THE eOlIAPSE OF 
 
 THE KINGDOM OF 
 
 NAPLES
 
 (SriffinjjS&nrraft
 
 presented to the 
 UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 SAN DIEGO 
 
 by 
 
 Mrs. Griff ing Bancroft
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
 KINGDOM OF NAPLES
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
 KINGDOM OF NAPLES 
 
 By H. Remsen Whitehouse, 
 Lately of the United States Diplomatic 
 Service. ******** 
 Author of the ".Life of Amadeus of 
 
 Savov, King of Spain " Ete<o -,..* 
 
 ,wav 
 
 .^, . is\V5L \o *vw* 
 
 ^ 
 
 BONNELL, SI & CO. 
 
 1899
 
 
 of N* 
 
 f fS- 
 
 f ranch II, 
 King of Naples
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
 KINGDOM OF NAPLES 
 
 By H. Remsen Whitehouse, 
 Lately of the United States Diplomatic 
 Service. ******** 
 Author of the " Life of Amadeus of 
 Savoy, King of Spain," Etc. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 BONNELL, SILVER & CO 
 
 1899
 
 Copyright, 1899, by 
 BONNELL, SILVER A CO. 
 
 All rights reserved.
 
 TO 
 
 JUDGE AND MADBE 
 
 DJ LOVING GRATITUDE I DEDICATE 
 
 THIS STUDY. 
 
 THE LARCHES," 
 
 OCTOBER, 1899.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 MM 
 
 Preface 11 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone's letters from Naples. Their effect on Europe 
 and in Naples. Traces of the reign of Murat. Ferdinand L 
 grants Constitution. Conference of Laybach Revoca- 
 tion of Franchise. Political persecution. Ferdinand IL 
 and his relations with Liberalism. The Bandiera brothers. 
 Revolutions of 1848. Ferdinand II. grants Constitution. 
 Sicily in 1848. Offer of Crown to Duke of Genoa. Dis- 
 missal of Liberal Ministry Filangieri in Sicily. Bombard- 
 ment of Messina. Fall of Palermo. Lord Junto interme- 
 diary in subsequent negotiations 15 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Ferdinand II. attempts to free himself from Parliamentary 
 restraints. Disorders it Naples. Flight of Pius IX. to 
 Gaeta. Revolution in Rome. Grand Duke of Tuscany 
 seeks refuge at Gaeta. Charlss Albert's offer of assist- 
 ance. Gioberti's policy misrepresented in Piedmont. 
 French intervention. Ferdinand meets Gariba'di's forces 
 at Palestrina. Defeat of Neapolitans at Velletri. Resto- 
 ration of the Pope. International relations of Kingdom 
 of Naples. England and France during Sicilian revolu- 
 tion. Mazzini and " Young Italy." Parliamentary com- 
 plications in Naples. Mr. Morrison's letter to Daniel 
 Webster. Ferdinand seeks to abolish Franchises 85 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Factors which undermined Neapolitan Throne. Idea of Na- 
 tional Unity. Characteristics of lower classes. Educa- 
 tional opportunities. University of Naples. Colleges of 
 the Jesuits. Their sphere of influence. Measures to 
 check spread of Liberal theories. Newspapers and the 
 Press. The Aristocracy and its relations to Public Affairs. 
 Diplomatic service. The Army and Navy, and their 
 relations with the Crown. The Swiss Guard. Politics in 
 the Army. Arsenals and Shipyards. Taxation. Police 
 system. International influences. Recall of English and 
 French diplomatists. Napoleon III. and Prince Murat. 
 Decline of Neapolitan Diplomacy 58 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Count Cavour's projects for alliance with Naples. The 
 Plombieres' interview. Plans of Napoleon III. and 
 Cavpur. Dynastic ambitions. Proposed partition of the 
 Peninsula. Attempted assassination of Ferdinand II. 
 Milano and "Youu<? Italy." Political significance of at- 
 tack. Pisacane's expedition. The ' Cagliari " incident. 
 British claims. Lord Malmesbury on transportation 
 of political prisoners. Diplomatic interference Fer- 
 dinand's policy from 1856-59 reviewed. His reactionary 
 measures. His bigotry and superstitions 82
 
 8 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Marriage of Crown Prince. Ceremonies in Munich and 
 Trieste. Ferdinand starts for Adriatic coast. Incidents 
 of the journey. The suspicious illness at Ariano. Accusa- 
 tions against the Bishop. The Court reaches Bari. 
 Arrival of Maria Sophia. Her meeting with Francis and 
 members of his family. Ferdinand's illness increases. 
 The Count of Syracuse arrives. The return to Naples. 
 Alarming news from Turin. Napoleon III. and Victor 
 Emmanuel. Opinions of foreign royalty visiting Naples. 
 Details of Ferdinand's last days. His death 10(8 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Expectations of a change of policy. Events in Northern 
 Italy. Their influences on Naples. Accession of Francis 
 II. Ferdinand's second marriage. Education of Francis. 
 Life at the Neapolitan Court during his youth. His 
 character and early training. The religious influences. 
 Want of political training. The "Camarilla"; its com- 
 position and objects. Influence of the Queen-Mother. 
 The Count of Syracuse. His surroundings and political 
 ambitions. Palace intrigues. Conspiracy in favor of 
 Count of Tram 181 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 An envoy from Turin. Proposals for alliance between Naples 
 and Piedmont. French and English diplomatic relations 
 are resumed. Royal proclamation eulogizing Ferdinand 
 Filangieri at the head of the Government. His previous 
 career. Political problems confronting him. Count Sal- 
 mour's mission. Opposition to alliance. Mazzini's 
 schemes. Action of Swiss Government. Revolt of Swiss 
 Guard. Massacre of same. Swiss regiments disbanded. 
 Kossuth on situation in Naples. Court functions and eti- 
 quette. Abstention of aristocracy. Their sympathies for 
 Murat.- 186 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Pilangieri's political sympathies. Napoleon III. : his aims 
 and policy. Cavour's policy. Plan for partition of Papal 
 States. Count Salmour's failure. Villafranca. Cavour 
 resigns. Rumors from Sicily. Filangieri's resignation. 
 His retirement at Sorrento. Blunders of the Administra- 
 tion. Cavour to Marquis d'Azeglio. Lord Palmerston 
 on Cavour. An Italian Confederation. Napoleon's em- 
 barrassments. Sir James Hudson and his associates. 
 English policy in Italian question. Opinions of Prince 
 Consort. Diplomacy at Turin. Marquis Villamarina goes 
 to Naples. His instructions. His report on situation at 
 Naples T. 164 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Efforts to secure alliance. Cavour returns to office. His 
 correspondence with Villamarina. Prudential policy. 
 Cession of Nice and Savoy. The reasons for same. Vil- 
 lamarina's reports. Distrust and opposition excited by 
 cession of territory. Cavour's relations with Kossuth and 
 Hungarian patriots. Cavour and European Diplomacy. 
 Victor Emmanuel's letter to King or Naples. Deter- 
 mined opposition to alliance 176
 
 CONTENTS. 9 
 
 CHAPTER X. PA<M 
 Revolutlonaryplotting. Morelli in Calabria. Garibaldi and 
 Tennyson. Preparations for Garibaldi's expedition. Maz- 
 zini indorses Unity and Victor Emmanuel. Conspiracy 
 and Massacre of La Gancia. Risings in Sicily, their repres- 
 sion. Diplomatic protests. Nunziante's mission. Ru- 
 mors of Garibaldi's expedition. Plans to frustrate same. 
 Garibaldi lands at Marsala. Lanza sent to Sicily. His 
 methods of combating revolution. Sicily welcomes Gari- 
 baldi 1W 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Cavour and the Sicilian expedition. His relations with 
 Garibaldi. Diplomatic perils. Garibaldi a Republican. 
 His letter to Victor Emmanuel. Cavour to d'Azeglio con- 
 cerning expedition. He explains position of Piedmont. 
 Cavour is blamed. His defence of his policy. A Russian 
 protest. Cavour and European Diplomacy. Anecdotes 
 from his private correspondence. His relations with 
 French and English politicians. Louis Napoleon's en- 
 tanglements 818 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Anxiety at Naples. Filangieri's counsels. He leaves Naples. 
 Francis sends De Martino to Paris. His reception by 
 French Emperor. The Emperor's advice and warning. 
 The " Camarilla's " accusations. Francis grants Constitu- 
 tion. The Pope antagonistic to Piedmontese alliance. 
 The Franchise coldly received by Liberals. Riots in 
 Naples. The application for alliance. Cavour's embar- 
 rassments. His conditions. Arrival of Neapolitan Envoys 
 at Turin. Their demands. Victor Emmanuel writes 
 Garibaldi. The General refuses obedience. Cavour con- 
 fides to D'Azeglio details of his policy 2537 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Promulgation of Constitution. Preparations for elec- 
 tions. Amnesty of political prisoners. Tumultuous re- 
 ception of exiles. Action of troops. Disorders in the 
 capital. Romano's influence. Romano ; his character 
 and antecedents. The Queen-Mother goes to Gaeta. In- 
 trigues of the "Camarilla." Romano's further demands. 
 Insulting resignations. The Press embarrasses the 
 Government. Schism in Revolutionary Committees. 
 Romano's revelations. His political memoirs. Cavour's 
 opportunity. His despatch to Envoy at St. Petersburg. 
 His remarks to Nisco. Disaffection in Neapolitan Army. 
 The Ministerial programme. The elections postponed.. 250 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Garibaldi crosses the Straits. Preoccupations of Cavour. 
 Plan to neutralize Garibaldi's prestige. The mission to 
 Chambery. Napoleon's encouragement. Conspiracy of 
 the " Camarilla." Seizure of arms. Expulsion of Count 
 of Aquila Francis amidst conflicting counsels. Ro- 
 mano's memorandum. Letter of the Count of Syracuse. 
 Francis addresses himself to Garibaldi. Indecision of 
 King. Energetic policy of Cabinet. Resignation of same. 
 Garibaldi at the gates. Francis decides to leave Naples. S70
 
 10 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. PAGI 
 Farewell proclamation and protest. Suspicions of treach- 
 ery. Preparations for departure. The gunboat "Mes- 
 sagero." Reception of Ministers and Diplomatists. The 
 Sovereigns leave the Palace. Refusal of Neapolitan war- 
 ships to follow King. The voyage to Gaeta. The King 
 and Queen during journey. Arrival at Gaeta 294 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Naples remains calm. Offer to land Piedmontese troops 
 refused. Commission appointed to meet Garibaldi. His 
 communications with Romano. An officious Provisional 
 Government. Garibaldi enters Naples. His reception by 
 populace. Evacuation by Royalist troops. Garibaldi's 
 loyalty suspected at Turin. Romano's attempts at recon- 
 ciliation. Mistakes of Dictator's Government. The Pied- 
 montese ultimatum to the Pope. Cavour's justification. 
 Piedmontese troops enter Papal States. Diplomatic 
 protests. Napoleon privately approves 100 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Francis at Gaeta. He forms a Ministry. Instructions to 
 local officials. Address to the Army. The battles of the 
 Volturno. Garibaldi's submission. Political excesses in 
 Naples. Piedmontese troops enter Neapolitan territory. 
 Cavour's audacious counsels. His belief in non-interven- 
 tion of France and England .Austrian hostility. Victor 
 Emmanuel at Ancona. His proclamation to Southern 
 populations. The "Times "on situation. Appointment 
 of Pro-Dictator at Naples. The Plebiscite. Meeting of 
 Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi. Fall of Capua. Victor 
 Emrranuel in Naples. Departure of Garibaldi. Honors 
 and rewards offered him. Alexander Dumas in Naples. 
 His opinion of Garibaldi 817 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Operations on the Garigliano. Failure of fleet to co-oper- 
 ate. Napoleon's enigmatical policy. Conference at Var- 
 sovie. Defeat of Royalists. Retreat on Gaeta. The for- 
 tress of Gaeta. Its garrison. Members of Royal Family 
 assembled there. Early days of the siege. Napoleon 
 proposes armistice. Francis writes Emperor refusing to 
 capitulate. Action of Powers. Cavour's influence over 
 English statesmen. Lord Palmerston's assertions 340 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 The Siege of Gaeta. Bombardment. Diplomatic interfer- 
 ence. Cialdini makes unexpected attack. Francis re- 
 jects proposals for capitulation. His letter to the Em- 
 peror Napoleon III. Departure of French fleet. Action 
 of Royalist officers. Heroism of Queen Maria Sophia. 
 Typhus Epidemic. Negative results of bombardment. 
 Series of catastrophes Renewed attacks. Terrific ex- 
 plosions. A truce. General Milon negotiates surrender. 
 Conditions of capitulation. Departure of King. 
 Francis addresses troops. He goes to Rome. His wan- 
 derings and death. Surrender of Messina and Civitella. 
 Victor Emmanuel proclaimed King of Italy. Con- 
 clusion 354
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IN presenting the following study the author 
 lays no claim to the discovery of recondite, or 
 hitherto unpublished, documents. His aim 
 has been to place before readers unfamiliar 
 with the historical and biographical literature 
 of Italy and France, a consecutive narrative of 
 a curious episode of contemporaneous history, 
 the true inwardness of which is little known 
 outside a small coterie of students interested 
 in the social and diplomatic undercurrents of 
 this period of Italian political regeneration. 
 
 A great mass of conf usingly conflicting ma- 
 terial, treating of the Italian political renais- 
 sance, is at the disposal of students in Italy 
 and France, as also in Germany and Austria ; 
 but the author is unacquainted with any work 
 in English dealing exclusively with the national 
 and international causes, political as well as 
 social, which contributed to the collapse of the 
 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
 
 11
 
 12 PREFACE. 
 
 Most readers are, of course, aware that the 
 direct result of Garibaldi's filibustering expe- 
 dition to Sicily was the annexation of Naples, 
 and of that island, to the recently extended do- 
 minions of King Victor Emmanuel II. ; but the 
 circumstances which made it possible for this 
 handful of adventurers to overturn the organ- 
 ized military, naval and civil institutions of a 
 State numbering nearly eleven millions of in- 
 habitants, are neither adequately understood 
 nor appreciated by many professing an interest 
 in the historical data of this century. 
 
 For this purpose a study of the life and times 
 of the two Princes whose benighted policy con- 
 tributed more directly to the collapse of their 
 Dynasty (which had ruled nearly one hundred 
 and twenty-six years) has been necessary. 
 
 In formulating his estimate of the charac- 
 ters and influences of Ferdinand II., and his 
 son, Francis II., of Naples, the writer's authori 
 ties have been selected on the most eclectic 
 principles. 
 
 Amongst Italian writers there exists, not un- 
 naturally, a tendency to either pass the sponge 
 over the blood-stained record of past years, or 
 to magnify the evils of an abhorred system. 
 Dispassionate criticism is looked for in vain 
 amongst the authors who were witnesses of, or 
 actors in, the drama, and whose prejudices or
 
 PREFACE. 18 
 
 personal sympathies warped their judgment. 
 Nevertheless such divergent testimony has 
 been taken as offered by Nisco, " Memor," 
 Bersezio, Chiala, Giampaolo, Kattazzi, Insogna, 
 Villamarini, Komano, Zini, Garibaldi, Settem- 
 brini, Bianchi, de Cesare, White- Mario, and 
 many others too numerous for mention here. 
 Besides these, many ephemeral pamphlets and 
 documents, published contemporaneously with 
 the events criticised or recorded, have been 
 perused and digested, with every endeavor to 
 arrive at a just and unbiased appreciation of 
 their value, and to reconcile widely diversified 
 opinions, and statements, by the aid of a com- 
 parison of facts, and the light thrown upon 
 them by the recent publication (in Italy) of 
 confidential correspondence, hitherto inacces- 
 sible. 
 
 The author has, moreover, been fortunate in 
 enjoying the privilege of personal acquaintance, 
 or correspondence, with several of the minor 
 actors in the drama he describes, and has thus 
 been enabled to gather opinions and criticisms 
 at first hand of a period which, although hardly 
 remote, is yet sufficiently removed from the 
 present generation to be endowed with the 
 dignity of History. 
 
 The author desires to express his gratitude 
 for the courtesies extended him by Commenda-
 
 14 PREFACE. 
 
 tore Giacomo Malvano, Senator of the Kingdom 
 of Italy, and General Secretary of the Italian 
 Foreign Office ; and to the Duke de San-Mar- 
 tino di Montalbo, Agent of the Neapolitan 
 Bourbons in Rome, whose constant fidelity, 
 and indefatigable labors in the service of his 
 late Sovereign, compel the admiration and re- 
 spect of all parties.
 
 THE COLLAPSE OP 
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Mr. Gladstone's letters from Naples. Their effect on Europe 
 and in Naples. Traces of the reign of Murat. Ferdinand I. 
 grants Constitution. Conference of Laybach. Revocation 
 of Franchise. Political persecution. Ferdinand II. and his 
 relations with Liberalism. The Bandiera brothers. Revo- 
 lutions of 1848. Ferdinand II. grants Constitution. Sicily 
 in 1848. Offer of Crown to Duke of Genoa. Dismissal of 
 Liberal Ministry Filangieri in Sicily. Bombardment of 
 Messina. Fall of Palermo. Lord Minto intermediary in 
 subsequent negotiations. 
 
 WHEN" Mr. Gladstone startled the world in 
 1851 by his famous letters to Lord Aberdeen, 
 in which he described the administration of the 
 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as "the negation 
 of God erected into a system of government," 
 the catching phrase found a ready circulation 
 throughout Europe and America. 
 
 The letters were speedily translated into 
 many tongues, and as rapidly disseminated by 
 
 15
 
 16 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 those who had for years been agitating, within 
 and without the realms of the Neapolitan 
 Bourbons, for reforms. Now for the first time 
 the deeds of darkness enacted by a Government, 
 long known as the most retrograde and bigoted, 
 were brought under the searching light of 
 public opinion abroad. The barbarous repres- 
 sion of the Liberalism of 1848 had passed 
 almost unnoticed at a moment when most Eu- 
 ropean governments were engaged in strug- 
 gling with, and in some instances succumbing 
 to, similar popular outbursts. The government 
 of the Kingdom of Naples, or of the Two Sic- 
 ilies, as it was officially termed, was known 
 to be despotic, and those people out of Italy 
 who thought about it at all were vaguely aware 
 that Ferdinand II. kept regiments of Swiss 
 guards for his protection. Some of those who 
 had gone deeper into the affairs of the State 
 knew that Ferdinand after having had wrung 
 from him a Constitution which he solemnly, 
 and with unnecessary reiteration, had sworn to 
 uphold and defend, once the peril averted, had 
 quickly perjured himself, setting the incon- 
 venient document aside, and devoted his ener- 
 gies to venting his fury upon all those who 
 had advocated its adoption. But to what 
 extent the despotism was carried ; how rigor- 
 ously liberal ideas were crushed ; to what
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 17 
 
 degree of cruel repression all intellectual or 
 moral progress was doomed, few, if any, had 
 had the curiosity to inquire. The energies 
 expended ; the principles involved ; the intel- 
 lectual and social impulses, struggling for life 
 and mastery ; the real political nullity of an 
 obsolete system galvanized into a semblance of 
 vitality by unreasoning abhorrence of liberal 
 innovations were truths ignored by the world 
 until the great English statesman and philan- 
 thropist indignantly flung the results of his 
 investigations before the tribunals of civiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Lord Palmerston stated in Parliament that 
 he had caused reprints of Mr. Gladstone's now 
 famous letters to be sent to each of Her Maj- 
 esty's Kepresentatives in Europe, directing 
 them to hand each government a copy of the 
 pamphlet, with the hope that, by affording an 
 opportunity for its perusal, their influence 
 might be secured in promoting the distinguished 
 writer's object. 
 
 On the government of the Two Sicilies, Mr. 
 Gladstone's letters, emphasized and given offi- 
 cial significance by Lord Palmerston's vigorous 
 despatch, produced no impression whatever. 
 The latter document was carefully withheld 
 from Ferdinand by his ministers, who casually 
 referred to the subject as " one of Lord Pal- 
 *
 
 18 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 merston's usual impertinences/' When, how- 
 ever, in spite of ministerial precautions, the 
 King did become acquainted with the text of 
 " Palmerston's impertinence/' he dismissed 
 the subject with the oracular remark that it 
 was " an important and well written docu- 
 ment. " 
 
 It was not until some years later (1856), that 
 Count Cavour, during the Congress of Paris, 
 cleverly exploited the wide-spread indignation 
 at the methods employed by the Neapolitan 
 Bourbons in a memorable speech, which may 
 be said to have dealt the death-blow to the as- 
 cendency of Austrian influence in the Penin- 
 sula, and thus prepared the way for the down- 
 fall of the obnoxious dynasty. 
 
 The French occupation and reign of Murat 
 had left indelible traces of liberty, and had 
 dowered the country with really progressive 
 and liberally intentioned institutions, some of 
 which were in many respects superior to those 
 at that moment (1851) existing in other Italian 
 States. The evil lay not in the laws and insti- 
 tutions themselves so much as in the fact that 
 the administration thereof had become either 
 a dead letter, or totally corrupt. Murat had 
 done his utmost to model his new possessions 
 on the lines established by his imperial brother- 
 in-law in France. To him were due the re-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 19 
 
 forms in the antiquated legal procedure; the 
 abolishment of class privileges ; the curtail- 
 ment of ecclesiastical prerogatives and time- 
 honored exemptions of Church property. The 
 City of Naples is indebted to him for its fine 
 promenade ; the construction of the only mil- 
 itary roads, and engineering works of public 
 utility, were the result of his efforts. When, 
 after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon I., the 
 Congress of Vienna recalled Ferdinand I. from 
 his refuge in Sicily, and restored to him his 
 dominions, he promptly set about abolishing 
 or rendering innocuous all the reforms intro- 
 duced during the reign of the French General, 
 and speedily had the kingdom again under the 
 despotic rule of the earlier years during which 
 Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton had been his 
 intimates, and the latter his counsellor. He 
 did indeed, in dire distress, grant a Constitu- 
 tion to his subjects, and greatly impressed all 
 who witnessed the imposing ceremony attend- 
 ing his taking the oath thereto, by solemnly 
 adding of his own accord as his eyes sought the 
 Cross over the altar : " Omnipotent God, who 
 with infinite penetration lookest into the hearts 
 of men and into the future, if I lie, or if one 
 day I should be faithless to my oath, do Thou 
 at this instant annihilate me." 
 
 Austria, however, soon aided him in ridding
 
 20 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 himself of troublesome obligations, and his re- 
 turn from the Conference of Laybach was the 
 signal for wholesale persecution of all who had 
 been instrumental in influencing his decision to 
 grant the odious franchise. Farini computed 
 at eight hundred those who suffered death in 
 the cause of liberty during the years 1821 and 
 1822 ; but of the nntold host who languished 
 in dungeons or dragged out a miserable exist- 
 ence in the galleys ; and of those more fortu- 
 nate who found safety in exile, no estimate can 
 be formed. 
 
 Fortunately for his subjects, Ferdinand I. 
 died in 1825. The reign of his successor varied 
 only in that it was considerably shorter, and 
 consequently less onerous to this enslaved 
 people. 
 
 Since 1830, when he succeeded his father, 
 Francis I., Ferdinand the Second had been oc- 
 cupied at intervals in the suppression of revolu- 
 tionary movements of greater or less importance 
 both in Sicily and the mainland. The expecta- 
 tions founded on his leanings towards Liberalism 
 which had possessed some shadow of proba- 
 bility before he ascended the Throne, quickly 
 evaporated when he assumed the Crown. His 
 first marriage, with a daughter of the House of 
 Savoy, had given satisfaction to his subjects, 
 but she was all too quickly succeeded by an
 
 THE KINGDOM Of NAPLES. 21 
 
 Austrian Princess with whose advent the influ- 
 ence of her native country once more became 
 paramount. Discontent and insubordination 
 were rife throughout the realm, more especi- 
 ally in Sicily ; but the risings were sporadic, 
 totally lacking in competent leaders or cohesive 
 action, and therefore more easily trampled 
 under. That of the Bandiera brothers in 1844, 
 owing to the romantic interest attached, suc- 
 ceeded for a moment in arousing the sympa- 
 thies of Europe. These two young Venetians 
 of distinguished family, having deserted from 
 the Austrian service, enrolled themselves under 
 the banner of Mazzini's society of " Young 
 Italy," and accompanied by a handful of fol- 
 lowers, embarked upon one of the most heroic, 
 but utterly fantastic, enterprises of modern 
 times. Having effected a landing in Calabria 
 they were quickly captured, and perished mis- 
 erably for the cause they represented. 
 
 The year 1848 was, however, to witness far 
 more serious upheavals of the old order, not 
 only in the Kingdom of Naples, but throughout 
 continental Europe. 
 
 In Piedmont, Charles Albert became consti- 
 tutional King of the nation which had wel- 
 comed him as the recognized head of Liberal- 
 ism in 1821, when for a brief period he held the 
 Regency. Ten days later Pius IX. who had
 
 22 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 astounded conservative Europe a couple of years 
 earlier by his sympathy with the abhorred creeds 
 of reform, timorously yielded to the importuni- 
 ties of his subjects, and issued the Politico- 
 ecclesiastical Franchise, paraphrased a Consti- 
 tution, which was to prove his undoing. The 
 revolution of February had deposed Louis 
 Philippe as King of the French ; and even 
 Austria and Germany were in the throes of 
 internecine strife. Italy was ablaze from Sicily 
 to the Alps ; and to add to the general con- 
 flagration Charles Albert declared war against 
 Austria with public sympathy throughout the 
 length and breadth of the Peninsula behind him. 
 On February 10, 1848, Ferdinand yielded to 
 the popular clamor which threatened to sweep 
 away his Throne, and promulgated a Constitu- 
 tion modelled on that given to the French in 
 1830. Shortly after, an army, under General 
 Pepe, marched bravely out of Naples amidst 
 indescribable enthusiasm, on its way north to 
 re-enforce the operations against Austria. This 
 last astounding concession was, however, a mere 
 feint to silence the obsessions of the Liberals, 
 for its Commander carried in his pocket in- 
 structions not to cross the Po. The subsequent 
 events at Custozza and Novara furnished an 
 excuse for its recall, and although General 
 Pepe and a few of his followers refused to con-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 23 
 
 form to this change of policy, and actually did 
 join the Venetians, the main body of the troops 
 obediently returned to Naples. In May of the 
 same year, on the date fixed for the meeting of 
 the Parliament which had been convoked in 
 Naples, riots broke out in the city, and furnished 
 a pretext to postpone the meeting of the 
 Chamber, as well as to suspend the Constitu- 
 tion. There is small doubt but that the whole 
 trouble was the direct result of intrigues and 
 inspirations from high quarters. The King 
 felt he could rely upon the Swiss regiments and 
 knew that his friends the "lazzaroni" were 
 always on hand when an opportunity for dis- 
 order and plunder presented. As a conse- 
 quence barricades were erected, palaces were 
 plundered and burned, while the streets were 
 strewn with the dead and dying. True to his 
 nickname, King " Bomba " ordered the guns of 
 the forts trained upon the town, and Naples 
 was quickly bombarded into subjection. 
 
 In Sicily the revolution was not so expedi- 
 tiously disposed of. For over a year the island 
 had been seething in suppressed fury, bursting 
 forth, however, in local revolts where the blind 
 tyranny of the oppressors goaded the miserable 
 sufferers to madness : risings each in turn 
 smothered with accompaniments of untold 
 cruelty and barbarism. "Nothing is more
 
 24 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 powerfully demonstrative of the inflexible bru- 
 tality of the Bourbon rule," says Still man, 
 " than this persistence, in the face of such terri- 
 ble lessons, of the pleasure-loving people of the 
 southern provinces, in their efforts to escape 
 from their chains." 
 
 The inhabitants of the unfortunate island 
 demanded the Constitution of 1812 which had 
 been accorded them under the guarantee of 
 England, and impatient of delay had broken 
 out in insurrection with the opening of the 
 new year (1848). After protracted fighting 
 Palermo was evacuated by the royal troops who 
 fell back on Messina. Flushed with success, 
 and secretly trusting in aid from England, a 
 representative Sicilian Parliament, which had 
 been hastily convened, decided on the deposi- 
 tion of the Bourbon dynasty, and agreed to 
 offer the Crown to the young Duke of Genoa, 
 sou of Charles Albert of Savoy, and younger 
 brother of Victor Emmanuel. This body, con- 
 sisting as it did of men of the highest standing 
 and influence in the land, both as regards birth 
 and education, gave conclusive evidence of the 
 universal character of the prevailing discontent. 
 The realization of the project was, however, 
 doomed to failure quite as much on account of 
 the grave local political compl ications to which 
 it would give rise, as by reason of the defeats
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 25 
 
 and abdication of Charles Albert, and the sub- 
 sequent inevitable restoration of the predomi- 
 nance of Austrian influence from Milan to 
 Naples. Although the offer of their Crown by 
 the Sicilians was given a quasi-international 
 significance from the fact that the members of 
 the Commission charged to negotiate with 
 Charles Albert were conveyed from Palermo to 
 Genoa in English and French war vessels, which 
 had recognized and saluted the tricolor flag, 
 the support of these nations was purely moral ; 
 while England immediately after the reverses 
 of Piedmont, made it clearly understood that 
 such it should remain. Furthermore it is 
 doubtful if, in view of the modifications and 
 exactions now introduced into the original 
 Constitution of 1812, and by which the Sicilian 
 Parliament had hedged about and cramped the 
 royal prerogatives and dignity, Charles Albert 
 would have consented to allow his son to accept 
 the offer. Be this as it may, Ferdinand had 
 notified the Piedmontese Court that a favorable 
 consideration of the Sicilian offer must mean 
 war with Naples, and neither Charles Albert nor 
 his successor were in a position to force an issue 
 hazardous at the best, and which under existing 
 circumstances would have been suicidal. The 
 Commission was therefore assured of the grati- 
 tude of the House of Savoy for the honor it
 
 26 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 sought to bestow on one of its members, but 
 diplomatically informed that Charlea Albert 
 could neither accept nor refuse the Crown 
 offered his son without a careful consideration 
 of the highest interests of Italy. The Duke of 
 Genoa added personally that he would in any 
 event obey his father, and be guided by the 
 higher interests of the Italian cause before his 
 own. So the subject was allowed to lapse, 
 while the Sicilians on returning to their island 
 soon had their hands and hearts full with the 
 far more momentous issues of the vengeance 
 wreaked upon them by the monarch they had 
 so lately declared "forever deposed." 
 
 It was hardly to be expected that Ferdinand 
 would submit passively to the insulting decrees 
 of the Sicilian Parliament, yet the disturbances 
 nearer home both in Naples and Calabria were 
 of such a character as to counsel prudence. 
 Then again the early achievements of the Sar- 
 dinian arms at Goito and Milan, and Liberalist 
 uprisings throughout Europe decided him to 
 await as far as possible the issue of current 
 events before committing himself irretrievably 
 to a policy which might prove disastrous. 
 Ferdinand had contrived to reassure Austria as 
 to the true inwardness of the armed demonstra- 
 tion on the Po, while cunningly propitiating the 
 tide of Liberalism he momentarily could not
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 27 
 
 stem. To this policy was due the procrastina- 
 tion of military operations against the revolted 
 island. Once it had become reasonably certain 
 which way the wind was going to blow as in- 
 dicated by such straws as the Austrian suc- 
 cesses in Hungary and at Custozza and Volta, 
 and the purely platonic attitude of England 
 and France in the Sicilian question, he began 
 the operations which had been secretly in 
 preparation during the period of uncertainty. 
 
 The Liberal Ministry was promptly dismissed, 
 its members and supporters being loaded with 
 chains and thrust into the prisons or galleys. 
 A reactionary Cabinet replaced the audacious 
 advocates of Liberty and Eeform, and taking 
 their cue from their royal master, devoted their 
 energies to ferreting out the adherents to the 
 policy of their predecessors in office, and 
 suffocating liberal aspirations, even of the 
 mildest forms, in the dungeons of Nisida, 
 Procida, Ischia, or worse. Carlo Poerio and 
 Settembrini, the former a few months previously 
 the apparently valued counsellor of the King ; 
 the latter a distinguished and influential man of 
 letters, were amongst the most notable victims. 
 
 Having thus made atonement to Austria for 
 the temporary desertion of the principles of 
 Absolutism, Ferdinand was able to give undi- 
 vided attention to the Sicilian rebels.
 
 28 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Towards the end of August General Filan- 
 gieri, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, who 
 had been entrusted by Ferdinand with the com- 
 mand of the expedition, started forth on the 
 re-conquest of Messina, the key to successful 
 operations in the island. Twenty thousand 
 men had been massed in the neighborhood of 
 Reggio, the Calabrian port facing Messina. 
 Colonel Orsini, who commanded the Sicilian 
 troops occupying Messina, had had frequent 
 brushes with the Royalists who continued to 
 hold the citadel of that town after the retreat 
 from Palermo. He had repeatedly implored 
 the Council of War sitting at Palermo to allow 
 him reinforcements in order to dislodge the 
 enemy from their stronghold, and free the 
 island from Neapolitan occupation ; but his 
 advice had been systematically disregarded, and 
 consequently when the invading army landed 
 the Sicilians found themselves between two 
 fires, or rather three, for the fleet anchored 
 before the town, as soon as Filangieri had ac- 
 complished a landing, began a furious bombard- 
 ment. Under cover of this, General Nunziante 
 brought his division to the shore, close under 
 the citadel, and co-operated with its occupants 
 in the attack on the town. Although speedily 
 reduced to a mere heap of ashes the city de- 
 fended itself stubbornly. The citizens had
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 29 
 
 sworn to perish under the ruins of their homes 
 rather than return to an allegiance they loathed, 
 and were particularly infuriated by the partici- 
 pation in the struggle of the mercenaries of 
 the Swiss regiments. The slaughter had be- 
 come so terrible that the foreign Consuls im- 
 plored Filangieri to grant a truce, hoping some 
 mutual agreement might be reached. Filan- 
 gieri replied that he would order his men to 
 cease firing when the citizens returned to their 
 allegiance to their lawful Sovereign. This the 
 desperate defenders still stubbornly refused to 
 do, and the straggle was resumed, the Sicilians 
 disputing each inch of their soil, but yielding 
 step by step, and street by street, until their 
 every stronghold was surrounded and captured. 
 Heartrending accounts were published con- 
 cerning the unqualified cruelty, and savage 
 butchery, practised by the victorious troops on 
 this occasion. Certain it is that the English 
 and French admirals threatened active inter- 
 vention should Filangieri not moderate the 
 fury of his soldiers. It must be remembered, 
 however, that Filangieri had dismissed the 
 transports which conveyed his troops across the 
 straits, thus cutting off all escape and making 
 a complete and final victory imperative. On 
 the other hand, as has been already stated, the 
 Sicilians had taken oath to bury themselves
 
 30 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 beneath the ruins of their town rather than 
 yield. Thus both parties were rendered des- 
 perate : a war to the death had been declared, 
 and it became a question of killing or being 
 killed. Undoubtedly barbarous cruelties were 
 perpetrated on both sides ; unpardonable license 
 being granted the victors by their officers ; but 
 the sympathies of most European countries 
 being undeniably with the oppressed, the con- 
 temporaneous published accounts are tinged 
 with obvious exaggeration. The account given 
 by an eyewitness, an officer of the Swiss Muralt 
 regiment, who published his experiences in 1851, 
 does not differ materially from the description 
 of any battlefield of modern civilization. To 
 the attacks made upon him later, both in his 
 own country and abroad, for the enormities 
 perpetrated by his soldiery, Filaugieri replied 
 with counter charges against the rebels, even 
 going so far as to state that the inhabitants of 
 Messina had quartered the dead bodies of the 
 Swiss, and sold the flesh in the streets at a 
 penny a pound. 
 
 The proclamation issued by Filaugieri on 
 taking possession of the town certainly conveys 
 no intimation of undue vengeance. After in- 
 viting the former municipal officials to resume 
 their functions, on September 10 he published 
 an edict stating that His Majesty, " the loring
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 31 
 
 father of his people, would forget the past mad- 
 ness, being persuaded that from henceforward 
 his Sicilian subjects would return to the devoted 
 and faithful allegiance to his sacred person." 
 Of course it may be objected that the unfortu- 
 nate inhabitants of Messina had small choice 
 in the matter, while it may be further argued 
 that the determination to make Messina a free 
 port in order that its prosperity might be re- 
 vived, was not altogether a disinterested action 
 on the part of those who were to administer its 
 ruined finances. If we would find a reason for 
 such suspicious clemency we must seek a polit- 
 ical motive. Ferdinand realized that with the 
 fall of Messina the backbone of the insurrec- 
 tion was broken, and it was greatly to his in- 
 terests to win back the remainder of the island 
 by diplomacy should such a course be feasible, 
 for already the French Republic, to say nothing 
 of England, gave token of viewing the harsh 
 repressive measures employed with none too 
 favorable an eye. The next few months 
 demonstrated the wisdom of the policy of pro- 
 crastination, and conciliatory debate and discus- 
 sion, pursued by the King. The attitude of 
 Russia greatly influenced the pretensions of the 
 French Government concerning the indepen- 
 dent legislation of Sicily, while the Austrian 
 victories made Lord Palmerston, who now re-
 
 82 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 mained practically alone in his opposition to 
 Ferdinand's methods of dealing with his revolted 
 subjects, still less inclined to become actively 
 involved in the dispute. 
 
 The fall of Messina was closely followed by 
 the capitulation of Milazzo, the garrison of 
 which fell back on the capital. 
 
 Meanwhile Palermo still remained impenitent 
 and unpunished. For the last seven months 
 the island Parliament had been frittering away 
 its time over protracted discussions, and the 
 editing of magniloquent proclamations, which 
 had led to little beyond the creation of personal 
 jealousies and widening of party enmities. 
 Provision for the troops under arms, or the 
 levying of fresh recruits, there was scarcely 
 any. The floating of a loan which had been 
 attempted in Paris had proved a failure, and 
 the Provisional Government had not been any 
 more successful in the collection of a forced 
 contribution at home. All idea of national 
 cohesion of action, or scheme of federation 
 with northern Italy, was lost sight of, and the 
 struggle drifted into the narrow limits of insu- 
 lar independence ; which in its turn became 
 more and more subjected to mere local interests. 
 Ferdinand, pursuing the astute policy of dis- 
 crediting the rebels in the eyes of European 
 sympathies, continued to show a disposition to
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 33 
 
 come to terms in spite of the Royalist advan- 
 tages. Lord Minto, who acted as intermediary, 
 was indefatigable in his efforts to reconcile the 
 conflicting interests, and journeyed to and fro 
 between the Island and Naples bearing draft 
 after draft for constitutional reform, or con- 
 certive administrative concessions. Even when 
 these appeared most liberal, trustworthy guar- 
 antees were lacking, or spurned as unacceptable 
 by a people whose faith in royal promises had 
 been so often and so rudely shaken. 
 
 Thus negotiations dragged on month after 
 month until France and England, having ex- 
 hausted both patience and influence, stood 
 aside. Hostilities began afresh in March, 1849, 
 and resulted in the capture of Taormina, and 
 the bloody sack of Catania, surpassing by many 
 degrees the cruelties and horrors of Messina. 
 Again the foreign admirals intervened ; again 
 came fruitless negotiations ; then again a resort 
 to arms. The result was, as foreseen by the 
 circumstances following the fall of Messina, 
 and in view of the total lack of organization 
 on the part of the leaders, political and mili- 
 tary, the capture of town after town, and 
 the final surrender of Palermo on May 15, 
 1849. 
 
 Filangieri, on taking possession of the capital, 
 granted a general amnesty, which, however, 
 3
 
 34 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 excluded some forty of the principal political 
 and military offenders. 
 
 Thus ended the Sicilian revolution. The 
 unhappy victims, however, soon found them- 
 selves again under their accustomed chains, 
 which, despite all promises to the contrary, con- 
 tinned to be drawn tighter and weighted more 
 heavily, until after a lapse of ten years the 
 successful invasion of Garibaldi knocked the 
 fetters from their limbs.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Ferdinand II. attempts to free himself from Parliamentary re- 
 straints. Disorders in Naples. Flight of Pius IX. to Gaeta. 
 Revolution in Rome. Grand Duke of Tuscany seeks 
 refuge at Gaeta. Charles Albert's offers of assistance. 
 Gioberti's policy misrepresented in Piedmont. French 
 intervention. Ferdinand meets Garibaldi's forces at Pales- 
 trina. Defeat of Neapolitans at Velletri. Restoration of 
 the Pope. International relations of Kingdom of Naples. 
 England and France during Sicilian revolution. Mazzini 
 and " Young Italy." Parliamentary complications in 
 Naples. Mr. Morrison's letter to Daniel Webster. Ferdi- 
 nand seeks to abolish Franchises. 
 
 FERDINAND now found himself free to enter 
 frankly on the policy of reaction he had tenta- 
 tively inaugurated in May of the previous year. 
 He could afford to snap his fingers at the Par- 
 liament he had rendered innocuous, and which 
 he only awaited a more favorable combination 
 of circumstances to rid himself of entirely. 
 On receiving the news of the fall of Messina the 
 King sent Ruggiero, one of his Ministers, to 
 inform the Chambers that the session was pro- 
 rogued until the 31st of November. A howling 
 mob, suborned by the reactionists, accompanied 
 Rnggiero to the University where the deputies 
 35
 
 36 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 were assembled, shrieking, " Long live the 
 King;" "Death to the Deputies." In the 
 course of the day other demonstrations in favor 
 of King and Constitution paraded the streets 
 and put to flight the advocates of Absolutism. 
 The police and troops, seeing their proteges 
 in danger, now came upon the scene, and pro- 
 ceeded to arrest the newcomers. A part of the 
 city was placed under martial law ; numbers 
 were imprisoned ; several condemned to twenty- 
 five years in chains. Thus was inaugurated 
 the reactionary policy, and system of political 
 persecution, which by reason of its excesses 
 eventually compassed the destruction of the 
 Dynasty it was formulated to uphold. 
 
 From the 7th of September, 1848, no op- 
 portunity was lost to weaken the National 
 Guard. Under one pretext or another regi- 
 ment after regiment was disbanded ; some- 
 times the reason advanced was failure to re- 
 press Liberalist manifestations ; at others, the 
 accusation that the organization prevented free 
 expression of public rejoicing over the return 
 to paternal government. On the 27th of July, 
 1849, the destruction of the national militia 
 was complete, and the Absolu tist party was rid 
 of this inconvenient instrument of popular 
 manifestation. 
 
 Meanwhile fortune seemed to play into the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 37 
 
 hands of the Neapolitan Ruler. On the even- 
 ing of November 24, 1848, Pope Pius IX., dis- 
 guised as a common priest, fled from Rome, 
 in the carriage of the wife of the Bavarian 
 Minister to his Court, and crossing the Nea- 
 politan frontier, took refuge in Gaeta, a sup- 
 plicant for his royal hospitality. The circum- 
 stances which had led up to this desperate ac- 
 tion were complex. Voluntary concessions to 
 the Liberalism of the day on the part of the 
 most rigidly conservative Court in Christendom 
 had dumfounded Europe ; and had caused 
 the Pope to be looked up to and saluted as 
 the champion of Italian liberties and political 
 regeneration. But the incline on which the 
 Pontiff had thus rashly ventured, prompted 
 by personal convictions perhaps, but with a 
 total lack of political foresight or genius, soon 
 proved too steep for him to keep his footing. 
 Swept from one premature concession to an- 
 other ; yielding when it would- have been 
 wiser to refuse, and as weakly withholding 
 what it would have been politic to grant ; the 
 Sovereign Pontiff was overwhelmed by the 
 flood too suddenly unloosed, and which, no 
 channel having been prepared for it, over- 
 flowed, submerged and devastated that which 
 it had been intended to cultivate and fructify. 
 Liberty too suddenly achieved, and without
 
 38 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 training and careful preparation, by a people 
 unaccustomed to political freedom, is as dan- 
 gerous as a loaded weapon in the hands of a 
 child. The Romans, for long centuries kept 
 in political serfdom, considered Liberty and 
 License as synonymous terms. When, with 
 the assassination of Count Eossi, the swing of 
 the pendulum indicated reaction, they were in 
 no mood to passively accept restrictions placed 
 upon its abuse, and the flight of their Sov- 
 ereign, was the signal for a Mazzinian Utopia. 
 Count Pasolini, the original initiator of Pins, 
 then Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, Bishop of Imola, 
 into the mysteries of Liberalism ; and Marco 
 Minghetti, had indeed foreseen the danger, and 
 continually counselled moderation and caution. 
 They had, however, merely succeeded in get- 
 ting themselves distrusted by both parties. 
 
 The news of the Pope's flight and safe advent 
 at Gaeta was carried to Ferdinand by Count 
 Spaur in person, and transported the Neapoli- 
 tan Court with joy. "Rejoice/' cried the 
 Government organs, "the representative of 
 Jesus Christ is in the Kingdom ; and Ferdi- 
 nand II., the descendant of Saint Louis, is the 
 host of the most holy Father." And indeed 
 Ferdinand had cause for rejoicing, for the 
 utter failure of Liberalism, as illustrated in so 
 strikingly prominent an example, could not fail
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 39 
 
 to strengthen his own hand. Pius the Ninth ; 
 the idol of the progressive party ; the de- 
 clared champion of National Independence and 
 Liberty ; the advocate of Constitutionalism 
 and Federation ; a victim of the reforms he 
 had himself instituted, was now a refugee 
 within the realm of the Sovereign who, amongst 
 all Italian despots, passed as the most antag- 
 onistic to the Liberal Creed erstwhile pro- 
 fessed by the High-priest of Christendom ! 
 
 A couple of months later (January, 1849,) 
 Ferdinand was still further elated by the un- 
 ceremonious arrival at Gaeta of another royal 
 fugitive in the person of the Grand Duke Leo- 
 pold II., of Tuscany, likewise a victim of the 
 spread of Mazzini's theories for popular gov- 
 ernment. The old fortress and stronghold of 
 successive Neapolitan dynasties became for the 
 time being the centre of a brilliant Court, and 
 the hotbed of reactionary intrigue. Hither 
 hastened the diplomatists of the various Euro- 
 pean Courts accredited to the Holy See, to- 
 gether with the special envoys sent with offers 
 of mediation, or more substantial aid, for re- 
 placing the Pope in the Chair of St. Peter. 
 Nor did these offers come from the ultra-con- 
 servative rulers alone. The danger which must 
 result from the ill-considered Roman insur- 
 rection was keenly felt by those who had the
 
 40 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 true interests of the national canse at heart. 
 In spite of his conscientious espousal of the 
 doctrines of Constitutionalism, or because of 
 them, Charles Albert of Savoy quickly discerned 
 the peril engendered by the excesses committed 
 both in Home and Florence, and recognized 
 the injury to the Nationalist principles which 
 would ensue should the Pope be successful in 
 his appeals to Spain and Austria to regain for 
 him his Crown. He therefore despatched his 
 envoys to Gaeta to plead with him that he dis- 
 pense with foreign aid, and accept that of 
 Sardinia. Ferdinand was, however, too astute 
 to allow the prestige of aiding the dethroned 
 Pontiff to regain possession of his dominions 
 to be alienated. He was fully alive to the fact 
 that should this end be accomplished by the 
 Moderate Liberals who formed the vast ma- 
 jority of the national party, and of whose policy 
 Cavour was later a notable exponent, their 
 cause would be immediately enhanced in the 
 eyes of European conservatism. It was obvi- 
 ously to his advantage to discredit them abroad, 
 and encourage the prevalent misapprehension 
 which confused the advocates of Constitution- 
 alism and liberal reforms with those rabid re- 
 publicans inoculated with the virus of Maz- 
 zini's irredentist principles. Even at this early 
 date, and in spite of his recent military re-
 
 THE KINGDOM Of NAPLES. 41 
 
 verses, Charles Albert had achieved a popu- 
 larity throughout the Peninsula which gave 
 umbrage to his fellow-sovereign. It was con- 
 sequently with considerable satisfaction that 
 Ferdinand witnessed the success of Neapolitan 
 influence and diplomacy which secured for him 
 the advantage of co-operating with Austria and 
 Spain. 
 
 The Neapolitan official newspapers accused 
 Charles Albert of insatiable cupidity, insinuat- 
 ing that having failed to obtain either glory 
 or additional power in his attempts to set him- 
 self up as the champion of Italy against Aus- 
 tria, or by encouraging the Unitarian conspira- 
 cies directed against the Princes of the Penin- 
 sula, he desired to try his fortune once more 
 by appearing as the defender of the Holy See. 
 Gioberti, the originator of the proposed policy, 
 does not appear to have been in thorough sym- 
 pathy with his colleagues in office, or with a 
 considerable portion of the Piedmontese and 
 Italian political world. The scope of the pro- 
 posed intervention in Tuscany and at Rome 
 which he considered essential to safeguard 
 national independence threatened by foreign 
 invasion, was wilfully misconstrued by his 
 enemies at home and abroad ; and branded as 
 a traitor by those he sought to serve, he was 
 made to pay the penalty of his zeal. It is, of
 
 42 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 course, an open question whether his influence 
 with France, then under the fascination of La- 
 martine's eloquence, would have saved Rome 
 the humiliations she was to undergo. But the 
 plan possessed at least an undeniable patriot- 
 ism, coupled with a plausible political hypothe- 
 sis, which makes it difficult to clearly under- 
 stand, when stripped of petty personal jeal- 
 ousies, the tremendous opposition of statesmen 
 whose names eventually became synonymous 
 with patriotism and energetic action. 
 
 Pio Nono was disinclined to owe his restora- 
 tion to the bayonets of the French Republic ; 
 while Ferdinand was equally apprehensive con- 
 cerning the ideas which might be imported by 
 those who had so recently taken part in the 
 Revolution of February. Initiative was, how- 
 ever, taken from him by the appearance of 
 General Oudinot under the walls of Rome ; 
 and no alternative offered but for Naples to co- 
 operate against Garibaldi who was in command 
 of the Roman forces, with all possible haste. 
 This Ferdinand proceeded to do, marching to 
 the frontier of the Papal States with an army 
 ten thousand strong. At Palestrina, Garibaldi, 
 himself at the head of about four thousand 
 men, met the Neapolitans, and although both 
 parties claimed the victory the Bourbon forces 
 found it advisable to fall back upon Velletri.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 43 
 
 A few days later (May 16, 1849), Garibaldi 
 having been considerably reinforced, attacked 
 the King at Velletri and inflicted a signal and 
 final defeat upon his arms. 
 
 From a military point of view the Neapoli- 
 tan expedition had been a failure ; but its 
 political and diplomatic advantages were mani- 
 fest. By his action Ferdinand had allayed 
 the rancor and suspicions of Austria, which 
 his armed demonstration on the Po had given 
 rise to, and at the same time convinced the 
 conservative Princes that his apparent sym- 
 pathy with the Italian movement in Northern 
 Italy had been wrung from him by force of cir- 
 cumstances, and was not in accord with per- 
 sonal convictions. Austria signified the de- 
 sired approval ; styling him the " Initiator of 
 the restoration of order in Europe." The 
 Pope, who might now be relied upon to aban- 
 don the anomalous position he had assumed with 
 the Tiara, became his debtor and his ally. 
 There remained France and England. Of the 
 former he was also in a sense the ally, since the 
 nominal object of the presence of the two 
 armies on Roman territory had been the same, 
 namely, to replace Pio Nono on his throne. 
 Yet Ferdinand could not forget that the com- 
 ing man in France, Louis Napoleon, had fought 
 for the Italian cause in 1831, and had bound
 
 44 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 himself by solemn oath to assist its furtherance. 
 He could hardly expect the new French Ke- 
 public, whose birth was founded on revolution- 
 ary principles, to openly acquiesce in his medi- 
 tated return to Absolutism. In regard to 
 England his anxiety was less, for he thoroughly 
 understood the sentimentalism underlying an 
 only apparently vigorous policy of intervention 
 in his affairs. And here we find the key to his 
 otherwise inexplicable clemency and toleration 
 in Sicily a policy almost Machiavelian in its 
 astute proficiency. England and France both 
 became his dupes for the time being ; and in a 
 sense, almost his accomplices, since their 
 squadrons passively followed his operations, 
 their commanders acting somewhat in the rela- 
 tion of seconds in a prize fight, and calling 
 time when the Sicilians were too roughly 
 handled. His line of diplomacy was fixed. 
 None could question his right to lead his legit- 
 imate but revolted subjects to an appreciation 
 of their error. At the same time, that there 
 was serious cause for the revolt few would deny; 
 while the fact that the tendencies of the age 
 demanded reform, and radical reform, was dis- 
 tressingly evinced on all sides. Concessions 
 must be made, but he determined they should 
 be concessions of such a character that, while 
 satisfactory to the self-constituted protectors of
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 45 
 
 Sicilian interests, when their moment of use- 
 fulness had passed, the empty shell might be 
 cast away, none but the victims being the wiser 
 that the kernel had never existed. 
 
 In this Ferdinand was successful, and when 
 the British Government reminded him of the 
 pledges given and the rights of his Sicilian sub- 
 jects, his Minister replied, under date of Sep- 
 tember 20, 1849 : " Sicily enjoys perfect tran- 
 quillity, and the inhabitants are happy to have 
 returned to the protection of their legitimate 
 Sovereign." 
 
 Although open resistance to the government 
 had been trampled down, the effervescence by 
 no means subsided ; and both in Sicily and on 
 the mainland we find the agents of Mazzini 
 particularly active in keeping it alive. In spite 
 of the visionary and often crudely impracticable 
 nature of the great agitator's schemes, to his 
 soul-inspiring enthusiasm is due much that was 
 afterwards accomplished by cooler heads. His 
 society of " Young Italy " appealed directly to 
 the hearts of the generous youth of the country, 
 and aroused in them fervent patriotism, intense 
 hatred of their foreign rulers, together with an 
 irrepressible yearning for glory and martyrdom. 
 Neither Mazzini nor Garibaldi possessed any 
 genius for, or sympathy with, the cold, calcu- 
 lating science of Diplomacy ; the skill and pa-
 
 \ 
 
 46 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tieuce of the manipulator of political oppor- 
 tunities ; the prudence of the statesman who 
 looks beyond the immediate result, and care- 
 fully weighs and calculates the ultimate conse- 
 quences of the action, were to them incompre- 
 hensible, when not absolutely contemptible. 
 Both frequently imperilled the cause they de- 
 voted their lives to by this utter contempt of 
 international complications. Both possessed 
 unparalleled magnetic influence over the ma- 
 jority of those who came within their orbit ; 
 both labored for the doctrines they professed 
 with purely disinterested motives, and total 
 abnegation of self. Of Garibaldi's tangible 
 achievements, the record is writ large, yet there 
 can be no doubt but that to the dogged perse- 
 verance despite every form of persecution, to 
 the consummate skill in conspiracy and in- 
 trigue, as well as to the miraculously inciting, 
 though often bombastic, eloquence of Mazzini, 
 Italy owes as much. 
 
 Meanwhile in Naples, Parliament, after having 
 been prorogued a second time, was finally allow- 
 ed to meet on February first (1849). As the 
 deputies entered the hall they were greeted 
 with applause and cries of encouragement, for 
 the people knew the occasion to be one in 
 which their rights were in grave peril. From 
 the outset the representatives found themselves
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 47 
 
 in open conflict with the Government, and on 
 the horns of a dilemma. During the enforced 
 recess the Government had taken upon itself to 
 collect taxes unauthorized by Parliament ; thus 
 violating a constitutional prerogative of that 
 body. The Chambers consequently found them- 
 selves in the unfortunate position of either pass- 
 ing over in silence a proceeding fundamentally 
 illegal, or of placing themselves in overt opposi- 
 tion to the Crown, and thereby running the 
 risk of dissolution. To the surprise and anxi- 
 ety of all when the session opened the Minis- 
 ters made no reference to the matter, neither 
 attempting to justify their illegal action nor to 
 obtain authorization for its continuance. Evi- 
 dently a trap had been laid, and a situation 
 created expressly to embarrass the Assembly, 
 and force an issue. In order to escape with 
 a semblance of dignity from an intolerable 
 position, it was decided to introduce a bill 
 providing the Government with the temporary 
 power of imposing taxes in order that the 
 public service be not embarrassed ; and simul- 
 taneously present an address to the King 
 praying for the dismissal of those Ministers 
 whose actions, directed against the fundamental 
 principles of the Constitution, rendered them 
 unworthy of the confidence of the Crown, and 
 whose continuance in office fomented discord
 
 48 TELE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 and dissensions between the dynasty ana tne 
 country. This proposition gave rise to pro- 
 longed discussion. Many were against the 
 presentation of such an address, appreciating 
 the friction which must result. On the other 
 hand it was urged that the Chambers, by tacitly 
 accepting measures so contrary to the Consti- 
 tution, stultified themselves, and became the 
 accomplices of those whose aim it was to annul 
 constitutional franchises. Considerable per- 
 sonal courage was displayed by those taking 
 prominent part in the debate, for none were 
 ignorant of the risks they ran. On March 
 third the address was finally voted, accompanied 
 by the declaration that the Ministry no longer 
 enjoyed the confidence of the Country. 
 
