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 The Bearing of the Evolutionary Theory 
 on the Conception of God — A Study 
 in Contemporary Interpretations 
 of God in Terms of the Doc- 
 trine of Evolution 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL^IN 
 
 CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 (department op systematic theology) 
 
 BY 
 UKICHI KAWAGUCH] 
 
 A Private Edition 
 
 Distributed by 
 
 The University of Chicago Libraries 
 
 1916 
 
h3 
 
 GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 MENASHA, WISCONSIN 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The one far-reaching contribution of the nineteenth century is the 
 empirically formulated concept of organic evolution. The object of 
 this investigation is to ascertain the bearing of the evolutionary theory 
 on the conception of God as it is worked out in typical recent philosophies 
 of reUgion. 
 
 The method and scope of the study are as follows. In the intro- 
 duction, we shall briefly consider certain typical a priori theories of 
 evolution, showing reasons for not including these in our inquiry. In 
 the first part of our main study, we shall survey the problems due to the 
 attempt to bring the evolutionary theory into relation with the tradi- 
 tional conception of God, indicating the content and meaning of the 
 inductive evolutionary theory and the essentials in the traditional con- 
 ception of God. We shall attempt, in the second part, which forms the 
 main body of our work, to make a critical examination of the solutions 
 to these problems given by typical recent philosophies of reHgion, 
 namely, Royce's absolute ideaUsm, Eucken's philosophy of life, Bowne's 
 personal idealism, and James's pragmatism. In our discussion of these 
 reUgious philosophers, our treatment of them will be limited by the 
 subject of our study. Hence reference will be made only to those of 
 their works which are more or less directly related to our subject-matter. 
 In the third and the last part, we shall make a summary statement of the 
 results and the implications of our discussion, with particular reference 
 to the solutions examined in the second part. In this concluding part, 
 we shall not endeavor to make an exhaustive treatment of the impUca- 
 tions of our inquiry. We shall simply attempt to set forth the general 
 bearing of the evolutionary theory on certain elemental problems con- 
 nected with the doctrine of God. 
 
 In the preparation of this thesis, the writer wishes to acknowledge his 
 indebtedness to those writers who are concerned with present theologico- 
 scientific problems. This indebtedness is indicated by the references 
 made to their works in the following study. But he is under a special 
 obUgation to his teacher. Professor Gerald Bimey Smith, of the Uni- 
 versity of Chicago, for his valuable criticisms and suggestions. 
 
 Ukichi Kawaguchi. 
 Chicago^ Ill.j August, 1914. 
 
 355379 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 b[bliography vu 
 
 Introduction: Typical Modern Philosophical Theories of Evolution 1 
 
 Part One 
 Survey of the Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary 
 
 Theory and the Traditional Conception of God 4 
 
 I. The Content and Meaning of the Evolutionary Theory 4 
 
 IT. The Traditional Conception of God 13 
 
 III. The Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary Theory 
 
 and the Traditional Conception of God 16 
 
 Part Two 
 Typical Recent Solutions of the Problems Involved in the Relation between 
 
 the Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception of God 20 
 
 I. The Solution of the Problems in Royce's Absolute Idealism 21 
 
 II. The Solution of the Problems in Eucken's Philosophy of Life 35 
 
 ni. The Solution of the Problems in Bowne's Personal Idealism 48 
 
 IV. The Solution of the Problems in James' Pragmatism 63 
 
 Part Three 
 
 Statement of the Results and Implications of the Foregoing Discussion 80 
 
 I. The Problem of Method 81 
 
 II. The Problem of the Relation between Theology and Science 84 
 
 III. The Problem of God as the Transcendent Supernatural Personality 89 
 
 IV. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being 92 
 
 V. The Problem of God's Relation to Man and the World 98 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 The main works consulted in the preparation of the thesis are here given, largely 
 in the order of treatment. The other works referred to are acknowledged in the 
 footnotes. 
 
 A. The Theories of Evolution 
 
 Lamarck, Philosophie Zoologique, Paris, 1850. 
 
 A. S. Packard, Lamarck, The Founder of Evolution, New York, 1901. 
 
 Darwin, The Origin of Species, New York, 1867. 
 
 Darwin, The Descent of Man, New York, 1874. 
 
 Bergson, Creative Evolution, Eng. tr.. New York, 1911. 
 
 A. Weismann, Th€ Evolution Theory, 2 vols., London, 1904. 
 
 H. DeVries, Species and Varieties, Chicago, 1905. 
 
 H. DeVries, The Mutation-Theory, 2 vols., Chicago, 1909. 
 
 V. L. KeUogg, Darwinism Today, New York, 1907. 
 
 B. Traditional Theologies 
 
 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2 vols.. New York, 1871-1878. 
 W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2 vols.. New York, 1888. 
 A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1907. 
 Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, 2 vols.. New York, 1899. 
 Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies, New York, 1912. 
 
 C. Typical Recent Philosophies of Religions 
 
 1. J. Royce, 
 
 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, New York, 1888. 
 
 The Conception of God, New York, 1897. , 
 
 The World and the Individual, 2 Series, New York, 1899-1901. 
 
 The Philosophy of Loyalty, New York, 1908. 
 
 William James and Other Essays, New York, 1911. 
 
 The Sources of Religious Insight, New York, 1912. 
 
 The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols., New York, 1913. 
 
 2. R. Eucken, 
 
 Christianity and the New Idealism, Eng. tr.. New York, 1909. 
 
 The Problem of Human Life, Eng. tr,. New York, 1909. 
 
 The Life of the Spirit, Eng. tr.. New York, 1909. 
 
 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, Eng. tr., Ix)ndon, 1911. 
 
 The Truth of Religion, Eng. tr.. New York, 1911. 
 
 Main Currents of Modern Thought, Eng. tr., New York, 1912. 
 
 3. B. P. Bowne, 
 
 Theory of Thought and Knowledge, New York, 1897. 
 
 Metaphysics, New York, 1898. 
 
 Theism, New York, 1902. 
 
 The Immanence of God, New York, 1905. 
 
 Persdnalism, New York, 1908. 
 
 The Essence of Religion, Boston, 1910. 
 
VIU BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 4. Wm. James, 
 
 The Will to Believe, New York, 1897. 
 
 The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, 1902. 
 
 Pragmatism, New York, 1907. 
 
 The Meaning of Truth, New York, 1909. 
 
 A Pluralistic Universe, New York, 1909. 
 
 Some Problems of Philosophy, New York, 1911. 
 
 Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York, 1912. 
 
 D. Works Bearing on Present Theologico-Scientific Problems 
 
 E. S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, Boston, 1910. 
 J. M. Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, Baltimore, 1909. 
 
 L. T. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, London, 1913. 
 H. Hoffding, The Problems of Philosophy, London, 1905. 
 
 F. H. Johnson, God in Evolution, New York, London, 1911. 
 I. King, The Development of Religion, New York, 1910. 
 
 E. W. Lyman, Theology and Human Problems, New York, 1910. 
 A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, Chicago, 1910. 
 
 W. Ostwald, Natural Philosophy, New York, 1910. 
 
 K. Pearson, The Gramma of Science, London, 1900. 
 
 R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, New York, 1912. 
 
 H. Poincare, The Foundations of Science, New York, 1913. 
 
 F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, London, 1891. 
 
 F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, London, 1907. 
 
 J. M. E. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, London, 1906. 
 
 G. B. Smith, Social Idealism and the Changing Theology, New York, 1913, 
 J. Ward, The Realm of Ends, Cambridge and New York, 1911. 
 
 E. S. Waterhouse, Modern Theories of Religion, London, 1910. 
 
INTRODUCTION: TYPICAL MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL 
 THEORIES OF EVOLUTION 
 
 The most typical modern philosophical theories of evolution are 
 those of Hegel and of Spencer. A brief examination and critique of 
 their conceptions of evolution forms the introduction to the main task 
 of our investigation. 
 
 Hegel has given an elaborate philosophical expression of the his- 
 torical spirit of the nineteenth century. The worid of nature and of 
 man, for him, constitute the manifestations of the underiying cosmic 
 reason. The method by which he arrived at this conception is through 
 the analysis of human consciousness. When we discover the laws of our 
 thought, according to Hegel, we know the nature of cosmic reality; 
 for the laws of hiunan thought are identical with those of that reality. 
 Hegel finds that we think in terms of comparison and differentiation. 
 When I define a thing, I define it by setting over against it something 
 which is not that thing; and after this process of comparison and dif- 
 ferentiation, I reach a synthetic idea which reconciles the antithesis 
 involved in the relation of being and nought, subject and object, ego and 
 non-ego. In short, we have the HegeUan dialectic: thesis, antithesis, 
 and synthesis. This triadic process of thought is seen, for example, 
 in Hegel's analysis of the notion of Being. We have first the notion of 
 Being, and then over against this notion, we have that of Nought. 
 These notions are abstract and antithetical. But their abstractness and 
 antithesis find their concreteness and reconciliation in the notion of 
 Becoming.^ In this triadic process of thought, Hegel finds the nature of 
 cosmic reality or reason. This reason objectifies itself in nature and 
 comes to its subjective consciousness in the mind of humanity.^ 
 
 Now, the point with which we are here concerned is this: whether 
 the cosmic reality, which Hegel holds to be engaged in the processes of 
 manifestation, is involved in a real evolution. From his extensive 
 appeal to history, and from such an expression as: "Of the Absolute 
 it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it 
 what it is in the very truth, "^ it would seem that Hegel attributed to 
 reaUty a real change and growth. But a closer examination shows that 
 Hegel does not find such a change and growth in the ultimate being of 
 cosmic reality. The cosmic reason, in his thought, unfolds in nature 
 
 » WaUace, The Logic of Hegel, 1892, pp. 158 ff. 
 
 2 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Eng. tr., 1890, p. 10. 
 
 3 The Phenomenology of Mind, Eng. tr., 1910, I, p. 17, cf. II, p. 822. 
 
2 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 and history what it already possesses.^ "Development or progress," 
 says Hegel, "is not the making of something out of nothing, but the 
 end unfolding, or manifestation of that which in another respect eternally 
 is."^ Hegel's theory of evolution is, at best, one of thought-process, but 
 not of time-process.^ 
 
 God, from the standpoint of Hegel's dialectic, is the ultimate reason 
 of the world wherein he is manifesting himself and working out his 
 plan {The Philosophy of History, p. 38). "God," for Hegel, "is the 
 absolutely True, the Universal in and for itself, the All-comprehending, 
 All-containing, that from which everything derives substance."^ This 
 God manifests himself in the different stages of religious development, 
 and reaches his highest expression in the absolute religion;^ and yet he 
 is eternally the same, self-identical God.^ Thus Hegel stands for a 
 closed system of reality; in his universe, there is no real evolution. 
 
 When we pass from the idealistic evolutionary theory of Hegel to 
 that of Spencer, we find a mechanical theory of evolution. Spencer 
 divided reality into that which is relative and that which is absolute. 
 The former is knowable and open to the investigations of objective 
 sciences; the latter is unknowable, and while underlying both science and 
 religion, it is beyond our finite knowledge. The purpose of Spencer is to 
 synthesize the facts of the knowable region into a synthetic philosophy 
 by means of his theory of evolution, which is expressed in the formula: 
 ^^ Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite , incoherent 
 homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, during which the retained 
 motion undergoes a parallel transformation.^ ^^^ These phenomena of 
 evolution in the knowable realm of reality are made possible by the 
 
 4 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, pp. 57, 82; WaUace, op. ciL, p. 379. 
 
 * Quoted by Adamson in his The Development of Modern Philosophy, 1903, II, 
 p. 303. 
 
 « See Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 1893, p. 47; Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, 
 p. 88, footnote; McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, 1910, pp. 18 flf.; Rogers, 
 Student's History of Philosophy, 1908, p. 452. 
 
 ' The Philosophy of Religion, I, p. 90. 
 
 ^Ibid., II, pp. 327 S. 
 
 8 For the use made of this HegeHan conception of God, see John Caird, An Intro- 
 duction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1891, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, 
 1899, esp. Lectures, III, VI, VII; CampbeU, The New Theology, Chaps. II, III, IV; 
 Gordon, Ultimate Conceptions of Faith, 1903, Chap. IX; Hyde, Outlines of Social The- 
 ology, 1895, Part I. 
 
 10 First Principles, 1900, p. 407. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 3 
 
 cosmic force, the unknowable absolute/^ but this is not subject to evo- 
 lution. 
 
 The question which we raise in this connection is this : Does Spencer 
 hold to a rear evolution in the being of reality? It is manifest that he 
 exempts the underlying, unknowable reality from any evolution. Is 
 there a real evolution, then, in the knowable reaUty? In the knowable 
 region of reality, according to Spencer, there are going on changes, 
 transformations, evolutions, dissolutions. But, however, we fail to see a 
 real change and growth even in the knowable reality of Spencer; for 
 him, matter, motion, and force are given once for all, and they are con- 
 stant quantities.^ Thus the universe, in all its knowable and unknow- 
 able aspects, is quantitatively constant in its being. Consequently, God, 
 who is identified by Spencer with his unknowable absolute, is free from 
 all evolution. While the evolutionism of Spencer, therefore, calls for a 
 change in our conception of God's relation to the world, it does not 
 demand a radical change in our view of the nature of God.^^ 
 
 Thus both Hegel and Spencer stand, though in different ways, for a 
 closed system of reahty; in their world there is no real growth, but aU is 
 constant and is given once for all. This being the case, it is not our aim 
 to ascertain the bearing of their theories of evolution on the conception of 
 God. We shall turn at once to the empirical conception of evolution 
 and consider its consequences for the doctrine of God. 
 
 " IhU., p. 200. 
 
 ^^Ihid., pp. 176 ff., 184 £f., 194 ff. 
 
 " For the use and criticism of Spencer's conception of God, see Fiske, Cosmic 
 Philosophy, 1874, Part III, Chaps. II, III; Picton, The Religion of the Universe] Flint, 
 Agnosticism, pp. 629 ff.; Boutroux, Science et Religion, Paris, 1908, pp. 80 ff. 
 
BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 PART ONE 
 
 Survey of the Problems Involved in the Relation Between the 
 Evolutionary Theory and the Traditional Conception oe God 
 
 /. The Content and Meaning of the Evolutionary Theory. 
 
 Obviously it is a first task in this investigation to determine the 
 content and meaning of the evolutionary theory as held by empirical 
 science. This task is necessitated by the fact that the concept of evolu- 
 tion is used in varied senses. We shall briefly consider typical theories of 
 evolution, and then attempt to indicate the central elements common to 
 the theories. The bearing of these on the conception of God is our main 
 concern. 
 
 A. T)rpical Inductive Theories of Evolution. 
 
 (i) Lamarck's Theory of Evolution. 
 
 It is generally agreed that the first scientist who inductively formu- 
 lated a theory of evolution was Lamarck (1744-1829). Osborn observes 
 that Lamarck, "as founder of the complete modern theory of descent, 
 is the most prominent figure between Aristotle and Darwin."^ Prior to 
 Lamarck, it is true, the doctrine of celestial and of terrestrial evolution 
 had been expressed; but Lamarck applied the evolutionary idea to the 
 realm of organic life. And at the time of Lamarck his contemporary 
 naturalists held to the theory of the immutability of species and the 
 doctrine of special creations. Lamarck in his early days shared these 
 views. But by the publication of his Philosophie Zoologique, 1809, he 
 reversed all previous thinking on the matter of organic evolution. 
 
 Lamarck's theory of evolution is characterized by the three central 
 ideas: the influence of the changing environment on the need and habits 
 of organic beings; the effect of use and disuse of organs in the production 
 of changes in the organisms; and the inheritance of acquired characters. 
 According to Lamarck, changes in the environment affect organisms in 
 two ways: they create new needs and these new needs produce in them 
 new habits.2 This doctrine of the influence of changes in the environ- 
 ment is closely connected with Lamarck's other idea, namely, that of the 
 effect of use and disuse. Lamarck holds that the environmental changes, 
 in creating new needs in the animals, cause in them new movements to 
 satisfy the new needs; these new needs, which necessitate new actions, 
 
 * From the Greeks to Darwin, p. 156. 
 
 2 Packard, Lamarck, The Fotitider of Evolution, p. 925. Ih this work Packard 
 gives a translation of Lamarck's Philosophie Zoologique. 
 
ON TEE CONCEPTION OF GOD 5 
 
 make demands on the animals to make use of parts which were previously 
 relatively inactive; and these new parts, being thus used, develop and 
 become enlarged.^ The changes thus produced in organisms under the 
 influence of changing environment and the use and disuse of parts by 
 the organisms are transmitted from one generation to another by means 
 of heredity. This is Lamarck's crowning principle by which he accounts 
 for the origin of new species."* These are the essential elements in 
 Lamarck's theory of evolution.^ 
 
 We are in this study concerned solely to indicate the impUcations of 
 Lamarck's theory with reference to the conception of God. Lamarck 
 holds that all organisms arose from germs. The first germs originated 
 by means of spontaneous generation. This would mean a reduction of 
 the divine activity, not only in the production of new species, but also 
 in the formation of the very beginnings of life. It is nature that carries 
 on the process of organic evolution.^ Yet Lamarck does not dispense 
 with the activity of God in the production of species. He conceives 
 of God as the Supreme Author of all things who has endowed nature 
 with laws and properties for the production and maintenance of all forms 
 of life.^ God is thus the first cause, but he is not actually engaged in the 
 work of organic evolution. Thus the God of Lamarck is deistically 
 related to the organic world. 
 
 (ii) Darwin's Theory of Evolution. 
 
 Lamarck formulated, as has been shown, a theory of evolution in 
 1809. But the thinking world continued, on the whole, to hold that 
 species were fixed reahties and that they were each specially created. 
 This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that the world was not ready to 
 accept the theory of organic evolution, and, on the other hand, to the 
 fact that Lamarck did not bring forth sufficient inductive data which 
 would compel its acceptance. But Darwdn, through the publication of 
 his The Origin of Species in 1859, vindicated the theory of descent 
 through variations as an estabhshed fact in the organic realm. ^ It 
 should, then, be noted that the significance of Darwin is to be foimd not 
 in the fact that he originated the theory of evolution, for he did not, but 
 
 3 Packard, Ibid., p. 303. 
 */frw/., p. 304. 
 
 ' For a criticism of Lamarckism, see Kellogg, Darwinism Today, pp. 265 ff. 
 « Packard, op. cit., p. 284, cf. p. 158. 
 ' Philosophie Zoologique, I, p. 113. 
 
 ® See Wallace, Darwinism, p. 6; Hoffding in Seward, Darwin and Modern Science, 
 1909, p. 447; DeLagima, Dogmatism and Evolution, 1910, p. 117. 
 
6 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 in the double fact that he gathered an astonishing mass of empirical 
 data respecting plants and animals, and that he worked out the theory 
 of natural selection to account for their evolution. Thus the universal 
 acceptance of the theory of descent results from the convincing character 
 of Darwin's data on the subject. Hence to estimate properly the place 
 of Darwin, we need to take account of the thoroughly scientific method 
 with which he proceeded in his work as well as of his theory of natural 
 selection. 
 
 The central elements in Darwin's theory of evolution are as follows: 
 The first is the fact of heredity^ It is a matter of common observation 
 that plants and animals reproduce their own kind. The regularity and 
 uniformity of this reproductive process of nature is fully recognized and 
 depended upon by Darwin to account for the formation of species. The 
 second element is also the commonly observed fact that all individuals 
 differ from one another and from their parents. This is the principle of 
 variation. The differences, though slight, among offspring from the 
 same parents are, for Darwin, very important, as they afford material 
 for natural selection to accumulate, preserve, and give rise to new 
 species.^ The third element is the fact that all organized beings multiply 
 at an enormous rate — at a geometrical ratio. The increase of organisms 
 at such a rate leads to what Darwin calls the struggle for existence.^^ 
 This leads to the last and crowning element, the principle of natural 
 selection. Darwin shows that variations useful to organisms are natur- 
 ally preserved for their good, while those which are harmful to them are 
 likewise destroyed.^^ "This preservation of favorable variations and 
 the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection. "^^ The 
 above elements constitute the gist of Darwin's theory of evolution.^^ 
 
 The theological implication of Darwin's theory of evolution is similar 
 to that of Lamarck. Darwin has convincingly shown that the formation 
 of species is not by special creation but by natural selection. He holds 
 that miraculous interventions are wholly unnecessary in the process of 
 organic evolution. The laws of heredity, imperceptible variations, over- 
 multiplication of organisms, and natural selection or the survival of the 
 
 ' The Origin of Species, p, 45. 
 
 io/6wf., p. 63. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., p. 77. 
 
 » Ibid., p. 7S. 
 
 " For some discussions on Darwinism, see Kellogg, op. cit. ; Schmucker, The 
 Meaning of Evolution, 1912. A quite different theory of evolution from that of 
 Darwin is found in DeVries, The Mutation-Theory, and Species and Varieties. He 
 holds that the formation of species is result of sudden, discontinuous changes. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 7 
 
 fittest are sufficient to account for the transformations in organic realm. 
 Darwin does not do away with the work of God, <X)ut he relegates the 
 activity of God to the beginnings of life. God, according to Darwin, 
 has impressed laws on matter for the production of organisms.^'' But 
 we must note, in justice to Darwin, that he is not primarily concerned 
 with the metaphysics of evolution but with its processes.^ 
 
 (iii) Bergson's Theory of Evolution. 
 
 Hitherto our discussion has been confined to the theories of evolution 
 primarily in their empirical aspects. They make no attempt at philo- 
 sophic explanation. But in Bergson we find the two interests combined: 
 scientific and philosophic. Bergson starts with the inductive data of 
 biological evolution, and proceeds, on the basis of these data, to build a 
 philosophy of evolution. The central elements of his philosophy may be 
 considered as three: the view of reaUty as change or duration; the doc- 
 trine of the original impetus of life; and the theory of knowledge based 
 on intuition. Of these we are specially cohcemed with the first two, 
 for they have direct relation to his theory of evolution. 
 
 1. ReaUty as Change or Duration. 
 
 Bergson commences his ^^ Creative Evolution^^ with an analysis of 
 human consciousness. Here we are on most certain groimd, in that 
 we can take an internal view of ourselves. What do we find, then, in 
 our consciousness? The most universal fact of our consciousness 
 is change, a change not only in the passage from one state to another 
 of our consciousness, but also in the states themselves. In fact, there 
 is no essential difference between the passage from one state to another 
 and the persisting in the same states.^® In our effort to give vahdity to 
 these changing states, we fall back on some unchanging ego, a fixed 
 substratum. But for Bergson there is no such thing as a fixed ego, an 
 entity, or stuff; aU is change and duration.^^ 
 
 From this examination of human consciousness which is bound up 
 with change and duration, Bergson passes to existence in general. Ma- 
 terial objects, according to Bergson, do not share the changing charac- 
 teristics of organic life. Matter as such is lifeless and dead; it is inca- 
 pable of change by itself. The material world is a world of mechanism 
 where the future is foreseeable. Time does not bite into it. But there 
 is undeniably a succession of time in material systems. Such a suc- 
 
 " Ibid., pp. 424 ff. 
 
 ^* The Descent of Man, pp. 702 f . 
 
 i« Op. cit., pp. 1 ff. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 4. 
 
8 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 cession is a sign of their likeness to ourselves. Further, matter has a 
 tendency to form isolable systems, but their isolation is not complete; 
 they are bound up with extra-material influences. There is, indeed, a 
 thread which binds all the elements of the universe into an organic 
 unity. It is because of this thread, which is transmitted to the smallest 
 particles of the universe, that we experience in life the duration that is 
 immanent in the whole of the universe. Thus the condition of change 
 and duration in the material systems is that they shall be reintegrated 
 with the whole of reality.^^ 
 
 So the universe as a whole changes and endures. It also grows. The 
 universe is not ready-made; it is growing and making new additions. 
 Reality is in the process of continual change and growth. It is ever 
 creating and adding to itseh new worlds.^^ The universe is thus acting, 
 creating, and growing. 
 
 2. The Vital Impetus. 
 
 It is the doctrine of the vital impetus that differentiates the theory of 
 Bergson from mechanism, finalism, and the theories of evolution which 
 have been considered. Bergson sets forth his doctrine of the original 
 impetus of life in opposition to what he calls radical mechanism and 
 radical finalism. He considers these systems of thought as utterly 
 inadequate to explain the phenomena of life. Radical mechanism is 
 inadequate in that it views all things as already given and made, whereas 
 in reahty we cannot take such a view. "We perceive duration as a 
 stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, 
 and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live."^" 
 Radical finalism must also be rejected, and for the same reason. It 
 likewise assumes that all things are given once for all in eternity. Radi- 
 cal finalism is not, however, so rigid and fixed as radical mechanism. 
 Nevertheless, radical finalism is untenable because it holds that nature 
 is carrying on a foreseen plan — a view which is not verified in nature and 
 life. 
 
 Thus Bergson sets aside radical mechanism and radical finalism 
 because they fail to take account of the change and duration which we 
 perceive to be the very essence of life. 
 
 Bergson displaces these systems of thought with his doctrine of the 
 vital impetus, which, he admits, is allied with radical finalism in certain 
 respects. Like radical finalism, his doctrine represents the entire 
 
 '^Ibid.,p.n. 
 'Ubid., -p. 24S. 
 "/6«f.,p. 39. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 9 
 
 organized world as a harmonious whole. But this harmony is not 
 perfect as is claimed by radical finalism. Each species and even its 
 individuals, deriving a certain impetus from the original impulsion of 
 life, tend to use it for themselves; hence there arises universal conflict. 
 Thus there is no harmony in fact, only in principle. Since all the diver- 
 gent streams of life receive their impetus from a common source, and 
 since they are not actually in a harmonious relation with each other, if 
 there is harmony at all it is not before but behind us. The future is 
 unforeseeable by us. For we are in the stream of life which is growing, 
 creating constantly new forms. These forms, however divergent they 
 may be from each other, possess a common thread which runs through 
 them all. This common element is the original impetus of life which is 
 inmianently working out into divergent lines of evolution. By virtue 
 of this vital impetus there is a harmony in the systems of things. 
 
 It is, moreover, the original impetus of life working in divergent 
 directions of evolution that is the fimdamental cause of the variations 
 which accumulate to produce new forms of life. While species, separating 
 from their common stock, accumulate differences as they progress in their 
 evolution, yet in certain definite points they may evolve individually 
 the similar structures, for example, the eye of mollusks and of verte- 
 brates. Such similar structures, contends Bergson, cannot be accounted 
 for by the accidental variations of Darwin or the external influences of 
 Lamarck. They are, on the contrary, due to the original impetus of 
 life that is working in the organisms. 
 
 The evolution of life in divergent directions is made possible, then, 
 by the vital impetus. Now, what is the nature of this vital impetus? 
 Bergson does not tell whence it came. He holds it as the basic principle 
 of evolution. It is the world-principle, the cosmic consciousness.^^ 
 But it is not omnipotent. Bergson fully admits the limitations of the 
 vital impetus.^ If the force immanent in life were omnipotent, it would 
 produce all forms of existence at once; but since it is limited, it cannot do 
 
 The God of Bergson may be identified with the \dtal impetus. God, 
 according to Bergson, is engaged in the process of perpetual activity. He 
 is like a sheU shooting out forms of life in many directions.^ He does not 
 know beforehand the final outcome of the process of evolution in which he 
 
 21 Ibid., pp. 239, 261. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 126. 
 ^ Ibid., pp. Uli. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 9%. 
 
10 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 is engaged. There are, in the evolutionary process, accidents, setbacks, 
 deviations, conflicts, which he must struggle to control. "God thus 
 defined," writes Bergson, "has nothing of the already made; He is 
 unceasing life, action, freedom. "^^ God, from the point of view of Berg- 
 son, then, is vitally related to the forms of life, and shares in their experi- 
 ences of change, struggle and growth. Accordingly, the God of Bergson 
 is not absolute but is finite in his nature; and so his relation to the world 
 is expressed in terms of relativity. Thus with the surrender of all the 
 absolute characteristics of the central being of reality, there is no finality, 
 no absoluteness anywhere; all is reduced to the relativity of becoming. 
 
 B. Essential Elements in the Evolutionary Theory 
 
 Typical inductive theories of evolution have briefly been outlined. 
 It remains, at this stage of our study, to indicate the essential ideas in the 
 evolutionary theory. 
 
 1. The Idea of Change. 
 
 (The static view of the world has characterized the prevailing philoso- 
 phies and theologies from the classic period of Greek philosophy to our 
 time. The satisfactions of life have been found in absolutes, finaUties, 
 immutabihties, eternities, fixities. The world of change, suffering, pain, 
 conflict has been declared apparent and illusory. But from the days of 
 Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), another 
 view of the world has constantly been gaining ground. Scientists in their 
 investigations of the natural phenomena first observed the movements of 
 planetary systems, then of the earth, and finally of the organic world. 
 From the time of Lamarck, in particular, the organic world has been 
 subjected to intensive and extensive investigations. Evidences have 
 been gathered from palaeontology, geology, geographical distribution, 
 morphology, embriology, to show that there have been going on changes 
 in the world of living beings. It is the unanimous opinion of biolo- 
 gists that all the existing species of plants and animals have descended 
 from former generations of species, which also descended from their 
 predecessors, and so on to the time when the protoplasmic organism 
 arose from inorganic matter in, as yet, an unknown manner. The 
 notion of descent with modifications is not questioned for a moment by 
 biologists.^ Following this biological theory, Bergson universalizes the 
 
 28 Ibid., p. 248, cf. his remark on God quoted by LeRoy, The New Philosophy of 
 Henri Bergson, p. 225. 
 
 2«See, e. g., Weismann, The Evolution Theory, I, p. 3; DeVries, Species and Varie- 
 ties, p. 4; Kellogg, op. cit., p. 3; Lock, Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, etc., 
 1911, p. 30; Geddes-Thomson, Evolution, pp. xf.; Schmucker, op. cit., pp. 233 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD U 
 
 idea of change and makes it the very essence of life. From this point of 
 view, change is not a superficial thing that can be explained away or 
 ignored. For the whole world as we know it is in the process of change. 
 
