the motion 
 of juror, and not by counsel." ^ But tliere seems to be no good 
 sense in placing jurors under such restrictions. If they are fit 
 for the discharge of their duties at all, they are competent to 
 discharge them in a sensible and proper manner, just as the 
 judge would discharge the same duties if he were sitting as the 
 trier of the facts. But the line of propriety is clearly crossed 
 when counsel, in argument, against the objection of the opposite 
 party, hand to the jury a paper, in order that they may deter- 
 mine the question of a disputed signature by a comparison of 
 Jiandwrilinrj ? This mode of proving handwriting by a compari- 
 son made by the jurors is not competent under the rules of evi- 
 dence,^ and therefore such an act is an act of the same quality as 
 the act of getting before the jury, in argument, any other inad- 
 missible, evidentiary matters.* 
 
 § 993. Referring- to the Failure of the Opposite Party in a 
 Civil Case to Testify. — The omission of the opposite party in 
 a civil case to testify in his own behalf, for the purpose of ex- 
 plaining matters which, from their nature, lie within his own 
 knowledge, unless a sufiicient explanation is otherwise afforded 
 by his evidence, is a fair subject of comment.^ The contrary 
 conclusion has been reached in North Carolina, but upon reason- 
 ing wdiich does not commend itself to favorable consideration. "^ 
 In one case that court say: " Th.e fact that a party does or does 
 not offer himself as a witness, standing alone, does not allow the 
 jury to presume anything for or against him, and can on\j be 
 the subject of comment as to its propriety or necessity, in any 
 given case, according to the circumstances, as the introduction 
 of any other witnesses may be commented upon." ^ In another 
 
 1 Indianapolis «Sbc. R. Co. v. Mil- •» Ante, § 063. 
 
 Icr, 71 111. 4()4, 472. s Lynch v. Peabody, 137 Mass. 92. 
 
 2 Sliorb V. Kinzie, 100 Iml. 429. ^ Dewies v. Pliillips, (JS N. C. 53; 
 
 3 Bcrryliill v. Kirclmer, tX! Pa. St. Chambers v. Gret^nvood, 08 N. C. 274, 
 480- Benedict v. Flanigau, 18 S. C. 288; Gragg v. Wag-ncr, 77 N. C. 24G. 
 506- s c. 44 Am. Rep. 583. " Devries i\ Phillips, 63 N. C. 53.
 
 780 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tl"., 
 
 case the court reasoned that it is the privilege^ and not the dutyy 
 of a party to a civil action to offer himself as a witness. " The 
 fact," the court say, " is not the subject of comment at all — 
 certainly not unless under very peculiar circumstances, which 
 must necessarily be passed upon by the judge presiding at the 
 trial, as a matter of sound discretion." ^ The sound rule is the 
 reverse of that suggested in the language above quoted. In 
 many cases the fact that a party does not offer himself as a wit- 
 ness, standing alone, will raise a fair inference that he is sup- 
 pressing the truth, and this manifestly ought to be the subject of 
 fair comment to the jury, — as much so as his failure to call any 
 other credible witness within his reach, who knows the facts in 
 controversy. Rules which hamper counsel in freely presenting 
 their client's cause to the jury are not conducive to -the proper 
 administration of justice. Modern statutes rendering parties 
 competent to testify, and providing for the examination of par- 
 ties, having taken the last vestige out of the old common-law 
 rule which shielded a party to a civil action from producing 
 evidence against himself, there is no reason in the nature of 
 things why the failure of a party to a civil action to take the 
 stand as his Own witness should not be the subject of fair com- 
 ment to the jury, in like manner as his failure to produce any 
 other witness who presumptively knows the material facts. ^ 
 
 § 994. Reading Newspapers to the Jury. — Whether the 
 reading to the jury, during argument, of paragraphs from a 
 newspaper, will be ground fox a new trial must, of course, 
 depend upon the nature of the matter read. If it is 
 evidentiary in its nature, or whether evidentiary or not, of 
 a tendency to excite prejudice against the losing party, it 
 will be ground for a new trial. It was so held where, in a 
 suit brought against a railway company for a personal injury to 
 an employe, the plaintiff's counsel read to the jury a newspaper 
 article intended to cast a stigma upon all railway comjianies on 
 account of their recklessness in caring for the lives of their em- 
 
 ^ Grags V. Wagner, 77 N. C. 246. ^ p^sty §§ 1001-1003.
 
 Tit. lY, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF right of argument. 781 
 
 ployes.^ " It is not proper, however, to permit counsel to read 
 newspaper comments upon the case on trial, nor upon facts con- 
 nected with it, nor upon like matters. In short, extracts can 
 only be used for the mere purposes of illustration, and never as 
 statements of facts or expressions of opinion ; nor can they be 
 used under the cover of illustrations, when they contain state- 
 ments of facts or expressions of opinion, concerning the par- 
 ticular case in hearing, or cases of like character." ^ But it is a 
 rule in this connection that prejudice from such a course of con- 
 duct on the part of counsel will not be presumed, but must 
 appear, in order to warrant a reviewing court in granting a new 
 trial on this ground. Thus, where it appeared from the bill of 
 exceptions that the counsel of the successful party read, as a part 
 of his argument and for the purpose of illustrating it, a slip cut 
 from a newspaper containing the form of a prom'issory note call- 
 ing for $10, and then, by folding it in a peculiar manner, showed 
 that it assumed the form of a note for $279 ; and the bill of excep- 
 tions showed that the counsel commented upon the note read 
 from the slip, ))ut did not state what his comments were, — the 
 Supreme Court could not see any prejudicial error, but presumed 
 that the comments were such as were proper for the counsel to 
 make. "If," said Elliott, J., "the counsel had written the 
 paper which he used for the purpose of illustration, it would 
 scarcely be contended that it was improper for him to make use 
 of it for the purpose of illustrating the manner in which a man 
 not used to business might be imposed upon and induced to be- 
 lieve he was signing one instrument, when in fact he was actually 
 signino; one of an altojjether different character." ^ 
 
 § 995. Reading Books of Science to the Jviry. — In the 
 
 former chapter the circumstances under which books of the Jaio 
 inay be read to the jury in argument were considered, from which 
 
 i Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bragouier, Ins. Co. r. Cheever, 3G Ohio St. 201 ; 
 
 13 Bradw. (111.) 467. s. c. 38 Am. Hep. 573. 
 
 - Baldwin v. Bricker, 86 Ind. 221, ^ Baldwin v. Briciier, 86 lud. 221, 
 
 opinion by Elliott, J., citing Thomp. & 223. 
 M. on Juries, § 351 and authorities;
 
 782 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOmp. Tl'.^ 
 
 it will appear that the reading of books of the law stands on this 
 peculiar footing: that whereas, juries are in criminal trials and 
 in actions for libel, judges of the law as well as of the fact, it 
 necessarily follows that counsel have the right to argue the law to 
 them, so that they do not commit the indecency of arguing 
 against the law as laid down by the court; in the making of which 
 argument they nuist necessarily have the right to read to the 
 jury extracts from books of the law. This, at least, is the 
 limit of the right, as laid down by those courts which uphold to 
 the fullest extent the doctiine that, in criminal trials and in ac- 
 tions for libel, juries are judges of the law as well as of the facts. 
 But the reading of other books, and notably books of science, to 
 the jury rests upon a different footing, which will now be consid- 
 ered. And first it must be observed, — 
 
 § 996. That Such Books are not Evidence. — The rule is 
 that i)rofessional books, books of science — e. g, medical books — 
 are not admissible in evidence, though experts may be asked 
 their judgment and the grounds of it, which may be founded on 
 books, as a part of their general knowledge.^ The reason of the 
 rule is, obviously, that if the authors were present they could not 
 be examined without being sworn and exposed to a cross-exam- 
 ination. Their declarations or statements, whether merely ver- 
 bal, or written, or printed and published in books, are not 
 admissible." ^ While it is said that a general historij may be read 
 from, yet this is only to refresh the memory of the court as to 
 something which it is supposed to know ; that is of which it takes 
 judicial notice.-^ Ai)plying this rule it is held that quotations 
 from medical books are nxjt admissible as evidence, when offered 
 independently, or when read by witnesses. So, in those 
 jurisdictions where it is conceded that, under appropriate 
 restrictions, domestic law books may be read to the jury, 
 yet the reason assigned for allowing this is that the court, 
 
 Ok'lvitiu. Easley, 1 Jones L.(N. C.) 2 Battle, J., iu Melvin v. Easley, 
 
 38(); Collier u. Simp.sou, aCaiT. &.P. 73; supra; Stilling o. Thorp, supra. 
 Ktillinu; v. Tliorp, 54 Wis. 528; North- ^ Northiugtou v. State, supra. 
 
 iugton V State, 78 Teuu. (U Lea) 424.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX. J ABUSES of right of argument. 7ii3 
 
 being the judge of the law, may correct the counsel as 
 to the law so read, or as to the application of it. Nay, the court 
 may prohibit counsel from reading to juries extracts from books 
 of law ^vhich have no pertinency to the issues on trial. But the 
 opinions of medical experts are in the nature of facts, and as 
 such must, like all other facts of which judicial notice is not tak- 
 en, be established by the testimony of living witnesses. They 
 cannot be proved by writings which are in the nature of hearsay 
 declarations, which come from persons who are not present testi- 
 fying as witnesses, and who are not even shown to be competent 
 to express scientitic opinions.^ In so ruling in a criminal case, 
 Baron Alderson said to counsel: "I should not allow you to 
 read a work on foreign law. Any person who was properly 
 conversant with it might be examined; but then he adds his own 
 personal knowledge and experience to the information he may 
 have derived from books. We must have the evidence of indi- 
 viduals, not their written opinions. We should be inundated 
 with books, if we were to hold otherwise."^ The doctrine has 
 been reaffirmed in many cases. ^ 
 
 § 997. Instauces Affirming and Disaffirnnng" tlie foregoing 
 
 Rule. — Thus, where it is a material question, upon a trial be- 
 fore a jury, whether a party has been treated by a medical 
 practitioner in a proper and skillful manner, it is error to permit 
 counsel, in arguing to the jury, to read an extract from a medical 
 work, giving the opinion of the writer as to the pro})er mode of 
 treatment to be followed in such a case.* On the contrary, 
 
 1 People V. Wheeler, 60 Cal. 580, Legg v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 286; Wade 
 
 584; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 70 (deuyiug ?;. De Witt, 20 Tex. 401 ; Ripou u. Bittel, 
 
 Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene (Iowa), 30 Wis. 619; State v. Sartou, 2 Strobh. 
 
 441,445). L. (S. C.) 60; Collier v. Simpsou, 5 
 
 - Reg. V. Crouch, 1 Cox C. C. 94. Carr. & P. 73; Carter v. State, 2 
 
 3 Reg. r. Taylor, 13 Cox C. C. 77; lud. 617; Attoruey-Geueral v. Plate 
 
 State V. O'Brieu, 7 R. I. 338; Ash- Glass Co., 1 Austr. 39; Liming v. 
 
 worth V. Kittridge, 12 Cush. (Mass.) State, 1 Chaud. (Wis.) 178; Green w. 
 
 193 •, Commonwealth v. Wilson, 1 Gray Cornell, 1 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 14. 
 
 (Mass.) 338; Washburn v. Cuddihy, ^ Gale v. Rector, 5 Bradw. (111.) 481, 
 
 8 Gray (Mass.), 431; Commonwealth 484. 
 
 V Brown, 121 Mass. 81. Compare
 
 784 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 where, in a criminal trial, the prosecuting attorney first proved 
 by the testimony of a practicing physician that a certain medical 
 work was a book " recognized by the medical profession as good 
 authority on all subjects therein treated of," it was held com- 
 petent to allow him to read extracts from it.^ In a case 
 
 of murder, where the homicide grew out of a difficulty between 
 two " gentlemen" one of whom, after having vainly endeavored 
 to obtain satisfaction according to the " code," proceeded to 
 " post" the other as a coward, it was held not such an irregu- 
 larity as required a new trial, that counsel for the State, in his 
 opening argument, read extracts from a standard work on duel- 
 ling and also from an essay on the same subject written by him- 
 self, which laid down the rules obtaining " among gentlemen " 
 as to blows, insults and apologies, the "lie direct," the " amende 
 honorable,''' etc., and which gave an account of the unhappy 
 life of one who had killed his adversary in a duel. The court 
 could not say that this was entirel^Mmpertinent to the case under 
 consideration, or beyond the scope of the limits allowed to ad- 
 vocacy. ^ 
 
 § 998. AVhetlier such Books may be Read for Purposes of 
 Argviment or Illustration. — Upon this question there is a dif- 
 ference of opinion, involving what might be called a strict and 
 liberal construction of a well-settled and obvious rule. On the 
 one hand, it is held that, such books not being admissible as evi- 
 dence, it is not permissible for counsel to read to the jury extracts 
 from them by way of argument or illustration ; since this would 
 have the effect of enabling counsel to get before the jury a species 
 of evidence which the law rejects as incompetent.^ It has even 
 been held that an expert should not be allowed, in giving his 
 testimony, to read from a work on medical jurisprudence.* On 
 
 1 Merkle v. State, 37 Ahi. 13i) (fol- Ashworth v. Kittridse, 12 Cush. 
 lowing Staiuleumier r. AVilliaiiisou, 29 (Maiss.) 193; People v. Wheeler, GO 
 Ala. 5G6; Acct. Bowiuau v. Woods, 1 Cal. 581; s. c. H Am, Rep. 70. 
 Greene (Iowa), 445). * Commomvcalth v. Sturtivant, 117 
 
 2 Cavauah v. State, 56 Miss. 300, Mass. 139. Compare Yoe v. People, 
 308. 49 111. 410, 412. 
 
 3 Reg. V. Taylor, 13 Cox C. C. 77;
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES OF RIGHT OF ARGUMENT. 785 
 
 the other liand, it has been held that counsel may properly be 
 allowed, by way of argument or illustration, to read a pertinent 
 quotation or extract from a work of science or art, as well as a 
 classical, historical or other like publication, because it would 
 make no difference whether repeated by counsel from recollection 
 or read from a book; though it would be an abuse of privileoe 
 for counsel to make the right to read such matter the means of 
 getting improper matter before the jury.i But the followino- 
 quahfication has been made to this rule: "The matter read or 
 stated should be pertinent to the subject of inquiry, and so far 
 calculated to elucidate it as to aid the jury in a better under- 
 standing of the evidence produced at the trial." '^ So in an 
 English criminal case, it was held that counsel had the rio-ht 'to 
 read to the jury the general observations of a learned Jud-e 
 made in a case tried some years before, on the nature and effect 
 of circumstantial evidence, if he adopted them as his own opin- 
 ions and made them a part of his address to the jury.^ It is also 
 conceded that the trial court may, in the exercise of a sound 
 discretion, determine how far the public time shall be taken up 
 m this way.4 Other courts have settled upon the broader rule 
 that the extent to which counsel in criminal trials mav read books 
 to the jury is a matter confided to the discretion of the trial 
 court, which discretion will not be reviewed unless in clear cases 
 of abuse ;^ from which it follows quite clearly that where the 
 trial court refuses to permit counsel to read from a book not in- 
 troduced in evidence to the jury, this will be no ground of re- 
 versal except in very clear cases. ^ 
 
 § 999. Instructing the Jury that Such Books are not Evi- 
 dence.— Where this practice has been permitted, it is the clear 
 duty of the court to instruct the jury that the extracts from the 
 
 1 Legg V. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 287; 3 K^g. v. Courvoisier, 9 Carr. & P 
 
 reaffirmed in Union Central Life Ins. 3G--> 
 
 Co. -• Cheever, 36 Oliio St. 201, 209; * Legg .. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 287. 
 
 .. c. 38 Am. Rep. 573. . j.empsey .. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 
 Union Central LifP Ins. Co. v. 429; Ilines ^^. State, 3 Tex. App. 483 
 Cheever, supra. e ^Vade .. De Witt, 20 Tex. |l8 ' 
 
 50
 
 786 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 books which have been read to them are not evidence, but simply 
 the theories of medical men.^ But whether such an instruction 
 will cure the error and prejudice is quite another question. In 
 Indiana, where a book purporting to be a medical work had been 
 read by counsel to the jury, and the court afterwards instructed 
 them that the extract w^as to be regarded not in anywise as evi- 
 dence, it was held that no reversible error had been committed.^ 
 The Supreme Court of California, on the contrary, in an elab- 
 orate judgment on this subject, regard the Indiana case as not 
 having been well decided.^ The question comes back to the con- 
 flict of opinion which obtains on the question whether the preju- 
 dice which flows from the admission of incompetent evidence is 
 cured by the action of the court in subsequently instructing the 
 jury to disregard it.* 
 
 § 1000. Illustrations. — Where the court allowed the counsel for 
 the State to read to the jury, against the objection of the prisoner, the 
 evidence of Charles H. Porter, who, as professor of chemistry, had 
 given testimony in a criminal trial in another State, counsel reading 
 from the published report of the trial of People v. Hartung.,^ it was 
 held that the ruling was erroneous, and the court, speaking through 
 Breese, C. J., said : "If the State's attorney, in such a case or in any 
 case, read from medical books in his argument to the jury, the court 
 should instruct them that such books are not evidence, but theories 
 simply of medical men. To permit testimony given in another State 
 to be used as evidence against a prisoner on trial in this State, was 
 the height of injustice, as the prisoner had no opportunity to cross- 
 examine the witness or to meet his testimony by other evidence." ^ In 
 a civil action for damages for overflowing the plaintiff's land and in- 
 juring the plaintiff's machinery by backwater from the defendant's mill- 
 dam, the plaintiff was allowed to read extracts from a book called 
 "Evans' Millwright's Guide," in his closing argument to the jury, 
 although the defendant objected. The court instructed the jury that 
 ■ extracts read from a scientific work were not even a prima facie author- 
 ity, but, like the argument of counsel, or other thing adduced in illus- 
 
 1 Yoe V. People, 49111.410,412. * Ilopt v. People, 7 U. S. Sup. Ct. 
 
 2 Harvey v. State, 40 lud. 51G. Rep. (JH; 21 Am. Law Rev. 459. 
 
 3 People V. Wheeler, GO Cal. 581; -''' 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 297. 
 
 s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 70. . ^ Yoe v. People, 49 111. 410, 412.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 787 
 
 tration, might be satisf actor}' to the jury, or might not. It was held 
 that in view of the admonition of the court, no ground for new trial was 
 presented. Hovey, J., in giving the opinion of the Supreme Court, 
 said : " Reason is neither more nor less than reason because it happens 
 to be read from a book ; and we think we would be adopting a very 
 difficult rule to enforce if we should attempt to compel counsel to use 
 their own arguments for every position they might assume." ^ 
 
 § lOOl. Referring to the Failure of the Prisoner to Testify in 
 His Own Behalf. — Since the passage of statutes in most Amer- 
 ican jurisdictions enabling the accused person, in a criminal case, 
 to testify in his own behalf, it has become an important question 
 whether, in case the accused does not avail himself of this priv- 
 ilege, the State's attorney may be permitted to comment upon 
 the fact in his argument to the jury. In some of the States the 
 statutes ^vhich thus enable an accused person to testify contain 
 the provision that his neglect or refusal to do so shall not raise 
 an}" presumption of guilt, nor shall the circumstance be referred 
 to by the State's attorney.'* The courts, whether following the 
 express language of statutes or attempting to carry out the 
 analogies of the old law, generally hold that the failure of the 
 accused person, in a criminal trial, to testify in his own behalf, 
 cannot be referred to by the State's counsel in their argument to 
 the jury, and that to permit a reference to it is error for which 
 a conviction will be reversed; -^ though if he does take the witness 
 
 1 Cory V. Silcox, 6 Ind. 30. Knight v. State, 70 Ind. 375; Morrison 
 
 2 Kansas Laws 1871, ch. 118, §1; v. State, 7(5 lud. 335, 338; State v. Banks 
 MissouriRev. Stat., § 1919. The Maine (Me.), 3 New Eng. Rep. 240; Corn- 
 statute recites that the fact that the de- monwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411. 
 fendant in a criminal prosecution does Contra, Stover v. People, 50 N. Y. 315 ; 
 not testify in his own behalf shall not • Price v. Com., 77 Va. 393; State v. 
 be evidence of his guilt. Maine Rev. Martin, 7-t Mo. 547; State v. Banks, 3 
 Stat., ch. 134, § 19. New Eng. Rep. 240; s. c. 78 Me. 490 
 
 3 States. Browntield, 15 Mo. App. (superseding the contrary rule in State 
 593; Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200,220; States. 
 (N. y.) 309; Showalter v. State, 84 Lawrence, 57 Me. 574, and Stale v. 
 Ind. 563; State v. Mosley, 31 Kan. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298). For further ob- 
 355; State u. Graham, 17. N. "W. Rep. servations on the policy of statutes 
 192; Long u. State, 5G Ind. 182; Cora- admitting prisoners to testify, see 
 monwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; Peoples. Jones, 31 Cal. 573; People u.
 
 788 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 stand, his testimony becomes the subject of fair comment, like 
 that of any other witness.^ 
 
 § 1002. Instances under the foregoing Rule. — In Ohio and Kansas, 
 it seems to be conceded that the incidental allusion by the prosecuting 
 attorney (not in argument to the jury) to the failure of the accused to 
 take the stand in his own behalf may not, under particular circumstances, 
 require the granting of a new trial. '^ In Missouri, the statement of 
 the prosecuting attorney, in his argument to the jury in a case of lar- 
 ceny, " that no attempt had been made by the defendant to explain his 
 possession of the property," was not regarded by the reviewing court 
 as referring to the fact that the defendant himself might have been ex- 
 amined as a witness if he had so chosen, and was therefore held not a 
 
 ground for a new trial. -^ In one jurisdiction the rule is that, if any 
 
 objectionable comments are made by the State's counsel, upon the fail- 
 ure of the accused to take the witness stand in his own behalf, his 
 
 Farrell, 31 Cal. 583. In a recent case 
 in Maine, State v. Banks, supra, the 
 history of the practice iu that State ou 
 tliis subject is thus given in the opin- 
 ion of tlie court delivered by Virgin, 
 J.: "In 18<!4r, for the first time, a 
 person charged with commission of a 
 •criminal offense was made, ' at his own 
 request, and not otherwise, a com- 
 petent witness.' Stat. 1804, ch. 280. 
 After this statute took effect, county 
 attorneys, where the accused did not 
 elect to testify, were allowed, in argu- 
 ment to comment ou tlie fact to the 
 jury. State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 220; 
 State V. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574; State 
 V. Cleaves, 59 Me, 298. This practice 
 continued for fifteen years, and while 
 it operated favorably for innocent per- 
 sons, it resulted disastrously to the 
 guilty who would not add i)erjury to 
 the crime charged. Thereupon the 
 Legislature, believing that the consti- 
 tutional provision which declares that 
 ' the accused shall not be compelled 
 to furnish or give evidence against 
 himself (Decl. Rights, § 5), like the 
 
 rain descending upon the innocent and 
 guilty alike, and looking to a more 
 careful protection of this right, enacted 
 that ' the fact that the defendant iu a 
 criminal prosecution does not testify 
 in his own behalf shall not be evidence 
 of his guilt.' Stat. 1879, ch. 92, § 1; 
 Rev. Stat., ch. 134, § 19. AYe think 
 the intent of the statute is that the 
 jury, in determining their verdict, 
 shall entirely exclude from their con- 
 sideration the fact that the defendant 
 did not elect to testify, substantially 
 as if the law d[id not allow him to be a 
 wituess. Commonwealth v. Harlow, 
 110 Mass. 411; Commonwealth v. 
 Scott, 123 Mass. 241," It has been 
 supposed that the fact that a party 
 does not testify is not a circumstance 
 against him, unless there is sufficient 
 evidence to justify a finding against 
 him. Ilorton v. Parsons (N. Y. Sup 
 Ct.), 24 Week. Dig. 234. 
 
 ^ Ante, §§ 64(;, 989. 
 
 ^ Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 306; 
 State V. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355. 
 
 3 State V. Preston, 77 Mo. 294.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 789 
 
 remedy is to object to them at the time, and to ask the judge to in- 
 struct the jury that they should not be considered by them to his 
 prejudice; that, in such a case, the judge is not required to treat the 
 whole trial as a nullity because of such remarks, and withdraw the case 
 
 from the jury.i But another court goes to the length of holding 
 
 ihat, where counsel for the State, in their argument, are guilty of the 
 highly improper and unprofessional conduct of referring to the fact of 
 the failure of the accused to take the witness stand in his own behalf, 
 such refei-ence being prohibited by statute, a conviction will be reversed, 
 although the court may have interposed and rebuked the impropriety ; 
 since in such a case it cannot be known how far the remark may have 
 prejudiced the rights of the accused. ^ Nor will an instruction admon- 
 ishing the jury to pay no attention to the remark, cure the prejudice. ^ 
 
 § 1003. Comments by the Author on the Foregoing Rule. — The 
 foregoing rule is a striking illustration of the extent to which old ideas, 
 however foolish, when constantly reiterated by grave and earnest men, 
 will pass unchallenged as the very essence of wisdom, — a thing which is 
 every day illustrated in the idiotic religious creeds which take hold of 
 the beliefs of the most learned men. It is an attempt to invest accused 
 persons with this privilege and at the same time to throw around them 
 the shield of the ancient maxim nemo seipsum accnsare teiietiir, thus 
 keeping alive the maxim after the state of things which called it into 
 existence has wholly passed away. The maxim had its origin in times 
 when it was the practice to put accused persons to the torture, for the 
 purpose of compelling them to disclose the guilt of themselves and their 
 accomplices, and its original meaning was that no one should be com- 
 pelled, by torture^ or by any other compulsory means, to accuse himself. 
 If we adhere to the maxim in its original meaning, we proceed upon a 
 foundation of common sense and of obvious justice. But there is no 
 sound reason why a prisoner should not be interrogated, as is done in 
 continental countries, in respect of the circumstances surroundino- the 
 alleged crime, his answers and his manner of sustaining the examina- 
 tion being fair subjects of consideration by the jury. Far less reason 
 is there for the conclusion that he may avail himself of the privilege 
 of becoming a witness in his own behalf, and yet the triers of the facts 
 are so far to stultify their own understanding as not to draw any unfavor- 
 
 ^ Com. V. Worcester, U-t Mass. 58, 3 state v. Balch, 31 Kau. 405; s. c, 
 
 Gl. 2Pac. Rep. GOO. 
 
 2 Augelo V. People, 96 111. 209.
 
 790 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOllip. Tl',, 
 
 able inference against him if lie declines the privilege. In every other 
 situation the rule of reason has its sway. Co)itra spoliatorem omnia 
 prcesumimtur ; and, as already seen, where a party in a civil trial fails to 
 produce material witnesses, depositions or documents within his reach, 
 the fact creates a presumption against him and becomes a subject of 
 fair comment in argument to the jury.i But here the tenderness of the 
 law toward the criminal classes is so great, that the ordinary methods 
 by which men reason in arriving at truth are to be put aside. A 
 hardened counterfeiter or thief sits in the prisoner's seat, and he above 
 all others could if he would, and would if he could, explain the incul 
 patory circumstances shown in the evidence against him ; but it is his 
 privilege to say not one word ; and, lest the jury should draw from his 
 silence that inference which the experience of men draws in every like 
 situation from the failure of him to explain who best can explain, the 
 prosecuting attorney is not to allude to the circumstances in argument, 
 but is to assist, by silence, in concealing from the jury, if possible, the 
 fact that the law allows the prisoner to take the witness stand and ex- 
 plain, if he can. Such efforts are not only ineffective, but they are 
 puerile. As the intelligence of the community constantly rises, juries 
 will seldom be assembled to try criminal cases who do not know that 
 the law extends to ever}^ accused person the privilege of being a witness 
 for himself. They justly regard it as a privilege which was intended to 
 be the shield of the innocent and not the shield of the guilty. They 
 know that an innocent man, who can explain, will always attempt do so. 
 They bring to the discharge of their duties the processes of reasoning 
 upon which men proceed in the ordinary affairs of life. They cannot be 
 trained, for the purposes of a single trial, to stultifying common sense, 
 in order that guilt may be screened and crime go unpunished. An}' 
 attempt to reach such a result, by withholding from their minds a 
 knowledge of the state of the law on the subject, must be as fantastic 
 as the attempt of the old hen which has hatched a litter of ducks, to 
 keep them from running into the water. There is especially less reason 
 for this rule under modern holdings which limit the cross-examination 
 of the accused to the matters touched upon in his direct examination, 
 and which prohibit the putting of disparaging questions to him touching 
 the circumstances of his past life.- The privilege of withholding eoi- 
 dence and concealing the truth is an abomination which must be rooted 
 out of the law. 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 453, 704, 705, 089. 2 ^^te, §§ (;52, G53.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 791 
 
 § 1004, Comnientiug on Failure to call Prisoner's Wife 
 as a Witness. — The privilege of the defendant in this regard 
 should, by analogy, be extended also to him in respect of his 
 wife, where the statute allows him to call her as a witness but 
 prohibits the State from doing it. Accordingly, it has been held in 
 a jurisdiction where there is a statute enabling a husband or wife 
 to testify for each other, that it is an irregularity, for which a 
 conviction will be reversed, that the State's attorney, in his ar- 
 gument to the jury, commented upon the fact that the wife of 
 the accused was not called in the particular case; since, if either 
 marital partner were obliged to call the other, the failure to do so 
 would become evidence, and the sanctities of the marital relation 
 would be thereby broken up, and the policy of the statute de- 
 feated. ^ But in Texas, where the most extreme views are 
 generally taken in favor of the rights of defendants in criminal 
 cases, it has been held not error to allow the prosecuting attorney, 
 in his closing argument, to comment on the failure of the de- 
 fendant's wife to appear and testify as a witness in his own behalf, 
 the nature of the case being such as to make her an appropriate 
 witness.^ 
 
 § 1005. Prisoner's Counsel may enlarge on the Prisoner's 
 Right to be silent. — Moreover, it has been ruled that, " as there 
 is danger that the jury, knowing that the law now permits a de- 
 fendant to testify, may draw inferences against him from his 
 omission so to do, his counsel may properly, in addressing the 
 jury, insist and enlarge upon his constitutional and legal right in 
 this respect," without the danger of the matter being made the 
 subject of unfavorable comment by the State's counsel.^ 
 
 § 1006. Illustration of the Foregoing. — On the trial of a joint 
 indictment against two persons for breaking and entering a dwelHng 
 house in the night time for burglary, neither of them testified. Their 
 counsel in his closing argument alluded to this fact, and to the reasons 
 
 1 Johnson v. State, 63 Miss, 313, editing attorney from referring to the 
 
 2 Mercer V. State, 17 Tex. App. 4(;3, faihire of a wife to testify on behalf of 
 467. The Kansas statute (Kan. Laws her husband, 
 
 1871, cli. 118, § 1), prohibits the pros- " Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass, 239
 
 792 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 for it, and stated that the fact they did not testify should not raise any 
 presum[)tion against them, and made the following remarks: ""What 
 good would the testimony of these people be in proving their inno- 
 cence? If guilty, would they confess it? If innocent, they are to be 
 proved so by other lips than thei.rs. I have been endeavoring to dis- 
 cover the real facts in this case, and have never asked Scott or 
 Dunlap or Mrs. Scott about it, and have never spoken to these men, nor 
 heard their voices except as they were challenging the jury. They 
 could add by their word nothing for me, either for or against them. 
 I tell you, gentlemen, I never yet called a prisoner to the stand. 
 I never have been through the farce, and I could not be here to 
 ask that these men might have their shackles taken off and go 
 upon the stand and declare their innocence to 3'ou, Their testimony 
 would be utterly worthless. When Professor Webster was tried 
 for the murder of Dr. Parkman, his two daughters went upon the 
 stand, and delivered important testimony. The lawyers for the gov- 
 ernment asked no questions, but bowed them graciously from the 
 stand, because they knew that, from the lips of those daughters, plead- 
 ing for the life of their father, no testimony could come that would 
 weigh with the jurors. And so, gentlemen, as I said before, I could 
 not have these men unshackled to protest their innocence to you. If 
 they went on the witness stand, what could they do but deny the testi- 
 mony of Edson, that he met them on Lexington avenue and Fiftieth 
 street, or Madison avenue at Red Leary's and Fort Hamilton, or that 
 they came here," The prosecuting attorney, in his closing argument, 
 was proceeding to discuss these reasons, and to argue that other reasons 
 than those suggested were the real reasons for not calling the defend- 
 ants and Mrs. Scott as witnesses, when the counsel for defendants 
 interrupted, and asked the judge to rule that the fact that the de- 
 fendants did not testify could not be commented on by the govern- 
 ment. But the judge, having first stated the law, that the fact that the 
 defendants did not testify did not create any presumption against them, 
 ruled that, inasmuch as the matter had been referred to by the defend- 
 ants' counsel, the prosecuting attorney had the right to comment on the 
 reasons which the defendants' attorney gave for their not going upon the 
 stand and testifying in their own belialf, and also to give the reasons 
 which, the government contended, really existed for their not testifying, 
 and permitted the prosecuting attorney to proceed in his comments. The 
 defendants having been convicted, on exceptions it was held that this was 
 error. Mr. Chief Justice Gray, in giving the opinion of the court, said: 
 "As there is danger that the jury, knowing that the law now permits a
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of eight of argument. 793 
 
 defendant to testify, may draw inferences against him from his omission 
 so to do, his counsel may properly, in addressing the jury, insist and 
 enlarge upon his constitutional and legal right in this respect. When 
 counsel for the defendants in the present case went farther, and re- 
 ferred to his own opinion and practice upon the subject, and to what he 
 supposed to have taken place in other cases, he might well have been 
 checked by the court. But the absolute exemption secured to the de- 
 fendants by the constitution and laws, from being compelled to testif}', 
 and from having their omission to do so used in any way to their detri- 
 ment, could not be affected by superfluous and irregular suggestions 
 of their counsel in the heat of argument. That exemption could only 
 be waived by each defendant's own election to avail himself of the 
 statute, and to go upon the stand as a witness. The course of the 
 closing argument for the prosecution tended to persuade the jury that 
 the omission of the defendants to testify implied an admission or a 
 consciousness of the crime charged, and the presiding judge, in per- 
 mitting such a course of argument, against the objection of the defend- 
 ants, and in ruling that the prosecuting attorney had a right to com- 
 ment on the reasons which the defendants' counsel gave for their not 
 going upon the stand and testifying in their own behalf, and also 
 to give the reasons which the government contended really existed 
 for their not testifying, — committed an error which was manifestly 
 prejudicial to the defendants, and which obliges this court to set aside 
 the verdict and order anew trial." ^ 
 
 § 1007. Coniiuenting ou the Difference between Original 
 and Amended Pleadings. — Difficulty has been found in dealing 
 with the question whether, where a pleading has been amended, 
 the original pleading can be put in evidence as an admission of 
 the party whose pleading it is.^ It is too obvious for discussion 
 
 1 Com, V. Scott, 123 Mass. 239. ball, 13 Alien (Mass.), 4G0; Phillips v. 
 
 2 lu Massachusetts discarded or Smith, 110 Mass. 61 (under a stat- 
 abandoned pleadings cannot be thus ute). la Missouri it has been held 
 referred to. They are treated as hav- that an abandoned pleading cannot be 
 ing been drawn by the counsel for the read in evidence as an admission 
 purpose of laying the merits before the against the party, ou the trial of the 
 court, and as being hardly the act of same case in whicli the pleading was 
 the party, and also as being in some originally filed. Corley v. McKeag, 9 
 sense in the nature of privileged com- Mo. App. 38, 41; Owens Co. v. Pierce, 
 munications. Baldwin v. Gregg, 13 5 Mo. App. 57i3; Breckenkamp v. 
 Mete. (Mass.) 253; Walcott i?. Kim- Kces, 3 Mo. App. 585. But these de-
 
 794 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 that it cannot properly be used in final argument, for the purpose 
 of reaching the same result, where it has not been put in evi- 
 dence.^ 
 
 § 1008. Suffering the Audience to Applaud the State's 
 Counsel. — In a case of murder, the following scene took place: 
 Upon the conclusion of the argument of the counsel who had 
 opened the case for the State, the audience, which was composed 
 of some four hundred people, cheered and applauded the speaker. 
 This was late at night, and further argument was postponed un- 
 til the next morning. The court did not restrain the audience, 
 or in any way express its disapprobation of the improper demon- 
 stration, nor was the jury cautioned against suffering this con- 
 duct of the audience to influence their minds in the consideration 
 of the case. On the next morning, counsel for the defendant 
 were permitted, in their addresses to the jury, to comment upon 
 and condemn without restriction the occurrence of the night be- 
 fore. In reply to them, counsel for the State, in the concluding 
 argument, characterized the demonstration as a " spontaneous 
 outburst of approval, by the audience, of this cause, after they 
 had heard it truthfully represented by the State." This remark 
 was not reproved by the court, nor was the jury admonished to 
 guard themselves against being influenced by the popular demon- 
 stration. As the conviction was reversed on other grounds, the 
 reviewing court deemed it unnecessary to say whether or not they 
 would have suffered the conviction to stand, if this irregularity 
 had presented the only ground of reversal. But they took occa- 
 sion to say that the trial court should have taken prompt and de- 
 cided action on the occasion, and should have endeavored, by its 
 condemnation of the proceeding, and its admonitions to the jur}^ 
 to prevent any prejudice to the defendant by such reprehensible 
 
 cisions are overruled iu the later case Compare Priest v. Way, 87 Mo. 16, 27, 
 
 of Auderson v. McPike, 86 Mo. 293, 32; Taussig v. Shields, 26 Mo. App. 
 
 301. It may always be read on the 318, 32('.,327. 
 
 trial of another case. Murphy v. St. ^ Taft v. Fislie, 140 Mass. 250; s. c. 
 
 Louis Type Foundry, 21) Mo. App. 54 Am. Rep. 459; Walcott d. Kimball, 
 
 541; Dowzelotv. Kawliugs, 58 Mo. 75; 13 Alien (Mass.), 460; Phillips v. 
 
 Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. •22s, 245. Smith, 110 Mass. 61.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 795 
 
 conduct; and that, in this effort, the counsel for the State should 
 have united.^ 
 
 § 1009. Civil Responsibility for Words Spoken in Forensic 
 Debate. — The limits of this chapter do not permit an extended 
 discussion on this most interesting topic. The general rule, upon 
 which modern cases unite, is that words spoken in debate, or 
 written in the regular course of a judicial proceeding, or before 
 a quasi-judicial tribunal, by a party or his counsel, which are 
 pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry, are absolutely 
 privileged, and wholly without reference to the motives which 
 may have prompted them.^ An idea formerly lingered in the 
 books that, in order to make the words privileged they must have 
 been pertinent to the issues, and not spoken ex malitid ;'^ but the 
 modern doctrine is that, if the words are material to the issues, 
 the question of malice or motive is an immaterial inquiry.* The 
 rule, carried to this extent, is deemed absolutely necessary to 
 uphold that freedom of forensic debate which is so essential to 
 the due administration of justice. Where, however, a party or his 
 counsel wanders from the issues, whether in writing or in speak- 
 ing, maliciously, to asperse and villify another, the case is not 
 within the privilege.^ 
 
 1 Cartwright v. State, 16 Tex. App. 22 Weud. (X. Y.) 410; Gilbert v. Peo- 
 
 47;^, 489; s. c. 49 Am. Rep. 826. pie, 1 Deuio (N. Y.), 41; Hoar v. 
 
 ■ 1 Hawk. P. C, ch. 28, § 8; Cooley's Wood, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 193; Mower v. 
 
 Coust. Lini. 443; Hodgsou v. Scarlett, Watsou, 11 Vt. 536; Jeuuiugs v. Paine, 
 
 1 Baru. & Aid. 232, 239; s. c. 1 Holt N. 4 Wis. 358. 
 
 P. 621; Mackey v. Ford, 5 Hurl. & N. ^ Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 Baru. & 
 
 792; Cutler v. Dixon, 4 Coke, 146; s. c. Aid. 232; s. c. 1 Holt N. p. 621. 
 
 Dyer, 285; "Weston v. Dobiuiet, Cro. * Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309; 
 
 .Tac. 432; Astley r. Youuge, 2 Burr. Gilberts. People, 1 Deuio (N. Y.),41; 
 
 807, per Lord Mansfield, C.J. ; Brooke Hastings v. Lusk, 22 AVeud. (N. Y.) 
 
 r. Montague, Cro. ,Tac. 90; McMillan 410; King v. Wlieeler, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 
 
 V. Birch, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 178; Newfleld 725. 
 
 (' Coppermau, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) ^ Gill)ert ». People, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 
 
 (x. s.) 360; Marsh v. Ellsworth, 36 41. Compare Padmore v. Lawrence, 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 532; s. c. 1 Sweeny 11 Ad. & E. 380; Broraage v. Prosser, 
 
 (X. Y.), 152; 50 N. Y. 309; Garr v. 4 Baru. & C. 247; Remington v. Coug- 
 
 Seldeu, 4 N. Y. 91; Ring v. Wheeler, duu, 2 IMck. (Mass.) 210. 
 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 72.); Hastings r. Lusk,
 
 796 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1010. Who entitled to be Heard. — Parties are entitled to 
 appear in pr'opria persona, and conduct their own causes, if they 
 are fooHsh enough to do so; ^ but a person Avho is not an enrolled 
 attorney or counselor has no right to appear as such for a party. - 
 The loife of a party has no right to a^ipear and conduct his 
 cause at nisi prius.^ A party conducting his own cause ma}^ 
 rightfully address the jury as his own advocate, without waiving 
 his right to give evidence as a vjitness in his own behalf.* But 
 a party not enrolled as a counselor of the court cannot claim the 
 right to conduct his cause in part by himself and in part by 
 counsel: if he examines his own witnesses, counsel will not be 
 heard in his behalf on points of law.^ According to a review of the 
 authorities by Mr. Chief Justice Gray,® they seem to indicate that 
 counsel for a deceased parti/ nvdy he heard as amicus curioe before 
 the full court, " where the exceptions sought to be established 
 have been allowed and entered in his client's lifetime, because 
 the delay in disposing of them would be the act of the court; ^ 
 or if the exceptions had been taken by the party in his lifetime, 
 though not allowed or entered until after his death, because they 
 would be his own exceptions, seasonably alleged and tendered by 
 himself, and the subsequent allowance and entry of them might 
 be treated as mere forms to put them in order for hearing; ^ or 
 if the ruling below had been in his favor, and the questions of 
 law reserved on the motion of the other party ; ^ or if the ques- 
 tions of law had been reserved by the judge himself at the trial 
 or hearing, and brought before the full court by his report, or 
 by motion pursuant to leave so to reserve." ^^ But an amicns 
 
 ^ Hightower v. Hawthorn, I ' Citing Martin r. Tapley, 116 Mass. 
 
 Herapst. (U. S.) 42; Henck v. Tod- 275; Bridges r. Smyth, 8 Biug. 20; s. c. 
 
 hunter, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 275. 1 Moore & S. 93; Miles v. Williams, 8 
 
 2 ji,ife^ § 209. Q. B. U7. 
 
 3 Col)bett V. Hudson, 15 Ad. & El. « Kelley v. Riley, 10(5 Mass. 339. 
 (X. s.) 988; s. c. 14 Jur. 982. » Currier u. Lowell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 4 Cobbett V. Hudson, 1 El. & Bl. 11 ; 170. 
 
 s. c. 17 Jur, 488; 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 11. '» Springfield v. Worcester, 2 Cnsh. 
 
 * Mosoati V. Lawson, 1 Mood= & (Mass.) 52, 62; Freeman u. Kosher, 13 
 
 Rob. 454. Ad. & El. (n. s.) 780. 
 
 6 Martinu,Tapley,ll!tMass.ll(;,119.
 
 Tit. IV, Ch. XXX.] ABUSES of right of argument. 797 
 
 ciirice cannot take a case up, by a bill of exceptions or otherwise, 
 although he may have been counsel for the deceased party, and 
 his authority may have been revoked by the death of his client. 
 "An amicus ciirice,'' said Gray, C. J., " is heard only by the 
 leave and for the assistance of the court, and upon a case already 
 before it. He has no control over the suit, and no right to in- 
 stitute any proceeding therein, or to bring the case from one 
 court to another, or from a single judge to the full court, by 
 exception, appeal or writ of error." ^ Where competent counsel 
 are retained in a cause and are present in court, prepared to 
 argue it, the court commits no error in declining to hear coun- 
 sel not retained in such cause, or in any other pending cause in 
 which a similar question would arise, but who merely expect to 
 have a similar cause thereafter? There is no rule of law which 
 prohibits an attorney of record, who is a witness in a cause, from 
 summing up the case before the court or jury. It seems that 
 there was, however, a rule in California which prohibited it from 
 being done without permission of the court ; but where the court 
 gave such permission, no question was presented for review. "^ 
 In Missouri it is held that it is not ground of new trial that an 
 attorney', who had assisted the prosecuting attorney by taking 
 the testimony, was allowed to make the opening argument to the 
 jury with a fifteen minutes speech. The court said: "It is 
 wholly immaterial whether the permission was made matter of 
 record or not, nor does it make any difference whether he was 
 employed in the case, or gratuitously assisted the prosecuting at- 
 torney. An attorney emploj-ed in the case may even make the 
 statement of the case to the jury. The fifth subdivision of sec- 
 tion 1908 ^ cannot be construed so as to require the prosecuting 
 attorney, instead of other counsel engaged in the cause, to make 
 the opening statement." ^ The employment of special counsel by 
 
 1 Martin v. Tapley, supra; citiug ^ Branson v. Carruthers, 49 Cal. 
 Yearb., 4 H. VI. 16, pi. KJ; Isley's 375. 
 
 Case, 1 Leon. 187; Knight v. Lovr, 15 ^ Rgy. Stat. Mo. (ed. 1879.) 
 
 Ind. 374; Minor's Abr., Amicus Curice. » state v. Rob, 90 Mo. 31, 36; fol- 
 
 2 Nauer v. Thomas, 13 Alleu lowing State i;. Stark, 72 Mo. 38. 
 (Mass.), 572.
 
 798 
 
 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL. [1 Thomp. Tr 
 
 private prosecutors, to assist the district attorney, is not inhibited 
 by the hiws of Texas. The State's attorney should, however, re- 
 tain the direction of the prosecution, and not resign the same to 
 assistant counsel.^ 
 
 1 Burkhart v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 699. The court say: "This practice 
 has beeu known to all the legislatures 
 that have assembled in the State, and 
 if it be an illegal and improper prac- 
 tice, as contended by counsel for de- 
 fendant, it is indeed strange that it 
 has been so long and so universally 
 tolerated by the law-making power and 
 sanctioned by the courts. It seems 
 that, in some States, this practice is 
 not allowed ; but in most of the States 
 
 it is sanctioned. It is, however, the 
 duty of the district or county attorney 
 to reserve to himself the direction of 
 the case. This he should never sur- 
 render to assistant counsel. Whart. 
 PI. & Pr., § 555, and cases there cited; 
 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., § 281. The court did 
 not err in overruling the defendant's 
 objection to permitting the district at- 
 torney to avail himself of assistant 
 counsel in the prosecution, both in the 
 conduct and arguing of the case."
 
 Tit. V, Cil. XXXI. J GENERAL RULES. 
 
 799 
 
 TITLE V. 
 
 PROYI^CE OF COURT A^D JURY : QUESTI0:N'S 
 OF LAW AND OF FACT. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXIII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXVI. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXVIL 
 
 Chapter '. 
 
 XXXVIIL 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XXXIX. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XL. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLI. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLIII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLIV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLVL 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLVII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 XLVIII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 \T,IX. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 L. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LI. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LIII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LIV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LV. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LVL 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LVII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LVIII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LIX. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LX. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LXI. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LXII. 
 
 Chapter 
 
 LXIIL 
 
 General Rules. 
 
 Existence and Interpretation of Laws, Ordi- 
 nances, Rules and Customs. 
 
 ■ Interpretation of Private Writings. 
 Verbal Speech : Oral Contracts. 
 Existence and Terms of Express Contracts. 
 Implied Promises. 
 
 • Sales of Personal Property. 
 Warranties in Sales of Chattels. 
 Negotiable Instruments. 
 Payment: Accord and Satisfaction. 
 
 •Statute of Limitations; Bankruptcy: New Prom- 
 ise AND Part Payment to Revive Barred Debt. 
 - Insurance. 
 
 ■ Intent. 
 
 •Authority: Agency: Ratification. 
 
 • Alteration of Written Instruments. 
 -Possession. 
 
 ■Waiver: Abandonment: Laches: Acquiescence, 
 
 ■ Identity: Resemblance. 
 
 -Place: Boundary: Identity of Land. 
 -Notice. 
 
 • Description, Quality, Characterization. 
 
 • Reasonableness. 
 ■Malicious Prosecution. 
 •Negligence. 
 
 Cakkiers of Goods and other Bailees. 
 
 Nuisance and Obstruction. 
 
 Fraud. * 
 
 Slander and Libel. 
 
 Measure of Damages. 
 
 Of the Power of Juries as Judges of the Law. 
 
 Matters OF Crime. 
 
 Of Nonsuits. 
 
 Directing the Verdict.
 
 ^00 PROVIIsCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tf., 
 
 CHAPTEK XXXI. 
 
 GENERAL RULES. 
 
 Article I. — Questions of Law for the Court. 
 Article II. — Questions of P'act for the Jury. 
 
 Article I. — Questions of Law for the Court. 
 
 Section 
 
 1015. The Ends of Judicial Adraiuistratiou. 
 
 1016. Facts Ascertained, Judge pronouuces Conclusion. 
 
 1017. Judge must declare the Law, and not leave it to Jury. 
 
 1018. But Error not Reviewed unless Excepted to. 
 
 1019. Nor unless Prejudicial. 
 
 1020. Nor where Jury decide Question of Law rightly. 
 
 1021. Judge decides all Questions on an Agreed Case. 
 
 1022. But Question reserved should present a Pure Question of Law. 
 
 1023. Judge Passes upon the Admissibility of Evidence. 
 
 1024. Decides as to the Competency of Witnesses. 
 
 1025. Whether he may submit the Question to the Jury. 
 
 1026. Not bound to hear Objections to Competency and Sufflcieucy at the 
 same Time. 
 
 1027. Construes the Pleadings. 
 
 1028. Decides whether there is a Variance between the Pleadings and Proof. 
 
 1029. Decides Facts shown by the Records of the Court. 
 
 1030. Essential Facts Admitted or Undisputed. 
 
 1031. Wliatis meant by a Mixed Question of Law and Fact. 
 
 § 1015. The Ends of Judicial Administration. — All effort 
 in judicial administration expends itself in two directions: 1. In 
 ascertaining the ultimate or constitutive facts upon which the 
 rights of the parties depend. 2. In applying the law to such 
 facts. In cases at law the jury ascertain the facts, and the judge 
 applies the conclusion of law to them. The conclusion of law 
 applied to the a.scertained facts becomes the judgment of the 
 court, not its onZer or co7nmand, the fiction being that the court 
 pronounces the law, and that it moves forward, by its inherent
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 801 
 
 vigor, to the result. This fiction is expressed in the conckiding 
 words of every judgment at law, — Consideratum est per cur- 
 iam: it is considered by the court, that the plaintiff recover of the 
 defendant, or that the defendant go hence, etc. 
 
 § 1016. Facts Ascertained, Judge pronounces Conclu- 
 sion. — In either case, therefore, where the facts are ascertained 
 beforehand, the judge pronounces the conclusion of the law 
 thereupon. Logically the facts would be ascertained first, and 
 then the conclusion of the law would be pronounced by the 
 judge. This is the case where special verdicts are found, and also 
 where the controversy is submitted upon an agreed state of facts. 
 But where a jury return a general verdict, this embodies a 
 mixed conclusion of law and fact. In such cases the judge pro- 
 nounces the law to the jury upon all the hypotheses of fact which 
 the evidence substantially tends to prove, — leaving them to de- 
 termine what hypothesis has been proved, and to apply to it the 
 law thus stated. It must strike the thoughtful mind at once, 
 that the ofiiee of deciding difficult questions of fact and api)ly- 
 ing conclusions of law announced from the bench to the facts 
 so decided, is a difficult one, especially for a body of untrained 
 persons acting in a situation entirely new and strange to them ; 
 and so, it is confidently stated, it results in actual practice. 
 
 § 1017. Judge must declare tlie Law, and not leave it to 
 Jury. — The judge decides questions of law; the jury, questions 
 of fact.^ It is obviously the right of every suitor to have the 
 opinion of the judge upon questions of law, material to the proper 
 determination of his case. The jury are not qualified to deter- 
 mine such questions, and they are calculated to confuse, embar- 
 rass and mislead them. The general rule, therefore, is that it is 
 error for the judge to submit questions of law to the determina- 
 tion of the jury.^ 
 
 1 Co. Litt. 155, 156; Fost. Cr. L. United States v. Carlton, 1 Gall. (U. 
 255,256. S.) 400; Thomas v. Thomas, 15 B. 
 
 2 Hickeyv. Ryan, 15 Mo. G3, G7; Mon. (Ky.) 178; Ragau w. Gaither, 11 
 Fugate V. Carter, 6 Mo. 2(;7, 273; Gill & J. (Md.) ^72.
 
 802 PROVINCE OF COURT AND -JURY. [1 TllOllll). Tl'., 
 
 §1018. BcT Erkok not Reviewed unless Excepted to. — But it is 
 no giouiul for a new trial that the judge left to the jury, as a question 
 of fact, that which he himself should have decided as a question of law, 
 unless the error was objected to at the time.^ 
 
 § 1019. Nou Unless Prejudicial. — Thus, it has been held that an 
 instruction, leaving it to the jury to determine tiie question whether the 
 instrument sued on is a promissory note, or not, is bad ; but where the 
 instruction was immaterial and technical, it was cured by the statute of 
 jeofails.- And sometimes, where the judge has submitted to the jury 
 a question which involves a conclusion of law, he may cure the error 
 by an additional explanation. Thus, in an action against a railway 
 company for killing hogs, which had stra3'ed upon its track, the judge 
 was asked to instruct the jury that, in order to find for the plaintiff, 
 they must find that the hogs strayed upon the track at a point where 
 the defendant was bound by law to fence its track. It was said that 
 the judge could not properly have given this instruction to the jury, 
 without, at the same time, telling them at what points of its track 
 a railroad company is bound by law to have its track fenced. With 
 such a correction, there would be no question of law left for the jury 
 to decide."' 
 
 § 1020. Nor where Jury decide Qiiestioii of Law rightly. — 
 
 If the judge submits a question of law to the jury and they de- 
 cide it rightly, there is no ground of exception; since it would be 
 absurd to reverse a judgment in order that the judge might decide 
 what the jury rightly decided.* 
 
 § 1021. Judge decides all Questions on an Agreed Case. — 
 
 On an agreed case, stated to the court in writing for its decision, 
 the court necessarily draws all inferences, both of law and of 
 fact, from the facts agreed upon, which may be necessary to its 
 judgment. Thus, it has been held that, whether the relation of 
 landlord and tenant existed between tlie parties, and whether the 
 
 1 Strickland r. Stricklaiul, 8 C. B. HI; .loiios v. rullou, Cf) Ala. SOC : 
 
 724. Gk'un v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 63 N. 
 
 " Lee ?■. Duulap, '>'> Mo. 454. C. 510; State v. Craton, 6 Ired. L. 
 
 3 Hudsou V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., (N. C) 1<;4; Thorubnrnh v. Maston, 
 
 63 Mo. 525, 530. 1)3 N. C. 258, 2(14; Woodbury v. Tay- 
 
 * Bemsteiu v. Humes, 78 Ala. 134, lor, 3 .Jouos L. (N.C.) 504.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 803 
 
 tenancy of the defendant was such as to make a notice to quity 
 or a demand of possession requisite to entitle a phiintiff in 
 ejectment to maintain his action, was a question to be determined 
 by the court, upon the consideration of an agreed state of 
 facts.^ 
 
 § 1022. But Question Reserved should present a Pure Ques- 
 tion of Law. — But, as appellate judges cannot, in jury cases, draw 
 the conclusions of fact from the evidence, a question reserved for 
 the decision of an appellate court must be a pure question of law. 
 It cannot be a mixed question of law and fact, for that would nec- 
 essarily draw to the court that which properly belongs to the 
 jury. 2 If a point of law is to be reserved, it must be done by 
 stating on the record the facts on which it arises, otherwise the 
 point thus reserved is a mere abstraction.^ And these facts must 
 be either admitted on the record or found by the jury ; since 
 the court cannot withdraw the decision of the facts from the 
 jury, by reserving as a point, whether, under all the evidence in 
 the case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Without this, judg- 
 ment cannot be entered non obstante veredicto.^ There is only 
 one exception to this rule, and that is said to be a seeming one 
 merely, — where the question is whether any ewcZence has been 
 given of some fact essential to the plaintiff's case or the defend- 
 ant's defense.* 
 
 § 1023. Judge Passes vipon the Admissibility of Evidence. — 
 
 "Within limits already stated ^ the judge passes upon the admissi- 
 bility of evidence, although his decision involves questions of 
 fact, which may even reach to the decision of the main issue. ^ 
 
 ' Howard v. Carpeuter 22 Md. 10, Pa. St. 43!i; Campboll v. O'Nicll, 64 
 
 23. Pa. St. 290. 
 
 2 Com. V. McDowell, 86 Pa. St. 377, ^ Wilde v. Traiuer, avpra; Camp- 
 37!). bell V. O'Niell, supra. 
 
 3 Irwin V. Wickersham, 25 Pa. St. *» Ante, § 318, et seq. 
 
 316. ' See the observations of Lowry, 
 
 •» Wilson V. Steamboat Tuscarora, C. J., as to this function of the Judge 
 
 25 Pa. St. 317; Winchester v. IkiuK-tt, in De France v. De France, 34 Pa. St. 
 
 54 Pa. St. 510; Wilde v. Trainer, 59 385, 390-92.
 
 804 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOllll). Tl'., 
 
 § 1024. Decides as to the Competency of AVitiiesscs. — The 
 
 question whether a witness is competent to testify concerning the 
 matters in issue is, in all cases, a question of law for the court. ^ 
 And this is so, although the inquiry involves questions which are 
 purely questions of fact.^ Thus, the question whether a person 
 who is offered as a witness is insane ; "^ or whether one whose ad- 
 missions were offered in evidence was a jpartner of the defend- 
 ant; ■* or whether an offered witness was incompetent by reason 
 of having a certain amount of negro blood in his veins ; ^ or 
 whether he was interested in the event of the suit; ^ — these and 
 all other like questions are decided by the judge, and are not re- 
 ferred to the jury. This being so, it is error for the judge, 
 after permitting the testimony of a witness to go to the jury, to 
 instruct them to disregard it, if they should find that the wit- 
 ness was interested.^ So, where the competency of a witness is 
 attacked on the ground of insanity, if the court has decided in 
 favor of his sanity, the evidence adduced to the court cannot be 
 submitted to the jury to affect his credibility.^ Nor will a court 
 of error revise the decision of the trial judge on the competency 
 of a witness, on the ground that his decision might have been 
 influenced by evidence which he ought not to have considered. 
 The appellate court will not presume that the judge was influenced 
 by such evidence.^ It has been held, however, that the question 
 whether a witness, sane at the time he testifies, was insane at the 
 time of the transaction concerning which he testifies, is a question 
 for the jury, since it goes to his credibility, and not to his com- 
 petency, and the opposing party may adduce such testimony 
 with his other evidence. '** In fact, the jury are often required, in 
 
 1 Chouteau v. Searcy, 8 Mo. 7;3:3; ■* Harris v. Wilsou, 7 Weud. 75. 
 Reynolds ?J. Louusbury, G Hill (N. Y.), * Nave's Aclmr. v. Williams, 22 lud. 
 534 ; Nave's Adinr. v. Williams, 22 lud. 3C8. 
 
 308; Cook V. Mix, II Couu. 432; ante, " Cook v. Mix, 11 Couu. 432, 
 
 § 323. ' Chouteau v. Searcy, 8 Mo. 733. 
 
 2 Ante, § 318. » Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 45, 
 
 3 Holcomb V. Holcomb, 28 Couu. 75. 
 
 177; Kei,nua v. Hill, 2 Dcu. C. C. 25;); '■' Jbid. 
 
 s. c. 5 Cox C. C. 470; 20 L.J. Kep. " Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Coun. 
 
 (X. s.) M. C. 222 ; 5 Eui;. L. & Eq. 547 : 177. 
 
 (.'ampbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXr.J GENERAL RULES. 805 
 
 estimating the credibility of a witness, to pass on the same evidence 
 which was heard by the judge on the question of his competency.^ 
 
 § 1025. Whether he may siibiuit the Question to the Jury. — 
 
 It is said that there are cases where the question involves com- 
 plicated facts , which may be submitted to the jury. Thus, where 
 it became a question whether the statements of a witness, who 
 had been an attorney of one of the parties, was to be excluded 
 on the ground that tliey were privileged comnumications, it was 
 held that it was not improper to leave to the jury the ques- 
 tion whether, at the time the statements in question were made, 
 the relation of attorney and client subsisted between the witness 
 and the party; though, in the particular case, too large a range 
 of exclusion was left to them.^ It is not, however, to be inferred 
 from this, that there are any cases in which the judge is bound 
 to take the opinion of a jury as to the competency of a witness. 
 The doctrine is that he may do it; and, where the point depends 
 upon the decision of an intricate question of fact, this is some- 
 times done."^ In Pennsylvania, it was held that, where one, of- 
 fered as a witness, is objected to on the ground of interest^ and 
 parol evidence is given to the court to sustain the objection, if 
 the interest is in the least degree doubtful, the judge may per- 
 mit the witness to testify, and refer the question of his interest 
 to the jury.^ On grounds already stated,"'' we may venture to 
 question the soundness of these views Experience proves that 
 juries are scarcely capable of deciding properly those questions 
 which the law has clearly committed to them. It will still more 
 embarrass them to compel them to shoulder a part of the bur- 
 den which properly belongs to the judge. 
 
 § 1026. Not bound to hear Objections to Competency and 
 Sufficiency at the same Time. — "It is undoubtedly true," 
 
 1 Shipton r. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El. §§ 49, 425; Spencer v. Trafford, 42 
 314, per Lord Deuman, C. J. Md. 1. 
 
 2 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Key- ■* Hart v. Ileiluer, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 
 nolds, 36 Mich. 502. 407; Gordon v. Bowers, 10 Ta. St. 226; 
 
 3 1 Phil, on Ev. (8th od. by Amos Ilayues v. Ilunsicker, 20 Pa. St. 58. 
 & Phillips), p. 2, note; 1 Greeul. ou Ev. ^ Anlr, § ;!18, <t seq.
 
 bOG PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TilOIlip. Tl., 
 
 says Marshall, C. J., " that questions respecting the admissibility 
 of evidence are entirely distinct from those which respect its 
 sufficiency or effect. They arise in different stages of the trial, 
 and cannot with strict propriety be propounded at the same 
 time."» When, therefore, the counsel for the defendant prayed 
 the opinion and direction of the court to the jury, that the evi- 
 dence offered by the plaintiff was not admissible, competent and 
 sufficient to be left to the jury as proof of the plaintiff's title to 
 recover, it was held that the judge might properly have refused 
 to give them ; for the blending of an objection to the admis- 
 sibility of evidence, in the same application which questions 
 its sufficiency, is not only unusual, but it confounds propositions 
 distinct in themselves, and is calculated to embarrass the court 
 and the question to be decided.^ 
 
 § 1027. Construes the Pleadings. — The construction of 
 the pleadings is, of course, always a question for the court. ^ It 
 is the province of the court to determine, from the pleadings, 
 what allegations are admitted, and what denied.^ It is, therefore, 
 the duty of the court to state the issues to the jury, without re- 
 ferring them to the pleadings to ascertain what the issues are.* 
 For like reasons, the judge should not tell the jury that all the 
 allegations in the petition, not si)ecitical]y denied in the answer, 
 are to be taken as true; for this refers them to the pleadings, 
 to determine what the allegations are which are not denied. He 
 should inform them specifically what the issues arc.® It is error 
 to leave the jury to construe and determine the effect of the 
 pleadings.^ 
 
 § 1028. Decides whether tliere is a Variance between the 
 Pleadings and Proof. — AMiether there is a variance between 
 the pleadings and proof, is likewise a question of law for the ex- 
 
 1 Columbiau Ins. Co. r. Lavvreuce, •• Dasslcr v. Wisley, 32 Mo. 498. 
 
 2 Pet. (U. S.) 25, 44. •'• Missouri Coal & Oil Co. v Ilaunl- 
 
 2 Breckenkamp v. Rees, 3 Mo. App. bal &c. 11. Co., 35 IMo. 84. 
 
 585. *= Hall V. Keufro, 3 Met. (Ky.) 51. 
 
 3 Potter w. Wooster, 10 Iowa, 334; 
 McKiiiiicy i'. Ilartnian, 4 luwa, l.'J4.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 807 
 
 elusive determination of the court. ^ Thus, in an action for sla7i- 
 der, it is for the court, and not for the jury, to determine 
 whether there is such an identity between the words laid in the 
 declaration and those which have been proved, as will support 
 the action. The jury ascertain what words were spoken, and, 
 if there is a variance between them and those contained in the 
 declaration, they will look to the opinion of the court, in order 
 to be informed whether it is of such a nature as will defeat the 
 action. 2 
 
 § 1029. Decides Facts shown by the Records of the Covirt. — 
 
 These are ascertained by the judge upon an inspection of the 
 records of the court, and are not submitted to the jury for their 
 decision. The apparent reason is that the court must, in the 
 nature 6f things, be more familiar with its records and more com- 
 petent to judge of their meaning than the jury can be. A 
 familiar illustration of this statement is shown in the rule that a 
 plea of nul tiel record is always tried by the court, and not by 
 the jury.^ Thus, in charging the jury, dates fixed by the records 
 of the court may be stated to them as facts.* So, where the 
 law authorizes a tender to be made by laying money into coui^t^ 
 the court will inform itself whether the money has been paid in, 
 and need not submit the question to the jury.^ So, upon the 
 hearing of a motion to enter an order nujic j^ro tunc, the court is 
 to decide whether the order was in fact made, thouoh not entered 
 of locord at the time claimed, and is not to submit the question 
 to a jury. ^ 
 
 § 1030. Essential Facts Admitted or Undisputed. — Obvi- 
 ouslv, whenever the facts are all admitted in writing, it is un- 
 necessary for the jury to pass upon them.^ " Where the facts 
 are undisputed or clear, the court should apply the law and de- 
 
 1 Birch V. Beuton, 26 Mo, 153, Ifil; i Andrews v. Graves, 1 Dillon C. C. 
 Berry v. Drydeu, 7 Mo. 324. (U. S.) 108. 
 
 2 Ibid. * Newton v. Allis, 16 Wis. 197. 
 
 3 Kidley v. Buchanan, 2 Swan 6 Lewis v. Armstrong, 64 Ga. 645. 
 (Tenn.) , 555. ' Howard r.Carpeuter, 22 Md. 10, 23.
 
 808 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tu., 
 
 termine the case."^ Thus, the facts being conceded, whether a 
 given act is within the scope of a servant's employment has been 
 held a question of law for the court .^ 
 
 § 1031. What is Meant by a Mixed Question of Law and 
 Fact. — The courts frequently speak of mixed questions of law 
 and fact, and, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to 
 understand precisely what they mean when they use this ex- 
 pression. It is often said that, in the case of a mixed question 
 of law and fact, the jury are to find the facts, and the court is to 
 pronounce the law upon the facts as they may be so found. ^ This 
 is done in two ways: either by a special verdict, in which case, 
 the jury tirst iind the facts, and afterwards the judge, in render- 
 ing judgment, pronounces the law upon them ; or, in the form of 
 hypothetical instructions given by the judge to the jury, — he 
 telling them that, if they find from the evidence a given state 
 of facts, the law is for the plaintiff, or for the defendant, as the 
 case may be. The latter practice is now most in vogue in Amer- 
 ican State jurisdictions.* Accordingly, where the evidence is 
 conflicting, the court, in instructing the jury, declares the law 
 upon the alternate hypotheses of fact presented by the opposing 
 testimony.^ Therefore, it is not to be understood that, in the 
 submission to a jury of a mixed question of law and fact, the 
 jury, in any civil case, is to determine what the law is, ex- 
 cept as it receives it from the court. Many issues are neces- 
 sarily so made up as to involve matters of law as well as 
 of fact, and the whole matter is then properly submitted to 
 the jury as a mixed question of law and fact; but, in disposing 
 of the issue, the jury is bound to act upon the law as given to it 
 by the court, and to apply it to the facts, as found, under the 
 ofuidance of the court. ^ 
 
 1 Powell V. Powell, 23 Mo. App. * Fourth National Bank v. Heu- 
 365, 373, opinion by Philips, P. ,1. schen, supra. 
 
 2 Snyder V. Hannibal &c. K. Co., 60, ^ Marshall v. Schricker, 63 Mo. 
 Mo. 413. • 308. 
 
 * Fourth National Bank u.Heuschen, ^ gt, Louis National Stock Yards v. 
 
 62 Mo. 207, 209. Wiggins Ferry Co., 102 111. 514.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 809 
 
 Article II. — Questions of Fact for the Jury. 
 
 Section 
 
 1035. What Evidence was iu fact Given, 
 
 1036. Knowledge of a Witness. 
 
 1037. Weight, Probative Effect, SutHciency of Evidence. 
 
 1038. Credibility of Witnesses. 
 
 1039. Inferences of Fact from otlier Facts in Evidence. 
 
 1040. Particular Questions or Points of Fact. 
 
 1041. Effect of Contradictory Admissions previously made. 
 
 1042. Whether a Witness an Accomplice. 
 
 1043. Sufficiency of Cori'oboratiug Testimony. 
 
 1044. Sufficiency of Impeaching Testimony. 
 
 1045. Inference from Failure to Produce Evidence. 
 
 1046. Deductions from the Appearance of Witnesses. 
 
 § 1035. What Evidence was in Fact Given. — Where coun- 
 sel cannot agree as to the evidence, or misstate it in argument to 
 the jury, it is the province of the jury, and not the court, to de- 
 termine what evidence was actually given. ^ Where there is no 
 official stenographer present to take down the exact words used 
 by a witness, and the judge has made no minutes of his testi- 
 mony, if counsel disagree as to what the witness has said on a 
 material matter, the court must submit the question to the jury, 
 even in the face of a motion for a nonsuit on the ground of va- 
 riance. " What the witness says in his testimony on the trial of 
 a cause, when the exacts words have not been taken down as 
 uttered, is a question for the jury; and emphatically so, the sense 
 in which they are used." ^ 
 
 § 1036. Knowledge of a Witness. — Where a witness swears 
 positively to a certain fact, it is not for the court to reject his 
 deposition on the ground that, from the terms in which the wit- 
 ness states the fact, the witness had no knowledge of it. Whether 
 or not the witness has knowledge of the fact, is an inference for 
 the jury and not for the court. ^ Where a witness, in testifying 
 
 1 Strauss v. Kansas City &c. K. Co., ^ porter v. Piatt, 57 Vt. 533, 536. 
 
 86 Mo. 421, 432; State v. Zumbunson, ^ Dickinson u. Lovell, 35 N. H. 9,. 
 
 86 Mo. Ill; affirming s. c. 7 Mo. App. 17. 
 526.
 
 810 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 to the best of his knowledge and belief, refers to matters which, 
 in a previous answer, were sc stated as to indicate personal knowl- 
 edge, it is for the jury rather than for the court, to determine 
 whether he is speaking from personal knowledge.^ 
 
 § 1037. AVeight, Probative Effect, Sufficiency of Evidence. — 
 
 In all cases, after the judge has determined the preliminary ques- 
 tion in favor of the admissibility of the evidence, the weight and 
 [)robative effect of it become a question for the jury.^ This rule 
 is most commonly expressed by the bare statement that, where 
 theevidenceis conflicting, the weigJit of it is to be determined by 
 the jury."^ Another expression of the same legal conception is 
 that, where there is evidence tending to prove a proposition of 
 fact, whether it is sufficient to establish the fact is a question for 
 the jury.* To illustrate: the circumstance that the evidence is 
 all on one side does not, it has been held, authorize the court to 
 direct the jury that it proves a fact in controversy ; \is sufficiency 
 is for them.^ The jury have the power to refuse their credit to 
 parol testimony, and no action of the court, it has been held, 
 should control the exercise of their admitted right to weifjh its 
 credibility.^ A consequence of this rule is, that a judgment will 
 not be reversed on error or appeal because the evidence is conjlict- 
 ingJ This rule is subject to the power of the judge to limit the 
 effect of the evidence by instructions^ where it is admitted for a 
 particular and limited purpose, as hereafter pointed out.** 
 
 § 1038. Credibility of Witnesses. — The weight of evidence 
 always involves the consideration of the credit to be given to the 
 opposing witnesses ; and it is accordingly a rule that this is a 
 
 1 Toulmau v. Swaiu, 47 Mich. 82. * Hudson ?'. Weir, 29 Ala. 294. 
 
 2 Welstcad I'. Levy, 1 Mood. & Kob. ^ Ciiarleston lu.s. Co. v. Corner, 2 
 138, per Paik, ,J. (iill (Md.), 411. 
 
 8 Cape Girardeau &c. Co. v. Brulld, « Ilnd. 
 
 51 Mo. 144; Moore •». Pieper, 51 Mo. ' Stater. Kiuney, 81 Mo. 101. 
 
 157; Covey v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 8f) ^ ^„^e^ §§ 351^ 793; post, § 2416. 
 Mo. (i.35; Browu v. Missouri Pacific R. 
 Co ,13 Mo. App. 462.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 811 
 
 question within the exclusive province of the juiy.^ The rule 
 is the same in criminal as in civil cases, and judgments in crim- 
 inal cases will not be reversed on error or appeal merely because 
 the evidence is conflicting. ^ The court cannot, on a motion for 
 a nonsuit or a peremptory direction, invade the province of the 
 jury, by attempting to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, 
 to reconcile conflicting statements, or to determine what weight 
 is to be given to the evidence of the respective witnesses.^ If 
 their testimony presents a conflict or discrepancies, it is the 
 province of the jury to reconcile them if possible, and if not, 
 they may give credence to the witnesses who, in their opinion, 
 are best entitled to it.* Thus, the relative value of contradictory 
 statements made by one when drunk and when sober, presents a 
 question for the jury.^ In equitable actions of ejectment in 
 Pennsylvania, all controverted questions of fact are for the jury.® 
 
 § 1039. Inferences of Fact from other Facts in Evidence. — 
 
 What inferences are to be drawn from the facts in evidence is, 
 within reasona])le limits, a question for the jury.^ This is well 
 illustrated by what will be hereafter stated touching the question 
 of negligence , which is often an inference of fact from other 
 facts in evidence.® A limitation of this rule is that, in certain 
 cases, the fact being established, the law conclusively draws the 
 inference, or annexes the conclusion. The inference or con- 
 clusion which the law thus pronounces from the established fact 
 is often called a presrimj)tion of law. Of these, familiar instances 
 are the presumption of malice, which the law draws from the 
 
 1 Moore v. Pieper, 51 Mo. 157; Hill ^ state v. Kiuney, 81 Mo. 101; Seal 
 
 V. Sutton, 8 Mo. App. 353; Hitchler v. v. State, 28 Tex. 491. 
 Voelker, 8 Mo. App. 492; Greeuvvood ^ Coudy v. Iron Mountaiu ^^c. K. 
 
 v. Harris, 8 Mo. App. 603; Mecliauics' Co., 85 Mo, 79, 85. 
 Savings Institution v. Pottlioff, 9 Mo. ■» Seal v. State, 28 Tex. 491. 
 
 App. 574; Meyers v. Union Trust Co., ^ Fhieli v. State, 81 Ala. 41, 47, 50. 
 
 82 Mo. 237; Rosecraus v. Wabash iScC. e Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. St. 3(17. 
 
 E. Co., 83 Mo. 678; Coudy v. Iron ' Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Ind. 10, 
 
 Mountain &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 79, 85; 23; Eoss v. Citizens Ins. Co., 7 Mo. 
 
 Tallon V. Grand Portage Mining Co., App. 575. 
 55 Midi. 147; Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. « Tost, § 1G63, et seq. 
 
 St. 367.
 
 812 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOUip. Tr.j 
 
 making of an assault with a deadJy weapon ; ^ the presumption 
 of guilt from the recent unexplained jwssesston of stolen goods; "^ 
 the presumption of malice from making a /a^sff accw5a<^ow against 
 a person, imputing the commission of an indictable offense.^ 
 Accordingly, as already seen,* it is a general rule, subject to ex- 
 ceptions, that the conclusions or opinions of witnesses are not 
 admissible in evidence;^ otherwise the witnesses would usurp 
 either the function of the court of declaring tiie law, or that of 
 the jury of deciding the facts. It has been said that "in gen- 
 eral, whenever an inference is to be drawn by a jury, from the 
 proof of certain facts, it is the duty of the court to state to the 
 jury, in a case calling for it, not only what facts were not suffi- 
 cient legally to authorize the presumption, but what facts, if 
 proved, will justify it." ^ 
 
 § 1040. Particular Questions or Points of Fact. — It is nec- 
 essarily a part of the foregoing rule that, where a particular 
 question or point of fact is disputed, whether it reaches to the 
 
 ■ merits of the whole controversy or not, it must, in general, be 
 decided by the judge. Thus, where a witness was interrogated 
 respecting a conversation, which the witness believed to have 
 taken place in the presence of a party, and gave certain reasons, 
 grounded on distances and tone of voice, for believing that the 
 party did not hear the converss^ioQ? — it was held that the court 
 erred in deciding that the party did not hear the conversation, 
 and in excluding the testimony as to what the conversation was. 
 " It was not for the witness nor the court, but for the jury, to 
 determine from all the circumstances," Avhethcr the party heard 
 what occurred in his presence.^ So, where a remark, made by 
 the defendant to the plaintiff, was material evidence, if made 
 before the delivery of a deed, but the evidence was conflicting as 
 
 ' to whether it was made before or after, it was held that all the 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 18. ^ Wheeler v. Schrocder, 4 R. I. 383, 
 
 ''■ 1 Grceiil. Ev., § 34. 392 (ciling Lecraw v. Boston, 17 Mow. 
 
 3 1 Greeul. Ev., § 18; 2 Id., § 418. (U. S.) 42*;, 43(1). 
 
 ■• ylu«e, §§ 377, 378. 'Wilson v. Irish, 02 Iowa, 2(;0,. 
 
 5 People V. Wilson, 3 Paii<. Cr. (N. 2(54. 
 Y.) 200, 20G.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXI.] GENERAL RULES. 813 
 
 evidence concerning the remark should have gone to the jury, 
 and that it was for them to determine whether it was made before 
 or after the delivery. ^ 
 
 § 1041. Effect of Contradictory Admissions previously 
 Made. — So, whether or not certain admissions, previously made 
 by the prosecuting witness in a criminal trial, contradictory to 
 his testimony, will have the effect to impair his credit as a wit- 
 ness, is necessarily a question for the jury.- 
 
 § 1042, Whether a Witness an Accomplice. — Whether a 
 witness is an accomplice in the commission of a crime for which 
 the defendant is on trial, within the meaning of the rule that his 
 testimony must be corroborated in order to furnish ground for 
 a conviction, is a question for the jury, and not for the court. -^ 
 
 § 1043. Sufficiency of Corroborating- Testimony. — It is 
 
 equally a question for the jury whether such a witness has been 
 corroborated. Thus, wiiere, independently of the evidence of an 
 accomplice, there is evidence tending to connect the defendant 
 with the commission of the offense, the question of its sufficiency 
 is for the jury.* 
 
 § 1044. Sufficiency of Impeaching* Testimony. — In like 
 
 manner, as hereafter explained, the sufficiency of impeaching tes- 
 timony — whether a witness has been successfully impeached — 
 is always a question for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1045. Inference from Failure to Produce Evidence. — As 
 
 already soen,^ the failure or refusal to produce evidence which 
 is within the power of the party, affords ground for an infer- 
 
 1 Ihid. V. Elliott (N. Y.), 12 N. E. Rep. 602, 
 
 2 State V. Johnageu, 53 lovAa, 250. aud note. As to who is au accomplice 
 
 3 State V. Lawlor, 28 INIiuu. 217. Avitliia the rule, see Smith v. State 
 
 4 People V. Kimz (Cal.), 14 Pac. (Tex.), 5 S. W. Rep. 219, aud uote. 
 Rep. 836. Respect iuij; the sufliciency ^ Post, § 2426. 
 
 of accomplice testimony, see People <^ Ante, §§ 453, 794, 795, 989.
 
 814 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [iTllOllip. Tv.y 
 
 ence unfavorable to him ; and where he has purposely destroyed 
 instruments of evidence, the law warrants the makins: of what- 
 ever deductions against him the case fairly admits of, in conform- 
 ity with the maxim contra spoliatorem omnia pra^sumuntur. 
 "Without stopping to consider the extent of this presumption, it 
 will be here said that, in cases tried before juries, it is for them 
 to say what inference is to be drawn from the failure of a party 
 to produce evidence which is accessible to him.^ Upon this 
 question it has been held proper, under circumstances, for the 
 judge to decline to rule that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to 
 produce certain evidence, and that the absence of such evidence 
 was to be weighed as discrediting the testimony of a particular 
 witness; and on the other hand, to instruct that, where a party 
 knows that evidence is likely to be introduced at a trial incon- 
 sistent with his own claim, and if his claim is w^ell founded, it is 
 in his power to produce other evidence which will control that 
 brought against him, his failure to produce such other evidence 
 should be considered as a circumstance against him, — leaving it 
 to them to say whether this principle applies to the conduct of 
 either party. ^ 
 
 § 1046. Deductions from the Appearance of Witnesses. — 
 
 It has been held that a jury may properly be permitted to find, from 
 the appearance of a young man, without other evidence, that he 
 is not twenty-one years of age.^ On like grounds, where it was 
 a question, whether a railway company, having the duty of mak- 
 ing a proper inspection of cars coming upon its road from other 
 lines, employed a competent person to perform this duty, it might 
 be judged of by the jury from the appearance of the person so 
 employed when testifying as a witness in the case, in addition to 
 evidence that the car which was the source of the injury was de- 
 fective, and in connection with the general testimony of the in- 
 spector.* On the contrary, it has been ruled in the same court, 
 
 M^ldridge v. Hawiey, ll.j Mass. '' Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6. 
 
 410. * Keith v. New llaveii ikc. K. Co.,. 
 
 2 Sturtevant v. Wallack, Ul Mass. 140 Mass. 175. 
 119.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXL] general rules. 815 
 
 that the fact that the juiyj in most cases where a vieio takes 
 place, acquire a certain amount of information which they may 
 properly treat as evidence, presents no suitable obstacle to the 
 granting of a new trial, on the frround that the verdict is against 
 the weight of the evidence.^ 
 
 1 Tully V. Fitchburg R. Co., 134 this question, see ante, § 889, et seq,; 
 Mass. 499, 503- For a controversy on especially §§ 900, 901.
 
 816 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThOUip. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, ORDINANCES, RULES 
 
 AND CUSTOMS. 
 
 Section 
 
 1050. Judge interprets Written Laws. 
 
 1051. Illustration of an Application of this Rule. 
 
 1052. Meaning of Words in Statutes. 
 
 1053. [Continued.] Whether a Pretended Act of the Legislature was duly 
 
 Passed. 
 
 1054. Foreign Laws. 
 
 1055. Existence of Municipal Ordinances. 
 
 1056. Interpretation of Municipal Ordinances. 
 
 1057. Validity of Rules, By-Laws, Regulations, etc., of Corporations. 
 ' 1058. Existence of Particular Usages or Customs. 
 
 1059. Mining Laws and Customs not enacted by the Legislature. 
 
 1060. Constitution and By-Laws of a Private Society. 
 
 1061. The Law of the Particular Case. 
 
 1050. Judge Interprets Written Laws. — The interpretation 
 of statutes, constitutional ordinances, municipal ordinances and 
 by-laws, and all other written laws, is for the court, and not for 
 the jury.i It has been held that juries are not judges of the law 
 in criminal cases, in the sense which entitles them to interpret 
 the meaning of words employed in criminal statutes, and that it 
 is error for the court in its charge to submit the meaning of such 
 words to them; ^ but this subject will be considered hereafter.^ 
 
 § 1051. Illustration of an Application of this Rule. — Thus, it is 
 a question of law, who is " a mill owner, within the meaning of the law 
 relating to mills and mill-dams " in Wisconsin, and this is to be ex- 
 
 1 Barnes v. Mayor of Mobile, 19 Denver &c, R. Co. v. Olsen, 4 Colo. 
 
 Ala. 707; Fairbanks v. Woodhouse, 293; Large u. Orvis, 20 Wis. 696, 
 6Cal. 433; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 111. 2 cm-pcHter v. People, 8 Barb- 
 
 317; Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ivy.) (N. Y.) 603, 610. 
 553; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 2.50; '■^ Post, § 2132, et seq. 
 
 Supervisors v. Heeuau, 2 Minn. 330;
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXII.] INTEKPRETATIOX OF LAWS, ETC. 817 
 
 plained to the jury, and not left to them to discuss and settle for 
 themselves. Therefore, an instruction that, in order to maintain a de- 
 fense in an action under a statute called the Mill-Dam Act, for flow- 
 ing the plaintiff's land and obstructing the wheel of her mill, on the 
 ground of a prior right as a lower mill-owner on the same stream, the 
 defendant •' must have shown himself to be a mill-owner within the mean- 
 ing of the law relating to mills and mill-dams," was properly refused.^ 
 
 1052. Meaning- of Words in Statutes. — It is error for the 
 court to submit to the jury the meaning of a material word in a 
 statute. Thus, in an indictment for unlawfully selling stray an- 
 imals, it became a question whether the sale was attended by 
 three adult bidders besides the members of the family of the de- 
 fendant, who had taken up the estray, which was made by the 
 statute,^ a prerequisite to the validity of the sale. The court de- 
 clined a requested instruction as to the meaning of the word 
 '■'■ family " in the statute, but told the jury that they could put 
 their own construction on it, it being a matter of proof. It was 
 held that this was error, the court saying: " What is intended in 
 the statute by the words ' the family of the taker up,' is, when 
 applied to a particular state of facts, a mixed question of law and 
 fact. So far as the fact is governed by law, it belongs to the 
 judge to declare the law ; and so far as the fact was one of proof, 
 it was a matter to be ascertained from the evidence, and one not 
 to be left to the personal knowledge of the jury."^ 
 
 § 1053. [Continued.] Wliether a Pretended Act of the 
 Legislature was duly Passed. — Whether what purports to be 
 an act of the legislature of a State was duly passed, with the 
 concurrence of the requisite majority of the members of 
 both houses, as is required by the constitution of the State, 
 so as to become a valid law, is a question of law for the 
 
 'i Large v. Orvis, 20 Wis. G'JiJ. agemeut." See as to the raeauing of 
 
 2 Kev. Stat. Tex., art. 4.583. the word; Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 la. 
 
 3 Goode V. State, 16 Tex. App. 411; 431; Arnold v. Waltz, 53 l\x. 70(5; s. c. 
 citing Green v. Hill, 2 Tex. 4(J5, The 3(5 Am. Rep. 248, and note; AVilson v. 
 court defined the word '■'■ family " to Cochran, 31 Tex. G77; Howard v. 
 mean, " the collective body of persons Marshall, 48 Tex. 471, 478; Raco v. 
 in one house under one head or man- Green, 50 Tex. 483.
 
 818 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tr., 
 
 court, aird not a question of fact for the jury.^ In a sub- 
 sequent case, one of the questions which was regarded as 
 settled in the case just cited was thus stated: " Whether a seem- 
 ing act of the legishiture is or is not a hiw, is a judicial question, 
 to be determined by the court, and not a question of fact to be 
 tried by a jury ; " and this doctrine was reaffirmed.^ This is in 
 conformity with what was said in an early case in the same court: 
 " Whenever a question arises in a court of law, of the existence 
 of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the 
 precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called upon to 
 decide it have a right to resort to any source of information 
 which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind 
 a clear and satisfactory answer to such question ; alwa^^s seeking 
 first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the 
 positive law has enacted a different rule. " ^ In the case first cited 
 it was said: " There can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining 
 the existence of a law. That which purports to be a law of a 
 State, is*a law, or it is not a law, according as the truth of the fact 
 may be, and not according to the shifting circumstances of parties. 
 It would be an intolerable state of things if a document purport- 
 ino" to be an act of the legislature could thus be a law in one case 
 and for one party, and not a law in another case and for another 
 party; a law to-day, and not a law to-morrow; a laAV in one 
 place, and not a law in another in the same State. And whether 
 it be a law, or not a law, is a judicial question, to be settled and 
 determined by the courts and judges." Further on in the same 
 opinion it is said: " Of course, any particular State may, by its 
 constitution and laws, prescribe what shall be conclusive evidence 
 of the existence or non-existence of a statute; but the question 
 of such existence or non-existence, being a judicial one in its 
 nature, the mode of ascertaining and using that evidence must 
 rest in the sound discretion of the court on which the duty in aUy 
 particular case is imposed." ^ In determining this question, it 
 
 1 South Ottawa v. Perkius, 94 U. S. » Gardner v. Collector, G Wall. (U. 
 
 260. S.) 499, 511. 
 
 * Post V. Supervisors, 105 U. S. * South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U 
 
 667, S. 2G0, 2C7, 209, opinon by Bradley, J.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXII.] INTERPRETATIOX OF LAWS, ETC. 819 
 
 is competent for the judges, npon whom the duty of deciding it 
 IS miposed, to resort to the written records of the tegislature%o 
 far as they disclose the steps which took phice in the passao-e of 
 the statute in question.^ ° 
 
 § 1054. Foreign Laws. —Unless there are statutes enablin'- 
 courts to take judicial notice of foreign laws, or to ascertain 
 their existence from foreign law books,^ the existence of a for- 
 eign law is proved as a fact, just as any other fact is proved. 
 \et when the existence of the law is thus established, it is for 
 the court to determine its meaning, just as it is to determine the 
 meaning of a domestic law.^ In New Hampshire it is said that 
 evidence of the existence of a foreign law is to be addressed to 
 the court, and not to the jury.* And this is the view of Mr 
 Justice Story ,^ adopted by Prof. Greenleaf,« and by the Supreme 
 Court of Maryland.^ But in Missouri and North Carolina it has 
 been held that the existence of a foreign law is a question of fact 
 for the jury ; « and it is so held in Massachusetts, with the addition 
 that it is for the jury to determine as a fact, what construction 
 has been put upon the particular foreign law by the courts of 
 
 S ^' IT^^^ "-^ Collector, (5 Wall. (U. 3 Cecil Bank .. Barry, 20 Md. 287, 
 
 S.) 499, 510; Purely v. People, 4 Hill 295; Consequa ^^ Willings 1 Pet C C 
 
 ^^^' Jm^V^?'o^?^'^''-^'''P^''' ^'" (^' ^-^ 2^^' Charlotte ..ChoutJuu*, 83 
 
 i/r o^; ;^' ' ^P^"Sler V. Jacob, 14 Mo. 194; .. c. 25 Mo. 4C5; Liviu^stou 
 
 111. 297; Young v. Thomson, 14 111. v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Cranch (^! S ) 
 
 380; Speer «. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. 280; Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass.'l36- 
 
 St. 37G; Matter of Welman, 20 Vt. Klines. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; Cobb i; 
 
 653; Supervisors .. Heenan, 2 Minn. Griffith &c. Co., 87 Mo. 90, 94; Hooper 
 
 330; Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165; v. Moore, 5 Jones L. (N. C ) 130 
 Post V. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 668; " Ferguson v. Clifford, 37 N H 86 
 
 People V. Campbell, 8 111. 466; " Story on Confl. Laws, § 638 ' 
 
 Prescott V. Trustees, 19 111. 324; « 1 Greenl. Ev., § 486 
 
 Happel V. Brethauer, 70 111. 166; MVilson ^. Carson, 12 Md 54 75- 
 
 Watkins V. Holman, 16 Pet. (U. S.) Bank v. Barry, 20 Md. 287 29-,-' Do 
 
 25, 55,56; Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 Sobry i7. De Laistre, 2 Harr. & J rku 
 
 How. (U. S.) 334; Gregg v. Forsyth, 192. 
 
 l\ f^r.'J^'J'?. ^'^' ^■''''' ""• ^•^"'^'' ' Charlottes. Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194; 
 
 68 111. 160; Miller v. Goodwin, 70 111. Moore v. Gwynn, 5 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 
 ^^l\ . ^ 187; Cobb V. Griffith &c. Co., 87 Mo. 
 
 As m Connecticut. Lockwood v. 90, 94; Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L 
 Crawford, 18 Conn. 3(_;i. (X. C.) 130.
 
 820 PROVINCE OF coLirr AND JURY. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 the particular country.^ Outside Of the rule, it is the duty of 
 the court to instruct the jury as to its meaning, and it is error 
 to refer the whole question to them without such instructions.^ 
 Statutes of sister States of the American Union are foreiern laws 
 within the meaning of this rule ; and where the statute of a sister 
 State is given in evidence, it is the duty of the court to expound 
 it to the jury, and it is proper to refuse instructions which com- 
 mit its exposition of it to them.'^ 
 
 § 1055. Existence of Municipal Ordinances. — A city ordi- 
 nance, it has been hold, is to be yroved by evidence addressed to 
 the court, and not to the jury.^ 
 
 § 1056. Interpretation of Municipal Ordinances. — The in- 
 terpretation of a municipal ordinance stands on the same footing 
 as. that of a statute ; it must be made by the court, and an in- 
 struction wdiich submits its meaning or legal effect, or its appli- 
 cability under given circumstances, to the jury, is erroneous.* 
 As hereafter seen,^ the reasonableness of municipal ordinances is 
 a question for the decision of the court. But it has been ruled, on 
 doubtful grounds, that, whether the cutting down of the sidewalk 
 adjacent to the plaintiff's lot to the level of the street, 15 feet 
 below, was a construction of the highway within the meaning of 
 the constitutional provision, was a question of fact for the decision 
 of the jury ; and that the court erred in instructing them that 
 the plaintiff was entitled to recover, if his property was injured, 
 without regard to the circumstances or character of the altera- 
 tion.' 
 
 § 1057. Validity of Rules, By-laws, Regulations, etc., of 
 Corporations. — Whether a certain rule of a railway c()r})oration 
 
 1 Holraan v. Kiug, 7 Met. (Mass.) < Roulo v. Valcour, 58 N. H. 347 ; 
 384. See Mostyu v. Fabri-;as, Cowp. Hall v. Coslello, 48 N. H. 17fi, 179. 
 1C4; Miller V. Heiurick, 4 Camp. 155; ^ pemisylvaiiia Co. v. Frana, 13 
 Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130. Bradw. (HI.) 91. 
 
 2 Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones L. ^ Fust, § 1057; § 15G8, et seq. 
 
 (N. C.) 130. ' Montsoraery v. Towusend (Ala.), 
 
 ^ Cobb V. Griffith &c. Co., 87 Mo. 2 Sonth. Kep. 155. 
 90, 94.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXII.] INTEHPRETATION OF LAWS, ETC. 
 
 821 
 
 be reasonable and therefore valid is a question of law for the 
 court, — the general rule being that the reasonableness of the by- 
 laws, rules and regulations of corporations, whether private or 
 municipal, is to be decided as a question of law, and that such a 
 by-law, rule or regulation, if unreasonable, is to be held void as 
 matter of law ; ^ and it is improper to submit the question of the 
 reasonableness of such a by-law, ordinance or regulation to the 
 decision of a jury.^ But whether a given, rule of a railroad cor- 
 poration is adequate for the safe management of its trains, is a 
 question of fact for the jury.-^ 
 
 § 1058. Existence of Particular Usages or Customs. — 
 
 Where a usage is set up to vary the terms of a contract, there are 
 generally two questions for the jury: 1. Whether the usage or 
 custom has been proved. 2. Whether the parties contracted 
 with reference to it.* The existence of a local custom or usage 
 which is not of a character so general as to be matter of common 
 knowledge, and therefore the subject of judicial notice, is a ques- 
 tion oi fact for ajuri/;^ but whether a given custom he valid or 
 
 1 Merzv. Mo. Pa. R.Co., UMo. App. 
 t59; City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 
 547; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis R. 
 Co., 14 Mo. App. 221; pout, §§ 109(J, 
 105t7, 1138, 1139, 
 
 2 Neier v. Mo. Pa. R. Co., 12 Mo. 
 App. 20. 
 
 ^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. McLallen, 
 84 111. 109. 
 
 * Burroughs v. Langley, 10 Md. 
 248; Powell v. Bradlee, 9 Gill & J. 
 (Md.) 220, 247, 277; Foley v. Masou, 6 
 Md. 37; Dorsey v. Eagle, 7 Gill & J. 
 (Md.) 321. 
 