 Ferdinand, however, relying upon the re- 
 actionary current, which had already set in 
 throughout Europe, simply refused to receive 
 the Commission nominated to present the 
 address. Ten days later, having in the mean- 
 time allowed his dupes the empty satisfaction 
 of passing laws to which he never gave official 
 sanction, " Bomba " put an end to the " Consti- 
 tutional Comedy " by dissolving Parliament. 
 
 With the subjugation of Sicily, the fall of 
 the Roman Republic, and the victory of Austria 
 at Novara, followed by the restoration of the 
 Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany to their
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 49 
 
 respective Thrones, the return of the good old 
 days of paternal government, maintained by 
 militarism and assisted by a police system 
 ubiquitous and supreme, seemed assured. Yet 
 Ferdinand had been badly frightened, and was 
 besides too close and intelligent an observer of 
 the psychology of a movement so universal and 
 deep-rooted to be wholly at ease. To one so 
 thoroughly versed in the subtleties of dissimula- 
 tion the supposition that all danger had disap- 
 peared was absurd. Although Vesuvius might 
 not be in active eruption it would be folly to 
 suppose the hidden flames would not on occa- 
 sion burst forth afresh. Of Italy he could be 
 reasonably certain that is with the possible 
 exception of Piedmont, whose young Sovereign, 
 Victor Emmanuel, was as yet untried ; but 
 France, who had become in a sense his imme- 
 diate neighbor, her troops being quartered in 
 Home, was an unknown quantity. Eussia was 
 his friend, and had given him moral support in 
 the late Sicilian crisis, and Russia looked with 
 not unnatural aversion on the growing power of 
 the Bonaparte at the head of the French Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Home affairs, however, claimed his diplomacy 
 
 quite as urgently as his interests abroad. It 
 
 was obviously imperative to purge the Kingdom 
 
 of the germs of Liberalism and disaffection. 
 
 4
 
 50 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 This he promptly set about doing in the 
 manner most congenial to his nature ; namely, 
 executions, imprisonments and banishments. 
 The Sicilians, protected to some extent by 
 amnesties and guarantees, suffered relatively 
 less than their unfortunate fellow-citizens of the 
 mainland ; but on Naples the King vented his 
 displeasure unchecked. 
 
 Mr. Morrison, United States Charge d' Af- 
 faires at the Neapolitan Court, writing to Daniel 
 Webster under date of April 19, 1851, says : . . . 
 " It is apprehended that the peace of the 
 Kingdom may be disturbed by the congregation 
 of revolutionary chiefs at the London Exposi- 
 tion of Universal Industry. Possessed of such 
 an opinion the government has refused to grant 
 passports to native artisans proposing to ex- 
 hibit their specimens of Neapolitan manufac- 
 tures. The policy of the present Cabinet, I 
 fear will, sooner or later, produce another in- 
 surrection. No reforms of any description are 
 being made, while a system of military terror 
 everywhere prevails. The islands around the 
 Bay of Naples, as well as the prisons and galley- 
 hulks, are filled with unhappy beings legally 
 condemned, or held on suspicion, for participa- 
 tion in the revolution of 1848. The expected 
 amnesty at New Year's was not granted, and 
 hundreds of men of refined, intellectual tastes,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 51 
 
 and lately high in position, are laboring in the 
 galleys side by side with the most infamous and 
 abandoned criminals. The most earnest ap- 
 peals and representations on the part of the 
 representatives of friendly foreign powers have 
 thus far been ineffective to induce the King 
 and his Ministers to change their policy. The 
 consequence is that, with the first opportunity, 
 there will be a general rising throughout the 
 Kingdom, particularly in Sicily, the inhabitants 
 of which are entirely estranged from the reign- 
 ing family." 
 
 The "general rising" anticipated by Mr. 
 Morrison did not take place for many years ; 
 yet, in spite of the fearful expiation of the recent 
 attempts, the sullen discontent and wretched- 
 ness continued to be evinced by sporadic demon- 
 strations in Naples and Calabria at not infre- 
 quent intervals. 
 
 As we have seen, Parliament had been dis- 
 solved, the halls where the rare sessions had 
 been held being actually dismantled. The offi- 
 cial journal had modified its title, and got rid 
 of the " constitutional " prefix ; but the crafty 
 King had not deemed it prudent to openly re- 
 voke the obnoxious Chart, fearing that by so 
 doing he might lend a color of illegality to his 
 government. He was nevertheless firmly de- 
 termined that all should be in readiness for its
 
 52 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 disavowal when the opportune moment arrived. 
 This he proposed to hasten by means of popu- 
 lar petitions a method equally ingenious and 
 original, and which could be relied upon not to 
 lead to complications with foreign States. Al- 
 ready, in August, 1849, emissaries had been 
 despatched throughout the various provinces 
 with instructions to sound those in authority, 
 and to suborn communes and municipalities 
 with promises of grants for public works, rail- 
 way concessions, remission of local taxes, or 
 simply the bestowal of honors, or pecuniary 
 remuneration ; thus gradually and stealthily 
 paving the way for the withdrawal, or consign- 
 ment to oblivion, of the last vestige of public 
 liberties.
 
 . - = arrived. 
 
 rttta of popn- 
 .^ftuious aud 
 - ot to 
 Al- 
 . 
 
 Tity, 
 ! ami 
 
 ;r. ; irks, rail- 
 
 >cal taxes, or 
 
 ral o - -i'cuniary 
 
 stealthily 
 fort! on 
 
 .YY VB\V>-'i
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Factors which undermined Neapolitan Throne. Idea of Na- 
 tional Unity. Characteristics of lower classes. Education- 
 al opportunities. University of Naples. Colleges of the Jes- 
 uits. Their sphere of influence. Measures to check spread 
 of Liberal theories. Newspapers and the Press. The Aris- 
 tocracy and its relation to Public Affairs. Diplomatic serv- 
 ice. The Army and Navy, and their relations with the 
 Crown. The Swiss Guard. Politics in the Army. Arsenals 
 and Shipyards. Taxation. Police system. International 
 influences. Recall of English and French diplomatists. 
 Napoleon III. and Prince Murat. Decline of Neapolitan 
 Diplomacy . 
 
 THUS far we have considered the political 
 institutions and aspirations of the Kingdom of 
 Naples, but it would be manifestly unfair to 
 confine the investigations to this field alone, or 
 to attribute the causes for the collapse entirely 
 to the influence of the revolutions of 1848 and 
 1849. Although the great revolutionary period 
 finished with the latter year, the following dec- 
 ade was fraught with issues at home and 
 abroad, which, while less important individ- 
 ually and separately, formed in the aggregate 
 the determining weight in the oscillating scales, 
 and swayed the Dynasty to its ruin. 
 53
 
 54 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Yet notwithstanding the undeniable influ- 
 ence of these factors, the destruction of the 
 Throne of the Two Sicilies was the result of an 
 Idea : nay ! more, the advent of a Man whose 
 personality gave substance to a Theory cen- 
 turies old a combination fraught with such 
 colossal potentialities that even had that King- 
 dom enjoyed a less unsatisfactory government, 
 it must inevitably have succumbed. The Idea 
 was Italian Unity : the Man, Victor Emmanuel 
 IL, "the Honest King/' Slow of growth; 
 often crushed out of sight, or overlooked in 
 combinations calculated to defeat its accom- 
 plishment ; plotted against, misrepresented, 
 and maligned ; it nevertheless constituted the 
 fundamental principle on which all political 
 creeds, all national aspirations and ambitions, 
 were based. 
 
 Although this is essentially true, yet is it 
 equally a fact that the subjects of King Ferdi- 
 nand, and later of his son, Francis II. , were, 
 as a whole, not dominated by this desire for 
 national unity. To use a paradoxical, but ex- 
 pressive, phrase, the upheavals came from 
 above, not below. That is to say, they were 
 fomented and carried out by the upper and 
 educated classes ; government officials, literary 
 and professional men ; not to mention a royal 
 Prince or two. The mass of the population
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 55 
 
 stood aloof, apathetically interested but not 
 sufficiently educated to be actively concerned 
 with questions outside their daily routine. To 
 them it was all an affair of taxation : should 
 unity mean a lightening of their burdens, they 
 were unionists ; if not, " Bomba " was good 
 enough for them. This was perhaps not equally 
 true of Sicily, where a peculiar system of land 
 tenure, combined with other local idiosyncra- 
 sies, had familiarized all classes with insurrec- 
 tion ; and where, although the peasant was cer- 
 tainly no less ignorant, he was nevertheless 
 more alert to grasp any chance of bettering his 
 material position, and quick to note the value 
 of the political enfranchisement which would 
 enhance his importance as a factor in local 
 interests. Beyond these, however, his concern 
 was as apathetic as that of his brother across 
 the water. He might belong to a secret society 
 as a matter of fact, he rarely did but if so, 
 its political creed was generally so vague and 
 confused, or so transcendental, as to be totally 
 beyond his ken ; although this did not render 
 him a less dangerous instrument in the hands 
 of his leaders, or less docile if called upon to 
 fight. But on such as these the doctrines of 
 Mazzini had little hold. They could, in fact, 
 only be reached and influenced by their imme- 
 diate superiors, and were not generally avail-
 
 56 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 able for purposes of purely political revolt. In 
 a study of the social and political regeneration 
 of Southern Italy the peasant class constitutes 
 an unimportant factor. He fought when made 
 to fight, or defended himself when cruelly 
 attacked ; but the ethics of the cause he served, 
 or combated, were nothing to him, and victory 
 or defeat left him where they found him. 
 Italy can point to no Andreas Hofer in her 
 struggle for independence. Eome produced a 
 Ciceruacchio, it is true, but he was no peasant, 
 but a wine-carrier of the Trastevere. 
 
 Although the lower classes were left in a 
 state of almost complete ignorance, it being 
 the exception for a peasant to be able to sign 
 his name, the educational opportunities were, 
 for the times, of no mean order, and in many 
 respects superior to those offered in other parts 
 of Italy. The University of Naples enjoyed 
 a wide-spread reputation in the middle of the 
 century, and although the curriculum appears 
 meagre in our days, it was on a par with, if 
 not ahead of, many similar institutions in the 
 Peninsula. It supported six Chairs, or Facul- 
 ties : Theology, Mathematics, Natural Sciences, 
 Jurisprudence, Literature, and Medicine. It 
 is characteristic of the detestation entertained 
 by Ferdinand of the vulgarization of the 
 Science of Government that after 1849, the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 57 
 
 University Chair of Political Economy was offi- 
 cially styled "Public Economy." 
 
 Good as it was, the University of Naples was 
 alone of its class in the King's dominions north 
 of Sicily. For this reason, as well as owing to 
 the great difficulties of communication between 
 the capital and the provinces, was due the rela- 
 tively restricted number of students who at- 
 tended its lectures. This number was further 
 diminished by the vexations of a meddlesome 
 police, constantly interfering, and not infre- 
 quently disbanding the classes on account of 
 some imaginary political conspiracy. The 
 authorities looked with unconcealed aversion 
 upon any considerable congregation of students, 
 fearing the dissemination of liberal ideas, or 
 even an interchange of local subjects for dis- 
 content. For this reason a Sicilian was denied 
 access to the University of Naples. Even in 
 that island a choice of the three Universities 
 was not permitted. Natives of the provinces 
 of Palermo, Trapani and Girgenti must pursue 
 their studies in the University of Palermo. 
 Those of the provinces of Catania, Caltanissetta 
 and Noto, at Catania ; while the youth of Mes- 
 sina were obliged to frequent the institution 
 maintained in the capital of that province. 
 
 Although Naples alone of the cities on the 
 mainland possessed a University, several of the
 
 58 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 royal colleges, invariably under the control of 
 the Jesuits, supported chairs of Law, Civil, 
 Penal and Koman ; of Anatomy and Phys- 
 iology ; of Theoretical and Practical Surgery ; 
 of Chemistry and Natural History ; and, in one 
 or two instances, of Mineralogy and Geology. 
 The Jesuits themselves undertook the instruc- 
 tion of Literature, Philosophy, and Physical 
 and Mathematical Sciences : the professors of 
 other branches being usually laymen. The 
 colleges of Salerno, Bari, Catanzaro and Aqnila, 
 provided more or less complete courses. These 
 institutions also issued diplomas in Law, Medi- 
 cine, Mathematics and Physics, thus making it 
 possible for the less ambitious student to dis- 
 pense with the honors conferred by the Univer- 
 sity at Naples. 
 
 The Eoyal College of Theology enjoyed 
 special privileges, and claimed the Sovereign 
 Pontiff as Honorary Rector. This establish- 
 ment was naturally under the direct supervision 
 and control of the Clergy, and was devoted to 
 ecclesiastical and classical studies. There ex- 
 isted also a number of more or less private in- 
 stitutions, generally in the hands of the Jesuits, 
 and frequented by the sons of the lesser nobility, 
 and professional classes. 
 
 The Council of Public Instruction was, dur- 
 ing the last decade of Ferdinand's reign, under
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 59 
 
 the presidency of Don Emilio Capomazzo, a 
 man of vast culture whose Voltairian sym- 
 pathies and open detestation of the Jesuits, 
 were in noted contrast with the majority of his 
 colleagues. It is to be observed, however, that 
 Ferdinand himself had no leaning towards the 
 followers of Loyola, fearing and mistrusting 
 their special aptitude for political intrigue. 
 Nevertheless the Order had strong advocates 
 at Court, headed by the Queen. All works in- 
 tended for the press must pass the censorship 
 of this Council not once but twice ; for al- 
 though permission might be granted to print, 
 a second scrutiny was necessary, before publi- 
 cation, in order that the members might be as- 
 sured that there existed no surreptitious inex- 
 actitude between the original manuscript and 
 the printed pages. The staff of officials charged 
 with this supervision, as well as that of books 
 imported from abroad, was composed, with but 
 three exceptions, of ecclesiastics. 
 
 Yet guarded, supervised, and purged of all 
 dangerous seditious taint, as were the publica- 
 tions provided for the subjects of the Nea- 
 politan King, the seeds of revolt were wafted 
 over the frontiers, and found congenial soil in 
 university, college, and school. By no such 
 puerile constraint, irksome and irritating to a 
 degree, could it be hoped to erect a barrier
 
 60 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 between the Kingdom and the thought of the 
 outer world ; or to quash legitimate aspirations 
 for the political rights of which the nation had 
 been defrauded. The exiles and conspirators 
 beyond the frontiers were able, despite all pre- 
 cautions, to keep in touch with the revolution- 
 ary element at home, and by means of clandes- 
 tine presses, or manuscripts circulating from 
 hand to hand, keep alive the fires which burned 
 sullenly beneath an apparently tranquil surface. 
 The chronicles of those years (1849-1859) teem 
 with the condemnations and martyrdom suf- 
 fered by the would-be patriots caught red- 
 handed, or ferreted out by the ubiquitous 
 police. The possession of an illicit printing 
 press meant long years in the galley-hulks or 
 prisons, or death, the latter by far the least 
 appalling form of punishment. 
 
 Newspapers were published in the capital and 
 some of the larger towns, but journalism, in the 
 modern sense, can scarcely be said to have ex- 
 isted. All foreign news items, or happenings 
 within the realm, of a political significance ad- 
 verse to the government, when not suppressed, 
 were so misrepresented or manipulated to har- 
 monize with the royal policy, as to lose all value 
 or interest. The editors had to content them- 
 selves and their readers with purely literary 
 articles : criticisms of the plays performed at
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 61 
 
 the various theatres, or opera ; poetry and 
 charades, by means of which latter bits of 
 political information were not infrequently con- 
 veyed to the initiated. The literary articles 
 were often of a remarkably high standard of 
 excellence, and served as illustrations of grace- 
 ful writing ; but naturally under these circum- 
 stances the Press had no weight with public 
 opinion, and furnished no indication of the 
 political pulse of the nation. The Neapolitan 
 of those years took up his paper in search of a 
 competent verdict on last night's play, or an 
 exhaustive analysis of the latest fashionable 
 romance. Or he eagerly scanned the list of 
 apartments to let ; or yet again, if socially in- 
 clined, glanced at the names of foreigners of 
 distinction who had recently arrived. Should 
 he chance to be one of those to whom the trend 
 of public affairs abroad, or information afford- 
 ing some clue to the political regeneration of 
 his beloved Italy, was of interest, he had re- 
 course to the dangerous expedients already 
 mentioned. 
 
 Although several members of the aristocracy, 
 and, as has been hinted, even connections of 
 the royal family, were actively concerned in 
 revolutionary intrigues, and in sympathy with 
 the Italian movement, they as a class took little 
 interest in politics, and an insignificant part in
 
 62 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the administration of the government. Even 
 the diplomatic posts were, with one or two 
 exceptions, filled by men not of noble birth. 
 This can be partly accounted for by inferiority 
 of education, owing to the system which con- 
 fided the sons of the aristocracy to the Jesuits, 
 and ignored the higher branches, but is also to 
 be attributed to indolence and love of pleasure. 
 
 Paris, and after the accession of Victor 
 Emmanuel II., Turin, were the most impor- 
 tant diplomatic posts ; but as Ferdinand allowed 
 his representatives no initiative, their mission 
 was merely one of observation. The King of 
 Naples was his own Foreign Minister, as he 
 was his own Inspector of Police. The entire 
 mechanism of government, down to minute de- 
 tails of administration, centred in his hands. 
 Even his military commanders took no action 
 except under explicit orders ; while the police 
 made their reports directly to the Koyal Chan- 
 cery. With his genius for diplomacy, his un- 
 deniable intelligence, as well as his marvel- 
 lous capability for work, the King cast in the 
 shade all those surrounding him, and dwarfed 
 even their most ambitious efforts. 
 
 As was to be expected Ferdinand's interest 
 was centred in the army : a broken reed, alas ! 
 which served the dynasty ill. Before 1848 the 
 Neapolitan troops numbered sixty thousand,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 63 
 
 on paper ; but in reality mustered scarcely 
 forty thousand fighting men. After the events 
 of that and the following year the army was 
 gradually increased to one hundred thousand. 
 Of the revenues of the State which did not 
 reach thirty millions of dollars, eighteen millions 
 were spent on this supposed bulwark of the 
 Throne. In this profession also the aristocracy 
 were conspicuous by their absence. The tradi- 
 tion which surrounded the king with the flower 
 of the youth of the highest nobility had van- 
 ished, their places being filled by the sons of 
 the provincial gentry, government officials, or 
 military families. Many of the chiefs were old 
 warriors of the days of Murat ; "Men without 
 political creed, who served the Bourbons whom 
 in secret they 'despised ; men who in private 
 were the friends of liberty, in public the brutal 
 instruments of servitude." Notable excep- 
 tions to these were found in Filangieri, Ischi- 
 tella, and Castelcicala : men of high moral 
 principles and noble antecedents. 
 
 In spite of the sarcastic words of his grand- 
 father, who, coming upon Ferdinand, still a 
 youth, occupied in selecting designs for new 
 uniforms, savagely muttered : " Dress them 
 as you will, they will always run away," the 
 latter, who, while without any pronounced tal- 
 ent, yet possessed considerable military knowl-
 
 64 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 edge, continued to identify himself personally 
 with his army. He invariably appeared in 
 uniform, in private as well as on public occa- 
 sions ; assisted at all reviews or annual camps, 
 and frequently inspected the barracks and mili- 
 tary establishments. With the men he enter- 
 tained cordial relations, conversing with them in 
 dialect and addressing numbers of them by name. 
 In spite of this condescension and ingenuous 
 aifability his presence inspired a cringing fear. 
 Discipline, although extremely strict, almost 
 cruel, in non-essentials, was of such a nature as 
 to increase the dread of the soldier for the results 
 of transgression, rather than instill a spirit of 
 reasoning obedience to his superiors. Flogging 
 was of frequent occurrence ; often inflicted for 
 insignificant breaches of military etiquette, and 
 was moreover carried out with most brutal and 
 degrading accessories. The prevalence of the 
 " Camorra" was the curse of the army ; even 
 the most terrible forms of punishment never 
 succeeding in eradicating this national scourge. 
 As has been said the superior officers were al- 
 most without exception men far past the prime 
 of life, but the military college of the Nunzia- 
 tella turned out well-educated and efficient 
 men who filled the lower grades. Amongst 
 the latter there existed a decided esprit de 
 corps, unfortunately totally absent in their
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 65 
 
 superiors, who were for the most part men 
 without convictions and of purely expedient 
 loyalty to the dynasty they served. Several of 
 these had served King Murat, and are said to 
 have looked back with thinly concealed regret 
 to that regime. The younger men, however, 
 conscious of the deficiencies of their service and 
 fully alive to the dangers arising from the low 
 moral standard they deplored, made earnest 
 though ineffectual attempts at reform. But re- 
 form of any description, even when it so nearly 
 touched the interests of his own salvation, was 
 insuperably repugnant to Ferdinand ; and the 
 advice and admonitions of the more far-seeing 
 of his officers were allowed to pass unheeded. 
 All material of war, including guns, cannon, 
 and powder, was manufactured in the King- 
 dom ; the home industries also providing every- 
 thing necessary for the clothing and mainte- 
 nance of the soldier. Poor and ill-cared for the 
 latter undoubtedly was, but not exceptionally or 
 conspicuously so for the times in which he lived. 
 If we judge the Neapolitan soldier by his 
 conduct in Sicily, and his precipitate retreat 
 at Velletri, we should be apt to stigmatize him 
 as pusillanimous. It should be borne in mind, 
 however, that on these occasions enthusiasm 
 for the cause for which he was made to fight 
 was totally lacking; and that he was called 
 5
 
 66 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 upon to wage a fratricidal war absolutely 
 abhorrent to his convictions ; in itself a suf- 
 ficient explanation for an undeniable faint- 
 heartedness. 
 
 When in later years the forlorn hope of de- 
 fending a dynasty, discredited by perjury, and 
 covered with odium, was offered, the handful 
 of troops which remained faithful to their King, 
 displayed a heroism and self-abnegation at 
 Gaeta which compelled the admiration of 
 their political enemies, and the sympathy of 
 the civilized world. 
 
 In earlier days Napoleon and Murat had en- 
 tertained the highest opinion, and expressed 
 the warmest praise for the Neapolitan troops 
 under their command. In Spain with Murat ; 
 in the Russian campaign and retreat from 
 Moscow with the Emperor ; at the battle of 
 Lutzer and before Danzig, their bravery and 
 endurance of hardships and privations had 
 been especially commended by the Emperor 
 and their various chiefs. 
 
 Given an incentive worthy of his courage, 
 and led by chiefs in whom confidence could be 
 reposed, the Neapolitan was fully equal to 
 any demands made upon him. This trust was 
 never given to Ferdinand ; while the devotion 
 displayed in the lost cause of his successor was 
 more the result of fortuitous circumstances
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 67 
 
 than any conviction, or loyalty, for the prin- 
 ciples involved. How little real confidence 
 Ferdinand had in the affection of his troops, 
 or what illusions he entertained as to their 
 loyalty in an emergency, is strikingly evinced 
 by the treatment of the pampered Swiss Guard 
 to whose especial care the safety of the Throne 
 was entrusted. These consisted of four regi- 
 ments, recruited for the most part in the 
 Catholic cantons, and had taken the place of 
 the Austrians after the Congress of Vienna had 
 definitely arranged the political status of what 
 Count Metternich described as the various 
 "geographical expressions" of the Peninsula. 
 By virtue of their origin, rather political than 
 military, the Swiss Guard became a purely 
 dynastic institution, and as such the recipient 
 of marked attestation of royal predilection. 
 The remuneration was two-thirds greater than 
 that of the Neapolitans, while they enjoyed 
 besides numerous privileges and indulgences 
 denied their native-born comrades. Although 
 in the ranks might be found men of question- 
 able antecedents and more than doubtful 
 character, they were officered exclusively by 
 representatives of the oldest and most dis- 
 tinguished Swiss families, of both the German 
 and French Cantons, and included some of the 
 proudest names in the Confederation. The
 
 68 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 cost of the maintenance of this body exceeded 
 six hundred thousand dollars annually ; but 
 the value of their service to the Crown was in- 
 estimable. Naturally enough the Neapolitan 
 viewed this favored outsider with envy and 
 hatred ; and looking upon him as a barbarian, 
 lost no opportunity for stirring up trouble and 
 making bad blood. On the other hand the 
 privileged mercenary was not slow to retaliate, 
 assured of the indulgence if not the open 
 approval of his royal master. Thus native 
 and foreigner led a cat and dog existence 
 which only terminated with the dissolution of 
 the Swiss regiments resulting from their mutiny 
 in 1859. 
 
 During Ferdinand's lifetime, in spite of 
 manifest cause for discontent, the army re- 
 mained passively indifferent to the blandish- 
 ments of the advocates of Liberalism and 
 Nationalism. That proselytes abounded in 
 the higher grades is proved by the sudden suc- 
 cess of the propaganda immediately following 
 the death of the Despot. The personal in- 
 fluence of the Sovereign, the intense fear he 
 inspired, and the dread of his vengeance, 
 coupled with the belief in the fidelity of the 
 Swiss Guard, were, strange as it must appear, 
 sufficient to keep the latent forces down. With 
 his death the whole edifice crumbled and fell ;
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 69 
 
 destroyed not merely by its own inherent rot- 
 tenness, but swept by the irresistible political 
 avalanche from beyond the frontiers. 
 
 When the peculiar configuration of the King- 
 dom is considered it must be acknowledged 
 that the Neapolitan marine forces were in no 
 way proportionate to the requirements of the 
 country. Surrounded on three sides by the 
 sea, with the greatest and most populous island 
 of the Mediterranean an integral part of the 
 realm, and numerous smaller islands dependent 
 on it, the resources of the Neapolitan Crown 
 as a sea power were insignificant. The fleet, 
 although neither numerous nor powerful in 
 armament or tonnage, was, however, well 
 manned and officered, the organization being 
 far superior to anything of the kind in Italy. 
 Count Cavour, always vigilantly alert for im- 
 provements in the Sardinian service, borrowed 
 from it the drill practice, and flag signal sys- 
 tem. Had Ferdinand displayed the same 
 amount of interest in his navy as he lavished 
 on his land forces the material was at hand 
 wherewith to have built up a peculiarly efficient 
 service. But he was no sailor himself, and had 
 moreover made the grave mistake of appoint- 
 ing as Vice-Admiral, and President of the Ad- 
 miralty Board, his brother, the Count of 
 Aquila, who cared even less for naval matters.
 
 70 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 This branch of the national defence was conse- 
 quently left in the hands of officers, who al- 
 though individually thoroughly efficient were, 
 nevertheless, powerless to procure the royal 
 protection necessary to advance the best inter- 
 ests of their service. This neglect was keenly 
 felt, and in his hour of trial was the cause of 
 bitter humiliations to Ferdinand's successor. 
 The Eoyal Marine College, and the school for 
 the education of non-commissioned officers, sail- 
 ors and gunners, were ridiculously insufficient 
 for the demands of the service. The former 
 accommodated forty pupils who graduated as 
 officers and naval constructors ; the second 
 institution made provision for only fifty. The 
 High Military Court was common to both serv- 
 ices, and was composed of military and naval 
 officers. It was designed as a species of Court 
 of Appeal, more especially charged with the 
 revision of courts-martial, with the object of 
 defining whether the law of procedure had 
 been violated. Unfortunately this institution, 
 calculated by virtue of its composite character 
 to stand as a healthy corrective of bureau- 
 cratic abuses, was, like every other branch of 
 the administrative service, poisoned by Court 
 influences, and its efficiency destroyed by ob- 
 sequious subservience to the royal will. 
 The arsenals and ship-yards at Naples and
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 71 
 
 Castellammare, where all the vessels of the 
 fleet were constructed, were amongst the best 
 of their kind in the Mediterranean, and vastly 
 superior to any others in Italy. 
 
 The financial system of the Kingdom was 
 admirably conceived but detestably adminis- 
 tered. Scialoia, who undertook in 1857 a paral- 
 lel between the State Budgets of the Piedmont 
 and Naples, demonstrated that the subjects of 
 Victor Emmanuel II. paid a mean annual tax 
 of twenty-six lire (about five dollars) per capita, 
 while those of King Ferdinand were called 
 upon to furnish the State with but twenty-one 
 lire. The former had, however, as compensa- 
 tion for their slightly heavier burden, greater 
 security for individual liberty and protection 
 of property ; besides economical advantages 
 resulting from the ready and convenient modes 
 of intercommunication, works of public utility, 
 and an honest administration. None of these 
 advantages were enjoyed by the Neapolitan, 
 whose taxes went to support an oppressive, 
 corrupt and unprogressive government. The 
 roads throughout the Kingdom were wretched, 
 and for political considerations purposely kept 
 so. It was a journey of twelve days from Reg- 
 gie to the capital. A short line of railway 
 connected Naples with Castellammare on the 
 bay, and another ran to the Royal Palace at
 
 72 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Caserta ; a total of perhaps eighty kilometres 
 for the two lines. Besides these no others ex- 
 isted in the Kingdom. 
 
 No description, however summary, of the 
 salient features of that period of Ferdinand's 
 reign embraced between the return to the re- 
 actionary and absolutist policy in 1849, and his 
 death ten years later, would be complete with- 
 out a glance at its most prominent character- 
 istic the Police. 
 
 It has been said with truth, that Ferdinand 
 was his own Prefect of Police. He received 
 the reports of the official chiefs under whom 
 worked an army of inspectors, detectives and 
 rapacious spies, whose unholy zeal was stimu- 
 lated to the utmost by the knowledge that they 
 in turn were tracked and spied upon by secret 
 agents in every class and walk of life. The 
 demoralization engendered by this odious es- 
 pionage permeated every crevice of the social 
 fabric, turning to fear and hate the relations 
 between officials and those in private life, and 
 making every species of familiar intercourse a 
 danger few cared to incur. Politics, local, 
 national or international, formed the quarry of 
 this pack of voracious sleuth hounds. To hold 
 political opinions contrary to those dictated by 
 the theories of Absolutism, or any opinions not 
 in accord with a blind subservience to the will
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 73 
 
 of the Despot, constituted treason. The ex- 
 pression of such opinions, even in private, 
 branded the speaker as a dangerous demagogue ; 
 a source of peril to organized society, and con- 
 sequently legitimate prey for the police. As a 
 matter of course this branch of the administra- 
 tion became omnipotent not only in the affairs 
 of the general public but even in the Palace. 
 Ferdinand himself became their victim, for 
 realizing their power the various chiefs soon 
 began to play upon the credulous timidity of 
 the King, exaggerating, contorting, or even 
 inventing plots which should redound to their 
 personal advantage, or increase their influence. 
 Under this system the police became the 
 greatest and most powerful institution of the 
 Kingdom, and it is hardly to be wondered at 
 that such a practically limitless sphere of au- 
 thority should have engendered intolerable 
 abuses and acts of unwarranted violence. 
 Under police control were placed : excavations 
 and archseological research ; bands of music ; 
 railways ; the census ; the national archives ; 
 the telegraphs ; the Official Journal ; the im- 
 portations of horses from abroad ; the post- 
 office ; suppression of smuggling ; and, of 
 course, the supervision of university students 
 and those attending all schools. Even diplo- 
 matists and Consular agents were not exempt
 
 74 THIS COLLAPSE OF 
 
 from their inquisitorial vigilance ; while they 
 kept a careful eye on the Guard of Honor ; the 
 reserves ; the prisons ; and the pharmacies 
 throughout the realm. 
 
 The events of 1848 and 1849 had determined 
 King Ferdinand to surround his subjects with 
 a moral Chinese Wall which should effectually 
 shut out the dreaded Liberalism which had 
 made such giant strides abroad. Knowing full 
 well the vigorous campaign kept up beyond the 
 frontiers against his reactionary policy, his 
 chief dread of the dissemination of seditions 
 theories was centred in the foreign Press. 
 He had succeeded in muzzling, and rendering 
 innocuous the journals of the Kingdom, but his 
 police was powerless to prevent the surrepti- 
 tious introduction of newspapers from the 
 north, in spite of an army of censors. These 
 journals circulated in the universities and 
 schools, being forbidden fruit, were read with 
 greedy eagerness. Had the police confined 
 themselves to unearthing revolutionary plots 
 and bringing the conspirators to judgment they 
 would have been performing a manifest duty, 
 necessary for the preservation of public order 
 and the safety of the State. But by their 
 unparalleled brutality, by their frenzied despot- 
 ism, constituting a form of tyranny of which 
 the King himself was a victim, the legitimate
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 75 
 
 ends were smothered in a heterogeneous maze 
 of oppression, cruelty, deceit, and senseless 
 persecution ; arousing the defiant irritation, 
 the madness of despair, of a populace which 
 would have formulated no complaint under a 
 reasonable system. To be arrested because the 
 brim of a hat was too large, and might signify 
 conspiracy ; to be arraigned as a demagogue on 
 account of a pointed beard, were the pin-pricks 
 of a policy which provoked even the most 
 phlegmatic citizen who sipped his coffee, or 
 toyed with his "granita" under the awning of 
 a cafe. But when it came to dragging honest 
 men from their beds in the dead of night on 
 the merest shadow of a suspicion of complicity 
 in a plot which had no more substantial exist- 
 ence than that of a figment conceived in some 
 police inspector's brain ; and leaving the victim 
 to languish, untried, for months in one or other 
 of the horrible, pestilential prisons, the thirst 
 for revenge engendered the organism of revolt. 
 Salvatore Giampoalo, a Neapolitan of con- 
 servative tendencies who published his memoirs 
 shortly after the annexation of Naples to Italy, 
 says that the police system of those times con- 
 stituted the real conspiracy against the State 
 and against the Dynasty, and was the direct 
 cause of the events of 1860. Those who peruse 
 the long list of victims, and the sickening
 
 76 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 details of the refinements of crnelty and torture 
 inflicted often on absolutely innocent men 
 will agree with him. 
 
 It would be unfair to cast the whole odium 
 of the police misrule on King Ferdinand. Yet 
 he originated the system, and if the vast 
 machine got beyond his control, the responsi- 
 bility was still his, and the curses of his sub- 
 jects, together with the indignation of the 
 civilized world, were hurled at the Dynasty 
 which tolerated such anacronisms. 
 
 In as great a measure as was possible Ferdi- 
 nand had isolated himself and his people from 
 the political influence of all States beyond his 
 frontiers, excepting the Court of Rome. We 
 have seen that his diplomacy, as a service, was 
 reduced to mere watchfulness on the part of 
 his representatives ; they being allowed to take 
 no part in the alliances or political combina- 
 tions of the years succeeding the events of 1849. 
 The atrocities perpetrated within his realms 
 were, however, noised abroad, and formed the 
 subject of frequent diplomatic warning, and 
 attempts at amicable intercession. The storm 
 raised by the publication of Mr. Gladstone's 
 letters threatened for a time serious compli- 
 cations, only averted by the impossibility of 
 accord amongst the European Powers, and the 
 adroit diplomacy of Austria. Then came the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 77 
 
 Crimean war which engaged the attention not 
 only of France and England, but also of Pied- 
 mont. The subsequent Congress of Paris gave 
 Count Cavour his long awaited opportunity for 
 drawing official notice to the condition of the 
 Italian States under Austrian influence. 
 Cavour's insinuations and censure had the de- 
 sired effect on public opinion ; but until Aus- 
 tria could be humbled it was useless to attempt 
 to strike at the root of the evil. Napoleon's : 
 " Que peut-on faire pour 1'Italie," set Cavour 
 on the track of an eventuality to be patiently 
 schemed for, and laboriously cultivated until 
 the propitious moment for joint action arrived, 
 and Magenta and Solferino opened up a vista 
 of dazzling possibilities. 
 
 In the meanwhile the storm-clouds continued 
 to gather. Diplomatic notes reached Naples 
 in May, 1856, in which the Cabinets of London 
 and Paris intimated, in no ambiguous language, 
 that it would be advisable that an amnesty be 
 granted to political prisoners, and that radical 
 reforms be undertaken in the judicial adminis- 
 tration of the Kingdom. Ferdinand replied 
 that he considered himself the only competent 
 judge of what was necessary within his realm ; 
 and reminded Count Walewsky and Lord Clar- 
 endon that he recognized the right of no gov- 
 ernment to interfere in the administration of a
 
 78 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 foreign State ; and especially in questions af- 
 fecting the dispensation of judicial authority. 
 Although undoubtedly strictly within his rights 
 as the legitimate ruler of an independent 
 State, Ferdinand would certainly have hesi- 
 tated a few years earlier before despatching so 
 categorical a reply to such powerful counsellors. 
 But his diplomatic astuteness had become 
 blunted, and he who had been a past master 
 in the crafty art of dissimulation and intrigue 
 in his younger days, now rashly assumed an in- 
 flexible attitude of obstinate defiance in the 
 face of the disapprobation of the better half of 
 Europe. In spite of the unsatisfactory politi- 
 cal conditions existing at home, and the open 
 hostility this abrupt repudiation of advice 
 must entail, he discarded the equivocal 
 assurances which would at least have tempora- 
 rily silenced his inopportunate admonishers ; 
 thus placing himself in direct antagonism 
 with the Emperor whose star was so greatly in 
 the ascendant, and whom he had been the first 
 to recognize on his assumption of the Imperial 
 purple. The inevitable result was the rupture 
 of diplomatic relations, the English and French 
 representatives demanding, and receiving, their 
 passports. 
 
 October twenty-first, 1856, was a gala day 
 for the Liberals who recognized in the depar-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 79 
 
 ture of the representatives of powers friendly 
 to their cause the forerunner of the dawn which 
 should usher in their triumph. Sympathetic 
 demonstrations greeted the diplomatists as they 
 drove through the streets of Naples, in spite of 
 the precautions taken hy the police. The in- 
 cident had, however, no tangible result beyond 
 the temporary cessation of official intercourse, 
 and in due time the respective Legations were 
 reoccupied by their former tenants. Neverthe- 
 less Count Cavonr and the Liberal Party were 
 right in estimating the occurrence as a triumph 
 for the Italian cause. Although Austrian in- 
 fluence had apparently scored a victory, Ferdi- 
 nand's lack of political foresight, or insuperable 
 distrust, threw the omnipotent French Emperor 
 into the outstretched arms of the House of 
 Savoy ; a circumstance Cavour had foreseen 
 and prepared for. By this ill-considered policy, 
 while he secured the isolation his timorous soul 
 craved, he encompassed his own ruin, and fur- 
 thered the political combinations of the enemies 
 of the only foreign State whose influence he 
 tolerated. It appears incomprehensible that a 
 man who had displayed such marked political 
 ability, especially amongst the tortuous paths 
 and pitfalls of diplomacy, should become so 
 blinded by prejudice. That Ferdinand was 
 convinced that the consummation of a united
 
 80 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Italy was not at any moment contemplated by 
 Napoleon III., and that the inviolability of the 
 Papal States was assured, is not improbable. 
 Cavour himself had at that time no plan beyond 
 the expulsion of Austria ; and even the later 
 promise of the French Emperor to free Italy 
 "from the Alps to the Adriatic "was not in- 
 terpreted to embrace Southern Italy. Theoret- 
 ically this reasoning was correct. Yet at the 
 same time Ferdinand had ample and frequent 
 demonstration of the deep-rooted discontent 
 amongst the more intelligent and cultured 
 classes of his subjects, and of the wide-spread 
 unpopularity of his Dynasty. He was not igno- 
 rant of the sympathies, insignificant and re- 
 stricted to a small circle, it is true, entertained 
 for Prince Murat, but which, nevertheless, 
 owing to the relationship existing with the all- 
 powerful Emperor, were not unworthy of con- 
 sideration under conditions so essentially un- 
 satisfactory at home and abroad. A more 
 plausible explanation, but one for which, while 
 frequently advanced there exists absolutely no 
 reliable authority, is that the misguided King 
 had come to a mutual personal understanding 
 with Austria and Russia, although no formal 
 treaty or league existed. This theory, which 
 is cited merely as an historical legend, is not 
 necessarily invalidated by the fact that Ferdi-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 81 
 
 nand refused an avowed alliance with Russia, or 
 by the subsequent efforts of his successor to 
 obtain the support of Piedmont and the good 
 offices of the French Emperor. However this 
 may be, the conduct of the Neapolitan Court 
 in 1856 drove another nail into the coffin of 
 the Bourbon dynasty, while it strengthened 
 the Liberalist cause, gaining for it the service- 
 able forbearance of powerful neutrals, perhaps 
 not in complete sympathy with the funda- 
 mental creed of the movement. 
 6
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Count Cavour's projects for alliance with Naples. The Plom- 
 biSres 1 interview. Plans of Napoleon III. and Cavour. 
 Dynastic ambitions. Proposed partition of the Peninsula. 
 Attempted assassination of Ferdinand II. Milano and 
 "Young Italy." Political significance of attack. Pisacane's 
 expedition. The " Cagliari " incident. British claims. 
 Lord Malmesbury on transportation of political prisoners. 
 Diplomatic interference Ferdinand's policy from 1856-59 
 reviewed. His reactionary measures. His bigotry and 
 superstitions. 
 
 IT is now very definitely substantiated by the 
 recent publication of political documents and 
 diplomatic despatches, that Count Cavour had, 
 up to the period of Garibaldi's unexpected 
 achievements, formed no concrete plan for the 
 annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
 to the House of Savoy. His opposition to the 
 Bourbons of Naples, and his attacks on the fla- 
 grant misrule existing within their realm, were 
 prompted by the Austrian influences para- 
 mount there and so detrimental to his projects 
 for the emancipation of northern Italy. Prior 
 to Magenta, and for a considerable period there- 
 after, we have irrefutable evidence that he 
 would have urged his Sovereign to welcome an
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 83 
 
 alliance with the southern Kingdom for pur- 
 poses of united action in driving out the foreign- 
 er. Had this been accomplished the sacrifice 
 of Nice and Savoy might have been avoided, 
 for Napoleon, after Villafranca and the conse- 
 quent non-fulfilment of his engagements, had 
 himself absolved Victor Emmanuel and Cavour 
 from the obligations previously contracted : 
 although it is certain that France would in this 
 case have considered herself entitled to some 
 compensation for the (at that moment unfore- 
 seen) annexation of Tuscany. The political 
 unity of the Peninsula must thereby have been 
 retarded, although its ultimate accomplish- 
 ment was inevitable. Yet again, the unfortu- 
 nate chaotic interval after the fall of Gaeta 
 would have been avoided by allowing the Nea- 
 politans time and opportunity to themselves 
 throw off the yoke, as the Tuscans had done. 
 Cavour realized this : and being perfectly 
 satisfied that the plum must eventually fall into 
 his royal master's lap, was content to let it 
 ripen thoroughly on the tree ; having no relish 
 for green fruit. This philosophic nonchalance 
 was, however, attended by a systematic solicitude 
 that the warm sunshine of Liberalism, as evinced 
 by the Constitutional Government of Piedmont, 
 should be given every opportunity to hasten the 
 maturity of the luscious southern fruit. Too
 
 84 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 wise to show his hand so early in the game, 
 while apparently falling in with the Emperor's 
 never very definite plan for a restoration of the 
 Murat regime at Naples, he kept his official and 
 non-official agents actively employed in dis- 
 seminating an essentially Pan-Italian propa- 
 ganda. 
 
 During the famous Plombieres interview, in 
 July, 1858, when Napoleon III. and Count 
 Cavour were casting about for a plausible 
 pretext for a joint declaration of war on Austria, 
 the difficulties of a satisfactory re-arrangement 
 of the Italian chessboard came under discus- 
 sion. The Pope and the King of Naples caused 
 the Emperor considerable embarrassment : the 
 first on account of the fact that the Catholic 
 sympathies of France, with which he would 
 have to reckon, must be with the Head of the 
 Church ; the second because any attack on 
 King Ferdinand would arouse the susceptibili- 
 ties of Russia, who made a point of honor of 
 protecting him. Cavour, equal to the occasion, 
 pointed out to the Emperor that it would un- 
 doubtedly be advisable to leave the Sovereign 
 Pontiff in the possession of Rome, protected as 
 he was by the French garrison, but that on 
 account of the notoriously bad government of 
 the Romagna provinces under Papal rule, there 
 could be no objection to allowing them to
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 85 
 
 revolt. As for the King of Naples, he might 
 be left undisturbed, unless he took sides with 
 Austria. Nevertheless his subjects might also 
 be permitted to revolt if they considered the 
 moment opportune for casting aside the paternal 
 domination of the Bourbons. 
 
 This arrangement being satisfactory to the 
 Emperor, the following map of Italy was de- 
 cided upon. The Valley of the Po, Ro- 
 magna and the legations (Bologna and Ferrara) 
 would constitute the Kingdom of Upper Italy, 
 and would be governed by the House of Savoy. 
 The Pope would retain Rome, and the territory 
 surrounding it. The rest of the Papal states, 
 together with Tuscany, would form the King- 
 dom of Central Italy. The States of the King- 
 dom of Naples would not be interfered with. 
 These four Italian States would constitute a 
 Confederation similar to the Germanic, the 
 Presidency of which would be given to the Pope. 
 
 Cavour, in transmitting an account of this 
 conversation to Victor Emmanuel, adds : " This 
 arrangement seemed to me quite acceptable. 
 According to its provisions Your Majesty being 
 already by right Sovereign of the richest and 
 strongest portion of Italy, would become the 
 effective sovereign of the whole Peninsula." 
 
 During this same conversation Napoleon III. 
 spoke openly of the pleasure it would afford
 
 86 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 him could he return to Murat the throne which 
 had been occupied by his father. 
 
 The price of this compact, which Bismarck 
 sneeringly styled " la politique de pourboire," 
 was to be : as a retainer, the hand of Victor Em- 
 manuel's eldest daughter, Princess Clotilde, for 
 the Emperor's cousin Prince Jerome ; and, 
 on execution, the cession of Savoy and Nice to 
 France. 
 
 The conditions were onerous, but the immense 
 advantages which would accrue to his royal 
 master caused Cavour to eloquently urge their 
 acceptance. 
 
 In forming a judgment of the third Na- 
 poleon's policy and actions in Italy it is of 
 importance that what may be termed dynastic 
 pride be not overlooked. The Emperor may, 
 or may not, have been sincere in his avowed 
 sympathy with national aspirations in the 
 abstract ; in practice a united Italy was 
 manifestly detrimental to French interests, and 
 could not fail to be so considered by French 
 Statesmen. The treaties of 1815 not only hum- 
 bled France while overturning the Napoleonic 
 dynasty : the maintenance of their stipula- 
 tions lessened the prestige of the Second 
 Empire. Austrian supremacy over what had 
 been one of the brightest jewels in his uncle's 
 sceptre constituted an unquestionable check
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 87 
 
 to the nephew who songht to revive the lustre 
 and traditions of that brilliant epoch. Oavour 
 with penetrating insight, and thorough under- 
 standing of the foibles and ambitions of the 
 new Caesar, encouraged this policy to the 
 best of his ability, at the same time bringing 
 into play every subterfuge by which the Italian 
 cause might profit without a corresponding 
 advantage being reaped by his Imperial ally 
 within the boundaries of the Peninsula. We 
 have witnessed his acceptance of the Plombi^res 
 compact by which the political geography of 
 Italy was to be transformed, and it is known 
 that Napoleon had on this occasion hinted at 
 the desire that his cousin Jerome might be 
 intrusted with the administration of Tuscany. 
 But to neither this scheme nor the proposal 
 that Murat be given the throne of Naples, did 
 Cavour commit himself, although he bowed 
 before the expression of the Emperor's wishes. 
 Help to drive out the foreign invader was im- 
 perative, and the price coveted for such aid he 
 could offer. Once this accomplished, the 
 famous " Italia fard da se " would suffice for 
 the decisions concerning the occupancy of the 
 vacant throne or thrones, and the signs of the 
 times left little doubt as to who would be 
 elected. Villafrance came nigh to destroying 
 all these patiently elaborated plans, while the
 
 88 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 hastily convened congress at Zurich still farther 
 darkened the horizon. In the meanwhile por- 
 tentous events neutralized the significance of 
 the resolutions adopted by the diplomatic Con- 
 gress assembled in Switzerland, and swept the 
 prudently prepared combinations of Cavour 
 himself, not to ruin, but towards unlooked-for 
 success. 
 
 The meeting at Plombires, although the 
 drift of the conversations between the Emperor 
 and Cavour could only have been surmised by 
 him, left Ferdinand uneasy. The close amity 
 existing between France and Piedmont fore- 
 boded no good for Naples, and must be con- 
 sidered in the light of encouragement by the 
 Liberals, who turned to the French Emperor 
 for the furtherance of their plans. 
 
 The Neapolitan King had been much im- 
 pressed by the political significance of the des- 
 perate attack upon his life made by Milano, on 
 December 8, 1856. The assassin, one Agesilao 
 Milano, a private in one of the regiments sta- 
 tioned at Naples, wonld appear to have nursed 
 the plan of ridding his country of the enemy 
 of national regeneration for a considerable 
 period, and certainly displayed great cunning 
 and perseverance in putting himself in a posi- 
 tion to accomplish his object. A blind and 
 unreasoning adherent to the teachings of Maz-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 89 
 
 zini, he had become affiliated with the society 
 of " Young Italy " during his sojourn in 
 Naples, and had proclaimed to the companions 
 to whom he owed his initiation his determina- 
 tion to sacrifice his life for the cause. In 
 vain his sponsors warned him of the futility 
 of such isolated action, and urged him to wait 
 until arrangements could be made for a general 
 uprising to follow a successful assassination. 
 His thirst for martyrdom was not to be over- 
 come by any arguments of prudence or expe- 
 diency, although when the moment he had 
 chosen arrived, he led them astray by feigning 
 to have postponed his intention. 
 
 Mazzini, while he never actually advocated 
 assassination for the attainment of the political 
 aims of his sect, did not on the other hand op- 
 pose extreme measures when brought to his 
 notice. On such occasions he evasively argued 
 that the responsibility rested upon the indi- 
 vidual, not on the society or its doctrines. If 
 he did not actually place the knife in the hands 
 of his disciples, he was nevertheless disinclined 
 to disarm, or even discourage, the individual 
 avenger of political wrongs whose lower in- 
 stincts led him to adopt assassination as a means 
 to his ends. In the present instance Milano 
 appears to have been guided by the spirit if not 
 the letter of the doctrines he had imbibed, act-
 
 90 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ing on his own initiative in as far as the moment 
 to be selected, but in obedience to the moral 
 suasion of at least two of his fellow-associates. 
 At a review which Ferdinand was holding at 
 Naples on the above mentioned date, Milano, 
 selecting the opportunity when in the march 
 past he found himself within a few feet of the 
 King, suddenly left the ranks and rushing up- 
 on his victim aimed a violent bayonet thrust, 
 which must inevitably have been fatal had not 
 the pistol-case at the bow of the saddle turned 
 aside the weapon, which glancing off inflicted 
 but a slight wound. Before Milano could 
 make the second lunge which he attempted, he 
 was seized and overpowered by those surround- 
 ing the King. Ferdinand, in spite of his wound, 
 is said to have displayed the greatest calm and 
 courage. The review was not interrupted, 
 many close at hand being unaware that an at- 
 tempt on the King's life had been perpetrated. 
 To Count di Montemolino who witnessed the 
 assault, and rushed to the King's aid, Ferdinand 
 whispered : "Stand back. Keep silent." This 
 presence of mind undoubtedly saved Naples a 
 bloody conflict. Had the attempted assassina- 
 tion been generally observed it would immedi- 
 ately have been attributed to a military con- 
 spiracy, and the Swiss regiments have been 
 called upon by their officers to fire on the native
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 91 
 
 troops then and there. General Sigrist, com- 
 manding the Swiss regiments, has asserted that 
 had he witnessed Milano's assault he would 
 unhesitatingly have given such an order ; and 
 it has also been stated by officers in the Nea- 
 politan army that they would have retaliated 
 with their artillery. Under these circum- 
 stances the populace must inevitably have be- 
 come involved, and the slaughter been enor- 
 mous. It has been suggested that Milano may 
 have had this eventuality in view ; and counted 
 on a civil war to facilitate a general rising of 
 the Liberals throughout the Kingdom. 
 
 The review over, Ferdinand, surrounded by 
 his Bodyguard, was driven rapidly to the Pal- 
 ace, and immediately summoned his physician. 
 The possibility having been suggested that the 
 weapon was poisoned, the Queen threw herself 
 on her knees and sucked the wound. 
 
 During the inquiry which was immediately 
 instituted, Milano indignantly repudiated the 
 plea of insanity advanced by his advocate, and 
 repeatedly maintained that his act was pre- 
 meditated and unrepented. A Court-martial 
 in due time condemned the would-be assassin 
 to death by hanging. When the sentence was 
 read to him he raised his eyes to Heaven, and 
 exclaimed : " My God, I die like a thief for 
 Italian Liberty."
 
 92 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Many arrests were made in connection with 
 this affair, and numerous expulsions from the 
 army followed, but no actual accomplices were 
 discovered. Ferdinand is credited with the 
 desire to spare the man's life, but is said to have 
 been overruled by the protests of the members 
 of the Government and his Household, as well 
 as by the advice of certain foreign representa- 
 tives at his court. Of course the police re- 
 doubled their activity in the search for possible 
 accomplices or conspirators ; no portion of the 
 Kingdom being exempt from their fiendish 
 machinations and brutal despotism. 
 
 Milano's crime, despite the precipitancy of 
 its author which had made collective action 
 impossible, nevertheless aroused the Liberals 
 to an appreciation of the necessity for cohesion. 
 Many of the revolutionary clubs and associa- 
 tions dated their organization from this event. 
 The malcontents waxed bolder notwithstand- 
 ing the vigilance of the police ; clandestine 
 printing presses sprang up and issued seditious 
 literature which found ready circulation 
 throughout the realm. On several occasions 
 the walls of Naples were placarded with revo- 
 lutionary posters, to the delight of the popu- 
 lace and fury of the authorities. Tricolor 
 cockades were secretly distributed ; and in the 
 theatres the audiences clamored continually
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 93 
 
 for Verdi. The significance of the sudden 
 enthusiasm for this composer lay in the dis- 
 covery that the letters spelling his name also 
 formed the anagram : " Vittorio Emmannuele 
 Ee D'ltalia." Nor were the Unionists alone 
 in their efforts to foment agitation ; the adher- 
 ents of Prince Murat, and the followers of 
 Mazzini were also in the field, ready to take 
 advantage of any opportunity which might of- 
 fer to raise the standard of revolt. 
 
 Mazzini himself came to Genoa to settle, with 
 Carlo Pisacane, the details of the plot, after- 
 wards celebrated in the annals of diplomacy as 
 the "Cagliari" incident. This expedition, 
 which vied in audacity with that of the heroic 
 Bandiera brothers in 1844, was undertaken by 
 a handful of brave but misinformed enthusi- 
 asts ; and included besides the leader Pisacane, 
 Giovanni Nicotera, afterwards one of King 
 Humbert's Cabinet Ministers. The lines on 
 which the expedition was planned were simple 
 enough, but the links of the chain became dis- 
 jointed at the outset through failure to meet 
 Kosolino Pilo as had been arranged, and to re- 
 ceive from him the arms and men deemed nec- 
 essary to take possession of the steamer " Cag- 
 liari," on which the conspirators had embarked. 
 Pisacane, however, succeeded in winning over 
 the captain and crew of the steamer without
 
 94 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the use of force, and induced them to steer for 
 the convict station on the island of Ponza. 
 Here they surprised the small garrison and re- 
 leased the eight hundred prisoners confined 
 there. Eeinforced by three hundred and 
 twenty-three of these, and having collected 
 arms and ammunition, they again set sail and 
 effected a landing at Sapri, on the Calabrian 
 coast, on June 28, 1857. In the meanwhile 
 Mazzini having heard that the junction with 
 Kosolino Pino had failed, and, taking it for 
 granted that the whole scheme had miscarried, 
 neglected to prepare his agents for the arrival 
 of the conspirators. In addition to this the 
 information as to the readiness of the populace 
 to welcome their deliverers proved grossly erro- 
 neous, and the invaders soon found themselves 
 arrayed not only against the Royal troops, but 
 in actual conflict with the very peasants they 
 had come to emancipate from the yoke of the 
 Bourbon. Defeated and hunted for days amidst 
 the mountains, where the inhabitants slaugh- 
 tered all on whom they could lay hands, the 
 leaders were finally arrested and condemned to 
 death : a sentence afterwards commuted by 
 Ferdinand. 
 
