^"^^Ai^xXl^^ . 5^^JA^a..-v^^v n^-^ur^^ ^Sl^W^^ WORKS OF PAUL JANET. Member of the French Academy. FINAL CAUSES. With Preface by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D. From Second French Edition, i vol., 8vo $2.50 THE THEORY OF MORALS. Translated by Mary Chapman, under the supervision of President Noah Porter. 8vo .... $2.50 FINAL CAUSES. BY PAUL JANET, MEMBER or THE INSTITUTE, PROFESSOR AT THE FACULTE DES LETTRES OP PARIS. 2rran0lat£t) from tfje SecontJ lEtiition of t|)e jhencfj BY WILLIAM AFFLECK, B.D. amitJ) Preface lip EGBERT FLINT, D.D. LL.D., PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, UNIVERSITT OF EDrNBURSH SECOND VDITKjJ. NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBXER'S SONS. 1892. IV AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION. For the rest, I do not conceal fi-om myself that it is mainly to the subject of my book that I owe this honour. Great Britain has always been the classic land of final causes. It is there that natural theology originated, has been developed, and has held its ground with honour down to our days. In our own age a great publicist and a great physiologist. Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell (both Scotchmen), counted it an honour to annotate the excellent work of Paley. Dugald Stewart, in his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vindicated against Bacon the utility of final causes as a means of research, at least in the sphere of the natural sciences. What are called the Bridgewater Treatises have rendered popular, by a succession of scholarly studies, the argument drawn from design in nature; and recently, again, these re- markable works — the Duke of Argyll's Reign of Law and Professor Flint's Theism — have anew recalled attention to this famous and indestructible argument. The present work is not altogether of the same kind as those of which I have just spoken. It is not a treatise of natural theology, but an analytical and critical treatise on the principle of final causes itself. Different times require dif- ferent efforts. Philosophy has in our days assumed a new aspect. On the one hand, the development of the sciences of nature, which more and more tends to subject the phenomena of the universe to a mechanical concatenation ; on the other hand, the development of the critical and idealist philosophy that had its centre in Germany at the commencement of this century, and which has had its counterpart even in Scotland with Hamilton and Ferrier ; and, in fine, the progress of the spirit of inquiry in all departments, have rendered necessary a revision of the problem. The principles themselves must be subjected to criticism. At the present day the mere adding of facts to facts no longer suffices to prove the existence of a design in nature, however useful for the rest that work may still be. The real difficulty is in the interpretation of these facts ; the question is regarding the principle itself. This AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION. V principle I have endeavoured to criticise. I have sought its foundations, authority, limits, and signification, by confronting it with the data and the conditions of modern science, as well as with the doctrines of the boldest and most recent meta- physics. If my book has any interest, it is in having set forth the problem in all its complexity, under all its aspects, without dissembling any difficulty, and in presenting all the interpretations. Apart from every conclusion, I think I can present it to philosophers of all schools as a complete treatise on the subject. Considered in this point of view, it will at least have, in default of other merit, that of utility. Some modifications and, as I hope, improvements have been introduced into the English edition. The Appendix, some- what too extensive in the first edition, has been relieved of certain portions of less useful erudition. Also two pieces, which likewise formed part of the Appendix in the French edition, have been introduced into the text itself, notably the last chapter of the second part (The Supreme End of Nature). By this transference the work has seemed to me to gain in force and interest. Paul Janet. FOBOBS-LES-BAINS (SbOTB BT Oi8B), 10th October 1878. PEEFATORY NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR. » rPHIS translation has been undertaken on the recommenda- -■- tion of Professor Flint and others, who regard M. Janet's work as by far the ablest on the subject of Final Causes, and as well fitted to supply a lack in our literature. By an inter- esting coincidence, while our version was passing through the press, the following statement appeared in an influential newspaper of August 29th, in a letter from its French corre- spoudent, the writer being in all probability unaware that an Enghsh edition was in progress : ' Will there not be found in British science a man of eminence to fight the battle of good sense and of the facts, against the monstrous imaginations of Darwin? If such a man comes out, he will find powerful assistants in our Quatre- fages, our Blanshard, and our Janet. The book of this last one, on the Causes Finales, is really an event in science, and ought to have a large circulation among the educated classes abroad.' The only change that has been made on the original is that, with the author's approval, two notes in the Appendix (x. and xii.) have been omitted. This translation has now been compared with the author's second edition, and the numerous additional notes and other changes and transpositions have all been embodied in their proper places. The translator would gratefully