 2. The Fact of Growth. 
 
 Previous to the full sway of organic science, evolution meant an 
 unfoldment of something already given. All systems of thought stood 
 for a closed system of reality. Reality was held to be ready-made; so 
 it was not subject to the process of growth. Over against this closed 
 view of reality, the modern theories which we have considered hold to 
 actual growth in the being of things (this is particularly true of Bergson). , 
 Organic beings, from the point of view of the evolutionary theory, are not 
 merely evolving latent potentialities, but they are actually growing in 
 their being. All the forms of life have come to be what they are by the 
 process of growth in the content of their being. Particularly, it is one 
 of the radical contentions of Bergson that there is a real growth in things. 
 The evolution of life means, for him, a real increase in the being of 
 things. ReaUty is not ready-made; but it is constantly creating, becom- 
 ing, growing, adding to itself new worlds. While he admits that there 
 are blind alleys, arrests, setbacks, and the like, yet in the main lines of 
 evolution there are real growth and progress.^^ 
 
 3. Organic Continuity. 
 
 The evolutionary theory means, further, the continuity and soli- 
 darity of organic beings. Lamarck constructed a phylogenetic tree show- 
 ing the oneness of organic beings. As to the evolution of man he suggests 
 the view that he probably descended from some arboreal creature allied 
 with the apes. The enormous amount of inductive material accumu- 
 lated by Darwin in his The Origin of Species vindicates the organic 
 solidarity of all hving beings. In his later book. The Descent of Man, 
 Darwin attempts to show the essential oneness of man with other forms 
 of life. He accomplishes this task by a careful comparative analysis of 
 m a n with mammals and lower animals respecting their higher qualities 
 as well as their physical characteristics. He fully recognizes the differ- 
 ences between man and the animals, especially, in regard to the higher 
 qualities of man; but he considers that there is no fundamental difference 
 between them.^^ This belief is shared by all the biological scientists. 
 Bergson apparently differs from them in his view of the evolution of life 
 as taking place in divergent directions; and he holds that in consequence 
 of this divergency the vegetable, animal, and human beings differ not 
 
 " Bergson, op. cit., pp. 251 ff. 
 " The Descent of Man, p.702. 
 
12 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 only in degree but in kind. Yet he maintains the fundamental unity of 
 all the forms of life by virtue of the original impetus; and he fully ac- 
 knowledges the continuity of the different lines of evolution once they are 
 started by the impetus.^^ So Bergson is essentially one with the biolo- 
 gists in regard to the continuous solidarity of organic beings. 
 
 This consensus of opinion held by the biologists has frequently been 
 attacked by theologians who seek to introduce certain so-called 'breaks* 
 into the process of evolution. Such breaks are said to have taken place 
 at the dawn of life, the appearance of sentiency, and the awakening of 
 consciousness. Opposition is especially manifest to the inclusion of man 
 in the organic series. This inclusion seems to these theologians to 
 involve a degradation of the dignity of man. But the real motive of 
 their adherence to the breaks is the wish to show the hand of God at 
 those particular points.^^ This theological a priori assumption, however, 
 is doomed in view of the results of the painstaking empirical investiga- 
 tions of biological science; and the organic solidarity of living beings is 
 maintained as a scientific fact. 
 
 4. Factors of the Evolutionary Process. 
 
 Do the evolutionary theories as a whole hold that the processes of 
 change, growth, and continuity are effected by purely empirical factors 
 or by metempirical forces? Are the forces which make possible the 
 evolutionary process natural or supernatural? or are they both natural 
 and supernatural? This is a critical point in the theory of evolution. 
 (The factors of evolution recognized by Lamarck and Darwin are, in 
 the main, empirical. These factors, according to them, were given to 
 the original forms of life by the Supreme Creator at the very beginning 
 of the evolutionary process.^^ For both these biologists, God is the 
 omnipotent and omniscient being who created matter and energy and 
 endowed them with the laws and properties for all subsequent develop- 
 ment. God is the first cause; but the real factors of evolution are 
 secondary causes.^^ There are, however, many biologists who refuse 
 to bring in any other factors than those which they can scientifically 
 test.^^ Other biologists, such as Wallace, are dissatisfied with the 
 
 ^Wp. cit. Chap. II, cf. Ibid., pp. 251-271. 
 
 30 See, e.g., Griffith- Jones, The Ascent through Christ, 1901, pp. 26-32, cf. Ibid., 
 pp. 243 ff . 
 
 31 Packard, op. cit., p. 374; Darwin, The Origin of Species, p.424. 
 
 '2 Cf. Jordan and Kellogg, Evolution and Animal Life, pp. 9 f., 468 f. 
 " See, e. g., Kellogg, op. cit., p. 378; Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment, 
 1913, pp. 305 £f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 13 
 
 pure empiricism, e. g., of Darwin, and bring in metempirical forces.^ 
 Bergson holds that the meehanical and accidental factors held by 
 the prevailing theories of evolution are inadequate and maintains that 
 the prime factor in the evolution of living beings is the original impetus 
 of life. Briefly stated, extra-empirical factors are not recognized by 
 most of the biologists. Some are dogmatic on this point, while others 
 take a less dogmatic attitude. But whatever their position respecting 
 the ontological nature of the factors of evolution, it is manifest that 
 they consider them either externally or internally in close relation to 
 the evolving organisms. The forces which carry on the evolutionary 
 process are held to be immanent in the organisms and in their environ- 
 fnent. The ontological character of these forces is subject to further 
 investigation. 
 
 5. The Question of Teleology. 
 
 And, finally, does the evolutionary theory hold that there is purpose 
 in the process? This is another mooted question. Lamarck believed 
 that organic beings are tending from less perfect toward more and more 
 perfect forms.^ Darwin considered that the organic evolution had 
 reached its summit in man; but he refused to commit himself to any 
 definite view as to the ultimate destiny of humanity.^ Bergson rejects 
 radical mechanism and radical finalism alike, but does not deny that 
 there is some sort of purpose in the evolutionary process.^^ In view of 
 the fact that from the standpoint of the evolutionary theory the whole 
 organic world is changing and growing and is involved in accidents, 
 setbacks, and the like, it cannot hold to an absolute teleology that must 
 be realized at all cost. From its point of view, if there is teleology in the 
 process at all, it is a finite, growing, changing teleology in the evolution 
 of fife. 
 
 So we may summarize the meaning of the evolutionary theory thus: 
 It holds that all the forms of life are in the process of a continuous 
 change and growth, which is effected by the forces immanent in the 
 organisms and in their environment, for a limited, growing, developiug 
 purpose. 
 
 //. The Traditional Conception of God 
 
 The content and meaning of the evolutionary theory have been out- 
 lined. But in order to see the issues called forth by the theory we must 
 now note the essentials of the traditional conception of God. 
 
 3* Wallace, op. cit., Chap. V; Simpson, The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature, 
 pp. 254 fif., 277 fF.; Schmucker, op. cit., Chap. XDC. 
 ^ Packard, op. cit., pp. 323, 345 f. 
 ^ The Descent of Man, pp. 702 ff. 
 " Op. cit., pp. 265 ff. 
 
14 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 1. God as the Supernatural Personality. 
 
 The dominant characteristic of all systems of orthodoxy is super- 
 naturalism. Essential are a supernatural creation, supernatural revela- 
 tion, supernatural Christ, and a supernatural salvation. Consequently 
 God is essentially separate from the world of nature and of man and is 
 beyond the power of natural human knowledge. Indeed, God as the 
 supernatural Being is the absolutely indispensable foundation of the 
 orthodox system .^^ The world- view underlying this conception of God 
 is a philosophy which divides reality into two realms: a natural and a 
 supernatural. In accordance with this view man and other finite beings 
 belong to the natural realm, while God and his messengers belong to the 
 supernatural. The connection between the two realms is effected by 
 means of the supernatural acts of God. 
 
 The emphasis, then, in this conception of God is placed upon his 
 specific deeds in his relation to the world. The acts of God, however, 
 are not altogether normal, that is, such as we observe in the processes of 
 nature and man, but they are supernatural. He mysteriously decreed 
 in past eternity his relation to and the course of the world; he miracu- 
 lously created the world out of nothing; he made revelation of himself 
 in a supernatural book; he miraculously sent his only begotten son into 
 the world to accomplish the plan of salvation for the elect.^^ What is 
 all important for orthodoxy is supernaturalism in the activities of God 
 in his relation to the world. Accordingly, therefore, orthodoxy maintains 
 its belief in the miraculous acts of God."*^ Now it is this insistence on the 
 supematuralness of God's acts that leads orthodox theologians to oppose 
 the modern doctrine of evolution. They cannot see the hand of God in 
 the gradual process of evolution; if there be a God, he must be known by 
 his miraculous deeds. To hold that the world and man have come to be 
 what they are by the process of a slow and gradual evolution means 
 atheism.^^ It should be noted that their opposition to the evolutionary 
 theory is due to the desire to maintain intact the finality of their system 
 deducable from the infallible scripture which is given by the transcen- 
 dent, supernatural God, and to furnish a positive basis of assurance to 
 
 ^* See Greene, The Supernatural, in Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies, 
 pp. 142 ff. 
 
 39 See Hodge, Systematic Theology, I, p. 535 ff., 550 ff., 151 ff.; II, pp. 378 ff.; 
 Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, I, pp. 393 ff., 61 ff.; Strong, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 353 
 ff.; II, pp. 371 ff.; I, HI ff.; II, 669 ff., etc. 
 
 40 Hodge, op. cit., I, 617 ff.; Shedd, op. cit., I, 533 ff.; Strong, op. cit., II, 431 ff. 
 
 " See Hodge, op. cit., II, 11 ff.; Shedd, op. cit., I, 499 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 15 
 
 men that God is powerful to perform even miraculous deeds, if necessary, 
 for their ultimate victory. So God must necessarily be conceived of as 
 the supernatural personality, who expresses his relation to the world by 
 means of supernatural acts. 
 
 2. God as the Absolute Being. 
 
 This is the philosophic view of God, which orthodoxy holds along 
 with its conception of him as a specific, supernatural person, who mani- 
 fests himself in concrete acts. God, who is conceived of as a transcen- 
 dent personality in popular Christianity, is given, in the philosophical 
 view of him, metaphysical attributes. Philosophically viewed, God is the 
 ultimate reaUty, the source and ground of all that exists. God so con- 
 ceived possesses such attributes as spirituality, infinity, perfection, per- 
 sonaUty, immutability, and the like.^ God as such corresponds to the 
 Idea of ideas of Plato, the Form of forms of Aristotle, the mystical One 
 and the Good in Plotinus. The moral aspects of these ideas of Gk)d are 
 expressed in the conception that he is eternally complete and perfect) 
 This notion of God as immutable and static in his perfection is based 
 upon the substance philosophy which formed the fundamental presuj>- 
 position of Greek theology.^ Every effort is made to maintain the 
 absoluteness of God from the limitations of time, (^he eternity of God 
 means that he is above the time and succession which are charac- 
 teristics of our consciousness. We do not know how a God who is a 
 conscious personahty could be timeless in his thinking, but he neverthe- 
 less is free from time.** Moreover, God is exalted above all the causes 
 and possibiUties of change. He is absolutely immutable in his essence, 
 attributes and purpose.*^ With this insistence of traditional theology 
 on the absoluteness of God goes also its desire to retain the finaHty of its 
 system. The absoluteness of the divine revelation, the uniqueness of 
 Christ, the completeness of Christianity, all stand or faU with the doc- 
 trine of the absoluteness of God. So God is held as the absolute being. 
 (The absoluteness of God, from the point of view of orthodoxy, does not 
 signify that he embraces the whole of reaUty — Hodge, op. cit., I, 382 f.). 
 
 In brief these two elements — God as the supernatural personahty 
 and absolute being — constitute the basic ideas in the traditional con- 
 ception of God. They represent man's practical ethico-reHgious and 
 philosophical interests, traceable, respectively, to the Hebrew and Greek 
 
 « Strong, op. cit., I, p. 248. 
 
 *^ For the emphasis upon the substance idea of God, see Hodge, op. cit., I, 367 S. 
 
 « Ibid., 385 ff . 
 
 *^Ibid., 390 f.; Shedd, op. cit., I, 351 f. 
 
16 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 influences in theology. Orthodox theologians, such as Hodge and Shedd, 
 start with God as the ultimate reality, the metaphysical source and 
 ground of the universe; but they lay most stress on the idea of God as 
 the supernatural, transcendent person, who governs the world of nature 
 and of man by means of specific, miraculous acts and interventions. 
 God as a cosmic principle is too remote and colorless to satisfy the moral 
 and reHgious needs of man, so that the chief emphasis has been placed 
 on the view of God as the supreme sovereign who manifests his relation 
 to the world and man in particular deeds and acts of supernaturalistic 
 character. Still the philosophical view of God reached by means of 
 human reason is not ignored; it is held to satisfy the speculative interests 
 of man. So these two views of God are maintained together as the 
 fundamental constituents in the traditional conception of God.^ 
 
 This thoroughgoing supernaturalistic conception of God is wholly 
 opposed to the theological implications of the evolutionary theory. For 
 this theory implies that if there be a God, he must be not only vitally 
 related with the forms of life but also be orderly and gradual in the 
 method of his activity; and furthermore that such a God must be held 
 to be actually himself involved in the process of change and growth. 
 But such an evolutionary conception of God is repugnant to orthodoxy. 
 Hence there arise many problems in the attempt to bring the traditional 
 conception of God into relation with the evolutionary theory. These 
 problems we have yet to state in the following section. 
 
 ///. The Problems Involved in the Relation between the Evolutionary 
 Theory and the Traditional Conception of God 
 
 1. The Problem of Method. 
 
 Manifestly the method as to how we may reach and formulate the 
 conception of God is a great question which needs to be settled. The 
 method followed by science in the construction of the evolutionary 
 theory is antithetical to that used by traditional theology in formulating 
 its conception of God: the former employs the inductive, empirical 
 method; the latter, the a priori, revelation method. The one outstand- 
 ing characteristic of the evolutionary theories examined above is that 
 they are formulated as result of more or less careful inductive study of 
 the processes in organic world. (One may question this statement with 
 respect to the theory of Bergson. It should, however, be replied that 
 Bergson, too, set forth his theory of evolution after years of investigation 
 in the field of organic evolution). But it is quite otherwise with tradi- 
 
 ^ See, e. g., Hodge, op. cit., I, 366. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 17 
 
 tional theology. It maintains that God has made his final revelation 
 in the scripture. Its conception of God is obtained by a systematic 
 analysis of the content of this revelation, for in it there is given once for 
 all the true nature of God."*^ Which method, now, should be used in 
 the formulation of the conception of God? This is a critical problem, 
 for on its solution depends largely the character of our conception of 
 God. (This will appear in the course of our study.) 
 
 2. The Problem of the Relation between Science and Theology. 
 This problem has already been implied in the preceding one. But 
 
 the question of the relation of science to theology involves also a meta- 
 physical problem, i. e.. Can the afiSrmations of science be held as the 
 final word on the ontological realities with which theology deals, or must 
 theolog>' hold that there is more to reality than is revealed by science? 
 Traditional theology, having an infallible and authoritative source for 
 its affirmations, does not make any real use of the results of scientific 
 investigation. This dogmatism of traditional orthodoxy has been 
 polemically transferred to what Perry calls naive, uncritical naturalism.'*^ 
 Such naturalism declares that it has the last word on the matter of 
 reaHty; it claims that what it discovers by means of its inductive method 
 is all there is to reaUty. For it, cosmic substance, cosmic energy, eternal 
 matter, mechanical causality are all that there are in the world of reality, 
 and all the facts of human life are explicable in terms of these sub-human 
 entities. Shall these two dogmatisms be allowed to continue, or must 
 we seek for a reconciliation between them? If we accept the latter 
 alternative, how can they be reconciled? The solution of this problem 
 has a close relation to the content of the conception of God.'*^ 
 
 3. The Problem of God as the Supernatural, Transcendent Per- 
 sonality. 
 
 The traditional conception of God, following the dualistic view of 
 the universe and political analogies, holds that he is the sovereign person 
 who has determined the course of the world and who expresses his relation 
 to it in specific supernatural acts. The duaUstic philosophy, on which 
 this view of God is based, has been undermined by the discovery of the 
 Copernican astronomy. Kant has shown in his Critique oj Pure 
 Reason that we can never know a God who exists all by himself. The 
 evolutionary theories do not know any other world than this where the 
 forces which carry on the evolution of life are immanent in the organisms 
 
 " E. g., Hodge, op. ciL, I, 182 f., 364. 
 
 *« Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chap. IV. 
 
 *" See Perry, op. cit., Chap. V, Religion and the Limits of Science. 
 
18 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 and in their environment. These theories know no such supernatural 
 interventions from an unknown realm of reahty into the course of evolu- 
 tion, as are essential to the traditional conception of God. Thus is 
 raised the problem of the transcendence or immanence of God. Is God 
 organically connected with the life-process or only occasionally by 
 miraculous interventions? If one is forced to surrender the trans- 
 cendence of God in the traditional sense, what sort of transcendence 
 can be held? Or if one must conceive of God in terms of immanence, 
 what should be done with the concept of God's personality? Such is 
 the problem called forth by the evolutionary theory in view of the tradi- 
 tional conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality. 
 This is closely connected with the next and the other problem to be 
 mentioned. 
 
 4. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being. 
 
 The traditional conception of God holds to the view of him as the 
 absolute. It conceives of* God in terms of completeness, perfection, 
 immutabiUty. The absoluteness of God from the exigencies of time 
 and history is tenaciously maintained. But in our examination of the 
 meaning of the evolutionary theory we discovered, among others, the 
 two essential elements, change and growth, which are held as charac- 
 teristic of the forms of life. As human life with other forms of life are 
 considered to be engaged in the processes of change and growth, these 
 characteristics of life are applied to all the sciences and institutions 
 concerned with the interests of life. Not only social institutions change 
 and grow but also their ideals. Not only do ethical ideas and ideals 
 change from one age to the other, but also the content of moral conduct 
 changes and grows. So does philosophy change and grow. And religion 
 is not exempt from this process of change and development. Both its 
 expressions and content change and have history. Thus the idea that 
 things have history and so change from age to age has penetrated into 
 all the aspects of human Hfe. Absolutes, finaUties, eternities, perfections 
 are not found anywhere in the realm of man. Do they exist beyond the 
 human sphere? Is God free from change and growth? All admit that 
 our ideas of God have changed from the days of primitive man. But do 
 change and growth hold true only of the conceptions of God, and not 
 of the object of the conceptions? Is God absolute or is he in any sense 
 finite? This is the most critical problem which needs to be carefully 
 considered. 
 
 5. The Problem of God's Relation to the World and Man. 
 The traditional conception of God holds that God created the world 
 
 out of nothing through the fiat of his sovereign will. But our astronomi- 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 19 
 
 cal and geological sciences tell us that it has taken millions of years to 
 produce the world as we have it. All the forms of life have come to be 
 through the process of change and growth. The theories of evolution, 
 then, reduce existing things to so small and insignificant beginnings that 
 the creation of these seems scarcely worthy of the supreme being. What 
 then shall be done with the traditional doctrine of creation? Further- 
 more, what view should be taken of the orthodox doctrine of divine 
 providence? According to this doctrine, God has the sovereign control 
 of all things, and he is working out, by supernatural means, a prede- 
 termined, absolute plan for the world. But is he actually governing the 
 world in accordance with his plan? Are there not things in the world 
 which seem to be defeating such a divine plan? This is notably the case 
 with the undeniable fact of evil. Are evils in the world merely negations 
 of the good? Are they incidents in the process of evolution? Are the 
 evils in the world there because God could not prevent them? Or are 
 there actually evil forces independent of God's control? Must we 
 accept the orthodox solution and say that God is not an efl&cient cause 
 of the evils but permits them to exist? 
 
 And what should be said of God's relation to man? Traditional 
 theology holds that man is a creation of God, but, since his fall, he is 
 totally destitute of all high values; and hence he is wholly dependent on 
 God for obtaining the lost righteousness and dignity. From this point 
 of view, man has no initiative, no real freedom; but God is all in all. 
 The evolutionary theory, however, teaches that the forces which make 
 possible the on-going of evolution are resident in the evolving organisms 
 and their environment. Are the powers that enable human life to 
 change and develop wholly of God or of man? Or are God and men 
 mutually cooperating to achieve higher values in life? This opens up 
 the larger question of God's relation to social progress. Positivistic 
 philosophers maintain that the movements of social progress are due 
 to the workings of human social forces. Orthodoxy, on the other hand, 
 holds that they are of God. Which view should be accepted? 
 
 The above constitute the essential problems involved in bringing 
 together the evolutionary theory and traditional conception of God. 
 We shall now turn to the typical attempts at their solution. 
 
20 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 PART TWO 
 
 Typical Recent Solutions of the Problems Involved in the Rela- 
 tion BETWEEN THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE TRADITIONAL 
 
 Conception of God 
 
 We shall not deal, in this section, with present-day treatises on s^'ste- 
 matic theology. For these either ignore the problems raised by the 
 evolutionary theory, or else refuse seriously to face the issues involved. 
 This is the case, in the main, with all systems both of Catholicism and 
 Protestant orthodoxy.^ Some theologians do, indeed, recognize the 
 difficulties raised by the doctrine of evolution and make efforts at their 
 solution; but in such efforts their chief interest is to preserve the tradi- 
 tional conception of God. This attitude is characteristic of certain 
 liberal interpretations of orthodoxy.^ Other writers are much influenced 
 by the evolutionary theory and apply the theory to the history of reli- 
 gions, but as yet have not worked out a doctrine of God from their 
 evolutionary point of view. This is true, in a limited sense, of Catho- 
 lic Modernism;^ and more particularly of the Religions geschichtliche 
 Schule. ^ For any profound appreciation, then, of our problem, we must 
 turn to philosophers rather than to professional theologians. In this 
 study we shall concern ourselves with the solutions worked out in typical 
 recent philosophies of religion, namely, Royce's Absolute Realism, 
 Eucken's Philosophy of Life, Bowne's Personal Idealism, and James's 
 Pragmatism. For all the advocates of these systems of thought recognize 
 
 1 See Wilhelm and Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, I, pp. 158-256, 358- 
 427; Hodge, op. cit., I, 366 ff., II, 3 &.; Shedd, op. cit., I, 151-546; Princeton Biblical 
 and Theological Studies, 1912, pp. 136-207; for Ritschlian theology, see Kaftan, Dog- 
 matik, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 161-189, 231-241; Wendt, System der Christlichen Lehre, 
 Gottingen, 1906, I, 82-122, 133-161; and Haering, The Christian Faith, Eng. tr., 1913, 
 I, 315-363, II, 499-513; for Positive theology, see Seeberg, The Fundamental Truths 
 of the Christian Religion, Eng. tr., 1908, pp. 135-172; and Forsyth, Positive Preaching 
 and Modern Mind, pp. 41-72, 199-290. 
 
 2 See, e. g., Clark, An Outline of Christian Theology, 1903, pp. 63-161, The Christian 
 Doctrine of God; Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, 1907, pp. 81-298; and King, 
 Reconstruction in Theology, 1901, Chaps, V ff. 
 
 3 See Tyrrell, The Programme of Modernism, 1908; and Loisy, The Gospel and the 
 Church, 1903, pp. 1-22, 180-225. 
 
 *See Troeltsch, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religions geschichte, 
 Tubingen, 1912, The Dogmatics of the " ReligionsgeschichtHche Schule," A. Jour. 
 Theol., Jan., 1913; Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion, Harvard 
 Theol. Rev., Oct. 1912; Miller, The Teaching of Ernst Troeltsch, Harvard Theol. 
 Rev., VI, 426-450; and Bousset, \Miat is Religion? 1907. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 21 
 
 the inadequacy of the traditional conception of God. They are fully 
 conscious of the problems raised by modem scientific concepts, including 
 the evolutionary theory, and make critical attempts to solve the problems. 
 
 /. The Solution of the Problems in Royce's Absolute Idealism. 
 
 The classic modem foraiulator of absolute idealism is Hegel. He 
 defined reaUty in terms of logical processes of thought, and reached the 
 concept of a philosophic absolute which he made equivalent to the God of 
 Christianity. Among the recent representatives of this general system of 
 thought, who are interested in the rehgious problems, are such men as 
 Otto Pfleiderer, John and Edward Caird, T. H. Green, John Watson, 
 R. J. Campbell, W. DeW. Hyde, G. A. Gordon, and Josiah Royce. 
 Among absolute idealists Royce has kept most abreast of modem scien- 
 tific movements, and has endeavored to construct his conception of God 
 in the light of these. The essential features of his system are that the 
 ultimate reaUty of the world is an all-inclusive Mind or Spirit; that all 
 finite forms of existence are manifestations of the fundamental reahty; 
 that this reality and finite spirits are organically related; that, therefore, 
 when we discover the laws of our thought and volition, we know the 
 nature of the ultimate reality; and that when we reach this reality, the 
 absolute, it becomes the criterion of our thought and all our evaluations.^ 
 With this general remark we proceed to our immediate task. 
 1. Royce's Conception of God. 
 
 (1) The Method of Royce. 
 
 The fundamental philosophical and religious task of Royce is to get 
 from our finite point of view over to that of an absolute, so that the 
 latter shall determine all the activities and values of our life. The 
 method followed by him in working out this task is a method which 
 analyzes the processes of human social consciousness. Former neo- 
 Hegelians, for example, J. Caird, used a rigidly individuahstic method. 
 But Royce, especially in recent years, makes use of the principles of 
 social psychology. (This is very marked in his recent work, The Problem of 
 Christianity). His method, however, is essentially identical with that 
 of his predecessors; for his primary object is to ascertain the thought 
 processes of social mind. He is confident that, through this analysis of 
 the logical processes of social mind, he can get at the heart of reality. 
 This intellectualistic procedure of Royce is consonant with his assump- 
 tion that the finite thought-process and infinite thought-process are 
 
 6 Royce, The World and the Individual, I, 42, 127, 181, 394, 426; cf. J. Card, An 
 Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 229, 233 ff., 245, 252. 
 
22 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 organically related, and that the former mirrors the latter.^ This is the 
 method which Royce employs to derive his conception of God. He 
 depends neither upon an objective revelation nor on the inclinations of 
 subjective feeling, but he completely trusts in the power of human 
 thought, whether individual or social, to ascertain the nature of God. 
 What then is the character of God reached by the use of this dialectic 
 method? This we must proceed to ascertain. 
 
 (2) The Content of Royce's Conception of God. 
 
 i. God as the Absolute Being. 
 
 God as the absolute Being reconciles the antinomy between the two 
 aspects of our experience — thought and fact. Our experience, accord- 
 ing to Royce, comes to us as sheer light and shade, sound and silence, 
 pain and grief, all intermingled. But we have in the depth of, our 
 experience ideas or attempts to give meaning to these sheer facts. As a 
 sum total of these ideas we have thought. This thought and the facts 
 of experience are in conflict with each other.. To escape this antithesis 
 we long for a reality which shall reconcile these two phenomena of our 
 life. This reality is found in God the Absolute Being; for in him there 
 is no conflict between fact and thought.'^ 
 
 The fundamental significance of God as the Absolute Being, then, 
 according to Royce, is found in the thought of him as the objective 
 fulfilment, in final form, of the internal meaning of all our finite ideas 
 or thoughts. This view of God is reached through a critical analysis 
 of the meaning of Being and the conditions of true ideas. After a 
 critical examination and rejection of the theories of Being held by 
 Realism, Mysticism, and Critical Rationalism,^ Royce develops his 
 theory of Being. This is determined by his conception of the meaning 
 of an idea. An idea, according to Royce, possesses two meanings — ^an 
 internal and external. The internal meaning of an idea is the expression 
 of a specific purpose. The external meaning of an idea is found in a 
 specific object which is willed to be the idea's object.^ The internal 
 meanings of ideas are at first vaguely embodied in their objects; but 
 gradually they gain in clearness; and any ideas are true when they are 
 embodied completely in their ultimate objects. Any idea is true when 
 even in its vagueness, it corresponds " to its final and completely individ- 
 ual expression. "i'^ From this follows Royce's theory of Being: ^'What 
 
 « The World and the Individual, I, 8, 424 ff. 
 7 Ibid., I, 55 ff. 
 
 ^Ibid., I, 62 ff., 103 ff., 137, 181, 196 ff. 
 Ubid., I, 24 ff., 325, 327, 329, 331, 337. 
 "/Wi.,p. 339. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 23 
 
 is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form 
 and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas. "^^ This 
 Being is something Other than themselves which finite ideas seek. 
 They seek a Being which, when found, would end all their doubts, 
 feeing, for Royce, then, is not something independent of finite ideas, 
 not the Immediate of Mysticism, nor the vaUdity of ideas as held by 
 Critical RationaUsm; it is, on the contrary, the ultimately individual 
 embodiment of the object of all finite ideas. To summarize in his words, 
 Being is *' (1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite 
 idea with which, in any case, we start our quest; (2) a complete fulfilment 
 of the will or purpose partially embodied in this idea; (3) an individual 
 life for which no other can be substituted. ... It is an individual 
 life, present as a whole. . . . This life is at once a system of facts, and 
 the fulfilment of whatever purpose any finite idea, in so far as it is true 
 to its own meaning, already fragmentarily embodies. This life is the 
 completed wiU, as well as the completed experience, corresponding to 
 the will and experience of any one finite idea."^^ Such a complete life is 
 conclusive of all search for perfection which every finite idea seeks. 
 When we reach this Being in its ultimate, individual life, we can lay aside 
 all ifs, thens, validities, and the rest; because all our seekings and troubles 
 will then be at an end. Such a Being is a world in which the meanings 
 of all our finite ideas and experiences are completely expressed. Such a 
 Being, such a world of experience, is God. " Since this one world of 
 expression is a life of experience fulfilling ideas, it possesses precisely the 
 attributes which the ages have most associated with the name of God. 
 For God is the Absolute Being, and the perfect fulness of life. . . . 
 In God we live and move and have our Being." ^^ 
 
 ii. God as the All-inclusive Consciousness. 
 
 This conception of God as the cosmic consciousness, possessing a 
 knowledge of all things in their wholeness, is already impUed in the 
 foregoing view of him as the Absolute Being. Royce holds that his 
 theory of Bemg as the ultimate fulfilment of the meanings of all finite 
 ideas involves the unity of all knowing process. From this point of 
 view he proceeds to show that there is one all-inclusive consciousness 
 embracing all finite consciousnesses, and that this cosmic consciousness is 
 God. Whatever is, according to Royce, is consciously known either 
 
 ''Ibid., p. 339. 
 ^/^^w/., p. 341. 
 "^ Ibid., pp. 3^9 i. 
 