 Meanwhile the " Cagliari " in attempting to 
 leave the Gulf of Policastro, after landing Pisa- 
 cane's band, was boarded by a Neapolitan frig-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 95 
 
 ate, " Tancredi," and declared a lawful prize. 
 This action gave rise to the diplomatic contro- 
 versy which really lent importance to a singu- 
 larly romantic, but otherwise not uncommon 
 revolutionary, incident. It would seem im- 
 possible to absolve the vessel of the charge 
 of pure and simple filibustering ; and thus 
 the case appeared to most people. But 
 Count Cavour took a different view, and en- 
 couraged the demand of the Rubattino Com- 
 pany that their vessel be returned to them. 
 Backed by the British Minister at Turin, who 
 seized as a pretext to interest himself in the 
 dispute the fact that two of the engineers of 
 the captured steamer were English subjects, 
 Cavour insisted that the vessel was protected 
 by the Sardinian flag, and had, moreover, been 
 illegally boarded in waters beyond the limits of 
 Neapolitan jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this 
 very debatable point and the unquestionable 
 object of the voyage, Lord Derby, on May 25, 
 1858, caused a threatening note to be written, 
 declaring the capture of the " Cagliari " a vio- 
 lation of maritime law, and that it behoved 
 Great Britain, in the interests of such regula- 
 tions, to insist on the liberation of the crew 
 and the return of the vessel to her owners. 
 There was no alternative for the unfortunate 
 Ferdinand, in view of this energetic interven-
 
 96 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tion, but the payment of three thousand pounds 
 as indemnity to the two foreign engineers, and 
 the restitution of the captured vessel. 
 
 Arbitrary as the ruling of the British Govern- 
 ment undoubtedly was in the present instance, 
 and bitterly humiliating to the Sovereign, Fer- 
 dinand dared not protest. Universal indigna- 
 tion had been aroused abroad by the recent 
 negotiations opened with the Argentine Repub- 
 lic seeking to arrange for the exportation to 
 that country of political prisoners under guar- 
 antees that they should be so provided for as 
 to relieve the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies from 
 all fear of further molestation. These stipula- 
 tions, stigmatized in the English Parliament 
 as a revival of the slave trade, and which prac- 
 tically sold the victims into bondage under a 
 foreign and half-civilized State, offended the 
 humanitarian instincts of Europe. Owing to 
 the violent denunciations this proposal elic- 
 ited, especially the campaign waged by the 
 London " Times," it was decided to embark the 
 more notorious of the prisoners on a man-of- 
 war, and transship them in a Spanish port to a 
 merchant vessel bound for New York. The 
 first half of the programme was successfully car- 
 ried out, but the exiles having prevailed upon 
 the captain of the merchantman to land them 
 in England, were speedily enabled to renew
 
 THE KINGDOM Of NAPLES. 97 
 
 their conspiracies, enhanced by the halo of 
 martyrdom acquired by their recent, and loudly 
 heralded experiences. 
 
 Lord Malmesbury, writing on January 23, 
 1859, to the Prussian Minister in London, 
 says:* "Having received notice that several 
 of the political prisoners were to be sent to 
 America, I was led to hope that our official 
 relations with the Government of Naples might 
 be resumed. But my illusion was short-lived. 
 Unfortunately the Neapolitan Government ac- 
 companied this act of mercy by a decree which 
 curtails for the future the civil liberty of 
 millions of subjects. This policy is as incom- 
 prehensible as it is distasteful to the English 
 Government. The decree of December 27, 
 1858, is a permanent violation of Neapolitan 
 laws : consequently it is worse than the tempo- 
 rary state of siege. It is therefore impossible 
 for the Government of Her Majesty, after hav- 
 ing broken off diplomatic relations with the 
 Neapolitan Government in 1856 because its 
 proceedings were tyrannical, to resume them 
 in 1859, when Ferdinand II. still further re- 
 stricts the civil and political guarantees of his 
 people, and entrusts to Courts-martial the juris- 
 dictions over political misdemeanors. " 
 
 The Emperor of the French protested in 
 * Translated from the Italian version. 
 7
 
 98 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 like manner ; but Ferdinand turned a deaf ear 
 to warning and entreaty. Almost his last 
 official act (May 16, 1859) was an intimation 
 that his Ambassador would only be permitted 
 to return to Paris with the explicit understand- 
 ing that no demands be made relative to the 
 internal administration of the Kingdom. And 
 this after the declaration of war upon Austria 
 by France and Sardinia ! 
 
 The last three years of Ferdinand's life 
 (1856-1859) were marked by an increasingly 
 persistent endeavor to collect and maintain 
 every detail of the Administration within his 
 own grasp. At the same time, appreciating 
 the immense power of the Church, he aimed at 
 a closer community of interests between the 
 Altar and the Throne. The Council of Bishops 
 held at Caserta, had in view the elaboration of 
 a system by means of which the Clergy would 
 be placed in a position not unlike that which 
 they held in the Middle Ages ; the power and 
 prerogatives of the Crown, far from being sac- 
 rificed, being still jealously guarded, or in- 
 creased. It was, in fact, a compact between 
 the Church and Crown directed against the 
 interests and liberties of the State. By his 
 rescripts of May 3 and August 15, 1856, Ferdi- 
 nand ordered that the organized charitable in- 
 stitutions should hand over to the Bishops a
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 99 
 
 portion of their revenues, or of the capital 
 donated by testators. Successive decrees issued 
 in 1857 restored to ecclesiastics, in violation of 
 the fundamental laws of the Kingdom, privi- 
 leges of which they had been deprived in the 
 middle of the last century as being incompatible 
 with the advance of civilization. The decree 
 of May 6, 1857, granted the privilege to priests 
 and monks of trial for penal offences in secret 
 audience, and of expiating the correctional 
 sentences inflicted in religious houses. The 
 Bishops were intrusted, in May of the same 
 year, with the revision and censorship of the 
 Press ; thus annulling the law of August 13, 
 1850, which provided for the execution of this 
 duty by the Council of Public Instruction. 
 The law which forbade priests to bless a mar- 
 riage before it had been sanctioned by the civil 
 authorities was abolished. Amongst other 
 retrograde concessions the Bishops were pro- 
 claimed inspectors by right of office of all pub- 
 lic and private schools. 
 
 While placing the country under the heel of 
 the Clergy, Ferdinand nevertheless maintained 
 his despotism in all essentials. Although the 
 influence of the Jesuits was extended, Absolut- 
 ism was strengthened by placing the educa- 
 tional institutions under the guidance of men 
 devoted to his person, and presumably to his
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF 100 
 
 dynasty. Yet herein lay the unconscious error 
 of his system. It has been already pointed out 
 that Ferdinand mistrnsted the Jesuits ; not 
 only on account of their leaning to political 
 intrigue, bub by reason of the very capabilities 
 in educational matters he now professed to 
 admire. Under no circumstances would he 
 admit a member of the confraternity to his con- 
 fidence, or to his private confessional. The 
 explanation of the undoubted mutation of the 
 policy of his earlier years when contrasted with 
 that followed during the months immediately 
 preceding his death, can be traced to two 
 sources : the influence of the Queen, increasing 
 in proportion to her husband's intellectual and 
 physical decline ; and the bigotry and childish 
 superstitions to which he became subjected. 
 These would appear to have increased with 
 the expansion of his religions fervor. Nisco 
 cites many examples, most noticeable amongst 
 which was the King's deadly terror of the 
 " jettatura," or evil eye ; a peculiarity he 
 shared, however, with millions of his subjects. 
 Did it happen that he came face to face with 
 a monk, or a lame, bald or squinting person, 
 when setting out on a journey, the dread of 
 pending misfortune kept him in constant ap- 
 prehension. He is said to have attributed his 
 illness during his last journey to the Adriatic
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 101 
 
 to welcome his son's wife, to the encounter 
 with two Cappucine monks as the carriage 
 passed out of the gates of the Palace ; while 
 the aggravation of his sickness was caused, he 
 believed, by the persistent stare of a bald man 
 in the cathedral at Brindisi.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Marriage of Crown Prince. Ceremonies in Munich and Trieste. 
 Ferdinand starts for Adriatic coast. Incidents of the jour- 
 ney. The suspicious illness at Ariano. Accusations against 
 the Bishop. The Court reaches Bari. Arrival of Maria 
 Sophia. Her meeting with Francis and members of his 
 family. Ferdinand's illness increases. The Count of Syra- 
 cuse arrives. The return to Naples. Alarming news from 
 Turin. Napoleon III. and Victor Emmanuel. Opinions of 
 foreign royalty visiting Naples. Details of Ferdinand's 
 last days. His death. 
 
 DISQUIETED by the warlike rumors and prep- 
 arations in the north, Ferdinand, towards the 
 end of 1858, shook off his political lethargy to 
 the extent of opening negotiations for a matri- 
 monial alliance for his son, the Duke of Cala- 
 bria, later Francis II. Policy, as well as incli- 
 nation, pointed to the advantages to be secured 
 by strengthening the family ties which already 
 bound him to the Austrian Court. The strug- 
 gle against the ever increasing tide of Liberal- 
 ism had become complicated by the aspirations 
 of the Mnrat party, to which color was given 
 by the thinly veiled sympathies of Napoleon III. 
 A matrimonial alliance which would bring him 
 into closer relationship with the mighty Haps- 
 102
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 103 
 
 bnrgs might at least serve as a check to the 
 latter evil. 
 
 With these objects in view the Neapolitan 
 Minister at Munich was instructed to make 
 proposals for the hand of the young Princess 
 Maria Sophia, daughter of Duke Maximilian, 
 of Bavaria, and cousin of the reigning monarch. 
 A sister of the beautiful Elizabeth who had 
 recently become Empress of Austria, Sophia, 
 although not endowed with the marvellous love- 
 liness of her radiant sister, was nevertheless an 
 exceedingly handsome and charming young 
 woman, while the subsequent misfortunes and 
 cruel humiliations she was called upon to suffer 
 gave evidence of a strength of character amount- 
 ing on occasions to heroism. Under less per- 
 nicious influences, even in spite of her extreme 
 youth and inexperience, this ardent and cour- 
 ageous woman might have done much to avert 
 the disasters which overtook the Throne she 
 shared. 
 
 The inevitable preliminary negotiations 
 having been satisfactorily disposed of, and the 
 formal demand accepted, the marriage by pro- 
 curation took place in the royal palace at 
 Munich on the evening of January 8, 1859. 
 Prince Luitpold of Bavaria personified the 
 bridegroom ; the King of Naples being repre- 
 sented by his special Ambassador, Count Ludolf .
 
 104 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 On the thirteenth the new Duchess of Calabria 
 set forth on the journey to her future home. 
 At Vienna she was joined by her sister the 
 Empress of Austria who accompanied her to 
 Trieste, where the final ceremony of handing 
 over the bride to the royal commissary, charged 
 to escort her on board a Neapolitan frigate, 
 was to take place. The great hall of the 
 Palace at Trieste was for this occasion divided 
 by a line simulating the demarcation of the 
 frontiers of the two States, Bavaria and Naples. 
 On the Neapolitan side stood the Duke of 
 Serracapriola, Ferdinand's Commissary, and 
 the ladies and gentlemen of the Court of the 
 new Princess ; on Bavarian territory the com- 
 missary of King Maximilian, Count de Rech- 
 berg, the ladies of honor of the Princess, and 
 the civil and military authorities, awaited the 
 entrance of the bride. When Maria Sophia 
 appeared the respective Commissaries, and their 
 suites, advanced to the line of demarcation, 
 and formally exchanged their credentials. 
 Count Rechberg having bid the Princess an of- 
 ficial adieu, advanced with her to the dividing 
 line, and handed her over to the Duke of Ser- 
 racapriola. Once within Neapolitan territory 
 the bride received the homages of her new 
 Court, and of the admiral and officers of the 
 squadron which was to accompany her to Bari,
 
 THE KINGDOM. OF NAPLES. 105 
 
 where her husband was awaiting her. On the 
 conclusion of this interesting ceremony Maria 
 Sophia, attended by her sister the Empress and 
 the combined courts, proceeded to the Neapoli- 
 tan frigate " Fulminante," on board of which 
 the private farewell greetings with the members 
 of her family and personal friends were gone 
 through. 
 
 Meanwhile Ferdinand had quitted his capital 
 and undertaken the journey to the Adriatic 
 coast to attend the official welcome and recep- 
 tion of his daughter-in-law. The Queen, 
 Maria Theresa, an Austrian by birth, and the 
 bridegroom with his half-brothers and sisters 
 accompanied the Sovereigns, who were attended 
 by a numerous suite of Court dignitaries. 
 
 The original plans for the journey had been 
 made with Manfredonia as the port where the 
 meeting was to take place. This town was to 
 be reached by a circuitous route embracing the 
 cities of Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi and Bari, 
 visited under the impression that a royal so- 
 journ would do much to cement the loyalty of 
 those provinces. Nothing can better demon- 
 strate the mistrust with which the Sovereign 
 looked upon his liege subjects than the avoid- 
 ance of any refreshment at the hands of the 
 provincial and municipal dignitaries within 
 whose jurisdiction he might travel or seek rest.
 
 106 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 All food or refreshment for the royal table was 
 prepared and served by the trusted servants 
 attached to his person. The trip began under 
 particularly trying circumstances : the cold 
 was intense, and deep snow made the roads in 
 the mountainous districts well-nigh impassable. 
 Ou several occasions the danger resulting from 
 the ice-bound condition of the highways made 
 it necessary for the royal travellers to descend 
 from their heavy coaches and traverse consider 
 able distances on foot. Extraordinary precau- 
 tions had been taken for the safety of the King, 
 who must needs travel through districts infected 
 with brigands, and political malcontents, of 
 every condition. On the evening of the second 
 day, which had been an unusually fatiguing 
 one, owing to the steepness and abominable 
 condition of the roads, the cortege arrived 
 after nightfall at Ariano. Tired out, and will- 
 nigh frozen, Ferdinand was fain to accept the 
 hospitality of the Bishop, Monsignor Michel 
 Caputo, and to sup and spend the night at the 
 Episcopal Palace. It would appear that the 
 political convictions of Monsignor Caputo were 
 not altogether above suspicion from a Bourbon's 
 point of view. Be this as it may, all authorities 
 agree in dating the illness which was to carry 
 the Monarch to the tomb from the night 
 passed at Ariano. Shortly after the King had
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 107 
 
 retired for the night his faithful body-servant, 
 Galizia, who slept in an adjoining room, was 
 roused by a violent noise ; and on rushing into 
 his master's presence found him, with his 
 pistols clutched in his hands, in a state of 
 great excitement. The King asserted that an 
 assassin was concealed in the chamber, and 
 insisted on four sailors of his guard, together 
 with Galizia, remaining with him. The 
 servant declared that the attempted assassina- 
 tion was purely imaginary, and that he found 
 the King suffering from violent fever, attended 
 with pains in the body, and more particularly 
 the bones. In spite of the fact that he was 
 still suffering considerably the King insisted 
 on resuming the journey next morning ; yet 
 notwithstanding the unavoidable fatigue no 
 alarming symptoms became manifest until after 
 their arrival at Lecce. Although at the time 
 no suspicions were aroused, after the King's 
 death three months later, the wildest rumors 
 were circulated. It was then currently affirmed 
 that Monsignor Caputo had poisoned Ferdinand, 
 and the fact that the Bishop ultimately 
 became officially connected with Garibaldi 
 lent a semblance of plausibility to such asser- 
 tions, which the adherents to the Bourbon 
 Dynasty were not slow to seize upon as ex- 
 emplifying the iniquity of their political foes.
 
 108 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 There is not, however, a particle of evidence 
 to substantiate so monstrous an accusation. 
 The probabilities are that Ferdinand, unaccus- 
 tomed to the severe exposure he had under- 
 gone, and which he rashly faced the day after 
 his mysterious sickness, developed the seeds of 
 the malady which, first from neglect, and later 
 owing to inefficient medical treatment, became 
 complicated by pre-existent disorders. Certain 
 it is that on his arrival at Lecce on January 
 14, 1859, Ferdinand became so ill that the 
 Court physicians were hastily summoned from 
 Naples, while the plans for the journey were 
 so altered as to provide for the reception of the 
 bride at Bari, instead of at Manfredonia. For 
 over a fortnight the royal patient lay grievously 
 ill at Lecce ; then, a slight improvement 
 having manifested itself, the Court hurried on 
 to Bari which was reached the same evening. 
 Greatly exhausted by the unavoidable fatigue 
 of the rough journey, Ferdinand with difficulty 
 mounted the stairs leaning heavily on the 
 Queen and Doctor Eomaglia, who assisted him 
 to his bed. 
 
 On the second of February, the " Fulmi- 
 nante," having on board the young Duchess and 
 her suite arrived off Bari, and was received 
 with great ceremony and public rejoicings. 
 Ferdinand, who was now suffering intensely
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 109 
 
 from inflammation of the lower intestines, com- 
 plicated by an internal trouble the exact nature 
 of which the doctors failed to diagnose, was 
 unable to leave his bed to welcome the new 
 member of his family. The festivities were 
 consequently limited to the religious service 
 which completed the interminable nuptial cere- 
 monies the young Duchess had already sub- 
 mitted to, and which was performed in the 
 great gallery of the Palace, converted for the 
 occasion into a chapel. " Memor," who has 
 preserved for us a most minute account of all 
 the circumstances attending the last months 
 of Ferdinand's life, in relating the meeting of 
 the Duke of Calabria with his wife, mentions 
 the fact that conversational intercourse be- 
 tween the bride and groom was rendered some- 
 what embarrassing as the Duke failed to un- 
 derstand the French used by Maria Sophia, 
 and comprehended not a word of the German 
 she addressed to his stepmother. The King 
 was greatly taken by the charm of his 
 daughter-in-law's manner, who in turn recip- 
 rocated his affection with warm sympathy. 
 
 Meanwhile Ferdinand's condition grew stead- 
 ily worse and his sufferings became intolerable. 
 Doctor after doctor was summoned, but as 
 none were allowed to see the patient, and had 
 to content themselves with the diagnosis which
 
 110 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Komaglia, repeated to them, their services were 
 negative. In vain was the King's room hung 
 with the pictures of all the most celebrated 
 Saints of the Kingdom ; in vain did the pa- 
 tient imbibe waters and potions to which mirac- 
 ulous properties were attributed ; the disease 
 resisted all treatment, physical and spiritual. 
 Certain symptoms now began to appear which 
 left no doubt in the minds of his physicians 
 that a surgical operation would be necessary. 
 Romaglia, having discovered the existence of 
 pus, became greatly alarmed, and declining the 
 responsibility of an operation in a small pro- 
 vincial town such as Bari, urged an immediate 
 return to Naples by sea. The Neapolitans 
 from whom Ferdinand's condition had been 
 concealed, now began to murmur at the pro- 
 longed absence of the Court, all the ceremonies 
 attending the bride's reception being over. 
 Strange rumors were circulated, and owing to 
 the presence at Bari of the Austrian Archdukes 
 Ranieri and William, it was asserted that an 
 offensive and defensive alliance with Austria 
 was being secretly negotiated. This aroused 
 the Liberals who were eagerly anticipating the 
 armed intervention of the Emperor of the 
 French for the liberation of northern Italy 
 from the hated Austrian rule. The King's 
 brother, the Count of Syracuse, credited with 

 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. HI 
 
 liberal sympathies of a militant order, and 
 who never ceased to urge an alliance with 
 Piedmont and an understanding with the Na- 
 tionalists, posted off in haste to Bari, to dissuade 
 the King from such a course should it be under 
 contemplation. The news of the landing of 
 the political prisoners destined for America, 
 and of their enthusiastic reception by the 
 British public and press, had created consider- 
 able excitement in Naples. The facts were 
 not concealed from Ferdinand, who in addition 
 to the anger he felt, and weakened by suffering 
 and disease, was disinclined to return to Naples 
 and face the malicious triumph of the Liberals 
 in his capital. With one pretext or another 
 the departure was postponed until the seventh 
 of March, on which date the royal family em- 
 barked on the " Fulmiuante " and set out for 
 Naples. A fresh examination of the King, 
 made at his request by the naval surgeons on 
 board, confirmed the existence of pus, and 
 counselled an immediate operation. To this 
 the Queen would not listen. Palliatives were 
 resorted to and the journey of fifty hours 
 accomplished without undue suffering. A 
 special train hurried the royal party from 
 Naples to the Palace at Caserta, where the 
 acute agony of the unfortunate Sovereign was 
 to drag on for long weeks to come.
 
 112 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 In spite of his physical sufferings and the 
 knowledge that the only probable release was 
 death, and that at no distant date, Ferdinand 
 continued to give his personal attention to the 
 affairs of State. Carafa, who under the imme- 
 diate supervision of the King discharged the 
 duties of chief of the Bureau for Foreign Af- 
 fairs, assiduously communicated the alarming 
 despatches received from Count Antonini dated 
 from Brussels, where he had established him- 
 self after the rupture of diplomatic relations 
 between France and Naples, for the purpose of 
 watching the progress of events. The news 
 received from this diplomatist, as well as from 
 the representative at Turin, the Chevalier Ca- 
 nofari, left little doubt of the intentions of 
 Napoleon III. and Victor Emmanuel. The 
 Congress, proposed by Russia and nominally 
 accepted by all the great Powers, which was to 
 deal with the Italian question, gave a momen- 
 tary respite. Few believed the French Em- 
 peror to be sincere in his professed willingness 
 to refer the questions at issue to such a Con- 
 gress ; and while Ferdinand still preserved 
 confidence in the ability of Austria to maintain 
 by force of arms the " statu quo " in Italy, he 
 could not but be impressed by the gravity of 
 the political situation. In Piedmont, and 
 above all in the Liberal and Nationalist prin-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 113 
 
 ciples prevailing there, he recognized the direst 
 foe to the institutions his personal influence 
 had, up to the present, been able to force upon 
 his subjects. That Cavour was a party to the 
 schemes for Italian Federation as conceived by 
 Napoleon III. he was assured ; but to what 
 extent the Emperor had committed himself in 
 connection with the disposition of southern 
 Italy he could only surmise. Such speculations 
 were not of a nature to procure repose for the 
 King who, tortured in body, and keenly aware 
 of his approaching dissolution, was forced to 
 passively witness the transformation of the 
 political creeds he so tenaciously clung to. 
 
 The visit of the Russian Grand Duke Con- 
 stantine, and that of King Frederick William 
 of Prussia, during the month of March, bring- 
 ing with them assurances that peace would not 
 be disturbed, did not tranquillize the King, 
 who fully appreciated the significance of the 
 preparations so actively carried on within 
 the dominions of his cousin of Savoy. And 
 indeed the optimism of his royal guests was 
 rudely shattered before they had shaken the 
 Neapolitan dust from off their shoes. On 
 April sixteenth the Austrian ultimatum calling 
 upon Piedmont to disarm furnished the long- 
 awaited pretext, and its indignant refusal ten 
 
 days later swept the scheme for a Congress, as 
 8
 
 114 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 proposed by Kussia, into the limbo of diplo- 
 matic absurdities. The military revolution at 
 Florence of April 27th, resulted in the ignomin- 
 ious flight of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 
 and the establishment of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment of Ricasoli. Almost simultaneously the 
 Duchies of Parma and Modena freed themselves 
 of their rulers ; the Papal Legate retired from 
 Bologna ; and the first successes of the French 
 and Sardinian allies gave rise to the wildest 
 exultation amongst the Liberals of Naples in 
 the very face of the police, who, dazed and 
 almost paralyzed by the rapidly shifting events 
 enacted in Upper Italy, seemed utterly inade- 
 quate to cope with the added responsibilities thus 
 bewilderingly thrust upon them. 
 
 Meanwhile in the great Palace of Caserta 
 the long-drawn agony of the Sovereign was 
 nearing its fatal termination. The various 
 doctors called to relieve the sufferings of the 
 distracted Ferdinand were powerless to arrest 
 the progress of general decay. The purulent 
 corruption had infected the entire organism of 
 the patient, relentlessly invading external and in- 
 ternal organs : the lungs became congested, and 
 horrible sores broke out on various parts of the 
 body. Every breath was agony : every move- 
 ment an indescribable torture. An operation 
 afforded temporary relief, but confirmed the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 115 
 
 diagnosis, and convinced the physicians that 
 all hope must be abandoned. The King spent 
 much of his time in prayer : Maria Theresa, 
 his faithful Consort, on her knees at his bed- 
 side. Continual recourse was had to so-called 
 miracle-working remedies ; and as at Bari the 
 royal bedchamber was littered with all the 
 accessories of superstitious devotion ; relics, 
 images of the Saints and Madonna, holy waters, 
 or the fantastic preparations of ecclesiastic 
 quacks. Although the King had lost all con- 
 fidence in the power of doctors to aid him, 
 he turned with simple faith to each new image, 
 each holy relic, or miraculous picture, for the 
 consolation denied him by human science. 
 Although the condition of the King was an 
 open secret in Naples, the doctors issued no 
 bulletin until April 12th, in deference to the de- 
 sire of the Queen, who feared the effect the 
 alarming news might have upon the hostile 
 political elements in the Kingdom. The ad- 
 ministration of the last rites of the Church on 
 this day made further concealment of the pa- 
 tient's desperate condition impossible. In sign 
 of sympathy the theatres were ordered to close 
 their doors, public entertainments of all sorts 
 being forbidden. 
 
 These last weeks of suffering and anxiety 
 furnish us with a side view of the character of
 
 116 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the extraordinary man who for twenty-nine 
 years swayed the destinies of the Kingdom of 
 the Two Sicilies. The tyrant whose will alone 
 governed eleven millions of his subjects ; the 
 despot who had unhesitatingly condemned hun- 
 dreds of the brightest intellects of his realm to 
 death, and worse than death, now showed a touch- 
 ing consideration for those who attended him in 
 his hour of need. The suspicion that the point 
 of the bayonet with which he had been wounded 
 by Milano was poisoned, had never been eradi- 
 cated from Ferdinand's mind. Shortly before 
 his death he inquired of his surgeon, Capone, 
 if there were any suppuration from the scar 
 of the old wound, on which, since the attempted 
 assassination, he had always worn a little stone 
 supposed to possess miraculous qualities. Ca- 
 pone having examined the scar, assured the 
 King that the wound was completely healed, 
 and at the same time gave vent to bitter vitu- 
 peration of the would-be regicide. Ferdinand 
 gently rebuked this outburst, saying: "I 
 called you to examine the wound, not to judge 
 the crime. God has judged that ; and I have 
 pardoned it ; so that is enough/' Yet this 
 apparent softening was attended by no cor- 
 responding leniency or faltering in the political 
 course he had so relentlessly pursued. Cruel 
 and barbarous this had undoubtedly been ; but
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 117 
 
 if his policy was shortsighted and bigoted, it 
 was at least consistent. Personal ambitions he 
 had none ; although his assumption of the ex- 
 clusive control of matters of State is liable to 
 be construed as such. Nevertheless his aspira- 
 tions aimed no higher than handing to his suc- 
 cessor the integral inheritance which had been 
 his. He is asserted to have claimed, only a few 
 days before his death, that the Crown of Italy 
 might have been his, could he have reconciled 
 his conscience to the necessary spoliation of the 
 various Italian Sovereigns. This it may be per- 
 mitted to doubt ; but the fact remains that ter- 
 ritorial aggrandizement had no place in his polit- 
 ical programme. When, on November 8, 1830, 
 he had succeeded his father, Francis I., his first 
 official proclamation savored of an aspersion on 
 the policy of the late government. " We do not 
 deny," he said, " the existence of profound evils 
 which merit redress, and that our people look to 
 us for the alleviation of the burdens which a 
 troublous past has placed upon them." The 
 next day his brother, the Count of Syracuse, 
 was appointed Viceroy of Sicily, and the Mar- 
 quis delle Favare, whose cruel administration 
 had driven the islanders to desperation, was 
 given twenty-four hours' notice to quit. This 
 action, taken in conjunction with his own past 
 record, and the reform of certain administra-
 
 118 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tive abuses which had long oppressed his sub- 
 jects, contributed to excite the wildest enthu- 
 siasm and most ardent expectations. But those 
 who founded their hopes on the liberal effusions 
 of his irresponsible youth were doomed to 
 speedy disappointment once the reins of govern- 
 ment were well within his grasp. The few 
 half-hearted reforms granted in the first flush 
 of accession to power had, however, merely 
 whetted the appetites of the Liberals greedy 
 for more extended franchise, and Ferdinand 
 soon realized that this path must inevitably 
 lead not only to a very considerable infringe- 
 ment of the Absolutism dear to his Bourbon 
 soul, but also to the open antagonism of Aus- 
 tria, and, be it noted, the disapproval of the 
 King of Sardinia. Thus began the lifelong 
 struggle with the principles with which as Heir 
 to the Throne he had felt some latent sympathy, 
 but for which, as the love of power increased 
 with age, he conceived a loathing which blinded 
 him to any true appreciation of the spirit of 
 the times in which he lived, and wrecked the 
 political fabric he had counted on a quasi- 
 Chinese isolation to preserve. 
 
 This much can be said in extenuation of the 
 political excesses of which he was guilty. Of 
 the charge of infamous perjury ; and the ini- 
 quitous juggling with the sacred vested rights
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 119 
 
 of his people, nothing can absolve him. The 
 utter disregard of all humanitarian obligations 
 is equalled, if not surpassed, by the ferocious 
 treatment of the patriots of the Italian provinces 
 under Austrian rule ; but martyrs of the Spiel- 
 berg revolted against a power which, if oppres- 
 sive, was at least legally instituted, while the 
 crime attributed to their unhappy brethren of 
 Naples was, subsequent to the concessions of 
 1848, passionate adherence to the Chart which 
 had been freely granted them under sacred 
 oath, and of the privileges of which, through 
 no fault of their own, they had been treach- 
 erously deprived. The sequel to the events of 
 the fifteenth of May, 1848, must for all time 
 brand Ferdinand the Second of Naples a per- 
 jured King, and a traitor to the liberties he 
 had of his own free will (as he explicitly stated 
 in his proclamation announcing the Constitu- 
 tion) accorded his subjects. No satisfactory 
 explanation, no valid claim of expediency, can 
 be brought forward in extenuation of the accu- 
 sation of deliberate and conscious fraud. 
 
 On his death-bed Ferdinand, when recom- 
 mending his soul to his Creator, added, that 
 he craved the pardon of his subjects, both as 
 Sovereign and as a man, for his wrongs towards 
 them. When taken in conjunction with his 
 final admonition to his son to change nothing
 
 120 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 in the policy he had himself pursued, the words 
 quoted can hardly be construed as an expres- 
 sion of regret for the political course so persist- 
 ingly and relentlessly pursued. 
 
 Surrounded by his family, attended to the 
 last by the faithful Maria Theresa, whose con- 
 stant devotion during the many weeks of sick- 
 ness is beyond all praise, Ferdinand passed 
 away a little after midday on the twenty-second 
 of May, 1859.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Expectations of a change of policy. Events in Northern Italy. 
 Their influences on Naples. Accession of Francis II. 
 Ferdinand's second marriage. Education of Francis. Life 
 at the Neapolitan Court during his youth. His character 
 and early training. The religious influences. Want of 
 political training. The " Camarilla " ; its composition and 
 objects. Influence of the Queen-Mother. The Count of 
 Syracuse. His surroundings and political ambitions. 
 Palace intrigues. Conspiracy in favor of Count of Trani. 
 
 WITH the death of Ferdinand an alleviation 
 of many of the vexatious and antiquated forms 
 of administration was confidently looked for ; 
 while it was further anticipated by the more 
 sanguine that reforms more in accord with the 
 altered conditions of political life throughout 
 Italy, and the exigencies of international public 
 opinion, would be granted. 
 
 A great cry of relief and yearning expectation 
 went up from the exiles in Florence, Turin, 
 Genoa, Paris, and London. Hope, long crushed 
 and oft deferred, sprang up anew in the breasts 
 of those who had suffered weary years of banish- 
 ment and poverty. Even the most ferocious 
 revolutionists, the Irredentists themselves, 
 paused awhile to see what use the new King 
 121
 
 122 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 would make of his power. The opportunity 
 was a golden one : who can say, had it been 
 intelligently employed, what the consequences 
 might have been ! Those personally acquainted 
 with the young Sovereign did not, however, 
 entertain illusions concerning the cessation of 
 political abuses ; much less credit the rumors 
 of imminent or radical reforms. The immense 
 influence of the Queen-Mother, together with 
 the opposition and jealousies of what was known 
 as the " Camarilla," or Court reactionary clique, 
 forbade optimistic surmises. 
 
 The last moments of the dying Despot had 
 been embittered by the news from .northern 
 Italy. Ferdinand lived just long enough to 
 know of the success of the allied armies of 
 France and Sardinia against the Austrians at 
 Montebello, while he looked in vain for signs 
 of the anticipated intercession of Russia and 
 Prussia. That Ferdinand realized the grave 
 significance of the political events of the last 
 few months of his life none can doubt. But 
 that he considered them of a nature to imperil 
 his Dynasty seems improbable from the fact 
 that his political instructions to his heir con- 
 tained no suggestions for a modification of the 
 system of political apathy which was hurrying 
 the Crown to destruction. There was time, 
 even now, to arrest the disintegration : and had
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 123 
 
 Ferdinand urged the alliance with Sardinia it 
 is conceivable that his son would have respected 
 his counsels and done his utmost to secure the 
 goodwill of an already powerful neighbor, in 
 spite of the emphatic disapprobation of Pius IX. 
 As has been intimated, however, Ferdinand 
 trusted more to the geographical conformation 
 of his country, and to the buffer afforded by 
 the Papal State to the north, than to shifting 
 political alliances. In spite of the experiences 
 of 1848, when he had entertained the fugitive 
 Pope at Gaeta, the possibility of this protective 
 buffer-State being removed seemed to him as 
 inconceivable as that the sea which surrounded 
 the other portions of his realm should evapo- 
 rate. 
 
 Francis the Second, born on January six- 
 teenth, 1836, was just over twenty-three years 
 of age when he succeeded his father. His 
 mother, Queen Maria Christina, a Princess of 
 the House of Savoy, had, during her short 
 career, made herself generally revered and be- 
 loved. The " Saint," as she was styled by the 
 impressionable Neapolitans, did not live to 
 watch over and guide her son. Barely a fort- 
 night after his birth she died, never having 
 recovered, it is said, from the effects of a brutal 
 jest of her husband, who pulled a chair from 
 under her shortly before her confinement.
 
 124 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 After nine months of widowhood Ferdinand 
 had given his subjects a new Queen of a very 
 different stamp in the person of Maria Theresa 
 of Austria, who, for reasons rather political 
 than personal, he had preferred to the Princess 
 Maria Christina of France, a daughter of Louis 
 Philippe, for whose hand he had also been in 
 treaty. Diametrically the opposite of the 
 lamented "Saint" in disposition, character 
 and physique, Maria Theresa, although pos- 
 sessing such sterling qualities as courage and 
 determination, very speedily became an object 
 of distrust and aversion to the subjects she 
 ruled over. Of an intensely jealous tempera- 
 ment, descending even with her petty sus- 
 picions to those employed in menial positions 
 in her bedchamber and household, she elimi- 
 nated all social element from her husband's 
 Court. With the aspiration to govern she 
 rapidly acquired great authority and influence 
 over her husband, while she completely domi- 
 nated her step-son, who never freed himself 
 from this baneful subjection. To her jealous- 
 ies and machinations, rather than to any 
 organic sloth of intellect, can be traced the 
 deplorable lack of education, and total absence 
 of political preparation for the duties he must 
 one day assume, which proved so disastrous to 
 his reign. During Ferdinand's lifetime, and
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 125 
 
 even after Francis had ascended the throne, 
 she constantly conspired against him in favor 
 of her own son, Louis ; yet so skilfully were 
 her intrigues woven, and so complete was her 
 ascendency over the insipid Francis, that she 
 retained her influence to the very end. In- 
 tensely superstitious and bigoted she was in- 
 strumental in greatly increasing the power and 
 despotism of the Clergy, to whose bishops were 
 conceded attributes usually allotted to the 
 police. 
 
 Life at the Court of Naples since Francis 
 had been of an age to participate in it had been 
 neither brilliant nor diverting. After 1848, 
 and especially after the attempted assassination 
 by Milano, the Court had resided as little as 
 possible in Naples. The palace of Caserta was 
 the favorite residence of Ferdinand and his 
 family, although annual visits were made to 
 Gaeta, especially during the summer months. 
 Once out of Naples, the family life differed 
 very little from that of any well-to-do Italian 
 household. The King hated pomp and cere- 
 mony of all kinds, and infinitely preferred the 
 quiet domestic circle. All this had been very 
 different in the early years of his married life ; 
 but the anxious and painful experiences of 1848 
 would seem to have cast a gloom over his whole 
 nature. In place of the pleasures or distrac-
 
 126 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tions of a Court which possessed all the ele- 
 ments for social brilliancy, there was gradually 
 developed that intense absorption in State busi- 
 ness, to its minutest details, which formed one 
 of the most curious characteristics of this re- 
 markable man. Strange to say, Ferdinand at 
 no time seemed to recognize the expediency 
 of initiating his son into the mysteries of per- 
 sonal government. As has been said, the edu- 
 cation which Francis received was conspicu- 
 ously insufficient and elementary at a Court 
 where learning, or even the ordinary accom- 
 plishments or pursuits of a gentleman were 
 held in disdain. Not only was the heir to the 
 Throne left with a mind absolutely unculti- 
 vated, and unprepared for the onerous duties 
 and responsibilities of his position, but he was 
 not even made proficient in the sports or pas- 
 times of royalty. Ferdinand's own education 
 had been extremely imperfect ; but he was by 
 nature endowed with a hard common-sense ; a 
 shrewd knowledge of men; a prodigious memory; 
 and above all a dose of self-assurance sufficient to 
 compensate in no small degree for the absence 
 of ordinary book-learning. Surrounded, by 
 preference, with men of very ordinary mental 
 attainments, his natural brilliancy, combined 
 with a certain essentially Neapolitan "esprit," 
 made his educational shortcomings the less
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 127 
 
 observable. He expressed himself most easily 
 in the Neapolitan dialect, as also in the Sicil- 
 ian idiom ; but his Italian was pure, if not 
 eloquent, while his French was fluent and 
 graceful. In Ferdinand, the king and the man 
 were widely separated and distinct. If as a 
 Sovereign little can be advanced in his favor, 
 as a man, as a husband, and as a father, no 
 criticism would be justifiable. Seated at his 
 family table, loaded with the maccheroni and 
 plebeian national dishes, the predilection for 
 which he shared with the meanest of his sub- 
 jects, the dreaded Monarch appeared the most 
 benign and guileless of men. The family circle 
 was a large one, for Maria Theresa had had 
 nine children of her own, and the visits of re- 
 lations from Tuscany or Austria were frequent. 
 Each child had its diminutive, or pet name, 
 and by such was invariably addressed by the 
 King. A not uncommon sight in the environs 
 of Caserta was a huge wagonette, driven by the 
 King himself, and filled with children of all 
 ages. 
 
 If the lay-education which Francis received 
 was meagre, it may be added that his religious 
 instruction could have fitted him for the priest- 
 hood. Exceedingly timid and retiring by 
 nature, the conditions prevailing at his father's 
 Court, and especially the treatment he received
 
 128 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 at the hands of his stepmother, were not calcu- 
 lated to inspire self-assurance. Dominated by 
 his social surroundings, he became the more 
 readily subjected to fanatical religious influ- 
 ences. Unfortunately religion was synonymous 
 with superstition of the most gross and degrad- 
 ing character at the Neapolitan Court. One 
 of the principal duties of the troops garrisoned 
 in Naples was to swell the constant religious 
 processions to the various miracle-working 
 shrines for miles around the capital : which 
 functions were devoutly attended by the King 
 and his household. Ferdinand had caused the 
 church bells to be melted down for cannon in 
 1848 : ten years later the defences of the country 
 were remodelled for ecclesiastical purposes. Yet 
 in spite of the most minute observance of trivial 
 rites, and notwithstanding the haunting super- 
 stitions to which he was a prey, Ferdinand never 
 permitted the increased political power of the 
 prelates, whose hands he reverently kissed, to 
 degenerate into license. He was the Master : 
 and although advantage might be taken of his 
 subjects by those he placed in authority over 
 them, he personally insisted on implicit obe- 
 dience and subservience in matters clerical as 
 well as secular. Even his dealings with the 
 Pope were conducted on a strictly business 
 basis, and no favor shown. While this was
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 129 
 
 possible to a nature which combined strength 
 of will and obstinacy of purpose, with craft, 
 and no mean intelligence, it stood to reason 
 that the yielding, vacillating and unformed 
 character of his son must be as wax to the 
 influences which surrounded him. And so it 
 was, for after his father's death we find Francis 
 ever the dupe and tool of interested and unscru- 
 pulous advisers ; swayed this way and that by 
 the conflicting factions in Palace or Council 
 Chamber : to-day completely dominated by the 
 Queen Mother ; to-morrow convinced by the 
 persuasive arguments of Liborio Komano ; only 
 to hark back again to the obsolete pretensions of 
 the " Camarilla." The antithesis of his father, 
 Francis had not even " les qualites de sea de- 
 fauts " to redeem him from insignificance. 
 Like Charles the First of England and Louis 
 XVI. of France, it is by virtue of his misfortunes 
 that he will live in history. His tutors in child- 
 hood were General Ferrari and Admiral Spina, 
 the latter sleeping in the Prince's room, and 
 being charged with the supervision of the most 
 trivial occupations of his daily existence. 
 With the exception of the religious works, to 
 which his reading was confined, his instruction, 
 such as it was, was carried on by word of mouth, 
 history being so purged that accounts of revolu- 
 tions, or constitutional liberties, might not 
 9
 
 130 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 disturb his mind, these being represented to 
 him as condemned by the Church. Later we 
 shall find him gravely warning his erring sub- 
 jects that revolt against his authority consti- 
 tutes revolt against God, and consequently 
 entails eternal damnation. Yet when driven 
 to bay at Gaeta we shall have to record acts 
 closely allied to heroism ; followed by a dignified 
 resignation in adversity, which demands our 
 respectful sympathy. The Duke of Sperlinga, 
 a Sicilian nobleman, cites a dialogue which may 
 be taken as illustrative of the theories instilled 
 into the mind of the youthful Prince. Standing 
 beside Ferdinand one fete-day and looking into 
 the great square before the Palace thronged 
 with pleasure-seekers, Francis asked his father : 
 " What can the King do with all these people ? " 
 To which the King made answer : " He has the 
 right to cut their heads off ; but he doesn't do 
 it out of respect for our holy Religion." 
 
 Another anecdote descriptive of the fatalism, 
 or mystical resignation of the young King is 
 related by "Memor." During a conference 
 with the director of the Ministry of Finance, 
 De Liguro, the accidental trembling of the table 
 at which they were seated was immediately 
 interpreted by the King as an omen that his 
 reign would be short. De Liguro remonstrated 
 with his sovereign for allowing such thoughts
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 131 
 
 to haunt his mind ; but Francis sadly replied : 
 " Dear Sir ; I hold neither to my life, nor to 
 my throne, because I remember what is written : 
 ' Dominus dedit, Dominus abstulit/ and I say : 
 God gives, God takes away." 
 
 By the " Camarilla/' of which mention has 
 been made, is understood that party in the 
 Court circle which professed the principles of a 
 pure Absolutism, and was consequently irrecon- 
 cilable to any concessions of a liberal or consti- 
 tutional nature. The Queen Mother was con- 
 spicuously the leader of this faction, whose 
 influence with the new King was not unnaturally 
 preponderant, for to its doctrines most of the 
 members of the royal family also adhered. A 
 notable exception was the Count of Syracuse, 
 Francis' uncle, who was, and had for some time 
 been, in open sympathy with the Liberals, and 
 the Nationalist cause. It is certain that when 
 the Count first advised his nephew concerning 
 the expediency of political concessions, urgently 
 demanded by his subjects, and counselled an 
 alliance with Piedmont, his conviction in regard 
 to Liberalism and Nationalism went no further 
 than Louis Napoleon's " Italy for the Italians," 
 and embraced no scheme for national unity. 
 In a note dated May 11, 1859, and conse- 
 quently before Ferdinand's death, Count 
 Gropello, Charge^ d' Affaires of the Sardinian
 
 132 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Legation at Naples, advised his Government 
 that the King's brother was in favor of such 
 an alliance for the purpose of freeing Italy 
 from foreign rule. Cavour at this period 
 strongly advocated such a course, fully appre- 
 ciating the advisability of the two greatest Ital- 
 ian powers being at one on this point. His 
 agents therefore had special instructions to 
 cultivate intimate relations with the Count of 
 Syracuse, and through this Prince attempt to 
 influence the King. The house of the Count of 
 Syracuse was notoriously the political " rendez- 
 vous" of men of professed Liberal tendencies ; 
 and as such was closely watched by the police. 
 Ferdinand called his brother's salon "the 
 antechamber of Hell," in allusion not only to 
 the political plots hatched therein, but also to 
 the not always strictly immaculate moral 
 character of its frequenters. As a matter of 
 fact it was one of the rare Neapolitan houses 
 where artists and literary men were received on 
 their intellectual merits ; and where diplomatic 
 representatives of foreign powers congregated 
 for the interchange of the political news of the 
 day. By rabid advocates of the Bourbon 
 regime the Count of Syracuse has been termed 
 a traitor to his family ; an accusation substan- 
 tiated in the minds of many by his subsequent 
 conduct. Yet prior to Garibaldi's Sicilian
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 133 
 
 incursion, the Count certainly nourished no 
 more extended projects of reform than those 
 which have been already mentioned. That he 
 should be hated and distrusted at Court was 
 not to be wondered at : nor can we feel surprise 
 that Maria Theresa should have done all in her 
 power to destroy his influence with his nephew, 
 and to poison the King's mind, through the 
 medium of his confessor, with insinuations that 
 the Count aspired to the Regency. In reality 
 his supposed influence amounted to little or 
 nothing with Francis, although owing to his 
 high position at Court, and to his noted 
 sympathies, he was appealed to, flattered and 
 cajoled, by those who possessed the confi- 
 dence of the steadily growing party whose polit- 
 ical convictions he was understood to share. 
 Thus he became a very monster of iniquity in 
 the eyes of the " Camarilla/' w'ho poured out 
 upon him the vials of their wrath ; branding 
 him traitor, and tracing to his machinations 
 the downfall of the old order. This odium he 
 shared later with his brother, the Count of 
 Aquila, who was subsequently banished by 
 Francis for lending countenance to an adminis- 
 trative transaction, open to the interpretation 
 of treason ; but banished with such tender 
 solicitude for public opinion, that his disgrace 
 was adroitly concealed beneath the intimation
 
 134 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 of the advisability of his acceptance of an 
 important political mission abroad. 
 
 Nor was the Palace itself free from intrigues 
 to dispossess the unfortunate Francis, and 
 place his half-brother, the Count of Trani, 
 upon the Throne. Such a plan was currently 
 reported to have received the sanction of Maria 
 Theresa ; and one or two insignificant demon- 
 strations in favor of her own son actually took 
 place in the province of Bari. Certain incrim- 
 inating documents are said, by " Memor," to 
 have been brought to the notice of the King 
 by Filangieri. Francis, however, on being in- 
 formed of the nature of the accusation, threw 
 the papers unopened into the fire, exclaiming 
 with touching simplicity to his Minister : 
 " She is the wife of my father/' Be this as it 
 may, there is no trustworthy evidence of the 
 direct participation of the Queen Mother in 
 any of these intrigues, which may be safely 
 attributed to the over-zealous adherents of the 
 " Camarilla." Nevertheless such incidents, 
 proving as they did the existence of a spirit of 
 rebellion against his authority amongst those 
 to whom he would most naturally turn for sup- 
 port, could not but increase the suspicious 
 timidity and constitutional lack of self-confi- 
 dence of the young King.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 An envoy from Turin. Proposals for alliance between Naples 
 and Piedmont. French and English diplomatic relations 
 are resumed. Royal proclamation eulogizing Ferdinand 
 Filangieri at the head of the Government. His previous 
 career. Political problems confronting him. Count Sal- 
 mour's mission. Opposition to alliance. Mazzini's 
 schemes. Action of Swiss Government. Revolt of Swiss 
 Guard. Massacre of same. Swiss regiments disbanded. 
 Kossuth on situation in Naples. Court functions and eti- 
 quette. Abstention of aristocracy. Their sympathies for 
 Murat. 
 
 THE accession of Francis II. furnished the 
 pretext for the despatch, in accordance with 
 the usages of diplomatic courtesy, of a special 
 Ambassador from Turin, who, while he carried 
 the official condolences of his Sovereign for the 
 recent bereavement of the Neapolitan Court, 
 was in addition charged by Cavour to improve 
 the opportunity afforded for a mutual political 
 understanding. Count Salmon r's confidential 
 instructions leave no doubt as to the nature of 
 Cavour's preoccupations at this date. " There 
 are sound arguments/' he writes on May 27, 
 1859, " for the belief that in undertaking the 
 war for Italian independence Napoleon III. 
 entertains no dynastic ambitions ; if, however, 
 135
 
 136 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 with the progress of events, such were to be 
 developed, an alliance between the two Italian 
 Powers would be useful as a check." Cavour 
 then proceeds to state that the Sardinian Gov- 
 ernment would be disposed to go to the length 
 of a compact, reciprocally guaranteeing the 
 inviolability of the territories of the two realms, 
 in the form of an offensive and defensive al- 
 liance. At the same time he urges the neces- 
 sity of inaugurating the new reign with broad 
 and liberal reforms, which, together with the 
 prestige acquired by a league with Piedmont, 
 could not fail to bear good fruit at home and 
 abroad. 
 
 England and France had also resumed diplo- 
 matic relations with Naples on the death of 
 Ferdinand, and their representatives bore in- 
 structions which, although the ends to be 
 served were necessarily divergent, coincided 
 in the main with the views entertained by 
 Sardinia, and laid stress on the advisability of 
 a radical departure from the system of govern- 
 ment so persistently adhered to by the young 
 King's predecessor. The British Cabinet, 
 which looked with distrust on the ascendency 
 of French influence brought about by the suc- 
 cess of the Franco-Sardinian arms, was inclined 
 to favor the preservation of the Bourbon Dyn- 
 asty, provided such support be rendered con-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 137 
 
 sistent with the nation's unvarying attitude as 
 the advocate of Constitutional liberties. Russia 
 and Prussia viewed with alarm the eventual 
 destruction of the treaties of 1815, and the 
 dangers of Napoleonic supremacy in the Penin- 
 sula, should the upholders of Murat be trium- 
 phant. Napoleon III. himself, realizing that 
 the sentiment of Europe must be against him 
 in such an attempt to emulate the Imperialism 
 of his uncle, and desirous of preserving the 
 confidence of England, instructed his Minister 
 at Naples to join his diplomatic colleagues in 
 urging Francis to recognize the altered condi- 
 tions of the political arena, by spontaneously 
 granting his subjects the desired reforms. 
 Such an understanding was, however, su- 
 premely distasteful to the advanced Liberals, 
 who looked to National Unity, and to that 
 alone, for the alleviation of the existing evils 
 in the Peninsula. Nor was such a solution 
 any more acceptable to the Republicans of 
 whom Mazzini was then still the revered and 
 magnetic leader. 
 
 Glancing at the political situation in Europe 
 at this moment (May and June, 1859), it seems 
 incredible that Francis and his advisers 
 should have hesitated to adopt a course so 
 patently indicated for the preservation of the 
 Throne. Yet Francis hastened his fate with
 
 138 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the committal of an initial error which could 
 but alienate the sympathies of well-wishers, 
 and destroy the prospects of substantial sup- 
 port either at home or abroad. 
 
 In a proclamation issued almost immediately 
 after the funeral ceremonies, the young King 
 lauded to the skies the political and admin- 
 istrative wisdom of his father, "that great 
 and pious Monarch whose virtues could never 
 be sufficiently extolled," and gave it to be 
 clearly understood that no modifications, in a 
 Liberal sense, would be made in the line of 
 policy hitherto pursued. It is claimed by 
 apologists of the Bourbon Dynasty, that Francis 
 had indeed contemplated a different pro- 
 gramme, and that he actually laid before his 
 Ministers on the occasion of their first meeting 
 the draft of a proclamation providing for the 
 convocation of the electoral colleges ; the 
 special conditions under which his august 
 father had deemed it advisable to suspend the 
 Constitution having, in his estimation, now 
 ceased to exist. Francis is represented, by 
 these same apologists, as reluctantly yielding 
 such personal inclinations " to the wider expe- 
 rience in affairs of State " possessed by his ad- 
 visers, to whom such a course was distasteful, 
 as involving the disapproval of Austria. There 
 is no valid historical authority for such asser-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 139 
 
 lions, which are, moreover, totally at variance 
 with the irresolute and timid character of the 
 young Sovereign. 
 
 Acting on the advice of his father, Francis, 
 after some hesitation, and the temporary em- 
 ployment of Troja as chief of the Government, 
 called to his councils the aged General Filan- 
 gieri, Prince of Satriano. The advantages of 
 a wide experience were certainly not lacking 
 to the hoary old soldier, when, at the age of 
 seventy-five, he undertook the guidance of the 
 destinies of a discredited and tottering Dynasty, 
 surrounded by enemies and undermined by dis- 
 sensions affecting its very vitals. Filangieri 
 had fought at Austerlitz, and upon the glorious 
 fields of France, Italy and Spain ; had served 
 Joseph Bonaparte in Naples and in Spain ; had 
 been aide-de-camp to Murat, and a representa- 
 tive of his diplomacy. To him Ferdinand owed 
 the reconquest of Sicily in 1849 : a task he 
 had undertaken with considerable reluctance. 
 Thoroughly imbued with the spirit of progress ; 
 a modern, in his political convictions and sym- 
 pathies, he was, nevertheless, devoted to the 
 Bourbons, and loyal to his oath a soldier's 
 oath, untainted by partisanship. Unfortu- 
 nately Filangieri found himself surrounded by 
 colleagues in office whose influence over the 
 King completely paralyzed the vigorous initia-
 
 140 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tive he realized as imperative to avert a catas- 
 trophe. Hampered on all sides by the jealous 
 bureaucracy of the military and civil adminis- 
 trations, which resented any interference with 
 abuses which had with long immunity come to 
 be considered as privileges ; openly antagonized 
 by the Court party, headed by the Queen 
 Mother ; and without possessing the real con- 
 fidence of the King ; it is hardly surprising 
 that his efforts proved powerless to cope with 
 the complicated, and extremely grave, politi- 
 cal problems demanding prompt solution. He 
 did indeed induce Francis to condone the sen- 
 tences of a few of the political martyrs who 
 had not been included in the decrees of Decem- 
 ber 27, 1858, and March 18, 1859 ; but they 
 were immediately pestered by such unbearable 
 restrictions and vexations that a voluntary exile 
 alone remained possible. 
 