acknowledge the kindness and justice of the criticisms on his effort to pre- sent this admirable work in fit English. He has not been unmindful of them in this revisal. W. A. PEEFACE BY PEOPESSOE FLINT. n^HE publishers of this work having requested rae to -*- preface it with a few words of recommendation, I will- ingly comply with their desire, although convinced that scarcely any book has recently appeared which less needs extrinsic testimony in its favour. The French original, which was published only in 1876, has already attracted to itself much attention, and all candid judges, whether'accepting or not its conclusions, have warmly acknowledged its great ability and value. Although not an absolutely exhaustive treatise on final causes, seeing that it does not attempt to trace their presence in the regions of intellect and emotion, moralit}^ and history, it is the most comprehensive work which has been written on the subject ; while the omission indicated, whether intentional or not, is perhaps one which could be amply justified. It is also a truly philosophical treatise, alike in conception, spirit, and execution. Truth alone is sought, reason alone is appealed to, and difficulties are neither evaded nor represented as less formidable than they really are ; but, on the contrary, every serious objection, either to the existence of final causes in nature, or to the interpretation which the author would assign to them, is stated in its full force. Certainly no disposition is shown to exaggerate the weight or worth of the answers which are given to these objections. The general plan of the work is so simple, and the manner in which its argument is gradually unfolded is so clear and natural, that the reader is never left in uncertainty as to where he is or whither he is going. M. Janet possesses in a high degree the expository talent for which French writers are so distinguished. At the X PREFACE BY PROFESSOR FLINT. same time, his earnestness and tliorougliness as a thinkei prevent his making any sacrifices to mere external graces, and hence he always writes as one who, having done every- thing to make himself intelligible to his readers, expects from them in return their whole attention. The first of the two parts into which the treatise is divided deals with the problem, Are there ends in nature ? In order to discuss this problem in a satisfactory manner at the present day, a man need not be a specialist in mechanical and biologi- cal science, but he must have an extensive and accurate general knowledge of such science, and an acquaintance with^ and insight into, its history, methods, limits, and tendencies, which few specialists display. M. Janet possesses these quali- fications in an eminent degree, and was well known to posses* them before he wrote this work, in which they are so conspic- uous. The possession of them had enabled him to intervene in the Materialistic controversy on the side of a spiritualistic philosophy more effectively perhaps than any other French thinker. The present work is the natural sequel of two ad- mirable smaller writings, Le Cerveau et la Pensee (1867) and Le Materialisme Contemporain (1875, 2d ed.). The latter has been translated into English and German. The second part of the present treatise deals with the problem. What is the ultimate cause or explanation of ends in nature ? For its dis- cussion speculative talent and an intimate acquaintance with modern metaphysics are demanded. The demand is, of course, met in M. Janet, whose life has been assiduously devoted to the cultivation of philosophy, and who is the author of works of acknowledged value in almost all its departments. French spiritualism has at present no abler or more influential repre- sentative in the Institute, the University, or the Press ; and French spiritualism, although attacked from all sides, — by positivists, experimentalists, criticists, idealists, and mystics, — is still well able to hold its own, and at least as strong in men, principles, and services as any other school of French thought. PREFACE BY PROFESSOR FLINT. xi On a few points my views do not entirely coincide with those maintained by M. Janet in the present volume. It would be useless and ungracious, however, merely to indicate these differences, and it is impossible to discuss them within the limits of a preface. The argumentation as a whole com- mands my full assent ; and while I should welcome any adequate attempt to refute it as not less valuable than itself, I have little expectation of seeing any refutation of the kind There seems to be small hope of a work as comprehensive and thorough as that of M. Janet's being written from the opposite point of view, when even a critic of the talent of Mr. Sully can fancy that there is relevancy in such reasoning as the following : — ' One or two observations on M. Janet's line of reasoning must suffice. We hardly think he will secure the support of men of science in limiting the action of physical or mechanical causation where he does. To say, for example, that mechanical principles cannot account for the symmetrical arrangement of the lines of a crystal, is surely to betray a rather superficial acquaintance with the mechanical mode of explanation. It seems much too soon, in view of Mr. Darwin's reduction of so many adaptations to a strictly mechanical process, to affirm that physical causation is in- adequate to account for the orderly arrangements ,of living structures. We are, no doubt, still a long way from a mechanical theory of organic growth, but it may be said to be the qucesitum of modern science, and no one can say that it is a chimera. Should