24 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 by US or by an all-inclusive knower as fulfilment of some finite idea.^'* 
 The meanings of our finite ideas find only a partial fulfilment in our 
 experience — consciousness. These partially fulfilled meanings of our 
 experience are completely and finally fulfilled in a cosmic experience. 
 The world of individual experiences exists in relations. These relations 
 are known to us only partially, but they are known as a whole to a cosmic 
 consciousness. Our social experience accepts, as real, minds, the past 
 and future. But they are real only as they are known to a universal 
 consciousness. Our individual and social experiences are fragmentary 
 and chaotic. These fragmentary experiences are completely present to 
 an all-inclusive knower. Such a cosmic knower is God. For he is the 
 Omniscient Being, who possesses an absolute unity of thought and 
 experience. This Omniscient Being, God, finds present before him all 
 things not as result of fragmentary and gradually completed process of 
 inquiry, but directly and all at once. For such a God there are no 
 problems; all things are present before him completely solved. All our 
 experiences are fragmentary and partial, but the Omniscient Being or 
 God has an absolute experience, in fact he is the Absolute Experience.^ 
 That such an Absolute Experience exists is shown in the very fragmen- 
 tariness of our experience, which implies the existence of an Absolute 
 Experience,^^ We find the significance of our existence in the Absolute 
 Experience which comprehends all our strivings, tasks, purposes as com- 
 pletely fulfilled. In such an Experience we are eternally at home.^' 
 To this God, the Absolute Experience or Cosmic Consciousness, Royce 
 assigns the attribute of personality, which is defined in terms of an all- 
 inclusive consciousness.^^ In his recent work. The Problem of Christi- 
 anityj Royce conceives of God as the Universal Interpreter.^^ So Royce 
 conceives of God in terms of an absolute experience or cosmic conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 iii. God as the Absolute Moral Will. 
 
 So far we have considered Royce's view of God as the Absolute 
 Being and Experience. In these views of God there is also involved 
 the idea of him as the Absolute Moral Will. But in this idea of God 
 we see particularly the voluntaristic element in Royce's system. That 
 
 '^ Ibid., p. 396. 
 
 ^^ Royce, The Conception of God, pp. 1 Q. 
 
 i«/6zrf., pp. 31ff. 
 
 " The World and the Individual, I, 427. 
 
 18 Op. cit., II, 418 a. 
 
 i» II, p. 324, cf. ibid., 373 ff., 296. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 25 
 
 God is the Absolute Will is seen in the fact that to be means to fulfil in 
 final, individual expression the only purpose, the Absolute Purpose.^o 
 This Absolute Purpose is not an abstraction, but it is infinitely complex; 
 so that its unity is a unity of many Wills, each of which finds its final 
 expression in an all-embracing Will — Godi The expression of this Abso- 
 lute Purpose is both temporal and eternal. But these two expressions 
 are completely unified in the Absolute Will. 
 
 A special problem for Royce to solve, in this connection, is whether 
 this God who is declared the Absolute Will can be conceived of as moral. 
 Royce maintains the view that God is the Absolute Moral Will. That 
 God is such a being follows from the contention of Royce that the world, 
 which is in essence identical with God, is moral. Royce's argument for 
 the moral nature of the world is based upon his conception of the tem- 
 poral and eternal orders and of the human self .^^ Royce holds that in 
 the temporal order of the world there is provided ample room for rnoral 
 deeds and tasks to be performed; and since the finite individuals, in 
 their unique manner, express the will of God, they have individuality 
 and freedom. Thus, in short, the world is moral, and, in consequence 
 of this fact, God is the Absolute Moral Will, which Will, from an eternal 
 point of view, is absolutely fulfilled.^ 
 
 (3) . The Relation of God and the World, 
 i. The Relation of God and Nature. 
 
 Nature, according to Royce, is the World of Description, while 
 finite minds constitute the World of Appreciation. The reahty of the 
 physical world is boimd up — since it has no independent existence — 
 with that of social beings — the World of Appreciation. The world of 
 social beings is real, because they furnish to us the meaning of our 
 vague ideas; they give us the constantly needed supplement to our own 
 fragmentary meanings.^ Having thus estabhshed the reality of the 
 social world, it is not difficult to see that of the natural world. The 
 physical world is real because my fellow beings experience material 
 objects beyond them and this their experience supplements my own 
 limited experience. The phenomenal world, then, exists beyond my 
 private experience — it exists in the experiences of my fellow beings) 
 Thus the reality of the external world is dependent on that of the social 
 world.24 
 
 2" The World and the Individual, II, 335. 
 
 21 See Ihid., Lectures III and VI. 
 
 ^ For Royce's treatment of the problem, see Ihid., esp. Lecture VUL 
 
 a/6tV/.,pp. 170,172. 
 
 "/WJ., pp. 175ff. 
 
26 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 'As to the constitution of the natural world, Royce holds that it 
 together with the finite minds is an aspect of a larger life of the world. 
 The processes of nature and human minds are essentially alike; at 
 bottom they are identical — the only difference between them is that the 
 processes of nature go at a different time-rate than ours.^ The me- 
 chanical laws and theories of science do not tell us the essence of nature; 
 they indicate only how nature behaves. Royce easily accepts the doc- 
 trine of evolution, because, from the standpoint of his theory of reality, 
 it can be made to show that the processes of nature and mind are alike, 
 and it can thus establish the fundamental oneness of these elements of 
 reality with the larger life of the Absolute.^^ While nature, at bottom, 
 is thus mental in its processes and alive with the life of God, yet it does 
 not form a complete manifestation of him. It only gives us a glimpse 
 into the larger life of the Absolute Being; it furnishes to us only a hint 
 of a vaster realm of life of which we form a part.^^ Nature, for Royce, 
 then, is an order of genuine conscious life, manifesting, in a limited way, 
 God the Absolute, who is not its external cause but its very existence.7 
 
 ii. The Relation of God and Man. 
 
 In accordance with his theory of Being Royce affirms the essential 
 unity of man with God the Absolute, and makes the former an aspect of 
 the latter. Man appears to us an incident and product of nature, 
 heredity, education, and social environment. But how do you know 
 that you are a such being? It is because you are ontologically linked 
 with the life of God. By virtue of this organic unity of man with God, 
 man shares, in essence, all the attributes of the infinite in finite forms./ 
 His problem is to attain to a conscious knowledge of this fact. But this 
 affirmation of the ontological unity of man and God the Absolute raises 
 a great problem, which Royce is called upon to solve, viz.: whether 
 or not man really possesses freedom and individuality, and so is capable 
 of a real moral life. Royce contends that man has freedom and individu- 
 ality, and therefore is a real ethical being. The essence of freedom, in 
 Royce's view, consists in the selective activity of conscious life. That is, 
 I have several objects which may express my internal meanings, but I 
 uniquely select from them an object and allow it alone to be the objec- 
 tive fulfilment of my internal meanmg.^^ In all his discussion of the 
 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 219 &. 
 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 219 S., 2^2. 
 
 27 Ibid., pp. 8 ff., 204; cf. J. Caird, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, I, 75. 
 
 28 Royce, op. cit., II, pp. 242, 330. 
 
 ^^Op. cit., I, pp. 449 &.; cf. II, Lectures VI, VII, where the same view is worked 
 out in detail. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 27 
 
 relation of God to man, Royce holds that man has his freedom and 
 individuality by virtue of his organic relation to God- but he maintains 
 that in God man still dwells as an unique individual; for he is an unique 
 expression of God's purpose.^*) WTiile in Royce's vrorld there is only one 
 final and complete seK — the Absolute Self — , yet within this Self there 
 is articulation, contrast, variety. Hence there is a place for the individual 
 finite self. But this finite self is not as yet an accompUshed fact, but an 
 ideal to be achieved in the future.^^ There are difficulties in the way of 
 realizing this ideal seK in v-iew of the fact that the present finite self is 
 closely bound up with nature and social environment. But these 
 difficulties are dissolved when we see that this world, in its wholeness, is 
 the expression of the determinate and absolute purpose, the fulfilment 
 of the divine will.^- God accompUshes his absolute plan in the world as a 
 whole. (Any finite self is free not in isolation from the whole in which 
 God expresses his plan, but in relation to it and in expressing in its 
 imique manner the will of God. So with all one's dependence one is 
 free by expressing in his own way the will of God.^ Thus Royce 
 attempts to secure the place of the individual in his system of the 
 Absolute. 
 
 2. Criticism of Royce's Solution of the Problems. 
 
 An outline statement of Royce's general position and conception of 
 God has now been set forth. This has prepared us for the task before us, 
 namely, to make a critical examination of the position of Royce respecting 
 the problems which we have indicated as due to the effort to bring the 
 evolutionary theory into relation with the traditional conception of God.^ 
 In accomplishing this critical task we shall be able to see, more concretely, 
 the extent to which Royce has worked out the bearing of the evolutionary 
 theory on his conception of God. 
 
 In general it can be said that Royce has worked out his conception 
 of God from the standpoint of his absolute ideaUsm. Through the 
 medium of this system of philosophy, he has given an ideaUstic interpre- 
 tation of the world, in opposition to the mechanistic theory of natural- 
 istic philosophy, and a conception of God in terms of dynamic immanence, 
 in contrast to the traditional conception of God in terms of reaUstic 
 supernaturaUsm. It is, then, from the point of view of absolute idealism, 
 
 ^^Op. ciL, II, p. 286. 
 
 ^'Ibid.,pp.2S9i. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 292. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 293. 
 
 ** See above, pp. 16 ff. 
 
28 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 that Royce has ultimately worked out the bearing of the evolutionary 
 theory on the conception of God. (This fact must be borne in mind in 
 the criticism that follows.) 
 
 In the first place, as regards his method of formulating his conception 
 of God, we note that Royce has not made use of the inductive empiricism 
 employed by the formulators of the theories of evolution which we have 
 considered. He has devoted a major portion of the first series of his 
 great work, The World and the Individual, to the exposition of his theory 
 of Being, and makes the theory the basis of all his subsequent investiga- 
 tions. Hence he frankly claims a full independence of his philosophy 
 from scientific results.^ Royce analyzes human temporary, and frag- 
 mentary experiences and absolutizes them into an all-inclusive, absolute 
 experience.^^ Or he makes an analysis of human ideas or thoughts and 
 reaches his theory of an absolute Being or Thought, and considers this 
 theory as the basis of his system.^^ Thus the Absolute Experience or 
 Being is made the ultimate basis of our finite experience and thought. 
 If we ask how our fragmentary experiences could "be synthesized into the 
 Absolute Experience or Thought of Royce, when the chasm between the 
 content of our finite experience and that of an all-inclusive reality, if 
 there were such a being, is so great; Royce makes the identification 
 between them on the ground of logical oneness of our thought with 
 cosmic thought. It is from the standpoint of an a priori Absolute 
 Experience or Thought that we find the criterion of all the evaluations 
 which Royce makes on the world and man. He has no ultimate confi- 
 dence in the facts of our common experience; for these are fragmentary 
 and fallible. Instead of basing our view of the world on the revelations 
 of our finite experience, we must build our philosophy on a Being which 
 has an absolute knowledge and experience, on an all-embracing reality, 
 and interprete the sheer facts of our experience from the viewpoint of 
 such a Being. Our conception of God, in the thought of Royce, should 
 not be derived from the standpoint of our experience, but should be 
 constructed in accordance with the theory of an absolute Being, yea in 
 terms of that Being. Accordingly the method of Royce is wholly opposed 
 to that of the scientific evolutionary theory. 
 
 The intellectuaUsm and apriorism of Royce's method, however, is in 
 full accord with his general system of thought. Such a method he must 
 follow in order to maintain his system of philosophy. He must ever 
 
 ^ Op. cit., II, p. 8. 
 ^ Ibid., Lecture lU. 
 " Op. ciL, I, pp. 339 f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 29 
 
 insist on the primacy of reason as the source of religious insight, and on 
 that to which this reason leads, namely, the all-inclusive and aU-knowing 
 insight, as the criterion of the truth and falsity of our views of things.^^ 
 But it should not be overlooked that there are statements in Royce's 
 works, which are not in agreement with his dialectic, absolute method. 
 He accepts, for example, the Kantian dictum: Nur in der Erfahrung ist 
 Wahrheitf^ and he maintains that the problem of reaUty is first of all a 
 problem of experience and practical needs, and that his conception of 
 reality, in one aspect at least, is thoroughly empirical.^'^ In the work 
 which is distinctly devoted to the problem of reHgious knowledge, Royce 
 speaks much of individual and social experiences as sources of reUgious 
 insight,"*^ and appeals to the actual experiences of those who practise 
 religion as guides for us to the truth.^ Moreover, in his recent work, 
 The Problem of Christianity, he acknowledges that he aims to deal with the 
 subject from the standpoint of life;'^ and this claim is fully justified, 
 particularly, in the first volume of the work. These and other assertions 
 of Royce^ show that a real interest of Royce is to ascertain the data of 
 our common individual and social experiences, and to build his view of 
 the world on them. Hence just in so far as Royce deals with our experi- 
 ence in its varied aspects, he is not in line with his absolute method; for 
 it cannot be consistently maintained, as he does, that the method of 
 experience would point us to an all-inclusive experience.^ On the other 
 hand, just to the extent that Royce makes use of the data of our experi- 
 ence, he is in agreement with the method of the scientific evolutionary 
 theory. So to this degree, he has worked out the bearing of the theory. 
 In view of the fact that philosophically Royce does not use the 
 inductive method of science, it is not difficult to see what his attitude 
 toward science is. We have seen that he claims an absolute independence 
 of his system from the results of science. This he effects by dividing 
 the universe into two worlds: the world of fact and that of thought; 
 the world of description and that of appreciation; the temporal and 
 eternal orders. Science deals with the former, while his philosophy deals 
 
 ^* The Sources of Religious Insight, pp. 84 ff., 109 ff. 
 39 The World and the Individual 11, p. 362. 
 *oO/>. cit., I, pp. 55,401. 
 
 *^ The Sources of Religious Insight, pp. 26 ff., 37 ff. 
 *= IhU., pp. 166 ff . 
 « Pp. 12 ff. 
 
 " See op. cit., I, pp. 387 ff.; II, p. 5. 
 
 *5 The World and the Individual, II, pp. 11 ff.; cf. The Sources of Religious Insight, 
 pp. 109 f., 137, 144 f. 
 
30 BEARING or TIIE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 with the latter; so they are independent of each other. This indepen- 
 dency, however, can be maintained only as each of them is willing to 
 restrict itself to its own field prescribed by Royce. But our scientific 
 and philosophic interests are so related in our experience that such a 
 rigid separation between them as indicated by him is practically impos- 
 sible. As a matter of fact, science is always enlarging its borders; there 
 is no closed region for its investigation;^ so that we cannot say to science: 
 Thus far thou mayest go but no further. Philosophy or theology cannot 
 shut its eyes to the fields ordinarily covered by special sciences, for the 
 results of these sciences are closely related to the interests of life, with 
 which theology and philosophy must concern themselves.'^^ Thus the 
 futihty of dividing the world into two distinct fields and of assigning 
 the one to science and the other to philosophy is clearly evident.^^ 
 
 But, in reality, Royce does not confine himself to his alio ted field. 
 He is not satisfied with the interpretation of the world given by science, 
 and offers his idealistic theory of it, and considers it as the final view of 
 the universe.^^ There is much truth in his statement: "The modem 
 naturalistic and mechanical views of reality are not, indeed, false within 
 their own proper range, but they are inadequate to tell us the whole 
 truth. "^^ But to maintain that the theory of being, which Royce holds, 
 must determine all his interpretation of nature and man,^^ is against the 
 empirical temper of our age. The present age desires neither scientific 
 nor philosophic dogmatism. Consequently, both science and philosophy 
 must assume a thoroughly empirical attitude in order that there may be 
 a proper relation between them. But such an attitude Royce does not 
 entertain. And his refusal to assume the empiricism, which character- 
 izes the evolutionary theory, is characteristic of his absolute idealism. 
 Yet the very fact that Royce affirms even the temporal reality to our 
 experience of the world, and assigns this temporal order to the work of 
 science, shows that he is interested in viewing the facts of life from an 
 empirical point of view; and so he departs from his absolute philosophical 
 theory. But just to the degree that Royce thus takes an empirical 
 attitude, he has solved the problem of the relation of his theology or 
 
 *^ Pearson, The Grammar of Science, pp. 12 ff., 24. 
 *'' Cf. Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, p. 81. 
 ^® Cf. I, King, The Development oj Religion, pp. 9 f. 
 
 ** The World and the Individual, II, pp. 207 £F.; William James and Other Essays, 
 pp. 60 ff. 
 
 60 William James and Other Essays, p. 72. 
 *^ The World and the Individual, II, pp. 8 f . 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 31 
 
 philosophy to science; and so to that extent he has indicated the bear- 
 ing of the evolutionary theory on the question of God. 
 
 Now, in regard to Royce's conception of God, enough has already 
 been said^^ to show that it is fundamentally different from the kind of a 
 God made necessary, if we accept the evolutionary view of the world. 
 The evolutionary theory would hold that if there be a God, he must not 
 only be immanent in the world but should himself be actually involved 
 in the process of change and growth. The Gk)d of Royce is, however, 
 wholly unlike such an evolving God. True, his God is immanent in the 
 world of thought and is not such a colorless being as held by the mystic. 
 True, his God is engaged in the processes of thought — ^he is interpreting 
 the world. But he is eternally what he is — there is no change and 
 increase in his being. He is not such a static absolute as that of Spinoza, 
 but he is nevertheless forever complete and self-contained. This con- 
 ception of God as the Absolute, All-inclusive Being, free from the vicissi- 
 tudes of time and evolution is perfectly consistent with Royce's system of 
 philosophy — absolute idealism. From the standpoint of this philosophy 
 we can have no other God than the eternally perfect God of Royce. 
 
 But what is worthy of note in this connection is that this conception 
 of the eternal absoluteness of the Gk)d of Royce needs to be modified in 
 the light of many of his statements which indicate finite aspects of his 
 God. To cite a few, we note the following: "The only way to give our 
 view of Being rationaUty," writes Royce, ^ is to see that we long for 
 the Absolute only in so far as in us the Absolute also longs, and seeks, 
 through our ver}'- temporal striving, the peace that is no where in Time, 
 but only, and yet absolutely, in eternity. Were there no longing in 
 Time, there would be no peace in eternity. . . . The right eternally 
 triumphs, yet not without temporal warfare. . . . This warfare occurs, 
 indeed, within the divine life itself. ... I sorrow. But the sorrow is 
 not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow."^ ' 
 "God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and 
 triumphing over and through its very finitude. . . . Our sorrow is God's 
 sorrow. ... In me the temporal being, in me now, God is in need, is 
 hungry, is thirsty, is in prison. In me, then, God is dissatisfied. But 
 he is God. He is absolute. Eternity is his. He must be satisfied. In 
 eternity, in the view of the whole temporal process, he is satisfied."^ 
 These and similar expressions of Royce indicate clearly that his God is 
 
 "See above, pp. 21 £f. 
 
 *3 The World and the Individual, II, pp. 386, 398, 409. 
 
 " William James and Other Essays, pp. 183, 296. 
 
32 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 striving to attain the goal of his perfection. But in the last analysis 
 Royce would hold that this impression of God's finitude is due to our 
 finite, temporal point of view. From the point of view of the Absolute, 
 its will is completely expressed, its tasks perfectly done, its moral life 
 absolutely finished.^^ If God is thus eternally complete in himself, why 
 does he suffer, struggle, and long to be perfect at all? Is his temporal 
 suffering only apparent and his eternal perfection an actual fact? In 
 other words, Royce, to be consistent, has to afl&rm either the stated 
 suffering of God as real and so his God finite, or his suffering as an 
 illusion and hence his God eternally complete. Royce, it .seems, does 
 not wish to do either. He feels too keenly the realism of life to pro- 
 nounce God as all complete and perfect, and so untouched by our finite 
 experiences. He would consider his God as closely related to our tem- 
 poral life, and, therefore, he attributes to his God the elements of finite 
 experience. Yet, impelled by his absolute idealism, Royce maintains 
 that the all-inclusive perfect being is at the heart of the world.^ But 
 we must remark that just in so far as Royce interprets God in terms of 
 our evolutionary experience, which he does, he departs from his philo- 
 sophical position, and comes to the conception of God necessitated by 
 the evolutionary theory. These aspects — those that are in agreement 
 with his absolute ideaHsm and those that are in accord with the evolu- 
 tionary theory — ^we also note as we come, finally, to remark on his con- 
 ception of God's relation to the world and man. 
 
 It is maintained by Royce that his God is morally perfect." This 
 moral perfection of God is not the result of moral struggle on his part.^^ 
 Royce, moreover, declares that his God is not merely immanent in the 
 world but is identical with the totaUty of the universe in all its expressions, 
 God is identical with "the totaUty of what is, past, present, and future, 
 the totality of what is physical and what is mental, of what is temporal 
 and of what is enduring .... Like the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, 
 this entire world is not only with God, but is God."^^ This being the 
 case, the world of nature and of man must be absolutely good, as Royce 
 asserts.^^ But the empirical theories of evolution, we have examined, 
 
 *^See, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 442 ff.; The Conception of God, 
 pp. 8 ff.; The World and the Individual, II, p. 302. 
 
 ^^ See The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 436 ff. 
 
 ^^ The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 441 ff.; The Conception of God, p. 8. 
 
 ^^ The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 448. 
 
 ®^ William James and Other Essays, pp. 168 f.; cf. Ibid., pp. 285 f. 
 
 "" The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 444. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 33 
 
 indicate to us that there are connected with the evolutionary process of 
 the world merciless struggles, miseries, wastes, anomalies, sufferings. 
 These forms of evil we cannot deny to exist, nor can they be explained 
 away. Royce maintains that the world is good when it is viewed in its 
 entirety .^^ An empirical evolutionist would scarcely consider the pro- 
 cesses of nature so ideaUstically as does Royce.^^ The actual process of 
 nature suggests either that the God immanent in it is impotent to carry 
 out his plans without evil consequences, or that there are evil forces 
 which are counteracting his activities. But Royce admits neither hypo- 
 thesis. He must contend for the view that the world from an eternal 
 point of view is perfect. Yet he does not deny all reality of evils in the 
 world; he admits their temporal reality, and seeks to give significance to 
 their presence.^^ Here again we see his deviation from his absolute 
 ideaHsm and a tendency on his part toward the point of view of the 
 evolutionary theory. 
 
 To speak now of Royce's view of God's relation to man, we need 
 to note that since his God, being the aU-inclusive individual of the world, 
 embraces all finite beings; and since the latter have no existence apart 
 from the former, a logical consequence would be that finite beings possess 
 no real freedom and individuality. Finite beings are aspects of the 
 Absolute. They possess no existence of their own; their ultimate goal is 
 to be ontologically one with the Absolute. This view of finite beings 
 logically follows from Royce's absolute idealism. But h^ distinctly 
 attempts to show that finite beings possess individuality and freedom." 
 In view of the fact, he holds, that each finite being expresses in his unique 
 manner the will of the Absolute, he possesses real freedom and individu- 
 ality. Because finite beings thus possess freedom and individuality 
 there are provided all the possibilities for moral life.^ And in the 
 temporal order of the world there are real moral deeds done and real 
 achievements toward a better world. Hence you as a finite being must 
 strive with all your might to accompUsh the will of God in your life and 
 society. Especially in his recent works Royce is urgently advocating 
 the necessity of this moral activity — we must five the life of loyalty to 
 an eternal cause. (See The Philosophy of Loyalty] William James and 
 
 " The World and the IndivUual, II, p. 379. 
 «2 7^Vf., pp. 219ff. 
 
 " The Warld and the Individual, I, pp. 380ff.; IT, pp. 388 ff.; The Sources of Religious 
 Insight, pp. 215 flF. 
 
 " The Warld and the Individual, II, Lecture VII. 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 343 ft. 
 
34 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 Other Essays] The Sources of Religious Insight) The Problem of Christi- 
 anity), 
 
 But this insistence of Royce upon moral activity leads us to ask: 
 Why should we be loyal and struggle against the apparent forces of evil 
 to create a better world, when the world in its essence is aU complete 
 and finished? Why must we struggle through the evils of life to obtain 
 perfection, as is held by Royce,^ when there are no real evils in the world, 
 and we stand before our God all complete?^^ Thus unless there are 
 possibilities for change and growth in the world, we cannot see how there 
 could be real moral life for us finite beings. If the world is finished from 
 an eternal point of view, as Royce holds, so that we cannot change its 
 course; the only course open to us is to deny the reality of movement 
 and progress in the world of our experience, and engage ourselves in a 
 mystic contemplation of an "eternal" world. Moreover, God is not 
 found in the world where an actual evolution is taking place; therefore 
 we can find God only in escaping from the world of evolution. What 
 other course than this can we take when we are told that the real world 
 is perfect, but that this perfection is not found in time, and that our 
 comfort lies in the knowledge of the Eternal?^^ But such a contempla- 
 tive life is wholly against the spirit of our time. And Royce would not 
 tolerate such a life. His interests he in the actual experiences of social 
 realm and he urges that we shall realize a universal community.^ ^ A 
 consistent absolute idealism would give up interest in our evolutionary 
 experience and would urge a life of speculation on the eternal perfection 
 of the world. Royce, however, declines to accept this path. The moral 
 and religious appeals of our world are so great that he must accept and 
 deal earnestly with them. In following this course, as he does, Royce 
 deviates from the position of his absolute idealism, and comes to the 
 standpoint of the evolutionary theory which stands for the reaUty of the 
 time-process in which God and men are engaged for the creation of a 
 better world. 
 
 This brings us to the close of our criticism of Royce's solution of the 
 problems raised by the evolutionary theory. We have observed that 
 fundamentally Royce has not carried out consistently the implications of 
 his theory. We have indicated to what extent he has departed from 
 his idealistic position and worked out the bearing of the evolutionary 
 
 ^ William James and Other Essays, pp. 171 fif., 287 S. 
 
 *' The World and the Individual, II, p. 150. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., pp. 379, 411. 
 
 *^ The Problem of Christianity, Lectures II ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 35 
 
 theory on the problem of method and on the conception of God. While 
 it cannot be said that Royce has positively solved the problems, yet 
 he has done much to interpret God in terms of the evolutionary theory. 
 
 //. The Solution of the Problems in Eiccken's Philosophy of Life 
 
 1. General Philosophical Position of Eucken. 
 
 The primary concern of Royce, as we have seen, is to formulate a 
 philosophical theory of the world which shall determine all the interests of 
 life. The construction of a Weltanschauung is not, however, Eucken's 
 first object. His fundamental interest lies in the life-process itself — m 
 its attempts, struggles, tasks. Eucken does not consider this life- 
 process in its isolated aspects — the intellect, emotion, will — ^but he views 
 it as a whole, that is, in its inner connections. This is one reason why 
 he differs from other vitalistic systems.''^ That is to say, Eucken deals 
 with life, not intellectually nor psychologically, but noologically — making 
 an examination of the Ufe-process in its wholeness. In this noological 
 examination of life, he observes that it is engaged in the process of 
 struggle, opposition, conflict with the physical world, with merely human 
 culture, and even within the higher domain of life itself. To get rid of 
 these enervating chains, life must not have recourse to philosophical 
 speculation, nor to aesthetic or pietistic contemplation of the world; but 
 it must struggle with all its migjit; work it must, if life is to triumph over 
 all its foes.^^ But it is a firm conviction of Eucken that work, which is 
 thus an indispensable element in life, cannot, however, assure its final 
 victory; if life were to gain — as it must — its ultimate triumph over all its 
 enemies, it must be grounded in an independent spiritual life.'^^ It is 
 with this afi&rmation of an independent spiritual life that Eucken's con- 
 ception of God is connected. Consequently, we shall consider his con- 
 ception of God from the standpoint of the spiritual life. 
 
 2. Eucken's Conception of God. 
 
 (1) God the Independent Spiritual Life as the Indispensable Factor 
 in the Life-process of Man 
 
 God, in all the intellectuaHstic systems of philosophy, is the cosmic, 
 explanatory principle of the universe, the ultimate criterion of human 
 thought. It is otherwise with Eucken. '• God, for him, is that ultimate 
 Reahty without which the life-process of humanity, in its struggles with 
 
 ^o Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 3-80. 
 
 '* Here emerges his activism, Ibid., pp. 255-261. 
 
 ""■ On these points, see The Problem of Human Life, Preface; The Truth of Religion, 
 pp. 84 f., 455 f.; The Life of the Spirit, pp. vii, 401 ff.; Main Currents of Modern 
 Thought, pp. 113 f.; Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 242, etc. 
 
36 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 the forces of evil, cannot win or be assured of its final victory. The 
 necessary existence of God, according to Eucken, lies in the fact, first, 
 that there emerges in man a higher life in contrast to that of nature; 
 secondly, that so soon as this higher life becomes evident in man, there 
 ensue tremendous conflicts between it and the forces of the physical 
 world, social culture, and of the merely human; and, thirdly, that our 
 work cannot enable us ultimately to triumph over all these opposing 
 forces. We must briefly consider these points. 
 
 Eucken fully accepts the doctrine of evolution which views man as a 
 product of nature. '^^ But he contends that this is not tantamount to 
 man's complete identity with the life of nature. The very fact that we 
 have knowledge of nature and its processes shows that we transcend 
 nature. Thought sets up an inner transcendent unity by which to judge 
 nature; it asks the whence and why of the natural phenomena. Thought 
 thus creates a conflict, a dissatisfaction of man with nature. But thought 
 cannot free man from the powers of nature. '^^ This impotency leads us 
 to ask whether fife is not more than thought. And in this inquiry, we 
 find in Hfe a higher interest developing itseK. Life based on nature 
 aims only at its self-preservation. But as life advances beyond nature, 
 there develop altruistic motives and man Uves in the interest of the 
 family, the state and the like. In this forgetfulness of mere self, there 
 appears a new form of life, a new relation between men; and a new relation 
 to nature is also developed — nature becomes a means of man's advance- 
 ment. In this detachment from nature, there occurs a liberation from 
 external ties and a development of a self-conscious spirituality. " It is this 
 development of a self-conscious spirituality in man that essentially 
 differentiates him from the life of nature. 
 
 But so soon as this higher life appears in the domain of man, he is 
 confronted with oppositions from all sides. So long as man remains in 
 the self-preserving stage of nature, he is not opposed by nature. But as 
 man attempts to raise his higher life above the degrading pulls of nature, 
 he feels keenest its opposition. Death, for example, coming from the 
 order of nature, cuts short the life of the individual, and so frustrates his 
 hope for an infinite span of life, his longing for an immortal existence. 
 The natural order is thus unconcerned with the aims and values of 
 human life.'^^ So we must seek for a Divine spiritual Ufe to help us win 
 the spiritual victory. ^^ 
 
 " Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 110 ff. 
 7*/W<f., pp. Il7f. 
 
 75 See The Truth of Religion, pp. 292 f. 
 78/6JJ.,pp. 293ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 37 
 
 Opposition to the autonomous development of man's spiritual life 
 comes, also, from the region of culture. Culture at first seems to create 
 a world of reason and order; yet in reality it hinders the onward march 
 of the spiritual life. The spiritual life would make itself independent of 
 all the external shackles of life, and thus be made the end in itself; but 
 culture aims to make itself an independent end, and so to subordinate the 
 spiritual Ufe to its own service. Social culture creates customary forms 
 of life and urges individuals to conform themselves to them. In this 
 effort of social culture, it levels down the individual differences and gives 
 no special recognition to great personaUties; and thus it crushes individual 
 greatness. 
 