 Writing a few months later (March 17, 
 1860), Lord Malmesbury, in his " Memoirs of 
 an Ex-Minister," says : " Naples is in a dread- 
 ful state. The tyranny of the present King far 
 exceeds that of his father, and the exaspera- 
 tion is so great that a revolution may take place 
 at any moment. But events in the north of 
 Italy have much to say to these feelings, and 
 naturally encourage the Neapolitans to imitate 
 them."
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 141 
 
 Filangieri had from the outset realized the 
 vast importance of the events taking place in 
 the north, and was prepared to neutralize their 
 consequences by concessions calculated to make 
 comparisons between the two Governments less 
 invidious. Consequently he would gladly have 
 seen his Sovereign lay aside the injurious adhe- 
 rence to his father's system of isolation, and 
 frankly accept the proffered friendship of Pied- 
 mont. The importance attached to Count 
 Salmour's mission, and the sympathies of his 
 subjects therewith, had been very clearly dem- 
 onstrated to Francis through the public recep- 
 tion offered the Sardinian Envoy on his arrival 
 at Naples. On the evening of his advent many 
 thousands of cards were left at his hotel, while 
 the enthusiasm of the crowds which thronged 
 the adjacent thoroughfares broke all bounds 
 in its wild exultation. Several arrests were 
 made, but the weakness and indecision of the 
 Government were manifest. Count Salmour's 
 official reception was courteous, but every effort 
 was made to deprive it of the significance attrib- 
 uted to it by the public. In order to avoid a 
 monster demonstration, said to be in prepara- 
 tion, to greet the diplomat on the occasion of 
 his visit of ceremony to the Palace of Capodi- 
 monte, Francis decided to meet his guest in 
 Naples. Filangieri and Francis himself were
 
 142 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 deeply impressed by the proposals formulated 
 by the Sardinian Envoy. Palestro and Magenta 
 (June 4), which latter battle liberated Lom- 
 bardy, had considerably shaken the confidence 
 professed by the Neapolitan Court as to the 
 ultimate success of the arms of the Dual Mon- 
 archy, and Francis showed signs of wavering. 
 The news of the victory of Magenta had called 
 forth an imposing demonstration at Naples, 
 and undoubtedly suggested the substitution of 
 Filangieri for Troja in the direction of affairs ; 
 which substitution might well be considered in 
 the light of a concession. With the arrival of 
 Count Salmour and the knowledge of his fre- 
 quent colloquies with General Filangieri, the 
 rumor spread that the alliance was practically 
 decided upon. To defeat this end one of the 
 strangest, most incongruous, and withal uncon- 
 scious, coalitions of history was forced into 
 existence. Fighting for diametrically conflict- 
 ing ends, both parties united with the sole 
 object of rendering impossible the conclusion 
 of the obnoxious alliance. On the one hand 
 the Queen Mother, the Princes of the Blood, 
 the Court party and the powerful " Camarilla/' 
 contending for the principles of Absolutism, 
 and an alliance with Austria ; on the other the 
 Unionists at all costs, who saw in the projected 
 alliance the ruin, or at least the indefinite
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 143 
 
 postponement, of their cherished hopes. By 
 the former irresistible pressure was brought to 
 bear on the unhappy Francis, whose character- 
 istic vacillation and suspicious timidity made 
 him an easy prey, and who, thoroughly terri- 
 fied by the dread consequences conjured up by 
 the " Camarilla," allowed the golden oppor- 
 tunity to slip through his fingers. By the 
 Unionists, and the whole swarm of revolution- 
 ary exiles congregated at Turin, Cavour was 
 overwhelmed with bitter denunciation for the 
 attempted abandonment of a policy they had 
 been led to believe he vigorously advocated. 
 
 Before war had broken out between the 
 Franco-Sardinian allies and Austria, and while 
 European diplomacy was still frantically striv- 
 ing to avert the threatened crisis, Lord Lof tus, 
 Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, in an in- 
 terview with M. de Buol, had endeavored to 
 persuade the Minister of the paramount neces- 
 sity for the cessation of intervention in the 
 affairs of such Italian States as were not under 
 the political control of Austria an interven- 
 tion which could only encourage warlike sen- 
 timent and revolutionary intrigues. To all 
 such arguments Count de Buol emphatically 
 replied : " Do you suppose, my lord, that the 
 option of peace or war is in the hands of the vari- 
 ous Governments ? It is in the hands of the
 
 144 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Mazzinians, in the nets of whom England her- 
 self is taken ; without knowing it, she is play- 
 ing the game of the revolutionary party." 
 
 How far this was literally true it is impossible 
 to say ; certain it is, however, that in the pres- 
 ent instance the Mazzinians, in conjunction 
 with the Liberals, were able to secure the co- 
 operation of one neutral State to the limited 
 extent deemed necessary for the furtherance 
 of their objects ; a co-operation perfectly legit- 
 imate, however, and in absolute harmony with 
 the Liberalist theories officially in practice 
 within its territory. Yielding to the represen- 
 tations of the revolutionary commission which 
 had been despatched to Berne, the Swiss Con- 
 federation requested of the Neapolitan Govern- 
 ment that the title of Swiss Guards be with- 
 drawn from the mercenary regiments in its 
 pay ; at the same time forbidding the further 
 use of the Cantonal arms which had ornamented 
 their banners since 1829. Major Latour, who 
 was sent from Switzerland with these instruc- 
 tions, received the moral support, not only of the 
 French and English Ministers at Naples, but 
 also the native officers, who looked on the exist- 
 ence of the privileged Swiss regiments as a slur 
 put upon their loyalty and valor. The mer- 
 cenaries were readily persuaded by interested 
 parties that the decision of the Confederation
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 145 
 
 implied, not only the loss of their ancient priv- 
 ileges, but even the forfeiture of their rights 
 as citizens of the Kepublic. 
 
 This proved a sufficient incentive for insur- 
 rection. On the evening of June seventh, a 
 company of the Second Regiment (there were 
 four in all) mutinied, and reinforced by their 
 infuriated comrades in the various barracks, 
 seized their banners, and killing or wounding 
 such of their officers as attempted to impede 
 or restrain them, marched forth with beating 
 drums and wild cries towards the Palace of 
 Capodimonte. The noisy charge in the semi- 
 darkness through the silent streets, accom- 
 panied by reports of guns fired at random, and 
 the din of hoarse voices vociferating in an un- 
 known tongue, struck terror into the souls of 
 the Neapolitans, who but vaguely realized that 
 a military revolt was in progress. Burners of 
 the disturbance were carried to the Palace, but 
 it was only when the mutineers reached the 
 gates that the full import of the insurrection 
 was understood. The portals were hastily 
 closed, while Rear- Admiral Del Re, who was in 
 command of the scant guard, prepared for the 
 defence. Although it was about midnight the 
 mutineers demanded to see the King, and in- 
 sisted that their nationality as well as the pres- 
 ervation of the Cantonal arms on their banners
 
 146 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 be guaranteed them. The terror and confu- 
 sion in the Palace was indescribable. The 
 Queen Mother, who had been informed that a 
 military revolt had broken out, quietly advised 
 that the Swiss regiments be sent for ; but when 
 told it was they who mutinied, turned pale and 
 prepared for flight. It was believed that all 
 four regiments had revolted, and that their ob- 
 ject was to take the royal family prisoners. As 
 there were no officers, or chiefs, a parley was 
 difficult ; especially as the thousand or more 
 fully armed men were in a state of the wildest 
 excitement. Francis sent Admiral Del Re, ac- 
 companied by several officers of his household, 
 to attempt to calm the men, authorizing him 
 to inform the soldiers that, being favorably dis- 
 posed towards them, he would consider their 
 grievances, and meet them on the following 
 morning on the Parade Ground. 
 
 Mollified by the royal assurances, the noisy 
 band straggled off in the direction of Capodi- 
 chino, discharging their guns in the air, and 
 looting the wine shops along the route. 
 
 Meanwhile Generals Filangieri, Lanza, Garo- 
 falo and Nunziante were devising means to 
 smother the dangerous outbreak and check the 
 possible spread of an insurrection it was feared 
 might become universal. Early next morning 
 the mutineers were surrounded where they had
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 147 
 
 encamped, and shot down by the artillery of 
 the Thirteenth native regiment and that of 
 their compatriots (the Fourth) which had re- 
 mained loyal. Eighty were killed outright, 
 about two hundred wounded, while two hun- 
 dred sixty-two were taken prisoners. The rest 
 having disbanded escaped to the outlying 
 country. The impression caused by this mas- 
 sacre was tremendous and wide-spread. Nun- 
 ziante was accused of having ordered the troops 
 under his command to fire without giving the 
 insurgents the option of surrender. This as- 
 sertion was officially contradicted, and would 
 indeed seem too barbarous for truth. The fact 
 remains, however, that out of the attacking 
 forces but two soldiers were wounded ; this 
 would seem to indicate that the mutineers were 
 taken completely by surprise. 
 
 On the advice of Filangieri, and as a conse- 
 quence of the incidents described, the Swiss 
 regiments were declared disbanded, thus put- 
 ting an end to an institution which had enjoyed 
 the fullest confidence of the Throne for over 
 thirty years. 
 
 That the disbanding of the Swiss Guards, 
 rendered inevitable by the recent disaster, de- 
 prived the Crown of one of its most dreaded 
 supports was universally and exultingly recog- 
 nized by Liberals and revolutionists of every
 
 148 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 shade. The odium of the fierce carnage on the 
 Parade Ground was naturally laid at the door 
 of the hated Despot ; although that Francis 
 was personally to blame for the excessive zeal 
 of Nunziante was not seriously credited even 
 by his foes. The opportunity for making polit- 
 ical capital out of the disgraceful occurrence 
 was, however, not one to be lost. Undoubtedly 
 had Francis been consulted~the brutal butchery 
 of an unofficered rabble of disgruntled merce- 
 naries would never have been allowed, and the 
 incident would have passed unchallenged by 
 the world, or at most have excited a recrudes- 
 cence of protests from those who contended 
 that the Throne should dispense with a support 
 so derogatory to its dignity. 
 
 Shortly after the disappointing peace of Vil- 
 lafranca, Kossuth in a political memorandum, 
 in which he rapidly reviews the situation and the 
 possibilities it offers, wrote to Count Teleki in 
 reference to the neutrality of the King of 
 Naples : * " Would to Heaven that he moved ! 
 It would not even be necessary to beat him, 
 because the mercenaries being abolished the 
 Neapolitan army within a fortnight would have 
 Garibaldi as its leader, and Italian unity would 
 be accomplished. However, this intervention 
 
 * Chiala, Politica Segreta di Napoleone III. e di 
 Cavour.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 149 
 
 of the Bourbon does not seem in the least 
 probable. " 
 
 Others besides Kossuth appreciated the sig- 
 nificance of the revolt of the seventh of June. 
 Francis had no more confidence than his father 
 had entertained before him in the impeccable 
 loyalty of the Neapolitan troops, while it was 
 speedily made manifest to him that he indi- 
 vidually was completely lacking in that per- 
 sonal prestige which had compelled unques- 
 tioning, if reluctant, obedience to Ferdinand's 
 authority. The loss of the Swiss regiments 
 was consequently an irreparable one, and al- 
 though an effort was made to replace them by 
 a wholesale importation of Bavarian and Aus- 
 trian recruits, the defection was recognized as 
 a serious menace to an authority already so 
 deeply undermined by conspiracies extending 
 to the domestic hearth, and permeating the 
 family circle of the Sovereign. 
 
 Nevertheless the extreme youth and inex- 
 perience of the Sovereigns precluded the sup- 
 position that affairs of State, however weighty, 
 should completely absorb them. It must be 
 remembered that Francis was barely twenty- 
 three, while his bride had but just passed her 
 eighteenth birthday. The etiquette of Court 
 mourning had enforced a period of seclusion 
 and abstinence, which had now come to an
 
 150 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 end. On July 24 the ceremonies and festivities 
 attending the young King's accession to the 
 Throne were inaugurated with a State visit to 
 the shrine of San Gennaro, the Patron Saint of 
 Naples ; when the miracle of the liquefaction 
 of the Saint's blood was accomplished with 
 more than usual promptitude, and duly inter- 
 preted as a propitious omen for the prosperity 
 of the opening reign. Then followed the sol- 
 emn but gorgeous function of kissing hands, 
 which was carried out with all the rigorous 
 rules of the etiquette of a bygone age. For 
 many years Court pageants of any description 
 had been rare. Ferdinand, after the troubles 
 of 1849, had withdrawn more and more to the 
 comparative privacy of Caserta and Gaeta, and 
 dispensed with all superfluous official recep- 
 tions. Deeply immersed in the business of 
 government, which, as has been described, cen- 
 tred in his hands, and to the most minute and 
 trivial details of which he gave his personal 
 attention, it was manifestly impossible to be- 
 stow much time on display, even had his tastes 
 lain in that direction. Had Ferdinand so de- 
 sired there is little doubt but that he could, in 
 the earlier years of his reign, have won back the 
 Neapolitan aristocracy, as a class, from the 
 isolation to which they had been self-con- 
 demned since the Bourbon restoration. This
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 151 
 
 isolation, more apparent than real, had been 
 brought about by the reception extended to 
 Joachim Murat. Ferdinand, however, deemed 
 it a prudent policy to hold aloof ; believing it 
 expedient to foster the illusion that, dispensing 
 with the support of the aristocracy, the Crown 
 rested on the surer foundation of the popular 
 suffrage of the masses, with whom it was thus 
 brought in more democratic contact. The 
 reasoning was subtle, if fallacious, and gave 
 rise to misconceptions and confusion on the 
 part of leaders of the Second Empire in their 
 intrigues concerning the destinies of the King- 
 dom of Naples. Because as a class the Nea- 
 politan aristocracy had welcomed Murat in the 
 beginning of the century, it did not follow that 
 Lucien would be similarly received forty odd 
 years later, when the theory of national inde- 
 pendence, and, above all, of Italian unity under 
 an Italian Prince, had become a burning issue. 
 That great discontent existed amongst the more 
 enlightened members of the aristocracy was 
 evinced by the popularity of the Count of 
 Syracuse, whose open hostility to the Court 
 made his salons the rendezvous of malcontents 
 of all parties, and in which they rubbed shoul- 
 ders with Liberals of such advanced opinions 
 that they closely resembled Kepublicans. The 
 fluctuating importance of the Neapolitan " Mn-
 
 152 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 rattisti " was, however, regulated and controlled 
 by the rise or decline of French influences in 
 the Peninsula, despite the undoubted encour- 
 agement the movement received from a very 
 restricted circle of Italian sympathizers. The 
 aristocracy was, however, without political 
 training or aspirations, and as completely out 
 of touch with popular sentiment as with Court 
 influence. 
 
 With the accession of Francis many indi- 
 vidual aristocratic malcontents returned to 
 their allegiance, or at least took advantage of 
 the f Stes and gaieties to appear at Court. Nev- 
 ertheless the bulk of those attending the gala 
 performances at the huge San Carlo theatre, or 
 the ceremonies at the Palace, belonged to the 
 official world, the few exceptions being those 
 whose love of pleasure, or apathetic lack of 
 political convictions, made their surroundings 
 a matter of indifference. To a great extent 
 the opposition of the aristocracy was tradi- 
 tional, having its origin in the loss of certain 
 privileges, of which with the return of the 
 Bourbons they had been deprived. That polit- 
 ical prejudices were not very deep-rooted is 
 evinced by the fact that many who would have 
 welcomed a Mnrat accepted Court positions 
 under Victor Emmanuel ; while several of 
 those who had occupied high posts under the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 153 
 
 Bourbons were equally desirous of discharging 
 similar functions in connection with the House 
 of Savoy. This is not only true of the aris- 
 tocracy, but applies also to many leading Nea- 
 politan statesmen, as well as army and navy 
 officers of all ranks, and lends a semblance of 
 truth to the cry of " Treason " raised by the 
 Absolutists who remained staunch to their 
 allegiance to the fallen Dynasty. In Sicily this 
 generalization did not hold good ; many of the 
 most ancient and aristocratic families were also 
 foremost in their intelligent eagerness for the 
 political welfare of their country. In 1848 and 
 1849 the flower of the nobility fought side by 
 side with the representatives of the humbler 
 classes for the freedom of the island. The 
 Sicilians, although availing themselves of every 
 occasion for revolt against the Bourbon yoke, 
 never having been under the dominion of 
 Murat, were impervious to the blandishments 
 of the conspirators who sought the re-establish- 
 ment of Bonapartist supremacy. Given a Murat 
 and a Francis II., they remained Legitimists by 
 force of habit ; but when a third alternative 
 was presented in the person of the "Honest 
 King " of Savoy, there was no doubt in which 
 direction their sympathies lay.
 
 CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 Filaiigieri's political sympathies. Napoleon III. : his aims and 
 policy. Cavour's policy. Plan for partition of Papal States. 
 Count Salmour's failure, Villafranca. Cavour resigns. 
 Rumors from Sicily. Filangieri's resignation. His re- 
 tirement at Sorrento. Blunders of the Administration. 
 Cavour to Marquis d'Azeglio. Lord Palmerston on Ca- 
 vour. An Italian Confederation. Napoleon's embarrass- 
 ments. Sir James Hudson and his associates. English 
 policy in Italian question. Opinions of Prince Consort. 
 Diplomacy at Turin. Marquis Villamarina goes to Naples. 
 His instructions. His report on situation at Naples. 
 
 THE glorious adventures and triumphs of his 
 youth had imbued Filangieri with very pro- 
 nounced Bonapartist sympathies. As a veteran 
 of the Napoleonic wars he was cosmopolitan, 
 in the broadest and best sense of the word ; as 
 a politician and a statesman he clearly foresaw 
 that a change of front and the abandonment 
 of the narrow principles of the internal and 
 foreign policy followed by Ferdinand, could 
 alone save the Dynasty and insure the auton- 
 omy of the Kingdom. For the accomplish- 
 ment of this end the friendship and support of 
 the Western Powers, especially France, was of 
 prime importance. It needed but a modicum 
 154
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 155 
 
 of statesmanship to appreciate the fact that 
 the interests of Napoleon III. could profit 
 neither by the obliteration of the Kingdom of 
 Naples from the map of Europe, nor its ab- 
 sorption, under the pretext of suppressing rev- 
 olutionary anarchy, in the all-devouring maw 
 of Piedmont. To secure the support of Louis 
 Napoleon, deeply committed to the principle 
 of Italian nationalization (not unity), two con- 
 cessions were imperative : the total and un- 
 conditional severance from Austrian influences ; 
 and the immediate grant, or revival, of a Con- 
 stitution framed in accordance with the liberal 
 theories of the day. General Roguet, sent by 
 Napoleon III. to congratulate Francis on his 
 accession, had special instructions to urge the 
 acceptance of this programme, and was ener- 
 getically seconded by the French Minister who 
 had returned to his post on the resumption of 
 diplomatic relations. 
 
 Reference has already been made to the al- 
 liance with Piedmont, which Count Cavour 
 desired not only as a protection against Aus- 
 trian supremacy but also as a check to Bona- 
 partist ambitions in Tuscany. After Magenta 
 a territorial manipulation involving the trans- 
 formation of the political geography of Italy 
 was suggested, and received, it is said, the 
 sanction of Napoleon III. and Lord Palmerston.
 
 156 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Piedmont was to be allowed to annex Lombardy, 
 the Ducbies and the Legations as far south 
 as the River Cattolica ; while to the King 
 of Naples would be given Umbria and the 
 Marches. The Pope would thus be relegated 
 to the so-called Patrimony of Saint Peter ; a 
 dominion considered ample for the exercise of 
 his temporal prerogatives. 
 
 In the Council of Ministers Filangieri could 
 count on no majority to advance his proposals, 
 and he was fully aware of the insurmountable 
 repugnance Francis would oppose to any pro- 
 ject involving a rupture of friendly relations 
 with the Holy See. Tempting as was the bait 
 offered, and thoroughly convinced as he was 
 of the advantage of gaining the good-will of 
 his powerful accomplices, Francis, who had 
 been prepared by Troja for the proposed 
 spoliation of the Papal dominions, indignantly 
 refused to become a party to so " sacrilegious a 
 scheme/' and promptly reported the iniquitous 
 proposal to Rome. Bearing in mind the quasi- 
 sacerdotal education Francis had received, to- 
 gether with his mysticism and the apathetic 
 fatalism of his character, it is difficult to un- 
 derstand how such a programme could ever 
 have been expected to receive his support. 
 
 The rebuff administered to Count Salmour 
 on. this occasion destroyed all probability of
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 157 
 
 his success in the negotiations for an offensive 
 and defensive alliance, and he took his depart- 
 ure amidst the enthusiastic plaudits of the ad- 
 vanced Liberals and Unionists, who had looked 
 upon the possibility of such an alliance with 
 considerable alarm. 
 
 Meanwhile portentous events were rapidly 
 succeeding each other in Northern Italy. The 
 Legations rose in rebellion against the Papal 
 authority, and the Rulers of Parma and 
 Modena were deposed by their subjects. The 
 provisional Governments of Emilia and Tus- 
 cany were established, and the unsatisfactory 
 peace of Villafranca had driven Cavour from 
 the political arena. Wild rumors of a rev- 
 olutionary invasion of the Neapolitan terri- 
 tory by Garibaldi and his dreaded hordes began 
 to circulate, while vague reports of Sicilian 
 agitation reached the capital. Filangieri, real- 
 izing that not a moment was to be lost, boldly 
 presented to Francis, on September 4th, the 
 draft of the Constitution prepared by Manna ; 
 making its acceptance conditional to his re- 
 tention of office. The King, timid and vacil- 
 lating, fearing to risk a decision, yet harried 
 by the threats of the " Camarilla, " desired a 
 furthe: postponement, urging the peril of so 
 radical a departure from the conservatism of 
 his father. Wbereupon Filangieri unhesitat-
 
 158 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ingly presented his resignation as President of 
 the Council and Minister of War. Although 
 Francis did not unconditionally accept the 
 tendered resignation, he signified his willing- 
 ness that the Minister should temporarily seek 
 a much required rest, replacing him provi- 
 sionally with Raffaele Carrascosa, and nominat- 
 ing one of Murat's old Lieutenants, Gaetano 
 Garofalo, to take charge of the War Office. 
 
 Filangieri now betook himself to the seclu- 
 sion of his villa at Sorrento, over the door of 
 which he caused the following placard to be 
 affixed : ' ' This notice denies entrance to all ; 
 for it is either a proof that I am out, or that I 
 will receive nobody." 
 
 Although pleading advanced age and ill- 
 health, as an excuse for his withdrawal from 
 active participation in public affairs, it is prob- 
 able that Filangieri at first contemplated no 
 more than a voluntary temporary retirement, 
 as a protest against the rejection of the policy 
 of reform and diplomatic negotiation he advo- 
 cated. Thoroughly disheartened, however, by 
 the failure of his plans for the rescue of the 
 Throne from the perils he so keenly appreci- 
 ated, as well as by the continual blunders of the 
 Crown, and those who had succeeded him in 
 the administration of affairs, he was gradually 
 led to the conviction that it would be impossi-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 159 
 
 ble to retrieve the errors committed, and there- 
 fore continued to insist that he should be re- 
 lieved of all official responsibility. It was not 
 until March 16, 1860, that Francis, yielding 
 to his persistent entreaties, finally and formally 
 exonerated him from the nominal discharge of 
 the duties of President of the Council and 
 Minister of War. 
 
 In the interval, blunder after blunder had 
 still further estranged the sympathies of the 
 nations an alliance with which offered the only 
 hope of salvation, and widened the gulf be- 
 tween the Government and People of the King- 
 dom of the Two Sicilies. Aiossa, a man whose 
 ignorance and violence were proverbial, had 
 been entrusted with the direction of the Police, 
 and had forthwith revived the excesses and 
 persecutions which had signallized the reign of 
 Ferdinand. The " Camarilla," again trium- 
 phant, was omnipotent in those branches of the 
 public service whose agents came in direct con- 
 tact with the citizen, and as a natural conse- 
 quence the friction and mutual animosity daily 
 increased. 
 
 Not satisfied with declining the friendly 
 proposals of France, England and Piedmont, 
 Francis had excited their suspicious resent- 
 ment by the formation of a military camp on 
 the frontiers of the Papal States ; and by allow-
 
 160 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ing it to be surmised that the establishment of 
 the same was not merely intended for the de- 
 fence of his territory, but also designed as an 
 efficient support to the Pontifical troops, should 
 the latter be assailed. This army corps, which 
 had left Naples on September 14, 1859, un- 
 der the command of General Pianell, had been 
 preceded by profuse assurances of filial rever- 
 ence for his Holiness, which were universally 
 interpreted as equivalent to an avouchment 
 of eventual co-operation with the forces of 
 the Holy See. The Piedmontese Government 
 promptly demanded an explanation as to the 
 scope of the military demonstration, and re- 
 ceived in reply assurances that the expedition 
 was intended merely to insure the inviolability 
 of Neapolitan territory in view of existing 
 political conditions. Nevertheless, and in spite 
 of this plausible explanation, the incident 
 caused considerable annoyance, for it was gen- 
 erally conceded that the Neapolitan Govern- 
 ment was not sincere in its protestations, and 
 that the troops were destined for a very dif- 
 ferent service should occasion present. 
 
 The Peace of Villafranca had apparently 
 left Austria but slightly disabled. With 
 Venice, the fortresses of Peschiera, Mantova, 
 and the other strongholds of the Quadrilateral, 
 she could still strike terror to Italian hearts.
 
 THE KINGDOM Of NAPLES. 161 
 
 Austrian influences at the Vatican were also 
 still formidable in spite of recent loss of pres- 
 tige. Cavour's resignation at Villafranca had 
 been considered as a national calamity by the 
 Liberals, although as a matter of fact, owing 
 to his more complete individual liberty of ac- 
 tion, the Count was enabled to inspire his per- 
 sonal agents throughout the Peninsula with 
 greater freedom from restraint than when in 
 office. His retirement was moreover univer- 
 sally recognized as temporary, and his return 
 to power merely a question of expediency. In 
 the meantime the onus of reconciling a discon- 
 tented public opinion to the unsatisfactory 
 peace negotiations fell upon the shoulders of 
 Rattazzi. 
 
 In announcing his retirement to the Marquis 
 d'Azelio, Cavour writes on July 16, 1859 : 
 " Je suis la bte-noire de la diploinate. You 
 have been able to convince yourself of this 
 during your last visit to Paris. Walewski de- 
 tests me for a thousand reasons, and above all 
 on account of the sarcasms and ' quodlibets ' we 
 indulged in with Clarendon over the Treaty of 
 Paris. Cowley has nervous spasms when he 
 sees me. I think I would cause a nightmare to 
 the Austrian Plenipotentiaries. In short, I am 
 the man least calculated to obtain concessions 
 from the diplomatists. These gentlemen would 
 ii
 
 162 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 refuse to the man what they might perhaps 
 grant the Country, provided it were represent- 
 ed by a sympathetic person." 
 
 As evinced by the following letter from Lord 
 Palmerston to Lord Cowley, then Ambassador in 
 Paris, England was fully prepared for the inevi- 
 table changes in the political geography of Italy. 
 Writing from London under date of August 
 22, 1859, the English Prime Minister says : 
 " I know that all the partisans of arbitrary 
 government in Europe represent me as the bit- 
 ter enemy of Austria, and I wish whenever you 
 hear this you would deny its truth. I am an 
 enemy to bad government, to oppression and 
 tyranny ; and, unfortunately, the Austrian 
 rule in Italy, as elsewhere, has been marked by 
 those evils. I am an enemy, therefore, to the 
 bad system of Austrian Government, and heart- 
 ily wish all Italians to be freed from the Aus- 
 trian yoke. . . . Much is said at Paris of what 
 are called the intrigues of Cavour unjustly, I 
 think. If it is meant that he has labored for 
 the enlargement of Piedmont and the freedom 
 of Italy from foreign yoke, and from Austrian 
 rule, he will in history be called a patriot ; but 
 the means he has employed may be good or 
 bad. I know not what they have been ; but 
 the end in view is, I am sure, the good of Italy. 
 The people of the Duchies have as good a right
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 163 
 
 to change their rulers as the people of Eng- 
 land, France, Belgium, and Sweden ; and the 
 annexation of the Duchies to Piedmont would 
 be an unmixed good for Italy, and for France, 
 and for Europe. I hope Walewski will not sway 
 the mind of the Emperor to make the enslav- 
 ing of Italy the end of a drama which opened 
 with the declaration : ' Italy free from the 
 Alps to the Adriatic/ and : ' 1'Italie rendue a 
 elle-meme.'"* 
 
 Villafranca made it manifest that Italy must 
 work out her own salvation ; and Italians were 
 in no mood to passively await the adoption of 
 the curtailed programme of national independ- 
 ence laid before the Congress of Zurich. In 
 his letter of October 20, 1859, Napoleon III. 
 had informed Victor Emmanuel that the de- 
 mand would be made that Parma and Piacenza 
 be reunited to Piedmont, that territory being 
 strategically indispensable to it. But the rule 
 of the Duchess of Parma was merely to be 
 transferred to Modena, and Tuscany restored 
 to the Grand-Duke Ferdinand, with provision 
 for the introduction of certain liberal reforms. 
 According to the ideas of the Emperor, as 
 expressed in this letter, essential conditions 
 for the regeneration of Italy necessitated the 
 composition of several independent States 
 * Aahley's " Life of Lord Palmereton."
 
 164 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 united by a federal organization, each of these 
 States being free to adopt its own Constitution 
 and reforms. This Confederation would, it 
 was asserted, consecrate the principle of Italian 
 nationality ; it would, moreover, be under one 
 flag, one Customs regulation, and one system 
 of coinage. The Central Government was to 
 be in Rome, and formed of representatives from 
 each State, under the Honorary Presidency of 
 the Pope. No mention is made in the letter 
 of the scheme for the partial spoliation of the 
 Holy See to the mutual advantage of Piedmont 
 and the Two Sicilies, and it is difficult to under- 
 stand how Napoleon proposed to reconcile this 
 latter scheme with the political necessity of 
 retaining the support of the Catholic voters at 
 home. It is probable, however, that Napoleon 
 III. had as little faith in the power of the half- 
 measures propounded for the consideration of 
 the Congress of Zurich, to quench the danger- 
 ous fires he had fanned into flame, as he had 
 in the strength of the colorless Francis, to 
 withstand the fierce opposition of the clerical 
 element and " Camarilla" to a political venture 
 so at variance with the sacred traditions of his 
 Dynasty. 
 
 The Emperor's enigmatic "We shall now 
 see what the Italians can do by themselves/' 
 addressed to Victor Emmanuel at Villafranca,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 165 
 
 was almost an incentive to push ahead and let 
 consequences take care of themselves. France 
 must temporarily wash her hands of an under- 
 taking which unforeseen contingencies on the 
 Rhine frontier had dangerously complicated ; 
 but the fury of Italian Liberals to whose cause 
 the Emperor was personally deeply committed 
 must be appeased by some well-sounding, yet 
 not too substantial, sop. In other words, Na- 
 poleon found himself compelled to hedge ; and 
 to retrieve his lost popularity at home, while 
 he circumvented the baffled Italians by the aid 
 of a diplomatic paradox, which the laws of 
 Probabilities might be counted upon to render 
 innocuous. Cavour deeply chagrined, yet real- 
 izing the futility of further reliance or material 
 aid from France, readily grasped at the alter- 
 native, appreciating the advantages to be gained 
 by purely Italian initiative in a question of 
 national supremacy. 
 
 The rumor that Francis, even at this late 
 date, under pressure of the " Camarilla," and 
 released from the nominal restraint of the 
 presence of Filangieri, meditated an alliance 
 with the Pope, and the vanquished, yet still 
 formidable, Hapsburgs, was not wholly im- 
 probable, and justified the ruffled susceptibil- 
 ities of Piedmont. While the perplexities 
 arising out of the projected annexations were
 
 166 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 rife, Naples must be closely watched. The 
 strict neutrality of the Southern Kingdom was 
 absolutely essential to the furtherance of north- 
 ern ambitions. Hence the uneasiness evinced 
 at Turin by the news of the concentration of 
 Neapolitan troops on the Papal frontier. That 
 Francis only required to be given enough rope 
 in order to hang himself was confidently an- 
 ticipated ; but the consequences of the sui- 
 cide might be attended by considerable risk to 
 those who had too complacently furnished the 
 cord ; while it was especially desired to avoid 
 conflict with parties whose bonds of amity, or 
 mutual interests, would give countenance to a 
 claim in the disposal of the deceased's estate. 
 
 England was ready enough to lend a hand 
 surreptitiously in schemes calculated to di- 
 minish French or Austrian prestige in the 
 Neapolitan and Papal States. Sir James Hud- 
 son, Her Majesty's Envoy at Turin, personally 
 a warm and trusted friend of Italy, and ad- 
 vocate of unity, frequently entertained political 
 exiles from various Italian States, especially 
 Mazzini. Lord Hubert de Burgh, at that time 
 (1859-60), Secretary of the English Legation, 
 jocosely remarked one evening to his French 
 colleague d'Ideville : " I have just dined with 
 Sir James. We were ten at table, and with 
 the exception of the Minister and myself, all
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 167 
 
 were under sentence of death. 1 still shud- 
 der ! " At the same time Her Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment was not prepared at that period to 
 openly antagonize either of the Powers above 
 mentioned by a frank and explicit declaration 
 of policy in regard to Italian affairs. Mr. 
 Henry Elliot, the English Minister at the 
 Neapolitan Court, had received general instruc- 
 tions to urge the necessity of reforms, and to 
 second the French Envoy in his endeavors to 
 obtain such ; but this action was prompted 
 rather by humanitarian than political consid- 
 erations. No very definite line of policy had 
 been established by either Whig or Tory Cab- 
 inets with regard to Italian affairs, beyond the 
 traditional, although spasmodic, encourage- 
 ment of Liberalism, or rather Constitutionalism, 
 exacted by an indignant public opinion when- 
 ever any especially virulent outbreak of tyr- 
 anny was forced into notice by the exiles who 
 made London their headquarters. The moral 
 support, or frown, of Great Britain, had, how- 
 ever, on more occasions than one influenced 
 the destinies of Italy. The positive veneration 
 entertained by Count Cavour for the political 
 institutions of England, and his continued 
 efforts to retain the sympathies and good-will 
 of her leading statesmen, is demonstrated in 
 his private correspondence with the Sardinian
 
 168 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Minister in London, the Marquis Massimo 
 d'Azeglio. Although generally admired and 
 esteemed in the English political world, Cavour 
 never succeeded in gaining the confidence of 
 Prince Albert, who entertained an invincible 
 mistrust of the Italian statesman. " This 
 feeling," writes Sir Theodore Martin in his 
 Life of the Prince Consort, " seems in some 
 degree to have prevented the Prince from 
 making full allowance for the difficulties with 
 which Cavour hail to contend in accomplishing 
 his great task. It would in all probability 
 have been altered by the fuller knowledge of 
 the secret history of the time, which has since 
 become available. . . ." 
 
 The political bargain of Plombieres by which 
 the Princess Clotilde of Savoy was given in 
 marriage to Prince Jerome, cousin of the Em- 
 peror, had produced a deplorable impression at 
 the English Court, where also the intrigues 
 between Cavour and Kossuth, lending counte- 
 nance to the insurrections plotted in Hungary, 
 and on the Danube, were viewed with suspicious 
 aversion. 
 
 In spite of diplomatic squabbles, or compro- 
 mising incidents, English public opinion was 
 almost universally in sympathy with the great 
 Italian Statesman who was making such a plucky 
 fight, against what appeared overwhelming
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 169 
 
 odds, for the diffusion of the Constitutional 
 Liberties so dear to the Anglo-Saxon ; and was 
 consequently disinclined to pry too closely into 
 the possibly accessory schemes for territorial 
 aggrandizement, which so troubled foreign 
 politicians. 
 
 Critical moments there certainly were ; while 
 delicate situations not infrequently arose, for 
 the satisfactory solution of which no small 
 credit is due both d'Azeglio in London, and 
 Sir James Hudson at Turin. To the latter 
 Nicomede Bianchi offers a well-merited tribute 
 in his " Politique du Comte de Cavonr de 1852 
 a 1861." " It will certainly not be superfluous, " 
 he writes, " to add that the diplomatic activity 
 of Sir James Hudson, during the entire period 
 that he occupied the post of English Minister 
 near King Victor Emmanuel, was to Italy of 
 eminently practical utility. Under all circum- 
 stances, and under the most difficult conditions, 
 he always merited the esteem and confidence 
 which the King, and the most Liberalist of his 
 Ministers, placed in him ; as well as that of 
 the most influential and most esteemed chiefs 
 of the Italian National Party/' 
 
 The Chevalier Canofari, Neapolitan Envoy 
 to Piedmont, was fully aware of the diplomatic 
 influences, and Nationalist ambitions, at work 
 in Turin, ample details of which he forwarded
 
 170 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 to his Government. But Filangieri alone rsad 
 correctly the signs of the times, and recognized 
 the urgency of concluding the proffered friend- 
 ship before rapidly shifting interests should 
 make it advisable for Sardinia to dispense with 
 Italian alliances. From his solitary retreat at 
 Sorrento the old statesman gazed with mourn- 
 ful eyes on the apathetic indifference and be- 
 sotted intolerance which were hurrying the 
 Throne to destruction ; and the young Sover- 
 eign, he would so willingly have saved, to exile. 
 The Government of Piedmont, in spite of the 
 failure of Count Salmour's mission, could not 
 accept the refusal as final. The diplomacy of 
 Europe seemed at this moment to be in league 
 against Victor EmmanueFs reaping any con- 
 siderable material advantages from the late war. 
 It is true the populations of the Duchies, as 
 well as of the Romagna and Marches, clamored 
 for admission into the fold ; but the Congress 
 assembled at Zurich had under consideration 
 eventualities which Piedmont could, in the pres- 
 ent crisis, not openly ignore. A period of 
 uncertainty must be tided over a period 
 fraught with dangerous possibilities ; arising 
 both from the patriotic zeal of the victors, and 
 the subtle intrigue of disappointed ambitions. 
 As an offset to these, as well as offering the 
 surest guarantee against further foreign inter-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 171 
 
 vention in the purely domestic affairs of Italy, 
 the Neapolitan alliance seemed the most satis- 
 factory solution of the problem. Once such 
 an agreement concluded by the two Great 
 Powers of the Peninsula, the details of the 
 partition and distribution of the minor States 
 might form the subject for amicable mutual 
 negotiation. Something must be yielded if 
 aught were to be gained. 
 
 With this end in view, as well as for purposes 
 of trusty observation, it was decided to confide 
 the contemplated negotiations to the Marquis 
 de Villamarina. The diplomatic experience 
 and personal attributes of the late Sardinian 
 Minister to Paris designated him as especially 
 fitted to undertake the extremely delicate duties 
 which were now assigned him. Although 
 originally recalled from the Imperial Court to 
 superintend the reorganization of the civil ad- 
 ministration of Lombardy, the diplomatic serv- 
 ices now required of him, ungrateful as they 
 must have appeared, were nevertheless courage- 
 ously, if reluctantly, undertaken. That the 
 scope of the mission, organized in a spirit of 
 loyal amity, and for the attainment of recipro- 
 cal advantages, became later liable to the accu- 
 sation of duplicity, was due primarily to the 
 inconceivable shortsightedness of the Bourbon 
 Court. The relentless pressure of political com-
 
 172 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 binations, unforeseen a few months previously, 
 could not in fairness be construed as a reflec- 
 tion on the good faith of the Marquis de Villa- 
 marina in his dealings with the King of the 
 Two Sicilies. In his documentary History of 
 European Diplomacy in Italy, Nicomede Bian- 
 chi cites " in extenso " the instructions imparted 
 to Villamarina by General Dabormida, at that 
 moment Minister for Foreign Affairs at Turin. 
 These enjoined on the Sardinian Envoy to con- 
 duct himself with dignity, prudence and tact, 
 in his relations with the various political fac- 
 tions. While advocating the introduction of 
 liberal reforms, no undue pressure was to be 
 exercised, and no interference attempted in 
 the domestic affairs of the State. Neither in- 
 citing nor restraining either political party, the 
 Minister should use his influence towards foster- 
 ing the natural and spontaneous development 
 of principles more in accord with the altered 
 conditions of social and political requirements, 
 which necessarily affected all the Princes and 
 all the States of Italy ; and induce the Bour- 
 bons to calmly and patiently accept the in- 
 evitable modifications of government demanded 
 by the times. All this was to be accomplished 
 without social disturbance or political revolt ; 
 the example of Piedmont being constantly 
 placed before the eyes of Ruler and subjects,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 173 
 
 as an object lesson of the benefits to be derived 
 from Constitutional Government. Thus in- 
 directly a parallel was to be drawn between the 
 partisans of Austria and Absolutism, and the 
 representatives of Italy and Liberty ; and the 
 responsibility of the rejection of the alliance, 
 and its possible consequences, laid at the door 
 of King Francis and his Government. 
 
 In his eloquent refutation of the charges of 
 duplicity, advanced by his political enemies, 
 Villamarina writes in the " Opinione " of April 
 26, 1861: "I do not speak of the most con- 
 ciliatory dispositions I carried to Naples, in 
 accordance with the orders and instructions I 
 had received from my Sovereign and from his 
 Government. I will not mention the honest, 
 frank and sincere manner in which I executed 
 those orders and instructions in the negotiations 
 I had the honor to undertake with the Court of 
 Naples : without ever attempting to shake the 
 loyalty of others, I yet placed my own beyond 
 the insidious intrigues of the ever-alert enemies 
 and adversaries of Italy, who swarmed in the 
 Councils of that King, and constituted the 
 domestic influences which surrounded him." 
 
 Addressing the Senate on April 9 of the 
 same year, Villamarina draws the following 
 word-picture of the Neapolitan Administration : 
 " Corrupt and corrupting, it was organized
 
 174 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 thus : a people debased ; held in ignorance and 
 the most revolting brutality : a large army, 
 well uniformed, well paid, of fine appearance, 
 but inspired by absolutely anti-national senti- 
 ments, and trained to look upon the foreigner 
 as a friend, and to regard the fellow-citizen as 
 an enemy, and as such to be oppressed and de- 
 spoiled. No development of commerce ; none 
 of industries, nor of agriculture : all doors 
 closed to this unfortunate people, save one 
 alone, that of official life : and that not for the 
 formation of honest employees, but rewarding 
 the bad and corrupting the good, in order to 
 win over the greatest number of satellites to 
 the ferocious despotism and cruel oppression 
 practised. Each official received a modest 
 salary, but each knew that he could steal with 
 impunity, and for these reasons the offices 
 were sought after : not in order to serve the 
 State and benefit Society, but on account of 
 the fat increment afforded by fraudulent con- 
 tracts and malversions of all kinds." 
 
 The picture is a dark one, and some allow- 
 ance should be made for the righteous indig- 
 nation of the speaker. A glimpse at the ad- 
 ministrative branches of the Kingdom under 
 Ferdinand II. has been afforded in the earlier 
 pages of this study : consequently the reader 
 will be able to draw his own conclusions con-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 175 
 
 cerning the accuracy of what appears a rather 
 s weeping statement ; reproduced here, however, 
 as exemplifying the sentiments prevailing 
 amongst a considerable number of persons high 
 placed in the official world.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Efforts to secure alliance. Cavour returns to office. His cor- 
 respondence with Villamarina. Prudential policy. Cession 
 of Nice and Savoy. The reasons for same. Villamarina's 
 reports. Distrust and opposition excited by cession of 
 territory. Cavour's relations with Kossuth and Hungarian 
 patriots. Cavour and European Diplomacy. Victor Em- 
 manners letter to King of Naples. Determined opposition 
 to alliance. 
 
 DURING the opening weeks of 1860 a year 
 fraught with the direst consequences to the 
 tottering Neapolitan Throne the Marquis de 
 Villamarina labored incessantly to bring about 
 a mutual understanding between the Courts of 
 Turin and Naples. Of the futility of his efforts 
 to secure an alliance, or even a semblance of 
 conciliation, the Minister was quickly per- 
 suaded. The intrigues woven at Court and 
 directed against the principles of National In- 
 dependence, together with the plots hatched in 
 conjunction with the Vatican for the frustra- 
 tion of the Piedmontese negotiations, confirmed 
 the diplomatist in his conviction that no lessons 
 had been learnt from recent events in the States 
 of Northern Italy, and the misfortunes of those 
 Rulers who sought to oppose the manifestation 
 176
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 177 
 
 of popular aspirations towards National Liberty. 
 In addition his task was still further compli- 
 cated by the agitation of certain enthusiasts 
 whose noisy clamor alarmed the susceptibilities 
 not only of Francis, but of European Diplo- 
 macy. 
 
 Count Cavour returned to power on the twen- 
 tieth of January, and it was indeed fortunate 
 for Italy that he again held the tiller. 
 
 In his letter to d'Azeglio of July 16, 1859, 
 written on the day of his retirement from office, 
 Cavour had said : " You are aware that the 
 policy of the present Cabinet has always been 
 frankly National ; that it had not in view the 
 territorial aggrandizement of Piedmont, but 
 the emancipation of Italy ; the establishment 
 throughout the whole Peninsula of a wisely 
 liberal system." 
 
 Was a modification of these views now advis- 
 able ? And must the obstinate refusal of 
 Francis to come to terms with the generous 
 Nationalist aspirations of the day, mean the 
 removal of the chief obstacle to the establish- 
 ment throughout the whole Peninsula of a 
 " wisely liberal system " ? That Cavour al- 
 ready foresaw that his Koyal Master must event- 
 ually occupy the Neapolitan Throne is incon- 
 testable ; but he was keenly aware that Europe, 
 and first and foremost the French Emperor, 
 
 12
 
 178 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 would strenuously oppose such ambitions. 
 Just how far the Italian Statesman guided, or 
 was guided, by the political events of the next 
 three months it is hazardous to affirm. 
 
 That he was sincere in his desire for at least 
 a temporary arrangement with the King of 
 Naples there can be no doubt. " I strongly 
 approve your prudence," he wrote Villamarina 
 on February 11, " and I agree with you that 
 at the present moment it is of supreme impor- 
 tance to prevent any revolutionary movement 
 in Italy/' The old Italian proverb " chi va 
 piano, va sano " fitted the negotiations he had 
 in hand. The dread of undoing by the pre- 
 mature disclosure of inopportune ambitions the 
 good work already fairly in course of accom- 
 plishment, was as strong as his desire to com- 
 plete the mighty fabric of his dreams. None 
 other but this past master in the arts of dis- 
 simulation combining as he did the wile of 
 the serpent and the boldness of the lion could 
 have safely steered through the perilous com- 
 plications of the next few months. France 
 had ceased active opposition to the annexation 
 of Central Italy, now merely insisting that 
 irrefragable evidence of the public sentiment 
 should be forthcoming. This both Cavonr and 
 Ricasoli were determined to provide, and to 
 carry their point in the face of the opposition
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 179 
 
 of the French Emperor as well as the futile de- 
 crees of the Congress of Zurich, which had 
 formally recognized the rights of the Sovereigns 
 of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, when it con- 
 cluded its labors on November 10, 1859. Again, 
 fortunately for Italian Unity, the Government 
 of Lord Palmerston, now in power, was inclined 
 to regard with benignity the spread of Consti- 
 tutional liberties ; and this moral support, in 
 conjunction with the inflexible persistency of 
 Ricasoli, who would accept no compromise, or 
 half-measures, finally turned the scales. With- 
 out the employment of force it was manifestly 
 impossible for Napoleon to gainsay the decision 
 of the Tuscan leaders, supported by unequiv- 
 ocal manifestations of popular sentiment. 
 
 True to the principles of his " politique de 
 pourboire," as Bismarck had termed the Em- 
 peror's diplomacy, Napoleon, in spite of his 
 voluntary renunciation of all such claims after 
 the Peace of Villafranca, again broached the 
 subject of the cession of Nice and Savoy as 
 compensation for the territorial aggrandize- 
 ment allowed Piedmont. Undoubtedly this 
 was no surprise to Cavour ; and in anticipation 
 of the immense eventual advantages to be 
 gained he was fain to accede to the French 
 pretensions with as good grace as possible. 
 
 Summoning what philosophy he can to his
 
 180 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 aid, Cavour writes on February 12th to the 
 Marquis d'Azeglio, in London : " Having 
 persuaded France to undertake the Italian 
 war in the name of the principle of nationali- 
 ties ; having invoked for the last eight months 
 the principle of deference to the wish of the 
 people, especially when in harmony with the 
 first ; we would not have contested on one side 
 of the Alps what we upheld on the other. 
 When France asked us what we would do if 
 the great majority of the inhabitants of Savoy 
 and Nice demanded union with the people 
 speaking the same tongue, we answered that 
 we did not traffic in populations : that we 
 would neither sell nor exchange the smallest of 
 our villages ; but that if the subjects of non- 
 Italian races desired, as was said, to separate 
 from us, we would certainly not restrain them 
 by force." 
 
 On March 24th the treaty ceding Savoy and 
 Nice to France was signed. As he took the 
 pen from the hand of the French Plenipo- 
 tentiary, Cavour cynically remarked : " Now 
 you are our accomplices." In other words 
 this signified that the price of the cession of 
 territory to France was that Piedmont be 
 allowed a free hand in the south. " The two 
 principal men in Europe to-day are Napoleon 
 and Cavour," said Monsieur Guizot. "The 
 stakes are laid ; I back Monsieur de Cavour."
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 181 
 
 The French statesman was correct : that 
 document bound the Emperor hand and foot, 
 and delivered him into the power of his crafty 
 ally. As a matter of form he might demur to 
 the Sicilian expedition, and in the case of 
 Naples, peevishly resent the unceremonious dis- 
 card of Muratist ambitions, but beyond dip- 
 lomatic protestations he was not likely to go. 
 
 Putting aside the purely sentimental con- 
 siderations, in themselves of considerable im- 
 portance, the loss to Piedmont was not of great 
 material consequence. The abandonment of 
 Nice seemed likely, however, to cause the 
 Government embarrassment, as it aroused the 
 furious resentment and violent opposition of 
 Garibaldi, already a power to be reckoned with, 
 who being a native of that town regarded the 
 cession as a personal grievance. 
 
 Meanwhile Villamarina was patiently study- 
 ing the situation in Naples, and slowly reaching 
 the conclusions which proved of such inesti- 
 mable value in the guidance of the policy 
 emanating from Turin. To him Cavour ap- 
 peals on March 30th for trustworthy informa- 
 tion concerning the probable condition of 
 public sentiment under certain political con- 
 tingencies ; as well as regarding the relative 
 strength of the Republicans, Annexationists 
 and Muratists, throughout the realm. These
 
 182 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 are interesting as indicating a possible modifica- 
 tion of policy, resulting from the signature of 
 the treaty ceding Nice and Savoy, by which 
 sacrifice it was hoped to commit the French 
 Emperor to at least a tacit acquiescence in the 
 purely Italian diplomacy of the Piedmontese 
 Cabinet. " You know," he continues, " that 
 I do not at all desire to force a premature 
 issue of the Neapolitan question. I think, on 
 the contrary, that it would suit us to have the 
 existing condition of affairs prolonged some 
 years. But I learn from a trustworthy source 
 that even England despairs of the maintenance 
 of the ' statu quo/ and it is, doubtless, in view 
 of not improbable eventualities that she keeps 
 her fleet in Neapolitan waters. I fear there- 
 fore that we shall soon be forced to adopt a 
 plan which I would have liked to have had 
 time to mature." 
 
 The reply forwarded by Villamarina, on 
 April 14th, served as the basis for the 
 subsequent diplomatic policy of Piedmont, 
 until, owing to the bewilderirigly rapid se- 
 quence of events, the studied policy of to-day 
 gave way before the expediency of to-morrow. 
 Viewed as such, a synopsis of the Envoy's 
 opinions is pertinent. 
 
 The Marquis expressed himself deeply dis- 
 trustful of the arguments advanced by Napo-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 183 
 
 leon to secure Neapolitan intervention in the 
 Marches, and the consent of Piedmont to this 
 undertaking. In this scheme he thought he 
 recognized a double policy, the result of which 
 would prove a deception to his Government. 
 The guarantee of Austrian non-intervention, 
 except in the event of a revolution in Naples, 
 meant nothing, or rather meant everything, as 
 such revolution could be provoked at will by 
 the Austrian agents there, should it be deemed 
 opportune. Unless supported by armed in- 
 tervention, an insurrection incited by French 
 agents could not result in the Emperor's favor. 
 Muratism, although not dangerous under ex- 
 isting circumstances, might become so should 
 the Emperor give that party frank and un- 
 equivocal support. In the event of such a 
 combination, the party would undoubtedly be 
 greatly strengthened by the adhesion of a large 
 body of indifferent or timid partisans who 
 would avail themselves of an opportunity to 
 cast in their lot with the strongest. To 
 Cavour's query concerning the possibility of 
 an aunexationist movement such as had taken 
 place in Tuscany, Villamarina unhesitatingly 
 replied in the negative. He believed the army 
 to be with the King ; and the Government 
 amply strong enough to restrain the populace. 
 A revolution such as had recently broken out
 
 184 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 in Sicily could alone dethrone the Bourbons 
 of Naples. While Naples still held very 
 generally to autonomy, the Sicilian revolt was 
 purely annexationist : questions of Liberty, 
 Reform or Constitution entering into it merely 
 because synonymous with the doctrines of the 
 House of Savoy. Should the Sicilian revolt 
 prove successful, continental Naples might be 
 drawn into the movement : the provinces lead- 
 ing, the capital following. Such a conse- 
 quence, foreshadowing as it must Italian Unity, 
 would undoubtedly prove most distasteful to 
 Napoleon III. as also to non-Imperial France. 
 Republicanism, the Marquis considers an in- 
 significant element in the present crisis, the 
 frank honesty of the Savoy Dynasty having 
 disarmed the most energetic apostles of that 
 creed. Turning to a consideration of the 
 attitude of foreign diplomacy, Villamarina says 
 in reference to Russia : " I must say that the 
 Representative of this great Power has for 
 several days past insisted, both with the King 
 and with the Government, even putting great 
 vivacity in his arguments, on the necessity, 
 and even the urgency, of adopting a more 
 conciliatory system. Aside from this advice, 
 which is to-day perhaps rather tardy, he holds 
 aloof, and maintains a strict reserve. " This 
 attitude is ascribed by Villamarina as due not
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 185 
 
 to special friendliness for Piedmont, but to the 
 desire to be revenged on Austria and wipe 
 out the humiliations imposed by the Court of 
 Vienna in 1856. As far as England was con- 
 cerned there appeared no difficulty whatever. 
 The Marquis placed no faith in the insinua- 
 tions, fostered by Continental jealousies, that 
 Great Britain aimed at gaining possession of 
 Sicily ; nor did he anticipate any opposition on 
 the part of that Power to the eventual achieve- 
 ment of Italian Unity. Her Majesty's Minister 
 at Naples had frankly and openly declared to 
 him that England would not repudiate, where 
 Naples was concerned, the principles she had 
 admitted in Central Italy ; provided the annexa- 
 tion be the result of universal popular suffrage, 
 expressed with entire liberty of action, and 
 without pressure or constraint. 
 
 The cession of Nice and Savoy had caused 
 considerable discontent ; but Sir James Hudson, 
 who thoroughly understood and appreciated 
 Cavour's motives, was generously disposed to 
 report the matter in the most favorable light to 
 his Government, and to smooth over all diplo- 
 matic asperities ; while d'Azeglio, who possessed 
 the esteem and confidence of many influen- 
 tial English politicians, labored incessantly to 
 minimize the political importance of France's 
 acquisitions, and was successful in turning the
 
 186 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 wrath of the British Cabinet against the greed 
 of the French Emperor, who had thus ruth- 
 lessly exacted his pound of flesh. 
 
 To cripple Austria, and embarrass her mili- 
 tary independence by encouraging the polit- 
 ical fermentation in Hungary was an essential 
 part of Cavour's general policy. The Italian 
 statesman entertained more or less secret re- 
 lations with the great Hungarian patriot and 
 agitator, Louis Kossuth, as well as with his 
 accredited agents, principally Klapka, Pulszky 
 and Teleki, who spent much of their time in 
 Turin, and kept their chief accurately and 
 minutely informed on all questions of current 
 interest. Kossuth, with whom the Emperor 
 Napoleon III. was also in frequent and intimate 
 communication, and who exercised an undoubt- 
 ed influence both in Paris and Turin, was 
 tolerated, even sympathized with, yet distrust- 
 ed, in official England. Moral encouragement 
 had not been withheld the Hungarian agitator 
 in London and Paris, while Turin had given 
 more substantial support in the shape of funds 
 and arms. In the complications resulting 
 from the proposed annexations in northern and 
 central Italy, and during the Neapolitan crisis 
 the importance of the r61e Hungary might as- 
 sume was clearly recognized. " The Hungarian 
 question," wrote Cavour to Lorenzo Valerio,
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF 187 
 
 Governor of Como (near which place Kossuth 
 was staying in the spring of 1860), " is for us of 
 supreme importance. It is closely allied with 
 onr own. Without the co-operation of Hungary 
 the seizure of the Quadrilateral is an extremely 
 risky undertaking ; nevertheless it must be at- 
 tempted, not so much for the liberation of 
 Italy from the Austrians as for our protection 
 from anarchical revolution." 
 
 Pulszky, who obtained an audience with 
 Victor Emmanuel shortly after Garibaldi's ar- 
 rival in Sicily, in his report of the conversation 
 to Kossuth, represents the King as answering 
 his request for a fresh consignment of arms, 
 with the significant remark that all available 
 arms were sent to Sicily to be kept in readiness 
 for use in Naples. " We are on the eve of 
 great events," said the King. " It is possible 
 that Austria will attack us : I should be glad 
 of it : I would courageously resist the on- 
 slaught. I have still many accounts to settle 
 with Austria ; the exile and death of my father 
 are not yet avenged. I know they hate me, 
 and they have good reason for so doing. . . . 
 In a month we shall know if we are to have 
 war this year; (' preparez-vous ') hold your- 
 selves in readiness/' * 
 
 * Chiala, Politica Secreta di Napoleone III. e di 
 Cavour.
 