 5 Steamboat Sultana v. Chapman, 
 5 "Wis. 454, 46(»; Chesapeake Bauli v. 
 Swaia, 29 Md. 483; Kuhtmanw. Brown, 
 4 Rich. L. (S. C.) 479, 481; Parker v. 
 Ibbetson, 4 C. B. (x. s.) 34n; Steam- 
 boat V. Hopkins, 30 Miss. 703; Bur- 
 roughs V. Langley, 10 Md. 248; Brig 
 Cadmus v. Matthews, 2 Paine C. C. 
 
 229 ; Grave v. Brien, 1 Md. 438 ; Chicago 
 Packing &c. Co. v. Tilton, 87 111.. 547. 
 In an action against a railroad com- 
 pany for damages on the ground of 
 negligence, it was held not incumbent 
 on tlie plaintiff, in opening his case, to 
 show that, by the laws of railroad com- 
 Xiauies, the defendants were guilty of 
 want of ordinary care. " If he saw 
 fit to trust that question to the good 
 sense of the jury, he might. It is not 
 one of those mere scientific subjects 
 whose laws, like that of botany, 
 geology, or medicine or surgery, are 
 matters of settled principle or accurate 
 knowledge. If the defendants desired 
 the benefit of the rules of engineering 
 for their exculpation, they might show 
 the custom, and, if not unreasonable, 
 of wliiclithe jury must judge, it would 
 avail them." Quimby v. Vermont 
 Central R. Co., 23 Vt. 387, 394.
 
 S22 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 invalid, is always a question of law for the court, and should not 
 be left to a juiy.^ The extent of the custom — whether it is or 
 is not universally recognized in a particular locality, is also a 
 question of fact for a jury.^ The inference of fact as to whether 
 a party had authority to act in a particular way from another, 
 is a question of fact for the jury, where it depends upon a course 
 of dealing between the parties, — as whether a person has been 
 accustomed to draw on a banker, although he had no cash credit 
 in the hands of the banker.'^ 
 
 § 1030. Milling Laws and Customs not enacted by the J^eg- 
 islature. — At an early day in California the persons engaged in 
 mining the precious metals established certain laws or rules, in 
 order to prevent conflicts among themselves and to settle disputed 
 questions of right. It has been held, in a case depending upon 
 these rules, that they are to be proved as facts, and that the ques- 
 tion of their existence is to be submitted to the jury ; but that it 
 is for the court, upon their being so proved, to instruct the jury 
 as to their proper meaning and application. * 
 
 § 1060. Constitution and By-Laws of a Private Society. — 
 
 So, the by-laws of a corporation or other voluntary association 
 or private society, when proved, are to be interpreted by the 
 court, the same as a public law, and it is error to submit the 
 interpretation of them to the jury.^ This is illustrated by a 
 
 1 Chicago Packing &c. Co. v.Tilton, iugs, liad against tlie decedent during 
 87 111. oil. his life time, were iu accordance with 
 
 2 Ibid. the constitution and by-laws of the 
 
 3 Cummingw. Shand, SHurl. &'N. 05. society. The court said: "Whether 
 * Coleman v. Clements, 23 Cal. 245, any, and if any, what proceedings took 
 
 248. This, it will remembered, is in place, were proper inquiries for the 
 
 confoi-mity with the rule which relates jury; but whether they were in ac- 
 
 to foreign laws. coi'dance with the constitution and 
 
 5 In an action by the adrainistra- by-laws of the society or tribe, was 
 
 tors of a deceased member of a a question of law for the court, and 
 
 benevolent societt/ for the benefit alleged not one of fact for the jury." Osceola 
 
 to be due from the society on account Tribe v. Rost, 15 Md. 295. The court 
 
 of his death, it was held that the court cite: Emery v. Owings, 6 Gill (Md.), 
 
 properly refused to submit to tlie jury 101, 190; Clark v. Marriott, 9 Gill 
 
 the question whether certain proceed- (Md.), 331, 337.
 
 . Tit. V, Ch. XXXII.] INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, ETC. 823 
 
 case where the indes of a hoard of t7\ide were a part of the con- 
 tract sued on, and authorized the phiintiff , who Avas a member of 
 the board, and who, as a commission merchant, had bought pro- 
 duce for future delivery on account of the defendant, to offset 
 and settle such trade by other trades made by the defendant, and 
 to substitute some other person for the one from whom he pur- 
 chased the property, — thus, in the slang of such institutions, 
 " ringing out the deal." Acting under this rule, the plaintiff 
 released the seller from his contracts, and, having many similar 
 transactions in his business, proposed to himself to substitute, in 
 place of the contract with the seller, the agreement of such other 
 contractor as might be available for the purpose at the time of 
 settlement, but designated no particular contractor or contract. 
 It was held that it was a question of law for the court whether 
 this was a substitution within the meanino; of the rule ; since it 
 involved merely an interpretation ot the rule, which was within 
 the province of the court. ^ 
 
 § 1061. The Law of the Particular Case. — Where, upon a 
 given state of facts, the law has been pronounced by an appellate 
 tribunal and the cause remanded for a new trial, the trial court 
 will, if the same state of facts is again presented by the evidence, 
 declare the law thereupon according to the opinion of the appel- 
 late court. Thus, it is was ruled in Missouri that, where the 
 Supreme Court had declared a sale void, upon an appeal 
 presenting a certain state of facts, and, on trial anew, the facts 
 presented by the evidence were substantially the same, the trial 
 court should have held the sale void as a question of law.^ 
 
 1 Higgins V McCrea, IIG U. S. 2 Vail v. Jacob, 7 Mo." App. 571 
 
 671. (not i-eported in full) .
 
 824 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF PRIVATE WRITINGS. 
 
 Section 
 
 1065. General Rule as to the Interpretation of Writings. 
 
 1066. Reason of the Rule, 
 
 1067. What Instruments the Rule Embraces. 
 
 1068. Error to submit such a Question to the Jury. 
 
 1069. Characterization, Interpretation and Effect of Wills. 
 
 1070. Interpretation of Public Records. 
 
 1071. Interpretation of Judicial Records. 
 
 1072. Interpretation of Contracts by Correspondence, 
 
 1073. [Continued.] Observations on the Above Rule. 
 
 1074. [Continued.] An Exception to the Above Rule. 
 
 1075. Meaning of Ordinary Words and Phrases, 
 
 1076. Meaning of Words not used in their Ordinary Sense, 
 
 1077. Instances under this Rule, 
 
 1078. [Further Illustration.] Promise to pay in '' Cash Notes." 
 
 1079. View that the Jury must Declare the Meaning of the Word, and the 
 
 Court Expound the Contract, 
 
 1080. Technical Terras known only to Experts, 
 
 1081. The Meaning which the Parties themselves have placed upon their Con- 
 
 tract. 
 
 1082. [Continued.] Court to Instruct Jury as to Inferences, 
 
 1083. Rule where Parol Evidence is Required to Explain Ambiguities, 
 
 1084. [Illustration,] Where Parol Evidence is admitted to Explain a Will. 
 
 1085. [Contiuued.] How the Jury Instructed in such a Case, 
 
 1086. Contract partly in Writing and partly in Parol. 
 
 1087. Receipts for .Aloncy Paid. 
 
 1C88, Meaning of Words varied by Evidence of Usage. 
 
 1089, Mercantile Contracts explained by the Usages of Trade. 
 
 1000. Instance of an Instruction Erroneous within this Rule. 
 
 1091, The Correct Reading of Written Instruments. 
 
 1092. Blanks in Written Instruments. 
 
 1093. [Continued.] Cases where the Meaning has been submitted to the Jury. 
 
 1094, [Continued.] Blanks in the Descriptive Calls of a Deed. 
 
 1095, Whether an Instrument is Sealed or Unsealed, 
 
 1096. Validity of Written Instruments. 
 
 1097, V/hether a Contract is against Public Policy. 
 
 1098. Inferences from Writuigs j)ut in Evidence to show Extrinsic Facts.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIIl.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 825 
 
 1065. General Rule as to the Interpretation of Writings. — 
 
 As a general rule, the interpretation or construction of written 
 instruments, which are drawn in language so plain as not to re- 
 quire the aid of extrinsic evidence, is a question for the court, 
 and it is -error to submit such a question to the jury.^ An 
 instruction to the jury, as to the legal effect of a written in_ 
 strument, is not subject to objection as being an instruction 
 upon a question of fact.^ The rule is said to be that written in- 
 struments should be construed and interpreted by the court upon 
 inspectio7i only^ unless terms of art or other unusual language 
 be employed, or unless words are employed not in their ordinary 
 
 1 Parker u. Ibbetsou, 4 C. B. (x. s.) 
 345; State V. Lefaivre, 53 Mo. 470; 
 Edwards v. Smith, G3 Mo. 119; Blake- 
 ley v. Benuecke, 59 Mo. 193; Burress 
 V. Blair, 61 Mo. 133; State?;. Doimelly, 
 9 Mo. App. 520; Brecheisen v. Coffey, 
 loMo. App. 80; Michael w. St. Louis 
 Mutual Fire lus. Co., 17 Mo. App. 23; 
 Fruin V. Crystal Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 397, 
 404 ; Falls Wire Man. Co. v. Broder- 
 ick, 12 Mo. App. 378; Spaldiug v. 
 Taylor, 1 Mo. App. 34; Goddard v. 
 Foster, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 123; Lapeer 
 Ins. Co. V. Doyle, 30 Mich. 159; 
 Eyser v. Weissgerber, 2 Iowa, 4(13; 
 Levy V. Gadsl)y, 3Crauch (U. S.), 180; 
 Str'^eter u. Streeter, 43 111. 155; Drew 
 V. Towle, 30 N. H. 531; Shepherd v. 
 White, 11 Tex. 34G; Thomas v. Thom- 
 as, 15 B. Mon. 178; Smith w. Faulk- 
 ner, 12 Gray, 251 ; Warren v. Jones, 51 
 Me. 146; Cocheco Bank v. Berry, 52 
 Me. 293; Williams v. Waters, 36 Ga. 
 454; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Cassell, 
 17 111. 389; Nash». Drisco,51 Me. 417; 
 Perth Amboy Man. Co. v. Condit, 21 
 N. J. L. 659; Rogers v. Colt, 21 N. J. 
 L. 704; Brown v. Hatton, 9 Ired. (N. 
 C.) 319; Roth v. Miller, 15 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 100; Vincent v. Huff, 8 Serg. & R. 
 (Pa.) 381; Moore v. Miller, 4 Serg. & 
 R. (Pa.) 279; Wasou v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 
 
 525; Collins v. Benbury, 5 Ired. (N. 
 C.) 118; Bedford v. Flowers, 11 
 Humph. (Tenu.) 242; Gregory v. 
 Underhill, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 207, 211; 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. McKenna, 13 
 Lea (Tenn.), 280, 288; Holman v. 
 Crane, 16 Ala. 570, 580; Welsh v. Dus- 
 ar, 3 Binn. (Pa.) 329, 337; Fowle u. 
 Bigelow, 10 Mass. 379 384; Woodman 
 r. Chesley, 39 Me. 45; Harris v. Doe, 
 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 369; Leviston v. 
 Junction R. Co., 7 Ind. 597; Emery v. 
 Owiugs, 6 Gill (Md.), 260; Kidd v. 
 Cromwell, 17 Ala. 648; Walker v. 
 Bank of Washington, 3 How. (U. S.) 
 62; Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671, 
 682; Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471; 
 Friend v. Friend, 64 Md. 321 ; Warner 
 V. Thompson, 35 Kan. 27; Russell v. 
 Arthur, 17 S. C. 477; Union Bank v. 
 Heyward, 15 S. C. 296; Mowry u. Stog- 
 ner,3 S. C. 251, 253; Burke v. Lee, 76 
 Va. 386; Dixon v. Duke, 85 Ind. 434; 
 Butler V. State, 5 Gill & J. (:Md.) 511, 
 619; Sellars v. Johnson, 65 N. C. 104; 
 Luckhart v. Ogden, 30 Cal. 547, 556 ; 
 Dunn V. Rothernell, 112 Pa. St. 272; 
 Van Eman v. Stauchfleld, 8 Minn. 518, 
 522; Grady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147. 
 2 Lucas V. Snyder, 2 G. Greene 
 (Iowa), 499; San Antonio v. Lewis, & 
 Tex. 69, 71.
 
 ^26 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 signification, and which hence require explanation by extrinsic 
 evidence.^ " The construction of all written instruments," said 
 Baron Parke, " belongs to the court alone, whose duty it is 
 to construe all such instruments as soon as the true meanino- of 
 the words in which they are couched, and the surrounding cir- 
 cumstances, if any, have been ascertained as facts by the jury; 
 and it is the duty of the jury to take the construction from the 
 court, either absolutely-, if there be no words which are to be 
 construed as words of art, or phrases used in commerce, and no 
 surrounding circumstances to be ascertained; or conditionally, 
 when those words or circumstances are necessarily referred to 
 them. Unless this were so, there would be no certainty in the 
 law; for a misconstruction by the court is the proper subject, by 
 means of a bill of exceptions, of redress in a court of error; but 
 a misconstruction by the jury cannot be set right at all, effect- 
 ually."^^ 
 
 § 1066. Reason of the Rule. — "This," said the Supreme 
 Court of Pennsylvania, " is a matter of very great importance. 
 The security of property depends upon it ; for there is no appeal 
 from the decision of a jury. The injured party may indeed 
 move for a new trial, but the court may grant or refuse, at its 
 discretion. It is the right, therefore, of every suitor, to have 
 the opinion of the court on such matters as, by the law of the 
 land, the court is bound to decide ; and one of these matters is the 
 construction of w^ritten contracts. There may be cases in which 
 extrinsic circumstances are so connected with a writing as to ren- 
 der it necessary to leave the whole to the jury." ^ "It is," said 
 Le Grand, C. J., " exclusively the province of the court to in- 
 terpret all written instruments, and to determine the materiality 
 and force of each and all the facts contained in them. Were the 
 jury permitted to do this, there would be no certain legal signifi- 
 cance assignable to any paper ; for it would depend upon the 
 
 1 Van Email v. Stanchflcld, 8 Minn. ford, 8 Mees. & W. 823. See also Mor- 
 518, 522. ell v. Frith, 3 Mees. & W. 406. 
 
 2 Baron Parke in Xeilson v. liar- 3 Donison v. Wertz, 7 Serg. & R 
 
 "a.) 372, 376.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXIIL] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE AVRITINGS. 827 
 
 peculiar notions of each particular jury, under whose supervision 
 it mio;ht be brouo;ht ; and thus a recital in a case like the one be- 
 fore us might be deemed material by one jury, and by another, 
 as wholly immaterial and unimportant." * "It is," said Mr. 
 Justice Cooley, " for the court to interpret the written contracts 
 of parties ; for when they have assented to definite terms and 
 stipulations, and incorporated them in formal documents, the mean- 
 ing of these, it is supposed, can always be discovered on inspec- 
 tion ; nothing which is within the purview of the contract is left 
 in doubt, and there is of course nothing to submit to the jury." ^ 
 
 § 10G7. What Instruments the Rule embraces. — The ob- 
 ligation of the court to expound the meaning of written instru- 
 ments to the jury, and not to submit such questions to them, 
 embraces every species of writings: contracts, "^ records,* deeds,^ 
 wills, ^ and all others.' So, where a disputed question turns up- 
 
 1 Cook's Lessee v. Carroll, ti Md. 
 104,111. 
 
 2 McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. 294, 
 295. See also Thompsou v. Richards, 
 14 Mich. 172. 
 
 3 Cases, ante, § 1065; jyost, § 1068. 
 ■* Adams v. Betz, 1 Watts (Pa.), 
 
 425. 
 
 5 McCutcheu v. McCutchen, 9 Port. 
 (Ala.) 650; Seaward v. Malotte, 15 
 Cal. 304 ; Bonney tj. Morrill, 52 Me. 252 ; 
 Veuable I' McDonald, 4 Dana (Ky.), 
 336; Hodges v. Strong, 10 Vt. 247; 
 Whittlesey v. Kellogg, 28 Mo. 404; 
 Hurley v. Morgan, 1 Dev. & Batt. 425; 
 Morse v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824; Ad- 
 dingtou V. Etheridge, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 
 436; Poage v. Bell, 3 Rand. 586; Smith 
 V. Clayton, 29 N. J. L. 357; Brown v. 
 Huger,21 How. (U. S.) 305; American 
 Bank v. luloes, 7 Md. 380; Whiteford v. 
 Munroe, 17 Md. 135; Deanr. Erskiue, 
 18 N. H. 81; Stark V. Barrett, 15 Cal. 
 361; Montagu. Linn, 23 111. 551; Harris 
 V. Doe, 4 Blackf. (Ind ) 369; Symmes v. 
 Brown, 13 Ind. 318; Millerr. Sluickle- 
 
 ford, 4 Dana, 264; St. .John v. Bump- 
 stead, 17 Barb. (N. Y.)100; Stevens «. 
 Hollister, 18 Vt. 294; Cox ?j. Freedley, 
 33 Pa. St. 124; Price v. Mazauge, 31 
 Ala. 701, 709. 
 
 •5 Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17; 
 Downing v. Bain, 24 Ga. 372; Sartor 
 V. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; Willson v. 
 Whitefleld, 38 Ga. 269. So, whether 
 or not a will has been executed with 
 the proper formalities is, of course, a 
 question of law. Roe v. Tyler, 45 111. 
 485; Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496: Sulli- 
 van V. Honacker, 6 Fla. 372 
 
 7 Kidd V. Cromwell, 17 Ala. 648; 
 Earbee v. Craig, 1 Ala. 607; Carpentier 
 V. Thirston, 24 Cal. 268; Richmond 
 &c. Co. V. Farquar, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 89; Leviston u. Junction R. Co., 7 Ind. 
 597; Pickerell v. Carson, 8 Iowa, 544; 
 Caldwell v. Dicksou, 26 Mo. 60; Hol- 
 man u. Crane, 16 Ala. 570;Cahoonv. 
 Ring, 1 Cliff. (C. C.) 592; Turner v. 
 Yates, 16 How. 14; Moore v. Leseur, 
 18 Ala. 606; Long v. Rodgers, 19 Ala, 
 321.
 
 828 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThoHip. Tl'., 
 
 on the construction of two or more written instruments which are 
 to be construed together, it is the duty of the court to construe 
 them and to dechire their meaning to the jury, and to direct a 
 verdict, if, in the state of the case, a due construction of the in- 
 struments determines the controversy.^ Instances under the 
 rule could be multiplied almost without number. Thus, the force 
 and effect, as well as the interpretation and construction, of a 
 writing, upon the question whether it is a lease or not, is for the 
 determination of the court and not of the jury.^ So, whether 
 an agreement between parties amounts to an extension of time 
 for the performance of a prior contract between them, and if 
 so, what time, are questions of law for the court, and not ques- 
 tions of fact for the jury .^ So, it was held error to submit to the 
 jury the question whether the terms of a written contract ex- 
 cluded a general custom of trade, the existence of which had been 
 proved before then.'* 
 
 § 10G8. Error to submit such a Question to the Jury. — 
 
 An instruction which submits to the jury the interpretation of a 
 written contract, which is so plain in its terms that extrinsic 
 evidence is not needed to explain its meaning, is erroneous ; ^ if 
 the jury construe it wrongly, the judgment will be reversed; 
 but if they construe it rightly, the error will be immaterial.^ 
 
 § 1069. Characterization, Interpretation and Effect of 
 Wills. — This doctrine applies to wills, and all questions touch- 
 ing the operation, construction and effect of testamentary ivrit- 
 ings, are for the court, with the single exception that where 
 there is a latent ambiguity parol evidence may be heard. ^ 
 
 1 Helraholz v. Everiugham, 24 Wis. Spalding v. Tayloi*, 1 Mo. App. 34; 
 
 266. Willard v. Suraner, 7 Mo. App. 577; 
 
 - Dilim V. Kothermcl, 112 Pa. St. Brooks v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 11 
 
 272. Mo. App. 350; Miller v. Duniap, 22 
 
 •" Luckhart v. Ogdtni, 30 Cal. 548, Mo. Apj). 97; other cases, a«fe, § 1065. 
 556. 6 Brooks v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 
 
 •» Parker v. Ibbetson, 4 C. B. (..x 11 Mo. App. 350; Mai'tineau v. Steele, 
 
 s.) 345. 14 Wis. 273; ante, § 1020. 
 
 ^ State V. Lefaivre, 53 Mo. 470; ' Burke v. Lee, 76 Va. 386,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXllI.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 829 
 
 Whether a will has been executed with all the jjroper formalities, 
 is a question of law for the court, and is not to be submitted to 
 the jury.^ Whether a paper tendered in evidence is testamentary 
 in its character, to take effect on the death of the maker, and 
 whether, as such, it should be admitted for probate, is peculiarly 
 a question for the court. But, on being so admitted, the ques- 
 tions as to the testamentary capacity and free volition of the 
 testator is for the jury.^ There is always a presumption, it is 
 said, against an imperfect testamentary paper ; and where it is 
 doubtful whether it was intended to operate as a deed or as a luill, 
 it is for the jury to decide, on the facts touching its execution 
 and deliveiy, the declarations of the maker and other circum- 
 stances, which ^vay it was intended to operate.^ Although the 
 interpretation of wills is generally a question of law for the 
 court, yet where the question depends upon i\\Q form of attesta- 
 tion, which may have been the result of ignorance on the part of 
 the testator (the law requiring a different attestation in case of 
 a disposition of real property from that required in case of a 
 disposition of personal property), it has been held, in a contest 
 touching personal property alleged to have been passed by the 
 will, that the question whether the testator intended that the 
 paper should operate as to t/ie personal, properly unless it could take 
 effect as to the real property, is a question of fact for the jury.* 
 
 § 1070. Interpretation of Public Records. — Whether a cer- 
 tain instrument, for the alteration of which a person has been 
 
 1 Roe V. Taylor, 45 111. 485. There ^ Ferguson v. Ferguson, 27 Tex. 
 
 Is a ruling in one jurisdiction to the 339, 344. Compare Herrington v. 
 
 effect that, -nhether a testamentary Bradford, Walker (Miss.), 520; Jones 
 
 instrument was signed and attested v. Kea, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 301; Lyles 
 
 as required by law are questions of v. Lyles, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 531 ; 
 
 fact for the jury. Watford ^.Eorester, Wigle f . "Wigle, 6 Watts (Pa.), 522; 
 
 06 Ga. 738. If tliis means anything Wareham v. Sellers, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 
 more than that the question whetlier 98; Witherspoon v. Withcrspoon, 2 
 
 tlie will was in fact executed by the McCord (S. C), 520; King's Proctor 
 
 person by whom it purported to be v. Dairas, 3 Hagg. 218. 
 
 executed, it is an obvious judicial ■* Fatheree v. Lawrence, 33 Miss, 
 
 aberration. 585, G28. See also Jones v. Kea, 4 
 
 ■■' Watford i'. Forester, Gfi Ga. 738. Dev. (X. C.) 301.
 
 830 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 indicted and put upon trial, is a public record, is a question of 
 law for the court. ^ Thus, it is the province and duty of the 
 court to settle, as a question of law, the meaning of the speci- 
 ficatlon. of a patent ; and, if it cannot be ascertained satisfactor- 
 ily from an inspection of the patent, it is to be declared void 
 for ambiguity. Accordingly, where, in an action on the case for 
 an infringement of letters-patent, it was objected, upon the face 
 of the specification of the patent, which was for improvements 
 in the mode of propelling vessels, that it was uncertain whether 
 the patentee claimed a wheel constructed spirally or only spiral 
 paddles attached to a wheel, and the court instructed the jury 
 that the question whether the specification was ambiguous in the 
 particular charged was one compounded of law and fact, and 
 that, if the jury should find that a spiral wheel and a spiral pro- 
 peller were the same thing in ordinary acceptation, then the 
 specification was sufliciently certain in that respect, — it was 
 held that the instruction was erroneous.^ 
 
 § 1071. Interpretation of Judicial Records. — The mean- 
 ing of a judicial record, including the question of its validity, 
 is always a matter to be expounded by the court, — as whether 
 an order granting letters of admimstration is valid or invalid.^ 
 As already stated,* this rule applies with peculiar force to the 
 records of the particular court. So, it has been held that, where 
 there is a question as to the meaning of an order of sale of per- 
 sonal property made by an Orphans' Court, it is not competent 
 to introduce the order book and to show similar orders made 
 by the court in the matter of other estates, — the construction 
 of the particular order being for the court.^ So, where in an 
 action on a contract, the defendant pleads a decree of a chancery 
 court, to show a release by the plaintiff of his cause of action, 
 it is for the court to construe the decree and determine from its 
 face, whether it was intended to operate as a release; and a 
 
 1 State V. Anderson, 30 La. Ann. ^ Sims v. Boynton, 32 Ala. 352, 
 Pt. 1,557. 3C0, 
 
 2 Emerson v. Hogg, 2 Blatchf. (U. '' Ante, § 1020. 
 
 S.) 1, G. Compare Washburn v. ^ Wyatt v. Steele, 2(; Ala. G3<), (;49. 
 
 Gould, 3 Story (U. S.), 122.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 831 
 
 charge which submits this question to the jury is erroneous. ^ 
 So, also, the interpretation of an award made by arbitrators is 
 for the court; although it has been said that, in construing 
 either the terms of the submission or the language of the award, 
 reference may be had to all the surrounding facts of the 
 case.'- 
 
 § 1072. Interpretation of Contracts by Correspondence. — 
 
 Where the evidence adduced to prove the existence of a contract 
 consists wholly of letters which have passed between the parties, 
 it is the oflfice of the court, upon an inspection of the letters, if 
 they are capable of being understood without extrinsic evidence, 
 to declare, as matter of law, whether the>' amount to a proposal 
 and to an unconditional acceptance, so as to constitute a contract,^ 
 and, if so, to say what the contract is ; ^ and it is error to submit the 
 question to the jury.^ This must, on principle, be qualified with 
 the statement that, where the question of contract or no contract is 
 to be determined from the acts as well as the writino-s, in or- 
 der that the court shall determine it, the act must be established 
 by uncontroverted evidence, and must be of an unetjuivocal 
 character. If they admit of different inferences as to the in- 
 tent, the question is, on principle, one of fact for a jury.^ 
 
 1 Shook V. Blouut, 07 Ala. 301. -whether their award conforms to the 
 
 2 The award of arbitrators is cou- direction and powers giveu them by 
 elusive upon the parties, only iu the subraissiou, must of course be de- 
 respect of those matters which have termined by the court as a questiou 
 been submitted to them for ai'bitra- of law, upon a consideration of the 
 tion. If they assume to act on ques- terms of the submission. Squires r. 
 tions not submitted to them, or fail to Anderson, supra; Kanousein Kauouse, 
 follow the directions of the submis- SO 111. 4.3!). 
 
 sion iu a material point, their award ^ Falls Wire Man. Co. v. Broderick, 
 
 iu respect of those matters will not be 12 j\Io. App. 378, 385; Luckhart v. 
 
 binding, whether the questious be Ogdeu, 30 Cal. 547, 55(1; Macbeath v. 
 
 questions of law or questious of fact. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172, 180. 
 
 Squires r. Anderson, 54 Mo. 193. Cou- •» y.^ Valkeuburg v. Rogers, 18 
 
 suit also Pratt v. Hackett, G Johns. Mich. 180 
 
 (N. Y.) 13; Allen t7. Galpin, 9 Barb. * Lea v. Henry, 56 la. 662; Russell i?. 
 
 (N. y.) 246. Whether the arbitrators Arthur, 17 S. C. 477; Rauney y. Hig- 
 
 had authority to act in reference to by, 5 Wis. 62. 
 
 any particular subject-matter, or •' Post, § 1083.
 
 832 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1073. [Continued.] Observations on the above Rule. — In the 
 leading case upon this rule, the question was whether the defendant 
 had contracted as agent for the government or for himself, and it was 
 objected that, whether he had made himself liable or not was a ques- 
 tion which ought to have been left to the jury to decide. " But," said 
 Lord Mansfield, "there was no evidence which was proper for their 
 consideration ; for the evidence, consisting altogether of written docu- 
 ments and letters which were not denied, the import of them was mat- 
 ter of law, and not of fact." Willes, J., said on the same point: 
 "There was no other evidence but letters, which were before the jury, 
 and the judge had a right to give his opinion upon them. The con- 
 struction of deeds is a matter of law, but that of letters is proper for 
 the consideration of the jury." Buller, J., said: "I do not agree 
 with my brother Willes as to the construction of letters. If they are 
 written in so dubious a manner as to be capable of different construc- 
 tions, and can be explained by other transactions, the whole evidence 
 must be left to the jury to decide upon, for they are to judge of the 
 truth or falsehood of such collateral facts which may vary the sense of the 
 letters themselves. But if they are not explained by any other circum- 
 stances, then, like deeds or other written agreements, the construction of 
 them is a mere matter of law." ^ This case must therefore be taken as 
 deciding that the construction of letters, not in themselves ambiguous 
 so as to require the aid of extrinsic evidence in their explanation, is for 
 the court and not for the jury. 
 
 § 1074. [Continued.] An Exception to the Above Rule. — To 
 this rule an exception was stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in a 
 case where F. sued the Franklin Insurance Company upon a policy of 
 insurance. The answer alleged that the loss occurred after the policy 
 had become void because the premium note was not paid when due. 
 The reply charged that the company sent the note after the default to 
 T. for collection ; that T. directed the defendant to continue tlie insur- 
 ance and guaranteed the i)ayment of the premium, to which the defend- 
 ant assented. On the trial of this issue, the plaintiff gave in evidence 
 T.'s letter to the defendant, reading, " Continue the policy in force and 
 we will guarantee the payment of tlie note." The plaintiff also gave 
 evidence showing the course of dealing and correspondence between T. 
 and the defendant. This showed that the defendant made no reply to 
 the letter, but wrote him several letters on other matters during the 
 
 1 Macbeath v. Ilaldiimiml, 1 T. K. 172, ISO, 181, 182.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 833 
 
 interval prior to the loss. Upon this evidence the court, on motion of 
 the defendant, took the issue from tlie jury. It was held that this was 
 error. The letter of T. did not in terms or by necessary implication 
 under all the circumstances, call for a reply if the defendant assented 
 thereto. The court should have submitted, under suitable instruction, to 
 the jury, the question : " Did the defendant assent to T. 's proposal? " i 
 
 § 1075. Meaning of Ordinary Words and Phrases. — The 
 
 meaning of ordinary words and phrases in written instruments 
 is to be interpreted by the court, and not by the jury.^ Thus, 
 the question what is meant by the words of a written contract 
 sued on, "when the walls shall be completed," being a question 
 involving the construction of a contract, has been held a question 
 of law for the court. ^ So, it has been held error for the judge 
 to submit to the jury whether the words used in a loarranty of 
 facts upon which a policy of insurance was obtained asserted an 
 existing factor merely gave an opinion, — the warranty being 
 wholly in writing.'* So, it is said, that what is meant by the use 
 of the words '•^ insupportable^^ and ^'■outrageous,'" in a statute 
 relating to divorces, is a question of law ; but that the existence 
 and truth of the facts which amount to such outrages are for the 
 jury.^ So, in an action for slander, where there is no averment 
 that any of the words used had a local or provincial meaning, the 
 jury should be left to judge, from the speaking of the words and 
 the attending circumstances, of the meaning intended to be con- 
 veyed by the use of them. Accordingly, it is error in such a 
 trial, to allow witnesses to give their opinions as to the meaning 
 of such Avords.^ 
 
 § 1076. Meaning of Words not used in their Ordinary 
 Sense. — In the interpretation of written instruments the words 
 employed are to be understood in their ordinary sense unless it 
 appears doubtful whether they were intended to be understood 
 
 1 Fry V. Franklin Ins. Co., 40 Oh. * Bennett v. Agricultural Insurance 
 St. 108. Co., 51 Coun. 504. 
 
 2 Brady V. Cassidy, 104 N.Y. 147, 153. ^ Byrne v. Byrne, 3 Tex. 33G. 
 
 3 Worcester Medical Institution v. ^ Justice v. Kirlin, 17 Ind. 588. 
 Harding, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 285, 289.
 
 834 PROVINCE OF COUU'I AND JURY. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 in that sense, in which case the court may receive extrinsic evi- 
 dence for the purpose of aiding in the construction/ and may 
 refer the question of tlie meaning of the words to the jurv/^ 
 The rule has been stated thus: " Ordinarily, the construction of 
 written instruments is for the court, and not for the jury ; but 
 where a writing contains technical (other than legal) terms^ 
 mercantile abbreviations en- phrases, or obscure expressions, the 
 meaning of such terms or expressions is to be ascertained by the 
 jury." '^ It has been also said that ordinarily, " the meaning of 
 words and the grammatical construction of the English language, 
 so far as they are established by the rules and usages of the lan- 
 guage, are 'prima facie matter of law, to be construed and passed 
 upon by the court. But language may be ambiguous, and used 
 in different senses; or general words in particular trades vlw^ 
 branches of business — as among merchants, for instance — may 
 be used in a new, peculiar or technical sense; and therefore, in 
 a few instances, evidence may be received from those who are 
 conversant with such branches of business and such technical or 
 peculiar use of language, to explain and illustrate it."* It is 
 also said that if the question arises from the obscurity of the 
 writing itself, it is determined by the court alone ; but questions 
 of custom, usage, and the actual intention and meaning derived 
 therefrom, are for the jury. ^ " This," said jMr. Justice Story, 
 " is especially applicable to cases of commercial correspondence, 
 where the real objects and intentions and agreements of the 
 parties are often to be arrived at only by allusions to circum- 
 stances wliich are but imperfectly developed." ^ This principle 
 has been frequently recognized and acted upon/ 
 
 1 Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 Mees. & ^ Brown v. Brown, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 
 W. 535; Weil v. Scliwartz,21 Mo. .\pp. 573, 570; Prather v. Koss, 17 Ind. 4!io, 
 372, 380. 499. 
 
 2 Bunce v. Beck, 43 Mo. 266, 280; » 2 Phil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill's Notes), 
 Simpson v. Hargitson, 35 Leg. Obs. § 734. 
 
 172; Weil v. Scliwartz, 21 Mo. App. " Brown v. McGrau, 14 Pet. (U. S.^ 
 
 372, 881; Edwards v. Smith, 03 Mo. 479,493. 
 
 119, 127; Fagin u. Counoly, 25 Mo. 94; ^ See for instance, Fagin v. Con- 
 
 McNichol V. Paciflc Express Co., 12 noly, 25 Mo. 94, where this was the 
 
 Mo. App. 401, 407. only question in tlie case. 
 
 3 McNichols y. Pac. Ex. Co., supra.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 865 
 
 § 1077. Instances under this Rule. — Thus, the meaning of ihe ex- 
 pression, in a mercantile letter, " Please to give them credit in exchange 
 when the bills are duly honored," was held by Gibbs, C. J., to be, " a 
 question singularly fit for a jury, and one on which they were likely to 
 arrive at a sounder conclusion than the court, because their knowledge 
 of it arises from daily experience." And in this view the other three 
 judges of the common pleas concurred. i - - - - So, where a letter re- 
 mitting a bill contained a request, " which please to honor," and the 
 reply was, "Your bill of Z. 100, to W.Johnson & Co., shall have 
 attention," — it was left to a jury to say whether the words " shall have 
 
 attention " amounted to an acceptance of the bill.^ So, where a 
 
 factor was directed to sell a consignment of flour " after the receipt of 
 the Atlantic's news," and there had been other correspondence relat- 
 ing to the sale of the flour, it was properly left to the judge, sitting as a 
 jury, to determine, as a question of fact, whether the factor had sold the 
 flour in conformity witli the instructions.-^ So, where one mer- 
 chant instructed another to purchase for him two cargoes of coal 
 " afloat," and there was some dispute as to what was meant by the 
 word " afloat," and testimony was given as to its meaning among mer- 
 chants, it was held that the court properly submitted the question of 
 
 its meaning to the jury. "^ So, where the question concerned the 
 
 meaning of the abbreviation "CO. D.," it was held proper to submit it 
 
 to the jury. 5 It has been held that the words " in liquidation," 
 
 written after the signature to a note executed in the name of a partner- 
 ship, if proved to have been written when the note was made, and if 
 according to mercantile usage they import a firm dissolved, furnish a 
 circumstance from which the jury may infer that the payee of the note 
 
 had notice of the dissolution of the firm.** So, it has been held, 
 
 where the question related to the identity of certain wood which had 
 been levied upon by an oflicer and which was described in his return as 
 " sixt}' cords of soft cord ivood, more or less," that the term " soft wood," 
 not being one to which the law has attached a specific meaning, the 
 court cannot expound it, but that it is properly left to the jury to say 
 what was intended to be embraced in the language used.''' So, it 
 
 1 Lucas V. Grouing, 7 Taunt. 164. * Law v. Cross, 1 Black (U. S.), 
 
 2 Rees V. Warwick, 2 Barn. & Aid. 533, 538. 
 
 113. See also Story on Agency, § 75. ^ McNichol u. Pac. Ex. Co., 12 Mo. 
 
 See also Macbeath v. Haldemand, 1 App. 401. 
 
 T. R. 172; Morrell v. Frith, 3 Mees. & « Bnrru. Williams, 20 Ark. 172, 188. 
 
 W. 402. 7 Darling v. Dodge, 36 Me. 370. 
 
 3 Fagin v. Conuoly, 25 Mo. 94. »
 
 836 PROVINCE OF couuT AND JUKY. [I Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 has been held that parol evidence is admissible to explain what the par- 
 ties meant in a written instrument by the phrase "-waste ground," 
 when used in reference to railroad building.^ 
 
 §1078. [Further Illustration.] Promise to pay in "Cash 
 Notes." — AVhere a promissory note agreed to pay a stipulated amount 
 of money " in cash notes due since the first day of January, 1845," it 
 was held, in an action on the note, a question for the jury, to determine 
 what the parties meant by the use of the words "cash notes." In 
 giving the opinion of the court, Lipscombe, J., said: "The use of the 
 words ' cash notes ' creates the presumption that the parties intended 
 to give some effect to them and to designate a payment different from, 
 and more favorable to the party promising, than the payment of money. 
 We believe, at all events, that it should have been left to the jury to 
 decide what was meant by the use of the terms, and also to say, if they 
 meant some other thing, and the value of such thing. I recollect read- 
 ing, in an opinion of Judge Cowan, on the vexed question of latent and 
 patent ambiguities, that he puts a case that once occurred befoi'e him, 
 of a suit being brought on a promise in writing to pay so much money 
 in deal. The judge said that he was totally at a loss as to what mean- 
 ing should be attached to the word deal, but, by leaving it to the jury 
 on proof, it was rendered perfectly intelligible. It was to be paid in 
 work in the maker's trade — that is to say, in blacksmith's work, the 
 maker being a smith. No rule of evidence would have been violated ; 
 it would not have been altering a written contract by parol ; it would 
 have been only showing what the parties really meant. "We do not 
 know how much injustice would be done by undertaking to say, that 
 all such promises were absolute for the payment of so much money. 
 The parties may have intended something else, and if so, such in- 
 tention should not be defeated by an arbitrary rule of construction 
 that would render it senseless and of no effect. It is likely that a man 
 would often be willing to give a much higher price for property, payable 
 in notes due to him, tlian he would be willing to pay in money. And 
 if so contracted, neither the law, nor reason, would hold him liable to 
 pay the amount in cash. The difference between payments in cash 
 notes and cash can only be ascertained by a jury." ^ 
 
 § 1079. View that Jury must declare Meaning of Word, and 
 Court expound Contract. — There is a moditied view, that in such 
 
 1 Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495, 4ti9. ^ ^y-ird v. Lattimer, 2 Tex. 245, 248.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 837 
 
 a case, after the jiiiy have declared the meaning of the doubtful or 
 technical word, the court must proceed to interpret the instru- 
 ment with reference to the meaning so declared, and must 
 expound its effect to the Jury.^ This view has been thus formu- 
 lated in an English case : " The construction of all written instru- 
 ments belongs to the courts alone, whose duty it is to construe all 
 such instruments as soon as the true meaning: of the words in which 
 they are couched, and the surrounding circumstances, if any, 
 have been ascertained as facts by the jury.^ Another court 
 has thus stated the rule: "If words of doubtful meaning: are 
 employed, or such as have more than one meaning, the question 
 whether their technical sense is different from their ordinary 
 meaning, may be left to a jury; but, in the end, the court must 
 determine the interpretation of the contract, with such light as 
 the verdict may afford on the question submitted to the jury." ^ 
 Accordingly, it has been held that, in an agreement reserving 
 the privilege of using all the water of a spring, " the same as it 
 has been formerly conveyed^'''' for the use of a certain paper 
 mill, the word " conveyed " refers to the manner of taking the 
 water, and not to the conveyance of the right; and that the 
 meaning of the word in such a case, was rightly decided by the 
 court, and not submitted to the jury.* It is submitted, however, 
 that this rule cannot be conveniently employed in those jurisdic- 
 tions where special verdicts are not in use; though even there, 
 its application is not necessarily impracticable, since the court 
 might, by h3'pothetical instructions, direct the jury as to the 
 various meanings of the instrument, according to the various 
 meanings which they might give to the disputed word or phrase. 
 
 § 1080. Technical Terms known only to Experts. — There 
 is a similar view that, where a contract embraces technical terms 
 known only to experts in a particular art or science, it will be 
 
 1 Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 Mees. laying clown the correct doctrine. 
 & AV. 535; Edelman v. Yeakel, 27 Pa. Fruiu w. Crystal Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 397, 
 St. 26. 401. 
 
 2 Neilson v. Harford, 8 Mees. & W. 3 Edwards v. Smith, G3 Mo. 119, 
 806, 823. This laui^iuage has been 127, opinion by Napton, J. 
 
 quoted in a recent case in Missouri as •♦ Edeluiau v. Yeakel, 27 Pa. St. 26.
 
 838 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thouip. Tr., 
 
 proper to receive the evidence of persons skilled in such art or 
 science, to enable the court to determine the meaning of the con- 
 tract. ^ In such a case, it has been said that the testimony of 
 experts is admissible in proper cases to aid the court in such 
 interpretation, — as where the instrument contains technical terms 
 which are peculiar to a certain art, trade or business and which 
 are not subjects of common knowledge, — such as the words 
 '■'•slow up'" in railway management.'-^ 
 
 § 1081. The Meaning which the Parties themselves have 
 Placed upon tlicir Contract. — It has been well observed: 
 *' The rights of parties to put an interpretation upon their own 
 contracts, even to the extent of doing away, practically, with the 
 ordinary and plain meaning of terms, cannot well be denied, so 
 long as their interpretation does not result in a contract which, 
 for some reason, is in itself unlawful; and the cases are nu- 
 merous and consistent, which permit a resort to the proof of the 
 circumstances or situation of the parties, when their contract was 
 made, and of their transactions under it, when its terms are of 
 doubtful or ambiguous meaning, for the purpose of arriving at 
 the true intention, and, when this is done, the question must be 
 left to the decision of the jury." ^ 
 
 §1082. [Continued.] Court to Instruct Jury as to Inferences. — 
 On what the writer conceives to be an erroneous view, the Supreme 
 Court of Rhode Island hold that it is the duty of the court, in a case 
 calling for it, to instruct the jury what inferences may be legally drawn 
 
 1 McAvoy 1?. Loug, 18 111.147,150. Sandf. (S. C.) 202; Williamson v. 
 
 2 Louisville &c. R. Co. w. McKeuua, McClure, 37 Pa. St. 402; Pratlier v. 
 13 Lea (Teuu.), 280, 288. Ros.s, 17 Ind. 495; EatOQ v. Smith, 20 
 
 3 Ileissner v. Oxley, 80 Ind. 580, Pick. (Mass.) 150; Ettiiig ■?;, President, 
 584, opinion by Woods, J. The learned 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 59; School District 
 judge cited the following authorities v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330; Watson v. 
 " as more or less in point:" Bates t?. Blaine, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 131; Har- 
 Dehaven, 10 Ind. 319; Symraes v. per ?;. Kean, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 280; 
 Brown, 13 Ind. 318; Bell t). Golding, Frederick v. Campl)ell, 14 Serg. & R. 
 27^ Ind. 173; Conwell v. Puinpiirey, 9 (Pa.) 293; See also 2 Pars. Contr. 
 Ind. 135; Wilcoxen v. Bowles, 1 (Olh ed.) 493. 
 
 La. Ann. 230; Lowber v. Le Roy, 2
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII. J INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 839 
 
 from the words of a written contract, or from tlie words of receipts, 
 coupled with the conduct of the parties in relation thereto. The court 
 say: " The legal force and effect of the words in written business doc- 
 uments and of the conduct of the parties in exposition of them, are so 
 purely matters of law, that a judge would, in our opinion, fail in his 
 duty, if he neglected to give it in charge to the jury, so far as was 
 necessary for the proper decision of the case before them." ^ This 
 language must be taken with two qualifications: 1. The words in busi- 
 ness documents may have a technical meaning among merchants, 
 such as will call in parol explanation or evidence of usage in their 
 interpretation, — in which case their meaning is for the jury. 2 2. If 
 the acts of the parties, done in respect of writings which have passed 
 between them, are equivocal or susceptible of different interpreta- 
 tions, the judge manifestly cannot declare the meaning of such acts to 
 the jury. 
 
 § 1083. Rule Where Parol Evidence is required to explain 
 Ambiguities. — AVhere the meuning and effect of written in- 
 struments depend, not merely on their construction and language, 
 but on collateral facts in pais or extrinsic circumstances, the in- 
 ferences of fact to be drawn from them should be left to the 
 jury. " An admixture of parol with written evidence draws the 
 wliole to the jury." ^ This happens where a contract is so am- 
 biguous as to require the aid of parol evidence to ascertain its 
 meaning, in which case tlie question of its meaning is necessarily 
 left to the jury,^ and the court must not, in instructing them, 
 assume to interpret it.^ But it is said that the court may give 
 such instructions upon the legal effect of the instrument as will 
 meet the various phases presented by the extrinsic evidence.^ 
 
 1 Wheeler v. Schroeder, i K. I. 383, v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 
 392. (U. S.) 59; Jeuuings v. Sherwood, 8 
 
 2 Ante, § 107G. Conn. 122; Foster v. Berg, 104 Pa. St. 
 
 3 Holmau v. Crane, 16 Ala. 570, 580; 324; Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts (Pa.), 
 Sewall V. Henry, 9 Ala. 24; Overton v. 385, 392. 
 
 Tracey, 14 Serg. & R. 311,330; Wat- * Bedard v. Bouville, 57 Wis. 270, 
 
 .son V. Blaine, 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 131, 275; Ganson v. Madigan, 15 Wis. 
 
 13(J; McKean v. Wagenblast, 2 Grant 144, .154, 155 (meaning of the word 
 
 Cas. (Pa.) 4G2, 46G; Turner v. Yates, "team.") 
 
 l(iHow.(U.S.) 14; First National Bank ^ Philibert v. Burch, 4 Mo. App. 
 
 V. Dana, 79 N. Y. 108, IKi; Gardner v. 470. 
 
 Clark, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 538, 551 ; Ettius « Taylor v. McXutt, 58 Tex. 71.
 
 840 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 For perhaps stronger reasons, where a question arises as to the 
 nature of a contract which subsists between parties, and its solu- 
 tion depends, not only upon the construction of several 2vritten 
 instruments^ but also upon oral evidence, it has been held proper 
 to submit the whole question to a jury. So held, where the 
 question was whether a contract between several parties was a 
 joint contract and created a joint liability.^ 
 
 § 1084. [Illustration.] Where Parol Evidence is admitted to 
 EXPLAIN A Will. — It was said of a will, where such evidence had been 
 introduced to aid its interpretation : " The ascertainment of intention 
 from the will itself falls within the province of the court ; and where the 
 sense is incomplete, the deficiency cannot be supplied by extrinsic evi- 
 dence; a latent ambiguity occurs, and the bequest is void. But a dis- 
 crepance, or an accordance, between the whole or particular parts of 
 the description, may be shown by evidence dehors, to create, or to de 
 stroy an ambiguity which is said to be latent, because it is concealed 
 by the will, and disclosed but by extrinsic circumstances. A legatee 
 is designated by 7iame or by description, according to his condition or 
 the relation he bears to persons or things ; or by both. Where the 
 designation is by a name common to two or more, and without refer- 
 ence to circumstances of description, the question of identity is one 
 purely of fact. Where, however, a description or an addition is inap- 
 plicable, not only to the party named, but every one else, its falsity is 
 insufficient to invalidate the designation by the name, the maxim being 
 that Veritas nominis toUit errorem demonstrationist and Lord Bacon has 
 some curious observations on this head to show that, next to the actual 
 presence of the donee, a designation of him by name is the more wortliy 
 in certainty; whence a legal presumption of fact, in case of a discrep- 
 ance, that the falsity is in tlie description and not in the name." - Ap- 
 plying this principle, where the will read, "• I give and bequeath to 
 my nephew, James Vernor Henry, son of my deceased sister, Elizabeth, 
 his heirs or assigns," etc., and James- Vernor Henry was not the 
 nephew, but the grand nephew of the testator, and not the son, but the 
 grandson of his sister named Elizabeth, but the testator had a nephew 
 named Robert R. Henry, who made pretension to be the person named 
 in the bequest, it was held a question of fact for the jury which was 
 
 » 
 
 1 Bradford V. South Carolina R. Co., 2 cjting Bacou's Maxims, Reg 
 
 7 Rich. L. (S. C.) 201, 214. XXV,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATIOX PKIVATE WRITINGS. 841 
 
 the person named. i The court applied the principle that, in the case 
 of latent ambiguity in a will, explanatory declarations made by a testa- 
 tor at the time of its execution are admissible in evidence. So also 
 are previous professions of the testator, indicating a design to give his 
 property in a particular wa}'.^ 
 
 § 1085. [Continued.] How the Jury instructed in such a Case. — 
 From the points which were ruled upon in the case above cited, the fol- 
 lowing charge to the jury may be constructed, so far as the same applies 
 to the general principles of law applicable in such a case: "The jury 
 are instructed that, the description of the person named in the bequest 
 failing to apply to the plaintiff in every particular but the Christian 
 name, and there being a person claiming this legacy who was in being 
 when the will was made, and known to the testator, who answers thi? 
 description a(;cording to its very letter, a latent ambiguity or uncertainty 
 as to the person intended by the testator to take the legacy is pre- 
 sented." " If the evidence be such as satisfies the jury that the per^ 
 son bearing the name mentioned in this clause of the will, and who is 
 the plaintiff in this suit, was intended by the testator, the inconsistent 
 description will not prevent his recovery. The evidence, by parol or 
 word of mouth, which the plaintiff has been allowed to give for the pur' 
 pose of dispelling or removing the uncertainty as to the person intendec'' 
 by the testator, need not be conclusive, or such as to remove the am- 
 biguity beyond every doubt, nor is it necessary that it afford a high de- 
 gree of probability that tlie plaintiff was the person intended by the tes- 
 tator; but it will be sufficient if it satisfies the minds of the jury that 
 such was the fact." -^ 
 
 § 1086. Contract partly in Writing and partly in Parol. — 
 
 Where a contract is partly in writing and partly in parol, and the 
 parol evidence is conflicting, or such as to leave the intention oi 
 the parties obscure, it is proper to submit to the jury the decis- 
 ion of the question what the contract was.^ 
 
 § 1087. Receipts for Money Paid. — A written receipt 
 for the payment of money is an admission only, and, though 
 
 1 Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts (Pa.), flen, 2 Ves. Juu. 589; Dare v. Geary, 
 385, 392. cited Arab, 375. 
 
 2 Compare Harris v. Bishop of Lin- ^ Vernor v. Henry,3 Watts(Pa.),385. 
 coin, 2 P. Wras. 137; Tliomas v. ^ Edwards w. Goldsmitli, Ki Pa. St. 
 Thomas, (J T. R. G71; Standenv. Stan- 43, 48; post, § 1113.
 
 842 PROVIA'CE OF COURT AXD JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tu., 
 
 evidence against the person who made it and those chdraing under 
 him, is not conclusive evidence, except as to a person who may 
 have been induced by it to alter his condition.^ It may there- 
 fore be contradicted or explained ; and it will be for a jury or other 
 trier of the facts to say, upon such contradictory or explanatory 
 evidence, what the fact was.^ But an instrument in writing which 
 acknowledges the receipt of a sum of money, in full for damages 
 sustained by the signer in consequence of an injury received 
 from the person paying the money, is not a simple receipt which 
 can be explained or varied by parol evidence, but is in the nature 
 of a release, and is a contract which bars an action for the injury, 
 unless shown to have been obtained by fraud. It cannot be 
 explained by parol evidence, but its meaning and conclusive 
 effect must be pronounced by the court. ^ 
 
 § 1088. Meaning of Words Varied by Evidence of Usag-e. — 
 
 Words used in a particular relation may have a different mean- 
 ino- from that which attaches to them in their ordinary use. 
 Hence, it is that evidence of usage is sometimes admissible to 
 show that ordinary words, when used with reference to a partic- 
 ular subject, have a peculiar meaning ; and in such a case, whether 
 the words have such peculiar meaning is, of course, a question 
 for a jury. Thus, in one case it w^as held that, in an action on a 
 lease of an estate which included a rabbit warren, evidence of 
 usao"e w^as admissible to show that the words " thousand of rab- 
 bits" were understood to mean one hundred dozen, that is 
 twelve hundred. The decision was based on the ground that the 
 words " hundred, " "thousand," and the like, w^ere not under- 
 stood, when applied to particular subjects, to mean that number 
 of units; tliat the definition was not fixed by law, and was there- 
 fore open to such proof of usage. ^ Commenting u})on this case, 
 it was said by Chief Justice Shaw: " Though it is exceedingly 
 difficult to draw the precise line of distinction, yet it is manifest 
 
 1 Stratoa u. Rastall, 2 T. R. 36(i ; pare Eglestou v. Kuickerbocker, 6 
 Wyatt V. Hertford, 3 East. 147. Barb. (N. Y.) 458; and "White v. 
 
 2 Graves v. Key, 3 Barn. & Ad. 313, Parker, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 48. 
 
 318. ■* Smith V. Wilsou, 3 Baru. & Ad. 
 
 3 Coou V. Kuapp, 8 N. Y. 402. Com- 728.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE MKITINGS. 843 
 
 that such evidence can be admitted only in a few cases like thei 
 above. Were it otherwise, written instruments, instead of im- 
 porting certainty and verity, as being the sole repository of the 
 will, intent and purposes of the parties, to be construed by the 
 rules of law, might be made to speak a very different language, 
 by the aid of parol evidence." ^ Accordingly, where a town had 
 conveyed a beach, reserving the right to enter and take away 
 *' gravel and sand * * * for the making and repairing of 
 their highways," it was held that evidence was admissible to 
 prove what species of material had been used as gravel by the 
 town for repairing its highways before the making of the deed, 
 since this nmst be presumed to have been within the contempla- 
 tion of the parties; but such evidence was not admissible to prove 
 the meaning of the words " sand and gravel," as generally and 
 usually understood at that town.^ 
 
 § 1089. Mercantile Contracts explained by the Usages of 
 Trade. — ^This introduces another exception to the general rule 
 above stated,-^ which is that, in the case of a mercantile con- 
 tract, if " the instrument be not clear and unequivocal, evidence 
 of the usage or course of trade which is to be carried into effect, 
 is admissible to explain the meaning and remove the doubt." * It 
 is also reasoned that parol evidence is admissible to show the ex- 
 istence of a custom of trade or business, within the purview of 
 which the contract was made, provided such custom was of such 
 universal practice as to justifj' the conclusion that it became, by 
 implication, a part of the contract; and the existence and extent 
 of such a custom is a question of fact for a jury,^ except in the 
 case of customs of such universality that the courts will notice 
 their existence judicially.'' " The principle applicable to such a 
 
 1 Brown v. Browu, 8 Mete, (Mass.) ^ Branch v. Palmer, (!5 Ga. 210. 
 673, 577. 6 In an action on a contract 
 
 2 Brown v. Brown, supra. whereby a defendant undertook toiin- 
 2 Ante, § 10(35. part to a competent person the Infor- 
 •* 2 Kent Com. 556: Salmon Falls mation necessary to enable him to op- 
 Man. Co. V. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.) erate a sugar factory, it was held a 
 4-16, 454; Browu v. Brown, 8 Mete. question for the jury, under the evi- 
 (Mass.) 573, 570; Prather u. Ross, 17 deuce, whether such competent per- 
 Ind. 495, 499. sou should be au expert in the general
 
 844 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl., 
 
 case is, that the evidence of usage, and the surrounding circum- 
 stances, in explanation and illustration, are for the consideration 
 of the jury, — the province of the court being to instruct them, 
 conditionally or hypothetically, what should be the proper con- 
 struction or interpretation of the written instrument, as they 
 may find the evidence either to support or not to sustain the pur- 
 pose for which it has been offered." ^ " When a new and unu- 
 sual word is used in a contract, or when a word is used in a tech- 
 nical or peculiar sense, as applicable to any trade or branch of 
 business, or to any particular class of people, it is proper to re- 
 ceive evidence of usage, to explain and illustrate it, and that evi- 
 dence is to be considered by the jury; and the province of the 
 court will then be, to instruct the jury what will be the legal 
 effect of the contract or instrument, as they shall find the mean- 
 ing of the word, modified or explained by the usage." ^ 
 
 § 1090. Instance op an Instruction Erroneous within this Rule. — 
 An instruction was granted, to the effect that a certain entry is a suffi- 
 cient memorandum in writing of a contract to bind the defendant, pro- 
 vided the jury find that it "either expressly, or according to tlie 
 sense and signification of its language and figures, under the estabhshed 
 custom and usage of merchants in the city of Baltimore, at the time," 
 etc., " represented truly and fully the terms of and parties to the con- 
 tract of sale." It was held that this instruction was erroneous un- 
 der the above rule, because it authorized the jury to construe the entry 
 or memorandum, without any absolute or conditional construction there- 
 of by the court. ^ 
 
 § 1091. The correct Reading of Written Instruments — 
 Identity of Words — Legibility. — There is a conflict of authority 
 on the question whether the deciphering of illegible writings is for 
 
 bnsiuess of making sugar, and also 150, 15(1; Neilson tj. Harford, 8 Mees. 
 
 whether a competent person, within & W. 823. 
 
 the meaning of the contract, had been ^ Eaton u. Smith, 20 Pick. (]V>ass.) 
 
 designated by the defendant to receive 150, 15G, opinion of the court by J'haw, 
 
 the information bargained for. Tan- C. J. 
 
 sill u. Briukmau, l(i Mo. App. 557. 3 Williams v. Woods, 16 MtJ i-'-'U, 
 
 1 Williams v. Woods, IG Md. 220, 253. 
 251; Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. (Mass.)
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 845 
 
 the court or the jury. According to one view, the proper read- 
 ing of an illegible writing is for the court, and not for the juiy, — 
 as for instance, whether a Christian name in an indictment should 
 read David or Daniel. ^ So, whether the letters *'o/cc" in a 
 policy of insurance meant " stx," which would make sense, or 
 " oix " which would make nonsense, was erroneously submitted 
 to the jury.- But we find the same court deciding in a subse- 
 quent case that, while the construction of written instruments is 
 for the court, yet the identity of a word in such an instrument, — 
 as, for instance, where it is so written that it may be read either 
 fifty or sixty, — presents a question of fact for a juiy.^ Again, 
 in one court we find it decided that it is for the court to decide 
 what are the letters and figures used in an instrument which is 
 offered in evidence and the meanino; which is to be attached to 
 them; and, if it be the instrument sued on, whether it varies 
 from the one which is described in the declaration.* In another 
 court, where there was an objection to the admission of a promis- 
 sory note in evidence, upon the ground of an alleged variance 
 between the date of the indorsement of the note and that of the 
 copy of the note set out in the petition, and the court was unable 
 to determine, because of the peculiar manner in which the figures 
 were made, whether there was a variance or not, — it was held 
 that it was within the discretion of the court to submit the question 
 of the variance to the jury, under proper instructions.^ Swing- 
 ing back with the pendulum, we find that where, on the trial of 
 an indictment for perjury, it became a question whether a word in 
 a record which had been produced, which was written above an 
 erasure, was the word " meeting " or the word "mutiny," Lord 
 Ellenborough, C. J., ruled that it was not a question for the 
 jury, but that it was a question within the peculiar province of 
 the court. ^ But we apprehend that this last decision is unsound 
 
 1 Com. V. Riggs, U Gray (Mass.), * Riley v. Dickens, 19 111. 29. 
 
 377. See also Com. v. Davis, 11 Gray 5 Partridge v. Patterson, 6 la. 514. 
 
 (Mass.), 4. See also Jefferson County v. Savory. 2 
 
 2 Lapeer Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 30 Mich. G. Greene (la.), 238; Converse v. War- 
 159. ren, 4 la. 158. 
 
 3 Paine v. Eingold, 43 Mich. 341. « Rex v. Hacks, 1 Stark. N. P. 521.
 
 846 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 ill principle; for the reading of a word in a writinij:; is nuitter of 
 fact, and not matter of law; and although it may properly be 
 committed to the judge in civil cases, yet in a criminal case, 
 where the essential question of criminal intent may depend upon 
 it, and consequently where the whole question of guilt or inno- 
 cence may turn upon it, it is manifestly an invasion of the 
 province of the jury for the judge to withdraw its decision from 
 them. It is scarcely necessary to add that, on the trial of an in- 
 dictment for i\\Q forgery of a particular instrument, the question 
 whether it was forged or not, being the essential question in the 
 case, is exclusively for the determination of the jury; and hence 
 that it is not necessary that this question should be determined 
 prior to the admission of the instrument itself in evidence.^ 
 
 § 1092. Blanks in Written Instruments. — The same con- 
 trariety of holding exists in respect of the meaning of written 
 instruments, where blanks have been left unfilled through cleri- 
 cal misprision. According to one view, it frequently presents 
 a case of what is called "patent ambiguity , which is not explaina- 
 ble by parol, but in which case the court must declare the mean- 
 ing if it can be done, and if not, to declare the instrument to be 
 void for uncertainty. Many cases are found where essential 
 words have been omitted from such instruments, and where their 
 meaning has been declared as matter of law. Thus, where a 
 paper, given to the plaintiff by the defendant, promised to pay 
 
 the plaintiff one hundred and twenty-three and 6-100, 
 
 on demand, and interest, it was held that it was a promis- 
 sory note, payable in money and for a certain sum, and that the 
 statute of limitations did not ap})ly,^ It well might be; for 
 there were prefixed on the upper left-hand margin, as is usual 
 in the case of })roniissory notes, the figures $123.06, i)lainly 
 showing the amount intended. So, where, in the bond of a sheriff 
 as tax collector, the undertaking was to pay " to the treasurer 
 of the district of Tennessee," and the sheriff was collector for a 
 county within the collection district of West Tennessee, and the 
 
 ' Mosier v. State, 14 lud. 2(;i. - Coolbroth v. Puriiituu,-'9Me. 4(J9.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIIL] ixterpretatiox private writings. 847 
 
 law required the sheriffs within that district to pay the moneys 
 collected to the treasurer of West Tennessee, it was held that the 
 court vv'ould supply the word "West" before the word " Ten- 
 nessee," so as to give effect to the instrument.^ So, in an old 
 case, where the obligation read, *'I, Phillip Goole, do stand 
 bound [without stating to whom] in the sum of sixteen pounds, 
 and is to be paid to the said John Games the elder's executors," 
 the court supplied, after the words " do stand bound" the words 
 " to the executors of John Games," that beins the manifest 
 sense of the instrument. ^ So, where a note was made payable 
 
 " six after date," it was queried, but it should not have been, 
 
 whether the meaning of the parties was a question for the court 
 or for the jury. It was a case Avhere the judge sat as trier of the 
 facts, and, the note having been given tcf an insurance company 
 for a policy, and six months being the usual term of credit, it 
 was ruled that, if there be nothing in the note to indicate ii dif- 
 ferent time, the law would regard it as payable six months after 
 date. The rule applied was that the ambiguity was patent, and 
 hence not explainable by parol testimony ; but that the actual 
 intention of the parties might be inferred from the paper itself, 
 in the lisiht of the circumstances in which it wasffiven.'^ 
 
 § 1093. [Continued.] Cases where the meaning has been sub- 
 mitted TO the Jury. — In an early case in Mississippi the declaration 
 in an action of assicmjJsit described the note sued on as paj-able twenty- 
 four months after date ; but the note itself, when offered in evidence, 
 
 appeared to read " twenty- four after date." It was held that 
 
 the note was admissible in evidence without parol explanation, the fury 
 being the judges of the fact of the time of payment intended to be stip- 
 ulated by the parties to the instrument.^ So, in an early case in 
 
 New York the instrument sued on read: "Six months after date, I 
 
 promise to pay to the order of Phillip Brotherton eight , for value 
 
 . received," etc., and, after it had been transferred, the words " hundred 
 dollars " were inserted in the blank without obtaininsj the indorser's 
 
 1 Kincannon v. Carroll, Yerg. ^ Nichols v. Frotlimgham, 45 Me. 
 (Teun.) 11. 220. 
 
 2 Langdouv. Goole, 3 Lev. 21. ♦ Conner v. Routh, 7 How. (Miss.) 
 
 176<
 
 848 PROVINCE OF COUKT AND JURY. [1 Tboiiip. Tr., 
 
 assent, and parol evidence was given to sliow that it was intended that 
 tlie amount of the note should be for eight hundred dollars, and that 
 the words " hundred dollars " were omitted by mistake. It was held 
 that the presiding judge properly left it to the jury to say whether it 
 was the intention of the parties to give and receive a note for eight 
 hundred dollars.^ 
 
 § 1094. [Continued.] Blanks in the Descriptive Calls of a 
 Deed. — The meaning of a clerical imperfection in the descrip- 
 tive calls of a deed, as where a word is accidently omitted, 
 may be submitted to a jury as a question of fact. It was so 
 held where the word " white," with a blank following it, was the 
 call for a certain corner, and evidence was given to show that a 
 white oak tree stood nearly in the course indicated in the deed ; 
 in which case it was held proper to leave it to the jury to say 
 whether the white oak tree was the corner intended. ^ This 
 seems to be no more than an application of the rule that, where 
 the description in a deed is indefinite and doubtful, and suscept- 
 ible of more than one application, thus constituting what is 
 known as a latent ambiguity, — the court, to remove such ambi- 
 guity, may resort to extrinsic evidence, and thus restrain, con- 
 fine and apply the description to a single object. In such a case 
 it is said that, " if the court cannot, by a fair and legitimate con- 
 struction or use of either description, or by all united, locate 
 with sufficient certainty the land conveyed in the several deeds, 
 then the court will resort to extrinsic or parol testimony, and 
 to the aid of a jury, to ascertain the true intent of the par- 
 ties, and to locate the lands." ^ 
 
 § 1095. Whether Instrument Sealed or Unsealed. — 
 
 "Whether an instrument is scaled or not is a question of law for 
 the court; * but whether the seal is that of a particular party, — 
 as for instance a corporation, — must, in case of dispute, be sub- 
 
 1 Boyd V. Brothersou, 10 Weud. 3 Bell v. Woodward, 40 N. H. 315, 
 
 (N.Y.) 93. 332. 
 
 ' DoVjson V. Fiuley, 8 Jones L. * Scliwarz v, llcrrenkind, 2G 111. 
 
 <N. C.) 41)5, 499. 208.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXIII.] INTERPRETATION PRIVATE WRITINGS. 849 
 
 mitted to the jury.^ So, where the issue is presented whether an 
 instrument has been altered or not, and if so, wlienand by whom, 
 by the addition of a seal, this may well be submitted to a jury.- 
 
 § 109G. Validity of Written Instruments. — Enlarging the 
 same view, where all the evidence concerning the assignment of a 
 patent-right was in writing and uncontradicted, it was held the 
 duty of the court to determine the validity of such an assignment, 
 and error to submit the question to the jury.^ But where the 
 validity of the instrument depends upon unextrinsic fact which is 
 doubtful or disputed, — as whether the obligee was so intoxicated 
 at the time of making it, as to be entitled to rescind it after be- 
 coming sober, — this must, of course, be submitted to the jury.* 
 So, it has been held that, whethera contract made on Sunday was 
 a work of necessity or cliarity, within the meaning of a statute, is 
 a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 
 § 1097. Whether a Contract is against Public Policy. — But 
 
 where the true moaning of a contract is thus ascertained, the 
 question whether or not it is against public policy, is a question 
 for the court, which it is error to submit to the jury.^ The 
 reason is that, otherwise there would be no settled rule by which 
 the validity of contracts could be determined, and they would 
 be determined, not according to settled principles of law, but 
 according to the uncertain and fluctuating conceptions of juries 
 as to the proper standard of morality and private and public 
 rights. 
 
 § 1098. Inferences from Writings put in Evidence to show 
 Extrinsic Facts. — Where a writing thus put in evidence is not 
 a dispositive instrument, but is merely offered for the purpose 
 
 1 Grossman v. HilltOTvn Turnpike ^ Hooper v. Edwards, 18 Ala. 280. 
 Co., 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 225. e Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & Bl. 391; 
 
 2 Schwarz V. Herreukiud, swpra. s. c. 22 L.J. (Q. B.) 185; 18 Eng. L. 
 
 3 Snyder ?;. Kui-tz, 61 Iowa, 593. Eq. 151; Pierce v. Randolph, 12 Tex. 
 ^ Cummiugs V. Henery, 10 lud. 109; 290, 295, where the question is rea- 
 
 Reynolds u. Dechaums, 24 Tex. 174; soned at considerable length by Hemp- 
 
 Hanna v. Phillips, 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) hill, C. J. 
 
 253. 
 
 54
 
 850 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thom[). Tf., 
 
 showing an extrinsic fact, it will be for the jury to say what in- 
 ference of fact is to be drawn from it.^ The reason is that the 
 question which arises in such a ease is not the proper interpretation 
 of a writing which disposes of the rights of the parties, but what 
 effect the writing shall have as evidence of a collateral fact, — 
 as for instance, where the question under inquiry is whether 
 payment of an obligation has been made, and a writing (not a 
 receipt) is introduced as evidence, tending to show that payment 
 had been made.'^ " The most authentic documents," said Scott, 
 J., " when offered for such a purpose, become no more than 
 mere letters or a written correspondence, which, when offered in 
 evidence to prove a fact, are always to be interpreted by the 
 jury." ^ It is added that " when documents are offered for such 
 a purpose, they, like written correspondence, may be interpreted 
 by extrinsic evidence.^ Accordingly, where the effect of a writ- 
 ten instrument, collaterally introduced as evidence, depends not 
 merely upon the construction and meaning of the instrument, but 
 upon extrinsic evidence and. circumstances, the inferences of fact 
 to be drawn from it must be left to the jury.^ 
 
 ^ Primm v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205, 211; 2 Reynolds v. Eichards, 14 Pa. St. 
 
 Wilson V. Board of Edncation, 63 Mo. 205. 
 
 137, 142; McNichol v. Pacific Ex. Co., ^ primm v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205, 211. 
 
 12 Mo. App. 401, 407; Reynolds v. 'i Primm u. Haren, supra. 
 
 Richards, 14 Pa. St. 205; McKean v. ^ B^rreda v. Silsbee, 21 How. (U. 
 
 Wao-enblast, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 462, S.) 147, 168. 
 466.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIV.] VERBAL speech. 851 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 VERBAL SPEECH: ORAL CONTRACTS. 
 
 Section 
 
 1105. Meaning of the Speakers a Question for the Jury. 
 
 1106. Meaning Ascertained, Court to declare tlie Legal Effect. 
 
 1107. [Continued.] Where there is Doubtas to the Meaning of the Language 
 
 Used. 
 
 1108. Rule Restated as to Parol Contracts. 
 
 1109. Illustrations of the Foregoing. 
 
 § 1103. Cleaning of the Speakers a Question for the Jury. — 
 
 Where there is a controversy as to what the parties to a con- 
 versation intended, the question is a question of fact for the 
 jury.^ The rule has been stated, with some variation, as foUoAvs: 
 " The interpretation of Avritten contracts is for the court; but 
 where the matter rests in words, and the intention of the parties 
 is to be ascertained from what they have said and done, it is a 
 question for the jury." ^ " When the words are written, the 
 general rule is that the court shall interpret them ; but when 
 they are merely spoken, the sense and meaning intended are for 
 the jury." ^ " The rule is undoubted that the meaning of 
 words used in a conversation, and what the parties intended to 
 express by them, is exclusively for the jury to determine." * *' It 
 often happens, in conversation and in parol contracts, that the 
 meaning of the parties may be understood, and is in fact intended 
 to be, very different from the literal import of the words em- 
 ployed. What may have be^n said before or after, the use of 
 
 1 Folsom V. Plumer, 43 N. H. 469, 474; Fowle v. Bigelow, 10 Mass. 379. 
 472; Demiug v. Foster, 42 N. H. 165; * Warnick v. Grosholz, 3 Grant Cas. 
 Murphy v. Bedford, 18 Mo. App. 279. (Pa.) 235, per Woodward, J. 
 
 2 Halbert v. Halbort, 21 Mo. 277, * Brubaker v. Okeson, 36 Pa. St. 
 284; Festerman v. Parker, 10 Ired. L. 519, per Strong, J.
 
 852 PKOVixcE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 figurative expressions, emphasis upon particular words or sen- 
 tences, reference to other matters, not fully expressed, bat well 
 understood by all in hearing, and many other circumstances, 
 are material elements, and often have a controlling influence, in 
 ascertaining the intention of those whose language is reported. 
 Important contracts are made verbally, in terms not well suited 
 to express the design of the parties, if they were used in a writ- 
 ten instrument, but are understood by them and others with the 
 utmost precision. Actions of slander are maintained upon 
 words, which, taken literally, indicate no unworthy motive or con- 
 duct. In cases, where such evidence is adduced in support of 
 the affirmative or negative of any proposition presented to a 
 jury, it is their province to determine its meaning. To find what 
 the language was, is nothing more than to find the evidence, 
 which they adjudge to be true; the result of that as a fact, it is 
 their duty to find, and the court cannot direct what it shall be; 
 and if the jury omit to find the fact which is involved in the issue, 
 the court have no power to infer it." ^ 
 
 § 1106. Meaning ascertained, Court to declare the Legal 
 Effect. — Where the sense in which the parties understood the 
 lano-uage is thus ascertained by the jury, it is for the court to 
 declare its legal effect.^ When, therefore, a contract is proved 
 by parol evidence, and its terms, as thus established, are distinct 
 and explicit, it is the duty of the court to construe it, and not to 
 submit its meaning to the jury.-^ The rule, as stated by Profes- 
 sor Parsons and judicially approved, is this: " What a contract 
 means, is a question of law. It is the court therefore that deter- 
 mines the construction of a contract. They do not state the rules 
 
 1 Copeland v. Hall, 29 Me. 93, 95, Ridcler v. McKuight, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 perTeuuey, J. 294; Sraalley v. Hendrickson, 29 N. J. 
 
 2 Waruick u. Grosholz, 3GrautCas. L. 871; Short ■?;. Woodward, 13 Gray 
 (Pa.) 235; Brubaker v. Okesou, 3G (Mass.), 86; Festerniau v. Parker, 10 
 Pa. St. 519; Folsom u. Pluraer, 43 N. Ired. L. (N. C.) 477; Khodes v. Ches- 
 11. 4G9, 472; Codding v. Wood, 112 Pa. sou, Busbee (N. C), 336. 
 
 St. 371, 377; Demiug v. Foster, 42 N. 3 Dicfeiiback v. Stark, 56 Wis, 462. 
 
 H. 165; Islay r. Stewart, 4 Dev. & See also Kaiiuey ?;. Illgby, 5 Wis. 62; 
 
 Batt. (N. C.) 160; Beltr. Goodc,.'?l Mo. Mowry ?;. Wood, 12 Wis. 413; Mar- 
 
 128; Judge v. Leclaire, 31 Mo. 127; I)e tiaeau v. Steele, 14 Wis. 272.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIV.] VERBAL srEECH. 853 
 
 or principles of law by which the jury are to V)e bound in construing 
 the language which the parties have used, and then direct the jury 
 to apply them at their discretion, to the question of construction ; 
 nor do they refer to these rules unless they think [)roper to do so, 
 for the purpose of illustrating and explaining their own decision. 
 But they give to the jury, as matter of law, what the legal con- 
 struction of the contract is, and this the jury are bound, absolutely, 
 to take." " Unless this were so, there would be no certainty in 
 the law ; for a misconstruction by the court is the proper subject, 
 by means of a bill of exceptions, of redress in a court of error, 
 but a misconstruction by the jury cannot be set right at all 
 effectually." ^ Thus, where, in an action upon an open account, 
 the answer alleged that the account had been settled, and that 
 the plaintiff had executed his promissory note to the defendant 
 for a balance found due on settlement, it was error to instruct 
 the jury to determine the legal effect of the note, that being a 
 question of law for the court. ^ 
 
 § 1107. [Continued.] Where there is Uoubt as to the Meaning 
 OF Language used. —It has been ruled that, where a doubt arises upon 
 the meaning, force and construction of language used in oral speech, the 
 language must be interpreted by the court ; but where the doubt arises 
 upon the question whether the words used are to be deemed the words 
 of the speaker in his own behalf, or words which the speaker is using 
 as an agent in behalf of his principal, this question of fact depends not 
 so much on the meaning of the words, as on a just consideration of all 
 the facts and circumstances in evidence, bearing upon the question of 
 the agency and the intention and understanding of the parties as to 
 what took place between them, and that the meaning of the language 
 in such a case is for the jury.*^ 
 
 § 1108. Rule restated as to Parol Contracts. — Where the 
 terms of a contract are to be gathered from the conversations 
 and conduct of the j^arties, it is for the jury to determine what 
 
 1 2 Pars. Cont. (6th ed.) 492; Id. 2 Terry v. Shively, 6i Ind. 106. 
 
 (7th ed.) 624. Quoted with approval ^ AVnituey v. Swett, 22 N. H. 10, 
 
 in Estes v. Boothe, 20 Ark. 523, 590. 14.
 
 854 
 
 PROVIXCE OF COURT AXD JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 their understanding was.^ The rule is said to be that the jury 
 have the right to determine the existence of a parol contract, 
 
 1 Tallou V. Grand Portage Copper 
 Milling Co., 55 Mich. 147; Sines v. Su- 
 perintendents of Poor, 55 Mich. 383; 
 Kingsbury v. Buchanan, 1 1 la. 388, 398 ; 
 Dennis v. Croolis, 23 I\Io. App. 532; 
 Carl V. Knott, 16 la. 379, 384; Codding 
 V. Wood, 112 Pa. St. 371, 377; Hough- 
 ton V. Houghton, 37 Me. 72; Copeland 
 V. Hall, 29 Me. 93; Tobiu v. Gregg, 34 
 Pa. St. 446. See also Strong v. Saun- 
 ders, 15 Mich. 339; Maas r. AVliite, 37 
 :\Iich. 126; Estate of Young, 39 Mich. 
 429; Engle v. Campbell, 42 Mich. 565; 
 Colgan V. Aymar, Lalor Supp. (X. Y.) 
 27; Rhea v. Riner, 21 111. 526; Bartlett 
 V. Tarbell, 12 Allen (Mass.), 123. As 
 to when the plaintiff is to be nonsuited 
 under the operation of this rule, tliere 
 is an interesting case in the New York 
 Court of Coniraou Pleas, where the 
 judges were divided in opinion. It was 
 laid down by the majority that it is 
 not a sound proposition that, upon 
 proof of a contract, whether in writing 
 or by parol, the terms of which are 
 not varied by extrinsic evidence, it be- 
 comes necessary to submit the con- 
 tract to the jury for interpretation as 
 to the intentiou of the parties. It was 
 held that if there is no dispute about 
 the terms of the contract, it is the 
 duty of the court to pass upon its va- 
 lidity and effect. Whether, under such 
 proof, the plaintiff has, or lias not 
 made out a cause of action, is for the 
 court to decide; and if the uncontra- 
 dicted evidence of the terms of tlie 
 contract is not sufficient to show tlie 
 plaintiff's riglit to recover, the case 
 cannot be strengthened by submitting 
 the evidence to the jury to ascertain 
 the intentions of the parties making 
 It. But the court were also of opinion 
 that, where the evidence leaves the 
 terms of the contract or aiiv other 
 
 fact in doubt, then the facts may be 
 found by the jury; but the court did 
 not understand this rule to extend to a 
 case where the construction of a con- 
 tract is difficult, if there is no conflict 
 in the evidence. From this conclu- 
 sion Charles F. Daly, J., dissented. 
 Among other things he said: "But I 
 think the court below erred in grant- 
 ing him a nonsuit. Before a nonsuit 
 can be directed, there must be no 
 doubt In respect to what is proved by 
 the evidence. The evidence must not 
 only be taken to be true, but it must 
 be so clear and conclusive, in respect 
 to the facts upon which the conclu- 
 sions of law are based, that it is in the 
 power of the court to draw every in- 
 ference which a jury might draw. 
 Smyth V. Craig, 3 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 
 18. If it is uot of that character, the 
 case must be submitted to the jury, un- 
 der proper instructions f i"om the court 
 in respect to the law. This is espec- 
 ially so where no written agreement or 
 contract is entered into, and a ques- 
 tion arises as to the inteut of tlie part- 
 ies, to be gathered from their acts 
 and declarations. Where the intent 
 follows as the legal and logical con- 
 clusion from their acts, it may be 
 passed upon by the court; but where, 
 upon the evidence, it is so uncertain 
 or doubtful as to justify a jury In find- 
 ing either way, then it is not in the 
 province of the court to pass upou the 
 question, but the case must be sub- 
 mitted to the jury." Chapin v. Potter, 
 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 366, 370. State of evi- 
 dence on which it was held error 
 to submit to the jury, as a ques- 
 tion of fact, whether there was an 
 agreement to discharge an indorser: 
 East River Bank v. Kennedy, 9 Bosw. 
 (X. Y.) 543.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIV.] VERBAL speech. • 855 
 
 its extent and limitations. They are to find not only what lan- 
 guage was used, but its purport and meaning. In cases of writ- 
 ten contracts, it is the duty of the court to define the meaning 
 of the language used in them, but in verbal contracts such dut}^ 
 is confined to the jury. They are not barely to ascertain the 
 words and forms of expression, but to interpret their sense 
 and meaning,^ This question, it has been well said, " is single^ 
 and cannot be separated so as to refer one part to the jury, 
 find another 2)art io ihe judge; but in its entirety the question 
 is one of fact." '^ It is scarcely necessary to add that this 
 question is to be determined from the evidence of what the 
 parties said and did, and not from the understanding of one 
 of the parties of Avhat he said or did.-^ 
 
 § 1109. Illustrations of the Foregoing. — Applying this rule, it 
 has been held that it is not for the trial court to rule, as matter of law, 
 that certain words uttered in conversation amounted to an estopi^el in 
 
 pais.^ So, where the action was assumpsit to recover the price of a 
 
 cotton gin, and the defense was the statute of frauds^ and there was 
 neither the paA^mentof earnest money, nor an acceptance of the article, 
 nor a written contract, — the court held that the plaintiffs could not 
 recover, unless work and labor were to be bestowed on the article which 
 was the subject of the contract ; and, as the evidence on this point was 
 very inconclusive, a nonsuit was set aside, in order that a jury might an- 
 swer, on another trial, whether the parties understood that the contract 
 was for the sale of a gin merely, or for the sale of a gin on which work 
 
 and labor were to be bestowed before delivery.^ In an action by 
 
 an executrix to recover for 2'>rofessional services rendered by her testa- 
 tor, as a general attorney of an estate of which the defendants were the 
 representatives, after the testimony of several witnesses had been re- 
 ceived, going to establish that the plaintiff's testator had for several 
 years acted at the instance of the defendants as attorney of the estate, 
 and placing estimates upon those services, it was testified by a witness 
 for the defendants, that the i)laintiff had admitted that her testator was 
 
 I Herberts. Ford, 33 Me. 1)0; Cope- < Brubaker r. Okesou, 36 Pa. St. 
 
 laud V, Hail, 29 Me. 93. 519. 
 
 * McKeuzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. 294, ^ Wiuship v. Buzzard, 9 Rich. L. 
 296. CS, C.) 103, 
 
 * Farley v, Pettes, 5 JIo. App. 202,
 
 85G PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tl., 
 
 employed to collect money due to the estate represented by the de- 
 fendants on a considerable number of notes which were placed in his 
 hands, and that one of the defendants agreed to give him ten per cent, 
 on all mone3'S collected. In this state of case, it was held that it 
 should have been left to the jury to determine whether the agreement 
 did not embrace all the notes which the plaintiff's testator had in 
 his possession belonging to the estate, whether collected by means of 
 
 suit or otherwise.! So, in replevin for a horse which had been 
 
 loaned by the plaintiff to the defendant, to be returned at a subsequent 
 date, the controversy turned upon a conversation between the parties, in 
 which the plaintiff had said to the defendant: " Well, sell him and pay 
 me ;" or, " pay me and you can sell the horse ;" or, " you can sell the 
 horse, pay me, and I guess there will be no trouble." The court in- 
 structed the jury that it was for them to determine what language and 
 words were used by the plaintiff ; that the words, " pay me and sell the 
 horse," would not imply an authority to sell the horse ; but if the words 
 were, "sell the horse and pay me," that they would authorize the de- 
 fendant to sell the horse; that if the words were, "sell the horse, 
 and there will be no trouble," they amounted to an authority to sell 
 the horse ; and that the last clause, " and there will be no trouble," did 
 not alter the sense and made no difference in the effect of the words. 
 It was held that, in giving these instructions, the court erred ; since the 
 jury ought to have been allowed to find, not only what language was 
 used, but also the meaning of the language, in view of all the circum- 
 stances of the case. 2 In like manner, in an action of assumpsit on 
 
 2l promise to pay the bond of another, the following " point " was sub- 
 mitted to the trial court by the defendant: " That if the evidence in 
 this case proves a promise, or has a tendency to prove a promise of any 
 kind, it is a promise to pay both debts of $400 each, secured by the 
 two judgment bonds and the two judgments entered on the same in 
 consideration of total forbearance ; and, plaintiff's having issued exe- 
 cution on one of the judgments and sold all the real estate of Isaac E. 
 Kemp, and purchased the same themselves, cannot recover upon such 
 promise." The answer of the trial court was : " It is not for us to say 
 that the evidence proves or has a tendency to prove a promise as stated 
 on this point; whether it does so is for the jury to say. If it does, 
 however, the law is correctly stated in the i)oint presented." In this 
 the Supreme Court saw " no error, but only a careful demarcation of 
 
 1 Broward v. Doggett, 2 Tla. 49. ^ Copelaiid v. Hall, 2'J Me. 93, 95.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIV.] VERBAL speech. 857 
 
 the line between the provinces of tlie judge and the jury." ^ So, 
 
 it has been held proper to submit to the jury the question whether the 
 defendant has contracted as a common carrier or as a mere hirer for 
 the particular job, after telling them that "a common carrier is one 
 who holds himself forth to the public to carry for hire from place to 
 place," and that, " though the number of instances employed in carry- 
 ing may be evidence of the character of a common carrier, it is not the 
 rule which constitutes it. The law has fixed no number of instances 
 which shall stamp him with the character. If he holds himself forth to 
 the public to carry for hire, he is a common carrier, as much in his first 
 trip as in his second, third or fourth. Did the defendant undertake as 
 a common carrier? * * * This you will decide on all the evidence. 
 If satisfied the defendant was a common carrier, the next question to 
 be determined In^ the jury is, whether the contract in this case was one 
 of affreightment as a carrier, or whether the defendant merely chartered 
 and hired his boat, his hands, and himself, to the plaintiffs, placing all 
 in their control, they running the boat on their own account, and only 
 paying him wages for the hire of the boat, himself and hands." ^ 
 
 1 Kuii's Executor v. Young, 34 Pa. 2 duller v. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120. 
 
 St. 60.
 
 858 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TilOmp. Tl*. , 
 
 CHAPTER XXXy. 
 
 EXISTENCE AND TERMS OF EXPRESS CONTRACTS. 
 
 Section • 
 
 1112. Existence of Contracts. 
 
 1113. Partly iu ^V"riting aud Partly in Parol. 
 
 1111. Observations on the Rule that the Existence of a Contract is a Question 
 
 of Law. 
 1115. Illustrations. 
 IIK). ]\Iistakes in the Terms of a Contract. 
 
 1117. Illustration. 
 
 1118. Whether a Contract is Verbal or in Writing. 
 
 111!). AVhether an obligation is Independent or Dependent. 
 
 1120. Contract Entire or Divisible. 
 
 1121. Original or Collateral. 
 
 1122. Quantum Meruit — Value of Work done or Materials Furnished. 
 
 1123. Collateral Purpose for which a Contract was made. 
 
 1124. Whether a bill of Sale was intended as a Mortgage. 
 
 1125. Penalty or Liquidated Damages. 
 
 1126. Gratification of a Contract. 
 
 1127. Whether there has been a Novation. 
 
 1128. Delivery of a Deed. 
 
 1129. Acceptance of a Deed by the Grantee. 
 
 1130. Date of the Delivery of a Deed or of the Taking Effect of a Contract. 
 
 1131. Whether Delivered as an Escrow. 
 
 1132. Existence of a Partnership. ' 
 
 1133. Instructions on which this Question has been submitted to Juries. 
 
 1134. Genuineness of Signature. 
 
 1135. How Proved. 
 
 113(J. Consideration of a Contract. 
 
 1137. Whether a Forbearance was the Acceptance of a Promise to pay the 
 
 Debt of Another. 
 
 1138. Whether a Written Promise was Founded upon an Illegal Consider- 
 
 ation. 
 
 1139. Whether the Contract is Real or Colorable to Cover up a Gambling 
 
 Transaction. 
 lUO. Whether a Market was " Manipulated " or Fictitious. 
 
 1141. Performance or Waiver of Performance. 
 
 1142. Place where a Contract is to be Performed. 
 
 1143. Whether or not a Contract is Usurious. 
 
 1144. Further of this Subject.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 859 
 
 § 1112. Existence of Contracts. — It will appear from the fore- 
 going that, in every case where the existence of a contract is in 
 issue, whether it is sought to prove its existence by parol or by 
 a writing, there will be a preliminary question of fact for the 
 jury. If the contract is in writing, and is the instrument suedon, 
 the signature thereto is adinitled^ unless it is denied on oath, 
 under a statutory rule existing in several jurisdictions. In cases 
 outside the operation of this rule, it is necessary to prove first the 
 execution (which includes signature) and secondly, the delivery 
 of the instrument, — both of which are questions of fact. If 
 it is sought to prove the contract by parol, it is also for the jury, 
 as already seen,^ to ascertain what the understanding of the par 
 ties was. Where the execution and delivery of the writing are 
 proved or admitted, then, upon principles already stated,^ it is 
 for the court to say, upon an inspection of the instrument, 
 whether or not it constitutes a contract. Where an oral conver- 
 sation is proved, it is for the jury to say in what sense the lan- 
 guage was used and understood, and, this being ascertained, it is 
 for the court to decide, — generally upon hypothetical instructions 
 to the jury, — whether or not it constitutes a contract.^ These 
 questions, in their general bearings, will be considered in this 
 chapter. In relation to contracts of sale ^ and to certain other 
 contracts,^ they will be reserved for separate treatment. 
 
 § 1113. Partly in Writing and Partly in Parol. — In like 
 
 manner where an action is brought upon a contract which is partly 
 oral, and conflicting evidence is introduced in regard to the con- 
 versations which are alleged to have resulted in a completed con- 
 tract, the questions whether a contract was in fact made and, if 
 so, what were its terms are questions for the jury ; ^ and in such 
 a case the legal effect of the contract may properly be submitted 
 to the jury as a mixed question of law and fact, — the}' finding 
 the facts, and the court directing them as to the legal results which 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 1105, 1108; Waltheim v. * Post, § ll&l, etseq. 
 
 Artz, 70 Iowa, 609. * Post, §§ 1195, 1215, 1280, et passim. 
 
 ^ Ante,^ \0(^5,et seq. ^ Bolckow v. Seymour, 17 C. B. 
 
 3 Ante, § HOG. (x. s.) 107.
 
 860 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 follow.^ For perhaps stronger reasons, where the contract rests 
 partly in correspondence, and partly in oral communications, it 
 is held that, whether or not there is a contract, is a question 
 for the jury.'^ 
 
 § 1114. Observations on the Rule that the existence of a 
 contract is a Question of Fact. — Loose expressions are fre- 
 quently found in judicial decisions to the effect that, whether a 
 contract exists is always a question for the jury. It is obvious 
 that it will or will not be a question for the jury, according to 
 circumstances. Where the question rests wholly in parol evi- 
 dence, or, as in the cases above stated, partly in writing and 
 partly in parol, and there is the further condition that the evi- 
 dence is conflicting, it will be a question for the jury. So, 
 where the question depends entirely upon parol evidence, adduced 
 by the party sustaining the burden of proof, and there is no con- 
 flict in the evidence, it may still be a question for the jury, since 
 it will be for them to say whether they will believe the witnesses. 
 So, where the question depends upon a written instrument, the 
 
 1 Ante, § 1086; Farwell v. Tillsou, determined by the jury, under proper 
 76 Me. 227; Horaaus v. Lambard,21 instructions from the court. It is not 
 Me. 308; Smith v. Faulkner, 12 Gray necessarily true, that where, in the 
 (Mass.), 256; Haney v. Caldwell, 35 attempt to establish what were the 
 Ark. 156, 164. In a recent case in terras of an agreement by extrinsic 
 Illinois, where the question touched proofs, there is no conflict in the tes- 
 the peculiar jurisdiction of the Su- timouy, the question becomes purely 
 preme Court in cases which have one of law. Evidence tending to 
 reached it through the intermediate establish a contract may be all on one 
 appellate court, it was ruled that side, and yet may be of such a char- 
 where the terms of the contract are acter as to leave the question as to 
 specifically determined, then the mean- whether a legal contract was in fact 
 ing or legal effect of the contract made or not, in extreme doubt; and in 
 presents a pure question of law, such case the question as to the mak- 
 and the court alone is permitted to ing of the contract, and the purport 
 construe it. But where not only the of its terms, together with its legal 
 legal effect of the agreement upon the effect, is a mixed question of law and 
 controversy in hand, is to be deter- fact. St. Louis National Stock Yards 
 mined, but also the terms of the agree- v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 102 111. 514. 
 ment itself are to be ascertained from ^ Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall, 
 extrinsic proofs, there is presented a (U. S.) 123, 142. 
 mixed question of law and fact, to be
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 861 
 
 execution of which is denied, it will be a question for the jury 
 whether the instrument was executed by the party sought to be 
 charged as obligee therein.^ But where the execution of the in- 
 strument which is offered as evidence of the contract, is either 
 proAcd or admitted, then it will be the duty of the court to 
 determine from an inspection of it, and to inform the jury 
 whether it is or is not a contract — whether it is or is not that 
 which fixes the liability sought to be fastened upon the obligee 
 therein."^ This is no doubt all that is meant by the general ex- 
 pressions found in judicial opinions that the jury are to find 
 whether the contract was in fact made out, while the interpreta- 
 tion of it is for the court. ^ So, where the question is not whether 
 the instrument has been executed at all, but whether, in a case 
 requiring technical formality, it has been properly executed, the 
 decision will be pronounced by the judge, upon an inspection of 
 the instrument. Thus, the question whether a deed or mortgage 
 has been properly executed and acknowledged, is a question of 
 law, to be passed upon by the court, and it is error to leave such 
 a question to the jury.* So, where a jwoposal for a contract is 
 in writing, it is for the court to construe it ; if the accejytance 
 which is alleged is verbal, it is a question for the jury whether 
 the offer has been accepted or not, but they cannot decide that 
 it was without evidence.^ 
 
 1 May V. Burk, 80 Mo. 675, 680. In a case in Tennessee the evidence 
 
 2 Eyser v. Weissgerber, 2 la. 463, tended to show that a parol contract 
 479. had been agreed upon in the first iu- 
 
 ' Stokes V. Burrell, 3 Grant Cases stance, and afterwards a written con- 
 (Pa.), 241. That tlie jury are to find tract had been signed, and it was held 
 whether the contract was in fact made, that the plaintiff had the right to have 
 but the intent and the obligations of the question whether the written con- 
 it they must find under the directions tract embraced all the terms of the 
 of the court, and any mistake in such previous parol agreement, submitted 
 instructions will be reviewed on error, to the jury. Cobb v. Wallace, 5 
 see 111. Cent. R. Co. v. Cassell, 17 111. Coldw. (Tenn.) 539. But this was 
 389, 394. See also Cunningham v. probably a misapplication of the rule; 
 Cambridge Savings Bank, 138 Mass. for the rule whicli is generally applied 
 4«0. in such cases is that the subsequent 
 
 ■* Bullock V. Narrott, 49 III. 65. writing merges the preceding parol 
 
 * Wagner v. Egleston, 49 Mich. 218. negotiations.
 