 Great as are the oppositions of nature and culture, still greater 
 entanglements are found within man's spiritual life itself. The opposi- 
 tions from without are small in comparison with the difficulties found 
 within the spiritual life." The effort of the spiritual Ufe to possess the 
 whole of Hfe is opposed by the individual movements: scientific, aesthetic, 
 moral, religious interests each and all claim exclusive rights. Further, 
 there is a cleft between the subject and object — between the individual 
 consciousness and external world. And, finally, there is an antagonism 
 between the noological and psychological methods of dealing with lifej 
 
 Thus the higher life of man is confronted by the oppositions from 
 without and entanglements from within. The situation of man, there- 
 fore, is exceedingly dark and hopeless. Desperate as it is we can neither 
 remain in the region of nature nor give up the task to acquire an inde- 
 pendent spiritual life.'^^ What can, then, aid us to triumph over the 
 depressing forces of evil and to create in us an independent spiritual 
 life? We may appeal to our work, for it is not a mere incident in man's 
 life; "but it is that through which he first develops a spiritual life; through 
 which he acquires a spiritual existence."^^ But can this work com- 
 completely enable rnan to rise above the conflicts and oppositions? 
 Eucken says. No. We must, in our desperate situation, he would say, 
 appeal to a world-transcendent reality, a universal life. It is through 
 our participation in such a transcendent spiritual Hfe that we ultimately 
 triimiph over all the opposing forces. Even when there is a complete 
 failure in our work, a depressive frustration in our struggle against the 
 world, through the world-transcendent spiritual life, we may be more 
 than conquerors.^*' 
 
 " Ibid., p. 307; cf. Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 172. 
 
 " The Tridh of Religion, pp. 291-363; cf. Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 134 ff. 
 
 " Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 202 £. 
 
 «» Ibid., pp. 275 ff.; cf. The TrtUh of Religion, pp. 126 ff. 
 
3S> BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 Thus Eucken affirms God as the indispensable presupposition of the 
 life-process of man. Our next concern is to determine the character of 
 this God. 
 
 (2.) God as the Absolute Spiritual Life. 
 
 God has already been characterized by Eucken as the universal, 
 world- transcendent spiritual life. But more particularly he conceives of 
 God as the Absolute Spiritual Life.^^ Eucken thus summarizes the con- 
 tent of his conception of God: "It signifies to us nothing other than an 
 Absolute Spiritual Life in its grandeur above all the limitations of man 
 and the world of experience — a Spiritual Life that has attained to a 
 complete subsistence in itself, and, at the same time, to an encompassing 
 of all reality. . . . The idea of God signifies to us nothing other than 
 an Absolute Spiritual Life — a life in possession of a complete existence 
 for itself, and constituting the substance of reality. "^^ This conception 
 of God is set forth by Eucken in contrast to two other conceptions — 
 the anthropomorphic and the ontological speculative. The former 
 attempts to keep God as near to man as possible, while the latter aims 
 to lift God as high and far above man as possible. The anthropo- 
 morphic view of God as a magnified replica of human being has been 
 characteristic of the conceptions of God in historical religions. Over 
 against this tendency, ontological speculations have endeavored to hold 
 God as a being without any qualities and above all concepts. This 
 speculative conception of God as devoid of all anthropomorphic feature 
 has led man to passive contemplation. The anthropomorphic tendency 
 is right in its insistence that, in order for religion to be power in man, God 
 must be held as near him; while the ontological speculative view of God 
 is right in that it Hfts religion above the presentations of the merely 
 human. Eucken holds that his conception of God as an Absolute 
 Spiritual Life reconciles these antithetical tendencies, for this conception, 
 he contends, is derived from the life-process itself. In the life-process of 
 man there develops an independent spiritual life which lifts hun not 
 simply above the life of nature but also above that of the merely human; 
 so that man in his union with the spiritual life becomes one with the nature 
 of God the Absolute Spiritual Life. Thus through this transcendentali- 
 zation, the finite and the infinite do no longer appear in sharp opposites. 
 Thus, with Eucken, the conception of God as the Absolute Spiritual 
 
 81 This conception of God is worked out, especially, in his book, The Truth of 
 Religion. 
 
 »Ubid., pp20SL,2H. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 39 
 
 Life is the ultimate principle which solves the problems involved in the 
 relation of the Divine and human.^ 
 
 (3) God's Relation to Man and the Worid. 
 i. God's Relation to Man. 
 
 We have already seen that Eucken considers the Absolute Spiritual 
 Life, God, to be the indispensable presupposition of the spiritual life of 
 man in its struggle against the forces of evil. We have now to ascertain 
 Eucken's view of man's ontological relation to God. This is a difficult 
 task; because Eucken is not interested in logical distinctions, and conse- 
 quently does* not make definite statements. We may perhaps state his 
 view of God's relation to man thus: God the Absolute Spiritual Life is 
 free from all struggle and conflict; this Absolute Spiritual Life is not a 
 natural property of man; and yet it is operating in him from the com- 
 mencement of his evolutionary process. In the course of the evolu- 
 tionary process of man, there develops in him, in consequence of the 
 immanent activity of the Universal Life, a higher life in distinction to 
 that of nature. This higher life of man has not yet become one with 
 the life of God, for it is still subject to conflict and struggle; so that man 
 must fight, by the help of God, against the forces of evil, rise above them 
 and so make the infinite life of God, his essential nature.^ Thus Eucken 
 conceives of God's relation to man in terms of both immanence and 
 transcendence.^ 
 
 But now how do God and man become so related? It is here that 
 Eucken differentiates himself from orthodoxy and other systems. Ortho- 
 doxy afiirms that God comes to man through supernatural and external 
 means; Eucken, on the contrary, holds that God reveals himself to us 
 inwardly and immediately. Romanticism and pietism hold that we 
 realize God's presence in our subjective feeling ;:1but Eucken maintains 
 that it is through our volitional activity that we become aware of GodJ 
 Speculative philosophy tells us that we obtain our union with God 
 through the activity of our thought; Eucken, on the other hand, asserts 
 that it is mainly through our practical struggles against the forces of 
 evil that we come into an intimate touch with God.^ It is, then, through 
 voHtional activity that man realizes his relation to Gk)d.^^ ) 
 
 ^ For his attitude toward the personality of God, see The Truth of Religiotiy 
 pp. 208 ff., cf. Ibid., pp. 430 ff. 
 
 ** See Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 60 f.; The Truth of Religion, pp. 119 fF., 
 158, 163 i.;Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 154. 
 
 85 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 143, 152, 154; The Truth of Religion, pp. 221 flf. 
 
 ^ The Truth of Religion, pp. 250 f., 251 ff., 583 ff.; Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, 
 p. 172. 
 
 *' Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 247. 
 
40 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 As to the effects which follow from this relation of God to man, 
 Eucken holds that there takes place a [complete transformation of man 
 into the likeness of God, and the life of God becomes man's essential 
 nature. ^^ Man's higher aspirations — after infinity, freedom and equaUty, 
 eternity, fellowship, a soul-life, and inward greatness — ^are made real, 
 when he is at one with the Absolute Spiritual Life.^^ Through the 
 Universal Life, we become freed from the conflicts of Ufe.^° The uni- 
 versality, sovereignty, autonomy of the Spiritual Life becomes the 
 possession of man who struggles to embrace the whole of reality. ^^ 
 Thus Eucken holds up an inspiring future for the man who fights to 
 achieve in himself an independent spiritual life. But such a life is 
 always a task to be accomplished.^^ 
 
 ii. God and the World. 
 
 Eucken seeks to reconcile, through his conception of God as the 
 Absolute Spiritual Life, the antithetical tendencies of thought between 
 transcendence and immanence, dualism and monism, supernaturalism 
 and naturalism. He is opposed to the crass duaHsm of ordinary thought; 
 he would view the Godhead in an intimate relation with the nature of 
 things. But a thoroughgoing denial of dualism leads inevitably to 
 pantheism. Eucken appreciates the merits of pantheism; it holds up 
 before us the unity, grandeur, beauty, and the greatness of the world. 
 But he is opposed to the system because it represents the world in all 
 its aspects as completely harmonious. Now, our life-process discovers 
 itself involved in desperate struggles and oppositions against the world 
 which are ignored by pantheism.^^ Pantheism, moreover, holds that 
 the great aims of life are already attained; it thus leads to mere contem- 
 plation of reality, and to a quietistic optimism. It is the view of Eucken 
 that it is characteristic of religion to affirm that the Divine world repre- 
 sents along with itself another world which is brought into relation with 
 the Divine world not by its own strength but by that of the Divine.^' 
 So religion, with its affirmation of the Absolute Spiritual Life which is 
 effective above and within the world, must constantly oppose both 
 pantheism and duaUsm. 
 
 88 Ihid., pp. 145 f . 
 
 89 The Truth of Religion, pp. 261-282; cf. Ihid., pp. 437-453; Life's Basis and Life's 
 Ideal, pp. 16SS. 
 
 90 The Truth of Religion, pp. 120, 126, 131, 188, 191. 
 « Ibid., p. 170. 
 
 92 Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 229. 
 
 93 See The Truth of Religion, p. 218. 
 9* /6m?., pp. 220 f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 41 
 
 With this contention of reHgion for a close relation of God to the 
 world, Eucken agrees. He considers God the Absolute Spiritual Life 
 to be the very foundation of the world. In spite of the fact that there 
 are evil forces operating against the activity of God, the existence and 
 processes of the world must be due to the immanent activity of God. 
 If out of nature man arises with a capacity for appropriating the Uni- 
 versal Life, there must have been present in the evolutionary process 
 such a life as its ultimate cause. With the recognition of the Absolute 
 Spiritual Life as the foundation of our life, " our whole view of the cosmos 
 changes, and with it our task in life. Nature no longer constitutes the 
 whole of reality, and the latter acquires a deeper significance."^^ "Na- 
 ture must be more than a soulless machine if its evolution is to lead, 
 as it does, to the point where a self-conscious life emerges."^ ^Thus in 
 the thought of Eucken, God is the ultimate cause of the world. 
 3. Criticism of Eucken's Solution of the Problems. 
 We have observed, in our exposition of Eucken's conception of God, 
 that he has sought to bring it into line with the evolutionary thought of 
 our age. This is particularly manifest in his emphasis upon the life- 
 process and its acti\dty. Here we find an equivalent for Darwin's 
 central idea, the struggle for existence. But we have now to enquire 
 more particularly whether Eucken has made use of the essential ele- 
 ments of the evolutionary theory in his formulation of his conception of 
 God. 
 
 The central thought in Eucken's philosophy of life is his conception 
 of a world- transcendent spiritual Ufe, a whole of reality, which he identi- 
 fies with God. This God, the cosmic spiritual life, furnishes the solution 
 to all the problems of our life. He is the fundamental basis of human 
 life and its activities. A pertinent question is: How does Eucken come 
 to his conception of such a God? Eucken repudiates the intellectualism 
 of idealistic philosophy (that of Hegel, for example), the subjectivism of 
 Romanticism, and such voluntarism as that of Schopenhauer.^^ He is 
 especially opposed to the psychological method, which would base our 
 view of reaUty on what it discovers in the immediate psychical life of man. 
 That we cannot base our philosophy of life on what we find in the imme- 
 diate psychic existence is evident from the fact that it is characterized 
 by uncertainty and transitoriness. Therefore we must oppose the 
 psychological method, as it cannot discover a durable truth which we 
 
 * Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 459. 
 
 ^Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 270 f.; cf. The Truth of Religion, pp. 165 flf. 
 
 »' The Truth of Religion, pp. 73 ff. 
 
42 ' BEARINC^ OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 seek. In the place of psychological method, Eucken follows what he 
 calls the noological method. "To explain noologically," writes Eucken, 
 "means to arrange the whole of the Spiritual Life as a special activity, 
 to ascertain its position and problem, and through such an adaptation 
 to illumine the whole and raise its potencies. "^^ By thus viewing the 
 various aspects of life noologically, Eucken comes to the view of an 
 independent spiritual life as the basis of his philosophy; all things must 
 be viewed from the standpoint of such a life.^^ 
 
 It is evident, even from this brief reference to his method, that 
 Eucken does not make use of the inductive method employed by the 
 formulators of the evolutionary theories. Eucken, like Royce, explains 
 reality deductively, that is, from the standpoint of an independent 
 spiritual life which he affirms to be a priori necessary (Royce's intellectu- 
 alism, of course, is absent from Eucken). With this a priori assumption, 
 Eucken discounts the elements of reality ascertainable in history and in 
 our experience. And this a priori method is perfectly in accord with his 
 general philosophical position. Nevertheless, in spite of his fundamental 
 interests in an absolutist metaphysics, Eucken, like Royce, is constantly 
 concerned with the actual struggles and conflicts of experience; he is 
 incessantly engaged in setting forth the life-process in its progressive 
 development. It is not something beyond our experience with which 
 Eucken deals; he is investigating the living and empirical interests of the 
 life-process itself. What attracts his attention and leads him to inquire 
 is thus our evolutionary experience. His interest in the evolutionary 
 experiences of life is indicated to us by his historical works.^^° Yet it is 
 his fear that we cannot discover a stable basis of life through the use of 
 empirical method that leads him to distrust this method and to fall 
 back on his a priori procedure.^^^ Thus we see in Eucken, as we have 
 found in Royce, a double tendency: a tendency to deal with the facts 
 of life empirically, and a tendency to view them from the standpoint of 
 an a priori assumption. 
 
 This double tendency appears in his attitude toward science. Eucken 
 fully appreciates the worth of science as it enables us to control the 
 forces of nature.^^^ This appreciation of modern science is made m2im.' 
 
 ^^Ibid., p. 178; cf. pp. 453 ff.; Life's Basis and Life's Ided, pp. 158, 242 f., 351 f. 
 " Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 129 ff. 
 
 ^°° E. g., The Problem of Human Life, Main Currents of Modern Thought. 
 ^"^ For a criticism of Eucken's method, see Waterhouse, Modern Theories of 
 Religion, pp. 257 ff. 
 
 ^°* Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 345 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 43 
 
 fest in his repudiation of the naive supematuralism of traditional Chris- 
 tianity.^^ He readily accepts the fact of evolution.^^ He holds that 
 it is not natural science that creates trouble for us, but our own weakness 
 in spiritual convictions.^^^ But a question here is: Can he really appre- 
 ciate and do justice to scientific concepts, the evolutionary theory 
 included, without accepting the method by which these concepts are 
 formulated? Can he accept the theory of evolution apart from its 
 method? The method and theory of evolution sesm to be so closely 
 bound up with each other that one will find it very difficult to accept 
 the one and reject the other in any consistent way. Eucken is perfectly 
 willing to view man as a product of nature, provided he is allowed to 
 maintain that in man there appears in the course of his evolutionary 
 process an independent spiritual life.^^ He thus lays his greatest 
 emphasis upon the super-empirical factor in the evolutionary process of 
 man. 
 
 It is this emphasis of Eucken on an independent spiritual life above 
 evolution that leads him to oppose the naturalistic philosophy which 
 results from the phenomenal success of modern science. He cannot 
 tolerate the theory that the whole life of man is identical with the physi- 
 cal and chemical elements of nature, and that it can be explained by 
 something lower than man.^^^ 
 
 But what we wish to indicate here is that Eucken has done much to 
 bring science and philosophy or theology into cordial relations. He is 
 wilHng that science should deal with the whole physical realm of reality. 
 And it may also concern itself with the psychical facts of existence. 
 Eucken does not introduce breaks into the evolutionary process; he 
 accepts man completely as a product of nature. The only thing in 
 science, which he strenuously opposes, is its naturaUstic tendency to 
 explain human life purely in terms of natural elements. Eucken rightly 
 holds that there is more to reality than it is discovered by natural science. 
 So that natural science must surrender its dogmatic tendency if there 
 is to be a tenable relation between it and theology. But, in order to 
 estabhsh a completely harmonious relation between them, Eucken would 
 have to give up his a priori assumption of an absolute spiritual reaUty 
 
 '^Ihid., pp. 6 ff.; The Truth of Religion, pp. 521 ff., 549 f. 
 ^°* Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 257, 262 f., 278. 
 ^* The Problem of Human Life, pp. 541 f . 
 i«» The Life of the Spirit, p. 271. 
 
 ^'^'' Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 24 ff.; Main Currents of Modern Thought, 
 pp. 184 f. 
 
44 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 standing outside the evolutionary process. Eucken, however, in accord- 
 ance with his philosophical position, refuses to be content with the kind 
 of reality indicated by the evolutionary theory. But the very fact that 
 he views so much of reality, as we have seen, from the standpoint of the 
 evolutionary theory, shows that he has departed from a strictly abso- 
 lutistic position, and gives positive value to the aspects of reality ascer- 
 tainable in our evolutionary experience. 
 
 Now in regard to the traditional conception of God as the transcen- 
 dent, supernatural personality, it should be noted that Eucken has set 
 aside its supernaturalistic features, and retains what he regards as its 
 eternal element. He cannot conceive of God as coming to us by means of 
 external revelation, miracles, mediations, even by the Son of God.^^^ 
 He would not, therefore, hold to the view of God as a realistically con- 
 ceived transcendent personality. To be sure, Eucken holds to the 
 transcendence of God, but not in the sense of traditional theology. The 
 God of Eucken is transcendent only in the sense that he cannot be 
 identified with the mere totality of evolving things, and so is above time 
 and history which characterize empirical reality. But this rejection of 
 the traditional conception of God as transcendent personality is not, 
 however, for Eucken, equivalent to the denial of its eternal kernel. 
 This eternal element in the traditional doctrine of God is found in the 
 affirmation of an Absolute Spiritual Life in union with man.^*^^ This 
 leads us to the problem of God as the Absolute Being. 
 
 Enough has been said in our treatment of Eucken's conception of 
 God to show that he conceives of him as the Absolute Spiritual Life 
 above the limitations of time and history.^^*^ Eucken maintains that 
 God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is the foundation of all time-order. 
 An Eternal Order of things is the basic principle of history. Man cannot 
 find satisfaction in history, if there is not disclosed in it to him "aw 
 over-historical nature.' '^^^ Time becomes to us a phantom if eternity is 
 lacking in it. We get to the Spiritual Life through the movements of 
 time, but it is above time and history. ^^^ We seek for a basis of life. 
 But we canot find it in our immediate experience, thought, or activity; 
 for in the whole life of immediate existence, all is change. We must, 
 therefore, seek for it beyond our psychic state — in a whole of Hfe which 
 
 108 The Truth of Religion, pp. 576 ff. 
 
 109 Ibid., pp. 544 ff. 
 "0 See above, pp. 38f. 
 
 1" The Truth of Religion, p. 175. 
 ii2/6w/.,p. 176. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 45 
 
 is not subject to time.^^^ To conceive of God as subject to the changes 
 of history means to surrender the absoluteness of all truth. "To place 
 variableness in God means nothing less than to surrender the absoluteness 
 of truth, it means no less than to leave the field to a blind positiveness 
 and a destructive relativism. "^^* ReHgion lays hold of "an Absolute 
 Life which in its very nature is timeless. "^^^ To reduce all reality to 
 becoming means to empty of life all its content. "The transformation 
 
 of all reality into a stream of Becoming destroys all truth 
 
 and empties life of all its content. ReaUty itself seems nothing more 
 than an ephemeral world of shadows. "^^^ So that "All Spiritual Life is 
 here a struggle against the flux of time — an ascent to eternal and immor- 
 tal truth. "^^^ Thus Eucken cannot subject God to the changes of time, 
 to which we are exposed. In order to give a firm and unchangeable 
 basis to the changes of our experience, God must be conceived of as the 
 Absolute Spiritual Life free from all the vicissitudes of time.^^^ This 
 affirmation of God as above time and history is the indispensable kernel 
 of Eucken's philosophy."^ 
 
 But, now, there are many elements in the philosophy of Eucken 
 which would naturally lead him to conceive of God in terms of change 
 and growth. For example, his emphasis on activity rather than on 
 thought as an essential means of appropriating reality ;^° his recognition 
 of movement and history as characteristic of modern age;^^^ his view of 
 God as immanent in the world of man helping him to be one with himself^ 
 — all these and other like elements call for the view of God as a changing, 
 growing being. Eucken, however, affirms that, in the interest of human 
 life and civilization, we must conceive of God in terms of an Absolute 
 Spiritual Life above the changes of time. This affirmation of Gk)d's 
 imchangeabihty can be consistently maintained by Eucken only if he 
 views the ultimate meaning of the world of experience in static terms, and 
 conceives of God's relation to the world and man in somewhat after the 
 fashion of traditional supernaturaUsm. But he is too keenly conscious 
 
 "^ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 154. 
 
 "* The Truth of Religion, pp. 379 f. 
 
 '^ Ibid., p. 477. 
 
 "• Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 4L 
 
 ^^^ The Truth of Religion, p. 446. 
 
 "8/&i(f., pp. 537ff. 
 
 "9 Ihid., p. 455. 
 
 ^« Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 220 ff., 255 ff. 
 
 ^21 The Life of the Spirit, pp. 104 fiF. 
 
 122 The Truth of Religion, pp. 221 ff. 
 
46 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 of the life and movement of the world of nature and of man to conceive 
 of them in static terms. Neither the physical world nor the human 
 world is, for Eucken, a finished entity; they are, on the contrary, changing 
 and growing realities. The essential characteristic of our empirical life 
 is its movement, struggle, conflict. We are not yet personalities, but 
 growing to be such. Moreover, his activistic faith does not permit him 
 to confess his allegiance to the traditional supernaturalism of Christianity. 
 He would rather conceive of God as involved in a vital relation with the 
 movements of history.^^ If Eucken consistently followed out this con- 
 ception which attributes movement and growth to nature and humanity 
 and views God's relation to them in dynamic terms, it would be exceed- 
 ingly difficult to maintain the static absoluteness of God. Can the God 
 of Eucken, who is held to be in dynamic relation to the world of nature 
 and of man which are involved in the process of change and growth 
 remain unaffected by their change and growth? It does not appear 
 possible for such a God to be essentially unrelated to these processes 
 which are seen to be the dominant characteristics of the world and 
 humanity. Thus if Eucken maintains the absoluteness of God in the 
 midst of change and movement and progress, he must do it in opposition 
 to the undeniable facts of our common experience and the inductive 
 evidences of science. But we have shown that there are many features 
 in the philosophy of Eucken which are irreconcilable with his contention 
 for the static absoluteness of God. But these elements which oppose 
 the central thought of Eucken indicate that he has not been able to 
 escape the bearing of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God. 
 This aspect of his philosophy will appear as we come, finally, to his view 
 of God's relation to the world and man. 
 
 Eucken ultimately conceives of God's relation to the world in terms of 
 immanent ideaUsm.^^^ This conception, however, is not in accord with 
 his opposition to immanent idealism and his indictment of the processes 
 of the natural world. One of the considerations which leads Eucken to 
 oppose the system of immanent idealism is its assumption that reality 
 is completely rational. He feels that the historical and scientific studies 
 of the nineteenth century have made the world appear very dark and 
 irrational.^25 'pj^jg sense of the irrationality of the world and of its 
 oppositions to the values and aims of human life is so strong that Eucken 
 
 ^23 See Christianity and the New Idealism, pp. 45 ff.; Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, 
 pp. 188 £f.; Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 318 flf. 
 ^ See above, pp. 40 f . 
 126 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 20; cf. The Truth of Religion, pp. 290 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 47 
 
 is forced to acknowledge that the evils in the world present to us an 
 insoluble enigma of life.^^e jf Qq^j jg the ultimate cause and foundation 
 of the world, as Eucken claims, why should there be evils, and why could 
 they not be explained? The admission of Eucken as to the reality of the 
 evils in the world and its irrationality suggests either that his God is 
 impotent to control the evil forces of the world, or they are due to some 
 non-divine factors. In either case God would be finite in power. But 
 Eucken, influenced by the rationalizing tendency of immanent idealism, 
 maintains that the world, despite its insoluble evils, is due to the imma- 
 nent activity of God.^^^ Yet his firm conviction and constant reiteration 
 of the wickedness of the world manifested in its oppositions and hin- 
 drances to the interests of human life tend toward the conception of a 
 finite God. 
 
 To come now to Eucken's view of the relation of God and man, we 
 observe that he considers this relation from the standpoint of the prac- 
 tical interests of the life of man. God as the Absolute Spiritual Life is 
 absolutely necessary to give content and subsistence to man's life; 
 without such a God man would be bound by the evil forces of nature and 
 so could not attain to his destiny. The method, by which we come in 
 touch with this all-necessary God for our life, is practical. It is through 
 struggles, sufferings, conflicts, according to Eucken, that we come to the 
 sense of our union with God; we must fight with all our might against 
 the evil forces of the world if we are to possess the life of God in our 
 soul, for in the hardest fight we gain the clearest vision of God.^^^ In 
 accordance with this emphasis of Eucken on the indispensableness of 
 volitional activity, we find that only in a few passages a vision of a life 
 above the struggles of our temporal experience is promised.^^® Holding 
 this life of bliss before us we must ever struggle to make it our own. 
 
 A question arises at this point: What is God's relation to us in our 
 struggle? Is he implicated in our struggles against the antagonistic 
 forces of the world? If he is not involved in the sufferings caused by 
 these depressing experiences, how could he actually help us? Eucken 
 flatly denies that God participates in our struggles and sufferings. All 
 that we need to know, according to Eucken, is that God does help us 
 out of the apparent defeats of our life.^^*^ He desires to preserve the 
 
 126 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 280 f. ; The Truth of Religion, pp. 490 ff. 
 
 ^' Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, pp. 270 £f. 
 
 i28/6^J.,pp.246f,255fif. 
 
 "9 See Ihid., pp. 277 f.; The Truth of Religion, pp. 126 ff. 
 
 "" The Truth of Religion, pp. 432 ff. 
 
48 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 freedom of God from the changes and experiences of time. But what 
 we need particularly to observe is that Eucken gives very little space to 
 an exposition of his contention that God is above the changes and suf- 
 ferings of our life. On the other hand, abundant space is given to his 
 exposition of the life-process of man in its historical development. And 
 the very terms in which he speaks of God are derived from the actual 
 experiences of human life. The phrase most used by Eucken to repre- 
 sent God, namely, spiritual life, stands for a reality of which we are 
 directly conscious and conscious in terms of changing experience. The 
 God of Eucken is thus not consistently portrayed as so far above the 
 limitations of human experience as he claims. 
 
 We may conclude our criticism of Eucken with the remark that there 
 are many elements in his philosophy which contradict his avowed abso- 
 lutistic position, and which, on account of this very opposition to the 
 central thesis of his system, namely, an independent spiritual life as the 
 fundamental basis and ideal of human life, show how largely he has been 
 led by the evolutionary experiences of our life to deal with it empirically 
 and to interpret God in terms of these experiences. He thus shows 
 plainly the influence of the evolutionary theory on his conception of God. 
 
 ///. The Solution of the Problems in Bowne's Personal Idealism 
 
 1. Bowne's General Philosophical Position, 
 
 The primary concern of Bowne is to work out a system of philosophy 
 and of religion which shall undermine unscientific naturalism and do away 
 with a false supernaturalism, and which shall yet do justice to both 
 science and religion (This is particularly manifest in his book. The Imma- 
 nence of God.), He employs to accomplish this task a twofold method. 
 In dealing with the problems of metaphysics, Bowne confesses that we 
 have no other means of inquiry but thought. The world exists in and 
 for thought, and the categories of human thought are taken to be iden- 
 tical with the principles of cosmic being. ^^^ Hence *' We have no means of 
 deahng with reahty other than through the conceptions we form of it."^^^ 
 With regard to our moral and religious problems, however, Bowne holds 
 that we must appeal to our practical experiences.^^^ Yet it should be 
 observed that, for Bowne, the ultimate nature of reality is finally to be 
 determined through the medium of thought; at any rate, thought forms 
 the starting point in his treatment of philosophy and of religion. 
 
 "1 Theism, pp. 138, 132. 
 
 ^^^ Metaphysics, p. 3. 
 
 ^^Uhid., pp. 411 f., 427, 429; Theism, pp. 153, 261-280, 320. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 49 
 
 The essential nature of reality, discovered by this method of thought, 
 is, according to Bowne, conscious intelligence or personality. For him, 
 "the entire world is a thought world; that is, a world^that exists only 
 through and in relation to intelligence. The mind is the only ontological 
 reality. "^^ This conscious inteUigence, mind, or personality is the 
 inexplicable presupposition of all reality ;^^ it constitutes the fundamental 
 nature of the universe. But this conscious personality, which is the 
 ultimate nature of the world, is not Royce's all-inclusive being. It con- 
 sists of an infinite mind and finite minds. Here emerges Bowne's personal 
 idealism in the theory that the ultimate reality is a world of persons 
 with a Supreme Person at its head.^^^ From the standpoint of this 
 conception of reality, Bowne constructs his doctrine of God and meets 
 the problems raised by the evolutionary theory.^^'' 
 
 2. Bowne's Conception of God. 
 
 We shall consider, following Bowne's method, first his metaphysical 
 conception and then his reUgious conception of God. 
 
 (1) God as the World-Ground. 
 
 Bowne's metaphysical conception of God is summed up in the view 
 of him as the world-ground, the causal and explanatory principle of the 
 universe. This world-ground is characterized, according to Bowne, 
 by unity, intelligence, and personality. 
 
 God is first of all the unitary ground of all things; all forms of exis- 
 tence have their being in and through him. The world, from one point 
 of view is many, while it is, from another point of view, one. It is not, 
 however, the many that sustain the world, but the one. This view that 
 the one is the causal ground of the world is worked out by Bowne through 
 the theory of interaction (which he inherits from Lotze). Bowne 
 assumes that the world forms a system of interaction; things are related 
 with each other through the medium of interaction. The interaction 
 between them is made possible "through the unity of an all-embracing 
 one, which either coordinates and mediates their interaction, or of 
 which they are in some sense phases or modifications. "^^^ Thus there 
 are two sorts of interaction. In the case of phenomenal reality which 
 has no ontological reality of its own, the interaction is immediate; 
 while in regard to finite spirits that have a certain measure of onto- 
 
 ^^* Metaphysics, p. 423; cf. Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 50. 
 
 ^^ Theism, pp. 168 f. 
 
 "* Personalism, pp. 277 f. 
 
 "^ For other essential elements of his philosophy, see Metaphysics^ esp. Part I. 
 
 "8 Metaphysics, p. 81; cf. Theism, p. 59. 
 
50 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 logical reality and so to this extent are distinct from the all-embracing 
 one, the interaction is a mediated and coordinated interaction. The 
 unitary being which thus sustains the world of many in the relation of 
 interaction is absolute and infinite. As absolute this being does not 
 exclude all relation; but it freely determines its own relation to the world. 
 As infinite this being does not deny the existence of the finite world; 
 but it is the only sufficient source of the latter.^^^ 
 
 This absolute and infinite unitary ground of the world is intelligent! 
 To show that God, the world-ground, is inteUigent, Bowne employs two 
 kinds of argument — the inductive and speculative. 
 