 188 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 It was to this plotting Prince Albert object- 
 ed, deeming it unworthy of a great statesman. 
 It would, however, be exacting too much of 
 any statesman, especially one situated as was 
 Cavour, to renounce the use of clandestine 
 weapons in combating a crafty foe of im- 
 measurably greater numerical strength ; or to 
 look for an over-scrupulous interpretation of 
 the rigid ethics of international obligations in 
 times of peace, pending the solution of a crisis 
 involving national existence. And especially 
 when it was patent that Austria neglected no 
 opportunity of opposing the full force of her 
 diplomatic and dynastic influences to circum- 
 vent the legitimate aspirations towards the Nea- 
 politan alliance, and the adoption of a purely 
 national policy in Italy. If Cavour outwit- 
 ted European diplomacy he was merely the 
 winner in a contest of official duplicity in which 
 many of his competitors overreached them- 
 selves, and became the victims of their own 
 double-dealing. Yet notwithstanding the pro- 
 bability of England's complacence, and the con- 
 viction that the French Emperor, by virtue of 
 the recently concluded territorial bargain, must 
 needs "laisser faire" should an issue of the 
 Neapolitan question be forced upon him, Cavour 
 with true statesmanlike foresight, and the very 
 thorough knowledge he possessed of national
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 189 
 
 idiosyncrasies, preferred that evolution rather 
 than revolution should be the means employed. 
 Besides these prudential preferences, the polit- 
 ical horizon beyond the Alps did not at this 
 moment (April) appear sufficiently free from 
 clouds to warrant a radical change of policy. 
 
 It was therefore under his advice that Victor 
 Emmanuel wrote a carefully worded proposal 
 (partaking somewhat of the nature of a warn- 
 ing) to his Cousin of Naples : " . . . We 
 have reached a period when Italy can be divided 
 into two powerful States ; one in the North, 
 the other in the South ; two States which by 
 the adoption of one and the same National 
 policy, could maintain the great conception 
 of our time : National Independence. The 
 principle of Dualism, provided it be well estab- 
 lished and honestly adhered to, may yet be 
 accepted by Italians. ... If you allow some 
 months to elapse without giving your adherence 
 to my friendly suggestion, your Majesty will 
 understand the bitterness of those terrible 
 words, 'too late,' as experienced by a member 
 of your family in 1830 in Paris : perhaps Ital- 
 ians may concentrate all their hopes on a single 
 head, and there are duties which, however 
 painful, an Italian Prince must accept. There- 
 fore let us devote ourselves jointly to so noble 
 a task ; let us demonstrate to the Holy Father
 
 190 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the necessity of granting legitimate reforms ; 
 let us bind our States with a bond of real 
 friendship, whence will undoubtedly spring the 
 grandeur of our common country. Grant 
 without delay a Liberal Constitution to your 
 subjects ; make appeal to the influence of the 
 men who are most esteemed on account of the 
 sufferings they have endured in the cause of 
 Liberty. Efface all suspicions from the minds 
 of your people, and let us conclude a perpetual 
 alliance between the two most powerful States 
 of the Peninsula. Thus shall we secure for 
 our country the inestimable advantage of being 
 the arbiter of its destinies. ... * 
 
 " Whom the Gods destroy they first drive 
 mad." Victor Emmanuel's personal appeal 
 was received in the same spirit of stubborn 
 antagonism as had been the advice of his 
 diplomatic representatives, and the counsels of 
 France and England. Even the encourage- 
 ment of Kussia, which favored the proposed 
 alliance, was powerless against the opposition 
 of the Pope, who objected to Francis that inti- 
 mate relations between the Neapolitan and 
 Sardinian Courts must unavoidably imply 
 acquiescence in the spoliations of which the 
 Church had been the victim. 
 
 * Victor Emmanuel to Francis II., April 23, 1860.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Revolutionary plotting. Morelli in Calabria. Garibaldi and 
 Tennyson. Preparations for Garibaldi's expedition. Maz- 
 zini indorses Unity and Victor Emmanuel. Conspiracy and 
 Massacre of La Gancia. Risings in Sicily, their repression. 
 Diplomatic protests. Nunziante's mission. Rumors of 
 Garibaldi's expedition. Plans to frustrate same. Garibaldi 
 lands at Marsala. Lanza sent to Sicily. His methods of 
 combating revolution. Sicily welcomes Garibaldi. 
 
 DURING the early months of 1860 unparal- 
 leled activity reigned amongst the various revo- 
 lutionary committees in Naples, the provinces, 
 and in Sicily. None believed in the mainte- 
 nance of the political " statu quo " ; and the 
 events in Upper Italy, and discouraging atti- 
 tude assumed by the new King, left only a few 
 optimists, or dynastic enthusiasts, with any illu- 
 sions concerning the stability of the Throne. 
 
 In Calabria more especially, the revolution- 
 ary organizations were plotting a general up- 
 rising, and unceasingly laboring for the dissem- 
 ination of their doctrines amongst all classes. 
 
 As early as December, 1859, Donate Morelli, 
 
 one of the most ardent Calabrian patriots, and 
 
 an enthusiastic Unionist, opened a vigorous 
 
 campaign with the object to securing the co- 
 
 191
 
 192 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 operation of Garibaldi in the revolutionary 
 movements of the South. In his letters to the 
 Committee at Naples, he advises that Garibaldi 
 be urged to organize an expedition to the Cala- 
 brian coast. A couple of thousand men, well 
 officered, and provided with efficient arms, 
 munitions, and a dozen field-pieces, would, 
 Morelli is confident, be successful. Everything 
 is in readiness in the southern provinces, and 
 only the initiative of Garibaldi is needful. 
 ' f We dwell over a mine," he writes, " and 
 must either fire the train or withdraw the 
 charge ; otherwise there is imminent danger 
 that it explode spontaneously ; " and the en- 
 terprise be thereby seriously compromised, for 
 " the young men already champ the bits which 
 restrain their generous impulses, and reproach 
 us with the tremendous responsibility we as- 
 sume in deferring action." 
 
 The Central Committee in Naples, in ac- 
 knowledging Morelli's eloquent appeal, declines 
 the responsibility of a resolution, and contents 
 itself with cautioning the Calabrian chief to 
 use extreme prudence in his relations with the 
 various sub-committees throughout his district. 
 Morelli, nothing daunted, redoubled his mar- 
 vellous energy, and doggedly continued his 
 propaganda, contributing inestimable services 
 in the preparation of the political soil, and the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 193 
 
 planting of the seed which was to flourish so 
 luxuriantly six months later. 
 
 But the cry for Garibaldi was soon taken up. 
 The name of the popular hero exercised a po- 
 tent fascination over the people of Southern 
 Italy, and inspired even the Neapolitan troops 
 with vague awe. The legends of his exploits 
 in America acquired fabulous proportions in 
 the minds of the ignorant and impressionable 
 Southerners, while the traditions of 1849, and 
 the memory of the precipitous retreat of Vel- 
 letri when the Bourbon arms fled before the 
 red-shirted warriors of the Eoman Tribune, 
 were still fresh in the recollections of the sol- 
 diers of Francis II. De Cesare says that even 
 before the General landed at Marsala, or had 
 entered Palermo, his invincibility had become 
 legendary amongst the populations of the Two 
 Sicilies. He was believed to be endowed with 
 superhuman powers : in his presence the op- 
 posing forces melted away ; he had conquered 
 all those who measured themselves against him, 
 and only a few months ago the Anstrians in 
 Lombardy had been routed. His proud, and 
 at the same time benevolent physiognomy, con- 
 firmed this belief, and was universally known 
 by means of innumerable reproductions of his 
 portrait. 
 
 During Garibaldi's sojourn in England, in
 
 194 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 1864, he visited Tennyson, who " was charmed 
 with his simplicity," but thought that in 
 worldly matters he seemed to have the " divine 
 stupidity of a hero." In a note to the Duke 
 of Argyle the Poet refers to this visit : 
 "... What a noble human being ! I ex- 
 pected to see a hero and I was not disappointed. 
 One cannot exactly say of him what Chaucer 
 says of the ideal Knight, ' As meke he was of 
 port as is a maid;' he is more majestic than 
 meek, and his manners have a certain divine 
 simplicity in them, such as I have never wit- 
 nessed in a native of these islands, among men 
 at least, and they are gentler than those of 
 most young maidens whom I know. He came 
 here and smoked his cigar in my little room 
 and we had half an hour's talk in English, though 
 I doubt whether he understood me perfectly, 
 and his meaning was often obscure to me. . . . 
 I happened to make use of this expression, 
 ' That fatal debt of gratitude owed by Italy to 
 Napoleon.' * Gratitude,' he said; 'hasn't he 
 had his pay ? his reward ? If Napoleon were 
 dead I should be glad, and if I were dead he 
 would be glad." ; 
 
 Donato Morelli's activity on the mainland 
 was ably seconded in Sicily by Francesco Crispi 
 and Rosolino Pilo, both natives of the island. 
 As agent of the revolutionary committee Crispi
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 195 
 
 who in spite of long exile was thoroughly in 
 touch with the political aspirations of his fellow- 
 citizens made two expeditions throughout the 
 island, and carefully laid down the lines for 
 the new movement prepared by the exiles in 
 Turin. At this period Crispi was an ardent 
 Republican, and as a disciple of Mazzini, was 
 looked upon with suspicion by Cavour, to whom 
 he made known the result of his investigations 
 and applied for material aid. With Farini, 
 then Governor of Modena, he was more suc- 
 cessful, however, receiving the promise of a 
 million francs towards the organization of the 
 projected expedition which he sought to induce 
 Garibaldi to command. 
 
 Petty jealousies and dissensions amongst the 
 leaders and instigators of the auxiliary expedi- 
 tion from Northern Italy, together with the 
 hesitation of Garibaldi to assume the respon- 
 sibility of the command, caused the miscarriage 
 of expected co-operation between the exiles and 
 their impatient brethren in the South when, on 
 April fourth, the flame burst forth in Palermo. 
 
 Meanwhile public opinion was electrified by 
 a renunciation, or modification, of creed com- 
 ing from a most unexpected quarter. The ac- 
 tion of Mazzini, who, in launching his soul- 
 inspiring proclamation to the Sicilians, coupled 
 the destruction of the Bourbons with the war-
 
 196 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 cry of " Annexation " and " Long Live Victor 
 Emmanuel, King of Italy," overcame all hesi- 
 tation, and rallied the independent parties to 
 the banner of Savoy. " Before I became a 
 Republican," he wrote, " I was a Unionist ; I 
 thought that the Republic alone could lead to 
 unity, I was mistaken. Victor Emmanuel has 
 carried Italy nearer this goal, and will lead her 
 thither if the people lend him their support. 
 For this reason I sacrifice old theories, and with 
 you, Sicilians, and with all the other Peoples 
 of the Peninsula, who in future will become 
 one People, with you I cry : l Long Live Vic- 
 tor Emmanuel, King of Italy ! Sicilians, the 
 hour has come ; in the name of Italy, to arms ! ' " 
 
 Mazzini's formal and unconditional indorse- 
 ment of the revolutionary programme of Unity 
 under the House of Savoy, caused the wildest 
 enthusiasm throughout Italy. In Naples tri- 
 color badges and ribbons made their appear- 
 ance in the streets, or were thrown from the 
 galleries of the theatres, in spite of the re- 
 doubled vigilance and severity of the Police. 
 
 Twenty-four hours previous to the outbreak 
 in Palermo the Count of Syracuse addressed a 
 solemn warning to his nephew, pointing out 
 the dangers of the present policy and terminat- 
 ing as follows : "One single course remains 
 open for the salvation of the country and the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 197 
 
 dynasty, threatened with dire peril : namely, 
 the adoption of a national policy which, having 
 its foundation in the real interests of the State 
 naturally indicates that the interests of the 
 realm be amalgamated with those of Upper 
 Italy." 
 
 Although there would appear to be a direct 
 connection between the Prince's words and the 
 almost simultaneous thunder-clap in Sicily, 
 such is not really the case. That the Count of 
 Syracuse, owing to his avowed sympathies with 
 the Liberal Party, was aware that a rising was 
 projected in the island is possible ; but the ex- 
 plosion in Palermo being due to fortuitous cir- 
 cumstances of which he could not have been 
 cognizant at the time, precludes the supposi- 
 tion that he counted on its effect to augment 
 the significance of his warning. Nevertheless 
 the more bigoted of the " Camarilla" persisted 
 in tracing the conspiracy to the Count, and, 
 incredible as it must appear, persuaded 
 Francis that the whole affair was a trap to 
 frighten him into the acceptance of the desired 
 alliance. 
 
 The conspiracy of La Gancia had been organ- 
 ized in accordance with the scheme for the up- 
 rising fomented by Crispi in his recent visits to 
 Sicily, and was intended to co-operate with the 
 expedition from Piedmont, promised by Crispi
 
 198 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 and Pilo. The monastery of that name situ- 
 ated on the outskirts of Palermo had been 
 selected as a deposit for arms and ammunition, 
 gradually collected for use at a propitious mo- 
 ment. Information having been furnished 
 Maniscalco, a famous chief of the Sicilian Po- 
 lice, on April 3rd, by a treacherous inmate of 
 the establishment, to the effect that arms were 
 concealed in the building, and that it was the 
 habitual meeting place of Liberalist conspira- 
 tors well known to the Police, steps were im- 
 mediately taken to raid the premises. In con- 
 cert with General Salzano, Military Commander 
 of Palermo, Maniscalco penetrated into the 
 buildings and instituted a search, which, how- 
 ever, revealed nothing of a more revolutionary 
 character than a dozen monks calmly perform- 
 ing their evening devotional exercises. Never- 
 theless, convinced of the accuracy of his infor- 
 mation, the suspicious Chief of Police caused 
 the monastery to be closely watched during the 
 night, and aided by the soldiery completely 
 surrounded the buildings. Trapped like mice 
 the insurgents who had lain concealed in the 
 vaults during the search, rashly opened fire on 
 the Koyalists at daybreak ; the Church bells 
 sounding a general alarm. Cries of "Viva 
 1'Italia ; Viva Vittorio Emmanuele" resounded 
 on all sides, as the troops stormed the monas-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 199 
 
 tery and breaking in the doors were soon en- 
 gaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with the 
 inmates. The defenders, few in number, were 
 quickly overpowered ; nineteen Liberals and 
 one monk were put to death, and many wounded. 
 Having gained possession, the soldiery com- 
 pletely sacked and devastated the premises, 
 carrying off even the sacred images and objects 
 of ritual. 
 
 General Salzano, fearing further disturb- 
 ances, immediately placed the city under mar- 
 tial law, and demanded the consignment of all 
 fire-arms within a delay of twenty-four hours, 
 under penalty of death. Maniscalco, in the 
 meanwhile, lost not a moment in placing under 
 arrest all citizens suspected of participation in 
 the conspiracy, or known as sympathizers with 
 the Liberalists. Amongst those imprisoned 
 were Baron Riso, whose son had been wounded 
 at La Gancia ; Prince Niscemi, Prince Giardi- 
 nelli, Chevalier Sangiovanni, and many others 
 of social and political prominence. 
 
 In spite of the crushing defeat suffered by 
 their comrades in Palermo the insurrectionists 
 throughout the island rose against their op- 
 pressors, and joined in the cry for " Italy and 
 Victor Emmanuel." Bloody encounters took 
 place at Bagheria, Misimeri, Carini, and Par- 
 tinico, and quickly spread to other towns and
 
 200 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 villages of the provinces. Rosolino Pilo, who 
 had landed secretly just after the disaster at 
 La Gancia, hastened to undertake the organi- 
 zation of the scattered hands ; at the same 
 time urgently petitioning Garibaldi to no 
 longer delay his expedition for the liberation 
 of the unhappy island. Through his instru- 
 mentality the following proclamation was cir- 
 culated over the length and breadth of Sicily, 
 and kept alive the flagging energies of the 
 patriots : " The blood of the massacred martyrs 
 cries out for vengeance. Let all prepare to 
 fight. We will no longer have peace until 
 Sicily be united to our common country, 
 Italy!" 
 
 In Naples the news caused intense excite- 
 ment in the Liberal ranks, although the Court 
 and official world made light of the incident. 
 In the streets seditious cries for Italy and 
 Victor Emmanuel kept the police busy with 
 arrests ; while the sympathy openly expressed 
 for the Sicilians might have been supposed to 
 enlighten the most deluded optimists as to the 
 trend of public sentiment. 
 
 None could fairly question the right of 
 Francis to chastise his rebellious subjects. 
 Unfortunately for the Neapolitan Monarch the 
 zeal of his agents exceeded all bounds, and the 
 barbarous punishment, and wholesale execu-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 201 
 
 tiona, aroused the humanitarian instincts of 
 civilized Europe. The reign of Ferdinand II. , 
 so replete with shocking abuses and political 
 persecutions as revealed in the widely-circulated 
 letters of Mr. Gladstone nine years earlier, was 
 not forgotten. Philanthropic legislators in 
 foreign lands, recalling the descriptions of the 
 atrocities perpetrated during those years, and 
 aware that Francis refused to depart one iota 
 from the mistaken policy of his father, now 
 asked whether they were to be called upon to 
 passively witness a repetition of those horrors. 
 The Military Commission in Palermo organized 
 for the trial of those suspected of participation 
 in the recent outbreak appeared to have lost 
 all sense of moderation in its thirst for blood. 
 Both the English and French diplomatic rep- 
 resentatives in Naples, horrified at the reports 
 received from the Sicilian capital, protested to 
 Francis in the name of outraged humanity. 
 " I fear/* wrote Brenier to his Government, 
 " that the military justice of the King of 
 Naples will cause more blood to flow than was 
 shed during the actual insurrection, and that 
 it will be even more effective in severing Sicily 
 from the Throne of the Bourbons than the 
 rebellion." 
 
 Francis finally yielded to the protestations of 
 diplomacy, and, on May seventh, so far re-
 
 202 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 strained the ferocity of his agents as to decree 
 that no capital execution should be carried out 
 without his personal consent. 
 
 Meanwhile the repressive measures instituted 
 by General Salzano were vigorously prosecuted, 
 the Royalist troops attacking, and in most 
 cases routing, the insurgents, who disbanded 
 only to form again in the mountainous districts 
 where pursuit was attended by almost insur- 
 mountable difficulties. Again, unfortunately 
 for the King of Naples, the officers in com- 
 mand of the Royal Troops allowed their men 
 to commit excesses of such flagrant brutality, 
 burning and pillaging towns and villages, and 
 torturing the miserable victims suspected of 
 collusion with the rebels, that the sympathies 
 not only of liberal-minded foreigners, but of 
 many loyal Neapolitans, were actively enlisted 
 in the cause of the unhappy islanders, while 
 the blood of the Liberals throughout Italy 
 boiled with indignation. 
 
 Francis, rudely awakened from the rosy 
 dreams of security in which the courtiers of 
 the " Camarilla" sought to keep him by studi- 
 ously belittling the importance of the insur- 
 rection, or its consequences, finally decided to 
 despatch General Nunziante to examine and 
 report on the situation in the island. The 
 result of this investigation, which was reported
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 203 
 
 personally to the King by Nunziante, and cor- 
 roborated by Acton, who commanded the 
 steamer which carried him ; was most discour- 
 aging, amounting in fact to a thinly veiled 
 insinuation that under a continuance of the 
 existing official regime, the island must inevi- 
 tably be lost to the Crown. The Prince of 
 Castelcicala, Lord Lieutenant and Commander 
 in Chief of the forces in Sicily, had on a recent 
 visit to the capital assured the King that the 
 utmost quiet reigned throughout the island. 
 Deeply chagrined by the lamentable failure of 
 his political insight, and dismayed at the pro- 
 portions the conspiracy had developed (some 
 say doubting his competency to cope with it) 
 Castelcicala tendered his resignation on April 
 15th, together with the request that he be im- 
 mediately relieved of the responsibility of office. 
 This request was not granted, however, until 
 a month later ; and in consequence the un- 
 happy Lord Lieutenant suffered the additional 
 mortification of having heaped upon his head 
 the bitter reproaches of the Court for his 
 failure to prevent the first brilliant success of 
 Garibaldi's invasion. " The men who will 
 land in Sicily/' wrote Francis a few days after 
 the proffered resignation, " will certainly not 
 be less than a thousand ; add to this number 
 those from the villages and outlying districts
 
 204 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 who will rise after the landing, and those who 
 will be furnished with arms and ammunitions 
 brought by the expedition, and it is evident 
 that one single battalion cannot stand against 
 such a concourse. I leave for you to imagine 
 the pitiable effect which would be produced, 
 should the regiment be defeated in the first 
 encounter, or worse still, be made prisoner, 
 and transported abroad as a trophy. For this 
 reason strong concentrations of troops should 
 be arranged, that these may act in concert with 
 the detachments destined to operate where the 
 filibusters may land, in order to take them 
 between two fires. " 
 
 In spite of these military preparations the 
 unpleasant revelations contained in the report 
 of Nunziante and Acton respecting the degree 
 of confidence to be reposed in the officers and 
 troops in the island, decided Francis to essay a 
 policy of opportunism, the propagation of 
 which, however, earned him not gratitude but 
 indignation, mingled with a feeling akin to 
 contempt. Instructions were issued from 
 Naples to raise the state of siege, and to deal 
 leniently with the malcontents ; for it was 
 recognized that should Garibaldi's threatened 
 expedition take place, and a landing be suc- 
 cessfully effected, the Rebellion of to-day would 
 rapidly be converted into the Revolution of to-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 205 
 
 morrow. Half measures of any description 
 now came too late. The brutality of the mili- 
 tary and police had snapped the last feeble 
 link which bound the Sicilians to their legiti- 
 mate Sovereign. Nor could it be expected 
 that with the promise of aid in the immediate 
 future from the renowned Garibaldi, in whose 
 invincibility they firmly believed, the harassed 
 and hunted bands of Rosolino Pilo, would pas- 
 sively surrender their arms and persons to the 
 discretionary clemency of the Bourbon, the 
 value of whose assurances the dread experience 
 of the past had taught them to correctly ap- 
 preciate. As a consequence, although the in- 
 surrection was apparently crushed in the towns 
 of the seaboard, it burned fiercely in the 
 mountainous districts where the organized 
 bands had taken refuge, pending the advent of 
 the long-awaited succor from over the sea. 
 
 At eight o'clock on the evening of May 6, 
 1860, in the midst of the Court preparations 
 for a ceremonious visit on the morrow to the 
 venerated shrine of San Gennaro, a telegram 
 arrived from Chevalier Canofari, Neapolitan 
 Envoy at Turin, warning his Government that 
 Garibaldi had sailed. The uncertainty to the 
 movements of the expedition prevented any con- 
 crete plan for the concentration or disposal of 
 the naval and military forces of the Kingdom.
 
 206 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Would the two steamers seized by the filibus- 
 ters attempt a landing on the Calabrian coast, 
 or make directly for Sicily ? The fact that 
 Garibaldi with his lieutenants, Crispi, Bertani, 
 Bixio and Medici, were plotting and organizing 
 the expedition at Genoa, was of course known 
 to the Neapolitan police, but the secret of the 
 choice of a landing place had been well kept, 
 or was rather so entirely dependant on circum- 
 stances impossible to foresee, as to partake 
 more of the nature of expediency or sudden 
 inspiration. The vessels of the Neapolitan 
 squadron had been given instructions as early 
 as April twentieth to keep a sharp lookout ; 
 and their commanders received a broad official 
 hint not to hesitate to overhaul suspicious 
 strangers flying a friendly flag. 
 
 Although the news was concealed from the 
 public, it leaked out on the following day 
 when the French mail steamer from Genoa 
 reached Naples ; and the knowledge that Gari- 
 baldi had succeeded in evading the Piedmontese 
 authorities, who it was feared might hesitate 
 to carry complaisant near-sightedness to the 
 length of an official cecity so manifestly a vio- 
 lation of international etiquette, caused the 
 most frantic joy amongst the Liberals. 
 
 After attending the religious function, for 
 which elaborate preparations had been made,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 207 
 
 Francis sent for General Filangieri, and com- 
 municating the news to him without apparent 
 emotion or appreciation of its significance, 
 asked the old statesman's advice concerning 
 the despatch of fresh troops to Sicily. 
 
 On the eleventh the telegraph brought the 
 news of the landing of Garibaldi at Marsala, 
 and the " Official Journal" which had ignored 
 the report of the sailing of the expedition, in an 
 issue a couple of days later laconically referred 
 to the " flagrant act of piracy which was con- 
 summated on the eleventh instant, by the 
 landing of an armed forced at Marsala." 
 
 While persisting in representing the expedi- 
 tion to his own subjects as of small importance ; 
 the raid of a band of rapacious brigands, who 
 burned and devastated the districts they over- 
 ran ; threatening, bribing, or coercing the 
 peaceful peasants to join their ranks, Francis 
 now sufficiently realized the gravity of the 
 situation to make an urgent protest at Turin, 
 and to despatch the following circular to all 
 Neapolitan diplomatic representatives abroad : 
 " In spite of communications from Turin, and 
 the promise of that Government to prevent the 
 expedition openly organized and armed by 
 brigands, it sailed nevertheless, under the very 
 eyes of the Sardinian fleet, and yesterday landed 
 at Marsala. Inform the Government to which
 
 208 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 you are accredited of this act of savage piracy 
 promoted by a friendly State. " 
 
 At the Council of State held in Naples on 
 the fourteenth, to which Filangieri had been 
 bidden, and at which the Count of Aquila also 
 assisted, Sicilian affairs formed the sole subject 
 of debate. The Cabinet were unanimous in 
 their desire that Filangieri, vested with plen- 
 ary authority, should go to Sicily. The old 
 General, however, refused, putting forward his 
 advanced age, and the physical impossibility of 
 assuming at such a crisis so onerous a charge. 
 In vain did Francis plead that again the Mon- 
 archy would be indebted to him for the preser- 
 vation of Sicily ; Filangieri persisted in his 
 refusal to undertake the operations, although 
 he suggested a plan of campaign, which was 
 accepted. At the further recommendation of 
 Filangieri, General Ferdinand Lanza, an old 
 Sicilian, was appointed as the successor of 
 Prince Castelcicala ; and in spite of his remon- 
 strances and discouraging prognostications, 
 was hurried off to Palermo, where, on the 
 seventeenth, he assumed the reins of govern- 
 ment and the command of the troops in the 
 island. 
 
 Lanza presented himself to his countrymen 
 next day, armed with a proclamation redolent 
 with conciliatory sentiment, promises of moral
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 209 
 
 and material ameliorations, and the offer of a 
 free and generous pardon, in the name of his 
 Sovereign, to all misguided individuals who 
 should now make act of submission to govern- 
 mental authority. Once the pacification of the 
 island accomplished, he was authorized to state 
 that a Prince of the Royal Family had already 
 been selected to reside in their midst as Vice- 
 roy. This functionary would immediately 
 begin the construction of roads, railways, and 
 other works of public utility ; and would de- 
 vote all his energies to the development of the 
 resources and industries of the country, as well 
 as the adoption of every means suggested by 
 experience for the increase of general prosper- 
 ity. With a mild warning of those who heeded 
 the dangerous teachings of crafty agitators, 
 the promulgator called upon his compatriots to 
 cast in their lot with the Royal Troops, under 
 whose protection alone they would find sal- 
 vation. 
 
 Lanza himself could have had but little faith 
 that the anodyne of his well-intentioned but 
 insipid appeal would convince the impenitent 
 insurrectionists, flushed with the strong intoxi- 
 cant of success ; and who had, moreover, in 
 times gone by awaited in vain the execution 
 of the provisions of so many similar documents. 
 Now the revered Leader was actually in their
 
 210 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 midst, and his undertaking had from the start 
 been crowned with tangible results. Even 
 those who would fain have still hung back, or 
 temporized, were drawn forward by the mag- 
 netism of the man, and the enthusiasm of their 
 native leaders. The evening before the publi- 
 cation of his proclamation the tidings of the de- 
 feat of the Royalists at Calatafimi had reached 
 the General. He forwarded the same to Naples 
 in a gloomy despatch describing the condition 
 of the island as most alarming, and the inhab- 
 itants " possessed by the delirium of revolu- 
 tion. " 
 
 Nor could the " alter ego " of the King of 
 the Two Sicilies pretend to ignore the very 
 different conditions prevailing between the 
 forces which now confronted each other. On 
 the one hand wild enthusiasm ; bravery amount- 
 ing to heroism ; an apostolic faith in the cause 
 they served, and for which they cheerfully 
 sacrificed their lives. On the other side an 
 army numerically superior, but lacking an 
 Ideal ; devoid of the stimulus of conviction : 
 an army which bore arms professionally in the 
 service of a Sovereign for whom they personally 
 felt no enthusiasm, nor even the mingled fear 
 and respect his father had inspired. Opposed 
 to them was a leader surrounded with the halo 
 of legendary invincibility, whose name evoked
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 211 
 
 recollections of the fatal retreat of Velletri : a 
 retreat which, as De Cesare justly remarks, 
 "had imbued the Neapolitan army with the 
 conviction of its impotency to combat an enemy 
 who knew not the fear of death." Unlike 
 their opponents whose commander's word was 
 absolute and unquestioned law to his followers, 
 the Neapolitan troops were led by officers whose 
 jealousies, mutual recriminations and accusa- 
 tions of treachery, destroyed the confidence of 
 their subordinates. Add to this the knowledge 
 that the Neapolitan soldier stood alone, while 
 his adversary enjoyed not only the good will of 
 the native population, but felt himself backed 
 by the moral approval of all Italy, and the 
 sympathies of Liberal Europe. 
 
 The history of Garibaldi's astounding achieve- 
 ments is too familiar to require recording 
 here. On May twenty-seventh the General 
 astonished the world by his audacious capture 
 of Palermo ; and shortly after demonstrated by 
 the conclusion of an armistice, in accordance 
 with the terms of which eighteen thousand 
 Neapolitan troops evacuated the capital, that 
 the loss of the island to the Crown of the Two 
 Sicilies was henceforth inevitable, if not already 
 virtually an accomplished fact.
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Cavour and the Sicilian expedition. His relations with 
 Garibaldi. Diplomatic perils. Garibaldi a Republican. 
 His letter to Victor Emmanuel. Cavour to d'Azeglio con- 
 cerning expedition. He explains position of Piedmont. 
 Cavour is blamed. His defence of his policy. A Russian 
 protest. Cavour and European Diplomacy. Anecdotes 
 from his private correspondence. His relations with French 
 and English politicians. Louis Napoleon's entanglements. 
 
 THE attitude assumed by Count Cavour to- 
 wards Garibaldi's expedition, although not 
 openly antagonistic, was one of extreme reserve, 
 and had given great offence to the ultra-Lib- 
 erals, while at the same time it failed to satisfy 
 the Conservative element. The former made 
 no allowance for the embarrassing exigencies of 
 Diplomacy ; the latter witnessed with alarm the 
 thinly concealed collusion of the King's Govern- 
 ment in an undertaking, the startling illegal- 
 ity of which must needs offend the susceptibil- 
 ities of Conservative Europe. The Minister's 
 conduct of affairs was certainly open to mis- 
 conception, and severe criticism : and if in- 
 comprehensible to Garibaldians, and as such 
 condemned by their sympathizers, must be 
 scored in unmeasured terms by scandalized 
 212
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 213 
 
 Conservative Chanceries. Certain it is the 
 great statesman sailed dangerously near the 
 wind on more than one occasion ; while the 
 dust he threw in the eyes of foreign diploma- 
 tists so blinded many of his own compatriots 
 that they failed to credit him with the strict 
 adherence to the fundamental principles he so 
 adroitly juggled with. Considerable friction 
 existed between the Minister and the General 
 consequent on the recent territorial cessions to 
 France, which Garibaldi had bitterly de- 
 nounced. On his side Cavour mistrusted the 
 generous impetuosity of the Free-Lance and 
 self-constituted arbiter of the political destinies 
 of Southern Italy ; and was moreover un- 
 feignedly apprehensive of the influence which 
 might be exercised over him by associates, the 
 orthodoxy of whose political creed was dubious, 
 and who might be assumed to prove utterly 
 callous to the irksome entanglements of the 
 diplomatic obligations he himself was con- 
 strained to propitiate, if not strictly observe. 
 To the Unionists at all costs the bid for the 
 Neapolitan alliance seemed to destroy the only 
 admissible explanation of the cession of Savoy 
 and Nice ; a sacrifice, they argued, might have 
 been avoided had Cavour played off English 
 susceptibilities against French ambitions ; and 
 it consequently became a matter of indifference
 
 214 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 whether they involved the Government in 
 foreign complications through their machina- 
 tions in the Papal and Bonrbon States. Maz- 
 zini had written Garibaldi in January : " I ap- 
 preciate the times : I yield to the Nation : I 
 will not act against the King, I will not con- 
 spire for the Republic ; I only breathe the word 
 'Unity* ; I aim at annexation ; at successfully 
 inciting revolt in Sicily and elsewhere, bargain- 
 ing only for immediate acceptance." But he 
 included in this programme Rome as the Na- 
 tional capital and the ousting of the French ; 
 and therein lay the peril. What Mazzini ad- 
 vocated in January, Garibaldi was prepared to 
 execute in May. The "Vous voila nos com- 
 plices " gleefully uttered by Cavour when the 
 French Plenipotentiary affixed his signature 
 to the treaty of March twenty-fourth, might 
 be interpreted as the implied recognition of a 
 certain license in the Sicilian question, but 
 could not possibly be stretched into a reference 
 to Rome. 
 
 La Farina, who labored to allay the suspi- 
 cions lurking in Cavonr's mind, concerning the 
 orthodoxy of Garibaldi's political creed and 
 loyalty, informed the Minister on April twenty- 
 fourth that his fears of Mazzini's influence 
 were needless, since a ' ' pronounced discord " 
 existed between the General and the celebrated
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 215 
 
 agitator. Yet this disagreement was but a 
 passing one, and in spite of Mazzini's renun- 
 ciation of his personal preferences, Cavonr 
 considered that he had good ground for his 
 misgivings as to the depth and sincerity of the 
 monarchical convictions of the late Republi- 
 cans. 
 
 An anecdote related by Aurelio Bellisomi 
 gives color to the suspicion of temporary sub- 
 servience to a political expedient, entertained 
 by Cavour. On April twentieth an applicant 
 for enrollment in the proposed expedition, 
 asked Garibaldi whether it would not be pos- 
 sible to omit the arms of the House of Savoy 
 from the banner under the aegis of which it 
 was designed to combat. " My son/' he re- 
 plied, " you are aware that I am as much of a 
 Republican as you are ; but you must make 
 the same sacrifice I do, because it is necessary 
 for Italian Unity." That Garibaldi never 
 wavered for an instant, his loyal allegiance 
 once spontaneously offered, became evident in 
 the sequel ; at the same time the above con- 
 versation, which is quoted by White Mario * 
 affords partial justification of Cavour's misap- 
 prehensions, for which he has been so roughly 
 handled by the more enthusiastic biographers 
 of the Garibaldian heroes. 
 
 * " Agostino Bertani e i suoi Tempi."
 
 216 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Nothing more frank and loyal than Gari- 
 baldi's farewell address to Victor Emmanuel, 
 as the expedition sailed from Quarto could 
 well be desired. 
 
 "I did not counsel the insurrectionary 
 movement of my brothers in Sicily/' he wrote, 
 " but the moment they rose in the name of 
 Italian Unity, of which Your Majesty is the 
 personification, against the most infamous 
 tyranny of oar epoch, I did not hesitate to 
 place myself at the head of the expedition. 
 Our war-cry will ever be : ' Long live Italian 
 Unity : Long live Victor Emmanuel, its fore- 
 most and bravest soldier ! ' " 
 
 Two days after the departure (nominally if 
 not effectively clandestine) of " The Tliousand," 
 Cavour forwarded to the Marquis d'Azeglio, 
 his intimate friend and confidante, as well as 
 official representative in London, a letter in 
 which his position is so clearly outlined that it 
 seems permissible to transcribe it in its entirety. 
 Dated from Turin, on May eighth, 1860, 
 whither he had hurriedly returned from Bo- 
 logna on receipt of the news, Cavour writes : 
 " The events in Sicily have decided me to 
 depart from the reserve which I had assumed 
 vis-a-vis the English Government in con- 
 sequence of the sentiment of distrust which 
 the affair of Savoy had unfortunately kindled
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 217 
 
 against us in England. Whatever the differ- 
 ence of views which manifested themselves on 
 this occasion between the Ministers of Her 
 Britannic Majesty and myself, a difference I 
 sincerely deplore, it seems to me indubitable 
 that England and Sardinia have, as concerns 
 Sicily, but one and the same interest. In 
 reality (as you have frequently had occasion to 
 repeat to Lord Palmerston and Lord John 
 (Russell) we have no other aim than that of 
 restoring Italy to the Italians ; of founding on 
 a real and durable basis the independence of 
 the Peninsula ; and of freeing it from all moral 
 as well as material subjection. We ceded 
 Savoy and Nice only because, rightly or 
 wrongly, we are convinced that those districts 
 cannot be considered integrally as of Italian 
 nationality. But (as I hastened to inform you 
 by telegraph) we would not yield one inch of 
 Italian territory no matter what advantages 
 might be offered with the exchange. You can 
 consequently absolutely deny the absurd rumor 
 relative to the cession of Genoa, or any other 
 portion of Liguria, to France. Lord Palmer- 
 ston and Lord John have too much clairvoyance 
 not to believe in the sincerity of this declara- 
 tion. By the treaty of Marcli 24th we sought 
 to deprive France of all pretexts for hindering 
 the furtherance of our policy in Italy. I hope
 
 218 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 to have succeeded : at least as far as Sicily is 
 concerned, where nobody dreams of Muratism. * 
 But if the agreement with France costs us such 
 efforts and sacrifices, the understanding with 
 England should be quite a matter of course 
 and almost self-evident. I am too well ac- 
 quainted with the existing principles in Eng- 
 lish politics to credit the old stagers who at- 
 tribute to Lord Palmerston designs for the 
 conquest of Sicily, and of the project of turn- 
 ing the island into a fief under an English pro- 
 tectorate. In Sicily, as in Central Italy, Eng- 
 land can have but one object : to leave the 
 Italians masters to decide their destiny ; to 
 prevent any foreign intervention or influence. 
 This is just what we desire ; for, I repeat it, I 
 am first of all an Italian, and it is in order that 
 my country may enjoy " self-government," * * 
 at home and abroad, that I have undertaken 
 the arduous task of driving Austria out of 
 Italy, without substituting the domination of 
 any other Power. You will be careful there- 
 fore to explain to Lord Palmerston that, in the 
 Sicilian affair, we desire first of all to put our- 
 selves in perfect accord with England. We 
 did not encourage Garibaldi to embark upon 
 this adventure, which appeared to us foolhardy. 
 
 *The italics do not exist in the original text. 
 * * The words are in English in the original.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 219 
 
 We regretted the precipitation which causes us 
 the most cruel embarrassment, and which may 
 dangerously compromise the future of Italy. 
 Nevertheless we respected the highly honorable 
 motives which inspired his audacious resolu- 
 tion, and toe did not consider ourselves authorized 
 to prevent by force efforts which aimed at amel- 
 iorating the fate of the Sicilians. If Gari- 
 baldi succeeds ; if the great majority of Sicilians 
 cluster around him ; ive only ask for them the 
 full liberty of deciding their destiny ; of making 
 of the independence they have acquired the usage 
 which seems to them most advisable. * I hasten 
 to give you these explanations. In communi- 
 cating them to Lord Palmerston, and Lord 
 John, you will add, my dear Marquis, that in 
 order to satisfy the pressing solicitations of 
 Russia, I had inserted in the " Official Gazette" 
 of to-day an article which refutes the rumors of 
 the complicity of the Government of the King 
 in Garibaldi's expedition. " * * 
 
 As was to be expected, however, European 
 Diplomacy saddled Cavour with the moral 
 responsibility of Garibaldi's action ; charging 
 the Piedmontese Government with tacit com- 
 plicity, if not active participation in the enter- 
 
 The italics do not exist in the original. 
 * *Nicomede Bianchi " La Politique du Comte de 
 Cavour."
 
 220 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 prise. But although the various Cabinets 
 stormed and vigorously protested, the policy of 
 non-intervention was not departed from. It 
 was speedily manifest, moreover, that public 
 opinion throughout Europe (and especially in 
 England) did not concur with the official 
 world in its scandalized condemnation of so 
 flagrant a breach of neighborly relations. 
 Occurring between States of a common na- 
 tionality, whose political division was consid- 
 ered by many an anomaly, and by those profess- 
 ing the sacred principles of consanguinity 
 loudly proclaimed a detrimental anachronism, 
 the " international " aspect of the incident 
 appealed no more strongly to the general public 
 than had the recent events enacted in Tuscany 
 and the Duchies. 
 
 But if public opinion viewed with leniency 
 an episode, the chivalrous character of which 
 powerfully appealed to the imagination, the 
 official world was less inclined to condone the 
 triumph of a revolutionary movement, the 
 threatened extension of which must inevitably 
 entail a shifting of the existing political equilib- 
 rium, by the foundation of a new Great Power 
 on the ruins of the petty sovereignties of Italy : 
 a probability not to be contemplated without 
 concern. 
 
 It is characteristic of the man that Cavour
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 221 
 
 unhesitatingly accepted a situation not of his 
 own making, seeking the furtherance of his 
 fundamental policy in spite of the new dangers 
 and complications which surrounded him, with 
 a skill and patience which compelled the admira- 
 tion of the more broad-minded of his opponents. 
 Without repudiating Garibaldi, an action which 
 would have destroyed his personal influence 
 with the Liberals and Nationalists, and unques- 
 tionably, in view of the rapid and complete 
 success of the expedition, have lost Victor 
 Emmanuel his popularity, while it might even 
 have menaced the existence of the Dynasty, he 
 contrived to turn the tables on the more im- 
 portunate of his accusers, if not by convincing 
 logic, at least by arguments, the magnificent 
 audacity of which engendered plausibility. 
 Cleverly brandishing the dread spectre of the 
 Republic, or Anarchy, before the eyes of mon- 
 archical Europe, should Victor Emmanuel at- 
 tempt to restrain the explosion of righteous 
 indignation against the systematic tyranny of 
 the Neapolitan Bourbons, he turned upon Aus- 
 tria and England with the sarcastic query : 
 " By what right is Sardinia accused of not 
 having prevented the landing of the audacious 
 adventurer in Sicily when the whole Neapolitan 
 fleet was incapable of doing so ? While Aus- 
 trians and Irish embark without hindrance at
 
 222 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Trieste, in order to flock to the defence of the 
 Pope ; how could the Sardinian Government, 
 even if cognizant of it, prevent Sicilian exile* 
 from aiding their own brothers in the struggle 
 against their oppressors ? " 
 
 From distant Russia the voice of Prince 
 Gortchakoff thundered forth the threat that, as 
 the Government of Turin avowedly found itself 
 dominated by the revolutionary element to the 
 extent of being driven to the disregard of inter- 
 national obligations, all European States should 
 combine for a mutual regulation of their rela- 
 tions with Piedmont : adding that " did the 
 geographical position of his realm not forbid, 
 the Tzar would lend armed assistance to the 
 Neapolitan Bourbons, without regard to the 
 policy of non-intervention proclaimed by the 
 Western Powers." To these continued re- 
 monstrances and threats Cavour replied : " We 
 cannot be less Italian than the English and 
 French, who openly aid Garibaldi's expedition. 
 Not one of the vessels sailing recently for 
 Sicily was under the Sardinian flag : the greater 
 number displayed the American ensign. " The 
 attitude of Prussia was hardly less alarming 
 than that of Austria and the great Northern 
 Empire, but to France and England Cavour 
 looked with most anxiety for the possible check- 
 mate in the game so boldly undertaken. Ap-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 223 
 
 predating that concertive action between the 
 three first named States was an eventuality so 
 remote that he could legitimately discount the 
 risks, he continued to fence with such cleverly 
 intermingled audacity and cunning, that before 
 the bewildered diplomatists had unravelled the 
 import of an ambiguous declaration, they found 
 themselves confronted with fresh entangle- 
 ments which kept them busy until the Minister's 
 projects had become accomplished facts. 
 
 The progress of events was so rapid that, on 
 June twenty-fifth, little more than five weeks 
 after the landing of the expedition, Cavour, 
 referring in a private letter to the proposed 
 intercession to dissuade Garibaldi from crossing 
 to Calabria, remarks : " We will second as far 
 as the continent is concerned for the Maca- 
 roni is not yet cooked ; but as for the 
 oranges which are already on our table, we 
 are quite decided to eat them." 
 
 That the oranges were within his grasp 
 was due to France and England. The attitude 
 of England in regard to the annexation of 
 Tuscany and the Romagna offered a reassuring 
 guarantee as to her probable action in South- 
 ern Italy, which indeed Lord John Russell 
 foreshadowed in the significant despatch of 
 May fifth to the British Ambassador at Vienna, 
 Lord Loftus. " If tyranny and injustice
 
 224 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 are the characteristic traits of the Govern- 
 ment of Southern Italy," he remarks, " those 
 of the Government of Northern Italy are 
 liberty and justice. This being the case, 
 sooner or later the populations of Southern 
 Italy will be politically united to their brothers 
 of the North, and will wish to be ruled by the 
 same Sovereign. ..." As a matter of fact 
 England was deeply concerned with but two 
 eventualities which misrht emanate from the 
 existing, or future, complications in the Penin- 
 sula : firstly, the re-opening of hostilities be- 
 tween Austria and Piedmont ; and secondly, the 
 temptation offered Cavour, by reason of the 
 enormous difficulties surrounding him, to pur- 
 chase the aid of France with further territorial 
 concessions, especially that of the island of 
 Sardinia. The Count's letters to D'Azeglio are 
 full of fervent disclaimers of the reports 
 crediting the Government with such intentions, 
 and indignantly proclaim that, regardless of 
 consequences, not another inch of Italian soil 
 will be yielded. Once this suspicion satisfac- 
 torily dispelled, Great Britain was willing 
 enough to allow matters to follow their natural 
 course ; and not adverse, on occasion, to allow- 
 ing it to be implied that Garibaldi enjoyed, 
 within certain limits, the good-will of English 
 statesmanship, as represented in Lord Palmer-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 225 
 
 stem's Cabinet. Of the sympathy of British 
 public opinion there had been, and was, no 
 room for doubt. 
 
 With France the negotiations were of a more 
 delicate nature, in spite of the "complicity" 
 which Cavour assumed was created with the 
 signature of treaty of March twenty-fourth. 
 The Peace of Villafranca had imbued Italians 
 with an irresistible longing for National Unity, 
 and the Emperor, Napoleon III., was responsi- 
 ble for Villafranca in the eyes of all Italians. 
 He was, moreover, bound by subtle and numer- 
 ous personal ties to the Italian cause. Al- 
 though the political union of the Peninsula 
 must prove unacceptable to those statesmen 
 who foresaw with its achievement the inevi- 
 table decline of French influence, yet the 
 Emperor (whose politics were not by any 
 means always in harmony with those of the 
 majority) could not consistently retract a pol- 
 icy whose fundamental lines were based on 
 the extension of the principle of national- 
 ities, and for the defence of which the blood 
 of his soldiers had been so recently shed. Of 
 this Cavour felt reasonably convinced ; yet the 
 vehement protestations from Paris called forth 
 by Garibaldi's action were disconcerting. Un- 
 doubtedly Napoleon III. viewed with disap- 
 proval this wholesale annexation, together with 
 15
 
 226 TEE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the probable disappearance of the Southern 
 Kingdom ; yet the current which threatened 
 to sweep Victor Emmanuel and Cavour aside 
 should they resist its impetus, had so entangled 
 Louis Napoleon in its eddies and whirlpools 
 that he too must needs follow the stream. 
 " What can be done with a Government like 
 that of Naples, which obstinately refuses to 
 heed advice ? " he remarked evasively to those 
 who sought his opinion on the situation. And 
 later, when Francis in desperation sent his 
 envoys to Paris to plead for intercession : "It 
 is not to me you should have come, but to 
 Victor Emmanuel. Sardinia alone can check 
 the course of the revolution." 
 
 Under these circumstances, while Cavour 
 groaned beneath their protestations, and dis- 
 comfited the querulous diplomatists with enig- 
 matic refutations, he plodded stolidly towards 
 his goal ; always seeking to guide the tumultu- 
 ous revolutionary flood into the quieter chan- 
 nels of Diplomacy, through which he was con- 
 fident of accomplishing his ends, if more 
 tediously, at least with greater immunity from 
 the risk of possible shipwreck.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Anxiety at Naples. Filangieri's counsels. He leaves Naples. 
 Francis sends De Martino to Paris. His reception by French 
 Emperor. The Emperor's advice and warning. The " Cam- 
 arilla's" accusations. Francis grants Constitution. The 
 Pope antagonistic to Piedmontese alliance. The Franchise 
 coldly received by Liberals. Riots in Naples. The applica- 
 tion for alliance. Cavour's embarrassments. His condi- 
 tions. Arrival of Neapolitan Envoys at Turin. Their de- 
 mands. Victor Emmanuel writes Garibaldi. The General 
 refuses obedience. Cavour confides to D'Azeglio details 
 of his policy. 
 
 MEANWHILE at Naples Garibaldi's achieve- 
 ments were watched with growing concern, 
 while the revolutionary mutterings echoed 
 from Calabria and the southeastern provinces 
 of the continent became a source of further 
 apprehension in Court and Governmental cir- 
 cles. A Council of State assembled on May 
 thirteenth to study the situation and devise 
 expedients. Besides the King, several mem- 
 bers of the Royal Family, and the regularly 
 accredited officials, Filangieri was present. 
 When called upon for his opinion, the old 
 statesman affirmed that his views had under- 
 gone no change, and that he could only reiter- 
 ate his former advice. His belief was that the 
 227
 
 228 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 policy hitherto pursued must be reversed ; 
 Austrian influences be discarded, and a "rap- 
 prochement "attempted with France ; a course 
 he considered obviously dictated by the lessons 
 of Magenta and Solferino. Furthermore, he 
 advocated the concession of a Constitution and 
 the acceptance of the proposal to occupy the 
 States of the Church, as far north as Perugia 
 and Ancona. He also proposed that an envoy 
 be despatched to Paris to seek to obtain from 
 the Emperor the necessary guarantees for the 
 integral preservation of the Kingdom, or at 
 least, as he prudently but significantly added, 
 of the continental provinces. To General Car- 
 rascosa, who insinuated that had he, Filangieri, 
 accepted the mission to Sicily, when so urged 
 by the King on April fourth, the Royal cause 
 would to-day have been triumphant in the 
 island, the veteran sadly objected : " You are 
 mistaken, General. When I left Sicily on Sep- 
 tember 30, 1854, I carried away with me the 
 conviction that the system of government Cas- 
 siui was endeavoring to enforce on that coun- 
 try would sooner or later entail its loss to the 
 Neapolitan Monarchy/' 
 
 During the heated debate which followed be- 
 tween the party which approved concessions and 
 a radical change of policy (not from convic- 
 tion, but by virtue of necessity), and the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 229 
 
 nItra-Conservatives, adverse to the slightest 
 departure from the old system, Francis main- 
 tained the impassive fatalism so deeply rooted 
 in his nature. Convinced that France, Eng- 
 land, and Piedmont had decreed the extinc- 
 tion of his Dynasty, he saw in Garibaldi the 
 tool, and behind him recognized the guiding 
 forces which would encompass the ruin of his 
 House. 
 
 Although Filangieri's proposals could not be 
 accepted unanimously, they were favorably con- 
 sidered by a majority of those present, who 
 perceived that in the execution of these previ- 
 sions alone lay any reasonable hope of salvation. 
 A diplomatic council, which followed imme- 
 diately, was attended by the English, French, 
 and Spanish representatives. Of these Carafa 
 begged their good offices to induce Garibaldi 
 to provide for an honorable evacuation of Pa- 
 lermo by the Neapolitan forces, then practi- 
 cally at his mercy. 
 
 Three days later Francis again summoned 
 Filangieri, who then learnt that the strategical 
 plans, prepared by him for the military opera- 
 tions in Sicily, had been discarded and another, 
 preferred by Nunziante, adopted in its stead. 
 This latter, which included the bombardment 
 at Palermo, he emphatically denounced. Al- 
 though again consulted by the King concern-
 
 230 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ing the advisability of a return to the Consti- 
 tution of 1848, which he advocated, Filangieri, 
 convinced that his advice, although solicited, 
 was unheeded, and unwilling to witness the 
 catastrophe he felt was now unavoidable, left 
 Naples and sought refuge in France. While 
 he returned to his native city shortly after 
 the collapse of the Dynasty he had so faith- 
 fully served, he refused all honors or emol- 
 uments at the hands of the new Government ; 
 not from animosity, or even regret for that 
 which was lost, but prompted by a quiet dig- 
 nity which gained him the esteem of all parties. 
 He passed away in 1867, at the ripe old age of 
 eighty-three ; to the last a noble example of 
 the virtues of the ideal soldier ; steadfast to his 
 allegiance, to his military oath, and to the ob- 
 ligations of patriotism, in spite of personal 
 opinions, or preferences. 
 
 The deliberations of the Council of State 
 of May thirtieth resulted in the decision of 
 Francis to address himself personally to the 
 Emperor of the French. On June sixth he 
 wrote declaring himself ready to grant a Con- 
 stitution, provided the Emperor would guar- 
 antee the autonomy of the Kingdom and the 
 preservation of the Dynasty. Chevalier de 
 Martino, at that period Neapolitan Envoy at 
 the Papal Court, was selected to undertake
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 231 
 
 this delicate mission, concerning the success 
 of which even the most sanguine demurred. 
 " If you allow some months to elapse without 
 giving your adherence to my friendly sugges- 
 tion, Your Majesty will understand the bitter- 
 ness of those terrible words : ' Too late,' . . ." 
 had been the prophetic utterance of Victor 
 Emmanuel but a couple of months earlier. 
 Francis was now about to drink of that bitter- 
 ness to the dregs, and to reap the harvest of 
 his own folly, and the years of persecution and 
 barbarous oppression of his perjured prede- 
 cessors. 
 
 On reaching Paris the Chevalier de Martino, 
 together with the Neapolitan Envoy accredited 
 to the Imperial Court, immediately sought an 
 audience with the Emperor. This was granted 
 next day (June 12) at Fontainebleau, and the 
 prolonged conversation which ensued between 
 Napoleon III. and his Minister, M. de Thou- 
 venel, on the one side, and the two Neapolitans 
 on the other, left no illusions in the minds of 
 the unfortunate diplomatists as to the fate in 
 store for their royal master. 
 
 The Emperor began by deploring the events 
 which had taken place in the Kingdom, and 
 expressed his regret that his disinterested ad- 
 vice had been so long unheeded. Having read 
 the letter from the King to the Two Sicilies,
 
 232 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Napoleon III. echoed the words of Victor 
 Emmanuel : " It is too late." A month ago 
 I might have been able to arrange everything ; 
 now it is too late. France is in a difficult posi- 
 tion. Revolutions are not restrained by words, 
 and, at this moment, the revolution not only 
 exists, but is triumphant. The Italians are 
 cunning, and they realize full well that after 
 having given the blood of my children for their 
 National cause, I will never turn my guns 
 against them. It is this conviction which has 
 brought about the revolution ; the annexation 
 of Tuscany ; in spite of me, and contrary to 
 my interests. They will treat you in the same 
 way." 
 
 The Neapolitan Envoys, endeavoring to con- 
 vince the Emperor that his interests were iden- 
 tical with their own, lost no opportunity of 
 painting the political future of the Peninsula 
 in the darkest hues. They argued that Sicily 
 could not possibly be retained permanently by 
 Piedmont, and was consequently inevitably 
 doomed to be included within the sphere of 
 English influence probably engulfed by Per- 
 fidious Albion, under the guise of a protector- 
 ate. To all such prospects Napoleon remained 
 apparently indifferent, merely reiterating his 
 advice that Francis lose no time in accepting 
 the proffered alliance with Piedmoat ; and
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 233 
 
 warning his hearers that only by adapting his 
 policy to the National aspirations, could their 
 Sovereign expect to stem the current, unless, 
 indeed, he was strong enough to circumscribe 
 and stamp out the revolution within his 
 borders. In vain did the Neapolitans argue 
 and protest ; Napoleon met protest and argu- 
 ment with the same objections : "All this may 
 be true enough, but we are now brought face 
 to face with accomplished facts. The force of 
 public opinion is invincible : the position of 
 France is no longer that of 1849 : on this ac- 
 count we do not desire the annexation which 
 is contrary to our interests, and we counsel the 
 only practical means of avoiding, or at least 
 retarding it. But an irresistible pressure is 
 working against us : a force to which we must 
 yield. Accede to the exigencies of the moment. 
 The National cause must triumph. Sacrifice 
 everything to this idea in one way or another. 
 I don't discuss the means by which it may be 
 found possible to solve all the objections which 
 exist ; but I tell you to do it, and do it quickly. 
 To-morrow it will be too late. In this case my 
 loyal and sincere support will be assured yon ; 
 otherwise I shall be obliged to stand aloof and 
 allow Italy to act by herself. The principle of 
 non-intervention, sealed with the blood of 
 France, will be maintained."
 