 862 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1115. Illustrations. — This is well illustrated in a case in Texas, 
 where an action was brought on the following instrument of writing, 
 signed by the defendant: " There is a balance due the bearer, $475.00. 
 C. R. Hopson to H. L. Kinney, August 15, 1852." It was held that 
 this writing imported that the sum mentioned therein was due from the 
 maker to the bearer, and that the law would imply a promise by him to 
 pay such sura. But if tlie instrument was arl(b'essed to a third person, 
 it was to be regarded merely as a memorandum of a fact, or as convey- 
 ing information of a fact, without legal significance until explained, and 
 was not, of itself, a contract for the payment of money; and it was 
 for a jury to say what the fact was, of which the writing was a memo- 
 randum, or of which the writing was intended to convey information, 
 or of which it was an acknowledgment, as the case might be. It was 
 accordingly held that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as 
 requested by the defendant, " that if they believed, from the evidence, 
 that the plaintiff was employed by H. L. Kinne}^, or liis agent, to work 
 for him, and the writing sued on was a mere memorandum, inform- 
 ing Kinney of the amount due by him on such hiring, then they 
 
 should find for the defendant." ^ A. and B. enter into a verbal 
 
 contract by which A. undertakes to sell and deliver to B., at a certain 
 time and place, fifty bales of cotton, for which B. is to pay A. at the 
 rate of tencents a pound. About the time fixed for the perform- 
 ance of the contract, the parties agree that the time for its perform- 
 ance shall be postponed to another named day, and that it shall be 
 reduced to writing, — which, however is never done. On the day last 
 appointed, B. and the agent of A. meet at the place designated for the 
 delivery of the goods, and B. takes the agent of A. aside and says to 
 him that A. ought to release B. from the contract. But the agent of 
 A. proceeds nevertheless to tender to B. the cotton, which B. refuses 
 to accept and pay for. Here, there is question of fact for a jury, 
 whether the parties intended by the second agreement that the original 
 contract sliould be no longer binding unless reduced to loriting, or whether 
 they intended merely that it should be reduced to writing, with the 
 
 view of having more certain evidence of what the contract was.^ 
 
 It has been held a questi m of fact, to be determined from all the evi- 
 dence bearing upon the case and the conduct of the parties, whether a 
 subscription to the capital stock of a railway company, was made 
 under the provision of the charter of the company, granted by a 
 
 1 Hopson V. Brunwaukel, 24 Tex. 2 Adams r. Davis, 16 Ala. 748. 
 
 607.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS coxtracts. 863 
 
 special act of the legislature, or under a provision of the general law of 
 
 the State relating to railway companies. ^ In an action by a railway 
 
 company upon a contract of subscription to its capital stock, it appeared 
 that the contract provided that the money so subscribed should be 
 expended in the construction of the road from St. Johnsbury to 
 "Derby Line," and also that it should not be binding until the whole 
 road from St. Johnsbury to Derby Line should be put under contract 
 for grading. The defendant having given evidence tending to show 
 that the words " Derby Line " meant, in common usage, a village of that 
 name in the town of Derb}^ it was held that it became a question of 
 fact, for the jury to decide, whether the use of this term in the contract 
 meant the north line of the town (or township) of Derby, or the vil- 
 lage named Derby Line. The court said: " The more full and perfect 
 the proof, the greater the probabiUty of satisfying the jury and obtaining 
 a verdict ; but no amount of testimony on a point of this character could 
 have the effect to change this question of fact to one of law, so as to 
 wai-rant the court in taking it from the jury and deciding it as a matter 
 of law. Indeed, all the evidence as to the general understanding of 
 the meaning of this expression in the vicinity, has no direct application 
 on the real question in issue. It bears only on the pro babilities of the 
 case ; and if it had been proved, bej'ond all question, that, prior to the 
 making of this contract, this expression had never been used with refer- 
 ence to the town line, it would not have been conclusive. The expression 
 being a proper one to use in that connection, the parties may have used 
 it in that sense in this contract for the first time. The question would 
 still be open for the jury to say in what sense the parties in fact used 
 
 it." 2 It has been held, in the case of a written contract which was 
 
 the subject of parol explanation, that, whether it was an absolute pur- 
 chase of a half interest in a mortgage, or an assignment pro tanto of 
 the legal right, in consideration of a part payment, such as would toll 
 the statute of limitations, should be left to the jury upon all the evi- 
 dence.^ 
 
 § 1116. Mistakes in the terms of a Contract. — Whether a 
 clause in a written contract was inserted by a mutual mistake of 
 the parties, is a question which cannot generally arise in an 
 
 > Mastln V. Pacific E. Co., 83 Mo. ^ Bi^ir v. Lynch (N. Y.), 11 North 
 
 634. East. Rep. 947; reversing s.c. 35 Hun, 
 
 2 Connecticut &c. R.Co. v. Baxter, (iUS. 
 32 Vt. 805, 812.
 
 864 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoinp. Tl'., 
 
 action at law ; since the reformation of mistakes in contracts is 
 one of the peculiar heads of equity jurisdiction.^ But in cases 
 where public policy is concerned in relieving against the hard 
 features of certain classes of contracts, the question goes to the 
 jury. This, it is assumed, is the case in regard to onerous pro- 
 visions in contracts of insurance., and it has been held to be the 
 rule in the case of clauses in contracts made with -puhlic carriers 
 wdiich limit the liability of the latter. ^ 
 
 § 1117. Illustration. — Thus, in an action by a shipper against a 
 carrier for damages to goods in transit, it has been held competent to 
 submit to the decision of the jury the question whether a clause in the 
 bill of lading, limiting the responsibility of the carrier was not inserted 
 by a mistake, — the court no doubt meaning mutual mistake. The 
 court below submitted the question to the jury upon an instruction 
 which told them that the burden of showing the mistake was on the 
 plaintiffs ; that they must satisfy the jury of the mistake ; and instruct- 
 ing them as to the difference between the liability of the defendant in 
 case they should find that no mistake had been made in the bill of lading, 
 and in case they should find that the words were inserted through mistake. 
 This judgment was affirmed, the Supreme Court, in an opinion given by 
 Jeremiah Black, C. J., saying, among other things : " It is of the utmost 
 importance to the commerce of the country that carriers should be held 
 to strict accountability. Gross wrongs would be practiced every day 
 if the laws on this subject were relaxed. Slight evidence ought to be 
 sufficient to set aside any special provision in the bill of lading, which 
 is intended to relieve the carrier from his ordinary legal responsibility. 
 And this not only because public policy requires that carriers should 
 have the strongest interest in the performance of their duties, but also 
 on account of the manner in which such stipulations are generally made. 
 Goods are commonly sent by the owner to the carrier's place of busi- 
 
 1 Gray v. Ilornbeck, 31 Mo. 400. It jury on siibmission of the jury issues; 
 
 was said iu a case iu New York that, and if in such a case a trial occurs 
 
 where an issue is raised by an answer upon all the issues made, it is not 
 
 in ejectment upon the question whether error for the judiie to refuse to submit 
 
 a deed should be reformed (no issues the question of the reformation of the 
 
 having been settled with direction to deed to the jury, under the evidence 
 
 ■try by jury), it should either be tried upon that issue. Olendorf v. Cook, 1 
 
 by the court prior to the trial of the Lans. (N. Y.) 37. 
 
 prmcipal issue, or reserved from the ^ Po>>t, § 1803.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 865 
 
 ness, where they are received, and the bill of lading made out by the 
 carrier or his clerk. It is often not seen by the owner until it is too 
 late to insist on a change in the terms. It can hardly be called a con- 
 tract, for a contract requires the assent of both parties. The better 
 rule perhaps would be, to treat all provisions of this kind as void, 
 unless inserted by the express consent of the employer." ^ 
 
 § 1118. Whether a contract was verbal or in Writing. — It 
 
 has been held that, where the whole evidence in a case presents 
 a disputed question of fact, whether the contract by which the 
 rights of the parties are governed, was in parol or in writino-, 
 evidence may be given by them, both as to the precise question, 
 and as to the verbal declarations and acts of the parties, which 
 are claimed to have constituted the alleged parol contract, and 
 also as to the contents of the alleged written instrument ; and 
 that it may then be left to the jury to say whether the contract 
 was in writing or in parol, with instructions that, if they first 
 find that it was reduced to writing, they must afterward, in de- 
 termining the terms of the contract, consider only that part of 
 the evidence Avhich tends to show the contents of such writino-. 2 
 
 o 
 
 § 1119. Whether an Obligation is Independent or Depend- 
 ent. — It has been held, in an action to enforce the specific per- 
 formance of a contract to convey land, that the obligation upon 
 which the action is i)redicated may be shown by parol evidence to 
 be dependent upon the payment of a note given for the purchase- 
 money, although the bond makes no reference to the note, nor 
 the note to the bond. But the facts which show the interde- 
 pendency of the two obligations must be both averred and 
 proved; and it will be a question for the jury whether they were 
 dependent, and the court ought not to assume that they were so 
 as a fact.-^ 
 
 § 1120. Contract Entire or Divisible. — Whether a contract by 
 which an attorney engaged to prosecute a petition for divorce was en- 
 
 i Clioteaux v. Leech, IS Pa. St. 22i, Younger v. Welch; 22 Tex. 417, 
 
 232. 425. 
 
 2 Jenness V. Berry, 17 N. H. 549. 555.
 
 866 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThODip. Tl'., 
 
 tire, and whether he was to be paid for his services before or after the 
 contract was fully performed, have been held, under circumstances, to 
 be questions of fact.^ 
 
 § 1121. Original or Collateral. — If an undertaking to answer 
 for the debt, miscarriage or default of another is not in writing, 
 it is void under the statute of frauds, unless it assume the char- 
 acter of an original undertaking. Thus, if A. is unable to get 
 credit from a merchant, and B. goes to the merchant and says, 
 " Credit A. for what goods he wants, and I will pay for them, 
 if A. does not," this is a collateral undertaking to answer for the 
 default of A., and is void unless in writing. But if B. says to 
 the merchant, " Sell and deliver to A. such and such goods, and 
 charge the same to me, and I will pay for them," this is an original 
 undertaking, and B. is answerable for it, although not in writing. 
 Whether an agreement is original or collateral, also arises in re- 
 spect of the discharge of sureties. Thus, if A. is indebted on a 
 promissory note which is past due, upon which the liability of B. 
 as an indorser has become iixecl, and C. says to the payee, " Ex- 
 tend the time of payment to A., and I will pay the note if A. 
 does not," this undertaking is void under the statute of frauds, 
 unless in waiting, and does not operate to discharge the indorser, 
 because it is not binding upon the maker ; it leaves him at liberty 
 to sue upon the note at any time. But if C. enters into an ar- 
 rangement with the holder of the note to pay it, in consideration 
 of his giving time to A., this engagement will be an original un- 
 dertaking, and not within the statute of frauds, and the agreement 
 of forbearance will furnish a good consideration for it; and 
 therefore such an agreement for extension will prevent the holder 
 from suing upon the note before the expiration of the time so 
 agreed upon, and, if made without the consent of the indorser, 
 will discharge him. In these and like cases, it may be a question 
 whether the contract is original or collateral, and also whether 
 the question is to be decided by the court or by the jury. Pro- 
 fessor Parsons seems to have obscured the question, or rather 
 straddled it, by stating: " Whether a contract is collateral or or- 
 
 ^ Dodge V. Jauvriu, 5!) N. H. 16.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 867 
 
 igiiical'may be a question of construction, and then it is for the 
 court; but it is often regarded as a question of fact, and then it is 
 for the jury." ^ Of course, if it is a question of construction, it 
 is for the court, and if it is a question of fact, it is for the jury. 
 In a case in Texas, although the promises were in writing, 3'et it 
 was held, that the proper construction of the contract would be 
 a question for the jury, unless the terms of the several promises 
 in writing relied upon were such as to allow of a liability on the 
 part of the defendants as either collateral or original undertak- 
 ings on their part, accordingly as the facts which attended and 
 formed a part of the contract would show them to be the one or 
 the other. The court reasoned that the written terms which 
 were used, being in thenxselves doubtful, suggested that there 
 might be something in the transaction which gave rise to them, 
 which would explain and render clear their meaning, and thus 
 afford light for the interpretation of the contract as it was really 
 intended. In this view, parol evidence would be admissible to 
 explain it, and of course this would carry the question of its 
 meaning to the jury.^ Another court has held that, where a writ- 
 ten instrument is so ambiguous in its terms that it may be con- 
 sidered either as a guaranty or as a direct undertaking , accordipo; 
 to the circumstances under which it was given, and the testimony 
 as to those circumstances is conflicting, it is error to give instruc- 
 tions based upon the assumption that it was a direct undertaking; 
 but the question whether it was a direct undertaking or a guar- 
 anty should be submitted to the jury under proper instruc- 
 tions.^ 
 
 § 1122. Quantum Meruit — Value of Work done or Materi- 
 als furnished. — In an action for what is termed a quantum 
 meruit, or quantum valebat, that is, for the reasonable value of 
 work done or goods furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant, 
 
 ^ 2 Pars. Contr. (5th ed.), p. 11. payable uiuety clays from Jau. 13th, 
 
 2 Hueske v. Broussard, 55 Tex. 201. 1870, with interest at teu per ceut. per 
 
 The eugagemeutconceruiug which this annum." Ibid. 
 
 was held was an indorsement on the ^ Philibert v. Bui'ch, 4 Mo. App. 
 
 backof auoteof thewords; * 'Accepted, 470.
 
 868 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 at the request of the latter, the question what is the reasonable 
 value of the services or the goods, is, of course, a question for the 
 jury.^ In such a case the true question for the decision of the 
 jury is, what was the ordinary price iov such work and materials, 
 charged by other persons in the same business. In such an ac- 
 tion, it is therefore erroneous to charge the jury: "It is not 
 your province to say how much profit ought to be charged by 
 the plaintiffs." But the court should content itself with- say- 
 ing: " You are not to, set yourselves up as judges of what loco- 
 motive engine builders ought to charge as profits, but simply 
 whether the charges in the plaintiff's bill are the usual charges 
 in the trade." ^ 
 
 § 1123. Collateral Purpose for which a Contract was 
 made. — A branch of the doctrine that ^;M?'/)05e and intent are 
 questions of fact,^ is found in a ruling to the effect that, while 
 the interpretation of a deed of conveyance is a question for the 
 court, yet the purpose for which it was given, — as in the case 
 of an ordinary quit-claim deed, — may be a question of fact for 
 the jury, in the determination of which, parol evidence, not con- 
 tradicting or varying the terms of the deed, may be heard.* 
 
 § 1124. Whether a Bill of Sale was Intended as a Mort- 
 gage. — The rule is now believed to be settled in all English and 
 American jurisdictions, that, in a suit in equity, the object of 
 which is to have a bill of sale of chattels or a deed of land, 
 absolute on its face, declared to be a mortgage merely, and to 
 let in the right of the vendor or grantor to redeem, it may be 
 shown that the intention of the parties, notwithstanding the con- 
 versance is couched in absolute language, was merely that it 
 should stand as a security for money lent. Within the meaning 
 of this rule, the intention of the parties to the instrument, out- 
 side of the language of the instrument itself, becomes a question 
 
 1 Becker v. Hecker, 9 Ind. 497. " Post, § 1333. 
 
 2 Baumgarduer v. Buruliam, 93 Pa. ■» Iluth v. Caroudelet &c. Co., 56 
 St. 88. Mo. 202.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 869 
 
 of fact to be decided by the chancellor upon extrinsic evidence ; ^ 
 and in many cases the question will arise in actions at law, in 
 which cases the real intent of the parties to the instrument will 
 be a question of fact for the jury.^ In those jurisdictions where 
 legal and equitable remedies are blended, it should seem that this 
 should be regarded merely as a rule of evidence^ and not as a 
 rule of procedure depending upon the form of the action.^ Ac- 
 cordingly, w^e find that it has been held, in an action brought to 
 recover the possession of a slave, which the defendant held under 
 an instrment of writing purporting to be an absolute bill of sale, 
 that the plaintiff might show that the instrument was a morto^ao-e 
 merely, and that this question might be submitted to the jury. 
 The court said: " This question was to be decided by the jury, 
 upon the evidence, independently of the form of the instrument, 
 or the phase sought to be put upon the transaction, by represen- 
 tations and admissions of the parties." ^ In determining whether 
 a bill of sale, given in consideration of a pre-existing debt, is a 
 mortgage, the question to be settled is whether the intention of 
 the parties was to cancel the pre-existing debt, or to secure its 
 payment; and this is a question of fact for a jury in all cases, 
 depending upon the negotiations had at the time and the subse- 
 quent acts of the parties.^ In Pennsylvania a mortgage, though 
 in the form of a conveyance of title, is in reality not only in 
 equity but also at law, only a security for the payment of money 
 or for the performance of other collateral contract. It is none 
 
 1 Parish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254, 2G1; Cook v. Fire Ids. Co., fi7 Cal. 369, 371; 
 Englisli V. Laue, 1 Porter (Ala.), 328; Wilson v. Shoenberger, 31 Pa. St. 295; 
 Keunedy v. Kennedy, 2 Ala. 571, 589; McCoy v. Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88; Wood 
 Eilaud V. Kadford, 7 Ala. 724; Bishop v. Matthews, 73 Mo, 477, 481. 
 
 V. Bishop, 13 Ala. 475; Sledge v. ^ Quick, u. Turner, 20 Mo. App. 29; 
 
 Clopton, 6 Ala. 589; Turuipseed v. Bassett y. Glover, No. 3895, St. Louis 
 
 Cuuuingham, 16 Ala. 501; Locke v. Ct. of App. 
 
 Palmer, 26 Ala 312; Brantley w. West, * Horuew. Puckett, 12 Tex. 201, 205. 
 
 27 Ala. 542; West v. Hendrix, 28 Ala. See also Simpson t'. McKay, 12 Ired. L. 
 
 226; McCarron v. Cassiday, 18 Ark. (N. C.) 144; Stamper ??. Johnson, 3 
 
 34, 49; Johnson v. Clark, 5 Ark. 321; Tex. 1; Luckettw. Townsend, 3 Tex. 
 
 Scott ?7. Henry, 13 Ark. 119; Bishop 119; Stephens w. Sherrod, 6 Tex. 294. 
 
 V. Williams, 18 111. 101. s Cook v. Fire Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 369, 
 
 2 Bemis v. Phelps, 41 Vt. 1, 4; 371.
 
 870 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 the less so, because the defeasance, instead of appearing in the 
 original deed, is contained in a contemporaneous or subsequently 
 executed instrument. If an absolute deed, if other instruments 
 operating as a defeasance be simultaneously executed, it is a con- 
 clusion of law that they constitute together a. mortgage, and it is 
 the duty of the court to declare that such is their legal effect. 
 But if the alleged defeasance be executed subsequently, it is a 
 question of fact for the jury, where the action is an action at 
 law, whether the transaction was intended as a sale or merely as 
 a security for money loaned.^ 
 
 § 1125. Penalty or Liquidated Damages. — The Supreme 
 Court of Pennsylvania, after reviewing several decisions,^ con- 
 cluded that the question whether the amount stated in a conditional 
 bond or contract is to be taken as a penalty, or as a liquidation 
 of damao;es arisino; from a breach of the condition, is to be 
 determined by the intention of the parties, drawn from the 
 words of the whole contract, examined in the light of its subject- 
 matter and its surroundings; and that, in this examination, the 
 court must consider the relation which the sum stipulated bears 
 to the extent of the injury wdiich may be caused by the several 
 breaches provided against, the ease or difficulty of measuring a 
 breach in damages, and such other matters as are legally or nec- 
 essarily inherent in the transaction. The concurrent declara- 
 tions of the parties are inadmissible, except to show mistake or 
 fraud. Evidence, outside the contract, may in some cases be 
 required to explain the subject-matter and exhibit the surround- 
 ino*s, and, in the investiijation of the transaction in its various 
 phases, the testimony of witnesses may be admitted for other 
 
 1 Wilson V. Shoenberger, 31 Pa. St. weeks later. See also Jaquesv. Weeks» 
 
 295. lu Reitenbaugh r. Liulwick, 31 7 Watts (Pa.), 2G1 ; Kerru. Gilmore. 
 
 Pa. St. 131, tfie question whether a Watts (Pa.), 405; Raukiuw. Mortimere, 
 
 conveyance, absolute on its face, was 7 Watts (Pa.), 372. 
 
 intended as a deed of sale or as a ^ Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat 
 
 security for money, was submitted to (U.S.) 13; Robeson v. Whitesides, 
 
 the jury as a question of fact, because IG Serg. & R. (Pa.) 320; Bun v. Todd, 
 
 the defeasance was not executed at 41Pa. St. 212; Streeper v. Wii'.iams, 
 
 the same time with the deed, but a few 48 Pa. St. 450: Shreve v. Brereton. 51
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS CONTRACTS. 871 
 
 purposes, affecting the enquiries already stated. The truth of 
 the facts thus shown is for the jury, but their legal effect is for 
 the court. ^ 
 
 § 1126. Gratification of a Contract. —While the meanino- 
 of a written contract is thus to be determined by the court, whal 
 IS sometimes termed its gratification, is matter for the jury. 
 This, as hereafter seen,^ i, most frequently illustrated in apply- 
 ing a deed of conveyance to the land itself. Whether a o-iven 
 monument was intended by the deed, is, for instance, a question 
 of fact for the jury. It is further illustrated in controversies in 
 respect of tl^^identity of things which are the subjects of written 
 contracts, where, upon ascertained facts, the question may 
 become one of interpretation, and hence for the court. Thus it 
 has been laid down that, whether certain property, appurtenant 
 to the engine and machinery of a mill, passed to a mortgagee as 
 after-acquired property under the terms of the mortgage^v.-^.^ a 
 question of law for the court on the facts proved.^ Extendino- 
 the same idea, where a contract was accepted conditionally, to be 
 paid upon the happening of a contingency, whether the contin- 
 gency had happened was deemed a question for the court.* 
 
 § 1127. Whether there has been a Novation. —Closely allied 
 to the proposition that the existence of a contract is a question of 
 fact for the jury, is another proposition, which is, that whether 
 there has been, by the act of the parties to a contract, a release 
 of the obligor therein and an assumption by a third person of the 
 obligation of performing it, is a question of fact for a jurv, under 
 proper instructions.^ -The existence of such agreement, like 
 any other fact of kindred import, may not be susceptible of 
 direct proof, but it is to be determined by the jury from all the 
 facts and circumstances in evidence." " 
 
 Pa. St. 175; Bagley v. Peddie, 5 Sandf. 2 p^^^^ § ud et seq 
 
 LwsWPr-^Mf ' """"' " ""'"' ' ' "'""'""'^ '■ ''"''^y'^-^^^ 66 Mo. 672. 
 
 1 M u .,?•, ' ^^^S^*^ '-■ I^o™"-' 8 Cal. 353, 358. 
 
 335 Ml '■ ^"'^°''-^^' ^^^ ^*- St. ^ Brown v. Kirk, 20 Mo. App. 524. 
 
 " ' ■ * ^^'t^- 529, opinion by Pliilips, P. J.
 
 872 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY, [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 1128. Delivery of a Deed. — A deed is not operative until 
 it is delivered. When, therefore, a deed is offered as evidence of 
 a contract, the question whether or not the contract exists will 
 depend upon the fact whether the deed has been delivered. This, 
 where all the facts arc undisputed, has been he]d a question of law 
 for the court. 1 On the contrary, it has been ruled that whether, 
 upon a given state of facts, it was the intentioyi of a party who 
 had executed a deed to deliver the deed, is a question of fact for 
 a jury.^ On the same subject another court has said : " The de- 
 livery of a deed is a question of fact. The law has prescribed 
 no particular form in which it shall be made. "When the question 
 rests upon the attendant circumstances and the intention of the 
 parties, the facts of their existence and their effect are peculiarly 
 within the province of the jury. It is error, then, for a judge 
 to tell the jury there is no evidence of a delivery, when any cir- 
 cumstances are proved from which it may be inferred, no matter 
 how slight or inconclusive they may be. The party relying upon 
 them has a right to have them submitted to the jury for their 
 consideration." ^ A third view is. that, what constitutes the de- 
 livery of a deed is a mixed question ofJaiu and fact. ^ In another 
 court this view has been elaborated thus : " What constitutes a 
 delivery of a deed is often a mixed question of law and fact. An 
 arbitrary rule ought not to be laid down. Each case must stand 
 more or less on its peculiar facts. The intent to convey is evi- 
 denced by the act of making out and didy executing and ac- 
 knowledging a deed. The delivery may be evidenced by any act 
 of the grantor, by which the control or dominion or use of the 
 deed is made available to the grantee. It is not necessary it 
 should be handed over actually to the grantee, or to any other 
 person for him. It may be delivered under certain circum- 
 stances, though it remain in the possession of the maker. Where, 
 however, there is not an actual transfer from the grantor to the 
 grantee, it should affirmatively appear from the circumstances, 
 
 i Rogers v. Carey, 47 Mo. 232. 3 pioyd v. Taylor, 12 Ircd. L. (N. 
 
 2 Grain v. Wright, 3G Hun (N. Y ), C.) 47, opinion by Nash, J. 
 74, 77. . ■* Jackson v. Thipps, 12 Johns. (N. 
 
 Y.) 418,421.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 873 
 
 acts or words of the parties, that the intention to pass a title really 
 existed."^ In a case in New York, Spencer, J., used the fol- 
 lowing striking language: "It is requisite in every well made 
 deed that there be a delivery of it. This delivery must be either 
 actual, by doing something and saying nothing, or else verbal, by 
 saying something and doing nothing ; or it may be both. But by 
 one or both of these it must be made; for otherwise, though it 
 be never so well sealed and written, ^'■et is the deed of no force." ^ 
 In another case, the only infallible test was said to be, has the 
 orrantor divested himself of all dominion and control over the 
 conveyance ? ^ But it is obvious that this is not the only infalli- 
 ble test ; for in many cases where there is plain evidence of an 
 intent that the deed shall become presently operative, although 
 remaining in the custody of the grantor, a delivery may be found 
 to have taken place. Thus, it has been ruled, " that, when a deed 
 to a minor child is absolute in form and beneficial in effect, and 
 the father (and grantor) voluntarily causes the same to be re- 
 corded, acceptance by the grantee will be presumed, and such 
 facts constitute, prima facie, a delivery, and afford reasonable 
 presumption that the grantor intended to part with the title, and 
 clear proof should be made that a person who, under such 
 circumstances, has executed and acknowledged and caused a deed 
 to be recorded, before the court would be warranted in declaring 
 that he did not intend to part with his title." * Another court 
 has held that the act of taking the deed to the recorder of deeds, 
 for the purpose of having it recorded, may, under circumstances, 
 be a sufficient delivery, although the deed be not in fact recorded.^ 
 Another court has stated what seems to be the better rule under 
 this head, that, while the recording oi a deed is not in itself a de- 
 
 ' Burke v. Adams, 80 Mo. 504, 512. » fi^ey v. Huey, G5 Mo. 089, 694. 
 
 2 Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. (N. * Tobin v. Bass, 85 Mo. 654, 658. 
 
 Y.) 418, 421. This language has been The cases cited in support of this 
 
 four times quoted with approval by the dic'um were: Cecil v. Beaver, 28 la. 
 
 Supreme Court of Missouri. Huey u. 242; Robinson v. Gould, 26 la. 89; 
 
 Huey, 65 Mo. 689, 693; Turner v. Car- Masterson v. Cheek, 23 111. 72; aud 
 
 peuter, 83 Mo. 333, 336; Miller w. Lull- Mitchell v. Ryan, 3 Oh. St. 377. 
 man. 81 Mo. 311, 316; Burke v. Adams, ^ Burt v. Cassety, 12 Ala. 734. 
 
 80 Mo. 504, 512.
 
 ^74 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 livery of the deed, yet it is evidence from which a delivery may 
 be found, and is therefore an assurance by the grantor of the title in 
 the grantee . ^ From the foregoing, it would appear that the delivery 
 of a deed may be established by circumstances, as well as by direct 
 proof, and that, when it is sought to be proved by circumstantial 
 evidence, the court should submit the circumstances, with proper 
 instructions, to the jury for their finding upon the question. ^ 
 
 § 1129. Acceptance of tlie Deed by the Grantee. — In the 
 
 case of a deed poll, conveying land to a grantee for a considera- 
 tion recited to have been paid, an acceptance by the grantee will 
 generally be presinned, since an acceptance is manifestly for the 
 interest of the grantee. But there are cases where the question 
 has been submitted to juries. Thus, it has been held, under 
 circumstances, that the facts should have gone to the jury, for 
 them to say whether the grantee had knowledge of a deed of 
 bargain and sale made to him, and whether he gave his assent 
 thereto, directly or otherwise; and that the court did not err in 
 refusing to rule that the deed had never been delivered, nor in 
 instructing the jury, at the instance of the plaintiff, that, assum- 
 ing the facts which the evidence tended to prove, there was no 
 delivery of the deed.^ In another case it has been ruled that, 
 whether a deed of conveyance of real estate has been accepted 
 by he grantee, so as to pass the title and oblige him to seek his 
 remedy, if any he has, for a failure of title, on the covenants in 
 the deed, or go without any, if those covenants were without 
 authority and void, — is a mixed question of law and fact, to be 
 settled by the jury, under the advice of the court.* 
 
 § 1130. Date of the Delivery of a Deed or of the taking 
 Effect of a Contract. — In the absence of any evidence as to the 
 date of the delivery of a deed, the pi^esumptioii is that it was 
 
 i Blight V. Scheuck, 10 Pa. St. 289. 2 Vau Hook v. Walton, 28 Tex. 
 
 Compare Miller v. LuUinau, 81 Mo. 5i). 
 
 311; atlirming s. c. 11 Mo. App. 41'.); ^ Bensley v. Atwill, 12 Cal. 231, 
 
 (^Tregory v. Walker, 38 Ala. 2G, 33; 23G. 
 
 McLurei;. Colclough, 17 Ala. 96; Mor- ■» Earle v. Earle, 20 N. J. Law 348, 
 
 ris ' . ^'avuer, 32 Ala. 4'J'J. 3G3.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 875 
 
 executed and delivered at the time when it bears date.^ This prin- 
 ciple is held to apply, both in respect of the question of the date 
 of the execution, and the date of the delivery of the deed.^ But 
 this is not a conclusive presumption. It is what Mr. Best calls 
 2i prima facie presumption, and it has been said that, even w^here 
 the evidence is free from doubt in the mind of the court, the 
 question of the date at which a deed was delivered is to be sub- 
 mitted to the jury.^ But where the indorsement on a deed was 
 all the evidence offered as to the time when it had been admitted 
 to record, it was said that the trial court did not err in refusinof 
 to submit that question to the jury; though, if countervailing 
 proof had been offered, the jury would have been the proper 
 tribunal for its determination.* But this presumption does not 
 hold in relation to deeds in fee, unattested and unacknowledg-ed.^ 
 Whether such a deed was actually executed and delivered at the 
 time it bears date, or not, is a question of fact for the jury, 
 which must ahvays be submitted to them where the evidence is 
 conflicting." The question which of two instruments was first 
 executed, they not referring to each other, and one of them being 
 undated, is a question of fact.^ 
 
 § 1131. Whether delivered as an Escrow. — A deed or 
 other written obligation is said to be delivered as an escrow, 
 when it is delivered to a third person, upon condition that it shall 
 not take effect until a future date, or the happening of a future 
 event. Whether a deed was so delivered, must generally be a 
 question of fact for a jury.^ Thus, where a contract in duplicate 
 
 ' Best ou Presuraptious, 181. ^ Genter v. Morrisou, supra. 
 
 2 Smith V. Batteus, 1 Mood. & Rob. ' Coons v. Chambers, 1 Abb. App. 
 341 ; Stoue v. Grubbam, 1 Kolle Rep. Dec. (N. Y.) 439. 
 
 3, pi. 5; Ofley v. Hicks, Cro. Jac. 2G3; ^ VVliere, upon the trial of a cause, 
 
 Barry v. Hoffman, G Md. 79, 80. it is doubtful, upon the evidence, 
 
 3 Barry v. Hoffman, supra. whether a written contract for tlie 
 
 4 Budd V. Brooive, 3 Gill (Md.),198, sale of goods signed by the vendor, 
 221. See also Trasher v. Everhart, 3 and delivered to tlie purchaser, was 
 Gill & J= (Md.) 234. delivered absolutely or conditionally, 
 
 5 Elsey V. Metcalf, 1 Deuio (N. Y.), the question must be submitted to the 
 323: Genter v- Morrison, 31 Barb. jury. Scott?;. Peutz, 5 Sandf. S. C. 
 (N. Y.) 155. (N. Y.) 572.
 
 876 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmil. Tl'.,. 
 
 was left by the parties with a third person, and the evidence as 
 to the arrangements for its subsequent delivery and the terms 
 upon which it was to become operative was conflicting, — it 
 was held that the question of the terms and conditions upon 
 which it was to become operative was one of fact for a jury, 
 depending upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from 
 the luhole transaction, and that the court was right in refusing 
 to instruct the jury that delivery in a particular mode was essen- 
 tial.^ A party who purports to be bound by a written instru- 
 ment, — as for instance, a .promissory note, may show by parol 
 that it w^as delivered as an escroiv, or that it was delivered to be 
 held upon a condition to be performed before the rights of the 
 holder could attach.^ But upon this subject it has been said: 
 " A deed can only be delivered as an escrow to a third person. 
 If it be intended that it shall not take effect until some subsequent 
 condition shall be performed, or some subsequent event shall hap- 
 pen, such condition must be inserted in the deed itself, or else it 
 must not be delivered to the o;rantee. Whether a deed has been 
 delivered or not, is a question of fact, upon which, from the 
 very nature of the case, parol evidence is admissible. But 
 whether a deed when delivered, shall take effect absolutely, or 
 only upon the performance of some condition not expressed 
 therein, cannot be determined by parol evidence. To allow a 
 deed, absolute on its face, to be avoided by such evidence, would 
 be a dangerous violation of a cardinal rule of evidence." ^ 
 
 §1132. Existence of a Partnership. — It is frequently said 
 that the question whether a partnership exists is a question of 
 fact.* But this is an example of the inconsiderate manner in 
 
 1 Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123. v. C'atliu, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 248, per 
 - Kicketts v. Pendleton, UMd. 321, Phitt, J., arguendo. 
 329; Bell v. In<?estre, fi-t Eng. C. L. * McDonald?;. Matucy, 82 ]\Io. 358, 
 317; s. c. 12 Ad. & El. (x. s.) 317. .3(13; McMullan v. MacKenzie, 2 G. 
 3 Lawton v. Sager, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) Greene (la.), 3<i8; Doggett v. Jordan, 
 349, 351, opinion by Karris, J.; citing 2 Fla. 541, 549. Accordingly, it -was 
 Gilbert v. North American Fire Ins. ruled that a finding by a judge, sitting 
 Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 43; Ward v. as a jury, that there -^vas no partner- 
 Lewis, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 518; Jackson ship between the plaintiff and the de-
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPKESS CONTRACTS. 877 
 
 which legal propositions are frequently stated by the courts 
 ^\hat constitutes a partnership, that is, what amounts to a part- 
 nership m contemplation of law, is a question of law for the court • ' 
 whether a partnership exists in a particular case, will be a ques- 
 tion for the decision of the judge or of the jury, accordingly as the 
 facts are established or in dispute. If they are established, the 
 judge will declare their legal effect and will determine whether 
 or not they show the existence of a partnership ; if uot, the con- 
 clusion will be for the jury, under the instructions of the court 
 Therefore, where an issue is raised as to whether a partnership 
 exists, and the evidence is conflicting, or the inferences to be 
 drawn from the facts in evidence are not clear, it is the duty of 
 the judge to explain to the jury what will constitute a partner- 
 ship, and leave it to them to say whether the testimony adduced 
 is sufficient to establish the facts necessary to the existence of a 
 partnershijD.^ 
 
 § 1133. Instructions on which this Question has been submitted 
 TO Juries. — " If the jury find that the defendants were jointly inter- 
 ested in the business, in which the work and labor charged in the com- 
 plaint were performed, sharing the profits and losses between them, that 
 constitutes the defendants copartners, and renders them liable as such 
 for habilities incurred on account of such business." 3 ^^ consti- 
 tute a partnership there must be an agreement between the parties, both 
 consenting thereto, that they will, from a certain day or time, share the 
 profits and be responsible for debts and losses and carry on the busi- 
 ness for their mutual benefit; and there must be an entering upon or 
 conducting or doing business under such agreement, or some business 
 preparatory thereto, to make them or either of them liable to third 
 
 parties as partners.* "If the defendants, Cole and Damson, on 
 
 or about the middle of October, 1860, and before the date of the note 
 sued on, entered into an agreement to seU goods in copartnership at 
 Indian Point, and after said agreement was made, the defendant. Cole, 
 
 fendauts, was uot a conclusion of law, ^ Dulany v. Elford, 22 S. C 304 
 
 bat of fact. Kahn v. Ceutral Smelting 308. " ' ' 
 
 Co., 2 Utah, 371 ; Bormau, J., dissent- ^ Approved in AVarner r. Mvrick 16 
 
 i^S- Minu. 9i. 
 
 1 Cumpston v. McNair, 1 Wend. 4 Approved in Lucas v. Cole 57 
 
 (N. Y.) 457, 4G3. Mo. 145.
 
 878 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoiiip. Tr., 
 
 represented to plaintiffs tliat tliey were in copartnership, and bought 
 goods and gave a note in the joint names of both defendants, the court 
 will find the issue for the plaintiffs, even though the court may believe 
 from the evidence, that no invoice was taken, and that thie said co- 
 partnership was dissolved soon after tlic 27th October, i860 J 
 
 " If the jury find that the defendants had any arrangement for ship- 
 ping cattle from Stoutsville, by which it was agreed that either of them 
 might buy the stock on his own responsibility, and, upon its delivery 
 for shipment at said place, the others might take an interest in any 
 stock so purchased and delivered, if, upon examination of it, they 
 thought it suitable to ship, or not purchased too high ; or by which, if 
 they purchased stock when all together, it was to be shipped on joint 
 account; or if, after looking at or agreeing to take an interest in stock 
 purchased by any one of them before delivered at said place, it was to 
 be shipped on joint account, and the parties to share in the profits and 
 losses, such facts or agreements did not constitute them general part- 
 ners, but only partners in each transaction.- 
 
 § llSl. Genuineness of Signature. — The genuineness of a 
 signature, when disputed, is, of course, a question of fact for a 
 iury.=* 
 
 § 1135. How Proved. — A signature may be proved by the evidence 
 of a witness who has seen the. person write. " It is held suflficientfor 
 this purpose that the witness has seen him write but once, and then 
 only his name. The proof in such case must be very light, but the 
 jury will be permitted to weigh it."^ Such evidence will take the 
 question to the jury.^ So, a witness who has seen a party make his 
 signature by a mark on several occasions, has been held competent to 
 testify as to the genuineness of his signature.*^ Where, however, the 
 
 1 Ibid. 4 1 Greenl. Ev., § 577. 
 
 2 Approved in Valentine v. Hickle, ^ Garrells v. Alexander, 4 Esp. 37; 
 39 Ohio St. 23, 24; citing Bank v. Magee v. Osborn, 32 N. Y. 6G9, 682; 
 Sawyer, 38 Ohio St. 339; Peterson Eagleton u. Kingston, 8 Ves. 464, 473; 
 V. Roach, 32 Ohio St. 374; Bevan v. Powell v. Ford, 2 Stark. 164; Lewis v. 
 Lewis, 3 Eng. Ch. 377; Harvey v. Sapio, 1 Mood. & Malk. 39; Com. v. 
 Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319; Saville Levy, 2 Wheel. Cr. Ca. 246; Utica Ins. 
 V. Robertson, 4 T. R. 720; McGar v. Co. v. Badger, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 102; 
 Drake, 5 Reptr. 347 (Teuu.) ; Wall v. Mudd v. Snckermore, 5 Ad. & El. 730. 
 Eife, 37 Pa. St. 394. 6 George v. Surrey, 1 Mood. & Malk. 
 
 3 Magee v. Osborn, 32 N. Y. 669. 516.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 879 
 
 knowledge of the handwriting has been obtained by the witness from 
 seeing the party write his name, /or that purpose, after the commence- 
 ment of the suit, the evidence has been held inadmissible.^ In an ac- 
 tion on a promissory note, the defendant having denied the genuine- 
 ness of his signature, called his son as a witness, who testified that cer- 
 tain words in another note, which his father had actually given, were 
 written by the witness himself. On cross-examination, the witness was 
 required to tvrite the same words in the presence of the jury, for their in- 
 spection and comparison with the note in controversy. It was held that 
 this was competent evidence and proper on cross-examination.-^ In re- 
 spect of the proof of handwriting by comparison, the Supreme Court 
 of Missouri have adopted the rule stated by Prof. Greenleaf, which is 
 this : That the general rule is that handwriting cannot be proved by a 
 comparison of the disputed signature with signatures admitted to be 
 genuine; but that this rule has been relaxed in two cases: 1. When 
 the writings are of such antiquity that living witnesses cannot be had, 
 and yet are not so old as to prove themselves. 2. When other writings, 
 admitted to he genuine, are already in the case. Here, the comparison 
 may be made by the jury, with or without the aid of experts.^ The rea- 
 son assigned for the second exception to the rule is that, as the jury 
 are entitled to look at the writings for one purpose, it is better to per- 
 mit them, under the advice and direction of the court, to examine them 
 for all purposes, than to embarrass them with impracticable distinctions 
 to the peril of the cause* In Rose v. First Nat. Bank,^ the rule was re- 
 examined, and held to apply in the case of the cross-examination of a 
 witness, as in the case of his direct examination ; and accordingly it was 
 held error to introduce certain fictitious signatures on the cross-examina- 
 tion of an expert witness, for the purpose of testing his knowledge as to 
 the handwriting of the plaintiff. According to Wagner, J.: "The 
 strongest and best reason in support of the rule for rejecting evidence 
 founded on comparison of handwritings in ordinary cases, is that the 
 writings, intended as specimens to be compared with the disputed paper, 
 would be brought together by a party to the suit, who is interested to select 
 
 1 Stranger v. Searle, 1 Esp. 14. - Huff v. Nims, 11 Neb. 304; ante, 
 
 Compare Muckl v- ^uckermore, 1 Nev. § 620. 
 
 & P. 32, 56; s. c o Ad. & El. 703; Tit- ^ state u. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380, 383; 
 
 ford V. Knott, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302, 305. 
 211; Com. v. Hammond, 2 Maine, 33; ^ 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 578; State v, 
 
 Cuuniugham v. Hudson Eiver Bank, Scott, supra. 
 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 557: Williams v. 5 91 Mo. 399. 
 
 Davis, 1 Penu. (N. ,T.) 177; Handy t\ 
 State, 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 42.
 
 880 PROVINCE OF COURT A*ND JURY. [1 Thouip. Tl'., 
 
 such writings only as may best subserve his purpose ; and that tliey are 
 not likely, therefore, to exhibit a fair specimen of the general character 
 of handwriting. " 1 Another reason is that, to permit the introduction 
 of such papers, would embarrass the case by the trial of an indefinite 
 number of collateral issues.- 
 
 § 1136. Consideration of a Contract. — It is scarcely neces- 
 sary to say that, where the want of consideration of a promissory 
 note, which is the foundation of the actions, is pleaded, or where, 
 under the practice in some jurisdictions, notice is given that proof 
 of consideration will be required at the trial, and there is con- 
 flicting evidence on the question, it will be a question for the 
 jury to determine whether a consideration has been satisfactorily 
 proved.^ 
 
 § 1137. Whether a Forbearance was the Acceptance of a 
 Promise to Pay the Debt of another. — It has been held that a 
 promise to pay the debt of another cannot be rendered binding 
 by proof that it was in consideration of forbearance, unless there 
 be something to show, not only that it was made for the purpose 
 of obtaining time, and that time was actually given, but that the 
 indulgence thus accorded was in pursuance of the request implied 
 by the promise; and that the question is one of fact, which can 
 not be found affirmatively in the absence of proof.* By parity 
 of reasoning, it is held that, whether actual forbearance, follow- 
 ing a promise to pay interest upon interest for the forbearance, 
 is evidence of an acceptance of the promise, is a question offact.^ 
 Upon this subject, the Supreme Court of Illinois have said: " If, 
 under all the circumstances in evidence throwing light upon the 
 question, it is reasonable to believe the part}^ acted upon the faith 
 of, and pursuant to the promise, a jury would be justified in 
 finding that he so acted ; otherwise not. But it is a mere matter 
 of reasoning about human affairs, in which the individual knowl- 
 
 1 State V. Scott, s?<pra. 305; Cobb v. Page, 17 Pa. St. 469; 
 
 2 State V. Scott, swpra; Rose w. First Shupe v. Galbraith, 32 Pa. St. 10; 
 Nat. Bank, supra. Yomig v. Hill, G7 N. Y. KIT. 
 
 3 Swain v. Ettling, 32 Pa. St. 486. ^ Edgertou v. Weaver, 105 111. 43, 
 
 4 Edgerton v. Weaver, 105 111. 43, 47. 
 46; Snyder v Leibeugood, 4 Pa. St.
 
 tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS CONTRACTS. ggl 
 
 edge and experience of the reasoner as to the motives of human 
 action become a factor. It is finding a fact from circumstantial 
 evKlence, or, as is said by some writers on evidence, a principle 
 fact from subordmate evidentiary facts. If the question were, 
 whether there was an express acceptance by words, there could 
 be no difficulty in perceiving the question to be purely one of 
 fact ; yet the only difference between that and the present ques- 
 tion IS that between direct and circumstantial evidence. There 
 the proof IS direct, and it is only to determine whether it shall 
 be believed; here it is indirect, and requires reasoning as well as 
 perception and memory. But the conclusion is all the time one 
 ot tact, —in the one case, from evidence directly to the point- 
 m the other case, from evidence more remote, but, it may be' 
 equally convinciuo-." 1 -^ ' 
 
 § 1138. Whetlier a Written Promise was founded upon an 
 Illegal Consideration. -The rule seems to be that, in an action 
 upon a written promise, where the defense is that it was aiven 
 for a wagering consiaeration, it is the duty of the court if the 
 writmg contains evidence of its invalidity upon its face,' to ex- 
 elude It from the jury; but if there is not sufiicient upon its face 
 to render it void, extrinsic evidence should be admitted to show 
 the rea nature of the agreement and the consideration u,3on 
 which the promise was executed ; and it should be left to the 
 jury to determine the question of the legality of the considera- 
 tion, under an instruction that, if they find it was given upon a 
 wager, or that the whole or any part of the consideration was 
 tor money or property laid or staked upon a bet or waa-er the 
 promise is absolutely void, even in the hands of an innocent 
 purchaser.^ Where the facts speaking upon this question are un- 
 .disputed, obviously it is for the court to say whether the instru- 
 ment was valid or not, and in such case the court may direct the 
 verdict; 3 but obviously where the facts which are oifered in 
 
 ^ Edgerton v. Weaver, 105 III. 43, 3 porter .. Haveus, 37 Barb. (^ Y ) 
 
 47, opinion by Scholfiekl, J. 343. -K-^-i..) 
 
 2 Craig V. Andrews, 7 Iowa, 17, 22; 
 Danforth v. Evans, IG Vt. 538. 
 
 5G
 
 882 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thooip. Tr., 
 
 evidence to impeach the instrument -are disputed, the question 
 must go to the jury, upon proper instructions as to the conclusions 
 of law upon the facts, as the jury may find them. Thus, it has 
 been held, in a case where the evidence was conflicting and 
 doubtful as to the consideration of a note which promised to pay 
 $100.00, with 10 per cent, interest, "on and after the election of 
 James Buchanan to the presidency," — that the question whether 
 it was given upon a wager, or whether the whole or any part of 
 the consideration was for money or property laid or staked upon 
 a bet or wager, should be submitted to the jury, with the in- 
 struction that, if it was so given, it was absolutely void, and no 
 recovery could be had upon it against the maker, even in the 
 hands of an innocent purchaser.^ 
 
 § 1139. Whether the Contract is Real or Colorable to cover 
 lip a Gambling Transaction. — What are called " option deals ^^' 
 that is, contracts, usually made upon the floor of merchants' ex- 
 changes, and in smaller establishments of the same kind called 
 "bucket shops," are, it is well known, void as against public 
 policy, where no delivery of the article ostensibly contracted for 
 is contemplated, but where the intention of both parties is merely 
 to bet upon the future state of the market, and to settle, or to 
 " ring out the deal" (to use the slang of this species of gambling) 
 by the payment of " differences," — are void as against public 
 policy.'^ These contracts are generally evidenced by a written 
 memorandum, and are valid in form, and presumptively so in 
 law. It is, therefore, held that the burden is upon the party 
 assailing the validity of such a contract, to show that actual 
 
 1 Craig V. Andrews, 7 la. 17. 52 "Wis. 593; Tenney v. Foot, 4 Bradw. 
 
 2 ^Vatermau v. Bucklaud, 1 Mo. (III.) 594; s. c. affirmed, 95 111. 99; 
 App. 45; Kent v. Milteuberger, 13 Mo. Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 5 Mees. & 
 App. 503; Williams v. Tiedemann, G W. 462. Many of the foregoing cases 
 Mo. App. 269; Fareira v. Gabell, 89 hold the sales under consideration 
 Pa. St. 89; Smith v. Bouvier, 70 Pa. St. valid; and, although they are not har- 
 325; Bruas's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 294; monious, several of them lay down 
 Lehman v. Strassbnrger, 2 Woods clear distinctions between valid sales 
 (U. S.), 554; Sawyer v. Taggart, 14 for future delivery and mere wagering 
 Bush (Ky .) , 729 ; Barnard v. Backhaus, contracts.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 883 
 
 delivery was not intended h\ the parties to it, but that it was a 
 mere cloak to cover up a gambling transaction. This may, of 
 course, be shown by extrinsic evidence; and whether the evidence 
 adduced is sufficient to establish the fact will, in many cases, be 
 a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 
 § 1140. Whether a Market was '* Manipulated »♦ or Ficti- 
 tious. — In dealing with a case of this kind, where there was a 
 by-law of the exchange regulating sales for future delivery and 
 providing that nothing therein should be construed " as author- 
 izing unjust or unreasonable claims based upon manipulated or 
 fictitious markets," it was held that the court could not deter- 
 mine, as matter of law, that prices produced by speculation in 
 articles of trade were unreal or fictitious prices, but that the 
 question as to whether the prices, at which the settlement of 
 such a contract was required to be made on a given day, were 
 fictitious, as based upon a manipulated market, or were the true 
 values for the purpose of consumi^tion or manufacture, — was a 
 question of fact for the jury ; and that the finding of the jury on 
 this question would not be disturbed on appeal, where there was 
 any substantial evidence to support it.^ 
 
 § 1141, Performance or Waiver of Performance. — Whether 
 a contract has been performed^ or its performance waived, will 
 be in most cases a question of fact for a jury. The court in in- 
 structing the jury will tell them whether specific acts which the 
 evidence tends to show do or do not amount to a performance or 
 a waiver.^ 
 
 § 1142. Place where a Contract is to be Performed. — It is 
 
 said to be a principle of universal law that, in every forum, a 
 contract is governed bv the law with a view to which it was 
 made.^ It is well settled that the validity of a contract is to be 
 
 1 Ream v. Hamilton, 15 ]\Io. App. ' Spauldiug r. HoUenbeck, 39 Barb. 
 577. (X. Y.) SO, 8-t; x>f>^t, § 12r)0, et scq. 
 
 2 Kent V. Miltenberger, 15 Mo. App. ■* Waymau i'. Southard, 10 Wheat. 
 480,489,491. The question is reasoned (U.S.) 1, 48, per Marshall, C. J. 
 
 at considerable leuirth.
 
 884 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoinp, Tr., 
 
 determined by the law of the place of performance. Suppose, 
 in the case of a written contract, it is so framed that the place of 
 performance is left in doubt: Shall the court decide, as a matter 
 of law, Avhere it was to be performed, or submit the question to 
 a jury? In one case it was held that the question, being one of 
 intent, should be submitted to a jury. The action was upon a 
 promissory note made by a husband and wife, who resided in 
 Indiana, to a payee, who resided in Ohio. The husband being 
 indebted to the payde, it was agreed that a note should be given 
 for the amount due, signed by him and his wife, and that the lat- 
 ter should charge her separate e>-tate with its payment. The 
 note in suit was accordingly given, and a clause so binding the 
 property of the wife was inserted. The note was made and de- 
 livered in Indiana, but dated in Ohio, and the place of payment 
 was left in blank. By the laws of Indiana such a note was not 
 binding on the wife, but by the laws of Ohio it was. It was 
 held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the question submitted 
 to the jury, as to the place where the parties intended that the 
 contract should be performed, and whether they contracted with 
 reference to the law of Indiana, or the law of Oliio.^ 
 
 § 1143. Whether or not a Contract is Usurious. — Whether 
 or not a contract is usurious has been held a question of Jaw ; ^, 
 and, upon hypothetical or established facts, the court is to say, 
 in instructing the jury, whether it is usurious or not. But this 
 is true only where the question is one of interpretation, arising 
 on the terms of a written instrument, or upon a state of con- 
 ceded facts. In most cases it will be a mere question of intent, 
 whether the amount reserved or agreed to be paid in excess of 
 the legal rate of interest was widersfood by the parties to be a 
 compensation for forbearance or for the use of money, or whether 
 it was intended as a compensation for some other service.^ It is, 
 therefore, 2H most cases, a question of fact for the jury.^ " The 
 
 1 Shillito V. Reinekiug, 30 Ilim ^ Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 
 (N. Y.),345. 77; Mix v. Madisou lus. Co., 11 lud. 
 
 2 Belden v. Gray, 5 Fla, 504; s. <■. 117, 120; Williams v. Reyuolds, 10 
 3 ria. 110. Md. 57; Duraut v. Banta, 27 N. J. L. 
 
 3 Ante, §§ 1105, 1108; post, § 1333. (i25, (;37; Cuyler v. Sauford, 8 Barb.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXV.] EXPRESS CONTRACTS. 885 
 
 taking of usury," says Monell, J., " must be in pursuance of a 
 corrupt agreement, express or implied ; and it is difficult to con- 
 ceive of a case, tried before a jury, where the judge would be 
 justified in depriving a party of the right of having it passed upon 
 by them, whether theie was such corrupt agreement, especially 
 when it is to be made out from circumstances, and must be de- 
 termined in a great degree by the intent of the parties." ^ It is 
 scarcely necessary to add that, in order to warrant the court in 
 submitting the question whether a particular transaction was a 
 device to evade the statute against usury, there must always be 
 some evidence pi-ima facie raising such inference."^ But such 
 evidence may be wholly circumstantial. Thus, where there was 
 no direct evidence that an usurious agreement was made at the 
 time of the loan, but it was proved that, twenty-two days there- 
 after, the borrower paid and the lender received, for the use of 
 the money from the time of the loan to that date, a sum equal to 
 the interest at a rate much greater than the lawful rate, — it was 
 held a question for the jury whether or not the loan was made 
 upon an usurious agreement. This holding was under a rule that 
 a note given upon an usurious consideration is void.^ 
 
 § 1144. Further of this Subject. — It is said to be quite 
 immaterial in what manner or form, or under what pretense, an 
 usurious contract is cloaked; if the intention is to receive a 
 greater rate of interest than the law allows for the use of money, 
 this will taint the contract with usury ; ^ and whether the trans- 
 
 (N. Y.) 225, 232; Tucker v. Wila- ». Swift, 74 Ga. 595; Cockle v. Flack, 
 
 mouicz, 8 Ark. 157. 93 U. S. 344. 
 
 1 Chatham Bank v. Betts, 9 Bosw. - Williams v. Reynolds, 10 Md. 57, 
 
 (N. Y.) 552, 557. To the same con- 67; Ayrault v. Chamberlain, 33 Barb, 
 
 elusion Is Eobbins v. Dillaye, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 229, 230; White v. Stillman, 25 
 
 (N. Y.) 77, 80; Ayrault v. Chaml)er- N. Y. 541. 
 
 lain, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 229. Compare 3 Catlin v. Gunter, 11 N. Y. 368. 
 
 Whiter. Stillman, 25 N. Y. 541. Thus, ■* "In order to constitute usury, 
 
 it was properly left to the jury to de- there must be a corrupt intent to take 
 
 cide, on all the facts, whether a com- more than the legal rate for the use of 
 
 mission charged for the sale of money loaned." Tyler on Usury, 98, 
 
 produce in connection with a loan of 103, 108. See Bush v. Buckingham, 2 
 
 money, was a cover for usury. Mollis Ventr. 83; Xevison v. Whitley, Cro.
 
 bS6 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOlUp. Tl"., 
 
 action is so intended, when valid on its face, is a question of fact 
 for a Jury.^ Where, however, the question depends merely upon 
 the interpretation of a written instrument, it may be a question 
 for the court. ^ It is said that whether the lender intended to 
 take more than the legal rate of interest is a question of fact, 
 and if it be found that he did, the law annexes to the intention 
 the element of corruption; for ignorance of the law will not 
 excuse in such cases any more than in others.^ The distinction 
 is well stated by Mr. Justice Story thus: "In construing the 
 usury laws, the uniform construction in England has been (and 
 it is equally applicable here), that, to constitute usury within 
 the prohibitions of the law, there nuist be an intention, not only 
 to contract for, but to take usurious interest ; for if neither party 
 intended it, but acted bona fide and innocently, the law will not 
 infer a corrupt agreement. Where, indeed, the contract upon 
 
 Car. 501; Buckley v. Guildbauk, Cro. 
 Jac. 678; New York &c. lus. Co. v. 
 Sturges, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 6(54, 667; 
 Murray v. Harding, 2 Wm. Bl. 859, 
 865; ISTourse v. Prime, 7 Johns. Cli. 
 (N. Y.) 77 ; Bank of U. S. v. Waggener, 
 9 Pet. (U. S.) 378, 399; Button v. 
 Downham, Cro. Eliz. 643 ; Bedingfield 
 V. Ashley, Cro. Eliz. 741; Roberts v. 
 Trenayne, Cro. Jac. 507; Floyer v. 
 Edwards, Cowp. 112; Hammett«. Yea, 
 1 Bos. & Pul. 144; Doe v. Gooch, 3 
 Barn. & Aid. 664; Solarte v. Melville, 7 
 Barn. & Cres. 431; Lloyd v. Scott, 4 
 Pet. (U. S.) 205, 224; Condit v. Bald- 
 win, 21 N. Y. 219; De Forrest v. 
 Strong, 8 Conn. 513, 519; Beckwith v. 
 Windsor Manf. Co., 14 Conn. 594, 606; 
 Belden v. Lamb, 17 Conn. 441, 453; 
 Trotter v. Curtis, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 161; Doak v. Suapp, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 180, 185; Judy v. Gerard, 4 McLean 
 (U. S.), 360; Marvineu. Hymcrs, 12 N. 
 Y. 223, 231, 236; N. Y. Fireman's Ins. 
 Co. V. Ely, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 678; Archi- 
 bald V. Thomas, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 289; 
 Heath 'u. Cook, 7 Allen (Mass.), 59; 
 
 Childers v. Dean, 4 Eand. (Va ) 406; 
 Stockett V. EUicott, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 123; Gibson v. Stearns, 3 N. H. 185, 
 187; Busbee v. Finn, 1 Oh. St. 409; 
 Otto V. Dnrege, 14 Wis. 574; Fay r?. 
 Lovejoy, 20 Wis. 407; Hayward v. Le 
 Baron, 4 Fla. 404; Horton v. Moot, 60 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 27. 
 
 ^Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 
 72, 76; Mitchell v. Napier, 22 Tex. 
 120, 128; Fleming v. Mulligan, 2 
 McCord (S. C), 1"3; Cran v. Hen- 
 dricks, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569, 635; 
 Beckwith v. Windsor Manf. Co., 14 
 Conn. 594, 606; Belden v. Lamb, 17 
 Conn. 441, 453; Seymour v. Marvin, 
 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 80, 83; s. c. allirmed, 
 sub nom. Smith v. Marvin, 27 N. Y. 
 137; Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N. Y. 281, 
 283; Barretto v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 
 (N. Y.) 181; Bobbins v. Dillaye, 33 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 77, 80; Horton v. Moot, 
 60 Barb. 27; Tyler on Usury, 98. 
 
 - Levy i\ Gadsby, 3 Crauch (U. S.), 
 180. 
 
 3 Maine Bank v. Butts, 9 Mass. 49.
 
 Tit. y, Ch. XXXV.] EXPRESS contracts. 887 
 
 its face imports usury, as by an express reservation of more than 
 legal interest, there is no room for presumption, if the intention 
 is apparent; res ipsa loquitur. But where the contract on its 
 face is for legal interest only, then it must be proved that there 
 was some corrupt agreement, or device, or shift, to cover usury, 
 and that it was in the full contemplatiou of the parties. * * * 
 The quo ammo is, therefore, an essential ingredient in all cases of 
 this sort."i It is true, that here, as in cases of negligence, 
 and indeed in other cases, the court will be able to say, in cer- 
 tain states of the evidence, that there is no evidence tending to 
 show usury. 2 On the other hand, in many cases, where the evi- 
 dence is undisputed, or where the case depends upon the con- 
 struction of an instrument of writing, the court will be able to 
 say that the transaction was usurious per se.^ 
 
 1 Bank of U. S. v. Wagsener, 9 Pet. 2 stockett v. Ellicott, 3 Gill & J. 
 
 (U S.) 378, 399; quoted with approval (Md.) 123. 
 in Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219, 221. 3 ^ntg^ § H42.
 
 888 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 IMPLIED PROMISES. 
 
 Section 
 
 1147. Three General Propositions Stated. 
 
 1148. Proposition 1 : That a Coutract-willnotbe Implied Contrary to the Real 
 
 Understanding of the Parties. 
 
 1149. Exception No. 1. 
 
 1150. Exception No. 2. 
 
 1151. Commentary on the Foregoing Proposition. 
 
 1152. Proposition 2 : That a Moral O bligation -uill not of Itself support an 
 
 Implied Promise. 
 
 1153. Illustrations. 
 
 1154. Proposition 3: That a Request is Necessary to raise an Implied 
 
 Promise. 
 
 1155. Observations on this Proposition. 
 
 1156. Further Observations. 
 
 1157. Question of Law or Fact. 
 
 1158. Instructions as to Implied Contract between Members of Family to 
 Pay for Board, etc. 
 
 § 1147. Three General Propositions Stated. — The following 
 propositions are often met with in the books, either stated in 
 terms or assumed as the basis of decision: 1. That a promise 
 will not be implied contrary to the real understanding of the par- 
 ties.^ 2. That a 7noral obligation will not support an implied 
 
 » Page V. Marsh, 36 N. H. 305; Y.) 208; Olney v. Myers, 3 111. 311; 
 
 Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) Robinson v. Cushman, 2 Denio (N. 
 
 473; Harney t'. Owen, 4 Blackf, (In d.) Y.), 149; Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. 
 
 337; Fitch v. Peckham, 16 Vt. 150; (Mass.) 129; Andrews v. Foster, 17 
 
 Griffin v. Potter, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 209 ; Vt. 556 ; Swires v. Parsons, 5 Watts & 
 
 Livingstone. Ackeston, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) S. (Pa.) 357; Guenther v. Birkicht, 22 
 
 531; Urie V. Johnston, 3 Pa. (Penr. & Mo. 439; Gillett v. Camp, 27 Mo. 541; 
 
 W.) 212; Alfred V. Fitzjames, 3 Esp. Coleman v. Roberts, 1 Mo. 97; Morris 
 
 3; Williams -y. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. u. Barnes, 35 Mo. 412. 
 312; Williams v. Finch, 2 Barb. (N.
 
 Tit. V, Ch, XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 
 
 889 
 
 promise,^ and perhcaps not an express promise. ^ 3. That a re- 
 quest is necessary to raise an implied promise.^ It is proposed to 
 consider what these propositions mean and how far they are true. 
 
 § 1148. Proposition 1 : Tliat a Coutract will not be implied 
 contrary to the Real Understanding- of the Parties. — I shall 
 
 i Atkins V. Banwell, 2 East, 505; 
 Edwards v. Davis, 16 Jolms. (N. Y.) 
 281; Bartholomew v. Jacksou, 20 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 28; Dunbar v. Will- 
 iams, .10 Johns. (N. Y.) 28; Dunbar 
 V. Williams, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 2J:9; 
 Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reed, 5 
 Cow. (N. Y.; 587, 602, per Golden, 
 Senator; Ibid. C20, per Spencer, Sen- 
 ator; Wennall v. Adney, 3 Bos. & P. 
 247; Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739; 
 Brooks V. Read, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 380; 
 Everts v. Adams, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 351; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Gow. (N. 
 Y.) 475; Doaue v. Badger, 12 Mass. 
 65; Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575; 
 Erear v. Hardenburg, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 272. 
 
 2 It should seem that, upon a ques- 
 tion so elementary and so necessary to 
 be understood by all men, the law 
 ought to be well settled ; but there is 
 an irreconcilable conflict of opinion 
 among the highest courts and the 
 al)lest judges, whether a moral or a 
 conscientious obligation is of itself a 
 sufficient consideration to support an 
 express promise. In favor of the 
 proposition that it is, we find the dis- 
 tinct opinions of Lord Mansfield (Lee 
 V. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36, 4G), Lord 
 Ellenborough (Atkins v. Banwell, 2 
 East, 505), and Chief Justice Kent. 
 Stewart v. Eden, 2 Gaines (N. Y.), 150. 
 These opinions are supported by con- 
 siderable dicta and perhaps by some ex- 
 press decisions. Adkins v. Hill, Gowp. 
 288; Hawkes v. Saunders, Id. 200: 
 Truemau v. Teuton, Id. 544 ; Scott v. 
 
 Nelson, 1 Esp. N. P. 95; Watson v. 
 Turner, Bull. N. P. 147; Doty v. Wil- 
 son, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 378; McMorris v. 
 Herudon, 2 Bail. Law (S. C.), 56; s. c. 
 21 Am. Dec. 515; Cardwell ■?;. Strother, 
 Lit. Sel. Gas. (Ky.) (S. C.) 429; 12 Am. 
 Dec. 326. Contrary conclusions are to 
 be drawn from the following cases : 
 Bret V. J. S., Gro. Eliz. 755; Harford r. 
 Gardener, 2 Leon. 30; Ehle v. Judson, 
 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 97 ; Smith v. Ware, 13 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 257 ; Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 
 272 ; Frear r. Hardenburg, 5 Johns. (N. 
 Y). 272; Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 
 184; Thome v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 84; Kelbourn v. Bradley, 3 Day 
 (Conn.), 356 ;s.c. 3Am.Dec. 237; Cook 
 V. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; s. c. 18 Am. Dec. 
 79; Nixon v. Vanhise, 2 South. (N. J.) 
 491; s. c. 8 Am. Dec. 618; Greenbaum 
 V. Elliott, 60 Mo. 25. The inquirer 
 who curiously pursues the subject will 
 find it either elucidated or confounded 
 by a comparison of the following de- 
 cisions : Bessich v. Goggill, Palmer 
 (K. B.), 559; Butcher v. Andrews, 
 Garthew, 446 ; Church v. Church, cited 
 in Sir T. Raym. 260 ; Hayes v. Warren, 
 2 Strange, 933; Style v. Smith, cited 
 in 2 Leon. Ill; Barber v. Fox, 2 
 Saund. 136; Hunt v. Swain, 1 Lev, 
 165; s. c. Sir T. Raym. 127; 1 Sid. 
 248; Loydv. Lee, 1 Strange, 94; Cock- 
 shott V. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763. 
 
 * Infra, sec. 4; Schmidt v. Smith, 
 57 Mo. 135; Price v. St. Louis Life 
 Insurance Co., 3 Mo. App. 262; Sloan 
 V. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 58 Mo. 220.
 
 890 PROVINCE OF COUKT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 show: 1. That this proposition however understood, is not uni- 
 versally true. 2. That it is not true in any case in the full sense 
 which the words in which it is couched import. (1.) Whether 
 this proposition is understood in a strict sense according to the 
 import of the words in which it is couched, or in the loose sense 
 which I shall hereafter point out, it is not universally true. Two 
 exceptions cut in upon it so extensively as almost to destroy its 
 character as a rule. The first exception is, that it does not apply 
 where the act out of which the promise is implied is in itself a 
 tort. The second is, that it does not apply in the case of build- 
 ing contracts. 
 
 § 1149. Exception No. 1. — The first of these exceptions in- 
 troduces the well-known princi})le that where A. unjustly, by 
 force or by fraud, ^ gets from B. that which belongs to B. , B. may 
 either sue A. for the tort and recover the damages which he may 
 have suffered, including special or consequential damages where 
 such damages are pleaded and proved, and, in aggravated cases, 
 exemplary damages given by way of punishment and example ; 
 or he may ivaive the tort and recover, as upon a contract, in 
 some cases, the money which A. has received for the thing taken, 
 and in other cases its reasonable value. Thus, if a man wrong- 
 fully takes my goods and chattels and converts them into money, 
 albeit through a larceny,'^ I can waive the tort, sue him on an 
 implied promise and recover the money. ^ A man forcibl}^ ab- 
 
 1 Magoffin V. Muldrow, 12 Mo. 512; v. Smith, Id. 536; Balch v. Patten, 45 
 Walker I'. Davis, 1 Gray (Mass.), 500; Me. 41; Shaw v. Coffin, 58 Id. 254; 
 Boston R. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), Howe v. Claucey, 53 Id. 130; Lord v. 
 «?; Howe V. Clancey, 53 Me. 130. French, 61 Id. 420; Rand v. Nesraith, 
 
 2 Howe V. Clancey, 53 ]\Ie. 130; Id. Ill; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Pa. St. 
 Boston R. Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), 9 ; Goodenow v. Snyder, 3 Greene (la.) , 
 83. 5!);) ; Moses v. Arnold, 43 la. 187 ; Fratt 
 
 , 3 ilambley v. Trott, Cowp. 373; v. Clarii, 12 Cal. 89; Halleck v. Mixer, 
 
 Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 10 Id. 574; Crow v. Boyd, 17 Ahi. 51; 
 
 120; s. c. 22 Am. Dec. 410; Curamin^s Pike v. Bright, 21 Id. 332; Sl.iat v. 
 
 V. Noyes, 70 Mass. 483; Glass Co. v. Evans, 35 111. 455; Center Turnpike 
 
 Walcott, 2 Allen (Mass.), 227; Boston Co. v. Smith, 12 Vt. 212; Stearns v. 
 
 &c. R. Co. V. Dana, 1 Gray (Mass.), Dillingliain,22 Vt. 624; Randolph Iron 
 
 83; Mann v. Locke, 12 N. H. 246; Co. r. Elliott, 37 N. J. L. 184; Budd t'. 
 
 White V. Brooks, 43 N. II. 402; Smith Ililer, 27 Id. 43; Ilutton v. Wetherald,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI. ] IMPLIED PROMISES. 
 
 891 
 
 ducts, or entices away, or knowingly harbors and conceals my 
 child (the same being my servant) or my apprentice; I can 
 maintain an action for the tort^ and recover, not only direct 
 compensatory damages, but also indirect or consequential damages 
 where the same are laid and proved,^ and also exemplary damages 
 
 5 Harr. (Del.) 38; Watsou v. Stever, 
 
 25 Mich. 38(1; Nordeu v. Joues, 33 Wis. 
 600; Stockett v. Watkins, 2 Gill & J. 
 (Md.) 326; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 428. The 
 doctrine seems to be iu great con- 
 fusion, as will appear by a learned 
 note of Mr. Freeman in 31 Am. Dec. 
 242, et seq. The incongruity of the 
 common law is such that if a man 
 tortiously gets possession of my house, 
 and holds it adversely to me, I cannot 
 waive the tort and recover on an im- 
 plied promise for use and occupation. 
 Lloyd V. Hough, 1 How. (U. S.) 160; 
 Stockett V. AYatkins, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 326; s. c. 20 Am. Dec. 438; Smith v. 
 Stewart, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 46; s. c. 5 
 Am. Dec. iSo; Fitzgeralfl v. Beebe, 7 
 Ark. 305; s. c. 46 Am. Dec. 285; Hen- 
 wood V. Cheeseman, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 500; Hayes v. Acre, Cam. & M. 19; 
 Stuart V. Fitch, 2 Vroom (N. J.), 17; 
 Hallu. Southmayd, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 32; 
 Moore v. Hai-vey, 50 Vt. 297; Osgood 
 V. Dewey, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 2iO; Gunn 
 V. Scovil, 4 Day (Conn.). 228; Couch 
 V. Briles, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 257; 
 Estep V. Estep, 23 Ind. 114; Nance v. 
 Alexander, 48 Id. 516; Dalton v. Lan- 
 dahn, 30 Mich. 349; Edmoudson v. 
 Kite, 43 Mo. 176; Sylvester v. Rawls- 
 ton, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 286; Newby v. 
 Vestal, 6 Ind, 412; Redden v. Barker, 
 4 Harr. (Del.) 179; Williams v. Hollis, 
 19 Ga. 313; Dudding v. Hill, 15 HI. 61 ; 
 NcNair v. Schwartz, 16 Id. 24; Dixon 
 V. Haley, Id. 145; Boston v. Binuey, 11 
 Pick. (Mass.) 1; Scales v. Anderson, 
 
 26 Miss. 94; Cohen v. Kyler, 27 Mo. 
 122; Brewer v. Craig, 18 N. J. L. 214; 
 
 Stewart v. Fitch, 31 Id. 17; Hurd v. 
 Miller, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 540; Campbell 
 V. Reuwick, 2 Bradf. (N. Y.) 80; Coit 
 V. Planer, 4 Abb. Pr. (x. s.) (N. Y.) 
 140; LaForge v. Park, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 (N. Y.) 223; Pierce v. Pierce, 25 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 243; Espy v. Fenton, 5 Ore, 
 423; Langford v. Green, 52 Ala. 108; 
 Folsom V. Carli, 6 Miuu. 420; Ryan v. 
 Marsh, 2 Nott & M. (S. C.) 156; Wig- 
 gins V. Wiggins, 6 N. H, 298; Richey 
 V. Hinde, 6 Ohio, 371 ; Howe v. Russell, 
 41 Me. 446; Sampson v. Shaeffer, 3 
 Cal. 196; O'Connor v. Corbitt, Id. 370; 
 Cincinnati v. Walls,-! Ohio St. 222; 
 Wiiarton v. Fitz Gerald, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 
 503; Byrd v. Chase, 10 Ark. G02; East- 
 man V. Haward, 30 Me. 58; Curtis v. 
 Treat, 21 Id. 525; Croswell v. Crane, 
 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 191 ; Watson v. Brain- 
 ard, 33 Vt. 88 ; Ramirez v. Murrey, 5 
 Cal. 222, 
 
 1 Gilbert v. Schwenck, 14 Mees, & 
 W. 488; Magee v. Holland, 27 N, J, L. 
 86 ; Plummer v. Webb, 4 Mason (U. S.) , 
 380; Steele v. Thatcher, 1 Ware (U. 
 S.), 91 ; Evans v. Walton, L. R. 2 C, P. 
 615; s, c, 36 L.J. (C. P.) 307; Stowe y. 
 Haywood, 7 Allen (Mass.), 118; Wood 
 V. Coggeshall, 2 Met. (Mass.) 89; 
 Caughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244; Blake 
 V. Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221 ; Sykes v. Dixon, 
 9 Ad. & El. 693; Pilkington v. Scott, 
 15 Mees. & W. 657; Hartley v. Cum- 
 mings, 5 C. B. 248. 
 
 2 Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, 
 12; Flemington v. Sraithers, 2 Car. & 
 P. 292 ; Wilt V. Vickers, 8 Watts (Pa.), 
 227; Magee v. Holland, 27 X. J. L. 86.
 
 892 PEOViNCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 given as a punishment and for mental suffering ; ^ or I can waive 
 the tort and sue as upon a contract for the vahie of the services 
 of the child or apprentice while so kept away.^ In all these 
 cases the law raises the implication of a contract, although no 
 contract was intended by either party. It raises it on the prin- 
 ciple of an estoppel. It allows the plaintiff to assert it, and pro- 
 hibits the defendant from denying it, although it is not true. It 
 will not permit the defendant to deny it, because it will not per- 
 mit him to avoid a right of action founded in plain iustice, by 
 proving his own wrong. ^ 
 
 § 1150. Exception Xo. 2. — The second exception, that which 
 arises in the case of building contracts^ is equally marked. A. 
 contracts with B. to build a house upon the land of the latter, 
 according to certain plans and specifications. A., endeavoring 
 in good faith to complete the contract, fails to complete it, or 
 fails to complete it according to the specifications, or fails to 
 complete it within the time agreed upon. Nevertheless, as B. 
 has received benefit from the labor and materials of A., the law 
 implies a neio promifie on his part to pay to A. what they are 
 reasonably worth,* less the damage which B. may have sustained 
 
 1 Magee v. Holland, 27 N. J. L. 8G; ard, 109 Mass. 192; Moulton v. Mc- 
 Stowe V. Haywood, 7 Allen (Mass.), Owen, 103 Mass. 587; Bragg u. Town 
 118. of Bradford, 33 Vt. 35; Dyer v. Jones, 
 
 2 Lightly V. Clanston, 1 Taunt. 112. 8 Vt. 205; Brackett v. Morse, 23 Vt. 
 
 3 Lightly t?. Claustou, 1 Taunt. 112. 354; Morrison v. Curamiugs, 26 Vt. 
 ^ Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 48G; Hubbard «. Belden, 27 Vt. 645; 
 
 (Mass.) 181; s. c. 19 Am. Dec. 268; Barker v. Troy &c. K. Co., Id. 780; 
 
 Smith V. First Congregational Meet- Swift v. Harriman, 30 Vt. 607; Kettle 
 
 ing House, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 178 ; Jewell v. Harvey, 21 Vt. 301 ; Corwin v. Wai- 
 
 V. Schroeppel, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 5(14; lace, 17 la. 378; Tait v. Sherman, 10 
 
 Hayden v. Madison, 7 Me. 78; Lee v. La. 60; Phelps v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 
 
 Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378; s. c. 55 Am. (Mass.) 50; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 659; 
 
 Dec. 110; Marsh v. Pilchards, 29 Mo. Norris v. School District No. 1, 12 
 
 105; Lowe V. Sinclair, 27 Mo. 310; Me. 293; s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 182; Mcr- 
 
 Lamb v. Brolaski, 38 Mo. 53; Creamer rill v. Ithaca &c. E. Co., 16 Wend. 
 
 V. Bates, 49 Mo. 525; Yeates ?7. Ballon- (N. Y.) 586; Shipton v. Casson, 5 
 
 tine, 56 Mo. 530; Cullcu v. Sears, 112 Barn. & Cres. 378; Sinclair «. Bowles, 
 
 Mass. 299, 308; Walker v. Orange, 16 9 Barn. & Cres. 92. Mr. Freeman, the 
 
 Gray (Mass.), 193; Cordell v. Bridge, learned editor of the American Decis- 
 
 9 Allen (Mass.), 355; Powell t;. How- ions, has contributed a valuable note-
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 893 
 
 through the breach of the express contract which subsisted be- 
 tween the parties; i which contract, breach, and consequent dam- 
 age, may be pleaded by B. as a counter-claim to the action of 
 A.2 This principle is extended in some jurisdictions to contracts 
 to perform labor or furnish materials other than buildino- con- 
 tracts,^ and in some jurisdictions it is denied as to building con- 
 tracts.4 It is perceived that, where the rule as to birildincr 
 contracts prevails, it results in this: That the law allows a party 
 to recover upon an implied promise which did not exist in fact, 
 and which is distinctly variant from the terms of a written con- 
 tract which did exist. 
 
 § 1151. Commentary on the foregoing Proposition. — Hav- 
 ing thus shown that the proposition that a contract cannot be 
 implied contrary to the real understanding of the parties is not 
 universally true, I shall next show that the proposition is not 
 true in any case in the full sense which the words in which it is 
 couched import. Indeed, this must be apparent from what has 
 
 on the subject of these contracts (19 
 Am. Dec. 272, 282) in which he con- 
 cludes that " this doctrine seems to be 
 recognized, or to be growing in favor. 
 "Where, under a special contract, a 
 party has in good faith bestowed some 
 labor or parted with some articles to 
 the beneflt of another, who has as a 
 matter of fact enjoyed the beneflt of 
 the labor or the articles, whether vol- 
 untarily or involuntarily, and where 
 the incomplete performance has not 
 been the result of the party's own pro- 
 voking, or of causes which he might, 
 with ordinary diligence, have-provided 
 against, tlie one receiving such bene- 
 fit must pay therefor." 
 
 1 Sickles V. Pattison, U Wend, 
 (N. Y.) 257; s. c. 28 Am. Dec. 527; 
 Pettee v. Tenn. Manufacturing Co., 1 
 Sneed (Tenn.), 38G; Crouch v. Miller, 5 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 586; Stump v. Estill, 
 Peck (Tenn.), 175; Irwin v. Bell, 1 
 Tenn. 485; Yeats i\ Ballentiue, 5G Mo. 
 
 530; Williams w. Porter, 51 Mo. 441; 
 Eyerman v. Mt. Sinai Cemetery Asso.^ 
 61 Mo. 489; Ahern v. Boyce, 19 Mo. 
 App. 552; Austin v. Keating, 21 Mo. 
 App. 30. 
 
 2 Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481; 
 s. c. 26 Am. Dec. 713. Compare Mar- 
 shall V. Jones, 11 Me. 54. 
 
 s Porter v. Woods, 3 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 56; s. c. 39 Am. Dec. 153; 
 Eldridge v. Rowe, 7 111. 91; s. c. 43 
 Am. Dec. 41 ; Britton v. Turner, 6 N. 
 H. 481; s. c. 26 Am. Dec. 713; McClay 
 V. Hedge, 18 la. 66. Compare Larkiu 
 V. Buck, 11 Oh. St. 568. 
 
 * Smith V. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173 
 (compare Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 
 145; Sinclair v. Talmadge, 35 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 602; Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. 
 
 Y. 256, 264) ; Erwin v. Ingram, 24 N. 
 
 J. L. 519; Haslack v. Mayers, 26 N. J. 
 
 L. 284; School Trustees v. Bennett, 
 
 27 N. J. L. 513; Brown v. Fitch, 33 N. 
 
 J. L. 418.
 
 894 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 just been said with regard to building contracts. Here the par- 
 ties have entered into a contract in which everything which is to 
 be done is specified with minute detail. There is no defect in 
 the real understanding of the parties. The contract is not 
 performed as made, and yet a recovery is allowed for a partial 
 performance. But it does not follow that the law has allowed a 
 recovery upon an implied promise which is totally oj-)posed to the 
 intention of the parties ; for such contracts do not import that if, 
 after a bona fide effort at performance, something is left undone, 
 nothing shall be paid for what has been done. This is not what 
 the rule means. It means that no recovery can be had upon an 
 implied assumpisit which is entirely opposed to the understanding 
 of the parties. It means that, where the parties have made one 
 contract for themselves, the law cannot make a totally different 
 contract for them, and one which would lead to results totally 
 opposed to those which they contemplated. This is well illus- 
 trated by a class of cases where persons occupy towards 
 each other, by consent, the relation of pctrent and cJiild. A 
 father is not liable at law to support his adult son or daughter, 
 nor entitled to his or her services. The same may be said of a 
 step-father in respect of his step-child ; of an uncle in respect of 
 his nephew or niece, and so on; and yet, if the latter come to 
 live with the former, and live in his family for years as a child 
 lives with its parents, rendering services, and receiving in return 
 shelter, clothing and subsistence, without any distinct contract as 
 to wages, the latter cannot hereafter recover wages of the for- 
 mer, or of his executor or administrator, although the value of 
 the services rendered may have been greater than the value of 
 the shelter, clothing and subsistence received; and the reason is 
 that, for the law to raise such a promise would be to raise a 
 promise directly opposed to the obvious understanding of the 
 parties.^ So, where a slave voluntarily continues in his master's 
 
 1 Eobinson v. Cushmau, 2 Deu. held in Massachusetts that a mau who 
 
 (N. Y.) 149; Guild r;. Guild, 15 Pick. supports his wife's child by a former 
 
 (Mass.) 129; Fitch v. Peckhara, 16 Vt. husband may maintain an action 
 
 150; Andrus v. Foster, 17 Vt. 556; anaiust such child, upon an implied 
 
 Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312. assumpsit, for necessaries furuished 
 
 Contrary to this principle, it has been the latter. Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 
 
 895 
 
 service after being entitled to his freedom, and renders services 
 and is supplied with necessaries, without an understanding that 
 he is to receive wages, he cannot recover them on an implied 
 assumpsit,^ though it is otherwise w^here he is held involuntarily. ^ 
 So, it has been held that, if an apprentice continue in the service 
 of his master under voidable indentures, he cannot thereafter 
 recover wages contrary to the covenants of the indentures.^ But 
 this is very doubtful; for an " understanding" with an infant y 
 is not the same as an understanding with a person who is sui juris. 
 It is the privilege of infancy to avoid contracts not clearly for 
 the infant's benefit; and, accordingly, the better opinion seems 
 to be that the infant may, in such a case, disafiirm the contract of 
 apprenticeship, abandon the service, and sue for the reasonable 
 value of his services.^ 
 
 § 1152. Proposition 2 : That a Moral Obligation will not of 
 itself Support an Implied Promise. — It must occur to the phi- 
 losophical mind that, in any correct system of laws, no substan- 
 
 G75, per Parsons, C. J. ; Worcester v. 
 Marchaut, 14 Tick. (Mass.) 510. But 
 this is denied in Missouri. Gillett v. 
 Camp, 27 Mo. 541. And see Cooper 
 V. Martin, 4 East, 76; Gay v. Ballon, 
 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403. Under special 
 circumstances, a widowed mother 
 has been allowed to maintain a 
 like action against her daughter for 
 support during her minority. Wor- 
 cester V. Marchaut, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 
 510. 
 
 1 Griffin v. Potter, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 209; Livingston v. Ackeston, 5 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) 531 ; Urie v. Johnston, 3 Pa. 
 (Peur. & W.) 212; Alfred v. Fitzjames, 
 3 East, 3. 
 
 2 Peter v. Steel, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 
 250. 
 
 3 Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 473; Harney v. Owen, 4 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 337. Spe, in support of this 
 principle. Weeks v. Leighton, 5 N. H. 
 343; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 84 (overruled in Medbury v. Wat- 
 rous, 7 Plill (N. Y.), 110). 
 
 ■> Ventr. Osgood, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 
 572; Moses V. Stevens, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 
 332. See also Corpe v. Overton, 10 
 Bing. 252 (overruling, it seems, 
 Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508; s. c. 
 2 J. B. Moore, 552; dictum of Lord 
 Mansfield in Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden, 
 39 ; s. c. Wilmot's Opinions, 22('>, note 
 rt); Oluey V. Myers, 3 111. 311. The 
 nature of implied promises is curiously 
 illusti'ated by the rule that, while an 
 infant can, with certain exceptions, 
 avoid his express contract, he cannot 
 avoid his implied promise; which 
 shows that an implied promise is no 
 contract at all. Thus, an infant's tort 
 can be waived and assumpsit main- 
 tained against hira under the same 
 circumstances as in case of an adult. 
 Elwell V. Martin, 32 Vt. 217; Shaw «. 
 Coffin, 58 Me. 254; Walker v. Davis, 1 
 Gray (Mass.), 500.
 
 896 PROVINCE OF. COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 tial distinction should exist between moral and legal obligations, 
 but that, whatever a man is bound in conscience, or according to 
 o-ood morals or good usage, to do for the "reparation of another, 
 the law ought to compel him to do at the suit of that other. It 
 is, perhaps, the greatest reproach upon the common law, which 
 was made by our ancestors when they were barbarians, that it 
 exhibits in many instances a wide divergence between legal and 
 moral obligations. It traveled in narrow and unbending grooves ; 
 its rio-id technicality expelled conscience from the administration 
 of justice, and created the necessity for another court and a sup- 
 plementary system of jurisprudence, which should lind the means 
 to compel the doing of right, where the common law sanctioned 
 or permitted the doing of wrong. The doctrine that a moral ob- 
 ligation is not of itself sufficient to raise an implied promise, is 
 laid down aaain and aijainin books of the common law. I recall 
 but one case where it has been distinctly denied. A master drove 
 his female slave from his house half naked, shockingly beaten, 
 and having an iron weighing fifteen pounds attached to her foot. 
 The plaintiff, from motives of humanity, took the slave to his 
 house, clothed, fed, cared for and cured her, against the protests 
 of the master, who declared that he would not pay the plaintiff 
 for his services, but would sue him for harboring his slave. Nev- 
 ertheless, the plaintiff sued the master in assumpsit and recov- 
 ered the value of his services, on the ground that the moral 
 obligation of the master to provide for his slave w^as sufficient to 
 raise an implied promise to indemnify the plaintiff, although con- 
 trary to his express declarations.^ This Avas a nisi prius decision, 
 and not of high authority. It undoubtedly reached the right 
 result, but gave an erroneous reason for it. The true reason 
 was, that a master is bound to furnish necessaries for his slave, 
 just as a father is for his child, or a master for his apprentice; 
 that this obligation is not only a moral but a legal obligation ; 
 and that it is the legal obligation which raises the promise and not 
 merely the moral obligation. These suggestions, perhaps, con- 
 duct us to the true rule ; it is, that a moral obligation is not a 
 
 1 Fail-child v. Bell, 2 Brcv. (S. C.) 129; s. c. 27 Am. Dec. 702.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 897 
 
 sufficient ground in law for implying a promise, except in those 
 cases where the leo;al oblio-ation moves forward to the line of the 
 moral oblio-ation and concurs with it. The rule then is, that a 
 tnoral obligation ivhich is not a legal obligation is not sufficient 
 to support an implied promise. This rule is necessarily and uni- 
 versally true ; for the reason that an implied promise is nothing 
 more nor less than a leo-al oblio-ation, and therefore the moral ob- 
 ligation which will raise such a promise must necessarily also be 
 a legal obligation. 
 
 § 1153. Illustratious. — A son is under the strongest moral 
 obligation to support his infirm and indigent parents, but as he 
 is under no leg-al obligation to do so, the law will not raise a 
 promise on his part to do so.^ So, a father may be under the 
 strongest moral obligation to support his adult indigent child, 
 but clearl}^ a promise to do so will not be implied ; because this 
 moral obligation has been held not sufficient to support an express 
 promise to pay expenses previously incurred on behalf of such a 
 child.'* So, parish officers may be under a moral obligation to 
 support their indigent poor, who happen to fall sick or receive 
 wounds while temporarily sojourning in another parish. But 
 they are under no legal obligation to do so ; and if such a pauper 
 receives assistance from such other parish, no action can be sus- 
 tained against the officers of the former parish for reimburse- 
 ment.^ 
 
 ^ Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. (N. sick among strangers, and, being poor 
 
 Y.) 281. A son being under no legal and in distress, was relieved by the 
 
 obligation to pay debts contracted by plaintiff. Afterwards the father wrote 
 
 his indigent father for the latter's to the plaintiff promising to pay him 
 
 necessary support, his written prom- the expenses incurred. It was held 
 
 ise to pay such debts is without con- that tliis promise would not sustain 
 
 sideration, and therefore iucapal>le of an action. Mills v. Wymau, 3 Pick, 
 
 being enforced in law. Cook r. Brad- (Mass.) 207. 
 
 ley, 7 Conn. 57; s. c. 18 Am. Dec. ^ Atkins v. Banwell, 2 East, 505; 
 
 79. Wenuall v. Adney, 3 Bos. & P. 2i7 
 
 ^ Thus, a sou who was of full age (overruling Simmons v. Wilmott, 3 
 
 and had ceased to be a member of his Esp. 91, and Scarmanv. Castell, 1 Esp. 
 
 father's familjj was suddenly taken 270).
 
 898 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1154. Proposition 3 : That a Request is Necessary to Raise 
 an Implied Promise. — As a, general rule, a man cannot make 
 another man his debtor, without the consent of that other before 
 or after the fact. If, therefore, one gratuitously or officiously 
 do something which he may regard as beneficial to another, the 
 law will not impV a promise on the part of that other to pay 
 for it ; ^ unless, having power either to keep or reject the benefit 
 conferred, he elects to keep it ; in which case he may be held 
 liable to pay for it, on a principle somewhat similar to that upon 
 which a party is often held to have ratified an unauthorized act 
 done professedly on his behalf. The general rule is said to be 
 that a request is necessary to raise an implied promise. ^ It has 
 been so held where the plaintiff rendered services necessary to 
 save the defendant's property from destruction by fire; ^ where 
 the plaintiff, a physician, administered medicine to the defend- 
 ant's slave, in a case not of pressing necessity ; * where the parish 
 officer furnished surgical assistance to the defendant's servant 
 .who had sustained an accident; ^ where the plaintiff and defend- 
 ant were tenants in common of a building, and the plaintiff made 
 repairs, but not at the request of the defendant ; ^ where the 
 plaintiff without the request of the defendant, repaired a w^ell 
 and pump situated on the land of the defendant, which the 
 plaintiff cUiimed the privilege of using; ^ where the plaintiff, 
 owning the upper, and the defendant the lower fioor of a house, 
 
 1 Watkius V. Trustees, 41 Mo. 303; 2 Esp. 739; Brooks v. Read, 13 Johus. 
 Bailey v. Gibbs, C Mo. 4.5; Joues v. (N. Y.) 380; Everts v. Adams, 12 
 Wilson, 3 Joliiis. (N. Y.) 434; Beach Johns. (N". Y.) 352. 
 
 V. Vaudenburg, 10 Johns. (jST. Y.) SGI; ^ g.^i.ti^oloi^-ie^ u_ .Jackson, 20 
 
 Stokes V. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20; Child v. Johus. (N. Y.) 2S. 
 
 Morley, 8 T. R.G13; AVinsorw. Savage, * Duubar v. Williams, 10 Johns. 
 
 8 T. R. 290; Lewis v. Lewis, 8 Strobh. (N. Y.) 249. 
 
 L. (S. C.) 530. 5 Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739. 
 
 2 Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 ^ Mumfordv. Brown, GCow. (N. Y.) 
 Johus. (N. Y.) 28 ; Dunbar v. Williams, 475. A tenant in common at common 
 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 249; Rensselaer law, may compel his co-tenant to join 
 Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) him in making repairs, by writ cle 
 587, G02, per Colden, Senator; 76tVZ. 620, raparatiow, faciendn, which remedy 
 per Spencer, Senator; Weuuall v. Ad- prolxiljly still survives in some form, 
 ney, 3 Bos. & P. 247; Atkins v. Ban- ^ Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. G5 
 w^ell, 2 East, 505; Newby v. AViltshire,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 
 
 899 
 
 repaired the roof, after requesting the defendant to join him in 
 it, whicli the latter refused to do;^ where the overseers of the 
 poor of one town assisted a pauper belonging to another town, 
 he being so sick that he could not be removed to such other 
 town;*'^ where a physician furnished medicine to a pauper, but 
 not at the request of the overseers of the poor, and then sued 
 them for payment ; ^ and where the plaintiff rendered particular 
 services as a mere kindness to the defendant, without any ex- 
 pectation of being paid therefor.^ But where the plaintiff ren- 
 dered services to the defendants, intending that they should be 
 gratuitous,^ or relying upon the generosity of the latter for com- 
 pensation ; ^ or rendered services in the mere expectation of being 
 compensated by a legacy,^ it was held that he could not recover 
 compensation for them. 
 
 1 Loring v. Bacou, 4 Mass. 575. 
 
 2 Brooks V. Read, 13 ,Tohus. (N. Y ) 
 380; Weuuall v. Aduey, 3 Bos. & P. 
 247 (overruling Simmous v. Wilmott, 
 3 Esp. 91, and Scarmau v, Castell, 1 
 Esp. 270) ; Atkins v. Banwell, 2 East, 
 505, Compare Wing v. Mill, 1 Barn. & 
 Aid. 104. 
 
 3 Evertsu. Adams, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 352. But where a person has, at the 
 request of an overseer of the poor, and 
 on his promise that he would see him 
 paid, boarded a pauper, he may main- 
 tain assumpsit tlierefor against the 
 overseer, although uo order has been 
 made for the relief of the pauper. 
 Kingv. Butler, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 281. 
 Compare Palmer v. Vandenburg, 3 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 193; Fox t?. Drake, 8 
 Cow. (N. Y.) 191; Minklaer V. Rock- 
 feller, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 276 ; Gourley v. 
 Allen, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 644; Flower v. 
 Allen, Id. 654; Olney v. Wickes, 18 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 122. 
 
 * James V. O'Driscoll, 2 Bay (S. C), 
 101; s. c. 1 Am. Dec. 632. 
 
 5 Gore V. Summersoll, 5 Monr. 
 (Ky.) 513; Whaley v. Peak, 49 Mo. 80; 
 Asbury v. Flesher, 11 Mo. 610. 
 
 ^ Jacob V. Ursuline Nuns, 2 Mart. 
 (La.) 2(i9; s. c. 5 Am. Dec. 730. 
 