 The chief inductive arguments employed are those from order, tele- 
 ology, and finite intelligence.; The argument from order means that 
 the order seen in nature is not due to some non-intelligent, but to an 
 intelligent, principle. ^^"^ The argument from teleology holds that in 
 inorganic and organic realms not only do we see order, but an order 
 directed toward ends; there we discover an intelligent purpose. In 
 nature there is a reign of law but also of purpose and ends. This argu- 
 ment must be used with caution. For it does not teach an external 
 making of things, but an immanent guiding; nor does it hold that what- 
 ever can be explained by natural laws and agents is exempt from mental 
 causality. ^^^ ; Positively the teleological argument teaches that the pro- 
 cesses in nature are determined by ends; that there we perceive an intelli- 
 gent activity at work for the accomplishment of purpose or purposes. 
 But a purpose cannot act except as a conception in the consciousness of 
 some agent. Hence this activity demands a preconceiving intelligence 
 as its implication or condition. ^'^^ The last inductive argument, that is, 
 that from finite intelligence, points out that we cannot go from our finite 
 intelhgence, of which we are conscious, to some non-intelligence for its 
 explanation; but we must refer our finite intelligence to some cosmic 
 intelligence for its explanation.^^ It is the view of Bowne that these 
 inductive arguments are valid as far as they go, but they are not final. 
 So he turns to his speculative arguments to show the intelligence of the 
 world-ground. 
 
 He mentions two speculative arguments — the epistemological and 
 metaphysical. The epistemological argument shows that atheism des- 
 
 ^^^ Metaphysics, p. 93; cf. Theism, pp. 60 f. 
 "" Theism, pp. 69 f. 
 1" Ibid., pp. 82 flf. 
 
 ^*=For Bowne's attitude toward the counter arguments to the above theistic 
 design argument, see Theism, pp. 89 ff. 
 "3/6/^., pp. 119 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 51 
 
 troys the trustworthiness of reason. In a mechanical system of mind 
 there are no mental acts, but only psychological occurrences. Further, a 
 necessitarian, mechanical system cannot make any distinction between 
 truth and error. But we must hold that our faculties are made for 
 truth. Hence epistemologically we are led to the position of theism. 
 We must afl&rm an intelligent principle in order to give validity to our 
 knowledge. The argument from metaphyscis indicates that a self- 
 contained atheistic world of common-sense realism does not actually 
 exist. The only extant world is a world of thought relations. The 
 intelligent world is a world of meanings and thought contents, and 
 these are impossible except with reference to inteUigence. Such an 
 intelligent principle is the only adequate explanation of the finite world.^'*^ 
 
 We have now reached the view that the world-ground or God is the 
 unitary causaUty of all things, and that he is their rational or inteUigent 
 principle. But does it follow from this that the world-ground is also 
 personal? Is the unitary and intelligent being of the world unconscious 
 or conscious personality? Bowne contends that to conceive of the world- 
 ground m terms of intelligence — as we must — means to view it also as 
 personal.^^ The alleged antinomy between personaUty and absolute- 
 ness is avoided by holding that inteUigence as appUed to the world- 
 ground is not an adjustment oi the inner condition to the outer; it simply 
 means the power to know. PersonaUty, moreover, does not mean cor- 
 poreality or spatiaUty; by personality is meant only self-knowledge and 
 seU-control.^^ Despite the objections made against this affirmation of 
 personaUty,"^ Bowne maintains that we are shut up to the notion of 
 divine personaUty."^ Personality for us finite beings is an ideal to be 
 achieved, but it belongs unconditionally to the infinite. A perfect and 
 complete personaUty is found in God only."^ 
 
 It has already been indicated that this unitary, inteUigent, and per- 
 sonal world-ground or God is the ontological cause of all things. But 
 Bowne repudiates all systems which deny or miUtate against the abso- 
 lute independence of God from the world. He maintains that God is 
 the independent cause of aU finite existence. Hence he rejects aU forms 
 
 '^^ Ibid., pp. 134 ff. 
 ^« Ibid., p. 160. 
 
 ^*« Ibid., p. 162; cf. Metaphysics, p. 116, Personalism, p. 226. 
 "7 Theism, pp. 164 ff. 
 "8 Ibid., p. 169. 
 
 ^*^Ibid., pp. 150 ff.; cf. Rashdall, Personality: Human and Divdne, in the volume 
 Personal Idealism, edited by Henry Sturt. 
 
52 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 of pantheism as derogatory to the absoluteness of Gk)d/^^ and contends 
 for the view that all finite forms of existence have their being in and 
 through the immanent activity of God. The physical or phenomenal 
 world owes its existence to God absolutely; while the finite spirits have 
 "thing-hood" to a certain degree, and so that they are not related to God 
 absolutely. But both these forms of reality are caused to be by God, 
 that is, all finite existences are dependent on God for such existence as 
 they have.^^^ Bowne is especially concerned to guard the ontological 
 reality of the finite spirits. They cannot be said to possess the same 
 quality of existence as that of the infinite. Nevertheless, they have a 
 substantial reality, for they can act and be acted upon. In our experience 
 we find that we have a certain measure of freedom as well as the sense 
 of our dependence on the external forces. It is because of this limited 
 freedom that we are made responsible for our moral deeds. But we are 
 ultimately dependent on God for our existence.^^^ 
 
 So far we have considered Bowne's metaphysical conception of God. 
 We now turn to his religious conception of God. 
 
 (2) The World-Ground as Ethical. 
 
 Bowne's religious conception of God is expressed in the doctrine that 
 the world-ground is ethical. Thus he identifies the absolute and infinite 
 intelligent personal God, the world-ground, which he has found to be 
 the necessary metaphysical principle of the world, with the God of 
 religion (in this also Bowne is following Lotze). Bowne, however, 
 candidly admits that the God of metaphysics is as such unsatisfactory 
 to religion. Religiously the metaphysical conception is secondary. The 
 human mind, on the whole, has sought for a religious conception of God 
 prior to a metaphysical conception. As a matter of logic the metaphysical 
 attributes^^^ of God are barren ethically and so religiously; they furnish 
 a possibiHty of an ethical nature, but do not necessarily imply such a 
 nature. But from the religious point of view the important attributes 
 are those which affirm the ethical character of God. Religion demands 
 a God whom man can love, trust and worship. To satisfy this demand 
 of religion, God must be conceived in terms of highest ethical qualities. 
 The immediate task, then, for Bowne, is to determine whether the God 
 of his metaphysics can be declared ethical, so that he may be considered 
 the proper object of rehgious faith. 
 
 15" Theism, pp. 199 ff. 
 i«i76ii.,p. 207. 
 "2Seef6/(f., pp. 218ff. 
 "3 See Theism, pp. 172 fiF. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 53 
 
 If we accept the idea of a perfect being as the ground of the universe, 
 the question of the moral character of God is settled at once. For in 
 that case, the true, the beautiful, and the good would immediately 
 follow. But Bowne proceeds to examine the empirical arguments to 
 ascertain whether they convince us of the ethical character of the God of 
 metaphysics. The empirical arguments attempt to show the moral 
 character of God by a consideration of the moral nature of man, the 
 structure of society, and of history. In regard to the moral nature of 
 man it may be said that it owes its existence to a moral God, for we 
 cannot think of it as coining from an unmoral God. This is an argimaent 
 from moral effect to a moral cause. "Hence spontaneous thought has 
 generally regarded the moral nature in man as pointing to a moral 
 character in God as its sufficient ground. Speculation, too, knows of no 
 better account to give." ^ One of the imphcations of this argument is 
 that our conscience immediately testifies to a moral character of God; 
 sin is sin against the moral will of God. This consciousness of sin as 
 being against the will of God as well as other moral considerations have 
 led mankind to posit a supreme justice and goodness in God. Another 
 empirical argument concerns itself with the structure of life and society 
 and of the course of history. These are held to reveal the moral nature of 
 God. Life is so constituted that it makes for values and ends. The 
 structure of society, too, is such as to further moral ends through its 
 moral institutions. The course of history, moreover, shows the rise and 
 development of moral ideals, and indicates also that nations have been 
 wrecked by their own oppression, injustice, and immoraUty. These are 
 the chief empirical arguments that have been iised to show the goodness 
 of God. 
 
 These empirical arguments, however, in the opinion of Bowne, are 
 not productive of certainty as to the ethical character of the world- 
 ground; they do not form a source of the faith in a moral God; neither 
 do they convince us of the superiority of a moral universe. They are 
 based upon picked facts and so ignore other facts which are against the 
 moral nature of the world. They in themselves, therefore, do not furnish 
 a conclusive evidence as to the ethical character of God. The outcome 
 of an empirical examination of the facts which the world presents to us, 
 then, "would probably be the affirmation of a being either morally 
 indifferent, or morally imperfect, or morally good, but limited by some 
 insuperable necessity which forbids anything better than our shabby 
 
 ^ Theism, p. 252. 
 
54 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 universe. "^^ But our mind cannot be content with such a being. It 
 would rather maintain its faith in a perfect being as the basis of the 
 moraUty of the world, and set aside the dark features of it until we shall 
 gain a better insight which may enable us to harmonize them with the 
 idea of God as the perfect being. Bowne holds that this assumption is 
 made on cognitive and moral grounds to save life from logical and moral 
 destruction; it is an act of instinctive self-defense on the part of the mind 
 to save life from its mental and moral collapse. " This impUcit teleology 
 of life," says Bowne, "leads with equal necessity to the affirmation of a 
 Supreme Reason and a Supreme Righteousness. "^^^ So Bowne appeals 
 to the deep experiences of life itself, and not to logical proof, to reach a 
 final verdict as to the moral character of the world-ground.^^^ Since 
 our understanding is only an instrument for interpreting the data fur- 
 nished by experience, it is dependent on experience for its interpretation 
 of the world, particularly, in regard to its ethical character. So we must 
 have vital experience, for it is in active, Hving experience that we really 
 come to discern the goodness of our Creator. When logic fails to give 
 us the certainty as to the ethical character of God, the experiences of 
 life thus come to our aid. "Experience is held to testify not only to a 
 cosmic reason but also to a cosmic righteousness." ^^^ Thus Bowne, 
 especially in dealing with ethical and religious interests, lays a great 
 emphasis on experience as the final arbiter in these matters. 
 
 With this appeal to vital experiences Bowne seeks to solve the problem 
 of evil. This cannot be settled by ratiocination but by active moral 
 living. For when we consult this life of humanity we find that it reveals 
 "faith in the moral goodness of God."^^^ This faith is an ineradicable 
 part of the human nature. It enables man to "wander in the wilderness 
 until he has fitted himself to enter the promised land."^^° So through his 
 appeal to the experiences of life Bowne finds reason to beheve that the 
 world-ground or God is ethical. 
 
 [ The essential characteristics of God as an ethical being are held to be 
 love and hoHness; God is a being of holy love. These ethical elements of 
 God must be held in their organic unity. For love without holiness 
 would be mere sentimentahty, that is, it would lack the necessary moral 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 25S. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 25S, d. p. 261. 
 
 ^'' Ibid., p. 2S9. 
 
 ^» Ibid., p. 261. 
 
 ^Ubid., p. 2S5. 
 
 i«°/6^.,p. 284. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 55 
 
 content; and holiness apart from love would be a lifeless negation. Thus 
 we would view God as a morally perfect being, and hence our moral 
 ideal.^^^ Such a morally perfect God is the necessary presupposition of 
 our moral life. We are so constituted that, in order to Uve a substantial 
 moral life, we must believe in a God who is at the same time the supreme 
 reason and supreme righteousness of the world, who is constantly working 
 in the natural order, in the course of history, and in the world of man for a 
 supreme moral goal, the creation of a community of free moral persons. ^^^ 
 
 We have thus far set forth positively Bowne's conception of God. 
 We shall now turn to the criticism of his solution of the problems with 
 which this study is concerned. 
 
 3. Criticism of Bowne's Solution of the Problems. 
 
 Our discussion of Bowne's philosophical position and his conception 
 of God has shown that he represents a type of religious philosophy which 
 seeks to vindicate the vaUdity of the essential content of the Christian 
 doctrine of God in an age of philosophical skepticism and of scientific 
 progress. Conscious of the difficulties raised, particularly, by modem 
 science, Bowne has sought to bring the traditional conception of God 
 into relation with the scientific concepts of our time through the medium 
 of his personal ideaUsm. It is our concern here to make a critical exami- 
 nation of his solution of the problems occasioned by the evolutionary 
 theory. 
 
 As regards Bowne's method of formulating his conception of God 
 it is not easy to generalize. For in his mode of procedure there are inter- 
 mingled apriori-deductive and empirical-inductive elements.^^ In his 
 treatment of the metaphysical conception of God, he is following an 
 apriori-deductive method shut through with intellectualism; though he 
 claims that the practical experiences of life also lead us to the view of God 
 as a Supreme Reason ;^^ while in his discussion of the religious view of 
 God, he lays a particular emphasis on experience as having the last word 
 on the subject. It is with his emphasis on life in the formulation of his 
 conception of God that we find the most difficulty. We agree with the 
 suggestion of Bowne that the vital experiences and interests of life must 
 ultimately determine one's conception of God. But it does not follow 
 that empirically we shall be able to identify the God of metaphysics with 
 
 "^ For Bowne's effort to show how such a perfect moral being is capable of real 
 life, see Theism, pp. 287 ff. 
 »«2 76i^., Chap. VII. 
 i« See, e. g., Theism, Chaps. VI f. 
 ^"/W^., pp. 258, 261. 
 
56 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 the God of religion, as does Bowne, and consider him as the Ethical 
 Absolute.^^^ Hence we are justified in sajdng that Bowne, even in his 
 construction of his religious conception of God where he lays the most 
 emphasis on experience, is proceeding on the basis of his preconceived 
 theory of the universe and of God.^^^ Such a procedure is, however, 
 wholly in harmony with his a priori metaphysical assumption. Yet we 
 need to observe that the very fact that Bowne lays so much emphasis on 
 vital experience; that he distrusts the power of logical syllogizing to 
 furnish our final conception of the character of God;^^^ and that he 
 frankly admits the priority of reUgious conception of God to that of the 
 metaphysical,^^^ shows that he has departed from his metaphysical 
 apriorism, and approximates the inductive method of the evolutionary 
 theory. 
 
 To come next to Bowne's attitude toward science, we note that he 
 stands for a division of labor between it and philosophy. He relegates 
 science to the region of phenomenal reality. There science has a free 
 hand in its work of describing the occurrences of natural events and their 
 causal nexus; but it has no word to say concerning the ontological 
 realm.^®^ With this division of labor, science, on the one hand, and 
 philosophy and theology, on the other, are independent of each other; 
 the former concerns itself with the phenomenal world in its inductive 
 causation, and the latter deals with the noumenal reality in its ontological 
 causation. Difficulty arises only when science steps out of its field and 
 gives a mechanical-causation explanation to the facts of the noUmenal 
 world; or when it claims that what it discovers is all there is to reality. ^^° 
 In order, then, to keep the peace, science must always be content with 
 its task of inductive description, and must admit that its realm is con- 
 tinually dependent on the noumenal; while philosophy and theology 
 should accept the descriptions of science as inductively valid and be 
 allowed to insist that the realm of science is only one aspect of reality. 
 These must be the terms of reconcihation between science and philosophy. 
 So contends Bowne. He accepts the doctrine of evolution in its induc- 
 tive sense; but he absolutely refuses to accept it, if it means that the 
 
 165 Ihid., pp. 285 ff. 
 
 i6« This is very manifest in his indictment of atheism, ihid., pp. 291 ff. 
 
 i"/Ji</.,pp. 258ff. 
 
 i«8/6ii., pp. 248ff. 
 
 ^^^ Metaphysics, pp. 68 f.; Theism, pp. 241 f., 323; The Immanence of God, pp. 18 ff. 
 
 "° Metaphysics, pp. 250 ff.; The Immanence of God, pp. 6 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 57 
 
 processes of evolution are carried on by means of merely phenomenal 
 causes.^'^ 
 
 This solution is one that can scarcely be maintained. It depends 
 upon the vaUdity of dividing the universe into phenomenal and nou- 
 menal reaUties, and upon the success with which we can keep science in 
 its field. ReaUty, as we know it, is so organically inter-related in all 
 its parts that it is difficult to maintain the distinction made by Bowne. 
 Moreover, science does not restrict itself entirely to the physical world, 
 but is constantly enlarging its field of investigation and aspires to deal 
 with our spiritual reaUties. Philosophy and theology, on the other hand, 
 cannot be unconcerned with the results of science. Hence it would 
 seem that the best way to work out a helpful relation between them is 
 to view reality as one and as open to both for investigation.^^ 
 
 It should be noted, however, that the division of labor between 
 science and philosophy, which Bowne makes, and the use of the scientific 
 concept of order in his conception of God^^^ point to the view that, in 
 these regards at least, Bowne is not strictly consistent with his idealistic 
 position; but that he has a large positive place for modem science. To 
 this extent, he admits certain implications of the evolutionary theory in 
 his conception of God. 
 
 Respecting the traditional conception of God's personaUty and his 
 relation to the world, it should be said that Bowne has set aside its 
 reaHstic-supernaturalistic features so as to make it more acceptable to 
 our age of science and immanent philosophy. To be sure, Bowne 
 retains the concept of God's personaUty as his essential character. Yet 
 the God of Bowne is not a transcendent personaUty who Uves in a super- 
 natural world and occasionaUy makes inroads i^to the realm of the 
 natural by means of miraculous interventions. ' His God is actively 
 immanent in the natural order, in the course of history, and in the human 
 realm, working in these realms in an orderly manner.^^'* Further, Bowne 
 does not hold to the traditional doctrine of creation as a temporal occur- 
 rence, nor does he set forth the other traditional doctrines of preserva- 
 tion and providence; these doctrines are comprised in Bowne's thought 
 of the continual dependence of the world on the immanent activity of 
 God.^^^ The God of Bowne, it must be granted, is transcendent; but 
 
 "1 Metaphysics, pp. 276 ff.; Theism, pp. 103 ff. 
 
 172 Cf. Shaler, The Interpretation of Nature, 1893, 11.48 f.; Lyman, Theology and 
 Human Problems, pp. 118 ff. 
 
 "3 Theism, p. 323; Metaphysics, pp. 7 ff.; Theism, pp. 241 ff. 
 "* Metaphysics, pp. 285 ff.; The Immanence of God. 
 "5 Metaphysics, pp. 99 ff.; Theism, pp. 218 ff. 
 
58 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 he is transcendent only in the sense that he is not identical with the 
 totality of the world, and that he is its ultimate cause. And as to Bowne's 
 conception of the personality of God, the difference between it and that 
 of the traditional doctrine is fully manifest. While the traditional con- 
 ception of God's personality is that of a magnified repHca of human per- 
 sonality; Bowne, on the contrary, conceives of his personality in cosmic 
 terms — it is the ultimate principle of the universe (one may well question 
 the use of the term personality in this sense). But here also we note 
 that his practical religious interest has led him to conceive of God in 
 concrete terms.^^^ Thus his hospitable attitude toward empiricism 
 appears. 
 
 We may now come to his solution of the problem of God as the abso- 
 lute being. It has been sufficiently indicated that Bowne thinks of God 
 in terms of absoluteness and infinitude. He consistently maintains 
 God's independence of the world. God is related to the world, but this 
 relation is freely posited by him.^^^ Evils are undeniably in the world, 
 but God is entirely free from the responsibility for their existence. The 
 world, as we actually find it, cannot be said to show the absolute goodness 
 of God; yet considered as an instrument for the working out of a divine 
 plan, it is perfect; so we may legitimately keep our faith in a righteous 
 God who has a complete control of all things.^^^ In short, God is com- 
 plete and perfect, and his relation to the world is a matter of his favor. 
 This being the case with God, the central elements of the evolutionary 
 theory, change and growth of things, do not apply to him. While 
 Bowne repudiates the notion of rigidly static reality ,^^^ and recognizes 
 changes in the world, he views God as unchangeable and free from time. 
 Not that that unchangeability means "an ontological rigidity of fixed 
 monotony of being." Rather with God unchangeability "means only 
 the constancy and continuity of the divine nature which exists through 
 all the divine acts as their law and source." ^^^ God is the conductor of 
 the world-process, yet is totally free from time. We must maintain this 
 unchangeabiHty of God, because to surrender it means to wreck ths 
 trustworthiness of human thought; there must be a changeless element 
 in the world in order to have a valid metaphysics.^^^ 
 
 "' The Essence of Religion, pp. 7 ff. 
 
 ^^^ Theism, pp. 163. 
 
 178 /&«/., pp. 273 ff. 
 
 "9 Metaphysics, Chaps. I, III. 
 
 180 Theism, p. 178. 
 
 ^^' Ibid., pp. 183 ff., 212. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 59 
 
 But we need to inquire whether Bowne has really established his 
 contention for the unchangeability of God. To begin with, his view 
 of reality as active, and his admission that being is process/^ imply 
 some sort of progressive action on God's part. Further, Bowne opposes 
 the theory that the world of nature and of man alike have their existence 
 independent of God; nature is no self -running machine, nor is man a 
 natural product. In other words, according to Bowne, God and the 
 world are organically related. To be sure, Bowne maintains that this 
 relation is not imposed on God from without, but is a self-posited rela- 
 tion. Nevertheless he affirms God's immanent relation to it. If God 
 and the world are thus related with each other, how could the former 
 remain unaffected by the movement, change, and progress which mark 
 the latter? In order that God may be held immune from these pro- 
 cesses, he must be conceived of as existing in isolated reality. But such a 
 reaUstic view of God, Bowne does not entertain. Moreover, according 
 to Bowne, the finite spirits have an ontological otherness over against 
 the being of God. Though they owe their existence to the eternally 
 creative activity of God, yet they have a certain measure of distinctness 
 and independence. The God of Bowne is not such an all-inclusive 
 being as that of Royce, but is a supreme person at the head of a commun- 
 ity of finite persons. Now if Bowne's God is not thus an all-embracing 
 and all-inclusive being, and if the finite spirits have their ontological 
 otherness, though it may be very slight, how could his God be declared 
 absolute and finite? Is he not in some way Hmited by the existence of 
 finite spirits? A true metaphysical absoluteness of God, which Bowne 
 wishes to maintain, can be obtained, it seems, only by conceiving of 
 him as totally unlimited by the existence of the world and man. We 
 cannot get around the difl&culty involved in God's relation to the world 
 by saying, as does Bowne, that this relation is defined and posited by 
 God himself; for if God is absolute, why need he posit this relation to the 
 world at all? Bowne, again, holds that God has assumed his relation 
 to the world as its omnipresent ground for the purpose of realizing some 
 worthy end, a conmiunity of moral persons.^^ Now, the realization of 
 this goal, according to Bowne, is not effected by miraculous intervention; 
 it is to be achieved through the process of historical development. If 
 God thus possesses a goal the realization of which involves a process of 
 development in which he is engaged, how could he be held to be free 
 from development in his own experience? Does not the possession of 
 
 182 Metaphysics, pp. 28, 30, 53 ff . 
 
 183 Theism, pp. 213, 231. 
 
60 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 such an end as objective for God imply that he is not yet satisfied, and 
 so is not complete? And if he has this goal that is as yet unrealized, 
 how could he be a perfect absolute? It seems very difficult to conceive 
 of a God, who has an unrealized end in any way, as an absolute and 
 infinite being. 
 
 Finally, Bowne admits the existence of evils in the world of nature 
 and of man.^^ He is too fully aware of the evils in the world as to deny 
 their existence or to maintain that they can be justified.^^ But Bowne 
 frees God from any share in the evils of the world. He can do this 
 because he holds that the world considered as a means of achieving an 
 end is perfect, while it is actually imperfect. True, certain evils in the 
 world may be turned toward the production of something good. But 
 this fact does not render the actual system faultlessly perfect. Bowne 
 makes men wholly responsible for the moral evils in the world, and so 
 exempts God from any share in them.^^ True, men must be held 
 accountable for their evil acts. But if the system of the world is good 
 because it is controlled by a perfect God for the accomplishment of an 
 end, why does it furnish any occasion for the evil deeds of men? ,J If, 
 however, men commit moral evils, not in relation to their environing 
 world, but as result of the determination of their will, why should not 
 their will always be turned toward the accomplishment of good deeds, 
 when God, the perfect being, is its ontological ground? Bowne reduces 
 the evils in the animal world to the matter of pain, which he holds, is of 
 small consequence.^^^ But if God the all perfect and omnipotent being is 
 the causal ground of the animal world, how could there be any pain at 
 all? It would seem empirically from the fact of evils in the world, which 
 Bowne does not deny, that God is either impotent to control the world 
 without involving it in imperfections, or is incapable of putting down as 
 yet the forces of evil which are opposing his work. Bowne, however, 
 does not consider any such suggestion. He still contends for a morally 
 perfect God. But, even granting that there is such a God, the existence 
 of evils militates against his moral perfection. For how could a God, who 
 is organically related with the world, be morally blessed, when there are 
 evils in it? These and the like considerations lead us to say that Bowne's 
 contention for the absoluteness of his God is not supported by the empiri- 
 cal elements in his own system. The above cited elements in his philoso- 
 
 *^ Theism, pp. 273 ff.; cf. The Essence of Religion, pp. 45 ff. 
 185 Theism, p. 284. 
 188 IhU., pp. 273 ff . 
 "7 Ihid., p. 285. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 61 
 
 phy, when consistently followed, would lead us to a view of God as 
 struggling with the forces of evil, in cooperation with human personalities, 
 and as actively engaged with them in the creation of a better world. 
 Hence he would be a limited, changing, growing being. 
 
 The essential finitude of God as Bowne conceives him appears when 
 we view, finally, his conception of God's relation to man. Respecting 
 this matter, Bowne is opposed to such a theory of absolute idealism as 
 that of Royce, for example, according to which God is the all-inclusive 
 being of the world, apart from whom man has no real existence whatever. 
 Bowne, on the contrary, stands for the view that finite spirits, while 
 they are causally dependent on Gk)d, have a certain degree of indepen- 
 dent existence. But from the standpoint of his metaphysics, the onto- 
 ^jgical otherness of the finite spirit is not easy to determine. For the 
 finite spirit, as he says, "has only a limited and relative existence at 
 best. ... In the fullest sense of the word only the infinite exists; 
 all else is relatively phenomenal and non-existent. "^^^ Such is the con- 
 clusion to which, he holds, we are speculatively forced. It is the appeal 
 to the experiences of life that really, as he admits, leads him to maintain 
 the selfhood of the finite spirit.^^^ This affirmation of the ontological 
 otherness of finite spirits on the basis of experience, it should be observed, 
 is incompatible wdth the strict absoluteness of God; for God is Hmited by 
 these other real spirits. When we consider Bowne's view of God's 
 moral relation to man, the above criticism is reinforced. God, who is the 
 ontological ground of the world of nature and of man, is, according to 
 Bowne, also the moral ruler of the universe. God as such has the 
 absolute control of all things; all the processes of nature and the course 
 of hiraian history are ultimately determined by the creative will of the 
 infinite.^^^ In view of this fact that God has absolute control over the 
 world, all its forces must inevitably work toward the accompUshment of 
 the divine plan. Evils do exist, but they cannot thwart the work of an 
 omnipotent God. Whatever finite spirits may do to prevent the reali- 
 zation of the purpose of the infinite, it will ultimately be accomplished. 
 Fundamentally it would not make very much difference whether the 
 finite spirits work for or against the divine plan; for God the infinite 
 being will finally bring it to its consummation.^^^ But Bowne lays great 
 stress on the necessity of moral activity. The essence of religion, for 
 
 "8 Metaphysics, pp. 100 f. 
 
 i89 76iJ., p. 101. 
 
 "» Theism, pp. 230 flf. 
 
 ^" The Essence of Religion^ p. 7. 
 
62 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 him, consists in righteousness, and not in reUgiosity.^^^ There are 
 mysteries in the world; but we are not to speculate upon them; what we 
 are called on to do is to follow the will of God.^^^ In our Hfe of prayer, 
 we must do all that can be done by us instead of relying upon God to 
 do everything.^^ A wonderful transformation in the world will take 
 place if men turn to love God and their neighbors as themselves.^^^ 
 This emphasis of Bowne upon the necessity of practical moral activity 
 must inevitably modify his conception of the absoluteness of God. 
 Men become conscious of unreality in their moral endeavors, if God has 
 the absolute control of their moral future, and if they cannot, therefore, 
 in any way, change the course of their moral destiny. Bowne refuses 
 philosophically to give up his faith in the absolute purpose and govern- 
 ment of God. But from the standpoint of practical morality and religion, 
 he has done so. This fact appears, for instance, in such words as these: 
 "We are to work because it is God who works in us. We cannot work 
 apart from God, and God also works only in connection with our work- 
 ing. "^^ This cooperative activity of God and ourselves is what we find 
 in our experience. To adhere to such a view of our moral and religious 
 relation to God means, however, to modify the conception of him as an 
 absolute or infinite being whose plan for the world is eternally fixed. 
 There are thus many elements in Bowne's system, which would lead to 
 the conception of God as a metaphysical and moral being who has along 
 with him other persons with whom he is closely related in the work of 
 creating a better moral community. 
 
 We may conclude our criticism of Bowne's solution of the problems 
 with the remark that there appears in his efforts, as we found in those 
 of Royce and Eucken, a double tendency: a tendency to maintain the 
 independence of God from the world of time and history, and a tendency 
 to conceive of him in terms of evolutionary experience. Metaphysi- 
 cally the former tendency predominates, and from the point of view of 
 practical morality and religion, the latter tendency has the preeminence. 
 But even from the standpoint of his metaphysics the elements of empiri- 
 cism cannot be said to be absent, for we have referred to his appeal to 
 experience to settle some metaphysical problems. So then these ele- 
 ments of empiricism in Bowne's solution of the problems show distinctly 
 
 192^-^., pp. 73ff. 
 
 ^93/6/J., pp. 46ff. 
 
 "^ Ihid., 127 ff. 
 
 "« Theism, pp. 278 f. 
 
 ^* The Essence of Religion, p. 237. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD • 63 
 
 the influence of the evolutionary theory on his method, and on his 
 conception of God. 
 
 IV, The Solution of the Problems in Jameses Pragmatism 
 
 William James represents a contemporary movement of thought 
 which completely accepts the evolutionary theory and interprets realities 
 from its standpoint^^^ By frankly accepting the empirical theory of 
 evolution, pragmatism is the most radical of the philosophies of reUgion 
 with which we are concerned in this study. This will appear as we 
 proceed to examine James's pragmatic philosophy and his conception of 
 God with a special reference to his solution of the problems. 
 