 234 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 These utterances, almost brutal in their 
 frankness, were hardly capable of misconstruc- 
 tion, and the unfortunate Envoys fully realized 
 that their cause was lost. Yet they pleaded 
 that a word from the Emperor, if spoken with 
 firmness and decision, could still arrest the rev- 
 olutionary tide emanating from Turin ; and 
 they further urged, not without reason, that 
 if the principles of universal non-intervention 
 be enforced, steps should be taken to prevent 
 Piedmont from covertly aiding and abetting 
 the revolution. Although the Emperor prom- 
 ised that he would use his good offices at 
 Turin, he held out small prospect of success. 
 " Of what use is it ! " he exclaimed impatiently, 
 " Cavour himself is overwhelmed." In Na- 
 poleon's opinion Cavour was, in truth, most 
 apprehensive lest the revolution, with its in- 
 evitable excesses and irresponsible plunges into 
 the unknown, drag down to destruction the 
 labors of his patient diplomacy. 
 
 In his detailed report of this most important 
 conversation, Antonini, theKesident Neapolitan 
 Envoy at Paris, adds that Thouvenel made no 
 attempt to conceal his animosity. He further 
 states that during a discussion as to the possi- 
 bility of the royal arms achieving a re-conquest 
 of Sicily, the French Foreign Minister gratui- 
 tously affronted them with the insinuation that,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 235 
 
 were such a course attempted, it was " doubt- 
 ful whether Europe could remain an impassive 
 spectator to the cruelty of our soldiers." 
 
 The contents of Antonini's despatches were 
 not calculated to re-assure the Neapolitan 
 Court ; yet, as had been the case with the re- 
 ports from Sicily, the "Camarilla" accused 
 the diplomatist with coloring the tenor of the 
 Emperor's conversation, for the purpose of 
 frightening and coercing the King. Even 
 Antonini's disclaimer in his second report : "I 
 trust the justice will be rendered me that I 
 have never sought to arouse false hopes/' was 
 characterized as gross and interested exaggera- 
 tion, by the blinded adherents to the traditions 
 of the old regime. The intrigues, and mali- 
 cious accusations of the " Camarilla," together 
 with the mysterious conferences between that 
 new-fledged Liberal, his uncle, the Count of 
 Aquila, and Brenier, the French Envoy, in- 
 creased the doubts and perplexities of the 
 King. 
 
 All Europe awaited, with conflicting sen- 
 timents, the issue of the strange drama being 
 enacted at Naples. On the one hand, the 
 fierce and bigoted reactionary policy of the " Ca- 
 marilla," headed by the Queen Mother ; on the 
 other, two of the King's uncles rivalling each 
 other in their spontaneous professions of a
 
 236 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Liberalism profoundly antagonistic to the tra- 
 ditions of their race. An hereditary Despot, 
 distraught midst the counsels of foreign ad- 
 visers ; the menaces of an increasingly strong 
 political party ; half his Kingdom snatched from 
 him by an audacious filibuster in the name of 
 Greater Piedmont of Italy ! and the dawning 
 conviction that the other half was tottering on 
 the brink, requiring but a touch to precipitate 
 to destruction the Dynasty which had in spite 
 of a century and a quarter of enforced alle- 
 giance held no place in the hearts of the people. 
 By granting under the stress of disaster that 
 which he ought to have inaugurated his reign 
 by pontaneously proclaiming, Francis, like his 
 relative Louis XVI. of France, showed his per- 
 sonal weakness and the rottenness of the ob- 
 solete institutions which alone upheld his 
 Throne. The Constitution wrenched from him 
 on June twenty-fifth now merely hastened the 
 catastrophe, rendered inevitable by the suicidal 
 policy persistently pursued during the first 
 thirteen months of his reign. 
 
 The promulgation of the Sovereign Act, as 
 the cession of liberal institutions was termed, 
 was finally decided in a combined State and 
 Family council held in the Palace at Portici, 
 on June twenty-first, which included all those 
 who had participated in the conference of May
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 237 
 
 thirty-first, excepting Filangieri. This assem- 
 blage decided by a majority of eight out of four- 
 teen votes, to recommend the King to follow 
 the advice offered by Napoleon III., namely : a 
 liberal Constitution for Naples ; special institu- 
 tions for Sicily ; and the alliance with Piedmont. 
 The King had not assisted at the discussions 
 of the Council. When informed of the result 
 of its deliberations he signified his acquiescence, 
 but, with characteristic vacillation, despatched 
 the same evening De Martino, who had re- 
 turned from Paris, to Rome to seek the Pope's 
 sanction. While approving the proposed am- 
 nesty, and realizing the necessity for separate 
 political institutions in Naples and Sicily, Pius 
 IX. as a matter of conscience clung to his em- 
 phatic objection to the alliance with Piedmont, 
 although, appreciating the perilous embarrass- 
 ments of his neighbor, he did not insist on the 
 abandonment of this essential point. As a re- 
 sult of De Martino's report, Francis, on the 
 morning of June 25th, signed the important 
 document which it was hoped would guarantee 
 the preservation of the Throne. The Act em- 
 bodied : a general amnesty for all political 
 crimes committed prior to the date of its pro- 
 mulgation ; the formation of a new Ministry 
 under Antonio Spinelli, charged with the elab- 
 oration of the articles of a Constitution mod-
 
 238 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 elled on a basis of Italian National representa- 
 tive institutions ; the conclusion of an alliance 
 with His Majesty the King of Sardinia, for the 
 common interests of the Two Crowns in Italy 
 the granting of analogous representative in- 
 stitutions in Sicily, with a Prince of the Royal 
 House as Viceroy ; and decreed, moreover, that 
 the flag should henceforth be composed of the 
 Italian National colors, red, white, and green, 
 with the arms of the Reigning Dynasty in the 
 centre. 
 
 On the morning following, the King and 
 Queen drove into Naples in an open carriage. 
 Although respectfully saluted by the populace 
 as they passed through the crowded streets, 
 there was no sign of the enthusiastic welcome 
 they had been led to expect as a result of the 
 proclamation of the previous day. This was 
 due in great measure to the action of the 
 Liberal and Revolutionary Committees in the 
 capital, which had issued instructions that the 
 Constitution be coldly received ; warning their 
 members that the King had no intention of 
 keeping faith with the Liberals, and that the 
 measures now wrung from him would be revoked 
 on the first favorable opportunity ; that to ac- 
 cept the same would be equivalent to treachery 
 towards the Sicilians, who were at that very 
 moment being butchered by the Neapolitan
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 239 
 
 Soldiery, besides dealing a death-blow to aspi- 
 rations for Italian National Unity. As a con- 
 sequence, while the men-of-war anchored in the 
 bay, the forts, and public buildings, hoisted 
 the new tricolor flag, greeting the same with 
 the thunder of salutes from the artillery afloat 
 and ashore ; the official rejoicings awakened 
 no response from the general public. To make 
 matters worse riots broke out ; and the follow- 
 ing evening increased to alarming proportions. 
 Bands recruited from the lowest scum of the 
 population, their numbers swelled by agents of 
 the secret Police, invaded the principal streets, 
 yelling " Long live the King. Down with the 
 Constitution. Death to the Liberals." The 
 Police Offices, in various parts of the town 
 were broken into ; the archives burnt or des- 
 troyed ; the Commissioners wounded or mal- 
 treated. In other quarters the infuriated mob 
 attacked all those suspected of Liberal tenden- 
 cies, and even insulted and struck the French 
 Minister, Brenier, who was passing in his car- 
 riage. The fomentation, and enactment, of 
 these outrages was generally attributed to the 
 influence of the Queen Mother and the King's 
 half-brother, the Count of Trani, both bitterly 
 opposed to the proposed Constitution, and who 
 hoped by these means to render its promul- 
 gation ineffective. It has been objected, how-
 
 240 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ever, that as Villamarina and the Unionists 
 were equally anxious, although from very dif- 
 ferent motives, that the Constitution should 
 not be successfully launched, or favorably re- 
 ceived, it is unfair to hold one party responsi- 
 ble for the shameful scenes enacted. That the 
 roughs and agitators were the paid agents of 
 one or more political parties there is no doubt, 
 while their indiscriminate attacks on Police 
 and Liberals alike would seem to indicate the 
 connivance of those interested in defeating, for 
 one purpose or another, the proposed reforms. 
 As a result of the disturbances the Consti- 
 tutional Ministry initiated its career by pro- 
 claiming the state of siege, an unfortunate but 
 imperative necessity, at least until measures 
 could be devised for the preservation of order 
 by the formation of the promised National 
 Guard. 
 
 Under the Presidency of Antonio Spinelli, 
 with De Martino in charge of Foreign Affairs, 
 and the hitherto obscure, but soon all-power- 
 ful, Liborio Romano as Prefect of Police, the 
 new Ministry lost no time in approaching Vil- 
 lamarina on the subject of the Piedmontese al- 
 liance. Count Talleyrand, French Minister in 
 Turin, seconded the Neapolitan application, 
 which now caused Cavour considerable em- 
 barrassment. The Marquis of Villamarina,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 241 
 
 who had closely watched, and carefully studied 
 the development of the present situation, and 
 was thoroughly cognizant of its causes, ex- 
 pressed himself in his despatches to Turin as 
 not by any means satisfied concerning the sin- 
 cerity of Francis, either in connection with the 
 concessions wrung from him, or the motives 
 which prompted the application for an alliance 
 so lately spurned. In his opinion, as in Cavour's, 
 the opportune moment for such a tie had passed; 
 while Garibaldi and his companions had 
 travelled too far on the road to success to brook 
 any attempt at direct interference, or sugges- 
 tion tending to the restoration of the old order. 
 " If we yield now, and accept the Neapolitan 
 alliance," he wrote to Cavour, " we shall have 
 revolution at home as well as here in Naples : 
 and, moreover, the Bourbons will encourage 
 its explosion. " 
 
 It was hardly to be expected that the astute 
 Piedmontese Prime Minister would willingly, 
 and in the face of recent developments, jeop- 
 ardize his Sovereign's National popularity by 
 formally binding himself to succor his found- 
 ering southern rival from the consequences of 
 his own blind folly. Yet the susceptibilities of 
 the European Powers demanded careful hand- 
 ling ; and especially France and England, who 
 now welcomed the proposed alliance as a possi- 
 16
 
 242 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ble termination of the vexations Italian im- 
 broglio, which threatened to complicate inter- 
 national relations, and constituted a perpetual 
 menace to the equipoise of political combina- 
 tions. Consequently Cavour, while not de- 
 clining to discuss the matter, began by insist- 
 ing on three preliminary considerations, the 
 acceptance of which he held indispensable. He 
 contended, firstly : that any formal bond be- 
 tween the two Governments was impossible 
 while civil war existed in Sicily, since Victor 
 Emmanuel could not become the ally of the 
 King of Naples, who was even now shedding 
 the blood of his subjects in the disaffected 
 island. The second consideration called for 
 the immediate cessation of all intimate relations 
 with Austria, and the abandonment of obnox- 
 ious influences hostile or detrimental to the 
 principles of Italian Nationalism. Thirdly, 
 Cavour laid stress on the necessity that the 
 policy of the two Governments towards the 
 Roman Curia should be identical. 
 
 European diplomacy could not openly take 
 exception to considerations so manifestly in ac- 
 cordance with the recognized interests of the 
 Italianism so loudly proclaimed; yet the subter- 
 fuge was too thinly veiled not to be clearly 
 perceptible to those gifted with an appreciation 
 of the probabilities, as evinced by existing real-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 243 
 
 ities. The invalidation of the proposed treaty 
 owing to a possible breach of faith on the part 
 of the Neapolitan Government, would un- 
 doubtedly have entangled Austria, France and 
 the Holy See, and perhaps other European 
 Powers ; while the fruits of 1859 would certain- 
 ly have been lost. It consequently behoved 
 Cavour, aside from dynastic ambitions, to pro- 
 ceed cautiously before committing his country 
 to a course which, whatever advantages it 
 might have offered a couple of months earlier, 
 was now viewed with sullen disapprobation by 
 an increasingly powerful party, spread over the 
 entire Peninsula. 
 
 On July third the Neapolitan Envoy at Turin 
 officially opened negotiations with the announce- 
 ment that a special Embassy would shortly arrive 
 at the Piedmontese capital for the purpose men- 
 tioned, and two weeks later Commendatore 
 Giovanni Manna, and Baron Winspeare, reached 
 Turin. The former was well known as an au- 
 thority on financial administration, and as an 
 ardent, if prudent, advocate of liberal institu- 
 tions : the latter had gained a reputation as an 
 able diplomatist and administrator. The basis 
 on which negotations were to be carried on 
 were the following : An alliance between the two 
 Crowns, to consolidate and assure the independ- 
 ence of the Peninsula against foreign attacks
 
 244 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 or influence ; a Customs and Commercial 
 League ; Uniformity of coinage, weights and 
 measures ; Agreement for postal service, and 
 literary copyright, as well as for the railway 
 systems. In fact, a general fusion of the 
 material interests of the two States. The 
 King of Naples, furthermore, consented that 
 Sicily should be free to elect a Parliament in 
 conformity with the Constitution of 1812 ; 
 which body might decree a complete political 
 separation from the Continental Kingdom, yet 
 remain under the sovereignty of the Neapolitan 
 Throne, which would be represented by a 
 Prince of the Koyal Family, as Viceroy. The 
 Ambassadors were, moreover, empowered to 
 treat concerning the recognition of the annexed 
 provinces of Tuscany, and the Duchies ; but 
 for the late Pontifical possessions a special 
 arrangement was proposed, by virtue of which 
 Piedmont was to exercise a limited sovereignty 
 over the Legations, while the Bourbon King 
 assumed similar functions in connection with 
 the Marches and Umbria. 
 
 The Bourbon Envoys, however, very rightly 
 and justly insisted, as a preliminary, on the 
 cessation of hostilities in Sicily, and the formal 
 assurance that neither Garibaldi, nor his fol- 
 lowers, be allowed to cross over to the Continent, 
 or to incite the continental population to revolt.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 245 
 
 This last condition was warmly supported by 
 Russia, Prussia, France and England. Although 
 Cavour protested that the Government, as such, 
 had no authority over Garibaldi, who, having 
 severed every link of dependence on it by re- 
 nouncing his military grade, and his status as 
 Deputy, would undoubtedly turn a deaf ear to 
 any orders emanating from Turin ; he never- 
 theless considered it advisable to conciliate 
 diplomatic requirements by making an appeal 
 for prudent moderation on the part of the vic- 
 torious filibuster, who still loudly proclaimed 
 his fealty to Victor Emmanuel. Under date 
 of July twenty-second the King of Sardinia 
 thus addressed the popular hero : " General, 
 you are aware that I did not approve of your 
 expedition, with which I have had absolutely 
 no connection. But to-day the difficult posi- 
 tion in which Italy finds herself makes it my 
 duty to place myself in direct communication 
 with you. In the event that the King of Naples 
 concede the complete evacuation of Sicily by 
 his troops ; if he should voluntarily desist from 
 all intercession, and engage personally not to 
 exercise any kind of pressure over the Sicilians, 
 in order that they may have full liberty to select 
 that Government which best pleases them ; in 
 this case I think it would be more reasonable 
 to renounce all ulterior projects against the
 
 246 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Kingdom of Naples. If you are of a contrary 
 opinion I expressly reserve to myself complete 
 liberty of action, and abstain from expressing 
 any opinion relative to your designs." The 
 reply which reached Turin a few days later ran 
 as follows : " Sire, Your Majesty is aware of 
 the affection and reverence I entertain for your 
 person, and how eager I am to obey you. 
 Nevertheless your Majesty must appreciate the 
 embarrassment I should find myself in, should 
 I assume a passive attitude in face of the Neapol- 
 itan continental population which I have been 
 obliged to restrain for so long, and to whom I 
 have promised my immediate support. Italy 
 would demand of me an accounting for such 
 inaction, and would suffer immense detriment 
 from it. On the termination of my mission I 
 will lay at your Majesty's feet the authority 
 which circumstances have conferred upon me, 
 and shall be most happy to obey you for the 
 remainder of my life." 
 
 An examination of his private correspondence 
 with the Marquis d'Azeglio affords an insight 
 into the perplexities and worries which harassed 
 the Prime Minister during these days of un- 
 certainty, and multitudinous entanglements. 
 Writing to D'Azeglio on July 12th, in anticipa- 
 tion of the arrival of the Neapolitan Envoys, 
 he professes to know neither the proposals they
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 247 
 
 will advance nor the replies he will make. " If 
 they really consent to the cession of Sicily, and 
 will aid us to demolish Rome, I think we might 
 come to an understanding : for a time at least." 
 His estimation of Manna, after their first inter- 
 view, is interesting. The Envoy struck him as 
 a thoroughly honest man who had been forced 
 into assuming a r61e which inspired him with 
 profound repugnance, and whose confidence in 
 the Government " he has been made to repre- 
 sent " is of the most limited. On the same day 
 on which Victor Emmanuel penned the letter 
 to Garibaldi which has been quoted above, 
 Cavour informed his correspondent in London : 
 " I am going to advise the King to write to 
 him (Garibaldi) to accept a truce, on the basis 
 of the concession to the Sicilians of their polit- 
 ical future. I doubt very much whether Gari- 
 baldi will accept this advice. It would indeed 
 be too stupid not to take advantage of the 
 deplorable condition in which Naples finds 
 itself. In the meanwhile the whole Diplomatic 
 Corps here is down upon me ; Hudson excepted." 
 After describing the attitudes of the various 
 representatives, Cavour acknowledges that, 
 while the diplomatists rail and storm be presses 
 forward, and that the fleets and armies of the 
 West alone can stop him. Referring to the 
 proposed alliance, and the cowardly cession of
 
 248 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Messina to Garibaldi, he exclaims : " This 
 measure proves that at Naples there is no 
 longer an army, no longer a Government. 
 Manna himself admits that the discredit into 
 which his Government has fallen renders an 
 alliance more difficult. One may ally oneself 
 with an enemy one respects, even after having 
 defeated him : one cannot sully oneself by a 
 union with a Government which does not even 
 know how to fall with honor/' At Turin the 
 surrender of Messina was considered as doing 
 away with all possibility of preventing Gari- 
 baldi's descent upon the mainland, should such 
 a course have been deemed advisable. Cavour 
 in this connection writes explicitly : " Don't 
 think that I look without serious apprehension 
 on this coming event. It is no longer a question 
 of the King of Naples : nobody in his capital 
 wants him any more, and the good Villamarina 
 (whose last despatch I forwarded) does not 
 cease in his warnings to me that it would be an 
 enormous blunder to attempt to prop up an 
 edifice which is crumbling on all sides, and 
 whose every support, Navy, Army, Administra- 
 tion, is undermined. But there is great danger 
 in allowing Garibaldi to gain possession of 
 Naples. Not being able to prevent his taking 
 Naples, there is but one means of saving our- 
 selves from being overwhelmed by him : it is to
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 249 
 
 vie with him in boldness, and not allow him to 
 monopolize the Unitarian idea which now exer- 
 cises an irresistible fascination over the popular 
 masses. Certainly the dangers of this situation 
 are not concealed from me ; but events are 
 stronger than men. There would be no use in 
 struggling against them." He then desires 
 D'Azeglio to sound the British Government, 
 with all due secrecy and circumspection, as to 
 what aid would be forthcoming, should events 
 in the South make the active intervention of 
 Piedmont necessary or advisable. A week 
 later Cavour furnished the Marquis d'Azeglio 
 with a copy of the ultra- confidential instruc- 
 tions to Count Nigra, which outlined the 
 proposed expedition of General Cialdini to 
 Ancona. A postscript to this important docu- 
 ment encloses a lock of Garibaldi's hair, as " a 
 trophy to be dangled before the eyes of the 
 female admirers of the hero of Sicily 1 "
 
 CHAPTER Xin. 
 
 Promulgation of Constitution. Preparations for elections. 
 Amnesty of political prisoners. Tumultuous reception of 
 exiles. Action of troops. Disorders in the capital. Ro- 
 mano's influence. Romano ; his character and antece- 
 dents. The Queen-Mother goes to Gaeta. Intrigues of the 
 "Camarilla." Romano's further demands. Insulting resig- 
 nations. The Press embarrasses the Government. Schism 
 in Revolutionary Committees. Romano's revelations. His 
 political memoirs. Cavour's opportunity. His despatch to 
 Envoy at St. Petersburg. His remarks to Nisco. Disaffec- 
 tion in Neapolitan Army. The Ministerial programme. 
 The elections postponed. 
 
 THE newly- formed ministry in Naples, anx- 
 ious to allay popular suspicions by a tangible 
 proof of the sincerity of the Sovereign Act pro- 
 mulgated on June twenty-fifth, strongly ad- 
 vised Francis to revive without delay the Con- 
 stitution of 1848, which they argued " had only 
 been suspended in consequence of painful cir- 
 cumstances, which need not now be recalled/' 
 and had never been abrogated. The King 
 signed the decree re-establishing this Constitu- 
 tion on July first, and simultaneously convened 
 the Electoral Colleges for August nineteenth, 
 and Parliament on September tenth. Next 
 day the city was relieved of the oppressive 
 250
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 251 
 
 measures of martial law, which had been in 
 force since the outbreaks which accompanied 
 the promulgation of the Act. 
 
 The Ministry now became absorbed in the 
 formation of committees for the preparation 
 of laws and reforms, to be submitted to the 
 consideration of the future Parliament. 
 
 The amnesty of political prisoners and exiles, 
 promised by the Act, went into operation on 
 July third ; not only for those whose trials were 
 still in progress, but including all nndergoing 
 confinement, or under sentence of perpetual ban- 
 ishment from the Kingdom. The execution of 
 this decree plunged the Government into fresh 
 embarrassments and complications, for the 
 bolder, and more irreconcilable, of these politi- 
 cal agitators lost not a moment in inciting their 
 adherents to continue a struggle, the first fruits 
 of which were already theirs. The arrival of 
 each popular martyr, such as Settembrini, 
 Pisanelli, and Imbriani, was the signal for 
 demonstrations of tumultuous sympathy, in- 
 variably accompanied by cries of " Viva Italia," 
 and " Viva Garibaldi." Count Cavour had 
 advised all the exiles who had taken refuge in 
 Turin to return to their country, and to use 
 their influence towards the propagation of 
 National principles. Most were anxious to 
 Avail themselves of the facilities extended, but
 
 252 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Carlo Poerio significantly refused to return to 
 Naples, as long as the Bourbons occupied tne 
 Throne. 
 
 It was rumored that the troops were opposed 
 to the franchise lately granted, and naturally 
 continual friction between the Liberal and 
 Military elements ensued. On July fifteenth 
 the Grenadiers of the Royal Guard, exasperated 
 by one of the aforementioned demonstrations, 
 charged the Liberalist sympathizers, with the 
 cry of " Long live the King ;" cut down those 
 who resisted, and even sacked several shops in 
 which terrified citizens had taken refuge. 
 
 The occurrence spread terror throughout the 
 city, and caused consternation in the ranks of 
 the Ministerial party. Liborio Romano laid 
 the responsibility at the door of the Reaction- 
 ists, and claimed to possess documents in sup- 
 port of his accusation. The Minister of War 
 resigned, and was succeeded by General Pianell, 
 while Liborio Romano took charge of the Min- 
 istry of the Interior vacated by del Re. Dur- 
 ing his brief administration of the Prefecture 
 of Police, Romano had surrounded himself with 
 members of the "Camorra," numbers of whom 
 had but just obtained their release from the 
 prisons, by virtue of the recent amnesty. This 
 policy, which has been adversely criticised, was 
 not without sound advantage at the moment,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 203 
 
 and although originally resorted to under stress 
 of complex circumstances, was undoubtedly 
 later the means of saving the capital from far 
 more serious disturbances. The system gave 
 rise to great abuses, it is true, and favored 
 many individual acts of retaliation on Bourbon 
 adherents ; but the formation of the National 
 Guard acted as a check to the over-zealous 
 police, and moderated the evils of this tempo- 
 rary expedient, which became alarmingly ap- 
 parent, however, when, after the fall of the 
 reigning Dynasty, it was necessary to expur- 
 gate this element from the ranks of the local 
 and National bureaucracy. 
 
 In the meantime Liborio Romano was the 
 idol of those he had placed in positions of more 
 or less importance. The police force, and the 
 members of the National Guard, the ranks of 
 which were also thronged with " Camorristi," 
 affectionately styled him " Father." This lat- 
 ter body of men, which on July seventeenth 
 consisted of six thousand men, was two days 
 later increased to nearly ten thousand. Prince 
 Ischitella, formerly a Minister of Ferdinand II., 
 and a devoted friend of Romano, commanded 
 this branch of the service, and was surrounded 
 by officers equally attached to the new Minister 
 of the Interior. The enthusiasm aroused by 
 Romano's visit to the barracks of the National
 
 254 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Guard on July seventeenth, in company with 
 Ischitella, was indescribable, and cleared away 
 all doubts as to the influence at the command 
 of the political star which had but so recently 
 appeared above the horizon. 
 
 Liborio Romano, originally an obscure lawyer 
 from Lecce, a town in the heel of Italy, has 
 traced his political memoirs, or justification of 
 the policy pursued during the few months he 
 was in power. These are, however, unconvinc- 
 ing and susceptible to varied interpretation, 
 leaving the impartial reader in doubt as to the 
 real share, or responsibility, attributable to 
 him in the disasters which overtook the Sov- 
 ereign he professed to serve. He proclaimed 
 himself a Federalist at a time when that doc- 
 trine was popular with political agitators ; and 
 the expression of these views had gained him 
 credit amongst a certain class of politicians, 
 and even served, in conjunction with other 
 qualifications, to bring him into more or less in- 
 timate relations with the Count of Aquila, who 
 dabbled in Liberalism, and was eager to play a 
 political role at any cost. Although Romano 
 had suffered persecution, imprisonment and 
 exile at the hands of Ferdinand II., and had 
 been mixed up in various conspiracies from 
 1828 upwards (he was born in 1794), his politi- 
 cal convictions were dubious and his talents
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 255 
 
 hardly above mediocrity. If his phenomenal 
 popularity was the result of a combination of 
 circumstances, more or less beyond his control, 
 it was also due in great measure to the man's 
 special aptitude for intrigue, and the posses- 
 sion of what has been described as the Italo- 
 Grecian cunning, at once ingenuous and caress- 
 ing, characteristic in the descendants of the 
 Greek colonists who settled on the shores of the 
 lower Adriatic, and Ionian Sea. His immense 
 popularity and undoubted, though brief, in- 
 fluence, were of advantage to the Bourbons and 
 Liberals in turn ; for he possessed no vestige 
 of political conscience, and from the outset 
 played a double game. It is a significant fact 
 that after the collapse of the Government he 
 served, and an exceedingly brief career under 
 Garibaldi, Romano was shunned by the Union- 
 ists, and was given no part in the reorganiza- 
 tion of Southern Italy. 
 
 On assuming the administration of the Prefec- 
 ture of Police, which office the Count of Aqnila 
 was instrumental in overcoming the King's 
 hesitation to grant him, Romano insisted that 
 the Queen Mother, whose influence he rightly 
 mistrusted, should no longer reside in Naples. 
 Francis, greatly impressed by the evident au- 
 thority of the new Minister over the undisci- 
 plined elements of the population, as well as his
 
 256 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 power with the Police and National Guard, 
 reluctantly yielded to this and other conditions 
 hardly less humiliating. The Dowager Maria 
 Theresa, accompanied by the King's half- 
 brothers, and the more notorious of the 
 "Camarilla," took their departure to Gaeta, 
 but continued, nevertheless, from the shelter 
 of that stronghold, to conspire against the 
 Liberal institutions whose spread they witnessed 
 with impotent rage and horror. Komano de- 
 scribes the " Camarilla " as more fatal to the 
 Dynasty than any of the revolutionary factions. 
 " This party, blinded by implacable hatred of 
 the Liberal institutions, revived in spite of it, 
 failing to appreciate the nature of the Italian 
 movement or the strength of the revolution, 
 did not recognize the fact that the Dynasty was 
 abandoned by all Europe, by the country itself, 
 and by those who had previously been its 
 staunchest upholders. Counting on the hesitat- 
 ing, uncertain character of the King, who had 
 no definite plans, they hoped to secure a facile 
 victory, could they, by means of a * coup 
 d'etat,' possess themselves of the Government, 
 throw over the Constitution, and lay hands on 
 the Ministry, and the chiefs of the various 
 parties." Romano further states that he 
 frankly told the King when he accepted the 
 portfolio of the Interior, that, in view of the
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 257 
 
 altered conditions throughout Italy as well as 
 the triumphant progress of the revolution, it 
 was now useless to expect Piedmont to agree to 
 the alliance. He did not conceal from the 
 Sovereign, he says, that the universal sympathy 
 with the House of Savoy, the victories of 
 Garibaldi, and the growing desire for National 
 unity, offset by the recollections of an irrepar- 
 able past, constituted almost insurmountable 
 obstacles. In his opinion, the only possible 
 salvation lay in the observance of the strictest 
 legality, and the most loyal and broadest inter- 
 pretation of the constitutional franchises. 
 This, and this alone, could inspire trust in 
 the Government, and faith in the sincerity of 
 its intentions. 
 
 Not content with the banishment of the 
 Queen Mother to Gaeta, and the dispersal of 
 the " Camarilla," Eomano demanded that the 
 army be immediately required to swear fealty 
 to the Constitution ; that the Eoyal Guard be 
 disbanded, and the National Guard increased 
 to twelve thousand men. Francis reluctantly 
 consented that the oath be administered to the 
 troops, and still more unwillingly yielded to 
 the demand for an increase of a body of men 
 manifestly hostile to his personal interests, but 
 stood firm for the preservation of his Guard, 
 although he compromised the difficulty by
 
 258 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 transferring the quarters of these regiments 
 to Portici, outside Naples. By these measures 
 Liborio Romano practically controlled the 
 whole military and police force in the capital ; 
 while, thanks to the methods of recruiting al- 
 ready described, his influence rapidly extended 
 throughout the provinces as well. 
 
 Another bitter humiliation and source of 
 fresh anxiety awaited the unfortunate Francis 
 after the promulgation of the Constitution. 
 Alexander Nunziante, Duke of Mignano, the 
 trusted and favorite General of Ferdinand II., 
 as well as of his son, requested the acceptance 
 of his resignation ; and a few days later re- 
 turned to the King all the decorations which 
 had been showered upon him, with the insult- 
 ing comment that he could no longer wear on 
 his breast the insignia of a Government which 
 confounded honest, straightforward and loyal 
 subjects with those deserving only of con- 
 tempt. Simultaneously, the Duchess of Mig- 
 nano requested that she be relieved of her 
 duties of Lady of Honor. In addition, Nun- 
 ziante addressed an order of the day to the 
 troops under his command, couched in terms 
 which left little doubt of the political spirit 
 which animated him. 
 
 The publication of these documents caused 
 a profound impression throughout Italy,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 259 
 
 which was greatly increased when it became 
 known that Nunziante had communicated his 
 intentions to Count Cavour, together with 
 declarations which virtually committed him to 
 the Unitarian Cause. 
 
 Francis now received daily and significant 
 indications of the growing isolation of his posi- 
 tion. The Legitimist element of the aristoc- 
 racy, deeply offended by the Liberal franchises 
 embodied in the Constitution, held aloof, or 
 manifested their indignation by refusing to 
 salute the Sovereign in the streets. 
 
 Meanwhile, Romano vigorously pursued his 
 system of official expurgation. In every 
 branch of the public service the adherents of 
 the old regime were retired, or unceremoniously 
 turned out, being replaced by those in sym- 
 pathy with the new order. Long lists were 
 daily presented for confirmation to the King, 
 who, although he might rebel on occasion, 
 was, nevertheless, in the end obliged to yield 
 to the inexorable will of the Minister he dis- 
 trusted, but to whose supremacy he was forced 
 to submit. 
 
 The liberty of the Press, accorded by the 
 stipulations of the Chart, quickly degenerated 
 into the most reprehensible license. Paltry 
 sheets of every shade of progressive or reac- 
 tionary opinion, anti-dynastic for the most part,
 
 260 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 some frankly Unitarian, others officious mouth- 
 pieces of the Cavouriani, the followers of 
 Garibaldi, or of Mazzini's more fanatical 
 disciples, sprang up in all directions, the only 
 loyally Constitutional and Federalist paper 
 supporting the Ministerial programme being 
 the " Italia." Although it was attempted to 
 restrain the vituperative excesses of this 
 ephemeral literature by means of bonds which 
 each political publication was required to de- 
 posit, the measure raised such a storm of pro- 
 test that its enforcement was rarely resorted 
 to. The malicious misrepresentation of pro- 
 posed reforms proved one of the serious em- 
 barrassments against which the Constitutional 
 Ministry labored from the outset, and must 
 even under less unfavorable auspices have con- 
 stituted a source of danger and failure. 
 
 To add to the confusion occasioned by the 
 heterogeneous politics of this unbridled Press, 
 a schism was created in the Liberal Committee, 
 the ramifications of which extended through- 
 out the southern provinces. The split re- 
 sulted in the formation of two Committees : 
 that of Order, and that of Action. The former, 
 composed of men devoted to Count Cavour, 
 and convinced of the wisdom of the prudential 
 policy he advocated ; the latter made up of 
 the followers of Garibaldi. While both aimed
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 261 
 
 at the triumph of the revolution, their methods 
 and vehicles were divergent. The Committee 
 of Order desired the success of the revolution 
 on the Continent to be independent of the per- 
 sonal participation, or direct influence of 
 Garibaldi, and worked to bring about this re- 
 sult by securing the co-operation of the Nea- 
 politan military organizations. To this party 
 the defection of General Nunziante, and its 
 possible influence on the troops under his 
 command, was of supreme importance. In 
 the hope that a " pronunziamento," enhanced 
 by his presence, might accomplish this end, 
 Cavour summoned Nunziante from Switzer- 
 land, where he had retired, and entrusted him 
 with a mission to Naples. The Committee of 
 Action, on the other hand, desired for various 
 reasons that the, no longer doubtful, over- 
 throw of the Bourbon rule should redound to 
 the credit of Garibaldi alone. 
 
 A third party, essentially reactionary and 
 bitterly anti-Liberal, conspired under the 
 guidance of the Queen Mother and Count of 
 Trapani, against the existing Government, and 
 aimed at creating a " coup d'etat," which 
 would throw the power into their own hands, 
 and allow them to get rid, not only of the 
 constitutional franchises, as has been said, but 
 to dispense with the King himself. Romano
 
 262 TEE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 clearly states that the disorders of July 
 fifteenth were the beginning of a " coup 
 d'etat " organized by this party, and that, al- 
 though unsuccessful in its immediate object, 
 its effect on the negotiations pending in Turin 
 was far-reaching ; while the loss of prestige 
 to the Crown, both abroad and at home, was 
 incalculable. The Neapolitan Minister of the 
 Interior is not surprised that Cavour should 
 avail himself of the incident to abandon any 
 serious ideas of the alliance he may pre- 
 viously have entertained, although in order 
 not to prematurely provoke a crisis, the con- 
 sequences of which could not then be foreseen, 
 he allowed it to be understood that the ques- 
 tion was still under diplomatic discussion. 
 While, for very obvious reasons, it is not safe 
 to rely on the strictly historical accuracy of 
 many of the explanations of disputed points 
 advanced by Romano, it is nevertheless inter- 
 esting to note that he, a prominent actor in 
 the drama, declares that the Spinelli Cabinet 
 opened negotiations for the alliance unwill- 
 ingly, "coerced by Napoleon III., and by all 
 the European Powers, except Austria. ..." 
 He adds that the Neapolitan Government, in 
 seeking the alliance, "had not only in view 
 the propitiation of foreign Diplomacy, but 
 hoped thereby to foist on Turin the responsi-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 268 
 
 bility of the progress of the revolution, and of 
 the civil war which might ensue. " He absolves 
 Cavour of the accusation of bad faith, hurled 
 against him by the infuriated and disappointed 
 supporters of a policy which aimed at the 
 entanglement of Piedmont ; and is of opinion 
 that the prudential dissimulation, and pro- 
 crastination, of the Sardinian Minister, who 
 was early aware of the real situation, served 
 the double purpose of safeguarding the 
 interests of his own country, and averting the 
 untold horrors and excesses of a civil war 
 in the southern Kingdom ; at that moment 
 the theatre of the violent passions of con- 
 tending political factions of all denomina- 
 tions. 
 
 The recent publication of much of the secret 
 political correspondence of this period, has 
 given us perhaps a clearer appreciation of the 
 real motives of some obscure negotiations than 
 the actors themselves possessed. In the case 
 of Romano the fact should not be lost sight of 
 that his memoirs, published after his death 
 (1873), take the form of an apology, or an at- 
 tempt at posthumous political rehabilitation ; 
 and display in the most favorable light many 
 actions generally considered difficult of satis- 
 factory explanation. Nevertheless his estimates 
 of the closing scenes of the remarkable drama
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 in which he played so conspicuous, though 
 unenviable, a part cannot fail to be instructive. 
 The disintegration of the Military and Naval 
 forces of the Kingdom became daily more ap- 
 parent, both in the field in Sicily, and amongst 
 the reserves in the capital, and the continen- 
 tal provinces. General Nunziante boasted to 
 Oavour that his personal influence with the 
 army, and especially with the regiments of 
 Chasseurs he had lately commanded, was suffi- 
 cient to secure their adhesion to the banner of 
 Victor Emmanuel and Unity. Cavour, now 
 thoroughly convinced that the collapse of the 
 Bourbon Dynasty was merely a question of 
 time, and realizing the importance of being 
 prepared for all eventualities, despatched the 
 General on a Sardinian man-of-war to Naples, 
 in order that he might ascertain the extent of 
 his vaunted influence. At the same time Ad- 
 miral Persano, under pretext of placing him- 
 self at the disposal of the Princess of Syracuse, 
 a member of the House of Savoy, was instructed 
 to station his fleet in Neapolitan waters, and 
 hold himself in readiness for all contingencies ; 
 being especially watchful lest, with the spread 
 of disaffection, the Bourbon Marine come under 
 the direct control of Garibaldi. The Admiral 
 now placed himself in open communication 
 with Villamarina. and the Committee of Order,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 5466 
 
 which, us has been said, favored the cautioux 
 diplomacy of Cavour in preference to the au- 
 dacious policy of the Garibaldians. On the 
 squadron under his command, which was grad- 
 ually increased as opportunity offered, Persano 
 embarked several regiments of Bersaglieri in 
 anticipation of the necessity of their presence 
 for the preservation of order, or protection of 
 the Sardinian Envoy. 
 
 In his despatch of July twenty-eighth to the 
 Marquis Sauli, Sardinian Envoy at St. Peters- 
 burg, Cavour broadly hints at the probable 
 action of the Government. After graphically 
 describing the political and social conditions 
 of the Neapolitan Kingdom, he adds : " As for 
 ud, if it were in our power to infuse a breath 
 of moral regeneration in a body stricken with 
 incurable decrepitude, we would not refuse our 
 aid. But, under existing conditions, we must 
 be careful not to wound the National senti- 
 ment." This intimation that the Government 
 regarded the present issue as a reproduction of 
 the principles of 1789 ; the opposing forces 
 representing Absolutism and Liberty; National- 
 ism versus local autonomy ; one of which must 
 destroy the other ; was undoubtedly intended 
 lot the edification of European Diplomacy, and 
 as such produced its effect. 
 
 We have seen that his despatch to d'Azeglio,
 
 266 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 dated three days earlier, was more explicit, and 
 prognosticated a rivalry in audacity with Gari- 
 baldi as the sole means of counter-balancing 
 the dangerous popularity of the hero of the 
 Sicilian conquest. To Baron Nisco, a Neapoli- 
 tan exile, whose collaboration with Nunziante 
 was desired, he exclaimed : " We have now 
 entered upon a phase when it is incumbent on 
 us either to become conspirators in order to 
 make Italy, or to perish with the Nation. Let 
 us make this last sacrifice ; let us conspire ! " 
 
 The problem, which had now reached a dan- 
 gerously acute stage, resolved itself into the 
 query whether Piedmont should profit by the 
 intrigues of the revolutionists at Naples (doubt- 
 ful transactions perforce, and which could not 
 always bear the light of day) or run the risk of 
 seeing the prize slip between her fingers to the 
 advantage of one of the ultra-radical parties, 
 eager to filch the booty from the monarchists. 
 Cavour, although certainly not a squeamish 
 politician, still hesitated to declare openly, and 
 in the face of European opposition, for the rev- 
 olution ; but from this moment the mask was 
 tentatively lifted,and Villamarina and Persano, 
 while careful in the observation of interna- 
 tional diplomatic conventionalities, neverthe- 
 less worked more or less openly in the cause of 
 Unity.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 267 
 
 The disaffection in the army grew apace as 
 the conception of National Unity waxed more 
 popular, owing in part to the astounding achieve- 
 ments in Sicily, and also to the incessant labors 
 of the Committees in the two Calabrias, and 
 other southern provinces. In spite of the 
 splendid bravery of Colonel Bosco and his faith- 
 ful band at Milazzo, the insolent disregard of 
 orders from Naples convinced the King's ad- 
 visers that many of the commanders of the 
 island were no longer worthy of implicit con- 
 fidence. The feeling of uneasiness was greatly 
 intensified when the Count of Syracuse, in per- 
 son, warned the Ministry that the loyalty of 
 the crews of the vessels destined for the trans- 
 portation of three battalions which it was de- 
 sired to send to the aid of Bosco, still belea- 
 guered in the citadel of Milazzo, was not to be 
 counted on ; and advised the abandonment of 
 the proposed expedition. 
 
 The deluge, as it mounted higher and higher, 
 found the Government practically inactive ; 
 still hesitating as to the line of policy to be 
 adopted, and obviously incompetent to cope 
 with the complex problems of the situation. 
 Spurred on to a semblance of operative energy, 
 a Ministerial programme was finally issued on 
 August fourth. The belief that the Govern- 
 ment seriously thought to arrest the invading
 
 268 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tide by the publication of this weakly-con- 
 structed document, seems incredible. Such 
 phrases as " Protection of the established Re- 
 ligion " " Institution of Communal Reforms 
 and Public Works " sounded well ; but to think- 
 ing men the promise of the " entire and sin- 
 cere fulfilment of the previsions of the Consti- 
 tution/' seemed suspiciously superfluous, while 
 there was a decidedly false ring in the optimis- 
 tic references to the negotiations in progress 
 for the Piedmontese alliance. Nor is it con- 
 ceivable that Spinelli believed he could long 
 deceive popular sentiment concerning the doom 
 of negotiations the unsatisfactory reception of 
 which from their initiation was well known. 
 The announcement of the forthcoming open- 
 ing of the polls for the election of the National 
 Representation in Parliament alone lent mean- 
 ing to this programme. But the exaltation of 
 the public mind was too great to be calmed 
 with vague and indefinite assurances. The 
 Press seized upon the question of the represen- 
 tation in Parliament, and immediately began 
 the publication of lists of candidates, selected 
 from amongst the late exiles and political prig- 
 oners professing the most unequivocal Unita- 
 rian and anti-Dynastic principles. 
 
 Liborio Romano publicly denied that the 
 (Government exerted any influence in the prep-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 269 
 
 aration of the electoral lists, and stated that it 
 merely " desired an honest, prudent, inde- 
 pendent and Constitutional-Monarchial Cham- 
 ber." 
 
 The Electoral Colleges were convened for 
 August nineteenth, but the convocation was 
 prorogued until the twenty-sixth, and again 
 postponed to September thirtieth ; for the rea- 
 son, as advanced in the royal decree, that " the 
 disturbances in Sicily and in Calabria were un- 
 favorable to a candid election/'
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Garibaldi crosses the Straits. Preoccupations of CATOWT. 
 Plan to neutralize Garibaldi's prestige. The minion to 
 Chambery. Napoleon's encouragement. Conspiracy of the 
 " Camarilla." Seizure of arms. Expulsion of Count of 
 Aquila. Francis amidst conflicting counsels. Romano's 
 memorandum. Letter of the Count of Syracuse. Francis 
 addresses himself to Garibaldi. Indecision of King. Ener- 
 getic policy of Cabinet. Resignation of same. Garibaldi at 
 the gates. Francis decides to leave Naples. 
 
 THE passage of Garibaldi, and what was now 
 known as the Army of the South, to continen- 
 tal Italy, was viewed with hardly less acute 
 alarm in Turin than in Naples. Although the 
 personal loyalty of the Chief whose banner was 
 inscribed with the patriotic device, "Victor 
 Emmanuel and Italian Unity ," was not ques- 
 tioned by the mass of Unionists throughout the 
 Peninsula, the political creed of many of his 
 lieutenants and henchmen was open to sus- 
 picion. Cavour dreaded the influence of these 
 surroundings ; and while unwilling to renounce 
 the prudent policy thus far adhered to, fully 
 realized the blow to the national prestige of 
 the " Honest King " which would follow the 
 insinuations of pusillanimous inertia, should 
 Garibaldi be permitted to accomplish unaided 
 270
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 271 
 
 the conquest of the Southern Kingdom. 
 Already the independent and brilliant achieve- 
 ments of the guerilla chieftain suggested dis- 
 quieting possibilities, should he, flushed with 
 even greater triumphs, give vent to the resent- 
 ment ho had felt at the cession of his native 
 town of Nice, and embroil his country with 
 France by an attack on the Eternal City. 
 
 Much as Cavour dreaded a departure from 
 the diplomatic channels hitherto pursued, it 
 was now apparent that, unless Piedmont was 
 to reap merely odium, and possibly incur 
 serious danger, from an enterprise entered 
 upon in the name of the national cause her 
 Sovereign impersonated, action could no longer 
 be delayed. 
 
 Although the Piedmontese Government 
 cannot be said to have been taken by surprise, 
 yet, nevertheless, the rapidity of events in the 
 South was unprecedented, and Cavour would 
 have preferred more time to mature his plans. 
 This, however, was denied him, and he con- 
 sequently faced the dilemma with character- 
 istic energy. 
 
 " I don't flatter myself," he wrote d'Azeglio 
 on August first, " that England will partic- 
 ularly relish my plan ; I think she would 
 prefer to see Garibaldi reach Naples, even if 
 he brought anarchy and revolution in his train.
 
 272 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 She considers him as the enemy of France, and 
 that is enough to render him dear in her eyea. 
 But we cannot expose ourselves to destruction 
 for the sake of pleasing England. ..." 
 
 Needless to say, that the plan referred to 
 aimed at reaching Naples in advance of Gari- 
 baldi. In determining upon this bold move 
 the Piedmontese Minister laid great stress on 
 the oft-proclaimed non-intervention policy of 
 the English Cabinet. France he felt confident 
 would not go contrary to British opinion in 
 this matter, although the Emperor might deem 
 it incumbent on him to bluster officially in 
 order to propitiate the Legitimist and Clerical 
 elements, which must necessarily take exception 
 to any violation of the territories of the Pope. 
 
 The result of the mission of Farini and 
 Cialdini to ChambSry, where they met the 
 Emperor, who was visiting his newly-acquired 
 possessions, was satisfactory in so far as it 
 confirmed Cavour's conviction that Napoleon 
 III. would not resent the passage of the Pied- 
 montese forces through the Papal States, pro- 
 vided Rome itself were left untouched. The 
 Envoys were greeted with the reassuring ex- 
 clamation : " WeH ! Why are you not more 
 energetic ? Count Cavour hesitates to confront 
 the scarecrow represented by the Legitimist 
 volunteers which Pius IX. has gathered around
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 273 
 
 his banner ! Do you think that the whole of 
 France is ready to rush to the aid of these 
 discontented loafers ? " * 
 
 Yet, while raising no objection in principle 
 to the proposed expedition, the Emperor 
 deemed it more prudent, in view of the suspi- 
 cion in which he and the Piedmontese Govern- 
 ment were regarded by the Diplomacy of 
 Europe, to await the inevitable result of the 
 revolutionary movement on Naples. "Let 
 Garibaldi go there first," he insisted, " and 
 you can go afterwards." A month earlier he 
 had written to Count Persigny, his Ambassador 
 at the Court of Saint James : "I am anxious 
 that Italy should obtain peace, no matter how, 
 so that I can withdraw from Rome, and that 
 foreign intervention may be averted." 
 
 The presence in Rome of General Lamori- 
 ciere, a brilliant, but anti-Napoleonic, officer 
 whose record in Africa had been a most 
 glorious one, and who now commanded the 
 Pontifical troops, constituted an undoubted 
 menace to the success of Cavour^s proposed 
 undertaking. A bigoted Legitimist, bitterly 
 hostile to Napoleon III. and his policy, while 
 correspondingly devoted to the fanatical and 
 ultra-conservative faction at the Roman Court, 
 his influence would, it was feared, inevitably 
 
 * Farini and Cialdini to Cavour, August 29, 1860. 
 18
 
 274 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tend to involve France in any quarrel between 
 the Pope and the Piedmontese Government. 
 The dream of the Papal See was the reconquest 
 of the Romagna, lost owing to the enforced 
 withdrawal of Austrian support after Villa- 
 franca. With the handful of troops at his 
 disposal General LamoriciSre could naturally 
 not undertake this task ; yet a skilful manipula- 
 tion of the threatened political chaos might 
 make such an enterprise feasible at any moment. 
 
 The assurances given Cavour's envoys at 
 Chambery were consequently of the utmost 
 value to Piedmont. If left alone to deal with 
 the Papal troops and their French commander, 
 General Cialdini was confident of success. It 
 only remained to await the advent of a pretext, 
 the seizure of which would not too violently 
 shock the jealous susceptibilities of European 
 Diplomacy. 
 
 Meanwhile the perplexities of the Nea- 
 politan Government were aggravated by the 
 petty and continual annoyances devised by 
 the members of the " Camarilla," who seized 
 every juncture to embarrass and vilify the 
 Constitutionalists. The reactionary move- 
 ment of July fifteenth, misunderstood by the 
 masses, while it failed to yield any substan- 
 tial profit to its promoters, had undoubtedly 
 increased the popular suspicion of the Court
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 275 
 
 Party ; and public opinion included Francis 
 in this faction, failing to understand how 
 one could be more royalist than the King. 
 The Clergy, naturally reactionary and ultra- 
 conservative, perceiving that Francis was being 
 forced by the revolutionary tide to the cession 
 of liberties prejudicial to their interests, threw 
 the enormous weight of their authority into 
 the scales, and through the manifold secret 
 hannels at their command, urged the aban- 
 donment of the Constitutional pledges, even 
 though such a course entail the deposition of 
 the King, bloodshed, and all the horrors of 
 civil war. The Count of Aquila, who aspired 
 to the Regency, was supported by this party, 
 as well as by the " Camarilla." The conspir- 
 acies of this Prince, as well as that of his 
 henchman, the French Legitimist priest de 
 Sauclieres, although abortive, and under less 
 critical circumstances insignificant, were, never- 
 theless, indications of the disintegration of the 
 Dynastic principle. Under the specification of 
 hardware, the Count of Aquila had secretly 
 imported from France a quantity of uniforms 
 and weapons, identical with those used by the 
 National Guard. The plan was to equip a 
 number of the adherents of the "Camarilla" 
 with these uniforms, and to simulate disturb- 
 ances between the populace, or rather mob of
 
 276 THE COLL At SB OF 
 
 suborned " lazzaroni," and this fictitious Na- 
 tional Guard, on the one hand ; while other 
 bodies of traversied troops mingled with the 
 real Civic Corps, creating confusion, and giv- 
 ing the semblance of mutiny in the ranks ef 
 the upholders of the Constitutional privi- 
 leges ; thus discrediting the Government, and 
 evincing the popular aversion to the lib- 
 eral leaders. This decidedly clumsy plot 
 was easily unearthed by Romano's police, the 
 arms and accoutrements confiscated, and 
 documents, clearly compromising the Count, 
 placed in the hands of the Government. 
 The affair was immediately considered by the 
 Council of Ministers, in special session ; and 
 after mature deliberation the arrest of the 
 Count was decided on. This very proper de- 
 cision was, however, not carried out, owing to 
 the repugnance of certain members of the 
 Cabinet, who feared to provoke a crisis by such 
 extreme measures, and was commuted into an 
 order of expulsion from the Kingdom within 
 twenty-four hours. Francis, although cogni- 
 zant of the nature of the accusation, and of the 
 contents of the incriminating documents, re- 
 frained from taking part in the deliberations 
 of the Council. He, however, approved its 
 decisions, and yielded to Spinelli's emphatic 
 demand that should the Count of Aquila re-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 277 
 
 quest an audience of his nephew, this favor 
 should be denied. Owing to the weakness of 
 the Government, or the insistence of the cred- 
 ulous Francis, the threatened disgrace was 
 still further mitigated, and the Count left 
 Naples on August 14th on an improvised mis- 
 sion to England ; nominally for the purchase 
 of two frigates for the royal navy. 
 
 The details of the propaganda undertaken 
 by the priest de Sauclidres, provided for a sec- 
 ond Saint Bartholomew, in which the Liberals 
 were to have assigned them the unenviable 
 part of the Huguenots. De Sauclieres, when 
 arrested, confessed that the conspiracy, which 
 he stated was in favor of the King, included 
 in its ranks " the highest in the land." That 
 Francis was cognizant of the conspiracy before 
 its discovery by the police is maintained by 
 certain writers, but the extent of its ramifica- 
 tions will never be known, for the Provisional 
 Government of Garibaldi quashed the proceed- 
 ings against its participants, by virtue of the 
 decree of September llth, granting full am- 
 nesty for all political crimes. 
 
 The moral condition of the capital when it 
 became known, on August 19th, that Garibaldi 
 had actually passed the fleets stationed in the 
 Straits of Messina, and successfully landed at 
 Melito, is indescribable. The fall of Reggio.
 
 278 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 and the military promenade through Calabria, 
 struck terror into the souls of the Reactionists, 
 while it intensified the frenzied enthusiasm of 
 the jubilant Liberals. The King, distraught 
 by the conflicting opinions of his official coun- 
 sellors, hesitated to adopt a line of conduct. 
 The Diplomatic Corps beseeched Francis to 
 spare the Capital the horrors of a siege, cul- 
 minating with the inevitable excesses attend- 
 ing a triumphant revolution. Spinelli advised 
 energetic action, although he did not conceal 
 his apprehension of the contamination, and 
 general demoralization, of the royal troops. 
 He expressed the conviction, however, that 
 should the King place himself at the head of 
 his regiments, confidence and discipline would 
 be restored. " At least," he urged, "if it is 
 our destiny to succumb, we would fall with 
 honor, and would be free from the reproach of 
 fleeing before a handful of men whose only 
 strength lies in the prestige of their chief." It 
 was argued that this prestige rested exclusively 
 on previous abnormal achievements, and that 
 .a single defeat would destroy the popular cre- 
 dence in the infallibility of the hero. The 
 " Thousand" who had landed at Marsala had, 
 it is true, increased to fourteen times that 
 number ; but these were badly armed, wretch- 
 edly equipped, and, from a military point of
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 279 
 
 view, undisciplined, besides being deficient in 
 artillery, cavalry and commissariat, and with 
 no reserve to fall back upon in case of serious 
 reverse. Francis, on the other hand, had still 
 nominally at his command some forty-four 
 thousand men, efficient artillery, and (it was 
 asserted) abundant ammunition and provender 
 for man and beast, besides the substantial sum 
 of six millions of ducats in the treasury. The 
 Minister of War had prepared a plan of resist- 
 ance acceptable to a majority of his colleagues, 
 and approved by Ischitella. Francis read the 
 document, listened to the counsels of his mil- 
 itary advisers, and with characteristic but 
 fatal irresolution continually postponed his de- 
 cision. 
 