 ' Little V. Dawson, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 
 Ill; Osborne v. Governors of Guy's 
 Hospital, 2 Stra. 728; Le Sage v. 
 Coussmaker, '1 Esp. 187; Plume v. 
 Plume, 7 Ves. 258 ; Lee v. Lee, 6 Gill & 
 J. (Md.) 316. Compare Patterson v. 
 Patterson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 379; Gary 
 V. James, 4Desau. (S.C.) 185; Roberts 
 V. Swift, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 209. But if, 
 in such a case, both parties really in- 
 tended that the services should be 
 compensated in some way, an action 
 upon a quantum meruit pro opere et 
 labore will lie ; and whether or not they 
 so intended is a question of fact for a 
 juiy or other trier of facts. Osborne 
 V. Governors of Guy's Hospital, 2 
 Stra. 728; Jacobsou v. LeGrauge, 3 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 199; Le Sage v. Couss- 
 maker, 3 Esp. 187; Higginsouv.Fabre, 
 3 Desau. 88, 91; Shakspeare v. Mark- 
 ham, 10 Hun (N. Y.), 322, 326; s. c. in 
 Court of Appeals, 72 N. Y. 400, 406; 
 Robinson v. Raynor, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 131 ; s. c. in Court of Appeals, 28 N. Y. 
 497; Quackenbush v. Ehle, 5 Barb. 
 ' (N. Y.) 472; Campbell v. Campbell, 65
 
 900 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOUip. Tl'., 
 
 § 1155. Observations ou this Proposition. — A request being 
 necessary to the existence of an implied promise, it follows that, 
 in counting upon such a promise, the pleader must allege a re- 
 quest,* or at least, it must appear that the jDarty promising was 
 under a legal obligation to do the ;ict himself, or to procure it to 
 be done.^ And here again, we find ground for the conclusion 
 that this rule, that a request is necessary to support an implied 
 promise, is not of universal api^lication ; for we find that, under 
 certain states of fact, the request itself will be implied.'^ This, 
 however, is not a presumption of law, but a conclusion of fact to 
 be drawn from the evidence in particular cases. But, like most 
 other facts, it maybe proved by circumstantial evidence; and 
 the beneficial nature of the services, though not enough when 
 standing alone, may be very important in a chain of circum- 
 stances tending: to establish such a conclusion.* 
 
 §1156. Further Observations. — It may be added to the 
 foregoing that the law will never imply a promise contrary to 
 the manifest justice of the case.^ Indeed, this whole doctrine 
 of implied promises appears to have been originally a fiction of 
 law, devised for the purpose of reaching substantial justice. The 
 law^ in its development has passed through the age of fiction, and 
 it is submitted that it is time to call this doctrine by another 
 name. There can be no such thing as an implied promise. The 
 very term involves a contradiction. The particular i:)romise either 
 was made by the party sought to be charged, or was not made by 
 him. If it was made by him, it is matter to be pleaded and 
 proved, like any other fact. I have shown that the doctrine in- 
 
 Barb. (N. Y.) ^'-t*; Martin w. "Wright, 3 gee Fairchild v. Bell, 2 Brev. 
 
 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 4110; s. c. 28 Am. (S. C.) 129; s. c. 27 Am. Dec. 702. 
 
 Dec. 4f.8. ^ Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 * Duruford r. Messiter, 5 Maule & 97, 99; Hicks v. Burlians, 10 Jolms. 
 
 S. 440. (N. Y.) 243; Oatfield v. Waring, 14 
 
 2 Comstock V. Smitli, 7 Jolms. Johns. (N. Y.) 188; 1 Saund. Tl. & Ev. 
 
 (N. Y.) 87; Parker v. Crane, 6 Wend. 2G4, n. 1., See also Doty v. Wilson, 14 
 
 (N. Y.) 647; Hicks v. Burhaus, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 378. 
 
 Johns. (N. Y). 243; Livingston v. ^ W^eir v. Weir, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 
 PiOgers, 1 Caines (N. Y.), 583. G45; Skeen v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 24.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 901 
 
 volves the absurdity of creating a fictitious promise where no 
 promise whatever was made, where a different promise was 
 made, and where there was an entire repudiation of the promise 
 which the Liw created. What, then, is the real substance of this 
 doctrine? It is not that the hiw creates a promise where none 
 existed, or where a different one existed, for that would be im- 
 possible and absurd; but it is that the law raines a duty or 
 creates an obligation. Ought we not, then, to abolish this worn- 
 out nomenclature, ajid in its stead to speak of \A\q duty or obli- 
 gation which the law creates and enforces in the situations named ? 
 If the common law should ever be codified, and the words " im- 
 plied promise " or " implied assumpsit " should be found in the 
 code, they would be a monument of reproach to its authors. 
 
 § 1157. Question of Law or Fact. — Whether the law, under 
 given circumstances, implies a promise is for tJie courts and not 
 for the jury ; since the jury are not judges of the law ; ^ but where 
 the law does not imply the promise, it is a question for the jury ^ 
 what the parties really intended? Thus, a step-father is under 
 no legal obligation to support a step-son ; but where the step- 
 son lives in the family of the step-father and labors for him 
 as his own son would do, without any express understand- 
 ing as to the terms upon which he so resides and labors with 
 the latter, the law implies neither a promise on the part of the 
 step-father to pay the step-son for his services, nor a prom- 
 ise on the part of the step-son to pay the step-father for his sup- 
 port ; but it is assumed that the parties intended that the parental 
 relation should exist between them.^ But in such a case, it may 
 be a question for the jury upon the facts, whether the step-son 
 was living Avith the step-father upon his hospitality, as children 
 ordinarily live with their parents.* In an action of assumpsit 
 against a married ivoman, evidence that the plaintiff furnished 
 materials and labor on the defendant's house, held by her in her 
 
 1 Prickett v. Badger, 37 Eug. L. & ^ ^,j^e^ § 1154^ l^igt ^ote. 
 
 Eq. 428 (overruling, it seems, ou this * Ante, § 1151. 
 
 point, De Eernardy v. Harding, 8 Exch. * Myers v. Malcolm, 20 111. G21. 
 
 822). Compai-e Planch v. Colburu, 8 
 Biug. 14.
 
 902 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tboilip. Tl'., 
 
 own right, at the request of her husband, with no request on her 
 part, but with her knowledge and consent, is not conclusive, in 
 law, of a promise by her to pay for such labor and materials, but 
 is evidence from which the jury may find such a promise. ^ On 
 a similar theory, it has been held that a written acknowledgment 
 of A., who is in the occupation of land, that he holds it as the 
 tenant of B., does not raise a presumption of law that he 2^'^^'^^'^- 
 ises to j^ciy rent, nor transfer from B. to A. the burden of proof 
 on the question of fact whether the understa^iiding was that rent 
 should be paid. " From the defendant's occupation and ac- 
 knowledged tenancy, the law does not imply a }iromise to pay 
 rent. The question whether there was such a promise, is a ques- 
 tion of fact." 2 
 
 § 1158. Instructions as to Implied Contract between Members of 
 Family to pat for Board, etc. — "If the jury find from the evidence 
 that the defendant has lived in the family of the plaintiff and has had her 
 boarding and washing done and furnished by the plaintiff and his family, 
 and that there was no contract or agreement between the plaintiff and 
 defendant, and as to how much defendant should pay plaintiff for said 
 boarding and washing, then I charge you that the law is, that there was 
 an implied contract that the defendant was to pay plaintiff what said 
 boarding and washing were reasonably worth for the time said defend- 
 ant so boarded at plaintiff's house ; and you will so find for plaintiff such 
 reasonable compensation, not to exceed the amount claimed in plaintiff's 
 petition. The rule above applies, unless the jury find from the evidence 
 that defendant lived with her son as a [)art of his family." ^ - - - - " If 
 
 1 Bickford v. Dane, 58 N. H. 185. factory in a certain state of society, 
 
 2 Savings Bank r. Getchell, 55 N. H. tliey did not hesitate, by legal pre- 
 281, 285. In giving the opinion of the sumptions and other measures, to ex- 
 court, Doe, G. J., also reasons thus: teusively control the jury iu the 
 " The practice of shifting the burden decision of questions of fact. The 
 of proof by a legal presumption is tendency iu this State is toward a cor- 
 largely abandoned iu this State. It rectiou of those errors, and the es- 
 often materially encroached upon the tablishment and observauce of the 
 province of the jury, but caused less true line between law and fact, and 
 injustice when parties were not al- between the duty of the court and the 
 lowed to testify than it would now. duty of the jury." 
 
 "Wlien courts assumed the power of ■" Approved in GreenwcU v. Green- 
 
 excluding the testimony of the parties, well, 28 Kans. pp. 078, G79. 
 for reasons allesjed to have been satis-
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVI.] IMPLIED PROMISES. 903 
 
 the jury find from the evidence that the defendant is the mother of the 
 plaintiff, and that, for the time mentioned in plaintiff's petition, the de- 
 fendant lived with the plaintiff as one of his f amil}-, assisting in perform- 
 Ingthe ordinary duties of the household, and there was no express contract 
 that the defendant was to pay for her board and washing, and no un- 
 derstanding by either party that such board and washing were to be 
 paid for, then I charge that, as between mother and son, there is no im- 
 plied promise to pay for such board and washing, and the plaintiff can- 
 not recover in this case." i " Usually when one person performs 
 
 services or labor for another, which is of value, the law implies a prom- 
 ise or legal obligation on the part of the person receiving the service 
 to pay what such services are reasonably worth. Yet this is not always 
 the case. When, from the circumstances and situation of the parties, 
 it could not reasonably be expected that either party could suppose or 
 apprehend there was anything to be paid or received, and did not so 
 understand at the time, then the law does not imply any legal obliga- 
 tion to pay. If you find from the evidence that defendant, at the 
 
 request of a friend of the plaintiff, when the plaintiff was a child of 
 five or six years old, took him into his family and nurtured and cared 
 for him when he was too young to provide for himself, and he remained 
 there as a member of the familj^ of defendant, and, when he became of 
 suflficient age, performed service and labor for defendant, and continued 
 to receive his board and clothes, and continued to make the defendant's 
 house his home, then, for the time being, the legal obligations existing 
 between the parties were the same that they would be between parent and 
 child, and the law will imply no legal obligation on the part of defend- 
 ant to pay him for his services, nor could defendant maintain any action 
 against the plaintiff for his board or clothes, or care in rearing him and 
 
 providing for him a home." ^ "If the plaintiff, after she arrived 
 
 at full age, continued to live with her father, as she had done previously, 
 with no new duties or responsibilities assumed in the family by her, and 
 was provided with necessaries, etc., as one of the family, she would 
 not be entitled to recover for such services, unless there was an express 
 understanding between her and her father, before these services were 
 rendered, that she should receive such compensation ; and if the note was 
 given for such past services, and there was no such understanding ex- 
 isting between them, she cannot recover. But if the note was given 
 for such past services, the fact that it was given, will raise a presump- 
 
 ^ Jhid ; citing Ayres I". Hull, oKaus. ^ Approved iu Boyer r. Riley, 41 
 
 419, Iowa, 14, 15.
 
 904 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 tionthat there had been a previous understanding or agreement between 
 the plaintiff and her father that such compensation was to be made, and 
 unless such presumption is overcome by evidence that no such under- 
 standing existed, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover." ^ 
 
 ^ Approved iu Pitt's Aclm'r v. Pitts, and then sued for the value of his 
 
 21 Ind. 314. A more elaborate instruc- services, may be found in Hilbish v, 
 
 tiou, in a case where a son resided Hilbish, 71 Ind. 30. See also Smith v. 
 
 with his father after coming of age Denman, 48 Ind. 65.
 
 Tjt. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 905 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 SALES OF PERSONAL PEOPERTY. 
 
 Article I. — What Questions for the Court and What for the Jurt. 
 Article II. — Precedents op Instruction to Juries. 
 
 Article I. — What Questions for the Court and What for the Jury. 
 
 Section 
 
 1160. Preliminary. 
 
 1161. Loosely said to be a Question of Law. 
 
 1162. Said to be a Question of Law where Facts proved or not Controverted. 
 
 1163. Question for Jury where Facts in Doubt. 
 
 1164. Cases where Euled as a Question of Law. 
 
 1165. Question Drawn to the Jury where a Question of Intent. 
 
 1166. Whether the Parties Intended that Title should Pass, although Some- 
 
 thing remained to be done to the Property. 
 
 1167. Cases where Decided as a Question of Fact. 
 
 1168. Illustrations of the Foregoing. 
 
 1169. Whether Delivery of Part a Delivery of the Whole. 
 
 1170. Illustration. 
 
 1171. Bona Fide Purchaser for Value. 
 
 1172. Whether a Sale was Conditional. 
 
 1173. Instruction as to an Absolute Sale Intended as a Pledge. 
 
 1174. Whether a Sale and a Delivery of Collaterals were Parts of one Trans- 
 
 action. 
 
 1175. Delivery of Personal Property purchased with Land. 
 
 1176. Compliance with a Contract of Sale which contains the words "More 
 
 or Less." 
 
 1177. Under what Circumstances Question withdrawn from the Jury. 
 
 § 1160. Preliminary. — The subject of discussion in this chap- 
 ter is little more than an illustration or amplification of a subject 
 already discussed. i The question whether a sale at common law 
 exists, stands on the same footing as the question whether any 
 
 1 Ante, chap. XXXV.
 
 906 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 other contract exists, and is to be answered by the court or by 
 the jury, according to principles ah*eady stated. ^ But the statute 
 of frauds has introduced a special rule in regard to this species 
 of contract. There must be a delivery by the vendor, and an ac- 
 ceptance by the vendee, of the thing intended to be sold, where the 
 contract is not in writing; and this complicates the question of 
 sale or no sale with the further question whether or not there 
 has been such a delivery and acceptance as satisfies the statute 
 of frauds. Moreover, the law recognizes two kinds of contract 
 in respect of sales of personal property: an agreement to make 
 a future sale, and a present contract of sale.'' These elements 
 sufficiently differentiate the contract of sale of personal property 
 from other contracts, to justify a separate inquiry into the ques- 
 tion under what circumstances the existence of such a contract is 
 to be pronounced as a question of law and under what circum- 
 stances found as a conclusion of fact. 
 
 § llGl. Loosely said to be a Question of Law. — It has been 
 said that the question of sale or no sale is a question of law, and 
 is not to be decided by the opinions of witnesses.^ Certainly it 
 is a sound conclusion that it is not to be decided by the opinions 
 of witnesses; for whatever it may be, it is not a mere question 
 of private opinion. It is also said to be a question of law, and 
 very often a question extremely difficult to decide, what shall be 
 deemed a delivery upon a sale of goods.* This conception does 
 not carry us any farther than the obvious conclusion that the 
 I'ule of sale, like the rule or measure of damages, is a rule of 
 law. If it is intended to convey the idea that the application of 
 this rule to doubtful, complicated or equivocal facts is for the 
 judge, and not for the jury, then it is a palpably erroneous con- 
 ception. 
 
 § 1162. Said to be a Question of Law where Facts proved 
 or not Controverted. — Again it is said that, where the facts are 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 1112, IIU. » uolt v. Marriott, 9 Gill (Md.), 331, 
 
 2 Beuj. ou Sales, § 309. 33i!. 
 
 * Belt V. Marriott, supra.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII,] SALES of personal pkoperty. 907 
 
 proved or are not controverted, it is a question of law whether 
 they show a sale.^ This is no more than a branch of the general 
 rule which applies to all questions arising in judicial administra- 
 tion: the facts being ascertained, the judge pronounces the con- 
 clusion of law. But what are the facts, within the meaning of 
 this rule? As elsewhere seen, in respect of various questions, ^ 
 they embrace not only what are termed constitutive facts, but they 
 embrace also those ulterior inferences of fact which the court, and 
 not the jury, are to draw. One of these ulterior inferences of fact 
 is that of intent. The question of contract or no contract is involved 
 ultimately in this question of intent, — that is, whether both par- 
 ties intended that there should be a contract, — whether there was 
 an aggregatio mentium, a meeting of minds, a concurrence of in- 
 tent. In many cases the constitutive facts, — that is, all the 
 facts which need be stated by the pleader or deposed to by the 
 witnesses, will be indisputably established; but yet whether this 
 concurrence of intent existed, — in other words, whether there 
 was a sale, — will remain an inference of fact to be drawn by 
 the jury. This, however, forms an exception to the general 
 rule that the judge pronounces the law upon conceded or estab- 
 lished facts; and undoubtedly, in the great majority of cases of 
 this kind, the judge, and not the ]m-y, will draw the conclusion. 
 This introduces us to another conception, which is, — ■ 
 
 § 1163. Question for Jury where Facts in Doubt. — There 
 is no doubt whatever upon the proposition that, where the facts 
 are in doubt, the que.-^tion is to be resolved by the jury in every 
 case where they return a general verdict, — the court assisting 
 
 1 Fuller V. Beau, 34 N. H. 299; the vendor of a ticket describiug the 
 
 Houdlette v. Tallnaau, 14 Me. 403; goods (two hundred aud twenty-three 
 
 Burrows v. Stebbius, 26 Vt. 659. It bales of hay lying on the Levee at St. 
 
 was so held in Glasgow ■«. Nicholson, Louis), and the price at which they 
 
 25 Mo. 29, where a delivery of a cer- were sold, the ticivet authorizing the 
 
 titicate of the city weigher of the purchaser to take possession as soon 
 
 weight of five hogsheads of sugar as the hay could be weighed, was 
 
 which lay on the wharf, together with held sufficient evidence to warrant the 
 
 a bill of the price, was held to consti- jury in finding that the hay had been 
 
 tute a delivery of the sugar. In Bass delivered. 
 V. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192, the delivery by 2 Ante, §§ 1112, 1114; post, § 1333.
 
 908 PEOVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tv.y 
 
 them with instructions as to the applicatory principles of law, 
 based upon hypothetical facts within the scope of the evidence. 
 Whenever, then, the material facts are left in doubt, the question 
 is to be decided by the jury, under suitable instructions as to the 
 law.^ Or, to throw this rule into contrast with the preceding: 
 " When the law can pronounce, upon a state of facts, that there 
 is or is not a delivery and acceptance, it is a question of law, to 
 be decided by the court. But when there may be uncertainty 
 and difficulty in determining the true intent of the parties respect- 
 ing the delivery and acceptance, from the facts proved, the ques- 
 tion of acceptance is to be decided by the jury." ^ Again, it is 
 said: " When there is no dispute as to the facts, it is a question 
 of law; when the evidence is conflicting, the jury must decide."^ 
 In such a case the court should leave it to the jury, upon the evi- 
 dence, to decide whether the facts which are adduced for the 
 purpose of showing delivery and acceptance were true, and 
 should direct them hypothetically that, if such facts are true, 
 they do or do not constitute a delivery.^ 
 
 § 11G4. Cases where ruled as a Question of Law. — The 
 
 last preceding statements undoubtedly embody the general 
 rule ; and cases are found where the question has been ruled 
 as a matter of law, as indeed it should be Avhere the facts 
 are both settled and unequivocal. Thus, where a sale of wdieat 
 w^as made which had been consigned to B., and a delivery order 
 was given to the vendee, and the Avheat was burned in an elevator 
 before the vendee had time to send the delivery order to F., it 
 was held that the sale was incomplete, because the legal title was 
 in F., through whose co-operation alone it could have been vested 
 in the plaintiff. The legal title was hold to be in F., because of 
 the wdieat having been placed in his elevator and mingled with 
 " his wheat, in conformity with a peculiar rule in regard to storage 
 
 1 Fuller V. Bean, 34 N. H. 299; Rid- ^ Hoiullette u. Tallman, U Me. 400; 
 
 die V. Vanmin, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 283; Glass r. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 297, 300. 
 
 George V. Stubbs, 20 Me. 250; Draper * Glass v. Gelvin, supra; Hatch v. 
 
 V. Jones, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 2«0; Smith Bailey, 12 Cnsh. (Mass.) 29. 
 
 V. Denuie, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 260; Bishop * Williams v. Gray, 39 Mo. 201, 20G. 
 V. Shillito, 2 Barn. & Aid. 329, note.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVIL] sales of personal property. 909 
 
 in elevators. 1 Indeed, there seems to be nothing in the subject 
 of sale and delivery to take the case out of the general principle, 
 subject to the exception already and hereafter explained,^ that, 
 where the facts are found or conceded, whether there has been 
 a delivery to satisfy the statute of frauds and constitute a sale, 
 is a question of law for the court. This in most cases is neces- 
 sarily so ; for we find that modern courts do not submit the ques- 
 tion to the jury upon the whole evidence without instructions, 
 but that they instruct them hypothetically whether a given state 
 of facts, shown by the evidence, does or does not constitute a sale. 
 Thus, in a case in Maine, it was held proper for the judge to 
 charge the jury, under proper evidence, that, if they found that 
 the defendant purchased all the logs charged in the plaintiff's ac- 
 count, and that the logs were all deposited at the same place, and 
 that the defendant, at the time of the purchase, employed B. to 
 haul them out, and he actually did haul out a portion of them on 
 the same day in which the bargain was made, and as soon there- 
 after as could be conveniently done, and that they Avere received 
 and used by the defendant under the contract, — this Avas such a 
 delivery and acceptance as the law required, and that the defend- 
 ant would be chargeable for the whole property sold.^ In this 
 case the court did no more than apply to a hypothetical state of 
 facts the principle that, Avhere there has been a parol sale, a de- 
 livery and acceptance of a part is a delivery of the whole, so as 
 to satisfy the statute of frauds and transfer the title.* 
 
 § 1165. Question Drawn to the Jury where a Question of 
 Intent. — The authorities agree that if, as between the buyer 
 and the seller, anything remains to be done before the goods are 
 to be delivered, the right of propert}' does not pass.^ But while 
 
 1 Perkins v. Dacou, 13 Mich. 81. 336; Outwater v. Dodge, 7 Cow. 
 
 2 Ante, § 11G2; post, §§ 11C5, 1333. (N. Y.) 87; Draper v. Joues, 11 Barb. 
 
 3 Davis V. Moore, 13 Me. 424. (N. Y.) 203; Barrett v. Pritchard, 2 
 
 4 Waldron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414; Pick. (Mass.) 512; Bishop v. Shillito, 
 Damon v. Osborn, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 2 Barn. & Aid. 329, note; Evans v. 
 470; Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. Harris, 19 Barb. (X. Y.) 416; Tarliug 
 (Mass.) 280. V. Baxter, G Barn. & Cres. 360; White- 
 
 * "Warren v. Buckminstcr, 24 N. H. house v. Frost, 12 East, G14; Hanson
 
 910 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr.y 
 
 this is so, it is conceded that the parties may agree, either ex- 
 pressly or tacitly, to change this rule, and that title to the prop- 
 erty shall pass at once.^ " The question," said Lord Brougham, 
 " must always be, what was the intention of the parties in this 
 respect, and that is of course to be collected from the terms of 
 the contract." ^ Other authorities emphasize the idea that it is 
 a question of intent.^ Intent being generally a question for a 
 jury, except where it is declared in a written instrument,* it 
 follows as a necessary conclusion, that, in many cases, whether 
 the title has passed will be a question of fact to be submitted 
 to a jury upon all the evidence ; ^ though it has been said 
 that wdien the facts are ascertained, either by the written agree- 
 ment of the parties or by the findings of the court, * * * 
 they are questions of law.^ This is in accordance 'with the 
 
 V. Meyer, 6 East, 6U; Rugg v. Miuett, 
 11 Eaqt, 209; Simmons v. Swift, 5 
 Baru. & Ci'es. 857; Wallace v. Breeds, 
 13 East, 522; Macomber v. Parker, 13 
 Pick. (Mass.) 183. It is said that a 
 contract of sale is uot complete until 
 the happening of an event expressly 
 provided for, or so long as anything 
 remains to be done to the thing sold, 
 to pnt it in a condition for sale, or to 
 identify it, or discriminate it from 
 other things. McClung v. Kelly, 21 
 la. 508, 511. Nor is the sale complete 
 while anything remains to be done to 
 determine the quality of the goods, if 
 the price depends upon the quality, un- 
 less this is to be done by the buyer 
 alone ; and even if earnest money, or if 
 part of the price be paid, the sale is 
 not for that reason complete. It has 
 been inaccurately said that " no sale 
 is complete, so as to vest in the ven- 
 dee an immediate right of property, so 
 long as anything remains to be done 
 between the buyer and seller in rela- 
 tion to the thing sold." McClung v. 
 Kelley, supra. See Story on Sales, § 
 296 and note 2; Chitty Contr. (10th 
 
 Am. ed.) 396, 397; Add. Contr. (2d 
 Am. ed.) 225, 228. 
 
 1 Alexander v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. 
 Cas. G71; Schindler v. Houston, 1 
 Denio (N. Y.), 51; Mixer w. Cook, 31 
 Me. 340; Draper v. Jones,' 11 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 263. 
 
 2 Logan V. Le Mesurier, 6 Moore 
 P. C. 1]6. 
 
 3 Furniss v. Hone, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 256; Smith v. Dennie, 6 Pick, (Mass.) 
 266; Smiths. Lynes, 4N. Y. 44; Elgee 
 Cotton Cases, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 180, 187; 
 Hatch V. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124, 131; 
 Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520, 525; 
 Callahan v. Myers, 89 HI. 566, 570j 
 Sewell V. Eaton, 6 Wis. 490; Fletcher 
 V. Ingram, 46 Wis. 191, 201. << It is," 
 saidBigelow, C. J., "a question of in- 
 tent, arising on the interpretation of 
 the entire contract in each case." 
 Briggs V. A. Light Boat, 7 Allen 
 (Mass.), 287. 
 
 * Post, § 1333, et seq. 
 
 5 Fuller V. Bean, 34 N. H. 290, 305. 
 
 6 Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 620, 
 525.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII. ] SALES of personal property. 911 
 
 views of the late Mr. Benjamin, who, after pointing out the 
 distinction between a sale and a mere promise to sell, says: 
 " Both these contracts being equally legal and valid, it is ob- 
 vious that, whenever a dispute arises as to the true character 
 of an agreement, the question is one rather of fact than of law. 
 The agreement is just what the parties intended to make it. If 
 that intention is clearly and unequivocally manifested, cadit 
 qucestio. But parties very frequently fail to express their in- 
 tentions, or they manifest them so imperfectly as to leave it 
 doubtful what they really mean ; and when this is the case, the 
 courts have applied certain rules of construction, which, in most 
 instances, furnish conclusive tests for determining the contro- 
 versy.^ 
 
 § 1166. Whether the Parties intended that Title should 
 pass, although Something remains to be done to the Prop- 
 erty. — Restating the rule of the preceding section, it seems to 
 be that the question whether a sale is completed or only execu- 
 tory, is usually one to be determined from the intent of the 
 parties, as gathered from their contract, and from the situation 
 of the thing sold and the circumstances surrounding the sale ; 
 that where the goods sold are designated so that no question can 
 arise as to the thing intended to be sold, it is not absolutely 
 essential that there should be a delivery, or that the goods should 
 be in deliverable condition, or that the quantity or quality, 
 when the price depends upon either or both, should be deter- 
 mined, — these being circumstances indicating intent, but not 
 conclusive ; but that, where anything is to be done by the vendor, 
 or by the mutual concurrence of both parties, for the purpose of 
 ascertaining the price of the goods, as by weighing, testing or 
 measuring them, where the price is to depend upon the quantity 
 or quality of the goods, the performance of those tilings, in the 
 absence of anything indicating a contrary intent, is to be deemed 
 presumptively a condition precedent to the transfer of the prop- 
 erty, although the individual goods be ascertained, and they ap- 
 pear to be in a state in which they may be and ought to be 
 
 1 Benjamin on Sales (Sd ed.), § 309.
 
 912 PRO.VINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl"., 
 
 accepted.^ "Presumptively," says Cooley, C. J., "the title 
 does not pass, even though the articles be designated, so long as 
 anything remains to be done to determine the sum to be paid ; 
 but this is only a presumption, and is liable to be overcome by 
 such facts and circumstances as indicate an intent in the parties 
 to be controverted." And it was held that the Circuit Court 
 erred in treating the question as a question of law, instead of de- 
 ciding it as a question of fact.^ 
 
 § HG7. Cases where Decided as a Question of Fact. — Upon 
 conflicting or equivocal evidence, the question whether a sale of 
 property has taken place is, then, a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 It has been ruled, in a good many cases, where the contract 
 rested in parol, that, whether there has been a complete sale or 
 not, is a question of fact for a jury.* On like evidence, it has 
 been frequently held a question for a jury, whether there has 
 been a delivery by the seller and an acceptance by the buyer, 
 according to the contract or intent of the parties, so as to trans- 
 fer title from one to the other and satisfy the statute of frauds.^ 
 It has been held that, when the facts and the intention of the par- 
 ties are ascertained, it is for the court to decide whether in law 
 
 1 Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 608; Caywood v. Timmous, 31 Kan. 
 
 324; restated by Cooley, J., iu Byles v. 304. 
 
 Colier, 54 Mich. 1, 4. Other cases iu 2 Byles v. Coljer, 54 Mich. 1, 5. 
 
 affirmation of the same doctrine are: ^ Ante, § 1114. See, for illustration, 
 
 Hatch V. Fowler, 28 Mich. 205; Hahn Globe National Bank v. lugalls, 130 
 
 u. Fredericks, 30 Mich. 223; Wilkinson Mass. 8. Compare National Bank r. 
 
 V. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386; Grant v. Ingalls, 126 Mass. 209. . 
 
 Merchants &c. Bank, 35 Mich. 515; •* De Bidder ?;. McKnight, 13 Johns. 
 
 Scotten V. Sutter, 37 Mich. 526; Car- (N. Y.) 293; McCluug r. Kelley, 21 la. 
 
 penter v. Graham, 42 Mich. 191 ; Brew- 508, 511 ; Gatzweiler r. Morgan, 51 Mo. 
 
 erv. Salt Asso., 47 Mich. 526; Kelsea 47. 
 
 V. Haines, 41 N. H. 246; Southwestern ^ Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246, 
 
 Freight Co. v. Stanard, 44 Mo. 71; 253; Phillips v. Bistolli, 2 BarUc & 
 
 Shelton ?;. Franklin, 68 HI. 333; Straus Cres. 511; Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 
 
 V. Minzesheimer, 78 111. 494; Crofoot 192; Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 
 
 V. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258; Groat v. Gile, 553; Bratt??. Chase, 40 Me. 269: Jones 
 
 51 N. Y. 431 ; Burrows v. Wliitaker, 71 r. Hook, 47 Mo. 329 ; Rhea v. Riner^ 21 
 
 N. Y. 291; Dennis v. Alexander, 3 Pa. 111. 526, 531; Weld v. Came, 98 Mass. 
 
 St. 60; Galloway v. Week, 54 Wis. 152; Obcr r. Carson, 62 Mo 209, 214.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES of personal property. 913 
 
 they constitute an acceptance ; but if they are disputed it is a 
 question for the jury whether there has been a delivery and ac- 
 ceptance in point of fact, and their finding that there has been an 
 acceptance puts an end to the question of law./ It has also been 
 said: "Whether the passing of the sale note was symbolical 
 of a delivery, or whether the buyer's request that it [the 
 goods] should not be weighed until the next morning, his agree- 
 ing to pay the charges and expenses from the time of the sale, 
 and employing Hawley to see that it was properly covered on 
 his account, amounted to an acceptance and receipt, were all 
 matters of fact to be found by the jury." ^ 
 
 § 1168. Illustrations of the Foregoing. — After a bargain and 
 sale of a stack of hay, between parties on the spot, evidence tbat the 
 vendee actually sold part of it to another person (by whom, though 
 against the vendee's approbation, it was taken away), was held suffi- 
 cient to warrant the jury in finding a delivery by the original and an 
 acceptance by the vendee, such as to satisfy the statute of frauds.^ .... 
 In an action by an administrator to recover possession of certain slaves, . 
 it was shown that the intestate, some forty years before, purcliased one of 
 the slaves and took a bill of sale for her to himself ; that he subsequently 
 sought to divest himself of the title and vest it in his wife ; and that to 
 that end, the original bill of sale was surrendered, the vendor substituting 
 in place of it another written transfer to the testator's wife, under whom 
 the defendants claimed title. It was held, on this evidence, that the 
 court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. The court said : 
 "The title of Seals (the plaintiff's intestate) prior to March, 1830, is 
 unquestioned. It is equally clear that he intended and attempted to 
 effect a valid legal transfer to Mrs. Seals. Whether he succeeded in 
 carrying his intention into effect is the question. There being no cred- 
 itors to complain, it was his right to deal with his property as he 
 pleased — to give it to whom he thought proper. The intention to 
 part with his title and to vest that title in his wife being clear, it would 
 require but slight evidence, after the lapse of nearly forty years, to 
 satisfy' the mmds of either court or jury that the intention of the par- 
 ties was effectuated by a proper delivery, even if it should be consid- 
 
 1 Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192. * 8 Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192. 
 
 2 Bass V. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192, 201. 
 
 58
 
 914 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'.^ 
 
 erecl that the claim of the husband's representatives was not of too stale 
 a nature to deserve consideration in a court of justice. Nevertheless, 
 upon the issue of delivery or no delivery, title or no title, the facts 
 should have been submitted to the judgment and finding of the 
 jury."^-- - - Where A. bought the boards to be made out of a cer- 
 tain quantity of logs in the possession of B., to be paid for at a stipu- 
 lated price per hundred feet, when the boards should be sawed, and the 
 boards were sawed, piled, and notice given to the purchaser, — it was 
 ruled, seemingly as a matter of law, that, considering the nature of the 
 articles sold, the delivery was sufficient to render the sale valid and to 
 
 transfer the title to the purchaser.- By the condition of a sale at 
 
 auction, the purchaser was to pay 30 per cent, upon the price, upon 
 being declared the highest bidder, and the residue before the goods 
 were removed. A lot was knocked down to A. as highest bidder, and 
 delivered to him immediately. After it had remained in his hands three 
 or four minutes, he stated that he had been mistaken in the price, and 
 refused to keep it. No part of the price had been paid. It was held 
 that it was a question of fact for the jury, whether there had been a 
 delivery by the seller and an actual acceptance by the buyer, intended 
 by both parties to have the effect of transferring the right of posses- 
 sion from one to the other. ^ In an action for the purchase price of 
 
 lumber, the evidence being conflicting, it was held for the jury, not 
 for the court, to determine : 1. Whether the lumber was delivered under 
 one entire contract, so that the acceptance of a part would operate as 
 an implied acceptance of the whole ; 2. Whether the lumber delivered 
 was of the kind and quality contracted for ; and, if not, 3. Whether, 
 after discovering the defects and notifying the plaintiff thereof, the 
 defendant kept the lumber in a safe and suitable place, reasonably con- 
 venient for delivery to the plaintiff upon demand and the payment of 
 lawful charges.^ 
 
 § 1169. WhetherDeliveryof Part a Delivery of the Whole. — 
 
 A sale of personal property and a receipt, acknowledging pay- 
 ment with delivery of a portion, do not necessarily transfer to 
 the vendee title in the whole property sold. Delivery of a ])art 
 
 1 Jones V. Hook, 47 Mo. 329, opiu- Cres. 511. Compare Bleukiu.sop v. 
 ion by Currier, J. _ Clayton, IJ. B. Moore, 328; Carter v. 
 
 2 Bates V. Conklini,', 10 Wen'd. Toussaint, oBarn. & Aid. 255. 
 
 (N. Y.) 389. ^ Rood v. Priestly, 58 Wis. 255. 
 
 3 Phillips V. Bistolli, 2 Barn. &
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES of personal property. 915 
 
 operates as a constructive delivery of the whole only in cases 
 where it is intended by the parties that such shall be the result.^ 
 Whether delivery of a part is a delivery of the whole is there- 
 fore a question of fact to be submitted to a jury, "^ and it is error 
 to instruct them thilt "a sale of the whole and receipt for payment 
 and delivery of part, as between the vendor and vendee, would 
 be a delivery of the whole, which was then manufactured, toward 
 the contract," etc,^ 
 
 § 1170. Illustration. — An agreement was made between A. and 
 B., by which A. was to have the right to take possession of the goods 
 of B. , and sell them to pay a debt of B. to A. At the time when the 
 agreement was made, B. kept the goods in a certain store, from which 
 a portion was afterwards moved to a new store. A. went to the new store 
 and told B. that he had a right to take possession and did take posses- 
 sion, and put B. in as keeper, and directed him to sell the goods for A. 
 B. agreed to do it. It was held that this was sufficient evidence of a 
 taking possession of the goods in both stores, to entitle A. to maintain 
 replevin against an officer who subsequently attached the goods in the 
 old store as the property of B., and it was for the jury to determine 
 whether possession was taken of a part for the whole. "^ 
 
 §1171. Bona Fide Purchaser for Value. — Where it is a 
 material question, in an action of replevin for a chattel, whether 
 the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value, as where the 
 defendant bought it from the plaintiff's vendee, who had paid 
 counterfeit money to the plaintiff for it, — it has been held that 
 the question was oneybr the jury. ^ This is obviously so, it being 
 a question of intent.^ 
 
 § 1172. Whether a Sale was Conditional. — Whether a sale 
 of personal property was an absolute or conditional one is a ques- 
 
 1 Pratt V. Chase, 40 Me. 269, 273; ard, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 202. See also 
 Dixon V. Yates, 5 Barn. & Ad. 313, per Boynton v. Vezie, 24: Me. 286. 
 Littledale, J. ; Buuuy v. Poyutz, 4 » pratt v. Cliase, 40 Me. 269, 273. 
 Barn. & Ad. 568; Simmons v. Swift, 5 ■* Wilson v. Russell, 136 Mass. 211. 
 Barn. & Cres. 857. ^ Green v. Humphrey, 50 Pa. St. 212. 
 
 2 As was done in Shurtleff v. Will- « p^gi^ § 1333^ etseq.
 
 916 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 tion of fact /or the jury ?■ In a contest touching title to a chattel, 
 where the question depends upon whether the sale of the chattel 
 was absolute or conditional, if the plaintiff claims under an ab- 
 solute sale, the burden is upon him ; or, if he claims under a 
 conditional sale, the burden is equally upon him, to prove a com- 
 pliance with the condition.- Where the evidence touching the 
 agreement rests in parol, it is to be left to the jury, upon all the 
 evidence, to decide which kind of a sale it was.^ 
 
 § 1173. Instruction as to an Absolute Sale Intended as a 
 Pledge. — " The court instructs the jury that, although they may be- 
 lieve that there was a verbal sale, absolute in its terms, of the property 
 to Mudd (the defendant), by Ingle (the plaintiff), and a delivery of it 
 to Mudd, with a condition or understanding between them that Ingle 
 should have his team back upon complying with the conditions of the 
 agreement, — then said sale is simply a pledge of the property to secure 
 tlie indebtedness, and the ownership of the property is and was all the 
 time in plaintiff, subject to the pa^^ment of the indebtedness existing 
 between them, for the security of which the property was dehvered to 
 Mudd.'"* 
 
 § 1174. Whether a Sale and a Delivery of Chattels were 
 Parts of one Transaction. — It has been held, under circum- 
 stances, that, whether a sale of personal property and a delivery 
 of certain chattels were parts of the same transaction, or were 
 separate transactions, is a question /o?* the jury .^ 
 
 § 1175. Delivery of Personal Property purchased with 
 Land. — Where one purchases land and receives a conveyance 
 therefor, and at the same time buys personal property situated 
 on the land, the question whether the vendee had actual posses- 
 sion of the land, is an important one, in determining whether there 
 was an actual delivery of possession of the personal property ; 
 
 1 Richey v. Burues, 83 Mo. 362. ^ Sawyer v. Spofford, 4 Cush. 
 
 2 See Whitwell ■;;. Vincent, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 5!)8. 
 
 (Mass.) 449; Reed v. Upton, 10 Pick. ^ Approved in Ingle v. Mudd, 86 
 
 (Mass.) 522; Heath v. Randall, 4 Mo. 216. The action was replevin for 
 Cush. (Mass.) 195. the property spoken of. 
 
 s Keen v. Preston, 24 Ind. 395.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII. SALES of personal property. 917 
 
 which latter question is to be regarded, it seems, a question for 
 the jury ?■ 
 
 § 1176. Compliance with a Contract of Sale which contains 
 the Words " More or Less." — "In sales of merchandise, espec- 
 ially in large quantities, where it is impossible to ascertain with 
 precise accuracy the number or weight of the articles, before con- 
 cluding the contract for their purchase, it is necessary and usual 
 to insert the words ' more or less,' or ' about,' in connection with 
 the specific amount which forms the subject of the contract, in 
 order to cover any variation from the estimate, which is likely to 
 arise from differences in weight, errors in counting, diminution 
 by shrinkage, or other similar causes. But in such cases, parol 
 evidence is not admitted to show that the parties intended to buy 
 and sell a different quantity or amount from that stated in the 
 written agreement. On the contrary, it is hold to be a contract 
 for the sale of the quantity or amount specified ; and the effect 
 of the words ' more or less ' is only to permit the vendor to 
 fulfill his contract by a delivery of so much as may reasonably 
 and fairly be held to be a compliance with the contract, after 
 making due allowance for excess or short delivery arising from 
 the usual and ordinary causes, which prevent an accurate esti- 
 mate of the weight or number of the articles sold; or, as it is 
 sometimes briefly expressed, it is ' an absolute contract for a 
 specific quantity within a reasonable limit.' "What is a reason- 
 able limit, and a substantial compliance with such contract, if 
 the facts are not in dispute between the parties, is a question for 
 the determination of the court.'' ^"^ 
 
 1 Cahoon v. Marshall, 25 Cal. 197. and reasonable limit of short delivery; 
 
 2 Cabot V. Winsor, 1 Allen (Mass.), and that, by proof of a delivery of a 
 546, 550, opinion by Bigelow, C. J. portion of the 475 bundles, and a read- 
 See also Bourne v. Seymour, 16 Com. inoss to deliver the residue of the lot. 
 Bench, 33<;; Pemboke Iron Co. v. Par- the plaintiff proved a full compliance 
 sons, 5 Gray CMass.), 589. In the case with the terms of his contract. In 
 first cited, under the circumstances, Cross v. Eglin, 2 Barn. & Adolph. 106, 
 five per cent in five hundred bundles the question was likewise ruled as a 
 of gunny bags was held not to be such question of law, and it was held that 
 a deficiency as to fall outside of a fair where the contract was for " about
 
 018 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoiup. Tr., 
 
 § 1111 . Under what Circiunstances Question withdrawn 
 from the Jurj. — It is said by Mr. Browne in his treatise on the 
 statute of frauds: ''Whether there has been a delivery and ac- 
 ceptance sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds is a mixed 
 question of law and fact. But it is for the court to withhold the 
 facts from the jury, when they are not such as can afford good 
 ground for finding an acceptance; and this includes cases where, 
 thouo;h the court mio;ht admit that there was a scintilla of 
 evidence tending to show an acceptance, they would still feel 
 bound to set aside a verdict finding an acceptance upon that evi- 
 dence." ^ Quoting this language, it was said in a case in Massa- 
 chusetts: " What this scintilla is, needs to be stated a little more 
 definitely ; otherwise it may be understood to" include all cases 
 where, on a motion for a new trial, a verdict would be set aside, 
 as against the weight of evideijce. It would be impossible to 
 draw a line theoretically, because evidence, in its very nature, 
 varies from the weakest to the strongest, by imperceptible de- 
 grees. But the practical line of distinction is that, if the evi- 
 dence is such that the court would set aside any number of 
 verdicts rendered upon it, toties quoties, then the cause should be 
 taken from the jury, by instructing them to find a verdict for the 
 defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence is such that, 
 though one or two verdicts rendered upon it would be set aside 
 on motion, yet a second or third verdict would be suffered to 
 stand, the cause should not be taken from the jury, but should 
 be submitted to them under instructions. This rule throws upon 
 the court a duty which may sometimes be very delicate ; but it 
 
 300 quarters more or less," and 350 Woodlief, /d. 173, note; Hall v. Cun- 
 quarters were tendered, the vendee ningham, 1 Munf. (Va.) 330; Twiford 
 was not bound to receive such a large v. Wareup, Finch, 311 ; Winch v. Win- 
 excess, at least in the absence of evi- Chester, 1 Ves. & B. 375; Smith v. 
 dence showing that an excess above Evans, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 109; Boar v. 
 the quantity named was in conterapla- McCormick, 1 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 166; 
 tion. Compare Moore v. Camplx'll, 10 Glenn v. Glenn, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 488; 
 Exch. 323; Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason Anon., 2 Freem. (Miss.) 107; Joliffe 
 (U. S.), 414; Thomas v. Perry, 4 Pet. v. Hite, 1 Call (Va.), 301. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 49; Nelson v. Matthews, i Browne St. of Frauds, chap. 15, 
 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 164; Quesnel v. § 321.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES of personal property. 919 
 
 seems to be the only practicable rule which the nature of the 
 case admits." ^ 
 
 Article II. — Precedents of Instruction to Juries. 
 
 Section 
 
 1180. How a Jury Instructed iu such Cases. 
 
 1181. Precedent of au lustructiou: When Sale Complete so as to cast Risk of 
 
 Ownership upon Buyer. 
 
 1182. Another Precedent. 
 
 1183. Delivery of Sale Ticket a Symbolical Delivery. 
 
 1184. Delivery of Sale Ticket, Goods to be Subsequently Weighed. 
 
 1185. Another Statement of the Same Conclusion. 
 
 1186. Validity of Sale as Against Subsequent Purchaser in Action of Replevin 
 
 Under Iowa Statute. 
 
 1187. What Delivery of Possession Necessary as against Attaching Creditor 
 
 of Vendor. 
 
 1188. Another Precedent. 
 
 1189. Symbolical Delivery by Delivery of Bill of Lading. 
 
 § 1180. How a Jury Instructed in such Cases. — It is for 
 
 the court to instruct the jury Avhat would amount in law to a sale ; 
 and W'here a custom of trade has been proved, governing the par- 
 ticular transaction, it is proper to refer them to the custom as 
 the standard by which to determine whether the contract was 
 completed ; but the ultimate question whether a sale in fact took 
 place is, where the evidence is conHicting, a question for the 
 jury.^ It has been held error for the court to instruct the jury, 
 in substance, in a case where the question related to a sale of 
 hogs, that, if the hogs were sold by the net weight, to be ascer- 
 tained by weighing after they were slaughtered and cleaned, then 
 the presumption that the sale was completed by the delivery is 
 met and repelled, and the loss falls on the plaintiff as owner, 
 unless he shows that the parties intended the sale to be complete 
 upon the delivery, — there being no such presumption, but the 
 circumstance being merely for the consideration of the jury, iu de- 
 
 * Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen an act of delivery and acceptance, and 
 
 (Mass.), 1,5. The court then pro- that a verdict for the defendant should 
 
 ceeded to set out a state of facts on have been directed, 
 ■which it was held that there was not - Erisman v. Walters, 26 Pa. St. 
 
 even a scintilla of evidence to prove 467.
 
 920 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 termining the intention of the parties.^ On the other hand, 
 proceeding upon the conception that, " what amounts to a deliv- 
 ery of the goods sold, when the facts are given, is a question of 
 law,"' an instruction was approved which directed the jury that 
 if a given state of facts, presented by the evidence, was true, 
 they constituted a good delivery. ^ The language of Chancellor 
 Kent would seem to form a good text for a hypothetical instruc- 
 tion to a jury in such a case: " The good sense of the doctrine 
 on this subject would seem to be that, in order to satisfy the 
 statute [of frauds], tliere must be a delivery of the goods by the 
 vendor, with an intention of vesting the right of possession in 
 the vendee, and an actual acceptance by the vendee, with the in- 
 tention of taking possession as owner." ^ 
 
 § 1181. Precedent op an Instruction — When Sale Co^tplete so 
 AS TO CAST Risk of Ownership upon Buyer. — " That when the terms 
 of a sale are agreed upon and the bargain is struck, and everything 
 which the seller has to do about the property is comjjlete, the contract 
 of sale is then perfect — the ownership of the property vests at once in 
 the buyer, and this he takes at once ; the property, and all the risks of 
 accident to the property is upon the buyer who is the owner thereof." ^ 
 
 § 1182. Another Precedent. — " All that is necessary to pass prop- 
 erty is that the buyer and seller agree. If one who has a long course 
 of dealing with another, have a correspondence in regard to certain 
 specific property, nearer to the purchaser than the seller, and more 
 proper!}-, by reason of their business relations, in the control of the 
 purchaser, and they agree one to buy and the other to sell, the sale is 
 complete, just as soon as they agree and the seller charges the buyer, 
 and the buyer credits their respective books with the price of the prop- 
 erty." ^ 
 
 § 1183. Delivery of Sale Ticket a Symbolical Delivery. — "If 
 the court finds that the plaintiffs, by their agent, sold the hay in ques- 
 
 1 Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 3 2 Kent Com. 504. 
 
 654. ^ Approved in Robinson v. Ulil, 
 
 2 Williams v. Gray, 39 Mo. 202, 20G. Neb. 328, 331, 332. See Gen. Stat, of 
 So held in Glass v. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 297, Neb., chap. 25, § 11. 
 
 300; Hatch v.Bayley, 12 Cush. (Mass.) ^ Robinson v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 328, 
 
 27. 332.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES of i*ersonal property. 921 
 
 tion to the defendants at $33 per ton, and, at the time delivered to 
 him a sale ticket, as described in evidence, and that by custom said sale 
 ticket authorized defendant to receive the hay and place the same under 
 his control, then there was a valid sale and delivery of the hay." ^ 
 
 § 1184. Delivery of Sale Ticket — Goods to be Subsequently 
 Weighed. — "If it appear from the evidence that plaintiffs, by their 
 agent, Hawley, agreed to sell, and that the defendant agreed to buy the 
 223 bales of hay at the price and sum of S33 per ton ; that Hawley 
 thereupon handed defendant a ticket showing the number of bales of 
 hay and where the same was, and that by the custom of merchants the 
 said ticket would authorize the hay to be delivered to the defendant as 
 soon as the same was weighed, and that defendant thereupon stated 
 that he did not want it weighed on that day ; that plaintiff assented 
 thereto, upon condition that said hay should be at the charge of defend- 
 ant, to which condition defendant assented, — then plaintiffs are entitled 
 to recover of the defendant the price agreed on." ^ 
 
 § 1185. Another Statement of the same Conclusion. — " If it ap- 
 pear, from the evidence in this case, that, by the contract between the 
 parties, the hay was to be weighed merely for the purpose of ascertain- 
 ing how much money defendant was to pay at $33 per ton, the price 
 having been agreed upon ; that the hay was at the levee, at the time of 
 such contract of sale, separate from any other hay ; that it was not in 
 the actual possession of some third party, nor in the actual possession 
 of any one ; that a ticket, or other badge of authority to receive or take 
 the hay, either before or after the hay should be weighed, was given by 
 the plaintiff's agent to the defendant, — then the sale and purchase is 
 complete, and the defendant is liable for the value of the hay at the 
 contract price." ^ 
 
 § 1186. Validity of Sale as Against Subsequent Purchaser in Ac- 
 tion OF Replevin Under Iowa Statute. — " Under the laws, a sale of 
 personal property is not valid as against a subsequent purchaser, for 
 value, without notice thereof, unless the same is duly recorded, when 
 the possession of the property remains with the vendor. In this case 
 
 1 Approved in Bass v. AYalsh, 39 ^ Approved in Bass «. "Walsh, 39 
 
 Mo. 193. Mo. 193. 
 
 * Approved in Bass v. Walsh, 39 
 Mo. 193.
 
 922 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 you will notice that the parties herein both claim title from John 
 O'Hara. The plaintiff claims that O'Harasold and delivered the cattle 
 to him, prior to the making and recording of the mortgage to the de- 
 fendant, but admits that his sale was not recorded. Now, if it should 
 turn out, upon the evid'ence (and you therefore find) that the plaintiff 
 did, in good faith, purchase the cattle in controversy of said O'Hara, 
 and that, in pursuance of such sale, said O'Hara delivered the posses- 
 sion thereof to the plaintiff prior to the execution of the mortgage, and 
 the same was still in plaintiff's possession at the time of the execution 
 of defendant's mortgage, then you should find your verdict in favor of 
 the plaintiff. In such case, O'Hara having made a complete sale by 
 delivery of possession, the rights of the plaintiff would be perfect, and 
 O'Hara could not impart any title or right as against the plaintiff by a 
 subsequent mortgage to defendant. If you find a sale of the cattle to 
 plaintiff by contract, then, to make the sale perfect as against a subse- 
 quent mortgage, taken in good faith and without notice, there must 
 have been an actual delivery or change of the possession of the cattle 
 prior to the making of the mortgage ; that is to say, they should have 
 been placed in the custody of plaintiff by setting the cattle apart to him, 
 or such other act as the nature of the propert}^ would reasonably admit 
 of, and such custody or actual possession should be continued down to 
 the time of the execution of the mortgage. In other words (to more 
 accurately state the law), the actual possession of the property should 
 not remain and be in said O'Hara, plaintiff's vendor." ^ 
 
 § 1187. What Delivery op Possession Necessary as Against At- 
 taching Creditor of Vendor. — "As between the parties, delivery of 
 possession is not essential to the completion of a sale of chattels, unless 
 made so by the terms of the bargain ; but as against an attaching 
 creditor, such delivery of possession, actual or constructive, is essential 
 to the completeness of such a sale. The change of possession, like 
 other parts of the transaction, must be by the will of both parties, and 
 with the design of rendering the sale complete. If anything remains to 
 be done by the vendor which is material or important before the vendee 
 can identify or possess the thing sold, or before it become deliverable, 
 
 1 Approved iu Suttou v. Ballon, 46 plicable to a state of facts where a bill 
 
 Iowa, 519, 520. See also Adal v. Zangs, of lading was issued and negotiated, 
 
 41 Iowa, 541; Tegler v. Shipmau, 33 see Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Gilvin, 81 111. 
 
 Iowa, 194. For au instruction ap- 513.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVII.] SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 923 
 
 the sale is executory and incomplete, and the property does not pass 
 absolutely to the vendee." i 
 
 § 1188. Another Precedent. — 1. " If there was a 6om/cZe sale of 
 the pictures in dispute, by John How to plaintiff, and if, prior to the 
 levy on them by defendant, there was actual, visible, continued change 
 of the possession of the same, then the jury will find for the plaintiff. 
 2. If the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff did not in 
 good faith purchase the said pictures, and that there was no actual 
 visible and continued change of possession of said pictures prior to the 
 levy thereon by defendant, they will find for the defendant. 3 If the 
 jury believe from the evidence that, prior to the levy by defendant on 
 the pictures, the plaintiff notified and informed Mr. Dyer, that he had 
 bought said pictures, and that he was the owner thereof, then there was 
 such change of possession, as is contemplated by instructions one and 
 two." - 
 
 § 1189. Symbolical Delivery by Delivery op Bill of Lading.— 
 ''In order to constitute a valid sale and deliverv of the screenin-^s'by 
 Slaughter to plaintiffs, Slaughter must have done everything whic'h, by 
 the terms of the bargain, was incumbent on him to do ; he^must have 
 intended to part with possession of the screenings, and must have 
 actually parted with the possession thereof, and the plaintiffs must have 
 received said screenings with the intention and for the purpose of hold- 
 ing same as owner. But the court instructs the jury that a delivery of 
 the bill of lading read in evidence to the plaintiffs, if, in fact, there was 
 such a delivery, constitutes a sufficient delivery of the screenino-s to 
 pass title thereto." 3 " 
 
 l^el^TZrV^ '^""^'"'' "• '^'^'"'' '' ' ^PP^°^^^ "^ How .. Taylor, 52 
 
 Texas, 364. The court said: "The Mo. 592, 595, 596 
 
 charge to the jury was characterized 3 Approved iu Kirkpatrick «. Kau- 
 
 by great clearness and logical precis- sas City &c. R. Co., SG Mo 341 
 lou iu espouudiug the law."
 
 924 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl*.^ 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
 
 WARRANTIES IN SALES OF CHATTELS. 
 
 Section 
 
 1195. "What Constitutes an Express Warranty. 
 
 1196. Court to Declare the Legal Effect of Written Warranties. 
 
 1197. Jury to Interpret Oral Warranties. 
 
 1198. Whether Statement a Warranty or a mere Expression of Opinion. 
 
 1199. Jury to Determine whether Purchaser relied on Statement. 
 
 1200. Precedent of Instruction in such a Case. 
 
 1201. Whether Quality equal to Warranty. 
 
 1202. What Constitutes "Unsoundness " in an Animal. 
 
 1203. Instruction as to what Disease will Constitute an Unsoundness. 
 
 1204. [Continued.] Instruction that "Texas Itch" in a Horse i« such a 
 
 Disease. 
 
 1205. Instruction as to Rule of Caveat Emptor, 
 
 120(3. [Continued.] What Constitutes a Warranty in the Sale of a Chattel. 
 
 1207. [Continued.] Vendor not Responsible for Representation of Honest 
 
 Belief. 
 
 1208. Instruction as to Effect of Warranty of Machine, in Action for Price 
 
 with Breach of Warranty as Couuter-Claim. 
 
 1209. [Continued.] Instructions as to Measure of Damages in such a Case. 
 
 1210. [Continued.] Instructions as to Effect of Agreement to Rescind in 
 
 Case of Failure of Warranty. 
 
 § 1195. What constitutes an express Warranty. — "It is 
 
 well settled that neither the word ' warrant,' nor any precise 
 form of expression, is necessary to create an express warranty; 
 but it may, under certain circumstances, result from any affirma- 
 tion of the quality or condition of personal chattels, made by the 
 vendor at the time of the sale. A bare affirmation, not intended 
 by the vendor to have that effect, will not constitute a warranty ; 
 and this, for the plain reason that a warranty in its nature is a 
 contract, and no contract or agreement can be made or entered 
 into without the consent and co-operation of two contracting par- 
 ties." ^ The rule of law on this subject has been well said to be, 
 
 1 Edwards v. Marcy, 2 Allen (Mass.), 48G, 489, opinion of the court by Merrick, J.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVIII.] WARRANTIES IN SALES OF CHATTELS. 925 
 
 that " any affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing 
 sold, made by the seller at the time of the sale, for the purpose 
 of assuring the buyer of the truth of the facf affirmed, and in- 
 ducing him to make the purchase, if so received and relied on 
 by the purchaser, is an express warranty." ^ "To prove, in 
 any particular instance, that there was a warranty by the vendor, 
 it is therefore not sufficient to show merely that, at the time of 
 the sale, he affirmed in clear and definite language a fact relative 
 to the essential qualities or condition of the o-oods or thino-s 
 sold ; but to this there must be superadded proof that he intended 
 thereby to influence the mind of the purchaser and to induce 
 him to buy, and that the latter did buy upon the faith of and in 
 reliance upon the affirmation. This is essential to show that 
 
 there was in fact a contract between the parties upon the sub- 
 ject." ^ 
 
 § 1196. Court to Declare the Legal Effect of Written War- 
 ranties. — " When the contract is in writing, and the affirmation 
 is incorporated into or makes a part of it, the court is to declare 
 its legal effect ; the exposition of it involving a mere question of 
 law.^ * * * But in all oral contracts, it is within the 
 
 1 Osgood V. Lewis, 2 Harr. & G. Patricks. Leach (Neb.), 1 N. W. Eep. 
 
 (Md.) 495; Edwards v. Marcy, 2 Allen 853; Neave v. Arutz (Wis.), 14 N. W. 
 
 (Mass.), 486, 489. See Heusliaw v. Rep. 41. That the representation of 
 
 Robins, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 83, where the vendor, to become a warranty, 
 
 the same principle is asserted in sub- must have been relied upon by the 
 
 stantially the same terras. Also Nan- purchaser: Halliday y. Briggs (Neb.), 
 
 manv. Overlee (Mo.), 3 S.W. Rep. 380; 18 N. W. Rep. 55; Torkelsou v. Jor- 
 
 Dulaney v. Rogers, (i4 Mo. 201 ; Walsh genson (Minn.), 10 N. W. Rep. 410. 
 
 V. Morse, 80 Mo. 568 ; .Tones v. Rail- 2 Edwards v. Marcy, supra. 
 
 road Co., 79 Mo. 92; Blaney u. Pelton ^ Edwards v. Marcy, 2 Allen 
 
 (Vt.), 13Atl. Rep. 564; McClintock v. (Mass.), 486, 490. This was done iu 
 
 Emick (Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep. 903 ; Warder the following cases : Henshaw v. Ro- 
 
 V. Bowen (Minn.), 17 N. W. Rep. 943. bins, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 83; Hastings v. 
 
 To constitute a warranty, neither the Lovering, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 214; Rice v. 
 
 word " warrant," nor any equivalent Codman, 1 Allen (Mass.), 377; Shep- 
 
 word, is indispensable. Warder v. herd v. Kain, 5 Barn. & Aid. 240. See 
 
 Bowen (Minn.), 17 N. W. Rep. 943. also Borrekins v. Beviu, 3 Rawle (Pa.), 
 
 It is sufficient if the language used by 23; Batturs v. Sellers, 5 Harr. & J. 
 
 the vendor amounts to an undertaking (Md.) 117; and 6 Harr. & J. (Md.) 
 
 that the goods are as represented. 249; Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446;
 
 926 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoinp. Tr., 
 
 province of the jury to determine, in view of all the circum- 
 stances attending the transaction, whether the necessary ingre- 
 dients to constitute such warranty, namely, the intention of the 
 vendor that his affirmation should operate as an inducement to 
 the purchaser to buy, and the acceptance of or reliance to some 
 extent upon it by the vendee, as one of the grounds, motives or 
 reasons for making the purchase, do actually exist." ^ 
 
 § 1197. Jury to Interpret Oral Warranty. — In conformity 
 with the principles already stated,- the interpretation of oral 
 warranties is generally left to the jury. " A warranty may be 
 verbal or written. When it is reduced to writing, it is the 
 province of the court to expound it; but when it is merely 
 verbal, it is for the jury to interpret the words of the witness 
 who testifies concerning it. The court may explain to the jury 
 what constitutes a warranty, when it rests altogether on oral 
 proof ; but as no particular form of words is essential, and it is 
 mostly a question of intention on the part of both the vendor 
 and vendee, that question, like any other question of fact, must 
 be left to the jury." ^ 
 
 § 1198. Whether Statement a Warranty or a mere Expres- 
 sion of Opinion. — The rule is that, whenever the vendor, at the 
 time of the sale, makes an assertion or representation, respecting 
 the kind, quality or condition of the thing sold, upon which he 
 intends that the vendee shall rely, and upon which the vendee 
 does rely in making the purchase, it amounts to a warranty.* If, 
 
 Chandelorw. Lopiis,Cro. Jac. 4; Power * Ante, § 1195; Lamrae v. Gregg, 1 
 
 V. Barham, i Ad. & El. 573; Freeman Mete. (Ky.) 444. See also as to -vvhat 
 
 V. Baker, 2 Nev. & Man. 44G; Chapman amounts to a Trarrauty : Smith v. Mil- 
 
 - V. Murch, 19 .Johns. (N. Y.) 290; Swett ler,2 Bibb (Ky.), 617; Baconv. Brown, 
 
 v. Colgate, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196; 3 Bibb (Ky.), 35; Dickens u. Williams, 
 
 Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 48. 2 B. Monr. (Ky.) 374; Duffee v. Mason, 
 
 1 Edwards v. Marcy, 2 Allen 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 25; Vernon i?. Keys, 12 
 (Mass.), 48C, 490. See to the same East, 632, 639; Morrill v. Wallace, 9 
 effect Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Harr. & N. H. Ill; Chapman v. Murch, 19 
 G. (Md.) 495. Johns. (N. Y.) 290; Cook v. Moseley, 
 
 2 Ante, § 1105. 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 278; Foggert v. 
 
 3 Lindsay t?. Davis, 30 Mo. 406, 410, Blackweller, 4 Ired. L. (N. C.) 238; 
 opinion by Napton, J. Baum v. Stephens, 2 Ired. L. (N. C.) 411.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVIII.] WARRANTIES IN SALES OF CHATTELS. 927 
 
 however, the vendor, by what he says, merely intends to express 
 an opinion or belief about the matter, and not to make an affirm- 
 ation of a fact, then the statement will not amount to a warranty ; ^ 
 and where doubts exist upon the evidence whether, in the case of 
 an oral statement, the vendor intended to assert a fact, or 
 merely to express an opinion or belief, that question must be 
 left to the jury to decide.^ Where the representation is in writ- 
 ing, but is not incorporated into or made a part of the contract 
 of sale, the question whether it amounted to a contract of war- 
 ranty, or whether it was the mere expression of an opinion, not 
 accepted or acted upon by the vendee so as to constitute a con- 
 tract, has been held equally a question for the jury. Thus, in 
 an action upon an alleged warranty in the sale of a horse, it ap- 
 peared that the plaintiff wrote to the defendant: "You will 
 remember that you represented the horse to me as five years 
 old," etc., and the defendant replied: " The horse is as I repre- 
 sented it." Here it was left to the jury to determine whether the 
 defendant, at the sale, gave an undertaking to the effect mentioned 
 in the letter.'^ 
 
 § 1199. Jury to* Determine whether Purchaser relied on 
 the Statement. — So, where an action for damages is predicated 
 upon the ground that a certain statement, made by the vendor 
 touching the character or quality of the thing sold, was a war- 
 
 1 Heusou V. King, 3 Joues L. (N. difference between warranties and ex- 
 
 C.) 411); Rogers u.Aciiermau, 22 Barb, pressions of opinion, Salmon t?. Ward, 
 
 [N. y.) 134; Congar v. Cliamberlaiu, 2 Carr. & P. 211; Jendwiue v. Slade, 1 
 
 14 Wis. 258; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Harr. Esp. 572; Omrod v. Hatli, 14 Mees. & 
 
 & G. (Md.) 495; Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. W. (564; Duulop v. Wriglit, 1 Peake N. 
 
 577; Foster v. Estate of Caldwell, 18 P. 123; Budd ■;;. Fairmaner, 5 Carr. & 
 
 Vt. 17G; Beeman v. Buck, 3 Vt. 53; P. 78; Ricliardson v. Brown, 8 Moore, 
 
 Tliornton v. Tliompsou, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 338; s. c. 1 Bing. 344. The statement 
 
 121; Buswell v. Roby, 3 N. H. 4G7; must be such as to justify the vendee 
 
 Tuttle y. Brown, 4 Gray (Mass.), 457, in relying upon it as a statement of 
 
 460; DeSchawuberg v. Buchanan, 5 fact, as distinguished from an opinion. 
 
 Carr. & P. 343; Power v. Barbara, 4 Manufacturing Co. v. Thoraas (Iowa), 
 
 Ad. & El. 473. At least, upon proper 5 N. W. Rep. 737; Worth v. Mc-Connell 
 
 instructions as to the effect of the (Mich.), 4 N. W. Rep. 198. 
 language which the jury may find to - Lamme v. Gregg, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 
 
 have been used. Denning v. Foster, 444. 
 42 N. H. 165, 176. Compare, as to the 3 Salmon v. Ward, 2 Carr. & P. 211.
 
 928 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 ranty, it is for the jury to determine whether the purchaser 
 accepted and acted upon the statement as such; since, as ah'eady 
 seen/ this acceptance and action are necessary to give to the 
 statement the quality of a contract, — in other words, to lift 
 it cut of the character of a mere representation and to make it a 
 wai ranty. Thus, where a railroad company issued and sold 
 bonds which bore on their face a certificate, signed by persons 
 describing tliemselvo> as trustees, that the bonds were secured 
 by a fiirst mortgage to such persons in trust for the bondholders, — 
 it was held that there was no absolute presumption that a pur- 
 chaser of such a bond relied upon the certificate, and that, in an 
 action upon a note given by him as a part of the consideration 
 of the purchase, the defense being a breach of this assumed con- 
 tract of warranty, the question should be submitted to the jury, 
 to determine whether the defendant accepted the bond relying 
 to any extent on the certificate.'^ 
 
 § 1200. Precedent of an Instruction in Such a Case. — "If dur- 
 ing the negotiation for the sale of the horse, the defendant made an 
 assertion of soundness, which assertion was intended to cause the sale 
 of the horse, and was operative or effectual in oausing such sale, then 
 such assertion would constitute a warranty. But a mere expression of 
 an opinion is not enough to constitute a warranty." ^ 
 
 1 Ante, § 1195. but iu the seuse iu which the words 
 
 2 EdAvards v. Marcy. 2 Allen are used in this connection, there is no 
 (Mass.), 4G0. difference. Again, many cases make 
 
 2 Approved in Little v, Woodworth, a distinction between the assertion of 
 
 8 Neb. 283. The court said (p. 284) : a fact and the expression of an opin- 
 
 *' It is well settled that no particular ion. Yv^hether certain words, would be 
 
 form or set of words are necessary to regarded as the affirmation of a fact 
 
 constitute a warranty of the character or tlic expression of an opinion would 
 
 or soundness of chattels, but that any often depend upon tho nature of the 
 
 form of words, whereby a vendor, article commended. Words, which 
 
 pending a negotiation, makes aOirma- might amount lo ;i warranty of sound- 
 
 tion or assertion that his article of ness of a horse, might be regarded as 
 
 traffic is possessed of a particular a mere expression of opinion wlieu 
 
 character, for tlie purpose of inducing applied to tlie merits of a patent wash- 
 
 a purchase, when such affirmation or ing machine. We see no objection to 
 
 assertion is relied upon by the pur- the instruction given, as it very fairly 
 
 chaser, will constitute a warranty, expresses the law of the case, as we 
 
 Some cases make a distinction be- understand it." 
 tween alBrmatiou and mere assertion.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVIIL] warranties in sales of chattels. 929 
 
 § 1201. Whether Quality Equal to Warranty. — In an ac- 
 tion for the purchase price of a manufactured article, sold with 
 warranty, the question of the strength and capacity of the article 
 to undergo the service for which it was intended, is a pure ques- 
 tion of fact. So is the question what is proper management in 
 the use of such an article.^ 
 
 § 1202. What Constitutes " Unsoundness " in an Ani- 
 mal. — On like grounds, in an action for a breach of warranty 
 of the soundness of an animal, it has been laid down that what 
 constitutes an unsoundness is a matter for the jury. " It is not 
 the province of the judge to determine the character of diseases. 
 When we say, therefore, that distemper would have been an un- 
 .soundness as well as glanders, we mean, of course, if the jury 
 should so consider it from the evidence submitted to them. 
 Whether glanders is an aggravated form of distemper or a dis- 
 tinct disease, or whether either of the diseases would constitute an 
 unsoundness, are rtuestions of fact with which the court has nothins: 
 to do . " 2 So , it has been ruled , in an action for a breach of warranty, 
 t hat the question whether corns in a horse' s feet constitute unsound- 
 ness, is a question of fact, to be determined upon the evidence, and 
 the general legal definition of unsoundness „ The court say ; ' ' The 
 law gives a general definition of unsoundness, and leaves it to the 
 trier of the facts to find whether the infirmity of corns, in the par- 
 ticular case, is within the general definition of unsoundness, — 
 whether that defect materially diminishes the value of the horse 
 and his ability to perform service . Such a diminution of value and 
 ability is an unsoundness, although it be temporary and curable." ^ 
 
 1 Tyson v. Tyson, 92 N. C. 288. such an organic defect that his stum- 
 
 2 Lindsay v. Davis, 30 Mo. 406, bling can only be avoided by a peculiar 
 412. A warranty of soundness of a mode of shoeing, which the vendee, 
 horse, unless expressly restricted, ex- using reasonable diligence, cannot 
 tends to all manner of unsoundness, discover. Morse r. Pitman (N, H.), 4 
 whether known to the vendor or not. Atl. Rep= 880. 
 
 Van Hoesenv. Cameron (Mich.), 20 N. ^ Alexander v. Button, 58 N. H. 
 
 W. Rep. 609. A warranty that a horse 282. Compare Kiddell v. Buruard, 9 
 
 is sure-footed, and all right in every Mees. & W. 668; Roberts v. Jenkins, 
 
 way, excepting only stumbling from 21 N. H. 116, 119. 
 temporary causes, is broken if he has
 
 930 PEOVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 § 1203. Instruction as to what Disease will Constitute an Un- 
 soundness. — "The rule of law as it is laid down in the books in this 
 class of cases is, that if, at the time of the sale, an animal has any dis- 
 ease which actually does diminish the actual usefulness of the animal, so 
 as to make it less capable of work of any description, or which, in its 
 ordinary progress, will diminish the natural usefulness of the animal ; 
 or if the animal has, either from disease or accident, undergone any al- 
 ' teration of structure, which either actually does at the time of sale, or in 
 its ordinary effects will diminish the usefulness of the animal, such ani- 
 mal is unsound." ^ 
 
 § 1204. [Continued.] Instruction that " Texas Itch,"" in a 
 Horse, is Such a Disease. — "If it is true that Briggs [warrantor] 
 himself, and also several witnesses for him, who had in various ways 
 been connected with the herd, neither knew nor had observed that the 
 horses sold said Dunbar were diseased ; yet, if you are satisfied from 
 the evidence that said horses were at the time of said sale, in fact in- 
 fected with said disease, known as the ' Texas itch,' this will be suffi- 
 cient to show a breach of the warranty of the soundness of said 
 horses ; if you believe from the evidence there was in fact any such 
 warranty, made by said Briggs, as claimed by said defendant." ^ 
 
 § 1205. Instruction as to Rule of Caveat Emptor. — "On the 
 sale of an article of personal property, no action can be maintained for 
 any difference in quality between the thing contracted for and the thing 
 delivered, unless there be an express warranty made by the seller, or 
 there be fraud on his part. Without an express warranty by the seller, 
 or fraud on his part, the buyer must stand all losses." ^ 
 
 §1206. [Continued.] What Constitutes a Warranty in the Sale 
 OF a Chattel. — "In order to constitute a warranty, there must be ai- 
 affirmation as to the quality or condition of the thing sold (not asserted 
 as a matter of opinion or belief), made by the seller at the time of the 
 sale, for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the fact 
 affirmed, and inducing him to make the purchase, which is so received 
 and relied on by the purchaser, and that the purchase-money was paid 
 
 1 Approved in Van Iloesen v. Cam- ^ Approved in Wallace v. Wren, 32 
 eron, ot j\Iich. filfi, C.IT. 111. 148. 
 
 2 Approved in Dimbarv. Briggs, 18 
 Neb. 94, 97.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXVIII.] WARRANTIES IN SALES OF CHATTELS. 931 
 
 for the undertaking of the seller, that the article sold was of a particu- 
 lar quality." i 
 
 § 1207. [CoNTixuED.] Vendor not Responsible for Representa- 
 tion OF Honest Belief. — "If the seller of an article of personal prop- 
 erty represents what he himself believes as to the qualities or value of 
 an article, and leaves the determination to the judgment of the buyer, 
 there is no fraud or warranty in the case, and the seller would not be 
 liable'for any defect in the quality of the thing sold." ^ 
 
 § 1208. Instruction as to Effect op Warranty op Machine, in 
 Action for Price with Breach op Warranty as Counter-Claim. — 
 " The question for you to determine is this : Was the machine war- 
 ranted as represented ? If so, did it fail to operate as it was warranted 
 to do? And if it did so fail, what was the amount of damages sustained 
 by the defendant? The burden of proof, to establish these allegations, 
 is upon the defendant, and he must satisfj'' your minds by a preponder- 
 ance of evidence that the machine was warranted and that it failed to 
 operate as warranted, or it will be your duty to return a verdict for 
 plaintiffs for the full amount due on the note by its terms." ^ 
 
 § 1209. [Continued.] Instruction as to Measure op Damages in 
 Such a Case. — "If j-ou find from the evidence that the plaintiff's agent 
 did warrant the machine as represented, and that it failed to answer its 
 warranted character, then the measure of defendant's damages is the 
 difference between the value of the machine in the condition in which it 
 actually was at the time of the sale, and what it would have been had it 
 answered its warranted character." "* 
 
 §1210. [Continued.] Instruction as to Effect op Agreement to 
 Rescind in Case op Failure of Warranty. — "The defendant al- 
 leges in his answer that it was the contract between the parties, that if 
 the machine, upon trial of the same, did not perform as it was war- 
 ranted, upon being notified, plaintiff would receive back the same 
 
 ^ Ibid. Iowa, 477; Grammar v. Borgam, 27 
 
 2 Ihid. Iowa, 3G9; Williams v. Douaidson, 8 
 
 3 Approved iu McCormick v. Dun- Iowa, 108. 
 
 ville, 36 Iowa, 645, 648; citing Aultraau ■* McCormick v. Duuville, 36 Iowa, 
 
 V. Theirer, 34 Iowa, 272 ; and distin- 645, 649. 
 guishiug Bamberger v. Grieuer, 18
 
 932 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 and return the defendant the money paid, and that the defendant noti- 
 fied plaintiffs of the fact that the machine would not work, and requested 
 them to receive it back and return the money, which they refused to 
 do. If 3^ou find that this was the contract between the parties, then 
 you are instructed that defendant cannot recover on his counter-claim 
 for damages without having returned the machine to plaintiffs, or with- 
 out proving an offer to return, and a refusal by them to receive it, pro- 
 vided the plaintiffs or their agent could be found. " i 
 
 1 Ibid. 649.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 933 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 
 Section 
 1215. Eeasonable Diligence in Presenting Commercial Paper. 
 1216 In Presenting Bill of Exchange for Acceptance. 
 1217. Precedent of an Instruction in such a Case. 
 1218: In Presenting Sight Drafts for Payment. 
 
 1219. This Rule, how Applied. 
 
 1220. In Presenting a Demand Note, or a Note in which Time of Payment Is 
 
 not fixed. 
 
 1221. "When a Demand Note is Overdue. 
 
 1222. Reasonable Hours for Presentment of Commercial Paper. 
 
 1223. Reasonable Notice of Dishonor of Commercial Paper: View that this is 
 
 a Question of Fact. 
 
 1224. View of Lord jMansfield and his Associates th at it is a Question of Law. 
 
 1225. This View generally Adopted in America. 
 
 1226. No Reversal if the Jury decide it Rightly. 
 
 1227. This Rule, how Applied in England. 
 
 1228. Further Illustrated. 
 
 1229. Another Illustration. 
 
 1230. Precedent of an Instruction on this Point. 
 
 1231. Another Precedent: ludorser Competent to give Notice to Prior In- 
 
 dorsee 
 
 1232. Another Precedent: Variance in Description in Notice of Dishonor. 
 
 1233. Whether the Circumstances of a Particular Case ai-e Sufficient to Dis- 
 
 pense with Demand and Notice. 
 
 1234. Effect of Insolvent inserting the Bill in his Schedule. 
 
 1235. "Waiver of Notice to Indorser. 
 
 1236. Whether Notice of Protest probably reached the Indorser. 
 
 1237. " Second of Exchange, First Unpaid." 
 
 1238. Refusal to Pay or Accept. 
 
 1239. Whether the Holder took in Good Faith and without Notice of Prior 
 
 Equities. 
 
 1240. Whether the Plaintiff has Assigned the Note sued on to Another for the 
 
 Benefit of his Creditors. 
 
 1241. Whether Note an Extension of Time or Collateral Security. 
 
 1242. Whether Notes are Renewals of Former Notes. 
 
 1243. How the Jury Instructed in such a Case. 
 
 1244- Instruction as to the Effect of an Indorsement in Blank in an Action by 
 
 the Assignee. 
 1245 Instruction as to Duty of Indorsee of Check to JIake Effort to Collect 
 
 same before suing Drawer.
 
 934 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY' [1 Thomp. Tr,, 
 
 § 1215. Reasonable Diligence in Presenihig Commercial 
 Paper. — The right of the holder of a bill cf exchange which 
 has not matured, or of a bill of exchange or promissory note 
 which has matured, to hold the drawer in case of a bill of ex- 
 change, or the maker in case of a promissory note, for the 
 amount named in the instrument, in the case of non-acceptance 
 before maturity or non-payment after maturity, — seems to de- 
 pend upon the exercise of reasonable diligence upon the part of 
 the holder in presenting the paper, for acceptance or payment as 
 the case may be, and in giving notice to the indorser of its non- 
 acceptance or non-payment. Active diligence, it has been said, 
 is imposed upon the obligee in pursuing the obligor, fcr a re- 
 covery of the sum due on a bill assigned to him, so that nothing 
 shall be lost by his laches ; and the question is whether he did 
 use due diligence, which is a question for tfie decision of the 
 court} This measure of diligence is discharged by making pre- 
 sentment within what the law calls a reasonable time. 
 
 § 1216. In presenting Bill of Exchange for Acceptance. — 
 
 A bill of exchange nuist be presented for acceptance within a 
 reasonable time^ with reference to the interest of the drawer to 
 put the bill in circulation, or the interest of the drawee to have 
 the bill speedily presented; and what constitutes a reasonable 
 time is a mixed question of law and fact, for the determination 
 of the court and jury,^ — which means that the question must be 
 submitted to the jury under proper instructions.^ Where there 
 was no evidence of a general visage, and the testimony as to the 
 opinion of merchants on the point was conflicting, the court re- 
 fused to disturb a verdict, in which it was found that a delay of 
 five months, in presenting a bill drawn upon Rio de Janeiro, was 
 not unreasonable. In giving the opinion of the court, Tindal, 
 C. J., said: " There is no definite time prescribed by the law of 
 England, within which such presentment for acceptance must 
 
 1 Crawford v. Berry, G Gill & J. ^ Miillick v. Kadakisseu, 9 Moore 
 
 (Md.) 63, 70; Brooks v. Elgin, G Gill V. C. 4G. 
 
 CMd.), 254, 2G0. ^ Mollish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416, 
 
 421; ante, § 1031.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 935 
 
 take place. lu some countries, as iu France, the times within 
 which a foreign bill, payable at sight, or at any certain time after, 
 must be presented for acceptance to the drawee, are fixed by 
 positive law, according to the place where, and the place on 
 which the bill is drawn. Thus, for instance, where it is drawn 
 from the continent of Europe, or the isles of Europe, and pay- 
 able within the European possessions of France, such present- 
 ment for acceptance must be made within six months from the 
 date, in default of which, the holder can have no remedy against 
 the drawer or indorsers.^ But there is no such law in Eno-land : 
 una, in the absence of any such positive regulation, or of any 
 general usage or course of trade, no other rule, as it appears to 
 us, can be laid down as the limit within which the bill must be 
 forwarded to its destination, than that it must take place within 
 a reasonable time, under all the circumstances of the case, and 
 that there must be no unreasonable or improper delay. Whether 
 there has been, in any particular case, reasonable diligence used, 
 or whether unreasonable delay has occurred, is a mixed question 
 of law and fact, to be decided by the jury, acting under the 
 direction of the judge, upon the particular circumstances of each 
 case." 2 
 
 § 1217. Precedent of an Instruction in such a Case. — The jury 
 are to determine, on the evidence before them, whether there had been 
 an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff, the holder of the bill, 
 in sending it forward for acceptance, or in putting it into circulation. 
 In order to arrive at the proper determination of this question, the jury 
 are to take into their consideration the situation and interests, not of 
 the drawer only, or of the holder only, but the situation and interests 
 of both ; and to say whether, under all the circumstances, the delay in 
 this case, was unreasonable or not.-' 
 
 ^ Citing Code de Commerce, liv. 1, approved by the whole court. The 
 
 tit. 8, § 11. priuciple upou which this case was de- 
 
 2 Mellish V. Eawdon, 9 Biug-. 41G, cided had been declared iu the Com- 
 ^-2- mon Pleas as early as 1795, lu the 
 
 3 This iustruction, with some case of Muilmau v. D'Eguiuo, 2 H. Bl. 
 slight verbal cliauges, was giveu by 505. Iu this last case Mr. Justice 
 Tiudal, C. J., iu Mellish r. Eawdon, 9 Buller conceived that, "if, instead of 
 Biug. 410, and, after advisement, was putting the bill iuto circulation, the
 
 936 PROVIJ^CE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOIlip. Tr.^ 
 
 § 1218. In presenting Sight Drafts for Payment. — The 
 
 rule as to bills of exchange drawn payable at sight, is that they 
 must be presented for payment within areasonahle thne.^ It has 
 been said in one case,^ and held in others,^ that what is a rea- 
 sonable time for the presentment of such a draft is a question of 
 fact; but the better opinion, supported by the decisions of the 
 best courts, and by the opinions of the most approved writers on 
 negotiable paper, is that, where the facts are clear and uncon- 
 tradicted, the question is one oflaio, to be decided by the court.* 
 This view is to be preferred, because it results in giving the 
 mercantile community definite rules by which to govern their 
 actions, instead of remitting the question to the uncertain discre- 
 tion of juries. 
 
 § 1219. This Rule, how Applied. — In the application of this 
 principle, it has been held, as a matter of law, that, where a bank 
 has received a sight draft for collection, drawn upon a party or 
 another bauk, having a place of business in the same city in which 
 the collecting bank is situated, the collecting bank does not use 
 due diligence if it fail to present the draft to the payee for pay- 
 ment before the close of the folloioing day ; ^ and it has been 
 held that a custom among banks, of doing business among them- 
 selves through a clearing house, does not alter the rule that a 
 
 hokter were to lock it up for any Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Phoenix Ins. Co. 
 
 length of time, * * * he was gnilty v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501, 511. 
 of laches." This expression, thought •* Prescott Banli v. Caverly, 7 Gray 
 
 Tindal, C. J., in the case lirst cited, (Mass.), ^17; Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow. 
 
 "when properly construed, only leaves (N. Y.) 705; s. c. 17 Am. Dec. 538; 
 
 the rule above laid down as tin- Mohawk Banlc v. Broderick, 10 Weud. 
 
 certain and undefined in its applica- (N. Y.) 304 ; Gough v. Staats, 13 
 
 tion as it was before." Mellish v. Wend. (N. Y.) 549; Dy as r. Hanson, 
 
 Rawdou, !) Biug. 423. Compare 14 Mo. App. 363; Byles on Bills, IGS; 
 
 Schute V. Robins, Mood. & Malk. Edwards on Bills, § 540; Dan. Neg. 
 
 133. Instr., §4(iG. But while it is error to 
 
 1 Salisbury v. Renick, 44 Mo. 554; submit this question to the jury, yet if 
 Phoenix Ins. Co. ■;;. Allen, 11 Mich. the jury decide it rightly, there will be 
 501, 511. no ground for reversing the judgment. 
 
 2 Pugitt V. Nixon, 44 Mo. 295, Dyas v. Hanson, sHpra; ante,^W2Q. 
 opinion by Wagner, J. ^ Dyas v. Hanson, 14 Mo. App. 363, 
 
 3 Mohawk Bank v. Broderick, 13 370.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 937 
 
 check must be presented to the bank on which it is drawn at 
 least during banking hours on the next succeeding day.^ And 
 although there has been some difference of opinion as to whether 
 the same measure of diligence is required in the presentment of 
 sight bills of exchange as in the presentment of bank checks, 
 the better opinion seems to be that there is no sound reason for 
 a distinction. " The fact that one instrument is drawn upon a 
 bank and the other upon an individual, can make no difference 
 in principle concerning the duty of the holder; what will be 
 due diligence in the one case will be due diligence in the 
 other." 2 
 
 § 1220. In presenting a Demand Note, or a Note in which 
 Time of Payment is not fixed. — A bill or note may be trans- 
 ferred as well after, as before it is due.' The difference is said 
 to be that if it is transferred after due, as there is no time fixed 
 for payment, the indorser undertakes that it will be paid on de- 
 mand, which means that it will be paid within a reasonable time 
 after demand of payment is made ; and what is a reasonable time 
 is a question of fact for the jury under all the circumstances of 
 the case.* It has been so held, where the note was drawn and 
 dated in New York, on the 4th of Augu.'^t, 1857, by a person 
 living in Pennsylvania, and was presented about the 12th of Sep- 
 tember following. The court held that, under the circumstances, 
 whether the delay of presentment for between five and six 
 weeks was reasonable or not, ought to have been submitted to 
 the jury. The court conceded the general rule that, where all 
 the facts are entirely undisputed, what is a reasonable time is a 
 question of law, but added: " In a case like the present, involv- 
 ing various considerations, and particularly the laws of a sister 
 State, it appears to us that this question should have been sub- 
 
 1 Rosenblatt v. Haberman, 8 Mo. son, J. See also St. John v. Homans, 
 App. 486. See also Alexanders. Burch- 8 Mo. 382,385; Marker v. Anderson, 
 field, 1 Carr. & M. 75; s. c. 7 Man. &G. 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372. 
 
 1061. 3 story on Bills, §§ 220, 223. 
 
 2 Smith V. Janes, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) ■« Union Bank v. Ezell, 10 Humph. 
 192; s. c 32 Am. Dec.'527, per Bron- CTenn.) 385.
 
 938 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl., 
 
 mitted to the jury under proper instructions of the court." ^ 
 The question whether demand has been made upon the maker 
 ^yithin a reasonable time, so as to charge an indorser, is reasoned 
 upon the same principles. It is said, that it has never been at- 
 tempted to fix the time with any degree of precision, except in 
 reference to the circumstances of each particular case; which cir- 
 cumstances go merely to show the intention of the parties in re- 
 spect to the time of payment, and amount therefore to no more 
 than evidence of their agreement. This being a question of intent, 
 and the intent not being expressed on the face of the instrument, 
 it is a question, like other questions of intent, to be determined 
 by a jury under all the circumstances surrounding the trans- 
 action. ^ 
 
 § 1221. When a Demand Note is Overdue. — In England " a 
 note payable on demand is not considered as overdue without 
 some evidence of payment having been demanded and refused ; 
 although it be several 3'ears old, and no interest has been paid 
 on it."^ "It has been a question," says Chancellor Kent, 
 ' ' when a note payable on demand is to be deemed a note out of 
 time, so as to subject the indorsee, upon a subsequent negotia- 
 tion of it, to the operation of the rule," — meaning the rule 
 which lets in proof of equities between the original parties, 
 where the note is negotiated after it becomes due. And he pro- 
 ceeds to state that, " when the facts and circumstances are 
 
 1 Barbour v. Fullerton, 36 Pa. 9 Mees. & W. 15; Barough v. White, 4 
 St. 105, opiuiou by Koacl, J. The Baru. & Cress. 325. But the American 
 court added: "The distinction be- cases seem to hold that the undertak- 
 tween the two classes of cases is often ing of an indorser of such a note is 
 a nice one, and is carefully marked by that he will be bound, provided the 
 Chief Justice Shaw in Wyman v. payee, without success, uses due dili- 
 Adams, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 210." geuce to collect the same within a 
 
 2 Tomliuson Carriage Co. v. Kin- reasonable time. Castle v. Candee, 16 
 sella, 31 Couu. 269, 273. In England Conn. 221 ; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 
 the very sensible conclusion has been Conn. 361; Culver v. Parish, 21 Conn, 
 reached that the word ^' demand, ^^ in 408. 
 
 such a note, is synonymous with ^ Byles on Bills (7th ed.), 145, 179, 
 
 " request ^^ and that the promise is 180; Chitty on Bills (10th ed.), 155; 
 
 therefore a promise to pay when re- Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 Me'fcs. & W. 15, 
 
 quested to do so. Brooks v. Mitchell, and American note. 
 
 J
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 939 
 
 ascertained, the reasonableness of time is a matter of law, and 
 every case will depend upon its special circumstances." ^ Amer- 
 ican cases are found w^liich proceed upon the ground that it is a 
 question which is to be decided by the court? A statute of 
 Massachusetts^ put the matter at rest in that State, by enacting 
 that a demand made at the expiration of sixty days from the date 
 of the note, without grace, is deemed to be made within a reason- 
 able time} 
 
 § \'2t2Ll. Reasonable Hours for Presentment of Commercial 
 Paper. — Moreover, it seems that what are to be deemed reason- 
 able hours, within which a bill of exchange or other commercial 
 instrument may be presented for payment, is a question of law 
 for the court. Accordingly, it has been held that, where the 
 bill is made payable at a particular bank, the holder impliedly 
 agrees to ascertain the usual hours within which such banker does 
 business, and to present it within those hours ; and hence a pre- 
 sentment after the close of banhing hours, when the house is shut 
 and the clerks are gone, is not a sufficient presentment to charge 
 the drawer.^ The rule in regard to presentment at the office of a 
 banker is established with reference to a well known rule of 
 trade that a presentment out of the hours of business is not suffi- 
 cient; ^ but the English courts do not apply this rule in the case 
 of the presentment at other places than at banking houses ; nor 
 in such cases do they require that the presentment should be 
 made within business hoursJ Where the bill was presented at a 
 house in London, where it was made payable, at 8 o'clock in the 
 evening of the day when it fell due, it was held that the present- 
 ment was sufficient to charge the drawer, although at that hour 
 the house was shut up and no person answered to the bell ; ^ 
 
 1 3 Kent. Com. 120, 121. (Mass.) 400; Sacket v. Loomis, 4 Gray 
 
 2 Thurston v. M'Kown, 6 Mass. 428; (Mass.), 148. 
 
 Wethey v. Andrews, 3 Hill (N. Y.), « Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; 
 
 582; Agawan Bk. v. Strever, 18 N. Y. ELford v. Teed, 1 Maule & S. 28. 
 
 502; s. c. 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 82. « Wilkius v. Jadis, 2 Barn. & 
 
 3 Mass. Act of April 6th, 1839 Adolph. 188. 
 
 (Laws Mass. 1839, p. 56, chap. ' Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 
 
 121). 224; Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527. 
 
 * See Rice r. "Wesson, 1 1 Met. '' Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527.
 
 940 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. TlV 
 
 though it was conceded that a presentment at midnight would 
 be unreasonable,^ But, although the presentment be made at a 
 bank and after hanking hours, yet if a person has been stationed 
 there for the purpose of returning an answer to the person 
 making the presentment, and an answer that the bank has " no 
 orders " is returned, the presentment will be as good as though 
 made within banking hours ; since the purpose of presenting it 
 has been subserved. - 
 
 § 1223. Reasonable Xotice of Dislionor of Commercial 
 Paper : View tliat this is a Question of Fact. — Most of the 
 analogies, "^ which rehite to the question whether what is reason- 
 able time is for the decision of the judge or of the jury, 
 would remit this question to the jury as a question of fact; and 
 while the rule that it is to be decided as a question of law is un- 
 doubtedly more beneficial to commerce than the rule which would 
 remit it to the varying opinions of jurors, yet it is said that the 
 former is not an inflexible rule. There are many cases where it 
 w^ill be a fair question for the jury or the trier of the facts, 
 whether the holder or the notary exercised reasonable business 
 diligence in endeavoring to find out the proper address of the 
 indorser when a non-resident.^ An examination of the cases 
 shows that the courts are in the frequent habit of putting this 
 question to juries under proper instructions.^ 
 
 1 Wilkins v. Jadiz, sripra. Or be- 
 tween 6 and 7 in the evening, when no 
 one but a girl Avas left to take care of 
 the countiug house. Morgan v. Davi- 
 son, 1 Stark. 11-t. 
 
 2 Garnott v. Woodcock, 6 Maule & 
 S. 44; s. c. 1 Stark. 475. 
 
 ^ Post, § 1530, et seq. 
 
 ^ Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, 
 14 Mo. App. 152, 154. 
 
 5 In Barbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 2, 
 Lord Elleuborough, C. .T., considerhig 
 the question of reasonable notice as 
 corajiouuded of laAV aud fact, left the 
 "wiiole question to the jury; advising 
 
 them that it was not necessary, in his 
 opinion, for a person to leave all otlier 
 business and attend solely to one 
 transaction; but they were to con- 
 sider wlietlicr, upon the whole, rea- 
 sonable dispatch had been used by the 
 plaintiffs in communicating notice of 
 the dishonor of the bill to the drawer. 
 A rule for a new trial was made ab- 
 solute, and two of the judges ex- 
 pressed the opinion that the question 
 was a question of law; but llie de- 
 cision seems not to have turned upon 
 tliat point.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 941 
 
 § 1224. View of Lord Mansfield and his Associates that it 
 is a Question of Law. — It was laid down by Lord Mansfield, 
 who may be justly called the father of the English law of com- 
 mercial paper, that what is reasonable notice to an indorser of 
 non-payment by the maker of a promissory note, or to the 
 drawer in case of a bill of exchange, is a question of law, which 
 for the sake of certainty and uniformity in commercial transac- 
 tions, should be decided by the court. "It is of great conse- 
 quence," said that eminent judge, " that this question should be 
 settled. Certainty and diligence are of the utmost importance 
 in mercantile transactions. It is extremely clear that the holder 
 of a bill, when dishonored by the acceptor, must give reasonable 
 notice to the drawer or indorser. What is reasonable notice is 
 partlj'' a question of fact, and partly a question of law. It may 
 depend, in some measure on facts; such as the distance at which 
 the parties live from each other, the course of the posts, etc. 
 But wherever a rule can be laid dowm with respect to this reason- 
 ableness, that should be decided by the court and adhered to by 
 every one, for the sake of certainty." Ashurst, J., in the same 
 case said: " It is of dangerous consequence to lay it down as a 
 general rule that the jury should judge of the reasonableness of 
 time. It ought to be settled as a question of law. If the jury 
 were to determine this question in all cases, it would be produc- 
 tive of endless uncertainty." Buller, J., added the following 
 opinion: " The numerous cases on this subject reflect great dis- 
 credit on the courts of Westminster. They do infinite mischief in 
 the mercantile world, and this evil can only be remedied by doing 
 what the court wished to do in the case of MedcaJfy. Hall,^ 
 by considering the reasonableness of time as a question of law, 
 and not of fact. Whether the post goes out this or that day, at 
 what time, etc., are mattersof fact; but when those facts are estab- 
 lished, it then becomes a question of law on those facts, what no- 
 tice shall be reasonable. ' ' '^ The rule thus laid down seems finally 
 to have been established as a rule of the common law of Ensfland,^ 
 
 1 Triu. Terra, 22 Geo. 3, B. R. 3; 3 Hirschfield v. Smith, Hair. & 
 Douc 113. Ruth, 284, 288, per Erie, C. J. 
 
 2 Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167.
 