 1. James's General Pragmatic Position. 
 
 James offers pragmatism as a philosophical attitude which shall 
 mediate between rationalism, on the one hand, and empiricism, on the 
 other, by adhering to the religious interest of the former while keeping 
 the empiricism of the latter.^^^ Pragmatism, according to James, is thus 
 first of all a method. It is a method which attempts to solve philosophical 
 problems with reference to the practical consequences of the notions 
 involved in the problems. Pragmatism deals, for instance, with the 
 question whether the world is one or many by pointing out the differences 
 in life, which may result from one view or the other.^^^ Pragmatism, as a 
 method, does not concern itself with principles, wholes, universals, but 
 with the concrete, empirical, particular facts of practical life; its atten- 
 tion is directed toward an inquiry into the ascertainable practical aspects 
 of Hfe.^^'' From this point of view, James as a pragmatist accepts only 
 those things which are actually experienced.^^^ This empirical pragmatic 
 method leads necessarily to certain theories some of which we must 
 briefly indicate. 
 
 James holds that our ideas, theories, laws, and the like are not copies 
 of objective realities; but rather they are means for action — tools for 
 adjusting ourselves to the environing realities.^^ True ideas, from this 
 point of view, are those which help us most in our practical life, that is, 
 those are true ideas which will aid us successfully to attain to the objects 
 
 ^" Other foremost representatives are F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey; but 
 James has most seriously undertaken to work out a pragmatic philosophy of religion. 
 
 198 Pragmatism, p. 33. 
 
 199 Ibid., p. 45. 
 
 200 Ibid,, pp. 54 f . 
 
 201 Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 42, 160 f., 182; The Will to Believe, pp. vii f. 
 
 202 Ibid., pp. 56 f . 
 
64 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 of our desires, and so give us the maximal combination of satisfactions.^o^ 
 This does not mean, however, that the objects of our ideas are unreal.^^ 
 But it does mean that our ideas are never final. If our old ideas have 
 become useless to us, we lay them aside and get new ideas which will 
 really help us in our life. Thus our ideas are constantly shifting and 
 changing as our experiments proceed. 
 
 This changing nature of our ideas is closely connected with the 
 changing and growing aspect of all reality. Not only do our ideas change 
 but also the realities with which we deal change and grow. Reality 
 consists of the flux of our sensations, the relations which obtain between 
 them, as well as the previous truths which every inquiry must take up. 
 These elements of reahty are never fij^ed; we have a great part to play in 
 making them real and vital to our life; in fact we add new factors to 
 reality.^^^ So reality is not ready-made, but it is forever in the making.^^ 
 
 This conception of reality as changing and growing is related to 
 another view of James that there are possibilities for novelties in the 
 world. The world is not fixed; in it there are occurring new things which 
 surprise us. In view of this fact James would agree with the remark of 
 Bergson that the doors of the future are wide open. So James stands 
 for what he calls the chance theory of moral freedom, according to which 
 there are real possibilities for doing either good or evil in the world; we 
 cannot tell beforehand what we shall do in the future; but we have to 
 wait for the moments when we shall choose either possibilities.^^^ 
 
 Pragmatism, with its empirical method of dealing with reality, leads, 
 finally, to the concept of a pluralistic universe. It is the contention of 
 James that the facts of experience do not warrant the theory of cosmic 
 Unity as held by rationalism. Rather they indicate the view that there 
 are many forces which are inter-related in a more or less external way. 
 "Pragmatically interpreted," writes James, "pluralism or the doctrine 
 that it is many means only that the sundry parts of reality may he extern- 
 ally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, 
 has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some 
 sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but 
 
 203 Ibid., p. 58, cf. pp. 73, 201, 218; Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 159, 253, 260. 
 
 ^^ The Meaning of Truth, pp. xv f.; cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 247 fiF. 
 
 208 Pragmatism, pp. 239 ff.; cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 193 ff. 
 
 206 Yor James' characterization of the difference between pragmatism and ration- 
 alism on this point, see Pragmatism, pp. 251-261. 
 
 20' The Will to Believe, Chap, on The Delimma of Determinism; Pragmatism, 
 pp. 118 ff.; Some Problems of Philosophy, Chaps. IX ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 65 
 
 nothing includes everything, dominates over everything. . . . The 
 pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire 
 or kingdom. However much may be collected, however much report 
 itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, some- 
 thing else is self -governed and absent and unreduced to unity." ^os 
 These are the essential elements in the pragmatism of James, which must 
 be considered in connnection with his conception of God, and with his 
 solution of the problems which we are considering, 
 
 2. James's Conception of God. 
 
 (1) God as the "More" in Human Experience. ^ 
 
 James holds that, from a strictly empirical point of view, we cannot 
 deny the existence of a world beyond our finite experience; for we actually 
 come into direct contact with such a world. (This is in full agreement 
 with his contention that the pragmatic theory of ideas does not signify 
 the unreality of their objects.) So he says that if the notion of a world 
 beyond our physical world aids our practical life, pragmatically we must 
 accept the idea of such a world.^^^ This empirical attitude of James 
 means that he opposes the dogmatism of naturalism which maintains 
 that the physical world is the only world and that there is no other world 
 beyond it.^^^ Religious faith means, for him, a belief in the existence of 
 an unseen order of some kind beyond this natural world.'^^ That there 
 exists some unseen order of things James is positively certain. We are 
 so related to such an order of reality that we must take some positive 
 attitude toward it. Faith in this unseen realm is our constitutional 
 need.^2 But how are we related to this unseen universe and why must 
 we assume a positive attitude toward it?^^^ 
 
 James attempts, in this work, to explain the "more" in our experience 
 by the theory of the "subconscious self." He suggests that "the 'more' 
 with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its 
 hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life."^" When 
 we inquire into this subconscious region, we find that conscious persons 
 are continuous with a wider self from which come saving experiences, 
 
 20M Pluralistic Universe, pp. 321 f., cf. p. 325. 
 
 209 Pragmatism, pp. 267 ff. 
 
 210 The Will to Believe, p. 52. 
 ="/Wrf., p. 51. 
 2i2/fei^.,pp. 54ff. 
 
 213 James's theory of this order is developed at length in his work, The Varieties of 
 Religions Experience. 
 ^'* IMd., p. 512. 
 
66 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 with an enrichment of religious Hfe objectively true so far as it goes.^^^ 
 (We call this realm a supernatural or mystic region. Whatever it may 
 be called, it is in this region that most of these ideal impulses originate of 
 which we are unable to give articulate account; yet to this realm we are 
 more intimately related even than to this visible world. This unseen 
 world is not, moreover, simply an ideal. For when we commune with this 
 world beyond our physical order, there are produced in us practical 
 effects; we are turned into new men, and so our manner of life is trans- 
 formed.2^^ j Hence we have no philosophical reason for calling this realm 
 unreal. 
 
 James connects the name of God with this higher part of the sub- 
 conscious realm) with which we are in a close contact. "God is the 
 natural appelation," he says, "for us Christians at least, for the supreme 
 reality, so I call this higher part of the universe by the name of God. 
 We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to 
 his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. "^^^ Our personal life is 
 made better or worse in proportion as we follow the demand of God. 
 /Thus God is real because he produces in us real effects.^^^ To say that 
 this farther side of our experience is the absolute world-ruler, is of course, 
 a considerable over-belief. This over-belief is commonly held. It may 
 be legitimate to the extent that there exists another world which has its 
 natural constitution different from this material order.^^^ James con- 
 fesses, however, that we do not know exactly what characteristic divine 
 facts enter into our life from the hither side of the subliminal region. 
 But he holds that such a yonder realm does actually exist. "The whole 
 drift of my education," writes James, "goes to persuade me that the 
 world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of 
 consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain 
 experiences which have meaning for our life also; and that although in the 
 main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two 
 become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in."^^^ 
 /'Thus James maintains his faith in the existence of a larger and more 
 significant world than this physical world, and connects the former with 
 the name of God. He is led to this position by the concrete practical 
 
 216/iiJ., p. 515. 
 2i8/6fJ., p. 516. 
 2"/WJ., pp. 516f. 
 218/6^., p. 517. 
 "9/6^., p. 518. 
 22o/^>«i.,p. 519. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 67 
 
 effects produced by this yonder world in the life of the individuals 
 whenever they commune with it through their prayers and other exercises 
 of faith. But why must we continue to affirm the existence of such a 
 world? May we not be satisfied with what physical scientists tell us 
 as to the " real" world? This leads to another aspect of his conception of 
 God, where James gives his pragmatic answer to the above question. 
 
 (2) God as a Practical Moral Necessity. 
 
 James postulates the "more" in human experience as represented by 
 our common religious object, God, on the ground of psychological and 
 practical effects produced in our life. It is on the same grounds that 
 he considers God as an elemental necessity in human life. In analyzing 
 the ethical life of man, James discovers there two types of mood — the 
 strenuous and easy-going. The latter is based on prudence and natural 
 himian clauns. He indicates that the merely human claims do not 
 produce in us strenuous moral life. A merely human world without a 
 God to lay his claims upon us does not furnish to our moral life its needed 
 stimulating power. If we believe that there is a God who makes his 
 high moral claims upon us, we are stimulated by the claims to a rigorous 
 moral life.^^ For the sake, then, of living a strenuous moral life, we 
 would affirm the existence of a God.^ But this is not, however, the 
 only reason that leads us to affirm the existence of God as a moral neces- 
 sity. 
 
 Our spiritual world, according to James, must contain a God, for 
 without him our future would be dark, our ideals and hopes would 
 lack the possibility of their realization, and hence there would be no 
 assurance of any victory to our struggles. It is for these reasons that 
 James sets aside all materialistic substitutes for the theistic faith.^ 
 James holds that so far as the past of the world is concerned, there is no 
 essential practical difference whether we deem it the work of matter or of 
 spirit; but it makes a great difference in regard to the future of the 
 world.^ What does the world promise? Can matter promise a world 
 which goes to nearer and nearer perfection? Scientific materialism, in 
 the thought of James, promises nothing but a cold death of the world. 
 It does not hold out to us that goods are in store for us in the future. 
 AU goods will be gone.^ Scientffic materialism then does not warrant 
 
 221 The Will to Believe, p. 212. 
 
 222/6/^., p. 213. 
 
 223 Ibid., p. 134. 
 
 22^ Pragmatism, pp. 96 ff. 
 
 225 Ibid., p. 105. 
 
68 BEARING or THE E\'OLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 the realization of our ideal hopes.^^^ Spiritualism, on the contrary, 
 with its notion of God, gives us an assurance of the success of the world. 
 "A world with a God in it to say the last word," writes James, "may 
 indeed burn or freeze, but we think of him still mindful of the old ideals 
 and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy 
 is provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the final 
 things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs 
 of our breast ,"22^ The essential difference between these two systems 
 lies, not in their metaphysics, but in this: "Materialism means simply 
 the denial that the moral world is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate 
 hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and 
 the letting loose of hope."^^^ Thus James stands with those who affirm 
 the existence of a God as a practical moral necessity. The godless 
 universe is, for James, like the automatic person who may do for us 
 mechanically those things which a Hving person performs; yet the former 
 lacks the personal touch and interest of the latter, which men crave.^^ 
 With the affirmation of God as a practical moral necessity there 
 emerges the question whether James conceives of him as the absolute 
 guarrantor of our final moral victory. It should frankly be said that 
 James does not commit himself to the view that God gives us such an 
 assurance. The forces of evil and of good are really in the world, and 
 they are competing with each other for mastery. Our ultimate victory- 
 depends upon the vigor and success of the cooperative activity of our- 
 selves and God. , With regard to this matter, James stands for the 
 melioristic view as to the ultimate future of the world, that is, the world 
 [may be saved in the end, but we are not now sure of its final victory.^^o 
 (Thus the world contains real ventures, chances, risks, possibilities for 
 either losing or winning — a real game of life, the success of which depends 
 on the cooperative activity of all the agents concerned.^^i While God 
 does not promise us the guaranteed victory of our moral world, yet he 
 does, through his active interest in our struggles, hold up before us the 
 hope that there is an eternal moral order and that we may finally suc- 
 ceed. On this account we must have God on our side in the game of 
 life. What then is the nature of this God? We may now turn to James's 
 answer to this question. 
 
 226 Ihid., p. 106. 
 
 227 Ihid., pp. 106 f.; cf. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 517. 
 
 228 Pragmatism, p. 107. 
 
 229 The Meaning of Truth, footnote, pp. 189 f. 
 
 230 Pragmatism, pp. 232 ff., 290 ff. 
 
 231 75^-^^ pp 296 f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 69 
 
 (3) God as a Superhuman, Finite Personality. 
 
 James sets forth his conception of the nature of God in opposition to 
 that held by monistic idealism and rational theology. But he does not 
 dogmatically deny all truth to the absolutist theory of God. As a good 
 pragmatist, James says that he has no rationahst bias against such a 
 theory. The Absolute is true in so far as it affords the assurance that 
 the world in reality is good, so that men who trust in it may take moral 
 hoHdays.^^ Can I then accept the Absloute? asks James. In regard 
 to this question he points out that if any idea or beUef helps us to lead a 
 better life, we should accept that idea unless our beUef in it clashes with 
 our greater vital benefits.^ In accordance with this principle he rejects 
 the Absolute, because the acceptance of it conflicts with his other vital 
 interests.^^ The main considerations for his rejection of the Absolute 
 may be summarized as follows: The theory of the Absolute as the all- 
 inclusive consciousness of the universe is logically untenable ;^^ the view 
 of the Absolute as possessing one absolute purpose for the world is in 
 contradiction to the real dangers, risks, possibiUties, novelties which we 
 find in actual experience ;^^ the idea of the Absolute as eternally perfect 
 is inconsistent with the existing imperfections in the world ;^^ and, 
 finally, the conception of the Absolute as free from the experiences of 
 suffering, struggle, time, history, change and growth creates the sense 
 that God is alien to our problems.^^ Thus it is evident that what James 
 objects to in the monistic as well as the scholastic conceptions of God 
 is their view of him as eternally complete and perfect. With this rejec- 
 tion of the Absolute, James proceeds to outline his conception of God 
 from the viewpoint of his pragmatism. 
 
 In accordance with his general philosophical position James sets 
 aside all the infinite attributes with which God had been endowed by 
 philosophy and theology, and conceives of him in terms of finitude and 
 relativity. The extensive study he has made in regard to religious 
 experience cannot be cited, he holds, to support the infinitist conception 
 of God. "The only thing that it unequivocally testifies is that we can 
 experience union with something larger than ourselves and in that union 
 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 73 fiF.; cf. A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 113 f. 
 ^ Pragmatism, p. 76. 
 "^ Ibid., pp. 7SS. 
 
 ^A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 198 ff.; Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 138; Prag- 
 matism, pp. 145 ff. 
 
 ^Pragmatism, pp. 140 ff.; Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 139 f. 
 
 23M Pluralistic Universe, pp. 123 f.; Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 138. 
 
 ^^A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 47 ff.; Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 139. 
 
70 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 find our greatest peace. ' '^^ Philosophy and mysticism identify this some- 
 thing larger with God who is the all-inclusive soul of the universe. 
 
 ^"Meanwhile," continues James, "the practical needs and experiences of 
 rehgion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man 
 and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is 
 friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the 
 power should be both other and larger than ourselves. Anything larger 
 will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not 
 be infinite, it need not be solitary. "^^^ There may be a collection of such 
 larger selves, with different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute 
 unity realized in it at all. So a sort of polytheism returns upon us.) 
 It is the pluralism of James that leads him to take this view of God. 
 But he does not dogmatize on this point. 
 
 God, then, who is identified with this something larger element of 
 religion, is a superhuman, finite, growing personaHty. Unlike the God 
 of rationalism, the God of James is one of many beings in a pluralistic 
 universe. Pluralistically conceived, his God is "one of the eaches."^^ 
 
 ' Such a finite God, in the thought of James, is identical with the God of 
 popular Christianity. "The God of popular Christianity is but one 
 member of a pluralistic system. ... I can hardly conceive of anything 
 more diflferent from the absolute than the God, say, of David or of 
 Isaiah. That God is essentially finite being in the cosmos, not with the 
 cosmos in him, and indeed he has very local habitation there, and very 
 onesided local and personal attachments. ... I believe that the only 
 God worthy of the name musi be finite. "^^^ In order to be consistent 
 with our common experience and to get out of the monistic difficulties, 
 both philosophy and theology should accept, "along with the super- 
 human consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, 
 in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power 
 or in knowledge, or in both."243 While the God of James is like us in 
 his experiences of struggle, st;riving, change, and growth, yet he is far 
 greater being than ourselves. / He is to be conceived of "as the deepest 
 power in the universe," a mental personality distinct from and yet 
 related to our personalities, a power not ourselves "which not only 
 makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us."^^ ; 
 
 23^ The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 525. 
 
 2" Ibid., p. 525. 
 
 ^^ A Pluralistic Universe, p. 44. 
 
 ^'Ubid.,pp. 110 f., 125. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 311. 
 
 ^ The Will to Believe, p. 122. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 71 
 
 Because of the finiteness of his God, James holds that he and we are 
 closely related in our common task of creating a better world. "Having 
 an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like 
 ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness from all that is human, of 
 the static timeless perfect absolute. "^^ Thus he and we stand shoulder 
 to shoulder in the process of self-realization and of working out a better 
 moral order in an indefinite future. Evils exist in the world. God and 
 we work together to lessen their amount or crush them out of existence. 
 In this struggle for a better world, God being greater than we, does 
 the work more effectively than ourselves. Yet he cannot do it all; we 
 must cooperate with him in this great work. 
 
 Not only are we thus practically related with God, but also we find 
 ourselves in a close psychological relation with him. The rehgious 
 experiences of men point to the belief that we are related with a large 
 spiritual environment. Moreover, aU the empirical evidences seem "to 
 sweep us very strongly towards the behef in some form of superhuman 
 life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious."^ So 
 we are practically and psychologically in an intimate relation with God, 
 which is made possible by the fact that he and we are fundamentally 
 one in nature.^^^ 
 
 3. Criticism of James' Solution of the Problems. 
 
 Much has been said, in our discussion of James' conception of God, 
 to show that in his philosophy of reUgion we find a thoroughgoing use 
 and appHcation of those principles of empiricism which characterize the 
 scientific investigations of our age. In the other philosophies of religion 
 which we have studied, while the element of empiricism was not absent, 
 it was not the pivot around which these philosophies turned. The deter- 
 mining factor in them was something wholly or partially underivable in 
 and through the actual experiences of life, something assumed a priori 
 as the all-conditioning principle of their procedure. And what enabled 
 them to posit such a principle is the intellect which is deemed, in the main, 
 the highest category of human life (Eucken forms a possible exception; 
 but even for him, thought, when it is grounded in an independent spiritual 
 life, enables us to get at the heart of reaUty.). In James, for the first 
 time in the course of our investigation, do we observe that all the a 
 priori elements and intellectualism of the preceding systems of philosophy 
 are abandoned, and that an effort is made to formulate a doctrine of God 
 
 ^ A Pluralistic Universe, p. 318. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 309. 
 2*7 ihU., p. 34. 
 
72 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 on the basis of empirical investigation. Moreover, in order to give 
 meaning and basis to the actual experiences of Ufe, Royce, Eucken, and 
 Bowne have all attempted to maintain that behind the mirror of our 
 present existence there exists an eternal order which is our real home. 
 James, on the contrary, has given up all notion of a duplicate universe; 
 for him there is only one world, the world of our common experience 
 where realities are ever in the process of making, where our deeds are 
 done, where our goods are achieved; and he is fully satisfied with this 
 world made real to us in and through our concrete, practical experience 
 (True, James is constantly seeking to discover more and more of the 
 depth and significance of the one world; but he does not ask for a second 
 world that cannot be experienced by us.). Thus the most significant 
 feature in his philosophy of religion is his empiricism in method and in 
 theory. Hence our criticism must be undertaken in full recognition of 
 these facts. 
 
 James, to begin with, has completely set aside the revelation-method 
 of traditional theology and the apriori-intellectualistic dialectic of all 
 speculative systems of philosophy. He makes use of a thoroughgoing 
 empirical method in the formulation of his conception of God. This 
 does not mean, of course, that James employs the categories of physical 
 sciences in dealing with the problem of God, nor that he follows the 
 intellectualistic procedure which usually marks the inductive formulation 
 of natural science; but it signifies, on the contrary, that he adopts the 
 same scientific spirit which is manifested in all scientific works, and 
 carries it out in his investigations in the higher realms of reality. An 
 anti-intellectualistic, voluntaristic-emotional, psychological empiricism is 
 what James uses in dealing with man and God. We need not dwell 
 longer on this general empirical method. 
 
 But a word should be said concerning the individualistic aspect of his 
 method, which is specially marked in his discussion of religious experience. 
 Religion, according to James, means for us "the feelings, acts, and experi- 
 ences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves 
 to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine ^^^ Defining 
 religion thus in terms of individual relationship, James does not con- 
 cern himself with the social aspects of religion which find expression 
 in liturgies, theologies, ecclesiastical organizations; but he deals pri- 
 marily with the individual cases of religion. ''The pivot around which 
 the religious life, as we have traced it, revolves," writes James, "is the 
 
 2*8 The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 31. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 73 
 
 interest of the individual in his private destiny. Religion, in short, is a 
 monumental chapter in the history of human egoism. . . . ReUgious 
 thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of 
 religion, the one fundamental fact."^^^ It is in the reahn of individual 
 feelings that we come into the depth of reality .^° Thus with his affirma- 
 tion of the primacy of individual feehngs, James sets forth a kind of 
 reUgious mysticism over against the intellectualistic veiw of religion. 
 Individuality and feelings are organically related. " IndividuaUty is 
 founded in feeUng; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, bUnder strata 
 of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real 
 fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how 
 work is actually done."'^^ But it is doubtful whether we have to get 
 at the content of religious experience through the avenue of purely 
 individual expressions, as James holds. It seems, in view of the fact 
 that both the individual and social expressions of reUgion are organic 
 parts of the on-going process of religious evolution, that we need to 
 take account, in dealing with religion, of both these elements. By follow- 
 ing this more comprehensive method rather than the atomistic procedure 
 of James, there opens up to us a vast field for investigating reUgion — 
 we can now view reUgion in its historical and social connections, and 
 not merely in its isolated individual expressions.^^ If James were true 
 to his thoroughgoing empirical attitude toward all the facts of experience, 
 he should make use of the data on religion obtainable through its social 
 expressions as well as its indi\ddual expressions.^^ 
 
 With regard to his attitude toward science, it is to be remarked, first, 
 that James gives a full recognition to the practical value of scientific 
 work.2^ But this acceptance of the results of science is not equivalent 
 to viewing its laws as Hteral copies of reality. Practically all the so- 
 called laws of science, in the thought of James, "are only approxima- 
 tions. . . . They are only a man-made language, a conceptual short- 
 hand, as some one calls them, in which we write our reports of nature."^ 
 
 249BtJ., p. 491, cf. p. 501. 
 
 25o/6i^., pp. 498ff. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., pp. 501 S. 
 
 ^2 See Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, and I. King, The Development 
 of Religion. 
 
 ^^ For criticism of James' method, see Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, 
 pp. 61 ff.; Faber, Das Wesen der Religions psychologie und ihre Bedeutungfiir die Dogma- 
 tik, pp. 25 ff., cf. pp. 101 ff. 
 
 254 Pragmatism, pp. 186 ff . 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 57. 
 
/ 
 
 74 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 They are simply our hypotheses which are useful to us in our dealings 
 with nature. Further, we have already had occasion to remark that 
 James is opposed to the scientific materialism which results from the 
 success of science, because it is opposed to the ideal interests of men.^^ 
 And, finally, James is not content with the view that the revelations of 
 natural science are all that there are to reality. Beyond our physical 
 order, there is an unseen spiritual realm whose nature our physical 
 science cannot determine.^^ In regard to our moral problems science 
 cannot give us the answer we need, so that we must consult " our heart. "^^ 
 Science deals with its elements, laws, and the processes of nature regard- 
 less of their bearing on human life. But James contends that it is not 
 through our dealing with reality in terms of cosmic laws and processes 
 that we come to the heart of reality; but rather "as soon as we deal with 
 private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the 
 completest sense of the term.^'^^ Thus James from the standpoint of his 
 distinctly human interest rightly opposes the extravagant claims of 
 uncritical naturalism, so often made in the name of natural science. 
 
 To speak next of James's attitude toward the traditional conception 
 of God as transcendent personality, we find that he is in opposition to 
 its arbitrary and realistic aspects. He cannot tolerate the idea of God 
 as a sovereign monarch who saves some and damns others in an arbi- 
 trary fashion.^^^ Moreover, for James, the traditional conception of God 
 as totally distinct from the world, all complete unto himself from eternity, 
 leaves us foreigners to the deepest reality of the universe. James holds 
 that the tendency of thought in our time is for *'the pantheistic field of 
 vision, the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external 
 creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reahty."^^^ 
 He stands with this tendency of thought and conceives of God in terms 
 of intimate relationship with men.^^^ 
 
 This leads us to James's solution of the problem of God as the abso- 
 lute being. Royce, Eucken, and Bowne have all conceived of God in 
 terms of dynamic immanence. But they have exempted God from the 
 process of change and growth which mark our empirical world. God is 
 
 25« See above, pp. 67 f . 
 
 267 The Will to Believe, pp. 52 f. 
 
 268 Ibid., p. 22. 
 
 269 The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 489. 
 ^^Ibid., pp. 329 f.; cf. A Pluralistic Universe, p. 30. 
 2*^ A Pluralistic Universe, p. 30, cf. pp. 24. ff . 
 
 2«2/6i(/., p. 34. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 75 
 
 essentially immutable. James, however, has given up all static notion 
 of reaUty; for him all realities are forever in the process of making. This 
 is what he finds in experience. Hence God, who is vitally related to this 
 evolving world, is also changing and growing; the time-process is not 
 an illusion or appearance to him; he has history just like any human 
 being. Consequently, the God of James is essentially a finite being, 
 a member in a pluralistic universe. This conception of the finiteness of 
 his God is repugnant not only to absolutistic philosophers but also to all 
 the theologians who wish to retain the traditional doctrine of God as a 
 perfect being. But it is noteworthy in this connection that when the 
 theologians oppose the idea of a limited God, they do so largely on philo- 
 sophical grounds, and not usually on religious grounds. Ever since the 
 Christian religion came in touch with the philosophically trained Greek 
 Christians, notably the Apologists, there have been present in Christian 
 theology two interests, the rehgious and philosophical. The philo- 
 sophical interest of Christian theology has always sought to conceive of 
 God in terms of infinitude, while its religious interest has held to the view 
 of God as a being who is striving with the struggles of his people, hence 
 essentially a limited God. But Christian theologians, on the whole 
 (with the possible exception of Ritschl), have not seen the antithesis in- 
 volved in these two conceptions; they have rather interpreted the finite 
 aspects of the Gk)d of religion in terms of an absolute and infinite being 
 of philosophy. In the pragmatic religion of James, we find, for the 
 first time the two antithetical conceptions of God brought to a sharp 
 issue. He has pointed out that the God of ordinary Christianity is but a 
 member in a pluralistic imiverse.^ Such a conception of God, no doubt, 
 has been held by Christians in their practical moral and rehgious life. 
 And it is for practical reasons, in the main, that James advocates his view 
 of God as a finite being who is striving with us in our conmion task of 
 creating a better world. He cannot accept the Absolute who is the all- 
 inclusive being of the universe and who has absolutely determined the 
 course of the world; so that the world presents no new possibihties. 
 James would rather have a God who is not absolutely sure of the world's 
 outcome than to beUeve in a supreme deity who has absolute control 
 over the destiny of the universe in all its details.^ For a world with 
 open possibihties in it is far more desirable than a world whose destiny 
 is eternally fixed. 
 
 ^A Pluralistic Universe, p. 110. 
 ^ The Will to Believe, pp. 181 ff. 
 
76 BEARING OF ITIE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 James' sort of God and of the world are, on the whole, in line with 
 the standpoint of the evolutionary theory. God and the world from 
 the viewpoint of the evolutionary theory must, it seems, be conceived 
 of in terms of change and growth, hence in finite terms. The trend of 
 the empirical investigations of science and the spread of the evolutionary 
 view of the universe seem to point towards this conclusion. 
 
 To conceive of God as a finite being, however, does not mean to hold 
 him as a very insignificant reality. "The finite God whom I contrast 
 with it (the absolute)," says James, "may conceivably have almost 
 nothing outside of himself; he may have triumphed over and absorbed 
 all but the minutest fraction of the universe; but that fraction, however 
 small, reduces him to the status of a relative being, and in principle the 
 universe is saved from the irrationalities incident to absolutism. "^^^ 
 Thus the God of James, who is reached from the viewpoint of a pluralis- 
 tic universe, is a finite being in the sense that he does not include all 
 beings. "A theism," remarks Ward, "that is reached through pluralism 
 can never end in an Absolute in which God and the World alike were 
 absorbed and lost: the only Absolute then that we can admit is the 
 Absolute which God and the World constitute. "^^^ This is practically 
 what James means when he conceives of God as a finite, relative being 
 who is closely related to us in our struggles, conflicts with the forces of 
 the antagonistic world to create a better moral order.^^^ Thus the 
 conception of God as a finite being is not after all so radical as it at first 
 sight appears. And this conception of God is wholly in harmony with 
 the avowed empiricism of James. 
 
 One other remark we need to make in this connection is in regard to 
 James' view of the relation between God and the world. The primary 
 interest of James, as we have seen, is not to seek in God the metaphysical 
 explanatory principle of the universe, but rather to find in him a spiritual 
 reality which is in close relation with men in their struggles to create a 
 better world. It is the practical moral religious needs of men that first 
 of all lead them to God for their satisfaction. "The gods we stand by," 
 writes James, "are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demand 
 on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one an- 
 other. "^^^ One of the considerations which leads James to view God 
 pluralistically (He, however, in his later book, A Pluralistic Universe, 
 
 ^ A Pluralstic Universe, pp. 125. 
 
 2«« The Realm of Ends, pp. 141 f . 
 
 ^'' A Pluralistic Universe, p. 312. 
 
 268 The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 331. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 77 
 
 says that "word 'polytheism' usually gives offence, so perhaps it is better 
 not to use it"^^) is his intense human interest in religious matters. 
 