 On August 20th, Liborio Romano handed 
 the King his famous memorandum. This docu- 
 ment, not having been indorsed by the major- 
 ity of the Cabinet, was presented privately, 
 and on the personal responsibility of the Min- 
 ister of the Interior. After summarizing the 
 political situation at home and abroad, and 
 dwelling on the lack of discipline, and conse- 
 quent scant trust to be reposed in the army, 
 and the even more deplorable conditions pre- 
 vailing in the marine forces, Romano advances 
 the belief that "a return of the confidence of 
 the people in their Prince has become not only
 
 280 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 difficult bat impossible." Therefore he pro- 
 poses, and counsels, that the King leave the 
 country for a time at least, placing the tem- 
 porary Regency in the hands of a Minister 
 worthy of confidence. The Regency of a 
 Royal Prince would not serve the purpose, as 
 it would not command public confidence, or 
 " offer any guarantee for the interests of the 
 Dynasty." Public opinion demanded a prompt 
 decision on all sides, among the masses, as 
 well as in the ranks of those natural support- 
 ers of the Crown, the Army and Navy, there 
 existed profound distrust. The Ministry could 
 do nothing to avert, or reconcile,, this universal 
 scepticism of the good faith of the Grown ; nor 
 could they pretend to ignore it. The Minister 
 then advises that Francis, at the moment of 
 his departure, " address the People with loyal 
 and magnanimous words, which shall bear wit- 
 ness to the kindness of your paternal heart, 
 which has taken this noble resolve in order to 
 spare your subjects the horrors of civil war. 
 Your Majesty will then have recourse to the 
 verdict of Europe, and will await from time, 
 and the justice of God, the return of confidence, 
 and the triumph of your legitimate rights." 
 Should the King, in his wisdom, decide to re- 
 ject the counsels of his Minister, Romano adds 
 that no other course would be open to him but
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 281 
 
 to resign the high office with which he has been 
 entrusted, in the belief that he no longer en- 
 joys his Sovereign's confidence. 
 
 On a first reading of this extraordinary 
 document we are inclined to brand Liborio 
 Romano as a consummate hypocrite, but a more 
 careful perusal discloses the fact that he ex- 
 aggerates, conceals and promises nothing. It 
 is patent that he, as other thinking men, 
 realized that once the Bourbon Throne was 
 vacated, either by spontaneous renunciation, 
 or the forcible ejection of its occupant, no 
 foreign or domestic power could, or would, re- 
 store a Dynasty so thoroughly unsatisfactory, 
 not only to the country itself, but also in the 
 eyes of progressive Europe. 
 
 Romano has been stigmatized as an arch- 
 traitor by those writers who sympathized with 
 Bourbon rule in Naples, and as has been said, 
 the Italian Government showed no desire to 
 retain his services after the fall of the Dynasty, 
 although Garibaldi availed himself of his co- 
 operation for a while. He was undoubtedly 
 instrumental in avoiding unnecessary blood- 
 shed in the capital, and subsequent events 
 amply justified his estimation of the crisis. 
 That he believed the advancement of his per- 
 sonal ambitions to be compatible with the best 
 interests of his country, is a supposition which
 
 282 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 would be considered hazardous by many, but 
 is not contradicted by facts. 
 
 The startling propositions contained in the 
 Minister's memorandum were reiterated four 
 days later in a document which, considering 
 the source from which it came, must be ac- 
 knowledged as infinitely more significant. 
 The Count of Syracuse addressed his royal 
 nephew in unequivocal terms, leaving no room 
 for doubt as to the extent of the sacrifice de- 
 manded of him. 
 
 " SIKE : 
 
 " When I raised my voice to avert the perils 
 which threatened our House, I was unheeded ; 
 see to it that now, when I prophesy still greater 
 misfortunes, I find access to your heart, and 
 that I be not refuted by short-sighted and 
 baneful counsel. 
 
 "The conditions of Italy which are com- 
 pletely changed ; the ideal of National Unity 
 which has assumed gigantic proportions dur- 
 ing the few months following the fall of 
 Palermo ; have deprived Your Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment of the strength which upholds States, 
 and rendered impossible an alliance with Pied- 
 mont. 
 
 " The populations of Upper Italy, horrified 
 by the reports of the Sicilian massacres, re-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 288 
 
 pulsed the Neapolitan Ambassadors ; and 
 miserably abandoned to the hazards of arms 
 alone, deprived of alliances, we are the prey 
 of the resentment of the multitudes which rise 
 up in all parts of Italy demanding the exter- 
 mination of our House, which has become the 
 target for general reprobation. Moreover, the 
 civil war, which now invades the continental 
 provinces, will overwhelm the Dynasty in the 
 supreme ruin which the crafty manoBUvres of 
 perfidious counsellors has long since prepared 
 for the descendants of Charles III. of Bour- 
 bon. The blood of citizens, uselessly shed, 
 will again inundate the thousand cities of the 
 Kingdom, and you who were the hope, and 
 the object of the affection of the people, will 
 be contemplated with horror as the sole cause' 
 of a fratricidal war. Sire ! Save our House 
 while there is yet time : preserve it from the 
 maledictions of all Italy ; imitate the example 
 of our royal relative of Parma, who released 
 his subjects from their allegiance, and made 
 them the arbiters of their own destiny, as soon 
 as civil war had broken out in his Duchy. 
 Europe, and your People, will credit you for 
 your heroic sacrifice ; you will be enabled to 
 serenely lift your face before God, who will re- 
 ward the magnanimous action of Your Majesty. 
 Your soul being regenerated through mis-
 
 }J84 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 fortune, your heart will expand to the noble 
 aspirations of the Fatherland, and you will 
 bless the day when you sacrificed yourself for 
 the greatness of Italy. 
 
 " With these words, Sire, I simply fulfil the 
 duty imposed by my long experience, and I 
 pray God that He guide you, and render you 
 worthy of His benedictions." 
 
 Abandoned by Ministers and family alike, 
 the unfortunate Francis, in desperation, is 
 said to have made a supreme appeal to the 
 wielder of the avenging sword which threatened 
 to sweep away his Crown. The following 
 almost incredible proposition is vouched for 
 by several contemporaneous writers, amongst 
 *others Signora White-Mario, who accompanied 
 her husband during Garibaldi's southern cam- 
 paign, and Maxim du Camp, who relates it in 
 his personal experiences.* After the capitu- 
 lation of Soveria, Garibaldi received, from the 
 hands of M. J. La Cecilia, a letter written by 
 the order of Francis, and dated August 
 seventh, by the terms of which the King 
 offered the successful General, on condition 
 that he refrain from any attempt to overturn 
 the Bourbon Government : (1) The abandon- 
 ment of Sicily, which should be allowed to de- 
 
 * " Expedition des Deux-Siciles." Paris, 1861.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 285 
 
 cide its own destiny by universal suffrage. 
 (2) The free passage for himself and his army 
 through Neapolitan territory, without, how- 
 ever, traversing Naples. (3) Three millions 
 of ducats in cash. (4) The co-operation during 
 six months of fifty thousand men of the royal 
 troops, as well as the fleet, for the purpose of 
 attacking Austria in Venetia, or the Papal 
 troops at Ancona. (5) The right of raising 
 volunteers throughout the Kingdom. 
 
 As there exists no official documentary evi- 
 dence to substantiate their assertions, the bur- 
 den of proof, as well as the responsibility of 
 historical accuracy, must rest with the above- 
 mentioned authors. Neither Liborio Romano, 
 who would presumably have been cognizant of 
 the transaction, owing to his subsequent offi- 
 cial relations with Garibaldi, nor the victorious 
 General himself, make any reference to the 
 letter which, clearly branding Francis a traitor 
 to country and traditions alike, would have 
 been eagerly fastened upon by his enemies to 
 stigmatize him as such in the eyes of the world, 
 and especially those sympathizers who consid- 
 ered he had been unfairly dealt with. 
 
 Although Romano had warned the King, in 
 his " Memorandum " of August twentieth, of 
 the futility of resistance, or serious reliance on 
 the loyalty of the troops still nominally at the
 
 286 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 disposal of the Crown, he did not hesitate to 
 support his colleagues in the Cabinet in their 
 demands for immediate and energetic action. 
 Neither did he apparently deem it inconsistent 
 to retain his official position, in spite of the 
 threat of resignation should Francis disregard 
 the advice given. The myterious conduct of 
 Liborio Romano has been commented on by 
 writers of all shades of political opinions. It 
 is difficult to explain the object of his numer- 
 ous intrigues with Royalists, Liberals, and the 
 adherents of Cavour, Ma/zini, and Garibaldi, 
 unless we admit that he sought for himself, by 
 virtue of his undoubted popularity with the 
 masses and National Guard, the position of 
 Regent, or Dictator, pending the settlement of 
 the vexed question of the future of the Realm. 
 His immediate acceptance of office under Gari- 
 baldi does not destroy this hypothesis, for the 
 victorious General had loudly proclaimed his 
 intention of at once passing on to the conquest 
 of Rome, and the deliverance of Venetia ; the 
 attempted realization of which projects was 
 alone prevented by the unexpected stand of 
 the Royalists at Capua, combined with the op- 
 portune appearance of Cialdini in the Papal 
 States. 
 
 To the ever-nearing flood, which must infal- 
 libly overwhelm him, Francis opposed the same
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 287 
 
 listless fatalism, the same mystic resignation, 
 or vacillating concurrence with the proposals of 
 his advisers, which had caused the despair of 
 his well-wishers since the beginning of his 
 troubles. The energetic decision which alone 
 could arrest, or at least postpone, the cataclysm, 
 seemed impossible to his unstable character, 
 so fatally ready to yield to every new influence. 
 Each day brought tidings of the defection of 
 adherents whose fidelity was reckoned incor- 
 ruptible ; while many of those nearest his per- 
 son now forsook their allegiance, and openly 
 joined the ranks of the revolutionists. All 
 moral authority of the Government appeared 
 to have vanished. Suspicion, bad faith, malign 
 accusations, and petty self-seeking intrigue, 
 invaded the Palace, the offices of the Govern- 
 ment and the Civil and Military Associations. 
 The southern provinces, the Calabrias, Puglie 
 and Basilicata were in open revolt. On all 
 sides Provisional Governments sprang into be- 
 ing, and placed their resources of men and 
 money at the disposal of Garibaldi, or the Dic- 
 tator, as he was already styled. Grossly exag- 
 gerated reports, and the wildest rumors, were 
 spread about the capital, dangerously inflam- 
 ing the imagination of the already overwrought 
 and terrified populace. Yielding to the mali- 
 cious insinuations of the ever active " Cama-
 
 288 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 rilla," and in direct violation of the advice of 
 his Cabinet, Francis nominated General Cutro- 
 fiano, a noted reactionist, and advocate of 
 drastic measures of suppression, as Governor 
 of Naples. His pernicious counsels were, how- 
 ever, annulled or rendered innocuous, by indi- 
 vidual members of the Cabinet, who warned 
 the King that the slightest provocative meas- 
 ure would hasten the explosion of popular 
 fury, and involve the city in defiant revolt, re- 
 sulting in carnage and plunder. 
 
 In the council of August twenty-ninth, the 
 Cabinet, alarmed at the persistent intrigues of 
 the " Camarilla," and enigmatical attitude of 
 the King, resolved that decisive action must 
 be forced upon him. Spinelli, President of 
 the Council, and Pianell, Minister of War, in 
 spite of the uncertainty of the loyal support of 
 the troops, were in favor of the adoption of a 
 plan of resistance, and so solemnly informed 
 the King ; making it clear that not a moment 
 was to be lost. Francis as usual agreed with 
 them, and promised to give the matter his 
 attention. Next day, no action having been 
 taken, the Minister of War declined further 
 responsibility and tendered his resignation. 
 The name of General Ulloa, whose previous 
 offers to combat Garibaldi had been declined, 
 again came under consideration, but met with
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 289 
 
 insurmountable opposition. On the evening 
 of September first, Pianell, in spite of his equiv- 
 ocal official status, again sought the King, 
 and urged that Francis concentrate the forces 
 at his command in some well chosen position 
 which would cover the capital, and there make 
 a stand against the enemy. He declared his 
 conviction that should the King place him- 
 self frankly at the head of these troops, which 
 included the mercenary regiments largely com- 
 posed of Bavarians, and men from the Austrian 
 Adriatic provinces, his presence would inspire 
 fresh ardor, and re-establish the discipline, 
 weakened by systematic neglect, and the dis- 
 credit into which the officers had fallen, owing 
 to personal jealousies and dissensions. 
 
 Francis appeared inclined to accept this ad- 
 vice, and ordered a Military Council to assem- 
 ble at the Palace next day. 
 
 Although the meeting took place at the ap- 
 pointed hour, its deliberations came to naught ; 
 in consequence, it is claimed by some, of the 
 treacherous attitude assumed by several of its 
 members. General Pianell, irritated beyond 
 endurance by the continual rejection of his ad- 
 vice, and deeply mortified at the evident lack 
 of confidence displayed, insisted on the accept- 
 ance of his resignations as statesman and mili- 
 tary commander, accompanying the same with
 
 290 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 a letter setting forth his reasons for so doing. 
 He left for France the following morning, not 
 being willing to witness the humiliations in 
 store for his Sovereign. 
 
 On September third, having exhausted every 
 means of inducing the King to attempt to save 
 himself and his country, the Cabinet, following 
 the example of Pianell, insisted on the accept- 
 ance of their resignations. Francis, while 
 complying with their wishes, requested the 
 Ministers to remain at their posts until their 
 successors had been selected. The formation 
 of a new Cabinet which could cope with the 
 overwhelming odds, and yet adhere strictly to 
 the spirit as well as the letter of the Constitu- 
 tional guarantees, was, however, obviously im- 
 possible. Garibaldi, without firing a shot, or 
 striking a blow, was within a few days' march 
 of the capital ; and for widely different reasons, 
 Cavour and the "Camarilla" were anxious 
 that disturbances should break out before his 
 arrival. Rumors were actively circulated that 
 the forts were about to fire upon the city ; the 
 lowest element of the populace being reported 
 as eagerly expectant of the plunder which 
 must fall to their share in the ensuing con- 
 fusion. To the vigilance and authority of the 
 National Militia during these days and nights 
 of unreasoning panic and universal intrigue,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 291 
 
 great credit is due, and whatever stigma may 
 be attached to the political fame of Liborio 
 Romano, his salutary influence over this body 
 for the preservation of order cannot be disputed. 
 On the morning of the fourth, the alarming 
 news that considerable reinforcements for 
 Garibaldi had been landed not far from Salerno, 
 brought together a hastily summoned council 
 of war, attended by all the Generals available. 
 The unanimous opinion expressed by his 
 military advisers convinced the King that 
 effective opposition to the entry of Garibaldi 
 into Naples was now impossible. Should the 
 troops about Salerno be called upon to attack 
 the popular idol, it was averred, they would 
 either disband, or go over in a body to the 
 revolutionists. It was agreed that the only 
 efficient line of defence now lay between Capua 
 and Gaeta, to the north of the capital ; and 
 Francis was advised to evacuate Naples, leaving 
 small garrisons in the three forts, and intrust- 
 ing the maintenance of public order to the 
 National Guard. There being no longer a 
 Minister of War, the Generals assembled in 
 council signed the report, which was handed 
 to the King. The venerable General Carras- 
 cosa alone, when consulted privately by his 
 young Sovereign, disapproved the abandon- 
 ment of the capital. " If Your Majesty leaves
 
 292 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Naples," he muttered, " you will never return 
 again." General Prince Ischitella, although 
 he signed the report with his colleagues, em- 
 phasized his disgust at his perfunctory action 
 by flinging away the pen, and leaving Naples 
 the same evening. 
 
 Spinelli was again summoned by the King 
 early on the morning of September fifth, when 
 Francis informed him that he had decided to 
 leave Naples for Gaeta, and from the shelter of 
 that stronghold vindicate his claims. After 
 instructing the Premier to prepare a farewell 
 proclamation to his Neapolitan subjects, Fran- 
 cis and Maria Sophia, accompanied by two 
 gentlemen of their suite, went for a drive in an 
 open carriage. They were greeted formally, 
 even respectfully, by the passers-by. When 
 opposite the Foresteria, so soon to be occupied 
 by Garibaldi, an humiliating evidence of the 
 altered spirit of the times was cruelly, though 
 unwittingly, thrust upon the unfortunate 
 Sovereign. At the corner stood the Royal 
 Pharmacy, the signboard of which was deco- 
 rated with the Bourbon lilies. A ladder, placed 
 against the side of the shop, so encumbered 
 the street that the carriage was brought to a 
 momentary halt. Glancing up Francis beheld 
 a couple of workmen busily engaged in effac- 
 ing the Bourbon emblems. Smiling sadly, but
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 293 
 
 otherwise unmoved, Francis drew the attention 
 of his Consort to the prudential measure of the 
 politic apothecary ; and ordered the coachman 
 to return to the Palace.* 
 
 The remainder of the day was passed in 
 transacting the official business necessitated by 
 the King's departure. Receiving the chiefs 
 of the National Militia, with their new Com- 
 mander, De Sauget, at their head, Francis 
 communicated to them his decision to leave the 
 capital temporarily, and intrusted them with 
 the maintenance of order during his absence, 
 which he asserted would be of brief duration. 
 In the course of the afternoon a Council of 
 State was held, during which decrees of minor 
 importance appertaining to the routine of the 
 various Departments were presented and 
 signed. Before dismissing his Ministers Fran- 
 cis instructed De Martino, who was in charge 
 of the portfolio for Foreign Relations, to 
 prepare a protest to the European Powers, and 
 to submit the draft for his approval during the 
 course of the evening. Spinelli handed the 
 King the draft of this document, as well as 
 that of the farewell proclamation, late that 
 night. Francis signed both with but a passing 
 comment on the style of their composition, 
 which he recognized as that of Romano. 
 * Memor " La Fin di un Regno."
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Farewell proclamation and protest. Suspicions of treachery. 
 Preparations for departure. The gunboat "Messagero." 
 Reception of Ministers and Diplomatists. The Sovereigns 
 leave the Palace. Refusal of Neapolitan war-ships to 
 follow King. The voyage to Gaeta. The King and Queen 
 during journey. Arrival at Gaeta. 
 
 SEPTEMBER sixth dawned bright and fair. 
 On the street corners groups of excited 
 citizens discussed the farewell proclamation, 
 which had been published during the early 
 morning hours, and was conspicuously plac- 
 arded over the town. 
 
 In language impregnated with deep resigna- 
 tion, singularly free from resentment, and not 
 devoid of a certain dignity, Francis informed 
 his subjects that, although at peace with all 
 Europe, "an unjust war contrary to the rights 
 of Nations" had invaded his realm, forcing 
 him to absent himself from the capital. " My 
 governmental reforms : my adhesion to the 
 great National and Italian principles could not 
 avert it : moreover, the necessity of defending 
 the integrity of the State provoked incidents 
 294
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 295 
 
 which I always lamented. I solemnly protest 
 against this unjustifiable hostility, on which 
 the present and future ages will pronounce 
 severe judgment." In order to spare his 
 Neapolitan subjects the horrors of war, as well 
 as to insure the preservation of the National 
 edifices, museums, and collections of priceless 
 value, Francis states that, together with a 
 portion of his army, he now goes forth to 
 defend his rights. The remainder of his troops 
 will be left in the city to watch over, in concert 
 with the National Militia, " the security and 
 the inviolability of the capital." To the 
 Ministry, the Syndic of Naples and the Com- 
 mander of the National Militia, is intrusted 
 the task of avoiding the evils of civil disorders, 
 and the disasters of war, to which end the fullest 
 powers are conferred upon them. In taking 
 leave of his fellow-citizens Francis adds : " I 
 recommend to them union, peace, and the 
 fulfilment of their duties as citizens. Let not 
 an excessive attachment to my Crown become 
 a source of trouble. If the chances of the 
 present war should lead me back amongst you ; 
 if on some future day, which it may please 
 Divine Providence to determine, I regain the 
 Throne of my ancestors, rendered more illus- 
 trious on account of the liberal institutions 
 with which I have surrounded it, my sole desire
 
 296 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 will be to find my people united, powerful and 
 happy. " 
 
 This proclamation was accompanied by one 
 from the Prefect of Police, calling upon all 
 citizens to maintain strict order, and not 
 " rashly compromise the t glorious destinies 
 now dawning " over their country. 
 
 Naples was in a state of mingled curiosity, 
 stupor, and terror. The mysterious prepara- 
 tions at the Palace, and the departure of large 
 bodies of troops, encouraged speculations of 
 the wildest nature. It was asserted that the 
 wording of the proclamation was ambiguous : 
 that its fair speaking was a snare to lull the 
 suspicions of the Liberals, in order the more 
 readily to overwhelm and destroy them. The 
 fact that some six thousand men, exclusive of 
 the National Militia, were left to garrison the 
 forts of Carmine, the Egg, and that of St. 
 Elmo, as well as to guard the Arsenal, gave 
 substance to the fears entertained by many 
 that Garibaldi's advent would be the signal 
 for a general bombardment, which must in- 
 evitably result in a rising of the " lazzaroni," 
 and lower strata of the plebs, and the sack 
 of the city. Many families notoriously con- 
 nected with the old regime left Naples, not 
 trusting in the ability of the Militia to over- 
 awe and restrain the infuriated populace,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 297 
 
 under circumstances which seemed now un- 
 avoidable. 
 
 During the night of September fifth numer- 
 ous baggage vans, escorted by soldiers, left the 
 Royal Palace, and turned in the direction of 
 Capua ; while on the following morning large 
 quanties of luggage were hurried on board the 
 two small steamers, "Messagero" and " Del- 
 fino," anchored in the Military Port, under 
 the guns of the Arsenal. Although Francis 
 carried with him considerable personal pr%p- 
 erty, little or no treasure, or articles of intrin- 
 sic value, were removed. The enormous ac- 
 cumulations of gold and silver plate belonging 
 to the Royal Household were left in Naples, 
 and integrally turned over to the Government 
 established by Garibaldi by those in charge. 
 Nor did Francis attempt to withdraw from 
 the Banks his private treasure, amounting to 
 nearly eleven millions of ducats. In accord- 
 ance with the special instructions of the King, 
 none of the valuable pictures, or furniture, 
 decorating the Palace, and forming the private 
 property of the Crown, was removed ; with the 
 exception of two portraits by Van Dyke, and 
 RaffaeFs Madonna, to which latter picture he 
 was particularly attached. 
 
 Orders had been issued to the Commander 
 of the " Massagero," a small gunboat of 250
 
 298 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 tons, to hold his vessel in readiness to sail for 
 Gaeta at six that evening. Although the per- 
 sonal devotion and loyalty of the Captain, 
 Vincenzo Criscuolo, was beyond question, the 
 same could not be said for all the members of 
 his crew, and it transpired later that threats 
 were employed to compel the firemen to re- 
 main at their posts. Another panic was 
 created shortly before the departure of the 
 Sovereigns, by the action of the Piedmontese 
 frigates, " Maria Adelaide" and " Maria Pia," 
 which suddenly slipped from their former 
 moorings, and took up positions directly 
 opposite the Military Port, almost blocking the 
 narrow channel. This was interpreted as in- 
 dicative of an attempt to be made to prevent 
 the departure of the royal party ; and Francis 
 was earnestly pleaded with to leave the city 
 secretly, or under the protection of a foreign 
 flag. Criscuolo was, however, successful in 
 prevailing on the King not to leave his capital 
 as a fugitive, but to depart openly on board 
 his own vessel, and under his own flag. 
 
 The Ministers took leave of the King shortly 
 before the hour fixed for his departure. Fran- 
 cis received them courteously, and addressed a 
 few words of thanks, or admonition, to each in 
 turn. Although the King affected indiffer- 
 ence, the great effort he made to control him-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 299 
 
 self was evident to all. In taking leave of 
 Spinelli and De Martino, he displayed affection- 
 ate regret : to Liborio Romano, after recom- 
 mending him to watch ceaselessly that public 
 order be not disturbed, he remarked with 
 warning significance : " But look out for your 
 head, Don Liborio." To which Romano re- 
 plied : " Sire, I will see to it that it remain 
 on my shoulders as long as possible." 
 
 The Diplomatic Corps was not received 
 officially, although most of the members, to 
 whom De Martino had communicated the King's 
 protest addressed to their Governments, went 
 privately to bid the Sovereign farewell. With 
 the exception of the English, French, and 
 Piedmontese Envoys, all the diplomatists 
 accredited to the Neapolitan Court eventually 
 received instructions to follow the King to 
 Gaeta, where many of them remained during 
 the greater part of the subsequent siege. 
 
 Besides the officials accompany ing the Court, 
 hardly twenty persons assembled at the Palace 
 for the final hand-kissing. The numerous 
 courtiers, and beneficiaries of the royal favors 
 had melted away with the first indications of 
 approaching calamity. 
 
 The Sovereigns left the Palace on foot for 
 the landing stage, Maria Sophia leaning on her 
 husband's arm, calm and outwardly cheerful.
 
 300 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 The members of the suite, and those of the 
 Military Household who still preserved their 
 functions, followed the royal couple through the 
 gardens and passages leading to the Watergate. 
 
 Before leaving the harbor, Francis instructed 
 Commander Criscuolo to signal orders to the 
 Neapolitan war-vessels anchored in the roads, 
 to follow him to Gaeta ; but these signals were 
 ignored. When hardly out of sight of the city 
 a squadron of four vessels of the Royal Marine 
 was met ; these also refused to obey the royal 
 commands. 
 
 The voyage was a mournful one. No re- 
 freshments had been prepared : indeed all were 
 too absorbed by the anxieties of the moment to 
 think of food. About ten o'clock the Queen 
 retired to a small deck-cabin, and rested on a 
 sofa. Francis passed the night alternately 
 pacing the deck, plunged in solitary medita- 
 tion, or in fitful conversation with the devoted 
 Criscuolo. About two in the morning he 
 asked if the Queen had retired, and on being 
 informed that she still slept in the deck-house, 
 entered noiselessly, and threw his own mantle 
 over the recumbent form of his unfortunate 
 young consort. 
 
 At six in the morning the " Messagero " 
 steamed into the harbor of Gaeta ; and the last 
 act of the drama was begun.
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Naples remains calm. Offer to land Piedmonteae troops re- 
 fused. Commission appointed to meet Qaribaldi. His 
 communications with Romano. An officious Provisional 
 Government. Garibaldi enters Naples. His reception by 
 populace. Evacuation by Royalist troops. Garibaldi's 
 loyalty suspected at Turin. Romano's attempts at recon- 
 ciliation. Mistakes of Dictator's Government. The Pied- 
 montese ultimatum to the Pope. Cavour's justification. 
 Piedmontese troops enter Papal States. Diplomatic pro- 
 tests. Napoleon privately approves. 
 
 MEANWHILE Naples remained outwardly 
 calm. The theatres and other places of amuse- 
 ment were open, although less frequented than 
 usual. The busy street life of the great city 
 preserved its every-day animation, yet the mul- 
 titudes which thronged the Toledo and prin- 
 cipal thoroughfares wore an air of general ex- 
 pectancy and anxiety foreign to the pleasure- 
 loving populace of the southern metropolis. 
 
 The offer of the Marquis Villamarina to 
 land troops from the Piedmontese war-vessels 
 to assist in the maintenance of order was re- 
 fused by the Ministry, which called on the 
 301
 
 302 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Syndic and Commander of the National Guard 
 to concert the measures to be taken to hand over 
 the material resources of the city to Garibaldi. 
 As a consequence of these deliberations the 
 Syndic, Prince of Alessandria, and General de 
 Sauget, were charged with the duty of nego- 
 tiating with Garibaldi at Salerno next morn- 
 ing. Special messengers were despatched im- 
 mediately to announce the departure of the 
 King, and to acquaint the Dictator with the 
 plans of the authorities in the capital, and of 
 the arrangements proposed for his reception. 
 
 The messengers delivered their communica- 
 tions to Garibaldi late the same evening, and 
 before seven o'clock on the morning of the 
 seventh, the following telegram was received 
 by Romano: 
 
 "As soon as the Syndic and Commander 
 of the National Guard, whom I await, shall 
 have arrived, I will come to you. During 
 these anxious moments I recommend you to 
 maintain the order and calm befitting the 
 dignity of a People about to enter upon the 
 possession of their individual rights. 
 " The Dictator of the Two Sicilies, 
 
 "JOSEPH GARIBALDI." 
 
 Romano instantly replied as follows :
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 303 
 
 " To the Invincible General Garibaldi, Dictator 
 of the Two Sicilies. Liborio Romano, 
 Minister of the Interior and Police. 
 " With the greatest impatience Naples awaits 
 your arrival in order to salute you as the Re- 
 deemer of Italy, and place in your hands the 
 reins of Government, and the direction of its 
 destinies. While awaiting this I will firmly 
 preserve public order and tranquillity ; your 
 authority, already made known by me to the 
 populace, is the best guarantee of the success 
 of this task. I await your further orders, and 
 am with unlimited respect, Most Invincible 
 Dictator, yours, 
 
 " LIBORIO ROMANO. 
 
 ^NAPLES, September?, I860." 
 
 While Romano insists that instantaneous 
 and unconditional annexation to the Kingdom 
 of Italy was desired by the Committee of Or- 
 der, he yet states that the Ministry considered 
 such a course "fraught with perils and com- 
 plications." He asserts in his memoirs,* that, 
 in the estimation of those left in authority by 
 Francis, Naples should retain untrammelled pos- 
 session of her rights, and that the fusion with 
 the rest of Italy, if desired, should result, not 
 
 * " Memorie Politiche di Liborio Romano," Naples, 
 1873.
 
 304 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 as the compulsory annexation of a conquered 
 people, but as the outcome of free option, and 
 with the recognition of the rights of an equal ; 
 the conditions and nature of the compact being 
 determined, as in the instance of many of the 
 smaller States, by a Plebiscite. This explana- 
 tion is not in absolute harmony with the text 
 of Komano's enthusiastic despatch to Garibaldi, 
 wherein the Minister of the Interior proclaims 
 Naples' impatience to place in the hands of the 
 Dictator "the reins of government, and the 
 direction of its destinies." 
 
 That unconditional surrender as in the case 
 of a conquered foe was distasteful to the late 
 Ministers is conceivable ; yet as Garibaldi came 
 in the name of Italian Unity, and of Victor 
 Emmanuel, the objection to the co-operation 
 of that Sovereign's accredited representaitve 
 appears contradictory. The explanation is to 
 be found, in part, in the jealousies and friction 
 which existed, and had for some time existed, 
 between the more ardent Ministers of the 
 Crown and the Marquis de Villamarina, who 
 was for political considerations (not to say per- 
 sonal ambitions) anxious to wrest from them, 
 and from Garibaldi, as large a part as possible 
 of the prestige attaching to the annexation. 
 Romano has stated that his earnest desire was 
 to bring about a reconciliation between Gari-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 305 
 
 baldi and Cavour, and it is admissible that he 
 feared the possible consequences should the 
 Dictator find the fruits of his victories snatched 
 from him, the city practically in the hands of 
 Cavour's agents, and occupied by the Pied- 
 montese troops. 
 
 Certain of the Cavouriani, with Pisanelli at 
 their head, notwithstanding the fact that the 
 Ministry still remained nominally in office, and 
 that the National Militia was prepared to en- 
 force its commands, determined to establish a 
 Provisional Government pending the arrival of 
 Garibaldi, and forthwith issued a decree call- 
 ing upon all good citizens to assist in preserv- 
 ing order. Ten minutes after the promulga- 
 tion of this decree, it became known that the 
 General was actually on his way to the city, 
 and this self-constituted Assembly promptly 
 issued another, officiously creating him " Dic- 
 tator." When informed of these proceedings 
 Garibaldi, deeming himself slighted, and his 
 dignity as conqueror offended, ordered the 
 arrest of the presumptuous politicians. Ro- 
 mano, however, realizing the danger of friction, 
 or desirous of being serviceable to Cavour, was 
 instrumental in so arranging matters that the 
 order of arrest was revoked, and Pisanelli 
 actually became a member of the Dictator's 
 Government. 
 20
 
 306 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Meanwhile, ignorant of the dissensions 
 amongst the annexationists, or more probably 
 conscious that he could afford to ignore them, 
 Garibaldi started for the capital. Leaving 
 Salerno by train on the morning of September 
 seventh, the conqueror, accompanied only by 
 General Cozenz and Doctor Bertani, without 
 escort or following, alighted at the railway sta- 
 tion in Naples at noon. Eomano and a vast 
 multitude were there to greet him ; the former 
 ready with a discourse impregnated with ful- 
 some flattery and extravagant optimism ; the 
 latter with an enthusiasm born rather of re- 
 lief at the escape from unknown danger, than 
 of an intelligent appreciation of the altered 
 political conditions symbolized in the person of 
 the red-shirted warrior. Entering an open 
 carriage, the Dictator and his friends drove 
 slowly through the densely crowded streets, un- 
 der the forts garrisoned by the Bourbon troops, 
 and past the guard-houses of the Bavarian mer- 
 cenaries, to the palace of the Foresteria. Gari- 
 baldi modestly refused to occupy the Eoyal 
 Palace, so recently vacated by Francis, declar- 
 ing that it should remain untenanted until 
 Victor Emmanuel's advent. Yielding to the 
 frantic entreaties of the multitude assembled 
 beneath the windows of the Foresteria, the 
 Dictator, in a few words thanked the people,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 307 
 
 " in the name of all Italians and of Humanity, 
 for the sublime deed which has this day been 
 accomplished ; " and submitted to an embrace, 
 which the donor, General d'Ayala, magnilo- 
 quently assured him was "the kiss of five hun- 
 dred thousand Neapolitans." Again entering 
 his carriage, Garibaldi and his companions 
 proceeded to the Cathedral to do homage at the 
 shrine of Saint Gennaro, and assist at the Te 
 Deum and solemn benediction. At the Dic- 
 tator's request, Romano now seated himself 
 beside him, and drove, amidst scenes of the 
 wildest enthusiasm, to the Angri Palace, where 
 the headquarters of the Government and the 
 General's Staff were established ; and where he 
 shortly received the chiefs, military and civil, 
 who had renounced their allegiance to the 
 Bourbon Dynasty. 
 
 Among the astounding incidents of this un- 
 paralleled appropriation of the capital of a 
 great Kingdom, must be noted the orderly 
 and unmolested evacuation by the Eoyalist 
 troops of the forts and garrisons. Their march 
 through the streets, re-echoing with joyful ac- 
 clamations for Italian Unity and Victor Em- 
 manuel, on their way to join their comrades on 
 the Volturno to fight under the banner of the 
 King whose overthrow the inhabitants were 
 celebrating, resembled a parade rather than a
 
 308 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 retreat. Yet fidelity to the Bourbon Prince 
 was by no means unanimous amongst those 
 who had remained passive spectators of the 
 Dictator's entry : many officers and men now 
 availed themselves of the freedom afforded to 
 throw in their lot with the new regime, while 
 others, less martially inclined, abandoned the 
 struggle and sought the seclusion of their na- 
 tive villages. 
 
 Hardly less anomalous was the spectacle 
 offered devout Neapolitans when Garibaldi, on 
 the day after his arrival, made his way in a 
 hired vehicle to the shrine of the Virgin, at 
 Piedigrotta, which the Bourbon Monarchs were 
 accustomed to visit annually on this same date, 
 attended by great pomp and military parade, 
 in commemoration of the accession of their 
 Dynasty to the Throne of Naples. 
 
 Once in possession of the capital, Garibaldi's 
 first official act decreed that all vessels of war, 
 arsenals, armaments, and marine supplies, be- 
 longing to the State of the Two Sicilies, be 
 transferred to the fleet of the King of Italy, 
 Victor Emmanuel, and placed at the disposal 
 of Admiral Persano. (Considerable apprehen- 
 sion had existed that Francis might be success- 
 ful in prevailing upon the Commanders to hand 
 over their vessels to Austria.) Although this 
 spontaneous and tangible token of the loyalty
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 309 
 
 of the victorious freebooters was calculated to 
 reassure those who had questioned the purity 
 of his intentions, it did not, strange as it may 
 appear, completely allay the suspicions of the 
 authorities in Turin. Not that the personal 
 oyalty of the chief was seriously doubted, as 
 has been already stated, but surrounded by such 
 political agitators as Mazzini, and urged for- 
 ward by Bertani, and others, who had seconded 
 him in the Sicilian venture, it was felt that his 
 ambitions, or those of his counsellors, might 
 yet provoke European intercession, aud jeopar- 
 dize the fruits of previous successes. That 
 substantial cause existed for this is evinced by 
 the fact that on September tenth, three days 
 after his arrival in Naples, Garibaldi told Mr. 
 Elliot, British Minister at the Court of the Two 
 Sicilies, that he intended to push on to Rome, 
 and when that city was in his hands, offer the 
 Crown of United Italy to Victor Emmanuel, 
 upon whom would then devolve the task of the 
 liberation of Venetia. He spoke of the Em- 
 peror of the French with contempt and defi- 
 ance. * 
 
 The organization of the first Ministry was 
 left virtually in the hands of Liborio Romano, 
 
 * Despatch September 10. Mr. Elliot to Lord John 
 Russell.
 
 310 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 and Agostino Bertani, Garibaldi's trusted and 
 able Lieutenant, and "alter ego," during the 
 preparation of the Sicilian expedition. Eomano 
 claims that his principal preoccupation in the 
 selection of his colleagues was to surround the 
 Dictator with men devoted to Cavour, and thus 
 establish a link between the two great factors 
 of Italian Unity. This chimerical opportunism 
 was foredoomed to failure. Bertani strenuously 
 contested the influence of the Constitutional- 
 ists, urging that a Ministry responsible before 
 the Nation for its actions was incompatible 
 with the dignity and prerogatives of a Military 
 Dictator. He was, in fact, desirous of seeing 
 his chief legally vested with powers as auto- 
 cratic, and absolutist, as those wielded by any 
 of the detested tyrants whose unfortunate suc- 
 cessor had just been dethroned. The conse- 
 quence was immediate friction, and bitter ani- 
 mosity. Three days after their nomination, the 
 members of the Ministry felt constrained to 
 tender their resignations ; while within fourteen 
 days of its formation the struggle between the 
 Cabinet and the Secretariat of the Dictator, 
 presided over by Bertani, had become so acute 
 that the Ministers were, at their urgent de- 
 mand, relieved of office. The retiring statesmen 
 handed the Dictator a document setting forth 
 the perils of a policy which ignored the Consti-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 311 
 
 tutional Guarantees vouchsafed by the late Gov- 
 ernment, and vested with illimitable powers the 
 representatives of the new regime in the vari- 
 ous provinces ; some of which already began to 
 display symptoms of a reactionary character 
 which demanded the most delicate and judi- 
 cious handling to prevent blazing forth in frank 
 and open acclamation in favor of the deposed 
 Dynasty. 
 
 Meanwhile Cavour, who had foreseen the 
 Roman difficulty from the moment that Gari- 
 baldi proposed to cross the Straits of Messina, 
 had, as we have seen, made preparation to 
 meet it with a stroke of policy as audacious as 
 any conceived by the red-shirted hero of the 
 Pampas. His agents secretly canvassed the 
 Marches and Umbria, and encouraged the dis- 
 position to revolt against the Papal authority, 
 with promises of the co-operation of the Italian 
 troops at the opportune moment. This crisis 
 Cavour deemed to have occurred when Francis 
 fled from his capital before the Garibaldian 
 advance. 
 
 Consequently, on September seventh, the 
 Piedmontese Government sent an ultimatum 
 to Cardinal Antonelli, Papal Secretary of State, 
 calling for the immediate disarmament of the 
 mercenary forces levied by the Pope, alleging 
 that their existence constituted a continual
 
 312 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 menace to the peace of Italy. The Papal Ad- 
 ministration was furthermore unequivocally in- 
 formed that, unless its forces were disbanded 
 at once, the Sardinian Government would con- 
 sider itself justified in "preventing any at- 
 tempt which might be made to repress the 
 manifestations of National feeling in Umbria 
 and the Marches." But twenty-four hours 
 were allowed the Papal authorities to extricate 
 themselves from this awkward predicament. 
 In his Circular, addressed to the European 
 Courts, Cavour describes this action as "neces- 
 sitated by the interests of the new Italian 
 Kingdom, and the welfare of the Peninsula ; " 
 and recalls the fact that some years before, the 
 Sovereign Pontiff had himself been the re- 
 vered advocate of this great National move- 
 ment, which had now passed beyond the con- 
 trol of Princes and States alike. 
 
 Writing to Baron Stockmar from Balmoral 
 on September fourteenth, the Prince Consort 
 says : " Here joy at the fall of the Neapolitan 
 dynasty is universal. Sardinia gives out that 
 she will be compelled to incorporate the King- 
 dom, and to send troops into the Koman States, 
 in order to prevent anarchy, as Garibaldi is sur- 
 rounded by Mazzinians." 
 
 The cry raised by Cavour that Garibaldi 
 would certainly, if left to his own devices,
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 313 
 
 march upon Rome, and allow Mazzini to pro- 
 claim the Republic there, had its weight with 
 the European Courts for whose benefit it was 
 raised. The Sardinian Cabinet contended, 
 with no small show of reason, that foreign in- 
 tervention, from whatever quarter it might 
 come, must inevitably mean a renewal of the 
 chaotic struggles of preceding years ; and 
 argued that in this connection Piedmont, and 
 the Piedmontese army, constituted the only 
 safeguard for the peace of Europe. Reference 
 has already been made to the mission of Farini 
 and Cialdini to Chambery, where they ascer- 
 tained the views of the Emperor of the French 
 concerning the proposed official intervention of 
 Sardinia in the Neapolitan drama. That the 
 personal policy of Napoleon III. on this occa- 
 sion was not in accord with that of his official 
 entourage has been frequently advanced. 
 France professed herself interested in the for- 
 mation and maintenance of three independent 
 States in the Peninsula : the Kingdom of Italy, 
 the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples. 
 In view of the uncertain political conditions 
 prevailing in the Peninsula, and in deference 
 to the solicitude expressed by the powerful 
 Catholic party, the French Government main- 
 tained a garrison in Rome, apparently for the 
 defence of the Pope. The nomination of Gen-
 
 314 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 eral Lamoriciere to the command of the Papal 
 forces had been considered by many, who fore- 
 saw the complications likely to arise out of the 
 Neapolitan controversy, as a grave error ; the 
 more especially as the General's authority was 
 not restricted to the immediate precincts of the 
 Eternal City, but ranged over the provinces 
 which were in a state of ferment, and already 
 showing irrefutable symptoms of sympathy 
 with the Unitarians. 
 
 As was expected, the advance of the Sar- 
 dinian troops into Papal territory, in accord- 
 ance with Cavour's ultimatum, was defiantly 
 opposed by Lamoriciere. The Sardinian vic- 
 tory of Castelfidardo, and the total defeat of 
 Lamoriciere, and the Papal forces under his 
 command at Ancona, after a brave but in- 
 effectual resistance, placed the French in an 
 anomalous position. Count Persigny, Napo- 
 leon's Ambassador in England, and one of his 
 earliest and most devoted followers, condemns 
 this policy with the severest strictures. In his 
 opinion the consequences of Castelfidardo were 
 ruinous to French prestige. By making pos- 
 sible the encounter, and allowing the subse- 
 quent spoliation of the Holy See, and the an- 
 nexation of the Kingdom of Naples to that 
 of Italy, the Emperor plunged his policy into 
 inextricable complications and contradictions.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 315 
 
 " In the eyes of all Europe," says Persigny, 
 "his Government was discredited. He had 
 desired to prevent the union of Italy, and 
 Italian Unity was accomplished in spite of him. 
 He pretended to protect the Holy See, and the 
 Pope lost his richest provinces. " 
 
 It is hardly to be wondered that Catholic 
 France, and especially the Legitimist oppo- 
 nents of the Empire, cried out in horror at a 
 policy which amounted in their eyes to sacri- 
 lege. The application of some balm to soothe 
 the susceptibilities of the outraged victims of 
 the Emperor's duplicity became imperative. 
 A great cloud of diplomatic dust was conse- 
 quently kicked up between the Foreign Offices 
 of Paris and Turin, and in sign of protest; 
 Count Talleyrand, French Minister to the Sar- 
 dinian Court, was instructed to demand his 
 passports (September 18th). Within a few 
 weeks the Russian and Spanish Envoys re- 
 ceived similar instructions, and left their 
 posts, protesting loudly against this official 
 violation of international obligations. 
 
 Notwithstanding this diplomatic bluster, 
 when, a couple of weeks later, Victor Em- 
 manuel decided to assist in person at the pas- 
 sage of his troops into Neapolitan territory, 
 and so advised the French Emperor by tele- 
 gram, stating that he was " leaving for Naples
 
 316 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 in order to prevent the proclamation of the 
 Kepublic," he received the unofficial congratu- 
 lations of Napoleon III. on the adoption of 
 this " energetic resolution."
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Francis at Gaeta. He forms a Ministry. Instructions to local 
 officials. Address to the Army. The battles of the Vol- 
 turno. Garibaldi's submission. Political excesses in 
 Naples. Piedmontese troops enter Neapolitan territory. 
 Cavour's audacious counsels. His belief in non-intervention 
 of France and England. Austrian hostility. Victor Em- 
 manuel at Ancona. His proclamation to Southern popula- 
 tions. The " Times " on situation. Appointment of Pro- 
 Dictator at Naples. The Plebiscite. Meeting of Victor 
 Emmanuel and Garibaldi. Fall of Capua. Victor Emman- 
 uel in Naples. Departure of Garibaldi. Honors and re- 
 wards offered him. Alexander Dumas in Naples. His 
 opinion of Garibaldi. 
 
 AFTER consultation with the members of his 
 family, and the military authorities assembled 
 at Gaeta, Francis modified his previous inten- 
 tions of passively awaiting in that strong- 
 hold the developments of Diplomacy, and de- 
 cided, pending the arrival of reinforcements 
 from Naples and the South, to concentrate the 
 forces at his disposal at Capua, and on the line 
 of the Volturno and Garigliano, in anticipation 
 of circumstances which would permit of an 
 attempt being made for the reconquest of the 
 capital. 
 
 317
 
 318 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 His first act was the constitution of a Minis- 
 try, which included not only a Minister of 
 War, one of Marine, and a Secretary for Foreign 
 Affairs, but provided for the portfolios of 
 Finance, Public Works, Public Instruction, 
 Grace and Justice, Interior, the inevitable 
 Police, and Ecclesiastical Affairs. At the 
 same time the Prefects and Magistrates through- 
 out the realm were warned that the state of 
 siege was proclaimed, and instructed to obey 
 the Military commanders of their districts. 
 
 Although we may smile at what appears 
 pure " na'ivet^ " on the part of the dethroned 
 Monarch, the motives for the adoption of this 
 course were not devoid of ingenuity. Francis 
 and his advisers were well aware that none of 
 the former Crown officials thus addressed would 
 pay the slightest heed to the instructions of a 
 Government no longer in a position to enforce 
 its mandates ; nevertheless, the proclamation 
 was calculated to mislead the European Powers, 
 and make it appear that the Government of 
 the King still wielded authority throughout 
 the provinces, in spite of the successful raid 
 of the filibusters ; and in this wise partially 
 retrieve, in the eyes of foreign diplomacy, the 
 error committed in abandoning the capital. 
 It is easy to discern the hand of the Queen 
 Mother and " Camarilla " in this, and many
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 319 
 
 subsequent schemes, the futility of which were 
 manifest. Left to his own devices, Francis 
 would certainly have abandoned a struggle, the 
 hopelessness of which he appreciated, and have 
 retired to Home, or Bavaria, in obedience to 
 the dictates of the fatalism which underlay his 
 nature. Guided and influenced by stronger 
 minds into the adoption of a course of obstinate 
 resistance in the face of overwhelming odds, he 
 and his faithful consort displayed a heroism 
 on the ramparts of the beleaguered citadel, and 
 an abnegation during the privations and sick- 
 ness attending the siege, which compelled the 
 unstinted admiration of his most bitter oppo- 
 nents. 
 
 General Ritucci was intrusted with the 
 supreme command of the remnant of the army 
 which occupied Capua and the surrounding 
 districts, and to which the King addressed 
 from Gaeta a desperate appeal : 
 
 "Soldiers:" (he cried) "It is time that 
 the voice of your King should be heard in your 
 ranks : the voice of the King who grew up 
 with you ; who has lavished all his care upon 
 you ; and who comes now to share your lot. 
 Those who, by allowing themselves to be de- 
 ceived and seduced, have plunged the King- 
 dom in mourning are no longer amongst us.
 
 320 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Nevertheless, I appeal to your honor and your 
 fidelity, in order that by glorious deeds we may 
 efface the disgrace of cowardice and treachery. 
 We are still sufficiently numerous to annihilate 
 an enemy which employs the weapons of de- 
 ceit and corruption. Up to the present I have 
 desired to spare many towns, but now that we 
 are relegated to the banks of the Volturno and 
 Garigliano, shall we allow ourselves to still 
 further humiliate our fame as soldiers ? Will 
 you permit your Sovereign to abandon the 
 Throne, and leave you to eternal infamy ? 
 No ! At this supreme moment let us rally 
 round the flag to defend our rights, our honor, 
 and the fair fame of Neapolitans ; already 
 sufficiently discredited." 
 
 With the addition of the contingent from 
 Naples, and the arrival of many detachments 
 which had found themselves isolated and 
 scattered throughout the provinces, the mili- 
 tary gathering on the banks of the Volturno 
 mustered some forty thousand strong. These 
 forces were generally well equipped, amply 
 provided with artillery and munitions of war, 
 and were, moreover, strongly intrenched and 
 flanked, while their rear was protected by the 
 practically impregnable fortress of Gaeta. 
 Unfortunately for the Royal cause, the treach-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 321 
 
 ery and deceit by which Francis was sur- 
 rounded continued to be manifest even in the 
 face of the enemy. Desertions of Generals, 
 officers and men became daily occurrences ; 
 while the prestige of the Crown was still further 
 weakened by the ill-advised absence of Francis 
 himself from the front on the eve of the first 
 encounter with the enemy. 
 
 Before returning to Gaeta, Francis, in an 
 order of the day, dated September twelfth, 
 confided the ramparts of Capua to the "valor, 
 fidelity and honor " of his soldiers, whom he 
 again exhorts to banish all ideas of treachery. 
 The King's half-brothers, the Counts of Trani 
 and Caserta, remained with the troops, and 
 took part in the battle of Caiazzo, when the 
 Royalists successfully engaged the Garibaldians 
 under General Tiirr. Had the advantages then 
 gained been promptly followed up, the con- 
 sequences would undoubtedly have been 
 serious for the defeated Garibaldians. This 
 reverse, the first suffered by the invaders, and 
 which caused a feeling of uneasiness as to the 
 possibility of a movement upon the capital, 
 decided Garibaldi, who had returned in all 
 haste from a temporary absence in Palermo, 
 whither he had gone to reconcile the conflict- 
 ing interests prevailing there, to concentrate 
 his troops, scattered along the coast from the
 
 322 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Gulf of Policastro to that of Salerno ; and to 
 limit operations to the left bank of the Vol- 
 tnrno, and the defence of the approaches to the 
 capital. 
 
 The battles of the Voltnrno, which took place 
 a few days later (October first and second), in 
 which the Bourbon troops gave evidence of 
 unqualified pluck and determination, being 
 finally repulsed, thanks to the timely arrival 
 of the Piedmontese regulars (Bersaglieri) de- 
 spatched by Villamarina, at the earnest request 
 of Garibaldi, convinced the latter that the task 
 of dislodging the Royalists from their strong- 
 holds was beyond the unaided strength of his 
 red-shirted volunteers. The proud independ- 
 ence of the victorious Dictator did not prevent 
 his realizing the perils of his position, and the 
 dangers which might result therefrom to the 
 cause of Unity. Laying aside his former bom- 
 bastic pretensions, he addressed Victor Emman- 
 uel, on October fourth, in simple and loyal 
 terms. Taking advantage of the opportunity 
 offered by the recent victories of Cialdini over 
 the Papal forces, he congratulated the King on 
 these feats of arms, and modestly referred to 
 his own successes on the Volturno, adding sig- 
 nificantly : "I know that Your Majesty is 
 about to send four thousand men to Naples, 
 and it will be wise. Your Majesty will acknowl-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 323 
 
 edge that I am heartily his friend, and that I 
 merit confidence. It is much better to wel- 
 come all honest Italians, no matter what parties 
 they may have belonged to in the past, rather 
 than favor the formation of factions, which 
 might become dangerous in the future. Being 
 at Ancona, Your Majesty ought to make an 
 excursion to Naples, either by sea or by land. 
 If by land, which would be preferable, Your 
 Majesty should be accompanied by at least one 
 division. Advised in time, I would effect a 
 junction with my right, and would come in per- 
 son to present my homages, and receive orders 
 for subsequent operations." 
 
 The tone of this letter justifies the boast of 
 the Marquis de Villamarina in his despatch to 
 Cavour : 4< The political battle is won. I know 
 that I acted contrary to my instructions in con- 
 ceding two battalions of Bersaglieri in aid of 
 the Garibaldians, but I also know that when 
 the Dictator had news that our soldiers had ar- 
 rived, he exclainfed with joy: 'This time I 
 clearly see that Piedmont is sincere, and that 
 the Piedmontese are our real brothers."' 
 
 The news from Naples had recently been 
 such as to cause Cavour the keenest anxiety. 
 Excesses, political and military, marked the 
 reign of the red-shirted followers of Garibaldi, 
 or rather that of the adventurers and hangers-
 
 324 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 on, warriors in name only, who terrorized the 
 town with their swaggering and disorderly con- 
 duct. Mazzini, Alberto Mario, Cataneo, Ber- 
 tani, and others ; Republicans, Federalists, 
 conditional Annexationists, and the advocates 
 of an indefinite Dictatorship, each in turn made 
 assault on the loyalty of the popular hero, and 
 essayed to undermine his allegiance to his Sov- 
 ereign, and envenom his personal quarrel with 
 the wily diplomatist and statesman at the head 
 of the Government in Turin, on whose dismis- 
 sal from office he was urged to insist. 
 
 It was to counteract this pernicious influence, 
 and check the exorbitant pretensions, which 
 jeopardized the fair fabric of unity to as great 
 an extent as the diplomatic opposition of 
 Europe, as well as to officially place the " Re 
 Galantuomo " at the head of the movement un- 
 dertaken in his name, that Cavour now coun- 
 selled Victor Emmanuel to complement one 
 audacity with another by joining his forces at 
 Ancona, and marching on Naples. The step 
 was a bold one, and although undoubtedly ne- 
 cessitated by the situation at Naples, might 
 readily have complicated an already sufficiently 
 perilous predicament. It is now known that 
 Bertani telegraphed the chief of a small force 
 stationed near the Papal frontier, to "oppose 
 the entry of the Piedmontese troops coming from
 
 THE JT/JVGDOJbr OF MAPLES. 326 
 
 the border ; " * and that the patriotic action of 
 the commander of the National Guard of the 
 district, Count Acquaviva, alone prevented a 
 collision, the consequences of which must have 
 been almost irreparable. 
 
 Castelfidardo had deeply shocked European 
 Diplomacy, but the intelligence that Victor 
 Emmanuel was about to march his forces upon 
 Naples, and co-operate with those of the success- 
 ful filibuster, fairly staggered the Chanceries 
 of the Powers. 
 
 When counselling his Sovereign to partially 
 throw off the mask and unite, or, if necessary, 
 oppose, his forces to the unofficial legions oper- 
 ating in the South, Cavour played a dangerous 
 card. The notification to the various Courts 
 that the Piedmontese went to restore order in 
 the Neapolitan Realm, and to avert the impend- 
 ing proclamation of a Republic, could hardly 
 be expected to satisfy an already overtaxed 
 credulity. The ground had, however, been 
 carefully prepared, and no essential neglected 
 which might contribute to assuage, or check- 
 mate, the jealousies, national and international, 
 which such action must arouse. In England 
 public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of 
 Garibaldi's enterprise. While Her Majesty's 
 responsible Ministers might officially frown. 
 * Niaoo. " Francesco II."
 
 326 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ominously at so flagrant a violation of the 
 sacred rights of nations, they were individually 
 in sympathy with the Italian cause, and conse- 
 quently disinclined to risk popularity by active 
 intervention in a question offering no prospect 
 of material advantages. Of the personal good- 
 will of the Emperor of the French there had 
 been ample and tangible demonstration, and at 
 this time the will of Napoleon III. still consti- 
 tuted the law of France, although his opinions 
 might not be indorsed by the members of his 
 Government, or shared by a large portion of 
 his subjects. With the latter the assurances 
 that the Eternal City should be respected and 
 protected from the proposed aggression of the 
 Garibaldians, and the Pope left in undisturbed 
 possession of the Patrimony of St. Peter, car- 
 ried weight, especially with the Catholic Legit- 
 imist element, the long-standing umbrage of 
 which the Emperor expected still further to 
 propitiate by the Syrian expedition undertaken, 
 nominally at least, for the purpose of avenging 
 the massacres in the Lebanon. Moreover, 
 France and England were at this moment 
 :united for the protection of mutual interests in 
 ithe Far East, and consequently the less dis- 
 posed to quibble over Italian politics. Aus- 
 tria, undisguisedly and menacingly hostile, 
 might have to be reckoned with at any moment ;
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 327 
 
 in which case Russia and ^Prussia would prob- 
 ably lend her moral support, if no more. 
 