 942 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 and is now codified by statute in England in the -Bills of Ex- 
 change Act, 1882.1 
 
 § 1225. This View generally adopted in America. — This 
 view has been established by the best judicial opinion in this 
 countiy.'^ It may be formulated in the statement that the 
 question of due diligence in giving notice of protest to the drawer 
 of a bill of exchange, is, for commercial reasons, a question of 
 law, ivhere the facts are undisputed .^ The meaning is that, upon 
 a given state of facts the court may rule conclusively that the 
 notice was insufficient.^ It is a mere variation in the expression 
 of this rule to say that the sufficiency of demand and notice of 
 non-payment, to charge the indorser of a promissory note or the 
 drawer of a bill of exchange, is a question of law for the court,^ 
 or to say that it is error to submit to a jury the question whether 
 the protest of a dishonored negotiable instrument, and notice to 
 the drawer or indorser, were regular or leijal.^ As the facts will 
 not be specially found except in those jurisdictions where special 
 verdicts are in practice, or where special interrogatories are sub- 
 mitted to juries, it will, under the operation of this rule, be the 
 office of the court to instruct the jury that certain facts in evidence 
 do or do not, in law, amount to sufficient notice of non-payment 
 to charge the indorser; ^ and the cases are very numerous where, 
 
 1 45 and 40 Vict., chap. (!1, §^9, sub- 3 Carroll v. Upton, 3 N. Y. 272. 
 sec, 12. Compare Hunt v. Maybee, 7 N. Y. 2G6. 
 
 2 Brenzer v. Weightmau, 7 Watts & ^ Etting v. Schulkill Bank, 2 Pa. St. 
 S. (Pa.) 204; Bank of Columbia v. 355; Sherer w. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 
 Lawrence, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 578, 583; 134,141. 
 
 Sandersons. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 483; ^ Rickettsu. Pendleton, 14 Md. 321, 
 
 Stanley v. Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala. G52, 330. 
 
 G57; Rickettsr. Pendleton, 14 Md. 321 « Watson u. Tarpley, 18 How. (U. 
 330. "The sufficiency of service [of S.) 517. See also Bank of Columbia 
 notice to charge an indorser], upon «. Lawrence, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 578; Dick- 
 facts shown, is a question of law; and ins v. Beale, 10 Id. 572; Rhett v. Poe, 
 any rule which leaves it Indefinite 2 How. (U. S.) 457; Camden v. Do- 
 must always leave parties in doubt remus, 3 ZcZ. 515; Harris v. Robinson, 
 concerning their legal rights and lia- i Id. 33G; Lambert v. Ghiselin, 9 Id. 
 bilities." Nevius c. Bank of Lansing- 552; and see the English decisions 
 burg, 10 INIich. 547, 550, 551, -per cited in Rhett v. Poe, .swjara. 
 Campbell, J. , ' Sherer v. Eastou Bank, supra.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE 1NSTRU3IENTS. 943" 
 
 upon conceded facts or upon hypothetical instructions, the courts 
 have decided this question as one of law. It was well said 
 that "any rule adopted must be in some respects an arbitrary 
 one," and the courts proceed upon the idea that it is better to 
 apply an uniform rule in commercial transactions, than to leave 
 each case to the shifting discretion of juries.^ 
 
 § 122G. No Reversal if the Jury Decide it Rightly. — But, on a 
 principle already stated,- no prejudicial error will accrue to the indorser 
 from leaving this question to the jury, where they decide it rightly. It 
 was so held, where it was shown that a notice, accompanied by a protest 
 of a note for non-payment, was left at the office of an indorser, who 
 was an attorney at law and who kept no clerk, in the afternoon of the 
 day on which, by law, it was required to be given. Here the law pre- 
 sumed that the indorser received the notice, and it was hence sufficient 
 to charge him as matter of law ; and the decision of the jury that it did 
 so charge him was therefore correct in point of law, and the interme- 
 diate steps by which that decision was reached became immaterial. It 
 was a case of error Avithout injury, which does not authorize a reversal. ^ 
 
 § 1227. This Rule, how applied in England. — In the application of 
 this rule, to state the English cases as they have been collected and stated 
 by the late Judge Taylor in his work on evidence, ^ the reasonable time 
 within which such notice must be given means, " according as the parties 
 live in tlie same or in different places, either that the letter containing 
 notice should be so posted that, in due course of delivery, it would ar- 
 rive on the day following that on which the writer lias received intelli- 
 gence of dishonor ; ^ or that such letter should be posted before the 
 departure of the mail on the day following receipt of intelligence ; ^ or, 
 if there be no post on that day, " or if it start at au unreasonable hour in 
 
 1 Towuseud ('. Lorain Bauk, 2 Oh. 515; Smith u. Mullett, 2 Camp. 208, per 
 St. 345; Dale v. Golds, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) Lord Elleuborough; Hiltou v. Fair- 
 490; Reamer v. Downer, 23 Weud. clough, Id. 633, per Lawrence, J.; 
 (N. Y.) G2G; Brenzer v. Wightmau, 7 Rowe v. Tipper, 13 Com. Bench, 249, 
 Watts & S. (Pa.) 266; Bauk of Colum- 2oQ, per Maule, J. 
 
 bia V. Lawrence, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 583. ^ -\yiiiiaras v. Smith, 2 Barn. & Aid. 
 
 2 Ante, § 1020. 496. Compare Sheltou v. Braithwaite, 
 
 3 Stanley v. Bauk of Mobile, 26 Ala. 7 Mees. & AV. 436. 
 
 652. 1 Geill v. Jeremy, Mood. & M. 61, 
 
 •* 1 Tayl Ev. (8th Eug. ed.) § 30. per Lord Teuterdeu. 
 
 ^ Stockeu V. Collin, 7 Mees. & W.
 
 944 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 the morning, ^ — then the writer shall have an additional day. If, too, 
 the bill be presented through a banker, one day more is allowed for 
 giving notice of dishonor, than if it were presented by the party himself .^ 
 At one time a donbt seems to have been entertained whether, in the 
 event of there being several indorsers to a bill, the holder would have a 
 separate day allowed him for giving notice to each ; but it is now ex- 
 pressly decided that he has in general but one day to give notice to all 
 the parties against whom he intends to enforce his remedy, though each 
 of the indorsers in turn has his day,^ and though the holder may avail 
 himself of a notice duly given by any other party to the bill.* Again, 
 the holder of a cheque, or of a bill or note payable on demand, must, 
 in general, present the instrument for payment on or before the day 
 following that on which it was received.^ But, in these cases, the term 
 ' reasonable time ' may sometimes receive a different construction, re- 
 gard being had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade, and 
 the particular facts. ^ This last rule applies, not only as between the 
 parties to a cheque,''' but as between banker and customer, unless cir- 
 cumstances exist from which a contract or dut}^ on the part of the banker 
 to present at an earlier, or to defer presentation to a later period, can 
 be inferred."^ But the rule does not apply to cases where the action is 
 brought by the holder of a banker's cheque against the drawer, unless, 
 during the delay, the fund has been lost, as by the failure of the 
 banker, 9 — the rule being that, as between the drawer of a cheque and 
 
 1 Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Biug. 715; s. BocUliugton v. Schlencker, 4 Barn. & 
 c. 1 Moore & P. 750; Bray v. Hadweu, Ad. 752; Moule v. Brown, 4 Biug. N. 
 
 5 Manle & S. 68; Wright?;. Slmwcross, C. 266. See Bailey v. Bodeuham, 16 
 2 Barn. & Aid. 501, note. Com. B. (n. s.) 288; s. c. 33 L. J. 
 
 2 Alexander v. Burchfleld, 7 Man. (C. P.) 252. 
 
 6 G. 1061, 1066; Hayues v. Birks, 3 ^ Statute 45 & 46 Vict., chap. 61, 
 Bos. & P. 599; Scott v. Lifford, 9 East, § 45, sub-sec. 2; § 74, sub-sec. 2; § 86, 
 347; s. c. at nisi prius, 1 Camp. 246; sub-sec. 2. 
 
 Laugdale v. Trimmer, 15 East, 291. '' Hopkins v. Ware, L. R. 4 Esch. 
 
 See also the receut English statute, 45 268. 
 
 and 46 Vict., chap. 61, sec. 49, sub- « Hare v. Henty, 30 L. J. (C. P.) 
 
 sec. 13. 302; s. c. 10 Com. Bench (n. s.), 65. 
 
 3 Rowe V. Tipper, 13 Com. Bench, See Prideaux v. Criddle, L. R. 4 Q, B. 
 249; Dobree v. Eastwood, 3 Car. & P. 455; s. c. 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 232; s. c, 
 250. See, however, Gladwell v. Turner, 10 Best & Sm. 515. 
 
 39 L. J. Exch. 31 ; s. c. L. R. 5 Exch. ^ Robinson v. Hawksford, 9 Ad. & 
 
 59. El. (n. s.) 52; Serlev. Norton, 2 Mood. 
 
 ^ Chapman v. Keaue, 3 Ad & El. & Rob. 401; and see note Id. 404; 
 
 193; .s. c. 4 Nev. & M. 607. Laws v. Rand, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 76; 
 
 * Kickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537; s. c. 3 Com. Bench (x. s.), 442. See
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 945 
 
 the holder, any time less than the period of the statute of limitations is 
 unreasonable for presentment for payment, unless some loss is occa- 
 sioned to the drawer b}^ the dela}-. 
 
 § 1228. Further Illustrated. — The holder of a bill of exchange, 
 on the day after it became due, called at the office of the drawer, and, 
 on being told that he was engaged, wrote on a scrap of paper and sent 
 to him the following notice: " B.'s acceptance to J., 500 £., due 12th 
 Jan. is unpaid: payment to R. & Co. is requested before 4 o'clock." 
 The clerk of J., who took in the notice, said that " it should be attended 
 to." Upon these facts appearing, the court directed a verdict for the 
 plaintiff against the indorser, reserving leave to the defendant to move 
 to enter a verdict for him. It was held that this direction was right. ^ 
 
 § 1229. Another Illustration. — It has been held error, in an action 
 upon a bill of exchange for non-acceptance and non-payment, to in- 
 struct the jury "that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the 
 count in the declaration on the protest of the bill for non-acceptance, 
 unless due and regular notice was proved of the protest of the bill for 
 non-payment, though the jury might be satisfied from the proof, that 
 the bill had been regularly protested for non-acceptance, and due notice 
 thereof given to the defendant ; that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, 
 notwithstanding the proof of protest for non-acceptance and due notice 
 
 also Alexander v. Burchfleld, 7 Man. his opinion by saying : " It is said that 
 
 & Gr. lOGl; Heywood v. Piciiering, L. is a question for a jury." Ibid., 461. 
 
 E. 9 Q. B. 428; s. c. 43 L. J. (Q. B.) Baron Bramwell concluded his opinion 
 
 145. by saying: "I hold, tlierefore, that, 
 
 1 Paul V. Joel, 3 Hurl. & N. 455, 4G0; in this particular case, tliere was evi- 
 
 qualifyiug Solarte v. Palmer, 7 Bing. deuce for a jury, according to the law 
 
 630, and following Bailey v. Porter, 14 as laid down in Solarte v. Palmer (5 
 
 Mees. & W. 440, an authority in point. Moore & P. 475; 7 Bing. 540), that the 
 
 The peculiarity of this decision is tliat, notice so given conveyed an intimation 
 
 while the question was decided as a that the bill had been presented and 
 
 question of law, it was held by the was dislionored. And I am prepared 
 
 judges proper to leave it to the jury, to go further, and say tliat in every 
 
 Chief Baron PoUocls said: " It would case where the demand of payment is 
 
 have been propei* to leave it to the jury made on a drawer or indorser by the 
 
 to consider whetlier, under all the cir- holder of a bill on a proper day, it 
 
 cumstauces, the defendant had not rea- ouglit to be left to the jury to say 
 
 sonable information that the bill had whether, under the circumstances, 
 
 been presented and dishonored, and there was sufficient notice of dishon- 
 
 that he was called upon to pay it." or." Ibid., 463. 
 Ibid., 460. Mr. Baron Martin concluded 
 
 60
 
 946 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl*., 
 
 thereof, the plaintiff must prove protest for non-payment and due notice 
 thereof, to the defendant ; and that the jury were the judges of the 
 testimony, and could give to the witnesses such credit as they thought 
 them entitled to, looking to all the circumstances of the case." ^ 
 
 § 1230. Precedent of an Instruction on this Point. — "If the jury 
 find from the evidence that the notice of protest and non-payment of 
 the note in question was left by the notary on a desk in a second story 
 of the building occupied by defendant Boernstein, and that the business 
 office of said defendant was in the third story of said building, then the 
 jury ought to find a verdict for said defendant Boernstein, unless they 
 further find from the evidence that defendant actually received said 
 
 notice.- Unless the jury find from the evidence that notice of the 
 
 non-payment of the note in question was delivered to the defendant 
 Boernstein personally, or to some person in his employ, at his usual 
 l^lace of business, within a reasonable time after the same note became 
 due, then they will find for the said defendant Boernstein." ^ 
 
 § 1231. Another Precedent : Indorser Competent to give Notice 
 TO Prior Indorser, — "That an indorser of a promissory note is a 
 competent person to give notice to any prior indorser of a demand, and 
 the dishonor of payment of a promissory note." ^ 
 
 § 1232. Another Precedent: Variance in Description in Notice 
 OF Dishonor. — "In the notice of dishonor of a promissory note, an 
 unintentional variance in the description of the note will not vitiate the 
 notice, if, under all the circumstances of the case, the notice is not mis- 
 leading and identifies the note witli reasonable certainty." ^ 
 
 § 1233. Whether the Circumstances of a Particular Case 
 are Sufficient to Dispense with Demand and Notice. — Whether 
 the circumstances of a particular case are sufficient to dispense 
 with demand of payment, and notice to the drawer or indorser 
 of non-payment, is said to be always a question of hnv addressed 
 to the judgment of the court. If the facts on which this question 
 
 1 Watsou V. Tarpley, 18 How. * Townsend v. Chas. H. Heer Dry 
 (U. S.) 517. Goods Co,, 85 Mo. 503, 508. 
 
 2 Approved in Kleinmaii v. Bocru- •'> Townseud v. Chas. H. Heer Dry- 
 stein, 32 Mo. 314. Goods Co., 85 Mo. 503, 507. 
 
 3 Ibid.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 947 
 
 arises be admitted, or are not denied, or are undeniable, then it is 
 said to be exclusively a matter of law, to be pronounced upon by 
 the court; but if the facts be traversed, or the proof be equivocal 
 or contradictory, then it is said that the question should be sub- 
 mitted to the jury upon hypothetical instructions, by which the 
 court declares the inferences of law which arise upon such states 
 of fact as the jury may find.^ 
 
 § 1234. Effect of Insolvent Inserting the Bill in his Schedule. — 
 Contrary, it would seem, to the foregoing conceptions, it has been held 
 that, where the drawer of a bill of exchange afterwards becomes insolv- 
 ent, surrenders his property to his creditors under a statute, and inserts 
 the bill in his schedule of assets, this is evidence to go to a jury upon 
 the fact of notice, and the sufficiency of the evidence is a question for 
 them to decide, and is not subject to review or error.^ 
 
 § 1235. Waiver of Notice to Indorser. — Whether the question 
 whether an indorser has waived his right to notice of the dishonor of 
 the bill, is a question of law or of fact, seems, like many other ques- 
 tions relating to the law of waiver,^ to depend upon the nature of the 
 evidence which is adduced to support the contention that there has been 
 a waiver. In the first place, it is to be observed that the law conclu- 
 sively ascribes to certain acts, by the indorser of a note or the drawer 
 of a bill, the effect of a waiver of the right to such notice. That a s?<6- 
 sequent promise to pay the note by an indorser, who has full knowledge 
 of all the facts, amounts to a complete waiver of the want of due notice, 
 
 1 Orear v. McDonald, 9 Gill (Md.), the bill, has been held to be competent 
 350, 359; following Cathell v. Good- evidence to go to a jury, of a regular 
 win, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.) 470. notice of the dishonor of the bill, and 
 
 2 Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. (U. S.) to warrant a jury In presuming that a 
 170,175. In the opinion of the court regular notice had been given. Thorn- 
 byMr. Justice Campl)ell, it is said: ton u. Wynn, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 183; 
 " A plaintiff may prove, by admissions Rogers v. Stevens, 2 T. R. 713 ; Patter- 
 of a defendant, that all the steps nee- sou v. Beecher, 6 J. B. Moore, 319; 
 essary to charge him as an indorser or Caihpbell v. Webster, 2 Man. G. & Sc. 
 drawer of a bill of exchange have been 253; Union Bank v. Grimshaw, 15 La. 
 taken. Proof of a direct or condi- 321. The effect of such evidence in tlie 
 tional promise to pay after a bill be- particular case must be determined by 
 comes due, or of a partial payment, or the jury, and their decision cannot be 
 of an offer of a composition, or of an reviewed by an appellate court." 
 acknowledgment of his liability to pay ^ Post, § 1435, et seq.
 
 948 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY, [l Thomp. Tl*., 
 
 is settled as a matter of law.i So, of a subsequent part payment of the 
 note by the indorser, with knowledge of the precedent facts. While 
 some of the cases assert that it is evidence from which a jury ma}- infer 
 that demand was duly made and notice given, many others declare it 
 to be a waiver of notice itself.^ So, a subsequent promise^ with full 
 knowledge of the facts, although not founded on any new considera- 
 tion, is deemed to hold the indorser to his liability, on the principle of 
 loaiver.^ But it must be shown by the plaintiff, affirmatively and clearl}-, 
 that the drawer or indorser knew, when he made the subsequent prom- 
 ise, that he had not received regular notice. This is a fact to be 
 proved, and it is not to be inferred, from the mere fact of a subsequent 
 promise, that regular notice had been given, or was intended to be 
 waived.* So, if the indorser agree to extend the time of payment be- 
 yond the maturity of the note, such an agreement amounts to a guar- 
 anty that he will hold himself bound at the expiration of that time, and 
 is in law a waiver in advance of his right to notice ^ So, where the 
 holder of a negotiable note, by an agreement with the maker, and for a 
 valuable consideration, extended the time for its payment, and after- 
 wards indorsed the same to a third person, without giving him notice of 
 the agreement for such extension, it was held that he was liable to the 
 indorsee without demand of payment upon the maker, protest, or no- 
 tice ; since, to hold otherwise would be to allow him, by his secret agree- 
 ment, to perpetrate a fraud upon the indorsee. In other words, the 
 law, upon such facts, conclusively ascribes a waiver of his right of 
 notice.*^ On the other hand, it has been held that, whether certain 
 conversations amounted to a waiver of the right of demand and notice, 
 
 1 Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 109; Eogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713, 
 134, 141, per Strong, J. Hospes v. Alder, 6 East, 16, u. ; Luudie 
 
 2 Levy V. Peters, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) v. Robertson, 7 East, 231 ; Aiison v. 
 125, 128; Reed v. Wilkinson, MS., Bailey, Bui. N. P. 276; Whittaker r. 
 opinion of Mr. Justice Washington at Morris, Esp. Dig. 58; Wilkes «. Jacks, 
 Circuit (cited in Whart. Dig. 87); Peake N. P. Cas. 203; Porter ?;. Ray - 
 Vaughan v. Fuller, 2 Strange, 1246; worth, 13 East, 417; Haddock w. Bury, 
 Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 134, MS. (cited 7 East, 236). Compare 
 142. Forster v. Jurdisou, 11 East, 104. 
 
 '" Duryee v. Dennisou, 5 Johns. ^ Trimble v. Thome, 16 Johns. 
 
 (N. Y.) 248; Trimble v. Thome, 16 (N. Y.) 152. 
 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 151; Miller t?. Hackley, * Ridgway v. Dey, 13 Pa. St. 208, 
 
 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 375, 383; Grain v. Col- 211. 
 
 well, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 384; Agau v. <= Williams v. Brobst, 10 Watts 
 
 McManus, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 180; (Pa), 111. 
 Donaldson v. Means, 4 Dall. (U. S.)
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 949 
 
 is a question of fact for a jury ; ^ and it was held proper to refuse to 
 instruct the jury that, if the indorser, after knowing the fact of his dis- 
 charge from liability by reason of the failure to make demand and give 
 notice, said " that he meant to pay the note, but should take his own 
 time for it, and would not put himself in the power of the bank," ren- 
 dered him liable to pay the note.^ Referring to this case, a modern 
 writer of reputation expresses the view that, whether or not distinct 
 words used would amount to a waiver, is a question of law ; although 
 he concedes that, if intermixed with others about which the testimony 
 is clear and concurrent, it would make a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 Contrary to much that is said above, it was held in Massachusetts that 
 the statement by an indorser who had received no notice of non-pay- 
 ment, upon being asked what he was going to do about the note, that 
 " the note will be paid," was not equivalent to a waiver of notice, — 
 the court being of opinion that the expression fell short of a promise 
 by him, either to pay the note or to see it paid.'' 
 
 § 1236. Whether Notice of Protest probably reached the In- 
 dorser. — Although the certificate of notice in a protest of a notary 
 may be so drawn as not to be evidence to charge the indorser, yet it 
 has been held that the court may, under circumstances, instruct the 
 jury that they may connect with it the other evidence on the part 
 of the plaintiff, and that, if they believe from the evidence that the 
 notice was left in such a way that in all probability it reached the de- 
 fendant, it was sufficient to charge him: " It was for the jury to say, 
 from the whole proof thus taken together, whether the facts would justify 
 the conclusion that the defendant had received the notice left at his 
 office."^ This holding is based upon a conception which is not sup- 
 ported by the current of authority. The rule established by judicial 
 authority generally is that the fact whether notice was received is im- 
 material ; since it is not a question of actual notice, but a question of 
 diligence in giving notice.^ 
 
 § 1237. '* Second of Exchange, First Unpaid." — The mean- 
 ing of these words iii a bill of exchange has been held, under 
 
 1 See ante, § 1105, et seq. ^ Stanley v. Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala. 
 
 ^ Union Bank v. Magi'iider, 7 Peters 652, ()57. Compare Rives v. Parmley, 
 
 (U.S.), 287,290. 18 Ala. 201; Caster v. Thomason, 1& 
 
 3 2 Dan. Neg. Instr., § 1100. Ala. 721. 
 
 ^ Creamer 15 Perry, 17 Pick. (Mass.) « AiUe, §§ 1223-1225. 
 
 332, 335.
 
 950 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tbomp. Tr!, 
 
 certain circumstances, a question of law for the court, and not of 
 fact for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1238. Refusal to Pay or Accept. — But the refusal to pay 
 or accept commercial paper is, of course, a question of fact; and, 
 where this is in doubt or dispute, the court errs in giving an in- 
 struction which assumes that there was such a refusal. ^ 
 
 § 1239. Whether the Holder took it in Good Faith and 
 without Notice of Prior Equities. — On grounds of public 
 policy, with the view of protecting those who deal in commercial 
 paper and of upholding the cliaracter of these instruments of 
 commerce, the courts in England and in this country have, after 
 some conflicting decisions, united in the conclusion that, whoever 
 purchases a negotiable security from the holder before maturity, 
 gets a good title thereto, discharged of any equities which may 
 have existed between the original parties to the instrument, in 
 the absence of knowledge on the part of the purchaser of cir- 
 cumstances affecting tlie title of the holder, provided the pur- 
 chaser acts in good faith. It is not sufficient to destroy his title 
 that there were circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man 
 upon inquiry, or that he may have been negligent in failing to avail 
 himself of his means of knowledge. The test of his liability is 
 not neo-li^ence or diligence, but it is good faith or bad faith; al- 
 though the fact of negligence may, under circumstances, be re- 
 garded as evidence tending to show bad faith. ^ It is obvious 
 that, in cases which call for the application of this rule, the ques- 
 tion whether the purchaser of the paper had notice of prior 
 equities will, if tlie evidence is conflicting, be a question of fact 
 
 IBank of Pittsburg v. Neal, 22 s. c. 10 Eng. C. L. 154; Goodman v. Har- 
 How. (U.S.) 96, 108. Compare An- vey, 4 Ad. & EI. 870; Swift v. Tyson* 
 drews v. Pond, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 5 ; Fow- 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1 ; Goodman v. Simonds, 
 lerv. Brantley, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 318; 20 IIow. (U. S.) 343; Pringle v. Phil- 
 Goodman V. Simonds, 20 How. (U. S.) ips, 5 Saudf. S. C. (N. Y.) 157 (wliere 
 343. See ante, § 1075, et seq. tlie decisions are ably reviewed) ; 
 
 2 Brooks?;. Elgin, 6 Gill & J. (Md.) Hamilton v. Marks, 63 Mo. 178; Ed- 
 254, 259; Weeton v. Ilodd, 26 Eng. L. wards r. Thomas, 66 Mo. 483; Mason v 
 & Eq. 278. Bank of Commerce, 16 Mo. App. 275. 
 
 3 Gill V. Cubit, 3 Barn. & Cres. 466; Compare Both v. Colvin, 32 Vt. 125.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 951 
 
 for the jury; and, upon a principle elsewhere stated, that fraud^ 
 and intent^ are hi general questions of fact, it will also follow 
 that the question whether the purchaser acquired title to the 
 paper in good faith, within the meaning of the rule, will gener- 
 ally be a question of fact for the jury. It is said, in a else in 
 Vermont, that -the questions, whether the holder of current ne- 
 gotiable paper has taken it with or without notice of defenses 
 between prior parties, —whether he has exercised good faith in 
 the transaction, or has been guilty of negligence or a want of 
 proper caution, — are always questions of fact to be submitted 
 to and determined by the jury. All the circumstances attending 
 the transaction, the condition of the several other parties, and all 
 other facts that bear upon such an issue, are onlv evidence for the 
 jury to weigh in deciding it ; " 3 and it was held that, in respect 
 of such an inquiry, a /r/eree stands in the place of a jury.* 
 
 § 1240. Whether the Plaintiff has Assigned the Note sued on to 
 Another for the Benefit of his. Creditors. — In an action upon a 
 promissory note, it has been held that an answer averrino- that plaint- 
 iff has assigned the note to another for the benefit of his creditors 
 raises an issue in the nature of a dilatory plea, which, if found true,' 
 would not result even in an abatement of the action, but would furnish 
 ground for an order of court requiring the additional party to be made 
 plaintiff, on pain of a dismissal without prejudice; that the issue thus 
 raised is triable by the court, ^nd not by the jury; and that the 07ius 
 jprobandi is on the party making the objection. It was added that 
 where no other defense is set up, and the court finds for the plaintiff on 
 such an issue, the court should render judgment on the merits, without 
 the intervention of a juiy.^ 
 
 § 1241. Whether Note an Extension of Time or Collateral 
 Security. —This question is closely allied to the question of /^ay- 
 ment, which is discussed in a future chapter." Where a new note 
 is given to the holder of an old note part due, upon which an 
 
 ^Pos«,§ 1933, eiseg. 133. Compare, as to the nature of 
 
 Post, § 1333, et seq. such a defense, Carpenter v. Miles, 17 
 
 3 Eoth V. Colvin, 32 Vt. 125, 133. B. Mon. (Ky.) 602. 
 
 I l^^^\ ' ^ee especially §§ 1254, 1255, 1257. 
 
 ■5 Vanbusliirlj v. Levy, 3 Met. (Ky.)
 
 952 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 indorse}' or surehj is liable, the question may arise whether the 
 oiving of the new note operated to extend the time of payment 
 of the debt, and thereby to discharge the indorser or surety ; and 
 it has been held that the question should be submitted to a jury, 
 to determine whether there w^as an agreement to extend the time 
 of payment on the dishonored note, or whether the new note was 
 given and received as collateral security to the old one.^ The im- 
 portance of the rule is found in the other rule of law that the re- 
 cei})t of a bill or note having a time to run, from the party pri- 
 marily liable on a bill or note then overdue, does not discharge 
 an indorser on the bill or note overdue, unless there is an agree- 
 ment, express or implied, that the new bill or draft is in payment 
 of the former, or an extension of the time of payment of the 
 former, in favor of some party who is liable thereon prior to 
 such indorser.'^ Where it has been expressly agreed that the 
 new note is received as collateral security to the overdue note, 
 the right of immediate action upon the overdue note is not sus- 
 pended, and the indorser or surety is not discharged.^ 
 
 § 1242. Whether Notes are Renewals of Former Notes. — 
 
 Where it was claimed that certain notes were reneiuals of former 
 notes, and those again of others, in a continuous series, all for 
 the same debt, it was held proper to submit the question to the 
 jury as a question of fact. And it was held that the question 
 was, whether or not they were renewals, and not what the parties 
 intended or considered. A renewal was defined in the instruc- 
 tions, approved on appeal, to be " a new security given for a 
 debt due, or falling due, — in fact, substituting one security for 
 another, wdiether it is the same debt or not; " and the court 
 added: " If the securities now held, are the notes or securities 
 given for the same debt, they are renewals; " and it w\as held 
 that this was a correct and comprehensive view of the law.* 
 
 1 Taylor v. Alien, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) (N. Y.),294; Huffman v. Hulbert, 13 
 294. Wend. (^N. Y.) 375; McLaue v. La- 
 
 2 Taylor v. Allen, supra. fayette Bank, 3 McLean (U. S.), 589. 
 ^ Myers v. Welles, 5 Hill (N. Y.), ^ Appeal of the Bank of Commerce, 
 
 463; Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio 44 Pa. St. 423, 430. 
 (N. Y.), 512; Hart v. Hudson, 6 Duer
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XXXIX. J NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 953 
 
 § 1243. How THE Jury Instructed in such a Case. — In such a 
 case the following instruction was given to the jury, and was held as 
 liberal as the plaintiffs could desire: "That it is not necessary, in or- 
 der to one note being a renewal of a former one, that it should be of 
 the same amount, or time to run, or made or indorsed bj' the same 
 parties; nor that the note given in renewal should be given, or bear 
 date upon the day of the maturity of the former note ; and that it need 
 not appear that the identical proceeds of the new note were actually 
 applied to take up the note for which it was a renewal. That a new 
 note may be a renewal of a former one, although the new note passes 
 through the regular course of discount in a bank ; in other words, that, 
 because a note is discounted, it does not necessarily follow that it is 
 not a renewal of a former note; and that, if the jury believe that the 
 several series of notes testified to by William H. Maurice, formed one 
 continuous transaction in the loan of money by the bank to Maurice, of 
 which loan the notes in question are the evidence, the verdict must be 
 for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding any new note, in any one or more of 
 the series, may have been discounted prior or subsequent to the ma- 
 turity of the preceding note. You are to determine whether the notes 
 now held are securities for the same debt." ^ 
 
 § 1244. Instruction as to the Effect of an Indorsement in Blank 
 IN an Action by the Assignee. — " The jury are instructed that, where 
 a note has been indorsed in blank, the holder of the same may fill the 
 blank with the name of the indorsee ; that the indorsement of the note 
 is said to be in blank when the name of the indorser is simply written 
 on the back of the note, leavmg a blank over it for the insertion of the 
 name of the indorsee, or of any subsequent holder ; and that in such a 
 case, while the indorsement continues blank, the note may be passed by 
 mere delivery, and the indorsee or other holder is understood to have 
 full authority personally to demand payment of it, or make it payable, 
 at his pleasure, to himself or to another person." ^ 
 
 § 1245. Instruction as to Duty of Indorsee of Check to make 
 Effort to Collect Same before Suing Drawer. — " Unless the jury 
 believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs, when they became the in- 
 dorsees of the check in the declai'ation mentioned, used due diligence 
 to collect the same by presentation for payment at the bank, and if 
 
 ^ Appeal of the Bank of Commerce, ^ Approved in Palmer v. Marshall, 
 
 44 Pa. St. 423, 430. CO 111. 292.
 
 954 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 dishonored, gave immediate notice thereof to the defendant, then they 
 will find for the defendant ; and the fact that the effects of the bank 
 were removed from the banking house, at the time they obtained the 
 check, would not excuse them from the duty of presentation of the 
 check for payment, nor from giving notice of its dishonor, unless it was 
 notoriously known that the effects had been removed ; then such present- 
 ation was not necessary. 1 
 
 ^ Approved iu Ford v. McClung, 5 W. Va. 158.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XL.] payment: accord and satisfaction. 955 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 PAYMENT: ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
 
 Section 
 
 1250. Accord and Satisfaction a Question of Fact. 
 
 1251. Payment a Question of Fact. 
 
 1252. View tliat it is a mixed Question of Law and Fact. 
 
 1253. View that it is a Question of Law. 
 
 125i. Purpose for which a Note is Delivered and Accepted. 
 
 1255. Payment or Purchase of a Note. 
 
 1256. Cliaracter in whicli a Person to whom Money is Paid Receives and 
 
 Holds it. 
 
 1257. Order Delivered as Payment or for Collection. 
 
 1258. As between Landlord and Tenant. 
 
 1259. Another Illustration. 
 
 1260. What will repel the Presumption of Payment from Lapse of Time. 
 
 1261. Whether a Payment was Voluntary. 
 
 1262. Instruction as to Conditional Payment of Debt by Draft, in Action to 
 
 Recover for Goods sold, on Account of which Sale Draft was Given. 
 
 1263. Precedent of an Instruction as to Payment of a Bond in an Action 
 
 thereon. 
 
 § 1250. Accord and Satisfaction a Question of Fact. — To 
 
 constitute an accord and satisfaction, that which is received by 
 the creditor must be accepted by him in satisfaction; he must 
 intend to accept it as a satisfaction. Whether there was such 
 an acceptance is a question of fact for a jury ; ^ and the conclu- 
 sion reached by the jury in such a case, upon conflicting testi- 
 mony, sustained in the trial court, will not be disturbed in an 
 appellate tribunal.^ 
 
 1 Frick V. Algeier, 87 Ind. 255; 16 Pa, St. 450; Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa. 
 
 Hardmau v. Bellhouse, 9 Mees. e^ W. St. 147; State Bank v. Littlejohn, 1 
 
 69G; Hall v. Flockton, 16 Ad. & El. Dev. & B. (N. C.) 563; Maze v. Miller, 
 
 (N. s.) 1039; Jones v. Johnson, 3 1 Wash. (U. S.) 828; Western Union 
 
 Watts & S. (Pa.) 276; Hart v. Bailer, Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429, 442; 
 
 15 Serg & R. (Pa.) 162; Brenner v. s. c. 9 Am. Rep. 744. 
 Herr, 8 Pa. St. 106; Stone v. Miller, 2 prick v. Algeier, 87 Ind. 255.
 
 956 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1251. Payment a Question of Fact. — Whether a debt has 
 or has not been paid, is generally a question of fact for the 
 jury,^ since it is generally a question of intent? Thus, whether 
 a judgment entered by a wife against her husband has 
 been paid, is a question of fact for the jury, although the wife 
 died seven years afterwards, her estate was not administered 
 upon, and a scire facias to sue out execution was not issued on 
 the judgment until twelve years after the death of the wife.^ 
 Where a debt is to be paid in kind — as for instance, rent in cot- 
 ton — and the debtor becomes liable to the creditor on another 
 account, and goods of the particular kind are delivered by the 
 debtor to the creditor, it will be a question for a jury to determine 
 to which debt it was intended by the parties that it should be 
 applied.* 
 
 § 1252. View that it is a Mixed Question of Law and 
 Fact. — Payment has been said to be a mixed question of law and 
 fact. Accordingly, it is not proper for the court to submit such 
 a question to the determination of a jury, in a case in equity.^ 
 But a sounder view is that, upon a feigned issue to ascertain 
 whether a judgment has been paid or not, the question of pa"«'- 
 mentis exclusively for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1253. View that it is a Question of Law. — All this has been 
 regarded as compatible with the idea that it is competent for the 
 judge to say, as a matter of law, whether a given state of evi- 
 dence, assuming it to be true, amounts to proof of payment; the 
 rule being that the legal sufficiency of the evidence, in other 
 words, the conclusion of law to be drawn from the evidence, is, 
 in general, a question for the court. ^ It has therefore been held 
 proper for the court to decline to instruct the jury that, if they 
 
 1 Barnes v. Brown, 69 N. C. 439; ■* Phillips v. McGuire, 73 Ga. 517. 
 Germania Ins. Co. w. Davenport (Pa.), Compare Pritchard u. Comer, 71 Ga. 
 9 Atl. Rep. 517; Union Bank u. Smizer, 18. 
 
 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 501. ^ Adams v. Helm, 55 Mo. 468. 
 
 2 Post, § 1333. ^ Horner v. Hower, 49 Pa. St. 475. 
 
 3 Hess V. Frankenfield, 106 Pa. St. ' Frost v. Martin, 29 N. H. 307 ;. 
 440. post, § 2242, et seq.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL.] payment: accord and satisfaction. 957 
 
 believe that a payment, which the evidence shows to have been 
 made, was not in hiw a payment of the note, etc., the plaintiff 
 might recover.^ But the only ground on which this instruction 
 could have been properly refused was, that it was not aptly 
 framed, so as to bring the question to the minds of the jurors. 
 There is no rule of law as to what is or what is not payment. 
 Payment is simply the doing of what a man has agreed to do. 
 It is, therefore, a pure question of fact; and where a man has 
 agreed to pay, and tenders what he understands to be perform- 
 ance of his agreement, and the other party accepts it, it is a naked 
 question of fact and intent, whether it was accepted as perform- 
 ance. In every such case the ultimate point of inquiry does not 
 touch a rule of law, but stops at a conclusion of fact. 
 
 § 1254. Purpose for wliicli a IVote is Delivered and 
 Accepted. — This has been held necessarily a question of fact 
 for a jury.^ It has been held, under circumstances, that, whether 
 a note was given and accepted in satisfaction of a judgment, 
 that is, in absolute payment of it, or was merely given for the 
 purpose of fixing the amount due and as an additional or collat- 
 eral security^ is a question of fact for a jury.^ So, it has been 
 held that the question whether a note, given for the settlement of 
 a suit against a third person, is an extinguishment of the original 
 claim," or collateral to it, is a question of fact.'* The taking of a 
 note of an individual partner for a partnership debt, where it is 
 agreed to be taken as payment, extinguishes the /;«r<?iers/n^9 Je6i!,- 
 and the question whether the note is taken in payment of the 
 debt, or as collateral security only, is, in an action of assumpsit 
 against the partnership, a question of fact for the jury. ^ Under 
 circumstances, it has been held a question of fact whether a sum 
 of money was paid in satisfaction and discharge ^;ro tanto of a 
 note, to take immediate effect as payment, or was merely ad- 
 vanced to and deposited with the party by way of security, to 
 be applied in payment of the note, only in case the whole amount 
 
 » Ibid. * Wilson v. Hauson, 20 N. H. 375. 
 
 2 Sellers v. Jones, 22 Pa. St. 423. ^ Bouuell v. Chamberliu, 2G Conn. 
 
 3 Schilling v. Durst, 42 Pa. St. 126. 487.
 
 958 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 of the debt should not be obtained out of the property, by a 
 mortgage by which the note was secured, — the question depend- 
 ing upon the intention of the parties.^ And, in general, it may 
 be said that the question whether a note or bond is given and 
 accepted in satisfaction of the original debt, is for the jury; and 
 it is error for the court to decide it as a matter of law.^ This is 
 merely a branch of the rule that, when a matter is to be deter- 
 mined according to the intention of parties, it is for the jury to 
 determine what their intention was.^ So, where a person is 
 indebted to a bank, and gives his promissory notes for the amount 
 of the debt, the mere acceptance of the notes by the bank will 
 not necessarily operate as a satisfaction of the debt ; and whether 
 or not there was an agreement at the time to receive them in sat- 
 isfaction, or whether the circumstances attending the transaction 
 warranted such an inference, are questions of fact for a jury.^ 
 So, where a firm, consisting of three persons, was sued upon an 
 account, for which it appeared that two of the firm had executed 
 to the plaintiff their note, and the suit was dismissed as to these 
 two, and stood against the third partner alone, — it was held that 
 it was a question of fact for the jury whether the note of the other 
 two was received by the })laintiff in extinguishment and satisfac- 
 tion of the debt of the three. If it were, the third partner would 
 be discharged from the debt ; otherwise not.^ So, payment and 
 satisfaction of an account or a note may be made by the delivery 
 an acceptance of an account against a stranger ; and the question 
 whether payment w^as intended is a question of fact for the jury.® 
 Proof of the acceptance of a promissory note or bill of a third 
 person, if it appear to be the voluntary act and choice of the 
 creditor, and not a measure forced upon him by necessity, when 
 nothing else could be obtained, will support a defense of pay- 
 
 1 Dean?7. Toppiu, 130 Mass. 517. •* Lyman v. Bank of U. S., 12 IIow. 
 
 2 Stone V. Miller, 16 Pa. St. 450, (U. S.) 225, 243. 
 
 456; Jones V. Johnston, 3 Watts & S. ^ Keerl v. Bridgers, 10 Smecles & 
 
 (Pa.), 276; Wallace v. Pairraan, 4 M. (Miss.) 612. 
 
 Watts (Pa.), 379; Hart v. Boiler, 15 « Willard v. Germer, 1 Sandf. S C. 
 
 Serg. &R. (Pa.) 162. (N. Y.) 50. 
 
 3 Post, § 1333, et seq.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL.] payment: accord and satisfaction. 959 
 
 ment ; ^ but whether it will amount to payment is a question of 
 fact for a juiy.^ 
 
 § 1255. Payment or Purchase of a Note. — The question, 
 under many states of fact, will be properly a question for the 
 jury, whether a transaction by which a note passed from one party 
 to another was a purchase of the note by the transferee, such as 
 did not extinguish it, or a payment such as did.^ It frequently 
 becomes a material inquiry, where a third person takes up a note 
 which has matured in bank or elsewhere, whether he does it in 
 payment of the note or merely to purchase it; and this is a ques- 
 tion of fact, for a jury, depending upon the intention of the holder 
 and the person thus taking it up.* 
 
 § 1256. Character in which a Person to whom Money is paid 
 receives and holds it. — The character in which a person to 
 whom money is paid receives it, is a question of fact, unless the 
 law annexes a definite character to him under the circumstances, 
 as in the case of a public officer receiving and dealing with public 
 moneys. This seems to have found an illustration in a case in 
 Maine, where money was paid to the person who held the place 
 of agent of a school district, the same being sufficient to pay the 
 school teacher what was due him, provided the school teacher 
 had qualified himself to receive it and had become entitled to it, 
 by obtaining a certificate of his qualification as a teacher, as re- 
 quired by the governing statute. Here it was held that, although 
 the school teacher had performed'his duty acceptably, yet it was 
 the pleasure of the town, under the statute, to withhold from 
 him his salary until he had procured the statutory certificate, and 
 that he could not maintain an action against the town therefor; 
 yet if the town elected not to refuse to pay him his w^ages for 
 this reason, but paid the money to the person who held the place 
 of agent of the district, and it was so received by the latter, it 
 
 1 2 Greenl. Ev., § 523; Union Bank » Comstockv. Savage, 27 Conn. 184. 
 
 » Smiser, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 501, 514. •* Runyon v. Clark. 4 Jones L. (N. 
 
 ^ Ibid ; Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns. C ) 52. Compare Sherwood v. Col 
 
 (N. Y ) 310- lier, 3 Dev. L. (N. C.) 380.
 
 960 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 would be the property of the instructor, and he might maintain 
 an action against the agent to recover it; and whether the agent 
 received the money of the town for the use of the teacher would 
 be a question of fact rather than of law, — the inquiry being in 
 what character and for what purpose he received it.^ 
 
 § 1257. Order delivered as Payment or for Collection. — So, it is 
 for a jury to decide whether an order on a third person was taken for 
 collection merely, by a creditor of the person by whom it was delivered, 
 or as payment when the amount thereof should be collected. In other 
 words, whether or not such an order was accepted by a creditor from 
 his debtor in satisfaction of the debt and in discharge of his debtor, 
 should be left to the jury.^ 
 
 § 1258. As BETWEEN LANDLORD AND TENANT. — A tenant being in- 
 debted to his landlord for rent, the agent of the landlord, without the 
 authority or knowledge of the landlord, took a bill of exchange from 
 the tenant for the rent, and paid over the amount of the rent to the 
 landlord in his settlement of account. The bill was afterwards dis- 
 honored whilst in the hands of a third party, and the rent was not 
 paid by the tenant, whereupon the landlord distrained. It was held to 
 be a question for the jury, whether the bill was discounted for the tenant, 
 or whether the money was loaned to the tenant by the agent, or whether 
 it was advanced by the agent to the landlord ; and that if the bill was 
 discounted for, or the money was loaned to the tenant, the landlord 
 was not entitled to distrain ; otherwise he was.^ . . . _ So, in another 
 case where, on the rent becoming due, the agent of both tenant and land- 
 lord paid the amount of the rent to the landlord, without any authority 
 from either party, and the tenant afterwards failed to pay the rent, and 
 the landlord distrained, — it was a question for the jury whether the 
 payment was made by the agent on behalf of the tenant, or by waj" of 
 
 advance to the landlord."* In a case in New York, the lessee of 
 
 a farm, on the day after $65.00 had become due and payable for an 
 installment of rent, entered into a written contract with his lessor for 
 the surrender of his unexpired term, in consideration of which, and 
 other stipulations, the lessor agreed to pay at a subsequent day, and 
 
 1 Dore V. Billings, 26 Me. 56. < Griffltlis v. Cliichester, 14 Eng. L. 
 
 2 Stephens v. Tliornton, 26 111. 323. & Eq. 372, note. 
 
 3 Parrott v. Anderson, 14 Eng. L. & 
 Eq. 371.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL.] PAYiMENT: accokd and satisfaction. 9G1 
 
 actually did pa}', $550.00. In an action to recover tlie SGo.OO of rent 
 due wiien this agreement was made, it was held: 1. That the contract 
 did not operate as a release or extinguishment of the rent which had 
 become due. 2. That, from the contract and a receipt thereon indorsed, 
 of the subsequent payment of the $550.00, no legal presumption arose, 
 either that the rent had been previously paid, or that the amount was 
 allowed when the receipt was executed. 3. That these facts were 
 properly submitted to the jary^ with instructions that it was a question 
 of fact for them to determine whether, considered in connection with 
 all the evidence in the case, they did not warrant a presumption of the 
 payment of the rent.^ 
 
 § 1259. Another Illustration. — In a suit on a recognizance, in the 
 Orphans' Court of Pennsylvania, by an heir who took one of three pur- 
 parts at the appraisement, executed in favor of the Commonwealth, for 
 the payment to the other heirs of their proportional shares in the pur- 
 part, it was held permissible for the recognizor, the defendant, under a 
 plea of " payment with leave," to show that one of the purparts not 
 taken at the appraisement, was sold by a trustee under order of the 
 Orphans' Court, that all the balance of the proceeds, after payment of 
 the debts of the intestate, was paid to the plaintiff, and that the defend- 
 ant in the suit never made any objection ; and the fact whether or not 
 it was received in paj^ment, depending upon a question of intent^ should 
 have been submitted to the jury. '^ 
 
 § 1260. What will repel the Presumption of payment from 
 Lapse of Time. — It has been held that, what will repel the ar- 
 tificial presumption of pa^-ment arising from the lapse of a great 
 length of time, is a question of laiv, and that it is error to submit 
 it to a jury.^ Contrary to this, and on sounder grounds, it has 
 been held that the question whether the presumption of payment 
 has been repelled, is a question of fact for a jury ; * and the sound 
 rule seems to be that, notwithstanding the legal presumption of 
 payment arising from the lapse of time, the question of payment 
 remains a pure question of fact for the jury, and any evidence 
 
 1 Sperry v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 407. ^ Grantham v. Canaan, 38 N. H. 268; 
 
 ■■ Kidd V. Com., 16 Pa. St. 426. McQuesney v. Heister, 33 Pa. St. 435; 
 
 ' Woodbury v. Taylor, 3 Jones L. Joy v. Adams, 2G Me. 330, 333. 
 <N. C.) 604. 
 
 61
 
 962 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 tending to satisfy them that no payment has actually been made, is 
 competent and admissible.^ This is in accordance with what is 
 said by Dr. Greenleaf : " In all these cases, the presumption of 
 payment may be repelled by any evidence of the situation of the 
 parties, or other circumstance, tending to satisfy the jury that 
 the debt is still due." '^ There is possibly room for a distinction, 
 in respect of this question, between the presumption of payment 
 which the jury are authorized to draw from a great lapse of time 
 less than twenty years, and the presumption which" the law draws 
 where the lapse of time is greater than twenty years. In the 
 North Carolina case first cited, the lapse of time was less than 
 twenty years, but a statute of, that State had cut down the time 
 wdiich raises this protection against stale demands, froni twenty 
 to ten years, and the demand had been in existence for more 
 than that length of time.-^ In a case in Pennsylvania, more than 
 twenty years had elapsed since the creation of the obligation. It 
 was held that, whether the facts were sufficient to rebut the pre- 
 sumption was a question for the court and not for the jury. 
 " The presumption," said Strong, J., " is one drawn by the law 
 itself from a given state of facts, and whether it exists or not, is 
 necessarily j'^or tlte court.''' ^ 
 
 § 1261. Whether a Payment was Voluntary. — Where a party 
 sues to recover money which he has paid to a sheriff under exe- 
 cution, and the state of the case is such that he can recover it 
 back if it was paid under compulsion, but not if it was paid vol- 
 untarily, the question whether the payment was voluntary will, 
 of course, be a question of fact /"or the jury. ^ 
 
 § 3 262. Precedent op an Instruction as to Conditional Payment 
 OF Debt by Draft, in Action to recover for Goods Sold, on Ac- 
 count OF which Sale, Draft was Given. — " If the jury believe from 
 
 1 Grautham v. Canaan, 38 N. H. ^ "Woodbury v. Taylor, 3 Jones L. 
 268. (N. C.) 504. 
 
 2 1 Grecnl. Ev., § 39. See also * Heed v. Reed, 46 Pa. St. 239, 243. 
 Cowau & Hill's important note to 1 The learned judge cited Delauy v. 
 Phil. Ev., p. G7'!, note 193, where many Hobiusou, 2 Whart. (Pa.) 503, as an 
 cases are collected. authority for the proposition. 
 
 5 E^ing V. Peck, 26 Ala. 413.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL.l payment: accord and satisfaction. 963 
 
 the evidence, that the plaintiff sold to the defendant corn, they will 
 find for the plaintiff, unless they believe further, from the evidence, 
 
 that the defendant was paid for the same.^ If the jury believe 
 
 from the evidence, that the defendant gave a draft or drafts to the 
 plaintiff, or to any one for him, in part or full paj^ment for said corn, 
 and that said draft or drafts were accepted by tlie plaintiff upon the 
 condition that he could use it or them to pay his debts, then they will 
 find for plaintiff, unless they beheve the plaintiff did or could have 
 used said draft or drafts in the payment of his debts ; if they further 
 believe that said draft or drafts have been returned or offered to be 
 returned to defendant, and that plaintiff did not receive any money on 
 such draft or drafts." - 
 
 § 1263. Precedent of an Instruction as to Payment of a Bond in 
 AN Action Thereon. — "If the jury believe from the evidence, that 
 the plaintiff and defendant accounted together as to the indebtedness, 
 evidenced by the bond suet^ on, and so accounted freely and without 
 concealment or fraud by either, and that, as a result, the bond was so 
 paid and discharged as that the defendant was then entitled to said 
 bond, — then it is not material to inquire into the consideration so paid 
 and accepted in the discharge thereof ; but if they believe from the 
 evidence, that the transaction was not so executed, final and conclusive, 
 that the defendant was then and there entitled of right to said bond, 
 then all pretended payments claimed which are shown to have been 
 paid in Confederate money, or other illegal or unlawful currenc}', are 
 null and void, and should be totally disregarded by the jury." ^ 
 
 1 Approved in Hodgen v. Latham, 3 Approved iu Washington v. Bur- 
 33 111. 34G. uett, 4 W. Va. 85. 
 
 2 Ibid.
 
 9G4 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tboiup. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XLI. 
 
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS : BANKRUPTCY : NEW PROMISE AND PART 
 PAYMENT TO REVIVE BARRED DEBT. 
 
 Section 
 
 1267. Promise to revive Debt Discliarged by Bankruptcy. 
 
 1268. Promise to revive Debt Barred by Limitation. 
 
 1269. Submitted to Jury on what Evidence. 
 
 1270. Wliat Indebtedness the New Promise refers to. 
 
 1271. Part Payment to take a Debt out of the Statute of Limitations. 
 
 1272. Right of Creditor to apply the Payment. 
 
 1273. Which Debt Intended. . 
 
 1274. Instruction as to Revival of Debt Discharged by Bankruptcy. 
 
 1275. Defendant's Instruction as to New Promise where Debt is Barred by 
 
 Statute of Limitations. 
 127G. A Similar Instruction under a Statute Requiring the Promise to be in 
 Writing. 
 
 § 1267. Promise to revive Debt Discbarged by Bank- 
 ruptcy. — Where an oral promise is relied upon to revive a 
 debt which is discharged by bankruptcy , the question whether 
 such a promise is proved ^yill generally be a question of fact for 
 the juiy ; ^ but whore the words relied on to take the case out of 
 the statute of limitations amount in law to an express promise, 
 the meaning of the words will not be referred to the jury, but the 
 court may instruct them as to their legal effect, — ^ as where the new 
 promise or acknowledgment is in ivriting, indorsed on the instru- 
 ment which is the evidence of the precedent indebtedness.^ In a 
 very elaborate judgment upon this subject in Maryland, the tenth 
 proposition ruled by the court was : "What kind of promise 
 or acknoAvledgment is sufficient to take a case out of the act of 
 
 ' Bennett v. Everett, 3 R. I. ir)2, 403. Compare Curzon v. Edmondson, 
 
 155; United Society v. Winkley, 7 (i Mees. & W. 2'.t5, where it was held 
 
 Gray (Mass.), 460. that whether a writing amounts to an 
 
 2 Evans v. Carey, 29 Ala. 99. acknowledgment of title within a stat- 
 
 3 Beasley v. Evans, 35 Miss. 102, ute is a question for the judge and not 
 19^"''," Morrell v. Frith^ 3 Mees. & W. for the jury to decide.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLI.] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 965 
 
 limitations, is for the court to decide; and the evidence offered 
 to prove such promise or acknowledgment is proper to be 
 submitted to the jury, as in other cases, under the direction 
 of the court." ^ A better statement of the rule could not 
 be drawn. It is merely a statement of the general rule in re- 
 gard to the existence and interpretation of promises, which is 
 that, whether the promise to pay the barred debt was made, is a 
 question of fact for the jury to determine, but what is the con- 
 struction and effect of the promise, if made, is a question of law 
 to be decided by the court; ^ which means that, where there is 
 any dispute as to the facts which go to prove the making of the 
 new promise, the question must be submitted to the jury, upon 
 hypothetical instructions, framed so as to apply the law to a state 
 of facts which the evidence tends to prove. But where there is 
 no dispute as to the facts, that is, as to the character of the prom- 
 ise and the circumstances under which it was made, and the cir- 
 cumstances are such that different inferences of fact could not 
 fairly be drawn from them, then the court is to declare, as mat- 
 ter of law, whether the promise operated to revive the barred 
 debt. 3 
 
 1 Oliver v. Gray, 1 Harr. & G. (Md.) ise [to pay a debt discharged by 
 
 204,219. bankruptcy] need not be to the holder 
 
 "^ Clark V. Sigoiiruey, 17 Conn. 511 ; of the debt, but it must refer to the 
 
 «H^e, §§ 1105, HOG. debt without question. No particular 
 
 3 This, somewhat expanded by the form of words need be used to cousti- 
 
 author, is the doctrine of Clarke v. tute this promise. Any words, or 
 
 Butcher, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 674, 679; perhaps signs or actg, which signify a 
 
 Hancock v. Bliss, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) present willingness to pay the debt, 
 
 267, and Miller v. Lancaster, 4 Me. 159. and which are intended to convey that 
 
 Compare Burghaus v. Calhoun, 6 idea to the hearer, are sufficient The 
 
 Watts (Pa.), 219, where it is laid natural import of the words used must 
 
 down that, "to avoid the uncertainty be a contract to discharge by payment 
 
 and insensible encroachments on the the moral obligation that remains, 
 
 statute that would ensue, did we at- whatever the debt discharged by the 
 
 tempt to shape our course as to this certificate. A bai'e acknowledgment 
 
 statute by former decisions, we may of the justness of the debt, of its 
 
 require the acknowledgment of the present existence as a debt formerly 
 
 demand, as a debt of legal obligation, contracted and now unpaid, is not suf- 
 
 to be so distinct and palpable in its flcient. Such statements as these will 
 
 extent and form, as to preclude hesita- remove the bar of the statute of limit- 
 
 tion." It has been said: " This prom- ations; for from these the law will
 
 966 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 § 1268. Promise to revive Debt Barred by Ldmitation. — 
 
 Whether an instrument purporting to be an acknowledgment of 
 a debt is sufficient to take it out of the bar of the statute of limi- 
 tations, is a question for the court; but whether the debt sued 
 for is the one thus acknowledged, is a question for the jury. ^ 
 
 § 1269. Submitted to Jury on what Evidence. — But every 
 kind of evidence conducing to show a recognition of the claim 
 or claims in suit, as still subsisting, and the debt as one of the 
 debts referred to and spoken of by the defendant in his ac- 
 knoAvledcrment or promise, should be submitted to the jury.^ 
 Thus, where two independent claims were held by the plaintiff 
 against the defendant — one on an account, and the other on a 
 
 imply a promise to pay. Not so, as 
 relates to the bar of the bankruptcy 
 certificate. The bankrupt must make 
 the promise, and not leave it to the 
 law to imply it. In this sense the 
 promise must be express. It must 
 also be unqualified and unconditional, 
 or else the party seeking to avail him- 
 self of it must show the condition 
 performed." Bennett v. Everett, 3 K. 
 I. 152, 155. See also Fleming v. Lull- 
 man, 11 Mo. App. 104; Graham v. 
 Hunt, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 7; Stewart v. 
 Keckless, 24 N. J. L. 427; Field's 
 Estate, 2Eawle (Pa.), 351, 356; Du- 
 seubury v. Hoyt, 53 N. Y. 521; Eeith 
 v. LuUman, 11 Mo. App. 254; Cam- 
 bridge Sav. Inst. V. Littlefleld, Cush. 
 (Mass.) 213; Allen v. Ferguson, 18 
 Wall. (U. S.) 13; Egbert v. McMi- 
 chael, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 45; Fleming v. 
 Hayne, 1 Stark. 370; Mosely ■!). Cald- 
 well, 59 Tenn. 208; Shockey v. Mills, 
 71 Ind. 288, 292; Randidge v. Lyman, 
 124 Mass. 361; Underwood v. East- 
 man, 18 N. H. 582, 585; Bank v. Boy- 
 kin, 9 Ala. 320, 322; Huckabee v. May, 
 14 Ala. 263; Wynne v. llaikes, 5 East, 
 515; Soulden v. Van Kensselaer, 9 
 Wend. (N. Y.)2!)7; Besford r. Saun- 
 
 ders, 2 H. Bl. 116; Edson v. Fuller, 22 
 N. H. 183; Haines v. Stauffer, 33 Pa. 
 St. 541; McKiuley ?7. O'Keson, 5 Pa. 
 St. 369; Comfort v. Eisenbeis, 11 
 Pa. St. 13; Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 238; Cogburn v. Spence, 15 
 Ala. 549; Herndou ^-..Givens, 19 Ala. 
 313. 
 
 1 Mastin v. Branham, 86 Mo. 643, 
 648 ; Warlick v. Peterson, 58 Mo. 408 ; 
 Dickinson v. Lott, 29 Tex. 173, 179; 
 Kim))all v. Estate of Baxter, 27 Vt. 
 623, 632; Dorru. Swartwout, 1 Blatchf. 
 (U. S.) 179, 184. Under the Missouri 
 statute (R. S. Mo., § 3248), such an 
 acknowledgment must be in writing 
 and signed by the party making it; 
 and in order to be effective it must be 
 either in the form of an express prom- 
 ise to pay, or of an acknowledgment of 
 an actual, subsisting debt on which the 
 law would imply a promise. Boyd v. 
 Hurlbut, 41 Mo. 264; Chambers v. 
 Rubey, 47 Mo. 99; Mastin u. Branham, 
 supra. See, on the subject generally, 
 Smith V. Eastman, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 
 355; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet, (U. S.) 
 351, 362. 
 
 2 Cook V. Martin, 29 Conn. 63.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLI.] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 967 
 
 note, — a statement of which, on a single piece of paper, was 
 presented to the defendant soon after they fell due, and admitted 
 by him as so presented, and, five years afterwards, the defendant 
 made a general acknowledgment of indebtedness to the plaintiff, 
 and promised to pay him what he owed him, and a suit was 
 thereafter brought on the note and account, to Avhich the defend- 
 ant pleaded the statute of limitations, and in which the plaintiff 
 offered evidence of the new promise, — it was held, that the evi- 
 dence was not to be rejected on the ground that the promise was 
 too general and indefinite, but that the question of its applica- 
 tion was for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1270. What Indebtedness the New Promise Refers to. — 
 
 The question what particular indebtedness is referred to by the 
 new promise, is obviously a question of fact for a jury.'^ 
 
 § 1271. Part Payment to take a Debt out of the Statute 
 of Limitations. — The rule under this head seems to be that a 
 part payment which will take a debt out of the operation of the 
 statute of limitations must be made under circumstances such as 
 will warrant a finding, as a question of fact, that the debtor in- 
 tended to recognize the debt in question as a subsisting debt, and 
 one which he was willing to pay. " Therefore, the mere endorse- 
 ment, by the creditor,, of a credit upon the note, without the 
 
 ^ Cook V. Martiu, 29 Conu. (53. 110. Per contra, in Buckiugliam v. 
 
 2 Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. Smith, 23 Conu. 453, it was ruled tliat 
 
 (Mass.) 110, 112; Buckiughara v. the burden was ou tlie plaintiff to sliow 
 
 Smith, 23 Conu. 453; Cook v. Martin, that the promise related to notes in 
 
 29 Conn. 63. In Baillie v. Inchiquiu, suit. 
 
 1 Esp. 435, Lord Kenyon, ruled at nisi » Miller ?;. Talcott, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 prins, that, where a debt is established 168, 172. Compare Bloodgood v. Bruen, 
 
 against a defendant who relies on the 8 N. Y. 362; Shoemaker v. Benedict, 
 
 statute of limitations, if the plaintiff 11 N. Y., 176: Peck v. N. Y. &c. 
 
 gives any general evidence of acknowl- Steamship Co., 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 226. 
 
 edgment, it shall be taken to apply to See Bridgetou v. Jones, 34 Mo. 411; 
 
 the debt in question; and that it lies Callaway Co. Court v. Craig, 35 Mo. 
 
 on the defendant to explain the prom- 395; Block v. Dormon, 51 Mo. 31; 
 
 ise so made and to show that it applies Vernon Co. v. Stewart, 64 Mo. 408; 
 
 to some other demand. Compare Shannon v. Austin, 67 Mo. 485. 
 Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick. (Mass.)
 
 968 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 privity of the debtor, is not evidence of part payment for this 
 purpose.^ 
 
 § 1272. Right of Creditor to apply the Payment. — But 
 
 this rule is subject to the exception that, where there are several 
 debts having different periods of limitation, and the debtor 
 makes part payments without specifying to which item of in- 
 debtedness they are to be applied, the creditor may apply them 
 to any item which he may choose, and the application so made 
 will save the bar of the statute. ^ This conclusion, though sanc- 
 tioned by many authorities, is not supported by any underlying 
 basis of sense. The theory upon which part payment takes the 
 case out of the statute is, as already seen,^ that it is a recogni- 
 tion by the debtor of the obligatory force of the 2)cirticular debt; 
 but a payment not made with reference to any particular debt is 
 not in fact a recognition of the obligatory force of any particu- 
 lar debt. This rule is a good illustration of the results which are 
 reached by judges when proceeding according to purely techni- 
 cal modes of reasoning — which in many cases are no reasoning at 
 all. This conclusion involves the solecism that, while statutes of 
 limitation are favored by the courts because they are statutes of 
 repose (and this is the doctrine of all courts), yet a creditor 
 may, by his mere volition, keep alive a particular indebtedness, 
 although the debtor may regard it as bawed. 
 
 § 1273. Which Debt Intended. — Where there are two debts, 
 one of which is barred by limitation, and there is a part payment 
 not specifically appropriated by the debtor or creditor, it is a 
 question for the jury whether the payment was made generally 
 on account of what might be due from the debtor at the time, or 
 on a particular account."* 
 
 1 Phillips V. Mahaii, 52 Mo. 197; Co., 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 226; Davis v. 
 Loemer v. Haug, 20 Mo. App. 1(;3; Araey, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 412; Whip - 
 Goddard V. Williamson, 72 Mo. 131. pie v. Blackiugton, 97 Mass. 476; 
 
 2 Jackson v. Burke, 1 Dill. C. C. Beck v. Haas, 30 Mo. App. ; Will- 
 (U. S.) 311; Wills V. Fowkes, 5 Bing. iams v. Griffith, 5 Mees. & W. 300. 
 
 N. C. 455; Harrison v. Davies, 23 ^ ^,j^<,^ § i271. 
 
 La. Ann. 210; Ramsay v. Warner, 97 < Walker v. Bntler, 6 El. & Bl. 506 j 
 
 Mass. 8; Peck v. N. Y. &c. Steamship s.c. 37 Eng. L. &Eq. 13.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XLI.] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 969 
 
 § 1274. Instruction AS to Revival of Debt Discharged b-v Bank- 
 ruptcy. — " The promise by which a discharged debt is reviewed, must 
 be clear, distinct and unequivocal. There must be an expression by the 
 defendant of a clear intention to bind himself to the payment of the 
 debt. The new promise must be distinct, unambiguous and certain. 
 The expression of an intention to pay the debt is not sufficient. There 
 must be a promise before the debtor is bound. An intention is but the 
 purpose a man forms in his own mind ; a promise is an express under- 
 taking or agreement to carry that purpose into effect, and must be 
 express, in contradistinction to a promise implied from an acknowledg- 
 ment of the justness or existence of the debt." ^ 
 
 § 1275. Defendant's Instruction as to New Promise where Debt 
 IS Barred by Statute of Lijiitations. — " The court instructs the jury 
 that the instrument, dated June 18, 18G6, which has been received in 
 evidence, was barred by the statute of limitations before this suit was 
 brought, and no recovery can be had upon the same, unless the defend- 
 ant, within six years before the bringing of this suit, made a new prom- 
 ise ; and the burden of proof of that rests upon the plaintiff, and not 
 upon the defendant. The plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the pre- 
 ponderance of testimony. If the plaintiff claims the right to recover 
 upon a new promise alleged to have been made by the defendant, and 
 the testimony upon that point is so conflicting that the jury cannot 
 determine whether such a promise was made or not, they must find for 
 the defendant." - 
 
 § 1276. A Similar Instruction Under a Statute Requiring the 
 Promise to be in Writing. — " The jury, in order to take the case out 
 of the statute of limitations and entitle the plaintiff to recover, must 
 find from the testimony that the defendant has, within the last ten years 
 before the commencement of this action, made his promise in writing to 
 pay said note, or that he has actually paid some portion of the princi- 
 pal or interest thereon within the time aforesaid." ^ 
 
 i Approved iu Shockeyv. Mills, 71 2 Substantially as approved in 
 
 Ind. 292; citing Blumeustiel Law and Parker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 336. 
 
 Practice in Bankruptcy, pp. 551, 552; 3 Approved in Bridgetou v. Jones, 
 
 Bump BanJii-uptcy, (yth ed.) p. 748. 34 Mo. 472.
 
 970 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tbomp, Tr 
 
 C H A P T E K XLII. 
 
 INSURANCE, 
 
 Article I. — Fire Insurance. 
 
 Article II, — Life and Accident Insurance. 
 
 Article III, — Marine Insurance. 
 
 Article I. — Fire Insurance. 
 
 Section 
 
 1279. Authority of an Insurance Company to do Business. 
 
 1280. Insurable Interest, 
 
 1281. Authority of Insurance Agents to waive Conditions. 
 
 1282. A Series of Instructions on this Subject. 
 
 1283. Statements in Application Construed by the Court, 
 
 1284. Materiality of Misrepresentation or Concealment for Jury, 
 
 1285. Otherwise in Case of Warranties, 
 
 128(3, What if it is Doubtful whether the Words import Representations or 
 Warranties. 
 
 1287, Where Truth of Statements are Vouched for so far as Known and Ma- 
 
 terial. 
 
 1288, What if Statements not Responsive to an Inquiry, 
 
 1289, Instruction as to what Misrepresentation or Fraudulent Statement will 
 
 avoid Policy and what will not, 
 
 1290, Whether Change of Circumstances increases the Risk. 
 
 1291, Defendant's Instruction as to what Alteration will avoid the Policy. 
 
 1292, A Similar Instruction drawn from the Plaintiff's Standpoint. 
 
 1293, Whether Prospective Warranty or Clause of Forfeiture Violated. 
 
 1294, Instruction that Temporary Vacation of Premises does not avoid 
 
 Policy. 
 
 1295, Reasonable Time for the Occupation of Insured Premises by a Tenant. 
 129(), Reasoual)le Time for Giving Notice of Loss. 
 
 1297, Sufficiency of Preliminary Proofs of Loss. 
 
 1298, Defendant's Instruction as to Fraudulent Proofs of Loss. 
 
 1299, Waiver of Preliminary Proofs of Loss, 
 
 1300, Waiver of Limitation of Time within which Action to be brought. 
 
 1301, Waiver of a Condition against Transfer of Policy. 
 
 1302, Whether a Fishing Scow is a " Building." 
 
 1303, Wliether a Certain Business is a " Manufactory,"
 
 Tit. V, CIX. XLIL] FIKE INSURANCE. S71 
 
 Section 
 
 1304. Failure to Mention Specific Articles of Merchandise. 
 
 1305. Identity of the Articles Destroyed, 
 
 1306. Mutual Insurance — Data for Correct Assessment. 
 
 1307. Plaintiff's Instructions as to Renewal of Policy by Oral Contract. 
 
 1308. Instructions on the Theory of a Waiver of the Right of Forfeiture by 
 
 Promising to Rebuild. 
 
 § 1279. Authority of an Insurance Company to do Busi- 
 ness. — The question whether a foreign insurance company has 
 authority to do business in the State would ordinarily depend 
 upon the power of the company to exhibit the certificate, or 
 other evidence of authority, required by the statute. Where, 
 however, the company affirmatively assumed proof of the exist- 
 ence of the certificate required by th^ statute, for several years, 
 but omitted proof of it for a particular year, it was held that it 
 was not error to submit to the jury the question whether it had 
 author ity.i 
 
 § 1280. Insurable Interest. — In an action on a policy of fire 
 insurance, issued to another party and assigned to the plaintiff, 
 it has been held proper to submit to the jury the question whether 
 the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the policy.^ 
 
 § 1281. Authority of Insurance Agents to Waive Condi- 
 tions. — Where, in an action on a policy of life insurance, it 
 appeared that, following an application of the insured for a 
 policy, there was a declaration, signed by tho applicant, but 
 which was not made a part of the policy, stating that he agreed 
 that the insurance proposed should not be binding until the pre- 
 mium, which was payable partly in cash and partly by note, 
 should be received by the defendants, or their accredited agent, — 
 it was held that parol evidence was admissible, for the purpose of 
 showing a waiver of such prepayment, to the effect, that the 
 defendant's agent verbally agreed that the policy of insurance 
 should take effect immediately upon the approval of the applica- 
 
 1 American Ins. Co. r. Smith, 19 - Mitchell r. Home Ins. Co., 32 la. 
 
 Mo. App. 627. 422, 420.
 
 972 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl*., 
 
 tion, and that the premium note might bo made, and the cash pre- 
 mium paid at some future time, at the convenience of the parties, 
 provided that such agreement was made known to and acquiesced 
 in hy the defendants. And where, in such an action, the plaintiff 
 claimed that the defendant's general agent for procuring appli- 
 cations for insurance had authority to make such agreement, 
 which the defendants denied, it was held that, Avhether or not the 
 agent had such authority was properly submitted to the jury} 
 So, where a fire insurance company claimed that their agent, who 
 procured the insurance, was such for certain definite purposes 
 only, and that he had no authority to fill out applications for 
 parties applying for insurance, but it nevertheless appeared that 
 they had recognized him in other policies as their agent, and there 
 was no written evidence of the extent of his authority, it was 
 held proper to submit the question to the jury.'' 
 
 § 1282. A Series OF Instructions on this Subject. — " A principal 
 is liable for the acts of his agent, done within the scope of his employ- 
 ment. A general agent, notwithstanding private instructions, may, 
 within tlie limits of his agency, bind his principal, unless the person 
 dealing with the agent knew of the instructions. A particular agent 
 (by which is meant one authorized to do one or more special things) 
 binds his principal only so far as he pursues his authority. The rule 
 is, as to the public, that the authority of a general agent may be re- 
 garded by them as measured by the usual extent of his general em- 
 ployment ; but as to acts of particular or special agents, the rule is 
 different; a principal may well say to one who dealt with an agent for 
 a particular purpose (special agent): 'It was your business first to 
 ascertain for yourself the chai'acter and extent of his agency.' - - - - 
 By accepting the policy sued on, plaintiffs are bound to know of the 
 terms and restrictions therein contained. The nature and ex- 
 tent or limitations on the authority of McKinney (the agent), you 
 are to find, from all the evidence before you, taken together and care- 
 fully compared. If, from the evidence, you are satisfied that he 
 (McKinney) had the authority to act as the general agent of the de- 
 
 1 Sheldon t?. Connecticut M. F. Ins. ^ Hough v. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 
 
 Co., 25 Conn. 207. Compare Plumb Conn. 10. 
 V. Cattaraugus &c. Co., 18 N. Y. 392; 
 Rowley v. Empire Ins. Co., 3G X. Y. 550.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIL] fire insuranxe. 973 
 
 fendant company, and that, within the scope of such a^encv, he Avas 
 authorized to receive notice of additional insurance in other companies, 
 and did, in fact, receive such notice, then such notice was notice to the 
 
 defendant. If, from the evidence, you find that McKinney's 
 
 agency was only to procure risks and take premiums, and then deliver 
 policies, his agency would, in that event, be a particular, as contradis- 
 tinguished from a general, agency ; and, in that case, his authority 
 would not extend to waiving any of the terms of the policy. - - - - It 
 is the duty of a holder of a policy of insurance to inform the company 
 or its agent of any change of the status of the thing or risk ; in like 
 manner, it is his duty, within a reasonable time, to dul}-- notify the 
 company in which the first policy was taken out, of any additional 
 security by additional insurance, in order that said company may in- 
 quire into the solvenc}^ and standing of the companies, which, in case 
 
 of loss, must share such loss. Where it is in evidence that the 
 
 insured obtained further insurance in other companies, contrary to the 
 
 stipulations of policy sued on, such policy is vitiated. E3' the 
 
 terms of the policy sued on, consent in writing on the policy itself is 
 requisite ; but if such consent in writing were in fact given by the de- 
 fendant company, or by some agent who had the authority to give such 
 written consent, and if plaintiffs, after obtaining additional insurance 
 in other companies, they having previously notified the agent who, 
 according to the terms of his agency, was charged with the duty of re- 
 ceiving such notice, — then such written consent is binding upon the 
 company ; but the burden of proof is upon plaintiffs, and plaintiffs 
 must satisfy the jury by proof that McKinney did give the written con- 
 sent, after he was informed of the amount of additional insurance, and 
 the company in which such additional insurance was so obtained ; and 
 furthermore, plaintiffs must prove that McKinney had the authority to 
 give such consent. No presumption of such authority arises, but such 
 an authority must be proved by plaintiffs." - 
 
 § 1283. Statements in Application Construed by the Court. 
 
 The answers to questions in the application for a policy of fire 
 insurance are to be interpreted by the court, in conformity with 
 the general principle that the interpretation of written instru- 
 ments belongs to the court, and not to the jury. So held, where 
 the answers to a question as to the ' ' relative situation of other 
 
 1 Approved iu lus. Co. v. Lyous, 38 Texas, 25G, 257, 258.
 
 974 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tbomp. Tr. ^ 
 
 buildings" specified two buildings "with fifty feet." It was 
 held that this meant willdn fifty feet, and that the answer was 
 sufllcient, although one of the specified buildings was within two 
 feet.i 
 
 § 1284. Materiality of Misrepresentation or Concealment 
 is for Jury. — Whether a misrepresentation or concealment by 
 the assured, in a i)olicy of fire insurance, of the true natvire and 
 extent of his interest in the property insured, or any other fact 
 upon which information is required by the underwriter prior to 
 issuing the policy, will avoid the policy, depends upon its mate- 
 riality in respect of the risk undertaken; and, according to the 
 weight of authority, this question of materiality is for the jury.^ 
 On the contrary, it has been recently ruled in ^Massachusetts that, 
 if a contract of insurance is sought to be avoided on the ground 
 that it was induced by false and fraudulent representations, the 
 question of the materiality of the representations is for the 
 court, and not for the jury.^ This is simply an application of the 
 rule that the construction of an oral, as well as of a written 
 contract, is for the court where the terms of the contract ate 
 established.* This, it is reasoned, is quite distinct from the ques- 
 tion whether facts concealed or misrepresented increase the risk, 
 
 1 Allen V. Charleston Mutual Fire 540; Lindsay v. Union Mutual Ins. 
 Ins. Co., 5 Gray (xMass.), 384:. Co., 3 R. I. 157; Columbia Ins. Co. v. 
 
 2 Mutual lusurauce Co. v. Deale, Lawrence, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 503, 516; 
 18 Md. 27, 50; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Sexton v. Montgomery County Mut. 
 Coates, 14 Md. 285, 298; 2 Duer on Ins. Co., 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 191, 202; 
 Ins. 889, § 31; Clark v. Union Mut. Masters u. Madison Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 
 Fire Ins. Co., 40 N. H., 333, 338; 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 625, 633; Gates v. 
 Boardraan v. New Hampshire &c. Ins. Madison County Mut. Ins. Co., 2 N. 
 Co., 20 N. H. 551; Daniels U.Hudson Y. 43; Keeler v. Niagara Fire Ins. 
 Elver Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 41(;, Co., 16 Wis. 523, 540; Schenck ?j. Mer- 
 426; Elliott v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. cer County M. F. Ins. Co., 24 N. J. 
 Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 139, 144; Flinn Law, 447. 
 
 V. Headlam, 9 Barn. & Cres. 693; Hull 3 penn. &c. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 134 
 
 V. Cooper, 14 East, 479; Mackay v. Mass. 56. 
 
 Rhinelander, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) * As held in Short v. Woodward, 
 
 408; Williams «. Delafield, 2 Caines 13 Gray (Mass.), 86; Globe Works u. 
 
 (N. Y.) 329; Farmers &c. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 106 Mass. 207; ante, §§ 1065, 
 
 Snyder, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 481; Curry 1106. 
 
 u. Com. Ins. Co., 10 Pick. (Mass.) 535,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIL] fire insurance. 975 
 
 which, in cases of fire insurance, is for the jury.^ Contrary to 
 the holdino; in the Massachusetts court above given, it was ruled 
 in Maine, where a seller of spectacles falsely represented to the 
 purchaser that " the spectacles were a new invention, that they 
 were brilliants, and that he had never sold them to any one else 
 in Portland," — that it was a question for the jury, and not for 
 the court, to determine whether this was a representation of 
 material facts.^ 
 
 § 1285. How in Case of Warranties. — This rule has been 
 applied in some cases where the statements would seem to have 
 been warranties,^ and some confusion has sprung up in conse- 
 quence. But the sounder opinion is that, where it is agreed 
 that the representations are warranties, the insurer is entitled to 
 an exact compliance with them, without regard to their mate- 
 rialty, — in which case the question of their materialty cannot, of 
 course, be submitted to a jury.* More fully stated, where a 
 policy of insurance against loss by fire declares in express terms 
 the survey, or description of the premises, referred to therein, 
 to be " a part of the policy " and " warranties," — such descrip- 
 tion is to be construed as a warranty, and not as a representation. 
 The rule as to a warranty is that, if broken, it defeats the policy; 
 the insurer may insist upon its exact truth, according to its tenor. 
 In a case where the truth of the description is warranted, it is 
 error to submit to the jury the question whether the particulars 
 in which, at the time of issuing the policy, the premises did not 
 correspond with the description, increased the risk or not.^ 
 
 § 1286. AVliat if it is Doubtful whether the Words import 
 Representations or Warranties. — If it be doubtful, from the 
 words of a policy, whether certain statements, made by the ap- 
 
 1 Lindeuau v. Desboroiigh, 8 Barn. ^ Sexton v. Montgomery County M. 
 & Cres. 586; Hugueniu v. Rayley, 6 Ins. Co., 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 191. 
 Taunt. 186. * Gates v. Madison County M. Ins. 
 
 2 Sharp V. Ponce, 74 Me. 470. Com- Co., 2 N. Y. 43, per .Jones, J. 
 
 pare Teague v. Irwin, 127 Mass. '= Le Roy v. Market F. Ins. Co., 39 
 
 217. N. Y. 90,
 
 976 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tl'., 
 
 plicant relative to the subject of the insurance, are to be re- 
 garded as warranties or as representations merely, they will be 
 regarded as representations.^ A statement in an application for 
 insurance is to be considered a representation rather than a Avar- 
 ranty, unless it is clearly made a warranty by the terms of the 
 policy, or by some direct reference thereto."'^ Where the state- 
 ments in the policy characterize the statements in the applica- 
 tion and survey as representations, that they are such is hardly 
 a matter of doubt .^ Where the evidence left it doubtful whether 
 the survey, although it declared that the statements therein were 
 w^arranties, w-as delivered by the plaintiff for the purpose of 
 procuring the policy, or was received by the agent as a private 
 memorandum only, and whether the policy had not been de- 
 livered prior to the execution and date of the survey, — it was 
 held that the defendant was not entitled to a peremptory charge 
 that the conditions of the survey and policy had been violated, and 
 that the plaintiff could not recover ; but the question should have 
 been submitted to the jury under proper instructions.* 
 
 § 1287. Wliei'e Truth of Statements are Vouched for, so 
 far as Known and Material. — Where the language did not 
 amount to a warranty that each answer was true, but only that 
 the answers were " a just, full and true exposition of all the facts 
 and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value 
 and risk of the property to be insured, — so far as the same are 
 known to the applicant, and are material to the risk," — it was 
 held that the knowledge of the applicant and the materiality of 
 the facts stated, were both questions which were properly sub- 
 mitted to the jury.^ 
 
 1 Garcelon v. Hampden F. Ins. Co., facturers &c. Ins. Co., 8 Met. (Mass.) 
 60 Me. 580, 583; Wilson v. Conway F. 114. 
 
 Ins. Co., 4 E. I. 143; Le Eoy v. Park ^ i^q jjoy „ pai-^ p. Ins. Co., 89 
 
 F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 56. N. Y. 5(i. 
 
 2 Garcelon v. Hampden F. Ins. Co., ° Garcelon v. Hampden Fire Ins. 
 50 Me. 580, 583; Daniels v. Hudson Co., 50 Me. 580. So held in a similar 
 Eiver Ins. Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) application in Elliot v. Hamilton &c. 
 41f;. Ins. Co., 13 Gray (Mass.), 139. Cora- 
 
 3 Garcelon V. Hampden F. Ins. Co., pare Lindsey v. Union Miit. Five Ins. 
 50 Me. 580, 583; Houghton v. Mauu- Co., 3 R. I. 157.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XLIL] fire insurance. 977 
 
 § 1288. What if Statements not Responsive to any In- 
 qnii-y. — In reference to statements in the application or survey 
 which are not responsive to any interrogatory therein, the bur- 
 den of proof is on the insurance company to show then* materi- 
 ality and falsity; and these are to be determined by the jury.^ 
 
 § 1289. Instructions as to what 'Misrepresentations or Fraudu- 
 lent Statements will avoid Policy, and what will not. — " An un- 
 true or fraudulent statement, or denial, made b}' the applicant, of a fact 
 material to the risk, to induce the issuance of a policy, will prevent 
 the policy from taking effect as a valid contract, unless the insurer has 
 in some way waived or estopped himself from relying upon such mis- 
 statement to avoid the policy. If an insurance company issues a 
 
 policy upon a greater risk than an ordinary one, with a full knowledge 
 of all the facts, it cannot escape the binding obligation of its contract 
 
 by pleading such fact. If you find that James A. Miller made an 
 
 untrue or fraudulent statement of a fact material to the risk, in the ap- 
 plication for the policy, then you should find for the defendant, unless 
 you further find that the defendant ^yas informed of and knew the truth 
 in regard to such fact, and, after knowing such fact fully, received the 
 application, the premium money and notes, and issued the policy ; in 
 which case you should find for the plaintiff. > = - - A full knowledge of 
 the truth of the alleged misstatements of MiKer in the application, 
 communicated to Thornton and Case (agents), or either, was a com- 
 munication to the company." 2 = _ _ _ " Even if the jury shall believe 
 from the evidence that, at the time the insurance was applied for by the 
 plaintiffs, or their agejit, of the defendant, the plaintiffs or their agent, 
 represented that a watchman was kept and would be kept upon said 
 premises insured, and that no watchman was then or afterwards kept 
 thereon, yet, unless the jury beheve that the said representation was 
 one of the causes why the defendant took the risk, and without such 
 
 1 Garcelou v. Hampden Ins. Co., 50 Co., 5 Hill (N. Y.), 101 ; Eowley ?;. Ins. 
 
 Me. 580, 583; Daniels v. Hudson River Co., 3 Kej-s (N. Y.), 557; Anson v. Ins. 
 
 F. Ins. Co., 12 Cash. (Mass.) 417. Co., 23 la. 84. Contra, Vose v. Ins. 
 
 ^ Approved in Miller i). Mutual Ben. Co., G Cush. (Mass.) 42; Smith v. Ins. 
 
 Life Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 216, 222, 223; Co., 24 Pa. St. 320; Mitchell w. Ins. 
 
 citing Rowley v. Insurance Co., 3() N. Co., 51 Pa. St, 402; Lowell u. lus. Co., 
 
 Y. 550; Masters v. Insurance Co., 11 8 Cush. (Mass.) 127; Forbes v. Ins. 
 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 624; Sexton v. Ins. Co., Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 470; Lee v. Ins. 
 
 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 191; McEwen v. Ins. Co., 3 Gray (Mass.), 583. 
 
 62
 
 978 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoill[). Tr., 
 
 watchman being then kept and continuing to be kept, tlie said defend- 
 ant -svould not have taken the risk or issued the poUcy ; then, the fact 
 that no watchman was kept proves no defense in this action." i 
 
 § 1290. Whether a Change of Circumstances increases the 
 Risk. — It is a familiar rule in the law of tire insurance that any 
 change in the condition of the property insured, which substan- 
 tially increases the risk, avoids the policy; but whether such a 
 change has taken place is always a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 Whether the company, in defending an action on a polices relies 
 upon the falsity of the particular representation, or on the fail- 
 ure to comply with an executory stipulation, it is upon them to 
 prove it; and it is a question of fact for the jury in either as- 
 pect.^ Thus, where the policy required that notice should be 
 given to the company of any alterations which tend to increase 
 the risk, within twenty clays, or that the insurance should be- 
 come void, and alterations were made and no notice given, it w^as 
 held a cpiestion of fact for the jury whether such alterations did 
 tend to increase the risk.* So, where the subject of the insurance 
 was a dwelling-house in a suburban place, and, after the insurance 
 and before the loss, it was removed bodily to a position 200 feet 
 away, without, it seems, being brought into proximity to any 
 other buildings or combustible materials, it was held that the 
 court could not say, as matter of law, that the removal increased 
 the risk, but that whether it did or not was a question for the 
 jury.^ 
 
 ^ Approved iu Bersche v. Globe Mu- 
 tual Tire lus. Co., 31 Mo. o4G, 551. 
 
 2 Gamwell v. Merchants &c. Ins. 
 Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 1G7; Clark v. 
 lusimance Co., 40 N. H. 333, 331); Le 
 Eoy V. Park F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 56; 
 Grant v. Howard lus. Co., 5 Hill 
 (N. Y.), 10; Townsend v. North-western 
 Ins. Co., 18 N. Y. 108; North British 
 &c. Ins. Co. V. Steiger, 13 Bradw. 
 (111.) 482; Schmidts. Ins. Co., 41 III. 
 295; New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 
 32 111. 221; Wood on Fire Ins. 814; 
 
 Smith V. Mechanic's &c. Ins. Co., 32 
 N. Y. 399; Shepherd «. Union M. F. 
 Ins. Co., 38 N. H. 232, 240. 
 
 3 Daniels v. Hudson River &c. Ins. 
 Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 410, 42G. Com- 
 pare Bilbroughv. Metropolis Ins. Co., 
 5 Duer (N. Y.), 587. 
 
 4 Schucck V. Mercer County M. F. 
 Ins. Co., 24 N. J. Law, 447. 
 
 ^ Griswoldu. American Central In- 
 surance Co., 1 Mo. App. 97; s.c. af- 
 jirmed, 70 Mo. G54.
 
 TiU V, Cb. XLII.] FIRE INSURANCE. 979 
 
 § 1291. Defendant's Ixstkcction as to what Alteration will 
 Avoid the Policy. — "If au^'' alteration in the building insured was 
 made by plaintiff, or under his direction, or with his knowledge or 
 consent, after insurance made with defendant, whereby said building- 
 was exposed to greater risk or hazard from fire than when insured, the 
 policy became void, unless plaintiff has proved to the satisfaction of the 
 jury that an additional premium and deposit, after such alteration, 
 was settled with and paid to defendant or agent before the fire hap- 
 pened." 1 " It is no defense to a recovery in the suit that the plaintiffs, 
 or any of them, either at the time of obtaining the polic3'sued on, repre- 
 sented the value of the buildings on said premises greater than their real 
 value, or after the loss represented the value of the property insured, or 
 the extent and amount of the loss, greater than it really w^as, unless the 
 same was done knowingly and willfully by plaintiffs, and with a fraudu- 
 lent design." ^ 
 
 § 1292. A Similar Instrcction Drawn from the Plaintiff's Stand- 
 point. — " The jur}' are instructed that no alteration or repairs, made on 
 premises insured by plaintiff, would avoid his policy, nor can his recov- 
 ery be defeated by means of alterations or repairs, — unless the same were 
 such as to increase the risk or hazard from fire to the injured premises. 
 If the jur}' find from the evidence that defendant made the policy sued 
 on, and the property insured was destroyed by fire, as stated in petition, 
 and plaintiff complied wiili the agreements and conditions in the policy 
 
 to be complied with on his part, they will find for the plaintiff. 
 
 The jury are instructed that the policy sued on could not be made 
 void, nor can the recovery of plaintiff be defeated by the erection of 
 any building immediately adjacent or adjoining premises insured, 
 unless such erection materially increased the risk or hazard of fire." ^ 
 
 § 1293. Whether Prospective Warranty or Clause of For- 
 feiture Violated. — But where the provision in the policy is that 
 the premises shall not be used to cany on certain enumerated 
 employments, or for the storage or keeping of certain enumer- 
 ated chattels, without a special provision to that effect, this is a 
 
 ^Approved in Keru v. South St. Louis Mut. lus. Co., 40 Mo. 22: citiuo- 
 
 Louis Mut. lus. Co., 40 Mo. 19, 22, Gardner v. Piscataquis Mut. F. lus. 
 
 2 Approved in Bersche v. Globe Co., 38 Me, 439; Curry v. Coinmon- 
 Mut. Fire Ins. Co., CI Mo, 546, 550. wealth Jus, Co., 10 Pick. (Mass.) 535; 
 
 3 Approved in Keru r. South St. Frauds v. Somraerville Mut. Jus, Co., 
 
 25 N. J. L. 78.
 
 980 PiiOVIXCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tlioiiip. Tr., 
 
 prospective warranty, the breach of which avoids the policy and 
 prevents any chiim for indemnity for a k)ss, though it ap})ears 
 that the tire arose from some cause Cjuite unconnected with the 
 prohibited employment or article.^ In such a case there is, of 
 course, no question for the jury as to the materiality of the war- 
 ranty, though there may be a question as to whether there has 
 been a breach. Thus, where a policy of insurance stipulated 
 that " the work of carpenters, roofers, tinsmiths, gas-fitters, 
 plumbers and other mechanics, in building, altering or repairing 
 any building or buildings covered by this policy, will cause a for- 
 feiture of all claim under this policy, without the written consent 
 of this company indorsed thereon; — it was held, upon a certain 
 state of evidence, to be a question of fact for the jury whether or 
 not there had been such an alteration in the building as it was the 
 intention of the })arties to stipulate against.^ 
 
 § 1294. Instruction that Temporary Vacation of Premises does 
 NOT AVOID Policy. — "If a man insures his dwelling house and lives 
 therein at the time, and contracts not to let the building become vacant 
 and unoccupied, he cannot, as a matter of fact, vacate it absolutely, leave 
 it in that condition, and recover on the policy in case of loss. But if 
 he goes off temporarily, on business or matters for his own benefit or 
 otherwise, — temporarily merely, with the intention of coming back to 
 his place and there living, and with no intention of abandoning the 
 place, — the contract will not he vitiated by that kind of a transaction ; 
 and had the tenant in this case gone away on temporary business before 
 he surrendered up the premises to this Mrs. Norton, and had the fire 
 occurred while the tenant occupied it, there would be no question but 
 that the company would be responsible for the loss, if the going away 
 was merely temporary, with the intention of coming back and making 
 it the home of the tenant. I think in this case, gentlemen, if you are 
 satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence, or are clearly con- 
 vinced, that Mrs. Norton put her things into that building with the 
 intention of making it her home and her residence as a matter of fact, — 
 
 1 Mead v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 7 such conditions in policies, compare 
 N. Y. 530; Westfall v. Hudson River Franliliu Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ice Co., 
 F. Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 289, 293. 36 Md. 102; Kami v. Home Ins. Co., 
 
 2 Macli V. Rochester German Ins. 69 N. Y. 387. 
 
 Cu , 35 Hun (N. Y.), 75, 78. As to
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XLIL] FIRE INSURANCE. 
 
 981 
 
 did not live in it in person before the fire, but, after placing those things 
 in, she went away*on mere temporary business with the intention in her 
 mind to comeback and live there, — that the premises would not be 
 unoccupied and vacant within the meaning of this policy, and that the 
 company would be responsible for the loss. She must, of course, have 
 placed her goods in that building with the intention in her mind to 
 make it her residence — to make it her home, and must have gone away 
 on business — temporarily gone away, simply for a temporary purpose, 
 not permanently, — not with the idea of abandoning the place. If she 
 went away temporarily, to be gone a few weeks or a few days, on busi- 
 ness of her own, with the intention of coming back and living there, I 
 do not think the policy is vitiated ; and I think the plaintiff in this 
 cause, who sues as assignee of the policy, can recover, if you so find." ^ 
 
 § 1295. Reasonable Time for the Occupation of Insured 
 Premises by a Tenant. — Where, in the survey upon which a. 
 policy of fire insurance is granted, the question occurs, " How 
 
 1 The above, which was evidently au 
 oral charge, takeu down l:)y a stenog- 
 rapher, was approved in Shackleton v. 
 Sun Fire Office, 55 Mich. 290, 291. 
 Coolcy, C. J., said: " We have con- 
 chided, after some hesitation, that the 
 instruction should be sustained. There 
 is no doubt, if the insured had actually 
 begun living in the house before her 
 departure on business, the temporary 
 absence would not have affected the 
 policy; in contemplation of law, her 
 occupation of the house would have 
 been continuous. Stupetski v. Trans- 
 atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 43 Mich. 373; 
 Cummins v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 67 
 N. Y. 2G0; Herrmann v. Merchants' 
 Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184; Phceuix Ins. 
 Co. V. Tucker, 92 111. (U: Dennison v.^ 
 Phoenix Ins. Co., 52 Iowa, 457. The 
 only question, then, is whether the 
 fact that for the few days she remained 
 at home before starting on the busi- 
 ness trip, she did not sleep in the 
 house or take her meals there, should 
 make any difference. Under the cir- 
 cumstances we think not. The insured 
 
 had taken possession of the house, as 
 the jury must have found, for the pur- 
 pose of permanent occupancy. She 
 had moved in her liousehold furniture 
 and other goods, and was cleaning and 
 doing other work preliiuinary to living 
 there in person. Nothing, apparently, 
 was wanting to complete personal 
 possession, except that she lodged and 
 took her meals at her father's a few 
 rods off. Those facts were not con- 
 clusive against her occupancy. It 
 could not be justly claimed, we think, 
 that if a family, for the purposes of 
 cleaning and interior decoration, were 
 thus to sleep and take meals at a 
 neighbor's, while busy in the house in 
 working hours, they would in doing 
 so vacate the house. But the case of 
 such a family would be analogous to 
 that of the party insured in this case." 
 Wustum V. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 138; Ash- 
 worth V. Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 422; Car-r 
 rigau V. Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 298; 
 Herrmann v. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 162, 
 distinguished.
 