it ever be reached, one suspects, in spite of M. Janet's assurances, that ideas of final causes will soon wax very faint. For such a theory, while admitting that there is a close relation between organ and function, would be able to furnish another explanation of the relation ; and M. Janet's argument, that what resembles the result of internal volition cannot be due to another cause, will hardl}^ convince those who are familiar with the doctrine of the plurality of causes. The author seems to us to argue most weakly when he seeks to assimilate our knowledge of design in nature to xii PREFACE BY PROFESSOR FLINT. that of others' conscious thoughts and volitions. T'he inde- pendent chains of reasoning by which we are able to establish the existence of another mind, whether in one of our fellow- men or of the lower animals, serve as a mode of mutual verification, and to this there corresponds nothing in the teleological argument.' — Mind, No. 5, Jan. 1877, pp. 246-7. Now, the central idea of M. Janet's book is that final causes are not inconsistent with physical causation. This idea he endeavours to confirm by an elaborate process of cautious reasoning, which extends through both parts of his work. In other words, the general aim of his whole treatise is to show that Mr. Sully's objection is irrelevant and in- admissible. This being the case, Mr. Sully was obviously bound in logical fairness to refute M. Janet's argumentation before urging an objection which takes no account of it what- ever. It would 'betray a rather superficial acquaintance with the mechanical mode of explanation to say that mechanical principles cannot account for the symmetrical arrangement of the lines of a crystal ; ' but to attribute to M. Janet any saying of the kind is to show a wonderful capacity for mis- apprehending what he really says, which is, ' that the produc- tion of the crystalline forms of minerals can he mechanically explained by an agglomeration of molecules, of which each one has precisely the same geometric form as the whole,' but that the need of belief in thought or design is not thereby dispensed with, being still demanded by the very forms of the molecules and the co-ordinated action of the mechanical laws. M. Janet has taken great pains to show that those who are truly familiar with the doctrine of the plurality of causes will not oppose mechanical causes to final causes, or to a primary intelligent cause, and those who dissent from him must display their familiarity with the doctrine by proving that he is mistaken in this respect, and has not made good his conclusion. I do not wonder that Mr. Sully should think that M. Janet 'argues most weakly when he seeks to assimilate our knowledge of design in nature to that of others' conscious PREFACE BY PROFESSOR FLINT. xiij thoughts and volitions,' for he clearly does not understand his argument. No man who does will fancy that there are any independent chains of reasoning by which we establish the existence of another mind, human or animal, to which nothing corresponds in the teleological argument. The evidences of design are our only evidences for the existence of other human minds. The use of spoken and written language, the production of machinery, the association of efforts, the co-ordination of actions, etc., are not independent chains of reasoning, but simply links in the one chain of inference from the evidences of design to intelligence, which is the only proof we possess that other men have minds. Mr. AfQeck has, it seems to me, done good service by his- excellent translation of M. Janet's very able and important work. R. Flint. The University of Edinbuboh, October 29, 1878. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. WE reprint this book on Final Causes with notable modi- fications, bearing, if not on the things themselves, at least on the order and arrangement of the materials. We have relegated to the Appendix a certain number of develop- ments that were in the text, and which retarded the discussion and interrupted its sequence and connection ; and, recipro- cally, we have introduced into the text important pieces which have seemed to us to form an integral part of our subject.^ This book is not, as has been said (for the rest, with good will) in some reviews, a work of polemic : it is a work of criticism, which is very different. Polemic is a method of combat; criticism is a method of research. Polemic only sees the feebleness of the adversary and the strength of the thesis that is defended ; criticism sees the weakness and the strength of both sides. Polemic is engaged beforehand, and pursues a determined aim ; criticism is disinterested, and lets itself be led to the result by analysis and examination. Criticism is methodical doubt ; it is therefore the philosophic method par excellence. In a science in which one has not at his disposal the methods of rigorous verification possessed by the other sciences, namely, experiment and calculation, in a science in which one has only reasoning at his disposal, if one is content with a one-sided reasoning that only presents things under one aspect, one will doubtless be able to think what one pleases, and each one, thinking for his part, will have the same right ; but there will then be as many philosophies as individ- uals, and no common, no objective philosophy. Philosophic 1 See in the sequel of the Preface the note where we explain more in detail the changes made in this edition, xiv PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XV reasoning, it seems to us, to compensate for what it lacks on the side of rigorous verification, ought therefore to