 To his life-long friend, the Comtesse de 
 Circourt, Cavour admitted in his letter of 
 September twenty-third, 1860, that: "Italy 
 finds herself in a very critical position. What 
 with Diplomacy on the one side, and Garibaldi 
 on the other, it is not by any means pleasant. 
 I hope nevertheless that we shall succeed in 
 disengaging ourselves from our embarrass- 
 ments, and in establishing our country on the 
 solid foundations of order and liberty, in spite 
 of the defiance of the Absolutists, and the 
 follies of the Republicans/' 
 
 A month later he informs the same corre- 
 spondent that "we shall possibly soon be 
 called upon to undergo a severe trial. Austria 
 it seems proposes taking advantage of the ab- 
 sence of the King, and of our best troops, to 
 attack us. We are preparing for a desperate 
 resistance. Although Cialdini and Fanti are 
 at Naples, we have with us La Marmora and 
 Sonnaz, who don't allow themselves to be in- 
 timidated by Benedeck and the Archduke 
 Albert. We are prepared to risk our all. 
 The country is as calm as if the outlook were 
 cloudless. While realizing the danger which 
 menaces them there is no panic, for all appre- 
 ciate that the cause at stake is great enough to
 
 328 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 warrant the most tremendous sacrifices for its 
 attainment." 
 
 Victor Emmanuel, whose ardor had more 
 frequently to be restrained than encouraged by 
 his Minister, eagerly seized the opportunity for 
 throwing off the wearisome yoke imposed by 
 Diplomacy, and embarking on the adventurous 
 activity his soul craved. 
 
 On his arrival at Ancona, the King received 
 deputations from the Abbruzzi and Naples, 
 presenting petitions, covered by many thou- 
 sands of prominent names, clamoring for im- 
 mediate annexation, and urging that he pro- 
 ceed at once to the capital. Although nothing 
 loath to comply with such request, diplomatic 
 etiquette, and the amenities of international 
 intercourse, forbade that such a step should be 
 taken while the accredited representative of 
 the King of Naples remained in official resi- 
 dence at Turin. Cavour therefore informed 
 Baron Winspeare in a curtly worded despatch, 
 dated October sixth, that civil war, and the 
 absence of a regular Government constituting 
 a grave peril, Naples had had recourse to Vic- 
 tor Emmanuel to afford the needed protection. 
 " It is with the object of fulfilling this high 
 mission," he continues, "that His Majesty 
 Victor Emmanuel sends his soldiers to Naples; 
 they will safeguard Italy and Europe by
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 
 
 crushing anarchy and disorder, and preventing 
 bloodshed." 
 
 The Neapolitan Envoy replied with a vigor- 
 ous protest ; but realizing the futility of fur- 
 ther effort, immediately left Turin. 
 
 Before crossing the river Tronto, which di- 
 vided the Papal and Neapolitan States, Victor 
 Emmanuel addressed a proclamation to the 
 populations of the Two Sicilies. In this docu- 
 ment, intended rather as a justification of his 
 action before the European Courts than as an 
 explanation of his presence amongst the ob- 
 viously delighted subjects of the Bourbon King, 
 the Sardinian Monarch dwells upon the politi- 
 cal and social conditions which render his per- 
 sonal intervention imperative. The use of his 
 name in the recent political changes effected 
 throughout the Kingdom had given rise to se- 
 rious misinterpretations. While the glorious 
 deeds and popularity of Garibaldi were duly 
 eulogized in the King's proclamation, and his 
 personal probity compared in its disinterested 
 purity to that of ancient times, the mistrust of 
 those surrounding the hero was clearly indi- 
 cated in a reference to the universal " dread 
 that a factional attempt would be made to sac- 
 rifice the dawning National triumph to the 
 chimera of an ambitious fanaticism." Again, 
 he asserted that while holding himself respon-
 
 330 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 sible before Europe for the recent events un- 
 dertaken in his name, in the face of the un- 
 doubted peril to the National cause, occasioned 
 by the presence of hordes of adventurers of 
 every nationality in the Papal States, and 
 which constituted a veritable -foreign interven- 
 tion of the most dangerous type, he had pro- 
 claimed " Italy for the Italians," and would 
 never permit that the Peninsula become a hot- 
 bed for the intrigues of cosmopolitan sects 
 tending towards the universal spread of the 
 doctrines of the Demagogue. 
 
 The Conservative-Liberal elements through- 
 out Europe, although perhaps shocked at the 
 apparent duplicity of Piedmontese diplomacy, 
 were, nevertheless, with the spectre of Revolu- 
 tion, or Anarchy, dangling before their eyes, 
 inclined to accept this vindication of a prin- 
 ciple, dangerous in its essence, and to agree in 
 substance with the opinion expressed in the 
 " Times " of October nineteenth. In this ar- 
 ticle the writer avers that : " In our eyes the 
 only defence for the conduct of the King (of 
 Sardinia) lies in those natural laws which lie 
 unwritten in every code and unnamed in every 
 form of Government, but which intolerable 
 oppression calls forth from latent existence 
 into active force. It is the unbearable tyranny 
 of the two Sovereigns of Southern Italy, it is
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 331 
 
 the massacres of Perugia, the prisons of 
 Palermo, and the dungeons of St. Elmo, which 
 have given to the people of Southern Italy the 
 right to call for a deliverer, and which have 
 given to Victor Emmanuel the same excuse for 
 assuming the Crown of Naples which William 
 of Orange had for accepting that of* England. 
 Upon this principle and upon no other, Victor 
 Emmanuel can vindicate his own presence in 
 Southern Italy, and upon this title he will be 
 fully justified in putting an end to the war by 
 one decisive movement." 
 
 If the intrigues at Naples had resulted in the 
 resignation of the Ministry originally formed 
 by Liborio Romano, these very excesses had 
 benefited the National Cause by necessitating 
 the appointment of George Pallavicino as Pro- 
 Dictator. Pallavicino, although a warm and 
 faithful friend of Garibaldi, was equally trusted 
 by the adherents to Cavour's policy, while his 
 devotion to the person of his Sovereign, and 
 his identification with the National Cause, was 
 above suspicion. To his energetic action, and 
 firm yet tactful perseverance in the face of per- 
 tinacious, and often malignant, opposition, 
 was due the eventual discomfiture of the dan- 
 gerous faction whose policy aimed at an indefi- 
 nite prolongation of the Dictatorship, even 
 should such a course necessitate open hostility
 
 33*2 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 with Piedmont. His appeal to Mazzini to 
 make a further sacrifice of his personal convic- 
 tions by leaving Naples, where his presence and 
 influence were a cause of serious embarrass- 
 ment to the Government, was, it is true, in- 
 effectual ; nevertheless the firmness of the 
 stand he made in dealing with Cataneo, Ber- 
 tani, Crispi, Mario, and others, whose policy 
 was in open contradiction to the clearly ex- 
 pressed desire of the populations of the conti- 
 nental provinces and Sicily, prevailed ; the spe- 
 cious reasoning of his adherents being made 
 apparent to Garibaldi himself. 
 
 The formula of the Plebiscite of October 
 twenty-first was simply as follows : " The peo- 
 ple desire Italy one and indivisible with Victor 
 Emmanuel, Constitutional King, and his legit- 
 imate descendants." The yeas, polled in the 
 metropolis and continental provinces amounted 
 to 1,302,064, against 10,312 nays : in Sicily, 
 432,053 voted in favor of the island being poli- 
 tically merged with the common Fatherland, 
 while 667 held a contrary opinion. 
 
 The same formula when offered to the popu- 
 lations of the Marches and Umbria, on Novem- 
 ber fourth and fifth, resulted in 134,847 yeas 
 as against 1,592 nays. 
 
 Victor Emmanuel did not await the result of 
 the Plebiscite, which indeed was only pro-
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 3$3 
 
 claimed officially on November fifth, but after 
 defeating the Papal garrisons of Perugia, Spo- 
 leto, and S. Leo, crossed the Tronto, amidst 
 the acclamations of the Abbruzzesi, whose depn- 
 ntations welcomed his troops as they marched 
 through their province. The news that Gari- 
 baldi had yielded, and decreed the Plebiscite, 
 reached the King at Grottamare. The neces- 
 sity for immediate action thus removed, and 
 being disinclined to enter Naples before the 
 result of the solemn manifestation of the will 
 of the people had been promulgated, Victor 
 Emmanuel now continued his journey by easy 
 stages. 
 
 Garibaldi, who had himself cast his vote in 
 favor of annexation, now marched forward to 
 meet his King. On the morning of the twen y- 
 sixth, at the little village of Caianello, the com- 
 manders came face to face. Victor Emmanuel, 
 on discerning the red-shirted warrior by the aid 
 of his field-glasses, gave spur to his horse : 
 Garibaldi did the same. Followed by their 
 escorts, the King and the Dictator drew rein 
 within a few feet of each other. To the cry of 
 " Long live Victor Emmanuel " raised by those 
 present. Garibaldi, lifting his sombrero, added 
 significantly: ''King of Italy." " Thank 
 you," was the simple reply, as Victor Emman- 
 uel stretched forth his hand and grasped the
 
 334 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 rough palm of the soldier of fortune. Side by 
 side, still hand in hand, the two continued their 
 way, earnestly discussing the military operations 
 both foresaw as inevitable. 
 
 Cordial and hearty as the meeting was, Vic- 
 tor Emmanuel clearly evinced his determina- 
 tion to brook no interference with his sovereign 
 prerogatives, or any attempt to overshadow the 
 prestige of his troops. To the General's re- 
 quest that he be accorded the honor of leading 
 in the advance against the Royalists intrenched 
 on the Garigliano, the King gently but firmly 
 objected : " Yon have been fighting for a long 
 while past ; it is now my turn. Your troops are 
 exhausted, mine are fresh. Your place is now 
 with the reserves." 
 
 The meaning implied by these words was not 
 lost upon the Dictator, who despondently re- 
 marked to Signora Mario : " They have placed 
 us at the tail ; " and who, when two days later 
 General della Rocca with the Fifth Army Corps 
 began the regular siege of Capua, took leave of 
 his troops and retired to Naples. From thence 
 he despatched a letter, impregnated with noble 
 sentiment, to the King, resigning into his hands 
 the powers, political and military, he had tem- 
 porarily usurped. 
 
 Capua capitulated on November second. On 
 the following morning the seven thousand men
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 335 
 
 which constituted the garrison marched out, 
 stacked arms, the officers being allowed to re- 
 tain their swords, and as prisoners of war were 
 eventually transported to Genoa. 
 
 With the fall of Capua the sovereignty of 
 Francis was restricted to the fortress of Gaeta 
 and dependent village of Mola, the citadel of 
 Messina, and the insignificant but practically 
 impregnable little mountain stronghold of Civi- 
 tella del Tronto, on the Papal frontier, which, 
 after a memorable siege of seven months, only 
 capitulated at the express command of the de- 
 throned King from his exile in Rome. 
 
 Leaving Cialdini in command on the Garig- 
 liano Victor Emmanuel hastened to Naples. 
 On the morning of the seventh, just two 
 months after the flight of Francis, the King of 
 United Italy entered the capital, amidst demon- 
 strations of enthusiasm described in the chroni- 
 cles of the period as bordering on delirium. In 
 the carriage at his side sat Garibaldi, clad in 
 his red shirt and wide sombrero ; while the Pro- 
 Dictator Pallavicino and Andrea Colonna, Syn- 
 dic of Naples, occupied the opposite seat. 
 Next day Victor Emmanuel, surrounded by all 
 the pomp and military splendor of his Court, 
 after having received the official notification of 
 the result of the Plebiscite of October twenty- 
 first, gave solemn audience to Garibaldi and
 
 336 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the members of the Government of the Dic- 
 tator. 
 
 This was the last official function in which 
 the ex-Dictator was to take part. Sore and 
 chagrined at what he considered the ingratitude 
 of his Sovereign, he left Naples next day on 
 the " Washington," which was under orders to 
 bear him to his island home at Caprera. The 
 great leader who had won for his King the fair- 
 est provinces of Italy, and brought ten million 
 subjects beneath his sceptre, carried with him 
 as the fruits of his victories a bag of seeds for 
 his garden, some vegetables and salted fish, and 
 about three hundred dollars in a purse handed 
 him by a friend as he embarked, for he had 
 forgotten to provide himself with money. 
 
 The impression caused in Naples by this de- 
 parture, which closely resembled banishment, 
 was most painful. Yet, as Cavour wrote to the 
 Marquis d'Azeglio, " We wished at all costs to 
 avoid appearing ungrateful. ..." The King 
 and Farini made the most magnificent offers to 
 Garibaldi. Not only was he appointed to the 
 rank of Field Marshal ; ample provision made 
 for his eldest son ; the title of aide-de-camp to 
 the King bestowed upon his second son ; and a 
 dowry provided for his daughter ; but to this 
 was added the grant of one of the royal estates ; 
 the offer of a steamship, as well as the highest
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 337 
 
 decoration in the gift of the Sovereign, the 
 Collar of the Annunziata, conferring upon the 
 holder the privileges and title of a cousin of the 
 King. Garibaldi refused all, demanding the 
 Lieutenancy of the Kingdom of the Two Sici- 
 lies for a year, and free control of the adminis- 
 tration during that period. " To have yielded," 
 adds Cavour, " would have been to submit for- 
 ever to the domination, not of Garibaldi, but of 
 those surrounding him." The King replied 
 curtly : " It is impossible ! " and Garibaldi left 
 for Caprera. 
 
 In his final audience with the King, the Gen- 
 eral begged that his companions, and officers, 
 be appointed to grades in the regular army cor- 
 responding to those they had held in his service, 
 and that his regiments be incorporated with 
 the troops of United Italy. Unfortunately even 
 this unselfish request, owing to the complica- 
 tions and professional jealousies which must 
 result therefrom, met with violent opposition. 
 
 Although at heart a republican, Garibaldi 
 never swerved from his allegiance to the Sov- 
 ereign in whose name he undertook the expedi- 
 tions which made his own of world-wide fame, 
 and the synonym for courage and chivalry. 
 The wiles and quicksands of Diplomacy were 
 to his straightforward but impulsive nature as 
 utterly incomprehensible as they were distaste-
 
 338 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 f ul. In matters political, frankly ignorant and 
 underestimating his own natural sagacity, he 
 became an easy prey to the fanatical adventur- 
 ers who fastened upon him and dogged his 
 steps, playing upon his vanity by cunningly 
 encouraging his ambitious dream of the libera- 
 tion of Rome and Venetia, in order to forward 
 their own selfish party, or personal ends. 
 
 Alexander D urn as, the elder, was amongst 
 the horde of foreigners who attached themselves 
 to the Dictator. Eminently practical, in spite 
 of his eccentricity, he managed during the con- 
 fusion attending the administration of the 
 capital, to secure a minor official sinecure, and, 
 until turned out by the Piedmontese, dispensed 
 Neapolitan gold with lavish hands in the charm- 
 ing Ghiatamonte Palace which he had caused 
 to be allotted to his use. To his friend 
 d'Ideville, Secretary of the French Legation at 
 Turin, the great author exclaimed with vigorous 
 enthusiasm : "The man is a hero ; a sublime 
 adventurer ; a character of romance ! He is a 
 fool, a simpleton, if you will, but an heroic 
 simpleton ! " 
 
 Smarting under a sense of individual wrong, 
 his heart ulcerated by what he considered the 
 hostility and ingratitude of the Government, 
 Garibaldi laid aside all personal rancor, and in 
 his farewell address to his companions in so
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 839 
 
 many perilous adventures, refers to Victor 
 Emmanuel as the " Gift of Providence to Italy ; 
 the Honest King around whom every Italian 
 should rally ; under whose banner every rivalry 
 should cease, and every hatred be set aside."
 
 CHAPTER XVHI. 
 
 Operations on the Garigliano. Failure of fleet to co-operate. 
 Napoleon's enigmatical policy. Conference at Varsovie. 
 Defeat of Royalists. Retreat on Gaeta. The fortress of 
 Gaeta. Its garrison. Members of Royal Family assembled 
 there. Early days of the siege. Napoleon proposes 
 armistice. Francis writes Emperor refusing to capitulate. 
 Action of Powers. Cavour's influence over English 
 statesmen. Lord Palmerston's assertions. 
 
 GENERAL CIALDINI crossed the Garigliano 
 on October twenty-ninth, Victor Emmanuel 
 being present, and attacked the forty thousand 
 Neapolitans intrenched beyond the river, with 
 the pre-arranged design of enclosing the enemy 
 between his own fire and that of Admiral 
 Persano, whose fleet hovered off the estuary. 
 The encounter proved a severe and obstinate 
 one, the Neapolitan artillery causing terrible 
 havoc in the ranks of the Piedmontese, who 
 found themselves unaccountably deprived of 
 the expected support of their ships. Both 
 parties finally claimed the advantage, if ad- 
 vantage there was : although authorities differ 
 on this technicality, all are agreed in eulogizing 
 340
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 341 
 
 the undaunted pluck of aggressors and defend- 
 ers alike. 
 
 The failure of Admiral Persano to co-operate 
 with the land forces was due to the action of 
 the French Admiral, Le Barbier de Tinan, 
 whose fleet was stationed in the waters of 
 Gaeta, and who interposed his vessels between 
 those of the Piedmontese commander and the 
 shore ; intimating at the same time that his 
 instructions constrained him to prevent any 
 attack from the sea on the forces around Gaeta. 
 
 When the reason for the silence of Persano's 
 guns transpired the indignation and fury of the 
 Italians knew no bounds. Greatly incensed, 
 and not a little mystified, Victor Emmanuel 
 despatched a telegram to the Emperor com- 
 plaining of the extraordinary conduct of the 
 French Admiral. Garibaldi had, on October 
 sixth, declared the blockade of Gaeta and 
 Messina, the citadel of which latter port was 
 still in the hands of the Royalists. Francis 
 protested not without cogency, against the 
 recognition of a blockade decreed by an 
 usurped authority which thus presumed to 
 control the commercial liberty of maritime 
 Powers. He argued that the action of Gari- 
 baldi was that of a pirate ; and that in passively 
 accepting the decree civilized Europe tolerated 
 piracy in the Mediterranean. The blockade
 
 342 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 was, however, neither recognized in principle 
 nor enforced, the French mail-steamers calling 
 regularly during the siege, until after the de- 
 parture of Napoleon's warships, when the 
 operations of the Italian fleet precluded a con- 
 tinuance of commercial intercourse. 
 
 That Le Barbier de Tinan misinterpreted 
 the instructions he had received, would seem 
 sufficiently evident from the following extract 
 from the despatch of November sixth, in which 
 Monsieur Thouvenel, French Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs, communicated the occurrence to 
 the Due de Gramont : " I regret that Admiral 
 de Tinan, although his instructions prescribed 
 that he limit his action to preventing the 
 attack of Gaeta from the sea, should have ex- 
 tended his operations further afield. King 
 Francis will have been led to believe that we 
 intended to defend his cause, whilst our inten- 
 tions were merely to leave a door open for him 
 to avoid becoming a prisoner of Victor Em- 
 manuel. This unfortunate mistake of the 
 Admiral will cause a great outcry ; and a 
 measure inspired by the Emperor's sentiments 
 of humanity will be represented as a fresh 
 example of duplicity." 
 
 In this, as in other cases, it remains to be 
 ^proved that Napoleon's policy, obscure, vexa- 
 tions and humiliating as it often appeared to
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 343 
 
 Italians impatient for the immediate political 
 redemption of their country, was not in reality 
 in accord with his oft-expressed assurances of 
 sympathy with their cause. A vacillating and 
 uncertain policy it must necessarily be, based 
 as it was on purely personal sympathies un- 
 supported by either National or Dynastic 
 interests. As has already been said, Napoleon 
 III. never intended to go as far as the over- 
 whelming revolutionary tide, combined with 
 unforeseen and fortuitous circumstances, now 
 carried him ; the interests of France being 
 distinctly at variance with those of a United 
 Italy. It was owing to this conviction that 
 Cavonr never ceased to mistrust the apparent 
 disinterestedness of his dangerous yet, for the 
 time, indispensable ally. 
 
 In the present instance the exercise of dip- 
 lomatic pressure on foreign Courts effectually 
 discouraged the intervention of Austria, as 
 well as the formation of a coalition for the re- 
 instatement of Francis, as contemplated by the 
 abortive conference at Varsovie (October 22, 
 1 860), between the Tzar, the Emperor of Aus- 
 tria, and the Prince Regent of Prussia. On 
 this occasion the much maligned and ridiculed 
 treaty of Zurich, clumsily dragged in by Aus- 
 tria at the intimation from the French Em- 
 peror that he would not tolerate a new Holy
 
 344 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 Alliance, served a purpose by reviving the 
 principle of non-intervention. 
 
 The result of the Plebiscite of October 
 21st, the entry of Victor Emmanuel into 
 Naples, together with the retirement of Gari- 
 baldi, terminating what had been regarded by 
 the Legitimist Courts as a revolutionary inci- 
 dent, now lent a new aspect to the Italian 
 question, simplifying it in one sense by the 
 achievement of that possession which consti- 
 tu'; :s nine points of the law, yet complicating 
 it in another with potentialities of far greater 
 import than the dethronement of the King of 
 Naples and banishment of the petty Sovereigns 
 of the Peninsula. 
 
 After the withdrawal of the French fleet 
 to the immediate vicinity of the fortress, the 
 operations were resumed on a more extensive 
 scale, the Neapolitan forces being simulta- 
 neously attacked by the divisions of Cialdini 
 and Sonnaz on land, while raked on their flank 
 by the guns of Persano's ships. 
 
 The retreat on Gaeta, begun in good order, 
 rapidly degenerated under the murderous cross- 
 fire to which they were subjected into a hope- 
 less rout, the panic-stricken Neapolitans 
 breaking their ranks in wild confusion to seek 
 shelter under the walls of the fortress. The 
 village of Mola, hitherto held by the Bourbon
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 345 
 
 troops, was now abandoned, enabling Gialdini 
 to advance his outposts to within three thou- 
 sand metres of the fortifications. Bat for the 
 presence of the French fleet, and the fear of 
 the international complications which must re- 
 sult should Persano disregard the injunctions 
 of the Emperor, there is little reason to doubt 
 that the Italians could have followed up their 
 signal success, and at one blow have annihi- 
 lated a foe, temporarily paralyzed by the mag- 
 nitude of this irretrievable disaster. 
 
 To add to the misfortunes which over- 
 whelmed the Bonrbon Cause news reached the 
 beleaguered citadel that the army corps com- 
 manded by General Ruggiero, an old and 
 trusted officer, had fallen back, without op- 
 posing resistance, on Terracina, where, having 
 been disarmed by the French in spite of the 
 earnest supplications of the Pope, 16,686 men 
 and 641 officers were disbanded and scattered 
 over the States of the Church. 
 
 Relieved of the anxiety of a possible attack 
 on his flank, Cialdini now began operations for 
 the siege (November 6, 1860). 
 
 It was, of course, evident, in face of the 
 overwhelming odds against him, that the Nea- 
 politan King must now look to the aid of Di- 
 plomacy rather than to the achievements of the 
 forces still at his disposal for the furtherance of
 
 346 TBS COLLAPSE OF 
 
 nis Cause. Nevertheless the siege promised 
 to be a protracted one owing to the obnoxious 
 circumstances which hampered the Italian op- 
 erations, and the very considerable natural and 
 artificial strength of the fortress itself. 
 
 Gaeta had been a renowned stronghold in 
 the days of the Norman invaders, its founda- 
 tions dating from ancient times : successive 
 generations fortified and improved its natural 
 advantages, Ferdinand II. devoting special 
 study to the adaptation of its defences to the 
 requirements of modern warfare, while lavish- 
 ing care upon the adornment and commodity 
 of the royal palace within its walls. The 
 fortress and town perched upon the rocky 
 promontory jutting out into the Mediterranean 
 were consequently admirably calculated to hold 
 in check an enemy advancing from the land, 
 while in this instance the sea front, also pro- 
 vided with modern batteries, was guaranteed 
 from assault by the presence of the French fleet. 
 
 At the beginning of the siege the place was 
 garrisoned by twenty-one thousand troops, 
 fully equipped and provided with munitions of 
 war in vast quantities. Food supplies con- 
 tinued to arrive from the neighboring Papal 
 ports of Civita Vecchia and Terracina, the 
 French Admiral abetting the liberty of com- 
 munication by water.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 347 
 
 In addition to Francis and Maria Sophia, 
 and their suites, the Royal Palace gave shelter 
 to the Queen Mother, the half-brothers and 
 sisters of the King, his uncles, the Court offi- 
 cials, Ministers of the Crown, and those mem- 
 bers of the Diplomatic Corps who had followed 
 the Sovereign from Naples. Amongst these 
 were the Papal Nuncio and the representatives 
 of Austria, Prussia, Knssia and Spain. It will 
 be remembered that the British and French 
 Ministers received instructions from their re- 
 spective Governments to watch the progress of 
 events from their Legations in Naples ; as a 
 consequence, in his personal communications 
 with Francis, the French Emperor now had 
 recourse to the services of his Admiral, who 
 combined with the duties of his regular pro- 
 fession those of a plenipotentiary within the 
 waters surrounding Gaeta. 
 
 No fighting of importance took place during 
 the remainder of the month of November ; but 
 on the other hand Diplomacy was frantically 
 active in its conflicting efforts to envenom or 
 amend a situation all sides felt to be intoler- 
 able. Desultory attacks on the part of the as- 
 sailants, accompanied by comparatively harm- 
 less shelling of the batteries, marked the weary 
 monotony of the days. On the twelfth an 
 ineffectual sortie took place, a half-hearted
 
 348 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 attempt being made to destroy the entrench- 
 ments which the Piedmontese were laboriously, 
 constructing. The same day a number of 
 Garibaldian prisoners confined in the Castle 
 were exchanged at Mola for the Neapolitans in 
 the hands of the enemy. The same date wit- 
 nessed the abandonment of the Bourbon Cause 
 by several of the most prominent Neapolitan 
 officers, including Generals Barbalonga, Co- 
 lonna, and Salzano, the latter ex-Governor of 
 Capua. The defection of these last named, in 
 whom he had placed implicit confidence, was a 
 bitter mortification to the sorely-tried Sover- 
 eign. Hardly less significant was the depar- 
 ture on November twenty-first of the Queen 
 Mother, the younger members of the Royal 
 Family, and the whole of the Diplomatic 
 Corps, with the exception of the Spanish Min- 
 ister, Bermudez de Castro, devotedly attached 
 to the person of the King. Even the Arch- 
 bishop of Gaeta availed himself of this oppor- 
 tunity to abandon the sinking ship. 
 
 On the nineteenth Colonel Bosco, having 
 now purged the six months enforced idleness 
 stipulated in the parole granted him by the 
 Italians after his distinguished defence of Mi- 
 lazzo, arrived at Gaeta, and offered his services 
 to Francis. The King welcomed this gallant 
 officer with enthusiasm, practically placing in
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLKb 349 
 
 his hands the entire supervision &nd organiza- 
 tion of the military operations. 
 
 Count Cavonr had in the interval lost no op- 
 portunity of protesting against the continued 
 presence of the French fleet, and of impressing 
 upon the Emperor the grave prejudice caused 
 by this overt intervention on behalf of the 
 Bourbon King. Acting under his advice, Vic- 
 tor Emmanuel sent Count Vimercati to Paris 
 with a personal letter to the Emperor. After 
 considerable delay, during which pressure was 
 brought to bear on the defender of Gaeta, 
 Napoleon informed Vimercati, through M. 
 Thouvenel, that if Victor Emmanuel would 
 consent to an armistice of eight days' duration, 
 he would signify to Francis that the further 
 defence of Gaeta was useless, counsel him to 
 abandon the struggle, and, in case of refusal, 
 withdraw his fleet. 
 
 That satisfactory results were expected from 
 these negotiations is demonstrated by the fol- 
 lowing extract of Cavour's letter of December 
 9, 1860, to the Marquis d'Azeglio : " A tele- 
 graphic despatch from the King, received last 
 night, informs me that His Majesty adheres to 
 the Emperor's proposals, trusting that in eight 
 days either Gaeta will have surrendered, or that 
 the French fleet will have retired." 
 
 In the meanwhile Napoleon wrote privately
 
 350 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 to the Neapolitan King urging him to abandon 
 a struggle which could have but one termina- 
 tion, and intimating that he would be con- 
 strained at no distant date to recall his squadron. 
 To the Emperor's advice and warning, Fran- 
 cis replied in dignified terms, thanking him 
 for the support afforded by the presence 5 of his 
 fleet, but declaring his determination to defend 
 his rights to the end. " You are aware, Sire," 
 be continues, " that Kings who descend from 
 their thrones remount them again with diffi- 
 culty, unless their misfortunes be illumined by 
 a ray of glory. Here I am a Sovereign in prin- 
 ciple, but a General in reality : I no longer 
 possess a State ; I rule over but a sandy beach 
 and faithful soldiers. Can I abandon, on ac- 
 count of the probability of personal risks, an 
 army eager to preserve the honor of its flag ; a 
 fortress on which my ancestors lavished their 
 greatest care in order to make of it the last 
 bulwark of the monarchy ? As a Prince, and 
 a soldier, I must fulfil my duty to the end. I 
 may succumb ; I may be taken prisoner ; but 
 Princes must know how to die if need be. 
 Francis I. was a prisoner, and yet History has 
 not denied him praise for his valorous feats of 
 arms, and the dignity with which he underwent 
 his captivity. No evanescent exaltation in- 
 spires ibis language. It is the outcome of sober
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 351 
 
 reflection, and Your Majesty possesses the heart 
 and the intellect wherewith to appreciate my 
 sentiments." 
 
 An offer from Great Britain of a war-ship to 
 convey the King to any port he might select, 
 was declined in like manner. 
 
 Undoubtedly the entreaties of the enthusias- 
 tic yonng Queen, seconded by the optimistic, 
 at times even bombastic, assurances of Bosco, 
 influenced Francis in the adoption of a decis- 
 ion, the suicidal if heroic nature of which was 
 patent to all. Moreover, in spite of the disil- 
 lusions experienced when Admiral de Tinan, 
 in accordance with the limitations imposed 
 upon his actions from headquarters, impassively 
 assisted at the defeat and rout of his troops on 
 the Garigliano, Francis still clung pertinaciously 
 to the belief that Napoleon III. would continue 
 to befriend him. Notwithstanding his brave 
 words, and the proud stand he had taken, the 
 inevitable consequences which must overtake 
 him should the Emperor carry out his threat, 
 haunted the unfortunate King, and spurred 
 him to make every effort to secure the inter- 
 cession of those foreign Courts avowedly 
 friendly to his cause. At his earnest supplica- 
 tion the Tzar, Prince Regent of Prussia, and 
 Austrian Emperor, sought, through their rep- 
 resentatives in Paris, to persuade Napoleon to
 
 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 maintain his squadron at Gaeta. M. Thouve- 
 nel, when acknowledging the personal interces- 
 sion of these Sovereigns, explained to their 
 Ambassadors that, in view of certain consum- 
 mated facts which could now neither be un- 
 done nor ignored, the only means of relieving 
 the King's position was by facilitating the ar- 
 rangements for an armistice ; and that Admiral 
 de Tinan had been instructed to use his good 
 offices to that end. The French Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs added unequivocally, however, 
 that whether the propositions be accepted or 
 rejected " the moment for the recall of squad- 
 ron, although not yet definitely fixed, would 
 not be long delayed." 
 
 The negotiations undertaken during the ar- 
 mistice failed to achieve any satisfactory result ; 
 yet Napoleon still hesitated to enforce his 
 threat. " The miserable question of the fleet 
 does not progress," writes Oavour on January 
 fourth. "The Emperor, while well disposed 
 towards us, puts us off from week to week, 
 never reaching a decision." 
 
 Meanwhile Cavour was straining every nerve 
 to induce the Cabinet of St. James to bring 
 pressure to bear on the French Emperor, par- 
 ticularly amenable at this juncture to sugges- 
 tions from across the Channel. Lord Palmer- 
 ston and Lord John Russell were gradually
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 353 
 
 being won over to the views of the astute states- 
 man in Turin as represented to them by the 
 Marquis d'Azeglio. Under date of November 
 28, 1860, Lord Malmesbury enters in his enter- 
 taining Diary : " Lady Tankerville called and 
 told me she went to see Lady Palmerston this 
 morning. Whilst she was there Lord Palmer- 
 ston came in in a furious passion with the 
 Emperor of the French for preventing the 
 bombardment of Gaeta, and saying the atroci- 
 ties committed by Francis II. were dreadful ; 
 that he had ordered people's eyes to be put out, 
 their noses cut off, etc., and that it was neces- 
 sary to put an end to this state of things. 
 Lady Tankerville expressed her disbelief of this 
 story ; at which Lord Palmerston got more 
 angry, and said it was official and therefore 
 must be true." 
 
 The influence which the Marquis d'Azeglio 
 had gained over the English Premier is still 
 further demonstrated by a later entry in the 
 Diary of the ex-Minister. On December first, 
 Lord Malmesbury notes : " Saw de Persigny 
 (the French Ambassador to the Court of St. 
 James), who abused Palmerston, saying he is 
 not at all the man he used to be ; that he was 
 completely led by d'Azeglio, and believed 
 everything he told him. . . ."
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 The Siege of Gaeta. Bombardment. Diplomatic interference. 
 Cialdini makes unexpected attack. Francis rejects pro- 
 posals for capitulation. His letter to the Emperor Napo- 
 leon HI. Departure of French fleet. Action of Royalist 
 officers. Heroism of Queen Maria Sophia. Typhus Epi- 
 demic. Negative results of bombardment. Series of 
 catastrophes. Renewed attacks. Terrific explosions. A. 
 truce. General Milon negotiates surrender. Conditions of 
 capitulation. Departure of King. Francis addresses 
 troops. He goes to Rome. His wanderings and death. 
 Surrender of Messina and Oivitella. Victor Emmanuel 
 proclaimed King of Italy. Conclusion. 
 
 ALTHOUGH there had been some sharp fight- 
 ing, combined with a desultory but compara- 
 tively innocuous bombardment, since the in- 
 vestiture of the fortress of Gaeta, the em- 
 barrassing presence of the equivocally neutral 
 fleet, and the frequent interruptions necessi- 
 tated by the diplomatic negotiations in process 
 between the Cabinets of Turin and Paris, 
 materially retarded Cialdini in the preparations 
 necessary for the concentration of his resources 
 for a decisive and effectual attack. 
 
 Daring the first days of January (1861) the 
 354
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 365 
 
 firing became more active, and on the seventh, 
 Francis and the Queen, accompanied by their 
 suites, abandoned the palace, and for greater 
 safety took up their quarters in the armored 
 casemates. The parallels, constructed with 
 great difficulty under the incessant fire of the 
 enemy, had now been carried within efficacious 
 range, and all was in readiness to begin con- 
 clusive operations, when orders again arrived 
 from Turin to cease firing, the French Emperor 
 being desirous of arranging another armistice. 
 While anxious to avoid bloodshed, and mini- 
 mize the casualties of what he recognized to be 
 a fratricidal war, Cavour, in view of the prej- 
 udice, political, diplomatic and material, 
 which most result from a prolongation of the 
 abnormal situation, yielded unwillingly to 
 Napoleon's suggestion. In his despatch to 
 d'Azeglio of January 11, 1861, he explains 
 his position ; " The suspension of operations 
 for two weeks seemed inacceptable to me : all 
 the more so as a few days' rain would suffice to 
 seriously damage the earthworks constructed 
 at the cost of such sacrifices. On the other 
 hand, Hudson (British Minister at Turin) him- 
 self urged me not to reply to the Emperor with 
 & point-blank refusal. I therefore made a 
 counter-proposition limiting the armistice to 
 eight days, while letting it be understood that
 
 356 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 if the fleet did not retire, Cialdini would, not- 
 withstanding, storm Gaeta."* 
 
 Although Francis was unwilling to avail 
 himself of the proposed armistice, Admiral de 
 Tinan, acting under personal and urgent in- 
 structions from the Emperor, took upon him- 
 self the negotiations by which it was ultimately 
 agreed that all operations should cease between 
 January 9th and 19th the date fixed for the 
 departure of the French war vessels. 
 
 On the 8th, Cialdini, presumably desirous of 
 protesting before Italy and Europe that the 
 acceptance of the armistice was due solely to a 
 courteous desire to gratify the Emperor, and 
 refute in advance disparaging insinuations 
 which would inevitably be levelled against 
 the prowess of Italian arms, in the event 
 of the Imperial intercession resulting in a 
 capitulation, took advantage of the interven- 
 ing twenty-four hours for a combined attack 
 on the fortress with all the resources at his 
 disposal. The firing on both sides was heavy 
 and destructive. Cialdini, although deprived 
 of the co-operation of Persano's ships on the 
 water-front, a co-operation he would depend 
 upon after the departure of the French, had, 
 nevertheless, impressed upon him by the nega- 
 tive results of this improvised and nnlooked- 
 * " La Politique du Comte de Cavour." Bianchi.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 357 
 
 for attack, the immense strength of the fortress 
 and the undaunted courage of its defenders. 
 
 It is difficult to comprehend the motives 
 which prompted Francis to reject all considera- 
 tion of the proposals now made to him, which 
 provided for an honorable and advantageous 
 capitulation, unless we assume that he was 
 unduly elated by the spirited defence opposed 
 on the 8th, and exaggerated the importance of 
 the havoc created by his guns on the Italian 
 works. This could, however, hardly warrant 
 the assumption that the Italians would abandon 
 an enterprise which would be greatly facilitated 
 in its military aspect, and simplified politically, 
 with the departure of the so-called neutrals. 
 It is more probable that the dethroned Sover- 
 eign overestimated the issue of the organized 
 " brigandage," as the guerilla warfare, waged 
 by thousands of his former soldiery, was termed ; 
 and misinterpreted the significance of the 
 purely local reactionary movements which dis- 
 turbed isolated portions of his former domin- 
 ions. It is also certain that he was cruelly de- 
 ceived in his appreciation of the essentially 
 platonic, or sentimental, nature of the sym- 
 pathy accorded him from abroad. His letter 
 of January 15th to the French Emperor de- 
 monstrates very clearly the extent of the 
 illusions he entertained ; but the simple dignity
 
 358 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 of its language, impregnated with an impassive 
 resignation, not far removed from heroism, 
 testifies to the influence exerted by the coura- 
 geous woman at his side, rather than any trans- 
 formation of the weak and yielding fatalism of 
 his character. 
 
 " Monsieur mon Frere : " he writes, " Your 
 Majesty's fleet will depart in a few days, and 
 all communication between this place and the 
 rest of the world will be interrupted. Permit 
 me to avail myself of this last opportunity to 
 write and thank you again for the interest you 
 have so nobly evinced. 
 
 " I promised Your Majesty that when I had 
 adopted a definite resolution my first care, an 
 obligation dictated by loyal gratitude, would be 
 to inform yon of it. I now fulfil my promise. 
 After the declaration of the French Admiral I 
 hesitated long, I confess : on every side I rec- 
 ognized serious objections, and the opinions of 
 those I felt bound to consult were divided con- 
 cerning this supreme alternative. 
 
 "If, on the one hand, by remaining here, 
 abandoned by the whole world, I expose myself 
 to falling in the hands of a disloyal foe, and 
 run the risk of compromising my liberty, per- 
 haps my dignity and my life ; on the other hand, 
 I should by withdrawing surrender a fortress 
 still intact, thus tarnishing my military honor,
 
 TEE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 359 
 
 and renounce, by an excess of prudence, all 
 eventualities, all hope of the future. 
 
 "And how could I yield when in all the 
 provinces of my Kingdom, my subjects rise with 
 one accord against the domination of Pied- 
 mont ? How can I surrender, when on all sides 
 I am encouraged to resist ; when from all parts 
 of Europe private individuals or Governments 
 incite me to persevere in the defence of my 
 Cause, which is also the Cause of Sovereigns ; 
 of the rights of Nations ; of the independence 
 of Peoples ? If political considerations give 
 the appearance of temerity to my resolution, 
 Your Majesty's great and noble heart will dis- 
 tinguish and appreciate my motives. 
 
 " I am the victim of my inexperience ; of the 
 cunning, of the injustice and audacity of an 
 ambitions Power. I have lost my Kingdom ; 
 but I have not lost my faith in the protection 
 of God, and in the justice of man. My rights 
 are to-day my only inheritance, and it is neces- 
 sary in their defence to bury myself, if needs 
 be, beneath the smoking ruins of Gaeta. 
 
 " It is not this prospect which caused me to 
 hesitate for a moment. My only fear was that 
 in becoming a prisoner I might witness the 
 royal dignity debased in my person. But should 
 this last trial be in store for me ; should Europe 
 consent to this final outrage, be assured, Sire,
 
 360 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 that I will utter no complaint, and that I will 
 meet my fate with resignation and firmness. 
 
 "I have made every effort to decide the 
 Queen to separate herself from me, but I have 
 been conquered by her gentle entreaties, and 
 by her generous determination. She has de- 
 sired to share my fortunes to the end, devoting 
 herself to the direction of the hospitals, and 
 the care of the sick and wounded. From to- 
 night Gaeta is the richer by another sister of 
 charity. 
 
 " Not knowing whether Your Majesty will 
 recognize the blockade, and being doubtful if 
 the Imperial mail-steamers will be able in future 
 to bring me news of Your Majesty, I have has- 
 tened to write in order that the last news which 
 reaches you from the interior of this fortress 
 should carry assurances of the profound esteem, 
 of the sincere gratitude, and of the true friend- 
 ship, with which I have the honor to be, Monsieur 
 mon Frre, Your Majesty's Good Brother ; 
 Francis." 
 
 Before the expiration of the truce Oialdini 
 commissioned General Menabrea and Colonel 
 Piola-Caselli to parley with the enemy ; offering 
 terms for an honorable and advantageous capit- 
 ulation. These were courteously but firmly 
 rejected, with the somewhat pretentious allega- 
 tion that it would be an outrage on the honor
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 361 
 
 of Neapolitan arms to surrender a fortress capa- 
 ble of a vigorous resistance. When informed 
 of this retort Cialdini paid a glowing tribute to 
 the valor of his opponents by exclaiming : " If 
 they were not Italians, I should be proud to 
 fight against such men ! " 
 
 Yet in spite of this haughty demeanor the 
 precarious conditions prevailing within the nar- 
 row and over-crowded limits of the town had 
 made it necessary to reduce the garrison. Dur- 
 ing the previous days numerous bodies of troops 
 had been embarked on vessels sailing under the 
 French flag, and landed at various points along 
 the coast ; whence most of them found their 
 way to. the mountains, or into Papal territory, 
 there to be amalgamated with the bands of 
 " brigands " recruited for the purpose of con- 
 tinuing the struggle and inciting reactionary 
 revolt throughout the dominions of the ex- 
 King. Owing to these departures, and to 
 numerous desertions, the garrison at the mo- 
 ment of the recall of the French fleet had been 
 reduced to less than twelve thousand men.* 
 
 With the expiration of the armistice the 
 French squadron weighed anchor, at half-past 
 four on the afternoon of January nineteenth, 
 and sailed out of the harbor. Three Spanish 
 vessels which lay under the shelter of the fort- 
 
 * " Battazzi et son Temps." Madame Rattazzi.
 
 362 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 ress yielded to the peremptory intimation of 
 Cialdini, and took their departure, in company 
 with the Prussian corvette "Ida," which had 
 conveyed several members of the Diplomatic 
 Corps to Gaeta during the armistice. 
 
 Deprived of the support of the Freiich, and 
 with the certainty of suffering and cruel priva- 
 tion before him, only to be relieved at the cost 
 of his Crown, the heart of the unfortunate 
 young Prince was cheered in this dark hour of 
 anguish by the spontaneous action of his offi- 
 cers, who presented an address renewing their 
 homage and allegiance to their King, and de- 
 claring : " Whether our fate is about to be 
 decided, or whether a long period of struggle 
 and suffering still awaits us, we will face our 
 destiny resignedly and fearlessly : we will go to 
 meet either the joys of triumph or the death 
 of the brave with the proud and dignified seren- 
 ity befitting soldiers." 
 
 Admiral Persano lost no time in stationing 
 the fourteen vessels of various tonnage which 
 constituted his fleet before Gaeta, and offi- 
 cially proclaiming the blockade. 
 
 And now began a drama the enactment of 
 which called forth a chivalry and courtesy more 
 in accord with the fabled narratives of the 
 Crusades than the grim realities of modern 
 warfare. While the Queen was abroad on her
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 363 
 
 visits of mercy, a black flag indicated her 
 whereabouts, and there the Italians refrained 
 from pointing their guns. Maria Sophia, how- 
 ever, despised this courteous discrimination, 
 and was often to be found on the ramparts in 
 the thick of the smoke and din of battle, en- 
 couraging the gunners ; heedlessly exposing 
 herself midst a rain of flying shells and bullets. 
 To the horrors of war was added the hardly 
 less ghastly spectacle afforded by the virulent 
 outbreak of typhus, which quickly overcrowded 
 the hospitals, and paralyzed the insufficient 
 medical resources. To the fever-stricken fort- 
 ress Cialdini sent supplies of ice and medi- 
 cines ; volunteering also surgical aid for the 
 sufferers, or facilities for their transportation 
 beyond the zone of active hostilities. 
 
 The combined bombardment from land and sea 
 had begun on the 22d. During the eight hours 
 this furious attack lasted the land batteries 
 hurled about 11,400 projectiles against the 
 doomed fortress, which responded with over 
 10,600. The damage done by the guns of the 
 fleet was less extensive than had been antici- 
 pated. This was partly due to the inexperi- 
 ence of the gunners, but more particularly ow- 
 ing to Persano's timid hesitation at exposing 
 his ships, and bringing them within effective 
 range. Feats of daring and courage signalized
 
 364 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 the attack as well as the desperate defence. 
 Maria Sophia, attended by the Swiss General 
 Schumacher the regimental bands gaily playing 
 the royal anthem, visited the batteries, her 
 presence exciting the enthusiasm and redoub- 
 ling the valor of the men. The horror and 
 confusion of the scene was intensified during 
 the afternoon by the bursting of a shell in the 
 powder magazine of the " Cappuccini " battery, 
 causing a frightful explosion, and the death of 
 nearly all the brave fellows serving the guns, 
 besides reducing the works to a heap of shape- 
 less ruins. 
 
 Nevertheless the negative results of the naval 
 bombardment decided Cialdini to adopt other 
 means of attack, and suggested the employ- 
 ment of a species of torpedo, or powder-ships. 
 These vessels, containing about one hundred 
 thousand pounds of powder, were designed to 
 be run ashore against the sea-batteries, and 
 there exploding with terrific force, shatter the 
 works and their defences, tearing open a breach. 
 During the construction of these terrible en- 
 gines of war, which necessitated careful calcu- 
 lations and somewhat intricate machinery, 
 Cialdini continued to push forward the work 
 on his trenches. It may be mentioned, how- 
 ever, that occasion for the use of the " fire- 
 ships," as they were termed, was fortunately 
 avoided.
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 365 
 
 With the opening of February the attack 
 was resumed with increased impetuosity. A 
 series of misfortunes and catastrophes, calcu- 
 lated to damp the ardor of the most sanguine 
 advocates for uncompromising resistance, still 
 further contributed to the horrors of the situ- 
 ation. The rapid, all pervading, epidemic of 
 typhus spread consternation : in a single night 
 the fell disease carried off ninety-three victims, 
 amongst others the Abbe Eichellzer, the Queen's 
 confessor, and several officers of the King's 
 Staff, who died in the armored casemates within 
 which the royal couple had taken refuge. The 
 feeling of general despondency was further 
 increased by the receipt of a letter to Maria 
 Sophia in which the Empress Eugenie very 
 clearly implied that all hope of the possible 
 intervention of France must be abandoned. 
 On February third the " Cappelletti " battery 
 blew up : two days later a shell fell in the 
 Sant* Antonio bastion, exploding the maga- 
 zine, completely wrecking the works, killing 
 two hundred and twelve soldiers, including 
 General Traversa and Colonel di Sagro, and 
 burying beneath the debris nearly a hundred 
 sappers. The same explosion practically de- 
 stroyed the defences surrounding the draw- 
 bridge leading to Porta di Terra, or the land 
 gate, and cot off communication with that
 
 366 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 quarter. Admiral Persano, perceiving that an 
 attempt was in progress to repair the breach, 
 sent the gun-boat "Garibaldi" during the 
 night to shell the ruins. In spite of the terri- 
 bly destructive fire kept up by this war-ship, 
 Major Afan de Kivera, accompanied by a 
 handful of volunteers, went to the assistance 
 of his comrades, and succeeded in extracting 
 many who, though crushed and pinioned be- 
 neath the smoking ruins, still breathed. 
 
 The terrible effects of this explosion, or 
 rather series of explosions, induced Francis to 
 send General Eitucci with a petition for a truce 
 of forty-eight hours, in order that a more 
 thorough search might be undertaken for those 
 still buried beneath the fallen walls. Cialdini 
 not only willingly acceded to this request, but 
 received a hundred of the wounded in his 
 hospital at Mola, and forwarded an equal num- 
 ber to the infirmary at Naples. 
 
 During these operations it transpired, how- 
 ever, that the Neapolitans, in violation of the 
 express stipulations governing the truce, were 
 employing the materials extracted from the 
 ruins in repairing the damage, created by the 
 explosion. Cialdini, indignant at this unjus- 
 tifiable breach of faith, now rejected further 
 proposals for an armistice of fifteen days ; re- 
 fusing even to consider the prolongation of
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 367 
 
 the present cessation of hostilities, beyond an 
 additional twelve hours. In consequence, on 
 the morning of the 9th, the combat was re- 
 sumed with such energetic determination, and 
 under conditions so disadvantageous to the 
 besieged, that even those amongst his advisers 
 whot had been most uncompromisingly firm 
 in their counsels for resistance, now warned 
 Francis of the futility of further efforts. 
 
 Preliminary negotiations for the surrender 
 were opened on the evening of the llth, just as 
 the Piedmontese were preparing to storm the 
 fortress, after having opened a breach in the 
 Philipstadt bastion, which commanded the 
 isthmus connecting the promontory of Gaeta 
 with Mola on the mainland. 
 
 Francis, realizing that favorable terms would 
 with difficulty be obtained by General Ritucci, 
 who had incurred the personal animosity of 
 Cialdini by his disloyal conduct during the 
 recent truce, now transferred the command of 
 the fortress to General Milon, intrusting him 
 also with the negotiations for the capitulation. 
 The discussions were carried on in the Pied- 
 montese camp at Mola, and, owing to frequent 
 interruptions, occupied the greater part of 
 three days. Pending the conclusion of nego- 
 tiations, and the ratification of the various 
 articles, no cessation of hostilities had been
 
 368 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 granted : the plenipotentiaries consequently 
 held their sessions amidst the roar of artillery 
 and rattle of musketry. On the third day a 
 shell fell on the magazine of the Transylvanian 
 Battery, containing over three hundred and 
 sixty thousand pounds of powder. The explo- 
 sion was terrific : 56 soldiers and two officers 
 lost their lives, while the material damage cre- 
 ated by the disaster, and the continuous bat- 
 tering of the Italian artillery, so impaired the 
 defences that further resistance became well- 
 nigh impossible, and decided the courageous 
 but disheartened Neapolitans to accept the 
 terms offered them. 
 
 The conditions regulating the capitulation 
 having been finally drawn up and duly signed, 
 the order to cease firing was given. The con- 
 ditions imposed were honorable and liberal : 
 the surrender of the fortress with all the ma- 
 terial of war, property of the State, and pro- 
 visions it contained, was insisted upon. The 
 honors of war were accorded to the garrison, 
 the officers being allowed to retain their 
 swords. All were to be treated as prisoners of 
 war until the fortresses of Messina and Civ- 
 itella del Tronto had surrendered, after which 
 the Neapolitans were to be disbanded and the 
 foreign mercenaries returned to their respect- 
 ive countries under parole not to take service
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 369 
 
 against the Italians for a year. The King, ac- 
 companied by the members of his family, the 
 Swiss Generals de Riedmatten and Schumacher, 
 as well as General Bosco, was to be allowed to 
 embark on the French corvette " Mouette," 
 which Napoleon had instructed should be held 
 in readiness for this mission after the recall of 
 his squadron, and which was now summoned 
 from Naples. 
 
 On the morning of the 14th, while the Pied- 
 montese troops occupied the land batteries, the 
 King, accompanied by his valiant young con- 
 sort, the members of his family, and the Gen- 
 erals above mentioned, descended to the water 
 front, and passing through a double line of 
 his faithful regiments, embarked on the 
 " Mouette," amidst the cheers of his soldiers 
 and the thunder of a salute of twenty-one guns 
 the last homage of those who had so valor- 
 ously upheld his Cause during the ninety-two 
 days the siege had lasted. Not until the 
 " Mouette " rounded the point and headed for 
 Givita Vecchia was the Bourbon standard 
 lowered and the tricolor of Italy run up in its 
 stead. 
 
 On the day of his departure Francis issued 
 an eloquent proclamation to his troops, thank- 
 ing them for the unselfish support they had 
 accorded him. "Thanks to yon," he wrote,
 
 370 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 "the honor of the army of the Two Sicilies is 
 intact : thanks to you, your Sovereign can 
 still lift his head with pride ; while in the 
 exile where he will await the justice of Heaven 
 the remembrance of the heroic fidelity of his 
 soldiers will ever afford the sweetest consola- 
 tion in his misfortunes." 
 
 Francis went directly to Rome, where he was 
 warmly welcomed by Pius IX., anxious to re- 
 ciprocate the hospitality he himself had re- 
 ceived at the hands of Ferdinand when a fugi- 
 tive at Gaeta twelve years previously. At 
 Rome, in the magnificent Farnese Palace, or 
 in his villa at Gastelgandolfo in the Alban 
 Hills, the ex- King continued to reside until, 
 with the destruction of the Temporal Power in 
 1870, and the occupation of the Eternal City 
 by the troops of United Italy, he became a 
 wand erer. Drifting over the su rf ace of E urope, 
 now in Bavaria, now in Paris (where the ex- 
 Queen Maria Sophia still (1899) makes her 
 headquarters), Francis never renounced the 
 hope of an eventual reinstatement on the 
 Throne of his ancestors. A snfferer for many 
 years from diabetes, he passed away during a 
 sojourn at Arco, a small watering place in the 
 lower Tyrol, at the head of the lake of Garda, 
 on December 27, 1894. 
 
 On taking possession of Gaeta the victors
 
 THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 371 
 
 found 700 cannon, 56,212 rifles, 10,858 side 
 arms, 209,859 projectiles, and over 200,000 
 cartridges, large quantities of powder, and pro- 
 visions for twenty (some say fifty) days. 
 
 Prince Carignano, who had been appointed 
 Lieutenant General of the new provinces by 
 Victor Emmanuel, arrived from Naples the 
 day after the departure of the dethroned King, 
 and passed the Bourbon troops in review. 
 
 Messina capitulated a month later (March 
 15th), and the phenomenal defence of the 
 stronghold of Civitella del Tronto was brought 
 to a close on the 27th of the same month, in 
 consequence of a letter dated from Rome, in 
 which their late Sovereign, thanking the brave 
 garrison for their loyalty and splendid courage, 
 signified that further resistance was now useless. 
 
 With the capitulation of these last strong- 
 holds of Bourbon rule the conditions of the 
 surrender of Gaeta were scrupulously complied 
 with, and the soldiers of the late Dynasty were 
 disbanded, those who desired being re-enlisted 
 in the Italian service, and the others assisted to 
 their homes. 
 
 On March 17, 1861, the Italian Parliament 
 assembled at Turin, proclaimed Victor Em- 
 manuel II. King of Italy, with only two dis- 
 sentient votes : the Monarchy of the Two Sici-
 
 372 THE COLLAPSE OF 
 
 lies being thus officially merged in the Kingdom 
 of United Italy. 
 
 England recognized the new dignity con- 
 ferred on the Head of the House of Savoy at 
 once : France only in the following June. 
 
 "The story of the collapse of the Neapolitan 
 Government in the hour of need would (says 
 Professor Dicey in his study of the life of Vic- 
 tor Emmanuel II.), if it were told honestly, 
 point a moral how States fall to pieces when 
 people, officials, ministers, and rulers are alike 
 corrupt, degraded and demoralized. But low 
 as Naples had sunk, the Government would, I 
 am convinced, have been strong enough to 
 withstand the onslaught of the Garibaldian in- 
 vasion, if behind Garibaldi there had not stood 
 the Kingdom of Italy/' 
 
 THE END
 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 A 000 741 556 5
 
 THECOUAPS