 982 PROVINCE OF COURT AXD JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tl"., 
 
 are the several stories occupied? " to which the answer is given, 
 " Unoccupied, but to be occupied by a tenant," the meaning of 
 this is held to be that the premises are to be occupied by a ten- 
 ant imtliin a reasonable time; and what will be a reasonable time 
 will be a question of fact for the jury, — although it is agreed 
 that the statements in the survey are warranties.^ 
 
 § 1296. Reasonable Time for giving' Notice of Loss. — 
 Where an insurance policy contained a clause requiring the as- 
 sured to give notice of the loss '•'■ forthwiili,^'' whether notice was 
 given forthwith, within the meaning of the instrument is, con- 
 trary to the general rule touching the exposition of written in- 
 struments, a qneslion of fact for the jury.^ The process of 
 reasoning by which this conclusion is reached is simple enough. 
 The courts hold that such a condition should be construed liber- 
 ally m favor of the insured, and that he complies with it when he 
 gives notice with due diligence, within a reasonable time, and 
 without unnecessary delay, under all the circumstances of the 
 case.^ While the question whether a party has used due dili- 
 o-ence or not in g-ivino; such notice has sometimes been held to be 
 a question of law, especially where the facts and circumstances 
 were admitted, established, or, conceded by the pleadings, — * 
 other courts have ruled that, upon a jury trial, where the facts 
 are in issue, it should be left, to the jury to determine what is a 
 reasonable time as a question of fact."' 
 
 1 Hough V. City Fire lus. Co., 2i) ^ Columbian lus. Co. v. Lawreuco, 
 Conu. 11, 24. 10 Pet. (U. S.) 507. 
 
 2 Doualiue v. Windsor County &c. ^ Doualiue v. Windsor County &c 
 Ins. Co., 5G Vt, 374. Ins. Co., 5G Vt. 374, 380. It is said 
 
 3 St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Kyle, 11 Mo. that the courts of Vermont have al- 
 278; luraan v. 'Western Fire Ins. Co., ways adopted this rule in all questions 
 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 452; Peoria &c. Ins. of doubt, depending upon a general 
 Co. V. Lewis, 18 111. 553; Niagara Fire inference from a multiplicity of par- 
 Ins. Co. V. Scammon, 100 111. ()44: s. c. ticular facts, and where the law has 
 11 Ins. L. J. 614; Phillips t\ Protection fixed no rule, — such as questions of 
 Ins. Co., 14 Mo. 220; Edwards v. Bal- due diligence, reasonable time, proba- 
 timore Ins. Co., 3 Gill (Md.), 176. ble cause, etc. /Wrf. 380, j^er Taft, J. : 
 Upon the more general question citing Sessions v. Newpoi't, 23 Vt. H. 
 whether ?-easciHa6Ze iiHie is a question of In a case in Connecticut it is said: 
 law or of fact, see jocisf, § 1530, e^ itefy. "Extreme cases either way may lie
 
 Tit. y, Ch. XLII.] FIRE INSURANCE. 933 
 
 § 1297. Sufficieucy of Preliminary Proofs of Loss. —It has 
 been held that the question of the preliminary proofs of loss is 
 f07' the jury, in the sense that the documents are to be laid be- 
 fore them for identification, leaving it to the judge to say whether 
 they make a prima facie case;i and that the jury mu^t de- 
 termme from the evidence the degree of particularity in the ac-' 
 count of the loss sent to the insurance company, and whether it 
 was as specific as the nature of the case admitted of.-' 
 
 § 1298. Defendant's Instruction as to Fraudulent Proofs of 
 Loss. — "The jury are instructed that, if thev believe from the evi- 
 dence, that the poHcy sued on contained a provision that all fraud, or 
 attempt at fraud, by false swearing or otherwise, shall cause a forfeit- 
 ure of all claims under the policy, and that, if they further believe from 
 the evidence that plaintiffs have fraudulently offered to defendant 
 proofs of loss under the policy, containing material statements in re- 
 gard to their loss under said policy, which the plaintiffs knew to'be 
 false at the time the same were offered, they will find for defendant." 3 
 
 § 1299. Waiver of Preliminary Proofs of Loss. — Where 
 the production by the assured of preliminary proofs of loss is 
 required by the policy, this is a condition precedent to his rio-ht 
 of action, unless waived by the insurer, expressly or impliedfy ; 
 and where the evidence is conflicting as to whether there has been 
 a waiver, of course the question is for the jury.* But it has 
 
 easily cleterrah.ed. Between them (Pa.) 325; Franklm Ins. Co r Uncle 
 
 there is a wide belt of debatable graff, 43 Pa. St. 350. Compare the 
 
 ground, and cases falling within it are case of Ward v. The Law Property As 
 
 governed so much by the peculiar cir- surauce & Trust Society 37 En- 
 
 cumstances of each case, that it is Law &Eq. 47, where the policy assure^d 
 
 much better to determine the matter as the plaintiff against the criminal de 
 
 a question of fact." Lockwood v. Ins. faults of a commercial traveler whom 
 
 Co 47 Conn 553 he employed, and provided that it 
 
 Klem V. I ranklm Ins. Co., 13 Pa. should be void if the claimant should 
 
 ;:;'■ ,,. ^ i^eglect or omit, for six days after mak- 
 
 JjTi J'-Z '"'■ ''■'''''''- ^"^^^^^^i^^overyorreceivingnoticethat 
 
 giaff 43 Pa. St. 3o0. a liability of the traveler had been in- 
 
 3 Approved in Schulter v. Mer- curred, to forward a written statement 
 
 chant s Mut. Ins. Co., C2 Mo. 237. of particulars, -the question turning. 
 
 Phffinix Ins. Co. v. Munday, 5 on the interpretation of the policy au5 
 
 Coldw. (Tenn.) 547, 551; Drakes, not upon evidence of waiver "" 
 Farmers' Union Ins. Co., 3 Grant Cas.
 
 984 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThORip. Tr., 
 
 been held that, where all the facts and circumstances relating to 
 the subject are admitted, the defendant has the right to require 
 the court to instruct the jury whether the evidence is suiEcient to 
 establish a w^aiver or not.^ Where the agent of the company 
 had ao-reed with the assured to ascertain the amount of their loss 
 from their books, and, in the answer sent by the company in re- 
 ply to the statement of the loss, refusing payment "on account 
 of circumstances connected with the insurance," and there was 
 no objection to the statement sent, the evidence of loaiver was 
 sufficient to justify a submission to the jury.^ 
 
 § 1300. Waiver of Limitation of Time within which Action 
 to be Brouglit. — Where the policy contains a limitation as to 
 the time within which an action can be brought thereon, this, it is 
 held, can be waived; and where there is evidence tending to 
 show a waiver, the question becomes a question of fact for the 
 jury .3 
 
 § 1301. Waiver of a Condition against Transfer of Policy. — 
 
 So, where, under a policy which, by its terms, becomes void 
 upon a sale or transfer of the property assured, without consent 
 of the company indorsed on the policy, and a change in the title 
 has taken place without any transfer regularly made, but the 
 party in interest has continued to pay premiums for a number of 
 years, it will be a question for the jury whether the state of the 
 policy was not known to the company, there being evidence en- 
 titling them to draw such an inference. Consequently it was a 
 question for the jury whether they had not waived the forfeiture, 
 which had taken place by the alienation of the property without 
 an assignment of the policy.* 
 
 i SpriDg Garden M. Ids. Co. v. ative must be supported by an 
 
 Evans, 9 Md. 1, 20. agreement founded on a valuable 
 
 2 Franklin Ins. Co. y. Updegraff, 43 consideration, or that the jact relied 
 Pa. St. 350. on as a waiver must be such as to 
 
 3 Coursin v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., estop the company from insisting on 
 46 Pa. St. 823, 330. Compare Ripley v. performance of the contract or for- 
 ^^tna Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 13G, where it feiture of the contract. 
 
 is held that such a waiver to be oper- •* Buckley v. Garrett, 47 Pa. St. 205,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIL] fire insurance. 985 
 
 § 1302. Whether a Fishikg-Scow is a " Building." — In an action 
 on a policy of fire insurance, one of the questions was wtiether the fisli- 
 ing-scow, which was the suliject of the insurance, was included in the 
 word " building " in the polic}' of insurance, so as to be thereby affected 
 by all the terms and conditions of the policy relating to buildings. 
 The defendant contended that it was so included, and that therefore, 
 it being unoccupied, both at the time it was insured and at the time it 
 was burned, the plaintiff could not, under the terms of the policy, re- 
 cover. It was held that it was error to exclude evidence tendered by 
 the defendant for the purpose of showing that scows of the kind and 
 cliaracter of the one insured were used and occupied as buildings by 
 the persons owning them ; that in the fishing season, such persons used 
 them as residences and places of business, and that when the fishing 
 season was over, they used them as residences on land ; that this par- 
 ticular scow was so used ; and tliat, in the same locality, other scows 
 were so used. It was further held that, upon such evidence and the 
 surrounding circumstances, it would have been proper to submit the 
 question to the jury, whether or not the parties to the contract intended 
 that all the limitations and conditions thereof should apply to the scow 
 as a building. 1 
 
 § 1303. Whether a Certain Business is a " Manufactory. ' ' — Where 
 a policy upon a stock of merchandise provided that a manufacturing 
 establishment or workshop should be considered as hazardous and 
 extra hazardous, and that the policy should be void if, during its 
 term, the risk should be increased by the occupation of the premises 
 for more hazardous purposes than were permitted in the policy, and it 
 appeared that one of the upper stories of the building was rented to 
 persons who carried on therein the business of putting together the 
 frames of chairs which had been elsewhere made, — it was held, but ap- 
 parently without much consideration, that the judge ought to have sub- 
 mitted the question to the jury whether this was a manufactorj^ or not, 
 within the meaning of the policj'."- 
 
 § 1304. Failure to Mention Specific Articles of Merchan- 
 dise. — An insurance on ''merchandise," such as is usually 
 kept in country stores, is not void because hardware, china, 
 glass, looking-glass, etc., are not specifically mentioned in the 
 
 J Euos V. Sun Ins. Co., CZ Cal. - Appleby v. Firemen's Fund Ins, 
 
 (;21. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 454, 457.
 
 '986 PROVIXCE OF COURT AND JUKY. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 application, if tlie articles are such as are usually kept in coun- 
 try stores; and whether they are such is a question of fact 
 for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1305. Identity of the Articles Destroyed. — As already 
 seen^ wliere i\\Q ambiguity 'n^ on the face of the instrument — 
 that is where it is a patent ambiguity — it is for the judge to 
 explain it; but an ambiguity in the contract arising out of ex- 
 trinsic evidence, which is necessary to be heard in dealing with 
 the subject of the contract, must be solved by the jury . It was 
 so held where there was a doubt as to the house in which the 
 goods insured were situated — whether they were situated in the 
 house which was burned, or in another and adjacent house, which 
 fact could not be determined by the language of the policy. In 
 such a case it was said by Strong, J. : " There is some ambiguity, 
 therefore, in the policy, arising from extrinsic evidence. The 
 construction of written papers is undoubtedly for the court, and 
 it is a question of law. Even if there be an ambiguity on the 
 face of a written or printed document, it is for the judge to ex- 
 plain it. But if the ambiguity arise from extrinsic evidence, as 
 it does in this case, it must be solved by the jury.^ It is for the 
 court to decide what the instrument means ; but the application 
 of the meaning nuist be a question of fact, when it is rendered 
 doubtful by parol evidence what was the identical subject re- 
 specting which the parties contracted. For this reason we hold 
 there was error in the charge of the court. It should have been 
 submitted to the jury to find, not the meaning of the written ap- 
 plication, but whether the subject of it was goods in the Kephart 
 House, or goods in the Western House, retained by the plaintiff 
 after his sale of the other to Kephart." ^ It is obvious that the 
 question whether the policy ap})lies to particular articles will be 
 a qwstion of fact for the jury,^ on the general principle that 
 questions of identity are for the jury,^ and by analogy to the 
 
 1 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. "Updo- * Boatty v. Ljcomiu;^ County Ins. 
 grafiE, 43 Fa. St. 350. Co., 52 Fa. St. 456. 
 
 2 Ante, § 1083. 5 Home lus. Co. v. Favorite, 4G 111. 
 
 3 Citing Smith r. Thompson, 8 C. B. 263, 270. 
 
 44. « Post, § 1450, etscq.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIl.] FIRE INSURANCE. 987 
 
 rule that the question what land is embraced in the descrip- 
 tive calls of a deed is for a jury,^ It is for the jury to determine, 
 as a question of fact from the evidence, whether the merchandise 
 insured was destroyed in the " building" described in the policy; 
 but if a building contain several store rooms, and there be any 
 uncertainty as to whether all the rooms were included, it is fatal 
 to the insurers; for the language of the policy is theirs, and is • 
 to be construed most strongly against them.^ "Where the insur- 
 ance company had given permission to the assured to " enlarge 
 the building " in which the merchandise insured was then con- 
 tained (the same in which it was subsequently burned), and, in 
 the permission, had mentioned the goods as insured in the build- 
 ing, requiring that no goods should be kept in the second story 
 after the completion of the addition, — this was held such evi- 
 dence that the store-rooms of the assured were in the building 
 described in the policy, as to justify a submission of the question 
 to the jury.-^ 
 
 § 130G. Mutual Insurance — Data for Correct Assessment. — 
 
 In an action to recover an assessment upon a de})osit note, given to 
 a mutual tire insurance company, the question whether the books 
 of the company furnish sutiicient data for the making of a correct 
 assessment, is a question of fact for the jury.* 
 
 § 1307. Plaintiff's Instructions as to Renewal of Policy by Oral 
 Contract. — "If you find from the evidence that the parties agreed 
 that the insurance should be renewed without a i:)ayment of premium, 
 and their minds met and they fully understood the terms of such renewal 
 in all respects, and notliing remained to be done thereafter except to 
 make out the renewal receipt on the part of the compan}', and the pav- 
 ment of the premium b}' the plaintiff, notwithstanding this was a verbal 
 agreement, it was nevertheless a valid contract for the renewal of the 
 policy, and the defendant is liable for the loss to the amount of the in- 
 surance. If you find that, yjrevious to January' 15, 1882, the de- 
 fendant company had issued a policy of insurance upon the building 
 
 1 Post, § 14C1, et seq. 3 /^iVZ. 
 
 2 FninkliiiF. lus. Co. r. Updegraff, •* Marblehead M. F. lus. Co. v. Un- 
 43 Pa. St. 350. der^Yood, 2 Gray (Mass.), 210, 214.
 
 988 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thouip. Tr.,. 
 
 and stock in question, which would expire on that date, and that, about 
 the time of its expiration, the agent of the company, for and in its behalf 
 agreed with the plaintiff, or his authorized agent, to renew said policy, 
 and that he, the agent of the company, would attend to it right away ; 
 and that their minds met as to the terms of such agreement ; and that 
 there was nothing further to be, done between the parties, except that 
 the agent of the defendant should make out and deliver to the plaintiff 
 or his agent the renewal receipt or evidence of renewal, and that the 
 plaintiff or his agent should then, or at some subsequent time, pay the 
 premium, — then I instruct 3'ou that such an agreement would bind the 
 defendant company to renew the policy, and they could only avoid 
 liability upon such contract by tendering the renewal and demanding 
 the premium, and the failure of the plaintiff to pay the same, or by 
 giving the plaintiff or his agent notice that the defendant company had 
 refused to carry the risk ; and such tender of the renewal and demand 
 of the premium, or the giving of the notice, as before stated, in order to 
 relieve the defendant from liability, must be done before the loss accrued 
 and before they knew of the loss. " ^ 
 
 § 1308. Instructions on the Theory of a Waiver ob^ the Right 
 OP Forfeiture by Promising to Rebuild. — "If the jury believe 
 from the evidence that the defendant gave to plaintiffs the notice 
 of their intention to rebuild the premises destroyed by fire, given 
 in evidence by plaintiffs, and that, at the time of giving said notice, the 
 defendant knew that no watchman had been kept upon said premises 
 from the time .of the issuing of said policy to the time of the 
 happening of the loss, then the jury may infer that the defendants 
 waived their right to interpose that fact as a defense to the right of 
 plaintiffs to recover under the policy, and the burden of pooof is on the 
 defendant to satisfy the jury that, at the time of giving such notice, the 
 defendant was ignorant of that fact. Although the jury may be- 
 lieve that, at the time of making the application for the policy sued on 
 by plaintiffs, or their agents, it was represented by them or their agents, 
 that a watchman was and' would be kept in charge of the premises in- 
 sured, and that that matter was regarded by the agents of defendant as 
 material to the risk — that is, without such representations the risk 
 would not have been taken, or a higher rate of premium would have 
 been charged therefor ; and that the building was damaged or lost by 
 fire, and at the time there was no watchman in charge of the premises ; 
 
 * Approved in Kiug v. Ilekla Fire Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 514, 515.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLII.J LIFE INSURANCE. ggg 
 
 and that the defendant, by its authorized officers and agents, knew these 
 lac s, and with such knowledge the defendant alone or in confrnction 
 wuh other companies, agreed to make good the loss by rebuilL" he 
 mses,and notilied plaintiffs thereof, and failed or refnsed Zl. 
 2 no ,T ° objections to maldnggood the loss on the gronnd 
 
 nt 1 ,fl .f""" "". '" "''"■«' "' ""^ P'-^"''^^^ »' ^''^ '™e of t^e fire, 
 intil after the insftntion of this snit ; from these circnistanccs the jnr; 
 a,e anthonzed to infer that defendant waived the matter, and in uch 
 case It constitutes no defense to this suit. "1 no in such 
 
 Auticle II. _ Life Insibance. 
 Section 
 1310. Whether Policy Authorized by Statute 
 
 ""• "^::;;; p:^:;:;::' "■""^^■■^" '^"-'^ - '■'^--"-tiou t,.„t ,. „a<i uo 
 
 ll!?' PI l'","»' ",''""" """" "■"'" '^'■°""»'S or from Natural Causes 
 1314. Habitual Intemperance 
 
 ""■ Tltll^reT"'™ "^ """""' "»-'»' -»>« >-P--nta.lon 
 1310. DeleiKlaut's lustructiou as to what Constitutes a Waiver of Ki^ht to 
 A,o„l Policy by Kcasou of False Statements In Application ' 
 
 § 1310. Whether Policy Authorized hy Statute. _ It is of 
 
 course, a question of legal inlerpreuaion, whether ti policy of life 
 
 hsuruace comes within llio purview of a statute which authorizes 
 
 the issuing of such iiolicies ,„■ „b„n, -t ■ ""tnoiizes 
 
 poli„,,i poiiues, oi whether it is a mere wager 
 
 § 1311. Whether the Insured Answered Falsely in his Appli- 
 cation that he had no Family Physician. -It is ciistomaiy in 
 
 the pniited questions and answers, in applications for policie^ of 
 
 dence of his family ,,hysic,a„, if he lias one. MHiere, in an action 
 upon a policy of life insurance, the right of recovery is c<,n- 
 tested, on the ground that the insured gave a false Answer to 
 tins question, it will ordinarily be a rjnestion of faU for the jury 
 
 ' Approved in Bersche v Glohp 2 -ir,,, ,, ,. 
 
 «ut. Kucfus. CO., 31 MO. .„,.sr" ancci;::::,: «"Br"S:?^^:-:-
 
 990 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThOHip. Tr., 
 
 whether the insured had ii family physician or not.^ Who is to 
 be deemed a family physician, within the meaning of such a 
 question, is, it seems, a question of Icnv; but whether the as- 
 sured had such a physician is, of course, a question of fact. A 
 family physician is defined to be the physician who usually at- 
 tends and is consulted by the members of a family in the capacity 
 of a physician; and where, in such an application, the usual med- 
 ical attendant is inquired for, the one who has been accus'omed 
 to attend, and not one who has occasionally attended, should be 
 mentioned."^ 
 
 § 1312. Whether a Death was from Drowning or from 
 Natnral Causes. — In an English case, H. effected with the 
 defendants a policy of assurance, whereby they agreed that, if 
 he should sustain any injury caused by accident or violence, 
 within the meaning of that policy and the conditions thereto, 
 and should die from the effects of such injury within three cal- 
 endar months from the happening thereof, then the funds and 
 property of the defendants should be subject and liable to pay 
 the sum thereby assured. The policy contained a proviso' 
 that no claim should be made in respect of any injury, unless the 
 same should be caused by some outward and visible means, of 
 which satisfactory proof could be furnished to the directors. 
 On a Saturday afternoon, H. went from London to Brighton by 
 railroad, having a ticket which entitled him to return by it on the 
 followino- iNIonday. About seven o'clock on Monday evening, 
 he left his lodgings, having expressed his intention to bathe 
 before he returned to London. His clothes were found on the 
 steps of a bathing machine, and about six weeks afterwards a 
 body was washed ashore on the Essex coast, which his brother and 
 some acquaintances deposed at the inquest was his body, but 
 which the jury found to be the body of a person unknown. It 
 was held, in the Court of p]xcliequer Chamber: 1. That, assum- 
 ino" that H. died from drowning, that was a death by " accident" 
 
 1 "Rokl V. Piedmont &c. Ins. Co., 58 Co., 58 Mo. 421, 424. Consult also 
 Mo. 421, 424; Gibson v. American &c. May on Insurance, § 304, and cases 
 Life Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 580. there cited. 
 
 2 Keid V. I'iedmont &c. Life Ins.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIL] life ixsuijaxce. 991 
 
 within the meaning of the policy. 2. That it was a question 
 for the juiy whether H. died from the action of the water or 
 from natural causes. The judges reasoned that the probability, 
 upon such a state of facts, was greater that he died from drown- 
 ing than from natural causes, which was sufficient to turn the 
 balance and take the case to the jury } 
 
 § 1313. Plaintiff's Instruction as to Insurable Interest of 
 Grandson in Life op Grandfather. — " I instruct you that a grand- 
 son with whom a grandfather resides, has an insurable interest in the 
 life of the grandfather ; and a policy of insurance taken out by the 
 grandfather in favor of the grandson, in the absence of fraud, is valid 
 and binding on the^company issuing it." '^ 
 
 § 1314. Habitual Intemperance. — The question whether a 
 person whose life was insured was habitually intemperate, within 
 the meaning of a clause avoiding the policy on this p-round, has 
 been held a question for the jury on conflicting or doubtful evi- 
 dence.'^ In such a case, where the insured had actually had an 
 attack of deUrium tremens, it was held proper to instruct the 
 jury that, if the habits of the insured " in the usual, ordinary, 
 and every-day routine of his life were temperate," the represen- 
 tations made, as to his habits being temperate, w^ere not untrue, 
 within the meaning of the policy, although he may have had an 
 attack of delirium tremens from an exceptional over-indulgence. 
 The court reason that it could not have been contemplated, from 
 
 1 Trew v. Railway Passengers As- 22 Am. Eep. 180; Campbell v. New 
 
 surance Co., 6 Hurl. & N. 838. Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381; 
 
 ^2 Approvediu Elkhart Mutual Aid Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 504; 
 
 Asso. V. Haughton, 103 Ind. 28f!, 290. Olmstedr. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 593; Fair- 
 
 The court discuss tlie question at child v. Northeast. Mut. Life Asso., 
 
 length and review the following decis- 51 Vt. 613; Clark v. Allen, 11 R. I. 439; 
 
 ions : Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, s. c. 23 Am. Rep. 49G; Loomis v. Eagle 
 
 29 Ind. 23G; Franklin Life Ins. Co. w. &c. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.), 39G; 
 
 Hazzard, 41 Ind. IIG; s. c. 13 Am. Lemon v. Pha?uix Ins. Co., 38 Conu. 
 
 Rep. 313; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. 294; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Seftou, 53 Ind. 380; Continental Life Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; ^tnaLife Ins. 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Volger, 89 Ind. 572; s. c. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 5G1. 
 46 Am. Rep. 185; Guardian Mutual 3 Northwestern Life Ihs. Co. v. 
 
 Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 111. 35; s. c. Muskegon Bank, 122 U. S. 501.
 
 9^2 PROVI.NCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the language used iu the policy, that it vshould have become void 
 in con.'-equence of an occasional excess by the insured, but only 
 where such excess, by frequent repetitions, had become a habit. ^ 
 
 § 1315. Defendant's Instruction as to Effect of Material False 
 Representation by the Assured. — "A misrepresentation or false 
 statement, made in his application for insurance, by a person whose life 
 is insured, respecting a material fact, avoiJs the policy issued ui)on that 
 application, and this, whether the misrepresentation was made inno- 
 cently or designedly. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence 
 that George Schwarzbach, in his application for the policy or certificate 
 here sued on, stated that he had no serious illness, or stated that he 
 had not had, during the last seven years, any disease or severe sickness, 
 and that either of those statements was false in any respect, deemed by 
 the jury material, — then, whether the said Schwarzbach intended to 
 deceive or not, the said policy or certificate is void, and the jury should 
 find for the defendant ; unless they further believe that the avoidance 
 of the policy or certificate has been waived by the defendant, in the 
 manner elsewhere explained." '^ 
 
 § 1316. Defendant's Instruction as to What Constitutes a Waiver 
 of Right to Avoid Policy by Reason of False Statements in Appli- 
 cation. — "There can be no waiver of the avoidance of a policy by 
 reason of material false statements or misrepresentations in the appli- 
 cation, unless the acts relied upon as showing the waiver were done with 
 full knowledge of the facts. While, therefore, the receipt of premiums 
 or assessments, with full knowledge, on the part of the defendant, of 
 facts working a forfeiture of the polic}'', might constitute a waiver of 
 such forfeiture, j^et the receipt of such premiums or assessments, in 
 ignorance of such facts, would not constitute a waiver. If, then, the 
 jury believe from the evidence that the policy or certificate sued on was 
 forfeited or avoided, by reason of false statements respecting material 
 facts made by George Schwarzbach in his application, and that the de- 
 fendant, when it accepted assessments from him, did not know that 
 such statements were false, — then the acceptance of such assessments 
 would not constitute a waiver of such forfeiture or avoidance. ^ 
 
 1 Insurauce Co. v. Foley, 105 U. S. Ohio Valley Protective Uuion, 25 W. 
 350,354; reaffirmed in Northwestern Va. G22, 640,041. 
 
 Life lus. Co. V. Muskegon Bank, 122 U. ^ Approved in Schwarzbach v. 
 
 S. 501, 512. Ohio Valley Protective Uuiou, 25 W. 
 
 2 Approved iu Schwarzbach v. Va. (!40.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLII,] MARINE INSURANCE. 993 
 
 Article III. — Marine Insurance. 
 
 Section 
 
 1318. Whether Evidence overcomes Presumptiou of Seaworthiness. 
 
 1319. Whether Circumstances raise Presumption of Unseaworthiness. 
 
 1320. Time vrithin whicli a Voyage sliould be Performed. 
 
 1321. Termination of the Voyage. 
 
 1322. Facts wliich will justify an Abandonment. 
 
 1323. Eeasonable Time for Abandoning a Cargo to the Underwriters. 
 
 1324. Eeasonable Time for Ascertaining whether Kecovery and Repair Pos- 
 
 sible. 
 
 1325. Whether Seizure of Vessel was an Act of War. 
 
 1326. Barratry: Misconduct in Doing an Act Proliibited by Statute. 
 
 1327. A Chai'ge to a Jury where the Defense was Barratry. 
 
 1328. Instructions as to what Constitutes Partial and what Total Loss. 
 
 § 1318. Whether Evidence Overcomes Presumptiou of Sea- 
 worthiuess. — In an action upon a policy of marine insurance, 
 the plaintiff goes to the jury with a presumiUion of laiu in his 
 favor that the vessel was seaworth}^, and whether the evidence 
 is sufficient to remove this presumption is a question for the 
 jury, and not for the court. ^ 
 
 § 1319. Whether Circumstauces raise Presumption of Un- 
 seaworthiness. — Where the inability of a ship to perform its 
 voyage becomes evident soon after leaving port, and it founders 
 without stress of weather, or other adequate cause of injury, the 
 presumption is that this inability existed before setting sail, and 
 that it was due to some latent defect which rendered the vessel 
 unseaworthy.2 In such cases " the law Avill intend a want of sea- 
 worthiness, because no visible or rational cause, other than a 
 latent and inherent defect in the vessel, can be assigned for the 
 loss ; and insurers do not insure against latent defects. ' ' ^ This pre- 
 
 1 Field V. Ins. Co., 3 Md. 245, 250. side v. Orplians' Benefit Ins. Co., 62 
 
 2 Walsh V. Washington M. Ins. Mo. 322, 325; Marcy v. Sun Mut. Ins. 
 Co., 32N.Y. 427, 436; Talcottv. Com- Co., 11 La. Ann. 749; Marcy «. Sun 
 merciallns. Co.,2 Johns. (N. Y.) 124; Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Id. 264; Parker v. 
 Barnewall v. Church, 1 Caines (N. Y.), Union Ins. Co., 15 Id. 688. 
 
 217; Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 11 ^ Patrick v. Hallett, 3 .Johns. Cas. 
 
 Pick. (Mass.) 227, 237; Watson v. (X. Y.) 76; Walsh v. Washington luSo 
 Clarke, 1 Dow (Pari. Rep.), 336 ; Gart- Co., 32 N. Y. 427, 437. 
 
 03
 
 994 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JUKY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 sumption does not belong to the class of presumptions which are 
 termed presumptions of hiw. It is not in the nature of a pvp- 
 sumptio juris et de jure. It is a mere presumption of fact, which 
 shifts the onus probandi, and which prevails only where it is un- 
 repelled by countervailing proof. But, even to this extent, no 
 presumption of unseaworthiness arises, except from facts which 
 exclude the rational inference of a loss attributable to the perils 
 of the seas.^ But where it satisfactorily appears that the vessel 
 was seaworthy on leaving port, and that it encountered marine 
 perils which might well disable a staunch and well manned ship, 
 no such presumption can be invoked, for the purpose of over- 
 turning a verdict and absolving the insurers from liability. - 
 When, therefore, a ship sinks in port, very soon after commenc- 
 ing her voyage, without having met with any extraordinary gale 
 of wind or other disturbing element, this fact is a circumstance 
 from which the jury are authorized to find that it is unseaworthy, 
 or, as the Louisiana cases term it, not portwortliy ; and whether 
 it is so or not, in an action on a marine policy, where unsea- 
 w^orthiness is set up as a defense, is a question of fact for a jury.-^ 
 
 § 1320. Time within which a Voyage sliould be Performed. 
 
 In an action upon a policy of marine insurance, the time within 
 which a voyage should be performed is a question of fact for the 
 
 § 1321. Termination of tiie Voyage. — It is obvious that, 
 where a particular place is stated in the policy as the termination 
 of the voyage, the identification of the place and the question 
 w'hether the ship had arrived at that place, are questions of fact. 
 So held where the voyage was described, " from Swan River to 
 
 1 Walsh V. Washiugtou lus. Co., sell, 1 Bay (S. C), 309; Parker v. 
 32 N. Y. 427, 436. Potts, 3 Dow (Pari. Rep.), 23; Burges 
 
 2 Walsh V. Washington Ins. Co., v. Wickham, 10 Jur. (n. s.) .)2. 
 supra; 1 Marsh. Ins. 158, 159; 1 Aru. ^ Gartside v. Orphans' Benefit 
 Ins. f;()2, § 245; Sherwood v. Ruggles, Ins. Co., (i2 Mo. 322, 32(5. 
 
 2 Sandf. S. C. (N. Y.) 55; Patrick v. ^ Charleston Ins. Co. v. Corner, 2 
 
 Ilallett, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 241; s. c. 3 Gill (Md.), 410, 426; post, § 1562. 
 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 76; Miller v. Kus-
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLII.] MARINE IXSURANCE. 995 
 
 Mauritius, and for thirty days after arrival," and, according to 
 custom, the ship anchored at what was known as Bell Buoy, 
 which was a buoy in the main ocean a few miles from the harbor 
 itself, and, after having remained there for fourteen days await- 
 ing money to pay a bottomry bond, was wrecked. It was held 
 a question for the jury whether she had arrived at Mauritius. 
 More strictly, the question was whether she had arrived at the 
 place at which ships of her character ordinarily anchor, when 
 Mauritius is the termination of the voyage.^ 
 
 § 1322. Facts which will Justify an Abandonment. — In an 
 
 action on a policy of marine insurance, the facts which will jus- 
 tify an abandonment avQ for the jury? 
 
 § 1323. Reasonable Time for Abandoning a Cargo to the 
 Underwriters. — In a case of marine insurance, where the ves- 
 sel was stranded and the cargo partly destroyed, it was held that 
 the owners must make their election to abandon the cargo to the 
 underwriters within a reasonable time; and Lord Ellenborough 
 conceived that it was the 'province of the judge to direct the jury as 
 to what would be a reasonable time under the circumstances, ^though 
 it is doubtful whether it would be so held at the present time. 
 
 § 1324. Reasonable Time for Ascertaining" whether Re- 
 covery and Repair possible. — Where a vessel has been wrecked or 
 sunk, and the policy of insurance recites that, " in no case what- 
 ever shall the assured have the rio-ht to abandon, until it shall be 
 ascertained that the recovery and repair of the said schooner are 
 impracticable," — the court b\\o\x\([ expound to the jury the mean- 
 ing of the clause; and it is not error to refuse an instruction 
 which is merely drawn in the language of the clause itself, be- 
 cause that is tantamount to submitting its meaning to the jury. 
 The meaning was held to be that the owner was not bound to 
 wait until it was demonstrated beyond any contingency that 
 
 1 Lindsay v. Jauson, 4 Hurl. & N. ^ Auderson v. Royal Exchange As- 
 699. surauce Co., 7 East, 38. 
 
 2 Delaware lus. Co, v. Winter, 38 
 Pa. St= 176, 187.
 
 996 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [i TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 the vessel could not possibly be got off and repaired ; else bis 
 right to abandon could never arise until the vessel had actually 
 gone to pieces; for, until that time, some fortunate and unex- 
 pected event might deliver her from peril. The recovery and 
 repair of the vessel would be ascertained to be imi:)ractiGable, 
 when, in the opinion of judicious men, acquainted with the sub- 
 ject, there was no reasonable probability that she could be got 
 off and repaired; and if the owner was not bound to wait until 
 it was absolutely certain that the vessel could not be got off and 
 repaired, then he was entitled to abandon.^ From this it would 
 seem to follow that the question is one for a jury, under proper 
 instructions from the court as to the meaning of the language of 
 the policy. 
 
 § 1325. Whether Seizure of Vessel was an Act of War. — 
 
 In an action on a policy of marine insurance, Avhere the evidence 
 showed that the insured vessel, while lying at a wharf in the 
 port of Norfolk, Virginia, for repairs, was, on the twenty-first 
 day of April, 1861, seized by a large body of men, professing 
 to act by authority of the State of Virginia, filled with stones, 
 towed out into the channel, amidst the cheers of the populace, 
 and sunk at the mouth of the channel, to prevent the ingress or 
 egress of vessels of war ; and that it was a time of such confusion 
 and excitement that no relief could be had from the courts, and 
 that the vessel wasdost, — it was held, upon these facts, taken in 
 connection with the history of the times, which the court would 
 notice judicially, that it should have been left to the jury as a 
 question of fact ^ whether the seizure of the vessel was an act of 
 war, on the part of those then engaged in hostilities with the 
 United States, or in aiding or carrying out existing or contem- 
 plated acts of war by the State of Virginia, or whether it was 
 the act of a mob simply. ^ 
 
 § 1326. Barratry : Misconduct in Doingr an Act Proliibited 
 by Statute. — Where the master of a vessel, in order to increase 
 
 ' Norton v. Lexington &c. Ins. Co., ^ Swinnerton r. Columbiau Ins. Co., 
 
 1 ; :i!. 236, 249. 37 N. Y. 174.
 
 Tit. V, Cll. XLIL] MARINE IXSURANCE. 997 
 
 the head of steam while racing with another vessel, brought a 
 barrel of turpentine from the hold to the furnace, whereby the 
 vessel was set on fire and destroyed, and there was an act of 
 Congress providing that turpentine must be secured upon steam- 
 boats in metallic safes, or in apartments lined with metal, at a 
 secure distance from any tire, — it was held that the question 
 whether the wrongful act of the master, in thus using the tur- 
 pentine, w'as misco7iduct, within the meaning of the rule of law 
 that a policy of insurance will not protect a party against his 
 own misconduct, was a question of laio for the court, and not a 
 question of fact for the jury; for, though, ordinarily, questions 
 of care, diligence and skill are to be decided by a jury, it is 
 otherwise where the law defines the very act to be done under 
 given circumstances. In such a case the jury have only to decide 
 whether the acts required or forbidden by the law have been 
 done.^ 
 
 § 1327. A Charge to a Jury where the Defense was Barratry. — 
 " The second defense is barratry, which may be said to comprehend not 
 only every species of fraud and knavery committed by the master or 
 pilot, with the intention of benefiting himself at the expense of the 
 owners of the boat, but every willful act on his part of known illegality, 
 whereby the owners are in fact injured. It consists of some fraudulent 
 act intended to injure them, or of a willful violation of known positive 
 law, in the navigation or management of the vessel, from which the loss 
 resulted. [The court here read the rules and the act of Congress as 
 recited in the statement of this case, and continued] : These rules are 
 intended to avoid collisions between boats ascending and descending 
 the river, and they prescribe the course to be pursued by the pilots. 
 They are made to be observed, and are binding as law upon the pilots, 
 subject, however, to any emergencies by which it may become necessary 
 to depart from them, to escape or avoid immediate danger from collision 
 or other perils. It is claimed that the pilot willfully violated these 
 rules of navigation, established under a law of Congress, by failing to 
 give the signals required by the rules, and by omitting to stop when the 
 boats had come within a distance of eight hundred yards. These rules 
 are in evidence, and the pilots are bound to obey them, unless some 
 emergency in the course of navigation occurs, justifying a departure 
 
 1 Citizens Ins. Co. v. Marsh, -tl Pa. St. 387, 393; post, §1C72.
 
 998 PROVINCE OF COUKT AND JURY. [iTllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 from them, to avoid a collision or other danger. The rules require that, 
 when the boats have approached within one mile, the pilot of the 
 ascending boat shall sound the whistle to notify the pilot of the descend- 
 ing boat on which side to pass ; and that, if the signals are not answered 
 and understood by the time boats have approached to the distance of 
 eight hundred yards, he shall stop his boat until the signals are cor- 
 rected and understood. Now, if the pilot of the America, on approach- 
 ing the United States, when they had approached within the mile, knew 
 or believed that they had come within the mile, and chose to omit to 
 give the signal required by the rule; or if, when lie knew or believed 
 that they had approached within the eight hundred yards, without 
 satisfactor}^ signals, he did not stop, although he knew that the rules 
 required that he should stop, but chose to risk the violation of the rule, 
 and the result of such violation of the rule was the loss, that would 
 constitute such misconduct of the pilot as to prevent a recovery, though 
 be did not actually intend an injury to the owners. He is not at liberty 
 to prefer his own judgment to the rule required by law, unless there be 
 some emergency requiring a departure from the rule. But he must 
 deliberately, or voluntarily and knowingly violate the rule, in order to 
 constitute such misconduct as to prevent a recoveiy. Tiie rules are 
 made to be observed by pilots ; they are intended for the safety of the 
 public and for the protection of the owners. Whether they are the best 
 that can be made or not, while in force they must be observed, and a 
 willful disregard of them is misconduct; and if a loss is caused thereby 
 to the owners, it is a loss by barratry, which is excepted from this 
 policy. But, in establishing this defense, the burden of the proof is on 
 the defendants. They must make it appear, by a fair preponderance of 
 evidence, that the pilot of the America did violale the rules knowingly, 
 and that the loss was the consequence. - - - - Mere error of fact or of law 
 is not sufficient to establish a defense on this ground. The pilot must 
 know his duty, and decline to do it. If he supposed that the distance 
 was a mile when he gave the first signal, and intended to comply with 
 the rule by the signal which he gave, the fact that he may have been 
 mistaken in his estimate of the distance is not misconduct which is a 
 defense. So, if when the boats approached to the distance of eight 
 hundred yards, the pilot of the America knew it, or believed it, and 
 knew that the signals had not been answered or properly understood, 
 and yet failed to stop or back his boat according to the law, that would 
 be such misconduct as would lie a defense against a suit for a loss 
 caused by it. But if, by reason of the darkness of the night, or other 
 causes not under his crintrol, he was mistaken as to the fact of their
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLII.] MAKIXE INSURANCE. 999 
 
 approach to the distance of eight hundred yards, until they had ap- 
 proached much nearer, such mistake would not be misconduct to defeat 
 
 a recover}'. The pilot is not to set up his judgment against the 
 
 rules, unless there arises an emergency in which he should honestly be- 
 lieve that it was necessary to depart from the rule to avoid a collision 
 or avoid danger. But if he, in good faith, endeavored to comply with 
 the rules of navigation and to avoid a collision, though he may have 
 erred in his estimate of distances, and though he may have been mis- 
 taken as to the interpretation of the rules, he cannot be held to be 
 
 guilty of such misconduct as to constitute a defense. You will 
 
 limit your inquiry on this subject to the conduct of the pilot in charge 
 of the America, as the onl}- barratry which can defeat this suit must be 
 of the officers or crew of the boat, for the loss of which this suit is 
 brought."! 
 
 § 1328. Instructions as to What Constitutes Partial and what 
 Total Loss. — " The question which has been contested as to the main 
 point in this case is, whether the amount of this loss is to be ascertained 
 by the rules applying to what is denominated a total loss, or by the 
 rules applying to a jiartial loss. A total loss may be actual or con- 
 structive. A constructive total loss is where the loss is not actually 
 total, but is so great as to justify the insured in abandoning the subject 
 of insurance or what remains of it to the insurers, and claiming a total 
 loss. It is usual for insured parties in cases of loss, whether actual or 
 only constructively total by abandonment, to surrender what remains 
 of the boat to the underwriters. This is a convenient way of making 
 certain what in many cases would otlierwise be uncertain. The sur- 
 render, by abandonment of the wreck or salvage, is so convenient, and 
 so generally adopted in such cases, that the question of an actual total 
 loss without an abandonment arises comparatively seldom. In the 
 present case there has been no abandonment or sale of the part saved 
 from the boat, but it has been used in rebuilding a new boat, or in re- 
 pairing the old one ; and one question — perhaps I ought to say the 
 question, for the jury to determine is, which of these two things has 
 been done. Has a new boat been built, or an old one repaired? As 
 there was no abandonment of the property saved, no mere constructive 
 total loss can be claimed. But, if there was an actual total loss, the 
 recovery may be as for a total loss without any abandonment, credit- 
 ing the expenses with the value of what was saved." ^ 
 
 1 Approved in Gerraania Ins. Co. v. 2 Approved in Globe Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Sherlock, 25 Oh. St. 33, 47, 48, 49. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 50, 65, 66.
 
 1000 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [I Thoinp. Tr., 
 
 CHAPTER XLIII. 
 
 INTENT. 
 
 Section 
 
 1333. General Proposition. 
 
 1334. Exception: Presumptions of Law. 
 
 1335. Parol Gifts. 
 
 1336. Landlord and Tenant — Intent to Evict. 
 
 1337. Instructions as to what constitutes an Eviction and the Effect of the 
 
 Same. 
 
 1338. Whether a Lease at Will was Expanded into one from Year to Year. 
 
 1339. Whether a Contract was Obtained by Duress. 
 
 1340. Precedent of an Instruction : What Duress will render a Contract Void- 
 
 able. 
 
 1341. Another Precedent: Action to Recover Money paid under Duress. 
 
 1342. Another Precedent: AVhat Constitutes such Duress as will avoid a 
 
 Deed. 
 
 1343. Whether a Husband acted as Tenant or Servant of his Wife. 
 
 1344. Whetlier an Improvement was made for Purposes of a Residence. 
 
 1345. Purpose for which Written Instruments were made. 
 
 1346. Revocation of a Will. 
 
 1347. Intent to Take Possession under a Will. 
 
 1348. Redemption or Purchase. 
 
 1349. Purpose for which Declarations were made. 
 
 1350. Whether a Conveyance was intended for the Father or for the Son. 
 
 1351. Whether an Offer was by Way of Compromise. 
 
 1352. Trust Created by Declarations and Acts. 
 
 1353. Precedent of an Instruction under this Head. 
 
 1354. Whether a Transfer was meant as a Gift or as a Bequest for Masses. 
 
 1355. Dedication of Land to Public Uses. 
 
 1356. Acceptance of Dedication. 
 
 1357. Whether Highway Created by Parol Dedication and User. 
 
 1358. Precedent of an Instruction upon this Subject. 
 
 1359. Domicile and Residence. 
 
 13G0. Occupancy and Abandonment under Homestead Laws. 
 
 13G1. Precedent of an Instruction in an Action to Recover a Homestead. 
 
 1362. Another Precedent: Abandonment of Homestead and Desertion of Wife 
 
 until after her Death. 
 
 1363. Whether there was an Intent to Arrest. 
 
 § 1333. General Proposition. — Intent is alwavs sl oiieslion 
 for the jury ^ except where it is to be gathered from the terms or
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIII.] INTENT. 1001 
 
 an unambiguous writing, and then, upon principles already ox- 
 plained,^ it is a mere matter of interpretation, to be performed by 
 the court. This principle has been much illustrated in "what has 
 preceded, and will be much further illustrated in chapters in this 
 title which are to follow. Some illustrative cases will also be given 
 in this chapter. Even where the intent with which an agreement 
 was made or an act was done is to be gathered in part from a writ- 
 ing and in part from oral speech or extrinsic circumstances,^ the 
 well expressed conclusion is: " When the intention of the writer 
 is to be judged of by the writing, it is a question for the court. 
 But when the meaning is to be judged of by extrinsic facts, or 
 when the writing forms part of a transaction, the rest of which 
 consists of words spoken or acts done; or when, whatever its 
 meaning, it is but a circumstance tending to establish some other 
 fact, — it is for the jury to say, whether the language was used in 
 the sense imputed ; or what is the character of the entire trans- 
 action, of which the writing forms a part^ or what is the truth 
 of the ultimate fact which it tends to prove. In these cases the 
 writing must go to the jury, to be considered with the other evi- 
 dence.^ 
 
 § 1334. Exception: Presumptions of Law. — To the fore- 
 going an exception arises in a limited class of cases, generally 
 arising in the criminal law, where the law conclusively imputes 
 an intent to the doing of a certain act, — as, for instance, the 
 intent to steal, from the recent unexplained possession of stolen 
 goods, about which judicial authority is not uniform.* 
 
 § 1335. Parol Gifts. — What the terms of a parol gift or 
 grant of a chattel were, is a question of fact for the jury, to be 
 gathered from all that was said and done, and not a question of 
 law for the court. ^ In a contest touching the title to a chattel, 
 whether it was given or loaned to one of the parties, is of course 
 
 1 Ante, § 1065, et seq. * Post, § 2534, et seq. 
 
 ^Ante,^^ 1083. 108(3, 1098,1113. ^ Halbert v. Halbert, 21 Mo. 277, 
 
 3 Winter v. Norton. 1 Ore. 42, 45, 283, 284. 
 opiuion by Ulney, o.
 
 1002 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [ 1 Thoiiip Tr., 
 
 a question of fact for a jury ; and in such a case, the gift being by 
 parol if it exist, the court should instruct the jury as to what in 
 law is necessary to the parol gift of a chattel.^ The title to 
 goods and chattels may pass by gift inter vivos, where there is a 
 delivery of the property. Mere delivery of the property will 
 not, in general, pass title. There must be an intention to give 
 accompanying the act of delivery, in order to consummate the 
 gift; or the circumstances authorizing the delivery of the goods 
 must be such as ordinarily accompany a gift, inducing the 
 donee to believe that a gift was intended. If that be the case, 
 the title to the goods will pass, although it may not be the secret 
 intention of the donor to make the gift.^ "When a son or daugh- 
 ter marries and is about setting up a separate establishment, and 
 the father provides the necessary outfit for housekeeping, such 
 as proper furniture for the dwelling house, and delivers the pos- 
 session to the son or daughter, without qualification or reservation 
 made at the time, — the presumption arises that the transaction 
 is a gift, prompted by natural affection for the daughter, and this 
 presumption should prevail. But it is a presumption of fact for 
 the jury, and not one of law for the court, and is hence liable to 
 be rebutted by other evidence showing that the donor did not so 
 consider it. It is said to be a presumption of fact, because such 
 conduct is universally considered as denoting a gift of chattels.^ 
 Where an intestate promised to pay the plaintiff, who was his 
 sister, after his death, a certain sum per year, for the time dur- 
 ing which she should live with him and keep house for him, and 
 the consideration was understood by the parties to be in part for 
 the services to be rendered by her, and in part a desire to make 
 her a mortuary gift from motives of affection, — it was held that 
 it was a question for tlie jury what portion of the stipulated 
 sum vras to be paid in consideration of her services, and what 
 portion as a mere gratuity ; that she was entitled to recover the 
 former, but not the latter; since the right to the former rested 
 upon a good consideration, but the recovery of the latter wou!d 
 
 1 Respassv. Young, 11 Ga. 114. » Ibid. 155. 
 
 2 Belts V- Francis, 30 N J. L 152, 
 154.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIII.]/ 
 
 INTENT. 
 
 1003 
 
 contravene the policy of the statute of wills; and that the jury 
 should have been specifically instructed to this effect.^ 
 
 § 1336. Landlord and Tenant — Intent to Evict. — To con- 
 stitute an eviction of a tenant by his landlord, such as will create 
 a suspension of rent, it is not necessary that there should be an 
 actual physical expulsion from any part of the premises ; ' but 
 any act of a permanent character, done by the landlord, or with 
 his procurement, with a view of depriving the tenant of the en- 
 joyment of the premises demised, or any part of them, will 
 
 1 Frost V. Frost, 33 Vt. G39. lu 
 Kellogg V. Adams, 51 W^is. 141, there 
 Is a long series of iustructious, ap- 
 plicable to a state of facts where a 
 father gave a piauo to his iufaut 
 daughter and afterwards mortgaged 
 it, and subsequently a contest arose 
 with the mortgagee as to the title. 
 
 2 Hall V. Burgess, 5 Barn. & Cres. 
 332; Upton v. Townend, 17 C. B. 30; 
 s. c. 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 212; Morse v. 
 Goddard, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 177; Pfund 
 V. Herlinger, 10 Phila. 13; Royce v. 
 Ouggenheim, 106 Mass. 201; Skally v. 
 Shute, 132 Mass. 3G7; Pendleton v. 
 Dyett, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 581 ; s. c. 8 Cow. 
 (N. Y.) 727; Cohen v. Dupont, 1 Sandf. 
 S. C. (N. Y.) 260; Rowbotham v. 
 Pearce, 5 Houst. (Del.) 135. From 
 these and other cases the question 
 would seem to be. not so much whether 
 the landlord has done acts which de- 
 prive the tenant of the beneficial enjoy- 
 ment of the premises, as contemplated 
 by the contract, and which therefore 
 constitute,a breach of contract on his 
 part, which is tantamount to an evic- 
 tion, — as whether the landlord has 
 done such acts, inconsistent with the 
 contract, as will justify the tenant in 
 abandoning the premises and refusing 
 the payment of rent; for it is conceded 
 that, notwithstanding the unfriendly or 
 injurious acts of the landlord, so long 
 
 as the tenant remains in possession, he 
 must continue to pay rent. See the 
 following cases : Elliot v. Aiken, 45 
 N. H. 35; Gilhooly v. Washington, 4 
 N. Y. 217; Wilson v. Smith, 5 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 379; Rogers v. Ostrom, 35 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 523; De Witt v. Pier- 
 son, 112 Mass. 8; Newby v. Sharpe, 8 
 Ch. Div. 39; Burn v. Phelps, 1 Stark. 
 94; Levitzky v. Canning, 33 Cal. 299; 
 Greton i'. Smith, 33 N. Y. 245; Grab- 
 benhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236; 
 Scott V. Simons, 54 N. H. 428; Boston 
 &c. R. Co. V. Ripley, 13 Allen (Mass.), 
 421; Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 209; 
 Peck V. Hiler, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; 
 Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 443; Leadbeter v. Roth, 25 111. 587. 
 Compare Halligan v. Wade, 21 111. 
 470. It seems that anciently an evic- 
 tion could only result from the judg- 
 ment of a court of law in favor of the 
 party claiming under a paramount 
 title; but latterly the word "evic- 
 tion " has come .to be regarded as 
 substantially synonymous with onster. 
 Formerly the evidence was matter of 
 record; now it may be shown by 
 pai'ol. Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 
 348; Morse v. Goddard, 13 Metc= 
 (Mass.) 177. See Gore v. Brazier, 3 
 Mass. 523; Smith v. Shepherd, 15 
 Pick. (Mass:) 147; Briggs v. Hall, 4 
 Leigh tVa«), 484.
 
 1004 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'.,. 
 
 operate as such an eviction; and it is for tJte jury to say whether 
 the act was done by the hxndlord, and whether it was done with 
 the intention of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the 
 premises.^ 
 
 § 1337. Instructions as to what Constitutes an Eviction and the 
 Effect of the Same. — " Physical and forcible expulsion is not neces- 
 sary to produce an eviction ; but any act on the part of the landlord 
 which deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, 
 amounts to an eviction. This is so, if the act was done in violation of 
 
 the rights of the tenant." " The principle upon which a tenant 
 
 is required to pay rent, is the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, un- 
 molested in any way by the landlord ; any if the jury believe from the 
 evidence in this suit, that the plaintiff took possession of any part of 
 the premises leased by her to the defendants, against their consent, then 
 in law it is an eviction, and releases the defendants from the payment 
 
 of any more rent, and they will find for the defendants, Forcible 
 
 expulsion is not necessary to cause an eviction ; any act done in viola- 
 tion of the rights of the tenant, without his consent, will amount to an 
 eviction. If the jury believe, in this case, that the plaintiff, after 
 making this lease, without the consent of the defendants, took posses- 
 sion of a part of said demised premises, — then in law, it is an eviction, 
 
 and they will find for the defendants. It is an eviction to take 
 
 from the tenant some part of the demised premises of which he was in 
 possession ; and if the jury in this case, believe, from the evidence, that 
 the plaintiff, without the consent of the defendants, took possession of 
 any material part of the <lemised premises, then the defendants are re- 
 leased from the payment of all rent, and the jury will find for the de- 
 fendants. If the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, 
 
 that the premises leased by the plaintiff to the defendants, or a part of 
 the same, were enclosed by a fence, and had on the same a brick build- 
 ing, and that the plaintiff took possession of said building and used it as 
 a stable, and took possession of the yard and used it as a cattle yard, 
 without the consent of the defendants, then, in law, it is an eviction, 
 and releases the defendants from the payment of any more rent ; and 
 
 1 Upton V. Townend, 17 C. B. 30; concrete instruction on the hypothesis 
 s. c. 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 212, 221 ; Hen- of an eviction by the fact of a portion 
 derson v. Mears, 1 Fost. & Fin. 636. of the demised land being taken posses- 
 
 2 Approveil inPricer.'Railroad Co., sion of by a railway company and its 
 34111.17,18 This case also contains a tracli laid thereon.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIII.J iKTEXT 
 
 de^en,.,., ,_. a pan of L/";:[::: izf H ^rw^^': 
 
 hastaken possession o( the same, a„d built a railroad over the 'ale 
 then, mlaw, this is an eviction, and releases the defendants frontTh' 
 
 Z::r'-*" ""*■ rf '"■'^•"^ -"" "■^"^ordefelda s . ! it 
 thoiign the jury may believe, from the evi(leii,.p .l,„t ti , , , 
 
 have never been disturbed in, or evicted fran he'n '=',*"'"'"•"'' 
 
 leased premises, and that the'/ have had th , e a"d Joy t? o^f" t 
 same tdl .f they further believe, from the evidence, t at\ " plaLtffl 
 bas taken possession of any material nn.■^nfoo•1 i ■ Z^' ^"*^ P'^i»tilt 
 
 outtheconsent Of thedefeL,an"t Ci'rtt'i:'?'"^' :.''■'• 
 and the defendants are not bound to pay any rent f„ , T'?","' 
 
 ::f:rt::t^"- --" - -™'-' - -~ i^i'VuTfoi z 
 
 §1338 Whether a Lease at Will was expanded into one 
 
 and accepted annually according to its terms, _ it was held t t 
 
 under proper mstructions.^ "lejuit/ 
 
 § 1330. Whether a Contract was Obtained by Duress 
 
 ^ Approved iu Smith ». Wise ks qi r? o-t t. 
 ^1^ U3, lU. Citing Wade J HUli w , f ' r""'"""^ "• ^"^' ^^ ^'^- ^l*; 
 
 21 liL 480; Anderson .°Chic;.o Ma' 2-2 ^^" '' ^"*^^^^^^' ^^^ Pa St. 
 
 r^i^.^^,^;: ^-f -rL^^: J --^^ ''• -^-.s. ^o Pa. s.
 
 1006 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JurjY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 guage which the evidence tends to show was used, must be of a 
 character which in hiw may amount to duress. 
 
 § 1340. Precedent of an Instruction: What Duress will ren- 
 der A Contract Voidable. — "A contract made under compulsion 
 may be avoided by the party by whom it was executed. Compulsion, 
 hovvever, to have this effect, must amount to what the law calls duress. 
 Mere angry or profane words, or strong earnest language, cannot con- 
 stitute such compulsion as will amount to duress, or enable a party to 
 be relieved from his contract. There may, however, be duress by 
 threats. Duress by threats does not exist, wherever a party has entered 
 into a contract under the»influence of a threat, but only where such 
 threat excites, or may reasonably excite, a fear of some grievous 
 wrong, as bodily injury or unlawful imprisonment." ^ 
 
 § 1341. Another Precedent: Action to Eecover Monet Paid Un- 
 der Duress. — " The rule in this class of cases is, that where a pay- 
 ment of money is made upon an illegal or unjust demand, when the 
 party is advised of all the facts, it can only be considered involuntary 
 when it is made to procure the release of the person or property of the 
 party from detention, or when the other party is armed with apparent 
 authority to seize upon either, and the payment is made to prevent it. 
 But where the person making the payment can only be reached by a 
 proceeding at law, he is bound to make his defense in the first instance, 
 and he cannot postpone the litigation, by paying the demand in silence 
 and afterwards suing to recover it back." ^ 
 
 § 1342. Another Precedent: What Constitutes such Duress as 
 WILL Avoid a Deed. — "To constitute duress which would avoid the 
 deed, it is not necessary that the threats be of physical injury alone; 
 but if the plaintiff, the wife of Tapley, was induced to execute the deed 
 by the threats of Tapley, her husband, that he would separate from her 
 as her husband, and not support her, it is duress and would avoid the 
 deed. The threats must be such as she might reasonably apprehend 
 
 1 Approved in Adams v. Strhiger, 2 Approved in Licbor v. Wciden, 17 
 
 78 Ind. 180, 181; citing Bennett v. Neb. 584; citing Mundy u. Whittemore, 
 
 Ford, 47 Ind. 2(i4; Bush v. Brown, 15 Neb. 647; King v. Williams, 21 
 
 49 Ind. 573; CofCett v. Wise, 02 Ind. N. W. Rep. (la.) 502; Maxwell's PI. 
 
 451; Reynolds v. Copeland, 71 Ind. and Pr. (3rd ed.) 104. 
 422; Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIII.] INTENT. 1007 
 
 would be carried into execution, and the act must have been induced 
 by the threats. It is not necessary that the threats be made at the 
 time, or immediately before signing, if it was within such time, and the 
 circumstances satisfy you that the threats or its influence properly con- 
 tinued and influenced the plaintiff." ^ 
 
 § 1343. AVhether a Husband Acted as Tenant or Servant of 
 hisAVife. — Whether a husband, carrying on a farm owned by 
 his wife and held by her to her own use, occupying with her the 
 dwelling house thereon, taking the crops annually, and having 
 the general management of the premises, is tenant or servant of 
 the wife, is a question of fact, on which there is no presumption 
 of law changing the burden of proof .^ 
 
 § 1344. Whether an Improvement was Made for the Pur- 
 poses of a Residence. — Under pre-emption laws in Pennsylvania, 
 it has been held a question of fact for a jury, whether an improve- 
 ment upon land was made for the purposes of a continued resi- 
 dence, — the question involving the intent of the improver.^ 
 
 § 1345. Purpose for which Written Instruments were 
 made. — In an action upon a state of facts (which need not be 
 set out), it was held a question for the jury to decide the pur- 
 pose for which an agreed statement o/y^^c^s was made, — whether 
 with the view to a reference, or as a statement to be laid before 
 the insurers in respect of a loss which had happened,^ — apply- 
 ing the general rule that questions of intent are for a jury. So, 
 where the trustee of an insurance company made a note, but not 
 for the purpose ostensibly put forth, and there was a lawful 
 purpose for which it might have been given, of the same charac- 
 
 1 Approved in Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Morse «. Mason, 103 Mass. 560; Delano 
 
 Minn. 458; citing 2 Greeul. Ev., § 301; v. Goodwin, 48 N. H. 203; Caswell v. 
 
 5 Denio, 157; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 239; Hill, 47 N. H. 407; Houston v. Clark, 
 
 1 Pars. Cout. 395. 50 N. H. 479. Similarly, agency and 
 
 - State V. Hayes, 59 N. H. 450, The authority are generally questions of 
 
 court say : " If the contrary rule is laid fact. Post, § 1308, et seq. 
 
 down in Albin v. Lord (39 N. H. 196, ^ Jones v. Brownfleld, 2 Pa. St. 55. 
 
 205), it cannot be sus*;ained." Cora- •* Knight v. New England Worsted 
 
 pare Noyes v. Hemphill, 58 N. H. 53G; Co., 2 Cush. (Mass.) 272.
 
 1008 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 ter as that put forth, — it was held a question for a jury whether 
 it was given for the hiwful or for the unlawful and fraudulent 
 purpose.^ So, where & paper was given to the common agent of 
 two insurance companies, on the refusal of the agent to pay a 
 thousand dollars, admitted to be due on a policy of one of the 
 companies, unless plaintiff w ould sign the paper, it was held that 
 the jury must determine whether it was supported by a consider- 
 ation as against the other company.'^ 
 
 § 1346. Revocation of a Will. — Revocation is a question of 
 intendoii, and evidence is admissible to show that intention, by 
 any act done or believed to have been done. The act done or 
 aimed to be done, as well as the purpose at the time at which 
 it was done, are matters of fact for a jury,^ and may be es- 
 tablished as other facts, by one credible witness, or by con- 
 vincing circumstances. It is also said, without the question 
 being reasoned, and, it is suggested, with doubtful propriety, 
 that " what facts amount to a revocation is of course a question 
 of law." ^ From the statement of the rule that revocation is a 
 question of intention, — that some act must have been done 
 clearly indicating an intention to revoke the existing will, suph 
 as cancellation, destruction, removal from the hands of the per- 
 son with whom it may have been lodged, or the like, — ^ it almost 
 
 1 Brouwer v. Hill, 1 Sanclf. S. C. Clark, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 140; Johnson u. 
 (N. Y.) G30. Brailsford, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 282; 
 
 2 Western Massachusetts Ins. Co. Means v. Moore, 3McCorcl (S. C), 282; 
 «. Duffey, 2 Kan. 348. Smith v. Dolby, 4 Harr. (Del.) 350; 
 
 3 Burns v. Burns, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) White v. Casten, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 
 295; Smiley v. Gambill, 2 Head 197; Barker v. Bell, 46 Ala. 216; Timon 
 (Tenn.), 164, 168. v. Claffey, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 438; Burns 
 
 4 Smiley v. Gambill, 2 Head v. Burns, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 295; 
 (Tenn.), 164, 168. Cliugau v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. St. 25; 
 
 ^ 1 Jarm. Wills (Randolph & Tal- Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 cott's edition), 282; citing Marr v. 388; Hi.ser. Fincher, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 
 Marr, 2 Head (Tenn.), 303; Boy Ian v. 139; Sumner v. Sumner, 7 Harr. & J. 
 
 Meeker, 28 N. J. L. 274; Mundy v. (Md.) 388; Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 
 
 Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; W^right v. La. An. 450; Belt v. Belt, 1 Harr. & 
 
 Wright, 5 Ind. 389; Gains v. Gains, 2 McH. (Md.) 409; Spoonemore v. Ca- 
 
 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 190; Overalls. bles, 66 Mo. 579. 
 Overall, Lit. Sel. Cas. 513; Smith v.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIIL] intent. 1009 
 
 conclusively follows that, whether there has been a revocation is 
 II question of fact for a jury, under proper instructions. AVhere 
 a will was found, after the death of the testator and twenty-five 
 years after it was made, in a barrel among waste paper, torn or 
 worn into pieces, which pieces were scattered, — it was held that 
 the questions whether the mutilation was done by the testator or 
 by other persons, and if by him, whether accidentally or inten- 
 tionally, and for the purpose of revocation, were questions of 
 fact for the jury,^ — a good illustration of the general doctrine 
 on the subject. It may be added that parol evidence of the acts 
 and declarations of the testator is admissible to determine 
 whether the will, which was found torn or cut, was nmtilated by 
 the testator, and, if so, with the intention of revoking it.^ 
 
 § 1347. Intent to take Possession under a Will. — A devisee 
 who takes possession under a will is estopped from denying its 
 validity; but, on an issue of devisavit vel non, it is, for the jury to 
 say whether the acts of the devisee show an intention thus to 
 take possession.-^ 
 
 § 1348. Redemption or Purchase. — A purchaser of land at a 
 treasurer's sale for taxes in Pennsylvania may, after the expiration of 
 llie two years prescribed by statute, consent to receive the redemption 
 mone}'', though he is not obliged to do so ; and if he receives it as such, 
 the transaction will be a redemption of the land, and not a purchase of 
 iL; and whether it is a redemption or a purchase is a question of fact 
 for a jury. 4 
 
 § 1349. Purpose for which Declarations were made. — It 
 
 has been ruled in Maine that, where the title to a chattel depends 
 upon whether a prior sale by one of the })arties to a third person 
 was absolute or conditional, the declarations of that person, made 
 against his own interest, and before he had dis})osed of his title, 
 are admissible to show the character of the sale ; that a mort- 
 
 1 Lawyers. Smith, 8 Mich. 411. Smith, 8 Mich, 411. See also Diirant 
 
 2 Patterson v. Ilickey, 32 Ga. 156; v. Ashmore, 2 Rich. L. (S. C.) 184. 
 Dan V. Brown, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 483; ^ Lanclis v. Laudis, I Grant Gas. 
 CoUagan v. Burns, 57 Me. 449; Hur- (Pa.) 249. 
 
 ring V. Allen, 25 Mich. 505; Lawyer v. ♦ Cox v. Wolcott, 27 Pa. St. 154. 
 
 <'4
 
 1010 PROVINCE OF COUKT AND JURY. [1 ThoDip. Ti'., 
 
 gagor of chattels has such an interest in the mortgaged property 
 that his declarations, disparaging his title, may be proved by one 
 who claims title against him and his vendee; and that, whether 
 the declarations of a former owner were made to prevent his 
 creditors from attaching his property, or in good faith, is a 
 question entirely for the jury} 
 
 § 1350. Whether a Conveyance was Intended for the 
 Father or for the Son. — In a recent case in Wisconsin, a con- 
 veyance of land, in which Amos W. Cross (then fifteen years 
 old) was named as grantee, was taken by his father, Ansel A. 
 Cross, who i)aid for the land, had the deed recorded, and there- 
 after retained possession of the instrument until his death, 
 twenty-four years later. The son did not know of the existence 
 of a deed, in which he was named as grantee, until after his 
 father's death. In an action of ejectment, upon evidence tend- 
 ing strongly to show that the father claimed that there was a 
 mistake in the deed, in that he should have been named as the 
 grantee, instead of his son; that he attempted to correct the 
 mistake after the deed was recorded ; that he took possession of 
 the land, paid the taxes, exercised many rights of ownership, 
 claimed the land as his property, contracted to sell it, and finally 
 conveyed it in his own name after having had po>^session for 
 more than twenty years; — it was held that it was a duestion for 
 the jury, whether the original conveyance was intended by the 
 parties thereto to run to the son, and, if so, whether it was delivered 
 to and accepted by the father for benefit of the son. Such evi- 
 dence w\as sufficient to overcome ih.Q presumption from the record, 
 that the deed was duly delivered to the grantee named therein. ^ 
 
 § 1351. Whether an Offer was by way of Compromise. — 
 
 Applying the rule that jweliminary questions of fact ^ which are 
 involved in the decision whether evidence is competent, must be 
 decided by the court, "^ it has been held that, in a proceed*ing be- 
 
 J Beedy v. Macomber, 47 Me. 451. stone, 37 Wis. 032, and Allen v. .\ileu 
 2 Cross V. Barnett, 05 Wis. 431; 58 Wis. 202; post. § 14o2o 
 distinguishing McPherson v. Feather- 3 Ante, cliap XIII
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIIL] intent. 1011 
 
 fore a sheriff's jury to assess damages for the taking of land for 
 a railroad, the question whether an offer of a certain sum for the 
 land was by way of compromise so as to prevent evidence of such 
 offer being competent, was a question for the sheriff to decide, 
 and not for the jury. He was to decide whether the offer w^as 
 made by way of compromise or not, and to exclude or admit the 
 evidence accordingly.^ 
 
 § 1352. Trust created by Declarations and Acts. — A trust 
 in personal property may be created by parol? Whether cer- 
 tain declarations and acts, tending to the conclusion that such a 
 trust was intended, did in fact create such a trust, is, in a case 
 triable by a jury, a question of fact and intent, to be decided by 
 them.^ 
 
 § 1353. Precedent of an Instruction under this Head. — "Where 
 the subject of an alleged trust was certain promissory notes, which were 
 claimed by the administrator of the alleged trustor, he denying the fact 
 of the trust, the following charge to the jury (omitting certain details 
 of fact) was approved : " To create a trust in property of this species, 
 it is essential that the delivery of the propert}^ to the alleged trustee be 
 with the purpose and intent of passing the legal estate to thetrustee^ 
 and vesting in him the absolute control over the property, even as 
 against the person creating the trust, subject onl}^ to the declared pur- 
 pose of the trust; and, if such an original owner reserves to himself or 
 heirs the power to control the property, and has only vested in the alleged 
 trustee a possession, without any intention of vesting the property in him, 
 but simply for the purpose of constituting him her agent to do certain 
 acts, and, at the same time, of reserving the power to dispose of the 
 property at his or her will, with or without the concurrence of the 
 trustee, — this would be an imperfect trust, and would not vest title in the 
 trustee. Whether there was a perfect trust created in this case, under 
 these instructions, is a question of fact, for you to determine from the 
 evidence in the case. You are to say from the evidence whether Mrs. 
 White intended to vest in Jackson the title to these notes and their pro- 
 ceeds, and to surrender her own control over them, upon the trust that 
 
 1 Davis I'. Charles River &c. R. Co., 342; Calder v. Morau, 49 Mich. 
 11 Cush. (Mass.) 500. Day v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448. 
 
 ''■ Bostwick V. 3Iahaffy, 48 Mich. 3 West u. White, 56 Mich. IJ :.
 
 lv)12 puovixcE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 Jackson should provide suitable maintenance for her during her life, 
 and for other purposes specified, and reserving to herself no power to 
 control them, other than the benefits of her support, and no legal title 
 to the property. If she did, claimant has no title, — that is, the ad- 
 ministrator would take no title, and cannot recover. If she did not, 
 then no title vested in Jackson, and the administrator is entitled to 
 maintain an action on the notes. If, on the other hand, you find that 
 the title to these notes vested in Jackson as trustee, under the instruc- 
 tions I have given you, the complainant will not be entitled to any sum, 
 and your verdict should be for the contestants." ^ 
 
 § 1354. Whether a Transfer was meant as a Gift or as a 
 Bequest for Masses. — Upon a ground similar to that which 
 makes the fact of a parol trust in chattels a question for the jury ,2 
 it has been ruled, under circumstances, that the question whether, 
 by a transfer of notes, made by a dying man to a priest, at the 
 time of executing a will which was subsequently found to be void 
 by reason of defective execution, in which will, drawn by the priest, 
 he had described himself as legatee, — the deceased intended to 
 make a gift of the notes to the priest, or to transfer them to him 
 for the purpose of paying his funeral expenses and having masses 
 said for the repose of his soul, Avas a question of fact J^ 
 
 § 1355. Dedication of Land to Public Uses. — To constitute 
 a valid common-law dedication, there must be an intention to 
 dedicate^ an act of dedication, and an acceptance on the part of 
 the public* Whether the owner of the land intended to dedicate 
 it, is, in general, a question of fact for the jury.^ In passing 
 upon this point, the jury will take into consideration the declara- 
 tions as well as the acts of the owner, with the view of determin- 
 ino" his intention ; and it has been held that subsequent 
 
 1 West V. White, 56 Mich. 126, 128. Leod, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 98, 104; Carpenter 
 
 2 Ante, § 1352. v. Gwyuu, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 395; Os- 
 
 3 Malone v. Doyle, 56 Mich. 222. wego v. Oswego Canal Co., G N. Y. 
 
 4 Irwiui:.Dixou,9How. (U. S.) 10, 257; Baker v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 491, 
 30; Baraclough v, Johu.sou, 8 Ad. & 494; Wilder «. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192, 
 EI. 99, 101; Poole v. Huskiusou, 11 200. 
 
 Mees. &W. 827,829; Green v. Chelsea, •"• Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192. 
 
 24 Pick. (Mass.) 71, 80; Hall r. Mc- 209.
 
 Tit. V, Cli. XLin.l IVTENT 
 
 declarations and acts are admissible, as tendino- to Pvnl ,• • 
 intent.i Evidence in nn/, to ,|,„ ,• '""S '° explain prior 
 
 t,o 1 .,, ' -^ ' "°'^-'''''^'''«>"""ofas(reet shoiiW 
 
 be submitted to a jury in all cases; but the validity and t^ 
 
 ecu, ; butif they depend upon cvi.leuce of user and n,3tlc, 
 location, they should be submitted to the inrv 2 p" "' 
 
 dedication is claimed under a recorded Jlt.^Ze con. lIi I'l! 
 
 d« ,;.! rV"''""""" °' "" '"'"' "■'-*'^"' -■ -t there .^1\ 
 dedication, but must submit the question to the jury .» 
 
 § 1356. Aoccptance of Dcdioation n„ iri.„ , . 
 
 held that the question whether therLrb^e: '^ a!::;::;. " V^ 
 
 he ptjblic, IS .«e of fact for the jury, in determinin., Xh the 
 
 rs!r"" Wllr" h" "'f "™^ '""'""' "' ''•■^™' Dedication and 
 
 Z , ' ~ f """■' ''"' '""'' " P^"°' 'le<licatioa of land fmn 
 h.ghway and such a nser by the public as creates a publ c ri< h"t 
 against the o«-ner of the fee, is, on conflicting test moiiv , 
 
 rrr '^^r ""' '' ^'"■■^•^ ^o, in Pennsylvani: it s hXThat 
 whether a right of >vay has been acquired or not bv an , i ,7 
 rupted user for twenty-one years, is a question foi I .r;"^:; 
 m.on for damages for obstructing a private way.- ad h, 
 
 adv:::"*,::';';;: "™^-^^- ".'«^ -"• •>« i-ti^ed in;;..:::! • ';^'^ 
 
 obstructing a highway, it ^as held er f:: Z c^^rrlrt 
 
 ^ Proctor V. Lewistou, 25 111, 153 e ct„« 
 
 2Statei;.Schwiu, 65Wis.207 ' 44 ^^'^^ "' ^'''^■P«»ter, 37 Pa. St. 41, 
 
 . 3 Eastland .. Fogo. 58 M^is 274; Whan'^X W.TT" J'n^^^^^^^^'^' ^ 
 
 citing Gardiner v. Tisdale 2 Wis 1 ~J J^ I' ^ '' ' Campbell v. Wilson, 
 
 < Wilder ... St. Pa,„,"'r^ mL:.' Ill] L''^:\Tlsf %?'"''' '■ ""=^^''"' 
 211. ' .^;; ^•^•^^- ^31 ; OJ^eson V. Patterson, 
 
 ^ Daniels u. People, 21 IlL 439. 
 
 29 Pa. St. 22.
 
 1014 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoiup., Tr. , 
 
 the jury, at the request of the State, where the evidence of the 
 dedication was circumstantial merely, that "the evidence, if true, 
 would authorize them to find that the street was a public road, 
 dedicated to a public use." ^ In such a case it was said by 
 Dixon, C. J.: "In order to constitute a dedication, it should 
 clearly appear that the highway had been used as such by the 
 public with the assent of the owner; and when this is shown the 
 dedication is established. Lapse of time and long use by the 
 public as such, are not necessary to its existence ; though, in the 
 absence of more direct proof, they are circumstances of more or 
 less force, according to the facts of each case, tending to establish 
 it. Acts of an unequivocal nature on the part of both the owner 
 and the public, may establish it in a very short space of time. 
 It is always a question of fact, to be left to the jury, deciding 
 upon the circumstances of each particular case." ^ 
 
 § 1358. [Continued.] Precedent of an Instruction upon this 
 Subject. — "The jury are instructed that highways may be acquired 
 by dedication. And in this case, if the jury beheve, from the evi- 
 dence, that, after the highway in controversy was located, defendants 
 set their hedges back, leaving room for the highway, and removed their 
 fence from said highwa}^, and permitted the public to use the same for a 
 highway, — these facts, if proven, maybe considered by the jury in de- 
 termining whether the defendants had dedicated this land to the public 
 for a highway." ^ 
 
 § 1359. Domicile and Residence. — Domicile and residence 
 are questions depending principally upon fact and intent, and 
 therefore they are generally questions of fact for the jury.^ 
 This principle applies in cases arising inactions for divorce.^ It 
 
 1 Sultzner v. State, 43 Ala. 24. .Tun. 217, 2()1. This charge was 
 
 2 Counehau ?;. Ford, 9 Wis. 240, 244. made by Mr. Justice Grier; aud, so 
 ■^ Approved in Wragg v. Peuu. far as it embodied propositious appli- 
 
 Towuship, 94 111. 11, 24. cable to the general subject of domi- 
 
 * Penusylvauia v. Ravenel, 21 How. cile, it was repeated iu a charge to the 
 
 (U. S. )103, 110. jury giveu by the Circuit Court of the 
 
 ^ Foss V. Foss, 58 N. H. 283. For United States for the Eastern District 
 
 au elaborate charge on the subject of of Pennsylvania, iu the case of Penn- 
 
 domicilej see White v. Brown, 1 Wall. sylvauia v. Ravenel, 21 How. (U. S.)
 
 Tit. y, Ch. XLIII.l j,-^^^.^ 
 
 the State, so thTt the o"d 1 J"" '' "'f , P'^-^ ""ode in 
 -0. «P0.. ... ,.e.„ted ITuLCoT.:^ t^ret/" "^ 
 
 a.i^. whether the p',.e,„.es Z2;J^:ZT '^7^ 
 . bolh a guestion of fad and intent, it is supposeTtl' h " 
 
 eases, a question for a iurv ■' A fi V '^'^ '"'' '" ™°"* 
 
 exempted fro.n execL^'i- .el^; t^i^ L;^ ' '""^ 
 so, m general, it may be lost h,. o '1"'"''' ''•' o<-c"Pancy, 
 
 though it isgen;rallv hdd thaUa t<^n;o!::::r", '"""''^-"'-'.• 
 
 .^.rtenai,.,n not work a forflu ^Tt e .Hr*^ Wh"'::'" 
 there has been miph n,. oK t uglit. V\ hether 
 
 question of Tct^ t ^^ rritrt' ''■; ""°^^^^^^' "^ - 
 
 question of intent; and so^t-ba.: i::! t;;^: '' "™'"'' '" "''' 
 
 scribed in the pet iL o, te ^l "ff 1^7 7" ''"' "" '"-^"^^^^ "- 
 tvife were in (act used oceunied f ^'. "''=J'°"<^^t'=»d of himself and 
 said wife ns their homestrd'unto^ "Tl^ '/ '"" '"'"""« "-' ^'s 
 that case the plaintiffrentiM t ' „ ' "" "'"' "^ •■"'" '" 
 
 the plaintiff as to the ho," estld • "f '" "" """' '""'''' "■'" "^ '«' 
 
 "• ^* you beheve from the 
 
 103, 110, which charge was annmrpri r» 
 
 ^y ...e supreme Co'urt, MrTt' ,''" wXcV V'of ' *^'^ ''"""»" 
 
 Daniel disseutiu^. at ^, ' ^ ^^^- l^^: Cook t? 
 
 ' Tiller .. Abernathy, 37 Mo 196 rt.f '''',n'n! ^''' ''' ^^^P^^^rd ^: 
 
 ^Seethe subject ' mscussed "i So^etf ' fJ^- '^ ' ^^^- ^^ ^^^P- 
 Thomp. Homest., § 210, et sen ««mest., § 2Go et seq. 
 
 ' Fyffe ... Beers, 18 Iowa, 4 7- Te. T'""''"'^ '"^ ''''*°' ^'- ^^"^^-' ^3 
 Locke r. Rowell, 47 N. H. 4G; PotJs .' '
 
 1016 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thonip. Tl'., 
 
 evidence that the plaintiff abandoned his wife, and left her to shift for 
 herself, and that he failed to support his wife, and that he voluntarily 
 and without cause left the premises used and occupied as a homestead, 
 and that he absented himself from said house and continued said aban- 
 donment up to the death of his said wife, — then and in that event 3'ou 
 will find your verdict in favor of the defendant." ^ 
 
 § 1363. Whether there was an intent to arrest. — It is 
 
 said* " To constitute a legal arrest, it is not necessary that the 
 officer should touch the person of the individual against whom tlie 
 jjrecept is issued. It is sufficient if, upon being in his presence, 
 he tells him he has such precept against him, and the person 
 says, " I submit to your authority," — or uses language expres- 
 sive of such submission. But it is not every touching of the per- 
 son that will constitute an arrest. It must be a touching wiih 
 such an inlent. For instance, an officer has a ca. sa. against a 
 defendant, whom he meets in company, and goes up and shalve 
 hands with him, without a})prising him that he has such a pre- 
 cept, — this would not amount to an arrest unless so intended 
 and understood by the parties. So, if the officer meets the de- 
 fendant in a public company or on the highway, and notifies him of 
 his having the precept, and directs him to meet him at some par- 
 ticular place, this might be an arrest or not, as the parties in- 
 tended." ^ This being so, whether there was an actual arrest 
 will in most cases be a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 
 1 Approved in Hector v. Knox, G3 
 Texas, G15. 
 
 2 Jones u, Joues, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 448. See also Joues v. Jones, 1 Joues 
 L. (N. C.) 491. See generally, as to 
 what words or acts constitute au ar- 
 rest: Goldt?. Bissell, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 210, 215; Huntington v. Blaisdell, 2 
 N.H. 318; Huutiugtouw. Shultz, Harp. 
 (S. C.) 453; United States v. Beuner, 
 
 Baldw. (U. S.) 234, 239; Field v. Ire- 
 laud, 21 Ala. 240; Emery v. Chesley, 
 18 N. H. 198; Whitehead v. Keyes, 3 
 Allen (Mass.), 495; Strout v. Gooch, 8 
 Me. 127; Courtoy v. Dozier, 20 Geo. 
 3(59; State v. Mahou, 3 Harr. (Del.) 
 568; Tracy w. Whipple, 8 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 379. 
 
 3 Jones V. Jones, 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 
 448.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XLIV.] AUTHOKiTY : agency: ratification. 1017 
 
 CHAPTER XLIV. 
 
 AUTHORITY: AGENCY: RATIFICATION. 
 Section 
 13(38. AVhen Relatiou of Principal ami Ageut Exists. 
 1309. Character iu Which a Persou holds Money, 
 
 1370. Scope of Agent's Anthority. 
 
 1371. Notice of a Limitation upon an Agent's Autliority. 
 
 1372. "Wliether a Factor obeyed his Instrnctions. 
 
 1373. Whether a Warehouseman received Goods as the Ageut of the Carrier 
 
 or as the Agent of the Vendee. 
 137-4. Authority to Give Notice on behalf of a Surety to Proceed against Prin- 
 cipal Debtor. 
 
 1375. Whether an Agent had the Implied Power to boi-row Money. 
 
 1376. Act of Street Commissioner in maliiug Repairs. 
 
 1377. Authority of Station Agent. 
 
 1378. General Authority of Bauli Cashier. 
 
 1379. Authority of Husbaud to employ Attorney for Wife. 
 
 1380. Whether the Act of a Copartner is within the Scope of the Business. 
 
 1381. Ratification Generally a Question of Fact. 
 
 1382. When a Question of Law and when of Fact. 
 
 1383. An Illustration. 
 
 138i. Instruction: Autliority of Agent of an Insurance Company to Receive 
 Notice of Additional Insurance in Action on Policy. 
 
 1385. Instruction: Authority of a Bi'oker for the Purpose of Signing Bought 
 
 and Sold Notes. 
 
 1386. Instruction: Want of Authority of a Canvassing Book Agent to Re- 
 
 ceive Payments from Subscribers. 
 
 1387. Instruction: Notice to Agent, when Notice to Principal. 
 
 § 1368. When Relation of Principal and Agent exists. 
 
 Whether the rehition of principal and agent exists is a question 
 of fact for a jury.^ While this question is not concluded by the 
 statement of the alleged agent, ^ yet evidence tending to show 
 
 J Schoelkopf v. Leonard, 8 Colo. App. 2G3; Schlesinger v. Texas &c. 
 
 159; Robinson v. Walton, 58 Mo. 38; R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 471; s. c. affirmed, 
 
 Middleton v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 146. 
 
 62 Mo. 579, 581; Barrett v. Indiauapo- ' Barrett v. Indianapolis &c. R. Co., 
 
 lis &c. R. Co., 9 Mo. App. 220; Wat- 9 Mo. App. 226. 
 son V. Hoosac Tunnel Line Co., 13 Mo.
 
 1018 PKOviNCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 that he held himself out ^ with the knowledge and consent of the 
 assumed principal, as having authority to act for him in the 
 manner in which he did act, is sufficient to take the question to 
 the jury.^ 
 
 § 1369. Character in which a Person holds Money. — The 
 
 character in which a person holds money, whether for himself 
 or for another, or for which of two contending parties he holds 
 it, is manifestly a question for a jury . This is well illustrated 
 by an English case, where W., being indebted to the plaintiffs, 
 and unable to pay them, agreed with the defendants that they 
 should discount bills, to be drawn by W. and accepted by the 
 plaintiffs, tor £2,500. The plaintiffs handed the acceptances to 
 the defendants. The defendants' manager asked the plaintiffs 
 when they required the money. The plaintiffs said they did not 
 want the money until the next day, but afterwards said they 
 would take £2,000 that evening. The manager said he would 
 not hand the check for that amount to the plaintiffs, but would 
 give it to W.'s clerk, and that he should require W.'s order for 
 the payment of the balance. W.'s clerk got the check for 
 £2,000, and handed it to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, on the 
 same evening, handed to the defendants an order by W. for pay- 
 ment of the balance to the plaintiffs. It was held that it was a 
 question for a jury whether, at the time of lodging the order, 
 the defendants held the money for the plaintiffs and, not for W.^ 
 
 § 1370. Scope of Agent's Authority. — The scope of an agent's 
 authority, where such authority is conferred in writing, is a ques- 
 tion of lavj for the court. ^ In like manner it has been held that 
 upon ascertained facts, the 'question whether authority to receive 
 notice is within the scope of the duties of an agent, is a question 
 of law for the court.* " If the authority of an agent be by at- 
 
 1 Watson V. Hoosac Tuuuel Line sidge v. Broadbeut, 4 Hurl. & N. 002. 
 Co., 13 Mo. App. 2(]3. 3 Nofsiuger v. lliug, 4 Mo. App. 
 
 2 Xoble V. National Discount Co., oZG. 
 
 5 Hurl. & N. 225. Compare Lilley v. * Mobile &c. K. Co. v. Thomas, 42 
 
 Hays, 5 Ad. & El. 548; Walker v. Ala. G72. 
 liostrou, y Mees. & W. 411; Liver-
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIV.] authority: agency: ratification. 1019 
 
 torney, or other writing, the instrument itself must in general be 
 produced, and, since the construction of writings belongs to the 
 court, and not to the jury, the fact and the scope of the agency 
 are, in such cases, questions of laiv, and are properly decided by 
 the judge." But '< in all instances where the authority, whether 
 general or special, is to be implied from the conduct of the prin- 
 cipal, or where the medium of proof of agency is per testes, the 
 jury are to judge of the credibility of witnesses, and of the im- 
 plications to be made from their testimony." ^ Again, it is said: 
 *' In most cases, if not in all, the question of agency is a matter 
 of fact y which it is the province of a jury to determine u})on, un- 
 der the instructions of the court ; and if the testimony tends to 
 prove that the person acting as agent had authority from his 
 principal to do the act, then it is manifest that the court cannot 
 exclude from the jury the act itself, without overstepping the 
 law of its dutv and assumino: to determine a matter which belongs 
 to the jury, to wit: the authority of the agent to do the act. 
 The correct rule is this: If there is no proof whatever tending 
 to prove the agency, the act may be excluded from the jury by 
 the court; but if there is any evidence tending to prove the au- 
 thoritvof the ao;ent, then the act cannot be excluded from them, 
 for they are the judges of the sufficiency and weight of the tes- 
 timony." 2 
 
 § 1371. Notice of Liinitatiou upon Agent's Authority. — 
 
 Where an agent makes a contract within the apparent scope of 
 hiH authority, he binds his principal, although in point of fact he 
 may have exceeded his authority, — that is, acted contrary to his 
 principal's instructions. In such a case, if the principal w^ould 
 escape liability upon the contract thus made by the agent, 
 it is necessary for him to show that the other contracting party 
 knew of the limitation upon the agent's authority; and whether 
 
 1 London Savings Fund Soc. v. Ha- Krebs v. O'Grady, 23 Ala. 732; Thayer 
 gerstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, v. Boston, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 511, oKi; 
 502, 503, opinion by Woodward, J. Gilpatrick v. Biddeford, 51 Me. 182; 
 
 2 McClung's Executors v. Spotts- Fislier v. Stevens, 10 111. 397; Hart u. 
 wood, 19 Ala. li]5, 170, opinion l)y Dar- Girard, 5G Pa. St. 23, 28. 
 
 gou, C. J. To the same effect, see
 
 1020 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 the other contracting party had such knowledge or not, is a ques- 
 tion of fact for a jury, to be submitted to them under proper 
 instructions.^ 
 
 § 1372. Whether a factor Obeyed his Instructions. — A 
 
 factor must strictly follow the instructions of his principal, and 
 any departure from them will be at his own risk. If, with proper 
 care and diligence and in good faith, he carries out the orders of 
 his principal, and a loss nevertheless occurs, it will fall upon the 
 principal ; and whether he has obeyed or disobeyed the instruc- 
 tions of his principal, will be a question of fact for the jury ; ^ un- 
 less the instructions are embraced in a written instrument of 
 unequivocal import, in which case its meaning must be declared 
 by the court. ^ 
 
 § 1373. Whether Warehouseman Received Goods as Agent 
 of the Carrier or as Agent of the Vendee. — Where the 
 question at issue was the right of stoppage in transitu^ it was 
 held that the jury should have been left free to determine, 
 upon all the evidence, whether the warehouseman, into whose 
 hands the goods had come when the vendor attempted to exer- 
 cise the right, had received the goods as the agent of the carrier 
 or as the agent of the vendee.* The decision proceeds upon the 
 well understood ground, that the delivery of the goods to the 
 vendee or to his agent would put an end to the transitus and de- 
 termine the right of stoppage.^ 
 
 § 1374. Authority to Give Notice on Behalf of a Surety 
 to Proceed Against Principal Debtor. — So, where there was 
 evidence that the son of a co-surety gave notice to the creditor 
 to proceed against the principal debtor, it was not error to sub- 
 mit the question of his authority to give such notice, to the jury. ^ 
 
 1 Gelviu V. Kansas City R. Co., 21 218; Mottrara v. Heyer, 1 Denio (N. 
 Mo. App. 273, 280. Y.), 483; Dodsou v. Wentworth, 4 
 
 2 Siegerson v. Pomeroy, 13 Mo. Man. & G. 1080; Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 
 620. Vt. 172. 
 
 3 Ante, § 10G5. ^ Klingensraitli v. Kliugeusmith's 
 
 4 Hoover v. Tibbits, 13 Wis. 79, 84. Ex., 31 Pa. St. 4(;0. 
 ^ Allan V. Gripper, 2 Cromp. & J.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIV.] authority: agexcy: ratification. 1021 
 
 § 1375. Whether an Agent had the implied power to bor- 
 row Money. — Under coutiictiug evidence as to the scope and 
 limits of the power of an agent appointed to build up the busi- 
 ness of his principal in a distant city, it has been thought proper 
 to submit to tJie jury the question whether the agent had implied 
 power to borrow money on the credit of his principal, — the 
 court saying: "The case was not one which could bo de- 
 termined by the court. It depended very much upon probabil- 
 ities and inferences, and those were required to be dis})osed of 
 by the jury. In both respects the case was one which could not 
 be withheld from their consideration; and their verdict on this 
 disputed evidence must be accepted as a legal result, even though 
 a different determination by them might have been regarded as 
 more consistent with the entire weightand effect of the evidence." * 
 
 § 1376. Act of Street Commissioner in Making Repairs. — 
 
 In an action for damages for an injury received ii> consequence of 
 a defect in the street of a city, it has been held that the acts of 
 the street commissioner, within the scope of the trust committed 
 to him, are prima facie the acts of the city ; and that, whether 
 they are within the general authority conferred upon him, is a 
 question for the jury.'^ " "Whether a particular act," said 
 Shaw, C. J., "operating injuriously to an individual, was au- 
 thorized by the city, by any previous delegation of power, gen- 
 eral or special, or by any subsequent adoption and ratification of 
 particular acts, is a question of fact, to be left to a juiy, to be 
 decided by all the evidence in the case." '^ 
 
 § 1377. Authority of Station Agent. — Following the gen- 
 eral current of authority, it has been held that the question 
 whether or not the station agent of a railway company has, as 
 such agent, authority to bind the company by a contract to fur- 
 nish cars to a shipper at his station at a particular time, is one of 
 fact and not of law ; and hence that it is error to reject testimony 
 
 1 Bickford v. Mfuicr, oC Huu 3 Thayer r. Boston, 19 Pick, 
 
 (N. Y.),44(;, 449. (Mass.) 511, olG. 
 
 ' Gilpatrick v. Biddeford, ol Me. 
 132, 190.
 
 1022 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tv., 
 
 offered by the railway company to prove that its agents had not 
 8ueh authority, and to instruct the jury on the theory that such 
 agents had such authority as matter of hiw.^ 
 
 § 1378. General Authority of Bank Cashier. — The cashier 
 of a bank is, however, an agent whose general duties are so well 
 established by the usages of commerce, that courts take judicial 
 notice of them ; and it is held that the extent of the general 
 powers of the cashier of a bank is a question of laio. ^ In the 
 absence of proof to the contrary, he will be presumed to have 
 authority to turn out the notes and assets of the bank in pay- 
 ment of its indebtedness.^ He binds the bank by his statements 
 touching its ordinary business in hand. * Under circumstances, 
 he binds the bank by giving false information to an inquirer,^ 
 though not where the circumstances are such that it is not his of- 
 ficial duty to give any information,^ as where he is not at the bank 
 attending to his ordinary duties.^ The law ascribes to him power 
 to indorse negotiable paper in the ordinary business of the bank ; ^ 
 
 1 Wood V. Chicago &c. R. Co., 59 
 Iowa, 106 (Beck, J., dissenting). 
 
 2 Farmers' Bank v. Troy City Bank, 
 1 Dougl. (Midi.) 457; Peninsular Bank 
 V. Hanmer, 14 Mich. 208. 
 
 3 Kimball t7. Cleveland, 4 Mich. GOC; 
 Peninsular Bank v. Hanmer, 14 Mich. 
 208. The ordinary duties which the 
 law ascribes to him were stated by 
 Mr. Justice "VVayue in United States v. 
 City Bank, 21 How. (U. S.) 35G, 3114. 
 
 •4 Cochecho Bank v. Haskell, 51 N. 
 H. IIG; Merchants' Bank v. Eudolf, 5 
 Neb. 527; Grant v. Cropsey, 8 Neb. 
 205; State Bank v. Wilson, 1 Dev. (N. 
 C.) 484; Hickok v. Farmers' &c. Bank, 
 35 Vt. 47G. 
 
 * Manufacturers' Bank v. Scofield, 
 39 Vt. 590. See, contra, Franklin Bank 
 V. Steward, 87 Me. 519. 
 