control itself, to be two-sided, to examine at once the pro and the contra^ — in fine, to be what the English call cross-examina- tion. This method we have sought to apply to the principle of final causes. Our aim then was much less the criticism of the adversaries of this principle, than the criticism of this principle itself: for the more we have it at heart, the more ought we to desire that it should withstand all trials; the more ought we to assure ourselves of its solidity. To found a doctrine only on the negation of the opposite doctrine is a frail foundation ; for, because others are vrrong, it does not follow that we are right ; and because our objections are strong, it does not follow that the objections of the oppo- nents are weak. This account taken of the objection is sometimes regarded as a complaisant concession, inspired by the exaggerated desire of peace. An absolute error! It is, on the contrary, a method of verification, which replaces, very imperfectly no doubt, but in a certain measure, the verification of experiment and calculation. The objection in metaphysic is the part of the forgotten and unknown facts. To suppress the objection, or to express it softly, is to suppress one side of the facts ; it is to present the part of the things that suits us, and to dissemble that which does not suit us ; it is to take more care of our opinion than of the truth itself. If, by this cross-examination, the truth appears much more difficult to discover, it is not our fault, but that of the nature of things ; but an incomplete truth, expressed in a modest way, is worth more than a pretentious error or an emphatic prejudice. After this rule the doctrine of final causes, precisely because it is ours, has been subjected by us to the most severe criticism ; we have made it pass through all trials ; we have pushed the affairs of mechanism as far as we could, for causes must not be multiplied without necessity. So far as XVI PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. mechanism suffices, we have no need of final causes; if it sufficed everywhere, there would be no need of them at all. But however great a part be assigned to it, there alwaj^s comes a moment when it runs aground and breaks down, were it only for example before the final causes in man. It is then that by way of regression the territory in appearance abandoned can be retaken little by little : we can ascend from psychological finality to physiological and organic finality, and from that still higher, till we finish by recognis- ing that mechanism not only does not suffice everywhere, but that it suffices nowhere, that it only explains the appear- ance, and not the foundation and reality. The true, the really manly method, is, then, that which places itself in the very heart of the difficulties, and which, from these very difficulties, elicits the necessity of an ultra-mechanical prin- ciple — a principle of finality and of thought. Such is our method ; and now here are our conclusions. They are reducible to three fundamental propositions : T. The first is that there is no a priori principle of final causes. The final cause is an induction, a hypothesis, whose probability depends on the number and characters of ob- served phenomena. II. The second is that the final cause is proved by the existence in fact of certain combinations, such that the accord of these combinations with a final phenomenon inde- pendent of them would be a mere chance, and that nature altogether must be explained by an accident. III. The third, in fine, is that the relation of finality being once admitted as a law of the universe, the only hypothesis appropriate to our understanding that can account for this law, is that it is derived from an intelligent cause. I. As regards the first point, we are certainly of those who would wish that the principle of final causes were self-evi- dent, or that at least, subjected to reflection, it appeared to us with the characters of necessity and universality that Leibnitz and Kant have signalized as the marks of notions PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XVll d priori. But it is impossible for us to find in it this double character. It is necessary that all that is produced have a cause ; it is not necessary that all that is produced have an end. If there were in nature only physical and chemical facts, an intelligence that should contemplate them apart from itself would be sufficiently satisfied by an explanation that would attach each phenomenon to its anterior cause, without pre-occupjang itself with the future effect. It is said that nothing is made without reason, and that reason is always a motive, an aim. This is to equivocate with the word reason, which may sometimes signify the determining reason, namely, that which precedes, and sometimes the consecutive or final reason, that is to say, that which follows. But, in many cases, the first reason suffices. A billiard ball struck by another is moved in such a direction ; that direction is explained by the stroke alone, and by the direction of the stroke, without it being necessary to suppose in the striking ball a sort of presentiment or foretaste of the effect produced. If one, then, must recognise final causes, it is only for this reason, that in certain cases the anterior reason does not suffice ; it is that, between that reason and the fact produced tliere is a void, a gap, an abyss, in a word, a chance. The final cause, then, is only the application of the more general principle of sufficient reason. So far as the anterior causes suffice, we must abide by them ; for we must not multiply causes without