 If, then, we conceive of God as vitally related to us in our moral 
 and reHgious tasks, and as standing for the ideal tendencies in life, we 
 are not necessarily called upon to specualte as to the problem of evil 
 or how the world came to be. Evil is one of the principles in the world, 
 which has no rational or absolute right to its existence; we need simply 
 to put it out of existence.^^*' So it is in regard to the ontological problem 
 of the world. James, in contrast to Royce, Eucken, and Bowne who 
 have more or less sought to solve this problem, does not attempt to set 
 forth his view of God's causal relation to the world. He turns away 
 from the Whence and Why of the world which he regards as the darkest 
 problems in philosophy, to a more practical inquiry into the What of 
 realtiy.^^^ He cannot bear the thought of natural theology that God is 
 revealed in nature so that we may worship her God, because he says 
 that we know too well the processes of nature as to consider her as the 
 adequate expression of God.^^^ Yet James does not dogmatically deny 
 that God is causally related to the world of nature. As regards the 
 question of design in nature, for instance, he holds that what he is con- 
 cerned to know is what design and what designer are there in the process 
 of nature; but the only way to ascertain them is through the study of 
 facts. Since, however, these facts are not as yet adequate to give us a 
 clear insight into the nature of design and designer, we have to be con- 
 tent with a certain pragmatic benefit, a promise of success, if we consider 
 that there are in nature a divine design and designer.^^^ And with 
 respect to the general problem of teleology, James does not hold that 
 there are no purposes in the world. He is simply opposed to the idea of 
 one absolute purpose to which all things must be subservient.^^"^ Hence 
 it should be observed here that while James contends for the view that 
 the existence and character of God are finally to be seen in personal 
 reHgious experience,^^^ he is not antagonistic to the theory that God may 
 be causally related to the world. This seems to be his attitude when he 
 says: "Truth of 'God' has to run the same gauntlet of all other truths. 
 
 2«9 P. 310. 
 
 2^° The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 131 f.; A Pluralistk Universe, p. 124, 
 
 2'^ Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 46. 
 
 272 The Will to Believe, pp. 43 f.; cf. The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 491 ff. 
 
 273 Pragmatism, pp. 1 13 ff . 
 274/Jw;., pp. 140 ff. 
 
 2'^ The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 498 ff . 
 
78 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 It is on trial by them and they on trial by it. Our final opinion about 
 God can be settled only after all the truths straighten themselves out 
 together. Let us hope that they shall find a modus vivendir' ^^^ Thus 
 for James the problem of God, as all other problems, is always an open 
 problem; he is ready to receive any truths about God which may compel 
 him to modify his present conception of him. But so far as it can be 
 ascertained in the extant works of James, it is quite evident that he has 
 not worked out the problem of God's causal relation to the world. 
 
 But a question is whether we can ignore this problem altogether, as 
 does James. It is indeed a difficult problem to ascertain the ontological 
 relation of God to the world. There are astonishingly many facts in the 
 processes of nature and human history which we do not wish to attribute 
 to God. Must we, then, give up the task of construing God's relation 
 to the world? It seems that in the interest of practical religion we need 
 to say something here. This leads to the further inquiry: Can such a 
 finite God as necessitated by the evolutionary theory control the world? 
 It does not appear that God needs to be infinite to sustain the world. 
 The world is admitted to be finite — it is changing and growing toward 
 perfection. So a finite God could be causally related to a finite world. 
 
 At any rate the religious man has his knowledge-interest as well as 
 his practical interests, and so we must seek to satisfy the cognitive side 
 of his religion. And this cognitive interest of religion is met by the view 
 that the world in some way is dependent on God for its existence and 
 continuance, and that, as result of our cooperative activity with him, 
 God will bring it to a successful consummation in an indefinitely distant 
 future. Such a view of God's relation to the world is consonant with the 
 empirical position of James which seeks to satisfy the interests of religion. 
 But his extreme anti-intellectualism has led him to ignore the cognitive 
 interest of the religious man.^^^ 
 
 We may conclude our criticism of James with the observation that 
 while his solution of the problems is most in accord with the essential 
 elements of the evolutionary theory, yet it is open to two objections: 
 first, his point of view with reference to religion is individualistic and so 
 disregards the social elements of religion which constitute a fruitful 
 source for determining the content of religion; and, secondly, he does 
 not give a full recognition to the intellectual elements of religion and so 
 he fails to satisfy the cognitive interest. 
 
 "^ Pragmatism, p. 109. 
 
 2'^ For critical exposition of James' philosoph}'-, see Perry, op. cit., pp. 349-378; 
 and for a criticism of James' philosophy of religion, Boutroux, Science and Religion^ 
 Eng. tr., pp. 355 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 79 
 
 This brings us to the close of our exposition and criticism of t)^ical 
 recent philosophies of religion. There remains the task of stating the 
 results and implications of the above discussion. This will form the 
 subject-matter of the third and concluding part. 
 
80 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 PART THREE 
 
 Statement of the Results and Implications of the Foregoing 
 
 Discussion 
 
 So far our effort has been to set forth critically the problems due to 
 the attempt to bring the modern doctrine of evolution into relation with 
 the traditional conception of God, and the solutions of these problems in 
 typical recent philosophies of religion. The purpose of the concluding 
 part of our investigation will be to summarize the results and to call 
 attention to certain implications. 
 
 In our survey of the situation in the first part of our work, we saw 
 that, since the evolutionary theory stands for an empirical method and a 
 changing, growing, and non-miraculous view of the organic world, 
 exempting no living reality from the process of evolution, while the 
 traditional theology adheres to its a priori revelation-method and its 
 conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural, sovereign person- 
 ality and as the infinite and absolute being, there arose many critical 
 problems, especially, in regard to the theological method of formulating 
 the conception of God and the conception of his nature. A full recog- 
 nition of these problems is essential to the constructian of a modern 
 doctrine of God. The evolutionary point of view has come to be so 
 pervasive and dominating in modern methods of investigation and ways 
 of thinking that we can no longer be content with the uncritical adjust- 
 ments of the traditional conception of God with the theory of evolution 
 which have marked the apologetic theologies of the past generation.^ 
 In view of this fact, the theologians must either abandon the logic 
 underlying the evolutionary theory, or accept it in a thoroughgoing 
 fashion and deal with the problems of theology from its standpoint. 
 Realizing the futility of the former alternative, we feel forced to deal 
 with the theory in earnest and to consider the work of theology from its 
 point of view. 
 
 In assuming this attitude toward the evolutionary theory, we find 
 two central problems, namely, that of method and that of the conception 
 of the nature of God. The fundamental issues involved, then, are these: 
 First, shall the a priori dogmatic method of traditional theology based 
 on an external authority continue to be used? or shall we adopt an 
 empirical procedure in the formulation of our conception of God? Sec- 
 
 ^ Such, e. g., are Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, and Gr ffith- 
 Jones, op. cit. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 81 
 
 ondly, can the traditional conception of God as the transcendent, com- 
 plete, and perfect being be retained? or must we conceive of him as 
 dynamically immanent in the processes of evolution, hence a changing, 
 grov^ing, finite being? To accept the fonner alternatives of these ques- 
 tions means to possess a system of finality and of absolutism in matters of 
 religion and ethics. But to take the position of the latter alternatives 
 signifies that there is no finality anywhere, either in the world at large 
 or more specifically in the field of religion and ethics. These issues are 
 indeed of far-reaching significance.^ With this recognition, then, of the 
 problems and of the issues involved in them, we now pass to a specific 
 consideration of the results and implications of our previous discussion. 
 
 1. The Problem of Method. 
 
 Reference has repeatedly been made, in the course of our study, to the 
 fact that the evolutionary theory demands a new method in dealing 
 with the doctrine of God as well as other reUgious doctrines. This new 
 method may be stated briefly as an investigation and formulation of our 
 conception of God on the basis of knowledge derived in and through 
 the actual reUgious experiences of individuals and peoples. In this 
 method there is no reliance on any external authority; material and cri- 
 terion are both found in the experiences of religious people. To this 
 experiential method demanded by the evolutionary theory, the deduc- 
 tive method of traditional theology founded on an infallible, supernatural 
 revelation is diametrically opposed. 
 
 The result of our study respecting the methodology of the men whom 
 we have studied may be siunmed up as follows: 
 
 Royce, whose method is fundamentally based on an Absolute Experi- 
 ence or Thought, or on an All-inclusive Insight, which he assumes a 
 priori, nevertheless gives a large space to the examination of the facts of 
 changing, growing, temporal social experience as a means of arriving 
 at his metaphysical conclusions.^ He is fully aware of the movements of 
 empiricism, especially since the days of Kant, and so cannot ignore 
 inductive investigation in matters of philosophy and religion. Thus 
 he confesses: ''Whatever may be the rationalistic bias or tradition of 
 any of us, we are all more or less empiricists, and we are so to a degree 
 that was never characteristic of the pre-Kantian rationalists. What- 
 ever may be our interest in theory or in the Absolute, we are aU 
 accustomed to lay stress upon practical considerations as having a 
 
 2 See Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, pp. 21 f. 
 
 3 This, as we noted, is particularly true of his recent works, e. g., The Sources of 
 Religiaus Insight, and The Problem of Christianity. 
 
82 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 fundamental, even if not the most fundamental, importance for philoso- 
 phy; and so in a general, and I admit, in a very loose sense of the term, 
 we are all alike more or less pragma tists."'* In a very marked degree, 
 the same regard for empiricism characterizes Eucken. He has given up 
 the power of thought relied upon by intellectualistic systems of philoso- 
 phy, for he finds it incapable of giving us the true insight into the problem 
 of human life. For him the contradictions in life cannot be so easily 
 solved as they are in such a philosophy as immanent idealism. Eucken 
 indeed, affirms as the basis of his philosophy an independent spiritual 
 life, which is underivable in and through the evolutionary experiences of 
 man. Philosophically he undertakes to view the facts of human experi- 
 ence from the standpoint of such a spiritual life. But we find that, in 
 reality, he is constantly dealing with the actual experiences of the life- 
 process in its struggles, conflicts, oppositions, tasks. In Bowne we see 
 distinctly two trends in his method. From the standpoint of his meta- 
 physics, he relies upon the capacity of thought for discovering the 
 nature of reality; and yet he fully admits that we must depend upon 
 experience to furnish the data for thought.^ From the point of view of 
 his religion, great stress is laid upon the actual experiences of life to 
 solve the problem of God and other problems of religion. Here he 
 depends not on the intellect but on experience to come to an under- 
 standing of the nature of God and of other rehgious realities. "The 
 understanding is only an instrument for manipulating the data furnished 
 by experience; and when the experience is limited or lacking, there is 
 nothing to interpret and really no problem."^ Thus Royce, Eucken, 
 and Bowne give much consideration to the facts of empirical experience 
 in matters, especially, of religion. Still, in spite of the attention they 
 give to experience, their method consists fundamentally in viewing the 
 problems of religion and of philosophy from the standpoint of some 
 absolute, some final criterion which they have a priori assumed. But 
 when we come to James, we find that he has set aside all a priori method, 
 and deals with the questions of religion from the viewpoint of actual 
 religious experience. For him the content of religion is not to be assumed, 
 but to be obtained and verified in and through concrete religious exper- 
 ience. Hence in him we note a complete reliance on the capacity of the 
 actual experiences of religion to determine its realities; thus he meets the 
 methodological demand of the evolutionary theory.^ 
 
 4 The Eternal and the Practical, The Phil. Rev., XIII, pp. 113 f.; cf. ibid., p. 142. 
 
 * Metaphysics, p. 5. 
 
 * Theism, p. 260. 
 
 ^ On the methods of these philosophers of rehgion, see above, pp. 21 f., 27 ff. ; 
 41f.;48f.;55f.;63f.;74f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 83 
 
 Briefly, this is the result of our study of the problem of method. 
 Even the philosophers of religion, Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who are 
 concerned to relate the problems of religion to a superempirical absolute, 
 nevertheless make so much use of the data of experience, that they tend 
 toward an experiential method. This tendency toward empirical 
 inquiry finds full scope in the inductive method of James. ^ The trend 
 of contemporary religious thought, so far as these men are representative 
 is thus in the direction of empiricism in method. 
 
 This methodological tendency means that if theology is to be in line 
 with the inductive, evolutionary spirit of contemporary sciences, it 
 cannot follow the method hitherto employed. Traditional theology fol- 
 lows the method of expounding and systematizing a given quantity of 
 supernatural revelation located in an infallible church or scripture.^ 
 Such a procedure is becoming more and more unsatisfactory; for the 
 investigations in biblical science are constantly bringing to light the 
 differences between the content of the biblical revelation and that of 
 modern religion.^^ A departure from this method marks the RitschUan 
 school, which views religion from the standpoint of the revelation of God 
 made in the historical person of Jesus. ^^ While this method is an advance 
 upon that of traditional theology, in that it is more in accord with the 
 results of bibUcal criticism than the latter; yet there is actually much 
 discrepancy between the religious consciousness and teaching of the 
 historical Jesus and the content of our modem reUgious experiences and 
 views. It thus becomes exceedingly difficult to make the historical 
 Jesus as the complete and absolute norm of religion.^ Fully aware of 
 this difficulty of the Ritschlian method, the ^' Religions geschichtliche 
 Schule'^ attempts to view the problems of reHgion from the standpoint 
 of the history of reUgions.^^ But while this school does actually deal 
 with reHgion empirically, there is still the desire to Hnk reHgious beUef 
 
 * Of course this remark does not signify that his method is fuUy satisfactory, but 
 it means that he has apphed the same scientific spirit, which characterizes the theorie 
 of evolution, in his investigations of religion. 
 
 9 See, e. g., Hodge, op. ciL, I, pp. 182 ff.; Shedd, op. cit., I, pp. 70 S. 
 
 10 See, e. g., Piepenbring, Theology of the Old Testament; Weinel, Biblische Theologie 
 des Neuen Testaments, Tubingen, 1913; WTiite, A History of the Warfare of Science 
 with Theology in Christendom, 2 vols., 1896, II, Chap. XX. 
 
 "Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott, Berhn, 1903, esp. pp. 79 flf.; 
 Hamack, Das Wesen des Christentums, pp. 33 ff. 
 
 ^ See, e. g., Schweitzer, The Quest of Historical Jesus; Scott, The Kingdom and the 
 Messiah. 
 
 "Troeltsch, The Dogmatics of the "ReUgionsgeschichtliche Schule," American 
 Journal of Theology, Jan., 1913. 
 
84 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 to some superempirical absolute. Troeltsch, for example, affirms a religi- 
 ous a priori quite after the transcendental method of Platonism.^'* The 
 above typical theological methods of the present are satisfactory to 
 many. But an increasing number of theological thinkers who have felt 
 the power of scientific investigations, especially in the field of religion, 
 can no longer follow esoteric methods. These men feel that in order 
 to take its place among the sciences of our age and to accomplish its 
 work for the furtherance of religious life, theology should employ the 
 method demanded by the evolutionary theory. In adopting such a 
 method of experimentation and verification, theology will indeed lose 
 its claim to finality in content, but it will find a vaster field for its inves- 
 tigation and gain scientific worth for what it discovers through the 
 medium of the new method.^^ Theology, then, in following the induc- 
 tive method of the evolutionary theory will seek for the sources of its 
 doctrines in the common religious experiences of people as these are 
 critically expounded in investigations dealing particularly with the his- 
 tory of religion and the psychology of religious experience. Christian 
 theology will, of course, study its religious inheritance in the records 
 especially of the Hebrew and Christian peoples, in order to gain sug- 
 gestive contributions toward the solution of its religious problems. Sig- 
 nificant personalities, notably the prophets and Jesus and his apostles, 
 will constitute a specially valuable source of religious insight. But 
 while these will form the primary sources of religion, theology will, in 
 accordance with its empirical method, deal with contributions on matters 
 of religion coming from any other worthy source. It is thus the great 
 field of human religious experience, in the largest sense, with which 
 theology would empirically deal.^^ In the use of such inductive pro- 
 cedure, theology would indeed be in accord with the methodological 
 point of view of the evolutionary theory; and it would also carry out 
 the implication of our investigation with regard to the problem of 
 method in its relation to the formulation of our conception of God. 
 
 2. The Problem of the Relation between Theology and Science. 
 
 The problem as to the relation between theology and science involves 
 especially the question of empiricism and metempiricism in theory. The 
 evolutionary theory based, as it is, upon scientific investigations, would 
 
 ^* Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion, Harvard Theo., Rev., V, 
 esp. pp. 419 ff. 
 
 ^^ Cf. Ames, op. cit., p, 320; Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychol- 
 ogy, American Journal of Theology,^, p. 232. 
 
 ^^ Cf. Johnson, God in Evolution, Chap. II, Concerning Method. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 85 
 
 necessitate the view that, since all forms of existence are related with one 
 another in an organic whole, the physical and psychical realms are alike 
 open to empirical investigations; that, inasmuch as we do not know of 
 any content of truth obtainable through metempirical means, all our 
 affirmations concerning God and other religious objects should be made 
 on the basis of our evolutionary experience; and that, as our life with all 
 its ideas and ideals is involved in the process of real evolution, all our 
 theories are not the exact representations of objective truths, but are 
 practical means of interpreting and of furthering human life. Traditional 
 theology, however, maintains that while the natural realm is open to 
 scientific investigation, the supernatural realm, where the main facts 
 of religion are believed to be located, is not amenable to inductive 
 experimentation; that the truths of religion are given to us by a super- 
 natural God through supernatural means; and that, therefore, these 
 truths are infallible and absolute. In view of the theoretical antithesis 
 involved in these two systems of thought, there arises the problem of 
 effecting a tenable adjustment between them. 
 
 For the solution of this problem, the philosophers of reUgion whom 
 we have consulted, have given us their contributions. Royce, in accord- 
 ance with his absolute idealism, holds that philosophy has the final word 
 on the subject of reality. Yet he recognizes the truths of science as 
 inductive descriptions of the temporal order. Moreover, he gives a high 
 value to the deeds and events of our temporal experience.^^ What he 
 opposes in science (natural science) is its uncritical affirmation that all 
 reality consists of physical elements and that all forms of existence are 
 explicable in terms of such elements. Eucken likewise appreciates the 
 place and worth of science in modern life. But he cannot tolerate the 
 scientific naturalism which reduces all reahty to the plane of physical 
 mechanism. With Bowne, science can freely concern itself with the 
 phenomenal reality, while philosophy deals with ontological reaHties. 
 But we note that Bowne bases many of his religious affirmations on the 
 ground of experience. When we come to James, we find that he has 
 given up all the dogmatic elements adhered to by the above philosophers, 
 and bases all his declarations on the discoveries of empirical inquiry; 
 but he is as fully antagonistic as they are to the materialistic contentions 
 of dogmatic natural science. Thus all these philosophers of rehgion hold 
 that the discoveries of natural science do not constitute the whole of 
 reaUty; accordingly, theological or religious affirmations must be given 
 
 " See, e. g., The Reality of the Temporal, International Journal of Ethics, XX, 
 pp. 269 ff. 
 
86 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 their due validity. Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who claim finality for 
 their systems, make much of their statements grounded on the facts of 
 experience, while James abandons all dogmatic elements and treats all 
 theories as hypotheses liable to modification and revision in the course 
 of changing human experience.^^ James thus considers the idea of God 
 also as a practical hypothesis of religion.^^ The empirical elements 
 traceable in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne thus find full recognition in 
 James, and are made the basis of his philosophy of religion as well as of 
 science.^^ 
 
 Such, in brief, is the tendency of thought among these philosophers 
 of religion on the relation between theology and science. Science has 
 its place to fill in the work of humanity, but it must give up its claim 
 to explain all realities in terms of physical elements; while theology should 
 relinquish its claim to set forth absolute truth. Both are called upon 
 to face the facts of life and of existence in a thoroughly empirical fashion, 
 and to consider themselves as means of furthering the on-going evolution 
 of life. This appears to be the implication of the solutions given by our 
 religious philosophers to the problem of the relation of theology and 
 science. 
 
 This implication as to the relation between theology and science calls 
 for a brief comment. The theories of evolution which we have studied 
 are characterized by a thoroughgoing empiricism. Lamarck indicates 
 that he has reached his conclusions as result of observation ;2^ Darwin 
 states that his theory of natural selection, formulated after years of close 
 study, does not exclude other means of modification of species;^ Bergson, 
 too, with his doctrine of a universal change does not claim finality for his 
 system.^ This undogmatic attitude of the evolutionists is characteristic 
 of contemporary scientists. While Haeckel maintains the view that 
 " all the previous boundaries of natural science have now fallen (in conse- 
 sequence of the progress of science); its domain has become extended 
 thereby over the whole realm of man's intellectual life. Nature is every- 
 thing, and therefore all true science is also at bottom 'natural science' ";^ 
 
 ^^The Will to Believe, Preface, pp. vii, f.; Essays in Radical Empiricism. 
 ^3 The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 506 f., 517 f. 
 
 20 For the views of these men on the relation between theology and science, see 
 above, pp. 29 f.; 42 f.; 56 ff.; 73 f.; and for a criticism of science, cf. Perry, op. cit., 
 Chap. V, Religion and the Limits of Science. 
 
 21 Packard, op. cit., p. 323. 
 
 22 The Origin of Species, cf . The Descent of Man, pp. 702 f . 
 
 23 Creative Evolution, pp. 44 flf., 265 ff. 
 
 24 The Boundaries of Natural Science, The Open Court, Feb. 1914, p. 73, cf. p. 69 f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 87 
 
 yet such an aflBrmation is not made by the most critically exact of scien- 
 tists. Pearson, for example, points out the incompleteness of science 
 and its concepts or laws as mental shorthand useful to the work of man: 
 "Although science claims the whole universe as its field, it must not be 
 supposed that it has reached, or ever can reach, complete knowledge in 
 every department. Far from this it confesses that its ignorance is more 
 widely extended than its knowledge. . . . We are thus to understand 
 by a law in science, i. e., by a 'law of nature,' a resume in mental short- 
 hand, which replaces for us a lengthy description of the sequences among 
 our sense-impressions. Law in the scientific sense is thus essentially a 
 product of the human mind and has no meaning apart from man."^^ 
 Ostwald, in a similar tone, says: ''The laws of nature do not decree what 
 shall happen, but inform us what has happened and what is wont to hap- 
 pen. ... We must not say, . . ., that because we have been able so 
 far to explain all experiences by natural laws it will be so in the future 
 likewise. For we are far from being able to explain all experiences. In 
 fact, it is only a very small part that we have begim to investigate. "^^ 
 Poincare, on the matter of scientific law, writes thus: "If we look at any 
 particular law, we may be certain in advance that it can only be approxi- 
 mate. ... No particular law will ever be more than approximate and 
 probable. Scientists have never failed to recognize this truth; only 
 they beheve, right or wrong, that every law may be replaced by another 
 closer and more probable, that this new law will itself be only provisional, 
 but that the same movement can continue indefinitely, so that science 
 in progressing will possess laws more and more probable, that the approxi- 
 mation will end by differing as Uttle as you choose from exactitude and 
 the probabiHty from certitude. "^^ Such is, in short, the thoroughly 
 empirical attitude of our foremost scientists in regard to the work of 
 science. 
 
 But what attitude do we find in the case of theologians? In con- 
 trast to the empiricism of the evolutionary theory and of contemporary 
 science, most of our theologies are marked by some dogmatic absolutism. 
 Orthodoxy maintains that it has the final truths m its divinely given 
 scripture,^^ which are beyond the ken of science. The RitschUan school 
 conceives of reaUty under two categories: the existential-judgments and 
 
 ^ The Gramma of Science, pp. 25, 86 f . 
 2« Natural Philosophy, pp. 28, 31. 
 2' The Foundations of Science, pp. 340, 341. 
 
 28 See, e. g., Hodge, op. ciL, I, pp. 151 ff., 364; Shedd, op. cit., I, pp. 70 ff.; Strong, 
 op. cit., I, pp. 145 ff. 
 
88 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 value-judgments. Science deals with the former, while theology is con- 
 cerned with the latter; the two are independent of each other. "The 
 evangehcal faith," says Herrmann, ''because it ought to be an indepen- 
 dent possession of the moral personality, must remain unentangled with 
 the present-day development of free natural science." ^^ For this school, 
 by thus dividing the field of knowledge and of faith, the content of 
 revelation given in the personality of the historical Jesus is theoretically 
 unaffected by historical criticism.^^ The Positive theologians contend 
 that in Jesus Christ the absolute truths of religion are found.^^ The 
 " Religions geschichichtliche Schule^' as represented by Troeltsch cannot be 
 satisfied with what we find in experience. He falls back on the position 
 of Platonic philosophy .^^ Thus theologians in one way or another with 
 their adherence to some absolute element in their systems contend for 
 the immunity of their theological doctrines from the encroachment of 
 science; for them the findings of empirical study cannot form the founda- 
 tion for their theological doctrines. These must be grounded on some 
 a priori principle underivable in and through human experience. 
 
 None of the positions, however, of the above theologians would 
 seem to be in agreement with the implication of the tendency of thought 
 manifested by our religious philosophers on the question of the relation 
 of theology and science. Of these philosophers, James has particularly 
 brought out, in accordance with his empiricism, the functional value of 
 our scientific and theological concepts; for him, they are the practical 
 means of adjusting ourselves to the environing realities for the purpose of 
 developing human life. This functional significance of our concepts is 
 recognized, as we have seen, by at least a few of our contemporary 
 scientists. The theologians, in the main, have not yet come to take 
 such a view of their doctrines; the theological concepts, according to them, 
 are more or less exact representations of objective realities. It is quite 
 manifest, as a result of our study, that the best way, in so far as our 
 present age of culture and civilization is concerned, is to take the hints 
 given by the philosophers of religion and the men of science whom we 
 have consulted respecting the relation between theology and science, 
 
 29 Die Religion, etc., Preface, p. iv, quoted by Simpson, The Spiritual Interpreta- 
 tion of Nature, p. 4. 
 
 '° See Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, 1899; BoutroiLx, Science et Religion, Part 
 II, Chap. I. 
 
 31 See Seeberg, op. cit., cf. Hodge, The Finality of the Christian Rehgion, Princeton 
 Biblical and Theological Studies, pp. 453 ff.; Brown, op. cit., pp. 74 S. 
 
 32 Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of ReUgion, Harvard Theo. Rev., V, 
 p. 420 ff. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 89 
 
 and conceive of the doctrines t>oth of science and of theology as working 
 hypotheses, which we acquire through the process of experimentation, 
 in order to achieve the higher values of life.^ In so conceiving the 
 function of theology and of science in relation to the interests of human 
 life, there is suggested a tenable relation between them, namely, the 
 relation of cooperative activity in the interest of promoting the develop- 
 ment of man in his struggle for existence. The whole realm of existence 
 will be open to science for investigation, as it is held, for example, by 
 Pearson;** so that it may go on with its work of observation, description, 
 classification, explanation as to the processes of nature, human society, 
 and of our psychological phenomena in order to have control over them 
 in the behalf of man; while theology is to proceed with its task, aided by 
 the results of scientific investigations in various fields, of interpreting 
 particularly religious phenomena and of formulating concepts, doctrines, 
 hypotheses of the objects of reUgion which will best further, in a given 
 age, its ideal ends. Such a theory seems to be the impUcation of the 
 trend of the solutions offered by our philosophers on the relation of 
 theology and science and also to be the bearing of the evolutionary 
 theory, especially, on the formulation of our conception of God. 
 
 3. The Problem of God as the Transcendent, Supernatural Person- 
 ality. 
 
 The problems which we have just been discussing relate, in a special 
 manner, to the question of empiricism in method and in theory with 
 regard to the conception of God. The problem before us and those that 
 are to follow concern our conception of the nature of God and of his 
 relation to the world. To take up the immediate problem, we have 
 noted that the evolutionary theory stands for a view of realities as 
 organically related into a whole; it, moreover, knows no other world, so 
 far as our experience shows, than this changing, evolving world whose 
 evolutionary process is effected by its immanent forces. God, then, 
 from the standpoint of the theory, must be organically related with this 
 world. Traditional theology, on the other hand, holds that God does 
 not essentially belong to this world; but. that he manifests his relation 
 to it by means of specific supernatural acts. So there emerges the 
 problem of God as the transcendent, supernatural personaHty. 
 
 ^ See Ames, Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology, American 
 Journal of Theology, X, pp. 219-232, Tiie Psychology of Religious Experience, Chap. XVI, 
 Ideas and Religious Experience; I. King, op. cit., Chap. XIII, Religious Valuation and 
 Supernaturalism. 
 
 ^ Op. cit., p. 24. 
 
90 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 Respecting this problem we have found this result. Royce has com- 
 pletely abandoned the Kantian things-in-themselves, and has conceived 
 of God in terms of immanent idealism. For him, there is no other 
 world than the world of thought and will. God is organically bound up 
 with such a world; he is its very life and substance. Eucken cannot 
 endorse the view of God as belonging to a supernatural world and as 
 coming to us by means of miraculous donation. God is considered by 
 him as the very basis of all existence, in spite of the appearances to the 
 contrary. God, according to Bowne, is the omnipresent ground of all 
 things; no finite being exists apart from the immanent activity of such a 
 God. God, in the thought of James, is intimately concerned with us in 
 our struggles for the attainment of higher and higher forms of hfe. 
 All these philosophers of rehgion attribute the notion of personality, in 
 varying degrees, to God, yet they do not conceive of him in terms of such 
 a rigid separation from the world as is held by traditional theology; 
 God, for them, is either the all-inclusive being of the universe (Royce), 
 or the independent basis and the ground of the world (Eucken and 
 Bowne), or one of the principal realities of the world (James); but in 
 every case, God is closely and organically related with the world.^*^ The 
 view of God, then, as immanently and dynamically related with the 
 world is suggested as the result of our study of the solutions given by 
 typical recent philosophies of religion to the problem of God as the 
 transcendent, supernatural personality.^ 
 
 The significance of this result of our investigation for theology, 
 briefly stated, is this: that, to be in line with and represent helpfully 
 the evolutionary and immanent view of the world, theology has to 
 abandon its traditional heritage of conceiving God in terms of dualistic 
 supernaturalism and to think of him as immanently active in the world 
 of nature and of man. But the ruling theologies of our day decline to 
 carry out this implication; they refuse to conceive of God in terms of 
 dynamic immanence; they are not wholly willing to surrender the super- 
 natural transcendence of God in the traditional sense. The underlying 
 reason of their disincUnation to view God in terms of dynamic relation 
 with the world is twofold: they have not, on the one hand, acquired 
 scientific confidence in the normal evolutionary activities of the imma- 
 nent forces in the cosmos; and, on the other hand, they desire to preserve 
 
 36 See above, pp. 25 f.; 39 fiF., 44; 49 ff., 57 flf.; 69 ff., 74. 
 
 ^ By this statement it is not intended to convey the idea that they identify God 
 pantheistically with the world. Even with Royce, God and the world are not, empiri- 
 cally at least, the same. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 91 
 
 the supernatural character of their religion. This attitude is expressed 
 by orthodoxy in its afl&rmation of the scripture as the supernatural 
 revelation of God, of the incarnation of Jesus as the miraculous interven- 
 tion in the course of history, of salvation as the supernatural act of the 
 Holy Spirit, and of the like.^^ In fact, the whole system of orthodoxy 
 is based upon the specific supernatural acts of God interposed in the 
 course of nature and of human history. 
 