 « Mapes V. Second Nat. Bank, 80 
 Pa. St. 1(;3; Swift v. .Jewsbury, L. II. 
 9 Q. B. 301, 312 (reversing s. c. sub 
 nom. Swift v. Winterbotham, L. H. 8 
 
 Q. B. 244). See also Etting v. Com- 
 mercial Bank, 7 Eob. (La.) 459. Com- 
 pare Mackay v. Commercial Bank, L. 
 R. 5 P. C. 394; s. c. 43 L. ,J. (P. C.) 31 ; 
 Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, 
 L. E. 2 Exch. 259. 
 
 ■^ Merchants' Bank v. Rudolf, 5 Neb. 
 527; Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray 
 (Mass.), 605; Houghton v. First Nat. 
 Bank, 26 Wis. 663. But see Merchants' 
 Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 
 G04 ; Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky, 1 
 T. B. Mour. (Ky.) 171, 182. 
 
 8 Wild V. Bank of Passamaquoddy, 
 3 Mason (U. S.), 505; Fleckuer v. U. 
 S. Bank, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 338; Folger 
 V. Chase, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63; Hart- 
 ford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 
 93; Bank of Genessee v. Patchin 
 Bank, 19 N. Y. 312; Everett v. 
 United States, G Porter (Ala.), 1G6; 
 Lafayette Bank v. State Bank, 4 Mc- 
 Lean (U. S.), 208; Bank of U. S. v. 
 Davis, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 533;
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIV.] authority: agency: ratification. 1023 
 
 to sign stock certificates indorsed in blank/ but not to indorse 
 strictly non-negotiable paper,- especially his own note; ^ to cer- 
 tify checks of the bank ; * to accept bills drawn upon the bank ; ^ 
 to sell exchange belonging to the bank,*^ and to indorse the same 
 for the purpose of passing title ; ^ and to guarantee the paper so 
 sold.^ But he has no implied power to compromise debts due 
 the bank,'' nor to give an indemnity to a sheriff,^*' nor to release 
 indorsers or sureties," nor to indorse for accommodation. ^■- 
 
 Elliot V. Abbot, 12 N. H. 549: Harper 
 V. Calhoun, 7 How. (Miss.) 203; West. 
 St. Louis Sav. Bauk v. Sliawuee Co. 
 Bank, 95 U. S. 557; s. c. 5 Rep. 33; s. c. 
 2 Cent. L. J. 46; 16 Alb. L. J. 473; 
 Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Chauviu, 8 Rob. 
 (La ) 49; Robb v. Ross Co. Bank, 41 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 586; Bissell v. First Nat. 
 Bauk, 69 Pa. St. 415; Maxwell v. 
 Planters' Bank, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 507; State Bank v. Fox, 3 Blatch. 
 (U. S.) 431 ; Farrar v. Gilman, 19 Me. 
 440; Crockett v. Young, 1 Sraecl. & M. 
 (Miss ) 241; Holt v. Bacon, 25 Miss. 
 567; Cooper v. Curtis, 30 Me. 488; St. 
 Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 9 
 Mo. 421 ; Kimball v. Cleveland, 4 Mich. 
 606; Carey v. McDougald, 7 Ga. 84; 
 Houghton V. First Nat. Bank, 26 Wis. 
 663; Bank of N. Y. v. Bank of Ohio, 29 
 N. Y. 619 (overruling Bank of State v. 
 Farmers' Branch, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 332) ; City Bank v. Perkins, 29 N.Y. ,554. 
 
 1 Mathews v. Mass. Nat. Bank, 1 
 Holmes (U S.), 396. 
 
 2 Barrick v. Austin, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 241. Compare Elliot v. Abbot, 12 
 N. H. 549. 
 
 3 West St. Louis Sav. 
 Shawnee Co. Bank, 95 U. S 
 5 Rep. 33; 2 Cent. L. J. 46; 
 J. 473. 
 
 4 Clarke Nat. Bank v. 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 593; Cooke v. State 
 Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 96. See also 
 Farmers' Bank ■;;. Butchers' Bauk, 
 
 Bank r. 
 . 557; s. c. 
 16 Alb. L. 
 
 Bauk, 52 
 
 16 N. Y. 125; .«. c. 4 Duer (N. Y.), 219; 
 14 N.Y. 633; 28 N. Y. 425; Merchants' 
 Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 
 604. 
 
 5 Farmers' &c. Bauk v. Troy City 
 Bank, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 457. But see 
 Pendleton v. Bank of Ky., 1 T. B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 171, 179. 
 
 "5 Fleckner v. United States Bank, 8 
 Wheat. (U. S.) 338, 360. 
 
 ' Wild V. Bank of Passaraaquoddy, 
 3 Mason (U. S.), 505; Farmers' &c. 
 Bank v. Troy City Bauk, 1 Dougl. 
 (Mich.) 457; Robb v. Ross Co. Bauk, 
 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 586; Lafayette Bank 
 V. State Bank, 4 McLean (U. S.). 208; 
 City Bank of New' Haven v. Perkins, 4 
 Bosw. (N. Y.) 420. 
 
 8 Sturges V. Bank of Circleville, 11 
 Oh. St. 153. 
 
 9 Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kohner, 58 
 
 26; 
 
 c. 8 Daly 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 (N. Y.), .530. 
 
 " Watson V. Bennett, 12 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 196. 
 
 " Daviess Co. Sav. Asso. v. Sailor, 
 63 Mo. 24; s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 488; 8 
 Chi. L. N. 332; Cochecho Nat. Bank v. 
 Haskell, 51 N. H. 116; Payne v. Com. 
 Bank, 6 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 24; Ryan v. 
 Duulap, 17 '111. 40; Eastman v. Coos 
 Bauk, 1 N. H. 23. Contra, Bank v. 
 Klingensmith, 7 Watts (Pa.), 523. 
 
 ^- Ex parte Estabrook, 2 Lowell 
 (U. S.), 547. Compare Perkius v. 
 Bradley, 24 Vt. iiG.
 
 1024 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thollip, Tr., 
 
 § 1379. Authority of Husband to Employ Attorney for 
 Wife. — On the principle upon which it is held that the fact of 
 agency is a question for a jury, it is also ruled that, where a 
 husband employs an attorney to bring an action in his own name 
 and that of his wife, in respect of her separate property, the 
 question whether he had authority so to do for his wife, is to be 
 tried in the same manner as the question of authority by any 
 other person employing an attorney ; but the jury may consider 
 the situation and relation of the parties, in determining whether 
 the husband acted as agent for his wife or for both, or in his own 
 behalf alone; and this is tantamount to saying that the question 
 is one of fact for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1380. Whether the Act of a Copartner is Within the Scope 
 of the Business. — A copartner is the general agent of the 
 partnership for the purpose of conducting the partnership busi- 
 ness in the usual way.^ Whether the act of the copartner is 
 w^ithin the scope of the business of the partnership, or whether, 
 in the doing of a contested act, he was conducting its business 
 in the usual way, so as to bind the other members, is a question 
 of fact for a jury.^ 
 
 § 1381. Ratification generally a Question of Fact. — The 
 
 question whether a principal has ratified the unauthorized act of 
 his agent, or whether a person has ratified or accepted the act of 
 one who has assumed, without authority, to act as his agent, is 
 generally a question of fact for a jury.^ This principle has been 
 applied to the case where a negotiable instrument has been al- 
 tered subsequently to its execution and delivery. The maker 
 may, by certain unequivocal acts done with a knowledge of the 
 alteration, ratify the same, — as where, with such knowledge, he 
 subsequently makes a part j^aynent; ^ and whether he has, by 
 
 1 Comfort V. Sprague, 31 Minn. Hagerstowu Savings Bk., 30 Pa. St. 
 405. 4<t8, 605. 
 
 2 Winship ('. Bank of U. S.,5Pet. ^ Middletou v. Kansas City &c. R. 
 (U. S.) 5r,i. Co., r,2 Mo. 579; Fislicr v. Stephens, 
 
 3 Loudon Savings Fund Soc. v. 16 111. 397. 
 
 s Evans v. Foreman, (iO Mo. 449
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIV.] authority: agency: ratification. 1025 
 
 subsequent conduct, ratified the alteration, has been said to be a 
 question of fact for the juiy.^ 
 
 § 1382. When a Question of Law and when of Fact. — 
 
 " Where the evidence is doubtful and may admit of different in- 
 terpretations, there it seems proper to submit the question for 
 the decision of the jury. But where they can justly lead to no 
 safe or satisfactory conclusion, a ratiti cation ought not to be 
 presumed." ^ In many cases the acts will be of such an unequivo- 
 cal character that the question maybe a mere question of law, — 
 as where the principal, with full knowledge, accepts the fruits of 
 the misconduct of the agent. ^ The precautions which should be 
 borne in mind in submitting this question to the jury are well il- 
 lustrated by a leading case in Maryland, in which the trial 
 court instructed the jury that, if the consideration for the 
 contract had been received by the agent and paid over to the 
 principal, who retained the same, these facts were in law an 
 adoption of the contract, and as binding on the principal as if 
 a previous authority had been given to an agent. This instruc- 
 tion w^as held erroneous, because the jury were not required to 
 find (1) that the defendants ,A;ner(; on what account the money 
 was paid them, and (2) that they knew the terms of the con- 
 tract on which the money was received.* Where the evidence 
 which speaks upon the subject whether the principal received 
 the fruits of the misconduct of the agent with full knowledge of 
 all the circumstances, is equivocal^ the question whether there 
 has been a ratification ought to be submitted to the jury under 
 proper instructions as to the law.^ 
 
 § 1383. An Illustration. — An illustration of the doctrine that, 
 whether there has been a ratification is a question of fact for a jury, is, 
 perhaps, found iu a case in New York, where the defendant, who was 
 
 1 Iron Mountain Bank v. Murdock, ^ Crooker v. Appleton, 25 Me. 131, 
 62 Mo. 70, 77. Compare German Bank 135; Bryant r. Moore, 26 Me. 84. 
 
 V. Dunn, 62 Mo. 79. * Pennsylvania &c. Co. v. Dan- 
 
 2 Story on Agency, § 253; Com- dridge, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 249, 311. 
 mercial Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. 812, 5 Hortou i>. Townes, 6 Leigh (Va.), 
 828. 47. 
 
 65
 
 1026 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThoiUp. Tl'., 
 
 sued as indorser of two promissory notes, had written to the plaintiffs, 
 agreeing to an arrangement giving further time of payment to the 
 makers, and that no act of the plaintiffs in so doing should exonerate 
 the defendant as indorser, and waiving notice of protest; upon which 
 facts it was held, reversing the trial court, that the defendant was not 
 estopped by the letter from setting up as a defense that the indorse- 
 ments were forgeries, but that the letter was evidence to be submitted 
 'to the jury as to whether the defendant may have ratified and affirmed 
 the indorsements, though not his own.^ 
 
 § 1384:. Instruction as to Authority of Agent of an Insurance 
 Company to Receive Notice op Additional Insurance in Action on 
 Policy. — " That the matter of McKinney being the agent of defend- 
 ants, is a question of fact for them (the jury) to determine from the 
 testimony ; and, in aid of their investigation, they are instructed that 
 an agent may be created by long acquiescence on the part of the prin- 
 cipal, with knowledge of his acts as agent for said principal, as well as 
 by express appointment ; and that if, by express agreement, it is so ar- 
 ranged between parties that one sliall be advertised as the agent, but that 
 another shall actually do the business, and this third person does trans- 
 act the liusiness, and becomes known as the agent of the principals by 
 transacting their said business, then the said third person is tlieir agent, 
 and the principal is estopped from denying it as to those who have ac- 
 quired rights against said principal because of the acts of said agent. 
 
 A corporation cannot affirm an act of its agent in part, and disaffirm as 
 to the residue. And the defendants herein are not to be allowed to 
 avail themselves of the benefits of McKinney's acts, wherein they en- 
 uie to their benefit, and to ignore and disaffirm the acts of said Mc- 
 Kinney when they may operate to their prejudice, provided he has 
 
 acted within the scope of such agency. When there is no evidence 
 
 of the written appointment of an agent, the fact and extent of his 
 agency must be determined by what he testifies and did, and also by the 
 acts of the company recognizing him. If either party must suffer from 
 
 the mistake of an agent, it must be the party whose agent he is. 
 
 If the plaintiffs procured the written permission of the agent to get 
 other insurance, and tlie agent neglected to indorse the same on the 
 policy, or inform the company, then the plaintiffs cannot be affected by 
 
 1 Thorn v. Bell, Lalor Snpp. (N. Y.) tlio Supremo Court iu this case is very 
 430. It should be added that the i)ro- doubtful, 
 priety of the couclusiou I'eached by
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIV.] authority: agency: ratificatiox. 1027 
 
 such neglect ; if such agent had authority to give the permission, which 
 is a fact for the jury." ^ 
 
 § 1385. Instruction as to Authority of a Broker for the Purpose 
 OF SIGNING Bought and Sold Notes. — " The court instructs the jury 
 that a broker for the purpose of signing bought and sold notes is the 
 agent of each and both of the parties to the contract which he makes ; 
 but in all other respects he is and remains the agent of the party who 
 originally employs him. If, therefore, the jury find in this case that 
 the defendant first employed the broker, Mr. Thorne, or first set him in 
 motion on the business involved in this controversy, they are instructed 
 that he was and remained the agent of the defendant, so far as any 
 agency resulted from the above facts, and that any mistakes which he 
 may have made in conveying to plaintiffs the directions of defendants 
 as to the manner of punching these rails, are the mistakes of defend- 
 ant's own agent, and that the plaintiffs are not responsible therefor." ^ 
 
 § 1386. Instruction as to Want op Authority of a Canvassing 
 Book Agent to Receive Payments from Subscribers. — "If the court 
 find that Du Plainval was a canvassing agent, obtaining subscriptions 
 for the plaintiff for books published by him and sold by subscription, 
 and that said Du Plainval was restricted by the terms of his employ- 
 ment from collecting for any books or parts of books, except such as 
 were delivered by him — and they further find that said canvassing 
 agent never had possession of the parts and works for which this suit is 
 brought, and did not deliver the same to the defendant, — then it de- 
 
 ^ Approved in Insurance Co. v. ties. He is accustomed to give tlie 
 Lyons, 38 Texas, 258, 259. In White buyer a note called a sold note, 
 V. Leighton, 15 Neb. 420, there is a and the seller a like memorandum 
 series of instructious as to the liability called a bought note. Story on 
 of the proprietor of a country store for Agency (9th ed.), § 28; Benjamin on 
 purchasesof goods made by his maua- Sales, § 275. While he represents 
 ger or clerk in charge of it, on the both parties in making the memoran- 
 theory of authority by being held out as dum, he represents, in all other mat- 
 agent, ters, the party originally employing 
 
 2 Approved m Schlesinger u. Texas him. Whart. Agency, § 715. The iu- 
 
 &c. R. Co., 87 Mo. 149. In approving struction seems to enunciate correct 
 
 this nistruction, the Supreme Court of priuciples of law, and, taking the 
 
 Missouri, speaking through IJlack, J., contract as the parties made it, it 
 
 say: "For some purposes, as the it seems that Thorne was acting as a 
 
 signmg of the contract, the broker is negotiator.'' 
 regarded as the agent of both par-
 
 1028 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 Clares the law to be that his employment as canvassing agent gave him 
 no authority to collect the money for which this suit is brought, and it 
 devolves upon the defendant to show that he had such authority.^ 
 
 § 1387. Instruction: Notice to Agent when Notice to Princi- 
 pal. — " The jury are instructed that notice to the general superintend- 
 ent of a railroad company is notice to the company." ^ 
 
 1 In Chambers r. Short, 79 Mo. 204, 
 it was held that the trial court erred 
 in refusing to give the above instruc- 
 tion, — the court proceeding ou the 
 
 authority of Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 
 298. 
 
 2 Approved inNeilonu. Kansas City 
 &c. R. Co., 85 Mo. 599, 609.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLV.] ALTERATION OF WRITINGS. 1029 
 
 CHAPTER XLV. 
 
 ALTERATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. 
 
 Section 
 
 1392. Fact of Alteration. 
 
 1393. Time of the Alteration. 
 
 1394. lu the Case of Negotiable lustrumeuts. 
 
 1395. Materiality of the Alteration. 
 
 1396. Authority for Making the Alteration. 
 
 1397. By whom Made and whether Fraudulent. 
 
 1398. These Questions, how Settled. 
 
 1399. Whether an Alteration has been Made in such a Manner as to excite 
 
 Suspicion and Provoke luquiiy. 
 
 1400. [Continued.] An Opposing View. 
 
 1401. [Continued.] An Instruction upon this Hypothesis. 
 
 1402. Instructions as to Effect of Material Alteration of Note after Delivery. 
 
 1403. Defendant's Instructions as to Unauthorized Alteration of a Promis- 
 
 sory Note, in an Action on the Note by Indorsee against Maker. 
 
 1404. Instruction as to Effect of Alteration of Note by Aflixiug a Seal thereto 
 
 in an Action on the Note. 
 
 § 1392. Fact of Alteration. — Whether there has been in 
 fact an alteration in a written instrument is a question for a 
 jury.^ 
 
 § 1393. Time of the Alteration. — If the Jury Ji7id there 
 was an alteration, then it is also for them to determine whether 
 it was made before the instrument passed from the hands of the 
 maker or afterwards ,2 even when no explanatory evidence is 
 offered.^ On the one hand, it has been held that, in the ab- 
 
 1 Paramore ?7. Liudsey, 63 Mo. 63; "When there are no indications of 
 Belfast Nat. Bank v. Harriman, 68 Me. falsity upon the paper^ the plaintiff is 
 522; Wood??. Steele, 6 Wall. (U. S.) not bound to go further, and prove 
 8C? Cole V. Hills, 44 N. H. 227. that it was made on the day it purports 
 
 2 Belfast Nat. Bank v. Harriman, 68 to be. Belfast Nat. Bank v. Harriman, 
 Me. 522 supra; Pullen v. Hutchinson, 25 Me. 
 
 s Crabtree v. Clark, 20 Me 337. 249.
 
 1030 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoni}). Tr.j 
 
 sence of evidence speaking directly or inferentially upon the 
 question, the law, following the general presiunption of right 
 acting, presumes that the alteration was made either before or at 
 the time of the signing of the instrument. ^ On the other hand, 
 it has been held that there is no presumption of laiv that the 
 alteration was made either before or after delivery. ^ *'If the 
 alteration is noted in the attestation clause, as having been made 
 before the execution of the instrument, it is sufficiently ac- 
 counted for^ and the instrument is relieved from suspicion; and 
 if it appears in the same handwriting and ink with the body of 
 the instrument, it may suffice. In other words, if nothing ap- 
 pear to the contrary, the alteration will be presumed to be con- 
 temporaneous with the execution of the instrument. But if 
 any ground of suspicion is apparent upon the face of the in- 
 strument, the law presumes nothing, but leaves the question of 
 the time when it was done, as well as that of the person by 
 whom, and the intent with which the alteration was made, as 
 matters of fact, to be ultimately found by the jury, upon proofs 
 to be adduced by the party otferingthe instrument in evidence." ^ 
 Restating the doctrine, the rule is said to be that, " if there be 
 suspicious circumstances on the face of the instrument, it is for 
 the judge trying the case to determine, from an inspection, 
 whether it be such as to require the party offering it to explain 
 the matter. When he submits the question, with the instrument 
 itself and the proofs, to the jury, it is a question of fact for their 
 determination; and their finding, as on any other question of 
 fact, is conclusive." * Where there are no such circumstances 
 of suspicion, the presumption in the absence of proof to the 
 contrary, is that the apparent alteration was made before the 
 final execution and delivery of the instrument. ^ 
 
 1 Matthews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 705; been approved in the following cases: 
 Bailey v. Taylor, 11 Conn. 531; Lub- Matthews v. Coalter, 9 Mo. 705; Lub- 
 bering v. Kohlbrecher, 23 Mo. 596; bering v. Kohlbrccher, 22 Mo. 596; 
 Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 63, 66. Paraniore v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 63. 
 
 2 Ely V. Ely, 6 Gray (Mass.), 439, * Holtou v. Kemp, SI Mo. 661, 665. 
 442. ^ Ibid.; Matthews «. Coalter, 9 Mo. 
 
 8 1 Greenl. Ev. , § 564. This statement 705; Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 
 of doctrine by Prof. Greenlc;.f has 63.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLV.] ALTEEATION OF WRITINGS. 1031 
 
 § 1394. In the Case of UesotlaMe Instruments. -A holder 
 of a promissory note, the date of which appears, upon inspec- 
 o„, to have been altered, must explain the deration and h^w 
 ^ o have been lawfully made, before he eau recover upon it" 
 .btnT f !\"^g»t'--'ble instrument is always presumed, in the 
 absence of evidence to have issued it clear of all blemishes 
 erasures and alterations, whether in the date or body of the i, : 
 ^^trument; and the burden of showing that it was defective whn 
 
 hcial to the maker. Such evidence, it has been held, is for the 
 jury, who are to say whether the alteration, if any was made 
 before or after the defendant parted with the note.' 
 
 tel*^^"' "■'"'"•*«»"' <" t"" Alteration. -But whether an al- 
 teration ,s material or not. is a^ueMon of la,o for the court * 
 Amaeria alteration of a written instrunfent, made af ei "t t 
 signed and del vered. without the consent of an obligor her in 
 will discharge him from its obligation.. This rule holds good' 
 although the alteration may be shown by evidence to have been 
 ni furtherance of the original intent of the parties; since if he 
 instrument does not express the real intent of the parties the 
 
 rejmmed. To tolerate an attempt to reform a security, by 
 
 ■ Simpson !>. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. St. 8 Ad «ri 91 « •>•,, ^- u 
 I86;Paiue». Edsell 19 pl « ,7b. "*"•."'• ^'S, 221 , Bishop „. Cham- 
 MllIer..Eead,27Pa St.M ' bre Mo„d. 4 M. n,, CIlBord ». 
 
 423;Simpson».sIac\hot,e 9P.; s' TJT'/i ""'■ 
 
 iQp TT ..u '''-'^^'""'>«. y -t^a. ht. ^ Belfast Nat. Bank u Hirrimon ao 
 
 ISr, Upon the question what altera- Me 500. Wood ^ «; , ' ^ 
 
 tions will avoid a written obli<.ation m S ^ ^n n /" ^*''^'' ' ^^'^"• 
 
 see Bowers .. Jewell. 2 N. H 543: irk H7 ' ^"'''"'^ "' ^^^«hews, 35 
 
 Marshall v. Gouo-ler in ^^rcr x- r>' /t, ' 
 
 (Pa.; 104; Mastef::Min:;4 T. E H^lfeH ^cf™'^' '' ^^^ ^^^' 
 320, 323; Getty v. Shearer 00 Pa st m! n ;, Champion, 30 Mo. 136; 
 
 12; Miller .. Gilleland 9 Pa sf lit IT V"''" ''^•' ' ^^" ^35; Mar-
 
 1032 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOlIip. Tl'., 
 
 the rash, and it may be secret act of the creditor, would change 
 the position of the debtor and subject him to risk and trouble 
 which ought not to be imposed on him. It would compel him to 
 encounter the perils of parol proof, not only to establish the fact 
 of alteration, but to show what the instrument was; and that 
 done, to meet the creditor's proof of bona fides.' ^ ^ Cases are 
 found which support the extreme doctrine that the most trifling 
 alteration of a written instrument cannot be made after its exe- 
 cution and delivery, without the consent of all parties toit; ^ and 
 that it is not at all material whether the alteration was done inno- 
 cently or fraudulently, since the effect upon the rights of the 
 obligor is the same in either case.^ But this rule has no just ap- 
 plication to cases where the alteration was immaterial, that is, 
 where it did not change the legal effect of the instrument, but 
 merely added something which the law would imply ; * and whether 
 an alteration is or is not material, within the meaning of this 
 qualification of the rule, is a question of law for the court. ^ But 
 there is a view that the question of the materiality of the alter- 
 ation can have little application to a case where the alteration has 
 been made by a party beneficially interested in the instrument, 
 and who has it in his custody ; it being contrary to the policy of 
 the law to permit the owner and custodian of an instrument to 
 change it, and then, when charged with the fact, to claim that 
 the alteration was immaterial.^ 
 
 § 1396. Avithority for 3Iaking the Alteration. — The ques- 
 tion whether there was authority to alter a written instrument, 
 as to fill up certain blanks which had been left therein at the 
 
 1 Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 119. ern Building Asso. v. Fitzmaurice, 7 
 
 2 Moore v. Bickham, 4 Biuu. (Pa.) 1. Mo. App. 283; Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass. 
 
 3 Warrington v. Early, 2 El. & Bl. 519; Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 119. 
 763; Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & Bl. 82 ^ State v. Dean, supra; Western 
 (overruling Catton v. Simpson, 8 Ad. Building Asso. v. Fitzmaurice, supra. 
 & El. 13(i;) Chappell v. Spencer, 23 ^ Hord v. Taubman, 79 Mo. 101; 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 584; Woodworth v. First National Bank r. Fricke, 75 Mo. 
 Bank of America, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 178; Haskell t?. Champion, 30 Mo. 136; 
 391; Evans v. Foreman, 60 Mo. 449. Moore v. Hutchinson, 69 Mo. 429; 1 
 
 * State V. Dean, 40 Mo. 464: West- Greeul. Ev., § 565.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLV.] ALTERATION OF WRITINGS. 1033 
 
 time of its signature, or to alter it in any manner which the evi- 
 dence shows, is matter for a jury to determine.^ This question 
 frequently arises upon evidence tending to show that the instru- 
 ment was drawn in blank, signed, and then delivered as an escrow. 
 It has been ruled that if an instrument, — as for instance a 
 promissory note, — is made by A. for the accommodation of 
 B., with the understanding that C. will also join therein, a blank 
 being left for the name of the payee, and C. refuses to join, but 
 afterwards the instrument, thus imperfect, is delivered to a third 
 person for value, upon a representation that the person so deliv- 
 ering it has authority thus to deal with it, and the name of such 
 third person is inserted therein as payee, he cannot recover upon 
 it as against A.^ But it is no objection to the validity of a bill 
 of exchange that the acceptance and indorsement were written 
 before the bill was drawn, notwithstanding the indorsement was 
 made by a stranger to the acceptor.^ 
 
 § 1397. By whom made and whetlier Fraudulent. — Other 
 questions may likewise arise which will also be for the determina- 
 tion of the jury, — as by whom the alteration was made, and 
 whether it was fraudulent or not.* 
 
 § 1398. These Questions, how Settled. — These questions 
 are to be settled by all the evidence in the case, the surrounding 
 circumstances, and the nature, character and appearance of the 
 alterations.^ 
 
 ^ State u. Dean, 40 Mo. 464. See ment authorized or subsequently rat- 
 
 also Stahl v. Berger, 10 Serg. & R. ified, au unauthorized alteration of it, 
 
 (Pa.) 170; Smith v. Croocker, 5 Mass. made after signing and delivering it, 
 
 538; Wooley v. Constant, 4 Johns. see Lammers v. AVhite Sewing Ma- 
 
 (N. Y.) 54; Ex parte Kerwin, 8 Cow. chine Co., 23 Mo. App. 471. As to tlie 
 
 (No Y.) 118. Belfast Nat. Bank v. ratification of such an act by a cor- 
 
 Harriman, 68 Me. 522. poration, see First National Bank v. 
 
 2 Awde V. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178. 
 
 3 Schultz V. Astley, 2 Bing. New ^ Belfast Nat. Bank v. Harrlman, 68 
 Cas. 544, As to what will be sufficient Me. 522; Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227. 
 evidence to authorize tlie court to ^ Belfast Nat. Bank v. Harriman, 
 submit to the jury the question 68 Me. 522; Ely y. Ely, 6 Gray (Mass.), 
 whether an obligor in a written instru- 439, 442.
 
 1034 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl., 
 
 § 1399. Wliether an Alteration has been made in such a 
 Manner as to excite Suspicion and provoke Inquiry. — This 
 question becomes material in respect of the rights of an innocent 
 purchaser for value, of a negotiable instrument ; and here the 
 general rule is that any alteration in the material part of a bill of 
 exchange or promissory note, as in the date, sum, time when 
 payable, consideration, or place of payment, will render the 
 same invalid, as against any party thereto not consenting to such 
 alteration, even in the hands of an innocent Jiolder .^ ISor is the 
 application of this principle affected by the skillfulness with 
 which the alteration is made, or by the probability that the clos- 
 est observer will fail to discover it,^ unless the case falls within 
 an exception to the rule, which will now be stated. This excep- 
 tion is that, if a promissory note is so negligently drawn, as by 
 leaving blank spaces unfilled, as to easily admit of a fraudulent 
 alteration, and such an alteration is subsequently made, the loss 
 will fall upon the original drawer, or upon one who indorsed it 
 in that condition, and not upon an innocent purchaser; ^ unless, 
 although the instrument was negligently drawn, the alteration is 
 made in such a manner as to excite suspicion and put a purchaser 
 upon inquiry, which in legal contemplation is tantamount to 
 actual knowledge ; * and whether the alteration, although not of 
 a glaring nature, is of a character sufficient to excite suspicion 
 and put a purchaser upon inquiry, has been held a question of 
 fact for a jury.^ 
 
 §1400. [Continued.] An Opposing View. — Negotiable 
 corporate bonds, which have been signed in blank by the proper 
 officials, and thereafter fraudulently issued by the ministerial of- 
 ficers or agents of a corporation, will, it seems, be good in the 
 
 1 Edwards on Bills, 95; Chitty on ^ Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 
 Bills, 182; Woodworth v. Bank of 60; (overruliug Wasliincton Savings 
 America, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 391; Nazro Bank v. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272) ; Trigg v. 
 V. Fuller, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 374; Bruce Taylor, 27 Mo. 245; Young v. Grote, 4 
 V. Westcott, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 374; Bing. 253. . 
 
 Trigg V. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245. * Capital Bank v. Armstrong, supra. 
 
 2 Hall V. Fuller, 5 Barn. & Cres. ^ Iron Mountain Bank v. Murdock, 
 750; Trigg r. Taylor, supra. (')2 Mo. 70; post, § 1708.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLV.] ALTERATION OF WRITINGS. 1035 
 
 hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. And whether there be 
 sufficient evidence on the face of the bonds to put a purchaser 
 upon inquiry as to their genuineness, will, it has been held in a 
 particular instance, be a preliminarij question for the courts which 
 the court will not submit to a jury, where their verdict for or 
 against the rights of the purchaser, would be a verdict founded 
 wholly upon conjecture.^ It is said that, in an action to recover 
 possession of suchfraudulent pieces of paper, by the persons who 
 are really entitled to have them, two facts must be established b}^ 
 the plaintiffs : 1. That the bonds belong to them. 2. That the 
 circumstances under which the defendant purchased them were 
 not such as to protect his title. The court proceeded upon the 
 idea that constructive notice is a legal inference from established 
 facts ; that, when the facts are in controversy, or when the alleged 
 defect or infirmity appears upon the face of an instrument in 
 writing, and is a matter of occular inspection, the question is one 
 for the court; and that whether, under a conceded state of facts, 
 the law will impute notice of such infirmities, is not a question 
 for the jury. Incidentally, the court rule that the purchaser of 
 negotiable securities, upon the open market and in the usual 
 course of business, is not bound to make a close and careful ex- 
 amination, in order to escape the imputation of bad faith in the 
 purchase ; that the rights of the purchaser of such a security are 
 not to be affected by what is called constructive notice^ unless it 
 clearly appears that the inquiry, suggested by the facts disclosed 
 at the time of the purchase, would, if fairly pursued, result in the 
 disclosure of the defect existing but hidden at the time ; and that 
 there must be, in the nature of the case, such a connection be- 
 tween the facts disclosed and the further facts to be discovered, 
 that the former may be said to furnish a clue, — a reasonable and 
 natural clue, — to the latter. ^ 
 
 § 1401. [Continued.] Ax Instruction upon this Hypothesis. — 
 " Although the jury may behave from the evidence that the note at 
 
 ^ Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220. seuted, aucl ou the -whole, the conclu- 
 
 2 Birclsall t7. Eussell, 29 N. Y. 220. siou of the court seems to be extremelj 
 
 Opinions -vrere delivered by two doubtful. 
 
 judges. Two of the otlier judges dis-
 
 1036 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the time it was executed by the defendant, had the words, ' after the 
 sale of fourteen mills,' and although the jury may believe from the evi- 
 dence that said words had been erased ; yet, if the jury further believe 
 from the evidence that those words were put upon the paper with such 
 light material that they could be erased without leaving any trace upon 
 the paper which could be detected by a prudent and careful man ; and 
 if they further believe from the evidence that said words were erased 
 from the paper without leaving any traces behind them to show that 
 they had ever been upon the paper, and that said erasure was made with- 
 out tlie knowledge of the plaintiff and before he purchased the same, — 
 then the law is for the plaintiff, and the jury should so find." ^ 
 
 § 1402. Instruction as to Effect of Material Alteration of 
 Note After Delivery. — "It is claimed by Brooks [defendant], that, 
 after he signed a note similar in all respects to the one sued on, ex- 
 cepting that the written words, ' with interest at ten per cent.' were not 
 then in the note, but that the printed words, ' with interest at ten per cent, 
 per annum after maturity,' were in the note, and that, since he signed the 
 note, without his knowledge or consent, the said printed words were 
 stricken out, and the said written words inserted. If such an altera- 
 tion of the note was made by any holder of the note, or made with the 
 knowledge of any holder of the note, without the knowledge of Brooks, 
 it would be a material alteration, and would release him from all liabil- 
 ity on the note, and if the defendant Brooks, proves this, by a fair 
 preponderance of the evidence, the verdict must be in his favor ; and it 
 would make no difference whether John Allen, the plaintiff, was or was 
 not the owner of the note at the time of the alteration, if he made the 
 alteration after Brooks signed it. " - 
 
 § 1403. Defendant's Instructions as to Unauthorized Alteration 
 OF A Promissory Note, in an Action on the Note by Indorsee Against 
 Maker. — "The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from 
 the evidence in the cause, that the promissory note, dated 13th Sep- 
 tember, 1873, read and shown to the jury in this case, was made by 
 the defendant, Murdock, and indorsed by the defendant Armstrong, 
 and delivered by him to his co-defendant, Murdock, for the purpose of 
 enabling Murdock, the maker, to raise money thereon for his own use ; 
 
 1 Approved in Harvey v. Smith, 55 2 Approved in Brooks v. Allen, 62 
 
 111. 225; citing Young v, Grote, 4 Ind. 405. 
 Bing. 258 ; 13 Eng. Com. Law 420.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLV.] ALTERATION OF WRITINGS. 1037 
 
 and if tliey shall further believe from the evidence that, after the de- 
 fendant Armstrong, had so indorsed and delivered said note to said 
 Murdoek, the words and figures, ' with interest at 10 per cent, per an- 
 num after maturity,' now appearing in said note, were written therein 
 without the kno^vledge, consent or authority of the defendant Arm- 
 strong, by said Murdoek, or by an}' agent or clerk of his, whether done 
 in the presence of any officer or agent of plaintiff, or not, and whether 
 with or without the knowledge of the plaintiff, the verdict should be for 
 the defendant Armstrong, on the second count. Tlie court in- 
 structs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence in this case, that 
 the promissory note, dated 17th September, 1873, read and shown to 
 the jury in this case, was made by the defendant Murdoek, and in- 
 dorsed by the defendant Armstrong, and delivered by him to his co- 
 defendant Murdoek, for the purpose of enabling the maker to raise 
 money thereon for his own use ; and if the}' shall further believe that, 
 after the defendant Armstrong, had so indorsed and delivered said 
 note to said Murdoek, the words and figures, ' with interest at 10 per 
 cent, per annum after maturity,' now appearing in said note, were writ- 
 ten therein, and without the knowledge, consent or authority of the 
 defendant Armstrong, by said Murdoek, or by any agent or clerk of 
 his, whether done in the presence of any officer or agent of the plaintiff 
 or not, whether with or without the knowledge of the plaintiff, the ver- 
 dict of the jury should be for the defendant Armstrong, on the first 
 
 count. The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the 
 
 evidence that the provisions as to interest now contained in the notes 
 read in evidence, and now sued on, were not contained in them at the 
 time they were made by Murdoek & Dickson, and indorsed and deliv- 
 ered by defendant Murdoek, but were inserted afterwards, — then the 
 burden of proof is not upon defendant Armstrong, to prove that said 
 provisions were inserted without his authority ; but it is upon the plaint- 
 iff to prove that they were so inserted with his authority ; and that, 
 therefore, if they believe from the evidence in the case, that said pro- 
 visions were not contained in said notes at the time of their said 
 indorsement and delivery by Armstrong to Murdoek, but were inserted 
 afterwards, — then, unless the plaintiff has further estabhshed to their 
 satisfaction, by a preponderance of tlie evidence in the case, that said 
 provisions were so inserted by the direction, or with the authority of 
 Armstrong, they should find against the plaintiff and for the defend- 
 ant Armstrong." ^ 
 
 1 Approved in Capital Bank v. Armstrong, G2 Mo. 59, 62, G3, 64.
 
 1038 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 § 1404. Defendant's Instruction as to effect of Alteration op 
 Note by Affixing a Seal thereto, in Action on Note. — " The burden 
 of proof is upon the plaintiff in this case, and unless the jury are satis- 
 fied, from the evidence, that the seal in question was added to the note 
 since its execution, without the knowledge and consent of the parties 
 
 thereunto, then they should find for the defendant. If the jury 
 
 believe, from the evidence, that the seal to the note in question was 
 attached thereto at the time of the commencement of this case and the 
 execution of the same, then the jury will find for the defendant. - - - - 
 If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the seal was attached to 
 the note in question before the commencement of this case, by the 
 plaintiff, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, then the 
 defendant is entitled to a verdict, and the jury should find accord- 
 ingly. The law imposes upon the party offering a paper in evi- 
 dence, the explanation of any alterations which may appear therein ; 
 and therefore if the jury believe, from the evidence, that any alteration 
 has been made in the note in question, the burden of proof is upon the 
 plaintiff to explain the same ; and unless the jury believe, from the 
 evidence, that such alteration has been explained by the plaintiff, the 
 presumption of the law is that it was made by the plaintiff, and the 
 jury should find for the defendant. It is of no consequence who 
 attached the seal to the note in question, if it was done with the knowl- 
 edge and consent of the parties to the note, before it came into the 
 possession of the plaintiff . - - - - If the jury believe, from the evidence, 
 that the seal was appended to the note in question after its execution, 
 and before the commencement of this suit, by and with the consent of 
 the parties thereunto, then the plaintifi" is not entitled to recover, and 
 the jury should find for the defendant."* 
 
 1 Approved in Schwarz v. Herrenkind, 26 111. 210, 211.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVI.] POSSESSION. 1039 
 
 CHAPTER XLVI. 
 
 POSSESSION. ■ 
 
 Section 
 
 1407. Possession, when Evidence of Title, 
 
 1408. Long Possession Relaxes strict Evidence of Title. 
 
 1409. View that Possession a Question of Law. 
 
 1410. When a Question of Law and when of Fact. . 
 
 1411. The Subject further Discussed and Illustrated. 
 
 1412. Conclusion that it is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact. 
 
 1413. Whether Actual or Constructive. 
 
 1414. Whether of Duration and Character Necessary to sustain a Prescrip- 
 
 tion. 
 
 1415. How Jury Instructed in si;ch a Case. 
 141G. Whether Common, Mixed or Exclusive. 
 
 1417. Color of Title and Good Faith of Claimant under. 
 
 1418. Territorial Extent of an Adverse Possession. 
 
 1419. Ouster of one Cotenaut by the Other. 
 
 1420. Abandonment of a Prior Possession. 
 
 1421. Surrender of Title to a Chattel acquired by Adverse Possession. 
 
 1422. Possession of Land sufficient to Affect Strangers with Notice. 
 
 1423. Precedents of Instructions as to Adverse Possession under Color of 
 
 Title. 
 
 1424. [Continued.] Successorship of Adverse Possession under Color of 
 
 Title. 
 
 1425. The Same Subject Continued. 
 
 1426. Similar Instructions under Missouri Statute. 
 
 1427. Instructions on Theory of Acquisition of a Fee by Twenty Years Ad- 
 
 verse Possession. 
 
 1428. Adverse Possession of Personal Property — Instruction on the Theory 
 
 of Five Years Adverse Possession. 
 
 1429. [Continued.] Instruction on the Theory that Adverse Possession must 
 
 have been " Continuous and Unequivocal." 
 
 1430. Another Instruction on the Same Hypothesis. 
 
 § 1407. Possession, when Evidence of Title. — The import- 
 ance of the question considered in this chapter lies in the fact 
 that possession is, in certain circumstances, evidence of title. 
 The bare possession of personal property, unexplained by sur- 
 rounding circumstances, raises a presumption of ownership in
 
 1040 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the possessor ; ^ and under some systems, in actions for the re- 
 covery of land, possession is pmna f tide evidence of title, and 
 it has been said that this principle is firmly fixed in all common- 
 law jurisprudence. It has been reasoned that, to depart from 
 this rule in its directness and simplicity, tends to destroy its 
 value, and that the question of possession and of the identity 
 of the land in dispute, should be left to the jury.^ Again, un- 
 der the principles of the common law, after the lapse of a cer- 
 tain number of years, a deed of grant of title to the possessor is 
 2}resumed.^ Moreover, statutes of limitation exist, it is pre- 
 sumed, in all American jurisdictions, under which a certain 
 length of continuous adverse possession either clothes the pos- 
 sessor with immunity from ouster in an action of ejectment, by 
 analogy to the negative prescription of the civil law, or vests in 
 him a title which he can transfer to another, by analogy to the 
 p)Ositive prescription of that law. It is not the purpose of this 
 work to consider these questions : they are alluded to merely for 
 the purpose of show^ing the imjiortance of the question under 
 what circumstances possession is a question of law, and under 
 what circumstances a question of fact. 
 
 § 1408. Long' Possession relaxes Strict Evidence of Title. — 
 
 It has been reasoned that, where land is sold by parol, the price 
 paid, the possession delivered, the assessment for taxes changed, 
 the taxes paid, and the control of the land by fixed boundaries held 
 by the vendee and those claiming under him for upwards of forty 
 years, — the possessor is not held, in ejectment against him by the 
 holder of the legal title, to the same strictness of proof of the con- 
 tract which is required in the case of a recent bargain. The rule 
 requiring the proof to bring the contracting parties face to face, 
 to hear them make or repeat the bargain, and precisely state its 
 terms, must, after that lapse of time, be relaxed. Hence, in 
 such a case it was held error to instruct the jury that the defend- 
 ant must prove the contract, clearly and satisfactorily in all its 
 parts, by witnesses who knew it, by having heard it made or re- 
 
 1 1 Greenl. Ev., § 34. M Greeul. Ev., §§ 45, 4G. 
 
 2 Hicks V. Davis, 4 Cal. G7.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL VI.] POSSESSION. 1041 
 
 peated in the presence of both parties ; that it must exhibit loca- 
 tion, boundaries, quantity, price, and manner of paj'meut ; that 
 the description must be so accurate that a third person could find 
 or run the lines ; that there must be proof that possession was 
 taken immediately, or soon after the contract was made, in pur- 
 suance of it; and that the possession must have been actual, 
 notorious, exclusive, continuous, and accompanied by improve- 
 ments. It is not necessary, in such a case, that the defendant's 
 possession should have been the continued, actual, resident, and 
 hostile i)OSsession required of a trespasser, to sustain a claim 
 of title under -the statute of limitations; but only that such a 
 possession for such a lapse of time should be shown, as that the 
 law would presume the release, satisfaction, or abandonment of 
 the right or claim of him who held it, to the party by whom any 
 duty under it may htive been due. Such a presumption does 
 arise in favor of a vendee in a parol contract and those claiming 
 under him, after the lapse of forty years from its date; the pay- 
 ment of purchase-money coeval with it, and the preceding posses- 
 sion delivered in pursuance therewith ; the change in assessment for 
 taxes from vendor to vendee; thepa^^ment of taxes, and continued 
 acts of ownership, evincing complete performance of the duty 
 owed to the vendor, and, as such, acknowledged and acquiesced in 
 by him. In such a case it is the duty of the court to leave the jury 
 to find the facts upon all the circumstances in the case ; and if 
 satisfied of the fact of the sale, identity of the land, extent of the 
 l)urchase, payment of the price, and delivery of possession in pur- 
 suance of the contract, this evidence should be held sufficient to 
 support the defense. ^ 
 
 § 1409. A'iew that Possession a Question of Law — In 
 
 some jurisdictions the view is taken that, what state of facts, 
 wdien established, will amount to possession, is a question of 
 law? Thus, in Missouri, what acts of ownership will amount to 
 adverse possession is a question of law, and it is error to submit 
 
 i Richards v. Elwell, 48 Pa. St. 2 Bowie v. Brahe, 3 Duer (X. Y.), 
 
 361. 35, 44. 
 
 66
 
 1042 PROVINCE OF. COURT AND JURY. [1 Thom}). Tv.y 
 
 such a question to the decision of a jury.^ Again, it has been 
 said: " The question of actual possession is a question of fact; 
 what would constitute possession, a question of law." - And 
 again: " It is the province of the court to tell the jury what con- 
 stitutes an adverse possession, and the jury must determine from 
 the evidence whether such facts exist, as, in the opinion of the 
 court, constitute such adverse possession."^ Again, it is held 
 that, in an action of forcible entry and detainer, the court may 
 properly instruct the jury that a hypothetical state of facts, pre- 
 sented by the evidence, does or does not constitute possession, and 
 it is for the jury to find whether such a state of facts exists.* And 
 where, in an action of trespass for cutting and carrying away 
 timber, the court declined to charge the jury " that the facts 
 and circumstances proved on the part of the defendant could not 
 establish for him any title by possession of the lauds in contro- 
 versy," — it was said in the reviewing court, that, " what consti- 
 tutes adverse possession, is a question of law; and if the evidence 
 in the cause, admitting its truth, does not show such possession, 
 it is the duty of the court so to declare." ^ And the court, pro- 
 ceedino- to examine what constitutes adverse possession and what 
 evidence is necessary to sustain it, held that the defendant's evi- 
 dence failed to establish such possession, and that the trial court 
 should so have instructed the jury.® 
 
 § 1410. When a Question of Law and When of Fact. — It is 
 
 said that, what constitutes adverse possession is a question of law ; 
 but, as the intention of the possessor must always be considered in 
 determining the question of adverse possession, that is a fact 
 
 1 Turner v. Baker, (U Mo. 219, 245. or, as it is called in the Civil Code of 
 
 - Blackman v. "Welsh, 44: Mo. 41, Louisiana, jactitation, on the ground 
 
 45, per Bliss, J. that the i)laintiff was not in possession 
 
 3 Macklot V. Dubreuil, 9 Mo. 477, of the landj filed in limine litis, had 
 
 491, opinion by Napton, J. been dismissed by the court previous- 
 
 * DeGraw v. Prior, GO Mo. 50. ly to the empaneling of the jury, — it 
 
 5 Cornelius u. Giberson, 25 N. J. L. was held that the question of posses- 
 
 1,31. sion was not before the jury for de- 
 
 ^ Ibid.S^. Where an exception to the cision. Arrowsmith '•. Durell, 14 La, 
 
 petition to an action of slander of title, Ann. s49.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVI.] POSSESSION. 1043 
 
 which could be ascertained alone by a jury ; and in determining the 
 quo animo, the jury must of course be governed by their own view 
 of the effect of the evidence.^ Whether possession is adverse or 
 friendly is always a question of intention. It is sufficient to pre- 
 vent the possession being adverse that the party taking posses- 
 sion intends to occupy the lands, subject to the will of the owner. ^ 
 This intention will generally be a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 Thus, where a tenant in common morto-aijed the whole estate and 
 remained in actual possession, it was held that, if her intention 
 was not to hold adversely to her co-tenancy, the mortgage did 
 not operate as a constructive ouster; and, there being evidence 
 that her intention was not to oust her co-tenant, whether there 
 was a constructive ouster was a cpiestion for the jury.* It is 
 stated by a modern writer of reputation that ' ' the question 
 whether an alleged possession is marked by the characteristics 
 requisite to make it adverse, and the foundation for a title by 
 occupancy, is not wholly a question of law, and is a question for 
 the jury, under proper instructions from the court." ^ Since 
 the celebrated judgment of Lord ]\Ianstield in Taylor v. Hords,^ 
 it seems not to have been much doubted that disseisin is a fact to 
 be found by a jury ; and the general rule may be stated that the 
 question wdiether a possession, under which a defendant claims, in 
 order to perfect his title under the statute of limitations, was an 
 open, notorious and adverse possession, is not exclusively a ques- 
 tion of law, but one which ought to be submitted to the jury 
 under proper instructions.^ In many cases, in order to tind this 
 ultimate fact, it will be necessary to determine whether the al- 
 leged disseisor took or held possession with the intent to exclude 
 
 1 Magee r. Mt\gee, 37 Miss. 138, 154. the same would exist over laud be- 
 
 - Criswell v. Alteraus, 7 "Watts lougiug to a public building. Putuam 
 
 (Pa.), 581. So it has been held that, v. Bowker, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 54:^. 
 
 whether the use of a right of loaij over ■'' Ante, §1196, et seq. 
 
 laud attached to a hotel is adverse or * Moore v. Collishaw, 10 Pa. St. 225. 
 
 permissive, is, in an action of tort for ^ Wood on Limitations, 258. 
 
 obstructing such a way, a question of ^ 1 Burr. GO, 113. 
 
 fact for a jury, under proper instruc- ' "Webb v. Richardsou, 42 Vt. 465, 
 
 tions from the court as to the nature 472. 
 
 of adverse possession, aud how far 
 
 r
 
 1044 
 
 PKOVIISX'E OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThoUl}). Tr., 
 
 the riobts of the prior owner or claimant. And it is now invaria- 
 bly held by American courts that the question whether occupancy 
 was Avitli an intent adverse to the owner, or an intent to hold in 
 subordination to his rights, is a question of fact for a jury.^ 
 " The question," says M. Wood, " as to what constitutes adverse 
 possession, as well as what evidence is necessary to establish it, is 
 for the court; but the question as to whether the possession in a 
 <j'iven case is adverse, or under the owner's title, is for the jury; 
 and the person setting up the claim takes the burden of establish- 
 ins; all the requisites to make his title by occupancy complete. ^ 
 But the court may decline to submit the question of adverse pos- 
 session to the jury, where, from the undisputed facts, as a matter 
 of law, no such possession exists."^ In order to bring a case 
 within this definition, all the authorities concede that the posses- 
 sion must be so open, notorious and unequivocal as to impart 
 notice to the world that it is under an exclusive claim of right 
 made by the possessor, and that the right of the prior owner or 
 
 1 Wood Lim., § 258. The following 
 cases, cited by Mr. Wood, support the 
 doctrine: Poiguard v. Smith, 6 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 172; Hall v. Dewey, 10 Vt. 
 593; Jackson v. Joy, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 102; Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 
 (U. S.) 402; Kinsell v. Daggett, 11 
 Me. 309; Jackson v. Stephens, 13 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 495; Coburn v. Hollis, 
 3 Met. (Mass.) 125; Gayette v. Be- 
 thuue, 14 Mass. 55; Hopkins v. Robin- 
 sou, 3 Watts (Pa.), 205; Brandt v. Og- 
 deu, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) ISiJ; Jackson ??. 
 Sharpe, 9 Id. 1G3; Jackson v. Wheat, 
 18 Id. 40; Jackson V. Waters, 12 Id. 
 365; Jackson v. Ellis, 13 Id. 118; 
 Smith V. Burtis, 9 Id. 174; Jackson 
 V. Newton, 18 Id. 355; Jackson v. 
 Thomas, 16 Id. 293; Jones v. Porter, 
 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 132; McClung r. 
 Koss, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 124; Cum- 
 raings V. Wyman, 10 Mass. 464; 
 Wallace v. Duffield, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 
 521; Schwartz v. Kuhn, 10 Me. 274; 
 Atherton r. .Tolmson, 2 N. H. 31; 
 
 Muushower i). Patton, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 
 334; Overtield ^'. Christie, lid. 173; 
 Boiling V. Petersburgh, 3 Rand. (Ya.) 
 563; Malson v. Fry, 1 Watts (Pa.), 
 433; Bell y. Hartley, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.( 
 32; McNairr. Hunt, 5 Mo. 300; Rogers 
 V. Madden, 2 Bailey (S. C), 321; Bos- 
 ton Mill Corp. V. Bulfinch, 6 Mass. 
 229; Bracken v. Martin, 3 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 55; Warren v. Childs, 11 
 Mass. 222 ; Read r. Goodyear, 17 Serg. 
 &R. (Pa.) .3.50; Prayr. Pierce, 7 Mass. 
 383; Stephens v. Dewing, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 
 112. 
 
 2 Herbert v. Henrick, 16 Ala. 581; 
 Runey v. Shoeubergei-, 2 Watts (Pa.), 
 23; Jones v. Porter, 3 Pen. & W. (Pa.) 
 132; Gill V. Fauntleroy, 8 B. Mon. 
 (Ky.) 177; Baker w. Swan, 32 Md. 355; 
 Washburn u. Cutter, 17 Minn. 361. 
 
 3 Wood on Limitations, § 258 ; citing 
 on the last point: Argotsinger v. 
 Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Bowie v. Bahe, 3 
 Duer (X. v.), 35: Nearhoff r. Addle- 
 man, 31 Pa. St. 279.
 
 Tit. Y, Ch. XLVL] POSSESSION. 1045 
 
 occupier is invaded and denied with an intention to assert a claim 
 adverse to liis.^ 
 
 § 1411. The Subject further Discussed and Illustrated. — Ex- 
 tending, it would seem, this idea, it has been ruled that if, by the 
 true construction of a deed, a grant of land extends beyond the 
 eaves and to the walls of a house owned by the grantor, and the 
 water is allowed for more than 20 years thereafter to fall u})on 
 the granted land from the ^aves of the house, — it should, in an 
 action for damages for a breach of the covenants of warranty in 
 the deed, be submitted as a question of fact, for the jury to de- 
 termine, whether the owner of the house thereby acquires a title 
 by adverse enjoyment, or an easement, or no riglit at all, in the 
 land under the eaves ; and a verdict was set aside because the 
 judge ruled, as matter of law, that the projection of the eaves of 
 the ancient house over the land claimed by the plaintiff under 
 his deed from the defendant, having continued over 20 years, 
 was an adverse occupation of the land under the eaves, which 
 matured into a right, so that the land under the eaves passed by 
 defendant's deed to the plaintiff.'^ So, where the defendant in 
 ejectment took another person upon the ground in dispute, 
 rented the same to him, and, after nailing up a cabin, which was 
 the only building thereon, they retired together, charging a wit- 
 ness who was present not to disclose the facts, — it was held that 
 the question whether the possession was changed should have 
 been submitted to the jury; since, if the arrangement was color- 
 able only, the possession was not changed, and this would be a 
 question of fact for the jury.^ It has been reasoned that, in 
 trespass quare clausum with issue joined on a plea of liberum 
 ienemenium, it is for the jury to ascertain the fact of adverse pos- 
 session, from all the evidence in the case applicable to that ques- 
 tion, embracing the intent with which the entry was made, the 
 nature of the possession, and the acts of ownership, conduct and 
 
 1 Beatty v. Mason, 30 Md. 400 ; Car- 2 Carbrey v. Willis, 7 Allen (Mass.), 
 
 roll V. Gillion, 33 Geo. 539 ; Thomas r. 304. 
 
 Babb, 45 Mo. 384; Soule v. Barlow, 49 3 Oliver v. Williams, 25 Ga. 217. 
 
 Vt. 329 ; Paine v. Hutchius, 49 Vt. 314.
 
 1046 
 
 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 declarations of the party under whom title by possession ma}' be 
 claimed,^ So, it has been held that, in ejectment, where there 
 is evidence tending to show some acts of ownership and })osses- 
 sion, such as a survey, a marking of lines by blazing and felling 
 trees, the erection of buildings, the cutting of timber, etc., 
 whether this is sufficient to establish possession is a question for 
 the jury, and not for the court. ^ And, under any view of the 
 question, it is the province of the jury to find, under proper in- 
 structions as to what constitutes possession, whether possession 
 is proved; and it has been added that their finding will not be 
 disturbed on error, unless manifestly against the evidence.-^ 
 
 § 1412. Conclusion that it is a Mixed Question of Law and 
 Fact. — It has been said: "Adverse possession is a mixed ques- 
 tion of law and fact, to be left to the jury under the instruction 
 of the court. Whether a given state of facts exists which con- 
 stitute adverse possession, the jury are to judge. But, assuming 
 all the facts proven to be true, whether they amount to adverse 
 possession, is unquestionably a matter of law for the court to de- 
 cide." ^ 
 
 1 Keener v. Kauffmau, 16 Md. 296, 
 307. The court cite Helms v. Howard, 
 2 Harr. & McH. (Md.) 76; Matthews 
 V. Ward, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 443; Adams 
 Ejectm. 505. 
 
 - Sharon v. Davidson, 4 Nev. 416, 
 
 3 Truesdale v. Ford, 37 111. 210. 
 
 ■4 Paxson V. Bailey, 17 Ga. GOO. 
 For a state of facts where the court 
 refused to charge the jury that a pos- 
 session had been proved, but submit- 
 ted to them the question on all the 
 evidence, see Gage v. Smith, 27 
 Conn. 70. In an action of ejectment 
 in Pennsylvania, it appeared that one 
 tenant in common was iudel)ted to his 
 co-tenants, and apparently insolvent; 
 that the surviving owners and their 
 representatives, during nearly forty 
 years, paid the taxes and ground rent 
 cf the premises, mortgaged the prop- 
 
 erty, and, at different times, erected 
 and re-erected buildings thereon, suit- 
 able for their business, and received 
 the profits. It was held that these 
 facts, though not conclusive evidence 
 of an ouster of the heirs of the de- 
 ceased co-tenant, should have been 
 submitted to the jury, with the in- 
 struction that, if true and unexplained, 
 they would justify the finding of the 
 ouster which was claimed to have 
 taken place. Keyser v. Evans, 30 Pa. 
 St. 507. The court said: '• Considered 
 separately, each of these factt^ may 
 have been conclusive; together they 
 bore powerfully on the result; for if 
 ' improving lands, and receiving the 
 rents, issues, and profits thereof, are 
 in all cases the highest acts of owner- 
 ship wliich can be exercised over 
 them, and the exercise of these acts
 
 Tit. Y, Ch. XLVI.] possession. 1047 
 
 § 1413. AVliether Actual or Constructive. — It has been said 
 that "what is actual, and what is constructive possession, in 
 many cases, must be a question of fact for the jury.'''' ^ In an 
 action of ejectment, brought against the defendants as trustees of 
 a church, it has been held proper to submit the question to the 
 jury, whether the defendants were actually in possession, or only 
 constructively in possession as trustees. ^ So, in a case where a 
 married woman, holding a farm to her sole and separate use, 
 lived upon it Avith her husband and family, he managing and con- 
 trolling it and taking the rents, profits, etc., for a number of 
 years as if he were the absolute owner, it was held that he must 
 be presumed, jjrhna facie, to have had the rightful and benefi- 
 cial possession of the land; but if there was doubt on the ques- 
 tion, it was for the jury, and not for the court, to determine the 
 character of his possession.-^ 
 
 § 1414. Whether of Durjition and Character Necessary to 
 Sustain a Prescription. — "As a general rule, the possession nec- 
 essary to sustain a prescription is founded upon facts, which it 
 is the province of a jury to ascertain." * Where adverse pos- 
 session is proved by parol testimony only, it is a mere question 
 for the jury whether it is continuous.^ The length of time dur- 
 ing which an adverse possession has continued, whether it has 
 reached back beyond the date of the possessor's deed, and if so, 
 whether or not he held under such a person, or by such a claim 
 
 strongly marks the possession with cases where the facts would be so nn- 
 
 exclusiveness and hostility ' (Dike- equivocal that the judge in chargiug 
 
 man v. Parrish, 6 Pa. St. 211), the de- the jury could assume the fact of pos- 
 
 feudant's testimony ought to have session as established. 
 given a preponderance to the scale." '■' Lucas u. Johnson, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 Ibid. 510, opinion by Porter, ,J. 244. 
 
 1 O'Callaghau v. Booth, fi Cal. C3, 3 Albiu v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196, 205. 
 
 65. Under circumstances, it was held ■* Anderson v. Bock, 15 How. (U. 
 
 in Texas that, whether a party was in S.) 323; citing Ewing v. Burnet, 11 
 
 possession or not, could not be as- Pet. (U.S.) 41; Beverly r. Burke, 9 Ga. 
 
 sumed as a fact, by the court in charg- 440. 
 
 lug the jury. Patrick v. Poach, 27 ^ Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. St. 
 
 Tex. 579, 581. But this conclusion 355. 
 means nothing; since there are many
 
 1048 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr.,. 
 
 and color of title, as to render bis possession adverse, — have 
 been held questions for a jury.^ - In like manner, it has been held 
 that the question whether or not open and exclusive possession 
 by a tenant, continued for thirty years, Avas adverse, is a question 
 of fact for the jury, on the trial of a writ of entry, and the judge 
 cannot take it from them by directing a verdict.'^ 
 
 § 1415. How Jury ixstructed in such a Case. — In such a case it 
 has been held proper to iastruct the jury, " that aright by prescription 
 could be acquired to a way over another's land by proof of twenty-one 
 years' uninterrupted, adverse, or undisputed enjoyment or use of it, 
 and that this was a question for the jury to determine from the evi- 
 dence ; that, if the plaintiff had proved this, he was entitled to recover ; 
 if not, their verdict should be for the defendant." ^ 
 
 § 1416. Whether Common, Mixed, or Exclusive. — In an 
 
 action of ejectment, it has been held proper to submit all the 
 acts of the party claiming possession, to the jury, under a proper 
 instruction, leaving it to them to say, from the number, char- 
 acter and times of the entries shown in evidence, whether they 
 exhibited a common or mixed possession, and thus evidenced to 
 them that the possession of the opposite party was not exclusive, 
 or whether they were purely casual and accidental, and not done 
 in prosecution of his rights as an owner. "Any other doctrine," 
 said the court, " would render the title of adjoining owners in- 
 secure, and liable to be divested by acts of which the owner may 
 be wholly ignorant. Where tracts are large and woodlands 
 extensive, an owner who sees an ax-mark perhaps in the middle 
 of his woodland, may not for an instant dream of its being an 
 ear-mark for a survey, to be connected with a distinct trespass 
 by clearing upon the outskirts of his tract. If his own ordinary 
 use of his woodland, which in such a case may be at very distant 
 intervals, is to be denominated a trespass, unless it carries with 
 it all the solemn acts to characterize an entry to toll the statute 
 in a case of actual disseisin, he may, at a distant day, find him- 
 
 1 Wiggins V. Holley, 11 Incl. 2. ^ gteffy v. Carpenter, 37 Pa. St. 41,, 
 
 2 Eaton V. Jacobs, 52 Me. 445, 454. 44.
 
 Tit. Y, Ch. XL VI.] possession. 1049 
 
 self deprived of liis valuable woodland by presumptions in favor 
 of a trespasser, without the benefit of the natural presumption 
 that flows from the acts of an owner, never rightfully excluded 
 from his land, or prevented from thus using his own." ^ 
 
 § 1417. Color of Title and Good Faith of Claimant there- 
 under. — AYliat constitutes color of title, within the meanino" of 
 statutes of limitations, is a question of laic; ^ and, in instructing 
 the jury in such a case, the court should tell them what constitutes 
 color of title. '^ Those claiming adversely under color of title must 
 enter and occupy the land in good failh, claiming the whole tract, 
 and relying upon the instrument which constitutes color of title, 
 as conveying to them the legal title.* And where there is a ques- 
 tion wdiether the deeds which are relied on as constitutins: color 
 of title are taken in good faith, the court should submit that 
 question to the jiiryJ' So, whether the claimant of land under 
 legislative grants was in " occupation and actual possession, 
 bona fide, and making improvements," is a question of fact, in 
 an action of trespass qnare dausum.^ But, color of title being a 
 question of law, it is error to submit to the jury the aggregate 
 question what is color of title made in good faith. Accordingly, 
 the following instruction has been held erroneous: " That if they 
 are satisfied from the evidence that the defendant had color of 
 title, made in good faith to, and paid all the taxes assessed on, 
 the land in controversy, the same being vacant and unoccupied 
 for seven successive years before the commencement of this 
 suit, he shall be adjudged the legal owner thereof, to the extent 
 and according to the purport of his paper title." ^ 
 
 § 1418. Territorial Extent of an Adverse Possession. — 
 
 Where there is a deed, though the description of the land therein 
 be indefinite, which purports to convey a tract of land, and a 
 
 1 O'Hara v. Richardson, 4ii Pa. St. •' Turner u. Hall, GO Mo. 271; Gaines 
 385, 391, opinion by Agnew, J. v. Saunders, 87 Mo. 557; Woodward 
 
 2 AVoodward v, Blanchard, IG 111, y. Blauchard, IG III. 42-t. 
 
 424. 6 :MerriIl v. Hilliard, 59 N. H. 481. 
 
 "" Turner v. Hall, 60 Mo. 271. ^ Shackleford v. Bailey, 35 111, 387, 
 
 ■* Gaines v. Saunders, 87 Mo. 557.
 
 1050 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 survey made by the grantee and a recorded plat describing the 
 exact tract claimed under the deed, and there is some evidence 
 of constant, continuous acts of ownership over the whole tract. — 
 the fact that the recorded plat subdivides the tract is not conclu- 
 sive that tlie actual possession, maintained through one employed 
 to warn trespassers off the whole tract, is possession only of the 
 subdivision on which the house is situated. But, in such a case, 
 it is for tlie jury to say whether he took possession of a part of 
 the tract, intending to take possession of the whole, under that 
 deed, and whether he exercised acts of ownership, openly and 
 notoriously, claiming, under that deed, the entire tract purporting 
 to be conveyed thereby. ^ It has been ruled, as matter of law, 
 that the mere dumping of some earth, or the piling and removing 
 of some rock, on small fractions of a ten-acre tract of land, is 
 not a taking possession of the entire tract, so as to entitle such a 
 possessor to maintain a possessory action therefor.^ 
 
 § 1419. Ouster of one Co-tenant by the Other. — Where 
 a co-tenant has been long in possession, receiving to his own use 
 
 1 McElhiuuey v. Kraus, 10 Mo. App. ~ Kenuedy v. Prueitt, 24 Mo. App. 
 218. Ill determiniug the question of 414. lu this case it was said by Rom- 
 adverse possession, the payment of bauer, J., in giving the opinion of the 
 taxes, by the person asserting title by court: " We can clearly see the difR- 
 such possession, is a fact which may, culty under w^hich the trial court la- 
 with other circumstances, be cousid- l)ored In an attempt to distinguish 
 ered by the jury. Draper v. Shoot, 25 possession as a matter of law, from 
 Mo. 197. See also Turner v. Hall, (lO possession as a matter of fact. In 
 Mo. 271; Gaines v. Saunders, 87 Mo. many cases tlie boundary between the 
 557, 504. That an adverse possession two questions is so indistinctthatit is 
 of apartmay be considei'edas extend- dilHcult to decide, Avithout a close 
 ing to the whole of a tract of laud, see analysis of the testimony, which the 
 Fugate V. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441; Turner haste of a jury trial does not admit of, 
 V. Hall, 60 Mo. 271; Long v. Higgin- on which side of the boundary the 
 botham, 56 Mo. 245; St. Louis Agri- case lies. That analysis, which we 
 cultural &c. Association v. Reinecke, were enabled to make with care, has 
 21 Mo. App, 478. What acts of pos- satisfied us, that the plaintiff, under 
 session will enable a claimant to main- the evidence, is not entitled to judg- 
 tain forcible entry and detainer against ment as a matter of law." Ihtd., page 
 a subsequent intruder. See St. Louis 420. 
 Agricultural &c. Association v. Rein- 
 ecke, 21 Mo. App. 478.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVI.] POSSESSION. 1051 
 
 the rents accruing from the property, and this has been acquiesced 
 in by the other co-tenant, it is a question for a jury under all 
 the circumstances, whetier there has been an ouster by the one 
 co-tenant of the other, and a possession by the former held ad- 
 versely to the latter.^ If a tenant in common, being in posses- 
 sion of the land, conveys it with a covenant of warranty against 
 all claims and demands, possession under the deed will be adverse 
 to the title of the co-tenants of the grantor. In such a case, if 
 the fact is found that the possession of the grantee is under a 
 deed, it is the legal conclusion that his possession is adverse, and 
 the question is not for the jury ? 
 
 § 1420. Abandonment of a Prior Possession. — In an action 
 of unlawful detainer, in which the only question is whether the 
 defendant's conceded prior possession had been abandoned before 
 the plaintiff's entry upon the land, the question of abandonment 
 is one of fact ^"^ 
 
 § 1421. Surrender of Title to a Chattel acquired by Adverse 
 Possession. — On the same principle, it has been held that, if a 
 husband, having acquired title to a chattel by adverse possession 
 against the true owner, verbally consents to the execution of a 
 deed of gift by the latter, conveying the chattel to a trustee for 
 the benefit of the husband's wife and children, it will be, in an 
 action of detinue for the chattel, a question for the jury whether 
 the husband's prescriptive title was thereby surrendered ; and 
 that an instruction, asserting that such consent would not di- 
 vest the title acquired under the statute of limitations, was an 
 invasion ot the province of the jury.* 
 
 1 Robidoux V. Cassilesi, 10 Mo. 2 Newmarket Man. Co. v. Peuder- 
 
 App. 51(;, h-1-1. As to what will be gast, 21 N. H. 54, 69. The court cite : 
 
 evidence of an ouster of oue co-teuaut Kittredge v. Pi'oprietors, 17 Pick, 
 
 by another, sufflcieut to take the ques- (Mass.) 246; Parker ?;. Proprietors, 
 
 tion to the jury whether there has &c., 3 Mete. (Mass.) 91. 
 
 been an ouster and an adverse posses- ^ Brown u. McCormick, 23 Mo. App. 
 
 sion, see Warfield v. Lindell, 30 Mo. 181; post, § 1435, et seq. 
 
 272; s. c. 38 Mo, 561; Lapeyre v. Paul, ^ Lucas v. Daniels, 34 Ala. 188, 
 
 47 Mo 586, Circurastauceg ruder which the aues-
 
 1052 PEOVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThoiUp. Tr., 
 
 § 1422. Possession of Land Sufficient to affect Strangers 
 with Notice. — Where the possession under a deed is open, no- 
 torious and unequivocal, it will affect strangers to the deed with 
 notice thereof, in like manner as would the recording of the deed 
 under the operation of the recording acts.^ The reason of the 
 rule is that, whatever 79i<^s a jjerson upon inquiry as to a fact is 
 equivalent in law to actual notice. But it is obvious that cases 
 may arise within this rule, where the evidence as to the character 
 of the possession may be so conflicting and may leave the con- 
 clusion in so much doubt, that it will be the duty of the court to 
 submit the question to the jury, whether the possession, with its 
 surrounding facts, is of such a character as to put a prudent man 
 upon inquiry as to the title of the alleged possessor. 
 
 § 1423. Precedents op Instructions as to Adverse Possession 
 UNDER Color of Title. — " That if the tenants, under their respective 
 leases from Kittredge, occupied and cultivated to the T^'ler line, in such 
 a manner as the owners of such land would ordinarily occupy and cul- 
 tivate, and such an occupation had continued for the period of thirty 
 years, it woukl constitute such an adverse possession as would bar the 
 demandant's right to recover." ^ 
 
 § 1424. [Continued.] Successorship of Adverse Possession under 
 Color of Title. — " That the possession of the premises by said lessees, 
 
 tion in whose possession personal ^ Approved in Eeed v. Proprietors 
 
 property was at the time of the levy, &c., 8 How. (U. S ) 274, 291. In Peuu- 
 
 was lield a question of fact to be left .sylvania, a cliarge to the jury, inauac- 
 
 to tlie jury. Ohlseu v. Mauderfeld, 28 tiou of ejectiueut, that they would de- 
 
 Minu. 390. termine whether or not the tenants of 
 
 1 Jacques u. Weeks, 7 Watts (Pa.), the laud in question were holding un- 
 261, 27G; Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. der lawful authority, or as tenants un- 
 249; s. c. 17 Ves. 433; Kerr t?. Day, der the plaintiff, aud, if the latter, that 
 14 Pa. St. 112, 117; Hood v. Fahne- the actiou would uot lie if no notice 
 stock, 1 Pa. St. 470, 474; Sailor v. to quit had been given, or demand of 
 Hertzog, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 259; Krider possession made, is correct, and it is 
 u. Lafferty, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 303, 318; also proper in such action to leave the 
 Green v. Drinker, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) question of possession to the jury. 
 440. Logan v. Quigley (Penu.), 11 Atl. 
 
 2 Hottenstein v. Lerch, 104 Pa. St. Rep. 92. 
 454, 4G3.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL VI.] POSSESSION. 1053 
 
 under the lease, was the possession of Kittredge, the lessor, and his heirs, 
 he claiming to have a deed which included them, and having turned Mel- 
 vin out of possession ; if it was of such a character as amounted to a 
 disseisin, it would in law, inure to the benefit of Kittredge and his 
 heirs, and would be the disseisin and adverse possession of the 
 lessor." ^ 
 
 § 14:25. The same Subject Continued. — "If the possession of 
 Cheever and Thissel, in 1796, under Kittredge, included the demanded 
 premises, and tlie same possession had been continued by the subsequent 
 lessees, as the evidence tended to show it had been, down to the entry 
 of the heirs of Melvia and wife, in 1832, it constituted in law such a 
 continuity of possession as would bar the demandant's right to re- 
 cover." ^ 
 
 § 1426. Similar Instructions under Missouri Statute. — " If de- 
 fendants, and those under whom they claim, have had adverse posses- 
 sion of so much of the premises described in the petition as is covered 
 by the building of defendants, and said possession was open, notorious 
 and hostile, under claim of title, and continuous for more than ten 
 years prior to the institution of this suit, on February 27th, 1864, then 
 the plaintiffs cannot recover the portion of said premises so covered by 
 said building." ^ " The court declares the law to be, that, in or- 
 der to divest the title to the land in plaintiff 's petition mentioned, out 
 of the plaintiff and vest it in the defendant, by reason of his adverse 
 possession, that possession must be actual, visible, notorious and hos- 
 tile, continuous and uninterrupted, under a claim of title, for a period 
 
 of ten years next preceding the commencement of this suit." ^ "If 
 
 the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, and those through 
 whom he obtained possession of the property sued for, had had a con- 
 tinuous possession thereof for twenty years next before the commence- 
 ment of this suit, claiming the same as their own, — then they should find 
 for the defendant as against each of the plaintiffs, who has not proved 
 
 1 Approved in Keed v. Proprietors St. Louis, 54 Mo. lOG. There is a 
 «S:c., 8 How. (U. S.) 274, 291. similar iustriictiou iu the same case, 
 
 2 Approved in Reed v. Proprietors ou the theory of a limitation of twenty 
 &c., 8 How. (U. S.) 274, 291. Com- years. 
 
 pare Melvia v. Proprietors &c., 16 Pick. 4 Approved iu Dalby v. Snuffer, 57 
 
 (Mass.) IGl; also 5 Met. (Mass.) 15. Mo. 29G. 
 
 3 Approved iu Daltou v. Bauk of
 
 1054 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 herself or himself either under twenty-one years of age, or a married 
 woman, at the commencement of such possession ; and the burden of 
 l)roofis upon each of the plaintiffs claiming to have been under such 
 age, or a married woman at the commencement of such possession, to 
 prove it affirmatively ; and until it be proved to the satisfaction of the 
 
 jur}', the contrary thereof should be presumed by the jury. If the 
 
 jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, and those through 
 whom he obtained possession of the land sued for, had had such a 
 length of possession thereof next before the commencement of tliis suit, 
 as described in instruction marked A, claiming the same as their own, 
 after the plaintiff, Emily Dessaunier was at the age of at least twenty- 
 one years and unmarried, they should find for the defendant as to 
 
 her. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, 
 
 and those through whom he obtained possession of the land sued for, 
 had had sucli a length of such a possession thereof next before the com- 
 mencement of this suit, as described in instruction marked A, claiming 
 the same as their own, after Margaret Mallet, mother of the plaintiffs 
 named Mallet, was of the age of at least twenty-one years and unmar- 
 ried, and that neither she nor her husband was ever in possession of 
 said land, and that the same, at and before her death, was in possession 
 of others claiming the same as their own, — then they should find for the 
 defendant." ^ 
 
 § 1427. Instructions on Theory of Acquisition of a Fee by 
 Twenty Years' adverse Possession. — "If the jury find from the 
 evidence that N. P. Taylor took actual possession, fenced in the whole 
 of the Gcncraux tract in 1836, and that he and his heirs continued in 
 such actual possession for more than twenty years thereafter, and that 
 said tract embraced and covered the premises in dispute, — such pos- 
 session was effectual to convey to said Taylor and his representatives 
 all the right and title confirmed to Faustin dit Parent or his represen- 
 tatives, and such possession vested in said Taylor and his representa- 
 - tives the documentary titles set up by Polk and others under said 
 Parent or Faustin and given in evidence by the defendants in this 
 
 case. If N. P. Taylor and his representative took the actual 
 
 possession of the Generaux tract, by fencing up the whole of it, and 
 held such possession, claiming the tract in fee, for more than twenty 
 years prior to the entry of the defendants, and those under whom they 
 
 1 Approved in Dessaunier v. Murphy, 33 Mo. IIH, 192.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVI.] POSSESSION. 1055 
 
 claim, such possession vested the fee iu said Taylor's representa- 
 tives." i 
 
 § 1428. Adverse Possession of Personal Property — Instruction 
 ON the Theory of Five Years' Adverse Possession. — "In order to 
 estabhsh the title of the propert}' in controversy in Charles W. Kiel- 
 mann, at the time of the execution and delivery of the Mertens mort- 
 gage, by possession, it must appear from the evidence that the said 
 Kielraann, for at least five years prior to such execution and delivery, 
 was in actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof." - 
 
 § 1429. [Continued.] Instruction on the Theory that Adverse 
 Possession must have been " Continuous and Unequivocal." — "It 
 is not sufficient, to constitute the possession referred to iu the preceding 
 instruction, that the said Charles W. Kielmann should have occasionally 
 used such property for the purposes of a printing oflSce, during a period 
 of time equal to five j^ears or more ; but such possession, in order to 
 bind the true owner, must have been continuous and unequivocal." ^ 
 
 § 1430. Another Instruction on the Same Hypothesis. — "If it 
 appear from the evidence that, at the time of the delivery to plaintiff's 
 vendor of the Kielmann mortgage, the title to the property so sold was 
 in some person other than the mortgager Charles W. Kielmann, then 
 the issues must be found for defendant, unless it also appear that the 
 said personal property was placed in possession of said mortgager by 
 such actual owner, and such possession, so acquired, had remained in 
 
 1 Farrar v. Heiurich, 86 Mo. 521, adverse possession: for such is the 
 
 527. Although this case was decided in settled law of this State." /6 id. 530. 
 
 favor of the defendants, yet the court The court cite: Banku. Evans, 51 Mo. 
 
 approved the principle embodied iu the 335; Shepley v. Cowan, 52 Mo. 559; 
 
 two above instructions. Ray, J., iu Barry u. Otto, 5G Mo. 117; Ridgeway r. 
 
 giving tlie opinion of the court, said: Holliday, 51) Mo. 144. The case was 
 
 " It is contended by the plaintiffs, aud decided on the ground that the younger 
 
 riglitfully so contended, that the title under which the defendants 
 
 actual, adverse, open and continuous claimed was good, 
 possession of the tract in question, by - In Mertens v. Kielmann, 79 Mo. 
 
 the plaintiffs and those under whom 412, it was held error to refuse this 
 
 they claim, from 1836 to 1860, under instruction. 
 
 claim and color of title, will not only ^ I^ Mertens v. Kielmann, 79 Mo. 
 
 bar a recovery by those claiming 412, it was held error to refuse this 
 
 under an older title, but will also con- instruction. 
 fer title on those claiming by such
 
 1056 
 
 PKOVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl'., 
 
 such mortgager for at least the space of five years, without demand, 
 made and pursued b}' due process of law, on the part of such owner." ^ 
 
 1 lu Merteus v. Kielmanu, 79 Mo. 
 412, 41G, it was held error to refuse 
 this instruction. In the course of its 
 opinion the court say : " We are aware 
 that it is held in this State, as else- 
 wliere, that a mortgagee of chattels, 
 after breach of the condition, is en- 
 titled to the possession of the property. 
 Eobinson v. Campbell, 8 Mo. 365; 
 Bowens v. Benson, 57 Mo. 26. And 
 ' a mortgagee may maintain replevin 
 against the mortgager for the prop- 
 erty before the maturity of the mort- 
 gage debt, if there be no agreement in 
 the mortgage that the mortgager 
 shall retain possession.' Jones on 
 Chattel Mort., § 442. But, ' to sustain 
 an action by a mortgagee agaiust a 
 mortgagor for an unlawful detention 
 of the mortgaged property, as distin- 
 guished from an unlawful taking of 
 it, the mortgagee must show a demand 
 
 for it and a refusal to deliver it.' 
 Jones Chattel Mort., § 443. From 
 the terms of the mortgage in question, 
 it is fairly inferal^le that the mort- 
 gagor was to retain possession of the 
 mortgaged property until the matur- 
 ity of the note secured by it. But, un- 
 der the authorities, it is immaterial 
 whether, by the mortgage, he was or 
 not entitled to the possession of the 
 property until breach of the condition 
 of the mortgage. No demand of pos- 
 session of the property was made of 
 the mortgager, who died before the 
 maturity of the note, or of the de- 
 fendant, who succeeded to the mort- 
 gager's possession, until after the 
 sale of the mortgaged property under 
 the mortgage, and the statute of lim- 
 itations did not begin to run against 
 the mortgagee until that demand and 
 refusal occurred."
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVIl.j waiver: abandonment. 1057 
 
 CHAPTER XLYII. 
 
 WAIVEE: ABANDONMENT: LACHES: ACQUIESCENCE. 
 
 Section 
 
 1435. Mixed Question of Law and Fact. 
 
 1436. "Waiver of Conditions in Contracts. 
 
 1437. Laches. 
 
 1438. Waiver in Legal Proceedings a Matter ot Law. 
 
 1439. Abaudoumeut of a Contract. 
 
 1440. Abandonment of Eights. 
 
 1441. Abandonment of Pre-emption or Claim of Public Lands. 
 
 1442. The Same Subject Continued. 
 
 1443. Waiver of Vendor's Lien. 
 
 1444. Abandonment of a Public Office. 
 
 1445. Waiver by Administrator of Copy of Claim against an Estate. 
 
 1446. Waiver by a Creditor of his Eight to Eescind a Composition Agreement. 
 
 1447. Waiver cannot Take Place without Knowledge. 
 
 1448. Instructions as to What Constitutes Abandonment of Eeal Estate in 
 
 Action of Ejectment. 
 
 § 1435. Mixed Question of Law and Fact. — It is said that 
 the question what amounts to a waiver is, in all cases, a mixed 
 question of law and fact, to be determined by the jury, under 
 proper instructions from the court ; ^ but this is not strictly true, 
 as will presently appear. Again, it is said: "If it be conceded 
 that there may be cases w^here the declarations or acts of the 
 parties to a contract are so express or unequivocal, that it would 
 not only be practical and competent, but even the duty of the 
 court to determine, as a matter of law, that certain rights had 
 been waived and could no longer be insisted on, those cases are 
 very rare; because a question of waiver is one of intention, and 
 most usually depends on acts or declarations which, in regard to 
 their character, are of an inconclusive or doubtful nature, and 
 furnish only evidence of intention and grounds of inference and 
 
 1 Trayuor i;. Johnson, 1 Head (Tenn.), 51, 55. 
 67
 
 1058 PROVINCE OF couKT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 deduction, which it is the proper province of a jury to consider." ^ 
 On the contrary, it has been held that, where all the facts and 
 circumstances upon which a waiver is predicated are admitted, a 
 party has the right to ask the court to instruct the jury whether 
 the evidence is sufBeient to establish a waiver or not.^ 
 
 § 1J:36. Waiver of Conditions in Contracts. — AVhether there 
 has been a waiver of the conditions of a contract is, where the 
 question depends upon declarations or conduct, a question of fact 
 for a jury.^ But wdien the question of waiver is to be deter- 
 mined by an inspection of a writing, it is a question for the court. ^ 
 Again, if the facts are established and are unequivocal in their 
 character, the court may say whether there has been such a 
 waiver, as a mere conclusion of law. Thus, where one stipulated,, 
 for a compensation to go to another State and take three slaves, 
 supposed to be in the possession of some person there, and deliver 
 them to their owner in Mobile, no time for their delivery being 
 fixed, it was held it could not be assumed as a legal conclusion 
 that the acceptance by the owner of two of the slaves was a waiver 
 of the entire fulfillment of the contract, but that it should be left 
 to the jury to determine whether, under the circumstances, such 
 acceptance was intended as a waiver.^ Contrary, it would seem, 
 to the doctrine of the last case, it has been held in Illinois, in an 
 action upon a contract indorsed upon a lease, by which the defend- 
 ant guaranteed the payment of rent reserved thereunder, that 
 whether a new agreement, made during the term of this lease, 
 between the lessor and lessee, regarding the terms of renting the 
 premises, constituted a waiver or surrenderof the original lease, — 
 that is whether it was so intended by the parties, — was properly 
 left to the jur>/.^ 
 
 1 Fitch V. Woodruff Iron "Works, 29 Hale Man. Co. v. American Saw Co., 
 Conn. 82, 91. Tliat i7itent is a qiies- 43 Mich. 250. 
 
 tion for the jury, see ante, § 1333, et * Mowry v. Wood, 12 "Wis. 414. 
 
 seq. 5 "Wolfe V. Parhuni, 18 Ala. 442, 
 
 2 Spring Garden Mutual Ins. Co. v. 450. 
 
 Evans, 9 Md. 1, 20. 6 White v. AValker, 31 HI. 422, 
 
 3 Chapman v. Colby, 47 Mich. 40 ; 423.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLYIL] waiver: abandonment. - 1059 
 
 § 1437. Laches. — This word is employed by courts of equity 
 to desiguate that negligence in bringing an action or otherwise 
 asserting one's right, which will preclude him from obtaining the 
 aid of such a court. As the ordinary procedure of such courts 
 takes place without a jury, whether the party has been guilty of 
 lau^ies will, of course, be decided by the chancellor, subject to 
 review on appeal. In courts of law, no delay in asserting one's 
 right by an action, unless it reach the period of the statute of 
 limitations, will operate as a bar to his right though such delay 
 may be an evidential fact against the plaintiff, where he asserts a 
 stale and disputed claim. In a case in Michigan, which was an 
 action at law for a deceit and wrongful conversion, it was said: 
 " Delay alone, while it may have some bearing on the fraud as 
 affecting the plaintiff's conduct, cannot be, in a court of law, a 
 bar to suit, unless coming within the statute of limitations appli- 
 cable to such cases. In all controversies not within the statute, 
 ivaiver, if relied on, is a question of fact and not of law." ^ 
 Outside of cases calling for the application of the equitable doc- 
 trine in respect of laches, the question whether a party has lost 
 his rights by his laches, or by acquiescence in the conduct of 
 another, may, on the principle first stated above, be a question 
 of fact, the decision of which, where the evidence is conflicting, 
 will not be a subject of review on error or appeal.^ 
 
 § 1438. Waiver ill Legal Proceecling.s a Matter of Law. — 
 
 There are many cases where the doing of certain acts are held 
 to amount to a waiver as a matter of law. A familiar illustra- 
 tion of this is in the case where the defendant in an action, who 
 has not been duly served with process, appears and contests the 
 merits. Here, by his voluntary appearance, he waives any de- 
 fect in the process which was sued out for the purpose of brino;- 
 ing him before the court against his will.'^ In many other cases 
 
 1 Dayton ('. Monroe, 47 Mich. 195, States, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 459; Gracie v. 
 opiuiou by Campbell, J. Palmer, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) (399; Pollard 
 
 2 Combs V. Smith, 78 Mo. 32, 40. v. Dwight, 4 Crauch (U. S.), 421; 
 
 3 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U. Knox v. Summers, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 
 S.) 253; United States v. Yates, 6 496; Leegee r. Thomas, 1 Blatchf. (U. 
 How. (U. S.) G05; Farrar v. United S.) 11 ; Fields u. Gibbs,l Pet. C. C. (U.
 
 1060 
 
 rKOVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOllip. Tl'., 
 
 in legal proceedings the parties are held, by particular conduct or 
 admissions, conclusively to have waived rights, which otherwise 
 they might have insisted upon.^ In general, it is said that, where 
 jurisdiction or the power to act exists, and the only objection to 
 its exercise is one intended for the benefit and protection of the 
 party complaining thereof, such objection must be taken at the 
 earliest practicable opportunity, after the party or his counsel 
 is aware of its existence, or it will be regarded as waived by the 
 omission or neglect to urge it as soon as possible. ^ Perhaps the 
 most frequent application of this principle is that pleas in abate- 
 ment must be filed in limine or they will be taken to have been 
 waived. ^ In general, an appearance and pleading to the declara- 
 tion amounts to a waiver of all precedent irregularities, ^ and the 
 defendant will not, under such circumstances, be heard to say that 
 he was not notified by service of process,^ or that irregularities 
 existed in previous orders of continuance.'' 
 
 S.) 155; Carringtou u Brents, 1 Mc- 
 Lean, (U. S.), 174; Suydara w Pitcher, 
 4 Cal. 280; Payne v. Farmers' Bank, 
 29 Conn. 415; Deputy v. Belts, 4 Harr. 
 (Del.) 352; Crull v. Keener, 18 111. (15; 
 Abbott V. Semple, 25 111. 107; Cruik- 
 shankv. Coggswell, 26 111. 366; Rob- 
 erts V. Thompson, 28 111. 79; Miles v. 
 Goodwin, 35 111. 53; Eldredge v. Fol- 
 well, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 208; Brayton w. 
 Freese, 1 Ind. 121; Little v. Vance, 14 
 Ind. 22; Bell v. Piersoa, 1 la. 21; 
 Lorriner v. Bank of 111., 1 la. 223; 
 Hall V. Biever, 1 la. 113; Harriss v. 
 Guiu, 10 Smed. & M. (Miss.) 563; 
 Winchester v. Cox, 3 Iowa, 575; 
 Chouteau v. Eice, 1 Minn. 192; Lewis 
 V. Nuckols, 26 Mo. 278; State v. 
 Woolery, 39 Mo. 525; Fox v. Reed, 3 
 Grant (Pa.), 81; Anderson u. Morris, 
 12 Wis. 689. 
 
 1 Illustrations of this will be found 
 in the following cases: Ransom v. City 
 of New York, 20 How. (U. S.) 581: 
 
 Selby V. Hutchinson, 111. 319; Gunn 
 V. Gudehus, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 447; 
 Gushing v. Babcock, 38 Me. 452 ; Hig- 
 ley V. Laut, 3 Mich. 612; Warren v. 
 Glyun,37 N. H. 340 ; Dale v. Radcliffe, 25 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 333; Gordon v. Inghram, 
 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 152; Belknap v. 
 Godfrey, 22 Vt. 288; Pulling v. Super- 
 visors, 3 Wis. 337. 
 
 2 Warren v. Glynu, 37 N. H. 340. 
 
 3 Hartz V. Com., 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 
 359; Preston u. Simons, 1 Rich. L. (S. 
 C.) 262; Morgan v. Houston, 6 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 314; Pearce v. Young, AValk. 
 (Miss.) 259. 
 
 4 Stanley v. Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala. 
 652, 656; Moore v. Phillips, 8 Porter 
 (Ala.) 467; Hobsou v. Emanuel, 8 
 Porter (Ala.) 442. 
 
 * Crawford v. Branch Bank, 7 Ala. 
 205. 
 
 « Stanley v. Bank of Mobile, 23 Ala. 
 652, 655.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVII.] waiver: ABANDONMENT. 1O6I 
 
 § 1439. Abandonment of a Contract. — What amounts to au 
 abandonment of a contract is a tuatter of law, and the court 
 should instruct the jury as to the legal effect of the facts which 
 they may find, bearing upon the question, and not leave it to 
 them to say, without such instruction, whether a contract has 
 been abandoned or not.^ In other words, where an act, or cer- 
 tain specific acts, are relied on to show an abondonment of a 
 contract by one of the parties to it, it is proper for the court to 
 declare whether such act or acts constitute an abandonment.^ 
 The principle is said to be this: " Where a contract is entire, 
 and not made divisible by its terms, one of the parties cannot 
 take advantage of his own default, either from laches or willful 
 refusal to perform his part, for the purpose of putting the con- 
 tract out of the way, so as to enable him to maintain assumpsit 
 on the common counts, and therefore evade the rule that, while 
 the special contract is in force, general assumpsit will not lie; 
 and the contract is considered to remain in force until it is re- 
 scinded by mutual consent, or until the opposite })arty does some 
 act inconsistent with the duty imposed upon him by the con- 
 tract, which amounts to an abandonment;" and that, what 
 amounts to an abandonment is a question of law, and it is error 
 to submit such a question to a jury.^ In like manner, it has been 
 said that ^'■ihQ abandonment of a claim may become and does 
 become, when the facts of the cases are admitted, a conclusion 
 of law from the facts, to be applied by the court, and not left to 
 the discretion of the jury." * 
 
 § 1440. Abandonment of Rights. — The subject of the a6a?i- 
 donment of a right stands on the same footing as the subject of 
 
 1 Henry V. Bassett, 75 Mo. 90, 95. (N. C.) 423; Devereux v. Burgoyne, 5 
 To the same effect White ti. Wright, 16 Ired. Eq. (X. C.) 351, — wliere tlie 
 Mo. App. 551 . question was considered in cases in 
 
 2 Chouteau v. Jupiter Iron Works, equity, where the judge disposed of 
 83 Mo. 73, 82. the facts as well as the law. 
 
 3 Dulat'. Cowles,7 Jones L. (N. C.) * Thoruburgh v. Mastin, 93 X. C. 
 290, opinion by Pearson, C. J. Com- 258; Headen u. Womack, 88 N. C. 
 pare Blake v. Lane, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) lOS. 
 
 412; Brown u. Beckuall, 5 Jones Eq.
 
 1062 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl'., 
 
 the luaivfv oi a right. In fact, in most cases the two words ex- 
 press the same idea. Whether a party has abandoned a right 
 once possessed, — as, for instance, a right to an easement, — would 
 seem to be always for the consideration of a jur}^ as a question 
 of fact and intention.^ Thus, in an action of ejectment tore- 
 cover a mining claim, it has been held a question for a jury, 
 whether a location, which the evidence tended to show, was made 
 prior to the time Avhen that attempted by the plaintitf, had been 
 forfeited or abandoned.'^ Where a chattel was in the possession of 
 a person, who made frequent declarations that he was the ow^ner of 
 it and offered to sell it, and another imputed owner lived but five 
 miles away, and he neither objected to the use of the property by 
 the actual possessor, nor made any interference with his use of 
 it, — these circumstances were held evidence tending to show that 
 he assented to the claim of right of the actual possessor, and it was 
 a question for the jury to determine their weight, — in other 
 words, whether such jH-rson had not waived any claim of title-^ 
 
 § 1441. Abandonment of Pre-emption or claim of Public Lands. — 
 What will constitute an abandonment, under a statute securing an inter- 
 est in the public lands to actual settlers who continuously reside on the 
 land, may, under some circumstances, be a question, of laiv, and under 
 others a question of fact. It is obvious that the question is distinctly 
 analogous to the question of domicile ; ^ and the question of the loss of 
 the right of a homestead exemption in land b}'^ ceasing to reside upon it as 
 a home.^ A number of decisions upon this question were made by the 
 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the Act of Assembly' of that 
 State, of date Dec. 30, 1786, allowing pre-emptions of tlie public domain 
 of the State, and defining what should constitute a settlement. It pro- 
 vided among other things, " that, by a settlement, shall be understood 
 an actual, personal, resident settlement, with a manifest intention of 
 making it a place of abode, and the means of supporting a family, and 
 continued from time to time, unless interrupted bv the enemy, or by 
 going into the militarj^ service of the country during tlie war." The 
 
 ' Parkins v. Dunham, 3 Strobh. ^ Avery r. Clenious, 18 Conn. 3flG, 
 
 Law (S. C), 224, 228. 310. 
 
 ■' Taylor v. Middleton, C,7 Cal. * Ante, § 1359. 
 