necessity ; but are there not cases where the anterior causes do not suffice, and where we must bring in the ulterior or final causes? That is the question. So truly is that the question, that even those who, in the most decided manner, lay down the principle of finality as a self-evident principle, only lay it down after all in giving precisely the reason which we have just given, that is, in signalizing the facts where the mechanical cause does not suffice ; for instance, organisms, genera, and species. But then, if such facts did not exist, and if nature were reduced to physical and chemical facts, the hypothesis would become XVm PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. useless. It is not then an a priori principle, applicable every- where in a necessary and universal manner. II. Now, what is the distinctive character of these facts in which we recognise the necessity of an entirely new order of things, namely, of the final cause ? That character is adap- tation to the future. This is the object of our second proposi- tion. It is here that our analysis ought to have all the precision possible to render evident the truth we defend ; for equivocation is very difficult to avoid. It is said in effect, and it is the fundamental argument of all the anti-finalists, that every effect, simply because it is an effect, must find in the cause that produces it a sufficient reason of its production, and that there is no room for wonder that the causes are fit to produce that effect, since otherwise they would not pro- duce it. Adaptation to the future, then, being the character of all causality without exception, could not suffice in any fashion as a criterion to characterise finality and serve as its proof. That is the difficulty : here is the solution. Without doubt, given a certain number of causes that act together, they must produce a certain effect, and it is no way astonish- ing that they be appropriate to that effect ; but that effect, so far as it is only a result, can only be an effect whatsoever^ hav- ing no relation to the interest of the being that is the subject of it, supposing that there are beings that have interest in such phenomena rather than in others ; but that is the prop- erty of living beings. Suppose, now, that such an interest exists, it is then evident that we no longer have to do with whatsoever effects, but with determined effects, having a precise relation to the conservation of the being. The un- limited field of undetermined effects is restrained ; an infini- tude of effects are found to be set aside as indifferent or contrary to the conservation of the being ; those only must be produced that are in harmony with life ; but these phe- nomena are still in the future when the organization is formed : that organization, in place of being called to produce whatso- ever effects, is circumscribed in its work by the necessity to PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XIX produce siicli a given effect and not another : this is what we call adaptation to the future. For that there must be an ar- rangement of causes, not merely a confused and any rencoun- ter, but a precise and limited rencounter. It is this precision, limitation, and circumscription in the arrangement of causes that is not explained, and that consequently in the mechanist hypothesis is without cause. The proof of finality, then, is made by the principle of causality. III. As to the third proposition, namely, that the finality of nature is not possible without an intelligent cause, we recognise with most of the critics who have been so good as to occupy themselves with our book, that this is the most delicate point of the demonstration. For it is said, if it is true that one can explain finality by intelligence, by what shall we explain intelligence, which is itself a finality ? And if there may be a finality by itself, and without cause (as is implicitly admitted in recognising an intelligence that is self- existent), why should it not be so with the finality of nature as well as of intelligence itself? — But it is a law of science, applicable as well to philosophy as to the other sciences, that we must push an explanation as far as possible, but stop if we cannot push it further. The scientist is warranted to explain the world by universal attraction, even if that attrac- tion itself should not be explained. Now, there can only be three modes of explaining the facts of adaptation in nature, namely, mechanism, instinct, and intelligence ; but mechan- ism is excluded by all that precedes ; there remain instinct and intelligence. As to instinct, it is first exposed to all the objections that can be directed against intelligence itself, namely, that it is itself a finality, that it is a fact pertaining to finite nature, that it supposes the organism, etc. But, moreover, to these objections, equal on both sides, there is to be added one against instinct that suffices to set it aside as primary cause, namely, that it is an occult faculty, a nescio quid that, very far from explaining any thing, is itself incom- prehensible. On the other hand, mechanism and intelligence XX PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. are two knoyn causes, of which we can form clear and distinct ideas ; whence it follows that if mechanism is set aside, as it ought to be, there only remains intelligence as a precise cause of which we could have any idea. In truth, if we are thus led by way of exclusion to admit intelligence as supreme cause, we recognise at the same time that the mode of intelligence whence finality might be derived is to us in- comprehensible ; for