 The conception of God as the transcendent, supernatural personality 
 is thus connected with the question of miracles. Miracles in the sense 
 of acts performed by God in contradistinction to the known order of 
 nature and of human history are essential to traditional theology .^^ One 
 of the strongest orthodox expressions on the necessity of the supernatural 
 principle in Christianity is made by W. B. Greene. He maintains that 
 the Christian religion stands or falls with the reality of God as the 
 Supernatural, i. e., absolutely distinct from the world. / "Christianity 
 insists on nothing so strongly as on this," he writes, "that it is not of 
 this world and so natural, but is directly of the sole because absolute 
 God and thus supernatural."^^ In a similar manner, C. W. Hodge con- 
 tends that the finality of the Christian religion depends on its superna- 
 turally communicated revelation of truth from an extramundane God.'*" 
 In these recent expressions of these men, there is the sharply defined 
 dualism of the natural and the supernatural, which is characteristic of the 
 older theologians above referred to. According to such a mode of thought 
 God must intervene in the course of the world to make himself known 
 to us and furnish us with his salvation. This supernaturalism is main- 
 tained by the Ritschlian school. ^^ Other theologians emphasize the 
 element of the supernatural in religion to a greater or less degree.'*^ 
 
 With all the emphasis thus put upon the supernatural character of 
 God by these theologians, it is interesting to note, especially in the 
 writings of the Ritschlians and other liberal theologians, the fact that 
 
 " See Wilhelm and Scannell, op. cit., vols. I and II; Hodge, op. cit., I, pp. 151 ff., 
 II, pp. 378 ff., 675 flf.; Shedd, op. cit., I, pp. 61 ff., II, pp. 261 ff., 353 ff.; Strong, op. 
 cit., I, pp. Ill ff., II, pp. 673 ff., Ill, pp. 777 ff. 
 
 38 Hodge, op. cit., I, pp. 617 ff.; Shedd, op. cit., I, pp. 533 ff.; Strong, op. cit., II, 
 pp. 431 ff. 
 
 3" The Supernatural, Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies, p. 145, cf . pp. 143 ff. 
 
 *° See ibid.. The Finality of the Christian ReUgion, esp. pp. 452 ff. 
 
 " See, e. g., Herrmann, op. cit., Kapitel II; Hamack, op. cit., p. 19; Wendland, 
 Miracles and Christianity, Eng. tr., 1911, esp. pp. 1, 3, 125, 158, 281, etc. 
 
 «See, e. g., Clark, op. cit., pp. 133 f.; Brown, op. cit., pp. 229 ff.; H. C. King, 
 op. cit., pp. 96 ff. 
 
92 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 genuine moral and religious elements in life are really considered by them 
 as the fundamental constituents of religion. For the Ritschlians, it is 
 not the miraculous birth or deeds of Jesus but his wonderful moral 
 religious personahty which makes him unique among the sons of men; 
 and the great objective of the Christian life is not a pietistic contempla- 
 tion of the gifts of God but the establishment of the Kingdom of God.'*^ 
 So we may say that there is, in contemporary theologies, a tendency 
 toward the elimination of the supernatural aspects of God, so as to con- 
 ceive of him as genuinely related to our moral religious experiences. 
 A suggestive expression of this tendency is given by G. A. Gordon in his 
 hook, Religion and Miracles. The central thought of his work is that 
 religion does not stand or fall with the fate of miracle. He holds that 
 miracles are logical possibilities but natural improbabilities. And he 
 confesses that, with his view of God as immanent in the world, miracle 
 has no part in his working philosophy of Ufe.^ Thus to conceive of God 
 in terms of dynamic immanence and to have confidence in his normal 
 activities in the world would indeed be in accord with the evolutionary 
 theory which eliminates the miraculous from the organic realm,'*^ and 
 would be working out the impUcation of the solutions of the problem of 
 God as the transcendent, supernatural personality offered by our reli- 
 gious philosophers in the work of theology .^^ This conception of God in 
 terms of organic relation with the world is intimately connected with the 
 next problem to be considered, namely, 
 
 4. The Problem of God as the Absolute Being. 
 
 This is the most critical problem in our investigation. For it imme- 
 diately opens up the question of absoluteness and finality versus finitude 
 and relativity in matters of ethics and religion. The evolutionary 
 theory stands for the relative and finite view of reality. Such a view of 
 the world is evident in its conception of all the forms of life as involved 
 in the process of change and of growth. God, from this evolutionary 
 point of view of organic reality, is to be conceived of in terms of change 
 and growth, the essential characteristics of the living world with which 
 he is vitally related. Traditional theology, on the contrary, contends 
 
 ^' Ritschl, Doctrine of Reconciliation and Justification, Eng. tr., Chap. IV, The 
 Doctrine of God; Herrmann, op. cit., Kapitel III; Harnack, op. cit., pp. 34 ff.; cf. 
 Clark, op. cit., H. C. King, op. cit., Chaps. XI f.; Brown, op. cit., pp. 326 ff., 377 ff., 
 182 ff. 
 
 « See op. cit., pp. 7, Z3, 82, 130, 165 ff. 
 
 ^ Weismann, op. cit., I, p. 6; cf. Pfleiderer, Evolution and Theology, p. 9. 
 
 ** For a very suggestive contribution on this subject, see G. B. Smith, Social 
 Idealism and the Changing Theology, esp. Chap. V. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 93 
 
 for the system of absoluteness and finality in religion and ethics. This 
 contention of traditional theology is a direct consequence of its concep- 
 tion of God as the eternally complete and perfect being of the universe; 
 he is, as such, wholly above time and history which mark our world. 
 
 The result of our inquiry as to the solutions of this problem in recent 
 philosophies of religion is as follows. The God of Royce, from the 
 standpoint of his absolute idealism, is the all-inclusive absolute being of 
 the universe, free from the temporary aspects of our experience. Yet we 
 have found that Royce attributes to his God such characteristics of our 
 evolutionary experience as sujffering, striving, satisfaction. Hence the 
 God of Royce, viewed at least from our finite point of view, is involved 
 in the process of change and of growth, so is a finite being; while he is 
 the absolute being, when viewed from an eternal point of view.'*^ God, 
 for Eucken, is the absolute spiritual Ufe, the independent basis of all 
 temporal order. But the real interest, from the standpoint of his actual 
 experience, is to view God in terms of our conflict, struggle, and activity. 
 Thus the God of Eucken would be involved in the evolutionary features of 
 human experience. God, in the thought of Bowne, is the omnipresent 
 ontological ground of the world, absolutely free from its evolutionary 
 characteristics. But the very fact that Bowne has repudiated the old 
 static notion of reality, that he has endeavored to establish the dis- 
 tinct existence of finite spirits over against the infinite, and that he has 
 sought to conceive of God in terms of actual relation with our moral and 
 religious experiences, leads logically to the conception of God as a 
 changing, growing, finite being. In James we note no effort to retain the 
 absolutistic conception of God, which the above philosophers theoreti- 
 cally attempt to maintain. James, on the contrary, finds the very 
 essence of life in its experiences of change, growth, risks, successes. 
 Hence he conceives of God in terms of these characteristics of our evo- 
 lutionary experience. Thus we observe that the evolutionary aspects 
 in the theological thoughts of Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, which appear 
 in spite of their conceptions of God under the category of some absolute, 
 are made the fundamental characteristics of God in the pragmatic 
 religion of James. ^^ We may, thus, say that the tendency of thought in 
 these philosophies of religion is to conceive of God in terms of the evo- 
 lutionary characteristics of our experience; and that this tendency has 
 reached its culmination in the conception of God as held by James. 
 
 " The World and the Individual, II, pp. 133 ff.; The Reality of the Temporal, The 
 nternational Journal of Ethics, XX, pp. 270 f.; The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 394 f. 
 " See above, pp. 21 ff., 31 ff.; 38 f., 44 ff.; 49 ff., 58 ff.; 69 ff., 74 ff. 
 
94 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 The implication, then, of the result of our study concerning the 
 problem of God as the absolute being, for theology is this : that it should 
 take a full cognizance of the evolutionary and finite characteristics of 
 the conceptions of God, which appear in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne as 
 against their absolutistic philosophical presuppositions, and which are 
 definitely afiirmed by James; and that it should conceive of God in terms 
 of those qualities which are in accord with the results of empirical inves- 
 tigations of the world and, particularly, of human religious experience. 
 In following the suggestive contributions of these religious philosophers 
 and in assuming this investigative attitude toward the empirical facts of 
 the world and of life, we find that all realities are involved in the processes 
 of change, movement, development. It has already been indicated that 
 the fact of change and of growth are recognized in both inorganic and 
 organic realms of existence.'*^ The reality of evolution is taken for 
 granted and the application of it is made in all the fields of investigation, 
 for example, in sociology ;^^ in psychology ;^^ in philosophy ;^2 i^ ethics;^ 
 in theology;^ in history of religion ;^^ and in the psychology of religious 
 experience.^ All these and other scientific inquiries accept the fact of 
 evolution and proceed on the basis of this fact. One of the clearest 
 indications of our immediate experience is the consciousness of the time- 
 process, of history, of development, of something done.^^ Hoffding 
 points out that in view of the fact that our empirical world is not finished, 
 
 *^See above, pp. 10 f., also the books cited on evolution; cf. Morgan, Evolution 
 and Adaptation, 1903, Chap. II; LeConte, Evolution and Its Relation to Religious 
 Thought, 1889, Part II, note p. 63; Osborn, op. cit.; Chamberiin-Sahsbury, Geology, 
 1904, etc. 
 
 ^° See, e. g., Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, 1909; Small, General Sociology, 
 1905; Kidd, Social Evolution, 1894;. 
 
 ^^ See, e. g., Baldwin, Mental Development; Development and Evolution, 1902; 
 Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, James, Psychology. 
 
 " See, e. g., Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities; Dewey, The Influence of Darwin 
 on Philosophy, 1910; The Studies in Logical Theory, 1903; Windelband, A History of 
 Philosophy, Eng. tr., 1905; Rogers, A Student's History of Philosophy. 
 
 *3See, e. g., Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, 1906; Dewey-Tufts, Ethics, 1908, 
 Part I. 
 
 " See, e. g., Harnack, History of Dogma, 7 vols., Eng. tr., 1897-1900; Fisher, 
 History of Christian Doctrine; Troeltsch, The Dogmatics of the " ReHgionsgeschicht- 
 liche Schule," American Journal of Theology, Jan. 1913. 
 
 °^ See, e. g., Jevons, An Introduction to the Study of Religion, 1896; Toy, An Intro- 
 duction to the History of Religions, 1913; Jordan, Comparative Religion, Its Genesis and 
 Growth, 1905; Allen, The Evolution of the Idea of God, 1897. 
 
 ^ See, e. g., Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, 1, King, op. cit. 
 ^ "7 Cf, Dodson, Bergson and the Modern Spirit, 1913, p. 20; Lyman, op. cit., p. 134. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 95 
 
 but that it always presents new experiences and new riddles, we cannot 
 have a complete knowledge. And he suggests the idea that this unfin- 
 ishedness of our knowledge "may perhaps be connected with the fact 
 that Being itself is not ready-made, but still incomplete, and rather to be 
 conceived as a continual becoming, like individual personaUty and like 
 knowledge. "^^ So far as our scientific studies and our empirical experi- 
 ence show, we ourselves and the realities with which we are related are 
 characterized by change, incompleteness, unfinishedness, growth, devel- 
 opment.^^ So from the standpoint of our empirical investigation and 
 our empirical experience, we must frankly admit that the world as a 
 whole is involved in the process of real evolution. 
 
 The critical question, then, is whether Gk)d can be held free from 
 the process of evolution, or whether he is to be conceived in terms of 
 such a process. We have observed that from the standpoint of our 
 actual empirical experience, all the philosophers of rehgion whom we 
 have studied, attribute to God the evolutionary features of the experience. 
 And this experiential mode of conceiving God should be followed, for it 
 is not in accord with the empirical temper of our age to find God outside 
 of our evolutionary experience and to define him other than in terms of 
 such experience. ^"^ Scientific spirit has come to be so dominating in our 
 modern world that the speculative arguments for the reaUty and the 
 nature of God, which were effective in the past, have become weak in their 
 convincing power. Consequently, in order that any conception of God 
 may be a living factor in our reUgious life, we must, it would seem, con- 
 ceive God in terms of those characteristics which our evolutionary 
 sciences and experience make manifest. There may be a realm or realms 
 in the universe where change, unfinishedness, development are not 
 found, and where God may be exempt from time and history; but the 
 world of our empirical science and experience, and God as he is known in 
 the experiences of the race are all marked by temporal features. God, 
 then, should be conceived under the category, not of completeness and 
 of immutabiUty, but of becoming and of development. 
 
 Thus to conceive Grod in terms of evolutionary experience, rather 
 than under the category of some metaphysical absolute, is demanded 
 by our religion and ethics. If by religion we mean pietistic contempla- 
 tion, philosophic knowledge, or passive receptivity, then the conception 
 of God as the absolute being, free from the finite aspects of our world 
 
 5« The Problems of Philosophy, w. 120, cf. p. 136. 
 
 *' See Schiller, Studies in Humanism, Essay, XIX; cf. Moore, op. cit., pp. 37 f. 
 
 *° See Ames, The Psyclwlogy oj Religious Experience, pp. 26, 317 f. 
 
96 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 and experience, may be satisfactory. But if religion means not merely 
 the faith in the conservation of values,^^ but also an effort of life to 
 attain to its highest values in the world; then we must conceive of God 
 not only in terms of immanence, but primarily as vitally and actively 
 related with us in the achievement of the values of religion.^^ The view 
 of God as merely immanent in the world is practically valueless to the 
 religious life of man who is struggling against the forces of evil to establish 
 the kingdom of righteousness in our world.^^ The God, whom practical 
 religion needs, must be a being who really shares in its struggles, con- 
 flicts, failures, successes, victories. Such a God has really been, as 
 James suggests, the God of the Hebrew and Christian religions. It is, 
 then, not the absolute who includes all beings by his all-embracing 
 knowledge, nor the absolute who is completely independent of the world 
 of his creation, that is demanded by practical religion; but it is a God 
 who really hears our prayers and who is actually cooperating with us to 
 realize the aims and values of our religion. 
 
 Moreover, from the point of view of our ethics, we need the concep- 
 tion of God as well as of the world as unfinished and becoming. The 
 futility of the traditional conception of God as the absolute being who has 
 definitely determined the course of the world and of human history in 
 accordance with his eternal plan becomes seK-evident, when we see that 
 our moral life demands that it ought to and really can change the charac- 
 ter of our moral universe. The changeabiUty of the world is thus one 
 of the elemental needs of our ethical life. But if God is essentially an 
 immutable being with an absolute purpose for and control of the world, 
 then there is created an antithesis and unreality between him and our 
 ethical consciousness; for ethically, so far as our moral experience indi- 
 cates, we are aware of the changes which we effect not merely in the 
 plan and direction of our own life, but also in our social environment. 
 Hoffding remarks thus on this point: "If Being were finished, harmoni- 
 ously and unchangeably, Ethics would be impossible. All Ethics 
 demands that there be effort. But there would be no room for effort, if 
 everything were in eternal and actual completeness."®^ Thus both our 
 religion and our ethics demand that we conceive of God not as an abso- 
 
 " Hoffding, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 9 ff., 215 ff. 
 " Cf. G. B. Foster, The Function of Religion, 1909, pp. 173-183. 
 83 Cf. Lyman, op. cit., pp. 21 f., 185 f. 
 
 ^The Problems of Philosophy, p. 151, cf. ibid., pp. 158 ff.; cf. Schiller, op. cit., 
 Essay XVIII on Freedom. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 97 
 
 lute but as a relative finite being, actually related with us in our religious 
 and moral life. 
 
 But thus to bring relativity and finitude into the being of God means, 
 of course, that we possess no absolute ground of our religious and ethical 
 assurance. The traditional conception of God as the absolute and 
 infinite being does assure us that the world, in spite of its appearances 
 to the contrary, will be saved by him at least in so far as he elects. But 
 the view of God as actually involved in the struggles and works of man 
 does not guarantee beforehand the ultimate success of our world.^ 
 As a matter of fact, however, the most stanch believers in the traditional 
 view of God must admit that the absolute certainty as to their salvation 
 is not a question of fact but of faith; they are to be reUgious and ethical 
 in the hope that they may be saved. So from the standpoint of our 
 actual moral and religious experience, there is not vouchsafed to us the 
 certainty of final salvation. This wiU not lead us to pessimism and 
 inactivity. For we are so constituted that when we are thus uncertain 
 as to the ultimate success of the world, we work so much harder in the 
 hope that we may, with God's help, brmg it to a happy issue. God, 
 then, from the viewpoint of practical religion and ethics, may be con- 
 ceived of as that great environing reality of the growing universe, who 
 is ever responsive to the calls of our need, who represents our highest 
 rehgio-ethical ideals and values, and who is constantly working with us 
 for the achievement of these ideals and values. At any rate, such seems 
 to be the conception of God which is in accord with the evolutionary 
 theory and the temporal character of our experience. 
 
 This conception of God in terms of evolutionary theory and our 
 changing, growing experience is held not only by James, but also by 
 others who, like him, are interested more or less in the religious and 
 ethical problems of our time.^ We may, then, conclude this section 
 with the remark that as men are guided by the knowledge brought to 
 light by the empirical investigations of science and by the actual needs 
 of rehgious and moral life, they tend to conceive of God in terms of our 
 evolutionary world and experience. With this remark, we shall now 
 turn to the last problem of our study. 
 
 «* Cf . McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 259 f . 
 
 « See, e. g., Johnson, op. ciL, Chaps. V-VIII; Waterhouse, op. cit., pp. 400 ff.; 
 Foster, op. cit., pp. 177 f.; Dodson, op. cit., p. 273; E. Herrmann, Eucken and Bergson, 
 Their Significance for Christian Thought, 1913, p. 171; Lyman, op. cit., pp. 148 fif.; 
 Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, pp. 368 fif.; Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, pp. 
 313 ff.; McTaggart, op. cit., pp. 186 ff., Chap. VII; etc. 
 
98 BEARING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 5. The Problem of God's Relation to Man and the World. 
 
 This problem has already been partly discussed in our consideration 
 of the preceding two problems. But the result and the implication of 
 our study regarding the problem should be more definitely stated. To 
 take up, first, the problem of God's relation to man, we observe that 
 while our philosophers of religion differ on this point from the standpoint 
 of their philosophies, they, on the whole, agree from the viewpoint of 
 empiricism. Since Royce philosophically conceives of man as a manifes- 
 tation of an all-inclusive absolute, he tends to jeopardize the place of 
 man. But, as we have seen, Royce contends, moved by his moral 
 experience, for the ethical selffood of man. Eucken is not interested in 
 finding out the ontological relation of God and man; his interest is 
 fundamentally a practical one: How can man be saved from the forces 
 of the antagonistic world? In answer to this question, he holds that 
 God is the indispensable presupposition of man's salvation. Yet this 
 salvation is not a matter of donation; man must achieve it through 
 struggle and work. Thus Eucken assumes the dignity and power of man. 
 Bowne attempts to set forth the ontological relation of man to God by his 
 theory of eternal creation, that is, that man is dependent on God for 
 his existence. He admits that, metaphysically considered, man seems 
 to possess only a phenomenal reality. But he appeals to experience to 
 establish the distinct existence of man over against God. In James, 
 we find that no effort is made to construe man's ontological relation to 
 God. The only thing he says on this point is this: that man and God 
 are alike in their nature. James is specially concerned to exalt the 
 powers of man which belong to him empirically. And yet he does not 
 ignore the fact of man's dependence on God; for he sees in God a great 
 spiritual factor, who aids man in his moral conquest. Thus all these 
 philosophers of religion recognize in the relation of God and man the 
 two elements: man's independence of and his dependence on God; and 
 they tend to explain this relationship on the ground of experience and 
 for practical considerations.^^ 
 
 The implication, for theology, of this inquiry as to the relation of God 
 and man is that our primary concern should not be to consider their 
 relation in terms of the biblical and traditional anthropology, but to 
 proceed on the basis of the facts disclosed by science and human experi- 
 ence. Theology, working from this point of view to define its concep- 
 tion of the relation of God and man, will be aided by such sciences as 
 anthropology, biology, sociology, general psychology, and, especially, 
 
 *' See above, pp. 33; 47 f. ; 61; 67. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 99 
 
 by the history of religion and the psychology of religious experience. 
 In studying the results of these sciences, we shall find that man is con- 
 scious of his dependence on and independence of his environment. Man 
 comes to the sense of his dependence on the natural environment, as he 
 thinks of the vastness of the physical universe and of his inabihty to 
 compete with the forces of such a universe. And as man is led to recog- 
 nize the existence of social relationships, he becomes conscious of his 
 dependence on the social environment. By thus proceeding from the 
 concrete aspects of human experience, it will be made clear to us that 
 we are dependent, for much of our life and activity, on God who is a 
 great element of our environment. But this sense of dependence is not 
 the whole of man's experience in his relation to God. Man is not wholly 
 of nature, for he can control its forces for his own advancement; and so he 
 transcends the natural life. Man and his social environment are inti- 
 mately bound up with each other ;®^ and yet man's individuaUty is a 
 fact, for he has the sense of his own responsibiUty which he does not 
 attribute to his society. Furthermore, man and God, though closely 
 related, we would hold, cannot be identified ; for we would not surrender 
 our own consciousness of moral initiative and accountability. So 
 the sense of independence is another aspect of our experience. And 
 this consciousness of autonomous power on the part of man is markedly 
 strong in the modern age, as result of his increasing conquest over the 
 forces of the physical world. Theology must take account of this sense 
 of human power, so that it may not define man's relation to God in 
 terms of receptivity, as is done by traditional theology in consequence of 
 its supernaturalism, but in terms of activity directed toward the estab- 
 lishment of a society of love and righteousness. In thus examining our 
 relation to God on the basis of empirical science and experience, we shall 
 conceive it in terms of dependence and independence and of practical 
 moral reUgious activity, leaving the question of the ontological nature 
 of this relation until further light is thrown on it by our science and 
 experience. This view of man's relation to God is demanded by the 
 evolutionary theory which, as we have seen, holds that the forces making 
 the evolution of life possible are resident in the organisms and in their 
 environment.^^ 
 
 •» Cooley, Human Nature and Social Order, 1902, pp. 2 ff. 
 
 "' It is not our aim here to touch upon the theological doctrines involved in man*s 
 relation to God, namel}^ sin and salvation. For a very suggestive treatment of these 
 subjects from the standpoint of social psychology, see Royce, The Problem of Christi- 
 anity, I, esp. Lectures III-VI. 
 
100 BEARING or THE EVOLUTIONERY THEORY 
 
 Lastly, we come to the problem of God's relation to the world. With 
 regard to this problem, it should frankly be admitted that we cannot, so 
 far as we know, give answer to the question of the beginnings of the 
 world. The theory of cosmic evolution traces the development of our 
 world to its small beginnings, and the doctrine of organic evolution con- 
 ceives of life as arising from some protoplasmic germs; but we do not 
 know, as James says, the Whence and How of the world — they are 
 matters of speculation, as yet, so we must wait for new lights to answer 
 these questions. Meanwhile, what religion wishes to recognize is 
 whether God is now causally related to the evolutionary process of the 
 world. This raises at once the question of teleology and of evil. 
 
 The answers, which are given by our religious philosophers, may be 
 stated as follows. Royce conceives of the world of nature as embodying, 
 in a partial manner, the will of God. From the point of view of the 
 absolute, there are no real evils in the world; but Royce maintains, from 
 the standpoint of empirical experience, the temporary reality of evil. 
 Eucken could not suffer the idea that nature as such is the cause of 
 human evolution; for him, God must be working in the process of nature 
 for the production of man. As to the problem of evil, he confesses 
 that it is speculatively and also practically insoluble; evils are in the 
 world, but we do not know why they are there. Bowne definitely stands 
 for the teleological relation of God to the world. That there are evils in 
 the world is fully admitted by him; but he leaves them to the judgment 
 of human experience to decide the why of their existence. In his thought, 
 God is not at all responsible for their being. James concedes that 
 there is some purpose in the world, while he does not consider it as 
 absolute. He suggests the view that God may be teleologically related 
 to the world in that he wishes to think of God, rather than matter, as 
 present in the process of evolution; but he is not explicit on this point. 
 He fully admits the real existence of evils in the world; there is no rational 
 reason for their being there, but they are there. He does not make 
 God causally responsible for their existence; he would hold him responsi- 
 ble, like ourselves, for trying to eliminate evils. '^^ Thus all these relig- 
 ious philosopher shold that there is some purpose in the world ;^^ and that 
 there are evils in the world, but God is not responsible for their existence. ^^ 
 
 '^ The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 131 f. 
 
 ''^ In the case of Royce, Eucken, and Bowne the purpose would be asbolute from 
 the standpoint of their philosophies; but from the point of view of the empirical ele- 
 ments present in them with regard to teleology, it must be a limited one, James 
 holds to a finite purpose in accordance with his conception of God. 
 
 72 See above, pp. 25 f., 32 f.; 40 f., 46 f.; 51, 60 f.; 68, 71, 77 f. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 101 
 
 That there is some purpose in the evolutionary process of the world 
 seems to be in agreement with the evolutionary theory. Lamarck con- 
 ceives of organisms as proceeding from less to more perfect forms. 
 Darwin considers that the variations useful to the organic beings are 
 preserved for their good. Since these evolutionists conceive of God 
 deistically, they do not hold that he is teleologically active in the process. 
 But they have to admit that ultimately, from their theistic position, 
 God is causally related to the process. At any rate, they would not 
 deny that there is a limited evolutionary teleology in the process. '^^ 
 Bergson, too, would not eliminate all purpose from the process, though 
 he does not hold to an absolute teleology; his teleology is a limited, 
 growing one. And God, for him, is unceasingly creating the forms of 
 life in the world."^^ Hobhouse holds that, from the point of view of 
 empirical investigation, the mechanical theory of the evolutionary 
 theory is untenable; but that it must be admitted that there is a purpose 
 working under conditions, so a limited purpose. ^^ Thus, on the whole, 
 it may be legitimately said that there is an evolutionary teleology in the 
 process of evolution. ^^ 
 
 Moreover, that there are evils in the world is admitted by all the 
 evolutionists. But it is in regard to their explanation that opinion 
 differs. It would seem that the tendency of our philosophers of reUgion 
 is to take a practical attitude toward the problem of evil. Royce 
 says that "Man's practical business is with the direction of his own will 
 to the service of God,"^^ rather than with the speculation as to the 
 presence of evils in the world. Eucken would not speculate on this 
 problem; but he, like James, urges us to fight against the forces of evil. 
 Bowne, too, exhorts men to put down the powers of evil. We may 
 conjecture that since God is limited, he could not control the world 
 without involving it in evils. Or we may say that the elements in the 
 world are not yet harmonized, hence evils result. '^^ This is indeed a 
 dark problem. Theology must deal wdth it wisely and critically. But 
 from the standpoint of practical religion and ethics, it seems sufficient 
 to say that, in view of the fact that we are unable as yet to give a satis- 
 
 " See Baldvsdn, Darwin and the Humanities, pp. 81 ff.; Moore, op. cit., pp. 261 ff. 
 ^*0p. cit., pp. 248 f., 265 ff.; cf. Dodson, op. cit., pp. 230 ff. 
 "^ Development and Purpose, Intr. pp. xxvi ff., 367, cf. 371 f. 
 '« Cf. Moore, op. cit., XII, The Ethical Aspect, pp. 257-278. 
 " The World and the Individual, II, p. 388. 
 
 '8 So Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, p. 368; cf. Hoffding, The Problems of 
 Philosophy, pp. 136, 150, 158 ff., 173 f. 
 
i02 BE:AS.ING OF THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
 factory answer to the question of God's real relation to the evils in the 
 world, what is demanded of us is, recognizing their existence and seeing 
 also that they cannot be reduced unless we fight against them, to struggle 
 and work, with God, in opposition to the evils in us and in the world to 
 estabUsh a world of love and righteousness. So we may conclude this 
 last section on the problem of God's relation to man and to the world 
 with the observation that, from the standpoint of man's practical moral 
 religious life, his needs would be met by holding the view that we our- 
 selves and the world are somehow dependent on God for existence and 
 progress, and that God is incessantly working in the world and with 
 ourselves to estabUsh a world of righteousness and love — an ideal religious 
 ethical community.'^® 
 
 We have now reached the end of our investigation of the bearing of 
 the inductive evolutionary theory on the conception of God as it is 
 worked out in t)^ical recent philosophies of religion. Our inquiry has 
 specially been directed toward the solutions given by these philosophies 
 of the problems which arose in the attempt to bring the traditional 
 conception of God into relation with the evolutionary theory. These 
 problems, we have found, to center around the question of empiricism 
 or metempiricism in method and in theory. The question, then, is of 
 twofold character: (1) whether theology shall make use of a thorough- 
 going empirical method in the formulation of its conception of God, or 
 whether shall proceed from the standpoint of some a priori principle or 
 principles; (2) whether theology shall be content, for the time being 
 at least, with those affirmations concerning God which are in accord with 
 the results of empirical science (in a comprehensive sense) and with the 
 actual religious experiences of the race, or whether shall conceive of God 
 in terms of some content of truth or truths which is derivable neither 
 through the investigations of science nor through the examination of 
 the evolutionary experiences of religion. The one outstanding result of 
 our study of the solutions offered by the religious philosophers on the 
 question is this: that even Royce, Eucken, and Bowne, who do not 
 philosophically stand for empiricism either in method or in theory, 
 employ many elements derivable in and through experience, and make 
 certain afl&rmations concerning God on the basis of these empirical ele- 
 ments; and that James proceeds on the basis of what he calls "radical 
 empiricism" in his method and in his conception of God. The tendency, 
 then, which is marked in Royce, Eucken, and Bowne in spite of their 
 
 " Cf. Ward, op. cit., Lecture XI, The Idea of Creation. 
 
ON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 103 
 
 absolutistic philosophical presuppositions, and which reaches its cul- 
 minating point in James, is empiricism in method and in theory. This 
 result of our investigation, and its implications for theology should be 
 carefully recognized and considered by theology in its construction of 
 the doctrine of God. At any rate, the evolutionary theory demands a 
 thoroughgoing empirical method and a doctrine of God based on this 
 method. The typical recent philosophies of reUgion which we have 
 examined give fruitful suggestions for the theologain who desires to grapple 
 with this important and difficult reconstruction of doctrine. 
 
LOAN DEPT 
 
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