 C5G. 5 Ante, § 13G0.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVII.] waiver: abandonment. 1063 
 
 question imder consideration, so far as it involved the interpretation of 
 this statute, turned upon the meaning of ihe words " continued from 
 time to time." The circumstances which give authoritative value to the 
 decisions under this statute, have, for the most part, passed awaj', and 
 they are cited merely as having an analogous value in cases where the 
 question arises under Acts of Congress, or in Texas under Acts of the 
 State Legislature, touching dispositions of the public domain. In one 
 case it was reasoned as follows by the court, speaking through Ken- 
 nedy, J. : "Abandonment is not always a question of intention, and 
 therefore a matter of fact, to be left exclusively to the jury without any 
 controlling instructions from the court ; * * * because, when 
 more than a reasonable time has elapsed for completing the settlement 
 without its being done, after making a proper allowance for all delay oc- 
 casioned by what the law ma}'^ deem a sufficient excuse or cause for it, 
 and the facts are not controverted, the law will pronounce the neglect or 
 the failure of the party to perfect his settlement, an abaudoment, what- 
 ever his intention in legard to it may have been." And therefore, where 
 no excuse whatever was offered why the claimant had not prosecuted 
 and perfected his improvements, by personal, resident settlement on the 
 land, although more than six years had elapsed from the commence- 
 ment of it, and this state of facts was shown by the evidence of both 
 parties, it was held that the court below would clearly have been justi- 
 fied in charging the jury that there had been an abandonment. ^ This 
 decision seems opposed to tlie previous decision of the same court, to 
 the effect that whenever a question of abandonment arose from a lapse 
 ■of time less than seven 3'ears, accompanied by circumstances from 
 which it might be inferred that the party intended to abandon, it was a 
 mixed question of law and fact, to be submitted to the jury ; but when the 
 question arose from mere lapse of time, it was a question of law, to be 
 determined by the court without regard to the intention of the party ; and 
 if the time exceeded seyeH2/ea?*s, it was a conclusive abandonment in law. '•* 
 Still earlier, it was said I)y Tilghman, C. J. : " Were the matter at all 
 doubtful it should be left to the jury. But abandonment is not in all 
 cases a matter of fact. It may be a conclusion of law from facts. 
 Where a man makes a settlement and leaves it for a great length of time, 
 it does not signify for him that he keeps up his claim. The law de- 
 clares that such verbal claims have no avail as against the act of relin- 
 quishing the possession. And in such case I consider it as the right of 
 
 1 Atchison v. McCulloch, 5 Watts - Breutliuger v. Hutchinsou, 1 
 
 (Pa.), 13, 15. Watts (Pa.), ^H.
 
 1064 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thoilip, Tr., 
 
 the judge to declare the conclusion of law." i In another case it was 
 said by Duncan, J. : " Abandonment is a term very often misapplied, 
 and 1 know nothing more destructive of the security of titles, than leav- 
 ing it to a jury to presume an abandonment of such a title. * * * 
 A man may abandon his settlement, and that abandonment may be of 
 such a cast, as that the court may decide it as a matter of law, inde- 
 pendent of the statutory provisions of limitation as to seven years ; be- 
 cause continuity of actual residence and possession is the very vital 
 principle of this right, and is apart of its legal definition. Hence, it is 
 determined that settlements must not have the smallest cast of aban- 
 donment. The abandonment then is not constructive, but absolute ; a 
 dereliction of the possession, which amounts to a surrender of the pre- 
 emption right, unless this dereliction is accounted for by some extraor- 
 dinary occurrence, as being dispossessed by force, and an immediate 
 prosecution of the right, or prosecution within some reasonable time, 
 or being driven off by the public enemy. Where a location is not fol- 
 lowed up by a survey in a reasonable time, this is the constructive aban- 
 donment, and may be decided as matter of law by the court ; and where 
 there is an intervening right before the survey, this imperfect right and 
 inception of title may be considered as relinquished, or in other words, 
 abandoned." And it was held that it was error to leave it to the jury 
 to decide, in the particular case, whether an application on whicli a sur- 
 vey had been made had been abandoned.^ In another case, where an 
 actual settler had resided on land for two years and had then left it un- 
 occupied for five years, it was held proper for the court to instruct the 
 jury that his absence for that length of time was a legal abandonment 
 of his rights. Gibson, C. J., said: " It is certain that a question of 
 abandonment is not necessarily a question of intention. There are in- 
 stances where the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, taking the 
 truth of it for granted, is not one of fact but law, and where an ad- 
 mitted intent to resume the settlement is immaterial. To substitute 
 claim for residence, a convenience for prosecution of title, would sub- 
 vert the whole doctrine of improvement. An appropriator is not to be 
 held off by an improver who has barely set his mark on the land, by tlu^ 
 commencement of a settlement, suspended, but intended to be resumed 
 at a more convenient season. In such a case, the animus revertendi 
 goes for nothing. It is continuance of residence, with such occasional 
 exceptions of temporary but indispensable interruption of it, as cireuni- 
 
 1 Cluggage V. Duncuu, 1 Serg. & K. - Watson v. Gilday, 11 Serg. & F,. 
 
 (Pa.) Ill, 120. (Pa.) 337, 340.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XLVII,] waiver: abandoxmext. 1065 
 
 stances may require, and of wliich it may be tlie province of tlie court 
 to judge, wliich is the groundwork of the title." ^ Finally, the conclu- 
 sion has been reached that, where the question of abandonment de- 
 pends upon mere lapse of time, not excused by any circumstance named 
 in the statute or contemplated by it, and there is no dispute as to the 
 length of the time, it is a question oflcav, to be decided by the court with- 
 out regard to the intention of the party ; and it was held, in such a case, 
 that relinquishment of actual residence for five years and nine months, 
 without any circumstance to bring the case within the equity of the 
 statutory excuses, was abandonment as matter of law, without regard 
 to the intention of the claimant.'^ In another case it was ruled that, if 
 actual residence be discontinued for five years, and not accounted for, i1 
 is an abandonment in point of law.^ 
 
 § 1442. The Same Subject Continued. — Passing from these to an- 
 other class of cases under the same statute, we find that it has been 
 well decided that, in all cases where the circumstances leave room for 
 doubt whether there was an abandonment or not, the jury is the proper 
 tribunal to decide.'* " Some cases," said Coulter J., " may be so strongly 
 and indelil)ly marked, either by continuous absence, and suffering the 
 improvement to return to its wild state, or by the declarations and acts 
 of the party, as to justify the court in deciding as a matter of law 
 upon the question ; yet, in a large majority of the cases which occur, 
 there is such a mixture of motive, intent and circumstances, as to make 
 it a matter properly referable to the jury. It is not a mere length of 
 absence for any reasonable time, which gives character to the act of 
 quitting possession ; for a man may leave behind him unquestionable 
 marks of the animus revertendi, such as grain growing, household 
 utensils and farming implements. On the other hand, short absence 
 may be marked as unequivocally, by acts and declarations, with an in- 
 tent to give up the right of settlement." ^ Accordingly, where the court 
 submitted the question to the jury upon the following instruction, it was 
 held no error : " When a single man had an actual settlement, improve- 
 ment, and residence on a tract of land, with a cabin to live in, suitable 
 to his circumstances in his single state, and married, his residing off the 
 
 1 McDonald v. Mulhollau, 5 Watts 359; "Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 
 (Pa.), 173. 214,219; Heath v. Bicldle, 9 Pa. St. 
 
 2 Jacobs V. Figard, 25 Pa. St. 45. 273. 
 
 3 Smith V. Beck, 25 Pa. St. 10(). ^ Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 
 * Foster v. McDivit, 5 Watts & S. 214. 219.
 
 10(36 rKovixcE of coukt and jury. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 land, in a Louse of his fatber-in-law, or with his father-in-law until 
 he could get accommodations for his wife and expected increasing fam- 
 ily, for a reasonable time, during which time he still occupies it, would 
 not be an abandonment. Whether the residence was changed for such 
 temporary purpose, and whether the time of this absence of personal 
 residence was a reasonable time to effect the object, and prosecuted 
 with due diligence, especially when there was conflicting and contradic- 
 tory evidence, would be facts to be determined l)y the jury." ^ Again, 
 where the court recapitulated the facts, instructed the jury what 
 amounted to an abandonment, and gave them what might perhaps be 
 an intimation of the court's opinion that there was an abandonment, 
 but left the question to them, it was held that, while there might be 
 evidence suflicientl}' clear to warrant the court in telling the jury, as 
 matter of law, that there had been abandonment, no error was com- 
 mitted in the particular case.^ In another case it has been held that 
 an interruption of occupancy for a period of six months would not of 
 itself amount to an abandonment, unless accompanied by acts or declar- 
 utions indicative of an intention to abandon the premises; and, under 
 the circumstances, it was held proper for the court so to charge the 
 jury, — the court conceding what is held in decisions already quoted, 
 that in some cases it will be a mere question of law.^ Reviewing tliese 
 decisions, it was held in a later case that, being so far advanced from 
 the period and policy which gave rise to the statutes, the court ought 
 not to contract the rule in regard to actual residence more than their 
 predecessors had done ; and where the discontinuance of the actual 
 resident possession was but a few days over two years before the war- 
 rant of the subsequent claimant was issued, it was held that this was 
 too short a time to give it the character of an abandonment in law from 
 lapse of time, and that the trial court therefore erred in rejecting evi- 
 dence tending to prove the animiis revertendi. The court intimated 
 that where the interruption of the settler's residence is for a less period 
 than./z'ye years, it ought to be left to the jury to determine, under all the 
 evidence in the case, whether there existed an intention to abandon.* 
 
 § 1443. Waiver of A^eiidor's Lien. — It has becu ruled 
 that, Avhethcr a vendor intended to waive liis lien by taking 
 a new note, is a question oflaiv, and ought not to be submitted 
 
 1 Heath v. Biddlc, 9 Pa. St. 273, 274. 3 Goodman ?•. Losey, 3 AVatts & S. 
 
 2 Sampler. Kol)lj, 1<; Pa. St. 305, (Pa.) 52i;. 
 
 320, ■• AVhitfoml) r. Ilovt, 20 Pa. St. 413.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLVII.] waiver: abandonment. 1067 
 
 to a jury. It was argued, and the court admitted the position, 
 that the abandonment of a vendor's lien is a question of intention; 
 but Lumpkin, J., nevertheless said: " The law is that the waiver 
 may be actual or implied. But whether the uniting of other 
 considerations in the same note is an implied waiver, is a question 
 of law, just as much as whether taking other and additional 
 security amounts to a waiver. The facts being admitted, the 
 law arising out of any given state of facts is to be decided by 
 the courts." ^ 
 
 § 1444. Abandonment of a Public Office. — It has been said 
 that, "what amounts to an abandonment of an office (if one 
 can be vacated by abandonment, otherwise than in the manner 
 prescribed by the statute), is a question of law, and the special 
 facts should be stated, in order that the court may determine 
 whether those facts constitute an abandonment or not." ^ 
 
 § 1445. Waiver by Administrator of Copy of Claim against 
 an Estate. — Under the statutes of Arkansas, the executor or 
 administrator of the estate of a deceased person is entitled to a 
 copy of any claim which is presented to the probate court for 
 allowance against the estate, — the object of the statute being to 
 enable him to act advisedly in allowing or refusing it, and, in 
 case of its allowance, to place in his possession accurate data for 
 the classification of claims against the estate.^ This beinsi; the 
 polic}" of the statute, where the executor or administrator has 
 had a fair and convenient opportunity to examine the original 
 claim, no violence is done to the spirit of the statute by the find- 
 ing of a waiver of the copj^ by a jur}^ even upon slight grounds ; 
 and it is held that, whether or not the facts and circumstances 
 shown in evidence amount to a waiver, is a matter of fact to be 
 determined by a jury.^ 
 
 1 Mims «. Lockett, 23 Ga. 237. The of facts; but the general rule is cer- 
 
 writer may be permitted to doubt the taiuly otherwise. Ante, § 1333, et seq. 
 
 conclusion of this case. "Where the 2 state v. Seay, 64 Mo. 89, 97. 
 
 question is one of Intention, tlie Invr ^ Borden r. Fowler, H Arli. 471, 
 
 may indeed conclusively annex a par- 474. 
 
 ticular intention to a particular state •* Grimes v. Bush, 10 Arlv. 047.
 
 1068 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [I Thomp. Tr., 
 
 § 1446. AVaiver by a Creditor of his Riglit to Rescind a 
 Composition Agreement. — If a composition takes place be- 
 tween a debtor and his creditors, wliereby eacli creditor is to re- 
 ceive a certain amount, the legal effect of the contract is that it 
 is not only a contract between the debtor and each separate credi- 
 tor, but it is a contract among the creditors themselves.^ Hence, 
 if one creditor consents to sign the agreement, upon a secret un- 
 derstandiuo; with the debtor or with an agent or friend of the 
 debtor, or even, it is held, with a mere volunteer, that he is to 
 set a larger amount than the other creditors, the rest of them 
 are cheated, and, on discovering this fact, have the right to re- 
 scind the contract and sue for their full debt.^ But, while this 
 and other circumstances which might be supposed, will give the 
 rio-ht to any particular creditor to rescind the composition agree- 
 ment and sue for his full debt, this right, like any other, may be 
 waived; and obviously it will be assumed in law to have been 
 w^aived, if the creditor, with full knowledge of the circumstances 
 which give him the right to rescind the agreement, accepts per- 
 formance of it from the debtor according to its terms. ^ But 
 where there are facts from which the contrary inference may be 
 drawn, which will control the decision of this question, — ■ as, for 
 instance, whether the creditor accepted performance . from the 
 debtor with full knowledge of the circumstances which gave him 
 the right of rescission, — the question whether there has been a 
 waiver must go to the jury.* Thus, where it appeared that, in the 
 state of facts previously supposed, the creditor refused to sur- 
 render the promissory note by which his debt was evidenced, ex- 
 cept upon the promise of the debtor to pay or secure the balance 
 in full, — under these circumstances the acceptance of part per- 
 formance from the debtor, according to the terms of the conipo- 
 
 1 Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393, Re Whitney, U Nat. Bank Reg. 1, 3; 
 39(;: Sage v. Valentine, 23 Minn. 102; Robson t\ Calze, Dougl. 21(); Holland 
 Breck v. Cole, 4 Saudf. (N. Y ) 79, v. Palmer, I Bos. &Pul. 95; Re Sawyer, 
 83. U Nat. Bank. Reg. 241. 
 
 2 Bank of Commerce v. Hoeber, 11 ^ Cobleigh v. Pierce, 32 Vt. 788, 
 Mo. App. 475; Pulsford v. Richardy, 79G. 
 
 22 L. J, (Ch.) 559; s. r. UlEng. L. & •* Ibid. 
 
 Eq. 387; Knight v. Hunt, 5 Biug. 432;
 
 Tit, V, Ch. XLVll.] waiver: abandonment. 1069 
 
 sition agreement, would not be conclusive evidence of u waiver, 
 and the question would remain a question for the jury.^ 
 
 § 1447. Waiver cannot take Place without Knowledge. — 
 
 It must in all cases appear that the party had a full knowledge 
 of his rights, in respect to the matter of which the waiver is 
 predicated; for, if ignorant thereof, of course no intention to 
 waive anything can be implied.^ In this respect the doctrine of 
 waiver rests upon very much the same footing as that of ratifi- 
 cation. Indeed, the two things are the same, though one term is 
 applied in one situation, and the other in another. To illustrate 
 the foregoing statement, take a case where the plaintiff hired a 
 slave to the defendant, by an express contract, to be employed 
 in a particular service. The defendant, disregarding the con- 
 tract, sub-hired the slave, to be employed in a totally different 
 service. Pending the latter service, the slave was taken violently 
 ill, and, at the suggestion of a physician, was taken to the house 
 of the plaintiff to be nursed, where he died. It was held that 
 the mere fact of the plaintiff receiving the slave under the cir- 
 cumstances was not of itself a waiver of the conversion ; that 
 whether or not it was such a waiver depended upon the motive 
 with which it was done, and that this was a question of fact for 
 a jury. If, with the knowledge of the fact which in law consti- 
 tuted the conversion, the plaintiff took back the slave as owner, 
 and as if the outrage had not been committed, this would be evi- 
 dence of a waiver of the conversion.^ 
 
 § 1448. Instructions as to what Constitutes Abandonment of Real 
 Estate in Action of Ejectment, — "The question of abandonment is 
 one of fact and intention. Ceasing to cultivate a lot in the common 
 fields and a removal elsewhere do not make an abandonment ; but, to 
 constitute an abandonment b^^ a part}', it must be shown that he quitted 
 the propert}'^ with the intention of no further claiming the same, and 
 
 ' Ibid. Compare Daucliy v. Good- ^ Tryanor v. Johusou, supra. Com- 
 
 rich, 20 Vt. 127. pare Bell v. Curamiugs, 3 Sneed 
 
 2 Tryanor v. Johnson, 1 Head (Tenu.), 275. 
 (Tenn.), 51, 55; Cobleigh r. Tierce, 32 
 Vt. 788, 71.) G.
 
 1070 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JUUY. [1 'rilOnip. Tl'. , 
 
 the burden of showing the abandonment rests upon the one who asserts 
 
 it. Although the jury may believe from the evidence that the 
 
 land in contest was part of a common-field or out-lot, and the same 
 was inhabited, cultivated or possessed by said Francis Bequette prior 
 to the 20th of December, 1803, yet if, from the evidence, they believe 
 that said Bequette, his heirs or legal representatives, did leave the said 
 common-field or out-lot with the intention not to return and occupy the 
 same, as his or their property respectively — such action on his or their 
 part is an abandonment of their or his right, title or claim to the land 
 in contest, and the jury should find accordingly." ^ 
 
 ^ Approved in Tayou v. Latlew, 33 Mo. 203, 208.
 
 Tit. V, Cb. XLVIII.] identity: resemblance. 1071 
 
 CHAPTER XLVIII. 
 
 IDENTITY: RESEMBLANCE. 
 Sectiox 
 1450. Question for Jury. 
 U51. Where there are two persons of the same Name. 
 
 1452. [Illustrations.] Whether Father or Son the Grantee in a Deed„ 
 
 1453. Identity of Personal Property. 
 
 1454. Res Judicata — Identity of the Issues in a Former Proceeding. 
 
 1455. Identity of a Signature with the Name of a Firm. 
 
 1456. Difference between two Machines. 
 
 1457. Sufficiency of Specification of a Patent — Informality — Abandonment — 
 
 Identity. 
 
 § 1-450. Question for Jury. — Identity is a matter peculiarly 
 within the province of the jury, to be determined by them in view 
 of all the circumstances ; and the court must not, in instructing 
 them, intimate an opinion as to what inferences should be drawn 
 by them from the facts in evidence.^ 
 
 § 1451. Where there are Two Persons of the same Name. — 
 
 Where it becomes a question which one of two persons bearing 
 the same name was intended to be the grantee in a deed, the ques- 
 tioii is one of fact for a jury. In so holding the Supreme Court 
 of Wisconsin have lately said: "In a sense, as to the real per- 
 son intended, there is a latent ambiguity in the deed, but more 
 properly, perhaps, it is a question of identity; as in wills, ' where 
 the words are neither ambiguous nor obscure, and the devise on 
 the face of it is perfect and intelligible, but, from some of the 
 circumstances admitted in proof, an ambiguity arises as to which 
 of two or more things, or which of two or more persons (each 
 answering the words in the will) the testator intended.' ^ This 
 is what Lord Bacon called ' an equivocation, that is, the words 
 equally apply to two things or two persons.' But it is clear that 
 
 1 Miller v. Marks, 20 Mo. App. 369. 2 Citing 1 Greenl. Ev., § 289.
 
 1072 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 ThoilllU Tl'., 
 
 ill any sense this question is not one of construction or of law, to 
 be decided bj^ the court in an action at hiw, but one of fact, 
 pure and simple, to be passed upon by the jury; as much so as 
 the meaning of words used in a written instrument, which this 
 court held was a question for the jury; ^ and, as the questions 
 in the cases hereafter cited in analogy to this case.'^ 
 
 § 1452. [Illustrations]. Whether Father or Son the Grantee 
 IN A Deed. — A father and son both bore the name of David Felker. 
 They both resided in the same town. The father purchased a piece of 
 land, takingthe deed to " David Felker, junior," describing him as of the 
 town where they both resided. The father executed notes for a part 
 of the purchase-money, and gave a mortgage of the land to secure the 
 same, b}' the name of " David Felker, junior." He said nothing at the 
 time of his acting as agent for his son, and the grantor supposed that 
 the father was in fact the purchaser, that his name was David Felker, 
 junior, and that he was conveying the land to him. Some of the evi- 
 dence tended to prove that the son had authorized the father to buj'' 
 the land for him and in his name, and that he had paid either directly or 
 indirectly, the whole purchase price. Under this evidence, it was held 
 a question of fact for the jury whether the son was or was not the real 
 principal and purchaser of the land, under an instruction that if they 
 found he was, then the title vested in him, and not in the father. ^ The 
 court disposed of the inference to be derived from the addition of 
 "junior " to the name of David Felker in the deed, by saying: "The 
 addition of 'junior ' is in law no part of a person's name, but it is used 
 as merely descriptive of the person; and is assumed, applied, and dis- 
 carded at will." * Another case involving this curious question was an 
 action of ejectment in New York ; where the plaintiff claimed title under 
 a sale, which had taken place under an execution, issued upon a judg- 
 ment which had been recovered asfainst one David Brown. The 
 
 1 Citing Gausou v. Madigau, 15 22 Wis. 132; Bancroft v, Grover, 23 
 Wis. 145. Wis.4()3; Harding w. Colburu, 12 Met. 
 
 2 Begg V. Begg, 56 Wis. 534, 537. (Mass.) 333. 
 
 The court cited the following analo- ^ pj.gutiss v. Blake, 34 Vt. 4G0; 
 
 gous cases of parol evidence to explain ante, § 1350. 
 
 written instruments: Tlioinpsou v. ^ Ibid. 405, citing Braiuard v. 
 
 Jones, 4 Wis. 100; Atwater v. Stilphin, Vt. 9; Blake «. Tucker, 12 
 
 Schenck, 9 Wis. 100; Staak v. Sigel- Vt. 39; Isaacs t'. Wilkey, 12 Vt. 077. 
 kow, 12 Wis. 234 ; Sargeaut v. Solberg,
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL VIII.] identity: resemblance. 1073 
 
 defendant claimed title by inheritance from her son, David C. Brown. 
 The premises in question were conveyed some years before the action, 
 by a deed duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, in which the 
 name of the grantee was stated to be David C. Brown. David C. 
 Brown was the name of an infant son of the judgment debtor, through 
 whom the plaintiff claimed, whose true name was David Addison Brown, 
 but who was sometimes called David Brown. The plaintiff claimed that 
 the father was intended to be the grantee in the deed, and gave evidence 
 tending to show that he negotiated the sale and that at the time of the 
 execution and delivery of the deed, he delivered to the grantor a bond 
 for the purchase-money, secured by a mortgage of the premises, which 
 bond and mortgage were, however, executed, in like manner with the 
 deed, in the name of David C. Brown. It was also shown that the 
 father went into possession of the premises and so remained until the 
 time of his dealli. There was also evidence tending to show that, in 
 important business transactions, the name of the father was written 
 David A. Brown. It was held that it was for the jury to say which of 
 the persons, the father or the son, was intended to be the grantee in the 
 deed, and that it was error to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. The 
 court said: " The defendant has the legal presumption in her favor 
 that her son was intended as the grantee ; and whether it has been 
 overcome by parol proof, we think should have been left for the jury 
 to determine." ^ 
 
 § 1453. Identity of PersoDal Property. — lu an action of 
 replevin, the identity of personal property is peculiarly for (he 
 jury, and they should be left free to make their own deductions 
 from the evidence. Upon the question of identity the testimony 
 of witnesses who swear to the fact of identity is necessarily the 
 statement of an opinion or conclusion ; but it is nevertheless, from 
 the nature of the case, to go to the jury.^ So, what property is 
 embraced in a levy which is described in the return in obscure 
 terms, may be shown by })arol evidence, and it is consequently 
 a question of fact to be determined by a jury.^ So, whether 
 certain goods delivered were delivered in pursuance of an oral 
 
 1 McDiiffiev. Clark, 39 Him (N. Y), 2 gtate v. Babb, 70 Mo. 504; Com. 
 
 K'.fl; citiug Padgett v. Lawrence, 10 r. Cuimiughain, 104 Mass. 545. 
 r:iige (N. YO, 170. 3 geott v. Sheakly, 3 "Watts (Pa.), 
 
 50. 
 
 OS
 
 1074 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Tliomp. Tr., 
 
 contract of sale, was held a question of fact for the jury.^ The 
 identity of property in chattel mortgage is always a question of 
 fact for tlie jury. It was so held where the question was whether 
 a certain engine, which had been seized and sold by the defend- 
 ants, w^as included in the description of " one portable saw mill," 
 in such a morto-age.^ 
 
 § 1454. Res Judicata — Identity of the Issues in a Former 
 Proceedinj?. — In order that a judgment may have the effect of 
 barring a subsequent action, it must appear, either upon the face 
 of the record or by extrinsic evidence, that the precise issu(3 
 was raised and determined in the former suit. If this appears 
 from the record of the former suit, apart from extrinsic evidence, 
 then the question is a question of law, and is not to be sub- 
 mitted to a jury.' But if it appears that several matters may 
 have been in issue, and that the judgment may have gone uj^on one 
 or more, thus leaving the precise issue in doubt, this uncertainty 
 should be removed by exti'insiG evidenced If such extrinsic evi- 
 dence is presented in the form of parol testimony, it should bo 
 left to the jury , under proper instructions, to say whether the is-- 
 sues, as defined by the court \\\ the case at bar, were in point of 
 fact passed upon at the previous trial. ^ 
 
 § 1455. Identity of a Signature with the name of a Firm. — 
 
 It has been held that the question whether " Chas. G. Ramsey 
 & Co." signed to a promissory note was the signature of the 
 firm known as the firm of " Charles G. Ramsey & Co." was a 
 question of fad for the jury.® 
 
 § 145G. Difference between two Machines. — A branch of 
 the rule that identity is peculiarly a question of fact for a jury, 
 
 1 Stonewall Man. Co. v. Peek, (13 (U. S.) 51J0; IJus.sell t;. Place, 94 U. S. 
 Miss. 342. COC. 
 
 2 AVc'ber v. Tiling, fiC Wis, 79. ° Tutt v. Price, 7 Mo. App. 194, 197; 
 ■"5 Tuttv. Price, 7 Mo. App. 194. Packet Co. v. Sickles, supra. 
 
 * Tutt r. Price, 7 Mo. App. 194; « Tilforcl v. Ramsey, 37 Mo. 663.. 
 
 Spradliug v. Conway, 51 Mo. 51; ofw; citing Kirk u. Blurtou, 9 Mccs. & 
 
 Wright V. Salisbury, 46 Mo. 20; W. 2st; Kinsman v. Dullam, 5 T, B. 
 
 Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. Mon. (Ky.) 382.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XL VIII.] identity: kesemblance. 1U75 
 
 may be found in a holding which has been made in an action at 
 hiw to recover damages for the infringement of letters-})atcnt. 
 It is ruled that, when the defendant in such an action sets up a 
 prior publication of a machine, anticipating the patented inven- 
 tion, and it appears that there are obvious differences between 
 the two machines, in the arrangement of the separate parts, in the 
 relation of the parts to each other, and in their connection with 
 each other in performing the functions for which the machine is 
 intended, and experts differ upon the question whether these 
 differences are material to the result, and whether they require 
 the faculty of invention — those questions are questions of fact, 
 to be left to the jury under proper instructions.^ 
 
 § 1457. Sufficiency of Specifications of a Patent — Infor- 
 mality — Abandonment — Identity. — It seems that, in an action 
 at law for the infringement of a patent, it is a question for the 
 jury, to determine from the evidence in the case, whether the 
 specifications, including the claim, upon which the patent was 
 granted, were so precise as to enable any person skilled in the 
 construction of machines, to make the one described ; also 
 whether the patent was possessed of novelty ; also whether a re- 
 newed patent was for the same invention as the original patent ; 
 also whether the invention had been abandoned to the public ; as 
 well as the identity of the machine used by the defendant with 
 that of the plaintiffs, or whether they have been constructed and 
 operate upon the same principle.'^ 
 
 1 Keyes v. Grant, 118 U. S. 25, 36; 2 Battiu v. Taggert, 17 How. (U. 
 
 distiuguishiiig Randall v. Baltimore S.) 74, 85. 
 &c. R, Co., 109 U. S. 478.
 
 1076 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr. , 
 
 CHAPTER XLIX. 
 
 PLACE: LOCALITY: BOUNDAKY: IDENTITY OF LAND. 
 
 Section 
 
 1-1:61. Court to Construe a Deed: Jury to Apply Description to the Laud, 
 14G2. Whether the Courses and Distances Carry the Lines to a Certain Point. 
 14fi3. Whether a Grant Includes the Premises in Controversy. 
 14G4. How Jury Instructed in such a Case. 
 
 1465. An Instruction on the Theory of a Boundary Line fixed by Agreement. 
 
 1466. What Monuments satisfy the Calls of a Deed. 
 
 1467. No Presumption of Law in such a Case. 
 
 1468. Whether a Particular Monument was Intended to be Adopted by a Deed. 
 
 1469. Calls of a Survey. 
 
 1470. [Illustration.] Conckisiveness of ^Marked Corners and Lines in a Sur- 
 
 vey. 
 
 1471. Indeflnile or Insufficient Calls in a Deed. 
 
 1472. Illustration of Foregoing. 
 
 1473. Parol Evidence Admissible in such a Case. 
 
 1474. Verdict of Jury of Vicinage Entitled to Great Weight. 
 
 1475. Identity of Land and whether Assessed or Unseated. 
 
 1476. Questions of Locality, Distance, etc., for the Jury. 
 
 1477. [Illustration.] Appurtenances. 
 
 1478. [Continued.] Curtilage. 
 
 1479. House-breaking: Whether the Place of Entry was a Part of the House. 
 
 1480. Boundaries of Places. 
 
 1481. Boundaries of Counties. 
 
 1482. Boundaries of a State. 
 
 1483. Public Roads: Instruction that Monuments and Lines of Surveyor 
 
 Prevail. 
 
 1484. Instructions as to Survey and Plat of Public Road being Evidence of 
 
 its Location, etc., in Criminal Prosecution for Obstructing a Public 
 Highway under Illinois Statute. 
 
 § 1461. Court to Construe a Deed — Jury to Applj' De- 
 scription of the Land. — While it is the duty of the court to 
 construe a deed, it is the duty of the jury to apply its descrip- 
 tive terms, when thus construed, to the land, and to ascertain 
 whether the premises in question are within the description^ 
 
 » Reed v. Proprietors &c., 8 How. H. 332; Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. St 
 (U. S.) 274; Bell v. Woodward, 46 N. 185, 189.
 
 Tit. V,Ch. XLIX.] place: boundary: identity of land. 1077 
 
 Stated in another way, " what are the boundaries of hind con- 
 veyed by a deed, is a question of law; where the boundaries are, 
 is a question of fact.''' ^ Still another way of stating the same 
 principle is to say that, while it is the peculiar province of the 
 jury to find facts and to ascertain the true positions of 
 objects called for as monuments in a deed, from the evi- 
 dence submitted to them, it is nevertheless the duty of the 
 court to determine, whether, or in what manner, a call in a 
 deed or patent should be gratified? " When there is a latent 
 ambiguity in the description contained in the deed, all the cases 
 agree that evidence aliunde is admissible. But it is not upon 
 this principle alone that the evidence is received. It is admissi- 
 ble in all cases where there is a doubt as to the true location of 
 the survey, or a question as to the application of the grant to its 
 proper subject-matter. It must be constantly borne in mind that 
 it is not a question of construction, hut of location. A question 
 of construction is a pure question of law, to be decided by the 
 court upon the terms of the instrument itself, to the exclusion of 
 evidence aliunde, Avhere no latent ambiguity exists. A question 
 of location, or the application of the grant to its proper subject- 
 matter, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury by the 
 aid of extrinsic evidence." ^ "It cannot be denied," said the 
 Court of Appeals of Maryland, "that the jury are the proper 
 tribunal to decide whether any, and what, variation ought to be 
 allowed in the location of lands. But whether any and what de- 
 gree of allowance for variation ought to be made are questions of 
 fact, to be determined by the jury on the testimony upon that 
 subject, adduced to them in the trial of the cause. If no such 
 
 1 St. Louis V. Meyer, 13 Mo. App. (Mass.) 17, 27; Brown v. Willey, 42 
 
 367, 381!; s.c. affirmed, 87 Mo. 276. That Pa. St. 205, 209, opinion by Tliorap- 
 
 tlie location of a disputed boundary son, J.; Herpel v. Malone, 66 Mich, 
 
 line is always a question of fact for a 199; Barry v. Otto, 56 Mo. 177. 
 
 jury, or for a referee when actinti; as a ^ Thomas v. Godfrey, 3 Qill & J. 
 
 jury, see the following cases: Tasljer (Md.) 143; Friend v. Friend, Gi Md. 
 
 V. Cilley, 59 N. H. 575; Madden v. 321,331. 
 
 Tuclier, 46 Me. 367; Abbott v. Abbott, •' Opdyke v. Stepliens, 28 N. J. L. 
 
 51 Me. 575; Tebbetts v. Estes, 52 Me. 83, 90, opinion by Green, C. J. See 
 
 566; Williston v. Morse, 10 Met. also Abbott r. Abbott, 51 Me. 575, 581,
 
 1078 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [l Thomp. Tl'., 
 
 testimony be offered, the jury are not authorized to depart from 
 the courses and distances expressed in the conveyances, by mak- 
 ing any allowance for variation." ^ "The identical monument 
 or boundary referred to in a deed is always a subject of parol 
 evidence ; and when disputed, it is always left to the jury to say 
 which was the actual monument intended. Thus, there may be 
 two trees of a similar species and with similar marks ; two simi- 
 lar stakes not far distant from each other, or two rivers of the 
 same name ; and which was intended by the deed would be set- 
 tled by parol evidence, on the ground that it is a latent am- 
 biguity." 2 
 
 § 1462. Whether the Courses and Distances Carry the Lines to 
 A Certain Point. — Thus, in an action at law, where a boundary line is 
 in dispute, and the laud is described in the deed by which the question 
 is governed, by courses and distances, but no fixed monuments or cor- 
 ners are mentioned, the question whether the courses and distances 
 carry the lines to certain points claimed by one of the parties, is a 
 question of fact for the jury, which the judge cannot determine by an 
 instruction peremptory in its nature. ^ 
 
 § 1463. Whether a Grant Includes the Premises in Contro- 
 versy, — AVhether land in controversy is included within a par- 
 ticular grant, being a question of identity, is necessarily a ques- 
 tion of fact for a jury.^ In an action for damages for the breach 
 of a contract to convey land, where it is objected that the instru- 
 ment sued on does not describe the land, the question of the 
 suificiency of the description is for the jury to determine from 
 the evidence, unless it is manifest from the instrument that it 
 cannot be located.^ So, it is the province of a jury to say 
 whether a descriptive ivarrant has been located upon the land 
 
 » Wilson V. Inloes, 6 Gill (Md.), ^ Opdyke v. Stephens, 28 N. J. L. 
 
 121, 1G3; Peterkiu v. Inloes, 4 Md. 84. 
 
 175. 4 Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 690,622; 
 
 2 Claremont v. Carlton, 2 N. II. 3G9, Bayuard v. Eddings, 2 Strobh. Law 
 
 373, opinion by Woodbury, , I. Tiiis (X. C), 374; Barry v. Otto, 5^ Mo. 177. 
 
 case is a very apt illustration of the ^ White v. llermaun, 'A 111. 243, 
 rule.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIX.j place: boundary: identity of land. 1079 
 
 called for in it, or not. And whether a warrant has been shifted 
 or properly located, is for them to determine.^ Where it was 
 established, not only as a part of the history of the country, but 
 by evidence in a particular case, that many of the documents, 
 relating to an hnpresario contract between the Mexican Govern- 
 ment and Martin de Leon, had been destroyed during the Texas 
 revolution, it w'as held that it was properly left to the jury to 
 say whether the land in controversy was in this tract. ^ 
 
 § 1464. How Jury Instructed in Such a Case. — The following 
 instructions, given in such a case, have been explicitly approved by the 
 Supreme Court of the United States : "1. That if they [the jur}-] believe 
 from the evidence, looking to the monuments, length of lines, quanti- 
 ties, actual occupation, etc., that it is more probable that the parties to 
 the mortgage of 1782 intended to include therein the demanded prem- 
 ises than otherwise, they should return their verdict for the tenants."^ 
 
 The following were approved by the Supreme Court of Texas : ' ' This 
 is an action of trespass to try title, brought by the plaintiffs in the peti- 
 tion against the defendants therein named. There is no controversy, 
 however, as to the titles of the parties, each claiming under the same 
 grantee from the sovereignt}^ of the soil, but the dispute is as to the 
 
 true boundary line between their respective tracts of land. The 
 
 general rules which are to be observed in ascertaining the locality, 
 identity, or boundary of a particular tract of land described in a deed 
 or grant, are well settled. Recourse must be had,, first, to natural 
 objects; second, to artificial marks, and third to course and dis- 
 tance. The acquiescence of the proprietors of adjoining lands, in 
 
 a particular line, is a circumstance to which the jury may look in deter- 
 mining the true boundary. If the jury believe from the evidence 
 
 that the boundary line between plaintiffs and defendants would give the 
 
 disputed premises to plaintiffs, then they will find for plaintiffs. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the jury believe from the evidence that said true 
 boundary line would leave said disputed premises in defendants' tract 
 
 of land, they will find for defendants. If the jury believe from 
 
 the evidence that the dividing line between the lands of plaintiffs and 
 
 1 Cassidy v. Couway, 25 Pa. St. 240, &c., 8 How. (U. S.) 274, 288, — the 
 244. court holding that the instruction is 
 
 2 White V. Buruley, 20 How. (U. S.) not obnoxious to the objection that it 
 235; 247. submits tlie interpretation of tlie deed 
 
 ^ Approved in Reed v. Proprietors to the jury.
 
 1080 PROVINCE OF COURT AXD JURY. [1 Thoilip. Tl"., 
 
 defendants has been run, and that the parties, or those under whom 
 they claim, have acquiesced in the same, and recognized the said divid- 
 ing line, they will find for defendants." ^ 
 
 § 1465. An Instruction on the Theory of a Boundary Line Fixed 
 BY Agreement. — " The jury are instructed that it is perfectly compe- 
 tent for parties owning adjoining tracts of land to settle, by agreement, 
 where the division line shall be ; and if the jury shall believe from the 
 evidence, that the plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining tracts of 
 land, and any question or dispute had arisen as to where the line now 
 in controversy was, and the plaintiff and defendant agreed upon the 
 line and established it, as between themselves, then, in that case, it is 
 wholly immaterial where a survey would put the line. Each party is 
 bound by his agreement; and, in determining whether there was such 
 agreement, and fixing on the line, it is competent for the jury to take 
 into consideration acts and statements of the parties at the time, the 
 acts done by, each and the fixing and adjustment of fences and im- 
 provements by them, under such agreement, if any ai-e proven." 2 
 
 § 1466. What Monuments Satisfy the Calls of a Deed. — 
 
 "Where a deed calls for a particular object, and there is evidence 
 as to the actual location of the object, it is the province of the 
 jury to find where its location was.^ Thus, where a survey called 
 for two small trees of a certain kind, as a monument at the cor- 
 ner of the tract of land surveyed, and two small trees of the 
 kind thus called for were found in the neighborhood, it was 
 proper to refuse an instruction to the jury to disregard them, on 
 the theory that it was doubtful whether they w'cre the trees 
 called for. The question was one of fact for the exclusive de- 
 termination of the jury.* 
 
 ^ Approved in Mc Arthur v. Henry, 35 N. II. 473; Jackson v. Ogdeu, 7 Johns. 
 
 Tex. 804, 80.j; citing George y. Thomas, (N. Y.) 238; Gilchrist v. McGee, i) 
 
 IG Texas, 74, 84; Houston v. Sneed, 15 Yergev (Teuu.), 455; Nichol v. Lytle, 
 
 Texas, 307, 309; Siugletou ^7, AVhite- 4 Yerger (Teuu.), 450. See also Wil- 
 
 Side, 5Yerger (Teun.), 18, 34; Koss sou v. Hudson, 8 Yerg. (Teuu.) 398. 
 V. Turner, 5 Yerger (Tenu.), 338; « Approved in Cutler u. CaUisou, 72 
 
 Goodridge v. Dustin, 5 Mete. (Mass.), 111. IIO. 
 
 3C3; Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. ^ nawkius u. Nye, 59 Tex. 98. 
 
 (N. Y.) 285; Dibble v. Rogers, 13 * Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594, 
 
 Weud. (X. Y.) 5.0(!; Chew v. Morton, (;05. 
 10 Watts (ra.),321; Gray v. Berry, 9
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIX.] place: boundary : identity of land. 1081 
 
 § 1467. No Presumption of Law in such a Case. — The 
 
 identity of a particular monument as the one called for in a deed, 
 involves a question of fact, and there is no presumption of law 
 in such a case. Accordingly, it has been held proper to refuse 
 the following instruction: " If they [the jury] found that there 
 was an old stake standing at the end of the one hundred and 
 fifty-six rods, the distance named in the deed, bearing upon it 
 surveyor's marks, and other indications of the character of the 
 monument named in the deed, in the absence of all proof to the 
 contrary, the presumption would be that it was the stake referred 
 to in the deed." The court say: " There was no presumption 
 of law in the case. The various facts bearing upon the stake, 
 tending to show the same to be the monument, were proper for 
 the consideration of the jury; but the court could not, as re- 
 quested, have given the instruction that there was any presump- 
 tion of law binding on them. The evidence was entirely for the 
 consideration of the jury." ^ 
 
 § 146S. Whether a particular Monument was Intended to be 
 Adopted by a Deed. — Closely allied to the foregoing is a rule 
 which so far lets in 2)(>^'ol eviCience to explain a deed, as to show 
 that a particular monument, not called for in the deed by name, 
 was intended to be adopted by it. This rule has been declared 
 with reference to public patents or grants. ^ And, though it has 
 been conjectured that it may extend, px, necessitate^ to old deeds, 
 yet it has been doubted whether it extends to private deeds ; 
 and, as it is a violation of principle, it has been said that it ought 
 not to be extended.^ The rule has been thus stated: " "Where 
 it can be proved that there was a line actually run by the sur- 
 veyor, which was marked and a corner made, the party claiming 
 under the patent or deed shall hold accordingly, notwithstand- 
 ing a mistaken description of the land in the i:)atent or deed." * 
 "This rule," said the same court in a subsequent case, " pre- 
 
 1 Robiusou t;. White, 42 Me. 209, ^ Safret i'. Hartmaii, 5 Joues L, 
 216. (N. C), 185. 
 
 2 Cherry v. Slade, 3 Murph. (N. C.) ■» Cherry v. Slade, 3 ^Nlurpli. (N. C.> 
 82. 82, 8(J.
 
 1082 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [] Thoilip. Tr., 
 
 supposes that the patent or deed is made in jiursuance of the sur- 
 ve}', and that the line Avas marlced, and that the corner that was 
 made in making the survey, was adopted and acted upon in mak- 
 ing the patent or deed ; and, therefore, permits such line and cor- 
 ner to control the patent or deed, although they are not called 
 for, and do not make a part of it. Parol evidence being thus 
 let in for the purpose of controlling the patent or deed, by es- 
 tablishing a line and corner not called for, as a matter of course, 
 it is also let in for the purpose of showing that such line and 
 corner were not adopted and acted on in the making of the 
 patent or deed ; because the rule presupposes this to be the fact." ' ^ 
 It necessarily follows that, whelher the line or corner was 
 adopted or acted upon in making the deed, is a question of fact 
 for a jury.'- 
 
 § 1469. Calls of a Survey. — " When the calls of a survey are 
 all ascertained by the grant, and there is no necessity for refer- 
 ence to external evidence to ascertain or identify them, their 
 construction is a matter of taw, and belongs exclusively to the 
 court ; but when parol evidence is introduced to ascertain or 
 identify the calls, then it is a question of ^aw and fact, the jury 
 tindinw the fact, the court declaring the law.'"^ "In cases of 
 boundary, which depend upon the swearing of witnesses, it would, 
 no dou))t, be incompetent for the court, by any sort of instruc- 
 tions that might be given, to withdraw from tlie jury a decision 
 upon the w^eight of the testimony, and the facts which the testi- 
 mony conduces to establish. The actual position and identity 
 of the boundary, in such a case, would be exclusively a question 
 of fact for the consideration and determination of the jury, and 
 not the court." ^ " Wiiere contradictory evidence is given of 
 the location of a survey, or where, from the evidence, the true 
 location is doubtful and uncertain, it nuist be referred to the 
 jury to determine the land included in the survey; but where 
 
 ' Safrct V. Ilartman, 5 Jones Law ■• CockroU v. McQuiun, 4 T. B. 
 
 (N. C.),l«5, 18'.». Mou. (Ky.) 63, opiuion by OAVslcy, 
 
 2 Ihi'l. J. 
 
 ■^ Ott V. Soulard, '.t Mo. 581, COJ.
 
 Tit. V, Cli. XLIX.] place: boundary: identity of land. 1083 
 
 there is no conflict in the evidence, and no room for doubt or 
 hesitation in regard to the location, there is nothing to leave to 
 the jury, and tlie questions of law are for the court." ^ 
 
 § 1470. [Illustration.] Conclusiveness of Marked Corners and 
 Lines IN a Survey. — Where the closing line of a survey, starting 
 from an admitted corner, did not, as marked on the ground, reach the 
 boundary of the tract which it was intended to enclose, and there were 
 no indications of a corner on the ground at that point, where it would 
 intersect said boundary if extended ; but there was, near that point, a 
 *' marked corner " which could be reached by diverging by an angle 
 of 45 degrees from the extremity of the marked line, — it was held a 
 question of fact for a jury, in an action of ejectment, whether the 
 " marked corner " was or was not the original corner, and if so, whether 
 the partial line on the ground had not been abandoned by the surveyor 
 and another one adopted, closing the survey by a straight line, running 
 from the admitted corner to the marked corner.'-^ 
 
 § 1471. Indefinite or lusuffieieut Calls in a Deed. — Where 
 the calls in a deed are so indetinite that the court cannot pro- 
 nounce their meaning, the question what land was intended by 
 the parties to be embraced in the deed, is a question depending 
 botli on law and fact, which should be submitted to a junj under 
 the direction of the court as to such rules of construction as may 
 be found applicable.^ 
 
 § 1472. Illustration of Foregoing. — It was so held wliere land 
 was described in different deeds as bounded " on the mountain," "by 
 the mountain," and " at the foot of the mountain." * So, where a tes- 
 tator, in devising land, laid down as a line of division, " a post" and 
 'a corner," and there were two such posts, and the language of the 
 will pointed to neither to the exclusion of the other, though external 
 circumstances might do so, — it was held that the question as to which 
 of the posts was intended was a question of fact, which did not de- 
 
 1 Ramage v. Peterraau, 25 Pa. St. (Mass.) 17, 2(): Murray r. Spencer, 88 
 
 349, opiuiou by Kuox, J. N. C. 3.")7. 
 
 - Huut V. McFarlaud, 38 Pa. St. ■* Willistou v. Morse, 10 Met. 
 
 (39, (Mass.) 17, 26. 
 
 ■^ Willistou V. Morse, 10 ISIetc.
 
 1084 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY [1 Thoin[). Tr., 
 
 pent! in any degree upon direction in matter of law. "Here," said 
 Gibson, C. J. , " there was no disagreement, — the name and the descrip- 
 tion answering in the same degree to each of the corner posts, so that 
 nothing was to bo determined but a pure question of fact." ^ So, where 
 a deed called for "an old line down a bottom to a given point," and 
 there was no evidence as to the old line, but there was conflicting evi- 
 dence as to two bottoms, extending from the point reached to the one 
 aimed at, — it was held proper for the judge to submit to the jury the 
 question which of the two bottoms was the one called for.'^ So, where 
 a lease described the demised premises as the lessor's " coal bank and 
 the appurtenances thereunto belonging," and did not otherwise describe 
 them, it was held, in an action for the rent, in which eviction was set 
 up as a defense, that it was for the jury, and not for the court, to say 
 what was the extent of the demised premises, — it being rather a latent 
 ambiguity to be solved, than an instrument of writing to be construed. 
 " The meaning of the words used," said the court, " is pla'u enough ; 
 but the extent and scope of their operation are where the ambiguity 
 lurks. Words enough were not put into the instrument to define the 
 boundaries of the grant, and therefore it was for the jury to define them 
 from evidence dehors the instrument." ^ So, in an early case in Cali- 
 fornia it was held that, where the boundaries of a lot of land granted 
 by an alcalde in Mexican times were uncertain, the true location of the 
 lot was a question of fact within the peculiar province of a jury.^ So, 
 it has been held in Pennsylvania that, where it is uncertain f-ora the 
 language employed in a sheriff's return, what land was in fact s >ld, the 
 question may, in an action of ejectment, be submitted to the jury. The 
 court say: "The construction of written instruments is undoubtedly 
 the exclusive province of the court, and the quantum of estate conveyetl 
 by a deed is referable to the judges alone. But where that estate is 
 situate, what are its limits and contents, must frequently depend '-"pon 
 evidence dehors the writing; and tlius it is often a' pure question of 
 fact, or of law and fact compounded, upon which a jury must be called 
 to pass. This is peculiarly true of loose written returns of writs of 
 execution, which ignorance and carelessness combine to divest of every 
 feature approacliing to certainty. With us, inaccuracy of description 
 in these inceptions of title is so often indulged, that it has been found 
 
 1 Brownfield v. Browuficld, Vl Ta. » Tllley v. :Moyers, 43 Pa. St. 40-t, 
 St. 130, 144. ' 411, opinion l)y Wocxhvard, J. 
 
 2 Hill V. Mason, 7 Jones . I.. * Eeyuolds v. West, 1 Cal. 323, 
 (N. C.),551. 3-28.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIX.] PI ..je: boundary: identity of land. 1085 
 
 necessaiy to make a liberitl use of assisting evidence, documentary and 
 oral, in correcting mistakes, explaining ambiguities, and appl3ang in- 
 determinate delineations to disputed localities. Where a return is in- 
 telligible in itself, and ascertains with reasonable precision the particular 
 tract taken in execution, no room is afforded for the introduction of 
 explanatory proof, and none will be received in contradiction of the 
 official act But where, either from the generality of the terms used, 
 uncertainty of delineation, or seeming contradiction of description, a 
 doubt is raised affecting the boundaries of the levy, its particular locality 
 or extent, recourse is necessarily had to evidence aliunde. In man^-, 
 l)erhaps most of these instances, the difficulty proceeds from wide gen- 
 eralities of language, which fail to indicate any precise locality, though 
 it also frequently springs from inability to fix a described line of division 
 or boundary, without invoking the local knowledge of those acquainted 
 with the subject of dispute. Wliere this happens, while the right of 
 construing the written return must be conceded to the court, the position 
 and limits of the land and the quantity intended to be sold, become a 
 legitimate object of investigation fur a jury. A judge who evades to 
 declare the meaning of a deed or other writing commits an error ; but 
 if the instrument cannot be understood without reference to extraneous 
 facts, the jury must judge of the whole." ^ AVhere a sheriff advertised 
 " all that tract of land and premises on which said William Todd now 
 lives, situate," etc., " and containing two hundred acres, more or less," 
 and made a sale, in pursuance of this advertisement, which was followed 
 by his deed to the purchaser, upon a subsequent controversy as to 
 whether a certain twenty-nine acres of land passed by the sale, the 
 question was held to be a question of fact for the jur}^ and it was held 
 that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. ^ 
 
 § 1473. Parol Evidence Admissible in such a Case. — From 
 what htis preceded it will follow that, in order to enable the jur}' 
 to discharge the office of applying the descriptive words of a 
 deed to the land, parol evidence must frequently be heard. ^ 
 Such evidence, it has been said, is alwai/s admissib/e.* 
 
 1 Hoffmau v. Banner, 14 Ta. St. 25, ^ Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575, 581. 
 28,opiuiouby Bell, J. See ante, ^ lOSS. Upon the admissibility of parol 
 
 2 Todd V. Philhower, 24 N. J. L. evidence, the court cited Waterman v. 
 797,807. Johnson, 13 Picl:. (Mass.)2(;i; AViug 
 
 '* Nagloe u. lugersoll, 7 Pa. St. l5d, r. Burgis, 13 Me. 111. "It some- 
 198. tiun.'S liappeu.^,"' says Davis, J.,
 
 1086 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOlup. Tl'., 
 
 5 14:74. Verdict of Jury of Vicinage entitled to Great 
 Weight. — It has been said, in an action for damages for cutting 
 a ditch and making a levy, whereby water has been diverted 
 from its previous channel and cast upon the huid of the phiintiff, 
 that " the rehitive situation of the huids of the phiintiff and 
 defen(huits, and the natural drainage of the soil, are matters 
 peculiarly within the cognizance of a jury of the vicinage; 
 and their verdict upon a subject so generally interesting to the 
 inhabitants of an alluvial region, is of the highest authority with 
 us." 1 
 
 § 1475. Identity of Land and Whether Assessed or Un- 
 seated. — Where, in an action of ejectment by one claiming un- 
 der a treasurer's tax deed, there is a question about the validity 
 of the deed, because of a doubt in regard to the identity of the 
 land described in the writ and that set out in the deed, or because 
 it is uncertain whether the land was really assessed as unseated, 
 or whether it was in fact unseated, — these questions, it has been 
 held, 'AXQ. for the jury and not for the court; and this is so, al- 
 though the defendant is a mere intruder, not having even color of 
 title. The reason is that the treasurer's deed is good for nothins: 
 unless it is made to appear that the land therein described was 
 assessed and taxed ns unseated, and it is too clear for dispute that 
 a question of identity of land is a question for the jury.^ 
 
 § 147G. Questions of Locality, Distance, etc., for the 
 Jury. — The general rule, then, is that questions of locality, 
 
 in this last case, " tliat tlie mon- 450." That tlio acts aud declarations 
 uraent found upon the ground cor- of llie i>raiilor are important in de- 
 responds Avith the description of the terininiug the question of boundary, 
 monument in the deed in some par- see Patten v. Goldsborough, 9 Seri;. 
 ticuiars, and differs from it in others. & R. (Pa.) 47. That subsequent occu- 
 In such case the whole description in pation by the parties is generally de- 
 the deed is not to be rejected, and cisive, see Stone v. Clark, 1 Met. 
 parol evidence is admissible to sliow (Mass.) 378. 
 
 wliether the monument, partially but ^ Williams u. Bridge. U La. Ann. 721 
 
 erroneously described, was the one opinion by liuclianau, J. 
 
 intended. Parker v. Smith, 17 Mass. 2 Miller v. McCullough, lO-t Pa. St. 
 
 413; f'larkw. Muuyan, 22 Pick. (Mass.) G24, (J29. 
 410; Slater v. Rawson, 1 .Met. (Mass.)
 
 Tit. V,Cli.XLIX.] place: boundary: identity of land. 1087 
 
 boundary, distance, direction, identity of land are questions of 
 fact, and not of law. 
 
 ^1477. [Illustration.] Appui'teiiances. — Thus, it has been 
 held, under circumstances which need not be set out, that the 
 question wdiether lots of ground are appurtenant to a railway, 
 and indispensably necessary to the enjoyment by the railway 
 company of its franchises, and, as such, included in a mortgage 
 of the railway property, is a question which may properly be 
 submitted to a jury} So, under an indictment founded on a 
 statute for selling liquor to be drunk in the defendant's out- 
 house, yard, garden and appurtenances thereto belonging, it has 
 been held a question of fact, for the jury to determine, whether 
 the liquor was drunk upon the appurtenances of the premises of 
 the defendant.'^ 
 
 § 1478. [Continued.] Curtilage. — So, it has been held, in 
 a criminal prosecution for burning a barn, charged to be within 
 the curtilage of a dwelling house, that the question wdiether the 
 barn was within the curtilage of the dwelling house, as alleged in 
 the indictment, was a question for the jury upon the evidence, 
 the court detinino;to them the meaninir of the word " curtilao'c" ^ 
 
 § 1479. Whether the Place of Entry was a part of the 
 House. — In cases of house-breaking, which are analogous to 
 burglaries at common law, the question whether the place 
 
 1 Shamokiu &c. R. Co. V. Livermore, Serg. &. R. (Pa.) 210; Caual Co. v. 
 
 47 Pa. St. 465. The court commeut upon Bouham, 9 Watts & !S. (Pa.) 27. 
 
 the following cases, touchiuy;thL'qut\s- - Stout w. State, 93 lud. 150. 
 
 tion what property is aj9p!(r<e;ja)i< to the ^ Com. v. Baruey, 10 Cusli. (Mass.) 
 
 property of a railway company or oth- -180. The court defined curtilage, iu 
 
 er corporation: Lehigh Coal &c. Co. law, as meaning a fence or enclosure 
 
 V. Northampton County, 8 Watts & S. of a small piece of land around a 
 
 (Pa.) 334; Railroad t?. Berks County, 6 dwelling house, usually including the 
 
 Pa. St. 70; Wayne County v. Delaware buildings occupied iu connection with 
 
 &c. R. Co., 15 Pa. St. 351 ; New York &c. the house, which enclosure may con- 
 
 R. Co, V. Sabin 26 Pa. St. 242; West- sist wholly of a fence, or partly of a 
 
 Chester Gas Co. v. County of Chester, 30 fence and partly of the exterior side of 
 
 Pa. St. 232; Ammarat v. Turnpike, 13 buildings so within tiie enclosure. 
 
 Ill' I.
 
 1088 PROVINCE OF COURT AXD JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 of ingress where the breaking took phice was a part of the 
 house which is cliarged to have been brol^en into, lias been 
 held, upon doubtful grounds, a question of laio for the court, 
 and not a question of fact for the jury. Thus, where the evi- 
 dence showed that the defendant entered the store-house, by 
 removing a grate on the street which gave him entrance into the 
 cellar thereunder, which connected with the store-house through 
 a hatchway, and the court instructed the jury that, if they believed 
 from the evidence that the grating removed by the accused was 
 not a part of the store-house, t\yQj should acquit, — it was held 
 that the question was one of law ; but, as the jury decided it 
 rightly, by convicting the defendant, the judgment was ordered 
 to stand. ^ 
 
 § 1480. Boundaries of Places. — In New Hampshire it is 
 laid down that the court cannot determine what are the limits, 
 or whether there are any limits, of a place, not being a public 
 corporation, described by its name only. "The court," said 
 Bell, J., " are in no situation to decide that Fisherville is not 
 a good and sufficient description of a place in Concord and Bos- 
 cawen, as alleged. Whether there is a place called by that name, 
 where it is situated, what are its limits, if it has any, are matters 
 of fact, to be determined by a jury upon such evidence as the 
 parties may lay before them. It is in no sense a matter of law, 
 of which a court can take judicial cognizance. What is included 
 in a name descriptive of a place, not being a public corporation, 
 is always matter for a jury .'^ - 
 
 § 1481. Boundaries of Counties. — The boundaries of coun- 
 ties, established by public law, are to be determined as matter 
 of law by the court, unless in cases where the meaning of the 
 statute is uncertain, in which easels, it has been held, the courts 
 will not disturb a boundary fixed by common usage and acqui- 
 escence. But where the boundary is not uncertain, the fact that 
 particular land has been for 28 years assessed in the wrong 
 
 1 Com. r. Bruce, 7!) Ky. 500. 2 Blaudiug v. Sargcut, 33 N. II. 239, 
 
 215.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIX.] place: boundary : identity of land. 1089 
 
 county, will not ])e sufficient to authorize a court to allow a jury 
 to say that the land lies within such count}'. The court must de- 
 cide it as a matter of law.^ But in a later case in the same court, 
 it was said: "Tlie definition of county lines is. of course, mat- 
 ter of public law, and, as such, must be interpreted by the court ; 
 but the jury alone can find the facts that give it a practical ap- 
 plication, in actions of ejectment for the trial of private rights." 
 When, therefore, in an action of ejectment, one of the parties 
 chiimed title to the land through a judicial sale, the validity of 
 which de})ended upon the question of fact whether tlie land lay 
 in one county or in another, it was held that the court committed 
 no error, after defining the county line as established by statute, 
 in leaving the question in controversy to the jury upon all the 
 evidence.'* It is added that, in such a case, where the meaning 
 of the law which fixed the line was long in doubt, the court was 
 not bound to ijive it an inter])retation derived from its lan2:uao;e 
 alone, without reference to the actual interpretation which it had 
 received through the acquiescence of the public during three 
 quarters of a century. "Long established public regulations,'' 
 said the court, " ought not to be disturbed by the logical or 
 philological criticisms of original principles; The county line 
 ousiht to be recognized as beino; where it was ffenerallv under- 
 stood to be, and not where we would now place it, if we had now 
 to apply the law for the first time. We can best ascertain where 
 the true line was, by looking to the public practice relative to it, 
 in connection with the levying of taxes, selecting jurors, serving 
 process by the sheriffs and constables, elections, official surveys 
 iind such like matters. More of such evidence would have been 
 better here." ^ 
 
 § 1482. Boundary of a State. — In i;. case in the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, it was said by Mr. Justice Nelson, 
 in giving tlie opinion of the court: " The boundary of a State, 
 when a material fact in the determination or the extent of the 
 
 ^ Johns V. Davidson, 16 Pa. St. 512. ^ Ibid., opinion by Lowrie, C. i. 
 
 a Heckerr. Sterling, 36 Pa. St. 423, 
 428. 
 
 09
 
 1090 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JCRY. [1 TllOIlip. Tl/, 
 
 jurisdiction of a court, is not a simple question of law. The 
 description of a boundary may be a matter of construction, which 
 belono:s to the court; but the application of the evidence in the 
 ascertainment of it, as thus described and interpreted, with a 
 view to its location and settlement, belongs to the jur.y. All the 
 testimony bearing upon this question, whether of maps, surveys, 
 practical location and the like, should be submitted to them 
 under proper instructions to find the fact." ^ 
 
 § 1483. Public Roads — Instruction that Monuments and Lines 
 OF SuKVEYOR PREVAIL. — "The monuments observed and lines actually 
 run by the surveyor, in surveying the road, and the laying out and viewing 
 the line of road on the ground where it is laid, always prevail in de- 
 termining the location of the road, provided the road is actually opened 
 on that line. The notes of survey and the plat returned by the surveyor 
 are matters of description, which serve to assist in determining the 
 place where the road is laid, but they are not conclusive. * * * 
 Whenever you find from the evidence that they (the surveyor, chain- 
 man, viewers, etc.) actually surveyed and located this road upon the 
 ground, if it was afterwards opened by the road overseer, will be the 
 road for the purposes of this case, whether it was laid upon the town- 
 ship line, or not." - 
 
 § 1484. Instructions as to Survey and Plat of Public Road being 
 Evidence of its Location, etc., in Criminal Prosecution for Obstruct- 
 ing a Public Highway under Illinois Statute. — " The monuments 
 or corner run to, by the surveyor in surveying the road, and the staking 
 and laying out of the road, must always control in determining the loca- 
 tion of the road ; and the field notes and plat returned by the surveyor 
 are but matter of description winch serve to assist in determining the 
 
 1 United States v. Jackalow, 1 Rep. 211; Turubiill v. Schroeder, 
 Black (U. S.), 484, 487. 29 Miun. 49; Johnson v. Preston, 9 
 
 2 Approved in Shaffer ■», Weech, 34 Neb. 474; Penry v. Richards, 52 Cal. 
 Kans. 598; citing Hiner v. People, 34 49G; Pike v. Dyke, 2 Me. 213; Brown 
 111. 297; Beckwith v. Beckwith, 22 v. Gay, 3 /(Z. 120; Williams w. Spauld- 
 Ohio St. 180; Everett u. Lusk, 19 Kans. ins, 29 Me. 112'; Marsh v. Mitchell, 25 
 195,199; McAlpine u. Reicheneker, 27 Wis. 706; Fleischfresser v. Schmidt, 
 Id. 257; Tarpenning V. Cannon, 28 Id. 41 Id. 22'i\ Jackson v. Cole, U! Johns. 
 r.fiS; Twogood v. Hoyt, 42 Mich. (N. Y.) 257. 
 
 G09; Cullacott v. Mining Co., C Pac.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. XLIX.] PLACE : BOUNDARY : IDENTITY OF LAND. 1091 
 
 place where the road was actually located. In determining the 
 
 boundaries of land in this State, the original mounds or monuments 
 must govern as to the location of the line, although the line may, by 
 following such original mounds, be made a crooked or deflected line. 
 And if the original mounds have once been discovered and recognized by 
 a county surveyor as original corners, a county surveyor who might be 
 subsequently elected, would have no right to disregard such original 
 corners and establish a different line, though such a line might be a 
 
 straight one. If the jury believe from the evidence, that Berfield 
 
 actually surveyed and located the road on the deflected line, under 
 proper authority, that would be the true line of the road, although the 
 true section line might be south of that. The actual survey and stak- 
 ing and viewing of the road, upon the ground where it is laid, consti- 
 tutes the location, and the markings and lines, made by the surveyor and 
 viewers upon the plat, do not constitute the location of the road, pro- 
 vided the road was actually opened upon such line." ^ 
 
 i Approved in Hiuer v. People, 34 111. 298, 299.
 
 1092 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TJlOlUp . Tl., 
 
 CHAPTER L. 
 
 NOTICE. 
 Section 
 
 1487. Distinction between Actual and Constructive Notice. 
 
 1488. Actual Notice in Lieu of Registration. 
 
 1489. Subsequent Purchaser with Notice. 
 
 1490. Notice of Non-Liability for Negligence. 
 
 1491. Notice on Passage Tickets as to Limit of Baggage. 
 
 1492. Notice to Guest of Usage of Leaving Money or Valuables at the Bar. 
 
 1493. Instruction as to Scienter in the Owner of a Vicious Dog from a Pre- 
 
 vious Bite. 
 
 1494. Liability of Partner Retiring without Notice of Dissolution. 
 
 1595. Rule applies only in Favor of Persons who have had Previous Dealings 
 
 with the Firm. 
 149G. But Retiring Partner may become Liable to Strangers by a " Holding 
 
 out." 
 
 1497. Rule does not apply as against Dormant Partners. 
 
 1498. Rule does not apply to a Partnership Trading under a Corporate 
 
 Name. 
 
 1499. Rule Rests ouly on the Principle of Estoppel. 
 
 1500. Kind of Notice Required: Actual Notice to Previous Customers. 
 
 1501. Reasonable Notice by Publication to the Public generally. 
 
 1502. Not a Question of Actual Notice, but question of Diligence in giving 
 
 Notice. 
 
 1503. General Notoriety. 
 
 § 1487. Distinction between Actual and Constructive No- 
 tice. — Actual notice is notice in fact; constructive notice is no- 
 tice in law. Actual notice is purely a fact, and is proved as a 
 fact and found as a fact by a jury.^ Constructive notice is the 
 
 1 Muldrow V. Robinson, 58 Mo. 332, party liable to pay an account had ac- 
 
 350; Beatie v. Butler, 21 Mo. 313, 323; quired notice from an interview which 
 
 Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 415; Eyer- occurred between him and the debtor, 
 
 man v. Second National Bank, 13 Mo. that the account had been transferred 
 
 App. 289; s. c. affirmed, 84 Mo. 408; to a third person. In such case, to 
 
 Hill u. Tissier, 15 Mo. App. 299; Mas- have given an instruction which was 
 
 terson v. West End Narrow Gauge R. requested, to the effect that what oc- 
 
 Co., 5 Mo. App. (j4. It was so held, curred between the parties to the ac- 
 
 where the question was whether the count did not amount to notice, would
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. 1093 
 
 notice which the kiw conclusively ascribes to certain kinds of 
 publications, such as the recording of a deed in the recording 
 office, or the publication of a legal notice to a non-resident or un- 
 known party. From this it follows that actual notice is always a 
 question of fact for a jury, and that constructive notice, upon the 
 fact of the statutory publication being found or established, is 
 always a question of law for the court. The only exception to 
 this rule which is recalled, arises in cases governed by the law mer- 
 chant, and has been already considered. 1 It is said: " Actual no- 
 tice does not require positive and certain knowledge, such as seeing 
 the deed ; but that is sufficient notice, if it be such as men usually act 
 upon in the ordinary affairs of life. When it is shown that pur- 
 chasers are affected with a knowledge of such circumstances, 
 then the foundation is laid from which the inference of actual no- 
 tice may be drawn," ^ 
 
 § 1488. Actual Notice in Lieu of Registration. — Actual 
 notice of an assignment preferring other creditors, is equivalent 
 to registration ; and whether the particular creditor or his attorney 
 had such actual notice is a question of fact for a jury in all cases. ^ 
 
 1489. Subsequent Purchaser with Notice. — Whether or not 
 the possession of a purchaser of real property, whose title is not 
 
 have been an invasion of the province ter of law, although the notice may have 
 
 of the jury, Saltraarsh v. Bower, 22 been written, addressed and mailed 
 
 Ala, 221, 232. The rule that notice of under such circumstances as, in a case 
 
 dishonor, if deposited at the proper within the law merchant, would make 
 
 time in the proper office with the a good notice to an indorser as a mere 
 
 proper direction, is conclusively pre- conclusion of law. Walworth v. Sea- 
 
 sumed to have reached the indorser, ver, 30 Vt. 728. 
 has been held to apply only to cases ^ Ante, § 1223, et seq. 
 
 governed by the law merchant; and it ^ Ji)icl.; citing Curtis v. Muudy, 3 
 
 has been held that, in other cases, Met. (Mass.) 405, See also Pomeroy 
 
 the question of the sufficiency of the v. Stephens, 11 Met, (Mass.) 244; 
 
 notii;e is one of fact for a jui'y. There- Spofford v. Weston, 29 Me, 140; Dejv. 
 
 fore, it has been held that the suffi- Dunham, 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 182; Jolland 
 
 ciency of a notice, given by the vendee v. Staiubridge, 3 Ves. 478; Wade on 
 
 of a chattel to the vendor, of the ven- Notice, passim; Speck v. Riggin, 40 
 
 dee's rejection of the chattel because of Mo. 405. 
 defectsiuit, cannot be decidedas mat- 3 van Hook v. Walton, 28 Tex. 59.
 
 1094 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tl"., 
 
 recorded^ is of such a character as to affect a subsequent pur- 
 chaser with notice, is a qupt^tion of fact for a jury.^ So, \r 
 Pennsylvania, it was heki that, whether or not a purchaser at 
 sheriff's sale had actual notice of an unrecorded assignment of 
 contracts relating to the land purchased, was a question of fad 
 for a jury."^ 
 
 § 1490. Notice of Non-liability for Negligence. — Where a 
 person or corporation, exercising a public employment, gives re- 
 ceipts to its customers upon which is printed a notice that such 
 person or corporation will not be liable for the negligence of its 
 employes in the exercise of their employment, it is held a question 
 for a jury ^ in an action for damages for such negligence, whether 
 the receipt was a part of the contract between the parties, 
 and it is not to be decided as a question of law.^ It was so de- 
 cided in the f ollowino; case : the master of a steam tug, of which 
 the defendants were owners, was employed by the plaintiff to tow 
 his fishino- smack out of a harbor. In so doing, the fishing smack 
 was stranded throus^h the alleged negligence of the master. The 
 plaintiff had, on previous occasions, hired the defendant's steam 
 tug to tow his smack, and, on paying the charge, had received re- 
 ceipts, on the back of which was printed a notice that the defend- 
 ants would not be answerable for damages occasioned by any sup- 
 posed negligence of their servants. It was held that it was a 
 question for the jury whether the contract in the particular case 
 was made on the terms printed on the back of the receipts.* 
 
 § 1491. Notice on Passage Tickets as to Limit of Baggage. — 
 
 So, it has been held that a notice, printed on the l)ack of a passage 
 ticket of a railway company, that the company would not be lia- 
 ble for the baggage of passengers beyond a certain amount, unless 
 freight on any addition thereto should be paid in advance, the 
 notice stating that " this forms part of all contracts for trans- 
 
 1 Pontou ?;. Billiard, 24 Tex. 619. Brown v. Eastc-ni K. Co., 11 Cusli. 
 
 2 Khiues v. Baird, 41 Pa. St. 250, (Mas.s.) 97. 
 
 264. ^ Symouds V. Paiu, G Hurl. & X. 709. 
 
 3 Symouds v. Pain, Hurl. &N. 709; See post, § 1802, 1803.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. 1095 
 
 portation of passengers and their effects, " — does not raise a 
 legal presamption that the passenger, at the time of receiving the 
 ticket and before the train leaves the station, has knowledge of 
 the limits and conditions which the carrier thus attaches to the 
 transportation of the baggage of passengers ; but, in an action for 
 the los-^ of a passenger's baggage, it will be a question for the jury 
 whether the plaintiff knew of the notice before commencing the 
 journey.^ In the concluding part of the opinion, Mr. Justice 
 Dewey says: " I am aware that, in reference to ordinary mer- 
 chandise transported by common carriers, it has been held in 
 some cases in the English courts, that a ticket given to the owner 
 of merchandise, containing on the face of it a condition or limi- 
 tation of the liability of the carrier, was held to furnish evidence 
 of the special contract of transportation, sufficient to affect the 
 owner of the merchandise, and to limit the liability of the car- 
 rier.^ These cases obviously differ with the present, and fail to 
 satisfy us of the sufficiency of the notice in the case before us."^ 
 
 § 1492. Notice to Guest of Usajje of Leaving Money or 
 Valuables iit the Bar. — The liability of an innkeeper for the 
 loss of goods of his guest is not varied b}" a usage at the particu- 
 lar inn, of guests to leave their money or valuables at the bar, un- 
 less the guest has actual knowledge or notice of such usage, and 
 whether he has such knowledge or notice is a question of fact for 
 the jury.* 
 
 § 1493. Instruction as to Scienter, in the Owner of a Vicious 
 Dog, from a Previous Bite. — In an action for damages for an injury 
 sustained by the plaintiff, through the fact of his minor son being 
 bitten by the defendant's dog, the court instructed the jury " that, to 
 enable the plaintiff to recover, he must prove that the dog was accus- 
 
 1 Browu V. Eastern R. Co., 11 Cush. * Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 
 (Mass.) «)7; post, § 1862, 1879. 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417, 428. The court 
 
 2 Citiug Austin v. Manchester &c. R. instructed the jury that the innkeeper 
 Co., 10 Com. Bench, 454 ; Shaw v. York would be exonerated if the guest was 
 &c. E. Co., G Rail. Cas. 87; s. c. 13 Ad. "willfully ignorant" of the custom. 
 & El. (X. s.) 347. Ibid. 
 
 ■^ Brown ?;. Eastern R. Co., supra.
 
 109G PKOVIXCK OF COURT AND JURY. [1 TllOmp. Tr,, 
 
 tomed to bite mankind, and that it must also be proved that the de- 
 fendant had knowledge that he was so accustomed to bite ; that, if a 
 single instance of biting mankind previous to the act complained of in the 
 declaration was fully and s^itisf actorily proved to the jury, and a knowl- 
 edge of such act on the part of the defendant was proved in like man- 
 ner, that had been held sufficient to warrant a jury in finding a verdict 
 for the plaintiff in cases of this kind; but that the force of such testi- 
 mony would depend much upon the circumstances attending tlie trans- 
 action, as, whether the}' indicated a disposition to bite without provo- 
 cation, or the contrary," The Supreme Court held that, " as a guide to 
 the jury in applying and weighing the evidence before them, this part of 
 the charge was unobjectionable, and adapted to the case, and fully sus- 
 tained by the authorities." ^ 
 
 § 1494. Liability of Partner Retiring without Notice of 
 Dissolution. — Where an ostensible or known partner retires 
 from the firm, he will still be liable for its debts and contracts, 
 as to all persons who have previously dealt with the firm and 
 have no notice of his retirement.'^ 
 
 § 1495. Rule Applies only in Favor of Persons who have 
 had Previous Dealings with the Firm. — The rule applies only 
 in favor of persons who have had previous dealings with the 
 firm. The object of requiring notice of the dissolution to be 
 given is to remove the impression which has been created in the 
 minds of such persons, that certain persons continue to compose 
 the partnership. So far as mere strangers are concerned, it is 
 obvious that no such impression can exist, and that they cannot 
 be said to give credit to, or place reliance on a partner of luhom 
 they are ir/norantJ^ Moreover, such persons must have dealt with 
 the firm as customers. The rule, it has been held, has no appli- 
 cation to the clerks and salesmen of a customer with whom the 
 
 1 Arnold v. Norton, 25 Conn. 92. v. Griffin, 1 Post. & Fin. U5; Faldo v. 
 
 * Story Part , § 160; Pope v. Risley, Griffin, 1 Post. & Ftu. U7; Grady v. 
 
 23 Mo. 185, 187, per Scott, J.; Gardner RoI)iuson, 28 Ala. 289, 300; Bradley v. 
 
 V. Towsey, 3 Littell (Ky.), 423, 425; Carap, Klrby (Conn.), 77, 8C; Biixtou 
 
 Kennedy v. Boliannon, 11 B. Mon. v. Edwards, 134 Mass. 5(17. 
 (Ky.) 118; AVestcrn Bank of Scotland ^ Dowzelot v. Kawliugs, 58 Mo. 70. 
 
 V. Needell, 1 Post. & Fin. 4(;i ; Mulford
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. lOiH 
 
 firm had previous dealings. The benefit of the rule reaches the 
 customer, but it does not, through him, reach his own agents and 
 servants.^ 
 
 § 1496. But Retiring Partner may Become Liable tc 
 Strangers by a " Holding- out." — But a retiring partner (or an} 
 other person) may become liable to strangers by holding himsell 
 out, or by suffering himself to be held out, to the public or t( 
 particular persons, as a partner.'^ Thus, if the retiring partnei 
 permits his name to remain over the door of the place of busi- 
 ness of the partnership after he has retired, he may become lia- 
 ble for the firm debts, although a notice of the dissolution has 
 been given by publication.-^ At least, he will be liable to any 
 one who has been misled by his conduct in this particular into 
 o-ivino; credit to the firm.* It was therefore held, in an action 
 where a defendant w^as sued upon a liability as a partner, and he 
 was shown to have been once a partner, that, even though it ap- 
 peared that the partnership had been dissolved, if there had been 
 no notice of the dissolution, any evidence that he had continued 
 to give orders and bills in the name of the firm, and to act as if 
 he were a partner with the same person, though in a different 
 business, and notwithstanding that it was proved that he was in fact 
 only a paid servant, — would be sufficient to render him liable for 
 goods ordered by him in the name of the supposed firm J" In such a 
 case, it will be a question for the jury whether the retiring part- 
 ner has acted in such a way as woidd lead a reasonable man to 
 suppose that he was still a partner, and Avhether the plaintiff in 
 fact acted upon the faith that he was so and gave credit to the 
 firm as such.^ It is obvious that, where a party is charged as a 
 partner on the ground of his having held himself out as such, he 
 can only be affected by acts of holding out^jnor to the contract 
 
 1 Richardson v. Snider, 72 Ind..425; ^ Williams v. Keats, 2 Stark. 290. 
 
 s. c, 37 Am. Rep. 168. < Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 7(5, 
 
 2 Mulford V. Griffin, 1 Fost. & Fin. per Sherwood, J. 
 
 145; Guruey v. Evans, 27 L. J. Exch. 5 Mulford v. Griffin, 1 Fost. & Fin. 
 
 16G; M'lver y. Humble, 1(5 East, 169, 145. 
 
 174, 176; Kennedy v. Bohannou, 11 B. " Faldo v. Griffin, 1 Fost. & Fin. 147. 
 
 Men. (Ky.) 118, 120.
 
 1098 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 sued on: since any subsequent holding out could not have in- 
 duced the i)laintiff to give the credit.^ 
 
 § 14:97. Rule does not Apply as against Dormant Part- 
 ners. — A very obvious suggestion to the mind will be, that the 
 rule does not apjdy so as to charge a dormant partner who is 
 unknown as a partner to creditors, for the reason that he has 
 never been held out as a member of the firm, and that credit has 
 presumably never been given to the firm on the faith of his being 
 individually answerable for its debts. ^ But the rule has been 
 extended to a dormant partner, where the creditor dealing with 
 the supposed firm had previously known that such dormant part- 
 ner was a member of the firm.'^ If the fact of his being a dor- 
 mant partner be unknown to all the creditors, no notice what- 
 ever of his retirement is necessary ; if it be known to a few, 
 notice to them is necessary.^ 
 
 § 1498. Rule does not apply to a Partnership trading 
 under a Corporate Name. — The rule which exonerates dormant 
 partners who retire without giving notice is held to have no 
 a})plication to a partnershij) which trades under a name which 
 would be appropriate to a corporation, in which the names of none 
 of the partners are given, such as the " Titusville Savings Bank." 
 The reason for this conclusion is thus stated: " When a copart- 
 nership is formed and an artificial name, such as is usually 
 employed to designate a corporation, is adopted, it must be 
 regarded as an invitation to give credit, not to the empty name, 
 but to the individuals who compose the association thus desig- 
 nated ; and hence none of the partners can properly claim to be 
 dormant. They are all, presumptively at least, known partners 
 and liable as such." * 
 
 1 Baird r. Planque, 1 Fost. & Fin. ■* Keunedy v. Bohanuon, 11 B. 
 344. . Moil. (Ky.) 118, 120. See also Doford 
 
 2 Grady v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 289, v. Reynolds, 3(i Pa. St. 32.5; Shamburg 
 300. V. Rn!j;<rles, 83 Va. St. 148.- 
 
 3 Farrar r. Defliune, 1 Car. & K. ■'• Clarke. Fletcher, 96 Pa. St 416, 
 580; Park r. Wooteu, 3.") Ala. 242. 417.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. 1099 
 
 § 1499. Rule Rests only on the Principle of Estoppel, — 
 
 Another obvious suggestion to the mind is that this rule is noth- 
 ing more than an illustration of the general principle of estoppel 
 by conduct.^ The rule as to such estoppels, is that where A., by 
 acting or failing to act in a given way, induces B. to believe in 
 the truth of a given state of facts, upon the faith of which B. 
 does something to his injury, A. will thereafter, as against B., be 
 precluded from showing that in truth such a state of facts did 
 not exist. The reason of the rule is that, having by his conduct 
 or his silence assisted in deceiving B. as to the truth of the facts, 
 it would operate as a fraud upon B. to allow him afterwards to 
 prove the truth. It is essential to the very idea of such an es- 
 toppel that B. must have done the act upon the faith of the ex- 
 istence of the state of facts, in the existence of which the 
 conduct or the silence of A. induced him to believe. It is to be 
 regretted that cases are found which, in dealing with the subject 
 under consideration, ignore this underlying principle and hold 
 that it is not necessary for the party seeking to hold such partner 
 to show that he gave credit to the firm on account of such part- 
 ner's financial ability.^ These cases proceed upon the naked 
 ground that a person, who suffers himself to be placed before the 
 world as a partner, precludes himself from asserting, against third 
 persons, that he was not in fact such.-* In so doing, they neces- 
 sarily raise the question above the level of a question of estop- 
 pel or of fraud, to that of a question of puhlic 'policy .^ They 
 forget that justice is the highest public policy, and that public 
 policy is not concerned in requiring a man to i)ay damages to an- 
 other, for doing or omitting to do something which has wrought 
 no injury to that other. They forget the cogent observation of 
 Chancellor Walworth, that" the want of knowledge of the dis- 
 solution of the partnership cannot benefit a customer who loses 
 
 1 Lind. Part. (4th ecL), 50; Love- ^ Compare the language of Eyre, C. 
 joy V. Spafford, 93 U. S. 430, 440, 441; J., in Waugh v Carver, 2 H. Bl. 233, 
 Thompson ■?). First Nat. Bank, 111 U, 246, with tlie observation thereon of 
 S. 529, 538; Pratt v. Page, 32 Vt. 13; Sir N. Lindley (Lind. Part. (4th ed.) 
 Hefner v. Palmer, 67 III. 161. 48), and the reasoning of Mr. Justice 
 
 2 Strecker v. Conn., 90 Ind. 469 Gray in Thompson v. First Nat, Bank, ' 
 
 3 Uhl V. Harvey, 78 Ind. 26. Ill U. S. 529, 538.
 
 1100 PROvrxcE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thomp. Tr., 
 
 nothing by his ignorance of the i'act, and who is only to be 
 phiced in the same situation as he would have been if the fact had 
 been communicated to hiui in season."^ The ground of estop- 
 pel is clearly that upon which the English courts have generally 
 proceeded. They have ruled that the " Holding out " of the de- 
 fendant as a partner must be something more than a holding out 
 "to the world," for that is a loose expression, — but to the 
 plaintiff himself, or under such circumstances of publicity as to 
 satisfy a jury that the plaintiff knew of it and believed him to 
 be a partner.^ " I told the jury," said an eminent English 
 judge,^ " that the defendant would be liable if the debt was con- 
 tracted whilst he was actually a partner, or upon a representa- 
 tion by himself as a partner to the plaintiff, or upon such a 
 representation of himself in that character as to lead the jury 
 to conclude that the plaintiff, knowing of that representation, 
 and believing the defendant to be a partner, gave him credit 
 under that belief." ^ In another case it was held that the per- 
 son sought to be charged as a partner was not liable, because 
 there was no evidence to show that credit was in fact given to 
 him.^ In this country, as in England, it has been held necessary 
 to prove that the plaintiff gave the credit with a knowledge that 
 the defendant had so held himself out. It is added that this 
 knowledge might be easily inferred, if the defendant had thus 
 held himself out to the community.^ The English doctrine is thus 
 summed up by the Lord Justice Lindley, in his work on Partner- 
 ship : " No person can be affixed with liabilty on the ground that 
 he has been held out as a partner, unless two things concur, viz. : 
 tirst, the alleged act of holding out must have been done either 
 
 1 Brisbau u. Boyd, 4 Paige (N. Y.), a case in the same court, in 18(!3, 
 17, 22. Chief Justice Erie and Mr. Justice 
 
 2 Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 Barn. &. Willes express similar opinions: 
 ' Ores. 128, 140, per Mr. Justice Parke, Martyn v. Gray, 14 C. B. (n. s.) 824, 
 
 afterwards Baron Parke and Lord 839, 843. The decision of the Court of 
 Wensleydale. Exchequer in Edmundson v. Thomp- 
 
 3 Baron Rolfe, afterwards Lord son, 31 L. J. (Exch.) 207; s. c. 8 Jur. 
 Ci'anworth. (n. s.) 235, is to t!ie like effect. See 
 
 ^ Ford V. Whitmarsii, Hurl. & \Y . also Carter v. Whalley, 1 Barn. & Aid. 
 53, .^5.-). II. 
 
 5 Pott V. Eyton, 3 C. B. 32, 39. In « Hefner v. Palmer, 07 111. Kil.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. 1101 
 
 by him or by his coDsent, and, second, it must have been known 
 to the person seeking to avail himself of it. In the absence of 
 the first of these requisites, whatever may have been done cannot 
 be imputed to the person sought to be made liable; and, in the 
 absence of the second, the person seeking to make him liable has 
 not, in any way, been misled." ^ The rule under this head can- 
 not be better summed up than in the following propositions, 
 found in an opinion of the Supreme Court of Vermont : It is 
 necessary to show : 1. That such customer knew, at the time 
 when the contract was made, that the partners whom he seeks to 
 hold had been in partnership. 2. That he was ignorant of their 
 dissolution. 3. That he made the contract supposing that he 
 was contracting with all of them as partners, and in reliance on 
 their joint liability. - 
 
 § 1500, Kind of Notice Required : Actual Notice to Pre- 
 vious Customers. — Under this head, there is a distinction be- 
 tween the kind of notice which is required to exonerate the 
 retiring partner in respect of previous customers of the firm , and 
 in respect of strangers or the general public. The principle is 
 that, as to previous customers, actual notice must be given, that is, 
 specially communicated to them.'^ The rule is well established 
 that publication of notice of the dissolution of a partnership in 
 a neivspaper, at the place where the business is carried on, is 
 not sufficient to relieve a retiring partner from liability for sub- 
 sequent transactions, in the firm name, with one having dealings 
 with the firm prior to the dissolution. In such case notice must 
 be brought home to the dealer, or it must appear that facts came 
 to his knowledire sufficient to advise him, or to o-ive him reason 
 to believe, that a dissolution had taken place.* It has been held 
 
 1 Lind. Part. (4th ed.) 50. ^ Gilchrist v. Brande, 58 Wis. 1S4, 
 
 2 Pratt. V. Pai>e, 32 Yt. 13. 190; Austin v. Holkuul, GD N. Y. 571; 
 
 3 Gorliara r. Thompson, Peake, N. Zollar -y. Janvrin, -47 N. H. 324; Lyon 
 P. 42; Godfrey v. Turnbull, 1 Esp. v. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1; Little r. 
 371; Graliain v. Hope, Peake, N. P. Clarke, 36 Pa. St. 114; Kenney v. 
 154; Parkin V. Carruthers, 3 Esp. 248; Altvater, 77 Pa. St. 34; Johnson v. 
 Minnitt^j. Whitney, 16 Yin. Abr. 244, Totteu, 3 CaL343; Ennis v. Williams, 
 pi. 12; Ketciiam v. Clark, 6 Johns. 30 Ga. 691; Hctchins v. Hudson, 8 
 CX. Y.) 144. Humph. (Tenn.) 42G; Prentiss r. Sin-
 
 1102 PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. [1 Thotlip. Tr., 
 
 that publication in <i newspaper taken by the dealer at the time, 
 is a fact fi om which the jury may infer actual notice to him, 
 though they are not bound to draw such inference.^ But where 
 there was some evidence that the plaintiff had taken the paper 
 off and on, in which the notice of dissolution was printed, but he 
 positively testified that he had no knowledge of any dissolution 
 of the firm, and his testimony was corroborated, and the jury 
 found in his favor, it was held that their finding was conclusive 
 upon the question of notice.'-^ It is not necessary, in order to 
 exonerate the retiring partner, that formal notice to the previous 
 dealer should be shown. Any notice which reached him in any 
 way, so as to advise him of the fact of dissolution, or which was 
 sufficient to put him upon his inquiry, is adequate.^ In all such 
 cases the creditor must, in order to avail himself of this rule and 
 hold the retiring partner, show that he did not havQ actual notice 
 of the dissolution of the partnership. Whether he did have such 
 notice or not is a question of fact for the jury; and the court 
 commits no error, it has been held, in declining to instruct the 
 jury that a certain course of dealing with the remaining partner 
 is evidence from which the jury ought to infer actual notice of 
 the dissolution, — especially where there is some evidence of a 
 want of notice.* 
 
 § 1501. Reasonable Notice by Publication to the Public 
 Generally. — In order to exonerate himself from liability for 
 the future debts of his copartners, the retiring partner should 
 see that a reasonable notice of his withdrawal from the firm is 
 given to the public in some form. " One who has been a mem- 
 ber of a partnership and has been so advertised to the world, 
 owes it to the community to give notice of his withdrawal from 
 the firm; failing in this, he stands bound to those who, in the 
 })elief that he is still a member of the partnership, give it credit. 
 
 clair, 5 Vt. HO; Dickinson v. Dickiu- "' Gilchrist v. Brande, 58 Wis. 184, 
 
 son, 25 Gratt (Va.) 321; Laird v. 200; Young u. Tibbitts, 32 Wis. 79. 
 Ivens, 45 Tex. 622. ^ Deford v. Reynolds, 36 Pa. St. 
 
 1 Treadwell r. Wells, 4 Cal. 2(;0. 325, 334. 
 
 2 Gilchriste. Brande, 5S Wis. 184, 200.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.l NOTICE. 
 
 1103 
 
 This duty to give general notice is due to the public; it is not 
 confined solely to former customers of the firm ; former customers 
 of the firm are entitled to actual notice." i In what form this 
 notice may be given was thus stated, upon a view of several 
 authorities, by Mr. Justice Hunt: '^ We think it is not an abso- 
 lute inflexible rule that there must be a publication in a news- 
 paper, in order to protect a retiring partner. That is one of the 
 circumstances contributing to, or forming the general notice re- 
 quired. It is an important one ; but it is not tlie only or indis- 
 pensable one. Any means that, in the language of Mr. Beli,^ 
 are fair means, to publish as widely as possible the fact of dis'- 
 solution; or which, in the words of Judge Edmonds,'^ are public 
 or notorious, to put the public on its guard; or, in the words of 
 Judge Nelson,^ notice in any other public or notorious manner; 
 or, in the language of Mr. Verplanck,^ notice by advertisement 
 or otherwise, or by withdrawing the external indications of part- 
 nership, and giving public notice in the manner usual in the com- 
 unity where he resides, ->- are means and circumstances proper 
 to be considered on the question of notice." « It has been held 
 that, where a person has served as a director in a joint stock 
 partnership and his name has been published as such, the mere 
 fact of dropping his name from the published list of directors is 
 not sufficient.^ 
 
 § 1502. Not a Question of Actual Notice, but of Diligence 
 in Giving Notice. — In the case of those who have not been cns- 
 tomers of the firm, the question is not whether actual notice was 
 received, but, as in the case of the protest of commercial paper,^ 
 
 ^ Strecker v. Couu, 90 Ind. 409, 471. ^ Senator Verplanck, in Veruon v 
 
 To the same effect see Backus v. Tay- Manhattan Co., 22 Wend (N Y ) 
 
 lor, 84 Ind. 503; Uhl v. Harvey, 78 183. 
 
 Ind. 26; Southwick v. McGovei:n, 28 « Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U S 430 
 
 Iowa, 533; Ketchara v. Clark, G Johns. 440. See, for illustration, Bradley v 
 
 ^^2 1'^,/i*' '■ '• ^ ^'''- ^''° ^^^- ^^""P' ^^'^'^y (C«^"-), 77, 83, where 
 
 Bell Com. 640, 641. an oral declaration to several persons 
 
 J Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb, was, under circumstances, held iusuf- 
 
 ^N. 1.) o49, oo2. ficient. 
 
 ^ Bristol V. Sprague, 8 Wend. v chirk v. Fletcher, 96 Pa. St 416 
 
 ^^•^•)'^-^- ' Ante, i 1-2-I-6, et seq.
 
 lie rnoviNCE of coukt and jury. [1 Thonip. Tr., 
 
 whetl^jfi' proper dili<rencc was used in giviiiu: notice; since it 
 uould be impossible for the retiring partner to give actual notice 
 to evory man who might by any possibility become ti future 
 creditor of the remaining partner, and no man is held to impos- 
 sibilities.^ " The question," said Mr. Justice Hunt, " is not 
 exclusively whether the holders of the paper did in fact receive 
 any information of the dissolution ; if they did, they certainly 
 cannot, recover against a retiring partner. But if they had no 
 actual notice, the question is still one of duty and diligence on 
 the pai't of the withdrawing partner. If he did all that the law 
 requires, he is exempt, although the notice did not reach the 
 holders." 2 
 
 § 1503. General Notoriety. — That the fact of the dissolu- 
 tion was a matter of general notoriety is not, as a matter of law, 
 equivalent to notice, in respect of the general public.^ But, upon 
 the question whether general notoriety is a fact from which, in 
 connection with other facts, the jury may infer knowledge, the 
 authorities seem to be conflicting. It should seem, upon princi- 
 ple, that evidence that the fact of the dissolution of the firm was 
 a matter of public notoriety is competent, for the purpose of 
 shoVving that the person seeking to charge the retiring partner 
 had knowledge of the fact. It has, however, been held, by a 
 court and judge of high authority, that such evidence is not even 
 competent. " ]Mere notoriety," said Chief Justice Shaw, " may 
 exist, and yet the party dealing with such firm may not be ac- 
 quainted with it. And where it is in the power of one party, and 
 his duty, to give public and explicit notice of a fact affecting the 
 rights of others, and he does not do it, it ought notto be assumed 
 upon doubtful grounds of })resumption." * In like manner, it was 
 said by ]\Ir. Justice Elliott : " The fact tliat the witiidraAval was 
 generally known within the community may jjerhaps be consid- 
 
 ' Veruon v. Manhattan Co., 22 ^ Lovojoy v. Spafford, '.i.'i U. S. 430, 
 
 WciHl. (N.Y.) 183; Bristol 17, Spraguc, 441. 
 
 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 423; Ketcliam v. ^' Strecker v. Conn, 'JO Ind. 4G9, 
 
 Clark, 6 Johns. (N. T.) 144; Wardwoll 471. 
 
 V. Ilaitiht, 2 IJari). (i\. Y.) 549, 652; ■» Pitcher r. Barrows, 17 Pick. 
 
 Lovejoy v. Spafford, W C. S. 430. (Mass.) 3G1.
 
 Tit. V, Ch. L.] NOTICE. ' 11Q5 
 
 erecl, in conjunction with other evidence, as tending to char-e 
 those deahng with the partnership with notice of the withdrawal- 
 but the mere fact that the withdrawal was a matter of general 
 notoriety will not supply the place of public notice, where there 
 is no visible change in the business, in the title of the firm, or in 
 its advertisements."! 
 
 ,.; ^T'^'' ;• fr''' '' '"''• '''' '""' ' ^^=^^^' ^- ^- ^2; Graham .. 
 4.1. See also Holdaner.Butterworth, Hope, 1 Peake, N. P. 154; City Bank 
 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 1 ; Gorham .. Thomp- .. McChesney, 20 N. Y. 240. 
 
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