foresight, which is the mode whereby finite beings attain ends, appears incompatible with the nature of the absolute being, since it supposes, on the one hand, the idea of time (pre-vision) ; on the other, the idea of difficulties or obstacles to conquer, or of certain pre-existing properties of matter to be employed to attain this or that end, notions all excluded by the very nature of the absolute. It will be seen in the course of this work how we have endeavoured to solve these difficulties ; we have endeavoured to show that there is even in man a mode of intelligence that is superior to foresight and to calculation, namely, inspi- ration ; but this mode of intelligence, although having analo- gies with instinct, is not to be confounded with it, for instinct is routine, and inspiration is creative. If, then, there is some- thing in us that can give some idea of creation itself, it is thence that one can derive it. Let us add, that even under this supreme form intelligence is yet only the most approxi- mate symbol by which we can endeavour to comprehend the production by the creator of means and ends. We believe that without pretending to comprehend the incomprehensi- ble, we must be allowed to seek in what we know the most elevated type possible in order to conceive what we do not know. Without doubt, what we call by the name of divine intelligence is something very different from what we think in employing that word ; but we mean to say thereby, that there is in God a cause of finality which is at least intelli- gence, and which, if it is something more, that something must be capable of translation into finite language by the word intelligence. Believing besides, like Descartes, in the PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. xxi veracity of our intelligence, without therefore believing in its equivalence to the absolute, we believe ourselves war- ranted to represent the divine perfections to ourselves by the attributes to which our reason conducts us when we consider them in the point of view of our finite spirit. The attributes of God are only, as F^nelon has said, the names by which we distinguish the different faces of the divine unity when we consider it in its relation with the world. It is thus we call Him wise, when we see the marvellous accommodation of means and ends ; good., when we think of the abundance of His gifts ; just., when we compare our merits and demerits with our actual or future destinies. Wisdom is the most visible of these attributes, and it is that to which the contem- plation of final causes conducts us. Doubtless the word is improper, like all that we borrow from human language to express the divinity ; but if by a transformation of intelli- gence we could anew translate the same thought from human language into divine, we would doubtless see that we were as near the truth as a finite spirit can be. It is in these terms, and under these reservations, that we maintain the doctrine of an intelligent cause of finality. We do not think that one can go farther ; but we think that one can and ought to go so far. Note. — The following are the most important modifica- tions made on this new edition, and which were already partly to be found in the English translation of this work (by William Affleck, Edinburgh 1878, with a Preface by Professor Flint) : 1. Chapter vi. (Book i.) of the first edition, entitled Objections and Difficulties., interrupted, by too long, special, and more historical than actual discussions, the current of the general discussion. Of this chapter we have preserved, under the title of Contrary Facts (chap, v.), all that could be attached to the general discussion, and have relegated the rest to the Appendix under these different titles : V. Final XXll PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. Causes and the Positivist Objection; VII. Lucretius, Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza; VIII. Abuse of Final Causes. 2. We have introduced into the text No. 8 of the first Appendix, entitled Herbert Spencer and Evolutionism ; that discussion has seemed to us altogether essential, and to be closely connected with the question of evolution in general, and in particular with the system of Darwin. 3. We have likewise removed from the Appendix into the text, in quality of final chapter, the last piece of the first Appendix, entitled Of the Supreme End of Nature. This piece has seemed to us to terminate the work in a more interesting and less abstract manner than the first conclusion. It presents, besides, the advantage of opening a prospect for a second work, which we will not do, but which others will be able to do in our stead, namely, finality in the moral order, a gap which has been with reason remarked in our book, but which we could only have filled up by doubling the work, — already too voluminous, — and which would, besides, exceed our actual strength. Let us add, that independently of these notable changes of composition, there are also many changes of detail, and, especially in the notes, additions that are not without importance. Paris, lUh February 1882. CONTENTS. TREFACES, ..... PRELIMINARY CHAPTER — THE PROBLEM, PAGE . v-xiv 1 BOOK I. THE LAW OF FINALITY, ....... CHAPTER I. THE PRINCIPLE, ...... II. THE FACTS, ....... ni. THE INDUSTRY OF MAN AND THE INDUSTRY OF NATURE, rv. ORGAN AND FUNCTION, ..... V. THE CONTRARY FACTS, . . VI. MECHANISM AND FINALITY, .... VII. THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION IN GENERAL, . Vm. THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION — LAMARCK AND DARWIN, rx. THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION — HERBERT SPENCER, 15 17 62 92 117 14G 172 215 232 264 BOOK 11. THE FIRST CAUSE OF FINALITY, .... CHAPTER I. THE PHYSIGO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF, II. SUBJECTIVE AND IMMANENT FINALITY, III. INSTINCTIVE AND INTENTIONAL FINALITY, IV. THE PURE IDEA AND CREATIVE ACTIVITY, V. THE SUPREME END OF NATURE, 287 291 314 346 387 414 APPENDIX. I. THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION, II. cuvier's law, ..... m. LESAGE OF GENEVA AND FINAL CAUSES, . IV. GEOFFKOY ST. HILAIRE AND THE DOCTRINE OP FINAL CAUSES, V. FINAL CAUSES AND THE POSITIVIST OBJECTION, VI. OPTIMISM — VOLTAIRE AND ROUSSEAU, . VII. OBJECTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES — LUCRETIUS, BACON, DB8CAETBS AND SPINOZA, ..... rni. ABUSE OF FINAL CAUSES, .... IX. FINAL CAUSES IN THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY, . X. THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF, 427 435 439 446 454 460 474 491 504 510- FINAL CAUSES. PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. THE PROBLEM. nnHE term final cause (causa finalis) was introduced into -'- the language of philosophy by scholasticism.^ It signifies the end Qfinis) for which one acts, or towards which one tends, and which may consequently be considered as a cause of action or of motion. Aristotle explains it thus : ' Another sort of cause is the end, that is to say, that on account of which (to ov h'eKa) the action is done ; for example, in this sense, health is the cause of walking exercise. Why does such a one take exercise ? We say it is in order to have good health ; and, in speaking thus, we mean to name the cause.' ^ Let us examine closely the proper and singular character of this kind of cause. What characterises it is, that, accord- ing to the point of view which one occupies, the same fact can be taken either as cause or as effect. Health is without doubt the cause of walking, but it is also the effect of it. On the one hand, health only comes after walking, and by it. It is because my will, and, by its orders, my members, have exe- cuted a certain movement, that health has followed. But. on the other hand, in another sense, it is in order to obtain this 1 Aristotle never employs it. He says, the end (t6 Te'.\os), that on account of which (to ov tVe/ca), but never the final cause (aiWa t^Aik?;). It is the same with other causes, which he always designates by substantives (uAij, eiSos, apxv «'»'^- so evident and so imperious that thought is absolutely im- possible without them. These are such as the principle of identity, the principle of causality, and the principle of sub- stance, the principle of space, and the principle of time. The simplest and clearest formulas which serve to express them are these : ' Nothing is at the same time, and considered under the same point of view, both itself and its contrary ; ' ' no phenomenon without cause, no mode without substance ; ' ' every body is in space, every event takes place in time.' The question we have to resolve is this : Among these pri- mary truths or fundamental principles, must we albO reckon, as is often done, another principle called the principle of final causes ? Is there a principle of final causes ? What is it? What is its formula? Does it form one of those neces- sary and universal principles without which it is impossible to think ? Or may it only bo a particular case of one of them ? Let us remark, first, that men are not well agreed even THE PROBLEM. & upon the formula of what they call the principle of final causes. For the principle of causality there is no difficulty : 'No phenomenon without cause.' By analogy we should have to formulate the principle of final causes in this manner : ' Nothing is produced without design ; every being has an end.' 1 Aristotle expressed it thus : ' Nature makes nothing^ in vam.' We onh^ need to express in these terms the prin- ciple of final causes to see at once that it is not of the same kind as the principle of causality. Th. Jouffroy, when ex- amining, in his Course of Natural Right, the truths on which moral order reposes, says : ' The first of these truths is the principle that every being has an end. Equal to the princi- ple of causality, it has all its evidence, all its universality, all its necessity, and our reason conceives no more exception to the one than to the other.' Despite the high authority of Jouffroy, we are obliged to declare that the principle here set forth, namely, that ' every being has an end,' appears to us to have neither the evidence nor the necessity of the prin- ciple of causality, namely, that ' all that is produced has a cause.' If by end is meant a certain effect resulting necessa- rily from a certain given nature, in this sense every being has an end, for every being necessarily produces what is con- formable to its nature; but if by end is meant an aim, for which a thing has been made, or towards which it tends, it is? not self-evident that the stone has an end, that the mineral has one. Doubtless, for him who regards nature as the work of a providence, it will be certain that all has been created for an end, and even the pebble will not have been made in vain ; but then the principle of final causes is no more than a corollary of the doctrine of providence — it is not a prin- ciple d priori, a necessary, universal, first principle. The doctrine of a universal end of things, flowing from the doc- trine of providence, cannot, then, be given as self-evident. We must insist on this difference between the principle of 1 To say, as is sometimes said, ' Every means supposes an end,' would be a pure tautology.